

**BROKERS BEYOND BORDERS:
MOLDOVA'S COUNTERTRAFFICKERS**

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ABSTRACT

Brokers Beyond Borders: Moldova's Countertraffickers

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Why do development organizations behave the way they do? What factors determine the key constraints and incentive structures within which they pursue their goals? In this paper, I make the case that development organizations should be thought of as brokers connecting donors on one side and beneficiaries on the other. As development brokerage organizations (DBOs), their strategic choices are influenced not only by the preferences of their funders, but also by the desires and capacities of the aid recipients whom they serve. To illustrate the advantages of this DBO perspective, I use it to shed light on two major empirical puzzles that I encountered while studying the field of organizations working to fight human trafficking in the Republic of Moldova.

1 INTRODUCTION

The fall of the Soviet Union and the accompanying acceleration of East to West migration within Europe has given rise to a modern narrative of European sex trafficking, which has been heavily promoted by international advocacy groups and widely propagated by Western media. Typically, this narrative involves young women living in abject post-Soviet conditions being lured abroad by false promises of high-paying jobs, only to become unwittingly ensnared in the sordid world of the international sex trade. Few countries feature as prominently or as frequently in these tawdry tales of ‘modern day slavery’ as does the Republic of Moldova (hereafter simply Moldova).

Moldova is a small country the size of Maryland with a population of about 4 million.¹ As the poorest country in Europe, it has seen nearly half of its workforce and a quarter of its population leave to work abroad over the past decade, and remittances constitute about a third of total GDP (Stemmer 2011). In spite of its tiny size and population, Moldova has received outsized attention in Western media outlets over the past decade for its role as a source country for victims of sex trafficking. NGOs and international organizations working in Moldova have, at times, greatly contributed to this image of Moldova as “one of the greatest sources of women trafficked to the brothels of Europe” (Costachi 2003: 30). Of course, these types of characterizations make great fuel for fundraising. Nevertheless, the reality of Moldovan sex trafficking, and the incentives and challenges facing countertrafficking organizations working there, are quite a bit more complex than they would appear at first blush.

¹ The precise population falls anywhere between 3.6 and 4.3 million depending on whether migrants to foreign destinations or inhabitants of the breakaway region of Transnistria are included in the total.

In the summer of 2009, I conducted field work in Moldova, which involved more than four dozen semi-structured interviews with experts in the field of human trafficking. The purpose of these interviews was to discover more about both the nature of human trafficking from Moldova as well as how it was being addressed by the myriad organizations actively working in the countertrafficking sector. As with most field research, even as some questions were answered, numerous others insisted on cropping up. In this paper, I focus on two sets of questions that were particularly puzzling.

The first puzzle has to do with the way that countertrafficking organizations in Moldova use human trafficking estimates. Given that human trafficking is an illicit and highly stigmatizing activity with an imprecise definition, it is no huge surprise that any estimate involves a high degree of subjectivity. Whereas countertrafficking organizations – like most development organizations – are highly dependent upon donor funding, it would seem advantageous for these organizations to stimulate donor interest by always publishing and promoting the highest estimates possible. In reality, however, many countertrafficking organizations have a much more complex set of incentives that determine the ways in which they deploy estimates of human trafficking. Thus, while some organizations really do simply choose to promote the largest numbers possible, others lowball their estimates or actively fight to suppress high figures, for motives that go beyond the mere maintenance of professional integrity.

The second puzzle centers on the human trafficking prevention priorities of organizations within Moldova's countertrafficking sector. Many Moldovan countertrafficking experts agree that a liberalization of migration privileges would be a highly effective way to prevent women from falling victim to traffickers. The idea is that

less restrictive visa regimes would make migration safer by reducing migrant dependence upon illegal intermediaries (who may turn out to be traffickers). Moreover, such a change would also bring the added benefit of promoting circular migration, which could help reduce the risk of a domestic labor crisis while also leading to more ‘brain gain’ (as migrants return home from abroad) rather than ‘brain drain.’ Instead of promoting pro-migration interventions, however, countertrafficking organizations have focused almost exclusively on projects intended to stanch out-migration, even as the lure of foreign jobs has frustrated efforts to convince Moldovans to stay home. Moreover, since 2009, there has also been a shift toward addressing domestic violence as a ‘root cause’ of human trafficking. However, given the difficulty of bringing about changes in social, cultural, legislative, and juridical rules and norms sufficient to combat domestic violence – even in highly developed nations – this recent turn toward trafficking prevention by means of domestic violence prevention is truly puzzling.

In this paper, I provide answers to these puzzles through the use of an innovative and generalizable conceptual framework, which I call a development brokerage organization (DBO) perspective. Drawing from network analytical theories of brokerage, this approach focuses upon triadic relationships wherein brokers connect otherwise unconnected side parties in order to facilitate the flow of goods and information between them. DBOs such as multi-laterals, NGOs, and community-based organizations (CBOs) function as brokers who facilitate the flow of international aid from donors at the top of the supply chain, down to beneficiaries at the bottom. These DBOs are not merely the flunkies of their funders, but middlemen who have multiple masters to serve.

In the first few sections of this paper, I review some of the literature relevant to this new approach before subsequently elaborating more fully the specifications of my DBO model. After I set up the framework for my analysis, I then show how this new perspective on development organizations can shed light on the particularly perplexing elements of the Moldovan countertrafficking field presented above. The concluding section includes a brief outline for how the DBO approach holds the potential to promote far greater understanding of processes and organizational strategies that are common motifs of the empirical literature on international development.

2 RELEVANT LITERATURE ON DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS

Development NGOs

The number of organizations involved in international development has grown tremendously since the 1980s, when donor governments decided it would be better to circumvent corrupt receiving governments by instead working through non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Since then, development NGOs have captured the attention of scholars across the social sciences. Research on these new, non-profit, non-governmental organizations has tended to fall into three general groups.

First, there has been a focus – emerging mostly from the political science literature – on trying to understand the effect of development NGO activity on the governments of aid-receiving countries. The central question here whether governments of developing nations are weakened by aid or strengthened by it (Callaghy 1987; Bratton 1989; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Manji and O’Coill 2002; Leonard and Straus 2003; Bräutigam and Knack 2004; Brass 2012). A second major theme of development NGO research is dominated by

anthropological case studies, and it asks questions about how well NGOs have succeeded in applying the bold, ambitious goals of development planners in the local communities where grand vision meets stark reality. A general conclusion of this branch of the literature is that development NGOs have not typically succeeded in “empowering” individuals through the transformative, “sustainability”-focused initiatives created by foreign planners (Campbell 2003; Pritchett and Woolcock 2004; Igoe and Kelsall 2005; Mosse and Lewis 2005). A third body of work dealing with development NGOs takes its lead from the writings of Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink on transnational advocacy networks (TANs). Beginning from the presumption that development NGOs and their partners are “bound together by shared values (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 2) and motivated by common grievances, most of the research from this perspective focuses on the relative merits of the various tactics and strategies that these coalitions deploy (see Wapner 1995; Finnemore 1996; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Tarrow 2005).

Each of these three branches of the development literature places emphasis on the outcomes of development NGO efforts, either for recipient governments, recipient communities, or for the transnational social movements that advocate for them. It has been a less common practice among development scholars to focus instead on the competing incentives and difficult constraints faced by development NGOs themselves.

Development NGOs as Firms

In the past decade, another body of literature has emerged – largely in response to the transnational social movements literature – that has sought to delve more deeply into such questions. Authors in this camp have emphasized the parallel between NGOs and firms, with a particular focus on the role that collective action challenges and competition

play in shaping NGO behavior (Cooley and Ron 2002; Sell and Prakash 2004; Smillie and Minear 2004; Bob 2005; Ron, Ramos, and Rogers 2005; Prakash and Gugerty 2010). Authors writing from this perspective have proposed a shift in the unit of analysis from the level of campaigns and movements to the level of individual organizations. Such a shift, they assert, allows for a more careful consideration of “theoretical questions that bear upon NGOs’ emergence (why, where, and when), internal organization (agency and accountability), and organizational strategies (funding and advocacy), and the relationship between emergence, structure, and strategy” (Prakash and Gugerty 2010:4). These scholars view advocacy groups as rational, purposive actors operating within the constraints of a complex policy environment wherein the struggle to survive can at times eclipse the normative objectives they purport to pursue.

The biggest missing component of this literature is a more complete appreciation of the effect of – and consequences for – the broader development context as a whole. That is, while the NGOs-as-firms literature does a good job of exploring the competing incentives and deep conflicts of organizations trying to do development, it yet has little to say about how these challenges vary with regard to an organization’s position within a development network or with regard to that network’s structure. Moreover, it has not yet been able to present a systematic model for connecting the collective action strategies deployed by NGOs to macro-level consequences for development.

The World Polity Literature

The contribution of sociologists to the literature on international development and the NGOs that power it has been limited, with the major exception of the world polity literature built upon the contributions of John Meyer and his colleagues (Meyer 1980;

Meyer, Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez 1997; Boli and Thomas 1997; Beckfield 2003). This literature considers the emergence of a global civil society, wherein the forms and behavior of development NGOs are largely structured by the global institutions that govern the world cultural process. From this macro-level perspective, the institutional environment becomes the center of analytical focus, as it is what gives purpose to states, NGOs, firms, and individuals alike (Falk, Kratochwil, and Mendlovitz 1985; Berman 1987; Weiss 1989). This focus on how global institutions provide scripts and models for appropriate local action helps explain the surprising degree of isomorphism of structure and strategy among international NGOs even across regions and despite great variation in funding sources (Boli and Thomas 1997: 184-7; Chabbott 1997: 223; Ghodsee 2006). Inefficiencies and sub-optimal outcomes are a frequent concern of this literature, which tends to emphasize the “intensive decoupling” and “structuration” that result as states and development agents become more responsive to the “exogenous world culture” than to “local, cultural, functional, or power processes” (Meyer et al. 1997: 173).

Missing from theories of world polity, however, is a precise elaboration of how the dominant global institutions are propagated and replicated from the level of governance agencies and nation states down through the aid chain until they reach the level of community organizations and private citizens. Absent, too, is a full appreciation for the uncertainties and challenges faced by development NGOs. By focusing on the stability achieved through the production of legitimate and appropriate “myths,” the world polity literature’s emphasis vis-à-vis development NGOs has centered almost entirely upon the relationships that these organizations have with those higher up the aid chain, while

neglecting to consider the difficulties of simultaneously maintaining relationships with those lower down the aid chain as well.

Development NGOs as Organizations

In their recent review article, Susan Watkins, Ann Swidler, and Thomas Hannan (2012) present a new sociological approach to understanding development NGOs. To start, they join the NGOs-as-firms perspective in calling for an analytical focus on NGOs themselves, and in refuting the assertion that these groups are a more altruistic, cooperative type of social organization. They go beyond the firms perspective, however, by drawing from James D. Thompson's work on *Organizations in Action* (1967) to assert that the uniqueness of NGOs stems not from their peculiarly selfless organizing principles, but from the "special uncertainties they face due to the environments in which they operate, the goals they pursue, and the social and material technologies they employ" (Watkins et al. 2012: 287). After highlighting a number of common features of the development landscape through an analysis of uncertainties in NGO environments, goals, and technologies, Watkins and her colleagues propose a series of new avenues for sociological research into development, some of which have motivated this paper.

First, they call for development researchers to try to better understand development NGOs by "[situating] them among the wider set of organizations and individuals attempting to meet similar needs, by mapping the key dimensions of the organizational field of which they are a part, including their overlaps and interpenetrations with other organizations and actors, from nation-states and intergovernmental organizations to churches, missionaries, and individual altruists" (p.304). In terms of seeking legitimacy, it would also be useful to elaborate upon "the reference groups of the

diverse occupants of the NGO organizational field” (p.306). And particular attention should be paid, they say, to “the brokers in development... [whose] imaginations, aspirations, and uncertainties determine the practical strategies that play such a large role in what NGOs actually do” (p. 304).

NGOs as Development Brokerage Organizations (DBOs)

Traction can be gained on many of the above questions through applying the principles of brokerage to an analysis of international development organizations. In the next section, I will elaborate upon how I propose to redeploy network analytical concepts and theories dealing with brokerage in order to gain more analytical leverage into the study of development organizations. The first key distinction of this proposed perspective is to avoid the problematic and contested label of NGO and to trade it for a broader conceptualization of development actors as falling into one of three categories: donors, beneficiaries, or development brokerage organizations (DBOs). A second critical distinction is that I will focus more on an organization’s position within the network of development actors than upon its attributes. That is, I hypothesize that a development organization’s behavior will be more closely associated with its structural position than with its organizational characteristics. These two divergences from the normative modes of analysis are tremendously helpful in facilitating a more systematic study of the complex modern development landscape. Moreover, this new approach holds the potential to more formally explain the source of the uncertainties recounted by Watkins et al.; to provide an elaboration of the mechanisms by which the global world culture is propagated; and to understand more clearly when and why NGOs behave like firms, as well as when and why they don’t.

3 BROKERAGE AND DEVELOPMENT

Previous Research on Brokerage and Development

Myriad researchers have talked about brokerage concepts without engaging directly with the theory on brokerage found in the social networks literature. Frequently, for instance, empirical cases have been used to demonstrate principal-agent challenges such as information asymmetries and the difficulty of effective monitoring (Cooley and Ron 2002; Gibson et al. 2005; Easterly 2006); ambiguous yet ever more ambitious goals from principals (Li 2007; Escobar 2011); and the resulting potential for fraud and corruption (Clayton, Oakley, and Taylor 2000; Cohen 2008; Fisman and Miguel 2009). And yet rarely have NGOs been thought of as being middlemen between donors and beneficiaries. A couple notable exceptions in this regard include Clifford Bob's talk of dual development markets (2005, 2010) and Sarah Lister's examination of NGO partnerships (2000). Other development scholars, meanwhile, have engaged directly with formal brokerage concepts, usually focusing on the role that of so-called cultural brokers who typically span the divide between central authorities and local communities (see Wolf 1956). These brokers (a.k.a. translators, guides, fixers, or go-betweens) are seen as crucial transporters and implementers of centrally planned but locally administered development strategies (Olivier de Sardan 2005; Lewis and Mosse 2006; Merry 2006).

Across these analyses, the unit of analysis has always been the individual as broker; and for good reason. As Lister discovered, "inter-organizational relationships for NGOs are frequently based upon personal relationships" (2000: 236). Moreover, the methodological individualist perspective (Arrow 1994) reminds us that there can't be any purposive action

without individual purposive actors. In other words: organizations don't link people, people link people. Nevertheless, a major focus of this paper is to propose a redeployment of brokerage theories that have heretofore been reserved for the analysis of individual relationships and behavior to organizations, organizational relationships, and organizational behavior. While it is important to remember that individuals are the only actors who are really making decisions, this is not to say that organizations cannot and should not be treated as agentic actors in and of themselves. Just as a firm's board of directors make collective decisions that are not merely equivalent to the sum of their individual preferences, DBOs of all stripes can and do act purposively in ways not precisely predicted by the strict aggregation of the interests of their managers and staff. Which is not to say that individuals acting as brokers should be ignored. To the contrary, it would be great for scholars to focus more on the role that individuals – or even coalitions – play in brokering between organizations and populations. Nevertheless, the vital role that organizations play in brokering the flow of information and resources in a development context deserves serious and rigorous attention.

Before further discussing my proposed application of brokerage theories in a development context, it would be prudent to first give a brief overview of the major concepts and theories that have been developed around brokerage in the social networks literature.

Brokerage Structure and Broker Benefits

Brokers perform the common function of facilitating the flow of goods, information, opportunity, or knowledge between otherwise unconnected side parties (Stovel and Shaw 2012: 141). That is, they fill a “structural hole” (Burt 1992). Scholars of brokerage have

found that this middle position tends to bring gains to brokers (e.g., Simmel 1950, Marsden 1983, Burt 2010) through two primary mechanisms: dependency² and information advantage³ (Stovel and Shaw 2012: 144). Particularly in a political context, brokers' power stems from their capacity to identify situations wherein one group desires the resources possessed by another and then to facilitate transfer accordingly (Gould 1989). The stronger the broker's monopoly on access to such resources or information, the more dependent side parties become upon the broker, and the more powerful is the broker's position in the network (Emerson 1962). Likewise, every new linkage and successful transaction that a political broker makes has the potential to consolidate the broker's information advantage. As this mechanism has the possibility of yielding increasing returns, there are strong incentives for such brokers to persist in their role as facilitators, even when these roles are highly conflicted and demanding.

Broker Challenges

A recent innovation in the brokerage sub-field is the conceptualization of brokers as not only uniquely privileged but also uniquely burdened by their position within a social network. Katherine Stovel and her collaborators (Stovel, Golub, and Milgrom 2011; Stovel and Shaw 2012) have made the case that brokers are in some ways functionally similar to an agent who must simultaneously serve two sets of principals who, by definition, are somehow – socially, ideologically, geographically, e.g. – durably isolated from each other. Moreover, the very presence of a broker implies that there is a low flow of trustworthy

² Dependency refers to the ability of brokers to extract profits or promises from side parties who rely on their mediation.

³ Information advantage refers to the broker's superior access to resources or information as a result of being in the middle.

information between the two side parties, making it infeasible for them to enter into direct negotiation. Thus, not only do middlemen have two masters to serve, but there are often large divides separating the two side parties. All of which means that neither of the standard tools for bringing an agent to heel in a typical single-principal scenario – i.e. close monitoring of the agent or realigning her incentives to be more in harmony with the principal's – are viable options for side parties hoping to keep a broker honest. Compoundingly, the greater the divide between a broker's clients, the greater the potential for brokers to exploit their position of advantage to extract profits and promises. Taken together, these elements of structural disequilibrium – dissonance among their dependents, low information flows, and the opportunity for exploitation – can present brokers with the dilemma of how to maintain their precarious position even as they persist in extracting profits and promises from their principals.

4 APPLYING BROKERAGE TO DEVELOPMENT: THE DBO FRAMEWORK

For international development to take place, there must be: 1) a structural hole, 2) demand (expressed or latent) from parties on both sides of that hole to exchange goods or information across it, and 3) a broker capable of facilitating this exchange. Any generalizable framework for applying brokerage theory to a development context, then, must include an explication of structural holes, side parties, and brokers. In my model, side parties within a given development field⁴ can be divided into two general groups: donors and beneficiaries. For convenience of reference, donors will often be referred to as the up-chain or higher side parties, while the terms down-chain or lower side parties will indicate

⁴ See Appendix A for a discussion of how I define a development field.

beneficiaries. In turn, my theory includes three types of donors and three types of beneficiaries, for a total of six total categories of side parties. Each organization or individual belonging to one of these six side parties can belong to one and only one of them. Unlike DBOs, which can occupy a different structural hole at different times (see below for more detail on DBOs), donors and beneficiaries are defined in my model in such a way that they can rarely, if ever change their structural position. Following is a brief definition and description of each of the six possible types of side parties.

Donors: Foreign Governments, Organizations, and Individuals

Foreign government donors are collective actors without a physical presence inside of the territory where aid is being disbursed.⁵ These donors include all and only those organizations entirely funded by and affiliated with nation states. This includes government ministries, state development agencies, and multi-lateral organizations such as those affiliated with the United Nations.

Foreign organization donors are collective actors with a physical presence outside of the aid-receiving territory. These donors include all and only those organizations not primarily funded by or officially affiliated with nation states. These include NGOs large and small, private foundations, churches, and private enterprises. Essentially, any non-governmental collective actor who is financing aid to the development field under analysis.

⁵ My conceptualization of donors differs somewhat from that common to either development theory or praxis. In my model, in order for an organization or individual to be considered a donor, it must have be located physically outside of the territory wherein the development field is located. That is, if an organization has an office of any kind inside of the territory of the development field, then I do not consider this organization to be a donor in my model. Instead, whatever organization outside of the country is funding or supporting that organization would be considered a donor and the country office would be a DBO (more on this later). Thus, while the United National Children's Fund (UNICEF) can be considered a donor, the UNICEF office located in Chisinau, Moldova is not a donor in my model, but a DBO. Even embassies, consulates, and development organizations belonging to donor nations are counted as DBOs if they are physically located within the territory in question.

Individual donors are private actors who reside outside of the aid-receiving territory and who give money directly to a development organization with a physical presence inside of the aid-receiving territory. Importantly, individuals can only act as donors in my model if they make a direct contribution to an organization with a physical presence in an aid-receiving country. That is, if they donate to the Red Cross in America and the Red Cross U.S. then donates to the Red Cross Moldova, then that funding would enter the field at the foreign organization donor level rather than at the individual donor level.

Beneficiaries: Central governments, local organizations, and individuals

Central government beneficiaries are collective and individual actors residing at the federal level of the aid-receiving government entity. These include national-level ministries, agencies, and bureaus, along with the officials and bureaucrats who occupy offices and hold positions at these levels. As with all beneficiaries, in order to qualify as a beneficiary, central government organizations or actors must be the ultimate recipients of development aid.

Local organization beneficiaries are collective and individual actors residing at the regional and municipal level of the aid-receiving territory. These include all aid-receiving municipal governments and their office holders, along with municipal-level community organizations (e.g. businesses, hospitals, churches, orphanages, etc...) and their staff.

Individual beneficiaries are the private actors who are the eventual target population of most types of aid. These can include populations of individuals, as during an awareness raising campaign, or they can include victims or potential victims of whatever malady the development aid is intended to treat or prevent.


Structural Holes in Development

Figure 1 contains a stylized representation of the flow of foreign aid goods and services from donors on the top to recipients on the bottom, and the three types of structural holes that dominate the modern development landscape. These holes represent gaps for which there is demand for brokerage from parties on both side.

For the most part, prior to the 1980s, development was driven by bilateral assistance from donor countries directly to recipient countries. Thus, there was basically a single structural hole between broker and donor (i.e. Hole #1 in Figure 1), which was typically filled by an in-country embassy or perhaps an in-country office of a multilateral organization. A visual representation of the development landscape of yesteryear from a brokerage perspective, then, would consist primarily of the left-most column of Figure 1. Presumably, central government beneficiaries would then pass development aid along to local individuals and organizations.

By the 1980s, however, foreign donors became more reluctant to deal exclusively with rapacious, rent-seeking recipient governments, so they instead began providing aid directly to local-level beneficiaries. This shift created a surge in demand for brokers to span this second structural gap (Hole #2 in Figure 1). As DBOs entered this void between foreign donors and local beneficiaries, subsidiary structural holes frequently emerged, with Biggie DBOs (with strong connections to foreign donors) seeking Baby DBOs (with strong connections to local communities) who could more effectively negotiate with community members and translate the goals of foreign planners into locally-realized realities. The simplicity of Hole #2 in Figure 1, then, belies the complex “supply-chain” of DBOs who have

Figure 1: Structural Holes in a Development Field




*Ties in the figure indicate the flow of development assistance, mostly in the form of money, technical assistance, services, or information.

come to occupy this gap (see Figure 4 for a somewhat more accurate rendering of this complexity).

Globalization has led to a rapidly improving worldwide transportation and communication infrastructure, along with rising global wealth. These have also combined to further fuel the demand for DBOs, while lowering the transaction costs of brokerage. In particular, there has been an increasing demand for the transfer of development aid goods across structural holes between private citizens in different countries who have become ever more aware of each other (Hole #3 in Figure 1).

Figure 2: Brokerage in International Development



Development Brokerage Organizations: DBOs


Generally conceived, a DBO is any organization that spans a structural hole in a given development field (see Figure 2). Just as there are three types of structural holes,

there are also three types of DBOs to fill each of those respective holes: Behemoths at Hole #1 (see Figure 3), Bulldogs at Hole #2 (see Figure 4), and Butterflies at Hole #3 (See Figure 5). Given that the motivations and characteristics of side parties will change dramatically between development fields, it is important to use a concrete case in order to illustrate the particular benefits and challenges that cluster around a each type of broker. To that end, Figures 3-5 contain information about each type of DBO in the specific context of the Moldovan countertrafficking field. Notwithstanding this need to ground a discussion of each DBO type in an empirical reality, however, there are a few general points that can be made about this DBO classification scheme.

To begin with, it is important to note that an individual DBO can span more than one hole. While Behemoths, Bulldogs, and Butterflies are ideal types, in reality, any given organization can span a different hole from project to project, or sometimes even within the same project. In particular, a Behemoth in one field may be a Bulldog in another. Within a particular development field, however, it should be possible to give a development organization a score based on the extent to which it occupies one type of hole or the other. Some DBOs may split their time somewhat equally between two or more gaps, but many will spend much of their time in just one type of structural hole.

A second general point is to emphasize the real gains in clarity that flow from using a DBO model of a development field. As the development landscape has grown ever more complicated, researchers have become increasingly incapable of appreciating the complexity of a development field without becoming mired in it. By seeking to isolate the organizational incentives and behaviors that arise from DBOs' shared location at the center

Figure 3: Structural Hole #1 and Behemoth DBOs




of a network of interconnected brokerage relationships, the brokerage perspective is ideally suited to cut through much of this complexity without failing to appreciate it.

Another advantage of the DBO model of a development field and the accompanying classification of brokerage organizations is that it allows for analysis of development organizations without being pulled into the contentious territory of trying to decide who is what and why. That is, it is much easier to determine an organization's position relative to an established typology of brokers and donors than to decide whether it is an IO, INGO, TNGO, NGO, NPO, or NGDO. Almost all of these labels are frustratingly imprecise and based upon frequently shifting or hard-to-measure characteristics, which are highly context dependent: as P.J. Simmons put it, "Defining NGOs is not an exercise for the intellectually squeamish" (1998: 83); and many of these terms remain contested by scholars and practitioners alike (Martens 2002; Willetts 2002; Lecy et al. 2010). And yet, even if what we call these groups may be trivial, discovering a reasonable, reliable, and reproducible method for grouping and analyzing the organizations that lie at the heart of development is critical for the accumulation of insights across studies.

Potential DBO Benefits

The benefits to brokerage generally include information advantages over side parties; control over the development agenda, due to the dependence of the broker's side parties upon the broker's superior vision and position; access to social and financial resources; and reputational rewards. All of these advantages are to some degree mutually reinforcing, particularly the latter two: greater access to resources bolsters an organization's reputation, which can then lead to greater access to resources, and so on.

Figure 4: Structural Hole #2 and Bulldog DBOs



In the Moldovan context, Behemoth and Butterfly DBOs both have high levels of control over the projects and initiatives they pursue, relative to Bulldog DBOs who enjoy less autonomy. Also, Behemoth and Biggie Bulldog DBOs have the greatest access to resources, while Butterfly and Baby Bulldog DBOs are limited in this regard. Thus, Moldovan countertrafficking Behemoth DBOs are best positioned to determine the course of the field as a whole, since they have the greatest degree of control over what they do, along with the greatest access to donor funds and to beneficiary institutional structures.


For a lengthier and somewhat more precise discussion of the differential benefits available to DBOs within the field of Moldovan countertrafficking organizations, see Appendix B and the accompanying table.

Common DBO Challenges

The special benefits of brokerage bring with them special challenges, as well. For the purposes of my model, I consider three general categories of challenges that each type of broker faces to a greater or lesser extent: weak bridges, structural imbalance, and suspicion.

The idea behind *weak bridges* takes as a starting point Mark Granovetter's idea (1973) that weak brokerage ties are at times ideal for transmission of information. Obversely, however, it is extremely challenging to maintain weak and decentralized ties due both to a lack of social reinforcement and to the constraints of having limited time and resources to devote to marginal relationships. Tension due to *structural imbalance*, meanwhile, has its theoretical foundation in Fritz Heider's (1946) concept of cognitive dissonance reduction, which predicts that a triadic situation will always resolve into a perfectly transitive one in which it can be said that 'my friend's friend is my friend,' and 'an

Figure 5: Structural Hole #3 and Butterfly DBOs



enemy of my friend is my enemy,' and so on. Brokers who straddle two unconnected side-parties will always feel the pull toward one side or the other as the social forces at play try to resolve the dissonance by closing the triangle. Short of closing, another mechanism for eliminating structural tension is for the structural hole to just dissolve. *Suspicion*, meanwhile, arises from a combination of trust and accountability issues. Trust issues stem from the difficulty brokers have of spanning cultures, linguistic, and ideological divides. Accountability issues arise from the low information flow between side parties and the resultant information asymmetries which privilege the broker upon whom the other members of the triad are dependent. Given the broker's ability to exploit this position of power, it is rational – if not always optimal – for side parties to become skeptical and distrusting of a broker's motivations.

In the Moldovan context, each type of DBO has to deal with a different bundle of challenges. *Behemoths* have to worry the most about frail ties to their down-chain beneficiaries (i.e. central government actors) who can easily withhold cooperation. They likewise have to deal with a high potential for suspicion and distrust stemming from the high stakes they deal with and from the necessity of having to span large cultural and institutional gaps. The greatest concern for *Biggie Bulldogs*, meanwhile, is the threat to their centrality that comes from intense competition for funding. They also face the common difficulties of having to maintain myriad weak ties with distant donors who operate on short-term contracts, and of having to translate the ambitions of foreign planners into locally-realizable projects. Baby bulldogs, too, struggle with the challenges of short contract lengths and of turning foreign plans into local realities. Finally, the *Butterfly DBOs* primarily have to deal with the challenge of maintaining ties to their numerous,

distant foreign donors, who usually do not enter into formal contracts and are only marginally invested in fighting human trafficking.

For a much more explicit and precise discussion of the various challenges that confront each type of Moldovan countertrafficking DBO, see Appendix C and the accompanying table.

5 CASE SELECTION AND DATA

Case Selection

Why use a case study to illustrate a theoretical framework of development brokerage? My choice of a case study approach to fleshing out my DBO model is consonant with John Gerring's statement on the subject: "A case study may be understood as the intensive study of a single case where the purpose of that study is – at least in part – to shed light on a larger class of cases (a population)" (2007: 20). If my goal, then, is to shed light on the population of modern development fields, why would I choose the Moldovan countertrafficking field as my case study? There are several factors that suggest this particular development field as one that is well-suited for analysis.

First of all, Moldova is a tiny country. With a population of about 4 million and a territory no larger than the state of Maryland, Moldova is an ideal setting in which to examine the dynamics of a development field in action. Few if any modern development fields can be called simple, but at least in Moldova, the numbers and distances are manageable enough to allow an enterprising researcher to gain a good deal of insight without devoting a lifetime to the task.

Secondly, the human trafficking field in Moldova is particularly well suited for analysis because of the impressive amount of public documentation that is available. In addition to the typical tonnage of reports and brochures that can be found on the websites and at the headquarters of most of the world's major NGOs, Moldovan DBOs (most notably the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE]) have also published a veritable trove of minutes from technical coordination meetings along with detailed accounts of nearly every organization in the human trafficking field and the initiatives they are involved in.

Additionally, the issue of human trafficking itself is a particularly interesting and timely one to make the subject of analysis. For one thing, this is a newly emerging issue field, which has really only begun to coalesce over the past decade and a half.⁶ Moreover, migration policies and human security matters are both hot topics in Europe and beyond.

Finally, the decision to focus on an Eastern European development field is an interesting one, given that so much of the development literature is devoted – and justifiably so – to case studies from the Global South. If the observations and mechanisms elaborated in this study of a tiny, former soviet republic resonate well with empirical studies from other world regions, then that will speak to the generalizability of the concepts presented here.

Data Resources

Before I delve deeper into the two substantive puzzles that frame this paper, it would also be prudent to discuss in more detail the data that inform my analysis. The first

⁶ For a more complete discussion of the recent emergence of human trafficking as an international issue of interest, see Appendix D.

and primary source for my analysis consists of 52 semi-structured interviews conducted with presidents, managers, and employees of nearly four dozen organizations active in the Moldovan countertrafficking field. These interviews took place during the months of June and July of 2009; they were conducted in English, Romanian, and Russian; and they usually lasted between one and two hours. Interviews were requested with the top 70 most prominent⁷ organizations who had headquarters in Chisinau and the immediate outlying areas, as well as one major organization from Tiraspol in the breakaway region of Transnistria. Happily, I was able to meet with 25 of the top 30 most active organizations in the field, along with several other lower-activity organizations. More frequently than not, the interviewee was the leader of the organization or the supervisor of the organization's involvement with human trafficking.

The second source of data for my case study consists of technical coordination meeting minutes published online by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). These include one set of minutes from a National Countertrafficking Committee Meeting, 83 national-level technical coordination meeting minutes (2005-2012), and 33 regional-level technical coordination meeting minutes (2005-2011). These minutes are highly detailed and run anywhere from three to a dozen pages in length each, often containing attendance records, summaries of original dialogue between meeting participants, and extensive discussions of organizational history and ongoing projects.

A third source of information on organizations working to prevent trafficking in Moldova were the websites of the organizations themselves. All told, I was able to find about 100 websites containing information on organizations and their involvement in

⁷ Based upon technical coordination meeting attendance.

human trafficking projects. A final source of data were the myriad reports available both online and in hard copy from DBO offices. In total, over 300 reports were collected.

6 PUZZLE #1: TRAFFICKING ESTIMATES

As stated in the introductory section of this paper, Moldova has received an astounding amount of attention from Western media over the past decade for its role as a source for human trafficking victims in Europe. A widely cited 2002 article by MSNBC, for example, claimed, “Nowhere is trafficking worse than it is in Moldova, where experts estimate that since the fall of the Soviet Union between 200,000 and 400,000 women have been sold into prostitution – perhaps up to 10% of the female population” (Mendenhall 2001). In 2003, the BBC Online ran an article about human trafficking in Moldova entitled, “Europe’s Human Trafficking Hub” (Bell 2003). In 2004, the award-winning two-part miniseries, *Sex Traffic*, featured two Moldovan sex trade victims as the central characters. In 2005, Angelina Jolie launched the MTV EXIT (Ending Exploitation and Human Trafficking) campaign with the documentary *Inhuman Traffic*, centered around detailed interviews of victims from Moldova and Romania about their experiences being trafficked into prostitution. Also in 2005, PBS Frontline chose Moldova as the setting for its acclaimed documentary *Sex Slaves* wherein the better part of an hour was spent tracking various victims who had been sold from Moldova into prostitution abroad, and an undercover reporter appeared to have had no trouble finding someone in Moldova’s capital, Chisinau, who was willing to sell him sex slaves for \$500 each. Again that year, PBS Frontline featured the work of photojournalist Mimi Chakarova who presented a critically praised investigative piece on Moldovan sex trafficking victims in which she claimed that 200,000

women had been trafficked from Moldova. In 2006, Romanian photojournalist Dana Popa revealed the acclaimed photo series *Not Natasha* about the plight of Moldovan sex trafficking victims returning home to Moldova. In 2007, ABC followed Frontline's lead in choosing Moldova as the center-piece of a documentary on sex trafficking. In 2008, Emma Thompson unveiled her unique artistic endeavor *Journey* which takes the patron through the experiences of Elena, who was trafficked from Moldova into prostitution in the UK. And later in 2008, the women's magazine *Marie Claire* featured a spread entitled "The Worst Places on Earth for Women" in which it made the assertion that Moldova is, "A sex trafficking superstore. Prostitutes are the former Soviet satellite's biggest export with nearly 750,000 slaves working around the world" (Thompson 2008).

Clearly there is a great degree of hyperbole to these figures and descriptions. As of 2000, for instance, the total stock of Moldovan migrants abroad was somewhere around 100,000. That number had increased to just about 400,000 in 2005, and by 2008 there will still only about 600,000 total Moldovans abroad (IOM 2008). Considering that just over a third of Moldovan migrants are female (Stemmer 2011:43), then the trafficking estimates above are just patently absurd on the face of them. The "truth" about human trafficking estimates, however, is that they are simply quite difficult to nail down. Trafficking is an illicit, stigmatizing activity with a fuzzy definition, so any estimate produced will be at least partly a product of subjective choices. Given this sort of flexibility, it would seem logical for countertrafficking DBOs in Moldova to consistently promote the highest numbers plausible. This was my expectation when I traveled there in the summer of 2009, intent on speaking with the "experts" to find out how accurate media representations of Moldovan trafficking really were. What I discovered truly surprised me.

I had expected that all these countertrafficking DBOs, desperate for funding, would be eager to embrace trumped-up estimates published in un-reviewed NGO studies and publicized by journalists. What I discovered, instead, was that DBOs have a much more complex relationship to numbers than that. Some DBOs would, indeed, embrace the inflated figures of the popular media. Most of the more established and reputable organizations, however, would go to the opposite extreme. For the most part, they would refuse to talk at all about how many victims there might be. Instead, they would offer only counts of victims who had been assisted since such data began to be tracked, back in 2001. As of 2010, this total number of trafficking victims who had been assisted in Moldova stood at 2,741 (IOM 2010). A far cry from the hundreds of thousands who were talked about in the popular press.

As I tried to figure out why different DBOs deployed estimates in different ways, I found that the typical approaches to analyzing the behavior of development organizations – e.g. seeing NGOs as profit-maximizing firms or as isomorphic script-followers – offered little or no insights. It was only once I began to see development organizations in terms of who they are structurally linked to – both up and down the supply chain – that I really started to comprehend what was underlying the seemingly strange behavior I observed. Ultimately, there seem to be two main factors that determine who is most likely to publicly deploy exaggerated estimates of trafficking prevalence. First, DBOs are much less likely to use exaggerated numbers when they face a high threat of non-cooperation from government partners (i.e. Behemoths). Second, DBOs are much more likely to oversell the trafficking situation when they are directly connected to foreign donors; Baby Bulldogs, for instance, have little to gain from hyperbole, because both of their side parties are extremely

familiar with the realities on the ground. Thus, Behemoths are the most reluctant to provide estimates because they most fear a central government backlash; Biggie Bulldogs have to balance the reward of stimulating greater donor interest against the risk of ticking off their government counterparts; Baby Bulldogs have no incentive to hyperbolize; and Butterflies have a strong motivation to exaggerate (i.e. to stimulate donor interest) and face few risks from their down-chain side parties.

Central Government Beneficiaries: Sick of the Scaremongering

To demonstrate how passionately the Moldovan central authorities feel regarding inflated trafficking estimates, I will share the story of the US Trafficking in Persons (TiP) report published in 2009. In that report, it was claimed that there was an ILO report that has purportedly stated that Moldova's National Bureau of Statistics "estimated that there were likely over 25,000 Moldovan victims of trafficking for forced labor in 2008" (US State Dept. 2009). This large figure raised the hackles of Moldovan government officials who quickly convened a meeting of the National Committee to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings so they could denounce it.⁸ At the meeting, the director of Moldova's intelligence agency "stressed that the report contains exaggerated data"; the co-director of the

⁸ More than just being a relatively large number, this estimate was particularly ruffling for the Moldovan ministers for two further reasons: First, it was a huge jump from the estimate of total victims in the previous year's TiP Report (7,500). Second, nobody had any idea where the number came from. Amazingly, when asked directly by government officials about which ILO report they were referencing the US Embassy refused to provide a specific citation. In my subsequent interviews with representatives from two ILO project groups in Moldova, along with dozens of other leaders in the countertrafficking field in Moldova *and* with the very US officials who wrote the diplomatic cable upon which the US TiP Report was based that year, nobody knew where the 25,000 figure had come from. Interestingly, Wikileaks has made it possible to review the information that the US Embassy in Chisinau sent to the State Department for inclusion in the 2009 TIP report. In a cable sent on February 18, 2009 entitled MOLDOVA: NINTH ANNUAL TIP REPORT, there is no mention from the US Embassy of the ILO report or the 25,000 victim figure. Perhaps the reason why US Embassy officials in Chisinau could not provide a citation for the ILO report is that this data was inserted by a State Department analyst in Washington without consulting with officials at the embassy.

Moldovan Center for Combatting Trafficking in Persons called the figure “clearly exaggerated”; and the Moldovan Minister of Justice stated that “such information creates an extremely negative image for Moldova and it is necessary to clarify where these inflated data came from” (National Committee 2009). Some government officials even suggested that the ILO be made to explain its methods to the committee at a later date. This kerfuffle over the 2009 TiP Report illustrates just how strongly Moldovan government officials feel about the exaggerated estimates that have frequently been used to characterize their nation vis-à-vis human trafficking.

Behemoth DBOs: Evading Estimates

Given the strong sentiments of the central government and their high capacity to withhold cooperation from Behemoths, the following episode should be unsurprising. In 2006, a five-country study was conducted by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) mission to Ukraine, which produced a series of estimates on the prevalence of different kinds of trafficking in each country. Based upon survey responses, the report projected that since 2000, there have been 31,500 cases of forced labor trafficking, 19,000 cases of forced domestic work trafficking, and 6,500 cases of forced sex trafficking from Moldova, making 57,000 total trafficking cases (IOM 2006: 12). When I mentioned this report to the head of the IOM mission in Moldova, he visibly seethed and launched into a profanity-laden tirade regarding the IOM chief of mission in Ukraine who had published the report. He went on to relate how he had actually demanded the IOM chief in Ukraine fly down to Chisinau, where he had to personally apologize to the Moldovan authorities for his shoddy research. Since the IOM, like all Behemoth DBOs, depends upon the host government’s good will to operate, the Moldovan chief of mission knew that he couldn’t

just ignore a report that made it seem like he wasn't doing his job. After all, over 90% of all trafficking cases in the IOM Moldova database are cases of sex trafficking, and all of these cases together total fewer than 3,000. Either the report out of Ukraine was completely false, or the victim profile created by Moldovan Behemoths is completely out of harmony with the realities of the trafficking situation and they have done a poor job in identifying and assisting the majority of victims. The fierce reaction of the IOM Moldova chief signals just how far he felt he needed to go in order to make sure that the IOM's central government partners did not get upset. A second round of surveys that was supposed to be conducted in 2009 was either never fielded or the results were never published.

Biggie Bulldog DBOs: Walking a Tightrope

Since Biggie Bulldogs have to compete fiercely for funding, while also frequently acting as Behemoths and dealing directly with government partners, they have to carefully balance the gains of high estimates with the potential losses of burning bridges with central government beneficiaries. Early on, these organizations were more prone to quoting large estimates – favoring the fundraising side of the equation. In 2001, for instance, the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) country office claimed in its annual report that “60% of all women trafficked to Europe came from Moldova” (UNFPA 2001). In their 2002 country report, this was modified to “60% of all the women and girl victims in Western Europe, the Balkans, and the Middle East” (UNFPA 2002) In 2004, they claimed without citation that “according to the IOM, at least 17,000 women are trafficked annually from Moldova” (UNFPA 2004). But UNFPA was not alone among Biggies in promoting larger than life estimates. In 2002, Moldova's premier counter-trafficking NGO, La Strada, stated that there were 10,000 Moldovan women trafficked abroad the previous year (Revenco 2002). In

2003, a report commissioned by ILO's International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (ILO-IPEC) claimed that, "according to unofficial data provided by law enforcement bodies, every year approximately 5,000 minors are transported to Russia and forced to provide sexual services" (ILO-IPEC 2003). In 2004, meanwhile, Mediciens du Monde's Moldovan office stated on their website that "in Moldova, the number of victims of human trafficking is estimated to be at 60,000, making it one of the countries most effected by this problem."

As time went on, however, Biggies generally grew ever more wary about putting out estimates; they are now hard to come by in official reports, and many have been removed from webpages.⁹ Biggie Bulldog DBOs that also frequently occupy the Behemoth position of working with the government on trafficking issues tend to be particularly cautious about the types of numbers they quote. As one project manager related: "We are constantly thinking, oh, maybe we shouldn't present this data because [government officials] won't like it.... It often happens that we are forced to remove some data or other because it doesn't make someone happy. It is very discouraging." Moreover, to avoid sanctions from government partners, some DBOs seeking outside funding will even continue to use inflated estimates for fundraising purposes, while simultaneously being careful not to broadcast these estimates publically. Another official from a Behemoth/Biggie Bulldog DBO, for instance, confided to me the following about the 25,000 victims figure that had been published in the US TiP Report of 2009: "Do I have any idea where that number came

⁹ As a case in point, when I interviewed a project manager with Moldova's branch of the UNFPA and brought his attention to a page on the organization's website stating the 17,000 victims per year figure, he took careful note of it and within the day the figure had been scrubbed from the site.

from? No. Do I think it's accurate? Probably not. Will I use it to try to get more money? Absolutely."

Butterfly DBOs: Flying Free

If the Baby Bulldogs have no incentive to hyperbolize, and Biggie Bulldogs have to walk a tightrope, Butterflies are free to fly as high as they plausibly can without having to fear reprisal. For DBOs in the Butterfly position, they run a very low risk of losing cooperation from their Beneficiaries, while standing to gain bigger bucks through the attention they can attract with large numbers. Which is not to say that Butterflies just pull numbers out of the sky. All it takes for a scurrilously large exaggeration to go viral is for one intrepid foreign journalist, one overly exuberant activist, or one daring Butterfly to get purposefully or inadvertently creative with the truth. Once a number has been quoted a couple times, then Butterflies have little incentive *not* to use it. Just one example should suffice.

In June 2001, Preston Mendenhall wrote an article for MSNBC entitled "'Infiltrating Europe's Shameful Trade in Human Beings.'" In this article, he claimed that "experts" estimate 200,000 – 400,000 Moldovan women have been sold into prostitution since the fall of the Soviet Union. Aside from the mention of "experts," there appears to be no other attribution for this figure (Mendenhall 2001). Most likely, this number was taken from a report published in December of 2000 by the Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights (MAHR), which was commissioned by Winrock to produce a study on Domestic Violence in Moldova. In that report, the authors stated that there were anywhere between 200,000 and 400,000 Moldovan women working abroad as of the year 2000. "Most of the women," they continue, "are working without proper authorization, some as housekeepers, babysitters,

nurses or assistants for the elderly. Unfortunately, however, the majority are trafficked for sexual exploitation or sold into prostitution” (MAHR 2000: 11). In turn, the MAHR report cites a pamphlet produced by the NGO Gender Center, which seems to never have been available online.¹⁰

Subsequent to the MSNBC article, a few US Peace Corps volunteers in Moldova made use of the unattributed figure in some promotional materials to raise funds from back home in 2003. Then in 2005, a Berkeley student named Mimi Chakarova cited these estimates in a photo-documentary project she produced for PBS/Frontline called the “Price of Sex.” In a Q&A with a Frontline reporter on the PBS website, Chakarova misattributed the estimate to the IOM:

REPORTER: You say that 200,000 women are trafficked from Moldova. Where did you get this number?

CHAKAROVA: The numbers vary - most estimates are between 200,000 and 400,000 women, depending on the source. I used the lesser number, which is from the International Organization for Migration, because I know sometimes this data is exaggerated in order to give more significance to the funding of specific projects. That number also includes girls and women who’ve been trafficked for labor, exploited as maids and factory workers and so on.

In subsequent years, numerous bloggers, journalists, activists, and at least one Butterfly DBO (Children’s Emergency Relief International) would continue citing this figure

¹⁰ It should be noted here that since this figure was published in 2000, it was likely prior to the promulgation of the Palermo Trafficking Protocol at the end of that year. Therefore, the definition of trafficking used in producing this number would depend entirely on who was behind it and how they view such issues as sex work. Likely, the original Gender Center authors who generated the estimate were working from the assumption that any sort of sex work constituted being “trafficked into sexual exploitation or sold into prostitution.” Regardless of definitions, however, it is almost laughably outlandish to claim that 200,000 or more Moldovan women were working in the sex industry abroad. Another point to consider is that at that time, the countertrafficking development field was just barely coalescing in Moldova. Gender Center, which would go on to be a mid-level Bulldog and a relatively major player in the field, was at that time not yet engaged in human trafficking projects. Perhaps the enormously exaggerated number was an attempt by Gender Center leadership to stimulate demand and to see if a structural hole would emerge for them to broker across. Unfortunately, the Gender Center was one of the few major countertrafficking DBOs that I was unable to get an interview with, as their leader was out of the country while I was in Moldova.

of 200,000 – 400,000 women having been trafficked from Moldova since the fall of the USSR. Then, in 2012, Chakarova released a full-length version of her documentary on sex trafficking, with Moldova again set as the central focus of the film. In numerous interviews with some of America’s most prestigious news outlets; in speaking engagements on the nation’s most renowned university campuses; and even in NGO headquarters, US embassies, and UN offices around the world, Chakarova has continued to use the figure of 200,000 Moldovan trafficking victims in promoting her latest, Emmy-nominated, multiple-award winning film project. In an email exchange with Chakarova in April of 2012, she related that she had omitted using these estimates in her new film because NGOs had become more wary in recent years of quoting such estimates. When I asked her for citations for the numbers she had used for her Frontline piece in 2005 – numbers she was continuing to use in promoting her new documentary – she told me that she would have to check her notes, but she was confident they were from “at least two reputable organizations” back in 2002/2003. Further research on my part has yielded nothing aside from the evidence presented above, which suggests that the estimates most likely originated with a small women’s rights NGO called the Gender Center.

Although Chakarova is not, herself, a DBO, her success in using wildly exaggerated estimates in order to promote her films is indicative of how tempting it must be for Butterfly brokers – even those who know better than to think that half of all women migrants from Moldova have been sold into sex slavery – to use hyperbole in order to subsidize the weak bridges between them and their donors in the developed world.

7 PUZZLE #2: TRAFFICKING PREVENTION PRIORITIES

The second substantive puzzle of this paper has to do with the human trafficking prevention initiatives chosen by the field of Moldovan countertrafficking DBOs. The puzzle here starts with the fact that many of the experts I spoke with agreed that pro-migration policies would be an ideal strategy for preventing human trafficking. That is, making it easier for Moldovans to travel abroad safely and legally would decrease their dependence upon illegal intermediaries. Moreover, when migrants know that they could come and go without fear of arrest or deportation, circular migration would likely become more frequent, thereby softening somewhat the dually devastating processes of brain drain among the highly educated demographics and of labor exodus among the unskilled working population. Examples of pro-migration initiatives include negotiating bilateral migration treaties with foreign states, working with government ministries to actively assist potential migrants, or inviting foreign employers to actively recruit Moldovan workers through official channels. Notwithstanding the potential benefits of such programs, however, the Moldovan countertrafficking field has steered almost entirely clear of these kinds of initiatives. What, then, have been the priorities in the field of trafficking prevention? In general, there have been three major trends in trafficking prevention in Moldova: anti-migration awareness campaigns and job training programs; proactive identification and assistance of potential victims through a National Referral System; and, more recently, a major domestic violence prevention initiative.

By far the most common type of human trafficking prevention effort has been the 'anti-migration' awareness campaign. An archetypical example is the 2003-2004 effort on behalf of the IOM, La Strada, and other partners to show the movie *Lilja 4-Ever* in every

secondary school in Moldova. This movie portrays the tragic story of a young girl abandoned at home by her parents, who have both emigrated for work, leaving her alone and impoverished. When she is presented with the chance to work abroad in Scandinavia, she eagerly takes the risk, only to discover too late that she has been duped. What awaits her in Sweden is nothing other than assault, humiliation, forced sex work, and eventual suicide. The message: stay home. Don't go abroad. It's too dangerous. It's not worth it. Don't do it! Never mind that there are no realistic alternatives. Never mind that dozens of your neighbors have already gone abroad to work and their families are now noticeably wealthier. Never mind that remittances are driving up the prices of local goods, practically forcing you to emigrate just to maintain your livelihood.¹¹

After a few years of anti-migration ad campaign saturation, donors and DBOs alike began looking for alternative approaches designed to keep Moldovans safe at home. One avenue that appeared particularly promising was that of targeted training programs intended to find the most vulnerable individuals and to teach them job skills. Oftentimes, the focus was on training women to be entrepreneurs so they could start their own businesses. The idea here is that if you “empower” vulnerable women by providing them with jobs, then they will no longer feel driven to emigrate in order to make a living. While accounts differ, the general consensus among experts seems to be that these types of initiatives were not very successful, and most of them were not renewed for multiple rounds of funding. Simply put, the Moldovan economic climate is a rather hostile one, particularly for small business owners, who are not infrequently “bled dry” by corrupt tax

¹¹ Indeed, demographic theories of migration predict that in the short to medium term, the cumulative pressures of migration will work to create ever more migration as a state develops, which is exactly what is happening in Moldova right now. Thus, any efforts to curb out-migration either through simple ad campaigns or by means of job creation in local villages will likely continue to be frustrated for a number of years to come.

collectors and city officials who descend upon them “like leeches on a newly whelped puppy” as one DBO manager put it. Moreover, even when entrepreneurial endeavors and other job creation efforts were successful, it was common for the newly “empowered” beneficiaries to use their recently acquired material resources to emigrate to fairer climes.

Then, in 2006, a number of donors and DBOs began to work closely with Central Government and Local Organization Beneficiaries on what would become a much more fruitful project – at least in terms of sustainability. The National Referral System (NRS) was piloted as a regional referral system for victims and potential victims of human trafficking. Over the course of about six years, various DBOs played a role in establishing a referral center in each of the 30 administrative units of the country, and in training multi-disciplinary teams in each region to refer all cases of trafficking victims or of extremely vulnerable persons to the center. Cases are then triaged and the individuals in question are provided (by government service providers and/or DBOs) whatever social, legal, or medical services they might need in order to recover from or prevent a trafficking situation.

One of the genius characteristics of the NRS is that it all but guarantees a growing pool of beneficiaries from year to year. This is because with each passing year, the infrastructure is strengthened, expanded, and becomes ever more competent in referring potential trafficking victims to the proper treatment centers. Thus, even as human trafficking victims decline (as they pretty much have since 2001), the total number of “potential victims” – who are loosely defined – can rise each year, as it has in every year since the NRS was established. In fact, the countertrafficking version of the NRS appears to have been successful enough that the key DBOs behind it (i.e. IOM, OSCE, UNDP, UNFPA)

were able to subsequently find a donor (the Government of Japan) to sponsor a multi-year, multi-million dollar effort to expand the scope of the NRS to include domestic violence prevention as well. The fight against domestic violence has proven to be a slow and uphill battle, however, since it has been extremely difficult to get judges and police to enforce new laws dealing with restraining orders. Likewise, it has proven quite challenging to change social and cultural norms that view some degree of domestic assault on a woman as nothing more than a private affair or as something within a husband's rights.

So why have there not been any sustained efforts as of yet to promote pro-migration policies? Why has the focus instead been upon anti-migration initiatives or on NRS-based efforts to find and assist would-be victims where they live? There are a few potential explanations here.

One possible explanation is that, perhaps, anti-migration priorities were highly effective. In truth, however, during the period of the most intense anti-migration activities, emigration rates were growing at a near-exponential rate. Job growth programs, as I said above, were largely a flop. And it took three years for a judge to issue the first restraining order on an abusive spouse after the law on domestic violence was first passed. Indeed, to the extent that human trafficking rates did fall during the early 2000s, some of the more candid experts confided in me that this improvement in the situation on the ground was likely due to an improvement in economic conditions in Moldova in the early 2000s, together with the stabilization of the post-conflict Balkans, and the construction of a basic legal and social infrastructure to deter and prevent future trafficking.

Maybe, then, these priorities were dictated by donor-side policy preferences. This is a common explanation for the sorts of anti-migration policies that first dominated

Moldovan countertrafficking efforts. An argument could be made, too, from a world polity perspective about the isomorphic propagation of an anti-migration norm within the global countertrafficking field. Both of these lines of reasoning do okay when it comes to explaining the anti-migration prevention strategy, but they each fall flat in explaining the shift to a National Referral System and then to an anti-domestic violence strategy. Anti-migration policies were certainly fairly well in line with Western European donor preferences, and similar initiatives are common enough globally to be an isomorphic replica of something pioneered elsewhere. However, the NRS and the domestic violence campaign were both quite novel countertrafficking strategies that were largely driven by DBO collaboration with the Moldovan Ministry of Labor, Family, and Social Protection.

A final potential explanation for the lack of pro-migration efforts, then, is that such policies may have been extremely difficult or inefficient to implement relative to other countertrafficking intervention options. Here too this idea is lacking in that it does not line up with what actually took place. In reality, there were a number of opportunities for the implementation of a series of pro-migration policies. One of the best such opportunities was when, in 2009, the EU decided to formalize an experimental agreement with Moldova called an EU Mobility Pact. The entire purpose of this agreement was to promote safe, legal circular migration from Moldova to EU states – such as Italy, Spain, and Romania – that had specifically expressed an interest in Moldovan labor. When the EU asked Moldova to provide a series of specific migration policy priorities to be implemented with EU assistance, however, the Government of Moldova requested that the focus of such policies be primarily the promotion of return migration and strengthening the capacity of Moldovan officials to police their own borders (Luecke, Mahmoud, and Steinmayr 2009:8).

And now we are finally beginning to arrive at an answer to the puzzle of Moldovan countertrafficking prevention priorities. The missing piece to the puzzle was that the Government of Moldova has an extremely strong anti-emigration preference, and the most influential DBOs in the Moldovan countertrafficking field (i.e. the Behemoths) respect that preference because they are essentially captured by the rent-seeking officials who comprise their Central Government Beneficiary partners. In other words, because Behemoths don't have any choice but to work with those who occupy the ministries of the Moldovan Government, they are forced to dance to the tune their government partners play.¹² And the Behemoths, in turn, determine the priorities for the rest of the field.

An important illustration of a failed attempt by a DBO to occupy a Behemoth role while promoting a pro-migration policy is found in the example of the International Labour Organization's (ILO) MIGRANT project. This campaign was intended to fight trafficking specifically through promoting safe, legal migration paths instead of trying to convince Moldovans to stay home. An interview with the former head of ILO-MIGRANT in Moldova, revealed that the project had to be called off two years early, however, because government officials had refused to cooperate in any project that could potentially increase the number of Moldovans working abroad, thereby exasperating their difficulties with labor shortages¹³ or deepening the population struggles in rural localities.¹⁴ In fact, leaders and

¹² One confidential informant working for a major Behemoth DBO helped illustrate the extent to which the key DBOs in the field have been captured by government interests: "When the government is unhappy, they call the UN regional offices and say: We don't want to work with you anymore. We don't need your help. The in-country representatives are rated by the government officials here. It is a big part of their evaluation. One of the last UN reps got a medal from the Prime Minister, for instance, and that really added some stars to his CV. So why stir up conflict when you can just make some ridiculous statements to make you and the government look better than you really are and you both end up forwarding your careers?"

¹³ At one point in the early 2000s, apparently, with nearly half the labor force working abroad, the Moldovan government could not find enough native Moldovans to fill government construction contracts, so they ended up importing laborers from Ukraine and Turkey to do the work.

representatives of several Behemoth and Biggie Bulldog DBOs in the field told me that it was the government's strong anti-migration preferences that prevented any progress on the front of promoting safe, legal migration options, even though most experts agree that this would be an ideal intervention for preventing human trafficking while respecting the desires and ambitions of Moldovans themselves.

Thus, the story here, once again, is one of development organizations as brokers being constrained by the preferences of their side parties both up and down the supply chain of development aid. Given the strong anti-migration preferences of the Moldovan government and the failure of anti-migration policies to produce results that would satisfy their donors, the most influential Behemoth DBOs successfully navigated a middle course via the National Referral System. The NRS allowed donors to feel like real progress was being made, since it helped DBOs and government partners find new beneficiaries by proactively assisting "potential" trafficking victims before they were trafficked; and government partners in the Ministry of Labor, Family, and Social Protection enjoyed the funded trainings, budget additions, and improvements to their infrastructure that accompanied the NRS initiative. And once the money for trafficking prevention via the NRS ran dry, the core group of Behemoths in the field were able to find new donors to sponsor a transition to focusing on countertrafficking by means of combatting domestic violence. This new focus may not have been the most efficient way to thwart trafficking, but it made use of the tried-and-true NRS infrastructure and partnerships that had proved to be winners in the past. That is, it allowed those DBOs to maintain their position as Behemoth brokers.

¹⁴ Numerous Moldovan villages have had so much labor emigration that they have been transformed into ghost towns of but few residents, if any remain at all.

8 CONCLUSION AND FURTHER APPLICATION

Development organizations are not merely agents of their funders. They are brokers straddling structural gaps between donors and beneficiaries. Frequently, such gaps are extremely durable and the differences between a DBO's side parties are extreme. Paying close attention to a development organization's side parties – i.e. their preferences and attributes – can tell us a great deal about the constraints, incentives, and opportunities available to a given DBO within a particular development field.

Table 1: Moldovan DBO Stabilization Strategies

Brokerage Stabilization Strategies	
Maintaining Structural Imbalance	Defusing Suspicion & Retaining Trust
Hole Hunting Niche Coordination Hyperbole Ratcheting Capture Organizational Grafting Coordination Meetings Staff Expansion International Travel	Staff Rotation Going Local, Going Foreign Chinese Wall Generalizing Goals "Creating Success" Specialization Professionalization Branding / Web Presence Matchmaking

I have focused this paper on just two empirical puzzles that can be decoded by examining the situation through a DBO lens. Yet there are myriad other development processes and organizational strategies that can be better comprehended through application of a brokerage approach to development. Table 1, above, contains a listing of various stabilizing strategies that I observed being utilized by Moldovan countertrafficking

DBOs during the course of my field work and research. The majority of these are recurrent – and sometimes perplexing – phenomena in the empirical study of development. Appendix E at the end of this paper contains a more elaborate discussion of each of these mechanisms from a development brokerage perspective, within the Moldovan context.

A promising endeavor for future research would be to make use of funding data for a development field in order to more precisely map out which organizations occupy which structural hole what percentage of the time. Subsequently, one could more rigorously test the extent to which a DBO's structural position predicts its behavior. Such an approach would truly allow researchers to appreciate and analyze the modern complexity of international development fields without getting mired in the mayhem.

APPENDIX A: DEVELOPMENT FIELDS

Before proposing any sort of generalizable model, it is important to be extremely clear when it comes to terminology. To this end, I should make explicit exactly what I mean when speaking of a development field. For my purposes, a development field consists of all actors (individuals and organizations) working on a specific development issue within a specific territory.

By actors, I refer primarily to collective actors (organizations), but also in some cases to individuals. Included in this definition are all donors (collective and individual, public and private), all aid recipients (collective and individual, public and private), and all intermediaries between the two (generally but not exclusively collective, private actors).

By development issue, I am purposely invoking a rather loose conceptualization that can accommodate variations in how a field is construed over time and place. The key factor for determining the boundaries of a particular field depends upon the understanding of the actors in that field as to where those boundaries lie. To use the example of the issue that defines the field under examination in this paper – that of human trafficking – at any given place or time, this field could include actors who specialize in, *inter alia*: children's rights, domestic violence, migration, criminal justice, corruption, job creation, legal assistance, or trafficking as such. Who is in and who is out can be determined by who is competing for the same funding, who is collaborating on the same projects, and who self-identifies or is identified by others as working in that particular issue field.

Territory, meanwhile, can theoretically be as broad or as narrow as makes sense, but generally the best demarcation when it comes to development is at the national level. Along with the requirement of there being an issue field that is commonly defined

throughout the territory in question, there must also be a shared institutional environment. Above the national level it is rare to have true collaboration, competition, or a shared institutional environment. A more likely alternative to the national-level unit of analysis might be a regional territory below the state level, particularly if there is a good degree of independence from central authorities and institutions.

Both in my definition of what a field is and of what goes on within it, there is a great deal of harmony between my conceptualization of a development field and the definition of a field promoted in the burgeoning new sociology literature on the general theory of fields. Just as with Neil Fligstein's and Doug McAdam's Strategic Action Fields (SAFs), my development fields have flexible boundaries and a shared institutional environment. Also, within each development field, power and resources are heterogeneously distributed among actors, each of whom acts strategically to maximize their own allotment (Fligstein and McAdam 2011:3-5). Development fields are also commonly characterized by governance structures (ibid. 6), and they require a great degree of social skill to navigate (ibid 7-8).

While the SAF approach focuses on change and stability within fields, however, my focus is different. SAF scholars use fields to focus on power struggles and their implications for change or stability of the overall field, but the DBO perspective focuses instead on how the structural composition of a modern development field leads to the emergence and persistence of strategies and structures that are common features of the contemporary development landscape.

APPENDIX B: BENEFITS FOR MOLDOVA’S COUNTERTRAFFICKING DBOS

Within each development field, different types of brokers will have different incentive schemes, since it is in large part their side parties, the issue they are addressing, and the country they are in (i.e. the institutional environment in which they operate) that determine the benefits and challenges that fall to each of them. Table 2 below indicates the distribution of benefits for each type of broker in the field of Moldovan countertrafficking DBOs. In the table, each type of organization is graded on a four-point scale, with 1 being the lowest and 4 being the highest, for four categories of benefits.¹⁵ Each score is imagined to be an *average* score for the ideal type of each broker in the field. That is, to the extent that there is variation within the categories of broker – depending upon who the side parties are, e.g. – there will also be some deviation from these predicted values.

Table 2: Benefits for Moldova’s Trafficking DBOs

	Behemoths	Biggie Bulldogs	Baby Bulldogs	Butterflies
Information Advantage - U	2	3	1.5	2.5
Information Advantage - D	1.5	2.5	1.5	1
Dependency --> Control	4	3	2	4
Access to Resources	3.3	3	1.8	2.5

Information Advantage

The benefit categories of “Information Advantage – U” and “Information – D” correspond to the advantage that each type of DBO typically has over its up-chain and down-chain side parties, respectively. There are two factors that are imagined to

¹⁵ It should be noted that this ranking system constitutes an artificial scale, which I am using for heuristic and illustrative purposes only. There is nothing to say that the difference between a 1 and 2 is the same as the difference between a 3 and a 4. Nor is there any guarantee that this differences will be the same from category to category. While this is not extremely problematic for expository purposes, it precludes the valid statistical manipulation of these numbers in any way. The same caveats apply to Table 3, as well.

contribute to the information advantage category: difficulty of supervision (operationalized here as propinquity between parties – see Table 3 below) and difficulty of evaluation (i.e. how hard it is to evaluate the efforts of DBO initiatives – again, see Table 3). In general, the information advantages that DBOs enjoy over their higher up side parties are driven mostly by the large distances separating them from out of country donors, while the information advantage over down-chain side parties is driven more by the inferior abilities of those parties to evaluate DBO activity.

As can be seen in the table, Baby Bulldogs generally have the lowest information advantages over their side parties, which makes sense given that they are physically close to parties on both sides, each of whom has an interest in watching them carefully. Behemoths and Biggies both enjoy relatively large information advantages over both sides. And Butterfly DBOs have high information advantages over their foreign donors, but little, if any, advantage over the individual beneficiaries with whom they work in close proximity.

Dependency and Control

This category is operationalized as a measure of the stability of centrality for each DBO, or the extent to which a DBO's side parties are forced to rely upon it in order to accomplish their goals. Here, Behemoths and Butterflies are figured to have side parties who are highly dependent upon them, due especially to: 1) the difficulty of trying to jump over them to connect directly to a party on the other side and 2) the few alternative paths connecting their up-chain parties to their down-chain parties. DBOs with higher levels of dependency from their side parties have greater influence over the agenda of projects that they pursue. That is, they will be more successful than low-dependency DBOs in convincing their side parties to change directions.

Access to Resources

Finally, this category is operationalized as a combination of a DBO's information advantages and the dependency of its side parties upon it together with the amount of money and resources that their up-chain side parties can muster. Unsurprisingly, Behemoths have the highest access to resources, due to the deep pockets of their donors and the vision and control advantages they have over their side parties. Baby Bulldogs have the lowest access to resources, as they enjoy but a limited vision advantage over their side parties, they exercise little control over the development agenda, and by the time aid flows reach them, the dollar amounts tend to be rather small.

It should be noted here that – although they are not included in the table – reputation rewards are another category of benefits for brokers, and they are closely related to access to resources. As a DBO gains greater access to resources, they simultaneously benefit from a bolstered reputation, which helps them to gain greater resources in the future, and so on.

APPENDIX C: CHALLENGES FOR MOLDOVA’S COUNTERTRAFFICKING DBOS

In the same logic as Table 2 above, Table 3 below provides a heuristic ranking for each type of DBO on a four-point scale, this time for the purposes of showing the distribution of challenges to brokerage that are present in the Moldovan countertrafficking field. These challenges to brokerage can be grouped roughly into three categories: threats to centrality (i.e. structural imbalance), weak bridges, and distrust (i.e. suspicion). For each sub-category, a higher ranking means that there are more difficulties for the DBO due to that particular issue.

Table 3: Challenges for Moldova’s Trafficking DBOs

			Behemoths	Biggie Bulldogs	Baby Bulldogs	Butterflies
Challenges to Brokerage	Structural Imbalance	Threats of closure	1	2	3	1
		Increasing competition	2	4	2	2
	Weak Bridges	Short contract length - U	2	3	3	4
		Threat of non-cooperation - D	4	1	2	1
		Marginal relationships - U	1	2	3	4
		Marginal relationships - D	1	3	2	1
		Low cohesion - U	1	3	2	4
		Low cohesion - D	1	3	1	1
		Low propinquity - U	3	3	1	4
		Low propinquity - D	1	2	1	1
	Suspicion & Distrust	Role conflict	4	3	2	4
		Mismatched incentives	2	3	3	1
		Difficulty of evaluation	2	3	2	1
		Difficulty of supervision - U	2	3	1	4
		Difficulty of supervision - D	1	2	1	1
		High stakes	4	3	2	1

Structural Imbalance

The first sub-category here is that of *Threats to Closure*. This category is intended to measure the extent to which different types of organizations are threatened by the possibility of being cut out of their position by having their side parties begin to interact directly with each other. This is a particular concern for Baby Bulldogs who have to be

concerned about the possibility that once the Biggie Bulldogs higher up the supply chain have established relationships with the beneficiaries further down the supply chain, their services will be less in demand.

The second sub-category here is that of *Increasing Competition*. While all DBOs have to face competition to some extent, it is the Biggie DBOs who have seen the greatest rise in numbers, particularly as foreign NGOs entered the field. As described a bit in Appendix D below, the huge influx of Biggie Bulldog DBOs from 2000-2002 had the effect of marginalizing the organizations who had previously been occupying those particular structural holes. A similar process took place again in 2008-2009 as the trafficking field expanded into the Domestic Violence issue field. On that occasion, less professional organizations who had been occupying the Bulldog structural position in that field – of domestic violence prevention – were now sucked into the human trafficking issue field, where it proved much more difficult to compete with more established Biggie Bulldogs. In one example, the nation’s first women’s shelter had to close its doors for some months due to lack of donor funding in 2010. To its good fortune, this DBO managed to substantially change its behavior – more on this in Appendix E – and was eventually saved from full collapse when it found new sponsorship.

Weak Bridges

The first measure of weak bridges is the *duration of contracts* that DBOs have with their higher up side parties. The shorter the contract, the greater the risk that DBOs will lose their funding as donors change their priorities. Generally, contracts get shorter moving down from Behemoths to Butterflies.

Next comes the *threat of non-cooperation* from down-chain side parties. This threat is particularly potent for Behemoths working directly with national ministries, moderate for Baby Bulldogs working with municipal leaders, and very low for Biggies and Butterflies who work with Baby Bulldogs and individual beneficiaries, respectively. Regarding the threat of non-cooperation from national officials, numerous interview subjects from major multilateral organizations confided that this particular threat was ever-present. As one confidential UN informant put it: “When the government is unhappy, then they call the UN regional offices and say we don’t want to work with you anymore, we don’t need your help. The representatives in charge are rated by government officials here. It is a big part of their evaluation, and they don’t want to do anything to jeopardize getting a good review.”

Marginal relationships, too, are a concern for DBOs. This category is intended to capture the extent to which a particular brokerage relationship is a core focus of a DBO or its side parties. Behemoth DBOs tend to be experts in whatever area they are working in, and they typically have thick relationships with actors on both sides. Butterflies, on the other hand, have a mismatch when it comes to their down-chain and up-chain side parties. On the one hand, they have thick relationships with beneficiaries based on whatever countertrafficking aid they are brokering. On the other side, however, even if they have thick relationships with donors back home (e.g. fellow church members), these relationships are not typically centered around countertrafficking. Also, it is not uncommon for these DBOs to have go on tours of churches, where they speak and raise funds for their cause. In these cases, their relationship to their donors is extremely thin, indeed.

Yet another factor that weakens bridges is the *low cohesion* among a DBO's side parties.¹⁶ Butterfly DBOs with dozens or hundreds of individual donors from different churches scattered across North America provide a good example of what it means to have low cohesion among side parties. In many of my interviews with Bulldog organizations, too, a common concern was with the time and resources organizations had to invest into grant writing and donor chasing just to stay afloat. Biggie Bulldogs are also in the unenviable position of usually having a number of unconnected down-chain side parties as well, scattered across the country. Maintaining relationships with so many side parties over a sustained period of time can be very taxing and difficult to keep up.

Finally, the last factor when it comes to the category of weak bridges is the subcategory of *propinquity*, or physical distance. Simply put, low propinquity makes it harder to sustain ties over time. Baby Bulldogs are in the unique position of being relatively close in physical proximity to both of their side parties. For the other types of DBOs, however, they typically are very close to their down-chain parties, but quite distant from their up-chain parties.

Distrust and Suspicion

The first subcategory when it comes to distrust is one I call *Cultural Spanning*. This is intended to capture the extent to which DBOs have to try to manage the culture clash of straddling a structural hole between side parties of different ethnic, linguistic, or institutional backgrounds. This culture clash is most pronounced for Behemoth and

¹⁶ Cohesion is a network analytical term that refers to the "level of internal solidarity among sets of actors linked by the broker" (Stovel and Shaw 2012: 142). Having just one up-chain side party would be an example of perfect cohesion, for instance. Having numerous uncoordinated side parties would indicate low cohesion.

Butterfly brokers who are each connected directly with foreign donors and native beneficiaries.

The next suspicion-promoting factor is that of *Mismatched Incentives*. Essentially, there will be a greater potential for distrust and suspicion when the goals between side parties are misaligned. Butterfly DBOs usually have the least to worry about on this count, because they are typically quite transparent about what services they are offering, and both donors and beneficiaries alike have to be on board in order for the project to happen. Similarly, because central-level ministries have such veto power over who is allowed to engage in direct talks with them, a rough alignment of incentives between foreign government donors and central government beneficiaries is typically a pre-requisite for organizations to occupy the Behemoth structural position. Bulldogs have the greatest difficulties when it comes to misaligned incentives of their side parties. Countertrafficking initiatives intended to prevent out-migration, for instance, are quite poorly matched with the incentives of most individual Moldovans, 80% of whom have expressed aspirations for emigration according to surveys conducted by the IOM (IOM 2012).

Another suspicion-promoting factor is *Difficulty of Evaluation*. Typically, the more broad and sweeping an initiative's ambitions, the harder it is to evaluate the actual impact thereof, and the greater room there is for suspicion on the part of side parties. On average, projects become more piece-meal and concrete as they move down from Behemoths to Butterflies. If Behemoths strive to sensitize government leaders to gender and trafficking issues and to create an anti-trafficking culture; Biggie Bulldogs focus on building up civil society (i.e. Baby Bulldogs) and empowering them to raise awareness and provide services;

and Butterflies spend almost all of their time and resources in-country providing specific services to individuals, such as shelter and care for trafficking victims or orphans.

Difficulty of Supervision, too, plays a role in undermining trust. Simply put, the further away a side party is from a DBO, the less able they are to see what is going on in the field and on the ground, and the greater the consequent potential for suspicion.

The final factor when it comes to suspicion and mistrust is that of *how high the stakes are*. Basically, the higher the stakes, the greater the risk that suspicion will undermine a DBO's relationship with its side parties. In 2009, for instance, the US TiP report quoted an ILO report in which it was supposedly stated that Moldova's National Bureau of Statistics "estimated that there were likely over 25,000 Moldovan victims of trafficking for forced labor in 2008." This large figure raised the hackles of Moldovan government officials who quickly convened a meeting of the National Committee to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings. The high-stake threat of losing all non-humanitarian funding from the US made Moldovan government officials extremely defensive. At the meeting, the director of Moldova's intelligence agency "stressed that the report contains exaggerated data"; the co-director of the Moldovan Center for Combatting Trafficking in Persons called the figure "clearly exaggerated"; and the Moldovan Minister of Justice stated that "such information creates an extremely negative image for Moldova and it is necessary to clarify where these inflated data came from" (National Committee 2009). This episode illustrates the distrust and suspicion that come into play when the stakes are raised. Behemoths dealing directly with the national government play for the highest stakes, and they have to bear the brunt of the accompanying distrust and suspicion. For butterflies who deal with small sums of money from hundreds of donors, intense suspicion and distrust are rare.

APPENDIX D: EMERGENCE OF THE FIELD OF COUNTERTRAFFICKING

Emergence of the Global Countertrafficking Field

The current consensus around how to understand human trafficking is something that has only emerged in the past decade. As Anne Gallagher has documented in her definitive work on the evolution of international law and norms on human trafficking, the key international organizations and government agencies working to combat “human trafficking” in the 1980s and 1990s had wildly different ideas about how to define it. Some groups considered human trafficking to be an instance of illegal migration, others focused exclusively on international sex work, or solely on cases of transnational criminal activity (2010: 16-25). Given these ad hoc conceptualizations of human trafficking and the lack of standardized approaches to dealing with it, international development agencies working to prevent whatever it was they called human trafficking had a difficult time finding stable structural holes across which to broker. Neither donors nor beneficiaries had stable expectations regarding how to measure, prevent, or ameliorate the effect of trafficking, and as such, durable preferences for transaction of countertrafficking development aid were rare. Consequently, human trafficking prevention in the international aid community was relatively limited during this period, even as it became increasingly clear that transnational sexual exploitation of women and children was an accelerating problem in certain parts of southeast Asia, as well as in the war-torn region of the Balkans.

In 2000, two major events transpired that helped to stabilize expectations around human trafficking as a development issue. First was the passage of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) by the United States in October. Second was the adoption of the

Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (aka the Trafficking Protocol) by the United Nations in November.

The TVPA had a major impact on the international countertrafficking agenda in two ways. First, it mandated that the US Department of State publish an annual report on the efforts of every country in the world to combat trafficking. Each country is ranked in these annual Trafficking in Persons (TiP) Reports on a three tier scale based on their efforts to combat trafficking, as determined by State Department officials working with government authorities in each country and in consultation with local trafficking DBOs. Countries found to be at Tier 3 – the lowest possible ranking – are penalized by being cut off from all non-humanitarian American aid. At the same time, the TVPA authorized the creation of a special department within the State Department for monitoring trafficking, and a fund on the order of \$100 million per annum was established to provide grants for countertrafficking initiatives around the globe. Thus, the TVPA went a long way towards providing standardized metrics for countertrafficking efforts, and it also injected a good deal of donor-side demand for brokerage into the global market for anti-human trafficking aid.

The Trafficking Protocol adopted by Palermo, meanwhile, also played a large role in stabilizing the market for brokerage of countertrafficking aid goods. In these terms, the main function of the Protocol was to frame and define the issue, and then to establish clear obligations of ratifying nations regarding victim protection and trafficking prevention. While a full discussion of the nuances of the Trafficking Protocol is outside the realm of this paper, it will suffice to point out a couple ways in which the Protocol established an agenda that favors state rights over the rights of actual or potential victims' rights; and an agenda that generally favors states that wish to prevent or tamp down on migration rather than

facilitating it. First of all, the Trafficking Protocol was passed as an addendum to the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. From the get-go, then, trafficking was to be framed in terms of international movement (rather than also dealing with internal trafficking), and as a matter of organized crime (as opposed to a labor rights, human rights, or purely migration framing). Second, while state obligations toward trafficked persons are quite extensive, another protocol on smuggling of persons was simultaneously passed, which basically asserts that if a migrant was “smuggled” rather than “trafficked,” the obligations of ratifying states toward her basically consist of not killing or torturing her. Since there is no way to monitor how states decide who is trafficked versus who is smuggled, the human rights protections in the Trafficking Protocol are rather weak. Finally, much of the Trafficking Protocol is devoted to explaining the obligations of states to tighten their borders, improve their monitoring mechanisms, and bolster their ability to police their own territory and borders.

The Emergence of the Moldovan Countertrafficking Field

Such was the institutional situation in 2000-2001 when the countertrafficking field in Moldova began to take shape. Prior to that time, there had only been a handful of projects run by small, locally-based NGOs and usually funded in a piece-meal fashion by small grants from multiple donors. Typically these projects focused on awareness campaigns and provided very basic services for trafficking victims on an ad hoc basis. Trafficking victims were being repatriated – at times by the dozens – by destination countries, particularly by the conflict-ravaged Balkans, and yet there was little effort on the part of either donors or the Moldovan government to systematically address the needs of these victims, or to prevent further trafficking from taking place.

Everything began to change, however, in the immediate aftermath of the Palermo Trafficking Protocol and the TVPA. First, the United States began to fulfill its new TVPA mandate by sponsoring at least 15 small-to-medium scale countertrafficking projects in Moldova from 2000 to 2002, with several federal bureaus sponsoring initiatives that were administered in-country by the US Embassy or USAID, who in turn worked through national and regional partners (Arnold and Doni 2002). During that same time period, a number of other major donors began to sponsor trafficking projects in the country for the first time, including: the OSCE, the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), the Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation (SDC), the European Commission (EC), the Italian Government, and the United National Development Program (UNDP). The years 2000-2001 also saw the entry or creation of DBOs who would come to dominate the Moldovan countertrafficking field for much of the subsequent decade, including: the International Organization for Migration (IOM), La Strada International, Winrock International, Regina Pacis, the Italian Consortium on Solidarity (ICS), and the Center for the Prevention of Trafficking in Women (CPTW). Other organizations that already had a presence in Moldova first began to take part in countertrafficking around the year 2001, and many other donors and DBOs would enter the field in the next two or three years. From 1999 to 2002, the number of DBOs active in the trafficking field in Moldova rose from fewer than ten to at least three dozen. By 2009, when OSCE and Winrock completed their rough census of national and regional actors working to counteract human trafficking in Moldova, they counted no fewer than 225 organizations in the field.

APPENDIX E: STABILIZING STRATEGIES AMONG MOLDOVAN DBOS

A number of stabilizing mechanisms have evolved over the years to help DBOs overcome the challenges and maximize the benefits of straddling particular kinds of holes in a development field. Most of these mechanisms are strategies that DBOs can choose to strategically deploy if it is within their capacity to do so. Usually, certain types of organizations are better able to utilize these stabilizing mechanisms than others, and this heterogeneous allocation of stabilization strategies plays a large part in determining who can occupy which structural positions in a given development field. Many of these mechanisms have become institutional norms that may seem mundane and obvious (staff expansion, e.g.), while others of them (the norm for intense cooperation e.g.) have sometimes puzzled observers. Still others of these mechanisms are less normative and more entrepreneurial in nature (creating “Chinese walls”, e.g.).

In Table 1 (in the conclusion, above), I provide a list of 18 mechanisms for brokerage stabilization that I discovered in the course of my engagement with the Moldovan countertrafficking field. These mechanisms are roughly allocated into four groups representing the types of structural challenges they help DBOs to overcome. It is important to state, however, that there is a good degree of cross-over here that is profoundly difficult to capture in a simple, elegant visualization: a technique for supporting weak bridges (e.g. capture) might also be useful in defusing suspicion, for example. The intention behind sorting these mechanisms as they are is for clarity of presentation and discussion, not to make a strong claim regarding which ones are used for what purposes. I am claiming, however, that each of the 18 mechanisms included in the table and discussed

below can be helpfully viewed as either a strategy or an institutional norm that has evolved to help stabilize the role of DBOs in the modern international development landscape.

Preserving Centrality

The first mechanism for stabilizing centrality is that of *Hole Hunting*. The idea behind this concept is simply that when a DBO with good vision of the structural landscape sees that the hole or holes they are currently straddling are in danger of either closing or disappearing, then one way to maintain a central position in the development field is to hunt for new holes to broker across. A prime example here is that of the coordinated decision by IOM, OSCE, UNDP, and UNFPA to get into the business of domestic violence prevention. Previous human trafficking initiatives centered on anti-migration messages and job creation programs had been driven in large part by donor priorities and preferences. The shift to begin efforts to curb trafficking by taking on domestic violence, in contrast, was clearly led by the aforementioned Behemoth and Bulldog DBOs, who in 2008 began hunting around for donors who would buy into their new initiative. Likely, these DBOs were looking at the trends of decreasing trafficking victims from year to year and anticipated a shift in donor priorities. Although they had to go far afield (i.e. the Government of Japan) before finding a donor to sponsor the 3-year, \$3.35 million project they were proposing, the hunt for a new hole to straddle ultimately proved fruitful. The extent to which organizations can hunt for new holes likely depends upon the information advantages that their structural position provide, along with the control they have over the agenda of the development field (see Table 2 in Appendix B). Thus, Behemoths and Butterflies, with high agenda control, will likely be more able to find new holes via alternative donors or new initiatives than would a Bulldog broker, who is more constrained

by the priorities of their up-chain parties. This is a raw deal for Baby Bulldogs who are highly threatened by threats of closure but unable to defuse these threats easily by seeking new holes. Thus, they are particularly susceptible to changes in the preferences of their side parties – a threat made all the more pointed when they have developed relatively specialized technologies, such as providing treatment for human trafficking victims.

Another mechanism for maintaining structural centrality is that of *niche coordination*. More than simply developing specialized technologies, the idea behind niche coordination is that organizations within a field who would otherwise be competitors coordinate with each other to make sure they are each straddling separate structural holes. In Moldova, for instance, after a few years of competing for funding and providing overlapping services, high-profile generalizing organizations such as IOM, La Strada, and CPTW began to specialize and cross-refer rather than duplicate efforts and compete for funding. La Strada took over full control of administering the in-country trafficking hotline, CPTW narrowed its focus exclusively to providing legal assistance, and IOM concentrated on administering a rehabilitation center for victims. This stabilizing strategy will likely be undertaken by those organizations who have high enough contextual expertise to pursue a specialized agenda, together with a large enough staff and generalized enough goals to be able to adapt to the changing ecology of organizations in the field. In the context of the high threat of competition for Biggie Bulldogs, it stands to reason that the organizations who most successfully occupy this structural position will be highly skilled at niche coordination.

Sustaining Weak Bridges

The first technique for supporting weak bridges is the time-worn demand stimulation technique of strategically-deployed *Hyperbole*. In the case of the Moldovan countertrafficking field, this hyperbole generally comes in the form of inflated estimates and sensationalized narratives. For a more full discussion of who is most likely to make use of hyperbole and why, please refer to Section 6, above.

In addition to hyperbole, *ratcheting* is another mechanism by which weak bridges can be maintained. The term “ratchet effect” was first coined by Stanley Lieberman (2000) in explaining the incremental changes in such mundane things as women’s fashions. The main idea is that a small, iterative tweak in an existing style can create a new, differentiated product. So too with the brokerage products offered by DBOs. By making small changes to their existing structures or by tweaking slightly their current practices, Moldovan DBOs can refashion themselves to better meet the demands of the market. A good example here is the way in which many women’s rights and children’s rights organizations that existed in Moldova prior to 2000 adjusted their focus just enough to be able compete for countertrafficking funding as that field emerged. The more susceptible an organization is to the vicissitudes of donor preferences (e.g. the shorter its contract length with up-chain parties, the less control it has), the more likely it will be required to master the ratcheting technique to survive. With relatively low control and short contracts, smaller Baby and mid-level Bulldogs (and Biggie Bulldogs to a lesser extent, too) stand to benefit the most from successful ratcheting.

The next mechanism for stabilizing weak bridges is *capture*. In structural terms, capture involves the broker becoming so biased toward one of their side parties that they

transform from neutral facilitator to interested agent, from intermediary to representative (Gould and Fernandez 1989). Thus, capture can reduce tension by solving the agency problem for the side that has taken the broker captive. Based on this definition, I would assert that organizations such as embassies and development agencies are, in essence, well-captured brokers. (Hence “agencies.”) Even if these captured Behemoth DBOs lose some of their ability to serve as impartial go-betweens in their dealings with the Moldovan government, they are spared the trouble of constantly striving to maintain short term relationships with up-chain parties. Conversely, for Behemoth DBOs without a highly cohesive up-chain party, capture is probably more likely to go in the other direction as they are pulled in by their highly cohesive down-chain parties in the Moldovan government. One representative of a Behemoth DBO operating in Moldova explained that it was nearly impossible to impose any sort of conditions on the Moldovan government for fear of falling out of the government’s good graces:

When the government is unhappy, they call the UN regional offices and say: We don’t want to work with you anymore. We don’t need your help. The in-country representatives are rated by the government officials here. It is a big part of their evaluation. One of the last UN reps got a medal from the Prime Minister, for instance, and that really added some stars to his CV. So why stir up conflict when you can just make some ridiculous statements to make you and the government look better than you really are and you both end up forwarding your careers?

He went on to give an example of the tremendous wastes and inefficiencies that this kind of a relationship had led to:

For example, there was a project where we got money to give to the government and I told them, okay, write up an itemized budget telling how much it will cost for each activity. They refused to write it, and I had to write it. So, I wrote up a budget and told them okay, here is a budget for just a fifth of the money that you want. Either accept this budget or write a new one showing what everything will cost. They came back a month later and just asked for all the money. I just wanted to give

them a fifth of the money, but my supervisors said, no it is the middle of the year, we need to start this activity, we are going to start evaluation reports really soon, so let's just give them all the money.

As long as this capture remains covert, it will help Behemoth DBOs to maintain their structural position and to benefit from the vision advantages, control, and access to resources that are tied to it. The other types of DBOs are less prone to capture, since they typically lack the sorts of highly cohesive side parties and the intense threats of non-cooperation that come with the Behemoth position.

For DBOs who have marginal relationships to their side parties, *organizational grafting* is a key stabilizing mechanism. Organizational grafting occurs when brokerage transactions are subsidized by an external organization, often in a way that helps to legitimate the broker (Meyer and Rowan 1977), and frequently through the provision of physical facilities (Small 2009). Butterfly DBOs with marginal relationships with their donors benefit tremendously from the organizational grafting of churches who provide both the facilities and a shared cultural vocabulary to help subsidize what would otherwise be weak ties between individual donors and Butterfly brokers. Biggie Bulldog DBOs, meanwhile, often have relatively marginal relationships with the Baby Bulldogs they work with, since these Baby organizations frequently are not specialists in trafficking, but have merely ratcheted themselves over to the trafficking issue from some other issue area that is more their main focus. In this case, the monthly OSCE-hosted technical coordination meetings (TCMs) hosted in Chisinau – along with regular regional TCMs in various localities throughout the country – serve marvelously as an organizational grafting venue to help Biggie and Baby Bulldogs come together regularly, thereby sparing them some of the costs of maintaining their marginal relationships. Furthermore, the ubiquitous treaties,

conventions, and multi-lateral organizations that beneficiary state governments are pressured into signing, ratifying, and belonging to serve as additional institutional structures that help to legitimate brokerage activity and to reduce transaction costs, particularly for DBOs who mostly occupy the Behemoth position.

The next two stabilizing mechanisms – *coordination meetings* and *staff expansion* – are most useful for DBOs with low-cohesion side parties. In the same way that regular TCMs can help to subsidize marginal relationships through organizational grafting, these and other meetings also serve the core function of providing a forum in which DBOs can coordinate with multiple of their side parties at one time, rather than spending the time meeting with each of them individually. Staff expansion, meanwhile, is another way to help manage a high number of uncoordinated side parties, especially if they are up-chain parties without a physical presence in the country. Behemoth DBOs often have enough internal funding to actually afford the staff necessary to write grants, compile progress reports, and jump through all the other rote and tiresome hoops necessary to keep donors happy. Biggie Bulldogs, however, often have to rely upon the help of volunteers – at least, such was the case in the Moldovan countertrafficking field. At the time that I conducted my interviews in the summer of 2009, at least five of the Biggie Bulldogs I visited were currently working with American volunteers whose main goal was to help with grant writing and other donor-related activities. Unfortunately for Butterfly DBOs who have extremely low cohesion among their donors, coordination meetings are not possible and fundraising often requires a personal touch that is hard to delegate to hired staff. Consequently, in order to

maintain their structural position, many Butterfly DBOs are forced to spend a great deal of time and energy each year travelling from fundraiser to fundraiser just to stay afloat.¹⁷

Finally, the last stabilizing mechanism for sustaining weak bridges is *international travel*. I already discussed in the previous paragraph how Butterfly DBOs are forced to travel frequently in order to visit with their scattered donors. The fact that the distances between these Butterfly brokers and their donors are very large just adds to these travel costs. And yet, such travel is almost certainly necessary for Butterflies to be able to straddle the structural hole they occupy for any length of time. Similarly, Behemoths and Biggie Bulldogs with low propinquity to their donors can and do make frequent use of international travel to attend conferences, seminars, and workshops where they network, advertise, and build relationships with current and potential donors alike (see Merry 2006).

Retaining Trust

The first of the mechanisms for maintaining trust is *staff rotation*. The idea here is simply that the difficulties of maintaining trust are extremely high for brokers who typically straddle such large cultural gaps (i.e. Behemoths and Butterflies). Given enough time, then, all but the most talented brokers will likely fall out of favor with one or the other of their side parties. Keeping a constant rotation of leadership, however, can help to prevent this. Many Behemoth-positioned DBOs such as embassies, development agencies, and multilaterals already have an institutionalized practice of limited terms and constant cycling of incumbents. Such a strategy would be practically much more difficult for

¹⁷ It is worth noting here that fundraising over the web and reporting on the progress of development projects via blogs is becoming an ever more popular option for coordinating with distant side parties. I will discuss the benefits of having an established web presence a bit later in this section.

Butterflies, however, because 1) they typically have fewer resources with which to constantly hire and retrain staff, 2) they are often small-scale operations that do not have multiple offices through which to rotate incumbents, and 3) their fundraising efforts typically require a more personal touch than do the grant-writing, proposal submitting standards of fund-seeking in the rest of the development field.

The second mechanism for retaining trust is what I call *Going Foreign or Going Local*. A common practice for foreign DBOs operating in Moldova – even for the embassies and development agencies – is to hire natives and to use them to parlay with native beneficiaries. While mission chiefs and head representatives are often foreign nationals, the majority of program managers are native Moldovans. Less obvious, perhaps, is the need for certain organizations to go the other way. Being able to engage with international donors requires a certain cosmopolitan sensibility and a familiarity with the language and workings of the international aid industry. Some organizations – especially those more rooted in the Soviet-era Weltanschauung of the past – have suffered tremendously for lacking this capacity. One prime example is Moldova’s first women’s shelter, which was founded by the former first lady of Moldova. While the staff at the shelter itself was reasonably friendly towards me, the leader of the umbrella organization that managed the shelter was borderline hostile throughout the course of my 45 minute interview with her. Throughout our conversation, she strove ardently to convince me that everything I had heard from everybody else about Moldova was wrong. No, civil society was not weak in Moldova. No, domestic violence was not a human trafficking issue. No, she was not interested in telling me about her shelter’s history or successes. And no, she was not interested in any more help from foreigners, thank you very much. Given how our

interview had proceeded, it was not particularly surprising to later read a line in a UN report stating that the shelter “operates with totally insufficient financial and human resources” (UNTFHS 2008: 11). Nor was it stunning to hear that the single foreign donor who had been sustaining the shelter decided at the end of 2009 to discontinue funding, due to “internal conflicts and dissatisfaction among staff” (IM 2009: 13). And it was not even that much of a shocker to find out that the shelter had spent an entire year without any funding, staffed entirely by unpaid volunteers, and was on the brink of shutting down for good. What truly *did* send me for a loop, however, was when I later discovered that in 2011 the shelter’s management requested a Peace Corps volunteer to help them out. Over the course of just one 18-month assignment, a single American Peace Corps volunteers created a snappy website; published documentation of what the shelter does, along with counts of beneficiaries assisted; helped secure numerous grants; and even assisted the shelter in organizing conferences, training sessions, and publicity campaigns (IIP 2012; McDaniel 2013). That is the value of learning to “go foreign.”

An almost diametrically opposing strategy for dealing with the distrust issues of having to straddle dueling cultural environments is that of creating a *Chinese Wall*. The idea behind this stabilizing strategy is that of created a deep separation between how you present things to one side party and how you present them to the other. A key example of this is the website strategy of a small NGO called the Beginning of Life. This NGO is half Butterfly (filling the structural hole between individual American and Canadian Baptist donors and individual human trafficking victims, whom it assists through a rehabilitation center) and half Bulldog (filling the structural hole between an American donor NGO and Moldovan school children, whom the organization targets for anti-trafficking, anti-drug,

and pro-life awareness campaigns). This organization has adopted the enterprising tactic of maintaining two websites with a practical “Chinese wall” between them. On the first of these sites, English is the only language option, the organization calls itself Beginning of Life, much of the site is devoted to their “Anti-Trafficking Program,” and their Mission Statement is: “To restore God’s original intent for His creation, simultaneously transforming people physically and spiritually, and integrating them into society.” On the second site, Russian is the only language option, the organization calls itself the “Escape Movement,” and the occasional mention of God or trafficking is overshadowed by the glossy, hip images intended to capture the attention of the teenage beneficiaries for whom the site is intended. By maintaining two completely separate pathways of communication with its side parties, Beginning of Life is able to project two separate images. On the one hand, they can show North American donors stock photos of women crying and tell them that “100,000 Moldovans are victims of human trafficking. More than 30,000 girls and women have disappeared without a trace.” On the other hand, they can show teenage Moldovans stock photos of beautiful adolescents playing guitars and listening to music, only occasionally letting slip a subtle word of caution about not getting caught up in trafficking.

The final mechanism for retaining trust is that of *generalizing your goals*. This is a particularly helpful strategy for brokers who find themselves trying to broker between side parties with competing goals (e.g. Bulldogs trying to push an anti-migration agenda on a population that almost universally wants to migrate). The idea behind generalizing your goals is that the more ambiguous your ambitions, the more leeway you have to frame things differently to each side party. This is where terms like empowerment and

sustainability come in. If Moldovans want to leave, but donors want them to stay put, how can you satisfy both parties? Empower your beneficiaries. To donors, this sounds like empowering them to lead better lives in Moldova, whereas Moldovans see an opportunity to empower themselves across the border.

Projecting Accountability

The first mechanism among those that can help brokers to project accountability is that of *creating success*. Watkins et al. (2012) talk about creating success first in terms of what sorts of technologies are being used. Can success be easily demonstrated? If so, then creating success is a fairly straight forward matter of pointing to what you have done. Over the past 10 years, we have helped 2,700 trafficked women, for instance. On the other hand, if goals are broad and technologies unproven, then creating success is a much more difficult task. Typically, then, organizations who fear suspicion from side parties regarding the difficulty of evaluating what they are doing will create success via one or all of three paths: counting, testimonials, and reports. Part of what got the women's shelter (see above) in trouble with donors was a lack of desire to "create success" via beneficiary counts, reports, and stories of women it had helped. A large part of what helps captured Behemoths maintain their position, meanwhile, is their ability to "create success" out of practically nothing. Take, for example, the following anecdote recounted to me confidentially by a UN employee:

There is supposed to be this committee that would meet and decides which ministry takes care of what. So we said, okay, we will finance your roundtable meetings as long as you give us a seat at the table so that we can watch the process and see the conclusions you come to. The government said, no, we will take the money, but you are not allowed to be there. Also, we get no agenda, no minutes, no access to anything that comes out of those meetings.... And now I have to make a presentation

and say that everything is going great, they are meeting, they have made goals, and I will have to make everything up. This committee has existed for five years, and they have a secretariat, and we have financed all of these people for the whole time, with UN style salaries, good salaries.

The second mechanism in projecting accountability is *specialization*. As opposed to niche coordination, this mechanism is not concerned with minimizing direct competition, but rather with developing more effective and transparent competencies, which can be more easily evaluated by distant donors. This is a particularly good strategy for Butterflies.

The third mechanism for projecting accountability is that of *professionalization*. There has also been a marked increase over the past half century in the professionalization, rationalization, and modernization of development workers, who have come to be recognized as a distinct class of actors (Chabbott 1997: 243-246). The better an organization is at speaking the language and sending out signals that it participates in this special category of Professionals who are unbiased and incorruptible, the more successful it will be in avoiding suspicions, particularly from its up-chain parties.

The fourth mechanism in this group is *branding* and establishing a *web presence*. The idea here is that the stronger your brand, the slicker your website, and the cooler your logo, the easier it will be to signal to distant side parties that you have your stuff together.

The fifth and final mechanism for projecting accountability to distant side parties is that of *matchmaking*. Whereas most of the brokerage situations that I have discussed to this point have involved brokering between two permanently unconnected side parties (or middleman brokerage), there is a second type of brokerage that I have not yet touched upon. The main objective of these other types of brokers is to bring otherwise unconnected actors into contact with each other, with the result being a new network connection where

one previously did not exist (Xiao and Tsui 2007). These actors can be thought of as catalyst brokers (Stovel, Golub, Milgrom 2011), insofar as they “alter the rate of interaction among actors and are minimally affected by the interaction” (Stovel and Shaw 2012: 146). Catalyzing, or matchmaking, within the Moldovan countertrafficking field (via technical coordination meetings and region-spanning projects) is one of the prime ways in which organizations such as OSCE, UNDP, IOM, and UNFPA were able to reinforce their position in the center of the trafficking field. Forming partnerships with other DBOs, and introducing other DBOs to each other helps catalyst brokers in the field to benefit from status gains that accrue from becoming ever more centrally embedded in a growing web of relations.

With all five of these accountability-projecting mechanisms, they will likely be most important for Biggie Bulldogs, least important for Baby Bulldogs and Butterflies, and somewhat important for Behemoths. This prediction stems from the distribution of challenges to each of these types of DBO when it comes to difficulties of evaluation and supervision.

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