

© Copyright 2022
Giselle E. Antoine

Organizational Cultures of Guilt & Shame

Giselle E. Antoine

A dissertation

submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

University of Washington

2022

Reading Committee:

Michael D. Johnson, Co-Chair

Crystal Farh, Co-Chair

Xiao-Ping Chen

Program Authorized to Offer Degree:

Foster School of Business

University of Washington

Abstract

Organizational Cultures of Guilt & Shame

Giselle E. Antoine

Chairs of the Supervisory Committee:
Professors Michael Johnson & Crystal Farh
Department of Management and Organization
Foster School of Business

This manuscript develops theory on organizational affective cultures of guilt and shame as systems of social control that guide members in how they ought to feel and behave surrounding the violation of norms. Moral emotions such as guilt and shame play an essential role in promoting self-regulation among organizational members. While research has extensively examined guilt and shame as discrete emotions, little work has explored guilt and shame as cultural phenomena that indicate the top-down forces of social regulation in organizations. In Paper 1 of this dissertation, I develop theory for guilt and shame cultures as complementary systems, each inhibiting transgression and encouraging reparative action via differential value systems. In Paper 2, I develop a scale for guilt and shame cultures in order to empirically assess the relative impact of these cultures on deterring deviance in organizations. Finally, in Paper 3, I present a close examination of shaming rituals. In this paper, I develop theory that explains when and how shaming is functional in discouraging deviance from organizational norms.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am deeply indebted to my dissertation co-chairs Professors Crystal Farh and Michael Johnson for providing unyielding support and critical feedback throughout this dissertation experience. However, it was really the *personal* support my chairs provided, extending well beyond the scope of this project, that made this endeavor possible. The feedback of my entire Reading Committee, including my co-chairs, along with Professors Xiao-Ping Chen and Jerald Herting, continuously pushed my boundaries and required me to expect more of myself in the way of excellent scholarship and rigorous methods. The quality of work presented in this final draft is a testament of the exceptional mentorship that I received from this group. I am additionally grateful for all the members of the Foster Business School Management & Organization department, including faculty and PhD students, who asked difficult questions that required me to think more deeply about my topic and revisit my own assumptions with a fresh set of eyes. Each question contributed to the betterment of the work presented here. I am further indebted toward Professors William Maddux and Francis Flynn, who have been among my most steadfast and caring academic mentors. I who has been I would also like to express my deepest gratitude to Professor Jason MacDonald, who initially planted the idea in my mind of guilt and shame cultures as a topic worthy of research. I owe so much of my professional passion to Jason's early encouragement. I'm also extremely grateful to Professor Qiongjing (Jerry) Hu, of Zhejiang University, who extended a tremendous effort in the data collection for Papers 2 and 3. Without his assistance, many of the rich findings presented in the latter half of this work would have been far more difficult to attain.

Finally, I could not have undertaken this journey without the support of many family members and friends. Words cannot express my gratitude to Margo Elbert whose mentorship and

love guided me through my most difficult and celebratory moments. I extend a special thanks to Dick, Dana, Maria, Barbara, Donna, Waynette, Lynne, Carolyn, and Gary for being my forever Seattle family. I have never felt so unconditionally loved by a group of people, and it made all the difference. Finally, I am forever indebted to the academic parents of the UW Family Housing Community, including Farah, Kristin, Akanksha, and many others who offered essential help, childcare, and community that made this journey possible.

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION.....	12
Paper 1: Organizational Cultures of Guilt and Shame: A Theoretical Model	17
Conceptual Foundations:	22
Organizational Cultures of Guilt & Shame.....	22
What are organizational affective cultures?	22
Organizational cultures of guilt and shame	23
Discrete Guilt & Shame Similarities.....	23
Guilt & shame as self-evaluative, moral emotions.....	23
Guilt & shame as prosocial emotions	24
Discrete Guilt & Shame Differences.....	24
Private (guilt) vs. public (shame).	24
Focus on specific action (guilt) vs. global self (shame)	24
Reparative action (guilt) vs. concealment (shame)	25
Violator Self-Regulation and Responses	26
Guilt culture: Self-regulation prior to a norm violation	26
Shame culture: Self-regulation prior to a norm violation	27
Guilt culture: Responses following a norm violation	27
Shame cultures: Responses following a norm violation.....	29
Witnesses & Third-Party Members.....	31
Guilt culture punishments: Private punishments	31
Shame culture punishments: Shaming & social distancing.....	32
Guilt culture responses: Collective apologies, confession & guilt.....	34
Shame culture responses: Cooperative concealment & collective shame.....	35
Downstream Effects of Guilt & Shame Cultures	37
Implications for Employee Behavior	37
Convergent Normative Effects.....	37
Socialization in a guilt culture	37
Socialization in a shame culture	38
Divergent Normative Effects	40
Guilt cultures promote	40
Shame cultures.....	41
Guilt culture divergent normative effects	42
Shame culture divergent normative effects	43
Discussion.....	44
Paper 2: Organizational Cultures of Guilt and Shame: A Scale Development Project	55
The Orbiting Constructs for Cultures of Guilt and Shame	57
Cultural Tightness-Looseness	57
Individualism-Collectivism	59
Power Distance.....	61
Behavioral Outcomes.....	63

Organizational Deviance	63
Interpersonal Deviance	65
Unethical Pro-Organizational Behavior	66
Additional Research Questions	68
Scale Development Process	72
Item generation.....	72
Study 1: Definitional Correspondence	73
Study 2: Exploratory Factor Analysis.....	74
Study 3: Confirmatory Factor Analysis.....	75
Study 4: Nomological Validity	76
Measures.....	79
Analyses.....	81
Results.....	84
Supplemental Analyses	88
Discussion.....	91
Limitations	103
Practical Implications	105
Future Directions.....	106
Conclusion	109
Paper 3: The Power of the Public Slap: A Multifaceted Perspective on the Costs and Benefits of Organizational Shaming.....	110
Theoretical Development.....	115
Shaming Rituals, Norm Violations & the Audience.....	115
Pathway 1: The Effects of Shaming on Audience Commitment to the Group and Its Norms	116
The Mediating Effect of Commitment to the Group and Its Norms on Deviance	117
The Moderating Effect of Shame Culture Orientation on Commitment to the Group and Its Norms	119
The Moderated Mediation Effect of Shame Culture Orientation on Deviance.....	120
The Moderating Effect of Guilt Culture Orientation on Commitment to the Group and Its Norms	121
The Moderated Mediation Effect of Guilt Culture Orientation on Deviance.....	123
Pathway 2: The Effects of Shaming on Condemning Moral Emotion toward the Target and the Violation	124
The Mediating Effect of Condemning Moral Emotional Response toward the Target	126
The Mediating Effect of Condemning Moral Emotional Response toward the Violation.....	127
The Moderating Effect of Stigmatizing Shaming on Condemning Moral Emotion	128
The Moderated Mediation Effect of Stigmatization on Deviance.....	129
The Moderating Effect of Reintegrative Shaming on Condemning Moral Emotion	131
The Moderated Mediation Effect of Reintegrative Shaming on Interpersonal Deviance	133
The Moderated Mediation Effect of Reintegrative Shaming on Deviance from the Violated Norms.....	134
Methods.....	135

Study 1.....	135
Sample and Study Design	136
Measures.....	139
Control Variables	141
Additional Research Questions.....	142
Shame Culture or Guilt Culture.....	143
Nature of the Transgression.....	144
Self-Evaluation Response.....	144
Empathic Response	146
Analyses.....	147
Results.....	148
Discussion.....	170
Limitations	177
Practical Implications	180
Future Directions.....	182
GENERAL CONCLUSION.....	185
Future Directions for Research on Guilt and Shame Cultures.....	188
Conclusion.....	190
REFERENCES.....	191
APPENDIX A	216
Table 1. Guilt & Shame as Discrete Emotions.....	216
Table 2. Guilt & Shame as Organizational Affective Cultures.....	217
Figure 1. An Overview of the Organizational Cultures of Guilt & Shame Theory	218
APPENDIX B	219
Table 3. Paper 2: Item Generation for Guilt Culture Statement Items	219
Table 4. Paper 2: Item Generation for Shame Culture Statement Items	220
Table 5. Paper 2: Item Generation for Guilt Culture Adjective Items	221
Table 6. Paper 2: Item Generation for Shame Culture Statement Items	221
Table 7. Paper 2 – Study 1: Factor Loadings with Shame Culture	222
Table 8. Paper 2 – Study 1: Factor Loadings with Guilt Culture.....	223
Table 9. Paper 2 – Study 1: Factor Loadings with Shame Culture	224
Table 10. Paper 2 – Study 1: Factor Loadings with Guilt Culture.....	224
Table 11. Paper 2 – Study 2: Exploratory Factor Analysis	225
Table 12. Paper 2 – Study 3: Confirmatory Factor Analysis	226
Table 13. Paper 2 – Study 4: Descriptive Statistics & Intercorrelations for Main Analyses	227

Table 14. Paper 2 – Study 4: Descriptive Statistics & Intercorrelations for Supplemental Analyses.....	228
Table 15: Paper 2 – Study 4: Results Summary for Main Study.....	229
Table 16. Paper 2 - Study 4: Main Analysis of Guilt and Shame Cultures on Cultural Tightness	230
Table 17. Paper 2 - Study 4: Main Analysis of Guilt and Shame Cultures on Collectivism	231
Table 18. Paper 2 – Study 4: Main Analysis of Guilt and Shame Cultures on Power Distance ..	232
Table 19. Paper 2 – Study 4: Main Analysis of Guilt and Shame Cultures on Organizational Deviance	233
Table 20. Paper 2 – Study 4: Main Analysis of Guilt and Shame Cultures on Interpersonal Deviance	234
Table 21. Paper 2 – Study 4: Main Analysis of Guilt and Shame Cultures on Unethical Pro-Organizational Behavior.....	235
Table 22. Paper 2 – Study 4: Supplemental Analysis of Guilt and Shame Cultures on Compliance and Deference	236
Table 23. Paper 2 – Study 4: Supplemental Analysis of Guilt and Shame Cultures on Anxiety	237
Table 24. Paper 2 – Study 4: Supplemental Analysis of Guilt and Shame Cultures on Affective Commitment	238
Figure 2. Paper 2 – Study 4: The Moderating Effect of Shame Culture Orientation on the Relationship between Shame Cultures and Compliance	239
Table 25. Paper 3: Main Analysis Descriptive Statistics & Intercorrelations – Chinese Sample	240
Table 26. Paper 3: Main Analysis Descriptive Statistics & Intercorrelations – Western Sample	241
Table 27. Paper 3: Supplemental Analyses Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations – Chinese Sample	242
Table 28. Paper 3: Supplemental Analyses Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations – Western Sample	243
Table 29. Paper 3: Supplemental Analyses Empathic Response Descriptive Statistics & Intercorrelations – Chinese Sample.....	244
Table 30. Paper 3: Supplemental Analyses Empathic Response Descriptive Statistics & Intercorrelations – Western Sample.....	245
Table 31: Paper 3 – Results Summary for Main Study	246
Table 32. Paper 3: Commitment to the Group at Time 2.....	248
Table 33. Paper 3: Commitment to the Violated Norms at Time 2	249
Table 34. Study 3: The Mediating Effect of Commitment to the Group at Time 2	250
Table 35. Study 3: The Mediating Effect of Norm Commitment on Norm Deviance at Time 3..	251
Table 36. Paper 3: The Moderating Effect of Shame Culture Orientation on Commitment to the Workgroup at Time 2.....	252

Table 37. Paper 3: The Moderating Effect of Shame Culture Orientation on Commitment to the Violated Norms at Time 2.....	253
Table 38. Paper 3: A Robustness Check on Moderating Effect of Shame Culture Orientation on Commitment to the Violated Norms at Time 2 –including Abusive Supervision	254
Table 39. Paper 3: The Moderated Mediation Effect of Shame Culture Orientation on Organizational Deviance.....	255
Table 40. Paper 3: The Moderated Mediation Effect of Shame Culture Orientation on Norm Deviance at Time 3	256
Table 41. Paper 3: A Robustness Check on Moderating Effect of Shame Culture Orientation on Workgroup Commitment at Time 2 including Abusive Supervision	257
Table 42. Paper 3: The Moderating Effect of Guilt Culture Orientation on Workgroup Commitment at Time 2	258
Table 43. Paper 3: The Moderating Effect of Guilt Culture Orientation on Norm Commitment at Time 2	259
Table 44. Paper 3: The Moderated Mediation Effect of Guilt Culture Orientation on Organizational Deviance.....	260
Table 45. Paper 3: The Moderated Mediation Effect of Guilt Culture Orientation on Norm Deviance	261
Table 46. Paper 3: Negative Moral Emotion toward the Target at Time 2	262
Table 47. Paper 3: Negative Moral Emotion toward the Violation at Time 2.....	263
Table 48. Paper 3: The Mediating Effect of Negative Emotion toward the Target on Interpersonal Deviance at Time 3.....	264
Table 49. Paper 3: The Mediating Effect of Negative Emotion toward the Violation on Norm Deviance at Time 3	265
Table 50. Paper 3: The Moderating Effect of Stigmatization on Negative Emotion toward the Target at Time 2	266
Table 51. Paper 3: A Robustness Check on the Moderating Effect of Stigmatization on Negative Emotion toward the Target at Time 2 including Abusive Supervision	267
Table 52. Paper 3: The Moderating Effect of Stigmatization on Negative Emotion toward the Violation at Time 2.....	268
Table 53. Paper 3: The Moderating Effect of Stigmatization on Negative Emotion toward the Violation at Time 2 – Robustness Check including Abusive Supervision.....	269
Table 54. Paper 3: The Moderated Mediating Effect of Stigmatization on Interpersonal Deviance via Negative Emotion toward the Target	270
Table 55. Paper 3: The Moderated Mediating Effect of Stigmatization on Norm Deviance via Negative Emotion toward the Violation	271
Table 56. Paper 3: The Moderating Effect of Reintegration on Negative Emotion toward the Target at Time 2	272
Table 57. Paper 3: The Moderating Effect of Reintegration on Negative Emotion toward the Target at Time 2 – Robustness Check including Abusive Supervision	273

Table 58. Paper 3: The Moderating Effect of Reintegration on Negative Emotion toward the Violation at Time 2	274
Table 59. Paper 3: The Moderating Effect of Reintegration on Negative Emotion toward the Violation at Time 2 – Robustness Check including Abusive Supervision.....	275
Table 60. Paper 3: The Moderating Effect of Reintegration on Interpersonal Deviance via Negative Emotion toward the Target	276
Table 61. Paper 3: The Moderating Effect of Reintegration on Norm Deviance via Negative Emotion toward the Violation	277
Figure 3. Paper 3: The Hypothesized Model	278
Figure 4. Paper 3: Variable Capturing for the Hypothesized Model Across Three Timepoints.	279
Figure 5. Paper 3: The Moderating Effect of Shame Culture Orientation on the Relationship between Witnessing Shaming and Norm Commitment	280
Figure 6. Paper 3: The Moderating Effect of Stigmatization on the Relationship between Witnessing Shaming and Negative Emotion toward the Target.....	281
Figure 7. Paper 3: The Moderating Effect of Stigmatization on the Relationship between Witnessing Shaming and Negative Emotion toward the Violation.....	282
Figure 8. Paper 3: The Moderating Effect of Reintegrative Shaming on the Relationship between Witnessing Shaming and Negative Emotion toward the Target.....	283
Figure 9. Paper 3: The Moderating Effect of Reintegrative Shaming on the Relationship between Witnessing Shaming and Negative Emotion toward the Violation.....	284
APPENDIX D.....	285
Independent Variables.....	285
Mediators	285
Moderators.....	286
Dependent Variables.....	288

INTRODUCTION

In recounting her time living in Japan, Ruth Benedict, a renowned American anthropologist, remarked on the curious system of social control that she encountered there. To her intrigue, Japanese culture revered shame as “the root of virtue” and relied on a “strong sense that other people are sitting in judgment” to instill moral values and social norms among their population (Benedict, 1946/2005, p. 222). Benedict’s observations sparked the interest of anthropologists and sociologists, spawning several decades of inquiry into guilt and shame cultures as social regulatory systems that guide behavior through two different emotional pathways (Ausubel, 1955; Creighton, 1990; Greenwald & Harder, 1998; Lebra, 1983; Mead, 1949; Scheff, 1988, 2003). This work showed that guilt cultures promote self-regulation primarily by inducing guilt – the intraindividual feeling that one has violated one’s own moral standards. Shame cultures, by contrast, promote self-regulation primarily by inducing shame – the interindividual feeling that one has disappointed their community. Guilt cultures require confession, genuine apology and changed behavior to achieve redemption, while shame cultures punish violators through public shaming as an atonement process.

While guilt and shame cultures may appear distal to organizational functioning, recent popular scholarship expounds the “hidden rules of atonement” that distinguish organizations in shame cultures like Samsung and Hyundai in comparison to organizations in guilt cultures like Enron and Lehman Brothers (Chun, 2017). In brief, this work suggests that the forces of guilt and shame as moral emotional cultures are salient and influential in defining how organizations discourage deviance and punish transgressions. Guilt cultures rely on individual conscience to regulate behavior, and violators are punished privately to elicit guilt and encourage reparative

action. Shame cultures rely on individual's sensitivity to the group's expectations. In shame cultures, the loss of face and standing in the group is the punishment.

To date, research on guilt and shame in organizations has overwhelmingly focused on the individual emotional episodes of guilt and shame (Bohns & Flynn, 2013; Leary & Kowalski, 1995; Tangney, 1995) and guilt- and shame-proneness as antecedent traits (Einstein & Lanning, 1998; Lewis, 1987). This work indicates that guilt, more so than shame, is predictive of productive and reparative responses to wrongdoing, such as honest confessions, sincere apologies and changed behavior (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). In addition, this research suggests that guilt-proneness, more so than shame-proneness, relates to number of positive attributes and outcomes, including moral character, norm compliance, leadership capability and affective commitment (Cohen, Panter & Turen, 2012; Flynn & Schaumberg, 2012; Schaumberg & Flynn, 2012; Schaumberg & Flynn, 2021). By contrast, this body of research correlates shame and shame-proneness with a number of unproductive outcomes such as depression, withdrawal, concealment of the wrongdoing, and aggressive behavior (Barret, 1995; Fischer & Tangney, 1995; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Altogether, the body of work on guilt and shame in organizational studies has focused predominantly on discrete emotions and dispositional traits and suggested that guilt, not shame, is the superior moral response to wrongdoing (Tangney & Dearing, 2002).

This conclusion seems overly simplistic, however, for several reasons. First, a wide body of cross-cultural research has indicated the interpersonal and moral benefits of shame in a number of different cultures (Bagozzi, Verbeke & Gavino, 2003; Bedford & Hwang, 2003). Thus, the current perspective on shame in psychology and management research inadequately acknowledges how shame plays a central and functional role in moral systems and social

development processes across many non-Western societies (Lebra, 1983; Wong & Tsai, 2007). Second, in general, people look at guilt and shame cultures as collective experiences that shape self-regulation at the individual level (Benedict, 1946/2005; Creighton, 1990; Greenwald & Harder, 1998; Mead, 1949, Scheff, 1988, 2003); however, existing work has so far paid minimal attention to how these emotions at the collective level of analysis manifest and influence behavior.

These outstanding gaps in research on guilt and shame in organizations indicate several important areas for theoretical development, which I explore in my dissertation. First, Paper 1 builds theory on shame and guilt cultures in organizations. In this conceptual paper, I extend theory on guilt and shame to consider these emotions as macro, top-down, emotional cultures which influence self-regulatory behavior in organizations through shared norms, values and underlying assumptions that are consistent with each discrete emotions. The theoretical model presented in this paper delineates the core indicators of guilt and shame cultures including how these cultures promote self-regulation prior to norm violations, the reparative actions they encourage following norm violations, and their respective atonement processes. The second half of the model expounds on the divergent and convergent outcomes of these cultures including how guilt and shame cultures accommodate individual differences and cultural change. Overall, Paper 1 greatly expands the narrative on the function of guilt and shame in organizations to consider how these emotions – as collective forces – impact deviance.

In Paper 2, I elaborate on the theoretical constructs advanced in Paper 1 by developing survey instruments to measure guilt and shame emotional cultures within organizations. Following established scale development guidelines, I have worked in collaboration with Michael Johnson (Co-chair) through the scale development process, including item generation,

definitional correspondence, exploratory factor analysis, confirmatory factor analysis, and nomological validity study (Colquitt, et al., 2019; Hinkin & Tracey, 1999), which explores the relationship between guilt and shame cultures and related cultural dimensions, such as collectivism, power distance, and cultural tightness-looseness. The primary purpose of this paper is to establish the nomological network for guilt and shame cultures and empirically test relationships proposed in Paper 1, with particular attention to how guilt and shame cultures influence norm-violating behavior. Paper 2 provides the first layer of empirical validation of the form, existence and relevance of guilt and shame cultures in organizational settings.

Finally, in Paper 3, I unpack the socializing function of shaming rituals from a witnessing perspective. Drawing on social control theory, the first pathway of this model illustrates how witnessing shaming operates as a socially binding experience by drawing members together in the punishment of a norm violation. In doing so, witnessing shaming elicits member commitment to the group and the violated norms as a pathway to deter deviant behavior. I further hypothesize that this effect is particularly salient for individuals high in shame culture orientation – i.e., individuals who possess beliefs regarding the moral validity of shaming punishments. Drawing on affective social learning theory, the second pathway of this model illustrates how witnessing shaming operates as a didactic and moralizing experience for the audience by drawing audience members' attention to the social disapproval of the violation and the violator (i.e., shaming target). In doing so, witnessing shaming elicits audience member condemnation of the violation and the target as a pathway to deter deviant behavior. I further hypothesize that this effect is attenuated by the nature of the shaming. When shaming is stigmatizing, audience members learn that deviance toward the violator is acceptable, but when shaming is reintegrative, audience members learn to condemn the violation but forgive the violator, thus reducing deviance toward

the target. In this paper, I employ a three-wave study design to test these hypotheses. Chiefly, this paper examines when and how shaming rituals operate as social binding and moralization processes to encourage audience member commitment and discourage deviance in organizations.

Altogether, this dissertation makes three major contributions to management research on guilt and shame. First, by drawing on research from anthropology and sociology, the theory paper greatly expands the focus on guilt and shame in organizations to consider their effects as top-down, moral emotional cultures that guide member behavior surrounding the violation of norms. This contribution highlights that the effects of guilt and shame extend far beyond the individual experience of these emotions and dispositional traits, to include the social forces that influence how members ought to feel and behave when norms are violated. Second, the scale development project creates a measurement tool for guilt and shame cultures, which previously did not exist. This scale further facilitates an empirical test of the relationships proposed in the theoretical framework. This study establishes the nomological network for guilt and shame cultures among a constellation of organizational behaviors and explores their functions (and dysfunctions) as systems of social control in organizations. Third, the empirical model on witnessing shaming illuminates our understanding of this socialization mechanism in organizations. Building on theories of social learning and social control, this model illustrates a nuanced and balanced picture of how shaming can be both beneficial and costly to organizational functioning.

Paper 1: Organizational Cultures of Guilt and Shame: A Theoretical Model

Giselle Antoine & Michael Johnson

“In a guilt culture you know you are good or bad by what your conscience feels. In a shame culture you know you are good or bad by what your community says about you, by whether it honors or excludes you. In a guilt culture people sometimes feel they do bad things; in a shame culture social exclusion makes people feel they are bad.” (Brooks, 2016).

Discouraging norm violations is a perennial concern in organizations (Dannals & Miller, 2017; Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009; Weber 1958, 1978). As such, scholarship has long explored various organizational approaches to deterring and punishing deviant behavior (Berry, Ones & Sackett, 2007; Marasi, Bennett & Budden, 2018, O’Reilly & Chatman, 1996; Tyler & Blader, 2005). However, this stream of inquiry has neglected a critical domain of scholarship. For the past half-century, rational approaches have dominated theorizing on social control in organizations (Barker, 1993; Marasi et al., 2018; Weber 1958, 1978). These approaches include the structural design of workplaces, bureaucratic red-tape, highly coordinated teams, and surveillance systems that constrain behavior and reinforce the rational-logic of organizational rules (Barker, 1993). In sum, past theorizing has overwhelmingly attended to control systems that shape how employees think about organizational rules. Yet attention to rational programming neglects the unique effects of emotional programming in regulating behavior. Indeed, emotions distinctly influence organizational outcomes in ways that cognitions fall short (Izard, Kagan, & Zajonc, 1984; Robinson, Watkins, & Harmon-Jones, 2013; Zajonc & Markus, 1985). Few emotions are more central to discouraging deviance than the moral emotions of guilt and shame (Haidt, 2003; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). It is widely acknowledged that individuals self-

regulate in anticipation of guilt and shame to avoid the negative experience of these emotions (Ahn, Kim, & Aggarwal, 2014; Renner, Lindenmeier, Tscheulin, & Drevs, 2013), making them influential in deterring deviance at the individual level. However, it is less clear how guilt and shame operate among collectives as top-down systems of social control that script feeling rules surrounding deviance in organizations.

The purpose of this paper is to develop theory on guilt and shame as organizational affective cultures that guide members in how they ought to feel and behave surrounding the violation of norms. Integrating theory from sociology, anthropology, and psychology, I assert that guilt cultures encourage members to rely on an internal moral compass to regulate behavior. In addition, violators in guilt cultures are punished in private to elicit self-judgment and encourage reparative action (Ausubel, 1955; Benedict, 1946/2005; Creighton, 1990; Greenwald & Harder, 1998). By contrast, shame cultures encourage sensitivity to group expectations to regulate behavior and use shaming and ostracism to punish violators (Chun, 2017; Creighton, 1990; Stearns, 2017). Attention to guilt and shame as moral emotional systems profoundly elaborates how these emotions permeate social control in organizations beyond the effects of rational systems and discrete guilt and shame. First, guilt and shame cultures leverage the powerful influence of emotion as a mechanism of social control in organizations. While employees may avoid deviance based on the rational logic of organizational rules, it is increasingly accepted that moral emotions precede logical reasoning (Haidt, 2001). In addition, sometimes a behavior is deemed to be immoral primarily because we feel it is wrong, even in the absence of a clear logical explanation (Haidt, 2001). In this way, an emotional approach to social control addresses the core of self-regulation and offers benefits beyond rational approaches. Second, while discrete guilt and shame can influence individual behavior (Daniels & Robinson,

2019; Tangney & Dearing, 2002), the problem of deterring deviance in organizations is an inherently collective concern, which frequently entails the coordinated efforts of multiple actors. In this way, guilt and shame cultures uniquely address the problem of social control as a collective problem by leveraging collective mechanisms. Unlike the discrete emotions, guilt and shame cultures involve common rituals, shared meanings, scripts, schemas, and behavioral regularities that arise from collective norms, values, and underlying assumptions (Barsade & O’Neill, 2014; Barsade & Gibson, 2007; Schein, 2017). Altogether, an emotional culture approach to theorizing on social control offers a host of unexplored implications relating to the effects of guilt and shame in organizations.

In this manuscript, I delineate the distinct ways guilt and shame cultures contribute to normative behavior in organizations. To do this, I draw on the concept of organizational affective cultures which refers to “the behavioral norms and artifacts, as well as the underlying values and assumptions, that guide the expression (or suppression) of specific emotions and the appropriateness of displaying those emotions within a social unit” (O’Neill & Rothbard, 2017: 78). In line with this notion, I propose that guilt and shame cultures comprise collective norms, values, and underlying assumptions regarding which moral emotion ought to guide self-regulation (i.e., anticipatory guilt or shame) and what behaviors ought to be displayed for violators to convey their remorse and achieve redemption. I then explain how guilt and shame cultures – through different mechanisms – induce norm abiding behavior in organizations. Specifically, I propose that guilt culture sensitize members to their personal normative standards, while shame cultures sensitize members to the workgroup’s standards. Lastly, I consider how guilt and shame cultures – despite both inducing norm abiding behavior in organizations – also produce distinct outcomes as they relate to the identification, exposure, and concealment.

Applying a lens of emotional culture to social control offers several implications for theory on guilt and shame, organizational affective cultures, and social control. First, by examining the function of guilt and shame cultures on norm compliance, I shift a longstanding perception that guilt – not shame – is the superior moral response to wrongdoing (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). While shame has been described as a “maladaptive,” “childish,” and “regressive” compared to guilt in Western psychological literature (Jacquet, 2015; Scheff, 1988; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney, Stuewig, & Martinez 2007a), cross-cultural studies challenge this position, indicating that shame plays essential prosocial and reparative functions in many contexts outside the West (Bedford & Hwang, 2003; Greenwald & Harder, 1998; Wong & Tsai, 2007; Yang & Rosenblatt, 2001). Furthermore, guilt and shame are differentially linked to Eastern and Western moral systems (Fung, 1999; Hwang, 2001; Said, 1979; Stearns, 2017) and play an influential role in defining appropriate behavior among their respective populations (Bagozzi, Verbeke, & Gavino, 2003; Bedford & Hwang, 2003; Fung, 1999; Greenwald & Harder, 1998; Kitayama, Markus, & Matsumoto, 1995; Lutwak, Razzino, & Ferrari, 1998; Szeto-Wong, 1997). Overall, these findings suggest that the management literature to date may have looked at guilt and shame too narrowly, failing to appreciate the various ways they can manifest, particularly in non-Western settings. As management research increasingly assumes a global perspective, it is fitting to acknowledge the centrality of shame to moral systems across numerous societies alongside the eminence of guilt (Chen, 2014; Fung, Lieber, & Leung, 2003; Lebra, 1983; Pishghadam & Firoozian Pour Esfahani, 2020; Strucely, 2018; Wong & Tsai, 2007). To address this gap, this theory explicitly adopts a global perspective to expand appreciation for how both cultures can functionally influence norm-abiding behavior in organizations.

Second, this manuscript extends theory on emotions in organizations with express attention to a domain of research that is critically lacking: organizational affective cultures (Barsade & Gibson, 2007; Barsade & O’Neill, 2017). This theory expands scholarship on emotional cultures beyond the normative expression (or suppression) of emotion, to include norms around emotional anticipation and action tendencies. Extant theory indicates that emotional cultures influence the emotions focal members feel and believe are acceptable to display within their organizational setting (Barsade & O’Neill, 2014; O’Neill & Rothbard, 2017). However, not all emotions involve visible displays (Ekman, Sorensen, & Freisman, 1969; Ekman, et al., 1987), and some emotions – such as guilt and shame – function primarily through the anticipation of the emotion rather than the expression of the emotion (Higgins, 1987). Furthermore, absolving guilt and shame is frequently associated with particular behaviors (i.e., action tendencies) – like apologies, confessions and reparative action (Cohen, Wolf, Panter, & Insko, 2011). Thus, the current focus of organizational affective cultures on the expression or suppression of emotion insufficiently captures the unfolding scope of influence that emotional cultures can impart on member anticipatory emotion and behavior responses. This theory expands the purview of emotional culture to include norms and assumptions around which anticipatory emotions ought to guide self-regulation (i.e., guilt or shame), and what behaviors members ought to display to signal the experience of the emotion following norm violations.

In the sections that follow, I first distinguish guilt and shame as discrete emotions and then describe how they can function as organizational affective cultures (Barsade & Gibson, 2007). Following that, I delineate indicators of cultures of guilt and shame to explain how the content of guilt cultures differs from shame cultures, primarily based on the values and norms

from which they arise. Finally, I illustrate convergent and divergent organizational outcomes of cultures of guilt and shame, which reflect the values from which they arise.

Conceptual Foundations:

Organizational Cultures of Guilt & Shame

What are organizational affective cultures?

I conceptualize guilt and shame cultures as organizational affective cultures that prescribe the appropriate pattern of emotional displays and behaviors surrounding the violation of norms. An organizational affective culture is “a top-down approach [to collective affect] in which collectively held norms — implicit or explicit — about appropriate emotions to express or hold in the group and/or organization, shape the type of emotions that are allowed and expressed in the group context” (Barsade & Gibson, 2007, p. 49; also see Ashkanasy, 2003; Barsade & Gibson, 1998; Barsade & O’Neill, 2014; Gordon, 1990). I expand on this theory to suggest that organizational affective cultures may also shape assumptions regarding which emotions ought to guide behavior, such that emotions need not be expressed, so much as anticipated. Drawing on theories of organizational and emotional cultures, I maintain that guilt and shame cultures are characterized by norms and artifacts, along with shared values and deep underlying assumptions (Barsade & O’Neill, 2014; Ostroff, Kinicki & Muhammad, 2013; Schein, 1992). Consistent with existing theory on organizational cultures, I propose that guilt and shame cultures are instilled through early socialization processes (Schein, 2017) and reaffirmed continually through member interactions. Over time and with repeated emphasis, these cultures instill scripts and schemas among members, eliciting situationally appropriate behavior surrounding the violation of norms (Abelson, 1981; Baldwin, 1992; Schank & Abelson, 1977). I build on these theories to illustrate the influence of organizational values, norms, and assumptions in socializing and guiding members toward situationally appropriate responses to norm violations.

Organizational cultures of guilt and shame

I develop the theory of organizational cultures of guilt and shame by bridging the literature on organizational affective cultures (Barsade & Gibson, 2007; Barsade & O’Neill, 2014) and discrete guilt and shame (Bedford & Hwang, 2003; Higgins, 1987; Tangney & Dearing, 2002) with the body of work on cultures of guilt and shame gleaned from sociological and anthropological research (Benedict, 1946; Creighton, 1990; Greenwald & Harder, 1998; Mead, 1936; Stearns, 2017). I propose that similarities and distinctions between guilt and shame cultures manifest through various lenses including the self-regulatory motivations of the focal actor prior to and following a norm violation, in addition to third party members’ (e.g., coworkers, customers, the media) responses to misdeeds (see Table 2). The following section distinguishes guilt and shame as discrete emotions, after which I detail artifacts and indicators of guilt and shame cultures.

Discrete Guilt & Shame Similarities

Guilt & shame as self-evaluative, moral emotions. As discrete emotions, guilt and shame share several qualities in common. For instance, both are defined as “self-conscious,” moral emotions (Kitayama, Markus & Matsumoto, 1995; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tracy & Robins, 2006) that arise in anticipation of or in response to transgressive behavior and norm violations (Baumeister, Stillwell & Heatherton, 1994; Keltner & Buswell, 1997). Both emotions invoke self-evaluation and elicit an internal conflict between the ‘ought self’ and ‘actual self’ (Allport, 1954; Cooley, 1902, 1964; Freud, 1930/2010, 1961; Higgins, 1987; Piers & Singer, 1971; Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010). This tension has been shown to motivate remorse (Baumeister et al., 1994) and counterfactual thinking over misdeeds (Niedenthal, Tangney & Gavanski, 1994). In this way, guilt and shame both function to maintain and restore alignment

between actual behavior and existing standards (Freud, 1930/2010, 1961; Higgins, 1987) (see Table 1).

Guilt & shame as prosocial emotions. Guilt and shame also play an essential role in regulating employee interaction in organizations. As social emotions (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1995; Baumeister et al., 1994; Fischer & Tangney, 1995, guilt and shame are known to motivate prosocial and interpersonal behavior (Bagozzi, Verbeke & Gavino, 2003; de Hooge et al., 2008; Haidt, 2003) alongside cooperation and reparative actions (Baumeister et al., 1994; Frijda, 1994; Haidt, 2003; Lewis, 1971; Tangney, Miller, Flicker & Barlow, 1996). For instance, guilt and shame may be invoked to discipline violators, elicit apologies, and inspire changed behavior following a misdeed (Baumeister et al., 1994; Erikson, 1963, Freud, 1923/1961).

Discrete Guilt & Shame Differences

Private (guilt) vs. public (shame). Despite these commonalities, guilt and shame are described as distinct emotional experiences with two principal differences (Izard, 1993; Lewis, 1971; Tangney, Stuewig & Martinez, 2014). First, guilt is described primarily as an intrapersonal emotion, while shame is defined as interpersonal. Guilt can (and often does) occur in solitude and absent public knowledge of the transgression (Baumeister, et al., 1994). For instance, guilt is described as “essentially private” (Buss, 1980: 159), “experienced in solitude” (Piers & Singer, 1953/1971: 68), and “evoked only from within the self” (Lewis, 1971: 85). By contrast, shame is defined as a public emotion, whereby the intensity of public condemnation amplifies the magnitude of the emotional experience. While one may feel ashamed in solitude, shame is particularly salient when the transgression enters the domain of public knowledge (Bicchieri, 2016; Smith, et al., 2002; Tangney, et al., 1996).

Focus on specific action (guilt) vs. global self (shame). Another key distinction between guilt and shame involves the focus of the negative emotion. While guilt is primarily

experienced over what one has done, shame is typically felt over who one is (Lewis, 1971; Tangney, 1991; Tangney, et al., 1996). For instance, employees may feel guilt for neglecting protocol, while they may feel shame for being negligent employees. While studies show that people may feel guilt or shame over similar wrongdoings, the particular emotion experienced is influenced by the focus of negative self-evaluation, either on the specific action or the global self (Tangney, Stuewig & Mashek, 2007a, b).

Reparative action (guilt) vs. concealment (shame). The differential focus on the specific action (for guilt) versus the global self (for shame) implicates the action tendencies associated with these emotions. Given the focus on specific action (for guilt), individuals feeling guilt typically seek corrective action to reform the behavior associated with their misdeed. For instance, guilt is more strongly associated with reparative tendencies, including confessing the wrongdoing, apologizing to victims, and making amends in comparison to shame (Baumeister et al., 1994). In contrast, given the focus on the global self (for shame), individuals feeling shame typically seek to hide themselves or conceal their wrongdoing. For instance, shame is more strongly associated with an inclination to escape the situation (Tangney & Dearing, 2002), feelings of exposure (Hultberg, 1988), and the urge conceal one's wrong from the judgement of others (Fischer & Tangney, 1995; Barret, 1995). The compelling urge to hide in response to feeling shame is rooted in the focus on the global self (versus the specific action) as the source of negative emotion. To escape the feeling of shame, one must conceal the self (or the transgression) from public scrutiny.

Insert Table 1 about here

In the following section, I describe indicators of guilt and shame cultures. First, I explore these indicators from the violator perspective and then from the perspective of third-party organizational members. I also attend to the role of guilt and shame cultures in promoting self-regulation prior to a norm violation and in atoning wrongdoings following the violation of norms.

Violator Self-Regulation and Responses

Guilt culture: Self-regulation prior to a norm violation. In an organizational culture of guilt, members primarily self-regulate to avoid feeling guilt, while in a shame culture, members primarily self-regulate to avoid feeling shame. In this capacity, guilt and shame cultures are complementary: both elicit self-regulation by organizational members, and at the collective level both broadly operate as systems of social control.

However, the foreboding of these emotions is activated by differential motivations from members of guilt and shame cultures respectively (Tangney, Stuewig & Mashek, 2007a). With guilt as an intrapersonal emotion and shame as an interpersonal emotion (Baumeister, et al. 1994; Smith, et al., 2002; Tangney, et al., 1996), in a culture of guilt, members self-regulate in order to maintain consistency between their internalized principles and their actual behavior (Carver & Scheier, 1982; Greenwald & Harder, 1998; Jackson, Mackenzie & Hobfoll, 2000; Zimmerman, 2000). This is consistent with the intrapersonal quality of discrete guilt, whereby the emotion is evoked primarily from within the self (Smith, et al., 2002; Tangney, et al., 1996). Thus, the self-regulatory motivation to avoid misdeeds arises overwhelmingly due to a personal judgment of one's own behavior (i.e., internal sanctions) in a guilt culture (Benedict, 1946; Mead, 1937). In

this context, misalignment of the ought and actual selves elicits feelings of guilt, which function to realign behavior (Higgins, 1987). As such, organizational cultures of guilt encourage self-regulation chiefly based on personally defined expectations of behavior.

P1a: In guilt cultures, members are expected to self-regulate in order to maintain alignment between their behavior and their internalized standards.

Shame culture: Self-regulation prior to a norm violation. In contrast, members of shame cultures primarily self-regulate in order to maintain their reputation and positive standing among the group. Because of the interpersonal quality of shame, members of shame cultures self-regulate maintain consistency between their behavior and the normative standards of the group (Bicchieri, 2017; Stearns, 2017; Tangney, et al., 1996). This motivation is consistent with the interpersonal quality of discrete shame, whereby the emotion is amplified by public knowledge of the misdeed (Smith, et al., 2002; Tangney, et al., 1996). Thus, self-regulation arises from the anticipation of judgment by the group (i.e., external sanctions) in a shame culture (Bandura, 1991; Benedict, 1946; Mead, 1937). In this context, misalignment between a member's behavior and normative standards of the group elicits shame, which motivates self-regulation. As such, organizational cultures of shame encourage self-regulation chiefly based on group expectations.

P1b: In shame cultures, members are expected to self-regulate in order to maintain alignment between their behavior and social normative standards of the group.

Guilt culture: Responses following a norm violation. Following a norm violation, members of a guilt culture share a tacit understanding that wrongdoers should feel guilty about their misdeeds. Similarly, guilt cultures predispose members to scripted, guilt-consistent responses to misdeeds. Thus, violators in a guilt culture understand that they ought to openly

acknowledge the misdeed, take ownership for the wrongdoing, sincerely apologize, express remorse, and demonstrate changed behavior, consistent with the behavioral responses of discrete guilt (Tangney, 1995; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney, Miller, Flicker & Barlow, 1996).

As these responses are more strongly associated with discrete guilt, members of guilt cultures believe public apologies and changed behavior to be the most appropriate responses to wrongdoing. As an exemplary illustration, in 2018, Starbucks CEO Kevin Johnson responded to the arrest of two black men in a Philadelphia store by publicly declaring, “I personally apologize,” in a gesture that openly acknowledged the wrong. He subsequently remarked, “We are accountable. . . I am accountable . . . I own it,” thereby taking personal ownership for the misdeed and harm caused. Subsequently, Starbucks closed thousands of cafes in order to implement an extensive racial bias and diversity training, which formed the foundation of a long-term program to address issues of bias, diversity, equity and inclusion throughout the corporation (Bariso, 2018). Through these measures, Johnson conveyed his commitment to changing the behavior of organizational members in response to the wrong done. The immediate response assumed by Johnson, to take ownership for the wrong, publicly apologize and take corrective action epitomizes a culture of guilt, wherein members implicitly understand apologies, accountability and behavioral change as the appropriate responses to misdeeds.

Importantly, in a guilt culture, questions around the immediacy of the response, the sincerity of the apology and the sufficiency of the amends are greatly deliberated and fiercely scrutinized (Koehn, 2013; Koehn & Goranova, 2018). Indeed, many members of guilt cultures questioned the genuineness of Johnson’s apology, noting that the violation simply demanded a public response in order to prevent reputational damage to the corporation (McGregor, 2018; Wagner, 2018). Indeed, the fact that the violation required an immediate, public and sincerely

expressed response is indicative that Starbucks operates in a wider national guilt culture, and that Starbucks leadership appreciated the expectations of the national audience in delivering its response. In a culture of guilt, failing to apologize or delivering insincere amends would be deeply hurtful and highly offensive. In addition, others argued that Johnson's response was insufficient in magnitude and effect, noting that racial sensitivity training inadequately remedies the core issues of racial prejudice and injustice (Gabbatt, 2018; Relihan, 2018). Altogether, the critical attention to the sincerity and sufficiency of apologies is a distinguishing artifact of guilt cultures. In a guilt culture, the audience is highly discerning of a genuine apology, and the violator must go to extensive lengths for their apology to be accepted (Hargie, Stapleton & Tourish, 2010; Hill & Boyd, 2015; Koehn, 2013; Koehn & Goranova, 2018). In this way, apologies form an integral part on the atonement process for guilt cultures.

Consistent with the focus of discrete guilt on specific action (versus the global self), violations in guilt cultures tend to focus on a specific action. In the examples above, the violators were guilty of making racist comments or racially profiling patrons, but not necessarily for being racists. This emphasis on specific action (versus the global self) allows for members to rehabilitate following their apologies and amends in the guilt atonement process.

P2a: In guilt cultures, members implicitly understand confession, public apology, and changed behavior to be the appropriate responses to wrongdoing. Shared understandings of misdeeds tend to focus on specific actions, as opposed to the global self.

Shame cultures: Responses following a norm violation. By contrast, in an organizational culture of shame, there is an implicit understanding that wrongdoers should feel ashamed of themselves. Similarly, shame cultures predispose members to scripted, shame-consistent behavioral responses to norm violations. Thus, norm violators in an organizational

shame culture habitually respond by concealing their wrongdoing or hiding in shame, particularly for those misdeeds that are likely to garner public reproach. As an exemplary illustration, homophobia has pervaded the National Football League (NFL) for decades. An expectation of hypermasculinity among NFL players is emphasized through the distribution of pornographic materials in locker rooms, team visits to strip clubs (Morton, 2013), and frequent usage of anti-gay slurs among members (Covitz, 2009; Phillis, 2013). The expectation to maintain a hypermasculine identity has motivated a number of members to conceal their homosexuality while playing for the league (Bieler, 2017; Buzinski, 2017), thus evidencing a culture of shame. For instance, former player Wade Davis, recounts going to excessive lengths to “hide being gay” during his time in the league “to protect his job” (Smith, 2012). He states, “I can remember going out that night, going to a strip club, spending probably \$1,500 just to make sure . . . if [my teammates] even had a glimmer of thought that I was gay, that I wasn’t,” Davis said. Similarly, Chris Culliver, a player well-known for making derogatory statements about homosexuality, asserted that “openly gay players would not be welcome on the team.” In addition, he advised that gay members wanting to come out should retire from the league and “wait ten years after that” to reveal their orientation (Rogers, 2013). Culliver’s comments underscore the expectation to completely conceal non-heteronormative sexual orientations from the NFL. The broadly held expectation that members should conceal their orientation to maintain their standing on their team epitomizes a culture of shame wherein concealment of an identity that violates the social norms of the group is expected.

As an extension of this example, the US Armed Forces maintained a long-standing policy of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (DADT), which required members to actively conceal non-heterosexual orientations. Importantly, this policy specifically targeted sexual identities,

demanding that gay and bisexual members “could serve only if they hid their sexuality” (Puglise, 2016). Notably, this policy did not preclude members from engaging in non-heterosexual relationships, but simply from revealing their identification as LGBTQ and more importantly from expressing pride in that identification.

Consistent with the discrete emotion of shame, violations in shame cultures tend to focus on the global self. In the examples above, the violators were shamed into hiding, not for specific acts, but because they were ontologically gay. Indeed, the open identification of the self as gay is the central violation in this context. Thus, the emphasis on the global self (versus a specific action) motivates members to conceal and hide those aspects of themselves that are misaligned with normative standards of the group.

P2b: In shame cultures, members implicitly understand concealment and hiding as the appropriate responses to wrongdoing. Shared understandings of misdeeds tend to focus on the global self (as opposed to specific actions).

Witnesses & Third-Party Members

It is important to consider the collective responses of witnesses and third-party members to misdeeds, as their reactions often reflect the norms, values and underlying assumptions of a guilt or shame culture. These reactions include punishments and collective responses to misdeeds.

Guilt culture punishments: Private punishments. In an organizational culture of guilt, third party members are more likely to enact guilt-consistent punishments for wrongdoing. Specifically, members typically defer to private punishments when an organizational member violates an important norm. The goal of punishments in guilt cultures is to exonerate the wrong by issuing consequences directly to the violator (Chun, 2017). Consider a guilt culture in which a member is found to be frequently absent or late for work. In this context, punishments would

likely involve a written warning or meeting with management to encourage acknowledgement of the wrongdoing and promote behavioral change. Importantly, warnings, meetings and consequences are exchanged directly between the violator and the supervisor, absent an audience (Campbell, Fleming & Grote, 1985; Creighton, 1990). As such, an email regarding absenteeism of one employee would not be sent to the entire department, announced in a departmental meeting or posted to a public forum. In a guilt culture, it is understood that the punishment itself serves as the atonement for the wrongdoing (Chun, 2017), and it is neither necessary nor appropriate to engage uninvolved members in the punishment process (Creighton, 1990). Punishments in guilt cultures are designed to activate a guilty conscience in the accused and encourage contemplation of the misdeed, a process which largely occurs in isolation (Childress, 1979; Kugler & Jones, 1992; Rees, Klug & Bamberg, 2015). Therefore, the internal sanctions elicited by this process do not require an audience to have their effect.

P3a: In guilt cultures, punishments are predominantly enacted in private absent the public gaze. The punishments alone serve as atonement to rectify the wrong done.

Shame culture punishments: Shaming & social distancing. In organizational cultures of shame, third party members are more likely to enact shame-consistent punishments to wrongdoing. Most notably, it is common for members to engage in shaming rituals when an organizational member violates an important norm (Jacquet, 2015; Orange, 2008; Massaro, 1991; Stearns, 2017; Thompson, 2015). Shaming may involve official public condemnation by an organizational leader or unofficial gossip by members (Garvey, 1998; Jacquet, 2015; Kurland & Pelled, 2000). Both official and unofficial shaming function to elicit humiliation and tarnish the violator's reputation (Braithwaite, 2003; Stearns, 2017), thereby enhancing the experience of shame (Bicchieri, 2016; Smith et al., 2002). For instance, in Tengzhou, China, when the team

failed to meet the company's sales targets, an organization with a strong performance orientation required its salesforce to crawl through traffic congested streets behind an employee carrying the company flag, (Paton, 2019). Images of the public shaming quickly proliferated across social media (You, 2019), adding to a growing body of organizations in East Asia that use shaming tactics (Useem, Singh, Liang & Cappelli, 2017). In this context, the shaming is the punishment (more so than the crawling), and enduring the public humiliation serves as an atonement for the wrong done (Chun, 2017). As a subtler example, some organizations maintain a Wall of Shame on which photos or names of absent employee are posted (Green, 2014), or breaches of organizational conduct are displayed for public scrutiny (Davis, 2017). Ultimately, these rituals elevate the magnitude of shame for the violator by drawing public attention to the violator as a wrongdoer (Piers & Singer, 1953; Smith, Webster, Parrott & Eyre, 2002). Importantly, in a shame culture, it is the violator who is subjected to punishment, not the behavior. Thus, exposure of the identity of the violator as a wrongdoer is central to shaming rituals (Garvey, 1998). In addition, the critical gaze of the public reinforces group norms regarding appropriate behavior, and the public humiliation serves as a deterrent against future transgressions (Bierenbaum & Sagarin, 1976; Garvey, 1998; Stearns, 2017). By participating in the shaming as spectators, third party members emphasize their allegiance to the collective standards and appreciate the consequences of deviance from group norms. In sum, shaming rituals are a distinguishing artifact of shame cultures.

P3b: In a shame culture, punishments are predominantly enacted in public, inviting social criticism. The shaming rituals alongside the punishments serve as atonement to rectify the wrong done.

Guilt culture responses: Collective apologies, confession & guilt. In a guilt culture, members are more likely to engage in guilt-consistent responses to wrongdoing on behalf of the organization, such as collective confessions and apologies. In 2014, Austria's national railway (ÖBB) opened a public exhibition at the European Parliament detailing the company's involvement in the Holocaust. Speaking to this decision, the company's CEO Christian Kern remarked, "When we first discussed bringing this exhibition here, some from our marketing team feared it would hurt the brand," Kern said. "But we need our brand to be clean. And showing what happened in the Holocaust is necessary for that" (JTA, 2014). The importance of public confession and apology on behalf of the entire organization is an artifact of a guilt culture. Even though the railway members responsible for the atrocities have left the organization, the legacy of guilt persists and the desire to absolve it in guilt-consistent responses pervades throughout the organization. Unlike a culture of shame which emphasizes concealment, hiding and escape, a culture of guilt prioritizes open acknowledgement of the wrong done and public apology, exemplified by ÖBB's exhibition. This collective response, taken long after the members responsible have left the company illustrates how guilt is experienced beyond the members directly involved in the wrongdoing. Thus, the collective participates in the experience of guilt and engages in guilt-consistent behavioral responses in tandem.

Importantly, collective guilt, apologies, and amends are enacted for misdeeds that benefit the organization as a whole or wrongdoings that involve collective participation from many organizational members, such as ÖBB Railway's involvement in the Holocaust (Gunn & Wilson, 2011; Umphress, Bingham & Mitchell, 2010). There are many instances when a single organizational member commits a wrongdoing and benefits independently. In such instances,

collective guilt is unlikely to occur, as members will attribute the misdeed as reflecting the individual violator and not the organization as a whole.

P4a: In guilt cultures, members engage in collective guilt, apologies, and amends for misdeeds that benefit the entire organization.

Shame culture responses: Cooperative concealment & collective shame. In shame cultures, members engage in shame-consistent responses to wrongdoing on behalf of the organization, such as collective concealment and scapegoating. While collective guilt aims to publicly acknowledge the harm caused by the organization toward a victimized group, collective shame aims to restore or protect the reputation of the organization from outsiders (Gunn & Wilson, 2011). Thus, in a shame culture, members may take part in shame-consistent responses to wrongdoing on behalf of the organization. Specifically, members may take part in cooperative concealment of the wrongdoing with the violator, either by deliberately overlooking evident wrongdoings or by actively concealing misdeeds that members know would garner public ridicule. For instance, a valued college football coach had a drinking problem that interfered with his work performance (Feno & Thiry, 2015; Jude, 2015). In response, the coaching staff collectively concealed the coach's drinking by smelling his breath prior to important meetings and making excuses for his non-attendance to events in cases where his drunkenness might have been revealed (Rosenberg, 2015; Sherman, 2015; Walters, 2015). Although the individual members were not active participants in the drinking, they worked cooperatively to protect this misdeed from public knowledge. The cooperative nature and patterned regularity of these responses shows that concealment of wrongdoing was an organizational culture that is consistent with the behavioral regularities of discrete shame (Barret, 1995; Fischer & Tangney, 1995; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). As a parallel example, substantial scholarship has examined the

“Blue Wall of Silence” (also referred to as the Blue Code or Blue Shield), which represents the cooperative efforts of Police Force officers to conceal misconduct and misdemeanors committed by their fellow members (Conway, 2010; Huq & McAdams, 2015; Skolnick, 2002). Ultimately, these collective responses suggest that the shame is felt beyond the individual member. Thus, the collective takes part in the experience of shame along with the violator and engages in shame-consistent behavioral responses in tandem.

Similarly, the former US Military Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (DADT) policy invokes cooperative concealment and collective shame. As indicated by the policy’s title, the honours of concealment rested equally upon the heterosexual-identifying members (who don’t ask) and the non-heterosexual-identifying members (who don’t tell). The cooperative nature of this policy indicates that concealment was a feature of the organizational culture (Schein, 2017). Ultimately, the cooperative nature of the policy suggest that the shame was felt beyond the individual non-conforming members. Thus, the collective participates in the experience of shame along with the focal actor and engages in shame-consistent responses in tandem.

Importantly, the nature of the collective response in shame cultures largely depends on how valued the violator is to the organizational community (Braithwaite, 2003). High status members are more likely to have their wrongdoings concealed, overlooked, and forgiven through a process of reintegrative shaming (Braithwaite, 1989; Gilbert & McGuire, 1998; Makkai & Braithwaite, 1993). Meanwhile, members who are social outsiders or lower in status are more likely to face scapegoating, ostracism, and banishment (Braithwaite, 2003; Gilbert & McGuire, 1998). These artifacts are summarized in Table 2.

P4b: In shame cultures, members engage in collective shame and cooperative concealment to protect high status, social in-group members.

Insert Table 2 about here

In sum, I assert that organizational cultures of guilt and shame are influential in guiding members' emotional and behavioral responses to norm violations. Importantly the similarities and distinctions between guilt and shame as discrete emotions are reflected in shame guilt and shame cultures. These similarities and differences manifest in violator responses prior to and following a norm violation and in the responses of third-party members.

Downstream Effects of Guilt & Shame Cultures

Implications for Employee Behavior

The following section elaborates the normative effects of organizational guilt and shame cultures. First, I delineate their convergent behavioral outcomes. In particular, I explain how these emotional cultures function similarly through member socialization to encourage self-regulation and reparative action within organizations. In the second section, I focus on the divergent effects of guilt and shame cultures, wherein I describe how these emotional cultures produce contrasting effects.

Convergent Normative Effects

“While shame cultures hold members to the group’s standards, guilt cultures hold members to their own standards” (Jacquet, 2015, p. 11).

Socialization in a guilt culture. Consistent with the attraction, selection, attrition (ASA) model, I suggest that jobseekers whose personal values strongly align with a guilt culture will be more likely to apply to guilt culture organizations (Schneider, 1987). Specifically, individuals who are inclined to (a) internalize moral standards and (b) engage in guilt consistent responses to wrongdoing will be more attracted to organizations with a guilt culture. In addition,

early socialization processes enculturate new members to the organization's norms surrounding transgressive behavior (Van Maanen & Schein, 1979). For instance, new members may undergo an intensive training process that fundamentally reorients their attitudes and behavior to fit organizational norms. In guilt cultures, these programs encourage members to internalize organizational norms, such that they need not refer to written rules or mission statements. For example, Lululemon's Landmark training motivates employees to adopt a holistic approach to life, embrace criticism, and constantly reevaluate life goals. The training demands that workers "rethink conventional perspectives" and "make significant changes in their lives" (Lieber, 2014). Altogether, the socialization process aims to transform members' outlook and behavior such that it aligns their identity with organizational norms.

In a guilt culture, new members will also be socialized to adopt guilt consistent responses to wrongdoings. Newcomers will likely encounter norm violations followed by guilt consistent responses, thereby reaffirming the organization's position on appropriate responses to transgressions. For instance, a newcomer might observe a leader openly admit to a mistake in a departmental meeting, sincerely apologize for his wrongdoing, and demonstrate changed behavior thereafter. Thus, new members come to appreciate public apologies and making amends as the appropriate response to transgression, even among high-status workers (Bandura & Walter, 1977; Brown, Trevino & Harrison, 2005). Through this socialization process, norms surrounding misdeeds will be reinforced. In addition, members learn to avoid transgressions because they have internalized the organization's norms, and members engage in guilt consistent responses to wrongdoing because they appreciate it as the appropriate response to wrongdoing.

Socialization in a shame culture. In a shame culture organization, jobseekers whose personal values most align with a shame culture will be more likely to apply to shame culture

organizations (Schneider, 1987). Specifically, individuals who prize group membership above individual persuasions will be more attracted to shame culture organizations. Thereafter, early socialization processes enculturate new members to the organization's norms surrounding transgressive behavior (Van Maanen & Schein, 1979). While shame culture organizations may prefer that members internalize the organizational norms, they do not require it. In shame cultures, members are more willing to tolerate public compliance with organizational norms, even if the norms are not internalized. Thus – at the basic level – training encourages newcomers to become familiarized with the norms they are expected to follow. For instance, Huawei requires employees to “study and sign guidelines” on business conduct annually (The Irish Times, 2018). A company spokesperson explains, “At the heart of the guidelines is the principle of acting in accordance with all local laws and regulations,” and violation can result in immediate termination. Thus, the training in shame cultures underscores the importance of outward compliance with organizational norms. Members appreciate that being a member of the organization requires following the group's rules.

In a shame culture, new members will likely encounter norm violations followed by shame consistent responses, thereby reaffirming the organization's position on the appropriate responses to transgressions. For example, a newcomer might learn through informal channels that a valued leader has violated a norm but gone unpunished, consistent with the shame response of hiding wrongdoings of important members. By example, new members then learn that concealing wrongdoings of valued members is an appropriate response to norm violations (Bandura & Walter, 1977; Brown, Trevino & Harrison, 2005). Through this process, norms are reinforced, members learn to avoid transgressions because they value group membership above

their personal preferences, and members engage in shame consistent responses to wrongdoing because they appreciate it as the appropriate response to wrongdoing.

P5: Guilt and shame cultures discourage transgressive behavior (in anticipation of wrongdoing) and encourage reparative actions (in response to wrongdoing) through socialization tactics.

Divergent Normative Effects

Despite the convergent effects involving socialization processes, guilt and shame cultures produce divergent normative effects. The following section expounds on how differing conceptions of the self give way to differential normative effects. For decades research has explored psychological conceptions of the self with particular attention to public and private selves (Andersen, Glassman & Gold, 1998; Baumeister, 2012; Buss, 2001; Froming & Carver, 1981; Froming, Walker & Lopyan, 1982; Modell, 1993; Scheier & Carver, 1980). In this section, I describe how guilt cultures prize a consistent sense of self and regard exposure of wrongs as the appropriate response to wrongdoing. In contrast, I illustrate how shame cultures encourage divergent public and private selves and view the concealment of wrongs as a justifiable, if not appropriate, response to wrongdoing (Baumeister, 2012; Fiske & Taylor, 2017).

Guilt cultures promote a consistent identity. I assert that guilt cultures promote a consistent identity across various contexts. A wide body of research underscores the importance of identity and identification to organizational membership (Ashforth, 2000). In guilt cultures, members are encouraged to uphold uniformity between the actual and ought selves in order to avoid or absolve guilty feelings (Higgins, 1987). Alignment between moral standards and actual behavior across contexts is paramount to conceptions of appropriate behavior in guilt cultures (Higgins, 1996; Stone & Cooper, 2001). To maintain a private identity that conflicts with public portrayals of the self would be perceived as deceptive, “two-faced,” and duplicitous within this

context (Creighton, 1990; Johnston & Selsky, 2005; Leary & Allen, 2011; Weiss & Feldman, 2006). For instance, in guilt cultures, a PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals) worker who passionately advocates a vegan diet to their community, but privately consumes animal products ought to feel internal conflict (i.e., guilt) due to incongruence between their public identity and private behavior. Indeed, such a scenario would be highly unlikely in guilt cultures. If the member's internal convictions were felt genuinely, they should be evidenced in their behavior, marking congruity between public and private identities (Baumeister, 2012; Creighton, 1990; Lebra, 1983). By contrast, if the member was not convinced by the tenets of veganism, they would neither promote it nor pretend to practice a vegan lifestyle. Thus, the social control mechanism in guilt cultures encourages members to demonstrate a consistent identity as a marker of appropriate conduct (Bruner, 1990; Modell, 1993; Trilling, 1971).

P6a: Guilt cultures encourage a consistent identity.

Shame cultures allow for distinct public & private identities. In contrast, I argue that the emphasis on contextuality in shame cultures allows for distinct public and private identities. Within shame cultures, members are sensitized to the social expectations of the group. As the situation changes (whether by audience or location), so do social expectations (Cialdini, Reno & Kallgren, 1990). Given the context-dependent nature of shame cultures, shame is experienced not for inconsistency in one's identity across situations, but for the expression of situationally inappropriate behavior (Creighton, 1990; Lebra, 1983). For example, in certain societies, smoking is considered taboo for women, and in some organizations, it is institutionally prohibited (Bush, White, Kai, Rankin, & Bhopal, 2003; Mackay & Amos, 2003). Within these contexts, a woman openly smoking within the vicinity of the workplace would bring shame to the entire organization, reflect poorly on the values of the institution and garner public reproach

and shaming. However, if the woman strictly maintained a public image of conformity (i.e., publicly identifying as a nonsmoker) and restricted her norm violations to private domains, her decision to smoke outside of the sphere of the workplace would likely go unquestioned and unmentioned (thus saving face; Brown, 1970). Essentially, in a shame culture respecting the normative standards of the organization in public is paramount (Creighton, 1990; Lebra, 1983) even if members cannot abide by these norms across all situations. Unlike guilt cultures, to maintain a private identity that conflicts with public portrayals of the self would not suggest duplicity in shame cultures, but rather respect and reverence for the moral standards of the group (Creighton, 1990; Johnston & Selsky, 2005; Leary & Allen, 2011; Weiss & Feldman, 2006). The imperative to maintain a public impression of conformity with the organizational context necessarily motivates some members of shame cultures to develop distinct public and private identities that allow for norm violating behavior in selected situations (Arkin & Baumgardner, 1986; Baumeister & Tice, 1986; Goffman, 1956; Modell, 1993). In this way, shame cultures achieve collective uniformity among the group, while accommodating individual differences in private spaces.

P6b: Shame cultures allow for distinct public and private identities.

Guilt culture divergent normative effects. Given the emphasis on internalized standards, a broader range of human behaviors and identities accompany cultures of guilt. As a result, guilt culture organizations readily adapt their rules to accommodate the variety of beliefs that their diverse members espouse. The recent transition to accommodating various gender pronouns in the workplace is a revealing example of how guilt cultures accommodate a range of behaviors and identities among members (Riggs, 2019). Rather than expecting individual members to adapt their gender identities to the traditional binary categories that have pervaded

workplaces for centuries, many American institutions are responding to members' increasing desire to be referred to by their chosen gender pronouns (Jackson, 2019; Nichols, 2013). These accommodations are enacted by encouraging members to open meetings and end emails with statements defining their preferred gender identity. In doing this, the organizational culture accommodates and supports individual differences. In brief, organizational norms in guilt cultures are modified to create space for a broader range of behavior.

P7: In guilt cultures, members tolerate a broader spectrum of behavior.

P8: In guilt cultures, members adjust rules to accommodate individual differences.

Shame culture divergent normative effects. Due to the prevalence of divergent public and private selves, alongside the abundance of social norms governing behavior, shame culture members appreciate that every social norm cannot be strictly observed in all contexts. In appreciation of this reality, organizations adapt to the possibility of norm violations by creating designated spaces (either spatial or temporal) where norm abidance is not expected or necessarily required. For example, during the month of Ramadan, public consumption of food and beverages is strictly prohibited throughout many Muslim societies (Ramahi, Seidenberg, Kennedy, & Rees, 2011), and this tradition is instituted within workspaces. While organizational members respect the public observance of this holiday, members understand that not all employees can or will strictly observe the fast throughout the entire month. In fact, the Islamic cannon dictates exceptions to the fast based on age, medical circumstances, etc. (Salahi, 2004). As such, workplaces typically arrange private eating spaces where non-fasting members can discretely consume food and beverages without violating public observance of the holiday. In a shame culture, public observance of the fast is paramount, as it conveys respect for the community and

shared values. In brief, temporal and physical spaces in shame cultures are modified to accommodate individual differences.

P9: In shame cultures, members tolerate norm violations in private spheres.

P10: In shame cultures, members adjust spaces (physical or temporal) to accommodate individual differences.

Discussion

Social control is an enduring goal in organizations (Bicchieri, 2016; Dannals & Miller, 2017), and moral emotional cultures profoundly influence regulatory behavior (Benedict, 1946/2005; Creighton, 1990; Haidt, 2003). Thus, organizational science could benefit greatly from an expanded view on how moral emotional cultures inform employee self-regulation. Despite decades of inquiry into guilt and shame cultures in anthropological and sociological research (Ausubel, 1955; Benedict, 1946/2005; Chu, 1972; Creighton, 1990; Demos, 1996; Greenwald & Harder, 1998; Leighton & Kluckhohn, 1947; Mead, 1936; Scheff, 1988; Stearns, 2017), scholarship from the organizational perspective is lacking. While a nascent body of management research has begun to explore selected emotional cultures (Barsade & O'Neill, 2014; O'Neill & Rothbard, 2017), extant research on guilt and shame almost exclusively attends to the individual level of analysis. In this manuscript, I argue that guilt and shame cultures uniquely influence behavior surrounding violations in organizations beyond the effects of discrete emotion.

This manuscript delineated the content of guilt and shame cultures with attention to the distinct artifacts and indicators of each. Importantly, I highlighted how these emotional cultures influence social expectations and rituals for violators and third-party members prior to and following the violation of norms. Subsequently, I explained how guilt and shame cultures

function equivalently to inhibit transgressions and promote reparative action via differential pathways. Finally, I illustrated how guilt and shame cultures can produce divergent outcomes, which may be perceived as intuitive and ethical by organizational members, but illogical and immoral to cultural outsiders.

This paper made an important contribution to theory on organizational affective cultures. Indeed, prior work has emphasized that emotional cultures influence the permissibility and expression of certain emotions in the workplace (Barsade & O’Neill, 2017). However, this work illustrated that emotional cultures can also influence the anticipation of emotion. Indeed, guilt and shame are rarely expressed. Further, the self-regulatory capacity of guilt and shame is achieved through the anticipation of these emotions. Therefore, this paper extended theory on organizational affective cultures to consider these cultures influence emotions beyond their expression.

Extending this point, a principal distinction between guilt and shame cultures revolves around attitudes toward exposure and concealment. My examples illustrate that within guilt cultures, the appropriate response to transgression typically involves exposure of the wrong via apologies, public confession and taking ownership. These exposure rituals signal the violator’s recognition that the behavior was wrong to other organizational members (Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney, et al., 1996). Thus, the act of public confession serves an important step in the atonement process and reintegration of the violator back into the workgroup (Higgins, 1987; Chun, 2017). The emphasis on exposure in guilt cultures underscores the importance of partaking in exposure rituals for organizational members and for modeling these rituals by leadership. Failure to do so could be perceived as a major breach in moral conduct.

Contrastingly, in shame cultures, concealment is frequently understood as the appropriate response to violations. Covering up a wrongdoing is especially relevant when the misdeed treads upon a social taboo (Johnston-Robledo, Sheffield, Voigt, & Wilcox-Constantine, 2007; Lee, 2009; Scheff, 2003). Concealment is important because it signals a public recognition that the behavior is wrong (otherwise it would be done publicly). Chiefly, concealment demonstrates respect for workgroup norms and sensitivities of other organizational members. Even if the violator cannot abide group norms in all situations, they should at least respect the values of their workgroup enough to restrict their wrongdoing to a private domain. In this way, concealment prevents causing offense or legitimizing a behavior that the organization deems to be wrong. The emphasis on concealment in shame cultures underscores the importance of respecting the expectations of the workgroup. Failure to do so could be perceived as a breach in allegiance to the organization.

The emphasis on concealment in shame cultures may also produce unwanted effects. I theorized that shame cultures deter deviance, yet the expectation for concealment of wrongdoing may also motivate members of these cultures to simply violate important norms and then carefully conceal their behavior. Naturally the concealment of rampant rule-breaking is not the purpose of a shame culture, and yet, if mismanaged, this could certainly be the result. Ideally members of shame cultures internalize the group norms through social-emotional learning processes (Clément & Dukes, 2017, 2019), such that they self-regulate in anticipation of shame, or simply because they do not want to disappoint their communities (Benedict, 1946). While this conceptual paper primarily focused on the functional aspects of guilt and shame cultures, there are a variety of ways that these cultures might lead to unwanted outcomes, such as shame cultures promoting concealed deviance. This is an important theme for future research.

The contrasting importance of exposure and concealment in guilt and shame cultures highlights a potential breeding ground for misunderstandings between members regarding the appropriate response to wrongdoing. In cases of low person-organization fit, or weak emotional culture, members may hold oppositional views on the proper response to violations (i.e., exposure or concealment), resulting in interpersonal conflict. For this reason, employing a deliberate approach to selecting and socializing members to the moral emotional culture is a cornerstone to their effectiveness.

Another principal distinction between guilt and shame cultures is their appraisal processes (Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001). Specifically, appraisal is expected to be signaled by the self-conscience in the case of guilt cultures (e.g., “I have done something wrong, therefore I should feel bad”) or by significant others (either real or imagined) in the case of shame cultures (e.g., “you have done wrong and brought shame to the community; therefore, you should feel ashamed”) (Greenwald & Harder, 1998; Mead, 1937/2003). This contrast suggests that guilt cultures rely upon individuals having a refined moral conscience to deter deviance. In other words, misconduct in guilt cultures is more commonly attributed to failures in the violator’s internal sanctions. Thus, hiring members who exemplify the moral standards of the organization is paramount to guilt cultures’ functionality. Likewise, the presence or promotion of members who lack strong internal standards can greatly compromise the efficacy of this system, as they may find little reason to attend to the rules. By contrast, shame cultures rely primarily on public scrutiny (or a sensitivity to the audience – real or imagined) to deter deviance. Thus, maintaining consistent and thorough oversight is paramount to shame cultures’ functionality. Likewise, work domains that are difficult to supervise can compromise the efficacy of this system, as members may become dependent on oversight to signal the need for self-regulation. In this way, both guilt

and shame operate complementarily to regulate behavior via differential appraisal processes, and both involve systemic weaknesses that leadership does well to anticipate.

Guilt and shame cultures may differ in the degree of effort that is required to strengthen either of these cultures within an organizational context. Due to the fact that guilt cultures require greater internalization of norms and that guilt is individualized (i.e., people feel guilty based on their own individual beliefs which may not be held by the group), it is likely more complicated to develop a strong guilt culture relative to a shame culture. Owing to these differences, guilt cultures likely rely more strongly on processes that identify strong person-organization fit during the initial recruitment and hiring (Kristof, 1996; O'Reilly & Chatman, 1991). This approach suggests that more resources would need to be devoted to deliberately identifying individuals who already possess norms and values that are in alignment with those of the organization. Similarly, organizations with stronger guilt cultures may need to go to greater lengths to accommodate the individual differences of their members, potentially allowing for greater flexibility or moral relativity around what is considered ethical and unethical (Gowans, 2004; Harman, 1978). This point is elaborated in propositions 7 and 8, which illustrates how guilt culture continuously adapt rules and policies to accommodate individuals' shifting values and beliefs. In contrast, because shame cultures rely on external sanctions, hiring committees need not be quite as discerning in identifying person-organization fit. Furthermore, the implicit assumption is that members will conform to the organization's norms, rather than the organization accommodating the members' various norms. Overall, the efforts to establish or strengthen a guilt culture are likely greater than for a shame for these reasons.

This paper made an important contribution to theory on organizational affective cultures. Indeed, prior work has emphasized that emotional cultures influence the permissibility and

expression of certain emotions in the workplace (Barsade & O'Neill, 2017). However, this work illustrated that emotional cultures can also influence the anticipation of emotion. Indeed, guilt and shame are rarely expressed. Further, the self-regulatory capacity of guilt and shame is achieved through the anticipation of these emotions. Therefore, this paper extended theory on organizational affective cultures to consider these cultures influence emotions beyond their expression.

Societal Cultural Dimensions

Consistent with scholarship on organizational cultures, I draw attention to the underlying values and norms that likely correlate with cultures of guilt and shame (see Figure 1; Schein, 2017; Schwartz et al., 2012). Extending prior theorizing, I suggest that individualism is a contextual indicator of guilt cultures, and collectivism is a contextual indicator of shame cultures (Bierbrauer, 1992; Creighton, 1990; Greenwald & Harder, 1998; Jacquet, 2015). Accordingly, in an individualistic context, members predominantly feel guilt due to the violation of personal standards, even if close others do not share those expectations or have any knowledge of the transgression (Bierbrauer, 1992; Creighton, 1990; Greenwald & Harder, 1998). By contrast, in a collectivist context, members self-regulate to avoid bringing shame to their community and losing standing among the group (Bierbrauer, 1992; de Waal, 1996; Greenwald & Harder, 1998; Kitayama et al., 1995; Lansky, 1995; Piers & Singer, 1953). Within this context, felt accountability may be so strong that the imagined audience is sufficient to regulate behavior (Lebra, 1973; Johnson et al., 1987). Subsequently, the imagined audience in the shame culture is analogous to the internalized moral conscience in the guilt culture.

In addition, I posit that low power distance is a contextual indicator of guilt cultures and high power distance is a contextual indicator of shame cultures. In a low power distance context,

I expect that followers have more latitude to self-determine right from wrong, consistent with a culture of guilt (Kitayama et al., 1995). The emphasis that low power distance places on self-management is consistent with the self-regulation and reliance on internalized standards from a guilt culture (Carver & Scheier, 1982; Jackson et al., 2000; Kim et al. 1994; Kitayama et al., 1995). By contrast, in a high power distance context, I suggest that matters of right and wrong are more commonly determined by leaders, and then dictated to followers. Consistent with a shame culture, high power distance instills a social context in which members are behold to socially defined norms of right and wrong (Kitayama et al., 1995), and follower behavior is closely scrutinized by leaders (Ball, 2010; Gagné & Bhave, 2011).

Furthermore, I posit that culture looseness is a contextual indicator of guilt cultures and cultural tightness is a contextual indicator of shame cultures. Cultural tightness-looseness (T-L) is defined as “the strength of social norms and degree of sanctioning within societies” (Gelfand Nishii, & Raver: 2006: 6), whereby tight cultures are characterized by strong norms and strict sanctions on deviant behavior, while loose cultures are characterized by “weak norms and a high tolerance for deviant behavior” (Gelfand et al., 2011: 1100). Cultural looseness is characterized by a high tolerance for a broad range of behaviors (Gelfand, et al., 2006). Thus, in loose societies, individuals experience greater latitude in defining their own social and behavioral standards (Gelfand, 2012; Gelfand et al., 2011). Rather than the individual conforming her behavior to the social norms of the group, in a loose context, the group accommodates societal standards to the variety of norms exhibited by its members. By contrast, in a tight culture, “norms [are] expressed very clearly and unambiguously, and severe sanctions were imposed on those who deviate” (Gelfand et al., 2006: 7). Within a societal context that places a heavy weight of social expectation to abide group norms and strict sanctions on norm violators, I propose that

cultural tightness elevates the salience of shame at the organizational level and enhances a shame culture among organizational members. Altogether I see various values, norms, and underlying assumptions as indicative of guilt and shame organizational cultures.

The Interplay between Guilt and Shame Cultures

For ease of exposition, I have treated guilt and shame cultures as categorically distinct from one another. It is possible, however, that organizations may embody both—or neither—emotional culture. For example, I argued that public shaming rituals (such as Article 15) in the Armed Forces are indicative of a shame culture. Yet military training programs frequently advise that leaders “praise in public and criticize in private” for minor violations that do not impact the entire team (Satterfield, 2019; Schwartz, 2015). This may indicate ambidexterity in the moral emotional culture of the Armed Forces, which leverages aspects of both guilt and shame cultures in regulating member behavior depending upon the nature and magnitude of the violation (Bruyaka & Prange, 2020).

In organizations with a strong guilt and shame culture, the expectation for apology can be so heavy, that violators may be forced to publicly apologize, even if they do not feel guilt sincerely. For instance, a Harvard employee was “forced” to publicly apologize for making a racially insensitive statement to a biracial neighbor (Fu & Guillaume, 2018). Intuitively, the organizational leadership understands that in a guilt culture, apologizing for such a misdeed is absolutely necessary and thus required it from the employee. In cases where the violation is so egregious and damaging, the expression of guilt – even if it is not genuinely experienced by the violator – is critical. Consistent with a guilt culture, the punishers may not humiliate the violator, but they will subject violators to a public experience that invokes heavy negative emotion, which aligns with the experience of public shaming. In this way, forced public

apologies may represent an artifact of organizations that have a strong guilt and shame culture, as both cultures require exposure of the wrongdoer before an audience, and both seek to induce a negative emotional experience for the violator.

It is also possible that organizations may have neither, or at least very little, aspects of guilt or shame cultures. Such organizations may have little interest in regulating their members' behavior at all. For example, online organizations often have very few expectations for their members' behavior. The software code repository Github has only a few simple rules for their members: they are human, age 13 or older, and not use Github for purposes that violate the law. Beyond these, Github has no expectations for how its members conduct themselves. Although this may only loosely be considered to be an organization, the proliferation of such online communities suggests that these new forms of organizing may provide rich insights into different expectations about social control.

Practical Implications & Future Directions

This manuscript has largely described guilt and shame cultures as they are present in organizations. However, the theory developed above may inform organizational leadership on the array of options that exist in promoting social control within their organization. Assuming a strategic perspective, leadership may consciously determine whether a culture that promotes guilt or shame is more fitting to the overall values of the organization and the emotional motivations leadership wants to encourage in promoting self-regulation. From this vantagepoint, leadership can deliberately socialize members to guilt or shame culture beliefs and reinforce these values by employing their respective atonement processes. Furthermore, leadership may employ ambidexterity in determining which approach (i.e., guilt or shame culture) is most relevant to specific types of violations (Bruyaka & Prange, 2020; Rafailidis, Trivellas, & Polychroniou,

2017). For instance, leadership may determine that private (guilt-consistent) punishments are more appropriate for minor misdeeds, while public (shame oriented) punishments are more fitting for severe violations. Finally, as organizations evolve, leadership may determine that a shift in moral emotional culture from guilt to shame (or vice versa) is necessary to realign the culture with the organization's social control ideals. Thus, leadership may take calculated steps to transform the culture, based on the evolving vision and immediate priorities of the organization.

While shame cultures have steadily waned in Western societies over the past century (Stearns, 2017), the rise of the Internet, social media and teleworking has greatly elevated the relevance of shame to modern workplaces around the world. Popular press and social media outlets increasingly operate as a platform for publicly shaming worker violations – ranging from racist comments (Obregon, 2021) and sexual harassment (Foister, 2019) to anti-masking (York, 2020) and even homicide in the case of George Floyd (Cheung, 2020). With the Zoomification of professional life, work is increasingly videorecorded and therefore can easily be proliferated and subjected to broad public scrutiny and shame-oriented punishments (Alberti, 2020). This rise in shame culture begs important questions for organizational leaders, such as: to what extent does leadership want to promote shame as a social control mechanism their workplaces? What aspects of shame cultures are supportive of organizational goals and when are they dysfunctional? Attention to these questions can help to guide leadership in making calculated decisions around which moral emotional culture is most applicable to their social control objectives.

As with all research, this theory is not without limitations, and our model points to several interesting directions for future development. First, while guilt and shame cultures

occupy the core of our framework, these are not the only moral emotions that affect workplace behaviors. For instance, Haidt (2003) recounts a number, including: contempt, anger, disgust, sympathy, empathy, and awe. A meaningful extension of this work would examine how other moral emotional cultures impact social control and punishment processes in organizations. Finally, our model highlighted several effects of guilt and shame cultures on organizational behavior. In particular, I highlighted distinct normative effects, including developing consistent versus divergent conceptions of the self. I also expounded on how these emotional cultures lend themselves to a cross-cultural tension between exposure and concealment as the appropriate moral responses to wrongdoing. While I chose to focus on this distinction in particular, there are certainly others. An inviting extension of our model would examine alternative logics that these cultures invoke.

Conclusion

Guilt and shame cultures will continue to play a significant role in organizational behavior. In this manuscript, I presented a model illustrating the contingent role of culture on the behavioral consequences of moral emotions. In particular, I highlighted how guilt and shame cultures can function as analogous systems, while simultaneously encouraging divergent normative effects. It is our hope that organizations will consider the broad range of moral emotional perspectives that extend from these cultures, as well as strive to encourage ethical behavior among diverse employee groups.

Paper 2: Organizational Cultures of Guilt and Shame: A Scale Development Project

Giselle Antoine & Michael Johnson

A host of research on the social function of emotions suggest that collectives use emotion to delineate group boundaries and enhance a sense of communal identity (Durkheim, 1915/1965; Frijda & Mesquita, 1994; Heise & O'Brien, 1993; Kemper, 1978; Keltner & Haidt, 1999). While decades of research have examined guilt and shame as intraindividual states and propensities (Cohen, Wolf, Panter, & Insko, 2011; Tangney, 1995, 1998; Tangney, Burggraf, & Wagner, 1995; Tangney & Dearing, 2002), minimal research has empirically examined guilt and shame as collective, social forces that indicate how members ought to feel and behave surrounding norm violations (Benedict, 2005; Creighton, 1990). Based on the theory developed in Paper 1, it is conceivable that guilt and shame cultures influence a number of organizationally relevant outcomes, including compliance, deviance and prosocial behavior. In order to empirically test these relationships, a valid and reliable measurement tool is required.

There are several reasons that motivate the development of a scale for organizational cultures of guilt and shame. Prior inquiry to guilt and shame cultures has been conducted qualitatively through ethnographic research (Benedict, 2005; Nash & Kilday, 2010; Stearns, 2017). While this work has laid important theoretical groundwork to this dissertation, cross-cultural comparisons are difficult to make on the basis of ethnographic studies (Hofstede, 1979). First, these studies are not replicable and often they focus on a single population. Meanwhile the propositions developed in Paper 1 outline prototypical indicators and outcomes of guilt and shame cultures of varying levels of strength. In order to assess the extent to which organizational cultures broadly reflect these indicators a scale would be greatly useful. In addition, a scale

would facilitate empirical testing of relationships between guilt and shame cultures and organizationally relevant outcomes.

Recent work in management points to a useful template for measuring cultures of guilt and shame. A nascent literature is emerging on organizational affective cultures (Barsade & O’Neill, 2014; Barsade & O’Neill, 2016, O’Neill & Rothbard, 2017). According to this theory, emotions manifest in organizations as collective, top-down forces that implicitly guide the emotions members feel and display at work through organizational values, norms, and underlying assumptions (Barsade & O’Neill, 2014). Recent work on organizational affective cultures of companionate love indicate data were collected based on a modified scale of prototypical emotions (Shaver, 1987). In the measure, participants report the extent to which colleagues in their unit expressed caring, tenderness and affection in the workplace setting (Barsade & O’Neill, 2014). (Specifically, participants responded to the item: “To what degree do the employees on the unit express the following emotions. . .” p. 567). Thus, the development of the companionate love scale indicates empirical precedent for creating a comparable measurement tool for organizational guilt and shame cultures.

Through a series of studies, I create an empirical measure of organizational affective guilt and shame cultures and test their respective impact on important behavioral outcomes in the workplace. I define these cultures as systems of social control that guide organizational members in how they ought to behave surrounding the violation of norms. Specifically, in guilt cultures, members primarily self-regulate around feelings of guilt, and responses to violations reflect guilt-consistent behaviors, such as apologies, confessions, and changed behavior. Violations done in public or private are judged equally, private punishments are common, and high and low status members are punished equally. In shame cultures, members primarily self-regulate around

feelings of shame, and responses to norm violations predominantly reflect shame-consistent behaviors, such as hiding and concealment. Violations done in private may be tolerated, public shaming is common, and high and low status members are punished differently.

The Orbiting Constructs for Cultures of Guilt and Shame

In order to establish the nomological network for guilt and shame cultures, it is necessary to consider how these cultures relate to orbiting constructs (Colquitt, Sabey, Rodell, & Hill, 2019). As it is commonly the case that certain cultural dimensions co-occur and are mutually reinforcing (such as high power-distance and collectivism), it is reasonable to believe that certain cultural dimensions are more supportive of guilt cultures than shame cultures and vice-versa. The following section explores the relationship strength and direction between guilt and shame cultures and related cultural values, orientations, and norms. In particular, I hypothesize the relationships between three common cultural orientations which I argue are most supportive of guilt and shame cultures: cultural tightness-looseness, psychological individualism/collectivism and power distance orientation.

Cultural Tightness-Looseness

I assert that cultural norms may be indicative of organizational guilt and shame cultures. Cultural tightness-looseness (T-L) is defined as “the strength of social norms and degree of sanctioning within societies” (Gelfand, Nishii & Raver, 2006, p. 6). Specifically, tight cultures are characterized by strong norms and strict sanctions on deviant behavior, whereas loose cultures are characterized by “weak norms and a high tolerance for deviant behavior” (Gelfand, et al., 2011, p. 1100). Although typically measured at the national level, T-L also manifests as an organizational culture and is shown to have important psychological implications at the individual level (Gelfand, Nishii & Raver, 2006).

Within tight cultures, “norms [are] expressed very clearly and unambiguously, and severe sanctions [are] imposed on those who deviate” (Gelfand, Nishii & Raver, 2006, p. 7).

Psychological research confirms that individuals in tight cultures exhibit a narrower range of psychological differentiation from the group (i.e., the concept of the self is embedded in the group) (Witkin & Berry, 1975). Theoretical work posits that cultural tightness is accompanied by an elevated sense of felt accountability (Gelfand, Nishii & Raver, 2006). While collectivism and cultural tightness may co-occur, this is not always the case, as some societies are collectivist and loose (e.g., Thailand) while others are individualistic and tight (e.g., Germany) (Chan et al., 1996; Triandis, 1989).

In tight cultures, group expectations are powerful influencing forces in defining social norms, guiding behavior, and distinguishing right behavior from wrong (Gelfand, 2012; Gelfand, Nishii & Raver, 2006). Within a context that emphasizes the social expectation to abide group norms and imposes strict sanctions on norm violators, I propose that cultural tightness reinforces a culture of shame at the organizational level. The strong external regulating system of tightness that promotes a public context for assessing norm violations is consistent with a culture of shame.

While group norms and expectations govern right and wrong in a tight context, looseness is characterized by a high tolerance for a broader range of behaviors (Gelfand, Nishii & Raver, 2006). In loose cultures, individuals experience greater latitude in defining their own social and behavioral standards (Gelfand, 2012; Gelfand, et al. 2011). Rather than the individual conforming her behavior to the social norms of the group, in a loose context, the group accommodates group standards to the variety of norms exhibited by its members. Thus, in a loose culture, the weight of social regulation rests more squarely on the individual – she is

personally charged with distinguishing right from wrong and with regulating her own behavior, in the absence of strong group norms and strict sanctions. The strong internal regulating system that promotes a private context for assessing norm violation is consistent with a culture of guilt.

H1: There is a stronger positive association between shame cultures and cultural tightness in comparison to guilt cultures and tightness.

Individualism-Collectivism

I assert that individualism-collectivism is related to cultures of guilt and shame in organizations. According to this cultural orientation, individualism celebrates the uniqueness, independence, and individuality of each person, and encourages self-actualization, self-determination, and realization of the true self (Hofstede, 2001; House et al., 2004; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Among individualists, the pursuit of individual goals and the expression of independent thoughts and inclinations takes precedence – even if those opinions are unpopular, and even at the expense of disturbing social relations and group harmony (Schwartz, 2012; Schwartz et al., 2012; Singelis, 1994; Triandis, 2018). Given the emphasis on individuality in this cultural dimension, moral emotions assume a distinctive flavor, one predicated upon individually defined moral standards, which may not necessarily align with the moral expectations of the group (Kitayama, Markus & Matsumoto, 1995; Nezlek, Kafetsios & Smith, 2008). Thus, individualists feel guilt predominantly due to the violation of moral standards they have established for themselves, whether or not close others share those expectations or share any knowledge of the transgression (Bierbrauer, 1992; Creighton, 1990; Greenwald & Harder, 1998).

Given the heavy emphasis on the individual's personal moral standards, public exposure is not a necessary prerequisite for eliciting the discomfort and unpleasantness associated with

wrongdoing. It is the individual's internalized conscience that guides their sense of right and wrong and which exacts punishment (i.e., guilt) in response to infringement (Guignon, 2004; Kitayama, Markus & Matsumoto, 1995; Mead, 1937/2003; Piers & Singer, 1953). Furthermore, guilt, predicated by the violation of one's own moral standards, operates as a powerful self-regulatory emotion for inhibiting transgressive behavior (Baumeister, Stillwell & Heatherton, 1994). In this context, a member avoids doing wrong primarily because they would hate to breach their personal standards and independently defined concept of their 'ought self.'

In contrast, the "self-in-relation-to-other" forms the basis of how the self is conceptualized in collectivist orientation (Hofstede, 2001; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). As such, collectivists prize the maintenance of group harmony above the articulation of independent views and pursuit of individual goals, even at the expense of self-expression (Gelfand, Bhawuk, Nishii & Bechtold, 2004; Singelis, 1994; Triandis, 2018).

While collectivists each maintain unique opinions, attitudes, and judgments, whether and how these proclivities are expressed depends greatly upon the social context (Barnlund, 1975; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 2018). Rather than the Self defining the self, the group and the context operate as powerful forces in determining the context-appropriate expressions of the self (Gardener, Gabriel & Lee, 1999). Given the influence of group membership in defining the self, moral emotions are heavily colored by collectively defined moral standards of behavior (Greenwald & Harder, 1998). Rather than an individual defining "right" and "wrong" behavior based on independently held views, the social context dictates moral and immoral behavior; and thus, abidance to these standards becomes critical to maintenance of standing within the group (Creighton, 1990; Mead, 1937/2003; Stearns, 2017).

Because relation to the group is central to the sense of self, collectivists regulate behavior to avoid bringing shame to their community and losing their standing among the group (Bierbrauer, 1992; de Waal, 1996; Greenwald & Harder, 1998; Kitayama, Markus & Matsumoto, 1995; Lansky, 1995; Piers & Singer, 1953). In a shame culture, felt accountability to the group may be so strong that the imagined audience is sufficient to regulate behavior (Glenn & Glenn, 1982; Lebra, 1973; Johnson et al., 1987). Subsequently, the imagined audience in shame cultures is analogous to the internalized moral conscience in guilt cultures. As such, the anticipation of shame operates as a behavioral regulatory mechanism for collectivists very similarly to how guilt functions to inhibit transgressions for individualists.

H2: There is a stronger positive association between shame cultures and collectivism in comparison to guilt cultures and collectivism.

Power Distance

I assert that power distance is a contextual indicator of guilt and shame cultures in organizations. According to this cultural dimension, societies and organizations differ in the extent to which members “expect and agree that power should be shared unequally” (Hofstede, 2001, p. 75; Carl, Gupta & Javidan, 2004; Kirkman, Chen, Farh & Chen, 2009).

Within organizations, this cultural dimension is manifested in decision-making processes. In a low power distance context, leaders readily encourage follower self-direction, creativity, independence and daring (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 2012). Rather than dictating to followers how to perform their work, followers should be empowered to make such determinations autonomously (Hofstede, 2001; Carl, Gupta & Javidan, 2004). In line with this orientation, I would also expect that followers have more latitude to self-determining right from wrong, consistent with a culture of guilt (Kitayama, Markus & Matsumoto, 1995).

In addition, low power distance values typically promote a flat structure, in which members are largely expected to self-manage and self-supervise (Hofstede, et al., 1999; Carl, Gupta & Javidan, 2004). Rather than relying on leaders to define and identify norm violations, followers are expected to autonomously self-regulate. The emphasis that low power distance values place on self-management is consistent with the self-regulation and reliance on internal moral standards from a culture of guilt (Carver & Scheier, 1982; Jackson, Mackenzie & Hobfoll, 2000; Kim et al, 1994; Kitayama, Markus & Matsumoto, 1995). Thus, low power distance values and beliefs provide the contextual groundwork to support an organizational culture of guilt.

While a low power distance context encourages self-direction among employees, high power distance values elicit allegiance and deference to authority figures. High power distance values reflect social power beliefs including the right of certain members to dominate others (Schwartz, 2012). Leaders in this context employ a directive, if not authoritative, leadership style, which followers expect, if not appreciate (Hofstede, 2001). Based on this dimension, decision-making resides in the hands of a few members at the top of the organizational structure (Carl, Gupta & Javidan, 2004; Hofstede et al., 1999). Given these values, I argue that matters of right and wrong are more commonly determined by leaders and dictated to followers, rather than decided autonomously by members as is expected in a low power distance context.

Additionally, high power distance correlates with support for follower surveillance, such that subordinates expect their behavior to be closely scrutinized by their superiors (Ball, 2010; Gagné & Bhave, 2011). Within this context, leaders are expected to judge the extent to which follower behavior adequately adheres to the prescribed norms (Kidwell & Sprague, 2009). Consistent with a culture of shame, high power distance orientation instills expectations that members will be beheld to socially defined norms of right and wrong (Kitayama, Markus &

Matsumoto, 1995), and whereby follower behaviors should be closely scrutinized by leaders. Altogether, high power distance values provide the contextual groundwork to support organizational cultures of shame.

H3: There is a stronger positive association between shame cultures and power distance in comparison to guilt cultures and power distance.

Behavioral Outcomes

Organizational Deviance

Workplace deviance refers to voluntary behavior that threatens to harm the organization, its members or both (Robinson & Bennett, 1995). Extensive research on workplace deviance indicates that it is a pervasive and costly organizational issue (Bennett & Robinson, 2000); therefore, it is unsurprising that organizations devote substantial resources in limiting it. According to theory, workplace deviance arises from a variety of forces when members either lack the motivation to adhere to norms or are motivated to violate them (Kaplan, 1975). A typology of workplace deviance distinguishes between deviance that is directed at the organization (i.e., organizational deviance) and deviance that is directed at workplace colleagues (i.e., interpersonal deviance). Organizational deviance includes behaviors like theft of workplace materials, damaging workplace property and intentionally working at a slow pace. Interpersonal deviance involves gossip, ostracism, embarrassment, and antagonistic behavior toward colleagues (Berry, Ones & Sackett, 2007). While these dimensions tend to be highly correlated (Dalal, 2005), there is strong empirical precedent to examine them separately because they are frequently motivated by different forces (Bennett & Robinson, 2000; Berry, Ones & Sackett, 2007).

In this dissertation, I have proposed that the organization's moral emotional culture can be a functional mechanism of social control for managing and deterring workplace deviance. In particular, I have argued that both guilt and shame cultures aim to control member behavior and discourage member deviance from organizational norms. Consistent with the theory elaborated in Paper 1, I have argued that guilt and shame cultures both encourage members to self-regulate and discourage members to violate organizational norms.

In particular, guilt cultures reinforce norm abidance and discourage deviance by encouraging norm violators to publicly apologize when they have committed wrongdoings. This norm is modeled by organizational leaders, as described in Paper 1. In addition, violators may be privately warned or punished for their wrongdoing. In a guilt culture, these private punishments are meant to activate the violator's guilty conscience, encourage contemplation of the wrong, and elicit commitment to changed behavior. Through this socialization process, members learn to feel guilty for deviating from the organization's norms and subsequently work to avoid it.

Similarly, I have argued that shame cultures reinforce norm abidance and punish deviance by publicly shaming violators. By making a public spectacle of wrongdoers and norm violations, all members learn what norms are prized and must not be broken. Through this socialization process, members learn to feel ashamed of deviating from the organization's norms, and subsequently they seek to avoid it. Based on this theorizing, I expect that strong guilt and shame cultures (relative to weak guilt and shame cultures) will both have a diminishing effect on organizational deviance among members.

H4a: There is a negative relationship between guilt cultures and organizational deviance.

H4b: There is a negative relationship between shame cultures and organizational deviance.

Interpersonal Deviance

As described above, interpersonal deviance refers to a particular form of deviant behavior that is directed at workplace colleagues. Unlike organizational deviance, which directly harms the organization, interpersonal deviance is focused on particular individuals within the workplace. Prior research indicates that specific factors motivate this behavior. In part Empirical research indicates a bystander effect for this form of deviance, whereby witnessing a colleague engage in interpersonal deviance increases the likelihood that the bystander will subsequently engage in interpersonal deviance too (Ferguson & Barry, 2011).

While both strong guilt and shame cultures discourage organizational deviance (relative to weak cultures), I expect that they will differentially impact interpersonal deviance. In particular, I expect that shame cultures will promote greater interpersonal deviance in comparison to guilt cultures. As described in Paper 1 and elaborated in Paper 3, shaming rituals are characteristic of shame cultures. These rituals specifically entail the public humiliation of the shaming target and involve bystanders (i.e., witnesses) in the experience of shame for the target. In very severe instances, these rituals may even entail physical punishment, stigmatization of the target. Thus, members of organizations with shame cultures are more likely to have witnessed and even participated in the humiliation and punishment of other members. According to the bystander effect of interpersonal deviance, this modeling experience would likely influence members of shame cultures to engage in interpersonal deviance, specifically toward the targets of shaming rituals.

By comparison, guilt culture punishments are typically conducted in private. In doing so, they actively protect the identity and integrity of the violator, so that no members other than the violator and the managers necessarily need to know about the punishment. Unlike shaming punishments, private guilt-consistent punishments do not involve other organizational members (Rodogno, 2009; Ten, 1987; Wüschner, 2017). For instance, guilt-based punishments may include a private warning email, sent directly to the violator, or a one-on-one performance review meeting between the supervisor and employee. While apologies are guilt culture consistent responses to wrongdoing, they are distinct from punishments, as they ought to be authentically violator initiated (Koehn, 2013). Furthermore, apologies focus on acknowledging the wrongdoing (Koehn & Goranova, 2018), and thus separate the violator from the violation, thereby maintaining the integrity of the wrongdoer. Therefore, in strong guilt culture organizations, members would not witness the humiliation of other members and would not be influenced by the bystander effect of interpersonal deviance. Thus, I expect that members of strong guilt culture organizations would be less likely to engage in interpersonal workplace deviance in comparison to members of strong shame culture organizations.

H5: There is a stronger positive relationship between shame cultures and interpersonal deviance in comparison to guilt cultures and interpersonal deviance.

Unethical Pro-Organizational Behavior

Extending the discussion of deviant behaviors, sometimes workers do bad things for good reasons (Umphress & Bingham, 2011). Namely, research has examined unethical pro-organizational behaviors (UPBs), which include deviant acts which yield direct benefits to the organization or organizational members (Umphress, Bingham & Mitchell, 2010). Ultimately, these behaviors aim to help the organization or protect it but do so in a way that leads members

to engage in ethically dubious acts. These behaviors include concealing information from the public that could damage the organization's reputation or misrepresenting information about the organization to make it look good. Prior research indicates organizational identification as a predictor of UPBs (Umphress, Bingham & Mitchell, 2010). I extend this research to argue that strong shame cultures likely promote greater UPBs among members relative to guilt cultures.

Consistent with research on discrete shame, this negative self-evaluative emotion is elicited and amplified by the public disclosure of wrongdoing (Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney, et al., 1996). Therefore, discrete shame, as a self-regulatory emotion, is more strongly correlated with image-protective strategies like concealment of wrongdoing and hiding of the self (Cohen, et al., 2011; Goffman, 1967/2009; Tangney, 1995). In addition, research on shame-proneness, the individual trait, correlates this disposition (relative to guilt-proneness) with elevated sensitivity and attentiveness to the opinions, judgements, and feelings of others (Tankana et al., 2015). In short, because shame-prone individuals care deeply about their public image, they deliberately present a public image that is pleasing to others, and they actively conceal actions and characteristics that are likely to elicit public criticism and ridicule.

As an organizational culture, I have argued that shame cultures influence organizational members in comparable ways. Specifically, in Paper 1, I proposed that members of shame cultures are more likely to engage in cooperative concealment of violations that occur within the organization. These cooperative concealment behaviors are motivated by collective shame, i.e., feelings of shame due to some deviant behavior occurring within the organization. In this way, members of shame cultures are particularly sensitive to protecting the image and reputation of the organization and organizational members to the general public. Thus, I expect that members of shame cultures will be more likely to engage in UPBs relative to members of guilt cultures.

In contrast, the discrete emotion guilt (relative to shame) is more strongly associated with confession, public apology, and changed behavior following transgressions (Tangney, Mashek & Stuewig, 2005; Tangney et al., 1995). So, when individuals feel guilty, they are more likely to respond to the emotional discomfort by willingly disclosing their deviant acts (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). In addition, research on guilt-proneness, the individual trait, correlates this disposition (relative to shame-proneness) with elevated sensitivity and attentiveness to the opinions, judgements, and feelings of others. In short, guilt-prone individuals care deeply about presenting an image of themselves that is fully reflective of their true nature, and they will disclose information even if they know it may cause some people to judge them negatively (Tangney & Dearing, 2002).

As an organizational culture, I have argued that guilt cultures influence organizational members in comparable ways. Specifically, in Paper 1, I proposed that members of guilt cultures are more likely to engage in collective apologies and confessions for violations that occur within the organization. These cooperative disclosure behaviors are motivated by a desire to absolve collective guilt, i.e., feelings of guilt due to some deviant behavior that occurred within the organization. In this way, members of guilt cultures are motivated to reveal information about the organization even if it may be damaging to the organization and its members. Thus, I expect that members of guilt cultures will be less likely to engage in UPBs relative to members of shame cultures.

H6: There is a stronger positive relationship between shame cultures and UPBs in comparison to guilt cultures and UPBs.

Additional Research Questions

As an extension of the relationships hypothesized above, this study will explore additional relationships that expand our understanding of how guilt and shame cultures influence

emotions and behavior in the workplace. I have chosen to designate these as additional research questions because they do not directly assess the social control elements of guilt and shame cultures. In this way, these questions elaborate on the impact of guilt and shame cultures beyond their specific relationship to deviant behavior. In particular, the following questions examine additional emotional and rule-following effects of guilt and shame cultures. Thus, the purpose of including these supplemental analyses is to provide a fuller picture of how guilt and shame cultures influence organizational behavior broadly in the workplace.

Compliance and Deference. Consistent with the theme of social control, I expect that both guilt and shame cultures will encourage compliance and deference in organizations. Compliance refers to employee adherence to organizational policies (Tyler & Blader, 2005). This form of rule following is especially important to facilitating organizational coordination and functioning, as it ensures that members are compliant with rules and policies in the execution of their daily work. Deference refers to voluntary acceptance of the rules and decisions made by the leader without question (Tyler & Blader, 2005). Unlike compliance, deference taps into employee willingness to follow rules, even in the absence of oversight. As described in Paper 1, guilt and shame cultures function not only to deter deviance but also to promote self-regulation surrounding organizational norms. As suggested in Paper 1, the intrinsic motivation to follow rules absent direct oversight may be especially strong and important in guilt cultures, where rules are internalized and integrated into the member's personal sense of appropriate conduct (Benedict, 1946). While shame cultures are more reliant on surveillance to enforce norms, over time and repeated exposure, it is expected that norms would eventually become internalized (Creighton, 1990), as members integrate an internalized audience and 'sense of shame' (Benedict, 1946). Ultimately, both systems seek to ensure that members follow rules and

willingly internalize them, so that constant oversight and punishment are not required. Thus, I expect that strong cultures of guilt and shame will promote compliance and deference toward organizational rules.

Anxiety. Due to differences in their atonement processes, I expect that guilt and shame cultures may impact employee stress levels and emotional exhaustion differently. Specifically, I expect that members of shame cultures may experience higher anxiety levels and emotional exhaustion on average due to the nature of shaming punishment processes. Anxiety refers to emotional distress in response to potentially harmful future events (Abramson, Metalsky & Alloy, 1989; Lazarus, 1966). Anxiety entails a combination of tension, nervousness, apprehension, and worry (Spielberger, 1983). Research suggests that anxiety is induced when individuals perceive threats within the workplace, and studies confirm that anxiety negatively impacts productivity and performance (Doby & Kaplan, 1995). Since shame punishments involve third-party audience members, it is more likely that members of shame cultures will be witnesses to another employee's public shaming. Organizational research on the bystander effect of interpersonal deviance indicates that witnessing another member's mistreatment can evoke negative emotional and behavioral responses (Ferguson & Barry, 2011). Indeed, witnessing interpersonal deviance can induce a state of threat, where the member worries that they may be the next subject of deviance. Thus, even if employees are not punished themselves, they may be witnesses to another member's shaming, which could elevate their anxiety levels. Because guilt cultures typically punish violators privately as suggested in Paper 1, it is less likely that members of guilt culture organizations will encounter punishments unless the members themselves are rule-violators. Therefore, members of guilt cultures are less likely to witness the punishment of other members, and by extension, experience less anxiety.

Affective Commitment. Few topics have received more attention in the management literature than employee commitment (Cohen, 2007; Klein, Molloy & Brinsfield, 2012; Mowday, Steers & Porter, 1979; Reichers, 1985). This is because, commitment strongly predicts a host of positive organizational outcomes including performance, satisfaction, and creativity (Mathieu & Zajac, 1990; Meyer, Stanley, Herscovitch, & Topolnytsky, 2002). Commitment broadly refers to the bond employees feel toward their organization, and it is driven by affective, normative and continuance motivations (Allen & Meyer, 1990, 1996). Affective commitment specifically reflects the emotional attachment members feel toward the group and has been described as “cohesion commitment” to the emotion of the group (Allen & Meyer, 1990). Thus, members high in affective commitment feel emotionally attached and in-sync with the emotion of the group. Because shame cultures promote self-regulation through attentiveness and sensitivity to the judgment of others, members of shame cultures are encouraged to feel emotionally bonded to their organizations and other organizational members. Furthermore, shame cultures instill a ‘sense of shame’ that reflects members’ sensitivity to the opinions, feelings, and judgments of others (Benedict, 1946). Thus, shame cultures promote and encourage affective commitment through the reliance on the interpersonal self-regulatory emotion – shame (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). By contrast, guilt cultures promote self-regulation through sensitivity to violating one’s personal moral standards. While a member’s personal standards are likely influenced by social forces within one’s work context (i.e., as internalized norms), guilt cultures do not require members to develop sensitivity to the opinions, feelings, and judgments of others as strongly as is required in shame cultures. In other words, in guilt cultures, it is possible and even socially acceptable to maintain one’s own unique sense of right and wrong, even if it opposes the beliefs of those within your social group. Because guilt cultures cultivate

sensitivity to the intrapersonal self-regulatory emotion – guilt (Tangney & Dearing, 2002), I expect that members of guilt cultures will reflect lower affective commitment to their workgroups relative to members of shame cultures.

It is important to note however, that because many members of guilt cultures may share similar beliefs. Thus, their internalized commitment to the norms may also positively influence their affective commitment to the workgroup. Therefore, I predict that both guilt and shame cultures are positively related to affective commitment, although I expect that shame cultures will have a stronger positive relationship.

Scale Development Process

Item generation

Following the scale development procedure prescribed by Hinkin and Tracey (1999) and Colquitt et al. (2019), the two coauthors independently drafted 50 items for guilt and shame organizational affective cultures. Item construction was carefully derived from the construct definitions and theoretical properties of these cultures with attention to their respective norms and artifacts (Schein, 2017). Item development involved multilingual researchers, such that the original items are written to facilitate translation and ensure conceptual consistency (Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997; Minkov, 2012). Furthermore, I adhered to the advice of Brislin (1986, p. 143-150) in writing items that optimize translatability for future cross-cultural use. Finally, I included both statement item and single word items in the scale, following the example of O'Reilly, Chatman, and Caldwell's scale of organizational cultures (1991). Thus, I developed two scales for each affective culture: a statement scale and an adjective scale.

After developing items independently, the researchers combined their scale item lists and discussed the items developed for conceptual clarity (Colquitt et al., 2019). Through this process, I eliminated two item pairs that I deemed inconsistent with theory or the definitions. I also

ensured that there was a parallel guilt item for each shame item in the scale to ensure the scales captured similar features of the two affective cultures. For instance, if a shame item read, “In this organization, people are expected to feel shame when they have broken the rules,” I ensured a parallel guilt item that read, “In this organization, people are *expected* to feel guilt when they have broken the rules” (italics added here for emphasis only). This resulted in an initial item pool of 46 statement items (23 pairs of items for shame and guilt cultures) and ten adjective items (five items each for shame and guilt cultures) (See Tables 3 – 6).

Insert Tables 3 – 6 about here

Study 1: Definitional Correspondence

Prior to the questionnaire administration, the measurements were distributed to experts in guilt, shame, and organizational affective cultures to establish face validity of scale items (Hardesty & Bearden, 2004). Specifically, I solicited participation from scholars on EMONET (i.e., a scholarly network of emotions researchers) affiliated with the Academy of Management. In addition, I distributed the survey to management faculty and PhD students in my department.

The subject matter experts were presented with the definitions of shame and guilt cultures at the header of each page and asked to evaluate the extent to which the items presented reflect shame cultures and guilt cultures (independently). Each page contained six items total, comprising three parallel shame and guilt item pairs. From this process, I obtained twelve responses which I assessed quantitatively by determining the pairs of parallel items that reflected the greatest separation in terms of high scores of shame items as indicative of shame cultures and low scores of shame items as indicative of guilt cultures (and vice versa for guilt items). I also

incorporated qualitative comments from subject matter experts regarding specific items or the relationship between items and the construct definitions.

On the basis of the subject matter experts' ratings of the correspondence of each item with the construct definitions, I removed five pairs of statement items (i.e., five each for shame and guilt cultures). This was due to the SMEs assessments that these items did not adequately distinguish between my definitions of shame cultures and guilt cultures. Thus, the pool of statement items was reduced from 46 to 26. I also removed one of the guilt items based on the SME ratings, reducing the adjective item pool from ten items to nine items (see Tables 3 – 6 in Appendix B for the reduced scale items).

Insert Tables 7 – 10 about here

Study 2: Exploratory Factor Analysis

Upon establishing face validity by topic experts, I tested my study for content validity on a sample of “naïve judges” ($n = 300$) consisting of working adults residing in the United States recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) (Colquitt et al., 2019; Hinkin & Tracey, 1999). Participants were presented with the definition of organizational affective cultures of guilt and shame on the header of a single page, followed by parallel pairs of items associated with each construct. Participants then rated the extent to which each item accurately captured the guilt and shame culture constructs respectively (Hinkin, 1998; Hinkin & Tracey, 1999) using a Likert scale (1 = “this item does an extremely bad job measuring the bolded construct above,” to 5 = “this item does an extremely good job measuring the bolded construct above”) based on the reduced set of items (Colquitt et al., 2019).

Following scale development procedures of Hinkin and Tracey (1999), I ran a series of ANOVAs on scale items to determine items with the largest differences between ratings of items as indicative of shame cultures versus guilt cultures. In addition, I submitted participant ratings to two exploratory factor analyses: one that included their ratings of how much each item corresponded with my definition of shame culture, and another that included their ratings of how much each item corresponded with guilt culture (Hinkin, 1998). Inspection of the eigenvalues, scree plots, and factor loadings guided the decision making on which items to retain in the scale and which items to eliminate in an iterative process of item reduction.

The initial EFAs yielded six and seven factors with eigenvalues greater than 1, and the scree plots also indicated more than the two expected factors. Additionally, a number of items showed high cross-loadings on other factors. Through an iterative process, I removed problematic item pairs and reran the EFAs. This process resulted in six more item pairs being removed from the statement item pool. Seven item pairs (i.e., a total of 14 items with seven measuring shame culture and seven measuring guilt culture) were retained (see Tables 7 & 8 in Appendix B). For the adjective item scale, I subjected the item set to similar EFAs as for the statement items. These EFAs both revealed one factor for guilt and two factors for shame. After removing a problematic item intended to measure shame culture, the EFAs both yielded clean results with all items loading on their intended factors (see Tables 9 & 10 in Appendix B).

Insert Table 11 about here

Study 3: Confirmatory Factor Analysis

I recruited an independent sample of 251 full-time working adults from Prolific to rate the items from the reduced scale. Specifically, participants were asked to reflect on the culture of

their organization and rate the extent to which each item was reflective of their workplace (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). I then ran a confirmatory factor analysis on the data and further reduced the item set based upon model fit indices and item loadings. In cases where the indices failed to meet desired levels, I reran the model after removing the most questionable items and re-examined the fit statistics (Bollen, 1989). This process iterated until the parametric estimates achieve significance levels and all fit indices fell within a specified range. I also ran Wald and Lagrangian Multiplier (LM) tests to determine whether other paths should be specified or removed. Altogether, this process resulted in 3 more item pairs being removed from the statement item pool. Four item pairs (i.e., a total of 8 items with four measuring shame culture and four measuring guilt culture) were retained (see Tables 11 & 12 in Appendix B).

Following recommendations by Hu and Bentler (1999) and Marsh, Hau, and Wen (2004), I used evaluative metrics of the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), standardized root mean residual (SRMR), and the root mean-squared error of approximation (RMSEA), as well as considered changes in the X^2 statistic for model comparison testing. Results indicated that the two-factor model fit the data well, $X^2(19) = 80.08, p < .01$ (CFI = .94; TLI = .91; RMSEA = .12; SRMR = .08). Furthermore, this model fit the data significantly better than an alternative one-factor model, $X^2(20) = 393.68, p < .01$ (CFI = .63; TLI = .48; RMSEA = .28; SRMR = .20).

Insert Table 12 about here

Study 4: Nomological Validity

This study aimed to establish associations between the developed measure (above) and conceptually related constructs. Orbiting constructs included individualism-collectivism, power distance (Hofstede, 2001; House et al., 2004; Kirkman, et al., 2009), and cultural tightness-

looseness (Gelfand et al., 2011), based on an overlap in theoretical properties and prior conceptual and empirical work. The results of this study aimed to illustrate the correlations (negative and positive) between guilt and shame cultures, the orbiting constructs, and organizationally relevant outcomes. This study employed a multi-rater, 2-wave study design in order to address common method bias concerns (Podsakoff, et al., 2003). I initially aimed to recruit the sample for this study on Prolific, targeting members of the Armed Forces; however, this approach did not yield a sufficient sample size to run an analysis ($n = 26$ at Time 2). As a secondary attempt, I attempted to recruit a sample through the Armed-Forces listserv of a university in the northwestern region of the United States. Similar to the initial data collection attempt, this approach yielded too few responses to analyze ($n = 5$).

Following two unsuccessful attempts to access a sample of Armed Forces service workers, I decided to broaden my sampling technique to include a wider range of industries, beyond the Armed Forces. While this approach yielded a larger sample size ($n = 215$), the number of coworker responses ($n = 41$) was still too low to assess the effects of organizational level variables on individual outcomes.

Presented with the challenges of recruiting a multi-rater dataset that included participants from a spread of industries, geographic regions, and organizations, I canvassed a couple survey panel companies (i.e., Qualtrics and ROI, formerly Clearvoice). Based on an assessment of my sampling needs, the companies projected fees ranging from 15,000 to 25,000 USD. Since these options fell outside of the scope of my research budget, I explored further options for data collection.

Due to several failed attempts at collecting multi-rater data from a spread of organizations, I decided to work in collaboration with a professor of organizational behavior

employed in China, who recruited a sample of 200 working adults using WeChat, with the support of 18 research assistants through the university alumni network. Each assistant was asked to recruit up to 20 focal participants from a spread of industries and geographic regions to complete two surveys separated by one week. An initial sample of 217 participants joined the WeChat group. At Time 1, focal participants were asked to respond to the guilt and shame cultures scales, along with established measures for the orbiting constructs and the dependent variable measures in order to establish nomological and discriminant validity (Colquitt et al., 2019). In particular, the focal participants reflected on their perceptions of the organizational culture as organizational informants (Chatman & Spataro, 2005).

In order to obtain multiple informants on the organizational culture, each participant was asked to identify and recruit up to five (5) colleagues from their organization who would respond to the measures of the organizational culture variables (i.e., guilt/shame cultures, power distance, individualism-collectivism and tightness-looseness). To address bias in the selection of workgroup colleagues, the research assistants provided participants with a random letter of the alphabet and directed participants to identify up to five workgroup colleagues whose first name began with that letter or the nearest letter to recruit. The focal participants responded to all survey items at Time 1. Then, at Time 2 following a one-week time lag, the focal participants were asked to respond to the dependent variable measures again. The one-week time lag primarily aimed to create some temporal separation between predictors, mediators, and dependent variables in an effort to address common method variance (Podsakoff, et al., 2003). While guidance on determining optimal time lags is sparse, research generally indicates that effects erode as the time lag between predictors and outcomes increase (Cohen, 1993; Cronbach, 1970; Dormann & Griffin, 2015). Thus, I opted for a one-week time lag to create some temporal

separation without distancing the measurements too greatly. Using this panel study design, I controlled for the Time 1 dependent variable measures when I assessed the relationships between guilt/shame cultures and the Time 2 dependent variables.

Measures

Cultural Tightness-Looseness (T-L) was captured by the focal participants (and up to 5 colleagues) at Time 1 using an adaptation of a validated 6-item measure (Gelfand, et al., 2011). Sample items included: “There are many social norms that people are supposed to abide by in my organization,” and “In my organization, there are very clear expectations for how people should act in most situations.” The reliability coefficient (α) for this scale was .52.

Individualism-Collectivism was captured by the focal participants (and up to 5 colleagues) at Time 1 using a validated 3-item measure (House, et al., 2003). Sample items included: “In this organization, managers encourage group loyalty even if individual goals suffer,” and “In this organization, group cohesion is valued more than individualism.” The reliability coefficient (α) for this scale was .52.

Power Distance was captured by the focal participants (and up to 5 colleagues) at Time 1 using a validated 3-item measure (House, et al., 2003). Sample items included: “In this organization, subordinates are expected to obey their boss without question,” and “In this organization, people in positions of power increase their social distance from less powerful members.” The reliability coefficient (α) for this scale was -.01. When I attempted to improve the scale reliability by dropping an item the reliability coefficient was -.19.

Notably, the Cronbach alpha for this Power Distance scale, and the preceding T-L and Collectivism scales fell well below the recommended range for a scale (i.e., .70 to .95), thus suggesting that these measures may suffer from poor inter-relatedness between items or too few items in the scale (Tavakol & Dennick, 2011). In attempting to understand the source of these

low coefficients of reliability, I examined the intercorrelations between the items in each of the scales respectively. This process revealed that each of the items correlated at low levels ranging from $r = .14$ and $.32$ (for T-L and Collectivism) to $r = 0.00$ (for Power Distance), indicating little to no relationship between the items within the respective scales. In addition, I attempted to drop items from each of the scales to improve the Cronbach alphas; however, this resulted in an even lower reliability coefficients. The fact that each scale included only three items (each) greatly constrained my options for dropping items to improve the reliabilities. Therefore, I proceeded with the analyses using the complete scales; however, I interpreted the results with some caution, and I discuss this limitation further in the Discussion and Limitations sections.

Organizational deviance was captured by the focal participants at Time 1 and Time 2 using a validated 19-item measure (Bennett & Robinson, 2000). Sample items for organizational deviance included: “Taken an additional or longer break than is acceptable at your workplace,” and, “Put little effort into your work.” Sample items for interpersonal deviance included, “Said something hurtful to someone at work,” and, “Acted rudely toward someone at work.” The reliability coefficient (α) for this scale was $.90$.

Unethical Pro-Organizational Behavior was captured by the focal participants at Time 1 and Time 2 using a validated 6-item measure (Umphress et al., 2010). Sample items included: “If needed, I would conceal information from the public that could be damaging to my organization,” and, “If it would help my organization, I would misrepresent the truth to make my organization look good.” The reliability coefficient (α) for this scale was $.85$.

Compliance and Deference were captured by the focal participants at Time 1 and Time 2 using a validated 11-item measure (Tyler & Blader, 2005). Sample items for compliance included: “I comply with work related rules and regulations,” and, “I use company rules to guide

what I do on the job.” The reliability coefficient (α) for this scale was .95. Sample items for deference included: “I voluntarily follow company rules and policies concerning how to do my job,” and “I willingly implement decisions even when my behavior is not being monitored.” The reliability coefficient (α) for this scale was .86.

Anxiety was captured by the focal participants at Time 1 and Time 2 using a validated 6-item measure (Marteau & Bekker, 1992). Participants reflected on the extent to which they felt the following emotions while they are at work, in general. Sample items included: “tense,” “upset,” and “worried.” The reliability coefficient (α) for this scale was .73.

Affective Commitment was captured by the focal participants at Time 1 and Time 2 using a validated 6-item measure (Allen & Meyer, 1990). Sample items included: “I do not feel like ‘part of the family’ at my organization,” (reverse-coded) and “I really feel as if this organization’s problems are my own.” The reliability coefficient (α) for this scale was .82.

Analyses

My definition of guilt and shame cultures as the shared norms, values, and assumptions surrounding which moral emotions (i.e., guilt or shame) ought to motivate self-regulation and reparative action following a violation is consistent with other research on collective (i.e., work group level) constructs (Guzzo, Yost, Campbell, & Shea, 1993; Hoffman & Jones, 2005; Yu & Zellmer-Bruhn, 2018). Therefore, I represent guilt and shame cultures as the workgroup mean (Carter et al., 2017), given that social interaction and socialization processes among workgroup members should yield common, although not perfectly identical, perceptions (Bliese, 2000).

The original sample included 217 focal participants who initially signed up to the WeChat group. Due to attrition between the two timepoints, the final sample for this study included 197 focal participants and an additional 364 paired workgroup members, representing a 90.7% response rate with a mean age of 32.12 ($SD = 6.41$), a mean tenure of 6.54 years ($SD =$

6.88). In addition, 66.13% of the sample were male, and 42.7% were employed in the private sector (as opposed to the public sector). In sum, the dataset comprised of 197 workgroups, with member totals ranging from 2 to 7 members (mean = 2.9, median = 2.0). Eleven focal participants from the original sample did not have any coworker respond to the survey, so these focal participants were not included in the analysis of guilt and shame cultures. For shame culture the ICC(1) was .06; $F(3, 189)$ was 1.18, $p = .09$, and the ICC(2) was .15. For guilt culture, the ICC(1) was .12; $F(3, 189)$ was 1.38, $p < .01$, and the ICC(2) was .28. LeBreton and Senter (2008) suggest that ICC(1) values of .05 represent small effect sizes, indicating that strong group agreement was not found in this sample. According to Bliese (2000), ICC values for .90 or higher represent excellent reliability, values of .75 to .90 represent satisfactory reliability, and values of .50 to .75 represent moderate reliability. The small ICC values in this analysis imply a weak inter-rater agreement on the guilt and shame cultures of their workgroups, such that individual responses to the items vary within each workgroup (Bliese, 1998). This explanation is plausible, as the majority of 197 teams represented in the sample included only two members (i.e., 97 teams, amounting to 51%). In order for strong agreement to be achieved, both members would have to rate the culture very similarly. The low inter-rater agreement in this sample may bias the outcomes of subsequent analyses, as workgroup members do not generally share strong agreement on the moral emotional culture of their workgroups. It is also notable that the ICC(1) is driven by how different the teams are from each other (i.e., difference between groups), in addition to how different individual team member responses are from each other (i.e., difference within groups) (Bliese, 1998). Therefore, if the mean scores for guilt and shame cultures of the teams are very similar, it would be difficult to predict which group any individual participant is in. So, the low ICC(1) values may also be attributed to the teams being very similar

in their levels of guilt and shame cultures. In examining the mean squares for this analysis of variance (ANOVA) (mean squares between = 1.11; mean squares within = .80), it is evident that this sample suffers primarily from low agreement within teams, which is driving the low ICC(1) values. If we consider culture strength in terms of consensus, or within group agreement, as it has been previously theorized and measured (Chatman & O'Reilly, 2016; Lindell & Brandt, 2000), this would imply that the guilt and shame cultures in the workgroups sampled were relatively weak. Following the line of scholarship on cultural strength, we might also expect that the effects of analyses on weak cultures would be muted, or even null, as weak cultures tend to be less effective in eliciting their targeted outcomes than strong ones (Lindell & Brandt, 2000). Following the proposed analyses for this study, I calculated the mean value across workgroup members to create guilt and shame culture scores. Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations are displayed in Tables 13 and 14.

Insert Tables 13 and 14 about here

Before proceeding to the formal analyses of the hypotheses, it is meaningful to note some interesting descriptive statistics and intercorrelations. Although the sample for this study was taken from China, a prototypical shame culture, the data indicate a higher mean for guilt cultures (mean = 4.32, *SD* = .79), relative to shame cultures (mean = 3.33, *SD* = .80). This statistic may suggest that China is not as shame oriented as previously thought, or that the workers included in this sample are from organizations that are simply low in shame cultures. It may also suggest that organizations that are higher in shame cultures also tend to be higher in guilt cultures. Since this is the first measure of shame cultures and I do not have data from other countries to compare, it is difficult to fully interpret this finding. The standard deviations for these variables also suggest

a fair amount of variance in these cultures across organizations in China, suggesting that these cultures vary in strength even within a single country. The very weak correlation between the two cultures also offers some support for the idea that these cultures are distinct ($r = .07$) Consistent with prior research on collectivism and cultural tightness (Gelfand et al, 2011; Hofstede, 2001), the means for collectivism and tightness in this population were relatively high (mean = 5.07, $SD = .76$, and mean = 5.03, $SD = .42$, respectively).

Results

All the hypotheses and related results are summarized in Table 15.

Insert Table 15 about here

Cultural Tightness. Hypothesis 1 predicted that there would be a stronger positive relationship between shame cultures and cultural tightness relative to guilt cultures and cultural tightness. To explore this hypothesis, I first regressed cultural tightness onto the guilt and shame culture measures, including control variables. Outcomes of this ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis revealed a positive, significant relationship between guilt cultures and cultural tightness ($b = .10$, $SE = .02$, $p < .001$) and a positive, significant relationship between shame cultures and cultural tightness ($b = .13$, $SE = .02$, $p < .001$), after accounting for the effects of control variables (See Table 16). In order to assess whether the effect of shame cultures on tightness was significantly different from the effect of guilt cultures on tightness, I ran a linear hypothesis test (Koch, 1999). Results from this analysis indicated that the regression coefficients for guilt cultures and shame cultures on cultural tightness are not significantly different from each other, $F(1, 550) = 1.05$, $p = .31$. Following this, I performed a relative weight analysis on the data, as it provides a more precise understanding of the relative impact of each predictor in the regression model in comparison to the others on the outcome variable (Johnson,

2000; Tonidandel & LeBreton, 2011, 2015; Tonidandel, LeBreton, & Johnson, 2009). In addition, relative weight analysis is a useful technique for assessing this data because it partitions variance among correlated predictors. Results indicated that of the 18% of variance that shame and guilt cultures explain in tightness-looseness ($R^2 = .18$), shame cultures explain 64% of that variance, relative to guilt cultures, which explains 36%. Thus, the stronger relative weight of shame cultures suggests that shame cultures (relative to guilt cultures) account for a greater proportion of the of variance in tightness that is explained by these cultures. Taken together, given the results indicate that shame cultures, rather than guilt cultures, account for proportionately more of the variance in cultural tightness.

Insert Table 16 about here

Collectivism. Hypothesis 2 predicted that there would be a stronger positive relationship between shame cultures and in-group collectivism relative to guilt cultures and collectivism. To explore this hypothesis, I regressed collectivism onto the predictor variables, including the relevant controls. Outcomes of this OLS regression analysis revealed that guilt cultures had a positive, significant relationship with collectivism ($b = .10$, $SE = .04$, $p = .02$) and shame cultures had a positive, significant relationship with collectivism ($b = .10$, $SE = .04$, $p = .02$) (See Table 17). A linear hypothesis test indicated that the effect of guilt cultures on collectivism was not significantly different from the effect of shame cultures on collectivism, $F(1, 550) = .006$, $p = .94$. I again performed a relative weight analysis on the data to determine the proportional relationship of each moral emotional culture to collectivism. Results indicate that shame cultures (48%) and guilt cultures (52%) predicted roughly equal variance in in-group collectivism of the

4% of variance that is explained by these variables. Therefore, the data from this study did not support the second hypothesis.

Insert Table 17 about here

Power Distance. Hypothesis 3 predicted that there would be a stronger positive relationship between shame cultures and power distance relative to guilt cultures and power distance. Results from an OLS regression indicated that guilt cultures did not have a significant relationship with power distance ($b = -.03$, $SE = .03$, $p = .43$), meanwhile shame cultures had a positive, significant relationship with power distance ($b = .19$, $SE = .03$, $p < .001$) (See Table 18). To test whether the relationship between shame cultures and power distance is significantly different from the relationship between guilt cultures and power distance, I ran a linear hypothesis test. Outcomes from this analysis revealed that the relationship between shame cultures and power distance is indeed significantly different from the relationship between guilt cultures and power distance, $F(1, 550) = 18.80$, $p < .001$. Furthermore, a relative weight analysis indicated that shame cultures explained 99% of the variance in power distance, relative to guilt cultures (1%) of the total 9% of variance in power distance that is explained by both variables, offering support for Hypothesis 3.

Insert Table 18 about here

Organizational Deviance. Hypotheses 4 – 6 predicted the effects of guilt and shame cultures on relevant behavioral outcomes respectively. In hypothesis 4a and b, I predicted that guilt and shame cultures would negatively impact organizational deviance. Results from this analysis indicated that neither guilt ($b = .01$, $SE = .03$, $p = .71$) nor shame cultures ($b = -.03$, SE

= .03, $p = .38$) had a significant negative effect on organizational deviance. These effects are consistent with and without control variables included in the regression (See Table 13). It is important to note that while the culture level variables were formed using aggregated scores from the workgroup members and the focal employee, the analysis was performed at the individual level, because only focal participants provided responses to the mediating and dependent variables. This decision followed the advice of Podsakoff et al. (2002) suggesting that predictors and criterion variables be obtained from different sources. Overall, the data did not support Hypotheses 4a and 4b. Results from this analysis are presented in Table 19.

Insert Table 19 about here

Interpersonal Deviance. Hypothesis 5 predicted that there would be a stronger positive relationship between shame cultures and interpersonal deviance (in general, not necessarily directed toward a norm violator) relative to guilt cultures and interpersonal deviance. Results from an OLS regression indicated that guilt cultures do not have a significant effect on interpersonal deviance ($b = .0004$, $SE = .05$, $p = .99$), meanwhile shame cultures have a significant positive effect on interpersonal deviance ($b = .10$, $SE = .05$, $p = .04$) (See Table 20). A linear hypothesis test revealed that the effect of shame cultures on interpersonal deviance was not significantly different from the effect of guilt cultures on interpersonal deviance, $F(1, 550) = 2.51$, $p = .11$. Finally, a relative weight analysis indicated that of the small amount of variance in interpersonal deviance that these cultures explained ($R^2 = .04$), shame cultures accounted 87% of that variance, in comparison to guilt cultures (13%). Overall, the results suggest that shame cultures account for more variance in interpersonal deviance relative to guilt cultures (of the little

variance that these cultures explain), although the effect of shame cultures on interpersonal deviance is not significantly different from the effect of guilt cultures on this outcome.

Insert Table 20 about here

Unethical Pro-organizational Behavior. Hypothesis 6 predicted that there would be a stronger positive relationship between shame cultures and unethical pro-organizational behavior (UPB) relative to guilt cultures and UPB. Outcomes from an OLS regression indicated that neither guilt cultures ($b = .08$, $SE = .10$, $p = .41$), nor shame cultures ($b = .001$, $SE = .10$, $p = .99$) had a significant relationship with UPB (See Table 21). In addition, a linear hypothesis test revealed that the effect of guilt cultures on UPB was not significantly different from the effect of shame cultures on UPB, $F(1, 186) = .39$, $p = .53$. The results indicate that guilt and shame cultures account for very little variance in UPB ($R^2 = .0005$). Of the little variance explained by these variables, a relative weight analysis revealed that guilt cultures actually have a stronger positive relationship with UPBs (RW = 98%) relative to shame cultures (RW = 2%). Altogether, the results indicate that guilt cultures account for more variance in UPBs relative to shame cultures of the very little variance that these cultures explain. Furthermore, the effect of guilt cultures on this outcome is not significantly different from the effect of shame cultures.

Insert Table 21 about here

Supplemental Analyses

In addition to the main analyses formally hypothesized in this study, I also conducted a series of supplemental analyses based on theoretical evidence. In particular, I suggested that guilt

and shame cultures both increase employee compliance in the workplace. Similar to the analyses above, I used aggregated mean scores of guilt and shame cultures (at the workgroup level) to reflect the guilt and shame cultures of the workgroups represented in the data set. I then regressed guilt and shame cultures onto measures of compliance and deference collected at Time 2, while controlling for age, gender, tenure, and private (versus public) sector employment. Results from this analysis revealed that neither guilt cultures ($b = .06$, $SE = .06$, $p = .26$) nor shame cultures ($b = -.09$, $SE = .06$, $p = .09$) had a positive, significant impact on employee compliance with organizational policies, and in fact the effect of shame cultures on employee compliance was negative and marginally significant. Similarly, the effects of guilt cultures ($b = -.02$, $SE = .04$, $p = .66$) and shame cultures ($b = -.02$, $SE = .04$, $p = .51$) were also not significant on employee deference either. See Table 22 below. In further probing this effect, results indicated that shame culture orientation (i.e., the individual belief in shaming punishments as legitimate) moderated the effect of shame culture on compliance ($b = -.24$, $SE = .07$, $p < .01$), such that shame culture reduces compliance for employees who are low in shame culture orientation ($b = -.24$, $SE = .07$, $p = .00$). However, for individuals high in shame culture orientation, shame culture does not significantly affect compliance ($b = .07$, $SE = .09$, $p = .47$). This effect is illustrated in Figure 2 below.

Insert Table 16 about here

Insert Figure 2 about here

Second, I predicted that shame cultures would have a stronger positive effect on employee anxiety, relative to guilt cultures based on theoretical evidence surrounding the use of

fear escalation in shaming punishments (Nash & Kilday, 2010; Pines, 1995; Stearns, 2017). Outcomes from an OLS regression indicated that neither guilt cultures ($b = -.07$, $SE = .09$, $p = .48$) nor shame cultures ($b = .05$, $SE = .09$, $p = .63$) had a significant relationship with anxiety (See Table 23). Furthermore, a linear hypothesis test revealed that the effect of guilt cultures on anxiety was not significantly different from the effect of shame cultures on anxiety, $F(1, 186) = .81$, $p = .37$. In addition, the results from a relative weight analysis revealed that guilt cultures have a stronger negative effect on employee anxiety ($RW = -71\%$) in comparison to shame cultures ($RW = 30\%$), of the little effect that these cultures have on anxiety ($R^2 = .03$). Altogether, the results suggest that shame cultures have a stronger positive effect on anxiety, relative to guilt cultures, although the difference between their effects is not statistically significant, and their combined effect on anxiety is small.

Insert Table 23 about here

Third, I predicted that shame cultures would be more strongly associated with affective commitment, relative to guilt cultures, owing to the theoretical emphasis on in-group priority in shame cultures (Creighton, 1990; Greenwald & Harder, 1998). Outcomes of an OLS regression indicated that neither guilt cultures ($b = .01$, $SE = .32$, $p = .98$) nor shame cultures ($b = -.04$, $SE = .07$, $p = .59$) had a significant effect on affective commitment (See Table 24). Furthermore, a linear hypothesis test revealed that the effect of guilt cultures on affective commitment did not differ significantly from the effect of shame cultures on affective commitment, $F(1, 186) = .91$, $p = .34$. Interestingly, a relative weight analysis indicated that both guilt and shame cultures negatively impact affective commitment, although to a minimal extent ($R^2 = .01$), with shame cultures having a stronger negative effect on affective commitment ($RW = -97\%$), in comparison

to guilt cultures (RW = -3%). I also discuss this result in the Discussion Section below. Overall, the results indicate that shame cultures have a stronger negative effect on affective commitment relative to guilt cultures, although the effect of shame cultures on the outcome is not statistically different from the effect of guilt cultures.

Insert Table 24 about here

Discussion

This dissertation aimed to develop and validate a scale for guilt and shame cultures in order to empirically test some of the relationships proposed in Paper 1. In particular, this paper examined how guilt and shame cultures correlate with conceptually relevant organizational cultures that make up the nomological network of guilt and shame cultures. These orbiting constructs included cultural tightness-looseness, collectivism, and power distance. Consistent with my hypothesis, the data supported the notion that shame cultures have a stronger positive relationship with cultural tightness relative to guilt cultures. Interestingly, the correlation between both moral emotional cultures and tightness was positive and significant. Consistent with theory on cultural tightness, as an indicator of the “strength of norms” (Gelfand et al., 2006), this finding suggests that stronger guilt and shame cultures positively relate with cultural tightness (Chatman & O’Reilly, 2016). Furthermore, the stronger relationship between shame cultures and tightness (relative to guilt cultures and tightness) is consistent with theory suggesting that social (i.e., collective) expectations are powerful influences on behavior in culturally tight contexts and violators are punished harshly (Gelfand et al., 2006; Gelfand et al., 2011). Given the emphasis on collective expectations guiding behavioral regulation in shame cultures the relative strength of this relationship (empirically) aligns with theory. It is also

important to note that the linear hypothesis test revealed that the difference in effect between guilt and shame cultures on cultural tightness was not statistically significant, although the direction of the effect supported my prediction (i.e., shame culture accounting for greater variance in tightness relative to guilt cultures). Furthermore, the bivariate correlations indicate a weak positive relationship between guilt cultures and tightness and shame cultures and tightness, indicating that these moral emotional cultures are positively related to cultural tightness but also empirically distinct from it.

Contrary to my hypothesis, shame cultures did not have a stronger positive relationship with collectivism, relative to guilt cultures. Indeed, the influence of both cultures on the variance in in-group collectivism was relatively equal. While this finding contradicts my theorizing, it may be understood relative to the population that was sampled for this study. In fact, my theorizing on this hypothesis was based on the assumption of collecting a diverse US sample or multinational sample. However, due to a variety of sampling constraints, the participants from this study were all from regions within mainland China, which is a highly collectivist society (Gelfand et al., 2004; Hofstede, 2001). Since the sample is collectivist at the country level, it is possible that the results might have been different with a more culturally diverse sample, including participants from individualistic societies. In other words, guilt and shame cultures might manifest in a particular way in collectivist cultures that differ from guilt and shame cultures in individualistic cultures. Since the sample only includes members of a collectivist society, it is not possible to assess this effect.

In addition, there might be theoretical reasons why guilt and shame cultures contribute roughly equal variance to collectivism. The theorizing in this paper (and Paper 1) largely assumed that guilt cultures emphasize internal sanctions as guiding self-regulation (Benedict,

1946), suggesting that collective (or group) level forces would not have as strong an influence on individuals in guilt cultures. However, it has also been suggested that in guilt cultures, members internalize collective expectations (Ausubel 1995; Benedict, 1946). Thus, collective expectations that bind members to the group may be relevant in guilt cultures too. Furthermore, because guilt cultures rely primarily on internal sanctions to promote self-regulation, collective norms may indeed be equally, if not more, important in guilt cultures relative to shame cultures (as the data somewhat suggest). In other words, because shame cultures rely more heavily on external (or group) sanctions to regulate behavior, strong cohesion with the group may in fact be as important in shame cultures in comparison to guilt cultures. Thus, it is theoretically possible that collectivism is equally correlated with guilt cultures as it is with shame cultures.

Another theoretical reason why the collectivism hypothesis was unsupported may be related to the nature of collectivism as a construct. Indeed, recent research suggests that collectivism can relate to team-based outcomes in unexpected ways (Chatman, Greer, Sherman & Doerr, 2019). Specifically, this research has shown that collectivism can either improve or hinder team performance depending upon the nature of the task, by blurring distinctions between members. Because guilt and shame cultures are both group level constructs that involve shared assumptions and collective responses to wrongdoing, it may be that the relationship between collectivism and these moral emotional cultures is not as straightforward or simplistic as I initially hypothesized. As the data and theory suggest, guilt and shame cultures may both relate somewhat equally to collectivism, given the inherent collective nature of the constructs.

A methodological reason accounting for the unsupported hypothesis may be attributed to the measurement tool used to capture collectivism in this study. There are many scales to measure collectivism in our literature (Gelfand et al., 2004; Hofstede, 2001; Jackson, Colquitt,

Wesson, & Zapata-Phelan, 2006; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2003), and for the purposes of this study, I decided to use a three-item institutional collectivism scale from the GLOBE study (House et al., 2004), with items including, “In this organization group cohesion is valued more than individualism,” and “In this organization, leaders encourage group loyalty even if individual goals suffer.” However, other scales capture collectivism at the societal level or at the psychological level. Because collectivism has been conceptualized and is measured in a variety of ways, it is possible that an alternative conceptualization of collectivism would more accurately capture the relationship I predicted. Furthermore, the reliability coefficient (i.e., Cronbach alpha) for this measure was low ($\alpha = .52$), falling below the recommended value of .70 (Tavakol & Dennick, 2011). Therefore, exploring the relationship between guilt and shame cultures and collectivism using a different scale to capture collectivism may be an important next step in understanding how these constructs truly relate.

Consistent with my predictions, results from this study provided strong support for the notion that shame cultures have a stronger positive relationship with power distance, relative to guilt cultures. This finding supports evidence that low power distance organizations promote self-management (Hofstede, et al., 1999; Carl, Gupta & Javidan, 2004), which more closely aligns with the regulation by internal standards that is encouraged in guilt cultures. By contrast, high power distance organizations reflect beliefs that certain members ought to dominate others, engendering to expectations that leaders ought to use surveillance and punishment systems to control subordinates (Ball, 2010; Gagné & Bhave, 2011; Schwartz, 2012), which are practices more consistent with a shame culture. Although this finding is consistent with the hypothesis, it is notable that the reliability for this scale fell far below the recommended value. Therefore, it is important to replicate this effect with a Power Distance scale with a higher reliability.

Since the reliabilities for the culture items were all lower than recommended, it is helpful to briefly consider the factors that may have led to these outcomes. Indeed, the GLOBE project scales were designed to replace the original cultural dimension items that were used by Hofstede (House et al., 2003), and specifically to address the poor face validity issues with the Hofstede measures. However, the GLOBE measures have not been widely adopted, as would be expected for a project of such scale, and indeed the items themselves have received criticism from other culture experts (Hofstede, 2006; 2010). In particular, the scales have been criticized for the phrasing essentially requiring participants to serve as cultural experts, rather than creating items that tap into implicit assumptions (Hofstede, 2006). In addition, the GLOBE items ask participants to rate their culture “as is” (i.e., practices) and then as it “should be” (i.e., values), and somewhat counterintuitively these are negatively related in the GLOBE study (Maseland & Van Hoorn, 2009), calling into question what exactly the items are measuring (Hofstede, 2006). Furthermore, the GLOBE divided collectivism into two scales: in group and institutional. Indeed, it is evident that the institutional collectivism scale, which was used for this paper, performed poorly even within the GLOBE study, showing few significant relationships with other variables (Gelfand, Bhawuk, Nishii, & Bechtold, 2003). Overall, there are some evident limitations to the cultural dimension scales taken from the GLOBE study, and thus it would be useful to reassess the nomological validity of the guilt and shame culture scales using alternative measures of the culture constructs.

A central argument of this manuscript is that guilt and shame cultures function primarily to control employee behavior. Surprisingly, the data did not support the hypothesis that guilt and shame cultures discourage organizational deviance. In fact, the two cultures combined explained very little variance in this outcome. There are several reasons, both theoretical and

methodological to explain this result. One possible explanation stems from the measurement of the dependent variable. Measures of organizational deviance were collected via self-report for this study. While self-report is the normative standard for research on organizational deviance (Bennett & Robinson, 2003; Berry et al., 2007), this scale was developed and has primarily been used in a Western (predominantly American) context (Berry et al., 2007). Meanwhile, cross-cultural research indicates that societal culture influences survey response patterns (Dolnicar & Grün, 2007; Ellis & Kimmel, 1992). Deviance is widely regarded as a sensitive topic (Bennett & Robinson, 2000; Berry et al., 2007), which can have the effect of eliciting socially desirable responses. Furthermore, China is regarded as a very culturally tight population (Erikson, et al., 2021; Gelfand et al, 2011; Uz, 2014), meaning that there are very strong norms governing behavior and strict punishments to rule violators (Gelfand et al., 2006; Gelfand et al, 2011). For these reasons, the participants might have felt uncomfortable reporting to the deviance items honestly, thereby biasing the results. Furthermore, if China is a prototypical shame culture, as I and others have theorized (Bedford & Hwang, 2003; Wong & Tsai, 2007), it is possible that participants responded to the deviance items in a shame culture consistent manner, by “concealing” their true deviant behavior through misreporting. Both of these explanations suggest that an inexplicit behavioral measure of deviance, or the use of an objective other reporter, might have been better suited for capturing deviance in this study. Finally, the low ICC(1) values reported in the analysis suggest that the workgroups sampled in this study suffered from low inter-rater agreement, which approximately translates to theoretical definitions of a weak culture (Chatman & O’Reilly, 2016). Prior work has shown that weak cultures are more likely to produce muted or null effects, relative to strong cultures (Lindell & Brandt, 2000).

Therefore, the null effects in this study may be attributed to a weak culture or low consensus about the guilt and shame cultures among workgroup members.

It is also possible that the effects of guilt and shame cultures on deviance depend upon the level of some other variables. Considering theory on person-organization fit (P-O fit), it is possible that guilt and shame cultures are effective at deterring deviance only when the members themselves believe in the validity of these moral emotional cultures. As the two cultures present somewhat opposing (and uncorrelated) approaches to deterring deviance and punishing violations, it is possible that misalignment between members' beliefs about how the culture ought to be and perceptions of how it actually is contaminate the effectiveness of these cultures. In subsequent hypotheses, I discuss the concepts of guilt and shame culture orientations, which reflect individual beliefs surrounding how organizations ought to prevent and punish violations. Individuals with a stronger guilt culture orientation believes violators ought to confess and apologize, and they believe punishments should be carried out in private. Meanwhile an individual with a stronger shame culture orientation believes that hiding and concealment of wrongdoing may signal respect for the sensitivities of the group, and they believe that public punishments can be appropriate. Therefore, if a member with a strong guilt culture orientation works in a group with a strong shame culture orientation, the moral emotional culture of the group may conflict with this members' core beliefs about how norms ought to be reinforced. Consistent with prior research on person-organization fit, the moral emotional culture may fail to achieve its primary aim of deterring deviance for this individual, because the manner of norm enforcement contradicts this member's core beliefs about how behavior should be controlled. Thus, it may be that guilt (shame) cultures deter deviance effectively for members who are high in guilt (shame) culture orientation, but not for those who are low in it.

Another potential moderating variable is group cohesion, which reflects the strength of the bonds between members and the group as a whole (Evans & Dion, 1991; Gully, Devine, & Whitney, 1995). When there is strong group cohesion, individual members feel greater motivation to adhere to the group's normative standards (Greer, 2012). As guilt and shame cultures aim to reinforce adherence to group norms, it may be necessary that the members of the group feel some level of cohesiveness with the group for guilt and shame cultures to have an effect. In other words, if a member feels low motivation to adhere the group's standards, as a baseline, invoking negative moral emotions may have little impact on deterring deviance. Put differently, members who do not care for the group standards to begin with may be equally unmoved by attempts to persuade adherence through negative moral emotional culture, because it may be difficult for these members to imagine feeling guilt or shame for behavior they do not believe are indeed violations. Thus, it is possible that my initial theorizing failed to account for some moderating variable that explains the relationship between guilt and shame cultures and deviance.

The results from this study illustrated that shame cultures indeed have a stronger positive effect on interpersonal deviance relative to guilt cultures, although the effect of shame cultures on interpersonal deviance was not statistically different from the effect of guilt cultures. The direction of this effect is unsurprising because members of shame culture more frequently use public, collective punishments (as opposed to private, one-on-one punishments) to respond to employee deviance. The inclusion of other employees in the punishment of rule-violators can have the effect of subtly endorsing interpersonal deviance among members. In addition, the punishments in shame cultures overlap with specific forms of interpersonal deviance, such as humiliating another member or speaking badly about another member to others (Bennett &

Robinson, 2000, 2003). Meanwhile, guilt cultures emphasize private punishments that aim to respect the anonymity of the violator. As such, employees in guilt cultures are theoretically much less exposed to and involved in the punishment of other members. Overall, promoting interpersonal deviance is clearly related to shame cultures, which managers operating in shame cultures ought to note.

Unethical pro-organizational behaviors include various forms of deviance that operate in the interest of the workgroup. Given the emphasis on protecting image and reputation in scholarship on shame and shame cultures (Nardella, Brammer, & Surdu, 2020; Tanaka, Yagi, Komiya, Mifune, & Ohtsubo, 2015), I hypothesized that shame cultures would have a stronger positive relationship with UPBs relative to guilt cultures. However, results from this study indicated the opposite. This finding is additionally surprising because scholarship on shame and guilt has long regarded guilt as the morally superior emotion of the two (Bedford & Hwang, 2003; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). In addition, empirical evidence from recent organizational research indicates that individuals who are guilt-prone are less likely to engage in absenteeism. In other words, workers who have a stronger tendency to feel the discrete emotion guilt, are less likely to engage in this counterproductive work behavior. Altogether, extant evidence and theorizing suggests that guilt cultures should promote ethical behavior, which makes it all the more surprising that I found essentially the opposite effect. There are a couple methodological and theoretical reasons that might explain this unexpected finding. First, the sample was comprised of members of a shame culture at the national level (i.e., China), whereas prior theory and research has examined Western and mostly American populations. Due to being socialized primarily around shame (rather than guilt) in a shame culture (Ausubel, 1955; Benedict, 1946),

participants in this sample may simply have a less functional response to guilt (relative to shame) based on their national origin and primary moral socialization.

The supplemental analyses for this study revealed additional surprising results. First, I predicted that guilt and shame cultures would positively relate to compliance and deference, given the theorizing that guilt and shame cultures are systems of social control. Similar to the findings on workplace deviance, the study design and measurement of the dependent variable may have biased the outcomes. As mentioned above, the study design relied on self-report, which may have compromised the honesty of participant reporting, given the relatively strong pressures around social desirability in China (Bernardi, 2006; Choi, Lee, Tanaka, & Xu, 2018), and the strong cultural tightness of China, which emphasizes compliance. Overall, social desirability may have resulted in the small amount of variance in the dependent variables (i.e., compliance and deference), thereby making it harder to detect an effect of the predictors in these models.

In addition, the null effects for both guilt and shame cultures suggest that there may be a moderating variable that helps to explain when guilt and/or shame cultures are effective at eliciting compliance and deference in the workplace. In thinking about this question, there may be variables relating to the individual, the leader, or the situation that attenuate this effect. For instance, it may be that individuals with a stronger internal locus of control are more responsive to guilt cultures in deterring deviance (Spector, 1982), given the emphasis in guilt cultures on internal sanctions guiding self-regulation. Likewise, it may be that individuals with a stronger external locus of control are more responsive to shame cultures capacity to deter deviance, given the emphasis on externally imposed punishments in shame cultures (Nash & Kilday, 2010;

Stearns, 2017). Future work may examine moderating variables that unpack when and for whom guilt and shame cultures are effective at discouraging deviance.

The second supplemental analysis found that shame cultures had a stronger positive relationship with employee anxiety, relative to guilt cultures, in alignment with my hypothesis. Consistent with my predictions, anxiety entails a combination of distress, tension, nervousness, apprehension and worry that arises in response to perceived threats within one's environment (Abramson, et al., 1989; Lazarus, 1966; Spielberger, 1983). Further research suggests that these threatening situations can even arise in the workplace, inducing a sense of anxiety that has harmful effects on task performance (Spielberger, 1983). Given that shame cultures employ public punishments that engage other members, it is likely that employees working in strong shame cultures experience greater exposure to punishments, as they are party to the disciplining of their workgroup colleagues. By contrast, guilt culture organizations more readily employ private punishments, meaning that members would not be exposed to a disciplinary measure unless they are employee being punished. In this way, working in a guilt culture organization would expose employees to relatively fewer punishments. Based on this contrast in disciplinary styles, I expected that members of shame cultures would perceive greater threat within their work environments owing to the public nature of punishments, and therefore experience greater anxiety. Meanwhile members of guilt culture organizations would perceive fewer threats in their work environment, owing to the private nature of punishments, and therefore experience relatively less anxiety.

The third supplemental analysis examined the relationship between guilt and shame cultures and affective commitment. Specifically, I theorized that shame cultures would have a stronger positive effect on affective commitment relative to guilt cultures. Interestingly, the data

revealed quite the opposite. Indeed, shame cultures had a stronger negative effect on affective commitment in comparison to guilt cultures, and the effect of both was negative. There are several theoretical reasons that might explain this finding. First, both guilt and shame are negative, self-evaluative emotions (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). In other words, both guilt and shame cultures promote self-regulation and atonement through the anticipation or experience of unpleasant emotional experiences. As prior research indicates that positive emotional cultures predict positive organizational outcomes (Barsade & O'Neill, 2014; O'Neill & Rothbard, 2017), it follows that negative emotional cultures may generally produce negative organizational outcomes, even though these emotions are self-regulatory in focus. Since affective commitment entails positive feelings toward one's workgroup, it is possible that the emphasis on a negative emotion diminishes this effect.

Another reason to explain these surprising effects is that punishments in shame cultures can (and frequently do) involve the public humiliation of members (Nash & Kilday, 2010; Stearns, 2017). Furthermore, watching another person being subjected to public humiliation may in fact, reduce feelings of connectedness to the group. Therefore, the nature of the punishments particularly in shame cultures may induce negative emotions toward the group based on their treatment of the violator, rather than positive emotions, as predicted. In addition, the hypothesized effect did not take into account moderating variables. Indeed, the relationship between guilt/shame cultures and affective commitment might be influenced by an employee's identification with organizational rule violators (Van Knippenberg & Van Schie, 2000), such that members who identify more strongly with violators experience reduced affective commitment in organizations that punish them. Similarly, the employee's guilt or shame culture orientation may also moderate this relationship, such that alignment between workgroup and individual produce

positive effects, whereas misalignment produces negative effects. Since data were collected on guilt and shame culture orientation, I tested these hypotheses. In brief, these analyses revealed significant interaction effects, suggesting that guilt and shame culture orientation moderate this relationship. However, there was no combination that actually enhanced affective commitment. So, in each case, misalignment between culture and orientation significantly reduced affective commitment, but alignment produced a null effect. Finally, the fact that shame is prevalent in certain contexts and commonly used to manage populations does not mean that it is liked or even preferred by members of those populations. In fact, outcomes from this analysis suggest that this may be the case. So, while the use of shame in Chinese organizations may be widespread, members may prefer a culture that lower in this dimension.

Limitations

Despite the strengths of this study, it is not without limitations. Principal among them, the sample for this study would ideally reflect a more cross-cultural population, particularly including members of Western countries, like the United States. A more culturally diverse sample would have the benefit of illuminating how these effects translate into a Western context, and which effects hold or manifest differently, on account of the different national culture.

In addition, the sample was limited in the number of members per workgroup. Of the 189 teams, 97 included only two members. As a result, the inter-rater reliabilities were low, suggesting that the mean of shame culture and guilt culture for the groups was unstable and might shift by adding more members. I attempted to address this concern by exploring the effects only on teams with three or more members; however, the inter-rater reliabilities were even lower for the sample of 97 teams (including 3 or more members). Exploring the results on teams with 4 or more members would have greatly underpowered any analyses. Therefore, a sample that includes more groups with four or more members would ideally yield a higher inter-rater

reliability, thus affording greater confidence in our measure of the guilt and shame culture of the organizations reflected in this sample.

Another limitation to the study was the self-report research design, which has been shown to contribute to common-method bias in data collection (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2012). It is important to note that while this is a concern, the majority of the dependent variables collected are traditionally captured via self-report, due to the private nature of deviant behavior (Bennett & Robinson, 2000; Berry et al., 2007). In addition, I captured the dependent variables at Time 2, separated by one week, an approach which has been shown to reduce the effect of common method variance (Podsakoff, et al., 2012). However, a superior study package might have included some data triangulation or a behavioral measure of deviance in an experiment to address these concerns.

The low reliabilities on some of the culture measures represents another notable methodological limitation to the nomological network study. Indeed, the reliability coefficients for Tightness-Looseness, Power Distance, and Collectivism were below the recommended levels, suggesting that the scales for these constructs were comprised of items with poor inter-relatedness (Tavakol & Dennick, 2011), and a test of intercorrelations between the scale items confirmed that this was indeed the case. The low reliability of these scales may have compromised the results of the analyses that were conducted using them. Thus, the findings on the guilt and shame culture nomological network may not fully or adequately capture how these emotional cultures related to cultural tightness, Power Distance, and Collectivism. Therefore, further research examining these relationships with a more reliable scale for tightness, Power Distance, and Collectivism is an important next step.

Practical Implications

Evidence from this study suggest that guilt and shame cultures exist in organizations at different levels of strength. This finding is important for leaders to be aware that their organizational culture may be strong or weak in either or both of these cultures and that they have implications for important organizational outcomes, including interpersonal deviance, anxiety and UPBs. The strength of certain co-occurring cultures, such as tightness and power distance could give an indication that the organizational culture may also be strong in a shame culture. Therefore, organizations or industries high in tightness and power distance may consider examining the strength of their shame culture and questioning whether it aligns with the organization's values and performance objectives.

Likewise, it is important for leaders to be aware that these cultures are not as useful in eliciting affective commitment or in reducing organizational deviance as I predicted, and as lay theory might suggest. On the contrary, the findings of this study indicate that these cultures have a negative impact on affective commitment and may even enhance interpersonal deviance (for shame cultures) and anxiety (for guilt cultures). These findings bear important practical implications for leaders, as the data reveal that organizations vary in these cultures. For organizations high in either guilt and/or shame cultures, it may benefit leaders to consider how important it is to maintain these cultures and what function they aim to serve. Likewise, if some leaders are consciously developing or maintaining a strong guilt or shame culture, it would benefit them to examine empirically whether or not it is having its intended effect.

For organizations with a strong shame culture, leaders should be aware of the dysfunctional effects of this culture on interpersonal deviance. This may be addressed by intentionally reducing the strength and prevalence of shame culture reinforcing norms. It may also be attenuated by employing a reintegrative approach to shaming (Braithwaite, 1989), which

includes ceremonies of forgiveness and reintegration following a shaming ritual. Likewise, organizational leaders should be wary of adopting or strengthening a guilt or shame culture with the intention of discouraging deviance or promoting compliance, as the data from this study did not support the notion that these cultures are functional in this way. At the least, organizational leaders would need to be wary that the intended functions of these cultures may be conditioned on certain variables that have yet to be fully explored and supported empirically. Overall, the outcomes of this study speak in favor of minimizing these cultures in organizations, until further evidence can specify the precise conditions when guilt and shame cultures are functional in enhancing the target organizational outcomes.

Future Directions

An important future direction of this work is to explore these effects in a Western setting in order to discern which effects are a feature of the Chinese sample, and which effects are a feature of guilt and shame cultures. Indeed, a body of research has emphasized how moral systems in Western and Eastern societies are more heavily influenced by guilt or shame respectively (Ausubel, 1955; Benedict, 2005; Creighton, 1990; Mead, 1930). As a result, members of Western societies cultures are more likely to have been socialized to self-regulate in anticipation (or response) to guilt (Ausubel, 1955), and therefore may display more functional responses to an organizational guilt culture. Similarly, members of shame cultures may have increased exposure to shame through their socialization (Ausubel, 1955; Benedict, 2005), and therefore display more functional responses to shame cultures. Examining these hypotheses among a Western sample may also yield some surprising or contradictory findings, suggesting that guilt and shame cultures might vary in the way they impact organizational members as a function of the broader national culture beyond the organization. In other words, future research

may find that national culture moderates the relationship between guilt/shame cultures and the outcomes examined in this paper.

In addition, this work examined the effect of guilt and shame cultures on various forms of extra-role performance, such as deviance and unethical pro-organizational behavior. However, there are reasons to believe that guilt and shame cultures might also influence in-role performance, such as task performance, creativity, and decision making. Indeed, a body of work has already linked discrete guilt and shame to in-role performance. For instance, studies suggest that discrete guilt can positively impact workplace performance (Grant & Wrzesniewski, 2010), and discrete shame can positively influence creativity (González-Gómez & Richter, 2015). Furthermore, cross-cultural work on shame indicates that the discrete emotion can enhance performance among collectivist populations, but not among individualistic ones (Bagozzi, Verbeke, & Gavino, 2003). Overall, this work suggests that discrete guilt and shame may impact in-role performance, yet it remains unclear precisely when and how. In addition, theoretical work has proposed that guilt cultures may positively influence performance, yet this hypothesis remains empirically untested. Altogether, while prior work has examined the effect of the discrete emotions on in-role outcomes, research has yet to examine the relationship between guilt and shame cultures on performance empirically, even though they have been theorized (Bohns & Flynn, 2013). Therefore, future research should empirically examine the impact of guilt and shame cultures on previously unexplored forms of in-role performance.

Finally, the present study examined other organizational cultures that were likely to co-occur with guilt and shame cultures respectively, such as tightness-looseness, collectivism, and power distance. However, future work might consider other variables at the organizational or industry level that create a context where guilt or shame cultures are most likely to arise and

flourish. For instance, given the emphasis on audience in shame cultures, it is possible that organizational contexts where performance is on display may give rise to shame cultures (such as the Armed Forces or professional sports teams), whereas organizational contexts where performance is largely private may give rise to or reinforce guilt cultures (such as accounting firms or consulting). Likewise, given the relative emphasis on internal (versus external) sanctions in guilt cultures, it may be that guilt cultures are more likely to emerge in contexts where the work is more independent, while shame cultures are more likely to emerge in contexts where the work is interdependent. Altogether, there are features of the work itself that may lend certain professions or industries to develop guilt and/or shame cultures. Future research may benefit from understanding how and why these cultures emerge and crystalize.

A further domain for future research may consider the strength of guilt and shame cultures as they influence in-role and extra-role performance. Indeed, prior scholarship on organizational affective cultures has compared the relative effects of strong versus weak emotional cultures on organizational outcomes (Barsade & O'Neill, 2014; O'Neill & Rothbard, 2017), suggesting a strong precedent to consider culture strength as it relates to organizational outcomes. The findings from this study suggest that weaker (versus stronger) guilt and shame cultures may have the potential to reduce interpersonal workplace deviance and enhance affective commitment.

A final avenue for future scholarship on guilt and shame studies may consider their impact on outcomes at higher levels of analyses. This dissertation has directly examined how guilt and shame cultures influence the behavior of individuals. Yet, as inherently interpersonal and group level phenomena, guilt and shame cultures likely influence outcomes at the group and organizational level as well. Future work may explore how guilt and shame cultures impact team

level performance, decision-making, and creativity, given evidence that organizational and team cultures can function as structural determinants of team outcomes (Shin, Kim, Choi, & Lee, 2016; Yoon, Song, Lim, & Joo, 2010).

Conclusion

In this paper, I developed a scale for measuring guilt and shame cultures in organizations. In addition, this scale development project examined the relationship between guilt/shame cultures and orbiting constructs, including tightness-looseness, collectivism, and power distance to establish their nomological network. Finally, I explored the relative effect of guilt and shame cultures on various organizational outcomes, such as deviance and affective commitment. Overall, this paper laid the groundwork for empirically testing relationships proposed in Paper 1 and expanding the body of knowledge on the impact of guilt and shame cultures in organizations.

Paper 3: The Power of the Public Slap: A Multifaceted Perspective on the Costs and Benefits of Organizational Shaming

Giselle Antoine & Crystal Farh

“We are moral beings to the extent that we are social beings” (Durkheim, 1961, p. 64).

A recent account of prominent Chinese leaders describes how Zhang Ruimin, CEO of Haier, popularized public shaming as a management technique throughout China. In this ritual, poor performers are made to stand before their fellow employees and explain their mistakes (Useem, et al., 2017). Various iterations of this shaming ritual have been documented and proliferated across social media, ranging from harsh and extreme (Paton, 2019; Smith, 2016; You, 2020) to mild and forgiving versions (Green, 2014; Kumarasamy, 2021). Shaming refers to the practice of public, social disapproval meted out by institutional leaders. Shaming engages the participation of multiple parties -- the shamers, the target and the audience. In the shaming ritual, each party has a specific role to play. The shamers issue the punishment, the target endures the humiliation, and the audience amplifies the experience of shame for the target by witnessing their public humiliation. Indeed, public shaming has been used by social groups for centuries and across cultures to punish violators and reinforce group norms (Greenwald & Harder, 1998; Pines, 1995; Stearns, 2017). While the use of shaming in organizations may seem a distant relic of American cultural past, recent manifestations of public shaming have re-emerged in modern Western institutions. Indeed, shaming is on the rise and has been used to address mask-wearing (Martin, 2020; Max, 2020), gender equality (MeToo!, Yanisky-Ravid, 2019), and racial justice violations (BLM, Lalami 2018), suggesting that shaming is not only present, but may even be useful in the modern workplace.

Despite the growing prevalence of this social phenomenon, theory on shaming in organizations is critically underdeveloped. First, from the Western psychological perspective, shaming is largely described as a monolithic and exclusively damaging form of punishment (Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher & Gramzow, 1992). Meanwhile a wide body of historical, ethnographic, and sociological research indicate the social benefits of shaming and centrality of shame among many non-Western moral systems (Ausubel, 1955; Benedict, 1946/2005; Braithwaite, 1989; Lebra, 1983; Mead, 1949; Wong & Tsai, 2007). For instance, in many Eastern cultures having a ‘sense of shame’ indicates an elevated stage of moral development reflecting members’ attentiveness to the rights and sensitivities of their social groups. In these cultures, shaming is a critical mechanism for socializing young people to the norms of the group. Through this lens, Western psychological research may inadequately acknowledge the potential social functions of shaming alongside its costs. In line with this theme, management and psychology research overwhelmingly focus on the experience and effects of shame as a discrete emotion (Tangney, 1995; Tangney & Fischer, 1985; Tangney & Dearing, 2003), and correlate it with a host of negative, dysfunctional outcomes (Tangney, et al., 2014), such as depression (Gilbert, 2000), social anxiety (Matos, Pinto-Gouveia & Gilbert, 2013), narcissism (Lewis, 1992) anger and hostility (Tangney et al., 1992). Altogether this work underscores that, “guilt, not shame, is the moral emotion of choice” (Tangney & Dearing, 2002, p. 136). Yet, very recent work has begun to explore the social learning benefits of observing another individual’s experience of shame (Schaumberg, 2021). Finally, theoretical and empirical work in criminology has examined the impact of shaming on the target (Braithwaite, Ahmed & Braithwaite, 2006; Sherman, Strang & Woods, 2000; Walgrave & Aertsen, 1996). This work illustrates the effectiveness and limitations of shaming punishments in preventing recidivism and eliciting

compliance among shaming targets (Braithwaite, 2000; Garvey, 1998; Harris, 2006; Harris & Maruna, 2005). However, this stream of research overlooks how shaming influences another critical party in shaming rituals: the audience.

The existing gaps in inquiry on shaming in organizations point to several unresolved theoretical tensions in the literature. First, shaming is portrayed as categorically harmful, a point which directly contradicts claims of the social and moral benefits of shame in a number of different cultures (Bagozzi, Verbeke & Gavino, 2003; Bedford & Hwang, 2003; Scheff, 2003; Wong & Tsai, 2007). This limited perspective discounts how shaming has been used throughout history and across cultures as a forceful and functional mechanism of social control (Ausubel, 1995; Burke, 2009; Greenwald & Harder, 1998; Lange, 2007; Nash & Kilday, 2010; Stearns, 2017). Second, research on shaming in management and psychology fail to account for the various forms shaming can take (Braithwaite, 1989). Indeed, ethnographic and sociological studies suggest that shaming assumes multiple forms in many non-Western cultures – including stigmatizing and reintegrative manifestations (Braithwaite, 1989, 2000) – but these nuances are sparingly considered in models of shaming and its effects. Third, much research has explored the impact of shaming on targets, but little has attended to the audience’s perspective. Lay theory has long suggested that witnessing shaming functions as a lesson for observers (Stearns, 2017). By orchestrating a collective emotional response to wrongdoing, shaming actively engages witnesses in the public condemnation. This engagement is designed to influence witnesses emotionally and behaviorally. However, extant research insufficiently attends to the impact of shaming on audience members, and more critically, how witnessing shaming may have implications for organizations.

This study attempts to address these gaps in the shaming literature by presenting a nuanced, social-functional model of shaming in organizations. In particular, I explore the following research questions: *How is shaming effective in discouraging deviance in the audience of shaming rituals? And what specific conditions give rise to shaming's benefits and what conditions amplify its costs?*

To address these questions, I propose two pathways that delineate how shaming impacts audience members' response toward the group and toward the target. The first pathway draws on social control theory, which suggests that members comply with norms to the extent that they are bonded with the social group (Hirschi, 1969/2009). I argue that witnessing shaming is a bonding experience, in that it physically convenes members and collectively engages them in the punishment of a violation. Witnessing the punishment of norm violations reinforces for audience members the value and importance of the group and its cherished norms. Shaming, thus, may increase members' commitment to the group, which in turn reduces deviance from group norms. I further argue that this first pathway depends upon audience members' beliefs about the validity of shaming punishments. Specifically, when members believe that shaming is an appropriate punishment mechanism, witnessing shaming is more likely to reduce deviance among audience members. However, when members believe that shaming is an inappropriate punishment, witnessing shaming may, in turn, increase their deviance.

The second pathway draws on affective social learning theory to illustrate the didactic and moralizing effects of shaming for audience members. Research on affective social learning indicates that members learn how to feel and behave toward targets by observing how high-status members engage with the target and the violation (Bandura & McClelland, 1977; Clément & Dukes, 2017). I argue that witnessing shaming leads audience members to experience

condemning emotions towards the target, and these emotions in turn lead to interpersonal deviance toward the target. I further argue that this second pathway depends upon the form of shaming that is implemented. Integrating research on stigmatizing and reintegrative shaming, I expect that when shaming is stigmatizing, it increases the effects of shaming on deviance toward the target, but when shaming is reintegrative, those effects are diminished. Altogether, this theoretical model illustrates how shaming rituals affect audience members in ways that benefit as well as cost organizations and shows that those benefits and costs depend on characteristics of the audience and on how shaming is implemented.

This work makes several contributions to the literature on shaming in organizations. First, management literature has yet to develop theory on shaming in organizations, despite substantial evidence that shaming occurs in workplaces and is used as a management technique (Green, 2014; Paton, 2019; Smith, 2016; You, 2020). As such, this study expands the narrative on shame in organizations beyond an individual, discrete emotional experience, to consider shaming as an inherently social phenomenon and emotionally binding experience. Second, this theory is among the first to explore the witnessing perspective on shaming. While a wide body of research has attended to the impact of shame and shaming on the target (Harris, 2006; Hay, 2001; Makkai & Braithwaite, 1994; Murphy & Harris, 2007), minimal research has attended to the socialization and moralization effects of witnessing shaming rituals in organizations. By examining shaming from the audience's perspective, this theory advances understanding of the socialization and moralization processes involved in shaming rituals. Third, this theory presents a balanced perspective on shaming in organizations which attempts to account for both its costs and its benefits. In particular, this theory argues that while witnessing shaming can benefit organizations in the form of enhanced commitment to the group and less deviance from group norms, that

benefit can potentially come at the cost of increased condemnation and exclusion of the target. At the same time, I also argue how those benefits and costs might plausibly be reversed by the presence of certain person- and contextual contingencies. Overall, this manuscript enriches understanding of shaming in its various forms to consider both its positive and its harmful manifestations in organizations.

Theoretical Development

Shaming Rituals, Norm Violations & the Audience

Shaming is a collective ritual that publicly punishes the violation of a norm. Throughout this manuscript I use the terms shaming and shaming rituals interchangeably to refer to this phenomenon. Consistent with theory on organizational culture, shaming rituals represent the visible manifestations of a shame culture (Schein, 2017). As a ritual, shaming is recurrently employed as a punishment tactic. Shaming rituals vary in harshness and intensity, ranging from mild and forgiving to severe and stigmatizing.

Chiefly, shaming shines a spotlight on the violation of a cherished norm and makes a spectacle of the punishment process. The violation of cherished norms is thus focal to shaming rituals. Norms describe how organizational members are expected to behave in various contexts (Cialdini, Kallgren & Reno, 1991; Sherif, 1936). Some norms are written into policy, but many are implied (Bicchieri, 2016). Norms indicate the appropriateness of various behaviors, such as how to dress at work, or what is acceptable and unacceptable to say or ask in formal or informal conversation among colleagues. In this way, norms are integral to the culture of a group (Schein, 2017; Sherif, 1936). Norm violations vary widely in their nature and intensity (Bicchieri, 2016). Many violations are minor and may only garner side glances. However, some violations threaten the organization's core values, defy moral standards the organization upholds, or tarnish the organization's reputation and relationships beyond repair. These latter violations are more likely

to elicit shaming responses and may influence the strength of the audience response to the shaming ritual.

Shaming engages the participation of multiple actors. In shaming rituals, the shamers traditionally include authority figures who enact the shaming punishment. The shaming target represents the member who has transgressed and is the focal subject of the punishment. The audience includes organizational members who bear witness to the shaming incident. Historical evidence indicates that the audience plays a significant role in shaming rituals (Stearns, 2017). Their mere presence amplifies the experience of humiliation for the target, and in this way, members participate in the public nature of the ritual (Burke, 2009; Nash & Kilday, 2010; Stearns, 2017). Given their presence in shaming rituals, it is conceivable that witnessing shaming not only affects the target, but the audience too. The following sections describe how bearing witness to shaming impacts witnesses emotionally and behaviorally.

Pathway 1: The Effects of Shaming on Audience Commitment to the Group and Its Norms

Although theory on the effects of shaming rituals is limited, social control theory helps to illuminate how witnessing shaming might affect audience members' commitment to the group (Hirschi, 1969/2009; Nye, 1958; Reckless, 1961). In the study of criminology, social control theory describes the various mechanisms that motivate compliance with group norms and discourage delinquent behavior (Reiss, 1951; Toby, 1957). According to this theory, several elements bind members to the group and subsequently encourage conformity, including member commitment to the group (Hirschi, 1969/2009). Commitment refers to emotional connections that members feel toward their group and members' sensitivity to the group's expectations (Hirschi, 1969/2009). In this theory, I argue the shaming is a socially binding experience for audience members.

Shaming enhances member commitment to the group in several ways. First, by spotlighting a norm violation (Nash & Kilday, 2010), shaming rituals heighten members' awareness of the group's normative expectations. Through this witnessing process, members learn that they must be attuned to the norms of the group, because violations generate a response. In this way shaming sensitizes and socializes members to the norms the group holds dear. By raising members' sensitivity to the weight of the violation, shaming rituals elevate the importance of collective expectations, norm abidance, and membership to the group in the workplace.

Second, by physically convening the group to witness the punishment (Pine, 1995; Stearns, 2017), shaming rituals literally bring people together. Through this process of engaging collective attention (Nash & Kilday, 2010), audience members learn that norm violations are not a matter of individual concern, but of group concern. They learn that violations harm the entire group and therefore garner collective responses. Thus, witnessing shaming binds members to the group in the interest of upholding the violated norms. In addition, shaming underscores that the norms are definitive of the group. To be a member of the audience is to participate in upholding the violated norm by punishing the violation (Nash & Kilday, 2010, Stearns, 2017). By engaging members in the punishment process, shaming rituals realign members' commitment to the observance of the violated norms. In this way, shaming has the potential to enhance member commitment to the group and the violated norm.

H1a: Witnessing shaming is positively associated with commitment to the group.

H1b: Witnessing shaming is positively associated with commitment to the violated norms.

The Mediating Effect of Commitment to the Group and Its Norms on Deviance

Shaming rituals are aimed at reinforcing group norms and subsequently regulating member behavior. According to social control theory, "the essence of internalization of norms

lies in the attachment of the individual to others” (Hirschi, 1969/2009, p. 18). Thus, the stronger the social bonds, the more likely members are to conform to group norms (Hirschi, 1969/2009). According to this theory, deviance and delinquency arise when the bonds between an individual and their social group are weak or broken. Therefore, individuals regulate to the extent that they feel bonded to their social groups (Hirschi, 1969/2009). Members who are sufficiently attached to the group are less likely to deviate from groups’ norms and engage in behavior that is harmful to the group. Since shaming rituals physically bring members together and collectively involve them in the condemnation of a transgression (Nash & Kilday, 2010; Stearns, 2017), witnessing shaming binds members to the group in an effort to rid the group of transgressive behavior. By participating in this socially binding and violation punishing ritual, audience members will be socialized to abide by the group’s norms and avoid deviant behavior that harms the group.

In addition to discouraging deviance toward the group, shaming specifically deters deviance from the norms that were violated. As shaming rituals engage audience members in the collective punishment of the violation, shaming re-instills commitment to the norm. Through this process of encouraging commitment to the violated norms, witnessing shaming realigns audience members’ behavior into conformity with the violated norms. As audience members’ commitment to the violated norms is increased by witnessing shaming of the wrongdoing, they are less likely to engage in behavior that deviates from the norms highlighted in the shaming ritual.

H2a: Commitment to the group mediates the negative relationship between witnessing shaming and organizational deviance.

H2b: Commitment to the group’s norms mediates the negative relationship between witnessing shaming and deviance from the violated norms.

While shaming rituals encourage commitment to the group, witnessing shaming may not influence all members in the same way. It is conceivable that witnessing shaming is especially effective in eliciting commitment and reducing deviance for some members more so than others. According to social control theory, shaming punishments are more effective among some individuals than others. Belief in the validity of the punishment system is a cornerstone to the effectiveness of punishments (Hirschi, 1969/2009). When individuals believe in the validity of shaming punishments, they are more likely to respond favorably to witnessing them. In understanding individual variation in responsiveness to witnessing shaming punishments, I introduce shame and guilt culture orientations as moderating variables.

The Moderating Effect of Shame Culture Orientation on Commitment to the Group and Its Norms

Shame culture orientation reflects individual beliefs that norm violators should feel shame for their wrongdoing and should be shamed publicly as part of the redemption process. Thus, some individuals believe that shaming is the appropriate mechanism for addressing norm violations. This variation in orientation depends upon upbringing, individual values, and the culture of the organization. Individuals who are higher in shame culture orientation are more likely to endorse and respond positively to witnessing shaming punishments, as these punishments affirm their individual beliefs about how violations ought to be addressed.

When individuals believe in the moral validity of a punishment, witnessing this punishment affirms their beliefs in the group and its values (Hirschi, 1969/2009). Thus, when organizational members believe in the moral validity of a shame culture, witnessing shaming should affirm their belief that the group and its punishment system are legitimate. For these individuals, witnessing shaming is more likely to have a functional impact and enhance their

commitment to the group and the violated norms. However, some individuals believe that norm violators should not feel ashamed of themselves and should not be publicly shamed for their wrongdoings (i.e., individuals with low shame culture orientation). For individuals who are low in shame culture orientation, witnessing shaming is less likely to be effective, because it does not align with their beliefs about how norm violations ought to be punished (Hirschi, 1969/2009). For these individuals, witnessing shaming is less likely to enhance commitment to the group. Thus, the effectiveness of witnessing shaming in binding the individual to the group and norm is dependent upon the witness's belief regarding the appropriate way to punish norm violations.

H3a: Shame culture orientation moderates the relationship between witnessing shaming and commitment to the group such that when shame culture orientation is higher, witnessing shaming increases audience member commitment to the group, but when shame culture orientation is lower, witnessing shaming has a weaker positive effect on audience member commitment to the group.

H3b: Shame culture orientation moderates the relationship between witnessing shaming and commitment to the violated norms such that when shame culture orientation is higher, witnessing shaming increases audience member commitment to the violated norms, but when shame culture orientation is lower, witnessing shaming has a weaker positive effect on audience member commitment to the violated norms.

The Moderated Mediation Effect of Shame Culture Orientation on Deviance

Based on the theory and arguments presented above, I expect that shame culture orientation will moderate the indirect effect of witnessing shaming on deviance through commitment. This is because members with high shame culture orientation are more likely to respond to witnessing shaming with stronger commitment to the group and the violated norms

(relative to members with low shame culture orientation) (Hirschi, 1969/2009; Nye, 1958).

Consistent with the social binding aspect of social control theory (Hirschi, 1969/2009), I expect that audience member deviance from the group and the violated norms will be weaker for members higher in shame culture orientation, because of their relatively stronger commitment to the group and the violated norms (relative to members low in shame culture orientation). So, it is expected that members with high shame culture orientation will respond to witnessing shaming with reduced deviance toward the group and the violated norms through stronger commitment to the group and the violated norms (in comparison to members low in shame culture orientation).

H4a: Shame culture orientation moderates the indirect negative relationship between witnessing shaming and workgroup deviance through commitment to the group, such that this indirect relationship is stronger when shame culture orientation is higher, and this relationship is weaker when shame culture orientation is lower.

H4b: Shame culture orientation moderates the indirect negative relationship between witnessing shaming and deviance from the violated norms through commitment to those norms, such that this indirect relationship is stronger when shame culture orientation is higher, and this relationship is weaker when shame culture orientation is lower.

The Moderating Effect of Guilt Culture Orientation on Commitment to the Group and Its Norms

Guilt culture orientation reflects individual beliefs that norm violators ought to feel guilty about their wrongdoing and should be addressed and reprimanded in private. Thus, some individuals not only dislike shaming punishments, but also prefer an entirely different form of punishment altogether (i.e., private punishments). Private punishments are a cornerstone of the guilt culture orientation, as they protect the integrity and dignity of the violator. By addressing

the violation in private, management is able to punish the wrongdoing, without personally incriminating and publicly humiliating the wrongdoer.

Individuals high in guilt culture orientation expect the violator to put themselves through their own internal moral reckoning (i.e., guilty feelings), endure a private punishment and ideally apologize voluntarily and sincerely. As such, individuals high in guilt culture orientation are likely to perceive shaming rituals as inappropriate, and they may even consider shaming to be unjust. For these individuals, witnessing shaming may even decrease their sense of closeness and attachment to the group, from watching the group participate in an activity that is directly at odds with their own beliefs about how punishments ought to be enacted (Hirschi, 1969, 2009). Thus, I expect individuals high in guilt culture orientation will feel less committed to the group and the violated norms as a result of witnessing shaming. In comparison, individuals low in guilt culture orientation do not believe feeling guilty (for the violator) or private punishments are essential to the redemption and retribution process. Therefore, when individuals low in guilt culture orientation witness shaming, it will have a weaker negative effect on their commitment to the group and the norm, because the punishment process does not strongly violate their beliefs about how wrongdoers ought to be reprimanded.

H5a: Guilt culture orientation moderates the relationship between witnessing shaming and commitment to the group such that when guilt culture orientation is higher, witnessing shaming diminishes member commitment to the group, but when guilt culture orientation is lower, witnessing shaming has a weaker negative effect on audience member commitment to the group.

H5b: Guilt culture orientation moderates the relationship between witnessing shaming and commitment to the violated norms such that when guilt culture orientation is higher,

witnessing shaming diminishes member commitment to the violated norms, but when guilt culture orientation is lower, witnessing shaming has a weaker negative effect on audience member commitment to the violated norms.

The Moderated Mediation Effect of Guilt Culture Orientation on Deviance

Similar to the moderated mediation effect of shame culture orientation, I expect that guilt culture orientation will moderate the indirect effect of witnessing shaming on deviance through commitment. Consistent with the social binding aspect of social control theory (Hirschi, 1969/2009), I expect that members higher in guilt culture orientation are more likely to respond to witnessing shaming with weaker commitment to the group and the violated norms (relative to members low in guilt culture orientation). Concurrently, audience member deviance is expected to be greater for members higher in guilt culture orientation, because of their relatively weaker commitment to the group and the violated norms (relative to members low in guilt culture orientation). So, it is expected that members with higher guilt culture orientation will respond to witnessing shaming with greater deviance toward the organization and the violated norms based on their weak commitment to the group and the violated norms (in comparison to members lower in guilt culture orientation).

H6a: Guilt culture orientation moderates the indirect positive relationship between witnessing shaming and workgroup deviance through commitment to the group, such that this indirect relationship is stronger when guilt culture orientation is higher, and this relationship is weaker when guilt culture orientation is lower.

H6b: Guilt culture orientation moderates the indirect positive relationship between witnessing shaming and deviance from the violated norms through commitment to those

norms, such that this indirect relationship is stronger when guilt culture orientation is higher, and this relationship is weaker when guilt culture orientation is lower.

Pathway 2: The Effects of Shaming on Condemning Moral Emotion toward the Target and the Violation

Shaming rituals are designed not only to penalize the target, but also to teach a lesson to the audience – and this lesson is instilled emotionally. By engaging observers in an emotionally intense experience, I argue that public shaming functions as a didactic and moralizing experience for audience members. So what lessons are the audience meant to learn?

According to affective social learning theory, individuals learn the appropriate way to feel and behave toward targets in their environment through a social and emotional referencing process. Specifically, individuals socially appraise and reference high status members to guide their own feelings and behavior toward the target (Clément & Dukes, 2017). Social appraisal and social referencing describe, “sensitivity to the use of another person’s appraisal of a situation to evaluate an event or an object” (Clément & Dukes, 2017, p. 257). As described above, multiple parties are present and engaged in the shaming ritual, including the target, the shamers and the audience. As the shamers issue the punishment to the target, audience members’ attention in the shaming ritual is divided between the shamers and the target, a form of social referencing called “natural pedagogy.”

As leaders in the group, the shamers model and exemplify the values and norms of the group. In shaming the target and spotlighting the transgression, the shamers not only punish the violation, but also teach witnesses how members of this group ought to feel and respond to this target and such transgressions. Thus, shaming is not only a mechanism for punishment, but also a platform for edifying and moralizing the audience. Indeed, research on shaming describes it as a

social convention that “conveys moral condemnation” (Karp, 1998, p. 278). In addition, condemning moral emotions, including contempt, anger, and disgust, are the prototypical emotional responses to another person’s transgression (Haidt, 2003). Theory suggests that shaming rituals are as much about the anger of the shamers as they are about the shame of the target (Stearns, 2017).

Thus, displays of condemning moral emotion are common in shaming rituals, and these displays may have an edifying impact on the audience. By observing how superiors feel toward targets and transgressions, observers learn expected scripts for feelings and internalize the normative expectations of the context. Theory and research on emotional contagion further confirm the ripple effect of observing others’ emotions in a social setting (Barsade, 2003). In particular, this research affirms the socialization effect of leader emotions in leader-follower interactions (Halverson, 2004; Volmer, 2012). Additional research suggests that this affective social learning process extends to moral evaluations. Observing a superior’s moral judgments of a target can socially influence the observer’s own moral judgments and behavioral responses (Bandura, 1969; Bandura & McDonald, 1963).

In the case of a public shaming, audience members observe management’s emotional response to a violation and the target. Observers’ appraisal of the shaming response signals how members ought to feel about the violation and respond to the target. Consistent with theory on moral emotions, shaming frequently entails a condemning emotional reaction to the target such as anger, contempt, or disgust (Greenbaum et al., 2019; Haidt, 2003; Tangney, Rozin, et al., 1999; Stearns, 2017; Stuewig & Mashek, 2007). Thus, management’s expression of condemning emotion is central to the shaming ritual and part of the intended lesson for the audience. The intense emotional reaction underscores that a cherished norm has been violated that warrants the

group's collective attention and emotional response. Through a social appraisal process, witnesses observe management's negative emotional response and learn to feel condemning emotions in response to the violation and toward the target.

H7a: Witnessing shaming is positively associated with condemning moral emotion toward the target.

H7b: Witnessing shaming is positively associated with condemning moral emotion toward the violation.

The Mediating Effect of Condemning Moral Emotional Response toward the Target

In addition to teaching the audience how to feel, shaming rituals instruct the audience on how they ought to behave. Affective social learning theory indicates that observers learn both emotional and behavioral responses from their social appraisal and referencing of superiors (Clément & Dukes, 2013). In shaming rituals, the audience witnesses the shamers' emotional responses in addition to their treatment of the target. The social interaction between the shamers and the target instructs the audience on how members ought to treat targets. Furthermore, decades of research on action tendencies indicate that certain behaviors naturally extend from particular discrete emotional experiences (Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005; Frijda, 1987; Roseman, Wiest & Swartz, 1994). In particular, this research indicates that condemning moral emotions frequently result in a host of negative behaviors directed at the target -- including negative character judgements and social distancing from the violator (Greenbaum et al., 2019). Thus, when individuals discern that a member has engaged in transgressive behavior, social exclusion and maltreatment are likely to result from the condemning moral emotions. By observing management's condemning moral emotions toward the target, the audience learns that mistreating the offender is an appropriate behavioral response. Thus, condemning moral emotion

in response to witnessing shaming is likely to result in the audience members engaging in interpersonal deviance toward the target.

H8a: Condemning moral emotion toward the target mediates the positive relationship between witnessing shaming and interpersonal deviance toward the target.

The Mediating Effect of Condemning Moral Emotional Response toward the Violation

In addition to punishing the target, shaming rituals principally spotlight the violation of a cherished norm. Indeed, shaming rituals are incited by violations and are therefore responses to transgressive behavior (Stearns, 2017). Thus, shaming is a ceremony and display of condemning the violation (Braithwaite, 1989). Drawing on affective social learning theory (Clément & Dukes, 2013), I argue that shaming serves a didactic and moralizing function for audience members by instructing them to feel condemning moral emotion toward the violation. Consistent with the condemning response to the target, internalizing negative emotion toward the violation motivates distancing from the transgressive behavior. Thus, through a process of engaging with the condemning response of shamers (i.e., affective observation), witnesses learn to feel negatively toward the violation and to avoid engaging in it. In this way, witnessing shaming is a mechanism for internalizing the norms and deterring deviant behavior. By witnessing the shamers' emotional and behavioral response toward the transgression and feeling the condemnation toward the violation, witnesses learn that the transgression is wrong and that they should avoid participating in it.

H8b: Condemning moral emotion toward the violation mediates the negative relationship between witnessing shaming and deviance from the violated norms.

According to affective social learning theory, observers learn how to feel and behave toward targets based on how the target is treated by higher-status members (Clément & Dukes,

2017). Specifically, the valence of the interaction between high status members and the target and violation signals to observers that negative behavioral and emotional responses to the target and violation are appropriate (Clément & Dukes, 2013; Gibson & Walk, 1960). Since audience members learn how to respond emotionally to the target and violation by witnessing shaming, it is conceivable that the nature of the shaming can modify and socially influence the observers' emotional and behavioral reactions. While shaming is frequently typified as an exclusively harmful punishment, ethnographic research indicates that shaming in many non-Western cultures assumes multiple forms (Braithwaite, 2000). Specifically, theory and research distinguish shaming that is stigmatizing in nature from shaming that is reintegrative (Braithwaite, 1989, 2000). I argue that this distinction will moderate the effects of witnessing shaming on condemning moral emotions felt toward the target and the violation.

The Moderating Effect of Stigmatizing Shaming on Condemning Moral Emotion

According to this theory, stigmatization is a form of shaming that treats the target as a bad person who is likely to transgress again. Consistent with the traditional descriptions of shaming, stigmatization expresses condemning moral emotion toward the target as a person and involves negative judgments about the type of person the target is (Losoncz & Tyson, 2007). Therefore, this form of shaming expresses the general idea that the target is bad because of some inherent trait (as opposed to something they have done) (Braithwaite, 1989). In doing so, stigmatization implies that the targets themselves are the ultimate source of the problem. For instance, a manager might shame an employee for making a sexist joke. If the shaming is stigmatizing, it would implicate the target as a misogynist, and imply that the target is unlikely to ever reform his views and alter his behavior.

In addition, stigmatizing shaming signals that the violation is highly egregious in nature, to the extent that the violation is irredeemable (Braithwaite, 2000). Thus, highly stigmatizing shaming models and instructs strong condemnation of the target and the violation. When members witness this form of shaming, they observe the strong condemnation modeled by the shamers and learn that condemning moral emotions are the appropriate response to the target and the violation. However, when the shaming does not implicate the target as an irredeemably bad person or the violation as unforgivable, witnessing shaming is less likely to elevate condemning moral emotion toward the target and the violation.

H9a: The relationship between witnessing shaming and condemning moral emotion toward the target is moderated by the stigmatizing nature of the shaming. When shaming is highly stigmatizing, witnessing shaming is more positively associated with condemning moral emotion toward the target. When shaming is minimally stigmatizing, witnessing shaming will have a weaker positive effect on condemning moral emotion toward the target.

H9b: The relationship between witnessing shaming and condemning moral emotion toward the violation is moderated by the stigmatizing nature of the shaming. When shaming is highly stigmatizing, witnessing shaming is more positively associated with condemning moral emotion toward the violation. When shaming is minimally stigmatizing, witnessing shaming will have a weaker positive effect on condemning moral emotion toward the violation.

The Moderated Mediation Effect of Stigmatization on Deviance

Based on the arguments above, I expect that stigmatization will moderate the indirect effect of witnessing shaming on interpersonal deviance through condemning moral emotion.

Prior theorizing suggested that stigmatization emphasizes that the target is an irredeemably bad person (Braithwaite, 1989; Harris, 2006). As such, witnessing stigmatization communicates strong condemnation of the target. Drawing on the pedagogical line of affective social learning theory (Clément & Dukes, 2013; Parkinson, 2011), when a witness observes public shaming that is highly stigmatizing, they are more likely to feel greater condemning moral emotion toward the target. In addition, I expect that audience member deviance toward the target will be stronger when the shaming highly stigmatizes the target, because of elevated condemning moral emotion expressed and experienced toward the target (relative to shaming that minimally stigmatizes the target). Thus, it is expected that witnessing stigmatizing shaming will result in greater deviance toward the target through stronger condemning moral emotion (in comparison to low stigmatization). However, when the shaming is minimally stigmatizing, witnessing the shaming would have a weaker positive effect on condemning moral emotion toward the target, and thus, witnesses would be less likely to mistreat the target (in comparison to witnesses of highly stigmatizing shaming).

Similarly, I expect that stigmatization will moderate the indirect effect of witnessing shaming on deviance from the norm through condemning moral emotion toward the violation. Prior theorizing suggested that stigmatization emphasizes that the violation is egregious and warrants a forceful, collective response (Braithwaite, 1989). As such, witnessing stigmatization communicates strong condemnation of the violation. Consistent with affective social learning theory (Clément & Dukes, 2013), when a witness observes public shaming that is highly stigmatizing, they are more likely to feel greater condemnation toward the violation through emotional convergence (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1993) and develop the sense that this violation deserves a strong response. In addition, I expect that audience member deviance from

the norm will be lower when the shaming highly stigmatizes the target, because of elevated condemning moral emotion expressed toward the target and the violation (relative to shaming that minimally stigmatizes the target). So, it is expected that witnessing stigmatizing shaming will result in reduced deviance from the norm through stronger condemning moral emotion of the violation (in comparison to low stigmatization). However, when the shaming is minimally stigmatizing, witnessing the shaming would have a weaker positive effect on condemning moral emotion toward the violation, and thus, witnesses would be relatively more likely to deviate from the norm (in comparison to witnesses of highly stigmatizing shaming).

H10a: The nature of shaming moderates the indirect positive relationship between witnessing shaming and target-focused interpersonal deviance through condemning moral emotion toward the target, such that this indirect relationship is stronger when the shaming is highly stigmatizing, and this relationship is weaker when the shaming is minimally stigmatizing.

H10b: The nature of shaming moderates the indirect positive relationship between witnessing shaming and deviance from the violated norms through condemning moral emotion toward the violation, such that this indirect relationship is stronger when the shaming is highly stigmatizing, and this relationship is weaker when the shaming is minimally stigmatizing.

The Moderating Effect of Reintegrative Shaming on Condemning Moral Emotion

As suggested above, not all shaming is stigmatizing in nature. Theory indicates that reintegrative shaming makes a public spectacle of the violation without stigmatizing the target (Braithwaite, 1989, 2000). According to this theory, reintegrative shaming reassures the target that they are trusted despite the wrong done. In addition, reintegrative shaming includes

restoration ceremonies in which the violator is publicly forgiven and harmony between members is restored (Braithwaite, 1989; Harris, 2006). As such, enactment of reintegrative shaming entails compassionate and forgiving emotional responses by the shamers. By modeling a forgiving emotional response toward the target, the shamers instruct the audience to respond to targets with reduced condemning moral emotion, consistent with affective social learning theory (Clément & Dukes, 2013; Veissière, Constant, Ramstead, Friston, & Kirmayer, 2020). However, when shaming is minimally reintegrative, the diminishing effect on condemning moral emotion is likely to be less pronounced, on account of observers not witnessing a reintegrative approach to the public disapproval.

An important feature of reintegrative shaming is that it focuses the public disapproval on the violation as being bad, without stigmatizing the target as being irredeemably flawed (Braithwaite, 2000). So, although reintegrative shaming has a negative effect on condemning emotion toward the target, it has a positive effect on condemning emotion toward the violation. While stigmatization incriminates the target, reintegrative shaming “dramatizes the evil,” while forgiving and restoring the integrity of the target (Braithwaite, 1989, p. 17). In this way, reintegrative shaming aims to separate the wrong from the wrongdoer and focus the shaming more so on the violation than the target (Braithwaite, 2000). Thus, the negative emotional response of the shamers in reintegrative shaming communicates strong condemnation of the violation, even though the shamers do not so strongly condemn the target. So, by witnessing reintegrative shaming, the audience members are instructed to feel condemning moral emotion specifically toward the violation.

H11a: The relationship between witnessing shaming and condemning moral emotion toward the target is moderated by the reintegrative nature of the shaming. When shaming

is highly reintegrative, witnessing shaming is more negatively associated with condemning moral emotion toward the target. When shaming is minimally reintegrative, witnessing shaming will have a weaker negative effect on condemning moral emotion toward the target.

H11b: The relationship between witnessing shaming and condemning moral emotion toward the violation is moderated by the reintegrative nature of the shaming. When shaming is highly reintegrative, witnessing shaming is more positively associated with condemning moral emotion toward the violation. When shaming is minimally reintegrative, witnessing shaming will have a weaker positive effect on condemning moral emotion toward the violation.

The Moderated Mediation Effect of Reintegrative Shaming on Interpersonal Deviance

Based on the theorizing above, I expect that reintegrative shaming will moderate the indirect effect of witnessing shaming on interpersonal deviance through condemning moral emotion toward the target. Hypothesis 9a suggested that high reintegration emphasizes that the target is ultimately forgiven, despite the wrong done. As such, highly reintegrative shaming communicates forgiveness of the target (Braithwaite, 1989; Harris, 2006). Drawing on affective social learning theory (Clément & Dukes, 2013), when a witness observes public shaming that is very reintegrative, they are much less likely to feel strong condemning moral emotion toward the target. In addition, I expect that audience member deviance toward the target will be weaker when the shaming maximally reintegrates the target, because of the diminished condemning moral emotion experienced toward the target (relative to shaming that minimally reintegrates the target). That is, it is expected that witnessing reintegrative shaming will result in lower deviance toward the target through weaker condemning moral emotion (in comparison to low

reintegration). In other words, consistent with affective theory (Clément & Dukes, 2013; Dukes & Clément, 2019), witnessing a more forgiving form of shaming should instruct observers to also treat the violators in a forgiving and compassionate manner. However, when the shaming is minimally reintegrative, witnessing shaming would not reduce condemning moral emotion toward the target as much, and thus, witnesses would be slightly more likely to display deviance toward the target (in comparison to witnesses of highly reintegrative shaming).

H12a: The nature of shaming moderates the indirect negative relationship between witnessing shaming and target-focused interpersonal deviance through condemning moral emotion toward the target, such that this indirect relationship is stronger when the shaming is highly reintegrative and this relationship is weaker when the shaming is minimally reintegrative.

The Moderated Mediation Effect of Reintegrative Shaming on Deviance from the Violated Norms

Based on theorizing above, I expect that reintegrative shaming will moderate the indirect effect of witnessing shaming on deviance from the violated norms through condemning moral emotion toward the violation. As argued earlier, high reintegration dramatizes the evil, while forgiving the target (Harris, 2006; Losoncz & Tyson, 2007). As such, highly reintegrative shaming communicates strong condemnation of the violation. Consistent with affective social learning theory (Dukes & Clément, 2019), observing a leader exhibit a gentle response to a violation, should socially reinforce this response. Therefore, when a witness observes public shaming that is very reintegrative, they are much less likely to feel strong condemning moral emotion toward the violation. As such, I expect that audience member deviance from the violated norms will be weaker when the shaming is maximally reintegrative, because the strong

condemning moral emotion directed at the violation reinforces this response for organizational members through a socialization process. So, it is expected that witnessing reintegrative shaming will result in lower deviance from the violated norms through stronger condemning moral emotion toward the violation (in comparison to low reintegration). However, when the shaming is minimally reintegrative, witnessing shaming would not increase condemning moral emotion toward the violation as much, and thus, witnesses would be slightly more likely to display deviance from the violated norms (in comparison to witnesses of highly reintegrative shaming). The complete hypothesized model is illustrated in Figure 3 below.

H12b: The nature of shaming moderates the indirect negative relationship between witnessing shaming and deviance from the violated norms through condemning moral emotion toward the violation, such that this indirect relationship is stronger when the shaming is highly reintegrative and this relationship is weaker when the shaming is minimally reintegrative.

Insert Figure 3 about here

Methods

Study 1

I tested the hypothesized moderated mediation model using a time-separated survey study design focusing on witnessing shaming in a consequential setting. Participant responses were collected over three time periods to address common method variance (Podsakoff et al., 2003). The time point capturing for each variable is indicated along with each scale and in Figure 4 below.

Insert Figure 4 about here

Sample and Study Design

I initially proposed to use a panel data collection agency to recruit approximately 500 employees who were employed in the Armed Forces at the time of the survey. I selected this industry because I expected that shaming would be particularly relevant and prevalent in the Armed Forces, based on prior research indicating a strong culture of honor in the Armed Forces (Kirkland, 2003), paired with the complementary nature of honor and shame cultures (Leung & Cohen, 2011). In addition, anecdotal evidence suggests that shaming and related abusive punishments are frequently employed in the Armed Forces (Zellars, Tepper & Duffy, 2002).

Based on my proposed sampling technique, I reached out to two independent panel data collection companies (Qualtrics and ROI). However, the quotes for collecting the proposed sample far exceeded my research budget for this dissertation. While a grant might have provided the necessary funds, that approach would have required delaying data collection by months. In fact, the grant proposals that I did submit specifically for funding did not yield any funding. Given the cost limitation to this data collection approach, I turned to Prolific to attempt to collect data from a sample of participants who were employed in the Armed Forces. This approach also faced limitations due to available sample size. At Time 2 of this data collection, I was only able to collect 26 participants, which was not a large enough sample size to run the analyses. As an additional measure, I attempted to recruit a sample through the Armed-Forces listserv of a university in the northwestern region of the United States. Similar to the initial data collection attempt, this approach yielded too few responses to analyze ($n = 5$).

Following two unsuccessful attempts to access a sample of Armed Forces service workers, I decided to broaden my sampling technique to include a wider range of industries,

beyond the Armed Forces. Prior to recruiting this sample, I pilot tested the shaming and guilt scales on a sample of full-time working adults from a range of industries (including retail, hospitality, healthcare, broadcasting, and construction) that I recruited from Prolific. This sample included 99 participants. For this pilot test, I asked participants to reflect on the culture of their organizations, and then respond to the guilt culture and shame culture items. I also included adapted items for shaming and guilt relating to Paper 3 of this dissertation for this study in order to economize sampling between Papers 2 and 3. In addition, I asked them to respond to a series of open-ended questions, including, “Recall an instance in the last 12 months when you witnessed a member of your workgroup being disciplined in public for a major violation. What was the violation?,” and “Describe how the member was punished.” To determine the most appropriate framing for the question prompt, I examined the standard deviation of shame culture from the Prolific Broad industries sample ($SD = 1.29$), which revealed that sampling full-time workers from a breadth of industries on Prolific could yield sufficient variance in the independent variable (i.e., shaming and shame culture). Therefore, I proceeded to collect data from Prolific, targeting workers from a range of industries. Participants were asked to respond to Time 1 items at the start of the study, which asked them to describe in writing an incident when they witnessed shaming in their workgroup. Then, after a week, they received an email invitation to participate in Time 2, and again at Time 3. In order to facilitate participants’ recollection of the shaming incident, violated norms, and punishment they described at Time 1, their descriptive responses were piped into the Time 2 and Time 3 surveys immediately above the relevant questions. Participants who did not respond to the Time 2 or Time 3 survey received one email reminder after two days. This process yielded a final sample of 179 participants at three time

points with an average age of 33 and an average tenure of 6.28 years. Fifty-five percent of the sample was male.

As the data collection for Paper 2 shared a significant overlap in variables, I also decided to include the scales for this study in the data collection effort for Paper 2, which was a sample of full-time workers in China employed across a spread of industries and geographic regions. The employees were recruited with the help of 18 research assistants using the WeChat platform, which is similar to Facebook in China, but includes more controls that allow researchers to ensure that the individuals being sampled are actual people and not bots. Each assistant was asked to recruit up to 20 focal participants from a spread of industries and geographic regions to complete two surveys separated by one week. An initial sample of 217 participants joined the WeChat group. Due to attrition and failed attention checks, the final sample included 197 participants, with an average age of 32.77 years old and an average tenure of 6.99 years. Sixty-nine percent of the sample was female and 50.25% were employed in the private sector. Similar to the Prolific sample, participants from China were asked the same set of questions at Time 1, then after a week, they were invited to respond to Time 2, and a week later to Time 3 items.

The time-separated research design was proposed with the express intention of reducing common method variance, which is the variance associated with the measurement method as opposed to the constructs under study (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Due to the consistency motifs and consistency effects attributed to common raters, we sometimes observe artifactual covariances between variables due to participants' efforts to maintain consistency in survey responses (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977). Time-separation has been noted as a technique to control for common method variance (Podsakoff et al., 2003). According to temporal separation, a time-lag is introduced between the measurement of the independent and

dependent variables. This lapse in time helps to create some psychological separation between the measurement of these variables, so that participants are less susceptible to consistency motifs in their responses¹.

Obtaining other-rater responses is another common technique for addressing common method variance. However, given the nature of the dependent variables in this model, I determined that other-rater responses would not be the best solution to the common method variance concerns. Recent meta-analytic studies on organizational deviance indicate that this construct is overwhelmingly captured through self-report from the focal employee (Berry, Ones & Sackett, 2007; Mackey et al., 2021). Due to the sensitive nature of the construct and the likelihood that most deviant behaviors are enacted in private, it would be difficult for anyone other than the focal employee to accurately rate their deviance. Therefore, following empirical precedent, I employed a time-separated self-report survey design for this study.

Measures

Witnessing Shaming. The extent to which management in the organization uses shaming as a punishment was captured using an adapted version of the scale developed in Paper 2 at Time 1. Unlike the global measure of shame culture that was captured in Paper 2, this adapted scale measured a specific incident of shaming, as observed by the member (i.e., witness). Focal employees responded to the 4-item scale. Participants responded to the following statement: “Indicate to what extent have you witnessed management engage in the following.” Sample items included: “People are publicly shamed as punishment for wrongdoing,” and “When

¹ In addition to time separation, I collected all independent variables, mediators, and moderators at Time 1. Then, I collected all mediators, moderators, and dependent variables at Time 2. Finally, at Time 3, I collected the dependent variables again. Collecting the mediators and dependent variables at multiple time points allowed me to control for the Time 1 mediators, when I assessed the relationship between the independent variables and the Time 2 mediators. Similarly, I controlled for Time 2 dependent variables when I assessed the relationship between the mediators and the Time 3 dependent variables.

employees break a rule the punishment is carried out in public” (See Appendix E for the full list of all survey items).

Workgroup Commitment. Commitment to the group was captured using a validated 6-item scale (Vandenberghe, Bentein, & Stinglhamber, 2004) at Time 1 and Time 2. Focal employees indicated their own commitment to the group. Sample items included: “I really feel a sense of ‘belonging’ to my work group,” and “I feel proud to be a member of my work group.”

Violated Norm Commitment. Commitment to the violated norms was captured using an adapted 9-item scale for goal commitment (Hollenbeck, Williams & Klein, 1989; Klein et al., 2001) at Time 1 and Time 2. Focal employees indicated their own commitment to the norm that was violated. Sample items included: “I am strongly committed to following this norm,” and “I am willing to put in a great deal of effort beyond what I normally do to follow this norm.”

Shame Culture & Guilt Culture Orientation. Shame and guilt culture orientations were captured at Time 1 using the scale developed in Paper 2. The focal employee responded to the items based on the following question: “To what extent do these statements accurately describe your beliefs about what ought to happen when an employee violates an important norm?” Sample items for shame culture orientation included: “When employees break rules, the punishment should be carried out in public,” and “People are expected to feel shame when they have been caught doing something wrong.”

Condemning Moral Emotion (Anger/Disgust/Contempt toward the target and violation). Condemning moral emotion felt toward the target and the violation was measured using the validated negative discrete emotions scale (Fredrickson, Tugade, Waugh, & Larkin, 2003) at Time 1 and Time 2. Focal employees responded to the following instructions: “Rate how you felt/feel about the norm violator/violation,” based on a 5-point scale (1 = slightly to not at all, 5 =

extremely). Sample items for disgust, anger, and contempt included: “contemptuous,” “angry,” “disgusted,” “revulsion,” and “disdain.”

Stigmatizing and Reintegrative Shaming. The extent to which shaming was stigmatizing or reintegrative was captured using a validated 11-item scale (Losoncz & Tyson, 2007) from the focal employee perspective at Time 1. Sample items for stigmatization included: “To what extent does management show disappointment in the employee as a person,” and “To what extent does management treat the employee like a criminal.” Sample items for reintegrative shaming included: “To what extent does management let the employee know in some way that they are still trusted,” and “To what extent does management forgive the employee after a while.”

Deviance from the violated norms. Employee deviance from the violated norms was captured by the focal employee using an adaptation of a validated measure on organizational compliance (Tyler & Blader, 2005) at Time 2 and Time 3. Sample items from the deviance scale included: “I comply with work related rules and regulations regarding the norms that were violated,” and “I follow established policies regarding the norms that were violated.”

Organizational and Interpersonal Deviance. Deviance was captured by the focal employee using a validated 7-item scale (Bennett & Robinson, 2000) at Time 2 and Time 3. Sample items for interpersonal deviance included: “acted rudely toward someone at work,” and “publicly embarrassed someone at work.” Sample items for the organizational deviance scale included: “taken property from work without permission,” and “taken an additional or longer break that is acceptable at your workplace.”

Control Variables

I also captured participant age, gender, and tenure as control variables at Time 1, as previous research indicates a relationship between these variables and deviant behavior (Giordano, Cernkovich, & Rudolph, 2002; Greenberg, 1985; Lochner, 2011; Oz, 2001). In

addition, for the sample from China, I captured whether the participant was employed in the public or private sector, as China has a large public sector, and the distinction between public and private sectors was deemed as meaningful and relevant to the hypotheses by my collaborator located in China.

In order to estimate the impact of shaming over and above the effects of a guilt-based punishment, I included a measure of guilt, as a control variable in all the analyses. The measure for guilt was developed from an adapted version of the guilt culture scale I developed in Paper 2. Furthermore, given that shaming shares some elements in common with abusive supervision (Martinko, Harvey, Brees, & Mackey, 2013; Tepper, 2000), a five-item established measure was also included as a robustness check in all the analyses that produced significant effects (Tepper, 2000)².

Additional Research Questions

In addition to the hypotheses described above, I tested alternative additional moderating effects and pathways that I suspected might bear relevance to witnessing shaming rituals. The purpose of including these supplemental analyses was to provide a fuller picture of how and when witnessing shaming influences audience members. As I explain below, I explored two macro-factors that I suspected might impact all the pathways hypothesized in this study. In addition, I examined two alternative pathways that I wanted to account for in order to demonstrate the unique effects of shaming over and above witnessing punishments in general.

² As described previously, all analyses were also run including time controls, such that Time 1 mediators were included as controls for Time 2 mediators, and Time 2 dependent variables were included as controls for Time 3 dependent variables.

Shame Culture or Guilt Culture

First, drawing on reintegrative shaming theory, I expected that shaming punishments would be particularly influential in eliciting social binding and norm compliance in the context of a shame culture. As detailed in Papers 1 and 2, a shame culture represents an organizational affective culture in which norms are frequently enforced using shaming and where public shaming is the typical punishment for norm violations. According to reintegrative shaming theory, shaming punishments are most impactful in encouraging social binding when the members of the group share a common and cohesive set of values (Braithwaite, 1989). In addition, reintegrative shaming theory derives from ethnographic research of shame cultures in which shaming punishments are functional in encouraging compliance and discouraging deviant behavior (Braithwaite, 2000). Altogether, in a shame culture, members expect to see shaming punishments and may be more rehearsed and socialized in how they ought to respond as audience members to shaming rituals. Therefore, I anticipated that when shame culture is higher, the social bonding and compliance outcomes would be most pronounced (i.e., relative to when the shame culture of the organization is lower). Put simply, I expected that a higher shame culture would strengthen all the relationships in the hypothesized model. In contrast, I expected that a guilt culture would inversely affect the outcomes of witnessing shaming. In a guilt culture, norm violators are typically addressed via private punishments. Thus, witnessing shaming in a guilt culture would most likely violate the normative expectations of the group around how transgressions ought to be punished. In this case, witnessing shaming would diminish members feeling socially bound to the group and result in less compliance.

Shame Culture & Guilt Culture were measured based on the scales developed in dissertation Paper 2 at Time 1. Sample items for shame culture included: “It is common to

publicly humiliate employees for violating a norm,” and “Norms are enforced by making an example of the people who violate them.” Sample items for guilt culture included: “People are privately reprimanded for wrongdoing,” and “It is common to privately confront employees for violating a norm.”

Nature of the Transgression

The hypothesized model did not directly specify the nature of the norm violation. However, I expected that the benefits and costs of shaming would vary as a function of nature of the transgression. Specifically, I anticipated that when the norm violation was perceived to be especially egregious or damaging to the reputation of the group, witnessing shaming would have a stronger and more positive effect on social binding, condemning moral emotion, and their related dependent variables. However, when the transgression was perceived to be mild by the audience members, witnessing shaming would likely not strengthen these relationships and might even diminish them.

Moral Intensity was measured using the validated 13-item scale (Barnett et al., 1999) at Time 1. Participants responded to items based on a 9-point scale. Sample items for recognition of a moral issue included: “Do you believe that there is a moral or ethical issue involved in the violation?” (1 = completely disagree, 9 = completely agree). Sample items for social consensus included: “I believe society as a whole considers the violation wrong.” A sample item for seriousness of consequences included: “I believe any harm resulting from the violation will be severe.”

Self-Evaluation Response

In addition to evoking social binding and condemning moral emotion, I expected that witnessing shaming would elicit self-evaluative responses among witnesses. According to social

comparison theory, individuals routinely compare themselves to others in their environment as a means of self-evaluation (Festinger, 1957). Witnessing the shaming of another member very likely encourages audience members to self-evaluate whether or not they are guilty of the same transgression. Consistent with social comparison theory, I expected that this effect would be especially pronounced when the audience members saw themselves as being very similar to the shaming target(s). As such, I measured vicarious self-evaluative emotion (i.e., guilt and shame) in addition to perceived similarity to shaming target(s). Extending this pathway, I expected that increased self-evaluative emotions would lead to greater withdrawal, as withdrawal is a prototypical behavioral response to feelings of shame (Tangney & Dearing, 2002).

Shame/Guilt was captured by the focal (witness) employee using a validated measure (Fredrickson et al., 2003) at Time 1 and Time 2. Participants were asked to reflect on the following statement, “Consider how you felt while you are witnessing another member being shamed by management.” Items included: “ashamed,” “humiliated,” and “disgraced.”

Similarity was captured by the focal (witness) employee using a validated measure (Liden, Wayne & Stilwell, 1993) at Time 1. Sample items included: “I think the target(s) and I are alike in a number of ways” and “The target(s) and I are similar in terms of our outlook, perspective and values.”

Withdrawal was captured by the focal (witness) employee using a validated measure (Lehman & Simpson, 1992) at Time 2 and Time 3. Sample items included: “Thoughts of being absent,” “Put less effort into your job that you should have,” and “Thoughts of leaving your current job.” An alternative measure included items from the withdrawal dimension of the Compass of Shame Scale (CoSS). Sample items included: “I avoid management,” “I want to run away,” and “I remove myself from the situation.”

Empathic Response

Finally, I anticipated that witnesses to shaming would experience some empathic response toward the shaming target. Based on the social interaction theory of emotion, emotional expressions in interpersonal settings commonly evoke complementary and reciprocal emotional responses from others in the vicinity (Kemper, 1978). According to this theory, anger responses from one party evoke fear responses from targets and witnesses (Keltner & Haidt 1999). Likewise, expressions of pain and suffering evoke emotional responses like empathy and compassion. Based on the reciprocal nature of emotions, I expected that witnessing shaming would likely evoke feelings of fear and anxiety toward the shamers. In addition, I expected that witnessing shaming would likely evoke other-suffering emotions, such as compassion and pity toward the shaming target (Greenbaum, et al., 2019). Furthermore, I anticipated that the emotional responses of witnesses are somewhat dependent upon the degree of identification witnesses share with the target. When witnesses identify with the targets, they are more likely to experience witnessing the shaming as a threat and punishment to themselves. So, in cases where the witness felt a high degree of identification with the target, I expected that high identification will strengthen the relationship between witnessing shaming and fear (toward the shamers) and compassion (toward the targets). However, when the witnesses felt minimal identification with the target, this would weaken the relationship between witnessing shaming and fear (toward the shamers) and compassion (toward the targets).

Extending these relationships, I expected that employee compassion would result in helping behavior toward the shaming target. A wide body of research on emotions suggests that other-suffering moral emotions frequently result in helping behavior.

Compassion was captured by the focal (witness) employee based on a validated measure (Fredrickson et al., 2003) at Time 1 and Time 2. Participants responded to the statement: “Please rate how you feel toward the target,” based on the following items: “sympathy,” “concerned,” and “compassion.”

Identification was captured by the focal (witness) employee based on a validated measure (Shamir et al., 1998) at Time 1 and Time 2. Participants were asked to consider their workgroup. Sample items included: “I identify strongly with the members,” and “The members are like family to me.”

Helping was captured by the focal (witness) employee based on a validated OCBI measure (Lee & Allen, 2002) at Time 2 and Time 3. Sample items included: “I would help the target,” “I would assist the target with their tasks,” and “I would show genuine care and concern for the target.”

Analyses

Prior to running analyses, I cleaned the data by removing participants who failed attention checks. In addition, I examined means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations between variables to check for any irregularities (Bedian, 2014). Furthermore, I examined alpha coefficients and scree plots for all variables to examine the internal consistency of the scales included in the analyses (Cortina, 1993). This process did not yield any irregularities, so I proceeded with the analyses. To test the direct effects and interactions hypothesized in this paper, I used ordinary least squares regression analyses (Cohen, Cohen, Aiken, & West, 2008). When examining interactions, I mean-centered the predictor variables prior to including them in the regression equation in order to facilitate interpretation of the coefficients (Dalal & Zickar, 2012). To test the hypothesized moderated mediation effects, I followed a structural equation modeling (SEM) path analysis including the relevant interaction terms in the equation (Tabachnick &

Fidell, 2018; Wright, 1921)³. Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations for both samples are presented separately in Tables 25 - 30.

Insert Tables 25 through 30 about here

Results

All the hypotheses and related results are summarized in Table 31.

Insert Table 31 about here

Commitment to the group. Hypothesis 1a predicted that witnessing shaming would be positively associated with commitment to the group. Results from an ordinary-least squares (OLS) regression analysis on the sample from China revealed that witnessing shaming was not significantly associated with commitment to the group ($b = .03$, $SE = .06$, $p = .67$) after accounting for the effects of the control variables. Results from this analysis can be viewed on Table 32. Likewise, results from an ordinary-least squares regression analysis on the Western sample revealed that witnessing shaming was not significantly associated with commitment to the group ($b = -.01$, $SE = .07$, $p = .84$) after accounting for the effects of the control variables. Results from this analysis can be viewed on Table 32.

Insert Table 32 about here

³ As proposed, I included Time 1 mediators and Time 2 dependent variables as controls, in addition to the demographic control variables specified above (age, gender, tenure, and public/private institution). Since results showed that the Time 1 mediators and Time 2 dependent variables overwhelmingly washed away any effects of the Time 2 mediators and Time 3 dependent variables, I present the findings for below with and without the time controls.

Commitment to the norms. Hypothesis 1b predicted that witnessing shaming would be positively associated with commitment to the violated norms. Results from an ordinary-least squares regression analysis on the sample from China revealed that witnessing shaming was not significantly associated with commitment to the violated norms ($b = .01$, $SE = .07$, $p = .84$) after including the control variables in the regression equation. Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 33. In contrast, results from an ordinary-least squares regression analysis on the Western sample showed that that witnessing shaming had a significant negative effect on commitment to the violated norms ($b = -.13$, $SE = .06$, $p = .049$) after including the control variables in the regression equation. When I include abusive supervision as an additional control variable and robustness check, this result becomes insignificant ($b = -.11$, $SE = .07$, $p = .09$). Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 33. I discuss this surprising finding in the Discussion Section.

Insert Table 33 about here

The mediating effect of commitment to the group. Hypothesis 2a predicted that commitment to the group would mediate the negative relationship between witnessing shaming and organizational deviance. Results from a mediation analysis using the PROCESS macro in r (Hayes, 2022) on the sample from China revealed that commitment to the group did not significantly mediate the relationship between witnessing shaming and organizational deviance ($b = -.004$, $SE = .01$, 95% CI [-.026, .018]) after controlling for the effects of the other variables. Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 34. Similarly, results from the Western sample indicated that commitment to the group did not significantly mediate the relationship between witnessing shaming and organizational deviance ($b = .0007$, $SE = .005$, 95% CI [-.007, .012])

after controlling for the effects of the other variables. Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 34.

Insert Table 34 about here

The mediating effect of commitment to the norms. Hypothesis 2b predicted that commitment to the violated norms would mediate the negative relationship between witnessing shaming and deviance from the norms. Results from a mediation analysis on the sample from China revealed that commitment to the violated norms did not significantly mediate the relationship between witnessing shaming and deviance from the norms ($b = .004$, $SE = .03$, 95% CI [-.038, .047]) after accounting for the effects of the other variables. Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 35. In addition, results from the Western sample showed that commitment to the violated norms did not significantly mediate the relationship between witnessing shaming and deviance from the violated norms ($b = -.032$, $SE = .02$, 95% CI [-.079, -.003]) after accounting for the effects of the control variables. Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 35.

Insert Table 35 about here

The moderating effect of shame culture orientation on commitment to the group. Hypothesis 3a predicted that shame culture orientation would moderate the relationship between witnessing shaming and commitment to the group such that when shame culture orientation was higher, witnessing shaming would increase audience member commitment to the group, but when shame culture orientation was lower, witnessing shaming would have a weaker positive

effect on audience member commitment to the group. Results from an ordinary-least squares regression analysis on the sample from China revealed that shame culture orientation did not significantly moderate the effect of witnessing shaming on commitment to the group ($b = .07$, $SE = .05$, $p = .13$) after accounting for the effects of the control variables. Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 36. Similarly, results from the Western sample showed that that shame culture orientation did not significantly moderate the effect of witnessing shaming on commitment to the group ($b = .09$, $SE = .05$, $p = .10$) after accounting for the effects of the control variables. Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 36.

Insert Table 36 about here

The moderating effect of shame culture orientation on commitment to the norms.

Hypothesis 3b predicted that shame culture orientation would moderate the relationship between witnessing shaming and commitment to the violated norms such that when shame culture orientation was higher, witnessing shaming would increase audience member commitment to the violated norms, but when shame culture orientation was lower, witnessing shaming would have a weaker positive effect on audience member commitment to the violated norms. Results from an ordinary-least squares regression analysis on the sample from China revealed that shame culture orientation did not significantly moderate the effect of witnessing shaming on commitment to the norms ($b = .04$, $SE = .05$, $p = .41$) after including the control variables in the regression equation. Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 37. In contrast, results from the Western sample indicated that shame culture orientation significantly moderated the effect of witnessing shaming on commitment to the norms ($b = .14$, $SE = .05$, $p = .009$) after including the control variables in the regression equation. This effect even remained significant after adding abusive

supervision as an additional control variable in a robustness check ($b = .13$, $SE = .05$, $p = .01$). Results of this analysis can be viewed in Table 38. In order to probe the significant interaction, I ran a simple slopes analysis (Aiken & West, 1996), which revealed that witnessing shaming significantly reduces norm commitment for individuals who are lower (i.e., minus 1 SD) or average (i.e., at the mean) in shame culture orientation ($b = -.33$, $SE = .09$, $p = .00$; $b = -.15$, $SE = .07$, $p = .03$, respectively). Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 31 and the interaction plot can be viewed in Figure 6 below. I discuss this point further in the Discussion Section.

Insert Table 37 and Table 38 about here

Insert Figure 6 about here

The moderated mediation effect of shame culture orientation on organizational deviance.

Hypothesis 4a predicted that shame culture orientation would moderate the indirect negative relationship between witnessing shaming and workgroup deviance through commitment to the group, such that this indirect relationship would be stronger when shame culture orientation was higher, and this relationship would be weaker when shame culture orientation was lower. Results from a SEM path analysis on the sample from China revealed that shame culture orientation did not significantly moderate the indirect effect of witnessing shaming on workgroup deviance through commitment to the group ($b = -.01$, $SE = .009$, 95% CI [-.029, .006]) after accounting for the effects of the control variables. Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 39. Results from the Western sample indicated that shame culture orientation did not significantly moderate the indirect effect of witnessing shaming on workgroup deviance through commitment

to the group ($b = -.004$, $SE = .005$, 95% CI [-.016, .002]) after accounting for the effects of the control variables. Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 39.

Insert Table 39 about here

The moderated mediation effect of shame culture orientation on norm deviance.

Hypothesis 4b predicted that shame culture orientation would moderate the indirect negative relationship between witnessing shaming and deviance from the violated norms through commitment to those norms, such that this indirect relationship would be stronger when shame culture orientation was higher, and this relationship would be weaker when shame culture orientation was lower. Results from an SEM path analysis on the sample from China revealed that shame culture orientation did not significantly moderate the indirect effect of witnessing shaming on deviance from the norms through commitment to those norms ($b = -.007$, $SE = .018$, 95% CI [-.025, .046]) after including the control variables in the regression equation. Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 40. However, results from the Western sample indicated that shame culture orientation significantly moderated the indirect effect of witnessing shaming on deviance from the violated norms through commitment to those norms ($b = -.03$, $SE = .016$, 95% CI [.007, .069]) after accounting for the effects of the control variables. Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 40. This effect remained significant even after including abusive supervision as an additional control variable in a robustness check ($b = .03$, $SE = .02$, 95% CI [.001, .073]). Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 41. In particular, the conditional indirect effects revealed that witnessing shaming significantly increased norm deviance via norm commitment for individuals who were lower in shame culture orientation (i.e., minus 1 SD), or average in shame culture orientation (i.e., at the mean) ($b = .08$, $SE = .03$, 95%

CI [-.152, -.022]; $b = .05$, $SE = .03$, 95% CI [-.109, -.009] respectively). Meanwhile witnessing shaming did not significantly impact norm deviance for those individuals who were high in shame culture orientation ($b = -.003$, $SE = .023$, 95% CI [-.046, .046]). The discrepancy between the samples is discussed in the Discussion Section below.

Insert Tables 40 and 41 about here

The moderating effect of guilt culture orientation on commitment to the group.

Hypothesis 5a predicted that guilt culture orientation would moderate the relationship between witnessing shaming and commitment to the group such that when guilt culture orientation was higher, witnessing shaming would diminish member commitment to the group, but when guilt culture orientation was lower, witnessing shaming would have a weaker negative effect on audience member commitment to the group. Results from an ordinary-least squares regression analysis on the sample from China revealed that guilt culture orientation did not significantly moderate the effect of witnessing shaming on commitment to the group ($b = -.07$, $SE = .06$, $p = .26$) after accounting for the effects of the control variables. Results from this analysis can be viewed on Table 42. Similarly, results from an ordinary-least squares regression analysis on the Western sample revealed that guilt culture orientation did not significantly moderate the effect of witnessing shaming on commitment to the group ($b = .07$, $SE = .08$, $p = .43$) after accounting for the effects of the control variables. Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 42.

Insert Table 42 about here

The moderating effect of guilt culture orientation on commitment to the norms.

Hypothesis 5b predicted that guilt culture orientation would moderate the relationship between witnessing shaming and commitment to the violated norms such that when guilt culture orientation was higher, witnessing shaming would diminish member commitment to the violated norms, but when guilt culture orientation was lower, witnessing shaming would have a weaker negative effect on audience member commitment to the violated norms. Results from an ordinary-least squares regression analysis on the sample from China revealed that guilt culture orientation did not have a significant moderating effect on the relationship between witnessing shaming and commitment to the norms ($b = -.04$, $SE = .06$, $p = .49$) after including the control variables in the regression equation. Results from this analysis can be viewed on Table 43.

Results from the Western sample revealed that guilt culture orientation did not have a significant moderating effect on the relationship between witnessing shaming and commitment to the norms ($b = -.06$, $SE = .08$, $p = .46$) after including the control variables in the regression equation.

Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 43.

Insert Table 43 about here

The moderated mediation effect of guilt culture orientation on organizational deviance.

Hypothesis 6a predicted that guilt culture orientation would moderate the indirect positive relationship between witnessing shaming and workgroup deviance through commitment to the group, such that this indirect relationship would be stronger when guilt culture orientation was higher, and this relationship would be weaker when guilt culture orientation was lower. Results from an SEM path analysis on the sample from China revealed that guilt culture orientation did not significantly moderate the indirect effect of witnessing shaming on organizational deviance

through commitment to the group ($b = .01$, $SE = .01$, 95% CI [-.010, .033]) after accounting for the effects of the control variables. Results from this analysis can be viewed on Table 44.

Similarly, results from the Western sample indicated that guilt culture orientation did not significantly moderate the indirect effect of witnessing shaming on organizational deviance through commitment to the group ($b = -.004$, $SE = .007$, 95% CI [-.019, .010]) after accounting for the effects of the control variables. Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 44.

Insert Table 44 about here

The moderated mediation effect of guilt culture orientation on norm deviance. Hypothesis 6b predicted that guilt culture orientation moderates the indirect positive relationship between witnessing shaming and deviance from the violated norms through commitment to those norms, such that this indirect relationship would be stronger when guilt culture orientation was higher, and this relationship would be weaker when guilt culture orientation was lower. Results from an SEM path analysis on the sample from China revealed that guilt culture orientation did not significantly moderate the indirect effect of witnessing shaming on deviance from the norms through commitment to those norms ($b = .03$, $SE = .03$, 95% CI [-.081, .025]) after including the control variables in the regression equation. Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 45. Likewise, results from the Western sample indicated that guilt culture orientation did not significantly moderate the indirect effect of witnessing shaming on deviance from the norms through commitment to those norms ($b = .02$, $SE = .02$, 95% CI [-.071, .018]) after including the control variables in the regression equation. Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 45.

Insert Table 45 about here

Pathway 2

Condemning emotion toward the target. Hypothesis 7a predicted that witnessing shaming would be positively associated with condemning moral emotion toward the target. Results from an ordinary-least squares regression analysis on the sample from China indicated that witnessing shaming was not significantly associated with condemning emotion toward the target ($b = -.03$, $SE = .07$, $p = .67$) after accounting for the effects of the control variables. Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 46. Similarly, results from the Western sample showed that witnessing shaming was not significantly associated with condemning emotion toward the target ($b = .05$, $SE = .07$, $p = .47$) after accounting for the effects of the control variables. Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 46.

Insert Table 46 about here

Condemning emotion toward the violation. Hypothesis 7b predicted that witnessing shaming would be positively associated with condemning moral emotion toward the violation. Results from an ordinary-least squares regression analysis on the sample from China revealed that witnessing shaming was not significantly associated with condemning emotion toward the violation ($b = .04$, $SE = .07$, $p = .54$) after including the control variables in the regression equation. Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 47. Likewise, results from the Western sample showed that witnessing shaming was not significantly associated with condemning emotion toward the violation ($b = .11$, $SE = .07$, $p = .11$) after including the control variables in the regression equation. Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 47.

Insert Table 47 about here

The mediating effect of condemning emotion toward the target. Hypothesis 8a predicted that condemning moral emotion toward the target would mediate the positive relationship between witnessing shaming and interpersonal deviance toward the target. Results from a mediation analysis on the sample from China indicated that condemning emotion toward the target did not significantly mediate the relationship between witnessing shaming and interpersonal deviance ($b = -.003$, $SE = .008$, 95% CI $[-.018, .013]$) after including the control variables. Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 48. Results from the Western sample revealed that condemning emotion toward the target did not significantly mediate the relationship between witnessing shaming and interpersonal deviance ($b = -.002$, $SE = .005$, 95% CI $[-.015, .005]$) after controlling for the effects of the other variables. Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 48.

Insert Table 48 about here

The mediating effect of condemning emotion toward the violation. Hypothesis 8b predicted that condemning moral emotion toward the violation would mediate the negative relationship between witnessing shaming and deviance from the violated norms. Results from a mediation analysis on the sample from China revealed that condemning moral emotion toward the violation did not significantly mediate the relationship between witnessing shaming and deviance from the norms ($b = .002$, $SE = .005$, 95% CI $[-.015, .009]$) after accounting for the effects of the other variables. Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 49. Similarly,

results from the Western sample showed that condemning moral emotion toward the violation did not significantly mediate the relationship between witnessing shaming and deviance from the norms ($b = -.004$, $SE = .006$, 95% CI $[-.007, .019]$) after accounting for the effects of the other variables. Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 49.

Insert Table 49 about here

The moderating effect of stigmatizing shaming on condemning emotion toward the target.

Hypothesis 9a predicted that the relationship between witnessing shaming and condemning moral emotion toward the target would be moderated by the stigmatizing nature of the shaming. Specifically, I predicted that when shaming was highly stigmatizing, witnessing shaming would be more positively associated with condemning moral emotion toward the target; and when shaming was minimally stigmatizing, witnessing shaming would have a weaker positive effect on condemning moral emotion toward the target. Results from an ordinary-least squares regression analysis on the sample from China revealed that stigmatizing shaming significantly moderated the effect of witnessing shaming on condemning emotion toward the target ($b = -.09$, $SE = .05$, $p = .047$) after accounting for the effects of the control variables. Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 50. In order to probe this interaction effect, I ran a simple slopes analysis, which revealed that witnessing shaming significantly reduced negative emotion toward the target when the shaming was highly stigmatizing (i.e., 1 *SD* above the mean) ($b = -.19$, $SE = .07$, $p = .01$); however the effect of shaming on negative emotion toward the target was not significantly affected at lower levels of stigmatization (i.e., 1 *SD* below the mean) ($b = .04$, $SE = .11$; $p = .72$). This effect became marginally significant after including abusive supervision as an additional control in a robustness check ($b = -.09$, $SE = .05$, $p = .056$). Results from this analysis

can be viewed in Table 51. This interaction can be viewed in Figure 7 below. Interestingly, results from this same analysis on the Western sample indicated that stigmatizing shaming did not significantly moderate the effect of witnessing shaming on condemning emotion toward the target ($b = .03$, $SE = .05$, $p = .54$) after accounting for the effects of the control variables, and this effect remained insignificant after including Time 1 condemning emotion toward the target as an additional control ($b = .02$, $SE = .03$, $p = .56$). Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 50. I discuss discrepancies between these samples in the Discussion Section.

Inserts Table 50 and 51 about here

Insert Figure 6 about here

The moderating effect of stigmatizing shaming on condemning emotion toward the violation. Hypothesis 9b predicted that the relationship between witnessing shaming and condemning moral emotion toward the violation would be moderated by the stigmatizing nature of the shaming. In particular, I hypothesized that when shaming was highly stigmatizing, witnessing shaming would be more positively associated with condemning moral emotion toward the violation; however, when shaming was minimally stigmatizing, witnessing shaming would have a weaker positive effect on condemning moral emotion toward the violation. Results from an ordinary-least squares regression analysis on the sample from China revealed that shame culture orientation significantly moderated the effect of witnessing shaming on condemning emotion toward the violation ($b = -.16$, $SE = .05$, $p < .001$) after including the control variables in the regression equation, and this effect remained significant after controlling for condemning emotion toward the violation at Time 1 ($b = -.11$, $SE = .04$, $p = .007$). Results from this analysis

can be viewed in Table 52. In addition, this effect remained significant even after including abusive supervision as a robustness check ($b = -.15$, $SE = .05$, $p = .001$). Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 53. Following the advice of Aiken and West (1996), a simple slopes analysis revealed that shaming had a positive, marginally significant enhancing effect on condemning emotion toward the violation when the shaming was minimally stigmatizing (i.e., minus 1 *SD* below the mean) ($b = .22$, $SE = .11$, $p = .05$), and shaming had a significant reducing effect on negative emotion toward the violation when the shaming was highly stigmatizing (i.e., plus 1 *SD* above the mean) ($b = -.17$, $SE = .07$, $p = .02$). In other words, minimally stigmatizing shaming marginally enhanced negative emotion toward the violation, while highly stigmatizing shaming reduced negative emotion toward the violation. Despite the significant effect found with the sample from China, results from the Western sample showed that stigmatization did not significantly moderate the effect of witnessing shaming on condemning emotion toward the violation ($b = .06$, $SE = .05$, $p = .25$) after including the control variables in the regression equation. Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 52.

Insert Tables 52 and 53 about here

Insert Figure 7 about here

The moderated mediation effect of stigmatization on interpersonal deviance. Hypothesis 10a predicted that the nature of shaming would moderate the indirect positive relationship between witnessing shaming and target-focused interpersonal deviance through condemning moral emotion toward the target, such that this indirect relationship would stronger when the

shaming was highly stigmatizing, and this relationship would be weaker when the shaming was minimally stigmatizing. Results from an SEM path analysis on the sample from China revealed that stigmatization did not significantly moderate the indirect effect of witnessing shaming on interpersonal deviance through condemning emotion toward the target ($b = -.009$, $SE = .005$, 95% CI $[-.020, .001]$) after accounting for the effects of the control variables. Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 54. Likewise, results from the Western sample revealed that stigmatization did not significantly moderate the indirect effect of witnessing shaming on interpersonal deviance through condemning emotion toward the target ($b = -.002$, $SE = .004$, 95% CI $[-.012, .004]$) after accounting for the effects of the control variables. Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 54.

Insert Table 54 about here

The moderated mediation effect of stigmatization on norm deviance. Hypothesis 10b predicted that the nature of shaming would moderate the indirect positive relationship between witnessing shaming and deviance from the violated norms through condemning moral emotion toward the violation, such that this indirect relationship would be stronger when the shaming was highly stigmatizing, and this relationship would be weaker when the shaming was minimally stigmatizing. Results from an SEM path analysis on the sample from China revealed that stigmatization did not significantly moderate the indirect effect of witnessing shaming on deviance from the norms ($b = -.006$, $SE = .008$, 95% CI $[-.010, .021]$) after including the control variables in the regression equation. Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 55. Similarly, results from the Western sample indicated that stigmatization did not significantly moderate the indirect effect of witnessing shaming on deviance from the norms ($b = -.002$, $SE =$

.004, 95% CI [-.003, .014]) after including the control variables in the regression equation. Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 55.

Insert Table 55 about here

The moderating effect of reintegrative shaming on condemning emotion toward the target. Hypothesis 11a predicted that the relationship between witnessing shaming and condemning moral emotion toward the target would be moderated by the reintegrative nature of the shaming. Specifically, I hypothesized that when shaming was highly reintegrative, witnessing shaming would be more negatively associated with condemning moral emotion toward the target. However, when shaming was minimally reintegrative, witnessing shaming would have a weaker negative effect on condemning moral emotion toward the target. Results from an ordinary-least squares regression analysis on the sample from China revealed that reintegration significantly moderated the effect of witnessing shaming on condemning moral emotion toward the target ($b = .12$, $SE = .05$, $p = .01$) after accounting for the effects of the control variables. Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 56. This effect remained significant even after including abusive supervision as an additional control variable in a robustness check ($b = .12$, $SE = .05$, $p = .01$). Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 57. A simple slopes analysis on this interaction effect (Aiken & West, 1996) revealed that witnessing shaming marginally reduced negative emotion toward the target, when the shaming was minimally reintegrative (i.e., minus 1 SD) ($b = -.15$, $SE = .08$, $p = .07$); however, witnessing shaming did not significantly impact condemning emotion toward the target at higher levels of reintegration (i.e., plus 1 SD) ($b = .15$, $SE = .10$, $p = .12$). In contrast, results from the Western sample indicated that reintegration did not significantly moderate the effect of witnessing shaming on condemning moral emotion

toward the target ($b = .01$, $SE = .05$, $p = .81$) after accounting for the effects of the control variables. Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 56.

Inserts Table 56 and 57 about here

Insert Figure 8 about here

The moderating effect of reintegration on condemning emotion toward the violation.

Hypothesis 11b predicted that the relationship between witnessing shaming and condemning moral emotion toward the violation would be moderated by the reintegrative nature of the shaming. Specifically, I predicted that when shaming was highly reintegrative, witnessing shaming would be more positively associated with condemning moral emotion toward the violation. However, when shaming was minimally reintegrative, witnessing shaming would have a weaker positive effect on condemning moral emotion toward the violation. Results from an ordinary-least squares regression analysis on the sample from China revealed that reintegration had a significant moderating effect on the relationship between witnessing shaming and condemning emotion toward the violation ($b = .13$, $SE = .05$, $p = .01$) after including the control variables in the regression equation. Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 58. This effect remained significant even after including abusive supervision as an additional control variable in a robustness check ($b = .13$, $SE = .05$, $p = .01$). Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 59. A simple slopes analysis of this interaction effect indicated that witnessing shaming significantly increased condemning emotion toward the violation when the shaming was highly reintegrative (i.e., plus 1 SD) ($b = .24$, $SE = .10$, $p = .02$). Yet shaming did not

significantly impact condemning emotion toward the violation at lower levels of reintegration (i.e., minus 1 *SD*) ($b = -.09$, $SE = .09$, $p = .29$). In contrast, results from the Western sample indicated that reintegration did not have a significant moderating effect on the relationship between witnessing shaming and condemning emotion toward the violation ($b = -.06$, $SE = .05$, $p = .21$) after including the control variables in the regression equation. Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 58.

Insert Tables 58 and 59 about here

Insert Figure 9 about here

The moderated mediation effect of reintegration on interpersonal deviance. Hypothesis 12a predicted that the nature of shaming would moderate the indirect negative relationship between witnessing shaming and target-focused interpersonal deviance through condemning moral emotion toward the target, such that this indirect relationship would be stronger when the shaming was highly reintegrative and this relationship would be weaker when the shaming was minimally reintegrative. Results from an SEM path analysis on the sample from China revealed that reintegration significantly moderated the indirect effect of witnessing shaming on interpersonal deviance through condemning emotion toward the target ($b = .01$, $SE = .006$, 95% CI [.002, .025]) after accounting for the effects of the control variables. Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 60. Conditional indirect effects from this analysis revealed that witnessing shaming had a marginal negative effect on interpersonal deviance via negative emotions toward the target at lower levels of reintegration (i.e., minus 1 *SD*) ($b = -.01$, $SE = .009$,

95% CI [-.033, .004]), and a marginal positive effect of on interpersonal deviance via negative emotions toward the violator at high levels of reintegration (i.e., plus 1 *SD*) ($b = .01$, $SE = .01$, 95% CI [-.004, .037]). Notably, this moderated mediation effect became insignificant after including abusive supervision as an additional control variable in a robustness check ($b = .003$, $SE = .007$, 95% CI [-.018, .009]). Results from the Western sample showed that reintegration did not significantly moderate the indirect effect of witnessing shaming on interpersonal deviance through condemning emotion toward the target ($b = .0001$, $SE = .001$, 95% CI [-.002, .003]) after accounting for the effects of the control variables. Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 60.

Insert Table 60 about here

The moderated mediation effect of reintegration on norm deviance. Hypothesis 12b predicted that the nature of shaming would moderate the indirect negative relationship between witnessing shaming and deviance from the violated norms through condemning moral emotion toward the violation, such that this indirect relationship would be stronger when the shaming was highly reintegrative and this relationship would be weaker when the shaming was minimally reintegrative. Results from an SEM path analysis on the sample from China revealed that reintegration did not significantly moderate the indirect effect of witnessing shaming on deviance from the norms through condemning moral emotion toward the violation ($b = -.005$, $SE = .007$, 95% CI [-.021, .008]) after including the control variables in the regression equation. Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 61. Results from the Western sample indicated that reintegration did not significantly moderate the indirect effect of witnessing shaming on deviance from the norms through condemning moral emotion toward the violation ($b = -.002$, $SE = .004$,

95% CI [-.012, .005]) after including the control variables in the regression equation. Results from this analysis can be viewed in Table 61.

Insert Table 61 about here

Supplemental Analyses

Guilt Culture & Shame Culture as Moderators. In addition to the hypotheses examined above, I developed additional exploratory research questions that I examined to provide a fuller picture of the impact of shaming on organizational behavior. In particular, I predicted that shaming would have its strongest social binding and norm enforcing effect within the context of a broader shame culture. In contrast, I expected that a guilt culture would inversely affect the outcomes of witnessing shaming. Results from an OLS regression analysis on the sample from China indicated that shame culture did not significantly moderate the effect of shaming on workgroup commitment ($b = -.04$, $SE = .07$, $p = .52$), norm commitment ($b = .04$, $SE = .07$, $p = .57$), condemning emotion toward the target ($b = .01$, $SE = .07$, $p = .90$), or condemning emotion toward the violation ($b = .05$, $SE = .07$, $p = .53$). Similarly, results from an OLS regression analysis on the Western sample indicated that shame culture did not significantly moderate the relationship between shaming and workgroup commitment ($b = .01$, $SE = .07$, $p = .91$) or norm commitment ($b = .01$, $SE = .07$, $p = .90$). However, shame culture did significantly moderate the relationship between shaming and negative emotion toward the target ($b = -.14$, $SE = .07$, $p = .04$), and the violation ($b = -.13$, $SE = .07$, $p = .04$). In addition, these interaction effects did not carry over to the dependent variables in a SEM path analysis. I discuss these findings in the Discussion Section.

In addition, I examined guilt culture as a moderator in these same regression models. Results of an OLS regression on the sample from China indicated that guilt culture did not significantly moderate the effect of shaming on workgroup commitment ($b = -.09$, $SE = .07$, $p = .22$), norm commitment ($b = -.08$, $SE = .08$, $p = .31$), condemning emotion toward the target ($b = .04$, $SE = .08$, $p = .59$), or condemning emotion toward the violation ($b = .15$, $SE = .08$, $p = .06$). Similarly, results from an OLS regression analysis on the Western sample indicated that shame culture did not significantly moderate the relationship between shaming and workgroup commitment ($b = .04$, $SE = .11$, $p = .72$), norm commitment ($b = -.13$, $SE = .10$, $p = .19$), condemning emotion toward the target ($b = .01$, $SE = .12$, $p = .92$), or condemning emotion toward the violation ($b = .08$, $SE = .12$, $p = .47$). Similar to shame culture, these interaction effects did not carry over to the dependent variables in a SEM path analysis. I discuss these findings in the Discussion Section.

Moral Intensity as a Moderator. I also anticipated that when the norm violation was perceived to be morally intense, witnessing shaming would have a stronger and more positive effect on social binding, condemning moral emotion, and their related dependent variables. Results of an OLS regression on the sample from China indicated that moral intensity did not significantly moderate the effect of shaming on workgroup commitment ($b = -.03$, $SE = .03$, $p = .39$), norm commitment ($b = -.01$, $SE = .03$, $p = .85$), condemning emotion toward the target ($b = -.03$, $SE = .03$, $p = .27$), or condemning emotion toward the violation ($b = -.02$, $SE = .03$, $p = .63$). Similarly, results of an OLS regression on the Western sample indicated that moral intensity did not significantly moderate the effect of shaming on workgroup commitment ($b = .05$, $SE = .04$, $p = .25$), norm commitment ($b = .07$, $SE = .04$, $p = .06$), condemning emotion

toward the target ($b = .0004$, $SE = .04$, $p = .99$), or condemning emotion toward the violation ($b = -.07$, $SE = .04$, $p = .07$).

Self-Evaluative Pathway. I further expected that witnessing shaming would have the effect of eliciting vicarious guilt or shame for organizational observers, and I predicted that this effect would be especially strong for members who perceived themselves to be similar to the shaming target. Unfortunately, due to limitations in survey length, I was unable to capture the measure for similarity to the target. Therefore, these analyses only assess the direct relationships between shaming and vicarious guilt/shame. Results of an OLS regression on the sample from China indicated that witnessing shaming did not significantly increase vicarious guilt ($b = .06$, $SE = .07$, $p = .36$), or vicarious shame ($b = .12$, $SE = .07$, $p = .11$) for witnesses after accounting for the effects of control variables. Likewise, results of an OLS regression on the Western sample indicated that witnessing shaming did not significantly increase vicarious guilt ($b = .09$, $SE = .06$, $p = .10$); however, it did significantly increase vicarious shame ($b = .16$, $SE = .06$, $p = .02$) for witnesses. I discuss this interesting finding in the Discussion Section.

Empathic pathway. Finally, I expected that witnessing shaming would increase empathy toward the target and fear toward the shamers. I further expected that identification with the shaming target would moderate this relationship such that such that this indirect relationship would be stronger when identification was higher, and this relationship would be weaker when identification was lower. Similar to the measure for similarity in the self-evaluative pathway, I was unable to collect the scale for identification with the target due to limitations to the survey length. Therefore, I examined the direct relationships between shaming and the empathic and fear-based responses. Results of an OLS regression on the sample from China indicated that witnessing shaming did not significantly increase sympathy toward the target ($b = .08$, $SE = .07$,

$p = .25$); however, it did increase audience member fear ($b = .08$, $SE = .04$, $p = .05$) after accounting for the effects of control variables. Interestingly, results of an OLS regression on the Western sample indicated that witnessing shaming did not significantly increase sympathy ($b = -.05$, $SE = .08$, $p = .52$) or fear ($b = -.02$, $SE = .02$, $p = .35$). I discuss these findings in the Discussion Section.

Discussion

In a three-wave survey study including two independent samples, representing participants from a range of countries, regions, and industries, I examined the social-binding and norm-reinforcing effects of witnessing shaming on various forms of organizational deviance. Evidence from this study revealed that witnessing shaming in general did not produce the intended commitment and compliance outcomes, even when used in a context where shaming is relatively common and integral to the moral system (such as China). I further found that shaming did not produce its social binding and norm reinforcing effects even when the shaming was moderated by the individual beliefs in the validity of shaming punishments (i.e., shame culture orientation) or the application of a reintegrative form of shaming. Overall, the findings indicated that while the context, individual beliefs, and nature of the shaming might offset the negative effects of shaming on the desired outcomes, no combination of variables actually resulted in a net increase in the intended commitment and compliance outcomes. This finding is especially pertinent given the strong lay rationale in favor of using this punishment technique.

Because this paper included a large number of hypotheses (i.e., 24 in total, not including the supplemental research questions), and many unsupported predictions, I will discuss the unsupported findings thematically rather than explaining each hypothesis individually in numerical order. One surprising unsupported hypothesis is that the data from China did not

support the social binding pathway hypothesized. Indeed, the findings for the social binding effects of witnessing shaming were not significant for any of the predicted relationships on workgroup commitment or norm commitment. This finding is especially surprising given that theory would suggest that shaming brings individuals together in unity surrounding the violated norm (Hirschi, 1969/2009). However, this null effect may be explained from other theoretical perspectives. First, shaming is widely acknowledged as a negative punishment (Braithwaite, 1989; Nash & Kilday, 2010; Stearns, 2017). While observers are not the direct targets of the shaming, watching another person endure embarrassment (in shaming's mildest form) or humiliation (in its more intense form) can nonetheless represent an unpleasant experience to witness (Rawlings, 1968). Furthermore, working in a setting where shaming punishments occur may lead members to feel uncertain about how they would be treated if they committed a violation themselves. Indeed, research indicates that the use of punitive punishments can reduce organizational commitment (Lambert, Hogan, Barton, Jiang, & Baker, 2008). Thus, although the intention of shaming is to unify the group in agreement on the norms, the penal nature of shaming may override the unifying effects, causing workers to feel less trust and affinity toward the organization.

Intriguingly, the data from Western sample revealed some surprising outcomes that contradict the hypothesized effects. Specifically, results from the Western sample indicated that witnessing shaming reduced commitment to the violated norms and subsequent compliance with the norms, and this effect was significant for individuals who were lower in shame culture orientation (with a null effect for those higher in shame culture orientation). In other words, individuals who did not believe in the validity of shaming punishments showed the most dysfunctional responses to it. Furthermore, this effect was only significant among the Western

sample, where shaming was on average less common. Altogether, the findings from the sample from China and Prolific suggest that shaming may not produce the intended social binding effects as predicted; however, it may reduce commitment to and compliance with the norms for individuals who are minimally shame oriented in a context where shaming is less common in general. While this effect was not hypothesized, it aligns with the theory proposed in this paper. Specifically, I predicted that the functional effects of witnessing shaming would be most pronounced for individuals who most strongly believed in the validity of shaming punishments (i.e., those higher in shame culture orientation). Indeed, these results align succinctly with person-organization fit theory, which maintains that compatibility between employees and their organizational culture produce the most optimal performance outcomes (Chatman, 1989; O'Reilly, Chatman, & Caldwell, 1991). Thus, the finding that misalignment between employee beliefs and the contextual culture (i.e., between shame culture orientation and organizational shaming) reduces compliance is consistent with theory on person-organization fit.

Another set of surprising findings came from the effects of stigmatization as a moderating variable. Consistent with theory on reintegrative shaming, I hypothesized stigmatization would have a dysfunctional effect on the intended outcomes, while reintegrative shaming would have a functional, enhancing effect on the outcomes for the sample from China. Contrary to my predictions, stigmatization significantly moderated the effect of shaming on negative emotion toward the violation, such that when stigmatization is low it marginally increased negative emotion toward the violation. but when stigmatization was high, it marginally diminished it. Furthermore, the moderating effects of stigmatization carried onto interpersonal deviance, such that shaming reduced interpersonal deviance toward the target via reduced negative emotion toward the target when stigmatization was higher. Taken together, these effects

suggest that stigmatization actually had a functional impact on the use of shaming among this population, as it functioned to relieve negative emotion toward the target and violation and subsequently reduced deviance toward the target. While this effect contradicts the hypotheses, there are theoretical reasons that might explain this surprising finding. Since stigmatization involves a punitive treatment of the target, it is possible that witnessing it resolves any moral anger observers feel toward the violation, as observers can see that the wrongdoing has been thoroughly vindicated (Mendes, Steinbeis, Bueno-Guerra, Call, & Singer, 2018). In addition, upon watching a person endure stigmatizing treatment, coworkers may feel empathic concern for the target, and subsequently respond by affording the target with gentler treatments to offset the harshness the target experienced (Batson, 1991; Singer, 2004). Therefore, alternative theoretical perspectives can help to clarify the seemingly functional effect of stigmatizing shaming.

It is important to note that the proposed method for this study included controls for the mediators (measured at Time 1) and the dependent variables (measured at Time 2). Analysis of the data revealed very strong correlations between the Time 1 and Time 2 mediators and between the dependent variables measured at the three timepoints. In addition, there were no significant effect of the predictors on the outcomes when controlling for the mediators or dependent variables at Times 1 and 2. However, when I explored these same analyses without the time controls, some significant effects emerged. Due to the entirely null effects resulting from the analyses with time controls included, I reported the results without time controls. Overall, the results with time controls suggested that there was very little change in the dependent variables across the three timepoints, and certainly less change than I anticipated based on the study design (which included time controls). I discuss this point further in the Limitations section below.

Finally, it is possible that poor measures may account for some of the null effects in this study. While every effort was made to use validated measures that are widely used in organizational studies, some measures, such as stigmatization and reintegration were gleaned from sociological texts (Losoncz & Tyson, 2007). As this dissertation already involved the development of two scales, it was a priority to not develop a third (or fourth) exclusively for the purposes of measuring these moderating effects. While the authors of these scales went through a scale development process, it is possible that the standards for scale development were not as rigorous compared to the established guidelines that are widely used in organizational scholarship (Hinkin, 1998; Colquit et al., 2019).

Theoretical Contributions

This paper shifted the scholarly conversation on shame in organizations in several notable ways. First, research on shame has primarily examined this emotion from the perspective of the individual wrongdoer who experiences shame as a discrete emotion (Daniels & Robinson, 2019) or as the dispositional tendency (trait) to feel shame (Cohen et al., 2011; Wolf, Cohen, Panter, & Insko, 2010). However, this body of research has neglected the inherent social nature of this emotion, as an interpersonal experience that is amplified by the presence of an audience. Therefore, this paper contributed to scholarship on shame in organizations by examining shaming as a collective process involving multiple actors, a perspective which is consistent with the interindividual quality of the discrete emotion (Tangney & Dearing, 2002), but is largely overlooked in studies that examine the impact of shame in workplace outcomes. This perspective is important because we find growing evidence that shaming is used as a punishment technique in organizations, and yet the effects of it are largely unknown.

In addition, as a process involving multiple actors, shaming has the potential to engage and impact various parties who play different roles in the shaming ritual. Indeed, scholarship on shame has tended to focus on the intraindividual experience of the discrete emotion and its subsequent effects on that actor (Daniels & Robinson, 2019; Xing, Sun, & Jepsen, 2021). Yet, this viewpoint has overlooked the inherent social nature of this emotion and the possibility that the benefits of shame may be most pronounced for third-party observers, rather than the individual who directly experiences the emotion. Therefore, this paper expanded the perspective on shame to include its impact from the perspective of observers.

Research on shaming to date has focused primarily on the experience of the target. This punishment focused view of shaming has examined the relative effectiveness of shaming at eliciting remorse and preventing recidivism for targets (Braithwaite, Braithwaite, & Ahmed, 2018; Kim & Gerber, 2012; Makkai & Braithwaite, 1994). Principally, this work has explored how shaming can engender compliance with regulatory standards among shaming targets and has shown that workplaces using a reintegrative shaming approach find greater compliance in comparison to workplaces using a stigmatizing shaming approach (Makkai & Braithwaite, 1994). Furthermore, this work has illustrated that offenders who experience reintegrative shaming show greater repentance and efforts to repay the victim(s) (Kim & Gerber, 2012). Thus, prior research has examined various ways in which reintegrative shaming can produce positive outcomes for shaming targets. However, as a public form of punishment, shaming includes an audience who has the potential to benefit from the experience as well. This paper was among the first to theorize about and empirically examine the potential benefits of witnessing shaming for observers.

Extending this contribution and integrating social control theory (Hirschi, 1969/2009; Nye, 1958); this paper examined the social binding and norm reinforcing potential of shaming from the witnessing perspective. This constitutes an important theoretical elaboration, as prior work has considered shaming's potential to punish violators and prevent repeat offense. Previous scholarship on shaming has illustrated that being the target of shaming can encourage subsequent compliance (Makkai & Braithwaite, 1994). However, as a social ritual that unites members in the collective punishment of a violation, shaming necessarily brings people together. Thus, this paper has highlighted how shaming can function to encourage greater commitment to the workgroup through its inherently collective nature. In addition, by engaging the audience in the punishment as witnesses, this paper extended theory on shaming to suggest that witnessing shaming may also reinforce the violated norm about audience members through their participation in the shaming process.

Drawing on affective social learning theory (Clément & Dukes, 2017), this paper theorized that being a witness to shaming has the potential to engage the organizational observer in a social emotional learning process. Indeed, prior research has focused primarily on the emotional experience of shaming from the perspective of the target (McIntosh, 2005; Ronson, 2016). Overall, this work has emphasized how the experience of shame is an overridingly damaging experience for the individual who is being shamed. In particular, this research has shown that shamed offenders may respond in anger (i.e., "humiliated fury") (Thomaes, Stegge, Olthof, Bushman, & Nezlek, 2011). By shifting the focus to the audience of shaming rituals, this paper has extended a new line of inquiry to consider the emotional experience of members who observe the event. As a punishment process, shaming has the potential to elevate emotions, not only for the targets, but for victims, shamers, and audience members as well. The theory

presented in this paper has illustrated the potential of witnessing shaming to activate and absolve moral anger toward the violator and violation, which may subsequently decrease deviance toward the norm, while enhancing deviance toward the violator. Altogether, this shift in view of shaming to the witnesses' perspective has broadened thinking on the topic to consider how shaming may give rise to more positive or functional emotional experiences for other parties involved in the ritual.

Limitations

Despite the strengths of this study, it was not without limitations. First, I faced considerable challenges in recruiting the sample for this study, which ultimately required modification of the sampling technique. This pivot fortuitously yielded two samples: one including participants from China recruited via WeChat and another including participants from (mostly) Western, English-speaking countries recruited via Prolific. The final samples had the advantage of representing working adults from a range of societies, industries, and geographic regions. Despite these benefits, sampling from two separate platforms (i.e., WeChat and Prolific) over non-overlapping timepoints precluded combining the datasets. Ideally, the sample would have comprised an international sample that was accessed from a single sampling agency, as a sample of that nature would have allowed for more direct cross-cultural comparisons. Additionally, a single cross-cultural sample might have afforded greater variance in the independent variable. Therefore, the source of the dataset presented some limitations to analysis of the results, particularly from a cross-cultural perspective.

Another limiting factor to the data collected in this study was the measurement technique and time separation. While the decision to utilize a one-week time lag was theoretically motivated, there are reasons to believe that a different time separation might have yielded more pronounced effects. For instance, it may be that the impact of witnessing shaming on the

outcomes is strongest immediately following the shaming event. Or it may be that it takes time for the effect to crystalize. Either way, the timing of survey distribution relative to the timing of the shaming event might have impacted the strength of the outcomes. To account for the effects of timing, both datasets included recency as a control variable, and I explored recency as a moderator, but did not find any significant effects on any of the mediator or outcome variables. Following up the current study with an experiment would help to address this limitation and further explore how time impacts the effects of witnessing shaming on its outcomes.

Related to the questions around the time lag, is the extremely strong correlations between the Time 1 and Time 2 mediators, and the Time 1, Time 2, and Time 3 dependent variables, suggesting that these values did not change significantly over the weeklong time lag. As a result of these correlations, including Time 1 mediators and Time 2 dependent variables in the analyses effectively washed away the effects of the other variables in the equations. Indeed, in a handful of analyses, there were some significant (although unexpected) effects when all the controls are added to the equation except for the time controls. For instance, I found that witnessing shaming is negatively associated with norm commitment for the Western sample, when controlling for all variables except for Time 1 norm commitment ($b = -.13$, $SE = .06$, $p = .048$). Additionally, shame culture orientation significantly moderates the relationship between witnessing shaming and norm commitment for the Western sample, when controlling for all variables except for Time 1 norm commitment ($b = .14$, $SE = .05$, $p = .008$). In particular, witnessing shaming significantly reduced commitment to the norm for those employees who were lower in shame culture orientation ($b = -.33$, $SE = .09$, $p = .00$). This effect carried over to the dependent variable as well, whereby witnessing shaming increased deviance from the violated norms via norm commitment for those employees who were lower in shame culture orientation ($b = -.08$, $SE =$

.03, 95% CI [-0.155, -0.019]). Therefore, the research design of this study may have been overambitious in expecting to find effects on the mediators and dependent variable while controls for the effects of those variables measured at Times 1 and 2.

As discussed previously, there are additional limitations to this study surrounding common source and method biases (Podsakoff, et al., 2003; Podsakoff et al., 2012), as this study employed a self-report survey study research design. The use of self-report for measures of workplace deviance is considered well-founded (Berry et al., 2007) due to the private nature of deviant acts. Therefore, workplace deviance scholars have determined that self-report is the preferred (and most widely employed) method for examining this outcome (Bennett & Robinson, 2003; Berry, et al., 2007). However, the self-report method of gathering data can lead to issues with social desirability bias in reporting (Krumpal, 2013), particularly for topics like deviance, where participants are motivated to present themselves more positively than they may actually behave in a laboratory or field setting. In addition, the collection of data from a single source can produce consistency motifs and consistency effects resulting in artifactual covariances between variables stemming from participants' efforts to maintain consistency in survey responses (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977). Time-separation has been noted as a technique to control for common method variance (Podsakoff et al., 2003), and I included a one-week time lag to create some separation between the reporting of mediators, independent, and dependent variables to leverage this remedy. However, a superior design would have triangulated data from multiple sources, including other-report measures completed by a direct supervisor or colleague, along with performance data from the human resources department. At the least, including additional measures of the dependent variables would better address the concerns with

common source and method variance in this study (Podsakoff, et al., 2003; Podsakoff et al., 2012).

Similarly, the survey design of this study relied on scale item measures of commitment and compliance. Although this study used validates measures that are commonly used in our field (Bennett & Robinson, 2000; Tyler & Blader, 2005), a more rigorous test of the dependent variables would have included a behavioral measure of compliance (or deviance) from the norms. Therefore, an experiment including a behavioral measure would optimally complement the survey studies in this paper.

The divergent findings between the Eastern and Western samples lead to additional questions to help understand the source of these discrepancies. It is possible that individuals in prototypical shame cultures are more highly socialized to shame and therefore are more likely to have positive responses to it, and less likely to have negative responses to it. It may also be the case that shaming is executed in a different manner in shame cultures relative to guilt cultures. Indeed, some ethnographic research has suggested that shaming in stronger shame cultures is more forgiving in comparison to shaming in weaker shame cultures (Braithwaite, 1989).

Practical Implications

The intended functions of shaming were largely unsupported by the outcomes of this study, leading to questions around the practical functionality of shaming in organizations. Overwhelmingly the findings from this study offer a cautionary tale around the use of shaming to encourage commitment to the values and norms of the workgroup and compliance with organizational norms. Based on these outcomes, it is advisable for managers to exercise reservation in the use of shaming in their workgroups. In particular, managers should appreciate that shaming is unlikely to promote commitment and compliance, even when used in a context that has a stronger shame culture. Additionally, the use of shaming has the potential to backfire

and even reduce the desired outcomes when applied in a context that has a stronger guilt culture and among individuals who do not believe in the validity of shaming punishments. This point is particularly salient, given the rise in shaming in Western contexts (Lalami 2018; Martin, 2020; Max, 2020; Yanisky-Ravid, 2019). Furthermore, managers should be advised that the theoretically prescribed leadership approach that was designed to offset shaming's negative effects (i.e., reintegrative shaming; Braithwaite, 1989) has not been shown to produce positive outcomes either, even when applied in a stronger shame culture context. In the most functional scenario, the culture of the organization (i.e., guilt culture vs. shame culture) and the way shaming is applied (i.e., stigmatizing vs. reintegrative) can reduce the negative effects of shaming. However, no combination of contextual and leadership variables yielded a positive effect when interacting with shaming on the dependent variables.

Outcomes of this study further note that individuals differ in their beliefs around the validity of shaming punishments, and these differences have meaningful effects on how witnesses are likely to respond to shaming punishments. In particular, the data revealed that individuals from Western societies who are lower in shame culture orientation (i.e., do not believe in the validity of shaming punishments) are more likely to exhibit negative responses to witnessing shaming. Therefore, managers operating in Western societies are advised to be particularly attentive to individual differences among their followers regarding their responsiveness to shaming. In most cases, it is advisable for managers in this context to avoid using shaming punishments altogether. However, if and when shaming is applied, managers ought to expect and prepare for negative side-effects of witnessing shaming among some followers in their organization.

For organizations and managers that are using shaming as a routine or formalized practice, it would greatly benefit the leadership to empirically examine what the leaders' intentions are for using shaming and to what extent it is actually producing those effects. It is possible that organizations are using formalized shaming rituals for outcomes that were not examined in this study. Furthermore, it is possible that the context of the organization or the way that shaming is being applied is indeed helping to enhance the organization's desired outcomes. However, given that the outcomes of this study did not indicate any positive effects of shaming, organizations that are already using it routinely should carefully examine this practice and consider how it may be benefiting or harming organizational outcomes.

Outcomes of this study also highlighted that the dysfunctional outcomes of witnessing shaming are significant and in the expected direction for the Western sample. Specifically, witnessing shaming was positively and significantly associated with interpersonal deviance toward the target in the Western sample (and this effect was marginally significant in the sample from China). Taken together, these findings suggest that the use of shaming in a predominantly guilt culture is unlikely to produce its intended effects. Thus, managers operating in a stronger guilt-based culture and/or Western context are advised to exercise particular caution in using shaming as a punishment technique, given that it is unlikely to yield positive outcomes and may even encourage negative side-effects.

Future Directions

Considering the body of research on shaming in organizations is in its nascency, there are many directions for future research. First, the predictions in this study primarily considered the effects of witnessing shaming on extra-role outcomes, such as commitment and deviance. However, research suggests that emotions, like shame, impact creativity, job performance, and turnover as well (Bagozzi, et al., 2003; González-Gómez & Richter, 2015; Korman, Tröster, &

Giessner, 2021). Therefore, future research may consider how witnessing shaming influences in-role job performance outcomes.

The focus of this study was on “top-down shaming,” whereby organizational leaders shame a subordinate for some wrongdoing. However, shaming certainly exists in lateral and bottom-up forms (Bartley & Child, 2007; Bloomfield, 2015; Nash & Kilday, 2010), whereby an employee shames another employee of the same rank or organizational level (in the case of lateral shaming), or a follower (or followers) shame an organizational leader(s). These forms of shaming obviously involve different power asymmetries in comparison to the top-down shaming examined in this paper. Therefore, it is likely that they would yield different results (even if holding all other variables constant). At its core, future research on lateral and bottom-up shaming would help to address questions around who gets to shame whom in organizations. Further, how do responses to shaming vary as a function of the relative power (and influence) of the shamer?

Similarly, this study examined the effects of organizational shaming on individual outcomes, yet there is reason to believe that shaming may have effects at the workgroup level as well. Given that shaming is conceptualized as a collective, emotional process, engaging the participation of multiple actors, it is fitting that shaming may impart effects on group level emotion, such as emotional contagion, collective shame, or group level moral outrage (Barsade, 2002; Brown, González, Zagefka, Manzi, & Čehajić, 2008; Gunn & Wilson, 2011). Given the public and punitive nature of shaming, it is also conceivable that shaming would impact team psychological safety and its related outcomes. As shaming rituals are theoretically designed to hold members accountable to the group (Elstad, 2009; Healthcote, 2012; Stearns, 2017), it is also conceivable that witnessing shaming may influence group level performance and productivity.

Furthermore, Overall, given the inherently collective nature of this ritual, it is fitting to examine how it influences outcomes at the workgroup level of analysis.

A wide body of research in the field of organizational studies has examined various approaches to leadership (Hannah, Avolio, Luthans, & Harms, 2008). Given that this study examined an approach to addressing norm violations from a managerial perspective, it would be fitting to examine how shaming interacts with different leadership styles. Future research may consider which leadership styles antecede and support the use of shaming. In addition, future studies may consider which leadership style enhance or minimize the functional and dysfunctional outcomes of this punishment technique.

While the research questions in this study examined shaming in general (without attention to a particular subject or violation), there are certain types of shaming that receive increasing attention in popular and scholarly press. Among these include fat shaming, food shaming, and body shaming (Eyal, 2014; Kitching, Fernández, & Horgan, 2021; Vogel, 2019; Warbrick, Came, & Dickson, 2019). With the rise in the body positivity movement (Bahr, 2018; Lazuka, Wick, Keel, & Harriger, 2020), alongside a persistent obesity epidemic (Friedrich, 2017), there is a growing debate around the use of shaming to motivate healthier eating choices and to encourage weight-loss among individuals with a higher-than-average body mass index (BMI) (Tomiya & Mann, 2013). While research and popular opinion suggest that fat shaming and food shaming are altogether unhelpful in motivating healthier lifestyle choices, research on this subject, particularly as it pertains to performance and interpersonal relations in the workplace remain largely unexplored and inconclusive.

Similarly, the use of shame to address violations related to racial justice and gender inequalities has recently come under scrutiny and public debate (Lopez, 2018; Vogel, 2019). For

instance, an “anti-discomfort” bill passed in Florida in 2022 explicitly bans employers from making workers “feel discomfort, guilt, anguish, or any other form of psychological distress” because of actions in the past committed by “members of the same race, color, sex or national origin” through training or instructional programs (Simonson, 2022). Notably, the bill illustrates a societal distaste for using shaming as a mechanism for addressing racial injustice and gender inequality in the workplace. At the heart of many of these conversations rests questions around who (i.e., which parties/groups) must shoulder the weight of uncomfortable emotions, particularly when violations occur across racial and gender lines.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

Scholarship on guilt and shame in organizations has tended to focus on the individual experience of these emotions and the dispositional tendency to feel them. Broadly, this research has suggested that guilt (relative to shame) is the more functional and moral response to wrongdoing. At the same time, cross-cultural work has indicated the centrality of shame to non-Western moral systems and the functionality of shame in early childhood socialization, suggesting that our understanding of shame through the lens of Western psychological literature may be somewhat unbalanced. In this way, prior research on guilt and shame has focused primarily on the discrete emotions from the perspective that guilt is the superior emotion. Meanwhile, some anthropological work has suggested that guilt and shame manifest at the cultural level and may operate complementarily. This dissertation has attempted to develop theory on guilt and shame at the cultural level, conscious applying an unbiased perspective. In doing so, I hope this work demonstrates the unique merits of guilt and shame as cultures, beyond the individual emotions and dispositional traits. I especially hope that this work highlights the legitimacy and potential functionality of shame cultures in organizations.

In Paper 1, drawing from anthropological and sociological research, I develop a theoretical framework that examines the content and outcomes associated with organizational cultures of guilt and shame. This paper lays important groundwork for understanding how guilt and shame cultures manifest in organizations and how they impact organizational norms and employee behavior. As a natural extension of Paper 1, in Paper 2, I develop a scale to measure guilt and shame cultures within organizations. Through this process I establish the nomological network for each and subsequently explore their relative effects on various organizationally relevant outcomes, thereby illustrating their existence and impact across a range of workplaces and industries. Finally, in Paper 3, I closely examine punishment styles of these cultures, with particular attention to shaming, given the lack of theory on this construct alongside its rise in popular culture. In this paper, I theorize and empirically test the social binding and norm reinforcing functions of witnessing shaming for organizational members.

In seeking to understand how organizational cultures of guilt and shame impact employee behavior, my theory and findings offer several insights. As described in Paper 1, I proposed that guilt and shame cultures both discourage deviance and promote prosocial repair (following a violation), although the culture arise from different values and maintain different norms. For instance, I theorized that guilt cultures promote self-regulation surrounding internally defined standards for behavior, while shame cultures promote self-regulation surrounding externally defined (group) standards for behavior. In addition, I expounded on differences in punishment systems between the two cultures, highlighting private “guilting” punishment in guilt culture, and more public shaming punishments in shame cultures. Finally, I noted that guilt cultures promote a consistent presentation of one’s identity across situations, whereas shame cultures allow for divergent public and private identities, especially in the interest of protecting the

reputation of the group. Overall, this paper expands thinking on how guilt and shame cultures manifest and influence behavior in organizations in various ways.

Paper 2 illuminated the relationships between guilt/shame cultures and its orbiting constructs. Specifically, this paper illustrated that high power distance and cultural tightness are more strongly related to shame cultures relative to guilt cultures. Furthermore, findings from this study surprisingly indicated that neither guilt nor shame cultures significantly reduced organizational deviance, calling into question the theory that these cultures exert emotional and social control over organizational actors. In addition, the results showed that shame cultures have a stronger positive association with interpersonal deviance and a stronger negative association with affective commitment, relative to guilt cultures, highlighting some evident drawbacks to this workplace culture. Finally, outcomes from this study revealed that guilt cultures have a strong positive relationship with employee anxiety and unethical pro-organizational behavior, relative to shame cultures. Altogether, the results of this study developed a scale for measuring guilt and shame cultures in organizations and highlighted some initial findings indicating how these cultures impact organizational behavior in some unexpected ways.

In Paper 3, I explored organizational shaming from the witnessing perspective. This study expanded theory on shaming in organizations by highlighting its intended social-binding and norm-reinforcing elements. Results from this study from two datasets, representing Eastern and Westerns samples interestingly did not support the lay theory that shaming enhances commitment or compliance. In fact, outcomes of the study indicated that witnessing shaming can even reduce commitment, particularly for those individuals who do not believe in the validity of shaming punishments. Overall, the results indicated that a stronger shame culture (at the workgroup level) and higher shame culture orientation (at the individual level) could offset the

negative effects of witnessing shaming. However, I did not find evidence that witnessing shaming actually yielded any of its intended effects among either sample and including individual and workgroup level moderators. As such, Paper 3 contributes to theory on shaming by emphasizing that shaming may not be as useful as it has been theorized or popularized to be, even among observers.

Future Directions for Research on Guilt and Shame Cultures

Beyond the questions explored in this dissertation, there are several promising avenues for future research that I encourage management scholars to consider. First, an exploration of how guilt and shame cultures (along with guilt and shaming) influence performance outcomes is both practically and theoretically relevant. This dissertation largely considering the impact of guilt and shame cultures on various forms of workplace deviance and norm compliance. Yet the content of work includes a host of norms that workers are expected to abide. Given that guilt and shame cultures aim to reinforce norms, it is fitting that they may have an influence on employee performance as well. At the same time, shame in particular, has been associated with withdrawal. Therefore, it is conceivable that shame cultures may not only be ineffective in promoting performance, but may even backfire, causing employees to recede from their employment activities and spaces.

Second, this dissertation explored the effects of guilt and shame cultures on individual behavior, yet these cultures may also impact behavior at the group and firm levels. As collective, socializing phenomena, guilt and shame cultures are designed to instill common norms, thereby nudging members of the organization toward shared meanings and common practices. This unification of values and norms at the group level would likely impact outcomes at the group (and even organizational) level too. For instance, as moral emotional cultures, guilt and shame cultures might impact group ethical decision making or collective ethical behavior. Similarly,

because one team member's performance (or underperformance) impacts the entire workgroup's outcomes, thinking about the relationship between these cultures and workgroup forms of performance may yield some interesting findings. Extending this idea, guilt and shame cultures can certainly impact firm level outcomes. When an organizational ethical breach reaches public knowledge, organizations have been known to respond to it in more guilt or shame-oriented ways. A fruitful avenue for future research might examine whether a guilt culture or shame culture response is more successful at protecting and repairing the reputation of the organization.

Third, future research on guilt and shaming punishments might examine how these punishment techniques are functional (or dysfunctional) in addressing specific genres of norm violations. For instance, popular press has recently highlighted the use of shaming to penalize violations associated with gender equality and racial justice (Lalami 2018; Yanisky-Ravid, 2019), with parties presenting strong arguments in favor of and against the role of guilt, shame, and shaming in response to these specific injustices. Altogether, modern workplaces include populations who have been historically under-served and even oppressed. The vestiges of past injustices, alongside contemporary micro-aggressions (Davis, Whitman, & Nadal, 2015; Sue & Lin, 2009), sexual harassment (Cortina & Areguin, 2021; Gupta & Garg, 2020), and mega-threats (Leigh & Melwani, 2019) has left a tension in the workplace that continues to pervade organizational environments and color interactions across race and gender lines. Indeed, conversations around these topics are riddled with anger, guilt, and shame, without clear guidelines on which emotional responses are most productive and how members ought to respond to these emotions when they arise. Thus, future research might explore the questions: How do these emotions, as cultures and punishment techniques, fit into our understanding of gender equality and racial justice in the workplace? When and how are guilt and shame ever

useful in resolving race and gender-based violations and advancing the conversation around race and gender differences at work?

Conclusion

In sum, the directions for future research on guilt and shame cultures is burgeoning with possibilities, given the rise of attention they have garnered and their relevance to pressing organizational challenges. The theoretical and empirical models presented in this dissertation point to the prevalence of guilt and shame cultures and their respective punishment techniques in organizations alongside their organizationally relevant outcomes. By integrating theory from various fields of study to develop these models, I hope that the findings presented in this dissertation pave a path forward for future studies and underscore the importance of understanding emotional cultures and their respective punishments to organizational scholarship.

REFERENCES

- Abelson, R. P. 1981. Psychological status of the script concept. *American Psychologist*, 36(7): 715-729.
- Abramson, L. Y., Metalsky, G. I., & Alloy, L. B. 1989. Hopelessness depression: A theory-based subtype of depression. *Psychological Review*, 96(2), 358.
- Allen, N. J., & Meyer, J. P. 1990. Organizational socialization tactics: A longitudinal analysis of links to newcomers' commitment and role orientation. *Academy of Management Journal*, 33(4), 847-858.
- Allen, N. J., & Meyer, J. P. 1996. Affective, continuance, and normative commitment to the organization: An examination of construct validity. *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, 49(3), 252-276.
- Alport, G. W. 1954. The historical background of modern psychology. *Handbook of social psychology*. Cambridge, MA: Adison-Wesley.
- Andersen, S. M., Glassman, N. S., & Gold, D. A. 1998. Mental representations of the self, significant others, and nonsignificant others: Structure and processing of private and public aspects. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 75(4): 845.
- Arkin, R. M., Lake, E. A., & Baumgardner, A. H. 1986. Shyness and self-presentation. In W. H. Jones, J. M. Cheek & S. R. Briggs (Eds.), *Shyness. Emotions, personality, and psychotherapy*. Boston, MA: Springer.
- Ashforth, B. E., & Humphrey, R. H. 1995. Emotion in the workplace: A reappraisal. *Human Relations*, 48(2): 97-125.
- Ashkanasy, N. M. 2003. Emotions in organizations: A multi-level perspective. *Research in Multi-level Issues*, 2: 9-54.
- Ausubel, D. P. 1955. Relationships between shame and guilt in the socializing process. *Psychological Review*, 62(5): 378-390.
- Bagozzi, R. P., Verbeke, W., & Gavino Jr, J. C. 2003. Culture moderates the self-regulation of shame and its effects on performance: the case of salespersons in The Netherlands and the Philippines. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 88(2): 219-233.
- Baldwin, M. W. 1992. Relational schemas and the processing of social information.

- Psychological Bulletin*, 112(3): 461-484.
- Bandura, A. 1991. Social cognitive theory of self-regulation. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 50(2): 248-287.
- Bandura, A., & McClelland, D. C. 1977. *Social learning theory* (Vol. 1). Prentice Hall: Englewood Cliffs.
- Bandura, A., & Walters, R. H. 1977. *Social learning theory* (vol. 1). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Barak, M. E. M. 2016. *Managing diversity: Toward a globally inclusive workplace*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Bariso, J. 2018. With a new apology, Starbucks's CEO just taught an important lesson in leadership. *Inc.* Apr. 16. <https://www.inc.com/justin-bariso/after-arrest-incident-goes-viral-starbucks-ceo-kevin-johnson-issues-new-apology.html>
- Barnlund, D. C. (1975). *Public and private self in Japan and the United States: Communicative styles of two cultures*. Tokyo: Simul Press.
- Barret, K. C. 1995. A functional approach to shame and guilt. *Shame, guilt, embarrassment and pride: Empirical studies of self-conscious emotions*. New-York: Guilford.
- Barsade, S. G., & Gibson, D. E. 1998. Group emotion: A view from top and bottom. In D. H. Gruenfeld (Ed.), *Research on managing groups and teams*, 1: 81-102. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science/JAI Press.
- Barsade, S. G., & Gibson, D. E. 2007. Why does affect matter in organizations? *Academy of Management Perspectives*, 21(1); 36-59.
- Barsade, S. G., & O'Neill, O. A. 2014. What's love got to do with it? A longitudinal study of the culture of companionate love and employee and client outcomes in a long-term care setting. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 59(4); 551-598.
- Barsade, S., & O'Neill, O. A. 2016. Manage your emotional culture. *Harvard Business Review*, 94(1), 58-66.
- Baumeister, R. F. (Ed.). 2012. *Public self and private self*. Berlin: Springer Science & Business Media.
- Baumeister, R. F., Stillwell, A. M., & Heatherton, T. F. 1994. Guilt: an interpersonal approach.

- Psychological Bulletin*, 115(2); 243-267.
- Baumeister, R. F., Stillwell, A. M., & Heatherton, T. F. 1995. Personal narratives about guilt: Role in action control and interpersonal relationships. *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, 17(1-2): 173-198.
- Baumgartner, H., & Homburg, C. 1996. *Applications of structural equation modeling in marketing and consumer research: A review. International Journal of Research in Marketing*, 13(2): 139-161.
- Bedford, O. A. 2004. The individual experience of guilt and shame in Chinese culture. *Culture & Psychology*, 10(1): 29-52.
- Bedford, O., & Hwang, K. K. 2003. Guilt and shame in Chinese culture: A cross-cultural framework from the perspective of morality and identity. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 33(2): 127-144.
- Benedict, R. 1946/2005. *The chrysanthemum and the sword*. London: Secker and Warburg.
- Bennett, R. J., & Robinson, S. L. (2000). Development of a measure of workplace deviance. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 85(3), 349.
- Bentler, P. M. 1990. Comparative fit indexes in structural models. *Psychological Bulletin*, 107(2): 238.
- Bentler, P.M. and Bonnet, D.C. 1980. Significance tests and goodness of fit in the analysis of covariance structures, *Psychological Bulletin*, 88 (3): 588-606.
- Berry, C. M., Ones, D. S., & Sackett, P. R. 2007. Interpersonal deviance, organizational deviance, and their common correlates: A review and meta-analysis. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 92(2), 410.
- Bierbrauer, G. 1992. Reactions to violation of normative standards: A cross-cultural analysis of Shame and guilt. *International Journal of Psychology*, 27(2): 181-193.
- Bicchieri, C. 2016. *Norms in the wild: How to diagnose, measure, and change social norms*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Bieler, D. 2017. Ex-NFL player Ryan O'Callaghan nearly killed himself instead of coming out as gay. *The Washington Post*. June 21. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early->

lead/wp/2017/06/20/ex-nfl-player-says-hiding-his-homosexuality-led-to-plans-for-suicide/

- Bierbrauer, G. 1992. Reactions to violation of normative standards: A cross-cultural analysis of shame and guilt. *International Journal of Psychology*, 27(2), 181-193.
- Birenbaum, A., & Sagarin, E. 1976. *Norms and human behavior*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.
- Boas, F., 1896. The limitations of the comparative method of anthropology. *Science*, 4(103): 901-908.
- Bohns, V. K., & Flynn, F. J. 2013. Guilt by design: Structuring organizations to elicit guilt as an affective reaction to failure. *Organization Science*, 24(4): 1157-1173.
- Boiger, M., Mesquita, B., Uchida, Y., & Feldman Barrett, L. 2013. Condoned or condemned: The situational affordance of anger and shame in the United States and Japan. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 39(4): 540-553.
- Bollen, K. A. 1989. *A new incremental fit index for general structural equation models*. *Sociological Methods & Research*, 17(3): 303-316.
- Braithwaite, P. F. 1989. *Crime, shame and reintegration*. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
- Briscoe, D., Tarique, I., & Schuler, R. 2012. *International human resource management: Policies and practices for multinational enterprises*. London: Routledge.
- Brislin, R.W. 1986. The wording and translation of research instrument. In W.J. Lonner & J.W. Berry (Eds.), *Field methods in cross-cultural research*. Hong Kong, China: Sage Publications: 137-164.
- Brooks, D. 2016. The shame culture. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from: <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/15/opinion/the-shame-culture.html>
- Brown, T. A. 2015. *Confirmatory factor analysis for applied research*. New York City: Guilford Publications.
- Braithwaite, J. 1989. *Crime, shame and reintegration*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Braithwaite, J. 2003. Reintegrative shaming. *Crime: Critical Concepts in Sociology*. London:

- Routledge, 345-361.
- Braithwaite, V., Ahmed, E., & Braithwaite, J. 2008. Workplace bullying and victimization: The influence of organizational context, shame and pride. *International Journal of Organisational Behaviour*, 13(2), 71-94.
- Braithwaite, J., Braithwaite, V., & Ahmed, E. 2000. Reintegrative shaming. *The Essential Criminology Reader*, 286-295.
- Breugelmans, S. M., & Poortinga, Y. H. 2006. Emotion without a word: Shame and guilt among Rarámuri Indians and rural Javanese. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 91(6): 1111-1122.
- Brown, B. R. 1970. Face-saving following experimentally induced embarrassment. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 6(3): 255-271.
- Brown, M. F., Darnell, R., Eriksen, T. H., Hayden, R. M., Moore, H. L., Myers, F., Shweder, R. A., Wilson, R. A., & Brown, M. F. 2008. Cultural Relativism 2.0. *Current Anthropology*, 49(3): 363-383.
- Brown, M. E., Treviño, L. K., & Harrison, D. A. 2005. Ethical leadership: A social learning Perspective for construct development and testing. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 97(2): 117-134.
- Bruner, J. S. 1990. *Acts of meaning* (vol. 3). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Burke, P. 2009. *Popular culture in early modern Europe*. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.
- Bush, J., White, M., Kai, J., Rankin, J., & Bhopal, R. 2003. Understanding influences on smoking in Bangladeshi and Pakistani adults: community based, qualitative study. *BMJ* 326(7396): 962-968.
- Buss, A. H. 1980. *Self-consciousness and social anxiety*. Freeman: New York.
- Buss, A. 2001. *Psychological dimensions of the self*. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.
- Buzinski, J. 2017. There aren't any out gay male athletes in major professional sports. *OutSports*. Nov. 15. <https://www.outsports.com/2017/11/15/16620066/out-gay-sport-robbie-rogers>

- Campbell, D. N., Fleming, R. L., & Grote, R. C. 1985. Discipline without punishment-at last. *Harvard Business Review*, 63(4): 162-169.
- Carl, D., Gupta, V., & Javidan, M. 2004. Power distance. *Culture, leadership, and organizations: The GLOBE study*, 62, 513-563.
- Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. 1982. Control theory: A useful conceptual framework for personality–social, clinical, and health psychology. *Psychological Bulletin*, 92(1): 111-135.
- Chatman, J. A., & Spataro, S. E. 2005. Using self-categorization theory to understand relational demography–based variations in people's responsiveness to organizational culture. *Academy of Management Journal*, 48(2), 321-331.
- Chen, M. J. 2014. Presidential address—Becoming ambicultural: A personal quest, and aspiration for organizations. *Academy of Management Review*, 39(2): 119-137.
- Chu, C. L. 1972. On the shame orientation of the Chinese from the interrelationship among society, individual, and culture. In *Symposium on the character of the Chinese: An interdisciplinary approach*: 85-125. Taipei, Taiwan: Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica. (In Chinese).
- Chun, R. 2017. Samsung, shame & corporate atonement. *Harvard Business Review*. May 17. <https://hbr.org/2017/05/samsung-shame-and-corporate-atonement>
- Childress, J. F. 1979. Appeals to conscience. *Ethics*, 89(4): 315-335.
- Cialdini, R. B., Kallgren, C. A., & Reno, R. R. 1991. A focus theory of normative conduct: A theoretical refinement and reevaluation of the role of norms in human behavior. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 24: 201-234.
- Clément, F., & Dukes, D. 2017. Social appraisal and social referencing: Two components of affective social learning. *Emotion Review*, 9(3), 253-261.
- Cohen, T. R., Wolf, S. T., Panter, A. T., & Insko, C. A. 2011. Introducing the GASP scale: a new measure of guilt and shame proneness. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 100(5), 947.

- Colquitt, J. A., Sabey, T. B., Rodell, J. B., & Hill, E. T. 2019. Content validation guidelines: Evaluation criteria for definitional correspondence and definitional distinctiveness. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 104(10): 1243.
- Cooley, C. H. 1902. Looking-glass self. *The production of reality: Essays and readings on social interaction*. Newbury Park, CA: Pine Forge Press.
- Cooley, C. H. 1964. *Human nature and the social order*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
- Covitz, R. 2009. Gay athletes don't fit in what is perceived as a homophobic NFL. *AdvoSports*. Nov. 2. https://www.victoriaadvocate.com/advosports/sports/nation/gay-athletes-don-t-fit-in-what-is-perceived-as/article_eb18fd5c-de4a-5d01-b6cc-227308b61a55.html
- Creighton, M. R. 1990. Revisiting shame and guilt cultures: A forty-year pilgrimage. *Ethos*, 18(3): 279-307.
- Dalal, R. S. 2005. A meta-analysis of the relationship between organizational citizenship behavior and counterproductive work behavior. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 90(6): 1241.
- Daniels, M. A., & Robinson, S. L. 2019. The shame of it all: A review of shame in organizational life. *Journal of Management*, 45(6): 2448 - 2473.
- Dannals, J. E., & Miller, D. T. 2017. Social norms in organizations. In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Business and Management*.
- Davis, J. 2017. HHS overhauls 'Wall of Shame' breach reporting website. *Healthcare IT News*. July 26. <https://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/hhs-overhauls-wall-shame-breach-reporting-website>
- De Hooge, I. E., Zeelenberg, M., & Breugelmans, S. M. 2007. Moral sentiments and cooperation: Differential influences of shame and guilt. *Cognition and Emotion*, 21(5): 1025 -1042.
- De Waal, F. B. 1996. *Good natured*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Demos, J. 1996. Shame and guilt in early New England. *The emotions*: 74 - 88.
- Douglas Creed, W. E., Hudson, B. A., Okhuysen, G. A., & Smith-Crowe, K. 2014. Swimming in a sea of shame: Incorporating emotion into explanations of institutional reproduction

- and change. *Academy of Management Review*, 39(3): 275-301.
- Durkheim, E. 1915/2001. *The elementary forms of religious life*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Einstein, D., & Lanning, K. 1998. Shame, guilt, ego development and the five-factor model of personality. *Journal of Personality*, 66(4): 555-582.
- Erikson, E. H. 1963. *Childhood and society - revised and enlarged*. New York: Norton.
- Feno, N., & Thiry, L. 2015. Documents, former players point to Steve Sarkisian's alcohol use at Washington. *Los Angeles Times*. Oct. 12. <https://www.latimes.com/sports/usc/la-sp-usc-sarkisian-washington-20151012-story.html>
- Ferguson, M., & Barry, B. (2011). I know what you did: The effects of interpersonal deviance on bystanders. *Journal of Occupational Health Psychology*, 16(1), 80.
- Ferner, A., Almond, P., & Colling, T. 2005. Institutional theory and the cross-national transfer of employment policy: The case of 'workforce diversity' in US multinationals. *Journal of International Business Studies*, 36(3): 304-321.
- Fischer, K. W., & Tangney, J. P. 1995. Self-conscious emotions and the affect revolution: Framework and overview. *Self-conscious emotions: The psychology of shame, guilt, embarrassment, and pride*, 3-22.
- Fiske, S.T. & Taylor, S.E. 2013. *Social cognition: From brains to culture*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Fredrickson, B. L., Tugade, M. M., Waugh, C. E., & Larkin, G. R. 2003. What good are positive emotions in crisis? A prospective study of resilience and emotions following the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11th, 2001. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, 84(2), 365.
- Freud, S. 1930/2010. *Civilization and its discontents* (J. Strachey, Trans.). New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
- Freud, S. 1961. The ego and the id. In *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, XIX(1923-1925): 1-66.
- Freud, S. 1964. *New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis* (J. Strachey, Trans.). New York: Norton. (Original work published 1933).
- Frijda, N. H. 1994. Emotions are functional, most of the time. *The nature of emotions:*

- Fundamental questions*. New York: Oxford University Press: 197-202.
- Frijda, N. H., & Mesquita, B. 1994. The social roles and functions of emotions. In S. Kitayama & H. R. Markus (Eds.), *Emotion and culture: Empirical studies of mutual influence* (p. 51–87). American Psychological Association.
- Froming, W. J., & Carver, C. S. 1981. Divergent influences of private and public self-consciousness in a compliance paradigm. *Journal of Research in Personality*, 15(2): 159-171.
- Froming, W. J., Walker, G. R., & Lopyan, K. J. 1982. Public and private self-awareness: When personal attitudes conflict with societal expectations. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 18(5): 476-487.
- Fung, H. 1999. Becoming a moral child: The socialization of shame among young Chinese children. *Ethos*, 27(2): 180-209.
- Furukawa, E., Tangney, J., & Higashibara, F. 2012. Cross-cultural continuities and discontinuities in shame, guilt, and pride: A study of children residing in Japan, Korea and the USA. *Self and Identity*, 11(1): 90-113.
- Gabbatt, A. 2018. Starbucks closes more than 8,000 US cafes for racial bias training. *The Guardian*. May 29. <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/may/29/starbucks-coffee-shops-racial-bias-training>
- Gagné, M. & Bhawe, D. 2011. Autonomy in the workplace: An essential ingredient to employee engagement and well-being in every culture. In V. Chirkov, M. R. Ryan, & K. M. Sheldon, *Human autonomy in cross-cultural context*: 163-187. Dordrecht: Springer.
- Gardener, W. L., Gabriel, S., & Lee, A. Y. 1999. I” value freedom, but “we” value relationships: Self-construal priming mirrors cultural differences in judgment. *Psychological Science*, 10, 321-326.
- Garvey, S. P. 1998. Can shaming punishments educate? *University of Chicago Law Review*. 65(3): 733–794.
- Gelfand, M. J. 2012. Culture’s constraints: International differences in the strength of social norms. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 21(6): 420-424.
- Gelfand, M. J., Nishii, L. H., & Raver, J. L. 2006. On the nature and importance of cultural

- tightness-looseness. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 91(6): 1225-1244.
- Gelfand, M. J., Raver, J. L., Nishii, L., Leslie, L. M., Lun, J., Lim, B. C., ... & Aycan, Z. 2011. Differences between tight and loose cultures: A 33-nation study. *Science*, 332(6033): 1100-1104.
- Gilbert, P. 2000. The relationship of shame, social anxiety and depression: The role of the evaluation of social rank. *Clinical Psychology & Psychotherapy: An International Journal of Theory & Practice*, 7(3), 174-189.
- Gilbert, P., & McGuire, M. T. 1998. Shame, status, and social roles: Psychobiology and evolution. In P. Gilbert & B. Andrews (Eds.), *Shame: Interpersonal behavior, psychopathology, and culture*: 99-125. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Giordano, P. C., Cernkovich, S. A., & Rudolph, J. L. 2002. Gender, crime, and desistance: Toward a theory of cognitive transformation. *American Journal of Sociology*, 107(4), 990-1064.
- Goffman, E. 1956. The nature of deference and demeanor. *American Anthropologist*, 58(3): 473-502.
- Goffman, E. 1967/2009. *Stigma: Notes on the management of spoiled identity*. Simon and Schuster.
- Gordon, S. L. 1990. Social Structural Effects on Emotions. 145-179 In *Research Agendas in the Sociology of Emotions*, ed. T.D. Kemper. Albany: SUNY Press.
- Green, A. 2014. My office has a wall of shame. *Ask a Manager*. March 13.
<https://www.askamanager.org/2014/03/my-office-has-a-wall-of-shame-interviewers-keep-commenting-on-my-height-and-more.html>
- Greenberg, D. F. 1985. Age, crime, and social explanation. *American Journal of Sociology*, 91(1), 1-21.
- Greenwald, D. F., & Harder, D. W. 1998. Domains of shame: Evolutionary, cultural, and psychotherapeutic aspects. In P. Gilbert & B. Andrews (Eds.), *Shame: Interpersonal behavior, psychopathology, and culture*: 225-245. New York, NY, US: Oxford University Press.
- Guignon, C. 2004. *On being authentic*. Abingdon, UK: Routledge.

- Gunn, G. R., & Wilson, A. E. 2011. Acknowledging the skeletons in our closet: The effect of group affirmation on collective guilt, collective shame, and reparatory attitudes. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 37(11): 1474-1487.
- Haidt, J. 2003. The moral emotions. *Handbook of Affective Sciences*, 11: 852-870.
- Hardesty, D. M., & Bearden, W. O. 2004. The use of expert judges in scale development: Implications for improving face validity of measures of unobservable constructs. *Journal of Business Research*, 57(2): 98-107.
- Hargie, O., Stapleton, K., & Tourish, D. 2010. Interpretations of CEO public apologies for the banking crisis: attributions of blame and avoidance of responsibility. *Organization*, 17(6): 721-742.
- Harrington, M. (1997). **The other America**. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster.
- Harris, N. 2006. Reintegrative shaming, shame, and criminal justice. *Journal of Social Issues*, 62(2), 327-346.
- Harris, N., & Maruna, S. 2005. Shame, shaming and restorative justice: A critical appraisal. *Handbook of restorative justice: A global perspective*, 452-462.
- Hay, C. 2001. An exploratory test of Braithwaite's reintegrative shaming theory. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, 38(2), 132-153.
- Heise, D. R., & O'Brien, J. 1993. Emotion expression in groups. In M. Lewis & J. M. Haviland (Eds.), *Handbook of emotions* (p. 489–497). The Guilford Press.
- Higgins, E. T. 1987. Self-discrepancy: a theory relating self and affect. *Psychological Review*, 94(3): 319-340.
- Higgins, E. T. 1996. The “self digest”: self-knowledge serving self-regulatory functions. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 71(6): 1062-1083.
- Hill, K. M., & Boyd, D. P. 2015. Who should apologize when an employee transgresses? Source effects on apology effectiveness. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 130(1): 163-170.
- Hinkin, T. R. 1998. A brief tutorial on the development of measures for use in survey questionnaires. *Organizational Research Methods*, 1(1): 104-121.
- Hinkin, T. R., & Tracey, J. B. 1999. An analysis of variance approach to content validation. *Organizational Research Methods*, 2(2), 175-186.

- Hirschi, T. 1969/2009. *Causes of delinquency*. United Kingdom: Taylor & Francis.
- Hofstede, G. 2001. *Culture's consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions and organizations across nations*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Hollenbeck, J. R., Williams, C. R., & Klein, H. J. 1989. An empirical examination of the antecedents of commitment to difficult goals. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 74(1), 18.
- House, R. J., Hanges, P. J., Javidan, M., Dorfman, P. W., & Gupta, V. (Eds.). 2004. *Culture, leadership, and organizations: The GLOBE study of 62 societies*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Hu, L. T., & Bentler, P. M. 1999. Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure analysis: Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. *Structural Equation Modeling: A Multidisciplinary Journal*, 6(1): 1-55.
- Hultberg, P. 1988. Shame: A hidden emotion. *Journal of Analytical Psychology*, 33, 109–126.
- Hwang, K. K. 2001. The deep structure of Confucianism: A social psychological approach. *Asian Philosophy*, 11(3): 179-204.
- Izard, C. E. 1993. Four systems for emotion activation: Cognitive and noncognitive processes. *Psychological Review*, 100(1): 68-90.
- Jackson, A. E. 2019. Amazing companies that champion LGBTQ equality hiring now. *Glassdoor*. <https://www.glassdoor.com/blog/companies-lgbtq-equality/>
- Jackson, T., MacKenzie, J., & Hobfoll, S. E. 2000. Communal aspects of self-regulation. In M. Boekaerts. *Handbook of self-regulation*: 275-300. Cambridge, MA: Academic Press.
- Jacquet, J. 2015. *Is shame necessary?: New uses for an old tool*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Johnson, R. C., Danko, G. P., Huang, Y. H., Park, J. Y., Johnson, S. B., & Nagoshi, C. T. 1987. Guilt, shame, and adjustment in three cultures. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 8(3): 357-364.
- Johnston, S., & Selsky, J. W. 2005. Duality and paradox: Trust and duplicity in Japanese business practice. *Organization Studies*, 27(2): 183–205.
- Johnston-Robledo, I., Sheffield, K., Voigt, J. and Wilcox-Constantine, J., 2007. Reproductive shame: Self-objectification and young women's attitudes toward their reproductive functioning. *Women & Health*, 46(1): 25-39.

- Jones, G. R. 1986. Socialization tactics, self-efficacy, and newcomers' adjustments to organizations. *Academy of Management Journal*, 29(2): 262-279.
- JTA. 2014. Austrian railway company makes amends, exhibits own Holocaust complicity. *Haaretz*. <https://www.haaretz.com/austrian-company-exhibits-holocaust-complicity-1.5326257>
- Jude, A. 2015. Steve Sarkisian was reimbursed by Washington for hefty alcohol bills. *The Seattle Times*. Aug. 27. <https://www.seattletimes.com/sports/uw-husky-football/steve-sarkisian-was-reiumbursed-by-washington-for-hefty-alcohol-bills/>
- Keltner, D., & Buswell, B. N. 1997. Embarrassment: its distinct form and appeasement functions. *Psychological Bulletin*, 122(3): 250-270.
- Keltner, D., & Haidt, J. 1999. Social functions of emotions at four levels of analysis. *Cognition & Emotion*, 13(5), 505-521.
- Kemper, T. D. 1978. Toward a sociology of emotions: Some problems and some solutions. *The American Sociologist*, 30-41.
- Kidwell, R. E., & Sprague, R. 2009. Electronic surveillance in the global workplace: Laws, ethics, research and practice. *New Technology, Work and Employment*, 24(2), 194-208.
- Kitayama, S. E., & Markus, H.R.E. 1994. *Emotion and culture: Empirical studies of mutual influence*. American Psychological Association.
- Kitayama, S., Markus, H. R., & Matsumoto, H. 1995. Culture, self, and emotion: A cultural Perspective on "self-conscious" emotions. In J. P. Tangney & K. W. Fischer (Eds.), *Self-conscious emotions: The psychology of shame, guilt, embarrassment, and pride*: 439-464. New York: Guilford Press.
- Kirkman, B. L., Chen, G., Farh, J. L., Chen, Z. X., & Lowe, K. B. 2009. Individual power distance orientation and follower reactions to transformational leaders: A cross-level, cross-cultural examination. *Academy of Management Journal*, 52(4), 744-764.
- Klein, H. J., Molloy, J. C., & Brinsfield, C. T. 2012. Reconceptualizing workplace commitment to redress a stretched construct: Revisiting assumptions and removing confounds. *Academy of Management Review*, 37(1), 130-151.
- Klein, H. J., Wesson, M. J., Hollenbeck, J. R., Wright, P. M., & DeShon, R. P. 2001. The

- assessment of goal commitment: A measurement model meta-analysis. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 85(1), 32-55.
- Koehn, D. 2013. Why saying "I'm sorry" isn't good enough: The ethics of corporate apologies. *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 23(2): 239-268.
- Koehn, D., & Goranova, M. 2018. Do investors see value in ethically sound CEO apologies? Investigating stock market reaction to CEO apologies. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 152(2): 311-322.
- Kugler, K., & Jones, W. H. 1992. On conceptualizing and assessing guilt. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 62(2): 318-327.
- Kumarasamy, P. 2021. When is public shaming appropriate at work? *Monster*. Accessed from: <https://www.monster.ca/career-advice/article/public-shaming-at-work>
- Kurland, N. B., & Pelled, L. H. 2000. Passing the word: Toward a model of gossip and power in the workplace. *Academy of Management Review*, 25(2): 428-438.
- Lalami, L. 2018. The social shaming of racists is working. *The Nation*. Accessed from: <https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/the-social-shaming-of-racists-is-working/>
- Lange, C. 2007. Legal and cultural aspects of ignominious parading (tashhīr) in Islam. *Islamic Law and Society*, 14(1), 81-108.
- Lansky, M. 1987. Shame and domestic violence. *The many faces of shame*: 335-362.
- Lazarus, R. S. 1966. *Psychological stress and the coping process*. McGraw-Hill.
- Leary, M. R., & Allen, A. B. 2011. Self-presentational persona: Simultaneous management of multiple impressions. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 101(5): 1033-1049.
- Leary, M. R., & Kowalski, R. M. 1995. The self-presentation model of social phobia. *Social phobia: Diagnosis, assessment, and treatment*, 94-112.
- Lebra, T. S. 1983. Shame and guilt: A psychocultural view of the Japanese self. *Ethos*, 11(3): 192-209.
- Lee, J., 2009. Bodies at menarche: Stories of shame, concealment, and sexual maturation. *Sex Roles*, 60(9-10): 615-627.
- Leighton, D. C., & Kluckhohn, C. 1947. *Children of the people*. Cambridge, MA, US: Harvard University Press.

- Lewis, H. B. 1971. Shame and guilt in neurosis. *Psychoanalytic Review*, 58(3): 419.
- Lewis, H. B. 1987. Shame and the narcissistic personality. *The many faces of shame*: 93-132.
- Lewis, M. 1992. *Shame: The exposed self*. New York: The Free Press.
- Lewis, M. 1995. Self-conscious emotions. *American Scientist*, 83: 68-78.
- Lieber, C. 2014. The self-help movement behind Lululemon's eerie dogma. *Racked*. Jan. 29.
<https://www.racked.com/2014/1/9/7625823/landmark-lululemon-feature>
- Lindsay-Hartz, J. 1984. Contrasting experiences of shame and guilt. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 27: 689-704.
- Lochner, L. 2011. Non-production benefits of education: *Crime, health, and good citizenship*.
 Accessed from: https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w16722/w16722.pdf
- Losoncz, I., & Tyson, G. 2007. Parental shaming and adolescent delinquency: A partial test of reintegrative shaming theory. *Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology*, 40(2), 161-178.
- Lutwak, N., Razzino, B. E., & Ferrari, J. R. 1998. Self-perceptions and moral affect: An exploratory analysis of subcultural diversity in guilt and shame emotions. *Journal of Social Behavior and Personality*, 13(2): 333-348.
- Mackay, J., & Amos, A. 2003. Women and tobacco. *Respirology*, 8(2): 123-130.
- Makkai, T., & Braithwaite, J. 1993. Praise, pride and corporate compliance. *International Journal of the Sociology of Law*, 21: 73-73.
- Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. 1991. Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation. *Psychological Review*, 98(2): 224.
- Marteau, T. M., & Bekker, H. 1992. The development of a six-item short-form of the state scale of the Spielberger State—Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI). *British Journal of Clinical Psychology*, 31(3), 301-306.
- Martin, M. 2020. Epidemiologist on why 'Pandemic Shaming' isn't working. *NPR News*.
 Accessed from: <https://www.npr.org/2020/12/19/948403401/epidemiologist-on-why-pandemic-shaming-isn-t-working>
- Massaro, T. M. 1991. Shame, culture, and American criminal law. *Michigan Law Review*, 89(7): 1880-1944.

- Mathieu, John E., and Dennis M. Zajac. 1990 A review and meta-analysis of the antecedents, correlates, and consequences of organizational commitment. *Psychological Bulletin*, 108(2): 171.
- Matos, M., Pinto-Gouveia, J., & Gilbert, P. 2013. The effect of shame and shame memories on paranoid ideation and social anxiety. *Clinical Psychology & Psychotherapy*, 20(4), 334-349.
- Max, D. T. 2020. The public shaming pandemic. *The New Yorker*. Accessed from: <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/09/28/the-public-shaming-pandemic>
- McGregor, J. 2018. Anatomy of a PR response: How Starbucks is handling its Philadelphia crisis. *The Washington Post*. April 19. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-leadership/wp/2018/04/19/anatomy-of-a-pr-response-how-starbucks-is-handling-its-philadelphia-crisis/>
- Mead, G. H. 1936. The problem of society: How we become selves. *Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century*: 360-385.
- Mead, M. 1937/2003. *Cooperation and competition among primitive peoples*. New York: McGraw Hill.
- Meyer, J. P., Stanley, D. J., Herscovitch, L., & Topolnytsky, L. 2002. Affective, continuance, and normative commitment to the organization: A meta-analysis of antecedents, correlates, and consequences. *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, 61(1), 20-52.
- Miller, S. 1985. *The Shame Experience*. Erlbaum: Hillsdale, NJ.
- Minkov, M. 2012. *Cross-cultural analysis: the science and art of comparing the world's modern societies and their cultures*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Modell, A. H. 1993. *The Private Self*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Morrison, A. 1983. Shame, the ideal self and narcissism. *Contemporary Psychoanalysis*, 19: 295–318.
- Morrison, A. P. 1987. The eye turned inward: Shame and the self. *The many faces of shame*, 271-291.
- Morton, D. 2013. Out on the edge. *ESPN*. May 13.

https://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/9315650/former-offensive-tackle-kwame-harris-opens-six-year-nfl-career-spent-closet-espn-magazine

- Mowday, R. T., Steers, R. M., & Porter, L. W. 1979. The measurement of organizational commitment. *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, 14(2), 224-247.
- Murphy, K., & Harris, N. 2007. Shaming, shame and recidivism: A test of reintegrative shaming theory in the white-collar crime context. *The British Journal of Criminology*, 47(6), 900-917.
- Nash, D., & Kilday, A. 2010. *Cultures of shame: exploring crime and morality in Britain 1600-1900*. Springer.
- Nezlek, J. B., Kafetsios, K., & Smith, C. V. 2008. Emotions in everyday social encounters: Correspondence between culture and self-construal. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 39(4), 366-372.
- Nichols, J. 2013. Pro-LGBT companies that have supported the LGBT community. *Huffington Post*, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/pro-lgbt-companies-holiday-shopping_n_4356335?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZWNVc2lhLm9yZy8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAABHqtUyu-Jo3C7lgujcTQRX7n3yfJOvL-W8aMypWc83sYBdiTz0L6XhB-DfgVcXasDWw4xRz0ul3wChi7TZ0tHXAzUfmPQpC7a5le6isTMCpaZO4hn3Ls7wHqKa0j7QgenLLjef4CD8Vh4sFW5yuFd0fbxWFPvMyppaFvKs42D6o
- Niedenthal, P. M., Tangney, J. P., & Gavanski, I. 1994. "If only I weren't" versus "If only I hadn't": Distinguishing shame and guilt in counterfactual thinking. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 67(4): 585-595.
- Nye, F. I. 1973. **Family relationships and delinquent behavior**. United States: Greenwood Press.
- Orange, D. M. 2008. Whose shame is it anyway? Lifeworlds of humiliation and systems of restoration (or "The analyst's shame"). *Contemporary Psychoanalysis*, 44(1): 83-100.
- O'Reilly III, C. A., Chatman, J., & Caldwell, D. F. 1991. People and organizational culture: A profile comparison approach to assessing person-organization fit. *Academy of Management Journal*, 34(3), 487-516.

- Ostroff, C., Kinicki, A. J., & Muhammad, R. S. 2013. Organizational culture and climate. In N. W. Schmitt, S. Highhouse, & I. B. Weiner (Eds.), **Handbook of psychology: Industrial and organizational psychology**: 643-676. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.
- Ostroff, C., Kinicki, A. J., Muhammad, R. S., Schmitt, N. W., & Highhouse, S. 2013. *Handbook of psychology: Industrial and organizational psychology*.
- Paton, C. 2019. Viral video shows employees who missed targets forced to crawl along road as punishment. *Newsweek*. Jan. 17. <https://www.newsweek.com/viral-video-shows-employees-who-missed-targets-forced-crawl-along-road-1295840>
- Phillis, B. 2013. NFL players' anti-gay comments show a league in need of growth. *Bleacher Report*. April 4. <https://bleacherreport.com/articles/1592550-nfl-players-anti-gay-comments-show-a-league-in-need-of-growth>
- Piers, G., & Singer, M. B. 1953. *Shame and guilt: A psychoanalytic and a cultural study*. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas.
- Piers, G., and Singer, M. 1971. *Shame and guilt: a psychoanalytic and cultural study*. New York: Norton (Original work published in 1953).
- Pines, M. 1995. The universality of shame: A psychoanalytic approach. *British Journal of Psychotherapy*, 11(3), 346-357.
- Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., Lee, J. Y., & Podsakoff, N. P. 2003. Common method biases in behavioral research: a critical review of the literature and recommended remedies. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 88(5), 879.
- Podsakoff, P. M., & Organ, D. W. 1986. Self-reports in organizational research: Problems and prospects. *Journal of Management*, 12(4), 531-544.
- Puglise, N. 2016. 'Don't ask, don't tell': military members 'out and proud' five years after repeal. *The Guardian*. Sept. 27. <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/sep/27/dont-ask-dont-tell-repeal-anniversary-us-military>
- Putnam, L. L., & Mumby, D. K. 1993. Organizations, emotion and the myth of rationality. *Emotion in Organizations*, 1: 36-57.
- Ramahi, I., Seidenberg, A. B., Kennedy, R. D., & Rees, V. W. 2012. Secondhand smoke

- emission levels in enclosed public places during Ramadan. *The European Journal of Public Health*, 23(5): 789-791.
- Rees, J. H., Klug, S., & Bamberg, S. 2015. Guilty conscience: motivating pro-environmental behavior by inducing negative moral emotions. *Climatic Change*, 130(3): 439-452.
- Reichers, A. E. 1985. A review and reconceptualization of organizational commitment. *Academy of Management Review*, 10(3), 465-476.
- Relihan, T. 2018. What Starbucks got wrong — and right — after Philadelphia arrests. *MIT Management Sloan School*. May 18. <https://mitsloan.mit.edu/ideas-made-to-matter/what-starbucks-got-wrong-and-right-after-philadelphia-arrests>
- Riggs, K. S. 2019. Get it right: Gender pronouns in the modern workplace. *Portland Business Journal*, (May 8). Retrieved from: <https://www.bizjournals.com/portland/news/2019/05/08/get-it-right-gender-pronouns-in-the-modern.html>
- Robinson, S. L., & Bennett, R. J. 1995. A typology of deviant workplace behaviors: A multidimensional scaling study. *Academy of Management Journal*, 38(2), 555-572.
- Rogers, M. 2013. Niners CB says openly gay players would not be welcomed on the team. *Yahoo! Sports*. <https://sports.yahoo.com/news/nfl--report--niners-cb-says-openly-gay-players-would-not-be-welcomed-on-the-team-190346715.html>
- Rokeach, M. 1973. *The nature of human values*. Free press.
- Rosenberg, M. 2015. Steve Sarkisian saga just the latest example of USC's mismanagement. *Sports Illustrated*. Oct. 12. <https://www.si.com/college/2015/10/12/usc-steve-sarkisian-fired-pat-haden-future>
- Said, E. 2003. *Orientalism*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Salahi, A. 2004. Exemption from fasting. *Arab News*. <http://www.aljazeeraah.info/Islam/Islamic%20subjects/2004%20subjects/November/Exemption%20From%20Fasting,%20Adil%20Salahi.htm>
- Salancik, G. R., & Pfeffer, J. 1977. An examination of need-satisfaction models of job attitudes. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 427-456.
- Shaffer, L. S. 1983. Toward Pepitone's vision of a normative social psychology: What is a social

- norm?. *The Journal of Mind and Behavior*, 275-293.
- Schank, R. C., & Abelson, R. P. 1977. *Plans, goals and understanding: An inquiry into human knowledge structures*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Scheff, T. J. 1988. Shame and conformity: The deference-emotion system. *American Sociological Review*, 395-406.
- Scheff, T. J. 2003. Shame in self and society. *Symbolic Interaction*, 26(2): 239-262.
- Schneider, B. 1987. The people make the place. *Personnel Psychology*, 40(3): 437-453.
- Sheikh, S. 2014. Cultural variations in shame's responses: A dynamic perspective. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 18(4): 387-403.
- Sheikh, S., & Janoff-Bulman, R. 2010. The "shoulds" and "should nots" of moral emotions: A self-regulatory perspective on shame and guilt. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 36(2): 213-224.
- Scheier, M. F., & Carver, C. S. 1980. Private and public self-attention, resistance to change, and dissonance reduction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 39(3): 390-405.
- Schein, E. H. 1992. How can organizations learn faster?: the problem of entering the Green Room. <https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/2399/SWP-3409-45882883.pdf>
- Schein, E. H. 2017. *Organizational culture and leadership* (5th ed.). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.
- Scherer, K. R., Schorr, A., & Johnstone, T. (Eds.). 2001. *Appraisal processes in emotion: Theory, methods, research*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Schwartz, S. H. 2012. An overview of the Schwartz theory of basic values. *Online readings in Psychology and Culture*, 2(1), 11.
- Schwartz, S. H., Cieciuch, J., Vecchione, M., Davidov, E., Fischer, R., Beierlein, C., ... & Konty, M. (2012). Refining the theory of basic individual values. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 103(4), 663.
- Shaver, P., Schwartz, J., Kirson, D., & O'connor, C. 1987. Emotion knowledge: further exploration of a prototype approach. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 52(6), 1061.
- Sherif, M. 1936. *The psychology of social norms*. Oxford, England: Harper.

- Sherman, R. 2015. USC did a horrible thing to Steve Sarkisian because it had no choice. *SBNation*. Oct. 15. <https://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2015/10/15/9518265/steve-sarkisian-usc-football-coach-fired>
- Sherman, L. W., Strang, H., & Woods, D. J. 2000. *Recidivism patterns in the Canberra reintegrative shaming experiments (RISE)*. Canberra: Centre for Restorative Justice, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University.
- Singelis, T. M. 1994. The measurement of independent and interdependent self-construals. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 20(5), 580-591.
- Singer, P. 1996. Rethinking life and death: The collapse of our traditional ethics. Macmillan.
- Smith, M. N. 2016. This video shows a bank manager in China brutally spanking employees for not 'exceeding themselves'. *Business Insider*. Accessed from: <https://www.businessinsider.com/bank-manager-in-china-allegedly-spanked-employees-for-not-exceeding-themselves-2016-6>
- Smith, R. H., Webster, J. M., Parrott, W. G., & Eyre, H. L. 2002. The role of public exposure in moral and nonmoral shame and guilt. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 83(1): 138-159.
- Smith, S. 2012. Former NFL player Wade Davis: I went to strip club to hide being gay. *CBS News*. <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/former-nfl-player-wade-davis-i-went-to-strip-club-to-hide-being-gay/>
- Spielberger, C. D. (1983). *State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Adults* (STAI-AD) [Database record]. APA PsycTests.
- Stearns, P. N. 2017. *Shame: A brief history*. University of Illinois Press: Champaign, IL.
- Stipek, D. 1998. Differences between Americans and Chinese in the circumstances evoking pride, shame, and guilt. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 29(5): 616-629.
- Stone, J., & Cooper, J. 2001. A self-standards model of cognitive dissonance. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 37(3): 228-243.
- Szeto-Wong, C. 1997. *Relation of race, gender, and acculturation to proneness to guilt*,

- shame, and transferred shame among Asian and Caucasian-Americans*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Dissertation Abstracts International: Section B: The Sciences and Engineering, 58(6-B), 3328.
- Tangney, J. P. 1991. Moral affect: the good, the bad, and the ugly. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 61(4): 598-607.
- Tangney, J. P. 1995. Recent advances in the empirical study of shame and guilt. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 38(8), 1132-1145.
- Tangney, J. P. 1995. Shame and guilt in interpersonal relationships. In J. P. Tangney & K. W. Fischer (Eds.), *Self-conscious emotions: The psychology of shame, guilt, embarrassment, and pride*: 114-139. New York, NY, US: Guilford Press.
- Tangney, J. P. 1998. How does guilt differ from shame?. In *Guilt and children* (pp. 1-17). Academic Press.
- Tangney, J. P. 1999. The self-conscious emotions: Shame, guilt, embarrassment and pride. In T. Dalgleish, & M. Power (Eds.), *Handbook of cognition and emotion*: 541-568. Chichester, UK: Wiley.
- Tangney, J. P., Burggraf, S. A., & Wagner, P. E. 1995. Shame-proneness, guilt-proneness, and psychological symptoms. In J. P. Tangney & K. W. Fischer (Eds.), *Self-conscious emotions: The psychology of shame, guilt, embarrassment, and pride* (p. 343-367). Guilford Press.
- Tangney, J. P., & Dearing, R. L. 2002. Gender differences in morality. In R. F. Bornstein & J. M. Masling (Eds.), *Empirical studies in psychoanalytic theories, Vol. 10. The psychodynamics of gender and gender role*: 251-269. Washington, DC, US: American Psychological Association.
- Tangney, J. P., & Dearing, R. L. 2002. *Shame and guilt*. New York, NY: Guilford Press.
- Tangney, J. P. E., & Fischer, K. W. 1995. *Self-conscious emotions: The psychology of shame, guilt, embarrassment, and pride*. New York, NY: Guilford Press.
- Tangney, J. P., Mashek, D., & Stuewig, J. 2005. Shame, guilt, and embarrassment: Will the real emotion please stand up?. *Psychological Inquiry*, 16(1), 44-48.
- Tangney, J. P., Miller, R. S., Flicker, L., & Barlow, D. H. 1996. Are shame, guilt, and

- embarrassment distinct emotions? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 70(6), 1256-1269.
- Tangney, J. P., Stuewig, J., & Martinez, A. G. 2014. Two faces of shame: The roles of shame and guilt in predicting recidivism. *Psychological Science*, 25(3): 799-805.
- Tangney, J. P., Stuewig, J., & Mashek, D. J. 2007a. Moral emotions and moral behavior. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 58, 345-372.
- Tangney, J. P., Stuewig, J., & Mashek, D. J. 2007b. What's moral about the self-conscious emotions. *The self-conscious emotions: Theory and research*, 21-37.
- Tangney, J. P., Wagner, P., Fletcher, C., & Gramzow, R. 1992. Shamed into anger? The relation of shame and guilt to anger and self-reported aggression. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 62(4), 669.
- The Irish Times. 2018. Inside Huawei's 'wolf culture' of boot-camp training and high-speed growth. *The Irish Times*. Dec. 19.
<https://www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/inside-huawei-s-wolf-culture-of-boot-camp-training-and-high-speed-growth-1.3736700>
- Thompson, C. 2015. *The soul of shame: Retelling the stories we believe about ourselves*. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press.
- Tracy, J. L., & Robins, R. W. 2006. Appraisal antecedents of shame and guilt: Support for a Theoretical model. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 32(10): 1339-1351.
- Trevino, L. K. (1992). The social effects of punishment in organizations: A justice perspective. *Academy of Management Review*, 17(4): 647-676.
- Triandis, H. C. 1989. The self and social behavior in differing cultural contexts. *Psychological Review*, 96(3), 506.
- Triandis, H. C. 2018. *Individualism and collectivism*. Routledge.
- Trilling, L. 1971. Authenticity and the modern unconscious. *Commentary*, 52(3): 39-50.
- Tucker, L. R., & Lewis, C. 1973. A reliability coefficient for maximum likelihood factor analysis. *Psychometrika*, 38(1): 1-10.
- Tyler, T. R., & Blader, S. L. 2005. Can businesses effectively regulate employee conduct? The

- antecedents of rule following in work settings. *Academy of Management Journal*, 48(6): 1143-1158.
- Umphress, E. E., & Bingham, J. B. 2011. When employees do bad things for good reasons: Examining unethical pro-organizational behaviors. *Organization Science*, 22(3), 621-640.
- Umphress, E. E., Bingham, J. B., & Mitchell, M. S. 2010. Unethical behavior in the name of the company: The moderating effect of organizational identification and positive reciprocity beliefs on unethical pro-organizational behavior. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 95(4): 769-780.
- Useem, M., Cappelli, P., Singh, H., Neng, L. 2017. *Fortune Makers: The Leaders Creating China's Great Global Companies*. United States: Public Affairs.
- Van de Vijver, F. J., Leung, K., & Leung, K. 1997. *Methods and data analysis for cross-cultural research* (Vol. 1). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Van Maanen, J., Schein, E. H. and Staw, B. M., 1979. In B. M. Staw (Ed.), *Research in organizational behavior*: 209-264.
- Vandenberghe, C., Bentein, K., & Stinglhamber, F. 2004. Affective commitment to the organization, supervisor, and work group: Antecedents and outcomes. *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, 64(1), 47-71.
- Wagner, R. 2018. The Philadelphia incident was terrible; Starbucks' response was admirable. *Forbes*. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/roddwagner/2018/06/01/the-philadelphia-incident-was-terrible-starbucks-response-was-admirable/#32cfcc1c23bc>
- Walgrave, L., & Aertsen, I. 1996. Reintegrative shaming and restorative justice. *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research*, 4(4), 67-85.
- Wallbott, H. G., & Scherer, K. R. 1995. *Cultural determinants in experiencing shame and guilt*. Guilford Press: New York, NY.
- Walters, J. 2015. USC ignored the warning signs about Steve Sarkisian's drinking. *Newsweek*. Nov. 12. <https://www.newsweek.com/usc-ignored-warning-signs-about-steve-sarkisians-drinking-problem-382591#:~:text=USC%20Ignored%20the%20Warning%20Signs%20About%20Steve%2>

- Sarkisian's Drinking,-
John Walters% 20C% 20Senior&text=On% 20Monday% 20afternoon% 20USC% 20fired,an% 20indefinite% 20leave% 20of% 20absence.
- Weiss, H. M., & Cropanzano, R. 1996. Affective events theory: A theoretical discussion of the structure, causes and consequences of affective experiences at work. In B. M. Staw & L. L. Cummings (Eds.), *Research in organization behavior*, 19: 1-74. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
- Wharton, B. 1990. The hidden face of shame: The shadow, shame and separation. *Journal of Analytical Psychology*, 35(3): 279-299.
- Witkin, H. A., & Berry, J. W. 1975. Psychological differentiation in cross-cultural perspective. *ETS Research Bulletin Series*, 1975(1), i-100.
- Wong, Y., & Tsai, J. 2007. Cultural models of shame and guilt. *The self-conscious emotions: Theory and research*, 209-223.
- Yang, S., & Rosenblatt, P. C. 2001. Shame in Korean families. *Journal of Comparative Family Studies*, 32(3): 361-375.
- Yanisky-Ravid, S. 2019. #MeToo Movement and the Four Steps of 'Naming, Blaming, Shaming and Amending'. Yanisky-Ravid, Shlomit, #MeToo Movement and the Four Steps of 'Naming, Blaming, Shaming and Amending' – Lessons from the Israeli Prevention of Sexual Harassment Act, within Physical and Virtual Spheres (February 12, 2019). NYU LAW, Labor & Employment Law, Proceedings of the 71st NYU Law Annual Conference on Labor, 2018, Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3345712>
- You, T. 2020. Staff at a Chinese company are forced to CRAWL on the street after 'failing to hit their annual targets'. *Daily Mail*. Jan. 15. <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-6593631/Staff-forced-CRAWL-street-failing-hit-annual-targets.html>
- Zimmerman, B. J. 2000. Attaining self-regulation: A social cognitive perspective. In **Handbook of self-regulation**: 13-39. Cambridge, MA: Academic Press.

APPENDIX A


Table 1. Guilt & Shame as Discrete Emotions

Discrete Emotions	Defining Features		Action Tendencies	
	Similarities	Distinctions	Similarities	Distinctions
Guilt	Self-conscious, negative, moral emotions	Evoked from within the self Focused on specific action	Self-regulation & prosocial behavior	Public apologies, open confessions
Shame		Evoked from public condemnation (real or imagined) Focused on the global self		Hiding, escape, concealment

Table 2. Guilt & Shame as Organizational Affective Cultures

Organizational Affective Culture	Violator Responses		Third Party Responses	
	Prior to a Norm Violation	Following a Norm Violation	Punishments	Responses to Misdeeds
Guilt Culture	Self-regulation arising from internal standards	Public confessions & apologies Prosocial behavior to rectify wrong done	Evoke guilt through trials and questioning Subject the behavior to scrutiny	Collective apologies & collective guilt
Shame Culture	Self-regulation arising from external (group) standards	Hiding, escape, concealment Prosocial behavior to repair reputation	Evoke shame through shaming and social distancing Subject the violator to punishment	Cooperative concealment & collective shame

Figure 1. An Overview of the Organizational Cultures of Guilt & Shame Theory



APPENDIX B

Table 3. Paper 2: Item Generation for Guilt Culture Statement Items

Guilt Culture Statement Items	
1	People are expected to apologize when they have done something wrong.
2	People are expected to feel guilt when they have done something wrong.
3	People are privately reprimanded for wrongdoing.
4	People are expected to feel guilt when they have broken the rules.
5	Norms are enforced by confronting the wrongdoer one-on-one.
6	It is never OK to break the rules, even if they are broken in private.
7	Violating the organization's norms means you have done a bad thing but are not necessarily a bad person.
8	The same rules apply to everyone regardless of their status.
9	When employees commit a wrong, they ought to show that they feel guilty.
10	When employees break a rule, other members expect them to publicly apologize for the wrong they did.
11	To be considered a good person, employees are expected to act in accordance with their personal core values.
12	It is common to privately confront employees for violating a norm.
13	When employees break rules, the punishment is carried out in private.
14	Employees self-regulate in order to uphold their own personal standards.
15	Employees apologize to rectify the wrong done.
16	People are more concerned with being authentic than following rules simply to please others.
17	Employees self-regulate in order to avoid feeling guilt.
18	When a valued employee does something wrong, other members expect the transgressor to be punished just like any other employee.

Table 4. Paper 2: Item Generation for Shame Culture Statement Items

Shame Culture Statement Items	
1	People are expected to hide when they have done something wrong.
2	People are expected to feel shame when they have been caught doing something wrong.
3	People are publicly shamed as punishment for wrongdoing.
4	People are expected to feel shame when they have broken the rules.
5	Norms are enforced by making an example of people who violate them.
6	It is okay for some rules to be broken, as long as they are broken in private.
7	Violating the organization's norms means you are a bad person.
8	Different rules apply to different people, depending on their status.
9	When employees commit a wrong, they ought to show that they feel ashamed.
10	When employees break a rule, other members expect them to accept being publicly shamed.
11	To be considered a good person, employees are expected to act in accordance with organizational norms.
12	It is common to publicly humiliate employees for violating a norm.
13	When employees break rules, the punishment is carried out in public.
14	Employees self-regulate in order to uphold expectations of the group.
15	Employees apologize to repair strained relationships.
16	People are more concerned about maintaining an image of conformity than following rules all the time.
17	Employees self-regulate in order to avoid feeling shame.
18	When a valued employee does something wrong, other members will overlook or conceal the transgression.

Table 5. Paper 2: Item Generation for Guilt Culture Adjective Items

Guilt Culture Adjective Items	
1	Guilt
2	Remorse
3	Apologizing
4	Contrition
5	Regret

Table 6. Paper 2: Item Generation for Shame Culture Statement Items

Shame Culture Adjective Items	
1	Shame
2	Humiliation
3	Belittling
4	Hiding
5	Concealment

Table 7. Paper 2 – Study 1: Factor Loadings with Shame Culture

Factor loadings for the definitional correspondence of each item with a shame culture.

Item	Factor 1	Factor 2
When employees break rules, the punishment is carried out in public.	.780	
It is common to publicly humiliate employees for violating a norm.	.763	
People are expected to feel shame when they have broken the rules.	.752	
When employees break rules, other members expect them to be publicly shamed.	.748	
When employees commit a wrong, they ought to show that they feel ashamed.	.739	
People are publicly shamed as punishment for wrongdoing.	.660	
People are expected to hide when they have done something wrong.	.658	
When employees break rules, the punishment is carried out in private.		.822
People are expected to apologize when they have done something wrong.		.806
When employees commit a wrong, they ought to show that they feel guilty.		.794
It is common to privately confront employees for violating a norm.		.788
People are expected to feel guilt when they have broken the rules.		.780
People are privately reprimanded for wrongdoing.		.771
When employees break a rule, other members expect them to apologize for the wrong they did.		.608

Note. Factor loadings lower than .40 are suppressed.

Table 8. Paper 2 – Study 1: Factor Loadings with Guilt Culture

Factor loadings for the definitional correspondence of each item with a guilt culture.

Item	Factor 1	Factor 2
When employees break a rule, other members expect them to be publicly shamed.	.862	
It is common to publicly humiliate employees for violating a norm.	.858	
People are publicly shamed as punishment for wrongdoing.	.853	
People are expected to feel shame when they have broken the rules.	.798	
When employees break rules, the punishment is carried out in public.	.798	
When employees commit a wrong, they ought to show that they feel ashamed.	.730	
People are expected to hide when they have done something wrong.	.727	
People are expected to apologize when they have done something wrong.		.732
When employees break rules, the punishment is carried out in private.		.725
It is common to privately confront employees for violating a norm.		.720
People are expected to feel guilt when they have broken the rules.		.701
When employees break a rule, other members expect them to apologize for the wrong they did.		.693
When employees commit a wrong, they ought to show that they feel guilty.		.656
People are privately reprimanded for wrongdoing.		.608

Note. Factor loadings lower than .40 are suppressed.

Table 9. Paper 2 – Study 1: Factor Loadings with Shame Culture

Factor loadings for the definitional correspondence of each item with a shame culture.

Item	Factor 1	Factor 2
Hiding	.838	
Concealment	.785	
Shame	.726	
Belittling	.637	
Remorse		.873
Contrition		.785
Apologizing		.726
Guilt		.838

Table 10. Paper 2 – Study 1: Factor Loadings with Guilt Culture

Factor loadings for the definitional correspondence of each item with a guilt culture.

Item	Factor 1	Factor 2
Concealment	.867	
Hiding	.858	
Shame	.821	
Belittling	.812	
Apologizing		.811
Remorse		.808
Contrition		.766
Guilt		.677

Table 11. Paper 2 – Study 2: Exploratory Factor Analysis

	Scale Items	Factor 1	Factor 2
<i>Shame Items</i>			
1	People are expected to hide when they have done something wrong.	0.583	
2	People are publicly shamed as punishment for wrongdoing.	0.813	
3	People are expected to feel shame when they have broken the rules.	0.765	
4	Norms are enforced by making an example of people who violate them.	0.78	
5	When employees commit a wrong, they ought to show that they feel ashamed.	0.689	
6	When employees break a rule, other members expect them to accept being publicly shamed.	0.808	
7	It is common to publicly humiliate employees for violating a norm.	0.789	
8	When employees break rules, the punishment is carried out in public.	0.784	
<i>Guilt Items</i>			
1	People are expected to apologize when they have done something wrong.		0.604
2	People are privately reprimanded for wrongdoing.		0.796
3	People are expected to feel guilt when they have broken the rules.		0.532
4	Norms are enforced by confronting the wrongdoer one-on-one.		0.759
5	When employees commit a wrong, they ought to show that they feel guilty.		0.49
6	When employees break a rule, other members expect them to publicly apologize for the wrong they did.		0.248
7	It is common to privately confront employees for violating a norm.		0.703
8	When employees break rules, the punishment is carried out in private.		0.64

Table 12. Paper 2 – Study 3: Confirmatory Factor Analysis

	Scale Items	<i>b</i>	SE
<i>Shame Culture</i>			
1	People are publicly shamed as punishment for wrongdoing.	1.312	0.08
2	Norms are enforced by making an example of people who violate them.	1.188	0.09
3	It is common to publicly humiliate employees for violating a norm.	1.053	0.07
4	When employees break rules, the punishment is carried out in public.	1.092	0.07
<i>Guilt Culture</i>			
1	People are privately reprimanded for wrongdoing.	1.4	0.08
2	Norms are enforced by confronting the wrongdoer one-on-one.	1.164	0.10
3	It is common to privately confront employees for violating a norm.	1.012	0.10
4	When employees break rules, the punishment is carried out in private.	1.11	0.09

Table 13. Paper 2 – Study 4: Descriptive Statistics & Intercorrelations for Main Analyses

Variables	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1. Shame Cul.	3.33	0.8	(.72)										
2. Guilt Cul.	4.32	0.79	0.07	(.71)									
3. Tightness	5.03	0.42	0.26**	0.20**	(.52)								
4. Collectivism	5.07	0.76	0.10*	0.10*	0.39**	(.52)							
5. Power Dist.	3.59	0.65	0.24**	-0.01	-0.17**	-0.09*	(-.01)						
6. Org. Dev.	1.56	0.55	0.07	0.05	-0.36**	-0.28**	0.20**	(.90)					
7. Interp. Dev.	1.48	0.57	0.15*	-0.01	-0.18*	-0.03	0.10	0.43**	(.94)				
8. UPBs	3.04	1.13	0.01	0.08	-0.16*	-0.21**	0.12	0.45**	0.15*	(.85)			
9. Age	32.07	6.43	-0.02	-0.01	0.12**	0.09*	0.03	-0.21**	0.06	-0.24**			
10. Gender	1.66	0.48	-0.05	0.00	0.08	0.14**	0.02	-0.24**	-0.08	-0.07	0.07		
11. Tenure	6.53	6.9	-0.03	-0.04	0.12**	0.13**	-0.05	-0.20**	0.08	-0.19*	0.78**	0.13**	
12. Private Sect.	1.42	0.49	0.01	0.02	-0.16**	-0.21**	-0.05	0.19**	0.03	0.00	-0.16**	-0.18**	-0.31**

Note. Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2.

Shame Cul. = Shame Culture; Guilt Cul. = Guilt Culture; Power Dist. = Power Distance; Org. Dev. = Organizational Deviance; Interp. Dev. = Interpersonal Deviance; UPBs = Unethical Pro-organizational Behavior.

Focal Employees $n = 197$; Coworkers $n = 336$; Total Employees $n = 533$; Teams $n = 189$.

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

Table 14. Paper 2 – Study 4: Descriptive Statistics & Intercorrelations for Supplemental Analyses

Variable	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Shame Cul.	3.33	0.80	(.72)								
2. Guilt Cul.	4.32	0.79	0.07	(.71)							
3. Compliance	6.04	0.64	-0.04	0.05	(.95)						
4. Deference	5.37	0.86	-0.06	0.11	0.68**	(.86)					
5. Anxiety	3.81	0.73	-0.01	0.08	0.07	0.12	(.73)				
6. Affect Commit	4.77	1.00	-0.06	0.03	0.40**	0.53**	0.17*	(.82)			
7. Age	32.07	6.43	-0.02	-0.01	0.16*	0.30**	-0.06	0.32**			
8. Gender	1.66	0.48	-0.05	0.00	0.20**	0.01	-0.05	0.02	0.07		
9. Tenure	6.53	6.90	-0.03	-0.04	0.15*	0.26**	-0.03	0.33**	0.78**	0.13**	
10. Private Sect.	1.42	0.49	0.01	0.02	-0.07	-0.18*	-0.08	-0.15*	-0.16**	-0.18**	-0.31**

Note. Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2.

Shame Cul. = Shame Culture; Guilt Cul. = Guilt Culture.

Focal Employees $n = 197$; Coworkers $n = 336$; Total Employees $n = 533$; Teams $n = 189$.

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

Table 15: Paper 2 – Study 4: Results Summary for Main Study

Hypothesis	Results
1 – tightness	partially supported
2 – collectivism	not supported
3 – power distance	supported
4a – guilt & org. deviance	not supported
4b – shame & org. deviance	not supported
5 – interpersonal deviance	partially supported
6 – UPBs	not supported

Table 16. Paper 2 - Study 4: Main Analysis of Guilt and Shame Cultures on Cultural Tightness

	Cultural Tightness			
	Model 1		Model 2	
	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE
Controls				
Age	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00
Gender	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.04
Tenure	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00
Private	-0.12*	0.05	-0.12**	0.04
Predictors				
Guilt Culture			0.09***	0.03
Shame Culture			0.13***	0.03
<i>R</i> ²		0.03		0.21
ΔR^2				0.17***

Note. Unstandardized coefficients.

Focal Employees *n* = 197; Coworkers *n* = 336; Total Employees *n* = 533.

Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2.

Private Sector = 1, Public Sector = 0.

* *p* < .05

** *p* < .01

*** *p* < .001

Table 17. Paper 2 - Study 4: Main Analysis of Guilt and Shame Cultures on Collectivism

	Collectivism			
	Model 1		Model 2	
	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE
Controls				
Age	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01
Gender	0.18**	0.07	0.18**	0.07
Tenure	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Private	-0.26***	0.07	-0.26**	0.07
Predictors				
Guilt Culture			0.10*	0.04
Shame Culture			0.10*	0.04
<i>R</i> ²		0.06		0.09
ΔR^2				0.03***

Note: Unstandardized coefficients.

Focal Employees *n* = 197; Coworkers *n* = 336; Total Employees *n* = 533.

Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2.

Private Sector = 1, Public Sector = 0.

* *p* < .05

** *p* < .01

*** *p* < .001

Table 18. Paper 2 – Study 4: Main Analysis of Guilt and Shame Cultures on Power Distance

	Power Distance			
	Model 1		Model 2	
	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE
Controls				
Age	0.02**	0.01	0.02**	0.01
Gender	0.02	0.06	0.04	0.06
Tenure	-0.02**	0.01	-0.02**	0.01
Private	-0.10	0.06	-0.10	0.06
Predictors				
Guilt Culture			-0.03	0.04
Shame Culture			0.19***	0.03
<i>R</i> ²		0.02		0.11
ΔR^2				0.09***

Note. Unstandardized coefficients.

Focal Employees $n = 197$; Coworkers $n = 336$; Total Employees $n = 533$.

Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2.

Private Sector = 1, Public Sector = 0.

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

*** $p < .001$

Table 19. Paper 2 – Study 4: Main Analysis of Guilt and Shame Cultures on Organizational Deviance

	Organizational Deviance			
	Model 1		Model 2	
	b	SE	b	SE
Controls				
Age	-0.02	0.01	-0.02	0.01
Gender	-0.27**	0.08	-0.27**	0.08
Tenure	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01
Private	0.15	0.08	0.15	0.08
Predictors				
Guilt Culture			0.01	0.06
Shame Culture			0.03	0.05
R^2		0.115		0.118
ΔR^2				0.002

Note. Unstandardized coefficients.

Focal Employees $n = 197$; Coworkers $n = 336$; Total Employees $n = 533$.

Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2.

Private Sector = 1, Public Sector = 0.

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

*** $p < .001$

Table 20. Paper 2 – Study 4: Main Analysis of Guilt and Shame Cultures on Interpersonal Deviance

	Interpersonal Deviance			
	Model 1		Model 2	
	b	SE	b	SE
Controls				
Age	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01
Gender	-0.12	0.09	-0.11	0.09
Tenure	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Private	0.06	0.09	0.07	0.09
Predictors				
Guilt Culture			0.01	0.06
Shame Culture			0.10*	0.05
R^2		0.02		0.04
ΔR^2				0.02

Note. Unstandardized coefficients.

Focal Employees $n = 197$; Coworkers $n = 336$; Total Employees $n = 533$.

Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2.

Private Sector = 1, Public Sector = 0.

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

*** $p < .001$

Table 21. Paper 2 – Study 4: Main Analysis of Guilt and Shame Cultures on Unethical Pro-Organizational Behavior

Unethical Pro-Organizational Behavior (UPB)				
	Model 1		Model 2	
	b	SE	b	SE
Controls				
Age	-0.05*	0.02	-0.05*	0.02
Gender	-0.18	0.18	-0.18	0.18
Tenure	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.02
Private	-0.13	0.17	-0.13	0.18
Predictors				
Guilt Culture			-0.02	0.13
Shame Culture			0.01	0.10
R^2		0.0654		0.0656
ΔR^2				0.0002

Note. Unstandardized coefficients.

Focal Employees $n = 197$; Coworkers $n = 336$; Total Employees $n = 533$.

Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2.

Private Sector = 1, Public Sector = 0.

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

*** $p < .001$

Table 22. Paper 2 – Study 4: Supplemental Analysis of Guilt and Shame Cultures on Compliance and Deference

	Compliance				Deference			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 1		Model 2	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Controls								
Age	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.04*	0.02	0.03*	0.02
Gender	0.27**	0.10	0.27**	0.10	-0.02	0.13	-0.02	0.13
Tenure	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01
Private	-0.01	0.10	0.00	0.10	-0.22	0.13	-0.21	0.13
Predictors								
Guilt Culture			0.18*	0.07			0.26**	0.09
Shame Culture			-0.05	0.06			-0.10	0.07
R^2		0.07		0.1		0.11		0.15
ΔR^2				0.03*				0.04*

Note. Unstandardized coefficients.

Focal Employees $n = 197$; Coworkers $n = 336$; Total Employees $n = 533$.

Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2.

Private Sector = 1, Public Sector = 0.

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

*** $p < .001$

Table 23. Paper 2 – Study 4: Supplemental Analysis of Guilt and Shame Cultures on Anxiety

	Anxiety			
	Model 1		Model 2	
	b	SE	b	SE
Controls				
Age	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.01
Gender	-0.09	0.12	-0.09	0.12
Tenure	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01
Private	-0.15	0.11	-0.14	0.11
Predictors				
Guilt Culture			0.18*	0.08
Shame Culture			-0.04	0.06
R^2		0.02		0.4
ΔR^2				0.02

Note. Unstandardized coefficients.

Focal Employees $n = 197$; Coworkers $n = 336$; Total Employees $n = 533$.

Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2.

Private Sector = 1, Public Sector = 0.

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

*** $p < .001$

Table 24. Paper 2 – Study 4: Supplemental Analysis of Guilt and Shame Cultures on Affective Commitment

	Affective Commitment			
	Model 1		Model 2	
	b	SE	b	SE
Controls				
Age	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01
Gender	-0.11	0.11	-0.12	0.11
Tenure	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01
Private	-0.05	0.11	-0.06	0.11
Predictors				
Guilt Culture			-0.04	0.08
Shame Culture			-0.07	0.06
R^2		0.01		0.02
ΔR^2				0.01

Note. Unstandardized coefficients.

Focal Employees $n = 197$; Coworkers $n = 336$; Total Employees $n = 533$.

Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2.

Private Sector = 1, Public Sector = 0.

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

*** $p < .001$

Figure 2. Paper 2 – Study 4: The Moderating Effect of Shame Culture Orientation on the Relationship between Shame Cultures and Compliance




Table 25. Paper 3: Main Analysis Descriptive Statistics & Intercorrelations – Chinese Sample

Variables	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
1. Shaming	3.40	1.32	(.72)															
2. Guiltling	4.46	1.16	.09	(.64)														
3. Shame Ori.	2.91	1.18	.45**	.11	(.69)													
4. Guilt Ori.	4.66	0.96	.00	.41**	.03	(.78)												
5. Stigma	3.03	1.27	.28**	.03	.13	.23*	(.88)											
6. Reintegration	4.40	1.28	.04	.18**	.03	.10	-.47**	(.80)										
7. T2 WG Comm.	5.00	1.20	.08	.36**	.12	.19**	-.20**	.43**	(.89)									
8. T2 Norm Comm.	4.67	1.30	.04	.19**	.06	.02	-.18**	.19**	0.34**	(.80)								
9. T2 Neg. Emo. T	3.08	1.28	-.02	.19**	.16*	.10	.30**	-.26**	-0.05	0.04	(.97)							
10. T2 Neg. Emo. V	3.61	1.32	.05	.17*	.16*	.13	.36**	-.16*	-0.06	0.02	0.69**	(.97)						
11. T3 Org. Dev.	1.58	0.66	.03	-.08	.00	-.08	.22**	-.31**	-0.30**	-0.23**	0.13	0.09	(.92)					
12. T3 Norm Dev.	1.13	0.94	-.06	.36**	.05	.29**	-.12	.33**	0.41**	0.49**	0.00	-0.01	-0.38**	(.97)				
13. T3 Interp. Dev.	1.30	0.54	.12	-.04	.03	-.10	.13	-.19**	-0.14*	-0.11	0.21**	0.15*	0.69**	-0.28**	(.93)			
14. Age	32.78	6.28	.04	.09	.04	-.08	-.30**	.29**	0.21**	0.18**	-0.05	-0.04	-0.15*	0.19**	-0.02			
15. Gender	1.69	0.46	-.07	.09	-.11	.08	-.11	.08	0.03	0.04	-0.04	-0.05	-0.22**	0.08	-0.25**	0.03		
16. Tenure	6.99	7.24	.08	.11	.06	-.13	-.30**	.26**	0.27**	0.16*	-0.13	-0.13	-0.14*	0.16*	-0.04	0.78**	0.15*	
17. Priv. Sector	1.50	0.50	-.10	-.08	-.04	.00	.21**	-.12**	-0.16*	-0.09	-0.01	0.02	0.19**	-0.05	0.10	-0.20**	-0.12	-0.35**

Note. Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2.

Private Sector = 1; Public Sector = 0.

n = 197.

Shame Ori. = Shame Culture Orientation; Guilt Ori. = Guilt Culture Orientation; Stigma = Stigmatization; T2 WG Commit = Time 2 Workgroup Commitment; T2 Norm Commit = Time 2 Norm Commitment; T2 Neg. Emo. T = Time 2 Negative Emotion toward the Target; T2 Neg. Emo. V = Time 2 Negative Emotion toward the Violation; T3 Org. Dev. = Time 3 Organizational Deviance; T3 Norm Dev. = Time 3 Norm Deviance; T3 Interp. Dev. = Time 3 Interpersonal Deviance; Priv. Sector = Private Sector.

* p < .05

** p < .01

Table 26. Paper 3: Main Analysis Descriptive Statistics & Intercorrelations – Western Sample

Variables	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1. Shaming	2.97	1.56	(.86)														
2. Guilting	4.93	0.96	-0.07	(.87)													
3. Shame Ori.	2.11	1.30	0.41**	0.11	(.88)												
4. Guilt Ori.	5.14	0.80	-0.12	0.40**	-0.13	(.87)											
5. Stigma	3.37	1.45	0.35**	0.28**	0.21**	0.11	(.90)										
6. Reintegration	3.78	1.54	-0.12	-0.02	0.00	0.13	-0.38**	(.79)									
7. T2 WG Commit	5.07	1.33	-0.03	0.11	-0.01	-0.03	-0.03	0.15*	(.94)								
8. T2 Norm Commit	5.81	1.29	-0.16*	0.08	-0.01	0.25**	-0.04	0.06	0.08	(.85)							
9. T2 Neg. Emo. T	3.54	1.51	0.05	0.14	0.18*	0.21**	0.19*	-0.21**	0.02	0.17*	(.96)						
10. T2 Neg. Emo. V	4.07	1.50	0.11	0.20*	0.20**	0.21**	0.20**	-0.20**	-0.01	0.17*	0.77**	(.96)					
11. T3 Org. Dev.	1.76	0.73	0.12	-0.04	0.16*	-0.12	0.05	0.00	-0.11	-0.09	-0.04	-0.05	(.89)				
12. T3 Norm Dev.	0.94	0.86	-0.21**	0.14	-0.09	0.34**	0.04	0.13	0.17*	0.41**	0.13	0.06	-0.31**	(.86)			
13. T3 Interp. Dev.	1.39	0.65	0.26**	-0.07	0.12	-0.15*	0.15*	-0.09	-0.12	-0.08	-0.10	-0.16*	0.50**	-0.26**	(.93)		
14. Age	33.00	9.34	-0.12	-0.05	-0.18*	0.01	-0.14	-0.06	0.04	0.03	0.02	-0.03	-0.17*	0.12	-0.06		
15. Gender	1.56	0.51	-0.13	-0.02	-0.12	-0.02	-0.11	0.02	0.06	0.08	0.00	0.02	-0.12	0.12	-0.32**	0.08	
15. Tenure	6.28	6.80	0.04	-0.04	-0.06	-0.08	0.03	-0.10	0.12	-0.04	-0.03	-0.10	-0.06	0.02	0.08	0.50**	0.01

Note. Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2.
n = 175.

Shame Ori. = Shame Culture Orientation; Guilt Ori. = Guilt Culture Orientation; Stigma = Stigmatization; T2 WG Commit = Time 2 Workgroup Commitment; T2 Norm Commit = Time 2 Norm Commitment; T2 Neg. Emo. T = Time 2 Negative Emotion toward the Target; T2 Neg. Emo. V = Time 2 Negative Emotion toward the Violation; T3 Org. Dev. = Time 3 Organizational Deviance; T3 Norm Dev. = Time 3 Norm Deviance; T3 Interp. Dev. = Time 3 Interpersonal Deviance.

* p < .05
** p < .01

Table 27. Paper 3: Supplemental Analyses Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations – Chinese Sample

Variables	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1. Shaming	3.40	1.32	(.72)										
2. Guilting	4.46	1.16	.09	(.64)									
3. Shame Culture	3.19	0.86	.63**	.22**	(.71)								
4. Guilt Culture	4.43	0.81	.09	.84**	.25**	(.71)							
5. Moral Intensity	3.08	2.05	.04	.21**	.17*	.22**	(.89)						
6. Vic. Shame	3.14	1.35	.15*	.22**	.51**	.27**	.15*	(.89)					
7. Vic. Guilt	3.27	1.33	.10	.22**	.36**	.34**	.08	.75**	(.79)				
8. Withdrawal	3.20	1.33	.05	-.03	.04	.11	.04	.03	.07	(.92)			
9. Age	32.78	6.28	.04	.09	.10	.05	-.05	.13	.16*	-.30**			
10. Gender	1.69	0.46	-.07	.09	-.10	.07	.15	-.08	-.13	-.06	.03		
11. Tenure	6.99	7.24	.08	.11	.13	.03	.00	.14	.11	-.33**	.78**	.15*	
12. Private sect.	1.50	0.50	-.10	-.08	-.09	-.07	-.07	-.11	-.10	.05	-.20	-.12	-.35**

Note. Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2.

Private Sector = 1; Public Sector = 0.

n = 197.

Vic. Shame = Vicarious Shame; Vic. Guilt = Vicarious Guilt.

* p < .05

** p < .01

Table 28. Paper 3: Supplemental Analyses Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations – Western Sample

Variables	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Shaming	2.97	1.56	(.86)									
2. Guilting	4.93	0.96	-0.07	(.87)								
3. Shame Cul.	2.46	1.01	0.61**	-0.01	(.88)							
4. Guilt Cul.	4.77	0.65	-0.10	0.85**	0.04	(.87)						
5. Moral Inten.	5.02	1.38	0.03	0.22**	-0.01	0.30**	(.87)					
6. Vic. Shame	2.53	1.32	0.20**	0.04	0.53**	0.15	-0.09	(.88)				
7. Vic. Guilt	2.28	1.16	0.15*	-0.08	0.43**	0.05	-0.17*	0.66**	(.83)			
8. Withdrawal	3.50	1.51	0.00	0.06	0.07	0.06	-0.05	0.16*	0.10	(.92)		
9. Age	33.00	9.34	-0.12	-0.05	-0.27**	-0.06	0.07	-0.18*	-0.13	-0.17*		
10. Gender	1.56	0.51	-0.13	-0.02	-0.11	-0.05	-0.02	0.00	-0.06	0.19*	0.08	
11. Tenure	6.28	6.80	0.04	-0.04	-0.05	-0.12	-0.03	-0.09	0.00	-0.11	0.50**	0.01

Note. Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2.

Private Sector = 1; Public Sector = 0.

$n = 175$.

Shame Cul. = Shame Culture; Guilt Cul. = Guilt Culture; Moral Inten. = Moral Intensity; Vic. Shame = Vicarious Shame; Vic. Guilt = Vicarious Guilt.

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

Table 29. Paper 3: Supplemental Analyses Empathic Response Descriptive Statistics & Intercorrelations – Chinese Sample

Variables	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Shaming	3.4	1.32	(.72)						
2. Guilting	4.46	1.16	.09	(.64)					
3. Compassion	4.03	1.25	.07	-.13	(.87)				
4. OCBs	4.79	1.02	-.06	.15*	-.12	(.89)			
5. Age	32.78	6.28	.04	.09	-.21**	.34**			
6. Gender	1.69	0.46	-.07	.09	-.11	-.01	.03		
7. Tenure	6.99	7.24	.08	.11	-.15*	.29**	.78**	.15*	
8. Priv. Sector	1.5	0.5	-.1	-.08	-.09	-.15*	-.20**	-.12	-.35**

Note. Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2.
 Private Sector = 1; Public Sector = 0.
n = 197.

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

Table 30. Paper 3: Supplemental Analyses Empathic Response Descriptive Statistics & Intercorrelations – Western Sample

Variables	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Shaming	2.97	1.56	(.86)					
2. Guilting	4.93	0.96	-0.07	(.87)				
3. Compassion	4.05	1.56	-0.06	-0.02	(.88)			
4. OCBs	4.80	1.05	-0.14	0.02	0.12	(.88)		
5. Age	33.00	9.34	-0.12	-0.05	0.04	-0.01		
6. Gender	1.56	0.51	-0.13	-0.02	0.06	0.07	0.08	
7. Tenure	6.28	6.80	0.04	-0.04	0.13	0.03	0.50**	0.01

Note. Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2.

n = 175.

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

Table 31: Paper 3 – Results Summary for Main Study

Hypothesis	China	Prolific
1a	unsupported	unsupported
1b	unsupported	Unsupported w/significant opposite effect (i.e., shaming reduces norm commit)
2a	unsupported	unsupported
2b	unsupported	unsupported
3a	unsupported	unsupported
3b	unsupported	partially supported significant interaction whereby low SCO reduces commitment
4a	unsupported	unsupported
4b	unsupported	partially supported l significant moderated mediation whereby low SCO increases deviance
5A	unsupported	unsupported
5b	unsupported	unsupported
6a	unsupported	unsupported
6b	unsupported	unsupported
7a	unsupported	unsupported
7b	unsupported	unsupported
8a	unsupported	unsupported
8b	unsupported	unsupported
9a	partially supported significant interaction whereby high stigmatization reduced negative emotion toward the target	unsupported
9b	partially supported	unsupported

	significant interaction whereby high stigmatization reduced negative emotion toward the violation	
10a	unsupported	unsupported
10b	unsupported	unsupported
11a	partially supported significant moderation whereby low reintegration marginally reduced negative emotion toward the target	unsupported
11b	partially supported significant moderation whereby high reintegration increased negative emotion toward the violation	unsupported
12a	Partially supported significant moderated mediation whereby high reintegration marginally increased interpersonal deviance	unsupported
12b	unsupported	unsupported

Table 32. Paper 3: Commitment to the Group at Time 2

	Workgroup Commitment (T2)							
	Chinese Sample				Western Sample			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 1		Model 2	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Controls								
Guilting	0.34***	0.07	0.34***	0.07	0.16	0.11	0.16	0.11
Age	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01
Gender	-0.10	0.17	-0.10	0.17	0.17	0.21	0.17	0.21
Tenure	0.04*	0.02	0.04*	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02
Private Sector	-0.15	0.17	-0.15	0.17				
Predictors								
Shaming			0.03	0.06			-0.01	0.07
R^2		0.187		0.188		0.0324		0.0327
ΔR^2				0.001				0.0003

Note. Unstandardized coefficients.

Chinese sample $n = 197$; Western sample $n = 175$.

Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2.

Private Sector = 1; Public Sector = 0.

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

*** $p < .001$

Table 33. Paper 3: Commitment to the Violated Norms at Time 2

	Norm Commitment (T2)							
	Chinese Sample				Western Sample			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 1		Model 2	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Controls								
Guilt	0.19*	0.08	0.19*	0.08	0.11	0.10	0.10	0.10
Age	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01
Gender	0.04	0.20	0.05	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.16	0.20
Tenure	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.02	-0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.02
Private Sector	-0.12	0.20	-0.11	0.20				
Predictors								
Shaming			0.01	0.07			-0.13*	0.06
R^2		0.0656		0.0658		0.02		0.04
ΔR^2				0.0002				0.02

Note. Unstandardized coefficients.

Chinese sample $n = 197$; Western sample $n = 175$.

Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2.

Private Sector = 1; Public Sector = 0.

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

*** $p < .001$

Table 34. Study 3: The Mediating Effect of Commitment to the Group at Time 2

	Chinese Sample				Western Sample			
	Workgroup Commit. (T2)		Org. Deviance (T3)		Workgroup Commit. (T2)		Org. Deviance (T3)	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Control Variables								
Guilt	0.34***	0.07	0.03	0.04	0.16	0.11	-0.03	0.06
Age	0.00	0.02	-0.02	0.01	0.00	0.01	-0.01	0.01
Gender	-0.10	0.17	-0.31**	0.10	0.17	0.21	-0.14	0.11
Tenure	0.04*	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.01
Private Sector	-0.15	0.17	0.18	0.10				
Predictor Variable								
Shaming	0.03	0.06	0.02	0.03	-0.01	0.07	0.04	0.04
Mediator								
T2 WG Commitment			-0.17***	0.04			-0.05	0.04
<i>R</i> ²		.19***		.17***		.03		.06

Note. Unstandardized coefficients.

Chinese sample $n = 197$; Western sample $n = 175$.

Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2.

Private Sector = 1; Public Sector = 0.

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

*** $p < .001$

Table 35. Study 3: The Mediating Effect of Norm Commitment on Norm Deviance at Time 3

	Chinese Sample				Western Sample			
	Norm Commitment (T2)		Norm Deviance (T3)		Norm Commitment (T2)		Norm Deviance (T3)	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Control Variables								
Guilt	0.19*	0.08	-0.23***	0.05	0.10	0.10	-0.09	0.06
Age	0.04	0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	-0.01	0.01
Gender	0.05	0.20	-0.07	0.12	0.16	0.20	-0.12	0.12
Tenure	0.00	0.02	-0.00	0.01	-0.01	0.02	-0.00	0.01
Private Sector	-0.11	0.20	-0.05	0.12				
Predictor Variable								
Shaming	0.01	0.07	0.07	0.04	-0.13*	0.06	0.07	0.04
Mediator								
T2 Norm Commitment			-0.31***	0.04			-0.25***	0.05
<i>R</i> ²		0.07		0.34		.04		.22***

Note. Unstandardized coefficients.

Chinese sample *n* = 197; Western sample *n* = 175.

Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2.

Private Sector = 1; Public Sector = 0.

* *p* < .05

** *p* < .01

*** *p* < .001

Table 36. Paper 3: The Moderating Effect of Shame Culture Orientation on Commitment to the Workgroup at Time 2

	Workgroup Commitment (T2)							
	Chinese Sample				Western Sample			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 1		Model 2	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Controls								
Guilt	0.35*	0.15	0.43**	0.16	0.34	0.21	0.25	0.21
Age	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01
Gender	-0.08	0.18	-0.05	0.18	0.18	0.20	0.22	0.21
Tenure	0.04*	0.02	0.04*	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02
Private Sector	-0.15	0.17	-0.16	0.17				
Guilt X Shame Cul. Ori.	-0.01	0.06	-0.04	0.06	-0.08	0.08	-0.03	0.08
Predictors								
Shaming			0.01	0.07			-0.02	0.07
Shame Cul. Ori.	0.08	0.25	0.21	0.27	0.37	0.39	0.07	0.44
Shaming X Shame Cul. Ori			0.07	0.05			0.09	0.05
R^2		0.19		0.2		0.04		0.05
ΔR^2				0.01				0.01

Note. Unstandardized coefficients.

Chinese sample $n = 197$; Western sample $n = 175$.

Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2.

Private Sector = 1; Public Sector = 0.

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

*** $p < .001$

Table 37. Paper 3: The Moderating Effect of Shame Culture Orientation on Commitment to the Violated Norms at Time 2

	Norm Commitment (T2)							
	Chinese Sample				Western Sample			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 1		Model 2	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Controls								
GUILTING	0.16	0.08	0.15	0.09	0.13	0.10	0.12	0.10
Age	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01
Gender	0.10	0.21	0.12	0.21	0.21	0.20	0.23	0.20
Tenure	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.02	-0.01	0.02	0.00	0.02
Private Sector	-0.10	0.20	-0.10	0.20				
GUILTING X Shame Cul. Ori.	-0.06	0.06	-0.04	0.06	-0.07	0.07	-0.01	0.08
Predictors								
Shaming			0.00	0.08			-0.16*	0.07
Shame Cul. Ori.	0.29	0.29	0.37	0.31	0.34	0.38	0.00	0.42
Shaming X Shame Cul. Ori			0.04	0.05			0.14**	0.05
R^2		0.07		0.074		0.02		0.09
ΔR^2				0.004				0.07**

Note. Unstandardized coefficients.

Chinese sample $n = 197$; Western sample $n = 175$.

Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2.

Private Sector = 1; Public Sector = 0.

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

*** $p < .001$

Table 38. Paper 3: A Robustness Check on Moderating Effect of Shame Culture Orientation on Commitment to the Violated Norms at Time 2 –including Abusive Supervision

	Norm Commitment (T2)			
	Western Sample			
	Model 1		Model 2	
	b	SE	b	SE
Controls				
Guiltling	0.12	0.10	0.12	0.10
Age	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01
Gender	0.17	0.20	0.20	0.20
Tenure	-0.01	0.02	0.00	0.02
Abusive Supervision	-0.08	0.08	-0.01	0.08
Guiltling X Shame Cul. Ori.	-0.06	0.07	-0.01	0.08
Predictors				
Shaming			-0.15*	0.07
Shame Cul. Ori.	0.32	0.38	0.02	0.42
Shaming X Shame Cul. Ori			0.13*	0.05
R^2		0.03		0.09
ΔR^2				0.06**

Note. Unstandardized coefficients.

Chinese sample $n = 197$; Western sample $n = 175$.

Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2.

Private Sector = 1; Public Sector = 0.

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

*** $p < .001$

Table 39. Paper 3: The Moderated Mediation Effect of Shame Culture Orientation on Organizational Deviance

	Chinese Sample				Western Sample			
	Workgroup Commitment (T2)		Organizational Deviance (T3)		Workgroup Commitment (T2)		Organizational Deviance (T3)	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Control Variables								
Guilting	0.34***	0.07	0.03	0.04	0.18	0.11	-0.03	0.06
Age	0.00	0.02	-0.02	0.01	0.00	0.01	-0.01	0.01
Gender	-0.07	0.18	-0.31**	0.10	0.22	0.21	-0.14	0.11
Tenure	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.01
Private Sector	-0.17	0.17	0.18	0.10				
Predictor Variables								
Shaming	-0.17	0.14	0.02	0.03	-0.22	0.13	0.04	0.04
Shame Culture Orientation	-0.16	0.17			-0.37	0.21		
Shaming X Shame Cul. Ori.	0.06	0.04			0.09	0.05		
Mediator								
T2 WG Commitment			-0.17***	0.04			-0.05	0.04
<i>R</i> ²		0.17***		0.20***		0.05		0.06

Note. Unstandardized coefficients.

Chinese sample *n* = 197; Western sample *n* = 175.

Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2.

Private Sector = 1; Public Sector = 0.

* *p* < .05

** *p* < .01

*** *p* < .001

Table 40. Paper 3: The Moderated Mediation Effect of Shame Culture Orientation on Norm Deviance at Time 3

	Chinese Sample				Western Sample			
	Norm Commit. (T2)		Norm Deviance (T3)		Norm Commit. (T2)		Norm Deviance (T3)	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Control Variables								
Guiting	0.19	0.08	-0.23***	0.05	0.12	0.10	-0.09	0.06
Age	0.04	0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	-0.01	0.01
Gender	0.06	0.20	-0.07	0.12	0.23	0.20	-0.12	0.12
Tenure	0.00	0.02	-0.00	0.01	0.00	0.02	-0.00	0.01
Private Sector	-0.12	0.20	-0.05	0.12				
Predictor Variables								
Shaming	-0.07	0.17	0.07	0.04	-0.44***	0.12	0.07	0.04
Shame Culture Orientation	-0.04	0.20			-0.46*	0.20		
Shaming X Shame Cul. Ori.	0.02	0.05			0.14**	0.05		
Mediator								
T2 Norm Commitment			-0.31***	0.04			-0.25***	0.05
<i>R</i> ²		0.07		0.34***		0.09*		0.22***

Note. Unstandardized coefficients.

Chinese sample $n = 197$; Western sample $n = 175$.

Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2.

Private Sector = 1; Public Sector = 0.

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

*** $p < .001$

Table 41. Paper 3: A Robustness Check on Moderating Effect of Shame Culture Orientation on Workgroup Commitment at Time 2 including Abusive Supervision

	Western Sample			
	Norm Commitment (T2)		Norm Deviance (T3)	
	b	SE	b	SE
Control Variables				
Guilt	0.12	0.10	-0.09	0.06
Age	0.00	0.01	-0.01	0.01
Gender	0.20	0.20	-0.13	0.12
Tenure	0.00	0.02	-0.00	0.01
Abusive Supervision	-0.01	0.08	0.02	0.05
Predictor Variables				
Shaming	-0.43***	0.13	0.06	0.04
Shame Culture Orientation	-0.44*	0.20		
Shaming X Shame Cul. Ori.	0.13*	0.05		
Mediator				
T2 Norm Commitment			-0.26***	0.05
R^2		0.09		0.23***

Note. Unstandardized coefficients.

Chinese sample $n = 197$; Western sample $n = 175$.

Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2.

Private Sector = 1; Public Sector = 0.

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

*** $p < .001$

Table 42. Paper 3: The Moderating Effect of Guilt Culture Orientation on Workgroup Commitment at Time 2

	Workgroup Commitment (T2)							
	Chinese Sample				Western Sample			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 1		Model 2	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Controls								
Guilting	0.30***	0.08	0.27***	0.08	0.20	0.12	0.21	0.12
Age	0.00	0.02	-0.01	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01
Gender	-0.13	0.17	-0.11	0.18	0.17	0.20	0.14	0.21
Tenure	0.04*	0.02	0.04*	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Private Sector	-0.15	0.17	-0.12	0.17				
Guilting X Guilt Cul. Ori.	0.01	0.07	0.05	0.08	-0.06	0.12	0.15	0.12
Predictors								
Shaming			0.06	0.07			-0.01	0.07
Guilt Cul. Ori.	0.07	0.33	-0.10	0.36	0.16	0.62	0.08	0.63
Shaming X Guilt Cul. Ori			-0.07	0.06			0.07	0.08
R^2		0.19		0.2		0.03		0.04
ΔR^2				0.01				0.01

Note. Unstandardized coefficients.

Chinese sample $n = 197$; Western sample $n = 175$.

Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2.

Private Sector = 1; Public Sector = 0.

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

*** $p < .001$

Table 43. Paper 3: The Moderating Effect of Guilt Culture Orientation on Norm Commitment at Time 2

	Norm Commitment (T2)							
	Chinese Sample				Western Sample			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 1		Model 2	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Controls								
Guilting	0.21*	0.09	0.18*	0.09	-0.03	0.11	-0.04	0.11
Age	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01
Gender	0.06	0.20	0.07	0.20	0.22	0.19	0.20	0.20
Tenure	-0.01	0.02	0.00	0.02	-0.01	0.02	0.00	0.02
Private Sector	-0.13	0.20	-0.09	0.20				
Guilting X Guilt Cul. Ori.	0.03	0.08	0.06	0.09	0.17	0.12	0.15	0.12
Predictors								
Shaming			0.05	0.08			-0.12	0.06
Guilt Cul. Ori.	-0.19	0.38	-0.36	0.42	-0.44	0.59	-0.33	0.60
Shaming X Guilt Cul. Ori			-0.09	0.07			-0.06	0.08
R^2		0.07		0.08		0.08		0.1
ΔR^2				0.01				0.02

Note. Unstandardized coefficients.

Chinese sample $n = 197$; Western sample $n = 175$.

Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2.

Private Sector = 1; Public Sector = 0.

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

*** $p < .001$

Table 44. Paper 3: The Moderated Mediation Effect of Guilt Culture Orientation on Organizational Deviance

	Chinese Sample				Western Sample			
	Workgroup Commit. (T2)		Org. Deviance (T3)		Workgroup Commit. (T2)		Org. Deviance (T3)	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Control Variables								
Guiting	0.27***	0.08	0.03	0.04	0.21	0.12	-0.03	0.06
Age	-0.01	0.02	-0.02	0.01	0.00	0.01	-0.01	0.01
Gender	-0.12	0.17	-0.31**	0.10	0.14	0.21	-0.14	0.11
Tenure	0.04*	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.01
Private Sector	-0.12	0.17	0.18	0.10				
Predictor Variables								
Shaming	0.04	0.06	0.02	0.03	-0.01	0.07	0.04	0.04
Guilt Culture Orientation	0.12	0.09			-0.14	0.14		
Shaming X Guilt Cul. Ori.	-0.06	0.06			0.07	0.08		
Mediator								
T2 WG Commitment			-0.17***	0.04			-0.05	0.04
<i>R</i> ²		0.20***		0.17***		0.04		0.06

Note. Unstandardized coefficients.

Chinese sample *n* = 197; Western sample *n* = 175.

Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2.

Private Sector = 1; Public Sector = 0.

* *p* < .05

** *p* < .01

*** *p* < .001

Table 45. Paper 3: The Moderated Mediation Effect of Guilt Culture Orientation on Norm Deviance

	Chinese Sample				Western Sample			
	Norm Commitment		Norm Deviance		Norm Commitment		Norm Deviance	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Control Variables								
Guilting	0.19*	0.09	-0.23***	0.05	-0.04	0.11	-0.09	0.06
Age	0.04	0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	-0.01	0.01
Gender	0.06	0.20	-0.07	0.12	0.20	0.20	-0.12	0.12
Tenure	0.00	0.02	-0.00	0.01	0.00	0.02	-0.00	0.01
Private Sector	-0.09	0.20	-0.05	0.12				
Predictor Variables								
Shaming	0.03	0.07	0.07	0.04	-0.13	0.06	0.07	0.04
Guilt Culture Orientation	-0.08	0.11			0.40**	0.13		
Shaming X Guilt Cul. Ori.	-0.08	0.07			-0.07	0.08		
Mediator								
T2 Norm Commitment			-0.31***	0.04			-0.25***	0.05
<i>R</i> ²	0.54***		0.89***		0.09*		0.22***	

Note. Unstandardized coefficients.

Chinese sample *n* = 197; Western sample *n* = 175.

Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2.

Private Sector = 1; Public Sector = 0.

* *p* < .05

** *p* < .01

*** *p* < .001

Table 46. Paper 3: Negative Moral Emotion toward the Target at Time 2

	Negative Emotion toward the Target (T2)							
	Chinese Sample				Western Sample			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 1		Model 2	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Controls								
Guilting	0.23**	0.08	0.24**	0.08	0.22	0.12	0.23	0.12
Age	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Gender	-0.09	0.20	-0.10	0.20	-0.02	0.23	0.00	0.23
Tenure	-0.05*	0.02	-0.05*	0.02	-0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.02
Private Sector	-0.17	0.19	-0.18	0.19				
Predictors								
Shaming			-0.03	0.07			0.05	0.07
R^2		0.07		0.072		0.022		0.025
ΔR^2				0.002				0.003

Note. Unstandardized coefficients.

Chinese sample $n = 197$; Western sample $n = 175$.

Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2.

Private Sector = 1; Public Sector = 0.

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

*** $p < .001$

Table 47. Paper 3: Negative Moral Emotion toward the Violation at Time 2

	Negative Emotion toward the Violation (T2)							
	Chinese Sample				Western Sample			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 1		Model 2	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Controls								
Guilting	0.21*	0.08	0.20*	0.08	0.30*	0.12	0.31**	0.12
Age	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01
Gender	-0.10	0.21	-0.09	0.21	0.07	0.22	0.11	0.22
Tenure	-0.05*	0.02	-0.05*	0.02	-0.02	0.02	-0.03	0.02
Private Sector	-0.10	0.20	-0.09	0.20				
Predictors								
Shaming			0.04	0.07			0.11	0.07
R^2		0.06		0.062		0.05		0.06
ΔR^2				0.002				0.01

Note. Unstandardized coefficients.

Chinese sample $n = 197$; Western sample $n = 175$.

Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2.

Private Sector = 1; Public Sector = 0.

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

*** $p < .001$

Table 48. Paper 3: The Mediating Effect of Negative Emotion toward the Target on Interpersonal Deviance at Time 3

	Chinese Sample				Western Sample			
	Neg. Emo. Target (T2)		Interp. Deviance (T3)		Neg. Emo. Target (T2)		Interp. Deviance (T3)	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Control Variables								
Guilt	0.24**	0.08	-0.04	0.03	0.23	0.12	-0.03	0.05
Age	0.03	0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01
Gender	-0.10	0.20	-0.26**	0.08	0.00	0.23	-0.37**	0.09
Tenure	-0.05*	0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01
Private Sector	-0.18	0.19	0.12	0.08				
Predictor Variable								
Shaming	-0.03	0.07	0.05	0.03	0.05	0.07	0.09**	0.03
Mediator								
T2 Negative Emotion (Target)			0.10**	0.03			-0.04	0.03
<i>R</i> ²		0.07*		0.13***		0.03		0.17***

Note. Unstandardized coefficients.

Chinese sample *n* = 197; Western sample *n* = 175.

Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2.

Private Sector = 1; Public Sector = 0.

* *p* < .05

** *p* < .01

*** *p* < .001

Table 49. Paper 3: The Mediating Effect of Negative Emotion toward the Violation on Norm Deviance at Time 3

	Chinese Sample				Western Sample			
	Neg. Emo. Violation (T2)		Norm Deviance (T3)		Neg. Emo. Violation (T2)		Norm Deviance (T3)	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Control Variables								
Guilting	0.20*	0.08	-0.29***	0.06	0.31**	0.12	-0.11	0.07
Age	0.03	0.02	-0.03	0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.01
Gender	-0.09	0.21	-0.09	0.14	0.11	0.22	-0.15	0.13
Tenure	-0.05*	0.02	-0.00	0.02	-0.03	0.02	-0.00	0.01
Private Sector	-0.09	0.20	-0.01	0.13				
Predictor Variable								
Shaming	0.04	0.07	0.07	0.05	0.11	0.07	0.10*	0.04
Mediator								
T2 Negative Emotion (Violation)			0.04	0.05			-0.03	0.04
<i>R</i> ²		0.06		0.17***		0.06		0.08*

Note. Unstandardized coefficients.

Chinese sample *n* = 197; Western sample *n* = 175.

Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2.

Private Sector = 1; Public Sector = 0.

* *p* < .05

** *p* < .01

*** *p* < .001

Table 50. Paper 3: The Moderating Effect of Stigmatization on Negative Emotion toward the Target at Time 2

	Negative Emotion toward the Target (T2)							
	Chinese Sample				Western Sample			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 1		Model 2	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Controls								
GUILTING	0.21**	0.07	0.20**	0.07	0.13	0.12	0.14	0.13
Age	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Gender	-0.05	0.19	-0.09	0.19	0.06	0.23	0.06	0.23
Tenure	-0.04*	0.02	-0.04*	0.02	-0.02	0.02	-0.02	0.02
Private Sector	-0.28	0.19	-0.30	0.18				
GUILTING X Stigma	0.08	0.05	0.08	0.05	-0.03	0.08	-0.03	0.08
Predictors								
Shaming			-0.07	0.07			-0.02	0.08
Stigmatization	-0.02	0.22	0.02	0.22	0.34	0.41	0.33	0.42
Shaming X Stigma			-0.09*	0.05			0.03	0.05
R^2		0.16		0.19		0.052		0.054
ΔR^2				0.03*				0.002

Note. Unstandardized coefficients.

Chinese sample $n = 197$; Western sample $n = 175$.

Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2.

Private Sector = 1; Public Sector = 0.

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

*** $p < .001$

Table 51. Paper 3: A Robustness Check on the Moderating Effect of Stigmatization on Negative Emotion toward the Target at Time 2 including Abusive Supervision

	Negative Emotion toward the Target			
	Chinese Sample			
	Model 1		Model 2	
	b	SE	b	SE
Controls				
GUILTING	0.20*	0.08	0.19*	0.08
Age	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.02
Gender	-0.03	0.19	-0.08	0.19
Tenure	-0.04*	0.02	-0.04*	0.02
Private Sector	-0.29	0.19	-0.31	0.19
Abusive Supervision	-0.07	0.08	-0.05	0.08
GUILTING X Stigma	0.08	0.05	0.08	0.05
Predictors				
Shaming			-0.07	0.07
Stigmatization	0.02	0.23	0.05	0.23
Shaming X Stigma			-0.09†	0.05
R^2		0.16		0.19
ΔR^2				0.03*

Note. Unstandardized coefficients.

Chinese sample $n = 197$.

Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2; Private Sector = 1; Public Sector = 0.

Stigma/Stigmatization = Stigmatizing Shaming.

† $p < .10$

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

Table 52. Paper 3: The Moderating Effect of Stigmatization on Negative Emotion toward the Violation at Time 2

	Negative Emotion toward the Violation (T2)							
	Chinese Sample				Western Sample			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 1		Model 2	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Controls								
Guilt	0.18*	0.08	0.15*	0.08	0.22	0.12	0.27*	0.12
Age	0.05*	0.02	0.05*	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Gender	-0.03	0.19	-0.06	0.19	0.12	0.22	0.15	0.23
Tenure	-0.05*	0.02	-0.05*	0.02	-0.03	0.02	-0.03	0.02
Private Sector	-0.23	0.19	-0.22	0.19				
Guilt X Stigma	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.05	0.04	0.08	0.06	0.08
Predictors								
Shaming			0.03	0.08			0.06	0.08
Stigmatization	0.28	0.23	0.29	0.22	0.01	0.39	-0.12	0.41
Shaming X Stigma			-0.16**	0.05			0.06	0.05
R^2		0.18		0.23		0.08		0.09
ΔR^2				0.05**				0.01

Note. Unstandardized coefficients.

Chinese sample $n = 197$; Western sample $n = 175$.

Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2.

Private Sector = 1; Public Sector = 0.

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

*** $p < .001$

Table 53. Paper 3: The Moderating Effect of Stigmatization on Negative Emotion toward the Violation at Time 2 – Robustness Check including Abusive Supervision

	Negative Emotion toward the Violation			
	Chinese Sample			
	Model 1		Model 2	
	b	SE	b	SE
Controls				
Guitling	0.16*	0.08	0.14	0.08
Age	0.05*	0.02	0.05*	0.02
Gender	0.00	0.20	-0.05	0.19
Tenure	-0.05*	0.02	-0.05*	0.02
Private Sector	-0.25	0.19	-0.23	0.19
Abusive Supervision	-0.07	0.08	-0.05	0.08
Guitling X Stigma	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.05
Predictors				
Shaming			0.03	0.08
Stigmatization	0.32	0.23	0.32	0.23
Shaming X Stigma			-0.15**	0.05
R^2		0.19		0.23
ΔR^2				0.04**

Note. Unstandardized coefficients.

Chinese sample $n = 197$.

Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2; Private Sector = 1; Public Sector = 0.

Stigma/Stigmatization = Stigmatizing Shaming.

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Table 54. Paper 3: The Moderated Mediating Effect of Stigmatization on Interpersonal Deviance via Negative Emotion toward the Target

	Chinese Sample				Western Sample			
	Neg. Emo. Target (T2)		Interp. Deviance (T3)		Neg. Emo. Target (T2)		Interp. Deviance (T3)	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Control Variables								
GUILTING	0.20**	0.07	-0.04	0.03	0.15	0.13	-0.03	0.05
Age	0.04	0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01
Gender	-0.07	0.19	-0.26**	0.08	0.05	0.23	-0.37***	0.09
Tenure	-0.04*	0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01
Private Sector	-0.30	0.19	0.12	0.08				
Predictor Variables								
Shaming	0.20	0.18	0.05	0.03	-0.13	0.20	0.09**	0.03
Stigmatization	0.66***	0.18			0.08	0.18		
Shaming X Stigma	-0.09	0.05			0.04	0.05		
Mediator								
T2 Neg. Emo. Target			0.10**	0.03			-0.04	0.03
<i>R</i> ²		0.18***		0.13***		0.05		0.17***

Note. Unstandardized coefficients.

Chinese sample *n* = 197; Western sample *n* = 175.

Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2; Private Sector = 1; Public Sector = 0.

Stigma/Stigmatization = Stigmatizing Shaming.

* *p* < .05

** *p* < .01

*** *p* < .001

Table 55. Paper 3: The Moderated Mediating Effect of Stigmatization on Norm Deviance via Negative Emotion toward the Violation

	Chinese Sample				Western Sample			
	Neg. Emo. Violation (T2)		Norm Deviance (T3)		Neg. Emo. Violation (T2)		Norm Deviance (T3)	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Control Variables								
GUILTING	0.15*	0.07	-0.29***	0.06	0.26*	0.12	-0.11	0.07
Age	0.05*	0.02	-0.03	0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.01
Gender	-0.05	0.19	-0.09	0.14	0.16	0.22	-0.15	0.13
Tenure	-0.05*	0.02	-0.00	0.02	-0.03	0.02	-0.00	0.01
Private Sector	-0.22	0.19	-0.01	0.13				
Predictor Variables								
Shaming	0.49**	0.18	0.07	0.05	-0.13	0.20	0.10*	0.04
Stigmatization	0.95***	0.18			-0.01	0.17		
Shaming X Stigma	-0.15**	0.05			0.06	0.05		
Mediator								
T2 Neg. Emo. Violation			0.04	0.05			-0.03	0.04
<i>R</i> ²		0.23***		0.17***		0.09*		0.08*

Note. Unstandardized coefficients.

Chinese sample $n = 197$; Western sample $n = 175$.

Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2; Private Sector = 1; Public Sector = 0.

Stigma/Stigmatization = Stigmatizing Shaming.

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

*** $p < .001$

Table 56. Paper 3: The Moderating Effect of Reintegration on Negative Emotion toward the Target at Time 2

	Negative Emotion toward the Target (T2)							
	Chinese Sample				Western Sample			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 1		Model 2	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Controls								
Guilt	0.27***	0.07	0.26***	0.07	0.21	0.12	0.21	0.12
Age	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Gender	-0.08	0.19	-0.08	0.19	0.00	0.23	0.01	0.23
Tenure	-0.04*	0.02	-0.05*	0.02	-0.02	0.02	-0.02	0.02
Private Sector	-0.21	0.18	-0.25	0.18				
Guilt X Reintegrate	-0.13*	0.05	-0.13*	0.05	0.01	0.07	0.00	0.07
Predictors								
Shaming			0.01	0.06			0.03	0.08
Reintegration	0.25	0.24	0.26	0.24	-0.23	0.35	-0.22	0.36
Shaming X Reintegrate			0.12*	0.05			0.01	0.05
R^2		0.18		0.21		0.066		0.067
ΔR^2				0.03*				0.001

Note: Unstandardized coefficients.

Chinese sample $n = 197$; Western sample $n = 175$.

Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2.

Private Sector = 1; Public Sector = 0.

Reintegrate/Reintegration = Reintegrative Shaming.

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

*** $p < .001$

Table 57. Paper 3: The Moderating Effect of Reintegration on Negative Emotion toward the Target at Time 2 – Robustness Check including Abusive Supervision

	Negative Emotion toward the Target			
	Chinese Sample			
	Model 1		Model 2	
	b	SE	b	SE
Controls				
Guilting	0.27***	0.08	0.25***	0.07
Age	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.02
Gender	-0.08	0.19	-0.07	0.19
Tenure	-0.04*	0.02	-0.05*	0.02
Private Sector	-0.21	0.18	-0.25	0.18
Abusive Supervision	0.01	0.07	-0.02	0.08
Guilting X Reintegrate	-0.13*	0.05	-0.13*	0.05
Predictors				
Shaming			0.01	0.07
Reintegration	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.25
Shaming X Reintegrate			0.12*	0.05
R^2		0.18		0.21
ΔR^2				0.03*

Note. Unstandardized coefficients.

Chinese sample $n = 197$.

Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2; Private Sector = 1; Public Sector = 0.

Reintegrate/Reintegration = Reintegrative Shaming.

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Table 58. Paper 3: The Moderating Effect of Reintegration on Negative Emotion toward the Violation at Time 2

	Negative Emotion toward the Violation (T2)							
	Chinese Sample				Western Sample			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 1		Model 2	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Controls								
Guilting	0.24**	0.08	0.22**	0.08	0.26*	0.11	0.29*	0.12
Age	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01
Gender	-0.08	0.20	-0.06	0.20	0.08	0.22	0.13	0.22
Tenure	-0.05*	0.02	-0.05*	0.02	-0.02	0.02	-0.03	0.02
Private Sector	-0.12	0.20	-0.14	0.20				
Guilting X Reintegrate	0.01	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.10	0.07	0.08	0.07
Predictors								
Shaming			0.07	0.07			0.08	0.07
Reintegration	-0.23	0.26	-0.20	0.26	-0.69*	0.34	-0.58	0.35
Shaming X Reintegrate			0.13*	0.05			-0.06	0.05
R^2		0.09		0.12		0.1		0.12
ΔR^2				0.03*				0.02

Note. Unstandardized coefficients.

Chinese sample $n = 197$; Western sample $n = 175$.

Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2.

Private Sector = 1; Public Sector = 0.

Reintegrate/Reintegration = Reintegrative Shaming.

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

*** $p < .001$

Table 59. Paper 3: The Moderating Effect of Reintegration on Negative Emotion toward the Violation at Time 2 – Robustness Check including Abusive Supervision

	Negative Emotion toward the Violation			
	Chinese Sample			
	Model 1		Model 2	
	b	SE	b	SE
Controls				
GUILTING	0.24**	0.27	0.22**	0.08
Age	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.02
Gender	-0.09	0.20	-0.06	0.20
Tenure	-0.05*	0.02	-0.05*	0.02
Private Sector	-0.12	0.20	-0.14	0.20
Abusive Supervision	0.05	0.08	0.00	0.08
GUILTING X Reintegrate	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06
Predictors				
Shaming			0.07	0.07
Reintegration	-0.18	0.27	-0.20	0.27
Shaming X Reintegrate			0.13*	0.05
R^2		0.09		0.12
ΔR^2				0.03*

Note: Unstandardized coefficients.

Chinese sample $n = 197$; Western sample $n = 175$.

Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2; Private Sector = 1; Public Sector = 0.

Reintegrate/Reintegration = Reintegrative Shaming.

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

*** $p < .001$

Table 60. Paper 3: The Moderating Effect of Reintegration on Interpersonal Deviance via Negative Emotion toward the Target

	Chinese Sample				Western Sample			
	Neg. Emo. Target (T2)		Interp. Deviance (T3)		Neg. Emo. Target (T2)		Interp. Deviance (T3)	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Control Variables								
Guilt	0.27***	0.08	-0.04	0.03	0.32**	0.11	0.11	0.07
Age	0.04	0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Gender	-0.06	0.19	-0.26**	0.08	0.15	0.22	0.15	0.13
Tenure	-0.05*	0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.03	0.02	0.00	0.01
Private Sector	-0.24	0.18	0.12	0.08				
Predictor Variables								
Shaming	-0.53*	0.21	0.05	0.03	0.33	0.18	-0.10*	0.04
Reintegration	-0.70***	0.18			0.00	0.15		
Shaming X Reintegrate	0.12*	0.05			-0.06	0.04		
Mediator								
T2 Neg. Emo. Target			0.10**	0.03			0.03	0.04
<i>R</i> ²		0.18***		0.13***		0.60***		0.73***

Note. Unstandardized coefficients.

Chinese sample $n = 197$; Western sample $n = 175$.

Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2; Private Sector = 1; Public Sector = 0.

Reintegrate/Reintegration = Reintegrative Shaming.

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

*** $p < .001$

Table 61. Paper 3: The Moderating Effect of Reintegration on Norm Deviance via Negative Emotion toward the Violation

	Chinese Sample				Western Sample			
	Neg. Emo. Violation (T2)		Norm Deviance (T3)		Neg. Emo. Violation (T2)		Norm Deviance (T3)	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Control Variables								
Guilt	0.22**	0.08	-0.29***	0.06	0.32**	0.11	-0.11	0.07
Age	0.04	0.02	-0.03	0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.01
Gender	-0.06	0.20	-0.09	0.14	0.15	0.22	-0.15	0.13
Tenure	-0.05*	0.02	-0.00	0.02	-0.03	0.02	-0.00	0.01
Private Sector	-0.14	0.20	-0.01	0.13				
Predictor Variables								
Shaming	-0.50*	0.23	0.07	0.05	0.33	0.18	0.10*	0.04
Reintegration	-0.63***	0.19			0.00	0.15		
Shaming X Reintegrate	0.13*	0.05			-0.06	0.04		
Mediator								
T2 Neg. Emo. Violation			0.04	0.05			-0.03	0.04
<i>R</i> ²		0.13**		0.17***		0.11**		0.08*

Note. Unstandardized coefficients.

Chinese sample *n* = 197; Western sample *n* = 175.

Gender: Male = 1, Female = 2; Private Sector = 1; Public Sector = 0.

Reintegrate/Reintegration = Reintegrative Shaming.

* *p* < .05

** *p* < .01

*** *p* < .001

Figure 3. Paper 3: The Hypothesized Model




Figure 4. Paper 3: Variable Capturing for the Hypothesized Model Across Three Timepoints




Figure 5. Paper 3: The Moderating Effect of Shame Culture Orientation on the Relationship between Witnessing Shaming and Norm Commitment




Figure 6. Paper 3: The Moderating Effect of Stigmatization on the Relationship between Witnessing Shaming and Negative Emotion toward the Target



Figure 7. Paper 3: The Moderating Effect of Stigmatization on the Relationship between Witnessing Shaming and Negative Emotion toward the Violation



Figure 8. Paper 3: The Moderating Effect of Reintegrative Shaming on the Relationship between Witnessing Shaming and Negative Emotion toward the Target



Figure 9. Paper 3: The Moderating Effect of Reintegrative Shaming on the Relationship between Witnessing Shaming and Negative Emotion toward the Violation



APPENDIX D

Independent Variables

Shaming Items adapted from Shame Culture Items (developed in Paper 2)

Reflect on how management punishes norm violations in your work group. Then, indicate to what extent the following statements reflect how management punishes norm violations in your work group.

1. People are publicly shamed as punishment for wrongdoing.
2. Norms are enforced by making an example of people who violate them.
3. It is common to publicly humiliate employees for violating a norm.
4. When employees break rules, the punishment is carried out in public.

Mediators

Workgroup Commitment (Vandenberghe, Bentein, & Stinglhamber, 2004)

Consider your feelings towards your work group. Then indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements.

1. I really feel a sense of “belonging” to my work group.
2. I feel proud to be a member of my work group.
3. My work group means a lot to me.
4. I do not feel emotionally attached to my work group. (R)
5. I do not feel like “part of the family” in my work group. (R)
6. I do not feel a strong sense of “belonging” to my work group. (R)

Commitment to the violated norms (Klein, Wesson, Hollenbeck, Wright & DeShon, 2001).

In reference to the norms that were violated, please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements:

Original Items - Goal Commitment	Adapted Items - Norm Commitment
1. It’s hard to take this goal seriously. (R) 2. It’s unrealistic for me to expect to reach this goal. (R) 3. It is quite likely that this goal may need to be revised, depending on how things go. (R) 4. Quite frankly, I don’t care if I achieve this goal or not. (R)	1. It’s hard to take these norms seriously. (R) 2. It’s unrealistic for me to expect to follow these norms. (R) 3. It is quite likely that these norms may need to be revised, depending on how things go. (R) 4. Quite frankly, I don’t care if I follow norms

<p>5. I am strongly committed to pursuing this goal.</p> <p>6. It wouldn't take much to make me abandon this goal. (R)</p> <p>7. I think this is a good goal to shoot for.</p> <p>8. I am willing to put forth a great deal of effort beyond what I'd normally do to achieve this goal.</p> <p>9. There is not much to be gained by trying to achieve this goal.</p>	<p>or not. (R)</p> <p>5. I am strongly committed to following these norms.</p> <p>6. It wouldn't take much to make me stop following these norms. (R)</p> <p>7. I think following these norms are a good goal to shoot for.</p> <p>8. I am willing to put forth a great deal of effort beyond what I'd normally do to follow these norms.</p> <p>9. There is not much to be gained by trying to follow these norms.</p>
--	---

Condemning Moral Emotion (Anger/Disgust/Contempt toward the target and violation)
(Fredrickson, Tugade, Waugh & Larkin, 2003)

Consider the violator (violation) and rate how you feel toward the violator (violation):

(Disgust)

Disgust

Distaste

Revulsion

(Anger)

Angry/Anger

Annoyed/Annoyance

Irritated/Irritation

(Contempt)

Contemptuous/Contempt

Scornful/Scorn

Disdainful/Disdain

Moderators

Guilt and Shame Culture Orientation (developed in Paper 2)

The following statements indicate your personal beliefs about how norm violations ought to be punished. Your personal beliefs about how norm violations should be addressed may differ from how they are actually addressed. So, the responses to the following items should reflect your personal beliefs. Indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements.

Guilt Culture Orientation	Shame Culture Orientation
----------------------------------	----------------------------------

<p>1. I believe people should be privately reprimanded for wrongdoing.</p> <p>2. I believe norms should be enforced by confronting the wrongdoer one-on-one.</p> <p>3. I believe it is best to privately confront employees for violating a norm.</p> <p>4. When employees break rules, the punishment should be carried out in private.</p>	<p>1. I believe people should be publicly shamed as punishment for wrongdoing.</p> <p>2. I believe norms should be enforced by making an example of people who violate them.</p> <p>3. I believe it is acceptable to publicly humiliate employees for violating a norm.</p> <p>4. When employees break rules, the punishment should be out in public.</p>
--	---

Stigmatizing Shaming (adapted from Losoncz & Tyson, 2007)

Consider how management treats employees who have violated cherished norms. Then indicate your agreement with the following statements.

Stigmatizing Shaming Original Items	Stigmatizing Shaming Adapted Items
<p>To what extent did the justice system . . .</p> <p>. . . show disappointment in you as a person.</p> <p>. . . make you feel ashamed of yourself.</p> <p>. . . make negative judgments about what kind of person you are.</p> <p>. . . treat you as though you are a bad person.</p> <p>. . . treat you like a criminal.</p> <p>. . . think of you as a bad person.</p>	<p>In the course of addressing the employee's wrongdoing, to what extent does (did) management . . .</p> <p>. . . show disappointment in the employee as a person.</p> <p>. . . make the employee feel ashamed of themselves.</p> <p>. . . make negative judgments about the kind of person the employee is.</p> <p>. . . treat the employee as though s/he is a bad person.</p> <p>. . . treat the employee like a criminal.</p> <p>. . . show that they think the employee is a bad person.</p>

Reintegrative Shaming (adapted from Losoncz & Tyson, 2007)

Reintegrative Shaming Original Items	Reintegrative Shaming Adapted Items
<p>To what extent did the justice system . . .</p> <p>. . . let you know in some way that they still trust you.</p> <p>. . . let you know in some way that they still care about you.</p> <p>. . . discuss what happened with you.</p>	<p>In the course of addressing the employee's wrongdoing, to what extent does (did) management . . .</p> <p>. . . let the employee know in some way that they are still trusted.</p> <p>. . . let the employee know in some that they</p>

<p>. . mention it to someone else (when you do good things). . . . forgive you after a while.</p>	<p>are still cared about. . . . discuss what happened with the employee. . . . mention other things the employee did that were good. . . . forgive the employee after a while.</p>
--	---

Dependent Variables

Organizational Deviance (Bennett & Robinson, 2000)

Consider your behavior at work and indicate the extent to which you engage in the following:

1. Taken property from work without permission
2. Spent too much time fantasizing or daydreaming instead of working
3. Falsified a receipt to get reimbursed for more money than you spent on business expenses
4. Taken an additional or longer break than is acceptable at your workplace
5. Come in late to work without permission
6. Littered your work environment
7. Neglected to follow your boss's instructions
8. Intentionally worked slower than you could have worked
9. Discussed confidential company information with an unauthorized person
10. Used an illegal drug or consumed alcohol on the job
11. Put little effort into your work
12. Dragged out work in order to get overtime

Interpersonal Deviance (Bennett & Robinson, 2000)

Consider your treatment of the violator(s) and respond to the following items.

Original Items	Adapted Items
<p>I have . . .</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. . . .made fun of someone at work 2. . . .said something hurtful to someone at work 3. . . .made an ethnic, religious, or racial remark at work 4. . . . cursed at someone at work. 5. . . . played a mean prank on someone at work 6. . . . acted rudely toward someone at work 7. . . . publicly embarrassed someone at work 	<p>I have . . .</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. . . .made fun of the employee at work 2. . . . said something hurtful to the employee 3. . . . made an ethnic, religious, or racial remark directed at the employee 4. . . . cursed at the employee 5. . . . played a mean prank on the employee at work 6. . . . acted rudely toward the employee at work 7. . . . publicly embarrassed the employee at work

Deviance from the violated norms (Tyler & Blader, 2005)

Recall the norm violation(s) that is (are) punished in your organization. Indicate your behavior regarding this norm:

Original Items	Adapted Items
<p>This employee . . .</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. complies with work related rules and regulations. 2. uses company rules to guide what they do on the job. 3. carefully carries out supervisor instructions. 4. follows established policies. 5. seeks information about appropriate company policies before acting. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. I comply with work related rules and regulations regarding these norms. (R) 2. I use company rules to guide what I do on the job regarding these norms. (R) 3. I carefully carry out supervisor instructions regarding these norms. (R) 4. I follow established policies regarding these norms. (R) 5. I seek information about appropriate company policies before acting regarding these norms. (R)