

Defining Terrorism in the Public Policy of the United States at the
Federal and Local Levels

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Chapter 1: Purpose of Study*Policy Problem:*

Problem definition in the policy sphere is both innately antagonistic and overtly strategic. During the policy making process, policy makers seek to marshal support for a particular obstacle imperiling the public interest by employing carefully fashioned symbols that serve to engender wide public appeal, though the ambiguity of symbols employed cannot be overlooked; to paraphrase Sharf, the difficulty of reaching a functional definition of an abstraction is, practically speaking, insurmountable (359). Beginning in the nascent years of the 21st century, terrorism has emerged as one of the foremost drivers of domestic and international policy agendas in the United States. From within this policy discourse have emerged a myriad of symbols deployed to describe the act of terrorism itself and those that pursue it, yet these definitions have proven to be disappointingly vague, easily misapplied, and, perhaps worst of all, inconsistent with one another and out of concert with the global community's working definitions.

Since 2001, terrorism has dominated the political discourse of the United States and has emerged as a potent policy agenda driver within the federal government. With the United States still actively engaged in the global War on Terror, prudence demands that the language and symbology used by policy makers be scrutinized to divine the implications of what a war on an abstract concept means for the American people and for the international community. The question of what "terrorism" is and the processes through which it is defined within the policy sphere is of quintessential importance. What exactly is "terrorism?" Myriad symbols have been deployed within the United States political sphere to describe violent political acts, yet these

definitions have proven to be disappointingly vague, easily misapplied, and often inconsistent with one another, falling out of concert with the global community's working definitions.

How should policy makers define terrorism so that the policies they generate can more effectively diminish its prevalence? How can existing definitions and symbology be refined or improved? How do speeches on terrorism given by prominent US political figures inform US policy at the state level, if at all? I have sought to address these topics in my research.

Without a solid working definition, policies that will be truly effective in deterring future terrorist attacks will remain elusive. Having drawn on a range of academic sources and a selection of documents from the corpus of US and international policy, I have sought to place the language of US antiterrorism policy and rhetoric generated since 9/11 within a spectrum of definitional strategies that have emerged from the existent scholarly literature. Finally, I aim to assess how if at all the US's working definitions differ in relation to the academically and internationally promoted definitions that I have identified in my research.

Justification of Study:

My justification for this study is two fold: first, that the ubiquity of terrorism and its trappings in the public and policy discourse within the United States warrants an examination of the divergent definitions generated through the inherent ambiguity of symbols and abstractions including "terrorism," especially given the plurality of sources that use the term and second, that for policy to be truly effective, it must adequately address a given policy problem such that its enactment maximizes the attainment of predetermined objectives. If that objective is the abatement of terrorism, then it follows that "terrorism" must be a known entity by way of precise definition. It is in the interest of all parties to combat terrorism and to deter those that may pursue

it to political ends; by providing an argument for a working definition informed by social contract theory, my research has sought to provide an alternative for policy makers, the use of which may help to maximize the achievement of their objectives in the struggle to end terrorism.

Definitions of Terms:

In order to make my research and findings accessible, it would behoove the reader to familiarize himself with a host of terms and concepts that appear often in the literature that is reviewed forthwith:

Armed conflict threshold: Sustained, violent conflicts with enough destructive potential to be beyond the scope of normal situations of internal disturbances and tensions such as riots and isolated and sporadic acts of violence.

Imported terrorism: Terrorism generated in one country and directed against the government, citizenry, or infrastructure of another country.

Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC): Low intensity conflict is the use of military forces applied selectively and with restraint to enforce compliance with the policies or objectives of the political body controlling the military force.

Manifestations of terrorism: Those acts that constitute terrorism or the aftereffects of those acts.

State-Sponsored Terrorism: Terrorism directly or indirectly funded by state actors either against domestic or foreign targets.

Sub-State Terrorism: Terrorism carried out by actors within a state but that are neither directed by nor directly aided by a state actor.

War crime: Deliberate attacks on civilians, hostage taking, and the killing of prisoners in a time of sustained conflict, specifically war time.

Washington State All-Hazards Plan (WSAP): A document created by Washington State lawmakers and partners to provide a working strategy for emergency management and homeland security in the State of Washington.

Chapter 2: Review of Literature

Research of a series of scholarly works has provided a host of functional definitions currently in use within the public policy discourse that can be roughly divided into four main categories:

1. Political-definition is framed in political terms and views terrorist acts as politically motivated demonstration with a predetermined purpose
2. Academic-definitions are outcomes based or focus on the specific connotative and denotative associations with terms used to describe terrorism
3. Historical-definitions are drawn either from existing policy discourse or historical definitions that have been in use at one time or another.
4. Normative-definitions are based on the moral or ethical assumptions of the actors producing the definition

Symeonidou-Kastanidou

In Symeonidou-Kastanidou's 2004 article, "Defining Terrorism," the author examines the symbolism behind the EU's 2001 decision to officially define terrorism in a binding resolution. Her attention falls most noticeably on the need for EU Member States to produce an official definition at all, given that most acts defined by the resolution as constituting "terrorism" were already punishable in some form under law, and that the resolution instead served to "[develop] novel measures of police and judicial cooperation among the European Union Member States" (17). Here, the question is as much about what terrorism is as much as what it is not, namely

those offenses which are, by convention, not considered political in nature within the EU for the purposes of extradition.

The symbolic significance of distinguishing terrorism from “quotidian” criminal activities then, Symeonidou-Kastanidou argues, is to “[manifest] an illusion of potential safety, and through the appeasement of the general public on a menacing phenomenon which they cannot cope with...[enhance] the authority [of substantive criminal law] through the legislative activity [Member States] ostensibly undertake” (17). While this “illusion of potential safety” may serve legislatures, it is widely assumed that criminal law does little to protect the public from terrorist attacks (ref in Symeonidou-Kastanidou; refer to it). Symeonidou-Kastanidou also goes on to suggest that the EU’s definition of terrorism in an official resolution served to legalize extraordinary anti-terrorist measures that would have or were already in conflict with human rights standards (18).

Symeonidou-Kastanidou goes on to distill some of the difficulties the EU encountered in effectively defining terrorism by examining the ambiguity inherent to the term. Terrorism means, in a literal sense, “to prevail, by inducing terror,” though the author points to the crucial political and social aspects of terrorism that are fundamental to its understanding. Dissociating terrorism from that socio-political context in which it occurs has been at the root of the international community’s failure to arrive at a generally accepted definition. Symeonidou-Kastanidou contends that the label “terrorism” has been applied all too liberally throughout history to a “wide range of diverse behaviors and situations,” and that this plurality of application has broadened the symbol too much to be readily available to policy makers (18). Complicating matters, state-sponsored terrorism, Symeonidou-Kastanidou’s argues, is perhaps the oldest and most widespread of all forms of terrorism, and one that has come *en vogue* in recent years

through the pursuit of insurgencies and proxy wars (20). The recognition of this form of terrorism at all presents a policy stumbling block for the EU, particularly so for those democratically elected governments that have participated in state-sponsored terror (19).

Symeonidou-Kastanidou identifies four main strains of Sub-State terrorism prevalent throughout history that are ultimately relevant to a generally acceptable definition of terrorism as a phenomenon:

- Resistance against dictatorships, aimed at reestablishing democracy or at replacing the regime with a new dictatorship
- Self-determination of national liberation movements, aimed at achieving the autonomy of certain regions or the creation of new countries
- “Imported terrorism”, i.e. terrorism generated in one country and directed against the government of another country
- Use of violence for the purpose of enforcing an alternative political proposal within a democracy (19).

In addition to these four so-called “classic” genre, Symeonidou-Kastanidou considers the relatively new phenomenon of international terror networks to be a significant threat to the stability of states, far more so than the violence and kidnappings originating from organized crime syndicates as these groups tend to seek to preserve existing political systems rather than undermine them (20).

For Symeonidou-Kastanidou, the historical plurality of definitions that have been applied to terrorism and the “incessant transformation of each one of its facets in the course of history gives rise to serious doubts as to the possibility of furnishing a complete definition of a terrorist act” (20). Furthermore, the politically and morally-based evaluations that are required to

characterize an act as “terrorist” rest on the unstable grounds of political and moral relativism: an objective evaluation of a perpetrator’s political motivations is simply unobtainable, as is an objective evaluation of the acts morality (20). In spite of this, Symeonidou-Kastanidou argues that “one cannot disregard the fact that in modern democratic States there appears to be a one-sided interest when it comes to combating terrorism...States only seem eager to fight against those forms of terrorism that threaten their own existence and the lives of their citizens around the world. (21) From this observation, the author offers a series of simple criteria that broadly address the aspects of wrongdoing required for States to view an act as “terrorist” in nature:

- Terrorist acts appear in the form of serious crimes against individual or social values
- They often aim at specific symbolic targets, but they hit “ordinary” targets as well, whenever terrorists want to draw attention to their action or to compel a government or an international organization to perform a certain act
- The crimes committed are always planned by groups that match the profile of a criminal organization
- All terrorist groups use violence for political ends aiming at overthrowing or destabilizing an existing socio-political system. (21)

Symeonidou-Kastanidou argues that while organized crime and terrorist crime are fundamentally similar, they are distinct in that the goals of the former are material, whereas those of the latter are political (22). The author concludes that a viable definition of terrorism must directly reference harmful wrongdoing that is “vigorous enough to challenge the foundations of democratic regimes” and subversive to the public order, while clearly delineating those punishable crimes and criminal activities that once committed, constitute a terrorist act (34).

Scharf

This approach to defining terrorism differs greatly from Symeonidou-Kastanidou's in that seeks a working definition based on already established definitions of war crimes. This definition, which hinges on "deliberate attacks on civilians, hostage taking, and the killing of prisoners," Sharf argues, can be readily applied to modern terrorist attacks occurring in peacetime (360).

While the Geneva Convention definition of war crimes is confined to areas of sustained conflict and cannot normally be applied to the sorts of sporadic, small-scale violence generally associated with terrorism in the 21st century, India successfully employed a derivative, peacetime applicable definition when prosecuting one of the perpetrators of the 2004 Mumbai hotel attacks in *Singh vs. Bihar* (361). Given that what can be called "the war crimes in peacetime" definition fit the circumstances of the Mumbai attacks so closely—deliberate attacks on civilians, hostage taking, and the killing of hostages—this approach stands out as a strong candidate for a workable definition of terrorism in public policy that is remarkably explicit, unencumbered with moral judgments, and already well-known within the international policy community. Furthermore, Russia employed a similar definition at the United Nations Security Council to condemn the Beslan school shootings carried out by Chechnyan separatists, lending credence to the notion that the international community may already be receptive to the usefulness of such a definition (362).

Another related definition might be drawn from existing International Humanitarian Law language that prohibits violent action during peacetime, including many acts reflective of modern terrorist methodologies. Because terrorism is not strictly confined temporally to wartime nor geographically restricted to recognized warzones, the IHL protocols prohibiting civilian-

centric violence are potentially more applicable in many cases than the stricter definitions set forth in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols of 1977, though the collective conventions do include some language addressed specifically to terrorist acts committed during armed conflict (363-364). What is more, the IHL protocols are explicit in defining prohibited conduct, and they apply to both civilian and uniformed actors, triggering command responsibility and ensuring prosecutorial jurisdiction for perpetrators of prohibited acts (364). While at first blush the IHL protocols may appear to be the answer to the Geneva Convention's shortcomings, it does suffer from a few serious flaws.

The main weakness in using IHL protocol to define and control terrorism lies in the ambiguity of the definition of what exactly constitutes armed conflict. At what point does an act of violence or a series of attacks amount to armed conflict rather than a terrorism spree? Scharf focuses on the "armed conflict threshold," which the IHL defines as distinct from "situations of internal disturbances and tensions such as riots and isolated and sporadic acts of violence," firmly placing terrorism as it is widely understood outside of the auspices of IHL protocol (365). Instead, terrorist acts that occur in peacetime (that is to say, below the "armed conflict threshold"), are covered by a host of strictly defined anti-terrorism conventions that have not been universally ratified, leaving significant deficiencies in anti-terrorism policy.

To fill the gaps between IHL protocol and the Geneva Conventions, Scharf suggests lowering the armed conflict threshold such that the Geneva Convention prohibitions on war crimes can be applied more widely without having to arrive at a new definition of terrorism as a peacetime variant of war crimes. In 1989, the Juan Calos Abella case established that non-military combatants can initiate and actively participate in armed conflict with enough destructive potential as to satisfy the standard laws of war (366). In such cases, the IHL

protocols are not applicable because the armed conflict threshold has been satisfied, thereby satisfying the requirements for the application of and the jurisdictional authority for the Geneva Conventions as well as allowing state actors to intervene militarily if necessary.

The 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York stand as another instructive case for a working definition of terrorism based on language of the Geneva Conventions. While Al-Qaeda and the United States had arguably been engaged in a low intensity sustained conflict since 1998, the sporadic nature of the violence between the two actors did not satisfy the armed conflict threshold at which point the IHL protocols give way to the Geneva Convention's authority. In response to the devastating attacks of 9/11, the United States argued, "ongoing mutual hostilities were not required" to satisfy the armed conflict threshold and that the attacks, by their very severity, were "tantamount to an attack by an armed force" (367). This novel definition of terrorism as war crime—specifically a single, severe attack on a civilian target—has allowed the United States Military Commission to charge Al-Qaeda members of having committed war crimes associated with their suspected involvement in the 9/11 attacks (367-368).

The United States has gone on to expand the reaches of its loose interpretation of the Geneva Convention on war crimes to include even minor terrorist acts committed against the United States in peacetime, including non-violent hijackings. The case of the United States v. Yunis set a precedent that terrorist organizations can be considered military organizations in some cases, making the war crimes provisions in the Geneva Conventions applicable to crimes committed by terrorist organizations, though such a definition is complicated by a provision protecting perpetrators from responsibility if they were acting in obedience to orders (368). In addition, such an expansion of the Geneva Conventions definitions of war crimes to include terrorism and to define terrorist organization as military bodies weakens the legislation by

protecting certain acts that are considered acceptable acts of war if committed by a military body in war time (e.g. kidnapping of political officials, attacks on government installations, assassinations of political leaders within their respective territories by domestic agents, etc.) (371-373).

Asta Maskaliunaite

Maskaliunaite argues that the intersection between state interests and the academic discourse on terrorism has undermined the neutrality of any definitions of terrorism in use in the policy sphere (49). The driving force behind attempting to define terrorism in the political discourse is the very real need for a legal basis to pursue perpetrators of violence against states and their assets; in this frame, allies need to be delineated from enemies according to their stance on terrorism, making the need for a definition of terrorism the most “crucial ingredient of the formation of policy directions towards the countries of the world” (37). Because of this, private state interests and considerations have clouded the necessarily neutral descriptions required by political ethics in defining policy problems and the policies subsequently rendered to address them.

The effect of conflicting interests between state actors is best exemplified by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the definitions of terrorism that have emerged from that discourse. Arab leaders and Israeli leaders have widely condemned terrorism in principal, but Arab leaders have historically viewed Palestinian terrorist acts as a necessary and legitimate part of resisting the occupation of Palestinian land (37). The main difference in working definitions between both sides stems from how the definitions are framed; Maskaliunaite emphasizes that a point of reference is essential in legitimizing or criminalizing an action. If the ultimate goals of an act are

emphasized rather than the violent course of action necessarily to achieving those ends, the violence tends to be perceived as more legitimate, while it seems less so if the violence itself is emphasized as a means of attracting attention to a cause (37-38).

States such as China have exploited definitional ambiguity to adapt “terrorism” to quell internal conflicts, and self-determination movements in particular (38). Quoting William Connolly, Maskaliunaite argues that:

Terrorism allows, as the state system is constituted, the state and the interstate system to protect the logic of sovereignty in the international sphere while veiling their inability to modify systemic conditions that generate violence by non-state agents; it also provides domestic constituencies with agents of evil to explain the vague experiences of danger, frustration, and ineffectiveness in taming global contingency (38).

The act of defining terrorism—or rather encouraging an ambiguous understanding of terrorism—has become a vital tool in protecting state interests, domestically and abroad, while at the same time dictating a state’s moral appraisals of enemies and allies by labeling them as either terrorist or as fighting terrorism. The act of defining an act as “terrorist” in nature is to deem it unacceptable since only prohibited acts carry such a label in political contexts, whereas internationally supported resistance efforts are exempted from the rigors of such a definition; in other words, “As a rule, terrorism is the name we give to the violence of people we do not like or support; for the violence of people we do like or support, we find other names” (39).

Within the social sciences, the discourse has been equally fraught with the pitfalls of loaded terms and state’s interests-based definitions (39). Maskaliunaite argues that the very act of trying to define terrorism is itself “part of a wider contestation over ideologies or political

objectives” (39). Rather than focusing on the historical uses of the term and the connotations thereof, it is of greater benefit for policy makers to be aware of the prevalence of the seven main definitional elements identified by Alex Schmid in his exhaustive study of 109 scholarly definitions:

1. Violence, use of force (83.5%)
2. Political (65%)
3. Fear, terror emphasis (51%)
4. Threat (47%)
5. Psychological effects and anticipated reactions (41.5%)
6. Victim-target differentiation (37.5%)
7. Purposeful, planned, systematic, organized action (32%)

“Violence” emerges as a unifying theme amongst the majority of scholarly definitions of terrorism, though this may be redundant as terrorism is at its core a violent act. Related to this, the idea of “political violence” is perhaps even more confusing to the effort of reaching a working definition, if only because not all acts of terrorism are inherently political in nature (44).

The inducement of fear within the population and the related psychological effects of terrorist attacks emerge as some of the strongest essential elements in a working policy definition of terrorism. Unanticipated violence is an essential aspect of terrorism and key to its aim of drawing attention to a particular cause, political position, or social movement (45). Intimately associated with these elements, victim-target differentiation stands as another strong operational term in defining terrorism because it highlights the difference between terrorism and common crime: terrorists seek to get the attention of their target audience through violence whereas common criminals employ violence to other ends (46). These three elements taken together

begin to lay a solid foundation for a workable definition of terrorism that can be applied readily by policy makers to ameliorate a frustratingly unpredictable threat.

The systematic, organized nature of terrorist organizations is essential in differentiating terrorism and the atmosphere of fear and instability it produces from the violence of non-aligned criminals (47). The perception of an organized front legitimizes the threat of a terrorist organization, facilitating the atmosphere of terror within the populace that draws attention to its cause.

Finally, there is a normative discourse that emerges from the social sciences that deliberately places the emphasis of terrorism and any definition thereof on the victims of terrorism-related violence. This presents a potentially neutral foundation for defining terrorism in that it is starkly contrasted with war—large-scale operations which generally involve state-sanctioned military actors employing violence in ways normally allowed under the auspices of international war law (48). However, such a definition, while objectively describing terrorism in terms of valid terrorist-victim relationships, has a normative assumption that the victims are morally superior to the terrorists, and by implication, that the authorities supplying the definition of terrorism employing such language are also morally superior and that their policies must be adhered to (48-49).

Ben Saul

Saul draws on the evolution of the language of UN Security Council resolutions and proposals to inform his analysis of the divergent definitions of terrorism that have emerged over the last 25 years. While the Security Council has adopted general legislative measures against terrorism, it did so without a legitimate effort to define it. Without an operative definition in

place, potentially effective and binding UN policies are made impotent, if only because the legal consequences cannot be brought to bear without in the absence of a clearly defined breach of international law (142).

Prior to the 9/11 attacks, neither the UN General Assembly nor the Security Council has imposed any measures fashioned specifically to address terrorism, but previous resolutions beginning in the 1980's were passed in response to specific aggressive acts without providing a general definition of which violent acts constituted terrorism (142). Due to the influential nature of Council decisions on member States, resolutions must be well-wrought. Any precedents set through Council action can carry notable weight within the global community not only because it represents the foremost global political decision making organ, but also because "the body of principles is still so fragmentary and abstract" (143).

During the political turmoil of the late Cold War period in the 1970's and 1980's, the Council showed reluctance to openly name terrorist attacks as valid threats to world peace. Even the series of jetliner hijackings in the late 70's and the Black September attacks at the 1972 Munich Olympics failed to produce any substantive definitions of terrorism, instead breeding a series of highly specific resolutions that forbid certain behaviors within existing legal frameworks without so much as a mention of the term "terrorism" (143).

In the 1980's high-profile hostage takings and political abductions forced the Council to adopt SC Res 638 which explicitly condemned such activities as "manifestations of terrorism," but neglected to touch on the essential political essence of terrorist activities in defining the proscribed actions in international policy (144). Such abductions if carried out during a recognized armed conflict, fell under the auspices of IHL protocols and in some instances the

Geneva Conventions, thereby being defined as war crimes where applicable instead of as deplorable terrorist acts (145).

It wasn't until 1989 when UN Res 1189 was adopted that some key elements of terrorism were defined in reference to the bombings of US embassies in Africa, though the term terrorism itself remained unresolved. Res 1189 described the bombings as "indiscriminate and outrageous" criminal attacks on civilians, and called on member states to bring the perpetrators of the attacks "swiftly to justice" (153). It is in this language that the key elements of terrorism are hinted at, though without an explicit definition in the resolution, applying the full force of international law against terrorists and those that supported them remained elusive.

The 9/11 attacks marked a turning point in the UN's efforts to produce a tractable definition of terrorism for the purposes of more effective policy measures. On 9/12 Res 1368 condemned the attacks and described them as "international terrorism, [and] a threat to international peace and security, though the resolution fell short of acknowledging the United State's right to military retaliation, nor did it identify the attacks as either an "armed attack" or as acts war (155).

Further legislation, particularly Res 1372, required States to actively prevent and suppress terrorist financing as well in addition establishing domestic laws to treat terrorism as a serious criminal defense. While Res 1372 did much to encourage the prevention and condemnation of terrorist activity within the global community, it did little to produce any workable definition of what terrorism is and what it is not; in fact, the "lack of definition was deliberate, since consensus on Res 1373 depended on *avoiding* definition" (157; emphasis added). Furthermore, the legislation like Res 1373 raises questions regarding the scope of

Council authority under the UN charter, to “designate a generalized, indeterminate phenomenon (rather than a specific act or incident, as in past practice) as a threat to peace and security (158).

Because Res 1373 avoided defining terrorism while insisting on describing the necessary control measures and punitive strategies, it inadvertently encouraged the creation in unilaterally generated definitions of terrorism on the State level, allowing member States to expand their domestic counter-terrorism policies into the international sphere without the necessary controls (159). In fact, Saul notes that as a result of Res 1373, nearly half of States have enacted special terrorism offenses, almost all of which differ from one another, along with national laws that are out of concert with one another (160).

In 2004, SC Res 1566 provided the first general definition of terrorism for the global community, though it was not presented as an explicit definition:

...Criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism... (164).

The working definition promulgated in SC Res 1566 provided States with a solid starting point for devising their respective national legislative and judicial protocols for addressing terrorism, but it failed to characterize terrorism as an explicitly political act (165). Nevertheless, SC Res 1566 produced the first widely accepted terrorism definition currently in effect within the global community.

Joseph Goldberg

Goldberg's approach to analyzing the evolution of terrorism as a concept hinges on the academic discourse surrounding the definitional process, as is similar in many respects to that of Maskaliunaite. Semantics plays a crucial role in how the term is used and in what contexts. An approach that focuses on forming meaning "from judgments more on the basis of actions and their circumstances and less on the basis of popular preconceptions about the actors" is preferable to those based on the negative normative connotations associated with the term itself as deployed by governments to describe their enemies (1).

Drawing on the work of Kenneth J. Long as the basis for his argument, Goldberg asserts that making policy makers aware of the semantics of terrorism is essential to informing its proper use and ultimately its appropriate working definition. Semantics is an essential aspect of the definitional process as this provides a "basis from which [one] can be skeptical of leaders who manipulate the concept for political advantage" (2).

Later diverging from Long, Goldberg acknowledges that while terrorism carries a pejorative connotation, scholars and policy makers need not accept the assertion that the term is "hopelessly loaded," because any description of political phenomena is, strictly speaking, reliant on terminology that expresses value judgments and is not as such rendered useless in political discourse (2).

Goldberg contends that violent acts targeted at civilians are inherently terroristic in nature, whether politically motivated or not, simply by virtue of having had as their objective to inflict violence upon individuals (10). In this definition, Goldberg defines terrorism strictly in terms of the attacker-victim power frame, avoiding the negative connotations of the term

terrorism itself and avoiding its political entanglements. This more neutral language is useful because it can be used to distinguish terrorism from retaliatory measures taken in the wake of terrorist violence without conflating the distinct actions and motives behind each (62).

David Rodin

This model is centered on the moral considerations required to reach a workable definition of terrorism. Rather than consider all of the rhetorical definitions of the term that have been used in the sphere of the public policy, Rodin seeks to define the concept in roughly objective terms to “unearth and explain the distinctive features which enable the concept to play the roles it does in our moral thinking” (753).

Rodin employs a fourfold approach that is roughly analogous to the four operational categories that I had defined to group the definitional strategies drawn from the literature reviewed for this research. They are:

1. Tactical and operational definition- focused on the weapons and strategies used by terrorists to define the action of terrorism.
2. Teleological definition-focused on the goals intended to be reached through violence, namely the political ends sought by terrorist aggressors.
3. Agent-focused definition-focused on the nature of the actor, namely on those who, at the sub-state level, apply violence as a means of political statement.
4. Object-focused definition-focused on the objects of terrorist violence being defined as neutral, innocent, civilian or noncombatant (755)

While Rodin suggest that each of the fourfold definitional elements might be applicable in some instances, he argues that the fourth category—object-focused—is the most crucial element in distinguishing terrorism, both linguistically and in terms of policy, from “common” criminality (755). The object-focused definition, when informed by the teleological considerations of the terrorists themselves, yields the following working definition: “terrorism is the deliberate, negligent, or reckless use of force against noncombatants, by state or non-state actors, for ideological ends and in the absence of a substantively just legal process” (755). This definition, derived from largely non-normative terms, does not absolve states that engage in violent behavior from being deemed guilty of terrorism, which speaks to the potential applicability of such an approach.

The moral aspect of Rodin’s working definition is assessed through the application of the “Double Effect Doctrine.” Simply put, this doctrine asserts that there is a genuine moral difference between intentional and unintentional harm to civilians. While any harm to civilians is considered undesirable and inherently “wrong,” the law of proportionality can be employed to determine if an act is morally permissible (763). For example, if an airstrike is intended to target only military installations but some civilians are killed as a result, so long as the intention was just (namely, that its goal was not the killing of civilians), the act can be seen as permissible in a moral context. A terrorist attack, on the other hand, is predicated on the death or maiming of civilians to achieve political goals, thus rendering all such attacks impermissible (763).

Rodin concludes with two policy recommendations: first, that policy makers be extremely cautious in using the aforementioned definition of terrorism as a *jus as bellum* or risk the moral quagmire of the Bush Doctrine, and second, that “any engagement which has as part of

its goals the elimination of terrorist threats and which is called a ‘war on terrorism’ should not, if it is to be legitimate, use terrorist tactics itself” (771).

Alex Schmid

Schmid and Maskaliunaite are largely in agreement with one another with perhaps one key difference: Schmid asserts that the moral relativism inherent in the term “terrorism” when used as a rhetorical device in public discourse can do no more than serve as “mere invective in political debates where charges and counter charges compete for the moral indignation or approval of relevant audiences” (397). In other words, while a less ambiguous definition is preferable to no definition at all, the normative assumptions of any workable definition are unsatisfactory in that they invite exploitation in the form of double standards by placing moral authority in the defining party (398).

Mamdani

In “Good Muslim, Bad Muslim” Mahmoud Mamdani asserts that the West’s inability to clearly define terrorism is born from a desire by Western policy makers to cast terrorism as a criminal act rather than as a political statement (229). This is problematic for two reasons: first, terrorists have proven remarkably resistant to threats of punitive punishment in US and world courts so a strictly criminal approach to defining the term makes for a “paper tiger” policy stance and second, if terrorists are to be understood as attempting to induce change in the socio-political environment through the application of violence, then they are effectively participating in what amounts to an overt act of political defiance and in so doing are seeking popular support within the populace (231). It follows then that terrorism, if truly a political act, cannot be easily defined in a way that differentiates it convincingly from other forms of protest that turn violent, though

one would be hard-pressed to equate the two acts. Where violence can arise in one instance, it is a necessary instrument if not the primary condition of the other.

Conceptualizing terrorism as a concept distinct from traditionally employed state-sponsored acts of violence is hindered by terrorism's similarity to the counterinsurgency efforts so often employed by Western governments in war time (232). While the lines blur in between the two strategies in real world application, the theoretical target of a counterinsurgency's violence is purely political or politically aligned soft targets, whereas that of a terrorist movement is primarily civilian, with political targets taking up secondary importance, though the impact of civilian killings is intended to be politically galvanizing (233). Mamdani argues that this strategic difference arises out of necessity, owing to the fact that counterinsurgency movements must rely heavily on widespread civilian support and resources whereas terrorists are often "substantially isolated from the civilian population" (233).

The varying ideological alignments of terrorist groups in the 21st century have complicated the US's desire for an easy label for the violent acts such groups commit. As Mamdani notes, "instead of terror being espoused by groups with clear ideological agendas, whether of the left or the right, and instead of an unadulterated quest for power, we have in this case the use of political violence by non-ideological groups that have neither expounded a cause nor openly attempted to organize support in the civilian strata" (251). If diverse ideological stances (including centrist or unaligned) can all lead to the same acts of political violence, defining terrorism is simply as violence committed to a political end or to force political change is simply not tenable as it does not reflect the scope of driving forces nor the varied goals of groups that commit acts of political violence; terrorism is an undoubtedly complicated

phenomenon that defies simple definition if only because the individuals and groups that employ terror to promote their agendas share so little in common.

Furthermore, Mamdani echoes the oft-repeated notion that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” in his analysis of the historical context of terrorism in the 21st century. Mamdani suggests that perhaps the most obvious source of difficulty in reaching a viable definition of what terrorism is stems from the notion that it may not in fact be very different from what Western governments consider necessary military interventions; “if state terror claims to be an exercise in maintaining law and order, societal terror presents itself as a fight for justice” (255).

Finally, Mamdani reminds readers that the US has a uniquely difficult role in defining terrorism because in the 1970’s and 80’s, the US government actively supported many terrorist and guerrilla groups in an effort to either control what it viewed as radically leftist governments or anti-American authoritarian regimes (100). In fact, the Reagan administration of the 1980’s incorporated an “ethical element” into the political rhetoric in support of interference by terrorist groups in the affairs of communist governments in Latin America (98). What then, if anything, can the US offer the global community in reaching an appropriate definition of terrorism if the US government has repeatedly supported terrorist groups as necessary, if not righteous, opposition to repressive regimes while at the same time condemning terrorism against Western powers as uniquely hateful and immoral acts of political violence?

Choosing a Model for Analysis

For the analysis of those definitions existing in US federal and international policy and for those present in the anti-terrorism framework created within Washington State, Rodin's object-focused theory of terrorism will be utilized as it represents the most precise, non-normative method of understanding terrorism and assessing the reaches of anti-terrorism strategies. I have chosen this model over the others present in the literature because Rodin's definition does not rely on pre-existing UN resolutions or the Geneva Conventions, which have proven too ambiguous or too problematic to make easily applicable, and nor does it rely on scholarly rhetorical discourse to arrive at its simple conclusions: that killing civilians to achieve a political goal constitutes terrorism, regardless of whether or not the perpetrator is a nation or a sub-national entity.

Using this model, I will analyze excerpts from the series of speeches given by President George W. Bush prior to the onset of the War on Terror in 2001 in order to provide a historical context for the United States' contemporary definition of terrorism. Then I will analyze the language of the Washington State All-Hazards Plan in order to present a snapshot of how terrorism definition has evolved within the United States, particularly at the state level, since the beginning of the War on Terror, and to place the definitions used by the state within the categories previously defined in order to take account of the definitional variability, if any, that persists within the United States policy sphere today. My hope is that the degree of ambiguity in popular definitions of terrorism and the highly politicized rhetoric employed in defining policies to address the threat of terrorism will be made clearer through my analysis so that policy makers can endeavor to produce less ambiguous, less normative anti-terrorism legislation that can gain widespread acceptance.

Chapter 3: Methodology

My research consists of a content analysis of selected works originating in the social sciences discipline that are concerned with defining terrorism within the context of public policy, namely international policy. After defining a series of four broad definitional categories as supported by my review of the existing literature, the official speeches as presented by the Whitehouse archives of Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama were analyzed first for overall content and then, if terrorism was mentioned explicitly in the text, the speeches were analyzed further based on a coding scheme (described in detail below) in order to categorize the definitions of terrorism used within those speeches into one of the previously established categories.

Along with the Presidents' speeches, official statements and speeches by the US State Department, the speeches of the heads of state of some key US allies were also analyzed in order to provide an international context. Finally, for comparison, the content of the speeches of some unaligned and non-allied heads of state were also analyzed within the matrix. This was the basis of the federal and international level of analysis for my research.

For the state level portion of my research, I employed the same coding scheme and definitional categories used in the analysis of the federal and international level speeches to analyze the content of the Washington State 2009-2013 All-Hazards Plan. This document serves as the state's operational manual in the event of any number of natural disasters and manmade threats, including terrorism, that occur in Washington.

Definitional Categories:

Based on the concepts and definitional methods described in the literature review, I devised a series of four definitional categories that were most easily applied to the content of the speeches reviewed for this research effort. While very loosely based on the categories set forth by Rodin, the definitional categories set forth here are somewhat less technical by design so that the formal language of state policy could be more easily categorized into clean models; Rodin's categories are highly technical in their content and are better suited to the analysis of academic treatises on terrorism than real world speeches.

The four categories that I have devised for the analysis are defined as follows:

Political model

-Framed in political terms and views terrorist acts as politically motivated demonstration with a predetermined purpose

Academic model

-Outcomes based or focus on the specific connotative and denotative associations with terms used to describe terrorism

Historical model

-Drawn either from existing policy discourse or historical definitions that have been in use at one time or another

Normative model

-Based on the moral or ethical assumptions of the actors producing the definition

Coding

The coding scheme employed in analyzing the contents of the speeches and the Washington State All-Hazards plan relied on the detection and recognition of key words and

phrases that were indicative of one of the previously defined definitional categories—political, academic, historical, or normative. An example of such coding would look something like this:

Political Model	Academic Model	Historical Model	Normative Model
<u>Key Terms:</u> “unseating government,” “attacking democracy,” “attacking liberty”	<u>Key Terms:</u> Language that focuses on tactical and object-focused definitions, e.g. “Bombing of non-military, civilian areas”	<u>Key Terms:</u> “war crimes,” “low-intensity conflict,” other language that makes reference to Geneva conventions	<u>Key Terms:</u> “mass murder,” “killing of innocents,” “evil acts,” “moral depravity”

Chapter 4: Results and Discussion*Results:*

The findings show that at the federal level, the United States and its allies have heavily favored the normative and political models for defining terrorism in official speeches following the attacks of September 11, 2001. At the state level, the Washington All-Hazards plan stands in contrast to the federal discourse, having displayed a trend toward the political and academic models in defining terrorism, though the analysis of a wider body of state-level documentation would serve to illuminate the strength of the trend, if any exists on a larger scale.

The initial working hypothesis that encouraged this research--that any definitional trends regarding terrorism that emerged at the federal level would inform the definitions employed at the state policy level--has not been borne out by the initial findings. Instead, the findings suggest there is a marked disconnect between the definitional discourse emerging from Washington policy makers and what is applied at the state and local levels, as is evident in the Washington State All-Hazards Plan.

What is more, when the findings are considered in terms of the wider international discourse defining terrorism as presented in the speeches of US allies and non-allied nations, the US definitions tend to be distinct from those in international legislation. This trend is most apparent when looking at the speeches of former President George W. Bush, whose speeches in the years following 9/11 were heavily reliant on normative appraisals of terrorism; those of President Barack Obama hinged more on the political definitional model.

At the state level, Washington's counterterrorism strategy as defined in the 2009-2014 All-Hazards Response plan does not offer any working definition of terrorism at all

beyond “man-made disasters,” though the preface provided by Adjutant General Timothy Lowenberg does make mention of the state shifting its focus away from terrorism planning toward an all-hazards approach (iii). In fact, the only working definition of terrorism provided in the 145-page document is one taken from the Department of Homeland Security which can be classified as an academic-political definition (137).

Discussion:

It can be inferred from the findings that the normative model of defining terrorism may be favored in the political sphere due to the leeway it affords politicians, both at the national and state levels. As a rhetorical device, the term “terrorism” itself can be a powerful tool in public discourse because of the implicit moral assumptions made when such a term is applied to the actions of an antagonistic party; as Schmid asserts, the term, irrespective of framing, can be deployed to act as “mere invective in political debates where charges and counter charges compete for the moral indignation or approval of relevant audiences” (397).

When terrorism is defined in the political discourse in terms of normative assumptions as in the case of many of the speeches researched here, it acts as a highly polarizing instrument by which politicians can at the same time reaffirm their convictions, steel their alliances with old allies, and re-delineate the gulf existing between their morally superior position and that of those that would commit terrorism against them.

Furthermore, it can be inferred that the normative model so preferred by the US and its allies, while describing a logically sound terrorist-victim relationship, additionally suggests a moral superiority of the laws and objections of the party actively defining terrorism over those of

the perpetrators of terrorism, further strengthening the defining party's position as morally superior to terrorists (Maskalinaute, 48-49).

At the state level, it can be assumed that the political and academic definition of terrorism present in the Washington All-Hazards plan was chosen simply because it offers the least ambiguous and most actionable description of what constitutes a terrorist attack out of any of the other possible definitional strategies. Emergency personal need not be concerned with the normative assumptions implicit in defining terrorism in terms of right and wrong or victims and victimizers. Their concern lays instead with responding effectively and quickly to a clearly defined set of events, something that the academic model provides with clarity. Despite my initial expectation prior to conducting my research that the Washington All-Hazards plan would be both operationally-oriented and highly descriptive of terrorism—one of the chief concerns of the plan--the document proves to be most concerned with the academic model of definition with next to no text dedicated to any political definitions of terrorism save for a glossary entry referencing the text of a document published by the Department of Homeland Security

That the normative model of defining terrorism has been favored by leading US politicians may point to a series of factors underpinning the temporal realities of each of the respective political figures' terms in office. Whether or not such a correlation exists is worthy of further academic study, though a possible explanatory hypothesis could be devised something like this: politicians tend to favor those definitional strategies that are most in step with the agendas of their respective political parties during the periods when each of the speeches examined in my research occurred. Looking solely at the data gathered and analyzed for my research, it appears that most of former President George W. Bush's normative statements on terrorism appeared in speeches given in the immediate aftermath of the September 11th attacks,

later speeches show a shift toward the political frame in defining terrorism. The speeches delivered by President Obama on the seem to show a trend toward the normative frame from late 2009 until the present, whereas in earlier speeches, President Obama favored tended toward political definitions, particularly in his first months in office. These apparent trends in definitional strategies within presidential speeches warrant further research.

Another possible area of research could center on whether looming election cycles or the conduct of the US-led wars in the Middle East—and the ebbs and flows of US popular support for those efforts—had any measurable impact on which definitional strategies were preferred by US politicians in the years following September 11, 2001.

Conclusions

In light of the research findings that the normative and political models of defining terrorism prevail at the federal level but not at the state level, it would be wise for state policy makers to include at least some aspects of the prevailing definitional strategies when defining terrorism to differentiate deliberate actions from accidental catastrophic events, natural disasters, or hostile acts by foreign actors. While an academic definition will remain essential for emergency planning documents including the Washington State All-Hazards Plan, including normative and political aspects within that definition would serve to put Washington State more firmly in step with US federal policy.

Appendix 1.1: Tables

Table 1.1 “Contemporary definitions of terrorism by category in selected speeches”

Political	Academic	Historical	Normative
<p>November 30, 2005. “War on Terrorism,” Pres. George W. Bush.</p> <p>“The third group is the smallest but the most lethal: the terrorists affiliated with or inspired by Al Qaida. Many are foreigners who are coming to fight freedom's progress in Iraq. This group includes terrorists from Saudi Arabia and Syria and Iran and Egypt and Sudan and Yemen and Libya and other countries. Our commanders believe they're responsible for most of the suicide bombings and the beheadings and the other atrocities we see on our television. They're led by a brutal terrorist named Zarqawi, Al Qaida's chief of operations in Iraq, who has pledged his allegiance to Osama bin Laden. Their objective is to drive the United States and coalition forces out of Iraq and to use the vacuum that would be created by an American</p>	<p>1982. <i>International Terrorism: Challenge and Response</i>, Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu</p> <p>“When I say that terrorism is war against civilization, I may be met by the objection that terrorists are often idealists pursuing worthy ultimate aims -- national or regional independence, and so forth. I do not accept this argument. I cannot agree that a terrorist can ever be an idealist, or that the objects sought can ever justify terrorism. The impact of terrorism, not merely on individual nations, but on humanity as</p>	<p>May 21, 2009. “Protecting Our Security and Our Values,” Pres. Barack Obama.</p> <p>“As I said, I am not going to release individuals who endanger the American people. Al Qaeda terrorists and their affiliates are at war with the United States, and those that we capture - like other prisoners of war - must be prevented from attacking us again.”</p> <p>“Other countries have grappled with this question, and so must we. But I want to be very clear that our goal is to construct a legitimate legal framework for Guantánamo</p>	<p>January 20, 2009. “Obama Inaugural Address,” Pres. Barack Obama.</p> <p>“With old friends and former foes, we’ll work tirelessly to lessen the nuclear threat, and roll back the specter of a warming planet. We will not apologize for our way of life, nor will we waver in its defense, and for those who seek to advance their aims by inducing terror and slaughtering innocents, we say to you now that our spirit is stronger and cannot be broken; you cannot outlast us, and we will defeat you....” “To the Muslim world, we seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect. To</p>

<p>retreat to gain control of the country. They would then use Iraq as a base from which to launch attacks against America and overthrow moderate governments in the Middle East and try to establish a totalitarian Islamic empire that reaches from Indonesia to Spain. That's their stated objective. That's what their leadership has said.”</p> <p>“In Iraq, there will not be a signing ceremony on the deck of a battleship. Victory will come when the terrorists and Saddamists can no longer threaten Iraq's democracy, when the Iraqi security forces can provide for the safety of their own citizens, and when Iraq is not a safe haven for terrorists to plot new attacks on our nation.”</p> <p>“The terrorists who attacked us and the terrorists we face murder in the name of a totalitarian ideology that hates freedom, rejects tolerance and despises all dissent.”</p> <p>“Some of the violence you see in Iraq is being carried out by ruthless killers who are converging on Iraq to fight the advance of peace and freedom. “</p>	<p>a whole, is intrinsically evil, necessarily evil and wholly evil.”</p>	<p>detainees — not to avoid one. In our constitutional system, prolonged detention should not be the decision of any one man. If and when we determine that the United States must hold individuals to keep them from carrying out an act of war, we will do so within a system that involves judicial and congressional oversight. And so going forward, my Administration will work with Congress to develop an appropriate legal regime so that our efforts are consistent with our values and our Constitution.”</p> <p>“Now, this generation faces a great test in the specter of terrorism. Unlike the Civil War or World War II, we cannot count on a surrender ceremony to bring this journey to an end. Right now, in distant training camps and in crowded cities, there are people plotting to take American lives. That will be the case a year from</p>	<p>those leaders around the globe who seek to sow conflict, or blame their society's ills on the West - know that your people will judge you on what you can build, not what you destroy. To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history; but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.”</p>
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		<p>now, five years from now, and — in all probability — ten years from now. Neither I nor anyone else can standing here today can say that there will not be another terrorist attack that takes American lives. But I can say with certainty that my Administration — along with our extraordinary troops and the patriotic men and women who defend our national security — will do everything in our power to keep the American people safe. And I do know with certainty that we can defeat al Qaeda. Because the terrorists can only succeed if they swell their ranks and alienate America from our allies, and they will never be able to do that if we stay true to who we are; if we forge tough and durable approaches to fighting terrorism that are anchored in our timeless ideals.”</p>	
<p>May 21, 2009. “Protecting Our Security and Our Values,” Pres. Barack Obama</p>		<p>December 1, 2009. “Speech on Afghanistan;” Pres. Barack</p>	<p>January 20, 2005. “Bush’s 2nd Inauguration Speech;” Pres. George W. Bush</p>

<p>“This responsibility is only magnified in an era when an extremist ideology threatens our people, and technology gives a handful of terrorists the potential to do us great harm.”</p> <p>“And where terrorists offer only the injustice of disorder and destruction, America must demonstrate that our values and institutions are more resilient than a hateful ideology.”</p> <p>“After 9/11, we knew that we had entered a new era — that enemies who did not abide by any law of war would present new challenges to our application of the law; that our government would need new tools to protect the American people, and that these tools would have to allow us to prevent attacks instead of simply prosecuting those who try to carry them out.”</p>		<p>Obama</p> <p>“Just days after 9/11, Congress authorized the use of force against al Qaeda and those who harbored them – an authorization that continues to this day. The vote in the Senate was 98 to 0. The vote in the House was 420 to 1. For the first time in its history, the</p> <p>...North Atlantic Treaty Organization invoked Article 5 – the commitment that says an attack on one member nation is an attack on all. And the United Nations Security Council endorsed the use of all necessary steps to respond to the 9/11 attacks. America, our allies and the world were acting as one to destroy al Qaeda’s terrorist network, and to protect our common security.</p> <p>Under the banner of this domestic unity and international legitimacy – and only after the Taliban refused to turn over Osama bin Laden – we sent our</p>	<p>“For as long as whole regions of the world simmer in resentment and tyranny - prone to ideologies that feed hatred and excuse murder - violence will gather, and multiply in destructive power, and cross the most defended borders, and raise a mortal threat. There is only one force of history that can break the reign of hatred and resentment, and expose the pretensions of tyrant”</p>
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		<p>troops into Afghanistan. Within a matter of months, al Qaeda was scattered and many of its operatives were killed. The Taliban was driven from power and pushed back on its heels. A place that had known decades of fear now had reason to hope. At a conference convened by the UN, a provisional government was established under President Hamid Karzai. And an International Security Assistance Force was established to help bring a lasting peace to a war-torn country.”</p>	
<p>September 20, 2001. “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,” Pres. George W. Bush “Al Qaeda is to terror what the mafia is to crime. But its goal is not making money; its goal is remaking the world--and imposing its radical beliefs on people everywhere.”</p>		<p>September 20, 2001. “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,” Pres. George W. Bush</p> <p>“On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country. Americans have known wars--but for the past 136 years,</p>	<p>December 1, 2009. “Speech on Afghanistan;” Pres. Barack Obama</p> <p>“To address these issues, it is important to recall why America and our allies were compelled to fight a war in Afghanistan in the first place. We did not ask for this fight. On September 11, 2001, nineteen</p>

		<p>they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the casualties of war--but not at the center of a great city on a peaceful morning. Americans have known surprise attacks--but never before on thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single day--and night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack.”</p> <p>“Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”</p> <p>“They hate our freedoms--our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other. They want to overthrow existing governments in many Muslim countries, such as Egypt, Saudi</p>	<p>men hijacked four airplanes and used them to murder nearly 3,000 people.</p> <p>They struck at our military and economic nerve centers. They took the lives of innocent men, women, and children without regard to their faith or race or station. Were it not for the heroic actions of the passengers on board one of those flights, they could have also struck at one of the great symbols of our democracy in Washington, and killed many more.</p> <p>As we know, these men belonged to al Qaeda – a group of extremists who have distorted and defiled Islam, one of the world’s great religions, to justify the slaughter of innocents.”</p> <p>“We will have to use diplomacy, because no one nation can meet the challenges of an interconnected world acting alone. I have spent this year renewing our alliances and forging new partnerships. And we have forged</p>
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		<p>Arabia, and Jordan. They want to drive Israel out of the Middle East. They want to drive Christians and Jews out of vast regions of Asia and Africa. These terrorists kill not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a way of life. With every atrocity, they hope that America grows fearful, retreating from the world and forsaking our friends. They stand against us, because we stand in their way.”</p> <p>“By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions--by abandoning every value except the will to power--they follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism.”</p>	<p>a new beginning between America and the Muslim World – one that recognizes our mutual interest in breaking a cycle of conflict, and that promises a future in which those who kill innocents are isolated by those who stand up for peace and prosperity and human dignity”</p>
<p>September 11, 2002. “CNN interview,” Mayor Rudolph Giuliani “We can't accommodate terrorism. When someone uses the slaughter of innocent people to advance a so-called political cause, at that point the political cause becomes immoral and unjust and they should be eliminated from any serious discussion, any</p>			<p>November 30, 2005. “War on Terrorism,” Pres. George W. Bush. “This war is going to take many turns. And the enemy must be defeated on every battlefield. Yet the terrorists have made it clear</p>

<p>serious debate.”</p>			<p>that Iraq is the central front in their war against humanity. And so we must recognize Iraq as the central front in the war on terror.”</p> <p>“The terrorists in Iraq share the same ideology as the terrorists who struck the United States on September the 11th. Those terrorists share the same ideology with those who blew up commuters in London and Madrid, murdered tourists in Bali, workers in Riyadh and guests at a wedding in Amman, Jordan. Just last week they massacred Iraqi children and their parents at a toy giveaway outside an Iraqi hospital.</p> <p>This is an enemy without conscience, and they cannot be appeased. If we're not fighting and destroying this enemy in Iraq, they would not be idle. They would be plotting and killing Americans across the world and within our own borders. By fighting these terrorists in Iraq,</p>
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			<p>Americans in uniform are defeating a direct threat to the American people.</p> <p>Against this adversary there is only one effective response: We will never back down, we will never give in, and we will never accept anything less than complete victory.”</p> <p>“Today in the Middle East, freedom is once again contending with an ideology that seeks to sow anger and hatred and despair.</p> <p>And like fascism and communism before, the hateful ideologies that use terror will be defeated by the unstoppable power of freedom. And as democracy spreads in the Middle East, these countries will become allies in the cause of peace.”</p> <p>“Many terrorists who kill innocent men, women and children on the streets of Baghdad are followers of the same murderous ideology that took</p>
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			<p>the lives of our citizens in New York and Washington and Pennsylvania.”</p> <p>“They fight because they know that the survival of their hateful ideology is at stake.”</p> <p>“The terrorists know that the outcome will leave them emboldened or defeated. So they are waging a campaign of murder and destruction. And there is no limit to the innocent lives they are willing to take.”</p> <p>“We see the nature of the enemy in terrorists who behead civilian hostages and broadcast their atrocities for the world to see.”</p> <p>“The rise of freedom in this vital region will eliminate the conditions that feed radicalism and ideologies of murder and make our nation safer.</p> <p>We are fighting against men with blind hatred and</p>
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			<p>armed with lethal weapons who are capable of any atrocity. They wear no uniform; they respect no laws of warfare or morality. They take innocent lives to create chaos for the cameras. “</p>
<p>1982. <i>International Terrorism: Challenge and Response</i>, Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu “Terrorism is carried out purposefully, in a cold-blooded, calculated fashion. The declared goals of the terrorist may change from place to place. He supposedly fights to remedy wrongs -- social, religious, national, racial. But for all these problems his only solution is the demolition of the whole structure of society. No partial solution, not even the total redressing of the grievance he complains of, will satisfy him -- until our social system is destroyed or delivered into his hands.”</p>			<p>May 2, 2011. “Speech announcing the death of Osama bin Laden,” Pres. Barack Obama. “Tonight, I can report to the American people and to the world, the United States has conducted an operation that killed Osama bin Laden, the leader of al Qaeda, and a terrorist who's responsible for the murder of thousands of innocent men, women, and children.”</p>
<p>December 07, 2009 Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Erdogan of</p>			<p>“September 20, 2001, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the</p>

<p>Turkey after meeting</p> <p>Obama “I will tell you that with respect to the issue of the PKK, I think that the steps that the Prime Minister has taken in being inclusive towards the Kurdish community in Turkey is very helpful, because one of the things we understand is, is that terrorism cannot just be dealt with militarily; there is also social and political components to it that have to be recognized.”</p>			<p>American People,” Bush</p> <p>“The terrorists’ directive commands them to kill Christians and Jews, to kill all Americans, and make no distinction among military and civilians, including women and children.”</p>
<p>December 01, 2009. “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Pres. Barack Obama</p> <p>“And the United Nations Security Council endorsed the use of all necessary steps to respond to the 9/11 attacks. America, our allies and the world were acting as one to destroy al Qaeda’s terrorist network and to protect our common security.</p> <p>“Over the last several years, the Taliban has maintained common cause with al Qaeda, as they both seek an overthrow of the Afghan government. Gradually, the Taliban has begun to control additional swaths of territory in Afghanistan, while engaging in</p>			<p>October 29, 2004. Al-Jazeera Video Broadcast, Al-Qaeda Leader Osama bin Laden.</p> <p>“And as I was looking at those towers that were destroyed in Lebanon, it occurred to me that we have to punish the transgressor with the same, and that we had to destroy the towers in America, so that they taste what we tasted and they stop killing our women and children”</p>

<p>increasingly brazen and devastating attacks of terrorism against the Pakistani people.”</p>			
<p>June 15, 2010. “Remarks by the President at an Event with Military Personnel in Pensacola, Florida,” Pres. Barack Obama</p> <p>“We will disrupt and dismantle and ultimately defeat al Qaeda and its terrorist affiliates. (Applause.) And we will support the aspirations of people around the world as they seek progress and opportunity and prosperity, because that’s what we do - - as Americans.”</p>			<p>September 11, 2001. “Address to the nation,” Pres. George W. Bush</p> <p>“Thousands of lives were suddenly ended by evil, despicable acts of terror.”</p> <p>“These acts of mass murder were intended to frighten our nation into chaos and retreat. But they have failed; our country is strong.”</p>
<p>August 31, 2010. “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the End of Combat Operations in Iraq,” Pres. Barack Obama</p> <p>“Extremists will continue to set off bombs, attack Iraqi civilians and try to spark sectarian strife. But ultimately, these terrorists will fail to achieve their goals. “</p>			<p>December 07, 2009. “Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Erdogan of Turkey after meeting” Turkish PM Erdogan</p> <p>“Another important issue with respect for us in Turkey is the fight against terrorism. And there was a statement that was made in this very room on the 5th of November 2007, which was very important in that context, because at</p>

			<p>the time we had declared the separatist terrorist organization as the common enemy of the United States, Turkey, and Iraq, because terrorism is the enemy of all mankind.</p> <p>Our sensitivity and response to terrorism is what we have displayed when the twin towers were hit here in the United States. Wherever a terrorist attack takes place our reaction is always the same, because terrorism does not have a religion -- a homeland. They have no homeland, no religion whatsoever.”</p>
<p>July 14, 2010. “Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials on Al Shabaab Terrorist Organization,” Pres. Barack Obama</p> <p>“Al Shabaab has what I'd refer to as a dual persona. In one respect, they are engaged in a domestic fight in order to advance their political agenda, but they do use terrorist tactics and exceptionally violent</p>			<p>September 23, 2009. “Remarks By The President To The United Nations General Assembly,” Pres. Barack Obama</p> <p>“That effort must begin with an unshakeable determination that the murder of innocent men, women and children</p>

<p>means to advance their agenda inside of Somalia.”</p>			<p>will never be tolerated. On this, no one can be -- there can be no dispute. The violent extremists who promote conflict by distorting faith have discredited and isolated themselves. They offer nothing but hatred and destruction.”</p>
			<p>October 6, 2009. “Remarks by the President at the National Counterterrorism Center,” Pres. Barack Obama</p> <p>“Now, we recently observed the eighth anniversary of that terrible day when terrorists brought so much death and destruction to our shores. And once more we remembered all the lives that were lost. And once more we redoubled our resolve against the extremists who continue to plot against the United States and our allies.”</p> <p>“As one counterterrorism expert recently</p>

			<p>observed, because of our efforts al Qaeda and its allies have not only lost operational capacity, they've lost legitimacy and credibility. Of course, nobody does a better job of discrediting al Qaeda than al Qaeda itself, which has killed men and women and children of many faiths in many nations, and which has absolutely no positive future to offer the people of the world.”</p>
			<p>April 19, 2010. “Statement by The Vice President on Iraq,” Vice Pres. Joe Biden</p> <p>“The former leaders of AQI are the ones who plotted, planned, and executed terrorist attacks against the Iraqis in recent past, as well as against Americans.”</p>
			<p>August 13, 2010. “Remarks by the President at Iftar Dinner,” Pres. Barack Obama</p> <p>“Our enemies respect no religious freedom. Al Qaeda’s cause is not</p>

			<p>Islam -- it's a gross distortion of Islam. These are not religious leaders -- they're terrorists who murder innocent men and women and children. In fact, al Qaeda has killed more Muslims than people of any other religion -- and that list of victims includes innocent Muslims who were killed on 9/11."</p>
			<p>September 01, 2010. "Remarks by President Obama, President Mubarak, His Majesty King Abdullah, Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Abbas Before Working Dinner," Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu</p> <p>"Only yesterday four Israelis, including a pregnant women -- a pregnant woman -- and another woman, a mother of six children, were brutally murdered by savage terrorists. And two hours ago, there was</p>

			<p>another terror attack. And thank God no one died. I will not let the terrorists block our path to peace, but as these events underscore once again, that peace must be anchored in security. I'm prepared to walk down the path of peace, because I know what peace would mean for our children and for our grandchildren. "</p>
			<p>September 01, 2010. "Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel after Bilateral Meeting," Pres. Barack Obama</p> <p>"There are going to be extremists and rejectionists who, rather than seeking peace, are going to be seeking destruction. And the tragedy that we saw yesterday where people were gunned down on the street by terrorists who are purposely trying to undermine these talks is an example of what we're up against. But I want everybody to be very</p>

			<p>clear: The United States is going to be unwavering in its support of Israel’s security and we are going to push back against these kinds of terrorist activities.”</p>
			<p>July 14, 2010. “Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials on Al Shabaab Terrorist Organization,” Pres. Barack Obama</p> <p>“First of all, I think as you're all aware, Al Shabaab has claimed responsibility for what can only be termed as a heinous and cowardly terrorist act that claimed the lives of I think about 76 individuals, most of them Ugandans, innocents, at these two sites, but also claimed the life of one American and injured five others.</p> <p>This is certainly in keeping with Al Shabaab’s threats that it has made, as well as its history of</p>

			<p>attacking innocents. And at this point, there are indications that Al Shabaab was indeed responsible for it and that its claim of responsibility is real.”</p>
			<p>May 02, 2011. AP News article, Sec. of State Hillary Clinton</p> <p>"Innocent people, most of them Muslims, were targeted in markets and mosques, in subway stations and on airplanes, each attack motivated by a violent ideology that holds no value for human life or regard for human dignity."</p> <p>"I know that nothing can make up for the loss of the victims or fill the voids they left, but I hope their families can now find some comfort in the fact that justice has been served."</p>

Appendix 1.2: Graphs

Figure 1: Frequency of Definitional Categories used in Speeches by Selected Political Figures"





Figure 2: Frequency of Definitional Categories used in WA All-Hazards Plan (2009-2014)"



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