

EXTRACTS FROM A PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE CAMBODIAN POLICE ASSISTED BY THE US FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI)

Following the publication today by the Washington Post of revelations concerning Second Prime Minister Hun Sen's involvement in the March 30 grenade attack in front of the National Assembly, it is appropriate to publish the following extracts:

May 2, 1997

[American Ambassador] Kenneth M. Quinn and [FBI] Special Agent X met [CPP Co-Minister of Interior] Sar Kheng on Friday afternoon at his residence at 3 p.m. Subject of the meeting was « Lack of cooperation with the [Cambodian counterpart on the grenade incident]. Ambassador Quinn reportedly told Sar Kheng that the investigation is going nowhere due to the lack of cooperation with the committee. He said the FBI team is here to fulfill your request, the committee on the other hand must do something more concrete and according to X, the Ambassador asked Sar Kheng if he could arrange a meeting with the [Hun Sen's] soldiers. Sar Kheng told Quinn that he already wrote a letter to Hun Sen but received no reply.

May 8, 1997

The chopper landed near the circle on the roadway [near the (ambodiana hotel) about 2 p.m. in the afternoon of March 30, 1997 and dropped two passengers off. Three Toyota Landcruisers went to the chopper and delivered two men believed to be suspects to [CPP] Vice-Governor of Kandal Province, named Kun Kim, Hun Sen's Unit # 2 Deputy (General) Ban Heang was seen with suspects on one of the Landcruisers.

May 15, 1997

On Thursday May 15, 1997, [FBI] Special Agent X who led the team of FBI investigators told the investigative Committee during a working dinner at Ly Lay restaurant that he wanted to recommend to the Committee the following:

« The Committee overseeing the investigation of the grenade attack on March 30, 1997 against Sam Rainsy's demonstration must blame the military units which stationed on street # 7 in front of the [Borum] pagoda. [...] and also at the park: Hun Sen's Unit # 2 (commander Huy Piseth revealed that the second Prime Minister cabinet gave the order on March 29 at 6 a.m. to dispatch the soldiers in order to secure the perimeter against infiltration. He said Major (Thin Sovann, the assistant to Gen Huy Piseth admitted that he put 15 men in the area [...]). [...] Special [FBI] agent X also recommended « the military units must be responsible as to why under the hot summer, especially in (ambodia, these soldiers were [dressed] in combat [uniforms], readily armed with AK47 rifles and wearing [helmets] with nets « it looks to me as if they were in maneuver or sent to the battlefield. It also looks so bad that they were not protecting civilians but threatening to shoot people instead. » He said « Never in the world military units confront civilians: If that [was] so, they look very bad, very bad for the country, especially the second Prime Minister. People all over the world learned from the press, from eyewitnesses accounts, from diplomats, they point their finger at the second Prime Minister. I have to believe them because Hun Sen's people did not say the truth [...]. There is nobody else except Hun Sen guards who let the grenade thrower into the [CPP] compound [...]. »

[...] Agent Y cut the conversation by saying that the street should be free for protesters and this is what the « real democracy is all about. If you threaten [...] civilians and use [...] guns, democracy will go down the drain. » [Two-star Police General and CPP Steering Committee member] Teng Savong (in charge of the investigation) whispered to my ear saying: « We knew who gave the order to attack the protesters but I [cannot say anything]. It is too dangerous. »

May 20, 1997

[...] Y began questioning [the witness] by asking him to tell him what he knows and what he saw before and after the bombing and where [he was]. [The witness] told the investigator that he was [...] sitting by the window by himself, looking out and suddenly [he saw] a guy appearing, looking nervous, [walking] a little fast and there was another man following behind. [The witness said] « I looked at him until he went [...] into the [CPP compound] »

May 23, 1997 - Special reports on sketches provided by FBI

Subjects [suspects] # 1 and # 2 ran [...] through Hun Sen's protection units [...] and went to the barracks or CPP compound with the help of somebody who opened the back gate. Subject # 3 ran through CPP compound and headed toward Hun Sen residence.

Note: For security reasons, names of witnesses and investigating agents have been deleted and/or replaced by X or Y.