❖REECAS NEWSLETTER❖

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At Play in the Oil Fields of Central Asia

by Jeff Lumpkin

I saw the salesman from across the room. Inevitably, he wanted to talk to me. At least 6'4", he was big, and made even more imposing by his Stetson hat and lizard-skin boots. He was from Texas, a-coming to supply the West-Kazak oil fields. Before I could duck away, he had cornered me. Like hundreds of others, he was in Almaty to get of piece of the action, to join Chevron, Mobil, Hurricane Hydrocarbons and others in extracting and shipping oil and natural gas from Central Asia to Europe, the Far East and the United States. Over the previous days, I had met literally dozens like him, trying to sell washover swivels, process control solutions, drilling fluid additives, downhole electronic pressure/temperature gauges and computerized mud logging. Unfortunately, I didn't have any idea what they were talking about.

For the second summer in a row I found myself working at Chevron Munaigas Inc., the Almaty-based subsidiary of Chevron International Petroleum charged with maintaining and enhancing relations with the Kazak government, as well as public relations, information gathering and new business development. Due to a dearth of real oil men in Almaty, I had been placed in charge of Chevron's exhibit at the Kazakstan International Oil and Gas Exhibition (KIOGE). This meant that I had to answer questions about Chevron's operations in Kazakstan, provide information to potential equipment/service providers and establish contacts with representatives of other oil companies operating in Kazakstan. It was a job for which, by and large, I was eminently unqualified.

For the most part, I found it very frustrating. The real oilmen quickly discovered my ignorance and stalked off, I'm sure shaking their heads that Chevron would place such an ignoramus in charge of their exhibit. There was, however, one aspect of KIOGE that was fascinating: talking with the major oil companies about their plans for shipping oil and gas from Central Asia to foreign markets. This problem, how to get oil from land-locked Central Asia, was the key to unlocking the vast wealth of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakstan. The export routes, and pertinent agreements, had great importance for the profitability of companies like Chevron, the economies of Russia and the Central Asian states and, arguably, the course of democratic reform in the former Soviet Union.

Since April 1993, when Chevron

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Third Annual Regional REECAS Conference

The Russian, East European, Central Asian Studies (REECAS) Center is pleased to announce its Third Annual Regional Conference on Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies. The Conference will be held **Saturday, April 26** at the University of the Puget Sound in Tacoma. There is no charge for admission to the conference. **More information on the conference, including abstracts of papers being presented, can be found at the following web site:**

http://weber.u.washington.edu/~reecasf/CONF97/

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began operations at the Tengiz oilfield in western Kazakstan, the Russian Federation has actively sought to maintain control of oil exports from Central Asia. At present, these routes all go through southern Russia to the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk or farther north to central Russia. As part of their efforts to maintain control of oil exports, the Russians have blocked plans to construct pipelines through Azerbaijan and Georgia, or Azerbaijan and Armenia to Turkey. Kazak access to pipelines has been restricted in favor of Russian oil, and routes through Iran blocked by U.S. diplomatic efforts. The end result is that oil and gas profits from Central Asian fields are far below what was expected. Oil companies have been forced to curtail further investment and, simultaneously, they have been compelled to search out export routes that avoid Russia.

One of the most fascinating pipeline proposals is advocated by Unocal. In conjunction with the government of Turkmenistan and a Saudi Arabian oil company, Delta Oil, Unocal is proposing to build a pipeline from Charjou, Turkmenistan, through Afghanistan to Karachi, Pakistan. I first became aware of this proposal while working at KIOGE and was incredulous that it could be considered. At that time, in early October, the Taliban, one of the three major factions fighting to rule Afghanistan, were besieging Kabul. It appeared that they would gain control of much of the country. That Unocal deemed it possible to build a pipeline through a war zone, or through a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, seemed unlikely to me. During a free moment, I walked over to Unocal's exhibition to find out more. A Unocal representative was, not unexpectedly, quite excited about the whole project. Echoing a Unocal pamphlet, he said that a pipeline to the Arabian Sea was the most expeditious route for Central Asia's oil. When I asked him about the war raging in Afghanistan, he said, "That's no problem, we've got deals with all the warlords." "Really?" I asked, astounded. "Yes," he replied, "they're very reasonable when it comes to money."

Questioned about Taliban, he was quite voluble in assuring me that only good could come of a successful offensive. Taliban would bring stability to the country and provide the law and order necessary to build a pipeline. I stared at him in wonder. Evidently, at Unocal they didn't understand much about the Taliban or the fear it inspired in Central Asia. To publicly announce that Taliban's successes were a positive development seemed at best ill-advised. At worst, I thought that Unocal was jeopardizing its position in Central Asia by siding with a political movement so threatening to the nearby republics.

This statement was repeated by a Unocal vice-president, Chris Taggart, who was quoted in *Trud* as saying, "If Taliban stabilizes the situation in Afghanistan and can gain international recognition, the possibilities of constructing a pipeline will be significantly improved."1 Local journalists soon began speculating on U.S. involvement with Taliban. According to these reporters, the U.S., via Pakistan, has supplied Taliban with money and arms, including tanks and aircraft. The supposed purpose of such support was threefold: to facilitate construction of Unocal's pipeline, to halt drug trafficking originating in Afghanistan, and to reduce Russian and Iranian influence in the region.

While the U.S. denies direct support of the movement, American officials have admitted to conducting talks with Taliban leaders. In addition, statements by State Department personnel reveal a perception that the U.S. could work with Taliban in halting heroin shipments and combatting terrorist networks currently active in Afghanistan. Such hopes appeared naive to many, especially observers in Russia who see

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REECAS Contact Information
REECAS Center
203B Thomson Hall, Box 353650
University of Washington
Seattle, WA 98195-3650
(206)543-4852

James West, Director
email: jdwest@u.washington.edu

Kurt Engelmann, Assoc. Director
email: kengel@u.washington.edu

Louis Marshall, Newsletter Editor
email: louism@u.washington.edu

Carol Ann Lindley, Outreach Asst.
email: clindley@u.washington.edu

Central Asian Update

At Play in the Oil Fields...

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American involvement in Afghanistan as inimical to Russian political and economic interests. Echoing Russian fears, a reporter for Delovaya Nedelya wrote, "It should be noted that the increasing tension on Afghanistan's northern border is in the interest of a few states in the West."2

As I read all these articles, I was pleased that, during my initial conversation with the Unocal representative, I had anticipated many of the reactions that appeared in the press. However, the full importance of Unocal's statements did not really strike me until some weeks later, in Tajikistan. In the company of two American scholars from Almaty, I flew to Dushanbe to observe a conference on democracy hosted by the Tajik Academy of Sciences. Perhaps unsurprisingly, I was drafted to give a talk. For the first time, I stood up in front of an audience and, in Russian, gave my opinion on, as suggested by my hosts, "The American View of the Russian Presence in Central Asia." After 15 minutes of halting oratory, I began taking questions from the audience. The first of these came from an Iranian political scientist, who wanted to know why America was supporting a fundamentalist Islamic movement like Taliban, while maintaining such tight sanctions on Iran. It seemed to him a bit hypocritical. Soon, I found myself embroiled in a debate about America's foreign policy goals in Central Asia which, to the audience, seemed to hinge on U.S. oil interests.

For much of the discussion, I felt myself to be on the defensive. Many of the questions I simply could not answer, lacking detailed knowledge about American relations with Taliban. While it seemed inconceivable to me that the U.S. would suppport such an extreme movement, I too had read reports of American consultations with Taliban leaders and could readily understand local perceptions of American financial and military support. On the other hand, the interchange with academics from all over Central Asia, including Afghanistan, Iran, and Russia gave me a new perspective on America's role Eurasia as well as the impact that seemingly harmless statements can have on international relations.

Jeff Lumpkin is a second year graduate student in REECAS focusing on Central Asia.

1 "Neft' Paxnet Krob'yu," *Trud*, No. 195 (22698), 29 October 1997, pg. 4. "Esli Taliby stabiliziruyut obstanovky i poluchat mezhdynarodnoe priznanie, to perspektivy stroitel'stva tryboprovodov znachitel'no uluchshatsia."

2 Berik Kenesov, "Taliby i Presidenty," *Delovaia Nedelia*, vol. 39 (n. 217), 11 October 1996, pg. 9. "Nado otmetit', chto namechayushchaiasaia napriazhennost' na severnoi granitse Afganistana v interesakh nekotorykh gosydarstv na Zapade."



Letter From Diana Pearce on the State of Women in Uzbekistan
March 31, 1997

The streets and subways of Tashkent are dominated by women dressed in New York high fashion--heels, mostly black or drab grays (regardless of season), long skirts, and the popular black leather coats from Pakistan. The village women, in the bazaar, subways, small towns, and buses, in contrast, wear brightly colored dresses, pantaloons, and scarves tied to cover their hair, not under their chins ("babushka" style, typical of the older Russian women), but behind and under their hair, making the typical street scene look like a combination of the streets around Columbia University and a nation of cleaning women. Even the Russian women who are street sweepers wear their hair covered and tied in this manner (all street-sweepers and subway floor-sweepers are women and Russian). While there are women who cover their hair, and necks completely, and even some who draw the scarf across their mouths, they are quite rare. At the same time, a woman with long hair who wears it loose rather than in a bun or clipped back is rare, even among Russian women.

Whether traditional or modern, women in Uzbekistan are experiencing two contradictory trends. Especially at the lower levels of society, women are less restricted than in almost any other Islamic region, largely the result of the Russian/communist efforts that virtually no-one wants to reverse. Second, especially for urban and educated women, there is a conservative backlash fueled not by rising Islamic fundamentalism, but by the transition to a market economy and ironically the Russian legacy. Altogether, it feels very much like growing up in 1950s suburban America (see the opening chapters of Marge Piercy's *The Women's Room*).

Islam was established earlier and more extensively than in any other country in this region, with Samarkand and Bukhara the site of many religious

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Reviews

Russian Women in Politics and Society
Wilma Rule and Norma C. Noonan, eds. Greenwood Press, 1996
by Joan McCarter

The fall of the Soviet Union and reorganization of Russian politics and society in the image of western liberal democratic and free market constructs have presented profound challenges not only to the country's leadership, but also to its citizens. The segment of the population that has been hardest hit is women. Making up 53 percent of the population, Russian women also constitute the majority of the unemployed in Russia, about 70 percent, mostly between the ages of 20 and 45 years. Whereas under Soviet rule, women's wages were about 70 percent of men's wages, women now make about 40 percent of what men earn. About 20 percent of these mostly unemployed and underpaid women are single parents.

These bleak facts are presented in Wilma Rules' introduction to *Russian Women in Politics and Society,* an outstanding new collection of essays tracing the role of Russian women in Russian and Soviet history. The book grew from an article published in June 1992 in *PS: Political Science and Politics* about a dialogue among several Russian women leaders and co-author Wilma Rule at the Moscow Center for Gender Studies and a similar discussion that followed in St. Petersburg. These discussions were focused upon the impact of a variety of electoral systems on women's participation and opportunity for political input and election in democratic countries.

The book is intended to provide an overview of cultural and political factors that have shaped Russian women's lives. It is divided into four sections, the first two detailing the evolution of women's roles in society and politics from Imperial Russian through the communist period, and the second two examining the legal, economic and societal impact the break-up of the Soviet Union has had on women. Chapters focus on women's political participation, their *de jure* and *de facto* positions vis-à-vis the various governments, the economic and political part women have played throughout Russian and Soviet history. Broad in scope, the discussion in most chapters provides the necessary background to understand the subject matter without providing extensive detail.

None of the research presented in *Russian Women in Politics and Society* attempts or intends to break new ground. It draws upon an extensive existing literature, including recent newspaper and journal articles, to provide a solid overview of existing structures and where and how women fit into them. The book would provide an excellent introduction of the primary issues in Russian women's studies to a newcomer to the field. In addition, the final sections provide excellent summaries of the reorganization of the post-Soviet government and the development of rule of law. Along with these useful chapters, the editors have included a glossary of Russian and Soviet leaders and of Russian terms. These glossaries include material that is quite familiar to Soviet or Russian specialists, but would be extremely beneficial to readers outside the field.

Joan McCarter is a third year REECAS student specializing in women's health care policy in Russia.

Resources for Learning Russian on the Web

by Emily Fields

Learning a language is a complicated task. It goes beyond just simple memorization of facts and processing of data. A language student must be able to both passively comprehend data and to produce new and unique utterances based on learned patterns. Most students learn languages by going to classes, which typically utilize the following resources: a textbook, workbook exercises, audio tapes and perhaps some video. Juggling these components can sometimes be cumbersome. Computer technology makes it possible to bring together many different components of language learning--text, audio, pictures or video images--into a single source for use in the classroom or as a supplement to classwork. Computer exercises allow students to develop their language skills and get feedback outside the classroom. This is of particular benefit to the language learner, who is unable for some reason to attend classes and must study on his own. The World Wide Web goes one step further and makes these resources accessable to anyone with Internet access.

The "Klubnika" website at <http://www.wavefront.com/~swithee/dictionary/menus/mainmenu.html> could be of particular interest to elementary school teachers since it integrates pictures, audio, and vocabulary that would be interesting to younger children. The main page shows pictures of three topics--animals, food and transportation--with the name of the topic written below in Russian and an English translation. Viewers can click on the picture of a cat, or airplane, or even a baby dolphin to hear the word pronounced in Russian. (Mac users will probably need to have LiveAudio or similar plug-in installed). The pictures are cute--especially that of the kitten--and would very likely appeal to children as well as adults. The weakness of this page as a pedagogical tool is that it doesn't teach you how to read the Cyrillic alphabet. To get access to this information you will need to go to a page such as "Russky for Travelers" at <http://www. travlang.com/languages/cgibin/langchoice.cgi?lang1=english&lang2=russian&page=main> or "Golosa" at <http://www.auburn.edu/~mitrege/RWT/Golosa1/index.html> .

The "Russky for Travelers" website gives the alphabet, a pronunciation guide and sound clips of how each letter is pronounced (appropriate plug-in is necessary). In addition, "Russky for Travelers" provides sound clips and you

can listen to the sound clips and even take a "multiple choice" quiz when you're done. This page is perhaps most useful for those traveling to Russia who need to know some survival phrases, but don't have time to study the language in depth. One weakness of the page is its dependence on transliteration. The "multiple choice" answers are all transliterated so students get very little practice in reading Russian in Cyrillic.

The "Golosa" website, created by George Mitrevski as a supplement to the textbook of the same name, gives a pronunciation guide to help one learning the alphabet, but no sound clips. The focus of this website is grammar, and it provides grammar explanations to go along with exercises. As such it could be assigned as supplemental work by a classroom teacher or be used by a self-study student wishing to learn more than just travel phrases. In either case both pages bring together a variety of resources into one location. The "Russky for Travlers" combines audio, text and feedback, the "Golosa" page combines grammar explanations, exercises and feedback. In both cases the key element is immediate feedback, which is difficult to get outside a classroom setting.

As to other language resources on the web, anyone who has spent hours leafing through dictionaries can appreciate the convenience of having an on-line dictionary at your fingertips. First of all it is often faster than using a hardcopy dictionary, since you don't spend a lot of time turning pages and scanning columns. Second, some on-line dictionaries can do multiple word searches, which allows you to compare the definitions of two different words without having to flip back and forth between two different sections of a hardcopy dictionary. A handy index of "On-line Dictionaries" can be found at <http://www.bucknell.edu/~rbeard/diction.html> or the "On-line Dictionaries and Translators" page at <http://rivendel.com/~ric/resources/dictionary.html> which provides links to similar indexes. If you have the right keyboard driver and fonts you can use "Ozhegov On-line" at <http://194.85.117.36/oz_demo. htm> or an "English-Russian Russian-English Dictionary" at <http://www.elvis.ru/~denis/dict.cgi>. This dictionary seems to operate under the maxim that brevity is the source of wit insofar as it tends to favor one word definitions, but as such it is still a valuable resource. If all you need is an English-Russian dictionary then the "Mueller Dictionary" at <http://www.falcon. ru/cgi-bin/wwwdic> could be the thing for you. Keep in mind, however, that it may have a few gaps. For example, it gives every definition under the sun for the word "mail" except the one involving the post office!

To use all of the above resources you will need to "Russify" your computer (if you haven't already). A handy page to help you get the proper fonts and such is the UW Slavic Department's "Cyrillic Web Fonts" page at <http://weber.u.washington.edu/~slavweb/slavfon.html>. George Mitrevski has a page at <http://www.auburn.edu/~mitrege/RWT/ welcome.html>, which offers links to pages with a variety of keyboard drivers.

All of the resources I've listed above have their counterparts off the web, ie. it is possible to obtain copies of audio, pictures, and text from other sources. The web just adds the dimensions of accessibility, convenience, and efficiency. In the study of sign language, however, the resources the web can offer are truly unique. Sign languages are visual and involve motion of hands as well as facial expressions to denote meaning. Hardcopy dictionaries for sign languages rely on pictures with arrows to depict hand motion, and these are often unclear and ambiguous. Video technology is a step up, in that one can view signs in real time, but it is difficult to organize lexical material for convenient access on a video cassette. Computer technology offers a way to access video images without having to hassle with a rewind button. An example of an on-line sign language dictionary is the "Russian Sign Language" page at <http://weber.u.washington.edu/~jkautz/qt/qt.html>. It is by no means a comprehensive dictionary of Russian Sign Language, but it is still a resource of incomparable value for the possibilities itdemonstrates.

The Internet resources available to one wishing to learn more about Russian language are far greater than what I've listed above. For those interested in investigating, links to valuable websites can be found at the REECAS page "Russian Resources on the Web: An Introduction," from which the above examples were taken <http://weber.u.washington.edu/~reecasf/RESOURCES/>.

Emily Fields is a graduate student in the department of Slavic Languages and Literature and a staff assistant at the Language Learning Center.

Book review of *Russian Religious Thought* Judith Deutsch Kornblatt and Richard F. Gustafson, eds. 1996. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press. 266pp.
by Tom Dykstra

The broad-sounding title *Russian Religious Thought* belies the narrow focus of this small paperback symposium. The main interest here is sophiology, a current in Russian intellectual history that arose late in the 19th century and died around the middle of this century. "Sophia" is the Greek word for "wisdom"; from the earliest days of Christianity, wisdom's metaphorical portrayal in Proverbs 8 as a feminine figure who speaks and acts has encouraged some Christian sects to speculate about its real independent existence as a divine or semi-divine entity. This was carried to great lengths by Gnosticism, while mainstream Eastern Orthodox theology rejected such speculation entirely, either restricting the word "wisdom" to its basic sense, or identifying it with the second person of the trinity (the Son). In the late 19th Century Vladimir Soloviev revived the Gnostic speculations about a personal "Sophia," and in the first decades of the 20th century several Russian theologians, authors, and philosophers followed his lead.

This symposium examines four of the Russian sophiologists, with a brief historical introduction and three articles devoted to each individual. The first is naturally Soloviev himself, while the others are Pavel Florensky, Sergius Bulgakov, and Semen Frank. The articles are by no means

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Professor Stephen Hanson Lectures at Kennan Institute

The Role of Ideology in Russian Party Formation

by Jodi Koehn

"Between 1989 and 1991 there was a widespread feeling in the West that not only had Marxism-Leninism as an ideology been vanquished with the fall of Communism, but perhaps finally ideology in general had seen its end" said Stephen Hanson at a Kennan Institute lecture on 9 December 1996. Hanson, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Washington, and Title VIII-Supported Research Scholar, Kennan Institute, said that since 1994, however, this idea seems to have reversed itself. Even Yegor Gaidar has acknowledged that although the ideology of Communism collapsed, ideology did give Communism a kind of power that reformers in Russia currently lack. There is an increasing concern that Russia needs a new state ideology, that somehow despite the collapse of Marxism-Leninism, something is needed to fill the void that was created.

The general attitude in America is that "ideology is bad and pragmatism is good." According to this idea, ideological politicians are irrational and need to be forced into submission. Americans see pragmatic politicians as similar to themselves, eager to cooperate and be part of the global liberal order. Hanson argued that instead of simply decreeing ideology as bad and pragmatism as good, we should try to see the two as complementary. Without an ideology to define a long-run political vision, it is often difficult to be politically pragmatic. Political pragmatism without a state ideology may often be equivalent to opportunism.

Hanson proposed defining ideology as: "Any explicit and consistent definition of the membership and boundaries of one's political community." According to the speaker, most of us have culture, not ideology. Most people know what political community they belong to solely in implicit and inconsistent terms. Cultural responses to the problem of political membership are more common, but they fail to give concrete answers to questions of where the boundaries and membership lie on the macropolitical level.

Hanson argued that in periods of stability-where issues of membership and boundaries are resolved-ideologists tend to be quickly marginalized. In periods of crisis when the boundaries of a political community are difficult to define, ideologists may have power they would not ordinarily have. However, it is risky to establish the boundaries and member-ship of a political community that does not yet have them. Ordinary people have very little to gain, and potentially much to lose by standing up to argue for a particular definition-most people prefer to be pragmatic. Hanson noted that in turbulent times, pragmatism is often inconsistent. A perfectly pragmatic politician will repeatedly change positions. The ideologists of the world who consistently stick to a definition over time despite the changing nature of political or geopolitical reality may achieve credibility and acquire power they otherwise may not have.

In 1993 when the new Russian Constitution was adopted there was much optimism in the West about the creation of new political parties to compete for votes in the new Russian legislature, create stable representative institutions, and transmit social interests at the regional level. In Russia today, there are so many parties that it is difficult to keep track of them. Although parties play an important role in elections and in coordinating the interests of certain Moscow elite, they tend to be Moscow-centric with few links to the grassroots level. In a 1994 poll only 22% of the Russian population identified even weakly with a political party (compared to 87% in the U.S. and 92% in Great Britain).

According to Hanson, many Russian political parties have not yet resolved the ideological problem: there cannot be identification with political parties in an environment where nobody even knows what "Russia" is. Instead, political parties often represent the pragmatic interests-or, due to the turbulent environment, opportunistic interests-of certain elites. Such parties are understandably discounted by ordinary Russian voters.

By 1996, it appeared that parties had to be either pragmatic with an enormous amount of wealth and resources such as Chernomyrdin's Our Home is Russia, or ideological to survive. In the 1995 elections, Chernomyrdin's party had a great advantage in terms of media and financial resources but could barely get over 10% of the vote because they were too easily perceived as the party of power. Yeltsin's efforts to create a new party from above were a lot like his attempts to call for a new state ideology from above-purely pragmatic motives cannot create a new ideology. Parties can stand for elections and get people to vote for a desired possibility or direct connections to the state apparatus but cannot provide party loyalty.

The ideologically-based parties of Zyuganov and Zhirinovsky have achieved relative success. Zyuganov's idea of Soviet Restorationism defines Russia as the Soviet Union. He has consistently argued that the spiritual traditions of the great *derzhava* of Russia merged with the Marxist-Leninist state created by Lenin and Stalin. Zyuganov's relative success as a party-builder in Russia could not have happened without this ideological consistency over time. It was only during the 1996 campaign when Zyuganov began to waver that the CPRF fractured. Zhirinovsky's ideology of Super-Imperialism consistently defines Russia as part of a four-part North-South division of the world that he envisions as the permanent future of mankind. Although support for Zhirinovsky was waning by 1996, he still retained committed ideological supporters.

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Hanson concluded that the original optimism about party formation in Russia was misplaced. It is difficult to build parties before issues of national identity and boundaries are resolved. As long as those issues remain alive in Russian politics, ideological parties will continue to play an important role. Only after there is a stable Russia with a stable role in the international system, will pragmatic parties compete in a left-right spectrum where parties move toward the middle and play a role that can consolidate democracy rather than potentially destroy it.

"Ideology, Pragmatism, and Post-Communist Party Formation in the Russian Federation" sponsored by the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, was presented 9 December 1996 by Stephen Hanson, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Washington, and Title VIII-Supported Research Scholar, Kennan Institute. Jodi Koehn is Assistant Editor, Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies.

Reports from other Kennan scholars are located on the World Wide Web at: <http://wwics.si.edu/PROGRAMS/REGION /KENNAN/KENNAN.HTM>

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introductory in nature; they assume a great deal of background knowledge, and some require familiarity with highly technical philosophical terminology. Some address issues that have already been debated in scholarship and assume the reader is acquainted with these debates.

Most of the articles attempt to determine the original sources of Russian sophiology or analyze aspects of it in the writings of its Russian proponents. Some of these sources are Gnosticism and Origen for Soloviev; Hegel, Fichte, and German Idealism for Frank; and Dante for Florensky. Aspects of sophiological thought reviewed are Florensky's view of "matter," Bulgakov's "theory of personality," and Frank's idea of "all-unity." A few essays do not fit either category, such as an attempt to exegete a single sophiological writing of Soloviev's. The articles vary greatly in usefulness. Robert Slesinski's article on Frank's conception of "all-unity" is likely to be incomprehensible to a reader who does not have an advanced degree in philosophy. Paul Valliere makes a valiant but ultimately unconvincing attempt to argue that sophiology developed as a method for Orthodoxy to dialogue with modern civilization. This issue may actually be among the most vitally important discussed in the book, since anyone who studies this topic must sooner or later deal with the question of just how important is a line of thought that arose and died within a few decades among a handful of Russian thinkers. Was it a passing "fad" or did it have deeper significance? Anyone who tends to believe the former will not be dissuaded from that view either by Valliere or by any of the other authors in this symposium. Other articles do successfully argue their theses. Philip Swoboda effectively demonstrates Frank's commitment to the primacy of philosophy over theology, concluding that he actually rejects the Orthodox religious tradition and is a philosopher, not a theologian.

The same conclusion applies to this book as a whole: it is about Russian philosophy, not Russian theology. And it may be considered recommended reading only for the narrowest of audiences: people researching topics related to the sophiology of these four philosopher/theologians. For such individuals, even if the text itself turns out to be disappointing, the list of 12 names of scholars having similar interests may make the book worthwhile.

Tom Dykstra is a gradute of the REECAS program, and is currently a graduate student in the History Department

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schools and Islamic sects known for their conservatism. (At one point, Bukhara was said to have a mosque for every day of the year.) It should be noted, however, that none of these institutions were for girls or women indeed, only a handful of mosques were either set aside for women or had special spaces or days for them. (Women's religion was and is somewhat different, which I will get to below.) At the same time, women were completely veiled, even in summer wearing a cloak (drab on the outside, colorful within) with the vestigial "sleeves" tied behind (very symbolic), and the face covered by a black horsehair veil-which when I tried it on, permitted remarkable ability to see, and yet not be seen, but was incredibly hot.

Like all of Central Asia, Uzbekistan experienced Russian domination for more than a century-first the Tsars, then the Bolsheviks. The Russian imperialists brought development--the railroad, the telegraph etc.--but the Bolsheviks directly challenged the seclusion and oppression of women. In 1927, they launched the "khudjum", which normally means military attack, but in this case refers to the attack on veils, with public bonfires in central squares. (After which, according to reports cited by Marfua Tokhtakhodjaeva, some women were killed by their husbands or fathers, while others were forced to shed their veils to curry favor with Party officials, then to go buy new ones in the bazaar and don them.) Probably most important in the long run, Russians brought women into the labor force, first making girls as well as boys literate, and then urging women into the labor force. Again, this had less impact on village women whose work did not permit the "luxury" of veiling and exclusion from the outside world. It is apparent in the bazaars, however: while early 20th Century photographs show only a few veiled Uzbek women among the Silk Road sellers, (although Kyrgyz and Turkmen women were never veiled), today they are many. Among their wares, they may sell veils, and clocks that chant the call to prayer. They themselves wear only the hair-covering scarf tied behind.

The urban workforce has many women, although they are in jobs as stereotyped as in the West as teachers, nurses, low-level clerical jobs. Although the Russians declared women formally equal, somehow, as in the West, women are often in jobs that pay less than similarly-skilled jobs held by men. Thus regular doctors are predominantly women (especially pediatricians), but is low paid and low prestige. Likewise, they are rarely in positions of responsibility, and whether a woman can be as "good" a boss as a man is hotly debated. Under the hegemony of the Russians, women moved into the larger economy but in a highly circumscribed set of stereotyped "women's" occupations. For example, some traditional creative occupations, such as gold embroidery in Bukhara, have been transformed from men's crafts to women's factory work, with men still doing the creative (design) work and women the tedious production work.

An important adjunct to Uzbek women's working outside the home is the family system, in which young couples continue to live with their parents as they have their children. Traditionally, the bride left her parents' house and became a daughter in her husband's house, even calling her mother-in-law "mother" though often her position was not unlike that of Cinderella. At the same time, the presence of grandparents, especially with the early retirement age, supported both young parents' work in fields and factories, with built-in baby-sitters.

The impact of the Russian domination on women's work and family lives supported women's dual roles in family and workplace, yet limited their achievements in the workworld, and created the double day well-known in the West. Under the Soviet Union, women were given generous leave (more than half pay until the child's 3rd birthday), and could stay home with sick children for long periods. Pensions provide for retirement early enough (55 for women) that women could help their daughters-in-law out with the grandchildren. Of course, that meant women were often not taken as seriously on the job, were less likely to get promotions, etc., and as in the West, bear primary responsibility for caring for the children, shopping and preparing for meals, cleaning, and so forth. But the system supported combining work and family life, even with relatively large families.

Now they have the worst of both worlds. Where once the employer was always ultimately the state, and thus no enterprise was saddled with the cost of generous leave and pension policies, now private firms find that the costs of hiring women, or giving them such generous benefits, are prohibitively high. Young women taking leave now report that employers do not pay even partial wages and often tell them there is no job for them to return to when their leave ends. Subsidized child care in "children's gardens" (day care centers) is much less available than before. Inflation has eroded the value of pensions and wages alike, requiring two earners and postponing retirement, and the advent of apartment living has broken up the three generation household. Many urban women feel stranded by the Russians, who promised equality and opportunity, yet in the end they now have jobs in which pay has eroded, and benefits such as maternity leave have evaporated. And as in much of the Soviet Union, the collapse of inefficient state enterprises has created a situation of serious underemployment and hidden unemployment: as often happens, in such a situation, it is felt that men ought to have the few available jobs.

With the end of the Soviet Union, and the effort to define a unique Uzbek identity, women have found public policy to be confused, contradictory, and inconsistent. After a short time of encouraging women to have the traditional large Uzbek family (8 or 10 children is not unknown, and in the 1989 census, 55% of families had 5 or more children), reality set in and the government set up the semi-official organization, For a Healthy Generation. It encourages women to space their children far apart (because it makes for healthier children), not marry or bear children too young, etc., thus encouraging smaller families, but only indirectly. Doctors encourage women, sometimes quite forcefully, to adopt IUDs or other forms of birth control.

Universities also have begun to circumscribe women's opportunities. The

prestigious University of World Economy and Diplomacy (set up directly under the President's Office) excludes women from International Relations and International Law, on the grounds that they will just marry and devote themselves to a family any way. Of 26 students enrolled in the section I taught there, only one was a woman. (Not surprisingly, enrollment is now predominantly male at this University, perhaps 80%.) Other economics, business, and technical schools have similar policies and results. Even Tashkent State University is mostly male. Yet it is expected that families will have only one or two children, leaving many women unclear, trying to sort out the mixed messages.

The effect on young women is striking. When students are asked at the beginning of a course to write down their career objectives, the women students are stymied and embarrassed, and cannot assert what they even want to happen in their lives, almost as if that kind of planning or hoping is inconceivable--and some will even say, it depends upon their husbands. They have trouble taking themselves seriously in class or outside, or participating in class discussions on an equal basis. In contrast, young men are assertive and sure of themselves long before they know anything that would justify such confidence. Even among grade school age children, one sees this pattern: when visiting a grade school, the boys were eager to try out their English, but when a group of girls finally screwed up their courage to try, they were by far the better students. (Many professors report that at all levels, girls are consistently better students, making their exclusion even harder to understand, and rewarding boys for their gender rather than their performance).

For many women, even among the university-educated, their lives are contingent upon others, mainly men. For most women, power comes only with age and association with men: only when she has married, AND born sons, and herself become a mother-in-law, can she begin to act on her own wishes and desires. This does not mean a "rush" to get married--marriage is inevitable, and arranged. To my surprise, when I asked around a circle of women at the Women's Center here--the only real "activists" here--how many had or would arrange their daughters' marriages, almost all said they would do so. They explained that of course, their daughters understood that their parents (in fact, their mothers) would want only the best for them, and would pick the best mates for them.

Getting married is an important marker in a woman's life, even if they have little to say about who is involved. It marks the transition, sometimes rather abrupt, from childhood to adulthood. It is traumatic for their mothers as well, and the marriage ceremony includes an all-women afternoon on the third day after the wedding. The bride returns to her home for the last time for an emotional reunion, is given many presents by her family-clothes, including shoes, coats, and so forth-and there is an all-women party with band, dancing, much food (prepared by the men!) as elaborate as the wedding party itself. For the next year, she may wear a special bride's hat (a pillbox lavishly embroidered in gold and sequins with a large tassel of gold), which can be seen even in offices and on the Metro, and she is shown off at the celebrations that mark the end of the month of fasting. Families with a new bride in the house welcome guests with tables laden, truly groaning with all kinds of sweets, including a kind of fried noodle (like tiny donuts) then glued together with honey in enormous mounds a foot or two tall (called *chok-chok),* all of which is supposed to made by the bride, showing off her skills. Today this ceremony does not mark a irretrievable break, but the difference in men's and women's experience of "marriage" is even expressed in language. The word for married for men roughly translates as "establishing a home" (or start a family) while the one for women means that she has gone out (from her home) into life, or existence, suggesting that for women, marriage is the way to "get a life", not just a stage in life.

Though getting married is extremely important for women, there is not much investment in the marriage relationship, but enormous investment in children, especially sons. Particularly for poor women, having sons is important, although even the educated are not immune: in a survey done by a class of mostly university educated Tashkent residents, there were 50% more sons than daughters (a puzzling result-even with a nonrandom survey, roughly 50% of offspring ought to be female), suggesting its importance to all classes. Indeed, one evidence of the importance of having children, especially sons, are the prayer rags tied to trees by holy tombs and mosques throughout Uzbekistan. Many saints' tombs (as well as those of rulers' spiritual and secular power seem to merge over the centuries) have next to them a tree, on which women tie rags and say prayers, sometimes circling the tomb 3 or 7 times, to grant their wish to have children. By one such tree just over the border into Turkmenistan, women had fashioned some of the rags with twigs into tiny cradles and laid them by the tree; by tradition, to insure that their wish to conceive is granted, having made their prayer, they are then to climb the nearby hill (on which 40 mullahs are said to be buried, hence its power), and tumble head over heels down the other side.

With not much investment in their relationship with their spouse, the sex segregation of work life, and the exclusion of women from much of public religious life (such as Friday prayers at the mosque, the *haj* (pilgrimage to Mecca), and most medresses), it is not surprising that there is a strong women's culture. Women are affectionate with each other, even in public (whereas even among Russians, one rarely sees public affection, even hand-holding, among heterosexual couples), call each other "(older) sister", reminding one of African American women's culture. Most surprisingly, in this somewhat reserved culture, they have a highly developed tradition of dance that is alive and well even among the most Russified elite. Uzbek women's dancing combines the grace and hand motions of Thai dancing, the rhythm of Middle Eastern dances, with elements that remind one of Egypt (hands pressed together as if prayer, head moved back and forth), Turkish belly dancing (although never done with such costumes or seductive gestures). All Uzbek dancers have long flowing dresses or gold-embroidered robes, sometimes with fantastic jewelry

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and rainbow-colored silk, beautiful but never provocative. And women of all ages, eyes flashing and with engaging smiles, will dance at every occasion except funerals, from weddings to the annual meeting of the Businesswomen's Association, or even while watching videos of weddings. Dance troupes are proliferating, and every state occasion and TV broadcast, has Uzbek dancing.

The very separateness and segregation of women's work and family lives, both modern and traditional in its sources that gives women's culture its strength, also keeps women from achieving a more equal and free position in society. Like all less powerful groups, it is women banding together that helps them survive the difficulties of life. They even, in time-honored fashion, undermine nominal male authority on occasion. An instance of this occurred when four of us women (from four different Western countries) visited one of the most conservative provinces. Our taxi driver/guide informed us that he was finally getting married, because now he had enough money so his wife would not have to work, and would stay at home full time even before children. But when we arrived at his home, where he lives with his grandparents, his grandmother, who of course arranged the marriage, told us that she had already told her future daughter-in-law that she could (even maybe should) continue working after their marriage at the bank where she is a clerk.

As Deniz Kandiyoti points out, this system of patriarchy and patrilocal family formation means that each woman makes her own personal bargains with patriarchy. If she can marry well and have sons, her future is assured. At the same time, such individual bargains work against women seeing how their common fate, as women, is being shaped outside of their own personal lives. The personal is not yet political for women in Uzbekistan: when I have told women that they or their daughters probably could not go to the University of World Economy, no matter their qualifications, even the most knowledgeable are surprised. Each woman who tells me about her difficulties--her loss of a job, the lack of leave, and so forth--is surprised to be told that other women are experiencing these problems.

Issues like these that women face, have emerged in the West and even Eastern Europe, but are not yet on the agenda in Uzbekistan--not just sensitive issues, such as domestic violence, but all work issues such as equal pay and sexual harassment, as well as reproductive rights, educational discrimination, and the economic problems of single mothers. In part, this is due to the absence of women in public life: far more than other Central Asian countries, Uzbekistan has abandoned any pretense that women should play an important role in public policy formation, so that the percentage of women in the Parliament has dropped from 32% to just 5%, and the only woman in the Cabinet heads the Office of Women's Affairs and chairs the Republican Women's Committee. Unlike other former states of the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan never dismantled nor changed the Women's Committee. It functions to represent women, but does not funnel any new ideas or concerns into the government, but rather decides unilaterally what the issues to be discussed will be. Thus there is neither mechanism nor a forum in which to raise new issues.

In addition, the general distrust towards non-governmental organizations makes it difficult to organize even service groups outside the government. For example, all NGOs must be registered, a process that may take literally years and endless bureaucratic hassles, often resulting in a loss of the energy behind a group. Not surprisingly, only one shelter for battered women has opened, and it is not in Tashkent, although one author stated that in a recent year there were nearly 800 bride suicides in Uzbekistan. (Unlike India, these are not killings, but suicides of women in despair over their lives, often in homes with oppressive mothers-in-law and/or husbands who are alcoholics, a growing problem with rising unemployment and underemployment in the stagnant rural economy.)

In many ways, women are at a crossroads in Uzbekistan. With the loss of belief in the Communist ideology, the rationale for women's participation in the public world of work and politics is also gone. Earlier in the century, efforts to reform Islam, including giving women a more equal role, were crushed, as the Bolsheviks sought to make communism the only source of progressive thinking. Many would like to import Western ways wholesale, but the high rate of divorce and family breakdown hardly recommends such ways (and even here, among the Russians, the much higher rates of divorce make Uzbeks naturally uneasy). Some efforts have been made to develop nascent progressive Islam-based rationales for women's equality, but such efforts are up against the much better funded forces of conservatism, with mosques built by the Saudis and others, and many scholarships to study Islam at centers of Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East.

At the same time, much of what women are experiencing in the workplace and public life is hard to assign to an upsurge of Islamic fundamentalism, for it much more closely echoes the themes found among suburban-dwelling baby-boomers in the American of the 1950s. Then, as is true here now, women were told to devote their lives to their children, and to live vicariously through their successes, rather than seek to have their own careers/lives. At least in the cities and universities, it is hard to see how the mullahs can be blamed for the limiting of women's opportunities. It is not they who sit on University admission's committees or hire office managers for international corporations or decide on awards for study abroad. But other sources clearly contribute. The shortage of jobs (real jobs, that pay wages that are not eroded by inflation) is one. Another is the Russian influence. Although women had many more opportunities, especially in academia, under the Russians, there was a glass ceiling in enterprises and politics alike (as evidenced by the lack of women in the higher reaches of the Kremlin, before or after the end of the Soviet Union). The celebration of International Women's Day, imported by the Russians, has become a kind of combination of Valentine's Day and Mother's Day,

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with men cooking breakfast, bringing chocolates and flowers to the women in their lives, and public paeans to women's virtues--her femininity and her selfless mothering of the nation. Not a word about equal opportunity, ending discrimination (which in both Uzbek and Russian is an imported word, something like "diskriminatsia"). And finally, there is just plain sexist conservatism, that would limit women to circumscribed family roles and limited work roles, regardless of talent and inclination, a conservatism found in most societies, modern as well as traditional. Whether women begin to come together to change their lives and participate more fully in Uzbekistan's development, or retreat to lives dominated by domestic concerns under the pressure of economic and political forces, remains an open question.

Diana Pearce, a specialist in Women's issues, is spending the current academic year in Uzbekistan.



Project Harmony Announces The Internet School Linkage Program (ISLP)

Project Harmony is pleased to announce its new "Internet School Linkage Program", a year-long project sponsored by the Soros Open Society Institute which aims to apply telecommunications technology to new and existing partnerships between US and NIS schools. Through the help of this program, teachers and students will use the Internet to communicate with partners abroad via e-mail and utilize various on-line resources to carry out joint educational projects and develop innovative cross-border curricula. Working closely with partner schools, Project Harmony will provide the educational leadership, technical equipment and support necessary to ensure that the Internet link is integrated into the academic program of participating schools.

Over the course of the next year, Project Harmony will identify fifteen NIS schools and a matching number of US partner schools. In each school, computer teams will be identified and take part in a series of training workshops and exchanges with their counterparts abroad to prepare them to serve as trainers in their home schools. Each pair of US/NIS faculty teams will work together with Project Harmony advisors to develop at least one major curriculum project which makes use of new Internet technologies. Projects will cover a range of topics, including but not limited to: youth culture, current events, cultural heritage, environmental science and creative writing. NIS schools will be supplied with Internet access and a computer hardware package tailored to the specific needs and interests of each school. In addition, Project Harmony will provide Russian-language training materials which address technical issues and approaches to integrating Internet technologies into the educational process. US schools will be given assistance in setting up similar computer facilities.

The host of resources and information to grow out of the project and its school partnerships will be made available on the Project Harmony WWW page. In the coming months, look for:

* School-to-School Partnership homepages - School profiles, partnership projects, up-to-date list of Project Harmony-sponsored school partnerships and schools currently looking for partners.
* Curriculum Corner - Internet-related curricula and project models, including examples taken directly from ISLP partner projects.
* The Virtual Exchange Experience - Personal reflections from students on their experiences using the Internet in the classroom and using E-mail to correspond with pen pals abroad.
* The Cultural Heritage Project - Reports from students researching the family history of partners abroad. Just one of many projects whose results and student reports will be published on the WWW.
* The School-to-School Web-zine - an electronic magazine produced by US and NIS students documenting classroom Internet projects, current events and youth culture.
* Listservs - Associated with the site will be a number of electronic mailing lists, including one for teachers to focus on curriculum development and one for students to focus on cultural heritage and current events.

For more information, contact:

Colleen F. Halley
Director, Internet School Linkage Program
Email: pharmony@madriver.com

World Wide Web Address:
<http://www.igc.org/pharmony/>

WORKSHOP

"THE CHALLENGE OF TEACHING HUMAN RIGHTS: THE CASE OF RUSSIA AFTER COMMUNISM"

Saturday, May 3, 1997
Thomson 317
University of Washington
Seattle, Washington

Traditional curriculum about other nations and cultures has usually emphasized issues of diplomatic relations, security studies, or economic competition. However, in recent years questions about the future of the nation-state, the impact of technology, the "end" of the Cold War have called into question these traditional models of study. The case of human rights in Russia raises particularly intriguing questions for our understanding of what we need to understand and how we should teach about other cultures and societies in a globalized world.

8:45-9:00 Gather, coffee, informal introductions

9:00-9:15 Stating the problem,
Bruce Kochis, Liberal Studies Program, University of Washington at Bothell

9:15-10:15 Seminar on "Human Rights in Russia: Discourse of Emancipation or only a Mirage?" article by Bill Bowring

10:15-10:45 Follow up discussion to the seminars,
Jim Harnish, Social Science Division, North Seattle Community College

10:45-11:00 Break

11:00-12:00 "Human Rights in Russia: From Central to Local Control,"
Vladimir Raskin, Moscow Research Center for Human Rights

12:00-1:15 Lunch in working groups

1:15-2:00 Follow-up to lunch groups,
Jim Harnish

2:00-3:00 Curriculum and Critical Sources in Human Rights,
Bruce Kochis and Kurt Engelmann, Associate Director, REECAS Center,
University of Washington

3:00-3:15 Announcements, next steps, and good-byes

The conference is open to all educators. There is no charge, but pre-registration is required. To register, call the REECAS Center (206) 543-4852 or email: marionc@u.washington.edu.

"NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States"

A conference at the University of Washington, Seattle
Petersen Room, UW Suzzallo Library
Tuesday, May 6 and Wednesday, May 7, 1997

The two-day conference will examine the question of NATO Enlargement and Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The program will focus in part on the question of ethnic diaspora in the Baltic Sea zone and include diplomats and academics from the three Baltic states, Russia, Poland and the Nordic states, plus the United States and Canada, including present and former officials of the US Department of State and Department of Defense.

The program will also examine the question of NATO and from the perspective of the new and established democracies in this region. Dr.Vitaly Zhurkin, currently Director of the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences and one of the authors of "the common European home' concept of the Gorbachev era, will be among the speakers.

The final session of the conference will take place Wednesday from7:30-9:30 in Kane Hall, will be co-sponsored by the Seattle World Affairs Council. The other co-sponsors of the program include the International Studies Program, the European Studies Program, the Baltic Studies Program, the Scandinavian Studies Department, and the Canadian Studies Program. The conference is funded by PNWCIS (the Pacific Northwest Colloquium on International Security) and REECAS.

By spreading these panels over two days we hope to allow for extended debates over the issues raised in formal presentations by panelists, remarks by designated commentators, and spontaneous reactions from conference participants. We hope that all participants will attend the program in its entirety. Time will be set aside for questions from the audience.

The chair of the conference will be Drew Mann, of the US State Dept. Presenters will include Victor Raskin of the University of Washington, Igor Zevelev of the Kennan Institute funding, and Teresa Rakowska Harmstone. Commentators will include REECAS professors Sabrina Ramet, Herb Ellison, and Dan Chirot, and Mikhail Alexevev.

Briefly, the themes to be explored are:

1) The *interaction* between security issues and the rights of citizens, ethnic groups, religious communities and nation-states. The interaction of all these issues with European area security structures.

2) Evolving *Russian views* on these questions.

3) Evolving *Baltic views* on these questions.

4) *Nordic experience* with these issues based on 200 years of complex interaction among diaspora, nation-states, Russian/Soviet imperialism and European security organizations.

5) Conflicting security imperatives for *Polish policy* in regard to Russia, the CIS, Kaliningrad and the Baltic states, the Nordic states, the Visegrad states and the NATO/EU states. The assumption is that Polish-NATO policy will serve as a catalytic agent in regard to all of these security horizons.

6) *American security interests* in regard to NATO and the former Warsaw Pact zone; the Soviet legacy of "de-nationalizing" East European security forces so that they have not been available to "nationalist" politicians of the Milosevic-Tudjman variety. The question of whether Brussels can perpetuate the Soviet legacy of the de-nationalization of East European security systems; the question of whether the Western democracies can further integrate their common defense structures so as to perpetuate the "de-nationalization" of security policy in Germany, Japan and other advanced economies. The long-term trends on alliance building and democracy.





The Future of the Russian Economy

Judith A. Thornton, Professor of Economics
Wednesday, April 30, 1997

a part of International Updates: Trends and Transitions in Your World

Sponsored by:

Jackson School Outreach Centers
Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies
University of Washington
and the Center for International Business Education and Research
School of Business Administration
University of Washington

Location: Husky Union Building (HUB), 200ABC, University of Washington campus
Time: 5:30-8:00 p.m. Preregistration required.

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Washington State Clock Hours are available to K-12 teachers and community college instructors for no additional charge.

Registration

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For more information call the South Asia Center at 206-543-4800, FAX 206-685-0668, or email [snodgras@u.washington.edu].

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To attend mail this registration form and seminar fees ($20.00 per person) to:

Jackson School Outreach Centers
Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies
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University of Washington
Box 353650
Seattle, WA 98195-3650

To request disability accommodations, contact the office of the ADA coordinator at least ten days in advance of the event, 206-543-

Summer Language Programs

University of Washington Intensive Central Asian Languages & Culture Program June 23- August 22, 1997

Intensive language instruction will be offered in **elementary and intermediate Uzbek; elementary and intermediate Kazakh; elementary Kirghiz and Tajik.** All languages will be taught with the assistance of native speakers from Central Asia. An extensive cultural program of lectures, music, dance, art and films will also be offered. *Pending funding, fellowships will be available.*

For fellowship information contact:

Ilse D. Cirtautas, Director
Central Asian Languages and Culture Summer Program
Dept. of Near Eastern Languages
229 Denny Hall, Box 353120
University of Washington
Seattle, WA 98195-3120
(206) 543-6033 or (206) 685-3800

For admission information contact:

Summer Quarter
5001 25th Avenue NE, GH-24
University of Washington
Seattle, WA 98195
(206)543-2300 or 1-800-543-2300



Fourth Baltic Studies Summer Institute 1997 University of Illinois at Chicago Summer Semester (June 16-August 8), 1997

First-year intensive courses will be taught in **all three Baltic languages (Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian).** Baltic Culture and Baltic History courses, each of 4 weeks duration, will also take place. *There will be a limited number of scholarships for language students ONLY.*

The Baltic Studies Summer Institute Consortium was founded by the University of Washington in 1994. In 1995, the Consortium grew to five members, and now includes Indiana University, the University of Illinois, the University of Michigan, the University of Washington, and the University of Wisconsin. Member institutions take turns in hosting BALSSI. Ties between the Baltic States and Central Europe will be approached by several courses in the 1996 BALSSI program. The following courses are planned:

LITH 101-2: First Year Lithuanian
The course is the equivalent of a full academic year (two semesters) of instruction in Lithuanian.

EST 101-2: First Year Estonian
The course is a full academic year (two semesters) of instruction in Estonian.

LAT 101-2: First Year Latvian
The course will cover the equivalent of a full academic year (two semesters) of instruction in Latvian.

LITH 299: Baltic History

LITH 115: Baltic Culture
The course will give an introduction to the cultures of the Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians. No knowledge of Baltic languages is needed.

Additional programs:
A program of guest lecturers and films is also planned. Concurrently there will be an exhibit of Baltic art and/or historical maps at the Balzekas Museum of Lithuanian Culture. An evening series of guest lectures will further enrich the course offerings.

Fellowships:

As in previous years, pending funding, there will be a limited number of fellowships available for students taking intensive language courses.

For further information, contact:
Prof. Violeta Kelertas, Endowed Chair of Lithuanian Studies
Department of Slavic and Baltic Languages and Literatures
University of Illinois at Chicago
(m/c 306) 1628 University Hall
601 S. Morgan St., Chicago IL 60607-7116 Tel. (312) 996-4412 or (312) 996-7856
Email: Kelertas@uicvm.uic.edu



Summer Language Programs

University of Washington
Intensive Russian
and Czech Language Program
June 23 - August 22, 1997

Earn a year's worth of language credit in 9 weeks and pay in-state tuition rates. The estimated 1996 tuition for each intensive language course is expected to be approximately $1,085 for undergraduates and $1,180 for graduate students, plus an additional $35 application fee (fees subject to change). See **Housing and Special Programs** for information on housing and meals.

CZECH - Elementary
Emphasizes conversation and basics of Czech grammar and vocabulary. Students develop a certain fluency in expressing themselves in everyday situations.

1st Year RUSSIAN
Introduction to Russian. Emphasis on oral communication with limited vocabulary. Short readings and writing exercises. Basic grammar. Conducted mostly in Russian.

2nd Year RUSSIAN
Comprehensive review of Russian grammar with continuing oral practice and elementary composition. Conducted mostly in Russian.

3rd Year RUSSIAN
Extensive practice in spoken and written Russian based on a variety of prose readings. Intensive review and supplementation of strategic grammatical concepts. Conducted mostly in Russian.

4th Year RUSSIAN
Class discussion, oral presentations, and composition, based on reading a variety of texts, both literary and non-literary. Advanced grammar. Conducted entirely in Russian.

Housing and Special Programs

Students who wish to live in a Russian-speaking environment may apply to live in the Russian House, located just across the street from the campus. The Russian House has its own modern kitchen facility, and residents may opt to prepare their own meals or to buy a meal plan. The Russian House is a focal point for extracurricular events, which may include Russian singalongs, folkdancing, plays, poetry readings, lectures, films, weekend bike rides, and hiking trips. The Russian House may also host Russian visitors in the fields of art, science, business, etc. Priority to live in the House is given to those with the strongest Russian language background. All students in the summer program are welcome to participate in activities held at the Russian House or just to visit.

Housing is also available on the Russian floor of the main dormitory, where Slavic Department students will be grouped together. Estimated costs for the Russian House or the Russian floor in summer 1996: $715 for a double; $905 for a single; $515 for the meal plan. Applications for the Russian House are available through the Slavic Department: (206) 543-6848. Applications for housing in the dorm will be available in April through Housing and Food Services: (206) 543-4059. Be sure to indicate RUSSIAN on your housing application.

Scholarship and Fellowships

The Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures offers one full-tuition scholarship for an undergraduate returning to the UW for the Summer Russian Program. Contact Slavic Department, (206) 543-6848. Deadline: April 5, 1997. For graduate students, Foreign Language and Area Studies Fellowships are available from Jackson School Student Services, University of Washington, Box 353650, Seattle, WA 98195-3650, (206) 543-6001. Deadline: February 1, 1996.

Applying and Registering

Call (800) 543-2320 to request a Summer Quarter Bulletin. Telephone registration begins early May. Applications by mail accepted through June 1. Later applications accepted in person only. No transcripts or letters of recommendation necessary. Application materials should be sent to Admissions Office, University of Washington, Box 355840, Seattle, WA 98195-5840. Course fees billed in early July.

For further information contact:

Shosh Westen
Slavic Department
University of Washington
Box 353580
Seattle, WA 98195-3580
Tel: (206) 543-6848
Fax: (206) 543-6009
E-mail: shoshw@u.washington.edu.

Calendar of REECAS-Related Events
Spring 1997

First Friday night of every month, Spring Term: Slavic Salons/Potlucks Russian House, 2104 NE 45th, 7pm

April

April 23 Film: "Man of Marble" (Poland)*

April 24 Thursday "Medical Relief Work in Kazakhstan" Nency Nersveen, RN, Swedish Hospital Denny Hall 123, 12:30-1:30pm

April 25 Friday "The History of the Seattle-Tashkent Sister City Relationship" Ilse D. Cirtautas, Department of Near Eastern Languages & Civilization Denny Hall 215, 12:30-1:30pm

April 26 Saturday The Third Annual Regional Conference on Russian, East European, and Central Asian Studies (REECAS) University of the Puget Sound, Tacoma, WA

April 30 Film: "Love Affair: or the Case of the Missing Switchboard Operator" (Yugoslavia) - Introduction by Professor Gordana Crnkovic*

April 30 Wednesday. "The Future of the Russian Economy" Judith A. Thornton, Professor of Economics Husky Union Building (HUB), 200ABC, 5:30-8pm Preregistration required. See page 14.

May

May 3 Saturday "The Challenge of Teaching Human Rights: The Case of Russia After Communism" Thomson 317, 8:45-3:15 Preregistration required. See page 12.

May 3 Saturday Ninth Nicholas Poppe Symposium on Inner/Central Asian Studies Denny Hall 215, 9:00am-6:00pm

May 6,7 Tues, Wed. "NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States" Petersen Room, Suzzalo Library See page 13.

May 7 Film: "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich"*

May 8 Thursday "Life in America as Viewed by Kazakh and Kirghiz High-school Students" Aida and Kazbek from Kazakhstan, and Almaz from Kirghizstan Denny Hall 123, 12:30-1:30pm

May 9 Friday "New Uzbek Publications" Ilse D. Cirtautas and Students of the Intermediate Uzbek Class Denny Hall 215, 12:30-1:30pm

May 14 Film: "Loves of a Blonde" (Czechoslovakia)*

May 15 Thursday "Food and Hospitality Among the Kazakhs in Mongolia" Jason Cancro, Undergraduate Student, UW Denny Hall 123, 12:30-1:30pm

Tentative: May 16 Friday "Life as a Physician in Uzbekistan" Dr. Murat Yunusov, Tashkent, Uzbekistan Denny Hall 215, 12:30-1:30pm

May 21 Film: "Cloud-Paradise" (Russia)*

May 23 Friday "The Ethnic Conflict in Osh 1991" Joint Meeting with the Uzbek Circle. Panel Discussion. Denny Hall 215, 12:30-2:00pm

May 28 Film: "Underground" (Yugoslavia)*

May 29 Thursday "Research on Kirghizstan" Professor Ilse D. Cirtautas, UW Denny Hall 123, 12:30-1:30pm

May 30 Friday "Uzbek Short Stories: Translation Project" Students of the Intermediate Uzbek Class Denny Hall 215, 12;30-1:30pm

June

June 4 Wednesday Year-End Joint Meeting with Presidents and Participants of Kazakh & Kirghiz Studies Group and Turkic Studies Group: Reports on Accomplishments and Planning for 1997-1998 Denny Hall 215, 12:30-2:00pm

*** All films will be shown at 7:00 p.m. on Wednesdays at the Russian/German House, 2104 NE 45th Street. The event is free of charge. UW ID required. One guest per UW ID permitted. If you want to be a guest, call 543-682, the Department of Slavic Languages & Literatures.**

Kazakh & Kirghiz Studies Group President: Talgat Imangaliev, 543-0697, email: talgat@u.washington.edu

Uzbek Circle President: Erdag Gknar, tel.: 543-0697, e-mail: goknar@u.washington.edu
(Faculty Advisor: Ilse Cirtautas, 543-6033 or 685-3800, e-mail: icirt@u.washington.edu)

Letter From the Director

As the Spring Quarter warms up, the news of the moment is that the REECAS Center was successful in the competition for Title VI funding for the 1997-2000 period. The two things that immediately spring to mind are the eighth line of *Hamlet* (check it out!), and the old adage that "half a loaf is better than no bread." The award is definitely good news - particularly good since the declared intention of the Department of Education to let some new area studies programs have a fair shot at the Title VI money made refunding anything but a foregone conclusion for long-established centers such as ours. The not-so-good news is that the money has been spread more thinly, and our funding is about $16,000 less than we asked for in 1997-98, and over $30,000 less for the following two years. The definitely bad news is that, in common with the other National Resource Centers in the Jackson School, we received only about one third of the FLAS fellowship funding we requested. For the rest of the millennium, our agenda is conditioned by all three varieties of news. We will be moving ahead with as many as possible of the plans that were built into our Title VI proposal: securing instruction in the less commonly taught languages; strengthening our course coverage, and revising our curriculum to better reflect both the needs and the realities of area studies in the present and the foreseeable future; strengthening our role in the exchange of ideas and research through seminars and visiting scholars; expanding our outreach, especially into high schools and the business and professional arena, and making it more effective through the use of the new educational technologies; adding to and diversifying our REECA area library resources; and incorporating the small but growing programs at UW Bothell and UW Tacoma into all our activities. What we cut from our original request will be the subject of 36 hours of agonizing (that's all the time we have to revise the budget for re-submission to the Department of Education), but we will do our best to keep the essentials in place. The scaling back of FLAS support for our graduate students is the most serious challenge: a situation that was chronically bad before is now critical, and fundraising for graduate support will be a top priority in the coming years. I'm looking forward very much to working closely with the REECAS faculty and staff, students, and supporters in the community at large as we consclidate our achievements, solve our problems and move ahead.

James West
REECAS Program Chair and Center Director

REECAS NEWSLETTER

203 Thomson Hall, Box 353650
Jackson School of International Studies
University of Washington
Seattle,WA 98195-3650

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