



DIRECTORATE FOR PLANS

# Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE

IN 478297

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GROUP 1  
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~~SECRET~~

*Communist Party*

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DIST 26 NOVEMBER 1971

COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR

DOI:

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**NMCC**

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SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY OF EL SALVADOR ~~VIEW OF PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY OF GENERAL JOSE ALBERTO MEDRANO~~

*EL SALVADOR  
FBI*

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SOURCE:

UNRECORDED (b)(1) (b)(3) BY FILED IN 109-17-226-

1.  COMMENT: THE PRINCIPAL ~~SECTORAL~~ <sup>EX-101</sup> GOAL OF THE NATIONAL OPPOSITION UNION (UNO) IS TO PREVENT THE NATIONAL CONCILIATION PARTY (PCN) FROM OBTAINING AN ABSOLUTE MAJORITY ~~IN THE~~ VOTE IN THE UPCOMING NATIONAL ELECTIONS. UNO LEADERS BELIEVED <sup>REC 08 64-200-226-384</sup> THAT 1971 ACCEPTANCE OF THE UNITED INDEPENDENT DEMOCRATIC FRONT (FUD) ~~WAS~~ PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION BY GENERAL JOSE ALBERTO MEDRANO WILL FACILITATE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE UNO GOAL.)


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2. JORGE SHAFICK H A N D A L, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF EL SALVADOR (PCES) AND THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY (PR), THOUGH NOT ACTUALLY A MEMBER, ATTENDED ON 22 NOVEMBER 1971 A MEETING OF THE UNG ELECTORAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE. DURING THIS MEETING, MUCH ATTENTION WAS GIVEN TO GENERAL MEDRANO'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE FUDI PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION, AND HANDAL PROVIDED A RATHER LENGTHY EXPOSITION OF HIS VIEW OF THE IMPLICATIONS AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MEDRANO CANDIDACY.

3. HANDAL SAID THAT THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF EL SALVADOR (GOES) HAS FOR SOME TIME EXERTED GREAT PRESSURE UPON GENERAL MEDRANO IN AN EFFORT TO DISSUADE HIM FROM BECOMING A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE. HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE A THEORY, WHICH HAS ACQUIRED SOME CURRENCY IN UNG CIRCLES, ACCORDING TO WHICH PRESIDENT FIDEL S A N C H E Z HERNANDEZ HAS LOST CONFIDENCE IN PCN PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE ARTURO ARMANDO M O L I N A AND DECIDED SECRETLY TO SUPPORT GENERAL MEDRANO.

*EL SAL.*


ACCORDING TO THIS THEORY, A MEDRANO VICTORY WOULD NOT ONLY BRING THE BETTER MAN TO THE PRESIDENCY, BUT IT WOULD ALSO PERMIT THE GOES

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TO ENJOY PUBLIC RELATIONS ADVANTAGES FROM AN OPPOSITION PARTY VICTORY.

4. HANDAL SAID THAT GENERAL MEDRANO, WHO ENJOYS CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT AMONG YOUNG MILITARY OFFICERS, HAS REPEATEDLY POINTED OUT TO THESE OFFICERS THAT THE PRESENT NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION HAS NOT DISPLAYED AN ABILITY TO COPE WITH SOCIAL UNREST, AND THAT A MOLINA ADMINISTRATION WOULD DO NO BETTER AND PERHAPS WOULD DO WORSE. GENERAL MEDRANO HAS EMPHASIZED THAT, SHOULD THE GOES FAIL TO COPE ADEQUATELY WITH SOCIAL UNREST, A POPULAR UPRISING WILL BE INEVITABLE. IN THE EVENT OF A POPULAR UPRISING, THE MILITARY WOULD BE CALLED OUT TO SUPPRESS IT, AND THIS COULD ONLY LEAD TO A WORSENING OF THE IMAGE OF THE ARMED FORCES. ACCORDING TO HANDAL, GENERAL MEDRANO HAS TOLD YOUNG SALVADORAN MILITARY OFFICERS THAT SUCH A CONFRONTATION WITH THE POPULACE IS NOT NECESSARY, AND THAT HE WOULD BE ABLE TO HANDLE THE SITUATION. GENERAL MEDRANO'S ALLEGED FORMULA FOR HANDLING SOCIAL UNREST IN EL SALVADOR IS TO ELIMINATE PHYSICALLY A SMALL NUMBER OF KEY LEFTIST LEADERS. GENERAL MEDRANO SUPPOSEDLY HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT REMAINS

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ONLY TO BE DETERMINED WHICH LEFTIST LEADERS SHOULD BE ELIMINATED, WHEN THEY SHOULD BE ELIMINATED, WHERE, AND HOW, ACCORDING TO HANDEL. GENERAL MEDRANO HAS RECENTLY ABSTAINED FROM ANTI-COMMUNIST STATEMENTS IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE COMMUNIST LEADERS TO EXPOSE THEMSELVES SO THAT HE CAN DETERMINE WHO SHOULD BE ELIMINATED.

5. [Redacted] COMMENT: THE THESIS OF A SECRET SANCHEZ-MEDRANO PACT HAS BEEN HEARD FROM TIME TO TIME AND MAY STEM FROM THE PRESENCE OF THE TWO TOGETHER AT A PROVINCIAL FUNCTION SOME TIME AGO. FOLLOWING THAT APPEARANCE, PRESIDENT SANCHEZ WAS ADVISED BY HIS SUPPORTERS TO CLARIFY HIS POSITION AND HE SUBSEQUENTLY ISSUED A STATEMENT ASSURING THE PCN OF HIS UNSWERVING LOYALTY CONCERNING GENERAL MEDRANO'S CONTACTS WITH YOUNGER MILITARY OFFICERS. SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD SEEM TO BE LOGICAL - HOWEVER, THE SENIOR COMMAND IS KNOWN TO FEAR AND DISTRUST MEDRANO AND YOUNGER OFFICERS WOULD PRESUMABLY BE CAUTIOUS IN THEIR DEALINGS WITH MEDRANO. AT LEAST THIS EARLY IN THE CAMPAIGN.

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6. [Redacted] DISSEM: STATE, DEFENSE ATTACHE, CINCSO, CINCLANT. [Redacted] GP-1

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