

Salaries for officials (necessity -1- P'angye surok, chönje hurok, sang for regular expenditures)

p.64, 3:25b

All the officials in the capital, even including the clerks and ~~servants~~ ^{+slaves} (iso pogye ^{吏胥僕隸}) will all be given regular salaries.

(Note: At the present time the salaries for the officials (paekkwon ^{百官}) are extremely poor. A rank 1 officials gets 60 sōk a year, down to a rank 9 official who barely gets 12 sōk a year. They cannot support themselves (on this) and customarily receive (gifts of) food (kweyu ^{饋遺}) from the provinces which are called chinbong (進奉).

But it is only the high and important officials who get this; the rest do not. In addition products left over from the various bureaus are all divided up privately among the officials, and this is called pun'a (分兒). As for the salaries of clerks, sometimes they have ~~had~~ them and sometimes not. It is not the same for every bureau.

As for those that do get salaries, they might get a cloth payment equivalent to 6 tu of rice per month. As for slaves, none of them get salaries. Therefore both clerks and ~~slaves~~ ^{吏隸} (iyen ^{漁鹽}) make their livelihood by stealing from the people's goods (ōt'al).

Because the situation has been like this, one cannot describe in words how great the harm and evil is. We ought to take into consideration the intentions of the ancients, and from the great officials down to the clerks and slaves set and give regular salaries for all of them and allot quotas out of taxes transported to the capital (chose ^{漕稅}).

See the section on the salary system. And once we have sufficient resources for this, then the present chinbong and pun'a can both be prohibited, and the practices of the clerks in stealing the people's goods (ōt'al) and taking bribes will all be completely eliminated. (reformed) (END NOTE)

3:26a

From the highest minister of state (kyōngdaebu) down to commoners

(sōin ^{庶人}), anybody who holds office will receive a salary and each will have his share (allotment). Superior people (Nobles (kwija ^{貴者})) will have enough to provide for ancestral rituals for all their relatives.

Base persons (inferior people, chōnja ^{賤者}) will have enough to support

職

Salaries for officials (out -2- P'angye surok, chŏnje hurok, sang of regular budget)

p.64, 3:26a

their parents and raise their wives and children, and all will (come from) regular salaries, and that is all. How could you allow them to seek their needs in addition to regular salaries? It was a regular system of the ancients to cut off payments of food from the households of the taebu to their teachers (soksu 束脩). If the taebu (officials) act like this, then the evils of the clerks seeking bribes naturally ought to be reformed (eliminated).

Each bureau ought to set and give necessities to official yamen (konghae 公解). Eliminate the present evil of making demands for funds (chugu 誅求: from the people?). (Note: Both large and small bureaus (kaksa) all ought to set and give (expenses) for official pillows and yo (bedding) matters. With regard to paper, /candles, firewood, etc. in every case calculate what needs to be taken in and determine a quota (of costs) in rice. (subnote: As for firewood, then just calculate (what is needed) for the petty officials office (sangjikpang 上直房) (END SUBNOTE) and pay for this from the tax grains transported to the capital (chose) first month? (of the yr?) every year in the first of the three spring months (maengch'un 孟春). Each of the bureaus naturally ought to use this for expenses. (Subnote: As for pillows and bedding (p'ojin 鋪陳), then buy it as needed (garbled term--in accordance with the evil buy it); and as for firewood and torches (柴炬) then call x in and designate purchasing agents (chuin 主人) as is done with the present tribute article purchasing agents (kongmul chuin). (END SUBNOTE) Once it is done like this, then the present practice of the higher bureaus making demands on the outer provinces for their pillows and bedding and other items ought to be first abolished. As for paper required in lawsuits, prohibit the collection of cloth payments (kap'o 價布), and collect paper for official purposes in accordance with the statutory codes. Also the present practice in the provinces of requiring

Taeding system
to be model
for bureaucrat
for finances

p.64, 3:26a paper taxes (chakchi 作紙) in addition to the collection of the land tax and other items is even more extremely inappropriate and should all be abolished. In addition to this, firewood, torches, cnaddles etc. for the bureaus (kaksa) in the capital, the evil of demanding payments of this ought all to be abolished. For details see my desdription of the salary system.)(END NOTE)

3:26b

In general make payments for the expenses provided in former ages by yamen land (konghaejŏn 公廨田).

(Note: At the present time the above items of the kaksa capital bureaus that are required by them are either too little or too much is demanded of other people (to obtain them). In general all come from unreasonable demands (on people). Those yamen that use rice and cloth customarily take care of them with excess rice and cloth (that they have) to obtain additional amounts that have not been taken into account. As for those yamen that receive tribute articles, ~~these~~ are (these items) ~~should be~~ taken care of with (the payment by) their tribute articles. The tribute middlemen (pangnapcha 防納者) use this (system) to exploit the people and obtain profit. Those yamen in charge of punishments take care (of their needs) ~~by~~ from their runners (saryŏng 使令) ~~and~~ who cause evils by taking bribes. The separate military agencies take care of it by having their clerks (sŏwŏn 書員) exploit the ~~people~~ soldiers to obtain them (the expenses). The firewood for the clerks offices (chikch'ŏbang 直廳房) is taken from the on-duty g troops allotted to them or from the fuel providers. The evils practices have become regulations, and it is all like this wherever one goes. Because it is like this whenever a magistrate takes leave of his post (paesa 罷辭), then the Royal Secretariat immediately claims a "pen debt" (p'ilch'ae 筆債) and forces the magistrates to collect a cloth levy. This is all based on established old practice. Don't officials realize this is deplorable?)(END NOTE)

a govt run on gratuities and squeeze

departs for his post?

拜辭

筆債

p.64, 3:26b

All expenditures in the capital will be from regular ^{funds} expenses (kyōngbi ^{經費}). (Note: And all regular expenses (kyōngbi) in the capital will be (from) taxes ~~gr~~ transported to the capital (chōse ^{漕稅}).) Put ~~and~~ end to the present evil of allotting expenditures (funds for them) to the provinces. (Note: All expenditures have their procedure and will come from regular expenditures (kyōngbi). As for such matters as horse transport and human (transport) labor costs, they also will be given payment from regular funds (kyōngbi). Absolutely do not apportion (these requirements) to the provinces (oehang).)(END NOTE)

All matters in the capital ought to be provided for and paid for in the (from the) capital, but at present most of them are paid for ~~by~~ by the provinces. Such matters as horse transport and human (transport) labor costs are also customarily divided up and apportioned among the provinces. What with going back and forth collecting keeping it (this stuff) and staying and waiting at ~~the~~ guest quarters (hostels?), there is no limit to the evils, and because of this there is no greater harm to the people and poison to the people than this.

Expenses for imperial envoys (ch'osa ^{詔使}) in the capital will also all be purchased in the capital, and there will be no setting (of quotas of such goods) in the provinces. (Note: In purchasing goods for official use, in every case set a superior price (higher than the market price?). It ought to be the same as the regulations for setting prices (for buying) goods for the capital bureaus (kaksa).) (Subnote: That is, the price that is given to the purchasing agent (chuin ^{主人}))(END SUBNOTE) Only after it is done like this will (people) compete to bring the goods, and will there be no difficulty in purchasing them. (i.e.--high prices will attract sellers) If it is not done like this, then there might be fear of shortage (lack of items) and the production of evils among the people. In general the (bureau) officials (yusa ^{有司}) know about making payments for expenses

transport
+
labor

p.65, 3:27a

pay liberal
prices to
attract
goods

salaries, regular official exp. -5- P'angye surok, chönje hurok, sang

p.65, 3:27a

from reserves in their treasuries and when they have a shortage before their eyes they can be stingy, but they do not realize that allotting expense requirements to the provinces causes great harm to the people and serious injury to the roots of the state. People who plan for the state must realize this idea and be careful not to compete for profit with the people and divide up and set (requirements for their expenses) in the provinces.)(END NOTE)

Officials in the provinces (oegang kwanwön) and clerks and slaves (iye) also are all to be given regular salaries.

(Note: At the present time none of the provincial officials have regular salaries. The magistrates collect irregular levies from the people for their needs. The provincial governors live off the adm. districts.

The provincial army and navy commanders (pyöngsa, susa) and their assistants (ch'ömsa, manho) release the duty soldiers

(from duty) and collect cloth to provide for their needs. The post-station officials (ch'albang) make collections from the post-station workers (yökchol) to provide for their expenses.

Each of them makes his own collects and there is no order to the amount.

Even in the case of the clerks and (official) slaves (isö, pogye), in the 8 areas none of them have anything to live on and each steals from the people (öt'al) in the area of his jurisdiction to provide for his expenses. And like in the capital this is the reason why with regard to all

the people of the whole country

there is no place that does not suffer harm.

We ought to take into consideration the intention of the ancients and from the highest and lowest regular officials (kwanwön) down to the clerks and slaves give regular salaries to all of them and take

(these expenses) out of the regular funds (kyöngbi) in each place in order to pay the amounts. See my discussion on the salary system.

Once it is done like this, then the former evils will be eliminated and absolutely reformed, and the articles needed for official expenses

great not supposed to engage in commerce + compete with people for profit (moral not economic)

Salaries

外方官員

吏隸

僉使幕

察訪驛卒

漁奪

salaries, regular official exp. -6- P'angye surok, chönje hurok, sang

p.65, 3:27b

will also all have fixed amounts and will be purchased according to standard regulations, and there will be no dividing up (expenses) and allotting them among the people.)(END NOTE)

Yulgok Yulgok said: The magistrates (chaeüpcha 宰邑者) of ancient times had regular salaries sufficient to feed them, and they divided up the surplus among their relatives. They saw how much they received in order to diminish imbalances (between surplus and shortage? chae hwalhyöp 裁潤狹). At present it is not like this. The magistrates have no regular salaries. The rice and other things under the control of the officials is all the products of the state (owned by the state). Even when Po-i (伯夷) :man in charge of rites under Emp Shun) was a high minister he did not use state goods for private purposes, so that he had no (food) to smear his mouth with. The problem is that our state laws are not well made. Therefore the princely man (kunja) has difficulty in keeping the law and avarice abounds in excess and great extremes. Outside of state taxes there should be no other types of levies ~~xxxxxx~~ that cause the people not to be able to endure the situation. Make it like this.

He also said: At the present time all the official pursue ~~their~~ things for themselves without regulation. The clerks conspire to manipulate things, so that if even one clerk or slave has the slightest (area) under his jurisdiction, ~~right away~~ he takes advantage of the situation to steal. This is an evil that truly will confuse government and destroy the state. But in ancient times officials and clerks all had regular salaries and received food from (the emperor) above. The clerks of the present time all have no salaries. If they don't steal (from the people), they have no way to sustain their livelihood. This is also because the systems of the state are not well provided for. The demanding of bribes by the clerks must be thoroughly stopped, and in place of this we must provide them with sustenance.

3:38a

p.65, 3:28a

Provide expenses for all official yamen (konghae) to provincial official offices. (kwansa ^{官司}). (Note: Such thing as paper, pillows (furniture) funds and bedding for official purposes), and provide costs for the various items. (Note: see the section on the salary system., Use the tax funds kept on hand (yuse ^{留稅}) to make payments. Also do the same for expenses of petty officials and guests.)(END NOTE)

Each adm. district will provide expenses for envoys (officials passing through on business) and guests (sagaek ^{使客}). (Note: Set quotas in accordance with whether it is a large or small route and with whether the costs are complicated or simple and make payment. For details see my discussion on the salary system. For such costs as for imperial envoys proceeding to pay court at the capital, envoys visiting neighboring countries (Japan?), those coming from foreign countries, make separate deductions for them.)(END NOTE)

All provincial expenses will be (~~not~~ paid for) from regular funds (kyöngbi). (Note: All regular funds in the provinces will be (spent from) tax funds on hand (yuse ^{留稅}))(END NOTE) End the present evils of demanding levies from the people. (Note: In general there are standard regulations for all expenditures which will be paid from regular funds (kyöngbi) according to standard procedure. If there should be some other requirements then all of them will be accounted for and deducted as in providing for horse and human transportation costs etc. And also these payments will be paid for out of regular funds (kyöngbi), and they will not be divided up and apportioned among the people. Except in the case of such matters as chön'gwan (傳關 ^{傳關} :?), then labor service will be required of the hanho (閑戶 ^{閑戶} : idle households) in accordance with regulations. As for horse transport costs, ~~xxxxxxx~~ the limit on weight will be 200 kün per horse-load. (Subnote: Basically it should be like this, but at the present time the scales are heavy?)

salaries, reg. official exp. 8-8- P'angye surok, chŏnje hurok, sang

p.65, 3:28a-b

and do not practice (use?) cash. (?) At the present time we ought to set (the limit) at 160 kŭn and wait for a correct scale that uses cash? (?) (chŏngch'in haengjŏn **正秤行錢**).)(END SUBNOTE)

行錢 = to pay off
in a gambling house?

(Note: At the present time the price for ^{the taedong} horse transport

(swaemaga **刷馬價**) has been set at a superior price (iwi ujŏng **既為優定**), but the people do not happily go along with it. /The officials customarily make the load heavy (heavier than normal) and call it one horse load, but in fact it is two. Therefore they record by force those people in the village that have horses and force them to load them (with cargo). There is no end to this evil. We cannot help but clarify and determine standard practice for hanging scales (hyŏnch'ing **懸秤**) and (? ~~ch'ing~~ ch'inggŭp? **秤給**).

(Note: At the present time the regulation for chŏn'gwan (**傳閑**) in each adm. district (ŭp) is that punishment is given for failure to transport (taxes? tribute? messages?). It would seem that there also be no obstacle to (using) this.

(Note: According to the present taedong regulations (taedong samok) all related misc. labor service (chabyŏk) is included in it, but the so-called homaemi (**虎贖米**) as before will be collected from the people's households. In general, tigers are captured in order to eliminate harm from the people, but at the present time every adm. district ~~is allocated~~ (a quota of) tiger skins, perhaps 2 or 3 per district (ŭp). Every year at regular periods there is pressure for payment of the skins and the (district) families have to pay a rice price (kami **價米**) (for the equivalent of cost of the skins). Even though each district catches and pays tigers and leopards (hop'yo **虎豹**), the higher agencies also in many cases reject them for being too small (in size), so it is necessary to collect an equivalent levy (instead) (ka **價**). It was sought to

tiger-skin
purchase
rice tax

salaries, reg. off. exp. -9- P'angye surok, chŏnje hurok, sang

p.65, 3:28b

save the people from harm, but ~~w~~ we succeeded in (chŏk 適) bringing harm to the people. How could this have been the original intention of the law? Just order each village (hyangni) to ~~establish~~ set up ~~kijŏng~~ a trap (kijŏng 機穿) and try to catch tigers and leopards and let it be for their own benefit, and do not have the officials collect them. If a provincial military commander of magistrate orders the troops out to surround and capture them, then recommend rewarding that official, (Subnote: If it is not a strange, bad animal, (the off.) then you may not promote him in rank; just give him a reward in rice or cloth, together with his troops), but do not have the skins paid to the government. If there are tigers and leopards running around and the village does not set up a trap, and the regular officials do not surround and capture them, then mete out serious punishments for all. As for tiger and leopard skins ~~use~~ for official use in normal times, then the appropriate agency pays a price and buys them. It ought to be like this.) (END NOTE)

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cash

For /All the above various payments, 1/3 will be in cash. (Note: Everything will be like this from the payments for royal necessities down to the salaries for regular officials (kwanwŏn 官員), clerks and slaves (iye 吏隸) and all expenditures. If there is ~~several~~ kok of rice (that has to be paid), then it will be paid in 2 parts rice and 1 part cash. If ~~several~~ cotton cloth have to be paid, then it will be 2 paid in 2 parts cotton cloth and 1 part cash. Also at the time when taxes are collect, 1/3 will be paid in cash. This then can be done after (haengjŏn 行錢 : cash is minted? put into circulation? adopted for use? authorized for use?).

行錢
put cash into circulation?

If there happens to be a famine, the all kinds of disbursements will be reduced by 20%. (Note: This will apply to all disbursements including payments for royal needs down to salaries for regular officials

p.66, 3:29a

salaries, exp. -10- P'angye surok, chŏnje hurok, sang
and clerks and slaves. Make a total calculation of the amount of
taxes, if 60% or less (of the usual amount is collected), then
(mag.) he will
declare it a famine. In the case of chu or ku, then/declare it for
the whole district (ŭp). In the case of the provincial governor,
they (can)
prov. army or navy commanders' yamen, then/declare it for the whole
province. And the court can declare it for the whole nation.
If it is a great (famine?) with no (taxes?), then make further
reductions in accordance with the circumstances.)(END NOTE)

Expenditures both large and small in the capital and provinces
have all been fixed and ~~the same system~~ have their checks (che 有其制).

There cannot be even the slightest additional levy on the people
outside of regular taxes (kyŏngse 經稅). Violators will be
indicted for the crime of "breaking the law" (wangbŏp 枉法).

(Note: ~~There~~ There definitely are laws dealing with people who collect
once
~~irregular~~ irregular taxes. Moreover if/each official pays a superior price
(on the market) for the goods he needs, then each official ought to embody
these intentions and see to it that no harm is done either to official
or private (interests). But at the present time there might be those
(clerks & slaves) buy the goods from them
who pay a cheap price and force (~~the~~) to ~~the~~

(at a cheap price), so that the clerks and slaves do not avoid demanding
bribes from the people in order to fulfill (the demands on them). This
is to force payment from the clerks who squeeze the people for it
and misappropriate the funds (supposed to be used for the purchase of
official goods). Anybody who acts like this should be punished
severely.)(END NOTE)

3:29b

~~Chŏng'am~~ Chŏng'am (靜菴 : Cho Kwang-jŏ 趙光朝) reported

to King Chungjong: If a man is able to overcome his self, he will
have no private (desires, feelings). (人能克己則無私矣).

The administration of Sŏngjong's reign was most lenient and humane.

Even the crime of embezzlement (kanjang 奸贓) was treated leniently.

(BUT) the practice of bribery began at this time. (!!!!)

punishment

*Cho Kwang-jŏ
bribery stems
from his leniency*

p.66, 3:29b

During Sejong's reign such officials like the manho (萬戶) were also all honest (廉潔) and mutually respectful. One can see ~~that~~ whether the practices of the sa (scholars) is correct or not (ajöng 邪正), and whether the way of government is ~~gxxx~~ flourishing or declining (oryung 河隆) ~~kanxhexeen~~ depends on this. Even though these evils have still not become serious at the present time, they must be strictly controlled. If the slightest violation is not allowed to stand at court, then the people will know what to fear and each of them will keep himself well polished. (in line). Moreover as for the practice of relatives and friends making gifts and bequeathals to one another, even though it is not to be compared with bribery, still you also should prevent them from making private requests of one another (isa sanggan 以私相干), then the way (to rectify) the world (sedo 世道) will naturally be clear and bright.

law to enforce morality

In the institutions of this country, we have taxes (se) and tribute (kong), but the taxes (se) are light while the tribute (kong) is heavy. But at the court of our forefathers expenses were kept simple (kanyak, small), and there was order to ~~what~~ what was taken from the people. From the middle of Yönsan(gun)'s reign, expenditures expanded and regular tribute was not sufficient to provide for ~~what~~ the meeting (the king's) requirements. Therefore all efforts were made (sor'üi 率意) to set additional (amounts) to meet (his) desires. After that this continued to go on without change and government affairs continued to be handled on the basis of authority and corruption. The lower clerks took bribes and controlled the ledgers, and the evils of pangnap todöng (防納刀燈: middlemen tribute machinations and squeeze) grew by the day and deepened by the month. Regular taxes (se) grew lighter (note: the land tax (chön'gyöl 田結) was not clear and much of it was dropped (from registration, so it was like this) while tribute goods (taxes) gradually became heavier.

light taxes but heavy tribute

3:30a

1494-1506
Yönsan(gun) began levies

p.66, 3:30a

ad hoc
tribute levies

In general when there was some matter again they allotted (tribute payments) in accordance with the matter, so that tribute goods and misc. labor service (kongmul chabyök) flourished and became heavier, and all the people fled from service and none were able to support their livelihood.

failure at
reform in
early Sönjo.

Yulrok's proposal
for tribute
reform

1592.
Yu Söng-yong
origin
of K (K) -
type system

At the beginning of Sönjo's reign, the prime minister, Yi Chun (李俊慶) recommended that this evil be abolished, but it was not carried out. After this, the Ch'ansöng (贊成), Yi I (李珥) submitted a recommendation in which he proposed the reform of the tribute ledgers (kong'an 貢案), but it was never put into practice.

After the Japanese invasions of 1592 (imjin), the Prime Minister Yu Söng-yong (柳成龍) recommended that tribute be abolished and be converted to rice (taxes) (changmi 作米) and that (articles required) be purchased (with rice) stored in the capital. (Note: During the war in 1592-3 the country was in confusion and it was calculated that there was no way to get food for the soldiers. PM Yu then requested that the tribute articles be changed and that payment be made in rice in order to save the people from what was plaguing them and provide for food for the army. His memorial stated: Even though

popular support
depends on
light taxes

restoration from the troubles of war depend on having sufficient soldiers and food, it ~~is extremely important~~ depends even more on obtaining the (support of) the people. The root of obtaining (the support of) the minds of the people cannot be sought elsewhere than in lightening misc. labor service and taxes (yo, pu 徭賦), and that is all there is to it. The nation's land tax should be lowered to 10%. As for ~~xxx~~ irregular levies such as tribute articles, chinsang (進上), and all kinds of local products, there have been extremely many things that are demanded (from the people), but at the time that the tribute (system) was first provided for it was not made equal and uniform/on the basis of land (possessed). The amounts (due) from each district was not

3:30b

10% land tax
+ tribute
reform

p.66, 3:30b

standardized. Therefore the price (cost, ka 價) of tribute items due from 1 kyöl of land might have been either 1 tu or 2 tu of rice, or it could have been (as much as) 7 or 8 tu, or as much as 10 tu., so that the service (tax) burdens on the people were not equal. If you add to this the costs of (transporting goods) back and forth on the roads, ~~expenses~~ and the/a squeeze and manipulation perpetrated by the clerks at the time when (the taxes, tribute) was received by the bureaus at the capital (kaksa) the total expense were while the amount then/100 times (the original taxes), ~~was~~ collected by the officials was only 10 or 20% (of the total collected), while the rest all ended up in private hands. As for the evil of royal tribute (chinsang), the harm to the people was even worse. In this case, too, when the system was first established, it was not necessarily like this, but after it had been in practice for a long time people became more practiced in deceit and the evils multiplied by the 10,000s and thousands. If at the present time we do not change it, then the livelihood of the people will be such that they will have even less hope of sustaining themselves, and there will be no way for the state to accumulate reserves. I always feel when considering (the problem of) tribute that we ought to calculate the total amount of tribute articles required from one province and also calculate the total amount of land (chön'gyöl) in a province, and adjust the figures and make it uniform, cut down where it is too much and add where it is too little, and no matter whether the district is large or small, but in every case make it uniform. If in district A there is a tax of 1 tu per kyöl, then in district B and C, they should also pay 1 tu. If ~~in~~ 2 tu, then also all (districts) should pay 2 tu. If it is like this, then the strength of the people will be equal and fair (kyunp'yong 均平) and what is paid (in taxes) will be uniform. The price (ka 價) for ~~xx~~ local goods will also be ~~equally distributed~~ (set) in accordance with this.

actual levies
100 x reg. taxes
officials got only
10-20%

p.66, 3:30b

made ~~equal~~ equal in either cloth, or rice or beans, and the amount of local products to be paid from one province in one year will be allotted in accordance with (the amount of) land (chön'gyöl).

(And the rate) on every kyöl will be no more than a small amount like a süng or hap, so that the people will not realize that they

have local ~~tribute~~ products (tribute requirement). The chinsang (royal tribute) will also be like this. For all of it rice and beans

will be paid. Collections in Chölla province will be made at the

Pöpsöngch'ang(法聖倉) in Kunsan; collections in Ch'ungch'öng

province will be made at the Asanch'ang(驛倉) and Kahüngch'ang

(可興倉); collections in Kangwön province will be made at

the Hüngwöngch'ang(興元倉); collections in Hwanghae province

will be made at the Kümgekch'ang(金坑倉) and Choüpch'ang(助邑倉)

collections in Kyöngsang province will ~~be~~ be put off until that

province has recovered somewhat and will be redeived in that province

for food for the soldiers. Collections in Hamgyöng and P'yöng'an provinces

will be kept on reserve in those provinces, but the rice and beans of

the (above mentioned) ~~xxx~~ 5 provinces will all be transported to the

capital granaries. With regard to the tribute products (kongmul) of

the capital bureaus (kaksa), and the local products (pangmul 方物)

and royal tribute (chinsang 進上), set a price for the products

that is uniform, and use the regulations for setting cotton prices

~~when~~ in the supervision of ramie cloth offerings and have the

officials (yusa 有司) buy (the needed items).

But if there is not enough military materiel and there is a matter of state requiring separate tax levies, then calculate the amount of tribute goods (kongmul) and royal tribute (chinsang) and made reductions (from them), but as for the rice and beans that are stored in the warehouses, do not bother to exchange them (convert one to the other, rice to articles), but take the surplus.

p.67, 3:31a

p.67, 3:31a

Yu Song-yong
cont.
MING

皇朝

(Yu) also said: I have heard that the Imperial Court (Huang-ch'ao

:the Ming dynasty) ~~has~~ does not have provincial royal tribute offerings (oebang chinsang). It is only that silver is collected from the 13 provinces and given to the Kuang-lu-ssu(光祿寺).

All products presented to the throne are purchased and used. If there is need (for goods) for special use, then there is a special order that (the emperor) cut down on his consumption and use the value of it in silver (so saved); therefore the people in the distant areas do not know of the labor of loading and transporting (tribute items), and all the products of the artisans in the four quarters are gathered together in the capital like (採辦). Whenever they want something, they are never unable to get it, and the capital grows welathier by the day, and the people in the fields are content and secure in their occupations. This is the best way to establish a law. Our country ought to ~~take in the same method~~ adopt this method. Therefore have the chinsang and other matters all be

in accordance with old (practice) and just convert tribute article payments from those in kind to rice payments (changmi 作米) and have (the articles) purchased in the capital.)(END NOTE)

But not long after ~~it was again~~ ^{they restored what was} abolished. When Kwanghae(gun) first came to the throne, the Ch'am'ni(參議) of the Ministry of Taxation, Han Paek-kyōm(韓百謙) submitted a memorial (sangso), which said: Of the evils of tribute articles in our country every one says that whether the state is preserved or perishes is really involved with this. How would the throne also not have heard that

3:31b - local products tribute at the beginning was well regulated. It is not just today that it has been a plague on the people; it has been going on for a long time and has frequently given rise to evils, (coins?) For one kwōn's worth of paper, 10 gold/is still not sufficient to offer (in tribute); for 1 piece of fur, 10 oxen is still not sufficient

한
백
겸
Kwanghae gun
Han Paek-kyōm

p. 67 3:31b to compensate for the value. And down to the present time it
has reached the vital organs (komang ^{膏肓} : region below the heart).
If at this time we do not change (it) and penetrate through (pyon i t'ongji
^{變而通之}), then a situation will come about where the land will
be destroyed and the (growth?) will be rare (^{尾鮮}), and where
even though you have good (men), you still won't be able to do anything
about it. Back in the ūrmi year period (1595) the prime minister
Yu Sŏng-yong had deep knowledge of these evils and abolished tribute
and converted it to rice (taxes) to use for obtaining miscellaneous
articles. Everything was bought in accordance with market prices,
and whatever was left over was used to supplement (purchase of) military
provisions. His intention was nothing but good, but the method was
not completely good, and there were many who resented it and few who
liked it. In the end it got to the point where there was no retreat
(no return, no turning of the heel ^{不旋踵}) and it was ~~abolished~~
(^{還罷} ~~hwangp'ae~~). Now that we have this opportunity, if we do not
carry out a reform, I believe that the plagues on the people at
present will be painful. This law (should) be applied throughout the
eight provinces without question of near or far, and every kyŏl of
land will provide (pay taxes of) 2 tu, and it will be transported to the
capital. Local tribute products both large and small will all be
stopped (abolished). As for the districts along the seacoast, since
they will transport (their rice?) on ship to the capital, how could
2 tu of rice ~~be anything but light~~ not be a light (tax)? In the case
of districts in the mountains and far off along rivers, then the
costs of transshipping to ports will be 3 times the original amount
(of tax), and therefore the mountain people would resent this.

As for goods that are used, if this Ministry (of Taxation) personally
buys and sells (goods), it will be the same as merchants, and it
will be able to cut the prices (of goods that it purchases?), so that

3:32a

origins of
大同

p.67, 3:32a

the people in the market shops (sijŏn ^{市廛}) will resent it. At this time it ^{was} ~~has~~ not been long since our return to the capital (after Hideyoshi's invasion?), and commodities (mulhwa) ^{and} ~~have~~ not yet ~~xxx~~ been gathered (there). If there ^{was} ~~is~~ an unexpected need

the govt had for something and the market shops (sijŏn) cannot obtain them, then you have no choice but to set up special allocations from the

provinces. The people will ^{ed} resent the double taxation and the clerks ^{had claimed that (the govt)} will have no intention of faithfully keeping the law, and ^{they} both will ^{become} together rise up and say that (the method) is inconvenient. There

will be no way (for the clerks) to earn profits through pangnap (防納: acting as tribute brokers), and there will be no way for the clerks to work their deceit. They will look ^{ed} for loopholes? (投間抵隙.) and definitely want ^{ed} to destroy the law, after which ~~xxx (the law) xxx~~

3:32b

~~xx~~ they will stop. (They will only stop when they have destroyed the law). If those in charge go not investigate and carry it out even more according to what is just, then I believe that the harm from ~~xxxxxxx~~ (converting tribute ^{was} ~~to~~ to a rice tax ^{will} be worse than the evils associated with tribute taxation, and in order to obtain (goods) in an emergency, ~~th~~ we will perhaps rely on those who act as tribute middlemen (pangnap) and leave things to their corruption, and there will be no way to check them. Alas! how could there be any limit to the desire for profit and (溪壑)! ~~when the~~

~~skin is gone, there is no place for the hair to be attached~~

(Unfortunately this is close to a situation where the skin is all gone and there is no place for the hair to be attached. ?? 皮盡而毛無所

附,不幸而近之也).

The purpose of people in charge of affairs at this time lies exclusively in obtaining large amounts (of taxes?) and (using) the surplus for subsidizing military provisions, but they are not giving deep thought to the matter of equalizing the people's (burdens of) labor

p.67, 3:32b

service (taxes). This is the reason why they are restrained on right
and left and in the end they cannot carry it out. ^{It seems like} ~~if~~ at the present
we are dopting ~~their intentions~~ but ~~going against the facts~~ are going against
the facts (of the situation). If (? ^{場合}) there are grades
(established in accordance with) the distace of the port (from which
the goods are transshipped to the capital), it is not necessary to
stick (to the figure) of 2 tu (per ~~kyöl~~ kyöl). For distances by
sea requiring 2 days or more (for transport), then we can also
allow (payment) by conversion of rice to cloth. If everything is
made uniform in accordance with ~~the heaviness~~
or lightness (of the tax) and the ease or difficulty (involved), then
how could there be displeasure? For all goods we could provide

p.68, 3:33a

✓ a price better than the market price, either two or five times greater,
and neither raise it durring a bumper crop nor reduce it during a famine
year, and have the tribute middlemen (pangnap chi pae ^{防納之輩}) know
that there is a uniform and fixed law and have them act as intermediaries
(brokers ^{以周旋其間}) to buy and send (goods) (according to)
where ~~there~~ those (goods) are (located), and to take their own
profits (in the transaction), then how would there be any displeasure?
If among these (requirements) it should be difficult to obtain
what is needed for the performance of rites or what is necessary
for the king's needs (sangbang ^{尚方}) ~~from~~ by requesting its
payment in the capital, then you can calculate and deduct the ~~f~~ value
of the product either in rice or cloth and have it paid (to the throne)
(sangnap) in kind. Then the estimate of the expansion or contraction
(of the amounts required) will only depend on having officials who
are able to handle matters. And the taxes on the people will be
✓ appropriate and levied equally, and you can avoid the evils involved
in raising and lowering (taxes?) and ~~in~~ (differences) in ease or
difficulty. How would anything not be convenient, and also how would

buy from where
they are + send
them to where
they are not
買送有無

p.68, 3:33a

there be anything that could not be x carried out?

(saha? 事下 :in implementing this?), the Chief State Councilor in the Myodang (State Council?), Yi Wŏn-ik (李元翼) in the detailed regulations (of the taedong system) established the Taedongch'ong (大同庁) (:that is, the Sŏnhych'ong 宣惠庁), and first tried out the method (law) in Kyŏnggi province. A rice tax of 16 tu/kyŏl was collected irrespective of whether the (crop) year was high, middle or low. (Note: It was collected twice a year in the spring and fall), and it was transported to the capital. Such things as tribute articles (kongmul), royal tribute (chinsang) and xx yamen salaries in the districts and horse transportation costs in the capital (kyŏngswaema 京刷馬) were all included in this. And by the present time the people of Kyŏnggi have somewhat been able to preserve their existence by relying on this (method). (Note:

Formerly it was only the value of the tribute articles (that was replaced by a land tax), therefore (the rate was) 1 tu/kyŏl, but in this case tribute, chinsang, and all miscellaneous labor service (associated with tribute payment and transport) was included in it, so that (the rate was set at) 16 tu/kyŏl (END NOTE)

At the beginning of Hyŏjong's reign (1649-59), the 2nd S.C. Kim Yuk (金裕) also requested the implementation of the taedongbŏp, The law and there were many with different opinions at court. It was only carried out in Ch'ungch'ŏng province, and in general the regulations were the same as those for the x Sŏnhych'ong), but in the interval many new regulation were added (to the old law). (Note: At present 1 volume (kwŏn) of we have/the regulations for the taedong law (taedong samok) as determined by Kim Yuk, and there are many of these regulations that are not yet completely (taken care of).) (END NOTE) (The rate was set) at 10 tu of rice per kyŏl, and there were to be no other levies besides this.

Yi Wŏn-ik + 大同

like receipt system

3:33b

金塔

p.68, 3:33b

The people were extremely satisfied with it. In the last years
 (of Hyojong's reign), Kim Yuk also requested that (the law) be
 extended to Chōlla province, but because many officials at court
 did not want it it was only carried out in districts along the seacoast.
 As for the rest (of the province) it still could not be implemented.
 (Note: The tax rate in Chōlla province was 13 tu/kyōl in rice.)(END NOTE)

This constitutes the details (of the history) of the taedongbōp at
 the present time. (Note: The fact that there are differences in
 (the tax rate for the taedong law) in Ch'ungch'ōng and Chōlla provinces
~~and the fact~~ meant that this (law) could not be carried out equally
 throughout the country. This was because there were light and heavy
 (different levies) of tribute in each of the provinces formerly.
 Because in Kyōnggi province there was more land that escaped (registration)
 therefore the tax rate in rice was even heavier.)(END NOTE)

3:34a

If in general you talk about what is different between the
 so-called taedongbōp and the present taxation regulations, then
 (you could say) that the taedong law calls for ~~calculating the~~
~~amount of tax (of taxes)~~ setting the quota of (taxes) on the basis of
 a calculation of what is needed, and collecting it in rice and
 having the court regulate expenditures. ^{vs. present regulation} Basic taxes (wōnbu 原賦)
 are on the contrary light (lighter), but they are collected from the
 people in accordance with the situation (need), and there is no
 fixed limit (to it). (This is the regulation at the present (for
 taxation).

At the present time the land system (chōnjōng 田政) is in a state
 of confusion. An area of 10,000 kyōl is left to the clerks to steal
 and expropriate at will, and the magistrates also customarily
 privately (illegally) hide it (from registration). (Note: As for
 what is commonly called "hidden land" (ūn'gyōl 隱結), at the
 outset (beginning), the land system was not clear, and the state found it

p.68, 3:34a

difficult to investigate the true facts. Therefore, if among the corrupt clerks you happened to have some like this, then when the state required taxes (labor service) there was no regular ~~(standards)~~ control, so that you had hidden land (ün'gyöl), where (officials) privately on their own divided up and collected (taxes). Only after this ~~did the~~ were the people able to obtain a small amount of leniency, so that even those clerks one might call good, also did not avoid this (practice).)(END NOTE) What was collected from regular levies was not what (should have been)~~provided~~ provided by 1,000 kyöl, and whenever there was some matter in all cases there were separate (special) levies on the people, as at the present time when you have some matter that requires the expenditure of 100 p'il, then they do their best to distribute that 100 p'il (of taxes) among the provinces. (Note: It is not necessary to calculate every single matter (case). In accordance with (the amount of) land, whenever some matter occurs, immediately they do their best to divide up and allot (the tax requirements) and for that reason there are no standards for how heavy(the taxes should be), and customarily there are tremendous differences in the burdens throughout ~~the~~ all areas.)(END NOTE) Also each province does its

3:34b

best to divide up and allot (requirements) among the adm. districts, and the administrative districts also allot and collect (them) from the people. (The request) comes from the court and (is levied on) the provinces; then it comes from the provinces and (is levied on, distributed among) the adm. districts; then it comes from the adm. districts and (is distributed among) the household heads (hoju 戸主); and then from the household heads to the peasants (chönbu 田夫).

(by raising the tax requirements)
Each level in the interval increases its profit (surplus), and
from time to time practices corruption and there are all kinds of evils. (Note: The reason why at each level the quota is raised is because

to p
down
taxation
system
quotas

p.68, 3:34b

the allotments of (tribute) goods have no regular quotas and no regular procedure, and the people do not know what the basic quota is, therefore corrupt (clerks, officials) take advantage of the situation to collect more than is required arbitrarily (on their own authority). Also there are leftover (surplus) amounts every time that (the taxes) are transported and paid. Only then can they inspect and reject (tribute offerings) and provide for wastage losses.

So that even though the clerks are not corrupt, they also have no choice but to collect more (in taxes than is due). Once the situation is like this, then from time to time everybody engages in corruption. This is why illegal surplus levies are gradually increasing and subsequently give rise to evils without limit.)(END NOTE)

If you make a total calculation of the expenses that the people (have to pay for), then it is no less than several hundred thousand p'il (2-~~3x000~~300,000). For even the smallest matter, all of the people of the eight ~~xx~~ regions have to suffer the ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ confusion (difficulty). The heads of household in all the eight regions all have to run around (trying to get tribute? to pay as taxes); and the officials of every district all have to go back and forth. The bother of (making out) documents, and the confusion (trouble) of chasing after and dunning (people for tax payments), and the vast extent of bribery are so great that they cannot be described in words. And in the end what the court gets for its needs stop at 100 p'il of cotton (cloth), and that is all. All matters (are done) like this.

p.69, 3:35a

Other matters are also like this. Today it is like this, and tomorrow it will also be like this. This is why the common people

have no time to rest, and accordingly the minds of the people get more confused by the day, and corruption and evil ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ gets worse by the day. This is why the salaries of the regular officials are very small, but ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ what the officials need for their wherewithal for the most part ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ depends on their reliance

p.69, 3:35a

on official (office, matters) in order to take care of their private affairs. None of the clerks have any salaires provided for them, but what the clerks have to eat completely depends on their practicing corruption and seeking bribes. This why from the regular officials down to the clerks the people who are honest are poor and cannot support themselves, and the covetous and selfish ~~increases~~ get wealthier by the day. The most honest are in even worse straights (straits), and the most covetous are even richer and more ~~content~~ satisfied. This is why the base-minded people who become magistrates always say that they don't want to ~~be~~ remain as a magistrate for six years; they only want ~~xxxxxx~~ once to entertain? (wait for? **待勅使**) an imperial (royal) envoy. (??)x If customs (p'ungsok) are like this, then law and institutions (are also?) like this. If the harm is as bad as this but you want to implement the taedong (system), (Note: That is, the regulations for the present taedong system also call for calculation of expenditures in order to determine revenues (income). Moreover ~~xxxxxx~~ in many cases there is not enough (collected?). But in collecting (taxes) from the people, it still has a fixed system.)(END NOTE) then the officials at court (**蒲朝官吏**) all say that the taedong (system) cannot be done. If you want to carry out a land survey, then they all say that a land survey ought not to be done. Alas! They do not want the state to have an established system x (chŏngje **定制**) for taxing the people; they only want there to be no fixed quotas. Unless they can If they cannot deceive and delude the ignorant, then they do not make it their duty to take responsibility for the country (or: they do not act righteously and turn their backs on the country. pur'ui puguk **不義負國**), and this is very ~~xxxx~~ extreme (the way they do not fulfill their duty). Since they are clerks and slaves who engage in tribute middlemen activities (pangnap) to obtain profits, then how is it sufficient to punish them?

customs
+
law

蒲

3:35b

obstructing
my officials

p.69, 3:35b

(Note) A certain provincial governor and a certain magistrate public

once openly conducted a discussion on blocking the taedong (system), but

~~and~~ (I) heard what they had to say privately (to one another). The

governor said: "Not carrying out the taedong system in your district

(kun'ŭp 君邑) is my ~~virtue~~ ^{thanks to you (me)} (to my credit? 吾之德

). The magistrate responded: not carrying out the taedong

system in the ~~lower~~ ^{my} districts is your honor's (sado 使道) virtue (to

your honor's credit). * If the taedong system were put into practice,

the magistrates would have no place to put their hands and feet

(nothing to rely on for income?)."

Alas! what is called having a place to put your hands and

feet--I don't know whether the purpose of it is to benefit the ~~state~~

state and the people, or whether it is to benefit one's private

interests in accordance with one's desires. If it really were to

benefit the state and people, then it should be the ardent desire

of the magistrate that the state have regular taxation and that the

officials have regular salaries. In governing the people, does the

obligation (that an official has) to expend all his efforts to put

them at ease depend on the fact that he (might) have no place to

"put his hands and feet" (no source of squeeze for income)? If

it really depends on his taking care of his private interests and

desires, then these people are those who do harm to the people

(~~the~~ mojŏk: 蠹賊 grubs which eat grain--injurious persons).

For based-minded persons to benefit by fattening themselves, and for

lawless elements in the state together with corrupt officials to

seek their own profit and delight in it--how is this any different

than if there were a rebellion within the state? Kingly laws

cannot tolerate (this). Nevertheless those people usually have

reputations as famous scholars, but you also have people that

the times have hopes in. But it has been a long time that the

age has declined and the way has become small, and the minds of the

吾 = you?

蠹賊
Official
lawlessness

p.69, 3:35b

the sadaebu (scholars and officials) have been sunken. Therefore in all matters (people) usually delight in them (the corrupt ones) and despite these (the good ones); rely on them (the bad ones) and do not rely on these (the good ones). Mencius in talking about the well-field system said that the feudal lords (chu-hōu) despised what harmed themselves, but everybody (else) left their domiciles. He also said that tyrannical rulers and corrupt officials necessarily were slow in (dealing with) the land boundaries. One can see from this ~~that~~ the distinction between virtue and profit, and public and private (interests). At all times they are mutually opposed (contradictory). (END NOTE)

Some might say that it is really an excellent thing to establish a law that regulates expenditures on the bases of regular taxes (kyōngse cheyong 經稅制用). It is only that if the salaries of regular officials are added on to (what they get at) present, and if all the clerks and slaves in the capital and provinces are provided with salaries, and if all expenditures are provided from regular funds (kyōngbi 經費), then won't the taxes on the people be heavier? I say to this that the salaries of the officials at present are low and the clerks and slaves have no funds support, but still many people spend more than is their due; ~~xxxthey~~ do they really eat (obtain their wealth) by cultivating their own lands? In general the material in the world all comes from the people. It is only by those above establishing regulations for controlling it that the right thing is done in affairs and each is secure in his share. Therefore taxes are made equal, and the people are harmonious and the state well governed. If it is not like this, then there is no order to affairs and people compete to rob and steal. Therefore taxes are heavy, the people are in difficulty and the state is in confusion. Even though everything comes from the people, still

gov't regulation necessary
(w/ist. & legal restraint on people)

Moreover the basic (purpose) of the ruler and his ministers is to govern the people, but the basic reason for establishing clerks and (official) slaves is to help out with affairs (sūngsa 承事). Therefore all of them obtain their food from the people. What harm is there if you set up officials to govern the people and establish clerks to take charge of affairs? What harm is there if when officials are insufficiently to provide for what ought to be done you (establish a system) whereby expenditures are based on calculations of income (revenue)? Will you be lacking in what you need (to spend)? the way ruled This is the way when princely men (kunja) in the world and their states. But in clarifying virtue and being careful about laws to rectify matters, nothing is more stupid than not approaching (matters) of small advantage, being careless in what you do and promoting evils and corruption, and yet still saying that you are not exploiting the people. In all the world there was never any principle by which by being careless in handling affairs (sa yu kūn'gu 事有近苟) harm did not devolve on the people. This is a situation that is true no matter how many twists and turns (convolutions). (This is a situation that is like the fact that the Yellow river must end up flowing east no matter how many twists and turns it takes. manjöl p'iltong 萬折必東).

Expenses for envoys

- Provide expenses for envoys to Peking and abolish the evil of ~~(having these people) make requests~~ *making (ad hoc) requests* (for funds). (Note: At the present time the court does not provide for envoys going to the)

capital (Peking)

p.69, 3:36a

districts of the
It ~~xxx~~ allows them to make their own requests of the/eight provinces,
so that the provincial governors, provincial army and navy commanders,
and magistrates see whether the conditions are good or bad and the
situation serious or ~~in~~ not, and ~~xxxxxxx~~ in accordance with
their own will send off (funds, articles). There are no fixed quotas
of goods (that are so shipped). All are hard labor and irregular taxes
that cut deeply into the fat (guts) of the ~~xxxxxx~~ people, and the
transport labor of man and horse is distributed throughout the 8 areas.
Not only are the evils great, but the matter is also extremely without
reason (unreasonable). We ought to have the appropriate ministry
set a quota of materiel to be given and abolish all these evils.)(END NOTE)

(Next come regulations for providing clothing to envoys)

-next, provisions for trip expenses. . .

3:37b

Not to have official grants to envoys for what they need, but
to make them ask for it themselves from the provinces, at the first
was a great deficiency in the statutes. At the present time the
Ministry of Taxation provides a large amount of what they need (to
the envoys). (Note: At the present time the Ministry gives for a trip
cloth, silk, silver, paper, fans, and even leopard skins. . . . The
amount is extremely large. /It is said that
It has been this way since the invasions
~~the~~ and the ~~prisoners~~ (Korean prisoners of the Manchus?) ~~made~~ all
kinds of requests ~~(on the way to exile?)~~ and there was an increase
in the practice of bribery by the envoys attending the royal princes
and powerful officials) Yet still there is no cessation of demands
(made on the provinces by envoys). The demands have become established
practice, so that there is no man who can stop them. If there are
those who plan to become wealthy by this means and the harm from
these illegal and evil practices and the sullyng of the morale of
the scholars has ~~reac~~hd this point, then we ought to make clear
prohibitions and completely abolish these evils.

唐
manchus:

(Manchu) barbarians 唐

p.70, 3:38a

(Note: In the past customarily what was demanded (by the envoys) ~~in the past~~ from the provinces) was paper, knives, and fans, and that was all. But recently all evils have been extreme. Perhaps what is requested by those without much power is not as bad as in the past, but when it comes to the requests of the powerful officials, then all kinds of goods are transported. What the provincial ~~army~~ army and navy commanders take along in silver and cloth goes beyond 4-500 (yang?). Not only do they request (these things) from the provinces; they also request them from the capital military yamen. The generals also secretly use military supplies to buy silver to transport, (also like the quotas for the wai-fan(外藩 :outer tributaries?). This is the reason why one trip as an envoy in most cases will make a wealthy man(out of you), and the evils of taking bribes and selling goods when they get there (to their destination) increases gradually by the day.)(END NOTE)

it has become an established practice
Some might say that in the present situation/that (envoys) make demands and take bribes. The control of this is not something that we can resolve. Even if the court has fixed regulations for providing goods (support) (to the envoys), the situation will not permit us to mediate & by this means. How about that?

I say to this that the institutions and procedures of the state are laws that ought to be put into practice for 10,000 generations. How are they only something which is established for the present day? But the envoys at present all plan for profit and take bribes. If it depends on us not to make a mistake ourselves, then as for them, Manchu (barbarians) even the ~~princes~~ would also know respect and fear, and there is definitely no reason to believe that they would seek a quarrel with us and invade us if we prevented our envoys from (paying? seeking?) private bribes. If it should happen that we have no choice but

laws + inst,

rites to Manchus

p.70, 3:38a

to pay large bribes (to the Manchus), then we ought to have the court calculate revenue and make special provision (to the envoys for this purpose). We cannot let them make demands themselves on the eight provinces and by so doing melt the fat off the people, and open up the gates of briber and throw the nation's laws into confusion.

3:38b

Bribes to the Manchus

At the present time it is not only the envoys who make demands (on the provinces for funds). The state from time to time also makes such demands. (Note: At present the state has such matters as construction and holding banquets etc., and customarily it makes special requests for funds (kuch'ŏng 求請). It also makes these (special) requests during state weddings.)(END NOTE)

illegal

The king is wealthy, he has the regular taxes of the whole country. What is taken in in revenue is basically sufficient to provide for all expenses. How is it proper to make special requests of the outer areas (oebŏn, wai-fan). We cannot allow other states to hear that our government makes these (special) demands. If this is not eliminated there is no hope that we will be able to rectify the ~~xxxx~~ practices (~~pujŏng~~ ~~xxxxxx~~) of the officials. The Spring and Autumn Annals writes for him to ask than when the King of Heaven comes ~~xxxxxx~~ for carts and gold must be deeply guarded against. The ~~xxxxxx~~ Hu-shih ch'uan (胡氏傳) says, "When those above like something, those below will definitely suffer for it." (上有好者下必有甚焉). If the king ~~xxx~~ ~~xxxxxx~~ makes (special) demands, those below will see this and be influenced by (his behavior). The officials (taebu) will definitely make demands in order to benefit their families. The scholars and common people will definitely make demands in order to benefit themselves, and they won't shirk even from seizing (the property of others) and killing the king and usurping the throne (ch'ansi 篡弒).

p.71, 3:39a

The rulers of old definitely illuminated the virtue of economy (frugality)

篡弒
儉

p.71, 3:39a

in guiding the officials. Each (official) had regular quotas in accordance with the respect due him and his place (in the order--literally, tŭng, hang, whether raised or lowered). The will of the people was established and all were secure in their roles, and there were no demands. The military and punishments were at rest. But

✓ when the spirit of extravagance (luxury) first made a move there was no check against it ~~xxxxxx~~, and it had to reach an extreme.

Bad official, lost their virtue, the way of honesty and shame was lost, favoritism and bribery grew by the day, and only when things sank into crisis and defeat (mang--death of an empire) did they stop. When you see what is written in the Spring and Autumn Annals, then you know ~~that~~ what the reason was for the decline and fall of the House of Chou.

Alas! Isn't there anybody who ~~xxx~~ can explain this to the king and encourage his deep reflection on the way ~~xxxxxx~~ cause a state in decline to rise and to restore a country fallen into confusion (hŭngsoe pallan chi to 興衰撥亂之道

All expenses of imperial envoys (ch'osa 詔使) on the route will exclusively be turned over to the hostel towns (ch'amip 站邑).
→ Abolish the evil whereby at present the various kun (districts) have to send (fund's) from distant places.

(Note: The present evils of the various adm. towns providing hostels (cham 站) cannot be described in words. We ought to have the adm. towns on the direct route pay for and provide (hostels). If there is an empty hostel ~~with~~ that is not located where the adm. town is, then have nearby adm. towns take charge of it. Also designate permanently one town, and do not ~~have~~ choose more than one, and also don't move or change it. With regard to all misc. items that can be prepared in advance, then prepare all of them in advance. As for the expenses involved in entertaining (the envoys), all should be deducted from regular tax revenues. If there are not enough runners (sahwan 使喚), then require the "idle household

閑戶

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budgeting, for envoys ~~20~~ P'angye surok, chǒngje hurok, sang

to perform labor service at the hostels (chamjǒm ^{站店}) in addition to their regular labor service, and deduct an equivalent amount from their taxes.. If you still do not have enough (servants), then pay wages and hire people (kǔpka koin ^{給賃雇人}). Calculate (what is needed) from the tax funds to be transported to the capital (chose) (^{漕稅}) from the town where the hostel is located and do not transport it.

It is not only (travelling) guests, but at the present time the official envoys of this country also customarily allot (requisitions punbae ^{分排}) among the various adm. towns and ask to be put up ^{We} (at hostels). ~~This~~ even more ought to ~~be~~ reform and abolish ~~this~~ regulation.

When hiring people (for hostel service) the ^{standard} ~~normal~~ regulation will be to pay them the equivalent of 5 sǔng of rice for a man-day ~~committed to cash~~ in cash. If transport (of merchandise) is required, then make payment in accordance with the regulations for horse transport (swaema ^{刷馬}). (Subnote: At the present time the fee for horse transport under the taddong system for every hostel (cham) is 3 tu ^{2 1/2} of rice in a bumper crop year, 2 tu in an average year, and 2 tu for a crop disaster year, paid in cash. . .)(END SUBNOTE)(END NOTE)

If you have already allotted more than enough clerks and slaves for adm. towns along the direct route (of the envoys), ~~then~~ and if you also construct additional hostels (chamjǒm), then there should be no need to hire people. If you're talking about an extreme situation (emergency), then hire people. If there is not enough (people), then ^{also} there/would be nothing wrong with requiring labor service from the soldiers in the district town and calculating (the amount of their service) and reduce their duty (time). You cannot say that there are not enough servants (sahwan) and (use this as an excuse) for distributing (service, tax) requirements (punbae ^{分排}) among the various adm. towns. If you calculate (what is needed) and (take it)

budgeting, for envoys ~~31~~ P'angye surok, chŏnje hurok, sang

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from the taxes in the district town that are supposed to be transported to the capital (chose), and keep it on hand, you definitely will have no reason to have ~~ix~~ shortages (of funds). If you are talking about an extreme situation, then keep all of it on hand, or perhaps you could also transport the taxes from adjacent adm. towns. You cannot use the pretext that funds are insufficient to allot levies among the various adm. towns.

Some might say that the expenses for putting up the imperial envoys have been divided up and allotted among the various district towns for a long time. If you make one adm. town responsible for it, ~~x~~ there is fear that that one town will not have the resources to pay for it.

I say to this that all the goods taken in (for paying envoys' expenses?) *megam = calculated as* are to be ~~deducted from~~ national (tax, revenue) accounts. If you take you take in 100 sŏk, then you deduct 100 sŏk. If you take in 1,000 sŏk then you deduct 1,000 sŏk. If you only talk about what comes in (without talking about deductions from state revenues to pay for it), it is just a pretext. What fear would there be that ~~there~~ (a single town) would not have the resources (to pay for the envoys' expenses, if the state provides for it out of general revenues)?

Some might say that there is fear that there would not be enough servants (~~xhwa~~ sahwan). I say to this that in addition to clerks, ^{idle} slaves and ~~idle~~ households (hanho), you can also reduce taxes and hire people to perform labor service ~~ix~~ at the hŏtels. This is only calculating what service is required (and not the ways to provide it), and that is all (that this objection amounts to). What fear would there be that there would be an insufficiency of people to act as servants? People in adm. towns along the direct routes would be exempted from other labor service, and these towns would have been provided with more resources (than they needed). And they would be allotted additional servants and slaves; and additional hostels would have been established; and additional post-station personnel. The

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budgeting, for envoys ~~33~~ P'angye surok, chönje hurok, sang

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whole entourage of an imperial (royal) envoy is no more than 40-50 people.

Basically there is no reason why there would not be enough to pay the expenses for entertaining them. How much less (would this be a problem)

if you retain the land taxes and take (from the taxes of) neighboring

towns (to pay for expenses)? ~~The~~ What distant towns ~~would~~ have to provide (under the present system) is for establishing hostels/~~would be~~ no more than a few people, but

able-bodied males are recruited to collect the various articles and it takes anywhere from ~~202 to 506~~ 2-3 to 5-6 days to transport them.

The magistrates abandon their business and there are uprisings (confusion)

at the boundaries between adm. districts; ~~all~~ all the people have labor

and expenses so that even the chickens and dogs ~~have~~ are not left to

live in peace. The evil and harm done is so great that you can't talk

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enough about it. The duties of one man at a post station causes work for

100 men from distant districts, and still ~~they cannot meet the~~

~~requirements of men sok (of expenditures) for the original hostel it does not meet the hostels~~ it is not enough. 1 sok's worth of expenses

at the original hostel require 100 sok's worth of expenses in distant

areas, and still there is not enough. How much worse is it when in the

interval corrupt ~~clerk~~ officials and clerks take advantage of the

situation to work their corruption; is this not only 1000 times (worse)?

That is why (providing) for 10 sok's worth of expenses at a hostel

(under my new system) is sufficient to do away with the ~~prod~~ (taxing of)

the production of 1,000 men in distant adm. districts. And providing

for labor service of ten men (on the ~~prod~~ spot where the hostel is

located) is sufficient to do away with the work of 10,000 people

in distant districts (under the present system). The state will then

deduct 100 sok's worth of expenses) from its tax revenues to provide

for the towns along the route, but it will not have to pay the

expenses for (the current levies on) a number of adm. towns that amount

to 10,000 sok, and it will not have to require the labor service of 10,000

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P'angye surok, chŏnje hurok, sang

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people from the various adm. towns (as under the present system where both taxes and labor service requirements are spread around to various towns). (If it were done this way), then wouldn't it be to our advantage?

This reform
would also have
centralized
expenditures,
budgeting.

At the present time we abandon simplicity for what is bothersome, and we discard what is easy and pursue what is difficult. Whenever we happen to have an envoy, they we ~~make the people~~ cause all the people of the country to overturn their families, destroy their production, and run around from East to West (one place to another), and we cause all the official in the country to abandon their tasks vacate their jobs and (run about) in confusion over the roads. How is this the way to do it? We should resolutely establish a (new) system and permanently abolish these regulations and give exclusive responsibility to the administrative town where the hostel (is located).

4/a
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Moreover, at the present time it is not only the traveling guests (kaeksa 密使), but this country's envoys in their travels also make distant administrative towns set up hostels and levy a requirement no different than of several people for each of them to be offered. This is even more/child's play. It should be changed immediately. (Note: generally speaking prior to this every time there was one ~~place~~ matter to be handled, either large or small, irrespective of (whether the towns subjected to these levies) were near or far, they immediately distributed allotments (among them), and this was because the taedong system was also not in operation.)(END NOTE)

I once saw the situation where hostels were set up (ch'ulcham 出立) in Chip'yŏng-hyŏn (砥平縣). The allotments allocated to chip'yŏng were one or two able-bodied males per family, and they also collected from this hyŏn 1 head ox (Note: If it was an honest magistrate, then he joined ^{forces} with other magistrates (to share the burdens) and it only cost them 1 ox. If it was a dishonest magistrate, then they

budgeting, for envoys ~~35~~ P'angye surok, chŏnje hurok, sang

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coming
required 1 ox ~~going~~ through and 1 ox going~~x~~ (1 ox when coming to the
hostel, and 1 ox when leaving the hostel). They also used this pretext
for other items as well.)(END NOTE), 3 or 4 roebucks (hornless deer ~~鹿~~),
several hundred chickens, and 60-70 pheasants. And when it came to
chicken eggs, oil, honey, all kinds of fish products, all kinds of
vegetables, salt, beansauce, all kinds of fruit, all kinds of rice and
noodles, and all kinds of utensils, even including miscellaneous items
such as straw ~~pillows~~ mats, dustpans, brooms, pots, cauldrons, large
and small gourds, irrespective of whether it was to be used temporarily
or not, all of it was provided from a broad (area) and loaded on
oxen and horses and transported for several hundred li. The amount of
(these things) was very great. When it came to pigs, bedding, large and
small ^{tents} screens, cushoins and painted screens, etc., then even though
these things were provided by the magistrate considerable ~~many~~ numbers of
men and horses (were required to transport them). Also one could not
limit the food and materiel needed for the regular officials,
clerks, slaves, oxen, and horses. And in whipping and forcing payment
from all areas (throughout the district?)
of these things, ~~now~~ nine of ten households cried (in pain). And
at the hostel there were ^{contradictions} disputes over all kinds of matters, and
not even the smallest thing got done? (so pulsaengsam ~~小不生事~~)

3:41b

If the imperial inveoy happened to stay in the capital for more
than a 10-day week, then he stayed as a guest at the hostel. The
men and horses (used for transport and service) could not stay there
for long. Those that came, returned, and again they had to levy
(additional ones) to take their place for the departure (return trip).
If there were not enough provisions and other goods, then again they
had to be levied to continue (the) journey. This is the reason why
none of the people could sit at rest and there were no worse evils
than these. The fact that corrupt officials and clerks took advantage
of the situation to work their corruption ~~is~~ was even ~~worse~~ more
unspeakable. ~~anxxevil~~.

budgeting, for envoys ~~36~~ P'angye surok, chŏnje hurok, sag

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The evils were like this, and yet what had to be provided for (suddenly?)
food for
was only/several able-bodied males per family for half a day's work,
and that ~~was~~ is all. If we make the towns on the direct route provide
for these additional few people, then we ~~will~~ have to do no more than
provide for a slight increase in expenses and still have plenty left over.

(If we did so), how would we have such evils? (Note: In calculating
the arduous labor required from 10,000 people of Chip'ŏng and the
misc. costs, it is not just (not less than? ~~不盡~~) 1,000 sŏk. If
we made the adm. towns along the direct route responsible (for these
costs), then even though we provide for each thing~~s~~ separately and
hire people for each matter, then it would not come to more than

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would there be great difficulty
several sŏk's worth of expenses. How much less ~~would it be~~ if we
combined the management of it and combined responsibilities. If we
eliminated the requirement of Chip'yŏng that they provide a hostel
~~and~~ but issued 50-60 sŏk of rice and collected in its place the land
tax of the towns~~on~~ on the direct route, then not only would the people
in the towns on the direct route be very happy, but the people of Chip'yŏng
would also be like released from a precarious situation. One can see on
the basis of this the advantages (of my method).)(END NOTE)

~~Once it is like this (like I suggest), then even though 2 or 3 times
a year (envoys stop at a hostel), every time (they do), it will all
be like this~~

Every time (an envoy passes by) it is like this. Even though
one might stop by two or three times a year, it is like this every time.
This also means that they have to borrow ^{houses} a house to entertain (the
envoys) at the hostel, and they must first have the people of the town
go and make them. Even though they might be thatched roof dwellings,
to construct ~~x~~ guest areas in distant places means that the expenses
will be 100 times greater, and after the guest leaves it is abandoned,
and after being abandoned, has to be used again. If the said district

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were given (complete) responsibility (for the envoys), and built permanent quarters, then how would ~~h~~ you have this ~~whole~~ problem? (Note: If you built a permanent tiled-roof dwelling, then not only would do away with this problem forever, but it also would be sufficient to improve? the view? of the people along the road and provide a secure stopping and resting (place) for travelers. This is the reason why additional hostels should be built.)(END NOTE) In only take up this 1 (example), but (from this) you can understand (what the situation is like) in other administrative towns. (Note: Even though in recent years the Sŏnhyech'ong has been providing for the cost of various items, yet it still has not solved the most serious problems, and for this reason ~~it still requires~~ it still requires the assignment of (ad hoc) hostels (among the various districts). The best thing would be to abolish (this system) directly. (END NOTE)

The evils of destroying resources and working the people (hard) mentioned above are

/ ~~is~~ like a petty matter (?). All the ancient states had officials

in charge of travelers (hsing-jen, haeng'in 行人大行人之官, taehaeng'in chi kwan

) who ~~is~~ took charge of the administration

of guests and regulated their going up and going down (through the country, to and from the capital?), and the protocol for their bowing and withdrawing (in front of the king?) and the quotas of sacrificial animals and (菴). As for the ~~is~~ royal envoys, then

even though the high officials supervised them, they ~~xxx~~ also all had men who took charge of their affairs. Therefore they were able to

have perfect rites, like one (and unified?), and in matters, from beginning

to end (it was like?) the King of Yüeh, (Kuch'ŏn 句踐)'s serving

of Wu (吳) (Hanhandaesajŏn. Kuch'ŏn, king of Yüeh during the S and A period who fought with the king of Wu and killed him, but was captured by his son in battle. He didn't lose his will for victory, however, and after waiting 20 years finally destroyed the kingdom of Wu.)

Chin Chien

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Within the four fiefs (sabong **四封**), they had the Ta-fu (taebu) take charge of it ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~. And outside the four fiefs they had Fan Li (**范蠡**) Merit Subject of Yieh during S & A period, helped Ch'ü Chien defeat the king of Wu, then abandoned his post and went to Ch'i; later went to T'ao and became wealthy) take charge of it. Of the two men, each took exclusive charge of ~~his~~ what ~~his~~ was able to do, and within and without there were no mutual disturbances, therefore they were able to establish it and accomplish their will.

At the present time on behalf of that type of service, the state has not establish^{ed} an official to take charge of guests, and has not settled on a system to take exclusive charge of hostels. Whenever there are guest envoys, then within (at the capital), the prime minister, the six ministries, and all officials ~~all~~ have to abandon their (regular) duties and gather round to welcome them, and in the province, all the district magistrates and local officials, clerks, slaves and all the people all have to abandon their tasks and get tired running around. The spirit and labor of the whole country is exclusively taken up with this. There are are disputes and confusion and people cannot open their eyes, ~~and have no~~ spare time for other thoughts ~~about~~ about their official duties. This is a situation where the state can be driven to ruin without waiting for a war to occur. Even in an age where things in the world were most clear, this still would not be the way to run a state. How much less so in these times where we are ashamed and endure pain (suffering)? We ought to establish this system right away and abolish forever the requirement that various administrative towns provide for hostels (ch'ulcham **出站**) and entrust everything to the adm. towns~~xx~~ along the direct route (that the envoys take). In the capital then appoint officials to take charge of guests (Note: They can be appointed as officials to receive guests from afar, and can be selected from among the chief

#1)
need for
system +
institutions

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ministers to hold their posts concurrently.)(END NOTE) And the reception of guests will all be entrusted to these men. If it is like this, then they will manage the adm. towns along the route and take exclusive charge of policy, and all the officials at court and all the magistrates in the provinces will take charge of their own affairs. How then could their be ~~disorder~~ confusion?

Some might consider that for this country to entertain the envoys of the Son of Heaven it would require an extremely large amount of goods to be spent and that the sum would be extremely large.

Rebuttal
If we happened to incur some unexpected matter (emergency), then even though we provided double and triple the price (necessary) it still would be difficult to expect that we would be able to buy (all that we need). This is not to be compared with this country's regular tribute offerings where in each case there is a purchasing agent (chuin 主人) who provides in advance for the purchase (and storage of goods). There has to be separate levies on the people, for only by doing so can you be free of the fear that you might be lacking in something.

This is extremely not so. The gold, silk, and other items required whenever an imperial envoy arrives are not what the people can produce (furnish). What the people can furnish is no more than such things as fish, meat, vegetables and fruit. Even though there might be an extremely unexpected (demand for goods for an envoy), if the people have it and you pay a good price for it, what reason could there be that it could not be obtained? (Note: If you say that even though you pay a good price, you still will not be able to obtain it, then there would be even less of a way to get it from the people. As for (obtaining) such things as food and drink, you ought to make those people provide them who can provide them, and that is all. If you make those people that are able provide them, then you will always have enough food products laid by. If you must

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demand from all the people who are in dire straits those things that it is difficult for them to ~~pay~~ provide in order to (satisfy) if the luxury demands for food for one day, then even/the son of Heaven went around hunting, he definitely would not be able to have it done like this. How would this be the way to embody the intention of the Son of Heaven to pacify the 10,000 regions?, and ~~xxxx~~ (how would this be) the way to treat the king's man (envoy) with courtesy? How much more so in the case of an imperial envoy when before this the payments required to entertain him were really not much, but the officials pointed to and used the pretext of old precedents and threatened the people in order to extract all kinds of goods from them, all of which reverted to those in the middle (middlemen) and were spent uselessly?)(END NOTE)

Ceremonies for changes of dist. mag.

Change the procedure by which old and new officials (magistrates) in the provinces have to welcome and send off (envoys). Abolish the present regulation in this country for (providing) men and horses. When the magistrates, garrison commanders (chinjang 鎮將), education officials (kyogwan 教官), post-station officials (ch'albang 察訪) go to their posts and leave their posts, also in all cases have them use the post-station (apparatus for their travels.). (Note: The governor provincial army and navy commanders, tosa 都事), and uhu 虞候) at the present time use the post-stations. When they leave their posts, even though they might belong to the category of men without office (soksan 所散), give them also horses and several retainers. See my section on the post and post-stations. The lower people (petty officials) in a given area will each prepare the ceremony within the boundary (of his district) and go out to welcome or send off (officials) but they cannot cross the boundary. Only clerks and slaves will go all the way to the capital to either welcome or send off (an official).

都事 虞候

所散

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(Subnote: For people in the countryside, perhaps we could eliminate
When
the court departure (ceremony) ~~xxx~~ going to their post, ~~xxxxxxx~~
or
~~xxx~~ when they leave their post they can return straight to their homes
and thus ~~xxxxxx~~ be met at their homes when being welcomed or being
sent off.)(END SUBNOTE) With regard to greeting or sending off

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people at the capital, the subordinate (petty officials required to
do this) ~~xx~~ for the tosa and uhu will be the same as for the magistrate
(that is, 3 men). There will be 4 men for the governor and provincial
army and navy commanders, and 2 men for the p'angwan, ~~sungjinjang~~ (3) ~~鎮將~~,
kyogwan, and ch'albang (subnote.. .) If the quota is exceeded the
(guilty) will be indicted for breaking the law, and the chief officials
in the area will also be dealt with seriously.)(END NOTE)

The (officials's) family belongs will all be transport by
privately ~~owned~~ (hired) men (and privately owned) horses. Just
calculate the itinerary and provide trip expenses. When an official
is going to his post, then pay him for a trip from the capital.
(Note: For those in the countryside, then (pay them) from their place
of residence and deduct (the payment) from regular official funds.)(END NOTE)

When (an official) is leaving (his post) then provide him
(with funds) from his district town. (Note: Deduct these costs also
from the regular funds in the adm. town. The petty officials in
that town will also go to the border (of the district) in either
meeting or sending off (an official).)(END NOTE)

Travel expenses (nobi ~~費~~) for every 100 li (Note: If it is
not a full 100 li, don't mention it. If it is more than 100 li
treat the extra amount
but less than 200 li, ~~xxxx~~ the same as for 100 li, and copy this
(above provision).)(END NOTE) for a puyun, and tohobusa, 30 5u of rice;
for a pusa and kunsu, 25 tu; for a hyŏllyŏng and p'angwan, 20 tu; for a
kunsŭng (~~郡正~~) and hyŏnsŭng (~~縣正~~), 15 tu. (Note: In all
payment will be
cases/2/3 ~~xxxxxx~~ in cash and 1/3 in rice. For those who want all cash,
(going to)
you may also allow it. If ~~xx~~ he is ~~xxxxxx~~ from a distant place and it is

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difficult to provide for all costs from the capital, then calculate
sub
(the costs to) an administrative town midway along the route. (Note:
to
As for example/Pyongyang or Hamhung in the northwest). Funds can
be given him by a customs stations (pass), after which the pass
can deduct it (from its costs?).

The provincial governor, army and navy garrison commanders, kyogwan
and ch'albang will all be allowed to take their families. If their
tenure of office is for a long time, then in accordance with this
regulation then (provide) 30 tu for (transporting) family belongings
25
for the governor and prov. army and navy commanders, 20 tu for the
ch'ŏmsa, 20 tu for the kyogwan and manho, and 15 tu for the ch'albang.)(END NOTE)

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At the present time the evil involved in meeting and sending
off (officials) is too great to describe in words. The requisitions of
men and horses, the running about along the roads, bringin rice and food
for over a 1000 li, and even plates and all kinds of utensils all
have to be loaded on horses and kept for entertaining the travelers
at guest areas, and the offerings of banquet all make the situation one
To
that definitely cannot be done. ~~XXXXXX~~ blame people for what definitely
cannot be done and regard this as appropriate has become the
is because we
custom of this country. This/only rely~~xxx~~ on the situation between
(right to give orders?)
superiors and inferiors, and doesnot give a thought to the suffering
of Heaven's people. This is why when one official has to be welcomed
or sent off, I don't know how much destruction it causes to the livelihood
of the people. (Note: When men porters and horses go along, it cannot
be predicted in advance whether they will stay in the capital a
short time or be delayed, and there might be difficult expenses
for a host of things while staying the capital. Therefore it is
necessary to provide a large amount of funds to take enough (men and
horses?) along. If collections are made from the people, then perhaps it
will be as much as several p'il of cloth per kyŏl. If you use the example

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of the one hyŏn of Hŭngdŏk, then there are not a full 1,000 households, but in 9 years the magistrate has been changed 10 times, and in addition to the necessary expenses (taxes) on the people's land to provide for horse transportation payments came to over 700 tong (of cloth) but it is said.~~x~~ ~~xx~~ The expense to the people is like this ~~xxx~~ the court is still careless about it; ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ this is the standard situation. /If it is not right before one's eyes, then customarily it is easy to talk about , but there is no deep investigation of the facts.)(END NOTE)

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I hear that in China when (an official) goes to a post in the provinces he takes draft horses along with him, but he uses his private horses and private men to transport his family belongings. The people in the administrative town (to which he is going) only go out to meet him or send him off at the district boundary, it is said. It is done according to what is reasonable and is the most appropriate (way of doing it). (Note: Some might say that household property basically ought to be transported by means of private men and horses, and that if the magistrates completely use the post-station system (for transportation when they are transferred to posts), then the post stations will have difficulty in paying expenses. Except for the most distant border region, with regard to all other magistrates, then each of their ~~xxxx~~ district towns should set a quota of transport horses; 1 riding horse and 2-3 draft horses, and the costs should be paid by deducting them from regular funds, and no further requirements should be put on the people. If it is done like this,~~x~~ then how about it?

I say to this that if (you want) to use people and horses from the official's district, then you also have to include in this payments ~~b~~ for the coastal route. In this situation, in the end you will have a gradual increase (of costs), and even though

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you have a law stipulating fixed official costs (for paying travel expenses), it will be difficult to carry out. The harm suffered by the people and clerks will be no different from what (prevails) today. The best thing is simply to use the post-station system.

The post stations are basically for (transportation) along the roads, with regard to but/the establishment of horse-lands to provide expenses, ~~also ought~~

we also ought to ~~consider this~~ calculate it in order to provide superior (funds). How about calculating it and setting it as follows? (Subnote: If we determine that half the costs from moving to one town to another should be given to each of the post-stations, then won't there be more than enough (to provide for costs?))(END SUBNOTE)

If one part (10%?) is used to entertain one trip and two parts (20%?) is used to entertain 2 trips, then what difference is there? Generally speaking whether (expenses are based on) the administrative town or the post-station, it's all a question of the people's strength. If you look at it from the official standpoint, then the facts are the same, but if you look at it from one standpoint ~~and~~ as opposed to another, then there is a great difference in the convenience and advantages (accruing from my plan as opposed to the alternate one).)(END NOTE)

The sealed (letter of) particulars of Cho Chung-bong(赵重峰) ~~stated~~ when he returned to ~~Korea~~ the East (Korea) said: "The appointment of officials to posts in this country is all ~~so~~ sloppily done. We take them from the East to fill (posts) in the West; we give them a post in the morning and change it in the evening, and even before they have warmed their seat they have destroyed the ledgers and robbed property (resources), and they fall into the tricks of the corrupt people. Whenever new officials are welcomed or old ones are sent off, men and horses are assigned (to aid them) and have to hurry and go off for over a 1000 li which destroys the production

budgeting for travel exp. -47- P'angye surok, chŏnje hurok, sang
maybe end of quote here

p.74, 3:45b

This is also an evil that does not exist in China. Even though officials in China have to go (to a post) over 10,000 li away they use their own horses and people to transport their families. Not for even 1 small horse or person (other than their own) is ~~bothered~~ the official resources bothered. And that is why this evil does not extend to the people, and the people ^{regular} all have constant production. Moreover ~~if~~ the newly appointed officials do not collect (service, funds--for transportation) ^{so that} from the people, ~~then~~ rapid transfers are possible, but it ~~xxxxxx~~ is necessary on the day that they are due to go to first submit a memorial (to the throne) about their dismissal (departure). For an official coming from a distant place, if you? borrow at monthly interest (to obtain funds for his expenses?) and keep it to wait for the new official's arrival, then when he returns to his home, he sells his land and servants to repay the monthly loan, but his family is reported destroyed(?). Every year the number of officials dismissed does not stop at one or two men, but the number of men who have to come and great one official is not just 100 men, so that the number of men who lose their jobs in the space of a year comes to several hundred men. Could one say that this should not be changed because it is a small matter?

I also refer to the fact that there is basically no difficulty in changing the law ~~&~~ and establishing (a new) system, it is just that the above people have never carried it out; this is what is ^{if} difficult. But/definitely there is no choice ~~xxxxxx~~ but to continue the present swaema (刷馬 :extra levy for horse transport), then we ought to set a quota. (Note: The quota of horses (to transport) family effects of magistrates of the sixth rank, according to the law code (taejŏn) is 20 horses for a pu or chu (mag.), 17 for a Tohobu, and 15 for a kun or lower. The number of men retainers should be determined in accordance with this regulation for horses.

3?46a