

p.261. 13:1a) Concerning the terms of office of all posts (pōmsi man 凡仕滿):  
 (note: In ancient times they only gave posts (to people) ~~on~~ on the basis  
of their talent (they calculated a man's talent and gave him a post),  
 and there were no terms (limits on tours) of office for officials. If  
 a man's virtue surpassed his position, then he was ~~elevated~~ and promoted; ~~or~~ <sup>demoted</sup>  
 or if he could not meet his responsibilities, then he was lowered and  
~~dismissed~~ dismissed. Talent matched position and position matched ~~the~~ talent  
 and a man was appointed to office for life. They just reviewed a person's record  
 every three years, and after three such reviews dismissed or promoted him.

Therefore, 9 years was the limit for the transfer of officials, and that was  
 all there was to it. In later generations, because people spoke of limits on  
 the transfer of officials (terms in office), they devised the (idea of) term  
 (tenure) (siman), and at the present time (I) will follow the ~~popular~~ customary  
 language (terminology).)(end note)

For capital offices of the (rank) of tanghagwan and below, (the term  
 of office) will be six years. (note: For all officials who are to be  
 transferred, you must take a look at their six (yearly) performance evaluations  
 and ~~then~~ ~~results~~ how good or bad their record was, and then reevaluate whether  
 the talent of the person and his job match one another. Only after that  
 may he be recorded (appointed?) as an official (chu 注). As for those  
 of the rank of tangsang or higher, since these are positions ~~in~~ that basically  
~~are~~ people are appointed to ~~because~~ because of their virtue, they may be  
 held for long periods of time with people held responsible for success. There  
 will be no limits on ~~their~~ tenure.)(end note)

For provincial officials, such as suryōng, chinjang (鎮將), kyogwan (教官),  
ch'alpang (察訪), the term of office will be 9 years. (note: All of  
 them will be allowed to take their families with them when they go to their  
 posts. The same, for those who go to frontier places.)(end note)

The term of office for Kwan'ch'alsa (governor), chōltosa (節度使), tosa  
 (都事): change to Kyōngnyōk (經歷), Ohu (廣候): change to P'yōngsa (評事)

talent  
 No limits  
 or limits

6 yrs.

no limits on  
 tenure for  
 Tangsang official

9 yrs.

261, 13:1a) will be six years. (note: All will be allowed to take their families with them. The term of office for the haeyun p'angwan(海運判官) and the suunp'angwan(水運判官) will also be six years. If there is someone who ~~xxx~~ is given a high ranking on an evaluation (sanggo ) for merit and ought to be promoted, then promote him in rank and wait for him to finish his term of office, and then transfer him (to another post). In the case of those who ought to be kept in their post even after their term of office is over, then reappoint them.)(end note)

-ITEM: With regard to terms of office for all officials, if there is a person who ought to be transferred, you must wait for a suitable (a vacancy ~~is~~ matching his rank: Han, III, p.3) vacancy, and only after transferring him to another post should you send out a substitute. This is <sup>to be</sup> the same for both capital and provincial officials.

13:1b

note(Even though a man may be in office for a long time, you have to wait until there is a ~~xxx~~ vacancy <sup>or a man to be transferred</sup> corresponding (to his rank?--sangdang kwöl <sup>相當副官</sup>)

~~to which he is to be transferred~~, and only then send out a substitute (ch'ultae <sup>出代</sup> transfers (changes of appts kyodae <sup>校代</sup>) (to take his place). As for/provincial posts (oegwan <sup>外官</sup>), ~~officials in provincial posts, you can switch officials around~~

describes present situation in the provinces

~~officials in provincial posts, you can switch officials around~~, the governor (kwanch'alsa), provincial military commander (ch'ultosa) ~~will be~~ <sup>are</sup> (done, taken care of?) in the governor's yamen ? (Yöngmun <sup>營門</sup>), and the (transfers) of ch'ömjöl chesa( <sup>倉節制使</sup>) and manho( <sup>萬戶</sup>) ~~will be~~ <sup>are</sup> (done) in the Chinmun( <sup>鎮門</sup>), and the (transfers) of magistrates (suryöng) <sup>守令</sup> and ch'alpang( <sup>察訪</sup>) ~~will be~~ <sup>are</sup> (done) in the yamen (amun). It will be necessary for these people to face each other and exchange seals. You will eliminate the law pertaining to the clearance of departing officials (haeyuböp <sup>解由法</sup>).

Some might say: Even though at the present time capital officials have terms of office, you should wait until a suitable vacancy <sup>or transferable official</sup> opens up ~~before transferring the man and finding a replacement for him~~, and in the case of provincial officials, replace them when their terms of office are up---As for <sup>you</sup> this kind of system, <sup>where</sup> both the capital and provincial officials are the same thing (~~same body~~) one body, same type of thing), and for both of them you

261, 1:13b) should wait for a suitable & vacancy before replacing them, *what's the reason for it?*  
How about that? To this I would respond: With regard to the system of inner

and outer officials, basically there cannot be a difference between them.

What is worse, the evil of frequent transfers of officials (such'e chi p'ye

*數遷之弊*

and the matter of (dismissing ~~an~~ officials) and making them

men without office for no reason at all (mugo chaksan chi sa *無故作罷之事*)

all stem from this (all are caused by this--by the practice of transferring provincial

~~posts~~ as soon as their terms are up??) We cannot help but make it the same &

(have the same system) for both capital and provincial officials.

~~xxxxxxx~~

(Someone might) say: This is OK. (But?) at the present time provincial

officials whose terms are up are immediately replaced (with substitutes), which is because

~~but~~ a replacement is sent only after they have cleared their old posts

(i ch'ul haeyu yonhu pang tuk ch'ongju *以出解由然後才得遷注*). If you

do away with the haeyu (clearance?) system (note, Han, ~~xxx~~ III, p.4--haeyu

means transfer of duties from a retiring official to a new one and submission

of a report to the Ministry of Taxation that the old official has stolen

nothing from the public treasury.), then won't thinkgs become lax and slovenly?

To this I would respond: The so-called clearance system (haeyu) is only

a means of controlling (kuje *拘制*) whether or not the tribute items

(kongmul) for each bureau (kaksa *各司*) and the slave personal tribute (nobi sin'gong).

has been paid or not, or whether the grain loan payments (hwanja) has been

received or not, and that is all (it's for). This is in the category of what

the bureaus at all times are supposed to keep watch over; it is not essentially

something for which there has to be a ~~xxxxxx~~ separate law. How much more

so since we have already ~~xxx~~ implemented the taedong system and reformed

the grain loan system (hwansang, hwanja), so that (the old haeyu) system is

even less concerned (with these questions). If you are talking about the

amount of grain and taxes or the record of soldiers and able-bodied males,

then these can be sent every year up to the bureaus. Why do you have to wait

for this (transfer of officials?) before reviewing these (figures)?

*frequent transfers of officials - dismissal of officials without cause*

*abolish 1777 clearance*

261. 13:1b) And as for the various items in the charge of the official, naturally ~~he~~ you have account books and ledgers ~~to~~ record these things, so what fear is there that there will be any laxity (or confusion in the handling of goods or items under his charge)? Thus, what is known as the clearance system (haeyu) is something in which I see no benefit; it is only a great evil. In general (this system) is basically one which mistakes the intent of the ancients in their search for men of talent to appoint as officials (appoint to office), and for that reason its an evil of a declining age (amlyu chi p'ye), so much so that I find trouble in finding the words to completely (denounce) it.) (end note)

ITEM: If you have an important post with a vacancy, and there is an official ~~s~~ who has not yet completed his term of office but it fit (suitable) to be selected and appointed to the post, you must have a special memorial (t'ukkye ch'on 特啓薦) recommending him, and then he will be appointed (naeju 乃注)

13:2a) (note: What I mean here by "special memorial" (t'ukkye 特啓) is not like the 文啓 ~~which~~ that is used at the present time whereby ~~which~~ a recommendation is made to appoint (to office) someone from among those officials whose current tour of duty is not over yet. What it means is that if someone has talent and worth like this (that is as ~~is~~ outstanding as is required for the job), and like this he is really suitable for the responsibilities and among those ~~which~~ officials whose terms of office are up there is no one who is suitable, then you dare to petition for appointment (the person whose tour of duty is still not over). If a man is found suitable and is forthwith transferred to a post (before his current post is up?), then after he has been transferred, it will be necessary to wait until his term of office is up before he is transferred again.) (end note)

ITEM: In case of an official about to be transferred, but who has not yet change of plans? gone to his (new?) post and a change is made (~~which~~), if he is not guilty of crime or transgression (note: that is any public business or anything involving mutual avoidance (sangp'i) (end note), then he may be kept on in his old post.)

相避

261, 13:2a) (note: This ~~is~~ will also be so even for those people who have already left their posts and for whom a ~~substitute~~ substitute (has been appointed) At the present time, (ch'ultae **出代**). /With regard to officials who are to be transferred but because of mutual avoidance or because of the commission of some public crime do not go (to assume their posts, since it is contrary to the incumbents?) reason to make san'gwan (officials without office, chaksan) out of them, they may be retained in their former posts. Also, at the present time, with regard to ch'amhagwan officials (rank 6-9?) who become supernumerary officials (without jobs, san'gwan), they must be stripped of their former posts and returned to rank 9B. They also must follow (be handled in accordance with?) their former rank.)(end note)

자백  
自辟

was  
Min. of Personnel  
Min. Sec. +  
S.C.

ITEM: All the nanggwan (**郎官**) of the State Council (chongbu) and the Six Ministries (yukcho) will be hired independently (chap **自辟**) by the official in charge (tangsang **堂上**) of ~~the~~ council or the ministry.

(note: the highest official (changgwan **長官**) will discuss it with the other tangsang officials. Once they have obtained a suitable person they will write a letter of recommendation on his talents and virtues.

There may be ~~either~~ either a single candidate or two candidates ~~xi~~ (ilmang hok imang **一望或二望**), (whose names) will be sent to the State Council or Ministries, which will either appoint the person (chu'i **權注擬**) or keep it on file (yukijang **留其狀**) for future reference. With regard to the

Nanggwan of the Ministry of Personnel, the chief official of that ministry will also write a letter of recommendation and keep it on file.

If a candidate should happen not to be suitable (for the post), then the Ministry of Personnel will submit a memorial of criticism (kyugye **糾啓**)

Even though the letter recommending appointment has not been circulated among the various ministerial tangsang officials for approval and the chief official of the ministry on his own guarantees and appoints the man, if later on ~~the~~

the person (candidate), appointee) should be involved in some criminal act or meritorious deed, then the person who recommended him will be held responsible, in accordance with the regulations pertaining to recommendation (ch'on'gō **薦考**).

responsibility

261, 13:2a) If for some reason the chief official (cannot do it), then the next tangsang down (in command) will take charge of it)(end note)

The ch'amhagwan of the Seoul Magistracy (Hansongbu) will also be hired independently (chapxi) by the tangsang of that pu (office). (note: the system for this will be the same as above)(end note)

13:2b) ITEM: If a person has not held the post of magistrate (suryong) and compiled a record of achievement in government (yu ch'ihyo ja) then he cannot be promoted to a rank 3A post. (note: If you have someone whose talents and virtues stand out from the crowd and who should not be restrained by standard ~~xx~~ qualifications, then the State Council, ministries, Sahonbu will convene and discuss the case, and petition for an edict (p'umji) in order to carry out (an irregular promotion). Following articles will be the same as this.)(end note)

ITEM: An individual must be 40 years of age to be appointed to a post. (Note: If the man is an unusual talent, then you need not be restricted by his age. Discuss and petition for an edict to carry out the appointment. With regard to ~~xxxx~~ officials of rank 7 or below in the yong-byong amun provincial governor's or military commander's yamen?), ~~they may be selected~~ xx people past the age of 30 may be appointed to these posts.)(end note)

Indented note: The state code provides that sons and grandsons of remarried widows may not be appointed to civil or military office (tongsoban); this is done out of the desire to prevent the remarriage of widows. But as a system it is extremely discriminatory (partial: xxmp'yön sim) and subsequently (subsequent to the issuing of this regulation?) it brought about the evil situation where people only talked about whether or not a person's ancestors were guilty guilty of crime or not; they never inquired whether the individual (involved) had worth or merit or not. The practice of not choosing officials on the basis of talent (merit) began with this. In ancient times they never had ~~xxxx~~ this kind of law. We should only rely on whether a man is worthy or able in ~~xxx~~ selecting him for office and abolish this law.)(end nt

of vs. prohibition of remarried widows

inherited status stigma

自辟

守令

非有治效者

稟旨

領兵衙門

偏甚

261, 13:2b) ITEM: If there is a case where a man who is not suitable is appointed to office, the State Council and the OIG (Sahönbu) will impeach the appointment (~~kyugyön~~ kyuhaek 糾劾).

遷=避

ITEM: If a high or low official is sick, after his illness last three months, then he will be transferred (ch'e 連). (note: Every full 10-day week, submit a list (of people ~~xxxx~~ who want to leave their posts). You may not submit a second list within a 10-day period. If a person does not get better (within three months, then dismiss him from office)(end note)

Sickness

If it is not a true illness, then you may not submit a list (document ~~xxxx~~, sick list). (note: Anybody who uses illness as a pretext will be investigated and impeached.)(end note)

No use of illness as a pretext

(We should)

Do away with the evil practice of people trying to avoid the ~~xxxxxxxx~~ suspicion of the densorate (taegan p'ihyöm ch'ochi chi p'ye 臺諫避嫌處置之弊)

and restore the regulation providing that a person should carry out his official duties even though he is under indictment (pok pich'u haenggong chi kyu

restore officials under indictment to jobs

復被推行公之規 侍從

who and sijong(侍從), ~~if they~~ are not guilty of crime and are transferred, and also ought (are worthy of)

262, 13:3a) ~~they ought~~ to be returned to their posts as censors or si(jong), just do not sever (cut) their salaries (note: that is, half salaries), and then wait until there is a vacancy. Do not do as is done at present, which is to appoint them temporarily to another post while they are waiting for a vacancy.

don't allow people to avoid or fawn on illness

(note: I also note that the practice of officials who are discontented over something excusing themselves (from their duties) because of illness in order to avoid (unpleasantness) is also not something which could be done by the ancients (people in ancient times). But how could ~~h~~ this be like what our present ~~is~~ censors (taegan) are called? (??) At the present time, censors, even for the slightest of reasons, or because of some matter that they wish to avoid will make a big fuss and claim illness in the hopes of being transferred. And if they are appointed to a post on the very next day, they will rush to it. This is like the customs of former days

262, 13:3a) have been achieved (restored?), so that even worthy men cannot avoid (falling into these practices). This is greatly to be deplored

(most deplorable). Once a censor is transferred, nobody asks whether ~~his~~ his ~~talents~~ talents are suitable ~~for the post~~ (for the post) or not; it is just said that "he was a censor" (taegan pujik <sup>臺諫付職</sup>), and he must be appointed to another post. Or a vacancy is created in order to handle him (take care of him), or within the space of a few days he is reappointed to the post of censor or attendant (tae-si <sup>臺侍</sup>). For this reason, the officials of the various bureaus (agencies) are also all transferred and moved, causing great change and confusion and things cannot be put in order (shape?). How ~~could~~ could it ever have been the purpose of establishing official posts and dividing up offices (differentiating jobs) to have caused things to be this way? If we do not change this regulation, then even/I Yun or Chou-kung (伊尹周公 <sup>伊尹周公</sup>) were prime minister, they wouldn't be able to do anything about it. Thus we ought to establish a clear order that in the case of censors change jobs (posts) who (are transferred to other posts) for no reasons at all, we should not cut off their salaries, but wait until there is a vacancy in the censorate and (in the meanwhile) do not give them another post. If they happen to be suited for another post, ~~and are appointed to it~~ and are appointed to it, then ~~let~~ let them stay in that post for a long time and hold them responsible for compiling a good record. And only after it is done like this ~~only after it is done like this~~ ~~only after it is done like this~~ will we be able to avoid the evil arising from the confusion of frequent changes in official posts among the bureaucratic agencies.

lead censors are transferred another post

do not appoint censors - who to protect themselves

to avoid frequent changes in officials in

It would seem that  
 (-INDENTED TEXT (Pangye's discussion): Some might say: The best way ~~is~~ would be ~~to~~ ~~fix~~ ~~the~~ ~~term~~ ~~of~~ ~~office~~ ~~of~~ ~~three~~ ~~years~~ ~~or~~ ~~six~~ ~~years~~ is to judge it in accordance with the circumstances

262, 13:3a INTENDED TEXT: (Pangye's comments). Some might say that three years or six years, judging from the circumstances, would seem to be all right (as limits on tenure for office holding), ~~but~~ so that what need is there to have terms of 6 or 9 years? To this I would say: Even ~~y~~ though 3 years or 6 years would be better than what we have at the present time, it still would not be the ~~m~~ best. (13:3b) Only when you have a 9 year~~s~~ term will it be all right. The harm from frequent changes of officials is that wily clerks (officials) use their guile to plague the people and cause them difficulty. And this is still the least of it. Officials must serve for long periods of time and be held responsible for achievement; only then will people know how to perform their jobs. And only after people know how to perform their jobs (as officials) will men of no talent ~~have no hope of~~ give up hope of lucking into ~~a~~ a position (gaining a position by chance or luck, rather than performance) while men of talent will be diligent. If men of no ~~talent~~ <sup>talent</sup> have no thought of gaining a position by luck ~~x~~, then the people's minds will be settled. If men of talent are diligent, then there will be ~~an~~ many worthy men (available for appointment to office). Only after things are like this, will there be an end to excessive (~~official~~ numbers of officials --supernumeraries), will government and education flourish and will praise and blame be (meted out) ~~truly~~ truthfully, and customs be made pure. The evil of frequent transfers of officials is completely contrary to this.

13:3b

*long term  
four of  
duty*

(Someone might) say: This is truly so. It is only that if officials won't we have are kept in office as long as this, then ~~you have~~ the evil of having men of worth and talent stagnate in low posts? To this I would say: If it is a case of a man of worth or talent, then we have the law for special recommendation (for promotion) and we have procedures for the review of official performance, and such men would naturally be promoted. What fear is there that they would stagnate in low posts? In later ages (after the hou-shih ancient three kingdoms of Hsia, Shang and Chou?) (~~have~~ ), no distinction was made between the worthy (intelligent) and the stupid, and they ~~were~~ changed

✓  
✓

262, 13:3b) with annoying frequency (ch'anyök pön? <sup>替易煩亟</sup>), and the minds of people throughout the world were day by day directed toward the competition for office (pungyöng <sup>奔競</sup>: almost literally--the rat race for office). With things like that, then in the space of several centuries and millenia all men became imbued with this and ~~madness~~ and 13:4a) customs and mores became shallow and thin, order was lost and law was abandoned, and ~~there~~ of all the affairs (of government), there was nothing that could be done (right). If we are not thorough in restoring (the correct) system, then we will not be able to settle the minds of the people and achieve good government.

Some might say: Frontier garrison posts are truly ~~serious~~ <sup>heavy</sup> in their authority, and if the provincial governors (kwanch'al) and army commanders (chöhto) are kept in office for too long a period of time, then there is fear that we will have some evil (effect from this) in later generations.

(HINTS AT BUILDUP OF REGIONAL MILITARY POWER?) How about that? To this I would respond; the positions of provincial governor (pangbaek <sup>方伯</sup>) and military commander (yönsu <sup>連帥</sup>) are posts held in ancient times by the Duke of Chou and Shao-kung ( <sup>周公</sup> ). How could they be anything like the people we have today <sup>who are appointed haphazardly?</sup> ~~if in appointing them you truly select~~

~~them~~ If you truly select the right people (for these posts), you ~~do not have~~ ought to be concerned that they might not stay long enough in their posts; you do not have to worry that they would be in them too long.

But if the court has no way ~~of~~ proper method for selecting officials), and does not appoint officials on the base of virtue, then even if these officials were changed every year or transferred every month, then it would only increase the confusion and decline (of the dynasty), and that would be all. How would it be of any help in maintaining (the dynasty)? It is only that after the abolition of feudalism (ponggon, feng-chien), in appointing officials they were unable to avoid setting limits on tenure, and in respect to all affairs, they could not help but follow along and make it an institution.

按

the scale of tenure of official posts

need a way of choosing officials

封建 limits

262, 13:4a) Therefore this, in terms of the use of a 6 year limit, was also in accordance with the circumstances. (note: It might also be said that although this is so, still ~~in~~ the people of ancient times in regard to these kinds of dispositions (places), also were not ~~without~~ lacking the intention to weigh\* (kwōn <sup>權</sup>) the lightness or heaviness (of the authority of regional officials?). Under the Chou dynasty system, they had ~~the~~ three ~~rank~~ tai-fu (<sup>大夫</sup>) act as supervisors (chien <sup>監</sup>) with the purpose of supervising the realms (kuo, states) of the governors (fang-po, pangbaek--governors), which was also their intention. (to maintain control or supervision from the center). How could you say that this did not take into consideration what was appropriate to the circumstances?

13:4b) It might be said that it would be all right to keep an official on duty for his whole life without changing him, and that to set a limit of six years was in effect also to weigh how light or serious (the situation was) and act in accordance with the circumstances.)(end note)

However, this only deals with the regulations for establishing limits (on tenure), and that is all. It is not a method for employing people (in office). Even if (the limit on term of office) were for a person's whole life, if he should be the right person (for the job), then he ought to be transferred. Or even if you had a 6-year limit on officeholding, if he was the kind of person who should be kept in his post, then he ought ~~to~~ to be continued in his post. (note: If a person's record of accomplishment is outstanding, then he should be rewarded and promoted in rank, and on this basis wait (for a vacancy, opportunity) to promote him (to a higher post).)(end note). This then is the kind of ~~thing~~ measure that is most suitable in terms of both ruler and minister clearly understanding principles \* and investigating affairs.

-Indented note (Pan'gye): I note that in ancient times under the feudal system (feng-chien) there was procedure for summoning people to court and for convening meetings (ch'ao-kuan, hui-t'ung <sup>朝觀會同</sup>).

Violate the  
6-yr limit  
to keep a  
govt official

觀 朝觀會同

262, 13:4b) If it had not been like this (if they had not done so), then they would not have had any ~~xxx (an impression of making the) xxx~~ way to make clear what the proper etiquette (li) was between ruler and minister nor to penetrate to the feelings of those above and those below (maintain proper communication lines between the rulers and the ruled) (t'ong sangha chi chōng **通上之情**); and they would not have been able too keep their face correct and proper, and they would not have been able to maintain law and order.

If we are to adopt the system of long terms of office, then we also ought to think about copying the ancient procedure for requiring officials to come to court (ipkūn chi chōi **入覲之節** **覲**). We **either** might establish that in

six years (they would have to come to court?), or that one time during the 6 years period they would have to come to court and memorialize on affairs. for an audience

Some might say that this is only the same as sending a court official to go and investigate (suprevice) them, that it is not like the feudal system (feng-chien).

If you have them (come to court) and personally petition on affairs (report on their affairs), then this is in accordance with the circumstances.

You may either summon them or have them attend an audience (so, kūn **召覲**) and that is all there is to it. It is not necessary to establish a regular system. What it depends on is the selection of intelligent men for office. (end note

(indented portion of text continues:)

--. Yulgok reported to King Sōnjo, saying: With regard to the appoint of officials at the present time, (the new appointees) bow down(at court) in the morning and in the evening they are transferred; their seats do not have a chance to get warm (**今之授官, 朝拜夕遷, 席子暖煖**). and talented

263, 13:5a) Even if you had worthy/men like the Duke of Chou, the Duke of Chao (Chao-kung, Han, II, 12, son of King Wen of Chou, ruled along with the Duke of Chou),

I Yūn (**伊尹**) and Fu Shuo? (**傅說**; Han, II, 13. minister under Kao-tsung of the Yin dynasty), if they were (treated) as at the present time by appointing them today to the post of ssu-tu (**司徒**) and then appointing them tomorrow to the post of ssu-kuan (**司寇**), they definitely would not be able to achieve anything, but would only (waste their time) running around in (useless)

once every 6 yrs

Yulgok

even with Duke's power would be ineffective

263, 13:5a) efforts, and that is all. How much worse is it when (the people you have serving as officials) are not worthy and talented men (like these sages of the past)? There are ways (to, tao--reasons?) for the frequent changes of officials. One is that officials petition that they are ill. The second is that people try to avoid suspicions (p'ihyōm **避嫌**). If you want to correct the evil of officials petitioning (for transfer) because of illness, then the king should issue an edict to all officials to strive to do their actual tasks and not follow customary practice. If they are not truly sick, then they are not to petition for release from duty, and if anyone is found to be using illness as an excuse (for a transfer, ~~dismiss~~ leaving his post), then he should be impeached and punished in accordance with the facts. A man should have to be sick for one week of 10 days before he first may petition for release from duty. The first time, he must be sick for 10 days before permission is given. The second time he must be sick for 10 days before he is given permission. On the third time, if one agency and one official petitions for release from duty, then the other officials (in that agency) may not also petition along with him. If a person is truly sick and has no choice but to petition along with (the first guy, who has petitioned for the third time), then the agency must deliberate and discuss the matter and submit a memorial, only after which the petition will be made. If things are done like this, then we can correct the evil of (officials) petitioning (for release from duty) on the grounds of illness.

10 days of sickness before leave

If you want to correct the evil practice of officials (leaving their posts) to escape suspicion, then we should not allow transfers of officials from their posts ~~to~~ to avoid suspicion except in the case where the censorate finds that a person is not suited (for the job). In the time of our ancestors, 13:5b) even if an official was under indictment by the censorate (p'ich'u **被推**), he was not transferred from his post, but if he was indicted by (ch'ugo **推考**) the Office of the Inspector General (Sahōnbu), then he was ~~dismissed~~ (ha **下**) (Han, II, 13 handed down to the Saganwōn).

263,5:13b) It is said (he said?), if a man is not a Yao or Shun, then how can he take ~~xxx~~ care of every matter extremely well? (How can he be good at taking care of every matter)? With regard to the present (regulation?) whereby important officials under indictment are to continue the performance of their official duties, it has no especially harmful effect on integrity (proper behavior: yömch'i **廉恥**); it is only that the censorate feels it is necessary to hold them responsible (for the behavior) of a sage worthy and (indicts) them for the most minor and inconsequential of errors, and forces them to (be) transferred from their posts. And the censors, who are the eyes and ears of the state are transferred from their posts frequently so that public opinion (kongnon **公論**) is not settled. And because of this they are transferred frequently to other posts, and other officials also (as a result) are transferred frequently (many times) It is because of this that officials are not able to accomplish much. In my opinion we should investigate what was done in past times and restore the regulation whereby officials under indictment are not transferred. Only then will we be able to correct the evil practice of officials leaving their posts in order to avoid ~~xx~~ suspicion. (note: In my opinion (Pan'gye--an **掾**), in previous ages (generations) we did not have this practice of officials (leaving their posts) in order to avoid the suspicion of the censorate. This practice first began during the reign of Chungjong (**中宗**), and after this time it became a mistaken regulation. Everyone was implicated in and became suspected for the most inconsequential of matters. Not only were there frequent transfers of officials, but in fact it ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ caused annoyance and became a convenient method for people (to work their wives, get their way), and at the present time/has become very firmly established.)(end note)

excessive indictment!

censors transferred frequently

Chungjong

Yulgok

happy  
 (Yulgok) also said: For the people to be at ease and prosperous (saengmin hyujök? **生民休戚**) depends on the magistrates, and whether the magistrates are diligent or lazy depends on the provincial governors (kamsa).

only 1-yr posts!

263, 13:5b) At the present time, the term of office (kwagi 假期) is limited to only 1 year, therefore those people who just follow along with the custom (time-servers) just pass time, while those who do their best are not able to accomplish anything. The annoying (unsettled) situation of frequent transfers only ~~xxxxxx~~ serves to clog up the post-stations (with travellers and baggage), and there is no connection (mutual support) between (the officials) above and (the people) below, and when there is an emergency there is no way to take care of it. (to implement orders). This is not a minor matter. I request that in each province we select a large administrative town in which to establish a yamen (solyong 院 <sup>yongmun</sup>) and that we have the provincial governors take their families along with them and act as concurrent magistrates of that town (upchae 邑宰) and remain in their posts for a long time, as is being done under the regulations (for officials sent to) the two border areas (yanggye 兩界), and that we hold them responsible for achieving good results (in their administration).

13:6a

✓

Yulsok

(Yulgok) also said: ~~xxxxxx~~ Some days ago I submitted a lengthy memorial on the need to have long-term provincial governors. If we were (also) to establish provincial army commanders' yamen (pyongyong 兵營) in large administrative towns and have these pyongsa (兵使: provincial army commanders) also assume concurrent responsibility as magistrates, it would be the best policy for restoring our military forces. Only after we have first established (the practice) of long-term governors should we have provincial army commanders take their families with them to their posts. Therefore, my greatest hopes are to be found in this (suggestion).

→

(Yulgok) also said: The capital is the heart and mind (stomach and heart poksim 腹心) of the country while the four-regions (sabang--frontiers) are its frontier shield (ponpyong 藩屏). Only after the frontier (fence) is completely strong can the heart and mind (of the country) be secure. But now is it that at the present time the districts and towns on our frontiers are all run down and full of evils? The provincial governors are changed frequently

✓

263, 13:6a) and the people don't know who the chief of the province is.  
 (pirates, invaders)  
 If by chance some fierce bandits should appear unexpectedly, even though  
 the provincial governor might want to take swift action to check them,  
 how would he be able to do it? This is the path to certain failure. I  
 request that we combine several of these declining (downtrodden and ruined)  
 13:6b) hsien into 9 single one in order to provide some relief to the efforts  
 (strength) of the people; that we select governors and appoint them for  
 long periods of time. If good government ~~xxx~~ becomes manifest throughout  
 the whole province and the people have something to put their faith in and  
 submit to, then in normal times ~~they~~ we can put the people at ease and  
 raise them (nurture them), and during emergencies, we will be able to  
 defend against regrettable situations (untoward results). Once the border  
 fences (pönp'yöng 藩屏) become strong, then the state (will be as secure) as  
 a flat stone. Some might have doubts because they feel that the power of  
the provincial governor will become too great, but this is not so. At the  
 present time in China all provincial governors take their families along with  
 them to their posts and are kept on duty for long periods of time,  
 perhaps for a dozen years. I have never heard that (the Chinese) because  
 of this are afraid that their powers are too great.

(note: I note that (Pan'gye) what (Yulgok) ~~was saying by his request that the provincial governors and provincial~~  
~~that~~ was saying by his request that the provincial governors and provincial  
 military commanders be allowed to hold as concurrencies the posts of  
magistrates (of towns that were the seats of districts over which they  
had jurisdiction) and to take their families along with them was because  
 state law (at the time) provided that district magistrates (suryöng) would  
 take their families with them, but provincial governors and military commanders  
 would not be allowed to take their families, and (the ~~magistrates~~ govs and mil. commanders) ~~took their~~  
~~families with them only because they~~ would (be able to) take their families  
 with them only if they were concurrently (magistrates) in the places (where  
 they were assigned).

Pan'gye!

263, 13:6b) Also, at the present time the provincial army commanders (pyongsā) do not have salaries while all the expenses of the military ~~ya~~ yamen must all be collected from the soldiers (kunsa). For this reason (Yulgok?) said that this (recommendation of his) was a policy (the best policy) for restoring the health (sobok <sup>蘇復</sup>) of the soldiers of the present time (of today). He was saying that they had/ temporarily to follow the present system.)(end note)

(THIS MAY BE AN IMPORTANT POINT: YULGOK AS A MELIORIST: YU MORE OF A COMPREHENSIVE PLANNER)

*Knew  
折中白石  
Crai Hakuseki*

*Japan  
Office for  
Info*

(note continued)(In the Kyangnok (看羊錄) of Kang Hang (姜沆: Han, II, p.17, Kang was captured by the Japanese during Hideyoshi's invasions and was incarcerated in Japan and released after four years and returned to Korea. This book is an account of his experiences in Japan.), it says: If there is a meritorious person among the Japanese (waein), they appoint him to office for life and allow (the post) to be inherited by his posterity and for this reason they are able to maintain law and order strictly (purely) and their ranks (of officials) are always fixed. When they mobilize (their armies?), they forthwith (immediately) gain victory. In our country, during ordinary (peace) times, we do not cultivate our sa (scholars, officials) nor teach our people. Add to this the fact that our military officers do not always have troops (under their command) and the troops do not always have officers commanding them. The people of an administrative district are half under the jurisdiction of the provincial governor and half under the jurisdiction of the provincial military commander (ch'iltosa). Individual soldiers in the morning are subordinated to (under the command of) the provincial governor, and in the evening (at dusk) are under the command of the towonsu (都元帥: 禮統) military commander). These hierarchies of command (ch'et'ong) are not connected (attached) to one another, and no form (formal organization: moyang <sup>模樣</sup>) can be achieved. So by what means would we be able to restrain our enemies in the future? During ~~the~~ Hideyoshi's invasions, Yi Pong-nam (李福男) in the morning acted as the Namwōn-busa (南原府使) and

263, 13:6b) in the evening he~~xx~~ acted as the Naju moksa(羅州牧使).

264, 13:7a) Today (x he?, a man) serves as Pang'ōsa(防禦使 :commissioner for defense), and tomorrow he serves as the Chōltosa (provincial army commander). If ~~xxxxxxx~~ it is said that a man cannot be a Pang'ōsa (is not qualified to be) and this definitely leads to opposition and the man's replacement, then how could he also serve as a Chōltosa? Or if it ~~ix~~ was already said that the man is suitable for the post of Chōltosa, and it happens that a man who has been dismissed from office ~~ix~~ must be appointed (to this post?), then why is it also necessary to transfer the Pang'ōsa? After Hansan(閑山) was destroyed, the bandit troops (Japanese) invaded Honam (Chōlla), but the provincial governor, Pak Hong-no(朴弘老) was recommended for a transfer (dismissal). The new governor, Hwang Sin(黃慎) then ~~took up his new~~ <sup>bought a substitute</sup> post, but the governor's yamen was destroyed, and he was unable to do anything about the situation. Of 53 officials (magistrates?) there was not one place where they were able to recruit troops and the bandit soldiers scattered all~~x~~ over the place doing as they pleased as if they were invading a territory where none lived. Since the war began, there was none of the eight provinces that sustained more damage than Honam, and this is because there was ~~no one in charge~~ no one in charge of the whole province. After the bandits (Japanese) surrounded Namwōn(南原), only then did O Ŭng-t'ae(吳應台) finally become the Chōlla pang'ōsa(全羅防禦使) and Kim Kyōng-no(金敬老) the Chōlla Chobangjang(助防將). At that time I had been (was in) Tangyangbu(潭陽府) and saw for myself when Kim Kyōng-no and the other (officials) ~~no one~~ finally received orders (to take up their posts). They had under their command not one soldier; ~~no one~~ they were alone on their horses, rushing to and fro. They (he) borrowed two pijang(裨將) from the Sunch'alsa(巡察使) with which to go and wait in ambush on the enemy. At that time, even ~~we~~ if we had had the likes of Chang Liang?(張良), or Han Hsin(韓信), Liu Chi(劉錡) or Yo Fei(岳飛), they still would not have been able to do anything. For the court to change the appointment

Han, II, p. 12.  
 防軍 = on watch or guarding the frontier  
 防軍 = paying poor peasants to assume one's frontier guard duties

Chōlla Province Commission

Han, II, p. 16

(張良), 韓信, 劉錡, 岳飛



264, 13:7b) --"kaejōng (開政) (note: the appointment of officials (chebae 除拜: at the present time, called chōngsa 政事) (end note) every year in the first month, first 10-day week, you will receive an edict and set a date for the appointment of officials (kaejōng).

(note: In the previous year, on the 15th day of the 12th month, begin the praise and blame (褒貶: review of officials), and in the 1st week of the 1st month, appoint officials (kaejōng). If there is some incident in the first week (that prevents your holding the kaejōng), then do it in the second 10-day week. After carrying out praise and blame, the chōnggwan (政官: personnel officials? state councilors?) will select men of talent. The state council and the ministers will sit together and discuss (them), and the OIG (Sahōnbu) will also sit in and discuss and recommend (men), carefully and cautiously. They must investigate the men's talents to see whether they are suited for jobs, discuss it in full and then decide everything, after which the recommendations/for appointments to office will be made. It cannot be done rushed or haphazardly, nor shoddily, but in accordance with procedure. If by the recommendation process (chuūi 注擬 you have already obtained the right men, then you can stop with a chief recommendee (such'ōn 首薦) and a auxiliary recommendee (pumang 副望), which would be enough. The king's obtaining men for office, whether done right or wrong, is the responsibility of the chōnggwan (政官: officials, personnel officials?, state councilors?). You should not have too many candidates vainly waiting around ~~whitexyux~~ for the results while you choose lots in the darkness.

We ought, in accordance with the Chinese court, establish a system of two recommendees, a head and an auxiliary (subu imang 首副二望) and abolish the current regulation for three recommendees (sammang 三望). (end note)

If you have very many vacant official positions, then in the first 10-day week of every month ~~haxaxa~~ conduct a kaejōng (to appoint people to office). (note: the one in the 1st month will be the taejōng (大政), and the ones in the other months will be the ad hoc appointments (kwōnmujōng 權務政).

2 ranked A+B instead of 3  
see.

264, 13:7b) If it surpasses this (if you have more vacancies than can be filled by ~~1~~ monthly appointments), then even though you have vacancies, you cannot make appointments too frequently or ~~has~~ desultorily, and wait until the next month to make appointments.--In receiving an edict and setting the date for the kaejŏng appointments of officials, if (you are to make appointments of) state councilors (chŏngbu), officials of the six ministries, the kwan (館), kak (科), pu (府) or wi (衛) tangsanggwan (officials of rank 3A or higher), and provincial governors, military commanders (chŏtosa) and magistrates (suryŏng), then (the appointees, recommendees) must be discussed by the state council (chŏngbu) and the OIG (Sahŏnbu) will attend and make its recommendations, as in the above regulation.)(end note)

Except in the case of extreme emergencies, where you will not be restricted by (regular, fixed) time (schedules). (note: If it is not an emergency appointment, then it must be a regular scheduled kaejŏng session. At the present time when there is a vacancy in the censorate (taegan) or among magistrates, then we hold an appointment session (kaejŏng) at our convenience. Even though there may be a vacancy in the censorate, we still cannot hold a kaejŏng appointment session ~~at this time~~ in accordance with the vacancy (at our convenience). We should wait until the next regular kaejŏng session for selection and appointment. Since a district magistrate has an assistant (igwan 員官), there is also no fear that affairs will be neglected. We should only emphasize the importance of choosing the right men and should not be too hurried or lax in making appointments. ~~at this time~~

*assistants to district mag.*

13:8a) (note continued): The appointment of men to office is an important task of the ruler; it is the foundation of maintaining order or causing confusion in government. The ruler ought to embody it (do it) well (truly). He should personally, together with his prime ministers and personnel officials go to court and conduct a regular kaejŏng session. Even in the case of the appointment of a single official, ~~at this time~~ serious deliberations should be conducted, only after which a selection should be

264, 13:8a) made and the man appointed to office. If the ruler does not know the man, then he must investigate and question him to see what kind of man he is. Only after this is done, should the appointment be made. You cannot just follow previous custom of later ages (of decline) and just sit in the interior of the palace without inquiring or asking (into the qualifications of candidates), leaving it up to ignorance when you (the king) puts a dot (next to the candidate's name) with his brush.)(end note)

Indented note: Yi Su-gwang(李粹光) said: In Kogyō times they had a standard procedure for conducting the ~~chōngsa~~ chōngsa (regular official appointments). In the 12th month they held the taejōng(大政) and in the sixth month they held the kwōnmujōng(權務政). Beyond this (if the requirements for officials was ~~no~~ more than this), then if there were a vacancy, they never made appointments. By the time when Ch'oe Ch'ung-hōn(崔忠獻) gained exclusive control over the government, they first changed the regular system of official appointments. They had (an institution) called the chōngbang(政房). In this dynasty, in addition to the two ~~tomok~~ tomok(都目) (official appointment sessions held during the year) we also make appointment as vacancies occur, or we also have official appointments made every day. This is different than the system used in former (ancient) times. I hear that in China on the 23rd day of every month the Ministry of Personnel (Li-pu) meets and selects (officials). As for other (times), they only make important appointments where they gather together and ~~recommend~~ recommend people for office, and that is all.)(end note)

When Cho Chung-bong(趙重峯) returned home east (from China?) he submitted a sealed note which said: I have seen how the system of official (appointments works) in China. Despite the fact that they have a large number of officials, still when they recommend people for office (chuūi 注擬), they always exert the utmost care. When they have a vacancy, then the six boards and the tu-ch'a-yūan(都察院) convenes and discusses the men who are recommended for office, and only after they deliberate on and decide on who is to be appointed does the Ministry of Personnel only recommend (two names.

Han, 正, 22.  
趙憲  
mastered  
in battle  
of 錦山  
during Hideoyoshi's  
invasions.

2 see.  
in China,  
not 3

264, 13:8a) How is it that (even) with the great population in China they (still) did not recommend three people (sammang<sup>2</sup>- for vacant positions)? (probably declarative: it is because...)

13:8b) Is it truly because it is difficult for them to find talented men, and it is because or is it because if you appoint a criminal (fei-jen 匪人) to a post, then it will cause harm to the living people (saengmin 生民)? As a result (put themselves forward as candidates?<sup>0</sup>) the people below do not dare ~~recommend for office~~ ~~if they are not taken~~ ~~to~~ ~~recommend~~ recommend? desultorily appoint people to office who are not talented, and those above do not dare desultorily appoint people to office on the basis of their selected and personal desires. And once a man is/appointed, he is given the post for a long time, and there are no calumnious impeachments or attacks on him. Once people are appointed, also all of them enjoy long terms of tenure in their posts. In a 9 year period there are three reviews of performance (san-káo 三考) when it is determined who will be promoted and who demoted (dismissed). The provincial? educational officials (kyogwan 教官) and the border commanders (Pyönsu 邊帥) will also take their families along with them, as part of a far-reaching (long-term) plan. Therefore, most of the common officials will do their jobs to the utmost, and many of the common people will obtain their places (be settled, secure). The reason why China is able to protect such a large area and keep it secure is because they do things this way.

Compared to China, the number of men of talent in this Eastern area (land--Korea) is not a full 1/20. We have experienced many wars; our scholars follow after falsity (error), morals and order is not made clear, righteousness and principle (üiri) is not distinguished. If you search for someone who can manage the country and talk of the right way (of governance), it is extremely difficult to meet up (with such a person). And there are not even many people around who can take charge of a situation and think of doing their duty. When the ministry of personnel? (chöngjo 政曹) has to make recommendations of men for office (chuüi 注擬), it does not discuss it in advance and decide on it, but only after taking their seats in the

✓  
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264, 13:8b) ministry hall (chŏngch'ōng <sup>政府</sup>) \* do they pick up their pens and for the first time and discuss (personnel matters). Almost all appointments are filled in desultory fashion. They select people from the East and (use them) to fill up (vacancies) in the West; they appoint people 265, 13:9a) to office in the morning and transfer them in the evening. The officials in the ~~capital~~ capital and provinces don't understand what their jobs are all about, and perhaps before their seats even have a chance to get warm they ~~are so busy that they do not have time to read the records~~ they distort the ~~the~~ records ( <sup>記錄</sup> : Han, II, 21) and steal property ~~and~~ and succumb to the schemes of the ~~the~~ wily clerks (ajōn). When new officials are greeted or when old officials are sent off, men and horses are commissioned to run around for a distance of a thousand li, thereby destroying the production of the poor people. This is also an evil which does not exist in China. (note: In China even though an official has to go (to a post) 10,000 li distant, he transports his family with his own private horses and private servants. Not one horse nor one man disturbs the strength of the officials (is disturbed by?), and this is the reason why corruption does not affect the people and the people are completely (engaged in) their regular ~~occupations~~ production.)(end note)

Moreover if a new official~~x~~ is not suited to the task of taking care of the people, then he ~~may~~ <sup>should</sup> be immediately transferred out of his post, and on the leave to assume very day he is to assume his duties, he ~~is~~ <sup>should be</sup> then memorialized for dismissal. If an official has to come from a long distance (and he does not have enough money to pay for the trip), then he ~~takes~~ <sup>should</sup> take out a loan at monthly interest ~~the peasants~~ and they wait for the new official to leave (for his post?), at which time he returns home, sells his land and slaves loan (servants) and pays off the monthly interest and is thus cut off from his family property. The number of officials who every year are reprimanded and dismissed from office <sup>should</sup> does not stop at just one or two. Not only ~~are~~ are 100 men (occupied) with greeting officials who come (to their new posts), but in the space of a year, the number of men who are put out of work (because

frequent transfers!

No such evil in China.

take a loan for travel costs

265, 13:29a) of the need to spend time greeting officials) comes to several hundred. If the ministry of personnel in appointing men ~~of office~~ to office ~~do~~ it in a short period of time without investigating the candidates, then the scholar and people of the whole country cannot help but sustain injury 13:9b) Can this not be changed on the grounds that it is just a small matter?

I would like for the sage intelligence (king) to issue a clear order to the Ministry of Personnel that it must first discuss and decide on (men to be appointed to office) in accordance with public opinion, and only after that should they make recommendations of candidates. They should not ~~xxxxxxx~~

~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ recommend people they know privately and ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ intimately (私昵), but should only (recommend) the able; they should not appoint people of bad virtue but only employ the worthy. They must use the method of having a primary candidate (such'ōn 首薦) and appoint people to office for long terms, and wait until they have a change to accomplish something (待其奮庸), and only then ~~xxx~~ promote them to another post. If this is done, then perhaps the people will learn to be diligent and the people will obtain their (proper) places (be secure).

(end of indented section--quote of Cho Chung-bong)

No see on  
the basis of  
personal  
intimacy

Recommendation

With regard to recommendation of men for office (ch'ōn'gō 薦舉) every 9 years (note: carry this out ~~wh~~ if there should be a shortage of men of talent)(end note) officials in the capital and provinces of rank 3 and above (note: the same as above for officials of rank 4 and up in the Sahōnbu, Hongmungwan, Sōnggyun'gwan. If there are many of worth and virtue, then even though they may not hold rank as high as this, then they too ought to be given a special order to recommend scholars.)(end note), and each (of the above officials) will recommend two men who are worthy able, and without any errors (record of crime or mistake) (note: From officials of 5th rank down to the common scholars, they too will submit letters of recommendation and prepare comments on the true facts of a person's (candidate's) talents and behavior, and this will conform to this procedure)(end note)

265, 13:b9b) --ITEM: The court will establish one yüan (office) (note: it will be named the Yönyöng(wön) (延英院) (end note) and all the men who have been recommended, except for those who are at the time incumbents in office, will all be summoned and treated with superior courtesy and given salaries in accordance with their rank, (note: in the case of <sup>former official</sup> clerks (chön'前御), give them salaries in accordance with their rank, and also provide salaries to Confucian scholars (yusa), as in accordance with the current regulation for providing ~~xxxxxxx~~ military posts and salaries (to people)(end note) Do not be too quick to appoint them to official 13:l0a posts, but only call them ünggyo (應教), which means that they are "awaiting orders", and have them live together and study and polish (their learning, themselves). If there then happens to be some matter of government to be taken care of (yu chöngch'i 有政治), then entrust them (with the task) of deciding on it in detail. Or if there happens to be some matter involving the code or rites, then entrust x them (with the responsibility) of debating it (giving their opinions). Have the members of the state council and the ministry of personnel and close attendants on the king associate with them and from time to time summon them to a royal audience? lecture (sodae 召對). (note: If there are too many of them, then have three or four of them come at a time, in rotation)(end note). After they have studied and perfected the true way for a year in residence, then evaluate their talents and virtues and appoint them to official rank.

(note: Ch'eng-tzu (程子) has written on this in detail in his Yen-ying cha-tzu (延英劄子 : Document on Inviting the Brave). I have used as references the Hsüan-chü-p'ien (選學篇) and the regulations of the Chin-shih-yüan (進士院). Some people might say that it is not necessary to do it like this. Except for the selected (recommended) scholars (sönsa 選士) who have been recommended and people whose behavior in office has been outstanding and those who are bright and outstanding in their learning and behavior, the state council, ministry of personnel and OIG x can sit

265, 13:10a) and conduct an examination (of recommendees, candidates). ✓

In the case of men who have already been appointed to office, then they should be summoned by those above for an interview where inquiry will be made into their conduct of government and behavior. Why not do it like this?

To this I would respond that to suggest that it be done like this <sup>also</sup> at the present time is/all right, but to conduct an examination to select scholars is basically not the intention of the ancients. Moreover, if you have a large number of people recommended and then subject them to a single test, how can you find out about them as people? Definitely ~~if~~ ~~you~~ only if you do it ~~in~~ in accordance with the method (I suggest) above, will everything be done ~~not~~ fully well with regard (to the needs of) those above and those below, those to the left and those to the right, so that you will truly have everlasting good results.)(end note)

ITEM: Anybody who makes a mistaken (wrong) recommendation will be dismissed from office. (note: If there are extenuating circumstances and a case where a person may be pardoned (for making a bad recommendation), then you can just cut his salary in half for a year. In all other cases dismiss the man from office. If the recommendee is guilty of embezzlement, corruption or violation of regulations etc., then add an additional degree of punishment. If he has recommended two (bad) men or more, than add an additional degree of punishment up to the point where you exclude his name (from the category of officials?) and reduce him to the status of a commoner.)(end note)

✓ Anybody who makes a recommendation for some private reason should be indicted for the crime of deception. (kimang-non 欺罔論). Anybody who makes a recommendation after taking a bribe or because the recommendee asks him for a recommendation, or who makes a recommendation of a person knowing that the man is no good--all these men will be indicted for the crime of deception. If there is a man worthy of recommendation because of his talent or virtue, then even though he may be the son or younger brother (of the recommendor?), then the recommendor shall not be charged with favoritism.)(end note)

NO EXAM of scholars

265, 13:10b). Those people who have recommended worthy men should be given special honors and appointments. (Note: As a reward advance the man in rank and ~~praxix~~ enfoeff him with a title, and only do it with men who deserve it. In all other cases you must wait until the man has served for a long period of time (in office) to get a clear idea of whether he has accumulated merit or committed crimes (while in office), and only after that should (rewards) be carried out. Even though the recommendor has passed away if he should be stripped of office, then strip him of his post posthumously. (subnote: and also take away the yin (üm) privilege), and in the case of those men (who have died) but who deserve promotion, then grant them this posthumously (subnote: and also grant their (heirs) the üm privilege). Those people who have been granted an honorary posthumous name, this should also be changed in accordance with whether (their recommendations) were good or bad (end note)

*Scholar!!*

ITEM: Dismiss from office any man who should have ~~appointed~~ recommended some scholar but who did not do so. !!

-The form for making a recommendation (ch'önjangsik 薦狀式):

So-and-so an official (note: If the man has no post, then do it in accordance with his basic title and also his place of residence), surname and given name.

Such-and-such a post, this subject, so-and-so, respectfully memorializes a matter of recommendation (ch'öng'gō) of the above official (note: if he has no official (title) then call him ~~by~~ as a person)(end note) etc. etc. (note: talk about his scholarship, behavior and ability, but only as is his due)(end note) is fit for a such-and-such a post (appointment)(note: or you can say that he can be put in charge of such-and-such a task. If he has both talent and ability combined, then you can also discuss what is appropriate.)(end note). This subject knows him to be worthy and does not dare not recommend him. (note: Or you can ~~say~~ say, from what I known, I cannot help but

265, 13:10b) If after he assumes responsibility he should be guilty of embezzlement or violation of standards he becomes remiss (lazy) and weak (疲博) or cruel and tyrannical, or violates the law and harms the people (note: if it is a military post, then talk about what is appropriate for military affairs)(end note), then I will willingly suffer punishment for

266, 13:11a ~~time~~ along with him. I humbly submit this memorial and await prostratex Respectfully ~~(your recommendation)~~ the royal edict. Humbly submitted. (note: Or if you write a recommendation in your own words with this general meaning (intent), it is also all right. If you recommend two men, then you can discuss both of them in the same letter; you do not have to make two separate letters.)(end note)

Year, month, day, such-and-such a post, humble subject so-and-so.

-If after the appointment is made the man who was guaranteed and recommended exceed (the law) should have a change of behavior and ~~act~~ exaggerate, the recommender will prepare a letter reporting the details and will at the same time himself conduct an investigation, (and if he does so), he will be pardoned from punishment (wŏnjoe 原罪). (note: Since the T'ang dynasty there had been discussion of this provision, and in the Sung dynasty it was finally made law.)(end note)

(indented note: Ch'iu Chün 丘濬 :Han, II, 27, of the Ming dynasty, an expert in state laws and precedents) said: The law for implicating the recommender (in the crime of the recomende) has long been practiced. ~~This~~ With this ~~in addition~~ they also established a law for pardoning from crime those who made a confession. If this law is carried out, then both the ~~recomendee~~ ~~and the~~ recommender and the recomende will both know (find out about?) and ~~warn~~ warn (each other). (end note)

For capital and provincial officials of rank 3 and up, and the censorate (taegan), sijong (侍從) (note: the historians sagwan (史官) are also included in this)(end note), district magistrates (suryōng), and educational officials (kyogwan), when they are first appointed to office, they will submit a letter yielding to and recommending their post to one other man who will take their place and be appointed to office (?)

自代

自代

266, 13:11a)(note: If it is a provincial appointment and the man has reported to court and is on his way to his post, then don't do this. With regard to the man who has been recommended, there will be no exceeded <sup>ing</sup> the regulations for haengjik or sujik (行職, 守職) brevet appointments with regard to the rank (connected) to this post. If he happens to be unusually outstanding in worth and ability, then you can allow that he not be restricted by considerations of rank. The form for the letter of recommendation should

roughly be like the samples to be found in the collected works of Han Yü (韓愈) (here reads, Han T'ui-chih (韓退之) ) and Chu Hsi. Every time there is a vacancy, then the person official should investigate and evaluate those people that have the most recommendations and appoint them. If you men who have yielded to the recommendee are ~~worth~~ look to see whether the ~~person~~ ~~is~~ ~~worthy~~ ~~or~~ ~~not~~, you ~~is~~ also can understand what kind of a guy (the recommendee) is. (end of note)

13:11b)

-Indented section: In the T'ang dynasty, during the time of Te-tsung (780-805), it was ordered to the ch'ang-ts'an-kuan (常參官) that within three days after his appointment he would recommend one man to replace himself (tzu-tai, chadae). In the Sung dynasty, Chen-tsung (真宗 :995-1023) revived this system of recommending officials to replace oneself. The ch'ang-ts'an-kuan and the chieh-tu (節度使) and kuan-ts'a (觀察使) and fang-yü-shih (防禦使), and tz'u-shih (刺史), and hsiao-yün (少尹), chi-chih (執事) and hsien-ling (縣令), all officials of rank 7 and up who were pure and <sup>men w. reputation</sup> hopeful officials? (ch'ing-mang-kuan (清望官) within three days after they were appointed had to submit a letter ~~yielding~~ yielding (their post) to once man who would replace them. Those people in the capital submitted (their letters) to the ou-men? (翰林), and those in the provinces ~~post~~ posted them at the post-station. The letters arrived at the Chung-shu men-hsia (state chancellery etc.) and every time there was a vacancy ~~in~~ of an official post, then they looked to see who had the most recommendations and considered that person, and appointed him.

Han, II, 29  
 official in  
 Tang times  
 who attended  
 court every  
 3 days  
 attended  
 court every  
 3 days  
 was able  
 to  
 attend  
 court  
 every  
 5 days  
 Civil  
 officials  
 above  
 rank 5  
 were  
 able  
 to  
 attend  
 court  
 every  
 5 days

!!

266, 13:11b)

(indented note). Ch'iu Chiin (丘濬) said: With regard to the system of self-substitution of recommended officials in the T'ang and Sung dynasties, this was based on ~~discussion~~ the proposal of Liu Shih (劉寔) of the Wei dynasty (Han, II, 29, he also served under the Chin dynasty). By this system not only could you see whether a person had the kind of talent that could be used (made him fit for office), but it was also good for promoting an atmosphere of yielding (modesty). He also said: the system of recommended officials substituting (someone else) for themselves can truly be adopted and carried out. Both the Ministries of Personnel and War will each set up a roster in two sections and will record in turn those who yield their posts. forwarded to the inner (palace?) One list will ~~consist of those who remain in their bureaus, and~~ and the other will ~~consist of those who~~ remain in their bureaus, and appointments to office will be made on the basis of this. If these ledgers are made the basis for recommendation and appointment, it will be of benefit in producing men of talent for office.) (end note)

(No limitation by family status or pedigree) (title by Han, II, 29, subject of next section

13:12a --. In appointing men to office, only rely on their worth and talent; do not talk about their family pedigree (mullon ki munji 勿論其門地).  
note:

(In making appointments of officials (imgwan 任官), it should be based only on worth; in entrusting people with tasks (wisa 位事), only do it on the basis of ability. Eliminate the present evil of family pedigree (munji), and together with that eliminate the sōgyōng (署經) law.

(indented note: Some might say that the intent of the present sōgyōng law is also to investigate officials, so what reason is there to abolish it? I would respond that the so-called sōgyōng is only something which requires offices and names of newly appointed officials to write down and present a list of/their paternal and maternal four relatives (naeoe sajo 內外四祖) and their wives four relatives. The yangsa (censorate) inspects them in order to determine whether a man will be permitted to conduct public duties or not. What is investigated

Han, II, 30

review of family name, family record of all 堂下官 app see by censorate

四祖 父, 祖父, 曾祖父, 外祖父

family pedigree  
1) 地

277, 13:12a) by it are only the official posts held by former generations (of one's family), and that is all, and basically it has nothing to do at all with an investigation into whether a man is worthy or not. It only promotes the evil of family pedigree (munji)(favoritism) and is profoundly contrary to the correct principle by which worthy men should be selected and appointed to office. We have no choice but to abolish it. (end note)

Cho Chung-bong (趙重峯) returned home and submitted a sealed document (to the king) which said: I humbly observed that in the imperial court of China the make the route for the selection of men for office extremely broad. It is based only on whether a man has talent, so that they do not discuss his family pedigree (munji). A man like Sun Chi-kao (孫繼皋) is the son of Chang-shih (韓師), yet at the present time he is a hsiu-ch'üan (修撰), and even though Ch'eng-hsien (成憲) is the son of (丫頭): note: name of a slave concubine, yet at the present time he is a compiler (p'ien-hsiu 編修).

Even though Hsü San-sheng (許三省) is a chü-jen (provincial degree holder), at the present time he is a yü-shih (御史) in Shansi. Otherwise, posts in the Kuo-tzu-chien (國子監: national academy) like the po-shih (博士), chu-chiao (助教), hsüeh-cheng (學正), hsüeh-lu (學錄) and others are filled with chü-jen (舉人) and kung-shih (貢士), so many so (of them) that you cannot count them all. The families of the great and

13:12b) wealthy only indulge exclusively in arrogant and lewd behavior and rarely are there people who adhere to righteous behavior ?(sön kük yu üi

鮮克由義) and their sons and grandson have nothing to rely on (for support), so they ~~xxxxxx~~, on the contrary, are not as good (well off) as

a poor and suffering scholars who move their minds (to study?) and are patient by nature and who (by study?) improve on those things that they do not do well. Thus even though people may be commoners and illegitimate sons (sangmin ölsok 常民孽屬), they do not abandon their talents. Those who have passed the examinations only respect writing and letters; their accomplishments are few and they ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ are floating (shallow) and quick-tempered

slave concubine's son

in China talent we select who are commoners + illegit son

VS EXAMS

浮躁

and are without true (accomplishment), so that on the contrary they are not as good (as well off) as those who have held a series of duty posts who are afraid of other people and are cautious in their speech (wei-jen hsü-yen ) and take responsibility for their work and do their utmost to perform their jobs (duties). Therefore, even though ~~xxxxxxx~~ chü-jen ~~xxxxxx~~ and kung-shih who appear on the path to fame. This is why the imperial (Ming) dynasty in establishing men of worth is in no way (restricted as to their ability to do so) and they are able to pacify ~~xxxxxxx~~ the masses of people of the empire and control those living far away. (remote regions)

But in our country, the path for the selection of men for office is extremely narrow, and there are extremely few people in the rural villages who are desirous of educating their sons. If among them there happen to be those who are called kööl (巨孽: big illegitimate sons?) who are able to become students in school (kyosaeng 校生), then they are extremely lucky and are not able to advance further ~~xxxxxxx~~ because a line is drawn (about them: chahwa 自畫). If among (sons of people) there happen to be those who are ch'önjok (賤族: lowborn), then no matter how good their talents are good their quality, there is no way for them to advance or be active (mu .... 無振奮之路). In the past during the Three Kingdoms, even though these countries were small, each of them was able to preserve a small corner (of the earth? for itself), and this was because there was no discrimination (mugan 無間) in their employment of men in office. (i ki yongin chi mugan ya 以其用人之無間). But since the middle of the Koryö dynasty when

few parents eager to educate sons; give illegit. sons gain some

no way for pleasure to advance

No descr. w/ 三(三)

from mid-Koryö! (how rank?)

267, 13:13a)

powerful officials took charge of the state they feared that loyal and wise scholars might arise from their thatched houses and act as an obstruction to their private ~~xxxxxxx~~ interests, so they planned to abolish the examinations for the illegitimate sons (sööl 庶孽), and the route (for the advancement of) worthy men gradually became narrowed. Up to the time of ~~xxxxxxx~~ our dynasty, the great officials (taesin) who made plans for (governed) the state only thought of benefiting their own sons and

267, 13:13a) grandsons and did not give any consideration to the loss of (good) men (for office) ~~xxxxx~~ for 10,000 generations (into the future).

And (illegitimate sons?) together with the sons and grandsons of remarried widows were prohibited from taking the examinations (kūngo **禁錮**), and this was recorded in the dynastic codes. Even though the kings were extremely just, when it came to the matter of promoting those people buried away in remote corners and poor lanes (osbcure villages and towns), they still had no knowledge of how urgent a matter this was.

In the past, even though men like Yi Chung-ho (**李仲慶**) and Kim Kūn-gong (**金謹恭**) were illegitimate sons (sōōl), yet for their whole lives they pursued their studies and urged their descendants (heirs) to begin (their learning) with the Hsiao-hsüeh (small learning). The contribution of these two men to the fact that present officials and scholars know shame (moral standards) and respect good reputations and education is considerable, and yet they ended up starving to death in poverty. In my stupid opinion, (if the Chinese) had completely barred the sons of remarried widows from office, then the talents of ~~xxxxxxx~~ Fan Chung-yen (**范仲淹**) would have been lost to the world, and ~~if~~ the illegitimate sons are prevented (from holding office), then people like Yi Chung-ho had to starve to death at that time, and the courageous and talented cannot achieve anything, and mores and morality in the end will be destroyed and the harm ~~wi~~ extends to the whole country.

13:13b) If at the present time our rare (rare and great) ruler at a distance shows respect for Ch'ang T'ang (**成湯**) (ancient sage kings?) and in what is close by adopts the models of China, there will be a means to effect change and it is to be hoped that in obtaining good men for office we will be able to achieve the good government of ancient times in the space of several decades' time.

Yu Sōae (**柳西崖**): Han, II, 33. Yu Sōng-yong (**成龍**) . CSC under Sōnjo, during Hideyoshi's invasion) said in his ch'ōmja (**答劄子**): With regard to the way for appointment men to office, you should ~~make the path~~

*Sōae  
Yu Sōng-yong*

*two objects  
some stances  
to death*

*about the  
models of  
China*

See

\* 267, 13:13b) should regard with importance making the path as broad as possible, and should not regard narrowness (a narrow path to office) as good. Therefore it is said that in establishing men of worth, there should be no way (of restricting them?); they should not be restricted to one corner: iphyōn mubang (立賢無方). When the Duke of Chou selected scholars (chū shih), he first began with the white huts (base persons living in poor huts); when Kuan-Chung (管仲) was prime minister of Ch'i, he selected two robbers; ~~whxxx~~ Yen Ying (晏嬰) recommended his chariot driver to be a ta-fu on the grounds that he spoke/one word ~~only~~ that was good; in the Western Han dynasty there were so many men of talent that many of them were obtained to be clerks of chūn-hsien (magistrates). Since the Wei and Chin dynasties and on, for the first time there was discussion about people's pedigree (munji 門地), and this was the ~~main~~ only cause for the decline in government and education. I also ~~feel~~ have feelings with regard to this. If the world is well governed, then worthy and talented men are at the top, and in the fields (countryside) there are no ~~xxx~~ (unemployed talented men) left over, and for that reason merit is achieved and sons of praise are composed. If the world is in confusion, then not everyone at the top is a worthy man, and at the bottom not everyone is ignorant (you have some worthy men scattered, unemployed in office, at the bottom of society). In the Spring and Autumn Annals, the Wu clan (武氏), the Yün clan, and the sons of (仍叔) were all people of high and prominent munji: 門地 Han, II, 33: munbōl and chich'e--family and local or regional connections and reputation?), but at the time types of 267, 13:14a) men like i-feng-jen (儀封人), (Ch'ang) Chū (長沮), (榮) 泓 and (荷蕢) were all left ~~to~~ in low jobs (Han, II, 33, these were all hermits that Confucius met, and the last three lived in the boonies cultivating the fields--unused in office) and were eking out a livelihood (breathing with difficulty) in the fields. Whether or not ~~a~~ the proper way of an age rises or falls turns on this great (question--of the employment of worthy and talented men). Generally speaking one should not speak of

Wei + chin  
17 地

!!  
an elite of talented men

distortion of status society

立賢無方

管仲

晏嬰

門地

尹氏

武氏

仍叔

門地

儀封人

長沮

榮 泓

荷蕢

*regional discrimination*

267, 13:14a) whether a man is of high pedigree (munji) or from the base category (class: chōillyu *賤流*), but should only seek for men of worth and talent, and that is all. In our country we have used many scholars from the south (in office), but we have had absolutlye none from the northwest.

*NW desc.*

It is a fact that the northwest has never been lacking in talented men; it is just that the area is far away and has little influence for attracting and promoting (appointing) men to office. We should select some outstanding men ~~for~~ from that area from time to time and appoint them to office and cause men of talent to compete with one another (for office) so that there ~~will~~ will not be any gap (discrimination) between north and south.

\* (provincial appointments: oeim *外任*: Han, II, 33--has sectioned this off)

-. Do not take provincial appointments (oeim) lightly, and by this means take seriously the requests of the people (for livelihood) (min ki *民壽*)

(note: The (posts) of provincial governor and provincial army commander posts (kwanch'alsa and chōltosa) are the ancient/pangbaek( *方伯* ) and yōnsu( *連帥* ). Get the right men (for those posts) and appoint them to office. The district magistrates (suryōng) are those men who, together with the ruler, govern the people of the empire. If they are not eminent (worthy) and talented men, you cannot appoint them to(these posts), but ~~at~~ the present time the custom in particular is to treat this posts lightly. We ought to eliminate this mistake and in particular take seriously the selection (of men for these provincial posts).(end note)

-ITEM: For the posts of district magistrate (suryōng), we must choose men who are worthy and good, knowledgable in government affairs and upright in personal character and able to govern the people and appoint them. (note: Definitely, if a man has been recommended, then investigate him and by this means appoint him to office. If a man is suitable for a post but has not recommendor, then let someone who is one of the tangsang officials in the ponjo

( *本曹* :ministry of personnel) recommend and guarantee him, and nominate him for office (chuūi *注擬*). You must not appoint anyone who is of low skills

*13:14b*

267, 13:14xb) or is a supernumerary official (one without office)(end note)

ITEM: When a district magistrate is transferred and sent back, you also must do it in accordance with the ancient method and summon him for an interview and memorialize the details, and then issue a decision as a standard practice. (note: When a man stands down from his post (hajik **下直**) he will bow respectfully and when a man is despatched on a commission (**差使員**) he comes to the capital and respectfully bows down (before the king?)--at the present time this is definitely carried out. If a man is to be transferred, at the time he comes (to court?), he should be summoned for an interview and questioned on what he has done (in office) and on the governmental affairs he should (should have?) carried out. If this is done, then not only will it encourage the officials, but it will also enable the people to know the way 真 (true way) of governing the people and this will be of great advantage.

The same (practice) should also apply to the educational officials (kyogwan) and the garrison commanders (chingjang).(end note)

ITEM: (The post of) garrison commander (chinjang **鎮將**) should also be determined as a true position and care should be taken in the selection of these men for appointment to office. (note: At the present time the posts of ch'ömjälchesa (**鎮節制使**) and manho (**萬戶**) are high in rank, but customarily they are not actual posts. Perhaps a hallyang (**樂良** :Han, II,

35--a hoban (powerful man) who still has not been appointed to office) is appointed to the post of manho, and after his transferred from the post he is returned to (the status of) ch'amha(gwan) (**參下(官)**), and for this reason the post of manho has become ex regarded even more as a superfluous and base position. The post of garrison g commander (chinsu **鎮帥**) is

extremely important, so how can it be regarded (treated) like this?. We ought to reform and determine its rank and issue clear orders that it is to be an actual post, and in accordance with the regulations for (the appointment of) district magistrates we should select and appoint those people who have been recommended as honest and able men and those who possess the talent (to be garrison commanders), and also appoint those men who have held 6th rank posts.

問良  
downgrading of Manho

6th r.

267, 13:14b) If there happens to be a man who has been selected and recommended for office who has not passed through the regular order (of promotion), through the ranks), then you also ought to raise his actual rank in accordance with the regulations for brevet appointments (sujik 守職) and raise his rank. You should not follow along in the old customs of appointing to office those people who are lacking in ~~rank~~ knowledge (and experience?, in government affairs). (end note)

Don't appoint someone from distant regions

-indented text: If a man has held a post for a long period of time, then it is not convenient to appoint to the post of garrison commander (chinjang) of a distant frontier region ~~with~~ someone who ~~has~~ is from the remote northern or southern areas. Except for cases of persons where one should not be restricted (by this qualification), customarily you should appoint someone from that province or a nearby province. Not only should this be done with

regard to garrison commanderis, but it also should apply to post-station officials, educational officials (kyogwan), and chu and hyōn (district) posts-- With regard to the above, all of them should be done like this. (note: For the time being let's not talk about (the practice adopted) ~~with~~ during the time (in China's past)

when states were being granted as fiefs (feng-kuo). During the Han dynasty the mu-shou (牧守 :magistrate?) also in all cases himself appointed the chang-shih (subordinate) officials such as the chieh-chia? (長史), chieh-chia? (別駕), tu-yu? (督郵), chin-kuan (津關) and chin-fang (鎮防), and customarily these were people from the local area. For this reason the officials and the

people knew each other, and affairs were taken care of and the people were at ease. In later periods all officials ~~was~~ were appointed haphazardly and there were many cases where southerners ~~were~~ went north (to assume posts) and held northerners guarded southern (posts). They went to distant regions away from their flesh and blood and were not used to local customs (to the local area).

Not only ~~was~~ was this inconvenient from the standpoint of their private feelings, but government affairs also in many cases was hammed and injured.

Those who are in charge of personnel matters must be aware of this.

Han Mu-shou appointed officials from local area

268, 13:15a) If you have ~~an official~~ (an official) who has an aged father or mother, then the present law holds that an official with a parent who is 70 years of age or older cannot be appointed to a post more than 300 li away (from where his parent lives) This regulation ought to be applied equally to all posts. But some might say that if we ~~do it like this~~ do it like this, we might be adhering too strictly (to an inflexible law), ~~but this is not so~~ but this is not so. Because not all posts are the same (in importance?), if the area happens to be particularly important or even more crucial, ~~then~~ and the person is indispensable, then basically we do not have to apply this regulation.)(end note)

Yulgot reported to King Sŏnjo, saying: In the king's administration of government, nothing is more important than loving the people, and in loving the people, nothing is more important than the magistrate. Hsüan-ti (皇帝) of the Han dynasty once said: The way in which the people are made secure in their lands and villages so that they will be at ease (be able to have a breath of rest) and not issue any cries of resentment depends on the fair administration of government and in the management of suits (complaints) (chŏngp'yŏng songni 政平訟理. Those who share with me (the responsibility)

13:15b | for these tasks are only the good ~~xxxx~~ 2,000 picul (officials) (二千石 magistrates). Even though Hsüan-ti's remarks were ~~damaging~~ greatly and severely damaging to the general investigators (雖傷於綜核太甚), yet by these words he showed that he deeply understood what were the essentials in the search for good government. Thus in the Chou dynasty, the six ministers (liu-ching 六卿) divided up and took responsibility for the six hsiang (六卿); and in the Han dynasty the san-kung (三公) first had to hold posts as (magistrates) in the san-pao (三輔: areas). Even if a man had the talent to be a kung-pao (公輔: prime minister), if he had not undergone a test (trial period) in governing the people, then he was lacking in actual experience and that was the reason (for these regulations). At the present time the

Yulgot

to investigate whether names of facts (事實) actually tally + to see what has been done well or badly.  
Han II, 39.  
三輔地方  
Where the seats of govt + surrounding the capital  
one 2

政平訟理

雖傷於綜核太甚

六卿

三公  
三輔

公輔

六卿

~~xx279~~ 268, 13:15b) (post~~x~~ of) provincial governor (kamsa) is (equivalent to) held the ancient posts of pang-po( 方伯 ), posts that were ~~fixed~~ in ancient times by the Dukes of Chou and Chao( 周公 ). Their responsibilities are the most important, so how can they be entrusted (to people) as "outside positions" (oeim 外任: of little importance) and regarded lightly? At the present time in appointing men to office, we treat provincial positions extremely lightly (desultorily). If a civil official has the slightest reputation, then he (all of them) are not appointed as provincial magistrates. Only after a person is abandoned by public opinion is he given a tally (of office to be a magistrate). For this reason, those people who act as magistrates realize that the future before them is not distant (they don't have much of a future), and they give no more thought to doing their best to pacify and take care of (the people). The best of them just serve their time in office, while the worst of them do harm to the people and fatten themselves and that is all they do. How could the livelihoods of the people not be cramped? (ga tsuan 賦)? Even though the appointment of governors is more important than magistrates, yet if you are also not careful in selecting them and you happen to appoint (to these posts) men of tangsang rank 2 who happen to enjoy great reputations at the time, then they will despair and lose heart (be disappointed--for having been effected demoted to a non-prestigious post?) and suspect that (they have received such appointments) because of public criticism (of themselves). If there are no orders given that special selections (of provincial officials be made), then these ~~xxxxxxx~~ people who are appointed to these positions will simply wander around the various local towns doing nothing more than ~~having~~ carrying kisaeng around and wasting their time in drinking, and that is all (they will do). How can we do a just and good job in appointing and dismissing men to and from office? The people are the roots of the country, but ~~in~~ if in ruling the people we cannot find the right way to do it, this is truly lamentable.

Yulrok

despair against pub. posts

lose heart at a provincial appointment

tax mag.

方伯

周公

外任

賦

send to censor out on rotation

268, 13:16a) I request that the civil officials who are in the ~~xx~~ ranks of the censors and court attendants? (taesi chi yöl <sup>taegan, sijong</sup> 臺侍之列) should serve on rotation in provincial posts (powoe 補外). Then look into their achievements in government and investigate to see whether they are able (worthy, outstanding) or not. Only after that should they be reappointed to a capital post~~x~~. In the case of exceptional (upright) officials (hsün-li 循吏) then increase them in rank and appoint them to office, and cause it most of the people who are to be appointed to office at the time come from the local chu and kun (districts). Moreover investigate those great officials who have talent and virtue and are also prepared and entrust them with the post of pangbaek (fang-po)(provincial governor, without setting a limit on tenure of one year.

off one-year tenure for prov. gov.

Each of them will select a large town in their province and there set up a governor's yamen, and have them take their families to their posts and stay in office for a long time, and make them responsible for accomplishing and achieving (their tasks, something). And when they come in (to serve in the capital), then have them participate in court affairs and ~~makxxxx~~ do away with the evil practice of emphasizing capital ~~affairxx~~ while making light of provincial ~~affairxx~~ (posts). If it is done like this, then the officials will fulfill their responsibilities and the people will be at ease in their obbupcations, and there will be some hope of achieving a rule of peace (ch'ip'yōng chi mang 治平之望).

deemphasize capital posts

13:16b

(Yulgok) also said: Whether the living people are at ease or bothered (disturbed: hyujök 休戚) depends on the magistrates. Whether the military quotas are truly (filled) or empty is related w to/the ~~xxxxxxx~~ of the border commanders (pyōngjang 邊將). Whether the promotion or demotion of officials is done correctly or not depends on the provincial governor. If the magistrate is not the right kind of man, then he will load his bribes (bribe money) onto a cart and will fawn on (flatter) the powerful (mikwon, mei-ch'üan 媚權), fatten himself and cause the people to be thin. If the border commander (pyōngjang) is not the right kind of man,

corruption

associated 滿民

肥己

268, 13:16b) then he will rob the soldiers of their property (剝割軍卒) and neglect and harm military preparations (隳損武備). If the provincial governor is not the right kind of man, then he will strive to pay off his debts, whether repaying favors or taking revenge on his enemies, and he will not investigate the conditions of the people. If it is like this, then even though you might have a sage ruler and outstanding ministers who lecture daily on the proper way of government, the benefits will not overflow to the bottom (provinces) and the transforming influences will not cover the outside (provincial areas), and within the area of the four boundaries, in the end there will be no principles by which (the country) can be governed. I humbly hope that we especially select the resolute, intelligent, humane warm men who can take responsibility for local affairs to be provincial governors and put them in charge of promoting (the worthy), punishing (the guilty), educating transforming the people and achieving good government, and if in the periodic review of performance (chönch'oe 殿最) they are found not to be just in their actions and to be lacking in accomplishment, then this should be publicized and they should be reprimanded and punished, and they should not be allowed to hold office. Also have the court officials each recommend men to be magistrates, but these men must be honest, able, loyal, and governed by reciprocity (in their dealings), and send them out to be magistrates over a 100 li's worth of territory. Charge them ~~xxx~~ with the responsibility of reviving what has fallen into decline (sojan 蘇殘) and lifting up (raising up) what has fallen into evil so that they ~~xxxxxx~~ are able to make the people happy. But if they are lazy in their duties and oppress the people, 269, 13:17a) then punish them severely and also indict those who have recommended them. When it comes to the chinsu and pojang (鎮帥, 堡將 : garrison commanders and ~~xxxx~~ chiefs of forts), you should also appoint ~~people~~ to those posts, on the basis of a just and correct method, people who have talent and are somewhat able to handle affairs. If you do not establish their ranks (whether high or low) on the basis of how much property they have, then to some

step down no force

court officials to be off

269, 13:17a) extent it is to be hoped that the "large rats" (oppressive officials will be gotten rid of <sup>碩鼠屏息</sup>) and the metal walls and scalding moat (impregnable cities <sup>金湯守固</sup>) will be firmly protected, and the living people for the first time (finally) will enjoy their livelihoods (occupations) and we will restore the ancient (methods). (End of indented section, quoting Yulgok)

PANGYE

(indented note: In my opinion (an, Pangye), the court is the root from which government originates, and the districts (chu-hyŏn) are the posts which receive ~~xxxx~~ government (orders, from the court). Even though we have ~~the~~ distinctions between the inner and outer (capital and provinces) and the root and branch, nevertheless what is called the root of government (sending out government orders) is no more than the chief ministers (chaebo <sup>宰輔</sup>) of the sŏng and pu (<sup>首府</sup>), and that is all. As for the other government bureaus (in the capital), all of them have their own separate responsibilities. As for the

MAGS

provincial magistrates, then we divide up the king's people (among them) and they personally conduct government in the place (of the king). There is no <sup>weil</sup> principle, however, for governing (the people)/if you do not choose (good) officials to be magistrates and if you do not place importance on the post of magistrate. People of ancient times used to say, "if you treat the district magistrates (kunsu, hyŏllyŏng) lightly, then this is (tantamount to) treating the people lightly." And if you treat the people lightly, then the empire and the ~~xxx~~ state will be treated lightly. This is truly so. In our own country, the practice of treating the provinces lightly (in low regard) has been particularly extreme, and in the present time we also have had the practice of transferring people (to provincial posts) for the purpose of ~~showing~~ indicating censure (of their performance, of them: sip'yŏm <sup>示貶</sup> -as a kind of exile), and as appointments made in response to requests, and that is all.)(end, indented note

shifting official to pms. appointment or disfavor EXCE

-ch'am'al (<sup>參謁</sup>): participation in court audiences?)

Ch'am'al will be conducted in accordance with present regulations.

(note: Newly appointed officials to posts of tanghagwan (<sup>堂下官</sup>) rank

Review of official

269, 13:17a) in the capital and provinces and those who are sent out as envoys (ch'ulsaja 出使者) will both take part in an audience (ch'am'al) at attached offices? of the State Council (üijöngbu) and Ministry of Personnel (note: ministry of war for military officials) within 10 days (from their appointment date?))(end note)

13:17b) Rewards and punishments (pop'yöm 褒貶) evaluations of official performance (will be done) in the last three months of every year, the tangsangwan officials of each government bureau and the tangsangwan of the sokcho (原曹 :ministry to which officials are attached?--ministry of personnel?), and in the provinces the provincial governors and chöltosa (prov. military commanders) will rank in proper sequence (tüngje 等第) their subordinate officials in terms of their merits and errors in conducting affairs and they will memorialize this to the throne. (note: It will start on the 15th day of the 12th month 臘月). In general after a capital official has been in office for 8 months, and a provincial official in office for a year, then they will be reviewed (pop'yöm). If the reviewing official (pop'yömgwan) is newly appointed and has not been in office for 6 months, then the former official will grade and rank (pop'yöm) (people), and if the former incumbent happens to be guilty of a crime or dead, then wait until (the new appointee to the post of reviewing official) has been in office for a full 6 months before he conducts a review & ranking (tüngje). The district magistrates (suryöng) will be ranked and graded by the provincial governors, but they will consult with the provincial army commanders (chöltosa). The border commanders (pyönjang) will be ranked and graded by the chöltosa who will consult together with the provincial governor.)(end note) And then carry out promotions and dismissals (~~promotions~~) (黜陟) (ch'ulch'ök) (note: ch'ök (陟) means to promote someone in rank)(end note)

(indented note: The taegan (censors) will also be graded and ranked by their chief official. Under the present law the taegan (censors) are not graded and ranked (tüngje), but this is not appropriate. Even though the

✓  
review of pop'yöm 8/12 mos

ch'ulch'ök will grade censors

269, 13:17b) censors are obliged to keep a check on each other, yet they are all guided by ~~each other~~ each other and receive guidance (leadership?) from each other (? kyesang t'ongsung 皆相統承 ).(end note)

ITEM: The evaluation (pop'yŏm) of official~~s~~ in the capital and provinces will be divided into 9 grades. We will use the T'ang system of evaluating performance (see below)(end note) And in all cases actual fact must be followed in evaluating the best (people). (note: At the present time we are lax in all matters and the pop'yŏm evaluations are even more neglected (is even more an empty matter)(dead letter) Even the commonest and basest of clerks is also given an upper grade (of performance) while men who are mature in their seeing and hearing (of things--experience) are not regarded as exceptional. ~~This must be thoroughly reformed~~ We must thoroughly reform this practice, and only after that can the reviews be done right.)(end note)

With regard to the highest grade (of performance grade), we must establish the grade and then wait for the person (who is qualified, before we give him this ranking), and that is all. It is not a grade that ought to be given to ordinary people. If, in addition to the best grade, there happens to be people worthy of praise, and if there happens to be, outside of the kŏjŏn( those people who are at court?) somebody who is especially deserving of responsibility, they also all should be reported according to the facts and memorialized to the throne.

ITEM: If there happens to be anyone who makes an error and does not do a correct job of grading or ranking people, he should be impeached by the state council, ministry of personnel, or Sahŏnbu (OIG) (note: Also change and correct the grade (that he has given). If anybody grades an official on the basis of private considerations and thus deceives the throne, he also should be punished.)(end note)

Upper-upper (grade). (note: raise the man three grades in rank (kye 階 ) The term, je kye, means cha( 資 :rank)(end note)

Sang-jung (upper-middle)(note: raise the man two grades)

Sang-ha (upper-lower), raise the man 1 grade.(end note)

T'ang system of 9 grade classif. system ✓

Standard with grade inflation ✓

13:18a)

269, 13:18a) -middle-upper (note: If a man is graded middle-upper (two times?) consecutively, then treat him as upper-lower)(end note

-middle-middle

-middle-lower (note: If a man is graded consecutively (2 times?) as middle lower, then treat him as lower-upper)(end note

-lower-upper (note: reduce his salary by half for 6 months)(end note)

-lower-middle (dismiss him from office)(end note)

-lower-lower (note: dismiss him from office (p'ajik) and ~~take away his~~ on his office warrants (kosin <sup>告身</sup>) take away three grades.)(end note)

When an official is transferred, then in every case after he has served a full term on duty take a look at his record of achievement and appoint him (to another post) in accordance with his rank (kye). (note: If it is a haeng or su brevet appointment, then do not go beyond three ranks (difference between his grade and his new post)(end note)

(note cont.: After his office warrant has been taken away (he has ~~been reduced in rank~~) if he is appointed to another post then do it in accordance with his reduced grade (rank).(end note)

13:18b) ~~Increasing~~ Except for increasing a person's rank and transferring them to a higher (office grade) post (note: for those people who are jumped in ~~rank~~ on a transfer not in sequential order on account of outstanding talent or virtue, then their rank (kye) should also be given a special raise, in accordance with the regulations for sujik(守職) <sup>except in</sup> brevet appointments)(end note) and/in special promotions of rank for people who have earned merit, in all (other) cases increases (in rank) should be done with an investigation (of official record).

Current practice and special raising of rank in honor of felicitous events should all be abolished, and the substitute promotion (in rank) of sons and younger brothers should also all be abolished.

Even though capital and provincial officials may be increased (raised) in rank, it will be necessary for them to wait until they have filled their terms of office before they are promoted to a higher (post) in accordance with their (higher) rank.

Schedule of evaluation

Abolish rank promotion of felicitous events

269, 13:18b). If you have a case of someone with an unusual record who scores a high grade on his evaluation review (note: that is anyone who scored upper-middle or higher or ~~x~~ who scores upper-lower on two (successive) reviews of performance)(end note), and with regard to those who are holding a quasi position? (chunjik 准職) who is specially promoted to tangsang rank, they will wait until their terms of office are filled and then will be transferred (to their new appointments). This will be the practice for both capital and provincial officials.

准職

(note: At the present time, if those holding the chunjik (quasi posts) of capital officials are promoted to tangsang rank, then they are immediately transferred away from their posts. The chöng( 正 ) officials? of the siwön( 修寺院)

do not take their responsibilities (offices) seriously, and all officials are transferred (too) frequently, and as a result it has become a firm and hard regulations, and that is all. Everything ought to be done the same as with the provincial officials. (That is,) even though a man is promoted in rank to tangsang, he should stay where he is and not be transferred. In ancient times when there was a good man who was worthy of praise, then they raised his rank, but he might keep his post for the whole of his life without ever being transferred (to another post), and there was not any (inner and outer) distinction (in the treatment of) capital and provincial (officials).

Only after it is done this way will we be able to select the right people and entrust them with responsibility and keep them in their posts for long terms.)(end note)

With regard to (people of) tangsang (rank) and above, these are selections made on the basis of a royal ~~command~~ command (appointment) on the basis of a person's virtue (myöngdök chi sön 命德之選). If it is not a person with a virtuous record of performance ~~and outstanding conduct~~ and outstanding conduct of government affairs, you cannot promote him. As for certain current

practices of promoting as the case may be togam( 都監 ), toch'öng( 都庁 ), küg'ok( 鞫獄 ) and munsarang( 問事郎 )(officials?) and of prior reports? coming (söllae 先來) of good news? (hüibo 彙報) of military officials,

too frequent

報先來 或官署

270, 13:1x9a), there is nothing to be said about this, and that is all there is to it. (note: These kinds of current precedents for promotion in rank are extremely mistaken rules. If you conduct an evaluation in accordance with the circumstances and reward someone, then there is no obstacle to doing it.)(end note)

When it comes to people who write out or copy books and letters, even though one might be slightly different from (better than) another, to promote them in rank because of this is also not in accordance with the principles of ancient times. Better to substitute another kind of reward (instead of promotion).

(note: It is all right to give them either chariots or horses or money or silk. In addition with regard to those who are at the present time 80 years of age or older, it goes without saying that both commore s are and ch'ongmin ~~wik~~ all be promoted in rank. Even though the intention behind this would seem to be good, still it is not appropriate. Generally speaking honoring the virtuous and treating elders as elders should be treated are things which should not be confused. We should establish a regulation that every year (the elderly) should be given royal grants of rice and meat.)(end note)

Indented section: (Pangye) I note that the praise of the good (those good at their jobs) and the blame of those who are bad (at their jobs) is the grand (principle) for encouraging and punishing (officials). But you have to wait until good or bad (actions) are made manifest before ~~you can do the right thing in according~~

you can do the right thing in according praise or blame. In the time of T'ang Yao (唐) and Yu Shan (虞) they conducted a review of official performance every three years, and after three (such) reviews they either promoted or dismissed (ch'ulch'ok) (officials). This was a case of definitely

waiting for good or bad (actions) to become manifest. \* When you get to the Chou dynasty, the prime minister (chung-tsai 冢宰) at the end of the year received communications? (shou-hui 受會) and ordered the wang to be dismissed or appointed (詔王廢置), and every three years he would review performance (of officials, wang?) in government and

*Merevents NOT POSTS*

*Sift elderly NOT POSTS to the*

*convened everyone*

*詔王廢置*

*冢宰*

*受會*

270, 13:1a9a) either reward or punish them. At intervals there were frequent variations in the system (? sosu ijeja 疎數異制者), perhaps fearing that people might be lax or lazy (in its adm.?), at times there ~~was~~ was harm and advantage (additions or subtractions to the system?).

From this time on, in the Han, Chin, T'ang and Sung dynasties, all of them had one ~~xxx~~ review (of official performance) a year, but the codes for promotion and dismissal (ch'ulch'ök) in the interval were not the same.

13:19b) By the time of the Great Ming dynasty (Ta-Ming), they conducted reviews of official performance once every three years, and after three such reviews (9 years?), then they promoted or dismissed people (ch'ulch'ök).

This was a restoration of ~~the~~ the ancient system. But with regard to the who system (the way it worked?), every official/completed a term of three years

would submit a letter of his achievements and the agency in charge of him would write on it whether it approved or disapproved (chönc'h'oe 殿最) and would then send it on to the ~~Board of Personnel~~ Censorate? (yü-shih

御史) and the Board of Personnel (Li-pu), who would also write a recommendation (evaluation, chönc'h'oe) on it. (note: this ~~is~~ evaluation (chönc'h'oe) had three grades; the first was called ch'ing (稱 Praise), the second was called p'ing-ts'ang (pyöngsang 平常 :average), and the third was called pu-ch'ing (no praise 不稱) (end note). Then (the document) was memorialized and an edict obtained, and the main was ordered to be reappointed to a post.

(note: In the 6th year, the second review was also conducted like this.

In the comprehensive review (t'ung-kao 通考) of the 9th year, then they decided on whether to ~~to~~ promote or demote the person)(end note)

This system was thus different from the (Chou dynasty practice) of having a general convocation (meeting) at ~~the~~ the end of the year and dismissing and appointing people (sejong ch'onghoe p'aech'i-ja 歲終總會廢置者), and I don't know whether it was good or not (miji ki ka ya 未知其可也).

As for our country, (aguk), we conduct a review every 6 months, and

in particular there is no intention here of doing this on the basis of a person's achievements or by investigating what ~~he~~ he in fact has done. Our ~~is~~ current

annual review  
Mins

ROUTINIZATION  
review of  
Mins

9 year  
term decision!

Kore a  
6 mo reviews

!!

empty review system!  
↓  
frequent transfers!  
ADMINISTRATIVE necessity  
3-3-yr eval. tied to feudalism!

no decisions made till 13:20a  
if it takes too long

no without promotion review  
vs frequent dismissal + promotion

270, 13:19b) regulations (system) is an empty matter (a dead letter: hōsa 廢事) and it stimulates even more the frequent transfers of officials (from one post to another). If you want to take into account what is best for ancient and modern times and establish regulations that can be implemented, then the best system (to adopt) would be to have a review (of official performance) once at the end of every year, and at that time carry out promotions (note: that is, promotions in rank--kagye 加階)(end note) and dismissals. The reason for having immediate decisions on whether to promote or dismiss officials is because after the abolition of feudalism (feng-chien fei hou 封建廢後), people were not appointed to office ~~from long periods of time~~ as they had been in ancient times. If they wanted to wait for several years before carrying out (appointments, reviews of performance and promotions and dismissals), then in the interim there would be changes and there would be many cases where promotions or dismissals would not be carried out, and people would not understand the true (purpose of, benefits from) a system of praise and blame (pop'yōm 褒貶; i.e. evaluation of official performance). Thus the best way to do it is to carry out promotions and dismissals forthwith. (note: Also, I note that once the system (fa) of praise and blame (review) has become strictly and clear and is carried out in accordance with the true facts, then except for those people who do injury to affairs and mistreat the people and cannot be allowed to stay in office for even the shortest time, everybody else ~~will~~ (cannot be transferred to another post) until he undergoes a pop'yōm review of his performance. We cannot do it as is done at the present time where officials are frequently dismissed and promoted.)(end note)

Under the T'ang dynasty law of review (k'ao-ko chih fa 考課之法), the chiefs of the bureaus (offices) would yearly evaluate their underlings for ~~merit and error~~ merit and error (mistakes) and differentiate them into 9 grades. The officials with regular rank (liu-<sup>nei</sup> chih kwan 流內之官) were given four grades of good ratings. The first was called te-i (德義有聞), the second was ch'ing-shen (清慎明著), the third was calab (公平可稱). The 4th was 恪勤匪懈

~~28x, m; p; h; a; x; m; f; m; k; m; x~~

270, 13:20a) From the court attendants close to the emperor down to the frontier garrison commanders, /regulations for the <sup>27</sup> ~~evaluation~~ <sup>最 (good points)</sup> of official performance based on the duties of the office were drawn up.

277ong  
ref. in  
review for

(note:

1) 献可替否為近侍之最 Making good recommendations to the throne and correcting errors (mistakes), is a good point for officials in close attendance on the emperor

2) To judge men and make recommendations and advance good men of talent (chōnhyōng inmul chōxjin chaeryang <sup>銓衡人物擢進才良</sup>) is a good point (ch'oe) for the bureau in charge of the selection of men.

3) To promote what is pure and to attack what is dirty, and to be correct in praise and blame (assessing performance) is a good point in the evaluation and comparison of performance (of subordinates) (<sup>揚清激濁褒貶必當</sup>)

4) In rites and ceremonies to act in accordance with the statues is what is good performance on the part of Ritual officials.

5) To harmonize the musical tones and not to lose the tune? (ch'ulchu <sup>錦奏</sup>) is what is good performance for music officials.

6) Not to delay decisions, and to give (rewards) and take away (office warrants?) in accordance with principle (what is right), is a good point for judging cases.

7) To use the proper methods in the control of units and to make no mistakes in maintaining guard and security is a good point in the performance of guards (sugwi <sup>官衛</sup>).

8) To keep the troops well trained and to maintain military equipment fully is a good point (ch'oe) for military commanders (tu-ling <sup>督領</sup>).

13:20b)

9) To obtain the true facts in prosecuting a criminal case (ch'ugük tükchōng <sup>推鞠得情</sup>) and to be fair and just in decisions is a good point for legal officials.

10) To be skilled and careful in the collation and comparison of texts and to be clear in deciding what is to be published is a good point for the chiao-cheng (<sup>校正</sup> : the officials in charge of comparing and rectifying texts).

270, 13:20b)

11) In receiving edicts and in submitting memorials (replies), ~~to speak clearly~~ and in declaring and receiving (the king's orders), to be clear and clever is a good point for the sönnap (宣納) : transmitter of documents).

12) To have pang (method 方) in instructing and guiding and having one's students do their studies (suöp) is a good point for school officials.

13) To be strict and clear in giving awards and punishments, and to always win victory in big battle is a good ~~mark~~ point (ch'oe) for a military officer (kunjang)

14) To be courteous and righteous (li-i) and virtuous in behavior and to keep purged and clean one's subordinate units (agencies), is a good point for a chönggyo (政教).

15) To record statutes ? (chönjöng 典正) in detail and to be able to do both good writing and managing of affairs is what a munsa (文史) should do.

16) To investigate affairs with skill and to do the ~~w~~ right thing in whatever one does is what a censor? (kyujöng 糾正) should do.

17) To be clear in one's investigations and to leave no error uncovered is what a kugöm (鞠檢) is supposed to do.

18) To keep one's affairs of office well managed and in offering and receiving (orders?) to ~~so~~ do things well is what a kamjang (監掌) is supposed to do.

19) To be faithful in ~~mark~~ assessing service and in the levying ~~payment~~ of taxes

so that the able-bodied males and artisans have no resentment is what the yöksa (役使) is supposed to do.

20) To plant and hoe at the right time and to bring in the harvest and collect ~~taxes~~ is what the tun-t'ien commander (tun'gwan) is supposed to do.

21) To be diligent in accumulating surplus (savings) and to be clear in making payments and collects is what a granary clerk (ch'anggo) is supposed to do.

22) To calculate the extra and short (periods?)(in the rotation of the earth) and to investigate (astronomical?) principles closely and with skill is what calendrical officials are supposed to do.

270, 13:20b) 23) To divine (chöm) the weather and to practice medical and geomantic skills with much effectiveness is what a master of the arts (pangsul 方術) is supposed to do.

24) To be skilled in investigating people (travellers) and not to obstruct travellers on their travels is what a good customs or ferry man is supposed to do.

25) To prevent confusion in the marketplace and to prohibit lewd and excessive behavior is what the city magistrate (sisa 市司) is supposed to do.

26) To husband and raise animals, and fatten them so that they prosper and are numerous is what the official of a grazing area is supposed to do (mokkwan)

27) To keep pure and clean the border and frontier areas and to keep the walls and forts in good repair is what the chinbang (鎭陽 鎭陽 :border commander) is supposed to do. (end note)

If a man has more than one <sup>excellent</sup> good mark (ch'oe 最) and ~~ix~~ scores "good" (sön) in four things, he will be graded upper-upper. If a man has one or more <sup>excellent</sup> ch'oe (good marks) and scores "good" in three things, or if he should ~~ix~~ not score a <sup>excellent</sup> good mark (ch'oe), but has four "good" things (that he does), then he will be ranked upper-middle. If a man has one or more ch'oe (<sup>excellent</sup> good evaluations) and scores good in two things, or if he has no ch'oe (<sup>etc.</sup> good evaluation), but scores "good" in three things, he will be graded upper-lower.

271, 13:21a)

evaluation), but scores "good" in three things, he will be graded upper-lower. has one or more <sup>etc.</sup>

If a man ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ ch'oe (<sup>etc.</sup> good evaluation) ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ and is "good" in one thing, or if he has no ch'oe evaluation, but is good in two things, then he will be graded as middle-upper. If ~~XXXXXX~~ he has one or more ch'oe (<sup>etc.</sup> good evaluations), or if he has no ch'oe, but is good in one thing, then he will be graded middle-middle. If in the conduct of his official

business he is cursory in its management, but there is no report of either "good" or ch'oe (<sup>etc.</sup> superior) performance, he will be graded middle-lower.

If he ~~KNOWS~~ is of poor intelligence and does not know how to handle things and make judgements clearly and errs in management, he will be graded lower-upper.

If he violates the public trust for his own private interest and does a g bad

271, 13:21a) job in his work, he will be graded lower-middle. If as an official he commits fraud and embezzles and is totally without accomplishment, then he will be graded lower-lower. These are the so-called 9 grades.

(note: In addition to the sŏn-ch'oe (good-excellent) ~~grades~~ evaluations, if you have a case of ~~an official~~ district magistrate who is skillful in the care and education of his people such that there is an increase in population, in each case take the present population of households as a standard of 10 parts (divided the number ~~in~~ by 10), and for every 10% increase in the population, increase the officials rank by one grade. In the case of a chou where the number of households is not a full 5,000 ~~or~~ or in a hsien where the number of households is not a full 500, then in each case set a standard of 5,000 and 500 households. If, on the contrary, his care and nurturing of the people is contrary to what is right and there is a decrease in the population, then establish a standard as used for an increase in population, and for every 10% decrease ~~in~~ the population, decrease his rank by one grade.

Those officials who encourage agricultural production and can achieve a surplus in production will also (be evaluated) by ~~xx~~ using the current amount of land as a standard ~~xx~~ of 10. For every increase of 20% (in the land under cultivation)(in the amount of crop?), raise the man's grade by one. If he achieves (increase) in more than one place, then you make recommend him for a multiple promotion.)(end note)

Indented note:( Chiu Ch'i (丘濟) says: There are things that can be adopted from the T'ang dynasty's k'ao-k'o chih fà (考課之法 : performance evaluation system) because they had detailed regulations for evaluating "good" performance (sŏn), and ~~was~~ rough (general) categories for evaluating "excellent" (ch'oe) performance. Generally speaking, a "good" rating was in order to make known their virtuous behavior, and an "excellent" rating was to make known their talent and skill (on the job?). The good and excellent ratings 13:21b) either double or cancel out, and you divide evaluations into 9 grades for the purpose of evaluating performance. Those capital and provincial officials

So-called 9 grades

promotion for pop. increase

vs decrease

clips mod.

271, 13:21b) who are superior (sang), will have their ranks raise; those  
tho come next will keep their posts, and those who rank low will have  
their salaries taken away and will be dismissed from office. This system  
comes close to achieve the intent of the ancients in their evaluation of  
officials.)(end note)

INDENTED SECTION: The above 27 categories of excellent performance  
(ch'oe <sup>最</sup>) are definitely defined in detail, but if you stick too closely  
to these categories (regulations), then it is possible that you might be  
too restricted by regulations and one might have the evil (bad problem)  
of not exhausting the true facts of the situation (not having the best possible  
~~evaluation~~ true evaluation of an official's performance). The responsibilities  
of a local magistrate (suryong) is to rule over the land and the people and  
to maintain general surveillance over all affairs. He is not like an official  
in the capital, each of whom has his one separate task. (note: If you  
evaluate a district magistrate on the basis of the above 27 categories of  
excellent performance, you might have to combine two or more of the categories,)(  
end note) It <sup>might</sup> ~~might~~ not be necessary to stick to the established regulations  
(for evaluation), ~~but~~ and it would also be all right to create new categories  
as the case arises in order to make clear the true facts of the situation.  
(note: I am only talking here about the above 27 categories of excellence (ch'oe);  
if you are dealing with the "four good" (evaluations), then one ought to  
conform completely with the regulations.)(end note)

Local  
MAG  
vs  
Capital  
Magistrate

Also in addition to the chonch'oe (<sup>殿最</sup>) evaluations of district  
magistrates, every three years (that is, the regulat year for/land register  
~~(surveys)~~)(end note) an investigation of increase or decrease in land ~~and~~  
households should be conducted to see the true facts of whether the magistrate  
has been caring and ~~h~~artuing the people and encourageing production or not. In  
the case of those who have increased the ~~area~~ area of cultivated land (kanjon 墾田)  
(note: kanjon means land brought under cultivation. Once a land system has  
been instituted, then the people are distributed throughout the land, and  
(land and people) is combined into one matter (a single problem, affair)(end note)



271, 13:21b) ~~existing~~ take the ~~existing~~ land (under cultivation) as a standard of 13:22a) ten, and declare that for every increase of 1/10 (10%) (over the existing amount of land under cultivation), every magistratex will be increased one degfee in his rank. And for decreases in the amount of land under cultivation, also do it like this and drop the man's rank by one degree, and make this a fixed regulation. (note: This regulation applies to those officials who have terms of office of 2 years or more; in their case handle it as the~~x~~ law states)(end note) (end indented section)

- . Susō (收叙 :receiving appointments?): every year in the winter (note:some say it should be done every three years), the relevant bureau will record those people whose office warrants (kosin) have been taken away from them and those people who have been dismissed from their posts and submit it as a memorial to the throne (kyemun) (note: After the 15th day of the 11th month, prepare the names of the criminals and submit it to the throne as a memorial. From among these names select those people who could be appointed to office (sosōja 疏叙者) and in the 12th month, first ~~day~~ week, the king will issue ~~and~~ edict to the appropriate ministry)(end note)

-Posthumous names (謚). Those high ministers who ought to receive posthumous names, when they die, then when they are buried, the appropriate bureau should discuss a posthumous name and memorialize it. (note: If before the funeral takes place there is some reason for it, then do not wait a year.)~~(end note)~~ With regard to ~~where~~ the good and bad deeds of a prime minister, all the people of the country ought to know about it, and it will not be necessary to wait until his posthumous biography (haengjang) is written; moreover it will not be necessary to wait until after his sons or grandsons have petitioned in order to discuss a posthumous name for him)(end note)

INDENTED SECTION: Yu Sōae (Sōngyong 柳五崖) said: The ancients placed a lot of importance on the posthumous name. In our~~x~~ dynasty since ~~the~~ before the reign of Myōngjong many people who ought to have received a posth. name did get one, but in recent years this practice has almost been completely abandoned.

annual report of dismissed off.

a band of posth. name

bureaucracy (review of performance) -57- Pangye surok, imgwon chi che rank (han, II, p.52)  
271, 13:22a)--. With regard to the posthumous granting (of ~~xxxxx~~ ch'ujung 追贈 )  
if a special award is given to somebody because of loyalty or outstanding  
(worthy) (talent, service), then (note: such as the former worthies and loyal ministers  
of recent times who were given awards and grants)(end note) their sons and  
grandsons will receive the ūm (yin) and other privileges, as has been done  
in the past.

13:22b) INDENTED SECTION: During the reign of Sŏnjo, Yulgok submitted  
a memorial to the throne, which said: The responsibilities of the ch'ŏn'gwan  
(the officials of Heaven 天官 :Han,II, 53--in charge of personnel selection)  
is very important. The man who occupied that position in past times ~~xxxx~~ regarded  
state government and the rectification of the affairs of the world (kukchŏng sedo  
as clear as could be  
國政世道 ) as his own responsibility. He was extremely (most)

bright (clear) in the examination and distinguishing (of people) k (kambyŏl 鑑別 );  
as fair and just as could be advocated  
and he was most fair (kong 公 ) in the selection of people. He expounded  
(chujang 主張) the purest (clearest) views of the time, while the subordinate  
officials (lang-liao 郎僚 ) only aided him in what he couldn't do (himself),  
and that was all (that they were responsible for). (郎僚只補其所不逮 )

At the present time even the selection of pure (officials) for the kwan and kak  
館閣 (?) is all entrusted to the nanggwan (郎官 :Ministry of  
Personnel bureau chiefs) and (the chief official) does not interfere (in the  
midst--does not intrude his opinion in what the nanggwan does). All he does/  
is to recommend people for the least consequential of posts, but even then  
he looks circumspectly (in front and behind) around, and whether he regards  
lightly  
(a person?) with disdain or importance depends on whether the person making  
the request (for a post) is high or low. ~~xxxxxxx~~  
~~candidates for office?~~ If in the midst (of the conduct of his selections?),  
he ~~xxxxxxx~~ operates (makes his decisions) half on the basis of ~~the~~  
what is fair and just and half on the basis of personal interest, then public  
opinion at the time praises him for doing a good job in it. Therefore, the  
decision about  
discussion of pure (men) (for appointment to office) depends on the bureau  
chiefs (nangnyo 郎僚), and does not depend on the chief official. For this

Partly rank

Yulgok 7.12 = peis.

middle-rank officials  
Nanggwan of Personnel  
!!!

✓

271, 13:22b)

~~28:xxx3422bx~~ reason the hat and the shoes are turned upside down and no proper conduct (kigang)(no proper order) is achieved in it. In past times each of those officials held on to his position (job) and performed his job correctly and guided the king in the right way (chöngsa kyögwang **正事格王**).

Even though benevolent orders issued from the top (king), yet if they were not in accord with just opinion (public opinion, kong'üi), then they had to overturn it and go against it. They had no choice but to not regard fawning and flattering compliance as respectful behavior. But at the present time everybody thinks that that ministry is only obliged to receive and carry out

272, 13:23a)

*no judgment of quality of working?*

written orders. If there is an order to appoint a man to office, nobody asks whether the man is good or not; they only think that an order from ~~the~~ above (the king) king must be obeyed. These (officials) are truly what is called the three-edict prime ministers (samji chaesang **三旨宰相**).

The Ministry of Personnel has a bureau in charge of investigating merit (kogong chi sa **考功之司**); therefore in the past the investigation of merit meant that an investigation was made into whether the officials were diligent or slack (**勤慢**), and if there were any officials who did not perform their responsibilities, then in accordance with what was revealed, they recommended that the man be dismissed, and for that reason the officials performed their responsibilities and none of them dared to lax or lazy. But at the present time the chönjo (**銓曹**: ministry of personnel) only has charge of appointments (chesu **除授**), and when it comes to the investigation and review of official performance (kogwa **考課**), they have no idea of what it is. Because of this the government bureaus have become loose (lax) and almost everything is destroyed (in disarray). At the present time government affairs are not done and government is not achieved, and the reason for it is that the good laws and beautiful intentions of our ancestors have been abandoned and are not practiced while the bad habits of recent times, on the contrary, have become established ~~practices~~ law (practice).

*No review*

*272/271*

first year of the In the/reign of King Injo, somebody said that at the present time government affairs were too bothersome and numerous, all of which was because of the ~~fact~~

272, 13:23a) (too) frequent g transfer of censorate officials (taegan 臺諫), and the frequent transfer of censors was also due to the fact that everybody was (trying to) avoid petty enmity (the petty dislikes of their enemies).

An official would be transferred in the morning and again in the evening; it was the same as child's play (a child's game). At the court of our ancestors even though the censorate might carry out a review (ch'ugo 推考) (in which attack

they would praise some official?), (the official) still would not be able to avoid transfer (would) not (be forced to) avoid (their wrath) or be transferred. The two censorate offices would then reveal sealed secrets

to one another, and from this one can know that (transfers of officials) in order to avoid the enmity (of other people) was basically not the system that was employed by our ancestors. And if by chance someone happened to be

slightly ill or if (an appointment) might be x of some inconvenience to somebody it was also regarded as inappropriate for people to compete with one another to claim illness (as an excuse) for fear that they might not be up to (the task, responsibilities involved in the appointment or office). Yang Ch'eng (陽城) (of the T'ang dynasty, Han, II, 54) held the post of censor for 10 years.

How could it have been that during that time he was never ill in the slightest?

Han Yü (韓愈) composed an essay on contending subjects (officials) (chaengsin-non 爭論) and was even impeached for it, but one also never hears that he used that as an excuse to avoid office. Moreover, in ancient times remonstrance

officials (ön'gwan 諫官) each spoke out on affairs, and for that reason and every person was able to speak his views (inin tük chin sogyön 從得盡所見) (a memorial to present)

At the present time, if a censor has something to say, then (his) subordinate officials take the letter and run around with it to the house of every man (get all them back: kwil 歸一)

(on the censorate?), and only after they get it back (with the approval of all agreed to it (were unanimous) the others?) do they then present it as a memorial. Because of this when a man makes a move he is restrained and obstructed and he does not dare speak fully

his mind fully. Once a man says something that goes against (opinion) or is regarded as strange, it gives rise to big commotion fight, and this is the

ATTACK on Censorate

remonstrance free expression of view

272, 13:23b) reason why court affairs are not quiet (chojŏ/pujŏng) <sup>chi</sup> 朝著不靖

We ought to ~~adopt the system~~ copy the old system and not allow the transfer of officials for avoidance of enmity and not allow people to petition for <sup>to take a vacation</sup> transfer (because of illness). And in the expression of views on affairs, there does not have to be unanimity of opinion (hap tong 合同), and in addition each man should express and memorialize his own views.

At the present time the Office of Special Counselors (oktang 五堂) is in the practice of submitting written memorials of opinion (ch'aron 劄論). If there is someone who has a different view, then they only follow the

opinion of the majority (yu ta shi jong 唯是飽), and the person who is not 12:24a) to go along (with the majority) avoids (the situation) and does not participate (in the memorial). He also <sup>may</sup> ~~might~~ submit his own written

memorial in order to expound his own views. And the censorate (taegan) also acts in accordance with the precedent of the Office of Special Counselors, where something ~~is~~ some of them do not participate (in a joint memorial) or

sometimes a person submits a separate memorial of his own views. The mind (feelings, purpose) behind this all arises from (a desire to fulfill) the public (good), and naturally there is no obstacle to doing it. If it

is done like this, then the pathways of speech will be even ~~more~~ wider (ikkoe 益擴) and moreover, there will be no ~~any~~ fear of altercation or strife. Even though this opinion was expressed at the time, still they did not rectify (reform, change) ~~the mind/practice~~ this bad (practice, situation).