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
Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth Century Europe

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About this series

The *Donald W. Treadgold Papers* publication series was created to honor a great teacher and great scholar. Donald W. Treadgold was professor of history and international studies at the University of Washington from 1949 to 1993. During that time, he wrote seven books, one of which — *Twentieth Century Russia* — went into eight editions. He was twice editor of *Slavic Review*, the organ of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, and received the AAASS Award for Distinguished Contributions to Slavic Studies, as well as the AAASS Award for Distinguished Service. Professor Treadgold molded several generations of Russian historians and contributed enormously to the field of Russian history. He was, in other ways as well, an inspiration to all who knew him.

The *Treadgold Papers* series was created in 1993 on the occasion of Professor Treadgold's retirement, on the initiative of Professor Daniel Waugh. Professor Treadgold passed away in December 1994. The series is dedicated to the memory of a great man, publishing papers in those areas which were close to his heart.

Sabrina P. Ramet
Editor

About the author of this issue

Norman M. Naimark is the Walter and Florence McDonnell Professor of East European Studies and Chair of the Department of History at Stanford University. He is the author of *The Emergence of Marxism in the Kingdom of Poland, 1870-1887* (1979), *Terrorists and Social Democrats: The Russian Revolutionary Movement Under Alexander III* (1983), and *The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949* (1995). He has also co-edited books on Soviet nationalities problems, Operation Barbarossa, the Soviet experience, Soviet Military Administration documents, and the establishment of communist regimes in Eastern Europe. For a number of years, he worked on and chaired the Program Committee of IREX and the Joint Committee on Eastern Europe (of the ACLS-SSRC). He presently serves as President of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies.

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Norman Naimark
Palo Alto, California

The historical enterprise contains any number of self-contradictory elements, not the least of which is the ultimate futility of trying to recreate the objective reality of the past. It is also the case that the conceptual language we use for understanding the past derives more often than not from the present or recent past. Even if some of the words we use — like war, tyranny, and rebellion — have an ancient etymology, their meanings change as new generations of historians approach politics and society from distinctly contemporary perspectives. The term genocide has a more recent derivation — Raphael Lemkin's 1944 book, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*. Toward the end of the war, Lemkin began to use the term to describe and understand the Nazi eliminationist attack on entire national groups. The United Nations General Assembly picked up the term from Lemkin in Article II of its Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948.¹ Of course, since that time, we have also used the term in the case of the Armenian genocide, as well as many others that predated the Nazi experience. As long as scholars recognize the strictures of their language and perspectives and are ready to accord the past its own dignity and autonomy, the enterprise of using current terms can continue in a healthy tension — or “conversation,” as E.H. Carr put it — between present and past.²

It is in this context that we need to understand the way the term “ethnic cleansing” instantaneously burst onto the scene of press and government analysis of the Yugoslav war in May of 1992. The term began to be used with phenomenal frequency to describe the attack of Serbs on Bosnian Muslims and to indicate that the purpose of the attacks was to eliminate the Muslims from large swaths of Bosnian territory.³ The term also was applied to Serbian attacks on Croats in Eastern Slavonia and Krajina the year before and was gradually applied as well to similar, though less intense, actions by the Croats and Bosnian Muslims against the Serbs. Almost immediately, there was controversy about the use of the term itself as a euphemism for genocide.⁴ In fact, it became quickly apparent from a series of Serbian atrocities in the late spring and summer of 1992 and the revelations by Roy Gutman about the inhuman conditions and criminal acts committed against Muslims in the Serbian detention camps, Omarska in particular, that ethnic cleansing did have genocidal implications.⁵ But it was equally clear that the Bosnian Serbs' primary goal was to drive

the Muslims out of the parts of Bosnia they claimed for their incipient republic.

Veljko Vujačić traces the first uses of the term to the Serbs themselves, who complained in the late 1980s of the Albanian ethnic cleansing — *etničko čišćenje* — of Serbs from Kosovo.⁶ Others have traced the concept to the Soviets, who indeed used the term *etnicheskoe chishchenie* to describe Armenian attempts to cleanse Nagorno-Karabagh of Azeris. However, if one looks to German usage, then the term, *Säuberung*, which can also be translated as *purge*, is used so often in an ethno-national context in Nazi and pre-Nazi German racial and eugenic theory that it is impossible to think of ethnic cleansing as somehow specifically Slavic. But in both cases, the Slavic and German, cleansing has a fundamentally dual meaning when it comes to a community of people; its implications are of both external and internal purging. One cleanses a body politic or a geographical region of a people; but one also cleanses a people itself of foreign elements.⁷ It is this latter element, which emphasizes a self-purging, which leads to fearsome up-close killing and brutal mutilation of neighbors and acquaintances.

Instead of developing a history of ethnic cleansing with an overly structured idea of what it is precisely, I would rather let the term take on meaning in the course of its historical explication. In fact, if there is a definition I find attractive, it is related to the definition of ethnicity provided by R. D. Grillo cited by Ronald Suny and Geoffrey Eley in their new compendium, *Becoming National*. "Ethnicity arises in the interaction of groups. It exists in the boundaries constructed between them." Moreover, "it is IN history, the flow of past events, that the emergence and variation appear, and only THROUGH history can we understand them."⁸ In short, ethnic cleansing contains the meanings that history has given it.

With this said, several further — and no doubt equally debatable — assumptions underlie this investigation. First of all, despite numerous instances throughout history of the expulsions of minorities and subject peoples by their rulers and conquerors, the kind of ethnic cleansing experienced in the twentieth century is distinctive, both in its ideological and political motivations and in its intensity. Thus, ethnic cleansing as experienced, for example, in former Yugoslavia, is a profoundly modern phenomenon, related to previous instances in the twentieth century (and no doubt to future episodes in the twenty-first), but not a product of "ancient hatreds," as so often suggested by politicians and journalists, who never tire of citing Ivo Andrić's essentially twentieth century novel, *The Bridge on the Drina*, to prove that the Balkans are forever violent. The pogroms in late nineteenth century

Russia do not prefigure Stalin's planned deportation of Jews — a potential second Shoah — before he mercifully died in March 1953. Turkish attacks on the Armenian population in Sassun, Zeitun and Constantinople in the mid-1890s under Abdul Hamid II were profoundly different in scale, intensity and type from the Young Turk-inspired Armenian genocide of 1915. The extermination of the Jews by the Nazis was not simply the last phase and natural outcome of centuries of German anti-Semitism, Daniel Goldhagen to the contrary.⁹

The foundational ideas of ethnic cleansing emerged from the development of European nationalism in the late nineteenth century. The articulation of political, ethnic exclusivism, and integral nationalism — the products of diverse thinkers and political activists from Roman Dmowski in Poland, to Francis Galton in England, and Ernst Haeckel in Germany — belong to the modern world, both in its post-Darwin and anti-Positivist intellectual phase and in its late colonial and pre-World War I nationalist incarnation. The genocidal potential of integral nationalism was already apparent in the Balkan Wars and in World War I. The important point is that modernity itself organized nations by ethnic criteria. As Zygmunt Bauman points out, this proved fatal in particular for the Jews:

Racism is unthinkable without the advancement of modern science, modern technology and modern forms of state power. As such, racism is strictly a modern product. Modernity made racism possible. It also created a demand for racism; an erathat declared achievement to be the only measure of human worth needed a theory of ascription to redeem boundary-drawing and boundary-guarding concerns under new conditions which made boundary-crossing easier than ever before. Racism, in short, is a thoroughly modern weapon used in the conduct of pre-modern, or at least not exclusively modern struggles.¹⁰

The issue in Bosnia, Peter Sugar makes clear, is ethnicity [racialism] not religion, as may seem the case. "Religion," he states, "becomes simply an identifying ethnic name tag."¹¹

Modern ideology cannot in and of itself explain the twentieth century impulse to attack other peoples. Modern state systems are critical for ethnic cleansing to work. The creation, the building, and the reconstruction of states, all of which require the mobilization of the state's resources, human and material, bring reasons of state to bear on the supposed dysfunctionality of heterogeneous populations.

Modern technology, modern communications, modern media, modern transportation, modern school systems, and modern weaponry are all part and parcel of the phenomenon of eliminating nations within nations.¹² Some scholars of Germany and of the Holocaust — Omer Bartov and Elisabeth Domansky, among them — trace killing systems to the industrialization of warfare that was developed and refined in World War I.¹³ Part of the relationship between ethnic cleansing and the modern state also has to do with issues of population control and management, census taking, and state intervention in reproductive policy. This becomes especially clear in the post-World War I German and Soviet cases, where the relationship between the individual and the state undergoes a remarkable regularization, characterized by the thoroughgoing attention to the ethnicity of the citizen. Even in the relatively backward Turkish state of Mustapha Kemal, the idea of Turkish nationality became much more regularized and bureaucratized than identities in the world of the Ottoman sultans, which were complicated by the relationships between the millets and the dominant Muslim religious nation.¹⁴

To focus on the responsibility of the modern state for ethnic cleansing does not relieve political leadership of its responsibilities for the brutal expulsions and deportations undertaken by the state in the name of its interests. On the contrary, given the power of the modern state, ethnic cleansing of the sort that has permeated the twentieth century could not have taken place without the initiatives and connivance of politicians and responsible state officials. Arnold Toynbee recognized this clearly in witnessing Greek and Turkish atrocities in Anatolia in 1921:

This is an ugly possibility in all of us; but happily, even when the stimuli are present, atrocities are seldom committed spontaneously by large bodies of human beings... More commonly the rabies seizes a few individuals, and is communicated by them to the mass, while in other cases the blood-lust of the pack is excited by cold-blooded huntsmen who desire the death of the quarry without being carried away themselves by the excitement of the chase.¹⁵

Not just political leaders, but those who are educated for the modern play prominent roles in ethnic cleansing. Medical doctors, in particular, were extremely important in the development of the Young Turks and their assault on the presence of Greeks and Armenians in Anatolia.¹⁶ Nazi doctors and medical researchers were critical to the development of the “science” of eugenics and of racial theory that led

to the ideological justification for the elimination of the Jews.¹⁷ The fact that the Bosnian Serbian leaders of ethnic cleansing included Radovan Karadžić — a psychiatrist — and engineers, like Slobodan Milošević, leads one to suspect that modern professional ethics are not inimical to mass murder.

The Cases

This working paper is divided into two basic parts. First, I briefly describe the five cases I am studying in depth; and secondly, I explore a series of preliminary observations about the historical phenomenon of ethnic cleansing itself. In each case, I have done (or plan to complete) some archival work. Of course, time, linguistic competence, and accessibility — in each historical case in different mixes — make it impossible to research completely each historical episode of ethnic cleansing in the archives. Nevertheless, archival and documentary sources are important as a way to cut through the layers of controversy and tendentious historiography that surround each of the cases.

(1) First of all, I begin with the Ottoman Empire (and Turkey) and examine the Armenian genocide of 1915. I also want to look at the Armenian case in the perspective of the expulsion of the Greeks from Turkey, part of which (along with the expulsion of the Turks from Greece) was regulated by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. It is worth noting at the outset that the Armenian issue is by far the most contentious and difficult historiographical problem of all of those I have examined. There is very little middle ground and almost no shading of opinion. So far, I have not read what I would consider to be a non-partisan history, though it may well be, as some historians of the Holocaust suggest about their subject, that a non-partisan history of the Armenian genocide could not be good history.¹⁸

(2) The paper also considers Nazi ideology and the Holocaust, subjects — obviously — of intense investigation and a huge body of scholarly literature. In this case, I focus most concertedly on the ideology of genocide — what people said they were doing and why, and how this interacted with other elements of Nazi racial, eugenic, and medical/health policy. Here, I rely in particular on the work of Götz Aly, Michael Burleigh, and Wolfgang Wippermann, among other specialists on the Third Reich, who examine the development of genocidal ideas and the state-authorized killing of deformed children and mental patients in the spring and summer of 1939, which widened to

include more and more of the "hereditary ill" in "euthanasia" programs in the fall.¹⁹ The most salient period of my work on Nazi policy towards the Jews is that of the initial occupation of Poland in September 1939 to the outbreak of the war against the Soviet Union in June 1941. A new and even more horrific stage in the elimination of the Jews begins in the fall of 1941 with the massacres of Jews by SS Einsatzgruppen in Eastern Poland and Russia and the total extermination of the Jews, which Christopher Browning suggests was conceived in October 1941 and planned by the Wannsee conference of January 1942.²⁰ In this latter period, the word ethnic cleansing no longer has much meaning; we are dealing with genocide, the Holocaust, the Shoah. In this sense, the Holocaust is the most extreme version of ethnic cleansing that one witnesses in the twentieth century, indeed that one can imagine. However, beyond that, in an epistemological sense, the arguments of many Holocaust scholars, Steven Katz most recently, that the Shoah is unique, cannot be accepted.²¹ Nothing in history is unique or incomparable, at least not to the practising historian, whose obligation it is to grant every event its uniqueness and its comparability.

(3) The third case at which I want to look in fact consists of two: the expulsion of Germans from Poland and from the Czech lands at the end of World War II and the beginning of the peace. These are particularly useful cases for reversing the moral lenses that inevitably color our views of the process of ethnic cleansing itself. In these cases, the victims, the Germans, aroused very little sympathy at the time of their expulsions, and it is still hard to muster a sense of outrage about what was done to them, particularly given the behavior of the Germans in Poland, but in the Czech lands as well. Even here, one's sense of moral balance is undone by the comparison. As we know, the Germans killed and murdered roughly six million Polish citizens, about half ethnic Poles and about half ethnic Jews. The Nazi occupation of Poland was brutal in the extreme, a good start to Hitler's plan in *Mein Kampf* to reduce the Poles to a slave labor status, while eliminating their intelligentsia and national aspirations. Despite the outrages of the Lidice massacre and the suffering of Czech partisans in the concentration camp of Teresin (Theresienstadt), the Czech nation survived the war intact. Indeed, historians have argued that Czech industry was actually in better shape after the war than on its eve, and that the Czech commercial infrastructure was not seriously damaged. Hitler did not get very far with his ideas about eventually expelling the Czechs from Bohemia and Moravia. Yet the ethnic cleansing of the Czech German

population — the so-called *Odsun* or transfer — was every bit as brutal as that of the Germans from Poland.

The East European cases also bring into focus the question of whether totalitarian and communist regimes are more prone to ethnic cleansing than democratic ones. In the Czech case, it is quite clear that the cleansing of the Germans was a top priority for the democratic leadership of the Czech government, Prime Minister Edward Beneš, in particular. There was a complete commonality of interests between the Czech communists, who formed local armed bands which carried out much of the cleansing, and the Beneš government. Plans for expelling the Germans from Czechoslovakia were refined already during the war by the Czech government-in-exile in London. Edward Taborsky developed a long memorandum on the subject — “Minority Regimes and the Transfer of Populations in Central Europe After this War” — which, however, made it possible for proven German anti-fascists to remain in postwar Czechoslovakia as individual citizens.²² But more radical voices prevailed as the practices of ethnic cleansing made few distinctions between fascist and anti-fascist Germans.

Between the Polish communists and the Polish government-in-exile, there existed very little practical difference in the determination to expel the Germans from Poland and from the newly occupied Western Territories, the so-called Recovered lands, *Ziemia odzyskany*. In neither the case of the communists nor that of the democratic politicians did it matter whether the Germans had been Polish citizens before the war or not, or whether they had been anti-fascists or not; they had to be expelled.²³ True, the London government worried more about the laws that would deprive the Germans of their citizenship and their property. But when Stanisław Mikołajczyk returned to Poland in the summer of 1945 to join the new Polish Government of National Unity, he — like communist leader Władysław Gomułka — insisted that the Germans be expelled and made light of Western worries about the Germans’ “plight.”²⁴ Meanwhile, Gomułka, as Minister of the Recovered Lands, made it clear that the German question would be resolved through a combination of ethnic cleansing and social revolution; the land question and the question of the Germans were one and the same, he insisted.²⁵

(4) The fourth case — or better pair of cases — that this working paper will examine is that of the deportation of the Chechens and Ingush from the Northern Caucasus to Kazakhstan and Kirghizia in February 1944 and of the Crimean Tatars four months later in May, primarily to Uzbekistan. The Balkars and Karachaevtsy were also deported from the Northern Caucasus in this period, and Armenians

(often called "Dashnaks"), Bulgarians, and Greeks were deported from the Crimea at approximately the same time. Their cases will be used as a way to illustrate some of the issues related to the peculiar nature of Soviet ethnic cleansing. But most of the focus will be on the Chechens and their ethnic cousins, the Ingush — both of which were treated as a single ethnic unit by the Soviet authorities — and on the Crimean Tatars. One of the characteristics of Soviet ethnic cleansing is the deportation of entire peoples, without any legitimized exceptions: some 480,000 Chechens and Ingush, 41,000 Balkars, 75,000 Karachaevtsy, and 220,000 Crimean peoples (189,000 of whom were Tatars).²⁶ Here and elsewhere I intentionally use rounded-off numbers. The NKVD documents on the deportations, some of which are now available to researchers in the Russian archives, are ridiculously precise about numbers.²⁷ NKVD statistics tend to undercount victims, while demonstrating false confidence in the reliability of the numbers passed on to the political leadership.

(5) The final case that will be considered is the most recent — that of the former Yugoslavia. As indicated above, the case of Yugoslavia provided the term "ethnic cleansing" with the conceptual artillery for making it useful for understanding other similar cases. There can be little question that what we are talking about in former Yugoslavia is primarily Serbian ethnic cleansing of Bosnian Muslims. But even before the explosion of headlines about Serbian atrocities in the spring and summer of 1992, the Serbs had practised ethnic cleansing as part of their war against Croatia. There can be little question that Croats also engaged in episodes of ethnic cleansing of Serbs; the forced expulsion of the civilian Serbian population of Krajina, many of whom are descended from Serbian military frontier colonists from the time of Maria Theresa, is the most notable case. Croats have also engaged in ethnic cleansing of Bosnian Muslims. The present conflict between Croats and Bosnian Muslims in Mostar is an example. There have also been cases of ethnic cleansing by Bosnian Muslims of Bosnian Serbs. Although by far the largest number of indicted war criminals (seventy-four altogether as of the end of April 1997) are Bosnian Serbs, there are also Bosnian Croats and Muslims who have been implicated in criminal episodes of ethnic cleansing.²⁸ In the former multiethnic Yugoslav republics, ethnically based elites are doing everything they can to rid themselves of the "other." In this context, it is important to reiterate that this is not the primitive Balkan phenomenon that we hear so much about in the press. Instead, these murderous attacks — no less than those on the Armenians by the Turks in 1915 or on the Jews by the SS and Wehrmacht in

1943 and 1944 on the Eastern Front — are ordered by political leaders and carried out by loyal soldiers.

The Course of the 20th Century

Clearly, this paper cannot include all the cases of ethnic cleansing in the twentieth century, nor can it even consider all those in Europe in the twentieth century. But by exploring a number of different kinds of cases over the course of the century, it may be possible to understand, at least, what is unique and different about the various episodes. Before doing this, however, it is important to historicize the cases and think about the linkages between them. The meanings of such words as *ethnos*, nation, state, and even deportation or cleansing change over time. The cases can and should be compared, but the observer must remember that they belong often to different temporal eras, not to mention different societies and cultures. The very words “ethnic” and “cleansing” would mean something different depending on the time and place they were used. With that said, it is still useful and interesting to establish connections between the various episodes of the phenomenon we call ethnic cleansing.

Hitler was supposed to have said on the eve of the Nazi invasion of Poland in September 1939, “Who, after all, speaks today of the annihilation of the Armenians?” Usually, this quote is associated with his murderous intentions regarding the Jews. In fact, Hitler was talking at this meeting in Obersalzberg on 22 August 1939 about executing a substantial number of members of the Polish intelligentsia. At the same time, it is questionable whether he referred to the Armenians in his pre-invasion briefing or not.²⁹ Still, there is plenty of evidence that Hitler knew about the mass murder of the Armenians, as did most European politicians, and that it could not have been far from his mind in the development of his own ideology of mass destruction. Talaat Pasha, one of the architects of the Armenian genocide, was killed in Germany by an Armenian nationalist in 1921; the assassin’s acquittal by a jury trial was widely discussed in the German press.³⁰

No one can read the Polish documents about eliminating the German minority from Poland and making Poland ethnically pure without recalling the German ideology as applied to the Poles. One of the oldest historical rules of warfare is that enemies learn from each other. There can be little question that the Poles learned from the Germans, both in their postwar treatment of the Jews, as well as in their

treatment of the Germans. Poles and Czechs forced the Germans to wear special signs of their nationality, white armbands. Czechs and Poles sometimes added a large "N" — for Nemeč, German — on the Germans' coats. If not immediately driven out of the country altogether, the Germans were confined to ethnically pure compounds, forced to observe curfews, and were not allowed to walk on sidewalks, eat in restaurants or cafés, or mingle with non-Germans. They were sometimes beaten and humiliated by brutal guards and even local townspeople as they were loaded onto box cars to be freighted out of the country. If, in the thousands of accounts of Polish and Czech brutality towards the Germans, one simply blanked out the names and eliminated some circumstantial evidence, it would be impossible to know whether the incidents described what the Germans did to the Czechs and especially to the Poles or what the Czechs and Poles did to the Germans.³¹ (Still, it is important to distinguish between the actions of the Nazis, which were part and parcel of a larger plan to dominate Europe and destroy its "lesser" peoples, and the actions of the Poles and Czechs, which were motivated primarily by a sense of grievance and revenge.) It is noteworthy, as well, that in their wartime planning for "transferring" the German population, both the Czech and Polish governments-in-exile made frequent reference to the ostensibly successful transfer of the Greek population from Anatolia and the Turks from Greece after the Lausanne Treaty of 1923.³²

Even the Soviet cases of ethnic cleansing have resonances of Hitlerian ideology and influence. In the 1920s and early 1930s, Soviet attacks on "enemies of the people" focused almost exclusively on class-based enemies, remnants of the old regime and the "kulaks." By the end of 1930s, just as in the rest of Europe, but Germany in particular, "enemies of the people" were viewed as based in alien nationalities. If a million kulaks were the deportees of the early 1930s, it was enemy nations who were deported in the late 1930s and 1940s — Tatars, Kalmyks, Koreans, Bashkirs, Chechens, and ethnic Germans, among others.³³ Amir Weiner suggests that this derives in particular from the promulgation of a new Soviet constitution in 1936, when Stalin claimed that socialism had been built, and therefore there could no longer be class-based "enemies of the people."³⁴ Stalin himself insisted to a group of Army officers in 1938 that there was no reason to think prejudicially about offspring of enemy classes after the building of socialism.³⁵ This accounts in part for the initial episodes of Soviet ethnic cleansing carried out on the eve of World War II and depicted in the work of Terry Martin.³⁶ Still, the extent to which Stalin deported whole nations from their homelands in 1944, treating nations as biological entities, cannot be explained without the influence of the

war and the example of the Nazis. The fate of the Jews in postwar Soviet society only strengthens this argument. For the first time in Soviet history, anti-Semitism became part of official Soviet ideology; Jews — like Solomon Mikhoels — were murdered because they were of Jewish origin. Before his death in March 1953, we now know that Stalin planned the deportations of the entire Soviet Jewish population to Siberia, which might well have meant a second Holocaust for the Jews of Europe.³⁷

The Yugoslav case also cannot be considered in isolation from other cases of ethnic cleansing in the twentieth century. The salience of the atrocities in the Balkans during World War II, especially of Croatian Ustashe against the Serbs, is obvious to anyone who has witnessed debates between Serbs and Croats about the contemporary situation in Yugoslavia. Decades of manipulation of these issues by the communist government did not help matters any, nor did the continuing manipulation of facts by the Serbian and Croatian media. One could argue that one of the immediate causes precipitating the war itself was the unwillingness of the Croatian government to abandon all Ustashe symbolism, including the checkered *Šahovnica*, hated and feared by the Serbs under Croatian rule in the Krajina and Eastern Slavonia. The Serbs also roused passions in the Balkans by systematically overestimating the number of victims of the infamous Ustashe camp in Jasenovac and treating every Croat as if he or she were part of a potential Ustashe revival. Bosnian Muslim participation in SS operations also became a common motif of Serbian propaganda, some of it unquestionably true, most wildly exaggerated, about Muslim atrocities against Serbs.³⁸ If “ancient hatreds” played little or no role in the Yugoslav war, hatreds sparked by memories and myths of World War II were too easily inflamed. Yugoslavia, like the Soviet Union, also shifted its ideological locus from class-based enemies to nationalist foes. Tito was able to manage this shift without destroying the multi-national South Slav entity, though we should not forget the victims of his tyranny.³⁹ In any case, with the end of communism in sight, his heirs were poorly equipped to deal with more openly articulated renewed nationalist ambitions.

Violence and Ethnic Cleansing

If these cases of ethnic cleansing are linked to one another throughout the twentieth century by their interactions and direct and indirect influences, they are also linked by their character. First and

foremost, ethnic cleansing is accompanied by extreme violence. This has to do in part with the fact that peoples do not leave their homes and homelands, their villages and their towns voluntarily. They must be forced to leave and that force often is applied in extreme forms in order to accomplish the desired results. For reasons that can only make one despair at the nature of human interaction, gratuitous violence, extreme cruelty, barbaric torture, and indifference to human suffering often accompany the projects of expulsion. The costs in life and limb are fearsome and devastating for the peoples involved. Unlike warfare between nations, ethnic cleansing usually involves an armed and violent perpetrator and an unarmed and innocent victim. The issue is not one of mutual escalation, as in warfare, but of a particularly reprehensible form of one-sided punishment. Arnold Toynbee often used the metaphor of the cat and mouse to describe the scenes he witnessed in Anatolia. He wrote: "My strongest impression during this horrible experience [of witnessing the atrocities carried out by the Greeks in the early summer of 1921] was of something inhuman in the blood instincts of hunters and in the terror of the hunted."⁴⁰

It will be some time before historians can agree on the human toll of the Armenian genocide. As reliable, contemporary, and fair-minded a scholar as Steven Katz cites the figure of 550,000 to 800,000 deaths, which is very much at the low end of the estimates offered by equally fair-minded and reliable Armenian scholars.⁴¹ Ronald G. Suny, perhaps the most restrained Armenian historian to write about the genocide, cites the figures of anywhere between 200,000 (the lowest estimate) to 1.5 million, sometimes claimed by Armenian accounts.⁴² In any case, substantial numbers of Armenians — perhaps as many as 800,000 — survived the onslaught. The tales of the survivors as well as the testimonies of the witnesses describe scenes of horror that were splashed across the headlines of European newspapers, leaving the same feeling of impotence and disgust within international "public opinion" that many have felt at the revelations of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia.⁴³

The attack on the Armenians began in late February 1915, when Armenian men of military age were rounded up by the Turkish army and forced into labor battalions. During the first week of April, the old, the young, and the women were rounded up by Turkish units and sent off into exile to Aleppo in northern Syria. The men in the labor battalions "were rounded up by troops from the regular army and summarily massacred."⁴⁴ The deportees were forced to march through deserts and wilderness, exposed to the elements, with no food and no protection from bandits, marauders and many of the escort troops themselves. The Armenians were robbed of their clothes and

the few provisions they had with them. Many fell by the wayside, dying in vast numbers alongside the road. Children were seized from their parents and sold into slavery to Kurdish chieftains. Those who resisted were sometimes hacked to death or tortured and left to die in the desert. Among those who reached the Euphrates, many women threw their children into the river before they themselves jumped in and drowned. Turkish and American scholars of Turkish history deny that the violence was directed by the state and reject the designation of "genocide" for what happened to the Armenians.⁴⁵ But few would argue with the proposition that there is a good deal more work to be done, particularly in the Ottoman archives, to get the story straight.⁴⁶

Many scholars point to the Greek-Turkish exchanges and the international cooperation surrounding the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 as an example of how the exchange of populations can be carried out to the benefit of both sides, peaceably and legally. This is historical mythology of the purest sort. The confrontations between Greeks and Turks in Anatolia were violent in the extreme. With the blessings of the British, Eleutherios Venizelos and the Greek army — which had already landed on the Aegean coast in May 1919 — invaded Anatolia in the spring of 1921 to carry out his version of the Megali idea of unifying Greek-inhabited territories throughout the Eastern Mediterranean and Black Seas. But the Greek Army's early successes inflamed its ambitions, and large areas of heavily Turkish-inhabited areas were subjected to fearsome ethnic cleansing. Arnold Toynbee described the horrors inflicted on innocent Turkish villagers by the marauding Greek *chettes*, paramilitary groups, which followed the Greek Army's advance. Villages were razed to the ground; Turkish men, women and children were burned alive; the pillaging and rapine were terrible.⁴⁷

Greek atrocities against the Turks and their advance on the Anatolian plateau aroused the resentment and fighting capacity of the Turks. Under Mustafa Kemal, who had already begun to unite Turkish forces in eastern Anatolia, the Greek advance was reversed and the Turks pursued the Greeks back to the Aegean. Turkish army and irregular forces engaged in very much the same horrid actions as their Greek antagonists: plundering, raping, burning, torturing, and cleansing the territory of Greek villages and settlements. The Turks took Smyrna (Izmir) at the beginning of September 1922 and literally drove the Greeks into the sea. The lucky ones were boarded on English and Allied ships to be evacuated to Greece itself. Many others — perhaps as many as 25,000 Greeks and Armenians — died in the great Smyrna fire of 9 September 1922. Although the evidence is far from convincing, the fire almost assuredly was purposely set by the Turkish troops.⁴⁸ In any case, the great cosmopolitan city

burned to the ground, bringing to an end the nearly 3,000 year Greek presence on the shores of Western Anatolia. As Dimitri Pentzopoulos writes: "It is no exaggeration to call the year 1922 'the most calamitous in the whole of modern Hellenic history.'"⁴⁹

Atrocities, massacres, and intercommunal warfare continued, even after the victory of Kemal. The Allies formed Mixed Commissions at Lausanne to complete the arrangements for the obligatory exchange of the 1.2 million Greeks who had lived in Anatolia and 356,000 Turks, primarily from Aegean Macedonia, many of whose families had also lived in the region for centuries.⁵⁰ Of those 1.2 million Greeks, however, all but some 290,000 had already had been driven from their homes and many had already arrived as refugees in Greece.⁵¹ By all accounts, the exchange was brutal and rough. Many Greeks, especially, died in the transfer. Greece itself became terribly overburdened with the hungry, sick, and homeless. Only by the end of the 1920s did the situation stabilize somewhat and the terrible loss of life due to hunger and disease diminish. According to Stephen Ladas, "tens of thousands of Greeks" perished in the flight from Anatolia or as a result of the inadequate conditions for staying alive in Greece itself.⁵² Meanwhile, the complicated agreements at Lausanne about compensating the refugees remained unfulfilled. Like the Dayton Agreement concluding the war in Bosnia, the Lausanne Treaty represented not the creative solution to an international problem, but the last and ultimately most bitter phase of a terrible tragedy of ethnic cleansing. Many of the Muslims transferred to Turkey spoke Greek and had little in common with the Anatolian Turks. Lord Curzon was particularly critical of the compulsory nature of the exchange of populations, "a thoroughly bad and vicious solution for which the world would pay a heavy penalty for a hundred years to come."⁵³

The ethnic cleansing of Germans from Polish and Czech lands also calls forth scenes of horror that beggar description. It is hard to know how many Germans died in the process of the deportations and expulsions themselves. So many died and committed suicide during the last phases of the war, when the Soviet armies overran East Prussia, Silesia, and Pomerania. Gerhard Ziemer estimates that out of 11.5 million Germans who were expelled from Eastern Europe as a whole, 2.5 million died, many from hunger and disease, many as a result of attacks by Soviet armies, and Czech and Polish occupiers.⁵⁴ This constituted, writes Gerhard Weinberg, "the largest single migration of people in a short period of which we know."⁵⁵ It really made no difference to the Poles or Czechs whether the Germans were antifascists or not, whether they were young, old, male or female. That the Czechs

were as brutal to the Germans as the Poles is something of a counterintuitive proposition given the fact that the German occupation of the Czech lands was so much more tolerable for its citizenry than the occupation of Poland.⁵⁶ But even Russian tank commanders were shocked by the gratuitous violence meted out by the Czechs to the Germans.⁵⁷ They specialized in hanging the Germans from their heels on trees or balconies, dousing them with petrol, and setting them on fire. In other cases, they would let them hang there alive, to be beaten, tortured, or set upon by casual passersby. In the town of Aussig on 30 July 1945, Czech crowds, aided by the local militia, went on a rampage, killing some 400 Germans. Women and children were thrown off the bridge into the river and shot at when they tried to swim away. The apparent cause was the rumor spread that German "Werewolves" had detonated an explosion in a local factory.⁵⁸ Many Germans who did not flee to the West were often rounded up in labor camps, where they faced every sort of brutality their wardens could conjure for their victims. Short of food, living in horrid sanitary conditions, they died in large numbers before they could be transferred to Germany.

The Poles also wreaked havoc on the Germans. Gangs of Poles from the central part of the country followed the Soviet armies into the newly occupied territories. They were there neither to settle the new lands nor to erect an administration, but to take what plunder they could back to their own home towns.⁵⁹ Unrestrained by weak local authorities, held back only sometimes by Soviet army units, they set upon the Germans, stole their valuables and property, and invaded their homes with impunity. In a "Wild West" atmosphere that was beyond the ability of the Polish government or police to control, these Polish groups — the word "bandits" were used only for political opponents — indiscriminately attacked and pillaged the Germans.

The violence of the wartime deportations of Chechens, Ingush, and Crimean Tatars was organized and focused on the date of deportation, 23 February 1944, for the Chechens and Ingush, and 17-18 May 1944 for the Tatars.⁶⁰ The NKVD used very much the same tactics in both cases. In the Chechen-Ingush region, Red Army troops were bivouacked among the local people for months before, with the explanation that they were taking a well-deserved rest from the war. The soldiers mingled with the local people and were often seen in their homes. Then at midnight of 22 February or dawn of the 23rd, the Chechens and Ingush were notified that they were to be resettled to Central Asia. As a rule, they had a half an hour to pack a few things and assemble in the town and village squares. No resistance was tolerated. Those who tried to escape were shot. The people were then

loaded into new Lend-Lease Studebakers and trucked off to the railheads, where they were loaded in freight cars for the long trip to Kazakhstan. There is ample evidence to demonstrate that the sick and infirm, those who were too weak or lived in too remote areas to be moved, were often simply shot.⁶¹ In some cases, there were mass killings. In the village of Khaibakh, two hundred and thirty Chechens were rounded up and locked in a large barn, which was then set on fire. When a few managed to bust out, they were machine-gunned by the surrounding soldiers. The estimates of those Chechens and Ingush killed range around 3,000. No Chechens or Ingush were to be left behind.

The violence did not end with the point of deportation. For the Chechens and Ingush, as well as for the Crimean Tatars, the journey to Central Asian exile was hellish and murderous. There was little or no food, water, or protection from the cold (in the case of the Chechens and Ingush) or from the heat (in the case of the Tatars). Many died, states one NKVD report, from "the extremely unsanitary conditions."⁶² The old and young died first. Periodically the trains stopped and the corpses were thrown out, to be buried in mass graves by conscripted locals. Indeed, one can chisel a permanent image into the edifice of twentieth century ethnic cleansing of freight cars, overcrowded with deportees, hungry, thirsty, starving, diseased, suffocating in unhygienic and barbaric conditions. Jews in the Third Reich, Germans deported from Poland and the Czech lands, Chechens, Ingush and Tatars, and even Bosnian Muslims describe conditions of transport that differ very little one from the other. (The Greeks often describe similar conditions on the freighters and ships that transported them from the Anatolian coastline.)

The NKVD documents on the deportations are filled with precise data about where the Chechens-Ingush and Tatars were to be settled, how much grain was to be made available for their consumption, what kinds of building materials were to be provided by the local authorities for their barracks, how they were to be employed and supported. Periodically, too, there are documents that indicate that much of this planning remained on paper only.⁶³ Not only were the local authorities not prepared for the arrival of tens of thousands of deportees, but the worst suffering awaited the already severely weakened survivors of the horrid transports. The locals lived poorly and in crowded conditions; rarely did the new provisions for the deportees make it to the point of settlement intact, and when they did, they were seldom given over to the Chechens, Ingush, or Tatars.⁶⁴ Instead, the new *spetspereselentsy* (special settlers) were treated as pariahs, set upon, beaten, and robbed by the locals of the few possessions they had, and

ignored by party and *kolkhoz* committees.⁶⁵ Children walked about in a daze, unwashed and with no shoes; even the adults were insufficiently clothed to survive the harsh northern Kazakh winter.⁶⁶ Thousands died from hunger, disease — most often typhus — and exposure in an alien and unfriendly environment. Chechen historians estimate that nearly 200,000 Chechens and Ingush died and were killed in the period of deportations and resettlement. The Crimean Tatars suggest that as many as 45 per cent of their population perished in the process, about half of whom were children.⁶⁷

The terrible violence associated with the war in Bosnia, in particular, has been documented well enough in the contemporary press to warrant only the briefest of mention. The numbers are the easiest part to digest, somehow: as far as we know at least 250,000 dead and more than two million refugees. At the same time, what human beings are capable of doing to other human beings in the name of cleansing a territory of an allegedly alien folk beggars description and thwarts analysis. The images of bodily torture, the sadistic maiming and disfiguring of the purported enemy, and the unspeakable horrors of the prison camp at Omarska, reported first by Roy Gutman of *Newsday*, call to mind every other case of ethnic cleansing in the twentieth century.⁶⁸ The historian seeks in vain for a convincing answer to the question: how can former neighbors, even friends, do this to one another? How do relatively successful multicultural societies fall apart so quickly: what happened to the Van of 1910, the Smyrna of 1914, the Berlin of 1930, the Simferopol or Grozny of 1940, the Poznan or Brno of 1930, the Banja Luka and Mostar of 1960?

War and Ethnic Cleansing

In every case, war and the transition from war to peace provide the backdrop for the removal of peoples. Violence is made acceptable by war; people live off of its promulgation; the taking of lives becomes habitual. Militaries follow orders, whether they march into battle against enemies or kill and expel identifiable ethnic "others" in their midst. Paramilitary groups, whether well-organized, like the Third Reich's *Einsatzgruppen*, or more spontaneously placed into battle, like the Greek *chettes*, Serbian *chetniks* or Polish and Czech armed militias, attack groups singled out for ethnic cleansing. Bandits, marauders, and asocial elements find their way into these paramilitary groups, wreaking havoc with innocent civilian populations, who are robbed and plundered, as well as brutalized, mutilated, and sometimes killed. The mythology and lore attached to cruel and he-

roic banditry in the Balkans may well have had an influence especially on the way Serbian combatants in Bosnia thought of their campaigns.

War provides a cover for violence and a justification for violence. In Hitler's case, for example, there seems little question that the attack on Russia ended one stage of the brutal cleansing of Jews from the Reich and their ghettoization in Poland to the cataclysmic stage of elimination and mass murder. Under the cover of the First World War, the Young Turks decided to drive the Armenians — perceived as traitorous and trouble-making — once and for all from Anatolia. Having lost their remaining territories in the Balkans in the course of the Balkan Wars in 1912 and 1913, the Young Turk triumvirate of Enver Pasha, Talaat Pasha, and Djemal Pasha were determined to preempt any possible attempts to create an independent Armenia in eastern Anatolia by driving out and killing its potential citizenry. "The war," wrote Christopher Walker, "provided a thick black velvet arras, behind which the Young Turks could act with impunity."⁶⁹

The Soviets also settled long-term scores under the cover of World War II and the alleged collaboration of the Crimean Tatars and Chechens and Ingush with the Nazis. Those historians who have looked seriously at the issue of collaboration have come up with similar conclusions. Tatars, Chechens, and Ingush did not collaborate at a markedly different level than did Ukrainians and Russians in the same areas.⁷⁰ Chechnya was never really occupied by the Germans, and the Soviet argument that Chechens and Ingush helped German units find their way through the mountains only applies to scattered mountain clans. The leaders of the Crimean Tatar *obkom* (regional party committee) during the war rejected the complaints of some Soviet partisan leaders that the Tatars collaborated in unusually large numbers. They documented Tatar resistance and accused Russian Soviet partisans of refusing to take in Tatar members. According to the Tatar communist leadership, the partisans drove the Tatars into the hands of the hands of the Nazis by wantonly attacking peaceful villagers, confiscating their food supplies, and burning down their homes.⁷¹

Wartime also highlights the strategic arguments for ethnic cleansing, which accompany its execution either explicitly or implicitly. The Armenians and Greeks were accused of endangering the Turkish war efforts. From the point of view of the Young Turks, the Armenians were spies and agents for the Russians, and this was demonstrated in the early victories of the Russians over the Turks in the Caucasus just as the Western allies attacked the Turks at Gallipoli. Therefore, the Armenians had to be eliminated from eastern Anatolia, or the border region of Turkey would never be safe from the Russians.

By eliminating the Armenians as a factor in the politics of eastern Anatolia, Ronald Suny writes, "the Young Turks could with one blow end Western and Russian interference in Ottoman affairs."⁷² According to the American ambassador in Turkey, Henry Morgenthau, the Turks were fully aware of the consequences of their strategically justified actions: "When the Turkish authorities gave the orders for these deportations, they were merely giving the death warrant to a whole race; they understood this well, and, in their conversations with me, they made no particular attempt to conceal the fact."⁷³

The Turkish government also targeted the Greeks as agents of the British on the western littoral of Anatolia and in eastern Thrace, who — at the end of the war and beginning of the peace — were intent, in the view of Pasha Mustapha Kemal, on turning Turkey into a Western mandate. Therefore, the Greeks had to be driven from Anatolia; Turkish settlers and Muslims from Greece would be moved into their towns and villages to defend against foreign armies.⁷⁴ It would have been hard for the Nazis to argue that the Jews constituted any kind of strategic threat to the Third Reich. But Hitler and his chieftains certainly thought that the Jews were the source of Western (and Soviet) resistance to the "New Order" in Europe. If war broke out, Hitler promised before the Reichstag 30 January 1939, the Jews would pay:

Today I shall act the prophet once again. If international financial Jewry inside and outside of Europe should succeed in thrusting the nations into a world war once again, then the result will not be the Bolshevization of the earth and with it the victory of Jewry, it will be the annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe.⁷⁵

The Polish government-in-exile's wartime planning regarding its postwar German population was overlaid with increasing worries about Soviet claims to the country's eastern lands, not to mention political issues related to Soviet demands for a "friendly" postwar Polish government. Especially after Yalta, it became apparent that the Poles would lose vast territories to the east and be compensated by the occupation of formerly German territories in the west. For both the Polish government-in-exile and the Polish communists in Moscow, it was imperative that the occupation of these territories turn into their annexation as quickly as possible. Demographic politics also played a critical role in the impulse to expel the Germans; where else would the Polish population from the eastern territories live, if not in newly acquired German territory. Geostrategy also was omnipresent

in the discussions about the future shape of Poland. The Germans would have to leave East Prussia and Danzig (Gdańsk) as well as the Pomeranian coast, at least as far as the Oder, and in some wartime plans even farther, beyond Rostock and Warnemünde. Some Polish government-in-exile plans even called for the Polish occupation of the Kiel Canal as a way of keeping the Baltic safe from German dominion. The Polish naval ministry also offered its opinion that the Pomeranian coast, Danzig, and Stettin (Szczecin) had to be cleared of Germans in order to insure the security of postwar Poland.⁷⁶

The Oder and Lusatian Neisse were used by the Germans, Mikołajczyk argued, for imperial control of Silesia and Bohemia.⁷⁷ For the sake of the free commercial development of Poland and Czechoslovakia, he insisted that these rivers be placed permanently under the control of the Poles. Of course, all of the Germans should be expelled from the territories east of these rivers.⁷⁸ In order to insure that these lands remained in the hands of the Poles, Mikołajczyk, like Gomułka, understood that the most important issue was getting the Poles to be masters of the land, to work it and organize it for the economic benefit of the region. Both communists and non-communists were less worried about world opinion in regard to the expulsions than about economic integration.⁷⁹

The Czechs rarely offered strategic arguments for the deportation of the Germans. For them, the primary reason for expelling the Germans centered on the responsibility of the Germans for the failure of the interwar republic. They were traitors to Czechoslovakia; had sold the country down the river to Hitler; and had to be expelled if Czechoslovakia was to succeed as a democracy. As Beneš explained, "our Germans... betrayed the state, betrayed democracy, betrayed us, betrayed humanness, and betrayed humanity."⁸⁰ For the Czechs, the expulsion of the Germans was a justifiable historical payback, not just for undermining and destroying the interwar republic, but for all the insults to the Czechs on the part of Germans and Austrians going back to White Mountain. Mostly out of sheer political expediency, but also influenced by neo-Pan Slavic sentiments, the Soviets supported both the Czechs and Poles in their determination to expel the Germans.⁸¹

Long-term strategic concerns, more implicit than explicit, influenced the Soviet decision to deport the Crimean Tatars and Chechens and Ingush. The Crimean Tatars claim, with considerable justification, that the Russian and Soviet governments had always hoped to create a "Crimea without the Crimean Tatars."⁸² Ethnic and religious affinities between the Crimean Tatars and the Ottoman Turks had spurred Imperial Russian antagonism to the Tatars in the first place. After the Crimean War, the Russians treated the Tatars as scapegoats

for the disastrous campaigns on the peninsula and expelled some 100,000 Tatars from the Crimea at the war's conclusion.⁸³ Burgeoning racial thinking during World War II did not help. But it was no doubt Russian designs on the Straits and on Turkey which had prompted the deportations of alleged Turkish sympathizers from the Crimean peninsula. In some ways, the Chechens and Ingush presented the Soviets with a similar strategic problem, a potential source of support for Turkish designs on the northern rim of the Caucasus. It is important to remember as well that both Stalin and Beria, the men most responsible for the deportations, were of Georgian origin and may well have had designs on the territories of the Georgians' Muslim neighbors and traditional enemies. This is born out by the fact that when the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic was formally abolished on 25 June 1946, the mountainous territories to the south had already been turned over to Soviet Georgia.⁸⁴

The Chechens and Ingush, even more than the Crimean Tatars, were traditionally considered by the Russian and Soviet authorities to be a thorn in the side of expansion in the Caucasus. The mountaineers carried on great battles against the Terek Cossacks, enlisted to pacify the Caucasus in Russian expansionism in the mid-nineteenth Century. After the Revolution of 1917, Chechens and Ingush resisted Soviet power; many died or were exiled in fighting against the Reds even after the Civil War itself was concluded. In the drive for collectivization, the Chechens and Ingush distinguished themselves by their fierce resistance to NKVD pressure to give up their plots and animals to newly founded kolkhozes. Even on the eve of the war, there were skirmishes between NKVD mountain units and scattered Chechen fighters, resisting induction in the Red Army. In this sense, Stalin and Beria seized the opportunity of the war and allegations of collaboration to deal with the Chechens and Ingush once and for all. Not surprisingly their plan did not work; hundreds of Chechens and Ingush escaped to mountain hide-outs and carried out warfare against NKVD troops late into the late 1940s and 1950s. During the recent war in Chechnya, military journals published detailed accounts of the attempts by specially-trained NKVD armed units to flush the Chechens from the mountains.⁸⁵ The idea in publishing this material was clearly to apply the lessons learned in the post-deportation struggles in the Caucasus to the contemporary war in Chechnya.

The Serbs' ethnic cleansing of Muslims in Bosnia was carried out with an eye towards strategic justifications, sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly invoked. The attacks on the Muslims were concentrated in Western Bosnia, around Banja Luka, and in Eastern Herzegovina, especially along the Drina valley bordering on Serbia

proper. There can be little question that Milošević, Karadžić, Mladić and the paramilitaries associated with them, focused on the villages and towns of these regions in order to create a Serbian territory contiguous with Serbia proper and joined to one another through the corridor of Brčko. No Muslim enclaves would be allowed to remain intact in what was deemed to be Serbian territory. Hence the fearsome attacks on Žepa and Srebrenica in the summer of 1995 and the continuing pressure on Goražde before Dayton. It remains to be seen whether the Dayton provisions calling for the return of refugees to their homes will be honored. The practical difficulties seem overwhelming, and the logic of expelling the Bosnian Muslims from Serbian territory allows no exceptions. In fact, there is a “ratcheting up” effect noted by Terry Martin in his work on ethnic cleansing in the Soviet Russia in the late 1930s.⁸⁶ Once the deportations start, those left behind are all the more subject to deportation because their dissatisfaction with the authorities will only be more intense. Moreover, theoretically they might be used both to justify the return of others, or — as Talaat Pasha told Ambassador Morgenthau about the surviving Armenians — they might “plan their revenge.”⁸⁷ The logic of ethnic cleansing, in other words, allows no exceptions.

Deporting Whole Nations

Ethnic cleansing establishes hard and inviolable borders between those who perpetrate the cleansing and those who are cleansed; there are no uncertainties and few compromises. Only the Ottoman and Turkish examples exhibited some variance from the general rule. Greeks were allowed to stay in Istanbul until the end of the 1920s; in fact, the total expulsion of all Greeks in Turkey was not completed until 1955. A substantial number of Armenians also managed to survive the 1915 genocide in Ottoman territory. Some Constantinople Armenians were not subjected to massacres or attacks. Among the Armenians deported from their homes in eastern Anatolia, some were able to save themselves and their children by converting to Islam. Enough Armenians survived in Cilicia in the south to form an Armenian brigade commanded by the French. One might argue that the nationalism of the Young Turks and their followers was not sufficiently distinguishable from Ottoman patriotism to adopt the kind of racialist ideology that would demand the elimination of *all* Armenians, the way Hitler insisted on the destruction of all of the Jews. Yet it is important to distinguish the events of 1915 from the massacres of Armenians under Abdul Hamid II in the mid-1890s. As Richard Hovannisian

has noted, the massacres of the mid-1890s were intended to keep the Armenians "in their place." On the other hand, the Young Turks sought "to create a frame of reference that did not include the Armenians at all."⁸⁸ In that sense, indeed, the Armenian genocide can be compared to the Holocaust.

Still, it was Hitler who introduced into the history of ethnic cleansing an unrelenting racist essence. As we know, the Jews — defined in genetic, not cultural, religious, or linguistic terms — were scheduled to be eliminated from the country, and eventually condemned to death. Jews survived the Holocaust, but not because the Nazis did not intend to kill them. After the war, the Poles and Czechs adopted a similarly racist idea of who is a German. Even completely Polonized Germans had to leave the new republic, though some successfully hid their nationality from the authorities. All Germans — fascists or anti-fascists — were forced to flee. Mikołajczyk liked to quote the famous statement of Stalin to Sikorski about the nationalism of German communists: "they are all Germans, all the same — fanatical and cruel."⁸⁹ No one forced the Germans to leave, Mikołajczyk insisted. But to those who fled, he would only say: "Go to hell, there is no return here for you."⁹⁰

Despite this rhetoric, the Poles sought to rescue as many Germanized Poles for the Polish nation as they could, just as the Germans tried to identify real Aryans among the Poles and Czechs for re-Germanization. The so-called autochthons who lived in formerly German territories — Mazurians, Kashubs, and Silesians — were similarly given the opportunity to re-Polonize themselves. In both the Polish and Czech cases, elaborate legal procedures were established to deal with the right to remain in the new republics of Germans in mixed marriages and children of mixed marriages. The documentation required in these legal procedures resembled that used by the Nazis to establish racial purity: baptismal certificates going back two generations, residence permits, and certified family trees. It should be reiterated, however, that legal proceedings applied only in the smallest minority of cases of ethnic cleansing. Usually, Germans and alleged Germans were expelled in paroxysms of retribution and mob violence. Few of the available legal niceties were offered German men, women or children in mixed marriages when facing vengeful Czechs and Poles.

The Soviet cases were notable for their completeness. All the Crimean Tatars — identified by the nationality recorded in their internal passports — were expelled in toto from their homeland. The same was true of the Chechens and Ingush. No exceptions were allowed — whether party secretary, partisan fighter, valued factory

specialist, or Hero of the Soviet Union. Husbands and wives of Russians and Ukrainians had the choice to be deported with their respective Chechen-Ingush or Tatar spouses; children not yet 16 could stay behind with the acceptable spouse. Tatar and Chechen-Ingush men at the front were deported directly from their units to one of the Central Asian destinations for exile. Sometimes it took years for families to be reunited.

The extent of the Soviet mania to cleanse the Crimea of every single Tatar is evident in the papers of the postwar Crimean oblast NKVD. In the late 1940s, a number of influential Tatars had managed to get permission from Moscow to return to the Crimea for one reason or another. In some cases, they had outstanding war records or they provided compelling family reasons to return. But the local NKVD authorities were outraged that as many as 220 or so returnees had reestablished homes in the Crimea and insisted that they not be given residency permits. The local party *obkom* requested that Moscow not allow any more Tatars to leave Uzbekistan and that all of those Tatars present in the Crimea be permitted to live anywhere in the Soviet Union except for the Crimea.⁹¹ Similarly, once all the Chechens and Ingush were deported from their homelands in 1944, requests to return were systematically rejected, although some well-connected Chechens were allowed to leave Kazakhstan for other parts of the Soviet Union.

Even after the death of Stalin in March 1953, the Soviet authorities refused to allow the Chechens and Ingush to return to their homelands, though a few began to make their way to the Northern Caucasus in any case. After Khrushchev's secret speech in February 1956 called attention to the violations and "excesses" of Stalinist policy in the treatment of Soviet nationalities, thousands of Chechens and Ingush began the long trek home. But unlike other nationalities, officially they were not allowed to return to their homelands. They were removed from the inferior status of being *spetspereselentsy*, but, stated the directive of the Supreme Soviet, "this does not mean that they have the right to the return of their property confiscated during their expulsion, nor do they have the right to return to the places from which they were expelled."⁹² In fact, the Soviet government intended to prevent the Chechens and Ingush from returning home at all and wanted them to move to an autonomous region designated for their peoples in Kazakhstan. But Chechen and Ingush party leaders and intelligentsia resolutely rejected any such "solution" to their problems.⁹³ Despite opposition from the new rulers of the traditional Chechen-Ingush homelands, the Soviet government finally relented in 1957. The Chechen and Ingush Autonomous Republic was reestablished and all

the Chechens and Ingush were allowed to return home.⁹⁴ The Crimean Tatars were not mentioned at all in the Secret Speech, and the implication was that they would not be rehabilitated like the other peoples. In fact, the Tatars were never rehabilitated; nor did they ever receive formal permission to return to their homeland in the Crimea. Only during *perestroika* did the situation change to the extent that Tatars could protest and demand the return of their lands, as they do today.

Even the intervention of the international community did not prevent the almost complete expulsion of Bosnian Muslims from what the Bosnian Serbs identified as their territory. The Muslim enclave of Goražde remains intact, in good measure because SFOR (NATO) troops are now on the ground in Bosnia. The logic of ethnic cleansing renders illusory the Dayton provisions that Bosnian Muslims be allowed to return to their homes and villages in the Srpska Republika. It seems equally unlikely that the Croat government will tolerate a reversal of its ethnic cleansing of Krajina in the summer of 1995. A more realistic test of the Croat government's ability to reverse the logic of complete ethnic cleansing of their territory of Serbs is Eastern Slavonia, where the political and cultural status of Serbs within Croatia remains contested. Not unlike the Czechs during the war who argued that individual antifascist Germans should be allowed to remain in Czechoslovakia as Czech citizens — like any other citizen, with no special status — the Croats maintain that they are ready to accept Serbs who are not tainted by "war crimes" as citizens of the new Croatia. Alas, the exclusivist logic of ethnic cleansing militates against a mixed Eastern Slavonia of Croats and Serbs, just as it militated against a mixed Czech-German population in the former Sudetenland. The city of Mostar lies at the heart of the internal conflict within the Muslim-Croat federation. On both sides of the Neretva, which divides the city between the western Croatian and eastern Muslim sections, ethnic cleansing continues to exact its toll on the population of the "other."

Monuments and Identity

The Yugoslav example also highlights another commonality of ethnic cleansing and that is the determination of the cleansers to wipe out not only the biological traces of the people, but the physical signs and memory of their culture and civilization as well. The destruction of mosques and of churches and monasteries in Bosnia and Herzegovina was integral to the process of driving out the other. The Bosnian Serbs identified Banja Luka as a strategic center for their rule

in Western Bosnia and proceeded to dynamite all of the city's mosques and burn down its Catholic churches. All traces of the city of Foča's Muslim past were dynamited and bulldozed; even the name of the city was changed to Srbinje (Serb Place). Trebinje's 500-year old mosque was dynamited; the town's graceful Turkish manor and surrounding buildings were burned to the ground.⁹⁵ After the Chechens and Ingush were driven from their homelands, Soviet bulldozers tore into Muslim cemeteries — the most sacred of Chechen and Ingush architectural monuments — and upended all of the gravestones. The Soviets then used the stones to serve as the foundations for factories and to pave roads, very much like the Nazis' use of Jewish gravestones.

In Anatolia, Greek and Armenian churches were destroyed and burned to the ground, sometimes with worshippers and priests in them. In other cases, the churches were transformed into mosques, frescoes defaced or painted over, altar pieces and church valuables melted down. Similarly, the Greeks robbed mosques of their carpets and furniture, killed pigs and left them to rot in the buildings, before setting them ablaze.⁹⁶ The Germans burned down synagogues during Kristallnacht, the night of broken glass, 9 November 1938; in Poland, the Germans burned and dynamited synagogues and converted others to storage houses and barns. Needless to say the Poles and Czechs also destroyed German monuments and vandalized German cemeteries. Fortunately, decent housing and building space was in such short supply, especially in devastated postwar Poland, that local Polish and Czech authorities protected well-known German architectural monuments from immediate destruction.

The destructive impulse in ethnic cleansing reaches far beyond a people and their buildings and cemeteries. Manuscripts, books, artworks, and archives are also targeted for destruction. Place names are changed.⁹⁷ Languages are purified to reflect the dominant nation and purged of local ethnic usages. Even dictionaries — Polish-German, Russian-Chechen, Turkish-Greek — are destroyed as insidious. History and historiography are changed in dramatic ways; either the expelled people disappears altogether from consideration or their role in the regions is distorted beyond all recognition.⁹⁸ After the Armenian genocide in 1915 and the Greek expulsion of 1922-23, Turkish history and historiography portrayed these peoples as being either deliriously happy in the Ottoman Empire or as plotting with the Russians (in the Armenian case) and the British (in the Greek case) to overthrow the sultanate. Especially when considering the Armenians, Turkish historians engage in a serious form of memory loss to this very day. The Nazis, of course, expunged the Jews completely from German history writing; they became the subjects instead of the new ra-

cial science. Books by, about, and including German Jews were the first to be burned by Nazi thugs. The Poles and Czechs burned and destroyed German books, almanacs, albums, and encyclopedias, while developing an historiography of the former German territories which proved their "real" Polish and Czech character and history. As late as the end of the 1960s, the Poles posted signs on the coastline west of Gdańsk to the Oder which read: "This territory always was and always will be Polish," as if they doubted that this was really the case.

Perhaps nowhere have whole peoples disappeared from books, newspapers, encyclopedias, or even daily conversation as they did in the former Soviet Union. One reads a good deal about non-persons in analyses of Soviet control of language and information, but rarely about non-peoples. When the Chechens, Ingush, and Tatars were deported from their homelands, they — for all practical purposes — disappeared into thin air. Indeed, many in the local population did not know where they had gone or if they were still alive. The Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic was formally abolished in 1946, its territories carved up between Georgia, Northern Ossetia, Dagestan, and the Stavropol region. Within a few months of the deportations, Dagestanis moved in to occupy many of the Chechens' former villages and farmsteads. Russians and Ukrainians took many of their jobs in Grozny's oil industry. The Chechen and Ingush names of towns were changed; no remnants were allowed of their culture. In the proceedings of the Grozny *obkom* for the period following the deportations, there was not a single mention of the Chechens and Ingush.⁹⁹ They had evaporated. Meanwhile, the Chechens and Ingush in Kazakhstan, isolated by the status of *spetspereselentsy*, earlier reserved for kulaks, sent their children to schools, which proscribed the use of their own language, and they were not allowed to possess books or newspapers printed in their tongue.

The situation for the Crimean Tatars was very similar, if somehow more tragic for the sheer number of books, manuscripts, and archives produced by their rich sedentary culture over the centuries and destroyed by the Soviets. In the post-deportation period, the Crimean *obkom* protocols also never once mentioned the Tatars, or, for that matter, the large numbers of Armenians, Bulgarians, and Greeks, who had been deported in the same period.¹⁰⁰ The only hint that large numbers of Crimean Tatars had been deported from the region showed up in the periodic complaints of the shortage of labor for bringing in the harvest in deserted collective farms. As in the Chechen-Ingush case, town names — some which had stood for centuries — were changed overnight; history books eliminated anything but the enemy Tatars

from their narratives; a nation disappeared, in this case to special settlements in Uzbekistan.

Attacks on Women

A final aspect of ethnic cleansing that deserves analysis is its patently gendered character. Despite the hard and firm categories of ethnicity that dominate the thinking and actions of ethnic cleansers, gender repeatedly asserts itself as a determinant of victimization. Part of the issue is the perception that the female is the locus of the nation, biologically, if not also spiritually and culturally. As a result, attacks on nations of the sort that constitute ethnic cleansing are often manifested in attacks of the most brutal sort on females of all ages and on their reproductive potentialities.

Armenian men were seized by the Turks, placed in labor battalions, and thousands were shot outright. But many fled to Russia, Greece, and the Middle East, some simply to escape persecution, others to continue to fight for their homelands. Meanwhile, the women, the aged, and the children remained behind. It was primarily the women who were forced out of their towns and villages in Anatolia and were sent on death marches through the deserts to the Euphrates. On the way, Turkish soldiers and Kurdish marauders attacked the women in droves; there was rape, gang rape, and rape murder. No one was exempt: not pregnant women, not prepubescent girls, not grandmothers. Young girls were singled out from the group and abducted into sexual slavery, sometimes to brothels for Turkish troops, sometimes for the harems of Kurdish chieftains. In Bitlis, 300 young girls were exempted from the deportations to serve as prostitutes for the Turkish army. Inevitably, the girls became diseased with syphilis and gonorrhea. They were then executed — in the words of the town's commandant — for "exhausting the vital force of the Ottoman army and [infecting] ... the children of the Fatherland."¹⁰¹ Armenian women and girls were helpless victims; few escaped the onslaught during the long march; many committed suicide.¹⁰² Rape and the humiliation of women was all too common on both sides of the Greco-Turkish conflict, as well. As soldiers, men could protect themselves from the aggressor in retreat or die in battle. Almost always unarmed and without defenses, the women — Greeks, Turks, Armenians — were open season for the marauding bands of armed ethnic bands that were so prevalent in Anatolia at the end of the First World War.

Nazi treatment of Jewish women also differed from that of the men, especially before the campaign of mass extermination was set in motion in the fall and winter 1941-42. Jewish women were subject to

sterilization; they were used for medical experiments involving pregnancy and abortion; they were forced to serve in SS brothels for the "pleasure" of Polish and Ukrainian camp guards and non-German SS affiliates. The Nazi determination to humiliate Jewish women knew no bounds. At every opportunity, they were stripped of their clothes, deloused, and marched about for the amusement of ghetto and camp guards. Often separated from the men, their fate in the mass extermination camps was also more unalterable, as the Nazis were determined to kill off the future of the Jewish people. Mary Felstiner recounts the unequal victimization of Jewish women: "Women were the ones more often left behind during emigrations from the Reich.... [Citing Auschwitz commandant Rudolf Hoess] 'There were always more men fit for labor than women.' [And Hoess again] 'The women went in [to the gas chambers] first with their children, followed by the men who were always the fewer in number.'" She concludes from her investigations:

Genocide is the act of putting women and children first. Of all the deceptions a death camp settled on, this one went down deepest. This was the hard core of the Holocaust.¹⁰³

In their newly occupied Western territories, Polish marauders sometimes chased down and raped German women of all ages, children and grandmothers included. Especially in the first months of the Polish occupation, armed adventurers from the former Generalgouvernement followed Soviet troops into the region with no intention of staying or settling, as hoped for by the Polish authorities, and with every intention of stealing what they could from the Germans. Away from their homes, brutalized by the experience of the Nazi occupation, and in search of booty, these Polish bands engaged in terrible acts of violence against German women, the vast majority of whom lived without military-age men at home.¹⁰⁴ The men had either retreated from the Red Army advance and were captured or killed by the Soviets. The actual expulsion, flight, and eventual deportation of the Germans took place in uneven waves, chaotically and often without rhyme or reason, leaving German women dispersed, confused, and uncertain of their futures. Many Germans expected that the Western Allies would occupy the territory that had been temporarily given over to the Poles. The Potsdam conference on the one hand and the British and U.S. foreign policy statements on the other were decidedly ambiguous on this issue, as the final determination of the eastern borders of Germany were to be left to the future peace conference. Mean-

while, German women paid a fearsome price of the Nazi attack on Poland; they were open season to rapists and plunderers.

There were few ambiguities about the future of the Sudeten Germans. Beneš was uncompromising; he wanted them all out and the Allies (British, Americans, and Soviets) all supported his demands. The Potsdam agreement actually slowed down the process of expelling the Sudeten Germans because an Allied commission was formed to insure the "orderly and humane" transfer of the population to Germany and Austria, as prescribed in Article XIII of the treaty.¹⁰⁵ The Americans, in particular, wanted to bring the chaotic expulsions under control, since most of the Sudeten Germans were designated to settle in Bavaria in the American zone. Meanwhile, tens of thousands of Czech communists and "antifascists" were transferred to the Soviet zone. The Beneš government was not content to wait for the American transports before seizing German property.¹⁰⁶ As a result, the local authorities removed the Germans from their homes and — in a sometimes more and sometimes less humane and orderly fashion — separated the men and women and confined them to ill-provisioned work camps. In the camps for females, the German women were subjected to humiliating searches, sexual abuse, and rape. When Czech commandants and guards were themselves disinclined to rape and sexual exploitation, they were more than willing to use the camps as bordellos for Russian soldiers stationed nearby. Czech overseers were known to scream at the women the epithets "German whores!" "German pigs!" That is precisely how they treated them. Before the final transfer out of Czechoslovakia was accomplished, many German women were badly infected with syphilis and gonorrhea; others were psychologically and physically wrecked by the frequent abuse of Soviet soldiers invited to the compounds by the Czechs.¹⁰⁷

Except for the first incursions of Soviet advanced units and NKVD troops into the Crimea after the Nazi retreat, when there were reports of the rape of Tatar women, the deportations of the Crimean Tatars and the Chechen and Ingush were not accompanied, as far as I know, by rape and the purposeful humiliation of women. Yet the Soviet deportations of the peoples of the Northern Caucasus and Crimea turned into attacks on women, the aged, and children, if for no other reason than that many of the military age men had perished or disappeared during the war. Even a few Chechen men managed to flee to the highest mountains, seeking to escape the fate of their fellow villagers. The women thus bore the brunt of the harsh conditions and helplessness of the deportation. As Muslim believers, the Tatar and Chechen and Ingush women also suffered terribly the loss of all privacy in the crowded and suffocating freight cars. The shame inflicted on the

women by the deportation paled when they faced the harsh conditions of survival in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Faced with an unfamiliar terrain, harsh climatic conditions, and alien cultures, the women were forced to take control of the family's economy, trying to scratch out an existence in extremely inhospitable surroundings. Many had to watch their children die, helpless and heart-broken.¹⁰⁸

Beverly Allen has written a searing indictment of Serbian attacks on Muslim women called *Rape Warfare*. The argument is that the Serbs not only used rape as a weapon of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, but that rape was central to their genocidal goals. She cites "tens of thousands" of cases of genocidal rape, whose goal was the impregnation of Bosnian women.¹⁰⁹ The European Council reported over 20,000 rapes; the Bosnian government estimated the number as being closer to 50,000.¹¹⁰ In the case of Bosnia, there can be little doubt that Serbian rape of Muslim women was not simply another example of the evil effects of men at war or of ethnic cleansing as an historical phenomenon.¹¹¹ Serbian soldiers have spoken of being ordered to rape. Rape camps had logistical and financial support from the agencies of the Bosnian Serbian government. The idea behind the rapes seems to have been two-fold. On the one hand, the reports of rape — easy enough to publicize widely — would help drive the Bosnian Muslims from their homelands. In this case rape is not an act of vengeance or humiliation of the enemy, it is a means to an end, a way of forcing the Muslim population to flee. Secondly, rape, impregnation, and forcing women to have the babies, "little Chetniks," was seen as a way to humiliate the victim, destroy their reproductive capabilities, and convince them their offspring were really Serbs.

Bosnian Muslim men also have suffered terribly at the hands of the Serbs, as well. The prison camps and torture, the mass executions and humiliations, have made an indelible impression on the world community, inspiring the creation of the War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague and the determination of the Tribunal to seize the individuals responsible for these heinous crimes and bring them to justice. Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims have been indicted for war crimes against the others. In part as recognition of the role of rape in ethnic cleansing, it too has been recognized a war crime. Fundamentally, the argument was that rape and sexual abuse produce "serious bodily" and "mental harm," and therefore should be seen as violations of the U.N. Genocide Convention of 1948.¹¹²

There is no easy answer to the question: why has rape assumed such an important dimension of the history of ethnic cleansing and genocide? Clearly, rape has been associated historically with modern warfare and military occupation.¹¹³ But in the situation of ethnic

cleansing, a number of other unarticulated social-psychological pathologies are being expressed at once. First of all, there is the denigration of women as a way to dishonor the ethnic other. Rape is seen in this connection as a way to exact revenge on the other for alleged injuries and insults. By violating women of child-bearing age, in particular, the ethnic cleanser attempts to destroy the core of the opponent nation. No doubt, in many cases, the rapists see the opportunity to realize their own misogynist and pornographic fantasies in war and in ethnic strife.¹¹⁴ Indeed, rape may be an indicator of even more deeply embedded problems of attraction to and repulsion from the women (and men) of the "other." Klaus Theweleit's study of the frightening psychosexual fantasies of Freikorps veterans is very suggestive in this regard.¹¹⁵

Conclusion

As a sad postscript to this outline of the dimensions of ethnic cleansing in the twentieth century, it is worth noting that there is no reason to assume that this brutal historical phenomenon will not continue into the twenty-first century. The "Short Twentieth Century" in point of fact is interminably long.¹¹⁶ What Rogers Brubaker has termed — somewhat harmlessly — the "unmixing of peoples" is a process whose force and violence have been far from exhausted on the European continent, or in the world as a whole.¹¹⁷ What is more, international institutions show no more ability to deal with ethnic cleansing than they did at the start of the century. The European powers seemed helpless to intervene on behalf of the Armenians and only aggravated the problems of the ethnic cleansing of the Greeks from Anatolia. The centrality of the Holocaust to *our* understanding of the twentieth century should not obscure the fact that the killing of the Jews was a matter of only mild concern to the "world community" during the Second World War. Even if the countries of the West knew about the deportations of the Chechen-Ingush and Crimean Tatars, they would most certainly have raised even less of a fuss about these events than they did when the Russians bombarded Grozny in 1994. There were some passing criticisms of the Poles and Czechs for the brutality of the expulsions of Germans; but few non-Germans could muster much sympathy for their plight. With violent ethnic cleansing and mass rape on our television screens night after night from the late spring of 1992 until the horrors of Srebrenica in the summer of 1995, the West did little or nothing to stop the genocidal acts in the war of Yugoslav succession. Unlike Lausanne and Potsdam before it, the Dayton agreement did bring an end to the fighting. But like the other peace agree-

ments, it also stabilized the ethnic divisions in former multinational societies. Therefore, the Dayton peace treaty should be thought of — like Lausanne and Potsdam — as a symbol of defeat rather than of victory. Ethnic cleansing was again successful. Why should the twenty-first century be any different?

To view ethnic cleansing in a comparative perspective should make it clear that historically it is not specific to particular cultures, East or West, Muslim or Christian, socialist or democratic, rich or poor. Modern states and modern politicians are very much the initiators of ethnic cleansing, and the sovereignty implied in their domestic affairs makes it difficult, if not impossible, for supra-state organizations to intervene. But this does not alleviate the responsibility of individual citizens and the human community for the havoc wreaked on their fellow men and women in this century. In this sense, Christopher Browning has it right and Daniel Goldhagen has it wrong; it is human action and inaction located in concrete societies and polities that we must investigate, not the ostensibly perverse histories or national characteristics of the Germans (or the Turks or the Serbs).¹¹⁸

Notes

¹ For a description of the origins and meaning of the word genocide, see Robert Melson, *Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 22-24; and Leo Kuper, *Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1981), pp. 52-56. For a recent discussion of the character of genocide and ethnic cleansing see Robert M. Hayden, "Schindler's Fate: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, and Population Transfers," *Slavic Review*, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Winter 1996), pp. 727-748.

² E. H. Carr, *What is History?* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962).

³ See Laura Silber and Allan Little, *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation* (New York: TV Books, 1995), p. 244.

⁴ See William Safire's "On Language" column of *The New York Times Magazine* (14 March 1993), p. 24.

⁵ Roy Gutman, *A Witness to Genocide* (New York: Macmillan, 1993), pp. 90-101.

⁶ Veljko Vujčić, *Communism, Nationalism, and Democracy in Russia and Serbia: 1985-1993* (draft manuscript), p. 149, note 30. My thanks to the author for making available a copy.

⁷ For the racial-hygienic theories behind the idea of "Säuberung," see Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wippermann, *The Racial State: Germany 1933-1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 28-37; and George L. Mosse, *Toward the Final Solution: A History of European Racism* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), pp. 215-222.

⁸ Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, "Introduction," *Becoming National: A Reader* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 21.

⁹ Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996), p. 23. Here, Goldhagen writes: "These chapters demonstrate the development in Germany well before the Nazis came to power of a virulent and violent 'eliminationist' variant of antisemitism, which called for the elimi-

nation of Jewish influence or of Jews themselves from German society. When the Nazis did assume power, they found themselves the masters of a society already imbued with notions about Jews that were ready to be mobilized for the most extreme form of 'elimination' imaginable."

¹⁰ Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 61-62.

¹¹ Peter F. Sugar, "Nationalism and Religion in the Balkans Since the 19th Century," *The Donald W. Treadgold Papers*, University of Washington, No. 8 (July 1996), p. 35.

¹² On the dominance of the modern state, see Daniel Chirot, "Modernism without Liberalism: The Ideological Roots of Modern Tyranny," *Contention*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Fall 1995), pp. 144-147; and "Herder's Multicultural Theory of Nationalism and its Consequences," *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Winter 1996), pp. 11-13.

¹³ Omer Bartov, *Murder in Our Midst: The Holocaust, Industrial Killing, and Representation* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 3-11; and Elisabeth Domansky, " Militarization and Reproduction in World War I Germany," in Geoff Eley (ed.), *Society, Culture, and the State in Germany, 1870-1930* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), pp. 427-463.

¹⁴ Nancy Reynolds, "Difference and Tolerance in the Ottoman Empire; interview with Aron Rodrigue," *Stanford Humanities Review*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1995), p. 81-93.

¹⁵ Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A Study in the Contact of Civilizations*, 2nd ed. (London, Bombay: Constable and Company, Ltd, 1923), p. 265.

¹⁶ See Vahakn N. Dadrian, "The Role of Turkish Physicians in the World War I Genocide of Ottoman Armenians," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Autumn 1986), pp. 169-192; and Lysimachos Econominos, *The Martyrdom of Smyrna and Eastern Christendom* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1922), p. 27.

¹⁷ Robert J. Lifton, *The Nazi Doctors, Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide* (New York: Basic Books, 1986). See also Burleigh and Wippermann, *The Racial State*, pp. 136-197; and Götz Aly, Peter Chroust,

and Christian Pross, *Cleansing the Fatherland: Nazi Medical and Racial Hygiene*, trans. by Belinda Cooper (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), pp. 22-99. For the role of "technocrats," see Christopher R. Browning, *The Path to Genocide: Essays on Launching the Final Solution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 59-76; also for doctors, see *ibid.*, pp. 145-168.

¹⁸ The closest one comes, in my view, is Ronald Suny's essay "Rethinking the Unthinkable: Toward an Understanding of the Armenian Genocide," in Ronald Grigor Suny, *Looking Toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 94-115.

¹⁹ Burleigh and Wippermann, *The Racial State: Germany 1933-1945*, pp. 145-147; and Götz Aly, "Medicine Against the Useless," in Aly, Chroust, and Pross, *Cleansing the Fatherland*, pp. 22-99.

²⁰ Christopher Browning, "Hitler and the Decisions for the Final Solution," The Elsie B. Lipset Lecture, Stanford University, 4 March 1997. See also his *The Path to Genocide*, pp. 125-144.

²¹ On the other hand, Katz's argument is serious, well-documented, and cannot be lightly dismissed. Steven T. Katz, *The Holocaust in Historical Context*, Vol. 1 ("The Holocaust and Mass Death before the Modern Age") (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 27-63.

²² The document was prepared for Beneš in 1943-44. See Hoover Institution Archives (hereafter, HIA), Edward Taborsky Collection.

²³ See Norman M. Naimark, *The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 148.

²⁴ HIA, Mikołajczyk, Box 38, Speech in Opole, 8 April 1946, p. 4.

²⁵ On Gomulka, see Antony Polonsky and Boleslaw Drukier (eds.), *The Beginnings of Communist Rule in Poland* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), p. 425; and G. P. Murashko and A. F. Noskova, "Natsional'no-territorial'nyi vopros v kontekste poslevoennykh real'nostei Vostochnoi Evropy, 1945-1948 gg.," *Natsional'nyi vopros v Vostochnoi Evrope: proshloe i nastoiashchee* (Moscow: Rossiiskaia akademiia nauk, 1995), pp. 236-237.

²⁶ According to NKVD figures of 26 November 1948, the number of Chechen-Ingush living in special settlements was 364,220, Karachaevtsy — 56,869, Balkars — 31,648 and Crimean Tatars — 185,603. If these figures are correct, roughly 290,000 of these peoples died in transport or after they arrived at their settlements. Tsentral'noe Khranenie Sovremennykh Dokumentov (Central Storehouse of Contemporary Documents, hereafter, TsKhSD), f. 2, op. 1, d. 65, l. 14.

²⁷ According to Beria's report to Stalin of 9 July 1944, the numbers deported were: 496,460 Chechen-Ingush, 68,327 Karachaevtsy, and 37,406 Balkars. His report of 4 July 1944 about the numbers deported from the Crimea include: 188,155 Tatars, 12,422 Bulgarians, 15,040 Greeks, and 9,621 Armenians. Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (State Archive of the Russian Federation, hereafter, GARF), f. 9401, op. 2, d.65, l. 275.

²⁸ *The New York Times* (29 April 1997).

²⁹ See the thorough investigation of the provenance of this quote in: Kevork B. Bardakjian, *Hitler and the Armenian Genocide* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Zoryan Institute, 1985), pp. 3-24. The original German documents, including the Louis Lochner document containing the Armenian reference, are in *Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik, 1918-1945, Serie D (1937-1945), Vol. VII* (Baden-Baden: Imprimerie Nationale, 1956), pp. 171-172.

³⁰ Vahakn N. Dadrian, *The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus* (Providence, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995), p. 409.

³¹ For German accounts of the brutality of the expulsions, which, however, show absolutely no understanding for the reasons the Czechs and Poles felt the need for retributive justice, see: *Die Vertreibung der deutschen Bevölkerung aus der Tschechoslowakei*, Vol. 2 (Munich: Deutschen Taschenbuch Verlag, 1984); and *Die Vertreibung der deutschen Bevölkerung aus den Gebieten östlich der Oder-Neisse*, Vols. 1 and 2 (Munich: Weltbild Verlag, 1993).

³² HIA, Edward Taborsky Collection, box 8, "Minority Regimes and the Transfer of Populations in Central Europe After this War," (prepared for Beneš, 1943-44), p. 8.

³³ Especially the deportation of the Koreans from the Soviet Far East in September 1937 served as a model for later mass deportations of minority peoples. GARF, f. 5446, op. 57, d. 52, l. 29.

³⁴ Amir Weiner, "Hierarchical Heroism and Universal Suffering: Biology, Sociology and the Postwar Jewish Community," Draft paper, Stanford, 1997, pp. 38-39.

³⁵ My thanks to Amir Weiner for pointing out this document. "Vystuplenie tovarishcha I. V. Stalina na prieme v Kremle v chest' komanduiushchikh voiskami Krasnoi Armii," *Bol'shevik*, Vol. XX, No. 10 (May 1945), pp. 1-2.

³⁶ Terry Martin, "The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing," in "The Soviet Nationalities Policy, 1923-1938", Ph.D. Thesis, University of Chicago, 1993. My gratitude to the author for sending me his manuscript.

³⁷ Shimon Redlich, ed., *War, Holocaust and Stalinism: A Documented History of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee in the USSR* (Luxemburg: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1955), p. 449.

³⁸ See Noel Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short History* (New York and London: New York University Press, 1994), pp. 189-192.

³⁹ For those victims from the communist side, see Ivo Banac, *With Stalin Against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 243-254.

⁴⁰ Arnold Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*, p. 262.

⁴¹ Katz, *The Holocaust in Historical Context*, p. 87. See his discussion of the numbers issue on p. 86, fn. 80.

⁴² Suny, *Looking Toward Ararat*, p. 114.

⁴³ Articles reproduced from the Western English-language press are compiled in Richard Diran Kloian, *The Armenian Genocide: First 20th Century Holocaust* (65th Anniversary Memorial Volume, 1980).

⁴⁴ Robert Melson, *Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 143-145.

⁴⁵ See Mim Kemal Öke, *The Armenian Question 1914-1923* (Oxford: K. Rustem & Brother, 1988), pp. 126-136; and Heath W. Lowry, *The Story Behind Ambassador Morgenthau's Story* (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1990); and Stanford Jay Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, Vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976-1977), p. 30.

⁴⁶ For the most deeply researched, if analytically confusing, account that includes some Ottoman archival material, see Dadrian, *The History of the Armenian Genocide*, pp. 219-234.

⁴⁷ Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*, pp. 282-288.

⁴⁸ Some Greek scholars suggest an even higher death toll of 125,000. See Econominos, *The Martyrdom of Smyrna*, p. 84. More likely is the figure provided by Dimitri Pentzopoulos of 12,000: *The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and its Impact upon Greece* (Paris and the Hague: Mouton & Co., 1962), p. 47.

⁴⁹ Pentzopoulos, *The Balkan Exchange of Minorities*, p. 47.

⁵⁰ Michael Marrus, *The Unwanted: European Refugees in the 20th Century* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 102-103.

⁵¹ Pentzopoulos, *The Balkan Exchange of Minorities*, p. 1, n. 79. According to Stephen Ladas, Lausanne oversaw the actual transfer of 189,916 Greeks to Greece (1924-26) and 355,635 Muslims to Turkey (1923-25). More than one million Greeks, he states, had already fled Anatolia by the time of Lausanne. Stephen Ladas, *The Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1932), pp. 17 and 441.

⁵² Ladas, *The Exchange of Minorities*, p. 724.

⁵³ Cited in Ladas, *The Exchange of Minorities*, pp. 341 and 378.

⁵⁴ Gerhard Ziemer, *Deutscher Exodus: Vertreibung und Eingliederung von 15 Millionen Ostdeutschen* (Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag, 1973), pp. 94 and 227. Heinz Nawratil estimates that of the 2.23 million dead, 185,000 were from Poland (14 per cent of German inhabitants) and 272,000 from Czechoslovakia (8 per cent of German inhabitants). Nawratil's estimates are the source of considerable dispute as exces-

sively high. See Heinz Nawratil, *Vertreibungs-Verbrechen an Deutschen* (Munich: Ullstein, 1987), p. 71. Many memoirs of the expulsions from Czechoslovakia talk about a quarter of a million losses. Even today, Czech historians claim that no more than between 15,000 and 40,000 Germans died in the "transfer." See *The New York Times* (9 February 1996).

⁵⁵ Gerhard Weinberg, *A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 895.

⁵⁶ Bradley Abrams explains "the virulence of the Czech's anti-Germanism" as having "arisen from their less than illustrious resistance record, coupled with the needs of compensating for the humiliations of Munich and occupation." In short, the Czechs needed to demonstrate "to themselves and their enemies who the true victors of the war were." Bradley Abrams, "The Struggle for the Soul of the Nation': Czech Culture and Socialism, 1945-1948," Stanford University, unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, 1997, p. 129.

⁵⁷ Report of the Political Section of the 4th Tank Army to the chief of the Political Administration of the First Ukrainian Front, "Ob otnoshenii chekhoslovatskogo naseleniia k nemtsam," 18 May 1945, Rossiiskii Tsentri Khraneniia i Izucheniiia Dokumentov Noveishei Istorii (Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Contemporary History, hereafter, RTsKhIDNI), f. 17, op. 128, d. 320, l. 161. The NKVD complained that Soviet commandants did not try to control the brutal expulsions of Germans from Czechoslovakia. Serov to Beria, 4 July 1945, GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 97, ll. 143-144.

⁵⁸ *Die Vertreibung der deutschen Bevölkerung aus der Tschechoslowakei*, Band I, pp. 121-123.

⁵⁹ Padraic Kenney, *Rebuilding Poland: Workers and Communists, 1945-1950* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 140-141.

⁶⁰ The most up-to-date work on the deportations is that of N. F. Bugai. In particular, see his *L. Beria — I. Stalinu: "Soglasno Vashemu ukazaniiu..."* (Moscow: "AIRO-XX", 1995), pp. 90-142 (for the Chechens and Ingush) and pp. 142-163 (for the Crimean Tatars).

⁶¹ Aleksandr M. Nekrich, *The Punished Peoples: The Deportation and Fate of the Soviet Minorities at the End of the Second World War*, trans. George Saunders (New York: W.W. Norton, 1978), p. 109.

⁶² GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 177, ll. 2-3.

⁶³ GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 153, l. 80. See also Beria's reports to Stalin and Molotov of July 1944, in which the NKVD chief talks about starvation and death among the deported settlers as a result of food shortages. Ibid., d. 183, l. 54. A local NKVD official in Kazakhstan, Fedotov, reports to Kruglov and Bogdanov in Moscow that many "abnormalities" appeared in the local arrangements for the Chechens and Ingush that caused much sickness and death among them. Ibid., l. 218.

⁶⁴ A 10 January 1945 report notes that the *spetspereselentsy* were in such bad shape that they could not work. They were "exhausted, weak, many were sick, [and] insufficiently clothed." GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 153, l. 20. "A very poor diet" is leading to the death of these people, a 23 November 1944 report notes. Ibid., ll. 42-43.

⁶⁵ GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 183, l. 37, ll. 238-239. Here, one typical *kolkhoz* leader is reported to have said, "We don't need your *spetspereselentsy*."

⁶⁶ GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 183, l. 290.

⁶⁷ Vasilii Subbotin, "Bor'ba s istoriei," *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 30 January 1991, in *Tak eto bylo*, Vol. III (Moscow: Rossiiskii mezhdunarod. fond kultury, 1993), p. 71.

⁶⁸ See the collection of his dispatches, in Gutman, *Witness to Genocide*. See also Helsinki Watch, *War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, Vol. 2 (New York, Washington D.C.: Helsinki Watch, 1993), especially "Patterns of Abuse," pp. 7-42.

⁶⁹ Christopher Walker, *Armenia: The Survival of a Nation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), p.200.

⁷⁰ Nekrich, *Punished Peoples*, pp. 57-58. On the Tatars, see Subbotin, "Bor'ba s istoriei," *Tak eto bylo*, Vol. III, p. 83.

⁷¹ The sharp conflict in the Tatar *obkom*, which met at this point in Sochi, is recorded in the protocols of the 18 November 1942, and 21 July 1943 meetings. RTsKhIDNI, op. 43, d. 1045, ll. 74-84; d. 1044, ll.

251-282. See also Alan Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), p. 159.

⁷² Ronald G. Suny, *Looking toward Ararat*, p. 106.

⁷³ Cited in Leo Kuper, "The Turkish Genocide of Armenians, 1915-1917," in R. G. Hovannisian, *The Armenian Genocide in Perspective* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1986), p. 48.

⁷⁴ Ladas, *The Exchange of Minorities*, p. 440.

⁷⁵ Cited in Melson, *Revolution and Genocide*, pp. 228-229.

⁷⁶ HIA, "Postwar Borders Poland," Kierownictwo Marynarki Wojennej, "Potrzeba Polityczno-Militarna Szczecina," November 1943, pp. 7-8; and Polish Foreign Ministry, "Granice zachodnie," p. 341. See also Sarah Meiklejohn Terry, *Poland's Place in Europe: General Sikorski and the Origin of the Oder-Neisse Line, 1939-1943* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 100; and Detlef Brandes, *Grossbritannien und seine osteuropäischen Alliierten 1939-1943* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1988), p. 406.

⁷⁷ HIA, Mikołajczyk, Box 38, nr. 46. Speech in Opole, 8 April 1946.

⁷⁸ Every German, insisted Mikołajczyk, was a "German nationalist" and the Germans should be restrained from exerting any influence on European affairs. HIA, Mikołajczyk, Box 72, "Rezolucje Rady Naczelny P.S.L.," 6-7 October 1946, p. 6. Communists, followers of Mikołajczyk, and the Polish government-in-exile agreed that the Germans had to be removed. "Germans, who after the war have not left Polish territory on their own," wrote the government-in-exile's planning committee for the peace treaties, "should be removed." HIA, "Postwar Borders," Ministerstwo Prac Kongresowych, "Tezy w Sprawie Wsiedlenia Niemców z Polski," August 1944.

⁷⁹ HIA, Mikołajczyk, Box 40, Protocol of PPS and PPR meeting, 28 September 1945, p. 6; Box 38, no. 27, Speech in Bydgoszcz, 25 November 1945; Box 38, no. 25, Speech in Warsaw, 23 November 1945.

⁸⁰ Cited in Nawratil, *Vertreibungs-Verbrechen an Deutschen*, p. 96. See also Edvard Beneš, *Odsun Nemců z Československa* (Prague: Nakladatelství Dita, 1996).

⁸¹ Alexei Filitov, "Problems of Post-War Construction in Soviet Foreign Policy Conceptions during World War II," in Francesca Gori and Silvio Pons (eds.), *The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, 1943-53* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p. 9.

⁸² Edige Kirimal, "The Crimean Turks," *Genocide in the USSR* (New York: The Scarecrow Press, 1958), p. 20.

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⁸⁴ "O likvidatsii Checheno-Ingushinskoi ASSR i ob administrativnom ustroistve ee territorii," 7 March 1944, GARF, f. 7523, op. 4, d. 208, l. 51. See also GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 64, l. 161.

⁸⁵ "Bandity stremilis'... sokhranit' fashistskii poriadok," *Voennno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, No. 5 (September-October 1996), pp. 83-89.

⁸⁶ Martin, "The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing," pp. 84-88.

⁸⁷ After confessing to Ambassador Morgenthau that three-quarters of the Armenians had been "disposed of," Talaat added: "The hatred between the Turks and Armenians is now so intense that we have got to finish with them. If we don't, they will plan their revenge." Cited in Suny, *Looking Toward Ararat*, p. 114.

⁸⁸ Richard G. Hovannisian, "The Historical Dimensions of the Armenian Question, 1878-1923," *The Armenian Genocide in Perspective*, pp. 25-26.

⁸⁹ HIA, Mikołajczyk, Box 38, no. 4. Speech in Opole, 8 April 1946.

⁹⁰ HIA, Mikołajczyk, Box 38, no. 27. Speech at Bydgoszcz, 25 November 1945.

⁹¹ GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 401, l. 8. The Crimean authorities claim here that Stalin met with Comrade Bulaev of the Crimean *obkom* at Yalta on 12 September 1948 and "gave the order not to allow Tatars in the Crimea under any conditions, because they serve as sources for foreign spies." See also *ibid.*, d. 402, l. 29, which claims that on 25 April 1949, there were still 46 Tatars in the Crimea, who were designated for deportation. See GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 155, l. 60a; op. 1, d. 404, l. 6, l. 28.

⁹² Ukaz of 16 July 1956, GARF, f. 7523, op. 4, d. 629, l. 201.

⁹³ See TsK KPSS, "O territorii Checheno-Ingushskoi ASSR, 25 December 1956," TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 32, d. 56, ll. 103-104.

⁹⁴ "O vosstanovlenii Checheno-Ingushskoi ASSR v sostave RSFSR," January 1957, GARF, f. 7523, op. 72, d. 701, l. 72.

⁹⁵ See Michael A. Sells, *The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996), p. 80.

⁹⁶ See Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*, p. 298.

⁹⁷ For the case of eliminating Tatar names from the Crimea, see Vasilii Subbotin, "Bor'ba s istoriei," *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 30 January 1991, in *Tak eto bylo*, vol. III (1993), pp. 68-69.

⁹⁸ The well-known Soviet scholars B. D. Grekov and Iu. V. Bromlei contributed to the rewriting of the history of the Crimean Tatars, emphasizing their lack of interest in economic development and their historical tendency toward banditry and pillage. Subbotin, "Bor'ba s istoriei," p. 85.

⁹⁹ For Grozny obkom records, see RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 45, d. 423, d. 424.

¹⁰⁰ See, for example, RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 44, d. 758.

¹⁰¹ Cited in Vahakn N. Dadrian, "The Role of Turkish Physicians in the World War I Genocide of Ottoman Armenians," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, Vol 1, No. 2 (1986), p. 183.

¹⁰² For some accounts, memoirs and fictional: see Carol Edgarian, *Rise the Euphrates* (New York: Random House, 1994); Abraham Hartunian, *Neither to Laugh nor to Weep* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968); and Henry Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Page, 1918; reprinted: Plandome, New York: New Age, 1975).

¹⁰³ Mary Lowenthal Felstiner, *To Paint her Life: Charlotte Salomon in the Nazi Era* (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), pp. 205-211.

¹⁰⁴ These stories abound in the volumes published by the German government on the "Vertreibung." *Die Vertreibung der deutschen Bevölkerung aus den Gebieten östlich der Oder-Neisse*, Vols. 1 and 2, reprinted (Munich: Weltbild Verlag, 1993).

¹⁰⁵ Alfred M. DeZayas, *Nemesis at Potsdam: The Anglo-Americans and the Expulsion of the Germans: Background, Execution, Consequences*, third ed. (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), p. 65.

¹⁰⁶ For an insightful English-language memoir on the period, see Erich Anton Helfert, *Valley of the Shadow* (Berkeley, CA: Creative Arts Book Company, 1997).

¹⁰⁷ These stories are told in detail in *Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa IV. Die Vertreibung der deutschen Bevölkerung aus der Tschechoslowakei*, Vol. 1 (reprinted) (Munich: Deutsche Taschenbuch Verlag, 1984).

¹⁰⁸ Many of these stories are recounted in the collection, *Tak eto bylo*, 3 vols. (Moscow: Mezhdunarodn. fond kultury, 1993).

¹⁰⁹ Beverly Allen, *Rape Warfare: The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), p. 71. See also Alexandra Stiglmayer (ed.), *Mass Rape: The War against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, trans. by Marion Faber (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1992).

¹¹⁰ Francis A. Boyle, *The Bosnian People Charge Genocide: Proceedings at the International Court of Justice Concerning Bosnia v. Serbia on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* (Amherst, MA: Aletheia Press, 1996), p. 30.

¹¹¹ See Sabrina Petra Ramet, *Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to Ethnic War*, second edition (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996), pp. 258-259 and 284.

¹¹² Boyle, *The Bosnian People Charge Genocide*, p. 29.

¹¹³ See my discussion of the problem in conjunction with World War II: Naimark, *The Russians in Germany*, pp. 69-140.

¹¹⁴ See Catherine A. MacKinnon, "Turning Rape into Pornography: Turning Rape into Genocide," in Stiglmeier (ed.), *Mass Rape*, pp. 73-81.

¹¹⁵ Klaus Theweleit, *Male Fantasies*, 2 vols. trans. Stephen Conway (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1987).

¹¹⁶ For the concept of the long nineteenth and short twentieth centuries, see Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991* (New York: Pantheon, 1994), pp. 5-17.

¹¹⁷ Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 10.

¹¹⁸ Christopher Browning, "Human Nature, Culture, and the Holocaust," in *The Chronicle of Higher Education* (18 October 1996), p. A72.

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