

The Modern Animal

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**Abstract**

The Modern Animal

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*The Modern Animal* explores transformations in human-animal relationships in the trans-Atlantic world from the early nineteenth century through the middle of the twentieth century. In tracking four major emergences – the beginnings of the early animal welfare movement, the rise of agribusiness, the origins of the conservation movement, and the development of the animal entertainment industry – it illuminates how material practices involving animals occasioned shifts in prevailing cultural constructions of animality, and likewise, how an array of cultural forms shaped the making of human-animal relations. In so doing, it argues that rapidly changing ideas of animality were intimately bound up with historic shifts in the construction of gender, the production of sexuality, and the particularization of racial difference. In telling the story of the modern animal, then, it reads transformations in U.S. social formation as part of a history that is not human, or not solely.

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## Introduction

In February 2002, a white Charolais cow jumped over the five-foot fence of a holding pen at Ken Meyer's Meats, a slaughterhouse in Cincinnati, Ohio. She then bolted into Clifton's 59-acre Mount Storm Park, and for the 11 days that followed, managed to evade the sustained efforts of police officers and SPCA officials to capture her. As the press caught wind of the story, the saga of the runaway cow was reported almost daily across the nation, and accounts even appeared in news coverage across Canada, England, Australia, France, and Germany. By the time she was finally apprehended on February 26th, the cow had become an international celebrity, earning herself exemption from slaughter, in the minds of most. On ABC's "Good Morning America," then-Cincinnati mayor Charlie Luken pledged to give the animal a key to the city, and when the equally impressed New York artist Peter Max investigated the possibility of adopting the cow, he found out that he was actually seventy-fourth in a long line of zoos, circuses, and other individuals who had already made offers to buy her. So Max pledged to donate \$180,000 worth of paintings to the SPCA, and was accordingly granted custody over other contenders. He subsequently arranged for "Cincinnati Freedom," or "Cinci," as the cow became known, to live out the rest of her days at Farm Sanctuary's New York Shelter. There, Cincinnati Freedom reportedly grew fat, made fast friends with other rescued cows, occasionally jumped fences to avoid the hoof trimmer, and otherwise prospered until her widely observed death six years later.<sup>1</sup>

Cincinnati Freedom was a singular cow, to be sure, but she condensed a multiplicity of cultural meanings onto one bovine body. From mere meat in an industrialized process of killing, she became a threat to civic peace, a spectacle on TV, an honored citizen of Cincinnati, a

prospective venture of entertainment enterprises, a coveted pet of (mostly unequipped) caretakers, an argument against animal cruelty, and a sign of nature rightfully restored. Over the days she spent on the run, however, one meaning among others began to stick to stories about Cincinnati Freedom, as stubbornly as a burr to fur. In her dramatic escape from the slaughterhouse less than six months after 9/11, Cincinnati Freedom loomed largely in the national imagination as a symbol of the “will to live, to enjoy life and not be messed with.”<sup>2</sup> For a short period of time, anyhow, the cow became the unlikely emblem of a besieged America, overcoming the threat of violence with the stubborn commitment to freedom.

The story of Cincinnati Freedom helped to facilitate a transformation in U.S. racial formation, but not in the way that one might expect. Instead of embodying the absence of cognition and communicable speech – signifying the simple inverse of the Enlightenment subject – this animal was filtered through a kaleidoscopic interpretative framework shaped by an array of interspecies practices, from eating meat to keeping pets to visiting zoos to establishing animal sanctuaries. Instead of strengthening the demarcation between human and animal, the sense of Cincinnati Freedom that ultimately took hold of the cultural imagination invited human identification across species lines. Instead of securing a neat correspondence between the racial other and the animal other, this cow functioned as the fulcrum for a rapid realignment of racial memory and racial meaning. For at first breath, the story of the “mad cow” seemed to play upon a well-worn refrain of animalized others wreaking havoc upon the American public order. But reaching deep into cultural memory, this “runaway” cow, this “fugitive” forager, almost indiscernibly sounded the story of countless human runaways and fugitives who crossed the Ohio River to find freedom in Cincinnati. If the cow’s most amplified racial resonance became some imagined heartland, where even the cattle are white, this signification was arguably a

contested outcome of competing cultural meanings bound up with vastly different material practices involving animal life. How these meanings are coopted in the (re)making of racial difference and the (re)consolidation of the racial order – particularly at moments of crisis and transformation – is the subject of this dissertation.

Following this opening anecdote, this dissertation aims to underscore how the seemingly symmetrical and stable binary of human/animal actually involves a dynamic relation, within which the meaning of the human depends upon the animal, even as the animal is subordinated to and excluded from the domain of the human. Departing from this deconstructive premise, this dissertation finds that the definitional dyad of human/animal is a particularly charged site within discursive contests of power, and, moreover, that it entangles other culturally pervasive and powerful nexuses, such as white/black, male/female, heterosexual/homosexual, to name a just few. And so the exploration of *the* modern animal soon becomes a pluralized project, as from the story of Cincinnati Freedom alone, one might gather the animal is quite a mercurial category – a hydra-headed beast, at best.

In so doing, this project follows what is by now a sizable body of scholarship exploring the co-construction of human difference and species difference. Before there was an academic field identifiable as “critical animal studies,” in fact, a number of notable feminist scholars initiated this important work. Carol Adams delineated the interrelationships between gender oppression and non-human animal oppression,<sup>3</sup> for instance, and scholars such as Donna Haraway and Susanne Kappeler showed how the animal’s naturalization of gender roles was complicated by its figuration of racial difference within imperial projects and national imaginings.<sup>4</sup> As critical animal studies took shape as an interdisciplinary knowledge formation, critics like Cary Wolfe advanced the philosophical and political urgency of intersectional

analyses, stressing how “the institution of speciesism” grants “particular power and durability” to forms of human oppression.<sup>5</sup> And following these important precedents, there has been an exciting outpouring of productive work in recent years exploring how the “discourse of species” shapes human cultural politics, from Clare Kim’s account of “slaying the beast” to Nicole Shukin’s rendering of “animal capital.”<sup>6</sup>

*The Modern Animal* intervenes in this critical conversation by foregrounding the historical malleability of ideas of animality and the instability of the human-animal divide, which scholars have often reified in its Enlightenment formulation rather than examined in its historically specific articulations. Cary Wolfe’s influential encapsulation of the entailments of modern humanism is a case in point. In *Animal Rites*, a book that played an important role in introducing the question of the animal to literary and cultural studies, Wolfe argues that the “institution of speciesism” relies upon “the tacit agreement that the full transcendence of the ‘human’ requires the sacrifice of the ‘animal’ and the animalistic, which in turn makes possible a symbolic economy in which we can engage in what Derrida will call a ‘noncriminal putting to death’ of other humans ... by marking them animal.”<sup>7</sup> For Wolfe, the ontological distinction of the human is maintained primarily “by the capacity for language,”<sup>8</sup> which is denied the animal and/or animalized human other, who might accordingly be permissibly killed. In a later book, *Before the Law*, Wolfe acknowledges that the story may be somewhat more complicated.<sup>9</sup> The same society might spend billions of dollars on pets and slaughter billions of animals within factory farms every year. In discussing the biopolitics of non-human life, however, Wolfe carries over the same formulation of the human-animal divide. To account for the fact that actual interspecies relationships seem to exceed this understanding, he simply argues that for some reason, some animals find themselves on the “human” side of the line.

The collection of lectures entitled *The Animal that Therefore I Am* has been a recurrent touchstone within the field of critical animal studies, yet as exemplified by Wolfe's reading of Derrida, the pivotal way in which Derrida reconfigures the question of the animal has often been underappreciated. In *The Animal that Therefore I Am*, Derrida discusses how the Western philosophical tradition has secured the domain of the human with reference to the category of the animal. Through a close reading of philosophers from Kant, to Heidegger, to Levinas, to Lacan, Derrida shows their indebtedness to the Cartesian cogito to the extent they suggest that in contrast to the human, "the animal neither speaks nor responds."<sup>10</sup> Insofar as Derrida himself sometimes seems to specify a very un-Derridean origin of the human-animal divide in the thought of Descartes, he seems to sanction the way his work has been most often been applied. Yet Derrida's actual reading practice suggests how variously the animal's inability to respond might be configured, from Bentham's affirmation of human agency through the recognition of animal suffering to Levinas's refusal of the animal's face on the basis of its (lack of) ethical capacity. As I see it, one of Derrida's central philosophical interventions concerning the question of the animal – and indeed, the reassessment that allows him to show so many thinkers attributed with dismantling the grounds of the Enlightenment subject as rather shoring up the construct of the human – has been to dislodge the philosophical and political significance of the human "content" of rationality or communicable speech.

In applying this insight to cultural forms that exceed the Western philosophical tradition, this dissertation attempts to read the human-animal divide diachronically as well as synchronically. By mapping critical transformations in human-animal relationships in the transatlantic world from the early nineteenth century through the middle of the twentieth century, this dissertation examines how emergent material practices involving animals occasioned shifts

in prevailing cultural constructions of animality, and likewise, how a wide array of cultural forms and representational modes shaped the making of human-animal relations. In so doing, it argues that rapidly changing ideas of “the animal” were intimately bound up with historic shifts in the production of human difference, and that the structuration of U.S racialized heteropatriarchy is thus inextricably tied to the animal. In telling the story of the modern animal, then, this dissertation describes transformations in U.S. social formation as part of a history that is not human, or not solely.

More concretely, *The Modern Animal* follows four major emergences in interspecies relationships and practices, which it foregrounds as these developments are highly productive of contemporaneous constructions of animality. In tracking the beginnings of the early animal welfare movement, the rise of agribusiness, the origins of the conservation movement, and the expansion of the animal entertainment industry, this dissertation highlights how the animal accrues distinctive meanings within each of these developments. Over the course of this project, the animal appears as a sentient creature, possessing human capacities; an animal-machine, incapable of bodily pain; a savage beast, expressing violent instincts; and an image of autonomous existence, exempt from natural law. By exploring the wider ramifications of these cultural constructions of animality, this project shows how they are inextricably tied to transformations in U.S. racial formation, which include the following: the criminalization of blackness in the age of emancipation; the importation of a newly exploitable workforce from Asia after the formal end of racial slavery; the forgetting of Native genocide with the expansion of U.S. empire abroad; and the development of racial science and sexology over the interwar years. As the last instance suggests, while following shifts in U.S. racial formation, this exploration also records how ideas of animality inform the construction of gender and the

discourse of sexuality. In fact, this project identifies the animal as a particularly potent site through which power articulates its separate axes and achieves its totality.

While scholars often leave the “content” of the animal uninterrogated, particularly when exploring the dehumanization of persons, some literary and cultural critics have begun to register the malleability of ideas of animality. Most notably, Laura Brown has shown how the philosophical and scientific literature concerning non-human animal life and human-animal relationships tends to reductively polarize around two positions, opposing “anthropomorphism to alterity, or a human-associated to human-alienating approach to the nonhuman.”<sup>11</sup> In contrast to the representation of the animal within philosophical ethics or scientific ethology, Brown argues that “representations of animal-kind in ... literary culture” demonstrate a “tendency to surprise, to invert, to challenge, or to experiment with expected modes of order and stable structures of meaning.”<sup>12</sup> As Brown reads representations of the animal within eighteenth century British literature – even within the age of Enlightenment itself – ideas of animality “are flexible, complex, and resistant to a singular understanding of status or meaning.”<sup>13</sup>

Overlapping more closely with the temporal and geographical location of my own archive of nineteenth and twentieth-century trans-Atlantic literature and culture, a number of literary scholars have recently examined historically specific cultural constructions of animality that exceed the de facto philosophical formulation, even if they less often follow Brown in self-reflexively marking their intervention as such. Jennifer Mason, for instance, has argued that the late nineteenth century witnessed the phenomenon of the “civilized creature,” which this project likewise addresses in following the humanization of the animal within nineteenth century children’s literature.<sup>14</sup> While he does not discuss animal nature, per se, Mark Seltzer has observed the “denaturalization of nature” within naturalist literature, a representational mode

within which this project similarly finds the materialization of the non-human animal-machine.<sup>15</sup> Michael Lundblad has marked the popularization of “the discourse of the jungle” during the Progressive era, a discourse that this project corroborates in tracking representations of violent animality through sport hunting memoirs and conservationist texts.<sup>16</sup> Finally, scholars such as Carrie Rohman and Glenn Willmott have analyzed the animal within modernist representational forms, within which this project similarly locates the autonomous animal of the interwar period.<sup>17</sup> In fact, these scholars are among my central interlocutors, and have deeply impressed my understanding of the (re)making of animality over the course of political modernity. However, this project departs from these previous studies in two ways.

First, this project is genealogical rather than archeological. In other words, instead of excavating a single cultural construction of the animal specific to a given period, this project attempts to tell the history of the present by showing how available meanings of “the human” and “the animal” emerged within distinct historical situations. In drawing a genealogy of the modern animal, this project specifies a domain that is crossed by discontinuity, subject to the play of forces, and rife with historical reversals. While I subscribe to Foucault’s assertion that the past never imposes “a predetermined form on all its vicissitudes,”<sup>18</sup> I recalibrate Foucault’s approach to genealogy to attend more closely to continuities as well as displacements, historical antecedents as well as historical remainders. To borrow some terminology from Raymond Williams: this story of the modern animal is especially attuned to the long reverberations of “residual” formations and the deep rumblings of “emergent” formations within social material processes.<sup>19</sup>

Of course, one might easily speculate how any dominant configuration of animal life both responds to that which preceded it and conditions that which follows it: the growing recognition

of animal rights ultimately facilitates the increased disciplinary management of non-human animal bodies; the animal-machine that emerges within these disciplinary procedures occasions a melancholic response to the loss of the animal within modernity; the resulting recuperation of (violent) animality motivates practices that yield the autonomous animal of the interwar years. And yet, the long reach of “residual” formations and the deep roots of “emergent” formations within any cultural process discourage the attempt to draw a neatly segmented story of historical succession. In charting the course of specific constructions of animality, this dissertation demonstrates the widely overlapping intervals of their historical impact, revealing a particularly dense point of competing meanings around the turn of the twentieth century. The distinctive meanings of animality that this project traverses are more properly described as inextricably entangled parallel developments rather than runners in a historical relay. This dissertation thus eschews the attempt to draw causal connections and instead proceeds by way of overlay. The history that unfolds from this approach is most properly described as a palimpsest. Each representation of the animal that this dissertation describes will partially conceal, and in so doing, more fully reveal the others.

Beyond a commitment to genealogical analysis, this dissertation demonstrates a second methodological commitment to materialism, which, in this usage, denotes an attention to the materiality of the non-human world as well as the material relations between humans. While literary and cultural critics have granted greater attention to the various guises of animality, they have often honed this awareness by disregarding animals in actuality. For instance, Steven Baker separates the “representation” and “reality” of animals, suggesting that cultural ideas of animality “operate largely independently of the living animal,” as they are essentially stereotypes, which do not (and never have) corresponded “to some ‘truth’ of the animal.”<sup>20</sup>

Sharing this assumption, Michael Lundblad advocates for “animality studies” in lieu of “animal studies,” arguing that the concern with actual animals might be distinguished from the more significant question of “human cultural politics.”<sup>21</sup> Of course, I agree with Baker and Lundblad that cultural constructions of animality are ideological, and in this sense that they do not represent “real” animals. However, I do not find that ideologies of animality can be disaggregated from the real material conditions that shape and are shaped by them.

In Lundblad’s prioritization of human cultural politics over the lives of actual animals, one senses an embarrassed dismissal of the political stakes of non-human animal life. In some ways, I am actually sympathetic to Lundblad’s reluctance to entangle an interest in animalized persons with an interest in animals as such, as this kind of investigation presents a persistent danger of equating non-human and human forms of oppression in the process of discussing their interrelation. As problematically, one risks securing the ideological association of human others and animal others. Yet I would insist these outcomes are not inevitable, and in fact, the difficult work of understanding the articulation of human and non-human animal forms of exploitation and domination is essential to their undoing. At best, Lundblad’s approach prioritizes human politics so as to eschew sloppy analogies. At worst, this approach is profoundly – and effectively, if not intentionally – anthropocentric.

But further, the discourse analysis carried out by Lundblad accomplishes a kind of hypostatization of representation, eliding the materiality of human existence as much as non-human animal existence. In Lundblad’s analysis, “real social relations” are tantamount to linguistic and cultural processes, and the material world is reduced to the site of their inscription. Critical conversations ranging from affect studies to science studies have recently unsettled this premise, inaugurating a “new materialism” that attends to the agentic function of non-human

actants in the making of nature-cultures.<sup>22</sup> Building upon this scholarship, this project pursues a robust theorization of materiality along three investigative axes. First, it considers how embodied human affects shape interspecies relationships and practices. Second, it assembles the lives of actual animals as historical subjects who are impacted by and instrumental to social material processes. And finally, it attends to the materiality of language – the form as well as the content of the discourse of animality.

Among animal studies scholars, Alice Kuzniar and Colleen Glenney Boggs have anticipated this study in exploring the affective mediation of human-animal relations.<sup>23</sup> Kuzniar's examination of the human affects that permeate human-canine relationships is useful insofar as it explores a range of affective vectors, from enjoyment to melancholy to shame. Boggs's study, on the other hand, articulates a sophisticated theory of "biopolitical subjectivity" that identifies affect as "the mechanism for claims to ontological difference" between human and non-human animals.<sup>24</sup> According to Boggs, humans' affective engagement with animals helps to explain the contradictory attitudes towards animal life that Wolfe also observes, or the way in which the human-animal divide fails to align with the division between bios and zoë. In the pages to follow, I appreciatively borrow Boggs's insight into the centrality of affect to the establishment of the caesura in the biopolitical field. However, I complicate Boggs's contention that there are essentially "two poles to our affective engagement with animals: that of 'positive feelings' and that of violence."<sup>25</sup> Like Boggs, I show how subjective affects mediate the state's biopolitical management of non-human life. Like Kuzniar, I move beyond "positive feelings" to attend to negative affects such as shame and melancholia. Importantly, this dissertation underscores how affects are something more than feelings, describing how the embodied experience of interspecies relations shape and are shaped by often unarticulated human affects.

In addition to exploring how embodied human affects shape ideas of animality and activities involving animals, this study pursues a material history of non-human animal life as such. A number of cultural historians have provided important precedents for this undertaking. Erica Fudge has even outlined the essential components of a “holistic history” of non-human animals, which this project aims to realize, and which number the following: 1) charting the history of ideas about animals; 2) addressing the material relations within which those representations are grounded; and 3) showing that “the human is only ever meaningful when understood in relation to the not-human.”<sup>26</sup> Harriet Ritvo’s *The Animal Estate* and Kathleen Kete’s *The Beast and the Boudoir* are two studies that beautifully exemplify this “holistic history.” But the rarity of work like theirs points towards the vexing methodological difficulties encumbering the history of animal life, which it may be worth addressing here.

Most obviously, animals do not represent themselves within the textual forms that usually comprise the historical archive. As Fudge puts it, “a dog can bark, and that bark can be recorded, documented, but it cannot be understood. The only documents available to the historian in any field are documents written, or spoken, by humans.”<sup>27</sup> Beyond the lack of a linguistic archive constituted by non-human animals themselves, another epistemological problem burdens the attempt to read against the grain to summon the lived experiences of non-human animals. For in exploring the history of non-human animal life, one must ask, in the words of Thomas Nagel, “What it is like to be a bat?” In the landmark essay by this title, Nagel argues that one might infer that bats possess consciousness, but that this is something very different from deducing the conscious experience of bats. We can hardly imagine the phenomenology of echolocation, for instance, or the experience of detecting the world through the reflection of one’s own high frequency shrieks. As Nagel writes, “bat sonar, though clearly a form of perception, is not

similar in its operation to any sense that we possess, and there is no reason to suppose that it is subjectively like anything we can experience or imagine.”<sup>28</sup> This problem of non-human phenomenology, as much as the problem of language, plagues the historian of animal life.

Perhaps for this reason, historians who address human-animal relationships and interspecies practices tend to describe their projects as histories of human attitudes towards animals and/or histories of human instrumentalization of animals. Even Erica Fudge’s useful criterion for a holistic history of animal life characterizes material relations involving actual animals in this way: “Animals are present in most Western cultures for practical use, and it is in use ... that representations must be grounded.”<sup>29</sup> If the human “practical use” of animals suffices as the limit of historical investigation, however, the animal never emerges as a historical subject. Susan Nance expressly articulates the assumption shared by many historians in her nonetheless excellent history of circus elephants. Cautioning against attributing anything like “agency” to elephants, Nance observes that elephants “do not comprehend human constructs like ‘capitalism’; they do not perceive ‘race,’ ‘class,’ or ‘gender ... so it is problematic to argue that they resist these human things.”<sup>30</sup> Because the first circus elephants “had no understanding of the human cultures that created their captivity in the United States,” according to Nance, “they could not possess any (human) social and political power.”<sup>31</sup> While Nance admits that elephants are capable of bucking their immediate conditions of existence, they do not participate in the wider field of human cultural politics that she describes.

I cannot help but think of Cincinnati Freedom’s incredible leap over a five-foot fence and eleven day escapade in Mount Storm Park. Did the cow comprehend the cultural meanings that she circulated? With Nance, I would venture that she did not. However, the cultural impacts of this particular cow were more than a consequence of her (human) instrumentalization. In

escaping from the slaughterhouse, Cincinnati Freedom comprehended enough about the practice of slaughter to actively resist it, and in so doing, she shaped the course of human cultural politics. To say this contribution does not count because it was not intended or understood betrays an attachment to liberal volunteerism. But as importantly, I think, to say that non-human animals do not knowingly navigate human cultures does not mean they do not knowingly negotiate their own forms of sociality as they are shaped by interspecies relationships and practices. I hardly think the following pages accomplish as much, but as an aspirational endeavor, I imagine an interspecies history that would attend to shifts in non-human animal sociality as well as and in relation to human ideas and practices. In reading Theodore Roosevelt's copious hunting memoirs, for instance, one observes a number of changes in non-human animal migratory patterns and animal behavior, which by no long stretch of the imagination, are complex non-human negotiations of white settlement and species depletion. If this project's insights into the lived experiences of non-human animals are necessarily limited, at the very least, I attempt to position animals as historical subjects, rather than objects.

This approach to the history of non-human animals might be called *ethological historiography*, adapting Susan McHugh's proposal of "narrative ethology" as a methodology for literary studies. As McHugh repurposes the scientific study of animal behavior (ethology) to excavate human-animal relations through reading literature (narrative ethology), she demonstrates an admirable attention to the material conditions of non-human animal life, resisting the more common focus on animality exemplified above. For McHugh, the task for the literary critic "concerns the interrelations of the representational forms and material conditions of species life."<sup>32</sup> Instead of regarding representations of animals in literature as merely metaphors for human difference or as the discursive detritus of liberalism's universal subject, McHugh's

“narrative ethology” explores how textual practices represent actual animals, and in so doing, how they open new possibilities for interspecies relationships. As I appreciatively draw upon McHugh’s approach, I make some adaptations to her execution of narrative ethology to yield slightly different results. The accent of McHugh’s analysis falls upon the agency of literary forms in paving the way for new interspecies practices. Conversely, I attempt to remain equally attuned to the agency of interspecies practices in shaping literary forms. Second, McHugh establishes what I believe is a false opposition between analyzing the figure of the animal and attending to the actual lives of animals. In so doing, she privileges realist representational forms and relies upon an implicit empiricism in reading them. In contrast, my reading practice attempts to reveal the trace of the animal within a number of figurative uses and across a variety of representational modes.

Overall, this dissertation attempts to underscore how nature-cultures are shaped by embodied experiences and widely distributed agencies that exceed the work of human discourse or the limits of human subjectivity. At the same time, this prioritization of materiality does not foreclose but rather focuses attention on the material forms of language itself. In fact, this dissertation shows how representational innovations and formal adaptations are inextricably bound up with the developments it describes. The animal autobiography’s rewriting of the slave narrative, for instance, was instrumental to the humanization of the animal and the circumscription of black humanity in the post-Reconstruction era. The exhaustive surface description of naturalist literature was crucial to the making of the animal-machine within its pages and the representation of the Chinese migrant worker as infinitely exploitable. The “nature faker” debate of the first decade of the twentieth century, which concerned the proper way of writing natural history, secured the ascendancy of violent animality that was widely appropriated

in the performance of white masculinity during the Progressive era. And modernist representational strategies of abstraction helped to circulate an idea of animality freed from any constraint, an expression of which might be found in the fascist instrumentation of excess.

In reading the politics of literary form, I have often observed semiotics at work, which I will more thoroughly explore when this dissertation becomes a book. For present purposes, it suffices to state that representations of human difference through the figure of the animal cannot always be described as metaphoric. Rather, the figure of the animal employs a variety of tropological functions, ranging from anthropomorphism to catachresis. At the risk of being overly schematic, I want to venture that distinctive cultural constructions of animality tend towards governing tropological usages. Literary anthropomorphism is perhaps most obviously tied to an actual attribution of human characteristics to animals; metonymic uses of the animal seem to characterize the figuration of transnational labor by the animal-machine; metaphoric displacement is crucial to the white masculine assumption of violent animality; and the modernist works that I explore both revel in catachrestic representations, but to very different ends: Ernest Hemingway does so to elide the material body of the animal, while Djuna Barnes uses catachresis to interrupt the false sense of totality so often summoned through the animal. In future iterations of this study, I hope to unpack the implications of specific tropological usages more fully than present purposes allow. The chapters that follow nonetheless attend to the figure of the animal as much the literary form in which the animal appears, while following Shukin's injunction to query the figure's implications for animal flesh.

The first chapter, "Pets and Punishment," considers nineteenth century children's literature as generative of a widening recognition of animal sentience. The chapter begins with a discussion of Jacksonian-era anti-cruelty lessons, which subject the future citizen to new

disciplinary tactics while imagining the citizen-subject in exclusionary terms. In mid-century abolitionist writing for children, in contrast, the anti-cruelty lesson encourages the kind treatment of animals while simultaneously advocating the emancipation of slaves through figurative uses of anthropomorphism. As the chapter demonstrates, the increasing ascription of “humanity” to animals, a trend that derives from the figurative use of anthropomorphism and culminates with the emergence of the early animal welfare movement, ultimately contributes to new modes of racial management in the aftermath of slavery. The chapter concludes with an exploration of the so-called animal autobiography, a transatlantic children’s genre that promotes animal welfare. The reading of animal autobiography shows how *Black Beauty* (1877) and less well-known examples of the genre adapt the conventions of the slave narrative in order to “domesticate” the claim to human freedom.

The second chapter, “The Incorporation of the Animal,” demonstrates how the Cartesian understanding of the animal as an automaton was revived within disciplinary procedures implicating animal life at the height of industrial capitalism. Of the many material practices and institutional forms that were productive of the concept of the animal-machine, this chapter focuses on farming technologies that ushered in the rise of agribusiness, representational modes of naturalist literature, and stop-motion photography. In Eadweard Muybridge’s famous study conducted at the University of Pennsylvania, *Animal Locomotion* (1887), stop-motion photography’s mechanization of the animal body constructs the laboring, racialized body as insensate and infinitely exploitable, while it simultaneously occasions a crisis in political liberalism’s positioning of the female body as a site of recuperation from the ravages of industrial capitalism. The tension between the animal-machine’s gendered and racial deployments resurfaces in Frank Norris’s *The Octopus* (1901). The novel’s portrayal of

racialized labor employs a metonymic slide between the Chinese migrant worker and the work animal, namely, the plow horse, indicating how the exploitation of human labor is legitimated by the denaturalization and mechanization of the non-human animal body. Thus the chapter shows how the concept of the animal-machine facilitated the global expansion of capital and the importation of transnational labor as a newly exploitable workforce after the formal end of slavery.

The third chapter, "Primitive Accumulations," explores the positioning of the animal as a site of human freedom over the course of the Progressive era. Beginning with the so-called nature faker controversy, a national dispute over the aptitudes of animal life, and proceeding to Theodore Roosevelt's early hunting writings, the first part of this chapter examines the growing conflation of animality and savagery in the American popular imagination. While other scholars have explored how Roosevelt's white masculine recuperation of savage animality legitimated racialized violence and imperial expansion, this section further foregrounds how the embodied experience of hunting and eating animals mediated Roosevelt's identification with animality. Underlining the interrelationships between material and ideational incorporation, this section draws upon psychoanalysis to show the white masculine cooptation of animality as a materially enacted, melancholic response to the multifaceted "loss" of the animal within modernity. At the same time it suggests that Freudian theory itself displays a melancholic repudiation of animal sacrifice within "civilization." This chapter locates the origins of the early conservation movement in the complicated entanglement of racial melancholia and the melancholic relationship to the loss of animal life. In reading conservationists including but not limited to Roosevelt and George Bird Grinnell, the chapter shows how the genocide of Indigenous populations is ideationally refused and elided through conservation's actual preservation of

animal populations. The chapter concludes by meditating on the biopolitical ramifications of conservation's intensified management of non-human animal life for both human and non-human animals.

The fourth chapter, "The Art of Animality," highlights the co-constitutive relationship between a distinctly modernist articulation of the primitive and the popularization of mass entertainments involving animals. To explore the relationship between modernist primitivism and the animal entertainment industry is not simply a question of aesthetics, however, but is also an investigation of what Walter Benjamin calls the aestheticization of politics. Indeed, this chapter argues that the aestheticization of politics might as properly be termed the *animalization of politics*, as the commodification of animal life in the context of the commercial spectacle plays a crucial role in the spectral reemergence of the aura in the age of mechanical reproducibility. Significantly, as this chapter demonstrates how the aura is constitutively animal, it suggests that the aura is constitutively racial, given the animal's role signification of racial meaning. As this chapter illuminates how modern forms of animal entertainment contribute to the production of racial meaning, it posits the modern spectacle of the animal as part of the conditions of possibility for the rise of European fascism while illuminating the interwar articulation of racial nationalism in the American cultural imagination.

The fifth chapter on the Harlem Renaissance that I had originally planned has been postponed past the dissertation stage of this project due to time constraints. And there are many additional ways this dissertation will take shape in future iterations, of course, no doubt ways I can't predict. Some possible areas of elaboration are readily visible to me even now, however. In attempting to map shifts in prevailing cultural constructions of animality, I have often focused on expressions of cultural dominance and paid shorter shrift to modes of cultural resistance. To

correct for this tendency and to complicate my accounts, I now recognize the appositeness of a reading of Charles Chesnut's "The Goophered Grapevine" (1887) alongside the consideration of agribusiness and racialized farm labor in the second chapter, for instance, or a discussion of Charles Alexander Eastman's *The Red Hunters and the Animal People* (1904) alongside the analysis of sport hunting, conservation, and settler colonialism in the third chapter. In looking forward to another iteration of this project, I also hope to address the early modern animal. I imagine this book should actually begin with the "malevolent animal" of colonial America, and so I am currently toying with an opening chapter on captivity narratives by Mary Rowlandson, Cotton Mather, and others. Although the completion of this project may be some years in the making, the chapters that follow already pursue its defining questions and advance its central interventions.

*The Modern Animal* confounds the dichotomization of modernity and animality, nature and culture, human and non-human, as it explores the modern developments that entangle non-human animal life in spite (or Bruno Latour would say because) of that enabling opposition.<sup>33</sup> While this dissertation underscores the unmediated materiality of the body as well as the agentive function of the nonhuman world within these developments, it simultaneously demonstrates the malleability of ideas of animality and the instability of the human-animal divide in relation to them. Ultimately, *The Modern Animal* displays the fungible workings of power through species difference and across species lines within nineteenth and early twentieth-century configurations of U.S. racialized hetero-patriarchy. In so doing, it raises the legacies of these inhuman histories in the present, and gestures towards alternative interspecies futures.

## Chapter 1: Pets and Punishment

*“We have begun by attending to the condition of slaves; we shall finish by softening that of all the animals which assist our labours or supply our wants.”*

Jeremy Bentham, *Principles of Penal Law* (1843)

Any given day at Washington Corrections Center for Women (WCCW), one might meet with dogs in the lobby of the prison, either passing through security or returning from the prison yard with their plantigrade companions. These four-footed frequenters of the carceral space in Gig Harbor are the beneficiaries of a non-profit called Prison-Pet Partnership (PPP), which runs an animal training program, a grooming service, and a boarding facility, all operating within the walls of WCCW, and all functioning through the labor of the women who are incarcerated there. While PPP is the only pet-related non-profit organization in Washington that bases its work solely inside the walls of a prison, almost every prison in the state houses some kind of animal training program, albeit these are often side-projects of animal shelters or training centers with a much wider operational purview. These programs are a growing phenomenon across the U.S., in fact, and like PPP, they typically aim to teach prisoners how to train service animals and/or show prisoners how to socialize rescue animals so they might be successfully placed in adoptive homes.

The animal-focused programs boast benefits for incarcerated persons, as well. As Prison-Pet Partnership’s website relays, the program “gives inmates the opportunity to learn valuable pet industry-related vocational skills to use in finding employment when they resume their lives outside of prison.”<sup>1</sup> Incarcerated employees of PPP might even gain Pet Care Technician Certification through the American Boarding Kennels Association, and in addition to learning industry standards for training, boarding, and grooming dogs, incarcerated women who work

with PPP might also gain clerical skills by working in the organization's on-site office. The program intends a more foundational education for its human participants than the simple acquisition of job skills, however. As the Washington Department of Corrections communicates the mission of the multiple animal training programs inside Washington State prisons, they "teach the offenders responsibility and provide an incentive to maintain positive behavior while incarcerated."<sup>2</sup> In short, these programs serve the dual purpose of "rehabilitating" offenders and disciplining (mostly) dogs into safe pets or serviceable animals. Put simply, pet-keeping practices in prison intend the "obedience training" of incarcerated persons as much as the animals with whom they work.

All of the dogs participating in the training program of Prison-Pet Partnership are obtained through animal rescue organizations or private persons seeking to "rehome" their pet, so that these animals might "lead lives of service rather than be destroyed." This method of recruitment is particularly noteworthy, as the chances of actually discovering suitable service animals in this manner are extremely low: a potential service dog should be young, healthy, unwary and unaggressive, eliminating 95% of the dogs that one might find in animal shelters, according to some estimates.<sup>3</sup> Of the few animals actually selected for the program, only one out of every fifteen to twenty dogs has the temperament and intelligence necessary to qualify as a service or therapy dog. However, PPP is commendably committed to saving even those animals who do not qualify. As PPP believes that "all of the animals brought into the program for training are all in need of a second chance,"<sup>4</sup> the animals who are unsuited for service undergo basic obedience training, after which they are placed in adoptive homes as "paroled pets."

In Prison Pet Partnership's quarterly newsletter, one might peruse the pets up for "parole," who seem all the more loveable for their imperfections. In their (usually) first-person

adoption ads, paroled pets are unstinting in stating the accommodations that their future owners will have to make for them, given their forgivable foibles. A calico cat named Zoey will need her “litterbox to be cleaned out everyday” if one wishes to avoid passive-aggressive accidents, but “what lady wouldn’t want a nice clean bathroom?”<sup>5</sup> A dog named Rebel has “some fear issues in new situations,” but he is “definitely making progress.”<sup>6</sup> Another dog named Freya admits, “I may bark and growl and even snap a little, but I have never actually bitten anyone,” so she has high hopes for a new home.<sup>7</sup> In fact, every paroled pet dreams of a family just like that of Quinn the dog, a successfully-placed parolee whose “new parents treat him like the King he thinks he is” – they even take him to Mexico! – confirmed by a snapshot of Quinn’s beachside doggy shenanigans, featured in the Winter 2010 newsletter.<sup>8</sup>

For animal kind, this is all well and good. But the commitment to non-human animal life on the part of Prison-Pet Partnership raises some troubling discrepancies with the commitment to human life on the part of the carceral state. Even though pets are successfully “paroled” by PPP despite these animals’ sometimes enduring behavioral problems, the elimination of parole for human prisoners sentenced to life in Washington State has persisted since 1993. Despite many Washingtonians’ belief that all non-human animals are in need of a “second chance,” humans who receive “three strikes” in this state are counted “out” for life: in fact, Washington was the first state to enact three strikes legislation. Although a criminal court in Vancouver, Washington might issue a cutesy juror badge to a service dog (and PPP graduate) named Parker,<sup>9</sup> such forms of civic participation are rescinded upon felony conviction in many places across the U.S. So how does one make sense of the disparities between the mobility, place-ability, and esteem-ability of prison pets and human prisoners? How does the concern for animal life – the

recognition of the “humanity” of animals – get tied up with the dehumanization of persons? And how do pets come to figure within modern forms of punishment in the first place?

To answer these questions, I turn to a somewhat unintuitive archive. This chapter takes nineteenth century American children’s literature as its central concern, as the early anti-cruelty lesson for children forged the disciplinary uses of pet-keeping practices that one might still perceive in the animal training programs in U.S. prisons. Following transformations in representations of animals in children’s literature, from early didactic lessons through abolitionist juvenile fiction to the popularization of the animal autobiography as a genre, this chapter advances the claim that over the course of the nineteenth century, the animal capable of feeling bodily pain became an animal capable of human feeling within the American cultural imaginary. Distinguishing between anthropomorphism as a literary trope and anthropomorphism as the literalizing attribution of human characteristics to animals, this chapter finds that the increasing use of the former within children’s literature contributed to cultural pervasiveness of the latter. Most importantly, it argues that shifts in the meaning of animal sentience participated in formulating new ideas of race that have their legacy in the contemporary criminalization of racialized persons.

In pursuing this argument, this chapter explores the politics of nineteenth-century feeling in relationship to non-human animal life. The scholarly interest in nineteenth-century forms of sentimentality, inaugurated by the defining debate between Ann Douglas and Jane Thomkins and more recently reinvigorated by the affective turn in cultural studies,<sup>10</sup> has illuminated not only the politics of feeling but also the historical roles of the primary “subjects” and “objects” of sentiment: those who fail to match the implicit material embodiment of the abstract universal human subject. Countless critics, for instance, have reworked the feminist critique of the

ideology of separate spheres, exploring the very public effects of women's private feelings.<sup>11</sup> Scholars have also explored the emergence of the bourgeois category of the child over the course of the nineteenth century, noting how Calvinistic notions of childhood depravity gave way to an increasingly sentimentalized figure marked not by original sin but by primordial innocence.<sup>12</sup> Finally, critical conversations have described how the cult of sentimentality informed debates about slavery, observing both the power of sentiment as a tool for social change and the regressive effects, for instance, of the identificatory relays that elide the suffering of the slave with the subjectivity of the sentimental onlooker.<sup>13</sup> Until quite recently, however, this wide-ranging scholarly debate has largely ignored how animals became enmeshed in nineteenth-century networks of feeling, and moreover, how the recognition of animal sentience structured the uses and effects of sentiment by and for human actors: particularly, women, children, and the enslaved. Building upon work by Jennifer Mason, Colleen Glenney Boggs, and Bridgette Fielder, among others, this chapter extends a burgeoning scholarly conversation about nineteenth-century feelings about animals as well as feelings ascribed to animals.<sup>14</sup>

As this chapter brings a consideration of the animal to bear on conversations about nineteenth-century feeling, it likewise brings a consideration of racial formation to bear on accounts of the early animal welfare movement. As several scholars have noted in passing, the rise of the early animal welfare movement followed in the wake of racial slavery, or better, appears to have rooted in the soil of abolitionist arguments.<sup>15</sup> However, the relationship between the emergence of a recognizable animal welfare movement and transformations in nineteenth-century racial formation has remained largely under-theorized. James Turner explains the investment of sympathy in animals as the channeling of a flood of nineteenth-century feeling towards a reactionary end: "kindness to animals profaned no social taboos and upset no

economic apple-carts, either in the theoretical systems of political economics or in the harsh daily encounter of capital and labor.”<sup>16</sup> Susan Pearson complicates this argument by suggesting the humane movement’s particular brand of sentimental liberalism allowed for the expansion of state power through the proliferation of private associations.<sup>17</sup> Even as I concur with the central insights of these historians, I underscore how sympathy for animals facilitated the entrenchment of the middle class and the expansion of disciplinary power *in relationship to debates about the institution of slavery and the fate of the formerly enslaved*.

The above epigraph intimates some of the relationships between nineteenth-century animal advocacy and racial projects that this chapter will more fully interrogate and explicate. In Bentham’s thinking, “softening” the lot of animals – particularly those animals “which assist our labours or supply our wants” – is likened to “attending to the condition of slaves.”<sup>18</sup> The statement is fascinating in its ambiguity: Does the consideration of both animal and slave proceed from the desire to end their suffering or from the wish to “soften” it while “supply[ing] our wants” more effectively? Does Bentham elevate the animal or degrade the enslaved in making a comparison – one might even read an equivalence – between the two? Does the welfare of animals arise as the next order of business following the “finishing” of the condition of slavery, or does the concern for animal welfare “finish” the concern for the condition of the enslaved? This chapter will explore these questions and others as it maps the relationships between feelings about animals and feelings about the enslaved in the American nineteenth century. In so doing, it highlights the need for critical animal studies as well as contemporary forms of animal advocacy beyond the university to interrogate the racial projects of their roots, and specifically, to move beyond a rights-based framework to interrupt the historical legacies of human and non-human oppression in the present moment.

In an effort to attend to emergent as well as dominant structures of feeling, this chapter begins its exploration well before the formal legislation and political organization for the protection of animals. It turns to children's literature, specifically, as anti-cruelty literature written for children was highly generative of the concomitant shifts in the notions of animality and particularizations of racial meaning that this chapter explores. This body of literature antedated and in many ways inaugurated the early animal welfare movement, while childhood education remained a central aim of animal welfare throughout the flurry of legal and legislative activity in the later nineteenth century that often anchors histories of humane advocacy. Telling the history of the humane movement through children's literature thus productively reconfigures its purview and periodization, and ultimately, allows a more thoroughgoing analysis of the relationship between the emergence of animal welfare and the formal end of racial slavery. Finally, reading the history of early animal welfare advocacy through children's literature sheds new light on the co-construction of nineteenth century childhood and animality.

It is not difficult to discern the ideological aims and disciplinary functions of many books written for children – they are, after all, written for children. And while there are noteworthy exceptions, critics of juvenile literature have often both underplayed and exploited this circumstance, yielding readily available analyses of structures of dominance that cast children's literature as reflective of dominant ideologies rather than effective in historical transformations. In contrast, this chapter emphasizes how the material forms of nineteenth-century children's literature actively contributed to transformations in U.S. racial formation. Through its humanization of the animal, American children's literature ultimately emerges as a curious cradle for an increasingly virulent discourse of black criminality crucial to the reconsolidation of white hegemony after the formal end of racial slavery. What follows is this not so simple story.

## Animal Pedagogies

In May 1775, *Pennsylvania Magazine* published a poem attributed to Thomas Paine, then editor of the journal. Entitled “Cruelty to Animals Exposed: Occasioned by a Real Circumstance,” the poem narrates the brutal treatment of a kitten by a “wretch” whom “pale disease had wither’d half away.”<sup>19</sup> Shaking with “pain and palsy,”<sup>20</sup> the wretch carries an obliviously purring kitten to the butchery on the outskirts of town. His malicious purpose is to throw the kitten to the dogs: “To see her living mangled limb from limb / Tho' scarce alive himself, was joy to him.”<sup>21</sup> As the wretch sets the dogs on the kitten, the speaker of the poem interposes, using a walking stick to drive the dogs away, though the speaker recognizes that “Dogs will be dogs, and act as nature taught / Murder with them is merit, not a fault.”<sup>22</sup> The dogs, once the kitten escapes, finally turn upon the wretch, who is killed in what the reader is invited to conclude is a just end.

Prior to the end of the eighteenth century, such admonitions against cruelty to animals were extremely rare. Though often protected from injury by their owners’ self-interest, early modern animals routinely – or perhaps more indicatively – publically suffered treatment that would be appalling to modern sensibilities.<sup>23</sup> However, if the poem seems to mark an emergent recognition of animal sentience, it does not equate animal with human feeling. Though recognizing that the kitten will experience pain in being “mangled limb from limb,” the speaker emphatically denies that the dogs might be capable of feeling what the speaker feels, i.e., pity for the kitten. The dogs merely “act as nature taught,” and the moral censure of the poem is reserved for the wretch, notwithstanding his propensity for cruelty might be correlated to his decrepit condition. “Cruelty to Animals Exposed” is typical in this regard: if the poem takes up the cause

of anti-cruelty, it defines cruelty as the infliction of bodily pain. If it asserts the animal is capable of feeling, it circumscribes the feeling of the animal to physical sensation.

In the year after Thomas Paine's poem was published in *Pennsylvania Magazine*, the first book-length treatment advocating kindness to animals appeared across the Atlantic. Rev. Dr. Humphrey Primatt's *A Dissertation on the Duty of Mercy and Sin of Cruelty to Brute Animals* (1776) forcefully repudiated the Cartesian idea that animals are insensate machines inured to pain or pleasure. Primatt asserts:

“superiority of rank or station exempts no creature from the sensibility of pain, nor does inferiority render the feelings thereof the less exquisite. Pain is pain, whether it be inflicted on man or on beast; and the creature that suffers it, whether man or beast, being sensible of the misery of it while it lasts, suffers evil.”<sup>24</sup>

Like Paine, Primatt defines animal sentience as the capacity to feel bodily suffering. Even as the experience of pain is something of an equalizer, oblivious to “rank or station,” this is not to say that animals are equal to humans; rather, “inferiority” does not preclude susceptibility to physical misery. More explicitly than does “Cruelty to Animals Exposed,” even, Primatt's dissertation differentiates between the capacities of humans and animals to affirm a natural hierarchy of being.

At the threshold of political modernity, the social mores of the rising middle-class began to prohibit cruelty to animals. As the examples above would indicate, however, this acknowledgement of the “rights” of animals looked very different from the assumptions that undergird contemporary animal rights advocacy. Animals required consideration, not liberation: they were thought to be simultaneously vulnerable to bodily pain and deficient in cognitive and emotional capacities resembling those of humans. Far from showing a kind of seepage of the

newly trumpeted “rights of man” across species lines, the attributes that animals were first granted little resemble those of the universal human subject. Perhaps this is nowhere more evident than in Jeremy Bentham’s *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (1789), which famously suggests that animals’ intellectual capacity – elsewhere the precondition for entering political community – is irrelevant in determining their proper treatment: “The question is not, can they reason? Nor, can they talk, but, can they suffer?”<sup>25</sup>

If the perception of animals’ susceptibility to physical suffering cannot be explained as the rights of the liberal individual drifting with the sea change of the bourgeois state, the liberal individual was still somehow at issue in the increasing preoccupation with the right treatment of animals by the turn of the nineteenth century. As a number of cultural historians have argued, the keeping of domestic animals, in particular, was critical to the construction of a superior moral economy of private life alternative to the public realm of production. Kathleen Kete’s landmark study of pet-keeping in nineteenth-century Paris, for instance, argues that bourgeois pet-keeping practices “imagined a better, more manageable version of the world,” relieving “the pressures of contemporary life” through the “elaborate construction ... [of a] world of affect and fantasy.”<sup>26</sup> In exploring the history of pet-keeping in the American context, Katherine Grier contends that nineteenth-century household animals permitted this imagining insofar as they could be made to signify “nature domesticated.”<sup>27</sup> In other words, household animals epitomized the peculiar “nature” of the private sphere, both cultivated and organic, neither touched by the man-made world of commerce and industry nor equivalent to the Hobbesian state of nature. As nineteenth-century domestic animals afforded neither practical use nor economic gain, even while they accumulated affective investments, they facilitated the “construction of middle-class identity based on interior qualities of mind,” as Jennifer Mason puts it.<sup>28</sup> Thus domestic animals provided

a necessary palliative to a society both committed to laissez-faire capitalism and disturbed by its social consequences. The attention to the *welfare* of domestic animals, I want to underscore, was particularly critical to this construction of human interiority exceeding or opposing the self-interested intentions of the possessive individual. Put simply, anti-cruelty sentiment helped to anchor the liberal individual's moral centeredness within a fast-changing, self-interested world.

But kindness to animals served as an exercise in as well as an emblem of the virtue of the bourgeois individual. The right treatment of animals acquired a pedagogical function by the end of the eighteenth century, as new ideas of personhood accompanied the spread of liberal political philosophy. The Calvinist notion that humans are inherently sinful was supplanted with the Lockean idea that the human is a "blank slate" that might be inscribed with an upstanding character at an early age.<sup>29</sup> Accordingly, efforts to extirpate or subjugate the depraved nature of children through corporal punishment gave way to what Richard Brodhead calls "disciplinary intimacy."<sup>30</sup> Expanding Foucault's theorization of modern political technologies that operate not through the infliction of physical pain but through the instruction of "the soul," Brodhead has argued that new forms of discipline abdicated the rod and enmeshed the child within "strong bonds of love" to better inculcate social norms and imperatives. If nineteenth century parents and educators effected a "superior introjection of authority with humanization's aid,"<sup>31</sup> though, this "humanization" implicated non-human animals within a larger disciplinary matrix.

As several scholars have observed, the inculcation of kindness to animals became a central tactic of new forms of childhood education,<sup>32</sup> while less often noted, new forms of childhood education were highly productive of a wider cultural endorsement of kindness to animals. Significantly, the integration of humane lessons into childhood education efforts long predates the legislative action and formal organization that so often dominates histories of the

early humane movement. Indeed, some of the earliest affirmations of animal sentience occur within the discourse of child development. John Locke's *Thoughts on Education* (1693), for instance, recommends the role that animals would increasingly play in the education of the bourgeois individual. Although Locke elsewhere asserts that "brutes ... are not capable of comparing and comprehending ... ideas,"<sup>33</sup> he nonetheless urges that "children should from the beginning be bred up in abhorrence of killing and tormenting any living creature," as cruelty to animals eventually hardens the heart against our "own kind."<sup>34</sup> By the early nineteenth century, American authors such as Lydia Sigourney, Lydia Maria Child, and Sarah Josepha Hale regularly recapitulated the Lockean injunction within parenting manuals,<sup>35</sup> arguing that benevolence to animals, in the words of Lydia Sigourney's *Letters to Mothers* (1838), is "the moral code of infancy" that lays "the foundation for a future superstructure of virtue."<sup>36</sup>

Within a number of newly materializing literary forms intended for children, as well, lessons concerning the proper care of animals aimed to ensure the viability of democratic institutions through the moral formation of future citizens. In Catherine Maria Sedgwick's instructional narrative *Home* (1835), for instance, a lesson on kindness to animals scaffolds a tutorial on the self-governance of the liberal individual. In a chapter entitled "A Glimpse at Family Government," four-year-old Haddy Barclay cuts a hole in her brother Wallace's kite so that her Maltese kitten might wear it like an Elizabethan ruff. The game is interrupted when Wallace enters the parlor: "The kite was the finest he had ever possessed," so in perceiving "the indignity to which it was subjected," Wallace loses his temper, seizes the kitten, and dashes it into a nearby tub of scalding water.<sup>37</sup> The elder Barclay brother Charles attempts to rescue the kitten "at the risk of his own hand," but "seeing its agony, with most characteristic consideration, he gently dropped it in again, and thus put the speediest termination to its sufferings."<sup>38</sup> Having

witnessed the scene, the father of the family, Mr. Barclay, sends Wallace to his room with these words: ““You have forfeited your right to a place among us. Creatures who are the slaves of their passions, are, like beasts of prey, fit only for solitude.”<sup>39</sup> Through his “murderous cruelty to an innocent animal,”<sup>40</sup> Mr. Barclay indicates, Wallace loses his claim to property and community, for he has indulged his passions *in the manner of an animal*.

In this lesson, the demonstration of benevolence to animals is what distinguishes children *from* animals, who have no capacity to act contrary to their passions, according to Mr. Barclay. While Colleen Glenney Boggs has acknowledged that children’s exercise of kindness to animals “makes them human stewards of animals and [thus] marks their separation” from animals within the Lockean educational tradition,<sup>41</sup> she accents how “the affective relationship between human beings and animals [both] founds and confounds the parameters of liberal subject formation,”<sup>42</sup> as humane education also encouraged children to identify with animals. Boggs’s exploration of the potentials of pet-keeping pedagogies to trouble the human-animal distinction is particularly useful in reading later nineteenth-century iterations of the anti-cruelty lesson, but the insistence of the human-animal distinction in the earliest lessons on kindness to animals precludes this possibility. In Sedgwick’s *Home*, in any case, benevolence to animals is not based on the animal’s likeness to the human, but rather is predicated on the human’s differentiation from the animal, and indeed, intends to instate that distinction. The kitten seems equal to its bodily existence, which Charles thus unhesitatingly ends (by transcending his own bodily sensitivity to scalding water) in the effort to “put the speediest termination to its sufferings.”<sup>43</sup> Instead of meting out corporal punishment to mirror Wallace’s infliction of physical pain, the Barclays sentence their son to solitude, as they “took care not to make rewards and punishments out of eating and drinking, and thus associate the duties and pleasures of a moral being with a mere

animal gratification.”<sup>44</sup> When Wallace finally overcomes his animality, holding his temper when some schoolmates provoke him several weeks later, he is welcomed back into the fold of the family, and as importantly, into the body of the nation. As Mr. Barclay explains to Wallace, “Americans ... [are] compelled from childhood to govern their tempers,”<sup>45</sup> as “the only effectual and lasting government ... is *self-government*.”<sup>46</sup> Having learned this lesson of self-discipline, Wallace is no longer subjected to the discipline of his family, and steps up to the status of an American citizen-subject, worthy keeper of prized kites (among other possessions).

The anti-cruelty lesson of *Home* reflects the widely shared aspiration of early children’s literature to ensure the viability of public institutions through the cultivation of private virtue. Early children’s books often doubled as parenting manuals, as Sedgwick’s *Home* attests. One of the most popular juvenile books of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, Sarah Kirby Trimmer’s *Fabulous Histories* (1786), aptly subtitled, *Designed for the Instruction of Children, Respecting Their Treatment of Animals*, also outlines disciplinary procedures for parents as much as correct behavior for children. The children’s book splits its attention between a robin family and the Benson family: as the parent birds guide their chicks through a number of early trials and temptations, until they literally become full-fledged adults, Mrs. Benson likewise shapes the character formation of her two children, Harriet and Frederick, chiefly through lessons on kindness to animals. Despite the concurrent education of the chicks and the children in its pages, *Fabulous Histories* forestalls any confusion of the former with the latter. While children occupy a liminal space between human and animal, which their educators seek to shrink so as to install them as fully human, non-human animals are incapable of this ontological transformation through moral and spiritual education. At one point in the story, for instance, Frederick and Harriet Benson intervene as another boy, Master Jenkins, carries out his customary cruelties

against animals. When Mrs. Benson later notices that Harriet has been crying out of compassion for Jenkins's many victims, she admonishes:

“It is wrong to grieve for the death of animals as we do for the loss of our friends, because they certainly are not of so much consequence to our happiness; and we are taught to think their sufferings end with their lives, as they are not religious beings; and therefore the killing of them, even in the most barbarous manner, is not like murdering a human creature, who is perhaps unprepared to give an account of himself at the tribunal of heaven.”<sup>47</sup>

When a visiting lady present challenges Mrs. Benson's refutation of animal sagacity with the example of the learned pig lately exhibited in London, Mrs. Benson denies said pig had ever learned to spell or could ever demonstrate “human faculties” such as cognition. In affirming that “no art of man can change the nature of any thing,” she concludes that only “great cruelty must have been used in teaching ... [the pig] things so foreign to his nature.”<sup>48</sup> In repudiating the intelligence and immortality of animals, Mrs. Benson emphatically affirms a hierarchy of being characteristic of early anti-cruelty literature.

On the one hand, the anti-cruelty lesson imbued the desired character traits of the emerging middle class: self-control (through lessons prohibiting violence against animals); industriousness (through lessons cautioning against neglect of animal care); and sympathy (through lessons advocating the intercession of animal cruelty). Beyond establishing the “human” criterion for a political community of equals, on the other hand, the anti-cruelty lesson often elaborated proper relations with those who fall outside this circle, beginning with unformed children themselves. In other words, the lesson on kindness to animals imagined the citizen-

subject in exclusionary terms while it subjected the future citizen to new forms of disciplinary control. In Mrs. Benson's anti-cruelty lessons, tellingly, feeling too much for animals is as objectionable as feeling nothing at all for animals: improper treatment of animals is any deviation from a measured kind of care. When Mrs. Benson and her daughter Harriet pay a call to Mrs. Addis, in fact, they meet with the unfortunate consequences of an inordinate love for animals. While Mrs. Addis's pets are marvelously acquitted, she neglects both the care and education of her children. Upon meeting Augusta, Mrs. Addis's daughter, "Mrs. Benson was quite shocked to see how sickly, dirty, and ragged this poor child was, and how vulgar also, for want of education."<sup>49</sup> As Mrs. Addis dotes upon her lapdog, paying no attention to her daughter, Augusta seizes a kitten by the neck, and when the kitten squeaks and the mother cat scratches her, Augusta drops the kitten on the floor. Mrs. Addis's rushes to the kitten's rescue and threatens to beat Augusta, but she offers no subtler lesson on the whys and wherefores of kitten handling. Subsequently, Mrs. Addis's pet monkey breaks his chain, throws down the teacups, and tears up the sofa, showing himself to be no more well-mannered than Augusta, despite Mrs. Addis's more devoted attentions to him. The household ruckus that results from Mrs. Addis's exorbitant affections for her pets suggests the proper ranking and proper disciplining of animal/ized others is necessary to maintain the wider social order.

In its pronounced emphasis upon the proper place of animals, *Fabulous Histories* betrays an educative purpose beyond the mere inculcation of middle-class mores. At many points in the book, Mrs. Benson explicitly asserts the hierarchical arrangement of the natural order: "I consider that the same almighty and good God, who created mankind, made all other living creatures likewise; and appointed them their different ranks in creation, that they might form together a community, receiving and conferring reciprocal benefits."<sup>50</sup> Mrs. Benson's celebration

of the natural order of creation is a legitimization of the existing social order, as well. At one point in the book, for instance, Mrs. Benson takes her children on a field trip to the farm of Mrs. and Mr. Wilson, who expounds upon the necessity of eating animals, the right to destroy malicious animals, and the appropriate exercise of power over animals in extracting use from them. At the conclusion of this discussion, Farmer Wilson avers: “I always consider every beast that works for me as my servant, and entitled to wages.”<sup>51</sup> If animals are compared to servants in Mr. Wilson’s speech, this is less to assert the humanity of his farm animals, given the book’s emphatic depiction of animal inferiority, than to suggest the animality of his servants. The lesson that the Benson children (and the children reading about the Benson children) receive, then, does not merely concern the treatment of animals, but also encodes a lesson about the hierarchical arrangement of human worlds.

Early natural histories intended for children were particularly suited to instilling an understanding of the animalized other’s place, as they centrally purposed to rehearse the order of God’s creation. As Harriet Ritvo observes in reading seventeenth and eighteenth-century natural histories intended for children, “the most important lesson taught by animal books was less directly acknowledged by their authors. This was a lesson about the proper structure of human society.”<sup>52</sup> Within nineteenth-century natural histories, the kindness lesson begins to intermingle with the science lesson, as the legitimation of human hierarchies by reference to the “natural order” is newly cemented by sentiment with the rise of the liberal democratic state. In *Natural History; or, Uncle Philip’s Conversations with the Children about Tools and Trades among Inferior Animals* (1835), for instance, Uncle Philip teaches child characters and child readers about different types of insects and arachnids, all the while cautioning: “he is very wicked and cruel boy who kills every poor bug that he sees, merely because he’s stronger than the bug.”<sup>53</sup>

Like Sarah Trimmer's *Fabulous Histories*, Uncle Philip's *Natural History* unflinchingly affirms the superiority of humankind, even as it advises kindness to animal kind. When asked if birds have reason, for instance, Uncle Philip informs the (significantly, only male) children: "No boys, they do not; but you have reason, and I have something to say to you about it. It is this: as God has given you reason, and so made you better than the poor dumb animals, he expects more from you. That is fair, is it not?"<sup>54</sup> If the boys bear all the responsibilities of reasoning, self-governing subjects, other animals have their own species-specific duties. As the sub-title of the natural history suggests, Uncle Philip discourses upon the workers of creation as much as the wonders of creation, teaching his charges about grasshoppers who bore holes with a gimlet, wasps who are skilled at paper-making, bees who act as God's "tailors," and animals such as woodchucks and groundhogs who "throw dirt with a spade."<sup>55</sup> Intermittently, Uncle Philip raises these industrious non-human workers as a standard for human wage-laborers, presenting human idleness and alcoholism as a kind of perversion of the natural order.

In at least one natural history lesson, Uncle Philip conveys the "natural" condition of unfree labor as well as wage labor. Among a number of different ant species, Uncle Philip discusses the legionary ants who "have their work done by their slaves," who are "ants of another kind."<sup>56</sup> According to Uncle Philip, the ant species enslaved by the legionary ants "is of a dark ash colour; the legionary is of a light colour. The dark coloured ant is now called the negro ant, and is a very industrious, peaceable insect, without any sting."<sup>57</sup> As Uncle Philip describes the relationship between the legionary ant and the negro ant, it is entirely symbiotic: as the legionaries "depend upon the negro ants for house and home, and, food,"<sup>58</sup> so too, "in some things the legionary does for the negro ant what it could not do for itself. God has made them necessary to each other, and this is the reason they live so kindly."<sup>59</sup> The invited comparison

between human slaves and ant slaves wields a convincing argument for the upholding of human hierarchies, as the equation of (inferior) animals and subordinated persons naturalizes the exercise of power by some humans over others. But most importantly, and newly with the rise of the liberal democratic state, the kindness of the “natural order” renders the human dominion of animal/ized others as a reciprocal interdependency ordained by the good Creator.

Thus the early anti-cruelty lesson encouraged governance of the self, but it also legitimated the governance of others falling short of fully human, albeit newly emphasizing the exercise of “human” restraint and the experience of “animal” suffering. On the one hand, in learning kindness to animals, children acquired the habitus of the bourgeois individual: in relinquishing the exercise of violence to the state and cultivating the self-discipline necessary for democratic society, children distinguished themselves from animals and earned their stripes as citizen-subjects. On the other hand, in rehearsing the human-animal divide, these same children received an education in legitimate exclusions from political community, exclusions that may have included children who had not learned their lessons, perhaps, but as importantly, numbered those animalized persons who, learn them or not, would never be excused from them.

### **Abolition, Anthropomorphism, and the Emancipation of Figurative Meaning**

As one of many natural histories written for children, *Uncle Philip’s Conversations with the Children about Tools and Trades among Inferior Animals* is representative in another regard. Particularly in the American context, juvenile literature in the first decades of the nineteenth century eschewed the fantastical and emphasized scientific or practical knowledge. In fact, much of the early American literature intended for children actually warned against the pernicious effects that fiction might have upon childhood development and attempted to define itself as informative rather than imaginative. Within this body of literature, animals most often appeared

within somewhat simplified natural histories appending moral instruction or within didactic, purportedly factual anecdotes discouraging animal cruelty.

Two of the earliest books written for children in the U.S., indicatively entitled *False Stories Corrected* (1814) and *True Stories Related* (1815), effectively illustrate the representation of animals authorized by this imaginative wariness. *False Stories Corrected* cautions that representations of those animals “that never did exist ... must be injurious.”<sup>60</sup> After debunking a series of falsities about actual animals and denying the existence of a number of mythical animals, the book concludes with the maxim: “It would be much better that strict care should be taken that facts and realities be inculcated from the earliest dawn. For, ‘Youth like softened wax with ease will take, / Those images that first impression make.’”<sup>61</sup> Samuel Goodrich, one of the first popular American children’s authors, also sought to impart only “useful knowledge” to children and usually dismissed imaginative stories as hardly conducive, if not outright dangerous, to their development. His Peter Parley tales by and large consist of factual lessons given by the eponymous figure on topics from geography to natural history, though ironically, these lessons are sometimes wildly inaccurate.

*Peter Parley’s Book of Fables* (1836) is an exception proving the rule, as this rare foray into the imaginative world of talking animals is hedged quite nervously by a number of qualifications in separate prefaces for parents and children. After describing how he has excised “such stories as might seem of questionable utility” in the preface for parents, Goodrich acknowledges that “conscientious scruples are entertained by many wise and good people as to the use of fiction in juvenile books.”<sup>62</sup> He cautiously suggests, however, that as scriptural parables convey moral lessons through invented events, animal fables might accomplish the same, though Goodrich does not intend “to recommend all books of fables for children; on the

contrary,” he states, “I deem most collections I have met with, very objectionable.”<sup>63</sup> In order to fend off the potentially deleterious effects of reading about animals who do what animals do not, Goodrich cautiously prescribes an appropriate reading method for the fable in his address to the young reader, beginning with a definition of the form:

[Fables] are tales, in which foxes, frogs, dogs, and other animals, are fancied sometimes to speak, and think, like men, women, and children. These *stories*, you will understand, are not *histories*; and I do not pretend that these things actually did happen. Only *imagine* them to have happened; and my object in telling them, is not to make you believe what is false, but to impress upon your mind what is true.<sup>64</sup>

Goodrich goes on to model the way of reading by which the husk of the imaginative narrative might be stripped from the fable’s moral kernel, and affirms several times before the reader moves on to the fables themselves – lest titles such as “The Carrier Pigeon; or, being busy and persevering in what we have to do” would not be clarifying enough – that his “design is to give you [moral] lessons of importance.”<sup>65</sup>

As Goodrich’s somewhat reluctant resuscitation of the fable form would indicate, American children’s authors inevitably began to verge on invention, even though they almost always subordinated any use of “the imaginative” to moral instruction. While anxieties about the influence of “untruths” upon the minds of children persisted into the late 1830s, one vein of juvenile literature, in particular, began to disregard the early warnings against anthropomorphism to reintroduce the representation of talking animals into children’s literature: namely, abolitionist writing intended for children. Lesley Ginsberg and Brigitte Fielder have both examined the use of anthropomorphism within abolitionist children’s literature, but in so doing, they have not situated the anti-slavery use of trope within a wider cultural context highly suspicious of “false

stories” for children -- not to mention “true stories” about slavery.<sup>66</sup> The powerful symbiosis between anthropomorphism and abolitionism might be further interrogated, as a number of circumstances surrounding the writing of abolitionist children’s literature overrode adult apprehensions about anthropomorphism.

Deborah de Rosa has argued that “domestic abolitionists,” or women who wrote abolitionist literature for children, often “walked the tightrope between the legitimate ‘literate public sphere’ and inappropriate gender behavior” by annexing anti-slavery children’s literature as a natural extension of feminine domestic terrain.<sup>67</sup> As de Rosa suggests, however, women writers’ tight-rope-walking not only involved preserving the appearance of feminine deference but also necessitated the careful navigation of pro-slavery waters. While forums such as the “Juvenile Department” of *The Liberator*, the official publication of the American Anti-Slavery Society (AASS), afforded many domestic abolitionists “a ‘safe’ place from which to voice their opinions,”<sup>68</sup> the American Sunday School Union (ASSU) and many other commercial publishers boycotted anti-slavery texts.<sup>69</sup> The social ostracism and professional consequences that Lydia Maria Child faced after the publication of *An Appeal in Favor of That Class of Americans Called Africans* (1833) effectively illustrates the consequences that many women writers obviated through either anonymity or indirection.

The abolitionist use of anthropomorphism functioned as something more than the sugar that helped the lesson of anti-slavery go down. For on the one hand, the animal’s figuration of the condition of the enslaved allowed a number of (primarily women) writers to enter into a contentious public debate with greater immunity to public censure. On the other hand, the humanization of animals to contest pro-slavery positions directly countered the animalization of humans to legitimate the institution of slavery. In other words, the use of anthropomorphism

within abolitionist children's literature amounted to a reverse discourse in the Foucauldian sense: keeping the terms while redirecting the aims of a dominant discourse.

While providing an extensive mapping of the paternalistic justification of racial slavery within antebellum pro-slavery writing remains beyond the purview of this chapter, the legitimization of human property through the animalization of the enslaved is prevalent within children's literature itself. One of the earliest periodicals intended for children, *The Rose Bud*, was established in Charleston, South Carolina under the editorship of Caroline Howard Gilman, whose pro-slavery sympathies are evident in stories and poems such as "Frank, To His Rabbit" (1833). In this poem, the child speaker celebrates his rabbit, inviting the association between the animal and the slave in excepting the rabbit's "skin" from his acclamations: "I cannot praise your skin as fair / 'Tis just the color of my hair --."70 The implied brownness or blackness of the rabbit permits a comparison between slave-owning and pet-keeping, which given the lengthy enumeration of the speaker's attentions and the rabbit's pleasures, seems quite the happy condition:

And you can hear the sweet birds sing,  
 And skip a little -- with your string;  
 And you can nicely nibble grass,  
 And see the people as they pass --  
 And you can breathe the balmy air  
 Without a *sigh* -- a thought or care!<sup>71</sup>

The end of the poem neatly reconciles the speaker's care for the rabbit with his ownership of the rabbit, conflating emotional and monetary value: "I cannot wish you to be *free* -- / You're worth a *diadem* to me!!"<sup>72</sup> In confusing the enslavement of persons with the domestication of animals,

the poem demonstrates the nimble ideological operation enabled by this pervasive pro-slavery analogy. Here, the animalization of blackness positions the enslaved as a “pet” more than a “beast of burden,” effectively obscuring the exercise of white domination through the rhetoric of care.

Abolitionist writers of children’s literature often targeted the institution of slavery by stripping this mantle of magnanimity from the ownership of human beings. Eliza Lee Cabot Follen, the prominent abolitionist, editor, and author of juvenile literature, rebuts paternalistic justifications of racial slavery in a poem entitled “Billy Rabbit to Mary,” which almost appears a direct refutation of “Frank, To His Rabbit.” The rabbit poem was published, along with another first-person animal poem representing the reflections of a squirrel on receiving his liberty, in *Hymns, Songs, and Fables, For Young People* (1846). In the preface to the poem, the reader learns that Billy Rabbit was captured from the woods and given to a little girl named Mary. Although she “was very attentive to the little prisoner, gave him an abundance of good things to eat, and tried her best to make him happy,”<sup>73</sup> Billy Rabbit was not so. Eventually, Billy managed to escape, though he was thoughtful enough to send Mary a letter, the poem itself, in which he explains that Mary’s care was no compensation for the loss of his freedom:

Oh, let not your kind heart be angry with me;  
 But think what a joy it is to be free,  
 To see the green woods, to feel the fresh air,  
 To skip, and to play, and to run everywhere.  
 The food that you gave me was pleasant and sweet,  
 But I’d rather be free, though with nothing to eat.<sup>74</sup>

“Billy Rabbit to Mary” substitutes the perspective of the rabbit-owner with that of the rabbit to speak to the deprivations that Mary’s provisions failed to mitigate and indeed originated. By extension, the poem suggests the deficiencies of pro-slavery arguments that hinge upon the slave’s putative affective and material dependency upon the slave-owner. To communicate its message, the poem not only reverses the usual directionality of human-animal ambiguity, humanizing the animal rather than animalizing the human, but also redirects the more usual invocation of “the natural.” Instead of legitimizing the hierarchical organization of human societies by invoking “natural” interspecies relationships of mastery and subservience, the poem stresses that while he was captive, Billy Rabbit was alienated from his natural state: “To see the green woods, to feel the fresh air, / To skip, and to play, and to run everywhere.”<sup>75</sup>

Such retooling of “the natural” occurs within a number of poems and stories advancing an anti-slavery message. In “The Escape of the Doves,” published in *Parley’s Magazine* (1835), the dove speakers likewise convey the unnaturalness of their captivity to their former captors as they flee from their accidentally opened cage:

We thank you for all the fine stories you tell  
 And all the good things you would give;  
 But think, since we’re out, we shall do very well  
 Where nature designed us to live.<sup>76</sup>

As the poem would imply, the deliberate selection of the species of the animal trope was crucial to the efficacy of abolitionist arguments stressing the “unnatural” condition of slavery. In contrast to the pro-slavery assignment of the slave to the status of a domestic animal or work animal, abolitionists most often focalized their anti-slavery message through wild animals or through animals that are domesticated only with difficulty. Abolitionists writing for children

associated the enslaved less often with cats and dogs than with birds and butterflies, squirrels and rabbits, who given their “natural” condition, were best able to voice the imperatives of freedom.

Different forms of cruelty as much as different species of animals lent themselves to distinctive articulations of an abolitionist message. For instance, stories and poems about robbing birds’ nests often contained a sub-text concerning the cruelty of separating slave families. In a poem entitled “Who Stole the Bird’s Nest,” first published in *The Youth’s Companion* and later anthologized in *Flowers for Children* (1846), Lydia Maria Child grants speech to a mother bird as she flies around questioning:

To whit! to whit! to whee!

Will you listen to me?

Who stole the four eggs I laid,

And the nice nest I made?<sup>77</sup>

Such depictions of broken bird families moralized against stealing birds’ eggs, but further condemned the severing of human familial bonds. While injunctions against robbing birds’ nests are highly pervasive within a number of publications that do not reference slavery directly, oftentimes the analogy between mother birds and slave mothers is drawn quite explicitly.

Elizabeth Margaret Chandler’s “The Kingfisher,” posthumously published in *The Poetical Works of Elizabeth Margaret Chandler* (1836), for example, relays the story of a Kingfisher who dies in an effort to protect her young from a terrible storm. The poem overtly compares the affection of the Kingfisher to the love of the slave mother:

“Oh! If affection like this hath part

In the warm depths of a wood-bird’s heart –

That even to die, is a better fate

Than to leave her dear ones desolate; --  
 What is the love of a mother's breast,  
 With the seal of a deathless nature press'd?<sup>78</sup>

As the poem goes on to condemn the men who would “Wrench from its mother's frantic hold, / Her weeping babes, to be pawn'd for gold;”<sup>79</sup> it amplifies the suffering of the enslaved mother, who is both compared to and distinguished from the Kingfisher in that she possesses “the seal of a deathless nature.”

It is worth underlining the degree to which this poem strives to maintain the human-animal distinction, even as it draws an analogous relationship between the situation of the bird mother and the condition of the enslaved mother. The poem's reassertion of the human-animal divide suggests the use of anthropomorphism within abolitionist children's literature did not necessarily intend the ontological reduction of the slave to the status of the animal – or the actual attribution of human characteristics to animals, for that matter. In fact, there is a critical distinction to be made between the figurative use of the animal to represent the condition of the enslaved and the intended equivalence between enslaved humans and wild animals. The attribution of human psychology, speech, and habits to animals within abolitionist children's literature should be considered first and foremost as a *figurative* use of anthropomorphism, one which was overdetermined by the particular set of rhetorical constraints faced by abolitionist women writers for children, outlined above. This figurative use of anthropomorphism might usefully be compared to personification, the attribution of lifelike qualities or forms to inanimate objects or abstractions: the talking animal within abolitionist children's literature does not necessarily imply the animal's real powers of ratiocination any more than “the howling wind” aims to indicate the actual location of the sky's larynx. This assertion is hardly an insight, yet it

warrants underlining, as contemporary debates about anthropomorphism within critical animal studies most often elides its appearance as a trope, and so muddy analyses of its cultural uses and effects.

Yet this analytical differentiation between different forms of anthropomorphism is difficult to maintain on the level of reader reception. While the strategic use of anthropomorphism allowed abolitionists to impart anti-slavery lessons to children, these lessons often conveyed a rather ambivalent message about the humanity of the enslaved and the meaning of emancipation. For as Brigitte Fielder has convincingly argued, abolitionist uses of anthropomorphism in juvenile literature fundamentally altered the traditional abolitionist appeal, which typically identified “animalization as a particular mistake of enslavement” and took issue with the fact that “the American system of chattel slavery ... treated people *as though* they were animals.”<sup>80</sup> As Fielder shows, the algorithm through which a number of anti-slavery arguments run can be broken down thus: first, human beings are different from animals; second, slaves are human beings; third, slaves are treated like animals; and so, slavery is an iniquitous institution. Within most antebellum anti-slavery literature written for adults, the animal emerges as a foil rather than as a figure for the enslaved. Consider, for instance, William Lloyd Garrison’s impassioned appeal in his preface to *Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass* (1845): “O how accursed is that system, which entombs the godlike mind of man, defaces the divine image, reduces those who by creation were crowned with glory and honor to a level with four-footed beasts, and exalts the dealing in human flesh above all that is called God!”<sup>81</sup> The efficacy of Garrison’s appeal actually hinges upon maintaining the distinction between the “mind of man,” made in the “divine image,” and “the level” of “four-footed beasts,” whose subservience to

human ends must be naturalized, rather than questioned, in order to enable a rhetorically powerful denouncement of the institution of slavery.

The use of anthropomorphism within abolitionist children's literature inevitably erodes this mainstay of the anti-slavery argument. According to Fielder, however, the radical message within these texts still holds: in her reading, the abolitionist use of common household pets to figure the enslaved more effectively garners interracial sympathy by offering "a point of recognition for Northern, white, child readers, most of whom were likely to have had little or no interaction with either enslaved or free black people."<sup>82</sup> For Fielder, this "model of sympathy, which is not dependent on articulations of sameness, is a more progressive model for affective sympathy and kinship because ... it has the potential for promoting such affective relationships across acknowledged positions of difference."<sup>83</sup> I am somewhat more suspect of the political potential that Fielder attributes to the abolitionist use of anthropomorphism, in the first place because the use of "more familiar" objects of affective investment to mediate interracial sympathy does not necessarily move us beyond the contingency of sympathy upon proximity and similarity. Secondly, abolitionists tended to invoke wild rather than domestic animals to figure the "natural" condition of the enslaved as "naturally" free. But most foundationally, perhaps, the use of anthropomorphism to represent the enslaved continued to invite, if more "kindly," the animalization of human beings.

In reading Harriet Beecher Stowe's postwar juvenile fiction, Leslie Ginsberg observes how the representation of animals enables "a retreat into a regressive fantasy of domestic harmony, served up to a Northern reading public that feared its own success in the postwar battle for racial and social equality."<sup>84</sup> In fact, this retreat from the demand for full citizenship for African Americans might be discerned within the earliest abolitionist texts written for children,

and arguably, is highly overdetermined by the human-animal relationship as the battleground for debates about slavery. *Original Poems for Infant Minds* (1830), by Ann and Jane Taylor, contains many poems that advance abolitionist aims through the typical tropes and plotlines. “The Bird’s Nest” reproaches children for stealing eggs from nests, with all the usual resonances of this pedagogical scene. “To a Butterfly, On Giving It Liberty” may be one of the first appearances of the often-repeated release of the butterfly, which equally recommends the emancipation of the slave. However, within this same volume of poetry, two companion poems, “The Little Bird’s Complaint to His Mistress” and “The Mistress’s Reply to Her Little Bird,” offer a much more ambivalent message. In “The Little Bird’s Complaint,” the bird laments the loss of the “sweet green woods” and “clear blue sky.”<sup>85</sup> The bird garners the reader’s sympathies by describing in unusual detail the tedium of life in a wire cage, the atrophying of his wings, and the loneliness he feels for his “tender mother’s downy breast.”<sup>86</sup> As the poem closes with the bird’s petition for his freedom, the reader can only assume that the authorial perspective is in complete accord with the bird’s appeal:

Kind mistress come, with gentle, pitying hand,  
 Unbar my prison door, and set me free;  
 Then on the white-thorn bush, I’ll take my stand,  
 And sing sweet songs to freedom and to thee.”<sup>87</sup>

However, “The Mistress’s Reply” does not tell the story of the bird’s liberation, as the reader might well expect in response to the compelling avian argumentation quoted above. Rather, the mistress reluctantly explains to the bird why she cannot set him free, though she affirms: “Gladly, dear little bird, I’d let thee fly, / If that were likely to relieve thy pain.”<sup>88</sup> According to the bird’s mistress, it was not she, but a cruel little boy, who stole the bird from his nest when he

was young. The bird's mistress intervened to spare his life, and "with the tenderest care" she nurtured him.<sup>89</sup> As the bird has never lived in the wild as an adult, however, the mistress worries that "Unused to such a wondrous place before, / Thou'dst want some friendly shelter where to hide."<sup>90</sup> The mistress rejoins the bird's longings for the "clear blue sky" with her enumeration of the dangers of the "world so wide": she tells her charge that fellow birds would peck out his eyes, that cats would chase him down, that no one would care to listen to his song, and that ultimately, winter's cold would "kill my pretty bird"<sup>91</sup>:

Then do not pine, my favorite, to be free:  
 Plume up thy wings, and clear that sullen eye;  
 I would not take thee from thy native tree;  
 But now t'would kill thee soon to let thee fly.<sup>92</sup>

Thus concludes the conversation between the bird and his mistress. The two poems effectively illustrate how the use of anthropomorphism to advance an anti-slavery argument permits the continued animalization of the slave to justify paternalistic social relations.

Gillian Brown has argued that an impulse towards "sentimental possession" pervades abolitionist women's domestic fiction, even as this very fiction critiques the property relations of slavery.<sup>93</sup> Differentiating the protections of maternal love from the expropriations of slavery, enduring possessions from fungible commodities, authors such as Harriet Beecher Stowe imagined a "domestic reformulation, rather than eradication" of the inclusion of blacks within the inventory of human possessions, according to Brown.<sup>94</sup> The concept of sentimental possession likewise describes the reassertion of white proprietorship through the assertion of protective care in "The Mistress's Reply." In recoding the continuation of captivity as the continuation of care, "The Mistress's Reply" does not so much abrogate as reformulate the

ownership of human beings. Yet abolitionist children's literature also extends Brown's understanding, as it suggests the human-animal relationship may have played a central role in the slippage from anti-slavery position to sentimental possession. For the particular logic of sentimental possession may not unfold quite in the way Brown describes: sentimental possession is less "the process of making things into possessions"<sup>95</sup> – a statement that sounds somewhat tautologically – than the process of making things into animals. Neither "object" nor "subject," the domesticated animal is both available for affective investment and unimaginable as autonomous, and so seamlessly welds the mystification to the rationalization of human subjugation.

Importantly, the abolitionist use of anthropomorphism humanized the animal as well as animalized the human. While abolitionists continued to employ the animal as a trope for the enslaved or the formerly enslaved, representations of "real" animals endowed with "human" characteristics began to appear in abolitionists' writing intended for children, as well. The line between the use of the animal as a figure and the actual attribution of human characteristics to animals becomes especially blurry in the years preceding and following the Civil War. In a number of stories about animals first published in the children's periodical *Our Young Folks*, and later collected in *Queer Little People* (1867),<sup>96</sup> Harriet Beecher Stowe alternates between these two forms of anthropomorphism. In "Miss Katy-Did and Miss Cricket" (1866), Stowe carries over the ante-bellum use of the animal trope to challenge race relations in the post-bellum context. The story features the vain and selfish Miss Katy the Katy-did, who decides to have a party, but refuses to ask Miss Keziah the Cricket and the rest of her "race," because of "their color, to be sure."<sup>97</sup> This cautionary tale against white supremacy (though less unquestionably against black submissiveness) ends as Miss Katy and her upper-echelon insect guests are caught

in the frost during the ball, while the “worthy crickets” avoid the disaster by “emigrating in time to the chimney corner of a nice little cottage.”<sup>98</sup> In its delivery of a purposeful message within a fanciful envelope, “Miss Katy-Did and Miss Cricket” is representative of many additional stories within *Queer Little People*, in which imaginative romps involving talking animals also attempt to (re)imagine post-bellum race relations.

But further, *Queer Little People* features animals who appear as characters in and of themselves within a realist representational mode. In “Aunt Esther’s Stories,” for example, a reminiscent narrator relays Aunt Esther’s nursery tale about Prince, a Newfoundland dog. In recalling Prince’s eagerness to please and distress in failing to please, the narrator suggests that “dogs are exquisitely sensitive to pain, shame, and mortification, as any human being.”<sup>99</sup> Here, the acknowledgement of the dog’s “human” capacities does not serve any figurative function, for the intended realism of Stowe’s story is confirmed by the narrator: “Aunt Esther’s stories were not generally fairy tales, but stories about real things.”<sup>100</sup> Similarly, the same Eliza Follen who in the 1840s wrote “Soliloquy of Ellen’s Squirrel” and “Billy Rabbit to Mary,” poems in which animals appear primarily as tropes for enslaved persons, subsequently wrote books such as *True Stories about Dogs and Cats* (1856) and *What the Animals Do and Say* (1857), which take an interest in animals for their own sake. In *True Stories about Dogs and Cats*, the widow Mary Chilton responds to her son Frank’s wish to hear “a real good true story about a dog, or any other animal,”<sup>101</sup> and ignores her son Harry’s request for a “made-up story” instead. Throughout the book, the widow Chilton confirms the veracity of the stories she relays, vouching for the reliability of each subsequent tale as she does for the first story, heard from an Englishwoman: “She was in the place where the thing happened, at the very time, and knew the dog and his master.”<sup>102</sup> In this text, as in Stowe’s *Queer Little People*, “true stories” about animals tend to be

true stories testifying to animals' "human" faculties, from stories about altruistic cats who overcome instinctual desires enough to save a bird or nurse a rat, to anecdotes about heroic dogs who save the lives of humans shipwrecked at sea or lost in the wilderness.

These authors' humanization of the animal reflects wider cultural trends. As Jennifer Mason has convincingly argued, late nineteenth century domestic animals in the U.S. were increasingly considered "civilized creatures," possessing "the intellectual, emotional, and moral qualities previously held to be exclusively human."<sup>103</sup> Whereas earlier in the century, the sentience attributed to animal life was tantamount to the ability to experience bodily pain, beginning in the 1840s, more prevalently in the 1850s, and pervasively by the 1860s, we might note a kind of syntactic shift in the expression of human sympathy for animals, whereby the animal not only appeared a worthy object of human compassion but also attained the status of a subject. In respect to some animals, at least, the gradation of cognitive and affective faculties according to species began to erode, and beyond the boundaries of the trope, animals began to think, to love, to mourn, to avenge, to despair – even to commit suicide.

The increasing attribution of "human" characteristics to "real" animals might be linked to a number of shifts in interspecies practices and relationships. In accounting for the emergence of the "civilized creature," Jennifer Mason forefronts the cohabitation of humans and animals within urban built environments; Katherine Grier likewise emphasizes the importance of pet-keeping to nineteenth-century conceptualizations of animal life; Susan Pearson suggests new forms of social discipline subjected animals as well as humans over the course of the nineteenth century; and James Turner asserts the popularization of evolutionary theory eroded the boundaries between species.<sup>104</sup> While an exhaustive exploration of these developments is beyond the purview of the present discussion, I want to underline the active participation of linguistic

forms in catalyzing the attribution of a wider range of human characteristics to animals. More specifically, the extensive use of anthropomorphism within abolitionist children's literature did more than underwrite the continued animalization of racialized persons, as per the discussion above. Anthropomorphism accomplished in fact what it performs as a figure: the attribution of human characteristics to animals. The strategic use of the trope to convey an anti-slavery message, together with the wider appearance of anthropomorphism with the growing acceptance of "imaginative" literature for children,<sup>105</sup> played a contributory role in the changing conceptualization of animal life.

The humanization of the animal was also a remaking of racial meaning. A new enunciation of sentimental possession was made possible by the anthropomorphizing representation of animal life. In *True Stories about Dogs and Cats*, Follen does not champion the emancipation of animals, but rather counsels kindness in keeping them: "We have made cats our slaves ... ought we not to make them as comfortable and happy as we can?"<sup>106</sup> As in the earliest anti-cruelty lessons, the affective bond between human and animal reconfigures a property relation as a reciprocal relationship in this book: If "every species [of dog] has become our property," the widow Chilton avers, "all this proceeds neither from want nor constraint, but solely from true gratitude and real friendship."<sup>107</sup> As the widow Chilton's emphasis upon the *dog's* gratitude and friendship suggests, however, it is not just *human* care but also and primarily *animal* affection that children's literature begins to stress. Like the earlier anti-slavery stories about robbing birds' nests and liberating caged animals, new plotlines congeal and widely circulate by the middle of the nineteenth century: animals often offer their help to an endangered human, reversing the human-saves-animal story; cats, dogs, and even chickens adopt and raise young of different species with surprising frequency, given the actual incidence of this

phenomenon; and a number of animals willingly face pain, deprivation, or danger out of love for their masters and mistresses, often sacrificing their lives in doing so. As well as recommending right actions for children, in other words, the animal story begins to prescribe the proper conduct of animal/ized others.

Within mid-century American children's literature, the virtuous animals who model good behavior are accompanied by animals who do some very bad things. Of course, earlier in the century, stories, poems, and natural histories written for children would often comment upon animals' negative "character" traits, but they would hardly fault animals for what was attributed to "nature." In a poem published in *The Rose Bud*, "The Little Boy Pleads for a Mouse" (1833), a boy learns this important lesson. As he becomes upset when his cat batters and kills a mouse, the little boy's mother corrects his confusion of human cruelty and animal instinct: "old puss cannot reason, / And therefore she is not a sinner."<sup>108</sup> It would be a very different matter if the boy were to torment and kill a mouse, however:

But when children, my darling, are cruel,  
 And injure the brutes heaven made,  
 They sully the beautiful jewel,  
 That with a kind heart is inlaid.<sup>109</sup>

Here, the cat is absolved of cruelty, despite the suffering that she inflicts on the mouse. Indeed, the story shows the extent to which early anti-cruelty lessons actually inscribed the stark division between human and animal through the human recognition of animal suffering: children like the little boy were encouraged to claim their humanity by demonstrating a "kind heart" dissimilar to the instinctual viciousness of old puss.

By the middle of the century, however, animals were often deemed culpable for their misdeeds. Stories and poems recounting animals' transgressions were concomitant with the emergence of those lauding animals' "human" faithfulness and selflessness. Asa Bullard's *Dog Stories* (1863) contains several celebratory stories such as "Bonaparte and the Dog," in which a dog's effort to retrieve help for a dead soldier inspires Napoleon's pronouncement: "There, gentleman, that dog teaches us a lesson of humanity."<sup>110</sup> Lest this story be read as merely an allegory of right human action, a long excursus on "The Dog's Voice" elsewhere in the volume catalogues the meanings of dogs' expressive sounds and furthermore affirms:

There can be but little doubt it would be able to frame words if it possessed the power ...

The dog is, in all its doings, guided by reason, and it performs no act without a reasonable motive. If any physical incapacity exists, it is to be found rather in the formation of the mouth ...<sup>111</sup>

If the dog "performs no act without a reasonable motive," this by no means implies that the dog's motives are always pure, however. For interspersed among the assorted "good dog" stories are a number of "bad dog" anecdotes. We meet a dog who picks on a cat, a sheepdog who feasts on one of the flock when the shepherd's back is turned, and a lazy "churn dog" named Frank who refuses to work, even though "Frank's really was not 'a hard place.'"<sup>112</sup>

Unsurprisingly, the negative animal traits and tendencies most often thematized within mid-century children's literature resembled and relayed racist characterizations of African Americans. The racial projects of bad animal stories are often so explicit they hardly warrant analysis, but a few illustrative examples are worth relaying. *The Judges Pets: Stories of a Family and its Dumb Friends* (1871), a collection of stories about a Northern judge, his family, and their animals, offers one interesting variation upon the recurring narrative of the unscrupulous crow.

In one particular chapter of the book, the judge intercepts two young crows stolen from their nest by a little boy, evoking the pet/slave liberator figure of abolitionist children's literature. The crows, Jack and Gill, grow tame and "strangely human," and "sometimes seemed almost to speak,"<sup>113</sup> exemplifying the usual narrative migration of the animal to the former preserve of the human. Jack eventually abandons Gill, who finds a new best friend (and implied equal) in Joe, the now elderly, once run-away slave who long ago found respite with the Judge's father, and whose "two greatest delights were Gill and the wood pile."<sup>114</sup>

If Joe seems to model the desired indebtedness and industriousness of the formerly enslaved, however, Gill embodies less desirable tendencies, for "Gill had one fault, which was really inexcusable in a crow so well brought up, and living always under the eye of a Judge: he was a shocking thief."<sup>115</sup> Filching everything from pencils to pads of butter – the former suggesting an unnecessary acquisition of the powers of literacy, the latter implying the unwarranted possession of anything superfluous to subsistence — the nuisance that is Gill only departs when Joe does. As Joe sustains a bad fall, reluctantly takes to his bed, and eventually dies, Gill likewise takes to the sky. This is not a sad ending, however, as the Judge and his family will henceforth have "only happy thoughts of old Joe," even as they "can never think of him without remembering his little friend Gill at the same instant."<sup>116</sup> Beneath the more banal soundings of white supremacy and black inferiority in this story is something more unsettling: the culmination of Joe's good deeds, even over and above his unfailing attention to the wood-pile, is quite simply to expire, and so rid the family of the noxious influence of Gill. In so doing, *The Judge's Pets* presages the easy pivot from the making of docile bodies to the marking of disposable persons.

Gill is only one of a whole flock – or herd, pack, horde (species depending) – but the story usefully exhibits the racial project harnessed to many bad animals. As is evident in the tight interlacing of an account of a good black man and a bad black bird, the attribution of humanity has as its counterpart the liability to criminality. Indeed, the Judge of *The Judge's Pets* augurs the accountability of the animal(ized other) to the law. In *Scenes of Subjection*, Saidiya Hartman explores how the selective acknowledgement of black subjectivity – choice, will and freedom - allowed the attribution of blameworthiness to the enslaved and to the formerly enslaved, facilitating relations of domination that rely not upon the relegation of the black body to object status but upon a circumscribed recognition of black humanity.<sup>117</sup> While I follow Hartman's lead in tracing the processes she describes within nineteenth-century children's literature, I argue it was less the limited recognition of black humanity than the unremitting association of blackness and animality that paved the way for indebted personhood and burdened individuality in the age of emancipation. Put differently, it was less the personification of property than the anthropomorphizing of the animal that played an instrumental role in passing a "circumscribed humanity" – or humanized animality – to racialized persons along a longstanding representative relay.

In fact, the "bad animal" does more than manifest the mechanisms of racialization that Hartman describes, and plays an instrumental role in their actuation. Stephen Best anticipates my trajectory here in exploring how the fugitive slave appeared as both indebted person and pilfered property within nineteenth century jurisprudence. While echoing Hartman's insights, Best underscores more than Hartman how the object status of the fugitive slave was not erased but rather overlaid with the properties of personhood.<sup>118</sup> The anthropomorphic animal, too, accomplishes something more than responsabilization, committing sins that sear into the flesh. In

other words, the efficacy of the anthropomorphic animal within racial representation is the capacity of the figure to *transfigure* the animalistic desecration of human law into the animal adhesion to the laws of nature. In short, the figure of the animal paradoxically naturalizes and generalizes an attribution of criminality that derives its meaning only from the positing of an indeterminable choice and individual action.

Accordingly, the bad animals in nineteenth-century children's books and periodicals are almost always represented as irredeemable. In earlier nineteenth century didactic lessons intended for children, in contrast, well-meaning children often make mistakes and then model the successful rectification of their behavior, usually according to the guidance of an adult. The incorrigible animal, on the other hand, tends to knowingly sin and only failingly undergo an attempted reformation of character, usually at the hands of a charitable child. Harriet Beecher Stowe created a number of memorable and incorrigible dogs in a series of stories for *Our Young Folks* entitled "Our Dogs," which were also later collected in *Queer Little People*. The last of the stories features a Scotch terrier named Wix, who "had a persistence in wicked ways that resisted the most energetic nurture and admonition."<sup>119</sup> Eventually Wix loses the affection of everyone in the family, save his child mistress, who still hopes "that her vigorous system of education would at last reform his eccentricities, and turn him out a tip-top dog."<sup>120</sup> However, she eventually faces the reality that Wix is not fit for the domestic scene, and so he's demoted to the stable, where given how he thrives there, it seems he was made to be.

While Wix is perhaps the worst of the lot, other dogs of Stowe's creation also have difficulty living according to the (humanized) canine's code. A dog named Rover distresses the children of the house by stealing and hiding the things of his little masters and mistresses, whose "tears and threats and scoldings ... were all wasted on him."<sup>121</sup> Rover soon graduates to killing

the neighbors' poultry, and although he's "shut up a whole day in a cold lumber-room, with the murdered duck tied around his neck," and although we're told the punishment made him "dejected and ashamed" enough to renounce poultry-killing forever, this information is immediately followed by the qualification, "except now and then, when he would snap up a young chick or turkey, in pure absence of mind, before he knew what he was about."<sup>122</sup> Unlike Wix, Rover acquires the veneer of virtue and falls into "comparatively transient follies" once grown. However, Rover's peccadillos nonetheless remind the reader that "his Newfoundland blood had been mingled with that of some other races."<sup>123</sup> Indeed, the text explicitly states that it was his "hunting blood [that] sometimes brought ... him into scrapes."<sup>124</sup> In ultimately recoding as a matter of "blood" those sins that are represented in the first instance as an issue of "character," the story of Rover instantiates the productive equivocality of incorrigible animality, which captures by way of criminalization the subject it secures by way of naturalization.

While the criminalization of racialized persons of course precedes emancipation – as does the humanization of the animal, for that matter – the increasing humanization of the animal lent new availability to such forms of racialization while the abolishment of human property gave new urgency to them. Scholars such as Angela Y. Davis and Alex Lichtenstein have linked the criminalization of blackness to the formal end of racial slavery, arguing that developments such as the legalization of involuntary servitude "as a punishment for a crime" by the Thirteenth Amendment and the rise of the convict leasing system in the New South effectively enabled the perpetuation of bondage in the putative age of emancipation.<sup>125</sup> Apropos of our line of inquiry, Colin Dayan has further argued that the position of dogs in property law set the stage for the legal fictions that secure the civil death of those convicted as criminals. Added to Dayan's rich assemblage of tort cases involving animals, children's literature suggests that racial

representation as well as legal categorization underwrote the reinvention of slavery, or perhaps better put, fictions that far exceed those of jurisprudence contributed to changing ideas of animality that were crucial to the particularization of racial meaning at this juncture.

Even as criminalization became a newly available mode of racialization, the cruel treatment of animals became a newly available mode of criminalization. In other words, the animal's attainment of the status of a (legal) subject made possible new categories of human criminality. Significantly, the first Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals essentially functioned as parapolice organizations. Although the delegation of police powers varied according to charter, most states allowed agents designated by an incorporated humane organization to apply to the local magistrate or sheriff, who then would authorize these individuals to parole neighborhoods and make arrests.<sup>126</sup> Historians such as James Turner and Susan Pearson have shown how the work of humane societies targeted working-class communities, in particular, whose livelihood involved daily interaction with animals and whose desperation often compelled the abuse of animals. Indeed, the disciplining of working-class populations often seems to rival the protection of animals as the primary aim of the early animal welfare movement. The autobiography of the prominent animal welfare advocate George Angell reveals that his effort to prosecute crimes against animals overlapped with and even seems to have yielded to a concern about the increase of crime in general with the passing of years. By 1876, Angell writes: "The larger portion of my time [during the year] ... was given in endeavors to call public attention to the great increase of crime ... and in advocating various remedies," the most important of which is humane education, of course.<sup>127</sup> In Angell's ever more impassioned efforts to eradicate the criminal class, though, humane education comes to be a means as much as an end in itself.

Significantly, the disciplinary application of anti-cruelty measures beyond the character formation of the bourgeois child burgeoned in the immediate aftermath of slavery in the American context. Henry Bergh founded the first American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals in 1866, three years following the Emancipation Proclamation and one year after the close of the Civil War. Only two years later and a few months before the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, George Angell began the Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (MSPCA), which would become one of the most active and influential organizations of the early animal welfare movement.<sup>128</sup> By the end of Reconstruction, Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals had sprung up in New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, California, Illinois, and Minnesota, in each case anticipated or followed by the passing of anti-cruelty legislation.<sup>129</sup>

As this timeline suggests, the early animal welfare movement in the U.S. facilitated the entrenchment of the middle class and the expansion of disciplinary power within the period of social upheaval marked on the one hand by the shift from bondage to contract and on the other hand by the importation of transnational labor. Unsurprisingly, then, early animal welfare advocates often targeted immigrant populations and African Americans, whom they construed as especially prone to animal cruelty and particularly needful of humane education. In a speech before the National Association of Superintendents of Public Schools, for example, George Angell proposed humane education to remedy the evils imported by “the hordes of immigrants pouring in upon us from all nations of the civilized world ... [who] cannot be much longer kept out,” and further, to quell “the civil war” incited by that other criminal class, the Knights of Labor.<sup>130</sup> On his lecture tours, Angell visited black educational institutions such as Howard

University and Wayland Seminary, seeking to reach African Americans as well as newly arrived immigrants.<sup>131</sup>

Even apart from the official efforts of animal welfare advocates, the inculcation of kindness to animals was integral to the project of fashioning the formerly enslaved into self-disciplining free-laborers. In fact, conduct manuals intended for the formerly enslaved recommended kindness to animals. In *The Freedmen's Book* (1865), Lydia Maria Child devotes an entire chapter to the subject, honing an anti-cruelty message specific to an African American audience:

Fugitive slaves, looking out mournfully and wearily upon a cold, unsympathizing world, have often reminded me of overworked and abused oxen ... Therefore, those who have been slaves know how to sympathize with the dumb creatures of God; and they, more than others, ought to have compassion on them.<sup>132</sup>

Notably, Child encourages the ex-slave's *identification* with rather than differentiation from the animal through sympathy. This lesson on kindness to animals thus departs from the inculcation of the liberal subject's distinguishing "humanity" and mastery (of self and others). Instead, it educates the ex-slave in the manners of meekness and humility necessary to the wage-laborer. In other words, the anti-cruelty lesson adapted for the formerly enslaved attempted less the cultivation of the habitus of the bourgeois individual than the battering down of a laboring body no longer governed by whip and chain.

In the aftermath of racial slavery, then, the increasing recognition of the rights of animals afforded a kind of double-edged disciplining of racialized persons. On the one hand, the widening cultural recognition of the "humanity" of animals imputed to the animalized other, too, humanity enough to be culpable for one's own condition. On the other hand, the formal

organization and legislation on behalf of animal welfare expanded the reach of animal pedagogies beyond the bourgeois child, enfolding and disciplining a labor force radically transformed by the importation of transnational labor and the shift from bondage to contract. When animalized, newly humanized, when humanized, newly animalized, African Americans experienced the redoubled bind of emancipation in the aftermath of racial slavery: the onerous assumption of the responsibilities of freedom without any of its entitlements was compounded by the ascription of new responsibilities for animals newly entitled with legal status. From this indistinct animality and uncertain humanity, the modern discourse of black criminality was made.

### **Animal Autobiography and the Domestication of Human Freedom**

In February of 1890, George Angell received a copy of Anna Sewell's *Black Beauty* (1877) in the mail. After reading this "autobiography" of an English horse, Angell immediately began to solicit funds so that the American Humane Education Society could print an American edition, which he prefaced with an introductory chapter entitled, "'The Uncle Tom's Cabin' of the Horse."<sup>133</sup> As Angell wrote in his introduction, he had long thought that "*Somebody must write a book which ... shall have as widespread and powerful influence in abolishing cruelty to horses as 'Uncle Tom's Cabin' had on the abolition of human slavery,*" and he believed he had found that book in *Black Beauty*.<sup>134</sup> Regarding its widespread readership, at least, Angell's predictions proved correct: by the end of the year, *Black Beauty* had sold several hundred thousand copies, and in the years to follow Angell and other animal welfare advocates continued to extend the novel's impact by translating it into other languages, offering a one-thousand dollar prize for its stage adaptation, and exhorting writers of humanitarian bent to produce additional animal autobiographies.<sup>135</sup>

Although *Black Beauty* is certainly the most well-known example, it is not singular but rather illustrative of a popular narrative form circulating throughout the transatlantic world. Beyond inspiring multiple imitations, *Black Beauty* had forerunners on both sides of the Atlantic.<sup>136</sup> Animal autobiographies in the American context appeared as early as 1866 with the anonymously authored *Autobiography of a Canary Bird*. First-person accounts of animals' lives were also published in periodicals in the years following the Civil War. In 1868, for example, the widely circulated humane journal, *Our Dumb Animals*, belied its name in printing "The Story of a Good and Faithful Horse, Told by Himself." Thus Anna Sewell's story hardly inaugurated even the equine animal autobiography, but rather exemplified an established literary form. In the wake of the enthusiasm generated by the American edition of *Black Beauty*, however, animal welfare advocates in the U.S. began to actively promote animal autobiographies, popularizing the genre to an unprecedented extent.<sup>137</sup>

By the turn of the century, the production of animal autobiographies reached its apogee alongside the animal welfare movement's increased emphasis on humane education efforts. A contest sponsored by the American Humane Education Society inspired Margaret Marshall Saunders's *Beautiful Joe: An Autobiography of a Dog* (1893). Subsequently, this story of a New England dog was published in Philadelphia, becoming the first book written by a Canadian-born author to sell over a million copies (in large part due to its American readership).<sup>138</sup> In 1895, the national convention of Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCAs) occasioned the authoring of another animal autobiography, Susanna Louise Patteson's *Pussy Meow: An Autobiography of a Cat* (1901). As the author's introduction relates, in response to convention-goers' call for more books like *Black Beauty* and *Beautiful Joe*, "Pussy Meow began writing her story," which was favorably reviewed by none other than Charles Chesnut.<sup>139</sup> *Pussy Meow* was

not the only animal autobiography to receive the endorsement of some notable figure – a glowing introduction by John F. Lacey, an eight-term Republican senator from Iowa, opens Virginia Sharpe Patterson’s *Dickey Downy: The Autobiography of a Bird* (1899).<sup>140</sup> One year following the book’s publication, Lacey famously authored a bill that prohibited the shipment of illegal game across state lines: what became known as the Lacey Act centrally aimed to protect non-game birds from market hunters, just as *Dickey Downy* had so passionately implored.<sup>141</sup>

As such concurrences suggest, the animal autobiography had a far-reaching impact on adult readers. However, the genre most often intended children and adolescents as its audience, and thus falls within the long tradition of nineteenth century humane literature that we have been exploring. The major plot-points of the animal autobiography tend to be instances of animal suffering, through which the genre advances the message of proper care for animals. Like the mid-century writing for children discussed above, the animal autobiography differs significantly from the earliest nineteenth century anti-cruelty literature, which reinforced the difference between human and animal aptitudes even in communicating animals’ susceptibility to physical pain. In not only positing the humanity of animals but further representing animal interiority as analogous to human interiority, the animal autobiography represents the culminating expression of the humanization of the animal over the course of the nineteenth century. For crucially, the animal autobiography adopts a realist mode of representation in ventriloquizing animal subjectivity, relaying without imaginative embellishment – other than the narrator’s ability to speak flawless human, that is – plausible milestones in the life of a typical, if often unfortunate, animal.

The animal autobiography performed cultural work beyond imbuing animals with human subjectivity, as it consolidated a new racial order following the formal end of racial slavery

through a rhetorically powerful reformulation of the slave narrative, as well.<sup>142</sup> Several scholars have noted in passing how the animal autobiography echoes many of the features of the slave narrative, and Moira Ferguson has offered an extended reading of *Black Beauty* along these lines.<sup>143</sup> While Ferguson's discussion draws useful correlations between the suffering of animals depicted in *Black Beauty* and the experiences of the enslaved, however, she pays less attention to how the book reiterates and reworks the generic conventions of the slave narrative. Further, Ferguson considers *Black Beauty* in isolation from other animal autobiographies and primarily in relationship to the British context. On the other hand, Jennifer Mason notes the circulation of early animal autobiographies in the American scene while situating Charles Chesnut's writing in relationship to the early animal welfare movement.<sup>144</sup> In showing how Chesnut wields animal welfare discourse to interrupt racist ideas of black animality, however, Mason follows Ferguson in highlighting the emancipatory potential of this discourse, paying less attention to the dominant racial projects advanced by early animal welfare efforts. Conversely, Susan Pearson observes the popularity of animal autobiography in the U.S. over the course of her incisive analysis of the humane movement's extension of state power throughout the social body.<sup>145</sup> Like Mason, however, Pearson's reading of the animal autobiography as such is limited, thus she neglects to consider how the genre might be productive of the larger cultural trends she surveys.

Following these scholars, I explore how the late nineteenth and early twentieth century animal autobiography appropriates and adapts the conventions of the slave narrative, expanding my discussion beyond *Black Beauty* to include a number of additional texts either authored or widely read in the U.S.<sup>146</sup> In organizing this discussion around an analysis of shared generic features rather than the reading of an individual text, I attend to how the material forms of language shape the production of cultural meanings and political exigencies. Yet as the

discussion to follow will show, form is not prescriptive of content but rather precipitates disparate cultural meanings within distinct historical usages. For the continuities between the animal autobiography and the slave narrative contain contradictory effects, as in rewriting the slave narrative, the animal autobiography domesticates the claim to human freedom in the putative age of emancipation. In fact, the period of the animal autobiography's greatest popularity suggests it is not simply a post-emancipation genre, but also, and more indicatively, a post-Reconstruction cultural form. Indeed, the following discussion will show the animal autobiography's crucial role in the reassertion of white hegemony following the formal end of slavery.

### **Good Dog. Bad Dog.**

The slave narrative itself adopts antecedent genres, melding spiritual autobiography, captivity narrative, adventure story, political pamphlet, and other cultural forms. While the genre took a less definitive shape as it emerged in the 1770s and 1780s, with the organization of radical anti-slavery societies in the 1830s and 1840s, the slave narrative began to congeal around a number of recurring and widely recognized rhetorical maneuvers.<sup>147</sup> The animal autobiography traffics in these telltale features of the slave narrative, starting with its substantiating strategies. The subtitle of the animal autobiography often announces that it is "written by himself" or "written by herself," as exemplified by "Memoirs of a Cripple" (1866), a story in *Our Young Folks* told from the first-person perspective of a spider. As commonly, animal autobiographies begin with either an epilogue, resembling in form and content what John Sekora famously describes as the "white envelope" to the slave narrative's "black message,"<sup>148</sup> or an animal narrator's preface, performing through a number of rhetorical acrobatics the apologies of the assuming author. Most importantly, animal autobiographies invariably invoke several of the

events that structure the storylines of slave narratives: the moment of capture, the experience of sale, the separation of the family, the restriction of mobility, the exploitation of labor, the abuse of the master, the attempt at escape, and the list goes on. At times, the animal autobiography even draws explicit correlations between the experiences of the animal narrator and the experiences of the enslaved, as in *Autobiography of a Canary Bird*, wherein the narrator compares his capture and confinement to the suffering of the human chattel on board a slave ship, which happens to be his first residence.

For the most part, however, the relationship between the slave narrative and the animal autobiography is recognizable through the reworking rather than the reiteration of generic features. Most foundationally, the animal autobiography substitutes the slave narrative's appeal to the humanity of the enslaved with the narrative of an animal, who, however anthropomorphized, remains unalterably an animal. While the slave narrative claims the full humanity of its author, the animal autobiography reinforces a correlation between blackness and animality. In many examples of the genre, the animal's figuring of blackness is heavily, even ham-fistedly, underlined. In *Black Beauty*, for instance, the equine narrator is nicknamed "Darkie" by his first owner. *Pussy Meow* features a mischievous kitten named Topsy, who vainly attempts to whiten herself (by stepping in a bowl of milk). And even when animals manage to evade names invoking stereotypes of racialized persons, from "Darkie" to "Blackie" to "Tom" to "Topsy," the preferred fur or feather color of animal narrators is almost invariably black or some hue of yellow suggestive of miscegenation. The animal autobiography thus effectively reestablishes racial difference through the longstanding trope of species difference. However, the genre redraws racial representation along radically new lines and advances racial projects that differ significantly from those of the antebellum context.

The slave narrative's onus to attest to the "humanity" of the enslaved often demanded it illustrate the moral conviction or religious feeling of its author. Harriet Jacobs's *Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl* (1861) exhibits moral feeling even as it complicates the meaning of moral action: in relaying the sense of shame experienced by enslaved women subject to sexual exploitation, Jacobs elucidates the unfeasibility of "virtuousness" when "laws reduce you to the condition of a chattel, entirely subject to the will of another."<sup>149</sup> In addition to exhibiting the moral sensibility of their authors, many early slave narratives such as Ukawasaw Gronniosaw's *Narrative* (1772) constructed parallel stories of bodily liberation and spiritual salvation, capitalizing upon the literary form of the spiritual autobiography. Some slave narratives even elaborated their author's religious vocations subsequent to gaining their freedom, including *A Brief Account of the Life, Experience, Travels, and Gospel Labors of George White, An African* (1810), *The Life, History, and Unparalleled Sufferings of John Jea, the African Preacher*, and *The Life Experience and Gospel Labors of the Rt. Reverend Richard Allen* (1833).

In keeping with the late nineteenth century migration of the animal to the former preserve of the human, the animal autobiography, too, endows animals with moral sense, or the aptitudes that make accountability to moral law make sense: the perception of the difference between right and wrong; the apprehension of the present in relation to the past and the future; and the recognition of the other as ontologically distinct from the self. Beauty, for example, conscientiously adheres to the moral principles his mother imparts when he is a colt, despite the sufferings that a succession of ignorant or abusive handlers inflict: "I hope you will grow up gentle and good, and never learn bad ways; do your work with a good will, lift your feet up well when you trot, and never bite or kick even in play."<sup>150</sup> In embodying traits such as industriousness, alacrity, and docility, though, animal narrators like Beauty model the desired

posture of the formerly enslaved in response to enduring racial subjugation. In contrast to many slave narratives, the animal autobiography does not recalibrate right action in relation to social and political circumstance, but instead commends the withstanding of continued mistreatment.

Long-suffering animals are accompanied by a number of non-human characters who make their pantry-thieving, furniture-destroying, work-shirking appearances just as frequently within animal autobiographies. The negative traits and tendencies recurrently demonstrated by these animals – indolence, duplicity, irresponsibility, and so forth – are the selfsame sins stereotypically ascribed to African Americans. For instance, Dickey Downy laments the laziness and deceitfulness of his feathered fellows, the unconscionable cowbirds, whose jet-black appearance he takes pains to underline. Whiling away their days on the backs of cattle, the cowbirds “never troubled themselves to make nests, but watched their chance to ... lay their eggs ... in the nests of other birds,” compounding idleness and deviousness with negligent parenting, and raising the specter of miscegenation, to boot. At the end of his story, the saintly Beautiful Joe similarly reproves a devilish stray dog named Dandy, who unmistakably evokes vagrant and vainglorious others. Although this “tramp” finds a temporary home with the Morris family, Dandy only awaits the right wind to carry him along. Before he has the chance to pursue his bad dog doings elsewhere, however, he’s killed by a guard dog when he attempts to steal food from a little girl. Reflecting on Dandy’s unfortunate end, Beautiful Joe advises not an increase of kindness to animals but an escalation of discipline: “A young pup should be trained just as a child is ... Dandy began badly, and not being checked in his evil ways, had come to this.”<sup>151</sup>

At times the reader must discern such lessons without the moral lights supplied by the likes of Beauty and Beautiful Joe, for not only minor characters but also animal narrators fail to walk or trot the straight and narrow path, sometimes quite shamelessly. After witnessing another cat’s

botched attempt to eat Rena the robin, for instance, Pussy Meow remains unmoved by the bird's condemnation of cats' cruelty, merely suggesting a better strategy: "I should have climbed upon the wire netting and the vines to the nest where the little birdies were, because they couldn't fly away. Oh, what a feast that would have been – four little birds, one after the other. It sets my teeth on edge to think of it."<sup>152</sup> The ravenous animal appetite is a frequently featured failing within animal autobiographies, and its recurrence invites the attribution of other uncontrollable cravings to the animal. Through innumerable scenes in which animals indulge in forbidden delicacies or binge on mouthwatering treats, the animal autobiography essentially projects the myth of the black rapist, albeit in child-friendly form.

In the animal autobiography, as elsewhere, the animal plays a pivotal role in naturalizing the badness of blackness. For it's not just that animals are bad in animal autobiographies: it's that animals are hopelessly, incorrigibly bad. The storylines of two early twentieth century animal autobiographies, *Yoppy: The Autobiography of a Monkey* (1905) and *Polly: The Autobiography of a Parrot* (1906), consist primarily of the destructive and expensive havoc wreaked by the interspecies duo when they manage to escape from their cages (Figures 1 and 2). Similarly, the plot of *Billy Whiskers: The Autobiography of a Goat* (1902), which self-identifies as an animal "autobiography," though it's told in the third person, amounts to a succession of scrapes, including one very naughty interspecies (read interracial) affair with a donkey.<sup>153</sup> Yoppy, Polly, and Billy are so obstinately disobedient, in fact, so dependably disregarding of the pet's proper code of conduct, they appear not quite capable of resisting their often very humorous misdeeds. The frequency of their failings suggests a slippage from moralizing to essentializing explanations of their bad behavior, explicitly articulated in *Only a Cat* (1876), wherein the narrator invokes the title at several moments to account for his peccadillos: "After all, I am 'only a cat,' and



Figure 1. “My Penitent Expression Failed to Move Her.” Illustration from Molly Lee Clifford, *Yoppy: The Autobiography of a Monkey*, 35.




Figure 2. "I Had Only Four Helpings of the Pies." Illustration from Molly Lee Clifford, *Polly: The Autobiography of a Parrot*, 187.

possess a cat's nature and a cat's propensities."<sup>154</sup> In the slippage between the animal's imperfect "nature" and the animal's questionable "character," the animal autobiography demonstrates the reliance of an emergent discourse of black criminality upon increasingly humanized depictions of the animal, which effectively soldered the sense of soul and body, choice and instinct, accountability and inevitability.

### **Animal Welfare Gets Back to Work**

On the one hand, pace Hartman, the animal autobiography ascribes to racialized persons, too, the "circumscribed humanity" demanding the shouldering of blameworthiness for one's own subjugation. On the other hand, the animal autobiography corroborates the expanded reach of anti-cruelty pedagogies beyond the bourgeois child for the purposes of class control. For the cruel masters of animal autobiographies are almost unfailingly working-class and are often immigrant persons, the human detritus of an industrial order rather than the aristocratic remnant of a feudal one. After a succession of increasingly diminished establishments, Beauty reaches his nadir in the hands of Nicholas Skinner, a cab-owner with "black eyes and a hooked nose" and a mouth as "full of teeth as a bulldog's."<sup>155</sup> Skinner's cruel treatment of animals marks Skinner *as* animal, illustrating how the humanization of the animal paradoxically enables the animalization of the human.

*Beautiful Joe* similarly features a brutish milkman named Jenkins, whose swill milk results in an outbreak of typhoid fever, an event that seems both indicated by and equivalent to Jenkins's beating, maiming, and killing of dogs. *Beautiful Joe* follows in the tracks of many animal autobiographies that punish the culprits of animal cruelty with police intercession and criminal conviction, for Jenkins lands in jail twice, first for cruelty, then for burglarizing, in which he is fortuitously apprehended by Joe himself (Figure 3). The combination of Jenkins'




Figure 3. Illustration from Margaret Marshall Saunders, *Beautiful Joe: An Autobiography*, 48.

crimes suggests a conflation of acts of animal cruelty with breaches in work discipline or encroachments upon bourgeois entitlements, an equivalency echoed elsewhere. A traveling Italian *steals* Tuppy the donkey from his happy home into the condition of “slavery,” as Tuppy describes his experience; and Yoppy the monkey is likewise stolen by a wicked Italian, who employs Yoppy as an organ grinder and eventually kills another monkey through neglect and overwork. Confusing animal cruelty with animal nabbing, the animal autobiography converts the slave narrative’s contestation of the ownership of human beings into a refutation of the redistributive claim to bourgeois property.

The animal autobiography’s representation of crimes against animality thus both illustrates and complicates Susan Pearson’s perceptive reading of the early animal welfare movement’s expansion of state apparatuses through the creation of private associations. While incisively observing the extension of disciplinary power through the growth of the humane movement, Pearson interprets the early animal welfare movement as an anticipation of the Keynesian welfare state in its expansion of state interference in social and economic affairs.<sup>156</sup> The animal autobiography’s representation of the surveillance and criminal prosecution of animal cruelty, however, suggests less the state’s assumption than the state’s displacement of obligation for social welfare through the criminalization of poverty. Jenkins, Skinner, and other working-class masters who populate the pages of animal autobiographies do not act out of desperation but out of avarice or viciousness. Carol Lansbury argues differently, contending that in *Black Beauty*, “the responsibility for brutality towards animals is not made the result of the innate callousness of the poor.”<sup>157</sup> Certainly, *Black Beauty* does feature a kind cabman, Jerry Barker, in whose service Beauty finds some respite. Yet if Jerry’s upstanding character interrupts the essentialization of working-class brutality, his easy uprightness eclipses the over-

determination of cruelty to animals by the destitution of the humans who handle them. In explaining to other cabmen why he doesn't drive on Sundays, Jerry asserts that "if a thing is right, it *can* be done, and if it is wrong, it *can be done without*,"<sup>158</sup> implying the irrelevancy of material conditions of existence in shaping the very possibility of doing "right" and "wrong." The genre thus recommends an expanded disciplinary reach of the state to punish individuals for systemic social problems, not to provide for them.

Beyond displacing the origins and onus of human and animal suffering, the animal autobiography effectively reduces the complex depiction of human suffering articulated by the slave narrative, which often took pains to highlight the emotional as well as the physical suffering of the enslaved. The authors of slave narratives vividly evoked the separation of families, for instance, emphasizing slavery's desecration of affective bonds even in the absence of physical pain. In recounting the separation of his family at the moment of sale, for example, Henry Bibb describes how "the gory lash" of his master, a Methodist deacon, "failed to break the grasp of poor Malinda," his wife.<sup>159</sup> Bibb underscores the primacy of Malinda's emotional torment even while insinuating the extent of her physical suffering, as he recounts how the deacon continued "laying on the gory lash, trying to prevent poor Malinda from weeping over the loss of her departed husband."<sup>160</sup> Through stories underscoring emotional suffering, slave narratives powerfully discredited the proslavery claim that affective bonds among slaves were attenuated enough to excuse their routine violation.

In contrast, animal autobiographies tend to highlight the corporeality of animal suffering, casting the emotional capacity of their narrators as decidedly blunted. The separation of the animal from its biological mother is a staple of the genre, yet the scene is often conspicuously underplayed. *The Autobiography of Frank*, for instance, recalls how the dog's mother and

brothers, “Black Duchess” and “her two nigger sons,” were sold when he was young. Instead of lamenting the loss of his family, though, Frank expresses “many thanks to that good fairy, who hardened the hearts of my purchasers of my family against me,”<sup>161</sup> as this circumstance allowed his later acquisition by his beloved mistress. The reader suspects that even owner adulation is merely the highest expression of a limited capacity, however, given the recurring scenes of animal ingratitude in animal autobiographies. For instance, Tuppy the donkey, after cavalierly remarking upon the departure of his mother – “Not that I regretted that very much”<sup>162</sup> – later fails to recognize his mistress when she returns from a long journey, at which point she laments: “I have always heard donkeys are stupid and incapable of feeling attachment, but I thought Tuppy would be an exception.”<sup>163</sup> Paradoxically enough, the animal autobiography ventriloquizes animal subjectivity only to diminish the cognitive and emotional capacities of animal/ized others.

Of course, slave narratives represent physical as well as emotional violence, yet not to reduce the enslaved to the bodily, but instead to highlight slaveholders’ arbitrary and excessive abuses of power. Solomon Northrup highlights the capriciousness of Patsey’s mistress, for instance, who repeatedly and brutally beats Patsey without provocation.<sup>164</sup> Slave narratives often represent not only the occasion but also the extent of slaveholders’ violence as utterly gratuitous, as when Moses Roper recounts a sadistically inventive punishment allotted to one slave woman, who’s trapped in a small box overnight after receiving an excessive dose of castor oil.<sup>165</sup> Through such accounts of “unnecessary” violence, slave narratives discredited the defense of slavery as a necessary form of social discipline for a primitive population, exposing the common forms of “correction” that contradict any discernable “good.”

While the animal autobiography echoes the slave narrative’s representation of arbitrary and excessive suffering, this theme emerges in different guise, i.e., through the motif of fashion.

Among the many sources of animal suffering, those stemming from the dictates of style are often foregrounded. For example, *Dickey Downy* organizes its message around a critique of late nineteenth-century millinery practices, which commonly utilized taxidermied birds in the decoration of women's hats. In a lengthy passage early in his narrative, Dickey paints in great detail the ostentatious hats of six "wicked ladies" as they parade beneath his tree:

Fastened on sidewise, head downward, on one was a magnificent scarlet tanager, his body half concealed by folds of tulle, his fixed eye staring into vacancy. On another was the head and breast of a beautiful yellow-hammer; it was surmounted by the tall sweeping plumes of the egret ... A third had had two song sparrows, imprisoned in meshes of star-studded lace. Their blithesome carol had been rudely silenced, their cheer to the world cut short, simply that they might be used for hand trimming ... far-away Australia had furnished the filmy feathers of the lyre bird which swept upward from a knot of ribbons ... the forests of Germany had contributed the pretty green linnet. Dove's wings and the rose breast of the grosbeak completed the barbarous display.<sup>166</sup>

Dickey accentuates the excess of "the barbarous display" in the excess of his narrative description and further stresses the gratuitousness of the birds' deaths in the narrative oscillation between bird parts and "folds of tulle," "star-studded lace," and a "knot of ribbons." Dickey's mother, too, notes, "We are not slaughtered to sustain their lives but to minister to their vanity,"<sup>167</sup> emphasizing the wastefulness as much as the fact of the killing of birds for decorative purposes. Lest this condemnation be read as a Veblenesque critique of the ostentatious wealth of the leisured class, however, Dickey later finds that many "poor and pinched" women frequent the millinery store, "and not a woman among them would have bought an unfashionable or out-of-date hat could she have had it at one quarter of the price."<sup>168</sup>

Animal narrators beyond Dickey contest the suffering of animals for the sake of stylishness. In *Beautiful Joe*, for example, the aforementioned Dandy relays the gruesome experience of having his ears clipped when he was young. Dismayed by Dandy's description of his festering, fly-ridden wounds, Beautiful Joe tries to make sense of the operation, pointing out that although bull terriers' ears are supposedly clipped to keep them from getting torn while fighting, Dandy is "not a fighting dog." Dandy explains that "one might as well be out of the world as out of fashion," but Beautiful Joe protests the trend on behalf of less dandified canines suffering the same operation. Equine autobiographies such as *Black Beauty* and *Exmoor Star* (1906) testify to another late nineteenth century fashion and source of animal suffering. The bearing rein consisted of a strap running from the horse's bit to the harness to the crupper encircling the tail, preventing the lowering of the head and arching the carriage to produce an animated impression, as shown in an illustration within *Exmoor Star* (Figure 4). For appearances alone, the device induced severe discomfort and often damaged horses' windpipes, as equine narrators report. *Exmoor Star* learns about the bearing rein during a conversation with another horse, who vividly describes "two nasty thick pieces of iron" that are "pulled so tight as to draw the blood."<sup>169</sup> Beauty also recounts his first-hand experience with the bearing rein at Earlshall, where the mistress "will have style":

[T]he action of the sharp bit on my tongue and jaw, and the constrained position of my head and throat always caused me to froth at the mouth more or less ... Besides this, there was a pressure on my windpipe, which often made my breathing very




Figure 4. “The Upper Bit ... Made Fast to a Hook in Front of the Saddle.” Illustration from A. E. Bonser, *Exmoor Star, or, The Autobiography of a Pony*, 46.

uncomfortable; when I returned from my work, my neck and chest were strained and painful, my mouth and tongue tender, and I felt worn and depressed.<sup>170</sup>

In rightly observing how *Black Beauty* focuses on fashion as a source of animal suffering, Gina Marlene Dorré argues that Beauty's assessment of the bearing rein refers not only to "the bound body of 'Beauty'" but also to the "bound and bustled" body of the late-Victorian woman, whose constricting costume was hotly contested within contemporaneous dress-reform debates.<sup>171</sup>

Insofar as the animal autobiography takes up the conventions of the slave narrative, however, the critique of fashion implicates the black body as much as the female body, the laboring body as much as the leisured body.<sup>172</sup>

In fact, the discussion of the bearing rein within animal autobiographies suggests the iron bit or gag that was used as a form of slave punishment in the Americas. The slave trader turned abolitionist, Thomas Branagan, describes this device in ways that are highly resonant of late nineteenth-century discussions of the bearing rein. In an essay entitled, "The Method of Procuring Slaves on the Coast of Africa; with an account of their sufferings on the voyage, and cruel treatment in the West Indies," Branagan explicates an illustration of the device: "A front and profile view of an African's head, with the mouth-piece and necklace, the hooks round which are placed to prevent an escapee when pursued in the woods, and to hinder them from laying down the head to procure rest. At A is a flat iron which goes into the mouth, and so effectually keeps down the tongue, that nothing can be swallowed, not even the saliva, a passage for which is made through holes in the mouth-plate."

Yet in contrast to Branagan's condemnation of the iron bit, it is not only or even primarily physical pain that evidences the argument against the bearing rein in *Black Beauty*, but also horses' decreased capacity to work. Beauty laments the impediments as much as the

unpleasantness of the contraption when he conveys how needlessly difficult pulling his mistress's carriage up a hill became as his reins were shortened: "Of course I wanted to put my head forward and take the carriage up with a will, as we had been used to do; but no, I had to pull with my head up now."<sup>173</sup> Similarly, Exmoor Star's acquaintance reports not only the painfulness but also the inefficiency of the device: "I had no power to pull properly, and the extra effort more than doubled the work."<sup>174</sup> In their emphasis on the inefficiency of the bearing rein, Beauty and Exmoor Star echo many contemporaneous critics of the device, whose arguments, as Gina Marlene Dorré observes, emphasized "utility, precision, rationality, and the verity of scientific understanding."<sup>175</sup> Reverend J. G. Wood, for instance, takes a tortuous route through principles of physics rather than appealing to pathos in his argument against the device: "[the reader] will see that, by a well-known mechanical law, a pull of one pound at A is equal to two pounds at C ... [W]hen the horse droops its head, the pull upon its mouth at C is twice as much as that at A."<sup>176</sup> Whereas Dorré suggests the peculiarly mechanical framing of the argument against the bearing rein was an attempt to render the critique more palatable, I would argue this framing examples how the concern for animal welfare was often mediated and motivated by considerations of utility by the end of the nineteenth century.

*Dickey Downy*, too, invokes birds' usefulness in advancing their preservation. When darting about an orchard, Dickey overhears two gentlemen regretting that the *melolontha vulgaris*, "the most destructive of beetles,"<sup>177</sup> has been damaging the trees. Although "enormous numbers of these grubs are eaten by birds," one gentleman informs the other, "birds are not so numerous as they used to be," given their slaughter for the sake of ladies' fashions.<sup>178</sup> In response to this information, the second gentleman offers somewhat of a non-sequitur: "a little incident" in which "one of America's great men," none other than Abraham

Lincoln, stopped where “a young bird had fallen from its nest ... tenderly picked it up[,] and put it back into its nest.”<sup>179</sup> The narrative thus alternates between an ecological critique of the needless extermination of birds and a sentimental promotion of benevolence to animals. Ultimately, though, the passage seems to rest upon incentives beyond the promptings of the “merciful heart” in recommending the preservation of birds, since the men conclude their conversation with a discussion of “the industry of the grackle” and the “redwing[, who] is equally as useful.”<sup>180</sup> The Abraham Lincoln anecdote introduces an association between birdness and blackness that seems to pertain to the discussion of the redwing and the grackle, as well. Thus as animal utility overrides animal suffering as the stimulus for human intercession, the potential usefulness of the black body, too, seems to recommend its “conservation.”

Even animal narrators who hail from species less often valued for pragmatic reasons freight arguments against animal cruelty with evidence of animals’ utility. In one chapter of *Pussy Meow*, the eponymous narrator and her friends meditate on the lives of a number of “useful and valuable cats,”<sup>181</sup> including a cat whose photograph raised money for the temperance movement, a cat who warned some lodging house inhabitants about a fire, and a long list of mousers and rat-catchers. After this discussion, Meow and company resolve to be “more useful cat[s] hereafter,”<sup>182</sup> and in a subsequent chapter, Meow’s mistress seems to envision the same promising, practical future for the black kitten she names Booker T. Washington, who turns out to be “every whit worthy” of the name.<sup>183</sup> As do Beauty and Dickey, Meow leverages the usefulness of animals like Booker as an argument against cruelty to animals, asserting that a “poorly-fed, ill-treated cat” will never catch mice, for “in time [she] loses her sense of smell.”<sup>184</sup> A good mouser is made with kindness, Meow reminds us: “the better you treat her, the more she will do for you in return.”<sup>185</sup>

Yet this appeal to utility or productivity affirms a utilitarian ethic that might contravene as often as contribute to the advancement of animal welfare, not to mention the project of racial uplift. Insofar as instances of needless suffering exemplify acts of animal cruelty within animal autobiographies, and insofar as considerations of human welfare undergird arguments for animal welfare, animal suffering occasioned for human benefit becomes unrecognizable as such. In condemning the unnecessary suffering of animals, in other words, animal autobiographies often demarcate an acceptable arena of “necessary” suffering, i.e., suffering that affords some productive end. The more quotidian pains and irritations that work animals endure, for instance, are often rendered a matter of course in animal autobiographies, as when Beauty offers his reader a rather illuminating definition of “breaking in”:

It means to teach a horse to wear a saddle and bridle and to carry on his back a man, woman or child; to go just the way they wish and to go quietly. Besides this, he has to learn to wear a collar, a crupper, and a breeching, and to stand still while they are put on; then to have a cart or a chaise fixed behind him, so that he cannot walk or trot without dragging it after him: and he must go fast or slow, just as the driver wishes. He must never start at what he sees, nor speak to other horses, nor bite, nor kick, nor have any will of his own; but always do his master’s will, even though he may be very tired or hungry; but the worst of all is, he may neither jump for joy nor lie down for weariness. So you see this breaking in is a great thing.<sup>186</sup>

The passage enumerates the strictures surrounding the life of a work animal but retracts any critique anticipated by this litany with the muted pronouncement: “So you see this breaking in is a great thing.” Beauty eventually determines that in the hands of a good master, the work of a horse is “not half so bad,”<sup>187</sup> and in any case, it is inevitable. Given the racial meaning harnessed

to “Darkie,” as Beauty is still named at this moment in the book, the passage suggests that the suffering of racialized persons is “necessary,” too, and that with a few “pats, kind words, and gentle ways,”<sup>188</sup> one might grow accustomed. In anesthetizing the animal’s sensibility to pain, the animal autobiography envisions an idyllic pool of industrial laborers, insensate and accommodating. In authorizing the animal’s subjection to productive pain, though, the animal autobiography ultimately concedes that if it hurts, so long as it works, so be it.

### **Happily Ever After**

The animal autobiography’s assertion of animal narrators’ contentment despite their “necessary” constraints markedly contrasts with the slave narrative’s depiction of the unrelenting struggle of the enslaved. Frederick Douglass, to take one memorable example, recounts how he is lent to Mr. Covey for his own “breaking in.” Pushed past his limit, Douglass eventually overcomes Covey in a physical struggle, an event that “rekindled the few expiring embers of freedom” and renewed Douglass’s resolve “that, however much [he] might remain a slave in form, the day had passed forever when [he] could be a slave in fact.”<sup>189</sup> In contrast to the slave narrative’s affirmation of aspiration and celebration of resistance, animal autobiographies often negatively represent what we might shorthand here as “animal ambition,” which inevitably misfires. In *Only a Cat*, for example, Blackie scales (among other things) a pile of newly washed blankets, which are stacked “nearly to the ceiling” specifically to prevent him from sleeping on them. Blackie, who is something of a kitten up a tree at this moment, must be helped down by his mistress, who chastises: “I hope you have learnt a lesson, Master Tom, not to climb up ... again.”<sup>190</sup> Blackie’s “ambitious propensities,” as his mistress characterizes them, continue to get him into trouble, however. On another occasion, Blackie influences Downey the kitten to ascend the mantelpiece, whereupon Downey accidentally spills a bottle of black ink onto the carpet,

implying both the dangerous possibility of ambition's contagion as well as the permanent "stain" that accidental success might leave. In the animal autobiography's thematization of animal ambition, high-climbing animals are often accompanied by over-eating animals. For example, Blackie falls ill from poisoned meat, eaten when he ventures outside the bounds of his family's garden in an instance of redoubled overreaching. In "Memoirs of a Cripple," an animal autobiography published in *Our Young Folks*, a captive spider grows larger and hungrier with each casting of her skin, and in her impatience to satiate herself, she loses her temper and eventually her life. As Brandy Parris argues in reading post-Reconstruction children's literature, the story betrays "the fear that freed blacks would grow as a population, demand more resources, and become violent when dissatisfied."<sup>191</sup>

There are countless examples of disastrously high-climbing and otherwise overreaching animals, but the genre's rendering of running away is perhaps most instructive, as it profoundly reconfigures the slave narrative's depiction of the escape from slavery. When animal narrators escape from "captivity," their initiatives often result in a more miserable state of affairs, and thus, an amplified reverence and gratitude for their owners upon their return -- and they almost always return. For instance, after Pussy Meow refuses to heed her mistress's call to come inside the house one evening, she soon encounters an old black cat named Nig, who entices Meow to "visit a friend down by the railroad."<sup>192</sup> After walking along the tracks for some time, the cats reach their destination: "a beautiful yard" with "a large white mansion."<sup>193</sup> At this very moment, however, a bulldog appears, mauls Nig, and chases Meow away. The rest of the night Meow spends lost, lonely, and shivering, reflecting on the consequences of her highly resonant attempt to follow the "railroad" to a loftier place: "we must expect sorrow and shame for disobedience."<sup>194</sup> Meow's misadventures are shared by many animal narrators, but more

importantly, so too are Meow's reflections upon the experience. Frank the dog learns the perils of wandering too far from home when he's caught in terrible thunderstorm while attempting to "steal away" for a few hours unbeknownst to his mistress: "willful thoughts and acts of disobedience invariably, sooner or later, meet with their due reward."<sup>195</sup> Perhaps Polly the parrot expresses it best when his flight from his kind master results in his imprisonment by a cruel little boy: "home was the best place after all."<sup>196</sup>

Authors of slave narratives sometimes speak, if circumspectly, to their disappointment in the liberal promise of freedom upon gaining their freedom from slavery. Harriet Jacobs, for example, laments how northerners "aped the customs of slavery" with segregated railcars.<sup>197</sup> If the animal autobiography, too, demarcates a kind of bounded freedom, it does so ebulliently instead of regretfully. In the final pages of many animal autobiographies, animal narrators frisk along the fence-lines of their limited freedom. Or flit, as the case may be: by the close of *Autobiography of a Canary*, the narrator informs the reader: "[n]o desire for freedom ever comes into my head now, for I am allowed to ... amuse myself ... about the room."<sup>198</sup> Despite multiple mischievous escapes from his cage, the formerly discontented Yoppy the monkey eventually resolves "to make the best of ... confinement," realizing that "there is not a happier animal than Yoppy."<sup>199</sup> Affirming not only his present happiness but also his enduring position, Polly the parrot gleefully reiterates his mistress's promise to provide him with a permanent "place" in the last lines of his narrative: "For ever and ever! For ever and ever!"<sup>200</sup> To chart any narrative progression within the animal autobiography, then, would be to observe not an increase of autonomy nor an improvement in circumstance but the growth of the animal narrator's contentment within situations that remain, well, largely the same.

Or if different, animal narrators' concluding circumstances still seem unequal to the happiness they nonetheless inspire. Whereas the slave narrative charts the expansion of possibility and personhood, the animal autobiography often traces the narrator's diminishment. Although Beauty finds a happy home, he is permanently scarred from breaking his knees due to a reckless drunken rider. Even in the absence of physical scarring, animal narrators often conclude their narratives in their dotage, rather than with the beginnings of a newfound existence. Many animal narrators comment upon their numbered days at the close of their stories with the equanimity of a soul right with their owner, and Blackie of *Only a Cat* as well as the nameless narrator of *Autobiography of a Canary Bird* actually die before finishing their narratives, so that their mistresses must relay their last moments in the final pages of the book. Animals are sometimes killed as a result of poor treatment within animal autobiographies, but their deaths more often exceed any discernable lesson against cruelty. At times, animal deaths even caution against too much kindness, as when the pinch narrator who relays the canary's fatal fit of apoplexy attributes its cause: "he was [either] fed too well" or "tasked his little brain" too much in writing his story.<sup>201</sup>

If animals are not always killed by kindness, animal autobiographies unvaryingly affirm the kindness of killing, exhibiting a somewhat strange fascination with animal euthanasia. The first edition of *Black Beauty* included instructions in the prefatory materials on how to properly euthanize a horse, and in other examples of the genre, such guidelines are detailed in the narrative itself. In *Beautiful Joe*, for instance, Laura's uncle Mr. Wood relays the most merciful way to kill a dog, describing how just that morning he "shot Bruno through his head into his neck" just "a little one side of the top of the skull."<sup>202</sup> For a cat, Mr. Wood advises, cyanide of potassium seems to do the trick. Conversely, *Pussy Meow* recommends chloroforming for cats,

concretizing abstract instructions by vividly portraying the euthanizing of an ailing stray. As Meow recalls, her mistress poured some “medicine on a small cotton pad, and placed it by the cat’s nose. Then she quickly covered her up with a tub, and Guy sat on top of it.”<sup>203</sup> The “cat whined and struggled” for a time, but Meow nonetheless concludes that the chloroformed cat “will thank her [mistress] for the kind act which ended her wretched existence,”<sup>204</sup> presumably in her afterlife.

While euthanasia certainly aims to curtain animal suffering, the high incidence and great detail of mercy killing in many animal autobiographies becomes a disconcerting narrative focus, and further, often betrays rationales that exceed the ending of pain. Meow’s mistress, for instance, euthanizes more animals than one can count on one hand, including a dog who was “not worth trying to save,” though his carcass could be salvaged for the glue factory, we are told.<sup>205</sup> In the animal autobiography’s representation of animal euthanasia, considerations of utility not only rationalize care for animals but also legitimate their very existence – or justify their extermination. Schooled in such warrants for animal welfare, the reader hardly pauses at the (reassuring) stipulation of Merrylegs the pony’s sale in *Black Beauty*: “that he should never be [re]sold, and *when he was past work* that he should be shot and buried.”<sup>206</sup> Through its representation of the decline and death of animal characters, the animal autobiography accomplishes a kind of narrative wish-fulfillment, realizing the desire for the disappearance rather than the incorporation of the black body within the body politic, providing that body is “past work.” The accent upon human agency in representations of animal euthanasia, however, indicates more than the wish for the eventual disappearance of African Americans through colonization schemes or evolutionary eventualities, auguring a frightening solution for “the problem” of the ex-slave in the form of white supremacist violence.

## School's Out

A cursory reading of the animal autobiography's racial project suggests a paternalistic justification of racial subordination. However, the animal autobiography's directive to care for animals, and by implication, animalized others, actually intimates a very different message: the ascription of human subjectivity facilitates new forms of dehumanization; the critique of excessive suffering legitimates forms of "necessary" suffering; and the closing restoration of the animal to a happy home anticipates an even happier end to the animal's very existence. Such an ambivalent ethic of care is characteristic of the post-Reconstruction era, which, as George Frederickson has argued, brandished a "new paternalism" that "was inevitably a tenuous and limited concept in a society devoted to laissez-faire individualism."<sup>207</sup> In other words, post-Reconstruction racial paternalism diverged significantly from proslavery arguments, essentially serving the social relations of industrial capitalism on the platter of a planter society. The encroachment of capital "was made more palatable by a sentimental homage to the Old South."<sup>208</sup> Paternalistic racial rhetoric simply encased the new in the trappings of the old.

Raymond Williams's description of "the residual" may illuminate how the racial paternalism characteristic of the post-Reconstruction era introduced a new mode of racial domination. Distinct from the archaic, the residual "has been effectively formed in the past, but it is still active in the cultural process ... as an effective element of the present."<sup>209</sup> While the residual may be oppositional to dominant cultural formations, Williams also describes a manifestation of the residual "wholly or largely incorporated into the dominant culture."<sup>210</sup> The examples that Williams provides – organized religion, organic community, selective tradition – all suggest that residual cultural elements tend to authorize material processes that work towards their own dismantling. I understand the ostensive racial paternalism of the animal autobiography

and the post-Reconstruction era more generally along these lines: as the revivification of a residual cultural element that actually palliates a radical reconfiguration of the racial order, one characterized less by the assumption than by the displacement of white “responsibility,” less by “care” than by “use,” less by protection than by violence, and ultimately, less by recognizing black subjectivity than by reaffirming black inhumanity. This realization raises another question: if the animal autobiography evinces a residual expression of racial paternalism, one that ushers in a radically new racial order, how might the genre’s expression of care for animals themselves be understood? How might the formal organization and legislation on behalf of animals over the latter decades of the nineteenth century actually resuscitate antebellum anti-cruelty sentiment to ease the configuration of jarringly new forms of animal exploitation at the height of industrial capitalism? This question is worth asking, even if its answer is beyond the purview of the current discussion.

In any case, the reverse directionality of the animal autobiography’s assertion of care unsettles not only the genre’s pedagogical purpose – to instill kindness to animals – but also its presumed pedagogical object – the hearts of children. Tellingly, the majority of child characters in animal autobiographies seem to have graduated past the grade level of anti-cruelty lessons. Although bad little boys make their cameos, far more often, and almost always when they are central characters, children appear as the caretakers of adoring animals or the saviors of suffering animals. Such representations reflect wider post-bellum shifts in the cultural construction of childhood, whereby the Lockean child, who through proper instruction might achieve sound character, became the Romantic child, who through careful protection might counter the effects of – or proffer an ideational sanctum from – a fast-changing, self-interested society. By the end of the nineteenth century, children were born, not made, good. Furthermore, within

representational forms, they found a new role in exerting their innocence as a corrective for a cruel world.<sup>211</sup> The kindness and assiduousness of child pet-keepers such as Laura of *Beautiful Joe* or Polly of *Dickey Downy* thus markedly contrasts with the cruelty of working-class masters. Even when they don't play a central role as good mistresses or masters, children often briefly appear to intervene in animal suffering, from the little girl who offers a cookie to the captive Yoppy to the little boy who convinces his grandfather to save Beauty at an auction. Such children work to endorse Beautiful Joe's belief: "I have seen many cruel men and women, [but] I have seen few cruel children."<sup>212</sup>

As scholars have observed, with the emergence of the Romantic child in the post-bellum era, didactic children's literature largely gave way to non-moralizing, imaginative forms, since new notions of childhood demanded not the formation of character but the preservation of innocence.<sup>213</sup> The persistence of the animal autobiography's anti-cruelty instruction within a wider cultural context in which moral education for children became increasingly moot reflects, on the one hand, the unevenness of historical transformation.<sup>214</sup> On the other hand, the didacticism of the animal autobiography indicates an expanded intended audience. Anna Sewall originally wrote *Black Beauty* for late adolescent grooms and drivers of horses, though it was and is read by younger children. In the American context, too, missionary education endeavors amongst Native American and African American youth adopted *Black Beauty* as curriculum, corroborating our previous discussion of the expanded disciplinary reach of late nineteenth century anti-cruelty campaigns beyond the white bourgeois child.<sup>215</sup> Even so, the genre's representations of angelic children suggest its pedagogical project cannot sufficiently be summed up as the promotion of benevolence to animals, or rather, that this aim had an uneven application across multiple audiences.

The animal autobiography's education in race relations, however, intends the full reach of its readership, and this lesson not only considers the child as a recipient, but also employs the child as a figure. If animal characters often trope blackness, the child as often represents whiteness. Miss Dorothy, the little girl who eventually shelters the runaway Meow, possesses "laughing blue eyes and long golden hair."<sup>216</sup> Yoppy the monkey similarly notes the aforesaid cookie-dispenser's "long yellow curls" and "soft and white" hands, which he further contrasts with his own: "not at all like mine."<sup>217</sup> The animal autobiography substantiates Robin Bernstein's argument that the performance of whiteness through Romantic childhood enabled racial projects "to appear natural, inevitable," and "innocent" within nineteenth century sentimental culture.<sup>218</sup> The "racial innocence" conferred by the Romantic child lent itself to divergent racial projects according to Bernstein's attentive reading, but in the case of the animal autobiography, the propinquity between the white child and the black animal tends to impart blamelessness to the continuation of racial domination.

For within animal autobiographies, children often appear not just innocent, but innocently injurious. In *Pussy Meow*, the blonde, blue-eyed Dorothy accidentally ties a ribbon "too loosely" around Meow's neck, which causes Meow's jaw to become uncomfortably caught. The anecdote easily reconciles Dorothy's kindness with Meow's predicament, casting the incident as an honest mistake while suggesting the dangers of too long a leash. Similarly, when Blackie of *Only a Cat* meets his mistress's new niece, the "fair baby" pulls the cat's tail, but of course she knows no better, so Blackie "never attempt[s] to scratch her,"<sup>219</sup> but only "mew[s] very gently." Meanwhile, the observing mother declares she "never saw such a harmonious contrast" as the juxtaposition between the "white frock" of the white baby and the "shiny black coat of ... [the]

beautiful cat.”<sup>220</sup> Insofar as the baby here signifies “whiteness” as well as “innocence,” she furnishes an ideology of “white innocence” that recasts coercion as congenial relation.

Even older children innocuously inflict animal suffering. In *Black Beauty*, some boys mistreat Merrylegs the pony, but they are judged guiltless of animal cruelty. The boys mount Merrylegs again and again, each time applying a hazel stick for a riding whip, so the pony instructs them by simply laying them “on the grass, and so on, till they were able to understand, that was all.”<sup>221</sup> Remarkably, Merrylegs believes: “They are not bad boys; they don’t wish to be cruel. I like them very well.”<sup>222</sup> Such scenes that exculpate unkindness accomplish a profound departure from earlier nineteenth century lessons instilling awareness of animal sentience, wherein child characters are excoriated, not exonerated, for animal cruelty. Further, whereas earlier anti-cruelty lessons charged the child with the care of the animal, here the animal is saddled, even literally, with responsibility for the child. As animal characters like Merrylegs endure the pain the unconscious child inflicts or (fail to) inspire the consideration the unwitting child withholds, the animal autobiography assuages the conscience of the nation, absolving its histories and its futures of racialized violence.

In the company of bad animals, the child assumes a slightly different representational function, figuring the imperilment as much as the innocence of whiteness. In *The Autobiography of Frank*, for example, the canine narrator relates a representative story of a cherubic child endangered by an unprincipled animal. In this story, a little boy named Markie Davidson, whose “face had such a sunshine of happiness beaming from it” and whose “voice sent forth such gleeful sounds,”<sup>223</sup> meets a premature end due to the obstinacy of a donkey named Moses. To celebrate his birthday, Markie and his friend Ted decide to ride Moses up and down Colnbury Hill. At the end of the day, Ted remembers that he’s “gone and dropped that plaguy ‘Uncle

Tom's Cabin" he'd brought with him. Ted returns to find his book while Markie amuses himself "by playfully tormenting his dumb companion," who far from "proving an obedient pupil," stands "rooted to the spot, immovable."<sup>224</sup> As Ted fails to return quickly, Markie urges Moses, "the most obstinate of his race,"<sup>225</sup> up the hill once more. As he reaches the summit and Ted shouts a greeting, Moses starts and shies, and throws Markie "with sudden violence backwards on the ground."<sup>226</sup> Markie is bedridden due to the fall, and eventually dies from his injuries. The story of Markie Davidson suggests black ascendancy results in the compromised integrity of the white body. If Moses the donkey is responsible for Markie's injuries, however, this hardly means that Markie is equally indebted to care for him – in fact, the narrative presents, or attempts to present, Markie's "playful tormenting" of Moses as somewhat cute. And as the story implies the ultimate cause of Markie's death is "that plaguy 'Uncle Tom's Cabin,'" it suggests the white assumption of moral responsibility for ameliorating the condition of blacks is not an imperative but a liability. Put simply, the story recommends the substitution of racial paternalism with racial responsabilization.

Historical events such as the Mary Ellen Wilson case of 1874, in which the first legal prosecution of child abuse appealed to animal cruelty statutes, and historical developments such as the emergence of humane societies, which eventually aimed to alleviate the suffering of both children and animals, may invite a simplified reading of the co-construction of nineteenth-century childhood and animality. However, the animal autobiography suggests less an easy correspondence between than a curious transposition of the cultural status of the child and the animal over the course of the nineteenth century. The pedagogical project of instilling kindness to animals was eventually supplanted by a racial project of extolling the inherent kindness of (white) children. In its profoundest rewriting of the slave narrative, the animal autobiography

substitutes the schooling in abolitionist sentiment with an education in white innocence and black culpability. Ramifying far beyond the condemnation of animal cruelty, the genre thus contributed to the making of a modern discourse of black criminality that hinged upon the humanization of the animal and effectively perpetuated the animalization of the human.

### **Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have argued that the material forms of children's literature contributed to a shift in the valence of animal sentience, such that the animal capable of feeling bodily pain became the animal capable of human feeling over the course of the American nineteenth century. Further, I have explored how the attribution of "humanity" to animal life shaped new modes of racial subjugation that hinged upon a limited recognition of black humanity. In reading the animal autobiography as the culminating expression of the developments this chapter traces, I have shown how children's literature facilitated the transformation from paternalistic forms of racial subjugation to a racial order sustained by notions of black culpability and white innocence.

Yet I do not mean to say that to agitate for the ethical treatment of animals is to aid and abet reactionary racial politics. In writing this chapter about the pitfalls of anthropomorphism, I have not meant to suggest that animals are not capable of pain, or emotion, or cognition, for that matter. In my mind, the dangers of what Franz de Waal deems as "anthropodenial," or the a priori rejection of the shared characteristics of human and non-human animals, loom just as largely. And not all anthropomorphisms are equal. In fact, de Waal himself advances an alternative to the "anthropocentric anthropomorphism" that we find in nineteenth century children's literature in "animalcentric anthropomorphism," which avoids "the mere projection of human experience onto animals,"<sup>227</sup> but still acknowledges capacities such as sentience, emotion, and cognition in some non-human species. While ethologists such as de Waal have shown the

anthropocentrism of some forms of anthropomorphism, and philosophers such as Cora Diamond as well as critics such as Cary Wolfe have troubled the use of a human rights framework to advocate for the well-being of animals,<sup>228</sup> anthropomorphism is more often recuperated to unsettle anthropodential than positioned as an object of critique in and of itself in the field.<sup>229</sup> To the extent that anthropomorphism is cautioned against, in fact, it is cast as something of a venial sin.

This discussion has shown the humanization of the animal to be far from innocent in its effects, however. As the question of the animal becomes increasingly central to American studies scholarship, then, it is crucial that critics continue to frame this question in committedly posthumanist terms. And while the affirmation of non-human animals' ontological complexity rightly remains at stake in these investigations, it is imperative that scholars ask something more of animal life than, "Can they suffer?" What would it mean to recognize non-human animals as capable of suffering, and capable of more than suffering? What would it mean to consider this "something more" as something other than the mark of the human? And how might the present expanse of human and non-human animal suffering be altered if we were to attend to the ways in which human and non-human histories – and alternative futurities for both humans and other animals – are not just intimately, but unpredictably bound?

## Chapter 2: The Incorporation of the Animal

Within several urtexts of critical animal studies, the natural philosopher René Descartes's description of the animal as a kind of automaton marks a decisive break in human-animal relations. For Jacques Derrida, the treatment of the animal within the Western philosophical tradition can be traced back to Descartes's famous pronouncement that insofar as the animal is determined by natural law, the animal "neither speaks nor responds."<sup>1</sup> According to John Berger, as well, it was Descartes's dualistic philosophy severing body from soul that bequeathed "the body to the laws of physics and mechanics" and reduced the animal to the realm of the bodily entirely.<sup>2</sup> However, as Anita Guerrini has pointed out, while Descartes described the animal as an automaton as early as the middle of the seventeenth century, few of his contemporaries actually translated mechanical philosophy's "methodological principle," an approach to research presuming a mechanistic understanding of the natural world, to a "moral principle," an effective belief that animals really are machines, incapable of thought, insusceptible to pain.<sup>3</sup> Although Descartes may have first described the animal as an automaton in the annals of philosophical literature, the popularization of this conceptualization of animal life should be considered not only in connection to evolutions in philosophical thought, but also in relationship to the social practices and institutional forms accompanying capitalism's global expansion.

By the end of the nineteenth century, the trans-Atlantic world underwent a wider popularization of the understanding of the animal as automaton. Of course, it is beyond the purview of this chapter to provide an exhaustive mapping of the multiple, interconnected activities (including industrial slaughter) that gave rise to the animal-machine. However, this chapter explores how the Cartesian understanding of the animal as an automaton was revitalized

within visual technologies such as stop-motion photography. Additionally, this chapter illuminates how the farming developments that ushered in the rise of agribusiness and the representational modes of naturalist literature shaped the construction of animal life in the age of the machine. Crucially, this chapter construes these developments as productive of the imagining of animal life, firmly situating the animal-machine within concrete interspecies practices and material human-animal relations.

Mark Seltzer has anticipated this chapter's exploration of naturalist literature, specifically, in describing the denaturalized nature of the naturalist imagination, which, for Seltzer, is inextricably tied to the emergence of the modern biopolitical state. In his study of "the body-machine complex," Seltzer takes up Michel Foucault's suggestion that the rise of a disciplinary society made possible an investigation into "Man-the-Machine."<sup>4</sup> Yet the procedures Foucault describes and Seltzer treats also implicated and continue to entangle animal life, the significance of which is often ignored. Indeed, in the Foucauldian account of the advent of modern biopower, it is less "life itself" than *human* "life itself" that emerges as the point of power's application. If we were to consider the bonanza wheat farm alongside the factory, the meat-packing plant as well as the military barracks, a very different account of the workings of modern biopower might emerge, one in which the animal-machine accompanies and advances the advent of Man-the-Machine. Following the recent work of animal studies scholars such as Cary Wolfe and Nicole Shukin, this chapter seeks to address this omission, offering an account of the workings of modern bio-power that crosses species lines.<sup>5</sup>

In exploring the "animal-machine complex," to riff on Seltzer, this chapter ultimately illuminates the flexible forms of racialization enabled by the production of unnatural nature at the height of industrial capitalism. In Eadweard Muybridge's famous photography study

conducted at the University of Pennsylvania, *Animal Locomotion* (1887), stop-motion photography's capture of the animal body constructs the laboring, racialized body as wholly body, freed from pain, ready for and reducible to its instrumental use. Whereas Muybridge's photography configures the animal as a mechanism operating according to an unalterable natural law, Frank Norris's *The Octopus* (1901) casts the animal-machine in a slightly different mold. The novel often imagines animal nature as endlessly malleable and so infinitely exploitable, employing a metonymic slide between the Chinese migrant worker and the work animal not only to authorize the hyper-exploitation of human labor but also to secure the sense of racial difference unsettled by this imagining of makeable nature.

Ultimately, this chapter shows how the concept of the animal-machine facilitated the global expansion of capital and the importation of transnational labor as a newly exploitable workforce after the formal end of slavery. Yet this chapter also highlights the cultural anxieties accompanying the mechanization of animal life, arguing that the frequently cited crisis of human sovereignty at this historical moment was embedded in what turns out to have been a vexed realignment of the human-animal divide. In other words, the animal-machine was not an untroubled means of reconsolidating social hegemony. The mechanical casting of animal nature, however expedient it may have proved for a number of racial projects, simultaneously occasioned a crisis in political liberalism's positioning of the female body as a site of recuperation from the ravages of industrial capitalism. As this chapter tracks the tension between the animal's gendered and racial deployments, it shows how the animal-machine eroded the mainstay of capitalism's moral authority: the fiction of a sphere of natural existence alternative to and uncorrupted by civil society.

### **From Emotion to Locomotion in the Age of Animal Reproduction**

In 1872, Charles Darwin published *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*. Originally conceived as a single chapter of *The Descent of Man* (1871), the sheer bulk of the material eventually required a separate treatise that would, like its forerunners, trouble the ontological status of the human, this time by outlining a series of general principles explaining the expression of various emotions and sensations in humans and other animals. In this work, Darwin adduces three major principles to account for the evolution of emotional expressions. The first principle of “serviceable associated habits” suggests that actions that were at one time serviceable are triggered habitually whenever the same state of mind occurs, even if the expression is no longer of any practical use in the new situation. For example, Darwin observes, cats and dogs often turn around several times and scratch the ground before they lay down – an action which is no longer serviceable in the context of the bourgeois interior, but no doubt had its use when these animals made their beds in foliage out of doors. The second principle, the “principle of antithesis,” suggests that there will be an involuntary tendency to perform actions exactly opposite to actions that are serviceable (or were once serviceable) in a contrasting state of mind. For instance, the dog that slinks in submission inverts the actually serviceable postures of aggression. The third principle, “direct action of the nervous system,” refers to processes that happen automatically in the body in response to particular physiological stimuli, such as starting or blinking when one is frightened.<sup>6</sup>

A cursory glance at Darwin’s *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* might conclude that it reduces the experience of emotion to a matter of biological determinism. However, while the reflexive reactions explained by the third principle of the study would invite this reading, Darwin appears much more interested in the first two principles that he describes, which resist the characterization of both the human and non-human body as mechanistic. In

reading *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*, Elizabeth Wilson offers a useful interpretation of the way in which the text traffics in Lamarckian notions, suggesting that Darwin thus illustrates “the entangled nature of the biology-psychology interface.”<sup>7</sup> According to Wilson, Darwin anticipates the insights of contemporary neurophysiology in suggesting that “biology does not act without psychology,” and that even “events governed by reflexive (autonomic) systems are embroiled in and amplified by psychic action.”<sup>8</sup> Building on Wilson’s reading, I would go so far as to say *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* uncannily prefigures the arguments of scholars such as Brian Massumi in its configuration of the relationship between affect, bodily movement, and historical change.<sup>9</sup> Far from asserting the primacy of physiological processes, Darwin appears to refuse the separation of embodiment and emotion. And as he attributes the former to the human animal, he likewise extends the latter to the non-human animal.

*The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* is a useful point of departure for this discussion, as the text participates in the nineteenth-century attribution of sentience to animals, and thus serves as something of a foil for the contrastive notion of the animal-machine that this chapter explores. But further, *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* introduces some of the representational strategies that will prove instrumental in the remaking of animal nature along these lines. Specifically, Darwin’s text was one of the first scientific treatises to use photographic illustrations. While photography had become quite current in Victorian popular culture by the time of the text’s publication, photographic representation was not yet a staple of scientific discourse. Tellingly, the 29 photographic illustrations of *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* do not quite function as photography would soon be purposed: as the scientific record of incontrovertible fact. Of course, the photographs in the study do provide a

kind of documentary evidence for the arguments that Darwin makes. However, as Phillip Prodger rightly observes, the photographs that Darwin selected for inclusion were intended primarily “to interest and engage his readers,” and they hardly assume the status of scientific evidence.<sup>10</sup>

In many ways, Darwin’s mainly rhetorical usage of photography was overdetermined by the development of photographic technology at the time. Darwin commissioned most of the photographic illustrations for *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* from Oscar Gustave Rejlander, an expatriate Swede living in London at the time. Given current exposure times of ten to twelve seconds and the unavailability of artificial light, Rejlander faced considerable difficulties in attempting to capture momentary expressions of fear, anger, sadness, and so forth. Accordingly, he often manipulated his photographs to produce the desired image. One of the most famous photographs from *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*, in fact, is actually a photographic copy of a drawing of an original photograph. While “Ginx’s Baby” was widely reproduced and distributed in Victorian England as a marvel of “instantaneous” photography (Figure 1), the image was actually produced by carefully copying a photograph onto paper, defining and darkening its details, and then photographing the drawing itself. Among other embellishments, Rejlander’s drawing of “Ginx’s Baby” placed the child on a padded chair that was missing from the original sitting.<sup>11</sup> Far from providing an objective record of physiognomic facts, then, Rejlander sought to construct realistic images that “contributed little of scientific value” to *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*, as Prodger argues. Of course, the photographs included within Darwin’s text significantly enhanced its arguments: the important point is simply that these photographs intended to be illustrative, not evidentiary. In the same year in which Darwin’s *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*



Figure 1. "Ginx's Baby." Photograph by Oscar Rejlander. Illustration from Charles Darwin, *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*, Plate 18.

was published, Eadweard Muybridge began experimenting with photographic studies of animal movement. Muybridge had earlier achieved a modicum of celebrity with his landscape photography of the Western United States and Central America. Consequently, he was approached by Leland Stanford – governor of California, president of the Central Pacific Railroad, and horse-racing connoisseur – who wanted to determine whether all four feet of a horse leave the ground during a trot, apocryphally, in order to settle a bet. In 1872, Muybridge successfully photographed Stanford's horse, Occident, and Stanford subsequently employed Muybridge on a continuing basis over the next decade to conduct photographic experiments that might prove useful in training his horses. Muybridge was certainly aware of Darwin's previous study of animal e/motion, and eventually, he even adapted a system that Rejlander had actually proposed (but never attempted) in a short paper published subsequent to *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*.<sup>12</sup> The photographic technique consisted of setting up a battery of cameras that would be sequentially triggered as a horse passed across the field of vision, thus capturing the animal's postural transitions from one moment to another. By 1879, Muybridge's work at Stanford's stable in Palo Alto was finished. He spent the next few years preparing a book based on his photographic studies, *Attitudes of the Horse in Motion* (1881), while giving lectures that were highlighted by the use of his zoöpraxiscope, a device that projected the sequential photographs as a motion picture – and thus began film.

It is perhaps a testament to the historical shifts in human apperception that eventuated from Muybridge's work that his plates no longer strike the contemporary viewer as disconcertingly strange. At the time of their introduction, however, the photographs disputed, for instance, the traditional artistic representation of a galloping horse with legs fully extended rather than gathered beneath the body in midair.<sup>13</sup> During his lecture tours, Muybridge often

controverted the skepticism of audience members through the use of his zoöpraxiscope, demonstrating that the awkward-seeming transitional moments of an animal's gait were in fact neither chance singularities nor doctored impossibilities, but natural and necessary to the animal's movement –or as Muybridge would soon call it – locomotion.

Of course, critics have long troubled the indexical nature of the photographic image presumed by Muybridge's motion studies. Alan Sekula, for instance, has argued that the photograph is an “incomplete utterance, a message that depends on some external matrix of presuppositions” for its meaning.<sup>14</sup> For John Tagg, as well, the presentation of the photograph as an unmediated imprint of the real is not only the central obstacle to the realization of the rhetoricity of the image, but also the photograph's “most powerful rhetorical device.”<sup>15</sup> Both Sekula and Tagg have argued that photography acquired its evidentiary force as it was incorporated as a technology of disciplinary power over the latter half of the nineteenth century. Within criminal proceedings, anthropological studies, medical records, and documentary work, photography was instrumentalized as a means of record and a source of truth, lending credibility to these new forms of scientific knowledge and facilitating the expansion of new tactics of disciplinary power.

Importantly, the use of photography to study the non-human animal body anticipated and facilitated the production of the human body through scientific photography. In fact, Muybridge is not the only notable nineteenth-century practitioner to photograph non-human animal movement. When in 1878, Étienne Jules-Marey viewed some of Muybridge's photographs in the French scientific journal *La Nature*, he immediately began corresponding with Muybridge, and eventually developed his own photographic method for analyzing animal motion, adding a number of photographic inventions to the long list of instruments he had developed for this

purpose.<sup>16</sup> During the years that Muybridge was photographing Stanford's horses, in fact, Marey had been busy attaching graphic inscriptors to horses' hooves to study their movement through time and space. The French physiologist, medical inventor, and harbinger of aviation technology amassed the results of these studies in *La Machine Animale*, or *Animal Mechanism* (1873), which posits the animal is an "animated motor," the phrase often used to signify animal life throughout the text. For Marey, the animated motor was essentially no different from "inanimate motors," or man-made machines, excepting, perhaps, the animal-machine's greater efficiency.<sup>17</sup> In short, Marey considered animal life as a purely mechanical phenomena, governed by the same laws of physics that rule inanimate nature. After his introduction to Muybridge's work, Marey developed the chronophotographic gun, which substituted Muybridge's battery of cameras with a single, rapidly rotating slotted-disk shutter that exposed a single plate multiple times to capture successive bodily movements. By 1882, Marey had assembled the instrument, which could monitor *all* the working parts of any given "animated motor" at once, allowing for a totalizing rationalization of the animal body – or in keeping with Marey's terminology, the animal mechanism.

While Marey's mechanistic philosophy of animal life antedates these photographic experiments, of course, his enthusiasm for Muybridge's work as well as his subsequent development of chronophotography suggest that new photographic technologies played an important role in producing (and popularizing) the late nineteenth-century conceptualization of the animal-machine. Crucially, photographic technologies were not simply recruited to a preexistent scientific project of schematizing the animal body, but were actually highly productive of the kind of body to which such taxonomic schemas might be applied. The photographic studies of Marey and Muybridge employ those disciplinary tactics that Foucault

describes: distributing bodies in space, calibrating action to temporal schemas, and serializing the succession of bodily movements. At each stage of motion, Muybridge's bodies are caught in what Brian Massumi might call a concrete possibility, a "normative variation" of endless, indeterminable potentialities. In other words, Muybridge's photography removes the body from the sphere of the virtual, which for Massumi, is the highly potentialized incorporeal dimension of the body. Muybridge's photographic experiments configure matter as "being" instead of "doing," repudiating the qualitative transformation of the body through affective experience. Arguably, it is the serialization of bodily movement that plays the most significant role in the remaking of animal nature within stop-motion photography. For the apprehension of animal motion within the photographic series actualizes the body not only within space but also through time. The body image that emerges within Muybridge's experiments, then, is qualitatively different from and in fact the polar opposite of what Massumi describes as "the body without an image," which registers "the in-between-ness of the incorporeal event."<sup>18</sup> To put it briefly, the materialization of the body within Muybridge's studies is a body stripped of all affective properties – let's say perspectives – and all transformative potentialities – still keeping with Massumi's terminology.

By limiting the transformative potentialities of movement to the normative and normativizing instance, Muybridge's photographs construct the animal's movement as unfolding with the inevitability of natural law. This observation suggests a significant revision of Mark Seltzer's understanding of the status of nature in the age of the machine. While Seltzer observes the "denaturalization of nature" over the course of the machine age, he argues that "the 'discovery' that bodies and persons are things that can be made" is the decisive development.<sup>19</sup> The problem with this analysis is the simplification of the complicated relay between "the natural" and "the technological." In describing the denaturalization of nature, Seltzer tends to

rely – in the last instance, at least – upon the abstracting effects of regulatory forms of power applied to populations, rather than attending to the concretizing effects of disciplinary forms of power applied to individual bodies. In so doing, he submerges what Foucault raises as the paradoxical result of the manipulations of the body within disciplinary forms of power: the body thus reveals its “natural machinery” or yields “the conditions of functioning proper to an organism.”<sup>20</sup> To put it plainly, it is not only the instrumentalization of the body that follows, but also the conceptualization of the body as determined by mechanical certainties that instrumentalization might ascertain and thereby more effectively utilize. Animal movement within Muybridge’s studies manifests as predictably automated, not endlessly adaptable. Indeed, in the stock lecture given during his European tour in the early 1880s – illustrated with the zoöpraxiscope, of course – Muybridge sums up his description of the different gaits of the horse – note the definite article – with the statement that among various specimens, “There is little essential difference in general characteristics of either of the several movements that have been described.”<sup>21</sup>

Muybridge’s early photographic experiments were more narrowly focused on the bodily mechanism of Stanford’s horses. However, during the same lecture tour mentioned above, Muybridge parted with Stanford over a copyright dispute, which would eventually lead him to expand the scope of his studies. While Muybridge was in London, Stanford published *The Horse in Motion* (1882), which contained five of Muybridge’s photographs and ninety-one lithographs based on his work at Palo Alto, but which nowhere attributed any of the images to Muybridge. Stanford had relegated Muybridge to the role of a technician, and Muybridge was furious. Thus when Muybridge returned to the U.S., he began an extended lecture tour seeking new patronage for a new and elaborate project addressing the attitudes of man, the horse, and other animals in

motion, which had the added effect of increasing the public's exposure to his work. Muybridge eventually found his sponsor in the University of Pennsylvania. The grounds of the newly created Veterinary Department at the University of Pennsylvania were allocated for the photographer's use, and the university advanced an initial sum of \$5,000 towards the completion of the project. Between the years of 1884 and 1885, Muybridge took over 100,000 sequential photographs, recording animals' postural transitions from one moment to another while they enacted a wide range of daily activities. From these studies, he published *Animal Locomotion* (1887), a collection of 781 collotype plates intended for the advancement of art and science.<sup>22</sup>

Of the 781 plates of *Animal Locomotion*, 561 display human subjects. Significantly, many of the activities that Muybridge records are forms of manual labor, which range from shoveling to sawing to laying brick (Figure 2). Indeed, *Animal Locomotion* marks one of the first uses of photography to analyze the working human body in order to better calibrate its movement in relation to productive ends. In so doing, Muybridge anticipates, and very likely inspired, the later photographic experiments of Frank and Lillian Gilbreth, who more famously brought photography to bear on workplace rationalization schemes in the first decades of the twentieth century.<sup>23</sup> Indeed, the subjects of the Gilbreths' most significant studies, ranging from bricklaying to using weapons, were first captured by Muybridge's photographic experiments. More famously than the Gilbreths, even, Frederick Winslow Taylor applied Muybridge's attention to the movement of the body through time to develop ergonomic recommendations for increasing the efficiency of repetitive assembly line work. Taylor used a stopwatch, not a camera, but he followed in the footsteps of Muybridge and Marey in conducting his own time-motion studies. Significantly, Taylor concocted his "systems of scientific management around ... the figure of a gorilla predisposed to the labor of mass production," as Nicole Shukin has




Figure 2. "Bricklaying." Eadweard Muybridge, *Animal Locomotion*, Vol. 2: Plate 505, 762-763.

argued.<sup>24</sup> In discussing the handling of pig iron, “perhaps the crudest and most elementary form of labor which is performed by man,”<sup>25</sup> Taylor suggests the job “is so crude and elementary in its nature that the writer firmly believes that it would be possible to train an intelligent gorilla” to do it.<sup>26</sup> In fact, a gorilla would be better than a man, Taylor suggests, for “one of the very first requirements for a man who is fit to handle pig iron as a regular occupation is that he shall be so stupid and so phlegmatic that he more merely resembles in his mental make-up the ox.”<sup>27</sup> In short, the secret to realizing the dream of perfect efficiency for Taylor is to find an ox-type who might be suited for each ox-task. Muybridge’s studies of animal motion accomplish just such a discovery.

In *Animal Locomotion*, Muybridge’s fascinating scripting of human figures naturalizes the position of different “types” of human animals within the division of labor. For instance, five of Muybridge’s 781 collotype plates feature a mixed race pugilist named Ben Bailey, who supplies the perfect image of the unskilled laborer that Frederick Winslow Taylor describes in *The Principles of Scientific Management* (1911). Given the pervasive representations of manual labor in *Animal Locomotion*, it is curious that Bailey does not perform a single functional task. Instead, he is shown walking, ascending and descending stairs (Figure 3), striking blows with his right hand and his left hand (Figure 4), and throwing an enormously large rock (Figure 5). However, if Bailey does not perform any instrumental activity within the photographic series in which he appears, this is all the better to render his body ready for and reducible to its instrumental use. In the demonstration of simplified, isolated movements, Bailey’s plates suggest that the natural law of the black body unfolds in the impressive (if caveman-like) physical feat of hurling a heavy rock, or more menacingly, the violent act of throwing a punch. In the photographic representation of Ben Bailey, the black “mechanism” is figured as naturally suited




Figure 3. "Ascending Stairs." Photograph of Ben Bailey. Eadweard Muybridge, *Animal Locomotion*, Vol 1: Plate 91, 54-55.




Figure 4. "Striking a Blow with Right Hand." Photograph of Ben Bailey. Eadweard Muybridge, *Animal Locomotion*, Vol 1: Plate 344, 182-183.




Figure 5. "Heaving a 75-Ib. Rock." Photograph of Ben Bailey. Eadweard Muybridge, *Animal Locomotion*, Vol 1: Plate 311, 160-161.

for unskilled labor, and especially needful of management of diverse kinds.

The fact that Muybridge imagined the photographs of Ben Bailey to represent a particular species of man is confirmed by the fact that on June 2<sup>nd</sup>, the day Muybridge photographed Ben Bailey, he introduced an anthropometric grid for the first time. The anthropometric grid behind Ben Bailey maps the postures through which he moves as somatic certainties, equivalent to bodily measurements, and as productive of racial typologies that might support the presumed superiority of the white man. As Elspeth Brown has discussed at length, Muybridge's introduction of the grid when he photographed Ben Bailey confirms his "investment in gendered evolutionary race science."<sup>28</sup> Brown writes, "It is as if the non-white 'other' cannot be understood, scientifically, without the anthropometric grid, a technology for mapping racial difference."<sup>29</sup> Brown hypothesizes that Muybridge borrowed the idea of the anthropometric grid from J. H. Lamprey, who in a London-based anthropological journal as early as 1869, used a grid of silk threads at two-inch intervals to better measure physiognomic differences when photographing racial types. Yet the grid was not widely popularized at the time, and indeed, it makes its very first appearance in the American context with Muybridge's photography. Marta Braun proposes that Joseph Leidy, who was one of the committee of nine professors and doctors assigned to "oversee" Muybridge's photographic experiments, and who was a member of the Ethnological Society of London, may have suggested the grid to Muybridge.<sup>30</sup> However, as Braun herself notes, Muybridge's committee was a mainly a formality: they met only once and rarely came to watch Muybridge at work. The one committee member who took an especial interest in Muybridge's work, the artist Thomas Eakins, soon abandoned any attempt to inform Muybridge's method: when Eakins argued for the advantages of the Marey-wheel camera in lieu of Muybridge's signature battery of cameras, for instance, Muybridge just ignored him with

characteristic obstinacy, and Eakins soon gave up on any collaboration with Muybridge to pursue his own photographic work independently.<sup>31</sup> Given the unlikeliness of Muybridge's chance encounter with the professional ethological journal published across the pond, however, we might consider the possibility that Muybridge's grid was developed independently of Lamprey's earlier usage.

When Muybridge first began his studies at the University of Pennsylvania in the summer of 1884, he suffered a number of setbacks. It took longer than Muybridge had estimated to build his outdoor studio, and in fact, it was not finished until the following autumn. However, Muybridge and his assistants were able to make 600 negatives at Philadelphia's Zoological Garden during the summer of 1884. Most of these photographs were discarded, as the bars of the animals' cages often cast distracting shadows on the subjects' bodies. However, the few photographs from the Philadelphia Zoological Garden that were ultimately included in *Animal Locomotion* suggest the animals' cages did more than interfere with a clear photographic image, and actually contributed to the development of Muybridge's photographic method. In the images of a kangaroo jumping (Figure 6) or an eland trotting (Figure 7), to take just a few instances of the zoo animals offset by bars, the cage forms a ready-made grid against which bodily movements might be spatially measured. I want to raise the possibility that Muybridge developed his own grid independently of Lamprey based on his incidental observation that the bars of the animals' cages might actually contribute to a more accurate reading of their bodily positions. At the very least, the work at the Philadelphia Zoological Gardens would have provided Muybridge with convincing evidence for usefulness of a gridded backdrop for his subsequent subjects. To suggest this source for Muybridge's grid is actually not to distance Muybridge's photography from racial science, however, but rather to reinforce it. If Ben Bailey is the first human animal to




Figure 6. "Kangaroo Jumping." Eadweard Muybridge, *Animal Locomotion*, Vol. 3: Plate 753, 1526-1527.




Figure 7. "Eland Trotting." Eadweard Muybridge, *Animal Locomotion*, Vol. 3: Plate 696, 1448-1449.

be made intelligible by the wires of a cage in Muybridge's studies, this all the more attests that Muybridge envisioned Bailey's "natural" place among other non-human animals.

*Animal Locomotion* portrays the "natural" position of the female body as well as the "natural" position of the black body within gendered, racialized divisions of labor. Both men and women walk, run, jump, lift objects, and ascend and descend inclines and sets of stairs. However, the photographs of men depict forms of manual labor such as carpentry, masonry, and blacksmithing; women, on the other hand, perform domestic work such as sweeping, washing floors, and scrubbing floors (Figure 8). When captured in the photographic series, the performance of nineteenth-century gender roles through culturally coded activities such as tipping a hat, in the case of men, or flirting a fan, in the case of women, likewise appears the inevitable operation of the bodily mechanism of the male or female (Figure 9). And just as the photographs of Ben Bailey align him closer to the non-human animal along the spectrum of species, women seem to occupy a lower rung on the evolutionary ladder. In repeatedly photographing women performing activities that require kneeling or stooping, Muybridge seems to play out scenes of evolutionary progression or regression, depending upon the particular phase of movement chaptered. Perhaps most strikingly, Plates 182-184 actually depict a woman "Crawling on hands and knees" and "Walking on hands and knees" (Figure 10), just like the quadrupeds in the final volumes of *Animal Locomotion*.

Yet the depiction of the female animal often seems to defy rather than typify the mechanistic representation of the body towards which Muybridge's photography tends. In other words, if the female body appears undoubtedly animal, it does not always seem the machine. When women are the objects of representation, there is often an element of accident, whimsy, or even outright absurdity in the story the serialized photographs tell. As is seldom the case with




Figure 8. "Kneeling on Right Knee and Scrubbing the Floor." Eadweard Muybridge, *Animal Locomotion*, Vol. 1: Plate 252, 490-491.




Figure 9. "Sitting Down on a Chair and Opening a Fan." Eadweard Muybridge, *Animal Locomotion*, Vol. 1: Plate 237, 476-477.




Figure 10. "Crawling on Hands and Knees." Eadweard Muybridge, *Animal Locomotion*, Vol. 1: Plate 182, 432-433.

male models, female models are often depicted turning in the midst of an action, as if suddenly interrupted by a thought or a call. The female models often stage quaint rather than characteristic activities, which include throwing oneself into a heap of hay and crossing an imaginary brook over stones with a fishing pole in hand (Figures 11 and 12). In many photographs, the investigation of female anatomy is subordinated to what appears an aesthetic interest in the graceful movements of a women's dress while she is dancing (Figure 13), or the cascade of water as a woman pours it into a basin or onto the ground. And although it is certainly one of the most curious plates, one is at a loss to describe how the sequence of one woman chasing another with a broom might have been conceived as advancing artistic and scientific inquiry (Figure 14).

While many critics have mentioned the incongruity of these photographs within the larger archive of Muybridge's work, Marta Braun has given sustained attention to them. In her rightful assessment, "these pictures are incongruent with what we understand to be scientific analysis of locomotion."<sup>32</sup> Braun further discloses Muybridge's adulteration of several photographic sequences to argue that in the final instance, "Muybridge's concern is with stories," not with scientific objectivity.<sup>33</sup> In short, Braun argues that Muybridge's enterprise is largely artistic, not scientific. I would concur with Braun's assessment that Muybridge considered himself an artist, not a technician: his impassioned copyright dispute with Stanford over the publication of *The Horse in Motion* is ample evidence of this. Yet arguably, Muybridge's "artistic" photographs are not necessarily a negation of the predominant tendencies towards scientific objectification in his work, but rather a complex negotiation of the problems that are raised by his photographic method – the troubling of ideas of authorship, among them. Arguably, the incongruous images of happenstance and picturesqueness in *Animal Locomotion* assuage the anxieties that attend the project's primary impulse.




Figure 11. "Throwing Self on a Heap of Hay." Eadweard Muybridge, *Animal Locomotion*, Vol. 2: Plate 455 1042-1043




Figure 12. "Crossing Brook on Stepping-Stones with Fishing Pole and a Basket." Eadweard Muybridge, *Animal Locomotion*, Vol. 1: Plate 176, 424-425.




Figure 13. "Dancing (Fancy)." Eadweard Muybridge, *Animal Locomotion*, Vol. 2: Plate 189, 824-825.



Figure 14. "Woman Chasing Another with a Broom." Eadweard Muybridge, *Animal Locomotion*, Vol. 2: Plate 464, 1052-1053.

Laura Doan has argued that the instrumentalization of time with the expansion of industrial capitalism was accompanied by a structuring of contingency through emerging technologies such as film (of which Muybridge was the forerunner). With the increasing instrumentalization of time, Doan argues, the filmic capture of the singular and indeterminate was sometimes embraced “to ensure their residence outside structure, to make tolerable an incessant rationalization.”<sup>34</sup> The strange scripting of women within *Animal Locomotion* might be read in this vein: as an attempt to recuperate a sphere of “outside” the rationalizing impulse of the overall project. Thus far, we have considered Muybridge’s work through the Foucauldian paradigms of Sekula and Tagg. However, Roland Barthes as well as Laura Doan offers an alternative critical paradigm that might better illuminate, for lack of a better catchphrase, Muybridge’s weird photographs. On the one hand, Barthes recognizes an element of photography that aptly describes Muybridge’s pictures of the working body. What Barthes calls the “studium” is photography’s conveyance of information: the function of the studium is to inform, to represent, to depict with “no duality, no indirection, no disturbance.”<sup>35</sup> On the other hand, in attempting to describe what animates certain photographs, Barthes names a second element that is sometimes present, which he calls the “punctum,” and which he elaborates as the “sting, speck, cut, little hole – and also a cast of the dice.”<sup>36</sup> The punctum often proceeds, for Barthes, from the accidental or occasional detail, “offered by chance and for nothing.”<sup>37</sup> Beyond imaging the contingent as per Doan’s description of filmic capture, Barthes suggests the punctum “is that accident which pricks me (but also bruises me, is poignant to me).”<sup>38</sup> Indeed, Barthes primary example of the punctum is a photograph of his mother, who at the time of his writing, had passed away. The punctum pricks because it proceeds from the sense of really being there: for the photograph is “the absolute particular,” the “This” that “cannot be transformed,” insofar

as it is “wholly ballasted by the contingency of which it is the weightless, transparent envelope.”<sup>39</sup> But further, the punctum summons “a blind field” or a “whole life external to the portrait.”<sup>40</sup> Thus the punctum gestures towards a subtle beyond – “as if the image launched desire beyond what it permits us to see.”<sup>41</sup> Put simply, the punctum revives within the photographic medium precisely that affective meaning which Muybridge’s photographic method most often dispels. Yet in the examples discussed directly above, Muybridge betrays an impulse to revive the punctum within the informational field of the studium, to borrow Barthes’s terminology. In other words, the photographs of *Animal Locomotion* sometimes seem to abandon the pursuit of scientific evidence, and reach instead for the “emanation of the referent.”

If the female body is most often the medium for Muybridge’s summoning of the singular and indeterminate – if the woman most often invites the affective relays proscribed by the typological example – she simply assumes her assigned role within the liberal fictions so necessary to upholding capitalist relations of production. Generally speaking, of course, *Animal Locomotion* troubles the imagining of the domestic economy alternative to the market economy, as this discussion has demonstrated thus far. Arguably, however, this unsettling outcome of Muybridge’s photographic method is precisely why he reasserts this space so obsessively. For Muybridge’s photography obliterates the idea of (female) animality upon which the liberal individual is predicated. In divesting the animal body of affective properties – or put differently, in stripping animal emotion from animal locomotion – Muybridge’s photographs proscribe the leading role played by the female animal in the construction of bourgeois interiority, and with no adequate understudy in sight. Further, in rationalizing the female body, Muybridge’s photographs often make the reproductive labor associated with or assigned to women visible *as* productive labor, which again, dispels the illusion of a domestic realm ruled by purely non-

material values. Paradoxically, these aesthetic and spiritual values are embedded in the animality of the female body. For the invisibilization of female reproductive labor might best be described as an animalization of labor, as it relies on the idea that reproducing the forces of production through affective labor, through domestic labor, and through procreation are merely animal, simply natural, functions. While of course, the rationalization of these “animal” functions – these forms of labor – is hardly emancipatory, it does pose significant difficulties for the appeal to a compensatory arena of unproductive (merely animal) existence.

In the face of these difficulties, Muybridge salvages the conceit of a non-instrumentalized arena of private life in some counterintuitive ways. Certainly, Muybridge’s photographs rationalize the most cloistered activities of the boudoir, which by no coincidence, are only performed by female models: dressing and undressing; washing and bathing; and even getting into and out of bed (Figures 15 and 16). As Muybridge assumes a voyeuristic vantage point in pursuing these series, his photographs frequently approach the pornographic, as several scholars have observed.<sup>42</sup> It is crucial to consider that perversity and pornography are un(re)productive forms of sexuality, which like the whimsical activities and accidental occurrences most often staged by women in Muybridge’s photographs, recover an animality irreducible to instrumental use. The staging of a number of homoerotic sequences, in particular, preserves sexuality from procreation. More than a gratuitous indulgence of the male gaze – though no doubt they are also this – photographs which include women playfully bathing each other, two women kissing one another, and one woman disrobing another negate the rationalization of human sexuality through an eroticism in excess of biological reproduction (Figures 17 and 18).

To reiterate, the nineteenth-century construction of a feminized private sphere alternative to the public realm of production was predicated on the imagining of animal life as sentient,




Figure 15. "Pouring Water in Basin and Washing Face." Eadweard Muybridge, *Animal Locomotion*, Vol. 1: Plate 413, 538-539.




Figure 16. "Getting into Bed." Eadweard Muybridge, *Animal Locomotion*, Vol. 1: Plate 263, 502-503.




Figure 17. "Woman Pouring a Bucket of Water Over Another Woman." Eadweard Muybridge, *Animal Locomotion*, Vol. 1: Plate 407, 526-527.




Figure 18. "Two Women Shaking Hands and Kissing Each Other." Eadweard Muybridge, *Animal Locomotion*, Vol. 1: Plate 444, 584-585.

moral, and fully human. Thus, it is important to remember that it is precisely female animality that is at stake in these photographs, which is evidenced by the fact that a countercurrent surfaces around the representation of non-human animals in *Animal Locomotion*, too, and complicates the general course of the project. Just as women are often cast in scenes of contrived contingency, some animals are made to demonstrate the same (in their case not simulated, but calculatedly stimulated) surprise, as in the photographic capture of “Chickens scared by a torpedo” (Figure 19). Further, Muybridge sometimes captures and preserves truly contingent animal actions in his photographs. Plate 365 captures a man startled by a pigeon while performing gymnastics, but this “ruined” demonstration of masculine sport is nonetheless retained for the collection (Figure 20). For despite the more common depiction of working animals in *Animal Locomotion*, Muybridge remains intensely interested in those animals who interrupt human intentions or defy human instrumentalization. In a sequence displaying a donkey “acting refractory,” in fact, Muybridge goes so far as to direct his model to feign being kicked by a donkey: quite comically, there is not a single photograph in the series in which the donkey’s hind legs lift from the ground, while the model quite observably propels himself off the haunches of the animal so that Muybridge might capture him in mid-air (Figure 21). The depictions of animals performing tricks, such as the plate that displays Denver the donkey’s miscellaneous performances (Figure 22), and the portrayals of animals engaged in play, as in the sequence that captures two dogs named Ike and Maggie playing tug-of-war (Figure 23), confirm Muybridge’s ambivalence towards the animal-machine that his photographic method tends to manufacture. Perhaps this is nowhere more evident than in Muybridge’s practice of providing the animal subjects’ names – which never occurs in the case of human models and almost always occurs in the case of non-human animal models. Perhaps there is no better evidence that the animal paradoxically anchors liberal ideas of personhood that




Figure 19. "Chickens Scared by a Torpedo." Eadweard Muybridge, *Animal Locomotion*, Vol. 3: Plate 781, 1582-1583.




Figure 20. "Hand-spring, a Flying Pigeon Interfering." Eadweard Muybridge, *Animal Locomotion*, Vol. 3: Plate 365, 736-737.




Figure 21. “Denver,’ Refractory.” Eadweard Muybridge, *Animal Locomotion*, Vol. 3: Plate 663, 1344-1345.




Figure 22. “Denver,’ Miscellaneous Performances.” Eadweard Muybridge, *Animal Locomotion*, Vol. 3: Plate 660, 1338-1339.




Figure 23. “‘Ike,’ ‘Maggie,’ etc. Tugging at a Towel.” Eadweard Muybridge, *Animal Locomotion*, Vol. 3: Plate 715, 1402-1403.

Muybridge's photography inexorably erodes, and ineffectually attempts to restore.

In one of the first sessions that he conducted for *Animal Locomotion*, Muybridge photographed a woman spanking her child in a remarkable series that rationalizes the private forms of punishment so foundational to the functioning of a disciplinary society. In the very last session he conducted – and in the final plate that appears in the arrangement of *Animal Locomotion* – Muybridge photographed the aforementioned chickens scared by a torpedo. Ultimately, it would seem, Muybridge's relentless pursuit of the rationalization of movement gave way to an increasing apprehension about the animal-machine of his camera's making. For the animal of Muybridge's experiments can no longer signify a refuge from an inhuman modernity or a realm of non-material aesthetic and spiritual values that exceed use value and exchange value. As this discussion has shown, these non-material values are paradoxically secured to the material body of the sentient animal – though they are dispelled by the animal-machine. Consequently, Muybridge's photographs at times present the animal as individual rather than typical, feeling rather than functioning, at play rather than at work, in an effort to assuage the anxieties unleashed by his method. Crucially, these photographic sequences are best understood as attempts to shore up capitalist relations of production, even as they would seem to resist instrumental rationality. For they serve to sustain the fiction of a compensatory animal existence, which is actually so crucial to enabling the expansion of capital. At those moments when Muybridge's photographs attempt to release the animal from its iron cage, then, they would do so only to capture it again.

### **The Cultural Work of the Work Animal**

The recurrence of the figure of the animal within literary naturalism has been long noted by scholars. June Howard, for instance, foregrounds the ideological work that “the brute”




Figure 24. "Spanking a Child." Eadweard Muybridge, *Animal Locomotion*, Vol. 1: Plate 527, 624-625.

performs in the naturalist dramatization of the antinomy between human agency and deterministic forces. In Howard's reading, the systemic animal imagery in literary naturalism surfaces alongside anxieties about proletarianization.<sup>43</sup> For Dana Seitler, on the other hand, the figure of the animal within literary naturalism registers contemporaneous scientific challenges to the human's unique ontological status. Naturalism's participation in what she calls "degeneration narratives" emerges with the proliferation of late nineteenth and early twentieth-century scientific discourses tethering humanity to its animal past.<sup>44</sup> In such readings of the naturalist treatment of the animal, however, the category of "the animal" is not considered in terms of its historical variability. Rather, in most critical work to date, "the animal" is a transparent category that becomes recruited to the philosophical and political project of literary naturalism around the fin de siècle, however variously this project is described. In other words, the nature of animal nature often remains unquestioned in critical treatments of naturalism's animal.

Mark Seltzer anticipates the intervention I would like to make in describing the specificity of literary naturalism's configuration of nature. In exploring naturalism's "body-machine complex," Seltzer usefully shows how scientific and technological developments as well as the production of statistical persons within the modern biopolitical state led to the "denaturalization of nature." In his study of "the body-machine complex," however, Seltzer seldom considers animal bodies. In critical conversations to date, in fact, naturalism tends to appear *either* as the story of the machine and the mechanization of humanity *or* as the story of the animal and the animalization of the human. As the following discussion will show, the recurrent trope of animality in naturalist literature exhibits the radical refiguring of animal nature *as* machine-like: the animal of naturalist literature is an animal-machine.

This insight is crucial to identifying how the animal figures in naturalism's representation of race. In her nuanced discussion of naturalism's "Asiatic form," Colleen Lye stresses the machine-like representation of the Chinese laborer when she argues that the figure of the Asiatic is "a different kind of monstrous presence" than the figure of the animal in naturalist literature, signifying not "the ambivalent pleasure of the body's libidinal release, but, on the contrary, the prospect of its mechanical abstraction."<sup>45</sup> Lye's work is foundational to the discussion of literary naturalism that follows, as it likewise takes up naturalism's representation of migrant labor. While I agree with Lye's discernment that the representation of Chinese laborers in naturalist literature often involves the thematization of the Asian body as a "mechanical abstraction," I depart from Lye in arguing that the animal is neither irrelevant to naturalism's "Asiatic form" nor translatable within naturalist literature as "the body's libidinal release."<sup>46</sup> As the pages that follow will demonstrate, the racialization of the Asian migrant worker in the age of emancipation was actually inextricably tied to new codifications of animal life *as* machine-like.

There are a number of naturalist texts that would offer abundant terrain for this exploration, from the adolescent fiction of Jack London to the short stories of Stephen Crane. Frank Norris's *The Octopus* (1901) instantiates the cultural work performed by the animal-machine in this chapter, however, as the novel centrally engages a historical development highly productive of mechanistic understandings of animal life in itself, namely, the rise of large-scale agriculture in California. Norris began writing the novel, projected to be the first of a trilogy of novels on the production, distribution, and consumption of wheat, in the spring of 1899. *The Octopus* takes as its subject the conflict between wheat farmers in the San Joaquin Valley and the Pacific and Southwestern railroad (P&SW). While the highly complicated plot involves several squabbles between railroad tycoons, who are pitched as unequivocal bad guys, and the wheat

barons, who tend to invite the reader's sympathies, the central conflict in the book emerges over the ownership of the ranches, which the farmers had leased from the railroad nearly ten years earlier with the option of eventually purchasing the land. The railroad attempts to take possession of the land after the farmers refuse to pay for the increased sale price, adjusted for the improvements actually made by the farmers during their tenancy. The events of the novel culminate with a deadly shoot-out between the wheat barons and railroad representatives, an event that Norris based partly on the historical shoot-out between ranchers and representatives of the Southern Pacific Railroad at Mussel Slough in 1880.

The novel has long puzzled critics: even as *The Octopus* reads as an indictment of monopoly capital and corporate power, relaying the ruin of wheat farmers in the San Joaquin valley due to the railroad's exorbitant grain rates and land speculation, the wheat barons who garner the novel's pathos in many ways have much in common with the railroad tycoons they oppose. Indeed, from the mid-nineteenth through to the early part of the twentieth century, the introduction of new farming implements radically transformed agricultural practice. Mechanical harvesters were introduced in the 1850s, cutting the equivalent of what eight cradlemen previously could do in a day; the invention of "ground-hog" threshers allowed farmers to thresh while harvesting, accomplishing what seventy laborers could achieve with flails within the same amount of time; and the creation of traveling combined harvesters eliminated the stacking process, allowing farmers to move directly from cutting to threshing. The mechanization of farm labor was crucial to the development of the bonanza wheat farm, or the large-scale wheat farming operation that arose in the late nineteenth century, as it allowed for the engrossment and cultivation of larger and larger tracts of land. Mechanization further meant that physical effort no longer determined productive output, dramatically decreasing the number of field hands needed

for certain stages of the growing process. Although many early innovations in farming technology actually increased the demand for labor by increasing the expanse of workable land, the large crews required during planting and harvesting could not be employed year round. Due to these developments, grain harvesters of necessity became migrant workers, drifting between agricultural districts as the seasons changed and employment became available. The influx of 2,000-3,000 laborers discharged from their jobs building the Central Pacific Railroad in 1869, as well as the additional surge of workers into the wheat districts with the industrial depression of 1873, likewise contributed to an enormous reserve army of the unemployed by the early 1870s, to the benefit of the wheat farmers and to the detriment of laborers.<sup>47</sup>

The *Octopus* repeatedly invokes the effects of agribusiness upon the lives of farmworkers only to subordinate this theme to the plight of wheat barons in their struggle with the railroad. For instance, the opening pages of the novel relay an incident involving the new plows that Magnus and Harran Derrick (father and son wheat farmers) have ordered just in time for planting. Based on the description and subsequent use of the machines, they seem to be Stockton gangplows, which required only one operator as well as a team of six to ten horses to plow twice the previous average acreage per day.<sup>48</sup> The delivery of the new farming implements becomes one of the first occasions for the novel to thematize the wrongdoings of the railroad: although the plows are sitting at the station when the Derricks arrive, due to a freighting regulation, they must wait for their plows to be shipped north to San Francisco before they are returned to Bonneville, putting the Derricks behind in their planting. Significantly, the Derricks' dispute with S. Behrman over the delivery of their plows tends to overshadow other injustices attendant upon the arrival of the new machinery. On the drive home from the train station, Harran and Magnus discuss the future of Hooven, the German tenant farmer who has recently heard that Magnus

might be “giving his tenants the bounce, and working Los Muertos himself,”<sup>49</sup> an aspiration only possible with the use of the farming implements described only a few pages before. In a maneuver that is repeated throughout the pages of *The Octopus*, the protracted account of the railroad’s wrongs tends to minimize the rancher’s role in casting off the human detritus of capital.

At the same time that it obscures the human consequences of agribusiness, *The Octopus* thoroughly, almost obsessively, describes how the mechanization of farm labor significantly altered the lives of work animals. Specifically, *The Octopus* preoccupies itself with the increased levels of coordination and control needed to manage large numbers of animals harnessed to innovative farming implements. On many bonanza wheat farms, as many as 800 horses or mules were lined up in succession to plow, seed, and harrow fields as one synchronized, mechanized apparatus.<sup>50</sup> In several extended passages of *The Octopus* – and these passages last pages – Norris paints the spectacular progression of hundreds of horses pulling plows, grain drills, and other farming implements:

There were arranged ... en echelon, not in file – not one directly behind the other, but each succeeding plow its own width farther in the field than the one in front of it. Each of these plows held five shears, so that when the entire company was in motion, one hundred and seventy-five furrows were made at the same instant. At a distance the plows resembled a great column of field artillery.<sup>51</sup>

In describing the gangplows of the bonanza wheat farm, Norris captures how the disciplinary tactics of nineteenth-century agribusiness produced the animal body as the animal-machine as surely as Muybridge’s photographs. In fact, the narrative perspective seems inordinately fascinated with the unnatural nature of animal life produced by new farming practices.

Significantly, the narrative perspective brings the mechanization of human labor into view only beside, or astride, the mechanization of non-human animal labor. In one relatively rare representation of human labor in the novel, a “bindleman” named Vanamee drives a 10-horse gangplow. Although Vanamee lives the life of an itinerant worker, evoking the displacement and dispossession of (white) threshermen with the mechanization of farm labor, in the novel, this particular “bindleman” is recast as a bereaved, college-educated prophet/seer/mystic whose wanderings are driven by spiritual yearnings, rather than material needs. The character centrally functions to eclipse the material conditions of migrant workers, and Vanamee’s stint as a driver of a gangplow on the Quien Sabe ranch is a case in point. As the narrative is focalized through Vanamee’s position within a long coordinated line of thirty-five plows, each drawn by a team of ten horses, it concentrates on the workings of the animal-machine:

Everywhere there were visions of glossy brown backs, straining, heaving swollen with muscle; harnesses streaked with specks of froth; broad, cup-shaped hoofs heavy with brown loam; men’s faces red with tan; blue overalls spotted with axle grease; muscled hands, the knuckles whitened in their grip on the reins; and through it all the ammoniac smell of the horses, the bitter reek of perspiration of beasts and men ...<sup>52</sup>

The sentence moves in an unbroken progression from the description of the horses to the depiction of their drivers, blurring the distinction between human and non-human animal. Further, the narrative fragments human and animal workers into interchangeable bodily parts: “backs,” “hoofs,” “faces,” and “hands.” Both human and non-human animals appear as mere bodies, unencumbered with active intelligence, and so amenable to their insertion within a well-oiled industrial machine. The “specks of froth” and “brown loam” from the horses’ sweat as well as the “bitter reek” of the horses’ stench summons the body of the workhorse quite viscerally, in

fact. The passage bookends the sight of men in overalls with horses' sweat and the horses' piss, for the non-human animal body figures the most bodily body, and as such it can most convincingly present the forceful expropriation of human and non-human animal labor as the mechanical unfolding of the forces of nature.

Perched on his driver's seat, Vanamee is described as "hypnotized by the weaving maze of things in which he found himself involved," his brain "lulled and stupefied" by the task of keeping "his team at an even, regular gait, maintaining the precise interval, ... [and] run[ing] his furrows as closely as possible to those already made by the plow in front."<sup>53</sup> This scene of mechanized labor does not mark a diminishment of human dignity, however, as the text describes Vanamee's stupor as a "pleasing numbness."<sup>54</sup> Similarly, the narrative describes the plowmen's "crude and primitive feasting" at the end of the day without disapprobation, relaying "the incessant sounds of mastication" accompanying the "gorging of the human animal" as a celebratory example of "all life reduced to its bare essentials, uncomplex, honest, healthy ... vital, real, and sane."<sup>55</sup> As the mechanization of labor reduces the worker to a body (without a mind), the apotheosis of alienated labor paradoxically assumes the guise of its opposite: the reconciliation of the human with nature. Thus the mechanization of natural life has as its corollary the naturalization of mechanical existence.

As the narrative focus swivels from the scene of production to the scene of consumption, from the gangplow line to the primitive feast, the animal-machine acquires another face. Earlier in this chapter, I made a corrective to Mark Seltzer's reading of the "denaturalization of nature" in the machine age. For in Eadweard Muybridge's photography, the body appears less as something that can be manufactured and manipulated ad infinitum than as something that reveals its natural machinery, apart from human making. This latter manifestation of the animal-machine

has its place even in *The Octopus*, as the gangplow scene corroborates. However, Seltzer is correct to suggest that the denaturalization of nature ultimately entails the “‘discovery’ that bodies and persons are things that can be made.”<sup>56</sup> I would simply elaborate Seltzer’s analysis by saying this “discovery” is most foundationally an insight into the social production of bodily needs and desires.

Significantly, the primitive feast the plowmen eat is that which “the Chinese cooks had set out in the shed of the eating house.”<sup>57</sup> If the plowmen eat such simple feed, the novel positions the Chinese cooks as the makers of this meal, and in turn, the most makeable men. There are two major ways that the Chinese laborer is imagined as makeable. On the one hand, as Colleen Lye observes, the novel envisions that Chinese tastes might be remade to expand American wheat markets. On the other hand, the novel imagines the bodily needs of the Chinese laborer might be remade to subsist on the barest means of subsistence. In this *The Octopus* is representative of a larger cultural imaginary. When in 1852, Chinese peasant farmers drawn by the Gold Rush began to arrive in San Francisco in large numbers, they soon became a source of cheap and abundant labor for farmers of the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta. Chinese immigrants performed some of the most arduous agricultural work in California in the latter half of the nineteenth century. With the passage of the Swamp Land Act in 1850, for instance, Chinese laborers became recruited to the task of draining, diking, and clearing swampland, and several swamp reclamation companies began to import Chinese laborers as early as 1856. Over the course of the following decades, Chinese laborers were further employed to plant thousands of acres of grapevines and orchards, build irrigation ditches, and bind and thresh grain on the San Joaquin Valley wheat farms. They soon became renowned for their efficiency, reliability, and seeming inexhaustibility. In considering Chinese laborers constitutionally able and content to

sustain high levels of productive output with the barest means of subsistence, farmers were able to minimize many of the expenses and liabilities entailed in keeping field hands. Given the imagined “elimination of the human element” in what he calls the “Chinese labor machine,” the editor of the Fresno Republican could thus celebrate, without compunction, the low costs and high productive output deriving from the exploitation of Chinese workers.<sup>58</sup> With the representation of the Chinese laborer as freed from “human” need, in other words, the contradiction between the gross exploitation of labor and the “free” market economy might be contained.

While the configuration of the Chinese migrant laborer as machine-like was often wielded to sanction capitalist exploitation, the stereotype also surfaces within anti-capitalist critique. As historians such as Alexander Saxton have shown, anti-capitalist sentiment often expressed itself in the discourse of “yellow peril,” scapegoating Chinese immigrant laborers for their own exploitation. Many socialists in California at the end of the nineteenth century argued that Chinese “cheap labor” threatened to displace the white working class within manufacturing jobs and fieldwork and further to degrade the American standard of living. In the late nineteenth-century discourse of Asian exclusionism, Chinese migrant workers were often cast as inhuman machines: constitutionally able and content to sustain high levels of productive output with the barest means of subsistence. Henry George, for instance, repeatedly expressed concern that farmers would come to regard all (white) field hands as what to him Chinese laborers were in fact: “not ... human beings but ... cogs in the means of production.”<sup>59</sup> Chinese laborers came to signify the evils of monopoly capitalism precisely through their signification as machines.

In reading the Asiatic form of naturalism, Colleen Lye highlights the role of Chinese cooks in mediating consumption in *The Octopus*, arguing that these scenes of feeding and eating

evoke the exclusionist argument that Chinese “cheap labor” threatened to degrade the American standard of living. Thus *The Octopus* partakes, so to speak, of the discourse of Asian exclusionism, but there are important distinctions to be made in the novel’s deployment. For *The Octopus* hardly wields the figure of the Asiatic machine to launch a (misdirected) working class critique of capital, as we might anticipate from its laudatory rather than condemnatory treatment of “life reduced to its bare essentials.” In fact, *The Octopus* illustrates how effectively the discourse of Asian exclusionism could be redirected to reconsolidate ruling class hegemony. In fact, the novel obsessively plays out the logics of Asian exclusionism in its pages only to scapegoat the Chinese migrant worker for the depredations of monopoly capitalism. Yet as the following discussion will show, the figure of the Chinese migrant worker is a spectral rather than central presence in these dramatizations. The animal-machine, on the other hand, is not. If, as Lye argues, the Asiatic is “a metonymic figure for the loss of autonomy experienced by individuals caught in the web of globalizing markets,”<sup>60</sup> then this metonymic displacement involves the animal as a noteworthy category along a signifying chain, one with a particularly strong gravitational pull.

The redeployment of the discourse of Asian exclusionism through the figure of the animal-machine relies on a properly metonymic relationship between the animal and the Asiatic, as the animal-machine does not simply stand for the Chinese migrant worker in the absence of any material relationships between the work animal and the human farmworker. Both human and non-human animal workers are both caught up within the technological developments that transformed farming into a highly productive venture of industrial capitalism. Yet as established in the discussion above, *The Octopus* foregrounds the non-human animal in its representations of labor, and so too in its representations of racialized labor. To take one representative plotline,

a buckskin mare owned by a wheat baron named Annixter plays a pivotal role in the course of events. Specifically, the buckskin mare becomes tangled up with the fate of the farmworker and the small farmer in *The Octopus*, who are represented by Delaney, a white farmworker, and Dyke, a small hops farmer. Both characters embroil the horse in some of the novel's most melodramatic scenes apropos of the loss of their jobs. Although Annixter's buckskin mare is described as "a half-broken bronco that fought like a fiend under the saddle,"<sup>61</sup> the novel recurrently describes the remaking of this recalcitrant bronco into a tractable animal. And as the novel surveys the mare's recurring transformations from animal into machine, it appears to link these transformations to the (mis)fortunes of Dyke and Delaney.

Early in the novel, the wheat baron Annixter dismisses one of his farmworkers, Delaney, without justifiable cause. Annixter's dismissal of Delaney is motivated by jealousy – he is eager to eradicate any competitors for the heart of one Hilda Tree, who works on his farm. However, the firing is actually precipitated by Delaney's use of Annixter's mare to mend a break in the fence. When Annixter decides to ride the buckskin mare to Los Muertos in order to impress Hilda Tree, he learns that Delaney has already taken the horse, having "busted her right enough," as the stablekeeper reports. When Annixter next encounters Delaney on the way to Los Muertos in a decidedly less virile buggy, the buckskin actually approaches "around the bend in the road at a slow trot."<sup>62</sup> Annixter fires Delaney on the spot: "'What do I *feed* you for? What do I keep you around here for?'"<sup>63</sup> The plotting of this scene casts the subdual of the mare and the supposedly unremunerative costs of Delaney's board as the "cause" of Delaney's dismissal, evoking the existence of cheaper, more manageable animals elsewhere.

Echoing Delaney's dismissal, Dyke loses his job due to the railroad's ability to find laborers for lower pay. He quits working for the P. and S. W. when they cut wages, insisting that

he is “a family man” unable “to get along on the new scale.”<sup>64</sup> Dyke takes to hops farming, but he is soon ruined by the railroad’s hiked-up freight rates. Infuriated by the railroad’s injustices, Dyke hijacks a train, kills a man, and becomes a fugitive. When he is finally spotted, Dyke flees to the Quien Sabe ranch to borrow Annixter’s mare, closely pursued by a posse. He is eventually surrounded, and so he abandons the wild horse for a detached locomotive in the depot at Guadalajara: “the great iron brute ... (was) obedient and docile as soon as the great pulsing heart of it felt a master hand upon its levers.”<sup>65</sup> Meanwhile, Delaney, now acting as a dummy for the railroad and heading up the posse, seizes the buckskin mare left by Dyke in Guadalajara. Dyke is soon after apprehended and placed on the mare, while “the sheriff, on foot, lead[s] the horse by the bridle.”<sup>66</sup> In narrating the chase, the novel underscores the substitution of a wild horse for an “obedient and docile” machine as well as the successful conversion of a highwayman’s mount to a plodding packhorse, linking Dyke’s arrest to these events.

With the stories of Delaney and Dyke, the novel repeatedly associates the taming of Annixter’s mare with the displacement of the farmworker and small farmer. As significantly, Delaney and Dyke lose their jobs as a result of either real or pretended cost to their employers: Annixter pretends to the unremunerative cost of Delaney’s board and Dyke quits his job with the railroad due to its ability to find workers for lower wages. As the dispossession of Dyke and Delaney seem to strongly evoke the discourse of Asian exclusionism, the role of the Chinese migrant worker within these narrative proceedings is conspicuous in its absence. Instead, the novel accomplishes a metonymic substitution in the figure of Annixter’s buckskin mare, whose coloring not only evokes caricatures of phenotypical features of “the Asiatic,” but whose breed characteristics also markedly resemble the stereotypical representation of the Chinese migrant worker: simultaneously tractable and tough.

The same substitution of the animal-machine for the Asian migrant worker occurs during a jackrabbit drive portrayed in *The Octopus*. Jackrabbit drives were one of many odd jobs that threshermen performed during the winter months in order to survive until the next harvest. As rabbits devastated young orchards and vineyards (planted primarily by Chinese laborers), men formed businesses and traveled from one farming community to another during the winter months, organizing jackrabbit drives that sometimes lasted up to forty or fifty consecutive days and often slaughtered tens of thousands of animals.<sup>67</sup> In the novel's account of the jackrabbit drive, which directly precedes the shootout between the ranchers and the railroad's representatives, a procession of coordinated teams of horses, reminiscent of those described in farming operations earlier in the novel, walks farmer Osterman's fields. Here, too, as in the descriptions of the procession of plows and grain drills, the novel dramatizes the tight coordination of "thousands of conveyances and cavaliers in a long line."<sup>68</sup> In this scene, the systematic procession of the horses ferrets out the wild rabbits, whose contrast with the work animals is heavily underlined: "No two act ... precisely alike" as they are driven through the field.<sup>69</sup> When one rabbit jumps into Annie Derrick's lap, she retains "for a long time afterward ... the sensation of the four little paws quivering with excitement, and the feel of the trembling furry body, with its wildly beating heart, pressed against her own."<sup>70</sup> In this scene, the animal-machine literally "drives out" the animal eking out its subsistence, evoking the "driving out" of white migrant workers by "cheap" Chinese labor.

Of course, the juxtaposition of the jackrabbit drive with the subsequent shootout between the ranchers' league and the railroad dummies, who attempt to drive out the ranchers from their homes, suggests the scene most readily figures the usurpation of the wheat farmers land. And indeed it does. The jackrabbit drive is comprised not of laborers but of "farm people

from all the country round about Bonneville,”<sup>71</sup> i.e., men, women, and children dressed “in their Sunday finery,”<sup>72</sup> who make a picnic out of the affair once the jackrabbits have been corralled and slaughtered. However, these agents of the jackrabbit drive are transfigured through subsequent scenes into the driven out. Crucial to the representative function of the jackrabbit drive is the relocation of the wheat farmers from the agents “driving out” migrant workers to the passive participants or even victims of an act of dispossession and displacement.

This is the way the discourse of “yellow peril” surfaces in the novel: not to operate as an unfortunate accompaniment to anti-capitalist sentiment and socialist agitation, but to displace the critique of the capitalist onto the Chinese laborer. Thus the novel functions less through ideological closure than through ideological displacement: it is less the resolution of the contradictions of capital than their endless relocation that the novel achieves. Yet if the Chinese migrant worker “stands” for the evils of monopoly capitalism, the animal-machine ultimately stands for the Chinese migrant worker by way of a second order metonymic slide, which this discussion has emphatically underlined but not yet explained.

Arguably, the role of the animal-machine in *The Octopus* and the reliance of Asian exclusionism upon the figure of the animal-machine more generally speaking can be understood thus. The racialization of the Chinese laborer relied less upon biological essentialism than upon the ascription of an unusual mutability of the Asiatic body to the most minimal means of subsistence. If the imagining of an endlessly adaptable nature legitimates uncommon degrees of exploitation, however, it would also seem to blur the lines of racial difference by foreclosing appeals to innate biological difference. The particularization of the Chinese laborer’s racial meaning, in other words, threatens to unravel the very meaning of race. This problematic points towards the flexible forms of racialization carried out through the trope the animal-machine. If

the novel casts the animal-machine in the role the Asiatic as it obsessively rehearses the logics of Asian exclusionism, this is because the animal-machine anchors racial difference in the face of the denaturalization of race. The heavy thematization of the Chinese migrant worker through the animal-machine redraws the lines of racial difference through an invocation of species difference. The denaturalization of the animal body nonetheless naturalizes the hyper-exploitation of the racialized body, and the flesh of the animal is further instrumentalized as an enabling figure of racialized capitalism.

### **From the Denaturalization of Nature to the Materialization of Culture**

On the one hand, the animal-machine is effectively mobilized in *The Octopus* to contain the contradictions of racialized capital. On the other hand, the novel treats the animal-machine with some degree of ambivalence, which is nowhere more apparent than in its use of “the octopus” as a sinister figure for the railroad. The animal-machine that is the railroad frequently and fatefully crosses tracks with other instances of industrialized animality, suggesting that the governing metaphor of *The Octopus* is highly overdetermined by its central preoccupations. In the opening pages of the novel, for instance, Presley, the dilettante poet and guest of the Los Muertos ranch, visits Annixter, the owner of the neighboring Quien Sabe ranch. As Presley leaves the house one day, Annixter suggests: “Say, take a look at that herd of sheep as you go up ... You might write a poem about ‘em.’”<sup>73</sup> However, when Presley encounters what Annixter calls “the biggest lot of sheep *you* ever saw,” he finds not a scene of bucolic charm but a sinister panorama of mass production:

Hundreds upon hundreds of gray, rounded backs, all exactly alike, huddled, close-packed, alive, hid the earth from sight. It was no longer an aggregate of individuals. It was a mass

– a compact solid, slowly moving mass, huge, without form, like a thick-pressed growth of mushrooms, spreading out in all directions over the earth.<sup>74</sup>

The sheep “hid[e] the earth” instead of standing in synecdotal relation to an idyllic countryside, underscoring the unnaturalness of this natural scene, and the “individual” animal is indiscernible within the enormous herd, stressing the excision of the animal from a domestic economy in which the production of use-values is shaped by interspecies interrelationships. Significantly, the sheep in this passage are grazing on Annixter’s land because he’s sold his wheat stubble to sheep ranchers. Solotari, the keeper of a restaurant in Guadalajara, informs Presley of this cost-cutting maneuver: “Very clever, that young Annixter. He gets a price for his stubble, which else he would have to burn, and also manures his land as the sheep move from place to place.”<sup>75</sup> Thus the “thousands of crowding bodies” are all the more an ominous outcome of agribusiness. The suggestion of decay and fungous growth confirms the text’s ambivalence towards the large-scale farming operation that is elsewhere a matter for marveling.

Later in the day, the sound of a locomotive disrupts Presley as he’s dreaming up poems. After the noise of the engine lapses, and after the reader has been treated to the first of many extended descriptions of the locomotive as a kind of mechanical griffin – part metal, part tentacle, part thundering hooves – Presley hears a “confusion of lamentable sounds that rose into the night.”<sup>76</sup> He follows the sound and discovers the same herd he saw earlier in the day had found a breach in the wire fence and been caught in the engine’s path:

“It was a slaughter, a massacre of innocents. The iron monster had charged full into the midst, merciless, inexorable. To the right and left, all the width of the right of way, the little bodies had been flung; backs were snapped against the fence posts; brains knocked out.”<sup>77</sup>

While the slaughtering of the sheep might simply read as a ham-fisted figure for how the railroad destroys the lives of the Tulare County wheat farmers, I believe Leo Marx comes closer when interpreting the passage as an instance of the prevalent literary figure of “the machine in the garden,” which marks the loss of an existence “closer to nature” in the face of rapid industrialization and urbanization.<sup>78</sup> The heavy animalization of the locomotive in this passage, as well as the fact that these same sheep are caught up in the cogwheels of capitalist enterprise, suggests the passage principally laments the disappearance of the pastoral scene – and importantly, the idea of animal life that inhabited it.

Significantly, the novel often routes its nostalgic vision of a pre-industrial age through female characters. Annie Derrick, the wife of wheat baron Magnus Derrick, is depressed by the vastness of the Los Muertos ranch where she now lives, remembering her childhood on a farm in eastern Ohio, “where the seed was sowed by hand, and a singled two-horse plow was sufficient for the entire farm; where the scythe sufficed to cut the harvest, and the grain was thrashed with flails.”<sup>79</sup> In contrast, Los Muertos appears to her “a principality ruled with iron and steam.”<sup>80</sup> While Annie Derrick laments the passing of the small farm, the female character Hilma Tree represents the persistence of the agrarian myth into the present – for a little longer, anyhow. Working in Annixter’s dairy, which makes “just enough butter and cheese for the consumption of the ranch’s personnel,”<sup>81</sup> Hilma’s activity is confined to the production of use-values. Hilma is described as living “a healthy, vigorous animal life passed under the hot southern sun,”<sup>82</sup> but although she is repeatedly animalized in the novel, she (at least initially) evokes an animality markedly different from the instrumentalized animal-machine. In attempting to court her affection, Annixter proposes that Hilma assume the role of some species of domestic animal in relation to him:

there's not a horse about the place that don't lay his ears back when I get on him; there's not a dog don't put his tail between his legs ... but wonder what I'd do, though, if he didn't slink so much, if he wagged his tail and was glad to see me? So it all comes to this: I'd like to have you ... sort of feel that I was a good friend of yours.<sup>83</sup>

If Hilma does not exactly wag her tail, as per Annixter's request, she does ultimately become a kind of domestic animal. In marrying Annixter, Hilma relinquishes her productive function on the farm and supplies affection in lieu of butter and cheese. Directly prior to the moment when Annixter asks Hilma to become his lover, she assumes an animalized posture, "drink[ing] from the creek, lying prone on the ground, her face half buried in the water, and this, not because she was thirsty, but because it was a new way to drink."<sup>84</sup> The element of whimsy in Hilma's animalistic gesture should remind us of Muybridge's atypical photographs of women and animals. Similarly, *The Octopus* eschews the reduction of bodily form to function and the subordination of effort to efficiency in portraying Hilda's animality. Elsewhere, the novel stresses the entanglement of animal life in processes of capital accumulation. Quite the opposite here: Hilma's animality connotes "an elemental existence, close to nature, close to life, close to the great, kindly earth."<sup>85</sup> The nature of this elemental "nature" is neither the mechanistic unfolding of inexorable law nor the technological remaking of nature, but rather an immanent existence within which means tend to fall apart from ends.

Many scholars have explained literary naturalism as a "man's game," or a kind of reaction formation to the "feminization of American culture" that Ann Douglas has described at length.<sup>86</sup> Offering a corrective to this prevailing account of naturalism, Jennifer Fleissner has argued that naturalism "is a literature as much (if not more) about domesticity, details, and women's inner lives as it is about a masculine return to nature," and thus it shares "much with

the genteel New England writing it is so often thought to leave behind.”<sup>87</sup> Fleissner, like Seltzer, attends to the changing status of nature within the age of the machine. However, according to Fleissner, the reconceptualization of “nature” within literary naturalism is a shift in the understanding of the nature of women. Previously contained within a naturalized, unchanging private sphere, sequestered from the social and political realms, at the end of the nineteenth century women for the first time could “now be seen stepping forth onto the stage of history.”<sup>88</sup> Reading naturalism’s female bildungsroman as a story of “wild energy and open-ended possibility,” Fleissner suggests that naturalism registers not the diminishment of human freedom, but the expansion of occupational opportunities and other possibilities for women.

On the one hand, I agree with Fleissner that changing roles of women within the family and the marketplace are central “obsessions” of naturalism overlooked by most of the critical literature to date. On the other hand, I dispute the attribution of a “wild energy and open-ended possibility” to the bulk of the literary treatments of these transformations. As the representation of Hilma Tree in *The Octopus* might suggest, when naturalist literature registers the breach in the boundary between the naturalized, feminized realm of private life and the masculinized social and political arenas, it is not with exuberance but with anxiety. In fact, naturalism’s characteristic “melodramas of uncertain agency” are often most staged upon the female body.

Hilma Tree is a case in point, as this paragon of primordial femininity eventually turns out to be somewhat of a cracked icon. When Annixter first asks Hilda to become his mistress, he is taken aback by Hilma’s misinterpretation of his proposition as a marriage proposal: “She was after his property, was for marrying him because of his money.”<sup>89</sup> Eventually, however, Annixter seems to apply his oft-repeated maxim – “you can’t get something for nothing” – to his relationship with Hilma. The marriage of Hilma and Annixter becomes visible as a form of

exchange – sex for provision – rather than an expression of liberal love freed from material considerations. Instead of basking in nuptial bliss after their marriage, Hilma and Annixter “get serious and get to work,”<sup>90</sup> turning their honeymoon week in San Francisco into a shopping spree in order to newly outfit the ranch house. When Presley visits Quien Sabe after the wedding and takes in the new trimmings, Annixter, who before had lived at Quien Sabe with only minimal accouterments, exclaims:

“‘she’s made a man of me. I was a machine before, and if another man, or woman, or child got in my way, I rode ‘em down, and I never dreamed of anybody else but myself. But as soon as I woke up to the fact that I really loved her, why, it was glory hallelujah all in a minute, and in a way, I kind of loved everybody then, and wanted to be everybody’s friend.’”<sup>91</sup>

However, this homage to Hilma’s softening influence – her making of a machine into a man – ultimately seems the greasing of the capitalist machine through the cultivation of a consumer. For far from anchoring an animal existence apart from capitalist relations of production, Hilma points Annixter straight into the department store, where he purchases a number of new “necessities.” The mountain of kitsch associated with Hilda’s “humanizing” influence denotes her role in the production of new needs and desires that are productive of capitalism’s expansion. When Presley visits the newlyweds, he kindly forebears criticism:

Presley looked at the marvelous department store bed of brass, with its brave, gay canopy; the mill-made washstand, with its pitcher and bowl of blinding red and green china; the straw-framed lithographs of symbolic female figures against the multi-colored new wallpaper; the inadequate spindle chairs of white and gold; the sphere of tissue paper

hanging from the gas fixture; and the plumes of pampas grass tacked to the wall at artistic angles and overhanging two astonishing oil paints in dazzling golden frames.<sup>92</sup>

Presenting a caricatured version of a private arena freed from instrumental rationality, the home of Hilma and Annixter is brimming with useless objects that loudly broadcast their status as fungible commodities.

As the kitsch object's caricature of the objet d'art would suggest, the reconceptualization of the material body as something with needs and desires that might be made – something that capitalism (re)produces to expand its markets – had profound implications for the imagining of sphere of non-material values. Put simply, the materialization of culture attended the denaturalization of nature in the age of the machine. Significantly, the novel's anxieties about the autonomy of artistic production tend to surface when women act as purveyors and consumers. When the farmers Derrick and the artist Presley meet at the men's club in San Francisco, for instance, they learn about the upcoming Million Dollar Fair and Flower Festival. The arts festival – organized by the women of the city, and funded by the president of the railroad – is intended to bring eastern investors to San Francisco, blurring the lines between cultural and economic enterprise. As the men's conversation meanders from the Million Dollar Fair and Flower Festival to the possibility of opening new markets in China, women begin to wander into the men's club – it happens to be “ladies day” – dramatizing the migration of women into masculine space. For the occasion of “ladies day,” the artist Hartrath has painted “A Study of the Contra Costa foothills,” a bucolic scene of a girl in a field full of poppies and reddish cows. The painting is raffled for the benefit of the fair, which further underscores the identity of the artwork and the commodity, while the women parrot one another's opinions without any aesthetic discernment.

In this scene, the novel emphasizes with every detail the imbrication of artistic production and market forces: the fair is not only funded by the railroad but ultimately intended to further the interests of industry; the women's response to the artwork is merely imitative and caught by contagion like the latest fashion trend; and the raffle itself evokes other forms of capitalist speculation censured by the novel. On the one hand, as the scene erodes the boundary between the aesthetic and the economic, it suggests the ultimate source of this erosion is the flow of female bodies onto masculine terrain. On the other hand, the scene suggests the impossibility of autonomous art is linked to the nature of female nature. For significantly, Hartrath's pastoral painting of a girl with a cow is the pivot around which these proceedings revolve. This bygone image of a natural female animal safe from the sways of capital is the foil for Norris's own artistic subject: the malleable female body that elaborates itself (and others) in the service of capitalist expansion.

At one point of the novel, Norris seems to entertain whether the embedded position of art within wider material processes might actually open new political possibilities for cultural production. Early in the novel, the poet Presley visits the Derrick's ranch "in search of a subject" for his "Song of the West." He is initially disappointed by the "material, sordid, deadly commonplace" disputes between railroad magnates and wheat barons that very much dispel the "rose-colored mist" through which he could like to see "that huge, romantic west that he saw in his imagination."<sup>93</sup> Eventually, however, Presley is moved by the farmer's plight: he abandons his "Song of the West" in writing a poem called "The Toilers," which is less an epic than "a comment upon the social fabric." The thwarting of Presley's previous attempts seems attributed to the fact that his "convictions had not been aroused."<sup>94</sup> In contrast, Presley writes "The Toilers" out of moral indignation, and Vanamee stamps the poem as "an utterance – a message" for the

people.<sup>95</sup> As per Vanamee's suggestion, "The Toilers" is published in the daily press so that it might be addressed "to the people – not the literary readers of the monthly periodicals."<sup>96</sup>

However, the enormous attention it receives eventually results in the poem's vulgarization: it is ultimately even read as an advertisement for patented cereals and infant food.<sup>97</sup> In Norris's estimation, the commercialization of art inevitably attends the democratization of cultural production.

With the increasing friability of the fiction of the material body untouched by material processes, the moral authorization of capitalist relations of production is brought to crisis. The aggravation of probity's guarantor of rightful property is in fact a central problematic of *The Octopus*. The moral deterioration of Magnus Derrick leads to his material diminishment, and thus the novel kills off the bad capitalist in a cautionary fashion. The material downfall of Magnus Derrick is precipitated not by the machinations of the railroad, but by his capitulation to the railroad's means – in other words, by the loss of his moral superiority. Interesting enough, the text heavily dramatizes the slackening influence of Annie Derrick upon Magnus in the story of his fall from grace. When Magnus Derrick's not only joins but further assumes leadership of the league of corrupt farmers and ranchers, Annie Derrick comes into the room, begging Magnus not to sign. She is beaten back by the crowd, which described as "the brute, many tongued, red-eyed, bellowing for guidance ... imposing its will with the abrupt, resistless pressure of the relaxed piston, inexorable, knowing no pity."<sup>98</sup> The weakening of feminine influence in this scene accompanies the crowd's manifestation as an animal-machine.

### **The Incorporation of Perversions**

Norris's evident anxiety about the materialization of culture provides some insight into his own formal strategies, and those of naturalism more generally speaking. In Georg Lukács's

well-known critique of naturalism, Lukács distinguishes naturalism from realism as a literary form typified by description, rather than narration – the latter being his preferred mode.

According to Lukács, naturalistic description is distinctive insofar as it uses accident in plotting, instead of showing how material relationships overdetermine the unfolding of events. Further, naturalistic description gravitates toward the meticulous and arbitrary detail, instead of subordinating textual particulars to an expressive function. Finally, Lukács criticizes naturalism's representation of aberrant members of a society in lieu of the "typical human qualities" revealed by and revealing larger social structures. With the advent of "descriptive writing" and the disappearance of narration, says Lukács, historical sense is flattened, material conditions are obscured, and the political potential of literary production is left unrealized. The central ideological weakness of the writers of the descriptive method is their portrayal of the social produce as "rigid and mechanical, moved (in a circle by its 'own' laws," such that individuals appear as "simply cogs in its works ... just as corn to the mill," and the possibility of genuine class struggle and historical change is denied.<sup>99</sup>

Lukács's account of naturalism is useful insofar as it identifies many features of naturalistic prose that I deem literary naturalism's characteristic production of narrative waste. In Norris's fiction, particularly, the repetition of the same sentence or even whole paragraphs within one novel sometimes occurs – a narrative tick that is not quite explainable as a matter of inadequate revision. As Lukács notes, naturalism's proliferation in detail is often in excess of its expressive function. Jennifer Fleissner also describes the excessive detail of naturalist writing as a kind of "obsessive compulsion," perceptively noting that it often is triggered by the naturalist text's treatment of women. Whereas Fleissner interprets this tendency as an effort to write the unfinished story of women's new roles and possibilities, I view naturalism's narrative excess

somewhat differently. Naturalism's proliferation of descriptive detail – especially when bumping up against the fate of female characters – is a last ditch effort to recover the purposive purposelessness of art. In carrying out a kind of literary luddism, Norris and other naturalists attempt to jam the machine of literary production with detail, repetition, and other dispensable discourse.

Arguably, naturalism's interest what Lukács deplores as the "atypical" members of human society is crucial to the evocation of artistry in excess of instrumentality. In describing naturalist literature as a form of "romance," Norris lends credence to this assertion. According to Norris, "the ordinary, the untroubled, the commonplace" have no place in naturalist literature.<sup>100</sup> Instead, what Norris calls "romance" must "go straight through the clothes and tissues and wrappings of flesh down deep into the red, living heart of things."<sup>101</sup> This interest in the extraordinary demands a particularly prurient narrative perspective. If realism is a visit "across the street to your neighbor's front parlor (with the bisque fisher boy on the mantel and the photograph of Niagara Falls on glass hanging in the front window)," naturalism is an investigation that "knock[s] over the little bisque fisher boy" in order to find what is hidden away.<sup>102</sup> The naturalist risks a further incursion:

[The author will go] upstairs with you, prying, peeping, peering into the closets of the bedroom, into the nursery, into the sitting-room; yes, and into that little iron box screwed to the lower shelf of the closet in the library; and into those compartments and pigeonholes of the secretaire in the study.<sup>103</sup>

Norris describes the author-as-voyeur, and what the naturalist author hopes to find is something very much like a perverse sexual secret. Like Muybridge's eroticized photographs, naturalism's interest in perversity might be read as an attempt to revive within literature those elements of

“life” that are not public, that have no apparent “use,” that are deflected from genital finality and procreative purpose.

The way in which the perverse is positioned as that which “knocks over the little bisque fisher boy” suggests there is something distinctive about Norris’s authorial investment in perversity, too. If the perverse is Norris’s counter to the kitschy cultural artifact, it is thus posed to answer the problems raised by the remaking of nature as much the anxieties unleashed by the rationalization and instrumentalization of nature. In fact, Norris’s bisque fisher boy begs a rereading of the production of perversity at the turn of the twentieth century. In Foucault’s telling of “the implantation of perversions,” the late nineteenth century witnessed the multiplication of disparate sexual identities through the production of scientific discourses as an instrument-effect of power. This particular moment is an important chapter in Foucault’s larger narrative about the advent of modern biopower itself.<sup>104</sup> While Foucault attributes the multiplication of new sexual identities primarily to the production of scientific knowledges, other scholars have placed greater emphasis on how capitalism provided the enabling conditions for the emergence of gay and lesbian identities. Rosemary Hennessy, for instance, argues the late nineteenth century growth of consumer culture hinged upon the production of “new forms of consciousness and identity, including new forms of family and sexuality.”<sup>105</sup> For Hennessy, the emergence of new sexual identities at the end of the nineteenth century is tied to the profit motive of capital – in particular, capitalism’s need to create new desires and market niches. New sexual identities are thus consequent to cultures of mass consumption. While focusing on productive rather than the consumptive moment, John D’Emilo likewise advances a materialist account of modern sexuality, suggesting it was the spread of wage labor and the disintegration of the interdependent household economy that allowed for the organization of lives apart from the heterosexual family

in greater numbers and the elaboration of a personal identity organized around sexual practice.<sup>106</sup> Yet while several queer studies scholars have attended to the way in which the material production and consumption of commodities is linked to the production of sexuality, the relationship between the material production of desire and the scientific codification of sexuality has remained largely under-theorized.

For the purposes of this argument, anyway, I want to read the scientific “implantation of perversions” as a reactionary response to the incorporation of perversions, what I want to define as the emerging cultural consciousness of the entanglement of bodily needs and desires with social material processes. Although a lengthy exploration into sexology remains outside the purviews of this chapter, I might briefly gesture here. The changes in the structure and the function of the nuclear family with the spread of wage labor and the growth of commodity culture were often noted within early sexological literature. Both Richard von Kraft-Ebbing and Max Nordau cast the sexual deviant at least in part as the product of the stresses of “modern” life.<sup>107</sup> In contrast, there’s an increasing tendency to describe the etiology of non-normative sexuality as a function of biological determination in later sexological literature by Havelock Ellis. On the one hand, the perverse restores to nature that excess that instrumental rationality stripped from it. On the other hand, the perverse biologizes what is historical.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter’s most basic argument is that cultural meanings of animality underwent a significant renovation in the age of the machine, during which the nineteenth-century recognition of animal sentience was overwritten by a widespread reconceptualization of the animal-as-mechanism. Building upon the work of Seltzer and others, this chapter argues that the renaissance of the animal-machine was tied to technological innovations and material relations that

implicated animal life at the end of the nineteenth century. By no means does this chapter exhaust the multiple activities and institutional forms that were productive of the animal-machine. However, it does elaborate the significant contributions of the material practices of agribusiness and the representational modes of stop-motion photography and naturalist literature.

Furthermore, this chapter argues that the animal machine was instrumental to shifts in U.S. racial formation at the moment when the formal end of slavery coincided with the importation of transnational labor. The representative relay running between the racialized body and the animal-machine facilitated the imagining of the laboring and racialized body as wholly body, freed from pain, ready for and reducible to its instrumental use. At different moments in this chapter, I identify two separate but intersecting ways in which the animal-machine signifies the racialized body: as a machine of human making and as a mechanism operating according to natural law. Both meanings are invoked in the service of white supremacy, the former in representing the Chinese migrant laborer as malleable to the most minimal means of subsistence, and the latter in casting the black laborer as naturally suited to the most demeaning forms of labor.

As this chapter has shown, however, the animal-machine was not an untroubled means of maintaining social hegemony. The mechanization of animal nature, however expedient it proved for a range of racial projects, had the added effect of unsettling the animal's ideologically productive role in the sustaining fictions of political liberalism. One way of understanding the impasses of animality that this chapter describes is to say that the animal-machine was highly enabling of disciplinary forms of power, but tended to worry juridical forms of power. Another way to understand the cultural anxiety or ambivalence that surrounds the animal-machine is to recognize that the human-animal divide is established along multiple fault lines: although

animality is a common trope for human difference, as forms of human difference are, well, different, the invocation of animality will be put to disparate uses. What's more, the available meanings of animality at any given historical moment – the particular content that fills the category of the animal – will serve some representative ends better than others. While the mechanization/animalization of the racialized body facilitated capitalism's global expansion at the height of industrial capitalism, by a kind of representational contagion, it troubled the positioning of the female body as a site of recuperation from the ravages of industrial capitalism. Ultimately, this chapter shows how the animal-machine unsettled the moral authorization of capitalist relations of production, and in so doing, it highlights how the nineteenth-century imagining of a sphere of purely non-material values was paradoxically predicated on the material body of the animal.

### Chapter 3: Primitive Accumulations

Each June, the historic western town of Medora emerges from its winter hibernation as North Dakota's primary vacation destination. For one of the state's greatest claims to distinction has long been that Theodore Roosevelt liked to visit, a fact that the small town of Medora has cultivated into a mythology strong enough to support an anomalous tourism industry. As the story goes, Roosevelt first traveled to the Dakotan Badlands to hunt buffalo in 1883, and smitten with the place, he invested in two separate cattle ranches there. In the same year of Roosevelt's initial visit and within the vicinity of Roosevelt's ranchland, a French nobleman known as the Marquis de Mores established a meatpacking outpost, naming it Medora after his (undoubtedly flattered) wife. The Marquis's enterprise ended in financial failure by the fall of 1886, but Roosevelt fared quite differently in the Dakota territories. After the devastating death of his wife and mother on the same day, Roosevelt took up residency in Dakota to live the strenuous life of a ranchman for a number of years. According to Roosevelt's own testimony, the experience restored his vitality and strengthened his character, equipping him to become the 26<sup>th</sup> president of the United States – and no less importantly within local lore, allowing him to assume the status of de facto founder of Medora.<sup>1</sup>

Each evening during the summer season, the Medora Outdoor Musical memorializes the making of Theodore Roosevelt in the rugged climes of western Dakota. After an assortment of variety acts and western song and dance numbers, which change each year with the contracts and the cast, the show unflinching and somewhat ceremonially concludes with its tribute. As the host tells the story of Roosevelt's Dakotan redemption (more or less the narrative provided above), the twilight deepens over the truly stunning rock formations that extend behind the stage:

unbroken chains of craggy, brush-dusted buttes show the sedimentations of millennia in their multi-chromatic strata of stone, eroded into visibility by the wind and water corrosion of millennia more. The narrative that echoes through this natural amphitheater ultimately arrives at Roosevelt's military action during the Spanish-American War, when his Dakota-forged mettle was put to the test. A spotlight suddenly illuminates an extempore Kettle Hill to the left of the stage, at the base of which the spectator views the Colonel reincarnated, together with several outfitted Rough Riders, all on horseback. An impersonation of Roosevelt's tightly-wound voice now blasts through the loudspeakers, recalling the taking of San Juan Heights as it's recorded in Roosevelt's memoir, *The Rough Riders* (1899), while the actors play out the scene:

I spoke to the captain in command of the rear of the platoons, saying that I had been ordered to support the regulars in the attack upon the hills, and that in my judgment we could not take these hills by firing at them, and that we must rush them. He answered that his orders were to keep his men lying where they were, and that he could not charge without orders. I asked where the colonel was, and as he was not in sight, said, "Then I am the ranking officer here and I give the order to charge ... let my men through, sir[!]"<sup>2</sup>

With guns firing, Roosevelt and the Rough Riders gallop up the precipitous butte, reaching the top as firecrackers light up the sky. The audience applauds, the first chords of the national anthem swell, and a triumphant Roosevelt, having ridden down the backside of the hill, strides onto the stage to lead the singing of "The Star-Spangled Banner."

The Medora Musical's jingoistic reenactment of the Battle of San Juan Hill upon the buttes of western North Dakota yields easily to a number of analyses that have been foundational to the argument of this chapter, from Gail Bederman's discussion of Roosevelt's performance of primitive masculinity to Richard Slotkin's analysis of Roosevelt's enactment of regeneration

through violence to Amy Kaplan's reading of empire as the white masculine eradication of anarchy at home and abroad.<sup>3</sup> Expanding the work of these scholars, this chapter focuses on the construction of white masculinity and the legitimization of racialized violence at the moment of U.S. high imperialism, while it attends more closely to a number of concerns that these scholars have addressed less centrally. In the scene described above, for instance, I dwell more lingeringly upon the sight of the rattled, rearing horses spurred up the steep declivity in near darkness, heavily freighted not only with riders but also with celebratory meanings of white masculine conquest and control. I observe that the amphitheater overlooks not an untouched, primordial landscape but the north end of Roosevelt National Park, where buffalo, elk, and mountain sheep survive as a legacy of the U.S. conservation movement, in which Roosevelt played a prominent role. I stress the peculiar narrative reliance upon the implicitly effete Frenchman, foil for the town's adopted founder, Roosevelt, who discovered in the Dakotan badlands not enterprise but escape, not new markets but new manhood, because he ventured there, the story underscores, not a meat-packing plant but a big-game hunt. In other words, I ask how material practices involving animals and emergent meanings of animality set the stage for the performance of masculinity and the enactment of racialized violence.

This chapter centrally explores two interrelated developments in human-animal relationships in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: the stylization of sport hunting and the beginnings of the conservation movement in the U.S. This exploration is routed through the life and writing of Theodore Roosevelt, who contributed significantly to both the popularization of "wilderness hunting" and the advancement of conservationist measures. In examining these developments, this chapter traces how animality accrues the sense of savagery – expressed and accessed through the exercise of violence – in the American popular imaginary

over the course of the Progressive era. Ultimately, this chapter links what Michael Lundbald calls the “discourse of the jungle,”<sup>4</sup> in which “civilized creatures” are recast as barbarous beasts, to a primitivist imaginary authorizing racialized violence and capitalist accumulation: what we might call primitive accumulation, to both invoke and expand Marx’s use of the term. But further, this chapter links the white masculine recuperation of (violent) animality to a profound imperial melancholia. The conservation movement emerges in this argument as a melancholic refusal of the “loss” of animal life occasioned by settler colonialism, but further, as a form of national forgetting whereby the “making live” of wildlife populations elides the “letting die” of Indigenous populations.

This chapter contributes to a number of ongoing critical conversations. First, it contributes to American Studies by exploring how material practices involving animals and representations of animality contributed to the structuration of racialized heteropatriarchy during the Progressive era. Second, this chapter extends recent work by Cary Wolfe, Colleen Glenney Boggs, Nicole Shukin, and others who consider biopolitics from the vantage point of non-human animal life.<sup>5</sup> The following pages will take as axiomatic these scholars’ understanding that any understanding of the application of power to life itself demands a consideration of how the lives of non-human animals are ensnared within modern biopolitics. Third, this chapter pushes against a reading tendency within critical animal studies, unsettling the inclination to view the permissibility of violence against animals as necessarily proceeding from the human-animal divide, especially as it is articulated in relationship to the capacity for rational thought. Thus this chapter resists an uncritical celebration of any instance of becoming-animal, following the important precedent set by Donna Haraway’s perspicacious critique of Deleuze and Guattari.<sup>6</sup>

Indeed, this chapter explores how various modes of becoming-animal entail the exercise of violence against both human and non-human animals.

This chapter locates its present-day stakes in the scene that opens it: not the *Medora Musical*, per say, but the easy endurance of the cultural meanings it circulates. Departing from western North Dakota is all the more apposite, as the state's 2008 oil boom, enabled by new hydraulic fracturing or "fracking" technologies, has in a few short years radically transformed the region: skewering the landscape with hundreds of oil rigs; straining road capacities, water supplies, and sewage systems with the influx of people and equipment; and deleteriously impacting the habitats, habits, and very existence of wildlife. The desolate, sparsely populated landscape that offered Roosevelt an escape no longer exists. Coinciding as it did with the onset of the recession, the transformation of western North Dakota has prompted little objection, as it has allowed the state's economy to thrive despite the economic downturn. However, it is not only the way in which the opposition to environmental degradation is silenced or subordinated in this and other instances, but also the way in which it is sounded that concerns us here. An article in *The New York Times Magazine* in January 2013, for instance, describes North Dakota as a "kind of frontier," where "it was almost possible to imagine the land as it appeared to Lewis and Clark when the Corps of Discovery came up the Missouri in 1804," a possibility increasingly diminished with the "devouring of the earth's nonrenewable resources."<sup>7</sup> The peculiarly colonial encasement of the author's protest here should give pause.

What forms of national forgetting allow one to mourn a time when the landscape was empty of human life, rather than emptied? What does one seek to recover in the encounter with the natural world? What modes of domination and acts of violence are actualized and legitimized in and through this encounter? This chapter gains traction in pursuing these questions through to

the question of the animal. Ultimately, it contests the inexorability of the sacrifice of animal life for human good. But further, it interrogates the interspecies histories and possibilities of human violence. In so doing, this discussion will propose, if it only begins to imagine, the ethical response to the modern forms of violence we have invented and continue to inflict, against human and non-human animals, entails something more than mourning, something other than melancholic repudiation, in facing our futures as well as our pasts.

### **From Civilized Creatures to Barbarous Beasts**

In 1903, John Burroughs published an article in the *Atlantic* entitled “Real and Sham Natural History,” launching a national public debate that became known as the nature faker controversy. At issue in the incendiary essay was a new brand of popular nature writing that, according to Burroughs, flagrantly crosses “the line between fact and fiction” and insidiously “induce[s] the reader to cross, too,” while working “such a spell upon him that he shall not know that he ... is in the land of make-believe.”<sup>8</sup> While Burroughs grants that it is “an artist’s privilege to heighten or deepen natural effects,” writers he identifies as Charles G. D. Roberts, Ernest Thompson Seton, and Reverent William J. Long abuse their creative license in pretending to be “assiduous contributors to *natural history*,” while presenting the credulous public with supposedly true stories that the “real” naturalist would never swallow.<sup>9</sup>

One suspects that Burroughs’s indignation at these “yellow journalists of the woods” was somewhat personally motivated. Ever since Houghton Mifflin Company had asked the Chicago schoolteacher, Mary Burt, to compile the first of many collections of Burroughs’s writings for the classroom in the 1880s, his essays had become a staple within educational curricula, given the prevalence of nature study at the time.<sup>10</sup> The growing popularity of books such as Ernest Thompson Seton’s *Wild Animals I Have Known* (1898) and William J. Long’s *School of the*

*Woods* (1902) jeopardized Burroughs's monopolization of the educational market. Even so, something more than personal rivalries must have fueled the nature faker controversy as it raged across the pages of widely-circulated journals and newspapers over the next several years, embroiling prominent literary figures, scientists, and even the president of the United States. The argument turned upon the question of the animal: the behaviors, capacities, and lived experiences of animal life. Essentially, critics impugned the nature fakers for falsely attributing to animals human characteristics such as morality and rationality. Indeed, these nature writers less often catalogued the traits of species than chronicled the life dramas of individual animals in an almost biographical manner, following the anthropomorphizing tendencies of the late nineteenth-century animal autobiography. As Ralph Lutts suggests, the nature fakers "represented a merging of the animal welfare approaches to domestic animals and the traditional wildlife essay – *Black Beauty* in a wolf's clothing, one might say."<sup>11</sup> This peculiar stylization of natural history was only one of many manifestations of the "civilized creature," to borrow Jennifer Mason's term.<sup>12</sup> However, these naturalists sang the swan song of the nineteenth century's anthropomorphic animal: with the onset of the nature faker controversy, the humanity of animality came into dispute.

Soon after Burroughs's *Atlantic* article, William J. Long rallied to his own defense, first under the pen name of "Hermit" in the April issue of *Forest and Stream* and next in the May issue of *North American Review*.<sup>13</sup> Although Seton and Roberts cautiously avoided involvement throughout the duration of the controversy, Long's vehemence soon invited others to join the fray. Caspar Whitney, editor of *Outing Magazine*, for instance, determined that Burroughs had announced a much-needed corrective: "We have grown maudlin over ... lovelorn rams or unselfish beavers or pacing mustangs or mathematical birds. It has been a veritable carnival of sentimentality."<sup>14</sup> Burroughs rejoined Long's rejoinders in *Century Magazine*, attacking in

particular Long's account of two orioles' problem-solving skills in building a hanging nest, which Long had offered as a counter to Burroughs's skepticism: "After such an example as this, how long will it be before the water birds will be building little rush cradles for their young or rush boats driven about the ponds and lakes by means of leafy sails, or before Jenny Wren will be living in a log cabin of her own construction."<sup>15</sup> Soon every new publication of nature writing was considered as a challenge to the opposing side of the debate. When William J. Long published "Animal Surgery" in 1903, in which a "woodcock genius" applies a clay cast to his own broken leg, he incited a storm of criticism within the journal *Science*.<sup>16</sup> One letter to the editor lambasted Long for granting the woodcock advanced knowledge of "theories of bone formation and regeneration ... never clearly grasped by some of our university juniors."<sup>17</sup> Others cited additional transgressions of scientific truth by the nature fakers, lamenting that "Long and his allies" were forming children "with minds perverted and ill adapted to survive as rational beings in a world of fact and law."<sup>18</sup> By the time (then President) Roosevelt dealt a climatic blow to the nature fakers in a 1907 interview with Edward Clark in *Everybody's Magazine*,<sup>19</sup> the tide had already begun to turn. By the end of the decade, Seton had curbed his embellished accounts of animal existence and turned his energies to the scouting movement; Long had abandoned children's books for literary criticism; and public schools had dropped the nature fakers from their curriculum. In all ways measurable, it seems, the nature fakers had lost the day.<sup>20</sup>

Yet the understanding of the natural world advanced by "real naturalists" was hardly "a world of fact and law," to quote our earlier correspondent, but a Darwinian arena ruled by violence. In his interview with *Everybody's Magazine*, Roosevelt centrally quibbled with Long's description of a caribou's killing by a wolf with one quick, painless snap to the heart. While he hammered mainly upon the physiological impossibility of this manner of killing, Roosevelt's

consternation stemmed as much from his disbelief that wolves would concern themselves with humane forms of slaughter.<sup>21</sup> In contrast, Seton's *The Natural History of the Ten Commandments* (1907) argued that biblical commandments "are fundamental laws of all highly developed animals."<sup>22</sup> Similarly espousing the moral order of the natural order, Long went to great lengths to explain away the suffering of prey attacked by their predators. When animals are wounded, he wrote, "They sink into a dozy, dreamy slumber, as free from pain or care as an opium smoker."<sup>23</sup> Burroughs, Roosevelt, and other "real naturalists," on the other hand, tended to locate the "reality" of nature in the experience of violent struggle. As the frequent substitution of "nature fakir" for "nature faker" over the course of the controversy suggests, opponents of the nature fakers centrally quibbled with any idea of the natural world invested with spiritual meaning or proscribing violent action. Even more suggestively, the use of "nature fakir" to slur the nature fakers casts their blindness to or repudiation of "natural" violence as insufficiently Western and justifiably colonized.

The nature faker controversy usefully marks a historical shift in prevailing cultural ideas of animality within the American cultural imaginary, as Michael Lundblad has already observed. In contrast to Lundblad's examination of the Darwinian *discourse* of animality during the Progressive era, this section more fully explores the material conditions and effects of the irruption of violent animality through a reading of Roosevelt's early hunting writing. As many readers of Roosevelt have already noted, the recuperation of animality within turn-of-the-century masculinist primitivism legitimated the exercise of racialized violence.<sup>24</sup> Somewhat differently from other scholars, this section explores how the material practices of hunting and eating animals mediated both Roosevelt's identification with the animal and the common sense of settler colonialism. Ultimately, this section shows the white masculine cooptation of animality to

be a melancholic response to the “loss” of the animal within modernity, building upon the work of Akira Mizuta Lippit and reading Freudian theory both with and against the grain. In so doing, this section argues that a complicated articulation – not to be confused with equivalence – of racial melancholia and animal melancholia gave life to a historically specific imagining of the animal, the violence of which disavows the violence of “civilization.”

Long before Roosevelt officially entered into the nature faker controversy, his hunting memoirs depicted the natural world as a stage of savage cruelty. In his *Outdoor Pastimes of an American Hunter* (1905), for instance, Roosevelt ridicules a certain Mr. Hudson, whose “The Naturalist in La Plata” represents “the cougar as being friendly to man, disinterestedly averse to harming him.”<sup>25</sup> As a corrective to the humanitarian impulses Mr. Hudson attributes to the cougar, Roosevelt relays several authenticated instances of cougars attacking humans. He quotes a letter written to Hart Merriam, Chief of the Biological Survey, describing how a cougar seized a child by the throat; he cites the testimony of John Goff, a Colorado hunting guide, recounting how a cougar stalked a young girl; and he affirms a number of “undoubted cases” in which “a negro was attacked and killed by a cougar.”<sup>26</sup> Despite the rareness of animal attacks upon humans, which Roosevelt even acknowledges, his meditations on every carnivorous species, from cougars to wolves to bears, frequently feature gruesome human killings.

Roosevelt finds that ungulates as much as carnivores display an innate animal viciousness that he attributes to natural instinct, despite the fact that threatening circumstances would explain much of the behavior he describes. In *Hunting Trips of a Ranchman* (1885), for instance, Roosevelt recalls approaching a fatally wounded but still living elk, who “raised its head and looked proudly ... the heavy mane bristling up on the neck, while its eyes glared and its teeth grated together.”<sup>27</sup> Lest we read this animal’s albeit incapacitated aggressiveness as a case of

self-defense, Roosevelt's ethological observations consistently show animal society to be fundamentally organized by force. In *The Wilderness Hunter* (1893), Roosevelt counts the bull elk "guilty of rape, robbery, and even murder,"<sup>28</sup> and elsewhere he likewise describes the mule deer buck as "a brutal, greedy, and selfish tyrant" in his relations with the doe.<sup>29</sup> From the top of the food chain to the bottom, Roosevelt's animals exhibit a bloodthirstiness that often belies their normative food source and sometimes stretches the bounds of belief as much as any nature faker's story. When Roosevelt recalls shooting an elk in *The Wilderness Hunter*, for example, he claims that a flock of whiskey-jacks, a species of bird more commonly known as the Grey Jay, "appeared at the first crack of the rifle," "followed the wounded bull as he dragged his great carcass down the hill, and pounced with ghoulish bloodthirstiness on the gouts of blood that were sprinkled over the green herbage."<sup>30</sup>

As several scholars have argued, Roosevelt's representation of the natural world as a Darwinian struggle for survival serves as an alibi for the dispossession and death of Native Americans as well as the violent expansion of empire abroad. Importantly, however, this alibi puts Roosevelt in two places at once, so to speak. First, the savagery of animal existence redounds upon "the savage." In other words, the line between white civilization and savagery is redrawn with this representation of violent animality to which Native Americans are relegated. Richard Slotkin has observed how Roosevelt deploys the long-standing symbology of "the savage war," according to which the supposedly "'savage' and bloodthirsty propensity of the natives" renders genocide justifiable insofar as "coexistence between primitive natives and civilized Europeans [is] impossible."<sup>31</sup> In large part, Roosevelt revives the notion of the bloodthirsty savage by likening the resistance of Native Americans to the attacks of wild animals

upon human life. His lengthy ruminations upon the viciousness of the latter, discussed above, thus provide an interpretative framework through which to view the former.

In *The Wilderness Hunter*, for instance, Roosevelt mentions the danger “from savage beasts and from the Indians” in the same breath: “Since I have been ranching on the Little Missouri two men have been killed by bears in the neighborhood of my range; and in the early years of my residence there, several men living or travelling in the country were slain by small war parties of young braves.”<sup>32</sup> Further, Roosevelt paints all Native peoples as one species of predator in their skirmishes with white frontiersmen. In relaying how three trappers were ambushed by Sioux warriors during a trip through Yellowstone, for instance, Roosevelt suggests the warriors “could of course have eaten up the three hunters in a minute” had they been more courageous.<sup>33</sup> However, the warriors instead encircled the hunters’ camp and “opened a perfect fusillade, wasting their cartridges with a recklessness which Indians are apt to show.”<sup>34</sup> The three hunters, “lying flat on the ground and well concealed, were not harmed,”<sup>35</sup> and by “endeavoring to make each shot tell,” they eventually fended off the attack. Roosevelt quotes one of the hunters as saying, “I only fired seven times all day; I reckoned on getting meat every time I pulled the trigger.”<sup>36</sup> In Roosevelt’s representation of the Indian wars, “the sly, lurking, bloodthirsty savages” are the animalistic aggressors. Thus Roosevelt can speak dismissively of “a good deal of sentimental nonsense [that] has been talked” about stealing land from “a set of treacherous, revengeful, and fiendishly cruel savages,” who “had no stronger claim than that of having a few years previously butchered the original occupants.”<sup>37</sup> The imperatives of self-preservation or the advancements of civilization cloak the encroachments of colonial power, and the violence of the white settler appears the defense of a moral high ground.

Significantly, Roosevelt's invocation of the symbology of the savage war seems to dismantle the paradigmatic axis of representation. For Roosevelt does not rely heavily upon the animalization of Native Americans to condone their treatment, if animalization means the representative use of animality to signify Indigeneity, to absent the ultimate referent, to substitute what is ethical in the treatment of humans with what is normative in the treatment of the animals. In drawing the line between savagery and civilization, Roosevelt rarely uses the animal as a trope, in other words. The conjunctive rather than the copula unites the human "savage" and non-human species: it is permissible to kill the savage *and* other animals in the name of civilization. The savage is *of* the animal and not *like* the animal. No act of representative displacement seems to be required. I want to merely mark the representative flatness at work here, as it is a point to which we will return.

Roosevelt's account of savage beasts and beastly savages is necessary to portray "slaying the beast" as an advancement of civilization. As Claire Kim argues, "slaying the beast is an act by which man restores social order," and thus, paradoxically enough, "civilization is achieved through violence."<sup>38</sup> Yet the violence that accomplishes the suppression of the beast (whether animal, woman, or racial other) seems often, even exuberantly, "uncivilized" itself. This observation leads us to the second use of savage animality as an alibi for imperial expansion, to which we alluded above. As Gail Bederman has noted, Roosevelt's belief in the racial superiority of white Anglo-Saxons is based not only upon their putative possession of the lights of civilization, but also upon "the potency of their violent masculinity – their ability to outsavage the savages."<sup>39</sup> In Roosevelt's Darwinian schema, the vanguard of evolutionary progress advances through the monopolization of violence. The highest realization of civilization paradoxically requires the rejection of its precepts and the participation instead in a contest of

brute force. The philosophy is played out in the narrative structure of *Hunting Trips of a Ranchman* (1885), which organizes its discussion of hunting various species along a kind of evolutionary scale, beginning with water-fowl and other birds, moving on to different species of deer, proceeding to mountain sheep and buffalo, and arriving at the pursuit of “Old Ephraim,” or the grizzly bear, whose “half-human footprints” and plantigrade posture mark its high rung on the evolutionary ladder.<sup>40</sup> Each subsequent species is described as more dangerous to pursue than was the preceding, and human ascendancy is secured in proving to be the most dangerous animal of them all. It is the domination of other animals through the exercise of force that defines the human, not the powers of rational thought or trappings of civilization. Roosevelt’s indifference to the importance of technical skill in shooting – “a good target-shot may be a very poor hunter, and a fairly successful hunter may be only a moderate shot” – confirms this reading.<sup>41</sup> For it is not the difficulty of the chase or the application of human technicity to the problem of the kill that “develops or implies the presence of ... manly qualities.”<sup>42</sup> If this were true, Roosevelt says, “a mink or even a weasel would have to stand as high up in the scale” as big game, a preposterous suggestion that apparently warrants no further discussion.<sup>43</sup>

Roosevelt’s imagining of masculine prowess and white supremacy through the hunt amounts to a recuperation of human animality: the ability to out-animal the animal. In riffing upon Bederman’s memorable phrase, I want to acknowledge the indebtedness of my reading to hers, but further, to emphasize Roosevelt’s reliance upon the animal in his construction of primitive masculinity. Of course, both Bederman and Slotkin have addressed how Roosevelt’s representations of hunting, on the one hand, claim civilizational superiority and the differentiation from racialized groups, and on the other hand, exalt primitive violence and the identification with “the savage.” Expanding these historians’ insights, this reading has thus far

underlined how Roosevelt's hunting writing both contributed to and relied upon new ideas of violent animality in suturing its ideological closures. But as importantly, Roosevelt's co-construction of animality and white masculinity emerges in and through the human-animal encounter. When Bederman discusses Roosevelt's hunting writing, she most often treats Roosevelt's sport hunting as a form of masculine play-acting. Bederman highlights, for instance, the hokey frontispiece of *Hunting Trips of a Ranchman*: a photograph of Roosevelt decked out in a buckskin suit that betrays the New York studio in which it was taken by the fake grass visible beneath his moccasins. Of course, Roosevelt's cowboy persona was a highly self-conscious construction. Yet his hunting writing suggests that the habitus of the hunt, or the embodied experience of this particular human-animal encounter, was crucial to his identification with the animal, his performance of primitive masculinity, and ultimately, his justification of racialized violence.

In reading Roosevelt's hunting memoirs, one is struck by the relative rarity of meditative reflection and the abstention from rhetorical flourish, particularly given Roosevelt's giftedness in this regard. Roosevelt's writing persistently refuses interiority, which is not surprising, perhaps, from someone who describes Thoreau as "slightly anemic."<sup>44</sup> Daniel Philippon has argued that Roosevelt's prose style reflects his pretension to "scientific realism": in Philippon's reading, Roosevelt's hunting memoirs are a kind of amalgam of natural history and autobiography.<sup>45</sup> Indeed, Roosevelt believed that "hunting should go hand in hand with the love of natural history,"<sup>46</sup> and there is ample evidence in his lengthy descriptions of the traits of various species that he understood his writing in this vein. If Roosevelt suggests that "a full description of the life history and chase of almost any kind of big game is worth more than any quantity of matter about new spiders and scorpions,"<sup>47</sup> however, this stems from the fact that the human animal

remains a primary object of Roosevelt's scientific investigations. Roosevelt reports his own bodily experience of heat and cold, exertion and fatigue, thirst and hunger as assiduously as he records the physiological and behavioral traits of wild animals. There is a visceral quality to the prose and an attention to embodied experience in stark contrast to the narrative indifference to interiority. In fact, the drama of the narrative often turns upon the materiality of the human body, rather than or in addition to the killing of the animal body: the lack of water during an antelope hunt, the lack of adequate clothing during a January stalk, the lack of protection from the sudden onset of a summer storm. By far the most frequent bodily preoccupation and narrative problem is hunger, which is resolved through the killing and eating of an animal.

Only rarely does Roosevelt fail to report the meal that follows the hunt, and he does so with the gusto of a gourmand, whatever the simplicity of its preparation. The reader learns of backwoods delicacies such as moose's nose and beaver's tail, although Roosevelt does not prefer these to the hump meat of the buffalo, which "is excellent and tender and juicy."<sup>48</sup> How the cut of meat, season of the year, and age of the animal affect its taste is Roosevelt's persistent preoccupation. The reportedly stringy flesh of grass plover is actually quite tender before the birds begin feasting on grasshoppers in late summer.<sup>49</sup> The grizzly bear would taste just as well as the black bear – quite like a young pig – if one were to swallow some at the height of berry season, before bears take to carrion feeding.<sup>50</sup> The white goat is "intolerably musky in flavor" as an adult, but the kids are thankfully edible,<sup>51</sup> at least on the hunting trail. For something about the hunt sharpens one's hankering for animal flesh. Several meals compete in Roosevelt's recollections for the status of the best ever, such as the simple breakfast of elk loin – "We had salt; we were very hungry; and I never ate anything better"<sup>52</sup> – or the yearling bighorn sheep that Roosevelt declares to have been the best "mutton, or meat of any kind," that he had ever

consumed.<sup>53</sup> If such statements seem hyperbolic, Roosevelt contends that “only those who have gone through much hardship and some little hunger, and have worked violently for several days without flesh food” can understand.<sup>54</sup> In the wilderness, the hunter confronts the material needs and desires hardwired into the body: “Until a healthy, active man has been without it for some little time, he does not know how positively and almost painfully hungry for flesh he becomes, no matter how much farinaceous food he may have.”<sup>55</sup> In the killing of animals and the eating of meat, Roosevelt’s representation of the natural world as a violent chain of destruction is inhabited, ingested, even. Darwinian ideas of violent struggle for survival are confirmed by the embodied experience of the hunt.

To describe Roosevelt’s hunting in the American West as “sport hunting” is somewhat of a misnomer, in fact. For even if Roosevelt’s cowboy persona is very much a persona, highly cultivated, self-consciously performed, in living out the fantasy of a ranchman, Roosevelt entered into some very real material conditions. For instance, in *Hunting Trips of a Ranchman*, Roosevelt relays one November trip he took to survey a small herd of cattle under the care of a ranch hand stationed thirty-five miles down the river. When he reaches his employee’s shack, he finds to his annoyance that “the cowboy, having run out of provisions[,]” had just left, “and, of course, he had left nothing to eat behind him.”<sup>56</sup> Roosevelt suffices with some tea that evening, but he wakes famished in the morning, a situation that he remedies by shooting five prairie fowl for breakfast, which “seemed most delicious food,”<sup>57</sup> despite the fact that by November, the birds “have begun to be dry and tough.”<sup>58</sup> While few hunts are occasioned by such dire straits, a large number of Roosevelt’s hunting trips are taken to keep the ranch “in meat,” and even the big game hunts, if undertaken for “trophies,” depend upon the game as a food source during the hunting trip. According to Roosevelt, cattleman hunt in the manner of early frontiersmen, who

pursued game “not only as a sport but also as the only means of keeping the posts and the expeditionary trains in meat.”<sup>59</sup> Roosevelt thus represents and indeed experiences hunting as a means of survival rather than a sport, a necessary form of subsistence as much as mode of recreation.

The representation of hunting as a requisite form of sustenance not only sanctions the killing of animals but also justifies the annexation of territory. Through representations of the necessary kill, Roosevelt differentiates between subsistence and profit, bodily need and financial gain, eating meat and market consumption. In playing upon these series of distinctions, Roosevelt imagines primitive accumulation as the rightful appropriation of property, following a long tradition of liberal thought. In *The Second Treatise of Government* (1689), John Locke explains that private property originates with every man’s “property in his own person.”<sup>60</sup> Since the “labour of his body and the work of hands ... are properly his,”<sup>61</sup> whatever “he removes out of the state that nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined it to something that is his own, ... thereby makes it his property.”<sup>62</sup> In Locke’s theorization of the *rightful* appropriation of goods held in common, we should emphasize, it is not simply that labor is added to the natural world, but that this labor produces use-value, or even more narrowly, the sustenance of life itself. Locke’s paradigmatic example of the rightful accumulation of property, tellingly, is the appropriation of a food source:

“He that is nourished by the acorns he picked up under an oak, or the apples he gathered from the trees in the wood, has certainly appropriated them to himself. Nobody can deny but the nourishment is his. I ask, then, When did they begin to be his? when he digested? or when he ate? or when he boiled? or when he brought them home? or when he picked them up? And ‘tis plain, if the first gathering made them his, nothing else could. That

labour put a distinction between them and common; that added something more to them than nature, the common mother of all, had done, and so they became his private right.”<sup>63</sup>

While Locke locates the right to private property in the expenditure of labor, the *rightfulness* of this act of appropriation hinges upon the expenditure of labor to sustain life. Only “as much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils” can be fixed as property: “whatever is beyond this is more than his share.”<sup>64</sup> Locke goes on to describe how the invention of money and the expansion of capital created the temptation to enlarge one’s possessions beyond the production of use values and thus resulted in “a disproportionate and unequal possession of the earth.”<sup>65</sup> Yet while admitting this perversion of proper ownership, Locke maintains the properness of private property, advancing a homologizing line of reasoning to justify appropriations further and further removed from the immediate fulfillment of bodily need: just as “he who gathered as much of the wild fruit, killed, caught, or tamed as many of the beasts as he could ... did thereby acquire a propriety in them,” so too “whatsoever he tilled and reaped, laid up, and made use of before it spoiled, that was his peculiar right.”<sup>66</sup> Roosevelt similarly portrays primitive accumulation as rightful appropriation by representing settler colonialism as a desperate struggle for survival rather than an opportunistic seizure of the means of production.<sup>67</sup>

Perhaps the most noteworthy representations of bodily need are those that seem to sanction the violation of established sporting code. Throughout his hunting memoirs, Roosevelt excoriates market-hunters or skin-hunters who “mercilessly slaughter the game in season and out” for the sake of a profit.<sup>68</sup> He often nods to the rules of good sportsmanship to distinguish himself from these hunters: “As a rule, I may explain, I do not shoot at anything but bucks.”<sup>69</sup> However, bodily need often dictates the breaking of such rules. In seasons of scarcity, Roosevelt rationalizes, “it was no longer possible to choose what we would kill, and, after the first of

September ... we did not spare either buck or doe if we were able to get one within range of our rifles.”<sup>70</sup> Not only the restrictions on the sex of game but also the stipulations concerning the means of killing might be flouted if mere survival is at stake: “Killing a deer from a boat while the poor animal is swimming in the water, or on snowshoes as it flounders helpless in the deep drifts, can only be justified on the plea of hunger.”<sup>71</sup> Thus Roosevelt can without compunction describe riding down a “fat whitetail fawn” one October, as he “had no fresh meat” for the camp.<sup>72</sup> Yet his enthusiasm about “the juicy roasted ribs” he feasted upon that evening – fawn, we are told, “yields the best of venison” – suggests craving often masquerades as compulsion.<sup>73</sup> Most significantly, in representing an oppositional relationship between the dictates of bodily need and the directives of human law, Roosevelt suggests that the “law” of nature necessarily trumps the trivialities of human legalities, for the violation of law is sometimes necessary to the survival of the species. The troubling aspect of this formulation is the ability to stretch the meaning of “survival” such that it encompasses the gross expropriations of empire, not to mention the tendency to restrict the right to “survival” such that it pertains only to members of the same species – or sub-species, as the case may be.

Thus far, this chapter has been tracking how Roosevelt’s material experience and discursive representations of hunting and eating animals secures the common sense of settler colonialism. But Roosevelt’s representation of eating meat further complicates predominant understandings of the permissibility of non-human animal death. It has become somewhat of a truism within critical animal studies to understand a mechanism of differentiation at work in what Clare Kim calls “slaying the beast” or what Jacques Derrida deems “the noncriminal putting to death” of animal/ized others.<sup>74</sup> In Cary Wolfe’s explanation of the “institution of speciesism,” for instance, “the full transcendence of the ‘human’ requires the sacrifice of the

‘animal’ and the animalistic,” which in turn makes possible the killing of animals and those marked as animals. In this formulation, the possibility of animal death seems to proceed from the human-animal divide or the withholding of the status of “fellow creature” from the animal, to use Cora Diamond’s framework.<sup>75</sup> Even in Donna Haraway’s rich reading of Carl Akeley’s African Hall, violence against animals seems to both rely upon and signify an exorcism of corporeal commonality: “the central moral truth of the Museum” and “the effective truth of manhood ... conferred on the visitor who successfully passes through the trial of the Museum” is that “the body can be transcended.”<sup>76</sup> If Haraway carefully attends to the anti-modern sentiment informing Akeley’s exhibition, she still reads an affirmation of human transcendence over animal existence within the African Hall, and perhaps rightly so, given the text with which she is working. Indeed, I do not mean to dispute or diminish any of the readings I have invoked, rather I want to underscore in Roosevelt’s writing an alternative mechanism that renders animal life expendable. Not human transcendence but immanent existence, not the mind but the body, not the differentiation of the human from the animal but the identification of human with the animal demands – rather than permits, as there is no disappearing act here – the death of animals, human and non-human.

Significantly, Roosevelt’s reclamation of human animality is not what Deleuze and Guattari understand as becoming-animal, becoming multiple, becoming anomalous: for them, the animal “is neither an individual or a species ... it has neither familiar nor subjectified feelings, nor specific or significant characteristics.”<sup>77</sup> If Roosevelt anticipates the misogynistic valorization of violence in the recuperation of (white male) autonomy in *A Thousand Plateaus*, in contrast to Deleuze and Guattari, Roosevelt’s animality is less an approximate figure for a philosophical postulation of becoming than an actual ontology for which to strive. Further,

becoming-animal for Roosevelt concerns not the unraveling but the formation of the subject, not the abandoning of the “I” for the play of movement, intensities, speeds and degrees across a plane of contiguity, but the processes through which the “I” (re)institutes and differentiates itself. In other words, identification with the animal and subjectification through the animal are very much at work within Roosevelt’s writing. Perhaps this emerges most vociferously in Roosevelt’s disidentifications, as when he disparages sheep-herders: “No man can associate with sheep and retain his self-respect.”<sup>78</sup> No man can associate with sheep and be a man. Conversely, no man can be a man save through his encounter with worthy man/imals. In his hunting memoirs, Roosevelt repeatedly extols the wapati’s lordliness, the bighorn’s hardiness, the bear’s ferociousness, to name just a few of his laudatory characterizations of various game animals. The qualities Roosevelt attributes to these animals are the very qualities he claims to cultivate in pursuing them. Given the similarities Roosevelt frequently draws between the hunter and the hunted, we might infer the existence of a kind of identificatory relay between Roosevelt and the animals he pursues.

Pivoting on this psychoanalytic parlance, I want to make a foray into Freudian theory in order to better illuminate the material conditions of Roosevelt’s identification with the animal. In turning to Freud, I follow scholars such as Judith Butler, Anne Cheng, and David Eng, among many others, who eschew a universalizing, reifying application of psychoanalysis by reading the psyche as always already social and historical.<sup>79</sup> As these scholars have shown, it is crucial to confront the intersection and co-creation of the psychic and the social in order to better understand, for instance, the shape of racial formation or the dictates of gender normativity. Extending their creative leveraging of psychoanalysis to explore material conditions and effects, I want to suggest that Freudian theory might also allow us to understand the more invisible and

impalpable processes that give shape and are shaped by human-animal relationships. In ultimately reading Freud against the grain, I will also explore how material practices involving animals and historical shifts in human-animal relationships shaped the thinking of psychoanalysis.

Apropos of the discussion above, it may be useful to attend to the central role that eating plays in Freud's account of the formation of the psyche. In "On Narcissism" (1914), Freud advances his notion of primary narcissism, the libidinal cathexis of the ego at the beginning of mental life. At this point of development, the "sexual instincts are ... attached to the satisfaction of the ego-instincts" and in effect indistinguishable from them.<sup>80</sup> In other words, the instincts of species preservation fasten first upon the imperatives of self-preservation: thus eating and sexual pleasure are one in the same. Freud expands upon the psychodynamics of primary narcissism in "Instincts and their Vicissitudes" (1915), where he designates this moment of mental life as the oral stage and first introduces the term "incorporation." If the experience of pleasure during the oral stage is autoerotic, the self being satisfied is not bound by the body: "during this period," Freud explains, "the ego-subject coincides with what is pleasurable,"<sup>81</sup> and "insofar as the objects which are presented to it are sources of pleasure, it takes them into itself, 'introjects' them ... and, on the other hand, it expels whatever within itself becomes a cause of unpleasure."<sup>82</sup> Freud suggests "the external world is divided into a part that is pleasureable, which is incorporated into itself, and a remainder that is extraneous."<sup>83</sup> The ideational "taking in" of the external world for Freud fundamentally hinges upon bodily incorporation in the form of eating. If eating often seems to metaphorize ideational processes of introjection for Freud, taking nourishment also actualizes incorporation and is in fact its originary mechanism during the stage of primary narcissism. However, in Freud's thinking, the processes of incorporation are neither contained to

oral activity nor confined to the oral stage of development, and this paves the way for our current discussion.

You are what you eat. What would it mean for us to literalize this dietary motto? What would it mean to consider a bodily “taking in” beyond the mother’s milk to effect a structuration of psychic topographies and social worlds? In *Totem and Taboo* (1913), Freud offers a rare meditation on the psychodynamics of eating meat, in particular, although importantly, he quarantines his discussion to the ritualistic eating of the totem animal within “primitive” societies (we will have more to say of this momentarily). Following the work of William Robertson Smith, Freud argues that the sacrifice and consumption of the totem animal, prior to garnering the sense of propitiating an angry god, symbolized that “the god and his worshippers were ‘commensals.’”<sup>84</sup> Just as the infant becomes “part of his mother’s substance, having been born of her and having been nourished by her milk,”<sup>85</sup> the primitive becomes one with his god, having been fed by his flesh. Freud thus seems to open up a consideration of eating the animal as a mode of identification with the animal, as he reads such a dynamic at work in the ritual of animal sacrifice within totemic societies.

Then again, Freud insists that he’s not really talking about animals at all. In Freud’s reading of totemic societies, the totem animal stands for the father, and the totemic system of taboos is “a product of the conditions involved in the Oedipus complex.”<sup>86</sup> According to Freud, we know this because analyses of children’s animal phobias show that they derive “at bottom [from their fear of] ... their father.”<sup>87</sup> Freud argues that animal phobias in children resemble the taboos pertaining to the totem animal, and if ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny, perhaps phylogeny can be said to recapitulate ontogeny. Since little Hans’s feelings about horses are really feelings about his father, the totem animal, too, must signify the father, and its sacrifice

commemorates the father's murder by the primal horde. Thus by way of a recurring psychoanalytic sleight-of-hand, Freud pulls the father from his magic hat, while the rabbit escapes his thinking.

On the one hand, I want to appreciatively invoke Freudian theory to tease out a distinctive logic of animal sacrifice at work, amongst other places, within Roosevelt's hunting writing. In this reading, killing and eating animals is an expression of animality, but further, the material practice of eating animals serves as a mechanism of becoming-animal: the ideational introjection of the animal attends the physical incorporation of the animal. On the other hand, I want to read Freud symptomatically, asking how carnivorous consumption, which elucidates for Freud the institution of the subject before the law, which seems to whisper to the psychoanalyst all the secrets of subjectification, is first rendered as a racialized and ritualistic practice and is second considered merely as manifest content. The incorporation of the animal, psychoanalytically speaking, seems to only happen within "primitive" societies, and the essence of the act is not an identification with the animal but an identification with the animal's referent. Effectively, Freud first disappears the animal within the practice of eating meat, and second disappears the practice of eating meat within "civilization."

To the extent that the animal vanishes within the origin story that he tells, Freud simply performs one of the disappearing acts necessary to sustain the self-conceits of civilization: the absenting of animal sacrifice. The invisibilization of the deaths of animals at the hands of humans has a history as long as political modernity. Noëlie Vialles locates the beginnings of the modern abattoir at the historical moment when Napoleon ordered "the prohibition of private slaughtering coupled with the obligation to have slaughtering performed in municipal establishments built far from urban centers."<sup>88</sup> According to Vialles, the institutionalization of

the modern slaughterhouse centrally aimed to quarantine “suffering, violence, waste and disease, ‘miasmas,’ and finally animals themselves” from an increasingly sanitized and sensitized public culture.<sup>89</sup> In her discussion of the rendering industry from the nineteenth century to the present, Nicole Shukin further emphasizes that “[r]etreating out of an urban field of vision was just one step in the reorganization of slaughter and rendering; doing everything possible to prevent the sensory revolt triggered by smell has arguably been ever more critical.”<sup>90</sup> For Shukin, controlling the “olfactory leakage from the industrial cooking of animal remains” is crucial to “the containment and management of affect aroused by a potential identification with animal others subject to sacrifice.”<sup>91</sup> In Shukin’s emphasis upon the rendering industry’s concerted efforts to disrupt human identification with the animal, she discerns some of the real material practices and processes that undergird the ideological imagining of “civilization” as freed from violence and other to animality.

But further, Shukin’s focus on the abattoir’s management of smell compels a revisiting of Freud’s account of the origins civilization, in which the olfactory sense plays such a prominent role. While in *Totem and Taboo*, Freud tells the fable of the murder of the father by the primal horde, in *Civilization and its Discontents* (1930), Freud supplements his original origin story – the eating of the totem animal as the institution of the law of the father – with some speculations on processes of organic repression that may have led to the momentous passage from animality to humanity. Within two long footnotes at the beginning and end of Chapter 4 in *Civilization and its Discontents*, Freud locates “the diminution of the olfactory stimuli” consequent to “man’s raising himself from the ground” as the moment of humanity’s arrival on the stage of history.<sup>92</sup> According to Freud, the “organic defense of the new form of life achieved with man’s erect gait against his earlier animal existence” subsequently compelled the repression of the instincts.<sup>93</sup> The

chain of events or the psychological processes that lead from the depreciation of olfactory stimuli to the beginnings of civilization are not entirely clear here, and indeed, Freud admits that his musings are “only a theoretical speculation.”<sup>94</sup> Of interest to us, though, is less the historical or psychological correctness of Freud’s reading of prehistory than the way in which Freud’s interpretation inscribes the political unconscious of his contemporary moment.

Over the course of Freud’s lifetime, the modern abattoir underwent its most dramatic developments. From the construction of the slaughterhouse at La Villette under the auspices of Haussmann’s renovation of Paris to the building of the Union Stockyards of Chicago, the “civilized” world over the latter half of the nineteenth century both accelerated and disappeared the production of meat to a degree that would have been previously impossible. In light of these intensified efforts to render animal sacrifice invisible, or better, un-smell-able, it is striking that Freud’s meditations on the diminution of smell and the “incitement to cleanliness” make no mention of the effort to minimize the smell of animal death, particularly given the fact that this account of organic repression supplements an origin story that involves the killing and eating of an animal. Freud’s text thus exemplifies the civilizational repression of animal death by repeatedly dissociating “the cultural trend towards cleanliness” and the killing of animals, the killing of animals and “civilization.”

The development of the modern abattoir had profound effects upon the lives of animals, of course, but it also had momentous consequences for the lives of humans. At the time that Henry Ford set in motion the first example of assembly-line production in Dearborn, Michigan, the moving lines of animal disassembly in the vertical abattoirs of Cincinnati and Chicago had been in operation for over fifty years. The beginnings of Highland Park, in fact, can be traced to Ford’s tour of a Chicago slaughterhouse, which deeply impressed the auto-maker with its deadly

efficiency: the movement of animal bodies suspended on hooks past stationary laborers confined to repetitive piecework.<sup>95</sup> One might even go so far as to say the advent of the abattoir played a privileged role in the development of modern forms of alienated labor. But whether or not we are speaking of the slaughterhouse or the forms of industrial labor modeled upon it, the experience of alienation within industrial capitalism centrally involves an estrangement from human-animal relationships and human animality.

In his *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, Marx describes the estrangement of practical human activity in four major ways: 1) as the alienation of the worker from the product of labor; 2) as the alienation of the worker from the labor process; 3) as the alienation of the worker from species being; and 4) as the alienation of the worker from other workers.<sup>96</sup> In outlining these interconnected forms of estrangement, Marx sometimes suggests alienation within the capitalist mode of production involves alienation from the “sensuous external world.” For instance, Marx emphasizes how the processes and products of labor within industrial capitalism no longer directly satisfy a physical need, but rather provide “a means to satisfy needs.”<sup>97</sup> In the explanation of alienation, however, Marx most heavily accents the reduction of humans to animal functions, rather than the estrangement of humans from their own animality. In fact, Marx defines capitalist alienation as a condition in which “man (the worker) no longer feels himself to be freely active in any but his animal functions – eating, drinking, procreating, or at most in his dwelling and in dressing-up, etc.; and in his human functions he no longer feels himself to be anything but an animal.”<sup>98</sup> According to Marx, “[t]he animal is immediately identical with its life activity. It does not distinguish itself from it.”<sup>99</sup> In contrast to animals, Marx argues, humans possess consciousness, and because of this, they are capable of “free activity,” or activity that “produces ... free from physical need and only truly produces in freedom

therefrom.”<sup>100</sup> The free “working-up of the objective world” is how “man first really proves himself to be a species being,” and the alienation from species being thus involves transforming “his advantage over animals into the disadvantage that his inorganic body, nature, is taken from him.”<sup>101</sup> In refusing to grant consciousness to the animal, Marx draws a false dichotomy between conscious activity and life activity, and in so doing, he locates human “species being” within the former. Marx also eclipses the nascent insight that sometimes still surfaces in this text, whereby the experience of alienation appears as an estrangement from the body, an alienation from “the direct means of life,” or a separation from the “sensuous external world.”

In referring to “species being” in the discussion to follow, I want to reinvest species being with the potential meaning it sometimes holds in the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844* to designate not only the production of the inorganic body but also the reproduction of the organic body, not only the expression of human intelligence but also the experience of embodied existence. Further, I want to extend Marx’s account of alienation to suggest that interspecies relationships as well as human relationships are estranged within capitalist relations of production. The invention of the slaughterhouse is a prime example of capitalism’s obfuscation of the relationships between human and non-human animals, as it occasioned the absenting of animals as well as the vanishing of violence, even while increasing the material reliance of humans on animal flesh.

The modern abattoir represents only one of many ways in which interspecies relationships and “species being” (in the full sense of the phrase) are estranged within capitalist relations of production. Akira Mizuta Lippit has anticipated the trajectory of this argument in arguing that animals “exist in a state of perpetual vanishing” in modern life.<sup>102</sup> For Lippit, “human advancement always coincides with a recession of nature and its figures – wildlife,

wilderness, human nature, and so forth.”<sup>103</sup> But the exclusion of the animal from humanity’s habitat comes at a cost: “human beings miss the animals that no longer make themselves heard in the world.”<sup>104</sup> Lippit initially invokes melancholia to describe the response to the loss of the animal within modernity: “the sacrificial economy by which animals were negated entered a new phase during the modern era – a phase marked by melancholia.”<sup>105</sup> Yet in Lippit’s reading of the animal within modern modes of representation, he uses melancholia rather loosely to name human nostalgia for an immanent existence that expresses itself through the spectral appearance of the animal within modern writing, film, and other technological media. As Nicole Shukin argues, Lippit also tends to interpret the animal merely as a figure for human longing or anti-modern sentiment, losing sight of the material relations and actual animals involved in the loss that he originally invokes. In contrast to Lippit, I want to put Freudian theorizations of melancholia to work in order to elucidate the psychic, social, and material dimensions of the loss of the animal within modernity, specifically, to demonstrate how Progressive era primitivism emerges as a melancholic response to this loss.

In “Mourning and Melancholia” (1915), Freud lays the groundwork for a theory of melancholia, which he describes as a process in which the loss of the object does not result in the usual course of retraction and reattachment of the libido to a new object.<sup>106</sup> Rather, the libido is “withdrawn into the ego,” establishing an “identification of the ego with the abandoned object.”<sup>107</sup> This identification with the lost object is a manner of averting the loss, retaining the object, and refusing the task of letting go, as it effectively sets up the object in the psyche. While Freud describes melancholia as a pathological response to loss in “Mourning and Melancholia,” as Judith Butler rightly observes, by the time he writes *The Ego and the Id* (1923), Freud describes melancholic incorporation more as part of the normal development of the ego. In *The*

*Ego and the Id*, Freud again describes melancholic incorporation as a dynamic whereby “an object which was lost has been set up again inside the ego – that is, that an object cathexis has been replaced by an identification.”<sup>108</sup> But further, Freud here suggests, “this kind of substitution has a great share in determining the form taken by the ego and ... makes an essential contribution toward building up what is called its ‘character.’”<sup>109</sup> To follow Butler’s reading, the ego thus “appears to be the sedimentation of objects loved and lost, the archaeological remainder, as it were, of unresolved grief.”<sup>110</sup>

What would it mean to consider the estrangement from animal life as an experience of human loss as much as an act of human violence? It is a difficult question to answer even as it is an intuitive question to ask, and this is partly why I believe the alienation from animality might occasion and exemplify the melancholic refusal of loss, which in Freud’s reading seems predicated in part upon epistemological difficulty: “one cannot see clearly what it is that has been lost.”<sup>111</sup> Who can say “what” we have lost “in” the animal? To be human is to repudiate the animal. And if this repudiation can be, is, experienced as loss, perhaps the animal in this case is as much a constitutive inclusion as a constitutive exclusion of the subject, a sedimentation as much as an unsettling of the self. In this reading, the anti-modern identification with the animal speaks a phantasmatic incorporation of the animal, itself a response to a loss that I want to read as “real,” whatever its ideological cooptation.

The disavowal that conditions the melancholic turn is often multifold, however. In Butler’s theorization of gender melancholia, for instance, the double disavowal takes the form of “never having loved, never having lost.” If there is a redoubled refusal at work within animal melancholia, however, it might better be expressed as “never having lost, never having lost,” a formulation in which losing iterates both transitively and intransitively. In the double denial that

conditions the melancholic response to the “loss” of the animal, it is not simply the refusal to let go of the lost object but the refusal to admit the event or act of losing, or better, the act of killing. We have already raised this latter form of disavowal in discussing the invisibilization of animal sacrifice within “civilization.” Another way to understand this species of animalia melancholia, in fact, would be to say that it turns upon a refusal to let go of not one but two “objects,” the animal and civilization. At the root of the melancholic relationship to animality there is a twinned loss: both the disappearance of animal life and the disillusionment with the civilizational ideals that occasioned that disappearance. In other words, the loss of the idea of civilization is correlative to or occasioned in part by the loss of the animal, and the refusal to let go of everyday interspecies intimacies and species being is accompanied, ironically, by the refusal to give up the idea of “civilization.”

This disillusionment with the idea of civilization is occasioned by the overwhelming violence that is exercised against humans within the “modern” liberal democratic state, as well. Anne Cheng usefully explains the dynamics of U.S. racial melancholia in this way: when American nationalism “is most shamefaced and traumatized by the betrayal of its own democratic ideals,” it melancholically “espouses human value and brotherhood.”<sup>112</sup> Yet although the nation claims to incorporate or assimilate the racial other, the racialized person is “most uneasily digested by ... American nationality,”<sup>113</sup> according to Cheng. In observing how the melancholic must “make sure that the ‘object’ never returns” in order to maintain the “elaborate structure of loss-but-not-loss,”<sup>114</sup> Cheng suggests that the American national imaginary likewise sustains the racialized other within a complex dynamic of “exclusion-yet-retention.”<sup>115</sup> Cheng most often considers the racial other as the lost “object” in her theorization of U.S. racial melancholia. However, in mapping the melancholic topography of U.S. racial formation, Cheng

also outlines a “loss” of liberalism’s ideals through their contradiction by the state violence. In the melancholic response to such a loss, the “multiple layers of denial and exclusion” that Cheng describes would necessarily include the denial of the nation’s histories of human exclusion, exploitation, and even annihilation.

Although Cheng uses the interpretative framework of racial melancholia to read Asian American racial formation, we might read a profound racial melancholia emerging from U.S. histories of settler colonialism, as well.<sup>116</sup> Consider, for instance, the lament for the closing of the frontier expressed most famously in Frederic Jackson Turner’s “The Significance of the Frontier in American History” and sounded even prior to the 1893 World’s Columbian Exhibition within Roosevelt’s hunting memoirs.<sup>117</sup> Historians have sometimes read the turn-of-the-century regret for the end of frontier existence at face value.<sup>118</sup> In other words, they suggest Turner, Roosevelt, and others mourn the closing of the frontier, not its opening; the end of the national myth of the rugged frontiersman, not the dispossession and death of First Peoples. However, when Roosevelt sounds an elegiac note in discussing the frontier “heroes of a bygone age,” the ultimate point of reference is often the racialized other: “the bronzed and sinewy cowboy” is described “as picturesque and self-reliant, as dashing and resolute as the saturnine Indian fighters whose place he has taken; and – alas that it should be written! – he in his turn must at no distant time share the fate of the men he has displaced.”<sup>119</sup> This sentence performs some remarkable displacements in its own right: as a metaphorical figure, the Indian displaces the cowboy, who has displaced the Indian in actuality, while the Indian augurs the cowboy’s own replacement by civilization.

What are we to make of this series of substitutions? Or how might we understand the contradiction within what follows, as Roosevelt “hope[s] against hope” that he himself “shall not live to see” the badlands “broken up into small patches of fenced farm land and grazing land,”

although of course his ranching enterprise paves the way for such parceled pastures? Roosevelt's contribution to these developments is disavowed by the regret that with their culmination, "one of the pleasantest and freest phases of Western American life will have come to an end."<sup>120</sup> If Roosevelt's colonial melancholia is sometimes unrecognizable as such, this is because it is paradigmatically melancholic: the disavowal of loss is so vehement, the identification with the lost object is so complete, that the loss is effectively refused. If Roosevelt mourns the end of the frontiersman, this is because he cannot mourn what he began. So the agent of colonialism identifies with the object of colonialism: the Indian killer identifies with the Indian and the directed exercise of violence returns as the unwilling experience of destruction.

Renato Rosaldo has coined the term "imperialist nostalgia" to describe a phenomenon in which "agents of colonialism ... display nostalgia for the colonized culture as it was 'traditionally' (that is when they first encountered it)."<sup>121</sup> In other words, within imperial nostalgia, "agents of colonialism long for the very forms of life they intentionally altered or destroyed."<sup>122</sup> Rosaldo notes that imperial nostalgia "is a particularly appropriate emotion to invoke in attempting to establish one's innocence."<sup>123</sup> It enables a kind of exculpation of colonial violence, for its lamentations disavow the destruction caused by colonizer. Arguably, then, imperial nostalgia is melancholic in structure, and Roosevelt offers a paradigmatic example of its mechanisms of refusal. What we might better call colonial melancholia is less a form of mourning than a refusal to mourn: it displays a refusal to let go of a lost object as well as a refusal to admit the violence at the origin of the object's loss. Thus colonial melancholia expresses itself not simply through nostalgic regret for the passing of the "noble savage" but through an intense identification with a romanticized construct of the Indian. Philip Deloria usefully describes this pervasive practice of "playing Indian" within dominant Anglo-American

culture as an effort to compensate for the inventedness of the nation. In the quest to constitute a “real” Americanism, Deloria argues, whites have often masqueraded as Indians, deriving from (and attributing to) Native Americans the sense of authenticity that might grant authority to American national identity.<sup>124</sup> Yet Deloria has difficulty accounting for how the white appropriation of a romanticized idea of the Indian coincides with the white denigration and active devastation of actual Native peoples. By linking the white identification with the fictive Indian to a melancholic refusal of genocidal violence, however, we might perceive the integral relationship between these seemingly contradictory attitudes and acts of appropriation and annihilation.

The melancholic transfiguration of colonial violence against “savages” into the white identification with “savagery” is particularly evident in an incident that Roosevelt relays, wherein eating once again mediates the melancholic incorporation of the racial other. In *The Wilderness Hunter*, Roosevelt reprints a letter sent to him by one of his old hunting friends in the Rockies, who writes on the occasion of learning about the proposed frontier cabin at the World Columbian Exhibition, to be presented by the Boone and Crockett Club (Roosevelt’s sportsman’s club discussed below). Roosevelt’s correspondent, whose misspellings and grammatical errors are replicated in the text, recommends a frontiersman’s frontiersman to occupy the demonstrational exhibit, one “Liver-eating Johnson” who earned his name in the following way:

in a hard Fight with the Black Feet Indians thay Faught all day Johnson and a few Whites Faught a large Body of Indians all day after the fight Johnson cam in contact with a wounded Indian and Johnson was aut of ammunition and thay faught it out with thar Knives and Johnson got away with the Indian and in the fight cut the liver out of the

Indian and said to the Boys did they want any Liver to eat that is the way he got the name of Liver-eating Johnson.<sup>125</sup>

Roosevelt uses this letter to illustrate “the originality” of frontiersmen, an originality that “may take the form of wild savagery, of mere uncouthness, or of an odd combination of genuine humor with simple acceptance of facts as they are.”<sup>126</sup> Here one might be tempted to say that eating the “savage” is a manner of becoming savage, just as eating the animal is a manner of becoming animal. Yet while the (pretense of the) physical incorporation of the Blackfeet warrior by this frontiersman is highly suggestive of a melancholic incorporation of the racialized other, I want to proceed with caution, here, as I do not want to replicate the reduction of the racial other to the status of the animal in exploring the mechanisms that link the culturally pervasive melancholic relationships to both the racial other and the animal other. I do not mean to conflate the species of animalia melancholia we have been discussing and racial melancholia. However, as the story of “Liver-eating Johnson” suggests, there is a complex and often slippery synergism between the two within the turn-of-the-century colonial melancholia that articulates a refusal to mourn the killing/loss of animal life and a refusal to mourn the killing/loss of human life. Rosaldo also observes that imperial nostalgia often mourns – I would say refuses to mourn – the destruction of the natural world as well as the devastation of colonized human communities. If racial melancholia and animal melancholia seem almost interchangeable at this moment in our analysis, this perhaps proves the point, though one I hope to critically illuminate, rather than uncritically replicate.

As the discussion above has shown, colonial melancholia disavows the loss of the object through a series of identifications that are more properly understood as a series of substitutions: between the self and the animal, the self and the racial other, and so on, and so forth. This

substitutive movement of melancholia might illuminate the slippery synergism of racial and animal melancholia: the way in which one loss sometimes stands for, stands in the place of, the refusal of the other. Indeed, Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok describe introjection as a site of signification or an originary form of metaphor.<sup>127</sup> They suggest “the initial stages of introjection emerge in infancy when the mouth’s emptiness is experienced alongside the mother’s simultaneous presence.”<sup>128</sup> When the mouth is empty of the object, “novel satisfactions” in the form of “words pertaining to the subject” fill the mouth instead,<sup>129</sup> and according to Abraham and Torok, “fill[ing] the emptiness of the mouth with words is the initial model of introjection.”<sup>130</sup> In exploring the workings of melancholia, I have described the introjection of the lost object as the institution of a substitutive object in the psyche. Yet in describing the melancholic making of the self through identification with the lost object, I have yet to stress the significance of the substitutive character of that object: the way in which it gives “figurative shape to presence,” rather than the presence of the lost object itself. What difference would it make to think about melancholia as a site of signification or a mode of metaphORIZATION? How might the metaphORICS of melancholia function as a medium of exchange that achieves a number of equivalences and displacements, with significant ideological outcomes? As the man acts the animal, how does the animal metaphORIZE the man?

The substitutive movement of melancholia raises the question of whether the violence that accrues to animality during the Progressive era can be considered as something more than the unfolding of intellectual history or the popularization of Darwinian ideas. For in Freud’s reading of the melancholic response, the accusations that would have been directed at the lost object are often redirected at the substitutive object of the self: the melancholic’s vociferous self-accusations are really disavowed denunciations of the lost object. If one of the “lost objects” at

the source of colonial melancholia is the idea of civilization itself, might Roosevelt's expression of animality *through violence* or his identification of animality with the exercise of violence be conditioned by a melancholic turn, more specifically, the melancholic introjection of the conflict due to ambivalence? Might we read the violence ascribed to the animal or appropriated within masculine self-expression as a redirected accusation of civilization? Can the understanding of human violence only as a resurgence of animality within humanity be a deflected perception of the violence of the very category of the human? If we can read the anti-modern identification with the animal as a melancholic response to loss, we can also read the pervasive imagining of animality's violent potential during the Progressive era as a melancholic form of "acting out." In this reading, the recognition of animal life only in its capacity for violence is a refracted recognition of the violence of civilization: an accusation that cannot be avowed.

Instructively, Freud himself demonstrates the dynamics of disavowal and displacement at work here. Freud's early psychoanalytic theory posits two kinds of instincts: instincts of self-preservation or ego-instincts and sexual instincts or libido instincts. This dichotomization eventually gives way to his theorization of the death drive, the instinctual inclination to aggression that Freud first introduces in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. The new dynamic duo becomes thanatos and eros, which unlike the ego instincts and sexual instincts, exist in constant conflict. In *Civilization and its Discontents*, Freud argues that "[t]he inclination to aggression is an original, self-subsisting instinctual disposition in man, and ... it constitutes the greatest impediment to civilization" as well as the greatest impediment to human happiness.<sup>131</sup> For civilization is only possible if this originary "aggressiveness is introjected, internalized[,] ... taken over by a portion of the ego, which sets itself over the rest of the ego as super-ego, and which now, in the form of 'conscience', is ready to put into action against the ego the same harsh

aggressiveness that the ego would have liked to satisfy upon other extraneous individuals.”<sup>132</sup>

With the introduction of the death instinct, Freud significantly revises not only his theory of the instincts but also his thinking on the shaping of psychic topography. In his earlier theorization of melancholia, it was the conflict due to ambivalence that occasioned the splitting of a “critical agency” from the ego, effectively establishing the very distinction between ego and super-ego.

However, in Freud’s later work, the conflict due to ambivalence, which arises only within social relationships, gives way to a conflict between instincts, and sociality is effectively removed from the syllogism that makes the psyche. In what I read as a melancholic disavowal and displacement, Freud locates the violence of civilization in the animality of the human.

Paradoxically enough, even and especially in his admission of human animality, Freud salvages an unhappy humanism, reluctantly placing in “civilization” a hesitant hope for humanity.

Many readers of Freud have maintained that his theorization of the death instinct emerged in response to the human death and destruction wrought by WWI.<sup>133</sup> While I want to echo this inference, I also want to entertain the possibility here that the killing of animals also informed Freud’s theorization of the death instinct, or better, that the industrialized killing of animals shaped both the possibility of WWI and Freud’s interpretation of the violence of “civilization.”<sup>134</sup> In light of the connections that historians have drawn between the technologies of slaughter and technologies of warfare, it is interesting to note that it is the ego-instincts, those instincts that are responsible for the preservation of the ego, the quenching of thirst, and the satiation of hunger, that ultimately give way to the death instincts within Freud’s thought. It is as if Freud ultimately came to believe in a necessary connection between hunger and violence, or as if the satisfaction of hunger through violence were the material practice that provided him with the evidence for the instinct of human aggression. On the one hand, Freud’s makeover of the

ego-instincts as the death instincts suggest at least an unconscious recognition of the historical relationships between the killing of animals and the killing of humans, the modern abattoir and modern warfare. On the other hand, insofar as Freud attributes human violence not to “civilization” but to instinct, not to the construct of the human but to the animality within humanity, he renders human violence ahistorical and inevitable. Like Roosevelt, Freud derives the inevitability of human violence from the supposedly innate violence of animals and the seemingly necessary violence against animals.

### **Vanishing Wildlife, National Forgetting, and the Emergence of Conservation**

In the decades following the Civil War, the “loss” of animal life became more than a matter of severing certain human-animal relationships and obscuring many persisting human-animal interdependencies. The complete extinction of many species became a real, felt, and rapidly approaching possibility. The encroachments of white settlement altered more and more habitats beyond the habitability of many animals.<sup>135</sup> Further, as urban populations grew, so too did newly organized patterns of consumption. Many public markets and restaurants merchandized a wide variety of wild game meat,<sup>136</sup> and over and above the demand for wildlife as a food source, the post-bellum fashion of decorating women’s hats with feathers and taxidermy created a millinery market for a wide range of bird species.<sup>137</sup> Correspondingly, a newly minted professional, the market hunter, worked on salary or commission to supply game to dealers and agents in a number of major cities. While there is limited information available to surmise the exact statistical impacts of market hunters upon various species’ populations, scattered reports suggest spectacularly devastating killings: one hunter could bring to market several thousand animal carcasses within a single season, easily slaughtering hundreds or even thousands of animals from a single species over the period of a few months.<sup>138</sup>

A number of late nineteenth-century technological developments accelerated the depletion of wildlife populations. The replacement of flint-locks with percussion caps and the substitution of the breech-loader for the muzzle-loader afforded hunters greater facility in killing; the invention of refrigerated storage allowed the shipment of game across longer and longer distances; and most importantly, perhaps, the expansion of the railroad made these distances widely accessible for the first time.<sup>139</sup> The impact of the railroad, in particular, might best be measured by the rapid decline of two species once noteworthy for their abundance across the expanse of the North American continent. At the end of the 1860s, the passenger pigeon and the American bison still existed in large numbers. Within a decade of the completion of the Union Pacific Railroad, however, these species' populations were nearly decimated. Although the last known passenger pigeon died in a Cincinnati Zoo in 1914, the last reported large nesting of the species, which upon its sighting was duly "harvested," occurred as early as 1878 near Petoskey, Michigan.<sup>140</sup> Unlike the passenger pigeon, the American bison would eventually be saved from total extinction through conservationist efforts. By 1889, however, the remaining wild buffalo in the U.S. totaled only 85 animals, according to the meticulous count of William T. Hornaday.<sup>141</sup> Adding those held in captivity, living within the borders of national parks, and roaming the Northwest Territory of Canada, the entire species barely surpassed 1,000 members at its nadir.<sup>142</sup>

Roosevelt's hunting writing everywhere registers these developments, even prior to his explicit promotion of conservationist measures and active involvement in the conservation movement proper. His earliest volume, *Hunting Trips of a Ranchman*, sounds an elegiac note even in describing species that were still relatively abundant during his residency in the western plains. For instance, in cataloguing the characteristics of the blacktail deer, Roosevelt predicts the species "bids fair to be the next animal, after the buffalo and elk, to vanish from the places

that formerly knew it.”<sup>143</sup> In fact, almost every species that Roosevelt describes in his hunting writing is described as a species threatened by extinction. But far from viewing the eradication of wildlife populations as tokening a triumphant survival of the fittest, Roosevelt marks these developments with deep regret: “To see the rapidity with which the larger kinds of game animals are being exterminated throughout the United States is really melancholy.”<sup>144</sup> The explicit promotion of conservationist measures more frequently accompanies Roosevelt’s ubiquitous observations of species’ depletion in later writing. By the time he authors *The Wilderness Hunter*, Roosevelt advocates for “a rigid system of game-laws rigidly enforced,” and additionally, “great national forest reserves which shall also be breeding-grounds and nurseries for wild game.”<sup>145</sup> In *Outdoor Pastimes of an American Hunter*, Roosevelt enlarges his vision to include the legal protection of wildlife as well as the preservation of habitats: “The national government could do much [more] by establishing its forest reserves as game reserves, and putting on a sufficient number of forest rangers, who should be empowered to prevent all hunting.”<sup>146</sup> In that volume, in fact, Roosevelt devotes an entire chapter to promoting the establishment of national parks after the model of Yellowstone, which if created in part “for economic purposes,” could also be established “for the sake of preserving all ... [nature’s] beauties and wonders.”<sup>147</sup> Importantly, Roosevelt did more than talk about these measures. Over the course of his administration, he oversaw the creation of 148 million acres of national forest reserves, 5 national parks, 18 national monuments, and 51 national wildlife refuges.<sup>148</sup> Ranking with Gifford Pinchot, John Muir, and George Bird Grinnell in the extent of his influence, Roosevelt played a formative role in the early conservation movement in the U.S., which historians interested in Roosevelt’s gender and racial politics have seldom foregrounded in their analyses.

Roosevelt's concern for the disappearance of wildlife – not to mention the part he played in the early conservation movement – might seem difficult to square with his enthusiasm for killing individual animals. However, Roosevelt is exemplary rather than anomalous in this regard, as hunters were some of the earliest and most ardent conservationists. John Reiger has convincingly claimed that “the first challenge to the myth of the inexhaustibility [of nature] that succeeded in arousing a substantial segment of the public was not the dwindling forests, but the disappearance, in region after region, of game fishes, birds, and mammals.”<sup>149</sup> And as Reiger and historians in his wake have argued at length, the disappearance of wildlife was most vociferously observed and opposed by sportsmen, who promoted the conservation of game and hunting grounds on a number of fronts.<sup>150</sup>

While a recognizable movement for wildlife preservation did not gather momentum until the 1880s, over the first half of the nineteenth century, British ideas of field sports began to spread to the American upper classes, transforming hunting from a means of subsistence into a demonstration of “manly restraint” and “fair chase.”<sup>151</sup> Henry William Herbert, an expatriate British nobleman whose nom de plume was Frank Forester, greatly contributed to this development. His popular hunting guide, *Frank Forester's Field Sports of the United States and British Provinces of North America* (1849), widely broadcast the hunting etiquette of the British aristocracy to the American public. In regularly lamenting “the reckless and ignorant, if not wanton, destruction of ... [game] animals by the rural population,”<sup>152</sup> Herbert promulgated a conservationist ethos as much as a class code. The “sportsman's code” incidentally proscribed many practices contributing to the depletion of wildlife species, but sportsmen eventually acquired a vested interest in preserving game species so as to safeguard their sport. As early as the 1830s, the first proposals for game laws appeared in magazines such as *The Spirit of the*

*Times* and *American Turf Register*.<sup>153</sup> Around the time of the Civil War, sport hunting became more popular, and a number of periodicals devoted solely to hunting and fishing emerged: *American Sportsman* in 1871; *Forest and Stream* in 1873; *Field and Stream* in 1874; and *The American Angler* in 1881. The continuance of the sport required the continuous supply of game, and so these periodicals railed against “unsporting” methods such as jacklighting (illuminating wild animals with lights while hunting at night), coursing (running wild animals down with dogs), or baiting (luring wild animals with food while waiting in hiding). Sporting magazines also lobbied for the passing of licensing laws, the lowering of bag limits, and the shortening of hunting seasons.<sup>154</sup> Under the editorship of George Bird Grinnell, *Forest and Stream* in particular became the veritable mouthpiece of the conservation movement, creating intolerance for market hunting and poaching, galvanizing the formation of the first Audubon Society in 1886, and advocating for a wide range of conservationist legislation.<sup>155</sup>

Sportsman’s clubs as well as sporting magazines played an influential role in advancing conservationist measures. As early as 1836, a group of New Jersey sportsmen formed “The Trenton Club” to propagate bobwhite quail.<sup>156</sup> In 1844, the New York Sportsman’s Club was established, an organization that would prove influential in passing model conservationist legislation. Its ranks included Robert Barnwell Roosevelt, an early advocate of fish culture and TR’s black sheep of an uncle, as well as the aforesaid Henry William Herbert, who drafted some of the earliest game legislation, which the New York Sportsman’s Club successfully pushed through the legislature to prohibit summer woodcock hunting.<sup>157</sup> While organizations such as the New York Sportsman’s Club were rare prior to the Civil War, the creation of national sporting journals gave greater impetus to the “club movement,” as sportsmen began to call it. In the winter of 1874-75 alone, nearly 100 sportsman organizations were created. By the end of the

1870s, over 300 sportsman's clubs existed across the nation, most of which actively promoted conservation as much as recreation.<sup>158</sup>

By far the most influential of these organizations was the Boone and Crockett Club, the first to address conservationist issues on a national scale. Soon after Roosevelt's return from the Dakota Territories in 1887, he proposed the idea over a dinner party held at his New York home. Roosevelt and two attendees of the founding dinner party, George Bird Grinnell and Archibald Rogers, drafted the mission statement of the organization:

“1) To promote manly sport with the rifle”; 2) “To promote travel and exploration in the wild and unknown, or but partially known, portions of the country”; 3) “To work for the preservation of the large game of this country, and so far as possible, to further legislation for that purpose, and to assist in enforcing the existing laws”; 4) “To promote inquiry into, and to record observations on, the habits and natural history of the various wild animals”; 5) To bring about among the members the interchange of opinions and ideas on hunting, travel, and exploration, on the various kinds of hunting rifles; on the haunts of game animals, etc.”<sup>159</sup>

The club's explicit conditions of membership required killing by fair chase three different species of North American big game; the more implicit conditions involved belonging to the upper echelons of eastern society. Over time, its members would include individuals such as Henry L. Stimson, the Republican statesman who would serve as Governor-General of the Philippines, one-time Secretary of State, and two-time Secretary of War over his career; Henry Cabot Lodge, the Republican Senator from Massachusetts and the first Senate Majority Leader; Owen Wister, the American writer who popularized Western fiction; and many other luminaries. Given the stature of many of its members, the Boone and Crockett Club leveraged considerable

influence in conservationist matters. Through its lobbying efforts, for instance, Congress passed the 1891 act enabling the establishment of federal forest reserves as well as the 1894 act protecting the birds and animals of Yellowstone National Park.<sup>160</sup>

The elitism of many prominent conservationists may suggest that the movement was essentially an attempt by gentlemen sportsman to consolidate their class status. Indeed, as we have noted, sport hunting emerged in the U.S. as a gentlemanly pursuit that played out an aristocratic code of conduct, which early hunting manuals such as Herbert's helped to disseminate. However, the "sportsman's creed soon took on an American tinge," as Thomas Dunlap has observed: the exemplary sportsman by the latter decades of the nineteenth century was not "the upper-class Englishman" but "the wilderness hunter."<sup>161</sup> The contrast between the two stylizations of masculine pursuit is readily discernable in the difference between early and late nineteenth-century hunting guides. Elisha L. Lewis's *Hints to Sportsmen* (1851), the first major work on hunting written by an American, follows Herbert's lead in defining the right usage of specialized vocabulary, elaborating the hunter's code of conduct, and specifying proper dress in the field:

All those sportsmen whose occupation or profession makes it desirable that they should have white and smooth hands, and there are but few gentlemen whose employments do not require this, they ought, *ex necessitate rerum*, to wear gloves when shooting, as nothing to our eyes looks more outré, if not vulgar, than a coarse, scratched, and scarred hand.<sup>162</sup>

In contrast to Lewis's concern for preserving the signs of civilization in the field, a hunting guide entitled *Fur, Fin, and Feather* (1871) written several decades later proposes the hunter immerse himself fully in the wilderness experience:

live well, grow hardy and tough as an Indian; lie down at night on his fir-strewn couch, and sleep in the sleep of tired, happy childhood; and rise in the morning and take a dip in the clear flashing water of some one of these lonely lakes, then settle around the sparkling fire, attack his breakfast with a vigor and an appetite previously unknown.<sup>163</sup>

Far from retaining his white and smooth hands, the hunter of the latter decades of the twentieth century sought to return from the field “hardy in mind and muscle.” Periodicals as well as hunting manuals register this shift in the stylization of sport hunting. When Charles Hallock first established *Forest and Stream*, for example, the journal was dedicated to promulgating the British concept of the gentlemen sportsman.<sup>164</sup> Under the editorship of George Bird Grinnell, however, the magazine reconceived its mission as acquainting readers with “those secrets which necessity compelled the savages to learn.”<sup>165</sup> Even the changing names of sportsman’s clubs indicated an altered conception of sport hunting: from the New York Sportsman’s Club – proudly announcing its urban affiliations – emerged the Boone and Crockett Club, nostalgically appropriating a frontier past. As these examples suggest, sport hunting in the latter decades of the nineteenth century was a central arena for the enactment of corporeal masculinity, which we discussed at length in the reading of Roosevelt above. It is simply worth reiterating here that for many more than Roosevelt, sport hunting was imagined and experienced as a primitive encounter with the natural world: an antidote to enervating effects of civilization.<sup>166</sup>

If environmental historians now widely acknowledge that sportsmen generated the conservation movement, they have often underemphasized the anti-modern impulse that impelled their activism. And in many ways, this oversight is entirely justifiable: for if the major impetus behind the conservation movement was anti-modern, the greatest irony of the conservation movement was that many of its outcomes were not. Quite the opposite: the

application of conservationist measures would advance the very processes disputed by anti-modern sentiment. Samuel Hays, more than anyone, has described how conservationist measures essentially advanced “rational planning ... [and] efficient development and use of all natural resources.”<sup>167</sup> Subsequently, historians have nuanced this picture of conservation as simply the extension of Progressive-era efficiency measures to the natural world. For example, Karl Jacoby notes that the conservation movement combined “modern and anti-modern impulses” in “uneasy combination.”<sup>168</sup> Reiger also observes that conservationists were “influenced by the same Romantic movement that touched every major American writer from Thomas Jefferson to Walt Whitman.”<sup>169</sup> Yet as Reiger’s lumping of Progressive-era primitivism with Jeffersonian naturalism illustrates, a loose invocation of “Romanticism” often suffices to cursorily describe the primitivist imaginary that eventuated in modern forms of natural resource management. And even as environmental historians who have focused on conservation’s involvement of sportsmen or protection of wildlife have registered its motivating anti-modern impulse, they have concerned themselves most centrally with state centralization and rationalization of natural resource management, and more recently, the extent to which these processes dispossessed rural, immigrant, and Indigenous populations.<sup>170</sup>

The conservationist efforts of sportsmen were impelled by more than the determination to sustain the animals and habitats necessary for the continuance of the sport. In Roosevelt’s memoirs, hunting appears a means of acting out white masculine animality, which this discussion has explained as a melancholic refusal of the multi-faceted “loss” of the animal within modernity. Given the new stylization of the sport hunting as “wilderness hunting” in the latter decades of the nineteenth century, Roosevelt is arguably exemplary in this regard. While the conservation movement was overdetermined by wide-ranging developments alienating human

animals from species being and interspecies relationships, the overwhelming loss that informed the rise of conservation was of course the extinction of species. The early conservation movement seems to have redressed the depletion of species, but as the following analysis will show, early conservation efforts more accurately carried out a complex form of melancholic repudiation of sportsmen's role in the environmental degradation and species depletion to which they had contributed. In becoming-animal through the exercise of violence against animals, sportsmen exacerbated the loss of animal life that had compelled such an enactment in the first place, deepening the folds of melancholic refusal and identification, disavowal and displacement, which would ultimately permit the perpetuation of violence against non-human animals and animalized humans.

On February 3, 1894, George Bird Grinnell and Charles B. Reynolds published a front-page editorial called "A Plank" in *Field and Stream*. At the time, it was the most revolutionary declaration on the subject of wildlife conservation yet published, as it called for a complete eradication of the sale of wild game.<sup>171</sup> The editorial begins by conjuring the tolls of "four hundred years of wanton wastefulness" upon wildlife populations.<sup>172</sup> In addressing the forms this wastefulness has taken, however, the writers believe that "the work of the sportsman, who hunts for the sake of hunting, has had an effect so trivial ... [that] it need not be taken into consideration."<sup>173</sup> Clearly, "the game paucity of today is due to the skin hunter, the meat killer, [and] the market shooter."<sup>174</sup> While there is no doubt as to the deleterious impacts of market hunters upon countless species' populations, *Field and Stream's* easy exculpation of the sport hunter is less convincing. For just as newly organized markets accelerated the killing of wild game for meat or plumage in the decades following the Civil War, the development of sport

hunting into a highly lucrative tourism industry over the same period spread the practice of killing animals for sport and increased the environmental impacts of hunters.<sup>175</sup>

Interestingly enough, Roosevelt's earliest hunting writing suggests that this conservationist par excellence was somewhat of a "game hog" in his earliest excursions into the field. In a chapter entitled "Water fowl" in *The Wilderness Hunter*, Roosevelt recalls his first hunting expedition to the Great Plains, which occurred years before he took up ranching in the Dakotas.<sup>176</sup> However, by the coordinates Roosevelt provides for the hunt's location, he allows the reader to assume it was yet another excursion of a seasoned ranchman, rather than the short-lived escapade of an Eastern gentlemen: "On one occasion my brother and myself made a short wagon trip in the level, fertile farming country whose western edge lies many miles to the east of the Bad Lands around my ranch."<sup>177</sup> The presence of the hunting guide on this particular sporting expedition is betrayed by Roosevelt's stubborn adherence to passive constructions in describing the labor involved in setting up camp, not to mention his odd representation of this activity as a kind of case study that calls for generalizations beyond the particular:

"When a place with grass, wood, and water is found, the wagon is driven up to the windward side of where the beds are to be laid, and the horses are unhitched, watered, and turned out to graze freely until bedtime, when a certain number of them are picketed or hobbled. If danger from white or red horse thieves is feared, a guard is kept over them all night. The ground is cleared of stones and cacti where the beds are to be placed and the blankets and robes spread. Generally we have no tent, and the wagon-cover is spread over all to keep out the rain. The coffee-pot is set among the coals, and the frying pan with bacon and whatever game has been shot is placed on top ..."<sup>178</sup>

The passage continues in this passive vein. But here it is worth interrupting to observe that if Roosevelt and his brother eat some of the game they shoot, they shoot far more than they can eat. At this point in his life, Roosevelt is eager to represent his masculine prowess, but he has not yet fully developed his conservationist conscience. So he is quite proud to report that he and his brother shot forty-three ducks in one day, “a very small bag indeed compared to those made in the Chesapeake, or in Wisconsin and the Mississippi valley.”<sup>179</sup> Like the editorial in *Field and Stream*, Roosevelt in this volume and elsewhere attributes the extinction of species primarily to market hunters, and vehemently distinguishes himself from them: “No one who is not himself a sportsman and lover of nature can realize the intense indignation with which a true hunter sees these butchers at their brutal work of slaughtering the game, in season and out, for the sake of the few dollars they are too lazy to earn in any other and more honest way.”<sup>180</sup> Yet Roosevelt clearly contributes to this slaughter, whether he is hunting for “sport” or “survival.”

Like the market hunters Roosevelt deplors, he is often undeterred in his pursuit of game animals by their actual extinction before his very eyes. In relaying the 1883 buffalo trip that resulted in the purchase of his Dakotan ranches, for instance, Roosevelt observes: “the last of the herds had been destroyed or driven out six months before, and there were only a few stragglers left.”<sup>181</sup> While mourning this fact in a lengthy excursus at the beginning of the chapter, Roosevelt has no qualms about shooting some of the last of these animals. As the first bison Roosevelt hits gallops out of sight due to his poor marksmanship, Roosevelt determines to kill yet another member of the species, whose entire head count at this point, we should remember, likely numbered around a hundred in the U.S., if not less. But the difficulty of ferreting out any more buffalo on the brink of their extinction makes Roosevelt “all the prouder of ... [the head] when at last it was in ... [his] possession.”<sup>182</sup> Just as Roosevelt hunts bison while lamenting their

disappearance, so too he participates in the obliteration of elk populations in western Dakota, while attributing their eradication solely to market hunters. In his chapter on still-hunting elk in *The Wilderness Hunter*, Roosevelt remembers killing “an elk near my ranch; probably the last of his race that will ever be found in our neighborhood.”<sup>183</sup> The finality of this appearance seems to have nothing to do with Roosevelt himself, curiously enough: rather, “the skin-hunters and meat-butchers wage the most relentless and unceasing war upon it for the sake of its hide and flesh, and their unremitting persecution is thinning out the herds with terrible rapidity.”<sup>184</sup> As Roosevelt’s chronicles suggest, if sportsmen fomented the conservation movement, this does not mean that they did not contribute to the species depletion that the movement arose to remedy. The insistent attribution of these conditions to market hunters simply shows the vehement disavowal of the sport hunter’s involvement in their creation.

As historians such as Karl Jacoby, David Spence, and Louis Warren have argued in examining nineteenth-century poaching practices and anti-poaching efforts, racialized populations were often cast with market hunters as the malefactors responsible for species depletion.<sup>185</sup> After Yellowstone National Park was established in 1872, for instance, the Crow, Bannock, and Shoshone who had formerly occupied the territory continued to make hunting forays into the fringes of the park area, not only because they were following established customs but also because they sought to supplement the insufficient food supply on the reservations to which they had been newly confined.<sup>186</sup> Grinnell’s *Forest and Stream* accordingly published several articles lambasting the “bands of roaming savages” in Yellowstone and calling for greater protections.<sup>187</sup> The Boone and Crockett Club similarly adopted a resolution to agitate against the “destruction of forests and of game caused by these Indian hunting parties.”<sup>188</sup> Partly in response to the public outcry, the Secretary of the Interior dispatched captain Moses Harris

and fifty cavalrymen from Fort Custer, Montana to Yellowstone to address the poaching problem. The same cavalry units that had been deployed to kill Indians in the Great Plains were assigned to protect animals in Yellowstone National Park for the next 32 years, implying the endurance of the same “enemy” in both contexts.<sup>189</sup>

Ironically enough, park officials often did more damage than good in “protecting” Yellowstone from “Indian invaders.” In prohibiting the fires that Native occupants had regularly set, for instance, officials suppressed the reproduction of the Lodgepole pine, whose cones only release seeds in intense heat, and further occasioned a buildup of underbrush that would lead to uncontrollable, catastrophic forest fires.<sup>190</sup> The concomitant killing of predators and protection of ungulate populations by park officials also led to an uncontained increase of elk, which ruined grazing lands and trees, with far-reaching ecological impacts.<sup>191</sup> There would be much more to say about conservationists’ vilification of Native “poachers” in Yellowstone and many other protected areas, but what I want to emphasize here is the mechanism that permits the displacement of sportsmen’s culpability for species depletion onto racialized persons. In fact, the racializing discourse of poaching exemplifies an inversion of the set of melancholic substitutions described earlier, whereby the civilizational violence against the Indian is falsely attributed to the animality (within humanity). Here, the disavowal of civilizational violence against the animal effectively ascribes that violence to the Indian. In short, the complex articulation of racial melancholia and the melancholic relationship to the loss of non-human animal life permits a bi-directional series of substitutions that serve to displace and perpetuate the violence of settler colonialism.

The colonial melancholia that characterizes the early conservation movement marks a departure from its expression within Roosevelt’s earlier hunting memoirs and “wilderness

hunting” more generally speaking, however. In order to determine the conservation movement’s distinctive articulation of colonial melancholia, we might note the development of Roosevelt’s conservationist ethos over the years. If Roosevelt transparently betrays his early days as a game hog, this is because his espousal of conservationist ideas is not ever-present but rather slowly materializes. As we have already observed, Roosevelt everywhere eulogizes the disappearance of wildlife, even in his earliest hunting writing. However, from his earlier to his later volumes, his perspective on the inexorability of species extinction markedly shifts. *The Wilderness Hunter*, for example, spends pages lamenting the disappearance of the buffalo, whose destruction “has gone on with appalling rapidity and thoroughness” since the railroads “carried hordes of hunters into the land and gave them means to transport their spoils to market.”<sup>192</sup> Yet in this early volume, Roosevelt pitches the extinction of the buffalo as an inevitable if regrettable consequence of civilizational progress. Even as he vividly describes the white buffalo skulls scattered across the plains “as melancholy monuments of their former existence,” Roosevelt understands the imminent eradication of the buffalo as an illustration of natural selection, rather than human destruction: “The rapid and complete extermination of the buffalo affords an excellent instance of how a race that has thriven and multiplied for ages . . . may succumb at once when these surrounding conditions are varied by the introduction of one or more new elements.”<sup>193</sup> While Roosevelt admits that “the slaughter of the buffalo has been in places needless and brutal,” he reconciles, “it must be remembered that its continued existence in any numbers was absolutely incompatible with anything but a very sparse settlement of the country; and that its destruction was the condition precedent upon the advance of white civilization in the West, and was a positive boon to the more thrifty and industrious frontiersman,” since as long as huge herds of buffalo grazed the prairies, the grasses would not have been able to support cattle.<sup>194</sup>

But “[a]bove all,” Roosevelt writes, “the extermination of the buffalo was the only way of solving the Indian question.”<sup>195</sup> For as long as the buffalo survived to sustain their way of life, “the Indians simply could not be kept on reservations,” and conversely, “its disappearance was the only method of forcing them to at least partially abandon their savage mode of life.”<sup>196</sup> As Roosevelt’s comment implies, the rapid extermination of the American bison during the 1860s and 1870s proceeded at a staggering rate of two to five million per year not simply for the sake of their hides and meat. The eradication of the bison meant that the encroachments of settler colonialism, from the establishment of farmsteads to the building of railroads, might proceed apace with less interference from Native Americans. An early expression of this policy can be found within Ebenezer Emmons 1840 report to the Massachusetts state legislature, *A Report on the Quadrupeds of Massachusetts*:

“So far as game and hunting are concerned, the sooner our wild animals are extinct the better, for they serve to support a few individuals just on the borders of a savage state, whose labors in the family of man are more injurious than beneficial. It is not, therefore, so much to be regretted that our larger animals of the chase have disappeared. What comforts their fur and their skins have provided, can be abundantly supplied by animals already domesticated, at far less expense, both of time and money, and are not subject to that drawback, the deterioration of morals.”<sup>197</sup>

In the years following the Civil War, Emmons’s report became a de facto military policy.<sup>198</sup>

General Philip Sheridan stated that the extermination of bison would do more to solve the Indian problem than the army had done in thirty years.<sup>199</sup> And Sheridan was right: the eradication of large herds of American bison across the Great Plains augured and aided the end of the Indian

Wars, for it eliminated nomadic tribes' central means of subsistence and prohibited their way of life.

Roosevelt would eventually change his position on the inevitability of the extinction of the buffalo, and indeed, his work would be instrumental in saving them from total extinction.<sup>200</sup> As importantly for our purposes, Roosevelt's writing would also eventually show a demonstrable shift in his conceptualization of Indigenous rights, or at the very least, a marked diminishment in the genocidal glee that characterizes *The Winning of the West* and *The Wilderness Hunter*, texts that most often provide historians with Roosevelt's representative ideas of race and race relations. By the turn of the twentieth century, Roosevelt adopts a different tone in discussing the Navajo and Hopi during his holidays in the Southwest. In "Across the Navajo Desert," written for *Outlook* magazine in 1913, Roosevelt still displays an unabashed sense of white supremacy when discussing the "long strides" in advancement the Navajos have made, "thanks to the presence of the white men in their neighborhood."<sup>201</sup> However, Roosevelt somewhat differently imagines a program of integration or incorporation of Native Americans into the national body. In that same year, another article in *Outlook* magazine reviewing a Hopi snake dance protests that "opening or cutting down the Navajo reservation" would be "a cruel wrong, and would benefit only a few wealthy cattle and sheep men,"<sup>202</sup> a far cry from his earlier dismissals of "sentimental nonsense" about Indigenous rights. Further, Roosevelt expresses his hope that the gradual assimilation of Native Americans will be "shaped as to preserve and develop the very real element of native culture possessed by these Indians – which, as I have already said, if thus preserved and developed, may in the end become an important contribution to American cultural life."<sup>203</sup> Such statements complicate the representation of Roosevelt as a social Darwinist, pure and simple: while he remains committed to white supremacist ideas, Roosevelt's racial projects

shift significantly over his lifetime, such that appeals to cultural preservation eventually succeed blatant endorsements of racialized violence.

It is crucial to observe that growing conservationist conviction within Roosevelt's writing closely parallels his increasing interest in "preserving" Native cultures. And for many people besides Roosevelt, conservationist measures linked the "saving" of Native Americans to the preservation of native wildlife, often quite explicitly. Some of the earliest calls for national parks envisioned these areas would hold wild people as well as wild animals. George Catlin, for example, advanced the idea after making a series of summer sojourns into the West to paint the "vanishing" American Indian. Saddened by the "corrupting" influences of white civilization upon the Sioux he painted, George Catlin's 1832 reflections proposed "[a] nation's Park, containing man and beast, in all the wild and freshness of their nature's beauty."<sup>204</sup> Similarly, Henry David Thoreau, concerned with the encroachments of more and more lumbermen into the Maine woods, concluded the nation must preserve a piece of wilderness for the purposes of spiritual renewal. In an 1858 *Atlantic Monthly* article, he asked: "why should not we ... have our national preserves ... in which the bear and panther, and some even of the hunter race, may still exist, and not be 'civilized off the face of the earth' – our forests ... not for idle sport or food, but for inspiration and our own true recreation?"<sup>205</sup>

This imagining of the national park as a shelter for "the hunter race" as well as a sanctuary for wildlife persisted long after the actual establishment of national parks within tourist and promotional practices. By the 1870s, visitors to the Yosemite Valley would frequently offer Yosemite tribal members a penny to perform a dance or song; with the arrival of the Kodak in the late 1880s, sightseers began to pay Yosemite to pose for photographs; and by the 1890s, tourists regularly sought to purchase the famous basketry from members of the tribe, who were

as much of an attraction as the wildlife and wilderness.<sup>206</sup> Eventually, Yosemite Park officials inaugurated the Indian Field Days, a festival ostensibly aspiring to “revive and maintain interest of Indians in their own games and industries, particularly basketry and bead work,” but more centrally aiming to bring visitors to the park in late summer.<sup>207</sup> In a similar vein, the Great Northern Railroad encouraged travel to Glacier National Park by hiring Blackfeet dancers to perform at the Glacier Park Lodge. In a 1912 promotional campaign for the park, ten Blackfeet were even sent to New York City to camp in tipis on the roof of a downtown hotel. Subsequent recreations of this advertising stunt in Chicago and Minneapolis encouraged travel to Glacier by touting the Blackfeet as “Glacier Park Indians.”<sup>208</sup>

Ironically, however, even as conservationist efforts were often imagined as “preserving” Native Americans, they often served as the occasion for egregious acts of dispossession, as Mark David Spence has examined at length. When Glacier National Park was established, for example, park officials curtailed the hunting, fishing, and timber rights of the “Glacier Park Indians” on what was known as “the ceded strip,” a 10 mile-wide tract of land originally part of the Blackfeet reservation. The Blackfeet had sold the land to the federal government under pressure from a governmental delegation in 1895, but on the condition that they retain hunting, fishing, and timber rights there. When park officials prohibited them from using the ceded strip, the Blackfeet filed a lawsuit, and after waiting a decade to give the case a hearing, the U.S. Court of Claims decided that once the lands in question had become a national park, they ceased to qualify as “public lands” – thus Blackfeet hunting, fishing, and timber rights no longer applied.<sup>209</sup> Although in contrast, the Yosemite were originally allowed to remain within the boundaries of Yosemite National Park when it was established, Superintendent Washington Lewis eventually engineered their expulsion through a process of attrition, applying a combination of enticements and

disciplinary measures.<sup>210</sup> These cases are merely the tip of the iceberg. Time and time again, the establishment of national parks, national forests, or federal game reserves entailed the curtailment of traditional hunting and fishing rights, the violation of treaties, and the dispossession of Native Americans.

An important distinction thus needs to be made: at least some animal species were made to live through conservationist efforts. On the other hand, “letting die” would increasingly characterize U.S. governmental policy and practice towards Native Americans. By the time the first national park was established in Yellowstone in 1872, the final reservation treaties had been signed and the end of Indigenous armed resistance was imminent. Two years after the New York legislature set aside 715,000 acres of the Adirondacks in a landmark decision – the first of its kind – to conserve forests for wise use and wildlife habitats,<sup>211</sup> the General Allotment Act of 1887 rapidly accelerated the whittling away of reservation lands, effectively clear-cutting long-standing modes of communal ownership through the allotment of lands in severalty. One year following the massacre at Wounded Knee, which would complete the conquest and containment of Native Americans to continually contracting reservations, the Federal Forest Preserve Act of 1891 authorized the creation of national forests by executive degree, which would permit the expansion of protected forests to 8.5 percent of the total land area of the United States.<sup>212</sup> While a growing preservationist contingent of the conservation movement advocated the protection of wilderness areas from human impacts or the safeguarding of nature in an “untouched” condition,<sup>213</sup> white-sponsored, off-reservation, manual-labor boarding schools such as Carlisle Indian Industrial School aimed to eradicate the “Indian” in favor of the “man,” as the founder Captain Richard H. Pratt often remarked, the better to insert that deracinated man into an industrial economy.<sup>214</sup>

To take conservationist discourse at its word, one might think that the conservation movement effectively created a sanctuary for both Indigenous populations and animal populations (problematic as this reduction of human to animal life in the act of saving it might be). But as the juxtaposition of major milestones in the progress of the conservation movement and the history of U.S. settler colonialism would suggest, at the same time that legislative codes, military interventions, and public policy decisions began to significantly increase the long-term viability of many species of wildlife, they significantly imperiled the life worlds of Native communities and the life itself of Indigenous persons. What warrants this juxtaposition, however, or what seems so striking within it, is the degree to which conservationist measures appear to be the mirror opposite of governmental policies and social practices directed at Native Americans: the increase of national forests, national parks, and wildlife preserves parallels the diminution of reservation lands; the preservationist push for the protection of wilderness areas untouched by civilization accompanies the implementation of brutal educational programs to “civilize” Native children; the active protection of animal life attends the passive production of human death.

At first consideration, we might read these concurrences as a powerful manifestation of racial melancholia. However, the mechanisms at work here are perhaps not sufficiently described as melancholic. For the disavowal of civilizational violence and the refusal of the loss of the object occur not through processes of internationalization and identification, but through the setting up of a substitutive object outside the self. The preservation of animal species within the conservation movement might better be described as fetishistic than melancholic, for the animal is actually preserved as a substitutive object, rather than introjected as a substitutive self. For Freud, of course, the fetish is a substitute for the penis – not just any penis – but the mother’s penis that in the normal course of resolution “should ... have been given up, but the fetish is

precisely designed to preserve it from extinction.”<sup>215</sup> In Freud’s thinking, fetishism as well as melancholia proceed from loss and the disavowal of loss: the fetish is that something that “has taken ... [the lost object’s] place, has been appointed its substitute.”<sup>216</sup> Only in the case of the fetish, the substitutive object is external to the self. Freud’s thinking would thus suggest an easy slippage from melancholia to fetishism, if only he did not tie the occurrence of the fetish so tightly to the loss of “a particular and quite special penis.”<sup>217</sup>

By unfastening the fetish from the mother’s penis, we might explore the possibility that the loss at the root of a culturally pervasive colonial melancholia might also express itself fetishistically. The preservation of animal life within the conservation movement, in this case, can be understood as a substitute object, a disavowal of loss, and even a preservation of the phallus, if not the penis. For the integrity of the white masculine subject depends upon the multifold refusals the animal here accomplishes. The loss of human life is ideationally refused through the actual preservation of animal life; the Indian is preserved not in actuality but in the figure of the animal – or not in the figure, but in the flesh. Significantly, Freud suggests “the last impression before the uncanny and traumatic one is retained as a fetish.” As the extinction of the bison enabled the subjugation of Native Americans, as the degradation of habitats and the depletion of species facilitated the encroachments of settler colonialism, one might read the preservation of animal life within the conservation movement as the retention of a “last impression,” an object associated with or connected to the object lost, and so that which comes to stand for it.

Just as melancholia’s substitutions describe a mode of metaphorization, the fetishistic relationship to animal life also designates a site of signification or a moment of metaphoric cooptation. Much earlier in this chapter, I made an observation concerning the representative

relationship between animals and Native Americans in Roosevelt's early hunting writing, particularly within his deployment of the symbology of the "savage war." Expressly, I suggested that Roosevelt's hunting memoirs often exhibit no representative relationship between animals and animalized persons, properly speaking. Although Indigenous peoples are relegated to the status of animals, they are not heavily figured as animals or their animalization is not metaphorical: the animal does not serve as a recurring vehicle for the tenor of the Indian. At least for the purposes of this analysis, I want to suggest that the figurative use of the animal in the representation of racial difference emerges fetishistically. As we can see by the way in which the preservation of wildlife is likened to the salvation of savages, the ideological productivity of the metaphoric relationship inheres in the displacements it effects by the equivalences it draws: the animal stands for the Indian, the animal is the Indian, and thus the making live of wildlife elides the letting die of humans.

### **Conservation, Population, and the Animalization of Biopolitics**

Even as the early conservation movement in the U.S. proceeded from a primitivist imaginary, the concrete realization of the conservationist vision most often advanced the very developments disputed by anti-modern sentiment. Thus Samuel Hays usefully underscores how conservation essentially adapted scientific management principles to the management of the natural world.<sup>218</sup> Louis Warren similarly shows how the conservation movement ultimately displaced local commons regimes with a federal system of natural resource administration that "assumed powers over human relations with the land that were once within the purview of local communities."<sup>219</sup> Hays, Warren, and many others correctly observe how the implementation of conservationist measures often encouraged the centralization of state powers, the alienation of local inhabitants from their environs, and the rationalization and instrumentalization of non-

human life. Extending the work of these environmental historians, I want to consider these processes as an advance of modern biopower. By framing the early conservation movement as a biopolitical development, we might better perceive how it profoundly shaped both the management of human and non-human animal life and the production of human and animal death in its wake.

Over the last several years, several animal studies scholars have called for a consideration of the question of the animal in light of the workings of biopolitics. In so doing, animal studies scholars have usefully underlined how the dispositifs or apparatuses of biopower hinge upon the species divide. For instance, Nicole Shukin asserts that “the biopolitical production of the bare life of the animal other subtends ... the biopolitical production of the bare life of the racialized other.”<sup>220</sup> In other words, “the power to reduce humans to the bare life of their species body arguable presupposes the prior power to suspend other species in a state of exception within which they can be non-criminally put to death.”<sup>221</sup> For Shukin, the production of race relies upon the production of “subspecies,” and so the discursive uses of animality are indispensable to the biopolitical production of bare life. Judith Butler concurs that the operation of sovereignty within the field of governmentality depends on the “reduction of human beings to animal status.”<sup>222</sup> But for Butler, “the bestialization of the human in this way has little, if anything, to do with actual animals, since it is a figure of the animal against which the human is defined.”<sup>223</sup> Conversely, animal studies scholars have challenged that the fatal efficacy of the figure of the animal in the production of human death has *everything* to do with actual animals. Rather than consider the animal “predominantly as a metaphor for that corporeal part of ‘man’ that becomes subject to biopolitical calculation,” Shukin among others repeatedly challenges critics to think both “the

figure” and “the flesh” of the animal, “the semiotic currency of animal signs and the carnal traffic in animal substances.”<sup>224</sup>

In initiating such investigations, however, many animal studies scholars have arguably abandoned the purview of the biopolitical, even while making some incisive theoretical contributions. Cary Wolfe, for instance, understands the question of the animal “within a biopolitical frame” as a question of standing “before the law.”<sup>225</sup> In Wolfe’s formulation, the animal “is ontologically and/or logically antecedent to the law, ... exists prior to the moment ... [of] the law,” and so becomes subject to death.<sup>226</sup> The question of the animal is recast in Wolfe’s analysis as the question of bare life. But does this different nomenclature sufficiently move us beyond the consideration of the constitutive exclusions of juridical personhood to the horizon of the biopolitical? Does the production of animal death “before the law” necessarily illuminate the production of death within a mode of power that safeguards and proliferates life? I want to answer both yes and no to these questions. On the one hand, in taking for granted the juridical nature of the biopolitical, Wolfe and many other scholars interested in the question of the animal are working from Giorgio Agamben’s corrective to Foucault, which asserts the continuing importance of juridical forms and state sovereignty to the workings of modern biopower. While on the one hand, I concur with this rethinking of the biopolitical in conjunction with rather than in contradistinction to juridico-institutional models of power, on the other hand, I want to preserve some of the specificity of the Foucauldian conceptualization of biopolitics in approaching so as to more fully illuminate the interrelationships between the biopolitical production of racialized bodies and the biopolitical management of non-human animal bodies.

In Foucault’s analysis, the power addressed to life itself evolves along two major axes, one that centers on the individual body through the application of disciplinary tactics – “an

anatomy-politics of the human body” – and one that focuses on the species body through “an entire series of interventions and regulatory controls: a bio-politics of the population.”<sup>227</sup>

According to Foucault, the hallmark of the biopolitical is *the management of populations*.

Although modes of biopolitical management are articulated to disciplinary controls of the individual body, *they pertain to the species body*. Further, in Foucault’s understanding, “the problems specific to population” that first emerged within modern forms of biopolitical calculus reshaped “the problem of government” such that it “finally came to be thought . . . outside of the juridical framework of sovereignty.”<sup>228</sup> Within modern forms of governmentality, that is, “population comes to appear as the ultimate end of government,”<sup>229</sup> and this new end entails new means “of employing tactics rather than laws, and even using laws themselves as tactics.”<sup>230</sup>

Thus to consider animal life “before the law” as does Wolfe does not fully exhaust the workings of the biopolitical, which applies to populations as much as individuals, appears tactical if also tactically juridical, exceeds the workings of sovereign power, even if sovereignty does not cease to play a role, as Foucault readily admits. Crucially, Foucault’s attention to the biopolitics of the population is inextricable from his theorization of race, which is that mechanism that creates the caesura in the biopolitical field, separating the population that is made to live and those (racialized) populations that are allowed to die.

While some animal studies scholars have failed to consider how non-human animal *populations* are implicated within modern biopolitics, other thinkers who have more appreciably attended to the control of the species body of non-human animals have sometimes flattened the important figurative function of the animal in the biopolitical production of racial meaning. Since Timothy Campbell’s translation of Roberto Esposito’s work, animal studies scholars have seized upon this Italian philosopher for the potential his thought might offer to think about the

biopolitics of non-human animal life. Since Esposito has not had as much truck as Foucault and Agamben within Anglo-American scholarship (outside critical animal studies and ecocriticism), a quick summation of his central interventions is warranted here. Esposito claims to have identified the answer to the problem that eluded Foucault: “Why does a politics of life always risk being reversed into the work of death?”<sup>231</sup> Faced with the problem of thinking how a “positive” and productive biopolitics is reversed into thanatopolitics, Esposito offers “a more ductile paradigm” in the form of “immunization.” For Esposito, “immunization” describes “a negative form of the protection of life. It saves, insures, and preserves the organism ... but it does not do so directly, immediately, or frontally; on the contrary, it subjects [part of] the organism to a condition that simultaneously negates or reduces its power to expand.”<sup>232</sup>

Equivocating between juridical and medical meanings of immunity, while suggesting the philological relation reveals their historical articulation, Esposito asserts that juridical *immunitas*, “the condition of dispensation from ... [reciprocal] obligation and therefore the defense against the expropriating features of *communitas*,”<sup>233</sup> unleashes the autoimmune disorders of modern biopolitics, in which the attempt to safeguard the proliferation of life proceeds by way of the mass production of death. The specifically modern dimension of the immunitary paradigm derives from the fact that the most important political categories of modernity – sovereignty, liberty, property – attempt to “immunize” the modern subject (juridically) from *communitas*, and whatever falls outside *immunitas* accordingly becomes subject to death (biologically).<sup>234</sup> Nazism for Esposito is the paradigmatic instance of the modern autoimmune disease that results: the concentration camp “is summarized in the principle that life defends itself and develops only through the progressive enlargement of the circle of death.”<sup>235</sup> The alternative, for Esposito, would be a non-immunized or radically communalized political semantics, one that would refuse

to cut the biopolitical continuum for therapeutic reasons, and one that would include plants and animals as well as humans – which is why animal studies scholars get so excited about Esposito.

Notwithstanding his welcome consideration of the stakes of non-human animal life, there are some serious problems with Esposito's framework. At the most basic level, Esposito suggests the solution to the abjection of certain forms of life, the designation of "flesh" that might be sacrificed to further the life of the body (individual or communal), would be to radically espouse the equivalence of all forms of life. This is a problem that even Cary Wolfe, one of Esposito's most appreciative readers, readily identifies. Wolfe says that Esposito "ends up radically dedifferentiating the field of 'the living' into a molecular wash of singularities that all equally manifest 'life.'"<sup>236</sup> Esposito's biocentrism, he rightly notes, would suggest that we permit viruses to ravage human populations, or if forced to choose, preserve the life of a California condor over the life of a human child. Certainly, we need a more nuanced approach to redressing the break in the biological continuum than Esposito offers. But we also require a more nuanced approach to theorizing its very existence. What I find most troubling in Esposito's thought, in fact, is his virtual elimination of race from the consideration of what Foucault calls "the caesura" in the biological continuum. For contrary to Esposito's assertions, Foucault did theorize "the cut," the resurgence of death within the production of life, precisely as a mechanism of race, which animal studies scholars such as Shukin, Wolfe, and others have elaborated as a mechanism of species most fundamentally. Esposito's claim to have identified a more integral relationship or "profound connection" between affirmative and thanatological biopolitics essentially disregards the principal dispositifs of biopolitics to take thanatological imperatives at their word. More limiting than many animal studies scholars' failure to consider the biopolitics of animal life as a question of population is Esposito's suggestion that the thanatopolitical drift of modern

biopolitics can be reduced to the simple operation of a “therapeutics” of death, eliminating the figurative function of the animal in designating that which is a threat to life.

The discussion that follows addresses the biopolitics of non-human animal life within the early conservation movement while resisting some of the theoretical tendencies disputed above. On the one hand, the discussion to follow will focus on the management of animal life on the level of populations, pace Foucault’s understanding of the hallmark of the biopolitical. In so doing, it will show the material entanglement of non-human animal life within late nineteenth and early twentieth-century modes of biopolitical reckoning. On the other hand, this discussion will simultaneously attend to the discursive deployment of the animal within human biopolitics, more specifically, within processes of racialization that rely upon the invocation of the non-human animal. In so doing, it will illuminate how the conservation movement’s animalization of biopolitics profoundly transformed the principal dispositifs of modern biopower.

Of course, to say that the conservation movement marks the advent of the biopolitical control of non-human animal life would be to designate a false point of origin. However, the early conservation movement initiated some significant developments in the management of the species body of non-human animals. To start, the conservation movement marks the moment when animal life was first rendered demographically intelligible, as exemplified by William Hornaday’s meticulous count of the remaining American bison at the end of the nineteenth century. Further, the conservation movement is the historical conjuncture at which animal populations began to be managed qua population. Finally, with the beginnings of the conservationist movement, many animal species first acquired something like bios: a political life exceeding the mere facticity of living. One might argue that anti-cruelty legislation advanced by the early animal welfare movement anticipated this development. However, the state-by-state

regulation of human treatment of animals following the Civil War did not necessarily concern the facticity of animal life or death as such. Legislation that limited the number of hours that cattle could be kept in the cars transporting them to slaughter, for instance, presumed the permissibility of animal death. In contrast, through the legal and legislative measures taken by early conservationists, animal life itself entered the political realm and received state protection.

The passing of game laws within many states prohibited the killing of certain species or female animals either altogether or within certain seasons, using certain methods, beyond a certain number.<sup>237</sup> Subsequently, the state legislation of animal life and death would give way to more and more federal controls: as early as 1871, the U.S. Fish Commission was established to unify the efforts of state-level commissions and hatcheries;<sup>238</sup> after a long campaign led by the Boone and Crockett Club, the 1894 Act to Protect the Birds and Animals in Yellowstone National Park made killing wildlife within park boundaries a misdemeanor;<sup>239</sup> and after years of agitation on the part of Audubon Societies, the 1900 Lacey Act effectively ended market hunting by banning the interstate shipment of wildlife or wildlife products taken in violation of state law.<sup>240</sup> While the designation of the first national forests and national parks intended the proliferation of native species within their boundaries, the establishment of the first wildlife preserves, beginning with Pelican Island in 1903, directly brought the protection of animal life under federal statutes.<sup>241</sup> Through the measures advanced by the conservation movement, then, some animals acquired immunity not only from cruelty but also from killing.

Yet the creation of legal protections of the life of some species in some circumstances, of course, left many animals vulnerable to death. The growth of the industrial production of meat proceeded apace of conservationist developments, of course. And regarding wildlife populations: prior to the ecological insights that Charles Elton and Aldo Leopold would popularize in the later

1920s and 1930s, the extermination of predators or “varmint” was considered not only unavoidable but also necessary for the preservation of deer, elk, moose, and other ungulates. Thus the Office of Economic Ornithology and Mammalogy, which soon after its establishment became known as the Biological Survey, actively contributed to the eradication of predator populations, even though it was charged with the scientific study and management of wildlife. To “preserve” wildlife, the Biological Survey implemented a predator and rodent control program that paid bounties for the killing of wolves, cougars, and other “varmint.” The program ultimately changed the Biological Survey’s vision, such that it evolved into a service agency to further the interests of farmers and ranchers, rather than a governmental agency devoted to scientific investigation and wildlife conservation. While the predator control program eventually led to a schism between the Biological Survey and the American Society of Mammalogists, in the early decades of the conservationist movement, the aims of preserving wildlife and killing predators were strangely enough viewed as complementary, rather than contradictory.<sup>242</sup> Even while fervently advocating for the preservation of wilderness areas and the protection of game species in *Outdoor Pastimes of an American Hunter*, then, Roosevelt would acknowledge: “It is inevitable and probably necessary that the wolf and the cougar should go.”<sup>243</sup>

With the animalization of biopolitics, “the animal” less clearly demarcates the line between lives worth living and lives unworthy of grieving by way of its opposition to “the human.” Rather, the field of the animal itself becomes variegated or crisscrossed by species lines. For Derrida and many other thinkers, the reduction of incommensurable life to the *singular* is central to making possible the non-criminal putting to death of both animals and animalized humans. In Derrida’s formulation, rather than recognizing the heterogeneous field of the living, the multifold interrelationships and interdependencies that span innumerable organic and even

inorganic forms, “the human” differentiates itself from “‘the animal’ in the singular and without further ado, claiming thus to designate every living thing that is held to be not human,”<sup>244</sup> thus to define that which is without speech and without thought, thus to determine that which may be permissibly killed. This formulation has proved an accurate diagnosis of innumerable historical instances, but nonetheless, the conflation of all forms of animal life, the reduction of all animals to “the animal,” does not sufficiently describe the discursive use of the animal in the wake of the legal protection of some forms of non-human animal life. With the admission of at least some species in some circumstances into the zone of bios, we will see the discursive deployment of a differentiated field of animality: not a discourse of species, pure and simple, but a discourse of “undesirable species.”

It’s not only that predator species, among other animal species, were placed outside the law, within the realm of bare life, but that they were considered lives unworthy of living precisely because other animal species had been placed firmly under the protection of the law. Predators were killed *in order to* allow other species to live. Esposito’s paradigm of immunization, then, which underscores the “integral relation” between making live and taking life, precisely describes the conservation movement’s instrumentalization of animal death. Of course, it’s not as if the conservation movement introduced the production of life through death. What it did inaugurate, however, and with profound historical consequences, was *the imagining of the extinction of an entire species’ population for the sake of the survival of another*. I want to emphasize here that the therapeutics of death applied to animal populations distinctively drew upon ecological actualities, however inaccurately conceived, which is why its cooptation within the racial discourse and genocidal projects of the twentieth century would prove to be so powerful. The point is not simply that wildlife management measures introduced a therapeutics

of death that would next be applied to human populations. Further, the effective instrumentalization of animal death would encase the senseless extermination of human populations within a crude ecological meaning. The actual management of animal populations could be considered among the real material conditions that anchored the ideological imagining of racial genocide.

It's no accident that some of the most ardent early conservationists in the U.S. were also some of the most enthusiastic proponents of eugenic ideas, although most often they proposed "positive" rather than "negative" eugenic measures. Roosevelt famously chastised the middle and upper classes for their low birthrate: "the capital sin, the cardinal sin, against the race and against civilization."<sup>245</sup> Henry Cabot Lodge and William Hornaday bemoaned the influx of immigrant populations. Madison Grant – the director of the American Eugenics Society, the vice-president of the Immigration Restriction League, and the infamous author of *The Passing of the Great Race* (1916) – was also a preeminent conservationist. Beyond his status as an original member of the Boone and Crockett Club, Grant's contributions to the early conservation movement include but are certainly not limited to sponsoring landmark deer hunting legislation in New York, saving the American bison through a breeding program at the Bronx Zoo, and co-founding the Save-the-Redwoods League.<sup>246</sup> Many eugenic proposals drawn from human-animal practices such as selective breeding precede the beginnings of conservation. But arguably, the idea that the Anglo-Saxon race might be threatened with extinction was concocted in the crucible of conservationist efforts or in the face of the actual extinction of many animal species. Ecological actualities such as the endangerment of the American bison and the extinction of the passenger pigeon gave credence to the ideological imagining of the "suicide" of the white race,

and the methods that had been developed to preserve animal populations were accordingly proposed to save the Anglo-Saxons.

Thus far, this discussion has shown how the inclusion of some forms of animal life within the political realm fundamentally transformed the production of bare life, both in terms of its designation – through a discourse of *undesirable* species instead of species pure and simple – and in terms of its death – by way of a “therapeutic” instrumentalization of violence rather than a passive process of “letting die.” While Esposito claims this therapeutic form of “taking life” is tantamount to an exercise of sovereign power, distinctive as it is from “letting die,” I would maintain that Esposito helps to explain the exercise of some instances of violence within modern biopolitics without actually illuminating the resurgence of sovereign power within the field of governmentality. In order to broach the production of non-instrumental death, the taking of life in which making live is neither a point of origin nor an end, I want to turn back to Giorgio Agamben’s theorization of sovereignty.

For Agamben, what characterizes the modern political order is “not so much the inclusion of zoe in the polis ... nor simply the fact that life as such becomes a principle object of the projections and calculations of state power.”<sup>247</sup> Rather, Agamben argues that “the realm of bare life ... gradually begins to coincide with the political realm, and exclusion and inclusion, outside and inside, bios and zoe, right and fact, enter into a zone of irreducible distinction.”<sup>248</sup> To explain this rather enigmatic formulation further: the production of death within modern biopolitics is not simply a matter of cordoning off the political order, creating a zone of “bare life” at its margins, and allowing the life that inhabits that space to die. Drawing heavily upon the political theory of Carl Schmitt, Agamben theorizes the “state of exception” not only as the space of the homo sacer, but also as the decision of the sovereign, not merely as an exclusion (from the

political order), but also as an inclusion (through the sovereign decision). Not only is the homo sacer outside the law, but also the sovereign is “outside” the law, insofar as the sovereign creates and guarantees the rule, rather than abides by it. At the same time, not only is the homo sacer included within the law, if only through an abandonment that necessarily establishes a relation to it, but also the sovereign is always already within the juridical order, insofar as “the exception is the originary form of law.”<sup>249</sup> Thus the included exclusion, excluded inclusion, defines both the homo sacer and the sovereign, and for this reason these figures, who seem to stand at the opposite poles of the political order, actually share a structural symmetry and form an integral relation: “the sovereign and homo sacer present symmetrical figures and have the same structure and are correlative: the sovereign is one with respect to whom all men are potentially homines sacri and homo sacer is one with respect to whom all men act as sovereigns.”<sup>250</sup>

Agamben’s analytic actually moves beyond Schmitt’s theorization of the state of exception to illuminate the resurgence of sovereign violence within the field of governmentality. For Agamben, the sovereign is not simply “outside the law.” As for the homo sacer, the “outside” of nomos for the sovereign is physis, or life itself, and “the physis/nomos antinomy constitutes the presupposition that legitimates the principle of sovereignty, the indistinction of law and violence.”<sup>251</sup> With this statement, Agamben suggests that sovereign power somehow implicates “bare life” not only in its object but also in its exercise. This argument emerges most clearly when Agamben turns to scholars of Germanic and Scandinavian antiquity to cite the proximity of the *wargus*, or wolf-man, to that of the homo sacer. If the wolf-man approximates the homo sacer, however, he stands for the sovereign within Agamben’s thinking. For Agamben, “that such a man is defined as a wolf-man and not simply as a wolf” is the decisive point: “the *loup garou*, the werewolf, ... is precisely neither man nor beast, ... [but] dwells paradoxically

within both [physis and nomos] while belonging to neither.”<sup>252</sup> Tracking the wolf-man through his appearance within the Hobbesian mythologeme, Agamben observes, “Hobbes founds sovereignty by means of a reference to the state in which ‘man is a wolf to men.’”<sup>253</sup> According to Agamben’s reading, “in the word ‘wolf’ (*lupis*) we ought to hear an echo of the *wargus*.” For the Hobbesian state of nature, far from “a pre-juridical condition that is indifferent to the law of the city,” is a state of exception “that constitutes and dwells within it.”<sup>254</sup> Put differently, in Agamben’s reading of Hobbes, the constitution of the political realm does not rely on “the subject’s free renunciation of their natural right,” but rather on “the sovereign’s preservation of his natural right to do anything to anyone.”<sup>255</sup> In this way, “in the person of the sovereign, the werewolf, the wolf-man of man, dwells permanently in the city.”<sup>256</sup>

Thus the specter of sovereignty haunts the city. What is crucial for our purposes, however, is to recognize the mask of the trace, and to perceive how the mask wears the face. As discussed above, many scholars have argued that the exercise of sovereign violence hinges upon the reduction of the human being to the status of the animal. But Agamben’s discussion of the wolf-man further suggests the unleashing of sovereign violence involves the bestialization of both the subject and the object of violence: the animality of the sovereign as well as the animality of the homo sacer. In other words, the animal does not merely function as a figure for the corporeal life that might be permissibly put to death, but also as the sign of the sovereign that might take life or let live. Importantly, the “simple fact of living” that serves as the “presupposition” of sovereign power is “neither simple natural life nor social life, but rather bare life.”<sup>257</sup> Agamben’s own line of argumentation often displays a slippage between “natural life” and “bare life,” which some readers of Agamben then admissibly replicate. However, Agamben takes pains to maintain the distinction when outlining the basis of sovereign power, and the

difference resides in the fact that bare life is sacred life. Through the invocation of the sacred, Agamben attempts to conceptualize a form of life utterly undetermined by the law, both human and natural. As only bare life is entirely undecided: only bare life can be the seat of the properly sovereign decision.

Agamben's account usefully describes how the production of bare life hinges on the double-edged dispositif of the animal within modern biopolitics. Still, as countless critics have observed, Agamben tends to flatten the historical dimension, assimilating all the manifestations of modern thanatopolitics to the paradigm of the concentration camp. If the wolf-man dwells permanently in the city, what are the historical conditions that permit him to emerge from his den? What are the social processes that shape the modern manifestations of the wolf-man, the werewolf, or the sovereign, beyond the fables of La Fontaine or the mythology of Germanic antiquity? Building upon Agamben's discussion, I want to suggest that the resurgence of sovereign power hinges not simply upon the suspension of the law within the field of governmentality, but further upon the availability of cultural meanings within the field of representation. In other words, the exercise of sovereign violence relies on a historically specific invocation of animality, which is capable of conjuring not only ferocity but also freedom, autonomous existence as much as violent existence, the exemption from natural law as much as the violation of human law: in short, "bare life" as much as "natural" life.

This chapter began by illuminating the *naturalization of violence* within wilderness hunting. It proceeded to elucidate the fetishistic character of the early conservation movement, which in making wildlife populations live, elided the "letting die" of Indigenous populations. The final section of this chapter has thus far explored how the biopolitical therapeutics of death was forged through conservationist measures. Yet if the reading of Agamben immediately above

is correct, none of these developments describes a manifestation of sovereign power, properly speaking, nor the interspecies practices and concomitant cultural ideas of animality that underwrite the exercise of sovereign violence. In fact, it will be the work of the fourth chapter of this dissertation to account for the production of animal life as autonomous existence, particularly in the context of modern animal entertainments. While this discussion of the biopolitics of non-human animal life thus serves as a bridge to upcoming concerns, I do not want to demarcate too sharply between the savage animality described in this chapter and the sovereign animality described in the next. In the first place, the conservation movement itself led to the establishment of a number of large-scale animal spectacles, namely, national parks, which commodified and aestheticized the animal body in all the ways the following chapter explores. In the second place, the specious sense of freedom that begins to accrue to animal existence over the course of the Progressive era was produced at least in part by conservation's unprecedented application of biopolitical controls to animal life.

For the purposes of our present discussion, in any case, I want to postulate that advancements in the management of non-human animal populations fundamentally transformed the cultural meanings of animality precisely because of the resistance of animal life to new forms of scientific intelligibility. Whereas earlier scientific procedures had inductively drawn the traits of species from individual specimens, these specimens would refuse to prove representative when regularly compared to others within more systematic scientific surveys. To take one instance, Roosevelt discovers noteworthy dissimilarities between individual cougar specimens during a Colorado hunt, which simultaneously served as a scientific study for the Biological Survey. The fourteen cougars the hunting party killed “showed the widest variation not only in size but in color,”<sup>258</sup> which Roosevelt represents in a scientific chart. The differential

presentation of individual members of the species is what Hart Merriam draws from Roosevelt's research, as well, for Roosevelt (rather blusteringly) quotes Merriam's letter to him: "Your series of skulls from Colorado is incomparably the largest, most complete and most valuable series ever brought together from any single locality and will be of inestimable value in determining ... individual variation."<sup>259</sup> Roosevelt's proliferation of intra-species difference through scientific investigation may simply illustrate the Foucauldian insight that the production of scientific norms through the study of populations only multiplies deviations from the norm. Foucault reads this development in the history of sexuality as a naturalization of deviance, an implantation of perversions, a recodification of pleasure as the inevitable outcome of bodily hardwiring. Yet arguably, the naturalization of deviation could have an inverse effect, whereby it would transform the very meaning of the natural. At least for the purposes of this argument, I want to posit that the naturalization of deviance might simultaneously bring about the denaturalization of nature.

Roosevelt's hunting writing sometimes registers such a consequence. Although he sets out to write natural history in recording his hunting exploits, Roosevelt recurrently notes the individuality of animals. Particularly in his later writing, Roosevelt repeatedly observes: "we must never lose sight of the individual variation in character and conduct among wild beasts."<sup>260</sup> At times, he chalks up "a wide variability" across members of the same species to "different conditions," cautioning against "accept[ing] the observations made in one locality as if they applied throughout the range of the species."<sup>261</sup> However, evolutionary adaptations to diverse environments do not fully explain the differences between members of the same species that Roosevelt finds: "Under the same conditions different deer and antelope vary,"<sup>262</sup> and for many other species, as well, "even in the same locality two individuals ... may differ widely."<sup>263</sup>

Roosevelt not only discerns a number of disparities in the physiological traits of animals, but also he finds a wide range of social behaviors. In discussing mule deer, for instance, he reports that although “a herd [most often] would consist of does, fawns, and yearlings,” still “it was not possible to lay down a universal rule. Again and again I saw herds in which there were one or two full grown bucks by themselves, and occasionally a solitary buck.”<sup>264</sup> The differences are so great that Roosevelt at times joins other mammalogists in questioning the “value of ‘species’ or indeed ... what is denoted by the term.”<sup>265</sup> Significantly, Roosevelt’s examples of individual variation within animal species often underscore the animal’s potential for violence. According to Roosevelt, “bears and cougars vary in cunning and ferocity,”<sup>266</sup> and some of the most interesting “variation[s] in [the] temper” of the grizzly bear are displays of bad temper or ferocious behavior. Roosevelt notes one anomalous occasion when he was charged by a grizzly bear, and not only so, but charged by a grizzly bear with his mouth open and teeth bared (other reports of charging bears observe closed mouths, apparently).<sup>267</sup> Moreover, when Roosevelt offers evidence that “individuals among ... [coyotes] have queer freaks,”<sup>268</sup> he provides instances of aggression, as when a mad coyote attacked a sleeping man in a well-staked campsite.

The conservation movement’s animalization of biopolitics transformed the course of human biopolitics in two major ways. First, with the legal protection of the life of some animal species, the human-animal divide would no longer serve as the primary mechanism of differentiation between bios and zoe. In the place of a discourse of species, a discourse of “undesirable species” became crucial to the production of bare life. Second, the resistance of animal life to new forms of scientific intelligibility and to the application of biopolitical controls contributed at least in part to the resurgence of sovereign animality that we will explore more fully in the next chapter. If the production of (some forms of) animal life as “bare life” is

foundational to the non-criminal putting to death of animalized humans – a claim that many scholars before me have argued – so too, I want to suggest, the imagining of animal life as a state of violence, a form of freedom, or an aspect of divinity is crucial to the reanimation of sovereign power in the field of governmentality. Put differently, sovereign power relies upon the equivalences drawn and the displacements accomplished by the figure of the animal in its very exercise or assumption as well as in its object or application. To the specific figure of the sovereign animal, and to another account of its making within material human-animal relations, I will now turn.

#### Chapter 4: The Art of Animality

“But it is precisely modernity that is always quoting primeval history.”<sup>1</sup>  
 - Walter Benjamin, “Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth Century”

In 1991, Damien Hirst created one of his most memorable works, if not one of the most iconic pieces of contemporary British art. *The Physical Impossibility of Death in the Mind of Someone Living* is a 14-foot tiger shark, preserved in a solution of formaldehyde, and displayed within a glass and steel-framed vitrine. Although it’s certainly his most celebrated piece, *The Physical Impossibility of Death in the Mind of Someone Living* was not Hirst’s first use of animal bodies in his art. *A Thousand Years* was his inaugural animal installation, consisting of a glass case containing a rotting cow’s head, which was feasted upon by maggots and flies. And since the making of this celebrated shark, Hirst has continued his quest to “create a zoo of dead animals,” as he describes what eventually became known as his *Natural History* series.<sup>2</sup> There would be much to say about any of these installations. For the moment, however, I want to dwell on Hirst’s shark, as it has an instructive natural history of its own that is less often contemplated than the piece itself.

*The Physical Impossibility of Death in the Mind of Someone Living* was commissioned by Charles Saatchi, the advertising tycoon whose patronage played an influential role in Hirst’s rise to the status of Britain’s richest living artist. Or rather, the shark was the result of Saatchi’s more open-ended commission to Hirst to make something for him: to evidence artistry. Accordingly, Hirst employed an Australian fisherman to catch “something big enough to eat you,”<sup>3</sup> which was duly found in the 14-foot tiger shark killed off the coast of Queensland. However, soon after the shark’s installation, the poorly preserved specimen began to disintegrate. As early as 1993, the Saatchi gallery gutted the shark and stretched its skin over a fiberglass mold in a somewhat

unsuccessful restoration effort. At least Hirst wasn't satisfied with the attempt: "You could tell it wasn't real. It had no weight."<sup>4</sup> Thus, when Hirst learned of Saatchi's impending sale of the piece to Steven Cohen in 2004 for an estimated \$8 million, he convinced the new buyer to underwrite a replacement shark for the relatively "inconsequential" cost of some hundred thousand dollars. When Hirst finally obtained a comparable specimen in 2006 – a 25-30 year old 13-foot female – he employed the professional assistance of Oliver Crimmen, a scientist and fish curator at London's Natural History Museum, in an effort to at least more closely approximate the physical impossibility of death in the mind of someone living. Hirst entertained the question of whether the replacement of the shark would result in a different artwork. While admitting that "the jury will be out for a long time to come," he answered for himself in the affirmative: "I come from a conceptual art background, so I think it should be the intention. It's the same piece."<sup>5</sup>

Hirst provides a postmodern installation of the art of animality, but it quite literally drips with the rich and sickly paradoxes that riddle the modernist aestheticization of the animal, which is this chapter's central concern. On the one hand, the real and weighty body of the animal is all: the fiberglass mold of the shark cannot constitute art – it has no weight – only the flesh itself. On the other hand, this shark or that shark, male or female, caught by this fisherman or that fisherman, from the coasts of Queensland or the waters of the Thames, if it were only possible: it wouldn't matter, as the concept is what counts. And this concept of the animal, for Hirst, has two faces: the primal and powerful jaws of the shark, suspending the possibility of death and decay (at least conceptually) within a bath of formaldehyde solution; and the severed and putrid head of a cow, rife with maggots. In other words, Hirst construes the animal as the embodiment of primeval power, on the one hand, as the emblem of earthly decay, on the other. For the artist, what unites these divergent presentations of the animal is a surprisingly unpretentious

amazement on the part of his audience. As he articulates his aesthetic on his official website, “I always thought it would be great if art galleries were more like the Natural History Museum (London), where you go in and there’s this big wow factor, rather than having to ask yourself, ‘What am I supposed to be thinking?’”<sup>6</sup> Art should be seen as a spectacle, for Hirst, and this spectacle is readily found in the animal. Perhaps the artist’s plump pocketbook is not unrelated to this fare-friendly philosophy.

But I may be getting ahead of myself. It is hard not to swim away with such a juicy morsel. It will be the work of this chapter to make sense of the complicated relationships between the spectacle of the animal and the aestheticization of animality, the abstract and the concrete dimensions of the animal body within the cultural form or forum, and the materialization of this body as alternately vital, primordial, and magnetic, on the one hand, and moribund, corrupt, and abject, on the other. Hirst’s postmodern aesthetic usefully turns its mechanisms into a thematic, luring these riddles to the surface for us to see, but arguably, Hirst’s inheritance is modernist primitivism. For if Hirst’s art, as Steven Baker suggests, is a manner of becoming animal,<sup>7</sup> he shares the aesthetic of many modernists whose work long antedates the formation of the Young British Artists group or the contributions of French poststructuralist theory. According to Baker, strangely enough, “there was no modern animal, no modernist animal,”<sup>8</sup> yet alone a modernist animal equal to the Deleuzian becomings that Baker tracks through the contemporary art world. However, I am not alone in finding a number of antecedents for what Baker corrals as “the postmodern animal,” or an aesthetic of becoming-animal that interrogates the existence of truth, the self-possession of the subject, and most foundationally, the dualism of the human and the animal.

A number of scholars have recently found such an animal within modernist literature, in particular. Dana Seitler, for instance, has contended that modernist representations of atavism often serve to disrupt the project of liberal humanism, more specifically, “the principles of rationality and sovereignty” that necessitate “the age-old separation of nature and culture.”<sup>9</sup> Carrie Rohman has similarly argued that the figure of the animal “profoundly threatens the sovereignty of the Western subject ... in modernist literature,”<sup>10</sup> sometimes with great anxiety, but often to advance an “antirationalist recuperation of animality.”<sup>11</sup> More recently, Glenn Willmott has suggested that “modern animalism” refuses ideologies of bourgeois wealth to reimagine abundance as “neither measureable by nor yielded by consumer production,” and pertaining rather to welfare and biodiversity.<sup>12</sup> In each of these readings, the modernist reclamation of the animal is invariably credited with resistance to dominant ideologies of bourgeois personhood and property. Even as I draw productively from these scholars, this essay resists the reading tendency that often appears at the nexus of modernist studies and critical animal studies. As this chapter will show, many modernist imaginings of becoming-animal are neither affirmative of animal life nor ultimately emancipatory for human lives. Nor is the emergence of modernist primitivism conceivable apart from the development of the capitalist relations that it ostensibly opposes.

A central assertion of this chapter, in fact, is that there is a co-constitutive relationship between a distinctly modernist articulation of the primitive and the popularization of mass entertainments involving animals. Within the parameters of new modernist studies, this insight contributes to the erosion of the perceived boundaries between “popular culture” and “high art” that modernist forms often promulgated.<sup>13</sup> To explore the origins of modernist primitivism within the animal entertainment industry is not simply a question of aesthetics, however, but also an

investigation of what Walter Benjamin calls the aestheticization of politics. Indeed, this chapter argues that the aestheticization of politics might as properly be termed the *animalization of politics*, as the animal plays a central role in the spectral reemergence of the aura in the age of mechanical reproducibility.

To elaborate: this chapter proposes that the animalization of politics is integrally bound up with the commodification of animal life, particularly in the context of the commercial spectacle, within which the animal becomes an abstract image available for utopian investment. Through a close engagement with Walter Benjamin's theories of commodity fetishism, this chapter shows how the (specious) freedom ascribed to animal existence within animal entertainments (and modernist art forms) actually derives from the fetishization of the commodity. Further, this chapter shows how the animal simultaneously lends a substitutive aura to the mass entertainment (as well as the modernist text), replacing the historical testimony with the pretense of prehistory, the historical trace with the biological substrate, in the age of mechanical reproducibility. Importantly, as this chapter demonstrates how the aura is constitutively animal, it suggests that the aura is constitutively racial, given the animal's role in the signification of racial meaning. As the following discussion will show, new forms of animal entertainment contributed to the emergence of a double discourse of racial nationalism, which simultaneously summons the nation's pre-cultural past and expunges the nation's racial and sexual others. As this chapter illuminates the production of the primitive and the discourse of degeneration in the context of the animal culture industry, it posits the modern spectacle of the animal as part of the conditions of possibility for the rise of European fascism while illuminating the interwar articulation of racial nationalism in the American cultural imagination.

The contributory animal entertainments range from the aquarium to the zoo, although in this chapter, I attend specifically to the bullfight and the circus, exploring the historical significance of these cultural practices in relationship to Ernest Hemingway's *Death in the Afternoon* (1932) and Djuna Barnes's *Nightwood* (1936), respectively. Admittedly, these texts are not obvious choices for the line of inquiry adumbrated above, for the first is very seldom discussed as an exemplar of the modernist aesthetic, and the second is less an instantiation of modernist primitivism than an engagement with its far-reaching cultural ramifications. And Hemingway and Barnes would seem to have little else than the ubiquity of the animal in their works in common. However, this seemingly strained juxtaposition shows two distinctive dealings with the emergence of the animal entertainment industry, and further, with the aestheticization/animalization of politics that this emergence facilitated. While Hemingway's aesthetic most often relies upon and replicates the beastly aura of the animal spectacle, albeit with some ambivalence when confronted with its fascist appropriations, Barnes crafts an alternative art of animality that disputes the animalization of politics and so opens the way for us to politicize the animal.

### **From the Slaughterhouse to Smyrna**

In the first few paragraphs of *Death in the Afternoon* (1932), Ernest Hemingway's treatise on the bullfight, the reader meets an unexpected admittance. Before he had attended the corridos de toros himself, Hemingway recalls, Gertrude Stein's expressed enthusiasm for the bullfight was unintelligible to him:

I had just come from the Near East, where the Greeks broke the legs of their baggage and transport animals and drove and shoved them off the quay into the shallow water when

they abandoned the city of Smyrna, and I remember saying that I did not like the bullfights because of the poor horses.<sup>14</sup>

Hemingway's expressed concern for "the poor horses" might well model the transformation from humane condemnation to aesthetic appreciation of the bullfight for the benefit of the uninitiated. Yet arguably, the maiming of the transport animals during the Greco-Turkish war undergoes no such narrative redemption. Hemingway wrote a fictionalized account of the incident at Smyrna as an "Introduction by the Author" to the 1930 edition of *In Our Time* (1925), temporarily pausing his work on *DIA* in order to do so. As the sardonic voice of an emotionally anesthetized British military official recalls the "pleasant business," the "mules with their forelegs broken pushed over into the shallow water" evidences the bankruptcy of Western ideas of "civilization," the inadequacy of linguistic representation to the events of the twentieth century, but most pertinently for this discussion: a somewhat surprising authorial – if not narratorial – repugnance for what happened on the quay at Smyrna.<sup>15</sup> Surprising, in the first place, because the disquieting representation of the animals' maiming, however fleeting, seems an odd intrusion into the introduction for a collection of short stories, yet alone a treatise on the bullfight. Surprising in the main because we are speaking about Hemingway, after all, and the glorified killing of the animal is the quintessential drama of the Hemingway text, whether the stage is one of hunting, fishing, or bullfighting.

Indeed, within critical animal studies scholarship, Ernest Hemingway's name sounds almost synonymously with anthropocentrism. *DIA* has drawn a great deal of this discussion, as it offers Hemingway's most sustained meditation on the bullfight. For many scholars, the text instantiates how the concept of "the human" obfuscates and even necessitates the suffering of animals. Margo Norris, for example, has argued that *DIA* "epitomizes the anthropocentric ...

suppression of Nature” upon which “the Western tradition has founded culture and art.”<sup>16</sup> The killing of the bull, in her reading, represents for Hemingway the triumph of human rationality over materiality and the transcendence of human art over embodied existence. Cary Wolfe similarly claims that Hemingway’s bullfight secures masculine authority and white supremacy through the ritual of animal sacrifice: the bullfight purifies “the subject of that pathological *material* aspect that ties it to the world of the Freudian animal,” and Jake Barnes thus attains the phallus, if not the penis.<sup>17</sup> In perceiving how masculinity does not necessarily hinge upon the body sexed as male in Hemingway’s text, Wolfe exemplifies a critical posture assumed by many scholars since the work of Mark Spilka, Robert Scholes, and Nancy Comley in the late 80s and early 90s.<sup>18</sup> If critics have long complicated a straightforward reading of Hemingway’s construction of masculinity, however, Hemingway’s representation of the human-animal encounter still often reads as a case study in the sacrificial economy of modern humanism.

Yet Hemingway’s *DIA* cannot be adequately explained using this heuristic. For *DIA* configures the bullfight as a form of human identification with rather than differentiation from the animal, envisioning an immanent relationship to the non-human world rather than transcendence over embodied existence. And Hemingway’s contestation of the violence of modern humanism is nowhere more apparent than in the chapter of *DIA* entitled “A Natural History of the Dead,” which vividly paints a number of grotesque scenes of war. The chapter impugns rational thought and technological advancement as the condition for the scenes it surveys, from the carnage resulting from the explosion of a munitions factory to the cruelties attending the medical treatment of the wounded. Hemingway is hardly singular in this regard. As critics from Paul Fussell to Modris Eksteins have argued, WWI painfully discredited the modern meliorist myth, occasioning a shift in public consciousness that was manifest in cultural

production ranging from war memoirs to modernist art.<sup>19</sup> Whether or not one accepts these scholars' positioning of WWI as *the* watershed between liberal myths and modernist disillusionment, Hemingway's "Natural History" clearly shows the erosion of liberal certainties by the rationalization of madness and industrialization of destruction.

Leading the reader through the nightmare of mechanized combat, the narrative adopts the perspective of an objective observer, who exhibits a thoroughgoing obtuseness instead of any especial insight. Parodying scientific investigation, the narrator makes a series of sound empirical observations that succeed in missing the point entirely:

In war the dead are usually the male of the human species although this does not hold true with animals, and I have frequently seen dead mares among the horses. An interesting aspect of war, too, is that it is only there that the naturalist has an opportunity to observe the death of mules. In twenty years of observation in civil life I had never seen a dead mule and had begun to entertain doubts as to whether these animals were really mortal.<sup>20</sup>

The narrator's attempt to arrive at some conclusion concerning the dead is as ludicrous as the belief in the immortality of mules, simply because one has never seen one die. While Susan Beegel argues that "Natural History" denies the literary humanist's investment of nature with Christian meaning by "dealing exclusively in 'the facts themselves,'" <sup>21</sup> I would argue the chapter demonstrates the insufficiency of fact as well as the "obscenity of abstraction." As Vincent Sherry has explored, the Great War became a crucible for literary modernism's challenge to liberal rationalism not only because wartime technological advancements accelerated the loss of life, but also because public discourse nonetheless "attempted to rationalize and support" such horrific events, revealing anew the discrepancies between Enlightenment ideals and the lived

realities that proceeded from them.<sup>22</sup> So too, the empirical investigation of death in “Natural History” egregiously fails to appreciate unfathomable loss.

As the passage quoted above illustrates, in its panoramic display of the wartime dead, “Natural History” frequently highlights non-human animal death. Among other scenes, the reader encounters the pack animals drowning in the shallow water at Smyrna (for the third time in Hemingway’s oeuvre), the mule carcasses deposited at the declivities of mountain roads during the Austrian offensive, and the dying of rabbits and cats. On the one hand, through the narrative rumination on the deaths of animals, the chapter highlights what the narrator explicitly states: that “most men die like animals, not men.”<sup>23</sup> In other words, “Natural History” shows human as well as animal existence to be material, embodied, and contingent. On the other hand, Hemingway casts the animal in a historical as well as a figurative role: if most men die like animals, this statement implies the manner of killing as much as the manner of dying.

The routinized slaughter of human beings within mechanized warfare had its historical precedent in the modern abattoir, as Daniel Pick among others has argued. With the construction of the slaughterhouse at La Villette during Haussmann’s renovation of Paris and the building of the Union Stockyards of Chicago in the 1860s, “a hitherto inconceivably rationalized and industrialized processing of meat” set the stage for the systematic mechanization of human death.<sup>24</sup> Arguably, the juxtaposition of human and animal dead in “Natural History” draws this same historical relationship. We might read Hemingway’s recurring use of slaughterhouse metaphors for the battlefield, too, as not simply metaphoric. Consider, for instance, an oft-quoted passage from *A Farewell to Arms* (1929), which instances the prevalent motif of butchery in Hemingway’s war fiction:

I had seen nothing sacred, and the things that were glorious had no glory and the sacrifices were like the stockyards at Chicago if nothing was done with the meat except to bury it. There were many words that you could not stand to hear and finally only the names of places had dignity. Certain numbers were the same way and certain dates and these with the names of the places were all you could say and have them mean anything. Abstract words such as glory, honor, courage, or hallow were obscene beside the concrete names of villages, the numbers of roads, the names of rivers, the numbers of regiments and the dates.<sup>25</sup>

If “abstract words such as glory, honor, courage, or hallow” are “obscene beside concrete names” for Lieutenant Henry, this is because “the sacrifices were like the stockyards at Chicago if nothing was done with the meat except to bury it.” Arguably, this likening intends no simile, but rather names the industrial slaughter of animals as a historical precedent for the twentieth century’s assembly line of human death.

For Hemingway, the bullfight affords an anti-modern antidote to the horrors he describes in “A Natural History of the Dead.” As Peter Messent among others has argued, the bullfight evokes a pre-modern existence that is “coherent and organic,”<sup>26</sup> rather than fragmented and mechanized. Hemingway thus pits the primitive ritual of the bullfight against the “grotesque forms of death that mark modern warfare.”<sup>27</sup> As the following discussion will show, however, this contestation of the violence of modern rationalism is itself a legitimization of violence, if, terrifyingly, not rationally.

### **The Autonomous Animal**

In an important ethnography of the Spanish bullfight, Garry Marvin argues that its significance lies in the “subordination and ‘culturalizing’ of nature.”<sup>28</sup> Although bullfighting is a

confrontation with untamed nature, its outcome is the eventual depletion of the bull's bodily strength by the matador's intelligence, which reinforces "the fundamental distinction in the arena ... between human and animal."<sup>29</sup> Yet Hemingway's representation of the bullfight, to the contrary, invests the spectacle with a diametrically opposed meaning: the bullfight signifies not the overcoming but the reclamation of human animality. The matador is likened to an animal, as when Hemingway comments that "there was always a wolf look about [Juan] Belmonte,"<sup>30</sup> one of the greatest bullfighters of the golden age. Further, the greatness of a matador does not necessarily inhere in his technical skill – a "trick of the wrist, eye, and managing of the left hand"<sup>31</sup> – but in his animalistic exuberance in the exercise of violence: "[a] great killer must love to kill."<sup>32</sup> And the death of the animal, "the emotional, aesthetic, and artistic climax" of the fight, hardly signifies the distinction of the human, as in that moment "man and bull *form one figure* as the sword goes all the way in ... death *uniting the two figures*."<sup>33</sup> Thus the killing of the bull conveys less the repudiation of animal nature or the reaffirmation of the human-animal divide than the becoming-animal of the human or the suspension of the human-animal distinction.

Crucially, however, the animality recuperated through the bullfight is of a different brand than is found in the stockyards of Chicago. Embedded within *DIA*, "A Natural History of the Dead" intends a stark contrast between the wild bull killed by the sword and the stock animal intended for the slaughterhouse. Hemingway's representation of fighting bulls highlights the animal's insubordination rather than instrumentalization for human benefit. For instance, *DIA* reviews a number of bullfights catalogued in *Toros Célebres* (1908), a Spanish reference book that relays the feats of notable bulls. As Nancy Bredendick notes, in discussing six of the fifteen hundred bulls featured in *Toros Célebres*, Hemingway dwells upon "the more bizarre and barbarous moments" of the book, in which bulls leap over the barrera or gore random

spectators.<sup>34</sup> While Bredendick believes that Hemingway means to contrast the anecdotes from *Toros Célebres* unfavorably with the ideal of the well-ordered corridos de toros, the lengthy narrative indulgence in these sensationalistic stories suggests they actually convey the essence of the ideal animal, if not the model bullfight. Indeed, the discussion of *Toros Célebres* closes with a disquisition on the exemplary bull, defined as “a wild animal whose greatest pleasure is combat and which will accept combat offered to it in any form, or will take up anything it believes to be an offer of combat,”<sup>35</sup> regardless of any outcome.

Hemingway’s representation of the unruly animal in the bullring marks an emergent cultural construction of animality that departs markedly from earlier imaginings of even violent animality. In his examination of the Darwinian-Freudian “discourse of the jungle,” Michael Lundblad argues the cultural construction of animality ascendant during the Progressive era was “‘naturally’ violent in the name of survival, and heterosexual in the name of reproduction.”<sup>36</sup> Philip Armstrong reads Hemingway’s representation of the animal along these lines, arguing Hemingway’s appropriation of “the revitalizing energy” of the animal amounts to a revitalization of the ideology of competitive individualism, which affirms violent struggle as “the fundamental law of both human and non-human nature.”<sup>37</sup> Yet the animal depicted in *DIA* defies any “fundamental law,” even that of violent struggle for survival. Rather than appealing to the inevitability of instinctual violence to legitimate the depredations of industrial capitalism, Hemingway opposes the alienation of capitalist relations by appropriating the violence attributed to animal existence, which appears less an expression of natural law than an expression of absolute freedom.

Instead of reading Hemingway’s representation of the bullfight as an authorization of an unfettered pursuit of commercial interests, then, I suggest that the bullfight is meant to represent

an economy alternative to the capitalist economy as well as an assertion of human freedom irreducible to capitalist accumulation. In order to elucidate the alternative economy represented by the bullfight in *DIA*, I would like to invoke Hemingway's contemporary, Georges Bataille, who was an appreciative reader of Hemingway,<sup>38</sup> and whose ideas of general economy depart significantly from the sacrificial economy of Western subjectivity with which we began this discussion. For Bataille, as for many of his contemporaries, the imperatives of productive labor and the accumulation of surplus value jeopardize human freedom, as the primacy of utility, rationality, and normality excludes everything that is "heterogeneous" to those aims and subsumes all human action to those ends. However, Bataille departs from the work of the Frankfurt school, for instance, in that he describes human alienation not only as a historical condition of industrial capitalism but also as a result of a trans-historical human-animal divide. And instead of describing the negative fate of the human will to knowledge in the dialectic of enlightenment, Bataille imagines a possible dialectic of autonomy, routed through the animal, which ultimately arrives at human sovereignty.

In the origin story that Bataille constructs, the "animal is in the world like water in water."<sup>39</sup> In other words, animal existence is characterized by continuity with the natural world, and the "passage from animal to man" is marked by the refutation of this immanent existence through the creation of tools and the establishment of prohibitions. The assertion of human autonomy from the natural given thus achieved, however, is radically undermined from the very beginning. According to Bataille, the transformation of the natural world through work and the overcoming of physiological processes through repudiation endangers even as it aims to express human sovereignty. Bataille describes the resulting "reversal of alliances" in this way: as that which expressed human autonomy is experienced as human enslavement, animal nature, "which

a spirit of revolt had rejected as the given, cease[s] to appear as such” and becomes instead an object of desire.<sup>40</sup> Paradoxically, the human regains humanity only in the recuperation of animality. In Bataille’s thought, this recuperation takes the form of expenditure: a word reserved for human activity that refuses utilitarian justification. Bataille names a number of things that exemplify this “principle of loss” and thus gain a measure of human freedom: “luxury, mourning, war, cults ... games, spectacles, arts, [and] perverse sexual activity.”<sup>41</sup> In his pornographic novella, *Story of the Eye*, Bataille presents the bullfight as an exemplary form of expenditure: a spectacle, an art, and an act of violence. The exercise of animalistic violence, in fact, seems the paradigmatic example of expenditure in Bataille’s thought, for nothing demonstrates the “principle of loss” better than violent destruction without end, of which the animal is both the exemplary subject and the consummate object.

Bataille’s idea of expenditure usefully underscores the vastly different significance of this mode of becoming-animal from the forms of “primitive accumulation” explored in the third chapter of this dissertation. Instead of legitimating the violent appropriation of the means of production and the unrestricted exploitation of the forces of production, Bataille’s recuperation of violent animality intends (if it does not necessarily accomplish) the radical repudiation of capitalist accumulation. Instead of coding animalistic violence as the ineluctable expression of “natural” instinct, Bataille’s reclamation of animality countermands natural (as much as human) law, an insight easily yielded by attending to Bataille’s depiction of perversity in *Story of the Eye* and elsewhere. Rather than read Bataille’s animal as the self-evident sign of the pre-cultural past, then, equivalent to all expressions of anti-modern sentiment, I want to account for its historical specificity. Both Bataille and Hemingway source their representations of sovereign animal/ity from the bullfight. Following their lead, the following discussion will show how the corridos de

toros is as much a production as an appearance of this peculiarly autonomous animality that gains ascendancy during the interwar years.

### **Another Natural History**

Although Hemingway and Bataille cast the bullfight as a primitive practice reaching back into time immemorial, the bullfight as we know it is a thoroughly modern phenomenon. While the bullfight was established by the medieval period, it was hardly recognizable as such by contemporary comparison, as the aristocracy used long lances to fight bulls entirely on horseback. It was not until the beginning of the eighteenth century that the arrival of the Bourbon dynasty in Spain and the new king's relative disinterest in the bullfight opened the practice to plebeians, who newly fought bulls on foot. Only in the mid-eighteenth century did Francisco Romero conceive of the technique of fighting bulls with the muleta, the scarlet cloth draped over a wooden stick, which is used to lead the bull through a series of passes in the final third of the fight. At the end of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, the bullfight underwent its most dramatic changes and achieved its present stylization, which interestingly, was correlative to its increased commercialization.<sup>42</sup> Beginning in the 1870s, the bullfighting poster materialized as a commercial art form, the cost of both fighting bulls and bullfighters' fees skyrocketed, and the number of bullfights performed and spectators attending these fights increased exponentially, developments that Adrian Schubert among others has documented. As this brief timeline of the materialization of the "timeless art" of the bullfight suggests, and as Shubert has argued at length, far from an archaic or atavistic practice, the modern bullfight emerged only as a form of commercialized mass leisure: a culture industry.<sup>43</sup>

In *DIA*, Hemingway often comments upon the commercial character of the bullfight. To invoke just a few examples: he asserts the authenticity of the bullfight has been adulterated by

the attempt to cater to the sensibilities of foreign tourists, who demand that horses be protected with padding to protect them from goring. Dramatizing the negotiation of the price of a horse between a horse contractor and a picador, the member of the bullfighting troupe who inserts pikes (or pike poles) into the bull's morillo (or shoulder muscle) from horseback, Hemingway declares: "you may have all the horse contractors I have ever met ... you may have all the bull ring servants too. They are the only people I have found in bullfighting that are brutalized by it."<sup>44</sup> While for Hemingway, the commercialization of the bullfight compromises the practice in its purity, I suggest that the emergence of the bullfight as a modern culture industry was actually productive of the sense of unspoiled "authenticity" that Hemingway finds there.

It may be difficult to perceive how the bullfight as a form of "mass culture" presents itself as a realm of restored authenticity while remaining within Horkheimer's and Adorno's classic understanding of the culture industry. For Horkheimer and Adorno, the culture industry ensures "the prolongation of work under late capitalism" by cultivating the habitus of the working class.<sup>45</sup> This analytic thus fails to describe the lived experience of the bullfight, which, far from accomplishing the repression of desire, affords a hypostasized realm of human freedom. In his influential article, "Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture," on the other hand, Frederic Jameson offers an alternative account of the ideological work of popular cultural forms. According to Jameson, "we cannot do justice to the ideological function of works like these unless we are willing to concede the presence within them of a more positive function as well: of what I will call, their Utopian or transcendent potential."<sup>46</sup> While Jameson's recognition of the popular cultural form's activation of "the deepest and most fundamental hopes and fantasies of the collectivity" is more descriptive of the bullfight than any account of the culture industry as an unambiguous enforcement of accommodation to existing relations of production, his account

leaves room for elaboration – specifically, of the *spectacle's* summoning of utopian longings and the *animal's* anchoring of authentic existence.

In order to better elucidate the lived experience of the spectacle of the animal, in particular, I turn to Walter Benjamin's theorization of commodity fetishism in the elliptical exposé of the projected *Arcades*, "Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth Century" (1935, 1939). Anticipating Jameson, Walter Benjamin conveys the character of the commodity as a representation of utopian longings, which are thereby expressed but never fulfilled. In the material culture of nineteenth-century Paris, the fetishism of the commodity may well alienate human beings as producers, but for the consumer, commodity fetishism often endows the commodity with the very freedom and promise of fulfillment proscribed by capitalist relations of production. In exploring the narcotic effects of commodity fetishism, Benjamin significantly extends the classic Marxian insight: that commodity fetishism makes social relations between persons appear as "socio-natural properties" of things.<sup>47</sup> For Benjamin suggests the fetishism of the commodity obscures not only the production of use values but also use values themselves: even the properties of things, so to speak. Benjamin writes that the world exhibitions "glorify the exchange value of commodities," such that the commodity's "intrinsic value is eclipsed."<sup>48</sup> Importantly, Benjamin associates the "glorification of exchange value" specifically with the nineteenth century's world exhibitions as well as the marketing of the *spécialité* or luxury item. For these representational goods – what Benjamin also frequently designates as phantasmagoria – are consumed *as* images, representations, or spectacles.

In reading Benjamin's account of modern phantasmagoria, we might gain greater insight into the cultural work of the commercial spectacle. As Susan Buck-Morss observes, as Benjamin attends to the "historical experience [of commodity fetishism] rather than an economic analysis

of capital,”<sup>49</sup> he finds “the key to the new urban phantasmagoria was not so much the commodity in the market as the commodity on display, where ... purely representational value came to the fore.”<sup>50</sup> Unsurprisingly, then, Guy Debord’s definitive analysis of “the society of the spectacle” markedly resembles Benjamin’s analysis of nineteenth century Paris. Just as Benjamin describes the world exhibitions’ “glorification” of exchange value and the obliteration of “intrinsic value,”<sup>51</sup> Debord suggests the society of the spectacle emerges when exchange value, which “could only have arisen as the proxy of use value,” establishes itself as “an autonomous power.”<sup>52</sup> Just as the cultural commodity offers the consumer a sense of liberation unavailable to the producer in Benjamin’s analysis, the spectacle invites “an outpouring of religious zeal in honor of ... [its] sovereign freedom” in Debord’s reading, as well.<sup>53</sup> Benjamin and Debord may periodize the commodity form’s complete “colonization of social life” differently,<sup>54</sup> but they both discern that the fetishism of the commodity obscures not only material social relations but also materiality in the more robust sense of physical matter. They both find this radical dematerialization at work within the phantasmagoric wares of the visual marketplace. And finally, the euphoria attending the “consumption” of the spectacle for both Benjamin and Debord would seem to hinge upon this crucial hollowing out of the material content of the object of display, so that it might be filled instead with the unfulfilled longings of the consumer.

But distinctively, as Benjamin explores the consumer culture of nineteenth-century Paris, those artifacts or milieus that cast a fetishistic glow upon the living body – fashion, film, and so forth – appear to pique his interest principally. Even cultural forms or forums that enmesh the animal body are often taken up in “Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth Century.” For instance, Benjamin invokes the caricaturist J. J. Grandville, whose “fantasies extend the character of a commodity to the universe.”<sup>55</sup> The immediate referent in this passage is an image from *Un Autre*

*Monde* (1844) in which the rings of Saturn are drawn as a cast-iron balcony. But of course, Grandville is most famous for *Les Métamorphoses du jour* (1828–29), a series of seventy lithographs in which human bodies wear animal faces that caricature (typically bourgeois) comportment within a number of quotidian scenarios. Grandville’s mention thus raises the question of the animal’s subjection to “the enthronement of the commodity,” which Benjamin identifies as Grandville’s “secret theme.”<sup>56</sup> The fetishism of animal life is more directly broached in the 1939 version of the essay, where Benjamin proceeds to discuss Grandville’s “literary counterpart,” the French naturalist Alphonse Toussenel, whose “zoology classifies the animal world according to the rule of fashion.”<sup>57</sup> Benjamin wields these examples to underscore the crucial point that commodity fetishism is “in conflict with the organic,”<sup>58</sup> hence the commodification of organic life essentially “couples the living body to the inorganic world.”<sup>59</sup> To trace Benjamin’s insight here in thicker outline: when extended to the living body, commodity fetishism obscures not just material relations of labor, nor simply the material properties or uses of objects, but also the material contingencies of life itself.

Thinkers from Theodor Adorno to Susan Buck-Morss have likened Benjamin’s description of the “inorganic world” to Georg Lukács’s idea of “second nature,” which is first introduced in *Theory of the Novel* (1920) and described in great detail (if not always designated as such) as the result of reification in *History and Class Consciousness* (1923). According to Lukács, “second nature” is the world fully created by humans that presents itself as “natural” and inevitable and so turns into “a prison instead of a parental home.”<sup>60</sup> While Benjamin would certainly concur with Lukács’s insistence that there is no ontological given that surpasses historical transformation, his perception of “inorganic nature” actually points towards the inverse of the problem that Lukács identifies in the second nature of reified subjectivity: rather than the

ideological conceptualization of human history or human social relations as an inevitable unfolding of natural law, “inorganic nature” is the ideological imagining of human history or human social relations as an overcoming of “the natural.” On the one hand, Benjamin recognized the radical potential of what Buck-Morss coins as “new nature,” or “the entire world of matter (including human beings) as it had been transformed by ... technology.”<sup>61</sup> As Buck-Morss writes, this “new nature” represents “real progress at the level of the means of production” in Benjamin’s thinking, as it opens new possibilities for fulfilling needs and desires, even as the realization of this potential would require the complete overthrowing of capitalist relations of production.<sup>62</sup> On the other hand, and crucially, “inorganic nature” is only a fallacious form of “new nature” in Benjamin’s thinking, for it accomplishes the derealization rather than the transformation of the natural world. This imagining of a human “nature” unfettered by material contingencies and constraints is the bastion of the historical myth of teleological progress, and the source of the giddy sense of human freedom that is only the appearance of actual liberation.


The fetishization of the organic world transforms the nature of nature. But it also alters the character of the commodity. In discussing the commodity’s ability to conjure forth the “wishful fantasies” that obscure “the inchoateness of the social product and the deficiencies in the social system of production,”<sup>63</sup> Benjamin suggests the wishful fantasies of an ideal future world often invoke “a distant or past world.”<sup>64</sup> The utopian longings for the future are referred to a primeval past: “elements from prehistory” that might banish the insufficiencies of the present moment from the mind. While the resulting wish image has revolutionary potential insofar as it expresses a desire for social utopia, as Buck-Morss rightly notes, to the extent that it lodges the utopian dream in mythic nature, the longing for an alternative futurity founders on the worship of an irrecoverable past. The image of organic nature has the effect of obliterating the commercial

character of the display within which it appears, and thus becomes the source of a false sense of totality, which is obtained not through the critical comprehension of complex social material processes but through the uncritical imagining of natural processes untouched by human hands.

The synergy of the spectacle and the “natural” explains the paradoxical summoning of a nature that is both a sign of human sovereignty and a realm of restored immanency. On the one hand, the commercial spectacle invests organic life with an autonomous existence consequent to the commodity form’s abstraction from even matter itself. On the other hand, organic nature coats the commodity form with a veneer of authenticity, banishing its commercial character from the mind. To sum up the implications of this discussion, we might simply say that Benjamin’s *Passagen-Werk* shows how commodity fetishism eclipses the natural life of history as well as the historicity of natural life. The task of historical materialism, then, is to elucidate the interweaving of history and nature through another “natural history,” a phrase first introduced in Benjamin’s *Trauerspiel* study. As Adorno explains Benjamin’s thinking in “The Idea of Natural History,” a lecture given in 1932 at a meeting of the Frankfurt chapter of the Kant Society, “the basic quality of the transience of the earthly signifies nothing but just such a relationship between nature and history: all being or everything existing is to be grasped as the interweaving of historical and natural being.”<sup>65</sup> Far from subsuming nature under history or history under nature, the idea of natural history “means that elements of nature and history are not fused with each other, rather they break apart and interweave at the same time in such a fashion that the natural appears as a sign for history and history, where it seems to be most historical, appears as a sign for nature.”<sup>66</sup> On the one hand, Benjamin conceives of history as conditioned by “natural” processes of mortification and decay, which as Beatrice Hanssen writes, “radically undermined Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment conceptions of human history, anchored in categories of

human freedom and historical teleology.”<sup>67</sup> On the other hand, Benjamin understands nature as “historical,” and thus the same material transiency and contingency that undermines claims to human transcendence also holds forth the possibility for the transformational mediation of matter, on which the hope of a classless society depends.

Through the work of historical materialism, natural history and historical nature are revealed. This revelation hinges upon the positioning of the commodity form within the charged force field between the past and the present, where it becomes newly legible as the dialectical image, yielding historical meaning and political insight in a “lightning flash” of truth. In describing the manifestation of the dialectical image, Susan Buck-Morss usefully maps four “physiognomic appearance[s]” or “contradictory faces” of the commodity form, two of which correspond to state of dreaming in her thinking – mythic history (phantasmagoria) and mythic nature – and two of which correspond to this moment of awakening – natural history and historical nature. To Buck-Morss’s perceptive identification and explication of these four appearances of the commodity form in Benjamin’s thinking, I’ve added the insight that the commodification of organic nature is crucial to the conjuring of mythic nature. Further, I want to suggest that the dual character of the commodity form structures the “physiognomic appearances” of the commodity form. The following diagram, slightly adapted from Buck-Morss, represents the presentation of the commodity in both its abstract and concrete dimensions, from both the vantage of historical awakening and the standpoint of ideological slumber:



As this diagram attempts to represent, the modern phantasmagoria (bottom left) show themselves to be subject to the logic of decay through dialectical mediation: the mortification of inorganic nature or the remnant of technological “progress” in the ruin (top left) reveals its profoundly material character. The bourgeois imagining of the teleological progression of human history as an overcoming of nature is thereby reconfigured as an understanding of natural history, i.e., a consciousness of historical processes as bound up with natural processes. By the same token, the dialectical mediation of mythic nature (bottom right) dispels its timeless presentation: the perception of the historical trace (top right) in the material object reveals its undeniably historical character. The imagining of an authentic sphere of natural life untouched by human manipulation or human imprint is thereby reconfigured as an understanding of historical nature, i.e., a

consciousness of natural processes as bound up with historical processes. As the unveiling of the commodity's two faces within capitalist relations is represented by the vertical axis of this diagram, the inner "truth" behind these ideological masks are represented by the diagonal axis: thus from the phantasmagoric imagining of a world freed from material contingencies and constraints, we might excavate the promise of a world that if material, is nonetheless makeable. From the worship of a mythic nature untouched by modern forms of alienation, we might unearth the earthliness of human existence. These are the truths that the dialectical image sparks in the electrified field between the past and the present.

### **Beastly Auras**

From the vantage of Benjamin's analysis of commodity fetishism, the consumption of animal life within modern spectacles including but not limited to the bullfight – one might also explore the zoo, the circus, even the national park – would have fundamentally transformed the nature of animal nature. If Benjamin is correct, we might well read the freedom that Hemingway attributes to or derives from the animal as a function of commodity fetishism: an abstraction from the material body that presents as autonomous existence. In this case, the emergence of the autonomous animal is ironically consequential to the complete colonization of the animal by the commodity form. In other words, the sense of escape the animal offers from the iron cage of capitalism is actually a function of the animal's capture by consumer culture. The animal's ostensive negation of instrumentalization stems from the instrumental use of the animal's representation. The animal's apparent autonomy derives from the erasure of the animal's interspecies interdependencies and historical roles.

The ubiquity of the autonomous animal within modernist art suggests that such forms are productive of the remaking of modern animality, but more foundationally, that the commercial

spectacle is productive of the modernist aesthetic itself, especially those modernist modes of abstraction upon which the claim to aesthetic autonomy depends. Indeed, Benjamin identifies an analogous relationship between the specious freedom of the commodity and the ostensible autonomy of the artwork. “The solemnity with which [the autonomous artwork] ... is celebrated,” Benjamin asserts, “is the corollary to the frivolity that glorifies the commodity,” since both the commodity and the artwork “abstract from the social existence of man.”<sup>68</sup> In other words, commodification is actually constitutive of the idea of aesthetic autonomy that would define itself precisely in opposition to the marketplace, while this aesthetic replicates the commodity fetishism’s mystification of social relations. For example, *DIA* reproduces the bullfight’s abstraction from the material existence of the animal in its own right. A number of critics have observed *DIA*’s aesthetic of excess, which contrasts markedly with Hemingway’s typical restraint, and which manifests in the generic heterogeneity of the text as well as in the superfluity of the prose. Even as Hemingway expatiates upon the dignified movement of the iceberg and excoriates the writer who will put in a good “phrase ... or simile ... where it is not absolutely necessary,”<sup>69</sup> he indulges in metaphor-laden, convoluted sentences in *DIA*. Consider the description of Cagancho the matador:

Cagancho is a gypsy, subject to fits of cowardice, altogether without integrity, who violates all the rules, written and unwritten, for the conduct of a matador but who, when he receives a bull that he has confidence in and he has confidence in them very rarely, can do things which all bullfighters do in a way they have never been done before and sometimes standing absolutely straight with his feet still, planted as though he were a tree, with the arrogance and grace that gypsies have and of which all other arrogance and grace seems an imitation, moves the cape spread full as the pulling jib of a yacht before

the bull's muzzle so slowly that the art of bullfighting, which is only kept from being one of the major arts because it is impermanent, in the arrogant slowness of his veronicas becomes, for the seeming minutes that they endure, permanent.<sup>70</sup>

This sentence is worth quoting in full, if only to give a visual representation of the proliferation of syntactic units and the use of two ornamental similes: Cagancho's feet are still "as though he were a tree" and his cape is spread "as the pulling job of a yacht before the bull." As Hemingway himself observes, "That is the worst sort of flowering writing," yet he maintains that it is "necessary to try to give the feeling," expressing doubts that "a simple statement of the method" will do.<sup>71</sup>

Perhaps this is Hemingway at his worst writing. Or perhaps this is Hemingway at his most modernist. As Thomas Strychacz argues, Hemingway's use of language in *DIA* stresses its "fundamentally metaphorical" character, "perpetually in need of supplemental translation."<sup>72</sup> Dropping the dead weight of the referent, Hemingway departs markedly from the aesthetic more characteristic of his larger oeuvre, wherein "language seems to have a clear and unequivocal ability to name things apprehended in a non-textual world."<sup>73</sup> In abandoning the synecdochal certainty of the iceberg for the free play of linguistic meaning, Hemingway revels in what we might read as a variant of modernist abstraction. In one memorable passage, for instance, the narrator ruminates on the bull's goading of the horses, pronouncing the scene to be comic, for the horses "are so unlike horses; in some ways they are like birds," specifically, like "awkward birds such as the adjutants or the wide-billed storks."<sup>74</sup> The horses are successively compared with adjutants, storks, and pelicans, before the metaphorization escalates into a catachrestic climax:

There is certainly nothing comic by our standards in seeing an animal emptied of its visceral content, but if this animal instead of doing something tragic, that is dignified,

gallops in a stiff old-maidish fashion around a ring trailing the opposite of clouds of glory it is as comic when what is trailing is real as when the Fratellinis give a burlesque of it in which the viscera are represented by rolls of bandages, sausages, and other things.<sup>75</sup>

The passage builds metaphor upon metaphor, comparing the bird-like horse to a stiff old maid, whose (horse-like-bird-like-maid-like) viscera is likened to the opposite of clouds of glory, an inverted image then referred to “bandages, sausages, and other things” – themselves representations of the viscera in the ring. The catachrestic representation of the horse succeeds in eclipsing the animal’s excruciating pain, even to the point of rendering the horse’s disemboweling a source of comic relief. The comic relief of the horse’s evisceration is correlative to the absolute freedom of the bull’s violence: both the freedom from pain and the freedom of violence derive from the obfuscation of the animal’s material existence.

On the one hand, the spectacle of the bullfight invests the animal with an autonomous existence consequent to the commodity form’s abstraction of material existence. On the other hand, the animal coats the commodity form with a veneer of authenticity. What I specifically want to highlight here is the proximity of this sense of authenticity to the Benjaminian concept of the aura, which typically inheres in the artwork or ritual object. As Hemingway describes the experience of the commercial spectacle, it creates “an ecstasy ... as profound as any religious ecstasy.”<sup>76</sup> The complete faena transports the crowd as the matador leads the bull “in a growing ecstasy of ordered, formal, passionate, increasing disregard for death that leaves you, when it is over, ... as empty, as changed and as sad as any major emotion will leave you.”<sup>77</sup> Far from linking this profound emotion to the debasement of the crowd’s critical faculty, however, Hemingway maintains “the emotion and spiritual intensity” of the bullfight is the “real thing.”<sup>78</sup> “Bullfighting is not a sport,” Hemingway argues in his first journalism on the subject: “It is a

tragedy. A very great tragedy.”<sup>79</sup> He often describes the bullfight as a kind of theater. Alternately, he likens the bullfight to a form of impermanent sculpture: “I know no modern sculpture, except Brancusi’s, that is in any way the equal of the sculpture of modern bullfighting.”<sup>80</sup> Whether cast as theater or sculpture, performance or form, the bullfight figures first and foremost in *DIA* as an art, not a commercial spectacle.

Interestingly enough, Hemingway attributes the profound emotion inspired by the bullfight less to the formal perfection of the matador’s maneuvers than to the bodily life and death of the animal: “the death administered to the animal ... [makes] it possible.”<sup>81</sup> When Hemingway writes of the matador, “he is performing a work of art and he is playing with death,” the conjunctive should be read not as additive but as indicative of an integral connection between the artistry of the bullfight and the death of the animal. If the matador is a sculptor, the animal is the clay. At times, Hemingway even describes the bull as “a canvas or ... marble.”<sup>82</sup> The bull is further compared to a kind of instrument, upon which “the bullfighter can play to the extent of his artistic ability as an organist can play on a pipe organ.”<sup>83</sup> In *DIA*, the artistry of the bullfight – what Benjamin would describe as the aura of the bullfight – appears to emanate from the body of the animal. Of course, Benjamin discusses the aura solely as an attribute of the artwork, but the animal as well as the work of art would seem to summon the absent presence of prehistory. Or in the case of the bullfight, the animal would seem to secure the “unique existence,” “historical trace,” and “ritualistic meaning” of the work of art, transforming a commodified form of entertainment into a profound encounter with the “real thing.”

One might argue the bullfight lends as much as borrows its aura from the animal. Yet this reading is forestalled by the fact that Hemingway similarly describes the animal as the medium

of “the real thing” in his writing, even though the production of writing and the performance of other arts would not seem to necessarily involve the animal in their actuation in the same way:

I was trying to write ... and I found the greatest difficulty, aside from knowing truly what you really felt, ... was to put down what really happened in action; what the actual things were which produced the emotion that you experienced ... but the real thing, the sequence of motion and fact which made the emotion and which would be as valid in a year or in ten years ... always, was beyond me.<sup>84</sup>

Hemingway marks his encounter with the bullfight as a point of arrival as a writer: the violent death of the animal somehow secures “what really happened” on the page, for what could be more real, what could be more simple? In this statement, Hemingway implies the authenticity of his art originates with the authenticity of the animal life he portrays. Or better, he implies the authenticity of his art derives from the animal death he enacts on page after page.

Crucially, then, Hemingway’s animal is a figure for the flesh. Put simply, animal life bodies forth the bare facticity of living and dying: the naked face of nature. Thus Hemingway stresses the importance of the fighting bull’s blood in a lengthy excursus on bull breeding in *DIA*: “when the blood that made the reputation of a breed goes thin ... then a breed ... is finished unless revived by a lucky and dangerous cross.”<sup>85</sup> Indeed, the bullfight is adulterated by the experience of the bull, who must have a “memory ... as clean as possible from any experience of bullfighting.”<sup>86</sup> Whenever experienced bulls are fought, according to Hemingway, the bullfight becomes “a very savage and primitive sport” that is “a long way from the ritual of the formal bullfight.”<sup>87</sup> Even when the inexperienced bull learns over the course of the fight to take up a *querencia*, or a point of relative protection to which the animal thus returns, the bullfight is diminished in Hemingway’s estimation. If an animal has established a *querencia*, he “is

inestimably more dangerous and almost impossible to kill.”<sup>88</sup> Yet the increased danger would seem somewhat secondary to the decreased resonance of the bull’s primordial meaning. As Hemingway asserts, “all of bullfighting is founded on ... [the bull’s] simplicity and his lack of experience.”<sup>89</sup> It is the “*fundamental premise*” of the bullfight that “the bull has never been in the ring before.”<sup>90</sup>

Given Hemingway’s emphasis upon the bull’s lack of experience and absence of memory, the animal’s “breath” of “authenticity” would seem to augur something different than the “historical trace,” even as it still secures “ritualistic meaning” or “authority.” Notably, Benjamin’s concept of the aura shows a similar rift in its sense, as the aura designates both that which withers in the age of mechanical reproduction and that which remains as a vestigial presence. As Alys Weinbaum clearly explicates:

Aura is initially associated with ‘historical testimony,’ ‘authority,’ and ‘authenticity.’ However, after first introducing the concept ... Benjamin continually returns to, augments, and reworks it so that aura eventually becomes associated not only with these attributes but also with the pretense of their presence, with their spectral effect. In other words, while aura initially names that which “withers” or “decays,” it later comes to name that which is artificially produced to replace or fill-in where a loss of “authority” or “authenticity” is identified or felt.<sup>91</sup>

Weinbaum proceeds to argue that “the concept of race that circulates in our supposedly post-racial times,” the invocation of race despite the obsolescence of race, effectively renders “biological race auratic each and every time it appears.”<sup>92</sup> According to Weinbaum, “aura and race in the present context are not simply analogous; rather, race has emerged as constitutively auratic within contemporary culture.”<sup>93</sup> I want to extend Weinbaum’s insight into the integral

relationship between aura and race to suggest that not only is race constitutively auratic in the present moment, but also aura is constitutively racial from the moment of its spectral resurgence in the age of mechanical reproducibility – and constitutively racial because constitutively animal. In other words, the animal often appears as the face of the aura's vestigial trace, which becomes evident within Hemingway's text itself. In upholding the pretense of the aura's presence, however, the animal substitutes the artwork's historical testimony with the absent presence of prehistory, the hand-made object with the image of unmade nature, the authenticity of the unique creation with the fleshliness of biological existence. In short, the animal supplements the historical trace with the biological substrate. It is exemption of "the animal" from historical and political meaning that best describes its governing political function, just as it is the insistence upon the artwork's autonomy from social and material processes that best describe its dominant modes of participation in them.

In "The Work of Art" essay, Benjamin cautions against the fascist aestheticization of politics. But in the fascist instrumentalization of the aura, one might equally describe an animalization of politics at work.<sup>94</sup> In Leni Riefenstahl's films, for example, the fascist invocation of mythic meaning relies upon the spectacle of the body, which both restores a semblance of organic community through the "biological substrate" of body, blood, and race, and endows that community with a sovereign right to violence without end. The relationship between the spectacle of the non-human animal body in the Spanish bullfight and the rise of fascism in Spain is no doubt more richly complicated than I am presently able to delineate. I only want to point out the plentiful evidence that suggests there *is* a relationship to be explored. The "golden age" of Spanish bullfighting corresponded to the years leading up to the Spanish Civil War, and during the struggle, Franco ensured the Andalusian bull ranches were husbanded to

their greatest potential. The bullfight was deployed as a Nationalist rallying cry so much that Republicans took to killing breeders and toreros: ““One less *torero*, one less fascist,”” read the *ABC* in 1938. And on May 24, 1939, the bullfight held in honor of the Nationalist victory was, as Elisabeth Hardouin-Fugier writes, “the apotheosis of all political bullfights,”<sup>95</sup> reverberating with Falangist anthems and nationalistic appeals.

At least one aficionado, however, became and remained an ardent anti-fascist: Ernest Hemingway himself. Hemingway covered the Spanish Civil War as a war correspondent for the North American Newspaper Alliance, and he soon rallied to the Republican cause. Together with Joris Ivens, he filmed a documentary entitled *The Spanish Earth* to raise public concern for Spain, only one of many attempts that he made to aide Republican efforts.<sup>96</sup> Given his zealous campaign against Spanish fascism, it is not surprising that Hemingway sometimes seems to perceive the dangerous possibility of the fascist cooptation of the bullfight. Indeed, even as he fabricates and celebrates the bullfight’s beastly aura within his own text, Hemingway sometimes betrays misgivings about the bullfight’s aestheticization (or animalization) of politics. Despite Hemingway’s own aesthetic of excess, *DIA* devotes several excurses to the evils of aesthetic mystification, denouncing everything from the purple prose of Waldo Frank’s *Virgin Spain* to the red plush of art museums. And while Hemingway insists that the bullfight is an art, not a sport, he admits the bullfight is “a decadent art in every way,” which “like most decadent things ... reaches its fullest flower at its rottenest point, which is the present.”<sup>97</sup> This decadent aesthetic may degenerate into a series of “tricks and mystifications” without “a nucleus of [knowledgeable] spectators,”<sup>98</sup> Hemingway worries, and accordingly he aims to cultivate this “nucleus” by educating the reader over the course of several hundred pages. The text ultimately casts doubt on its own endeavor to preserve the bullfight’s necessary quorum of true aficionados,

however. Indeed, the “old lady” character, the spectator-in-training whom “the author” attempts to educate over the course of several dialogues, is eventually thrown out of the book. Some spectators are incorrigible, it seems, either failing to appreciate the bullfight, or worse, indulging in the wrong kind of appreciation. When asked her impression, the old lady relays: “I liked to see the bulls hit the horses ... It seemed so sort of homey.”<sup>99</sup> Through the eyes of the old lady character, Hemingway recognizes the ritual is nothing but a gratuitous sport, which fabricates an artificial sense of belonging rather than remedies human alienation.

In its mission to eradicate the old ladies from the ring, *DIA* employs 81 educative photographs spread over 64 pages. Hemingway went to great lengths to obtain the photographs over the summer of 1931, and further, stood firm to maintain them, despite his publisher’s concern about raising the price of the volume.<sup>100</sup> For Benjamin, of course, the use of mechanical forms of reproduction might occasion the withering of the aura, opening an opportunity for critical apprehension of relations of production. In a piece written before *DIA*’s publication, Hemingway would seem to echo Benjamin’s insight into the potential of photography to dispel the aura, albeit with a different valuation of that effect. As Ronald Weber remarks, Hemingway’s “interest in photographs marked a change in attitude from his ‘Pamplona Letter’ in the *Transatlantic Review* the year before, when he had declared that ‘photographing kills anything, any good thing, just as it improves a bad thing.’”<sup>101</sup>

Yet the photographs in *DIA* sometimes manage to offer the reader a slice of the spectacle, summoning as much as disintegrating the bullfight’s beastly aura. As Benjamin also acknowledged, the potential of mechanical forms of reproduction to yield critical apprehension of existing relations of production is only a potential, not an inevitability, and photography and film might alternatively be deployed to mystify these relations. To illustrate, a picture of the

torero Cangancho “sculpturing with the cape” renders the bullfight’s impermanent sculpture an enduring aesthetic form (Figure 1). Another photograph of Marcial Lalanda performing a cambio de rodillas when the bull first enters the ring shows both the bull and the bullfighter at their peak levels of energy, and the man, cape, and beast coalesce into one vital figure within the frame (Figure 2). Many of the photographs’ captions do not specify the place or time that the photograph was taken, and some do not even name the specific suerte they feature. The caption for an impressive photograph featuring Chicuelo (Figure 3), for instance, simply reads: “Who could do this.”<sup>102</sup> A few photographs are left uncaptioned altogether, and simply resonate with timeless violence, such as the image of Juan Belmonte kneeling before a bull about to fall (Figure 4).

However, the majority of the photographs would seem to foster the critical apprehension of the aura’s spectral presence in the very ways that Benjamin describes. Far from inviting participation in a realm of ritualistic value, many of the photographs direct readers to contemplate the technique of individual matadors and the execution of specific maneuvers, which are invisible to the naked eye. Oftentimes, the photographs feature the failed execution of a maneuver, as in the photograph of Joselito, who “fat and out of condition,” has failed to “pass the bull with both knees on the ground,” and “has just taken out his pocket hanker chief and thrown it at the bull to start him”<sup>103</sup> (Figure 5). Several photographs juxtapose two different instances of the same suerte, inviting the reader to study the bullfight somewhat systematically, even scientifically, in the process of which the aura dissipates. For example, in the caption that compares two different attempts of Vincent Barrara at the same pass (Figure 6), Hemingway observes that “instead of letting the horn go by his chest, he has pulled away prudently so that ... man and bull do not form one group but are separate entities held together neither by emotion



Figure 1. "Cagancho sculpturing with the cape." Photograph in Ernest Hemingway, *Death in the Afternoon*, 301.



Figure 2. “Marcial Lalanda in a cambio de rodillas made when the bull first comes into the ring.” Photograph in Ernest Hemingway, *Death in the Afternoon*, 381.



Figure 3. "Chicuelo, Who could do this." Photograph in Ernest Hemingway, *Death in the Afternoon*, 357.




Figure 4. "Juan Belmonte." Photograph in Ernest Hemingway, *Death in the Afternoon*, 351.



Figure 5. “Joselito the spring he was killed ...” Photograph in Ernest Hemingway, *Death in the Afternoon*, 341.



Figure 6. "Vincent Barrera in a pase de pecho." Photograph in Ernest Hemingway, *Death in the Afternoon*, 306.

nor by plastic line.”<sup>104</sup> Through the study of the photograph, the position that “would be artistically correct” in lived experience “becomes ridiculous.”<sup>105</sup> Conversely, the goring of the horses and the killing of the bull becomes much less ridiculous in the still of the photographic frame. The bodily violence of the bullfight is highlighted in many of the mistakes captured by the camera, as in the remarkable image of a picador “ruining a bull by pic-ing a bull in the ribs instead of placing the pic in the hump of muscle over his neck and shoulders (Figure 7).”<sup>106</sup> And in the caption depicting Zurito from Cardoba (Figure 8), “one of the greatest picadors,” Hemingway grimly remarks: “the horse will be dead very shortly (if you look closely you may assure yourself of this).”<sup>107</sup> Far from cantering along a catachrestic chain of representation that elides the materiality of the horse’s body or the reality of the horse’s pain, Hemingway here is prompted to add: “The horses, incidentally, mostly come from the United States, where they are bought at the St. Louis and Chicago markets at 5 dollars or less a head and shipped ... to Spain.”<sup>108</sup> In Hemingway’s meditation on the photograph, the distinction so vehemently maintained between the bullfight and the slaughterhouse begins to blur.

The use of the photographs in *DIA* may not fully realize the radical potential that Benjamin locates in technologies of mechanical reproduction: to politicize the aesthetic instead of aestheticize the political. However, the photographs do give pause to the animalization of politics, the prevailing tendency of the text, and so open the way for us to politicize the animal. Amidst the dream images of *DIA* are images that emerge “suddenly, in a flash,” surging up “in the now of ... their recognizability,”<sup>109</sup> As Benjamin describes the dialectical image, it is the representation of the dream image for what it is, the recognition of the historical role of the wishful fantasy of the past, within the shocking fullness of the reconfigured present. In *DIA*’s montage of bullfighting photographs, Hemingway follows the procedures of capture and




Figure 7. “[A] picador ruining a bull by pic-ing him in the ribs instead of placing the pic in the hump of muscle over his neck and shoulders.” Photograph in Ernest Hemingway, *Death in the Afternoon*, 398.




Figure 8. "Zurito, from Cordoba ..." Photograph in Ernest Hemingway, *Death in the Afternoon*, 287.

assemblage that mark Benjamin's critical historiography, opening up a vastly different reading of the bullfight as a historical practice, rather than a primeval ritual. But if Hemingway captures the dialectical image, he refuses to read it. Instead, he hovers on the brink of sleep, almost awakening to the implications of the animal as it is dreamed in his moment. To do any differently requires our own awakening to the historicity of animal life, within another present, which will yield yet another past.

### **The Circus Parade, or, The Pre/ocession of Animal Simulacra**

In Djuna Barnes's *Nightwood* (1936), the circus is the meeting place of modernity's misfits, which number the novel's central characters. At a gathering of circus folk early in the novel, the Austrian Jew Felix Volkbein is drawn to the virtuoso verbosity of the cross-dressing medical student, Matthew O'Connor, and a modern American woman named Nora Flood also joins their circle of conversation, if O'Connor's extended monologue can be described as such. Following this fateful meeting amongst circus performers, O'Connor introduces Felix to Robin Vote, the woman whom Felix marries; she gives birth to their child and then leaves Felix for Nora; and when Robin likewise leaves Nora for another woman, Nora finds strange solace in O'Connor's arcane disquisitions on "the night" for the remainder of the novel. In this consists its relatively simple storyline. These events are precipitated when the Denckman circus arrives in New York. Nora – who sometimes works for the circus as an advance agent – attends the spectacle, this time as a spectator, vaguely aiming to keep "in touch" with some of its people. Unexpectedly, she is touched instead, by the girl who sits beside her. Nora initially turns to look at this girl "because the animals, going around and around the ring, all but climbed over at that point."<sup>10</sup> In observing how the light from the performing animals' eyes seemed to reflect upon her face, or "seemed to turn on her,"<sup>11</sup> Nora pivots towards the ring again:

The great cage for the lions had been set up, and the lions were walking up and out of their small strong boxes into the arena. Ponderous and furred they came, their tails laid down across the floor, dragging and heavy, making the air seem full of withheld strength. Then, as one powerful lioness came to the turn of the bars, exactly opposite the girl, she turned her furious great head with its yellow eyes afire and went down, her paws thrust through the bars and, as she regarded the girl, as if a river were falling behind impassable heat, her eyes flowed in tears that never reached the surface. At that the girl rose straight up. Nora took her hand. ‘Let’s get out of here!’ the girl said, and still holding her hand Nora took her out.<sup>112</sup>

The scene’s complex series of turns – its intricate sequence of touching and being touched – initiates the passionate and tortured relationship between Nora and Robin that *Nightwood* follows for the remainder of the novel. The passage is worth quoting at length, for the unnerving gaze of the lioness unsettles a number of critical accounts that have delineated the linkages amongst animality, aberrancy, and desire in *Nightwood*. As the lioness “went down” at the circus, so too will Robin ultimately go “sliding down” in the final “obscene and touching” scene of the novel, barking on all fours before Nora’s dog.<sup>113</sup> But while scholars have often explored the thematic of Robin’s animality within *Nightwood*, they have skirted the stubborn presence of the animal, which has variously entered analyses as a figure for the primitive, the perverse, the psychosomatic drive, the repudiation of the dominant social order, or the shattering of the subject – but invariably as a signpost for human life worlds. Or underworlds, as the case may be. In these accounts, the unnerving gaze of the lioness has remained untouched.

Critics who have centrally engaged representations of animality in *Nightwood* have tended to address either the novel’s interrogation of dominant discourses of animality or the

text's exploration of animality's (human) potentialities. Karen Kaivola represents the former trend in arguing that Robin's animality "is associated with an imagined, primitive, precultural past,"<sup>114</sup> which in Barnes's (and Kaivola's) assessment, fundamentally disfigures Robin's sexual difference as lower on the civilizational scale. Dana Seitler also reads *Nightwood* as a "degeneration narrative" that dramatizes sexual perversity as a form of atavism or a return to the form of an animal.<sup>115</sup> Seitler's reading ultimately reverses the negative valence of animality in Kaivola's account, however, as for her, *Nightwood* inhabits the degeneration narratives of sexology and eugenics only to "frustrate identitarian notions of sexuality"<sup>116</sup> Advancing a similar argument in a more Deleuzian vein, Carrie Rohman suggests that "Robin's mode of being is rhizomatic, schizophrenic, and amorphous," exemplifying "the practice ... of refusing an individuated identity."<sup>117</sup> In Rohman's reading, the animal represents the "outside of symbolization ... not as a radical absence" but as "a plentitude of anonymity."<sup>118</sup>

Yet the lioness hardly escapes the symbolic order as the material site of cultural inscription. And far from figuring the plentitude of nomadic subjectivity, the lioness draws attention to the constraints of her captivity in thrusting her paws through the bars, and with her "furious great head" and tears "that never reached the surface," the agony of her "withheld strength."<sup>119</sup> The circus is a space of queer potential, perhaps, but the encounter with the lioness also makes Robin feel queer, as in ill at ease, so that her introduction to Nora consists of "Let's get out of here," and once they enter the lobby, "I don't want to be here."<sup>120</sup> In reading *Nightwood*, it is crucial to attend to such moments of displeasure, discomfort, or devastation, moments that complicate an easy interpretation of the novel as a rhizomatic romp or essay in queer negativity. Further, and relatedly, Robin's becoming-animal must be read in light of what becomes of actual animals in *Nightwood*, more properly, the diegetic animals that appear so

often within the text, neither as metaphors nor as extensions of a contiguous material plane, but as actual actants.

The following discussion will hardly leave aside questions of human animality. Indeed, it will centrally address *Nightwood*'s contestation of the interconnected discourses of early twentieth century sexology and eugenics, on the one hand, and the novel's troubling of the presumptions of modern humanism, on the other. Departing from previous studies of *Nightwood*, however, this discussion will foreground how cultural representations of animality are integrally bound up with material practices involving animals, more specifically in this reading, with the spectacle of the circus. While several analyses of Barnes's novel have centered on the circus, like the critical accounts of animality in *Nightwood* surveyed above, they have only peripherally addressed the animal performers that so interested Barnes. Further, scholars have most often interpreted *Nightwood*'s circus as an instantiation of the Bakhtinian carnivalesque. For instance, Jane Marcus has influentially argued that *Nightwood*'s circus is a site of "communal resistance of underworld outsiders to domination," permitting the formulation of "a kind of feminist anarchist call for freedom from fascism."<sup>121</sup> Deborah Parsons is more sensitive to the ways in which the circus might redirect "the attacks of the carnivalesque back upon itself to become the agent of social order and control."<sup>122</sup> However, Parsons likewise emphasizes how the modern woman, among other circus freaks, might manipulate "circus misrule to present an alternative evaluation" of non-normative bodies "that does not assess them negatively as corrupt and degenerate" but rather unleashes their transgressive potential.<sup>123</sup> Whereas Marcus understands Barnes's circus as a contestation of fascism's authoritarian rule, and Parsons views the circus in *Nightwood* as a site of disruptive gender performance, in the discussion to follow, I argue that *Nightwood* shows how

spectacles of animality actually eased the rise of modern fascism and ultimately underwrote new regimes of sexual control.

In contrast to Marcus and Parsons, Laura Winkiel recognizes that *Nightwood* presents the circus as a “capitalized, homogenized culture industry.”<sup>124</sup> I am deeply indebted to Winkiel’s reading, but I would counter her suggestion that Barnes laments or seeks to “recover” an earlier, participatory public culture prior to the moment when “circus and vaudeville owners, motivated by profit, demanded that the shows be cleaned up.”<sup>125</sup> For the transformation of the American circus was largely complete by “the pivotal decade of 1915-1925,” when according to Winkiel, Barnes witnessed how live entertainments such as the circus “succumbed to the increasing economic and popular pressure of film.”<sup>126</sup> As early as 1903, the number of circuses and menageries traveling the nation peaked at 98 different companies, including 38 circuses travelling by rail.<sup>127</sup> These railroad operations typically involved the thoroughgoing marketing efforts of four advance advertising cars filled with lithographers, billposters, and “advance agents” like Nora Flood; highly specialized divisions of labor amongst hundreds of human and non-human animals; and of course, the overwhelming spectacle of the three-ring circus itself, which was adapted as early as 1881.<sup>128</sup> As circus historians such as Janet Davis have well documented, the circus became a culture industry several decades before Barnes began writing journalism about the hippodrome, Coney Island, and other forms of popular entertainment. In fact, as historians of the early circus such as Stuart Thayer have demonstrated, the circus was one of the first forms of popular entertainment, antedating the typical periodization of the emergence of “mass culture,” perhaps, but inventing many of its tactics and forging many of its functions.<sup>129</sup>

In her reading of *Nightwood*, Winkiel ultimately harkens back to the Bakhtinian interpretations of the circus advanced by other critics, only she positions its disruptive

possibilities further back in history. As the following discussion will show, however, this gesture that aligns human freedom and high modernism in a time and place outside the encroachments of capital is precisely what Barnes repudiates in writing *Nightwood*. But more immediately, *Nightwood*'s only invocation of an earlier instantiation of the circus hardly ascribes any liberatory function to it: Guido Volkbein, the father of Felix, carries a yellow and black linen handkerchief that "cried aloud of the ordinance of 1468, issued by one Pietro Barbo, demanding that, with a rope about its neck, Guido's race should run in the Corso for the amusement of the Christian populace."<sup>130</sup> Far from an anarchist call to freedom from fascism, Barnes links the circus and anti-Semitism early in the novel, although she ultimately explores the specificity of their modern articulation within capitalist relations of production.

In *Nightwood*, the commercial character of the modern circus is everywhere heavily underlined in terms resonant of the Frankfurt school. Far from a counter-public contesting the dominant order, the circus takes "its flight from the immense disqualification of the public."<sup>131</sup> If the circus presents an alternative to the rationalization of the workplace, such phrasing suggests, it also occasions the breakdown of a participatory public forum, or what Jurgen Habermas would call the communicative rationality of the public sphere. Felix is drawn to the "splendid and reeking falsification" of the circus because it links "his emotions to the higher and unattainable pageantry of kings and queens."<sup>132</sup> However, this splendor eludes his possession, and Felix's emotional investment and vicarious participation in this antiquated imaginary only works to "dazzle his own estrangement," itself a dazzling phrase for Felix's reconciliation with his own alienation.<sup>133</sup> The circus inspires a "humble hysteria" in Felix, securing his subjection through affective manipulation. Barnes likens the affective management of Felix to the training of the animal performer: Felix "loved that old and documented splendor with something of the love of

the lion for its tamer.”<sup>134</sup> The metaphor is heavily freighted, for the performing animal articulates Felix’s subjection in the full sense of the word: the love of the lion for its trainer both linguistically expresses and is materially connected to Felix’s own enthrallment.

The critique of the circus in *Nightwood* is hardly Barnes’s only exploration of popular entertainment involving animals. From 1913 until the early 1930s, Barnes supported herself as a journalist, writing for periodicals and newspapers as various as the *New York Press*, the *Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, *Vanity Fair*, *McCalls*, *World Magazine*, and *The New Yorker*.<sup>135</sup> In her articles and interviews, Barnes often sharpened her acerbic wit on the blunt object of commercialized leisure, covering everything from Coney Island to the Hippodrome. And in her journalism, as in *Nightwood*, Barnes often puts the animal on center stage. An article written in 1915 for the *New York Press*, “Djuna Barnes Probes the Souls of Jungle Folk at the Hippodrome Circus,” focuses exclusively on circus animals. Notably, this piece is preoccupied less with humans becoming animal than with animals becoming human. Laura Winkiel has argued that Barnes’s representation of humanized circus animals “mock[s] the hierarchy of humankind over the natural world” and “questions the boundaries ... between animals and humans.”<sup>136</sup> However, the sardonic voice of “Djuna Barnes Probes the Souls of Circus Folk” points toward a less sanguine reading.

The elephants are the first to step on stage in Barnes’s report, “devoid of ballet skirt or tights,” but nonetheless mincing before the public as the “gay, giggling chorus girls of the jungle” in a dance described as “gorgeously cynical.”<sup>137</sup> The elephant act culminates as a pachyderm seats itself on a chair with “presidential mien,” and as it sits, “open[s] its mouth [in a grin], swinging its trunk from side to side, and wink[s] a regular masher’s wink,” although according to the author, “its wink produced terror; its smile bred doubt.”<sup>138</sup> Subsequently, twelve

bears enter the ring in a similarly anthropomorphic manner, “on hind legs, with ‘paws like hands that pray,’” but this, too, is deemed “enormously hypocritical.”<sup>139</sup> The article is easily misread, for its elliptical style mirrors the chimera it chases. At the outset, however, Barnes writes, “there is something to be said for both sides of the bars.”<sup>140</sup> And if for the *New York Press* she is compelled to recount the “system of joy termed the three-ring circus,” within which “[t]here is no rattle of chains” and animals “are suddenly transported ... into actors,”<sup>141</sup> the other side of the bars – the specter of rattling chains – haunts her prose with heavy presence.

The cynical, doubtful, and hypocritical poses of the performing animals point toward the exploitative practices that lie behind the manifest content of the acts. A sinister limerick entitled “Jungle Jargon” serves as a kind of epigraph to the article, and it stresses the material realities behind the fantastic productions of the circus ring, particularly for the performing animals.

Conjuring the training of the performing dogs, for instance, Barnes writes:

And out of corners soft with light

A thousand little puppy-wails –

They shake a thousand funny tails

Upon the other side of night.<sup>142</sup>

Beyond throwing the spotlight on “the other side” of clever canine tricks, the limerick features a singing “monkey with a dreadful past,” dancing bears who are “denied all things but weight / And rug value in days to come,” and lions who cannot but “brew dread plans” as “they receive a Judas kiss.”<sup>143</sup> The limerick’s representation of the circus elephants is also noteworthy, as it records a behavior indicative of stress or distress in elephants:

And in dim stalls, both huge and high,

Soft elephants still undulate

Like old duennas out of date –

Like widows who may writhe and cry.<sup>144</sup>

The elephants undulating within their dim stalls suggest the stereotypical “weaving” behavior shown by many elephants in captivity. Stereotypes are abnormal, repetitive behaviors that include the pacing common to large cats in cages; the chewing and biting of horses stalled for lengthy periods of time; and the strange rocking and trunk-swinging behavior demonstrated by elephants.<sup>145</sup> The scientific literature on animal stereotypy is lengthy and its mechanisms are debated, but the uncontested condition of stereotypical behavior in animals is confinement, which Barnes stresses in this stanza, too, as the modifiers “huge and high” are displaced from the dim stalls to the elephants that uncomfortably occupy them in its second line. Replacing the pachyderm chorus girls with an apter anthropomorphism, Barnes likens these elephants to grieving widows and childless caretakers, emphasizing the severing of social bonds as well as the strictures of physical space.

In Barnes’s article for the *New York Press*, then, the blurred boundary between human and animal does not ebulliently unravel the human-animal divide through imaginative prose. Rather, Barnes’s anthropomorphic representation of the circus animals critically captures an actual trend of the twentieth century circus ring. In contrast, the earliest animal acts had emphasized the beastliness of animals.<sup>146</sup> The famous forerunner of “lion taming,” Isaac Van Amburgh, used whips and pistol shots to subdue wild cats in a cage. This act of human ascendancy was all the more impressive the more the cats bodied forth an impression of animal ferocity. When Van Amburgh toured in London, Queen Victoria made six visits to Drury Lane to see his performance, and once remained after the show to witness a gory feeding of the lions: a privileged sight that nevertheless encapsulates the import of the act intended for the general

audience.<sup>147</sup> The staging of animal ferocity kept pace with the development of the circus into a large-scale industry. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, new wild animal trainers such as Frank Bostock began to emphasize animal “training” over “taming.” Through the development of new training methods, lions, tigers, and other exotic animals were taught to respond obediently to engrained cues to roar, tangle with their trainers, and otherwise display a fabricated ferociousness. And alongside these performances *en ferocité*, or acts that stressed the wild animal’s savagery and the trainer’s temerity in the manner of Van Amburgh, emerged the act *en douceur*, which astounded spectators by the apparent docility and tractability of animals. The thrill of the latter performance derived not from the trainer’s apparent danger, but from the animals’ uncanny approximation of the human habitus.<sup>148</sup>

As Janet Davis writes, these tractable animal acts were “emptied of any connection to the wilderness.”<sup>149</sup> In addition to flesh-eating lions and tigers, spectators now could watch learned pigs spell words, dogs play dominos, and monkeys play musical instruments. Rats raised flags, elephants drank beer, and goats rode teeter-totters. According to the guidebook for Carl Hagenbeck’s animal exhibition at World Columbian Exposition in 1893, the program featured “bears walking the tight rope[,] ... ermine-mantled and crowned lions driving triumphal chariots [drawn by tigers] around the arena[, and] ... camels ... on roller skates,” amongst parrots playing euchre, hippos attempting the trapeze, and other animals accomplishing remarkable feats.<sup>150</sup> It might be tempting to interpret these acts as stemming from an increased recognition of the shared aptitudes of human and non-human animals. However, to associate the anthropomorphism of these animal acts with the spread of humane sentiment would be to ignore one obvious feature: they were meant to be silly and strange, and thus their pleasure derived less from the confirmation of any belief in the humanity of animals than from the measure of

disbelief they raised in the eyes of the beholder. Further, the performances *en ferocité* were not displaced but rather elaborated upon the acts *en douceur*: the same royal lions who drove chariots pulled by tigers would reappear in a subsequent act as man-eating denizens of the jungle, newly arrived from Africa. Finally, and most importantly, the necessary public presentation of the congeniality of circus life to animals in the wake of the humane movement was very different from the lived experiences of most performing animals.

Of course, by the turn of the twentieth century, impresarios and animal trainers had initiated a concerted effort to paint the circus as a more animal-friendly institution. In the late 1880s, the German animal merchant and trainer Carl Hagenbeck invented a new method of “kindness training,” which used “gentleness and sympathy” in the place of “tyrannical cruelty.”<sup>151</sup> And although he brandished this claim with typical entrepreneurial flair, Hagenbeck was not alone in this assertion. Frank Bostock and the Ferrari brothers also publicly avowed that they had abandoned “taming” methods for more “humane” methods,<sup>152</sup> and the American circus impresario J. A. Bailey went so far as to advertise his membership in the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals.<sup>153</sup> Hagenbeck’s claim to kindness is especially interesting, however, as this foremost animal trainer was also the unparalleled purveyor of exotic animals during his lifetime. From the 1870s through the first decades of the twentieth century, in fact, Hagenbeck secured a veritable monopoly over the international exotic animal trade. While Hagenbeck avers in his memoir that his “enthusiasm for [his] own calling originated more ... in a love for all living creatures than in any mere commercial instincts,”<sup>154</sup> given the commercial success of his business alone, the statement should read as highly suspect.

Although Hagenbeck claimed to have been “greatly distressed at the cruel methods of teaching animals to perform” prior to his “invention” of kindness training,<sup>155</sup> his business was

built upon the circuses that used these cruel methods, as well as other ventures that engaged in animal cruelty. After meeting Phineas T. Barnum in November of 1872, Hagenbeck became the exclusive animal supplier of the American big top boss, not to mention Barnum's chief competitors, including the circus impresario P. T. Forepaugh. In fact, Hagenbeck's business survived a temporary lull in the early 1880s as a direct result of the "elephant wars" between Barnum and Forepaugh during that decade, which facilitated "a continuous stream of elephants from Celon," a steady stream ensured in part by the need to replace the elephants who died.<sup>156</sup> In 1883 alone, Hagenbeck shipped 67 elephants to the U.S. to supply the demand for pachyderm-packed circuses,<sup>157</sup> which no doubt compromised the welfare of these animals even further. Strangely enough, Hagenbeck's memoir is full of indignant stories about his clients' cruelty to animals, although he does not seem to perceive himself as assisting this animal abuse.

Whatever animals' fate after leaving Hagenbeck's hands, falling into them in the first place was certainly as bad. Hagenbeck gained control of the exotic animal trade largely through establishing exclusive contracts with professional animal catchers, whose work necessarily involved a great deal of "collateral" damage, from the killing of adult animals when capturing their young to the deaths that inevitably resulted from the animals' traumatic transportation to the European or North American continent.<sup>158</sup> These deaths were less publicly professed than Hagenbeck's love for animal kind, and of course, Hagenbeck's customers also had a vested interest in some discretion about the bloody origins of their objects of display. Concerning the efforts made to procure a young rhinoceros for the Bronx Zoo in 1902, the famous "conservationist" William Hornaday wrote to Hagenbeck:

We must keep very still about forty large Indian rhinoceroses being killed in capturing the four young ones. If that should get into the newspapers, either here or in London,

there would be things published in condemnation of the whole business ... a good many cranks ... are so terribly sentimental that they affect to believe that it is wrong to capture wild creatures and exhibit them ... For my part, I think that while the loss of the large Indian rhinoceroses is greatly to be deplored, yet, in my opinion, the three young ones that survive will be of more benefit to the world at large.<sup>159</sup>

This killing of forty rhinos is a blatant contradiction of the conservationist program espoused by Hornaday and broadcast by the Bronx Zoo, which housed the breeding program that played an influential role in saving the North American Bison from extinction. Unfortunately, the instance is rather representative of the expanse between the public face of such institutions and their actual practices, whether these were (or are) touted as “conservationist” or “kind.”

For as historians such as Nigel Rothfels have argued, even the “humane” exotic animal trainer was in actuality “a profession that often required ... what might well have been called brutal training methods.”<sup>160</sup> While a new generation of animal trainers made much of the fact that they had relinquished the red hot irons previously used to force performing animals into their desired roles, the subsequent use of hoist cranes in training elephants to assume their performance positions, for instance, would seem still terrifying and terribly uncomfortable to the animals, if not painful.<sup>161</sup> And if performing animals tolerated such handling, this was because old-fashioned violence was still unreservedly used for “disobedient” animals, as almost all trainers of the period admit. One animal trainer who was schooled in Hagenbeck’s methods, William Pennsylvania, encapsulated the overarching strategy of wild cat training for readers of *McClure’s Magazine’s* in the following way: “It is merely that one particular man, by untiring patience, has succeeded in making himself appear in the lion’s eyes as the one great and boundless force of the universe before which he must bow.”<sup>162</sup> If actual violence was

administered less often using the new methods, these methods worked precisely because violence still loomed as an ever-present threat. Fear and intimidation remained the operative force behind the wild animal act. Thus for Frank Bostock, the “first principle” of exotic animal training is this: “never let an animal know his power,”<sup>163</sup> for “in nine cases out of ten,” this realization would lead the animal to “wreak his vengeance on the trainer for ... past outrages.”

Aside from the infliction of physical pain, it would seem the training of exotic animals for the late nineteenth and early twentieth century circus seldom inspired the mutuality and creativity that Donna Haraway observes in training her dogs for agility sports, and it hardly met the standard of “animal happiness” advocated by the animal trainer and language philosopher Vicki Hearne.<sup>164</sup> For Bostock, “habit and ignorance are what cause the animal to become an apt pupil in the hands of the trainer. The animal becomes accustomed to the same way of doing the same things at much the same time, and ignorance of his own power keeps him in this state of subjection.”<sup>165</sup> Similarly, Habenbeck’s invention of “humane” training methods allowed for little pleasure on the part of animals, who would perform “almost mechanically,”<sup>166</sup> as “their respective parts ... [were] so thoroughly drilled into ... the animals that they acquire[d] an absolutely inveterate habit of doing the right thing at the right moment.”<sup>167</sup> Unsurprisingly, then, Frank Bostock observes the intense dislike that performing animals take to their work:

To get the animals out of their cages and into the arena is most difficult and dangerous. Sometimes they come out with a rush at the trainer and his assistants, and sometimes they remain in a corner and refuse to move in spite of persuasions, coaxings, or threats. ... the animal generally gives in, and finally leaves the cage and sulkily betakes himself to the arena; but he always relieves his feelings by growls and roars.<sup>168</sup>

This reluctance of the animals to enter the arena is particularly symptomatic of the animals' relationship to their work, given their customarily cramped cages. In their manuals and memoirs, trainers observe a number of problems associated with the conditions of captivity required for the efficiency of the traveling circus, including stereotypical behaviors such as pacing, health problems such as rheumatism, and the inevitability of "going bad," or that eventual "inexplicable change of temperament" that manifests as the refusal to perform, the desperate attempt to escape, and the violent attack upon handlers.<sup>169</sup> As Bostock conceives of the change, the animal's "sense of wrongs, his hate, and his desire for revenge appear to have culminated suddenly, and his only wish is to get even with those who have been making him do things."<sup>170</sup> The only recourse for an animal "gone bad" was death, which was often dramatized as a criminal execution, as in the case of Topsy the elephant, who was publicly electrocuted at Coney Island after killing several handlers.<sup>171</sup>

In her article for the *New York Press*, Barnes raises the actual suffering of circus animals that impresarios often denied. If this point is somewhat belabored by the discussion above, it provides a necessary corrective to the scholarly conversation that attributes only a figurative function and largely liberatory meaning to the animal in *Nightwood*. Yet if Barnes is truly concerned with the exploitation of actual animals, she further explores the mechanisms that render performing animals' discomfort or distress unrecognizable as such. To Felix, Barnes writes, "the circus was a loved thing that he could never touch, therefore never know."<sup>172</sup> Felix's relationship to the circus is illustrative, as in *Nightwood*, Barnes explores how the spectacle of the circus renders the animal an immaterial representation available for human consumption, which both requires and elides performing animals' bodily pain. In fact, directly prior to the

moment when the lioness bows down before Robin, the text actually enacts the abstraction of the animal in the ring:

Clowns in red, white and yellow, with the traditional smears on their faces, were rolling over the sawdust as if they were in the belly of a great mother where there was yet room to play. A black horse, standing on trembling hind legs that shook in apprehension of the raised front hooves, his beautiful ribboned head pointed down and toward the trainer's whip, pranced slowly, the foreshanks flickering to the whip. Tiny dogs ran about trying to look like horses, then in came the elephants.<sup>173</sup>

The black horse assumes a plantigrade posture in a performance of equine anthropomorphism common to the early twentieth century circus. Clearly, this posture is assumed in response to the threat of violence, i.e., the whip towards which the horse's head is bowed and against which the horse's foreshanks shudder. If the horse's pained performance has gone unmentioned by critics, this is somewhat understandable, given its framing within the paragraph. The clowns that open the scene override the trembling legs of the animal with an invitation to play "in the belly of a great mother," and the dogs who perform beside the horse elide the horse's body in presenting an equine image, i.e., running "about trying to look like horses." The elephants only enter the ring, and then immediately disappear from the narrative scope. On the one hand, the passage forefronts the way in which the circus act requires the disciplining of animal bodies into docile bodies. On the other hand, the passage actually performs the spectacle's transubstantiation of animal flesh into a fanciful image of utopian investment. This becoming-image of the animal becomes most apparent, perhaps, when the unlikely contact across species' lines sunders the spectacle and makes the scene unbearable to Robin. As the image momentarily flickers, the

lioness's bodily presence and physical constraints, which normally never reach the surface, become ponderously present and deeply disturbing.

If Barnes is preoccupied with the anthropomorphic representations of the early twentieth-century circus ring, this is because they are symptomatic of the spectacle's abstraction of animality. In an insightful reading of the British circus, Yoram Carmeli argues as much, claiming that anthropomorphized circus animals appear "as emptied images of real elephants" that "shatter" and "textualize" the nature of the actual animal.<sup>174</sup> Essentially, Carmeli states, "circus animals become emptied images, ephemeral embodiments of Nature transcended."<sup>175</sup> For Carmeli, however, the disruption of an assumed animal nature within the circus contributes to the spectator's perception of animal cruelty, a perception that may not necessarily align with actual offenses against circus animals themselves. Barnes would suggest something very different. In *Nightwood*, the derealization of the animal body proscribes any perception of suffering altogether, actual or imagined. The phantasmagoria of animal life has consequences that exceed the dazzling of human estrangement. In becoming-image within the spectacle, the animal instantiates the "inorganic nature" that Benjamin describes, offering a specious sense of freedom by effacing material constraints and contingencies, which in this case, includes the circus animal's sensitivity to bodily pain.

Importantly, Barnes's insistence on the physicality of the animal is no recursion to an essentializing idea of animal nature. Animal advocates and social scientists who have argued against the circus on behalf of animal welfare have often fallen into this trap. Paul Taylor, for instance, contends the circus is injurious to the performing animal because it precludes "a life fitted for its species-specific nature."<sup>176</sup> In grappling with the sight of performing bears at the Russian circus, Suzanne Cataldi attempts to move beyond Taylor's naturalizing framework, but

little succeeds in dispensing with essentialized ideas of animal nature altogether when suggesting that animals' dignity, or "their being who or what they are," might provide "a basis for respectful attitudes."<sup>177</sup> Conversely, Michael Peterson attempts to evade these ontological pitfalls through a performance studies approach to animal circus acts. For Peterson, establishing ethical guidelines for the use of performing animals "should include the question of whether the animal presence stabilizes the identity of the bourgeois human spectator or troubles it."<sup>178</sup> Yet Peterson's measure falls miserably short when applied to the act *en douceur*, which both troubles human identity and employs animal cruelty in order to do so. In contrast to these critics, Barnes disputes the exploitation of animals within entertainments such as the circus *without* recurring to some notion of animal nature and *despite* the fact that circus acts can actually trouble such notions.

I will take up Barnes's robust theorization of the materiality of the animal body at a later point, but for the moment, I want to push through *Nightwood's* representation of the "inorganic nature" of the circus ring. In reading Hemingway's bullfight, I advanced a thesis similar to Carmeli's reading of the circus, arguing that the spectacle of the bullfight elides the material bodies of the animals that constitute it. In this argument, however, I further suggested the derealization of the animal within the barrera (or bull ring) fundamentally transforms the cultural meanings of animality that circulate within and beyond it. Specifically, I suggested the animal in the spectacle accrues the specious freedom of the commodity form. Perhaps the anthropomorphic acts of the circus, even more than the bullfight, underscores this transformation of animal nature within the crucible of the commercial spectacle. For the violence of the bullfight is easily misconstrued as instinctual violence rather than sovereign violence, while boxing elephants are less easily assimilated within this interpretative framework. The evident artificiality of the circus

animal betrays the unnatural nature of animal nature within the commercial spectacle, whether this nature is expressed through senseless violence (as in the bullfight) or purposeless play.

In any case, the secret affinity between the artificial animal of the circus and the wild animal of the bullfight should now be apparent, and so too, between the seemingly contradictory act *en ferocite* and act *en douceur* within the circus itself. We should not be surprised at Hemingway's admiration for Claude Beatty, the famous exotic animal trainer and circus performer who received a signed copy of *Death in the Afternoon* from the author as a token of his appreciation.<sup>179</sup> Nor might we perceive any contradictory impulses behind Carl Hagenbeck's determination to invent both a new form of training circus animals in nature-defying acts and a new type of zoological exhibit more closely mimicking "natural" habitats.<sup>180</sup> Within the bullfight as well as the circus, the fanciful circus act as well as the cage-free zoo exhibit, the spectacle of the animal summons a sovereign nature freed from any constraint. The shared sense of these animal entertainments is a compensatory and illusory freedom. In *Nightwood*, however, and in stark contrast to Hemingway, Barnes resolutely refuses to dazzle human alienation with the spectacle of the animal, showing the flesh beneath its sequined skin.

### **The Dual Character of the Racial Form**

On the one hand, *Nightwood* shows the transformation of animal nature within the spectacle of the circus, whereby the animal assumes a purely representational value that eclipses the animal's material existence. On the other hand, *Nightwood* captures the complicated relay by which the becoming-image of the animal within the circus entails the becoming-authentic of the image. The circus thus emerges as another habitat that invites the play of primitivist imaginings. In *Nightwood*, one character, among others, embodies an immanent existence that appears an antidote to the modern experience of alienation and fragmentation. When Matthew O'Connor

and Felix Volkbein are summoned to the *Hotel Recamier* to revive an unconscious woman, who turns out to be Robin Vote, they experience her powerful pre-modern magnetism. Arriving at the hostelry, they find “a confusion of potted plants, exotic palms and cut flowers, faintly over-sung by the notes of unseen birds.”<sup>181</sup> In the heart of this drawing room jungle, Robin appears for the first time:

The perfume that her body exhaled was of the quality of that earth-flesh, fungi, which smells of captured dampness and yet is so dry, overcast with the odour of oil of amber, which is an inner malady of the sea, making her seem as if she had invaded a sleep incautious and entire. Her flesh was the texture of plant life, and beneath it one sensed a frame, broad, porous and sleep-worn, as if sleep were a decay fishing her beneath the visible surface. About her head there was an effulgence as of phosphorus glowing about the circumference of a body of water – as if her life lay through her in ungainly luminous deteriorations – the troubling structure of the born somnabule, who lives in two worlds – meet of child and desperado.<sup>182</sup>

Compared to “a painting by the *douanier* Rousseau,” Robin presents an alluring image of immanent existence. She is both animalized and temporalized as prior to or outside of human history. Her every movement conjures “a forgotten experience” that entails “as insupportable a joy as the vision of an eland coming down an aisle of trees,” who is “stepping in the trepidation of flesh that will become myth.”<sup>183</sup> Robin is described “a woman who is a beast turning human,” but the preponderance of her animality and the mythologization of her flesh casts doubt that such a turn will ever reach completion. Even after Matthew douses her with water, Robin falls back “into the pose of her annihilation” once more and closes her eyes, though Felix observes them “still faintly clear and timeless behind the lids.”<sup>184</sup> Robin’s eyes possess “the long unqualified

range in the iris of wild beasts who have not yet tamed the focus down to meet the human.”<sup>185</sup>

Yet arguably, it is less the beast’s eyes than her beholder’s that this scene explores, for the “picture,” “image,” or “vision” of this primitive body is repeatedly stressed, from Robin’s comparison to a painting by Rousseau to the marvelous statement: “The woman who presents herself *to the spectator* as a ‘picture’ forever arranged is, for the contemplative mind, the chiefest danger.”<sup>186</sup>

In *Nightwood*, Barnes repeatedly positions the commercial spectacle as the site of the production of primitive meanings. As significant as Robin’s primitiveness, in other words, is the *staging* of this “quality of the ‘way back,’” or the description of this private drawing room scene in terms resonant of commercial display. When the *chausseur* summons the doctor to the hostelry to revive Robin, he invites Felix to attend him, but less as a medical assistant than as a spectator. “‘Pay,’ O’Connor says to Felix, ‘and follow me.’”<sup>187</sup> After forking out what is essentially an admission fee, Felix follows O’Connor to Robin’s room, which is described as a “set,” more specifically, “the property of an unseen *dompteur*, [or wild animal trainer], half lord, half promoter, over which one expects to hear the strains of an orchestra of wood-winds render a serenade which will popularize the wilderness.”<sup>188</sup> Essentially, the spectacle of Robin on the couch is equated to an animal act at the circus. The association is strengthened when Robin passes out for the second time, and Felix watches the doctor snatch a loose hundred franc note lying on the table with “a tension in his stomach, such as one suffers when watching an acrobat leaving the virtuosity of his safety in a made unraveling whirl into probable death.”<sup>189</sup>

While the circus metaphorizes the drawing room scene in which Robin first appears, another notable primitive in *Nightwood* makes an actual entrance within the circus animal act, albeit this manifestation is recounted at one remove from the diegetic appearance. When Nora

and Felix meet O'Connor at a gathering of circus performers early in the novel, O'Connor holds forth about Nikka, among other topics, "the nigger who used to fight the bear in the Cirque de Paris."<sup>190</sup> As O'Connor describes the circus performer, Nikka crouches "all over the arena without a stitch on, except an ill-concealed loin-cloth all abulge as if with a deep-sea catch."<sup>191</sup> Importantly, Nikka appears *only* within O'Connor's speech, which many critics have failed to observe in interpreting Nikka's performance. Just as Robin affords an *image* of the great past to Felix, Nikka appears as O'Connor's rhetorical *figure* for sexual freedom unhampered by civilizational constraints. But further, Barnes emphatically situates the production of the primitive within the present-day site of the animal spectacle. And through her emphasis upon the textualization of the animal/ized body, she suggests the derealization of the animal within the commercial spectacle is that which accomplishes the mystical transubstantiation of flesh into myth. For Barnes, the pull of the primordial past is a function of the commodity fetish.

In *Nightwood*, Barnes explores how the appeal to time immemorial upholds a myth of national origins. Guido and Felix Volkbein's pretense to an Austrian barony, their two sham portraits providing "an alibi for the blood,"<sup>192</sup> and all their "amazing and inaccurate proofs" of the past forge a national belonging that belies the fictive nature of every national history.<sup>193</sup> Through the characters of Hedvig and Robin, Barnes further explores how the female body becomes especially enmeshed in these efforts. Ann McClintock, among others, has argued that women are typically cast as "the symbolic bearers of the nation."<sup>194</sup> Further, women function to resolve "the temporal anomaly within nationalism,"<sup>195</sup> that contradiction arising from the necessary postulation of a shared cultural past and the coincident imperative of the nation's progress. For having been assigned "a permanently anterior time within the modern nation,"<sup>196</sup> argues McClintock, the female body nonetheless subtends an untroubled striving towards the

national future through her reproductive capacity, which both affirms her alignment with the material world and promises the advancement of the race. Barnes would seem to anticipate this insight, as in *Nightwood*, the female body quite literally becomes the bearer of national identity. The novel opens with the scene in which Hedvig Volkbein (Guido's Viennese wife) gives birth to Felix on a canopied bed with a "valence stamped with the bifurcated wings of the House of Hapsburg."<sup>197</sup> Not only Hedvig's Austrian identity, but also her military bearing is heavily emphasized: she names her son "with the gross splendor of a general saluting the flag,"<sup>198</sup> she dances as if making "a tactical manoeuvre,"<sup>199</sup> and her blind obeisance to her maternal mission leads her to believe Guido's claim to an "almost extinct" Austrian aristocratic line "as a soldier 'believes' a command."<sup>200</sup> The militaristic representation of Hedvig suggests the state's biopolitical management of the population through the reproductive body. With the occurrence of racial contamination in the opening pages of the novel, however, Hedvig ceases to obey, albeit unwittingly, the injunction to bear healthy offspring. Accordingly, her existence is summarily and unhesitatingly ended.

Like his own father, Felix attempts to reroute his racial identity through the female body. Upon seeing Robin for the first time, Felix "felt that he was looking upon a figurehead in a museum,"<sup>201</sup> and he imagines himself garnering from this "quality of the way back" not only a story of origins but also a possible future. Almost immediately, Felix considers marriage with Robin – a consideration that's peculiarly unconcerned with Robin's own thoughts on the matter – as "he wished a son who would feel as he felt about the 'great past.'"<sup>202</sup> Unlike Hedvig, however, Robin is disinclined to participate in this project. When she becomes pregnant, Robin meditates on "this woman Austria,"<sup>203</sup> seeming to realize that she has been tasked with the reproductive resolution of the nation's backward-looking forwardness. But Robin ultimately refuses this

procreative mandate. She gives up trying to meditate on the consequence to which her son was to be born, and takes up instead the memoirs of the Marquis de Sade. Instead of acting the archetypal mother, she curses like a sailor when giving birth. And soon after the arrival of Guido the younger, Robin abandons him.

Thus in *Nightwood*, Robin ultimately vacillates between two representations of the past. When Felix first meets Robin, she bodies forth the primitive meanings that might be deployed in imagining a story of national origins and organic community. Yet when Robin refuses the role set out for her as the repository of these meanings, the primitive turns the degenerate, the primeval appears the atavistic. Very early in their relationship, Felix begins to reassess this quality of the way back that Robin carries. He notes in touring museums with Robin that her taste, which “turning from an appreciation of the excellent, would also include the cheaper and the debased, with an emotion as real.”<sup>204</sup> When she touched such a thing, “the sensuality of her hands frightened him.”<sup>205</sup> After they marry, Felix finds himself “wrecking ... his peace of mind in an effort to acquaint her with the destiny for which he had chosen,”<sup>206</sup> but “he knew that he was not sufficient to make her what he had hoped.”<sup>207</sup> Whereas Robin’s sensuousness had once seemed to anoint her as a mother for the nation, she soon appears a sexual deviant: “a tall girl with the body of a boy.”<sup>208</sup> Her child does not mark the advancement of the race but its degeneration: “The child was small, a boy, and sad. It slept too much in a quivering palsy of nerves.”<sup>209</sup>

A number of scholars have explored how *Nightwood* troubles the sexological category of the invert with which Robin is labeled and the narratives of racial degeneracy that she plots. For instance, Andrea Harris argues that Matthew O’Conner represents a doctor “explain[ing] the intricacies of inversion,” providing a “biting parody of the ... sexologist.”<sup>210</sup> Dana Seitler also

argues that *Nightwood* inhabits the degeneration narratives of sexology and eugenics only to “rewrite the ‘becoming animal’ process as the moment when sexual identity ... breaks down.”<sup>211</sup>

In other words, Seitler shows how Barnes queers the ossified constructions of identity within sexual and racial science. While *Nightwood*'s contestation of degeneration narratives and disruption of scientific constructions of racial and sexual identity is certainly important, what strikes me as the crucial question at this point is the peculiar proximity of these denigrated objects of scientific knowledge – the sexual deviant and the racial other – to images of utopian investment. Indeed, the object and the image frequently turn out to be one and the same.

Just as Robin combines the allure of the primitive and the threat of the atavistic, Nikka potentializes two racial meanings. Robin Blyn has argued that Nikka performs “a Decadent art that serves as an immanent critique” of the fascist state that conflates “Decadence with degeneracy.”<sup>212</sup> But in her astute reading of Nikka's “neo-Decadence,” Blyn further notes that Nikka “brings together the tattooed man and the African savage, two standard exhibits of the American freak show stage.”<sup>213</sup> I want to dwell a little longer on Blyn's observation to highlight the different resonances of these two stock performances of the circus sideshow. The African savage was typically displayed as a member of the ethnological congress, a collection of racial “types” who might be studied as phenotypically representative of their “tribes” from the other side of civilization.<sup>214</sup> The tattooed man, on the other hand, was usually a white man who trumped up his tattoos with stories of exotic adventures amongst the “natives.”<sup>215</sup> Whereas the member of the ethnological congress circulated a pseudo-scientific racism that accentuated the civilizational distance between the racial other and the (implicitly white) spectator, the tattooed man invited the vicarious participation in a fantasy of primitive freedom. Of course, any neat demarcation between these two productions does not hold: the ethnological congress often

extended the allure of the exotic, and the tattooed man usually held on to his civilizational credentials in some way, for instance, by assuring spectators that he had been forcibly tattooed by Polynesians.

Yet the dual and dynamic presentation of the circus performer's racial meaning is precisely the point. Nikka's performance holds two resonances of racial meaning in the balance: it is both a production of the primitive and a display of the degenerate. Blyn reads Nikka's body as a manifestation of the latter, but in coming to terms with the fascist instrumentalization of decadence, it is imperative to perceive how the threat of the atavistic body is produced in tandem with the allure of the primeval past. The "degeneration narrative," to borrow Dana Seitler's term, names only one aspect of what is essentially the double discourse of racial nationalism. On the one hand, this discourse circumscribes the national body through the abjection of atavistic others. On the other hand, it appropriates the primitive past in constructing a story of national origins. While this discussion has argued that the production of the primitive is linked to the spectacle of the animal body, it might fruitfully explore how modern animal entertainments might be productive of the atavistic body, as well.

At least one business venture undertaken by the unrivaled exotic animal merchant and impresario, Carl Hagenbeck, exemplifies this twofold production of racial meaning. This discussion has already addressed two ways in which Hagenbeck more directly produced the animal entertainments he was almost singlehandedly responsible for supplying. Seeking to create new markets for his "overproduction" of exotic animals, Hagenbeck began a circus in 1887, securing a successful foray into the big top business by brandishing a claim to new and improved methods of "humane" training. And in 1907, he opened the famous animal park in Stellingen, which revolutionized modern zoological gardens by displaying animals within naturalized

enclosures. But it was the people show that made Hagenbeck a household name, both in Germany and internationally.<sup>216</sup> In 1874, according to his autobiography, Hagenbeck “happened to be importing some reindeer, and [his] friend, Heinrich Leutemann, the animal painter, remarked that it would be most picturesque ... [to] import a family of Lapps along with them.”<sup>217</sup> Hagenbeck seized upon this suggestion as a “brilliant idea,” and immediately “gave orders that [his] reindeer were to be accompanied by their native masters.”<sup>218</sup>

What became known as the “Lapland exhibit” was first organized on Hagenbeck’s property and afterwards taken to Berlin and Leipzig. As Hagenbeck’s “experience with the Laplanders taught [him] that ethnographic exhibitions would prove lucrative,” he immediately “followed up their visit by that of other wild men.”<sup>219</sup> In 1876, some Sudanese took the place of the Laplanders, and Hagenbeck toured both nationally and internationally with the group, which was subsequently followed by many others. Over the years, Hagenbeck’s people shows became more and more elaborate: the largest of them, the “Ceylon Caravan,” exhibited up to 200 participants, including 67 persons, 25 elephants, and a host of additional animals.<sup>220</sup> As this example attests, by the mid 1880s, Hagenbeck’s people shows had become gigantic productions that toured the major cities of Germany as well as the main metropolitan centers of Europe. They were patronized by hundreds of thousands of visitors, sometimes seeing up to 50,000 or 60,000 people in a single day.<sup>221</sup>

Most obviously, Hagenbeck’s people shows were significant because they aligned non-European persons with non-human animals, placing them on a lower rung of the evolutionary ladder. But they also typified the dichotomized production of racial meanings that proceed from the spectacular display of the animal/ized body. On the one hand, the authenticity of “primitive” peoples was manufactured as an object of desire, inviting the vicarious participation of the

spectator. As Nigel Rothfels has convincingly argued, the German imagining of “a past that existed ... before history” was actually “directly influenced by the appearance of the Hagenbeck people shows.”<sup>222</sup> At the same time, the spectacular presentation of the animal/ized other precipitated ideas of animal nature that fueled early twentieth century racial science. By the time Hagenbeck set up his fourth people show, an “Eskimo exhibit” within the Berlin Zoological Gardens, he had garnered the enthusiastic support of a number of major zoological and anthropological societies.<sup>223</sup> The Berlin Anthropological Society regularly gathered “scientific” evidence from Hagenbeck’s exhibits, mostly in the form of anthropometric data.<sup>224</sup>

In following Benjamin’s analysis of the commercial display’s remaking of nature – the simultaneous transformation of organic nature by the commodity form and the transformation of the commodity form by organic nature – this chapter has thus far explored how the commodity garners utopian meanings *from the perspective of the consumer*. But *from the vantage point of the producer*, capitalist relations are experienced not as an approaching heaven-on-earth but as the present hell of reified existence, which entails an altogether different manifestation of the “natural.” Most obviously, Lukács’s account of reification in *History and Class Consciousness* describes how consequent to the capitalist mode of production, social relations appear to be natural relations: “they appear to be fixed, complete and immutable entities which can be manipulated and even comprehended, but never overthrown.”<sup>225</sup> When Lukács first introduces the nascent concept of this “second nature” in *Theory of the Novel*, however, he presents the concomitant notion of “first nature,” which is the “dumb, sensuous, and yet senseless” nature that is not nature as such but rather “the historico-philosophical objectification of man’s alienation from his own constructs.”<sup>226</sup> If second nature is “the nature of man-made structures” that has lost “lyrical substantiality” by assuming forms “too rigid to adapt themselves to the


symbol creating moment,”<sup>227</sup> “first nature” is the corresponding conception of nonhuman nature, which is shorn of historicity, and manifests instead as brute facticity. In the discussion of “first nature” in *Theory of the Novel*, Lukács usefully captures how processes of reification render not only social relations nor even just the socially-created features of objects “thing-like,” but even non-human nature itself.

The negative valence of the racial body – the switch from the celebration of the primitive to the denunciation of the degenerate – stems from the reification of the animal body, or the making of mythic nature into what Lukács calls “first nature.” On the one hand, the crystallization of reified ideas of animal nature within modern spectacles of animality might be considered as consequent to the forms of scientific observation that infiltrate animal entertainments ranging from the aquarium to the zoo. As Lukács argues, the “crude empiricism” of the scientific method operates according to a closed system of formal laws, and thus the world it ascertains is only the reified world of fact, while the “concrete underlying reality” lies forever “beyond its grasp.”<sup>228</sup> On the other hand, the amenability of the animal spectacle to pseudo-scientific understanding suggests this reified nature may be as much the precipitate of the spectacle as the product of scientific reasoning. Or better, this ossification of the animal body might well be produced in part by the *production* of the animal entertainment itself.

Thus far, we have been exploring the cultural work of the circus from the seat of the spectator: from this vantage point, the docile body of the animal worker is transformed in the act *en douceur*, within which the “inorganic nature” of the animal phantasmagoria is allowed free rein. Yet however much they invited the fantastical imagining of unfettered animality, these acts were the highly disciplined productions of human and non-human animal bodies. Beyond the individual animal act, the traveling railroad circus as a whole was a near miraculous feat of

highly specialized and masterfully coordinated divisions of labor spanning multiple species, from humans to horses to elephants, and hundreds of individuals. Within a matter of half an hour, the typical railroad circus could transform any designated show grounds into a fully operational entertainment center, complete with a big top tent spanning hundreds of feet and holding upwards of 10,000 people. The coordination of these efforts was so remarkable that beginning in the 1890s, the U.S. War Department periodically sent army officers to large-scale circuses to learn how show managers organized the massive numbers of people and animals.<sup>229</sup>

In the second chapter of this dissertation, I argued that new forms of disciplinary power implicating animal life were productive of the resurgence of the animal-machine. The spectacle of the circus might be numbered among those turn-of-the-century phenomena that rationalized and instrumentalized the animal body to an unprecedented extent, and in so doing, transformed animal nature into mechanistic nature. The circus forged radically disparate meanings in its separate (but of course inextricably bound) capacities of cultural spectacle and entertainment industry. The following diagram represents the presentation of the commodity in both its abstract and concrete dimensions, from both the perspective of the alienated producer and the vantage of the mystified consumer:



I have already suggested that Lukács’s notion of “second nature” is the inverse presentation of Benjamin’s “inorganic nature,” which describes the imagining of human worlds as unnatural and therefore radically indeterminate, rather than ineluctably determined in the manner of natural law. Yet both “second nature” and “inorganic nature” are produced by the commodity form’s moment of abstraction within capitalist relations of production: of material relationships, in the first place, and materiality itself, in the second place. Correspondingly, both “first nature” and “mythic nature” are produced by the concrete appearance of the commodity form within capitalist relations: as the reified object, in the first place, and the ritual object, in the second place. On the one hand, the dual character of the commodity form structures these


“physiognomic appearances” of nature. On the other hand, the “two faces” assumed by the commodity form in both its abstract and concrete dimension derives from the disparate positions of the producer and the consumer.

According to Moishe Postone, Nazi anti-Semitism was similarly structured by the fetishism of the commodity and the antinomic presentation of social relations under capitalism. In Postone’s reading, the negative consequences of modern capitalism were associated only with its abstract dimension by National Socialists, while industry and technology were placed “on the ‘thingly’ side of the antinomy.”<sup>230</sup> Further, Jewishness was identified with the abstract dimension of capitalism, while Aryanism was identified with the concrete dimension: “the opposition of the concrete material and the abstract becomes the racial opposition of the Aryans and the Jews.”<sup>231</sup> Through this reading, Postone explains how “rapid development of industrial capitalism with all of its social ramifications” was “personified and identified as the Jew,”<sup>232</sup> while at the same time, capitalist development proceeded apace of the rise of National Socialism. In this way, Postone reconciles Nazism’s contradictory affirmation of industrial and technological development and simultaneous rejection of the social consequences of modern capitalism.

While I am deeply indebted to Postone’s attention to the relationship between racialization and commodity fetishism, there are a few difficulties with Postone’s account that I hope to address. First, Postone has difficulty identifying any mechanism more specific than capitalism itself that might bind the production of commodities to the production of racial meanings. Second, if the Aryan was placed on the “‘thingly’ side of the antinomy,” Postone cannot adequately account for the peculiarly metaphysical character of Aryanism, which as Hannah Arendt observes, did “not simply abuse religious rhetoric” but actually postulated “the divine origin of their own people.”<sup>233</sup> Third, and perhaps most importantly, Postone has difficulty

explaining how Jewishness assumed a racial character within modern anti-Semitism, as he links the idea of race to the concrete dimension of lived existence within capitalist relations, and Jews to the abstract dimension.

The discussion above yields some possible answers to these difficulties. Regarding the question of how the production of commodities becomes linked to the production of racial meanings, this analysis suggests the spectacle of animal life was generative of the mythic nature that grounds nationalistic appeals to organic national community, while the rationalization and instrumentation of human and non-human bodies was generative of the reified nature that grounded the constructions of racial and sexual science. But further, the peculiarly the “metaphysical” flavor of Aryanism, on the one hand, and the markedly racial character of modern anti-Semitism, on the other hand, suggests the racialization of both the Aryan and the Jew was structured by the antinomic structure of the commodity form. Instead of signifying either the abstract or concrete dimension of modern capitalism, the construction of both Aryanism and Jewishness involves a concrete (racial) manifestation and an abstract expression particular to each. Arguably, we might discern the “physiognomic appearances” of the Aryan and the Jew in the “physiognomic appearances” of the commodity form, as it is mapped above in both its abstract and concrete dimensions, from both the perspective of the alienated producer and the vantage of the mystified consumer:



In the diagram above, we might perceive a slightly different explanation of Aryanism's reconciliation of anti-modern sentiment with industrial development. On the one hand, Aryanism embraced the dream of technological progress and human freedom unhampered by material constraints and contingencies, which Benjamin locates within the "inorganic nature" of the modern phantasmagoria, and which accounts for the "abstract" expression or "metaphysical" character of Aryanism. On the other hand, Aryanism summoned the myth of an organic community extending back through time immemorial, which describes the "mythic nature" or substitutive aura of the ritual object, and which locates the "racial" meaning of Aryanism. Contrary to Postone's association of Aryanism and capitalist production, then, the wish images of the consumer, and specifically, the dreams conjured by the spectacle of the animal, were

imperative to the imagining of the Aryan race. The imagining of Jewishness, on the other hand, is both distinct from and structurally similar to the abstract expression and concrete particularization of Aryanism. Although the abstract expression and concrete particularization of Jewishness within modern anti-Semitism is similarly shaped by the antinomic structure of the commodity form, Jewishness becomes associated with the alienating effects of capitalist relations of production, as Postone rightly perceives: the Jew is imagined as the undetectable poison and hidden hand behind modern economic crises and social disintegration. I simply extend Postone's insight by suggesting there is an abstract dimension to Aryanism as well as a concrete dimension to Jewishness. The Aryan holds abstraction's potentialization of wishful fantasies, while the Jew bears abstraction's alienating effects. The Aryan is the racial embodiment of an authentic existence untouched by modern forms of alienation, while the racial meaning of the Jew corresponds to the reified "first nature" that Lukacs describes.

Barnes would seem to anticipate this argument. Critics such as Meryl Altman have noted how *Nightwood* "draws on the same storehouse of images as some of the most virulent attacks on Jews."<sup>234</sup> Indeed, Felix is the archetypal wandering Jew, and he further epitomizes the fragmentation and dislocation of existence within capitalist relations of production. He is associated in *Nightwood* with the deleterious consequences of capital, and associated with these consequences as their cause. When Felix first meets Robin, for instance, he tells her that "he had a post in the *Crédit Lyonnais*, earning two thousand five hundred francs a week; a master of seven tongues, he was useful to the bank, and, he added, he had a trifle saved up, gained in speculations."<sup>235</sup> In its characterization of Felix, *Nightwood* sounds a refrain that scholars have often identified within modern anti-Semitic discourse. However, *Nightwood's* trafficking in anti-Semitic stereotypes actually illuminates their specific materialization. In one of the most

inscrutable passages of the novel, *Nightwood* specifically explores the racial codification of Jewish cultural identity:

It takes a Christian, standing eternally in the Jew's salvation, to blame himself and to bring up from that depth charming and fantastic superstitions through which the slowly and tirelessly milling Jew once more becomes the 'collector' of his own past. His undoing is never profitable until some *goy* has put it back into such shape that it can again be offered as a 'sign.' A Jew's undoing is never his own, it is God's; his rehabilitation is never his own, it is a Christian's. The Christian traffic in retribution has made the Jew's history a commodity; it is the medium through which he receives, at the necessary moment, the serum of his own past that he may offer it again as his blood. In this manner the Jew participates in two conditions; and in like manner Felix took the breast of this wet nurse whose milk was his being but which could never be his birthright.<sup>236</sup>

The syntactical difficulty of the passage portrays racial scapegoating as a kind of grammatical error that mixes up modifiers, replaces one referent for another, and jumbles subjects and predicates. In *Nightwood*, Jewishness is associated with the alienation and fragmentation of existence within capitalism, or "offered as a 'sign'" of capitalism's "undoing" of social relations. But extending many scholars' readings of the anti-modern sentiment expressed through modern anti-Semitic discourse, *Nightwood* suggests the "Christian traffic in retribution has made the Jew's history a commodity." Given the dual character of the commodity form, "the Jew participates in two conditions." Although Jewishness is associated with the abstract dimension of capitalism, it will have a concrete presentation as well. Thus the commodity form is "the medium through which [the Jew] receives, at the necessary moment, the serum of his own past that he

may offer it again as his blood.” Put differently, if Jewish cultural identity can manifest as a matter of racial blood, this is because the abstract dimension of capitalism with which Jewishness is erroneously associated is inevitably attached to “the concrete” side of the antinomy, as well. For this reason, cultural identity might take on a racial character, and cultural aspersions might find a racial foothold. And for this reason, the worship of the “great past” makes Guido and Felix “heavy with impermissible blood.”<sup>237</sup>

### **Zoo Babies**

Last summer, I visited the Woodland Park Zoo in Seattle. For the reasons that so many animal studies scholars have explored – from their colonial legacies to their exploitation of animals – I generally find zoos to be disconcerting phenomena. Or more truthfully, loving animals, I loved any opportunity to look at animals, until I was touched by the unsettling stare of a pacing panther, sometime during my adolescence. And so, the visit was an atypical occupation of an August afternoon for me. The occasion: the diligent presentation of the couple form at a family picnic organized by my girlfriend’s employer, Seattle Children’s Hospital. The zoo must have seemed an obvious choice for a gathering of pediatricians, pediatric nurses, and their presumed progeny, for as evidenced by the hospital’s whale parking lot and giraffe emergency entrance – amongst other architectural adornments that I have often envied from the stark halls and dark basement offices of university buildings – children and animals are one of a cultural kind. This is something I discussed at the outset of this dissertation at length. What struck me on this summer afternoon, though, were less the human children at the zoo than the zoo animals’ “children,” who were enthusiastically advertised from the moment we picked up our tickets at the entrance. The zoo was abuzz with one word: babies. There were otter babies, lion babies, jaguar babies, sloth bear babies, and even a baby giraffe. Signs, maps, and other zoo-goers

spread the message: They are small, fuzzy, and frolicsome! Their cuteness will make you crazy! You just have to see the babies!

Zoos have made it their business to advertise novelty animal attractions as long as zoos have been in business. Soon after the London Zoological Society opened its doors to the rabble, sans the endorsement of any signatory, the enterprising manager D.W. Mitchell developed a system known as “starring,” meaning one curious novelty specimen would always be on display to attract new (and old) visitors.<sup>238</sup> The idea sprang from the success of the celebrated hippopotamus Obaysch, who more than doubled the turnout of the previous year when he first appeared in his London cage. Well before there were movie stars, believe it or not, there were zoo stars, whose extensive press coverage ensured steady attendance and sometimes even inspired fan riots. After Jumbo the elephant was sold by the London Zoological Society to P.T. Barnum’s circus, for instance, the public outcry in England was enormous, and of course, also encouraged by the ever-enterprising Barnum, as it only increased the elephant’s celebrity when he arrived in the U.S.

Obaysch was the first hippopotamus to step foot on the European continent in hundreds of years; Jumbo was one of the largest elephants ever held in Western captivity at that point in history. The making of an animal celebrity, to glean from these examples, would seem to hinge upon some combination of novel exhibition and exceptional nature. Relying on this well-tested formula, the baby boom at the Woodland Park Zoo delivered both brand new and exceptionally cute animals to a soon smitten public. To attempt to critically evaluate the experience of animal adorability is a dour endeavor, so not get me wrong: those small-clawed otters melted this cold queer heart in seconds. Watching the frolicsome furballs, I swear I felt an unfamiliar urge to have a litter of my own. But there would seem to be something more to this display of animal play

than an interspecies appreciation of youthful wonder. The otters' joyful invention of social relationships and curious testing of bodily capability suggested a very different game to some spectators, at least, if we consider the fact that the four pups were named after the Seattle Seahawks' Legion of Boom: Sherman, Thomas, Chancellor, and Maxwell. The joke contains a kernel of truth. For the play of the quarter back and the play of the otter pup, however produced by strict bodily discipline, in the first case, or productive of social worlds, in the second, offers the spectator the sense of release from the bounds of both.

The zoo baby brings us back to the autonomous animal surveyed throughout this chapter. Indeed, the infant animal may offer an intensified image of pre-cultural freedom, given its performance of play and exhibition of innocence. Yet the most popular baby at the Woodland Park Zoo is hoofs-down Misawa, the baby giraffe, who at two weeks of age, had already cultivated more mature, if less diverting, manners than the other babies I saw last summer. As he moved in graceful undulations about his pen, I had to wonder at his secret. For no other baby has earned himself a live webcam, nor anywhere near the advertising copy that Misawa has got. Neither quite cuddly nor often cavorting, this zoo baby has shown that strangeness is an equal attraction. In the cries to come see "the tallest baby in town," in fact, we might easily hear the echo of the freak show spiel. Misawa (now) the 6-foot 6-month-old is only one in a long line of (un)natural curiosities: the exceptionally big, the exceptionally small, and the exceptionally tall.

The zoo may have heaps of queer animals, but nonetheless, there are few places where the "natural" family form hails one so loudly. Indeed, beneath the baby boom excitement at Woodland Park, there often seems to be a giddy grabbing of an opportunity to fly in the face of hard-won feminist gains, shifted as they are to non-human terrain. On the Woodland Park Zoo's blog, the reader is assured that the female parents of the jaguar "triplets" and the lion

“quadruplets” have taken to the job quite naturally. They are “excellent mothers,” made for mating, built for breeding, and reduced to their reproductive capacity. Beyond its reification of both human and nonhuman animal nature, though, the zoo’s marketing of animal reproduction cloaks captivity as a conservationist measure: zoo animals as ambassadors for their endangered kind. The capacity of the captive animal to breed is cast as both a sign of their individual wellbeing and a contribution to the wellbeing of their species. Thus the Woodland Park Zoo proudly advertises its participation in Species Survival Plans (SSP), cooperative breeding programs led by the Association of Zoos & Aquariums. Yet these well-coordinated efforts to ensure the long-term survival *in North America* of species most often not native to that continent is more accurately and obviously an effort to ensure the long-term financial success of the zoos and aquariums that will gain possession of these animals, often with little consideration for their welfare.

Perhaps there is no better evidence for this claim than the fate of Chai,<sup>239</sup> the female Asian elephant who arrived at the Woodland Park Zoo in 1980, having been taken from her mother before her weaning. While she was still a zoo baby, Chai brought record-breaking crowds, and so once her growth had diminished her appeal, zookeepers identified her regular reproductive cycle as a likely source for another blockbuster baby. Considering costs, Woodland Park Zoo officials opted for artificial insemination, which involved “short chaining” Chai’s four legs, making it impossible for her to move more than an inch; inserting a flexible hose up the length of her 3-foot reproductive tract; and pumping sperm into her body. Given the invasiveness of the procedure, zookeepers regularly conducted mock inseminations for two years to accustom Chai to the experience, lest her resistance interfere with its successful completion once valuable

sperm was at stake. Thereafter, Chai was artificially inseminated up to 10 times a month, and sometimes twice per day, using sperm from a bull elephant in the Oregon Zoo.

After four years and ninety-one attempts at artificial insemination, Woodland Park Zoo officials decided to pursue other means to impregnate Chai, and petitioned the Association of Zoos and Aquariums to breed her with a bull at the Dickerson Park Zoo in Springfield, Montana. Officials at both Woodland Park Zoo and the AZA were well aware that Dickerson Park had been infected with an elephant herpes virus known as EEHV, which could lie dormant for years, but when activated, would destroy an elephant's internal organs in a matter of hours. The virus only attacks young elephants, however, so hoping any cross-contamination would not affect and/or outlast the gestation period, and desperate for a baby elephant, officials decided to take the risk. While Chai was stationed at Dickerson Park, two spectators witnessed a zookeeper beating her with a bullhook, and their report of the incident eventually compelled Dickerson Park Zoo to pay a \$5,000 fine in violation of the Animal Welfare Act. But Woodland Park Zoo fared much better from the exchange. Although she was worse for the wear – having lost over a thousand pounds from stress – Chai had conceived, and eventually she gave birth to female elephant named Hansa at the Woodland Park Zoo in 2000. Six years later, Hansa died from EEHV. For Chai, the death of Hansa meant the emotional distress that ethologists have long observed in elephants who experience the severing of deep social bonds by death or separation. For Woodland Park Zoo officials, the death of Hansa meant that Chai was the only remaining fertile female left at the Woodland Park Zoo, and so undeterred by past experiences and animal rights advocates, efforts to artificially inseminate began again.

I did not see Chai when I went to the Woodland Park Zoo last summer. I actually did not know about her story then, and she does not appear to anyone traveling zoo baby circuit, at least

for the time being. At the zoo that afternoon, however, I stopped for quite some time before another female animal: the lioness who lounged in the grass and watched impassively over her cubs, rolling and romping before her. She seemed to ignore the glass window against which a swarm of spectators were pressed, either not noticing or not deigning to respond to the human animals that gesticulated excitedly only 20 or 30 feet away. An eerily equivocal image of maternal contentment or gloomy acceptance, I could not say. Her “habitat” bore Hagenbeck’s mark, banishing bars and unfurling the sense of unbounded space. Still I wondered if there were potentialities that beckoned to her, histories that pressed, foreclosed by that enclosure. All the same, I caught my breath at her remarkable actualization before me. As Barnes might write, this lioness was ponderous, furred, and she made even the air seem full of withheld strength. I might simply say she was beautiful. Only I can’t be sure whether that statement is an acknowledgement or an erasure.

### Tailpiece

#### *Chaplinesque*

*We make our meek adjustments,  
Contented with such random consolations  
As the wind deposits  
In slithered and too ample pockets.*

*For we can still love the world, who find  
A famished kitten on the step, and know  
Recesses for it from the fury of the street,  
Or warm torn elbow coverts.*

*We will sidestep, and to the final smirk  
Dally the doom of that inevitable thumb  
That slowly chafes its puckered index toward us,  
Facing the dull squint with what innocence  
And what surprise!*

*And yet these fine collapses are not lies  
More than the pirouettes of any pliant cane;  
Our obsequies are, in a way, no enterprise.  
We can evade you, and all else but the heart:  
What blame to us if the heart live on.*

*The game enforces smirks; but we have seen  
The moon in lonely alleys make  
A grail of laughter of an empty ash can,  
And through all sound of gaiety and quest  
Have heard a kitten in the wilderness.*

*- Hart Crane*

Hart Crane's poem about a kitten has intrigued me since I first encountered it.

Uncharacteristically uncomplicated in its syntactical arrangement, for Crane, it is no more transparent for that. Over the years I've spent working on this project, its lines have occasionally threaded through my thinking, sometimes resonant, sometimes resistant, often representing for me the agonies of becoming-academic as much as any problematic of becoming-animal. I

suppose it's not surprising that in so long dallying the doom of that inevitable thumb, so to speak, "Chaplinesque" has become something of a scholarly credo of mine. Which is perhaps an appropriation that closes down the ambiguity proper to poetry. Or perhaps an adaptation that opens up the ambiguity proper to belief.

Even a wayward modernist such as myself can recognize how "Chaplinesque" succeeds, among other ways, in giving Ezra Pound the finger. It is a poem in which the heart lives on, daring sentiment, risking the bathetic, despite Pound's aesthetic prescription that poetry be "austere, direct, free from emotional slither." The brazen persistence of the heart in this poem is an aesthetic statement, to be sure, but it's also an orientation, even an ethic. Importantly, Crane's was no easy elation. His flights of poetic ecstasy were cut from an often times anguished existence, which ended with a strangely casual suicide by way of jumping off a steamship. Crane knew all too well that the "slithered and too ample pockets" of the speaker do not hold: emptiness will inevitably show the lining of amplex. Yet eventualities do not matter in the poem's persistent present tense. If we sense them hovering, then it is only the more to say: how bold the meek adjustments of this poem! How courageous the contentment!

In the most dizzying pirouette of "Chaplinesque," the loved world turns upon a kitten on the step. The statement spins manifold meanings. To sound only a few: we can still love the world, who find it full of suffering. We need not forget the world, who are touched by individual pain. We do not love the world, in fact, unless we hear the famished kitten in that wilderness. In yet another resonance, the sentimental image of the kitten is positioned in potential (if disputed) opposition to a larger vision. While the poem thus seems to recognize such failures of feeling, it refuses the inevitability of these outcomes. Still, the epistemological gap opened by the enjambment of the first two lines of the second stanza suggests that we can find, we can know,

the prescriptive basis for loving the world only with great uncertainty. The nonce response of making a warm bed from elbow covers, the immediate relation with the kitten who happens upon the step, serves as the model for ethical consideration. In this, there is no calculation of ontological minimums. Nor is there any longing for an animal-assisted escape from the world of human making. The hungry kitten adrift in the city street is an impossible repository of the sense of human ascendancy that masquerades as a return to primordial nature. The Romantic moon shines down upon an empty ash can, not Proteus rising from the sea.

Even so, the heart lives on, and Hart lives on, for knowing Crane's punning proclivities, assuredly this one is intentional. And pun plays upon homonym: the poet sidesteps the critic's chafing appraisal as the deer might dodge the hunter's sidling scope, according to the vivid imagery of the second stanza. Hart lives on as the hart lives on. But the antiquated word for a hunted animal – and the delightful referral of this animal name game (to Crane) – is not simply to proclaim the poet. The blustering assertion of human transcendence collapses with Crane's identification with an animal, with more than a few species in this poem, from those that slither to those that mew. Here, language is not a flight but a funeral rite, which Crane's use of (yet another antiquated word) "obsequy" serves to illustrate as much as to state. It is bound to its moment and material form; it is difficult to hear across the strong silence of historical distance. But this acknowledgement implies no obsequiousness to conventional modes, nor the abandonment of the imagination to enterprise. Only, the reader is tasked with imagining as well.

Despite its castigation of the critic, then, I sometimes think "Chaplinesque" is a poem as much about reading as it is about writing. In the dull squint of certain knowledge, there is no possibility. But in the darkened theatre, the rapt attention to the pirouettes of the pliant cane might permit such shifts in human apperception, from seeing (the moon in lonely alleys), to

imagining (a grail of laughter), from imagining (the sound of gaiety and quest), to perceiving (a kitten in the wilderness). The sensory drift in the final stanza of the poem performs the imagination's movement from the visible to the invisible, from silence to sounding, while the return from the envisioned to the actual insists that imagination is not escapism. Indeed, the introduction of the present perfect in the final lines of the poem suggests an alternative futurity unfolds only from the vantage of the situated past – and only from the perspective that has been affected, as has the viewer of the silent screen.

I've now come to the close of another performance, which is alas, not the last of the bows, the bow-wows, the game of academe will entail. And yet, these fine collapses are not lies. Even the dissertation is, in its way, no enterprise. The game enforces smirks, of course, but we have seen enough to believe that a profounder form of play might yield the opening of political possibility, the striving toward ethical relationship, the ability to simply survive the meek adjustments we must make, being the human animals that we are. And still to love the world in all the abundance of its creaturely life. It may be an odd thing to say at the haggard and harried end of one's graduate school career. But in sum of the work of the last many years, I can think of nothing better: the heart lives on, not only in spite, but also because of it.

## Notes

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### Introduction

<sup>1</sup> “Cinci Freedom: Cow Escapes Slaughterhouse and Prompts Public Outcry to Save Her,” Farm Sanctuary Official Website, Accessed April 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2014: <http://www.farmsanctuary.org/the-sanctuaries/rescued-animals/featured-past-rescues/freedom/>

<sup>2</sup> Jim Rohrer, “Fugitive Cow Cincinnati Freedom Became Star,” Cincinnati.Com, Accessed April 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2014: <http://www2.cincinnati.com/blogs/ourhistory/2011/10/02/fugitive-cow-cinci-freedom-became-star/>

<sup>3</sup> Carol Adams, *The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory* (New York: Continuum, 1990).

<sup>4</sup> Donna Haraway, *Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the World of Modern Science* (New York: Routledge, 1989); Susanne Kappeler, “Speciesism, Racism, Nationalism,” in *Animals & Women: Feminist Theoretical Explorations*, ed. Carol Adams and Josephine Donovan (Duke: Duke UP, 1995), 320-352.

<sup>5</sup> Cary Wolfe, *Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of Species, and Posthumanist Theory* (Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, 2003), 6.

<sup>6</sup> Clare Kim, “Slaying the Beast,” *Kalfou: A Journal of Comparative and Relational Ethnic Studies* 11.1 (2010): 57-74; Nicole Shukin, *Animal Capital: Rendering Life in Biopolitical Times* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009).

<sup>7</sup> Wolfe, *Animal Rites*, 6.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 45.

<sup>9</sup> Cary Wolfe, *Before the Law: Humans and Other Animals in a Biopolitical Frame* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013), 10.

<sup>10</sup> Jacques Derrida, *The Animal that Therefore I Am*, ed. Marie-Louise Mallet and trans. David Wills (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 89.

<sup>11</sup> Laura Brown, *Homeless Dogs & Melancholy Apes: Humans and Other Animals in the Modern Literary Imagination* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2010), 7.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 17.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>14</sup> Jennifer Mason, *Civilized Creatures: Urban Animals, Sentimental Culture, and American Literature, 1850-1900* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2005).

<sup>15</sup> Mark Seltzer, *Bodies and Machines* (New York; London: Routledge, 1992).

<sup>16</sup> Michael Lundblad, *The Birth of a Jungle: Animality in Progressive Era U.S. Literature and Culture* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2013).

<sup>17</sup> Carrie Rohman, *Stalking the Subject: Modernism and the Animal* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009); Glenn Willmott, *Modern Animalism: Habits of Scarcity and Wealth in Comics and Literature* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012).

<sup>18</sup> Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” (1971), *Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology: Michel Foucault*, ed. James D. Faubion and trans. Robert Hurley et al. (New York: New Press, 1998), 374.

<sup>19</sup> Raymond Williams, *Marxism and Literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977).

<sup>20</sup> Steve Baker, *Picturing the Beast: Animals, Identity, and Representation* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993), 28.

<sup>21</sup> Michael Lundblad, *The Birth of a Jungle*, 12.

<sup>22</sup> On new materialism, see Karen Barad, "Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter Comes to Matter," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 28.3 (2003): 801-831; Karen Barad, *Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning* (Duke: Duke UP, 2007); Jane Bennett, *Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things* (Durham: Duke UP, 2010); Diana Coole and Samantha Frost, eds., *New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics* (Durham: Duke UP 2010).

<sup>23</sup> Colleen Glenney Boggs, *Animalia Americana: Animal Representations and Biopolitical Subjectivity* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013); Alice Kuzniar, *Melancholia's Dog* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2006).

<sup>24</sup> Boggs, *Animalia Americana*, 6.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Erica Fudge, "A Left-Handed Blow: Writing the History of Animals," *Representing Animals*, ed. Nigel Rothfels (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 3-18.

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<sup>28</sup> Thomas Nagel, "What is it like to be a Bat?" *The Philosophical Review* LXXXIII. 4 (October 1974): 435-450.

<sup>29</sup> Fudge, "A Left-Handed Blow," 7.

<sup>30</sup> Susan Nance, *Entertaining Elephants: Animal Agency and the Business of the American Circus* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins UP, 2013), 9.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., 10.

<sup>32</sup> Susan McHugh, *Animal Stories: Narrating Across Species Lines* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011).

<sup>33</sup> Bruno Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1993).

## Chapter 1

<sup>1</sup> Prison-Pet Partnership Official Website, "About Us," accessed March 19, 2014.

[http://www.prisonpetpartnership.org/html\\_new/about.htm](http://www.prisonpetpartnership.org/html_new/about.htm)

<sup>2</sup> Washington Department of Corrections Official Website, "Animal Training Programs," accessed March 19, 2014. <http://doc.wa.gov/facilities/prison/animaltrainingprograms.asp>

<sup>3</sup> Brigadoon Service Dogs Official Website, "FAQs," accessed March 19, 2014.

<http://www.brigadoondogs.com/FAQ.html>

<sup>4</sup> Petfinder Official Website, "Prison-Pet Partnership Official Website," accessed March 19, 2014. <http://www.petfinder.com/shelters/WA243.html>

<sup>5</sup> "Zoey," *Paw Print Press: A Prison Pet Partnership Publication* 12.2 (Spring 2013): 2.

<sup>6</sup> Nicole Riviero, "Paroled Pooches Looking for Happy Homes," *Paw Print Press: A Prison Pet Partnership Publication* 12.2 (Spring 2013): 3.

<sup>7</sup> "Freya," *Paw Print Press: A Prison Pet Partnership Publication* 9.1 (Winter 2010): 2.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>9</sup> Prison-Pet Partnership Official Website, "In the News," accessed March 19, 2014.

[http://www.prisonpetpartnership.org/html\\_new/news.htm](http://www.prisonpetpartnership.org/html_new/news.htm)

<sup>10</sup> For discussions of affect, see especially Sara Ahmed, *The Cultural Politics of the Emotions* (New York: Routledge, 2004); Lauren Berlant, *The Female Complaint: The Unfinished Business of Sentimentality in American Culture* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008); Lauren Berlant, "The Subject of Tree Feeling: Pain, Privacy, and Politics," in *Cultural Pluralism, Identity Politics, and the Law*, ed. Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1999): 49-84; Lauren Berlant, ed., *Compassion: The Culture and Politics of an Emotion* (New York: Routledge, 2004); Patricia Ticineto Clough, "Affect and Control: Rethinking the Body 'Beyond Sex and Gender,'" *Feminist Theory* 4:3 (2003): 359-364; Patricia Ticineto Clough and Jean Halley, ed., *The Affective Turn: Theorizing the Social* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007); Federica Giardini, "Public Affects: Clues Towards a Political Practice of Singularity," *European Journal of Women's Studies* 6:149 (May 1999): 149-159; Michael Hardt, "Affective Labor," *boundary 2* 26:2 (1999): 89-100; Clare Hemmings, "Invoking Affect: Cultural Theory and the Ontological Turn," *Cultural Studies* 19.5 (September 2005): 548-567; Brian Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002); Eve K. Sedgwick, *Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003).

<sup>11</sup> The critical conversation surrounding nineteenth-century sentimentality, women, and femininity is particularly expansive. See especially Elizabeth Barnes, *States of Sympathy: Seduction and Democracy in the American Novel* (New York: Columbia UP, 1997); Gillian Brown, *Domestic Individualism: Imagining Self in Nineteenth-Century America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Cathy Davidson and Jessamyn Hatcher, eds., *No More Separate Spheres!* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002); Ann Douglas, *The Feminization of American Culture* (New York: The Noonday Press, 1977); Lori D. Ginzberg, *Women and the Work of Benevolence: Morality, Politics, and Class in the Nineteenth-Century United States* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990); Glenn Hendler, *Public Sentiments: Structures of Feeling in Nineteenth-Century American Literature* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Mary Kelley, *Private Woman, Public Stage: Literary Domesticity in Nineteenth Century America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984); and Cindy Weinstein, *Family, Kinship and Sympathy in Nineteenth-Century American Literature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Amy Schrager Lang, "Class and the Strategies of Sympathy," in *The Culture of Sentiment: Race, Gender, and Sentimentality in Nineteenth-Century America*, ed. Shirley Samuels (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); Lori Merish, *Sentimental Materialism: Gender, Commodity Culture, and Nineteenth-Century American Literature* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000); and Elizabeth White Nelson, *Market Sentiments: Middle-Class Market Culture in Nineteenth Century America* (Washington: Smithsonian Books, 2004).

<sup>12</sup> On the romantic child, see Gillian Avery, *Behold the Child: American Children and Their Books, 1621-1922* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 155-210; Priscilla Ferguson Clement, *Growing Pains: Children in the Industrial Age, 1850-1890* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1997); Mary Lynn Stevens Heininger, "Children, Childhood, and Change in America, 1820-1920," in *A Century of Childhood, 1820-1920*, ed. Mary Lynn Stevens Heininger et al. (Rochester: Margaret Woodbury Strong Museum, 1984), 1-32; Anne Scott Macleod, *American Childhood: Essays on Children's Literature of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1994), 143-156; Gail Schmunk Murray, *American Children's Literature and the Construction of Childhood* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1998),

51-116; Steve Mintz, *Huck's Raft: A History of American Childhood* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), 118-184; Karen Sanchez-Eppler, *Dependent States: The Child's Part in Nineteenth Century American Culture* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), 67-232.

<sup>13</sup> On nineteenth-century sentimentality and slavery, see especially Michelle Burnham, *Captivity & Sentiment: Cultural Exchange in American Literature, 1682-1861* (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1997); Susan M. Ryan, *Race and the Antebellum Culture of Benevolence* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003); Shirley Samuels, "The Identity of Slavery," in *The Culture of Sentiment: Race, Gender, and Sentimentality in Nineteenth Century America*, ed. Shirley Samuels (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 157-171; Karen Sanchez-Eppler, *Touching Liberty: Abolition, Feminism, and the Politics of the Body* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Lora Romero, *Home Fronts: Domesticity and its Critics in the Antebellum United States* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997); Laura Wexler, "Tender Violence: Literary Eavesdropping, Domestic Fiction, and Educational Reform," in *The Culture of Sentiment: Race, Gender, and Sentimentality in Nineteenth Century America*, ed. Shirley Samuels (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1992), 9-38.

<sup>14</sup> On animals and nineteenth-century sentimentality, see Jennifer Mason, *Civilized Creatures: Urban Animals, Sentimental Culture, and American Literature, 1850-1900* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005); Colleen Glenney Boggs, *Animalia Americana: Animal Representations and Biopolitical Subjectivity* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013); Brigitte Nicole Fielder, "Animal Humanism: Race, Species, and Affective Kinship in Nineteenth-Century Abolitionism," *American Quarterly* 65.3 (September 2013): 487-514.

<sup>15</sup> Indeed, animal welfare advocates on both sides of the Atlantic were closely tied to and often overlapped with abolitionist circles. George Angell, the founder of the Massachusetts SPCA, shared a law office with the prominent abolitionist leader Samuel Sewall. Abolitionists such as William Wilberforce sponsored bills preventing cruelty to animals, and prominent women abolitionists and writers such as Lydia Maria Child and Harriet Beecher Stowe took up their pens on behalf animals as well as the enslaved. In fact, one of Stowe's essays on the topic, "Rights of Dumb Animals" (1869), was circulated in the foremost publication of the early animal welfare movement, the Massachusetts SPCA monthly *Our Dumb Animals*, which incidentally, borrowed the iconography of Garrison's *The Liberator* in its masthead, substituting the figure of an enchained slave with that of a beaten horse. See James Turner, *Reckoning with the Beast: Animals, Pain, and Humanity in the Victorian Mind* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), 35-36; Jennifer Mason, *Civilized Creatures*, 122.

<sup>16</sup> Turner, *Reckoning with the Beast*, 37.

<sup>17</sup> Susan Pearson, *The Rights of the Defenseless: Protecting Animals and Children in Gilded Age America* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2011).

<sup>18</sup> Jeremy Bentham, "Principles of Penal Law," in *The Works of Jeremy Bentham*, vol. 1, ed. John Bowring (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1843). <http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/2009>

<sup>19</sup> International Vegetarian Union, "North America: 18<sup>th</sup> Century, Thomas Paine (1737-1809)," <http://www.ivu.org/history/northam18/paine.html> Paine, ll. 2.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, ll. 7.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, ll. 21-22.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, ll. 33-34.

<sup>23</sup> For histories addressing the emergence of ideas of animal sentience, see Gerald Carson, *Men, Beasts, and Gods: A History of Cruelty and Kindness to Animals* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1972), 43-138; Anita Guerrini, *Experimenting with Humans and Animals: From Galen to Animal Rights* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 70-92; Harriet Ritvo, *The Animal Estate: The English and Other Creatures in the Victorian Age* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), 1-44; Keith Thomas, *Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England 1500-1800* (London: Allen Lane, 1983), 121-191; James, *Reckoning with the Beast*, 1-38.

<sup>24</sup> Humphrey Primatt, *A Dissertation on the Duty of Mercy and Sin of Cruelty to Brute Animals* (1776) Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 2000, 7-8.

<sup>25</sup> Jeremy Bentham, "An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation" (1789), in *The Works of Jeremy Bentham*, vol. 1, ed. John Bowring (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1843). <http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/2009>

<sup>26</sup> Kathleen Kete, *The Beast in the Boudoir: Pet-Keeping in Nineteenth-Century Paris* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 2.

<sup>27</sup> Katherine C. Grier, "Animal House: Pet Keeping in Urban and Suburban Households in the Northeast, 1850-1900," in *New England's Creatures, 1400-1900: The Dublin Seminar for New England Folklife Annual Proceedings, 1993*, ed. by Peter Benes (Boston: Boston University Press, 1995), 120. See also Grier's *Pets in America: A History* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006).

<sup>28</sup> Mason, *Civilized Creatures*, 13.

<sup>29</sup> For discussions of the Lockean child in nineteenth century American culture, see Gillian Avery, *Behold the Child: American Children and Their Books, 1621-1922* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 65-154; Heininger, Mary Lynn Stevens Heininger, "Children, Childhood, and Change in America, 1820-1920," in *A Century of Childhood, 1820-1920*, ed. Mary Lynn Stevens Heininger et al. (Rochester: Margaret Woodbury Strong Museum, 1984), 1-32; Anne Scott Macleod, *American Childhood: Essays on Children's Literature of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1994), 99-142; Gail Schmunk Murray, *American Children's Literature and the Construction of Childhood* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1998), 23-50; Steve Mintz, *Huck's Raft: A History of American Childhood* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), 75-117; Karen Sanchez-Eppler, *Dependent States: The Child's Part in Nineteenth Century American Culture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 1-66.

<sup>30</sup> Richard Brodhead, "Sparing the Rod: Discipline and Fiction in Antebellum America," *Representations* 21 (Winter 1988): 67-96.

<sup>31</sup> Brodhead, "Sparing the Rod," 72.

<sup>32</sup> Boggs, *Animalia Americana*, 133-155; Katherine C. Grier, "Animal House," 120; Jennifer Mason, *Civilized Creatures*, 14; Pearson, *The Rights of the Defenseless*, 21-56; Turner, *Reckoning with the Beast*, 12.

<sup>33</sup> John Locke, *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690), ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 159-60.

<sup>34</sup> John Locke, *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* (1693), ed. John W. Yolton and Jean S. Yolton. vol. of *The Clarendon Edition of the Works of John Locke*, edited by John W. Yolton (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 180-181

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- <sup>35</sup> See Lydia H. Sigourney, *Letters to Mothers*, 6<sup>th</sup> ed. (New York: Harper, 1846), 35; Sarah Josepha Hale, *Manners; or, Happy Homes and Good Society All the Year Round* (1868) (New York: Arno Press, 1972), 244.
- <sup>36</sup> Sigourney, *Letters to Mothers*, 35.
- <sup>37</sup> Catherine Maria Sedgwick, *Home* (Boston: James Munroe and Company, 1835), 17.
- <sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 18.
- <sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 19.
- <sup>41</sup> Boggs, *Animalia Americana*, 147.
- <sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 135.
- <sup>43</sup> Sedgwick, *Home*, 18.
- <sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 20.
- <sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 25.
- <sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 28.
- <sup>47</sup> Sarah Trimmer, *Fabulous Histories; or, The History of the Robins: Designed for the Instruction of Children, Respecting Their Treatment of Animals* (1785), 13<sup>th</sup> ed. (London: N. Hailes, 1821), 50.
- <sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 51-2.
- <sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 80.
- <sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 157.
- <sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 130.
- <sup>52</sup> Harriet Ritvo, "Learning from Animals: Natural History for Children in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries," *Children's Literature* 13 (1985): 80.
- <sup>53</sup> *Natural History; or, Uncle Philip's Conversations with the Children about Tools and Trades among Inferior Animals* (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1835), 89.
- <sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 212.
- <sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, 80.
- <sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, 146.
- <sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, 148.
- <sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 150.
- <sup>60</sup> *False Stories Corrected* (New York: Samuel Wood, 1814), 3.
- <sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.
- <sup>62</sup> Samuel G. Goodrich, *Peter Parley's Book of Fables* (Hartford: White, Dwier and Co., 1836), 5.
- <sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.
- <sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, 7-8.
- <sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.
- <sup>66</sup> See Fielder, "Animal Humanism"; Lesley Ginsberg "Of Babies, Beasts, and Bondage: Slavery and the Question of Citizenship in Antebellum American Children's Literature," in *The American Child: A Cultural Studies Reader*, ed. Caroline F. Levander and Carol J. Singley (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2003): 85-105.
- <sup>67</sup> Deborah de Rosa, *Domestic Abolitionism and Juvenile Literature, 1830-1865* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2003), 13.
- <sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, 24.

- <sup>69</sup> Ibid., 19, 24.
- <sup>70</sup> Gilman, "Frank, To His Rabbit," *The Rose Bud, or Youth's Gazette* (July 13, 1833): 182, ll. 29-30.
- <sup>71</sup> Ibid., ll. 35-40.
- <sup>72</sup> Ibid., ll. 47-48.
- <sup>73</sup> Follen, "Billy Rabbit to Mary," *Into the Mouths of Babes: An Anthology of Abolitionist Children's Literature*, ed. Deborah de Rosa (Westport: Praeger, 2005), 50.
- <sup>74</sup> Ibid., ll. 5-10.
- <sup>75</sup> Ibid., ll. 7-8.
- <sup>76</sup> F. Mellon, "The Escape of the Doves," *Parleys Magazine* 3 (1835): 101, ll. 29-32.
- <sup>77</sup> Lydia Maria Child, "Who Stole the Bird's Nest," *The Youth's Companion* 20.1 (1846): 4, ll. 1-4.
- <sup>78</sup> Elizabeth Margaret Chandler, "The Sandpiper," in *The Poetical Works of Margaret Chandler*, ed. Benjamin Lundy (Philadelphia: Lemuel Howell, 1836), 65, ll. 25-30.
- <sup>79</sup> Ibid., ll. 33-34.
- <sup>80</sup> Fielder, "Animal Humanism," 492.
- <sup>81</sup> William Lloyd Garrison, Preface to *Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, An American Slave, Written by Himself* (1845), ed. by John W. Blassingame, John R. McKivigan, and Peter P. Hinks (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 2001), 7.
- <sup>82</sup> Fielder, "Animal Humanism," 493.
- <sup>83</sup> Ibid., 488.
- <sup>84</sup> Lesley Ginsberg, "'I am Your Slave for Love': Race, Sentimentality, and Harriet Beecher Stowe's Fiction for Children," in *Enterprising Youth: Social Values and Acculturation in Nineteenth-Century American Children's Literature*, ed. Monika Elbert (New York: Routledge, 2008), 99.
- <sup>85</sup> Ann and Jane Taylor, *Original Poems for Infant Minds* (Philadelphia: L.B. Clarke, 1830), 81, ll. 2; ll. 4.
- <sup>86</sup> Ibid., ll. 19.
- <sup>87</sup> Taylor, "The Mistress's Reply to Her Little Bird," 82, ll. 25-28.
- <sup>88</sup> Ibid., 82, 3-4.
- <sup>89</sup> Ibid., 13.
- <sup>90</sup> Ibid., 23-24.
- <sup>91</sup> Ibid., 22; 32.
- <sup>92</sup> Ibid., 33-36.
- <sup>93</sup> Brown, *Domestic Individualism*, 39-62.
- <sup>94</sup> Ibid., 41.
- <sup>95</sup> Ibid., 42.
- <sup>96</sup> Harriet Beecher Stowe, *Queer Little People* (Boston: Ticknor and Fields, 1867).
- <sup>97</sup> Stowe, "Miss Katy-Did and Miss Cricket," *Our Young Folks* 2.5 (May 1866): 291.
- <sup>98</sup> Ibid., 293.
- <sup>99</sup> Stowe, "Aunt Ester's Stories," *Our Young Folks* 1.10 (October 1865): 670.
- <sup>100</sup> Ibid., 668.
- <sup>101</sup> Follen, *True Stories about Dogs and Cats* (Boston: Whittemore, Niles, and Hall, 1856).
- <sup>102</sup> Ibid., 2.
- <sup>103</sup> Mason, *Civilized Creatures*, 19.

<sup>104</sup> See Katherine C. Grier, “Animal House”; Mason, *Civilized Creatures*; Pearson, *Rights of the Defenseless*, 21-56; and Turner, *Reckoning with the Beast*, 96-121.

<sup>105</sup> For discussions of the growing acceptance of imaginative children’s literature, see Avery, *Behold the Child*, 155-210; Macleod, *American Childhood*, 51-116; Murray, *American Children’s Literature*, 51-116.

<sup>106</sup> Follen, *True Stories about Dogs and Cats*, 9.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.

<sup>108</sup> Gilman, “The Little Boy Pleads for a Mouse,” *The Rose Bud* (August 3, 1833): 196, ll. 13-14.

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*, ll. 17-20.

<sup>110</sup> Asa Bullard, *Aunt Lizzie’s Stories* (Boston: Lee & Shepard, 1863), 62.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*, 42.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*, 16.

<sup>113</sup> E. Johnson, *The Judges Pets: Stories of a Family and its Dumb Friends* (New York: Hurd and Houghton, 1872), 73.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*, 74.

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*, 76.

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid.*, 78.

<sup>117</sup> Saidiya Hartman, *Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

<sup>118</sup> Stephen M. Best, *The Fugitive’s Properties: Law and the Poetics of Possession* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).

<sup>119</sup> Stowe, “Our Dogs: V,” *Our Young Folks* 1.7 (July 1865): 461.

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>121</sup> Stowe, “Our Dogs: II,” *Our Young Folks* 1.4 (April 1865): 230.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>125</sup> See Colin Dayan, *The Law is a White Dog: How Legal Rituals Make and Unmake Persons* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); Angela Y. Davis, “From the Prison of Slavery to the Slavery of Prison: Frederick Douglass and the Convict Lease System,” in *The Angela Y. Davis Reader*, ed. Joy James (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1998), 74-95; Alexander C. Lichtenstein, *Twice the Work of Free Labor: The Political Economy of Convict Labor in the New South* (London; New York: Verso, 1996).

<sup>126</sup> See especially Pearson, *The Rights of the Defenseless*, 137-184.

<sup>127</sup> George T. Angell, *Autobiographical Sketches and Personal Recollections* (Boston: The American Humane Education Society, 1892), 46, 54.

<sup>128</sup> For general histories of the early animal welfare movement in the United States, see Diane Beers, *For the Prevention of Cruelty: The History and Legacy of Animal Rights Activism in the United States* (Athens: Swallow Press, 2006); Sydney H. Coleman, *Humane Society Leaders in America* (Albany: The American Human Association, 1924); Gerald Carson, *Men, Beasts, and Gods: A History of Cruelty and Kindness to Animals* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1972), 63-138; Lawrence Finsen and Susan Finsen, *The Animal Rights Movement in America: From Compassion to Respect* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994), 23-71; Roswell C. McCrea, *The Humane Movement: A Descriptive Survey* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1910); Susan Pearson, *The Rights of the Defenseless*; James Turner, *Reckoning with the Beast*,

45-59; Bernard Oreste Unti, "The Quality of Mercy: Organized Animal Protection in the United States, 1866-1930" (Ph.D. diss., American University, 2002); Keith Tester, *Animals & Society: The Humanity of Animal Rights* (New York: Routledge, 1991).

<sup>129</sup> The correspondence between the end of slavery and the rise of animal welfare is evident in the British context, as well. In 1809, two years after the abolition of the English slave trade, Lord Thomas Erskine introduced a bill for the protection of animals in Great Britain. While a similar bill had been laughed off the floor in 1802, Erskine's measure lost by only ten votes. The following decades witnessed the passing of Richard Martin's bill preventing cruelty to animals in 1822; the founding of the first Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA) in 1824; and the abolition of slavery within the British empire in 1833. For more information on the animal welfare movement in Great Britain, see Moira Ferguson, *Animal Advocacy and Englishwomen, 1780-1900: Patriots, Nation, and Empire* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998); Hilda Kean, *Animal Rights: Political and Social Change in Britain since 1800s* (London: Reaktion Books, 1998); Coral Lansbury, *The Old Brown Dog: Women, Workers, and Vivisection in Edwardian England* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1985); Deborah Denenholz Morse and Martin A. Danahay, eds. *Victorian Animal Dreams: Representations of Animals in Victorian Literature and Culture* (Hampshire; Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2007); David Perkins, *Romanticism and Animal Rights* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003); Turner, *Reckoning with the Beast*; Harriet Ritvo, *Animal Estate: The English and Other Creatures in the Victorian Age* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987).

<sup>130</sup> George Angell, "The New Order of Mercy; or, Crime and its Prevention," paper presented at the annual meeting of the National Association of Superintendents of Public Schools, Washington, D.C., Feb 14, 1884), 27.

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*, 58, 84.

<sup>132</sup> Lydia Maria Child, *The Freedman's Book* (Boston: Ticknor and Fields, 1865), 97-101.

<sup>133</sup> Angell, *Autobiographical Sketches and Personal Recollections*, 94.

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*, 94-7.

<sup>136</sup> Coleman O. Parsons has situated *Black Beauty* in relationship to its "progenitors," but in reading George MacDonald as Sewell's primary influence, Parsons fails to recognize the significantly different modes of representation these authors employ. See Coleman O. Parsons, "The Progenitors of Black Beauty in Humanitarian Literature," *Notes and Queries* 192 (1947): 156-158. Laura Brown also discusses first-person animal stories in Great Britain that antedate the post-bellum appearance of the genre in the U.S., but again, these fantastical tales do not intend a realist depiction of animal. See Laura Brown, *Homeless Dogs and Melancholy Apes: Humans and Other Animals in the Modern Literary Imagination* (Cornell University Press, 2010), 113-143. Colleen Glenney Boggs has explored the biopolitics of a more recent American animal autobiography, Barbara Bush's *Millie's Book, as Dictated to Barbara Bush* (1990). Boggs's careful attention to this late twentieth century example of the genre, however, does not afford extensive consideration of its nineteenth century emergence. See Colleen Glenney Boggs, *Animalia Americana*, 157-186. Susan J. Pearson, on the other hand, discusses one animal autobiography (as I understand the genre) written prior to *Black Beauty*, "The Story of a Good and Faithful Horse, Told by Himself" (1868). See Susan Pearson, *The Rights of the Defenseless*, 124-128.

<sup>137</sup> As existing biographical evidence suggests animal autobiographies were written almost exclusively by (white) women, the genre marks the largely unacknowledged and critical role women played in the early humane movement.

<sup>138</sup> Although she identified as Nova Scotian throughout her life, Saunders periodically lived in the U.S. and regularly wrote for American journals such as *Godey's Lady's Book*. See *Dictionary of Literary Biography*, s.v. "Margaret Marshall Saunders," (by Carole Gerson), accessed on March 23, 2013,

[http://go.galegroup.com.offcampus.lib.washington.edu/ps/retrieve.do?sgHitCountType=None&sort=RELEVANCE&inPS=true&prodId=LitRC&userGroupName=wash\\_main&tabID=T001&searchId=R2&resultListType=RESULT\\_LIST&contentSegment=&searchType=BasicSearchForm&currentPosition=1&contentSet=GALE%7CH1200004385&&docId=GALEIH1200004385&docType=GALE&role=LitRC](http://go.galegroup.com.offcampus.lib.washington.edu/ps/retrieve.do?sgHitCountType=None&sort=RELEVANCE&inPS=true&prodId=LitRC&userGroupName=wash_main&tabID=T001&searchId=R2&resultListType=RESULT_LIST&contentSegment=&searchType=BasicSearchForm&currentPosition=1&contentSet=GALE%7CH1200004385&&docId=GALEIH1200004385&docType=GALE&role=LitRC)

<sup>139</sup> Jennifer Mason first drew my attention to Charles Chesnutt's review. See Jennifer Mason, *Civilized Creatures*, 133.

<sup>140</sup> John F. Lacey, "Introduction," *Dickey Downy: The Autobiography of a Bird* (Philadelphia: Rowland, 1899), 5-8.

<sup>141</sup> For more information about Lacey and other conservationists concerned especially with the protection of non-game birds, see Robin W. Doughty, *Feather Fashions and Bird Preservation: A Study in Nature Protection* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).

<sup>142</sup> Both Robert Dingley and Peter Stoneley have examined the racial discourse of *Black Beauty*, specifically, interpreting an inter-textual conversation between *Black Beauty* and *Uncle Tom's Cabin*. In likening *Black Beauty* to the sentimental novel of a white abolitionist, however, these critics ultimately misrecognize the generic field within which *Black Beauty* and other animal autobiographies operate and so misread their cultural aims and effects. Peter Stoneley, "Sentimental Emasculations: Uncle Tom's Cabin and Black Beauty," *Nineteenth-Century Literature* 54.1 (1999): 53-72; Robert Dingley, "A Horse of a Different Color: Black Beauty and the Pressures of Indebtedness," *Victorian Literature and Culture* 25.2 (1997): 241-51.

<sup>143</sup> Moira Ferguson, *Animal Advocacy and Englishwomen, 1780-1900: Patriots, Nation, and Empire* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998).

<sup>144</sup> Mason, *Civilized Creatures*, 119-156.

<sup>145</sup> Pearson, *The Rights of the Defenseless*, 124-128.

<sup>146</sup> Though certainly not an exhaustive list, the animal autobiographies that figure centrally in this discussion include Anna Sewell, *Black Beauty* (1877) (New York: Aladdin Paperbacks, 2001); *Autobiography of a Canary Bird* (New York: Anson D. F. Randolph, 1866); Margaret Marshall Saunders, *Beautiful Joe: An Autobiography* (Philadelphia: Charles H. Banes, 1893); Virginia Sharpe Patterson, *Dickey Downy: The Autobiography of a Bird* (Philadelphia: Rowland, 1899); Susanna Louise Patteson, *Pussy Meow: The Autobiography of a Cat* (Philadelphia: Jacobs & Co., 1901); Mollie Lee Clifford, *Yoppy: The Autobiography of a Monkey* (Boston: H. M. Caldwell Co., 1905); and Mollie Lee Clifford, *Polly: The Autobiography of a Parrot* (Boston: H. M. Caldwell Co., 1906). I mention briefly a few British-authored autobiographies reprinted in the U.S., including H. B. Paull, *Only a Cat, or The Autobiography of Tom Blackman* (New York: Thomas Whittaker, 1880) and A. E. Bonser, *Exmoor Star, or, The Autobiography of a Pony* (Chicago: A. S. Barnes and Company, 1906). The fairy tale translator Susannah Mary Paull's *Only a Cat, or the Autobiography of Tom Blackman* (1876) was first published in the U.S. in 1880 and printed again by the American Humane Education Society in the early 1890s.

As this discussion focuses on the production and reception of animal autobiographies in the American context, I have refrained from extension discussion of British-authored animal autobiographies by the children's author Elizabeth Burrows and the popular novelist Elizabeth Caroline Grey. However, books that receive brief mention include E. Burrows, *Tuppy: Or, The Autobiography of a Donkey* (London: Griffith and Farran, 1859); E. Burrows, *Neptune: Or, The Autobiography of a Newfoundland Dog, by the Author of "Tuppy"* (London: Griffith and Farran, 1869); Elizabeth Caroline Grey, *The Autobiography of Frank, The Happiest Dog Who Ever Lived* (London: Darton and Company, 1861).

<sup>147</sup> Yuval Taylor, "Introduction" to *I Was Born a Slave: An Anthology of Classic Slave Narratives*, ed. Yuval Taylor (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 1999), xv-xxxviii.

<sup>148</sup> John Sekora, "Black Message/White Envelope: Genre, Authenticity and Authority in the Antebellum Slave Narrative," *Callaloo* 32 (Summer 1987): 482-515.

<sup>149</sup> Harriet Jacobs, *Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl*, ed. Lydia Maria Child (San Diego: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1973), 56.

<sup>150</sup> Sewell, *Black Beauty*, 4.

<sup>151</sup> Saunders, *Beautiful Joe*, 296.

<sup>152</sup> Patteson, *Pussy Meow*, 155.

<sup>153</sup> Frances Trego Montgomery, *Billy Whiskers: The Autobiography of a Goat* (Chicago: Saalfield Publishing Company, 1902).

<sup>154</sup> Paull, *Only a Cat*, 82.

<sup>155</sup> Sewell, *Black Beauty*, 194.

<sup>156</sup> See Pearson, *The Rights of the Defenseless*.

<sup>157</sup> Lansbury, Coral Lansbury, *The Old Brown Dog: Women, Workers, and Vivisection in Edwardian England* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 74.

<sup>158</sup> Sewall, *Black Beauty*, 150.

<sup>159</sup> Henry Bibb, "Narrative of the Life and Adventures of Henry Bibb," in *I Was Born a Slave: An Anthology of Classic Slave Narratives*, vol. 2, ed. Yuval Taylor (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 1999), 73.

<sup>160</sup> Henry Bibb, "Narrative of the Life and Adventures of Henry Bibb," in *I Was Born a Slave: An Anthology of Classic Slave Narratives*, vol. 2, ed. Yuval Taylor (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 1999), 74.

<sup>161</sup> Grey, *The Autobiography of Frank*, 16.

<sup>162</sup> Burrows, *Tuppy*, 17.

<sup>163</sup> *Ibid.*, 19.

<sup>164</sup> Solomon Northrup, "Twelve Years a Slave," in *I Was Born a Slave: An Anthology of Classic Slave Narratives*, vol. 2, ed. Yuval Taylor (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 1999): 159-318.

<sup>165</sup> Moses Roper, "A Narrative of the Adventures and Escape of Moses Roper," in *I Was Born a Slave: An Anthology of Classic Slave Narratives*, vol. 1, ed. Yuval Taylor (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 1999): 259-486.

<sup>166</sup> Patterson, *Dickey Downey*, 34.

<sup>167</sup> *Ibid.*, 35.

<sup>168</sup> *Ibid.*, 131.

<sup>169</sup> *Ibid.*, 45.

<sup>170</sup> Sewall, *Black Beauty*, 88-9.

<sup>171</sup> Gina Marlene Dorré, "Horses and Corsets: Black Beauty, Dress Reform, and the

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Fashioning of the Victorian Woman," *Victorian Literature and Culture* 30.1 (2002): 176.

<sup>172</sup> Thomas Branagan, *The Penitential Tyrant; or, Slave Trader Reformed* (New York: Samuel Wood, 1807), 271.

<sup>173</sup> Sewall, *Black Beauty*, 84.

<sup>174</sup> *Ibid.*, 45.

<sup>175</sup> Dorré, "Horses and Corsets," 162.

<sup>176</sup> Qtd. in Marlene Dorré, "Horses and Corsets," 162.

<sup>177</sup> Patterson, *Dickey Downy*, 29.

<sup>178</sup> *Ibid.*, 29.

<sup>179</sup> *Ibid.*, 30.

<sup>180</sup> *Ibid.*, 31.

<sup>181</sup> Patteson, *Pussy Meow*, 190.

<sup>182</sup> *Ibid.*, 194.

<sup>183</sup> *Ibid.*, 207.

<sup>184</sup> *Ibid.*, 215.

<sup>185</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>186</sup> Sewell, *Black Beauty*, 10-11.

<sup>187</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.

<sup>188</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.

<sup>189</sup> Frederick Douglass, *Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, An American Slave, Written by Himself* (1845), ed. by John W. Blassingame, John R. McKivigan, and Peter P. Hinks (New Haven; London: Yale UP), 2001, 54.

<sup>190</sup> Paull, *Only a Cat*, 49.

<sup>191</sup> Brandy Parris, "Difficult Sympathy in the Reconstruction-Era Animal Stories of Our Young Folks," *Children's Literature: Annual of The Modern Language Association Division on Children's Literature and The Children's Literature Association* 31 (2003): 33.

<sup>192</sup> Patteson, *Pussy Meow*, 116.

<sup>193</sup> *Ibid.*, 117.

<sup>194</sup> *Ibid.*, 119.

<sup>195</sup> Grey, *The Autobiography of Frank*, 242.

<sup>196</sup> Clifford, *Polly*, 225.

<sup>197</sup> Jacobs, *Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl*, 168.

<sup>198</sup> *Autobiography of a Canary*, 31.

<sup>199</sup> Clifford, *Yoppy*, 215.

<sup>200</sup> Clifford, *Polly*, 268.

<sup>201</sup> *Autobiography of a Canary*, 34.

<sup>202</sup> Saunders, *Beautiful Joe*, 159.

<sup>203</sup> Patteson, *Pussy Meow*, 79.

<sup>204</sup> *Ibid.*, 79-80.

<sup>205</sup> *Ibid.*, 85.

<sup>206</sup> Sewell, *Black Beauty*, 77, emphasis mine.

<sup>207</sup> George M. Frederickson, *The Black Image in the White Mind: The Debate on Afro-American Character and Destiny, 1817-1914* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 209.

<sup>208</sup> *Ibid.*, 215.

<sup>209</sup> Williams, Raymond Williams, *Marxism and Literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 122.

<sup>210</sup> Ibid.

<sup>211</sup> See note 12 above.

<sup>212</sup> Saunders, *Beautiful Joe*, 14.

<sup>213</sup> For discussions of late nineteenth century imaginative children's literature, see Avery, *Behold the Child*, 155-210; Macleod, *American Childhood*, 51-116; Murray, *American Children's Literature*, 51-116.

<sup>214</sup> See Sánchez-Eppler, *Dependent States*, xx.

<sup>215</sup> Pearson, *Rights of the Defenseless*, 44.

<sup>216</sup> Patteson, *Pussy Meow*, 122.

<sup>217</sup> Clifford, *Yoppy*, 25-26.

<sup>218</sup> Robin Bernstein, *Racial Innocence: Performing American Childhood from Slavery to Civil Rights* (New York: New York University Press, 2011), 8.

<sup>219</sup> Ibid., 223.

<sup>220</sup> Paull, *Only a Cat*, 225.

<sup>221</sup> Ibid.

<sup>222</sup> Ibid.

<sup>223</sup> Grey, *The Autobiography of Frank*, 20.

<sup>224</sup> Ibid., 36.

<sup>225</sup> Ibid., 37.

<sup>226</sup> Ibid.

<sup>227</sup> Franz de Waal, "Anthropomorphism and Anthropodenial: Consistency in our Thinking about Humans and Other Animals," *Philosophical Topics* 27.1 (1999): 255-280.

<sup>228</sup> Cora Diamond, "Eating Meat and Eating People," *Philosophy* 53.206 (1978): 465-479; Cary Wolfe, *Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of Species, and Posthumanist Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).

<sup>229</sup> See, for instance, Lorraine Daston and Gregg Mittman's collected volume, *Thinking with Animals: New Perspectives on Anthropomorphism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); Jill Bennet, *Empathic Vision* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005).

## Chapter 2

<sup>1</sup> Jacques Derrida, *The Animal That Therefore I Am*, trans. by David Wills (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 89.

<sup>2</sup> John Berger, "Why Look at Animals?" *About Looking* (New York: Pantheon, 1980), #.

<sup>3</sup> Anita Guerrini, *Experimenting with Humans and Animals: From Galen to Animal Rights* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 37.

<sup>4</sup> Mark Seltzer, *Bodies and Machines* (New York: Routledge, 1992); Michel Foucault, *Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (1977), trans. by Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1995).

<sup>5</sup> Cary Wolfe, *Before the Law: Humans and Other Animals in a Biopolitical Frame* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013); Nicole Shukin, *Animal Capital: Rendering Life in Biopolitical Times* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009).

<sup>6</sup> Charles Darwin, *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* (1872), ed. by Joe Cain and Sharon Messenger (London: Penguin Classics, 2009).

<sup>7</sup> Elizabeth Wilson, *Psychosomatic Feminism and the Neurological Body* (Durham: Duke UP, 2004), 76.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Brian Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002).

<sup>10</sup> Phillip Prodger, "Illustration as Strategy in Charles Darwin's *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*," in *Inscribing Science: Scientific Texts and the Materiality of Communication*, ed. by Timothy Lenoir (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998): 146.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Oscar Rejlander, "On Photographing Horses," in *The British Journal Photographic Almanac* (1873): 115.

<sup>13</sup> See Haas, *Muybridge: Man in Motion*, 156-157.

<sup>14</sup> Alan Sekula, *Photography Against the Grain: Essays and Photo Works, 1975-1983* (Halifax: Press of the Nova Scotia College of Arts and Design, 1984), 4. See also Sekula's "Photography Between Labour and Capital," in *Mining Photographs and Other Pictures, 1948-1968: A Selection from the Negative Archives of Shedden Studio, Glace Bay, Cape Breton*, ed. by Benjamin H. D. Buchloch and Robert Wilkie (Halifax: Press of the Nova Scotia College of Art and Design, 1983): 193-268.

<sup>15</sup> John Tagg, *The Burden of Representation: Essays on Photographies and Histories* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988), 35.

<sup>16</sup> On the relationship between Marey and Muybridge's work, see Marta Braun and Elizabeth Whitcombe, "Marey, Muybridge, and Londe: The Photography of Pathological Locomotion," *History of Photography* 23 (1999): 218-24. On Marey, see Marta Braun, *Picturing Time: The Work of Etienne-Jules Marey, 1830-1904* (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1992).

<sup>17</sup> Etienne-Jules Marey, *Animal Mechanism: A Treatise on Terrestrial and Aerial Locomotion* (1873) (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1874).

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., 62.

<sup>19</sup> Seltzer, *Bodies and Machines*, 3.

<sup>20</sup> Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 156.

<sup>21</sup> Eadweard Muybridge, "The Attitudes of Animals in Motion, Illustrated with the Zoopraxiscope," (lecture given at the Royal Institution of Great Britain, Monday, March 13, 1882, 13).

<sup>22</sup> Brookman, Philip Brookman, *Helios: Eadweard Muybridge in a Time of Change* (Steidl: Corcoran Gallery of Art, 2010), 229-335; Robert Bartlett Haas, *Muybridge: Man in Motion* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 93-181; Gordon Hendricks, *Eadweard Muybridge: The Father of the Motion Picture* (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1975), 97-198; Kevin MacDonnell, *Eadweard Muybridge: The Man Who Invented the Moving Picture* (Toronto: Little, Brown, and Co., 1972), 81-144 ; Phillip Prodger, *Muybridge and the Instantaneous Photography Movement* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003), 112-221.

<sup>23</sup> Elspeth H. Brown, *The Corporate Eye: Photography and the Rationalization of American Commercial Culture, 1874-1929* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 65- 118.

<sup>24</sup> Shukin, *Animal Capital*, 89.

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- <sup>25</sup> Frederick Winslow Taylor, *The Principles of Scientific Management* (1911) (Stilwell: Forgotten Books, 2008), 30.
- <sup>26</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>27</sup> Ibid., 46.
- <sup>28</sup> Elspeth H. Brown, "Racialising the Virile Body: Eadweard Muybridge's Locomotion Studies 1883–1887." *Gender & History* 17.3 (2005): 631.
- <sup>29</sup> Ibid., 637.
- <sup>30</sup> Marta Braun, *Eadweard Muybridge* (London: Reaktion Books, 2010), 193.
- <sup>31</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>32</sup> Marta Braun, "Muybridge's Scientific Fictions," *Studies in Visual Communication* 10 (1984): 13.
- <sup>33</sup> Ibid., 18.
- <sup>34</sup> Mary Ann Doane, *The Emergence of Cinematic Time: Modernity, Contingency, Archive* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 11.
- <sup>35</sup> Roland Barthes, *Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography* (1980), trans. by Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 2010), 41.
- <sup>36</sup> Ibid., 27.
- <sup>37</sup> Ibid., 41.
- <sup>38</sup> Ibid., 27.
- <sup>39</sup> Ibid., 5.
- <sup>40</sup> Ibid., 57.
- <sup>41</sup> Ibid., 59.
- <sup>42</sup> For discussions of the eroticism of Muybridge's photographs, see Janine A. Mileaf, "Poses for the Camera: Eadweard Muybridge's Studies of the Human Figure," *American Art* 16.3 (2002): 30-53; Linda Williams, *Hard Core: Power, Pleasure, and the 'Frenzy of the Visible'* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).
- <sup>43</sup> June Howard, *Form and History in American Literary Naturalism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985).
- <sup>44</sup> Dana Seitler, *Atavistic Tendencies: The Culture Of Science In American Modernity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008).
- <sup>45</sup> Colleen Lye, *America's Asia: Racial Form and American Literature, 1893-1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 56.
- <sup>46</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>47</sup> See Richard Steven Street, *Beasts of the Field: A Narrative History of California Farmworkers, 1769-1913* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 235-406.
- <sup>48</sup> Streets, *Beasts of the Field*, 186-188.
- <sup>49</sup> Norris, *The Octopus*, 26.
- <sup>50</sup> See note 52 above.
- <sup>51</sup> Norris, *The Octopus*, 94.
- <sup>52</sup> Ibid., 96.
- <sup>53</sup> Ibid., 95.
- <sup>54</sup> Ibid., 96-96.
- <sup>55</sup> Ibid., 97-98.
- <sup>56</sup> Seltzer, *Bodies and Machines*, 4.
- <sup>57</sup> Norris, *The Octopus*, 97.

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- <sup>58</sup> Qtd. in Street, *Beasts of the Field*, 274.
- <sup>59</sup> Qtd. in Street, *Beasts of the Field*, 183.
- <sup>60</sup> Lye, *America's Asia*, 86.
- <sup>61</sup> Norris, *The Octopus*, 67.
- <sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 70
- <sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, 20.
- <sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, 335.
- <sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, 343.
- <sup>67</sup> Streets, *Beasts of the Field*, 217-218.
- <sup>68</sup> Norris, *The Octopus*, 347.
- <sup>69</sup> *Ibid.* 352.
- <sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, 352.
- <sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, 344.
- <sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, 345.
- <sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, 27.
- <sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, 28.
- <sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, 23.
- <sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, 41.
- <sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>78</sup> Leo Marx, *The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964).
- <sup>79</sup> Norris, *The Octopus*, 48.
- <sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, 62.
- <sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, 64.
- <sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, 166.
- <sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, 229.
- <sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, 66.
- <sup>86</sup> Ann Douglas, *The Feminization of American Culture* (New York: The Noonday Press, 1977).
- <sup>87</sup> Jennifer L. Fleissner, *Women, Compulsion, Modernity: The Moment of American Naturalism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 28.
- <sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.
- <sup>89</sup> Norris, *The Octopus*, 255.
- <sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, 286.
- <sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, 329.
- <sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, 329.
- <sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, 15.
- <sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, 362.
- <sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, 276.
- <sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, 265.
- <sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, 278.
- <sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, 199-200.
- <sup>99</sup> Georg Lukács, "Narrate or Describe" (1932), trans. David Fernbach, in *Essays On Realism*, ed. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1980), 54.

<sup>100</sup> Frank Norris, "A Plea for Romantic Fiction" (1901), in *Documents of American Realism and Naturalism*, ed. by Donald Pizer (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1998), 220

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, 214.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, 216.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, 217.

<sup>104</sup> Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction* (1978), vol. 1, trans. by Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1990).

<sup>105</sup> Rosemary Hennessy, *Profit and Pleasure: Sexual Identities in Late Capitalism* (New York: Routledge, 2000), 30.

<sup>106</sup> John D'Emilio, "Capitalism and Gay Identity," in *The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader*, ed. by Henry Abelove, Michele Aina Barale, and David M. Halperin (New York: Routledge, 1993).

<sup>107</sup> See Richard von Krafft-Ebing, *Psychopathia Sexualis: A Medico-Forensic Study* (1886), trans. by Harry E. Wedeck (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1965); Max Nordau, *Degeneration* (1898) (London: W. Heinemann, 1920).

### Chapter 3

<sup>1</sup> This is the narrative Roosevelt provides in his autobiography as well as the narrative circulated within promotional materials for Medora. See Theodore Roosevelt, *An Autobiography* (1913), vol. 22 of *The Works of Theodore Roosevelt*, ed. Hermann Hagedorn (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925), 112-154.

<sup>2</sup> Roosevelt, Theodore, *The Works of Theodore Roosevelt*, vol. xiii, *The Rough Riders* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1899), 98.

<sup>3</sup> See Gail Bederman, *Manliness & Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880-1917* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 170-216; Amy Kaplan, *The Anarchy of Empire in the Making of U.S. Culture* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 121-145; Richard Slotkin, *Gunfighter Nation: The Myth of the Frontier in Twentieth-Century America* (New York: Atheneum, 1992), 29-62.

<sup>4</sup> Michael Lundblad, *The Birth of a Jungle: Animality in Progressive Era U.S. Literature and Culture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

<sup>5</sup> Colleen Glenney Boggs, *Animalia Americana: Animal Representations and Biopolitical Subjectivity* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013); Kalpana Rahita Seshadri, *HumAnimal: Race, Law, Language* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012); Nicole Shukin, *Animal Capital: Rendering Life in Biopolitical Times* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009); and Cary Wolfe, *Before the Law: Humans and Other Animals in a Biopolitical Frame* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013).

<sup>6</sup> Donna J. Haraway, *When Species Meet* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 3-44.

<sup>7</sup> Chip Brown, "North Dakota Went Boom," *New York Times Magazine*, January 31, 2013, accessed March 23, 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/magazine/north-dakota-went-boom.html?pagewanted=all>

<sup>8</sup> John Burroughs, "Real and Sham Natural History" *Atlantic Monthly* 91 (March 1903): 298-309.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

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- <sup>10</sup> Ralph H. Lutts, *The Nature Fakers: Wildlife, Science, & Sentiment* (Golden, Colorado: Fulcrum Publishing, 1990), 29.
- <sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 32.
- <sup>12</sup> Jennifer Mason, *Civilized Creatures: Urban Animals, Sentimental Culture, and American Literature, 1850-1900* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005).
- <sup>13</sup> Hermit, "The Intelligence of the Wild Things: False Natural History," *Forest and Stream* 60 (18 April 1903): 304-5; William J. Long, "The Modern School of Nature Study and Its Critics," *North American Review* 176 (May 1903): 687-98.
- <sup>14</sup> Caspar Whitney, "The Sportsman's View-Point," *Outing Magazine* 42 (July 1903): 503-5.
- <sup>15</sup> John Burroughs, "Current Misconceptions in Natural History," *Century Magazine* 67 (February 1904): 515.
- <sup>16</sup> William J. Long, *A Little Brother to the Bear, and Other Animal Stories* (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1903).
- <sup>17</sup> William Morton Wheeler, *Science* 19 (1 April 1904): 550-1.
- <sup>18</sup> William Harper Davis, "Natural and Unnatural History," *Science* 19 (22 April 1904): 667-75.
- <sup>19</sup> Edward B. Clark, "Roosevelt on the Nature Fakirs," *Everybody's Magazine* 16 (June 1907): 770-774.
- <sup>20</sup> The most exhaustive study of the nature faker debate is Ralph H. Lutts, *The Nature Fakers*. See also Matt Cartmill, *A View to Death in the Morning: Hunting and Nature through History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 150-156; Thomas R. Dunlap, *Saving America's Wildlife* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 27-31.
- <sup>21</sup> For more information about Roosevelt's involvement in the nature faker controversy, see Gerald Carson, "T. R. And The "Nature Fakers." *American Heritage* 22.2 (1971): 60-110; Broadus F. Farrar, "John Burroughs, Theodore Roosevelt, and the Nature Fakers." *Tennessee Studies in Literature* 4 (1959): 121-30; Harry Gershenowitz, "The Natural History Controversy between Theodore Roosevelt and Jack London: A Life Scientist's View." *Jack London Newsletter* 14.2 (1981): 80-2.
- <sup>22</sup> Ernest Thompson Seton, *The Natural History of the Ten Commandments* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1907), 4.
- <sup>23</sup> William J. Long, *Briar Patch Philosophy*, by "Peter Rabbit" (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1906), 162.
- <sup>24</sup> See especially Bederman, *Manliness & Civilization*, 170-216; Amy Kaplan, *The Anarchy of Empire in the Making of U.S. Culture*, 121-145; Richard Slotkin, *Gunfighter Nation*, 29-62.
- <sup>25</sup> Theodore Roosevelt, *Outdoor Pastimes of an American Hunter* (1905), vol. 3 of *The Works of Theodore Roosevelt*, ed. Hermann Hagedorn (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1924), 18.
- <sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 21.
- <sup>27</sup> Theodore Roosevelt, *Hunting Trips of a Ranchman* (1885), vol. 1. of *The Works of Theodore Roosevelt*, ed. Hermann Hagedorn (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923), 267.
- <sup>28</sup> Theodore Roosevelt, *The Wilderness Hunter* (1893), vol. 2 of *The Works of Theodore Roosevelt*, ed. Hermann Hagedorn (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923), 150.
- <sup>29</sup> Roosevelt, *Outdoor Pastimes*, 225.
- <sup>30</sup> Roosevelt, *The Wilderness Hunter*, 180.
- <sup>31</sup> Slotkin, *Gunfighter Nation*, 12.
- <sup>32</sup> Roosevelt, *The Wilderness Hunter*, 396.
- <sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 397.
- <sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 398.

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- <sup>35</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>36</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>37</sup> Roosevelt, *Hunting Trips*, 18-19.
- <sup>38</sup> Claire Jean Kim, "Slaying the Beast," *Kalfou: A Journal of Comparative and Relational Ethnic Studies* 1.1 (2010): 57.
- <sup>39</sup> Bederman, *Manliness & Civilization*, 181.
- <sup>40</sup> Roosevelt, *Hunting Trips of a Ranchman*, 284.
- <sup>41</sup> Ibid., 33.
- <sup>42</sup> Ibid., 129.
- <sup>43</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>44</sup> Roosevelt, *Outdoor Pastimes*, 298.
- <sup>45</sup> Daniel J. Philippon, *Conserving Words: How American Nature Writers Shaped the Environmental Movement* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2004), 33-71.
- <sup>46</sup> Ibid., 305.
- <sup>47</sup> Ibid., 304.
- <sup>48</sup> Roosevelt, *Hunting Trips*, 247.
- <sup>49</sup> Ibid., 59.
- <sup>50</sup> Ibid., 291.
- <sup>51</sup> Roosevelt, *The Wilderness Hunter*, 114.
- <sup>52</sup> Ibid., 148.
- <sup>53</sup> Roosevelt, *Hunting Trips*, 171.
- <sup>54</sup> Roosevelt, *The Wilderness Hunter*, 127.
- <sup>55</sup> Roosevelt, *Hunting Trips*, 247.
- <sup>56</sup> Ibid., 79.
- <sup>57</sup> Ibid., 80-81.
- <sup>58</sup> Ibid., 81.
- <sup>59</sup> Roosevelt, *The Wilderness Hunter*, 14.
- <sup>60</sup> John Locke, *The Second Treatise of Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration* (1690) (Mineola: Dover Publications, 2002), 12.
- <sup>61</sup> Ibid., 13.
- <sup>62</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>63</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>64</sup> Ibid., 14.
- <sup>65</sup> Ibid., 23.
- <sup>66</sup> Ibid., 17.
- <sup>67</sup> Before describing the ideological counterpoint that emerges alongside this well-worn trope of "the savage war," I want to observe what is actually quite distinctive in Roosevelt's deployment of the discourse of savagery and civilization: Roosevelt's invocation of "the savage war" is retrospective. Within less than a decade of Roosevelt's publication of *Hunting Trips of a Ranchman*, Frederic Jackson Turner would announce the close of the American frontier. Roosevelt himself remarks, "now no Indians [are] left in my immediate neighborhood."<sup>67</sup> The symbology of the "savage war" that emerged as the enabling grounds for further westward expansion across the American continent now provides an interpretative map of its history, both within Roosevelt's hunting memoirs and the four volumes of *The Winning of the West*. Yet the authorization of the future as much as the past is at issue: the march of progress across the North

American continent arguably endorses the expansion of empire abroad. Roosevelt's account of settler colonialism has further imperial expansion as its ultimate referent.

<sup>68</sup> Roosevelt, *Hunting Trips*, 30.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, 334.

<sup>70</sup> Roosevelt, *Hunting Trips*, 335.

<sup>71</sup> Roosevelt, *The Wilderness Hunter*, 35.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, 47.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>74</sup> Jacques Derrida, "'Eating well,' or the Calculation of the Subject: An Interview with Jacques Derrida," in *Who Comes After the Subject*, ed. Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor, Jean-Luc Nancy (New York: Routledge, 1991), 96-119.

<sup>75</sup> Cary Wolfe, *Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of Species, and Posthumanist Theory* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2003); Cora Diamond, "Eating Meat and Eating People," *Philosophy* 53.206 (Oct 1978): 465-479.

<sup>76</sup> Donna Haraway, *Primate Visions: Gender, Race and Nature in the World of Modern Science* (New York: Routledge, 1989), 28.

<sup>77</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (1980), trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 244.

<sup>78</sup> Roosevelt, *Hunting Trips*, 112.

<sup>79</sup> Anne Cheng, *The Melancholy of Race* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); David Eng, *Racial Castration: Managing Masculinity in Asian America* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001); Judith Butler, *The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997).

<sup>80</sup> Sigmund Freud, "On Narcissism: An Introduction" (1914), trans. James Strachey, in *On Metapsychology: The Theory of Psychoanalysis*, edited by Angela Richards, vol. 11 of *The Pelican Freud Library*, edited Angela Richards and Albert Dickson (London: Penguin Books, 1955), 87.

<sup>81</sup> Sigmund Freud, "Instincts and their Vicissitudes" (1915), translated by James Strachey, in *On Metapsychology: The Theory of Psychoanalysis*, edited by Angela Richards, vol. 11 of *The Pelican Freud Library*, edited Angela Richards and Albert Dickson (London: Penguin Books, 1955), 133.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, 133.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, 134.

<sup>84</sup> Sigmund Freud, *Totem and Taboo: Some Points of Agreement between the Mental Lives of Savages and Neurotics* (1913), trans. James Strachey, vol. of *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, edited by James Strachey (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1950), 166-167.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, 167.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, 164.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, 158.

<sup>88</sup> Noëlie Vialles, *Animal to Edible* (1987), trans. J. A. Underwood (Paris: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 17.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, 19.

<sup>90</sup> Shukin, *Animal Capital*, 63.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*

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- <sup>92</sup> Sigmund Freud, *Civilizations and its Discontents* (1929), trans. James Strachey, vol. of *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, edited by James Strachey (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1961), 52.
- <sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, 60.
- <sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, 52.
- <sup>95</sup> Shukin, *Animal Capital*, 87
- <sup>96</sup> Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, trans. Martin Milligan (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1988), 69-84.
- <sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, 74.
- <sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, 74.
- <sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, 76.
- <sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, 76-77.
- <sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, 77.
- <sup>102</sup> Akira Mizuta Lippit, *Electric Animal: Toward a Rhetoric of Wildlife* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 1.
- <sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, 17.
- <sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*, 19.
- <sup>106</sup> Sigmund Freud, "Mourning and Melancholia" (1915), trans. James Strachey, in *On Metapsychology: The Theory of Psychoanalysis*, edited by Angela Richards, vol. 11 of *The Pelican Freud Library*, edited Angela Richards and Albert Dickson (London: Penguin Books, 1955), 257.
- <sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*, 258.
- <sup>108</sup> Sigmund Freud, *The Ego and the Id* (1923), trans. Joan Riviere, vol. of *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, edited by James Strachey (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1960), 23.
- <sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*.
- <sup>110</sup> Butler, *The Psychic Life of Power*, 133.
- <sup>111</sup> Freud, "Mourning and Melancholia," 254.
- <sup>112</sup> Cheng, *The Melancholy of Race*, 11.
- <sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.
- <sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.
- <sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.
- <sup>116</sup> Ranjana Khanna employs Freudian theories of melancholia to describe an affect of coloniality affording a critical agency. Contrasting with my description of the colonial melancholia that disavows the violence of the nation form, the "critical melancholia" that Khanna describes is a melancholic affect that haunts the colonized (rather than colonial) subject, as it is structured by an attachment to the lost ideal of the right of subjecthood. The resulting ambivalence unleashes a "critical nationalism" that may be directed to the "unworking of conformativity" and the reimagining of the concept of nation-statehood, rather than the forgetting of histories of genocidal violence. See Ranjana Khanna, *Dark Continents: Psychoanalysis and Colonialism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 23.
- <sup>117</sup> Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Significance of the Frontier in American History" (1893), in *Rereading Frederick Jackson Turner: "The Significance of the Frontier in American History" and Other Essays* (New York: Henry Holt and Company: 1994): 31-60.

<sup>118</sup> See Patricia Nelson Limerick, "Turnerians All: The Dream of a Helpful History in an Intelligible World," *American Historical Review* 100.3 (1995): 697-717; Slotkin, *Regeneration Through Violence*; Henry Nash Smith, *Virgin Land: The American West and Symbol and Myth* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950).

<sup>119</sup> Roosevelt, *Hunting Trips*, 31.

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>121</sup> Renato Rosaldo, *Culture & Truth: The Remaking of Social Analysis* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989), 69.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, 69.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*, 70.

<sup>124</sup> Philip Deloria, *Playing Indian* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

<sup>125</sup> Roosevelt, *The Wilderness Hunter*, 391

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*, 392.

<sup>127</sup> In differentiating more than does Freud between incorporation and introjection, Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok argue that incorporation can be understood as a kind of "antimetaphor," for "incorporation entails the fantasmatic destruction of the act by means of which metaphors become possible: the act of putting the original oral void into words" (132). Bodily incorporation literalizes the internalization of an object, while "fill[ing] the emptiness of the mouth with words is the initial model of introjection (128)." In contrast to this position, I have been arguing that incorporation might mediate ideation introjection, while ideational introduction might be enacted through physical incorporation. Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok, *The Shell and the Kernel*, vol. 1, ed. Nicholas T. Rand (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid.*, 127.

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid.*, 128.

<sup>131</sup> Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*, 77.

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*, 78-79.

<sup>133</sup> See for instance Peter Gay, *Freud: A Life for Our Time* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1988).

<sup>134</sup> Daniel Pick, among others, has discussed how the rationalized and industrialized processing of meat in the late nineteenth century set the stage for the routinized slaughter of human beings within the industrialized warfare of the twentieth century. Pick, Daniel Pick, *War Machine: The Rationalization of Slaughter in the Modern Age* (New York: Yale University Press, 1993).

<sup>135</sup> For what is still the definitive history of the depletion and extinction of North American species, see Peter Matthiessen, *Wildlife in America* (New York: The Viking Press, 1959).

<sup>136</sup> On the organization of game markets in major cities, see James A. Tober, *Who Owns Wildlife? The Political Economy of Conservation in Nineteenth-Century America* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1981), 75-81.

<sup>137</sup> See Robin W. Doughty, *Feather Fashions and Bird Preservation: A Study in Nature Protection* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1975).

<sup>138</sup> On market hunting, see especially Tober, *Who Owns Wildlife*, 52-56; James B. Trefethen, *An American Crusade for Wildlife* (New York: Winchester, 1975), 55-65.

<sup>139</sup> On impacts of new technology, see Trefethen, *An American Crusade for Wildlife*, 55-65.

<sup>140</sup> *Ibid.*, 65.

<sup>141</sup> William Temple Hornaday, *The Extermination of the American Bison, with a Sketch of its Discovery and Life History* 1889 (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2002), 525.

<sup>142</sup> Ibid.

<sup>143</sup> Roosevelt, *Hunting Trips of a Ranchman*, 124.

<sup>144</sup> Theodore Roosevelt, "Ranch Life and Game Shooting in the West," *Outing* (March 1886): 305.

<sup>145</sup> Roosevelt, *The Wilderness Hunter*, 413.

<sup>146</sup> Roosevelt, *Outdoor Pastimes*, 209.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid., 271.

<sup>148</sup> Several useful biographies of Roosevelt focus on his role as a conservationist. See Douglas Brinkley, *The Wilderness Warrior: Theodore Roosevelt and the Crusade for America* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2009); Paul Russell Cutright, *Theodore Roosevelt: The Making of a Conservationist* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1985).

<sup>149</sup> John R. Reiger, *American Sportsmen and the Origins of Conservation* (New York: Winchester, 1975), 4.

<sup>150</sup> Several environmental historians have usefully foregrounded the beginnings of the conservation movement in the concern for wildlife protection. For useful overviews, see James B. Trefethen, *An American Crusade for Wildlife* (New York: Winchester, 1975); Thomas R. Dunlap, *Saving America's Wildlife* (Princeton University Press, 1988). For the role of hunters in fomenting the early conversation movement, see especially Reiger, *American Sportsmen and the Origins of Conservation*. For a detailed examination of the federalization of wildlife protection, see Tober, *Who Owns Wildlife?* For a discussion of dispossession carried out through the conservationist crusade against poaching, see Karl Jacoby, *Crimes Against Nature: Squatters, Poachers, Thieves, and the Hidden History of American Conservation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Louis S. Warren, *The Hunter's Game: Poachers and Conservationists in Twentieth-Century America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997); and Mark David Spence, *Dispossessing the Wilderness: Indian Removal and the Making of National Parks* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

<sup>151</sup> For discussions of the aristocratic stylization of sport hunting before the Civil War, see Reiger, *American Sportsmen*; Nicolas W. Proctor, *Bathed in Blood: Hunting and Mastery in the Old South* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2002).

<sup>152</sup> Henry William Herbert, *Frank Forester's Field Sports of the United States and British Provinces of North America*, vol. 1 (New York, 1849), 17-18.

<sup>153</sup> Reiger, *American Sportsmen*, 35.

<sup>154</sup> For a thorough discussion of the contribution of sporting magazines to the conservationist ethos, see Reiger, *American Sportsmen*, 45-66.

<sup>155</sup> For a discussion of George Bird Grinnell's role in the conservation movement, see Michael Punke, *Last Stand: George Bird Grinnell, the Battle to Save the Buffalo, and the Birth of the New West* (New York: Smithsonian Books/Collins, 2007).

<sup>156</sup> Reiger, *American Sportsmen*, 34.

<sup>157</sup> Ibid., 40-41.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid., 57-58.

<sup>159</sup> Qtd. in Brinkley, *The Wilderness Warrior*, 204.

<sup>160</sup> For a thorough discussion of the founding and activities of the Boone and Crockett Club, see Brinkley, *Wilderness Warrior*, 201-216.

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- <sup>161</sup> Dunlap, *Saving America's Wildlife*, 11
- <sup>162</sup> Elisha J. Lewis, *Hints to Sportsmen* (Philadelphia: Lea and Blanchard, 1851), 246.
- <sup>163</sup> Qtd. in Tober, *Who Owns Wildlife*, 48.
- <sup>164</sup> Reiger, *American Sportsmen*, 50-51.
- <sup>165</sup> Qtd. in Dunlap, *Saving America's Wildlife*, 11.
- <sup>166</sup> For more on Progressive era primitivism, see Peter J. Schmitt, *Back to Nature: The Arcadian Myth in Urban America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969); T.J. Jackson Lears, *No Place of Grace: Anti-modernism and the Transformation of American Culture 1880-1920* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981); Leo Marx, *The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964).
- <sup>167</sup> Samuel P. Hays, *Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890-1920* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburg Press, 1959), 2.
- <sup>168</sup> Jacoby, *Crimes Against Nature*, 16.
- <sup>169</sup> Reiger, *American Sportsmen*, 55.
- <sup>170</sup> See especially Jacoby, *Crimes Against Nature*; Warren, *The Hunter's Game*; and Spence, *Dispossessing the Wilderness*.
- <sup>171</sup> Reiger, *American Sportsmen*, 89.
- <sup>172</sup> George Bird Grinnell and Charles B. Reynolds, 42 "A Plank," *Forest and Stream* (3 Feb 1894): 89.
- <sup>173</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>174</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>175</sup> Most environmental historians have taken conservationist discourse at its word, and thus they invariably tend to on the environmental impacts of market hunters, rather than sport hunters. However, some brief discussions of sport-hunting tourism include Jacoby, *Crimes Against Nature*, 26-28; Warren, *The Poachers Game*, 106-125.
- <sup>176</sup> See Brinkley, *The Wilderness Warrior*, 121-146.
- <sup>177</sup> Roosevelt, *The Wilderness Hunter*, 51.
- <sup>178</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>179</sup> Ibid., 57.
- <sup>180</sup> Ibid., 13.
- <sup>181</sup> Roosevelt, *Hunting Trips of a Ranchman*, 237.
- <sup>182</sup> Ibid., 247.
- <sup>183</sup> Roosevelt, *The Wilderness Hunter*, 271.
- <sup>184</sup> Ibid., 252.
- <sup>185</sup> See Jacoby, *Crimes Against Nature*; Warren, *The Hunter's Game*; and Spence, *Dispossessing the Wilderness*. For an interesting discussion of the scapegoating of African-American market hunters, see Scott E. Giltner, *Hunting and Fishing in the New South: Black Labor and White Leisure after the Civil War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008).
- <sup>186</sup> Jacoby, *Crimes Against Nature*, 88.
- <sup>187</sup> Ibid., 91.
- <sup>188</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>189</sup> Ibid., 97-98.
- <sup>190</sup> Ibid., 118.
- <sup>191</sup> Ibid., 119.
- <sup>192</sup> Roosevelt, *The Wilderness Hunter*, 223.

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- <sup>193</sup> Ibid., 225.
- <sup>194</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>195</sup> Ibid., 229.
- <sup>196</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>197</sup> Qtd. in Tober, *Who Owns Wildlife*, 9.
- <sup>198</sup> See Punke, *Last Stand*, 88-91.
- <sup>199</sup> Ibid., 89.
- <sup>200</sup> Brinkley, *The Wilderness Warrior*, 585-630.
- <sup>201</sup> Theodore Roosevelt, *A Book-Lover's Holidays in the Open*, vol 4. of *The Works of Theodore Roosevelt*, ed. Herman Hagedorn, 1-335 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1924), 39.
- <sup>202</sup> Ibid., 51.
- <sup>203</sup> Ibid., 54.
- <sup>204</sup> George Catlin, *North American Indians: Being Letters and Notes on their Manners, Customs, and Conditions, written during Eight Years' Travel amongst the Wildest Tribes of Indians in North America*, vol. 1 (1841) (Philadelphia: Leary, Stuart and Company, 1913), 294-295.
- <sup>205</sup> Henry David Thoreau, *Main Woods*, vol. 3 of *The Writings of Henry David Thoreau*, ed. by H. D. Blake, F. B. Sanborn, and Horace Scudder, Riverside Edition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1894), 212-213.
- <sup>206</sup> Spence, *Dispossessing the Wilderness*, 115-132.
- <sup>207</sup> Ibid., 116-120.
- <sup>208</sup> Ibid., 83.
- <sup>209</sup> Warren, *The Hunter's Game*, 126-151.
- <sup>210</sup> Spence, *Dispossessing the Wilderness*, 115-132.
- <sup>211</sup> On the leading role played by the conservation of the Adirondacks, see Frank Graham, *The Adirondack Park: A Political History* (New York: Knopf, 1978).
- <sup>212</sup> On the establishment of national forest preserves, see especially Hays, *Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency*, 27-48.
- <sup>213</sup> On the establishment of wildlife preserves and the preservationist strand of the conservation movement, see especially Roderick Frazier Nash, *Wilderness and the American Mind* (1967) 4<sup>th</sup> ed. (New Haven: Yale UP, 2001.)
- <sup>214</sup> Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr. *The White Man's Indian: Images of the American Indian from Columbus to the Present* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), 113-185.
- <sup>215</sup> Sigmund Freud, "Fetishism" (1927), trans. James Strachey, in *On Sexuality: Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality and Other Words*, edited by Angela Richards, vol. 7 of *The Pelican Freud Library*, edited by Angela Richards and Albert Dickson (London: Penguin Books, 1977): 352.
- <sup>216</sup> Ibid., 353.
- <sup>217</sup> Ibid., 354.
- <sup>218</sup> Samuel P. Hays, *Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890-1920* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburg Press, 1959).
- <sup>219</sup> Louis S. Warren, *The Hunter's Game: Poachers and Conservationists in Twentieth-Century America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 10.
- <sup>220</sup> Shukin, *Animal Capital*, 10.
- <sup>221</sup> Ibid.

- <sup>222</sup> Judith Butler, *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence* (London: Verso, 2004), 78.
- <sup>223</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>224</sup> Shukin, *Animal Capital*, 10.
- <sup>225</sup> Wolfe, *Before the Law*, 9.
- <sup>226</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>227</sup> Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction* (1978), trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 139.
- <sup>228</sup> Michel Foucault, "Governmentality," trans. Pasquale Pasquino, in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), 215.
- <sup>229</sup> Ibid., 216.
- <sup>230</sup> Ibid., 211.
- <sup>231</sup> Roberto Esposito, *Bios: Biopolitics and Philosophy*, trans. Timothy Campbell (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 8.
- <sup>232</sup> Ibid., 46.
- <sup>233</sup> Ibid., 50.
- <sup>234</sup> Ibid., xi.
- <sup>235</sup> Ibid., 110.
- <sup>236</sup> Wolfe, *Before the Law*, 59.
- <sup>237</sup> For a discussion of the emergence of game laws, see Tober, *Who Owns Wildlife*, 139-178.
- <sup>238</sup> On the angler's contribution to conservation, see Reiger, *American Sportsment*, 16-28.
- <sup>239</sup> See Brinkley, *The Wilderness Warrior*, 267-273
- <sup>240</sup> On the passing of the Lacey Act, see Doughty, *Feather Fashions and Bird Preservation*.
- <sup>241</sup> On the establishment of wildlife preserves and the preservationist strand of the conservation movement, see especially Roderick Frazier Nash, *Wilderness and the American Mind* (1967), 4<sup>th</sup> ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001).
- <sup>242</sup> For discussions of governmental predator extermination programs, see Dunlap, *Saving America's Wildlife*, 48-64; Trefethen, *An American Crusade for Wildlife*, 279-295.
- <sup>243</sup> Roosevelt, *Outdoor Pastimes*, 253.
- <sup>244</sup> Jacques Derrida, *The Animal that Therefore I Am*, ed. Marie-Louise Mallet and trans. David Wills (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 31.
- <sup>245</sup> Qtd. in Brinkley, *Wilderness Warrior*, 99.
- <sup>246</sup> Jonathan Peter Spiro, *Defending the Master Race: Conservation, Eugenics and the Legacy of Madison Grant* (Lebanon: University Press of New England, 2009).
- <sup>247</sup> Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 9.
- <sup>248</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>249</sup> Ibid., 26.
- <sup>250</sup> Ibid., 24.
- <sup>251</sup> Ibid., 35.
- <sup>252</sup> Ibid., 105.
- <sup>253</sup> Ibid., 105-106.
- <sup>254</sup> Ibid., 106.
- <sup>255</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>256</sup> Ibid., 107.

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- <sup>257</sup> Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 106.  
<sup>258</sup> Roosevelt, *Outdoor Pastimes*, 29.  
<sup>259</sup> *Ibid.*, 31.  
<sup>260</sup> *Ibid.*, 24.  
<sup>261</sup> *Ibid.*, 212.  
<sup>262</sup> *Ibid.*, 139.  
<sup>263</sup> *Ibid.*, 122.  
<sup>264</sup> *Ibid.*, 217.  
<sup>265</sup> *Ibid.*, 172.  
<sup>266</sup> *Ibid.*, 139.  
<sup>267</sup> Roosevelt, *The Wilderness Hunter*, 281.  
<sup>268</sup> Roosevelt, *Outdoor Pastimes*, 97.

## Chapter 4

- <sup>1</sup>From the 1935 exposé, “Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth Century,” trans. by Edmund Jephcott in *Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings* (New York: Schocken Books, 1978).  
<sup>2</sup> Damien Hirst, “The Agony and the Ecstasy: Selected Works from 1989-2004,” interview by Mirta D’Argenzio, *Electa Napoli* (2004): 122.  
<sup>3</sup> Lynn Barber, “Bleeding Art,” *The Observer*, April 20, 2003.  
<sup>4</sup> Carol Vogel, “Swimming with Famous Dead Sharks,” *The New York Times*, October 1, 2006.  
<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*  
<sup>6</sup> “Series: Natural History,” Damien Hirst, accessed February 10, 2014, <http://www.damienhirst.com/texts1/series/nat-history>  
<sup>7</sup> Steve Baker, *The Postmodern Animal* (London: Reaktin Books, 2000), 60-61.  
<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 20.  
<sup>9</sup> Dana Seitler, *Atavistic Tendencies: The Culture of Science in American Modernity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 13.  
<sup>10</sup> Carrie Rohman, *Stalking the Subject: Modernism and the Animal* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 12.  
<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 27.  
<sup>12</sup> Glenn Willmott, *Modern Animalism: Habits of Scarcity and Wealth in Comics and Literature* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), 15.  
<sup>13</sup> For a summation of (and mandate for) this trend towards “vertical” expansion within modernist studies, see Douglas Mao and Rebecca Walkowitz, “The New Modernist Studies,” *PMLA* 123.3 (2008): 737-748.  
<sup>14</sup> Ernest Hemingway, *Death in the Afternoon* (New York: Scribner, 1960), 2.  
<sup>15</sup> Ernest Hemingway, *In Our Time* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1953) 12.  
<sup>16</sup> Margo Norris, “The Animal and Violence in Hemingway’s *Death in the Afternoon*,” in *Beasts of Modern Imagination* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 201.  
<sup>17</sup> Cary Wolfe, *Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of Species, and Posthumanist Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 131.  
<sup>18</sup> Spurred in large part by the posthumous publication of *The Garden of Eden* (1986), critics began to complicate simplistic critical accounts of Hemingway’s masculinism. Most influentially, Kenneth Lynn’s psychoanalytic biography *Hemingway* interprets Hemingway’s life

in terms of the author's own "androgyny." Mark Spilka's book-length critical study, *Hemingway's Quarrel with Androgyny*, uses this "theory of androgyny" to interpret Hemingway's fiction. Robert Scholes and Nancy Comley's *Hemingway's Genders* expands the question beyond androgyny to reevaluate the construction of gender within Hemingway's writing. See Mark Spilka, *Hemingway's Quarrel with Androgyny* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990); Kenneth Lynn, *Hemingway* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987); Robert Scholes and Nancy R. Comley, *Hemingway's Genders: Rereading the Hemingway Text* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).

<sup>19</sup> Paul Fussell, *The Great War and Modern Memory 1975* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Modris Eksteins, *Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989).

<sup>20</sup> Hemingway, *Death in the Afternoon*, 134.

<sup>21</sup> Susan F. Beegel, *Hemingway's Craft of Omission: Four Manuscript Examples* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Research Press, 1988), 36.

<sup>22</sup> Vincent Sherry, *The Great War and the Language of Modernism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 18.

<sup>23</sup> Hemingway, *Death in the Afternoon*, 139.

<sup>24</sup> Daniel Pick, *War Machine: The Rationalization of Slaughter in the Modern Age* (New York: Yale University Press, 1993), 185.

<sup>25</sup> Ernest Hemingway, *A Farewell to Arms* (New York: Scribner, 1957), 185.

<sup>26</sup> Peter Messent, "'The Real Thing'?: Representing the Bullfight and Spain in *Death in the Afternoon*," in *A Companion to Hemingway's Death in the Afternoon*, ed. Miriam B. Mandel (Rochester: Camden House, 2004), 133.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>28</sup> Garry Marvin, *Bullfight* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 130.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 142.

<sup>30</sup> Hemingway, *Death in the Afternoon*, 178.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 232.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 178.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 247.

<sup>34</sup> Nancy Bredendick, "Toros Célebres: Its Meaning in *Death in the Afternoon*," *Hemingway Review* 17.2 (1998): 64-77.

<sup>35</sup> Hemingway, *Death in the Afternoon*, 113.

<sup>36</sup> Michael Lundblad, *The Birth of a Jungle: Animality in Progressive Era U.S. Literature and Culture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 2.

<sup>37</sup> Philip Armstrong, *What Animals Mean in the Fiction of Modernity* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 153.

<sup>38</sup> Bataille even wrote a combined review of *The Old Man and the Sea* and Carlos Baker's biography of Hemingway. See Georges Bataille, "Hemingway a la lumière de Hegel," *Critique* 9.70 (1953): 195-210.

<sup>39</sup> Georges Bataille, *Theory of Religion* (New York: Zone Books, 1992), 19.

<sup>40</sup> Georges Bataille, *The Accursed Share: An Essay on General Economy. Volume II: The History of Eroticism* (New York: Zone Books, 1993), 77.

<sup>41</sup> Georges Bataille, "The Notion of Expenditure," in *Visions of Excess Selected Writings, 1927-1939*, trans. Allan Stoekl (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), 118.

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<sup>42</sup> Anglophone histories of the bullfight that review the development of modern bullfighting include Elisabeth Hardouin-Fugier, *Bullfighting: A Troubled History* (London: Reaktion Books, 2010); Timothy Mitchell, *Blood Sport: A Social History of Spanish Bullfighting* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991), 47-81; Adrian Shubert, *Death and Money in the Afternoon: A History of the Spanish Bullfight* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). See also Garry Marvin, *Bullfight*, 52-65.

<sup>43</sup> On the commercial character of the bullfight, especially Schubert, *Death and Money in the Afternoon*.

<sup>44</sup> Hemingway, *Death in the Afternoon*, 187.

<sup>45</sup> Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), 109.

<sup>46</sup> Frederic Jameson, "Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture," *Social Text* 1.1 (Winter 1979): 144.

<sup>47</sup> Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy* (1867). Vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin Books, 1976), 165.

<sup>48</sup> Walter Benjamin, "Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth Century" (1935), in *Reflections*, trans. Edmund Jephcott (New York: Schocken Books, 2007), 152.

<sup>49</sup> Susan Buck-Morss, *The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1989), 81.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 81-82.

<sup>51</sup> Guy Debord, *The Society of the Spectacle*, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (New York: Zone Books, 1995), 152.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.* 31.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 43.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 29.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, 153.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, 152.

<sup>57</sup> Walter Benjamin, "Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth Century" (1939), in *The Arcades Project*, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), 18.

<sup>58</sup> Benjamin, "Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth Century" (1935), 153.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>60</sup> Georg Lukács, *The Theory of the Novel: A Historico-Philosophical Essay on the Forms of Great Epic Literature* (1920), trans. Anna Bostock (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1971), 191.

<sup>61</sup> Susan Buck-Morss, *The Dialectics of Seeing*, 70.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 80.

<sup>63</sup> Benjamin, "Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth Century" (1935), 148.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, 155.

<sup>65</sup> Theodor Adorno, "The Idea of Natural History," trans. Bob Hullot-Kentor, *Telos* 60 (Summer 1984): 121.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>67</sup> Beatrice Hanssen, *Walter Benjamin's Other History: Of Stones, Animals, Human Beings, and Angels* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 3.

<sup>68</sup> Benjamin, "Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth Century (1935)," 158.

<sup>69</sup> Hemingway, *Death in the Afternoon*, 191.

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- <sup>70</sup> Ibid., 13-14.
- <sup>71</sup> Ibid., 14.
- <sup>72</sup> Thomas F. Strychacz, *Hemingway's Theaters of Masculinity* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2003), 136.
- <sup>73</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>74</sup> Hemingway, *Death in the Afternoon*, 6.
- <sup>75</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>76</sup> Ibid., 206.
- <sup>77</sup> Ibid., 207.
- <sup>78</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>79</sup> Ernest Hemingway, "Bullfighting A Tragedy" (1923), *Dateline: Toronto, The Complete Toronto Star Dispatches, 1920-1924*, ed. William White (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1985), 344.
- <sup>80</sup> Hemingway, *Death in the Afternoon*, 99.
- <sup>81</sup> Ibid., 207.
- <sup>82</sup> Ibid., 99.
- <sup>83</sup> Ibid., 149.
- <sup>84</sup> Ibid., 2.
- <sup>85</sup> Ibid., 131.
- <sup>86</sup> Ibid., 126.
- <sup>87</sup> Ibid., 25.
- <sup>88</sup> Ibid., 150.
- <sup>89</sup> Ibid., 145.
- <sup>90</sup> Ibid., 22, emphasis mine.
- <sup>91</sup> Alys E. Weinbaum, "Racial Aura: Walter Benjamin and the Work of Art in a Biotechnical Age," *Literature and Medicine* 26.1 (2007): 217.
- <sup>92</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>93</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>94</sup> Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," in *Illuminations*, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), 217-252.
- <sup>95</sup> Elisabeth Hardouin-Fugier, *Bullfighting: A Troubled History* (London: Reaktion Books, 2010), 156.
- <sup>96</sup> On Hemingway's anti-fascist politics, see Keneth Kinnamon, "Hemingway and Politics," in *The Cambridge Companion to Hemingway*, ed. Scott Donaldson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 149-169.
- <sup>97</sup> Ibid., 68.
- <sup>98</sup> Ibid., 163.
- <sup>99</sup> Ibid., 64.
- <sup>100</sup> Robert W. Trogon, *The Lousy Racket: Hemingway, Scribners, and the Business of Literature* (Kent: Kent State University Press, 2007), 109-110.
- <sup>101</sup> Ronald Weber, *Hemingway's Art of Non-Fiction* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989), 33.
- <sup>102</sup> Hemingway, *Death in the Afternoon*, 356.
- <sup>103</sup> Ibid., 340.
- <sup>104</sup> Ibid., 305.
- <sup>105</sup> Ibid.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid., 298.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid., 285.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid., 284-285.

<sup>109</sup> Walter Benjamin, "Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth Century" (1939), in *The Arcades Project*, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin, ed. Rolf Tiedmann (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), 11.

<sup>110</sup> Djuna Barnes, *Nightwood* (1937) (New York: New Directions, 2006), 59.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid., 59-60.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid., 179.

<sup>114</sup> Karen Kaivola, "The 'Beast Turning Human': Constructions of the 'Primitive' in *Nightwood*," *The Review of Contemporary Fiction* 13:3 (Fall 1993): 175.

<sup>115</sup> Dana Seitler, "Down on All Fours: Atavistic Perversions and the Science of the Desire from Frank Norris to Djuna Barnes," *American Literature: A Journal of Literary History, Criticism, and Bibliography* 73:3 (September 2001): 525-562.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid., 549.

<sup>117</sup> Rohman, *Stalking the Subject*, 74.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid., 81.

<sup>119</sup> Barnes, *Nightwood*, 60.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid.

<sup>121</sup> Jane Marcus, "Laughing at Leviticus: *Nightwood* as Woman's Circus Epic," *Silence and Power: A Reevaluation of Djuna Barnes*, ed. Mary Lynn Broe (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1991), 211.

<sup>122</sup> Deborah Parsons, "Women in the Circus of Modernity: Djuna Barnes and *Nightwood*," *Women: A Cultural Review* 9.3 (1998), 271.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid., 267.

<sup>124</sup> Laura Winkiel, "Circuses and Spectacles: Public Culture in *Nightwood*," *Journal of Modern Literature* 21.1 (Fall 1997), 8.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid., 9.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid.

<sup>127</sup> Janet M. Davis, *The Circus Age: Culture & Society under the American Big Top* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 7.

<sup>128</sup> Janet Davis's *The Circus Age* remains the best overall source on the turn-of-the-century railroad circus. For a useful account that spans the rise of the circus over the nineteenth century but still focuses on the heyday of the American circus, see George Chindahl, *A History of the Circus in America* (Caldwell: Caxton, 1959). For an account of Coney Island, in particular, see John F. Kasson, *Amusing the Millions: Coney Island at the Turn of the Century* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1978). For a rare historical study that focuses specifically on impact of the circus business on animals, see Susan Nance, *Entertaining Elephants: Animal Agency and the Business of the American Circus* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013). For a discussion of the impresarios who propelled the growth of the circus in America, see Bluford Adams, *E Pluribus Barnum: The Great Showman and the Making of U.S. Popular Culture* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997); James Cook, *The Arts of Deception: Playing with Fraud in the Age of Barnum* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001); David Lewis Hammarstrom, *Big Top Boss: John Ringling North and the Circus* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992);

Neil Harris, *Humbug: The Art of P.T. Barnum* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973); and A. H. Saxon, *P. T. Barnum, The Legend and the Man* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989).

<sup>129</sup> On the early American circus, Stuart Thayer is an exhaustive source. See his *Annals of the American Circus: 1793-1829*, 3 vols. (Manchester: Rymark Print, 1976-1992); *Traveling Showmen: The American Circus before the Civil War* (Detroit: Astley & Ricketts, 1997). For information on the circus beyond the American Context, see Earl Chapin May, *The Circus from Rome to Ringling* (New York: Dover, 1963, 1932); George Speaight, *A History of the Circus* (London: Tantivy, 1980); and Rupert Croft-Cooke and Peter Cotes, *Circus: A World History* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1977). On representation in the circus, see Paul Bouissac, *Circus and Culture: A Semiotic Approach* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976); Helen Stoddart, *Rings of Desire: Circus History and Representation* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000).

<sup>130</sup> Barnes, *Nightwood*, 4.

<sup>131</sup> Barnes, *Nightwood*, 15.

<sup>132</sup> Barnes, *Nightwood*, 13-14.

<sup>133</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>135</sup> Phillip F. Herring, *Djuna: The Life and Work of Djuna Barnes* (New York: Viking, 1995), 75-102.

<sup>136</sup> Winkiel, "Circuses and Spectacles," 18.

<sup>137</sup> Djuna Barnes, "Djuna Barnes Probes the Souls of Circus Folk" (1915), *New York*, ed. Alyce Barry (Los Angeles: Sun and Moon Press, 1989), 192.

<sup>138</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.*, 193.

<sup>140</sup> *Ibid.*, 191.

<sup>141</sup> *Ibid.*, 194.

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid.*, 190.

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.*, 191.

<sup>145</sup> See for instance Georgia Mason and Jeff Rushen, *Stereotypic Animal Behavior: Fundamentals and Applications to Welfare*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Wallingford: CAB International, 2007).

<sup>146</sup> Stuart Thayer, "The Keeper Will Enter the Cage: Early American Wild Animal Trainers," *Bandwagon* 26.6 (1982): 73-88.

<sup>147</sup> John Stokes, "'Lion Griefs': The Wild Animal Act as Theatre," *New Theatre Quarterly* 20.2 (May 2004): 139-140.

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*, 141-152.

<sup>149</sup> Davis, *The Circus Age*, 149.

<sup>150</sup> Qtd. in Nigel Rothfels, *Savages and Beasts: The Birth of the Modern Zoo* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 151.

<sup>151</sup> Carl Hagenbeck, *Beasts and Men, Being Carl Hagenbeck's Experiences for Half a Century Among Wild Animals* (1909), trans. Hugh. S. R. Elliot and A. G. Thacker (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1911), 31.

<sup>152</sup> Frank Bostock, *The Training of Wild Animals* (New York: Century, 1903).

<sup>153</sup> Rothfels, *Savages and Beasts*, 156.

<sup>154</sup> Hagenbeck, *Beasts and Men*, 30.

<sup>155</sup> Ibid., 31.

<sup>156</sup> Ibid., 26.

<sup>157</sup> Ibid., 29.

<sup>158</sup> Frank Bostock actually describes the experience: The lion comes to the trainer from the jungle, after having been subjected to abuse and gross indignities ... He has been kept in cramped quarters, cruelly joggled and crushed in a narrow box while on his way to the coast from the interior, his bedding left unchanged, and the poor food with which he has been provided thrown carelessly into the refuse and offal which surround him. Clean and fastidious, as the lion always is about his food and person, he often refuses to eat, and this, added sometimes to seasickness, makes his suffering terrible ... In many cases he arrives in Europe or America sick and weak, and appears only too ready to die and get rid his troubles ... it frequently happens that wild animals kill themselves in frenzies of fear during transportation. Everything in their surroundings is new and strange to them. They have lost their freedom and the fresh air; they are cramped and half stifled in close quarters, surrounded by dirt and unwholesomeness, and cannot even keep their bodies still for two seconds, owing to the perpetual motion which goes on, and which, perhaps, terrifies them more than anything else. Therefore, when a wild animal is first turned over to the trainer, he is practically mad with his experiences and terrors. Bostock, *The Training of Wild Animals*, 131-132.

<sup>159</sup> Qtd. in Rothfels, *Savages and Beasts*, 67.

<sup>160</sup> Rothfels, *Savages and Beasts*, 157.

<sup>161</sup> Frank Bostock, *The Training of Wild Animals* (New York: Century, 1903), 167-168.

<sup>162</sup> Qtd. in Rothfels, *Savages and Beasts*, 157.

<sup>163</sup> Bostock, *The Training of Wild Animals*, 185.

<sup>164</sup> Vicki Hearne, *Adam's Task: Calling Animals by Name* (New York: Knopf, 1986); Donna Haraway, *The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and Significant Otherness* (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2003).

<sup>165</sup> Bostock, *The Training of Wild Animals*, 120.

<sup>166</sup> Hagenbeck, *Beasts and Men*, 133.

<sup>167</sup> Ibid., 130-131.

<sup>168</sup> Bostock, *The Training of Wild Animals*, 174.

<sup>169</sup> Ibid., 97.

<sup>170</sup> Ibid., 227.

<sup>171</sup> On Topsy, see Susan Nance, *Entertaining Elephants*, 184-186.

<sup>172</sup> Barnes, *Nightwood*, 15.

<sup>173</sup> Ibid., 59.

<sup>174</sup> Yoram S. Carmeli, "The Sight of Cruelty: The Case of Circus Animal Acts," *Visual Anthropology* 10 (1997): 10. See also "Lion on Display: Culture, Nature, and Totality in a Circus Performance," *Poetics Today* 24.1 (Spring 2003): 65-90; Yoram S. Carmeli, "'Cruelty to Animals' and Nostalgic Totality: Performances of a Traveling Circus in Britain," *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy* 22.11 (2002): 73-88.

<sup>175</sup> Ibid., 81.

<sup>176</sup> Paul Taylor, *Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 271.

<sup>177</sup> Suzanne Laba Cataldi, "Animals and the Concept of Dignity: Critical Reflections on a Circus Performance," *Ethics and the Environment* 7.2 (Autumn 2002), 116.

<sup>178</sup> Michael Peterson, "The Animal Apparatus: From a Theory of Animal Acting to an Ethics of Animal Acts," *TDR* 51.1 (Spring 2007): 45. See also Michael Kirby, "On Acting and Non-Acting," *Drama Review* 16.1 (1972): 3-15

<sup>179</sup> John Stokes, "'Lion Griefs,'" 43.

<sup>180</sup> By the fin de siècle, Hagenbeck was selling hundreds of animals a year to zoos, circuses, hunting parks, private collectors, and other buyers. Needing larger quarters to house these animals between their capture and sale, Hagenbeck bought 14 hectares of land in Stellington, outside Hamburg. Although it was essentially a holding station for animals destined for some far-flung entertainment enterprise, Hagenbeck turned the park into a form of amusement in and of itself. And not only so: when the animal park in Stellington opened in 1907, it came to represent an utterly new vision of how exotic animals could be kept. What became known as Hagenbeck's "Animal Paradise" displayed animals without the use of bars and fences, using calculated landscaping and hidden barriers instead, so that the animals appeared to be living in the wilds of Africa or India. The architectural illusion of the captive animals' freedom was soon emulated by zoological gardens all over the world, and it remains the standard for zoo design to this day. Nigel Rothfels, *Savages and Beasts*; Herman Reichenbach, "A Tale of Two Zoos: The Hamburg Zoological Garden and Carl Hagenbeck's Tierpark," *New Worlds, New Animals: From the Menagerie to the Zoological Park in the Nineteenth Century*, ed. By R. J. Hoage and William A. Deiss (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996): 51-62; Harro Strehlow, "Zoos and Aquariums of Berlin," *New Worlds, New Animals: From the Menagerie to the Zoological Park in the Nineteenth Century*, ed. By R. J. Hoage and William A. Deiss (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996): 63-72.

<sup>181</sup> Barnes, *Nightwood*, 37.

<sup>182</sup> *Ibid.*, 38.

<sup>183</sup> *Ibid.*, 41.

<sup>184</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>185</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>186</sup> *Ibid.*, emphasis mine.

<sup>187</sup> *Ibid.*, 37

<sup>188</sup> *Ibid.*, 38.

<sup>189</sup> *Ibid.*, 40.

<sup>190</sup> *Ibid.*, 19.

<sup>191</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>192</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.

<sup>193</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.

<sup>194</sup> McClintock, Anne McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Conquest* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 354.

<sup>195</sup> *Ibid.*, 359.

<sup>196</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>197</sup> Barnes, *Nightwood*, 3.

<sup>198</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>199</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>200</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>201</sup> *Ibid.*, 41.

<sup>202</sup> *Ibid.*, 42.

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- <sup>203</sup> Ibid., 51.
- <sup>204</sup> Ibid., 45.
- <sup>205</sup> Ibid., 46.
- <sup>206</sup> Ibid., 49.
- <sup>207</sup> Ibid., 48.
- <sup>208</sup> Ibid., 50.
- <sup>209</sup> Ibid., 52.
- <sup>210</sup> Andrea Harris, *Other Sexes: Rewriting Difference from Woolf to Winterson* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), 233.
- <sup>211</sup> Dana Seitler, "Down on All Fours," 5.
- <sup>212</sup> Blyn, Robin. "Nightwood's Freak Dandies: Decadence in the 1930s." *Modernism/Modernity* 15.3 (2008): 504.
- <sup>213</sup> Ibid., 503.
- <sup>214</sup> Bernth Lindfors, "Ethnological Show Business: Footlight the Dark Continent," in *Freakery: Cultural Spectacles of the Extraordinary Body*, ed. Rosemarie Garland Thomson (New York: New York University Press, 1996), 207-218; Robert Bogdan, *Freak Show: Presenting Human Oddities for Amusement and Profit* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1988), 176-199; Rachel Adams, *Sideshow U.S.A.: Freaks and the American Cultural Imagination* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001): 25-59.
- <sup>215</sup> On the self-made freak, see Bogdan, *Freak Show*, 234-266; Leonard Cassuto, *The Inhuman Race: The Racial Grotesque in American Literature and Culture* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997): 168-216.
- <sup>216</sup> Rothfels, *Savages and Beasts*, 81.
- <sup>217</sup> Ibid., 16.
- <sup>218</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>219</sup> Ibid., 20.
- <sup>220</sup> Hagenbeck, *Beasts and Men*, 29.
- <sup>221</sup> Rothfels, *Savages and Beasts*, 86.
- <sup>222</sup> Ibid., 120.
- <sup>223</sup> Ibid., 84.
- <sup>224</sup> Ibid., 98.
- <sup>225</sup> Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics* (1922), trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1971), 19.
- <sup>226</sup> Lukács, *The Theory of the Novel*, 191.
- <sup>227</sup> Lukács, *The Theory of the Novel*, 190.
- <sup>228</sup> Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, 104.
- <sup>228</sup> Georg Lukács, *The Theory of the Novel: A Historico-Philosophical Essay on the Forms of Great Epic Literature* (1920), trans. Anna Bostock (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1971) 191.
- <sup>229</sup> Davis, *The Circus Age*, 78.
- <sup>230</sup> Moishe Postone, "Anti-Semitism and National Socialism: Notes on the German Reaction to 'Holocaust,'" *New German Critique* 19.1 (Winter 1980): 110.
- <sup>231</sup> Ibid., 112.
- <sup>232</sup> Ibid., 232.
- <sup>233</sup> Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1948) (San Diego: Harcourt, Inc., 1968), 233.
- <sup>234</sup> Meryl Altman, "A Book of Repulsive Jews?: Rereading *Nightwood*," *The Review of*

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*Contemporary Fiction* 13:3 (Fall 1993): 161.

<sup>235</sup> Barnes, *Nightwood*, 45.

<sup>236</sup> *Ibid.*, 13.

<sup>237</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.

<sup>238</sup> Harriet Ritvo, *The Animal Estate: The English and Other Creatures in the Victorian Age* (Harvard University Press, 1987), 217.

<sup>239</sup> A two-part investigative report by Seattle Times Michael J. Berens details Chai's story. See especially Michael J. Berens, "Elephants are Dying Out in America's Zoos," *The Seattle Times*, December 1<sup>st</sup>, 2012. See also Michael J. Berens, "Elephant Havens Face Zoo-Industry Backlash," *The Seattle Times*, December 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2012.

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