Offshoring Militarism:

U.S. Military Aid and the Limits of American Foreign Policy

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Abstract

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This dissertation examines the determinants, effects, and implications of contemporary United States foreign policy tools, with a focus on U.S. foreign aid programs which provide military equipment, weapons, and security sector training to foreign countries – generally known as military aid or security assistance. I focus on how and why U.S. policymakers have used these foreign policy tools to pursue various strategic interests and goals around the world – primarily from the end of the Cold War through the late War on Terror – and question the effectiveness of this these programs for achieving such goals.

In the first chapter, I study how the U.S. uses military aid as a way to promote U.S. arms exports in the competitive global arms market. I argue that the U.S. utilizes military aid as a way to maintain its market share dominance in arms importing countries, in order to prevent recipients from turning to competitor arms suppliers, such as China and Russia. I find that increased relative

funding of military aid and security assistance correlates with recipient countries where the U.S. maintains a greater share of the arms import market.

In the second chapter, I study the contemporary policy of using security assistance to prevent internal instability abroad, and examine the relationship between U.S. security assistance programs and changes in recipient states' internal instability. I describe several mechanisms by which security assistance may fail to improve stability in states with fragile domestic institutions, and how such assistance can potentially stoke conflict or empower abusive regimes and security sectors. I find that increased relative amounts of U.S. security assistance funding does not correlate with improving indicators of state fragility, but instead correlates with slightly worsening state fragility scores.

In the final chapter, I examine the fundamental flaws in how U.S. security assistance policies are developed and implemented to achieve the U.S.'s various strategic goals. I argue that security assistance programs often reflect the short-term and shifting political strategies and concerns of U.S. policymakers, rather than the conditions or root causes of problems within the recipient countries. I also argue that these programs are strategically and substantively inadequate for achieving long-term policy goals in recipient countries or for solving complex, institutional problems abroad. I use two critical case studies of security assistance recipients – Pakistan and Colombia – and find that in both cases, security assistance policies lacked a long-term strategy, were inadequate for addressing the goals set forth by U.S. policymakers, and generated counterproductive effects. These chapters contribute to research and policy debates on the limits, effectiveness, and implications of contemporary U.S. foreign policy.

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my mother, Mary M. Schwab, in living memory, and to my wife, Kara Barnes.

> "The very substance of violent action is ruled by the question of means and ends, whose chief characteristic, if applied to human affairs, has always been that the end is in danger of being overwhelmed by the means, which it both justifies and needs. Since the end of human action, in contrast with the products of fabrication, can never be reliably predicted, **the means used to achieve political goals are more often than not of greater relevance to the future world than the intended goals**."
>
> - Hannah Arendt, *Reflections On Violence*, 1969 (emphasis added)

> "We spent all this money and they still hate us."
>
> - U.S. Congressman Steve Chabot, 2011
> (commenting on U.S. assistance to Pakistan at a Congressional hearing)

Introduction

Since the end of World War II, policymakers of both of the United States' political parties have relied on the foreign policy tools of purchasing weapons for foreign militaries and training and equipping foreign soldiers as a way to pursue various strategic interests around the world. These programs – often referred to in the press as "military aid" and in research as "security assistance" or "security sector assistance" (SSA) – are one of the primary ways the U.S. exerts its influence over the internal and external security environments of foreign countries (Karlin, 2017).[1] In late 2019, U.S. military aid policies became the focus of national political attention, when the House of Representatives used the president's decisions for this aid as the impetus in their decision to approve articles of impeachment against the 45th president of the United States, Donald Trump (H.Res.755, 2019). The House impeachment resolution stemmed from his order to withhold $391 million of military aid appropriated for "providing vital military and security assistance to Ukraine." The resolution focused on the president's use of this aid for a self-serving "quid pro quo" in order to

[1] Security assistance and military aid are often used interchangeably in contemporary research. In this dissertation, I use the Department of Defense's historical definition of military aid as focusing specifically on subsidizing large weapons systems for foreign militaries, whereas security assistance can encompass a wide range of activities including training and equipping foreign security sectors. Security assistance can include military aid and refer to all such programs, while military aid historically refers to defense purchase subsidies for foreign militaries (Serafino, 2016). Throughout these chapters, I will use security assistance and security sector assistance (SSA) interchangeably to refer to all programs within this scope, and use military aid primarily in reference to the programs which subsidizes large defense equipment to established foreign militaries.

"benefit his reelection, harm the election prospect of a political opponent, and influence the 2020 United States Presidential election to his advantage" (H.Res.755). The Government Accountability Office (GAO) determined this was illegal, stating "Faithful execution of the law does not permit the President to substitute his own policy priorities for those that Congress has enacted into law" (GAO, 2020). The issues surrounding this incident decision highlight broader questions about the utility of security assistance as a tool for addressing both domestic political interests and foreign policy goals. This dissertation analyzes how U.S. security assistance programs reflect various strategic interests of U.S. policymakers, which strategic interests drive security assistance policies, and whether or not such programs are effective for achieving their stated goals.

While the incident of a president withholding military aid for personal gain is an anomaly in the history of foreign aid policy, the U.S. has long provided such aid for a variety of political and security justifications to countries ranging from corrupt repressive autocracies to trusted democratic allies. The official justifications for security assistance can be potentially short-sighted, contradictory, and counterproductive, and these policy decisions can have long-term implications for internal, regional, and global security issues. Scholars have long debated the motivations and effectiveness of security assistance as a U.S. foreign policy tool (Sylvan & Majeski, 2009; Sullivan et al., 2011). In this dissertation, I seek to address several general questions regarding the determinants and implications of U.S. security assistance policies. To what extent have domestic political or economic factors affected how policymakers decide to use security assistance? Is security assistance an effective way to improve stability in fragile states? Is providing weapons, equipment, and training for soldiers an appropriate or adequate tool for addressing complex institutional problems in countries around the world? In order to explore the determinants and implications of U.S. security assistance policies and programs, I conduct quantitative and qualitative analyses throughout the three following chapters.

In the first essay, I examine the relationship between the allocation of U.S. security assistance and competition in the global arms trade. U.S. policymakers and defense industry leaders have described the global arms market as a "race for global influence," and security assistance programs that subsidize the purchase of U.S.-made military equipment directly contribute to this influence (CSIS, 2018). Policymakers and scholars have debated the role security assistance programs as a tool for promoting U.S. interests abroad and influencing recipient state behavior (Caverley & Kapstein, 2013; Sylvan & Majeski, 2009; Sullivan et al., 2011). While scholars have assessed the implications of arms sales abroad, the effectiveness of security assistance for pursuing various U.S. foreign policy goals, and the use of military aid for promoting arms sales in certain countries, research has not systematically examined the correlation between U.S. security assistance allocation and global arms market competition (Biddle et al., 2018; Thrall & Dorminey, 2018).

I develop a theory that the U.S. allocates security assistance funds as a way to improve its competitive advantage and maintain market share dominance among arms-importing countries. More specifically, I argue that in order to prevent the intrusion of competitor exporters like China and Russia, the U.S. will allocate greater amounts of aid to subsidize military equipment purchases in countries where the U.S. has a greater relative share of the arms import market. To test this theory, I use data on global arms transfers and U.S. security assistance funding in a regression analysis to assess the correlation between arms import market share – or a country's reliance on U.S. arms imports – and the volume of different categories of U.S. security assistance funding, from 1993 to 2012. I find that funding for the U.S.'s largest single military aid program – Foreign Military Financing – increases among countries that are both relatively large arms importers and in which the U.S. enjoys a higher relative arms market share. Therefore, this chapter finds that the allocation of certain security assistance programs is driven by economic concerns and a desire to promote the U.S. defense industry's exports in a competitive global arms market.

In the second essay, I examine the relationship between U.S. security assistance programs and changes in recipient states' internal instability. In recent decades, particularly since the onset of the War on Terror after 9/11, U.S. policymakers have argued that security assistance can be used as a tool to build the capacity of partner nations' militaries and security sectors in order to prevent conflict and instability in poorly governed states. The political logic of this strategy assumes that by working "by, with, and through" foreign security sectors, the U.S. can prevent instability while also preventing the need for the U.S. to directly intervene to quell internal conflict in foreign countries (Karlin, 2017). In pursuit of this strategy, since 9/11, the U.S. has spent tens of billions of dollars annually providing weapons and training to over 100 countries, the majority of which are relatively poor countries with fragile domestic political and security environments. Despite these goals and the expansion of security assistance programs in recent decades, enhancing the capacity of foreign soldiers carries inherent risks, and researchers have found little overall evidence it these programs have generated a net benefit for various U.S. strategic objectives around the world (Miller & Sokolsky, 2015). I argue that rather than improving institutions or security conditions in fragile and poorly governed states, the injection of weapons and trained soldiers into such environments through security assistance programs either has no effect on state fragility or makes conditions worse.

I develop a theory that describes several mechanisms by which security assistance would either fail to improve conditions in fragile states, exacerbate conditions of instability, stoke conflict, and/or empower abusive regimes. In order to test this theory, I examine the effectiveness of security assistance for reducing state fragility through a quantitative regression analysis and several qualitative illustrative examples. I use a regression analysis to measure the correlation between relative volume of U.S. security assistance funding and an index of states' institutional fragility – the State Fragility Index. Through this analysis, I find that the security assistance programs that focus on training and

equipping soldiers correlate with a slightly worsening State Fragility Index score, which indicates that these programs fail to improve stability at best, or contribute to deteriorating conditions at worst. I support this quantitative example through several brief anecdotal descriptions of the outcome of U.S. security assistance programs in several countries, with an in-depth case study of Kyrgyzstan, which received increasing amounts of security assistance after 9/11 despite having little prior military relationship with the U.S. and a history of undemocratic, abusive regimes. Therefore, this chapter explains how contemporary security assistance strategies is unlikely to achieve the goals set forth by U.S. policymakers, and more likely to destabilize security conditions in countries with fragile domestic institutions.

In the third essay, I examine the fundamental flaws in how U.S. security assistance policies are developed and implemented to achieve the U.S.'s various strategic goals. Using qualitative case studies, I identify the factors that lead U.S. policymakers to deploy security assistance in certain countries, and why these programs are often deficient and ineffective tools for achieving the stated goals set forth by policymakers. In this analysis, I assess not just the effectiveness of security assistance programs at achieving their stated goals, but also how various changing domestic political factors and strategic interests lead U.S. policymakers use these programs in response to emerging crises abroad. While many scholars have examined the effectiveness of security assistance programs for achieving various goals, few have looked at why U.S. policymakers assume that these programs – focused on providing weapons and training to foreign militaries – can realistically solve the complex problems to which they are tasked (Watts et al., 2018). I argue that these programs often fail to achieve their goals because they are both inadequate and inappropriate for solving complex institutional problems in recipient countries. More specifically, security assistance suffers from strategic and substantive deficiencies. Strategically, these programs are applied to issues that reflect the short-term political interests and concerns of U.S. policymakers, rather than a long-term

approach to legitimately address the problems facing recipient countries. Substantively, providing weapons and training to foreign security sectors is insufficient for reforming recipient countries' domestic institutions, incentivizing certain goals or behaviors among foreign leaders, or solving complex problems beyond engaging in combat against adversarial actors.

To assess this theory, I examine two critical case studies of countries that have been among the top recipients of U.S. security assistance in recent decades: Pakistan and Colombia from the late Cold War to the late War on Terror. In both cases, security assistance failed to achieve their politically justified goals. In Pakistan, U.S. aid has accomplished almost no long-term objectives, other than buying access for U.S. operations during the occupation of Afghanistan after 9/11. In Colombia, U.S. aid has failed to achieve its original goal of reducing narcotics production and trafficking. In these cases, the strategy was motivated by short-term political concerns held by U.S. presidential administrations and Congressional interests, rather than a holistic assessment of the roots of the crises within the recipient countries. I use qualitative sources including executive agency publications, Congressional hearings, academic research, and press reports to trace the development of U.S. policies toward each country over time. Using historical narratives and process tracing, I describe how U.S. policymakers justify and promote security assistance as a means to address various political concerns over time, and how these programs have failed to achieve their goals. In this way, the third chapter highlights the fundamental deficiencies in the way that the U.S. conducts foreign policy through its security assistance and military aid programs.

The results of these analyses provide important contributions to debates and research on the utility and role of foreign security assistance for addressing strategic issues abroad. This dissertation contributes to both academic research on U.S. foreign policy, foreign aid, global human rights, and international security studies, as well as contemporary policy debates on the future of the U.S.'s global security strategy. These chapters explain how one of the U.S.'s key tools for projecting its

global interests and influencing foreign countries – security assistance – is guided largely by short-term interests and unrealistic goals shaped more by domestic political imperatives than the facts of reality in recipient countries. These findings highlight the flaws in how U.S. foreign policy is conducted, and help explain how security assistance can potentially have destabilizing, destructive effects, with long-term consequences for foreign countries' institutions, internal stability, and citizenry. In recent years, scholars and journalists have noted the deterioration of the U.S.'s global preeminence and the U.S.'s post-Cold War "liberal hegemony" in the wake of protracted wars throughout the War on Terror amid increasing foreign powers like China (Saab, 2019). As policymakers and U.S. foreign policy bureaucracies like the State Department and DOD continue to emphasize security assistance as a way to achieve the U.S.'s goals in a changing global security environment, the findings of this dissertation can be used to caution against the continuation of this strategy.

Through the lens of foreign military aid and security assistance, this dissertation adds to contemporary debates on the long-term effects of the U.S.'s contemporary foreign policy strategy. Some observers have noted that the current decline of a U.S. grand strategy is the product of decades of short-sighted, overly ambitious, and unrestrained foreign policy decisions. For example, in Zachary Brown (2020) argued that "the United States needs leaders who can break free from short-term thinking habits and provide a renewed sense of purpose to guide American policies." Stephen Walt (2018) argues that the "death of global order" was caused by an overextended, unrestrained, unnecessary projection of U.S. military dominance after the Cold War that has failed at either promoting the U.S.'s long-term interests or making the world more secure. The theories, arguments, and evidence regarding security assistance programs that are presented in the following chapters speak directly to such contemporary criticisms of U.S. foreign policies. Throughout these chapters, I provide a theoretical framework and new data analyses to help policy analysts better

understand the limits of the U.S.'s ability to pursue its interests abroad and the deficiencies of its foreign military policy. In doing so, I provide a strong motivation for future research to consider how U.S. policymakers can better pursue a more stabilizing and less destructive long-term foreign policy strategy for foreign aid and security assistance.

Chapter 1

The Role of U.S. Military Aid in the Global Arms Market

1.1 Introduction

The transfer of arms and defense equipment to foreign military and security institutions is a key component of U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. State Department states that arms sales and defense trade take into account political, military, economic, arms control, and human rights conditions in the recipient country, and as such, these transfers reflect a complex web of foreign policy interests (State Department, 2019). Arms transfers can confer political support to foreign regimes, generate economic benefits to the domestic defense industrial base, promote U.S. influence over foreign state behavior, enhance capabilities of foreign security forces, and promote security cooperation and diplomatic relationships. U.S. policymakers historically describe arms sales, security assistance and military aid as crucial tools for providing access to and influence over recipient states.[2] Maintaining dominance in a recipient country's arms import market strengthens the supplier's relationship, access, and influence over the recipient's diplomatic or military behavior (Caverley & Kapstein, 2013). Thus, while promoting U.S. arms sales' share of the global market has clear economic benefits for domestic defense industries, it also directly promotes strategic security interests. This chapter explores if the U.S. has certain foreign policy tools – foreign military aid and security assistance - to preserve and promote U.S. arms market shares and its competitive advantage. More specifically: *does the distribution of military aid constitute or reinforce a competitive advantage for U.S. arms transfers in the global arms market?*

U.S. policymakers and defense industry leaders have described the global arms market as a "race for global influence" (CSIS, 2018). While the end of the Cold War saw the U.S. rise to an

[2] Throughout this chapter, I will use security assistance, security sector assistance (SSA) to refer to all programs within this scope, and use military aid primarily in reference to the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program which subsidizes large defense equipment to established foreign militaries (Serafino, 2016).

unprecedented competitive advantage in the global arms market in the mid-1990s, some of this advantage has faded. As the U.S. sees record volumes of arms sales and is the global leader in defense exports, its relative share of the global arms market has declined over the last decade amid the rise of competing exporters like Russia and China. (See Figure 1.1) U.S. defense industries face several challenges in the future, including relatively high prices on defense exports, declining domestic procurement budgets, and the rise of defense exports from foreign competitors (Lin, 2015). In the 1990s, the United States controlled nearly 60 percent of the global weapons market, while today, it is responsible for roughly 30 percent (Caverley & Kapstein, 2013). Given these trends, *is there evidence that the U.S. has used other foreign policy tools to retain its advantage and share in arms export markets?*

Figure 1.1



U.S. foreign policy tools include a variety of programs that provide direct assistance to foreign security forces and supply them with U.S.-manufactured equipment. In 2013, the United States spent over $18 billion on foreign military aid to assist foreign states in buying American defense equipment and training their forces (SAM, 2017). The U.S. significantly increased its use of foreign military aid and training programs with the onset of the War on Terror in 2001, and has

expanded such programs under a broad strategy described as "Building Partner Capacity" – or assisting foreign security forces to achieve a wide variety of goals (McInnis & Lucas, 2015). The expansion in the volume and scope of these foreign security assistance programs coincided with increased competition in the global arms market. In the mid 1990s, then-Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Alexander Watson explained to Congress the utility of security assistance programs for promoting arms sales: "[training programs] bring certain economic benefits as well; they give [foreign] officials experience using American hardware, and thus can influence their future procurement decisions" (FAS, 1994). According to the State Department, a key goal of Foreign Military Financing (FMF)—the State Department's largest single military aid program— is to "Assist the militaries of friendly countries and allies to procure U.S. defense articles and services that strengthen legitimate self-defense capabilities and security needs" (State Department, 2009). The State Department also emphasizes this benefit from training programs such as the International Military Education & Training (IMET) program, stating that IMET enhances the ability of partnering countries to utilize "defense articles and services obtained from the U.S."

Given the stated utility of security assistance and military aid distribution and foreign arms market competition, this study will explore the relationship between security and military aid distribution and foreign arms market competition. Some countries may receive no military equipment aid, as they have sufficient financial resources to purchase U.S. arms without subsidies. On the other hand, the U.S. may desire certain less affluent, strategic countries to participate in the U.S. arms market rather than that of a competing arms exporter. This study will assess the relationship between arms market competition, arms transfers, and different categories of U.S. military aid, including military equipment aid, train and equipment programs, and military education programs.

The chapter proceeds as follows: first, I assess background literature and evidence regarding U.S. participation in the competitive global arms market. This includes one section describing the dynamics of arms export competition, another describing how U.S. security assistance is administered and how it can be used to support arms exports, and a section on the existing relevant literature on the goals and impacts of U.S. foreign aid. Second, building off of existing literature and current trends in U.S. arms transfers and military aid, I will describe the theory of military aid as a competitive advantage in arms export markets, which leads to my primary hypothesis: states with greater dependence on U.S. defense exports will receive a greater relative amount of U.S. military aid. Third, I will describe the quantitative research design and data employed for testing my hypotheses. Finally, I describe my results, where I find that a greater reliance on U.S. arms imports correlates with receiving a greater relative amount of certain types of U.S. military aid funding. While most academic literature on U.S. arms sales and military aid examine the effects of arms exports and aid transfers, and my analysis will contribute to this literature by examining the county characteristics that drive the allocation of military aid and the relationship between arms market competition and the distribution of three distinct categories of U.S. military aid and security assistance programs.

1.2 Background on Global Arms Market Competition

The U.S. has continuously used arms sales as a key foreign policy tool through history, with Presidents, members of Congress, executive agency officials, and defense manufacturers alike advocating for expanding arms sales in order to increase American security, enhance the military capabilities of allies and partners, generate leverage over the policies and institutions of client nations, and bolstering the American economy while supporting the defense industrial base. (State Department, 2009; CSIS, 2018; Thrall & Dorminey, 2018). Given the crucial role that arms exports play in U.S. foreign policy, and the rise of competing arms exporters in recent years has threatened

the U.S.'s dominant position in the global arms market as well as its related security interests. Increasing competition from arms-exporting states such as China and Russia poses a threat to U.S. arms export markets and the maintenance of political and military relationships with arms-importing states. As one Assistant Secretary of the State Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs described, Russia has marketed its defense systems to challenge the U.S.'s ability to supply foreign partners with defensive capabilities, and China has used a combination of "cut-price systems such as unmanned aerial systems, predatory financing mechanisms, and sometimes outright briery" to influence importing states and to gather intelligence (Cooper, 2019). Kaplan (2005) described then-President Bush's arms sales promotion policy as follows: "for all the talking about rewarding friends and maintaining influence, what this really comes down to—what it's always come down to—is money and market share… [during] the Cold War, the market share was political (if we don't sell planes to Peru, the Russians will); now it's economic (if we don't sell planes to Pakistan, the Chinese will).

1.2.1 Increased Competition from Russia and China

For the duration of the Cold War, the Soviet Union was the only nation that closely rivaled the U.S. arms industry and export market. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. saw an "unrivaled competitive advantage in the production and export of advanced conventional weaponry" (Caverley & Kapstein, 2012). The reduction of Russia's defense spending and arms transfers allowed the U.S. to dominate the global arms trade both proportional to other exports and reap both economic and geopolitical benefits throughout most of the 1990s. However, this advantage began fading in the late 1990s with the resurgence of Russian arms exports. While in the 1990s the United States controlled 60 percent of the global weapons market, today it is responsible for only about 30 percent. Russia has successfully increased its exports without large increases in

defense expenditure over the last decade, and several other countries, such as China, Israel, and South Korea, are also becoming notable suppliers (Caverley & Kapstein, 2012).

Beginning in 2009, the U.S. began expanding efforts to deepen security relationships and promote arms exports in Southeast Asia, as China has both become the world's third largest arms supplier and increased its own efforts for regional influence (Lin, 2015). While only 5% of the global market, from 2010 to 2014, China's exports of major weapons rose by 143 percent. While Chinese systems are not as capable as Russian or American products, they are often "good enough" for developing states. For example, in September 2013, Turkey purchased a Chinese air and missile defense system over U.S., Russian, and Italian-French products, specifically for its comparatively lower price (FAS, 2017). Since 2011, China has sold armed drones – for a quarter of the cost of the American equivalent - to several African and Middle Eastern countries including Nigeria, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates (Lin, 2015). Meanwhile, there is some evidence that the U.S. is losing influence in Asia's arms market. For example, "Pakistan's largest arms supplier is now China, Singapore is acquiring French naval vessels, and for the first time in its history, the Philippines is looking to non-American aircraft sources" (Caverley & Kapstein, 2012).

1.2.2 Competitive Arms Import Markets

The two regions that see the greatest arms market competition are the Middle East and North Africa, and East Asia and the Pacific. Middle Eastern and North African nations – such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Qatar and Oman – make up the single largest regional arms import market in the world and for the United States (SIPRI, 2016). The developed nations in the East Asian and Pacific region – such as Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore – rely more heavily on U.S. and European exports than on those from competitors like Russia and China. However, since the year 2000, there have been substantial increases in defense budgets arms imports

competition in developing nations in this region such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. In North Africa, both overall defense budgets and U.S. arms imports have increased in Morocco and Tunisia, and in Sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria and Cameroon continue to be important markets for both the U.S. and its competitors (SIPRI, 2016). As countries in these regions continue to expand their defense budgets, they will see increased competition from the world's largest arms exporters.

While the U.S. has a large and diverse portfolio of arms-importing states, it has little room to gain new customers, but many chances to lose them to increasing foreign export competition. From 2000 to 2010 the U.S. exported defense equipment to nearly 100 countries, but outside of this export market portfolio, there are few opportunities to move into new markets where the U.S. has restricted or banned the sale of arms, such as China, Algeria, or Myanmar. In contrast, Russia and China both focus their exports on nations that are excluded by U.S. export policy and are actively expanding their exports into the U.S. arms market portfolio. Much of the loss of the arms market can also be attributed to the prohibitively high cost of most U.S. defense equipment. Analysts have referred to this phenomenon as the "Hyundaization Threat" in arms sales, referring to Hyundai's cheap automobiles becoming a serious global competitor, whereby this "proliferation of value-priced and 'good enough' weapons will challenge Western diplomatic and military relationships" (Katzman, 2015). For example, Russia, China, Turkey, India and Brazil have all begun selling competitively priced missiles, and both Pakistani and Indian fighter jets cost about 33%-50% less than the F-16 – America's cheapest fighter (Katzman, 2015). According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) arms transfer data, in 2013 Russian weapons exports increased by 35 percent from 2012, surpassing the U.S.'s by more than $2 billion (Keith, 2014). In the last two decades, several countries received weaponry from both the U.S. and Russia, including UAE, India, Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq, Pakistan, Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, Jordan, Bangladesh, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Ghana, Nigeria and Cameroon (Smith & Gould, 2014). On top of these U.S.-Russian

competitive markets, in late 2014, the U.S. lifted a nearly four decade-long ban on the sale of certain lethal equipment to Vietnam – Russia's third-largest arms importer (Spetalnik, 2016).

1.2.3 Impacts of U.S. Domestic Procurement Cuts

Many of the recent increases in competition challenging U.S. defense exports have coincided with another threat to the U.S. defense industry: sequestration and a declining defense budget. In particular, the 2011 Budget Control Act seeks to reduce the deficit in part by allowing defense spending to fall steadily from 4.3% GDP in 2012 to 2.8% GDP by 2023 (CBO, 2013). In the face of slower U.S. military spending, defense firms are "looking to Southeast Asian nations for new markets, capitalizing on their concerns about China's outlays on long-range planes, ships and submarines" (Boudreau, 2015). Dr. Aude Fleurant, Programme Director at SIPRI, states that this "decline in arms sales in the US, in our analysis, is mostly due to the decrease in the operations budget, so that directly affects the industry because these budgets also buy weapons and services" (Matsangou, 2015). A survey of senior U.S. defense industry representatives by Avascent – a defense consulting firm – found that "93% of senior aerospace and defense leaders believe foreign markets will be increasingly important in the coming years" due to flattening U.S. defense spending amid increasing expenditures in the rest of the world (Barney & Breen, 2015). In addition, 80% of these surveyed defense executives believe that foreign competition will only increase, "led by disruptive competitors with low cost offerings in China, closely followed by those in Asia, MENA [Middle East and North Africa], and Latin America" (Barney & Breen, 2015).

Two factors challenging U.S. arms exports emerge from this evidence: increasing foreign competition, and declining domestic budgets amid the push from domestic industry for greater emphasis on foreign markets. With prohibitively high prices on export items, alongside the rise of foreign competitors with cheaper "good enough" defense systems, if the U.S. wants to pursue its

economic and security interest through continued or expanded defense exports, it must improve its competitive advantage. The U.S. has a vital interest in maintaining relationships with foreign militaries of client states, as well as in maintaining leverage over these states' policy decisions through its dominance of their arms supply (Katzman, 2015). Both of these incentives for a competitive advantage in arms sales can be bolstered through the use of military aid.

1.3 Foreign Security Assistance as a Tool for Supporting U.S. Arms Exports

1.3.1 Overview of Authorities of Arms Sales and Security Assistance

Official policies, reports, and statements from executive agency officials have highlighted the links between foreign security assistance programs, U.S. foreign policy interests, and the support for the domestic defense industrial base and arms exports. Security assistance is used to promote U.S. interests and cultivating relationships with recipient states. Military equipment aid through the FMF program provides funding for states to purchase equipment from the U.S., constituting a direct subsidy for their deal. Security assistance programs that educate security and military officials or that train and equip security forces cultivate relationships with foreign militaries by educating their officers and training their forces how to use American defense systems. Both of these forms of military aid can create an incentive and competitive advantage for states to continue arms purchasing deals with the U.S.

U.S. executive agencies cooperate in the administration and promotion of U.S. arms exports through these foreign policy tools. The U.S. transfers arms – including hardware, equipment, and requisite training – directly to foreign governments through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, which is governed by statute under Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act. The State Department manages arms sales and determines which countries may receive these transfers, and the Department of Defense (DOD) executes the transfers to foreign militaries.

Together, the State Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and DOD's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) coordinate on administering arms sales through FMS, subsidizing foreign arms purchases through the FMF program, and training foreign security forces through the IMET program (State Department, 2019). While the State Department must notify Congress of an arms sale 30 days prior to its approval, Congress faces two fundamental obstacles to block or modify FMS agreements: it must pass special legislation, and it must be capable of overriding a presumptive presidential veto of such legislation (Kerr, 2020).

1.3.2 Official Support for Using Programs and Policies to Promote U.S. Arms Sales

In the early 1990s, while the U.S. share of global arms exports increased with the collapse of the Soviet Union, declining defense budgets in the post-Cold War era put a strain on defense manufacturers and pressured both government and industry officials to promote greater defense exports. During this time, high-ranking U.S. officials from both congress and executive agencies had begun to promote the idea of using FMF aid to increase defense export sales, maintain the defense industrial base, and create a greater advantage over foreign export competition (GAO, 1995). A 1995 Government Accountability Office (GAO) explains that while DOD officials had previously described FMF as a tool to support U.S. foreign policy and national security interests rather than a means to promote U.S. exports, by 1994, officials throughout the federal government had become increasingly willing to use aid to support arms exports and to intervene to influence competitions in favor of U.S. defense companies. Aid programs like FMF grants created a unique competitive advantage for the U.S., because no other arms exporter provided direct grant assistance to subsidize foreign arms exports. According to the same report, officials from multiple agencies believed that providing grant funding through FMF would generally eliminate the competition from other countries for exports to aid recipients.

During this same period of the promotion of policies to support U.S. arms sales, in February 1995, President Clinton announced in his arms transfer policy that U.S. embassy personnel and staff from the State Department and DoD should play an active role in marketing American defense companies, promoting sales of particular important to the U.S., and supporting DOD participation in international air and defense trade shows (GAO, 1995). Since the 1990s, the emphasis on promoting arms exports has become an even greater and more explicit priority of U.S. foreign policy bureaucracies. According to Andrew Shapiro, the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs in 2012, "U.S. security cooperation has become an increasingly critical component of U.S. engagement" (Shapiro, 2012). Alongside promoting security assistance programs, Shapiro has stated that "efforts to advocate more actively for U.S. arms manufacturers and other companies were a key priority" for the State Department, and that senior officials are now expected to promote U.S. defense exports on "all trips abroad" (Shalal-Esa, 2012). In 2014, Gregory M. Kausner, then Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, outlined a range of foreign policy goals that can be achieved through aid programs such as FMF, IMET, and other train and equip assistance programs. According to Kausner, one of the major benefits of military and security assistance is "influence" – establishing a long-lasting, enduring relationship between militaries that ensured continued access to the foreign regime. An additional major benefit of security assistance programs is that by encouraging the transfer of U.S. defense systems, they contribute to "economies of scale, [and] can help maintain U.S. investment in the defense sector" (Kausner, 2014). These statements highlight the fact that military aid programs create a means for the U.S. to invest in relationships with other nations, which in turn facilitate continued arms sales.

Aside from the use of direct foreign assistance such as FMF, the State Department and DOD have also advocated for the policy of reducing and eliminating fees as a means of reducing the cost of U.S. arms sales for foreign buyers and promoting U.S. arms exports in general. A 1994 GAO

report explains how in 1992, the State Department and DoD canceled the policy of requiring certain arms importers to pay additional fees for covering development and transactional costs – with the explicit goal of increasing the competitiveness of U.S. arms sales in the global market. The Arms Export Control Act permits DOD to waive or reduce such fees and charges on FMS arms transfers for the express purpose of preventing the loss of an arms sale agreement (GAO, 2018). According to a 2018 GAO report, DSCA and other DOD officials stated that "avoiding a potential lost sale is paramount", and that if cost waivers are not approved or a sale is lost, U.S. relations with the foreign government could be negatively affected.

More recently, observers and members of Congress have explicitly recognized the role of military aid programs – namely FMF – in protecting U.S. export markets and the domestic defense industry amid increasing foreign competition from countries like Russia and China. Such observers have questioned recent proposals to shift FMF from grants to loans, arguing that "such a move could weaken the U.S. defense industrial base, making weapons procurement more expensive for the United States itself, and that countries accustomed to obtaining weapons at no cost would turn to cheaper alternative providers like Russia or China" (CRS, 2017). A 2017 State Department report notes that reducing the amount of FMF grants could incentivize current FMF recipients to turn to other suppliers, primarily Russia and China (CRS, 2018). A 2018 Senate committee report reiterates the issue, noting that if FMF grants are reduced, the committee is concerned with "the loss of influence through increased arms sales by the PRC [People's Republic of China] and Russia to FMF grant recipients" (S.Rept. 115-152, 2018). These statements further illustrate how officials across multiple branches of the U.S. government acknowledge the role of foreign security assistance and military aid programs in defending U.S. export markets from loss to foreign competition.

1.3.3 Increasing Use of Foreign Security Assistance Programs

Increasing global arms market competition and shifting U.S. foreign security priorities over the last three decades have coincided with total increases in U.S. military aid budgets and changing security assistance policies. Prior to 2001, the U.S. dedicated roughly $7.3 billion to over 57 programs under the umbrella category of security assistance. About 87% of security assistance funds were sponsored by the State Department, such as the FMF program's military equipment aid, which annually comprised roughly 60% and $4.5 billion of these funds. In 2004, security assistance funds increased to $10.75 billion, with growth of the FMF program and substantial expansion of DOD aid programs such as coalition support funds for the War on Terror. By 2012, total U.S. security assistance funds had grown to $21.8 billion, with some increases in both State Department aid programs, but the most substantial increases within DOD aid portfolios. From the mid-1990s until 2012, the budget for FMF gradually increased from $3.5 to over $6.2 billion (DSCA, 2013). While an annual expenditure of roughly $6.2 billion may not be significant relative to the total U.S. operating budget, for most fiscal years, FMF pays for 20-25% of total U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) deliveries and is distributed to between over 70 countries to assist their purchase of U.S. equipment. For several countries, FMF covers *all* of their U.S. arms imports.

Figure 1.2 depicts the twenty largest U.S. arms importers from 2000 to 2014 who also received some amount of FMF. The figure excludes some of the U.S.'s largest importers – Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait – which are wealthier states who receive no U.S. financing assistance for their purchases. This figure also highlights the variation in the proportion of these states' arms import market share that is comprised by the U.S., illustrating their overall reliance on U.S. imports. Among these top import markets that receive some amount of FMF assistance, the median market share of U.S. arms exports is roughly 38%. This figure illustrates how in some of the U.S.'s largest arms export markets, the U.S. faces market competition for other exporters – such as

in Turkey, Pakistan, and Jordan, who also import a significant volume of arms from Russia, China, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and Germany, among others. Figure 1.2b presents the same plot but removes the outlier Egypt – which consistently receives over 15% of all FMF funds – in order to better compare the other top 19 U.S. arms importers that receive FMF.

Figure 1.2.



Figure 1.2b.



Figure 1.3 illustrates an approximate ratio of the magnitude of U.S. direct subsidies for certain countries' arms purchases. Examining these same twenty major arms importing countries, Figure 1.3 depicts an approximation of the ratio of FMF assistance to the value of the U.S. FMS arms imports delivered in the same year, between 2000-2014. As in Figure 1.2, the color scale

depicts the relative market share of U.S. arms imports in each country. This ratio is not an exact calculation, however, as countries can receive FMF in one year to finance the purchase of arms in future years, and the arms sale deliveries that they receive in one year may be the result of a purchase made years earlier. However, Figure 1.3 illustrates the general proportion of FMF the U.S. provides to each country relative to the general level of U.S. arms that they have purchased in this period. For example, during the years depicted in Figure 1.3, the U.S. appropriated a greater amount of FMF funds for Tunisia than the value of FMS delivered in this period, signaling that the U.S. is heavily investing in future arms transfers for Tunisia. This figure highlights the complex dynamics of the use of FMF to support U.S. arms sales. For example, while the U.S. provides a high amount of FMF to Lebanon, Mexico, and Jordan relative to the arms they purchase from the U.S., Lebanon and Mexico rely more heavily on the U.S. for arms imports than Jordan does. In some countries like the Philippines and Egypt, the U.S. subsidizes a relative majority of their purchases of U.S. arms and also has a majority share in their total import markets. In other countries such as Colombia, Bahrain, Oman and Poland, the U.S. subsidies a smaller relative fraction of their overall purchases and continues to have a greater share of their total arms imports.

Figure 1.3.



1.3.3 Anecdotes of Country Cases where the U.S. Faces Arms Market Competition

In a testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, General Joseph L. Votel, commander of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), stated that "some of our partners are seeking alternate sources of military equipment from near-peer competitors like Russia and China" (Votel, 2019). In this same testimony, the General describes programs such as IMET and FMF as being crucial tools for building and sustaining relationships with foreign militaries in the face of competition for influence from Russia and China. As mentioned above, there are numerous examples of states that receive U.S. security assistance and purchase U.S. arms, but that are choosing to also purchase arms from rising competitors, such as Turkey, Pakistan, and Nigeria. The following anecdotes further illustrate how the U.S. both uses its foreign policy tools to promote its own exports, and risks losing arms sales to competitors.

- Using FMF funds, the State Department has created an initiative called the "European Recapitalization Incentive Program" designed for explicit purpose of assisting Eastern European nations (including Slovakia, Albania, and Bosnia) to move away from Russian defense systems – such as helicopters and infantry fighting vehicles – and replace them with U.S.-made equipment. (Weisgerber, 2019).
- Despite consistently being one of the top 5 recipients of U.S. FMF funds, Jordan – a key U.S. ally in the Middle East that hosts a U.S. air base in its territory – continues to purchase defense equipment and maintenance services from Russia such as grenade launchers and air defense systems. (Teslova, 2019)
- In 2003, the U.S. assigned Thailand a non-NATO major ally status and has consistently provided Thailand several million dollars annual in IMET and FMF funds. In 2006, the U.S. temporarily suspended over $29 million in security assistance funds following the coup that

deposed then-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. The U.S. resumed its security assistance and arms sales to Thailand in 2008, without a significant impact on Thailand's reliance on the U.S. for arms imports (Stohl, 2014). However, after the U.S. again halted its military aid to Thailand following their military coup in 2014, Thailand quickly signed major arms and military exercise deals with China. This included their largest defense purchase in history of over $1 billion for submarines and battle tanks, which are offered by China at a lower price than those of the U.S. (Heijmans, 2019)

- Bahrain has consistently been both a significant purchaser of U.S. arms and recipient of U.S. security assistance funds, and Bahrain purchases a majority of its defense equipment from the U.S. Following the unrest during the Arab Spring in 2011 and Bahrain's violent crackdown on protestors, the U.S. temporarily froze both its military aid and arms transfers. Following this pause on U.S. transfers and aid, Bahrain signed its first major arms deal with Russia in 2011 and then again in 2014, purchasing both small arms and anti-tank systems (Kozhanov, 2016).

The case of U.S. military aid programs with Egypt also illustrates the role of such programs promoting U.S. arms sales and defense industry interests. The U.S. has "closely tailored its military aid" to get U.S. weapons systems into the hands of allies such as Egypt (Pianin, 2015). In both 2012 and 2015, President Obama lifted various bans on the transfer of military aid and equipment to Egypt. In 2012, opponents of the ban on Egyptian sales emphasized that would have meant "breaking existing contracts with American arms manufacturers that could have shut down production lines in the middle of President Obama's re-election campaign and involved significant financial penalties" (Myers, 2012). Laura F. Siebert, a spokeswoman for Lockheed Martin, in opposition to the military aid freeze, stated that the company "values the relationship established between our company and the Egyptian customer since the first F-16s were delivered in the early

1980s" (Myers, 2012). These statements highlight the importance of U.S. military aid in promoting defense industry exports goals, as well as enabling defense industry relationships with foreign recipients of arms transfers. A 2011 report by the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) highlights the risk of losing Egypt's arms markets to foreign suppliers if military aid is reduced. If the aid package for Egypt were reduced, Egypt may "turn to lower end goods from cheaper producers" – with China being the second-largest exporter of arms to Egypt, sending roughly $100 million worth of arms per year from 2002 to 2011 (CSIS, 2011). The report continues, stating that reduced military aid to Egypt would "open up competition for Egyptian military procurement contracts to European, Russian, and other global competitors." Indeed, after U.S. military aid to Egypt was frozen in late 2014, Egypt immediately turned to Russia for a $2 billion arms deal (Blake, 2015).

The preceding evidence including reports and statements from the State Department, members of Congress, and various country-level anecdotes suggests the utility of U.S. military aid programs in promoting defense exports. By subsidizing the purchase and strengthening diplomatic and military relationships, military aid may thus constitute a competitive advantage for U.S. arms sales amid increasing foreign competition

1.3.4 Academic Literature on U.S. Arms Transfers and Foreign Aid

The majority of relevant academic literature studies U.S. arms *transfers* (via the Foreign Military Sales program) in terms of impacts on particular variables of interest. Most literature on U.S. arms transfers and military aid examine the correlation with recipient state behavior. Literature on U.S. arms sales has examined which country characteristics drive U.S. arms transfers and when - assessing the relationship between U.S. arms transfers and recipients' regime type, alliances with the U.S., and both geostrategic and economic importance (Blanton 2000 & 2005; Perkins & Neumayer, 2008; Midford & de Soysa 2011). Literature on U.S. military *aid* typically sits within foreign aid -

rather than arms trade - literature. The results of most studies of aid depend on a number of factors, including the type of aid that is being analyzed (economic aid, military aid, and arms transfers) and the recipient state behavior of interest (UN vote compliance, democratization, foreign policy belligerence, and human rights practices) (Sullivan, Tessman and Li).

On the use of US military aid for inducing leverage over recipient state cooperation, Sullivan et al. (2011) find that from 1990 to 2004, "with limited exceptions, increasing levels of US aid are linked to a significant reduction in cooperative foreign policy behavior with the United States." In addition, they conclude that "US reaction to recipient state behavior is also somewhat counterintuitive; instead of using a carrot-and-stick approach to military aid allocations, our results show that increased recipient state cooperation is likely to lead to subsequent reductions in US military assistance." Several studies examine U.S. "interests" in terms of recipient states' UN voting records. Derouen and Heo (2004) "find that countries that move closer to US positions in the United Nations tend to receive more economic and/or military aid, but that increases in US aid led to increases in vote compliance in only a handful of countries." Lai and Morey (2006) "provide evidence that military and economic aid dependence induces higher levels of UN voting compliance only for nondemocracies." Kegley and Hook (1991) look at attempts by President Reagan and Congress to explicitly link the allocation of US foreign aid to recipient state voting coincidence with the United States in the UN General Assembly. Their study finds no relationship between US aid allocations and recipient state voting behavior.

Bove et al., (2014) also cite a variety of studies examining both foreign military aid and arms transfers. Various scholars have found evidence that military aid can help induce states to adhere to US foreign policy objectives and garner support for U.S. policies (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Meernik, Krueger & Poe, 1998). Bove et al. (2014) found that bilateral trade increases between the recipient countries and the US following FMF programs and US troop deployment. Bove et al. also

acknowledge that military assistance entails a "long lasting relationship between the supplier and the buyer," where the "size of military assistance conveys important information about the quality of bilateral relations" between the US and the recipient country.

On arms market competition, in Ethan Kapstein (1994) pointed out the potential for an American arms trade monopoly, linking it to the large economies of scale from post-Cold War globalization. Caverley (2007) also recognized the importance of U.S. market power, but predicted that the United States would "leverage the sale of weapons for geopolitical influence, giving up some economic benefits in exchange for its clients' agreement to refrain from competing with U.S. products or to sell to such geopolitical rivals as China." (Caverley 2007; Caverley & Kapstein, 2013) Neuman (2010) used several qualitative examples of the United States using its market leverage to influence other states' international behavior.

Caverly & Kapstein (2013) created a study seeking to examine the "import premium" given by the U.S. to arms recipients. The "import premium" here represents the discounted price of arms transfers, calculated by the ratio of SIPRI data on arms transfers and official U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) reports. The authors explain that SIPRI calculates the full market value of all articles transferred, regardless of price offsets implemented by U.S. agencies. Thus, the dollar amount reported for annual sales by DSCA, when lower than the SIPRI reported values, would represent the "import premium" discount or offsets given by the U.S. to certain recipient countries. While this "import premium" measure of SIPRI sales data ratio to DSCA sales data may measure an important gap in market versus actual pricing, this study assesses a competitive advantage represented the multiple types of direct security assistance and military aid programs. These authors acknowledge drawbacks to SIPRI data, as SIPRI cautions against comparing their data with "the sales values or the financial value of export licenses" in order to "measure the economic burden of arms imports or the economic benefits of exports." In addition, the authors

combine FMS sales and Direct Commercial Exports to represent U.S. arms transfers. FMF are primarily used to supplement FMS sales, and according to the State Department guidelines, may only be used for commercial sales "for a limited number of countries" and only approved through license on a case-by-case basis (DSCA, 2017). When measuring the "import premium," the authors do not state the mechanism by which DSCA sales would be lower than calculated market value reported in SIPRI data – they do not state that they subtract the value of sale price offsets from the total DSCA values.

1.4 Assessing the Security Assistance-Arms Market Relationship

1.4.1 Theoretical approach

In the sections above, this chapter has outlined evidence which suggests that: the U.S. actively seeks to promote its arms exports to and influence over certain arms importing states; U.S. officials and agencies view its foreign security assistance programs as important tools for partnering with, influence, and promoting U.S. interests in recipient states; and that U.S. officials are actively interested in combatting increasing influence and arms sales competition from foreign states such as Russia and China. The analysis that follows will examine whether or not different categories of security assistance programs correlate with U.S. defense industry market shares and arms market variables. Countries may receive partially subsidized arms transfers in order to maintain customers and prevent the loss of these markets to competing arms exporters. By investing in subsidized purchases and training programs, the U.S. may increase its competitive advantage in a country's arms market vis-à-vis less expensive competing offers. For example, in the aforementioned anecdotes about Thailand and Bahrain, when the U.S. only temporarily paused its military aid for political concerns, it arguably lost some of its competitive advantage as an arms supplier, and both states quickly turned to foreign suppliers – China and Russia – respectively. In addition, if arms transfers

signify an important security relationship between the U.S. and the recipient, then those states that rely more heavily on the U.S. for their arms imports might signify a country of relatively greater importance for U.S. interests, security partnerships, and influence. In this analysis, I hypothesize that U.S. security assistance programs may be used as direct or indirect incentives to secure the U.S.'s share of an importer's arms market.

This theory can be summarized as follows: Maintaining dominance in foreign states' arms import markets is a strategic goal of the U.S., in that it a) improves "leverage" over influencing the state's diplomatic or military doctrines; b) ensures greater access to and interoperability with the state's security forces; and c) provides a market for the U.S. defense industrial base, which seeks to grow its foreign markets amid declining domestic procurement budgets. Given these interests, the U.S. employs military aid to improve or maintain its competitive advantage in more competitive foreign arms markets. My hypothesis is that states with states with greater dependence on U.S. defense exports will receive a greater relative amount of three categories of U.S. military aid. These three categories are (1) military equipment aid (FMF), which is provided for the sole purpose of subsidizing purchases of major U.S. defense equipment; (2) train and equip programs, which includes a combination of the largest programs designed to train foreign security forces, build military interoperability with the U.S., and purchase small arms for combat forces; and (3) military education programs, which includes the two largest programs designed to educate and train foreign military leaders and officers and develop their relationships with the U.S. armed forces. The following analysis examines these three unique categories of security assistance that either subsidize both foreign militaries' equipment acquisitions and the U.S. domestic industry, trains foreign militaries to use U.S. equipment in the future, and build military-to-military relationships with foreign security forces.

Hypothesis: States with greater dependence on U.S. defense exports will receive a greater relative amount of U.S. military aid.

H1a. States will receive a greater relative amount of military equipment aid

H1b. States will receive a greater relative amount of train and equip aid

H1c. States will receive a greater relative amount of military education aid

1.4.2 Research design and dependent variables

In order to test my hypotheses, I will examine the correlation between measures of arms import dependence and arms import volume with the distribution of military aid between the years 1993 through 2012. This time period saw the rise of the U.S. as the world's largest arms exporter and the decline of Cold War-driven export policy, as well as the increase in export competition beginning in the late 1990s. The dependent variables are military equipment aid, train and equip aid, and military education aid. These variables are all transformed to a per capita measure of $1,000 in aid per 10,000 individuals, in order to compare proportionally equal measures across countries and to normalize the distribution of the dependent variables. The three dependent variables, made up of three primary categories of foreign military aid, are described as follows:

- Military equipment aid – represented by the Foreign Military Financing program, which provides grants and loans to help countries purchase U.S.-made defense articles and services. This program enables the recipient to purchase major military equipment and systems from the U.S. FMF is consistently single largest source of foreign military aid provided by the State Department.
- Train and equip aid – the combined values of the following aid programs, which are the largest such programs administered by either the State Department or the Department of

Defense.[3] To the extent that train and equip programs transfer equipment for select military and security purposes in the recipient country, these programs generally transfer small arms, vehicles, aircraft, surveillance technology, and other and non-lethal equipment. Programs include DOD' Section 1206, Section 1004, Section 1033, and Operations & Maintenance program funds, and the State Department's International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement aid and Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) program funds. These programs provide various types of weapons, vehicles, technology, and other non-lethal equipment to foreign military and security forces for various purposes including counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and stability operations (State Department, 2007)

- Military education aid – the combined values of the IMET and Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP), which focus on providing education to officers and leaders of security forces. IMET is managed by the State Department but implemented by the DOD, and CTFP is a DOD program. The stated goals of these programs include training future leaders, build military relations, enhance interoperability and capabilities for joint operations, and building and reinforcing the combating terrorism capabilities of partner nations (DOD, 2015; State Department, 2009).

1.4.3 Explanatory variables

Data on arms import reliance and arms market competition is from the SIPRI arms market Trend Indicator Values (TIV). My primary independent variable is the market share of U.S. arms transfers in an arms importing country – or U.S. arms import "*reliance*" – and is calculated by

[3] For the purposes of assessing foreign military assistance programs across time, this analysis has omitted programs designed explicitly for individual or a limited set of countries participating in the U.S. War on Terror, such as the Afghan Security Forces Fund, Iraq Security Forces Fund, or Coalition Support Funds,

dividing the volume of U.S. transfers to a country by that country's total volume of imports, per year. The comparison of arms importing states' reliance on certain arms exporters is frequently used by analysts to assess global arms market competition and exporters' relative influence in the market (SIPRI, 2017; Agmon et al., 1996). Arms imports to any given country can fluctuate significantly on a year-to-year basis, with some countries making large purchases in one year and no purchases the next year. In order to correct for these trends across time, I use four-year averages for each independent variable that represents arms market data – including U.S. arms import dependence, total volume of arms imports, and total volume of U.S. arms imports.

The analysis will also include several control variables. Gross domestic product (in constant 2005 dollars) controls for the relative size of countries' economies, and a higher GDP may result in receiving less aid, as nations with larger economies might be able to afford U.S. arms without subsidy or assistance. Political rights and civil liberties – from Freedom House's "Freedom in the World" index - will measure the "liberal" or "normative" goals of military aid, as the State Department claims one goal of FMF and other security assistance programs is promoting "democratically elected leaders." A measure of U.S. military presence – the number of U.S. military personnel in the recipient country – controls for the fact that the State Department and DOD state that military aid programs are intended to aid in "interoperability" with American troops. Various forms of military aid may be provided to ensure or maintain U.S. military operations' access to and presence in the recipient country. A measure of each country's military spending as a percent of their total government spending – from the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database – may indicate a more militarized state, greater likelihood of governments to spend on military purchases, and a larger arms market for defense purchases. Variables for internal and external conflict (in separate models) control for the fact that the U.S. may subsidize arms in countries that currently immediate security needs. Finally, my cases will include all "developing and emerging economies" from the years 1993

to 2012 – which includes the post-Cold War period where the U.S. saw greater advantages in the global arms markets, and more recent years where arms market competition has become a greater concern.

The pooled time-series, cross-sectional analysis uses a linear regression model with a lagged dependent variable. Given the use of several slow-moving control variables such as measures of political conditions and state fragility, the model does not include unit fixed, effects, which can bias results when slow-moving variables and a lagged dependent variable are present (McNerny, 2014; Caverley and Kapstein, 2013). Arms export decisions and deliveries take years to be finalized, and military aid appropriations and deliveries also typically occur through slow and deliberate bureaucratic processes. Therefore, this analysis is interested in the long-term effects of changes in explanatory variables, and the data may include time-dependent bias.

1.4.4 Discussion of results

This analysis suggests that country's reliance on U.S. arms imports has a significant, positive, and substantive correlation with receiving a higher per-capita volume of certain types of military and security aid from the U.S. Table 1.1 displays the regression coefficients, standard errors and significance of each explanatory variable for all three models. In particular, the analysis supports the hypothesis *H1a* and *H1b,* in that a country's increasing reliance on U.S. arms imports is correlated with receiving a large per-capita volume of both military equipment aid and train and equip program aid. This suggests the U.S. is more likely to direct these forms of military aid to countries where the U.S. dominates the arms import market in order to either maintain this market dominance and/or prevent the loss of the market share to foreign competitors. The fact that both of these types of aid are positively correlated with reliance on U.S. arms imports also suggests that not only does the U.S. fund the purchase of American-made military equipment, but it also invests in the training of

recipients' security forces for interoperability. On the contrary, military education aid is significantly and negatively correlated with reliance on U.S. arms imports, nullifying hypothesis *H1c*. The programs captured within this category of military aid are focused on the education of officers and leaders of security forces in non-lethal training, so unlike the train and equip aid programs, military education aid programs are not directly implicated in the use of U.S. military equipment imports. Furthermore, the fact that military education aid has a negative correlation with reliance on U.S. arms imports might suggest that these programs are used to professionalize officers and leaders in nations that have less developed security forces or smaller military budgets.

Figures 1.4 and 1.5 depict the relationship between U.S. arms import reliance and receiving security assistance and military aid funding. These figures depict the predicted probability of receiving a greater per-capita amount of U.S. military equipment aid (Figure 1.4) and train and equip aid (Figure 1.5) when a country has a higher percent reliance on U.S. arms imports. These figures display a simulated distribution of values and 95 percent confidence intervals generated by setting all explanatory values to their means, and varying the value of the dependent variable (per capita aid) and the primary independent variable (percent of U.S. arms import reliance). The regression lines in each figure – shown with 95 percent confidence bands – demonstrate that as reliance on U.S. arms imports increases, the amount of per-capita military equipment and train and equip aid received also increases.

Table 1.1: Reliance on U.S. Arms Exports and Per-Capita U.S. Military Aid, 1993-2012 (OLS Linear Regression Model)

Variable	**Model 1: Military equipment aid**	**Model 2: Train & equip aid**	**Model 3: Military education aid**
(intercept)	5.233	6.294	4.055
	(2.158)	(3.468)	(0.144)

Reliance on U.S. Arms Exports	44.11*** (5.472)	43.74*** (8.796)	-1.276*** (0.365)
Total U.S. Arms Imports	2.993e-06 (5.214e-06)	-7.718e-06 (8.381e-06)	7.278e-8 (3.480e-6)
Total Arms Imports	7.039e-03 (4.805e-03)	-7.961e-03 (7.724e-03)	-1.621e-04 (3.207e-04)
GDP	-1.805e-11*** (4.890e-12)	-4.366e-12 (7.859e-12)	-1.582e-12*** (3.264e-13)
Military expenditure percentage	1.603*** (0.4414)	-0.5200 (0.7095)	0.058 (0.029)
U.S. military presence	4.913e-04 (1.488e-03)	-1.286e-03 (2.392e-03)	-6.324e-5 (9.931e-05)
State Fragility Index	-1.024*** (1.488e-03)	0.3748 (0.3171)	-0.245*** (0.013)
Political rights	1.167 (1.118)	1.097 (1.797)	0.062 (0.075)
Civil liberties	1.003 (1.443)	-2.038 (2.319)	-0.022 (0.096)
International conflict	-2.629 (2.854)	24.32*** (4.587)	0.534** (0.191)
External conflict	-15.80 (15.44)	10.77 (24.82)	1.441 (1.031)
n=2591 Significance code: 0.001 '***' 0.01 '**' 0.05 '*' 0.1 '.'			

Figure 1.4



Figure 1.5



1.4.5 Contemporary policy developments and implications

While the preceding quantitative analysis of U.S. arms sales and military aid used data that extended to 2012, the patterns of U.S. foreign policy described here have continued through the end of the Obama administration in 2016 and into the Trump administration. The Obama administration "abandoned any pretense of limiting overseas arms sales, and embraced the reality that America is likely to remain the world's biggest weapons merchant for many years to come" (Thompson, 2012). The Obama administration increased total annual arms sales by over 43% throughout from 2009 to 2016, and doubled the total volume of sales made under the George W. Bush administration, driven largely by sales to wealthy Gulf States such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the U.A.E. (Weisgerber & Houck, 2016). The administration continued to direct military aid for purchasing U.S. defense equipment to strategically important and competitive arms import markets, and increased FMF funding to Southeast Asian nations like Vietnam and Indonesia in order to compete with Russian and Chinese imports (Thompson, 2012). The Obama administration's support of increasing foreign arms sales and using military aid to promote U.S. defense exports continued to signal the economic, market-driven nature of arms sale policy in the U.S.

When the Trump administration came into office in 2017, the president boasted about promoting U.S. arms sales as a key element of its foreign policy agenda (Hartung, 2019). The Trump administration generally continued and expanded upon the arms sales trends of the Obama administration, but with more explicit emphasis on the strictly economic gains of arms sales for the U.S. defense industry (Hartung, 2019). The administration generally rejected any rhetorical concern for recipients' legitimate internal or regional security concerns, and made a policy directive to "simply the regulatory environment" by downgrading human rights and strategic concerns in favor of economic considerations, speeding up the review process for major sales, and reducing

transparency in the transfer of certain weapons categories (Hartung, 2019). The Trump administration's strict focus on the economic benefits of arms sales has been reflected in its discussions of military aid programs, primarily FMF. Abandoning any pretense of using military aid to help allied countries to bolster their own security sectors, the Trump administration instead requested to replace FMF grants with expanded loan options, which defeated the purpose of assisting countries that could not afford to build up their defenses, and emphasized the economic, transactional nature of Trump's military aid policies (Torbati & Stone, 2017). The Trump administration has continued to emphasize using arms sales and military aid as a way to promote the U.S. defense industry, with little concern for any long-term implications for assisting strategically important countries, human rights abuses committed with U.S.-provided weapons, or other political and security-based considerations for foreign aid policies. Therefore, the theory and findings described throughout this chapter continue to apply to contemporary observations of U.S. arms sale and military aid decisions.

1.5 Conclusion

U.S. leaders and officials have described many goals and factors that drive arms export and military aid policies, including assisting allies, promoting certain norms, combating mutual threats, and ensuring the integrity of the defense industrial base. This analysis has shown that certain forms of U.S. military aid and security assistance are more likely to be directed to countries where the U.S. has a greater share of the arms import market. This finding supports the anecdotal evidence and statements from U.S. officials that arms market competition may be a significant factor driving military aid policy decisions. The finding further suggests that foreign arms market competition and the economic concerns for the U.S. defense industry are not issues that are inherently distinct from U.S. foreign policy, global military strategy, and national security interests. As foreign adversarial

nations – such as Russia and China – seek to increase their influence throughout the world in economic, political, and military terms, the U.S. may continue to use arms export and foreign aid as a tool to preserve its sphere of influence and maintain relationships with arms importing states and their security forces.

The fact that concerns for the U.S. defense industry and economic competition in the global arms market take precedent in U.S. foreign policy decisions has implications for several issue areas. By increasing the spread of weapons and military equipment around the world, the U.S. directly contributes to any acts of violence or destruction committed by the states and militaries that utilize such equipment. When the U.S. defense industry and concerns over economic competition in arms sales dictate the allocation of foreign aid, short-term economic priorities take precedent over long-term considerations for regional or internal stability of recipient countries. This dynamic highlights the short-sighted, limited nature of U.S. foreign policy calculations, which can increase the chances of counterproductive, negative externalities generated over time as a result of poorly planned arms sales and foreign aid decisions. By disregarding the inherent risks involved with arms transfers, contemporary U.S. policies for security assistance may exacerbate conflicts and instability abroad.

This chapter has approached these subjects strictly through the lens of the U.S. acting to promote its own security and influence around the globe by way of promoting arms exports in the face of competition from adversarial states. However, this chapter also contributes to research and analyses of the many implications that U.S. policies regarding arms transfers and foreign military assistance have in terms of arms proliferation, arms races, fueling inter-and-intrastate conflicts, contributing to regional instability and state fragility, the ethics of aiding and abetting regimes with poor human rights records, or the limits of foreign policies driven by the interests of the U.S. defense industrial base. U.S. arms transfers can – and have – enabled foreign regimes to engage in human rights abuses and violent interstate conflicts. While U.S. policymakers might have technically

valid assumptions about competitors like Russia or China simply replacing arms sales to any countries that the U.S. cannot or will not to supply with arms, using this logic to guide policies on arms sales and foreign assistance is not necessarily a strategic long-term strategy for improving security worldwide. Future research should further explore the risks involved with U.S. security assistance and military aid policies and the ways in which the U.S. can leverage its foreign policy tools to reduce such risks. The following two chapters continue to explore and describe the limits and implications of U.S. security assistance and military aid policies.

Chapter 2

Making Weak States Weaker?
Assessing the Relationship Between U.S. Security Assistance and Stage Fragility

2.1 Introduction

Since the end of World War II, the United States has provided equipment and training to foreign militaries and security forces as a way to pursue its foreign policy goals in every region of the world (Karlin, 2017). The U.S. currently spends nearly $18 billion annually on these programs—generally referred to as military aid or security sector assistance (SSA)—to train and equip more than 50,000 soldiers in over 150 countries (Saintsing, 2018; Watts et al., 2018).[4] In recent decades, policymakers have expanded the size and scope of SSA, with an increasing focus improving stability in weak and fragile states (Dalton, 2019). This strategy assumes that since weak governments cannot adequately control territory or prevent civil unrest, providing equipment and training can improve their security sectors' capacity to prevent instability, and the U.S. can thus outsource security tasks and avoid costly interventions. Despite these goals, enhancing the capacity of foreign soldiers carries inherent risks, and researchers have found little overall evidence it these programs have generated a net benefit for U.S. objectives around the world (Miller & Sokolsky, 2015). One 2015 report concludes: "despite the centrality of [SSA] in U.S. national security strategy and military operations, it remains unclear whether building the capacity of foreign security forces is an effective way to accomplish U.S. strategic objectives" (McInnis & Lucas, 2015). In this chapter, I argue that when controlling for factors that are most likely to impact a state's level of fragility, certain types of U.S. SSA – providing lethal equipment and training to security forces – do not improve stability, and correlate with worsening indicators of state fragility in the recipient country.

[4] Security sector assistance (SSA) captures a range of programs managed by the Department of Defense and State Department, which are variably referred to as security assistance, security sector assistance, security cooperation, and military aid in academic and policy research (Serafino, 2014; Watts et al., 2018). Security assistance and SSA will be used interchangeably to refer to U.S. foreign assistance programs targeting foreign militaries, security sectors, and law enforcement in recipient countries.

Each year, Congress appropriates funding for multiple SSA programs managed by the State Department and Department of Defense (DOD). Executive agencies and policymakers have used several justifications for funding these programs, arguing that they are useful for combatting mutual threats, purchasing U.S.-made defense equipment, ensuring access privileges for the U.S. military, and professionalizing security forces to respect democratic and human rights norms (Rand & Tankel, 2015). SSA programs can range from assisting Tunisia with securing its Libyan border, providing subsidized artillery and aircraft to Egypt, training and equipping Colombian security forces to counter the threat of insurgents and drug traffickers, and providing equipment to both police and maritime security forces in the Philippines (Isacson & Kinosian, 2017). These programs are used to provide arms and equipment, train soldiers and police forces, educate officers, support counter-narcotics trafficking and counterterrorism operations, improve border and maritime security, and maintain domestic security to prevent instability or the outbreak of civil conflict (McInnis & Lucas, 2015). The scope of these programs is broad, and the goals for affecting change and promoting stability in recipient nations are varied and ambitious.

Since the onset of the War on Terror after 9/11, U.S. officials have increasingly emphasized SSA programs and working with foreign partners as a way to prevent instability and violent conflict around the world. In 2010, then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates summarized the goals of SSA, stating it should be used for "for security capacity building, stabilization, and conflict prevention," particularly within "fragile or failing states" (Gates, 2010). The 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review similarly stated, "Where instability creates transnational threats, the United States must be ready to assist — in particular by helping our partner countries build effective and accountable security and justice institutions" (State Department, 2010). The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff also stated that SSA should be used to improve the capacity of partner nations' security forces, promote stability and maintain of sovereignty within the partner nation, deter

instability and violent extremism, and influence leaders to support U.S. foreign policy objectives, among several other goals (JCS, 2017). As officials have emphasized the importance of SSA for promoting stability abroad over the last two decades, these programs have expanded in total amounts of funding, number of programs, and the number of recipient countries (McInnis & Lucas, 2015).

While policymakers have emphasized SSA as a tool for promoting stability and expanded these programs around the world, sending weapons, equipment, and training to foreign security forces creates inherent risks and uncertainties within the recipient country, which are out of the U.S.'s control. The effectiveness of SSA assumes that recipient states' leaders and security forces are both willing and able to pursue goals aligned with the interests of U.S. policymakers. This represents a classic principal-agent problem, as the U.S., acting as a principal, has inherently limited control over the recipient-agent's self-interested goals and utilization of U.S.-provided resources. As SSA has become an integral component of U.S. foreign policy strategy, most of the increases in SSA since 9/11 has been directed toward governments that are unrepresentative, sectarian, corrupt or abusive, which are all risk factors for how U.S.-supplied training and military equipment are ultimately used. In such countries, leaders may utilize this assistance to consolidate power and benefit themselves, redirect security forces for purposes counterproductive to U.S. interests, and exacerbate political or intercommunal tensions within their country, while U.S.-supplied equipment and training risks ending up being used by adversarial forces (Watts et al., 2018).

For example, the case of U.S. SSA to Yemen highlights how this type of aid can be ineffective or counterproductive for improving stability. Between 2000 and 2015, the U.S. provided roughly $1 billion in SSA funding to Yemen in order to strengthen its security forces' counterterrorism abilities – primarily against al Qaeda – and improve internal stability (Hill & Kasinof, 2015). This SSA was supplied to Yemen through over ten different programs administered

by both the DOD and the State Department, and included tactical military training and weapons for Yemeni security forces and the creation of new special forces units (Goodman, 2016). After receiving some of the largest relative amounts of SSA during these years, the country descended into a factional civil war in 2015. Throughout the civil war, the U.S. lost track of over $500 million in weapons and equipment, and U.S.-provided weapons both contributed to Yemeni soldiers' human rights abuses and fell into the hands of adversarial rebel groups, signaling both the potential limitations and counterproductive, detrimental effects of the U.S.'s SSA strategy (Whitlock, 2015). This case highlights the weaknesses of U.S. efforts to prevent instability and build up the institutional capacity of fragile states.

Given the increasing emphasis that U.S. policymakers are placing on SSA as a means to achieve this strategic objective of improving stability, this paper examines the effectiveness and potential risks of contemporary SSA policies. While a variety of studies have explored programmatic effectiveness for specific goals in select countries, this analyses seeks to contribute to the literature on U.S. foreign aid and security studies by broadly examining the relationship between U.S. SSA programs and one of its key strategic objectives: improving stability around the world. I argue that SSA is at best ineffective and at worst counterproductive for improving stability in recipient countries, due to a few primary factors: these programs are not designed or implemented to adequately achieve this objective, and they are increasingly directed towards fragile states where funding for training and equipment is both an inadequate tool for reforming weak institutions, and increases the risks of government abuses and stoking internal conflict.

The paper proceeds as follows: First, I review the background of SSA programs from the late Cold War through the War on Terror, summarizing how the expectations of these programs have shifted as the U.S. increased its reliance on this assistance as a foreign policy tool. Next, I review policy documents and literature on the theories of how SSA is expected accomplish its goals,

and deficiencies with how SSA programs are implemented and monitored. I then review a selection of academic literature assessing the outcomes and effects of U.S. SSA. This is followed by a review of several mechanisms by which SSA programs can fail to achieve their goals of improving stability or even worsen levels of fragility in recipient states, supported by multiple country examples and an illustrative case study of U.S. assistance to Kyrgyzstan. Given the preceding sections' description of the deficiencies and risks present in U.S. SSA programs, I describe my hypothesis – that SSA may worsen levels of fragility in recipient countries – followed by a description of the quantitative research design.

2.2 Background on the Shifting Goals of U.S. Security Assistance

2.2.1 Security Assistance from the Cold War to the 1990s

The scope, volume, and number of stated goals of U.S. security sector assistance programs have increased in the last two decades. The expectation that SSA can be used to build up security institutions in weak states in order to prevent instability is a relatively recent development. As the post-9/11 years revealed the high costs of direct intervention as a means for promoting stability and U.S. interests in foreign countries, U.S. policymakers increased the emphasis on working "by, with, and through" allies and partners, in part as a cost-saving measure (Dalton et al., 2018). Tickner (2014) summarizes the contemporary profile of U.S. SSA: "In the post-Iraq, post-Afghanistan, post-financial crisis era, the importance of 'light footprint' approaches have grown in tandem with U.S. public opinion's adversity to costly, direct military involvement in contexts not perceived as directly threatening vital security interests." While the U.S. military has trained and aided soldiers in many countries for several decades, after the onset of the War on Terror, this mission "jumped in ambition and scale" in order to address new threats, promote stability, and combat terrorism without relying on widespread deployment of American troops (Schmitt & Arango, 2015).

While the U.S. has emphasized SSA as a way to promote stability and combat terrorism since 9/11, SSA had been used for different strategic interests in the past. In the Cold War era, the primary goal of SSA was to cultivate and maintain pro-Western and anti-communist regimes, provide diplomatic influence over recipient states, and grant the U.S. military access to strategic geographic locations. (Ross, 2017) Foreign military aid expanded during the Cold War in the post-Vietnam War era, when in the 1980s, "Washington sought to reduce direct U.S. involvement in regional conflict" and to bolster the capabilities of foreign states to 'undertake responsibilities' with might otherwise be assumed by the U.S. (Mott, 2002, p.28). Similarly to the late War on Terror, U.S. Cold War military assistance became a "low cost, low risk alternative to military power" – by the late 1970s, many "Americans considered commitment of U.S. troops[…] to be a policy failure" (Mott, 2002, p. 8). During this period, the U.S. often provided SSA to pro-Western regimes as a way to combat Soviet influence and internal opposition in Africa and Latin America, such as in Djibouti and Chile throughout the 1980s (Watts et al., 2018).

Two of the largest and longest-running SSA programs used by the U.S. are Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education & Training (IMET) (Ross, 2017). Policymakers consistently promoted these programs as a way "to establish and exert direct influence on individuals in a recipient military establishment, who would transmit U.S. influence to political leaders" (Mott, 2002, p. 29). The programs are managed by the State Department, and throughout the Cold War, were mainly "applied toward diplomatic ends, seeking to cement alliances and partnerships of pro-Western governments and to deepen the dependence of foreign militaries on the U.S. military-industrial complex." (Ross, 2017) The FMF program accomplishes this by subsidizing U.S.-produced weapons and defense equipment, which is promoted as a way to "improve the military capabilities of key friendly countries" (State Department, 2009). The IMET program primarily focuses on training for officers from foreign militaries, and is described by the DOD as a

"very important program that exposes students to the U.S. military and the American way of life" (DOD OIG, 2009). These SSA programs were designed and implemented primarily in order to build and maintain relationships with client states, provide strategic access and influence for the U.S. military, and strengthen pro-Western regimes (Sylvan & Majeski, 2009).

Throughout the Cold War, the goals of SSA were generally limited to simply supporting friendly pro-Western regimes, preventing increased influence of the Soviet Union and leftist political movements, and gaining access and influence for the U.S. military (Sylvan & Majeski, 2009). During this period, policymakers did not expect SSA programs to achieve the goals outlined in contemporary foreign policy strategies, such as promoting liberal norms like democracy and human rights, improving the security capacity of weak states, or preventing instability (Watts, 2015). Since SSA was not promoted as a tool to improve domestic stability, but rather to secure international alignment with the U.S., these programs frequently supported anticommunist regimes despite widespread corruption, human rights abuses, and often counterproductive domestic policies (Fleck & Kilby, 2010). Research has found that during the Cold War, while SSA may have secured support for the U.S. from anti-communist regimes, that these programs increased the incidence of civil wars, internal instability (Watts et al., 2018). However, as the U.S.'s foreign policy interests and strategies shifted in the post-Cold War era, and policymakers eventually embraced new goals and justifications for SSA programs, including the promotion of good governance and stability abroad (Watts, 2015).

After the Cold War ended, without an overarching security rationale of anti-communism, SSA programs significantly decreased in funding and scale in the early 1990s, along with other foreign aid budgets (Lawson & Morgenstern, 2019). During this period, the focus of SSA programs shifted from global anti-communism to broader goals of promoting democracy, good governance, conflict prevention and stability abroad, as well various regional issues, such as strengthening U.S. influence and access to the Gulf States, developing defense institutions in Eastern Europe and the

republics of the former Soviet Union, and addressing international illicit drug production and trafficking in Latin America (Lawson & Morgenstern, 2019). While much of the SSA funding during this period went to the FMF and IMET programs, the DOD and State Department both justified maintaining other SSA programs by emphasizing a newer strategic rationale: combatting narcotics trafficking in Latin America. In the 1990s, the State Department administered the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) program (originally created in 1978) and the DOD administered the Section 1004 Counter-Drug Assistance program (established in 1991), which provided weapons, equipment and training to foreign militaries and police for anti-narcotics activities, with the largest recipients including Colombia, Bolivia, Mexico, Peru and Ecuador (Isacson & Kinosian, 2017). This strategy of using military-centric SSA programs to combat narcotics trafficking was generally considered a failure (Falco, 1996). This period saw SSA beginning to take on the role of building up security sectors in developing countries in order to tackle specific operational goals.

As policymakers justified SSA for a wider range of purposes, such as counternarcotics and improving law enforcement capabilities, federal internal audits of these programs have found problems with how they were designed, implemented, and monitored (GAO, 2010). For example, evaluations of SSA for Latin American counter-narcotics efforts in the 1990s found that these DOD and State Department programs lacked adequate oversight, clear goals or strategies, end-use monitoring to ensure that this assistance as not used to commit human rights abuses (GAO/NSIAD-98-60, 1998). While FMF and IMET were originally directed toward states with well-established militaries that had close relationships with the U.S, beginning in the mid-1990s, these and other "train and equip" SSA programs increasingly provided training and equipment to police, security forces, and militaries in states with weaker civil-military institutions and poorer governance (Watts, 2015). As the rationale for increasing the size and scope of SSA programs would

shift to focus on counterterrorism and promoting stability after 9/11, these same programmatic issues for train and equip programs – a lack of clear goals, oversight, and monitoring – would persist (GAO, 2010). In summary, policymakers promoted SSA as the solution to a new range of complex problems within countries with weak security institutions. The specific deficiencies in the strategy, implementation, and oversight of these programs are further discussed below.

2.2.2 Growth of Security Assistance Policies and Programs After 9/11

As U.S. agencies increased the use of SSA to build up police and security forces for various goals in the 1990s, this emphasis expanded further with the renewed focus on counterterrorism after 9/11. Since the onset of the War on Terror, successive U.S. administrations have "increasingly prioritized efforts to build foreign security forces—particularly in weak and failing states—arguing that doing so advances U.S. national security objectives" (McInnis & Lucas, 2015). This post-9/11 foreign policy strategy – referred to by policymakers as "building partner capacity" – encompasses a broad set of "missions, programs, activities, and authorities intended to improve the ability of other nations" to achieve security-oriented goals (McInnis & Lucas, 2015). As part of this emphasis on building partner capacity and "burden sharing," the U.S. increased the funding, number of programs, scope, and stated goals for its portfolio of SSA-related activities. Before 9/11, there were 57 aid programs under the umbrella of SSA, which increased to over 100 programs by 2012. From the year 2000 to 2012, total SSA funds increased from $7.34 to $21.82 billion (Isacson & Kinosian, 2017). The State Department had previously overseen almost 90% of all SSA funds, but the majority of the increases after 9/11 were funneled through the DOD, with limited oversight from the civilian authority of the State Department.

As the U.S. military surged its deployment of troops abroad, Congress readily approved increases in the budget for the DOD, which included increased funds for existing and new SSA programs, which were all justified under the rationale of "combatting terrorism" and violent

extremism (Isacson & Kinosian, 2017). The overarching goal of this expanded SSA portfolio was for DOD to be "more responsive to emerging global threats, while addressing longer-term global and regional shared security challenges," but one unintended consequence was the creation of a "patchwork of authorities which complicated management, application and oversight of those engagements" (Harvey, 2017). Historically, the U.S.'s State Department-led SSA programs such as FMF and IMET had focused on improving diplomatic ties and aiding states with well-established, stable military institutions. However, throughout the 1990s and increasingly after 9/11, the DOD's SSA programs focused primarily on building new security capabilities in states without well-established security institutions or militaries (Watts, 2015).

The most significant increases in funding and programs post-9/11 were concentrated in U.S.-occupied Iraq and Afghanistan, however, the funding and scope of SSA also increased in more than 130 other countries, through various programs used to purchase defense systems and equipment, train and equip security forces, and educate officers (Jackson, 2017). The U.S. began increasing SSA funding for dozens of countries which had either been sanctioned right up until 2001, or that received little to no U.S. assistance in the preceding years, many of which suffered from poor governance and abusive regimes (Stohl, 2008). The majority of the growth in these programs after 9/11 was in "train and equip" programs, whereby DOD's regional and country-level combatant commands provide weapons and tactical training to local militaries or special forces in order to combat terrorism, insurgencies, violent criminal organizations, and narcotics traffickers (Jackson, 2017). Neither the U.S. military – nor the security sectors in most of the countries receiving SSA – had particular expertise in combatting these various problems, as most armed forces were traditionally trained for conventional warfare. (See Figure 2.1 for a map of developing countries that received SSA from the post-Cold War 1990s through the decade following 9/11, and Figure 2.2 for a plot illustrating increasing SSA funds) The U.S. provided increasing amounts of

equipment and training to security forces in states that lacked strong security institutions, and in many cases, to states where the U.S. had little or no experience with security partnerships, particularly states in Africa, Central Asia, and the Middle East.

Figure 2.1



Note: Data on dollar value of U.S. SSA is population adjusted and shown in per-capita values. The map's color scheme demonstrates that over these two decades, a few countries received a higher proportionate amount of SSA funds, mainly Iraq, Jordan, Afghanistan, Egypt, and Colombia. Source: U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency's "Fiscal Year Series", and the SSA Monitor.

Figure 2.2



Throughout the War on Terror, this rationale of "burden sharing" for transferring military capability to foreign states has coincided with the rhetoric of promoting good governance and stability abroad. The rhetoric of human rights and democracy promotion as a foreign policy goal had been a focus of the Clinton administration in the post-Cold War era (Carothers, 2003). As the Bush administration increased the size and scope of foreign aid programs after 9/11, these goals also became a key rhetorical justification for SSA. President Obama's 2013 Presidential Policy Directive 23, *U.S. Security Sector Assistance Policy* (White House, 2013), issued in April 2013, stated that U.S. SSA programs must "help partner nations not only build sustainable capacity to address common security challenges, but also to promote universal values such as good governance" (Sokolsky & Adams, 2015). Obama emphasized this again in the 2014 Presidential Policy Directive, stating that we must ensure "that arms transfers do not contribute to human rights violations or violations of international humanitarian law" (White House, 2014). Obama also articulated this in his 2014 commencement speech at West Point:

> "America's support for democracy and human rights goes beyond idealism -- it is a matter of national security. Democracies are our closest friends and are far less likely to go to war. Economies based on free and open markets perform better and become markets for our goods. Respect for human rights is an antidote to instability and the grievances that fuel violence and terror." (White House, 2014b)

However, while promoting good governance and stability are explicit expectations for SSA programs, the U.S. increasingly trained and equipped police, security forces, and militaries in fragile states with weak institutions and undemocratic leadership. As the U.S. sought to build new security capabilities and to gain access and influence for its counterterrorism activities and objectives, it increased its assistance to states that had autocratic or undemocratic governments, weak institutions, or internal political instability. For example, Pakistan, Yemen, Kyrgyzstan, Mali, Bahrain, Indonesia,

and Honduras are all states with poor records of human rights, democratic governance, weak institutions and internal instability which received significant increases in training and lethal equipment throughout the War on Terror (Stohl, 2008; Security Assistance Monitor (SAM), 2017). As SSA grew in size and scope during this period, it was increasingly directed to states with governments that were potentially unwilling to share or unable to pursue the desired objectives of U.S. foreign policy.

In summary, in recent decades the U.S. has increased its emphasis on SSA as a foreign policy tool, increased the number and types of SSA programs it employs, and increased the scope of the goals it hopes to achieve through such programs. Since the Cold War, SSA has evolved from being promoted a diplomatic tool to cultivate influence and access in friendly states, to being relied upon to build new security capabilities and strengthen institutions in weak and fragile states in order to prevent instability and share the burden of combatting terrorism. As the U.S. has expanded the amount of training and equipment it provides to security sectors in states with weak or undemocratic institutions, this has increased the potential risks that these programs may be ineffective or counterproductive for influencing recipient governments, improving stability, and building partner capacity (Neptune, 2016). The following section provides a review of the how SSA is supposed to achieve its goals, issues with the design and implementation of SSA, and a review of research on the effects of SSA.

2.3 The Logic and Deficiencies of Security Assistance for Improving Stability

In this section, I review literature and policy documents to describe the official logic of how security assistance programs are supposed to achieve their goals and the deficiencies in how these programs designed and implemented. After describing the general logic that officials promote for using SSA, I will describe two major deficiencies with current SSA policy: these programs were not

designed for the current applications and environments, and they lack sufficient monitoring and oversight in their implementation. These deficiencies highlight the potential for these programs to fail in their goal of improving stability.

The official logic of SSA policy and planning assumes at face value that these programs can extend U.S. influence and enable and influence recipient countries to improve security and stability within their county, prevent crises, and replace direct U.S. intervention with like-minded U.S.-trained and equipped security forces (Munson, 2013). The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) – which manages both DOD and Sate Department SSA programs – states in its SSA Management Manual that these programs "encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives" (DSCA, 2013). This SSA strategy rests on the assumption that a "powerful state can use military assistance as leverage to compel recipient state cooperation" (Sullivan et al., 2011). Keohane and Nye (1977) argue, for example, that dominant states can influence the foreign policy of dependent states using aid allocations to reward or punish past behavior and to act as an incentive that encourages future compliance. More recently, policy analysts have argued that "foreign aid, at the most general level, is a tool of influence—states give it because they believe it encourages recipients to take desired actions" (Palmer et al., 2002). However, these assumptions of the influential power of SSA have mostly applied to older programs that assist states in purchasing U.S. defense equipment and that educate and build relationships with senior military officers. These assumptions do not necessarily apply to the train and equip programs that have expanded in recent decades to build the capacity of security forces in fragile states (Karlin, 2017).

SSA may provide influence over foreign militaries by directly educating and training officers to adhere to U.S. security strategies and norms of behavior, promoting diplomatic and military-to-military relationships between the U.S. and the recipient, and incentivizing foreign leaders' cooperation by providing useful training and defense articles. According to the DOD's Joint

Operations Command, successful SSA and cooperation programs should result in "improved security, nonproliferation, political stability, good governance, sustained development, legitimate competition and trade, and economic prosperity" (McNerny et al., 2014). The DSCA Security Assistance Management Manual states that these programs build defense and security relations, promote specific U.S. security interests, and develop allied and friendly military capabilities in the host nation (DSCA, 2017). However, the overarching assumption of this official SSA doctrine is that leaders and soldiers recipient states are capable, willing, and able to utilize U.S. training and material assistance to pursue the same objectives as the SSA policy intends. Given the principal-agent relationship inherent in U.S. provision of SSA to foreign security sectors, there is an inherent risk that recipient countries will act in their own self-interest in ways that diverge from U.S. policy goals (Munson, 2013).

Despite the theories and assumptions of the influential power of SSA, the specific mechanisms by which SSA is expected to successfully "build partner capacity" and accomplish all of the assorted goals of U.S. security interests are largely absent from official policy documents. The Department of Defense and State Department have explicitly supported the "preventive hypothesis" – that SSA can prevent instability and fragility in partner states (DOD, 2006). However, policymakers and policy documents alike rarely describe how SSA is supposed to be able to effectively build up new, competent, accountable security capacities in states with fragile institutions (Boutton, 2016). The logic of SSA policy is essentially limited to catch phrases repeated in military doctrine and in the titles given to SSA programs: "building partner capacity," "burden sharing," or working "by, with, and through" security partners (Rand & Tankel, 2015). However, 2015 report to Congress states, "the assumption that building foreign security forces will have tangible U.S. national security benefits remains a relatively untested proposition" (McInnis and Lucas, 2015).

Researchers and analysts have summarized several specific deficiencies with current SSA programs: SSA models were not designed to accomplish their current goals, this assistance is not always applied to countries or contexts where it is likely to be most effective, and these programs lack adequate monitoring or a coherent theory of change (Watts, 2015; Karlin, 2017b). These deficiencies in the programs' design and implementation are detailed below.

2.3.1 Security Assistance Programs were Not Designed for Their Current Application

Security sector assistance programs were originally developed for states with relatively stable security institutions or in the process of democratization, but from the late 1990s and post-9/11, these programs began to be applied to "wildly different circumstances" in developing and fragile states (Watts, 2015). The traditional State Department-led SSA programs – FMF and IMET – had well established mechanisms for oversight, and were designed around "a slowly evolving environment (the Cold War), where the basic threat vectors changed little from year to year" (Eggers, 2016). Additionally, in the Cold War, these programs were directed at a smaller total number of countries, for the primary purpose of assisting close U.S. allies and securing support from anticommunist regimes. In contrast, the growth of SSA programs after 9/11 focused on greater "flexibility" in the ability for the DOD to more quickly administer training and provide equipment to security forces in a larger number of foreign countries. In 1980, FMF and IMET were provided to just 28 and 14 countries, respectively, but by 2010, FMF was provided to over 90 countries and IMET to over 50 countries total (USAID, 2017). These programs are now also expected to achieve a much wider range of specific goals than in previous decades, such as training and equipping inexperienced security sectors to carry out counterterrorism operations, secure borders, or combat narcotics trafficking. As the number and train and equip programs grew through various DOD authorities after 9/11, some analysts of described SSA in the War on Terror as a "patchwork" of

authorities that lack adequate oversight and monitoring, and that are "largely disconnected from a coherent and adaptable strategy designed to address identifiable strategic end-states" (Neptune, 2016; Thaler, 2016).

Despite the increasing use of SSA to achieve more goals in a wider variety of contexts, agencies that oversee these programs continue to rely on the same outdated models. One study described the problem, stating that current SSA infrastructure is "outdated and dysfunctional," particularly as policymakers increasingly expect this assistance to build new capabilities in high-risk and political instable areas (Neptune, 2016). Policy researchers have argued that from 1989 to the present, U.S. foreign SSA programs have relied on the same "routine" and "small set of means, resorted to over and over" to pursue its interests in client states (Sylvan & Majeski, 2009). The majority of SSA does not involve "high-level policy making, and are for the most part a matter of regular organizational procedures," carried out by pre-existing specialized bureaucracies within executive agencies (Sylvan & Majeski, 2009). Other observers have noted how bureaucratic path dependence has perpetuated the same approach to SSA policy, stating that "with the end of the Cold War in 1989-1990, the essential ideological justification for U.S. military assistance disappeared, but the major programs continued through bureaucratic inertia and recipient dependence" (Mott, 2002). Thus, "flowing through many competing agencies and fragmented programs, U.S. military assistance had many guises" – but relies on the same, unrevised means and techniques to accomplish various rhetorical goals (Mott 2002). While new recipient states were included in military aid budgets following September 11, 2001, these new programs received little discussion or analysis within the "[Presidential] Administration, with Congress, or with experts on specific regions or countries" (Stohl, 2002).

In practice, the administration and delivery of SSA resources has not changed since these models were first developed: country-level DOD and State Department officers request continued

funding for specific programs, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency manages the delivery of funds, equipment, and training programs, and the delivery and training is carried out by DOD combatant commanders and military personnel in the respective recipient countries (McInnis & Lucas, 2015; Neptune, 2016). Assessments of U.S. SSA have noted that bureaucratic resistance to change makes it difficult for policymakers and agencies to update SSA models to more effectively accomplish the newer goals of "building partner capacity" and succeed in the new contexts where it is being used. Moving away from the "business as usual" approach to improving governance and security sectors would require significant changes in the decades-old bureaucracies of the State Department and DOD (Karlin, 2015).

However, these organizations have a "a vested interest in maintaining a status quo that gives them greater influence in the bottom-up development of country programs," and senior national security officials "value the flexibility to use foreign assistance to promote short-term and tactical diplomatic goals or respond to unexpected emergencies, which puts a premium on maintaining easy access to funds that are not committed to long-term programs to build better governance and security sectors" (Karlin, 2015). The bureaucracies that have received increased funding and authority over the expanded use of SSA in the last two decades are not incentivized to alter their own approaches, or give up their own funding and authorities. As a result, some policy analysts argue that it would take "nothing short of a dramatic culture change" across these respective agencies to revise how they use SSA to build partner capacity and prevent instability in recipient countries (Saab, 2019). These observations highlight the possibility that this assistance may not be properly designed or implemented in ways that can accomplish the goal of preventing instability and building up countries' security capabilities.

2.3.2 Security Sector Assistance Programs Lack the Adequate Conditionality and Monitoring

As U.S. agencies have not significantly revised their approach to SSA in recent decades, one deficiency is that SSA programs lack the necessary levels of conditionality and monitoring that could make the programs more successful. Several analyses have argued that SSA is most likely to achieve its intended effects under certain conditions, such as when it is provided conditionally based on recipient states' cooperation and improvements, when recipient states have more stable political and economic conditions, when the goals are clear and monitored, and when enough aid is provided to make a difference (Biddle et al. 2018; Boutton et al., 2018; Miller and Sokolsky, 2018; Watts, 2018). However, the U.S. has increasingly directed its SSA toward states with undemocratic regimes or fractional democracies that suffer from institutional fragility, struggling economies, and popular discontent (Karlin, 2015). While U.S. SSA strategy seeks to prevent instability and build states' capacity to combat security threats, the U.S. has increased the amount of training and equipment it provides to some of the most poorly governed countries in the world (Adams & Sokolsky, 2015). Analyses of various SSA programs suggest that the programs lack the monitoring, evaluations, selectivity and conditionality that would track recipient states' improvements over time and encourage recipients to cooperate with the U.S.'s strategic goals (Boutton, 2016).

Without rigorous monitoring and conditioning assistance on recipients' cooperation, behavior, and improvements in capabilities, SSA programs are not likely to be effective at building partners' capacities (Karlin, 2015). Several assessments of SSA have acknowledged that these features – selectivity, conditionality, monitoring of impacts and goals – are virtually absent from the way that SSA programs are designed and how aid is distributed (Watts et al. 2018, GAO, 2019). Rather, analyses of the various programs managed by both the State Department and DOD describe them as lacking clear goals, oversight, monitoring, and conditionality – in summary, "there is no systemic review of what U.S. military assistance accomplishes" (Miller and Sokolsky, 2015). SSA programs lack "any rigorous and institutionalized process" to evaluate successes and risks, so these

assessments are "driven more by intuitive and impressionistic judgments" – far from any high-level policymaking process (Watts, 2015).

Current doctrine on SSA lacks a clear "theory of change" for how these programs should achieve their stated objectives. For example, the Army's security cooperation field manual and "Army Security Cooperation Handbook" devote almost no attention to partner-nation contexts or "political, economic, and social considerations" (Watts, 2015). Individual country cases typically receive little regular monitoring or scrutiny, and the organization of SSA programs themselves are rarely updated or evaluated. In most cases when apparent problems arise, "policy instruments are continued with adjustments or given greater resources," and "only in rare circumstances, such as the complete collapse of a regime, are instruments terminated rather than continued" (Sylvan & Majeski, 2009).

Audits of SSA programs from within the federal government have supported these findings that the programs lack clear performance measures and evaluations. For example, a GAO analysis of DOD's "global train and equip" programs found that both DOD and the State Department incorporated "little monitoring and evaluation" of these programs, have "not consistently defined performance measures," and that reporting on progress for improving stabilization and counterterrorism efforts has been "limited to anecdotal information" (GAO, 2010). Another review found that both DOD and the State Department have failed to track whether soldiers, police, and security forces that receive equipment and training from SSA programs received mandatory human rights vetting and training (GAO, 2019). The same report notes that "providing training on human rights issues and international humanitarian law to foreign security forces can further U.S. credibility and interests," as such training could "help maintain local populations' cooperation with U.S. security efforts by curbing potential abuses by partner country forces."

This same review also found that DOD and State Department have not evaluated the effectiveness of the human rights training for participating foreign security forces. An additional GAO review found that in certain African countries receiving SSA, these same agencies failed to vet several hundred trainees for criminal records or human rights violations, and these individuals all ended up receiving tactical training and equipment from U.S. train and equip programs (GAO, 2006). Partly as a result of this lack of sufficient monitoring or conditioning assistance on countries' performance, SSA programs have thrown "good money after bad," and rewarded bad behavior, including leaders' corruption, human rights abuses, and coups carried out by U.S.-trained soldiers (Adams & Sokolsky, 2015).

In addition to the lack of bureaucratic oversight, monitoring, and clear goals for many SSA programs, other analyses have argued that small amounts of SSA funds are distributed across too many countries to make a sustained difference in stability or provide leverage over the recipient government's cooperation (Adams & Sokolsky, 2015). For context, the U.S. state department's FY2016 budget provided $8 billion in aid to the security sectors of over 130 countries, and more than three quarters of these funds were reserved for Israel, Egypt, Colombia, and Jordan – with the remaining countries receiving an average of about $2 million each. A review of SSA in Africa by the RAND Corporation noted that in countries with poorer, limited government budgets, such as Burundi, Djibouti, or Niger, U.S. SSA can make up more than 15 percent of the countries' annual security budgets (Watts, 2015). In poorer countries, this amount of additional funding might not be sufficient to permanently reform and sustain new capabilities among the countries' security sectors, but is substantial enough to "shift power and resources to security services and away from the civilian institutions meant to provide oversight and accountability over these services" (Watts, 2015). Providing even small amounts of aid to a large number of poor and politically instable countries therefore increases the number of risks involved with empowering inexperienced security sectors or

self-interested recipient regimes, such as making them less accountable and more prone to committing abuses.

All of these factors – a lack of clear goals, a lack of adequate monitoring and evaluation, and program funding that is "spread thin" across too many different countries – suggest weaknesses in SSA programs' ability to improve stability and recipient countries' security capabilities. In summary, SSA often continues despite recipient's "bad behavior", the assistance is not adequately targeted where it is most likely to make a difference, most countries receive consistent levels of aid across time and therefore have little incentive to alter their behavior, and SSA programs are means-driven, rather than being guided by monitoring goals or achievements. The next section reviews academic literature on various outcomes of U.S. SSA programs.

2.4 Academic Literature on the Outcomes of U.S. Security Assistance

Several studies have examined the impact of U.S. security sector assistance programs on garnering cooperation from recipient states. On the use of U.S. military aid for inducing leverage over recipient state cooperation, Sullivan et al. (2011) find that from 1990 to 2004, "with limited exceptions, increasing levels of US aid are linked to a significant reduction in cooperative foreign policy behavior with the United States," and that uncooperative state actions were frequently followed by an increase in U.S. military aid. Various scholars have found evidence that military aid can help induce states to adhere to U.S. foreign policy objectives and garner support for U.S. policies (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Meernik et al., 1998). Other studies examine the correlation between U.S. military aid and certain compliant behaviors, like UN vote compliance (Moon 1983; Derouen & Heo 2004; Lai & Morey 2006). Bove et al. (2013) found that bilateral trade increases between the recipient countries and the US following FMF programs and U.S. troop deployment. Bove et al. also find that military assistance entails a "long lasting relationship between the supplier

and the buyer," where the "size of military assistance conveys important information about the quality of bilateral relations" between the U.S. and the recipient country. Finally, Bapat (2011) argues that SSA funds for counterterrorism can create a perverse incentive for host states to tolerate low levels of terrorist activity so as to justify the continuing to receive these funds.

Other studies have also used case studies and statistical methods to examine the impacts of SSA on the security and stability of recipient nations, and under what conditions SSA might be most effective. Sullivan et al. (2018) argue that military aid in the form of equipment and weapons transfers to post-conflict states can increase the incidences of state-led repression. Biddle et al. (2018) use a principal agent theory applied to case studies of U.S. SSA to El Salvador, Iraq, and South Korea at various points in history to argue that such aid programs are only effective when the recipient government shares aligned policy interests with the U.S., the aid is substantially intrusive enough to generate institutional reforms, and the aid is closely monitored and delivered on a conditional basis. Boutton (2019) uses case studies to argue that SSA to new regimes, personalist regimes, and regimes with a legacy of personalist or military rule are more likely to be destabilizing, due to the ability for recipient governments to use aid for purposes of "coup proofing" or developing a "Praetorian guard" of security forces to maintain control against potential opposition groups. Countries with personalist regimes and military rule typically consolidate institutional power around a single leader or small cadre of officers, and leaders of new regimes typically lack long-term institutional credibility and face strong opposition, each of these regime types are more likely to be insecure and thus utilize security sectors to protect the ruling regime (Boutton, 2016).

Similarly, Savage and Caverly (2017) use statistical methods to argue that U.S. security cooperation programs used to educate and train officers and soldiers increase the probability of attempted military coups, due the increase in human capital among the U.S.-trained personnel. McNerny et al. (2014) found somewhat contrary findings when examining SSA as a tool to prevent

worsening state fragility. They argue that SSA focusing on training and education had a positive impact on reducing state fragility, but that this effect only occurred in states that already had higher levels of state capacity, and that increased investment in these programs saw a diminishing return. Two other studies from the RAND Corporation found that SSA and building partner capacity was found to be most effective for reducing instability and conflict when recipient states have high institutional capacity; strong governance indicators; strong economies; broad strategic interests aligning the U.S. interests in the region; are in post-conflict periods of reform; and accountable to their population and respectful of human rights (Paul et al, 2013; Jones et al, 2006).

This body of research suggests mixed results for the impacts of U.S. SSA programs on recipient state cooperation and state fragility. Additional details from the aforementioned case of Yemen illustrate both the limitations and risks involved in providing SSA to improve stability in fragile states. In Yemen, U.S. assistance created undemocratic and destabilizing effects, as former President Saleh used U.S. funds and trainees to consolidate power around his family, develop a personal security force, replace security leadership with his relatives and patrons, repress citizens and opposing factions, and ultimately exacerbate instability and tensions within the country (Karlin, 2017). A majority of assistance provided during Saleh's rule funded new special forces units that were meant to combat al Qaeda, but these units were all led by a direct relative of Saleh, who had more interest in combatting internal opposition than Islamic extremists (Johnsen, 2012). After Yemen's 2011 popular uprising, Saleh was replaced by President Hadi, and when Saleh allied himself with Houthi rebels within the country, several U.S.-trained special forces units followed suit to fight for the rebels (Baron et al., 2017). As SSA continued, President Hadi redirected resources and soldiers to combat Houthi militants, rather than al-Qaeda, as the U.S. had intended. While U.S. SSA did not create the conditions for civil war within Yemen, this assistance provided tactical training

and lethal equipment that were used to commit acts of violence, exacerbate political tensions, stoke unrest, and contribute to the instability.

Analysts have also noted that programs used to train and equip Yemen's special forces units – primarily those administered by DOD – lacked sufficient oversight and monitoring of how these resources were distributed and utilized by the recipient security forces (Goodman, 2016). Following the onset of the civil war in 2015, the Pentagon has noted that U.S. weapons have fallen into the hands of Houthi rebels and other enemies of the former Yemeni government. In addition, throughout the civil war in Yemen, the U.S. increased supplied of lethal military equipment to Saudi Arabia, which has led continuous bombing campaigns in a proxy war against the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels. (Lamonthe, 2015) This example highlights how SSA can worsen or fail to prevent instability within recipient countries, despite a large amount of investment over several years.

Given the above review of the deficiencies of SSA programs, the mixed results from academic research on the influence and effectiveness of such programs, and the anecdotal example of Yemen, the next section describes several mechanisms by which SSA could fail to improve or even worsen levels of state fragility in recipient countries. These mechanisms are supported by additional anecdotes and the case study of U.S. SSA in Kyrgyzstan after 9/11.

2.5 Modeling How Security Assistance Can Fail to Improve Stability in Fragile States

The preceding sections have described deficiencies in how SSA programs are designed and implemented, and the mixed results from other researchers' findings on the effectiveness of these programs. In this section, I further describe the specific ways by which SSA can be ineffective at improving stability or potentially worsen instability in certain contexts within recipient countries. The stated goals of improving stability through SSA assume that these programs can leverage influence over recipient states' decision-making, improve institutional capacity and reforms, and

provide the necessary equipment, training, and relationships to assist in achieving security-related goals. This assumption was summarized in a 2009 letter to Congress from the Under Secretary of Defense presents certain types of SSA as a political tool "critical ... for executing our foreign policy" and "key to improving bilateral relationships, encouraging behavior in the U.S. interest, increasing access and influence, and building capacity where host-nation and U.S. interests align" (Serafino, 2014).

As mentioned above, the U.S. SSA strategy presents a principal-agent model. The principal actor (comprised of the U.S. foreign policy agencies responsible with overseeing SSA programs) delegates resources and authority to the agents (recipient nations' leaders and security sectors) in order to carry out actions on its behalf, such as pursuing mutual security objectives and preventing instability. The principal agent model can help explain some why SSA can fail to achieve its goals and the risks inherent in providing defense equipment and training to states with self-interested leaders and fragile institutions. The mechanisms by which SSA can be ineffective or counterproductive can be summarized as four interrelated models or problems: (1) reverse leverage and divergent interests, (2) moral hazard, (3) undermining legitimate governance and abetting abuses, and (4) misuse of resources and the risk of "blowback" (McInnis and Lucas, 2015; Watts, 2015; Karlin, 2017). These models are described in further detail below with illustrative anecdotes from specific countries. This is followed by an in-depth case study of SSA in Kyrgyzstan, including a justification of this case selection.

2.5.1 Mechanism 1: Reverse Leverage and Divergent Interests

The "reverse leverage" model posits that when regimes understand their strategic importance to U.S. interests, they may be emboldened to conduct self-serving and counterproductive behaviors with impunity (Mott, 2002). If a regime knows that it serves an

important purpose for U.S. interests, such as by providing access to a certain geographic area, or assisting the U.S. in counterterrorism operations, they might treat the aid as an entitlement and have little incentive to cooperate with U.S. strategic plans. Similarly, if a regime does not fully share the same interests as the U.S., but knows that the U.S. depends on it for certain security goals, it may use its SSA resources in ways that do not achieve or that are counterproductive to U.S. policy goals. While the U.S. gives military aid to gain leverage and influence, "in a competitive market for leverage through aid; it must compete with other states to keep its influence over client states" (Sullivan et al., 2011). As Sullivan et al. (2011) assume, the "United States chooses to invest heavily in training and equipping the military forces of other countries, with all the attendant risks this entails, because it needs something from these states […] Materially weak states can exploit the fact that a much stronger donor relies on them to provide some vital good—and the threat of defection to an alternative supplier—to exert influence over the donor." Thus, providing SSA risks "creating militarily strong, assertive clients that become more willing to ignore U.S. interests", and "if the amount of aid a state receives is itself indicative of its security value to the United States, states should become less cooperative the more aid they receive" (Sullivan et al., 2011).

This model of reverse leverage and divergent interests can be seen in the cases of U.S. SSA to Pakistan. After 9/11, Pakistan became one of the largest recipients of SSA, as the U.S. relied on the country to partner in the fight against al-Qaeda (Abizaid, 2018). Pakistani security sectors receiving training and equipment cooperated to an extent with U.S. security interests, and assisted in missions to "neutralize operatives, disrupt plots, and pressure those parts of al-Qaeda's network residing in the country" (Abizaid, 2018). However, capacity building for counterterrorism purposes was considered largely ineffective, and Pakistani leadership generally refused to cooperate with U.S. desires to combat other domestic criminal and terror networks, such as the Taliban and the Haqqani network (Tankel, 2018).

Additionally, the Pakistani military redirected resources and equipment provided by the U.S. for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency purposes to bolster its military presence near the border of its adversary, India. U.S. agencies were unwilling to suspend aid to Pakistan, as it depended on its strategic location and counterterrorism partnerships. Absent credible punishment for its lack of cooperation and "bad behavior" with SSA, Pakistan exercised "reverse leverage" over the U.S. in its principal-agent relationship, and continued to receive assistance while failing to combat internal sources of instability. As policy analyst Stephen Tankel put it, "No amount of [financial] assistance or threats to withhold it would lead the Pakistani security establishment to turn on the Taliban, Haqqani network, or other state-allied organizations" (Tankel, 2018). Even when the DOD finally reduced levels of security funds in 2015, Pakistani leaders were largely unmoved and offered no meaningful change in its strategic approach to militant groups and terrorists. This anecdote highlights the limits to the U.S.'s ability to exercise influence in the principal-agent relationship of SSA, which ultimately led to an ineffective strategy to combat security threats and sources of instability within Pakistan.

2.5.2 Mechanism 2: Moral Hazard

Under certain circumstances, U.S. SSA may be ineffective or counterproductive at preventing instability in a recipient country by creating a moral hazard scenario for the partner country. If states and their security sectors receive assistance to combat a specific threat, such as terrorist cells, insurgents, or narcotics traffickers, leadership may be incentivized to ignore or tolerate low levels of such threats in order to justify the continued delivery of useful resources, equipment, and training (Watts et al., 2018). As mentioned in the review of academic literature above, Bapat (2011) depicted this moral hazard in a principal-agent game theoretic model, arguing that "if host states are provided with the tools to pacify their territory only if terrorist campaigns are ongoing, but

will lose this aid once the problem of terrorism ceases, host states have little incentive to accelerate the demise of terrorist groups." This risk of moral hazard can be particularly likely in poorer states with smaller security budgets, where SSA is an important and substantial resource for their security institutions and leadership. In such circumstances, leaders may be incentivized to tolerate or misrepresent internal threats that concern the U.S. in order to continue receiving more aid. If these countries continue to receive SSA regardless of changes or improvements in internal stability or threat reduction, they have little incentive to effectively combat sources of state fragility (Biddle et al., 2017).

For example, a 2007 report from the Combatting Terrorism Center (CTC) charged that Kenya has engaged in these practices, suggesting a moral hazard problem (Watts et al., 2007). The U.S. has provided Kenya equipment and training for border security and counterterrorism operations since the 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassy in Nairobi by al-Qaeda affiliate al Shabaab (Rosenau & Schbley, 2013). After 9/11, Kenya became one of the largest recipients of SSA in Africa. U.S.-Kenyan counterterrorism efforts have included establishing anti-terrorism intelligence services, police units, and counterterrorism units within the military. The 2007 CTC report argues that while the U.S. has aggressively funded and pursued anti-terrorism operations and partnerships within Kenya, close cooperation with the U.S. has created serious political liabilities for Kenyan leaders, stemming from a number of grievances (Watts et al., 2007). Given Kenya's status as a relatively new democracy with fragile democratic institutions, Whitaker (2008) argues that Kenyan politicians have been reluctant to prioritize support for U.S. counterterrorism operations out of fear of stoking public opposition and resentment. For example, Kenyan leaders have been cautious not to upset Kenyan Muslim populations who feel targeted by U.S. policies, and the government faced heated protests after initially supporting U.S.-backed anti-terrorism legislation that was perceived as rolling back human rights protections and civil liberties (Whitaker, 2008).

Within Kenya, counterterrorism is a much higher priority for the U.S. than it is for Kenyan leaders, who view political insecurity, endemic poverty, and public health issues as greater and more immediate threats (Watts et al., 2007). Kenyan leaders have gained popular domestic support by resisting U.S. policy preferences, but are in turn incentivized to misrepresent both the significance of the threat of terrorist activity within their borders and their level of commitment to U.S. counterterrorism strategy in order to continue receiving SSA from the U.S. As a result, some observers have found evidence suggesting that Kenyan leaders have tolerated low levels of terrorist activity in order to continue receiving SSA and resources from the U.S. (Watts et al., 2007; Whitaker, 2008). The 2007 CTC report summarized this moral hazard scenario in Kenya, stating "external assistance conditioned solely on the presence of terrorism in effect rewards state failure to invest in the types of local activities needed to effectively address the problem."

2.5.3 Mechanism 3: Undermining Legitimate Governance and Abetting Abuses

If the U.S. provides SSA to countries with regimes that are corrupt, self-serving, or undemocratic, this assistance might undermine legitimate governance and abet abusive practices. Foreign leaders understand that the U.S.'s provision of SSA signals an interest and investment in the maintenance of the incumbent regime, and can direct and utilize certain types SSA in order to strengthen their internal power in ways that diverge from long-term U.S. policy interests (Boutton, 2018). The U.S. has directed much of its train and equip SSA programs to states with weak or fragile political and security institutions, particularly since 9/11. In such circumstances, leaders in these countries are "vulnerable to removal by government or military rivals, and a unified, competent military capable of combating insurgents is also capable of overthrowing the leader" (Boutton, 2018). Such regimes have security priorities that differ from those of the U.S. and might be incentivized to direct security resources to bolster their own power against combat internal

opposition. Insecure leaders can utilize SSA and trained soldiers to engage in "coup proofing," whereby they use soldiers as personal security forces. Even if leaders are not at high risk of being forcibly ousted, they can utilize SSA to insulate and protect themselves from public opposition, or to directly threaten, repress, and attack rival factions or dissenters that threaten their power. In such circumstances, SSA can worsen states' levels of fragility by abetting abusive actions, undermining legitimate governance, and being misused for purposes can ultimately exacerbate conflicts and worsen instability (Powell, 2018).

Instead of supporting the development of capable professional security forces as intended by U.S. security assistance policies, vulnerable leaders in fragile states can use SSA resources to empower and protect themselves, also known as "coup proofing". Leaders can exploit familial, ethnic, or political loyalties to staff key positions in security forces rather than promoting more competent individuals; create an armed force parallel to the regular military or security forces for the purpose of regime protection in the form of a "Praetorian guard"; develop multiple internal security forces to monitor one another; or use state resources for patronage of loyalists and eliminating potential rivals from the regime and security forces (Quinliven, 1999; Savage & Caverley 2018; Boutton, 2018). For example, Niger is one of the largest recipients of SSA in Africa, and its security forces are considered poorly trained and under-paid. President Mahamadou Issoufou has increased military spending and diverted resources to build a personal guard, and following an attempted coup in 2015, he purged the leaders of the senior officer corps and counterterrorism units. In this case, U.S. security assistance may be enabling the country's leader to consolidate power and politicize the security forces, while the greater military has seen little improvement in capability and professionalization (ICG, 2017; Bigot, 2016).

Chad offers another example: under the rule of President Idriss Deby, since the late 1990s, the country has hosted U.S. military exercises and received significant amounts of training and

equipment for combatting Boko Haram (Powell, 2018). President Deby diverted U.S.-provided equipment and trained soldiers to create a military unit with thousands of soldiers serving as a presidential guard, and despite this, he has consistently faced internal opposition and instability, both from within his own military and from rebel forces. In 2005, hundreds of soldiers from Deby's personal guard unit defected while demanding internal reforms, and he proceeded to fire thousands of these soldiers. He then developed a new personal security force "recruited from carefully selected groups" from within his patronage network and the national army (Debos & Tubiana, 2017). Throughout this period, Deby continued to receive support and resources from the U.S. and other Western powers, while committing human rights abuses, facing internal opposition, and deteriorating levels of internal stability (Plichta, 2019). Throughout the War on Terror, the U.S. has similarly trained and equipped presidential security personnel in countries including Cameroon, Djibouti, Rwanda, and Senegal (Powell, 2018).

In states where leaders are not necessarily vulnerable to removal by internal opposition, but are interested in repressing dissent, public opposition, or rival internal factions, U.S. security assistance can be used to directly or indirectly aid regimes committing abuses against their population. By abetting abusive regimes, SSA can fail to improve partners' capacities to prevent instability, or be directly implicated in violent actions that worsen countries' internal stability. Providing training and equipment to abusive regimes that stoke internal conflict risks exacerbating the instability that these programs seek to combat (Powell, 2018). For example, the U.S. had provided training and equipment to Uganda throughout the War on Terror, which played a key role in counterterrorism operations in Somalia (Ross & Dalton, 2020). While Uganda has been one of the largest recipients of U.S. assistance in Africa, its military has been "accused of corruption, political interference, and human rights violations," with both military and police units committing acts of torture and killing citizens (Ross & Dalton, 2020).

The U.S. attempted to incentivize reform by suspense some aid and canceling a military exercise in 2014, but this had virtually no effect on the abusive practices. Bahrain presents another example of U.S. assistance abetting an abusive regime. Bahrain has been a longtime ally of the U.S., and since the early 1990s, has received large sums of military financing for purchasing U.S. defense equipment as well as training and equipment for its security forces (Katzman, 2020). The ruling monarchy of the Al Khalifa family has historically utilized U.S. security assistance to directly or indirectly provide patronage to regime allies, sustain its capacity for coercion and repression, and maintain its stable grip on power while extracting rents from the economy (Vittori, 2019) In response to the 2011 Arab Spring uprising by a mostly Shia opposition to the Sunni-minority-led monarchy, the regime directed police and security forces to crack down on protestors, with thousands of civilians wounded and over 90 killed (Katzman, 2020). The U.S. responded to these abusive actions by suspending some SSA in 2011, but resumed this assistance in 2015, despite little evidence of human rights reforms (Tejas, 2015). All of these examples highlight how providing resources, training and equipment to security sectors in regimes with fragile institutions or abusive leaders can undermine legitimate governance, abet abusive practices, and worsen internal instability.

2.5.4 Mechanism 4: Misuse of Resources and the Risk of "Blowback"

Delivering lethal equipment and training to soldiers in countries with fragile institutions creates inherent risks. SSA programs that provide training and equipment to foreign security forces run the risks of granting these recipients an increased capacity for committing acts of violence, weapons being misused and falling into the hands to unintended actors, and contributing to instability. Soldiers or police that are trained and supplied with weapons may commit acts of violence against their own country's U.S.-backed regime and stage coups, or defect from state-sanctioned security sectors to join militants, criminal organizations or cartels, directly contributing to

the factors creating instability in their country in the first place (Karlin, 2017; Binder & Watson, 2018). Additionally, when the U.S. delivers military and security-related equipment – such as small arms and ammunition, artillery, armored vehicles, or surveillance technology – these articles have a life span that can exceed the scope of their intended use, and linger in the communities that receive them, potentially creating long-term counterproductive instability known as "blowback" (Binder & Watson, 2018). SSA is only as effective as the intended recipients' capacity to "receive, contain, and direct these resources toward positive ends," and in states with weak institutions, leaders and security forces "often struggle to fully implement the institutional frameworks required to prevent the misapplication of assistance" (Binder & Watson, 2018). As a result, U.S.-provided training and equipment may exacerbate the recipient country's instability and make institutional fragility even worse. The destabilizing risks of SSA are even more likely in states with "weak rule of law systems, low-capacity or abusive policing, corruption, and poor governance" (Jackson, 2017).

Several anecdotes illustrate how U.S.-provided training and equipment has been implicated in coups, misused by unintended and adversarial actors, and ended up in the "wrong hands" within recipient countries. For example, the U.S. has provided SSA to Honduras to create "elite" militarized police units and combat "narcoterrorists" and organized criminals, and these U.S.-supported units played a direct role in human rights abuses against citizens and in the 2009 coup that removed populist president Manuel Zeyala (Weiss, 2019; Kinosian, 2017). In Mali, in order to combat perceived terrorist threats throughout the War on Terror, the U.S. provided equipment and training to build up security forces, but largely failed to comprehensively strengthen the military or address issues such as organization and discipline (Karlin, 2017). In 2012, the U.S.-trained Captain Amadou Sanogo led a coup to depose Mali's democratically elected government, and after Al Qaeda in the Islamic Magrheb expanded its presence in northern Mali amidst the ensuing instability, the U.S.-

supplied Malian security disintegrated and defected, taking valuable U.S. defense articles with them (McInnis & Lucas, 2015; Karlin, 2017).

Additionally, In Mexico, members of an elite special forces unit received U.S. equipment and training for counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics operations, and in the late 1990s, between 30 and 200 of them defected from the military and joined the Zetas drug cartel (Arsenau, 2010). According to a U.S. special forces commander, these defectors had been given "light to heavy weapons, machine guns and automatic weapons" in their U.S. training, and their defection was in part a result of poor pay by the Mexican government and poor vetting and monitoring by the U.S. (Arsenau, 2010). In the additional examples of Yemen, Iraq, and Syria, significant amounts of U.S.-supplied defense equipment has fallen into the hands of various adversarial militias and insurgents when U.S.-trained soldiers and security forces have defected and abandoned posts throughout these countries' respective protracted civil wars over the last two decades (Karlin, 2017; Elbagir et al., 2019).

Other anecdotes highlight how U.S. SSA has been implicated in coups. As mentioned in the review of academic literature, research has suggested that in certain circumstances, soldiers receiving U.S. training may be more likely to attempt to stage a coup (Savage & Caverley, 2017). The U.S. has temporarily suspended SSA to several countries that underwent coups in the last two decades, including: Fiji (2006), Mauritania (2008), Madagascar (2009), Guinea-Bissau (2012), Mali (2012), and Thailand (2014) (Arieff, 2019). In other cases, the State Department has refused to officially label the illegitimate ouster of regimes as "coups" or completely suspend SSA deliveries, due to various diplomatic and political interests and sensitivities, such as in Honduras (2009), Niger (2010) and Egypt (2012) (Arieff, 2019). However, even when the U.S. suspends the delivery of additional SSA when a regime falls to a coup, all of the pre-existing trained soldiers and military equipment continue to remain within the country and be used by various actors in the now destabilized environment. All

of these examples highlight ways in which SSA can be directly or indirectly implicated in exacerbating instability in recipient countries and be used in counterproductive ways. This risk inherent in providing such assistance to countries results from the principal-agent model of foreign aid, as the U.S. has limited control over the agents receiving the equipment and training, making it virtually impossible to ensure that weapons will not be diverted or objectives carried out (Binder & Watson, 2018).

2.5.5 Illustrative Case Study: U.S. SSA to Kyrgyzstan in the War on Terror

2.5.5.1 Background

The case of U.S. SSA to Kyrgyzstan demonstrates how providing training and equipment to security forces in a country with weak institutions, corrupt leadership, inter-communal tensions, poor economic indicators, and factional political rivalries can abet the government's repression and abuses and exacerbate internal instability. I use the case of Kyrgyzstan because it exemplifies the risks and deficiencies associated with the U.S.'s post-9/11 strategy for SSA. Prior to the U.S. engaged Kyrgyzstan as a security partner in the War on Terror, the country had a long record weak of domestic institutions, poor governance, and history of abusive regimes since its independence. Before 9/11, the U.S. had virtually no relationship with its military, no prior experience engaging the country over security issues, and had provided no foreign aid until the year 2000. Despite these domestic institutional weaknesses and the lack of a U.S. military relationship with Kyrgyzstan, after 9/11, U.S. policymakers suddenly expected the country to be cooperative and to effectively absorb military training and defense equipment in order to carry out counterterrorism operations in pursuit of the U.S.'s agenda (Nichol, 2013). Given these features, Kyrgyzstan presents a case that was unlikely to have been successful at achieving the goals of SSA programs, and its undemocratic

regime was at significant risk of misusing the U.S.'s resources, training, and weapons for counterproductive purposes.

Since gaining independence in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan, like other poor, Central Asian countries, has struggled with undemocratic regimes, a fragile civil society, internal unrest, and corruption (Nichol, 2010). The nation's economy has been heavily dependent on foreign aid for the last three decades, which has exacerbated corruption among the Kyrgyz ruling elite, and created conflict among factions and regional clans that rival over positions of power and the state's limited financial resources (Satke, 2017). As the U.S. increased SSA to Kyrgyzstan throughout the War on Terror, the country has gone through two coups and regime changes (in 2005 and in 2010), continued corruption from its institutions, consolidation of power by abusive regimes, conflicts between rival ethnic and political factions, and repression of its citizens. The following paragraphs summarize the background of U.S. SSA to Kyrgyzstan, U.S. strategic interests, and how U.S. assistance has bolstered abusive Kyrgyz leaders and contributed to internal instability.

In the 1990s, the U.S. provided Kyrgyzstan small amounts of aid for economic development and to police forces for anti-narcotics trafficking, but after 9/11, the U.S. significantly increased its security sector assistance to Kyrgyzstan and other Central Asian countries, including Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The stated goals for increasing this assistance after 9/11 have been to "enhance its sovereignty and territorial integrity, increase democratic participation and civil society" and to "strengthen human rights, prevent weapons proliferation, and more effectively combat transnational terrorism and trafficking in persons and narcotics" (Nichol, 2010). In Kyrgyzstan, U.S. strategic interests included creating an air base for military transit outside the capital of Bishkek, improving the capabilities of Kyrgyz police, internal security, and military forces' for counternarcotics trafficking and counterterrorism activities. Between 2000 and 2016, the largest SSA programs included training and equipping police and security forces for combatting terrorism

and narcotics trafficking, supplying the military with equipment, and training military officers for U.S.-Kyrgyz military cooperation (SAM, 2017). These were largely-provided through DOD administered train and equip programs, which prioritized speed of deployment, flexibility, and quickly responding to security threats, as opposed to the traditional State Department FMF and IMET programs, which require a greater amount of oversight (SAM, 2017).

2.5.5.2 Corrupt Leaders, Misuse of Security Assistance, and Destabilizing Effects

Multiple Kyrgyz leaders have used security assistance resources to benefit and protect themselves, consolidate power, and repress and attack political opposition and citizens (Omelicheva, 2017). Assistance for counter-narcotics trafficking has been largely wasted due to central government collusion in criminal activities and the drug trade, Kyrgyz leaders have placed family members in control over U.S.-supported security forces and used them as personal "presidential guards," and U.S.-trained-and-equipped police forces have used violence and repression against dissenters and ethnic minorities. (Kucera, 2012; Levy, 2010). Kyrgyz leaders believed that given the country's apparent strategic importance for U.S. operations in the War on Terror, they could engage in such behavior without facing significant recourse from U.S. policymakers, demonstrating "reverse leverage" over the U.S. (Gott, 2006). These leaders faced little criticism from the U.S. for their abuses of power, as U.S. policymakers were more concerned with maintaining access to their military transit base and continuing efforts to train Kyrgyz forces to engage in counter-narcotics and counterterrorism activities (Levy, 2010).

The U.S. assistance ultimately emboldened abusive leaders and contributed to internal instability. From 2001 to 2005, then-president Akayev diverted U.S. funds into his personal accounts and to those of his "inner circle of kleptocrats" (Cooley, 2009). U.S. funds intended for operations, maintenance, fuel contracts, and training at the government-controlled Manas airport enriched the

Akayev regime and ended up in offshore bank accounts, according to the FBI (Cooley, 2009). As the U.S. provided training, weapons, and vehicles to Kyrgyz police and security forces for counterterrorism and border security operations, police committed violence against citizens and killed opposition protesters, and the Akayev regime continued to repress minority groups, prosecute political opponents, and ignore basic needs among the general population (Huus, 2003). As the country saw deteriorating conditions in terms of political fragility, undemocratic practices, and human rights abuses, many Kyrgyz citizens believed that the U.S. was "propping up a corrupt government" (Kucera 2012; Huus, 2003). Observers including the U.S. ambassador to Kyrgyzstan, Human Rights Watch, and other policy analysts criticized the U.S.'s SSA strategy for doing little to address the country's crises while aiding its abusive regime, and called on the Bush administration to "use its leverage with Akayev to improve the situation" (Huus, 2003). In 2005, Akayev was deposed by a coup and replaced by former Prime Minister Kurmanbek Bakiyev (who had previously resigned as PM in 2002, following popular unrest after Kyrgyz police shot multiple protesters) (Pannier, 2008).

Under the new Bakiyev regime, the U.S. further increased its SSA funding to train and equip Kyrgyz security forces for both maintaining internal stability, patrolling borders, combatting narcotics trafficking, and fighting terrorists (State Department, 2005; SAM, 2017). As the U.S. expanded its SSA programs, the president and his family consolidated power over politics, the economy, and the drug trade, attacked and imprisoned dissenters and ethnic minorities, and Bakiyev would ultimately be deposed in a violent coup in 2010. As Bakiyev assumed direct control over all security forces trained by the U.S., he appointed his own brother to command one U.S.-equipped national guard unit. This unit transformed to become the president's personal security force with the sole mission of "preventing regime change," also known as "coup-proofing" (Marat, 2010). These security forces both protected Bakiyev from direct pressure by competing forces, and acted "as an

offensive institution against the regime's opponents," which often included leaders of opposing factions and minority ethnic groups (Marat, 2010; Kucera 2012). A former Kyrgyzstani security official described this use of security forces by saying "It was a misuse of power… he took over everything that the United States provided" (Kucera, 2012). U.S. budget justifications for aid to Kyrgyzstan simply stated that training and equipment "will be used to provide equipment to military forces to enhance their ability to protect the country from terrorist threats," but the U.S. has little direct monitoring of how individual units are organized, and one U.S. military official in Central Asia stated "we don't necessarily have a say in how they [partner units] are organized" (Kucera, 2012). Bakiyev used U.S. assistance to empower himself against internal opposition, which had the counterproductive effect of stoking greater internal discontent, increased opposition from competing factions and ethnic minorities, and created more instability for the nation's political institutions.

As Bakiyev utilized U.S. trained-and-equipped security forces to protect himself, his regime and family committed acts of violence against opposition factions and minority groups, engaged in corrupt abuses of the nation's finances and resources, and ignored demands of citizens as the economy failed and the population struggled unemployment, increasing energy prices and regular power blackouts (Tynan, 2010). For example, in early 2010, thousands of ethnic Uzbeks came under violent attack by Kyrgyz militias and mobs in the southern region of the country, and reports stated that official Kyrgyz security forces used U.S.-provided equipment and military vehicles while contributing to the violence (Levy, 2010). However, while U.S.-trained security units were present during the ethnic violence and did nothing to stop the unrest, there has not been conclusive evidence directly tying U.S.-trained individuals to any specific violent acts (Kucera, 2012). Popular discontent with the Bakiyev regime's corruption and abuses erupted in April 2010, when thousands of opposition protesters began demonstrating in cities across the nation, calling for the president's

removal (Nichol, 2010). Bakiyev's U.S.-trained personal security guard, as well as other security forces and police, responded to the demonstrators with violence, and over 80 citizens were killed, with hundreds more injured in the unrest (Tkachenkochol, 2010). Bakiyev fled the country, and was replaced by an interim government until elections were held in 2011.

While the country has seen peaceful transitions of power since 2011, the country has continued to struggle with corruption, economic instability, and inter-communal tensions. In 2014, the U.S. closed its military air base outside of the capital, as then-president Almazbek Atambayev demanded increased payments from the U.S. and initiated a policy of more closely aligning the country with Russian foreign policy interests (Pillalamari, 2014). The U.S. reduced its SSA funds to Kyrgyzstan by nearly 90 percent in 2013, although until 2017 it still provided small amounts of funding for State Department-led programs to educate senior military leaders and cooperative planning for nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, and regional stability (SAM, 2017).

2.5.5.3 Conclusion

U.S. security sector assistance to Kyrgyzstan did not create the country's fragile political institutions and historical issues with corrupt leaders, economic instability, and inter-communal tensions between rival factions and ethnic groups. However, after 9/11, the U.S. began increasing the volume and number of SSA programs that it provided to developing and fragile states— including Kyrgyzstan— in pursuit of multiple foreign policy goals associated with the global War on Terror (Stohl, 2008). While the U.S. sought to utilize Kyrgystan's geographic location for a military air base and to build up Kyrgyz forces to combat security threats like narcotics trafficking and terrorism, it supplied resources, lethal equipment, and trained security forces into the country's fragile political environment. U.S. security assistance policy prioritized its short-term security interests over promoting institutional reform and monitoring how Kyrgyz leaders utilized this aid.

Multiple Kyrgyz regimes used U.S.-provided equipment and training to bolster their own power, attack and repress opposition and ethnic minorities, and insulate themselves from the discontent within their country, which led to worsening conflicts between rival political and ethnic groups, widespread discontent and protests, multiple coups, and worsened the fragility of the country's political, economic, and security institutions. This qualitative case provides a cautionary tale of the risks of providing SSA to countries with such conditions, and illustrates some of the mechanisms by which this assistance can make fragile or weak states even more instable.

2.6 Quantitative Analysis of Security Assistance's Effect on State Fragility

The preceding sections have described the increasing use of SSA to improve stability in foreign countries, the deficiencies in how these programs are implemented, and several specific models by which SSA can fail to improve institutional stability or even make fragile states more instable. These program deficiencies and case studies suggest problems with the official SSA policy's "preventive hypothesis" that U.S.-provided training and equipment can improve levels of stability or reduce institutional fragility in foreign countries. While the aforementioned anecdotes and case study provide some evidence of SSA's failures and counterproductive effects in certain countries, in this section I will test a hypothesis using a statistical test of the relationship between SSA in all recipient countries and changes in these countries' levels of state fragility.

2.6.1 Hypothesis and Research Design

Based on the evidence described in previous sections, I argue that overall, U.S. security sector assistance is ineffective or counterproductive for improving stability in recipient countries around the world. In order to evaluate this argument about the net effects of SSA on recipient state stability, the statistical analysis will test the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis: As U.S. security sector assistance to a country increases, state fragility is unlikely to improve over time.

In order to assess the hypothesis, I use statistical analyses to establish whether providing SSA correlated with a change in recipient states' indicators of state fragility over time. The analyses assess the relationship between receiving SSA and indicators of state fragility across 130 countries from 1995 to 2012. This period was chosen because it depicts the post-Cold War and post-9/11 era of U.S. SSA policy, when the SSA was increasingly prioritized as a way to build partner capacity and prevent instability abroad. The countries included in the analysis are all 130 and emerging economies that received any U.S. SSA during this period, except for Iraq and Afghanistan, which are removed as outliers due to the disproportionate amount of SSA they received given the large-scale U.S. military occupations after 9/11.

2.6.2 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable used as the basis of these analyses is the State Fragility Index (SFI). The SFI – developed by the Center for Systemic Peace (CSP) – is widely used as an indicator for levels of instability in conflict and development analyses (McNerny et al., 2014). While quantitative indicators of complex, country-level institutional factors are inherently limited, the SFI broadly captures multiple indicators of instability and state fragility across the world. According to the CSP, SFI "is a measure of fragility in a country, which is closely associated with the state capacity to manage conflict, make and implement public policy, and deliver essential services, and its systemic resilience in maintaining system coherence, cohesion, and quality of life, providing and effective response to challenges and crisis, and sustaining progressive development" (Ferreira, 2017). The SFI has a 26-point scale, with 0 being least fragile and 25 being most fragile, and is a composite of eight indicators on effectiveness and legitimacy across four dimensions: security, political, economic and

social.[5] The score takes into account indicators across these dimensions based on factors such as total residual war, state repression, regime stability, political inclusion, and human development indicators. More specifically, the dependent variable is the *change* in SFI scores over time. SFI five years prior is included as an independent variable to control for endogeneity, which enables the analysis to examine the change in SFI over five years, and detrends the data by accounting for countries' earlier fragility performance. The five-year lag structure is further explained in the discussion of independent variables below.

Although definitions of state fragility can vary, other competing measures of state fragility are in broad agreement on the key elements used to measure fragility. These include the scores created by the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy's (CIFP) Fragility Index, the Fund for Peace's Fragile States Index, and the World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA). The SFI is preferable to these other quantitative measures of state fragility for several reasons. The Fragile States Index is also used in research on state fragility, but it only dates back to 2005, while the SFI dates back to 1995, allowing for a greater span of time in the analysis. The CIFP and CPIA scores only have a range from 1 to 9 and 1 to 6, respectively, while SFI ranges from 0-25. The greater range in the SFI scores allows for greater nuance and variability in states' indicators of fragility, which allows for greater precision in statistical models looking at change in the score across time.

In Figure 2.3 below, the mean SFI score for all 130 developing countries that received any U.S. SSA in the period of analysis is plotted over time. During the years of this analysis, mean SFI scores for the sample countries improved substantially – with scores declining (improving fragility) by nearly 3 points total overall, moving from an average ranking of "serious fragility" down to "moderate fragility." According to the Center for Systemic Peace, fragility scores for the entire world

[5] The SFI can be distinguished by the following ranges of scores: 0–3, Little or No Fragility; 4–7, Low Fragility; 8–11, Moderate Fragility; 12–15, Serious Fragility; 16–19, High Fragility; 20–25, Extreme Fragility.

also declined throughout this period (Marshall & Cole, 2014). Given the observation that on average, countries receiving U.S. SSA saw declining SFI scores and levels of fragility, if SSA were to be modestly effective or even have no significant effect on recipient states' levels of fragility, we could expect that this assistance would correlate with improving SFI scores. However, the analysis described below will control for several independent variables to test whether or not SSA had a significant correlation with improving or worsening SFI scores.

Figure 2.3



2.6.3 Independent Variables

The primary independent variables are measures of U.S. security sector assistance provided to recipient countries. These variables are all transformed to a per capita measure of $1,000 in aid per 10,000 individuals, in order to compare proportionally equal measures across countries and to normalize the distribution of the dependent variables. Additionally, the analyses use five-year averages of the primary independent variables, in order to both control for large fluctuations in amounts of aid in consecutive years, and to assess the impact of multiple years of SSA provision on

the dependent variable, state fragility. The three SSA variables are categorized as train and equip aid, military equipment aid, and military education aid. The relationship between SSA and state fragility will be tested by evaluating all three of these categories combined, and each of these categories separately. Train and equip programs are used to build partner capacity by assisting security sectors and police forces for counterterrorism, stabilization, and counter-narcotics purposes, and are more concentrated in states with more fragile institutions than military equipment and military education aid (GAO, 2010; Dalton, 2015). In contrast, military equipment and military education programs are have traditionally been used to strengthen bilateral relationships, gain access to foreign governments, and assist allied militaries, rather than build partner capacity in fragile states to conduct stability operations (GAO, 2010). Therefore, the train and equip programs that seek to improve stability by arming security sectors in fragile states may have a greater correlation with changing SFI scores in recipient countries. To illustrate some of the largest recipients of total SSA funds and train and equip program funds, see Figures 2.4 and 2.5 below:

Figure 2.4



Figure 2.5



These three categories of security sector assistance are described as follows:

- Train and Equip Aid – the combined values of the following aid programs, which are the largest such programs administered by either the State Department or the Department of Defense.[6] To the extent that train and equip programs transfer equipment for select military and security purposes in the recipient country, these programs generally transfer small arms, vehicles, aircraft, surveillance technology, and other and non-lethal equipment. Programs include DOD' Section 1206, Section 1004, Section 1033, and Operations & Maintenance program funds, and the State Department's International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement aid and Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) program funds. These programs provide various types of weapons, vehicles, technology, and other non-lethal equipment to foreign military and security forces for various purposes including counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and stability operations (State Department, 2007)
- Military equipment aid – represented by the Foreign Military Financing program, which provides grants and loans to help countries purchase U.S.-made defense articles and services. This program enables the recipient to purchase major military equipment and systems from the U.S. FMF is consistently single largest source of foreign military aid provided by the State Department.
- Military education aid – the combined values of the IMET and Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP), which focus on providing education to officers and leaders of security forces. IMET is managed by the State Department but implemented by the DOD, and CTFP is a DOD program. The stated goals of these programs include training future

[6] For the purposes of assessing foreign military assistance programs across time, this analysis has omitted programs designed explicitly for individual or a limited set of countries participating in the U.S. War on Terror, such as the Afghan Security Forces Fund, Iraq Security Forces Fund, or Coalition Support Funds,

leaders, build military relations, enhance interoperability and capabilities for joint operations, and building and reinforcing the combating terrorism capabilities of partner nations (DOD, 2015; State Department, 2009).

In order to isolate the relationship between SSA and state fragility, the analysis includes several control variables that affect levels of fragility in developing countries. As mentioned, SFI five years prior is included to control for endogeneity and measure the change in SFI over time. The control variables also include the following: U.S. economic aid, transformed to a per-capita indicator of $1,000 per 10,000 residents, averaged across the previous 5 years. Economic aid programs can be used to improve domestic economic institutions and development, which may improve a country's level of fragility. Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita as a control variable, as countries with greater economic output may have stronger economic stability and a greater ability to fund and maintain stable domestic institutions that prevent civil unrest and conflict stemming from economic shocks (McNerny, 2014). A measure of each country's military spending as a percent of their total government spending – from the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database – which indicates the degree of a state's militarization and the degree of investment in military forces, which can prevent outbreaks of domestic conflict and instability. A measure of U.S. military presence – the number of U.S. military personnel in the recipient country – controls for the fact that the State Department and DOD state that SSA military aid programs are intended to aid in "interoperability" with American troops. Various forms of military aid may be provided to ensure or maintain U.S. military operations' access to and presence in the recipient country. Direct U.S. troop involvement in a recipient country can more directly prevent and mitigate worsening levels of state fragility. The analysis also includes dummy variables for the presence of internal and external conflict—from the Correlates of War project—to control for the relationship between the onset of conflict and changing levels of state fragility.

The Political Instability Task Force (PITF) – a U.S. government-backed project assessing state failure and effectiveness of state institutions – found that the two greatest predictors of worsening levels of stage fragility are regime type (based on the Polity II regime type indicator) and infant mortality (Goldstone et al., 2010). The analysis thus includes the Polity II score, and infant mortality rates. Infant mortality can serve as a proxy for standard of living, and "thus addresses popular perceptions of the effectiveness of the regime in providing for the popular welfare and nationalist programs of economic development" (Goldstone, 2001). Following the PITF analysis and McNerny et al., (2014), I include a second model where in addition to the Polity II score, the analysis includes dummy variables for discrete regime types: full autocracy, partial autocracy, partial democracy, and factional democracy, with full democracy excluded as the category to which these other four regime types are compared. The PITF found that the risk of instability is lowest in full autocracies and full democracies, while hybrid regimes—partial autocracies and partial democracies—are substantially more vulnerable to crisis. In particular, the PITF found that partial democracies with factionalism—defined as when "political competition is dominated by ethnic or other parochial groups that regularly compete for political influence"—had the highest likelihood of increased fragility. By including the two control variables that were found to be the greatest indicators of crisis and worsening state fragility, the analysis can more closely isolate in the independent relationship between SSA and changes in state fragility.

Following several studies, the analysis examined the impact of five years of security sector assistance on changes in state fragility across five years. U.S. SSA and other foreign aid programs often target a five-year strategy for impact, and several studies have found that such foreign aid can generate measurable impacts at or near five-year intervals (McNerny et al., 2014; Minoiu & Reddy, 2010; Tarnoff & Lawson, 2016). SSA policy advisors have also specifically recommended that the impacts of such programs should be comprehensively evaluated on a five-year basis (Ross & Dalton,

2010). In addition, given the relatively limited timespan in the analysis (1995-2012), using a five-year lag structure allows for a sufficiently long window of analysis to assess the impacts of security cooperation on state fragility – the impacts of aid provided from 1995 to 2007 on fragility in 2000 to 2012. Thus, the estimation technique is a linear regression model, with a five-year lag on the primary independent variable.[7]

2.6.4 Discussion of Results

The results of the statistical analysis find that the provision of SSA across five years is significantly correlated with a very modest worsening of states' fragility scores over five years in all versions of the model. When testing the three separate categories of SSA as described above, only one of the three categories —train and equip programs—was significantly correlated with change in state fragility scores, which also correlated with a weak worsening of SFI over five years, with a slightly greater coefficient than that for the combined variables. In Table 2.1, models 1 and 2 displays the coefficients, statistical significance, and standard errors for all independent variables for four models with the independent variable, total combined SSA funding per capita, with and without dummy variables for regime type. Models 3 and 4 display the results of the same models for train and equip programs. As the SFI is on a scale of 0 to 25, increases in the SFI indicate a worsening indicator of state fragility. Given the unit of SSA as an annual average of $1,000 for 10,000 residents, we can interpret the coefficient for train & equip SSA in Model 1 to say that increasing the assistance by a factor of ten is correlated an SFI score increasing – or become more fragile – by 0.018 points over 5 years. This suggests that when controlling for other variables, increasing relative amounts of SSA – and train and equip programs in particular – failed to improve states' stability, and correlated with slightly *worsening* SFI scores over time. Despite the fact that countries in the sample

[7] The presence of slow-moving control variables, such as regime type or GDP, as well as a lagged dependent variable, can enable unit level fixed effects to bias results (Beck & Katz, 2011). Therefore, the analyses are run without country level fixed effects.

saw an overall trend of improving average fragility scores during the period of analysis, SSA significantly correlated with stagnant and declining fragility over time. While an average worsening of SFI scores by less than a single point on the 25 point SFI scale is not a substantively large impact, the result shows that at best, this form of SSA does not have a net positive effect for improving fragility, and at worst, it correlates with worsening state fragility. For example, in a case such as Kyrgyzstan, when a recipient country has weak institutions, human rights abuses, and internal political unrest, these conditions would either fail to improve or deteriorate further after receiving SSA to train and equip its sector sectors. These results support the hypothesis that U.S. security sector assistance does not comprehensively improve state fragility over time.

The four models presented in Table 2.1 did not result in any statistically significant correlation between changes in SFI when incorporating the two primary independent variables and categories of SSA – military equipment aid (major defense technology and arms transfers) and military education aid (educational programs for officers and leaders in security forces). The lack of significance for these types of aid comports with other studies (Savage & Caverley, 2018; McNerny, 2014; Boutton, 2018), who argue that transfers of defense equipment and classroom-setting educational programs for officers are not fungible forms of aid, and are less likely to be used to either effectively prevent instability or be used by recipient country leaders in counterproductive ways that can stoke conflict or fail to prevent instability. In other words, major defense equipment transfers to a nation's military and educational programs for officers are less likely to have an effect on internal state fragility than aid that directly trains and equips security forces. The models' results for other control variables also comport with existing studies. As argued by the Political Instability Task Force (Goldstone, et al, 2010), regime type and infant mortality rates are highly statistically significant and correlated with changes in state fragility. Specifically, infant mortality and hybrid regime types are both correlated with worsening SFI scores. The Task Force also agued that

countries governed by fully autocratic regime types see some of the least amount of change in state fragility – and the full autocracy dummy variable has no statistically significant correlation with change in SFI.

Table 2.1: Influences of U.S. Security Assistance on 5-Year Change in State Fragility Score, 1995-2012 (OLS Linear Regression Model)

Variable	**Model 1: Total Security Assistance**	**Model 2: Total Security Assistance and Regime Type Variables**	**Model 3: Train & Equip Security Assistance**	**Model 4: Train & Equip Security Assistance and Regime Type Variables**
(intercept)	0.5474*** (0.1371)	0.409 (0.289)	0.591*** (0.137)	0.113 (0.267)
Security assistance (per capita, average of prior 5 years)	0.0018*** (0.0481-02)	0.0017*** (0.0481-02)	0.0022*** (0.0685e-02)	0.0017*** (0.0558e-2)
Economic aid (per capita, average of prior 5 years)	-2.936 (5.157)	-6.450 (5.095)	3.120 (4.643)	-7.519 (5.309)
State Fragility Index score (5 years prior)	0.7627*** (0.0126)	0.7385*** (0.0128)	0.7553*** (0.0127)	0.7333*** (0.0129)
GDP per capita	-2.673-e5*** (6.574e-6)	-2.020e-5** (6.590e-6)	-2.768e-5*** (6.579e-6)	-2.045e-5*** (6.593e-6)
Military expenditure percentage	0.0157 (0.0190)	6.423e-5 (0.0189)	-0.0149 (0.0191)	-0.0088 (0.0189)
U.S. military presence	-2.883e-5 (9.317e-5)	-5.344e-4 (9.176e-5)	-2.365e-6 (9.312e-5)	-4.558e-5 (9.177e-5)
Infant mortality rate	0.0327*** (2.042e-3)	0.0319*** (2.015e-3)	0.0336*** (2.061e-3)	0.0326*** (2.027e-3)
Internal conflict	0.9786*** (0.1092)	0.9526*** (0.1082)	0.9625*** (0.1099)	0.9431*** (0.1086)
External conflict	0.0304 (0.6724)	0.2011 (0.6626)	0.0617 (0.672)	0.1847 (0.662)
Polity 2 score	-0.0562*** (0.0069)	-0.0567* (0.0287)	-0.0573*** (6.439e-3)	-0.0559* (0.0291)
Full autocracy		0.1017 (0.4899)		-6.357e-3 (0.494)
Partial Autocracy		0.7425** (0.3842)		0.685* (0.352)

Partial democracy	0.6903*** (0.2282)	0.679*** (0.229)
Factional democracy	0.7515*** (0.1361)	0.751*** (0.136)

n=1494 Significance code: 0.001 '***' 0.01 '**' 0.05 '*' 0.1 '.'

2.7 Conclusion

Since the mid-20th century, U.S. military aid and SSA has taken many forms, under many justifications, and has generated many unintended and destructive consequences. This study has broadly assessed the background, program deficiencies, and risks of contemporary U.S. security programs and examined their effectiveness for improving state fragility around the world. As a result of several institutional factors, such as political pressure, budgetary constraints, bureaucratic path dependency, and overly optimistic demands of foreign assistance, over the last three decades, the U.S. has expanded its emphasis and reliance on SSA programs for accomplishing a litany of goals in many new and risky environments. The programs that provide training and equipment to security sectors in developing countries generally lack adequate monitoring and conditionality, and there are several pathways by which SSA can be misused by self-interested and abusive regimes or militaries. The quantitative analysis of this study suggests that, overall, SSA programs do not improve state fragility over time, and several country anecdotes and case studies highlight the destabilizing and lethal risks posed by supplying training and equipment to security sectors in states with weak institutions. Even if SSA is more useful in countries more stable institutions and regimes, countries with institutional weaknesses increase the risk that partner state regimes might collapse and be replaced governments antithetical to long-term U.S. foreign policy goals (Albertson & Moran, 2016).

As the U.S. has expanded the size and scope of SSA programs that are at ineffective at improving institutions in fragile states, several policy implications and recommendations should be

noted. Several policy analysts have suggested a common set of proposed interrelated reforms to improve the effectiveness and reduce the risks of SSA programs. First, rather than providing relatively small amounts of funding, equipment and training to many countries, the U.S. should first focus its stabilization efforts on fragile partnered nations with and a track record of cooperation and accountability (Albertson & Moran, 2017). Second, the U.S. provides SSA to nearly 200 countries around the world, and in countries without a strong existing relationship or record of accountability, funding and resources should be provided on an "ex ante" positive conditionality basis (Ross & Dalton, 2020). This approach would focus on developing concrete plans, long-term goals, and clearly identified conditions the partner nation would have to meet in order to earner increased or sustained SSA (Ross & Dalton, 2020). Third, assistance programs must be tailored to countries' specific institutional circumstances, and include a "whole-of-government" approach that is aligned with programs focusing on development and good governance, rather than solely focusing on short-term, tactical military objectives (Ross, 2017).

Finally, all of these proposals for more targeted, selective, and conditional implementation of SSA depend on a rigorous system for monitoring and measuring the utilization of U.S.-provided equipment and training within the partner nations (Karlin, 2017). Several aforementioned federal audits of these programs have found significant weaknesses in monitoring and evaluation, and have repeatedly recommended reforms for the State Department and DOD to improve evaluations of SSA. In summary, the ambitious political impetus to "do something" about the threat of instability around the world by delivering arms, equipment and training programs is often at odds with strategies that are more selective, deliberative, less risky, and ultimately more successful at actually building partner capacity abroad.

Public support for direct military intervention has fallen over the last decade, and the prospect of stabilizing weak states "by proxy" as a cheaper and faster alternative has become more

enticing to policymakers and agency officials. According to policy analyst Mara Karlin, "the commonly accepted narrative in Washington for SSA in fragile states can be summed up in one word: 'more'—more training, more equipment, more money, more quickly" (Karlin, 2017). While U.S. agencies and policymakers act in their own self interest by expanding the flow of weapons, defense equipment, and training for soldiers and police abroad, greater consideration should be given to the unforeseen risks and destabilizing consequences of SSA policy. The U.S. cannot build up security sector capacity in all countries that need it, and SSA that is not adequately targeted, selective, conditional on partner countries' cooperation, and sustained enough to make a prolonged impact is likely to pose greater risks than any potential rewards.

Chapter 3

The Politics of U.S. Security Assistance : Assessing the Limits of U.S. Foreign Policy in Colombia and Pakistan

3.1 Introduction

Between 2002 and 2018, the U.S. provided roughly $20 billion per year to purchase military equipment, weapons, and training for militaries, police, and security sectors in over foreign 150 countries, through a variety of programs within the Department of Defense (DOD) and State Department that are generally referred to as security sector assistance (SSA) (Miller & Mahanty, 2020).[8] Since the end of World War II, the U.S. has provided assistance to foreign security sectors to pursue various strategic interests and to influence governments around the world (Karlin, 2017). The size and scope of SSA programs significantly increased in the two decades following 9/11, when assistance was the highest it had been since the Marshall Plan of the late 1940s (Lawson & Morgenstern, 2019). As described in the previous chapters, policymakers have adopted a range of goals and justifications for providing SSA to certain countries, promoting it as a way to improve the capacity of security sectors to combat instability and conflict, eliminate security threats like terrorism and narcotics trafficking, provide influence over the recipient government, gain access to geostrategic areas, promote norms of human rights and democracy, and reform foreign governing institutions (Rand & Tankel, 2015; Miller & Sokolsky, 2018). Despite the large investment in SSA, a body of literature has found little evidence of these programs' ability to achieve most of these goals (Biddle et al. 2018; Sullivan et al., 2011). A 2018 RAND study summarized this point: "The goal is to make the world safer and advance U.S. security interests. But is it working? For the most part, we don't know" (McNerny & Moroney, 2018). This chapter addresses the following questions: what

[8] In this chapter, as in previous chapters, I will refer to these programs as security assistance and security sector assistance (SSA) interchangeably. According to the Congressional Research Service, many terms are variably used in connection with the supply of weapons, equipment, supplies, and training to foreign militaries and other security sectors, including: military aid, security assistance, security cooperation, security sector assistance, security force assistance, foreign assistance (Serafino, 2016).

factors determine the desired policy goals of security assistance, and to what extent are these programs effective for achieving these goals?

In this chapter, I argue that the goals ascribed to SSA programs are driven by short-term political motivations, and that SSA is both an inadequate and inappropriate tool for realistically accomplishing such goals. While foreign assistance aims to support certain goals within recipient countries, it is also a tool to pursue U.S. interests abroad, and U.S. policymakers' interests may not always reflect the problems or institutional needs within recipient countries. A variety of contemporary research seeks to explain how to improve SSA programs' effectiveness within the recipient country, primarily by improving monitoring and oversight, using SSA only under select conditions, or by using conditionality to incentivize recipient governments' cooperation with U.S. goals (Karlin, 2017; Berman & Lake, 2019). This literature generally analyses SSA as an instrument of foreign policy, but these programs – and foreign aid in general – are also instruments of domestic policy within the U.S., responding to political crises and reflecting policymakers' ideologies and priorities (Lancaster, 2008). Much of this research fails to address more fundamental questions on the motivations of SSA policies, such as the political factors that lead policymakers to promote SSA in certain countries, whether policymakers have valid assumptions or realistic strategies for how SSA can address different foreign policy goals, and whether SSA programs are actually designed to effectively solve problems within the recipient country with a long-term strategy.

To answer these questions, I will examine how U.S. policymakers' shifting political and strategic interests dictate when and how SSA is used in two critical cases of SSA: U.S. assistance to Colombia and Pakistan from the late Cold War to the late War on Terror. I argue that SSA often fails to achieve its stated goals because these programs reflect the short-term priorities and domestic political interests of U.S. policymakers, and are not tailored or implemented in ways that genuinely address the problems in recipient countries. As a result, SSA programs they lack a consistent long-

term strategy, and are substantively inadequate for accomplishing their stated goals in recipient countries. These strategic and substantive deficiencies create fundamental, unintended flaws in SSA policies. A 2015 study from Center for a New American Security acknowledges these issues: "Security assistance [is] too often provided on the basis of faulty assumptions about their utility and impact and with too little attention paid to the recipient nation's political environment, including the underlying factors shaping the construct and conduct of local security forces" (Rand & Tankel, 2015).

In order to illustrate these issues, I use historical narratives and process tracing to track the shifting priorities and policies towards two major recipients of U.S. aid: Pakistan and Colombia. Qualitative case studies are important for answering the questions on the motivations and outcomes of SSA programs, as they allow for exploring the historical and political context in which these programs operate. Security assistance does not operate in an apolitical vacuum free of political influences, as they directly reflect the political priorities and ideology of U.S. policymakers, and confer resources that can substantially alter domestic institutions within recipient countries. I choose Pakistan and Colombia as case studies because they are both among the largest recipients of SSA funding over the last several decades, having served as strategic centers for two central U.S. foreign policy agendas: the War on Terror and the War on Drugs, respectively. These two countries are major recipients of SSA, but represent wide variation for U.S. foreign policy interests, in terms of regional and geopolitical security concerns and historic relations with the U.S. In Pakistan, SSA programs were ineffective for achieving the primary goal of coercing Pakistan to cooperate with the U.S. by combatting and eliminating terrorist organizations such as the Taliban. In Colombia, SSA failed to achieve its original policy goal of reducing drug exports and shrinking the Colombian drug economy, but potentially had a limited impact on assisting the country's security sectors in combatting domestic insurgent groups and reducing overall conflict. Ultimately, in two countries

where the U.S. has invested tens of billions of dollars in SSA over multiple decades, these programs failed to achieve the original goals set forth by U.S. policymakers.

With the analysis of these case studies, I add to the literature on U.S. foreign aid and security policy by connecting the domestic political factors that shape SSA policies with assessments of the limitations and ineffectiveness of SSA programs. This analysis explains how SSA programs policies have been driven by short-term, security-focused priorities and U.S. policymakers' domestic political concerns; focused predominantly on bolstering foreign militaries and security sectors while ignoring other institutions; exacerbated factors such as corruption, undemocratic governance and human rights abuses; ignored the roots of the recipients' internal crises; and has failed to address the original goals that justified the use of SSA programs in the first place. As the SSA programs have been promoted as a key element of contemporary U.S. foreign policy, this analysis contributes to the literature on U.S. foreign policy, foreign aid, and international security. By taking a holistic, historical approach to analyzing the causes and consequences of U.S. security assistance policies, the analysis goes beyond simple program evaluations and explores the fundamentally flawed assumptions that guide this set of foreign policy tools. With my approach, I propose that future research on the effectiveness of foreign assistance programs – particularly SSA – should include an analysis of the appropriateness of the goals and expectations set forth by U.S. policymakers, and how domestic political factors and short-term interests determine the strategies and substance of foreign aid programs, to the detriment of a more effective long-term foreign policy strategy.

The chapter proceeds as follows: first, I provide a brief overview of contemporary SSA policies, along with a review of literature and program evaluations assessing the effectiveness of SSA programs. I then further describe my theoretical approach, explaining how the influence of U.S. policymakers' policy priorities and short-term strategic interests distorts and limits the effectiveness of SSA programs by creating strategic and substantive deficiencies. Next, I provide an overview of

my case selection decision for Pakistan and Colombia. This is followed by one section for each country, where I provide an extensive historical narrative to trace the process of how SSA has been justified and used in each country along with the shifting and evolving of political priorities of U.S. policymakers.

3.2 Background on Contemporary Security Sector Assistance Policies

3.2.1 Security Sector Assistance as a Multi-Purpose Tool

Since the end of the Cold War, and increasingly since 9/11, SSA has evolved from being a useful tool in foreign policy to being the primary means for the U.S. to address security concerns abroad (Reynolds, 2017). Historically, SSA programs were developed during the Cold War as diplomatic tools to bolster allies and secure pro-Western or anti-Soviet regimes and security forces around the world. With the end of anticommunism as the overarching goal of almost all foreign aid programs, successive presidential administrations and Congresses have emphasized shifting priorities and goals when shaping U.S. foreign policy strategies (Lancaster, 2000: Lawson & Morgenstern, 2019). From the late Cold War to the War on Terror, SSA has been used for wildly different foreign policy goals, such as for the international War on Drugs and combatting narcotics trafficking, promoting anti-nuclear proliferation, supporting human rights and humanitarian intervention, promoting democracy promotion, stimulating U.S. defense exports, helping the expansion of NATO, and the dominant priority of the last two decades: global counterterrorism, and preventing instability. As policymakers increased the number of goals and expectations ascribed to SSA programs, some analysts have described contemporary SSA policy as a "Swiss Army Knife of Statecraft," promoted by presidents, members of Congress, and both civilian and military agencies as "all-purpose tools appropriate for use in virtually any scenario" Miller & Sokolsky, 2018; Tankel & Dalton, 2017).

Over the last three decades, policymakers have adopted the position that SSA can be used as a multi-purpose tool to build security capacity and pursue a range of interests across nearly 150 countries. After the onset of the War on Terror in 2001, the mission of SSA "jumped in ambition and scale" in order to address new threats without relying on widespread deployment of American troops (Schmitt & Arango, 2015). After 9/11, U.S. security objectives focused increasingly on preventing "failed states" – as seen in U.S.-occupied Iraq and Afghanistan – and SSA was promoted as the way to so without direct U.S. intervention (Karlin, 2017). This model was outlined in a 2012 White House defense report: "Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives" (Ravinsky, 2015). The political logic behind this position is fairly simple: SSA programs enable policymakers to respond to foreign security concerns by outsourcing the work to foreign personnel, which avoids the political costs of deploying U.S. troops and simultaneously subsidizes the U.S. defense industrial base in the process (Karlin, 2017). For U.S. policymakers, this "low-cost" approach has the apparent advantages of both enabling them to "do something" about various foreign security objectives without having the U.S. shoulder most of the burden or risks itself (Karlin, 2017; Caverley, 2014).

As the scale and goals of these programs grew, they were also dispersed across a larger number of developing countries with weak and fragile institutions, as policymakers saw SSA as a way to solve and prevent problems in these countries which might end up threatening U.S. interests (Reveron, 2014, p63). However, as Mara Karlin described this belief, "[the] theory on strengthening partner militaries in weak states… can best be described as an 'undeveloped' concept whose history is less positive than its vision" (Karlin, 2017b, p10). Additionally, many of the goals used to justify SSA in these developing countries—like combatting narcotraffickers or building up security forces—often directly conflict with other goals, such as promoting democratic reforms and human rights protections (Tankel & Dalton, 2017). Policymakers increasingly promoted this approach of

providing weapons and training as the go-to response to a wide variety of security-related problems abroad, but have had little regard for whether this assistance achieves U.S. foreign policy objectives (Miller & Sokolsky, 2018).

3.3 Literature and Evaluations on the Effectiveness of Security Sector Assistance

Despite the prominence given to security assistance to achieve so many foreign policy goals, there is little consensus that it actually works. Over the last two decades, a variety of policy analysts, academics, think tanks, and U.S. agencies have developed a body of research evaluating the effectiveness of SSA for achieving goals such as influencing foreign leaders, building the capacity of foreign security sectors, preventing instability, promoting human rights, and combatting terrorism (Biddle et al., 2018; GAO, 2013; GAO, 2013b, Karlin, 2017b; Lancaster, 2008; Rand & Tankel, 2015; Sullivan et al., 2011; Tankel, 2018). A 2015 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report summarized the general consensus of this literature: "despite the centrality of [security assistance] in U.S. national security strategy and military operations, it remains unclear whether building the capacity of foreign security forces is an effective way to accomplish U.S. strategic objectives" (McInnis & Lucas, 2015). Other assessments are more direct: Miller & Sokolsky (2018) conclude that "Recipients of U.S. funding and weapons have largely failed to make major strides in their capabilities and, in some instances, may have even regressed," and Karlin (2017) states that "As examples that span the globe have demonstrated, in practice, American efforts to build up local security forces are an oversold halfway measure that is rarely cheap and often falls short of the desired outcome."

3.3.1 Criteria for Effective SSA

Several studies have identified factors that are most likely to make SSA effective at achieving certain foreign policy objectives. The key factors for determining the success of security assistance for influencing partners and achieving goals include: the alignment of mutual interests between the U.S. and the partner nation; the external threat environment of the partner nation; the nature and depth of U.S. involvement within the country; and the ability of the U.S. to carefully withhold and provide assistance as "carrots and sticks" to condition the aid on the recipient's cooperation (Berman & Lake, 2019; Biddle et al. 2018; Karlin, 2017b; Miller & Sokolsky, 2018).

Another body of research has focused on the importance of monitoring and oversight of SSA programs - For example, Berman and Lake (2019) conclude that "effective conditionality" in aid will require "intrusive monitoring" (p.219) However, research has noted shortcomings of these policies in practice, noting that U.S. policymakers typically use SSA as a first response to emerging crises, and have shifted away from the more difficult alternatives such as long-term economic development and political reform, which require sustained commitment, deep involvement in the recipient's domestic institutions, and creative diplomatic incentives (Lancaster, 2008; Priest, 2004). These studies all conclude that, for the most part, SSA is failing to influence recipients or achieve its goals, because most of these criteria are not met among partner nations.

Other analyses add to these findings by assessing SSA through the lens of a principal agent model. Berman and Lake (2019) propose a model for understanding how the U.S. can properly motivate "proxies" – or security partners – to do what the U.S. wants. They argue that the U.S., (the principal), can achieve its goals through security assistance to the partner (the agent), through a proper balance of conditional rewards and punishments (p3). Similar to other research, they emphasize the importance of shared interests for the principal to be able to adequately motivate and work through the agent, stating that the U.S. "too often assumes that its interests are closely aligned with those of its proxy, and funnels unconditional aid and support to the proxy's leader—ostensibly

to build greater capacity—failing to use the levers it possesses to induce appropriate effort" (p.5). Ladwig (2017), argues that SSA policy has continuously operated under the mistaken assumption that "the United States will share common goals and priorities with a local government it is assisting," which will "make it relatively easy to convince that government to implement U.S." policy prescriptions (p. 1). Other research on the U.S.'s attempts to condition its aid as "leverage" to pursue its objectives in recipient countries find that this strategy very rarely works (Biddle et al. 2018; Sullivan et al., 2011).

3.3.2 Limitations and Recommendations for SSA Programs

Multiple assessments conclude that the criteria most important for effective SSA programs – selectivity, conditionality, monitoring of impacts and goals – are largely absent from the way that SSA programs are designed and implemented (GAO, 2019, O'Mahony et al., 2018). Several evaluations from the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) have drawn similar conclusions over the years about the failure of the security assistance programs within both the DOD and the State Department to properly define goals performance measures, evaluate the effectiveness of their program for both tactical effectiveness and promoting good governance, or track the implementation and recipients of these programs (GAO, 2006; GAO, 2010; GAO, 2019). In summary, among the agencies responsible for these programs "there is no systemic review of what U.S. military assistance accomplishes" (Miller & Sokolsky, 2015). In addition to the lack of monitoring within program implementers, Miller and Mahanty (2020) state that despite the prominence of security assistance in current U.S. foreign policy, there "has been little to no effort on the part of the executive branch or Congress to evaluate the total efficacy of these programs." These scholars conclude that "Simply put, in the absence of rigorous program evaluation, U.S. security sector assistance is a faith-based policy."

As a result of these studies, research on SSA has produced various recommendations for how to improve its effective. A metareview of SSA evaluations summarizes three of the consistent recommendations: "security assistance programs should be more careful about who they train, why and how; security assistance programs should be long-term endeavors with a plan to maintain both the equipment provided and the relationships created with foreign security forces; and security assistance programs should evaluate the progress of partner countries with a clear strategic objective in mind and readjust aid as necessary" (Reynolds, 2017). For example, a 2018 RAND study recommends that SSA programs should build a "comprehensive political–military strategy," invest in "building security governance institutions," and that "Only by committing over long periods of time are larger changes possible" (Watts, et al, 2018). A 2015 report from the Center for A New American Security outlines several sweeping challenges and recommendations for improving the return on investment of security assistance, including "prioritize objectives," "balance short- and long-term objectives," "assess leverage," "understand the impact and effects of conditionality," and "measure outcomes" (Rand & Tankel, 2015).

These recommendations highlight fundamental problems with how the U.S. administers SSA: the selection of partners, prioritization and measurement of objectives, amount and duration of investment, and the lack of leverage and conditionality. While some analyses recommend that policymakers should lower their expectations for what these programs can accomplish, the majority recommend adjustments to the current models, but only with more conditionality, more evaluations, and more sustained investment (Reynolds, 2017; Chollet, 2018). Karlin (2017) highlights the continued emphasis on the current assumptions about SSA policy: "the commonly accepted narrative in Washington for security assistance in fragile states can be summed up in one word: "more"—more training, more equipment, more money, more quickly." However, these evaluations largely do not address the flawed assumption among policymakers that U.S. interests around the

world can be effectively addressed through SSA. What is missing from most of this literature on SSA is an analysis of the shifting domestic political factors that dictate SSA policy, which are at the root cause of many of its failures.

3.3.3 Domestic Political Influences on Foreign Aid

A variety of literature has connected domestic political factors and foreign aid, though not specifically SSA (Andreasen, 2014). For example, Lancaster (2008) notes how the ideology and political priorities of presidents—such as those who promote intervention and regime change versus those who prefer diplomacy and economic integration—can dramatically shift priorities for foreign assistance programs. Fleck and Kilby (2006) find that party ideology matters for foreign aid, with Democrats generally supporting more economic and development assistance, and Republicans focusing more on commercial interests, geopolitical concerns, and military aid. The same authors found when the president and Congress are controlled by the same party, aid budgets tend to be higher, while aid budgets are lower under divided governments (Fleck & Kilby, 2006). Thorpe (2014) argues that an economic reliance on the defense industry incentivizes Congress to consistently approve large military budgets, and that this "blank check" policy grants the Executive branch significant independence and discretion in executing foreign military policy (Thorpe, 2014, p127). Sylvan & Majeski (2009) argue that due to bureaucratic path-dependency, U.S. foreign policy tools have rarely changed throughout history, and that policymakers continuously rely on the same means to pursue shifting objectives. As a result, presidents and Executive branch agencies like the State Department and DOD continuously use the same "means" of security assistance to address various foreign policy problems, while "goals of various sorts are then, so to speak, pasted onto the means" (Sylvan & Majeski, 2009, p2).

More generally, research finds that foreign aid is not motivated according to a standard of helping the most in need or trying to solve other countries' problems, but rather that political and strategic factors drive U.S. foreign aid decisions (Coyne, 2011). Several studies find that foreign aid flows are often affected by lobbying, U.S. business interests, and commercial interests abroad (Anwar & Michaelowa, 2006; Fleck & Kilby, 2010). Cushman (2011) finds that defense manufacturers and lobbyists incentivize Congress to sustain funding for SSA programs that subsidize foreign defense purchases, while Congress has fewer domestic incentives to increase aid for foreign economic development. In the next section, I describe my theory on how the influence of domestic political factors generates fundamental strategic and structural deficiencies in SSA policy.

3.4 Theoretical Approach: the Politics and Deficiencies of Security Sector Assistance

Building on this literature, I argue that as shifting domestic political priorities have driven policymakers' goals and strategies for security sector assistance, that the U.S. has generally used security-centric, militarized aid programs regardless of whether they are adequate or appropriate for addressing the problems and goals within the recipient country. My theoretical approach connects the U.S.'s domestic political factors with the deficiencies that limit the effectiveness of SSA programs. More specifically, I analyze how domestic political priorities, competing strategic interests, and evolving security environments shape U.S. policymakers' foreign policy decisions for SSA, and how these factors contribute to strategic and substantive deficiencies in SSA policies and programs. When policymakers justify providing SSA to a foreign country in response to immediate crises or political priorities, it often lacks a consistent long-term strategy for addressing problems within the recipient country. Additionally, the substance of SSA is militarized aid – providing defense equipment, weapons, and training to foreign security sectors – which are often inadequate tools for

generating sustained reform and addressing complex institutional problems that face many countries receiving this aid. I refer to these issues as strategic and substantive deficiencies.[9]

Security sector assistance is used in response to policymakers' political priorities, not the needs or conditions of recipient countries. The strategy and substance of SSA reflects the immediate, short-term political interests of the U.S., rather than being tailored to the problems, conditions, or needs of the country receiving the aid. As a result, the U.S.'s efforts are often ill-suited to deal with the entrenched problems that gain the interest of American policymakers, lack long term strategy or commitment, and tend to focus heavily on militarized, tactical approaches to complex issues. With a lack of long term strategy and over-emphasis on providing military equipment and training to foreign security forces, SSA is at best ineffective at solving the complex problems for which it is justified, and at worst exacerbates corruption, conflict, and human rights abuses in the fragile countries that receive such aid. The next sections further describe the strategic and substantive deficiencies of SSA policies.

3.4.1 Strategic Deficiencies

Over the last three decades, policymakers have expanded the use of SSA programs in a greater number of recipient countries, for a greater number of political and security purposes, without a consistent set of overriding goals or a long-term strategy. Some scholars have acknowledged that after the Cold War, U.S. policymakers were allowed greater flexibility in their foreign policy priorities, and could thus come up with new and different justifications for using SSA

[9] For example, a 2015 report from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace summarizes these deficiencies: the purpose of security sector assistance is often "the achievement of urgent, immediate security and political goals, which have been derived from perceived U.S. strategic interests," and while it is "is administratively and politically convenient, it reduces strategic effectiveness and undercuts long-term institutional development efforts" in the recipient country (Myers, 2015).

abroad (Sylvan & Majeski, 2009; Walt, 2000). For example, Stephen Walt described the impact that the post-Cold War period had on U.S. foreign policy calculations:

> *"…U.S. preponderance gives it tremendous freedom of action. Because the United States is so secure and has such a large surplus of economic and military power, its leaders can pursue objectives that no other state would contemplate. This situation stands in marked contrast to the Cold War, when the Soviet threat gave U.S. leaders a clear set of priorities and imposed discipline on the conduct of foreign policy. But with the Soviet Union gone, U.S. leaders can pursue a wide range of goals without worrying very much about how others will respond… Thus the central paradox of unipolarity: the United States enjoys enormous influence but has little idea what to do with its power or even how much effort it should expend." (Walt, 2000, p.64)*

This "freedom of action" has enabled successive presidential administrations and Congresses to emphasize and de-emphasize different foreign policy objectives over time in accordance with shifting domestic priorities, security environments, and partisan or ideological influences. As a result, they have supported inconsistent, often incoherent strategies for SSA, with little regard for the long-term issues and conditions with recipient countries (Miller & Sokolsky, 2018).

The use of SSA as the all-purpose "Swiss Army Knife" to deal with different problems reflects the political pressure to "do something" to assist or respond to a salient foreign policy crisis, without overly committing U.S. resources or personnel (Schulman, 2019). When policymakers identify a "disturbance" worthy of concern – such as terrorist activity, narcotics trafficking, or a threat of civil war – they often respond by providing SSA with an injection of military financing, weapons and equipment, and security training programs. (Berman & Lake, 2019). Rather than developing new strategies or programs to try and achieve long-term or structural goals, policymakers fund and perpetuate the same programs every year, and simply pick a new rationale or justification to use these programs when a particular crisis arises (Sylvan & Majeski, 2009). Schulman (2019) summarizes this issue: "U.S. senior policymakers expediting these [security assistance] decisions are not spending a lot of time trying to understand the scope of their overall commitment, the long-term costs, and the availability of the right personnel." A 2015 RAND Corporation similarly

concluded that SSA is frequently used in response to immediate threats or problems, with "little regard for how [the assistance] might contribute to a long-term, comprehensive political strategy to build durable improvements" (Watts et al., 2018, p6).

In my analysis, I refer to these issues as strategic deficiencies: when policymakers continuously rely on the same set of SSA programs as a response to shifting political priorities and concerns without a long-term strategy. The 2015 RAND study noted that the lack of long-term commitments and comprehensive political-military strategies in SSA is partly driven by short-sighted political influences, in that "part of the problem lies in the short time frames associated with congressional appropriations and the short rotation cycles of U.S. personnel involved in [SSA] planning, both of which have the primary effect of reprising prior years' efforts and perpetuating short-term objectives." The same report notes that the reactive, short-sighted nature of SSA policy is counterproductive for achieving long-term effects, stating that the U.S. often provides large amounts of "[SSA] funding to countries in response to a crisis, then moving its focus and resources to the next crisis when it arises" (Watts et al, 2018, p6). While policymakers seek to address various issues and crises, the strategies guiding SSA generally fail to account for the unique historical, cultural, and political circumstances of the foreign partners being trained and equipped (Reynolds, 2017). Yet, as long as U.S. policymakers continue to shift in their foreign policy priorities and political agendas over time, SSA programs will lack a coherent long-term strategy, responding to new priorities and crises every few years.

3.4.2 Substantive Deficiencies

In addition to strategic deficiencies, the substance of SSA policies – which focus on a militarized response to a variety of problems – are inherently limited in their ability to accomplish the programs' varied goals. This deficiency is directly related to the strategic deficiencies: providing

weapons and training to security forces can produce quick visible actions against immediate crises and result in short-term tactical wins, but largely do not advance any long-term U.S. goals within the same state, such as promoting better governance, improving institutional stability, or enhancing accountability and rule of law (Rand & Tankel, 2015). When U.S. policymakers want to respond to a crisis in a foreign country without direct intervention, "kinetic efforts" – or mobilizing security forces – produce visible result in the short term, even if the long-term effect is at best, inconclusive, and at worst, destabilizing and counterproductive (Crenshaw, 2018). In addition, many of the problems that policymakers use to justify security assistance – such as the growth of terrorist organizations and violent extremism, or "narcoterrorism" and drug trafficking – stem from entrenched economic, social, and historical dysfunctions, which cannot be solved through military equipment, training, and combat.

The widespread use militarized aid results in part from the increasing "militarization" of U.S. foreign policy. After the Cold War, according to Dana Priest (2004), the "military simply filled a vacuum left by an indecisive White House, an atrophied State Department, and a distracted congress…U.S.-sponsored political reform abroad is being eclipsed by new military pacts focusing on anti-terrorism and intelligence sharing" (p.14). Adams and Murray (2014) further describe this trend: "militarization means a growing trend to view decisions on national security strategy, policies, and policy implementation from a military perspective […] Foreign policy issues and security challenges discussed at the senior policymaker level are framed as military challenges, most readily susceptible to policy solutions and programs for which military capabilities are seen as the appropriate response " (Adams & Murray, 2014, p.13).

However, research has found that militarized aid is not designed to produce lasting improvements in recipients' security or improve governance institutions, and that institutional reform would require a long-term commitment and deep involvement in the nation's political

institutions (Watts et al., 2018). A 2018 RAND study found that the failures of these programs are of the U.S.'s own making, and "the system is designed for failure […] because of the U.S. focus on immediate operational objectives, the whole model is upside-down […] train and equip our partners first, then worry about institution-building" (Watts et al., 2018). In summary, the substance of SSA is often inadequate for addressing many of its stated policy goals. Providing weapons and training to security sectors might increase their capacity for waging war, but such programs are not adequate for generating long-term institutional reform for the recipient countries' political, economic, and social conditions, which are at the root of many U.S. foreign policy concerns.

3.5 Analysis and Case Study Selection

My analysis will describe how SSA policies are determined by various domestic political priorities of U.S. policymakers over time, rather than the conditions affecting the recipient countries, and how the militarized focus of SSA programs has been inadequate for addressing U.S. policymakers' goals and justifications for this aid. To provide evidence of these strategic and substantive deficiencies in the U.S.'s SSA policies and programs, I will use process tracing and a narrative approach to evaluate the development and effects of SSA in two countries over time. This qualitative approach will explain the context and political factors that have motivated SSA policies over time, as well as these policies' outcomes in the recipient countries. The historical narrative approach enables the identification of common themes in complex political stories over time, and process tracing connects the causal relationship between the development of specific policies and political agendas and their outcomes (Collier, 2011; Patterson & Monroe, 1998). This analysis uses two critical case studies: Pakistan and Colombia from the late Cold War of the 1980s to the late War on Terror of 2016. Since the late 1980s, both of these countries have at one point been the third largest recipients of U.S. foreign aid and SSA specifically, and have consistently remained among the

top seven aid recipients (Bearak & Gamio, 2016). By assessing U.S. policies toward Pakistan and Colombia, this analysis will identify common themes in the deficiencies of SSA policies in two countries with distinct geopolitical contexts and different strategic interests for U.S. policymakers.

In order to assess the effectiveness of security sector assistance programs in these cases, I will examine the outcomes based on the stated goals and justifications by U.S. policymakers in each country. In each case, I will describe what the U.S. sought to achieve through SSA at a given time, and whether or not doing so led to desirable outcomes. In Pakistan, the assessment of the U.S.'s strategic objectives will focus on the goal of garnering cooperation in combatting terrorist organizations, such as the Taliban. In Colombia, the assessment will focus primarily on the U.S.'s original justification for SSA – counternarcotics and reducing drug production and trafficking – but will also assess the later justification for aid, which focused on the country's counterinsurgency efforts.

Pakistan is often referred to as an example of failed SSA policies, and Colombia as a mixed success, but in both cases, U.S. policies lacked a coherent long-term strategy, and policymakers shifted the focus and justifications of its foreign assistance in response to changing domestic political priorities (McInnis & Lucas, 2015; Suong, 2019; Vaughn, 2019). In Pakistan, SSA has been justified for multiple reasons, such as for fighting a proxy war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and disincentivizing nuclear proliferation, but since 9/11, large volumes of SSA have been promoted to garner its support for the U.S.'s War on Terror operations in Afghanistan and to encourage its military to combat Islamic extremist groups. In Colombia, SSA was originally justified as a component of the U.S. War on Drugs to combat drug production and traffickers, but was eventually reframed as a way to aid the internal conflict against armed insurgent groups. In both cases, SSA was generally insufficient for addressing many of the long-term, structural issues that U.S. policymakers used to justify providing this aid, such as gaining Pakistan's cooperation in combatting

terrorist organizations, or reducing narcotics trafficking in Colombia. Additionally, in both cases, SSA was promoted and justified by U.S. policymakers as a response to shifting political priorities and short-term strategic concerns, and did not generally reflect the conditions, political environment, or institutional problems within the recipient country.

Pakistan and Colombia are critical case studies because they have received a disproportionately large amount of SSA funds over a longer period of time relative to the majority of U.S. foreign aid recipients. Most countries have received a fraction of SSA funds as Pakistan and Colombia, so these cases may not be generalizable to all other contexts. However, if policymakers assume that greater amounts of U.S. funding and longer-term investment should generate greater results for SSA programs, then these two cases should test this assumption. The problems the U.S. tried to solve in these cases – such as eliminating terrorist activity from the Taliban in Pakistan, or the combatting the drug economy in Colombia – are long-standing and complex problems, which is what merited this level of investment in the first place. If decades of investment and tens of billions of dollars of SSA cannot achieve the U.S.'s goals in these cases, then this might suggest that smaller amounts of SSA distributed across the globe for shorter periods of time are unlikely to be effective elsewhere.

In order to develop a historical narrative and trace the processes of the development of U.S. policies and the implementation of SSA programs in each case, I will review a variety of qualitative sources. These include primary materials from U.S. agencies and policymakers, including presidential statements and policy directives, executive agency program descriptions, Congressional testimonies, and program evaluations from the GAO and Congressional Research Service (CRS). Sources will also include a variety of research and reporting from academics, policy analysts, think tanks, and journalists.

3.6 Case Study 1: Pakistan

The U.S. relationship with Pakistan from the end of the Cold War through the War on Terrorism (WOT) illustrates the deficiencies in the strategy and substance of SSA policies. With shifting political concerns and priorities over the last three decades, the U.S. has used SSA to pursue varying goals in Pakistan, from supporting the country as a proxy force to combat the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s, to sanctioning it over its nuclear tests and a coup in the 1990s, to again embracing it as a geopolitically important ally in the WOT to support U.S. operations in Afghanistan after 9/11. Official U.S. strategic concerns in Pakistan have included virtually every risk factor affecting the country: "terrorism, Afghanistan, nuclear proliferation, India, democratization and human rights, and economic development" (Kronstadt, 2019). Despite providing nearly $30 billion in aid over the last two decades, U.S. policymakers have been consistently frustrated with the results of U.S. programs, with Pakistani leadership's refusal to directly combat the Taliban and other Islamist extremist networks, as well as the country's troubled economic conditions, anti-American sentiments among the population, the dominance of its military government over civilian rule, endemic corruption, and misuse of U.S. aid funds for purposes unrelated to counterterrorism (Kronstadt; Ibrahim, 2009). Assessments of contemporary SSA in Pakistan have generally described it as a failure (Vaughn, 2019).

Since 9/11, Pakistan has been one of the largest recipients of SSA, and research on these programs has generally characterized Pakistan as an example of the failures of U.S. foreign aid policies (Kahn, 2018). According to a 2015 Congressional Research Service report on security assistance in Pakistan, "despite the priority placed on building Pakistan as a stable ally capable of tackling terrorist groups on its own soil, and despite considerable U.S. expenditure on building Pakistan's security capabilities in order to do so, the central goals of this [security assistance] effort arguably have not been met" (McInnis & Lucas, 2015, p.33). Policymakers have repeatedly

expressed frustration with Pakistan's lack of cooperation and improvements, which came to a fore with the 2011 revelations that Osama bin Laden had found years-long refuge in the country. In 2011, Foreign Affairs Subcommittee Chairman Rep. Chabot questioned why a decade of major aid programs had produced no obvious results in Pakistan, commenting, "We spent all this money, and [the Pakistanis] still hate us" (Kronstadt, 2011). I argue that based on the history of the flawed strategy and substance of SSA policies in Pakistan, no amount of delivering or withholding of assistance to Pakistan would be likely to coerce the country to pursue the U.S.'s goals, share U.S. interests, or foster legitimate domestic reforms.

This section describes how SSA policies have been shaped by U.S. policymakers' shifting, short-term security concerns; predominantly enriched Pakistan's military while ignoring other domestic institutions; contributed to corruption and undemocratic governance; ignored the causes of Pakistan's internal instability and its support for extremist nonstate actors; and failed to address the original goals that drove increased U.S. investment in Pakistan's security sectors: persuading Pakistan to cooperate with the U.S. in eliminating terrorist networks within the country. This analysis focuses on four distinct periods in U.S.-Pakistani relations: the rise of U.S. support during the 1980s to combat the Soviet invasion of neighboring Afghanistan; the reduction of nearly all aid and sanctions throughout the 1990s over concerns with its nuclear program; the surge in SSA after 9/11 when the Bush administration embraced the country as a strategic partner for its WOT in Pakistan; and the Obama administration's attempts to leverage SSA to coerce Pakistan into greater cooperation.

Figure 3.1 U.S. Security & Economic Assistance to Pakistan, 1980-2018



3.6.1 U.S. Assistance to Pakistan in the Late Cold War – 1980 to 1990

During the late Cold War period, the U.S.'s shifting political priorities and strategic concerns in Pakistan highlight the deficiency of SSA as a tool to garner cooperation from the country's leadership when the two country's strategic interests are fundamentally misaligned. The U.S. relationship with Pakistan throughout the Cold War was mostly tied to shifting U.S. security concerns, including Pakistan's conflicts with India, relationship with China, and its pursuit of a nuclear weapons program. In the early Cold War of the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S. saw Pakistan as a useful ally in the effort to contain the influence of the Soviet Union, while Pakistan saw U.S. support as a counterweight to the military power of India (Grimmett, 2009). The U.S. supported Pakistan's military leadership, despite multiple periods of marshal law and human rights abuses, while opposing its democratically governed regional adversary, India. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the U.S. repeatedly sanctioned Pakistan and withheld economic aid in attempts to coerce greater cooperation

and signal its disapproval of its nuclear program and escalating tensions with India, but often to little effect on the country's behavior (Pandey, 2018).

Given this pattern of applying and lifting sanctions over inconsistent security concerns, Pakistan came to see the U.S. as an unreliable and untrustworthy ally, and the lack of long-term enforcement of aid conditionality proved that the U.S. had no effective leverage to influence Pakistani leaders' motives or behavior (Pandey, 2018). U.S. policy toward Pakistan shifted with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979. Just eight months after Pakistan was previously sanctioned in reaction to its nuclear program, the Carter Administration waived all sanctions, as the U.S. had a new reason to embrace Pakistan as a partner in the effort to push the Soviet Army out of Afghanistan (Grimmet, 2009). This shift in policies toward Pakistan was not motivated by any renewed commitment by the U.S. to support Pakistan, but out of the need for a military response to Soviet expansion in the region.

To purchase Pakistan's cooperation, in 1980, Carter offered to resume economic assistance and allow arms purchases, but Pakistani leader Gen. Mohammad Zia ul-Haq rejected the initial $200 million offer, calling it "peanuts" (Oberdorfer, 2009). Democrats in Congress had been reluctant to increase funding to aid to Pakistan, over normative concerns with its human rights abuses and nuclear program (Pandey, 2018). In addition to asking for cooperation against the Soviets, U.S. diplomats also attempted to use this aid offer to convince Pakistan to halt its nuclear program, but found that "no amount of aid would persuade" its leaders to drop their nuclear ambitions (Auerbach, 1980). When Pakistan rejected both forms of cooperation – regarding the Soviets in Afghanistan and its nuclear program – analysts blamed this failed attempt to leverage foreign assistance on flawed U.S. diplomatic strategy, which miscalculated Pakistan's strategic interests (Auerbach, 1980). This period highlighted how U.S. policymakers viewed economic aid and SSA: as a transactional tool to purchase cooperation over the U.S.'s narrowly focused security issues.

In 1981, the newly elected Reagan administration – with a supportive Republican majority in the Senate – began growing the domestic defense budget and increasing both arms sales and SSA abroad as a more aggressive stance against the Soviet Union (Lebovic, 1988; Moffett, 1985). One year after Pakistan rejected the Carter administration's smaller aid offer, Reagan offered over double what Carter had proposed: over $500 million per year in security and economic assistance, with a six-year, $3.2 billion aid package, and forty F-16 fighter jets (Gwertzman, 1981). In 1986, the administration increased this assistance and agreed to more F-16 sale agreements. Throughout the rest of the 1980s, this bilateral relationship was narrowly aligned over the U.S.'s desire to remove the Soviets and the Soviet-backed government of Afghanistan, but lacked any long-term strategy for addressing other strategic concerns, like Pakistan's nuclear program, undemocratic military leadership, human rights abuses, or economy. The Reagan administration provided economic support funds to aid Pakistan's weak economy, SSA to both purchase cooperation and support proxy operations against the Soviets, and granted Pakistan wide discretion in channeling additional covert assistance to the Islamist mujahidin insurgent forces (Hussain, 2005). This assistance often served as patronage to Pakistan's army, empowering the military's dominance over the government, and encouraging undemocratic tendencies (Hussain, 2005).

The Reagan administration's criticism of arms control and nonproliferation negotiations with the Soviet Union was reflected in its SSA policy decisions (Kimball, 2004). Pakistan's geostrategic importance – serving as a "sanctuary, training ground, and staging area" for the U.S.-backed insurgency's against the Soviets – preempted all other U.S. concerns (Hussain, 2005). However, many in Congress pressed the issue of Pakistan's nuclear program, and in 1985, created the "Pressler Amendment," requiring the President to certify that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear weapon each year that foreign aid is provided (Bolkcom & Grimmett, 2006). The amendment was designed to give presidential discretion over Pakistan's aid delivery (Fair et al.,

2010). U.S. intelligence reports in the 1980s confirmed Pakistan was developing nuclear weapons, but this coincided with the height of U.S.-backed efforts to support Pakistan and the mujahidin in combatting the Soviets in Afghanistan (Burr, 2012). Public exposure of the program would have forced sanctions and the suspension of all assistance to Pakistan. Instead, the amendment required the president to "certify" that Pakistan had not developed weapons-grade nuclear material, allowing assistance to continue, in spite of the U.S.'s knowledge of the advanced state of its weapons program (Fair et al., 2010). Under the Reagan and then the George H.W. Bush Administrations, Pakistan was certified as not developing weapons-grade nuclear materials for five years in a row.

In February 1989, the Soviets withdrew completely from Afghanistan, and the transactional relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan immediately shifted. After the U.S. no longer needed Pakistan's assistance in the proxy war against the Soviets, U.S. leadership suddenly ended their efforts to obscure Pakistan's nuclear ambitions. In 1990, President Bush admitted knowledge of the nuclear program and invoked the Pressler Amendment, which then halted all SSA, economic aid, and federal arms sales (Grimmett, 2009). However, the Bush Administration quietly permitted the Pakistan to purchase commercial sales of military parts and technology – which both undermined the purpose of the aid cutoff, and undermined U.S. leverage and credibility (Waas & Frantz, 1992).

The sudden cut-off of both security and economic assistance in 1990 had several detrimental and counterproductive long-term effects for Pakistan, the U.S.'s long-term strategy in the region, and the future of the countries' bilateral relationship. The U.S.'s immediate cut-off of support showed Pakistani leadership that the U.S. lacked credibility as a reliable ally, revealing how the U.S. had little interest in long-term investment in Pakistan's internal conditions or institutions (Ali, 2016). This reinforced the perception among Pakistani leaders that "Washington embraced Pakistan when it judged it useful and then, like a used tissue, discarded it when it no longer required its assistance" (Huacuja, 2005). Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. repeatedly cycled through imposing

conditions on SSA, only to waive these restrictions even when conditions were not met, usually for other national security priorities (Tankel & Dalton, 2017). These patterns, along with the 1990 aid cut off, removed any credibility that the U.S. had for leverage its aid to coerce Pakistani leadership. The negative perceptions of the U.S. permanently damaged its ability to use SSA to achieve different of goals in Pakistan in the future, as seen in the post-9/11 period of engagement.

In this period, U.S. SSA policy also indirectly enabled deteriorating conditions within Pakistan that would eventually pose a direct security threat to the U.S. In 1990, the U.S. had left Pakistan to deal with continued conflict among insurgent groups and a domestic economic crisis. After years of providing SSA for Pakistan and proxy insurgents to "wage jihad" in Afghanistan, the cut off of SSA and military support left Pakistani leaders to form an alliance with what would become the Taliban, in order to maintain indirect control over border regions (Ali, 2016). In 2008, then-President Musharraf stated that the U.S. left the region "abandoned totally," and allowed "disaster" to follow (Epstein & Kronstadt, 2016). In 2009, Pakistani President Zardari reflected on this, writing "Frankly, the [U.S.] abandonment of Afghanistan and Pakistan after the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s set the stage for the era of terrorism that we are enduring" (Epstein & Kronstadt, 2016). Additionally, the USAID office – which had been one of the largest in the world – was eliminated overnight while the country entered an economic crisis (Ali, 2016). In this period, Pakistan faced a spike in unemployment and poverty, slowing economic growth, capital flight, unsustainable growth of foreign debts (Anjum & Sgro, 2017). In 2010, then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called the elimination of SSA and economic aid a "grave mistake," driven by some "well-intentioned" but short-sighted U.S. policy decisions (Gates, 2010b). The U.S.'s short, sighted, self-interested strategy for its foreign assistance policies generated counterproductive long-term effects for both Pakistan and the U.S.

This period of U.S. relations with Pakistan primarily highlights the strategic deficiencies of SSA policies, and foreign aid generally. The Pressler Amendment highlighted how domestic political interests distorted aid policies in contradictory and short-sighted ways: Reagan and Bush had known about Pakistan's nuclear program, but certified its absence to provide justification for the continuation of SSA to support the proxy war against the Soviets. When Bush severed aid over its nuclear program, it reflected the conservative administration's hardline approach to foreign policy, rather than a long-term strategy (Ali, 2016). By focusing SSA policies on narrow, tactical, short-term concerns with combatting the Soviet Union, and then abandoning Pakistan as a security partner when this strategic interest was removed, the U.S.'s strategy ignored any long-term effects on other issues, and damaged the interests of both countries (Ali, 2016). The U.S.'s 1990 decision to cut off all assistance and largely sever diplomatic relations with Pakistan permanently damaged U.S. credibility, the bilateral relationship, and the future pursuit of U.S. strategic interests in the region.

3.6.2 The Post-Cold War Period of Disengagement: 1992 to 2000

Throughout the 1990s, the U.S.'s shifting strategic concerns in Pakistan illustrates the strategic deficiencies of SSA programs for achieving the U.S.'s goals. By disengaging from Pakistan when it served no immediate use to the U.S., this policy permanently damaged the bilateral relationship, which would ultimately hamper the U.S.'s ability to garner cooperation in the next decade. After the 1990 suspension of aid to Pakistan, total U.S. assistance remained at its lowest level since the 1950s (Epstein & Kronstadt, 2013). By the end of the Cold War and when President Clinton was elected in 1992, his administration promoted a foreign policy framework based more on diplomatic engagement, and sought to reestablish relations with Pakistan with a narrow focus on monitoring their nuclear capabilities and tensions with India (Cookman, 2011). The administration resumed small amounts of economic support funds – roughly $70 million per year – and allowed

minor commercial defense transfers and military maintenance services in Pakistan (Ali, 2016). However, the paid almost no attention to the country's economic crisis, the abuses of its military-dominated political system, or the rising power of the Taliban, which received Pakistan's covert support (Rubin, 2010). With a lack of immediate security threats, and the Republican-dominated Congress' opposition to increased foreign aid funding due in part to budget concerns, the U.S.'s strategy remained relatively disengaged with Pakistan.

After the U.S. had damaged its reputation in 1990, the Clinton Administration recognized it had few means to engage Pakistan over its nuclear program and relations with India. In 1995, Secretary of Defense William Perry recognized the negative effects of cutting assistance to Pakistan, stating that the aid cutoff was a "blunt instrument" that made the Pakistanis "mad as hell" and "undermined the influence we formerly had," and that he "saw no evidence that it had increased our influence or leverage in Pakistan" (Haider, 1995). He also suggested that the cut off of assistance to Pakistan's military had encouraged their nuclear ambitions: "The weakening of Pakistan's conventional forces which resulted from this [cut to assistance] has led Pakistan's leaders to conclude that a nuclear capability is even more important to maintaining the security of the country" (Haider, 1995). These positions of the Clinton Administration highlight how differing political interests and perspectives from the previous administration would generate distinct approaches to the U.S.'s strategy for using SSA as a foreign policy tool.

Despite this recognition of the previous administration's mistakes, the Clinton administration continued to ignore Pakistan's internal issues, like its economic crisis and the growth of militant Islamist organizations like the Taliban. In 1993, a Pakistani citizen led a group of terrorists to bomb the World Trade Center in New York City, and the U.S. Diplomatic Security Service worked with Pakistani's Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) to track down and arrest the culprit (Katz, 2002). Despite the facts that the culprit traveled from Pakistan and that the ISI had a history

of supporting extremist groups, some U.S. intelligence analysts claimed that the plot was supported by Iraqi intelligence (Woolsey, 2001). Meanwhile, after Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto was elected in 1993, Pakistan's military leadership and ISI began increasing direct and indirect support for the Taliban, both as a way to maintain influence in Afghanistan and as a hedge against regional rivals, such as India (Rubin, 2002). The ISI also saw the Taliban as a useful partner in controlling poorly governed regions, and provided them with covert and overt funding, arms, transit routes, and training camps (Rubin, 2002). In the 1990s, the Taliban had significant support from and influence within the ISI, as "the Taliban had access to more influential lobbies and groups in Pakistan than most Pakistanis" (Baruah, 2000). Despite these developments, the U.S. remained narrowly focused on Pakistan's nuclear ambitions, providing miniscule amounts of economic support funds in order to gain good will with its leaders, and making little effort to re-engage Pakistan's military over the presence of Islamic extremist groups in and around its borders (Ali, 2016).

The administration's bid to re-engage diplomatic relations with Pakistan shifted with the June, 1998 announcement that it had conducted nuclear tests. Clinton announced new sanctions, and barred all financial assistance except for humanitarian purposes (Hufbauer et al., 2008). In January 1999, Clinton again made efforts to improve relations with a long-delayed debt repayment: $464 million in cash, which Pakistan had previously paid in 1988 for F-16 jets that were blocked by the 1990 Pressler Amendment decision (Lippman, 1999). As the U.S. held the funds for a decade, they had been a source of tension and had reduced the U.S.'s diplomatic leverage during this period. Pakistan's Ambassador Khokar stated after the repayment that "a major irritant in our relationship has been removed," and expressed satisfaction with the decision, stating "we need the cash" (Lippman, 1999). Nine months later, Prime Minister Sharif was ousted from power in a coup led by General Pervez Musharraf. The Clinton administration again invoked sanctions, cutting off all U.S. assistance (Hufbauer et al., 2008). Less than a month after the coup, the administration enacted a

waiver of these sanctions to allow emergency food assistance and financial loans for the indebted Pakistani government (Pandey, 2018).

As the decade and the Clinton Administration came to an end, the U.S. continued to lacked any long-term strategy for how to engage the country that was now led by an undemocratic military regime, possessed nuclear weapons, sponsored extremist insurgent groups, and suffered from internal economic and social instability. As U.S. policymakers had few domestic concerns or strategic need for caring about Pakistan, they largely ignored many of its ongoing internal crises. The U.S. provided Pakistan almost no SSA in this decade, but with the little economic assistance it did provide, the U.S. continued the ineffective cycle of conditioning and withholding assistance, with virtually no effect or impact on the country's leaders or decision making. This lack of a long-term strategy and inability to leverage influence over Pakistani leadership would continue under the new SSA policies under the next administration following 9/11.

3.6.3 The War on Terror and Resurgent U.S. Support for Pakistan: 2001-2008

The post-9/11 period of U.S. relations with Pakistan highlights both the strategic and substantive deficiencies of SSA policies. After the critical juncture of the events of September 11th, 2001, the George W. Bush Administration transformed the scale and objectives of the U.S. foreign aid strategy, with a new willingness to engage with any country that was "with us" in the WOT (Lancaster, 2008). Congress approved a massive increase in total U.S. foreign assistance – both SSA and economic aid – from roughly $8 billion before 9/11, to over $18 billion annually in the years following 9/11 (Easterly, 2017). Aside from U.S.-occupied Iraq and Afghanistan, the largest increase in post-9/11 SSA was in Pakistan, which increased from roughly $4 million in 2001 to $1.6 billion in 2003 (SAM, 2003). After a U.S.-led coalition began invading Afghanistan in October 2001 in order to remove the Taliban from power, the Bush Administration immediately recruited Pakistan as an

ally in counterterrorism operations (Cookman, 2011). To garner Pakistan's cooperation, weeks after 9/11, the administration waived all sanctions against (Hussain, 2005). The U.S. strategy toward Pakistan immediately shifted from disengagement and sanctions to expecting the country to cooperate as a tool to support U.S. operations. This period highlights both the strategic and substantive deficiencies in U.S. SSA policy. After 9/11, security assistance funds provided large sums of cash and military equipment to purchase Pakistan's cooperation, and focused entirely on the short-term security needs of the U.S., while disregarding Pakistani leaders' strategic calculations, their historic support for the Taliban, and the country's fragile internal economic and political conditions.

As the U.S. re-engaged Pakistan after 9/11 to support U.S. operations and counterterrorism efforts, U.S. policymakers and agencies relied almost entirely on the ISI and the dictatorial military leadership of Musharraf to coordinate operations from Pakistan and implement SSA programs. This reliance on the ISI was an unavoidable fact for the U.S.'s efforts to garner cooperation from Pakistan's military and to train and equip their security sectors for counterterrorism purposes. However, as described further below, the ISI had spent years investing in a relationship with pro-Pakistan elements of the Taliban to maintain a proxy force in Afghanistan and Pakistan's border region (Felbab-Brown, 2018). This fact of history suggests that the ultimate goals of SSA programs in Pakistan had little chance of ever succeeding. U.S. policymakers have accused Pakistan of playing a "double game" between the U.S. and the Taliban, but national security advisors have stated that this duplicity was known to U.S. intelligence, and was "baked into the stock price of U.S.-Pakistan relations" from the start of the WOT (Schmidle, 2018). Security assistance programs empowered and enriched Musharraf's regime and the ISI, while U.S. policymakers simultaneously expected these programs to coerce these institutions into embracing the U.S.'s strategy against the Taliban within Pakistan (Fort, 2007).

The U.S.'s contradictory and confused approach to Pakistan after 9/11 was articulated in statements from Secretary of Defense Colin Powell, just two days after September 11, 2001. A reported questioned statements from President Bush regarding U.S.'s renewed engagement with Pakistan, asking:

> *"What does the United States want from Pakistan? And frankly, I'm confused whether the U.S. sees Pakistan as an ally or, as the ``Patterns of Global Terrorism'' pointed out, a place where terrorist groups get training. Or is it a mixture?"*

To these questions, Powell replied:

> *"We have provided to the Pakistani government a specific list of things that we think would be useful for them to work on with us… Pakistan is a friendly country. We've had friendly relations with Pakistan for many, many years. Those relations have had ups and downs as a result of various things that have happened over the years. But right now we have friendly relations with Pakistan.*"

After decades of fluctuating relations and mutual mistrust, with Pakistan, the U.S.'s post-9/11 strategy did not account for the fact that Pakistani's security establishment leaders—including the military dictatorship of President Musharraf and the military officers leading ISI—had fundamentally different priorities and strategic interests than the U.S. For years, Pakistan's security establishment had built alliances with various nonstate actors and Islamist organizations such as the Taliban, due in part to the U.S.'s support for related insurgent groups in the 1980s as well as the U.S.'s abandonment of Pakistan in the 1990s. Stephen Tankel (2018) described this flaw in U.S. policy: "No amount of [financial] assistance or threats to withhold it would lead the Pakistani security establishment to turn on the Taliban, Haqqani network, or other state-allied organizations." The Bush administration promoted increased SSA to Pakistan was as a way to both purchase their cooperation and enhance their tactical abilities to combat terrorists, but the assumption that this assistance could accomplish either of these goals was not based in any historical evidence (Wirsing, 2008).

After 9/11, the Bush administration increased total assistance to Pakistan to over $2 billion, with over two thirds dedicated to SSA for its military, including cash payments, large military articles and weapons, and training (see Figure 3.1). The nature of U.S. assistance to Pakistan after 9/11 was driven largely by the views of the Bush administration and their belief in the ability to persuade Pakistani's military leaders, ISI, and then-President Musharraf to pursue U.S. goals in the country. With the massive offering of material assistance, Musharraf – under strong U.S. diplomatic pressure - offered President Bush Pakistan's "unstinted cooperation in the fight against terrorism" (Kronstadt, 2005). President Bush developed a personal affinity for Musharaff, even stating "When [Musharraf] looks me in the eye and says … there won't be a Taliban and won't be al Qaeda, I believe him, you know?" (Cohen & Chollet, 2010). Despite the political beliefs and motivations of the Bush administration, the U.S.'s strategy ignored Pakistan's own strategic interests, and the U.S.'s SSA programs were substantively inadequate for achieving long-term objectives. Ultimately, the U.S.'s strategy and programs failed, as Pakistan continued to support the Taliban, and by 2018, the number of annual terrorist attacks within Pakistan were greater than they were in 2005 (IEP, 2019). Additionally, billions of dollars in U.S. assistance was siphoned off by the ISI for purposes entirely unrelated to counterterrorism operations (Fort, 2007). The next sections further describe the deficiencies of SSA programs, the flawed strategies of the U.S., and the effects of the Bush administration's policies toward Pakistan.

3.6.4 Substantive Deficiencies of post-9/11 Security Sector Assistance Programs in Pakistan

The assistance that the U.S. provided to Pakistan proved to be an inadequate tool for generating change in Pakistan's security strategy or effectiveness for achieving the U.S.'s goals. Post-9/11 SSA to Pakistan demonstrates its substantive deficiencies: it was focused on subsidizing military equipment purchases and supporting Pakistan's military leadership, provided equipment

unsuitable for the stated purposes of counterterrorism, it fostered corruption, and little of the U.S.'s assistance benefitted the majority of Pakistanis (Cohen & Chollet, 2007). While the U.S. invested heavily in Pakistan's military and paying off its military leadership, it largely ignored corruption within the military establishment and its lack of civilian oversight, the misuse and theft of U.S. funds and equipment, human rights abuses committed by security sectors against citizens, the failing economy and increasing poverty rates, and domestic instability (Ibrahim, 2009). The majority of SSA took the form of Coalition Support Funds (CSF), intended to reimburse Pakistan for military operations against militants along its border (Cookman, 2011). The second largest SSA portion was for Foreign Military Financing (FMF), which was mostly use to purchase U.S.-manufactured defense systems, fighter jets, tanks, and submarines (Ibrahim, 2009). Smaller portions of SSA included train-and-equip programs for soldiers and police, focused on counterterrorism, border control and anti-narcotics trafficking. Economic assistance mostly consisted of economic support funds (ESF), which is "designated to promote economic or political stability in areas where the United States has special strategic interests," and USAID funding for disaster relief and food aid (USAID, 2005).

The large increase in U.S. assistance to Pakistan was primarily used as a "quid pro quo" transactional exchange to purchase the support of Pakistan's military, with little regard for how the assistance was applied to the goals of counterterrorism operations (Ibrahim, 2009). The Bush administration justified the SSA as a way to gain Pakistan's cooperation, build trust with its leaders, and provide the U.S. access to transit routes near Afghanistan and Pakistani intelligence. However, the CSF payments went directly to Pakistan's Ministry of Finance, which could use the funds however it wished, and Pakistan's military often used the funds for expenses unrelated to counterterrorism operations (Fair et al., 2010). These funds increased the Pakistani military's power and independence from civilian oversight, and it allocated most of these funds in efforts to counter India (Ibrahim, 2009). One Bush administration official stated that the funds were "diverted to help

finance weapons systems designed to counter India, not Al Qaeda or the Taliban… [as the U.S.] has paid tens of millions of dollars in inflated Pakistani reimbursement claims for fuel, ammunition and other costs" (Fair et al., 2010). One evaluation called the CSF funds "little more than a bribe to secure Pakistan's continued participation" and a "quid pro quo for Pakistani support of U.S. goals" (Fair et al., 2010).

Multiple evaluations of the CSF payments to Pakistan found that the program lacked clear goals or a strategy, and that with virtually no oversight of how the funds were used, Pakistan's military spent little of the funds on counterterrorism operations and diverted up to 70% of the payments to illegitimate purposes (GAO, 2008; Ibrahim, 2009). Pakistani officers frequently told U.S. officials what they wanted to buy with CSF funds, but the U.S. had no process to verify purchases (Ibrahim, 2009). For example, one DOD official stated "when high-ranking Pakistani officials visit the U.S. Secretary of Defense, they are more likely to turn in a wish list for hardware than to engage in a discussion about strategy" (Cohen, 2007, p.31). For example, CSF funds were allotted to build army bunkers and roads, equipment maintenance, and deliveries to soldiers ostensibly engaged in counterterrorism activities, but investigations found that few of these activities occurred and the funding rarely reached soldiers on the front lines of U.S.-led operations (Ibrahim, 2009). The Obama administration eventually supported better oversight of CSF after 2009, but the program continued as a transactional purchase of Pakistan's cooperation, fostering corruption, mismanagement, and waste (Ibrahim, 2009; Cookman, 2011). In summary, the largest element of SSA to Pakistan – which totaled nearly $15 billion by 2016 – had virtually no direct relevance to counterterrorism operations and was rife with corruption.

The second largest component of SSA – FMF funds for subsidizing Pakistan's U.S. defense purchases – was similarly deficient for achieving long-term U.S. counterterrorism goals in the country. The Bush administration justified subsidizing Pakistan's defense procurement by stating:

"Given its geo-strategic location and partnership in the Global War on Terrorism, Pakistan is a vital ally[…] This proposed [weapons transfer] will contribute to the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping an ally meet its legitimate defense requirements" (DSCA, 2006). FMF primarily went towards items such as F-16 fighter jets, anti-ship and antimissile defense systems, and air defense radar systems (Ibrahim, 2009). Members of Congress noted that this assistance was used to satisfy Pakistan's military leaders in exchange for their cooperation: Rep. Diane Watson stated "…the President's argument is essentially that Pakistan's military rulers deserve these F–16s because they have cooperated in the effort to fight both the Taliban and al-Qaeda" (Watson, 2006).

While these funds were justified to Congress as playing a critical role in the War on Terrorism, the majority of purchases were for "weapons of prestige" to help Pakistan bolster defenses against India, and had little to do with counterterrorism goals (Cohen & Chollet, 2007). In 2005, two U.S. Representatives on the House India Caucus wrote to President Bush, stating "Since neither Al Qaeda nor the remnants of the Taliban have submarines, armoured fighting vehicles or airplanes, we are gravely concerned that the systems being provided to Pakistan are intended to be used against Indian capabilities" (Kapila, 2004). In 2006, twenty Representatives wrote to President Bush "urging him to not license the sale of F-16 aircraft to Pakistan as such a sale would 'undermine our long-term strategic interests in South Asia' and 'squander an opportunity' to continue building positive relations with India" (Bolkcom, 2005). India's Defense Minister Mukherjee echoed these concerns, stating "F-16s and other lethal weapons are not required for fighting terrorism and are used in full-fledged wars… Given Pakistan's track record, we fear that such weapons will be directed towards India" (Bolkom, 2005).

Multiple analyses noted that this SSA to Pakistan was inappropriate and inadequate for counterterrorism goals. In a 2007 investigation, interviews with Pakistani and American officials

"acknowledged that they had never agreed on the strategic goals that should drive how the [FMF] was spent," or how the Pakistanis would prove that they were performing up to the U.S.'s expectations or pursuing U.S. goals (Rohde et al., 2007). An additional federal study noted the misalignment between SSA and U.S. goals, stating that "F-16s could be used in [counterterrorism] operations, but they are over-designed for these tasks… Less expensive and less sophisticated aircraft such as attack helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles, and combat search and rescue aircraft would appear to have greater utility in combating insurgents and other non-state actors than supersonic fighter aircraft" (Bolkcom, 2005). While this SSA rewarded Pakistan's leadership for granting the U.S. access and cooperation in its counterterrorism operations, the substance of this assistance was disconnected from and counterproductive for the U.S.'s long-term strategic goals.

The U.S. also provided smaller amounts of SSA funding for train and equip programs to enable Pakistani security sectors to conduct counterterrorism operations and improve internal stability (Fair & Chalk, 2006). This SSA mostly consisted of the IMET and International Narcotics Control & Law Enforcement (INCLE) programs, which the U.S. promoted to enable Pakistan to conduct counterterror operations along the Afghan border in the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA), to improve Pakistani law enforcement capacity, and to combat narcotics trafficking that often funded terrorist activity (Fair & Chalk, 2006). However, these programs had strategic deficiencies. The U.S. wrongly assumed that Pakistani personnel were willing and able to absorb this training and conduct counterterrorism operations, when in reality, the security sectors had little interest in pursuing U.S. objectives, lacked the requisite experience to conduct counterterrorism operations, and suffered from corruption. These programs also had substantive deficiencies, as they focused entirely on "hard aid" of providing weaponry, lacked oversight or clear measurable goals, and were not accompanied with a plan for addressing any systemic factors that contribute to popular discontent and support for militant groups (Fair & Chalk, 2006).

After the U.S. began operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, in 2002, the Bush administration requested that President Musharraf increase direct involvement in counterterrorism efforts (Ibrahim, 2009). Pakistan's military leadership argued its army was not equipped to carry out this request, as it had been trained to fight conventional defensive battles in more hospitable areas on its eastern border against India, and had not made the FATA region – a poorly governed, dangerous area with rough terrain – a focus of its operations since the 1980s (Fair et al., 2010). The U.S. responded by arguing that with enough funding, training and equipment, it could enable and incentivize Pakistan forces to join U.S. efforts against the Taliban (Ibrahim, 2009). The Pakistani leadership had little to lose by accepting free funding and equipment. Research has found that these programs were ineffective, as they lacked clear goals, equipment rarely reached its intended destination, security institutions suffered from corruption, and Pakistan's security sectors were fundamentally ill-equipped and uninterested in many of the U.S.'s security goals (Ibrahim, 2009). After nearly 7 years of providing SSA funds, training and equipment to Pakistan, a 2008 DOD report stated:

> *"The war on terror has caused Pakistan to engage in a counterinsurgency struggle for which it is ill-suited. The Army has been trained and equipped as a conventional military with a primary focus on fighting a conventional opponent. Pakistan's Frontier Corps has had the responsibility to maintain security in the tribal [FATA] area, is under-trained and ill-equipped" (U.S. Congress, 2008)*

In response to the report, at a 2008 Congressional hearing, one Representative questioned the Bush administration's policy by asking "what have we been paying for?" and stated "the result… based on any objective analysis, is wholly unacceptable" (U.S. Congress, 2008).

Pakistani soldiers and police had few incentives or requisite experience to support U.S. efforts against terrorists in the FATA region, and U.S. SSA was inadequate for completely transforming the incentives, culture, or capabilities of these forces. A 2007 report from the Council on Foreign Relations pointed to the fact that the prior periods of U.S. disengagement – namely the

complete cutoff of U.S. training programs for Pakistani officers and soldiers during the 1990s – "created a generation of officers with no personal connections to their U.S. counterparts and, correspondingly, less trust in or sympathy for the United States" (Markey, 2007). Additionally, most security sector personnel were severely underpaid, and remained "susceptible to outside influence and corruption, and are not respected by the public," (Fair & Chalk, 2006). Many of the personnel receiving U.S. training lacked basic coordination and communication infrastructure, and were unable to absorb or sustain U.S. training efforts in practice (Fair & Chalk, 2006).

U.S. security sector assistance policies also largely ignored the systemic and institutional factors that enabled extremism to flourish, such as poverty, unemployment, and dissatisfaction with the state (Cookman, 2011; Fair & Chalk, 2006). For example, a 2007 report from the Council on Foreign Relations suggested that "improving Pakistan's civilian institutional capacity is at least as urgent[…] the strength of Pakistan's infrastructure and public health, education, law enforcement, and justice sectors will determine its ability to sustain the fight against extremism over the long term" (Markey, 2007). However, this imbalance of U.S. priorities in its SSA policy was not new: the focus on short-term, tactical and political goals and U.S. security interests, and lack of long-term commitment to recipient countries' institutional conditions had been a consistent feature of U.S. policy Pakistan for the previous several decades. Additionally, by providing funding, training, and equipment to Pakistan's military institutions and largely ignoring its civil institutions, U.S. assistance abetted the abuses of its military leaders and worsened conditions for civilians. A 2007 RAND report noted that equipment and training often went to abusive security forces, who used them against civilian populations, stating "in implementing assistance, the U.S. has paid relatively little attention to human rights abuses and oversight" (Fort, 2007). In summary, post-9/11 U.S. security sector assistance to Pakistan was substantively inadequate for either incentivizing or enabling

Pakistan's security sectors to effectively pursue U.S. counterterrorism objectives, and this assistance generally ignored long-term institutional problems, while abetting abusive military practices.

3.6.5 Strategic Deficiencies of Security Sector Assistance Programs in Pakistan

The previous section details several flaws and failures in the design and implementation of various SSA programs in Pakistan under the Bush administration. While these programs suffered from corruption and failed to reform Pakistan's security sectors to pursue most U.S. counterterrorism goals, Pakistani leadership did make substantial, selective cooperative efforts in the early years of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. Musharraf was initially praised by U.S. leaders for his post-2001 cooperation, when he sealed off the western border and made two naval bases, three air force bases, and its airspace available to the U.S. military (Kronstadt, 2012). This cooperation also included granting logistics facilities, sharing intelligence, and detaining al-Qaeda members (Hussain, 2005). Pakistan's army lost several hundred members in operations to apprehend foreign terrorists, and leadership claimed to have lost more than 50,000 civilians and security personnel in U.S.-led operations by 2014 (Kronstadt, 2015). However, critics observed that the ISI and Pakistan's military were playing a "double game," where they cooperated enough with U.S. demands in order to receive SSA funds, but continued to enable elements of the Taliban which supported the Pakistani government, while refusing to sincerely commit to the U.S.'s counterterrorism efforts (Felbab-Brown, 2018). While Pakistan initially cooperated to a limited extent with the U.S., its leadership would never share the U.S.'s goal of eliminating the Taliban.

U.S. policymakers began to recognize Pakistan's reluctance and refusal to target and combat extremist groups like the Taliban and Haqqani network (Ibrahim, 2009). By 2006, the State Department acknowledged Pakistan's counterterrorism failures, with one U.S. official stating "[N]ot one senior Taliban leader has been arrested or killed in Pakistan since 2001" (Vaughn, 2009;

Beehner, 2006). From 2001 onward, the Taliban controlled large portions of the FATA, and Pakistani security forces made no significant effort to halt the cross-border flow of Taliban insurgents from Afghanistan (Ibrahim, 2009). Pakistan's military selectively targeted extremist groups which threatened or posed no utility to Pakistan's government, while tacitly enabling nonstate actors which promoted its interests in Afghanistan While its military occasionally engaged al-Qaeda and the "bad" elements of the Taliban that attacked within Pakistan's borders, Pakistan's supported the "good" elements of the Taliban, which supports its interests in Afghanistan and Kashmir (Tankel, 2018).

The root of the strategic deficiencies of security sector assistance policies in Pakistan was U.S. policymakers' complete lack of consideration for Pakistani leadership's own strategic considerations, political incentives, and historic support for the Taliban and other aligned Islamist organizations. In the 1990s, when the U.S. had cut off diplomatic and material support, Pakistani leaders had supported the Taliban to maintain additional influence in the region (Fair & Ganguly, 2015). Historically, the Pakistani military had long maintained alliances with Islamist nonstate actors, and had no intention of breaking that alliance (Suong, 2019). This strategy was effective for Pakistan: while relatively inexpensive, this maintained a pro-Pakistan presence in Afghanistan, provided a proxy security force in poorly governed areas, and shielded the state from needing to deploy its own forces (Fair & Ganguly, 2015). The Bush administration had simply ignored these facts of history when it decided that Pakistan could be an ally against the Taliban and other terrorist groups.

Some attributed the U.S.'s failed assumptions and strategy to the ignorance of U.S. officials: according to journalist Carlotta Gall, "American officials failed to recognize the huge investment in time, money, and military effort that Pakistan had put into the Taliban from 1994 to 2001." (Suong, 2019, p. 179). Just before U.S. WOT, in 2000 and 2001, reports from the United Nations and Human Rights Watch found that Pakistan was directly assisting Taliban forces in Afghanistan,

providing funding, diplomatic support, training, and recruiting fighters (HRW, 2001; U.N., 2000). In late 2000, U.S. diplomats had acknowledged in that Pakistan was involved in assisting the Taliban's capture of territory in Afghanistan (HRW, 2001). While Pakistani leaders have consistently denied that it supports the Taliban, U.S. policymakers had ample evidence to the contrary before designating Pakistan as a frontline ally in the U.S. WOT.

U.S. policymakers were strictly motivated by U.S.'s short-term security and political priorities, with little consideration for the interests or conditions within Pakistan itself. The Bush administration had simply failed to prioritize the issue of the Taliban in its early push to reward Pakistan for granting the U.S. access to strategic locations for its operations in Afghanistan. In 2005, Presdient Bush expressed "bewilderment and annoyance" that many Taliban leaders were suspected of hiding out and operating from within Pakistan (Schmidle, 2008). According to former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry, "Until at least 2005, the Bush administration simply did not prioritize the Taliban's Quetta sanctuary in its discussions with Pakistani officials. Al-Qaeda dominated U.S. attention. Pakistanis saw this as a green light to keep doing what they were doing with the Taliban" (Suong, 2019, p. 166). In 2005, the 9/11 Commission stated "Taliban forces still pass freely across the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and operate in Pakistani tribal areas" (U.S. Congress, 2007). Despite this evidence, the Bush administration's foremost policy concern was rewarding Pakistan for cheap and convenient access to Afghanistan, as it offered the most cost-effective route for providing war supplies to U.S. operations (Suong, 2019).

Near the end of the administration's second term, members of Congress – particularly the Democratic opposition – increased their criticism of its short-sighted approach and the lack of results for U.S. SSA in terms of eliminating the Taliban and reducing terror attacks in Pakistan. After several years and billions of dollars spent on SSA for Pakistan, policymakers criticized the lack of security improvements and evidence that Pakistani security forces had used U.S. equipment to

commit violence and human rights abuses against civilian populations (Fort, 2007). For example, in a 2006 hearing before the House Committee on International Relations, Democratic Representative Diane Watson criticized the Bush Administration's continued assistance to an uncooperative Pakistan:

> *"…Pakistan has helped us to hunt down individual Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders. But Pakistan has not made any effort to stop their moral, if not material support for like-minded extremist groups, nor has Pakistan made any real effort to combat the poverty, misery, corruption, and lack of democracy that fuels such extremist groups… by propping up Pakistan's military leaders at the expense of its own people, we reinforce the inequities that push so many otherwise neutral Pakistanis into the arms of extremist leaders.*" (Watson, 2006)

However, the administration made no to improve the lack of comprehensive strategy and lack of oversight that characterized U.S. SSA to Pakistan during this period. As a result, SSA funds continued to enrich Pakistan's military, fund purchases of large defense equipment unsuitable for counterterrorism operations, and foster corruption, mismanagement, and waste (Cookman, 2011).

U.S. security sector assistance policy toward Pakistan during the Bush administration was driven by U.S. strategic and political priorities, and the need to gain support for U.S. counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan. This strategy generally ignored the priorities of Pakistan's leadership and its tacit support for the Taliban, systemic problems with economic and internal instability, and the undemocratic rule of its military leadership under Musharraf. The substance of SSA funded Pakistan's defense purchases unrelated to any counterterrorism operations, suffered from widespread corruption and lack of oversight, and failed to achieve the U.S.'s goals of either convincing or enabling Pakistani forces to engage in counterterrorism operations against the Taliban. The next section details how the Obama administration would attempt to shift the focus and conditionality of U.S. SSA in Pakistan, but continued to pursue a failed strategy of attempting to coerce Pakistan's cooperation through the provision of aid.

3.6.6 The Late War on Terror and the Obama Administration: 2008-2016

When President Obama was elected in 2008, he inherited the bulk of the Bush administration's ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan from the WOT. The new administration shared many of Bush's goals and strategies for the WOT, and kept in place several key advisors to oversee foreign military policy, including Robert Gates as Secretary of Defense, as well as Gen. David Petraeus and Gen. Stanley McChrystal (Pious, 2011). While Obama did not substantially shift the U.S.'s approach, he had criticized the Bush administration for failing to go after al Qaeda and Taliban leadership, and promised to shift attention away from the Iraq War and toward terrorist organizations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as seen with the troop "surge" in Afghanistan from 2009 to 2012 (Barnett, 2016). Obama altered Bush's SSA policy toward Pakistan in a few ways: harsher rhetoric on Pakistan's failure to adequately combat al Qaeda and the Taliban, attempting to condition and withhold aid based on Pakistan's cooperation, and signing legislation in 2009 which sought to improve accountability and increase funding for economic-related assistance. However, later analyses concluded that these changes were largely rhetorical and cosmetic, and most of the substantive and strategic deficiencies of SSA policies established under Bush continued (Barnett, 2016).

The Obama administration—backed by a new Democratic Congressional majority—supported increased oversight of SSA programs, and in 2009 stated "we must focus our military assistance on the tools, training, and support that Pakistan needs to root out the terrorists[…] After years of mixed results, we will not provide a blank check" (Kronstadt, 2010). After Pakistani President Zardardi was democratically elected in 2008, Obama hoped to improve civilian oversight with U.S. aid programs, but Zardari continued to perpetuate the issues of internal corruption, enabling the Taliban, and distrust of the U.S. (Zaidi, 2011). The Obama administration initially sought to transform the relationship from a transactional, security-based arrangement into a more strategic partnership, but was limited by a historic reality of U.S.-Pakistan relations: security issues

would always dominate the agenda, and the countries' security interests did not align (Barnett, 2016). The Obama administration's approach to SSA was characterized by a few key junctures: the 2009 Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, which nearly doubled SSA and tripled development aid; the 2011 partial suspension of SSA due to a lack of efforts against the Taliban and the discovery of Osama bin Laden's Pakistani safe-haven; and repeated instances of increasing, withholding, and conditioning aid to little effect through the end of the administration in 2016. (SSA Monitor, 2015; Ali, 2016).

The Obama administration reflected many Democratic policymakers' criticisms of the Bush administration's strategies in Pakistan, and this new approach culminated in the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 – also known as the Kerry-Lugar Bill – which was co-sponsored by Senators John Kerry (D-MA) and Richard Lugar (R-IN). The bill had broad expectations for reforming the U.S. relationship with Pakistan with a "commitment to replace an atmosphere of mutual distrust and lack of accountability with a broad-based, durable commitment to Pakistan and its people[…]" (Senate, 2009). Through increased funding of both security and economic assistance, policymakers assumed that this bill could address long-standing concerns with Pakistan, including the misuse of U.S. funds, a lack of concern for Pakistan's economy and citizens, the lack of results in fighting the Taliban, and the empowerment of Pakistan's military at the expense of its civilian government. According to the Senate's summary of the bill:

> *"Instead of a transactional, tactically-driven set of short-term exercises in crisis-management, Kerry and Lugar aim to build a deeper, broader, long-term strategic engagement with the people (and not just the leaders) of this vitally important nation… Over the years, U.S. assistance to Pakistan has fluctuated with political events, sending mixed messages and leading most Pakistanis to question both our intentions and our staying power… The status quo is not working: the United States believes it is paying too much and getting too little—and most Pakistanis believe exactly the opposite."* (Senate, 2009)

The bill tripled non-military assistance and increased SSA over 5 years, conditioned assistance on certifications that Pakistan's military made efforts against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, urged

accountability in the use of U.S. funds, and focused non-SSA on projects to benefit civilians, such as improving democratic governance and economic development (Senate, 2009). However, these new goals and conditions perpetuated the invalid assumptions that additional funding and could persuade Pakistan's leadership to align its interests with the U.S., halt its enabling of the Taliban, and end corruption within the military's use of U.S. assistance. The efforts of the bill backfired: Pakistan's leadership reacted negatively, it strained already tenuous diplomatic relations, and the efforts to both increase the accountability of SSA and to implement economic assistance failed to make any notable improvements for achieving U.S. goals (USAID, 2018; Vaughn, 2009; Von Hippel & Shahid, 2009). It triggered a negative reaction among Pakistani's military leadership, press, and civilian population, who viewed the terms of conditionality and monitoring as U.S. encroachment on their sovereignty (von Hippel & Shahid, 2009).

The bill required leaders to prove and certify that they were "ceasing support" for terrorists, preventing nonstate actors from attacking neighboring countries, and demanded information on citizens associated with nuclear supply networks, to which leaders responded that "it is less an assistance program than a treaty of surrender" (von Hippel & Shahid, 2009). This requirement went beyond the Bush administration's requests of Pakistani leadership, by mandating that they provide evidence and state publicly that they were not supporting terrorist organizations. Many Pakistanis viewed the increased aid and conditions as an excuse for the U.S. to grow its footprint within the country, increasing the prevailing mistrust of the U.S. among Pakistanis, creating a counterproductive backlash for the U.S. (Zaidi, 2011). Pakistani analyst S. Akbar Zaidi noted the flawed assumptions of the bill's conditionality requirements: given Pakistan's lack of civilian authority over its military and historical problems with corruption, why would the U.S. expect Pakistan's government to be willing or able to enforce the conditions over its military and meet the

demands for accountability? (Zaidi, 2011) In 2009, counterterrorism analyst Brian Katulis noted the flawed assumptions of the administration's support for increasing SSA to Pakistan:

> *"Simply putting more U.S. taxpayer dollars into proposed counterinsurgency training for the Pakistani military is an incomplete answer at best… It seems to assume that the central problem is lack of capacity or equipment, rather than a motivation issue or unwillingness to work with the United States. Based on my discussions with top Pakistani officials, it was clear that key elements of the Pakistani security establishment simply just don't have the same threat perceptions as the United States. More funding and training avoids addressing those differences in threat perceptions between the two countries."* (Katulis, 2009)

Analyses of the bill's programs showed that it had little material impact on Pakistan's security priorities, cooperation, or economic development (Birdsall et al., 2012; Samad, 2020). The increase in economic aid signaled U.S. policymakers' concerns over liberal norms and economic development, but after decades of the U.S. ignoring Pakistan's economic issues, a few billion dollars in aid could do little to turn around living conditions for civilians and overcome internal corruption (Ibrahim, 2009). Pakistan's long-term development and governance challenges were severe, and the U.S. policymakers were overly optimistic about the ability of U.S. civilian agencies to expand development operations in Pakistan and make an impact after just a few years of investment (Vaishnav, 2012). The goals of the Kerry-Lugar bill represented the political ideals of the Obama administration, but did not present a coherent, realistic strategy for improving Pakistan's governance, security sectors, or economic development issues (Vaishnav, 2012).

While the Kerry-Lugar bill sought to improve the overall balance of aid by increasing economic assistance, these programs focused on U.S. policymakers' political interests, lacked a long-term strategy, were overly focused on supporting short-term goals for security, and did not reflect the needs or conditions within Pakistan (Vaishnav, 2012). In 2018, the USAID inspector general noted several deficiencies in the development components of the Kerry-Lugar bill: programs overwhelmingly focused on "high-visibility infrastructure projects intended to improve Pakistani perceptions of the United States;" it directed most funds to the FATA region near U.S. military

operations rather than Pakistan's major population centers; it lacked any coherent strategy; goals were dictated by the State Department's political and security interests; and the funding increases far exceeded the institutional capacity of USAID to implement projects within Pakistan (USAID, 2018). The increase in economic aid signaled the rhetorical priorities of the Obama administration, but the programs were still substantively deficient, and continued to fail at achieving their stated purposes. A 2012 investigation of these programs by concluded: "the reality is that there are limits to what assistance alone can accomplish and that a set of discrete projects, even if they are well executed, does not represent a strategy" (Center on Global Development, 2012).

One year after the Kerry-Lugar bill was passed in order to improve the accountability of SSA and increase civilian oversight of the military, in 2010 the Obama administration approved a $2 billion package for Pakistan to buy "to buy American made arms, ammunitions, and accessories" over the next four years (Zaidi, 2011). This funding for military equipment was intended to "reassure Pakistan of Washington's long-term commitments to its military needs and help bolster its anti-insurgent efforts" (Schmitt & Sanger, 2010). This significant show of support to Pakistan's military largely nullified the diplomatic attempts to shift U.S. assistance toward civilian governance and leverage better cooperation from the military. The U.S. continued to provide CSF cash reimbursements to the military with little oversight, and Pakistani leaders did not demonstrate any shift in their approach to combatting the Taliban or their use of U.S. funds to purchase equipment unsuitable for counterterrorism purposes (Zaidi, 2011).

The failure of the Obama administration's attempts to improve U.S. leverage over Pakistan became clear in 2011, when the U.S. executed a raid against al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden, who had lived safely for years near Pakistan's most prominent military academy (Zaidi, 2011). Despite harsher rhetoric, conditionality provisions, and increased funding for both security and economic assistance, the Obama administration was confronted—like previous administrations—

with the fact that foreign assistance funds were an inadequate tool for coercing Pakistani leadership to reform their own institutions, change their strategy, or shift their interests to match those of the U.S. In reaction to the U.S.'s raid on bin Laden's compound on their territory, Pakistani leaders requested a reduction in direct U.S. presence in the country. Given the discovery of bin Laden and Pakistan's lack of cooperation, just two years after the administration had increased SSA, in 2011 it withheld $800 million in funding, or one third of overall SSA (Wolf, 2011). While the U.S. continued to provide over $1 billion in annual SSA funds to Pakistan, the diplomatic relations were at their lowest point in a decade, Pakistan's leadership was unmoved in their positions, Pakistani approval of the U.S. dropped to a historic low of 4%, and the Taliban maintained a significant active presence within the country's borders (Dugan & Younis, 2012; Epstein & Kronstadt, 2013).

In 2013, the Obama administration released $1.6 billion in SSA funds to Pakistan, in a show of easing diplomatic tensions (Klapper, 2013). This attempt to withhold aid to signal disapproval and as leverage to incentivize Pakistan's cooperation generated little change, just as attempts to condition aid had failed throughout history. Analysts from both the Bush and Obama administrations contended that conditioning U.S. aid to Pakistan had a record of failure and would be counterproductive by reinforcing Pakistani perceptions of the U.S. as an unreliable partner, and Senator Carl Levin argued that short-term U.S. interests in combating terrorism were more important than trying to achieve long-term cooperation (Epstein & Kronstadt, 2013). Pakistani officials similarly insisted that "onerous" aid restrictions were counterproductive, and that Pakistan needed support, not criticism (Epstein & Kronstadt, 2013). Despite this, throughout 2014 and 2015, Congress restricted assistance based on Pakistan's efforts to combat terrorist networks, the Obama administration repeatedly waived conditional provisions to provide send additional aid, and the U.S. continued to see little change within Pakistan's policies toward the Taliban and other nonstate actors (Abizaid, 2018).

3.6.7 Conclusion – The Continued Deficiencies of U.S. Strategy in Pakistan

By the end of the Obama administration, U.S. policymakers had lost most patience with Pakistani leadership, and with the reduced U.S. presence in Afghanistan, there were fewer U.S. security imperatives on which to build with Pakistan (Abizaid, 2018). The Republican majority in Congress was now concerned about budget deficits and supported overall cuts to Obama's foreign aid budget, and the U.S.'s strategic interests in Pakistan declined along with its foreign assistance funds. Total aid to Pakistan reduced from its annual peak of $3.5 billion to $1 billion in 2016, reflecting frustration among U.S. officials with its support for the Taliban, as well as U.S. policymaker's shifting global priorities, such as fighting Islamic State militants, a resurgent Russia and an increasingly assertive China (Ali, 2016). U.S. troops would remain at over 8,400 personnel in Afghanistan through 2020, and the U.S. maintained reduced levels of assistance to Pakistan to sustain some degree of diplomatic relations, given Pakistan's influence within Afghanistan (Abizaid, 2018). Pakistan continued to hedge against the declining U.S. presence, maintaining alignment with nonstate actors like the Taliban, and increasing its strategic relations with China (Abizaid, 2018). This pattern continued with the Trump administration after 2016: in 2018, the new administration once against suspended portions of SSA to Pakistan, similar to many previous American efforts to change the behavior of the generals who dictate Pakistan's security policy (Gould & Ansari, 2019). And like previous administrations, the delivery and withholding of SSA would never make a difference to Pakistan's interests and security decisions.

Ultimately, the Obama administration's SSA policies continued the flawed strategies of the Bush administration, and attempts at reform were based on the political ideals of Democratic policymakers, with little regard for the institutional problems and misaligned interests within Pakistan. SSA continued to be an inadequate tool for enabling or coercing Pakistan into pursuing

U.S. objectives and combatting the Taliban and other terrorist networks. In an assessment of the deficiencies of security assistance policies in Pakistan, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Christine Abizaid summarized:

> *"[U.S. policies] have to address the underlying causes that create the conditions that terrorists exploit. Dealing with those underlying causes is a long and costly affair, especially in a region as multi-layered as South Asia. Fundamentally, to make progress against such an enormous challenge, America must broadly share with its partners the same basic interests. That is just not the case with Pakistan."* (Abizaid, 2018)

In 2018, President Trump suspended one-third of U.S. assistance to Pakistan, criticizing their "lies and deceit" for supporting the Taliban and Haqqani network – and as repeatedly shown throughout history, this aid suspension did nothing to alter Pakistan's interests or security policies (Schmidle, 2018). In February 2020, the U.S. signed an agreement to initiate a peace deal with the Taliban in Afghanistan, agreeing to reduce U.S. forces to approximately 8,600 soldiers, and a pledge from the Taliban to prevent terrorist groups to threaten the U.S. from within Afghan territory. However, this agreement failed to include the Afghan government, it is unclear whether the Taliban is serious about its pledge, and President Trump has continued to signal a desire to withdraw all U.S. forces without finalizing a peace deal, likely leading to a collapsed peace process and threatening the Afghan government with instability (Council on Foreign Relations, 2020). While the Trump administration promotes ineffectual hard line rhetoric against Pakistan, the U.S. needs to leverage what partnership it does have with Pakistani leaders in order to maintain some level of oversight and negotiating power with the Taliban in Afghanistan. A long-term policy in the region could compromise by accepting the facts of Pakistan's strategic interests in the region and continued support of the Taliban, but this strategy is likely to be politically unpalatable in the U.S. Under the Trump administration, there is no evidence that the substance or strategy of U.S. foreign policy or security assistance programs will see any change or improvement from previous administrations.

This analysis of over three decades of U.S. security sector assistance programs and policies toward Pakistan highlights how U.S. policymakers have justified and implemented the provision of funding, weapons, and training to Pakistan in pursuit of short-term strategic interests that serve the needs of the U.S., not the long-term needs of the people or civilian government of Pakistan. As one of the largest recipients of total U.S. foreign aid—and SSA in particular—over the last two decades, the lack of productive, long-term results for U.S. objectives in Pakistan highlights the strategic and substantive deficiencies of U.S. SSA policies. U.S. security sector assistance policies and relations with Pakistan are unlikely to improve or adopt a long-term strategy that acknowledges the divergence between the countries' interests.

3.7 Case Study 2: Colombia – A Mixed Success for U.S. Security Sector Assistance

The case of U.S. security sector assistance provided to Colombia from the end of the Cold War through the War on Terror further illustrates the deficiencies in the strategy and substance of U.S. security assistance policies. The U.S. has maintained a strategic alliance with Colombia since the early 1960s, and from 1990 to 2018, the country has been one of top five the largest recipients of U.S. foreign aid (Vaughn, 2019). Since the end of the Cold War, SSA to Colombia has reflected the shifting political imperatives of U.S. policymakers, whose justifications evolved from combatting coca cultivation and narcotics trafficking, to assisting the government in its decades-long internal conflict with leftist guerrillas, to securing U.S. access to naval bases and supporting a post-conflict peace deal (Cohen, 2020). Based on declining levels of violence and improvements in certain indicators of internal security since 2000, some observers have characterized U.S. efforts in Colombia as an example of successful implementation of security assistance to improve conditions within a partner nation (Vaughn, 2019; McInnis & Lucas, 2015; Sosa, 2017). While these programs did provide weapons and equipment to Colombian security forces in the state's civil war against

insurgent groups, other analysts are careful not to give too much credit to U.S. programs in the decline of internal conflict, stating that "amount of U.S. aid sent to Bogota is dwarfed by the money Colombia spends on security" and that SSA merely "tipped the war" outcome (Miroff, 2016).

However, such positive appraisals narrowly focus on the role that SSA had in combatting leftist insurgents in the civil war, which was only a secondary goal later ascribed to U.S. foreign assistance under the Bush administration. The original goals that policymakers used to justify the surge of SSA to Colombia in the 1990s and the 1999 Plan Colombia aid package were strictly focused on counternarcotics and reducing drug trafficking. For these original goals, U.S. aid programs in Colombia have completely failed to combat narcotics trafficking and reduce coca cultivation (Alpert, 2016; Ripley, 2014). As Tate (2016) notes, "the counternarcotics objectives of Plan Colombia are forgotten or dismissed with a wink and a wave by those who today proclaim its success." Analyses have also found that even if U.S. assistance did help Colombian forces combat nonstate actors and decrease certain types of violence, and that U.S.-supplied weapons and training contributed to widespread human rights abuses and displacement of civilians, undermining domestic political institutions (Dube & Naidu, 2015). Additionally, research has shown that efforts to violently attack drug-producing regions and organizations in Colombia created a "ballooning" effect, where the drug trade and associated violence simply expanded and dispersed throughout both Colombia and other nations (Rouse & Arce, 2006). The War on Drugs in Colombia shifted much of the drug trade to Central America and Mexico, where it has enriched and empowered armed criminal organizations and cartels, which led to a surge in drug-related violence and a break down of Mexico's internal security and political instability (González Bustelo, 2014). While Colombia may represent a case of mixed-success for U.S. foreign policy, U.S. policymakers' shifting and contradictory approaches and priorities toward the country since the end of the Cold War demonstrate the flawed strategies and substance of security assistance policies.

Since the 1960s, Colombia has endured a complex internal conflict with right and left wing armed opposition groups who largely funded themselves through narcotics trafficking, and by the 1990s, observers in Congress and in the Clinton Administration feared that the country could become a failed state (McInnis & Lucas, 2015). Along with internal civil conflict and the domination of cartels and narcotics trafficking over the economy, Colombia has also consistently faced widespread corruption and human rights abuses, violent crime, poverty, inequality, and poor economic development (Beittel, 2019). After providing over $11 billion in security assistance to Colombia's military and police since the 1990s, U.S. policymakers have praised the country as an example of successful foreign assistance efforts. In 2016, Secretary of State John Kerry claimed that U.S. assistance "had helped transform a nation on the verge of collapse into a strong institutional democracy with historically low levels of violence," and General John Kelly stated that the "miracle of Colombia" how the U.S. can export security abroad (Vaughn, 2019; Garamone, 2014). However, such recent appraisals ignore the facts that U.S. security assistance in Colombia failed at its original goals of reducing narcotics trafficking, failed to address alternative economic development strategies, and directly contributed to internal displacement and human rights abuses.

By tracing the development of U.S. security assistance policy toward Colombia since the end of the Cold War through the country's 2016 peace agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), this section describes how U.S. policies have been driven by short-term, domestic political concerns; focused heavily on militarized aid to deal with complex problems; exacerbated human rights abuses; ignored the roots of the causes of the internal crises and drug trade; and failed to address the original goals that drove increased U.S. investment in Colombia's security sectors. This analysis focuses on three general periods in U.S.-Colombian relations: the increased focus of U.S. policymakers on using security assistance to combat narcotics trafficking in Colombia at the end of the Cold War; the development of the U.S.'s Plan Colombia anti-narcotics

aid package in 1999 at the request of Colombia's President Andrés Pastrana; the shift of U.S. policies from counternarcotics to counterterrorism under the Bush administration after 9/11, leading to the continuation of these policies and gradual reduction of SSA to Colombia under the Obama administration.

Figure 3.2 U.S. Security & Economic Assistance Colombia, 1980-2018



3.7.1 Militarized Counternarcotics Strategy in the Late Cold War: 1980-1992

In the late Cold War period, the U.S. began increasing its support for the strategy of fighting a militarized "supply side" counternarcotics strategy in Latin America, which would ultimately prove ineffective and demonstrate the strategic and substantive deficiencies of SSA policies. Colombia has been the U.S.'s longest consistent ally in Latin America, and throughout the Cold War, it represented an important pro-U.S. democratic presence while American policymakers faced anti-U.S., communist, and Soviet-backed leftwing movements throughout the region (Crandall, 2008). For most of the second half of the 20th century, the U.S. sent Colombia limited amounts of security assistance for its military and funding to combat narcotics trafficking – from 1980 to 1988, total U.S.

assistance averaged approximately $25 million annually (USAID Greenbook, 2018). During this period, the Reagan administration funneled most security assistance in Latin America bolster anti-communist regimes and forces in countries such as El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Peru, with U.S. aid frequently contributing to violent civil conflicts and widespread human rights abuses (Weiss, 2019). The U.S. had increased foreign counternarcotics programs in the "War on Drugs" since the Nixon administration, and in the 1980s, the State Department's International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) program was funded primarily in Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico and Peru (Marcy, 2010; USAID Greenbook, 2018). However, for most of the 1980s, these programs remained "small and marginal" compared to U.S. funding for anti-communist and counterinsurgency efforts in the region (Isacson, 2005, p18).

In the 1980s, U.S. security assistance funding for counternarcotics purposes in Latin America was originally justified through the lens of Cold War politics and the apparent link between narcotics trafficking, leftwing governments and guerrillas, and political instability (Getchell, 2018). In 1976, Colombia's Minister of Defense requested greater funding for counternarcotics efforts, but the U.S. Ambassador under the Carter administration replied that countering narcotics was not significant enough to warrant "large levels of funds or even equipment" (State Department, 1976). By the mid-1980s, the Reagan administration's pushed for expanded U.S. influence and security assistance in Latin America, and sought to link "narcoterrorism" with U.S. security threats in the region, accusing the leftwing regimes in Cuba and Nicaragua of profiting from the drug trade and sending drugs into the U.S. to destabilize American society (Getchell, 2018).

The administration began to link its strategy for funding and supplying anti-leftist combatants in Latin America with a militarized focus to the war on drugs, supporting the use of security forces and violence in a supply-side approach of suppressing drug crops, producers and traffickers (Stokes, 2004). In 1987, one U.S. counterinsurgency advisor stressed stated that when the

Reagan administration promoted the link between leftist insurgent and drugs, that "Congress would find it difficult to stand in the way of supporting our allies with the training, advice and security assistance necessary to do the job," and create "the unassailable moral position from which to launch a concerted offensive effort" in Colombia (Stokes, 2005).

The Reagan administration succeeded in convincing Congress that narcotics trafficking was a political important national security issue in the Cold War (Boville, 2004). The administration portrayed the War on Drugs as a moral crisis where the "very foundations of civilization" were at stake, and rather than treating it as an issue of public health, conflated foreign drug traffickers and Cold War foes to support a militarized approach for addressing domestic political concerns with the drug trade (Carpenter, 2003, p.20). In the early 1980s, the insurgent leftist FARC movement within Colombia was not heavily involved in cocaine trafficking, but the administration exploited "circumstantial connections between narco-traffickers and Latin American guerrillas" to gain domestic political support for linking narcotics with greater U.S. Cold War security issues in the region (Boville, 2004, p. 126).

In the post-Vietnam era, Congress did not want to get involved in the "quagmire" of Colombia's internal conflict with FARC, but the administration's conflation of the threats posed by drug trafficking and leftist insurgents allowed it to justify continued security assistance to Colombia (Getchell, 2018). The 1982 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) explicitly permitted the US army to join the "war on drugs," and the classified 1986 National Security Decision Directive 221 declared foreign drug trafficking a "national security threat," where a combination of "criminal trafficking organizations, rural insurgents, and urban terrorists" can "undermine the stability of the local government" and become "part of an anti-U.S. or anti-Western debate." (Boville, 128; White House, 1986).

By the time President George H.W. Bush was elected in 1988, the U.S. approach to counternarcotics in Latin America had been established as a security and military issue that called for increased weapons and defense equipment to attack narcotics traffickers. In 1989, the Bush administration announced the "Andean Strategy" to attack the supply of drug production in Bolivia, Peru and Colombia, and doubled previous levels of security assistance to Colombia, with a $65 million package in helicopters, aircraft, boats, small arms and other equipment in order to "bring to justice those responsible for the scourge of drug trafficking" (Hoffman, 1989; Tate, 2007). This strategy also involved pressuring Colombian leaders to promote the extradition of drug traffickers to the U.S. for prosecution (White House, 1989). This was reflected in the administration's 1989 National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS), which emphasized harsher law enforcement and penalties for domestic drug traffickers within the U.S., and support for military activities and law enforcement against drug traffickers abroad (White House, 1989). The 1989 NDCS noted that while Colombia only produced 10% of the coca in the region, 80% of cocaine shipped to the U.S. was processed and shipped through the country, which justified supplying security assistance for monitoring and attacking these traffickers (White House, 1989). The U.S.'s supply-side approach to relied disproportionately on attacking individuals and suppressing drug supplies, with 70% of foreign drug control budgets focused on eradication and attacking traffickers (Boville, 2004).

While Congressional Republicans supported the militarized approach for addressing foreign drug traffickers, some Democrats raised concerns with the focus on a militarized approach to combat foreign drug supplies and the emphasis on harsher penalties within the U.S. In Colombia, U.S. strategy ignored contributors to narcotics trafficking such as "economic crisis, rural pauperization, institutional weakness, territorial disintegration, and spreading violence," and failed to consider the economic significance of coca cultivation for poor Colombians, offering no effective alternative development strategy for coca farmers (Boville, 2004, p128). At a 1989 hearing for the

House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, Democratic Rep. Charles Rangel stated "we are far from having a strategy" in the Andes nations, and criticized the administration's failure to support programs to eliminate the underlying conditions that give rise to drug use and trafficking (Barron, 1989; Treaster et al., 1989). Democratic Senator Joe Biden proposed assisting drug-producing nations' economies with a "debt for drugs" swap, where the U.S. would pay off foreign debts in exchange for alternative development and coca-eradication programs (Treaster et al., 1989). Senator Robert Byrd and Michigan's Governor Blanchard both suggested the administration transfer money from military spending to domestic treatment and prevention programs (Barron, 1989; Johnston, 1989). The Bush administration opposed these criticisms, stating "it is too expensive and would cut too deeply into military spending" (Johnston, 1989).

By framing the issue of narcotics trafficking in Colombia as a threat to U.S. national security and emphasizing the need to combat "narcoterrorists," the Reagan and Bush administrations justified using Cold War era security assistance programs to attack drug traffickers and eradicate crops. However, early evidence showed that this strategy failed to reduce drug trafficking in the region and created destabilizing, counterproductive effects for the population. When Colombian forces used U.S.-supplied artillery, small arms and helicopters to attack narcotics traffickers, not only did this increase retaliatory violence near civilians, but many Colombian traffickers simply moved across the borders into Bolivia and Peru (Marcy, 2010). As a result, the traffickers simply migrated closer to the source of coca cultivation, and the supply into the U.S. continued to increase. Additionally, U.S.-funded drug eradication and fumigation missions frequently destroyed the food crops of rural farmers and peasants, which both destroyed their primary livelihoods, increased their likelihood to take to coca cultivation, and increased their support for the FARC insurgent movement, whose support primarily consisted of rural peasants seeking greater economic stability

and human rights (Petras & Brescia, 2000; Livingstone, 2003). Using violence and suppression to combat a lucrative economic market was failing in Colombia.

While security assistance to Colombia failed to affect overall levels of drug trafficking, it also created contributed to internal destabilization and garnered criticism from some Colombian politicians. From 1984 to 1990, the Colombian government sought to negotiate with FARC and another left wing insurgent group, the National Liberation Army (ELN), to reduce its internal conflicts (Rabasa & Chalk, 2001). Throughout the attempted peace negotiations, the U.S. trained thousands of Colombian soldiers and provided tens of millions of dollars in lethal equipment, pressuring Colombia into armed offenses against guerrilla groups and citizens associated with the drug trade (Stokes, 2004). The U.S.'s programs exacerbated repression by Colombian forces and undermined the peace negotiations, which further destabilized the nation's domestic political institutions, contributing to a surge in violence in the early 1990s (Stokes, 2004). Colombian officials criticized the U.S. for not doing more to reduce its domestic demand for drugs, with the head of the Narcotics Bureau stating in 1988, "We're being left to fight this war alone… the country is being destabilized and what help are we getting?" (Riding, 1988). One Colombian journalist wrote that as long as the U.S.'s strategy continues, "we cannot expect greater understanding from the United States in a war that is ruining us materially and morally" (Riding, 1988). In 1989, after criticizing the U.S.'s militarized counternarcotics strategy in the region, Peruvian leaders abandoned talks between the U.S., Colombia and Bolivia, adding to the failures of the U.S.'s regional antidrug strategy (Treaster et al., 1989).

At the end of the decade, several trends in U.S. foreign policy in Latin America and Colombia emerged. With the absence of a Soviet threat, U.S. policymakers and foreign policy bureaucracies identified new political concerns to justify continued influence within Latin America, primarily focused on the War on Drugs and increasing free trade and economic ties (Crandall, 2002).

For example, in 1990, the Bush administration announced the "Enterprise for the Americas" to promote free trade in Central America and the Caribbean, and in 1992, it announced the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the U.S., Canada, and Mexico (Pastor, 2009). President Bush supported these plans by stating that the "Cold War is over" and that "the principal challenge now facing the United States is to compete in a rapidly changing, expanding global market" (Brown, 1994, p572). However in Colombia and the Andean Region, the primary ideological focus shifted to counternarcotics (Schoulz, 1998 p. xiv; Crandall, 2002). As a result, the War on Drugs functioned as a new rationale for sustained U.S. military influence and SSA programs in the region (Cohen, 2020).

By the time the Cold War officially ended in 1991, U.S. policies in Colombia were driven entirely by policymakers' concerns about narcotics trafficking both within the U.S. and abroad. As domestic drug problems dominated political concerns and election campaigns in the early 1990s, many U.S. policymakers saw policies in Colombia as an extension of their efforts to fight the War on Drugs. U.S. policymakers blamed increasing crime and drug use on Latin American drug suppliers, while Latin American politicians would blame the U.S. demand (Martz, 1995). U.S. military officials concerned with declining defense budgets similarly promoted the role of counternarcotics programs in Colombia as part of the solution to the domestic drug problem, in order to justify continued appropriations (Marcy, 2010). Thus, U.S. policy became "narcotisized" – meaning that almost every element of U.S. involvement in Colombia was justified by the issue of narcotics, the War on Drugs, and America's desire to solve its domestic drug problem by tackling narcotics at the source (Comollin & Hoffman, 2013).

3.7.2 The Post-Cold War Period: the Clinton Administration and the development of Plan Colombia: 1992-2000

When President Clinton took office in 1993, he attempted to shift the focus of the War on Drugs away from the Reagan and Bush-era focus on militarized foreign policy, and supported reducing domestic demand through both increased education and treatment programs and prosecuting drug dealers within the U.S. (Marcy, 2010). This resulted both from ideological differences in Clinton's views on the War on Drugs compared to his predecessors, and the mounting evidence that the previous Republican administrations' militarized, tactical, supply-side approach to cracking down on drug producers and traffickers had failed (Cohen, 2020). After four years and over $2 billion in security assistance funding, the Bush administration's "Andean Strategy" of using armed forces to fight drug trafficking in Colombia had failed to reduce narcotics proliferation. Echoing earlier criticisms from Congressional Democrats, the Clinton administration sought to distance itself from the militarized foreign counternarcotics strategy, and advocated for increased domestic drug prevention and treatment (Marcy, 2010; Treaster, 1994). The administration's anti-drug budget varied slightly from that of Bush, decreasing supply-side programs from 70% to 59% of the total budget, and increasing funding for treatment programs by 9% (Painter, 1994). In 1993, the administration's policy directive acknowledged the weaknesses of previous counternarcotics tactics in Latin America, and rhetorically supported the concept of promoting foreign countries' domestic institutions and economic development as a way to combat narcotics production (White House, 1993). However, the administration continued ultimately continued the previous approaches of supporting foreign militaries and law enforcement in combatting narco-trafficking organizations and domestic interdiction efforts (White House, 1993).

While promoting alternative counterdrug approaches, the new administration also faced bipartisan pressure to address the budget crisis, and total foreign counterdrug funding declined. In absence of the Cold War's overarching rationale for foreign aid, the total foreign assistance budget

declined 25% from $26 billion in 1993 to $19 billion in 1997 (Tarnoff & Nowells, 2005). The administration had expressed that continuing the Reagan-Bush security assistance policies in Latin America was "economically prohibitive," and cut security assistance to Colombia from $133 million down to $44 million by 1994 (Smith, 1993; Crandall, 2002). The U.S. continued providing funds and training to Colombia's security sectors to intercept narcotics traffickers and conduct aerial fumigation against coca and poppy crops, but with less funding and less focus on lethal military equipment than the previous administration (Marcy, 2010). The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) continued to assist Colombia's law enforcement and justice departments, primarily by sharing intelligence, law enforcement techniques, and a limited number of advisory personnel, which focused on apprehending key drug cartel leaders (DEA, 2018). However, the DEA was not a component of the SSA programs that provided weapons and tactical training to Colombian soldiers and police (State Department, 2002). While the Clinton administration had cut much of the funding for militarized supply-side campaigns against drug producers and traffickers, it did not increase funding for economic development or offer an alternative strategy in its place. Meanwhile, Colombia's political instability worsened, drug trafficking continued its upward trend, and the country began to resemble a "failed state," with increases in terrorist attacks from drug cartels, violence against civilians and politicians, and corruption throughout its domestic institutions (Marcy, 2010).

When a significant Republican Congressional majority took office in 1995, they quickly jumped on the opportunity to blame increasing domestic drug use, increasing drug production and cartel violence in Colombia, and the general failures of the War on Drugs on the Clinton Administration (Marcy, 2010). Republicans had campaigned as being tougher than Democrats on the drug problem, and Republican Senator Majority Leader Bob Dole wrote that "the Clinton administration's drug policy was failing." The Clinton administration commissioned a 1994 study by

the RAND Corporation, which supported its shift in counterdrug policies, finding that funding user treatment is ten times more effective than drug interdiction schemes and 23 times more effective than the supply-side War on Drugs policies of Reagan and Bush (Rydell et al., 1994). Despite this evidence, and the abject failure of the earlier aggressive counternarcotics policies under Reagan and Bush, Republicans called for "an examination" of what went "wrong under Bill Clinton" and an examination of what "worked from 1980–1992" (U.S. Congress, 1996). In response to this criticism, Clinton began to reverse course and began to support increased security assistance funding for a more militarized counternarcotics approach in Colombia and Latin America.

The Clinton administration's first pivot to a more aggressive foreign counternarcotics strategy was in 1998, when he signed the Republican-supported Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act (Marcy, 2010). The bill appropriated $2.3 billion over three years for counternarcotics equipment, training, and programs in over nine countries throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, including Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru (McCollum, 1998). The act overwhelmingly focused on military equipment and hardware for security sectors and law enforcement, providing multiple types of aircraft, helicopters, maritime vessels, and weaponry throughout the region, and less than 8% of the funding went to USAID alternative development programs, limited to Colombia and Bolivia. While Republicans had criticized the Clinton administration's failures in Colombia, and Colombia's coca production had grown from 10% to 70% of the regional market by 1998, just 9% of the funding in the act went to Colombia (McCollum, 1998). Congressional Republicans had shown an increased willingness to fund greater foreign assistance programming, although it was limited almost entirely to defense procurement through security assistance programs.

3.7.3 The Development and Distortion of Plan Colombia

The development of Plan Colombia – and the ways in which U.S. policymakers' preferences distorted its original design – highlights the continued deficiencies of SSA policies in Colombia. In 1998, Colombia elected a new president, the conservative Andrés Pastrana, who campaigned largely on the issues of combatting drug trafficking, violence among drug cartels and paramilitary organizations, internal instability, and seeking peace negotiations with FARC and ELN (Marcy, 2010). In his presidential campaign, Pastrana had vowed to seek a $7.5 billion "new Marshall Plan" from the international community to fund a comprehensive package to address Colombia's violent internal conflicts, expanding drug trade facilitated by cartels and paramilitary organizations, economic crisis, human rights abuses, and weak domestic institutions (Mendez, 2017). This plan would ultimately become known as "Plan Colombia" – the U.S. aid package approved by the Clinton Administration in 1999, of which 80% funded security assistance for Colombia's military and police (Ripley, 2014). Originally, the U.S. would provide $1.3 billion, Colombia $4 billion, and European allies and Japan would provide around $3 billion (Ripley, 2014). Plan Colombia would be the largest U.S. foreign aid package of the decade, making Colombia the third largest recipient of U.S. assistance, behind Israel and Egypt (Ripley, 2014). However, domestic opposition from Congress and the influence of competing U.S. political interests distorted the aid package to largely ignore much of Pastrana's original plan in counterproductive ways that made Plan Colombia less effective at achieving its original goals (Shifter, 2012).

While some contemporary assessments have described Plan Colombia – and the continuation of its security assistance strategy over the next decade – an example of successful U.S. security assistance policies, Plan Colombia was initiated by Colombian leaders but distorted by the influence of U.S. political interests. Pastrana's original plan called for nearly equal funding for five policy areas: (1) the peace process to end violent conflicts with armed groups and organized

criminals, (2) an economic strategy to support employment and alternative development, (3) a counter-drug strategy to combat all steps in the drug supply chain, (4) institutional reforms of the justice system to promote rule of law and human rights, and (5) democratization and social development to enfranchise communities, promote accountability in local government, and improve the livelihoods of vulnerable social groups (Mendez, 2017). U.S. policymakers – particularly the Republican-run Congress – had little interest in funding most of these initiatives, aside from a combatting drug traffickers through the provision of defense equipment and training (Mendez, 2017). The Pastrana administration lobbied U.S. members of Congress and executive agencies, and after significant debate, criticisms, consulting defense manufacturing lobbyists, and alternative proposals, the $1.3 Plan Colombia bill presented a militarized assistance package that differed little from U.S. approaches in the past (Ripley, 2014).

The domestic political interests of U.S. policymakers distorted Pastrana's original Plan Colombia in several ways. Congressional Republicans opposed increasing funding for economic and social development programs throughout U.S. domestic and foreign aid programs, and their stance on Colombia was no different: they wanted only to provide militarized assistance to attack drug supplies and traffickers (Shifter, 2012). Congress offered little support to the original Colombian proposal, which focused equally on broad social development, economic assistance to poor Colombians, and strengthening democratic institutions as it did on dismantling the drug economy (Shifter, 2012). Congress was already in favor of a security-centric aid package, and defense equipment manufacturers and contractors used the opportunity to lobby certain members to increase the Plan's appropriations for U.S.-made helicopters, weapons, transportation equipment, private security contractors, and military consultation (Neumann, 2006). According to Ramírez Lemus et al., (2005), once U.S. policymakers had revised the agenda of Plan Colombia, it was "fundamentally altered to reflect U.S. analysis and priorities, and the new U.S.-influenced

version would downplay development in favor of military aid. Other countries would show themselves unwilling to support the U.S.-dominated plan." As a result, Plan Colombia resembled the earlier failed strategies of Reagan and Bush Sr., and set the trend for future U.S. assistance to Colombia over the next decade.

The U.S. version of Plan Colombia disregarded most of Colombia's problems and priorities aside from combatting drug trafficking and focused almost solely on military equipment and training, which led to the loss of international support for Plan Colombia, damaged Pastrana's tenuous peace negotiations with FARC, ignored both the roots of the drug economy and multiple crises facing the nation, and would both contribute to increased human rights abuses of civilians and fail to reduce Colombia's drug exports in the long term (Isacson, 2005; Mendez, 2017). President Pastrana criticized U.S. policymakers for only supporting the military elements of the bill while ignoring the interconnected crises in the country, describing them as "obsessed" with the War on Drugs and "not its root causes" (Mendez, 2017, p96). Certain members of Congress attempted to cut out much of the non-military funding, eventually reducing the program funding for alternative development to 7%, rule of law and judicial reform to 5%, human rights and displaced citizens to 8% of the bill, with 80% going to military equipment and training for the military and police (Isacson, 2005; Ripley, 2014). U.S. policymakers made it clear that they cared little for supporting broader social or economic development or democratic institutional reforms in Colombia.

At the same time, some representatives saw the bill as an opportunity to increase defense procurement from within their districts. Defense manufacturers and contractors including Lockheed Martin, Texotron, and Sikorsky lobbied representatives to add to the bill the purchase of dozens of helicopters, planes, tanks and other military equipment, despite both U.S. and Colombian military officials stating that this type and volume of aircraft was inappropriate for their operations and Colombian forces lacked the training to utilize and sustain all of the equipment (Ripley, 2014). These

provisions in the bill – cutting back non-military aid and adding hundreds of millions of dollars for defense articles – were criticized by some Democratic representatives, as well as a range of drug policy experts and Colombian environmental, indigenous, and human rights organizations (Tate, 2007). Despite this criticism, the final version of Plan Colombia "struck a balance between what was politically feasible in Washington and Colombia's priorities based on the realities on the ground" in its focus on the "hard aid" of military equipment and security training (Shifter, 2012).

U.S. policymakers' political concerns also inhibited Colombian leaders' efforts at peace negotiations with FARC and other armed groups. A key condition of Plan Colombia restricted assistance to be employed only for counternarcotics purposes, despite the fact that various insurgent groups had been increasingly involved in the drug economy since the early 1990s, and much drug production occurred around FARC-controlled territory (Isacson & Poe, 2009). Congress opposed any U.S. entanglement in Colombia's internal conflicts, with representatives warning of the risks of a "Vietnam-like quagmire" (Mendez, 2017, p139). Policymakers also opposed Pastrana's 1998 demilitarized zone (DMZ) agreement with FARC, which was key to the ongoing peace negotiations, arguing that the DMZ enabled unchecked drug trafficking (Maseri, 1998). In 2000, the Clinton drug czar, General Barry McCaffrey, declared that the U.S. would not support counterinsurgency efforts in Colombia, in part due to Clinton's concerns with abetting human rights abuses (Isacson, 2005). These positions were contradictory: the U.S. wanted Colombia to fight a militarized campaign against drug traffickers, but avoid involvement in the civil war with armed groups that were involved in drug trafficking. Congress also opposed peace negotiations with FARC, which could reduce violence and instability, as they believed that this could lead to increased drug trafficking (Mendez, 2017). These positions did not reflect the facts of reality facing Colombia's leaders, but rather reflected ideological commitments to supporting the War on Drugs while avoiding Colombia's other internal issues.

Plan Colombia had originated in Colombia as a request for an internationally-backed $7.5 billion "new Marshall Plan" for a multifaceted, long-term approach to prevent state failure in Colombia, improve the economy and the livelihoods of its citizens, reform political and legal institutions, and reduce the production and flow of drugs from within the country (Suarez, 2018). The final version of Plan Colombia reflected U.S. policymakers' domestic political priorities, including limited funding economic and social programs, a militarized supply-side War on Drugs strategy, subsidies for U.S. defense manufacturers, and opposing both peace negotiations and armed conflict with FARC (Ripley, 2014). The majority of U.S. funding went through the INCLE, FMF, and Section 1004 Counter-Drug Assistance programs, used to purchase defense equipment, vehicles, weapons, and training for Colombian soldiers and police to combat, track, and interdict narcotics traffickers and producers (Beittel, 2019). As a result, while Colombian forces would receive subsidized equipment and training, the greatest direct beneficiaries of this funding were U.S. manufacturers and contractors (Isacson, 2001). When the U.S.-sponsored version of the plan emerged, allies like Japan and several European withdrew their financial support on the grounds that it was too heavily focused on military funding and dictated by U.S. interests, which limited the overall size and effectiveness of Colombia's original plan (Ripley, 2014). With a stated goal of reducing cocaine production 50% by 2005, Plan Colombia left the U.S. and Colombia with just one option: a military victory over drug traffickers and the associated armed insurgent groups (Shifter, 2012).

The evolution and approval of Plan Colombia illustrates how U.S. policymakers' ideological commitments and domestic political influences dictate SSA policies and programs, as opposed to the needs and conditions within the recipient country. This highlights both the strategic and substantive deficiencies in SSA policy: it reflects U.S. policymaker's interests, ignores any long-term strategy for addressing problems within recipient countries, and focuses heavily on militarized aid as a solution

for complex institutional problems. In 2001, the British ambassador to Colombia criticized the plan, stating that the U.S. strategy in the War on Drugs is "unwinnable," and that the "attack on the supply side of the drugs trade was always bound to fail" if the other elements – consumption and demand, economic incentives of drug production, and precursor chemicals – were ignored (Morris, 2001). John Carnevale, a senior advisor to multiple White House drug czars, argued the strategy of using militarized interdiction to attack the drug market was "incredibly naïve," criticizing the complete lack of focus on reducing demand and alternative development (Teslik, 2006). He also acknowledged how U.S. domestic political concerns prevented progress in combatting the drug economy, stating that "what works is politically impossible, and what's politically possible is destructive" (Teslik, 2006). The U.S. strategy ignored evidence on effective alternative drug policies, and its heavy focus on SSA and law enforcement reflected the priorities and ideology of U.S. policymakers, rather than a practical or feasible solution to Colombia's multiple internal crises (Comollin & Hoffman, 2013).

3.7.4 The Implementation of Plan Colombia and Policy Shifts in the War on Terror: 2000-2016

After the U.S. passed Plan Colombia in 2000, the implementation and effects of the initiative would occur under the newly elected George W. Bush administration. After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the Bush administration radically altered both domestic and foreign policy priorities for the U.S. to focus on counterterrorism, and Congress supported a dramatic escalation of defense spending and foreign aid budgets to fight the global War on Terrorism. In 2002, Colombia elected president Álvaro Uribe, who campaigned on a hardline stance in support of a strong military offensive against armed insurgents (Crandall, 2008). Just two years prior, U.S. policymakers had focused exclusively on counternarcotics goals, restricting aid from any direct involvement in counterinsurgency (Marcy, 2010). The Bush administration abandoned this strict focus, reoriented

policies in Colombia toward counterterrorism efforts against armed insurgents, and embraced the Uribe administration as a key ally in the War on Drugs and the War on Terror (Crandall, 2008). The U.S. SSA strategy shifted to reflect the counterterrorism priorities of the Bush administration, and the substance of SSA would perpetuate a militarized response to Colombia's drug economy and internal conflicts. These SSA policies would fail to achieve their original counternarcotics goals, and had mixed results for improving security: Colombian forces gained more territorial control and certain indicators of violence improved, but the expanded armed conflict contributed to widespread human rights abuses and displaced hundreds of thousands of civilians (Franz, 2017).

After 9/11, U.S. policymakers shifted the strategy and justifications for U.S. aid to Colombia shifted in several ways that reflected their new political and strategic priorities. Under the Clinton administration, Congress approved Plan Colombia with a strict focus on counternarcotics, and opposed U.S. involvement in the internal conflict with armed insurgents (Marcy, 2010). As the WOT dominated the U.S.'s political concerns and the overall security environment, the Bush emphasized drug traffickers as "narco-terrorists" – as had Reagan and Bush Sr. – grouping them in with the narrative of the U.S.'s global front against terrorism (Crandall, 2008). In 2002, Congress passed legislation to remove all restrictions limiting U.S. aid to counternarcotics purposes, allowing SSA to be used for counterterrorism efforts by supporting Uribe's escalating military offensive against armed groups such as FARC and ELN (Crandall, 2008). President Bush thus used the WOT to redefine the Colombian conflict and justify U.S. involvement. The target of this campaign remained the left-wing guerillas, while largely ignoring the armed right-wing paramilitary groups that had links to the Colombia army and a record of committing human rights abuses against citizens (Isacson, 2005). As a result, the U.S. blurred the lines between counternarcotics and counterterrorism in Colombia, and direct U.S. involvement in Colombia's internal conflict steadily expanded.

In 2002, Congress passed Bush's Andean Regional Initiative (ARI), which increased total counterterrorism and counternarcotics program funding in six Latin American countries, expanding funding for both SSA and economic assistance programs initiated under Plan Colombia (Amatangelo, 2005). Under Clinton, Congress opposed increased budgets for economic development, but as Bush advocated for a global increase in funding for both SSA and economic aid as components of the WOT, the ARI expanded funding for economic assistance to the Colombian government, and roughly $70 million in annual alternative development programs until 2006. However, SSA programs were still at the forefront of U.S. strategy, and the alternative development programs suffered from a lack of planning and insufficient funds, poor implementation, and were ultimately ineffective reducing narcotics production (Acevedo et al., 2008). The U.S. also directed SSA to protect Colombian oil supplies (Forero, 2002). The Bush administration emphasized a new global effort to diversify the U.S.'s oil supply, and analysts noted that oil companies had lobbied Congress to redirect SSA funding to protect Colombian oil infrastructure (Forero, 2002). The U.S. provided helicopters, weapons and technology for this effort, and 100 U.S. special forces would train about 1,600 Colombian soldiers to protect pipelines from attacks and theft by insurgent groups (GAO, 2005).

When President Obama was elected in 2008, he largely inherited and continued the Bush administration's priorities and policies in Colombia. By virtually all measures, U.S. counternarcotics strategy in Colombia had failed: by 2016, the volume of coca production and exports remained above their 2002 levels, and the country remained the world's largest coca producer (GAO, 2018). However, the Obama administration offered no strategic or substantive alternatives for SSA and economic assistance in the country for combatting the drug trade. At a 2009 summit, Colombian President Santos stressed the need for a new, non-militarized approach to addressing the drug economy, but Obama and U.S. diplomats refused to support the proposed alternatives, such as

decriminalization or halting aerial spraying (Rogin, 2012). While the administration continued to mandate supply-side strategies such as aerial fumigation, in 2015, Colombia defied U.S. policies and shut down fumigation operations, after years of research had shown detrimental effects to citizens' health and other agricultural crops (Neuman, 2015). The administration thus perpetuated earlier administrations' failed supply-side counternarcotics strategy, which reflected the U.S.'s ideological commitments, while ignoring the needs and requests of the country receiving its assistance and the roots of the drug economy.

The Obama administration also pursued additional strategic interests in Colombia, including a 2011 free trade agreement, utilizing U.S.-trained Colombian soldiers to "export" training to other Latin American countries, and rhetorically supporting the 2016 peace negotiations with FARC (Restrepo et al., 2016). The George W. Bush administration had pursued a free trade agreement in its second term, and in 2011, Obama and Colombian President Santos signed the agreement, which went into effect in 2012. However, critics of the free trade agreement noted that this economic liberalization adversely affected rural regions and small farmers, and drove poor farmers to increase coca cultivation for income, with total coca cultivation increasing during this period (Villareal, 2014). The trade agreement also offered no protection for labor unions, who had historically been targeted with violence, and the country saw increased paramilitary violence against Colombian trade unionists after the agreement's implementation (Villareal, 2014). In this way, the administration continued the Bush administration's agenda in Colombia and perpetuated policies that were counterproductive for both reducing drug production and trafficking and for alternative economic development strategies for rural populations.

The Obama administration also began a strategy of contracting U.S.-trained Colombian soldiers to implement counternarcotics and security-focused training programs for thousandsa of security forces and police in several other countries, primarily in Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador,

Honduras, and Panama (Kinosian et al., 2015). With declining SSA budgets, the administration saw this strategy as a way to export train and equip programs at a cheaper price, as Colombian-administered training programs cost a fraction of those managed by U.S. security forces. According to an Obama administration State Department official, this proxy training program was "a dividend that we get for investing over $9 billion in support for Plan Colombia" (Kinosian et al., 2015). The Obama administration therefore "exported" the SSA efforts in Colombia to other countries in the region, only with less oversight than U.S.-led training programs, despite the fact that hundreds of U.S.-trained Colombian forces had been implicated in human rights abuses and corruption throughout the implementation of Plan Colombia. In this way, the administration perpetuated both the strategic and substantive deficiencies of the military-centric SSA policies in the region.

Faced with the U.S.'s recovery from the 2008 economic crisis, budget constraints, and pressure from Congress, total U.S. aid to Colombia gradually decreased under Obama, and the U.S. pressured the country to increase its own investment in combatting narcotics and maintaining improvements in its internal security (Miller, 2009; GAO, 2019). Before the end of his presidency, in 2016 Obama requested that Congress sustain SSA and economic assistance funds in an aid proposal known as "Peace Colombia," in order to encourage Colombia's peace settlement with FARC (Isacson, 2016). In 2017, Congress approved this funding, over which more just over half was dedicated to SSA for the Colombian military and policy, with the rest for economic support funds and peace-building activities (Norman, 2017). However, the funding included contingencies requiring Colombia to continue forced eradiction of coca crops, and both Trump administration officials and Congressional Republicans suggested they would block funding if the peace process provided too many concessions to FARC or other leftwing insurgent organizations (Normal, 2017). In summary, SSA policies in Colombia since the 1990s have continued to reflect the various political priorities of U.S. policymakers, but generally perpetuated many of the strategic and

substantive deficiencies from earlier decades and failed to achieve their original counternarcotics goals. The results of these SSA policies are further described below.

3.7.5 Effects and Outcomes of Plan Colombia and post-9/11 SSA policies in Colombia

Research on the effects of Plan Colombia and post-9/11 SSA policies in Colombia has formed a general consensus on both the immediate and long-term outcomes of these policies from 2000 to 2016 (Alpert, 2016; Franz, 2017). From the 1980s to the implementation of Plan Colombia, U.S. engagement with Colombia was primarily justified as a way to fight the War on Drugs and combat narcotics production at its source. By many indicators, the U.S.'s SSA policies and War on Drugs in Colombia failed to significantly reduce drug production or exports (Alpert, 2016). After 9/11, the U.S. justified SSA through the lens of the WOT as a way to assist Colombia in its armed conflict with insurgents, and the results of these goals have been mixed. Plan Colombia initially contributed to the breakdown of peace negotiations with FARC, and its support an expanded military offensive against insurgents and drug traffickers led to the displacement of millions of citizens and widespread human rights abuses by both Colombian soldiers and associated paramilitary groups (Carasik, 2016). After initially increasing following Plan Colombia, homicide rates and other indicators of violence gradually declined in the country, and the Colombian army was able to weaken FARC, leading to another set of peace negotiations in 2016. Colombia eventually passed a controversial peace agreement with FARC in 2016, although this peace has been tenuous as the country seeks to establish a plan forward following decades of civil conflict (Crandall, 2019).

3.7.6 Failures of Counternarcotics Goals

The original goals of the increased volume of SSA and total aid to Colombia since the 1990s – to eradicate the production, supply, and trafficking of coca and other narcotics – failed. The U.S.

strategy funded a supply-side approach to counternarcotics, based on prohibition, forced displacement of coca farmers, aerial fumigation, and using soldiers and police to confront and combat illegal armed groups that funded, profited from, and organized much of the drug economy in Colombia (GAO, 2008). Multiple reports by the GAO, from 2001 to 2018 have all concluded that the drug reduction goals of U.S. assistance programs in Colombia have failed (GAO, 2001; GAO; 2008; GAO, 2018). As of 2017, Colombia remains the world's largest producer and exporter of cocaine, with coca cultivation above the levels from 2002, and production of cocaine is estimated at 800 to 1200 metric tons per year (GAO, 2018). Despite increasing numbers of cocaine seizures and interdiction, from 2013 to 2016, Colombian cocaine production expanded faster that at any point in history (Isacson, 2017). Analyses have found that coca farmers and producers have easily re-planted and relocated cultivation and production operations, and that aerial fumigation, manual seizures, and armed assaults and arrests of drug traffickers and paramilitaries are short-term tactics with no long-term results for the drug economy (Isacson, 2017).

Both Colombian leaders and research on the U.S.'s counternarcotics SSA policies have concluded that these strategies failed to address the systemic causes of illicit drugs cultivations and production, such as poverty, lack of economic opportunity, and ongoing conflict, while they have negatively affected the environment, economic stability, and health of citizens living near coca-producing regions (Acevedo et al., 2008) Plan Colombia caused coca production to spread to new areas and increase in neighboring countries, Despite the evidence, U.S. policymakers have continued this deficient, short-term strategy, offered no viable alternatives, and have applied similar approaches in other Latin American countries and Afghanistan (Alpert, 2016). As mentioned, in 2015, the Colombian government halted the aerial fumigation of coca crops, which had destroyed subsistence crops and generated serious illness for hundreds of thousands of Colombians for decades (Neuman, 2015). In 2016, Colombian President Santos reflected on the failures of the decades-long U.S.-

backed counterdrug strategy, noting that Colombia remained the number one producer of cocaine, quipping "we've never been number two" (Alpert, 2016).

3.7.8 Increase in Internal Displacement and Violence against Citizens

In addition to the negative impacts of drug eradication programs on Colombian citizens, the U.S.'s support for a militarized campaign against drug traffickers, guerillas, and paramilitary groups—which expanded as a counterterrorism offensive after 9/11—also generated devastating impacts for millions of Colombians (Isacson 2005). Under Plan Colombia, U.S. SSA provided weapons and training to Colombian armed forces in their efforts to attack armed insurgent groups and regain control of territory in the "push into Southern Colombia" strategy (CRS, 2001). From 1999 to 2002, Colombian President Pastrana had engaged in peace negotiations with FARC, but the U.S. opposed the proposed settlement with FARC, and with the increase in militarized counternarcotics operations, Plan Colombia led to the breakdown of the negotiations, inciting the worst period of violence in a half-century of armed conflict (Cohen, 2020). As armed offensives against drug producers and guerrillas escalated, it is estimated that Plan Colombia contributed to the internal displacement of up to 4 million citizens, placing Colombia only behind Syria in terms of the number of internally displaced people today (Lee, 2020).

In its efforts to combat left-wing insurgent groups, beginning in the mid-1990s, the Colombian army had unofficially aligned itself with illegal armed right-wing paramilitary groups under the umbrella organization of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, or AUC (Beittel, 2019). In efforts to obtain higher counts of killings and captures of left-wing FARC and ELN guerrillas, between 2000 and 2008, the Colombian army and paramilitaries engaged in widespread human rights abuses, extrajudicial assassination, and detention of thousands of citizens (Beittel, 2019). Known as the "false positives" scandal, Colombian forces killed over 5,000 noncombatants,

placed weapons on their bodies, and then reported them as enemy combatants killed in action (Beittel, 2019; Carasik, 2016). Colombian forces and the AUC committed other abuses, killing more than 1,000 trade unionists, 370 journalists, and 400 human rights defense, with many more activists tortured, disappeared or detained, and nearly half a million women were subjected to sexual violence from 2001 to 2009 (Carasik, 2016). As other indicators of violence declined and the Colombian government eventually reached a peace agreement with FARC in 2016, the impacts of mass displacement, violence, and human rights abuses would leave a permanent mark on the legacy of Plan Colombia.

In addition to the human rights abuses and displacement of Colombian citizens throughout the implementation of Plan Colombia, drug trafficking and drug-related violence also migrated from Colombia to Central America and Mexico. As mentioned, the military's attacks on drug producers and traffickers in Colombia resulted in a dispersion of the drug economy and its associated violence to countries that served as transit routes to the U.S., primarily Mexico and Central America (Felbab-Brown, 2009). The migrating drug trade enriched and empowered Mexican drug cartels, and violence in Mexico escalated from 2006 to 2016, with an estimated 150,000 cartel-related civilian deaths during these years (Felbab-Brown, 2009; Beittel, 2020). The Bush and Obama administrations responded to Mexico's surge in drug trafficking and drug-related violence with a similar approach as in Colombia, by funding billions in SSA to send weapons and training to Mexican soldiers and police to engage in warfare with the cartels. This approach has been described as "irrelevant at best and disastrous at worst," as it has exacerbated violence in Mexico, achieved few results with reducing the power of cartels or the drug trade, and has brought drug-related violence closer to U.S. borders (Armstrong, 2012). The externalities of the decades-long SSA strategy in Colombia there contributed to the spread of the drug trade, criminal organizations, and violence against citizens both within Colombia and across Central America and Mexico (Armstrong, 2012).

3.7.9 Reduction in Internal Conflict and the 2016 Peace Agreement

Despite the failure to reduce overall drug production, the expanded number of internally displaced persons, and widespread human rights abuses, since 2000, several indicators of violence have improved in Colombia, and the 2016 peace agreement with FARC signaled the end to the half-century long violent conflict (Franz, 2017). Once a global leader in violent crime, from 2002 to 2015, Colombia's homicide rate dropped by more than 50%, annual victims of guerilla and paramilitary massacres dropped from roughly 600 to 50, and kidnappings dropped by over 90% (Isacson, 2016). While many factors contributed to these improved security measures, this can generally be attributed to a concerted effort by Colombia's leaders to expand deployment of military and police throughout more of the nation's territory, improved police coverage in urban areas, and the increased mobility of security sectors – thanks in part to U.S.-provided vehicles – to respond more quickly to guerilla attacks and kidnappers (Isacson, 2016). In 2016, after 4 years of negotiations, Colombia ratified a peace agreement with FARC to bring an end to the violent conflict, although the agreement was initially rejected by a national referendum due to polarized popular opinion and opposition to the concessions by the government. Today, Colombia is one of the region's healthiest economies, and has become the leading U.S. ally in South America and a major free-trade partner (Miroff, 2016).

Given these improvements in Colombia's security, U.S. policymakers and military officials have characterized the country as a key example of successful security assistance policies, which provided training and equipment to Colombian soldiers and police to improve their professionalization and operational capacity (Vaughn, 2019). However, both U.S. officials and researchers are careful not to overstate the independent contribution that U.S. policies and SSA had on Colombia's improving security or 2016 peace deal (Miroff, 2016). In 2013, General John Kelly stated that Colombia was "perhaps the best example of the inherent value of security assistance in

the region" (Richani, 2013). However, in a 2015 op-ed, General Kelly noted that the critical enabler for Colombia's success was the will and commitment by its own leaders, and that "[U.S.] support through Plan Colombia was but a small fraction of the more than tens of billions of dollars the Colombian government invested to bring their country back from the brink and force a committed adversary to the negotiating table" (Kelly, 2015). While U.S. security sector assistance funding was not the primary cause for Colombia's security sector improvements or victory over FARC, some observers argue that "in critical ways, the U.S. intervention tipped the war" in favor of government forces (Miroff, 2016).

While the U.S. provided resources and equipment to help Colombian leadership to improve state capacity and reduce the power of FARC guerrillas, some observers are more critical of claims that SSA programs had a substantial impact on Colombia's security improvements. U.S. aid to Colombia never exceeded 0.8% of its GDP, and Colombian investment in its own security sectors was several times greater than U.S. funding (Miroff, 2016). A study published by the National Defense University argues that the most important factors for improved security and the peace agreement were the strategic long-term plans created by Colombian leadership, the domestic political consensus that endorsed these plans, the institutional strength that followed judicial, anticorruption, and security force reforms, and the fact that FARC and other armed guerrillas organizations were weaker than expected and unable to adapt to the state's military offensive (Spencer, 2012). This report argues that while U.S. security sector assistance and other aid played an important enabling role, the U.S. did not drive Colombian policy and strategy (Spencer, 2012). Additionally, Colombia's peace negotiations with FARC took place in Cuba, as a deliberate signal to both FARC and other Latin American leaders that the peace agreement reflected their own regional interests and as a rejection of any U.S. meddling or influence in the deal (Rodriguez, 2020). The

effect of U.S. assistance on improved security in Colombia depends on the extent to which SSA enhanced Colombian leaders' pursuit of their own strategies and policies.

3.7.10 Conclusion – The Mixed Success of U.S. Security Sector Assistance in Colombia

The case of U.S. SSA programs in Colombia has been promoted by U.S. policymakers and pundits as a success, with some claiming that Plan Colombia created a "Colombian miracle" that saved the country from state failure, and others suggesting it serve as a model for U.S. policies throughout Latin America (Tate, 2016). However, the guiding, preeminent goal of U.S. policies toward Colombia from the 1980s through the development of Plan Colombia – combatting and reducing the Colombian drug economy – has been an abject failure. For many U.S. policymakers today, the decades-long counternarcotics objectives of U.S. policies in Colombia are forgotten or dismissed, while they proclaim its success at improving Colombia's internal security (Tate, 2016). Plan Colombia's conflicting effects on internal security – a tenuous end to the conflict with FARC that followed mass displacement, widespread human rights abuses, and violence against citizens – also call into question the claim that U.S. SSA policies were a "success" in the country. For decades, U.S. policymakers had expressly forbid U.S. assistance from being entangled in Colombia's internal conflict, but after it was reframed as a front in the WOT after 9/11, they now claim the U.S. had a direct hand in the conflict's resolution.

Recent developments in Colombia and in the Trump administration's foreign policies suggest little change in the future of the U.S.'s strategy or SSA policies in Colombia. Given the continued coca production and trafficking from Colombia, the Trump administration has pressured the Colombian government to violate its own laws and resume aerial fumigation programs, expand forced eradication of coca crops, and violate elements of the peace accords with FARC, all while opposing the alternative economic development and crop substitution program for coca cultivation

that was part of the peace accords (Kincaid, 2020). In 2017, Trump threatened to withhold SSA funds and decertify Colombia after accusing the government of violating U.S. counternarcotics requirements, but did not take this step, in part due to the DOD's support for Colombian forces' training of other countries' security sectors (Beittel, 2019). In 2017, the administration deployed over 50 U.S. special forces to Colombian regions near the Venezuelan border, claiming to support counternarcotics operations (Kincaid, 2020). However, analysts in Colombia warn that the U.S. military presence is simply using Colombian as staging grounds to monitor or threaten Venezuela, while destabilizing the peace process and stoking conflict with FARC (Kincaid, 2020).

These conclusions and recent developments highlight the strategic and substantive deficiencies of the U.S.'s SSA policies in Colombia. Due to both domestic political concerns and ideological commitments to the War on Drugs, for several decades, U.S. policymakers have promoted a militarized, supply-side set of counternarcotics policies in Colombia, which have consistently failed, while generating destabilizing side effects within the country. These policies lacked a long-term strategy, and reflected the interests and beliefs of U.S. policymakers, while they rejected alternative, evidence-based counternarcotics approaches proposed by Colombia's own leaders. When U.S. leaders created a post-hoc association between Plan Colombia and global counterterrorism efforts after 9/11, this shift reflected the changing domestic political imperatives and security environment of the U.S., rather than any coherent long-term strategy. Security assistance policies in Colombia promoted inadequate, inappropriate programs and strategies for combatting the drug economy and ignored the root causes of Colombia's crises, while the justifications for such programs shifted to reflect the changing political priorities of U.S. policymakers. U.S. policies focused primarily on providing weapons and training as a solution to Colombia's problems, which ultimately contributed to internal destabilization and failed to reduce

drug production, but eventually assisted Colombian leaders' internal security strategies (Singer, 2008).

3.8 Conclusion

In this paper, I argued that U.S. security sector assistance programs often fail to achieve their official goals, because these programs reflect the short-term priorities and domestic political interests of U.S. policymakers, and are not designed or tailor to address the complex, institutional problems within the countries receiving this assistance. This misalignment between U.S. policymakers' political priorities that shape SSA policies and the problems within the recipient countries creates fundamental flaws for these programs. I argued that SSA policies have strategic deficiencies: they generally lack a long-term plan for solving complex problems within the recipient country, and are shaped more by the immediate priorities of U.S. policymakers than by the conditions or needs of the recipient country. Additionally, SSA programs have substantive deficiencies: U.S. policymakers continuously rely on the same set of militarized aid programs, promoting weapons and training as a "Swiss Army Knife" tool, and these programs are inadequate and inappropriate for solving the complex problems for which they are justified. By describing the development and implementation of SSA programs in two cases – Pakistan and Colombia – this analysis explained how these deficiencies have limited the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy instruments for achieving their stated goals. In Pakistan, SSA policies failed to account for the strategic motivations of the country's leadership, and in Colombia, SSA has consistently failed to provide a realistic, long-term solution to the country's illicit drug economy. In both countries, security assistance policies were shaped by short-term political imperatives – rather than realistic goals or evidence – failed to achieve their original stated objectives.

This analysis has drawn several conclusions with implications for literature and debates on U.S. security assistance policies, foreign aid, and foreign policy. In terms of assessing the effectiveness of SSA programs and policies, this analysis has shown that they are not effective for achieving the goals of U.S. policymakers beyond short term, tactical offenses carried about by foreign soldiers or security forces. Security assistance is largely ineffective as a tool of leverage for coercing foreign militaries or leaders to alter their strategic concerns, political priorities, or reform their own institutions to suit the policy goals of the U.S. Providing weapons and training to foreign soldiers is not effective for quickly solving complex, long-standing economic, political, or security issues, such as eliminating terrorist organizations from regions that have historically faced poor governance, or eliminating drug markets that are a product of both domestic and international economic factors. If the recipient country does not share the same strategic interests as the U.S. or faces issues of corruption and internal instability, then SSA is not likely to be used by the recipient so pursue all of the U.S.'s goals.

The most obvious effect of providing weapons, equipment, training and resources to foreign soldiers, police, and security sectors is to increase these institutions' capacity for committing or threatening acts of violence or waging war. When the U.S. provides these tools in order to increase foreign countries' capacity for state violence against these countries' internal or external adversaries, it is directly supporting or enabling whatever these foreign security forces decide to do with such resources. U.S. policymakers call these programs "security assistance" because they are funded as a way to improve foreign countries' "security," broadly defined. However, there is little guarantee that weapons in the hands of foreign soldiers will effectively improve security or be used in ways that U.S. policymakers intended. As explained in the previous chapter, and in this chapter's case studies of Pakistan and Colombia, these programs are frequently used to commit human rights abuses or in

ways that negatively affect citizens of the recipient countries or throughout the respective country's region.

Finally, the theories and evidence presented in this chapter have greater implications for how U.S. foreign policy programs and decisions are designed and implemented. As seen in the failures and destabilizing effects of the U.S.'s militarized approach in the global War on Terror and the War on Drugs, reactive foreign policy decisions often lack much consideration for their long-term effectiveness or externalities. When U.S. policymakers are driven by short-term political pressures to deploy security assistance as a way to combat salient problems – such as terrorism in Pakistan or drug trafficking in Colombia – they have tended to ignore the complex, historically-rooted factors that have produced such crises and instead treat the problems as simple battles to be fought with an injection of money, weapons, and tactical training. While the Trump administration's simultaneously isolationist and aggressive foreign policy rhetoric might signal a shift in the U.S.'s "grand strategy," the post-Cold War Washington consensus of "liberal hegemony" has largely failed. As Stephen Walt puts it, the U.S.'s tendency to overextend its attempts to influence the global order has been a failure, as "Democracy is in retreat worldwide, violent extremists are active in more places, the European Union is wobbling, and the uneven benefits of globalization have produced a powerful backlash against the liberal economic order that the United States had actively promoted" (Walt, 2018). The strategic and substantive deficiencies of the U.S.'s security assistance programs – deployed in over 100 countries worldwide – are evidence of the lack of any long-term "grand strategy" among policymakers in the executive or legislative branches.

Conclusion

While many scholars have examined various effects of U.S. foreign policy tools, military aid, and security assistance programs, it is important to continue to analyze what factors motivate U.S. foreign policy decisions and how these decisions create long-term impacts within countries around the world. As some observers note the decline of post-Cold War "liberal hegemony" and U.S.'s global preeminence, it is increasingly important to understand the limits and implications of the foreign policy tools used by U.S. policymakers to pursue various strategic interests and promote U.S. interests abroad. In this dissertation, I advance research and add to the discourse on these themes by testing theories about the motivations and effects of U.S. military aid and security assistance policies.

First, I argued that U.S. military aid programs—used to subsidize purchases of U.S.-made military equipment—are utilized to improve the U.S.'s competitive advantage in the competitive global arms market. While scholars have assessed both the politics of arms sales and the effects of various security assistance and military aid programs, my analysis contributes an original theory on the relationship between military aid and the competitive economy of arms exports. The findings of this analysis highlights questions about how military aid is driven by concerns about sustaining the U.S.'s defense industry, rather than legitimate concerns for global stability or international security.

Second, I assessed the contemporary political strategy which promotes security assistance as a way to improve the capacity of foreign security sectors and therefore reduce the likelihood of instability and state fragility. I described several mechanisms by which security assistance programs are more likely to worsen conditions of state fragility or generate null effects for improving internal stability, particularly when provided to developing states with fragile domestic institutions. Through quantitative analyses and a variety of qualitative examples and a case study, I show how this contemporary U.S. security assistance strategy has been ineffective and counterproductive for

improving security and stability abroad. In doing so, this analysis explains how certain elements of contemporary U.S. foreign policy are often counterproductive in the long term.

Finally, I develop a theoretical approach for understanding why U.S. policymakers choose to use security assistance as a tool for addressing a wide range of complex problems and crises abroad. I argue that security assistance policies suffer from strategic and substantive deficiencies which made them unlikely to effectively address problems in recipient countries and more likely to fail at achieving their stated goals in the long term. By using historical narratives and process tracing of U.S. policies toward two critical case studies, I showed how the short-term, domestic political imperatives of U.S. policymakers drive security assistance policies, which are often misaligned with the conditions and root causes of problems facing the recipient countries. In doing so, I connect research on domestic U.S. politics with the failures and limits of foreign policy programs and strategies.

I tested these theories with a range of qualitative and quantitative data, blending descriptive historical explanations, detailed theoretical models, and mixed analytical methods to assess the limits of contemporary U.S. foreign policy tools. This research helps to inform active policy debates on the future of U.S. foreign policy and security relationships with foreign countries amidst a changing global security environment. Future research should continue to track and analyze how these programs affect foreign citizens and institutions and how U.S. policymakers can exercise more restraint or long-term strategic thinking in the design and implementation of foreign policy programs. As the 21st century brings continued shifts in the global balance of power and the ability for individual countries to address global instability and emerging crises, researchers and policymakers alike must study and develop new strategies and approaches for engaging foreign countries, leaders, and institutions that go beyond the outdated, short-sighted models of contemporary foreign assistance programs and military aid.

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