New Urbanism and Neighborhood Revitalization:

A Case Study Analysis of Urban Design, Economic Development and Social Equity in HOPE VI Neighborhood Revitalization Projects

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Abstract

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HOPE VI neighborhood revitalization grants focus limited government resources in distressed communities to facilitate neighborhood change and transform urban neighborhoods into vibrant communities. HUD collaborated with the Congress for New Urbanism to develop principles for urban design to guide neighborhood revitalization. Inherent to this partnership is the assumption that urban design facilitates social economic development.

Multiple cross-site analyses and case study research evaluate the ability of new urbanism principles to initiate meaningful neighborhood revitalization. Critics of new urbanism inevitably find fault in outcomes while new urbanists invariably document evidence of success. This research attempts to reconcile divergent ideologies to evaluate HOPE VI neighborhood revitalization projects by the design standards prescribed by new urbanism: if new urbanism principles are successfully implemented in HOPE VI neighborhood revitalization projects, new urbanism is responsible for the outcomes.

This research expands on existing theory to measure the relationship between new urbanism design and neighborhood revitalization. To minimize claims against validity, the study begins with successful HOPE VI neighborhood revitalization projects in Seattle, Washington—New Holly and Rainier Vista. The redevelopment projects, both recipients of HOPE VI grants, are nationally recognized as exemplars of new urbanism. Urban design analysis considers each component of new urbanism design guidelines and verifies the presence, or absence, and effectiveness these principles. After analysis confirms HOPE VI redevelopment faithfully implements new urbanist principles, the research shifts to social and economic metrics that approximate neighborhood change and neighborhood revitalization. Neighborhood change is measured by qualitative indicators that influence neighborhood perception and stimulate private investment. Neighborhood revitalization is defined by the ability of a neighborhood to attract capital investment and ensure sustained development. The analysis ends with a discussion of social justice related to HOPE VI redevelopment projects.

The research concludes the New Holly and Rainier Vista redevelopment projects ascribe to new urbanism design principles. Social and economic variables identify trends that indicate neighborhood change at New Holly and Rainier Vista, but neighborhood change has yet to attract requisite capital to catalyze neighborhood revitalization. The findings are constrained by time and external factors, discussed in the conclusion, and suggest directions for future research.

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DEDICATION

To those enablers of my wanderings

And

To those that taught me how to feel

And

To those, and all those things, that are not inferno

Introduction

In 1989, the 101st Congress of the United States recognized the failure of urban renewal programs and economic development initiatives to sufficiently address serial unemployment and concentrated poverty, high crime rates, limited social mobility and racial segregation that characterized central cities throughout the country. In response, Congress established the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing to evaluate the national public housing stock and "alleviate the conditions that contribute to severely distressed public housing by the year 2000" (NCSDPH, 1992). The Commission classified 6% of public housing stock severely distressed, a total of 86,000 units where residents lived in dilapidated and obsolete buildings, required high levels of social and support services, surrounded by economically distressed communities.

The commission developed a National Action Plan that recommended physical improvements combined with social and community services and participatory planning and management. In 1992, The Department of Veteran Affairs and Housing and Urban Development (HUD), acting on the recommendations of the commission, created the Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere program (HOPE VI). Described by HUD Secretary Andrew Cuomo as "one of the most exciting developments in public housing since 1937," HOPE VI funds projects that "transform the lives of residents and revitalize entire communities" (CNU and HUD, 2000). Since inception in 1993, HOPE VI has funded 262 neighborhood revitalization projects totaling $6.2 billion through fiscal year 2010 (HUD, 2012).

The creation of the HOPE VI program appropriated substantial and necessary funding to revitalize neighborhoods. HUD recognized "simply giving people a roof over their heads is no

longer enough" (CNU and HUD, 2000). To provide guidance to local government officials, public housing authorities, and distressed neighborhoods, HUD collaborated with the Congress for the New Urbanism to develop and publish Principles for Inner City Neighborhood Design. The new guidelines "shaped the criteria by which communities and their public housing agencies receive funds under the HOPE VI program" (CNU and HUD, 2000) and required HOPE VI grant recipients to integrate urban design and place-making to stimulate neighborhood change. The principles emphasize community involvement and local economic development, diverse, mixed-income and mixed-use neighborhoods, public open space, and vibrant streets to establish spatial patterns that allow regional accessibility to compact, walkable neighborhoods (CNU and HUD, 2000).

The adoption of design strategies to achieve neighborhood revitalization indicated a departure from traditional models of urban renewal. Neighborhood revitalization is commonly defined as: "A process to influence and support institutional choices within a regional context toward investment in a particular neighborhood or neighborhoods" (Schubert, 2001). Thus, in successful HOPE VI neighborhood development programs, design strategies implicit to new urbanism attract capital investment to ensure sustained redevelopment (Larsen, 2005). This new approach altered the relationship between public and private development interests and signified a major transition from managerial to entrepreneurial modes of governance.

Social and economic conditions coupled with changing political preference precipitated continued disinvestment in urban areas through the twentieth century. Suburbanization depleted the tax base of many metropolitan areas as middle- and high-income households abandoned central cities to avoid deteriorating urban conditions. At the same time, the federal government ceased to support public housing and redevelopment programs, culminating in a "retreat from

the war on poverty" during Reagan's presidency (Chudacoff, Smith and Baldwin, 2010, 250). The shift in demographics and political preference left local governments limited options and fewer resources to address crime, poverty, serial unemployment and ethnic segregation. Urban governments recognized they "had to be much more innovative and entrepreneurial, willing to explore all kinds of avenues through which to alleviate their distressed conditions and thereby secure a better future for their population" (Harvey, 1989). New urbanism projects funded by HOPE VI provided local governments with initial capital investment and design principles intended to perpetuate investment in distressed communities to accomplish broader revitalization goals.

While the Department of Housing and Urban Development clearly endorses new urbanism and the assumed efficacy of design to attract capital investment and alleviate persistent economic and social problems, few studies substantiate new urbanist recommendations (Moudon, 2000; Larsen, 2005). The literature on HOPE VI demonstrates that even when studies "document substantial improvements in poverty rates, household income, property values, and mortgage investment… case studies of HOPE VI sites, while limited to a small number of cities… have been faulted for the ways in which they have yielded to private urban redevelopment imperatives and gentrification pressures at the expense of low-income housing needs" (Hanlon, 2010). Case study research is limited by site-specific contexts; pre-existing economic and social conditions and implementation by local officials thus influence the success of HOPE VI redevelopment (Hanlon, 2010). Though this might suggest case-study research of new urbanism and HOPE VI neighborhood revitalization is limited by external factors, if HOPE VI projects meet the criteria delineated by the Congress for the New Urbanism and the Department of Housing and Urban Development, redevelopment should facilitate revitalization in distressed communities. This investigation examines the ability of new urbanism design principles,

implemented with HOPE VI funding, to accomplish economic development goals in the inner city, alleviate serial marginalization of minority and impoverished populations, address urban social problems, and foster equity and social justice.

Seattle, Washington provides relevant opportunities to evaluate the effectiveness of HOPE VI and new urbanism in neighborhood revitalization. In 1995, the Seattle Housing Authority received a $48,116,503 HOPE VI neighborhood revitalization grant to redevelop Holly Park in the Rainier Valley neighborhood. Public-private partnerships increased the available funding to more than $340 million. SHA developed 871 units at Holly Park during World War II to house defense workers. The original public buildings, characterized by disrepair, were demolished and replace by 1,414 affordable and market rate units to meet the needs of the diverse populations that constitute the neighborhood. The neighborhood was renamed New Holly. Design strategies attempted to reconnect New Holly to South Seattle, improve street design and increase access to social and community services in a mixed-income community. To date, New Holly has received 13 local, state and national awards that recognize redevelopment, community and financial achievements (SHA, New Holly, 2012). "The project architects, Weinstein/Copeland Architects, were award the 2002 Congress for the New Urbanism Charter Award, recognizing the first phase of development as exemplifying "the best practices in the world of New Urbanism'" (Kleit, 2005).

New Holly is not the only HOPE VI project in the Rainier Valley. In 1999, HUD awarded an additional redevelopment grant to the Seattle Housing Authority for Rainier Vista. SHA received $35 million from HOPE VI and another $190 million from other funding sources, including $14.4 million from stimulus funds. SHA demolished 481 units of dilapidated public housing stock. While the project is still under construction, the final proposal includes approximately 875 units,

500 of which are designated as low-income housing. Similar to New Holly, the project leverages new, light-rail transportation networks, access to social and community services, to create a mixed-income community that is “one of the most desirable neighborhoods in Seattle” (SHA, Rainier Vista, 2012).

Both developments ascribe to the new urbanism design strategies outlined in Principles for Inner City Neighborhood Design. The mix of housing options encourages economically and racially diverse communities. Street design promotes pedestrian activity, eyes on the street, and compact neighborhoods. Spatial patterns rectify historic isolation of residents in the Rainier Valley and increase access to employment opportunities and social services. Infill development targets mixed-use neighborhoods. The extent to which New Holly and Rainier Vista conform to the design guidelines is addressed in greater detail in subsequent sections, but this cursory review suggests new urbanist principles are intentionally integrated into the design and planning in the Rainier Valley. If HOPE VI funded new urbanism projects realize the assumed benefits of neighborhood revitalization, proof of neighborhood change in the Rainier Valley should be evident and measureable by qualitative and quantitative indicators.

This study utilizes a complex methodological framework to measure the contribution of HOPE VI new urbanism to neighborhood revitalization in the Rainier Valley. Research includes a contextualization to describe the historical function of the Rainier Valley; primary and secondary sources weave together to acknowledge the important regional role for immigrant and minority populations since early settlement. The literature review discusses urban design and planning theory that link design, capital investment and economic development and examines the relationship between urban design, social demographics, community development, routine activities of place and crime prevention. Relevant academic research identifies appropriate

social and economic indicators to evaluate neighborhood revitalization. These theories are then integrated in a comprehensive methodology and organized by elements described in The Just City: urban design, economic development and social equity (Fainstein, 2010).

Urban design analysis considers spatial relationships that evolve from design intervention. This section evaluates how closely New Holly and Rainier Vista conform to the Principles for Inner City Neighborhood Design to efficiently leverage scarce resources to foster local economic development, increase land use mix, improve accessibility and connectivity, promote safety and security, create compact and walkable neighborhoods with street design and public open space, and preserve the architectural fabric of the community. The current spatial pattern is compared to historical development patterns to observe the urban design response to persistent social and economic problems. Fieldwork grounds spatial analysis in observation and photo documentation. The analysis then compares crime prevention theory inherent to defensible space (Newman, 1972, 1995) and routine activities of place (Jacobs, 1961; Whyte, 1980; Reynald and Elffers, 2009) with crime statistics to measure whether intervention mitigates crime.

Economic development focuses on two elements: neighborhood change and neighborhood revitalization. Qualitative indicators reveal patterns of neighborhood change to create conditions that attract development. Neighborhood revitalization analyzes property values, residential and commercial development, and home improvement to approximate capital investment (Larsen, 2005). This investigation expands the research to include patterns investment and disinvestment in Rainier Valley before and after HOPE VI intervention (Hackworth, 2001) and proxy indicators to measure neighborhood change, and by extension, the ability “to attract and maintain private investment as well as provide its residents with employment and

wealth-building opportunities" (Zielenbach, 2003). A representative list of indicators includes ethnic and racial composition, household income mix, education levels, and affordability; crime rates and community stability indicators—housing tenure and single-parent households—serve as proxies to estimate neighborhood market potential (Hubbard, 1995; Zielenbach, 2003; Deitrick and Ellis, 2004; Varady et al., 2005; Larsen, 2005; Galster, Tatian and Accordino, 2006; Talen, 2010).

In HOPE VI projects, tension develops between economic development, urban design and social equity. Kennedy and Leonard (2001) summarize potential conflicts between growth and equity objectives: "While it is clear that HOPE VI is reducing crime, blight and density of public housing projects, it appears too early to tell whether HOPE VI is contributing to gentrification." Their research provides indicators to approximate conditions that lead to gentrification and trends that signify gentrification in progress. These indicators overlap with new urbanism design principles and HOPE VI objectives: ease of access to job centers and high architectural value are both urban design strategies and conditions of gentrification; increased rates of homeownership and amenities for mixed-income residents are indicators of gentrification in progress and HOPE VI objectives (Kennedy and Leonard, 2001). Though the presence of these elements predict or indicate gentrification, commonly accepted definitions of gentrification require displacement of lower-income residents and neighborhood change that affects the character of the neighborhood. To study social equity, then, this research emphasizes displacement and neighborhood character using census data and demographics to analyze neighborhood change over time.

Literature Review

HOPE VI new urbanism is a design response to continued deterioration in the central city—marred by disinvestment, racial segregation and concentrated poverty—and the subsequent suburbanization of the built environment responsible for placeless sprawl, environmental degradation and greenfield development in rural and agricultural lands (CNU, 2012). The movement prioritizes urban design and planning principles that focus on physical spatial structure and embrace "the best physical qualities of traditional neighborhoods and small towns—connected street grids, local shopping, community parks, rear alleys and front porches" (Larice and Macdonald, 2007)—to establish physical contexts that further socioeconomic goals. Douglas Kelbaugh (2008) summarizes these goals:

"[T]o equitably mix people of different income, ethnicity, race and age; to build public architecture and public space that make citizens feel they are part of, and proud of, a culture and community that adds up to more than the sum of its private worlds; to be a responsible ecological force; to weave together a tighter urban fabric that mixes land of different uses and buildings of different architectural types within a well-connected network of streets and green spaces; to utilize regional public transit, revenue sharing, planning and governance to better tie together the metropolitan area."

The excerpt illustrates the complexity of the challenge accepted by new urbanists that readily acknowledge the limitations of physical design solutions to comprehensively address socioeconomic issues. Instead, new urbanism is positioned to facilitate economic vitality, community stability and environmental health through a coherent and supportive physical framework. New urbanism contributes 27 principles to guide public policy,

development practice, urban planning and design, to develop a theoretical framework organized by "three interrelated spatial scales: metropolis, city, and town; neighborhood, district and corridor; and block, street, and building" (Urban Design Reader). The argument posited by new urbanists—though implicit, still tentative—connects urban design and physical form to potential social and economic change across all three spatial scales.

New urbanism coalesces around three central concepts, articulated by the leaders of the movement, into a unified, though intentionally open, design theory: traditional neighborhood design (Duany and Plater-Zyberk), transit-oriented development and pedestrian zones (Calthorpe and Kelbaugh), and quarters (Krier). In concert, these theories form the normative basis—most evident in the Charter of the New Urbanism—for new urbanism that emphasizes diverse, compact, mixed use, pedestrian-friendly neighborhoods, derived from physical spatial structures that character pre-World War II communities, as the essential unit of community and economic development (Bohl, 2000). Neighborhood centers are then the focal point for shopping, dining, services and transit; residential areas radiate in decreasing density from this center (Calthorpe, 1993). The most recent iteration of new urbanism embodies the distribution and concentration of housing, economic activity and public and open space along a rural-to-urban transect that prescribes "types of streets, buildings, and public spaces consistent with the rural, suburban, or urban character of different settings, and a traditional neighborhood structure consisting of central, general, and edge zones" (Bohl, 2000). While new urbanist theory continues to evolve through research, the movement also receives substantial support by integrating place-based revitalization strategies with profitable density and land use patterns that incentivize private development (Larsen, 2005).

Despite the purported benefits of new urbanism, the movement is not without detractors that

criticize multiple components of new urbanism: normative recommendations are not validated by empirical evidence; principles rely on physical determinism; housing in new urbanist and transit-oriented developments is not affordable; redevelopment in inner city neighborhoods prioritizes economic growth and precipitates gentrification and resident displacement; traditional forms and spatial patterns proposed by new urbanism are nostalgic and thus static; design strategies are prescriptive and formulaic; and greenfield development contributes to low-density sprawl. These are not the only critiques against new urbanism, but the most prominent concerns evident in academic literature (Hanlon, Urban Design Reader, Moudon, Pyatok, Larsen, Fainstein). As Moudon (2000) succinctly observes, “The battle is on and it is not clear who will win the war. How well New Urbanism fares in the long term… will depend on how it decides to measure itself and validate its claims.”

Cliff Ellis (2002), a proponent of new urbanism and a major contributor to the body of literature that advocates new urbanist principles, separates these criticism into three categories: empirical evidence, ideological and cultural issues, and aesthetic quality. In an article dedicated entirely to the debate on new urbanism, Ellis suggests empirical findings are inconclusive, ideological and cultural critiques are theoretical abstractions subject to debate, and aesthetic quality cannot be statistically measured. After acknowledging the contribution of criticism in identifying theoretical deficiencies and directing future research, Ellis marginalizes “critiques of the New Urbanism [that] display characteristic flaws. Chief among these are the use of caricature, inadequate sampling of projects, deficient understanding of New Urbanist principles and practices, premature judgments, unrealistic expectations and ideological bias.” Instead of demonstrating proof of goodness, Ellis challenges critics to propose alternatives to new urbanism that replace “the current default setting for urban development in the US” where preferences for auto-dependent sprawl drive urban form.

The debate on new urbanism continues unresolved. Local officials in older industrial cities have displayed renewed interest in design to catalyze urban revitalization, explicitly linking good design with economic and social objectives (Dietrick and Ellis, 2004). A growing number of city governments perceive urban design as a strategy to emphasize distinctive social, cultural and physical attributes to attract capital investment and foster local development and economic growth (Hubbard, 1995). The erosion of public sector resources in the United States encourages local governments to adopt a neoliberal or entrepreneurial approach to encourage economic development, partnering with the private sector to "sell the city" (Hubbard, 1995; Larsen, 2005). Broad political acceptance of neoliberal economics and entrepreneurial governance shape neighborhood revitalization projects administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development and, by extension, HOPE VI projects that embrace new urbanism principles. New urbanism is thus challenged to translate design principles into tangible investment and economic growth in urban areas characterized by concentrated poverty, high crime, and racial and ethnic segregation.

Since 1993, HUD has dedicated over $6.2 billion to 262 new urbanism projects (HUD, 2012); the private sector, responding to economic incentives, is responsible for approximately 320 new urbanism developments in the United States (Talen, 2010). The popularity and proliferation of new urbanism projects thus challenges new urbanism to implement design principles to achieve tangible investment and economic growth in areas characterized by concentrated poverty, high crime, and racial segregation. Due to the preponderance of projects in both the public and private sectors and substantial financial investments, the principles espoused by new urbanists warrant analysis to measure the contribution of new urbanism to neighborhood revitalization. An array of cross-site and case study analysis attempts to determine whether new urbanism in HOPE VI projects achieves the objectives delineated in Principles for Inner-City Neighborhood

Design and if those objectives contribute to neighborhood revitalization.

Cross-site studies focus on socioeconomic indicators before and after HOPE VI revitalization (Zielenbach, 2003; Varady et al., 2005; Talen, 2010). These studies approach specific facets of new urbanism: Zielenbach emphasizes census data to measure neighborhood change to determine if new urbanism and HOPE VI create conditions that attract investment; Talen emphasizes housing affordability; and Varady et al research the ability of HOPE VI projects to attract middle-income families. Case study research in Birmingham, England (Hubbard, 1995), Atlanta (Keating, 2000), Washington D.C. (Cunningham, 2001), Pittsburg (Deitrick and Ellis, 2004), Orlando (Larsen, 2005), Tampa (Fogel, Smith and Williamson, 2008), and Louisville (Hanlon, 2010) consider the relationship between new urbanism, economic growth and social transformation in redeveloped neighborhoods. These studies—both cross-site and case study research—rely on unique methodologies and attach importance to different indicators, but the conclusions are remarkably similar: poverty rates decrease while household incomes, property values, and community stability increase (Zielenbach, 2003; Hanlon, 2010). The findings also suggest negative externalities that result from neighborhood revitalization. Social justice is questioned in each study, specifically displacement, gentrification, and housing affordability. More abstract concepts, inherently difficult to substantiate statistically, are discussed throughout the literature, openly criticizing the assumed relationship between community development and spatial proximity/chance encounters, the reestablishment of social ties after redevelopment, and the distribution of benefits in mixed-income neighborhoods as the marketplace responds to changing consumer demographics.

The outcomes HOPE VI neighborhood revitalization projects are constrained by a spatial and socioeconomic context and thus difficult to analyze. Each project attempts to integrate urban

design with social, economic and community development components. Public officials and agencies, non-governmental organizations, and private developers leverage shared resources to implement solutions. Revitalization research is thus vulnerable to questions that concern validity. Ellis (2000) and Hanlon (2010) suggest the selected case studies are not representative of the HOPE VI program while cross-site studies fail—or are unable—to separate the complex components that constitute revitalization projects. In order to effectively evaluate the success of HOPE VI projects, it is then more valuable and representative to evaluate successful HOPE VI projects (Dietrick and Ellis, 2004; Hanlon, 2010). Only when public housing agencies collaborate with non-government organizations and private developers to incorporate, implement, and appropriately manage revitalization projects, can the analysis claim validity and measure the contribution of new urbanism to revitalization. Noticeably absent from both cross-site and case studies are rigorous analyses of the application of urban design principles. Most research is content to simply identify a project as new urbanist and then focus on outcomes, with occasional tribute to selected theories of defensible space or street networks and walkability. Rarely do these projects consider the extent to which public-private partnerships conform to and implement Principles of Inner-City Neighborhood Design. When a project is successful, outcomes are accepted as evidence of appropriately implemented new urbanism principles, not absent, underfunded or poorly managed elements. Thus, new urbanism must claim responsibility for some outcome of HOPE VI projects, even if those outcomes are not unequivocally supportive of new urbanist theory.

The relationship between new urbanism and neighborhood revitalization is the focus of this research. Fainstein (2000) describes the dilemma: “In its easy elision of physical form with social conditions, the new urbanism displays little theoretical rigor.” Harvey (1997) expresses similar reservations:

> “But my real worry is that the movement [new urbanism] repeats at a fundamental level the same fallacy as the architectural and planning styles it criticizes. Put simply, does it not perpetuate the idea that the shaping of spatial order is or can be the foundation for a new moral and aesthetic order? Does it not presuppose that proper design and architectural qualities will be the saving grace not only of American cities, but of social, economic and political life in general?”

While these concerns might have been valid when written, current research offers either new insight or expands and substantiates older theories. Moudon (2000) and Hess (1997) posit new methods to evaluate connectivity and pedestrian accessibility with pedestrian route directness; at the same time, academic research attempts to establish normative standards for walkable communities from resident interviews and urban design criteria (Southworth, 2005). Distance is only part of an equation with both abstract design and discrete variables that distinguish walkable neighborhoods from auto-dominated streetscapes. Street networks, pedestrian sheds, edge



Figure 1: Pedestrian Accessibility and Route Directness. Source: Moudon (2000).

characteristics and daily needs of life are elements that define walkable communities. A walkable distance is then a function of these components. As of now, there is no consensus on distance. Early advocates define walkable neighborhoods as communities where “[t]he daily needs of life are accessible within the five-minute walk” (Kuntsler, 1996, 117); other approaches consider a walking shed that “delineates the area from which a place is reachable by a half-mile walk” (Hess, 1997, 63). Even if the research is inconclusive, trends emerge: Americans don’t expect to walk far for daily errands (only 10% would walk a half-mile) and route quality and directedness are critical (Southworth, 2005; Hess, 1997). New urbanism advocates high-quality street design and small blocks to accommodate stated resident preferences, minimize distance, and develop safe and vibrant streetscapes. Pedestrian route directness quantifies these principles as a proxy for walkability, connectivity and accessibility.

New research on defensible space advances theory from anecdotal urban criticism written by Jane Jacobs (1961) that advocates eyes on the street, identifies the theoretical shortcomings of defensible space and territoriality defined by Oscar Newman (1972) and incorporating routine-activities-of-place from urban design (Jacobs, 1961; Whyte, 1980) and criminology (Cohen and Felson, 1979; Sherman et al., 1989). Recent reformulations consider three components that delineate defensible space: territoriality, natural surveillance and image and milieu. While empirical research struggles to attach natural surveillance to locals (Newman) or strangers (Jacobs), routine-activities-of-place provides a formula where crime occurs “when a motivated offender and a suitable target converge in time and space in the absence of a capable guardian” (Reynald and Elffers, 2009). Thus, both residents and visitors serve as guardians if they are capable. The literature further links the components of defensible space with place attachment, where perceived and observed incivilities alter perceptions about neighborhood conditions and partially predict resident behavior after neighborhood change. The same characteristics that

Newman describes to distinguish defensible space contribute to place attachment and thus crime prevention (Reynald and Elffers, 2009). Place attachment is related to the image and milieu of a neighborhood where lack of attachment results from observable nuisances and incivilities (Brown et al., 2004; 2004). Through a combination of design principles, new urbanism intends to develop urban spaces where the built environment manifests form and spatial structures that discourage criminal behavior. Local architectural character defines the image and milieu of the neighborhood; dwelling as mirror of self and public open space encourage territoriality; and mixed-use neighborhoods and dynamic streetscapes embellish the social life of public spaces to increase guardians and thus natural surveillance.

Public housing developments in distressed urban areas are characterized by concentrated of poverty, limited employment opportunities and racial segregation; “[t]he deleterious impact of decades of racial and socioeconomic segregation in urban America is now well documented” (Joseph, Chaskin and Webber, 2007). With the adoption of new urbanism, HOPE VI transitions from large-scale public housing developments that accommodate a large number of low-income residents to an updated model that emphasizes mixed-income housing. The model is intended to disperse concentrations of poverty and facilitate interaction between different income levels to increase social capital and improve access to job networks. In theory, a mixed-income community also increases neighborhood purchasing power to drive demand and support local economic growth. These conclusions are contentious. Critics suggest the approach effectively prioritizes affluent residents at the expense of low-income residents and causes displacement and gentrification inherent to slum clearance and urban renewal programs (Zielenbach, 2003). Mike Pyatok (2000) expands on this criticism when addressing the cures prescribed by HOPE VI and new urbanism:

> "The cure mythology currently being promoted by these groups is to relocate poor people away from trouble housing projects, to rebuild the housing at lower density, and to import higher-income households, particularly homeowners, to live among the remaining low-income residents. The assertion is that mixing households with a range of income is healthier for a neighborhood than maintaining a homogenous low-income population…. Importing neighbors who already have jobs does little in the way of providing real jobs for the underemployed or unemployed people who remain as part of the new mix, or for those who must move on and be excluded from the mix. Moreover, the strategies of relocating the poor with rent vouchers, as the HOPE VI program does… forces the same painful social and economic costs that people forced to move experienced under earlier forms of urban renewal."

But mixed-income strategies conform to the market rationale supported by neoliberal governance and offer an alternative to federal or state intervention—no longer plausible in the current fiscal reality—to confront urban poverty (Joseph, Chaskin and Webber, 2010). It is thus important to examine the dynamics of disinvestment and investment in neighborhoods targeted for revitalization to determine if the mixed-income strategy achieves stated objectives and to describe both positive (local economic growth, fewer concentrations of poverty) and negative (displacement and gentrification) consequences. The issue is further complicated by social equity concerns related to neoliberal economics (Fainstein, 2000, 2010), particularly evident in the housing market (Talen, 2010). New urbanism and HOPE VI are then challenged to develop mixed-income housing that defies market economics to attract higher income residents while retaining lower-income populations. Even if these contradictory goals are accomplished, social justice theory requires an equal distribution of benefits regardless of income level. If the market

responds to the demand generated by higher income groups, but neglects the needs of existing low-income residents, the mix of goods and services available to the neighborhood excludes factions of the community. Lower income residents are then forced to different neighborhoods to satisfy daily needs of life and nullify the intentions of both new urbanism and HOPE VI to create compact, walkable neighborhoods. These complexities question the ability of new urbanism principles to achieve equitable outcomes in neighborhood revitalization projects.

Methodology

This research intends to identify and evaluate the connection between new urbanism principles that guide design and implementation of HOPE VI programs and neighborhood revitalization. As indicated in the literature review, multiple methodologies have been applied to HOPE VI projects in an effort to quantify the relationship between design and development, with mixed and inconclusive results. Cross-site studies that compare socioeconomic indicators across multiple HOPE VI projects document tangible economic benefits, but question both the process and social equity consequences. Case study research, while limited to a small number of cities, identifies faults in HOPE VI that result from gentrification and displacement attributed to entrepreneurial urban governance and diminished federal support, which enable private development to dictate revitalization programs. Hanlon (2010, 81) acknowledges the contribution of these studies to academic research; he suggests “such research has offered only cursory assessments of how the program is implemented, and to what effects.” Both cross-site analysis and case studies suffer from contextual limitations. Again, Hanlon (2010): “Cross-site studies… are prone to inconclusiveness because the factors that bear upon successful HOPE VI revitalization vary widely from site to site;” and “case studies are arguably not representative of the program.” To correct for these deficiencies in the existing literature, he proposes “an investigation of a ‘successful’ HOPE VI revitalization project” (Hanlon, 2010).

The case studies selected for this research—New Holly and Rainier Vista in Seattle, Washington—are appropriate candidates for analysis. Both developments embrace the new urbanism design principles prescribed by HUD and the Congress of the New Urbanism necessary to receive HOPE VI funding. Both projects leverage HOPE VI funding to collaborate with the private sector and in so doing accept entrepreneurial modes of governance to

achieve desired development goals. While Rainier Vista is still in development, New Holly attained recognized success and received numerous local, regional and national awards (HUD – New Holly – 2012). The Seattle Housing Authority "is considered a high-performing housing authority" and attributes the "success of New Holly… to the excellent contacts and partnerships that were made during the HOPE VI process" (ULI, 2002). By multiple standards, then, New Holly is a 'success' and it is reasonable to assert that Rainier Vista, employing identical processes, will produce similar results. Rainier Vista also supplies additional capital to a previously distressed neighborhood, which only reinforces the initial phases of public and private funding and development.

New urbanism claims credit for the success of project such as New Holly, but at the same time posits: "it is possible for any enterprise to go wrong" (CNU and HUD, 2000). When HOPE VI projects fail to facilitate neighborhood revitalization, responsibility is ascribed to stalled design innovation, poorly administered projects, neglected public space and deteriorating buildings. Bohl, in defense of new urbanism in the city, further attempts to insulate the movement from criticism:

> "The potential for design to encourage and support civic interaction should not be confused with *causing* neighboring and civic engagement…New Urbanism needs to be viewed as simply one strategy to be integrated within the larger array of economic and community development programs and social services necessary to improve inner-city neighborhoods" (Bohl, 2000, 793).

It is beyond the scope of this research—if it is even possible in complex economic, social and political contexts—to extract from each design principle a measureable contribution to overall neighborhood revitalization, but the assumptions contained within Principles for Inner City

Neighborhood Design mirror the diverse benefits extolled by new urbanists and HOPE VI. If new urbanism can accept credit for successes to advance normative standards for good city form in functioning neighborhoods, the movement is vulnerable to criticism that links design and neighborhood revitalization. In selecting successful HOPE VI projects, this investigation intends to avoid claims against its validity, and seeks to establish causal relationship between city form and neighborhood revitalization. The first stage of analysis attempts only to confirm that HOPE VI developments at New Holly and Rainier Vista comply with the design guidelines developed by the Congress for the New Urbanism and mandated by HUD for HOPE VI grant applications.

Urban Design

The first challenge is to identify by which means design standards are measured or observed. Several strategies are subject only to binary verification, presence or absence: Citizen and Community Involvement, Economic Opportunity and Infill Development. No absolute standards exist to measure these variables. Community engagement manifests in different forms and frequencies; economic opportunity preferences inclusion of local and minority owned business when contracting construction; and infill development, particularly in inner-city neighborhoods, is expected. Cursory analysis merely confirms New Holly and Rainier Vista engaged the public through the planning and development process, preferenced local and minority developers, and reclaimed blighted and abandoned areas in existing neighborhoods.

The second and most robust level of evaluation considers urban design and the interrelation of principles that allow residents to assert tacit ownership of homes, streets, and the neighborhood at large to facilitate community interaction, promote safety and security and attract middle-income residents. Effective urban design leverages city-wide and regional transportation

networks to enhance accessibility to the “functions of daily life: living, retail, employment, recreation and civic and educational institutions” (CNU and HUD, 2000) and “help bring people into the neighborhood from other parts of the city” (Bohl, 2000). The majority of guidelines proposed by new urbanism are constrained to urban design analysis to approximate good: City-Wide and Regional Connections, Streets, Public Open Space, Safety and Civic Engagement, Dwellings as Mirror of Self, Accessibility, Local Architectural Character and Design Codes. Design principles are grouped by analytical method for evaluation.

The rural-to-urban transect—proposed as a normative new urbanism design strategy by Bohl and Plater-Zyberk (2006)—is an analytical tool to compare street design, mixed use, public open space, local architectural character and design guidelines against prescribed standards of good city form. The transect is represented by land use maps to match usage patterns with prescribed segments of the transect. The transect also indicates the mix of land uses in New Holly and Rainier Vista. As indicated by Bohl and Plater-Zyberk, the mixture of uses increases as the transect moves from the neighborhood fringe toward the village center. Photo documentation confirms the level of type of redevelopment is appropriate to the neighborhood and reconnects New Holly and Rainier Vista to the surrounding urban fabric.

City-wide and regional connections are combined with accessibility and evaluated by pedestrian route directness. This method identifies village centers, but can be adopted to different target destinations such as transit hubs and retail centers that satisfy the daily needs of life. Destinations that satisfy a variety of community needs are selected at intervals that radiate from these centers. Direct, formal pedestrian travel to the redevelopment center is mapped and compared to the linear distance between these origins and centers. The ratio of these two distance indicate the directness or indirectness of these routes, and thus characterize walkable

communities emblematic of compact neighborhoods and pedestrian-friendly street networks prescribed by new urbanism (Hess, 1997; Moudon, 2000).

Safety and civic engagement, dwellings as mirror of self and public open space are theoretically grounded in eyes on the street (Jacobs, 1961), defensible space (Newman, 1972; Reynald and Elffers, 2009) and the social life of public spaces (Whyte, 1980). After synthesizing these three theories into a theoretical framework, field observation and photo documentation identifies where opportunities for natural surveillance occur, how the redevelopment encourages territoriality and establishes an image and milieu for the neighborhood, and if the neighborhood allows routine activities of place to engage public space throughout the day. This design analysis is compared to crime rates in the HOPE VI neighborhood and throughout the Rainier Valley to determine if crime prevention through environmental design successfully mitigates crime in New Holly and Rainier Vista.

The final unique component, diversity, is evaluated empirically with socioeconomic data and connects urban design and neighborhood change through Diversity and Mixed Use objectives (Hubbard, 1995; Zielenbach, 2003; Deitrick and Ellis, 2004; Larsen, 2005; Varady et al., 2005; Galster, Tatian and Accordino, 2006; Talen, 2010). Diversity, as described in the Principles of Inner City Neighborhood Design (2000), “provides a broad range of housing types and price levels to bring people of diverse ages, races and incomes into daily interaction.” Census data and qualitative indicators confirm the diversity of the population. Identified through the literature review, the indicators are selected for their relevance to potential market investors (Zielenbach, 2003). The analysis benefits from three distinct census data sets: 1990, 2000 and 2010. Interpreted to test design objectives, the indicators are also significant elements of neighborhood revitalization.

These principles constitute the design elements that define a neighborhood. Neighborhoods are an essential element of cities (CNU and HUD, 2000; Bohl, 2000; CNU, 2012) and incorporate the principles listed above. Street networks, connectivity and accessibility contribute to the compact, pedestrian-friendly nature of new urbanist neighborhoods. Diversity encourages mixed use development objectives and generates demand for goods and services that supports daily activities of life and engages the street and activates community through chance encounters. The emphasis on infill development, historical spatial patterns, and local architectural character enables designers to repair existing neighborhoods and foster connectivity across neighborhoods to increase access to the central city. In new urbanism theory and literature, strong neighborhoods emerge from the faithful implementation of new urbanism design principles for inner city redevelopment.

Social and Economic Development

The implementation of new urbanism design principles in New Holly and Rainier Vista—successful HOPE VI revitalization projects—implies a theoretical connection between urban design and neighborhood revitalization. As defined earlier, neighborhood revitalization concerns the ability of a neighborhood to attract and sustain capital investment; neighborhood design constructs the physical context to attract investment. Neighborhood revitalization begins with neighborhood change, the bridge that links urban design with capital investment. New housing, improved connectivity and street networks, an increased economic and tax base, the deconcentration of poverty and decreased crime rates diminish risk factors to incentivize investment (Zielenbach, 2003). Access to amenities such as public transportation, entertainment and culture attractions, walkable communities and bicycle paths, public open space, and good schools, all contained within aesthetically pleasing urban villages attract

middle- and high-income residents, disperse concentrations of poverty and drive growth (Clark et al., 2002; Florida, 2002). Thus, at least theoretically, design is critical to successful neighborhood change. After neighborhood change transforms urban communities, the neighborhood begins to attract private investment necessary for neighborhood revitalization.

As the leading indicator of neighborhood revitalization, patterns of capital investment and disinvestment are critical to evaluation. While socioeconomic data are useful proxies (Zielenbach, 2003), they are limited as surrogates for neighborhood investment (Hackworth, 2001). Investment patterns involve two distinct types of capital: small-scale owner-occupiers and corporate real estate developers. The bifurcation suggests differences in investment patterns associated with neighborhood revitalization (Hackworth, 2002). Traditional revitalization occurres through capital accretion where individuals invested in homes in urban areas with weak housing markets and lower costs; the collective action of individuals catalyzes revitalization. With shifts in federal and local government policy, government agencies partner with private developers to facilitate neighborhood change and provide high levels of capital necessary to redevelop neighborhoods more quickly (Hackworth and Smith, 2001).

New construction and sales exchange are two primary indicators of neighborhood investment. Sales exchange is “a measure designed to convey the sense of capital flows into and out of various housing markets… is derived by multiplying sales volume by average sales price for a given year” (Hackworth, 2001). To analyze investment, new construction and sales exchange are categorized by market segment to differentiate between investment in residential and commercial uses. The rates of residential and commercial investment, calculated by comparing rates of neighborhood change of a selected indicator (new construction, sales data, and

approved home improvements permits) in the study area (New Holly and Rainier Vista) to the same indicator on a larger scale (Rainier Valley), illustrate the relative concentration of real estate investment in target neighborhoods (Hackworth, 2001). With GIS analysis, investment patterns are then mapped to determine whether a neighborhood market supports predominantly commercial, residential or mixed-use real estate development. Increases in property and home values, though not direct measures of investment, compliment the analysis to measure economic growth common to neighborhood revitalization and calculate affordability. These four indicators combine to quantify investment in and around the study neighborhoods and illustrate which types of investment occurs where, before, during and after HOPE VI neighborhood revitalization in the Rainier Valley. Increases in investment and property value—preconditions of gentrification—then lead to a discussion of social justice, the final component of *The Just City*.

Social Equity

Social justice in neighborhood revitalization is a complex and often contradictory objective, particularly in the entrepreneurial city, that requires definition. Social justice is compartmentalized into three elements—democracy, equity, and diversity. A just city "needs to incorporate an entrepreneurial state that not only provides welfare but also generates increased wealth; moreover, it needs to project a future embodying a middle-class society rather than only empowering the power and disenfranchised" (Fainstein, 2000). Thus, the central question of justice regards the distribution of costs and benefits, whether the outcomes of neighborhood revitalization, rather than the process, are equitable across the socioeconomic spectrum (Fainstein, 2010).

When neighborhood revitalization depends on capital investment to stimulate growth, tensions

between economic development, urban design and social justice manifest. Economic development and urban design objectives in HOPE VI projects combine to reproduce conditions that increase property values in distressed neighborhoods and result in gentrification and displacement of current residents (Larsen, 2005; Hanlon, 2010). Previous research identifies conditions that predict the likelihood of gentrification: high rate of renters, ease of access to job centers, increasing metropolitan congestion or rising gas prices, high architectural value and comparatively low-housing prices (Kennedy and Leonard, 2001). These elements are either present in HOPE VI communities targeted for reinvestment (high rate of renters, relative housing price) or fostered through urban design principles specific to new urbanism (increased access to transportation and jobs, high architectural value) and illustrate the relationship between market demand and community vulnerability that facilitates gentrification.

New residents, attracted to revitalized neighborhoods by amenities and opportunity, displace current residents; demand then translates into increased property values, housing price and rents and economically discriminates against low-income residents. Additional factors inherent to new urbanism and HOPE VI exacerbate the threat of gentrification and displacement. Walkable neighborhoods command price premiums in the marketplace and new urbanist developments located near transit are increasingly unaffordable for low-income families (Talen, 2010). HOPE VI has also abandoned a one-for-one low-income housing replacement standard that discouraged private investment in earlier iterations of public housing (New Holly and Rainier Vista have both exceeded the one-for-one standard).

At this confluence of new urbanism and neighborhood revitalization, urban design and economic development, social equity is often a victim of the entrepreneurial city. Both cross-site and case-study research question gentrification and resident displacement (Hanlon, 2010) and provide a

framework for which to measure displacement outcomes after neighborhood revitalization. In order to evaluate neighborhood change due to redevelopment, “the focus here is on the degree of racial change and poverty reductions in HOPE VI neighbourhoods” (Goetz, 2011). The indicators selected for analysis are extracted from earlier research and measure change in racial demographics, owner-occupancy rates and poverty rates. The data are then compared to changes in the surrounding neighborhoods throughout the Rainier Valley to determine relative change in neighborhood character and composition that results from revitalization efforts.

When gentrification occurs, the marketplace responds and provides urban and cultural amenities demanded by higher income levels (Kennedy and Leonard, 2001). Lower income groups are then confronted with an additional barrier of economic exclusion: the goods and services available within the neighborhood no longer affordable for the low-income residents and challenge the mixed income objectives central to neighborhood revitalization and new urbanist goals. A second level of analysis thus catalogues the available mix of goods and services to confirm gentrification trends. This analysis contributes significantly to the discussion section wherein the findings are unified to evaluate if new urbanism and HOPE VI promote an urban design solution for neighborhood revitalization that encourages economic development and distributes benefits equitably across socioeconomic groups.

Social and Economic Historical Context

The Rainier Valley is the traditional destination for immigrants and minorities and point of entrance to the Seattle market. This brief history traces the evolution of social and economic processes that concentrated the poorest residents into the neglected corner of Seattle. Not only does this history discuss the social and economic pressures that segregated minority populations, but identifies the causes of disinvestment in the post-war years and ends describing the conditions in public housing that necessitated HOPE VI intervention. The focus on the black population (though other immigrant populations, particularly Italians and Asians, also experience significant discrimination and segregation at different points during the history of Seattle) is not intended to elevate the black community to a place of special prominence, but the discrimination and segregation of the black community is representative of market trends. The history is thus a narrative that describes minority and immigrant experience in Seattle where large populations faced systemic discrimination and forced into a ghetto existence by concerted social pressure and economic forces in the Seattle area.

The first black American appeared in Seattle in 1860. Until 1940, the black population in Seattle increased slowly, reaching 2,296 by 1910 and 3,789 by 1940 (Smith, D., The Seattle Times, 1963). The Rainier Valley then witnessed a dramatic influx of black residents during World War II. The Second World War created new employment opportunities for the black community and migration ensued. By 1950 the black population numbered 15,666 and continued to grow through 1960, when the population reached 26,901 residents, drastically altering the racial composition of the city (Smith, D., 1963). Projections predicted explosive growth in the coming decades. The black population was expected to exceed 50,000 people by 1975 (Smith, D.).

Before 1940, black residents registered few examples of overt discrimination. In a Seattle Times article from August 1965, Mrs. Fern L. Proctor, a black resident who had lived in Seattle since 1910, summarized race relations: “I don’t remember having any problems before 1940. We did what we wanted and went where we wanted. Of course, I can’t say there weren’t any problems, but I didn’t experience any” (Smith, L., The Seattle Times, 1963). Sentiment was such that civic leaders were optimistic about the future of integration in Seattle: “Both Negro and Caucasian leaders assert that Seattle is an ideal major city to solve its racial problems because the Negro represents only 5 per cent of the population” (Smith, L.,1963). But as the black population increased, so did discrimination and conflict. “As more Negroes came to Seattle, particularly during the war, incidents between Negroes and white became more numerous… [and residents reported] a change in the treatment of the Negro by white downtown restaurants and taverns and the forcing of the Negro to remain in the Jackson street area” (Smith, D., The Seattle Times, 1965).

Fair Housing Ordinance and Redlining in Seattle

In the pre-war years, the black community had little difficulty purchasing property or renting homes. Seattle had no identifiable “ solid black belt” that described concentrations of black resident in segregated urban areas in New York and Chicago (Adams, 1963). Urban unrest, discrimination and social change conspired to force a ghetto experience on the black population. To prevent the encroachment of blacks into white neighborhoods, the real estate industry introduced restrictive covenants that forbid minorities from most communities. The minority population was thus confined to the International District, predominantly Asian, the Central District—home to 78% of the black residents in Seattle—and the Holly Park and High Point public housing areas. If projected trends continued, 80 percent of the black population would

eventually live in the Central District, Holly Park and High Point (Smith, D., The Seattle Times, 1965). One covenant, adopted by Windermere, explicitly stated “No person or persons of Asiatic, African or Negro blood, lineage or extraction, shall be permitted to occupy a portion of said property, or any building thereon; except domestic servant or servants may be actually and in good faith employed by white occupants of such premises” (City of Seattle, 2012).

The real estate industry enforced these restrictive covenants and effectively distanced agents from reprimand. Housing, and particularly private property, were protected by the constitution, rights agents used to insulate themselves from legal rebuke. Orville Robertson, the executive vice president of the Seattle Real Estate Board clarified the board’s stance in opposition to fair housing legislation. “The board will continue to uphold the constitutional rights of property owners to sell to whom they please… ‘To resolve the problem of the minority, we destroy the rights of the owners of private real property. We destroy the rights of the real-estate agents by placing the burden on the agent’” (Smith, L., The Seattle Times, 1963). The King County Superior Court and the Washington State Supreme Court decided on cases that legitimized discrimination, reversing legal decisions and upholding the right of property owners to refuse sale to minorities: “The personal characteristics of the home owner and would-be buyer are irrelevant to the constitutional protection of private property, which is absolute (emphasis added)” (City of Seattle, 2012).

Economic opportunities continued to diminish as blacks faced increased discrimination in the workplace. With a decreased ability to earn decent wages or locate steady employment, blacks were forced into the Jackson Street area where “low purchase prices and low rentals doubtless appear to minority persons, many of whose incomes fall below average earnings for the citizens as a whole” (CACMH, 1962). The map *Negro Population Seattle: 1960* clearly illustrated



Figure 2: Negro Population Seattle: 1960. Source: CORE - http://depts.washington.edu/civilr/display.cgi?image=segregated/schmidt-black-1960.jpg

the spatial distribution of the black population in 1960. The majority of the black population was concentrated in the Central Area, the International District and the Rainier Valley, with few blacks residing above the Montlake Cut. School segregation and employment discrimination intensified as the black community spatially contracted into the confines of the Central District and the Rainier Valley. Diminished economic opportunities and deteriorated housing conditions resulted in overcrowding and urban crime. Civil rights leaders vociferously opposed housing discrimination and activists stage protest marches and sit-ins (Goodloe, 2007). In this context, Seattle sought means to rectify the growing inequality.

In 1964, the Seattle Open Housing Ordinance, or Proposition 1, prepared by the Seattle Human Rights Commission, developed a framework to legislate fair housing practices to “prohibit discrimination in the sale and rental of all public and private housing accommodations within the city on the basis of race, creed, color or national origin, however financed, and providing criminal penalties for violation.” Public debate emphasized the nature of private property and framed the ordinance as a choice between forced and open housing, or personal freedom versus government regulation. Appeals to freedom resonated with Seattle voters, who, on March 10th 1964, dismissed the ordinance with 115,627 votes cast in opposition, while only 55,448 supported the measure. The open housing debate rippled through local politics. The city also elected a new mayor, J. Braman, an opponent of open housing (City of Seattle, 2012).

The national civil rights movement exacerbated tensions between races and enjoined voting rights with demands for equal access to education, employment and housing. The Seattle chapters of the Congress of Racial Equality and the NAACP organized boycotts, marches and sit-ins to protest employment and housing discrimination. The *Fair Housing Listing Service*, a recommendation embraced by opposition groups during the open housing debate, negotiated

50 home sales outside of the Central Area for minority families. Harmony Homes built homes for 15 African American families in previously all-white neighborhoods. In 1967, Sam Smith became the first African American elected to the Seattle City Council. These advances, largely incremental, did little to reform the Seattle real estate market, ease discrimination or alleviate mounting pressure from minority communities for recognized equality in education, employment and housing. When Martin Luther King Jr. was assassinated on April 4th 1968, federal and local governments finally acknowledge the need to legislate equality. One week later, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1968 to prohibit discrimination the sale, rental or financing of housing; on April 19th, the Seattle City Council unanimously voted to approve a fair housing ordinance. The Council included an emergency provision that protected it from repeal via voter referendum (City of Seattle, 2012).



FAIR HOUSING LISTING SERVICE

"A committee of volunteers to find homes for sale to ALL QUALIFIED BUYERS in all areas of Seattle outside the central district and in the nearby suburban communities."

Initial Participants

Jean Jones
Don Watson
Unitarians for Social Justice

Sid Gerber
James Kimbrough
Harmony Homes

Rex Jones
Seattle Urban League

Dr. Earl Miller
N A A C P

Mrs. Albert F. Chaney
Christian Friends for Racial Equality

Tom Foulds
Pat Davenport
Shirley Buckingham
Public Affairs Committee of the East Shore Unitarian Church

Rev. Henry Hall
C O R E

Ed Singler
eg Alleyne
arold Martin
eorgia Martin
ary Barton
oris Eason
lora Cole

Sey Kaplan
nti-Defamation League

ev. Lance J. Jackson
ethel Christian
ethodist Church

The FAIR HOUSING LISTING SERVICE is newly formed to co-ordinate the activities of the participants who published the first list of over 50 homes for sale in September. These houses were in areas such as Bellevue, Mercer Island, the North and South Ends of Seattle, Ballard, Queen Anne, etc. at prices ranging from $9,000 to over $30,000. Many can be purchased on FHA terms.

In some cases the homes are available thru brokers; in others, the owners deal direct. The services of our committee are free. To contact owners and inspect houses, call any of the numbers listed below.

WANTED More homes for sale in all areas. We will publish revised lists monthly, and hope to have 100 homes by spring.

WANTED Names of home seekers who wish to locate outside the central district.

WANTED Organizations who will publicize these needs in their newsletters and encourage more listings.

If your home is for sale to any financially qualified buyer, or if you desire to see these homes already listed, phone any of the names below:-

North End Homes
Jean Jones LA 5-9176
Don Matson SU 3-2104

Mercer Island & South End -Seattle
Sid Gerber AD 2-0687

Bellevue - Lake Sammanish
Pat Davenport GL 4-5783
Shirley Buckingham SH 6-2252
Georgia Martin SH 6-0921

For other areas - phone any of the above names.

ail inquiries to Fair Housing Listing Service
P.O. Box 52, Mercer Island, Washington

Figure 3: Fair Housing Listing Service. Source: City of Seattle Archives.

Regulation did little to improve housing prospects for the minority population. Still limited by economic opportunity, most of the black community lacked the financial means to purchase housing outside of predominantly minority areas. Private lending practices across the United States threatened central cities. Sherman Maisel, who served on the board of governors for the Federal Reserve, cautioned lenders "that by ignoring the problems of the ghetto, by refusing to grant loans to inner-city projects, banks have 'helped created major social and economic

problems of crime, decay and segregation'" (Laurence, The Seattle Times, 1971). In his remarks, Maisel described redlining, a market-based approach to discrimination where lenders refused to loan money to neighborhoods that housed a high percentage of the minority population. Again, Maisel: "Banks have been reluctant to loan money to businesses owned by black because norms used by banks in determining risk factors on loans apply to businesses owned by whites with predominately white patrons;" he further cautioned that "[t]his type of analysis, plus oversimplified sociological theorizing, led to the concept that it would be profitable for lenders to concentrate their loans in new homogenous suburbs while redlining major sectors of the inner city" (Laurence, 1971). The term redlining is derived from maps that classified risk by geographical area. Lenders established physical boundaries, drawn in red ink, to discourage risky loans in black areas.

Lenders in Seattle were no different and the practice of redlining effectively curtailed business development and home construction in the Central Area and Rainier Valley. The Central Seattle Community Council Federation investigated the extent of discriminatory lending practices. In a report published in 1975 on Redlining and Disinvestment in Central Seattle, the "federation's housing committee said it had found that eight major banking institutions, which had loaned more than $190 million in mortgages elsewhere in King County last year, have made no more than two loans each in the [Rainier Valley] since 1970" (Robinson, The Seattle Times, 1975). The report exposed discriminatory banking practices previously refuted by financial institutions. Bankers and lenders expressed skepticism, questioning both the study methodology and findings, but conceded that even if the figures are not entirely accurate, they are close enough and mirror national disinvestment trends (Robinson, 1975).

The Seattle council responded by forming additional task forces to study the problem and

issue recommendations. The private sector, for their part, crafted aggressive public relations campaigns to repudiate mounting evidence of fiscal discrimination. In 1975 and 1976, the Seafirst Corporation, the Pacific National Bank of Washington, PeoplesBank and Washington Mutual all included elements in their Annual Report that both acknowledge and dismissed redlining practices and emphasized a willingness to review risk evaluation, invest in minority communities and support the establishment of a Lenders Review Board in Seattle. The Seafirst Corporation Annual Report stated: “In recent months, there has been a concerted national campaign directed at lending institutions to provide loans for neighborhood rehabilitation…In the role of advocacy, the [Central Seattle Community Council Federation] chose to publish figures that do not agree with our records… Although the federation’s methods and accuracy have been questioned, they have succeeded in focusing attention on the problem” (Seafirst Corporation, 1975). Pacific National Bank of Washington wrote, “In the real estate area, Pacificbank continued its firm policy against redlining” (Pacific National Bank of Washington,1976). PeoplesBank declared support for the Lenders Review Board: “Responding to public concern on the issue of redlining, the bank was a leading supporter in the effort of lenders to establish the Lenders Review Board in Seattle” (PeoplesBank, 1976). Washington Mutual “acknowledged that it lending practices in the past favored loans in newer communities” (Washington Mutual, 1976).

The negative attention generated by the Central Seattle Community Council Federation decreased discriminatory lending practices. In 1978, Reverend David Bloom, head of the Task Force on Housing and Urban Growth declared that practice of redlining had turned a corner, though it would be inaccurate to assume redlining had ceased to exist: “We are seeing the availability of money. Neighborhoods are turning around… there is an upswing in the quality of housing stock” (Ruppert, The Seattle Times, 1978). While some were ready to declare

victory on the war against housing segregation, a new form of discrimination emerged from the insurance industry. Insurers began refusing to renew insurance policies for homes where conditions deteriorated below an arbitrary set of standards.

A letter to Larry Jones, a Central Area black and special assistant to Mayor Charles Royer, from his insurance agent at Walmsley-Degginger & Co., Inc., detailed a required list of repairs: "They included repairing or replacing the roof and painting the trim of one of his homes, cleaning up a shed and sprucing up his yards" (The Seattle Times, 1978). The letter stated, "Safeco wants to know that there is a pride of ownership" (The Seattle Times, 1978). Jones could afford to make the repairs, but his compliance mattered little to Safeco. A second letter from Walmsley-Degginger informed Jones his policy would be cancelled regardless: "Even if you make the repairs that we discussed, they [Safeco] will not renew. They are concerned that if you allowed it to get in poor condition once, it will happen again." Jones eventually completed the repairs and obtained coverage from another insurer, but noted other Central Area residents couldn't afford the repairs and without insurance, stand to lose homes. A more nefarious accusation was implicit; insurance companies effectively declared blacks and other residents in the Central District don't have pride in home ownership (The Seattle Times, 1978). When insurers refused to renew coverage, and resident were unable to find insurance elsewhere, home owners in the Central Area elected to sell their homes, hoping the proceeds would secure homes elsewhere in the city. The insurance industry effectively created an additional barrier to home ownership for economically and politically marginalized black and minority residents in the Central District.

Racial Migration and Gentrification

After decades of disinvestment and employment segregation, lending and insurance

discrimination further contributed to the decline of quality housing stock in the Central Area and Rainier Valley. The confluence of social and economic marginalization created conditions for gentrification that would disproportionately impact the black and minority community in the Central Area and precipitate an influx of affluent white residents to the Central Area and an exodus of low-income, minority residents to the Rainier Valley.

Several factors indicated vulnerability. The age of the Central District bifurcated, characterized by a large proportion of retired homeowners and youth (grandparents raising children) creating a chasm notably absent of residents in prime income earning years. Housing costs and rents were comparatively low to citywide averages. Just how vulnerable Central Area residents were to market forces and gentrification trends would become readily evident in the near future.

In Seattle, a change in family structure and household size dramatically reshaped the housing market: “Seattle has been losing families with children and gaining single people or married couples with no children. As a result the average size of a Seattle household has declined significantly” (Hodge, The Seattle Times 1978). The average household size fell from 2.7 persons per household in 1963 to a mere 2.23 persons per household by 1977. So while the population in Seattle remained relatively static through the 1970s, housing demand effectively increased which resulted in a decrease of vacant properties. A draft for the 1979 Housing Assistance Plan for Seattle summarized the evolving housing market: “Further changes in social conditions and attitudes—namely the increase of women in the labor force, smaller household sizes, reduction in crime rates, and the reduction of racial tension in the city—have contributed to the increasing demand and subsequent increase in cost of housing” (The Seattle Times, 1978). At the same time, increased gasoline prices—a nasty side effect of multiple oil embargos—caused a return of residents to central cities in an effort to mitigate unaffordable

private transportation costs. Reverend Dr. Samuel B. McKinney, pastor of Mount Zion Baptist Church, discussed housing trends in an interview with the Seattle Times: “This [the Central Area] is a very desirable part of town in which to live. Someone told me that every time gasoline goes up 10 cents a gallon, look for more white folks to come back. The city’s becoming desirable for middle-class whites, and what were old, ramshackle ghetto-slum dwellings are being converted into palatial residences for the comfortable” (Moriwaki, The Seattle Times, 1981).

Gentrification required a suitable target neighborhood with an economically vulnerable population unable to resist market forces. Conditions in the Central Area allowed white, young families, poor artists and predatory, speculative real estate developers to exploit the minority population. The laws of supply and demand increased rents and home prices until, “low/ moderate-income families and elderly persons [found] it increasingly difficult to afford housing and [were] being displaced” (The Seattle Times, 1978). As the neighborhood became a more desirable destination, property values rose. Again, Larry Jones: “What worries me is my property taxes. Everybody’s taxes are going to jump. Once the tax assessor makes his adjustments on Central Area property, that’s going to affect a lot people, especially those on fixed incomes” (The Seattle Times 1978).

The increased cost of living forced low-income blacks out of the Central Area. The black community moved south, into the Rainier Valley, where rents remained stable, significantly below citywide averages. Demographic change in the 1970 and 1980 censuses documented conclusive evidence to substantiate significant displacement of the black population from the Central Area and reconstituted in the Rainier Valley. In 1970, “blacks made up more than half of the population in six census tracts (77, 78, 79, 87, 88 and 89) in the Central Area”



Figure 4: Black Population from 1970 to 1980. Source: The Seattle Times, 1981.

(Moriwaki, The Seattle Times, 1981). By 1980, only four tracts had a majority black population; in three of those four tracts, the white population "just about doubled." As the map depicts, the black population in the Central Area decreased in all census tracts and over ten percent in four tracts. At the same time, the black population in seven of the eight tracts in the Rainier Valley experienced an increase in excess of 15 percent (Moriwaki, 1981).

The Public Housing Projects: Holly Park and Rainier Vista

Racial migration concentrated low-income blacks in the Rainier Valley, particularly in the Rainier Vista and Holly Park public housing projects. The photographs from the Seattle Housing Authority are from Holly Park (Left) in 1941 and Rainier Vista (Right) 1940.

Figure 5: Holly Park, 1941. Source: Seattle Housing Authority.

Figure 6: Rainier Vista, 1940. Source: Seattle Housing Authority.

Both housing projects—originally developed to house defense contractors during World War II—transformed into repositories for low-income residents. Conditions deteriorated and the neighborhoods became havens of criminality and poverty bred violence. Carol Kassahn, an immigrant to Seattle, originally from Ohio, and mother of three, described her experience with Rainier Vista in an expose published by the Seattle Times:

> “I got a G.E.D. and started working for two years at a real job—as a youth counselor. Then the funding for the job ran out. I lost the house I was living in because I couldn’t afford it, and ended up living in Rainier Vista (a public housing project). Rainier Vista would scare the hell out of you. I got very used to glancing out my window and watching knife fights, aid cars coming three or four times a week. We used to joke that we weren’t paying rent, we were paying a cover charge for the entertainment. It’s like you have to get that kind of attitude to survive it” (Kassahn, The Seattle Times, 1976).

The migration of the black population coincided with immigration of Indo-Chinese refuges beginning in 1975. Between 1975 and 1982 a total of 16,000 refugees moved into Seattle, half of which located in southeastern corner of the city. Arlene Oki, “[w]ho runs the program development office of the Seattle Department of Human Resources, said most refugees “have nothing” and naturally gravitate to Southeast Seattle. There they find a high apartment vacancy rate and nearly all of the cities low-income projects” (Tewkesbury, The Seattle Times 1983,). Racial tensions between the two groups escalated until some Asians reported being “afraid to come out their houses because “blacks hit them’” and “resorted to carrying guns to protect themselves” (Guillen, The Seattle Times, 1984). Crime became so prevalent the United States Postal Service ceased home delivery, citing safety issues that included theft and attacks from packs of dogs that roamed the streets. Residents resisted the change and contended, “having to go outside to get mail is a threat to safety” (Bovey, Seattle Times, 1985).

Violence in the Rainier Valley further stigmatized residents of the public housing projects, perpetuated cycles of poverty, and led to higher levels of concentrated impoverishment. King County Councilman Ron Sims attempted to explain the structural constraints of poverty and

race to Seattle residents: “For people to be surprised that Seattle is a segregated community means that people haven’t listened to the children, who are candid and up-front. There is a racial lid in this city…. So many blacks perceive there is no opportunity. That perception is strong, particularly among kids. They are giving up” (Gough, The Seattle Times, 1988). The crack epidemic of the 1980s epitomized the dearth of option for economic mobility in low-income communities. The decrepit buildings at Holly Park and Rainier Vista, photographed in 1990 (Seattle Housing Authority), became the center of the drug trade, ‘rock houses’ where dealers preyed on poor customers.

Figure 7: Rainier Vista, 1990. Source: Seattle Housing Authority.

Figure 8: Holly Park, 1990. Source: Seattle Housing Authority.

After the Seattle Police and public housing residents coordinated efforts to eradicate drug dealing, closing seven crack houses in the projects that marked “the dramatic rise and fall of rock houses in the 116-acre Holly Park public housing project” (Dunn, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 1986), the Los Angeles street gangs moved north and fought turf wars, “using muscle to take over the operations of longtime drug dealers who don’t dare run to the police for help” (Duncan, The Seattle Times, 1987). One enterprising gang member, Hotshot, described the lure of the drug trade to a Seattle Times reporter: “At 23, he has tried “real jobs” a few times, but says he always returns to what earns him the most money with the least amount of work, “selling rock’” (Duncan, 1987).

Residents of the public housing projects openly suggested the projects needed to be demolished to disperse criminal elements and facilitate neighborhood change. By the late 1980s, the public acknowledged the cyclical relationship between concentrations of low-income and poverty: “Clearly, concentrating Seattle’s low-income rental housing in one or two areas is an unfair burden to those sections. The practice invariably causes economic stagnation for local businesses, increases racial segregation, and destabilizes communities” (The Seattle Times, 1989). As residents suffered under the reign of terror, so did businesses:

> “The number of burglaries of South End businesses skyrocketed—up to 100 “smash and grab” burglaries of valley businesses in four months. Between January and May of 1987, many businesses were hit three or four times. One, the Shuck’s Auto Supply in the 9400 block of Rainier Avenue South, was burglarized six times. In an apartment managed by Veldwyk [a real estate agent in South Seattle], a drive-by shooting lodged a necklace of bullets in a wall 6 inches from an infant’s head. Apartment managers lived in fear of many of their tenants. “Police refused to go with an owner to evict a drug tenant,” recalls Veldwyk. “Even if we had drug dealers barricaded in their apartment with no rental agreement, passing drugs through the window, they said it was a civil matter’” (Gwinn, The Seattle Times, 1987).

High crime further discouraged investment and, for the neighborhoods surrounding the public housing projects, afforded few opportunities for low-income residents to secure employment and achieve upward economic mobility. Bank lending again decreased throughout the Rainier Valley and ignited new accusations of redlining. Keith Dublanica, president of the South End Seattle Community Organization, described tacit redlining techniques in the Rainier Valley: “They have become more sophisticated in the 80s than they were in the 70s, but essentially the same things are happening. Now they are just ignoring us. They are guilty of benign neglect”

(Hayes, The Seattle Times, 1987). Dublanica further claimed "the racial composition of the South End (about 40 percent of the city's minorities live there), combined with very little business growth, makes it easy for banks to write the area off as too high a risk" (Hayes, 1987). Lenders cited investment risk as the primary force that prevented loan rates proportional to the city. Rainier Bancorporation President Jon Christoffersen countered that the bank actively targeted programs to increase available capital in low-income communities despite the risk and defended lower loan rates: "The thing people forget is that the free enterprise system is alive and well in banking. We can't afford to make bad loans and stay in business" (Hayes). Even Tom Wood, president of Liberty Bank, the only black-owned bank in the city of Seattle, admitted, "The way larger banks look at it, if they don't have to take the risk, then they don't. In a way, you can't blame them. The bottom line is return on investment" (Hayes). Community leaders and lenders alike feared economic blight would proliferate without immediate investment into the community.

Census data from 1990 demonstrated the concentration of minorities and poverty in the census tracts that contain the Holly Park and Rainier Vista public housing projects. In particular, a high percentage of black (33 percent) and Asian (46 percent) residents, and an extremely high poverty rate of 38 percent, characterized Holly Park.

Table 1: Population by Race at Rainier Vista and Holly Park, 1990. Source: U.S. Census Bureau.

	Rainier Vista (Census Tract 101)	**Holly Park (Census Tract 110)**
Percentage of Population in Poverty (1990)	16.9%	37.7%
Percentage Population White	36.5%	15.9%
Percentage Population Black	37.8%	33.1%
Percentage Population Asian	22.3%	45.6%
Percentage Population Hispanic	3.8%	4.7%

A combination of public and private investment in, and north of, Columbia City (adjacent to Rainier Vista) in the late 1980s partially ameliorated poverty, crime and racial segregation. Glant Corporation, Paine Corporation, Safeway, and Darigold invested in new factories and retail outlets to capitalize on low land prices and vacant properties to agglomerate sufficient land. Public investment in schools and the Columbia Health Center and Rainier Vista clinic coincided with private investment. The businesses employed residents from the local community; half of the employees walked to work (Lilly, Seattle Times, 1988). Increase job opportunities retained middle-class working families and white residents and insulated Rainier Vista from economic pressures that perpetuated poverty at Holly Park.

Improved conditions in Columbia City failed to save the Rainier Valley. Crime continued to discourage investment in South Seattle and economic growth faltered. The Rainer Valley “suffered under what one resident called the “negative image” of an area plagued by crime and an unhealthy business climate” (Merritt, The Seattle Times, 1991). A survey of Rainier Valley businesses categorized 66 percent of the buildings as poorly maintained or deteriorating. A report submitted by a group of 12 community organizations to the city of Seattle in 1991—the Southeast Action Plan—declared that Rainier Valley required “a major of infusion of public and private investment” to prevent decay from expanding until “some of the stable neighborhoods around Rainier Valley [weren’t] going to be so stable” (Merritt, 1991). The Southeast Action Plan detailed recommendations to reverse downward trends to improve neighborhood image, building code enforcement and local lending to encourage economic development, but the city council refused to dedicate the necessary resources—citing equity concerns—to satisfy the ambitious agenda (Merritt). In the early 1990s, a cluster of child murders, innocent victims of drive-by shootings and gang initiations, united the community in outrage and prompted the Seattle Housing Authority to intervene at Holly Park (Raley and Maier, Seattle PI, 1994).

Urban Design Analysis

The Urban-Rural Transect

The disparate elements new urbanism recommends coalesce in neighborhoods, the basic building block of community and cities. Neighborhoods are thus incubators for the social interaction required to generate the benefits extolled by new urbanists. The theory is normative in nature. Urban form, at least partially, dictates behavior. The nostalgia that characterizes new urbanism, from which it earned the description neo-traditional, is grounded in the assumption that the “character of place could offer people a vision they can better understand and invest themselves emotionally in” (Bohl and Plater-Zyberk, 2006). Traditional building forms and spatial patterns—distilled from the “general physical characteristics of urbanism that have existed for 5,000 years” of civilization in hamlets, villages, towns and cities—resonate emotionally and intellectually with residents and inspire a return to community, civic engagement and pedestrian activity that predates the separation of home and work enabled by automobiles and land use regulations. The rural-urban transect proposed by new urbanists advances a normative theory of urban design as “a way of locating and understanding a variety of different types of human settlement within a comprehensive web of natural and human habitats” (Bohl and Plater-Zyberk, 2006). To date, new urbanists are unable to substantiate the theory, but the transect “has been proposed as a prism for analyzing the degree of urbanity” (Bohl and Plater-Zyberk, 2006).

The transect offers no metric for evaluation. Spatial patterns are calibrated to local contexts. As a result, the transect can differ radically from location to location. The theory maintains that if New Holly and Rainier Vista develop urban form appropriate to the transect, people then

understand the spatial patterns and are personally invested in the fate of the neighborhood, engendering community and civic engagement. It is not within the scope of this research to prove the goodness of transect or argue that the rural-urban transect realizes assumed benefits, but merely confirms that New Holly and Rainier Vista ascribe to the new urbanist theory. The



Figure 9: The Urban-Rural Transect. Source: Bohl and Plater-Zyberk (2006).

two HOPE VI projects conform to the transect principle. The redevelopment projects connect single-family housing in the surrounding neighborhood, a land use that consistent throughout the Rainer Valley, with the commercial corridor on both sides of Martin Luther King Jr. Way South. The development fills the gap between single-family residential and commercial uses. In the terms proposed by new urbanism, Holly Park and Rainier Vista are in the general urban zone, delineated primarily by residential development. The redevelopment allows a variety

of building types, but emphasizes multiple housing types that include single-family residence and multi-family row houses. Setbacks and streetscapes are also variable. The maps below illustrate the bridge between single-family residential and commercial land use established by the revitalization projects at New Holly and Rainier Vista.

T4 THE GENERAL URBAN ZONE consists of a mixed-use but primarily residential urban fabric. It has a wide range of building types: single, sideyard, and rowhouses. Setbacks and landscaping are variable. Streets typically define medium-sized blocks.

Figure 10: The General Urban Zone. Source: Bohl and Plater-Zyberk (2006).



Figure 11: New Holly - Urban-Rural Transect.

Rainier Vista - Urban-Rural Transect



Figure 12: Rainier Vista - Urban-Rural Transect

The master development plans for both New Holly and Rainier Vista recognize the transect to create buffers between high traffic commercial and transportation uses and single-family residential development. In both developments, single-family homes are secluded on the edges of the development, protected from intrusive uses that attract visitors by multi-family residential, commercial uses and parks. The single-family residential concentrations nest against greenbelts or bleed the boundaries between surrounding residential neighborhoods. Parks at the center of each development serve as the community center or public square where retail centers are

not economically viable. Since parks draw visitors from both inside and outside the community, multi-family residential properties surround the parks, again buffering single-family residential areas against intruders. The development pattern acknowledges the primacy of single-family housing, spatially segregates households and promotes privacy to match the surrounding neighborhood context. This analysis does not accept the implicit goodness new urbanist suggest, but confirms the HOPE VI neighborhoods conjoin the web of development with appropriate local character and satisfy the requirements inherent to the rural-urban transect.

Connectivity

The Rainier Valley faces significant connectivity challenges. The neighborhood, which assumes multiple spatial definitions, is located in southeast Seattle, bounded on the north by Interstate 90, the major east-west freeway, Lake Washington to the east, the city limits at the southern edge, and shielded from the rest of the city by Beacon Hill, a significant physical obstacle that prevents convenient east-west access on surface streets. The two major roads—Martin Luther King Jr. Way S and Rainier Ave S—trace the valley floor from north to south and connect the Rainier Valley to downtown Seattle. For the 19% of residents that earn less than $50,000 per year who commute to work on public transit, public transportation is an essential link between homes in the Rainier Valley and employment centers in Seattle and on the Eastside. King County Metro Transit continues to target investment in southeast Seattle to provide improved access and transportation options, but geographic reality further highlights need for dense, pedestrian-oriented communities that leverage transportation and infrastructure investment to enhance connectivity.

Connectivity is a fundamental tenet of new urbanism that emphasizes accessibility and

pedestrian-oriented development to leverage public transportation networks and improve city and regional connection. The focus on pedestrian activity, street networks and building massing responds to development patterns that emerged during suburbanization, a process that fragments sidewalk networks and pedestrian routes and enables a horizontal distribution or sprawl of homes geographical dispersed from strategic transportation nodes where buildings are connected to streets by driveways and parking lots (Hess, 1997). The combination of these factors favor automobile-oriented lifestyles, physically dislocating work and retail destinations by greater distance, and thus preclude low-income residents from access to employment and shopping destinations and limit resident ability to fulfill the daily needs of life.

Aerial photos from 1990, prior to the redevelopment of New Holly and Rainier Vista, demonstrate these failed patterns. A curvilinear web of streets defines both developments. Single-family houses on large lots form a loose neighborhood core lacking direct pathways and connections between neighborhoods. Limited alley access exists and homes are primarily connected to the street by driveways. The development pattern and street network spatially confine the public housing units in isolated clusters that differ dramatically from adjacent neighborhoods in the Rainier Valley characterized by an urban street grid that necessitates the small blocks, small lots, and increased density that promote pedestrian activity.

The redevelopment of New Holly and Rainier Vista reverses the spatial distribution in a return to the neo-traditional model prescribed by new urbanists. While some of the larger access roads retain the curvilinear shape from earlier development, the interior roads are reconfigured to mimic the dense street network and small blocks in the surrounding areas. The new street grid allows residents in the interior of the development more direct access through the neighborhood to major roads and transit centers. Alleys and an emphasis on rear and street parking eliminate

Figure 13: New Holly Phase One and Two Aerial. From left to right: 1990, 2000 and 2010. Source: Google Earth.

Figure 14: New Holly Phase Three Aerial. From left to right: 1990, 2000 and 2010. Source: Google Earth.

Figure 15: Rainier Vista Aerial. From left to right: 1990, 2000 and 2010. Source: Google Earth.

typical suburban setbacks and push buildings toward the street. Walking paths connect the dense massing of housing with parks, open space and shared public facilities. When considered in concert, the redevelopment of New Holly and Rainier Vista encourage and facilitate pedestrian activity through the development. One way to measure this change is through route directness, an index that compares the Euclidean distance between to destinations to the walking distance.

Figure 16: Rainier Vista Street Grid Redevelopment. Source: Google Earth

As the before and after images illustrate, the previous street patterns and housing configuration defined impenetrable edges with only two access points on the fringe of the development. The edges define space and thus boundaries, preventing visitors and outsiders from intruding on the development while limiting direct pedestrian access to destinations beyond the residential development. Before redevelopment, with cars granted priority, pedestrians struggle to conveniently satisfy the daily needs of life. With the modified street network, pedestrian access and connectivity increase. The neighborhood is more porous, permeable, so residents can reach employment and shopping centers and transit hubs despite limited commercial

development in each HOPE VI project.

The images below depict route directness from available goods and services to approximate neighborhood centers. While the selected sites might not satisfy the complete bouquet of resident needs, they include essential destinations like grocery stores, farmers markets, public services, neighborhood schools and community centers. The analysis identifies ten destinations in Rainier Vista that fall within a half-mile pedestrian shed from the identified village center.

New Holly, stretched vertically along the Chief Sealth Trail, is divided into two overlapping pedestrian sheds (arbitrarily named New Holly North and New Holly South) where Interstate 5 and Beacon Hill discourage pedestrian activity to the northwest and west of the site. Eight destinations are mapped for each identified center. Transit hubs are ignored in this element due to an abundance of bus and light rail stations in both New Holly and Rainier Vista.

Route Directness in Rainier Vista: 1/2 mile pedestrain shed



Figure 17: Rainier Vista Route Directness

Route Directness in New Holly: 1/2 mile pedestrian shed for two village centers.



Figure 18: New Holly Route Directness

The table presents the average Euclidean distance, the average walking distance using sidewalks and paths (though paths do not cross public open space) and the route directness ratio. Though there is no absolute standard, neighborhoods with route directness closest to one are more pedestrian-oriented. Research by Hess (1997) compares the route directness ratio of dense urban neighborhoods in Seattle (Wallingford) with suburban neighborhoods on the

Table 2: Route Directness

	Average Euclidean Distance (Miles)	**Average Walking Distance (Miles)**	**Average Route Directness (Ratio)**
New Holly North	0.29	0.41	1.38
New Holly South	0.30	0.39	1.31
Rainier Vista	0.46	0.64	1.40
Weighted Average	**0.36**	**0.49**	**1.37**

suburban fringe (Crossroads). In Wallingford, where “routes are quite direct” (Hess, 1997, 63), walking paths are 1.2 times longer than the straight-line distance; in the more indirect network in Crossroads, walking distance is 1.7 times longer. If these guidelines for direct and indirect, or urban and suburban, are applied to New Holly and Rainier Vista, then redevelopment increases connectivity to levels that don’t quite reach the standard of established urban neighborhoods, but that far exceed automobile-oriented neighborhoods on the urban fringe.

Defensible Space

Crime in the Rainier Valley resulted from decades of neighborhood transformation caused by major economic and demographic shifts. Originally designed to house defense contractors during the Second World War, housing segregation, discriminatory lending patterns, the gentrification of the central district and limited multi-family housing opportunities in affluent neighborhoods confined low-income and minority residents to the Rainier Valley. The process of urban decay, common in central cities throughout the United States, allowed criminal activity to proliferate through the early 1990s. Newspaper records of murders in the Rainier Valley illustrate both the extent of crime in the Rainier Valley and aberrant housing conditions that almost hoist criminality upon residents: “A 7-year-old girl was shot to death early yesterday as she slept in a Rainier Valley home, and police said the murder scene was as bizarre as any they’ve ever encountered… But shock gave way to disbelief as detectives soon found themselves weaving through a maze of makeshift bedrooms built of shower doors and plywood stretching to the back property line. Behind the 720-square-foot house stood more than 25 cubicles, each outfitted with a mattress or couch” (Haley, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 12 August 1994). The shooter was a 14-year-old boy. But it was “the murder of an 11-year-old boy as part of a gang initiation rite at Holly Park in 1994 [that] particularly enraged local residents and resulted in renewed demands for change” (Zielenbach, 2003).

With HOPE VI neighborhood revitalization funding, the Seattle Housing Authority embraced the opportunity to implement crime prevention strategies through environmental design. The design guidelines provided to private developers summarized security principles. Though specified in different terms, the guidelines resemble the combine works of Jane Jacobs (1961), Oscar Newman (1972) and William Whyte (1980), and, by extension, the framework

for defensible space refined and updated by Reynald and Elffers (2009). Contained within the crime prevention strategies were four elements: natural surveillance, territoriality, image/ milieu and routine activities of place. The remainder of this section examines each design recommendation in theory and implementation and then relies on crime trends in the Rainier Valley to approximate the relationship between crime prevention and urban design.

Natural surveillance is defined by Newman as “the ability to observe the public areas of one’s residential environment and to feel continually that one is under observation by other residents while on the grounds of projects and within the public areas of building interiors” (Newman, 1972, 78). Newman and Jacobs differ slightly in their conception of natural surveillance. Whereas Newman emphasizes the importance of residents to observe and maintain social order within a neighborhood, Jacobs places the burden on strangers to provide “eyes on the street” and assert a dominant conception of social behavior to monitor and interceded when behavior deviates from what is acceptable (Jacobs, 1961). Reynald and Elffers reconcile this difference by merely conjoining the roles of residents and strangers. The presence of one thus reinforces the other, layering social norms to discourage criminal behavior in the public sphere. The design guidelines specify the relationship between the built environmental and natural surveillance: “The relationship of buildings, streets and public open spaces should enable visitors and neighbors to enjoy a safe and stable neighborhood, particularly by providing “eyes on the public realm”; that is, strong visual connection from the homes to the public realm areas” (SHA Design Guidelines, 2004).

In Holly Park and Rainier Vista, block size, street networks, building orientation, public space location and size, street-facing front porches and windows, and lighting design allow natural surveillance. The first stage of redevelopment alters the street configuration to replace roads

that terminate in cul-de-sacs where scattered single-family residences, oriented to protect the privacy neighborhoods, precluded sightlines to the public realm. With a rectangular street grid, windows and porches—semi-public space—face the street, on all four sides, along the length of the block to create sightlines that monitor the public sphere. Lighting design compliments physical elements and allows residents opportunity to monitor the street after dark. Photographs from Holly Park and Rainier Vista illustrate the implementation of these design principles.

Figure 19: Natural Surveillance. Source: Photos by author.

The picture on the left is of a small park, next to a driveway and parking lot, with two picnic tables. The buildings on either side of the park and driveway, and the row of multi-family housing behind, all have windows that face the picnic area, allowing surveillance from multiple parties as well as residents or visitors that use the parking lot throughout the day. The middle photo is of another park, with play equipment for children, emblematic of the public space tacitly annexed by gangs in neighborhoods characterized by high crime. The park is directly adjacent to multi-family townhomes so that the front porch, where residents interface with the neighborhood, essentially blurs the boundary between the home and the playground. The photograph on the right shows a street corner; in front of the house, which has windows that face both streets and a front porch as near to the corner as a rectangular lot allows, is a street light that enables residents to monitor the street (and a park, not pictured) from inside or outside throughout the day. While these images are merely representative—the pattern is consistent in both neighborhoods—each demonstrates the extent of natural surveillance opportunities manifest in

the built environment.

Though Newman advocates improved surveillance capacity, he admits that surveillance, in isolation, is insufficient to mitigate criminal behavior. Thus he introduces territorially to strengthen natural surveillance and create conditions that not only observe street life but to intercede where activities in the public sphere violate acceptable standards of behavior. Intervention requires individuals identify with the victim and expect action effectively alters the course of observed events (Newman, 1972). Again, Jacobs's initial observations of street life in Greenwich Village compliment the concept of territoriality. Where residents and visitors claim ownership of territory, criminal behavior is discouraged. She establishes her argument through contrast. Parks abandoned to the public sphere, where the community and visitors exert no influence over usage, are left to gangs that dominate the space and preclude use by families with children (Jacobs, 1961). To foster territoriality the Seattle Housing Authority introduces a land ownership hierarchy, dividing space outside the home into three tiers: the public realm, the semi-public realm and the private landscape area. The public realm includes the right-of-way, pedestrian paths and public parks. The semi-public realm is the space in front of homes, the yards and landscaping the partially exclude intruders but are visually porous. The private landscape area is defined by as the backyard and porch area, delineated by distinct boundaries like fences and hedgerows. The illustration below depicts all three tiers of that encourage territoriality.

A second series of photos demonstrates the territoriality in New Holly and Rainier Vista. The first two pictures are semi-public spaces. In these spaces it is common to see shoes and chairs and small tables, or, as in the second picture, bicycles. The presence of personal goods, some of value to thieves, suggests residents are comfortable leaving personal property on the front



Figure 20: Territoriality. Source: Seattle Housing Authority

porch absent fear of theft. Though few residents would so brazenly leave valuables in a public park, even with sightlines that allow natural surveillance, the front porch is essentially a private and defensible space, territory within the sphere of influence of the residents. The photo of the two porches with bicycles also indicates trust between neighbors, a shared territory, where the community defends the space and possessions within that space.

Figure 21: Examples of Territoriality. Source: Photos by author.

The other two pictures are representative of the private space assigned to each home. Residents are free to create a private landscape rooted in the concept that the dwelling is an extension or the image of self. These two photos are unremarkable, simply included to show different sizes of private space, but the variety in use of private landscape area stretches from

vast collections of toys to barbeques and vegetable gardens. The diversity of use indicates the private nature of the space. Residents are not constrained by specific standards and allow the space to reflect the families within. There is no direct method to measure ownership. Interviews and surveys approximate a sense of ownership; place attachment theory attempts to extract evidence of implied territoriality from indicators. Neither of these methods are conclusive (Kleit, 2003; Brown, Brown and Perkins, 2003). This investigation relies on visual evidence, which suggests that residents do exert ownership throughout the hierarchy of land ownership.

Figure 22: Private Space. Source: Photos by author.

Image and milieu are the last element of the theoretical triad proposed by Newman: "The introduction of a large grouping of new buildings of distinctive height and texture into an existing urban fabric singles out these buildings for particular attention. If this distinctive image is also negative, the project will be stigmatized and its residents castigated and victimized" (Newman, 1972, 102). Newman finds evidence of the negative relationship between image and behavior in public housing. Pruitt-Igoe in St. Louis, Missouri is the international symbol of failed urban renewal policies, but at inception was architecturally renown as the future of public housing; a design solution to alleviate poverty and crime and remove low-income families from the unsafe and unsanitary conditions notorious in projects and ghettoes throughout the United States. The failure of Pruitt-Igoe is well documented, but the lessons linger. A massive cluster of

unique buildings signified a vulnerable low-income population without the power or recourse to counteract criminal elements also confined within the project. Residents in public housing voice similar sentiment in public meetings and residency interviews, clearly stating a preference for housing indistinct from the surrounding neighborhoods.

The homes in New Holly and Rainier Vista satisfy this preference. The design guidelines and zoning codes restrict and mix housing types. Publicly developed multi-family units and subsidized single-family houses are interspersed with market-rate single-family homes built by private developers. Though professionals in the built environment can likely distinguish between the different unit types, the transition between construction types is relatively seamless and adopts design standards from the surrounding neighborhoods. The images below show a sample of the homes available to owners and renters in New Holly and Rainier Vista. The middle photo is for-sale market-rate housing built by a private developer while the other two images are Seattle Housing Authority multi-family units. Though some elements differ, the architectural styles are similar. The principal disparity is building materials. Without prior knowledge of New Holly and Rainier Vista, the neighborhood appears physical different from negative stereotypes of public housing.

Figure 23: Public and Market Rate Housing. Source: Photos by author.

One final strategy merges territoriality and image/milieu. The design guidelines specify “gateway and view terminus facades” or lots that mark the entrance to the community from surrounding

neighborhoods. They housing authority provides logic that mirrors defensible space theory: “Buildings and spaces located at view termini are influential tone-setting locations in the community. In addition to the special care in the details describe in the Façade Zone Elements, additional architectural and landscape detailing *must be provided* at these locations” (emphasis added). This strategy signifies the boundary of neighborhood and clearly distinguishes the space. The termini facades then project the character of the neighborhood and in this manner the built environment declares what is and is not acceptable within the community. The yellow signs in the photographs below announce neighborhood entrances; the text reads “Welcome to our Community; Please Drive Carefully.” The language suggests community through the associative plural (our) and alerts visitors to the presence of families and children through allusion, recommending caution to drivers. These recommendations foster the sense of community and contribute to the image of the neighborhood.

Figure 24: Image and Milieu. Source: Photos by author.

Routine activities of place theory reinforces defensible space and deters behavior that violate community standards. The housing authority recognizes the importance of active and diverse use of public space throughout the day: “Outside spaces serve diverse needs; active, passive, interactive, contemplative, reflective, evocative, artistic, large, small, nimble, cautious.” Parks of different size are scattered throughout the development. Some offer playground equipment

for children and basketball hoops for youth. Others offer seating for picnics and smaller pocket parks provide opportunities for peaceful contemplation. Baseball and soccer fields in the neighborhood host sport leagues. Community centers and neighborhood service centers provide an additional array of activities throughout the day.

Figure 25: Routine Activities of Place. Photos by author.

These design strategies are complimented by programmatic elements that reinforce natural surveillance, territoriality, the image and milieu, and routine activities of place. A new police station for the South Precinct borders the second phase of New Holly on the southern edge. Community services, a public library and neighborhood outreach offices encourage use of space throughout the day to mitigate the absence of retail activities that typically drive visitor traffic. Impact Property Services, a department of the Seattle Housing Authority, manages the

landscaping of the property, maintaining the image of the neighborhood and increasing the presence of observers on the street.

Figure 26: Neighborhood Services. Source: Photos by author.

The efforts of neighborhood revitalization investment and design intervention to prevent crime combined to produce impressive results in the Rainier Valley. Crime in the census tracts that surround the HOPE VI neighborhood revitalization projects diminished. From 1996, one year after construction began at New Holly, to 2007, majors crimes, which include homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny and vehicle theft, decreased by 32.2 percent. In the census tracts that contain New Holly and Rainier Vista, crime fell even further, 43 and 46 percent, respectively. In the four census tracts with the highest concentration of poverty, including the New Holly tract, crime decreased by more than 32 percent in each tract with the exception of tract 111, where crime decreased by only 12 percent. .

Observation of the HOPE VI neighborhoods substantiates the statistical findings. There is little evidence of perceived incivilities. Field research finds only two areas with graffiti, one instance which is so minimal it barely qualifies, and an additional fence where paint covers older graffiti. With the help of Impact Property Services, property is well maintained, with few exceptions of overgrown yards in private landscape areas. Vehicle traffic is minimal and residents maintain

a constant presence on streets, sidewalks and front porches to deter drug dealing and gang activity. Only one park evidenced residue of negative behavior with garbage, beer bottles and a shopping cart on the playground.

Figure 27: Perceived Incivilities. Source: Photos by author.

Though it is perhaps not possible to attribute the change in crime patterns wholly to design strategies, the implementation of crime prevention through environmental design principles contributes to neighborhood safety. The extent may not be measureable and here there is no attempt to quantify the relationship. What emerges is the importance of safety and security to neighborhood revitalization that is absent in earlier iterations of urban renewal. The bouquet of design strategies compliments the rest of the neighborhood redevelopment program: improved safety and security of residents fosters conditions that enable revitalization to be realized.

Diversity

New urbanism advocates mixed-income and ethnically diverse communities with a variety of housing options to attract new residents without displacing current residents. The purported benefits are multiple: a mixed-income community increases the community income base to stimulate consumer demand; ethnically diverse, mixed-income communities increase contact between disparate groups to improve access to social and employment networks; and integrated housing strengthens "the personal and civic bonds essential to an authentic community" (CNU, 1996). Diversity facilitates development to "promote the creation of mixed use neighborhoods that support the functions of daily life: employment, recreation, retail and civic and educational institutions" (CNU, 1996). Diverse communities also satisfy one of the primary HOPE VI objectives: the deconcentration of poverty. The redevelopment of Holly Park and Rainier Vista prioritizes an array of housing alternatives to integrate multiple income levels into the new and existing housing stock in the Rainier Valley to further social and economic objectives in neighborhood revitalization.

The Seattle Housing Authority is aggressive in pursuit of mixed-income and mixed-use neighborhoods, first demolishing 871 dilapidated public housing units at Holly Park and another 481 units at Rainier Vista. While HOPE VI abandoned previous standards that mandate an equal number of replacement units for each unit demolished, the housing authority redevelopment plan requires an increase in affordable housing units. New Holly provides 890 new housing units to low-income households; in Rainier Vista, approximately 75 percent complete prior to the culmination of Phase III, already includes 434 units for low-income households. The redevelopment plans are summarized in the table below. Whereas housing in both developments was exclusively public housing for low-income residents prior to

redevelopment, New Holly and Rainier Vista now include low-income rentals, low-income rentals for seniors and disabled adults, market rate rentals, subsidized public housing and for-sale, market rate housing. Residents are eligible for units designated extremely low income when household income is 30 percent of area median income; low income residence are available to households that earn 80 percent of the area median income.

Table 3: Housing Mix. Source: Seattle Housing Authority.

New Holly		
Housing Type	**Income Level**	**Units**
Market rate housing	Any	364
Public housing	Extremely low	400
Affordable rental housing	Low	288
Senior housing	Extremely low	80
Senior housing, assisted living	Any	54
Senior housing, assisted living	Extremely low	50
Senior housing, assisted living	Low	50
Affordable fo- sale housing	Low	112
Rental housing	Any	16
Total		**1414**

Rainier Vista		
Housing Type	**Income Level**	**Units**
Market rate housing	Any	209
Public housing	Extremely low	176
Affordable rental housing	Low	104
Senior housing	Extremely low	78
Affordable for-sale housing	Low	37
Rental housing, disabled	Extremely low	22
Affordable rental housing	Extremely low	17
Total		**643**

A mix of housing types and public subsidies allows the Seattle Housing Authority to address divergent goals: a balance between economic development defined by external investment and protections and housing options for current residents. The developments attract new residents to market rate homes in neighborhoods where rent and sales prices are below prevailing rates for the surrounding region; and public subsidies allow residents to remain in the community—after temporary displacement during construction. New Holly redevelopment also includes an additional 463 units of off-site housing for low-income residents. An award of 250 additional housing assistance vouchers accompanies the increase in affordable housing stock. The housing mix establishes the basic context for a mixed-income and mixed-use community.

Though this physical and programmatic context encourages mixed-income communities, the extent of success depends on change in neighborhood characteristics regarding income levels and ethnic integration.

The Rainier Valley is—and has been—the most ethnically diverse neighborhood in Seattle and, in one zip code, in America. The neighborhood, defined by affordable housing and proximity to downtown Seattle, functions as a point of entry for immigrants and thus as the stable nexus for minority communities. The racial mix within the community is consistent with predevelopment levels. Census data provides insight into population change since 1990, before HOPE VI neighborhood revitalization, through 2010.

In 1990, 32.3 percent of the population in the Rainier Valley neighborhood was white. The proportion of the white population dropped by 3.4 percent by 2000, but increased 20.2 percent by 2010 and returned to 1990 levels of 32.3 percent. The Asian population was relatively stable and constituted 29.4 percent of the population in 1990, 33.4 percent in 2000, before decreasing to 31.9 percent in 2010. The Hispanic population grew steadily through the same time period, increasing from 4.1 percent of the population in 1990, to 6.4 percent in 2000 and 7.5 percent in 2010. The only noticeable decrease in ethnic composition was evident in the Black community. While Blacks were the most prominent racial group in the Rainier Valley neighborhood in 1990, at 34.8 percent, the Black population decreased in each subsequent decade to 25.8 percent by 2000 and 25.5 percent by 2010.



Figure 28: Population by Race. Source: U.S. Census Bureau.

There is no standard against which to measure ethnic diversity. The data reinforce earlier notions of Rainier Valley: the population remains highly diverse. The most notable change from 1990 to 2010 is the decrease of the Black population. This decrease includes an influx of immigrants and refugees from East Africa that identify as Black. The decrease in the Black population is thus the most problematic neighborhood change and questions the relationship between social equity and redevelopment and potential gentrification. While the Asian and White populations equal or exceed 1990 levels, and the Hispanic population continues to grow steadily, the Black American community continues to dwindle in the Rainier Valley, beyond what the census data indicates. The Rainier Valley is still the most diverse neighborhood in Seattle after revitalization, and ethnic change is more thoroughly discussed in other sections of this study, but the project retains a multi-ethnic character essential to diverse new urbanist neighborhoods.

Household income is the second primary metric to evaluate diversity in the context of new urbanism and HOPE VI neighborhood revitalization. The three graphs below visually depict household income in ranges collected by census data in the Rainier Valley. Though the data is not adjusted for inflation, the bar graphs indicate the mix of income in the Rainier Valley at the time of each census. The first chart illustrates a concentration of income below $10,000 in 1990. Even when the data is adjusted for inflation, residential income is disproportionately clustered below the poverty line. The second and third graphs, from 2000 and 2010, demonstrate a more equal income distribution. A new cluster emerges between $50,000 and $124,999 by 2000. The recession that started in 2008 reverses some of the positive gains evident in 2000. Households with extremely low income increase slightly, but the middle class cluster is still evident in the Rainier Valley.



Figure 29: Income by Census Tract 1990. Source: U.S. Census Bureau.



Figure 30: Income by Census Tract 2000. Source: U.S. Census Bureau.



Figure 31: Income by Census Tract 2010. Source: U.S. Census Bureau.

These trends are also evident in the census tracts that include New Holly and Rainier Vista. The income mix indicates a more equal distribution of household earnings from 1990 to 2010. The same cluster of middle class households is evident while households earning less than $10,000 diminish by half. In both New Holly and Rainier Valley, population growth in the upper income groups is evident and continues through 2010 despite the recession. As poverty decreases in the study neighborhoods, and income growth in accelerates in the upper income

groups, the middle proportion of middle-class families is relatively stagnant and decreases over time in several income groups. The New Holly and Rainier Vista neighborhoods are thus characterized by increasing wealth on one end of the spectrum and a low-income population, though decreasing in prominence, on the other, leaving a hollow void of middle-class families in the neighborhood.



Figure 32: Income by Decade at Rainier Vista. Source: U.S. Census Bureau.



Figure 33: Income by Decade at New Holly. Source: U.S. Census Bureau.

The data suggest the redevelopment projects achieve a primary objective of neighborhood revitalization, effectively increasing the mix of incomes in the New Holly, Rainier Vista and the Rainier Valley neighborhood market area. The concentration of poverty evident in 1990 disperses as high-income households relocate to the Rainier Valley following revitalization. Income increase is expected to translate into consumer demand and stimulate commercial investment to establish mixed-use communities. In New Holly and Rainier Vista there is a disconnect in this relationship. Al Levine, Deputy Executive Director of Development for the Seattle Housing Authority, reports private developers were hesitant to invest in mixed-use development. Thus Rainier Vista and New Holly are primarily residential. Mixed-use buildings are limited to neighborhood services and community centers. The market fails to coordinate income growth with new commercial development. Thus income growth is either insufficient to stimulate investment or private developers expect increased demand to be satisfied in the surrounding market area available to residents through increased connectivity and public transportation options. A more thorough analysis of commercial investment is found in the economic development section of this study.

Economic Development

There are two primary economic objectives both explicit and inherent to HOPE VI neighborhood revitalization projects—necessitated by neoliberal economic and entrepreneurial governance—and embodied in new urbanism principles: capital investment and deconcentration of poverty. These objectives attempt to rectify historical patterns of disinvestment and concentrated poverty that characterize neighborhoods targeted for HOPE VI investment (see Social and Economic Historical Context section for detailed discussion of disinvestment and poverty in the Rainier Valley). In new urbanism theory, design principles and public and private funding facilitate neighborhood change. Neighborhood redevelopment projects that ascribe to and implement the guidelines for inner-city neighborhood design transform communities described by crime, poverty and poor housing conditions into safe, diverse, neighborhoods with access to transportation networks, employment centers and public open space. Improved conditions combine with urban amenities to attract mixed-income households to neighborhoods, where prices for market rate housing are below citywide averages, and thus dilute concentrations of poverty. The resulting population and income growth generates increased consumer demand. The free market then responds to increased demand, motivated by economic incentive, with commercial investment to expand marketplace activities and stimulate employment growth in the target neighborhood. Local residents benefit from new employment opportunities created by commercial investment. Household incomes, property values and home prices grow as neighborhood change transitions to neighborhood revitalization. The cycle perpetuates and accelerates investment and economic growth as neighborhood revitalization continues.

The economic development section divides data into two categories for analysis: qualitative indicators of neighborhood change and residential and commercial investment patterns

essential to neighborhood revitalization. Neighborhood change evaluates the social and economic conditions that shape perceptions about the neighborhood and thus approximates market strength to potential investors. Market strength is a function of consumer demand and investment risk. Census data from 1990, 2000 and 2010 describes conditions in the Rainier Valley, New Holly and Rainier Vista prior to redevelopment and before the HOPE VI award announcement (1990), after the start of construction at New Holly and the Rainier Valley redevelopment announcement (2000) and following the completion of New Holly and phases one and two at Rainier Vista (2010). When new urbanism redevelopment fosters neighborhood change, the data indicate positive trends in current and future consumer demand (population, income growth and educational attainment) and improved neighborhood stability that results in less investment risk (poverty, housing tenure and single-family households).

An analysis of neighborhood revitalization follows. Neighborhood revitalization is defined by the ability of a neighborhood or target market to attract and retain investment to ensure sustained investment. Neighborhood revitalization is only possible where neighborhood conditions allow, in the wake of neighborhood change. Since neighborhood change establishes the social and economic context required to catalyze neighborhood revitalization, accelerated investment is expected to correspond with improved neighborhood conditions. Investment analysis thus coincides with the announcement of HOPE VI neighborhood revitalization award in 1995, between the 1990 and 2000 census data. The analysis relies on four datasets provided by King County Department of Assessment that function as proxies for capital investment: residential construction, commercial construction, real property sales and approved home improvement permits. As neighborhood conditions improve, accelerated investment in the neighborhoods surrounding New Holly and Rainier Vista, and throughout the Rainier Valley, is anticipated.

Neighborhood Change

City expenditures target investments to attract residents, businesses and tourists to a region, city or neighborhood to increase tax revenue and capture consumer spending (Hubbard, 1995; Florida, 2002; Zielenbach, 2003). HOPE VI applies the same strategy to neighborhood revitalization. Several key variables indicate an increase in demand and thus market potential to investors. Population growth is the most direct strategy to stimulate demand; an increase in residents contributes to the tax base and adds consumers to the market area. But an influx in population does not necessarily translate into increased demand, as failed urban renewal experiments demonstrated, where concentrations of low-income residents only precipitated decline in central cities throughout the United States. To contribute to economic growth, residents need sufficient income to provide for basic human needs—housing, food, clothing and transportation—with some remainder of discretionary income to patronize commercial goods and services. Median household income is an indicator of current purchasing power while educational attainment correlates to potential income. Home tenure is an indicator both of neighborhood stability and spending potential; home ownership fosters place attachment and suggests the financial capacity to purchase and maintain a home. Conversely, markets characterized by above average concentrations of rental property imply a transient population without the financial security to purchase property. Single-parent households are predictive of both consumer demand and neighborhood stability. Since most low- and medium-income families with children require two wage earners to meet financial obligations, single-parent households struggle to earn enough income to afford goods and services beyond basic needs. This section analyzes demographic change in the Rainier Valley to determine if the market demand is robust enough, even after significant financial investment in housing, transportation, public services and open space, to attract additional investment and increase supply.

Seattle continues to exhibit strong regional growth that is expected to swell the regional population over the next several decades. Rainier Valley, which has traditionally served as an entry point for new immigrants and low-income transplants, is positioned to accommodate anticipated growth, but population trends suggest that new residents are not choosing to locate in the Rainier Valley. The city population increased by 9.1 percent between 1990 and 2000 and 8.0 percent between 2000 and 2010; the population in Rainier Valley increased slower, 8.9 percent and 6.7 percent, respectively. Population change in New Holly and Rainier Vista reflects redevelopment efforts: growth in New Holly exceeded citywide averages in 2000 as residents moved into new units and accelerated dramatically after completion of construction in 2007; the decrease in population at Rainier Vista resulted from temporary displacement to prepare for redevelopment before growing steadily between 2000 and 2010.

Table 4. Population Growth. Source: U.S. Census Bureau.

Population Growth								
Year	**Seattle**		**Rainier Valley**		**New Holly (110)**		**Rainier Vista (101)**	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
1990	516259		46455		5730		6251	
2000	563374	9.1%	50577	8.9%	6260	9.2%	5943	-4.9%
2010	608660	8.0%	53977	6.7%	9013	44.0%	6553	10.3%

Inflation median household adjusted income, when coupled with population growth, indicates the market potential. The equation is simple. A larger population, earning more income per household, has more purchasing power than a smaller population with the same household income or the same size population with a lower household income. Between 1990 and 2000, household income in both Holly Park and Rainier Vista grew rapidly. In those same years, population in both census tracts remained relatively stagnant. Demand thus increased only marginally. When population finally increased in both census tracts by 2010, following completed redevelopment at New Holly and the completion of phase one and two at Rainier Vista, it coincided with the 2008 economic recession and erased a portion of the economic

progress between 1990 and 2000. The Rainier Valley market remained more stable during the recession, likely due to clusters of high-income residents on the western shore of Lake Washington.

Table 5: Inflation Adjusted Median Household Income. Source: U.S. Census Bureau.

Inflation Adjusted Median Household Income						
Year	**Rainier Valley**		**New Holly (110)**		**Rainier Vista (101)**	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
1990	$ 45,265.00		$ 26,553.00		$ 43,519.00	
2000	$ 57,877.00	27.9%	$ 46,678.00	75.8%	$ 60,866.00	39.9%
2010	$ 54,012.00	-6.7%	$ 40,349.00	-13.6%	$ 49,764.00	-18.2%

Data on educational attainment, an indicator of potential or future income growth, is more difficult to interpret. New Holly exhibited consistent advances from 1990 to 2010, with a noted spike in bachelors degrees between 2000 and 2010. At the same time, the number of high school graduates in the Rainier Vista census tract decreased dramatically from 1990 to 2000 and continue to fall before 2010; in the Rainier Valley, high school degrees fluctuated slightly over the twenty years, but remained constant—though high school graduates decreased proportionally—while an influx of residents with bachelors degrees was evident from 1990 to 2010. Refugees and immigrants from East Africa and Southeast Asia without secondary or accredited high school degrees likely obscured education data.

Table 6: Education Attainment in Population 25+. Source: U.S. Census Bureau.

Educational Attainment Population 25+						
Year	**Rainier Valley**		**New Holly (110)**		**Rainier Vista (101)**	
	High School	Bachelors	High School	Bachelors	High School	Bachelors
1990	7357	4160	910	354	911	487
2000	7064	5938	965	448	698	955
2010	7348	7209	1069	984	680	863

Consumer demand faltered during the 2008 recession. Income growth between 1990 and 2000 noticeably regressed as a result. Population growth, particularly in New Holly, where gains in educational attainment are evident, indicates future market potential. The data for Rainier Vista,

characterized by a marked decrease in the portion of the population with high school degrees, suggests potential regression. Construction in Rainier Vista is not yet complete and educational levels might rebound after phase three construction is finished. Improvement in the two HOPE VI neighborhoods has not contributed to significant neighborhood change in the Rainier Valley; population growth, income and educational attainment outside the two redevelopment projects remain static.

The census data indicates increased stability and decreased risk in the Rainier Valley and pronounced improvement at both New Holly and Rainier Vista. Income growth between 1990 and 2000 provides evidence that concentrated poverty at the public housing projects dispersed. In 1990, the census blocks with the highest number of residents in poverty were concentrated at Holly Park, prior to redevelopment. High poverty census blocks extend south from Holly Park along Martin Luther King Jr. Way South through the Rainier Valley. Residents in poverty clustered around Rainier Vista. The highest concentrations of poverty disappeared by 2000, though several block south of New Holly increased in poverty, the maps indicate poverty deconcentrated as residents relocated to different areas of the Rainier Valley during the redevelopment of Holly Park and Rainier Vista.



Figure 34: Rainier Valley Concentrated Poverty 1990. Source: U.S. Census Bureau and WAGDA.

Rainer Valley - Households in Poverty - 2000



Figure 35: Rainier Valley Concentrated Poverty 2000. Source: U.S. Census Bureau and WAGDA.

The deconcentration of poverty coincided with trends that indicated increased neighborhood stability. The number of single-family households trended downward consistently from 1990 to 2010. New Holly displayed the most prominent change, decreasing from 31.5 percent of households in 1990 to 13 percent of households in 2010.

Table 7: Single-Family Households. Source. U.S. Census Bureau.

Single-Family Households (% Total Households)						
Year	**Rainier Valley**		**New Holly (110)**		**Rainier Vista (101)**	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
1990	2939	17.6%	649	31.5%	356	17.1%
2000	2110	12.1%	273	14.6%	278	12.9%
2010	2003	10.4%	365	13.0%	249	9.8%

Owner occupied homes continued to be a source of neighborhood market stability throughout the Rainier Valley and remained above citywide averages. The neighborhood revitalization programs and home ownership opportunities at New Holly dramatically increased home ownership in the neighborhood surrounding the public housing project. The percentage of owner occupied homes decreased in Rainier Vista, but the data likely reflect the impacts of temporary displacement necessary to initiate HOPE VI redevelopment.

Table 8: Owner Occupied Homes. Source: U.S. Census Bureau.

Tenure - Owner Occupied Homes (% Occupied Homes)						
Year	**Rainier Valley**		**New Holly (110)**		**Rainier Vista (101)**	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
1990	9170	51.1%	796	38.6%	1292	62.2%
2000	10731	58.6%	938	50.3%	1417	65.5%
2010	11354	53.1%	3355	78.0%	1371	47.9%

Vacancy trends are difficult to interpret. The massive influx of housing attributed to HOPE VI investment dramatically altered the housing market in the Rainier Valley. The number of vacant units in the census tract around New Holly increased from 166 in 2000 to 342 by 2010, though vacancy rates actually decreased.

Table 9: Vacancy Rates. Source: U.S. Census Bureau.

Vacancy - Total Vacant Units / Vacancy Rates						
Year	**Rainier Valley**		**New Holly (110)**		**Rainier Vista (101)**	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
1990	1214	6.8%	109	5.0%	112	5.1%
2000	819	4.5%	166	8.2%	112	4.9%
2010	1833	8.6%	342	6.8%	332	10.4%

Similar patterns are evident in the Rainier Valley, where an increase of over 1000 units from 2000 to 2010 only increased vacancy rates by only 4 percent. The data indicate the current housing stocks exceeds demand, but the market is gradually absorbing the supply. If current trends persist and vacancies, both absolute and as a percentage, continue to decrease, then the neighborhoods and public housing developments in the Rainier Valley stabilize and limit future investment risk.

When examined in concert, the indicators suggest neighborhood change is in progress and conditions are improving. Demand is gradually increasing with population and income growth and higher levels of educational attainment predict future growth. The neighborhood is stabilizing with a higher percentage of owner occupied units, fewer single-parent households and a deconcentration in poverty. Overall, neighborhood change indicates market potential for future investment in the Rainier Valley.

Neighborhood Revitalization

Sustained neighborhood revitalization efforts depend on the ability of a neighborhood to attract private investment, but private investors do not commit capital resources with sufficient market demand where potential returns exceed perceived risk. Thus, in HOPE VI neighborhoods,

marked by historic disinvestment and concentrated poverty, neighborhood change necessarily precedes private investment. In the Rainier Valley, then, capital investment is expected to remain absent until the market recognizes and responds to neighborhood change. There are several key periods in the redevelopment process when the market realizes and acts on potential returns: the announcement of HOPE VI funding and the start of construction; at the completion of phases of construction and return of residents to the neighborhood; and after all construction is complete. Other unique market changes influence perceived demand, such as the completion of the light rail line through the Rainier Valley to Seattle. The light rail connects consumers to neighboring markets, increasing accessibility to marketplaces outside for Rainier Valley residents and providing direct access to the Rainier Valley for visitors.

Table 10: Redevelopment Timeline. Source: U.S. Census Bureau.

Redevelopment Timeline	
Year	**Significant Milestone**
1995	Holly Park - awarded $47 million in HOPE VI funding for redevelopment
1996	Holly Park - residents receive counseling and assistance for temporary relocation
1999	New Holly - rental housing in Phase I completed; residents return to New Holly
1999	Rainier Vista - awarded $35 million in HOPE VI funding for redevelopment
2000	Rainier Vista - residents receive counseling and assistance for temporary relocation
2001	New Holly - rental housing and Elder Village Senior Housing in Phase II completed
2003	Rainier Vista - master plan approved by City Council
2004	New Holly - private developers begin construction on market-rate housing
2004	Rainier Vista - infrastructure and Phase I rental housing construction begins
2005	New Holly - rental housing in Phase III completed and occupied
2005	Rainier Vista - public housing in Phase I completed and occupied
2006	Rainier Vista - for-sale housing in Phase I completed and occupied
2007	New Holly - the last of 871 Holly Park replacement housing unit available for rental
2008	Rainier Vista - infrastructure and demolition in Phase II completed
2009	Link light rail service begins
2010	Rainier Vista - infrastructure construction for Phase II begins

New Holly Milestones

Rainier Vista Milestones

Rainier Valley Milestones

The timeline above identifies significant milestones development milestone that correlate with neighborhood change; as improvements aggregate and neighborhood change results, market incentives also accrete to attract capital investment to the HOPE VI neighborhood markets and throughout the Rainier Valley. The redevelopment timeline allows analysis on an annual basis, beginning in 1995, whereas neighborhood change measures rely heavily on census data available every ten years.

Three approaches attempt to evaluate the relationship between capital investment and neighborhood revitalization at New Holly and Rainier Vista. The spatial distribution of commercial and residential investment graphically represents investment and disinvestment patterns around New Holly, Rainier Vista, and throughout the Rainier Valley. Absolute investment patterns correspond to specific periods of investment measured by residential construction (units), commercial construction (square footage), real property sales (dollars and sales exchange), and approved home improvements permits (dollars and total permits). The four datasets are divided into two categories, where residential construction and approved home improvement permits illustrate anticipated market growth and potential as perceived by residents and individual investors and commercial construction and real property sales indicate perceptions of future value by non-residents and commercial investors. The final investment metric develops an index to compare the rate of investment at New Holly and Rainier Vista neighborhoods to the Rainier Valley neighborhood. The index enables comparison of residential and commercial construction, real property sales and approved home improvement permits across scales and over time to control for external factors—the 2008 economic recession—that obscure the significance of discrete variables absent of spatial context. Each dataset, from the King County Department of Assessments, is collated with parcel data with geographical information systems (GIS).

Before analysis begins, the relevant market areas are defined. The Rainier Valley neighborhood market is constrained by the built environment and geographic features and contains eight census tracts adjacent to the census tracts where New Holly and Rainier Vista are located (redrawn census tracts, nine tracts in 2000 and ten in 2010, are adjusted to match the 1990 census boundaries). The census tracts selected to delineate Rainier Valley neighborhood reflect significant elements that influence potential development and economic growth in the Rainier Valley. Interstate freeways create a hard, impermeable boundaries on the north and southwest edges of the Rainier Valley; Beacon Hill and First Hill border the Rainier Valley to the west and northwest, where steep slopes rise from the valley floor and physical prevent east to west connectivity; and Lake Washington defines the eastern edge of the neighborhood.



Figure 36: Rainier Valley Study Area, Census Tracts. Source: U.S. Census Bureau and WAGDA.

HOPE VI neighborhoods are defined by a one-mile radius from the centers of both New Holly and Rainier Vista developments. The Rainier Valley and New Holly neighborhoods only include

parcels from the census tracts in the Rainier Valley neighborhood. The selection excludes some parcels within a one-mile radius, but recognizes the same physical boundaries that limit access and hinder development in the Rainier Valley.



Figure 37: New Holly and Rainier Vista HOPE VI Neighborhoods, Census Tracts. Source. U.S. Census Bureau and WAGDA.

The spatial distribution of commercial and residential building in the Rainier Valley, categorized by decade built, visually illustrates concentrations of obsolete buildings throughout the Rainier Valley and pockets of new construction. Residential obsolescence is evident in the Rainier Valley, represented by a wide swath of buildings that stretch north to south through the heart of the Rainier Valley. The blue parcels indicate buildings built between 1900 and 1929.



Figure 38: Rainier Valley Residential Investment Patterns. Source: U.S. Census Bureau and WAGDA.

Rainier Valley Commercial Investment



Figure 39: Rainier Valley Commercial Investment Patterns. Source: U.S. Census Bureau and WAGDA.

After 1929, residential development stalled during the Great Depression and didn't recover until after World War II on the periphery of existing development. Following the war, an influx of Italian immigrants initiated population trends that continue to present day. Building development proceeded slowly, with limited development during periods of housing discrimination in the 1960s, redlining in the 1970s and high crime rates through the 1980s and early 1990s. With the redevelopment of Holly Park and Rainier Vista, new construction on the periphery of the public housing projects increased from 2000 to present. Bright red-orange and red dots cluster in the blocks in close proximity to the housing development. The spatial distribution suggests some degree of neighborhood change influenced perception about neighborhood conditions and market potential in the Rainier Valley, expressed by a moderate increase of new home construction in HOPE VI neighborhoods. New residential construction is still isolated to a limited number of parcels. The buildings built in the early 20th century continue to accommodate low-income populations, but remain vulnerable to future development speculation, demolitions, and gentrification.

Commercial investment illustrates a different pattern. No one period dominates construction decade. The development patterns appears to shift along Rainier Avenue, from older, smaller buildings in the southern part of the Columbia City neighborhood to larger parcels constructed in the 1970s and 1980s for manufacturing north of Rainier Vista. There is evidence of urban infill in small parcels around Rainier Vista after 2000. The data set also appears deficient, a concern substantiated by field research that confirms commercial parcels, particularly along Martin Luther King Jr. Way South, are absent from the King County Department of Assessments dataset or were deleted from the dataset if they lacked required fields to process the data in GIS.

In a series of papers that analyze inner-city real estate investment in New York City, Hackworth (2001) identifies variables to evaluate reinvestment, defined as “the return of investment to a building or neighborhood whose productive potential has been removed or undermined by disinvestment.” Commercial construction and residential construction, home improvement permits and real property sales data indicate investment in the HOPE VI neighborhoods and in the Rainier Valley. New construction is a basic measure of investment. With the available data, new construction is measured by year built and categorized by commercial (net square footage) and single-family housing development (units)—two distinct scales that engage different market participants that pursue separate motives. New single-family housing development, or lack thereof, suggests a shift in consumer preference and demand while commercial data indicate private developers recognize potential financial incentive and choose to invest. These data potentially preclude construction completed after 1995, demolished, and then redeveloped, but the impact is minimal. Commercial construction data are categorized by the King County Department of Assessments and include HOPE VI investment as well as public investment in public schools, community centers and neighborhood support services. The grouping thus conflates private and public investment and obscures analysis.

The data spikes in residential and commercial construction loosely conform to the significant milestones identified in the redevelopment timeline. Between 1999 and 2008, residential construction in New Holly peaks through neighborhood redevelopment, but declines after the completion of the final phase of construction. Construction at Rainier Vista is consistently low until redevelopment constructions begins in 2005. There is no discernable pattern to development in residential construction in the Rainier Valley.



Figure 40: Residential Construction. Source: King County Department of Assessments.

Commercial construction corresponds to multi-family housing construction in New Holly and Rainier Vista. Spikes in 2001, 2002 and 2005 at New Holly illustrate the increase in multi-family housing stock during redevelopment. The increase in commercial space during 2010, completed three years after the completion of New Holly is the first indication of strong private investment in the neighborhood market. Commercial construction in Rainier Vista is negligible through the study period. Notable exceptions in 2004 and 2005, after completion of public housing and for-sale housing, are part of HOPE VI redevelopment. The public housing redevelopment projects contribute significantly to commercial construction in the Rainier Valley. With the exception of 2009, when link light rail service begins, there is limited evidence of accelerated commercial investment in the Rainier Valley market. The lack of investment suggests private investors are slow to respond to or recognize market potential resulting from HOPE VI redevelopment.



Figure 41: Commercial Construction. Source: King County Department of Assessments.

Approved home improvement permits confirm residential investment patterns. Residents in the HOPE VI neighborhoods are either unable to afford home improvements or choose not to invest in single-family residences, despite high home ownership rates in the Rainier Vista and the Rainier Valley. The low level of investment dollars and approved permits at New Holly likely correspond to low levels of home ownership in the New Holly neighborhood prior to



Figure 42: Approved Home Improvement Permits in Dollars. Source: King County Department of Assessments.

redevelopment. After redevelopment, as ownership rates spike, there is little need for home improvement in new units.



Figure 43: Approved Home Improvement Permits, Total. Source: Source: King County Department of Assessments.

The lack of investment in Rainier Vista and New Holly differs from investment patterns in the Rainier Valley market. During a period of rapid economic growth in the Seattle area, confirmed by income growth in the HOPE VI neighborhoods, home improvement data indicate a fluid market where residents invest in homes to capitalize on market demand for homes in the Rainier Valley. Residents in New Holly and Rainier Vista ignore economic incentive to sell homes to affluent buyers, place significant value on the community or homes—an indication of place attachment—and elect to remain in the neighborhood, or assume reinvestment in existing homes is not realized in sales price if new residents plan to demolition homes or remodel existing homes.

Sales exchange and real property sales data indicate increased demand in the Rainier Valley from 1995 through 2006 (2007 data is omitted from sales exchange chart as an outlier).

Sales exchange measures the volume of capital flows into and out of identified markets; the index is calculated by multiplying the number of sales by the average sales price. Both real property sales and sales exchange steadily increase during the HOPE VI redevelopment. The period coincides with population and income growth in the study areas and indicates the most consistent period of investment and neighborhood change in New Holly, Rainier Vista and the Rainier Valley neighborhood market.



Figure 44: Sales Exchange and Real Property Sale. Source: Source: King County Department of Assessments.

The periods that indicate significant investment correspond with either HOPE VI redevelopment or larger market trends, particularly the housing bubble that led to the 2008 recessions. Improvements in neighborhood conditions attracted new, affluent homeowners to New Holly and Rainier Vista neighborhoods, but the population influx and income growth did not directly translate into additional residential or commercial investment. Approved home improvement permits growth is anemic through the period, a resident response to myriad social and economic contexts.

To determine if investment in the New Holly and Rainier Vista neighborhoods accelerated during development (an anticipated response to capital inflow and changing market conditions in the HOPE VI neighborhoods), the data is translated to a relative change index to calculate percentage growth period to period relative to a larger market context. Relative change is measured by an index that compares investment across spatial scales where: relative change is a ratio equal to the number of buildings completed (commercial construction) in a given period (2000-2004) at a given scale (New Holly) divided by the number of buildings completed in the same period at a larger scale (Rainier Valley), minus the number of buildings completed in the previous period (1995-1999) at a given scale (New Holly) divided by the number of buildings completed in the previous period on a larger scale (Rainier Valley).

$$\Delta NC_{COMMERCIAL} = NC_{NH}^{2000\text{-}2004}/NC_{RV}^{2000\text{-}2004} - NC_{NH}^{1995\text{-}1999}/NC_{RV}^{1995\text{-}1999}$$

The formula is easily adjusted to evaluate building alterations, investments made to existing structures, and sales data. The data are grouped in five-year periods that correspond with the redevelopment timeline. The period from 1995 to 1999 begins with the HOPE VI award and includes the completion of phase one New Holly and the HOPE VI award for Rainier Vista; the second period, 2000 to 2004, includes the completion of phase two at New Holly, the entrance

of private developers into market-rate housing and the start of construction at Rainier Vista; and the third period includes completion of phase three at New Holly, phase one public and for-sale housing in Rainier Vista, and culminates with the completion of the Link light rail. Grouping attempts to correct for outliers in the dataset that skew investment patterns when analyzed year to year. Since the HOPE VI redevelopment projects are included in both markets—investment at New Holly and Rainier Vista are included in the Rainier Valley market—the relative change index indicates periods of disproportionate investment over time. When the relative change index is positive, the rate of investment growth in the neighborhood market exceeds the rate of investment growth in the Rainier Valley; when the index is negative, investment growth in the Rainier Valley exceeds HOPE VI neighborhood markets.

The relative change index indicates residential and commercial construction in New Holly and Rainier Vista reflect the redevelopment timeline. In New Holly, where construction is concentrated in the second period, the relative change index is positive, but fails to maintain investment after initial construction. Investment in Rainier Vista is also linked to HOPE VI redevelopment. Residential growth indicates peak construction between 2005 and 2009.



Figure 45: Commercial and Residential Construction, Relative Change. Source: King County Department of Assessments.

Home improvement data confirm trends from the absolute data, but change is exacerbated by the small sample set. A relative increase in home improvement permits in the period from 2000 to 2004 in New Holly then decreased by a larger proportion after 2004. Rainier Vista again exhibited a proportional increase during active redevelopment, but witnessed relative disinvestment prior to the completion of phase one in 2005.



Figure 46: Approved Home Improvement Permits, Relative Change. Source: King County Department of Assessments.

The influx of homeowners into the Rainier Valley is not reflected in sales exchange and real property sales until neighborhood change begins in both HOPE VI neighborhoods. The average sales price in New Holly increases at the same rate as in the Rainier Valley from period one to period two, but increased after the completion of construction in 2007, consistent with neighborhood change. The average sales price for real property sales in Rainier Vista decreased between the first and second period, suggesting that redevelopment temporarily depressed sales price. Once construction began at Rainier Vista, the average sales price increased relative to the Rainier Valley, and indication that residents and buyers are more confident about the future of Rainier Vista after redevelopment. Positive increases in average sales price, relative to Rainier Vista, did not translate into relative increases in sales exchange.

If consumer demand increased average sale price, it did not increase sales volume in Rainier Vista and New Holly. Most of the investment is thus outside of New Holly and Rainier Vista.





Figure 47: Real Property Sales and Sales Exchange, Relative Change. Source: King County Department of Assessments.

The relative change index indicates that HOPE VI redevelopment is responsible for the majority of investment in the New Holly and Rainier Vista neighborhoods. During periods of construction in New Holly and Rainier Vista, commercial and residential investment exceeded investment rates in the larger market area. In New Holly, that increase reversed after completion, suggesting the market is not yet prepared for additional capital investment. Either demand is insufficient or supply, yet to be absorbed, exceeds demand. The variability in home improvement data indicates perception about the future of both HOPE VI neighborhoods remains mixed. In contrast, growth in average sales price, suggests that prospective buyers perceive future neighborhood change. The sales exchange data questions consumer behavior and indicates buyers either consistently overpaid for access to amenities and transportation networks or existing residents resisted encroachment from prospective home buyers—or both. The limitations of such analysis are discussed in greater detail in the conclusions. For now, it is enough to conclude that private investment has not yet materialized due to a confluence of factors that include the redevelopment timeline, the 2008 recession and neighborhood change in New Holly and Rainier Vista.

Discussion

The redevelopment of Holly Park and Rainier Vista provides evidence to support the incorporation of new urbanism and neighborhood revitalization. Since 1990, before the Seattle Housing Authority applied for and implemented redevelopment intervention in the Rainier Valley, the spatial change in household income in New Holly and Rainier Vista has effectively deconcentrated the high poverty rates that characterized the study neighborhoods and prompted extensive revitalization programs. Crime in the study neighborhoods has decreased markedly without resultant increases in the surrounding areas throughout the Rainier Valley. Though the developments are primarily residential, pedestrian connectivity has increased substantially and residents have pedestrian access to the daily needs of life within a half-mile radius from their homes; public transportation investment in the Rainier Valley has established a regional network that allows residents to commute to employment centers without incurring the costs of private transportation. The neighborhoods have remained diverse and continue to fulfill their traditional purpose as a first point of entrance for immigrants to the Seattle region. The redevelopment of Holly Park and Rainier Vista has not appropriated new lands while increasing public open space accessible to community residents and visitors. Design standards for subsidized public housing and private market rate housing have adopted design precedents from the local architectural character of surrounding neighborhoods; public housing and private development have produced forms nearly indistinguishable from one another. At the same time, New Holly and Rainier Vista redevelopment has actively prevented displacement of low-income residents commonly associated with neighborhood revitalization. The HOPE VI funded program has increased the availability and mix of affordable housing units to accommodate low-income families, seniors and special needs populations and provided market rate housing to attract new residents with higher household incomes.

Despite the listed advances, social justice concerns linger. While income diversity has increased, income groupings have concentrated at the far ends of the socioeconomic spectrum (as defined by census income categories). The formation of a middle-class population in the study neighborhoods has yet to materialize. No evidence has been identified to suggest neighborhood revitalization has increased economic opportunity across income levels in the Rainier Valley. There has been no concomitant investment in retail and commercial employment centers that attract local residents. The commercial mix, devoid of significant concentrations of office space, has continued to provide only low-wage hourly jobs at assorted small-scale local businesses such as restaurants and personal services (hair salons, dry cleaners, and convenience stores) and national chains (fast food restaurants, grocery stores and coffee shop). Thus any gain in household income has resulted either from an influx of outside residents with higher incomes derived from an external employment center or an increase in the number of income earners per household.

Racial diversity appears consistent in basic census statistics, but an influx of East African immigrants and refugees has distorted the figures. The census forms have traditionally failed to distinguish between ancestry and ethnicity and thus conflate Black Americans and African immigrants. The Rainier Valley, following the gentrification of the Central District, has traditionally been the community center for the Black population. Following HOPE VI revitalization, the proportion of Black Americans has decreased. Data from the 2000 and 2010 census indicate that approximately 20 percent of the black population in the Rainier Vista and New Holly neighborhoods are East African immigrants. Al Levin, of the Seattle Housing Authority, reports a majority of the black residents in the redevelopment projects are East African immigrants. Educational attainment levels have substantiated this finding. While the number of college graduates in the Rainier Valley has increased significantly since 1990, the

number of high school graduates has remained constant and decreased relative to population growth. The immigrant and refuge population has limited educational opportunity prior to arrival in the United States. The displacement of the Black community, evident throughout the history of Seattle, has persisted in neighborhood revitalization efforts in the Rainier Valley and the black population has now migrated in South King County.

Gentrification threatens the future of social equity in the Rainier Valley. Kennedy and Leonard (2001) select five "static and dynamic indicators [that] may provide insight as to which communities are beginning the gentrification process." New Holly and Rainier Vista, and, by extension, the Rainier Valley, exhibit four of the five conditions indicating the likelihood of gentrification:

1. High rate of renters
2. Ease of access to job centers
3. High and increasing levels of metropolitan congestion
4. High architectural value
5. Comparatively low housing values

The Rainier Valley has higher than average home ownership rates; gentrification is thus more difficult (when long-tenured residents refuse to sell) or expensive (when long-tenured residents demand price premiums that overvalue pace attachment). Relatively low housing values offset above-average home ownership rates. Compared to Seattle, home prices and property values in the New Holly and Rainier Vista neighborhoods, and the Rainier Valley neighborhood market, are lower than average and thus more affordable to residents that live and work outside the study areas. Transportation investments in the Rainier Valley—intended to increase access

to employment opportunities for existing low-income residents—stimulate external demand. Studies also suggest that access to efficient public transportation networks increase property values. If the value of transportation investment is not recognized by local residents, and buyers assume proximity to public transportation is incorporated in the purchase price, then housing prices are perceived to be below market value when compared to neighborhoods without access to regional transportation networks. In short, the properties are more attractive to potential buyers seeking urban amenities, but perceived value is static to existing residents. High architectural value, completely realized in the design guidelines distributed by the Seattle Housing Authority to private partners, increases gentrification potential. The homes in the HOPE VI projects are designed to blend into an existing housing stock. As both representation and reflection, even given the age of the existing housing stock, the architectural character of the remaining single-family homes in the Rainier Valley is indistinct from the neighborhoods throughout Seattle that have witnessed reinvestment in recent decades.

Conclusions

The adoption of new urbanism principles by HOPE VI to foster neighborhood revitalization affirms a beneficial relationship between new urbanism and neighborhood change. The study evaluates this relationship to approximate how design principles translate to economic and social development in impoverished inner city neighborhoods. The first stage of analysis concerns the new urbanism design guidelines delineated by the Congress of New Urbanism adopted by HUD HOPE VI Neighborhood Revitalization. While design guidelines are often abstract and as such offer little in standard metrics through which to evaluate performance, the completed design review confirms the presence and application of each new urbanist design principles in the redevelopment of Holly Park and Rainier Vista.

The redevelopment of Holly Park and Rainier Vista by the Seattle Housing Authority and public and private partners fully implements the design guidelines for inner city neighborhood revitalization. The larger question considered in the conclusion is how these design elements contribute to neighborhood change, as evidenced by qualitative indicators, and ultimately catalyze neighborhood revitalization, defined as the ability of redevelopment to attract and retain capital investment.

The variables analyzed to measure neighborhood change indicate a positive relationship between urban design and HOPE VI redevelopment. There is steady population growth in the Rainier Valley and in both HOPE VI neighborhoods; the racial and ethnic mix of the community exhibits slight fluctuations, but remains more diverse than other Seattle neighborhoods. At the same time, median household income increases in the Rainier Valley, and in the census tracts that contain New Holly and Rainier Vista. Income growth is not confined to high-income earners, but distributed across a range of incomes, leading to decreased poverty, especially

in the New Holly and Rainier Vista neighborhoods. Though the 2010 census indicates a slight decline in income and an increase in poverty, the data is tainted by the 2008 recession, which placed downward pressure on household income and increased poverty. The increase in poverty between 2000 and 2010 represents households that earn between 50 and 99 percent of the poverty line. Only a limited number of households dropped into the lowest income groups, below 49 percent of the poverty line. Educational attainment for people over 25 increases, evident in a percentage increase of residents with a bachelor degree. The number of people with only a high school degree remains constant, due to an influx of refugees from East Africa and Southeast Asia without secondary (or accredited) education. The number of single-parent households decreases over the same period. The percentage of owner-occupied units is relatively constant and remains above citywide averages. The most dramatic change in New Holly and Rainier Vista, and the Rainier Valley, is a drop in crime in all census tracts in the Rainier Valley. Crime in the census tracts where New Holly and Rainier Vista are located provide evidence that crime decreased more than 40 percent between 1996 and 2007.

Social and economic change in neighborhood redevelopment projects is part of a complex process. The urban design principles prescribed by new urbanists and administered by HOPE VI contribute to a reversal of social and economic decline in the Rainier Valley. Though significant investment from federal, state and local government sources—coupled with private sector investment—facilitates neighborhood change, previous iterations of urban renewal indicate capital alone is insufficient to achieve neighborhood change. Where the urban renewal programs of the 1960s manage to concentrate large populations of low-income residents into monolithic structures—designed to house victims of urban decay instead of addressing social and economic marginalization—the qualitative indicators for New Holly and Rainier Vista do not predict such a precipitous decline. The analysis indicates urban design contributes to

preliminary success in the two HOPE VI neighborhoods.

Crime is major determinant in neighborhood revitalization; a decrease in crime, in neighborhoods stigmatized as dangerous and violent, changes perceptions of the neighborhoods to encourage migration of new residents with higher incomes and establishes a safe and stable environment for private investment and commercial development. Multiple new urbanism principles combine to create safe neighborhoods: safety and civic engagement, streets, public open space, diversity and mixed use.

In the first stage of redevelopment, the Seattle Housing Authority removed curvilinear street network and cul-de-sacs—typical of suburbia—that defined the spatial distribution of homes in the original public housing developing. SHA then invested early phase funding to reestablish an urban street grid and reconnect New Holly and Rainier Vista to the existing urban fabric and the surrounding neighborhoods. The new grid pattern allowed SHA to eliminate wide setbacks and increase density to construct more homes on smaller lots and increase opportunities for natural surveillance. The grid network increased resident and visitor access to the neighborhood from surrounding communities. The streetscape discouraged thru traffic in the neighborhood. The new street network configuration enabled spatial transformation and windows, doors and porches now face the public sphere where residents engage in natural surveillance.

The housing authority established a hierarchy of space that encourages residents to assert ownership of each unit even when tenants were rents. Units are designed to blur the boundary between public and private space; as such, territoriality, while explicit to private space (fenced backyards), extends beyond the boundaries of the home into semi-public space (open front porches) and further into the public open space (sidewalks, streets and parks). The hierarchy

allows residents to claim space and assert authority and ownership over private yards and through the semi-public and public sphere. The image and milieu of both New Holly and Rainier Vista augment territoriality. The Seattle Housing Authority established firm guidelines for homes at the neighborhood termini and requires stricter design standards and higher quality building materials. Design guidelines also minimize differences between low-income and market rate housing to avoid stigmas that characterized low-income housing during urban renewal.

The Seattle Housing Authority redevelopment plan encourages a diverse racial and ethnic population and mixed-income households. Available housing options provide alternatives for a mix of extremely low-income, low-income and market rate homes. The resident mix requires a set of social standards common to a diverse neighborhood population to discourage offensive behaviors or perceived and observed incivilities. The diverse population demands different types of public space and residential amenities throughout the course of the day. The usage pattern, the routine activities of place, augments natural surveillance opportunities for both residents and visitors. The Seattle Housing Authority also screens residents for criminal history and immigration status and relies heavily on rental and employment history and positive references from previous landlords. Thus the screening process excludes a portion of the population with questionable rental or criminal histories to stabilize the community and minimize criminal influence.

New urbanism anticipates statistical improvement in social and economic indicators to translate into neighborhood revitalization. Safe, pedestrian-friendly communities with access to public transportation networks and employment centers provide urban amenities to attract a diverse, mixed-income population. Subsequent population and income growth improve the neighborhood economic base and stimulate demand. The market then recognizes increased economic

demand in the neighborhood and responds with capital investment to supply amenities and services to capture profit in emerging urban markets.

Capital investment has yet to materialize as expected. Limited new home construction has occurred around the periphery of New Holly and Rainier Vista, but large pockets of obsolete building stock continue to characterize the built environment in the Rainier Valley. Commercial investment is less evident than residential construction; the majority of commercial development, recorded as such by the King County Department of Assessments, includes schools and community centers and multi-family housing. Almost no new retail or office space has been constructed.

There are several possible explanations for the lack of capital investment in the Rainier Valley and each is at least partially responsible. Even when new urbanism facilitates neighborhood change in depressed neighborhoods, the aggregate increase in demand is insufficient to attract private investment. In this scenario, investors fail to acknowledge income and population growth or determine the increases do not exceed thresholds used to evaluate market potential. Another possible factor that influences investment decisions is transportation. Public transportation improves city and regional connectivity and expands the market area. Residents are able to travel on light rail service and public buses to the surrounding neighborhoods and downtown Seattle. If investors perceive residents satisfy consumer demand in nearby markets, there is little incentive to invest in riskier markets. Pedestrian transportation suggests another alternative: the market does not recognize pedestrian traffic as a viable source of consumers and resigns to invest in market serviced by public transport and private automobiles. Finally, neighborhood redevelopment at Rainier Vista and New Holly leverages $580 million of public and private funding to construct approximately 2,300 units, a net gain of nearly 1,000 units,

which saturates the market. Developers then delay investment in market rate housing until all built and planned units are absorbed by the marketplace. Subsidized low-income units further complicate the housing market. At both New Holly and Rainier Vista, residents earning 80 percent of area median income qualify for low-income housing rentals. Residents at or below this income level that choose subsidized housing remove themselves from the private housing market.

Time also plays an important role in both investment patterns and data analysis. At the time of this research, Rainier Vista phase three is still under construction. Cautious investors wait for total market absorption of available housing stock and neighborhood change to stabilize before committing capital resources to areas previously characterized by high crime, concentrated poverty and a high percentage of minority and immigrant residents. The recession that began in 2008 continues to interrupt positive economic growth. Investors are unlikely to locate development in neighborhoods without a historically strong economic base when the global financial markets are uncertain. It is thus possible that investors refuse to enter the marketplace until the future of the neighborhood market is more certain. If investors have waited to invest in the Rainier Valley, or in the census tracts around New Holly and Rainier Vista, the future, projected growth and benefits is not recognized in this study.

The research identifies positive neighborhood change between the 1990 and 2010 census, but concludes the neighborhood change facilitated by new urbanism and HOPE VI redevelopment has not catalyzed neighborhood revitalization. Future research can apply the methodology developed in this study to determine if neighborhood revitalization requires greater time lapse between implementation and analysis to fully evaluate the impact of HOPE VI neighborhood revitalization. It is also possible the standards adopted by this study to measure neighborhood

revitalization, defined here by the ability to attract capital to ensure sustained development, are not appropriate to evaluate the relationship between new urbanism and neighborhood revitalization and new standards are necessary to declare a redevelopment program successful. Despite the identified limitations, this research finds a connection between new urbanism principles for inner city neighborhood design and neighborhood change in HOPE VI neighborhoods. Future research is needed to determine if the social and economic benefits realized through urban design are inherent to new urbanism or transferable to competing theories of good city form.

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Appendix A: Summary of Urban Design Principles

Design Principle	Notes	Completed
Citizen and Community Involvment	Community encouraged to participate in development planning; translators available to residents that speak English a second language; meeting announcements widely distributed through multiple channels	✓
Economic Opportunity	Local contractors employed by general contracts under Section 3	✓
Diversity	A diverse mix of housing types; encounters between people of different ages, race and incomes likely	✓
Neighborhoods	Development repaired existing neighborhood; created connections to surrounding neighborhoods; compact and pedestrian-friendly with a range of activities within walking distance	✓
Infill Development	Replaced housing in existing urban neighborhood with increased density housing development	✓
Mixed Use	Despite the absence of retail and employment opportunities within the development, provides access to nearby employment centers and retail outlets; recreation, civic and educational institutions exist within the neighborhoods	✓
Citywide and Regional Connections	Leverage public investment in public transportation and infrastructure to connect Rainier Valley to employment centers in the Greater Seattle Area.	✓
Streets	Traditional grid system replaces curvilinear cul-de-sac street pattern; connects neighborhood to surrounding neighborhoods and public open space	✓
Public Open Space	Open space of different size and function scattered throughout development to encourage a range of outdoor activities for diverse users	✓
Safety and Civic Engagement	Housing and street design delineates public, semi-public and private space; building orientation encourages eyes on the street; diverse functions of public space encourage activity throughout the day	✓
Dwelling as Mirror of Self	Gateway and view terminus facades establish neighborhood character; the presence of families and children is evident in signage and public open space	✓
Accessibility	Heirarchy of public and private space enables acessible and visitable units without infringing on privacy of residents	✓
Local Architectural Character	Local architectural character matches single-family housing development in surrounding neighborhoods	✓
Design Codes	The Seattle Housing Authority and consultants developed robust design guidelines to encourage private development in the neighborhood market	✓

Appendix B: Crime Statistics

	Total Crime by Census Tract by Year			
	95	101 (Rainier Vista)	102	103
1996	547	615	309	616
1997	641	626	304	587
1998	572	617	217	520
1999	480	638	204	546
2000	560	579	216	643
2001	462	522	252	541
2002	475	572	246	608
2003	489	467	284	517
2004	430	399	220	499
2005	527	472	314	569
2006	444	449	263	491
2007	360	330	253	353
% Decrease 1996 - 2007	-34.2%	-46.3%	-18.1%	-42.7%
	110 (New Holly)	111	117	118
1996	561	564	226	866
1997	399	626	279	679
1998	348	521	191	542
1999	315	482	225	666
2000	335	506	237	588
2001	308	423	231	583
2002	418	543	187	553
2003	430	587	195	545
2004	317	472	223	619
2005	376	506	217	677
2006	465	521	232	756
2007	319	495	218	592
% Decrease 1996 - 2007	-43.1%	-12.2%	-3.5%	-31.6%

Source: Seattle Police Department