

**Manufacturing Towns in China**  
**Governance, Space, and Conveyance of Rural Migrants to the Assembly Line**

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To Rural Migrants

University of Washington

**Abstract**

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With respect to the current unprecedented Chinese industrialization and urbanization in human history, this dissertation studies three themes: rural migrants, governance, and manufacturing towns. It identifies the few studies of the themes on the scale of towns and villages, especially non-factory areas—town and village centers, and rural migrants’ living zones—as well as about the history of manufacturing towns. Thereby it focuses on examining the governance of rural migrants as ongoing resources of cheap labor in non-factory areas. To collect data, the author conducted 11-month ethnographical field studies in Dongguan, which symbolizes “the world’s factory” and consists of a sizable migrants’ population. My research methodology refers to an analytical frame based on Michel Foucault’s governmentality and Nikolas Rose’s interpretation of governance. This analytical frame highlights that local authorities—local governments, village

collectives, and industrialists—practice their governmentalities through implementing various governing technologies as tools and accordingly shaping spaces in order to govern rural migrants.

This dissertation argues that the governance of rural migrants in non-factory areas acts as several “invisible filters” corresponding to different spaces of non-factory areas, reinforcing the effect of rural labor supply and industrialists’ governance in factories. These “invisible filters” screen some rural migrants for inclusion as qualified factory labor and excludes the rest. This strengthens the treatment of rural migrants as ongoing resources of factory labor during the reform period. The screening mechanism of “invisible filters” is the local authorities’ heterogeneous conduct for dividing, segregating, examining, policing, selecting, reaching, cultivating, and finally organizing rural migrants while accordingly shaping the spaces of manufacturing towns. As a result, local authorities absorb a few high-*suzhi* (quality) rural migrants who are young, docile, devoted, skilled, and higher educated into advanced factory programs while demanding a large number of rural migrants, who are unskilled and low-educated, and must be young, docile and healthy, as cheap labor. In addition, local authorities exclude the rest of rural migrants as “dangerous personnel” whom these authorities perceive to harm social stability and manufacturing production potentially.

In contrast, rural migrants are not simply obedient and may resist the governance by applying their own techniques. Besides self-organized and individual resistance directly against authorities and their governance, rural migrants can choose to produce their peasants’ identities or imitations of urban residents’ identities instead of keeping their rural migrants’ identities such as strangers,

outsiders, and “blind flow”. Thereafter, they resist the governance through “vote by foot”—desertion of manufacturing industry or towns. In response, local authorities must change the governance accordingly. Through the reform era, the three research themes have been transforming with respect to constant interaction between local authorities’ governance and rural migrants’ resistance.

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## List of Abbreviations

BLRD	Bureau of Land and Resources of Dongguan
CALH	credit accumulation for local <i>hukou</i>
CCCCP	Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CRP	custody and repatriation procedure
DIPC	Dongguan Intermediate People's Court
DPSB	Dongguan Public Security Bureau
DSB	Dongguan Statistics Bureau
DTYIT	Dongguan Twenty Year Investigation Team
DUPD	Dongguan Urban Planning Bureau
DUPDI	Dongguan Urban Planning and Design Institute
FDI	Foreign direct investment
GDP	gross domestic product
GLF	Great Leap Forward
GOGG	General Office of the Guangdong Government
GOSC	General Office of the State Council
NBSC	National Bureau of Statistics of China
PPCC	People's Political Consultative Conference
PRD	Pearl River Delta
RMB	<i>renminbi</i> , Chinese currency, the unit is <i>yuan</i>
SCPRC	State Council of the People's Republic of China
SOE	State-owned enterprise
Songshanhu	Songshan Lake National Hi-tech Industrial Development Zone
TRC	Temporary resident card
TVE	Town and village enterprise
XSMB	XinGuanRen Service and Management Bureau

Note:

1 *mu* = 666.67 m<sup>2</sup> = 7175.94 ft<sup>2</sup>

1 meter = 3.28 feet

1 kilometer = 0.62 mile

1 *yuan* ≈ 0.16 U.S. dollars (in 2013)

## List of Chinese Terms

<i>baoshengong</i>	包身工 (indentured worker without pay)
<i>cun gai ju</i>	村改居 (turning villages into urban communities)
<i>chanye zhuan gongyeyuan</i>	产业转移工业园 (transferred-industry zones)
<i>chengguan</i>	城管 (law enforcers of the Urban Administrative and Law Enforcement Bureau)
<i>cheng zhong cun</i>	城中村 (villages in the city)
<i>chunfeng songluan</i>	春风送暖 (an government event called “Spring Breeze Brings Warmness” in which the government as spring breeze care for the poor)
<i>dazi bao</i>	大字报 (big-character poster)
<i>danwei</i>	单位 (work unit)
<i>dazhuan</i>	大专/大学专科 (college specialty)
<i>di fu fan huai you</i>	地富反坏右 (Landlords, rich farmers, antirevolutionaries, bad-influencers, and rightists)
<i>diaoyu de</i>	钓鱼的 (“fishing people” or burglar)
<i>dousi pixiu</i>	斗私批修 (struggle against selfishness and criticize socialist revisionism)
<i>e'shou fangdong</i>	二手房东 (secondary landlord)
<i>gongchang jia</i>	工厂价 (“factory price” or low price offered by factories)
<i>gaozhi/ gaodeng zhiye</i>	高职/高等职业 (higher vocation)
<i>hexie shehui</i>	和谐社会 (harmonious society)
<i>hukou</i>	户口 (household registration)
<i>jingji lianhe she</i>	经济联合社 (economic cooperative)
<i>jifen ruhu</i>	积分入户 (credit accumulation for local <i>hukou</i> )
<i>juzhu xiaoqu</i>	居住小区 (compounds of urban communities)
<i>kongzhi renkou shulang tigao renkou suzhi</i>	控制人口数量，提高人口素质 (control of population’s quantity and increase of population’s quality)
<i>lailiao jiagong zhuangpei bangongshi</i>	来料加工办公室 (Processing and Assembling Office)
<i>liudong renkou</i>	流动人口 (floating population)
<i>majiang</i>	麻将 (a game in which four persons play tiles)
<i>mang liu</i>	盲流 (“blind flow” or aimless migration)

<i>minbing</i>	民兵 (militia)
<i>nongmingong</i>	农民工 (“farmer worker” or rural migrant worker)
<i>nongmin gongyu</i>	农民公寓 (farmers’ apartment)
<i>nongjia shuwu</i>	农家书屋 (farmers’ reading room)
<i>wan</i>	玩 (“play”, enjoy or consume)
<i>pugong</i>	普工 (“ordinary worker” or unskilled worker)
<i>quzhong gongzuo</i>	群众工作 (mass work)
<i>quzhong luxian</i>	群众路线 (mass line)
<i>rencai shichang</i>	人才市场 (talent market)
<i>renmin wuzhuang bu</i>	人民武装部 (Department of People’s Armed Force)
<i>sangji yutang</i>	桑基鱼塘 (mulberry dike-fish pond complex)
<i>sanjiu gaizao</i>	三旧改造 (redevelopment of three types of dilapidated rural settings: towns, villages, and factory buildings)
<i>sanlai yibu</i>	三来一补 (foreign investment in forms of processing, assembling, and compensation trade)
<i>santong yiping</i>	三通一平 (land development of supplying water and electricity, constructing motor roads, and leveling land)
<i>sanzi qiye</i>	三资企业 (three forms of foreign financed enterprises including equity joined ventures, contractual joint ventures, and wholly foreign-owned ventures)
<i>song wennuan</i>	送温暖 (deliver care and warmth)
<i>shengti suzhi</i>	身体素质 (qualities of bodies)
<i>shuang zhuan yi</i>	双转移 (“Two Transfers” or transfers of both factories and rural migrants)
<i>suzhi</i>	素质 (“quality” or a set of degrees or attributes of human spirits, morality, values, education, skills, physical bodies, etc.)
<i>suzhi jiaoyu</i>	素质教育 (education of quality)
<i>Teng long huan nia</i>	(腾笼换鸟 “empty cages and transfer birds” or reclaim territories and transfer migrant labor)
<i>tudi miao</i>	土地庙 (land-god temple)
<i>tufei</i>	土匪 (bandit)
<i>tonggou tongxiao</i>	统购统销 (unified purchasing and marketing)
<i>wenmin</i>	文明 (civility)
<i>wu lei ren</i>	五类人 (five types of population or five types of rural migrant population)
<i>xianzhang</i>	线长 (assembly line leaders)
<i>xiaokang</i>	小康 (“well-off” or moderate prosperity)

<i>xingfu Guangdong</i>	幸福广东 (happiness of Guangdong)
<i>xinguanren</i>	新莞人 (“new Dongguan people” or new Dongguan citizen)
<i>xin houniao jihua</i>	新候鸟计划 (“New Migrant Bird Plan” or New Rural Migrant Children Plan)
<i>xin shimin</i>	新市民 (new urban citizen)
<i>yao zhifu, xian xiulu</i>	要致富，先修路 (construction of roads to be rich)
<i>yangchenggong</i>	养成工 (contracted workers with low pay)
<i>yidi wugong renyuan</i>	异地务工人员 (non-local worker)
<i>yuan meng jihua</i>	圆梦计划 (“True Dream Plan” or Guangdong New Generation Leading Migrant Workers Cultivation and Development Plan)
<i>zanzhu renkou</i>	暂住人口 (temporary resident)
<i>zhi’anyuan</i>	治安员 (auxiliary police or informal town/village police)
<i>Zhi’andui</i>	治安队 (village police team)
<i>zhongzhuan/ zhongdeng zhuan</i>	中专/中等专业 (secondary vocation)
<i>zuzhi junshihua, xingdong zhandouhua, shenghuo jitihua</i>	组织军事化，行动战斗化，生活集体化 (militarized organizations, combat-like actions, and collectivization of lives)
<i>zuzhang</i>	组长 (team leaders)

# Introduction

## I. Summary of the Research Problem and Approach

In China's current rapid urbanization and industrialization, a large portion of the over-250-million rural migrants is working in coastal towns where light manufacturing industry dominates the economy. Although rural-to-urban migration represents a freedom of movement that was not possible under the centrally planned economy of the Mao era (especially from 1958 to 1978) (Chan, 1994 & 2009; Wang, 2005), these rural migrants experience a wide range of constraints on their actions from various institutions as well as less formal forms of authority. An essential feature of rural migrants' transformation from farmers into low-wage urban industrial workers is that they remain secondary citizens with low socio-economic status in comparison with established urban residents or even with the established residents of rural villages. These villages have become urban simply by virtue of their location within expanding urban areas. Incidents like the Foxconn suicides in Shenzhen and the Honda Strike in Foshan, and riots in multiple new industrial towns in southern China such as Zengcheng, Shaxi, and Guxiang alert us the consequences of repressing rural migrants. Such events demand we pay attention to the way that rural migrants are governed, the conditions in which they work and live, the constraints they experience, and the forms of resistance they devise in response to constraints. Given the force that rural-to-urban migration represents in the urbanization of Chinese society and environment, it is especially important that we understand how the planning and development of manufacturing towns is relevant to the governance of rural migrants.

To understand the governance of rural migrants in manufacturing towns, this dissertation takes Foucault's concept of governmentality (Foucault, 2004/2007) as a theoretical starting point, and Nikolas Rose's concept of governance (Rose, 1999) as an analytical frame. Governmentality—authorities' rationality initiating "the conduct of conduct"—studies the various forms and operations of power/knowledge in modern society (Dean, 1999; Foucault, 2004/2007; Rose, 1999). Considering political power in terms of governmentality, Rose (1999,

p.20) argues that understanding governance “is to start by asking what authorities of various sorts wanted to happen, in relation to problems defined how, in pursuit of what objectives, through what strategies and techniques.” This problematizes governance into an analytical frame questioning aspects such as political rationality, governing technology and governable space that seek to shape governable subjects’ conduct to achieve certain ends (Rose, 1999 p.20; Bray, 2005 p.51-57). Through the application of this analytical frame, the dissertation identifies three governing authorities in manufacturing towns: the government, village collectives, and industrialists. The dissertation then interprets the three authorities’ political rationalities respectively in Foucault’s terms of pastoral power, sovereignty and discipline (1975/1979 & 2004/2007). Finally, the dissertation describes rural migrants’ resistance to these forms of governmentality.

There are three gaps in the existing literature on governance, rural migrants, and the planning and development of manufacturing towns in China which this dissertation attempts to fill. First, few studies of rural migrants address governance on the scale of towns. Second, few studies address these themes in non-factory spaces. Third, few studies address the comparative history of manufacturing towns within China or between China and elsewhere in the world. There is some literature on Chinese governance in terms of governmentality (Rofel, 1992; Bray, 2005; Sigley 2006; Jeffreys; 2006&2009; Feng, 2009; Hoffman, 2010), but only Rofel (1992) and Feng (2009) study rural migrants as governable subjects. There is a sizable literature about rural migrants on various spatial scales such as global (Hsing, 1998; Pun, 2005), national (Cai, 1999, 2001 & 2010; Chan, 1994, 2008, 2009 & 2010; Wang, 2005; Solinger, 2006; Fan, 2008; Whyte, 2010), and individual levels (Pun, 2005 & 2012; Rofel, 1992; Yan, 2008). Few studies examine rural migrants at the scale of towns or villages (Chang, 2010; Eng, 1997; Yeung, 2001; Zhang, 2001). Most of the spatially oriented literature on rural migrants focuses on factory spaces and manufacturing production (Cai, 1999, 2001 & 2010; Chan, 2010; Hsing, 1998; Pun, 2005; Rofel, 1992; Yeung, 2001), instead of non-factory spaces and rural migrants’ consumption. In all of this work, an historical perspective is rare.

Based on the existing literature and Foucault’s and Rose’s theoretical framework, the dissertation asks:

How do the authorities of Chinese manufacturing towns govern rural migrants as an on-going source of cheap labor, even as global market demand and other economic imperatives put constant pressure on towns and industries to adapt their manufacturing output and attract a workforce with appropriate skill levels?

Especially, I ask what governing rationalities and technologies the authorities in manufacturing towns use with respect to rural migrants, what problems the authorities encounter in this process, what kinds of spaces authorities develop in manufacturing towns, and how rural migrants resist those aspects of governance that constrain or exclude them.

To explore these questions, the dissertation adopts the prefectural municipality of Dongguan in Guangdong province as a case study. With 28 towns, a significant manufacturing industry and six million rural migrants, Dongguan is a symbol of the “World Factory” in China. The dissertation focuses on one town that shares significant features with other towns in Dongguan, especially a booming light manufacturing industry and a large rural migrant population. Within the town, it focuses on one indigenous village, and the town’s new central square as key spaces outside the factories. In addition, the dissertation addresses the municipally planned development of a new town, the Songshan Lake National Hi-tech Industrial Development Zone (locally shortened as Songshanhu). Within these two town-scale case studies, the dissertation focuses on non-factory areas: rural migrants’ rental housing, retail streets, and town/village centers.

Primary data collection took the form of environmental and participatory observation, as well as open-ended and semi-structured interviews. Living in the indigenous villages of Dongguan, I had numerous daily conversations with rural migrants. In observation, I paid attention to rural migrants’ behavior and their interaction with authorities’ agents in events such as factory recruitment and government propagation of new policies, and their daily activities in the town. I also observed urban form in the two towns from the self-development of village collectives to the planning and design of the town central square and the new town. I carried out open-ended interviews with 83 rural migrants, 13 government officials and 8 indigenous villagers, some of whom I interviewed several times. I gathered documentary data primarily from government documents including published books, policy files, online government reports,

comprehensive planning files, town and village archives, as well as media reports and street handouts of factories. I also use a few secondary data such as statistical yearbooks, annual reports, and census data.

In data analysis, my research refers to the concept of governmentality and applies Nicholas Rose's analytical frame of governance to my analysis. In addition, my research applies the resistance of the weak (Scott, 1985), practice of everyday life (Certeau, 1985) and technologies of the self (Foucault, 1986; *ibid.* et al, 1988) to analyze rural migrants' resistance. Within the analytical frame, my research applies the constant comparative method in grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss 1967; Corbin & Strauss, 1990) to the process of open coding, focused coding, memo writing, and finding analytical themes. In a circling process, my research compares my data and analytical themes with power theories in order to synthesize them for arguments and conclusions.

## **II. Personal Reflection on My Research**

I reflected on my research regarding the interaction between power and knowledge through three phases of experience: my life experience, my field studies in China, and my research in the United States. During the three phases, I have observed the change of my understanding of my research topic, and the multiple truths in the transitional exercises of power/knowledge. Between 1994 and 2003, I lived in Guangzhou, the capital of Guangdong province. This gave me a simple but chronological impression on Dongguan and rural migrants. Spending several summers and winters between 2009 and 2013, I collected data through my field studies in Dongguan. Meanwhile, I have been producing my research into a dissertation.

Between 1994 and 2003, I occasionally visited Dongguan, over one hour away by bus to the southeast of Guangzhou. In 1994, my parents and I moved from Hunan, an inland province where I grew up, to Guangzhou. Although my parents worked in universities and did not belong to the rural sector, my family migrated to Guangzhou for a better life as many rural migrants did

during the massive growth of the market economy at the time. Afterward, I witnessed the rapid development of Dongguan and observed rural migrants' relatively stagnant socioeconomic character. Around 1998, I was studying architecture at A School when a small local developer in Humen Town of Dongguan hired me to draw construction documents of a high-rise residential and commercial complex. The developer hosted me and other employees within one of his village villas, a four-story building on a hillside with a pigpen on the ground level. At the foot of the hill was an unpaved rural road, where rural migrants built temporary sheds on both sides of the road from iron sheets and bricks for their lodges and stores close to several factories. I seldom talked with rural migrants, even though I also migrated from Hunan to Guangdong. I perceived that my life had no connection with them because I regarded myself as an urban resident in both Hunan and Guangdong. At the time when I studied and worked in Guangzhou, I occasionally visited Dongguan's city centers and towns. However, like many urban residents, I never thought about or had incentives to visit industrial zones in manufacturing towns.

There was a gap between rural migrants' real lives and what ordinary urban residents commonly observed and perceived about them. It was very common to see rural migrants in the city and around my daily life. For instance, rural migrants squatting on sidewalks, resting and chatting, was both a normal and iconic scene in the city. The topic of rural migrants constantly appeared in Chinese media reports about poverty, low education, crime, and transportation during the Chinese Spring Festival and the like. Urban residents had been very easy to access them when we needed their cheap labor, e.g. calling companies to send a group of male rural migrants for moving services or a female rural migrant to be a nanny. However, I could not really participate in their lives since most rural migrants actually lived on the periphery of cities rather than city centers. Rural migrants' daily life occurred in places like industrial zones, a great distance from urban residents' *danwei* and homes. In addition, the constraints on rural migrants such as rigid factory management with low payment had no impact on urban residents who were outside these institutional controls.

Since I lived in Guangzhou, society had taught me to regard rural migrants as cheap labor, mostly due to rural migrants themselves and the labor market. In everyday life, parents routinely used rural migrants as a boogeyman to educate their children: look at those rural

migrants squatting on sidewalks; if you do not study hard, you will be like them, deserving a hard job with low pay. At that time, when the rural labor supply was abundant, many rural migrants worked as moving workers in cities. Once, my parents asked several rural migrant construction workers to move some heavy furniture to the fifth story of an apartment building without elevators. These rural migrants put blankets on their backs, leaned bookshelves and wardrobes on the blankets, and carried the furniture up and down the stairs for a few hundred *yuan*, not a high price. I still remember what one rural migrant worker said, “This is the only way that we can make a little more money besides construction work... Our work is not worth a good price.” I maintained my silence through my parents’ explanation of their limited job opportunities: “what can they do except this kind of job?” Through the fast transition from socialism to a market-oriented economy in only over a decade, we—myself and the Chinese around me—admitted the power of the market but paid little attention to governance, e.g. the *hukou* system, and the urban spaces shaping rural migrants as subjects. This constructed a social truth: rural migrants, who belonged to the lower-tiered rural sector in China’s historical, political, and socioeconomic rural-urban divide, were born to be cheap labor in cities. We not only accepted this ‘truth’ but also built it into our social norms.

In 2009, at the beginning of my field studies, I noticed that I was both an insider and outsider to rural migrants and locals. For my field studies, I started to draw connections with rural migrants through my life experience. As a Chinese national, I had lived in Hunan province, a large source for outgoing rural migrants, for seventeen years. I shared local culture, some habits, and memories with rural migrants from my home region. I had also lived in Guangzhou for almost ten years, could speak Cantonese, and shared a little life experience with the locals in Dongguan. This really benefited my access to rural migrants and key local informants through local classmates and government officials. For instance, a couple of rural migrants from my home region invited me to their rental room and cooked spicy food for me. Village cadres and town officials introduced by my local informants also invited me to have dinner in a luxurious restaurant and insisted to pay for the meal.

However, I also noticed that my research subjects could not fully accept me in field studies. I was an outsider due to my identity as a researcher, and my overseas experiences and

background. My interviewees knew I was a temporary resident in the city because of the span of my research. Rural migrants were interested in my overseas experiences but never believed that I would accept their lifestyle or become one of them. Several officials asked my nationality in my interviews with them, only wishing to release information to a Chinese. However, even though my subjects perceived me as an outsider, they did not lose their trust in me due to my nationality, my cultural connections, and my willingness to share my different life experiences with them. Whenever I mentioned that I was still a Chinese to either rural migrants or government officials, they felt satisfied with my answer, usually had a smile in their faces, and seemed eager to say more to me, even though they obviously admired Western people's lives. In fact, I also benefited from my identity of an outsider: a number of my research subjects shared information, e.g. their attitudes with their co-workers, tenants, landlords, managers, industrialists, the government, and the like, with me more than other members of their communities. Surprisingly, gender and age differences were not a problem for my access to my human subjects. I became familiar with both young and elder as well as both male and female rural migrants.

Through my field studies, my life started to connect with rural migrants. In a follow-up conversation after an interview with a rural migrant, he told me with great appreciation, "Thank you very much for visiting me... no one pays attention to us (rural migrants) and cares about us..." I did nothing except talk with him about his life experience in the interview, yet, he was moved by my actions and I remembered his words. To rural migrants, care from others was rare. They were strangers in the city (Zhang, 2001) and might only rely on the care of themselves. Other researchers from either China or overseas have played the role of activist or used their research to produce knowledge that could change rural migrants' conditions. Research has the potential to significantly influence the resolution of rural migrants' hardships and transform institutions, society, and spaces of cities and towns. However, researchers' actions in the field can also have an immediate impact on rural migrants' lives by changing individual's power relations. By carefully listening to rural migrants' stories, paying attention to their feelings and emotions, respecting their responses and engaging them in conversations unrelated to the research, a sharing of lives and experiences can be transformative. . The impact of care in field studies can be instant for individual rural migrants in comparison with the slow pace of long-term institutional changes of Chinese governance.

Since my research started, I have reflected on rural migrants' lives compared with mine as an international student in the U.S. As scholars such as Dorothy Solinger (1999), Feiling Wang (2005), and Jieh-min Wu (2010) argue, the *hukou* system and related institutions works as an internal passport relegating rural migrants to second-class citizens or immigrants in the city. Studying in the U.S., I have shared similar hardship to what rural migrants encounter in the city. For instance, like other non-immigrant aliens, I have to obtain a set of official permissions and follow strict regulations in order to work, live and study. However, I also receive a great deal of help from scholarships, social communities, local friends, and even strangers, all of which rural migrants can rarely encounter.

Through my research, I recognize that I have become a stranger to many Chinese around me, both in China and overseas, on the view of rural migrants. I have never discussed rural migrants' issues with my parents who have no interest in these issues but fully support my research. A number of my Chinese friends have argued with me that rural migrants' background in the countryside determines their fate in cities: rural migrants were born to be cheap labor and secondary citizens. Embedding myself in the tremendous literature about rural migrants and writing about them, I search for my own truth about the power of an intensive interaction between authorities, rural migrants and myself. This distances me from many Chinese who lack similar experiences.

My research intends neither to resolve rural migrants' issues, nor to criticize my fellow Chinese. Rather, through this research, I reflect on the interaction between power and knowledge. My research interprets the various power exercises and rationalities authorities deploy in making institutions, regulations, programs, activities, and spaces in the interaction with rural migrants. These power exercises, e.g. the "invisible filters" in non-factory areas in manufacturing towns, take place routinely in rural migrants' everyday life but typically veil themselves. This veil produces knowledge that appears complete, and legitimates our understandings of rural migrants, but is ultimately lacking. Thus, my research intends to uncover the veil of hidden power exercises to modify the knowledge and possibly change our understandings inside and outside of academia, for both Western readers and Chinese. I have

observed that many Chinese including my human subjects, my friends, and myself are embedded in and tied to dynamic but confined exercises of power/knowledge in China. Nevertheless, I also recognize that we may choose to step outside these exercises and produce different ones as rural migrants do when they temporarily reproduce themselves or desert factories or manufacturing towns. I hope my research, through the production of knowledge, can also accomplish this utility of changing power/knowledge..

### **III. Contributions and Limitations of this Dissertation**

This dissertation makes four contributions to the general knowledge of rural migrants and governance: (1) a new study of manufacturing towns with respect to the governance of rural migrants and the production of factory labor; (2) an initial study of the governance and the production in non-factory areas; (3) an archive of rural migrants' everyday life with respect to governance; (4) an induction of a model for further research of governance in other manufacturing towns and relevant problems.

First, this dissertation draws the sizable existing research on rural migrants together by connecting macro scale studies (including global, national, and regional level studies) and micro scale studies of the individual through the mid-level scale of manufacturing towns. Nowadays, most rural migrants live and work in towns instead of only migrating across the nation/regions or merely staying in factories. Only through research of manufacturing towns can we understand the full picture of the governance of rural migrants, the production of factory labor, and rural migrants themselves.

Second, it uncovers the function and meaning of governance in non-factory spaces. It contends that governance in non-factory areas functions by confining and shaping rural migrants' employment and consumption, thereby facilitating the production of rural migrants as cheap labor. This turns non-factory spaces into a spatial apparatus of governance as an "invisible filter" which connects to factory spaces and, according to authorities' expectations, channels rural

migrants into factories. The production of factory labor not only takes place in factories, but in non-factory spaces as well.

Third, it provides initial journalistic narratives of rural migrants' lives in non-factory areas through my ethnographic field studies. These narratives include rural migrants' everyday life in retail streets, rental housing, town centers and their lives as a type of resistance to governance. In contrast to much literature focusing on rural migrants' work and lives in factory spaces, my research enriches and archives the description of rural migrants' everyday life in non-factory spaces and assigns it meanings with respect to governance and resistance.

Fourth, it establishes a model for the governance of rural migrants in manufacturing towns. Further researchers can apply this model to examinations of the continuous urbanization and industrialization of Dongguan and other types of manufacturing towns. For instance, the spatial apparatus of the "invisible filters" is a reference for further studies of emerging governance in new manufacturing towns in inland China. In addition, my research exposes new problems of governance while the authorities are trying to solve their own problems that they encounter. For instance, it exposes the authorities' new examination of rural migrants and relevant exploitation in villages, especially in rental housing. This remains unknown to the public. It contends that the state's improvement of rural migrants' wellbeing is unsuccessful at the local level of villages while government agents fail to reach, care for and guide rural migrants. It argues that rural migrants are still marginalized even though the state and local governments are attempting to improve rural migrants' socioeconomic conditions. Thereby, it calls for continuous reform to dismantle the governance of "invisible filters" and search for alternatives.

The limitation of this dissertation lies in its methodology that confines the research in four aspects: the case study, data collection, data analysis, and evaluation of the governance. First, my research is a case study of Dongguan that consists of 28 towns. Although many towns in the PRD are similar to the towns in my case study, there are other manufacturing towns, e.g. in east and inland China, which are, in a way, different from my case. As a qualitative study focusing on a few manufacturing towns, my research possibly excludes other types of towns,

governance, and spaces. Second, limited accessibility to some types of interviewees constrains my data collection. For instance, I do not interview village police, because of difficult accessibility and unpredictable credibility of their responses regarding their dominant relation with rural migrants. Due to similarly difficult accessibility to skilled rural migrants with relatively higher education, I only interview fewer than 10 rural migrant workers in the new eco-high-tech town, Songshanhu. To substitute these missing data, my research collects other data through observation and documents. Third, the analysis of the relations between the three governing authorities is not comprehensive. Although my research considers collaboration and some contestations in their relations, unnoticeable conflict might still be out of my consideration due to insufficient data and opaque interactions between the three authorities.

Last but not least, my evaluation of governance is not comprehensive due to my focus on examining interactions and interpreting meaning rather than its casual effects. According to several economists and political scientists, a study of governance should consider an evaluation of governance in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, manageability, legitimacy, and political-community building (Salamon, 2002; Stone, 2012; Weimer & Vining, 2011). My research examines the effectiveness of the governing tools such as the continuous *hukou* reform and the policing system but does not pay attention to evaluating other aspects of governance. Future research can consider starting from a focus on my research limitations.

#### **IV. Structure of the Dissertation**

My dissertation includes seven chapters and a conclusion. Its structure follows an order that starts with a description of key research themes, moves to the topic of governance and spaces in manufacturing towns, and ends with rural migrants' resistance. The conclusion summarizes my findings and considers future directions of research.

Chapter One describes three research themes reviewed in the literature: rural migrants, governance, and manufacturing towns. With respect to the three themes, the chapter starts with a

description of the research context including unprecedented urbanization and industrialization in China, massive migration, and the emergence and growth of manufacturing towns. The chapter identifies gaps in the literature on the three themes, derives the key research question, and then discusses the methodology I use to answer the question, including the choice of a case study in Dongguan, the application of grounded theory, and the use of Michel Foucault's concept of governmentality.

Chapter Two explains the emergence of a system of governance for rural migrants, focusing on general conditions of manufacturing towns in the period of the 1980s and 1990s, as well as the three types of authority: government, village collectives, and industrialists. The chapter presents my analytical frame of the governance of rural migrants in manufacturing towns. In particular, the chapter examines the spatial pattern of manufacturing towns and villages. Finally, it interprets the operation, mechanism and result of the governance in particular types of non-factory space. In describing the governance system overall, this chapter lays the foundation for the following four chapters that describe how a particular type of non-factory space facilitates (or is the expression of) the exercise of governmentality *vis a vis* rural migrants.

Chapter Three examines the spatial governance in a town central square. It studies the government's political rationality interpreting government/official-migrant relations in comparison with the Christian pastoral power in the pastorate/pastor-flock relation. It studies the interpretation and exhibition of the government's relation with rural migrants. Then, it focuses on the government's operation of the spatial governance, especially the new regulation of the accumulation credit for local *hukou* (CALH), and the effectiveness of the CALH.

Chapters Four and Five examine the spatial governance in one of the indigenous villages of a town. As with many others, this village and the village collective existed in place for hundreds of years. During the reform period, village collectives involved in the development of a labor-intensive manufacturing industry, absorbing a great number of rural migrants. Encountering the problem of rapidly diminishing labor surplus and rural migrants' potential resistance, the authorities have been modifying their governance in villages. Chapter Four introduces the village and examines spatial governance in a main retail street in the village. It focuses on industrialists' factory recruitment of

rural migrants in the street and village collectives' security of the street. Chapter Five examines the spatial governance in a rural migrants' residential compound. It focuses on a new government program enacted by the government and directly enforced by village collectives that governs rural migrants by managing rental housing.

Chapter Six examines spatial governance in a new "ecological" and high-tech town, Songshanhu. It describes the government's planning of the new town, and the governance of rural migrants according to the assignment of ecological value to different territories in the town. In particular, it examines the governance of nature and resources in the planning. By doing so, the government expects to improve the efficiency and sustainability of manufacturing production.

Chapter Seven turns my research focus from governance to rural migrants' resistance in manufacturing towns. It interprets resistance within my analytical frame. It identifies and describes the pattern and typologies of rural migrants' resistance, examines a new type of resistance through Foucault's concept of technologies of the self, and evaluates the impact of the resistance. Rural migrants' resistance can significantly reduce the production and force the three authorities to alter the governance accordingly.

The final part of my dissertation concludes with a descriptive model, which interprets the spatial governance of rural migrants in manufacturing towns. It reviews the historical transformation of the spatial governance. Finally, it presents future research questions.

# Chapter One

## Rural Migrants, Governance, and Manufacturing Towns: three Research Themes, Literature Review, Research Question, and Methodology

### I. Research Context

Since the Chinese reform, which began in 1978, unprecedented urbanization and industrialization has been taking place along with rapid economic growth. In 1982, only 20.6% of the population lived in the urban area of China (NBSC, 1982). In 2011, 52.6% of the population lived in urban areas (ibid. 2012). Thirty percent of the more than one-billion population has moved from the countryside into the city and more are joining this massive rural-to-urban migration each year. For over thirty years, China has maintained around 8% annual GDP growth rate. It has become the second largest nation in the GDP ranking list in the world since 2010 (UN, 2010). With a manufacturing industry constituting around 30% of GDP (Naughton, 2007; the World Bank, 2010), China has quickly become the “world factory” by taking advantage of its large rural labor surplus and exporting manufacturing products overseas.

In China’s overall urbanization, over 200 million people are rural migrant workers (rural migrants or *nongmingong* in Chinese), former farmers temporarily living and working in the city (Cai, 2010; Chan, 2009; NBSC, 2012).<sup>1</sup> For decades, the Chinese rural sector has been in much

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<sup>1</sup> There are multiple terminologies naming Chinese rural migrants. First, in terms of mobility and migration, they are “migrants” (Yeung, 2001; Noughton, 2007). Second, in terms of both their rural identity and mobility, they are “rural migrants” (Li, 1995). Third, in terms of mobility and production, they are “migrant workers” (Eng, 1997; Pun, 2005; Lin, 2006). Fourth, in terms of rural identity, mobility and production, they are “rural migrant labor” (Cai, 2008; Chan, 2010) or “rural migrant worker” (Han, 2010; Wu, 2010). In addition, in Chinese context, their common name is *nongmingong* or *mingong* (farmer worker). Differentiated by gender, they are called *dagong zai* (young male migrant worker) or *dagong mei* (young female migrant worker). The government and society used to regard them as *liudong renkou* (floating population) or *mangliu* (blind flow), which a few local governments considers as discrimination against rural migrants now. Recently, these local governments officially name them after *xin shiming* (new urban citizen) or *wailai wugong ren yuan* (workers from non-local areas). My dissertation uses the name rural migrants in general and rural migrant worker when referring their status of factory workers.

worse socioeconomic condition than the urban sector. For instance, farmers' income has hovered around one third of urban residents' income (Naughton, 2005). A large number of farmers leave the countryside for work in the city becoming rural migrant workers (rural migrants). However, they cannot become much better off when various constraints prevent them from completely merging into the urban sector. For instance, the *hukou* (household register) system binds various benefits and public goods for Chinese individuals to their formal place of registration, preventing rural migrants from obtaining local urban *hukou* and, thus, from full urban citizenship. Rural migrants, therefore, do not have equal social status with urban residents.

Several recent events that received international attention call on us to not only continuously pay attention to rural migrants' socioeconomic conditions but also focus on problems in governing rural migrants in coastal areas, especially Guangdong province. In 2010, fourteen rural migrants committed suicide in Foxconn's plants in Shenzhen over a short period, highlighting the rigid control and exploitation of workers in foreign direct investment (FDI) factories (Pomfret et al, 2010).<sup>2</sup> In the same year, a strike in the Honda Plant in Foshan uncovered crude factory exploitation of rural migrants. Nineteen hundred rural migrants with a monthly salary of 800 *yuan* participated in the strike, unable to gain a foothold in the middle-class dream portrayed by Chinese officials (Bradsher & Barboza, 2010). In addition, three social unrests in Guxiang Town of Chaozhou, Zengcheng City of Guanzhou and Shaxi Town of Foshan created turmoil as thousands of rural migrants took to the streets to protest against their treatment, leading to riots and struggles with government and police (Browne, 2011; Page, 2011; Sudworth, 2012). In these three events, and in similar incidents across China, small disputes between individual rural migrants and local people escalated into severe conflict between local and non-local populations, and finally turned into turmoil. Rural migrant unrest and several hundred thousand other social incidents in recent years have pushed the Chinese government to govern rural migrants carefully in order to maintain social stability and economic growth (Olick, 2011).<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Foxconn is a Taiwanese invested enterprise manufacturing iPhone and other electronics. The 2010 Foxconn Suicide suddenly occurred with 18 workers' attempt at suicide and 14 deaths within a couple of months. For more details on Foxconn and the suicide event, also see ITFS (2010).

<sup>3</sup> Sun Liping, a Chinese Sociologist, unofficially reports that 180,000 social incidents took place in 2012. For more details, see Olick (2011).

Under rapid urbanization, coastal areas in China are quickly transforming from a rural setting to an urban setting. Besides the endless urban sprawl of big cities such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, the countryside of coastal areas is transforming in a rapid urbanizing process. Counties turn into cities and townships become towns. When counties maintain the growths of urban population and industries to reach certain criteria, the state can increase their rank to either prefectural cities or county-level cities. For instance, Guangdong has been one of the earliest and fastest urbanizing and industrializing coastal provinces since the reform. In this province, there were 92 counties in 1980 and 73 counties in 1990 (The Public Administration, 2008). In 2013, Guangdong only had 39 counties (ibid. 2013).

Many coastal cities and towns establish light manufacturing industry as an economic foundation and engine for rapid industrialization. On the one hand, this type of manufacturing industry as the local economic engine is quite powerful. For instance, Guangdong's economy with a strong manufacturing industry stepped ahead of other regions in China in the 1980s (Vogel, 1989; Naughton, 2007). It has maintained an outstanding economic model in the region since then (ibid.). In Dongguan of Guangdong, Humen Town was ranked the first in all towns in China with the largest economic output in 2007. Changan and Tangxia towns were ranked third and fifth, respectively. The dominating light manufacturing industry absorbs the majority of rural migrants to work in the factory: 44.8% of rural migrants in Eastern China work in the industry (NBSC, 2012).<sup>4</sup> On the other hand, light manufacturing industry producing garments, furniture, paper, plastic products and electronics are mostly labor-intensive, low-value-added, and can be environmentally polluting (Naughton, 2007 p.330-332&487). In Dongguan and similar cities in the Pearl River Delta (PRD), environmental pollution such as acid rain and pollution of air, water and soil is severe and deteriorating (Eng, 1997; Yeung, 2001).

Thus, there are three major interactive themes in the success and problems of the urbanization and industrialization. The first is rural migrants with respect to their large

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<sup>4</sup> The top two industries where most rural migrants work are manufacturing industry and construction industry. In 2011, 36.6% and 17.7% of rural migrants' population in China worked in the two industries respectively. In the same year, the two industries respectively absorbed 44.8% and 13.7% of rural migrants' population in East China.

population size, deprived social status and meager economic conditions. The second is the problem of how to govern rural migrants for manufacturing production, social stability, and rural migrants' wellbeing. The third is the space where rural migrants live, work and interact with others such as governing programs/institutions, e.g. the *hukou* system, and agents, e.g. government officials. Because the three themes interact with each other, it is necessary to study the three themes together. Therefore, my research begins with these three themes and their interactions.

My research must define a specific space in order to confine the number of my research samples in a population of over two-hundred-million migrants, local political and socioeconomic variances, and the large area of coastal China. This definition derives from the characteristics of migration. Most rural migrants enter urban peripherals instead of city centers where hostile conditions such as high housing expenditure and few opportunities of employment exclude them. On the urban periphery are many towns, which are rapidly urbanizing areas: most rural land has changed into industrial use but most locals still maintain their identities as villagers with rural *hukou*. These towns instead of cities or urban centers absorb a large number of manufacturing factories and rural migrants. This is why all the three rural migrants' social unrests mentioned above took place in this type of town. Thus, I select towns instead of cities as the space for my research. In addition, my research examines the three themes of migrant conditions, governance, and space on the scale of the town instead of the village, industrial zone or factory.

My research defines a manufacturing town in China as a town dominated by light manufacturing industries and a large number of rural migrants as factory labor. Examples of manufacturing towns include the towns of Dongguan, Shunde and Zhongshan in Guangdong and other provinces. These towns usually have tens of thousands of people, more than half of which are rural migrants working in factories (Figure 1). Most of these factories are labor-intensive, low-value-added, and might be environmentally polluting, but a few towns such as Zhangjiang have developed a relatively high-tech and high-value-added manufacturing industry.

Out of the large number of manufacturing towns, I choose Dongguan, a prefecture city in Guangdong, as a group of manufacturing towns for my research. On the one hand, Dongguan is

an outstanding case of manufacturing towns. It is located in the PRD, which led the early economic boom (GOSC, 1989; Vogel, 1989) and represents the PRD model of economic development (Naughton, 2007; Yeung, 2001). With 28 towns and 4 urban districts, it has been one of the major places for the development of manufacturing industry in China since the reform (Eng, 1998; GOSC, 1989; Yeung, 2001; Vogel, 1989). There are only 1.87-million local residents within a total population of 8.29-million in Dongguan (DSB, 2012). The majority of the six-million-non-local population is rural migrants. On the other hand, Dongguan cannot represent all manufacturing towns in China but a study of Dongguan can initiate further study of other types of manufacturing towns. For instance, there are three significant models of Chinese rural developments in the coastal areas: the PRD model, the Sunan model, and the Wenzhou model (Naughton, 2007). Although all three models theorize rural conditions under rapid urbanization and industrialization, each model differs in its mode of economic development: the Sunan model is based on a rural collective economy relying on town and village enterprises (TVEs); the Wenzhou model relies on private ownership and individual households; and the PRD model heavily relies on FDI (ibid. p.282-284). Recognizing differences between manufacturing towns in different regions, my research of Dongguan can be a model of understanding the three themes in Guangdong, and a good reference to studying other manufacturing towns in both coastal and inland China.

Table 1.1 Socioeconomic Data of Selected Manufacturing Towns in China <sup>a</sup>

	Manufacturing Town	Number of towns or villages <sup>b</sup>	Local population (1,000)	Rural Migrants' population (1,000)	Ratio of industrial production to GDP	Manufacturing industries
<b>Guangdong Province</b>	Dongguan City	28	1,790	4,560	48%	-
	Humen Town	30	126	426	52%	Garments
	Tangxia Town	22	44	200	62%	Electronics and electric equipment
	Chang'an Town	13	42	540	58%	Mechanic equipment, hardware and Electronics
	Foshan City	26	3,710	3,490	63%	-
	Zhongshan City	18	1,490	1,160	58%	-
	Shaxi Town	16	63	57	54%	Garments
	Xiaolan Town	15	162	156	57%	Hardware and electronics
	Zengcheng City	6	840	190	50%	Automobile and garments
<b>Jiangsu Province</b>	Kunshan City	10	710	1,210	57%	Electronics and computers
	Changshou City	13	1,067	445	36%	Textile and garments, Paper
	Jiangyin City	11	1,209	407	42%	Textile, paper, and electronics
<b>Wenzhou City</b>	-	118	7,984	-	46%	Mechanic equipment, leather and plastics

Note:

a. Data about Foshan, Zhongshan, and Zengcheng are retrieved from local statistical yearbooks in 2011. Data about Kunshan, Changshou, Jiangyin, and Wenzhou are retrieved from statistical annual reports in 2011. Data about Dongguan are retrieved from local statistical yearbook in 2010. Lacking data at the level of towns, my research uses data in county-level cities such as Zengcheng in Guangdong, and Kunshan, Changshou and Jiangyin in Jiangsu. These cities consist of significant manufacturing industry in their local economies and a large number of manufacturing towns within their administration. Due to the same reason, my research also uses the ratio of industrial production instead of manufacturing production to GDP.

b. In this column, the data of cities indicate the number of towns that a city has. The data of towns indicate the number of villages and urban communities that a town has. In recent years, a few villages turn into urban communities, but residents in these urban communities are still holding rural *hukou*. Since manufacturing towns are peri-urban areas, my research regards villages as the dominant type of administration under a town.

## II. Literature Review on Research Themes and Research Question

### A. Rural Migrants in Urbanization and Industrialization

#### 1. Rural Migrants in Developed Countries: Britain and United States in History

China, of course, is not the first country to undergo significant and rapid urbanization. A study of historical urbanization and industrialization in western developed countries can shed some light on the experience of Chinese rural migrants. The British Enclosure Movement pushed peasants from the countryside to cities and towns for centuries. Peasants lost their land when taken by rich landlords, capitalists, and Parliament and converted into pasture to feed sheep and supply materials such as wool for manufacturing industry in the city. These landless peasants had little choice but to enter cities and towns as rural migrants, working in factories and subject to exploitation. As Marx & Engels (1848/2012 p.43) point out, “not only are they slaves of the bourgeois class, and of the bourgeois State; they are daily and hourly enslaved by the machine, by the over-looker, and, above all, by the individual bourgeois manufacturer himself”. During the 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century, it was a prevailing phenomenon that rural migrants comprised the majority of population growth that swelled large cities such as London, Manchester and Birmingham (Engels, 1844/1969), Berlin and NYC (Hall, 1996). Tenement housing was a popular architectural style catering workers in Chicago, NYC and other international cities (ibid, p.34-46). These rural migrants were poor, unhealthy, had little social welfare and security, and lived in an urban environment lacking sanitation, infrastructure, open space, fresh air, and sufficient sunlight. They were subject to relocation and expulsion by governmental urban redevelopment projects, such as those implemented in Paris by Baron Haussmann or even later into the 20<sup>th</sup> Century (Castells, 1977; Halbwachs, 1909). In Marxist interpretations, capitalist authorities repress and exploit rural migrants who suffer in the urbanization and industrialization process, and may become proletarian struggling against the bourgeoisie.

Regarding rural migrants as active agents in the process of urbanization and industrialization, Thompson (1966) points out that the working class in Great Britain constituted itself through workers' own initiatives: "the working class made itself as much as it was made" (ibid. p.194). The constitution of the working class was rather diverse: "in many towns the actual nucleus from which the labor movement derived ideas, organization, and leadership, was made up of such men as shoemakers, weavers, saddlers and harness-makers, booksellers, printers, building workers, small tradesmen, and the like" (ibid. p193). These different types of workers (including rural migrants) shared culture and norms such as Methodism, Jacobinism, guilds and the like which contributed to forming the English working class and its own consciousness (ibid.).

However, while working-class identity came into being in opposition to that of capitalists, rural migrants in towns, e.g. the American company town, seemed easily governed and subject to industrialists' various ideologies and actions. Rural migrants were obligated to follow industrialists' rules and supposedly transformed into efficient and docile labor in industrialists' ideologies. On the one hand, rural migrants were under serious exploitation. For instance, rural woman workers in the New England had to work around "12 hours a day, 6 days a week, 309 days a year, only three regular holidays" (Dublin, 1975, 1979 p.59 & 61). Mining workers in small towns in the Appalachian area from Pennsylvania to the Mid-West worked in a dangerous environment and lived dreadfully in tents or self-built sheds, lacking basic infrastructure of utilities such as power and water (Green, 2010). The "yellow dog contract" banning unions exploited many workers, and company stores that replaced currency with scripts pushed workers into indebtedness (ibid.). After being indebted to company stores, workers often had no choice but to work for their companies most of their lives (Green, 2010).

On the other hand, rural migrants benefited from becoming efficient and skillful under industrialists' philanthropic guidance and welfare. For instance, in George Pullman's paternalism, 12,600 railway workers lived and worked in Pullman's highly ordered, and carefully planned and designed town which was even praised by some workers in the 1893 Strike (Crawford, 1995 p.39-40). Skilled instead of unskilled

workers could usually rent or buy better housing in the Pullman town and the Cannon town (Green, 2010). In Milton Hershey's philanthropic social welfare capitalism, his workers received "a cornucopia of benefits including insurance, medical coverage and a retirement plan" with no local taxes, abundant jobs and free services such as garbage pickup and snow removal (ibid, 2010 p.38). In our common understanding, qualified immigrant workers in Henry Ford's automobile plants received five-dollar salary per week and could afford their own housing and the Ford car.

Various rules in the American company town, however, aimed to regulate rural migrants and encouraged docility. Rural woman workers in Lowell lived in an isolated world of supervised arrangement of buildings in a remote location that prohibited outside intrusion (Dublin, 1979 p.59 & 61). In addition to rules in textile mills, they followed a group of standards such as a 10:00pm curfew, boarders' management, a sense of community shared with all other workers, and little allowance of privacy in their boarding housing (ibid. 1975). Milton Hershey banned newspapers for all workers in the Hershey town (Green, 2010). Moreover, Christianity was a good tool for industrialists to cultivate rural migrant docility. Most company towns mandatorily built Christian churches or religious structures to provide workers services (Christopher, 2011). Rural woman workers in Lowell had to attend regular Sunday services under company regulations (Dublin, 1979).

Rural migrants were also enmeshed in racism and racial politics in western history. In the U.S., black people migrated from the southern countryside to the northern industrial centers in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and early 20<sup>th</sup> century. They were the target of racial segregation and discrimination in northern industrial cities such as Detroit and Chicago. The rural woman workers and Irish immigrants in Lowell were all white (Dublin, 1975 & 1979). The Pullman Company reinforced racism by hiring white men as car builders and repair-shop workers, and only black men as porters (Hirsch, 1999). The American Railway Union that led the Pullman strike in 1894 "alienated black railway workers, some of whom were recruited as strikebreakers" (ibid. p.50). Racism also existed in company's welfare capitalism, e.g. Fordism. The five-dollar-a-day wage

introduced in 1914 required immigrant workers to prove a commitment in becoming “American” with a set of requirements on certain behaviors: “sobriety, cleanliness, marriage, speaking English and participating in religious worship (preferably Christian)” (Esch, 2011 p.93).

Rural migrants were not merely obedient, however. They commonly organized themselves and resisted the repression that they encountered. The U.S. Labor Statistic Bureau reported that the annual recorded number of strikes and lockouts in 1914 was 1,080, averaging three new strikes per day (U.S.BLS, 1916 p.8). Labor unions organized rural migrants to strike in company towns. For instance, docile rural woman workers in Lowell started their strikes in the 1830s under the influence of trade unions (Dublin, 1979). They launched the ten-hour movement for a shortened workday with the facilitation of the Lowell Female Labor Reform Association and the New England Workingmen’s Association in the 1840s (ibid).

In the American company town, rural migrants’ resistance and industrialists’ repression interacted each other. Following the wave of occasional lockouts in Lowell, there was a continuous cycle of worker strikes and industrialist oppression organized with the government’s assistance. The Illinois National Guard and the Pullman company finally dismissed the Pullman company strike organized under the American Railway Union in 1894 (Crawford, 1995). Coal-mining workers in Colorado marched the streets through the organization of United Mine Workers at America, only to be put down by approximately 1,000 Colorado National Guardsmen in 1913 (Green 2010). In the Cannon mills in Kannapolis, North Carolina, “when the workers dared to go on strike, he (Charles Cannon) got the governor to call in state troops to break the walkout and starved them into submission” (Green, 2010 p.91). In the interaction between workers’ resistance and industrialists’ repression, both sides use violence against each other. In coal-mining towns, labor gangs associated with assassinations were not rare: a few workers assassinated industrialists and managers while industrialists ordered private polices to assassinate union leaders and fostered gangs of black labor to control mining coal (Green, 2010).

Despite repression and exploitation, many migrants benefitted from the historical urbanization and industrialization in the West. They earned higher income in factories than in the countryside. They were beneficiaries of the philanthropy and social welfare of industrialists like Milton Hershey and Henry Ford. Workers' communities could help rural migrants: the planned, group-standard community allowed rural woman workers in early Lowell to grow "socially and intellectually" (Birkenmeier et al, 2002). When the government promoted social democracy in government towns such as Sunflower, Kansas, workers benefitted from community building through self-organization, building workers' community halls instead of Christian churches for community gatherings and allowed workers to establish their own newspapers and town council (Post, 2011). Rural migrants could achieve improved socioeconomic conditions in the progressive actions of both industrialists and the government.

## 2. Developing World: Brief of Constraints and Power of Rural Migrants

In contrast to the western historical urbanization, many developing countries such as India and South America share a common feature characterized as 'over-urbanization' in which the migrant populations overwhelm labor market demand with millions pushed into over-crowded slums and squatter settlements. Intuitively, farmers should leave cities when they cannot find jobs there. However, rural migrants frequently stay in cities, even though they are underemployed or unemployed. Lewis (1954) studies the fixed labor wages and rural-to-urban migration in developing countries, and argues that rural migrants' wages cannot increase until the rural labor surplus diminishes. Marxism highlights capitalists' exploitation, which results in workers' low wages (Marx, 1867/1952). In the process of exploitation, workers first turn all their labor values including their wages and surplus value into labor work. Then, the working process alienates worker's labor values into products. Finally, capitalists occupy these products, only paying workers' wages as an exchange of workers' all labor work, and thereby exploit the rest of labor values as surplus value that workers own and objectify in their

products. In contrast to the Marxist theory of exploitation, Lewis (1954) points out that the labor demand and supply maintain rural migrants' low wages. According to Cai (2010), the Lewis Turning Point at which rural migrants' wages start to increase explains the current phenomenon in which Chinese rural labor surplus diminishes and wages of labor start to increase. Although Chan (2009) questions whether this point has already been reached, the logic of this general trend seems to be operating in China today.

In a study of rural labor in African cities, Harris & Todaro (1970) extend Lewis's research and argue that the expected income gap between the urban and rural sectors instead of the actual difference between rural and urban wages attracts redundant farmers to cities and causes unemployment. This explains why farmers move to cities despite overcrowded conditions and low employment opportunities.

The succeeding research on rural migrants as cheap labor from Marx and Lewis to Harris and Todaro indicate three sources of power/mechanisms affecting rural migrants and migration. The Marxist theories of exploitation and alienation of labor highlight the power from capitalists/industrialists: their repressive relationship with workers. Lewis points out the importance of market in constraining rural migrants' socioeconomic conditions. The economic growth and collective actions of both rural migrants and industrialists determine these migrants' fate of becoming cheap labor. Then, Harris & Todaro model highlights the importance of rural migrants' own expectation and cognition of their development, e.g. their expected income, to migration. Accordingly, my dissertation acknowledges three sources of power from industrialists, rural migrants' cognition, and capitalist markets that shape rural migrants' poor economic conditions, and especially pays attention to industrialists and rural migrants (their interaction with and cognition of governance in manufacturing towns).

Similar to many rural migrants in the American company town, rural migrants in developing countries often are confronted with severe and institutionalized racism. The most notorious is apartheid in South Africa. For instance, the town of Soweto and many others segregated black people, some of who are rural migrants. In Brazil, Ford's

plantations implemented the idea of “racial-mixing”, ordering the white American, Portuguese, Indian and Negro in a hierarchy from white to black (Esch, 2011). Ford’s racial ideology on the one hand expresses a disturbing approach to “helping” the destitute region through “whitening” the local people or “rebuilding” human beings as the American. In another way, it taps the desire for consumer goods to flow into the vein of “the Amazonian people” for reshaping their consumer behavior according to the American and promoting an ideology of exploitation (ibid. 2011 p.95&96).

At the local level of developing countries, rural migrants encounter various rigid social cultural constraints, e.g. the Indian Caste system in both the countryside and the city. These various constraints become spatially significant. For instance, Indian farmers are under less control of the Caste system in the city than the countryside but cannot escape it. A rural Afghani woman still faces difficulty finding an urban job due to religious constraints in her country. There are probably many other constraints to rural migrants regarding enormous social cultural differences in the developing world. However, there are weak connections between these social cultures and Chinese counterparts, and between the histories of other developing countries and China. This requests my research to pay attention to social cultural issue at local level.

In a few developing countries such as India and Brazil, rural migrants and established urban residents have equal rights that include the right to vote, and access to basic urban welfare. Migrants live in squatter settlements or slums as their residences on public land and dwell close to city center. These squatters are not temporarily settled. In other words, both the government and developers have no strong power to sweep these squatters or slums away as Haussmann did to the poor in some slums of Paris. With their political power, rural migrants can bargain with other authorities such as the government for their own good. “In India and Pakistan, as a result, slum development become famously synchronized to election cycles: in Karachi, land invasion and pirate subdivisions typically increase in election years, while in India elections provide squatters with leverage to seek legislation or improvement of their *bustees*” (Davis, 2006 p.56).

### 3. Chinese Rural Migrants

In history, Chinese farmers/peasants migrated into cities where the economy boomed. For instance, in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, a large number of farmers had to migrate to cities to make a living when the rural economy, e.g. the traditional rural silk-making industry, was bankrupted under the pressure of modernization and industrialization in big Chinese cities such as Shanghai (Fei, 1946). In the 1930s, foreign investment flew into Shanghai in a short period of economic growth. The booming urban economy attracted a large number of farmers in the cities. Many rural women became slave-like *baoshengong* (indentured workers without pay) or *yangchenggong* (contracted workers with low pay) in Japanese invested yarn factories (Shanghai Government Editorial Committee, 2000). Factory recruiters often played the role of human traders in their home villages, deceiving the parents of young rural women to sign indentured contracts that required three years of work in factories for no wages. A Chinese writer, Xia Yan, disguised himself to enter a highly secured factory zone and observed these slave-like workers and prison-like factory conditions for two months. Xia Yan sorted the prison-like control in the Japanese factories into three points: workers as slaves lost their freedom with an indenture of both their labor and bodies for three years; workers as canned labor were enclosed in factories; workers worked for twelve hours or more a day. Similar slave-like conditions also existed for rural women working in British invested and Chinese invested factories in Shanghai until 1949 (ibid. 1986).

In the reform period, Chinese rural migrants are secondary citizens in cities serving as cheap labor for industrial production.<sup>5</sup> They are under various constraints, e.g. the *hukou* system. With social welfare and services determined largely through *hukou* status, rural migrants are secondary citizens with lower socioeconomic status than local

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<sup>5</sup> According to the NSBC, the definition of rural migrants in my dissertation refers to those people who hold rural *hukou* and have dwelled outside their hometowns where their *hukou* locates for at least six months. See NSBC (2010, March 19 & 2013, March 27) for more details. In the NSBC's definition, the total population of *nongmingong* includes people who hold rural *hukou* and have worked in non-agricultural industries locally for at least six months. My definition of rural migrants does not refer to this type of *nongmingong*, given the fact that, in cities and towns such as Dongguan in South China, most *nongmingong* are migrants instead of local farmers.

residents in the city. For instance, Yang & Cai (2000) and Cai et al. (2008) discuss migrants' social status and claim that rural migrants are always on the bottom of social stratification. In a case study of the college admission exam in 2001, Wang (2005, p.139-149) argues that the minimum score for admission to a student in a major urban center can be 20 to 140 points lower than a rural student in a scale of total 750 points. Li & Li (2010) observe that rural migrants in the city have no access to public subsidized housing and have to pay a large lump sum of money for enrollment of their children in public elementary and middle schools. Moreover, their pension plans typically require long-term residency and are non-transferable to other locations. Additionally, rural migrants are subject to numerous seemingly trivial hardships, for example, not being allowed to apply for or renew drivers' licenses outside their hometowns. Rural migrants have as little real voting right of electing representatives of the People's Congress and People's Political Consultative Conference (PPCC) as urban residents but also have no de-jure voting right which the locals have (ibid. 2010). As a result, Chen (2010) and Cai (2010) stresses that the Chinese urbanization rate is exaggerated: Chinese cities are still in a state of 'incomplete urbanization' due to the inability of rural migrants to obtain an urban *hukou*.

Through rural -urban migration, rural migrants are relatively better off in comparison with their fellow farmers. This is mainly expressed in rural migrants' increased income. On the one hand, Fei (1985) observes that in the Sunan region (South of Jiangsu province) an unskilled migrant worker can make more than 1000 *yuan* and a skilled worker can even make 2000 to 3000 *yuan* per month, which is a big fortune to farmers. Sicular & Yue (2010, p.100) indicate that the urban-rural income ratio is three to one, with rural migrant income lying somewhere near the middle of the two sectors at 60% of local residents' income. On the other hand, after the 1980s, thriving TVEs quickly shrank and the rural economy experienced significant degradation (Naughton, 2007). The rural sector was enmeshed in an impasse of outstanding problems in villages, agriculture, and farmers (Li, 2009; Pun, 2012). Thus, rural migrants encounter a dilemma: it is hard for them to return their hometowns to make a living, but they cannot completely merge into the urban sector and have to maintain their status as secondary citizens in cities. Liu & Cheng (2008) and Wang (2010) indicates that young rural

migrants have more education, more willingness for self-improvement, stronger desire to become permanent urban residents, less willingness to return to their hometowns, and have fewer farming skills, although they are under the same constraints as the first generation. Therefore, a few scholars argue that rural migrants currently constitute a new social sector in addition to the rural and urban dual sectors (Wang, 2010; Whyte, 2010; Wu, 2010).

In comparison with the urban sector and in consideration of their work, e.g. factory jobs, rural migrants are cheap labor under exploitation and factory discipline. Hsing (1998) argues that the factory discipline of rural migrants is characterized by a military style of management, long-time labor exhaustion, and cultural-regional exclusion and inclusion among social groups. Both Hsing (1998 p.8-91) and Yeung (2001 p.185-188) stress rural migrants' poor working conditions. First, there is little concern with workplace safety. Second, worker dismissal for rural migrants is common and sometimes unreasonable. For example, it is common for female workers to be fired if they become pregnant or even married. Third, working hours are very long: 13 hours a day with few weekends off in the factories studied by and more than 10 hours a day, 7 days a week in the factories studied by. Pun (2005) stresses that factory management techniques repressing rural women workers includes intensive and repetitive work, strictly controlled and monitored activities, and institutionalized factory regulations. In her study of Anhui nannies in Beijing, Yan (2008) reveals the historical transition of these nannies' relationships with their employers from lord and servant (*zhupu*) before 1949 to public servant (*gongpu*) and private servant (*fuwuyuan*) before the 1980s, and then to the current relation of master (*zhuren*) and servant or nanny (*baomu*).

Rural migrants suffer from rural patriarchy, but also have to rely on it. While entering the city is a means of escaping the misery of rural life and patriarchy, (Pun, 2005; Yan, 2008), migrants' social connections are based on regionalism and blood ties. Therefore, their ability to engage in self-improvement, job seeking, and education are often constrained. (Li, 1995; Hsing, 1998; Yeung, 2001; Pun, 2005). Through local rural

norms, indigenous villagers often reinforce these constraints in excluding and discriminating against rural migrants (Hsing, 1998; Yeung, 2001; Pun, 2005).

Rural migrants are therefore, subject to various forms of repression, coercion and exploitation. Under heavy and endless stresses, however, rural migrants are not merely obedient to the labor market, political institutions and Chinese rural tradition. They frequently engage in 'weak resistance'. Rafel (1992) observes the expression of Chinese traditional power of patriarchy, spatial subversion of long rest due to the residual hobbit of the Culture Revolution, and the way that both senior and young women workers broke rules. Pun (2005 p.60-75,104,151-167) observes female rural migrants' escape from their hometowns, their silent organization of lazy work against prohibition of listening radio on the shop floor, fighting each other, making gossip and rumors, and even screaming in a traumatic dream in a way of demonstrating resistance. Pun & Ren (2006) also observe that rural migrants utilize their dorms as their personal space for scheming plans of strikes against factory owners. Yan (2008) regards rural Anhui nannies' resistance as a method of self-cultivation and indicates that these nannies put efforts into personal achievement and self-improvements in order to escape from their undesirable factory working lives as well as coercive rural lives.

Rural migrants' resistance lies in their progressive perception of repression and constraints. In studying rural migrants' perception through surveys, Li & Li (2006) and Wang (2010) all discover the pattern of rural migrants' cognition of their systemic repression: they recognize their lower social status but hold more positive attitudes to the rural-urban difference than farmers. This likely stems from their perception that migration, overall, has improved their lives. Although rural migrants tend to blame their lack of education as the cause of their low social status, Wang (2010) indicates that rural migrants are openly concerned with and disapprove of discrimination against them, and have a stronger impulse to demand social justice than farmers or urban residents.

In short, rural migrants are subject to coercive governing forces from various authorities such as the state, industrialists and local agents. Reform in China, including

changes to the *hukou* system, promotes and improves rural migrants' choices and autonomy, but they are still exploited as cheap labor and secondary citizens. Despite the constraints imposed by various power exercises, they can resist repression, coercion, and exploitation through their own efforts.

## **B. Governance**

### 1. Governmentality and Power

I adopt Foucault's concept of Governmentality as the theoretical foundation for studying the governance of rural migrants in manufacturing towns. Foucault (1989 & 2006) develops the concept of Governmentality to understand the art of governance: Governmentality refers to "the conduct of conduct" —the mind of governance shaping, directing, cultivating, or guiding our behavior. In other words, Governmentality is the art, tactics and strategies of social control for stabilizing a society and leading, directing, guiding, or calculating our behavior, actions and even comportment (Dean, 1999 p.10; Foucault, 1991 p.87-105).

The concept of Governmentality frames various types of power as a fundamentally uneven relationship between people. Examples include pastoral power, sovereign power, disciplinary power, and security power (Foucault, 2006).<sup>6</sup> Although Foucault has little concern with eastern countries, e.g. China, in either knowledge or cases for building his theories, both Governmentality and the different types of power can be a theoretical reference to the analysis of governance in China. I contend that we can find counterparts to Foucault's theories in Chinese empirics. The reign of emperors for thousands of years of Chinese history, the prevalence of cultural norms governing the rural sector, and factory discipline in manufacturing industries are just a few obvious

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<sup>6</sup> Pastoral power refers to pastors' reach to, care for, and sacrifice for their flocks. Sovereign refers to a king's power thoroughly exercising on his people within his territory and law. Discipline refers to the partition, allocation, observation, examination, and normalization of human bodies and behaviors. Security as a modern western government's power allows problems' emergence and self-cancellation without obligated prevention. For more details, see chapter two.

examples. An adaptation of Foucault's theoretical concept of Governmentality offers a useful framework for the governance of rural migrants in manufacturing towns while his theorizations of power provide perspectives on my research themes. This analysis will employ an intensive comparison between Foucault's theories and my own empirical data.

Considering political power in terms of Governmentality, Rose (1999, p.20) argues that the analysis of governance "is to start by asking what authorities of various sorts wanted to happen, in relation to problems defined how, in pursuit of what objectives, through what strategies and techniques." This problematizes governance into an analytical frame questioning aspects such as political rationality, governing technology, governable spaces and subjects that seek to shape conduct to achieve certain ends (Rose, 1999 p.20; Bray, 2005 p.51-57). Studies of Governmentality, e.g. a study of governance, is to study our knowing and acting upon behaviors and actions for an understanding of truths concerning the conduct of conduct (Rose, 1999 p.19). This study is a two-way process of power and knowledge construction. Knowledge is the basis that directs authorities to act upon people in space. In doing so, certain ends and objectives related to people's conduct can be achieved. Power constructs knowledge (Flyvbjerg, 1998 p.2-3&27). Power exercises transform people's mind and understanding in adaptation, e.g. genetic obedience to disciplinary power exercises (Foucault, 1979). In doing so, ideology/knowledge is altered and reconstructed.

## 2. Repression and Resistance in Relevant Theories

"Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power... Instead there is a plurality of resistances, each of them a special case" (Foucault, 1978 p.95&96). On the perspective that resistance is within power and power relations, and an odd term of power as Foucault argues (ibid. p.96), I would like to sort up three types of resistance with respect to types of power techniques for my research.

The first is struggle such as class struggle in Marxism. “The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles...It (The modern bourgeois society) has but established new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle in place of the old ones” (Marx & Engels, 1848). In the class relation between capitalists and workers, struggle is workers’ common resistance to capitalists’ exploitation. The forms of struggle range from individual destruction of machines to organized strikes and violence, and may lead to revolution.

The second is the temporary tactics resisting repression in space, discourses, consumption, etc. in de Certeau’s analysis of everyday life (1984). These temporary resisting tactics appear in everyday life in a way that multiplies points of resistance everywhere in power relations (Foucault, 1978 p.95). “Resistance, tricky and stubborn procedures that elude discipline without being outside the field in which it is exercised, and which should lead us to a theory of everyday practices, of lived space, of the disquieting familiarity of the city” (Certeau, 1984 p.96). In the analysis of everyday life, “Making Do” introduces “artistic tricks and competitions of accomplices into a system that reproduces and partitions through work or leisure” (ibid. p.29). Silent production through consumption is “an art of using those imposed on it” (ibid. p.31). The “walking in the city” alters the planners’ configuration of using the city space and makes use of it with ordinary walkers’ blind understating of the space (ibid. p.93). Likewise, the poor’s weapon is of a hidden transcript that the poor maintains camouflage and resistance through deception, tricks, jokes, curses, crimes, escape and the like (Scott, 1985).

The third is a self-technology that is mainly the care of self. Technologies of the self “permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality” (Foucault 1988). In an analysis of Foucault’s technology of self, Rose (1999, p.43) argues for a method of understanding a governable subject itself:

“Rather, we need to undertake a more modest yet more practicable task: identifying the ways in which human beings are individuated and addressed within the various practices that would govern them, the relations to themselves that they have taken up within the variety of practices within which they have come to govern themselves... the trans-individual identities of class, status, gender and gentility in similar ways: the formation of identifications through the inscription of particular ethical formation, vocabularies of self-description and self-mastery, forms of conduct and body techniques.”

### 3. Relevant Literature on Governance in China

Three broad historical features of China shape the complex and transformative effects of governmentality in China: its long feudal history and large rural society, the reign of the Chinese Communist Party since 1949, and the period since 1978 characterized by dynamic reform, the extension of markets, and absorption of FDI. As Pun (2005) points out, young rural women migrants are enmeshed in three major power dynamics that variously support and contradict one another: the socialist state with its residency restrictions and economic policies; the oppressive patriarchal family; and the global capitalist system with its need for both disciplined labor and uncontrolled, libidinous consumption. Thus, my research examines various governance techniques over rural migrants originating from governing authorities of the state, society, and market.

In the Maoist state, both class struggle and the mass-line were common strategies of communist governance. The concept of the mass-line indicated a party/cadre-mass relation in which cadres investigate the conditions of masses, learn about and participate in their struggles, gather ideas from them, create a plan of action based on these ideas and adapt general policies to local conditions (Bray, 2005 p.57&58). The mass line embodied the party pastoral power governing cadres and the masses in the *danwei* (work unit) (ibid). In fact, class struggle and the mass line were never separated from each other. In dealing with controversial issues between the party and the masses, Mao (1957/1977, p.389-390) stressed a formula of “unity-criticism-unity” that means, “starting from the

desire for unity, resolving contradictions through criticism or struggle, and arriving at a new unity on a new basis. In our experience this is the correct method of resolving contradictions among the people.” The mass-line with class struggle normalized the masses into comrade-like individuals in a revolutionary governmentality (Dutton, 2009). In the reform, the post-Mao’s state is in a “regrouping” instead of “retreating” process forming new types of governmentality including central planning, social engineering, and neo-liberalism (Sigley, 2006).

In the people’s commune, both the mass line and class struggle facilitated the organization and control of farmers. First, the mass-line operated under the slogan "from the masses, to the masses." The tactic for cadres was to investigate the conditions of masses, learn about and participate in their struggles, gather ideas from them, create a plan of action based on these ideas and adapt general policies to the local conditions (Bray, 2005 p.57&58; Mao, 1949-1957/2007). In doing so, the CCP and cadres must do everything for the masses, completely believe the masses and rely on the masses in order to mobilize and organize them for revolutions (Mao, *ibid.*). Second, class struggle was a basic tool for different interest classes to be against each other in struggles in order to solve conflict and contradiction, and lead to the proletarian dictatorship (Marx & Engels 1848/2012). After 1949, the state led endless national campaigns through class struggle to purify both cadres and masses according to various revolutionary goals. For instance, the land reform ending in 1952 redistributed rural land from landlords to farmers and repressed the classes of landlords and rich farmers. The campaign to suppress counterrevolutionaries immediately started in 1949 to eradicate opposition elements, especially former Chinese Nationalist (Kuomintang) functionaries. The “three-anti” (*san fan*) and “five-anti” (*wu fan*) campaigns targeted and eliminated anti-revolutionary behaviors in cadres and urban bourgeoisie from 1950 to 1952 (Bray, 2005 p.110).

The state strengthened its control of farmers from 1949 to 1958. In the early 1950s, when the state encountered a large number of rural migrants searching for jobs in the city, it discouraged this rural-to-urban migration and expelled farmers from the city (Solinger, 1999 & 2006). In 1958, the official establishment of the *hukou* system limited

farmers' physical mobility to their hometowns (Chan, 1994). The food ration system eliminated opportunities for rural migrants to survive in the city. Farmers could only dwell in their rural towns/townships that the CCP state changed into the people's commune.

The state's local communist administration organized farmers collectively in the people's communes to accomplish various revolutionary goals such as increasing agricultural production to support national development. The commune system promoting collectivism replaced traditional rural patriarchy in the countryside. In traditional villages and townships, the senior such as the country gentleman and the respected elder governed peasants through kinship and regionalism (Fei, 1948/1992). In the commune system, CCP cadres replaced the village patriarch to lead and organize farmers who became commune members. Communist collectivism replaced rural kinship. The hierarchical organizational structure of the commune, brigade, and production team, which followed the state's commands, replaced the self-organized townships and natural villages. Clans and families organized peasants-farmers' social lives and village affairs. In particular, the unified purchasing and marketing system (*tonggou tongxiao*) through the state's central planning displaced the traditional marketing town to organize the economy of villages and towns (Lin et al., 1995; Skinner, 1964). Until the reform period, the people's commune continued to rule the administration of rural society.

Under the state's plan, the governance of farmers should accomplish three goals: militarized organization (*zuzhi junshihua*), combat-like actions (*xingdong zhandouhua*), and collectivization of lives (*shenghuo jitihua*) (CCCCP, 1958). A set of collective programs enacted this governance in the people's commune. These programs included the public canteen, collective kindergartens, day-care centers, sewing teams, barber rooms, bathrooms, senior houses, agricultural schools as well as communist professional schools etc. (CCCCP, 1958; Zhang, 1998 p.73&74). In these various programs, the public canteen played a very important role to organize farmers in the collectivization for agricultural production. The commune destroyed kitchens of families and organized farmers in natural villages to have free meals together (Zhang, 1998 p.73). In addition,

the collective ownership of land and property allowed the people's commune to shape the space of the commune in an ideal way for governance. For instance, the commune could expropriate any piece of land and set up any collective program such as the public canteen, village colleges and rural factories, regardless of the effectiveness and efficiency of these programs (ibid., 1998, p.69&70). The state expected that the collectivization could reduce total costs by reducing individual consumption of materials and use of time, thereby maximizing productivity (People's Daily, 1958). Nevertheless, collectivization actually wasted large amounts of food and resources, and quickly triggered the great famine between 1959 and 1961.

Moreover, cadres and active commune members policed farmers in order to militarize the commune and organize farmers to behave in unified and effective actions, just like training soldiers to prepare for a battle. Each commune included a department of people's armed force (*renmin wuzhuang bu*) which is the official department of securing the commune. This department formed militia (*minbing*) which included cadres and active commune members, and was active at the bottom level of the production team. Many communes even established its own convicted labor farm that could detain potential enemies uncovered from the masses of farmers and cadres for communist re-education or punishment. A former provincial deputy director in Anhui province reported that, in a county in Anhui province, "...not only did the country establish convict farms by itself but communes and brigades established small convict teams. Of the total 23 communes in the county, 13 communes established convict teams, and sentenced 2160 people to free labor... 1280 people died in convict teams" (Yin, 2011). In a county in Henan province, militia sent commune members with "weaknesses"—including laziness, superstitious behavior, indocility to cadres, resistance to joining the commune, or simply having once been a member of the Chinese National People's Party—into village convict labor farms (Xiao, 2009).

In particular, the *hukou* system, formally established in 1958 is the most significant institution controlling and organizing farmers and the rural migrants' population and labor. The *hukou* system is a household registration system that assigns

rural *hukou* to farmers and rural migrants as an official rural identity. It stopped mobility between the rural and urban sectors and facilitated the extraction of rural resources to the urban industrial sector (Wang, 2005; Chan, 2008 & 2009; Li & Li 2010; Wu, 2010). Today, it still constrains rural migrants' equal access to urban welfare and services (ibid.). Rooted in the discrimination of the *hukou* system, the associated institutions of welfare and services are as discriminating as the *hukou* system to rural migrants. Major welfare programs including social security, pension, insurance, public subsidies, medical care and education are only available to local residents (ibid.). In Guangzhou, the government not only divides the rural and urban *hukou* but also allocates greater benefits to those with *hukou* in urban centers compared with those on the urban periphery *hukou* (Li & Li, 2010 p.214-215). Rural migrants have great difficulty obtaining urban periphery *hukou*, and obtaining urban center *hukou* is all but impossible (ibid.).

The influence of the *hukou* system on the governance of farmers/rural migrants is enormous. The rural-urban divide has been the dominant socioeconomic and political structure that has affected and constrained rural migrants and farmers at the national level since the beginning of the Mao era. In the rural-urban divide, the urban sector has always held the upper hand in political and socioeconomic aspects (Chan, 1994 & 2009; Knight & Song 1999; Naughton, 2007 p.113-137; Wang, 2005; Pei 2006 p.1-44; Whyte, 2010). Lin & Cai (1995) argue that the state in Mao's era extracted rural resources to support heavy industrial development in urban areas under a seemingly invulnerable trinity of macro-economic control, allocation mechanisms, and micro-economic agencies. The rural-urban divide prevented any member of the rural sector from merging into the urban sector by joining an urban *danwei* (work unit) or state owned enterprise (SOE). In these respects, the *hukou* system serves many of the same functions. In the divide, the rural-to-urban income ratio is generally around 1:3 (Wang, 2005; Pei, 2006; Guan, 2010). In one example, Cai et al. (2008) indicate that SOEs still provide higher wages and benefits to workers than other types of employers including industrialists hiring rural migrants. Wang (2005 p.114-139) argues that the *hukou* system fosters economic growth in favor of the urban sector through large accumulation of capital and technology but artificially

maintains rural migrants as cheap and unskilled labor incompletely absorbed by the urban labor market.

Politically, farmers and rural migrants have less political power, e.g. voting rights in the election of People's Congress, than urban residents. In urban areas, rural migrants do not have voting rights in local elections (Li & Li, 2010). Referring to Yu Depeng (1995) and Xu Zhiyong (2004), Guang (2010) points out that China's rural population is severely underrepresented in formal political organizations and supported by fewer non-state associations in comparison with the urban population. In a case study of the People's Congress election, "as many as four times the votes are needed to elect a representative from a rural district compared with those needed for an urban area" (Guang, 2010 p.330; Xu, 2004; Yu, 1995). Even though the *hukou* system is under the government's continuous reform, Chan & Buckingham (2008) and Chan (2009) points out that the cumulative effect of these reforms is not an abolition but devolution of responsibility for *hukou* policies to local governments, which actually makes it harder for rural migrants obtain permanent residency in the city.

Chinese patriarchy has dominated the governance of farmers and rural migrants in both the countryside and the city throughout history. One century ago, male village elders managed village affairs, while a married woman had no name of her own—she was identified with the two surnames of her husband and father (Smith, 1899). The patriarchy of villages, clans and families tied to kinship, rural elders' domination and family relations, is the dominant power in traditional Chinese rural society (Fei, 1946 & 1948). Today, Both Pun (2005) and Yan (2008) point out that rural women migrate into the city to escape the dreadful rural society and patriarchy. However, rural migrants still rely heavily on their rural social networks, e.g. the kinship and regionalism that are not detachable from the patriarchy in seeking jobs and looking for assistance in the city (Li, 2003; Hsing, 1998; Pun, 2005).

Rural patriarchy can create a social divide between local and non-local people throughout history. As a result, rural migrants are excluded from the local. Decades ago,

rural migrants were marginalized from village affairs, even if they married indigenous villagers (Fei, 1946). Villages fought with each other to control scarce water resources as demonstrated in a history of the Gao village (Gao, 1999). Nowadays, networking in the factory in Dongguan relies on local cultural connections and excludes rural migrants from a non-local culture (Hsing, 1998).

Similar to the exploitative factories in the American company town, the control of *baoshenggong* in the Japanese yarn factories was rigid and crude before 1949. In Xiayan's observation, these slave-like woman workers were supervised, inspected and punished by a management hierarchy of Japanese female owners, foremen, and female security guards. Moreover, behind the rigid and crude factory supervision was the real control of labor by the powerful "green gang" that included human traffickers in Shanghai. The green gang replaced the government's administration of the labor contract system that was not merely an exploitive domination of foreign investments but represented a vulnerability of factory workers and owners (Honig, 1986 p.120-131).

The fast and powerful market transition in the reform era brought about a new mode of governmentality, e.g. neo-liberalism and factory discipline. On the one hand, farmers can now freely move into cities and search for jobs while temporarily dwelling in cities. Reform permits rural-to-urban migration and rural migrants can become better off through increased income (Wu, 2010), escape from dreadful rural conditions (Pun, 2005; Yan, 2008), and seek opportunities for self-development and autonomy (ibid.). Studying the urban young professional, Hoffman (2010) argues that "choice" becomes its own kind of governmentality for young college graduates, including the rural population attempting to seek freedom and autonomy through professionalism.

On the other hand, factory discipline has prevailed in factories since the reform. Rofel (1992) observes the conflict between new factory discipline and residuals of revolutionary struggle in the early reform period through workers' shirking in working hours and cadre's panoptic inspection via architecture form. Since then, Hsing (1998), Yeung (2001) and Pun (2005) all observed rigid factory discipline in exploitive labor

control, intensive and heavy factory work, and constant inspection on workers in the later reform period. Foreign managers maintain a high turnover rate in the female labor force through keeping them in work only until they lose “dexterity and attentiveness” in and outside a factory in Dongguan (Wright, 2003 p.291). In addition, Ren & Pun (2006) study dorm discipline and argue that the dorm discipline is similar to the factory discipline and response to the requirement of global production and the government’s irresponsibility of rural migrants’ reproduction. Neo-liberalism might open the door to rural migrants’ future development, but it is impossible for rural migrants to obtain much freedom within various constraints of the state’s sticky institutions, the rural patriarchy and rigid factory control.

In response to the literature reviewed above, my research applies the concept of governmentality and Rose’s analytical framework. It notices this multiplicity of governmentality modes in China and examines the historical discrepancies and present-day regrouping process of various governmentalities. There might be new or rejuvenated forms of governmentality emerging in China. For instance, arguing for a “green governmentality”, Yeh (2005) argues that the Chinese government is deepening the control of the territory of the Tibetan Plateau and alters pastoralists via the policy of converting pastures to grasslands (*tuimu huancao*). Feng (2009) argues that the state is promoting rural migrants’ welfare and freedom via building the *xiaokang* (well-off) socialism and a harmonious society (*hexie shehui*). Engaging these different forms of governmentality with Foucault’s examples such as discipline and sovereignty, my research applies Nikolas Rose’s analytical frame of governance.

In short, Foucault’s concept of governmentality establishes the foundation of studying governance of subjects. The perspective and focus of power relations in governance permits an exploration of multiple authorities’ moral grounds, strategies, tactics and purposes of conducting those subjects. Differing from mainstream political-economists who explain questions of ‘what’ institutions become and ‘why’ institutionalism comes into being, governmentality interprets governance (including institutions and institutionalism) to understand the processes and mechanisms of

governance. Moreover, Foucault uniquely includes space in his discussion of governance. On the perspective of governmentality, space, e.g. the Panopticon and other types of spaces that scholars can discover, is not only productive, as Lefebvre argues, but also purposely targets those governable subjects and shape their bodies, minds and souls according to authorities' purposes. Building research on governmentality, scholars such as Nikolas Rose, Peter Miller, and Paul Rabinow translate Foucault's power theories from modern liberal history to contemporary neo-liberal society within the context of capitalism. A few other scholars such as Michael Dutton and David Bray apply governmentality to analyses of governance in China within socialist or post-socialist contexts.

In contrast, Foucault's governmentality lacks at least two points of important concerns on subjects and space. One is value and the other is resistance. With respect to the first point, Goldman (2001) and Rutherford (2007) complement Foucault's power theories by arguing that authorities engage in the assignment of values, e.g. ecological value of nature and resources, in order to conduct subjects. Value as a moral standard of behavior is also important in forming subjectivity. This is a notion Foucault himself did not discuss. In governance, subjectivity has become a focus of authorities' central task and an object of power (Rose, 1990). The governance of subjectivity, personality, attitudes and the like is to govern subjects' soul and shape their self (ibid.). Through the governmental assignation of values to territory, subjects who are identified with that territory might ultimately associate those values with themselves. On the second point, Foucault pays little attention to subjects' resistance. As discussed above, theories of resistance developed by Karl Marx, James Scott and Michel de Certeau can reinforce studies of subjects' resistance.

## **C. Manufacturing Towns**

### 1. Global History: Company Towns and Communes of the Utopian Socialism

In the review of manufacturing towns, my research pays attention to the development and spaces of these towns. The American company town is a place for industrialists to carry out and practice their ideologies and rationalities upon their workers. Green (2010) sorts up two stereotypes of towns: exploitative towns with a majority of unskilled workers and disciplinary towns with a majority of skilled workers. In the exploitative town such as mining towns across Appalachia, industrialists do not provide miners necessary infrastructure or basic residence. Miners have to live in tents or self-built houses. Company stores replaced currency with scripts increasing workers' indebtedness. The "yellow dog contract" banned unions for organizing workers. Pullman Town was the exemplary disciplinary town, a highly ordered, carefully planned and designed wealthy suburban town which was even praised by some striking workers in 1893 (Crawford, 1995 p.39-40). Industrialists hired professional planners and designers for constructing well-planned town centers, residential neighborhoods and stylish housing. Indian Hill, for example, was an application of Ebenezer Howard's garden city and John Nolen's standardization of Company town planning for (especially, skilled) workers in Massachusetts. (ibid.). Milton Hershey built numerous public buildings and spaces such as a library, parks, a zoo, a swimming pool and golf course, an extensive trolley system, a medical clinic and athletic teams (Green, 2010 p.38). In addition, churches are commonly deployed in the town for workers to have a guided and regulated life style that industrialists stimulate as a contribution to production.

Synthesizing Foucault's power and Lefebvre's production of space, Herod (2011) points out that social actors are spatially embedded with various capacities to cross and shape space in capitalism: a social-spatial relation is expressed by socially engineering workers through spatial engineering of the city in the American Company Town. Industrialists carried out various ideologies in the territory of the town in order to differentiate skillful and unskillful workers, and manage them for industrial production. Exploitation shaped a dreadful shantytown for minimizing costs and squeezing every ounce of physical labor from unskilled miners. Forms of discipline such as Pullman's paternalism and Hershey's philanthropic social welfare offered skillful workers' a

“picturesque” town with sufficient facilities, amenities and stylish architecture and landscape for attracting and guiding them and promoting higher productivity.

In addition, Herod (*ibid.*) stresses that there is always a present-history dialogue in shaping social-spatial relationships. The histories of industrialization, migration, immigration and the like continue to resurface and restructure the social-spatial relation. More than just static ideal apparatuses managing workers, most American company towns are in constant process of transformation. During economic crisis, the Pullman town failed in its philanthropy to workers and turned into an exploitive town. Lowell in Massachusetts transformed from “a close-knit and planned community allowing woman workers to grow socially and intellectually” in the early 1800s into an exploitative town, “abandoning its souls” soon after immigrant workers replaced the New England woman workers (Birkenmeier et al. 2002). In a counter process of development of the Pullman town, Lowell and the like, several mining towns improved their environments for workers. For instance, in Tyrone, New Mexico, the industrialist fully owned and controlled the town, employed unskilled workers and hired a renowned architect to design a town with a formal Beaux-art center and informal garden city housing to help avoid social problems such as strikes (Crawford, 1995 p.137&138). Many towns do not completely belong to either of the two stereotypes of exploitive and disciplinary towns but have changing features in both of them (Green, 2010).

Similarly, the U.S. government hired designers to promote the idea of the Garden City in the government town, e.g. the Sunflower village, Kansas, and shape its physical layout: rural landscapes surrounded the village; green belts were inserted in the village; and residential buildings were designed to suit singles, spouses and families specifically (Post, 2011). Favoring social democracy instead of powerful individual ideologies, the government promoted individuality, e.g. allowing workers to decorate walls and place their own furniture in their houses (*ibid.*). In addition, the government built no churches (Christian Churches), which most company towns usually had, but community buildings for various religious activities, and promoted village residents’ self-organization by which these residents established their own newspapers and town council (*ibid.*).

Company Towns outside the U.S. exhibited a similar pattern of a social-spatial relation. The interaction of repression and resistance in the exploitive town was directly projected by the worker-gang-foreman disciplining relationship in the port of Santos, Brazil (Da Silva, 2011 p.68-91) or expressed complexly in the interaction among firms, workers, communities, and the government in Santos, Mexico's evolution from a company town to a union town (Gomez-Galvarriato, 2011 p.45-68). Welfare capitalism also exhibited itself in cases of the European Company Town, e.g. Port Sunlight in Cheshire, Britain, and Bournville near Birmingham (Gaskell, 1979), contrasting the poor condition of the majority of the English working class described by Engels (1969).

A small town was an ideal place for social experiments and attracted idealistic socialists such as Robert Owen and Charles Fourier to improve both workers' living and working environments and eliminate exploitation, cruel factory regulations, government laws and the like within capitalism. Both the New Harmony and the Phalanx tended to create a utopian discipline combining ordered urban form, a controlled number of commune members, and socialist institutions such as public ownership of properties and promotion of equality. Both of them were isolated communities in remote areas, accommodating a limited population (1,000 to 2,000 people in New Harmony and 1,600 people in Phalanx) (Fourier, 1822/1972; Owen, 1817&1841). The governance in both of them required short-time daily labor work, allowed very limited private property for commune members, divided work and time in terms of interests, talents, genders and ages, and distributed resources and products according to individuals' will (ibid.).

The physical forms of both New Harmony and Phalanx are designed and planned in a blueprint of utopian socialist ideology by which ordered spaces of the town communes supposedly spiritualize all commune members. For instance, both the designs of Stedman Whitwell's model community and *phalanstery* carefully allocated different programs such as dormitories and public rooms in order to improve commune members' social relations (Fourier, 1822/1972; Whitwell, 1830). Details of designs included equal distribution of light and darkness, accommodation of both the rich and poor, division of

generations such as the elder and the young, and the like (ibid.). The development of the two communes aimed at improving human beings' well-being, although it failed due to the utopian thinking in both Owen and Fourier's ideologies.

## 2. Cases in China: (1) Japanese Invested Factories in the 1930's Shanghai, (2) People's Communes as the Pro-manufacturing Town, (3) Manufacturing Towns in the Reform

The history of developing factories and manufacturing towns goes back to as early as the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century with dramatic transformations during crucial periods of China at the time. In the 1930s, foreign investment flew into Shanghai in a short period of economic growth. In the literature of Xiayan, factory buildings and dormitories were shabby, dirty, and always wet and crowded without privacy. Factory workers, mostly rural women, lived in overcrowded dorms and congregated in squatter settlements adjacent to textile factories to form the working class's residential and working areas. One example of this type of area was Gaolangqiao in the east of Shanghai. In the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, poor peasants migrating from northern Jiangsu gradually settled in Gaolangqiao and rural woman textile workers moved in later on (Lu, 2005&2006). Around 5,000 rural women worked there from 1914 to 1949 (ibid.). Most residential buildings were haylofts made of temporary building material such as hay, bamboo, wood planks and iron sheets. Others were overcrowded factory dorms for workers accommodating 56 persons with 28 double beds and an eight-square-meter bathroom opened only two to three times a week. Segregated from these workers' residents were cozy dorms for foreign employees: several Japanese employees' dormitory buildings were two-stories high with one-bed and two-bed rooms adjacent to hospitals, residential halls and swimming pools. In contrast to crude factory discipline in shanty residences, Gaolangqiao was also an incubator of rural woman workers' own lives and resistance: the northern Jiangsu rural migrants occupied an empty open space for entertainment such as acrobats and local opera; the CCP educated and organized factory workers in Gaolangqiao and turned it into a cradle of proletarian movements.

During Mao's period, the development of the People's Commune was driven by communist ideology and the political organization of farmers for production within the scale of towns. The Stalinist state in the Soviet Union organized farmers to work and live in the collective farm (Kolkhoz). Both China and eastern European socialist countries learned from Kolkhoz for their own rural collectivization. In China, from 1952 to 1958, individual farmers had either volunteered or been organized to join in the mutual-aid teams for cooperative farming by the Chinese government to increase agriculture production (Zhang, 1998). The Chinese state intended to demonstrate that communist public ownership was more productive than capitalist private ownership, setting targets to surpass Great Britain and catch up to the US in terms of economic development (Lin et al., p.57). Therefore, since 1958, the state formally launched the people's commune system in rural China in order to achieve these economic goals through the Great Leap Forward (GLF). The people's commune remained until the beginning of the reform period three decades later.

The early reform period initiated a variety of major policy changes that facilitated the rapid growth of town and village enterprises (TVEs): the establishment of the rural household responsibility system, the beginning of *hukou* reform, the abolishment of food rations and the people's commune, and the like. Studying the development of TVEs and farmers' free migration in small cities and towns in Sunan, Fei (1985) argued that China needed to develop small cities and towns as a reservoir for the population and an evacuation of marginal regions for progressive economic development. Rural industrialization through TVEs initiated the formation of early manufacturing towns in the east coast such as the Sunan region and the city of Wenzhou (Naughton, 2007). In Sunan, village collectives and leaders maintained the control of TVEs as the major economic engine and restrained the entry of migrants to work in these TVEs (ibid. p.282-283). In Wenzhou, local rural families controlled their family enterprises (ibid. p.283).

In the Pearl River Delta (PRD), TVEs also grew robustly in the early reform era. More importantly, manufacturing towns became prosperous due to significant foreign direct investment (FDI). Local economic development in the PRD had two modes. One

was through TVEs such as Shunde (Beiku); the other, prominent in Dongguan, was the development of *sanlai yibu* manufacturing industries (Vogel, 1989; Pan, 2002).<sup>7</sup> The FDI oriented Dongguan mode was more prevalent in the PRD, and TVEs were usually partly owned by foreign investors (Pan, 2002; Naughton, 2007 p.284). When TVEs shrank due to privatization in the 1990s, the FDI oriented economy became even more dominant in manufacturing towns in the PRD. The local government and the village collective prioritized FDI in multiple ways such as lowered taxation, increased efficiency in bureaucracy, facilitation of factory management, and networking with foreign investors, especially former Chinese emigrants, overseas Chinese, and the like (GOSC, 1989; GOD & DA, 1993 p.23-24; Eng, 1998).

The local government and village collectives led the development of the town although FDI was the economic engine. In a case study of Yantian village, Fengguang town in Dongguan, the village could take advantage of its resources and political power to maximize its own profit (Wang & Zhang, 1996 p.178-182). The village exercised its power in the three aspects: the village collective fully controlled the development of land; the villagers were the only shareholders of TVEs and economic benefits from FDI such as taxation and fees; and locals had priority over rural migrants in the local labor market (Wang & Zhang, 1996 p.178-182).<sup>8</sup> The PRD absorbed more rural migrants than Sunan region and Wenzhou (Naughton, 2005 p.284). Manufacturing towns were “the production-driven and socially segregated urban settlements” in the PRD (Eng, 1998).

Along with rapid economic growth, various problems emerged and quickly deteriorated in manufacturing towns. For instance, a few unclearly regulated policies

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<sup>7</sup> *Sanlai* means foreign investment in forms of processing and assembling. For manufacturing production, foreign industrialists provide materials, design modes and factory equipment, and take charge of sales and marketing. The government/village collectives provide land, factory buildings and labor. *yibu* means compensation trade between foreign industrialists and the government/village collectives. See Chinese Communist Party School of Dongguan (2008, p.11) and Yeung (2001) for more details.

<sup>8</sup> The process of political decentralization strengthened the power of township and village governments in Dongguan. In details, town and village governments received the power of proposing and permitting a project with either ten million US dollars or five million US dollars accordingly. For instance, Shilong Town, Humen Town and Guanchen Town could register and permit *sanlaiyibu* enterprises... Other towns and villages could register and permit individual private enterprises and employ temporary workers from Guangdong. Towns and Villages could allocate and manage electricity independently. See GOD & DA (1993 p.49).

prioritizing FDI, e.g. favorable permits and certificates issued to enterprises, offered government officials opportunities to abuse power (Hsing, 1997). Environmental decay such as acid rain accelerated with the development of the manufacturing industry in the PRD (Eng, 1998). Dongguan had an aggravation of crimes, an intensification of labor abuse (especially of rural migrants), rent-seeking opportunities, polarization of growth, and an increase in industrial (solid) waste pollution (Yeung, 2001).

While rural land ownership quickly changed in a few regions in China, the rural land collective ownership maintained relatively intact in manufacturing towns in the PRD. For instance, a number of villages on the periphery of Beijing have changed their rural land collective ownership into share-holding cooperatives in which elected indigenous villagers instead of cadres have become managers, and villagers as well as village committees own a certain proportion of shares (Po, 2008, 2011). Yet, indigenous villagers' communities of these village collectives have maintained their control of land ownership and development in the rural land reform that distributed the power of rural land management from village cadres to individual villagers. In contrast, villages in the PRD maintained rural land collective ownership: village committees still controlled the use, development, and management of most land, even though the boundaries of rural land ownership between township, village, and village team have never been clear (*ibid.*).

The local government and village collectives continuously invested in urban development and quickly transformed the physical environment. Local development mainly aimed at economic growth. Local governments and village collectives gradually accumulated capital through renting existing warehouses, ancestral temples, community halls, dining halls and offices to foreign industrialists (GOSC, 1989). "...in 1987-1988, the factories were generally simple brick structures, several stories high, which appeared from the outside much like apartment buildings" (Vogel, 1989 p.177). Both the local government and indigenous villagers in the PRD were getting rich and continued to invest enormous capital in infrastructure such as roads and electronic power stations by governments and many two to three story high self-built houses (*ibid.* p.179&180). Local governments preferred to invest in infrastructure and real estate to encourage FDI instead

of other public goods for its citizens, including migrants (Eng, 1998). Land partition was usually in a grid-layout for the convenience of large-scale development. In one example, the Longyan management zone in Humen town developed well equipped kindergartens, primary schools and a clean environment to attract foreign capitalists' families, and entertainment facilities, high-end hotels and, restaurants prevailed for pleasing local elite (and to make Hong Kong and Taiwan investors feel at home) (Yeung, 2001). Yet little to no investment went into supporting migrant workers. Therefore, rural migrants were not a concentrated target of urban development. Huang & Wang (2004) describe a spatial segregation of rural migrants in Dongguan through housing segregation. This segregation involved three aspects: (1) 70% of rural migrants lived in factory dormitories and the rest individually or collectively rented local self-built housing; (2) locals were willing to separate from rural migrants and live in collective-built or market-built apartment buildings; (3) for efficient and effective management of rural migrants, the local government also enacted regulations to separate rural migrants and locals (ibid.).

The development and space of manufacturing towns has been in continuous transformation in the reform period. Greatly affected by the global financial crisis, the manufacturing industry in China suddenly shrank in 2008. A large number of rural migrants lost their jobs and had to leave for their hometowns. But the shrunken manufacturing industry still demands more cheap labor than the countryside could supply due to the dual facts of a rapidly diminishing rural labor surplus (Cai, 2010) and insufficient young rural migrant labor across the nation (Chan, 2010). Dynamic interactions in local-global negotiation, rural-urban interaction, and local-non-local contestation are an ongoing process. As a result, manufacturing towns in Dongguan have transformed and been reconstituted into multiple spaces: a new peri-urbanism including the co-existence and overlapping of the new and the old, the urban and rural, and the socialism and capitalism, have flourished (Lin, 2010).

In short, the development and spaces of manufacturing towns express governing authorities' ideologies/rationality and facilitate the governance of farmers and rural migrants. The expression and facilitation can be direct and abrupt through planning and

design in the cases of some disciplinary company towns and socialist utopian communes. They can also be incremental, gradual, and reactive to the changing needs of governance, authorities, and farmers/rural migrants in the cases of the people's commune and manufacturing towns.

#### **D. Literature Gaps and Research Question**

My research intends to fill three literature gaps with respect to my three themes of rural migrants, governance, and manufacturing towns. The three gaps are: (1) there are few existing studies of these themes on the scale of the town or village; (2) there are few existing studies of these themes in non-factory spaces; (3) there are few studies engaging the history of manufacturing towns. There is some literature on Chinese governmentality (Bray, 2005; Feng, 2009; Hoffman, 2010; Jeffreys; 2006&2009; Rafel, 1992; Sigley, 2006), but there are very few, such as Rofel (1992) and Feng (2009) that study rural migrants as governable subjects. There is a sizable literature studying rural migrants in China through a perspective of national urbanization and industrialization, e.g. their migration patterns, labor issues and institutions (Cai, 1999, 2009, 2010; Chan, 1994, 2009, 2010; Fan, 2009; Pei, 2006; Solinger 2006; Wang, 2005). Some others study rural migrants at the individual level, especially how their lives, identities and subjectivities are influenced by national policies, local cultures, and urban/factory work etc. (Rofel, 1992; Hsing, 1998; Pun, 2005 & 2012; Chang, 2008; Yan, 2008). Additionally, there are studies on rapidly urbanizing towns in China, especially in Guangdong (Vogel, 1989; Eng, 1997; Hsing, 1998; Yeung, 2001; Naughton, 2005). Yet, most of the literature focuses on the regional economy and rural development, with the notable exception of Eng (1997) who studies rural migrants and governance on a scale of towns and villages (Figure 1.1). In addition, the majority of literature on governing rural migrants focuses on factory spaces. Only a few researchers (Han, 2010; Wang, 1996; Wang, 2005; Zhang, 2001; Chang, 2010) study rural migrants in non-factory spaces (figure 1.2). Many of them, however, (Wang, 1996; Wang, 2005; Zhang, 2001) are relatively outdated in comparison with the rapid change of China over the past decade. Some others focus their research in a way that deviates from mine. For instance, Chang (2010) details several young

rural women migrants' lives in non-factory areas of Dongguan, but the samples of these migrants are small (only several) and these migrants are, in a way, skilled workers. In addition, a historical perspective is rare in the studies of the three themes through my literature review.

Considering my research topic, theoretical framework and literature gaps, I ask the question:

How do the authorities of Chinese manufacturing towns govern rural migrants as an on-going source of cheap labor, even as global market demand and other economic imperatives put constant pressure on the towns and industries to adapt their manufacturing output and attract a workforce with appropriate skill levels?

My research draws studies of rural migrants and manufacturing towns together with the study of governance, and contributes to an understanding of the interactions between the three themes. First, it switches research from the national/regional and individual scales to the middle scale of the town and bridges relevant studies between the macro and micro scales. Second, it also shifts the study focus from the factory to the non-factory area and from rural migrants' production to their reproduction, relaxation and consumption for production. Third, it is concerned with the historical process forming both manufacturing towns and rural migrants. In addition to this literature contribution, I look forward to an improvement of rural migrants' social status and economic condition, and the towns' development, indirectly through my research. It might influence Chinese government officials and the public in a better understanding of governance and thereby acting for change. Further research can build on my work and move toward greater change. This process aimed at rural migrants' improvement in research and practice will make my study more meaningful.

Figure 1.1 Literature Gap between the Three Themes at the Scale of Towns

<b>Spatial Scale</b>	
Hsing, 1998; Pun, 2005&2012	(Global)
Chan, 1994, 2008 & 2009; Fan, 2008; Feng, 2008; Hsing, 2012; Knight & Song, 1999; Noughton, 2007; Solinger, 1996&2006; Vogel, 1989; Wang, 2005; Whyte (Eds.), 2010; Yan, 2008	(National/Regional)
Bray, 2005; Chan, 1992; Eng, 1997; Fei, 1985; Han, 2010; Hsing, 1998&2012; Yeung, 2001; Wang, 1996; Wang, 2005; Zhang, 2001; Whiting, 2001	(Town/Community)
Hoffman, 2010; Hsing, 1998; Pun, 2005&2012; Rofel, 1992; Yan, 2008; Yeung, 2001; Whyte (Eds.), 2010; Zhang, 2001	(Individual)
<b>Governance/Authorities</b>	<b>Rural Migrants</b>

Figure 1.2 Literature Gap between the Three Themes in Non-factory Areas

<b>Governance/Authorities</b>	
Cai, 1998& 2009; Chan, 1994, 2008 & 2009; Fan, 2008; Feng, 2008; Hsing, 2012; Noughton, 2007; Rofel, 1992; Solinger, 1996&2006; Vogel, 1989; Wang, 1996; Whyte (Eds.), 2010; Yan, 2008; Yeung, 2001	Han, 2010; Wang, 1996; Wang, 2005;
<b>Factory Space/Production</b>	<b>Non-factory Space/Consumption</b>
Cai, 1998& 2009; Chan, 1994, 2008 & 2009; Fan, 2008; Fei, 1985; Feng, 2008; Hsing, 1998; Li, 1996; Rofel, 1992; Solinger, 1996&2006; Vogel, 1989; Wang, 1996; Whyte (Eds.), 2010; Yan, 2008;	Zhang, 2001; Chang, 2010
<b>Rural Migrants</b>	

### III. Methodology

#### A. A Case Study of Dongguan

My research is a case study of Dongguan. It chooses Dongguan as the research focus because it consists of significant features typical of manufacturing towns in terms of its manufacturing industry and rural migrant population. With these features, the governance of rural migrants is as important and serious an issue in Dongguan as in any part of China. First, Dongguan has been a prefecture city in the PRD of the Guangdong Province in South China since 1988 (DRCCCPH, 2008 p.361; Figure 1.3).<sup>9</sup> The administration of Dongguan includes four urban districts and 28 towns (ibid.). Each town includes tens of villages, a significant manufacturing industry, and a great number of rural migrants whose population is usually several times the local population (Table 1.1.).

In terms of these significant features, Dongguan greatly differs from a few Chinese megacities such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, and is a better case for my research of manufacturing towns in comparison with these megacities. These megacities that also consist of a large number of migrants and usually have over ten million total population have different structures of administration, industry and migrants from Dongguan. In these megacities and many other Chinese cities, underneath the administration of the city are urban (city) districts as urban cores and counties that consists of multiple towns as subordinate administration units (Chan, 2007). The political and socioeconomic centers of these megacities are urban districts that dominate divisions of administration. As we can easily perceive, the economies in these megacities rely on diverse industries including services instead of merely manufacturing industry. In addition, even though there are a large number of migrants in these megacities, the proportion of migrants in the total population is lower than what Dongguan and other manufacturing cities have, and migrants' population may include a large number of urban migrants. Given Shanghai in 2011 as an example, its

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<sup>9</sup> Dongguan was a county before 1985 when the state promoted its administration into a county-level city (DRCCCPH, 2008 p.361). In 1989, the state promoted the administration of Dongguan again into a prefecture city, majorly due to its rapid economic growth (ibid.).

administration includes 16 urban districts and 1 county.<sup>10</sup> Tertiary industry instead of secondary industry contributes the most to GDP, and in secondary industry, heavy industry is more dominant than light industry. There are around 9-million migrants' population that is, however, less than the 14-million local people, and only 3.4 million people work in the manufacturing industry. Shanghai might consist of a very small number of manufacturing towns but are far less significant to Shanghai's development compared with the 28 towns in Dongguan.

Second, compared with other cities in the PRD, the manufacturing industry is more dominant in the economy of Dongguan. Since the reform, Dongguan has quickly transformed from an agricultural county into a manufacturing city.<sup>11</sup> Chart 1.1 indicates that the agricultural industry has quickly shrank since the reform began, and weighs little in the industrial structure of Dongguan nowadays, while secondary and tertiary industries have grown in prosperity. In particular, Dongguan has maintained an outstanding FDI-oriented economy based mainly on the manufacturing industry in the PRD since the reform (Eng, 1997; GOSC, 1989; Yueng, 2001; Wang, 2008). The government aims at making a powerful city with a dominant FDI-oriented economy with manufacturing as its economic foundation (GOSC, 1989; DTYIT, 1998/2008). Nowadays, the secondary industry contributes around 50% of GDP in Dongguan (as much as in other manufacturing towns/cities), and each town specializes in sub-manufacturing industries (Table 1.1).

Third, the rural migrant population has dominated the total population and labor in Dongguan for years. Table 1.1 also indicates that the proportion of rural migrants' population in the total is much larger in Dongguan than other manufacturing towns/cities. Rural

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<sup>10</sup> All Statistical data are retrieved from Shanghai Statics Bureau (2012).

<sup>11</sup> Traditionally, agriculture was the economic support of Dongguan before the reform. In 1978, agriculture production still contributed to 45% of the GDP in Dongguan. Fertile soil, warm climate and ample rainfall enriched Dongguan to produce large amount of paddy, economic plants and aquatic products (GSO, 1989; Vogel, 1989; Yeung, 2001). Dongguan has been renowned by its paddy rice, vegetables, fish, and fruits such as lychees and pineapples (ibid.). The mulberry dike-fish pond complex (*sangji yutang*) which prevailed in the PRD was one of the agricultural significances in Dongguan (Lin, 1997; Yeung, 2001; Zhong, 1982). In the complex, farmers excavated fishponds and fed fish with night soil and cocoon waste while building banks of these ponds with soils in the pond, planting mulberry trees on the bank, and feeding cocoons with leaves of mulberry trees (ibid.). This complex integrates nature and humans in a mutually beneficial way.

migrants' population in Dongguan is close to 6.4 million and 3.5 times of the local population (DSB, 2011).<sup>12</sup> Rural migrants' population in several towns such as Chang'an can be more than 10 times the locals (Table 1.1).

In addition, rural migrants' population and employment structures are relatively stable during the reform. Chart 1.2 indicates that rural migrants mostly come from outside of Guangdong. In detail, most of them come from the provinces of Hunan, Sichuan, Guangxi, Hubei, Jiangxi (DSB, 2011 p.91). When migrants from Guangdong have quickly decreased after the 1990s, migrants from other provinces become dominant in the total population (Chart 1.2). Chart 1.3 indicates that migrants' major employment in secondary industry has remained around 85% in the reform. This tells that most of rural migrants always work in manufacturing industry in Dongguan.

In the case study, my research focuses on non-factory areas: residential compounds, retail streets, and town and village centers. It chooses one of the 28 towns and selects one particular village in the town for scrutiny. Similar to other towns and villages in Dongguan, both the town and the village have significant manufacturing industry as a big portion of their local economy and a large number of rural migrants as a major portion of their total population. In the town center, my research examines the governance and spaces of the town central square. In the village, it examines a retail street and a rural migrants' residential compound. It also examines the change of governance and spaces in Songshan Lake National High-tech Industrial Development Zone (locally shortened as Songshanhu).


A case study of Dongguan can be a reference for studying the three research themes in other manufacturing towns. It can favor the exhibition of the features and relations of the three themes, which are more outstanding in Dongguan than in other manufacturing towns/cities. Because Dongguan has been a model of manufacturing since the reform began, a case study of Dongguan can generalize research findings in similar manufacturing towns in Guangdong. By comparison, studies of other manufacturing towns that are emerging in inner

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<sup>12</sup> The 6.4 million population includes a small number of migrants from urban areas and overseas. *Dongguan Statistical Yearbook 2011* does not identify the number of urban migrants. See DSB (2011).

China or have been in establishment in East China can also refer to my case study. As some other local governments initiate new eco-high-tech towns, the government of Dongguan has been developing Songshanhu to attract new FDI, high technology and talents in order to continue to develop manufacturing towns. Thus, a case study of Dongguan is meaningful to understanding both emerging and transforming manufacturing towns in China.


Figure 1.3 Dongguan Administration Map



Source: The Google Maps & BLRD (2007)


Note: There are four urban districts in Dongguan: Guancheng District, Dongcheng District, Nancheng District, and Wanjiang District. The rest on the map are the 28 towns in Dongguan.

Chart 1.1 Composition of Gross Domestic Product (1978-2010)



Source: DSB (2010 p.68)


Chart 1.2 Migrants' Population Structure in Dongguan (1990-2009)



Source: DSB (2010 p.135&136)

Note: The data of the population from overseas in Dongguan are absent before 1995.

Chart 1.3 Migrants' Employment Structure in Dongguan (1986-2009)



Source: DSB (2010 p.135&136)

## B. Data Collection

My data collection consists of primary data and includes complementary secondary data. I collect most of my primary data through the observation and open-ended interviews of my human subjects, as well as the observation of the built environment of non-factory areas in my field studies of Dongguan. I also collect relevant transcripts such as policies, regulations, and advertisement posters through my field studies. In addition, I retrieve most secondary data from websites and a few of them through my field studies.

I conducted my field studies between the summer of 2009 and the winter of 2013. The total time span for my field studies was close to 11 months. In detail, I spent five days, three months, five months, and three months during the summer 2009, the summer 2010, the spring and summer 2012, as well as the winter 2013, respectively. In the summer 2009, I visited my former classmates in Dongguan to prepare my field studies. As locals, they recommended that I visit a village and a town with the two features of a significantly large

number of rural migrants and a powerful light manufacturing industry, with which other towns and villages share to some degree. In the summer 2010, I visited the recommended village and town, and some others while traveling from town to town. My friend offered me his one-bedroom apartment in a high-end apartment building by the city central square. I could travel to villages and towns in the day, and returned to the apartment at night. I finally chose the recommended village and town as my major field sites due to their two features and my connection to a few officials in the village and town.

In the spring and summer 2012, I moved into the village and lived there by renting a small room in a rural migrants' residential compound in order to collect more data, which I missed when I lived in the city center in 2010. By doing so, I could study the factory recruitment of rural migrants in a retail street in the day, and participated in or observed many rural migrants' everyday life when they were off duty in the evening. In weekends, I usually visited the town center, and observed the town central square as well as public events in relation to rural migrants. But limited facilities and amenities, as well as condensed unhealthy living environment in the village quickly wore on me even though I hung out with rural migrants in the retail street a few times. Therefore, I occasionally visited and studied Songshanhu, the eco-high-tech town with picturesque landscape, and the Dongguan Public Library in the city center to collect documents. In the winter of 2013, I returned to the village and applied the same methods that I carried out in 2012. I also spent three weeks living closely to and studying Songshanhu.

With respect to geographic locations, I visited 4 urban districts, 16 towns, and 55 villages within these towns. The non-factory areas referred to three types of sites: town centers, villages, and Songshanhu. In town centers, I focused on their central squares where most public events took place. In villages, I focused on rural migrants' living zones including retail streets and residential compounds. I also visited village centers where village collectives dwell. Due to the limited numbers and high price of lodges such as hotels, I lived outside Songshanhu, and visited its centers and the northern industrial zone where most factory workers lived and worked.

My human subjects included the three populations: rural migrants, government officials, and indigenous villagers. I firstly observed their major events, which respectively took place in the three sites. The first event was factory recruitment of rural migrants in a retail street in the village. I directly observed rural migrants' conversation and behaviors in factory recruitment. The second event was rural migrants' daily life in residential compounds in the village and Songshanhu. I lived in residential compounds in villages and applied participatory/direct observation of their everyday life, sitting, chatting, watching, playing games, and the like, in the public space. In the two events above, I also applied direct observation of village collectives and the government agents' interaction with rural migrants, e.g. village police's patrol in retail streets and residential compounds. The third event was the government promulgation of new policies and factory recruitment of skilled rural migrants in the town central square. I directly observed conversations between government agents and rural migrants. After my human subjects became familiar with me, I invited them to join in interviews.

I considered obtrusion of my human subjects' lives in my observation and interviews (Table 1.2). With respect to my human subjects' confidentiality and privacy, unobtrusive observation required no introduction of the researcher and the research, and no consent from subjects. Obtrusive observation and interview required my introduction and my human subjects' consent. In approaching each population of human subjects, I followed a process from unobtrusive observation as the easiest step of approaching my human subjects to interview as the hardest step of approaching them. For instance, in rural migrants' residential compounds, I lived in residences and applied participatory observation of rural migrants' everyday life in the public area. I was living in the residence as these rural migrants did. Without obstruction of rural migrants' lives, I observed their activities as they observe each other in public areas.

Table 1.2 Actions of Observation and Interviews regarding Obtrusion to Human Subjects

	Rural Migrants			Government officials		Indigenous villagers
	Factory recruiter	Secondary landlord	Other rural migrants	Village policemen	Other officials	
<b>Unobtrusive observation</b>		X	X	X		X
<b>Obtrusive observation</b>	X				X	
<b>Interview</b>	X	X	X		X	X

Note: The crossed (X) area means that the researcher will take actions of observation or interview and the blank area means no action on the subject.

I applied open-ended interviews with my human subjects. In total, I recruited 83 rural migrants, 13 government officials, and 8 indigenous villagers. The 83 rural migrants included 12 rural migrant secondary landlords, 6 factory recruiters, 14 rural migrants seeking jobs, and 21 rural migrants living in their residential compounds. I approached the rest in parks and streets, and interviewed them afterward. The 13 government officials included 2 cadres in the provincial government, 3 cadres in the city government, 4 cadres in the town government, and 4 village cadres. 6 of the 8 indigenous villagers lived in the village on which I focus. I interviewed the other 2 indigenous villagers living in other towns. Each interview lasted 0.5-to-1 hour long. I also interviewed multiple times with same informants who were rural migrant secondary landlords, factory recruiters, and government officials between 2009 and 2013.

Key concerns motivated my open-ended interviews with respect to the three populations of my human subjects. With rural migrants, my key concerns were how they observed, understood, perceived, acted in and reacted to governance, and how the governance affected the town, especially the non-factory area and rural migrants' lives through their observation. For government officials, key concerns questioned what policies/regulations/programs/activities the government proposed to manage and serve rural migrants, and how the government implemented these policies. With indigenous villagers, my key concerns were about their interaction with rural migrants and their observation of the development of their villages. Detailed guiding questions of my open-ended interviews are in Appendix 6.

In general, it was not hard to access rural migrants due to my Chinese nationality and my background from Hunan Province where many rural migrants came from. I shared mutual regionalism and local culture, e.g. interests in spicy food, with many rural migrants from inland China such as Hunan and Sichuan. My success accessing rural migrants consisted of two methods. One was to target rural migrants who were resting in street parks or residential compounds. Most of the time, these rural migrants sat alone and might be eager to talk with others. The other was to firstly connect my background with them by either introducing my background or asking where they come from. After I got familiar with a few rural migrants through several interactions, I used the snowball strategy to ask them to introduce their rural migrant friends to me. However, my methods were much more effective with lower-educated rural migrants than higher-educated ones, e.g. rural migrants who had high-school education and above, and worked in pro-technology factories in Songshanhu. Higher-educated rural migrants expressed more cautiousness and indifference to strangers like me. The reason for their caution is out of my research scope but deserves further study.

In contrast to direct access to rural migrants, I had to rely on my informants' connections in order to access government officials and indigenous villagers. Without informants' networking, it was almost impossible to interview with officials and indigenous villagers. However, once I made a connection (*guanxi*), it was easy to access others through networking and a snowball strategy. As Edin (2006), Hsing (1998), and many other scholars researching China advised, connection remains a core prerequisite and technique for successful fieldwork and data collection in China. Through my former classmates, relatives, and friends who I met in a conference on China studies, I could connect with government officials in different bureaus of urban planning, labor, and *xinguanren* service and management, as well as at different levels in-between provinces and villages.

A top-down order of interviewing government officials worked well in my field studies. For instance, my informants introduced me to an official in the city government. Through an interview with the official, she introduced me to several officials of town governments and village cadres. These officials also introduced me to more village cadres. In

interviews with government officials and village cadres separately, each of them preferred to invite several of his/her coworkers to join in interviews. They told me that a group interview would depict a full picture of their works for me. I also applied the method of networking through informants to approach and interview with indigenous villagers. In particular, considering that most indigenous villagers might hesitate to talk about village affairs and their relations with rural migrants, I found the two indigenous villagers through their blogs. The two villagers criticized society and cared for rural migrants' lives and Dongguan in the blogs. Although they did not live in the town that I studied, they welcomed my interviews and provided valuable information about general conditions of villages in Dongguan.

For understanding the spaces of manufacturing towns and the three populations' interaction with these spaces, I observed urban forms of the three sites. I selected a retail street and a rural migrants' residential compound in the village, the town central square, as well as the center and residences of Songshanhu. These urban forms included (1) architecture, landscape, and infrastructure; (2) installations such as inspection cameras, monitors, recruitment tents, bulletins, posters, signs and the like. The purpose of this observation was to understand how urban forms facilitate the governance of rural migrants.

The urban forms of manufacturing towns affected rural migrants' activities and my field studies. In general, the forms of non-factory areas in the 28 towns had less confinement of rural migrants and could facilitate my research more than the planned forms in Songshanhu. Table 1.3 listed the impact of urban forms through two types of relations in my field sites: 1) relations between urban forms and rural migrants, 2) relations between urban forms and my research methods (observation and approach to rural migrants for their consent of interviews).

Table 1.3 Impact of Urban Form on Rural Migrants' Activities and My Research

	<b>Retail street</b>	<b>Rural Migrants' residential compound</b>	<b>Town central square</b>	<b>Songshanhu</b>
<b>Rural Migrants</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ A place attracting rural migrants' consumption, relaxation, and leisure</li> <li>▪ Main artery for rural migrants to access villages</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Masses of shop-houses close to each other</li> <li>▪ Alleys as the major place of rural migrants' social activities such as chat</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Symbolic and practical space of the government's power</li> <li>▪ Free entry, facilities, and amenities to attract rural migrants</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Gated residential compound</li> <li>▪ A lake as the town center and central amenities away from rural migrants' daily life</li> <li>▪ Fast-speed roads excluding rural migrants' activities</li> </ul>
<b>My observation</b>	As public space with a large number of rural migrants, it helped my observation.	As public space, its alleys in the compound allowed my observation.	It was public space attracting rural migrants and helped my observation.	It was not easy to observe rural migrants in gated compounds.
<b>My approach for rural migrants' consent</b>	As a place for rural migrants' rest and relaxation, it helped my approach.	It allowed me to live inside and approach rural migrants afterwards.	It allowed me to approach rural migrants.	It was not easy to approach rural migrants.

### 1. Retail street

Usually, retail streets were arterials of villages and connected villages with the outside. A retail street is the center of consumption and relaxation for rural migrants in villages. Beside the retail street, there are usually shop-houses, retail complexes, open spaces, and sometimes, small parks. In the day, most rural migrant job seekers arrived at villages by bus and accessed factories through these retail streets where factories recruited workers. In the evening, rural migrants flood, crowd, consume, relax and enjoy their leisure in retail streets. While resting, relaxing and consuming in retail streets, many rural migrants were willing to talk to me as a way of killing their time. The large number of rural migrants in the retail street facilitated my approach to them, and their control of their own activities and time allowed their cooperation with my interviews.

### 2. Rural Migrants' Residential Compound

A rural migrants' residential compound developed by village collectives are masses of multiple shop-houses that were usually four-to-seven-stories high and close each other. Most compounds were neither walled nor guarded and open to the public. Therefore, I could freely enter them. With few facilities and no amenities, alleys between shop-houses were the major location of rural migrants' social activities such as chatting and playing games. While living in these compounds and sitting in alleys as most rural migrants did, I could observe their daily activities, familiarize myself with them, and then ask for their consent of interviews.

### 3. Town Central Square

A town central square was a grand open space surrounded by government office buildings and important public buildings such as libraries and exhibition halls. Similar to the Tiananmen Square, a town central square was a symbol and practice of Chinese monumental space representing the government's power. The town government developed the square with prominent facilities and amenities that attracted many rural migrants. The government and their agencies also took advantage of this space and promulgated their policies/programs/activities in relation to rural migrants. Rural migrants can freely enter and exit the square. Thereby, like normal people, I could enter the square, and observe my human subjects and their activities.

### 4. Songshanhu

The government of Songshanhu developed the industrial zone far away from the town center on a picturesque lake. The government also planned and designed rural migrants' residential compounds as gated urban communities in the industrial zone. There were no retail streets but a retail complex center serving rural migrants. However, most rural migrants prefer to stay in their residential compounds or leave Songshanhu for other towns for consumption after work. They seldom stayed on high-speed roads either. Thus, it was not easy for me to observe their activities and approach them for interviews.

In addition to the collection of most primary data through observation and interviews, some primary data included the transcripts of government documents, media articles, and street handouts from either the government or factories. I retrieved these government documents such as laws, policies, regulations, archives, and investigation reports from the state and the government's websites, and locally published books, e.g. archives of villages and towns, which were available at the Dongguan Public Library. Relevant media articles were also available in their websites. Street handouts, which I collected through field studies, included transcripts, e.g. factory recruitment posters, and governmental flyers, posters and forms, which were available to the public.

The secondary data majorly referred to statistical data such as statistical yearbooks, annual reports, census data, and local survey data. Most of them were available in local statistics bureaus' websites. I also accessed to the China INFOBANK, the China Data Online at the University of Michigan, the websites of United Nations and the World Bank, and locally published reports/books for retrieving these secondary data.

### **C. Data Analysis**

My data analysis involves a circling process of deduction and induction of data within my analytical frame of governance. In the first part of deduction, I conceptualize some data into main concepts, relations between these concepts, and postulates, according to Foucaultian power theories. In the second part of induction, I apply grounded theory to group and code data, derive key analytical themes and relations between these themes, and make preliminary arguments. There are discrepancies between the two parts of data analysis. I find that some data do not fall into the domain of the power theories and precedent studies. Moreover, a few key analytical themes, relations, and preliminary arguments, which I derive through grounded theory, do not match the power theories and conflict with my postulates. I do not regard these discrepancies as problems but potential findings through my analysis. To synthesize these discrepancies with my analytical frame of governance, I may look for other theories, which are similar to Foucaultian power theories and can interpret these

discrepancies on the one hand. On the other hand, I continuously implement the process of deduction and induction in a circle in order to compare data, analytical themes, and arguments with theories and postulates. Finally, I identify the two parts of data, analytical themes and their relations which either fall into Foucaultian power theories or not, join the two parts together within my analytical frame of governance, remove invalid postulates, and make final conclusions.

An analytical frame of governance leads my data analysis. Foucault's governmentality problematizes governance into an analytical frame, which questions realms such as political rationality, governing technologies, governable spaces, and subjects, which seek to shape conduct to achieve certain ends (Rose, 1999 p.20; Bray, 2005 p.51-57). These realms help me to collect relevant data in fields, deploy power theories to conceptualize data, as well as sort up data through grounded theory. In chapter one, my research discusses the analytical frame in detail.

In the part of induction, my analysis refers to Foucault's well-developed power theories such as pastoral power, discipline, and sovereignty (Foucault, 1975/1979 & 2004/2007) to conceptualize relevant data regarding several concepts such as Panopticism (ibid. 1975/1979). With respect to the limitation that Foucault constitutes his theories from western history instead of eastern counterparts, my deduction refers to a few studies of China, e.g. the *danwei* system, from Foucaultian scholars such as David Bray, Gary Sigley, Michael Dutton, Lisa Rofel, and Lisa Hoffman. For instance, I borrow David Bray's argument—the mass line as the Chinese State's rationality of governing *danwei* in Mao's period—and carry out and extend this argument to conceptualize my data, raise postulates, and enrich my arguments.

In the part of induction, my analysis takes two steps of data analysis through grounded theory. This follows a process of grouping, open-coding, and focused coding data, then finding analytical themes and relations joining up these themes, and finally deriving conclusions (or theories in grounded theory) (Charmaz, 2009; Corbin & Strauss, 1990, 2008; Emerson & Shaw, 1995, 2011; Glaser, 1965; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). In the process, first, I

applied the method of open coding to field notes and other transcripts form documents. Open coding may generate some irrelevant codes. Therefore, focused coding refers to the interpretation of major realms of the analytical frame. For instance, I group and code data into the realm of governing technologies according to the definition of technology of government: a heterogeneous assemblage “with modes of perception, practices of calculation, vocabularies, types of authority, forms of judgment, architectural forms, human capacities, non-human objects and devices, inscription techniques and so forth” (Rose, 1999 p.34). Meanwhile, I practice memo writing to analyze data in both field studies and data analysis. This process of coding with memo-writing helps to select relevant data, link the information of data together, and finally find unified analytical themes which integrate as much as properties of codes and data.

The second step is the application of the “constant comparative method” (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Glaser, 1965; Glaser & Strauss 1967). In my data analysis, this method takes place simultaneously within the process of coding, memo writing, and finding key themes. I use this method in two ways: a “horizontal” and a “vertical” comparison. In a horizontal comparison, as Glaser and Strauss argue, I compare one new code (or incident) with others to see whether it is different from others or not and fits into one analytical theme (category) or not. Likewise, I also compare themes/sub-themes in order to check their relations via questioning how these themes/sub-themes share common properties of codes. In a “vertical” comparison, I compare data, codes and themes with theories to check if they belong to or include others. If there are extra codes/data, I will use my analytical frame to examine if it is necessary to integrate them into new themes. If a theme or the properties of codes are not “saturated” or “rich” in terms of its properties in the process of analysis, I need to go back to the fields or written documents to find more data (Corbin & Strauss, 1990 p.12&18). My four trips to the fields between 2009 and 2013 offered me enough time and opportunities to continuously apply and reinforce the “vertical” method. In addition, the “vertical” comparison exposes the discrepancies between power theories and themes derived from grounded theory. I identify the discrepancies with my interpretation in my research. As a result, this systematic process of “constant comparative method” includes as much relevant data as possible in the claim of grounded theory and helps to limit bias in research (ibid.).

Furthermore, I constantly implement the two parts of induction and deduction in a circling process. This helps me to involve more relevant power theories to interpret and conceptualize data, which are relevant to the analytical frame. For instance, when I collect data about how the government develops the new eco-high-tech town of Songshanhu, I group data which does not directly belong to Foucault's theories, go back to literature review to develop the concept of green-governmentality to interpret the data, and then modify the concept according to the data. Through this circling process, I finally join power theories, concepts, key themes, codes, and data together according to the analytical frame, build my arguments, and then deduct my conclusions.

## Chapter Two

### Analytical Frame of Governance, Spatial Pattern of Manufacturing Towns, and Emergence of “Invisible Filters”

This chapter examines three aspects of manufacturing towns in Dongguan: the analytical frame of governance, spatial patterns, and spatial governance. It develops an analytical frame for the governance of rural migrants in manufacturing towns with respect to Nicholas Rose’s interpretation of governance and Michel Foucault’s governmentality. It identifies several major realms of governance: governing authorities, their political rationalities, governing technologies, governing spaces, and rural migrants as the subject of governance. Then it examines the spatial patterns of manufacturing towns in studying governable spaces in Dongguan. Finally, it focuses on governance in Dongguan during the period of the 1980s and 1990s.

My research indicates that, in this period, there were three governing authorities: the government, village collectives, and industrialists. In the interpretation of my research, the three authorities’ governing rationalities were the government’s pastoral power, sovereignty and the rationale of the government’s agency, and factory discipline, respectively. These authorities implemented various governing technologies such as the *hukou* system and the police system targeting rural migrants, shaped spaces of manufacturing towns that could govern rural migrants, and thereafter governed rural migrants as sources of cheap factory labor. In particular, these authorities developed a polarized and local-artery-oriented pattern of manufacturing towns. Through a self-development of villages upon this pattern, village collectives divided their villages into separated zones including village centers where indigenous villagers dwell, and industrial zones where rural migrants lived and worked.

My research argues that the authorities’ operation of their governing technologies in the spaces of non-factory areas are examples of spatial governance as multiple “invisible filters” which screen rural migrants for manufacturing production. For instance, the reform has

transformed the *hukou* system as the “invisible wall” (Chan, 1994), which divided the rural and urban sectors, into one of “invisible filters”. The spatial governance as “invisible filters” involved a screening mechanism that partitioned, policed, selected, and conveyed some rural migrants into factories while excluding the rest outside manufacturing towns. This mechanism differs from market mechanisms that push farmers out of the countryside and pull them into cities.

## **I. Analytical Frame of Governance in Dongguan**

### **A. Theoretical Foundation of Governance**

For studying the governance of rural migrants in manufacturing towns, my research adopts the concept of governmentality (Foucault, 2004/2007) as my theoretical foundation because the focus of governmentality is about governing people. By bringing up governmentality, Foucault challenges many conventional assumptions, e.g. inquires of what and why things happened, and on the nature of government (Bray, 2005 p.2; Rose, 1999 p.20). With respect to studying the nature of government, governmentality refers to the rationalities of government (ibid.). In addition, government fundamentally refers to the concept of “the conduct of conduct” which marks the various operations of power/knowledge in modern society (Dean, 1999; Foucault, 2004/2007; Rose, 1999). In a detailed explanation, “to conduct” means to lead, direct, guide, or “calculate” people as to accomplish conducting tasks, and conduct as a noun means people’s behaviors, actions as well as compartment (Dean, 1999 p.17). As Dean (1999, p.18) elaborates:

[the conduct of conduct] is any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working through the desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs of various actors, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes.

Specifically, my research implements Nikolas Rose's interpretation of governance, which furthers Foucault's governmentality, as my analytical frame. Considering political power with respect to Foucault's governmentality, Rose (1999, p.20) argues that a study of governance "is to start by asking what authorities of various sorts wanted to happen, in relation to problems defined how, in pursuit of what objectives, through what strategies and techniques." Rose's enquiries of governance are similar to Dean's elaboration of "the conduct of conduct" but provides a more concrete analytical frame questioning how authorities govern people. According to Dean and Rose, my research considers how authorities practice their power/knowledge to conduct rural migrants' conduct for achieving certain ends and causing expected and unpredictable results in manufacturing towns.

In analyzing governance, Rose (ibid.) identifies several important and interrelated realms of governance including authorities' rationalities, governing technologies, and governable spaces that shape governable subjects' conduct. Several scholars have employed this frame to analyze governance (Bray, 2005 p.51-57; Goldman, 2001; Hoffman, 2010; Yeh, 2005). We can think of governmental rationalities as authorities' "thinking/thought" or the "mentality" of government which authorities may derive from different kinds of knowledge such as science, belief systems (for example, religion), and opinions (for instance, political decisions) (Dean, 1999). In particular, authorities' rationalities refer to the moral frames through which they develop their epistemology, and articulate ideals, principles, and justifications for different forms of government (Bray, 2005, Miller & Rose, 1990; Rose, 1999). These rationalities shape the way authorities identify the problems that they encounter, their expectations and objectives of governance, and the strategies and techniques they implement in governing.

Authorities convert their rationalities into real practice through governing technologies. As Rose (1999) argues in detail:

A technology of government, then, is an assemblage of forms of practical knowledge, with modes of perception, practices of calculation, vocabularies, types of authority, forms of judgment, architectural forms, human capacities, non-human objects and devices, inscription techniques and so forth, traversed and transected by aspirations to achieve certain outcomes in terms of the conduct of the governed.

With respect to Rose's definition, my research in Dongguan identifies the institutions, rules, programs, and plans as important types of governing technologies.

On the basis of their rationalities, authorities develop governing technologies and implement them through their agents. For instance, in the Christian church, the pastorate requested people to confess sins and deployed pastors to record their followers' sexual activities (Foucault, 1976/1978). The King's court had the executioner quarter the criminal, Damiens, by using horses to pull apart the criminal's four limbs (ibid. 1975/1979). In the early years of the twentieth century, a few industrialists in the U.S. adopted Frederic Taylor's scientific management and ensured its implementation by assigning managers and engineers to oversee the workforce (Bray, 2001; Rose, 1999 p.53).

Governable spaces and subjects are the targets of authorities' governance. Governance creates divisions, making up differentiated spaces of "populations, nations, societies, economies, classes, families, schools, factories and individuals" (ibid. p.31). By making these divisions, authorities identify people as countable and calculable subjects. Power is, therefore, spatial: "power is exercised from innumerable points, in the interplay of non-egalitarian and mobile relations" (Foucault, 1978 p.94). Spaces such as the Panopticon and the military camp, which punish and discipline prisoners and soldiers respectively, can be thought of as governing technologies conducting people (ibid. 1975/1979). In addition, space is productive and active: producing other spaces such as relations, meanings, signs, and values by interactions between social, physical and mental spaces (Lefebvre, 1991). Since it is productive, space is also interrelated with governing technologies. For instance, architectural form is a kind of practical knowledge employed as a governing technology (Rose, 1999). The architecture form of the Panopticon as an active apparatus disciplines inmates (Foucault, 1975/1977).

In highlighting meaning, order and value of nature and resources, scholars have developed the concept of "green governmentality" (or eco-governmentality) as a way of complementing Foucault and Rose's arguments about space and governance. Green governmentality claims that authorities govern nature and resources in a given territory through practices like environmental management and planning to assign value to nature and science, and

make people associated with that territory visible and accountable to governance (Bäckstrand, 2004; Goldman, 2001; Luke, 1999; Rutherford, 2007; Yeh, 2005). For instance, in the practice of green governmentality, authorities can develop a territory and its nature and resources into a type of governable space for the resettlement of indigenous people (Goldman, 2001; Yeh, 2005). Chapter six will discuss green governmentality in greater detail in the analysis of the governance of rural migrants and other people in an ecological and high-tech manufacturing town.


Likewise, subjects are “the governed” but not passive. Rose (1999, p.40) argues that governance must harness and “instrumentalize” subjects’ characters, passions, motivations, wills and interests, but the reverse is also the case. My research argues that just as authorities do, governable subjects can implement their rationalities, and exercise their strategies and techniques for their own objectives. For instance, one of these objectives may be to resist the authority of governance.

These major realms—rationalities, governing technologies, governable spaces, and subjects—interrelate and interact with each other, and comprise the concept of governance. There are multiple types of governance regarding these interrelated realms of governance. For instance, the architectural form of the Panopticon partitions each inmate into single cells, projects the authority’s gaze as a disciplinary technology from the central tower to each inmate, examines these inmates, and normalizes their self-examination to purify their souls (Foucault, 1975/1979). The interaction of cultural and scientific norms and spatial forms constructs a specifically French modernity embodied in people, science, the city and architecture (Rabinow, 1989). Frederic Taylor hoped to implement his scientific principles of management upon workers in order to increase industrial productivity (Rose, 1999). In China, the CCP-state governed cadres and masses in separated urban *danwei* such as bureaus, schools and factories, where the state provided these cadres and masses free housing, medical care, pensions and other welfare and services for leading them toward revolutionary goals.

The diagram below demonstrates how my research builds on previous studies to establish a framework to explore the governance of rural migrants in Chinese manufacturing towns (Chart

2.1). My research examines the major realms of governance, and demonstrates how the interactions between these realms govern rural migrants in manufacturing towns.

Chart 2.1 Diagram of Analytical Frame of Governance



### B. Three Governing Authorities in Dongguan

Since the reform, three governing authorities—the government, village collectives, and industrialists—dominate the development of manufacturing towns and the manufacturing industry. Here, “the government” refers to local governments such as the municipal and town governments in Dongguan. In my research I consider local governments, which are under the direct administration of the state, as generally following the state’s policies governing rural migrants. It also considers the government as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) government, because the state has been a party-state since 1949. “Village collectives” refer to

the communities of indigenous villagers as well as village committees that see to the administration of villages. “Industrialists” include both foreign and domestic industrialists. My research does not differentiate these two types of industrialists regarding their relation to rural migrants, but most of the factories in my field studies are foreign invested firms.

When the reform began, the state’s new open-door policy permitted FDI to flow into mainland China. The Pearl River Delta (PRD) in Guangdong moved ahead of other regions in absorbing FDI by taking advantage of indigenous villagers’ close social cultural ties to Cantonese emigrants and geographic adjacency with Hong Kong and Taiwan (Naughton, 2007 p.294; Vogel, 1989). A few individual villagers quickly became rich and contributed to local economic development by investing in housing, roads and the manufacturing industry (Chan, 1992; GSOC, 1989). Meanwhile, in Jiangsu province, village collectives’ private economy quickly recovered in rural marketing towns while town and village enterprises (TVEs) founded by town governments and village collectives grew and thrived (Fei, 1985; Naughton, 2007). While the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) government has maintained its regime since 1949, foreign industrialists and village collectives thrived and led the growth of manufacturing industry at the local levels of villages and towns in the early reforms.

In the earliest period of reform, the government of Dongguan was quick to abandon the communist ideology of anti-capitalism and issued policies favoring foreign industrialists in order to develop the manufacturing industry (GOSC, 1989). The General Office of the State Council summarizes favorable policies into three points: favorable policies to Chinese foreign emigrants through the overseas unity program; an increase of government efficiency to assist (FDI); and facilitation of factory management for FDI in order to adapt to international regulations.<sup>13</sup> Through the prioritization of economic growth objectives, the government of Dongguan encouraged capitalist industrialists to make Dongguan their home (The Dongguan Government, 1998). Under the dominating ideal of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”, the state announced that Dongguan was establishing a new ideology

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<sup>13</sup> For example, in the increase of the government efficiency, the government established a special office called *lailiao jiagong zhuangpei bangongshi* (Office of Processing and Assembling Materials). This office combined several government programs such as negotiation of contract, and industrial and commercial registration to simplify bureaucracy and increase efficiency (GOSC, 1989). See Wang (2008) for additional details.

adopting an FDI oriented economy while maintaining the party's leadership in the reform (GOSC, 1989).

An economic development model called *sanlai yibu* prevailed and thrived in Dongguan (GSOC, 1989; Vogel, 1989; Yeung, 2001). *Sanlai* means processing materials and industrial samples, and assembling industrial components, and *yibu* mean compensation trade between the government and FDI industrialists (ibid.). This model had two aspects: foreign industrialists provided capital including material, factory equipment and technology for production on the one hand; on the other hand, the town and village government provided land, infrastructure and labor (ibid.). Foreign industrialists brought in labor intensive and low value added light manufacturing industry, and opened factories making handbags, shoes, clothes, furniture and the like.<sup>14</sup> In the 1990s, the once-thriving TVE model quickly withered. Foreign and domestic industrialists privatized most TVEs after the state retreated from development of the rural sector at a national scale (Naughton, 2007). FDI in Dongguan kept increasing while a model of *sanzi* enterprises gradually replaced the *sanlai yibu* model.<sup>15</sup> This ensured the sustained dominance of light manufacturing and a FDI-oriented local economy in Dongguan into the present.

In addition, the reforms quickly resurrected rural collectives. The looser county-town-village system in which farmers gained more autonomy replaced the communist administration of people's communes. In this loosened and decentralized political and economic environment, rural traditions gradually resurfaced. Local rural norms such as traditional culture, kinships and regionalism were severely repressed but never disappeared completely in Mao's period. Not only did they return, but gradually became the organizing principles for economic development in the village collectives. For instance, in Jiangsu province, the rural market and the marketing town which had been eliminated under Mao quickly returned in the early 1980s (Fei, 1985). In Dongguan, village collectives took

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<sup>14</sup> This type of industrial technology that had prevailed in Hong Kong and Taiwan in the 1960s and 1970s became outdated when the prices of labor and land kept increasing with rapid economic growth. Nevertheless, in the early reform, this technology was new, relatively advanced and appropriate to Dongguan and other manufacturing towns.

<sup>15</sup> *sanzi* enterprises (*sanzi qiye*) are equity joint venture (EJV) (*hezi jingying qiye*), contractual joint venture (CJV) (*hezuo jingying qiye*) and wholly foreign-owned venture (WFOE) (*waishang duzi jingying qiye*). See Yeung (2001).

advantage of their social and cultural ties with foreign industrialists, and invested in FDI enterprises (GOSC, 1989). Individual rich villagers aligned with the village collective to invest in infrastructure, and industrial and residential buildings (Vogel, 1989). Village collectives shared profits and benefitted from an internal welfare distribution system regulated by kinships (Wang & Zhang, 1996; Yeung, 2001). Approaches to distributing profits in village collectives included subsidies and annual bonus-like red pockets to the indigenous villagers and large bonuses to local youth for college admissions and military enlistments (Wang & Zhang, 1996).

The three authorities of government, village collectives, and industrialists quickly dominated Dongguan's economic growth but also began to dominate the behavior and opportunities for the growing number of migrants living in Dongguan. In developing the manufacturing and real estate industries, authorities became both administrators and employers of a great number of rural migrants. Table 2.1 shows that GDP, light industry representing the manufacturing industry and FDI in Dongguan have maintained a high-speed and continuous growth in the reform. *Sanzi* enterprises have replaced *sanlai yibu* enterprises as the dominant industrial model since the early 1990's. Compared with FDI, TVEs have always been rather weak because *sanlai yibu* enterprises, which consisted of the majority of FDI, were dominant in the 1980s and 1990s. Foreign industrialists and FDI dominated the local economy, while the government, by taking the lead in initiating reforms, gained legitimacy by attracting FDI and encouraging GDP growth. Meanwhile, village collectives resurrected rural norms that facilitated kinship and other networks with foreign industrialists that further attracted FDI.

Table 2.1 Transformation of Several Important Economic Indicators in Dongguan

Items	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2009
<b>Local GDP</b> (100 million yuan)	7.22	22.60	80.44	296.29	820.25	2183.20	3763.91
<b>Light Industry</b> (100 million yuan) <sup>a</sup>	-	11.74	48.35	212.73	590.13	1733.92	2645.54
<b>FDI</b> (10,000 US dollars)	934	3,493	25,610	115,842	195,424	424,849	421,158
<i>Sanlai yibu</i> Enterprises	934	1,511	14,309	38,418	55,975	93,023	34,758
<i>Sanzi</i> Enterprises	0	1,383	10,010	67,247	108,737	282,116	259,399
<b>Number of TVEs</b> <sup>b</sup>	-	-	-	-	-	220	607
<b>Number of <i>sanlai yibu</i> Enterprises</b>	-	3141	6924	10371	8767	-	-
<b>Number of <i>Sanzi</i> Enterprises</b>	-	79	525	2,841	3,615	12,234	9,126


Source: DSB (2001&2010)

Note:

a. Due to lack of data in manufacturing industry production, my research uses light industry to represent the manufacturing industry, which weighs a large portion of the light industry.

b. The number of TVEs in the statistical yearbooks referred to the number of *sanlai yibu* enterprises as the dominant industrial type before 2002. Therefore, my research does not include the statistical number of TVEs before 2002.

Chart 2.2 Industrial Structure in Dongguan 1978-2009 (Percentage of Total Industrial Output)



Source: DSB (2005; 2008, p.143; 2010, p.185)

## C. The three Authorities' Rationalities

The three authorities—the government, village collectives, and industrialists—hold different political rationalities, which articulate their ideals, principles and objectives by which authorities direct their governance of rural migrants. My research respectively interprets the three authorities' rationalities through the lens of three types of governmentalities—pastoral power, sovereignty, and discipline—which Foucault (1975/1979 & 2004/2007) understands in terms of governmentality. My research does not contend that the authorities' rationalities are equivalent to the three governmentalities. Rather, it considers the three types of governmentalities as typological political rationalities, and uses these governmentalities as stereotypes to examine the features of the three authorities' rationalities. The lens of the three types of governmentalities only frame the parts of the three authorities' rationalities articulating their interaction with rural migrants in manufacturing towns. The authorities hold other rationalities to interact with other people and other spaces. In addition, my research admits that authorities' rationalities can change in time and will identify these changes along with continuous discussion of the governance in following chapters.

### 1. The Government's Pastoral Power

Foucault (2004/2007) develops the concept of pastoral power to analyze Christian governance, especially the early church and Christian thought, in which the pastorate and pastors guide and examine pastors' followers as the flock. The Christian pastoral power calls for pastors to sacrifice themselves for the flock and expects to lead the flock into salvation (ibid.; Dean, 1999). Bray (2005 p.60) explains that Foucault's pastoral power includes four characteristics of a pastor-flock relation: "salvation of the 'flock', individual sacrifice for the 'flock', individual care of each 'flock', and pastors' reach of the minds and souls of the 'flock'". This highlights the pastorate's guidance of the flock to think and behave always like Christ for the salvation of individuals and the whole world. This guidance embodies the pastorate's exercise of its pastoral power. In other words, the guidance is the pastorate's conduct that is to direct pastors to reach, care

about, and sacrifice for the flock, as well as cultivate and lead the flock along a pre-destined path (for instance, to live like Christ) toward the final destination of salvation.

My research adopts Foucault's pastoral power to analyze the government's rationality, and inquires what the rationality as the government's pastoral power in manufacturing towns is for further examination in following chapters. There are two aspects of this methodological approach. On the one hand, my research neither regards the government as the Christian pastorate, nor considers rural migrants as pastors' flock. Rather, it uses Foucault's pastoral power as an analogy to compare features of the government's rationality with the pastorate's counterpart, and a theoretical lens to examine the government's rationality toward rural migrants. On the other hand, my research admits the dramatic change of the government's rationality in the reform, e.g. the abandonment of communist ideology and embrace of market economy as commonly known. However, the government maintains the regime of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The party's leadership of ordinary people is stable. Therefore, my research leaves the inquiry of the government's pastoral power as an open question for further discussion (especially for the government's "policing" of rural migrants).

A few scholars shed light on the comparison between the rationalities of the pastorate and the government. Bray (2005, p.57) argues that the CCP government's rationality in the cadre-mass relation is the mass line (*qunzhong luxian*) strategy: "leaders take ideas from the masses, develop them into systematic policies, and then take them back to the masses to put into practice" as Mao's slogan of "from the masses, to the masses" implies.<sup>16</sup> By an analogy with the pastor-flock relation, CCP cadres reached, understood, served, cultivated, and mobilized masses in order to shape them into socialist labor for revolutionary goals (*ibid.*). Hoffman (2010, p.46) argues that the government in Dalian carried out "pastoral methods of trying to encourage 'middle-level or senior technical talents to settle in Dalian'." The guidance of universities as the government's agents guided college students in their employment in the early reform and continuously

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<sup>16</sup> For details of explaining the slogan, refer to *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung vol. 5* (Mao, 1949-57/2007). Also see Bray (2005, p.57).

impacted on their job seeking behavior afterward (ibid.). In addition, Feng (2009) argues that the state and a number of local governments intend to make rural migrants better off through “good governance” which regards rural migrants as human resources as well as the state’s agents nowadays. This “good governance” implies that the state and local governments have intention to play the role of “good pastors” to the rural migrant “flock”.

My research acknowledges that the mass line was not the party-state’s only rationality. However, it contends that it was the most important and crucial one dealing with the party-mass relation. Through Mao’s period, central planning was another rationality dealing with public affairs and the economy (Lin, et al., 1995). According to deterministic Marxism and Leninism, the development of history, economy, and society was predictable, should be planned, and could be well carried out by the communist party as the proletarian pioneer. Yet, at local levels, the state’s ideas generated through central planning relied on the mass line by which cadres adapted the state’s commands to local conditions, and especially mobilized the masses to implement these commands. During Mao’s era, endless mass campaigns from the Land Reform to the Cultural Revolution were significant examples that the state commanded cadres to practice the mass line and mobilize the masses to follow the state’s decision-making.

Moreover, the governmentality of pastoral power conceptually reconciles the ideal of central planning with the mass line. As pastors exercise their pastoral power to reach, cultivate, care, and sacrifice for their flock, they are exhibiting God’s will and enforcing God’s plan of the whole world toward the Last Judgment. In an analogy, the Maoist state initiated its blueprint plans of society and economy according to communism and local cadres exercised the mass line as their pastoral power upon the masses in order to carry out these plans and achieve communism. When local cadres adapted the party-state’s commands to local conditions, they joined the practices of central planning and the mass line.

During Mao's era, although difference existed between the mass line's intended governmentality and cadres' practice of it, this practice was effective across the nation. The practice of the mass line consisted of propaganda (Dittmer, 1973 & 1998) and thereby might be rhetorical or misleading to some degree. For instance, local cadres exercised the mass line to access the masses but might not consider the masses' "voices" such as suggestions and criticism. Instead, they frequently implemented the state's commands. Yet, a complete practice of the mass line could still take place at certain local places from time to time. For instance, in the Socialist Re-education Movement, the state requested work teams that senior cadres formed to enter villages, mobilized ordinary villagers to speak publicly about bitterness toward village cadres' corruption or repression, and organized villagers' words as investigation materials against these village cadres (Chan, 1992). In the Cultural Revolution, while Mao mobilized the masses against certain party cadres, the state invented the "big-character poster" (*dazi bao*) that promoted the mass line as a tool and weapon for the masses against cadres such as Liu Shaoqi (Dittmer, 1973 & 1998). Under the state's plan, the mass line could tie cadres (at least a portion of them whom the state regarded as counterrevolutionary) with the masses for the state's political goals.

In the reform, the government's political rationality is under a party-state's "regrouping" process instead of a "retreating" state (Sigley, 2006; Hoffman, 2010). A "regrouping" entails the government's "new objectives, circumstances or strategies" after the state's "retreat" in the early reform (Sigley, 2006 p.497). This regrouping process might suggest that the government's rationalities, e.g. the mass line, can remain and be still effective in the reform. For instance, while studying the progress of economic development and to research rural migrants' conditions, the state sent an investigation team to enter Dongguan and took note of rural migrants' monotonous lives (GSOC, 1989). It then suggested local governments improve rural migrants' lives by activating their cultural activities and providing avenues for relaxation in the late 1980s (*ibid.*). Chinese leaders such as Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao

continuously articulated the importance of the party/cadre-mass relation through their speeches and writings (ibid. 2011 May 05).<sup>17</sup>

Nowadays, the state expects to implement the mass line strategy in governing people. As president Xi Jinping recently stressed in a politburo meeting:

Social management is majorly to serve and manage people, and fundamentally is the mass work (*qunzhong gongzuo*). All departments of social management serve the masses... and work for the masses' interests. Mass work is the fundamental, constant and essential work of social management.<sup>18</sup> (Xinhuanet, 2011 February 23)

The mass work as the implementation of the mass line strategy derives from Mao: the CCP and cadres must work on the party-mass relation of relying on, reaching, understanding, learning from, and mobilizing the masses.<sup>19</sup> Social management targets social conflict, stability and harmony as crucial concerns of the state, local governments and society (ibid.).

The speeches and writings of Chinese Leaders highlight the importance of the mass line to the governance of rural migrants. In Guangdong, Wang Yang, the former provincial party secretary and current vice prime minister, stresses that mass work is the party's legacy and the state's requirement. Cadres must carry out mass work in self-education, and reach and care for the masses such as rural migrants (Nanfang Daily, 2011 January 09). In Dongguan, the government has established a bureau to specifically serve and manage rural migrants since 2007 (XSMB, 2008). Thus, the party-state and local

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<sup>17</sup> The Xinhuanet collects these Chinese leaders' writing and speeches about mass work.

<sup>18</sup> Likewise, president Xi Jinping launches the practice of a mass-line education in a meeting of the Politburo. In the meeting, the president calls on party cadres to spend around one year to learn from the mass line strategy, and fight with corruption and serve people. See CNS (2013, April 19). Also see Xi Jinping's other speeches or writings about the mass line collected in Tian Tian (2013, May 16).

<sup>19</sup> Bray (2009, p.104) identifies the historical relation between the mass line and mass work: "'the mass-line' was a concept developed by Mao Zedong from the mid-1930s and become the key operational creed of the CCP...After...1949, the concept was converted from a revolutionary strategy to a principle of socialist government. Local level cadres were all trained in the techniques of 'mass-line work'". As the practice of the mass line, mass work of the CCP and cadres consists of several features: (1) complete trust in and reliance on the masses; (2) reaching, understating and learning from the masses; and (3) mobilization of the masses (Deng, 1980/1994 p.342; Hu, 2011 January 04; Jiang, 1994/2006 p.364; Mao, 1957/2007 p.379).

governments never fully abandon the mass line strategy, even though several scholars argues that the party-state's governmentalities transform into a combination of "scientific social engineering and socialist planning" and neo-liberal "governing from a distance" (Jeffreys & Sigley, 2009 p.2). The government can carry out the mass line strategy, and target rural migrants regarding various circumstances and objectives in the reform.

Furthermore, scholars pay less attention to another side of the government's rationality associated with its reach, care, and mobilization of people. Michael Dutton (2009) reveals this side in his argument of revolutionary governmentality: endless mass-line campaigns normalized individuals through struggle, criticism and self-criticism in order to identify enemies of the revolution from the masses in Mao's period. In particular, Dutton contends that this revolutionary governmentality "has still not left our world entirely... [and has] come to redefine the early part of this new millennium" (ibid. p.35). As I propose the government's pastoral power as an open question above, my research will discuss this other side as a policing power in following chapters.

## 2. Village Collective as Local Sovereign and the Government's Agencies

Foucault identifies sovereignty as an absolute power that federal monarchies such as a king thoroughly exercise in territories through their laws, edicts and norms (Foucault, 1975/1979; 1980, p.103; 2004/2007). The king remains his central personage of legal edifice of the West in divine rights and power ruling life, death as well as his territory (ibid.). By taking Machiavellian transcendental prince as an example, Foucault argues that the prince acquires his territory by conquest or inheritance, and protects the territory against internal and external danger (Dean, 1999 p.104; Foucault, 2004/2007).

Communities of indigenous villagers in manufacturing towns derive their sovereignty from local rural norms, independent land control and fiscal budgets. Village collectives draw on centuries of tradition and inheritance that make up local rural norms including indigenous villagers' kinships, dialects, and local culture and knowledge that legitimize village collectives' domination of their territories, and differentiate rural

migrants as strangers and outsiders. In traditional Chinese villages, rural collectives ruled their villages and socioeconomically marginalized rural migrants who could never become members of these rural collectives even though they had lived there for decades (Fei, 1946). Senior villagers, e.g. the leaders of village clans, instead of government officials were the real rulers of villages and administrated village affairs (ibid. 1948/1992). In the history of village collectives' protection of their territories, villagers in different villages shed blood for controlling water resources in inter-village conflicts (Gao, 1999). Inheriting their ancestors' religious independence in South China from Chinese dynastic control, local people and emigrants in Quanzhou have participated in planning and redeveloping local Goddess temples for their spiritual and ancestral governance of territory (Abramson, 2011). To rural migrants as outsiders and strangers, local people generally maintained their discrimination of rural migrants as well as dominance of their territories in the reform (Han, 2010; Pun, 2005; Solinger, 1999). Local rural norms are, in a way, adherent due to their institutional inertia of a long history.

In addition, village collectives own their absolute independence of land development and their fiscal systems to rural migrants through the administration of village committees. Rural collectives' rural land ownership fundamentally supports and favors the allocation of resources for rural industrialization during the reform (Pei, 2002). By law, village committees are the primary mass organization of self-government in which villagers manage their public affairs, collectively owned land and other property.<sup>20</sup> The collective ownership of rural land allows village committees, their economic organizations and indigenous villagers to contract and manage the land.<sup>21</sup> Likewise, village collectives can own other property and economic organizations such as town and village enterprises (TVEs) and economic cooperatives (*jingji lianhe she*). Without much

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<sup>20</sup> According to the Article 2 of Organic Law of Village Committees of China promulgated in 1998, "a village committee is a mass organization of self-government at the grassroots level, in which the villagers administer their own affairs..." According to the Article 5 of the law, "the villagers committee shall, in accordance with the provisions of laws, administer the affairs concerning the land and other property owned collectively by the farmers of the village..." Accessed on June 18, 2013, retrieved from <http://www.china.org.cn/english/government/207279.htm>

<sup>21</sup> See the Article 10, 11 and 14 of The Law of Land Administration of China, accessed on June 18, 2013, retrieved from <http://www.china.org.cn/english/environment/34345.htm>

finance from the government, village collectives pay for their own expenditures, and therefore seek their own sources of fiscal revenue (Naughton, 2007). In contrast, rural migrants, as non-local residents, have no ownership of local land and can never participate in village collectives' operation of their fiscal systems.

In the continuous reform of collective rural land ownership and village fiscal systems since the early 2000s, village collectives retained their control of the rural land ownership and fiscal system (Po, 2011). This continuously legitimates the sovereignty of village collectives in Dongguan. While rural land and indigenous villagers in other regions quickly converted to urban land and urban residents, the urbanization of villages in Dongguan remains relatively stagnant. Between 2005 and 2008, the total area of agricultural land dropped slightly from 1.8 million *mu* to 1.7 million *mu*, and the government planned to increase this area to 2.2 million *mu* in 2010 (Deng & Wang, 2011 p.110).<sup>22</sup> Between 2000 and 2010, the number of local people with rural *hukou* dropped from 1.1 million to 0.9 million (DSB, 2011). Compared to national trends, this is a very slow pace of rural-to-urban transformation. Even though a number of villages in other regions such as Beijing turn their collectives into share-holding cooperatives and distribute shares to individual villagers, villages in the PRD retain their collective ownership (Po, 2008 & 2011). When many villages in Dongguan initiated economic cooperatives (*jingji lianhe she*) around 2005, villages committees required village collectives to hold more than half of total shares of property such as land (GVC, 2008 p.98; LVC, 2008 p.94; YVC, 2006 p.47). Some other villages in Dongguan did not even include land in the value of shares for their cooperatives and maintained previous rural land collective ownership (Po, 2008). Thus, representing village collectives, village committees in Dongguan retain control of land and their fiscal system through their economic cooperatives.

The sovereignty of village collectives' rural norms, land control, and independent fiscal system is generally exclusionary toward rural migrants. For instance, even though rural migrant woman could marry indigenous villagers, they typically have no rights to

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<sup>22</sup> In the source referred, agricultural land includes farmland, plantation land, forestland, grassland, and others.

own shares of village enterprises and redeem village dividends (Wang et al., 1996). These migrant women's children are entitled to lesser amounts of village welfare such as education subsidies and red pockets than indigenous village couples' children could receive (ibid.). Villages in Dongguan had control of most land development before 2000, although town governments recently reinforced their control, monitoring and managing of rural land (Hsing, 2010). Nowadays, while village committees allocate some of their income to family planning, education, insurance, cadres' bonus, and subsidies to the poor, elders, and military martyrs' families (LVC, 2008; QVC, 2009; SVC, 2008),<sup>23</sup> they do not indicate any coverage of rural migrants' welfare in their fiscal reports.

At the same time they act as local sovereigns, village collectives also act as government agents. Village committees are under the government's administration although they are not a formal part of the government. By law, the CCP is the core of leadership of villages, the government can guide village committees, and committees must publish and implement the government's regulations and policies.<sup>24</sup> In the reform, the government retained its designation of key committee members such as the CCP-appointed party secretary in the reform of village politics (Oi and Rozelle, 2000). Nowadays, in Dongguan, 40% of villages and urban communities have achieved villagers' direct elections of village committees, however, only CCP members can vote for village party secretaries and other party members in the committees (Nanfang Daily, 2011, April 25). The government, which the CCP leads, retains its authority over village committees.

### 3. Industrialists' Factory Discipline

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<sup>23</sup> Several village collectives' annual fiscal reports that I collected through my field trips also indicate the same types of distribution that only benefit village collectives.

<sup>24</sup> According to the Article 3 of Organic Law of Village Committees of China promulgated in 1998, "The primary organization of the Communist Party of China in the countryside shall carry out its work in accordance with the Constitution of the Communist Party of China and the Working Rules for Primary Organizations of the Communist Party of China in Rural Areas". According to the Article 4, "The people's government of a township, a nationality township or a town shall guide, support and help the villagers committees to establish and improve their self-government systems and to carry out self-government activities..." According to the Article 6, "the villagers committee shall publish and implement the Constitution, laws, regulations and State policies among the villagers..." Accessed on June 18, 2013, retrieved from <http://www.china.org.cn/english/government/207279.htm>

Industrialists are keen to discipline factory workers due to the high demand for their labor. Discipline acts as a bio-power that targets human bodies (Foucault, 1979 & 2007). Through discipline, industrialists distribute workers in factory programs, regulate and inspect their bodies, and finally normalize their behaviors in order to turn workers into docile bodies (ibid.). For instance, through the assembly line, Henry Ford assigned each worker to a specific location and gave him or her repetitive tasks in order to reduce the time to manufacture the Model T greatly (Ford, 2007). The concept of scientific management was based on modern knowledge and developed mechanisms for adjusting workers' bodies and behaviors to fit with planned programs, standardized tasks and tools, scheduled time tables, experimented instructions and formulae, and the like (Rose, 1999; Taylor, 1914). In modernization, the factory becomes an apparatus regulating each worker's daily behaviors for production.

Due to their motives of maximizing production, industrialists expect efficiency and frequently engage in exploitation as demonstrated by many historical cases, e.g. company towns. Both the assembly line and scientific management result in efficiency. In addition, disciplinary techniques facilitating efficiency are exhibited in multiple ways, such as the restrictive control of woman workers' daily routines in Lowell (Dublin, 1975 & 1979, Birkenmeier et al., 2002) and the cultivation of obedience by regulating workers' attendance of churches (post, 2011). In contrast, a few industrialists heavily exploit workers by reducing their labor cost. For instance, both the "yellow-dog" contract, which removes workers' rights of joining in labor unions, and company stores, which may trap workers in debts, can restrain workers' lives in rigid factory discipline for exploitation (Crawford, 1995; Green, 2010). Furthermore, industrialists can differentiate skilled workers from unskillful workers, and expect to discipline them toward either more efficiency or exploitation, respectively. For instance, a few industrialists such as George Pullman, Milton Hershey and Henry Ford prefer to provide more welfare and services as incentives to discipline skilled workers for increasing efficiency (Esch, 2011; Green, 2010). In contrast, discipline through rigid management, regulation, police investigation, intimidation, and assassinations of union supporters secured management's ability to

maintain low salaries and services for unskilled workers in the Appalachian mining towns (ibid.).

Foreign industrialists who play significant roles in manufacturing industry in China fully exercise factory discipline upon rural migrants' bodies. Historically, foreign industrialists from Japan and Britain could completely control the bodies of *baoshengong* (indentured workers) and completely exploit these workers' labor by long-hour intensive work, no payment and little services (Honig, 1986; Shanghai Government Editorial Committee, 2000). In the reform, foreign industrialists shape rural migrants' machine-like behaviors in the assembly line and military/prison-like life in their factories (Hsing, 1998; Pun, 2005; Yueng, 2001). For instance, the rigid factory discipline in the Foxconn Plant directly transfers the extremely high requirements of quality control from foreign industrialists such as Steven Jobs to rural migrants' intensive, fast, repetitive and delicate body-movements in manufacturing iPhones.<sup>25</sup> Industrialists in manufacturing towns operate as much discipline of rural migrant workers as their predecessors exercised in history.

#### 4. Collaboration and Conflicts Among the three Authorities

In Dongguan, the three authorities collaborate for their mutual interest in manufacturing production. The government and village collectives' prioritize foreign direct investment (FDI) (Eng, 1997). They have issued favorable policies in taxation, land development, infrastructure supply, profit distribution and the like to attract FDI (ibid., GSOC, 1989; Vogel, 1989). In the early reform period, the government established a special agency called the Processing and Assembling Office (*lailiao jiagong zhuangpei bangongshi*) which served and favored FDI (ibid.). This office congregated multiple government programs such as negotiation of contracts and simplified services such as industrial and commercial registration, customs permits and import & export permits (ibid.). Through the reform, both *sanlai yibu* enterprises and *sanzi* enterprises that have

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<sup>25</sup> See ITFS (2010) for more details.

dominated the local economy are the major beneficiaries of cooperation between foreign industrialists and the other two authorities.<sup>26</sup>

Besides favorable policies, networking through cultural ties draws the three authorities together to develop the manufacturing industry. From the city to factories, networking between government officials, foreign industrialists and local factory managers makes economic development flourish in Dongguan (Hsing, 1997). In particular, in villages, the three authorities tightly connect to each other due to shared rural norms but also through indigenous villagers who might have multiple identities as village cadres, FDI managers or private industrialists. Most foreign industrialists or their ancestors are emigrants from these villages. In the early reform, these foreign industrialists hired retired cadres as chief managers to deal with relations between the factory and the local government (Vogel, 1989; GOSC, 1989). Indigenous villagers preferred to work as factory managers (*ibid.*). Within the ongoing reform, a few former village cadres took advantage of socioeconomic connections and became the super-rich (Chan, 1995). Nowadays, cultural connections such as blood ties integrate the three authorities. Village cadres might come from a big family within the same kinship. In the village I studied, more than two thirds of indigenous villagers and six of eight cadres in the village committee have the same family name. One key investor in the village is an emigrant who fled from the village to Hong Kong to elude famines in the 1970s. Networking still largely facilitates the three authorities' cooperation at the local level.

Through the reform, the three authorities' governmentalities have remained relatively stagnant in the fast development of manufacturing towns. These governmentalities have their inertias and path dependences. Foreign industrialists may modify factory regulations and rural migrants' timetables but they continue to rely on these disciplinary techniques to manage rural migrants. The state has been reforming the *hukou* system and searching for new methods of social management but the party-state and local governments always maintain their leadership of rural migrants. During recent years, many villages in Dongguan have been changing into urban communities but many

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<sup>26</sup> For definition and information about *sanlai yibu* and *sanzi*, refer to the List of Chinese Terms and chapter one.

indigenous villagers maintain their rural *hukou* and rural norms. A village cadre who recently became the deputy director of the new urban community told me, “Nothing but the title of the village committee changed. Nothing will change in my generation... [Because] the town government does not urbanize my village now but probably waits for the young generation to gradually move out of the village and work in the city.” Even though villages are under rapid urbanization in Dongguan, village collectives’ local rural norms and administration of public affairs remain prevalent.

Thus, my research considers the dominant relation among the three authorities as characterized by cooperation. It also pays attention to their contests that might indirectly affect their governance of rural migrants. They contest each other due to conflicts of interests and objectives over time. For instance, the government often contests with village collectives in rural land expropriation in the current rapid urbanization. When the government intends to change collective ownerships of rural land into the state’s ownership and carries out eminent domain, village collectives can resist the change, and several village collectives such as villagers in Wukan might shed their blood for their land.<sup>27</sup> In addition, as the government’s agent, the village committee can shirk its governmental tasks when the government’s monitoring is loose. Contests can also take place between industrialists and the other two authorities. However, my research mainly focuses on the portion of the contests that impact the governance of rural migrants, because it is out of my research scope to study the contests between the three authorities systematically.

## D. Governing Technologies and Governable Spaces

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<sup>27</sup> In the Wukan event that broke up in 2011, corrupted village cadres colluded with real estate developers and expected to turn some rural land to urban land without indigenous villagers’ permission. In order to stop the expropriation of their land, most indigenous villagers in Wukan protested and blocked the entrances to their village for self-protection. In a conflict with indigenous villagers, the government seized a senior leader of the village collective who suddenly died in a police station. After the prevention of the land expropriation and a re-election of the village committee, this event finally ended. Similar events also took place in some other villages in Lufeng, Guangdong and around Shanghai. See Jacobs (2011, December 14&23) and BBC (2011, December 23).

The three authorities operate their own governing technologies such as rules and programs to conduct rural migrants. For instance, the everlasting *hukou* system, which the state launched for population control in 1958, is still effective nationally (Chan, 2009; Lu, 2005; Fan, 2008; Wang, 2005; Whyte, 2010). Even though the state has localized reform of the system since the early 1990s, rural migrants with non-local *hukou* are still barred from access to urban welfare and services including government employment, public housing, insurance, pension and education in the city, especially big cities such as Beijing and Guangzhou (ibid.). Currently, Dongguan with a population of 8.22 million consists of 6.4 million migrants who hold non-local *hukou* and mostly come from countryside.<sup>28</sup> The *hukou* system, still a tool of population control, excludes the majority of rural migrants from becoming permanent residents in Dongguan.

Local rural norms and an independent fiscal system are examples of tools for village collectives' governing technologies. Through these tools, village collectives could not only passively refuse rural migrants access to village welfare as mentioned above, but also actively targeted rural migrants and constrained their socioeconomic activities. During the decades of reform, local communities regarded rural migrants as criminal suspects and insecure personnel, and were targeted by police forces (Han, 2010; Pun, 2005; Solinger; 1996; Zhang, 2001). Discrimination occurred in daily life. For instance, Pun (2005, p.159) observed that local saleswomen seemed to look on rural migrants as the poor, and ignored rural migrants who asked for prices of goods. Through her observation of Dongguan, Chang (2008, p.27) claimed to see a clear social segregation as an ironic form of discrimination: "discrimination by local residents is not really an issue, because migrants almost never encountered locals".

In addition, the independent fiscal system allowed village collectives to collect fees from rural migrants according to local conditions. As the government's public schools, village education such as primary schools charged rural migrants mandatory tuition fees or selecting-school fees from hundreds to tens of thousands of *yuan* per year (Li & Li, 2010). Village collectives could also collect various other fees directly from migrants or indirectly

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<sup>28</sup> See *Dongguan Statistical Yearbook 2011* (DSB, 2011).

from their employers under the titles of public security, sanitation, training, housing management, certificate applications, etc., directly from rural migrants or indirectly from their employers (Dongguan Daily, 2012 August 01; Jiangxi Province Social Science Academy, 2006; Jinyang Net, 2007, March 14).<sup>29</sup>

Industrialists exercise multiple factory disciplinary techniques over rural migrant workers. Foucault's bio-techniques are exhibited in industrialists' management of partitioning, allocating, regulating, monitoring, and examining rural migrant workers' bodies. Factory programs, the assembly line, and work assignments and positions partition each rural migrant into a certain working spot and a bed in a dorm (ITFS, 2010; Pun, 2005). Rigid factory regulations, programs of assembly lines, and working positions defines workers' behavior and actives in the factory and possibly even in dormitories (Pun, 2005; Ren & Pun 2006). Restrictive and carefully scheduled timetables define and calculate workers' body-movements down to the second in Foxconn plants (ITFS, 2010). Intensive and long working hours, e.g. commonly over 10 hours a day and 7 days a week, exhaust rural migrants (Hsing, 1998; Yeung, 2001). Factory monitoring such as digital inspection (Pun, 2005) and one-worker-to-one-worker human inspection (Yeung, 2001) reinforces factory management. Hsing (1997) characterizes factory discipline of rural migrants as semi-military management.

Chinese Authorities shape governable spaces of cities and towns that can conduct rural migrants. For instance, the historical rural-urban divide excluded rural migrants from permanently settling down in the city (Chan, 1994 & 2009; Knight & Song 1999; Lin et al., 1996; Naughton, 2007; Pei 2006; Wang, 2005; Whyte, 2010). Nowadays, this divide still excludes rural migrants from urban welfare and services in big cities such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou (Chan, 2010; Naughton, 2007; Whyte, 2010). City centers thrive under heavy investment (Gaubatz, 1995), and economically exclude low-income rural migrants. The planning, design, and land control for developing urban centers correlate with

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<sup>29</sup> In 2012, the government of Dongguan officially abolished public security fees that towns and villages collected. See Dongguan Daily (2012, August 01). One example of collection of various fees was that Huanjiang Town had charged a lump sum fee of 51 *yuan* per year that included 5-*yuan* cost of a temporary resident card (TRC), 30-*yuan* public security fee, and 16-*yuan* environmental fee (*lvhua fei*) in the application of a TRC for years. See the Jinyang Net (2007, March 14).

favorable policies to wealthier local residents instead of the poor and migrants (Abramson, 2008; Abramson & Anderson, 2006). A large number of rural migrants in the city can only afford to live in slum-like rental housing which village collectives build (Chung, 2010; He et al., 2006; Zheng et al., 2009). Likewise, at local levels, e.g. in Humen town in Dongguan, authorities develop high-end facilities and amenities such as well-equipped kindergartens, and high-end hotels and restaurants to please local rich and make foreign investors at home (Yeung, 2001). In factories, authorities build management buildings higher than factory buildings in order to monitor workers (Rofel, 1992).

My research will continue to further the study of the three authorities' governing technologies and spaces in Dongguan. In this chapter, the section of spatial diagrams of manufacturing towns will discuss the governable spaces at the levels of towns and villages. The section of "invisible filters" will discuss the integration of governing technologies and spaces regarding the governance of rural migrants.

## **E. Docile Bodies vs. Resisters: Rural Migrants as Subjects of Governance**

Within governance, rural migrants become the governed subjects such as cheap labor and secondary citizens but not merely docile bodies. They experience the governance and may either accept it or potentially resist its coercion and repression. On the one hand, rural migrants' deprived conditions and low social status indicates that they are under governance. Forty percent of the over-250 million rural migrants are working in the manufacturing industry.<sup>30</sup> Their average salary, today around 60% of local residents' in the urban sector, has always been lower than the urban sector's income (Cai et al., 2008) (Sicular & Yue, 2010 p.100). Authorities' governing technologies such as the *hukou* system, local rural norms and the village fiscal system have treated rural migrants as secondary citizens by providing them little local welfare and services and potentially discriminating against them. In factories, industrialists' wage arrears had been significant until starting to drop in recent years (NBSC,

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<sup>30</sup> See NBSC (2013, May 27) for statistical data.

2013, May 27).<sup>31</sup> However, over half of rural migrants do not sign contracts with their employers (ibid.). Work dismissal for rural migrants is common and sometimes unreasonable, for example, using marriage and pregnancy as cause for dismissal (Hsing, 1997; Yeung, 2001 p.185-188). In addition, rural migrants might work in highly risky environments endangering health (Hsing, 1998; Yeung, 2001). As a result, Pun (2005) points out that rural women migrants are under the domination of the state, global capitalism and rural patriarchy.

On the other hand, rural migrants might take advantage of their migration to cities and towns, and can resist governance. Rural women migrants leave for cities as a way to resist hardship in the countryside and search for opportunities of self-development through migration (Pun, 2005; Yan, 2008). The factory girls in Dongguan can resist the constraints of their governance by finding better jobs in talent markets (*rencai shichang*) in Dongguan, and move upward in society to become office clerks (Chang, 2010). Demonstrating direct resistance, the numbers of industrial disputes and social unrests have escalated multiple times in the past decade (Butollo & Brink, 2012). Rural migrant construction workers employ class-consciousness to organize themselves, protest, and strike against developers or contractors due to wage arrears (Pun, 2012). As mentioned in the introduction of this research, the three large-scale social unrests involving thousands of rural migrants created turmoil in several manufacturing towns. Acting as individuals or in groups, rural migrants can actively respond to attempts to govern them.


In short, multiple authorities in manufacturing towns develop their governing rationalities, carry out their governmentalities, implement them through governing technologies, and shape the spaces of manufacturing towns through the governance of rural migrants. As Figure 2.2 indicates, there are three authorities—the government, village collectives, and industrialists—who carry out their governmentalities including pastoral power, sovereignty with a rationale of the government's agencies, and discipline, respectively. Yet neither authority has absolute power—it is necessary for each authority to

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<sup>31</sup> The percentage of wage arrears at the national level has continuously decreased: 4.1% in 2008, 1.8% in 2009, 1.4% in 2010, 0.8% in 2011, and 0.5% in 2012.

cooperate in the governing of rural migrants to achieve shared goals of manufacturing production. Due to the broad institutional discrimination and modes of governance described above, the great majority of rural migrants have little choice but to become cheap factory labor in manufacturing towns. Yet, in their interactions with authorities' governance techniques, rural migrants may obey or resist authorities' repression and coercion. As a result, conditions in manufacturing towns are at once strictly regulated, yet combustible.

Chart 2.2 Diagram of Analytical Frame of Governing Rural Migrants in Manufacturing Towns



## II. Spatial Patterns in Manufacturing Towns of Dongguan

The spatial form of Chinese cities displays a clear center-periphery pattern. This pattern stands out at the administrative levels of cities, counties and towns/townships. In his diagram of the spatial/administrative structure of a typical large city in China (Figure 2.1a), Chan (2007) illustrates this pattern and identifies high-density urban cores, extensive rural areas, and smaller urban centers at the city and county levels under the jurisdiction of the municipal government. High-density urban cores also consist of enormous commercial and residential developments (Gaubatz, 1995). Hsing (2010) argues that urban centers of cities, counties and towns/townships reflect a hierarchical order, and are both administrative and economic cores (Figure 2.1b). In this pattern, the center is urban areas as administrative and economic cores surrounded by urban fringes, and the periphery is rural areas including urban places.

The spatial form of manufacturing towns in Dongguan replicates this center-periphery pattern at the town-scale. The Dongguan city map identifies four urban districts in the center surrounded by 28 towns (Figure 1.1 in chapter one). According to Hsing's diagram and her study of Dongguan, each town consists of town centers with villages on the periphery (*ibid.*). Through my field studies, I observe that these town centers consist of town governments as well as economic cores such as high-end commercial and residential street blocks. Adjacent to these urban street blocks are scattered rural settings including villagers' low-rise residences and a few factories. Outside town centers are villages. The center-periphery pattern of manufacturing towns reflects the diagrams of both Chan and Hsing.

Adopting Hsing's diagram of metropolitan regions, my research develops a diagram of the spatial pattern of manufacturing towns (Figure 2.2a) and a diagram of the spatial pattern of villages (Figure 2.2b). The first diagram of towns identifies a polarized and artery-oriented pattern. Consisting of town governments, major commercial areas, and high-end residences, town centers correspond to the urban places in the rural fringes of Hsing's diagram. Outside these town centers are villages. Likewise, villages have their own centers where indigenous villagers dwell, and village committees as well as a few commercial areas locate. A few villages might have multiple centers, because these administrative villages consist of multiple natural


villages that physically separate from each other in the history of development.<sup>32</sup> Major local arteries such as provincial-level and country-level roads as well as main village streets connect with these town and village centers. Blank areas are the periphery of towns including the areas such as industrial zones. The second diagram of villages illustrates one administrative village in the pattern of towns. Corresponding to a polarized and artery-oriented pattern, this diagram also identifies separated zones. Besides village centers, there are other zones including industrial zones, rural migrants' living zones, and farmland. These other zones reflect the periphery in the first diagram.

Two important features in the development of Dongguan determine the spatial patterns of towns and villages: the disproportionate allocation of resources toward infrastructure, real-estate development, and amenities for attracting FDI at the expense of public goods (Eng, 1997; Yeung, 2001), and patterns of villages' self-development that reinforced the polarization of space in manufacturing towns. These features have created distinct and separate zones within the town with significant implications for the spatial boundaries of rural migrants' daily lives. Village collectives started to develop their own residences and industrial zones in the early reform period, and later developed separate retail and residential zones for migrants. This spatial pattern marginalizes rural migrants who live and work in industrial zones, pushing them into the peripheries and rural fringes in manufacturing towns. In the following section, I will elaborate on the two diagrams, explaining various aspects of the skewed development as well as village collectives' self-development.

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<sup>32</sup> A natural village refers to the village that exists and grows spontaneously and naturally. Natural villages may be geographically separated. An administrative village refers to the mass organization of village committees that base on villagers' residential areas, the size of their population, and the facilitation of their self-government. An administrative village may consist of more than one natural village. A large natural village may become a division of multiple administrative villages. See the Organic Law of the Villagers Committees of China (1998) for the information on administrative village and village committees.

Figure 2.1 Two Diagrams of Spatial Pattern of Chinese Cities/Metropolitan Regions




(a) Diagram of the Spatial/Administrative Structure of a Typical Large City in China

(b) Diagram of the Territory Structure of a Metropolitan Region

Source: Diagram (a) is directly cited from Chan (2007, p.387); Diagram (b) is directly cited from Hsing (2010, p.13).

Figure 2.2 Diagrams of Spatial Patterns of Towns and Villages



(a) Spatial Pattern of Manufacturing Towns

(b) Spatial Pattern of Villages

**A. Skewed Development, and Polarized and Local-Artery-oriented Pattern**

To encourage development of the manufacturing industry, the government and village collectives prioritized FDI, and allocated more resources into infrastructure, real estate and amenities of FDI compared with public goods. This results in skewed development in manufacturing towns due to the low amount of resource allocation to public goods such as public transports and health services compared to the average level of all cities in the PRD (Eng, 1997). The three authorities were keen to develop infrastructure. The development of real estate and amenities thrived in the centers of towns and villages. It also followed up the local development of infrastructure and created polarized spaces as a center-periphery pattern oriented by arteries as shown in diagram 2.2a.

Instead of relying on the state's investment, the government, village collectives and a few foreign investors heavily invested in infrastructure at local levels when the reform started. The GOSC (1989) identified a pattern of locally financing infrastructure in Dongguan: the development of infrastructure received a little support from the state and Guangdong Province, but relied primarily on local efforts. In the early reform, local governments in Guangdong with a tight fiscal budget collaborated with village collectives and rich indigenous villagers to develop crucial infrastructure such as electricity and major motor roads in order to attract FDI (ibid. Vogel, 1989).<sup>33</sup> Although the government limited most FDI to the manufacturing industry in the early reform, Hu Yingxiang, a real estate tycoon in Hong Kong, developed the Guang-Shen Expressway in the late 1980s (ibid.). Later on, under a period of high GDP growth, the government greatly expanded its investment in infrastructure to maintain the attraction of FDI in manufacturing towns of the PRD (Eng, 1997).

Likewise, village collectives in Dongguan quickly developed village roads and streets to attract foreign industrialists and develop the economy by themselves (LVC, 2008; QVC, 2009; SVC, 2008; YVC, 2006). For instance, the Youganpu Village Committee (YVC, 2006 p.105) reported: “the village deeply understood the principle of ‘Construction of Roads to Become Rich’ (*yao zhifu, xian xiulu*)... since the 1980s, the village committee with our natural villages has raised funds, planned village roads, and invested tens of million *yuan*.” Under the direction of the same principle of constructing roads for richness, the Lianhu village invested 21.84 million *yuan* to build all 41 village streets between 1990 and 2005 (LVC, 2008 p.73).

The three authorities also invested heavily in real estate and amenities while the government allocated fewer resources to public goods such as education and health care for ordinary people (Eng, 1997). The development of industrial zones in towns and villages best represent this skewed development in favor of FDI. For instance, in the Longyan

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<sup>33</sup> For instance, in the early reform, collectives and individuals in Gaobu Town invested 2.5 million *yuan* to build firstly a collectively funded and toll-charged local bridge in the nation (DRCCCPH, 2008).

Management Zone (village) in Humen Town, well-equipped kindergartens, primary schools and a clean environment were developed to attract foreign capitalists' families (Yeung, 2001). Entertainment facilities, high-end hotels and restaurants prevailed to please the local rich and make Hong Kong and Taiwan investors at home (ibid.). In contrast, rural migrants could barely access these facilities and amenities.

The skewed development reflected the center-periphery spatial pattern and created polarized spaces in manufacturing towns. Far more resources are poured into the development of city-centers, towns and villages where the local and foreign industrialists dwell than peripheries where rural migrants live and work. Because of over-investment in high-end real estate developments in city centers, building vacancies are high. For instance, the South China Mall, one of the biggest commercial complexes in the world maintains a vacancy rate of 99% (People's Net, 2013, March 06). This mall in the center of Wanjiang District includes theme parks and an IMAX cinema but only a few customers have visited since its opening in 2005 (ibid.).

More importantly, the government's urban development policies reinforced the skewed development by pouring major economic resources into high-end real estate development and major public projects in city-centers. In the early 1990s, three primary goals were set in the urban development plan of Dongguan: expanding the old city center, constructing a number of high-class, large commercial complexes, and building a number of high-class tourist hotels and recreational facilities (Shi and Qiu, 1993 p.51; Eng, 1997 p.559). In the urban development plan announced in early 2000, the government highlighted two points for development between 2000 and 2005: (1) focused land development of the new city central district and sub-centers in the two urban districts of Dongcheng and Wanjiang, and stimulation of adjacent developments of private real estate and public facilities; (2) major development projects in Dongguan's new city administration center, transportation networks, environmental improvements and public facilities.<sup>34</sup> Since then, the government completed a set of major governmental projects such as the new city administration center and continued to develop infrastructure and centers of the city and towns.

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<sup>34</sup> See Dongguan Comprehensive Planning 2000-2015 (DUPB, n.d.). For more details, see chapter eight.

Real estate development reinforced the locally skewed development of infrastructure and city, town, and village centers, rapidly transforming rural areas into manufacturing towns. This ultimately established an artery-oriented pattern of manufacturing towns. The arteries mostly consist of highways, main roads and streets constructed at the provincial and county levels (*shengdao xiandao*).<sup>35</sup> In towns of Dongguan, most living areas are attached to town arteries. Figure 2.3 indicates that built areas such as living, commercial and industrial areas are adjacent to larger arteries such as provincial level roads S255, S256, and S357. Further away from the arteries are bodies of water, farmland, urban forests, etc.

Further details in two examples demonstrate this pattern. My research selects these two different towns, Houjie and Dongkeng, according to economic development and topography that largely affects the pattern (Figure 2.3 & 2.4). Regarding GDP, Houjie located in the west of Dongguan belongs to the top-tier of towns in Dongguan. By contrast, Dongkeng in inner Dongguan belongs to a lower tier.<sup>36</sup> Regarding topography, the west portion of Houjie is flat, and its east portion is mountainous. In contrast, the area of Dongkeng is mostly flat. In town and village centers where locals settle, locations of town governments and village committees overlay with major commercial areas or residences. Outside these centers are industrial areas where most rural migrants work and live. Further away from these built areas of centers and peripheries is unbuilt “green areas” which include bodies of water, farmland, urban forest and the like. Local arteries such as provincial-and-county-level roads pass through these centers and connect these manufacturing towns with the greater region of the PRD.

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
<sup>35</sup> Provinces, autonomous regions and municipals make the plan of provincial highways (*shendao*). Counties make the plan of county roads (*xiandao*). Likewise, the state plans national highways (*guodao*). See Article 14 in the Highway Law of China promulgated in 2004, accessed on June 29, 2013, retrieved from [http://www.china.org.cn/china/LegislationsForm2001-2010/2011-02/14/content\\_21917058.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/china/LegislationsForm2001-2010/2011-02/14/content_21917058.htm)

The development pattern follows up expressways and national-level roads less than the local development of main roads and streets. One reason is that only a few expressways and first-level roads were constructed in comparison with lower level roads before the late 1990s. See the Length of Transportation Routes and Road Density in Table 6.2 (DSB, 2010, p.240) and the Length of Transportation Routes in Main Years in Table 6.3 (ibid. p.241). The other reason might be that expressways and national-level arteries are much less accessible than local-level arteries, thereby less attractable to residential and commercial developments.

<sup>36</sup> See DSB (2011, p.349).

The polarized and local-artery-oriented spatial pattern anchors and differentiates the authorities' governance according to space. In polarized spaces, not only are rural migrants marginalized to the periphery but the authorities and their agents occupy town and village centers where their governance must differ from the governance of rural migrants on the periphery such as industrial zones. For instance, local people and industrialists may govern their urban residences as gated communities in town centers and exclude rural migrants, but, in contrast, industrialists exercise rigid factory discipline to manage workers as docile labor in industrial zones. In addition, the local-artery-oriented pattern indicates that the authorities, especially village collectives, can fully control the development and usage of these local arteries such as village streets. As the authorities developed their towns along these arteries, they can continue to use some of these arteries as new infrastructure supporting their governance of rural migrants, freely shaping and reshaping the forms and spaces of these arteries according to their expectation of the governance. As an example, main retail streets in villages, which I will examine in chapter four, become a major place for village collectives and industrialists to govern rural migrants as potential unskilled workers. Thus, authorities associate their governance of rural migrants with different spaces that the spatial pattern highlights and reflects.


Figure 2.3 Local Artery-oriented Spatial Pattern of Dongguan



Source: The Google Maps and Baidu Maps

Note: Green land includes agrarian land, parks, and urban forests.


Figure 2.4 Map of Houjie Town



Source: The Google Maps, the Baidu Maps, and *Atlas of Donggaun* (BLRD, 2007)

Note: Green areas include agrarian land, parks, and urban forests.

Figure 2.5 Map of Dongkeng Town



Source: The Google Maps, the Baidu Maps, and *Atlas of Donggaun* (BLRD, 2007)  
 Note: Green areas include agrarian land, parks, and urban forests.

## B. Village Collectives' Self-development and Separated Zones of Villages

With its control of rural land development, independent fiscal systems, and rapidly increasing economy in towns and villages, village collectives developed their villages under their own wills. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, towns and villages started to rent existing public warehouses, ancestral temples, community halls, dining halls and cadres' offices to foreign industrialists who turned these facilities into factory buildings (GSOC, 1989; Vogel, 1989). Indigenous villagers with increasing income were building their new houses:

In many villages, by the end of the decade, all of the hundreds of houses were at most several years old. Thousands of the new homes were three-story family dwellings; and many who had originally built two stories had later added a third... Construction was simple enough that families and their friends put up their own. (Vogel, 1989 p.177&180)

Afterward, villages caught a "zone fever": the fast development of industrial zones. This development gradually separated factories from other areas of villages and congregated them into zones. Towns also developed their own industrial zones for absorbing FDI and congregating factories. Nevertheless, with direct control of rural land, it was easier for villages to develop their land than in towns. Village collectives developed their industrial zones in a way of *san tong yi ping*: establishing three types of infrastructure including water, electricity and motor roads, and leveling rural land such as paddy fields, fish ponds and hills for building factories (GVC, 2008; LVC, 2008; QVC, 2009; SVC, 2008; YVC, 2006). Village collectives built most of their industrial zones in the late 1980s and 1990s, and continued to develop a few zones after 2000 (ibid.). For instance, the Youganpu village totally developed nine industrial zones between 1985 and 2005, and eight of the night zones came into being before 2000 (YVC, 2006). The Qinghutou village developed four industrial zones, three of which the village had constructed before 2000 and absorbed around 100 factories (QVC, 2009). Indigenous villagers also recalled the history of separating factories from natural villages due to the geography of Dongguan. As one villager in her middle ages said:

My village had eight village teams. We all lived together on flat rural land and by paddy field and fishponds except that one team lived separately. When my village started to develop industrial zones, it was reasonable to choose hilly areas, level the land, and turn it into industrial zones. Villages in my town all developed their factories in this way.

Since the collective-owned industry such as town and village enterprises (TVEs) quickly withered after the middle 1990s (Chart 2.2), village collectives have switched their economic development to rental business until now. In this rural land development, village committees prefer to construct factory and retail buildings and rent them to industrialists or foreign businesspersons. Table 2.1 shows the fiscal incomes of four villages in Dongguan are mostly from rentals of factory building and retail stores instead of housing. This indicates that village collectives' economy heavily relies on renting industrial and retail real estate to industrialists and investors.

In comparison with village committees, indigenous villagers choose to build rental housing for rural migrants. A prevailing rural-to-urban transformation called *cheng zhong cun* (villages in the city) in China indicates indigenous villagers' self-development of rental housing. In *cheng zhong cun*, indigenous village households have their property right to rural land where their own houses sits and can develop their land or redevelop their houses into rental housing with more stories (Abramson & Anderson, 2006; Chung, 2010; Zhang et al., 2003). Benefiting from the low price of rural land, indigenous villagers can independently develop rental housing at a low cost and by themselves. Indigenous villagers rent their self-developed houses to rural migrants who enter cities and towns and seek temporary lodges at a low price (ibid.). In addition, the collective ownership of rural land allows village committees to change rural land use and land use right, and sell or lease land use right to indigenous villages (Deng & Wang, 2009 & 2011). Therefore, indigenous villagers can claim more rural land for the self-development of rental housing that rural migrants can afford. In a recent local survey in Dongguan, housing rental and village collective dividends account for 25.8% and 24.2% of villagers' total income in comparison with 7.9% and 20% in 1978 (ibid. 2011 p.13). Indigenous

villagers gradually increase their reliance on the rental economy of villages. As a result, both village committees and indigenous villages in village collectives have been keen on self-developing their villages and establishing the rental economy for seeking profit.

Nowadays, village collectives retain their control of developing rural land to some degree, but the government has strengthened monitoring and management of rural land (Hsing, 2010). On the one hand, a recent local survey indicates that village collectives can circulate land use right in multiple ways: rental, sale, ownership transfer, expropriation, contracting, exchange, stock shares and cooperation (Deng, 2011 p.113).<sup>37</sup> In terms of purposes of land development, the percentage of different types of land-use rights circulation, 56% is for the construction of factory buildings, 16% for the cultivation of economic plants and 12% for the development of infrastructure (ibid. p.114). Village collectives still maintain the power of changing land use rights majorly for their purposes of rural land development. On the other hand, the state proposed the goal of restrictively preserving 1.8-billion-*mu* of agrarian land in 2008 (State Council, 2008, October 23). Since then, the government in Dongguan has prohibited village collectives to change farmland into other land uses and preserved residential farmland in villages.

Village collectives developed their own residences in village centers and separated from rural migrants' living zones. Through the skewed development mentioned above, village collectives poured more resources into their natural villages for developing village committee halls, indigenous villagers' residences, commercial and retail facilities, ancestral halls, land-god temples (*tudi miao*) and community halls. In particular, village collectives with foreign investors developed luxurious hotels, tourist resorts, entertainment complexes, or commercial electronics and mechanics complexes in key locations, e.g. by arteries and entrances of villages (GVC, 2008; QVC, 2009; YVC, 2006). These high-end settings inevitably excluded low-income rural migrants. In

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<sup>37</sup> The Dongguan College of Technology conducted this survey in 2010. This survey selected 190 villages/urban communities in 29 towns/urban districts in Dongguan. It received 188 villages/urban communities' effective responses as samples. See Deng (2011 p.108).

addition, residential segregation between rural migrants and locals prevailed in Dongguan: the local was willing to separate from rural migrants and live in market apartment buildings or their self-built housing while rural migrants lived in factory dormitories or rented housing from indigenous villagers (Huang & Wang, 2004). In the observation of over twenty villages in my field trip, indigenous villagers all dwell in their natural villages that are separated from industrial zones and rural migrants' rental housing, although a few rural migrants rent rooms or apartments in natural villages.

Comprehensive planning of villages has finally reinforced the pattern of separated zones after 2000. According to my interviews of government officials, towns and villages in Dongguan had not been likely to compose their comprehensive planning until the 2000s. Many villages initiated their planning of fragmented land uses and zoned villages into industrial, residential, commercial and agricultural zones (GVC, 2008; QVC, 2009; YVC, 2006). In particular, these villages separated indigenous villagers' new residences from rural migrants' rental housing through their zoning. For instance, they constructed middle-or-high-rise apartment buildings only for indigenous villagers in recent years (*ibid.*). Youganpu village developed a residential community with 130 households in 1994 and a thirteen-story residential complex with 288 households in 2005, and only sold them for indigenous villagers (YVC, 2006).

As a result, this self-development in villages creates two types of factory layouts and two types of housing in villages (Figure 2.1). In factory layouts, the dominant type is industrial superblocks that are walled factories and dormitories. Village collectives usually develop a large piece of land into industrial zones and partition land into street blocks with large sizes of tens-by-tens or even hundreds-by-hundreds of meters. In these superblocks, village collectives either develop standardized, walled factory and dormitory buildings, or build them according to the specialized needs of specific industrialists. Super-block developments primarily appeal to large factories. Alternatively, small factories and workshops are established in rental rooms in buildings scattered throughout the villages, especially in retail and residential buildings. These small factories or

workshops usually occupy the upper floors of retail buildings or ground floors of residential buildings.

There are two main types of housing for indigenous villagers. First, villagers use their self-built houses for their families. Their own houses are usually two-to-three-stories high with decorations and large balconies on each floor. A few houses are historical buildings in China's natural villages. However, in the urbanization process, indigenous villagers continuously build-up their own houses in the natural village, clustering in the village center to leave other land for industrial development. Second, indigenous villagers also largely build rural migrants' rental housing. The typical migrant rental building is five to seven stories with retail shops or small workshops on the ground floor. On the upper floors are apartment-like rooms, usually single rooms with private or collective bathrooms, or one-bedroom apartments. Indigenous villagers or a few village collectives develop this type of rental housing mostly on their agricultural land. With a much lower price than market housing, village-built rental housing fills the vacuum left by the government and formal housing markets for affordable migrant housing. These rentals attract a large number of rural migrants who cannot afford urban market housing and do not have access to (or choose not to live in) factory dormitories.

Table 2.2 Four Village Collectives' Annual Fiscal Income Reports (10,000 yuan)<sup>a</sup>

Income	Village A	Village B	Village C	Village D
<b>Total fiscal income</b>	979	2,147	9,037	4,041
<b>Management income</b>	971	2,088	7,079	3,564
Direct operation income	0	116	0	281
Factory building rental	753	1,130	4,498	3,060
<i>Proportion of the total</i>	<i>76.9%</i>	<i>52.6%</i>	<i>49.8%</i>	<i>75.7%</i>
Retail store rental	5	567	1,308	198
<i>Proportion of the total</i>	<i>0.5%</i>	<i>26.4%</i>	<i>14.5%</i>	<i>4.9%</i>
Land rental	182	75	165	12
Management fee	31	0	852	12
<b>Other income<sup>b</sup></b>	8	59	1,958	477

Data source: The data of village A is from the village's 2012 annual report. The data of village B, C and D are from these villages' 2011 annual reports. I collected the data of the four villages from three towns through my field studies.

Note:

a. Few public documents such as statistical yearbooks of cities record village collectives' detailed fiscal data.

Nevertheless, village collectives in Dongguan post their annual fiscal reports on their public bulletins in recent years.

b. Other income includes interests, net income of asset trade, currency exchange income, tax return, land usage fees, public security fees, sanitation fees, school fees, investment income and others.

Figure 2.6 Photos of Developing History of Villages in Dongguan



(a) Youganpu Village of Fenggang Town in the 1950s



(b) Guanjintou Village of Fenggang Town in 1983



(c) Development of an industrial zone in Wanjiang District in 1995



(d) Youganpu Village of Fenggang Town in 2004

Source: Photos (a) & (d) from title pages in Youganpu Village Committee (2006); Photo (b) from Chung (2001, p.325); Photo (d) from title pages in Guanjingtuo Village Committee (2008)

Figure 2.7 Factory Layouts and Housing Types in Villages



(a). Factory Layout Type 1  
A superblock factory enclosed by walls and surrounded by fast-speed roads



(b). Factory Layout Type 2  
Small factories or workshops scatter on the ground floor of a residential building.



(c). Residential Building Type 1  
Indigenous villagers develop two-to-three-story houses as their own residences.



(d). Residential Building Type 2  
Indigenous villagers develop these five-to-seven-story buildings and rent them to rural migrants.



(e). Land God Temple



(f). Indigenous Villagers' Historical Houses

Source: Photos by the author

### III. Emergence of Spatial Governance: “Invisible Filters” for the Conveyance of Rural Migrants into Factories

While exercising their power upon rural migrants, the three authorities have shaped the spatial governance of market towns by employing “invisible filters” in non-factory areas. These “invisible filters” compose the operationalization of their governing techniques. When rural migrants seeking jobs through rural-urban migration enter these towns, these “invisible filters” screened rural migrants, excluding those unqualified for manufacturing labor from the town.

Reforms initiated institutional changes across the nation, and allowed farmers to migrate into as well as temporarily settle down in cities. For instance, the initiative of the *hukou* reform diminished the circumscription of farmers’ geographical movement and permitted their rural-urban migration, and the abolishment of food rations allowed farmers to consume and survive in cities (Cai, 1995 & 2001; Chan, 2004 & 2010; Fan, 2008). These changes seemed to open a “door” in the “invisible wall”, the metaphor used by Chan (1994) to describe the *hukou* system and China’s historical rural-urban divide. Economic changes such as marketization as well as the growth of TVEs and FDI in coastal areas absorbed farmers into factories. Due to unlimited rural labor supply, the market force pushed farmers out of the countryside and pulled them into cities (Lewis, 1954; Harris & Todaro, 1970). In response to these changes, rural migrants’ motivation such as expectation of increasing income, opportunities of self-development, influence from relatives and friends, and escape from rural hardship, drove them out of their hometowns into cities (Li, 2003; Liu & Zhang C, 2006; Luo & Wang, 2003; Pun, 2005; Yan, 2008).

The emergence of “invisible filters” corresponds to the national institutional changes in the early reform. These institutional changes did not remove the operation of the three authorities’ governing technologies at the local level of manufacturing towns. Instead, the decentralization of the state and the marketization in the 1980s and 1990s empowered local authorities to govern rural migrants. While the government and village collectives turned their focus from communist ideology to economic growth, the authorities shared a mutual interest in economic development and collaborated with each other for the purpose of manufacturing

production. Thus, the authorities locally targeted rural migrants as proper factory labor to manufacturing production.

The practices of “invisible filters” involved both the authorities’ operation of their governing technologies and the development of spaces of non-factory areas in manufacturing towns, as well as the interaction between the governing technologies and spaces. In the interaction, the authorities operated their governing technologies within different non-factory areas, accordingly shaped spaces of these non-factory areas, and screened rural migrants while defining rural migrants’ behaviors and actions to favor manufacturing production. As a result, the screening mechanism of “invisible filters” divided, policed, selected, and finally conveyed some rural migrants into factories, as well as excluded the rest, in different parts of non-factory areas.

In detail, the spaces of town and village centers, marked by the skewed development described above visually welcomed rural migrants and were physically open to them, but economically excluded them. The government’s development of town centers and real estate speculation drove up housing prices (Eng, 1997). Village collectives invested in their own properties, and rebuilt their own houses as well as developed factory buildings (Vogel, 1989). Town and village centers became places with high-end facilities and amenities pleasing the local rich and industrialists (Yeung, 2001). As low-income people, rural migrants could not afford to live in these centers. Moreover, the government provided insufficient public goods such as education and medical care in manufacturing towns (Eng, 1997). As non-local people, they could not access government employment, public education, health care, and insurance (Chan, 2008; Lu, 2005; Fan, 2008; Wang, 2005 p.52&68). Rural migrants could not obtain employment or access welfare and services located in town and village centers, but have to seek jobs in industrial zones on the periphery of these towns.

In villages, village collectives embedded in local rural norms socioeconomically dominated rural migrants as outsiders and strangers. Village collectives included and excluded rural migrants in villages by this “filter”. Socially, locals accused rural migrants of bringing serious social problems to the village, including petty crime and even murder (Zhang, 2001;

Wang, 2005). They might hold discriminatory attitudes toward rural migrants in factories, dorms and public spaces in towns and villages (Hsing, 1998; Pun, 2005). Rural migrants in Dongguan came from inner provinces such as Sichuan, Guizhou and Hunan. Indigenous villagers with local Cantonese culture do not share commonality with rural migrants in rural kinships and regionalism. They might separate from and exclude rural migrants from every aspect of their lives. In contrast, rural migrants connected by their local norms and regionalism are socially tied with their village fellows, living and working with them instead of indigenous villagers. Socially, these two groups of local and non-local populations maintain distance and do not normally interact with each other in their daily lives.

In addition, village collectives economically controlled their land development and internal fiscal systems for profits, and this resulted in the partition of rural migrants into industrial zones. While village collectives mainly invested in infrastructure and industrial zones instead of rural migrants' rental housing before the late 1990s, the majority of rural migrants had to work in factories and live in factory dormitories within industrial zones. Village collectives did not support rural migrants' welfare. Instead, they could charge rural migrants or their employers multiple fees such as public security fees and sanitation fees. The denial of welfare supports and the benefit of various fees facilitated village collectives' investment into industrial zones, and afterward their development of rental housing. Thus, rural migrants helped to fund their own residential segregation while villages increased their capacity to accommodate tenants.

The localization of the *hukou* system and associated institutions in the 1990s did not loosen restrictions, but served as another "filter" empowering the local government with population-and-labor control of rural migrants. For instance, the government of Dongguan could politically control rural migrants' local citizenship by manipulating *hukou* regulations. Since the beginning of reforms, it has been very difficult for rural migrants to become local residents except through marriage to a local resident or the purchase of local housing (Eng, 1997). On the first day of 2008, however, the Dongguan government removed the opportunity to receive local *hukou* via purchasing local housing (Government of Dongguan, 2008, January 01). This left rural migrants even fewer opportunities to become local residents. The government continues to exclude rural migrants' from social welfare and services through the *hukou* system. Thereby, as

village collective did in developing villages and excluding rural migrants, the government could accumulate more economic profits to invest in the skewed development pattern that further marginalized rural migrants. In addition, when the rural labor surplus was abundant, the government restricted factory employment of rural migrants using the *hukou* system. For instance, for pushing extra migrant labor back home, local labor bureaus in Shenzhen requested rural migrants as non-local people to register in labor service companies affiliated with the government and pay registration fees before they could work in the factory (Pun, 2005 p.41).

More importantly, the government associated its policing system and the *hukou* system in order to examine rural migrants and exclude insecure ones. The government aimed at maintaining a safe rural migrant labor force for manufacturing production, identifying regulation of migrants as a public security issue. Rural migrants were subject to police surveillance and potential lock-up (Han, 2010; Solinger, 1999; Wang, 2005). Regarding rural migrants as insecure personnel, police could openly examine and detain rural migrants “at the first sign of any trouble” (ibid. p.107). For instance, police could examine rural migrants’ ID cards and temporary resident cards (TRCs) and detain those who could not present these cards in streets. The custody and repatriation procedure (CRP) which the state established to control floating and begging people in cities in 1982 allowed the government to detain targeted rural migrants as floating population and exclude them from cities (ibid.).<sup>38</sup> In Dongguan, the Public Security Bureau was in charge of the management of rural migrants’ *hukou* and the ID card.<sup>39</sup> Rural migrants were required to apply for the TRC within seven days after arrival in Dongguan, and were subject to the local management of family planning and the examination of ID cards and TRCs.<sup>40</sup>

In addition to the government’s formal policing system, towns and villages in Dongguan have recruited thousands of town and village auxiliary police (*zhi'an yuan*) who assist formal police and directly interact with rural migrants since the early reform. For instance, Dongguan

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<sup>38</sup> In 2003, the state replaced the CRP with the procedure of the Measures for the Administration of Relief for Vagrants and Beggars without Assured Living Sources in Cities. See Wang (2005, p.191) for more details.

<sup>39</sup> See *Regulation of managing migrants in Dongguan 2001*, Standing Committee of Dongguan People's Congress (2001), accessed on August 1<sup>st</sup>, 2013, retrieved from <http://61.145.199.172/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/dgrenda/pdfxkd/200709/61871.htm>

Also see *Regulation of managing migrants in Dongguan 2004*, Standing Committee of Dongguan People's Congress (2004), accessed on August 1<sup>st</sup>, 2013, retrieved from <http://dgxgr.dg.gov.cn/575.html>

<sup>40</sup> ibid.

organized 2,700 full time employees to maintain public security in the early reform (GOSC, 1989 p.110). In another example later on, the Chang'an town hired 1,850 town police as auxiliary police, who include 650 *hukou* police who specially managed local and non-local people's *hukou* (Han, 2004). These auxiliary police were responsible to the local public security and managed rural migrants in villages and towns. Village collectives also organized village police teams. For instance, in Youganpu village, the village collective organized its first village police team with eight people in 1986 (YVC, 2006 p.287). The size of this village team had increased to 99 village police including 68 local people and 31 non-local people in 2005 (ibid.).

Town and village auxiliary police were the *de facto* force monitoring and controlling rural migrants in villages because of insufficient personnel in the formal police force. As the formal police, these town and village police could examine rural migrants' ID cards or TRCs, excluding those without these cards, and potentially fining or punishing them. They also divided territories of villages and towns into policing zones where they carried out three types of supervision: *hukou* police's inspection and collection of rural migrants' personal information, police and auxiliary police's patrol, 24-hour inspection and examination of key points in these zones (Han, 2004). In addition, they could carry out campaign-like surveillance targeting anywhere rural migrants would congregate including rural migrants' hostels, internet bars and rental housing in non-factory areas (YVC, 2006). They also cooperated with factory security guards to examine rural migrants. In my interviews, rural migrants in their middle ages all told me similar life stories about the police examination and exclusion of rural migrants. As one rural woman migrant recalled:

...at that time (in the 1990s), the village was so restricted in checking our TRCs. Village policemen might drive a truck into our residences or even the factory and send people without these certificates into police stations. By paying around two hundred *yuan* per person, these people's friends or factories could take them out... I was once seized but then released because they saw the factory tag on my coat. If nobody would bail you out in three days, you would be possibly sent to a convict farm nearby and work in carrying soil or excrement... Through that period, we were frightened when we saw *hukou* police in action...

The policing system with formal and informal police had aimed at clearing off insecure rural migrants in non-factory areas before the state removed the CRP in 2003. Many rural migrants staying in non-factory areas might not be as lucky as the rural woman above. As several middle-aged rural migrants recalled:

Once, some of us squatted by roads, wearing factory uniforms...but these village police still locked us up and delivered us into detention rooms. At last, our boss bailed us out by paying one or two hundred *yuan* per person...A few of our friends did not find jobs and lived in empty caves for indigenous villagers' tombs in hillsides. Some of them might have committed crimes...In striking campaigns, police raided these hills, cleaned them off the caves, sentenced several of them to jail, and expelled the rest back to their hometowns.

When rural migrants sought jobs in manufacturing towns, they encountered factory recruitment as the last “filter” before they could work in factories. Factories preferred young and docile rural migrants, sometimes, young rural women workers (Chang, 2008; Pun, 2005). In factory recruitment, factories examined these rural migrants' identities and selected qualified rural migrants for cheap labor while seeking profit in a way of open exploitation. When the rural labor surplus was sufficient, factories employed rural migrants by charging employment fees on each rural migrant (Pun, 2005). Industrialists and managers could dismiss workers due to pregnancy or control their turnover rate by maintaining their long working hours and repetitive work until these rural migrants lost their dexterity and alertness (Hsing, 1998; Wright, 2003).

In my interviews with middle-aged rural migrants, they recalled the manipulation of the recruitment process by industrialists. Rural migrants usually had to deposit several hundred *yuan*, close to half-to-one-month salary and their ID cards in order to secure their factory jobs. In addition, male rural migrants especially, were required to network with friends or relatives to introduce them to factory managers, treat these factory managers to a good meal, and then pay them up to one thousand *yuan* in red pockets in order to work in factories. As one rural woman migrant recalled her experience in the 1990s:

At that time, it was really hard to find a good job in factories. Girls were easier than men to find jobs but usually needed to pay introduction fees and employment fees which were

around several hundred *yuan*... Factory recruiters by entrances of factories usually did not allow job seekers to visit factories before employment. After I paid money to recruiters, they just asked me to come back to work in a couple days...

Due to the abundant rural labor surplus before 2000, industrialists took advantage of asymmetric information to employ as many young female migrants as possible. It was not easy for young male rural migrants to find factory jobs, and factory recruitment frequently excluded rural migrants in their middle ages and above.

In chapters three through six, my research will discuss the transformation of the governance and spaces, e.g. “invisible filters”, after 2000. Encountering several problems, the authorities have adjusted their governmentalities and launched new governing technologies (including new policies, programs and activities), continuously developing and redeveloping the spaces of manufacturing towns in order to govern rural migrants.

Within the screening mechanism of “invisible filters”, rural migrants both foster and alter their governance. Rural migrants’ own rural norms reinforce their segregation. However, more commonly and effectively than this, their resistance hinders repression and coercion, and has the potential to alter governance practices. For instance, when a young migrant, Sun Zhigang, resisted the police’s coercive examination and detention, police beat him and he died of his wounds. His death and the public outcry it caused led directly to the abolishment of the CRP. Rural migrants’ self-organization in strikes and social unrests in Shaxi, Guxiang, and other towns, definitely warned the authorities to pay attention to reforming their governance practices. In chapter seven, my research will discuss rural migrants’ resistance to the governance in further detail.

In summary, the three authorities of the government, village collectives, and industrialists have governed rural migrants as sources of cheap factory labor in manufacturing towns since the reform began in 1978. Respectively, the three authorities exercise their governing rationalities that my research interprets as the government’s pastoral power, sovereignty with the rationale of the government’s agencies, and factory discipline. During the 1980s and 1990s, the authorities

operated their governing technologies such as the government's *hukou* policy, village collectives' exclusive rural norms, and industrialists' disciplinary examination of workers' bodies for the governance of rural migrants. Through a skewed allocation of resources to favor manufacturing industry and themselves, the authorities also developed the spaces of their towns into a polarized and local-artery-oriented pattern. This development of towns socioeconomically and spatially marginalized rural migrants into industrial zones that were on the periphery of these towns and separated from other zones developed by village collectives. Nevertheless, several dramatic rural cases of social unrest suggest that rural migrants were not merely obedient but also resistant to their governance.

My research interprets the authorities' spatial governance—their operation of governing technologies interrelated to their development of spaces of non-factory areas in manufacturing towns—as “invisible filters” screening rural migrants for the selection of cheap factory labor. In the period of the 1980s and 1990s, the screening mechanism of “invisible filters” partitioned, policed, selected, and finally conveyed some rural migrants into factories, as well as excluded the rest, within and in relation to different parts of non-factory areas for favoring manufacturing production. In town and village centers, the authorities' skewed development with heavy and polarized resource allocation was the first “filter” economically excluding all rural migrants, who were poor, outside these centers. The village collectives' operation of local rural norms in their villages was the second “filter” which socioeconomically excluded almost all rural migrants outside village centers, and segregated them in industrial zones. The government's *hukou* system with relevant institutions such as the policing system was the fourth “filter” and politically excluded rural migrants outside local citizenships except for a very few opportunities such as marriage with the local. In particular, the policing system targeted all rural migrants as insecure personnel, and might examine as well as exclude any rural migrants in “any sign of trouble” out of these towns. At last, factory recruitment as the fifth “filter” examined rural migrants' bodies and identities, and selected qualified rural migrants according to criteria such as young age, female-preferred orientation, and obedience to discriminative management and open profit seeking.

As a result of the operation of these “invisible filters”, rural migrants could not economically access local welfare and services such as governmental employment, socially merge into local communities, or spatially work and live in town and village centers. Thus, only those qualified rural migrants who passed through the spatial governance of “invisible filters” could sell their labor to factories to sustain themselves, socially and spatially concentrated in industrial zones and confined to work as cheap factory labor while the “invisible filters” excluded the rest of the rural migrants from manufacturing towns.

## Chapter Three

### Central Squares: Planned Public Space and the Exercise of Governmental-Pastoral Power in Elevating *Suzhi*

Around 8:00 am on a Sunday morning, several officials of a town government in Dongguan came to the town central square. They set up desks paired with chairs in a line close to a main street by the square. On these desks, officials piled up forms and brochures. Sitting behind desks, these officials were enthusiastically communicating with people who walked by the square. Whenever people came along to their desks, officials would distribute forms and brochures to them. Observing this event, some people walked up from the main street to the square by the steps. They stood in front of these officials' desks and consulted them.

“How can I meet the requirement of accumulating credits for claiming local *hukou*?” one of them asked.

“The first important criterion is your diploma of education. The second is your professional title. The following criteria are your conditions for enrolling in social security, e.g. years and the amount of money you submitted into social security...” one official replied to him.

“Well, I used to donate my blood several times. I also have a diploma of MBA in a school of extension education. Will they increase my credits?” someone asked.

“Oh... This really depends on our review committee members' decisions,” the official could not find corresponding rules but pointed this person to follow key government officials' decisions.

Meanwhile, one official was directing several government staff to suspend a long bright red banner between two steel pillars on the back of the line of desks and chairs. On the banner was a golden title: Promulgation of XinGuanRen's Credit Accumulation for Local *hukou*

(household registration).<sup>41</sup> In the scene above, officials were promulgating a policy of credit accumulation for local *hukou* (CALH or *jifen ruhu* in Chinese) as a continuous reform of the *hukou* system. Through the CALH, the government of Dongguan has been issuing local *hukou* to migrants who claim that the credits in their calculation exceed the minimum standard since 2010.<sup>42</sup> In the scene above, the government targeted migrants whom the government named *xinguanren*: a name that literally means new (*xin*) Dongguan (*guan*) people (*ren*) or new Dongguan people (or citizens). A number of rural migrants, interested in the event and the CALH, asked relevant questions of these officials who were eager to provide consultation.

When I conducted my field studies after 2010, I observed this kind of events in town central squares several times. Government agents from multiple bureaus visited these squares, promoted new government policies, and occasionally organized migrants (mostly rural in origin) in activities such as cultural events. In a sharp contrast to government officials' hostility toward rural migrants, e.g. the detention of rural migrants without ID cards, before the 2000s, officials came to these squares, explained details of policies to rural migrants, answered their questions, and might advise them.<sup>43</sup> Nowadays, it seems that the government attempts to reach out and interact with rural migrants much more than before.

This chapter describes and analyzes the guidance of the government's pastoral power in centers of manufacturing towns. My research regards central squares of the city, towns and villages as the major place where the government exercises its guidance of rural migrants, and examines how the government conducts rural migrants in the square. This chapter first explains the government's interpretation and exhibition of its guidance in Guangdong Province and Dongguan. Then, it focuses on the government's practice of its guidance in manufacturing

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<sup>41</sup> *Hukou* means household registration. In 1958, the Chinese state officially launched the household registration to collect people's demographic information, as well as divide, monitor and finally control them (Chan, 1994; Fan, 2008; Wang, 2005). For more details, see chapter one and two.

<sup>42</sup> Since 2010, the Guangdong government has permitted local governments in Guangdong to absorb quality rural migrants into local residents. See GOGG (2010, June 07). The CALH is similar to immigration policies of skilled workers in some countries such as Canada if local *hukou* is viewed as an internal passport of Dongguan. In analogy to the Canadian government's expectation of including skilled workers who qualify certain criteria such as education and professional skills to prosper Canada, the government of Dongguan also expects to include quality migrants to further the development of manufacturing towns.

<sup>43</sup> For details about the government's hospitality to rural migrants, see Pei (2006), Solinger (1999 & 2006), and Wang (2005). Also see my interpretation of "invisible filter" in chapter two.

towns: the space of these squares, governing technologies, government agents' actions, and the effectiveness of the guidance in town centers.

In this chapter, my research argues that the government aims at absorbing young, docile, devoted, relatively-well educated, and skilled rural migrants, characterized as high-*suzhi* (quality) people to improve the manufacturing industry. The government has started to differentiate skilled rural migrants from unskilled ones by creating locally defined standards of *suzhi*. Within its governance practices, the government directs its agents to reach out to skilled rural migrants, research and understand their minds, and occasionally support them through the CALH policy, and other new programs and activities. This modifies the “invisible filter” of the town central square into an apparatus both symbolizing and putting into operation the government's attempts at guiding skilled rural migrants while continuously excluding unskilled ones into the village periphery. In doing so, the government attempts to construct ideologies such as the “Happiness of Guangdong” (*xingfu Guangdong*) to guide the behavior of residents and migrants, and cultivate their self-compliance through ideology. However, the CALH has proven unattractive for skilled workers and has received little response from the majority of rural migrants. The government's guidance of rural migrants in central squares therefore is less effective than expected.

## I. Government's Interpretation and Exhibition of its Guidance

### A. *Suzhi* and Guidance

In China, a special notion called *suzhi* defines people's qualities such as values, abilities and characteristics. The definition of *suzhi* is ambiguous and involves multiple aspects of human beings' souls, spirits, morality, minds, education, knowledge and experience (Han, 2009) as well as physiques and physical labor, e.g. qualities of bodies (*shengti suzhi*). Social groups may be given the label of low-*suzhi* on the basis of their behavior, suggesting a devaluation of their souls and morality—evidence of rural migrants'

low-*suzhi*, for example, includes behavior such as spitting and squatting in public. *Suzhi* can also specifically refer to labor's value for measuring capitalist production (Yan, 2008; Hoffman 2010). In terms of education and knowledge, it is equal to human capital as a factor of economic production.

Under reform, the state has constituted the notion of *suzhi* as a path to salvation for individuals, encouraging various qualities for which all Chinese should strive. The sixth plenum of the Twelfth CCP Congress in 1986 called for the development of the moral, scientific and cultural *suzhi* of the Chinese nation (CCCPC, 1986, September 28). For decades, the state has highlighted the importance of developing people's *suzhi*. For instance, the state calls for the "control of population's quantity and increase of population's *suzhi*" (*kongzhi renkou shulang tigao renkou suzhi*) and quality education (*suzhi jiaoyu*). These promulgations imply that many people such as lower-educated farmers and rural migrants who occupy the majority of the population are the primary target of developing *suzhi*. Rural migrants commonly regarded as low-*suzhi* by the state and urban society can only improve their conditions through the development of *suzhi* (Yan, 2008). In order to foster rural migrants' "flower-like happiness", the Guangdong government has called on rural migrants and other people to develop their *suzhi*.

In addition, the development of individuals' *suzhi* is not the state's ultimate purpose. Rather, the state furthers individual development as a strategy of governance to serve the development of the nation and society. The Fifteenth CCP Congress strengthened the relation between the development of the nation and people's *suzhi* by calling for the cultivation of millions of high-*suzhi* labor and technicians to meet the demands of modernization (CCCPC, 2000, November 11). To the state, an increase of rural migrants' *suzhi* will enhance the productivity of China's unprecedented urbanization and industrialization, driven largely by rural migrants in the reform era. As the Guangdong government calls for rural migrants to actively participate in the development of the "Happiness of Guangdong", the state affirms that rural migrants' development lies in their obedience to the state's conception of *suzhi*.

Furthermore, the state reconfigures people's value by the development of *suzhi*, employing it as a technology of governance that facilitates the assignation of value to people. Yan (2008) argues that *suzhi*, as human value, consists of several major features: (1) it is a catchall notion including every aspect of people's subjectivities; (2) it is an abstraction and repression of heterogeneity among people and population; (3) it codes and renders people's diverse subjectivities to be commensurable to development, e.g. economic development. Through its constitution of *suzhi*, the state equalizes multiple dimensions and aspects of human subjectivities, and synthesizes them into one dimension uniting individual and national development. In its coding scripts, the complexity of *suzhi* is reduced to a single dimension measured as either high or low. In the state's emphasis on developing *suzhi*, rural migrants' subjectivities and every aspect of their personal development become visible and countable to the state, enabling it to guide rural migrants accordingly for the development of the nation and society. As a result, *suzhi* has become a prevailing discourse across the nation, and its application normalizes organizational and individual implementations of *suzhi* for the measurement and standardization of people's various subjectivities.

My research contends that the state employs the development of *suzhi* as a pastoral power exercise, which is a guidance of rural migrants along a correct path and toward ultimate goals such as improved *suzhi* status. This argument about the governmentalities of the party-state differs from others who focus on state reform practices of social engineering or neoliberalism (Hoffman, 2010; Sigley, 2006; Yan, 2008).<sup>44</sup> In comparison with social engineering, the development of *suzhi* does not implement science as tools to discover, test, prove, and thereby invent *suzhi*, which Yan (2008) considers as non-existent. For Yan, *suzhi* is the state's creature, (a "phantom child" of the state in her words) rather than a component of people's actual subjectivities. Social engineering requires and legitimates science as the foundation, projecting a positivist "blueprint" of history, society and individuals.<sup>45</sup>

Nevertheless, the heterogeneous combination of morality, scientific knowledge, and cultural

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<sup>44</sup> In addition, Yan (2008) argues that the governmentality in the development of *suzhi* is neoliberalism.

<sup>45</sup> There are multiple views/theories interpreting social engineering, and they all legitimate science, especially positivist science as the only source directing society. For instance, Saint-Simon and Auguste Comte believes history and society are governed by objective laws like Newton's laws of physicals (Friedman, 1987). Social engineering designs society as a complex machine (Simon, 1987). Science is the best tool to measure, manage and shape workers' behaviors and actions (Taylor, 1914).

values through *suzhi* does not reflect any scientific principles. The abstraction and suppression of human value ignores some parts of people's truth such as their true self, for which science must search. Moreover, the announcement of *suzhi* in the CCP congress implies a political process giving birth to *suzhi*, and the promotion of a vocation to develop *suzhi* for individual and national development is ideological. Thus, the "blue-print" of individual and national *suzhi* developments is not the outcome of scientifically engineering individuals and society but of conducting people politically and ideologically.

In addition, the constitution and assignment of *suzhi* as human value to people, and the abstraction and reduction of diverse human subjectivities is antithetical to the provision of autonomy and choice in individual development. Even though the state and local governments permit rural migrants' individual development through the market and thereby promote neoliberalism as reflected in the governance of people at a distance (Hoffman, 2010; Rose, 1999; Sigley, 2006), they do not step back from governing people's minds and souls in developing the notion of *suzhi*.

In contrast, the development of *suzhi* identifies a pastoral power exercise. The constitution of *suzhi* establishes a righteous value system for people, and makes their various subjectivities, e.g. morality, abilities and skills, a value that is visible and countable to the state. The development of people's *suzhi* is to enhance their minds, souls, and abilities, and to guide people along through a state-determined value system for individual and national development. In particular, *suzhi* is mobilized by the state as a means to target groups such as rural migrants to identify their values and abilities as low *suzhi*, call for the development of their *suzhi*, and cultivate them for the increase of *suzhi*.

At the local level, the government of Dongguan adopts the state's notion of *suzhi* and adapts it to local conditions that are geared primarily to the development of manufacturing industries. As mentioned above, through regulating criteria in the CALH, the government defines rural migrants' *suzhi* according to criminal backgrounds, family planning, age, education, and professional skills. Personal income and performance such as awards and talents are relevant to *suzhi* in the criteria. The government carries out *suzhi* as a measure of

development to absorb quality rural migrants who will obey the law and governmental regulations (for example, compliance with family planning laws), are young and have desirable skills for manufacturing, and are rich or talented. In its enforcement of the CALH, for example, the government of Wanjiang District collects 1,767 pieces of information about high-*suzhi* rural migrants from 128 enterprises or *danwei* and inputs this information into a talent database center.<sup>46</sup> This information includes rural migrants' skills, talents and education. Through the CALH, the government targets high-*suzhi* rural migrants and attempts to reach them and understand their qualities. By issuing them local *hukou*, it offers them more welfare and services and finally absorbs them as permanent residents into local manufacturing production.

In the CALH, the government of Dongguan regulates a set of detailed principles in a tentative measure to include 'quality' migrants in the local population (Government of Dongguan, 2011, April 27). In this measure, the government aims at optimizing the population structure, expediting the transformation of economic development, and strengthening sustainable socioeconomic growth (*ibid.*). It assigns credits to applicants for urban residency according to three types of criteria. Applicants must meet a minimum number of credits to receive local *hukou*. The first type of criteria is migrants' *suzhi* (quality):

Applicants must have no violation of family planning policies and laws, no criminal backgrounds, and no record of participation in organizations and activities prohibited by the state. Applicants must also meet one of the following requirements:

- (1) Have a higher-technical job title or higher technician certificate, and under the age of 50;
- (2) Have secondary-technical professional titles or technician certificates or hold a nationally-certified industrial profession, and have a college special-technical degree or above (including high vocational education), and under the age of 45, continuously working in Dongguan for three years, and have purchased social endowment insurance for three years;<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> See XSMB (n.d.), accessed on June 24, 2013, retrieved from <http://dngxgr.dg.gov.cn/20524.html>

<sup>47</sup> For the information of college-technical degree (or education), see college specialty (*dazhuan*) education in the Article 16 of the Higher Education Law of China, accessed on June 22, 2013, retrieved from <http://www.china.org.cn/english/education/184667.htm#2>. For the information of high vocational (*gaozhi*)

- (3) Have undergraduate degree or above, bachelor diploma or above, under 45 years of age, have continuously worked for three years in Dongguan, and purchased social endowment insurance for three years.

In addition, the government selects quality migrants according to other criteria. In the CALH, the second type of criteria is migrants' performance demonstrated through rewards, prizes or praise from the government or the military. The third type is migrants' investment and payment of taxes in Dongguan. For instance, a person with an investment of at least three million *yuan* or a tax payment of at least one hundred thousand *yuan* in three successive years can claim a local *hukou*. Under the CALH, talent in sports, literature and the arts also contributes toward credits (*ibid.*).

Within the notion of the locally defined *suzhi* in Dongguan, rural migrants only become valuable when they are suitable to the local development strategy based largely on manufacturing production. For rural migrants in Dongguan, high-*suzhi* equals young, docile, devoted, highly educated, and skilled workers. Their obedience and acceptance of state-defined morality, as well as their professional skills and education are what matter for the government's guidance of the large number of rural migrants. In the governance of manufacturing towns, rural migrants' subjectivities become simple, unitary and visible: they must be docile and efficient manufacturing labor. Rural migrants are usually poor and rarely receive rewards or prizes from the government or the military. Thus, only a very small number of high-*suzhi* rural migrants defined by the government can attempt to apply for local *hukou*.

## **B. Mass Line of Guidance**

Both the state and local governments have responded to migrants' low socioeconomic conditions since the reform. In particular, the state has never given up its role of improving

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education, see the Article 13 of the Vocational Education Law of China, accessed on June 22, 2013, retrieved from <http://www.china.org.cn/english/education/184662.htm#2>

rural migrants' well-being by reinforcing its guidance of rural migrants. For instance, an investigation team of the State Council studied the development of Dongguan and advised the local government to stabilize rural migrants' labor supply, and improve rural migrants' working and living environment, labor protection, education, and training in the early years of reform (GOSC, 1989 p.92-114). The investigation team stressed that the government of Dongguan should allow skilled rural migrants to obtain local *hukou* in order to maintain the labor supply (ibid. p.113). In addition, the state's proposals, which aim at developing the "Well-off Society" (*xiaokang shehui*) and the "Harmonious Society" (*hexie shehui*) in the new century, expect to include rural migrants in the wealth and achievements of these idealized societies (Feng, 2009).

The state's political ideals and proposals above indicate that it maintains the mass line in its governmentality guiding rural migrants. The mass line, commonly understood under Mao as "From the Masses, to the Masses" ideologically reflected the pastors' guidance of the flocks. It activated cadres to enter and be with masses, communicate with them, understand what they say and perceive what they think, adapt general policies to local conditions, and teach and cultivate the masses into socialist labor for revolutionary goals (Bray, 2005).<sup>48</sup> Although communist ideology disappears in the reform era, the state and local governments never abandoned their guidance role through the mass line to reach, understand, cultivate, and care for rural migrants. Although revolutionary goals have diminished, the state and local governments still call on rural migrants to engage and participate in political movements such as the "Well-off Society" and "Harmonious Society".

During recent years, the state has stressed its attention to rural migrants' well-being. In its annual "number one" policy documents, the state demonstrates its care for rural migrants and gradually enlarges the domain of that care. For instance, the 2006 state number one document called for the protection of rural migrants' rights such as a strict implementation of the minimum salary system and solutions to problems in wage arrears (SCPRC, 2005). In detail, the 2010 document stresses the importance of making education more accessible for migrants' children, improving rural migrants' living conditions, social

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<sup>48</sup> For more information about the mass line or mass work, see chapter two and three.

welfare and security, labor protection and career development, and living conditions. It gave special importance to improving young rural migrants' urban lives (ibid. 2009). The 2012 document also mentions the facilitation of returning rural migrants' business development in their hometowns (ibid. 2011). At the local level, a few local governments establish policies to help rural migrants become new urban citizens (*xin shimin*) and declare attempts to remove local discrimination against rural migrants (Feng, 2009 p.39).<sup>49</sup>

In Guangdong Province, rural migrants' well-being emerges as an important consideration for the provincial government. The Guangdong government proposes to develop the "Happiness of Guangdong" (*xingfu* Guangdong) in the twelfth five-year plan between 2011 and 2015 (Fazhi Daily, 2011, January 24). In explaining the "Happiness of Guangdong" through his speech in the Guangdong People's Congress, Wang Yang, the former CCP party secretary in Guangdong, states that

...the masses' happiness is like flowers. The party and the government shall create the environment and conditions for the flower's growth. For instance, the party and government shall provide sunlight, air, soil and other conditions... what shall the masses do? I believe that everyone shall weed, water flowers, plow soil and eliminate insects. Everyone must be engaged in a duty of contributing to the happiness of Guangdong. Its development is a process of mutual development and enjoyment [through the collaboration of the government/the party and the masses]. (ibid)

In another public speech, Wang Yang states that the government should expedite policy research to abolish the title of *nongmingong* in order to improve the social integration of rural migrants and the local (CNS, 2012 January 04). The title of *nongmingong* literally means farmer workers or peasant workers. The government in Guangdong regards this title as prejudicial and intends to abolish it from government documents.

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<sup>49</sup> For instance, an urban district government in Xi'an declared to replace the name of *nongmingong* with a new name of *xinshimin* officially by announcing a regulation and only using the new name in government documents. See Shi & Liang (2006, December 12).

For developing the “Happiness of Guangdong”, the Guangdong government aims at congregating its strength to complete ten projects of people’s livelihood such as anti-poverty, employment, education, medical care, and transportation for the masses (Guangdong Government, 2011, February 01). In the project of education, the government proposes to assist rural migrant children’s access to local public schools through credit accumulation schemes and plans to invest over one billion *yuan* in rural education (ibid.).<sup>50</sup> In 2011, the Guangdong government permitted a small quota of 120 rural migrants to take exams and apply for governmental positions (ibid. 2011, July 15). In 2012, it officially replaced the name *nongmingong* with a new name of *yidi wugong renyuan* (non-local worker) and planned to continue to employ excellent rural migrants as junior civil servants (Guangzhou Daily, 2012, April 13). More importantly, the Guangdong government has permitted municipal governments to undertake comprehensive *hukou* reform according to local conditions.

Local governments in Guangdong implement the state’s ideological proclamations in the practices of guiding rural migrants in cities and towns. The most important practice is the continuous *hukou* reform under the CALH. This continuous *hukou* reform issues local urban *hukou* to qualified migrants through the CALH that measures rural migrants in multiple aspects such as educations, skills, taxation, and family planning. The Guangdong government has permitted cities in Guangdong such as Guangzhou, Zhongshan and Dongguan to establish their own systems of calculating these credits since 2010 (GOGG, 2010, June 07). Through the continuous *hukou* reform, qualified rural migrants can obtain local *hukou*, and according to regulations, gain equal rights to access urban welfare and services of urban employment, education, housing, medical cares and insurance.

Corresponding with the Guangdong government, the government of Dongguan intends to “foster flowers” by creating improved conditions for rural migrants. One important demonstration of its guidance is to change the name of *nongmingong* (rural

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<sup>50</sup> Later on, a government report indicated that 78% rural schools in the project had been under construction, and the government was moving rural migrant children’s local education forward by September 2011. Yet, there were no details on furthering this education in the report. See Guangdong Government (2011, November 17).

migrant worker) to *xinguanren*. In January 2007, a rural migrant representative of the People's Political Consultative Conference (PPCC) of Dongguan submitted a draft proposal to remove the use of *nongmingong* in governmental documents in the People's Congress and the PPCC of Dongguan (CCPSD, 2008). Soon after the Dongguan Daily reported this submission, the government collected over one thousand suggestions from society, selected three schemes of new names, and finally named all migrants after *xinguanren* in April 2007 (ibid. DRCCCPH, 2008). Dongguan, therefore, had declared the *nongmingong* title as discriminatory well before the provincial government (XSMB, 2008). Through this largely symbolic move, the government informed the broader public that it aimed to increase rural migrants' happiness and harmony by adopting the *nongmingong* ban.

The government also expects rural migrants to engage in and contribute to their own guidance as the rural migrant PPCC representative described above does. It selects quality rural migrants and absorbs some of them into the government. For instance, two *xinguanren* were selected to be representatives of the tenth Guangdong Congress of the CCP and the People's Congress of Guangdong Province, seventeen *xinguanren* served as representatives of the Dongguan Congress of the CCP, and five *xinguanren* served as representatives of the PPCC of Dongguan (People's Daily, 2011, August 02). The government expects to further its guidance of rural migrants through the name change. As the mayor of Dongguan stresses:

Non-local workers (rural migrants) are an important social group in Dongguan... It is only a new beginning to change the name of rural migrants. The government of Dongguan is caring for these non-local workers from political, economic and rural migrants' working and living aspects. It is going to solve rural migrants' real problems... (ibid)

In particular, the government established a special bureau in 2008, the XinGuanRen Service and Management Bureau (XSMB), to govern rural migrants (Guangzhou Daily, 2008, November 07; XSMB, 2008). The government plans to practice its guidance of rural migrants through serving and managing rural migrants (ibid.). In order to serve rural migrants, the XSMB takes charge of these major tasks: (1) selection and inclusion of qualified migrants; (2) provision, research and improvement of general services to migrants;

(3) promulgation of government policies and staff training (XSMB, 2008; *ibid.* 2009, August 07).<sup>51</sup> For accomplishing these tasks, the XSMB can collect targeted migrants' information, and coordinate with other government agencies such as the Labor Bureau and the Public Security Bureau.

In the first task, the government has been carrying out the CALH that include qualified migrants as local residents in a continuous *hukou* reform. The government also launches several relevant events to absorb qualified migrants. For instance, the government of Dongguan selects tens of migrants each year with outstanding performance evaluations from the government, companies or factories as “distinguished *xinguanren*” (Government of Dongguan, 2012, May 07). According to the government, both rural migrants and government organizations can recommend candidates on whom the general public votes, and a government committee will give a final review (*ibid.*). Selected distinguished *xinguanren* can automatically receive local *hukou* as the government rewarded them (*ibid.*).

In another task, the government attempts to expand and improve rural migrant services through multiple programs such as the organization of cultural activities and free training classes.<sup>52</sup> For instance, a cultural activity called the “New Migrant Bird Plan” (*xin houniao jihua*) provides free education and consultation to rural migrants' children who, like migrant birds, move back and forth between their hometowns, where they study during the school semester, and Dongguan where they have winter or summer breaks (*ibid.* 2011, August). In the government's skill training programs for rural migrants, a program called the “True Dream Plan” (*yuan meng jihua*) reimburses almost all of the tuition for selected young rural migrants' long distance learning courses in several renowned Chinese universities (Government of Dongguan, 2011, July 07).

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<sup>51</sup> The XSMB has four major offices regarding different tasks. They are the Office of Managing Rental Housing, the Office of Service and Cooperation, the Office of Promulgation and Information, and the Office of Managing Credit Accumulation. My research considers that the last three offices majorly provide services to rural migrants. For more details, see XSMB (n.d.), *the XSMB's offices and duties*, accessed on July 5, 2013, retrieved from <http://dngxgr.dg.gov.cn/3445.html>

<sup>52</sup> The government has been continuously launching new programs of services through its research. For instance, it combined multiple services such as the processing of migrants' certificates, fees and projects into one office. It is offering life insurance to rural migrants who are tenants in rental housing. It is also unifying multiple types of rental housing management, which individuals, private or collective property companies operate. See XSMB (2008) for more details.

In the third task, the government of Dongguan sends officials and staff to the public in order to promulgate policies and facilitate the first and second tasks as depicted in the scene at the town square that opened this chapter. The officials from the XSMB occasionally visit the town center to publicize the CALH. In another example, the government organized “*xinguanren* Service Day” (XSMB, 2011, November 06). In this event, the XSMB and 23 other bureaus visited a town center and provided rural migrants multiple free services in consultation, policy propagation, health examination, and education of fire protection. In another event, government officials entered rural migrants’ residential compounds and hosted a meeting with rural migrants. In the meeting, government officials collected rural migrants’ requests and suggestions, and discussed how to better serve and manage the rural migrants’ community (XSMB, 2010, August 27).

Thus, the government has rejuvenated the mass line strategy as a governing rationality and is presently attempting to carry it out and exercise it on rural migrants. The government emphasizes its guidance and care for the masses in the interpretation of the government-mass relation. It increases investments in improving rural migrants’ conditions. At local levels, the government establishes special organizations and programs in order to enhance its services for rural migrants. In governmental events and activities, government officials and staff reach, understand, and exhibit care for rural migrants. In this way, the government seeks to include rural migrants in the local community.

## **II. Absorption of High-*suzhi* Rural Migrants in Central Squares**

In an analogy to the pastorate’s operation of its pastoral power guiding its followers toward salvation, the government shapes its territory for identifying and exercising the guidance of its power upon people. The operation of pastoral power specifically corresponds to its territory, enclosing, partitioning and arranging it. The Christian pastorate’s ideologies, doctrines, principles, rituals and histories shape the architecture of churches, e.g. the Basilica of Saint Mary of the Flower in Florence, from master plans and facades to decorations in window glasses.

Likewise, the guidance of the government's pastoral power shapes the *danwei* space into a public family with hierarchical and ordered building layouts (Bray, 2005). These layouts adopt the idea of Chinese traditional courtyard houses in order to promote a family-like cadre-mass relation (ibid.). It also adopts the former Soviet Union's collectivism in urban planning, e.g. the communal house, to build facilities and amenities such as dormitories, collective canteens and bathrooms in order to produce cadres and masses' collective subjectivity (ibid.). In the reform period, Chinese universities acting as the state's agents, organize students to attend its campus career fairs held in classrooms where companies affiliated with the government locate their recruitment booths (Hoffman, 2010). The arrangement of students to meet with these companies in classrooms implies the intent of the university as a government agency producing 'patriotic professionalism' (ibid.). The government arranges the spaces of its territory depending on different purposes of production from time to time.

As the government chooses rental housing as a crucial place to examine rural migrants, it exercises its guidance of pastoral power in specific territories. The government often hosts events and activities for rural migrants in city and town central squares more than other places. For instance, the government may select a few selected rural migrants as representatives of the Dongguan People's Congress in administration buildings of these central squares. Thus, my research identifies these squares as the best places for the local government to exercise its guidance. In particular, my research contends that the production of the space of the square is shaped by the government's policies and its agents' actions, reinforcing the government's guidance of rural migrants.

## **A. Urban Form of Central Squares**

Between 2003 and 2004, the Dongguan government developed a new central square that was a leading project for improving and renewing the city (DRCCCPH, 2008). Three quarters the size of the Tiananmen Square, its area is 330,000 square meters with a maximum length of 1,400 meters and a maximum width of 250 meters. The landscape of the square is magnificent and picturesque. On the two south-to-north sides of the square, trees are densely

planted on meadows. In the center of the square is a 75-thousand-square-meter water surface and several grand plazas (Jinyang Net, 2006, December 19). Flourishing trees and meadows, electronically controlled fountains, reflecting pools, grand plazas, and monumental buildings are completely lit up at night.

The new central square of Dongguan is the political and cultural center of the city. Just as monumental buildings enclose the boundaries of Tiananmen Square, eight new public buildings surround the central square of Dongguan (Figure 5.1).<sup>53</sup> As major monumental buildings at the city's core, these eight buildings include an administration center, a conference hall, an opera house, an exhibition hall, a youth community center, a library, a masses' art center, and a science and technology museum. The administration center is the tallest building standing at the northern end of the square, facing south. On the west side of the square are the exhibition hall, the opera house, and the science and technology museum lining up from north to south. The conference hall, the library and the masses' art center, are on the east side, also positioned in a line. The youth community center stands at the south end of the square, facing north toward the administration center. The space of the central square is ordered along a north-to-south axis, with uniformity and symmetry along the axis, and a descending hierarchy from the north to south.

Central squares of manufacturing towns in Dongguan follow this pattern in their spatial configuration, although their sizes and scales are smaller than the central square of the city. In the town that I study, the central square is located in the administrative and commercial center. High-end commercial and residential buildings surround this square, and the town library and several government administration buildings are nearby the square. Three town streets are tangential to the south, west and east sides of the town central square. One police pavilion is on each end of the southern street that is the main street in the town center.

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<sup>53</sup> These monumental buildings in the Tiananmen Square are the Tian'an Gate on the north, the Mausoleum of Chairman Mao on the south, the Great Hall of the People on the west, and the National Museum of China on the east.

Paved by large manufactured-granite bricks, an elevated plaza occupies most of the town's central square. The elevation is about one meter high. On the boundaries of the south, west and east sides of the plaza are stairs, trees and meadows. On the north side of the plaza is a grand stage that hosts performances, movies and other community activities. Beside the stage is a huge LED screen that casts TV programs to people in the square in the evening. Close to the stage and the screen are tens of street benches, arrayed evenly on the plaza. The plaza is almost empty on its southern portion, an area used for various temporary and short-term activities.

Likewise, village collectives build squares in village centers mimicking city/town central squares and reducing their scales (Figure 5.2). In many villages of the town, village collectives have been building new plazas in recent years. These village squares can be close to village committees' administration buildings and commercial buildings or indigenous villagers' residences. These squares consist of fewer facilities than city and town central squares. Usually, village collectives only build a performance stage that might be monumental on one side of the square. These squares are often used to organize cultural and physical activities.

Figure 5.1 Central Square of Dongguan



Source: Cover of *Dongguan Yearbook 2004* (Local Archive Office of the Government of Dongguan, 2004)

Figure 5.2 Central Square of a Village



Source: Photo by the author

Note: On the back of the performance stage are indigenous villagers' houses.

## B. Cultivation of Central Squares

The town square is free for anyone to enter and use including rural migrants. It is a popular place for rural migrants' social activities. In the evening and weekends, rural migrant vendors set up their booths on the grounds of the square and attract many rural migrants to gather there. Rural migrants like to rest on benches, play games or wander around the square. They also stay in the square for quite a while to watch performances on the stage or TV programs on the LED screen when these shows are available in the evening.

Spaces and their symbolism are technical and productive. Foucault (1988) identifies technologies of sign systems that permit the use of signs, meanings and symbols and imply certain modes of training and modification of individuals. For instance, the symbolic power of language, myth and the like construct social phenomenology as a social reality and induce groups such as classes (Bourdieu, 1989). Likewise, abstract spaces such as maps, building plans and elevations are productive in their interaction with social and physical spaces (Lefebvre, 1991). For instance, abstract and physical forms in their interaction can produce a social space. Particularly, for the study of central squares, symbolism refers to not only language but also to spaces as sign systems signifying meanings and developing relations.

In his study of *danwei*, Bray (2005 & 2006) interprets the symbolism of *danwei* space. The traditional axis of a large-scale *danwei*, adopting the layout of traditional Chinese architecture and main administration buildings, embody the centrality of the CCP state to people's lives in *danwei*. The central positioning of administration buildings among other buildings symbolizes the mass line through which the CCP state's organization and production of socialist labor, as if cadres lived and worked among the masses. Beyond symbolism, the space of *danwei* through planning and design achieves practical effects in the production of labor and community. For instance, the enclosing walls of *danwei* marks and defines the realm of *danwei*, and produces the space where collective social life and the government operate. The hierarchical distribution of facilities and amenities from canteens and clinics to collective toilets and kitchens directly organize daily lives through collectivism.

Similarly, the central square of manufacturing towns embodies the government's leadership of rural migrants through symbolism. In this symbolism, the form of the central square embodies the government's guidance of rural migrants for further cultivation. On the central axis, administration buildings are the grandest and most magnificent buildings. The main administration building is centrally positioned in relation to other buildings. As the highest building in the square, it stands on the far north side and faces south, a position that symbolizes the absolute power of Chinese sovereignty. This pattern is evident in the highest position of the *taihe* hall in the Forbidden City, and the relation between the main room and side rooms in a Chinese traditional courtyard house. The architecture style of these administration buildings is neo-classical. They are symmetric, tall and stable. They usually have a central entrance on the second floor to which a grand stairway leads visitors. On each side of the stair is a long ramp leading vehicles to the second floor. The body of these buildings is concrete, covered by large areas of solid stones or porcelain bricks and small windows arrayed in a grid on facades. The top of some of these buildings are covered by a simplified "big roof": a remodel of Chinese traditional slopping roofs, or a western-style of domes or gables whose general forms are maintained but decorations and details are either removed or simplified. Learning from the symbolism of absolute power embedded in traditional architecture, the government desires to embody their leadership of rural migrants through administration buildings.

Each administration building in the central square is a small *danwei* enclosed by walls. On the one hand, as in the *danwei* system, centrally placed administration buildings within the open square implies that government officials work and are present with rural migrants. On the other hand, rural migrants as well as normal local residents cannot enter the administration buildings without permission. Security guards or police guard the entrances of these buildings and check visitors' identities. The self-enclosure of administration buildings cuts a clear line between government officials and rural migrants, and shapes an unequal relation between them. It is through these unequal relations that officials guide, serve and care for rural migrants.

Moreover, central squares embody the government's promise of prosperity to rural migrants under its leadership. Invested with large amounts of money and resources, the architecture and landscape in central squares are new, pleasant and can be described as high end or luxurious. In contrast with administration buildings, the major civic buildings usually have a contemporary-design style: asymmetric, irregular, complex, or free form geometry, large and continuous glass curtain walls, steel structures, and exterior aluminum panels. Similarly, the landscape has free-formed reflecting pools, music fountains, steel-made sculptures, LED lightings as decorations, and thriving southern plants lit up by spot lamps at night. Surrounding the central square, not far away from central squares are high-end office towers, retail complexes and luxurious apartment buildings. These buildings and the landscape make up the central square and mark the prosperous territory that embodies the progress, triumph and success of governance in manufacturing towns.

The form of the central square also symbolizes "freedom" and "happiness". The central square is not a large-scale *danwei* although major administration buildings are in the square. Instead, it is open to rural migrants. There are no enclosing walls around the square. Free entry, colorful decoration and multiple types of commercial and cultural activities embody the government's provision of "freedom" and "happiness" on the one hand. On the other hand, the government invites rural migrants into group activities. Cultural shows and commercial activities attract rural migrants who may stay in the square and watch the shows or commercial activities. A number of rural migrants also like to take pictures and enjoy themselves while choosing local architecture or social activities as beautiful background. The symbolism of the central square only displays optimism toward "freedom" and "happiness", and actively draws people to enjoy the prosperity promised and developed by the government.

More importantly, the symbolism inserts the ideologies of governance into rural migrants' minds and hearts. In the town square, programs on the big LED screen attracts people, mostly rural migrants, every evening. The schedule of these programs is the China Central Television (CCTV) news from 7:00pm to 7:30pm, the Dongguan news from 7:30pm to 8:00pm and a movie after 8:00pm. As the government usually states and Chinese people

commonly understand, the government's TV stations act as the "throat and tongue" of the government. The CCTV news delivers people the state's news, events, policies and ideas. Similarly, the Dongguan news delivers the local government's propaganda. Movies shown every night are mostly about "red" topics of the CCP, the state, socialism and the like. In my field trips, I happened to watch and enjoy two "red" movies in the town central square with a few rural migrants together: *the Founding of a Party* and *the Founding of a Republic*. The first movie describes how the CCP was funded through grassroots' actions and communist elites' leadership between 1911 and 1921. The second one depicts how the CCP led the Chinese people to destroy the Chinese nationalist regime and establish the People's Republic China in 1949.

Besides the programs in the large LED screen, prevailing slogans directly symbolize the government's cultivation through open and direct propagation in the central square. For instance, along streets around the city central square, each street light pole was hung with propaganda posters with one slogan of "Being a citizen with Civility (*wenming*), Making a Civilized City". On the town and city buses passing by these centers, similar slogans are continuously displayed on LED boards toward passengers. One slogan propagates "Holding Hands together Making Safe Transit" with the following one: "Cultivate Ordered Habits, Attend 'The Three Orders' Events". Another one promulgates "Promote Safe Transportation, Construct a Harmonious City". There are occasionally banners with similar slogans hung on buildings, walls or fences. Banners and posters with red backgrounds and golden characters highlight the government's reach cultivating rural migrants when government officials visit the central square.

The cultivation relies on the security of partition and observation of the central square. Police patrols, booths and warning signs remind rural migrants to obey government regulations. In the city central square, police install booths on corners of street intersections. Police and security guards patrol the square and guard the main administration building, as they do in the town central square. In the main street by the town central square, one yellow sign posted every ten or twenty meters highlights a warning with large bold characters: "Highly Secured Street, No Street Vending without permission, No Trespass, No Illegal

Transportation or Noise Pollution”. In another town, a signboard stands by the entrance of its central square. This sign identifies five categories of forbidden behavior and actions, and stresses the prohibition of self-organized activities, events, and prohibited behavior regarded as being vulgar or uncultured by the government:

Category One: People and groups in the square should maintain social order.

Prohibited behaviors are

...

Point three: illegal gatherings and parades

...

Category Three: People and groups in the square should maintain the protection of landscape and facilities...

Category Four: People and groups in the square should maintain the protection of sanitation...

Category Five: These following activities in the square must be under the permission of the government.

Point one: cultural and physical activities of groups

Point two: distribution of advertisement and installation of propaganda items such as placards, banners and balloons

Point three: installation of facilities for public and commercial services

The partition and observation of rural migrants in central squares not only protects but also facilitates their cultivation. Rural migrants can enter and use the central square but no one approaches the administration buildings. For instance, rural migrants in the city central square never walk up the grand stair to the plaza of the main administrative building guarded by armed police and security guards by the building entrance. Most of the time, this huge plaza is empty of visitors. In addition, rural migrants seldom organize their own cultural or physical activities. They can have individual activities such as watching movies, playing games, and shopping. Group activities and cultural events, policy propagation and talent markets are all subject to the government’s permission and organization.

Town central squares cultivate rural migrants through their spatial arrangement, symbolism, and the security of partition and observation. The territory of the square is enclosed, defined, and marked by the self-enclosed administration buildings, picturesque landscape, and facilities and amenities such as performance stages and LED screens. The symbolism of the space embodies and signifies the government's leadership and promise of prosperity, "harmony", "happiness", and freedom to rural migrants who want to enter the square and enjoy themselves. The operation of partition and observation through warning signs, regulation bulletins, and police booths and patrols protect and facilitate the cultivation of rural migrants at the individual level.

### **C. Government Agencies' Guidance of Skilled and Higher-educated Rural Migrants as High-*suzhi* People**

The town government enforces its interaction with rural migrants in the town square. Officials of the XSMB and other bureaus occasionally visit the plaza to set up exhibition booths and propagate new policies such as continuous *hukou* reform for rural migrants. For instance, every Sunday, one bus from the government's blood station parks by the plaza while officials and staff educate people about public health and encourage them to donate blood. A job-placement company affiliated with the Labor Bureau routinely holds career fairs called talent markets for high-*suzhi* (mostly skilled or higher-educated) rural migrants every weekend. The square, then, becomes an important interface where the government can reach and conduct rural migrants regarding new policies.

Through reaching rural migrants and understanding their thoughts, government officials turn the central square into the base of the government's guidance to select high-*suzhi* rural migrants. In the scene of the propagation of the continuous *hukou* reform, government officials visit the town central square and reach out to rural migrants, especially skilled and higher-educated rural migrants to explain new policies. Government officials in other bureaus and their affiliated organizations also take advantage of the town central square

as a place to cultivate rural migrants, propagate their policies and take actions to reach out and care for them.

In the job-placement event, the recruitment staff arranges tents into two parallel curved lines in a “U” shape. In-between the two lines of tents is the corridor with an entrance and an exit at the two ends of the “U” shaped line. Each factory occupies one tent with one desk, several chairs and a promotional poster hanging by the tent. Staff temporarily hired by the labor bureau occasionally assist in the free “talent” recruitment, installing the gate and providing stereos to attract bypassing people. The staff sometimes places an air-pumped “rainbow” gate in front of the entrance close to the main street. They also play loud music audible to the whole square as well as the main street. A staff member told me, “The Labor Bureau hosts this type of recruitment without a concrete schedule. It likes to assist recruitment companies’ events more than directly open its own recruitment”. The Labor Bureau seems to prefer to engage in rural migrants’ labor issues indirectly. However, officials in the Labor Bureau also occasionally join in the “talent” recruitment event and propagate labor law, as officials in the XMSB did.

Through the talent market, industrialists absorb skilled and higher-educated rural migrants as high-*suzhi* people. Employers value rural migrants’ skills while rural migrants can negotiate salary and welfare. Rural migrants enter, introduce themselves to factory recruiters, ask and answer questions, and submit application forms. Employers in Dongguan look for certain skills and usually ask, “What can you do? Do you know computers? Do you know English?”, while rural migrants negotiate salaries and choose their favorite factories (Chang, 2008 p.92). Chang (ibid) observed that diplomas, education, and experience are not important for rural migrants to find a good job, but my observation differs from Chang’s. Most factories in the talent market indicate their requirement of diplomas and education according to certain programs and levels of positions (Appendix 1). In order to find jobs as factory “cadres” such as assembly line leaders and managers, most rural migrants prepare their diplomas and professional certificates in interviews with factory recruiters. A few rural migrants without a high school or middle professional poly-tech diploma or above directly look for jobs for unskilled workers (*pu gong*—literally translated as “normal workers”). The

recruitment company prepares rural migrants' career registration forms (Appendix 5). In the form, rural migrants fill out their education and working experience. In particular, one quarter of the form is for rural migrants' self-evaluation. Typical responses include, "I work hard"; "I can study hard in your factory"; "I like teamwork", "I am honest and obey rules". Under the government's fostering guidance, the factory desires skilled workers and attempts to understand more about rural migrants: their skills, ability, capacity, and attitudes toward factory jobs.

The government also conducts its own research in order to understand rural migrants better. As part of the ongoing *hukou* reform, each town sends investigation teams to factories and enterprises to study skilled rural migrants' consideration of and response to the *hukou* reform. For instance, officials in the Dongcheng District XSMB interviewed 377 rural migrants in 17 factories and enterprises. The field study targeted skilled rural migrants:

In the 377 *xinguanren* interviewed, 49 persons are in management. 133 persons are professional technicians. 195 persons are ordinary workers. In addition, 72 persons hold college education, 158 persons have associate education. 103 persons have high school education. 44 persons have junior high school or lower education. 97 persons in the total hold professional certificates...<sup>54</sup>

Government officials also expect to receive feedback from rural migrants. The deputy director of the Dongguan XSMB addresses a communication system with rural migrants in the town government and village committees:

Currently, [the government] has organized officials and staff to enter villages, urban communities, enterprises, and factories and have 350 meetings with *xinguanren*. Over 9,000 persons attend these meetings. [The government] encourages *xinguanren* to participate in and discuss public affairs, learns from them, and distributes their feedback to relevant government departments. (Huang, 2011, November 27)

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<sup>54</sup> See XSMB (n.d.), *Report of credit accumulation for local hukou in Dongcheng*, accessed on June 25, 2013, retrieved from <http://dgxgr.dg.gov.cn/7030.html>

Besides researching rural migrants, the government displays its care for them. The government sends out officials and invests money and resources to educate rural migrants. This care includes (1) cultivation, (2) the provision of free goods and services, and (3) a combination of the first and second types of care. As the spaces of the central square cultivates rural migrants, government officials also visit the square to cultivate them. As referenced above, government officials from the blood collection bus educate rural migrants on basic health. City and town police officers also visit the central square, broadcast video clips and distribute brochures to educate rural migrants on fire protection and public security. The government organizes cultural and physical activities for rural migrants. For instance, the Dongguan government also establishes a library system in the city, towns and villages to encourage both rural migrants and locals to read books. Libraries are open at night and on weekends to accommodate migrants' work schedules. The government reports that the Chang'an town library trains around 90,000 rural migrants in a variety of skills in over 120 classes (Lin & Bin, n.d.). When I visited the library in my field studies, it was open on the weekend. The reading rooms on four floors were full of people. Some of them were rural migrants, wearing factory uniforms or occasionally speaking inland dialects.

In particular, the government employs experienced social workers who serve and care for rural migrants as well as promulgate government policies and law. Puhui, a local organization doing social work occasionally visits town and village centers in order to propagate laws, survey rural migrants' lives, counsel their problems in everyday life, and interact with them in games and cultural performances.<sup>55</sup> One government official explains Puhui's affiliation with the government and its operation of service:

...The government establishes the Puhui Work Office and supervises Puhui that is associated with the Social Affair Office of the College of Donggugan Technology. The government pays salaries to social workers in Puhui... Our town employs five social workers whom the government assigns to five different departments in order to assist the work in these departments... Puhui also invites social workers from Hong Kong to enter communities of masses for propagation and deliver them care and warmth (*song wennuan*).

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<sup>55</sup> See (DPSOC) (n.d.), accessed on June 25, 2013, retrieved from <http://www.dgpuhui.org.cn/puhui/webfile/>

In the provision of material goods and consulting services, government officials reach and serve rural migrants in order to warm their hearts. For instance, around the Chinese New year, the government of Dongguan serves rural migrants free dinners, reaches and communicates with around 2,000 poor rural migrants' households, offers rural migrants 1,200 train tickets to visit their hometowns, and adds 20 free TV channels for rural migrants staying in Dongguan (Huang, 2011, November 27). In addition, the XSMB set up 33 phone lines to listen to rural migrants' complaints and coordinate with other departments to solve rural migrants' problems (*The Dongguan Times*, 2012, January 11). To protect rural migrants' rights, the government targeted the problems of rural migrants' wage arrears, audited 268 enterprises and took back 3.977 million *yuan* in back wages for 25,300 workers (ibid.).

Combining the cultivation of migrants and the provision of services, the municipal and town governments launched an event of anti-poverty:

The city and a town XSMB along with a village committee visited and exhibited their support of nine poor families in a village. In order to provide rural migrants experiencing poverty in the village the opportunity to merge with local life and integrate with locals, the government invited two rural migrants as “distinguished *xinguanren*” in Dongguan to join in the event. In the event, government officials had a meeting with the two rural migrants, asked about their working and living conditions, and encouraged them to contribute more to local development and lead their village fellows to join in the development through their outstanding behavior and actions. After the meeting, government officials with the two rural migrants presented these poor families with money and groceries. The two rural migrants also donated their rice, oil and fruit (The Zhongtang Town Government, 2012 June 29).<sup>56</sup>

In the event, government officials in the city and town reached out and provided material and spiritual care for poor local and rural migrant families in a village. They held a

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<sup>56</sup> Also see *yingdao xinguanren bangfu laoguanren* (Guide *xinguanren* to help locals), The Jingyang Net, accessed on May 9, 2012, retrieved from [http://www.ycwb.com/ePaper/ycwbdfb/html/2012-05/09/content\\_1385872.htm](http://www.ycwb.com/ePaper/ycwbdfb/html/2012-05/09/content_1385872.htm)

meeting in the village committee building with selected skilled rural migrants. The government expected the meeting and the following event to cultivate these rural migrants' understanding of local conditions and the leadership of their village fellows for the development of towns. As a result, the two rural migrants followed the government's guidance through their donation.

Thus, the government, through its guidance reaches rural migrants and displays its care for them, especially for those skilled and higher-educated rural migrants with high-*suzhi*. In the reaching out process, government officials invite selected rural migrants to town and village centers or enter rural migrants' communities, and research their minds and thoughts through methods such as registration and investigation. In the caring process, the government cultivates rural migrants, provides them a few materials and services, and engages in activities that combine the two. In addition, the government is fostering and affiliating with organizations such as recruitment companies and NGOs to reinforce its guidance of rural migrants.

#### **D. Impact of the CALH and Rural Migrants' Responses**

In my field studies, I seldom met rural migrants who showed much interest in the CALH. When I asked rural migrants if they know about the CALH, they told me that they rarely go to town or village centers. They also did not know about the new *hukou* reform and paid little attention to the government's promulgation. When I pointed out that the government attached posters advertising the CALH on bulletin boards in their residences, they seemed unaware of the public bulletins.

When I asked rural migrants if they would prefer a local *hukou* in my interviews and conversations, surprisingly, they showed little interest and were largely indifferent. These rural migrants were ordinary people who were unskilled and lower educated, and therefore outside the high-*suzhi* population. As several rural migrants told me:

What can we do with local *hukou*? We do not see what benefit we can get to have local *hukou*. Even if we have local *hukou*, we are still poor and cannot buy local housing...we still need to pay our insurance and have to work in factories or restaurants... the state needs to propose other approaches to help us and do concrete things, e.g. an increase of our income...

Local *hukou* can offer few benefits to us, except that our children can apply and study in local schools. Nowadays, the education of migrants' children is a problem to parents like us...

Rural migrants' application under CALH is not very effective. The government absorbs a few quality migrants into the local population but cannot include as many as it needs. One government official evaluated the CALH in his town:

Last year, my town included over-100 migrants. We expect to help high-*suzhi* talents to settle down in our town...most of these migrants are not really high-*suzhi* people, although they are qualified for the application. They do not have enough *suzhi* to help the development of our town...the attraction in local *hukou* is only the education of migrants' children and migrants' employment. This means the CALH is not very attractive to real talents...

The government's surveys also indicate that quality rural migrants pay attention only to their material gain instead of their social status in deciding to become local urban residents. Rural migrants have three major concerns over the CALH: (1) whether or not their children can enter local public schools and receive quality education or not; (2) concerns that the cost of applying for local *hukou* might be high, that the process is time-consuming and troublesome, and that they are obligated to relinquish benefits and rights in their hometowns; (3) Benefits of the CALH are insignificant and unclear.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> See *Report of credit accumulation of local hukou in Dongcheng District*, XSMB (n.d.), accessed on July 24, 2013, retrieved from <http://dgxgr.dg.gov.cn/7030.html>

Also see *Report of credit accumulation of local hukou in Dalangshan*, *ibid* (n.d.), accessed on July 24, 2013, retrieved from <http://www.chinesetools.eu/tools/chinese-to-pinyin/index.php#transcribe>

In its guidance of rural migrants, the exercise of the government's pastoral power encounters its limitations. The application of the CALH exposes its limitations in the indifferent response to the program of rural migrants. First, the guidance of rural migrants is conditional, and the CALH only selects high-*suzhi* rural migrants. The locally defined *suzhi* greatly narrows rural migrants' entry to becoming local residents. Nowadays, the government implements *suzhi* as a tool of measuring rural migrants instead of a guide for investing in their development. Most rural migrants are not under the consideration of the CALH, and thereby do not actively respond to the continuous *hukou* reform.

Second, there is a gap between the government's purposes of guiding rural migrants to become manufacturing labor and fulfilling rural migrants' happiness, moderate prosperity, and harmony. The government frequently encounters this gap, and usually turns its concentration to the former for the development of the nation, economy or manufacturing production. This reduces rural migrants' interest in the government's actions. For instance, rural migrants are generally indifferent to the cultivation of signs, images, slogans, performances, and other activities and programs, that promulgate the government's policies and ideals in central squares. The government considers rural migrants' labor value much more than other subjectivities and individual development, and moralize rural migrants' minds, thoughts and souls in measuring diverse qualities or subjectivities by labor value as expressed in the standard of *suzhi*. Therefore, most rural migrants implement this standard to evaluate themselves. As a result, they determine that they are not valuable or valuable enough to the government to apply for the CALH.

Last but not least, the government's guidance through its exercise of pastoral power is not consistent but contingent. A pastoral power exercise such as the implementation of the mass line should be constant, routine, self-sacrificing, and catch all the flock. However, the application of the government's reach and care for rural migrants is costly, and the government only launches campaign-like events and activities that are provisional, on small scales, and appear insignificant and ineffective in the long run. For instance, the promulgation of the CALH in central squares, like the provision of free train tickets and food to poor rural migrants, are haphazard and irregular. The XSMB, the Labor Bureau and other

agencies in the town occasionally send officials and staff to central squares without a scheduled routine. Rural migrants' encounter with the government's reach and care is, therefore, often a matter of chance.

In summary, the state and local governments still maintain the mass-line strategy in the governmentality of pastoral power guiding rural migrants. Ideals such as the "Happiness of Guangdong" reflect the moral frame in which the state and local governments can guide rural migrants toward the perfect individual and social conditions of happiness, prosperity, harmony and freedom. The state's constitution of the notion of *suzhi* has become the key practice guiding people to accomplish their salvation and well-being to benefit individual and national development. Therefore, rural migrants who are generally regarded as low-*suzhi* people should engage in the state's guidance in order to develop themselves as well as contribute to national development. In Dongguan, the locally defined *suzhi* indicates that the government demands young, docile, devoted, higher educated, and skilled rural migrants to improve the manufacturing industry.

The government chooses town and village centers, especially central squares in towns and villages, to exhibit and practice its guidance. Through its heavy investment in city, town and village centers, the government as well as village collectives build their large central squares where grand administration buildings stand at one end of a central axis and face other major magnificent public buildings lining along the axis. This symbolizes ideals such as the accomplishment of people's prosperity, wealth, happiness, and freedom under the government's guidance. For guidance, the sign system including the symbolism of the square, as well as signs, banners, posters, the LED media screen, performance stage etc. in the square cultivates rural migrants to view the ideals as the goals of their development. Furthermore, officials and agents in the government's affiliated organizations also enter the square to implement and reinforce new policies, programs, and activities of guidance. In particular, through the CALH and the talent market in the square, the government and industrialists are keen to absorb skilled and higher-educated rural migrants, and legitimate this absorption by defining these rural migrants as high-*suzhi* people for improving manufacturing industry. Thereby, the two authorities exclude

unskilled and lower-educated rural migrants as low-*suzhi* people for the same purpose. So far, the effect of CALH is insignificant due to its narrowly defined *suzhi* criteria, limited provision of welfare and services attracting rural migrants, and rural migrants' tepid response.

## Chapter Four

# Retail Streets: the Combined Exercise of Factory Discipline and Village Sovereignty in Recruiting Unskilled Labor in Unplanned Public Space

In 2009, I visited Dongguan to initiate my field studies. I asked my local informants for advice. I preferred to visit a place with a significant manufacturing industry and a dominant number of rural migrants in the total population. They immediately pointed me to a village with two large shoe-making factory plants and a great number of rural migrant workers. The main retail street of this village made a strong impression on one of my informants: “This is a ‘ghost’ street in the day and a ‘horror’ street in the evening, full of rural migrants. I dare not visit this street at night!” In the village, few people go to the retail street when rural migrants work in factories in the day. In the evening, rural migrants crowd the retail street, and my local informants did not like to walk among this crowd of strangers in Dongguan.

In fact, what my informant depicted was an extreme but not unique scene in Dongguan. The global financial crisis in 2008 struck the Dongguan economy hard. A number of villages indeed became “ghost” places after many factories went bankrupt, causing a large number of rural migrants to lose their jobs and return to their hometowns. Shrinking manufacturing production and emptying villages could be a “horror” scene to the three authorities in my research, the industrialists, the government and village collectives.

In addition to local economic change, the abundant Chinese rural labor surplus is gradually diminishing across the nation. This phenomenon emerged after 2000 and became significant after 2008. Scholars argue that the Chinese labor market has reached the Lewis Turning Point (Cai, 2010; Zhang et al., 2010) or is approaching the point (Chan, 2010; Das & N'Diaye, 2013). At the Lewis Turning Point, rural labor supply is exhausted in comparison with labor demand and results in an increase of rural migrants’ wages (Lewis, 1954). As a result, the

three authorities cannot simply rely on market mechanisms to supply rural migrant workers to factories. Nowadays, recruitment of factory labor becomes burdensome to the three authorities. In the short run, they have to take immediate action to recruit as many rural migrants as possible into factories actively in order to maintain the manufacturing industry.

Rural migrants traditionally search for factory jobs through their kinship relations. Farmers sent their daughters to work in Japanese-invested factories in the 1930s due to their trust in village fellows who actually worked for gangs or foreign industrialists in Shanghai, signing their daughters to indentured contracts (Honig, 1986). Since 1978, rural migrants usually introduced their relatives, fellow villagers, and friends in a chain to foreign direct investment (FDI) factories when the rural labor surplus was abundant (Hsing, 1998; Pun, 2005). Foreign industrialists did not need to worry about labor supply for their manufacturing production and, instead, commonly charged workers employment fees as exploitation in recruitment (Pun, 2005). As described in chapter three, industrialists recruit skilled and higher-educated rural migrants in talent markets in town centers. In villages, factory recruitment has been passive, but has been transforming recently in response to the rapidly diminishing rural labor surplus.

This chapter describes and analyzes factory recruitment in a retail street of the village introduced by my local informants. In street recruitment, industrialists collaborate with the village collective but compete with each other. They send rural migrant workers to the retail street as recruiters. This chapter starts with an introduction of the village, the retail street, and the changing socioeconomic environment of factory job seeking. Then it uncovers the governing technologies of recruitment, the collaboration between industrialists and the village collective, and contestations between industrialists. In doing so, it explains how the two authorities of industrialists and village collectives manage factory recruitment of rural migrants and accordingly reshape village retail streets.

My research argues that industrialists extend the exercise of factory discipline to the recruitment process and collaborate with the village collective to maintain manufacturing production. While the village collective secures the retail street, industrialists operate factory discipline and organize recruiters in the retail street for the inspection, examination, and

registration of rural migrants. In contrast to the formerly passive recruitment of rural migrant workers, current street recruitment turns retail streets into labor markets where industrialists actively absorb unskilled workers (*pu gong*) into manufacturing production. As a labor market, the retail street transforms from the rural migrants' space of consumption into a service space for manufacturing production. This service is gender-oriented, and only selects young, docile, healthy and lower-educated rural migrants to be unskilled workers and excludes the rest. As a result, the "invisible filter" of factory recruitment has transformed from the passive selection of rural migrants into factories practicing open exploitation as discussed in Chapter Two, into the active recruitment of unskilled rural migrant workers in village retail streets.

## I. Introduction of a Village in a Manufacturing Town

The village I focus on is one of over twenty villages in a town where furniture and shoe-making industries have been its economic foundation and engine. Since reform began, the village, like others in the town, has undergone rapid but incomplete urbanization and industrialization. There are around three thousand indigenous villagers and twenty-five-to-thirty thousand rural migrants living here. Currently, these rural migrants are working in over sixty factories, most of which are in the shoe-making industry. However, the village is not completely industrialized—state policy has preserved residual farmland in order to protect agriculture. In the process of the village collective's self-development, however, the collective constructed most of the factory buildings, rural migrants' rental housing, a retail street, and indigenous villagers' housing, all of which are divided into a distinctive industrial zone, a rural migrants' living zone and an indigenous villagers' living zone.

The physical layout of the village clearly identifies a pattern of incomplete urbanization and industrialization (Figure 3.1). Connecting the town with other regions, a grand road cuts through the village and divides it into a western and an eastern portion. The western portion that serves as the indigenous villagers' living zone is smaller than the eastern one. It is mostly a natural village containing indigenous villagers' housing and state-preserved farmland. In the

natural village, indigenous villagers preserve fishponds and historical buildings such as an ancestral hall, a land God temple and a few historical residences. On the far west end of the natural village is the preserved farmland. There are a small number of factories on the southwest of the natural village.

In comparison with the western portion, the eastern section is a new development in the village. It consists of an industrial zone on the far eastern side, a rural migrants' living zone that includes several residential compounds and a retail street connected to the grand road. In the industrial zone, two Taiwanese-invested factory plants are the biggest of the more than 60 factories, employing most of the rural migrants in the village. They produce sport and casual shoes for several renowned U.S. companies. After the global financial crisis, the production in one of them shrank dramatically, and its workforce was reduced to from close to 10,000 workers to fewer than 2,000 employees. In contrast, the other factory plant survived the crisis and dominates the village economy, still employing over 10,000 rural migrant workers. This factory plant occupies a large part of the industrial zone: a 400-by-800-meter block roughly equal to 900 American football fields. Factory buildings and dormitories are aligned uniformly and a continuous wall encloses these buildings. The rest of the factories are on a relatively small scale and employ either tens or hundreds of rural migrant workers. They are scattered around the two big factories in the industrial zone. The village collective divides large blocks into small streets or parcels in which most industrialists rent factory buildings.

The rural migrants' living zone is in-between the grand road and the industrial zone. There are four rural migrants' rental residential compounds that indigenous villagers collectively developed. Each of these residential compounds consists of tens of five-to-seven story apartment buildings. Through my calculation, these residential compounds can accommodate at least 15,000 residents. A retail street is the main retail space of the village. It intersects with the grand road and connects the western and eastern portions of the village. Toward the east, it extends into the industrial zone. Toward the west, it also extends a short distance into the natural village through a recently built pedestrian bridge that is near the intersection between the retail street and the grand road. Major bus stops are also located around the intersection. Most outsiders such as rural migrants enter the village through the retail street. Thus, the retail street is the circulatory

hub of the village. It is the main entrance to the village, connecting the western and eastern portions of the village, and connecting the rural migrants' living zone with the industrial zone.

Both industrialists and entrepreneurs rent rooms on the retail street. This creates a mix-use environment combining retail and industrial use with a few small factories on the upper floors of retail stores. These buildings lining the retail street reflect a factory-style architecture: five-to-seven-meter stories in height, a column grid of seven-or-eight by seven-or-eight meters, concrete columns and beams, brick exterior walls covered by small white or yellow porcelain mosaics, and sliding aluminum windows on the walls.

The history of the retail street is short. Before the 1980s, its site was rural land. In the early 1990s, it came into being with the booming manufacturing industry. With the great number of rural migrants flooding the village and crowded in factories in the late 1990s, foreign investors developed these factory-like buildings into hotels and inns. However, apparel and telecommunication stores dominate the retail store. One nightclub, two large KTVs with an indoor skating rink and two internet bars opened later on (Table 3.1). As a circulatory hub of the village, this retail street is the best place for industrialists to recruit factory workers.

Figure 3.1 Village Map



Source: Prepared by the author based on Google Maps

Table 3.1 Major Operations in the Retail Street

A. Permanent Retail Stores		B. Temporary Booths
Program Name	Numbers	
Apparel Store	18	In the day:
Telecommunication Store	18	Factory Recruitment Booths
Shoe Store	6	In the Evening:
Restaurant	6	Temporary Booths
Convenient Store	7	(1) Apparels (clothes, shoes and accessories)
Hotel (Inns)	3	(2) Food Vendors
Hair Salon	3	(3) Fruit Vendors
Internet Bar	2	(4) Small Electronic Items (cell phones, batteries, radios, mp3, and the like)
SPA and Cosmetic Store	2	(5) Fortunate Tellers
Drug Store	2	(6) Barefoot Doctors
Bank	2	
KTV	2	
Night Club	1	
Travel Agency	1	
Clinic	1	

Source: Collected by the author

## II. Factory Recruitment Coming to the Retail Street

Holding a red plastic bucket of clothes hangers and a bamboo sleeping mat, carrying a cumbersome black backpack on his back, a young man approached a factory recruitment booth in the street. He appeared to be in his twenties, wearing wrinkled jeans and a pair of plastic slippers. His two front teeth were gone, and his upper lip had the obvious after effect of harelip surgery. He wandered in front of the recruitment booths and read factory poster advertisements adhered to plywood boards. After a while, he stopped by the booth where I was sitting, and slowly started to ask the two women recruiters if he could work in their factory. He spoke his words a little unclearly, and the recruiters did not respond. Noticing this, this young man handed a piece of paper to one recruiter and raised his voice.

“This is my medical examination form. I had my own examination in the town,” this young man pointed to the paper.

One of the women gave the form a quick glance. “Three of the total five results of the hepatitis examination are positive,” she said and returned the form to the young man, “My factory is big. (But) you can take a try at small factories.”

...

“What do you mean, ‘positive’?” he asked.

“This means you are sick,” one recruiter said to him impatiently. The other recruiter turned her face to me and other rural migrants surrounding the booth, giggling.

“This guy is a little silly,” she said to me.

I changed the topic with a question: “Why does your factory need workers’ medical reports?”

“Not my factory but almost all factories require this report... what will happen if a recruited person with a disease passes it to others? A factory cannot take this responsibility,” she explained to me.

While the young man still stood by in a silence, the two recruiters had a short discussion and talked to him again, “Ok, you can come to my factory but have to ask our trainer [personnel training new workers] if he can accept your own medical examination.”

...

“Do you have money with you?” one recruiter asked him. “If you need to take the medical examination again, you must pay 20 *yuan* to a hospital designated by my factory. You need to pay 8 *yuan* for your photos and ID copies...”

“Yes, yes, I have,” the young man quickly responded.

“Give me your ID card, I need to register it,” the recruiter took his ID card and wrote his information on an admission form.

“You stay here for a while and do not leave. Our factory minibus will come and pick you up,” the recruiter was afraid that he would still check other factories. She was trying to recruit as many workers as possible for her factory.

“Yes, yes...” the young man nodded his head. After a while, the factory mini-bus picked him up.

Every day, tens to hundreds of rural migrants approach recruitment booths in the village to find factory jobs that require few skills. Like the young man with hepatitis in the scene above, most rural migrant job seekers are adults under 30 years old, with a junior high school education or below. A few of them are middle aged or under eighteen (by law, factories can hire workers aged 16 and above). In addition, a few rural migrants have, at best, an elementary school education or are illiterate.<sup>58</sup> Overall, rural migrant job seekers visiting the retail street are usually young, poor and eager to find a job quickly.

The two women recruiters, Willow and Sprout, in the scene above are also rural migrants, and have worked in a factory plant for many years. Willow is the recruiter who read the young man's health examination form, checked his identities, and delivered him to her factory. She is in her late thirties. Sprout is in her early forties. Both of them have worked in Dongguan for around ten years. Like Willow and Sprout, many factory recruiters are close to or in middle ages, and work as “factory cadres” who are team leaders (*zuzhang*), assembly line leaders (*xianzhang*) or junior managers. Every day, in the early morning, they install their simple booth: a tent, a desk,

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<sup>58</sup> A 2009 statistical report from the National Statistical Bureau in China investigates 31 provinces and 7100 villages. In its samples, 1.1% rural migrants are illiterate, 10.6% have elementary school education, 64.8% have junior high school education, and 23.4% have high school or higher education. See NSBC (2010, March 19).

one or two chairs and a marketing poster about their factories. The poster placed in front of the desk usually introduces the company with several pictures of beautiful and clean working and living environments, lists various requirements for applicants such as age and gender, and employees' salaries and welfare (Appendix 2). During the day, recruiters in the retail street search for potential factory workers and send them to the factories.

Most recruiters are not usually busy and like to spend their time chatting with others. When nobody drops by their booths, they kill their time talking to each other, reading novels, knitting sweaters or napping. During my field studies, this made the recruitment rather informal and accessible for me. After I volunteered to assist Willow and Sprout to prepare their booth, they often gave me a chair or found a stool for me and invited me to sit down beside them. Through the same method, I also dropped by other recruitment booths and observed recruitment at other factories. Although I did not directly participate in recruiting rural migrants, I sat in booths, observed scenes in the retail street, and chatted with rural migrants, inviting some of them for further interviews.

### **III. Disciplinary Power Exercise upon Rural Migrants in Street Recruitment**

While industrialists operate rigid discipline in factories, they also extend it to the retail street. According to several recruiters' claims, factories in the village have been establishing recruitment booths in the retail street since 2005. Industrialists target a large number of unskilled rural migrant workers and bring factory discipline to the retail street to filter and organize rural migrants in street recruitment. Both recruiters and rural migrant job seekers are under the examination of factory discipline.

#### **A. Examination of Rural Migrant Job Seekers**

One afternoon, two men dropped by Willow and Sprout's booth. One of the two men pushed his bicycle with a little kid on its rear seat and stopped in front of us. After looking at the recruitment poster in front of the desk within the booth, he directly asked Willow about employment.

“A man in his early thirties can also work in your factory, can't he?” the man asked.

“Both of us are skilled workers at making shoes. We are faster than those young people,” the other man added.

Willow shook her head, “We prefer workers under thirty years old. This is written in the poster. Nowadays, big factories are equipped with various computers, mechanics and electronic devices. People more than thirty cannot learn as fast as those around twenty years old...If you need a job, we can introduce you to a small factory which needs your crafty work.”

While they were talking, several young rural migrants were surrounding a booth close to me. A recruiter talked to them, “Your group has two males and one girl. In order to work in the electronic factory you like, you need to find another girl. Our conditions are better than other electronic factories. Our requirements are looser than others are. They might ask for two girls plus only one boy in recruitment.”

The words I heard confused me, and I asked Sprout at my booth for answers. Without any surprise, she explained to me, “Industrialists of electronic factories prefer young girls because they are adapted to their factory environment. Young girls are more patient and careful... These factories do not need many young male workers.”

The consideration of identities in unskilled rural migrants' bodies prevails in the street recruitment. In order to work in a big electronic factory which usually offers relatively higher salaries than small factories, young male migrants have to rely on young females to act as if they are partners in their recruitment. In addition, factories usually hire unskilled rural migrants under 35 years old and prefer them under thirty years old. The best job for rural migrants in their middle ages and above is factory security guard. Factories in

electronics, apparels and the like demand patient, careful, and dexterous work and prefer hiring females to males. Mechanic-manufacturing, furniture and printing industries want more males than females. However, rural migrants' home regions, ethnicities, education, and working experiences are not part of the recruiters' considerations.

In addition, a few factories openly refuse to recruit any rural migrant who is different from the majority of rural migrants in health and appearance because they regard them as “abnormal workers” who might violate factory management and harm production. For instance, the big factory ultimately rejected the young man with hepatitis after the two recruiters sent him to the factory bus. In other examples, the big factory immediately dismissed a woman with epilepsy who passed out in the assembly line because managers thought she scared other workers. A few workers are effectively blacklisted by every factory in town. When a factory discovered a worker had HIV, most factories in the town quickly noted the worker's personal information, and commanded recruiters not to hire him or her. In other cases, some factories refused to recruit young male rural migrants with long hair—this regulation is even stressed on a warning board at the main entrance of one large factory. Some other factories refuse to recruit rural migrants with tattoos.

In her observation of a talent market for rural migrants in Dongguan, Chang (2008) speaks out against the open discrimination of factory recruiters: rural migrants' home regions, gender, age, and even height are selective conditions for employment. In Chang's argument, “Discrimination is the operative rule. Bosses liked their clerks [to be] female, pretty, and single, and they would only consider men for certain technical jobs.” (ibid. p.90) It is true that, in the positions of clerks or secretaries, these young women workers are often the objects of their bosses' libidinous desires. Successful males in the factories also target them (Pun, 2005). When rural migrants apply for skilled work in management and marketing, industrialists consider not only age and gender but also other body identities such as height, figure and looks, along with education and working experience.

In my view, discipline of migrants aims to produce labor for the manufacturing industry. To industrialists, rural migrants are firstly labor instead of employees with multiple

identities or targets of sexual desire. The majority of rural migrants are unskilled and have to sell their advantages: youth, ‘appropriate’ gender for different industries, and healthy bodies. Industrialists examine rural migrants’ identities in order to choose what they view as appropriate labor for their diversified industrial programs. Their examination and regulations, e.g. pairing one young female with one or two males, are the operational rules for selecting qualified but unskilled rural migrants in street recruitment. In doing so, the operative rules are discriminatory in the way they differentiate rural migrants.

One day, three young girls approached the two women recruiters’ booth. After Willow introduced working schedules and salaries (twelve hours a day and six days a week for roughly 2,500-yuan monthly salary), one girl felt unsatisfied with the conditions of the factory.

“When I worked in my former factory, I did not need to work overtime and still had a pay of over 4,000 *yuan*...” this girl claimed.

“...in this town, all factories require overtime working schedules like my factory and offer the same amount of salary... Workers in a few factories are required to work until 11:00pm or midnight. But in my factory, workers rest on every Sunday,” Willow explained to the girl. After a while, she turned around to me, with contemptuousness in her face.

“All factories in Dongguan calculate workers’ salaries based on the minimum salary plus over-time pay...if you and your friends worked in shoe-making factories, we can assign similar jobs to you,” Sprout said and delivered a piece of paper recording her monthly salary to the girl.

...

Meanwhile, one young man approached the booth and introduced himself, “I worked in the shoe-surface-making program before...four of us are looking for new jobs.”

“Good. Then you can continue to work in the shoe-surface-making program in my factory. Give me your ID cards. Fill out this registration form. You only need to fill your basic information such as name, age, gender, and health conditions, and

leave the other sections blank. By the way, give me your phone number. I can contact you if you do not show up in my factory in a couple of days... In the factory... a trainer will teach you factory regulations,” she is obviously happy to recruit four potential workers for her factory plant.

There are no negotiations between recruiters and rural migrant job seekers. In street recruitment, rural migrants rarely negotiate salaries, unlike the girl described above. Needless to say, they seldom negotiate welfare or working environments with factories. Unlike the urban talent market where rural migrants can try to sell their labor and negotiate salaries (ibid. Appendix 1), every condition of factory employment in street recruitment is fixed and articulated in factory job posters. Recruiters may carefully introduce factory conditions but never actively ask rural migrants for their expectations about their employment. Recruiters also ask job seekers for their working experience, but this is only for the allocation of job seekers into proper programs in the assembly line.

When job seekers express willingness to work in their factories, recruiters follow up with a rapid procedure of checking ID cards, filling out registration forms, and sending rural migrants to the factories by mini-bus. Although the registration form for the big factory has space for such things as education and skills, recruiters inform job seekers to fill in only their basic information such as age, gender, ID card numbers, and health conditions (Appendix 4). In the factory, trainers teach job seekers factory regulations and employ a variety of disciplining techniques including singing of the factory song, standing and marching. According to the registration form, in the initial probationary period, if rural migrant workers cannot follow factory regulations, do not provide valid and genuine personal information, or refuse to sign contracts in the first month, factory managers have the power to dismiss them unconditionally.<sup>59</sup> The registration form, then, establishes the disciplinary process at the earliest stages of the factory-migrant relationship from the beginning of street recruitment to the time when rural migrants finally sign contracts.

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<sup>59</sup> See Appendix 4.

Unlike factories that charged recruitment fees or retained rural migrants' ID cards as security for factories (Pun, 2005), most factories engaged in street recruitment do not overtly exploit and restrain rural migrants nowadays. Factories clearly explain the offer of salaries, factory welfare, working schedules and the like, and do not charge any fees and collect job seekers' ID cards in street recruitment. However, in order to work in factories, rural migrants must accept all conditions offered in employment, and are unconditionally subject to industrialists' requirements. In particular, most factories request rural migrant workers to deposit their first-month salaries as security fees and can only retrieve this money in the last month of their employment.

Thus, there is a common disciplinary process at work in the street recruitment of rural migrants. First, factory recruiters ask job seekers' age and working experience. They prefer rural migrants' bodily identities to be young, docile, healthy, and of the appropriate gender to manufacturing industry in gender. They do not value job seekers' working experiences but use them to distribute potential workers to different assembly lines. Second, factory recruiters tell job seekers that the salary is fixed with no possibility to negotiate factory welfare and working environments. Most rural migrants seldom try to negotiate their salaries. They only choose to say yes or no in response to job offers.

Third, if job seekers still show interest in the factory job, recruiters will inspect their ID cards, examine their age and fill their name in a registration form that is a visa to enter guarded factory entrances. The big factory plant will collect and input information from the form into its computer system for further examination and monitoring of the labor force. Fourth, recruiters will circumvent job seekers' desire to explore other job possibilities, requiring them to stay near the booth, then either directly send them into factories or call on a factory minibus to deliver them quickly into factories in the industrial zone. In the big factory plant, managers and trainers continuously discipline rural migrants by teaching them a factory song, military-style marching drills, and insisting they learn and are willing to comply with factory rules and quality controls before they can start to work.

In the whole process of street recruitment, factories constantly examine job seekers' bodily identities. Recruiters examine job seekers' age, gender and obvious shortcomings in appearances, e.g. physical handicaps, which can affect the labor force. Job seekers are usually required to hand in their medical examination reports from a local clinic designated by factories. If the applicants are finally accepted, they generally sign a contract that does not require them to deposit ID cards or pay an upfront security fee but does withhold their first month's salary until they quit their jobs.

The arrangement of booths and the space of the retail street are also crucial to street recruitment. Laid out in rows from the entrance of the village to the other end of the retail street, recruiters' booths redefine the space of the retail street for the purpose of recruitment. At the intersection between the grand road and the retail street are three or four booths near the pedestrian bridge and a bus stop. Coming from outside, rural migrants have to pass by these booths. A little further away from the entrance are around ten booths in a row against buildings, facing the street. In the second street intersection are another three or four booths close to another bus stop, several meters away from which are another row of booths against walls and facing the street. In the third street intersection, again, a third row of booths extends almost to the end of the retail street and the edge of the industrial zone. When rural migrants get off buses, enter the village or access the industry zone, they inevitably pass by these recruitment booths in the retail street.

The location of each booth in the retail street is usually fixed. A factory installs one booth in a certain location of the retail street. This is an informal agreement between factory recruiters after they have placed their booths in the same location for several years. The big factory plant installs as many booths as possible near the intersections and bus stops in the retail street. Its recruiters also place their booths in certain fixed spots in the street. After several informal negotiations among the recruiters' managers, this factory plant divides the retail street into multiple intervals for sub-factories that place their booths for programs of different assembly lines such as shoe surface-making, bottom-making and final assembly. When rural migrants walk by the street, they will continuously encounter different recruiters who are in different programs or different sub-factories but all in the big factory plant. When

they are not satisfied with a program in a booth, recruiters in that booth might suggest they try another program in the same sub-factory.

Although each booth is attached to a certain spot in the retail street, it is a temporary establishment. Recruiters do make slight adjustments to their position in order to facilitate recruitment. With four extensible poles supporting a canopy, the tent in each booth is foldable and movable. Recruiters like to set up their tents on sidewalks or low retaining walls where they can have better views of rural migrants. Sitting behind desks, these recruiters sit against the wall and face the whole street. In doing so, they can watch every pedestrian or passenger getting off buses or coming up the street. In addition, they expose themselves to job seekers via factory posters and their tents with printed factory names on the top canopies of tents. When someone is passing by their booths, they will immediately notice if that person intends to approach the booths or not by judging that person's appearance, e.g. carrying luggage, and behaviors, e.g. gazing at posters and tents. When they recognize a job seeker, they may activate the recruitment processes at once.

## **B. Examination of Factory Recruiters**

Even if factories are trying their best to hire as many rural migrants as possible, only a handful of rural migrants visit each booth and request job information. With limited numbers of rural migrants visiting the village each day, factory recruiters are in intensive competition, waiting for job seekers to drop by, endeavoring to recruit qualified unskilled workers. They examine each other while factory management simultaneously examines them. This forms a hierarchical order of examination from industrialists (both domestic and foreign) to factory management to recruiters to migrant job seekers. Through them, foreign industrialists transmit their demands for cheap and docile workers to managers who discipline factory recruiters in a system of intra-examination.

One day close to noon, a man with no factory uniform stopped by Willow and Sprout's booth. Unlike rural migrants asking about factory conditions or salaries, he directly

asked both Willow and Sprout where their coworkers in another booth were. “We do not know...they might have left for lunch,” they both replied. After the man left, they told me that he was a “factory cadre” in their human resource department. Willow talked to me with a raised voice, and she appeared to become a little emotional. “He occasionally drives a car along the retail street and inspects our work. These guys in human resources change their approach to the retail street occasionally...but I know they like to arrive from the entrance behind us. They also like to come around 11am when some of us plan to leave early for lunch.”.

Then, Sprout told me, “In a big factory, this occasional examination is common. In a small factory, nobody checks on me. But there is only me to recruit workers in my factory. Being lazy, I cannot recruit more workers... and what if my boss happens to pass by my booth?” Unannounced and covert monitoring and examination by factory representatives aim at eliminating recruiters’ lazy work in order to employ more workers.

Similar to workers in the assembly line, factory recruiters’ daily work is a routine of a fixed timetable and may be quota-based. In the big factory, all recruiters are expected to gather by a plaza of the walled super-block factory at 7:30 am where a factory bus takes them to the retail street. By 4:30pm, the bus picks them up and returns them to the factory. At a first glance, they seemingly work less than other factory employees do. However, the factory often gives them a quota requiring each recruiter to hire at least three workers a day. If they do not meet their quota, they are obligated to work as late as workers in the assembly line do. Each day in my presence, Willow, Sprout, and their coworkers in other booths calculated the number of recruited rural migrants in their forms or notepads, worrying about not meeting the quota. Willow always murmurs like a prayer, “Quickly, one more person comes here. Quickly, one more person...” Another recruiter told me in a follow-up interview, “The punishment for us if we don’t meet the quota of three recruited workers per day is to go to work in the assembly line from 6:30pm to 9:30pm. But this is not the worst case. Sometimes, our leaders might blame us and reduce our salaries as a fine... Not many of us like this job, but we have to come to the street under orders.”

The top-down pressure forces recruiters to examine each other within the big factory plant or between different sub-factories. Recruiters in the big factory plant are in competition with each other. They rarely collaborate with each other and try to manipulate potential recruits to join the sub-factories or specific assembly lines they represent. To increase chances to meet the quota, recruiters attempt to send more rural migrants than required to their factories for further examination and do not share recruits with their coworkers. Nevertheless, within the factory plant, each sub-factory or program can trade new recruited rural migrants if their leaders mutually agree. One recruiter in the big factory plant told me that they needed to watch out carefully for their coworkers as demonstrated in this dramatic story:

One girl [rural migrant] registered with me and should have entered my program. But another program had a great shortage of workers. For some reason, recruiters from that program accessed my registration form and changed my name to theirs. So, the girl goes to their department. Yet, that girl did not like that program and returned to mine, because that program was not as profitable as mine. So we know what happened now.

Examination between recruiters of different factories is more open and dramatic than the internal competition between departments. When I was sitting in the recruitment booth, two young rural migrants rejected Willow's offer and were about to leave. They told her, "We need to check other factories before making a decision." In the meantime, one man wearing her factory's uniform came along. When the migrants' backs were turned, Willow waved her arms wildly and kept trying to point the worker toward the migrants. Not understanding her, Willow's coworker passed by the two rural migrants. She told him with great agitation, "I just made lots of gestures to you, asking you to stop them and chat with them. I do not want them to go to other booths. Why do you have no reaction to me at all!" After several hours, in a quiet moment with no one around, she suddenly got my attention. She recognized the two migrants passing by her booth with another recruiter on their way to a different factory. "We did not stop the two men just now," she said, "so they are entering another factory."

Before Sprout worked with Willow, she had been forced to move away from her booth to her coworkers' booth in the middle of the retail street, far from bus stops and street intersections, with little foot traffic from rural migrants. She complained to me:

Those recruiters from other factories continuously blame me for taking away their rural migrants. Two of them shouted at me from time to time, 'Your booth is always here and blocks the storeowners' way. If someone from the store comes out, you must leave right away.' I could not endure this and chose to leave for another booth. Sprout could not figure out why the other two recruiters asserted she blocked the storeowners' way. "They made up this excuse to keep shouting at me to get rid of me," she said.

In another interview, a recruiter told me that recruiters have to hurry to stop incoming rural migrants from visiting any booths but their own:

During the Spring Festival, factories desperately need normal workers (unskilled workers). (Before the Chinese Spring Festival, many rural migrants leave their factories, return to their hometowns and come back several days after the Chinese New Year). Within that period, booths are occupied all over the street in the day. Recruiters try hard to occupy good spots in the street. Recruiters contend with each other in a 'heating stew'. When rural migrants get off the buses but do not cross the street yet, a few recruiters will run up to them and drag them into their booths before others can approach. Once, because of this, my coworkers fought with recruiters in another factory. The recruiters from the two booths attacked each other...those recruiters were so ferocious that they slapped my coworkers' faces... There are just a number of rural migrants. This factory takes one away. Then another factory loses one... After that fight, we always separate our booths from theirs: ours are on the one end of the retail street; theirs are on the other end.

In this way, factory discipline comes to the retail street and selects qualified rural migrants through the arranging of booths in the street, filtering out unqualified rural migrants by the examination of their demographic features and bodies, organizing qualified rural migrants through registrations, and examining recruiters in hierarchical observation. Factory

discipline reconfigures the space of the retail street for the use of recruitment. Factory recruiters occupy strategic locations such as intersections, bus stops and sidewalks, and locate their booths in certain spots of the street according to different factories and programs of assembly lines in the factories. Industrialists discipline rural migrant recruiters for efficient recruitment. Using disciplinary techniques, these recruiters gaze at potential rural migrants, examine their qualifications, register them, confine their activities in the street, and organize them into factories for further examination and normalizing judgment. In this process, discriminative criteria with respect to rural migrants' bodily features differentiate qualified rural migrants from unqualified ones: young bodies with sufficient physical power, healthy bodies that will do no harm to the factory labor force, gender preferences that assign labor to specific manufacturing industries, and "safe" bodies without long hair or tattoos to protect manufacturing productivity. By including these qualified rural migrants and excluding the rest, factories attempt to employ as much rural migrant labor as possible in the assembly line while maintaining control over the types of workers they hire.

Figure 3.2 Factory Street Recruitment in a Village



Factory recruiters in a village established their simple booth on sidewalks in March, one month after the Chinese Spring Festival. At that time, a number of rural migrants still came to villages but could not fill factory labor demand. In recent years, factories' street recruitment can last a whole year except for the season of the Spring Festival.

Source: Photo by the author

#### IV. The Village Collective's Security of Street Recruitment

Factories' street recruitment must rely on a secured retail street and village, not only because of Dongguan's high crime rates but also because conflicts ranging from a small quarrel to a street strike might unpredictably generate turmoil and ruin recruitment. To maintain the security of street recruitment, the village police team monitors rural migrants through surveillance of the retail street. The village collective projects a constant gaze on the retail street, rural migrant job seekers and factory recruiters.

Surveillance cameras are everywhere on the retail street. They have been installed outside the agriculture bank, the medical clinic, the post office, retail stores, KTVs, internet bars and even inside busses. Almost all buildings along the retail street have indoor cameras monitoring interior spaces. On the four walls of a typical retail store, there is at least one camera on each wall. Supermarkets install convex mirrors beside cameras. These inspection cameras are connected with independent monitors operated by store clerks. There are at least four inspection cameras inside a town or village bus: in the front, on the rear and on the two sides. In addition, warning signs are common on the retail street: "Ten-time Fines for Stealing One Item in the Store"; "This Room is under Digital Inspection!"; "Policemen's Warm Reminder to Watch out for Thefts and Embezzlers". Large-size tags are attached inside buses and on the windows: "This Bus is under Police's Video Inspection!"

Rural migrants are under retail storeowners' surveillance. In the entrances of the two supermarkets, rural migrants must check their bags and other belongings before entering the supermarket. Standing by checkout counters, staff may randomly search rural migrants' groceries purchased in the market. In a large apparel store, a special clerk sits on a two-meter-high stool and constantly watches customers. With inspection cameras and monitors, store clerks inspect rural migrants visiting their stores at every point of the store.

The village collective monitors the whole village and especially rural migrants through the surveillance of its village police team. Police stations occupy two key locations in the village. The village's police headquarters is located in the natural village in the west. A second branch is

positioned in the center of the eastern portion near the retail street, the rural migrants' residential compounds, and the industrial zone. Village police in both stations inspect rural migrants' residential zones and the industrial zone. However, the police station in the east portion of the village takes primary responsibility for the management of rural migrants' TRCs, family planning, safety, and the like.

In addition to the two police stations, there are several police pavilions in the village. The pavilions are located in the retail street and several other side streets. Police pavilions guard the main entrances to the village and major street intersections. Two pavilions are located near the intersection of the retail street and the grand road. One is at the entrance to the rural migrants' living zone and close to the recruitment booths. The other pavilion is at the entrance to the natural village. At the end of the retail street close to the industrial zone, there is a third pavilion standing in the middle of the intersection guarding the entrance to the industrial zone. In a few smaller streets, abandoned police pavilions are placed near street intersections or factory entrances. Each police pavilion is made of stainless steel and installed with translucent glass on each side. On its top are police lights and several security cameras facing different directions. On its bottom, four poles on each corner of a police pavilion lift the pavilion one meter higher than the ground. Village police climb a steep stair up to the pavilion enabling them to watch their surroundings with a good view. Wearing police uniforms, one or two village police (*zhi'an yuan*) usually stay inside the pavilion near factory recruitment areas and watch over rural migrants.

Disputes and brawls are uncommon in the retail street. However, once these conflicts occur, tens or even hundreds of rural migrants will surround the conflicts and watch them as street dramas. This may generate unrest that the village collective cannot control. Therefore, when disputes or brawls break out in the retail street, village police can immediately put them down thanks to their surveillance. When disputes or fights between recruiters break out, the village police come, divide the recruiters and relocate their booths in the retail street. In order to avoid rural migrants' conflicts such as brawls, protests, lockouts, and strikes, the village police divide the crowds of rural migrants and may expel individual rural migrants from the area.

In my field studies, I observed several cases of public disputes in the retail street. One dispute suddenly took place between indigenous villagers and a migrant driver whose minibus hit a villager's bicycle. The second was a dispute between storeowners and their customers. The third happened when village police stopped a rural migrant operating an illegal motorcycle taxi service transporting customers from one side of the village to the other. In all three cases, the village police attempted to remove people from the scene as quickly as possible. When they arrived, they first broke up crowds of rural migrants', yelling, "Walk away! Walk away! Do not stay here. Nothing interesting can be seen here." Usually, rural migrants in the crowds will leave immediately and quietly. Sometimes, especially in the evening or weekends, bypassing rural migrants who are off-duty will keep coming close to the scene of conflicts. In this circumstance, village police have to disperse the crowd by constantly shouting, "Walk away! Walk away..." Village police, then, prevent rural migrants from becoming involved in street conflicts.

Most of the time, village police stay in their pavilions. Occasionally, they patrol the retail street, riding their police motorcycles usually parked by the pavilions. In contrast, village police in the two police stations take more responsibility for patrolling the streets. They usually drive a police golf cart or a police car, circling around the east portion of the village. They seldom stop and check anyone but keep watch around the village. If disputes or brawls occur in the street, village police drive to the street to resolve problems.

One day, when I was sitting in the booth, I noticed that four village police drove a police golf cart and passed by the retail street. They did not stop but circled the village, patrolling back and forth in the retail street. They did not stop, but were constantly gazing at recruiters' booths. I was curious to know what was happening.

"What are they doing?" I asked Willow and Sprout.

"They are village policemen checking if factories from outside the village are recruiting rural migrants here. This is a local protection," Willow told me.

"If they find any recruitment booths from other villages, village policemen will expel them back to their villages. Some factories may send their recruiters to other villages."

“How can these policemen tell whether factories are in or outside this village?” I asked.

“Oh... They are police. They know our factories in the village and are familiar with our faces... but they might also ignore recruiters from outside if these recruiters pretend to look like us,” Willow answered.

When I asked Willow about her reaction to the police patrol for street recruitment afterward, she spoke out about her recruitment experience in villages:

Does the village collective charge factories fees for street recruitment? [I asked her if there was a fee for their using the street space]. My factory brings great benefit to the village. These retail stores you observe in the street and factory employees' lives all rely on my factory. To speak bluntly, [I think] this village would crash if this factory collapsed... The collaboration between factories and villages is an open secret to us. My factory donates a fire truck to the village... No village police will come to check us. I do not put my eyes on them at all when they pass me... People in the village sometimes call my factory and tell us not to recruit in the street when officials from the government will inspect the village. Only in this circumstance, we do not come to the retail street for recruitment... I used to go to another village to recruit workers for my factory. There were also police patrolling the streets. I only stayed there one day and became frightened by the patrol. I did not get caught but never wanted to go back again...

Rural migrants may understand the open secret of this collaboration but might not know the collaboration involves them in the security of street recruitment. On the one hand, factories request local protection by networking with the village collective offering donations, security fees and more. By providing security for street recruitment, the village collective engages in its collaboration with factories. Each town and village in Dongguan heavily invests in public security by hiring town or village police. In the village, the village collective establishes a network of police surveillance including police stations, pavilions, surveillance cameras, and police patrols to secure street recruitment and the village as a whole.

On the other hand, rural migrants can freely enter and exit the retail street but villagers consider them as both beneficiaries of the security they provide and as potential troublemakers. For years, village collectives in Dongguan charged annual public security fees of several hundred *yuan* per person directly from rural migrants or indirectly from industrialists who inevitably recouped the fees from their workers' salaries. When Willow is afraid to go to other villages for street recruitment, it is evident that the collaboration partitions villages from each other to secure their own recruitment. It is also evident that the village police patrol is in an effective way to secure the retail street for recruitment. Thus, the village collective not only inspects rural migrants but also factory recruiters to prevent outsiders from harming street recruitment.

## V. “Do not ‘play’ outside Factories anymore”: Parenting Rural Migrants for Street Recruitment

Willow was very active in the recruitment. Whenever a person passed by her booth, she would speak out loud, “Come here and take a look!” Whenever she recognized young people wandering in the street, she would also speak aloud, “Do not ‘play’ (*wan*) outside factories anymore. Come and work in my factory.” When a young man with a little beard passed by her, Willow immediately recognized him.

“You came here one month ago. Why have not you found a job yet? Last time when you came here, you had zero *yuan* in your pocket... You said you would ask your mom for money. Did you get it?” Willow spoke out.

“My mom gave me one thousand... Last time, she sent me six hundred *yuan* again. She asked me to eat well and not to be reckless spending money.” he spoke in a low and slow voice.

“Well...you have money now. Do not play around outside [factories]. Without a job, you will ask mom for money again. She will chide you...” Willow grinned at him.

“Last time, she did it by phone... She is also working in a factory.”

“Then you should get a job quickly. Let me fill a registration form for you... Take it with your ID card to the entrance of my factory... After you mail money to your mom, she will see she brought up a filial son.” Willow felt happy when teaching this young male rural migrant.

It was common for women recruiters to scold young rural migrants not working hard in factories but desiring more leisure and relaxation. To rural migrants, “play” means not only playing games and surfing the internet, but the consumption of time, money and materials in manufacturing towns. In industrialists and factory recruiters’ eyes, some young rural migrants “play” in the retail street: they like to take temporary jobs and only start to seek jobs when they spend all their money outside factories. To make them and their families better off, as both Willow and Sprout tells me, they had better stop uncontrolled consumption in the retail street and come back to factories to work.

To industrialists and factory recruiters, “play” implies lazy work in factories. A few recruiters occasionally complained to me when they saw young rural migrants wandering in the streets, “These youth cannot take bitterness like we did. Their parents care for them more than our parents did. These kids are always their parents’ babies... they cannot endure assembly line leaders or team leaders’ blame or abuse. Sometimes, when (factory) cadres impute any mistake to them, they might quarrel with their leaders and quit their jobs the next day.” In these recruiters’ mind, young rural migrants “played” in factories: they are not as diligent and obedient in factories as elder rural migrants.

In her research of a factory in Shenzhen that is adjacent to Dongguan, Pun (2005) points out that young, rural women migrants are enmeshed in the global capitalist system with its needs of both disciplined cheap labor and uncontrolled libidinous consumption of resources and labor. In the village, this dual need triggers rural migrants’ impasse of consumption: a difficult choice between low consumption and luxurious urban consumption under the constraint of their low income. On the one hand, they are low-paid workers in the global capitalist system. For decades, their basic salaries are equal to the minimum wage in Dongguan, although they can work over time and make a little extra income. With a salary of only two-to-three thousand *yuan* per month,

some of them still have to support their families or seek individual development in manufacturing towns. In the village, low salaries and industrialists' exploitation inevitably cause rural migrants' low consumption. For instance, some of them, especially middle-aged rural migrants, choose to save every cent for their families and for the future, eating cheap food and living in tiny rooms together. Every evening and on Sunday, street vendors come to the retail street, occupy sidewalks and motorways, and sell rural migrants their low-price goods. This draws such a large number of rural migrants to the retail street that rural migrants usually block the street at night. On the other hand, rural migrants are greatly influenced by the luxurious urban consumption that industrialists and many local residents enjoy. Stores that sell relatively expensive cellphones and renowned apparel to rural migrants are popular in the retail street (Table 3.1). KTVs and internet bars are always full of young rural migrants at night. Rural migrants can quickly spend all of their monthly salaries on these expensive goods. It is difficult for some of them to reject the desire of urban consumption and spend all of their money, while others maintain low consumption and resist this temptation.

In addition, rural migrants are enmeshed in rural paternalism. For years, rural paternalism and hardship in the countryside worked as a way of controlling farmers such as rural women (Pun, 2005; Yan, 2008). Even though some of them, e.g. young woman workers, are eager to escape paternalism through migration, they have to rely on the paternalism for social connections, e.g. seeking jobs and searching for community in towns. In this paternalism, mother represents the soft and mild power of their virtues of grace, tenderness and benignity in contrast to father's grandness, strength and strictness. In the power relation between mothers and children, good children must be filial to mothers who care for the children with their virtues. To be filial is to be obedient and not to be against parents: their orders, discipline and daily requests. According to paternalism, "to play" means not to be filial since the mother and Willow regard it as wasting time and money. These rural women migrants carry out rural paternalism in their use of disciplinary commands like "Do Not Play". They never lose their patience and remind young rural migrants to work diligently, obey factory rules and endure hardship, hoping to transmit these words into rural migrants' minds and hearts. Thus, compared with "to play", to work in factories is filial for rural migrant job seekers regardless of the working hardship that these mothers and woman recruiters experience and endure. Although rural paternalism in

manufacturing towns is not as strong as in their hometowns, it influences recruiters to discipline young rural migrants working in factories.

Desiring docile cheap labor, industrialists encourage rural migrants' thrift, diligence, docility, and prudent lifestyles, calling on principles of rural paternalism in order to diminish potential resistance that might be encouraged through their choices of urban consumption. My research will discuss rural migrant's resistance in the last chapter. In this chapter, it demonstrates that factory recruiters under factory discipline "parent" young rural migrants using rural paternalism. Under rigid factory management for recruitment, recruiters attempt to impose and exercise rural paternalism upon young rural migrants in order to hire as many rural migrant workers as possible. Embedded in rural paternalism, these recruiters consider intensive factory work and rigid rules less as exploitation and discipline but more as techniques, which rural migrant job seekers as well as recruiters themselves can practice to avoid excessive consumption, save money, and become filial children. As a result, the operation of factory discipline and rural paternalism in factory recruitment exhibits the authorities' intention of turning rural migrants into docile bodies of either factory labor or filial children. Through their rejection of urban consumption and acceptance of paternalism, many rural migrants adhere to a life style of low consumption, diligence and obedience promoted by paternalism and satisfy industrialists' desire to produce docile bodies of factory labor.

In summary, the two authorities of industrialists and village collectives operate factory recruitment as one "invisible filter" in the retail street to recruit as many unskilled rural migrants as possible in a national context of diminishing rural labor surplus and global economic downturn. Through street recruitment, industrialists extend factory discipline to the space of the retail street. In addition, the village police team up with retail storeowners to secure the retail street for recruitment. Finally, the exercise of paternalism emerges to facilitate factory recruitment when rural migrant recruiters enmeshed in both factory discipline and paternalism parent young rural migrants, encouraging them to accept low-consumption lifestyles and rigid factory management. Rural migrants encounter a difficult choice between incredibly low consumption and luxurious urban consumption, but ultimately, most have little choice but to

work in factories in order to sustain themselves. The governing technologies of factory discipline, police surveillance, and paternalism prevail and strengthen factory recruitment in the retail street.

In the operation of the “invisible filter”, the retail street becomes a labor market serving manufacturing production. The space of the retail street is productive in conveying unskilled rural migrant labor to factories. Physically, it is the major circulation hub leading rural migrants to enter the village and factories. Socioeconomically, it accommodates and facilitates the operation of the governing technologies by which industrialists select unskilled workers, who must be young, healthy, docile and poorly educated, and excludes the rest of rural migrant job seekers.

## Chapter Five

### Rental Housing Compounds: Panoptic Efforts to Exclude Undesirable Rural Migrants as the “*Lapsi*”

In the reform era, the authorities have come to regard rural migrants as floating population (*liudong renkou*) and “blind flow” (*mang liu*), and generally target rural migrants as “dangerous personnel” and potential criminals that threaten social order (Han, 2010; Pun, 2005; Solinger, 1996; Wang, 2005; Zhang, 2001).<sup>60</sup> As a floating population, rural migrants have no permanent residence in the city and frequently change their residence. The name “blind flow” with its suggestion of aimless drifting between cities implies that the authorities suspect rural migrants’ purpose and motives for migrating. For many years, the government and urban public have associated high crime rates with rural migrants (Han, 2010; Solinger, 1996; Wang, 2005). In Dongguan, the Intermediate People’s Court indicates that most rural migrants are temporary residents with low income, low education, few skills, but a strong desire to become rich, all of which leads some rural migrants to commit crimes due to their addiction to high-end consumption and laziness (DIPC, 2008 p.209 & 210). As a result, the court states that crimes committed by the floating population are the biggest challenge to public security, and the government should target the floating population to maintain order (*ibid.*).

In order to identify potential criminals, authorities investigate and interpret the purposes, paths, mechanisms, and effects of migration including their residencies and relevant activities in cities. The *hukou* system has always excluded rural migrants from urban public housing. Rural migrants are generally low-income and can rarely afford market-rate urban housing either. Only factory dormitories and village collectives’ low price rental housing are affordable to rural

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<sup>60</sup> The authorities do not often use the word of floating population and rarely name rural migrants after “blind flow” nowadays. Instead, as discussed in chapter three, local governments have officially assigned rural migrants with names such as *xin shimin* (new urban citizen) or *xinguanren* (new Dongguan citizen).

migrants.<sup>61</sup> Many rural migrants choose rental housing as an escape from rigid factory discipline carried out in dormitories, with greater freedom and autonomy outside the factory compound. In Dongguan, less than 20% of rural migrants lived in rental housing in the early 2000s (Huang & Wang, 2004). In a local survey in 2009, nearly half the rural migrant population lived in rental housing (Deng & Wang, 2009 p.340). While an increasing number of rural migrants are moving outside of factories, the government and village collectives have grown increasingly concerned with governing such a large number of rural migrants seen as a potential disruption to social stability and manufacturing production when they step outside the boundaries of factory discipline.

This chapter discusses the governance of policing rural migrants and focuses on the government's new program—the governance of rural migrants through managing rental housing—via the study of a rural migrants' residential compound in the village. It begins with a study of the government's policing power exercised on rural migrants in comparison with Foucault's interpretation of the Christian pastorate's examination of its flock: the pastorate's investigation of its flock, the flock's examination of each other, and individual self-examination (Foucault, 2004/2007). Then, it describes and analyzes the development of the compound and the exercise of policing power in the compound through the lens of Panopticism (ibid, 1975/1979). In this exercise, the XinGuanRen Service and Management Bureau (XSMB) has established a new program directly implemented by village collectives and government agencies shaping the

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<sup>61</sup> Village collectives have developed a large number of rental housing for rural migrants since the 1990s. Due to the collective ownership of rural land and village households' property right to the land where these households' own houses sit, indigenous villagers could control the development of their rural land, only with their village committees' permission in the 1990s (Abramson & Anderson, 2006; Zhang et al., 2003). The town government has strengthened its monitoring of rural land development after 2000 (Hsing, 2010). However, this development may still happen when village collectives elude the monitoring or develop rental housing from the land used for their own houses. I observe village collectives' continuous development of rental housing through my field studies. For instance, one village is building a high-rise apartment building for rental. This building has no government permit of construction according to one urban planning official's conversation with me after my interview. Since 2010, another village has started to build several rental apartment buildings for rural migrants by the village center where the land use is indigenous villagers' own housing. In addition, the price of rural land is quite low in comparison with the price of urban land (DUPB, 2006, October 13). This greatly reduces the cost of the rental housing development, and thereby allow indigenous villagers to offer rural migrants a low rental price, which is usually 200-to-300 *yuan* per month. See the session of Village Collectives' Self-development and Separated Zones of Villages in chapter two for more information.

In contrast, real estate companies develop market rate urban housing on high-price urban land. Some urban residents who purchase the urban housing in market and rent it out with an unaffordable high price to rural migrants. For instance, when I lived in the city center in 2010, I found out that the rental price of one bedroom apartment over there was usually between 1,000 and 2,000 *yuan* per month, which was close to a rural migrant's monthly salary.

space of the compound, and enforcing the continued surveillance of rural migrants. Finally, my research studies the impact of policing rural migrants in the compound and the effect of the government's guidance of rural migrants in villages.

My research argues that the government and village collectives have been developing the new program of managing rural housing as a means of policing rural migrants, excluding undesirable migrants, and securing social stability and manufacturing production. This program is a succession and transformation of the *hukou*-based tiered management of rural migrants (Wang, 2005). It is a new governing technology in which the authorities' disciplinary actions—registration, partition, inspection, and entrance guard—enact the operation of policing rural migrants. Although the program does not constrain rural migrants' physical movements, it still demonstrates some characteristics of Panopticism. The implementation of the program includes most rural migrants as potential unskilled workers, but excludes the rest as “dangerous personnel”, sometimes classified by the government of Dongguan into the “five types of population” (*wu lei ren*) such as criminal suspects and people without ID cards.<sup>62</sup> As a result, the implementation of this program in rental housing constitutes a new “invisible filter” screening rural migrants. In addition, village collectives exercise their sovereignty upon rural migrants by directly implementing the program, yet, undermine the task of assisting the government to guide rural migrants in the village.

## **I. Exclusion of Undesirable Rural Migrants through Policing Power**

### **A. Pastorate's Examination of its Flock and Policing Farmers in the People's Commune**

Even though Christian pastoral power demonstrates reaching, caring for, sacrificing, and guiding the flock into salvation (Bray, 2005; Dean, 1999; Foucault, 2004/2007), the

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<sup>62</sup> The government of Dongguan classified targeted population, mostly rural migrants, into five types for the enforcement of policing them. For details about the “five types of population”, see session IV. B in this chapter.

pastorate creates and relies on an examination of the flock for its governance. As Foucault contends:

So, the Christian pastorate is not fundamentally or essentially characterized by the relationship to salvation...rather, a form of power that, taking the problem of salvation in its general set of themes, inserts into this circulation, transfer, and reversal of merits, and this is its fundamental points...the Christian pastorate is also absolutely innovative in establishing a structure, a technique of, at once, power, investigation, self-examination, and the examination of others, by which a certain secret inner truth of the hidden soul, becomes the element through which the pastor's power is exercised, by which obedience is practiced... (ibid. p.183)

The pastorate turns salvation from its purpose into a problem that the pastorate intends to resolve by its examination of the flock. By doing so, the pastorate ensures the guidance of those followers whose salvation is not yet secured.

The pastorate's guidance of the flock legitimates the pastorate's examination of the flock. Foucault (ibid.) contends that the pastorate requests and guides the flock's submission of themselves to each other and finally turns the submission into examination. On the one hand, the guidance results in the pastorate's investigation of the flock. While reaching and caring for their flock, pastors must understand the flock's minds and touch its souls. For care, cultivation, and sacrifice, pastors necessarily examine their followers in the flock in order to understand them, e.g. their need, mistakes, and virtues, and call on these followers' submission of minds and souls to each other. For instance, the pastorate directs pastors to record their followers' sexuality such as behaviors and preferences of sexual activities in order to guide the flock into redemption (ibid, 1976/1978). On the other hand, the operation of guidance requires the flock's examination of each other and their own self-examination. In obedience to the pastorate's guidance, followers in the flock reach and care for each other as a way of examining others' minds, souls, and behaviors. They also submit their inner truths, including their sins, to their pastors and fellows as a means of self-examination. The pastorate, then, unifies the three aspects of examination: an investigation of the flock, the flock's examination of each other, and individual self-examination.

The examination of the pastorate's flock induces and facilitates salvation, a necessity of pastoral power. Examination normalizes the flock's practice of submission and insertion of the ideology of salvation into the flock's minds and souls. Within this examination, the flock constantly exercises various techniques of the pastoral power. For the requirement of submission, individuals in the flock constantly remind themselves and each other to care for, love, and possibly sacrifice for others: they need to reach and care for their fellows as Jesus does. In the self-examination of confession, they successively kneel, pray and repent. Whenever the pastorate requests members of the flock's submission to each other, its examination takes place in the operation of the pastoral power.

The pastorate enforces examination in order to identify and resolve problems, and stabilize the flock. For instance, the *lapsi* is a fundamental problem that the pastorate encounters and has to resolve to ensure salvation for the flock. The *lapsi* is the pastorate's corrupted follower that can compromise the whole flock. They are the 'lost sheep' pastors must reach out to or risk abandoning the rest of the 'sheep' (ibid.). In handling *lapsi*, the pastorate develops two solutions. One is to sacrifice for and care for the corrupted sheep. The other argues that it is "the sheep that is a cause of scandal, or whose corruption is in danger of corrupting the whole flock, [and] must be abandoned, possibly excluded, chased away, and so forth" (ibid. p.169). Instead of caring for the *lapsi*, the pastorate rationalizes excluding the corrupted in order to secure the whole flock on its way toward salvation.

Thus, to secure salvation, the pastorate examines the flock, and can divide the flock as well as exclude the *lapsi*. The pastorate turns the flock's submission in caring and sacrificing for each other into its examination of the flock for salvation. To ensure the salvation of the flock, it is necessary for the pastorate to examine the flock through its investigation, the flock's examination of others and self-examination. By doing so, it can divide the *lapsi* from the rest of the flock, isolating them until they can be redeemed, or abandoned completely.

In comparison with the pastorate's examination of its flock, the CCP government has historically examined the masses and excluded some of them for broader revolutionary goals.

Since the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, Mao Zedong (1926/1977, p.389) had emphasized the enemy-friend question: “Who are our enemies? Who are our friends? This is a question of the first importance for the revolution.” It became the key of revolutionary governmentality for the CCP to identify and differentiate friends and enemies, (Dutton, 2009). To resolve contradictions among the masses in developing socialism/communism, Mao (1957/1977, p.389) stressed a principle of “unity-criticism-unity” that “means starting from the desire for unity, resolving contradictions through criticism or struggle, and arriving at a new unity on a new basis.” Methods of criticism and struggle are the techniques to identify friends’ problems as contradiction among the masses and thereby expose problems related to enemies. To resolve problems caused by enemies such as the communist *lapsi*, the people’s dictatorship excludes these enemies from politics, compels them to obey the law, engages them in labor, and transforms them into new men (ibid. p.392). In Mao’s period, the CCP government internalized the enemy-friend problem in the masses, exercised its power to separate enemies and friends within the masses, and thereafter repress these enemies as well as unify friends.

In Mao’s period, both the mass line and class struggle in the government/cadre-masses relationship served as the CCP government’s political rationality for securing communism and resolving the enemy-friend problem. On the one hand, the CCP government could employ the mass line to investigate the masses. Criticism of others and self-criticism in the requirement of “Unity-Criticism-Unity” activated the masses’ examination of others and individual self-examination. Endless mass-line campaigns and political events classified people as comrades (e.g. cadres and friends) or enemies, mobilized comrades to know and find their enemies, and normalized the identification of enemies through comrades’ self-examination (Dutton, 2009). For instance, in the anti-rightist movement in 1957, the CCP government mobilized people such as intellectuals in self-criticism and the criticism of others in order to differentiate and repress many rightists as enemies of the people.

On the other hand, class struggle reinforced the division of the masses and exclusion of enemies. According to Marxism, class struggle was a means of moving society and history forward by dividing the population into multiple classes (Mao, 1926&1949/2007; Marx &

Engels, 1848/2012). In Mao's period, class struggle was constant across the nation through various campaigns and movements in order to search and struggle with enemies hidden within the masses. More intensive and complex than the division between the *lapsi* and the flock, class struggle/analysis divided the masses into multiple classes from time to time. One example was the multiple classifications of the people such as working class, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie, and the national bourgeoisie in 1949 (Mao, 1949/2007). Soon after, the government regarded landlords and capitalists as opponents of revolution, repressed landlords in the rural sector, and eliminated capitalists in the urban sector. The government also divided enemies into sub-classifications for further exclusion. Continuous political events classified various categories from time to time. One example was the classification of the "five black categories" of people including landlords (*di*), rich farmers (*fu*), antirevolutionaries (*fan*), bad-influencers (*huai*), and rightists (*you*).<sup>63</sup> The government divided people who might endanger revolution into this "five black categories". In doing so, cadres could use these categories to organize and repress corrupted members of the masses.

As the mass line and class struggle dominated the ideologies of Mao's period, the CCP government inevitably exercised its pastoral power in the people's communes, the proto-types of today's manufacturing towns. The government turned the administration of towns and townships into people's communes around 1958 and changed these communes back into towns/townships in the early reform.<sup>64</sup> In the government's guidance of farmers toward communism, cadres led, activated, and cultivated farmers in collective production of agriculture and rural industries. For instance, in the Great Leap Forward (GLF), cadres organized farmers in a set of collective programs such as production teams, public canteens, rural schools, and collective dormitories. Some of these collective programs remained in place until the reform period started. Through its guidance, the government expected cadres

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<sup>63</sup> These five types of people whom were classified after 1949 were sorted into the "five black categories" in the Culture Revolution. In contrast, there were the "five red categories" including workers, poor farmers, low-and-middle income farmers, revolutionary soldiers, and revolutionary cadres. In addition, there were other types of classifications of masses such as traitors, spies, capitalist leaders, and revisionists. See Tian & Liu (1995).

<sup>64</sup> In the early reform, the state officially replaced people's communes with towns or townships. See The Amendments to the Organic Law of China on the Local People's Congresses and Local People's Governments 1982, accessed on July 15, 2013, retrieved from [http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-10/18/content\\_2105035.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-10/18/content_2105035.htm) Afterward, the organizations of the town/township, village, and village team respectively displaced the commune, brigade, and production team in the people's commune system.

to organize farmers militarily into battle-like actions and collective lives.<sup>65</sup> Relying on these collective programs, cadres organized farmers in every aspect of their lives, and sought to eliminate the revolutionary shortcomings of the peasantry and cultivate their communist-socialist consciousness. In farmers' observations, the people's commune was an apparatus suppressing non-communist social characteristics in farmers' lives:

Farmers say the commune controls everything from head to foot and from life to death'. Farmers' freedom of migration and movement is under constraint. The social functions of family, clan and natural village are greatly repressed. Some traditional customs, habits and social interaction are criticized, prohibited or absorbed into the commune's rules. (Zhang, 1998 p.8)

The government organized farmers through various governing technologies and aimed at turning them into socialist commune members who devoted their labor to the development of the country as one of its revolutionary goals. In Mao's period, heavy industrial development was the state's major strategy of economic growth for the strength and wealth of the nation, with the stated goals of exceeding the industrial productivity of advanced capitalist countries such as Great Britain and United States (Lin & et al., 1996; Naughton, 2007). A set of domestic economic institutions such as unified marketing and purchasing and food rations extracted agricultural products and profits to support development (ibid.). After 1949, the state and local governments often discouraged rural-to-urban migration and expelled rural migrants from cities to the countryside because they were deemed as difficult to control, and ultimately a burden to cities. (Solinger, 1996 & 2006; Wang, 2011). The establishment of the *hukou* system in 1958 enclosed farmers within people's communes (Chan, 1994; ibid. Wang, 2005). As a result, the set of collective programs of the commune organized and guided farmers to contribute their labor to the developments of the commune and heavy industry.

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<sup>65</sup> With respect to the tactics in the mass line and class struggle, farmers are selected and organized in the three processes: militarized organizations (*zuzhi junshihua*), combat-like actions (*xingdong zhandouhua*), and collectivization of lives (*shenghuo jitihua*). See CCCC (1958).

In particular, the CCP government relied heavily on policing farmers for resolving the enemy-friend problem in which corrupted farmers might endanger development and other revolutionary goals. A people's commune was policed through (1) agencies such as police bureaus and stations, the Department of People's Armed Forces (*renming wuzhang bu*), convict labor farms, and militias; as well as (2) agents such as cadres, commune police, and commune activists. Government agents occupied key positions in the agencies, and investigated as well as organized commune members in order to identify and exclude corrupted farmers through the policing system. Moreover, some communes established convict labor farms that detained corrupted farmers and forced them to be low-paid or free labor. While the greatest 'enemies' such as anti-revolutionaries were repressed, others were targeted for reeducation so that they could become qualified commune members.<sup>66</sup> For instance, a former deputy director in the Anhui Province Public Security Bureau reported on the continuous division, exclusion and control of corrupted people around the period of the GLF for securing revolutionary goals (Yin, 2011). As the director highlighted:

[In 1958], the party committee, the government, the people's commune, and even brigade leaders could decide to arrest people, and communes could establish convict labor teams. Between 1958 and 1960, public security bureaus in Anhui arrested 170,000 people, and detained as well as reeducated 200,000 people through labor. Convicted teams in counties, communes and brigades arrested many more people than the numbers above. For example, in Dingyuan County...not only did the county establish convict farms by itself, but communes and brigades also established small convict teams. Out of 23 total communes in the county, 13 communes established convict teams, and sentenced 2,160 people into free labor... 1,280 people died in convict teams (*ibid.*).<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> In 1957, the state launched the regulation of Reeducation through Labor. According to this regulation, organizations such as schools, enterprises and other *danwei* could implement this regulation. After the government permitted these organizations' application of detaining people who were either minor offenders of these organizations or anti-revolutionists, the government, without sentence, could incarcerate these people in labor-camp-like detention centers and reeducate them through mandatory labor work. See *The Resolution on Approving the Decision of the State Council on the Issue of the Reeducation through Labor* (PCC, 1957). Soon after the release of this regulation, many communes that were both governments of towns/townships and organizations could apply for enacting the regulation established their convict labor farms as detention centers. Until now, the Reeducation through Labor has been still effective.

<sup>67</sup> For similar information, see Xiao (2009).

Furthermore, each commune established the organization of militias (*minbing*), which recruited young commune members as semi-militarists, and could be active at the level of production teams for military defense and the protection of public security.<sup>68</sup> In cooperation with police bureaus and convict labor farms, militias could mobilize commune members, and target and exclude locally defined corrupt farmers. For instance, Houjie Commune in Dongguan established its militias after 1949:

[Militias'] tasks are to protect local security, barns, investigate and prohibit drugs and gambling, as well as control prisoners... In August 1958... Houjie set up its regiment... the director of the Department of People's Armed Force led the regiment and 13 battalions in brigades... leaders of brigades occupied the commanders of these battalions... In 1962... Houjie organized excellent socialist youth between 18 and 28 years old in core militias, and qualified commune members between 18 and 35 years old in normal militias... and established 365 platoons in production teams. (Houjie Government, 1994 p.275)

In people's communes, the mass line and class struggle tied to and directed the operation of policing farmers. The mass line mobilized farmers in their examination of others and self-examination for the commune's investigation of farmers through the policing system. Class struggle differentiated corrupted farmers from commune members for further conduct or reform in the policing system. For instance, in Human Commune in Dongguan, farmers demonstrated their sincere decision of joining in the commune through their slogan of "Do not take Insects, Unhealthy Paddy and Harmful Thoughts into the Commune" (HPC & CDSYSU, 1959 p.108). One farmer, a commune activist, uncovered that another farmer in the middle-rich-farmer class had been spreading an anti-commune rumor. The activist reported the event to the commune, compelling cadres to criticize the middle-rich farmer's speech and behavior publicly. Their intent was not only to punish the guilty party, but also to enhance all farmers' consciousness about socialism and give farmers with possible pro-

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<sup>68</sup> See the Military Service Law of China 1955, accessed on July 15, 2013, retrieved from [http://baike.baidu.com/view/6809830.htm?tp=8\\_01](http://baike.baidu.com/view/6809830.htm?tp=8_01). Also see the Military Service Law of China 1998, accessed on July 15, 2013, retrieved from [http://www.china.org.cn/china/LegislationsForm2001-2010/2011-02/14/content\\_21916676.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/china/LegislationsForm2001-2010/2011-02/14/content_21916676.htm)

capitalist leanings a lesson (ibid.). In Henan Province, militias and cadres forced and mobilized farmers to examine others and report improper behavior to communes. “Weak” commune members such as the lazy, those hostile to cadres, and former nationalist party members and soldiers into village convict labor farms for further reformation (Xiao, 2009). As the legacy of the commune policing system, the effect of militias and convict labor farms is greatly decreased in the reform era, although the government has not officially removed them.

## **B. Policing Rural Migrants in the Reform**

The reform era restructured the governance of farmers and rural migrants, and removed many major elements of the CCP government’s pastoral power under Mao. In the early reform, communist ideologies quickly fell, and the discourses and practices of class struggle disappeared across the nation. The government no longer considered government-migrant relations through the “enemy-friend” lens. The “Unity-Criticism-Unity” strategy of the mass-line also disappeared. Many governing technologies of policing farmers such as the collective programs, criticism and self-criticism, and even the national institution of the people’s commune vanished as well. In contrast, the state initiated reforms of several major institutions such as the *hukou* reform, the abandonment of food rations, the establishment of household responsibility system, and the promotion of TVEs, most of which permitted and roused the rural-to-urban migration. Moreover, elements of neoliberalism such as the booming market economy and enormous flow of FDI fundamentally transformed the governance of rural migrants by offering them more freedom and antimony, making them better off.

However, the government has not completely abandoned the moral frame and governing technologies of the CCP government’s pastoral power in Mao’s period, for policing rural migrants during the reform. My research contends that the inertia of the CCP government’s pastoral power still influences the governance of rural migrants in its strategies for resolving problems such as rural migrants’ crimes and unrests in manufacturing towns.

This influence is manifest in two aspects. First, the government has adapted and built on some elements of the CCP's moral frame that established its pastoral power and transformed them for governance in the present era. As discussed in chapter two, the state has not abandoned the mass line but has called on it and emphasized it from time to time in the reform period. The government deploys the notion of *suzhi* to catch all aspects of people's subjectivity, and expects to continue to guide people's improvement of *suzhi* for the development of individuals and the nation as a path to 'salvation.'

From the perspective of *suzhi*, not only the government but also village collectives and industrialists establish a moral frame through which they perceive and take action toward rural migrants. Although this morality does not belong to a communist ideology of examining and excluding enemies of revolution, it commonly frames rural migrants as low-*suzhi* people. In other words, the authorities' morality categorizes rural migrants as low-*suzhi* on the basis of their bodily features, e.g. shabby clothing, dusty appearance, dark skin, their behavior of spitting and squatting, and their poor socioeconomic conditions such as low income, education and skill. Through this moral frame, the authorities have frequently come to associate all rural migrants with problems in development. For instance, in many years, the government and public blame rural migrants for problems such as high crime rates and deteriorated sanitation in cities (Hang, 2010; Solinger, 1996; Wang, 2006; Yan, 2008; Zhang, 2001). The court's interpretation of some rural migrants as criminal suspects cited in the beginning of this chapter exposes the government's moral reasoning: since rural migrants are low-*suzhi* people, they might not be able to resist the temptation of high-end consumption and luxury, and thereby commit crimes. Thus, not only is it necessary for the government to promote all rural migrants' *suzhi* (at least in daily media and official promulgation), but also it must exclude those rural migrants who become corrupted in production and development. From the perspective of viewing rural migrants as low-*suzhi* people, all rural migrants may potentially violate the development of manufacturing towns through disturbing public security and production, the undesirable *lapsi* of China's development.

The second lasting influence of the CCP government's pastoral power lies in the succession and transformation of the governing technologies in Mao's era. My research

highlights two features of successive governing technologies from Mao's period: the *hukou* system and the mobilization of people's examination of others. Just as some institutions such as convict labor farms, local militia, and the Department of People's Armed Forces still currently exist, the *hukou* system has not disappeared in the reform era. More importantly, in the 1980s and 1990s, based on the policing of the masses through the *hukou* system in Mao's period, the government developed a new policing system of *hukou*-based tiered management across the nation (Wang, 2005). The organization of this management mainly included (1) agencies such as police bureaus and stations, and detention stations; (2) agents such as *hukou* police, community activists, e.g. street committee and residential committee members, and secret informants who report migrants' information to the police; and (3) rules such as the *hukou* system and the CRP (ibid.; Solinger, 1999; Zhang, 2001 p.108).<sup>69</sup> Certainly, the government greatly transformed the policing system through *hukou* reform, but it maintained a few correlations with the policing system in the people's commune. Although the government did not exclude rural migrants from cities as the Maoist government had done, it identified, targeted, and organized rural migrants in cities through the *hukou* system as it had enclosed and organized farmers in the people's commune. The government rarely mobilized the masses in various political campaigns as it had done in Mao's period. Nevertheless, it still selected community activists and secret informants from both local and non-local people, and mobilized them as quasi-government agents by rewarding them in the form of favors or cash (Wang, 2005). This was similar to how the CCP government had selected young farmers as core militia, and mobilized commune members to report others' thoughts and behaviors while rewarding them through commendation and promotion. In the exclusion of rural migrants as the *lapsi* of development, detention stations of the CRP and convict labor farms still functioned to detain rural migrants in fast urbanizing manufacturing towns.<sup>70</sup>

Regarding rural migrants as dangerous personnel, this *hukou*-based tiered management in operation divided, monitored, and controlled the rural migrants population (ibid. Solinger, 1999). For instance, it divided targeted populations into four broad tiers of dangerous people, generally controlled residents, monitored residents, and the general

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<sup>69</sup> See Wang (2005) or Chapter two for more information about the CRP.

<sup>70</sup> See my interviews about the exclusion of rural migrants in the 1980s and 1990s in chapter two.

population, with multiple sub-categories under each tier (Wang, 2005 p.105&106). As a ‘floating population’ and ‘blind flow’, rural migrants belong to the first three tiers under the surveillance of the policing system (ibid.). All rural migrants are potentially subject to police surveillance through the street examination of ID cards and household examination of compliance with family planning, as well as detention and exclusion through the CRP.

The practice of the *hukou*-based tiered management significantly decreased after the Sun Zhigang event on March 17, 2003. In the event, Sun Zhigang, a migrant college graduate, was detained and brutally beaten to death by police after he could not present his ID card when stopped by police (Chan, 2009; Pun, 2005; Wang, 2005). Soon after this event, the state abandoned mandatory police examination and the CRP across the nation, and, on June 20, 2003, issued a new policy of Administration for Relief for Urban Vagrants and Beggars that aimed at helping and assisting the poor in cities with more care (Wang, 2005).<sup>71</sup> As a result, nowadays, police cannot unconditionally examine rural migrants, e.g. their ID cards and status of family planning in public, and automatically detain, fine, or repatriate them, unless rural migrants have become homeless, paupers or criminals (ibid.).

However, the policing power controlling rural migrants does not vanish but continuously changes its form. One example is the management of streets by the Urban Administrative and Law Enforcement Bureau, which succeeds a portion of the policing power. As commonly understood in China, *chengguan* (law enforcers of this bureau) targets street peddlers, mostly rural migrants, examines them, and disperses those without vending licenses, occasionally coming into conflict with a few peddlers who resist the management of streets. Yet, these law enforcers implement their policing power on streets instead of other places such as rural migrants’ rental housing most of the time and only target peddlers instead of ordinary rural migrants. *Chengguan*’s power of controlling peddlers does not aim to accomplish the task of policing the majority of rural migrants in general.

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<sup>71</sup> Also see Measures for the Administration of Relief for Vagrants and Beggars Without Assured Living Sources in Cities, accessed on July 2, 2013, retrieved from [http://www.gov.cn/zwgc/2005-05/23/content\\_156.htm](http://www.gov.cn/zwgc/2005-05/23/content_156.htm)

In order to govern all rural migrants as safe personnel, local governments have to continuously transform the *hukou*-based tiered management and search for new approaches. The state calls for an ‘innovative social management’ and direct local government implementation (Liang, 2011, August 02; Wu, 2013, August 08; Xinhuanet, 2011, February 23). In doing so, the government is transforming both its moral frame of policing rural migrants and relevant governing technologies. As President Xi Jinping stresses that the ‘innovative social management’ is fundamentally mass work (Xinhuanet, *ibid.*), the state and local governments tend to seek proper moral elements from the mass line for strengthening the government/official-migrant relation.<sup>72</sup> Accordingly, local governments modify their moral frame regarding rural migrants as potential problems of development: they do not officially claim rural migrants as “blind flow” or criminal suspects and change rural migrants’ name of *nongmingong* into *xin shimin* or *xinguanren*, which my research discusses in chapter three. Thus, in its statement, the People’s Intermediate Court in Dongugan stresses that not all rural migrants but some of them may commit crimes (DIPC, 2008). In addition, as the director of the Guangdong Provincial Public Security Department stresses in the People’s Daily:

...provide every person, including floating population, in Guangdong basic public services and social security. This also embodies a major aspect of accomplishing mass work... We should treat floating population as brothers and family members in deed... and accomplish the tasks of serving and managing [rural migrants] with deep affection. (Liang, *ibid.*)

The government’s official statements are rhetorical to some degree. Nevertheless, they indicate that the government openly demonstrates an expected transformation of the morality that rationalizes the policing of rural migrants according to the mass line, instead of other moral frames such as neo-liberalism. While the government searches for new governing technologies for policing rural migrants, it might also retrieve previous governing technologies such as the masses’ examination of others under the government’s pastoral

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<sup>72</sup> Mass work refers to the practices of the mass line strategy. See chapter two for more information about mass work.

power. By doing so, the government attempts to secure rural migrants' population by excluding undesired rural migrants with low-*suzhi* that could endanger development.

Chinese major media reports indicate that local governments in some major cities have launched their implementation of the 'innovative social management' of rural migrants. These cities commonly initiate three approaches of governing rural migrants by creating governable spaces. First, cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen are carrying out a grid management (Beijing Daily, 2011, June 02; Qiushi, 2010, September 03; Southern Daily, 2011, September 26; Wu, 2013, August 08; Xinhuanet, 2011, December 08). The government divides areas such as urban communities and villages into management cells in a grid, and assigns special personnel such as party members, police, auxiliary police, and managers to management cells. For instance, in 2004, the Dongcheng District in Beijing divided 137 urban communities into 589 management cells under the four tiers of the district government, neighborhood offices, community committees, and responsive agents charge (Wu, 2013, August 08). Each cell was equipped with "seven forces": grid cell managers, grid cell assistants, grid cell police officers, grid cell supervisors, grid cell communist party secretary, grid cell legal judiciary workers, and grid cell firefighters (*ibid.*). Second, regarding certain territories such as residences and factories in management cells, the government implemented new scientific technologies to monitor rural migrants and these territories, and digitalizes and input their information into data centers for further analysis (Qiushi, 2010, September 03; Wu, 2013, August 08). For instance, in Shenzhen, the government improves the standardization of information from the Street petition and Stability Center by registering all rental housing and reinforcing the registration and management of the floating population (Qiushi, *ibid.*).

Third, the government mobilizes society including selected local people and rural migrants in multiple programs to directly interact with and govern rural migrants, and thereby reinforce the 'innovative social management' (Beijing Daily, 2011, June 02; Southern Daily, 2011, September 26; Xinhuanet, 2011, December 08). For instance, in Dongcheng District, Beijing, community committees select "leaders in buildings" from either local or non-local people to promulgate policies, collect residents' information, manage

buildings, and communicate with, organize, monitor, as well as negotiate between residents in their buildings (Beijing Daily, *ibid.*). These committees connect the 34,210 “leaders in buildings” through new information technologies such as text messages, internet, and community information centers. In Sanyuanli Urban Community, Guangzhou, the community committee forms a rural migrant CCP branch that communicates and coordinates with over-10,000 rural migrants, and builds networks through these rural migrants’ local culture (Southern Daily, *ibid.*). In villages of Shenzhen, the government organizes masses including rural migrants in patrolling villages, especially remote areas where the police seldom reach (Qiushi, *ibid.*). Local governments tend to mobilize both local people and rural migrants, select some of them as the governments’ quasi agents such as informants and activists to govern rural migrants’ communities with the operation of the other two approaches. By doing so, these governments in the cases of media reports above claim that the results, e.g. decrease of crimes and the stabilization of rural migrants’ communities, are effective and positive.

In Dongguan, the government has also launched, implemented, and worked to improve its new social management of rural migrants. Soon after the Sun Zhigang event, the government of Dongguan separated the program of rental housing management from the Dongguan Police Bureau and directly operated this program with 15 bureaus such as the Fire Protection Bureau together (XSMB, 2008). Since 2008, the government has assigned this program to the XinGuanRen Service and Management Bureau (XSMB) (*ibid.*). The XSMB continuously improves this program through approaches that are “[In task two] to organize the management of *xinguanren* and rental housing in Dongguan, research the management and development proposals, implement management, and examine implementation” (*ibid.*). The XSMB takes charge of other relevant tasks. It directs the governance of rural migrants in towns (or urban districts) and villages (or urban communities), trains personnel and management teams, promulgates relevant policies for rural migrants and the management of rental housing, and carries out relevant field studies and research. In addition, it assists other government bureaus to maintain public security, and manage taxation and registration of

rental housing, family planning, *hukou* registration, the TRC, and a redevelopment of rental apartment buildings.<sup>73</sup>

Since the XSMB intends to reinforce the program of rental housing management with a new program through which the government can govern rural migrants while managing rental housing, my research identifies this new program as a means of governing rural migrants through managing rental housing. The government intends to govern rural migrants through several tasks such as collecting rural migrants' information and the information of rental buildings, installing devices such as surveillance cameras in rental housing, and developing model residences. While other local governments are developing rural migrants' model compounds as mentioned above, the XSMB is also establishing similar compounds for the new program. By July 2010, it had established 24 model compounds and was transforming 18 more.<sup>74</sup> By late 2011, it had established 43 model compounds (People's Daily, 2011, August 02). The government is likely to establish more model compounds in order to govern rural migrants by turning rental housing into governable spaces across Dongguan.

The government of Dongguan also propagates several model compounds such as the Jinyulin *xinguanren* Residential Compound. In the compound, the government operates governing technologies such as digital surveillance and services for rural migrants:

[The government] built one 160-meter wall enclosing the compound, set up three pavilions by entrances...25 surveillance cameras by the entrances and main alleys in the compound, and requested each apartment building to install at least one surveillance camera... individual inspection system were reconfigured and connected with the city inspection center. This integrated the total 338 surveillance cameras into a 24-hour and panoptic network of inspection...In the compound...there is an around 70-square-meter office which includes multi-function of office, fee payment, inspection, reading and other activities for the purpose of serving *xinguanren*. (Hong, 2009, June 06)

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<sup>73</sup> See XSMB (2008&2009, August 07) for more details.

<sup>74</sup> See XSMB (2010), accessed on July 2, 2013, retrieved from <http://dngxgr.dg.gov.cn/6637.html>

The master plan of the compound in Figure 5.1 indicates the locations of pavilions, the office and surveillance cameras. In particular, the plan highlights the three cameras that the government installs on the western wall for inspecting the three main alleys. The government claims that the digital inspection system is effective in eliminating crimes: using the system, the government noticed and resolved 188 crimes and accidents and seized 102 criminal suspects in the city (ibid.).


In short, the government has established its policing system targeting farmers or rural migrants so that it can exclude undesirable ones and secure the rest. The authorities' moral frame of governmentality differentiates undesirable and desirable migrants. In Mao's period, the CCP government carried out the mass line and class struggle to exclude various types of "enemies" endangering revolution. In an analogy to the pastorate's examination and exclusion of the *lapsi*, the policing system in the people's commune investigated farmers, organized them in examination of others, required self-examination, and excluded dangerous ones as the "*lapsi*" of revolution. In the reform, even though the communist ideology and revolution faded away, government and the public commonly regard rural migrants as low-*suzhi* people, e.g. a "blind flow" endangering the development of individuals and the nation. Succeeding governing technologies such as the *hukou* system and the mobilization of the masses' examination of others in Mao's period, the *hukou*-based tiered management targeted all rural migrants and could exclude any of them at the first sign of trouble based on the monitoring of police, activists and informants.

Nowadays, the state and local governments appear to be retrieving the mass line and strengthen it in order to eliminate the moral basis for discriminating against all rural migrants as dangerous personnel in cities. Nevertheless, in the process of transforming its morality, the government inevitably targets some rural migrants who might endanger either the ideals of "happiness" and "harmony" promised by the mass line, or the *suzhi* development of individuals and the nation. Rural migrants' social unrest is one problem that the government encounters in achieving its ideals and development, and the government still suggests in its statements and actions the rural migrants' low *suzhi* seduces some rural migrants into crimes. Thus, it is necessary for the government to target these hidden and undesirable rural migrants

as the “*lapsi*” of a continuous development in order to secure development for the rest of society (including other rural migrants). In doing so, the government is searching for new governing technologies in the ‘innovative social management’ to fill in the vacancy that the mostly abandoned *hukou*-based tiered management creates.

The development of model compounds in Dongguan partially reflects Foucault’s theory of Panopticism. According to Foucault (1975/1979), Panopticism involves four major aspects: (1) partition of individuals into separated spaces such as prison cells and military camps which are self-enclosed; (2) hierarchical observation of individuals at every point in space from a panoptic center; (3) ceaseless observation and inspection of these individuals; and (4) individuals’ own vigilance in pursuing the authorities’ objectives, e.g. purification of inmates’ souls (ibid.). In the Jinyuling *xinguanren* Rural Migrants’ Compound, the two authorities of the government and village collectives construct enclosed walls to separate rural migrant tenants from outside where crimes are prevalent, but do not constrain tenants’ physical movements inside the compound. Furthermore the authorities install surveillance pavilions, cameras and a monitoring room to gaze at people within the compound. In the following, my research scrutinizes a model compound, and the authorities’ major policing program—the governance of rural migrants by managing rental housing—through the lens of Panopticism.

Table 5.1 Master Plan of the Jinyulin *xinguanren* Residential Community



Source: Developed from photo by the author

## II. Entering a Rural Migrants' Residential Compound in the Village

For two months I lived in a rural migrant residential compound. In this time, I interacted with rural migrants on a daily basis, befriending many of them, observing their everyday life, and finally interviewing them. In the compound, I rented a tiny room for 25 *yuan* per day from Mrs. Zhang, a woman in her 50s living with her daughter and granddaughter. Mrs. Zhang came to Dongguan over 20 years ago from Guizhou, a poor, southwestern province. Just like most of her rural migrant tenants, she worked in a shoe-making factory in the village when she was young and first arrived in the city. After a few years, Mrs. Zhang, by then divorced and getting older, recognized that she could not endure the intensive labor in her factory and raise her daughter, Glow, at the same time. Thereafter, she leased two apartment buildings from indigenous villagers

who own the buildings, and began renting them to other rural migrants in 2005. Nowadays, roughly 40 rural migrant households like Mrs. Zhang's family are renting their leased apartment buildings in the compound to other rural migrants working in factories nearby. The government calls Mrs. Zhang and other rural migrants who engage in this practice secondary landlords (*e'shou fangdong*).

Glow recently quit her factory job to look after her family's rental business and take care of her own daughter. Glow first came to the village when she was in junior high school and, as many temporary migrants in the city, had shuffled back and forth between Guizhou and Dongguan for several years. Without finishing high school, she entered her mother's shoe-making factory. After joining in her family rental businesses, she converted the building entrance into her bedroom and office. She put a bed underneath the stairs at the entrance level, and lived there most of the time. She also placed a chair and a desk by the bed and worked there as a clerk of the rental building. Sometimes, she or her mother will sit down in a narrow alley in front of her apartment building, chat with people and play with her daughter while watching the entrance of the building. As other secondary landlords, Glow placed several plastic chairs and a dilapidated sofa in the alley for her tenants and friends' daily chat. A few of her tenants liked to rest in the sofa for a while after working all day long and before going back to their apartments. Taking advantage of the small gathering place in some alleys, I often sat with rural migrants and joined in their conversations to understand their lives in the compound better. After several weeks, I grew familiar with some other secondary landlords such as Mr. Wang and his family from Sichuan province that managed three apartment buildings.

Similar to Mrs. Zhang and Mr. Wang, most secondary landlords are from the first generation of rural migrants who migrated to Guangdong in the early years of reform. These secondary landlords are in their middle ages and have less physical power and more life experience than young rural migrants working in factories. In many respects, it is an ideal scenario for many of the first generation of rural migrants. From Mrs. Zhang and Mr. Wang's description, the rental business does not guarantee higher income than factory jobs. However, it does offer them more freedom: they are their own "bosses" and can manage their time themselves, although they still work as hard as other rural migrants. At 6:00am in the morning,

they usually get up and prepare for their business of checking housing security or selling breakfast when their tenants wake up to go to work. At noon, they often take a one-to-two hour nap and then continue to work until 1:00am to 2:00am after all their tenants come back.

One night, around 10:00pm, Glow set up a folding table by the entrance, put two large notebooks on the top of the table and checked off a list of her tenants when they returned to the building. When I happened to pass by, she invited me to chat with her.

“College Student<sup>75</sup>, come and sit here”, she invited me.

“Ok, boss,” I replied and sat down beside her while she stopped her tenants and asked them to register personal information in her notebooks.

“Wait a minute. You live in room 401, do you not? Come here and register your name, age, ID card number and household information... I also need your two portrait photos,” Glow stopped a middle-aged man with a bundle of spring onions in his hand.

The man swung the spring onion in front of Glow and replied, “I have no ID card with me now. I will take it with me tomorrow... I am in a hurry to go back home to make noodles, take a quick shower, and sleep. I have to get up very early to work tomorrow. You know this...”

“You guys cannot do things like this and must hurry with the registration. The village police team (*zhi'andui*) urges me to submit the two notebooks tomorrow. Go and get your ID card and your photos upstairs and come back soon,” Glow raised her voice while some tenants were around her.

After a while, when her tenants left, Glow started to chat with me and said, “...in fact, tomorrow is not the deadline but I have to push my tenants. Otherwise, when they work all day long in the factory, they may forget to register their personal information. The village police team is pushing hard on us to collect all tenants' information in residences. They can examine the two registration notebooks at any time...”

...

“Do you get paid for this by the village?” I asked

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<sup>75</sup> Glow and other secondary landlords call me “College Student” because there are only rural migrants with low education in the compound. I am their first tenant studying in a university.

“How could this happen?” Glow smiled to me with a surprise in her face.

Under the government’s command, the village collective directs secondary landlords to assist in the enforcement and policing of rural migrants. According to the requirement of the village police team, secondary landlords such as Glow and Mr. Wang are registering their tenants’ information. In an interview with him, Mr. Wang told me his “mission impossible”: the village collective planned to require secondary landlords to digitalize rural migrants’ information but he did not have the skill of typing Chinese characters in computers. “I can only ask for my thirteen-year-old son’s help. He plays computer games a lot...” Mr. Wang said to me with a wry smile. In an interview with a town government official with the XSMB, she told me that the bureau usually coordinates unified actions of managing rural migrants with many other bureaus/government offices such as the Public Security Bureau, the Labor Bureau and the Civil Affair Bureau of the town.

Rural migrants’ rental residential compounds, which indigenous villagers develop, have become the major site for examination of migrants by the government and village collectives in recent years to supplement government inspection of identity cards, and industrialists’ management in factories (DPSB, (2012, December 29; XSMB, 2013, February 04). Government agents such as officials in the XSMB and city/town police occasionally examine some rural migrants’ rental residences. Village collectives directly enforce the management within their rental housing through village police teams’ supervision of secondary landlords and other rural migrants. Glow, Mr. Wang and other secondary landlords are obligated to quickly register all requested information about their rural migrant tenants and rental housing, and then report to village police teams. The government aims at integrating and synthesizing the governance of rural migrants with the management of spaces, e.g. rental residential compounds, in manufacturing towns.

### **III. Development and Urban Form of the Rural Migrants’ Compound**

Indigenous villagers collectively develop their farmland, and individually build and lease their buildings to rural migrant secondary landlords in the village. Before the compound on which my research focuses was built, the construction site was a piece of lychee land. Mrs. Zhang's family used to live in the lychee land that non-local farmers rented from the village collective. She did not like to live in the factory dormitory because she thought that her factory life was like a prison. Workers were not allowed to leave the factory compound without permission from security guards and were frequently forced to speak with visitors through a fence. Building a shed by themselves and sharing water from a well with the farmers, Mrs. Zhang could leave the factory at night and live with her family in the lychee land. Her family could not rent apartments outside the factory, because, in the 1980s and early 1990s, few indigenous villagers developed rental housing.

Around the middle of the 1990s, village collectives and individual village households started to develop rural land and rental housing in the village. Under the loosening control of town governments, village collectives had full control of developing its land until recent years (Hsing, 2012). The town and the village had no comprehensive planning until early 2000. Thus, the village collective controlled the process of plotting land, selling and distributing land parcels to households. Then indigenous villagers individually hired contractors to construct apartment buildings.

In developing the compound, in the late 1990s, the village collective divided the lychee land in a grid and sold indigenous villagers land parcels while lowering the land price to a few households according to their social status. Some indigenous villagers told me that they purchased rural land at a price of 3,500 *yuan* per *mu* reflecting agrarian land prices while the village committee permitted households with veterans to pay 2,500 *yuan* per *mu*. They told me that a few village cadres received better parcels near main streets or entrances to the village. In addition, some other indigenous villagers told me that when disputes occurred between households in a clanship, the village collective might ask these households to select parcels through drawing lots. The household winning the lot took the better parcel. Then indigenous villagers hired non-local contractors to construct apartment buildings. Usually, a contractor worked for multiple households using one blueprint. Thus, new buildings in the village were

nearly identical to each other. Quickly, indigenous villagers developed over 90 five-to-seven story apartment buildings. These buildings were not walled, but were closely arrayed in a grid for saving space.

In 2009, several powerful villagers including two village party secretaries (village committee directors) and two very rich brothers purchased a piece of adjacent land from a Hong Kong investor who had leased the land from the village collective since the early reform. These villagers built newer and higher apartment buildings than existing ones, although they already developed their own land in 2002. This increased the total number of buildings to over 100 and expanded the compound closer to the retail street. When indigenous villagers had more money, they usually liked to increase their investment in residential buildings. This incremental and individual housing development prevailed in the village and is still ongoing today. Some indigenous villagers have developed another rental residential compound by the grand road in recent years. During my field studies, an indigenous villager was adding two more stories above his five-story building. The villager hired several workers to carry bricks, cement and sand by a lift simply made up of a rope, a winding engine and a basket. They were crafting walls and floors by hand, and would probably take no longer than one or two months to complete. It was a simple and fast process for indigenous villagers to develop rental housing in their rural land.

As the inflow of rural migrants grew into the millions, villages throughout Dongguan developed their own rental housing market in the 1990s. This market attracts a great number of rural migrants who temporarily live in these compounds. Based on my own calculations, the compounds in the village I studied can accommodate at least half of the 15,000 rural migrants in the village. In the residential compound, indigenous villagers lease all of their buildings to secondary landlords who pay indigenous villagers a lump sum of annual rental plus a security fee, manage the buildings, and rent single-room apartments to other rural migrants. Rural migrant couples and young rural migrants like to rent rooms in these compounds and leave factory dormitories for obtaining more privacy and freedom: in my interviews, they always tell me that it is a simple reason for them to live in the residence in order to stay away from factory management and enjoy their own time after work. These residential compounds are also places

for rural migrant job seekers to have lodgings. These job seekers usually stay for a couple of days and decide to remain or move on, depending on whether or not they can find a.

Indigenous villagers' self-development creates a unique urban form of the compound with the features of free entry and exit, a hierarchical circulation, self-enclosed shop houses, and limited public space. First, unlike other Chinese residences such as *danwei* (work unit) compounds and urban communities (*juzhu xiaoqu*), this rural migrants' residential compound and many similar ones in the town do not consist of continuous walls enclosing the compounds. The village collective does not plan to build a wall for rural migrants. In fact, indigenous villagers have completely developed this piece of lychee land without leaving room to build an enclosing wall. All apartment buildings on the periphery of the compound are built out to the sidewalks of village roads without any buffer areas such as meadows. Without a wall, there are no gates and security guards, which are common in other types of Chinese residential compounds. However, few entrances of apartment buildings on the periphery of the compound open outward onto village streets but inward towards the compound. The compound, with buildings so close to each other, in a way, encloses itself.

Second, when the village collective divided the lychee land into parcels, they also defined a circulation system in a grid for the compound. The circulation is a hierarchical system, which includes streets, alleys and service alleys (Figure 5.2, 5.3 & 5.4). Several streets (they are the three horizontal and widest paths in Figure 5.2) cut through the whole compound and connect it with outside roads. These streets are around eight meters wide, access both the entrances of apartment buildings and retail shops, and support the major transportation of vehicles and pedestrians. Alleys (they are the vertical paths, most of which are narrower than streets, in Figure 5.2) are the main place for rural migrants' social activities in the compound. They perpendicularly connect with streets. In comparison with the three streets, alleys are usually narrower, less accessible, and only serve pedestrians instead of vehicles. An alley is usually around five meters wide and a few retail storefronts open onto the alleys. Alleys do not cut through the compound from one side to the other or connect with two or more village roads outside the compound. Therefore, few vehicles pass through. This gives rise to rural migrants' usage of the alleys for a number of daily activities. In a few alleys, some secondary landlords

such as Mr. Wang and Mrs. Zhang like to place potted plants and chairs for tenants' to rest and chat. Mrs. Zhang and Glow even added a canopy to cover their alley. Some others make simple kitchens out of a table, a stove and a steel gas tank. Service alleys are gaps in-between two buildings. With a width of half-to-one meter, they are the narrowest part of the circulation system. They are so narrow that only limited sunlight and airflow can enter.

Third, all apartment buildings in the compound are the same type of shop houses: convenience stores or restaurants opened by rural migrants occupy the first floor, and a staircase leads to the residential units; at upper levels are apartments that are usually single rooms with a bedroom and a bathroom (Figure 5.2 b). The form of each building is like a five-to-seven-story box that designed to extrude from the bottom to the top floor. Upper floor plans are usually the same. Each building's footprint is around eight-by-fifteen meters. Each building has only one staircase as its entrance to apartments. This stair leads to interior corridors in-between two lines of single-room apartments with similar sizes.

The apartment buildings become self-enclosed due to incremental efforts. Landlords install aluminum bars outside most windows and some balconies to protect against thieves. On lower stories, frosted windows block views from outside the building. Some tenants on upper stories cover their windows with newspaper from the interior. The entrance doors of apartment buildings are steel anti-thief doors with electronic-sensor locks. In several new apartment buildings built in 2009, landlords installed an anti-thief door for each apartment. In the room I rented, frosted windows directly face the windows of the building across the half-to-one meter service alley. I have to keep my windows closed at all times. There is little communication between inside and outside of these apartment buildings.

As a result, the urban form of this compound in a way isolates rural migrants from each other and reduces their social interaction. Anyone can freely enter, exit, and move around the public space of the compound. However, the urban form limits rural migrant tenants' social interaction with each other. In the compound, there is no community hall, public rooms, playgrounds, lawns, or other facilities/amenities for activities of communities, which are common in other types of residential compounds in China. Self-enclosed apartment buildings

prevent rural migrants' communication between indoor and outdoor spaces. Because of bypassing vehicles, rural migrants drop by shops but seldom sit and stay for a long time in streets. Most of the time, the residential compound is almost empty: rural migrants usually work all day long until 9:30pm from Monday to Saturday. Only on Saturday night and on Sunday do rural migrants socialize in the compound. However, many rural migrants still choose to stay in their rooms instead of hanging around outside after work. This is probably because they either are tired or feel bored of the streets and alleys. When I lived in the compound, I recognized that many tenants came in and out of apartment buildings but rarely stayed outside. Thus, alleys are the only place for rural migrants' social interaction. In a few alleys, rural migrants may rest, chat and occasionally pay to play pool or *majiang*, which secondary landlords and storeowners set up. Other alleys are merely concrete paths with several trash bins. In addition, these alleys accommodating rural migrants' social interaction are not connected. Apartment buildings and streets separate these alleys into isolated public spaces where a few rural migrants gather.


In Dongguan, not all rural migrants' rental residential compounds are the same as the one in this research but they are similar to each other. Some of them are not as developed or organized in a grid. Some compounds follow patterns of physical geography shaped by the terrain of hills and boundaries of fishponds. A few of them consist of enclosed walls. But due to village collectives' self-development, most rural migrants' compounds, in a way, have the set of urban form discussed above. As discussed before, self-development is relatively low cost, unplanned, incremental, and geared toward short-term profit seeking. Therefore, indigenous villagers do not organize enclosed walls for the compounds to reduce cost, maximize the built-up space, minimize the development of public space, and minimize the width of the circulation system as demonstrated by service alleys.

The isolation of rural migrants' social interaction through the urban form of the residential compound, to some degree, is the result of the partition and allocation of human bodies in Panopticism. In the Panopticon, the architectural form partitions and allocates individual inmates into single cells to stop their interaction (Foucault, 1975/1979). Unlike the Panopticon, the compound does not constrain rural migrants' physical movements. Similar to but much larger than the Panopticon, the urban form of the compound reduces and separates

thousands of rural migrants' social interactions into a few separated pocket-like alleys as well as self-enclosed single apartment rooms. The urban form minimalizes rural migrants' communities. In daily conversation with one secondary landlord, I asked her why all the secondary landlords did not organize to build an enclosing wall in order to reduce crimes in the compound. Her answer surprised me but was reasonable, "This cannot happen at all. We do not know each other and don't get along with each other very well, and some of us are jealous of each other because of the competition of the rental business". There might be many reasons, e.g. competition and cultural differences explain why thousands of rural migrants in the compound cannot form a community. One major reason is the set of urban form that reinforce rural migrants' status as strangers who "do not know each other and don't get along with each other", even though rural migrants can make social connections through kinships and regionalism.


In addition, the partition and allocation of rural migrants in the compound facilitate two types of gazes. The first type is the criminal's gaze. Petty thieves and other criminals target individual rural migrants living in the compound and crimes alerts rural migrants and authorities to the need for public security. The urban form of the compound largely separates individual tenants from socially interacting with each other, but does not constrains anyone's entry, and thereby allows ubiquitous crimes to readily beset tenants. The other type of gazes come from the government, village collectives and rural migrants, and targets criminals. As my research will discuss in the following section, both gazes, especially the second one, are directed toward individual rural migrants for conducting them as potential factory labor.

Figure 5.2 Plan of the Rural Migrants' Residential Compound




Source: Developed from photos which the village collective exhibits in public

Figure 5.3 Diagram of the Circulation System and Floor plans of a Typical Apartment Building



(a) The Circulation System of a rural migrants' Rental Residential Compound



(b) First and Second Floor Plans of a Typical Apartment Building in the Residential Compound

Source: Drawings by the author

Figure 5.4 Hierarchical Circulation System in Rural Migrants' Residential Compounds



(a). Street



(b). Service Alley



(c). Alley

Alleys are popular places of rural migrant tenants' social activities. When most adults work in factories in the day, rural migrant children and elders socialize in allies.

Source: Photos by the author

## **IV. Governance of Rural Migrants through Managing Rental Housing**

In the governance of rural migrants through managing rental housing, the government of Dongguan focuses on several tasks including collecting rural migrants' information, collecting information on rental buildings, installing devices such as surveillance cameras in rental buildings, and developing model residences. Out of the village's four residential compounds, the government has chosen one to test its new governance techniques. In the process of the test, the government commands the village police team to directly implement tasks, and supervises secondary landlords assistance to the governance.

### **A. Crimes as a Problem for both Rural Migrants and the Government**

Even though rural migrants gain more freedom by temporarily escaping from factory discipline in rental housing, they encounter ubiquitous crimes, e.g. petty crimes, in their residential compounds. Occasionally, serious crimes such as robberies and murders may suddenly occur in compounds of the village as well. As discussed in chapter three, crimes in manufacturing towns have always been a problem for both rural migrants and the government. In the circumstances of a high crime rate, rental housing is very likely to be the place where crimes occur more frequently than other places. As the XSMB highlights, "The pressure on public security is heavy... In recent years, over 90% of penal crimes and other crimes violating public security are related to floating population and rental housing" (XSMB, 2008 p.352).<sup>76</sup> Encountering this problem, rural migrants suffer from petty crimes while the government correlates rural migrants, rental housing, and crime, and especially pays attention to serious crimes and rural migrants' unrest, which can easily violate public security and the development of these towns.

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<sup>76</sup> The XSMB's data might not be exaggerated. According to the town police's posters that I collect, around 19% murders and 5% penal crimes happened in rental housing of the town in 2011. Nevertheless, petty crimes are prevalent in the compound through my observation.

Petty crimes are a part of rural migrants' everyday life. Although detailed statistical data about crimes in Dongguan are not available, I continuously observed petty crimes in the residential compound. The day I rented Mrs. Zhang's room, she warned me to watch out for burglars. After she showed me a room, she said, "Be aware of those "fishing people" (*diaoyu de*)." Watching my confused face, she explained to me what "fishing" means:

"Put your belongings away from windows. Burglars like to drop in the compound after mid-night. They usually climb up to the second floor and use a fishing pole or similar tools to pick tenants' wallets or other belongings up and take them away..."

In the early morning of the second day, I passed by Mr. Wang's building after I went out for breakfast. A group of people was checking a video recorded by his surveillance camera. I chatted with a few people to see what had happened. Mr. Wang told me that several people driving a minibus stole his dog. Driving the mini-bus, criminals took his dog away in seconds before the Wang family could react to stop them. Mr. Wang's wife told me several times that she could not sleep well for a long time after her dog was stolen. "This horrific life will not stop until my death," she lamented to me.

Two days later, three households in Mrs. Zhang's building lost their computers. Thieves broke in by twisting the iron-sheet doors of the migrants' rooms. Again, after one week, I heard that more than ten households lost their computers in another apartment building one early afternoon when most tenants were absent. A surveillance camera recorded a couple of young males driving a minibus to the entrance of that building at noon. One of them guarded the entrance while others were moving computers one by one into the minibus.

There are other types of petty crimes such as simple assaults and brawls in the compound. I witnessed rural migrants suffer from these continuous petty crimes. Once, I was walking to a small restaurant to have lunch. A fight between a young worker and a group of four to five young rural migrants suddenly took place. The group of people surrounded the young worker. Shouting at the young worker not to resist or shout, each person in the group struck his head with a bottle of beer. After three or four strikes, this young worker's head was covered with blood. In seconds, people in the compound crowded the streets and alleys, surrounding the attackers but keeping a distance from them. Scared by the bloody scene, no

one dared to stop the fight or call police until the group of people let the young worker go away. Later, some witnesses told me that it was a fight between two conflicting groups of workers in a factory near the compound. Fear of theft and violence burdens people in the compound, yet they continue to endure it in their everyday life.

Serious crimes also happen in the village and other parts of the town. During my field studies, I heard that a man hacked his wife to death in front of a factory's main entrance by the compound because she was divorcing him. Several gangsters chased a man and killed him several years ago because he got lost, and could not get out the compound. In my last trip to the compound in 2013, I heard that a young woman rural migrant was murdered in another residential compound in the village. In addition, the topic of crimes and workers' suicides is not rare in tenants' daily chat. All of these make the compound and the other three similar to this one unsafe places to live.

My research highlights the compounds as unsafe residences ubiquitous with crime, accidents and fear embedded in residents' minds. This is not because I want to carry out a criminological analysis of these crimes. Rather, my research stresses that escalating crimes and accidents become a big problem to the government. In addition, Dongguan also encounters the social unrests, strikes and labor disputes related to rural migrants that are soaring across the country nowadays (China Labor Bulletin, 2009; Butollo & Brink, 2012). As the DIPC (2008, p.278) indicates, "Labor disputes are apparently increasing... the number of labor disputes filed to the court was less than 600 in 2000 but it increased to close to 4,000 in 2005... In 2006 ...it increases to 5,894."

More than petty crimes, serious crimes and accidents concern the government due to the belief that these serious crimes and accidents can prevent Dongguan from further development by violating social stability and disrupting manufacturing production. The DIPC declares the government's great concern:

The situation of public security in Dongguan seriously violates social stability and hinders a further economic development to some degree. Therefore, the party secretary of Dongguan...points out, 'we must indeed make unchangeable decisions,

operate our iron-like fists and wrists, and carry out the most severe approaches to stabilize public security. This is fundamental and unshakable...” (ibid. p.286)

The statement of XSMB about the heavy pressure on public security above implies that the government perceives a strong correlation between public security and these serious crimes in relation to rural migrants (XSMB, 2008 p.352). Thereby, the government develops the program of managing rental housing and implements it to target and govern rural migrants.

## **B. Investigation of Rural Migrants through Registration**

After the Sun Zhigang event in 2003, the state has abandoned the crude CRP, and police do not directly monitor and examine rural migrants, or detain those who cannot present their ID cards or TRCs in public. In order to fill the vacuum of examining rural migrants, the government of Dongguan has been developing and enforcing a local registration system that derives from the previous *hukou*-based registration of temporary residents. Before the early 2000s, the registration based on *hukou* required rural migrants to submit their household and temporary addresses to local police (Figure 5.1). Local governments requested rural migrants who stayed longer than three months to take relevant documents and register (Wang, 2005). Landlords were expected to bring migrant tenants to register and apply for TRCs at police bureaus or stations, but many rural migrants apply for their TRCs only if necessary [for instance, police alerted them to street examination or examined their friends or neighbors] (ibid.). When many rural migrants did not apply for their TRCs, it was difficult for the government to collect rural migrants’ information.

The new local registration system adopts the previous registration system, but loosens its connection with *hukou* (ID cards or TRCs). Instead, it reinforces the connection between rural migrants’ registration of their personal information and rental housing. It requests rural migrants to submit their information about households, temporary residences, employment, family planning, health, responsible persons, and commercial activities (Table 5.2). It is

mandatory for rural migrants to register their temporary residential information such as temporary addresses, dates of arrival, and dates of temporary residencies. When many rural migrants choose to live outside factories, the government requests landlords to directly enforce registration rather than only bring their tenants to police bureaus or stations. Assigned personnel who are secondary landlords collect and analyze the information in order to govern rural migrants by examining the relation between rural migrants and the space of rental housing. In the scene above, Glow followed the registration instructions by asking her tenants to provide their information plus individual photos, and compiling them in notebooks. Glow was then obligated to submit her registration forms to the village police team.

In addition, secondary landlords also submit information on rental housing such as building conditions, numbers of stories and rooms, and personal information of landlords, secondary landlords (managers), and renters to the village police team (Table 5.3). By doing so, village police teams collect information on rural migrants and their residences, and submit it to the XSMB of towns where it is reorganized and digitalized before being sent to the XSMB of Dongguan.

The government and village collectives identify the new program as a means to target crime suspects. The registration system classifies criminal suspects into five types of population for use by law enforcement such as the PSB and the XSMB. The five types of population include rural migrants: (1) without legal identities such as ID cards or temporary living cards (TLC), (2) without stable living addresses, e.g. at least a rental residence, (3) without stable jobs or income, (4) unemployed former criminals, (5) reported criminal suspects. A unified law enforcement system of the XSMB, the PSB, the Labor Bureau, village police teams and other government agencies can target any rural migrant who belongs to one of the five types.

With the information on both rural migrant tenants and rental housing, the registration system can associate the five types of rural migrants with rental housing. One example is the classification of rental housing. On the wall of Glow, Mrs. Zhang and Mr. Wang's apartment buildings are nailed small green signs: if none of the five types are found to live in an

apartment building, the building is marked with a green sign. Otherwise, buildings might be marked red signs as warnings to renters and police according to secondary landlords' claims.<sup>77</sup> The green and red signs classify rental housing into two types: the qualified and disqualified with respect to either tenants' status or the status of secondary landlords' management of rental housing. Thereafter, the authorities can more precisely target rural migrants according to classified rental housing.

More importantly and effectively, the XSMB of Dongguan enacts its local registration and associates the information on both rural migrants and rental housing by establishing an information platform. This platform is a central data center with the collection of rural migrants' information for facilitating registration. The government indicates, "[it] standardizes the management of an information platform...until now and through continuous input of rural migrants' information, this platform can compare the information between rental residences and tenants" (XSMB, 2008, p.354). A XSMB official of a town explained to me what the platform is, how it works, and how it is implemented:

This information platform is a means of dividing the governance of rural migrants from [direct] law enforcement of police departments. The platform collects information about rental housing, the secondary landlord, rural migrant tenants and their friends...basically, it uses software called "*xinguanren* information platform" for inputting, sorting and profiling data. Data are collected in a bottom-up order. Each village collects its own data and submits them to us. Villages have no right to change any information in the data but report it to the town, and we sort them into the computer and report to the city that gathers and filters all data in the center... We just follow the decision making from the city... Therefore, even if a rural migrant moves from one town to another, this platform can still record his information. We can trace them for any law enforcement agency and our bureau can collaborate with as many as sixteen bureaus or government offices to carry out a unified action.

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<sup>77</sup> In fact, I rarely found apartment buildings marked red signs in the compound and another compound nearby. This might be because the compound is model residences or because both indigenous villagers and secondary landlords refuse to mark red signs which can greatly impact their rental business.

The XSMB aims at collecting every rural migrant's information associated with the information of their rental buildings in order to trace rural migrants' latest location and their physical movement in Dongguan. "From 2007 to July 2010, the XSMB collected 372,000 pieces of information [on tenants/rental housing] and removed 65,365 pieces of information about rental houses/apartments. It also collected 4.48 million pieces of information and removed 1.96 million pieces of information about tenants..." (XSMB, 2010).

For data collection of the platform, the government establishes a hierarchical system for administration of the city, towns and villages. The XSMB of Dongguan designs relevant policies and centrally manages the platform. The XSMB of towns input all collected data into the platform, codes them and organizes the enforcement of data collection with the village. Through village police teams, village collectives supervise secondary landlords who directly collect information in each apartment building. This is the reason that Glow sit in front of her building entrance to register all her tenants for the village collective. Under the village police team's supervision and coercion, she has to collect her tenants' information carefully.

To ensure secondary landlords' cooperation with the government, the government guides them through training and commends excellent ones. The government trains secondary landlords how to manage their rental housing and tenants. "In the first half year of 2010, the XSMB organized 149 training workshops for secondary landlords and trained 21,270 of them" (XSMB, 2010). A town in Dongguan selects excellent secondary landlords as government informants who report any of their tenants' abnormal behavior or potential harm to public security (Nanfang Daily, 2011 November 21). The town government awards these informants prizes or excellent titles.

The authorities demonstrate their care for rural migrants and require their complete compliance with registration. For instance, most law enforcement notices and posters start with the sentence "for decreasing the crime rates in your residences, for safe rental residences or for benefiting rural migrants' convenience, the government will implement..." For mobilizing rural migrants in the compound to attend to their registration, the village police team redecorates its police station by the compound and changes the title on its plaque from

Police Station to Communication Point of Police and Masses. The authorities attempt to enact the application of the mass line to increase rural migrants' compliance with registration.

Thus, the government has been establishing the local registration system of rural migrants and rental housing, relying on it more than the *hukou*-based registration of temporary residents in policing rural migrants at the local level of rental housing, villages, and towns. The local registration system requires secondary landlords to submit individual information about themselves and their tenants, living partners and friends, and collect and sort this information in the information platform. By categorizing all the information, the system identifies the five types of rural migrant population, traces their movements in towns, and monitors them for potential exclusion from rental housing.

Table 5.1 Temporary Resident (*zanzhu renkou*) Registration Form (1996)

**Temporary Resident (*Zanzhu renkou*) Registration Form**

Original <i>hukou</i> type or category		Host/landlord's name			
Temporary residential permit serial number		Relationship to host/landlord			
Basic information	Name	Gender	photo		
	Other name	Nationality			
	Date of birth	year	month	day	
	Resident Personal ID card serial number				
	Permanent <i>hukou</i> address				
	Permanent <i>hukou</i> category		Education		
	Marital status		Profession		
Temporary information	Date of arrival		Reason of stay		
	Place of stay		Current profession		
	Current employment		Responsible person		
	Temporary address				
	Temporary residential permit issue date		Temporary residential permit expiration date		
	Reason of cancellation		Cancellation date		
	Left for where				
With persons 15 or younger	Relation	Name	Gender	Date of birth	ID card number
Verification by mail	Contacts				
remarks					

Filing unit    Processor    Filing date    year   month   day

FIG. 3.3. Registration Form for Temporary Residents (MPS Directive [1996] 3, May 26, 1996). Source: BPT-MPS 2000, 181 and MPS-PSMB 2001, 508-514. "Original *hukou* type or category" = either non-agriculture (urban) or agriculture (rural).

Source: Directly cited from Wang (2005) p.93

Table 5.2 *xinguanren*'s Information Collection Form in Dongguan (2012)

<b>Basic information</b>	*Name	*Gender	*Political status <sup>a</sup>		Photo	
	*ID card number					
	*Birth date	*Height	*Education	*Ethnicity		
	*Marriage status	*Country/Region	*Hukou type <sup>b</sup>			
	*hukou address					
	*Hometown	*Date of arrival at Dongguan	*Contact phone			
<b>Commercial information</b>	Financial service card application	Citizen's email application	Date of purchasing insurance	Life insurance application		
<b>Residential information</b>	Registration number	Apartment story	Room number	*Date of temporary residency		
	*Income source	Residential type <sup>c</sup>		Place of stay		
	*Temporary address			Reason of stay		
<b>Employment information</b>	Name of <i>danwei</i>	Monthly income				
	Occupation	Type of payment				
	Type of contract time					
<b>Family planning information</b>	Marriage and labor certificate	Valid date	Certified date	Number of children	If violate family planning policies?	
	Type of birth control		Date of control	Place of control		
<b>Health information</b>	If allergy to any medicine? (Identify the medicine if yes)		Diabetes	High blood pressure	Blood type	
<b>Children information</b>	Name	Gender	Order of siblings <sup>d</sup>	Place of birth		
	ID card number	Date of birth				
	If attend the vaccine plan in Dongguan?		School	Policy <sup>e</sup>	If has birth medical certificate?	
<b>Responsible person's information</b>	Name	Gender	Address			
	ID card number	Relationship				
	hukou address					

Source: collection by the author; also see FTXSMB (2013), *migrant registration form*, accessed on July 1, 2013, retrieved from <http://www.fgxgr.com/yewubanli/2013/0123/9.html>

Note:

- Political status is applicants' political identities such as Chinese Communist Party member or masses.
  - Hukou* type refers to non-agricultural *hukou*, agricultural *hukou* or others.
  - Residential type refers to the manner that applicants live with others, e.g. the manner of living alone or with friends or families.
  - Order of siblings refers to the number in the order of children's siblings.
  - Applicants need to answer whether the birth of their children complies with family planning policies.
- Selections with "\*" are mandatory fields to answer.

Table 5.3 Registration Form of Rental Housing Information (2013)

\_\_\_\_\_ Police bureau \_\_\_\_\_ Police station \_\_\_\_\_ Urban-community (Village) \_\_\_\_\_ Office

Policemen \_\_\_\_\_ Compound manager \_\_\_\_\_

<b>Housing information</b>	Housing address		
	Housing type (one-story building, multi-story building, basement, military building, apartment, new courtyard building, old courtyard building, temporary building, villa, rural house, shed in construction sites, others)		
	Housing feature (rental housing, non-rental housing with legal property rights, <i>danwei</i> dormitory, shed in construction sites, vessel, other)		
	Housing use (self-use, office, industry, others)		Room number
	Total story		Total area
	Potential hazard (fire protection, dilapidated building, illegal building, others)		
	Ownership (state, collective, private, land for private housing, <i>danwei</i> dormitory, others)		
	Rental or registration number		
	Property right certificate		Confirmation in the form of public security duty (yes or no)
	Evaluation of management (dangerous, normal, safe)		
<b>Information of landlord or director of <i>danwei</i></b>	Name of <i>danwei</i> to which the building belong		
	Name		Type of identity card
	Identity card number		Contact phone
	Landlord or director's address		
<b>Manager's information</b>	Name		Type of identity card
	Identity card number		Contact phone
	Relationship with landlord		Landlord or director's address
<b>Renter's information</b>	Name		Type of identity card
	Identity card number		Contact phone
	Relationship with landlord		Landlord or director's address

Prepared by: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_ year \_\_\_\_\_ month \_\_\_\_\_ day

Source: FTXSMB (2013), rental housing *registration form*, accessed on July 1, 2013, retrieved from <http://www.fxgr.com/yewubanli/2013/0123/9.html>

### C. Partition, Inspections, and Entrance Guard

Both rural migrants (most secondary landlords) and the government develop and implement disciplinary techniques of partition, inspection, and electronic entrance guards to monitor rural migrant tenants in the compound. Secondary landlords implement these techniques to secure their rental housing. The government commands village collectives to directly enforce the implementation in villages, and village collectives supervise secondary landlords. The government, village collectives and secondary landlords aim at ensuring migrants' have safe residences in Dongguan.

In the compound, ubiquitous crimes alert rural migrants to watch for any signal of unusual incidents. In streets of the compound, retail storeowners pay attention to strangers or outside vehicles passing by their shops. In alleys, some rural migrants at rest may stare at strangers passing by them. Secondary landlords gauge whether strangers approaching the entrance doors of their buildings are potential tenants or thieves. They usually say nothing but stare at strangers until they walk away. When I entered the compound for the first time, I noticed that rural migrants nearby slowly rotated their heads in my direction. It was only after I had gotten to know some of the people in the compound that this type of continuous inspection stopped.

Secondary landlords take charge of monitoring their apartment buildings. Landlords only protect their own properties and ignore others. There are no incentives for them to watch over other landlords' buildings, since they usually consider each other as competitors in the rental housing market. Being at work, rural migrants cannot watch and visually guard their rooms. In addition, rural migrants do not count on police to guard belongings. According to witnesses, village police rarely patrol in the compound. In addition, all rural migrants in interviews and daily conversations with me stress that police come to crime scenes but no victims have ever retrieved their stolen items. Mr. Wang's family finally quit raising dogs because the family believes that its dogs will be stolen again once they grow up. Therefore, rural migrant tenants have to largely rely on secondary landlords to keep an eye on streets, alleys, building entrances, and the doors of their rooms. This is the reason that Glow, Mrs.

Zhang and other secondary landlords always stay around their apartment buildings and watch over building entrances.

Secondary landlords develop their criteria of judging rural migrants in inspection. Some of them claim that they can identify thieves in a single glance. Mr. Wang classifies rural migrants as either potential tenants or potential thieves through his own set of four criteria. The first is appearance. For instance, people with shabby dress, or yellow teeth, or bad odor are not considered good tenants. The second is their behavior. For instance, he considers those people seeking rooms but looking around, asking other tenants' information or boasting richness as potential thieves. The third is their belongings. For instance, he regards people with long poles or knives as thieves. The fourth is timing. He tells me this: "If someone looks for rooms in the morning and seems tired. He might be either playing poker all night or a burglar... most people go to work in factories and need to sleep at night". Secondary landlords measure rural migrants in terms of their conduct of appearance, behavior, speech, actions in spaces of the compound. Thereafter, they can divide rural migrants into 'good' rural migrants seeking factory jobs and others as "blind flow", including the former as tenants and excluding the latter.

To facilitate their inspection, secondary landlords partition building entrances and rearrange their spatial settings. As Glow places a bed underneath the stair to sleep, and sets up a table and chairs by her building entrance for checking rural migrant tenants, secondary landlords usually place a table and a chair by the only stairway of an apartment building to watch over building entrances. They also place their beds in the tiny space underneath the stair platform. By doing so, they can sit or sleep by building entrances, keep watch over their buildings, and check anyone entering the building. For managing his three apartment buildings, Mr. Wang often goes around and checks them from time to time. When he cannot stay nearby entrances of the buildings, he still keeps his eyes on the entrances. Whenever he plays *majiang* with others in alleys, he always chooses a position where he can watch at least two of his buildings' entrances at the same time and closes the door of the third building entrance.

In addition, many secondary landlords such as Mr. Wang install surveillance cameras and monitors in apartment buildings to reinforce their inspection in recent years. Through these cameras and monitors, secondary landlords can monitor strangers as well as their tenants. They install surveillance cameras within and outside staircases. Outside a staircase, one camera is usually installed above the entrance door, facing the street. Inside it, one camera is installed on the first floor, facing the stair. From the second to the top floor, one camera is installed on each floor, facing the corridor. One monitor is installed on the desk or by the entrance door on the first floor. When secondary landlords sit by the desk, they can observe all public areas in and outside their buildings while watching the entrance.

The government and the village collective are applying similar techniques to secondary landlords' inspection but reinforce the techniques with much more strength and on larger scales. In the recent implementation of management, the two authorities do not mainly rely on police patrols for surveillance or enclosing residences with walls.<sup>78</sup> Instead, they are enacting grid management—a partition of the territory of the village with a respective allocation of special personnel, digital inspection, and digital entrance guards—in order to fulfill the task of monitoring the large number of rural migrants.

According to several posters that the village collective exhibits in its public bulletins for explaining the grid management, the town government divides the village into four management cells and assigns special personnel to manage these cells. Each area can consist of multiple sub-cells. This compound and another one belong to one cell in which multiple town police, village police and chief rental housing managers as special personnel to enforce management. Within the cell, each compound is a sub-area managed by a group of one town police officer, eight village police and three chief managers targets. In the enforcement, this town police leads his/her village police and chief managers to patrol and monitor the compound.

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<sup>78</sup> The government encloses a few but not all model compounds. In explaining its management of rental housing, the government states, “the second (method) is the categorization and management of rental housing. Enclose and semi-enclose congregated rental residences through the examination of ID cards in the entry. Assign special personnel managing a certain area of scattered rental residences” (XSMB, 2008, p.354).

On the other hand, the two authorities are establishing their own digital inspection system. In the streets of the compound, the village police team installs several surveillance cameras with wider scope than secondary landlords' cameras at building entrances, facing both outside and inside of the compound. These cameras are connected with monitors in the village police station nearby the compound and police centers in the town and city. Recently, the town XSMB is installing new surveillance cameras on the exterior walls of buildings in alleys. Facing building entrances, these cameras are placed every several meters and arrayed in a line. These cameras are connected with a citywide central control center that can report any crime to the town and city police. As of the end of 2010, around 8,500 monitor points have been established with surveillance cameras for the inspection of rental housing in Dongguan (XSMB, 2011). From 2007 to July 2010, the XSMB installed 12,348 surveillance cameras, established 24 model rural migrants' residential compounds (locally called *xinguanren* comprehensive service communities) and is developing 18 more of these model compounds.<sup>79</sup> In the compound, the government and the village collective installed 38 surveillance cameras by entrances and streets, and one surveillance camera for each of the 100-plus apartment buildings in 2013.<sup>80</sup>

Thus, there are three digital inspection systems operated by secondary landlords, village collectives, and the city and town governments, respectively. Each of them watches over a portion of the residence for different tasks: secondary landlords' inspection systems are independent of each other and protect their own apartment buildings. The village collective's surveillance cameras watch over major streets and entrances of the village to secure the whole village. The surveillance cameras of towns and the city face the entrances of residential buildings and watch every rural migrant entering and exiting buildings. Through the hundreds of thousands of cameras in the city, secondary landlords, village police, and town/city police or officials can monitor rural migrants and rental housing from their offices and control centers projecting numerous gazes. Even though surveillance personnel are

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<sup>79</sup> See XSMB (2010), *statistical data in 2010*, accessed on July 13, 2013, retrieved from <http://dngxgr.dg.gov.cn/6637.html>

<sup>80</sup> The data are derived from the village collective's posters in public bulletins.

absent in monitoring the compound, computers of both rural migrants and the authorities can record the scene for investigations of crimes.


Moreover, the government is establishing digital entrance guards that all secondary landlords in the compound are required to install that include a set of electronic locks, sensors, a back-up battery and a central processor. It is intended to “enclose and semi-enclose congregated rental residences through the examination of ID cards in the entry” (XSMB, 2008, p.354). Notices attached on walls of the compound state that the procedure of establishing the digital entrance guard is mandatory for rural migrants. In the implementation of the digital entrance guard, first, the government requires secondary landlords to install electronic locks and sensors on entrance doors and each tenant to apply for a TLC. Then, the village police team activates the TLC to become the key of the electronic lock. At last, the authorities expect to automatically collect and identify each rural migrant tenants’ personal information such as names, ID numbers and portrait photos. A secondary landlord claims that “the village and the town government plan to know who is living in or entering the building and calculate their entry information to know when they stay in the building and how many times they enter the building.” In a local media report, the director of a town XSMB states:

Different from a normal entrance guard, the system of the digital entrance guard can identify tenants [whose information is stored on the TLC]. The public security bureau can carry out a real time inspection. This is a convenience of population management. Through the TLC, the system covers the tenants’ information in over twenty thousand rental buildings. The police in the city, town and village hierarchically manage this system of entrance guard. In the future, the system will include more functions such as a finger print collection...

In my field studies, Mr. Wang allowed me to test the digital entrance guard soon after the village police team installed the full set of devices. When I used my ID card to touch the sensor and opened the entrance door, Mr. Wang’s computer monitor immediately displayed my personal information including my ID number, hukou address, and portrait photo in a form programmed by software. “The central processor which connects with the government’s internet might automatically send your information to the government,” Mr. Wang told me.


The three types of disciplinary techniques of partition, inspection, and the entrance guard system consist of hierarchical observation from the four layers of the city, towns, villages, and secondary landlords to rural migrants in the compound. Partition divides the territories of each town, village and rural migrants' residential compounds into hierarchical grids of cells and sub-cells respectively. Then, a hierarchy of agents including the city/town police and officials, the village police, and secondary landlords examine cells and sub-cells respectively. The digital inspection systems project infinite gazes from the city/town control centers, village police stations and secondary landlords' staircases to rural migrants in panoptic views. The four layers of observation records rural migrants' daily activities. The digital entrance guard automatically records and analyzes the information of rural migrants' identification such as home addresses, ID numbers or fingerprints, and the time of rural migrants' entry into a building. By doing so, the authorities and secondary landlords classify rural migrants into safe tenants and dangerous personnel for respective inclusion and exclusion.

Figure 5.5 Surveillance Camera, Entrance Guard, and Indoor Monitoring



(a). Surveillance Camera and Digital Entrance Guard

There are usually two black surveillance cameras on each side of the entrance door of an apartment building. One surveillance camera belongs to the government and connects with the village police station and city/town police centers. The other one belongs to the secondary landlord who owns it and connects with an indoor monitor. The small box with a green tag on the right of the door is the censor of the digital entrance guard.



(b). Entrance Guard and Indoor Monitoring

The secondary landlord places a monitor, which connects with multiple surveillance cameras outside, on the shelf near the entrance door. Usually, the secondary landlord sits by the table and the stair railing, and can watch the monitor from time to time. He/she often sleeps in the bed underneath the stair platform.

## **D. Inclusion with Normalization and Exploitation, and Exclusion for Securing Manufacturing Production**

The four types of disciplinary techniques above result in the systematic inclusion and exclusion of rural migrants. In the inclusion of rural migrant tenants, normalization of their inspection of others and themselves takes place. This normalization reinforces the social division of rural migrants at individual levels, and facilitates the authorities' governance. Through the inclusion of rural migrants as tenants, village collectives can take advantage of their non-local identities and exploit them. For excluding undesirable rural migrants, the city, town and village police can take any rural migrant in the five types of population out of the compound in their raids. Secondary landlords can refuse to rent rooms to some rural migrants as aberrant tenants or cooperate with the police to exclude some other rural migrants as criminal suspects. In doing so, the government and village collectives aim at securing the rural migrant population as a safe and docile labor force which does not violate public serenity and thereby does not decrease manufacturing production.

Rural migrants are cautious to strangers, and nervous about their belongings. One early morning, one of Mrs. Zhang's tenants quietly walked to her in the alley when I was there and chatted with her. The tenant said to her, "I heard someone talk about changing locks and make loud noises in my building..." When he saw me beside Mrs. Zhang, he dragged her a couple of steps away from me and lowered his voice so that I could not hear clearly. After he left, Mrs. Zhang told me about his caution. He was afraid that thieves might break the lock on his door and steal his computer, because he had to go to work soon. Therefore, he asked her to watch over the building and his room. Rural migrants usually do not leave cash and expensive belongings at home. Moreover, petty crimes are a part of rural migrants' everyday life, even though the management of rental housing reduces the crime rate in rural migrant tenants' perceptions. However, widespread surveillance cameras and electronic locks on doors alert them to keep an eye on others. As "strangers in the city" (Zhang, 2001), many rural migrant tenants worry about their belongings such as money and computers when they observe strangers' presence in the compound.

To protect their belongings, rural migrants in the compound gaze at not only strangers but also other tenants like me. Their residences are socially separated. The local and urban residents rarely enter the compounds in the village. The urban form of the residential compound divides and limits their simple social activities in alleys. Rural migrants do not have much time to interact with other tenants. They come from different regions and are not eager to get along with each other. There is neither a rural migrants' association nor community in the compound. As floating population, rural migrants only know a few tenants in the compound and gaze at others as strangers.

More importantly, while constantly gazing at others, rural migrants in the compound turn their gazes inward in a form of self-inspection. Mr. Wang's wife, being surrounded by constant petty crime, is frequently anxious. She gazes at herself through the reminders of being robbed and not making enough money, and could not sleep well. Rural migrants may remind each other of self-inspection. "It is better to remember to take your laptops or computers to the factory when you go to work. I do not take responsibility for the loss of any your belongings," secondary landlords often warn their tenants in this way. In their daily chat in the alley, rural migrants often discuss how to protect themselves from theft. In a conversation about a crime in which a woman worker's golden ring was robbed on the street, several women workers advised each other that it was not wise to wear any necklace or rings outside their buildings. One of them initiated the topic and blamed herself for the loss of her purse in a grocery market, "I should have held my purse tight in hand—I probably left it somewhere for one minute when I was buying vegetables. When I returned to the market and searched for my purse, I found my purse nearby but the cellphone inside was gone... I had to remind myself to always keep my belongings". As victims or witnesses of petty crimes, rural migrants constantly engage in self-protection, self-pity, nervousness, and occasional trauma.

The four new disciplinary technologies are effective to reduce crimes but cannot eliminate them, especially petty crimes. On one bulletin near the compound, the town police declared that crime rates in model compounds have significantly dropped and more tenants have been living in these compounds since the application of the new program. According to my interviews and observation, secondary landlords and tenants also notice the change and

feel safer than before. However, crimes of theft and robbery are still occasionally happening. Although the government should take a further study of the ever-lasting crimes in the model compound, some reasons are evident. For instance, the authorities pay more attention to serious crimes than petty crimes that can affect tenants' everyday life directly and constantly. Accidents such as the bloody fight between the young worker and a group of others mentioned in the previous section can happen without warning. Crimes are prevalent in not only model compounds but also the whole city of Dongguan. As a result, the normalization of rural migrants' gazes at others and themselves remains in the compound.

Thus, normalization reinforces the division between them and continuously reduces socialization with each other. This normalization is different from the normalization in the Panopticon or the factory. In the Panopticon, normalization adjusts inmates' conduct of correct behavior and purified souls. Factory discipline normalizes workers' body movements to comply with the requirements of production. In the compound, the normalization of rural migrants' gazes does not correct others' behavior or even refine their souls and spirits but creates a state of self-protection. It does not synchronize rural migrants' behaviors: rural migrants live their daily life as normal people and seldom purposively adjust their behavior to fit with others. Rather, in their normalization, rural migrants gaze at themselves, constantly remind themselves they are always in danger of being robbed or otherwise victimized, so they inspect others and reinforce security under the village collective's pressure while weakening themselves. Thus, normalization reinforces the social division between rural migrants through their inspection of each other, weakens rural migrants through self-inspection, and finally weakens their self-organized resistance to the authorities.

The authorities can take advantage of rural migrants' weakness for exploitation. Glow feels surprised by the very suggestion that she should be paid for her work of registering migrants. In fact, no secondary landlords receive payment for their labor work. Exploitation has long been overt and common in the manufacturing town. Nowadays, the three authorities are reducing the significance of overt exploitation. For example, the government of Dongguan has recently forbidden charging rural migrants public security fees across the city (Wang, 2012, May 31). However, covert exploitation still exists and transforms the policing

of rural migrants. For instance, in the process of installing electronic locks, each secondary landlord, not the building owners (indigenous villagers) was required to pay over 1,300 *yuan*. The village police team further requires each rural migrant tenant to pay 30 *yuan* for the application for a TLC card.

This kind of exploitation can be coercive through the enforcement of policing rural migrants. In the local registration of their tenants and rental housing, secondary landlords like Glow work out of obligation and for free. Some of them like Mr. Wang choose to cooperate with the village police team because they understand that they are leasing indigenous villagers' housing and need to maintain their business relations with village collectives. In the installation of digital entrance guards, however, no secondary landlords were eager to pay for devices such as digital locks. To reinforce their installation, the village police team occasionally examines secondary landlords without notice. Mr. Wang's wife complains:

...Indigenous villagers as the owners of these buildings do not want to pay for digital locks either. I heard that they made an agreement of refusing to pay for new digital sensors and locks in a village collective meeting. They [the village and the town] asked us to replace our digital locks with theirs and tried to charge us money... Recently, some village police often come to my store to prevent my customers from using my computers. We rent out these computers to people who like to surf the internet... Some other village police also come here often to check my registration books, search for mistakes, and trouble us [my family]... They are getting revenge on us [for refusing to pay for their locks?].

The program of the governance of rural migrants by managing rental housing excludes rural migrants who might endanger social stability and manufacturing production in the compound. The government targets the five types of rural migrants' population. Once it identifies these types of rural migrants, the government inputs their names into a black list in the information platform and can exclude them from factories, residential compounds or the village through police raids. Several evenings during my field studies, armed city and town police and the village police team suddenly arrived at the compound, seized some part of the

compound, searched building by building, and finally took several rural migrants away. Some rural migrants claimed that these rural migrants had no ID cards or TLCs.

Secondary landlords expect to rent rooms to rural migrants with factory jobs and may refuse others who they perceive as “blind flow” through their own judgment. By his criteria of judgment, Mr. Wang told me a story of his exclusion of a young “blind flow”:

The young man came here to rent a room in the morning. He took a long pole and looked like a “fishing people” [burglar]. He paid me a small amount of money for several days’ rent and boasted his father was doing seafood business... I suspected he would do harm to someone in the compound or steal my tenants, and asked him why he took a pole to walk around instead of finding a job in factories. He did not reply. Then I asked him to pay me a week rental in advance... in the next day, he left the compound but never returned. He still left his pole and several knives here... In my first glance, I recognized he was not a safe tenant.

Likewise, many other secondary landlords were likely to directly refuse or ask for security fees in advance to refuse rural migrants who were not factory job seekers. Mrs. Zhang once expelled a group of young tenants by asking them to pay one-month rent in advance that they could not afford. “When these five-to-six young men first came here, they told me they would find jobs in hair salons. But they just crowded in one room every day... with colorfully dyed hair, they seemed to do no work at all. I could not let them stay here long.”

## **V. Failure of the Government’s Guidance in Villages**

Besides policing rural migrants and modifying their morality according to the mass line, the state and local governments also directly exercise the mass line for the guidance of rural migrants in villages. Government agents such as officials and staff also reach out to rural migrants and attempt to understand and care for them in factories and rural migrants’ living zones. The former premier, Wen Jiabao, with other high-rank government officials visited

several factories in villages, studied the manufacturing industry, and talked with rural migrants about their lives in Dongguan in 2008 and 2012.<sup>81</sup> The government of Dongguan launched several activities and events for rural migrants in villages. For instance, as mentioned in chapter three, local government officials and staff exhibit the mass line in entering villages and serving rural migrants in the “*xinguanren* Service Day” (XSMB, 2011, November 06). For rural migrants’ self-education, the government establishes farmers’ reading rooms (*nongjia shuwu*) not only in the city library but also in villages (Liao, 2007, December 28). In another activity called “Spring Breeze Brings Warmness” (*chunfeng songluan*), the XSMB organizes several “distinguished *xinguanren*” to reach, donate and help poor rural migrants and indigenous villagers in order to socially integrate rural migrants with local communities (XSMB, 2012).<sup>82</sup> In addition, Puhui, a social-work organization affiliated with the government occasionally sends staff to visit villages, hosts political or cultural events, and offers basic legal consultation to rural migrants.<sup>83</sup> The government attempts to extend its operation of the mass line from town centers to villages and cover the whole city and towns.

However, the government’s guidance through the mass line fails its task of reaching, caring for, and mobilizing rural migrants in villages. There are multiple reasons for this failure. For instance, some government agents still maintain discriminative attitudes toward rural migrants. In addition, the principal-agent problem in the bureaucracy of the state, local governments and village collectives as the government’s agents weakens the operation of the mass line.<sup>84</sup> While local governments may shirk the state’s commands and ignore its opinions of

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<sup>81</sup> Other high-rank officials such as president Xi Jinping, who was the vice chairman of China at that time, and Wang Yang, who was the party secretary of Guangdong and is the vice premier now, also visited Dongguan and studied local conditions of the manufacturing industry and rural migrant workers. See *Zongyang gaoceng he guojia buwei liting dongguan zhuanxing shengji* (The state supports the development and industrialization in Dongguan), the *jinyang wang*, 2012, October 26, retrieved from [http://www.ycwb.com/ePaper/ycwbdfb/html/2012-10/26/content\\_1520967.htm](http://www.ycwb.com/ePaper/ycwbdfb/html/2012-10/26/content_1520967.htm).

<sup>82</sup> Also see XSMB (2012), 2012 *zhongtang cun fuping gongzuo fang'an* (the 2012 plan of anti-poverty in the Zhongtang village), retrieved from <http://dgxgr.dg.gov.cn/23354.html>. In the XSMB’s website, there are other similar government reports to the anti-poverty plan of the Zhongtang village.

<sup>83</sup> See Dongguan Puhui Social Work Center, *xinguanren*, accessed on July 25, 2013, retrieved from <http://www.dgpuhui.org.cn/puhui/Article/ShowClass.asp?ClassID=59>

<sup>84</sup> A principal-agent problem refers to principals’ political control of their agents. It is difficult and costly to guarantee agents’ complete compliance with principals’ interests. Agents can always shirk their tasks. Thereafter, principals usually apply multiple methods including incentives, rewards, punishments, and monitoring to their agents in order to solve the problem at best. See McCubbins et al. (1987) & Rhodes et al (2006, p.159).

policy implementation regarding rural migrants, village collectives also shirk tasks requested by the government.

My research contends that, more importantly, there is fundamental conflict between the government and village collectives in the operation of the mass line and policing rural migrants at the local level of villages. This conflict lies in the difference between the two authorities' governmentalities—the government's pastoral power and village collectives' sovereignty. Even though the government hopes to guide rural migrants in villages as in town centers, village collectives enmeshed in local rural norms instead segregate rural migrants and exploit them through the governance of rural migrants by managing rental housing and protecting industrialists' street recruitment. In comparison with the implementation of the mass line to reach and care for rural migrants, village collectives prefer to protect their sovereignty and economic interests by dominating rural migrants. They can also take advantage of its exercise of policing power to exploit rural migrants or assist industrialists to discipline them.

The government's guidance fails in two aspects in villages. The first aspect is the failure of reaching rural migrants. In their everyday life, rural migrants in villages encounter village police's inspection, surveillance and village collectives' overt discrimination and segregation instead of interaction and communication. The second aspect is the failure of caring for rural migrants. Village collectives' exploitation and village police's mandatory surveillance identify the existence of coercion and repression, and determine the failure of the government's guidance at the local level of villages.

In the first aspect, the staff of village committees follow the government's commands, enter and settle their offices in some rural migrants' residences but do not attempt to reach rural migrants' minds for serving them. In one rural migrants' residential compound that the government selects to promote for its efforts of managing and servicing rural migrants, the village collective establishes an office called 'rural migrants' home'. Several indigenous villagers work as full-time staff in the village committee managing rural migrants. On the wall by the entrance of the office are ten official plaques or so. On one plaque is a title of "Rural Migrants' Legal Consultation Point". Another one consists of a title of "Rural Migrants' Labor

Service Station”. Village staff openly state their intent to reach out to rural migrants and provide services. In the office, there is a farmers’ reading room that is supposedly for rural migrants’ study and relaxation. Yet, during a one week period, I never observed a member of the village staff directly speaking with rural migrants. I never observed any rural migrant enter the office to read books or magazines in the reading room either. Instead, several village staff members sometimes sat in couch or chairs, chatted with each other, and drank tea.

Village collectives ironically disconnect with rural migrants, while demonstrating their accessibility to rural migrants in public. Rural migrants in a residential compound negatively respond to the establishment of the office while village staff consider the hardship of administrating rural migrants and managing rental housing in the village. In one interview, a secondary landlord displayed his opinion on the office:

These services in the office are just a show. I do not see they protect our rights, or help us to find jobs. Where is the “Woman’s Home” which the plaque indicates in the office? I do not find it. No one except village staff visits the office. These village police [staff] determine whatever they like. For example, they allowed us to place slot machines by alleys before and decided the numbers of machines that a retailer could own regarding the retailer’s relation with them. Now they say this is gambling and prohibit us to install these machines...these people in the office do not work much. They just come and check if we register all tenants. For this, they receive salaries... Other things they do are to notify us if leaders will visit the model compound, require us to clean streets and alleys or tell us to have meetings with the village committee or the government. In fact, we manage our rental housing by ourselves.

In my field trips, I attempted to interview the village staff. However, they refused me and suggested I talk with the town XSMB. Before I left the office, one of them complained to me, “You do not know how hard it is to manage this compound. Even the work of examining problems in fire protection of rental housing is hard. We need to check each room on each floor of these seven-story buildings, walking up and down every time...” It is evident that village collectives can hardly fulfill the government’s task of guiding rural migrants, and a large gulf exists between village collectives and rural migrants’ trust in each other.

In the second aspect, the government's cultivation of rural migrants in villages fails due to the village collective's domination of rural migrants. In the residential compound, the village collective occasionally contacts secondary landlords to have meetings in order to educate them about fire protection and public security. In addition, the village collective intends to reinforce their obligation to install entrance guard systems. The secondary landlord recalled his experience in a meeting:

The village committee organized us to have a meeting about fire protection in the village committee building. The town fire station and public security department all came. We [secondary landlords] were busy... but every secondary landlord was obligated to attend the meeting by signing names in registration forms. The government taught us fire protection and the security of rental housing. Then they attempted to reinforce the installation of electronic sensors and locks... each lock cost us 1,380 *yuan*. They asked us to pay all... The implementation of digital entrance guard has been ongoing for almost one year and cannot move forward... We all want our bosses [indigenous building owners] to pay the money...

The village collective inserts its domination of sovereignty into the techniques of reaching and cultivating rural migrants for protecting its own interests. While promulgating fire protections, it coercively requires rural migrant secondary landlords to bear the cost of policing rural migrants. In the project of farmers' reading rooms, many villages establish these reading rooms in their village centers instead of rural migrants' living zones. In one village, the village collective sets up its farmers' reading room inside one of the village committee's buildings. This reading room is open to the public but closed in the evening and weekends when it should be open according to a schedule posted on the door of the reading room. In my field trips, no rural migrants who I talked in the village knew of the existence of this reading room. Some rural migrants did not even like to walk from their rental residence to the building. Ironically, this reading room was always empty of readers whenever I visited it to collect data relevant to the development of the village. No rural migrants used the reading room that the government hoped would cultivate migrants' *suzhi*. Indigenous villagers always crowded their ancestor hall or community hall, playing Cantonese operas or *majiang* instead of staying in the reading room.

On the background of the failure of the government's guidance in villages are village collectives' adherent segregation and discrimination derived from their sovereignty. During my field study, daily trivial disagreements and open disputes between the local and non-local people were common in villages. While I once drank local herb tea by an indigenous vender's booth, I heard a conversation between the local vender and her non-local customer speaking Mandarin.

"I need a cup of herb tea to cure my cold. How much is it?" the customer asked.

"Six *yuan*," the local vender replied.

"It is very expensive..."

"It is not expensive. The herb tea is Chinese medicine. Do you think it is water? It costs you more than ten *yuan* to see the doctor in a clinic..." the vender seemed a little unhappy.

"So, can it cure my cold after I drink it?" the customer still was not sure if she needed to buy a cup of herb tea.

"Non-local people like you know nothing about herb tea..." the vender turned her face to me and completely lost her patience.

Cultural gaps and controversial local norms enmesh every aspect of the local and non-local people's everyday life. Misunderstanding, discrimination, disputes, resentment, and major conflicts grow in these gaps. In a small traffic dispute in the village, a non-local driver, whose mini-bus scratched a bicycle of a village "victim", cried out, "local people just discriminate against non-local people for no reason!" when a group of indigenous villagers enclosed him in a street intersection. After some rural migrants surrounded the traffic accident but beheld it in silence, village cadres and village police came and seized the driver. Even though the driver was outraged, cursing and swearing revenge on the locals, he finally had to pay one thousand *yuan* under the pressure of the family and relatives of the "victim", and the village cadres and police. To appreciate the villagers' help and humiliate the driver due to his behavior, the wife of the "victim" spoke up about spending the money for treating her village fellows with good meals. As a result, ubiquitous cultural gaps and prevailing controversies escalate small disputes and conflicts, which may trigger rural migrants' dramatic resistance such as the three major rural migrants' social events in Shaxi, Zengcheng, and Guxiang. Village collectives' sovereignty can

fundamentally violate the government's attempt of socially integrating rural migrants and the local.

The failure of the government's guidance in villages completely excludes unskilled rural migrants as low-*suzhi* people out of the government's new proposals and services improving their lives. These unskilled rural migrants are still socioeconomically excluded out of town centers. In rural migrants' living zones of villages, village collectives strengthen the implementation of policing rural migrants while their domination, segregation and discrimination of rural migrants that violates the government's limited guidance through the mass line. Unskilled rural migrants who the government and village collectives do not support and serve can only sell their physical labor to factories to survive in villages of manufacturing towns.

In summary, the government, along with village collectives, has been developing a new program—the governance of rural migrants through managing rental housing—which polices rural migrants for securing social stability and manufacturing production nowadays. The operation of the new program has been succeeding and transforming the two former policing systems: the *hukou*-based tiered management of rural migrants between the 1980s and the early 2000s, as well as people's communes policing farmers in Mao's period. The practice of the government's pastoral power through the mass line and class struggle used to exclude corrupted farmers through the government's investigation, the masses' examination of others and self-examination in people's communes. During the reform period, the government's pastoral influence on policing rural migrants has been dramatically reduced. Nevertheless, it is still active as a way of mobilizing a few local and non-local people to examine rural migrants and exclude a few rural migrants (either their whole population or some of them) as the potential “*lapsi*” of development.

The new program associates the operation of policing rural migrants with rental housing instead of *hukou*, and thereby transforms the previous *hukou*-based tiered management. Registration, partition, inspection, and entrance guards in rural migrants' residential model compounds constitute the four types of disciplinary techniques in the new program, and exhibit

panoptic effects governing rural migrants. The local registration of rural migrants collects their detailed personal information tied to the information on their rental housing, as well as classifies and excludes five types of rural migrants' population as dangerous personnel. The grid management partitions the territories of towns, villages and residential compounds into hundreds and thousands of management cells and sub-cells for police's further actions such as allocation of special personnel policing rural migrants. The urban form of compounds divides and limits rural migrants' socialization, although rarely restraining their physical movements. Enormous surveillance cameras and the entrance guard system projects infinite panoptic gazes from multiple centers of the city, town and village police centers and stations, as well as staircases of apartment buildings toward rural migrants in compounds. In the transformation of policing rural migrants, the local registration reinforces the *hukou* registration of temporary residents. Police raids targeting at the five types of rural migrants, and secondary landlords' selection of rural migrant tenants displace police's mandatory examination and the CRP. The partition, inspection and entrance guard strengthen police's monitoring of rural migrants. In addition, a new hierarchy of agents including government officials in the XSMB, government and village police, and secondary landlords succeed the previous hierarchy of *hukou* police, community activists, and secret informants.

Thereafter, the operation of the new program in rural migrants' residential compounds constitutes a new "invisible filter" screening rural migrants. Through policing rural migrants, the government and village collectives include most rural migrants as potential safe unskilled workers, and exclude the rest, e.g. the five types of population, as "dangerous personnel". In the inclusion of the program, many rural migrants normalize their inspection on others as well as themselves due to high crime rates that the program is reducing. This weakens rural migrants' social connections and makes them less resistant to exploitation. In the exclusion, police raids can easily expel any rural migrant regarded as the five types of population, and secondary landlords might regard a few rural migrants as the "blind flow" and exclude them. Implementing the government's tasks in the program and others such as farmers' reading rooms, village collectives might exercise their dominant sovereignty on rural migrants for their own interests, and thereby undermine the government's efforts to guide and cultivate rural migrants in villages.

## Chapter Six

### Green Governmentality: Planning an Ecological and High-tech Town in Dongguan

In addition to the problem of a rapidly diminishing rural labor supply for the manufacturing industry, the authorities have recently encountered another problem: they consider the typical industrial model in Dongguan as unsustainable. During the past several decades of development, three main features—labor-intensive production, environmentally polluting practices and the production of low value-added goods—typify Dongguan’s industrial model (DTYIT, 1998/2008; Eng, 1998; Yeung, 2002). However, in the past decade or so, authorities have shown growing awareness of the long-term problems related to all three features of this development model. The production of clothes, shoes, furniture, paper, cement, and the like, demands a large amount of factory labor, but as discussed previously, labor supply today is insufficient. As is widely known, many urban and rapidly urbanizing regions in China are experiencing serious environmental degradation from air, water and soil, and other forms of pollution. These industries create a large amount of byproducts such as wastewater, contaminated air and poisonous heavy metals, polluting the environment of Dongguan (ibid.). Taken together, these features undermine the sustainability of Dongguan’s development because of the focus on low value-added goods: the high socioeconomic costs, of environmental destruction and lack of labor protection that may eventually overwhelm the cheap price of Chinese manufacturing products.

In order to sustain manufacturing production, the government has been developing a new model of manufacturing towns, ecological and high-tech towns, through which the government hopes to upgrade its manufacturing sector. During recent years, it has launched and carried out plans developing ecological and high-tech towns or zones in order to further industrialization and urbanization in Dongguan. On the one hand, the continuous industrialization focuses on the development of a new high-quality labor, technology-intensive and ecological manufacturing

industry (DRCCCPH, 2008; DTYIT, 1998/2008). This new manufacturing industry might resolve the problems of labor insufficiency, low-value added production, and pollution. For instance, the government now prefers electronics manufacturing to low-value added goods because it utilizes higher levels of technology and human capital (ibid.). On the other hand, the government has used the urbanization process itself as a means of enhancing its industrialization model. Just as the government and village collectives skewed development in favor of infrastructure and town centers to attract FDI in the past, the government is now engaged in developing the infrastructure to support high-technology manufacturing embodied in the new “eco-high-tech town.”

This chapter explains how the government of Dongguan plans new ecological and high-tech manufacturing towns, and conducts rural migrants as well as other people in order to facilitate its new manufacturing industry. In particular, this chapter focuses on a new town, the Songshan Lake National High-tech Industrial Development Zone (locally shortened as Songshanhu) developed by the government. Through the study of Songshanhu, it examines the governance of the territory of Songshanhu as well as people such as rural migrants in the territory. In the study, it firstly introduces the planning of Songshanhu and the concept of green governmentality (or eco-governmentality) for further analysis. Then, it discusses a set of the Guangdong government’s current decisions affecting the development of Songshanhu. Finally, it analyzes the planning of Songshanhu for the governance of rural migrants.

Within my analytical frame of governance, my research analyzes Songshanhu through the concept of green governmentality: a strategy of conducting people by governing nature and resources within a territory (Bäckstrand, 2004; Goldman, 2001; Luke, 1999; Rutherford, 2007; Yeh, 2005). My research argues that the government aligns different layers (or zones) of the territory of Songshanhu with different people according to different sets of criteria. The government assigns qualities to different layers of the territory through developing and assigning values to both nature and resources in these layers. Then, the development of Songshanhu locates people with different levels of *suzhi* (quality) into these layers. This implies that people’s *suzhi* is comparable to qualities of territory. As a result, most rural migrants, as low-*suzhi* people, rarely settle in Songshanhu, while some skilled and higher-educated migrants with relatively high-*suzhi*

can live and work on the social and physical periphery of Songshanhu. The government's pastoral power incorporates green governmentality and develops housing, science and culture into its new governing technologies interacting with the spaces of Songshanhu. This constitutes a new "invisible filter" that includes a few skilled and higher-educated rural migrants in Songshanhu while excluding the majority. As a result, social segregation of rural migrants, as in other towns of Dongguan, is reproduced in Songshanhu to facilitate a specific kind of higher-end manufacturing production.

## **I. Green Governmentality**

Understanding the destructive effects of the typical manufacturing industry to both the rural and urban environment, the government of Dongguan has sought to upgrade industry and the environment while searching for a new modality of governing its territory. After 2000, the government established a strategic objective of developing Dongguan into a renowned modern manufacturing city, ecological green city, and new cultural city (Zhu et al., 2004). The words of "ecology", "green" and "sustainability" along with others such as "high-tech" and "culture" are the government's key words defining Dongguan's future and identifying a new modality of governing territory. My research does not analyze how we can measure the technological/ecological levels of this development or evaluate the effects of the eco-high-tech development. Instead, it examines the government's new conduct of developing territory through the concept of green governmentality, and the resulting impact on rural migrants.

A few scholars reinforce Foucault's understanding of territory while arguing that Foucault pays little attention to nature and resources in territory. Rutherford (2007, p.294) points out that "nature was never high on Foucault's list of priorities – in fact, he indicated a definite distaste for it." Goldman (2001, p.501) contends that "Foucault and his interlocutors have overlooked and rendered undifferentiated: nature, qualities of territory, and the political-epistemic rationalities that give meaning, order, and value to them." Indeed, the Panopticon (Foucault, 1975/1979) and several examples of towns such as Poitou and Nantes in France (ibid.

2004/2007) mentioned above do not consist of description and analyses of nature and resources in territory.

Highlighting meaning, order and values of nature and resources, scholars developed the concept of “green governmentality” (or eco-governmentality) as a way of complementing Foucault and Nikolas Rose’s arguments about governable spaces conducting people. Green governmentality identifies that authorities govern nature and resources in its territory, e.g. environmental management and planning, in order to conduct people (Bäckstrand, 2004; Goldman, 2001; Luke, 1999; Rutherford, 2007; Yeh, 2005). Through the operation of green governmentality, authorities can shape the nature and resources within a territory into a type of spatial apparatus to conduct people.

The concept of green governmentality sheds light on power exercises by which authorities govern nature and resources for conducting people within territory. Bäckstrand (2004) points out environmental problems entail power exercises such as the operation of techniques, procedures and regulations that turn environment into objects of knowledge and targets of power exercises. Luke (1999) and Rutherford (2007) argue that problems of environment and the goals of saving the environment create a discourse of green governmentality as a particular category of power/knowledge. In green governmentality, authorities—experts including those from academic disciplines such as ecology and earth sciences—produce ‘truth’ about nature: the way that nature and resources can be described, and by whom (ibid.). To resolve environmental problems, authorities target nature, and interpret and act on the environment by enacting environmental policies and exercising their power to govern people.

In particular, two case studies demonstrate the operations of authorities’ green governmentality. In a case study of the World Bank’s environmental project in Laos, Goldman (2001) argues that transnational authorities implement science in assessing the environment, assign values such as market value to nature and resources, and resettle people viewed as having the potential to endanger that value, thereby “improving” conditions of nature and people. Goldman (ibid. p.167) summarizes the operation of green governmentality in his case: “confronted with what Foucault called the ‘problem of government,’ unevenly transnationalized

state and non-state actors have sought to ‘improve’ conditions of nature and populations by introducing new cultural/scientific logics for interpreting qualities of a state’s territory.” Likewise, in a case study of a Chinese state project converting pastures into grasslands in the Tibetan plateau, Yeh (2005) argues that the state intends to improve the conditions of pastures and resettle herders according to its interpretation and partition of different zones of pastures in the Tibetan plateau.

In the operation of green governmentality, the use of science and culture as potential governing technologies enforce authorities’ assignment of values to territory and people, and thereby can conduct these people in the territory. In Goldman’s study, the World Bank uses scientific tools such as mandatory environmental impact assessments to assign values to people and parcels of environment, and resettle local people out of forest regions (Goldman, 2001). This produces a kind of truth about the environment, and a new norm of environmental protection and development based on science and the regulation of people that makes them visible and accountable for the environmental effects of their behavior (ibid.). Similarly, in the study of converting pastures to grasslands, Yeh (2005) argues that the state assumes that the degradation of pastures in the Tibetan plateau is due to indigenous herders’ overgrazing to sustain their own livelihoods. Therefore, the state implements “science, sedentarisation and the market” to simultaneously resolve environmental problems and support herders’ livelihoods by giving high value to grasslands and claiming to make these herders better off through resettlement (ibid. p.15). When authorities evaluate and assign value to the environment to further developing territory, they also assign a lesser value to people and resettle them according to these evaluations.

Thus, my research attempts to distinguish green governmentality from previous studies above with respect to the analytical frame of governance (Rose, 1999 p.20). Green governmentality in my research refers to a type of governance where authorities interpret, create and assign values to nature and resources as well as people within a territory. These actions are used to conduct people in order to resolve environmental problems and develop the territory. In detail, authorities in manufacturing towns encounter environmental problems such as pollution and aim to resolve these problems by developing new manufacturing towns. In the development,

authorities implement power techniques such as science to interpret, create and assign values to territories and people in these towns. This results in a new relation between people and territory where authorities govern rural migrants according to their potential impact on the development of nature and resources in the territory of manufacturing towns.

In two aspects, my research adjusts the interpretation of green governmentality from the previous studies discussed above. One, within the operation of green governmentality, authorities' purpose in governing people and territory is production--especially manufacturing production and the production of labor. The "improvement" of territory and people aims at facilitating production. Second, authorities not only assign but also create values, and then assign these values to groups of people and the environment. These two adjustments facilitate my examination of the development of Songshanhu.

In one aspect, my research accepts the argument that "nature is socially produced and, under a capitalist regime, produced specially for commodification" (Harvey, 1996; Smith, 1990; cited in Goldman, 2004 p.501). My research does not pay much attention to the production of knowledge such as the World Bank's scientific tools (Goldman, 2001) and the formation of discourses in neoliberalism, e.g. the formation of discourse of green governmentality (ibid.; Luke, 1999; Rutherford, 2007). Instead, my research continues its focus on rural migrants and the development of new manufacturing towns such as Songshanhu. In addition, my research considers the production of knowledge such as scientific tools as the authorities' governing technologies for economic production. For instance, in the case of converting pastures into grasslands, Yeh (2005) criticizes the state's implementation of environmental policies because they do not really aim to improve conditions in Tibet, but to protect the economic production of other regions downstream from rivers in the Tibetan plateau. Meanwhile, the World Bank's scientific tools reinforce the transnational governments' policies of resettlements in Laos and trigger "immediate and inadvertent consequence of depriving some locals of basic resources while increasing the city's consumption (as well as production) of goods" (Goldman, 2001 p.515).

Moreover, authorities can create values and assign them to territory and people. On the one hand, Authorities intend to improve the qualities of territory through concepts of environmental protection, sustainability, and health. In the development of nature and resources into commodities, authorities constitute meanings of territory to alter production in territory. On the other hand, the state creates and assigns value to people in its construction and interpretation of *suzhi* in order to improve individual and national development (as discussed in Chapter Three). *Suzhi* abstracts, represses, and simplifies people's heterogenous subjectivities into a homogenous one-dimensional attribute. An increase of education, knowledge and skills, the cultivation of spirits, souls, and morality, as well as obedience to state policies such as family planning are the means of increasing people's *suzhi*. The state's development of people's *suzhi* contributes to national development.

In manufacturing towns, the government is keen to emphasize the importance of people's *suzhi* and define it locally in accordance with production goals. The government of Dongguan stresses "the development of people's *suzhi* and a healthy social environment for providing strong spiritual and intellectual support to economic development" (DTYIT, p.48). Within the continuous *hukou* reform in Dongguan, the government defines migrants' *suzhi* according to the criteria of professional skills, education, age, social security payment, family planning, and criminal background as well as other relevant criteria such as the government's awards and migrants' income (tax payment) (XSMB, 2011, May 5). The government uses *suzhi* and *hukou* reform to absorb high-*suzhi* migrants while settling them in Dongguan.

Through the operation of green governmentality, people and territory are comparable according to the measure of production. Authorities create and assign values, e.g. market value, to territory and people, and thereby give value-oriented qualities to both of them. The measure of production, e.g. GDP and other products, are means of identifying values. For instance, the World Bank's scientific tools such as green cost-benefit analysis enumerate the economic value of environment in Laos. The higher quality a territory is, the more it should *produce*. Meanwhile, the measure of production can also identify people's qualities, e.g. *suzhi*. The higher quality a person has, the more he/she should produce. For instance, authorities in Goldman and Yeh's cases classify indigenous people as having low and "undeveloped" qualities, and pose a danger

to the environment. Therefore, they should be resettled outside of protected zones to renew high environmental qualities in the territories. These resettlements entail a correlation between territory and people according to their comparable value-oriented qualities. Thus, people and territory share commonality in values of production, and can relate to each other according to the measure of production. By including environmental protection and sustainability as measures of production, authorities achieve the legitimacy of comparing territorial and human value, and derive the necessity and authority to govern both of them.

## **II. Emergence of Green Governmentality: Matching Rural Migrants with Territories in Guangdong**

The implementation of green governmentality in China is beyond the scale of manufacturing towns: the state is promoting sustainability in its current socioeconomic development (CCCPC, 2012, May 5). In the context of national development of sustainability, the development of Songshanhu is associated with a new set of governmental decisions to develop different territories and accordingly conduct rural migrants in Guangdong. In its decision-making, the government considers both territory and people according to measurable qualities, and arranges their configuration for the purpose of production. As a portion of regional developments, Songshanhu plays a role in developing a new territory and type of labor, both of which have high qualities of factors of production.

Since 2008, the Guangdong government has launched a plan transferring manufacturing industry and labor in Guangdong province. This plan is called the “Two Transfers” (*shuang zhuan yi*). The first transfer refers to selecting and moving the typical manufacturing industry from the PRD in southern Guangdong to the remote regions of eastern, western and northern Guangdong. With a large amount of the typical manufacturing industry, the PRD is a much more advanced region than the remote regions of Guangdong. Through this transfer, the PRD is able to reinforce development of a new technology-intensive and high-value-added manufacturing industry (GCCCCP & Guangdong Government, 2008, July 3). The second transfer refers to

moving and turning the rural labor surplus in the remote regions into factory workers in the manufacturing industry moved out of the PRD (ibid.). In this transfer, the government stresses the training of young local farmers through education in middle-professional or poly-tech schools to supply skilled workers to the new manufacturing industry in the PRD. In doing so, the government aims at continuously developing the region, improving the qualities of labor, and enhancing an advanced manufacturing industry.

In the plan, the government regards territories as firms that have different qualities and compete each other. Wang Yang, the former party secretary in Guangdong and the current vice premier in China, explicitly stresses this:

“Market competition usually takes place between firms. However, in China, with a socialist market economy, administrative areas intensively compete with each other. This pushes the rapid development of China forward in the thirty-year reform. The current ‘Two Transfers’ also emphasizes the competition between areas within an implementation of un-balanced development strategies. I completely agree with a development of one or two large-scale industrial transfer parks for open competition. (The administration area) which can work the development out kicks it off!”<sup>85</sup>

Wang Yang’s speech implies that the government expects to match territory and resources with labor for efficiency under its guidance.

The government is implementing this plan of “Two Transfers” through the spatial allocation of resources such as land, electricity and money to facilitate regional difference between the PRD and the remote regions (GCCCCP & Guangdong Government, 2008 July 3). In the remote regions, the government particularly allocates more resources than usual. For instance, it guarantees to provide land for developing factory plants and decreases costs of production through such practices as subsidizing electricity. It also plans to invest in infrastructure and increase the efficiency of bureaucracy through the administration of logistic certificates and financial support while calling for environmental protection. In order to absorb rural labor surplus in remote regions, the provincial government requires local governments to

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<sup>85</sup> See Wang Yang’s speech, accessed on July 21, 2013, retrieved from <http://www.gd.gov.cn/govpub/rdzt/jkszy/>

encourage and guide farmers to work in local factories and promises to provide industrialists incentives for recruiting indigenous farmers.

To resolve the problem of labor shortages in the PRD, especially when it comes to skilled workers, the government aims at training farmers in the regions outside the PRD and sends them to work in pro-technological factories in the PRD. For instance, the government requires middle professional and poly-tech schools in the PRD to provide at least 30% of their admissions to students from remote regions and arrange their local employment. The plan aims at transferring 6 million local farmers into the factory and training 3.6 million of them into skilled workers (ibid.). Guiding the farmers in the regions outside the PRD, the government expects to convey skilled workers into a technology-intensive manufacturing industry in the PRD.

The Two Transfers plan is starting to develop new manufacturing towns in the regions outside the PRD and convey rural migrants into these new towns. These new manufacturing towns are called “transferred-industry zones” (*chanye zhuan yi gongyeyuan*) directly developed by the local or provincial governments. According to data from the Development Research Center of the State Council, the government has established 35 of these zones absorbing the typical low-value added manufacturing industries that historically located in the PRD (Wang & Jia, 2004). Thereby, cities in the PRD can clear land for local development of a high-technology manufacturing industry. For instance, in Guangzhou, over 5,600 enterprises/projects have been closed and transferred since 2008. This provides 2.4-million-square-meters of industrial land for over 30 high-value-added industrial projects. In another example, the Dongguan government established eight transferred-industry zones in remote regions in 2008 (Guangdong Government, 2008 June 23). It states that the transfer can exclude the typical manufacturing industry and improve qualities of population in Dongguan (ibid.).

Governments of manufacturing towns aim at transferring both the typical manufacturing industry and unskilled rural migrants outside while absorbing technology-intensive industries, skilled rural migrants, and technicians. The “Two Transfers” policy does not explicitly layout how transfers should take place in the PRD, but a previous government policy called *teng long huan nia* (empty cages and transfer birds) discloses the Guangdong government’s ideal of

locating rural migrants in specific territories. *Teng long* means emptying cages, figuratively symbolizing territories. To empty cages is to move unskilled rural migrants outside territories like the PRD. *Huan niao* means transferring birds symbolizing labor. To transfer birds, then, is to push unskilled rural migrants outside and absorb skilled workers into the PRD. In Dongguan, a government draft report on increasing the population quality and improving technologies of industrials indicates:

[The government] needs to push *xinguanren* back to work in their hometowns through economic instruments such as an increase of their rent and business operation costs...push labor-intensive, low-value-added and low-tech industries away from Dongguan and allocate unskilled labor with low qualities (*di suzhi*) out of the city... (Guangdong Government, 2008, May 28).

This draft stimulated a heated debate in media and the public. Under serious criticism, the details above reflecting the decision making of “emptying cages to transfer birds” were removed in the final report but the purposes of increasing people’s qualities and improving manufacturing industry remain clear (DCPC&GD, 2008). This story of changing policies demonstrates that the government intends to match labor with territory in manufacturing towns.

In Dongguan, the government is working on additional tasks to the provincial government’s plan on territory and people. It pushes urbanization forward for a continuous industrialization of transforming the typical manufacturing industry into the new manufacturing industry. Currently, there are at least three major policies pushing urbanization forward. The first one is *cun gai ju* that turns villages into urban communities. In this policy, indigenous villagers’ rural *hukou* and rural land are converted into urban *hukou* and urban land. For instance, in 2002, the government started to implement *cun gai ju* in the Dongcheng district and extended the implementation to the other three urban districts in 2003 (DRCCCPH, 2008 p.366&367). The second is to redevelop three types of dilapidated rural settings (*sanjiu gaizao*). The three dilapidated types (*sanjiu*) refer to factory buildings, villages and towns that have been developed without comprehensive planning and are regarded as being inefficient to a pro-technology production model.<sup>86</sup> The third is to construct farmers’ apartments (*nongmin gongyu*). In this

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<sup>86</sup> See China Land Resource Newspaper. (2011, October 31).

implementation, farmers move outside their individual houses and into apartments developed by the government or village collectives.

The three government's policies and their implementations all consider a development/redevelopment of rural land for stimulating continuous industrialization. Government can gain more land resources for developing/redeveloping infrastructure that the new manufacturing industry needs. Through *cun gai ju*, the government can directly develop rural land while avoiding paying a high cost for land expropriation and engaging in time-consuming negotiation with village collectives. In the redevelopment of the three types of dilapidated rural settings, the government and village collectives coordinate with each other and aim at redeveloping rural structures, e.g. dilapidated factory buildings, into urban facilities such as high-tech factory buildings with mixed commercial and residential uses (DLRD, 2011). Similarly, the resettlement of indigenous farmers' apartments condenses indigenous villagers and their life styles, and frees more land resources for redevelopment. While indigenous villagers move into apartments, most of their villages and rural land are subject to redevelopment (DUPB, 2006, October 13).

The government provides two successful examples. One is the development of farmers' apartment buildings in three villages in Dalang Town and the redevelopment of these villages into Songshanhu. The other is the development of farmers' apartment buildings in four villages of Huangmei Town and the redevelopment of the four villages into urban communities. In addition, the government states its intention of redevelopment of rural land for secondary and tertiary (service) industries through the construction of farmers' apartments and the destruction of abandoned dilapidated villages after the relocation of indigenous villagers. Ideally, village collectives can retrieve rural land after demolitions to dilapidated buildings to develop tertiary industries (ibid.). However, the project of farmers' apartment buildings might not be successful. In my interviews, one official stated that, "Indigenous villagers do not move out of villages even though their apartment buildings are completed... The reason is that a few village collectives were bankrupted because they did not consider high inflation at the time they developed these projects. Therefore, the indigenous villagers who invested and lost money in the projects refuse

to move into farmers' apartments. The government does not stress the project of farmers' apartment buildings now.”

Implementation of the three policies is still at an early stage in which the government chooses and promotes certain towns and villages as models. Their effects require a follow-up examination. For instance, in the beginning of the implementation, the government selected eight towns as models for testing *cun gai ju* (Lei & Qiao, 2004, May 20). From 2004 to 2012, 60 villages in Dongguan were turned into urban communities.<sup>87</sup> The government's statistical data indicates that there are 52 farmers' apartment projects with 18,246 apartments accommodating 61,451 residents. “After the construction of farmers' apartments in towns and villages [except] urban districts and several urban communities, there are few successes of reclaiming rural land from village collectives.” (DUPB, 2006, October 13)

In addition, the government and village collectives plan to change land use to further industrialization. However, there is also increased emphasis on developing service industries instead of manufacturing. Two town planners told me in an interview that the current redevelopment of dilapidated villages aims to turn industrial land into commercial or residential uses. In another interview with several village cadres, one of them told me that the change of land use could greatly increase the village collective's profit:

The rental of factory buildings is usually seven to eight *yuan* per square meters. After 2008, being afraid of high building vacancies, many villages sub-contract their factory buildings to business middlemen who divide these buildings into small portions and rent them to small factories or workshops. This burdens village collectives' management of public security and FDI... in the current redevelopment of the three dilapidated rural settings, my village is submitting a redevelopment plan of two blocks of factory buildings to the provincial government. We [the village collective] plan to change the land of the two blocks into commercial-residential or commercial-trading uses. We expect that the rental can increase to fifty-to-one-hundred *yuan* per square meters.

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<sup>87</sup> See DSB (2011).

Without changing the basic rental economy of villages, village collectives expect to increase land value through land-use conversions. In doing so, they expect to improve the quality of villages through higher profits, easier management of FDI and improved public security.

Thus, the government is strongly considering the improvement of the production in its territory by assigning values to the territory of manufacturing towns. In addition, the government assigns values to people and defines their *suzhi*. Associating people's *suzhi* with qualities of territory develops the knowledge necessary to locate labor in territory in different regions and manufacturing towns of Guangdong. For sustainable economic growth, it gains legitimacy to match territory and people under the name of efficiency and competition. This deeply influences the planning of Songshanhu, which establishes and reinforces the location of labor within manufacturing towns.

### III. Songshanhu: Green Governmentality in Manufacturing Towns

#### A. Introduction of the Planning of Songshanhu

The labor-intensive, low-value-added and environmentally polluting manufacturing industry is typical in Dongguan and not sustainable in the long-term. Since the middle of the 1990s, the government in Dongguan has recognized the potential harm to economic growth due to the typical manufacturing industry and started to upgrade industries, increase environmental protection and improve labor conditions and quality. In the concluding remarks of its document of *Twenty Years in Dongguan*, the government stresses:

After ten years of development in Dongguan, several problems such as over-using land resources, inefficient development, ecological crises and serious pollution gradually emerged... the government plans to change the mode of economic development and improve manufacturing industry from labor-intensive to technology-intensive... (DTYIT, 2008 p.39&42)

To initiate the new development approach in Dongguan, the government launched a plan to develop a new town, Songshanhu, in 2001. The plan positions the development of Songshanhu as an ecological and high-tech model town with an integration of technology, industrial production, ecology and humanity (DRCCCPH, 2008 p.366). As a keystone project in the thirty-year reform of Dongguan, Songshanhu is the government's leading project for adjusting the economic structure and transform the development mode of Dongguan (ibid.).

The planning of Songshanhu is ambitious. The government plans Songshanhu to be a 72-square-kilometer territory that includes 59-square-kilometers of land for development, 5-square-kilometers of grassland, and an 8 square-kilometer lake called Songshan Lake (ibid. DUPB, 2007). The town is named after the lake. The proposed population will be 300,000 people in 2020 (ibid.). The development plan emphasizes high-tech industries such as computers, medicines, green food processing, and a number of research and pilot-scale experiments of high-tech industries such as biotechnology and optoelectronics (ACS&CAUPD, 2002). It also prepares to develop tourism, service industries and real estate (ibid.). Regarding the purpose of Songshanhu, the plan assigns Songshanhu four functions of production (*chan*), education (*xue*), research (*yan*) and tourism/landscape (*jing*) (DUPB, 2007).

In the spatial partition of planning Songshanhu, the plan divides the territory of Songshanhu into three layers (ibid. DUPDI, 2009). Each layer has its own functions. The first layer is the ecological core that consists of the lake and functions for tourism. The second layer is an inner ring outside the core with functions for education, research, and residences. The third layer is an outer ring that is the industrial zone outside the inner ring serving functions for production (Figure 6.1). In the core, it preserves the Songmushan reservoir, develops it into Songshan Lake, and constructs several recreational parks. The core hosts the town committee's administration building and several major public buildings by the lake. Located in the inner ring is the educational and research base that includes a poly-tech college, a medical school, a professional-technical school, an IT product research park, a national high-tech development service center and a Taiwan high-tech park. Several real estate developers also build apartment building towers in the inner ring and by the core. In

the outer ring, the government carries out a pro-technology strategy to attract research institutes, high-tech companies and high-tech product processing factories.

The government initiated the plan and immediately put it into action. In 2002, the government began to develop Songshanhu. It expropriated the land and water surfaces from the three towns of Dalang, Liaobu and Dalingshanto form the territory of Songshanhu (DUPB, 2007). The municipal government fully controlled rural land expropriation and resettlement of village collectives in order to reduce the cost and time of development. One Chinese journal article describes the process:

The preparation of land resources was one of the requirements for control (of developing Songshanhu). Without releasing the plan of the development (to village collectives), the government, once for all and with relatively low cost, expropriated the seventy-square-kilometer rural land including the eight-square-kilometer reservoir... this achieved the government's control of the cost and production of the development (Zhu et al., 2004).

In order to develop rural areas around the Songmushan reservoir quickly, the government resettled village collectives outside Songshanhu. The government funded resettlement and built high-rise residential towers as farmers' apartments for resettled indigenous villagers. For instance, the government completely resettled three villages in Dalang town and relocated indigenous villagers to several 11-to-26 story apartment buildings with underground parking lots and open space for community activities (DUPB, 2006 October 13).<sup>88</sup> By doing so, the government condensed indigenous villagers in building towers and claimed the rural land of the three villages as urban construction land further development of Songshanhu.

As of now, the development of high-tech industries, ecological tourism and other programs is ongoing. Quite a large number of migrants have settled in the new town. In the

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<sup>88</sup> Also see *nongmin gongyu jianshe: chengshi hua bi jing zhi lu* (The development of farmers' apartment buildings: necessity of urbanization), (2006 October 13), accessed on May 28, 2013, retrieved from [http://www.sun0769.com/news/dongguan/shms/t20071014\\_296035\\_1.shtml](http://www.sun0769.com/news/dongguan/shms/t20071014_296035_1.shtml)

ecological core of Songshanhu, the government has built several parks and is developing a 150-hectare wetland park by the lake. In the inner and outer rings, it attracts several high-tech companies such as Huawei, the Chinese electronic and telecommunication giant, to build their factories. The GDP of Songshanhu is catching up with the GDP of leading towns in Dongguan, increasing at a 73% annual rate from 640 million *yuan* in 2005 to 10 billion *yuan* in 2010 (SAC, 2010 December).<sup>89</sup> This rapid development requires a large amount of labor to settle in Songshanhu. According to the 2011 Census data of Songshanhu, the population of Songshanhu increased 25,000 migrant workers and 9,700 local residents.<sup>90</sup> Twenty thousand migrant workers live and work in the northern Industrial zone. Additionally, colleges and professional schools in the inner layer of Songshanhu bring in 3,000 teachers and 38,000 students.

In addition to the development of Songshanhu, the Dongguan government is also developing two similar projects near Songshanhu. One is named Ecological Park which has a size of 31 square kilometers with a central lake surrounded by high-tech industrial and service centers (SAC, 2009 April 8). The other project is called the Water-Land Zone (*shuixiang qu*) through which the government expects to develop ecological agriculture and residences, naming the zone after water and land/soil (*shuixiang*) so as to highlight the imagery of water resources and local rural culture (He, 2013 March 15). Although the government has not released detailed proposals of the development, it claims to have selected five villages and ten zones in various towns as models of the Water-Land Zone for further development (Wen, 2013 March 15). The three projects all identify the government's idea of abandoning the typical manufacturing industry and integrating the resources of ecology, technology, and local culture together for increased production.<sup>91</sup>


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<sup>89</sup> Some towns with top GDP have around 20 billion *yuan* in 2010. For instance, the GDP of Human Town is 28 billion *yuan*. The GDP of Houjie Town is 20 billion *yuan*. Also see Dongguan Statistical Yearbook 2011.

<sup>90</sup> The data of population are collected from the Songshanhu committee in my field trip.

<sup>91</sup> The idea of developing ecological high-tech town is not only taking place in Dongguan. Other prominent projects are ongoing in China. For instance, a new ecological town (or city) with 350,000 residents in plan is under construction in Tianjin. See Exhibition of Zhongxin Ecological City comprehensive planning, accessed on May 28, 2013, retrieved from <http://tj.focus.cn/ztdir/zxstc/index.php>. Also see Wong & Pennington (2013 February 13), accessed on May 28, 2013, retrieved from <http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/13/steep-challenges-for-a-chinese-eco-city/>. The Shanghai government also planned to turn an island called Chongming into an eco-town with 500,000 residents in an earlier time. See Peng, (2010, November 26), accessed on May 28, 2013, retrieved from <http://www.infzm.com/content/52790>. Also see Wong & Pennington (2013, February 13).

Figure 6.1 Master Plan of Songshanhu: three Layers of Core, Inner Ring and Outer Ring



Source: Drawn by the author based on Songshanhu comprehensive planning 2002

## B. New Center and Periphery: Assigning Values to Nature and Resources

In the development of Songshanhu, the government practices green governmentality alongside its guidance and examination exercised in other towns. Directed by its green governmentality, the government assigns values to both nature and resources in order to increase the quality of the territory for the whole and each individual parcel. In doing so, different types of labor such as researchers, technicians, skilled factory workers and unskilled rural migrants are located within different layers of the territory based on government-defined measurements of human and territorial value.

As in other towns of Dongguan, the government also guides and examines rural migrants while industrialists discipline them in factory employment in Songshanhu. For instance, the government regulates the Northern residents of Songshanhu through a covenant displayed in rural migrants' residences. The covenant guides rural migrants not to spit, randomly throw trash, throw items from upper floors, loiter, trespass, vandalize, steal or sabotage public facilities, store poison or flammable items, have pornographic products or drugs, gamble, make noise, or brawl (Figure 6.2a). Police divide the northern industrial zone into parcels, assign special policemen in each parcel, and coordinate with industrialists' security guards for the examination of rural migrants. For example, police established a station between factory plants of Huawei, a leading Chinese telecommunication company, and the company has fenced high-rise residential towers (Figure 6.2b). Workers must wear their workers' nametags to enter both factories and residences that are guarded by security guards provided by the only security company affiliated with the government. In a statement posted in bulletins by the police station, the police assign special personnel in a daily schedule to coordinate with security guards and respond quickly to any crimes reported that might affect factory production.

In recruitment centers and bulletins on streets and in residences, factories identify their needs for high-*suzhi* workers. Most factories request workers with junior-high school diplomas or above. A few factories prefer to hire technicians with specialty college diplomas, require fewer working hours, and provide more welfare than factories in other towns

(Appendix 3). A recruitment process usually requires job seekers to display their ID cards or school diplomas, read recruitment regulations, take qualified tests, fill recruitment forms, have interviews and medical examinations, and sign contracts. This is similar to the recruitment of skilled workers in centers of other towns.

However, differing from other towns, the government in Songshanhu juxtaposes the development of territorial development upon its normal guidance and examination. The government assigns values to nature and resources to strengthen the concept of ecological development. It also creates new values through a set of projects of environmental planning and inserts them into the territory. These acts increase the quality of the territory of Songshanhu and facilitate the government's ability to match rural migrants and other people with the appropriate territorial location.

Compared with other manufacturing towns in Dongguan, the comprehensive planning of Songshanhu establishes a new center-periphery relation in terms of assigned ecological values. The government changed the name of the eight-square-kilometer Songmushan reservoir into Songshan Lake as the physical and symbolic center of the ecological development. Instead of constructing a town central square, the government invited over thirty leading architects in China, including Yung Ho Chang who teaches architecture at MIT, to design major public buildings around the lake (Zhu, 2006). These public buildings such as the town committee's administration building, the library, the academic and communication center, and the production center, surround the lake instead of being arranged in a hierarchical order as central squares in other towns. For instance, the architect of the administration committee building emphasizes the relation between the building and the lake, and divides the building into five half-flying-shuttle-like building blocks pointing and facing the lake (Figure 6.3a).<sup>92</sup> In form and through symbolism, Songshan Lake giving its name to Songshanhu becomes centripetal to congregate these major public buildings, displaces the

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<sup>92</sup> For more details of the architecture design of the administration committee building, see *Dongguan songshanhu guanli weiyuanhui* (Dongguan Songshanhu Administration Committee Building), accessed on May 28, 2013, received from <http://dc.jiaju.sina.com.cn/case/detail/5605>

role of central squares as the symbolic town centers, and strengthens the concept of ecology in Songshanhu.

Similarly, reservoirs, fishponds and grasslands become the center in other zones. In the Northern Industrial Zone where most factory workers live and work, another small reservoir called Shilongkeng is turned into the central lake of the zone. The comprehensive planning locates a commercial and retail complex by the lake and makes it the central service center for factory workers. Several village collectives' woods and hills are preserved and turned into urban forests or the central park nearby Songshan Lake.

When the government renames or names resources after nature, hegemonic ecological discourses are born for the assignment of ecological values to the territory of Songshanhu. Through renaming the Songmushan reservoir and naming the new town after Songshan Lake, the government ties sites with nature and local culture, signifying the goals of ecological tourism and cultural preservation while implying an integration of ecology, humanity and sustainable industrial development:

The name of Songshanhu gives the development of the new-and-high technological industry in Dongguan a figurative meaning that is long thriving, never withered, long green and never old like pines... (The government) develops the territory through a preservation of nature and resources...and adds the modernity of a new-and-high technological zone (to the territory). (ACS&CAUPD, 2002)

The assignment of ecological values spreads across the ecological centers of Songshanhu. The government renamed reservoirs and fishponds with natural and cultural themes to favor ecological tourism.<sup>93</sup> Not only is the name of the Songmushan reservoir changed to Songshan Lake, the surrounding landscape has been dubbed as a scenic area called "Mist and Rain of Songshan Lake." In a crescent shape with lotus flowers growing around it, the government renamed Shilongkeng reservoir "Moon Lotus Lake." A piece of lychee land with ditches and fishponds is developed and named New Crescent Valley. In


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<sup>93</sup> The government lists over ten themes of ecological tourism on its website. See ACS (n.d.), accessed on May 28, 2013, retrieved from <http://www.ssl.gov.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/dgssl/pstly/index.htm>

various rural settings, the government combines local culture with ecological values. The government developed a historical park around a stone pillar, an embodiment of an ancient indigenous villager's achievement in academia (Figure 6.3b). The park is named "Topmost Master's Writing-brush" which highlights the historical legend of the village, reflects the form of the stone pillar, and implies the importance of education to the developments of individuals and villages from then to now. Throughout the eco-town, the government identifies and highlights physical forms such as the shape of the water's surface, rains and mists, and cultural relics such as the ancient stone pillar, the legend and name of "topmost master" as values derived from nature and culture. Meanwhile, the government ties these values to resources and formerly rural settings as a way of assigning value to the territory and improving the territory's potential for ecological tourism.

The more distant the parcels of Songshanhu are from the ecological center, the less value nature and natural resources the parcels have. The comprehensive plan locates the research and technological development centers, professional technological schools and colleges in the inner ring adjacent to the core of Songshan Lake. The outer ring is the most distant zone from the core. The plan locates factory plants with workers' dormitories and apartments in the northern industrial zone due to its low ecological value. Constrained by insufficient land, the plan can only locate an elementary school on the southern part of the outer ring. The value of the territory outside Songshanhu continuously drops with villages considered dilapidated and subject to resettlement or redevelopment in the future. Follow-up development quickly turns the plan into reality. Nowadays, the spatial structure of Songshanhu largely reflects the plan.

Figure 6.2 Factory Workers' Civil Covenant and Apartment Tower



(a) This covenant is attached in the Northern Living Zone

(b) These factory workers' apartment towers are under tightened security by entrance guard. Usually, two-to-four workers live in one apartment.

Source: Photo by the author

Table 6.3 Administration Committee Building and Topmost Master's Writing-brush Park



(a) Songshanhu Administration Committee Building

(b) Topmost Master's Writing-brush Park

Source: (a) CNS (2006, December 20), retrieved from <http://www.chinanews.com/other/news/2006/12-20/840779.shtml>

(b) Photo by the author

### **C. Environmental Planning: Creating Values through Ecological Projects**

In the arrangement of the territory of Songshanhu, the government promotes science in environmental planning to create ecological values. The government establishes a set of quotas, standards, and indexes as guidelines for its development, and plans several projects for improving the ecological environment of Songshanhu. It not only assigns values to nature and resources but also creates new values for “greening” the territory. High technology and ecology are the government’s new tools to incubate sustainable economic growth. For instance, it resettles several local colleges and professional schools, and absorbs several renowned academic institutes to settle in the new town.

Since the beginning of the development, the planning of Songshanhu has considered ecology as a foundation for future industrial development. The government states four major points guiding development in Songshanhu (DUPB, 2007):

1. The natural environment as a whole remains excellent and the coverage of natural green land is over 70% of the territory.
2. Development should minimize the destruction of the natural environment and avoid large volumes of land excavation. Development should improve the ecological environment.
3. All industrial projects in Songshanhu should be unpolluted. All products are green and environmentally protective.
4. All construction materials and office equipment are environmentally friendly and protective.

In the twelfth five-year plan (2010-2015) for developing Songshanhu, the government established a set of indexes for interpreting protection of the environment and resources. This set includes an annual investment of 4% of Songshanhu’s GDP in environmental protection, increasing total spending on protection by 48%, an 11% decrease in energy consumption as a percent of GDP, the achievement of 95% or above in the comprehensive index of environmental quality, and 100% disposal of living and industrial waste water and trash according to a safe standard.

The government launches multiple ecological projects increasing values of the territory. These projects cross the whole territory of Songshanhu. In one example, not only is the government developing ecological tourism in cores but it has also developed a greenway system with bicycle rental services (Figure 6.4a). Connecting its greenway with the new Guangdong greenway, the government establishes the greenway as a well-planned-and-designed landscape. Over-300 types of plants are planted by the greenway creating a variety of delicate fragrances and small parks, resting spots, bicycle rental stations and other facilities are placed around important nodes.<sup>94</sup> The government locates 14 bicycle rental stations and around 500 bicycles along the greenway to encourage “green travel behavior and low-carbon life”—the slogan printed on each bicycle (SAC, 2010 April 17).

In another example, the government contracts a food supply system for a company that provides workers organic food in rural migrants’ residences in the northern industrial zone (Figure 6.4b). Posters outside a supermarket claim to provide only organic food produced in a farm with careful control of processing food. In addition, the government is going to develop the site of a resettled village called Baobei village into a 150-hectare wetland park.<sup>95</sup>

Regardless of questions over how scientific this ecological development actually is, not only are there many mistakes in the implementation of development plans, but many of the scientific instruments such as the comprehensive index of environmental quality remain vague.<sup>96</sup> The lack of scientific analyses and even abuse of scientific ideas reinforces the hegemony of the words “ecology”, “green” and the like, with governments making dubious claims of sustainability in as many of their projects as possible. For instance, a six-lane high-speed road encircles the boundaries of the wetland park in the plan. How can the artificial wetland maintain its sensible bio-system when the traffic of the high-speed road can generate

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<sup>94</sup> See SAC, accessed on May 28, 2013, retrieved from <http://www.ssl.gov.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/dgssl/s20598/>

<sup>95</sup> See SAC, accessed on May 28, 2013, retrieved from <http://www.ssl.gov.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/dgssl/s16321/200901/129592.htm>

<sup>96</sup> The unclear interpretation of some scientific instruments is due to either the government’s incomplete data source or my insufficient data collection. I cannot find the government’s comprehensive interpretation through my entire data source.

a lot of pollution nearby? In addition, the improvement of the qualities of the territory demands a high maintenance cost. When asked about the development of the greenway, one government official told me: “after Guangdong province launched the greenway project, Dongguan was actively constructing greenways in the city. Paths of the greenway extended into many places including city centers and villages. Some of the places were remote and no one visited them. Nowadays, the surface of a few portions of the greenway is broken due to the lack of maintenance”.

The scientific tools of regulations, ecological projects, and hegemonic discourses remove indigenous considerations of nature and resources, and replace it with an ecological norm through which the government creates values for increasing qualities of territory. For instance, the mulberry dike-fish pond complex (*sangji yutang*) is a traditional Chinese agricultural form prevailing in the PRD. With hundreds of years of history, this complex integrates nature and humans in a mutually beneficial way: mulberry trees, pond fish and silk worms compose a sustainable ecological system, and farmers efficiently produce silks and fish through the system (Zhong, 1982). This complex disappears in the industrialization and the development of Songshanhu. Instead, the government’s ecological norm is born. The government sets up mandatory criteria of standards, indexes and percentages interpreting ecology. It also makes resources such as reservoirs, ditches, and fishponds equal to nature, and assigns high values to these resources under the name of ecology. In addition, it borrows scientific concepts of carbon emission, wetlands, greenways, organic foods and the like, and carries out these concepts as important measures of value in development projects. In the process of creating values and ecological norms, the government removed previous villages when it resettles village collectives outside Songshanhu. Thereby, it excludes all local rural norms including indigenous villagers’ life style and traditional aquiculture. This process of resettlement and redevelopment normalizes the territory of Songshanhu that was a diversified rural/urban setting with fishponds, reservoirs and farmland, with low value, into a territory with high value according to the government’s standards.

Table 6.4 Ecological Projects in Songshanhu



(a) A line of rental bicycles beside a green way



(b) Posters of developing green and safe food supply system

Data source: photo taken by the author

#### D. Matching Territory with People within the Center-periphery Relation

As the Guangdong government expects to match labor and territory in the regions of Guangdong, the government of Dongguan arranges people and territories according to their qualities (Table 6.1). It regards indigenous villagers as low-*suzhi* people due to these villagers' relations with the typical manufacturing industry and dilapidated villages, and resettles them outside Songshanhu. It plans to absorb researchers, engineers, technicians and the like as high-*suzhi* people into Songshanhu, especially the inner ring. Rural migrants who supposedly work in the outer ring will gradually move outside Songshanhu when a well-established high-tech industry brings more quality into the northern industry zone. By doing so, the government aims at achieving efficient allocation of nature, resources and labor in its territory for production.

Table 6.1 Allocation of Labor regarding the Qualities of Territory and People

<b>Territory</b>	<b>Quality of territory</b>	<b>Housing</b>	<b>People</b>
<b>1. Ecological core</b>	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Market apartment buildings</li> <li>▪ Luxurious villas</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ No industrial labor</li> <li>▪ 1,700 local residents including local rich and government officials</li> </ul>
<b>2. Inner ring</b>	Relatively high	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Government-built apartment buildings (100-to-300 square meters per household)</li> <li>▪ Market-rate apartment buildings</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ 3,000 researchers, engineers and technicians</li> <li>▪ 30,000 middle-professional and poly-tech Students and teachers</li> </ul>
<b>3. Outer ring (northern industrial zone)</b>	Relatively low now Increasing with the development of the high-tech industry	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Government-built apartment buildings (100-to-200 square meters per household or 14 square meters for singles)</li> <li>▪ Factory dormitories (4-to-6 person per room)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ 20,000 unskilled workers, skilled workers and technicians</li> </ul>
<b>4. Outside Songshanhu</b>	Low	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Indigenous villagers' self-built apartment buildings</li> <li>▪ Farmers' apartments</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Unskilled rural migrants</li> <li>▪ Resettled indigenous villagers</li> </ul>

Source: Songshanhu Comprehensive Planning 2009, and 2011 Census in Songshanhu

A short history of the development of Baopei village where the project of the wetland park is ongoing indicates that, although they seem powerful to rural migrants', village collectives can be subject to the government's power to allocate and resettle populations:

“The Baopei village is a migrant village... with 690 villagers now. It has encountered two resettlements. In 1958, for cooperating with the development of the Songmushan reservoir, villagers moved from the foot to the top of hills, and pursued farming and fishing. In 2001, because of the development of Songshanhu, the village was expropriated and resettled... (BVC)

Through this retrospective, we can tell that village collectives were subject to resettlement and career changes to support a reservoir assigned high value for the government during the Great Leap Forward (Xiong, 2009 August 6). Again, due to their improper relations to the new development of Songshanhu, indigenous villagers are allocated into farmers' apartments for their newly assigned roles of urban residents.

In the 2009 comprehensive planning of the northern industrial zone, the government explicitly indicates the allocation of labor in different layers while adjusting the structure of the population of labor:

The structure of the population will change from factory workers to technicians and researchers... [The government] changes the land use of the parcels on the south of the commercial land from industrial use into residential and commercial mixed use for researchers. People who serve industries can live in indigenous villagers' self-developed rental housing. Senior researchers' residential demand can be supplied in the core of Songshanhu...

The plan aims at increasing the population of researchers and technicians while reducing the population of factory workers. It sets up a 4-to-1 ratio of the populations of high-tech talents such as researchers, engineers and technicians to factory workers for the future development of Songshanhu.

In attracting high-tech talents, housing becomes the government's key tool to locate and settle labor. The 2009 comprehensive planning zones multiple types of residences according to the three layers of Songshanhu. In the two layers of the core and inner ring are the first type of residential use with 200-to-300 square meters per household (average 3.2 persons per household) and the second type with 100-to-120 square meters per household. In the northern industrial zone in the layer of outer ring, the plan divides the residential land into four types. The first type consists of apartments with 100-to-120 square meters per household. The second consists of apartments with 14 square meters per person. These two types are for researchers, engineers and technicians. The third is dormitories for factory workers. The fourth is residences outside Songshanhu, where unskilled rural migrants live.

Focusing on accommodating these high-tech talents as the major population of workers in the future, the government is developing more urban communities with high-rise apartment buildings. For instance, a newly completed residential complex consists of 2,302 apartments: it can host close to ten thousand people and primarily include thirty-to-sixty-square-meter apartments for singles (SAC, 2010 January 26). In contrast, factory dormitories

that accommodate four-to-six rural migrant workers per room are not the government's favorite projects for development anymore.

The high quality of the territory of Songshanhu attracted Vanke, a leading real estate company in China, and others to build luxurious high-rise apartment buildings by the lake regardless of ecology or wetland protection. The local rich around Songshanhu are very interested in purchasing this real estate. In an interview, a government official told me that the rich in other towns adjacent to Songshanhu considered the high quality of the school education in Songshanhu and preferred to send their children into these schools by purchasing these expensive apartment buildings nearby.

During my field studies, I met a male rural migrant over the age of thirty dragging his two suitcases and walking from one factory to another factory seeking work. He told me his experiences of seeking jobs in Songshanhu:

I just came out of that factory when you saw me. This factory allowed me to work but, after a while, they refused me... because I had been over thirty, too old for them. I have arrived at Songshanhu for a couple of days. Without a job, I am close to spending all my money. I cannot live inside Songshanhu but must stay outside. However, I still have to spend fifty *yuan* a day ... these electronic factories here do not recruit workers on weekends... I have to leave Songshanhu and come back later on.

Charging a lodger two hundred to three hundred *yuan* a day, hotels and inns in Songshanhu are unaffordable to rural migrant workers. The only choice they have when seeking jobs in Songshanhu, is to live in either factory dormitories or indigenous villagers' self-built rental housing around Songshanhu.

While the government is allocating labor, industrialists also create hurdles in the standards they use when choosing workers. In interviews with several young rural migrant workers who have worked in Songshanhu for several years, they told me in their dormitory that they had carefully prepared their resumes and dressed well for interviews. In an interview with a manager in his middle age, he stressed, "Several electronic factories have

not recently recruited new workers. Their salaries are high. Workers do not want to quit jobs... but their recruitment tests are so difficult that a high school graduate is not guaranteed to pass them.”

Thus, while the government and industrialists continuously place rural migrants in certain parts of the territory through planning and development, most rural migrants are still marginalized and might be excluded from Songshanhu completely in the future. The government implements green governmentality in governing territory and people in the territory. In the development of Songshanhu, science, culture, and housing are governing technologies that serve not only high technology production but also create an ecological norm as a local modality of green governmentality. Through the operation of this norm, the government creates and assigns values to territory and people, establish qualities that measure people and territory according to the values, and match territory with people according to people’s qualities and desired qualities for territory in order to sustain manufacturing production. This process is splitting rural migrants into unskilled and skilled workers with relatively high qualities. This group of skilled workers in Songshanhu is growing and deserves further research.<sup>97</sup>

In summary, the government has been exercising green governmentality in locating skilled and higher-educated rural migrants for sustaining and improving the manufacturing industry. Green governmentality aims at conducting people in territory by creating and assigning value to nature and resources in territory. In Guangdong, the practice of green governmentality appears to match different people such as skilled and unskilled rural migrants with different regions such as the PRD and the regions outside the PRD, respectively. A set of policies such as the “Two Transfers” and “*cun gai ju*”, and associated programs and actions enact the practice for the government’s purpose of more effectively developing Guangdong.

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<sup>97</sup> In contrast to rural migrants who I can easily identify in other towns, rural migrants who work in Songshanhu are mostly young and have little difference from urban youth in behaviors and appearance. Another significant contrast between rural migrants in Songshanhu and other towns is that I can easily approach and talk to rural migrants as strangers in other towns, but young rural migrants living dormitories in Songshanhu are mostly indifferent to my inquiries of interviewing them.

The planning of Songshanhu follows the practice of green governmentality in Guangdong. The comprehensive plan of Songshanhu divides the territory into three layers (zones): the ecological core with Songshan Lake, the inner ring for education, research, and residences, as well as the outer ring, which is mainly the northern industrial zone. The comprehensive plan assigns ecological values of nature to the lake, which was a reservoir, and other developed resources such as ditches and fishponds. In addition, it creates ecological values in different layers through scientific tools of regulations, ecological projects such as a greenway system and an organic food supply system, and local cultural development with hegemonic discourses. The plan and follow-up development place people in different layers according to people's *suzhi*, which is comparable to qualities of the layers. Mainly through housing development, the plan matches skilled and higher-educated rural migrants, who become relatively low-*suzhi* people in comparison with technicians, researchers and rich locals, with the northern industrial zone in the outer ring. The practice of green governmentality in Songshanhu constitutes another new "invisible filter" which screens the rest of rural migrants outside Songshanhu.

## Chapter Seven

### Rural Migrants' Resistance to the Governance

During my field study of the Songshan Lake National Hi-tech Industrial Development Zone (Songshanhu), I incidentally met a young man in a lawn nearby a main road. Leaving his bicycle beside him, he had opened a faucet in the lawn, and was washing his arms and hands. Waiting for a bus for quite a while, I noticed that he never stopped washing himself. Feeling curious about his behavior, I walked up to him and asked questions.

“What a hot day! Why do you keep washing your hands instead of staying in the shadows?” I started the chat while no one else paid attention to him.

“I am too black [my skin is too dark]. After I whiten my skin through washing it, I may find a good job here,” he replied frankly. It surprised me that his intention was not to cool himself at all.

“Why don't you find a job in other towns? And why do you wash your hands and arms?” I still did not understand the reason that he kept washing himself.

“I need to wash my skin to make it whiter... *Here* provides higher salaries than other towns. However, it is also harder to find a job here. The requirements [of recruitment] *here* are higher, too. I do not know if I can enter a factory here... I have to make myself cleaner and whiter. This will probably give me more chances... I need to wash myself whiter... because [if my skin] is too dark, no factories will hire me here,” he murmured while still washing his hands and arms.

Rural migrants are not merely docile bodies, although, in a way, they comply with the governance that, as discussed in previous chapters, aims at turning rural migrants into factory labor. Rural migrants are active resisters of the governance constraining their socioeconomic conditions. In the scene above, the young man resisted the fate of working in a typical factory with low salaries and potential harm to workers' health in most towns of Dongguan. Therefore, he left these towns and attempted to work for the pro-technology factories in Songshanhu that

were so impressive to him that he kept repeating the word “here”. In doing so, he attached his future development to the new town. Because he imagined that industrialists in Songshanhu would reject him in factory recruitment due to his appearance, he began to change himself by washing his skin silently and constantly. Industrialists’ governance in either Songshanhu or other towns became a problem for this young male rural migrant to consider and resolve.

In contrast with the young man’s “silent” resistance in the scene above, rural migrants’ resistance can also be open, direct, dramatic and destructive to governance. Statistics indicate that rural migrants’ unrest has dramatically soared in recent years: industrial disputes submitted to higher government levels increased to around 200,000 cases in the year of 2000, and the number of “mass incidents”, which roughly indicate unrest, more than tripled from 40,000 in 2000 to over 127,000 in 2008 (Butollo & Brink, 2012 p.422). In Guangdong, three major incidents of social unrest involving rural migrants suddenly broke out between 2011 and 2012. In 2011, two such incidents occurred in the Guxiang town of Chaozhou and the Xintang town of Zengcheng, and created turmoil throughout the manufacturing towns (Browne, 2011 June 14; Olick, 2011 September 26; Page, 2011 June 18). In 2012, in Shaxi Town of Foshan, thousands of rural migrants walked the streets to protest, escalating into a struggle with village collectives and the government and ultimately, descended into riots (Sudworth, 2012, June 27). In these major events, rural migrants’ interactions with local residents in everyday life set off small disputes that triggered repression against rural migrants. This repression, in turn, at times explodes into visible and demonstrative conflict between rural migrants and local residents. Nowadays, when the government encounters these social unrests, it sends police and troops to put down rural migrants’ riots while investing a large amount of resources to maintain social stability. Rural migrants’ resistance, from a hostile attitude toward coercion, to self-organized riots can become a significant problem for authorities’ governance.

Thus, a study of rural migrants’ resistance is necessary for our understanding of how it influences governance in manufacturing towns through reforms that attempt to stabilize society. In this chapter, my research focus turns from the three authorities’ governance to rural migrants’ resistance in manufacturing towns. This chapter begins with a study of the pattern of rural migrants’ resistance. Then, it examines the typologies of rural migrants’ resistance through three

theoretical perspectives: James Scott's study of Malaysian peasants' resistance, Michael de Certeau's study of resistance in everyday life and Michel Foucault's technologies of the self. Finally, it analyzes the impact of rural migrants' resistance upon governance.

My research argues that there are three types of rural migrants' resistance, which push the authorities to adjust practices of governance accordingly. The first type is rural migrants' self-organized social unrests such as riots, protests, strikes, petitions and disputes. The second is rural migrants' individual resistance such as petty crimes, deception, tricks, humiliation, jokes and various tactics of using or consuming the authorities' products, spaces, time and discourse for rural migrants' own production. These two types of resistance directly target authorities and their governance in order to claim rural migrants' self-interests and justice. Finally, rural migrants engage in a third type of resistance through the production of the self: some rural migrants claim their peasants' identity by their massive low consumption; some others claim an urban identity by mimicking urban residents' levels of consumption. In this process, migrants may choose to 'vote by foot' and leave the manufacturing towns, which can reduce or destroy manufacturing production if factories cannot meet their labor needs. As this research has argued, enhancing manufacturing production is the underlying function of the authorities' governance strategies. Therefore, when migrants disrupt manufacturing production, through either protest or "voting by foot", the authorities must consider ways to reform their practices of governance.

## **I. Rural Migrants' Resistance and Its Pattern in Manufacturing Towns**

### **A. What is Resistance?**

As Foucault argues, resistance is a type of power: "These temporary resisting tactics appears in everyday life in a way that multiplicity of points of resistance everywhere in power relations... Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power" (Foucault, 1978 p.95).

My research considers that rural migrants' resistance is their unique power exercise toward the three authorities' governance.

However, Foucault does not pay much attention to resistance. Therefore, my research refers to theories of resistance developed by James Scott and Michael de Certeau, both of whom pursue insightful and empirical studies about the resistance of the weak with respect to power relations. In *Weapons of the Weak*, Scott (1985) addresses peasants' irregular resistance to upper classes such as landlords in everyday life: peasants apply a strategy of cautious resistance and calculated complicity to maximize their own benefit without overtly resisting the upper classes. In *The Practice of Everyday Life*, Certeau (1984) identifies a set of resistance, e.g. the "making do", in which ordinary people carry out spatial tactics to use/consume authorities' products and temporarily but constantly alter governance in everyday life. Ordinary people indeed have their unique strategies and tactics against governance.

More importantly, James Scott sheds light on a definition of resistance for understanding the resistance of the weak:

At a first approximation, I might claim that class resistance includes any act(s) by member(s) of a subordinate class that is or are intended either to mitigate or deny claims (for example, rents, taxes, prestige) made on that class by superordinate classes (for example, landlords, large farmers, the state) or to advance its own claims (for example, work, land, charity, respect) vis-à-vis those super-ordinate classes.  
(Scott, 1986 p.290)

As long as people identify their purposes as either opposing authorities' claims or advancing people's own claims, their behaviors and actions are resistance to the authorities' governance.

Thus, my research defines rural migrants' resistance as power relations (regarded as people's interaction in my research) in which rural migrants intend to mitigate or deny the three authorities' claims or advance their own claims in manufacturing towns. Considering this definition, my research pays attention to the purposes of resistance. Considering rural

migrants' resistance as their political power, my research can analyze resistance within the same frame as Nicholas Rose's interpretation of governance. In other words, this analysis of resistance consists of identifying the purposes of rural migrants' resistance, rural migrants' political rationalities, technologies of resistance, spaces produced by resistance, and the impact of resistance on governance.

With respect to Scott and Certeau, there are at least two types of resistance in terms of forms of power relations. The first type is "(a) organized, systematic, and cooperative, (b) principled or selfless, and (c) has revolutionary consequences, and/or (d) embodies ideas or intentions that negate the basis of domination itself" (Scott, 1985 p.290). This type of resistance is our common understanding of direct resistance of dominators, e.g. revolutions, class struggle, strikes and protests. Rural migrants' dramatic social unrests belong to this type.

The second type of resistance is "cautious resistance with calculated complicity": the weak openly appears docile to authorities and simultaneously proceeds with many covert and resistive tactics including desertion, thefts, tricks, deceptions, humiliation, rumors, gossip, satire and jokes in everyday life (ibid.). This type of resistance may consist of multiple purposes for the weak: for instance, peasants who steal landlords' grain might have dual intentions of gaining more food and undermining landlords' properties (ibid.). In the scene about the young man washing himself, he resists industrialists' domination in the typical manufacturing industry while he is eager to work for other industrialists' pro-technological manufacturing industry.

My research contends that Certeau's concepts of resistance such as "making do", "*la parruque*" and "walking in the city" belong to the second type of resistance and are complements to Scott's calculated resistance. This resistance deploys temporary and situational tactics against repression (Certeau, 1984). Ordinary people practice this resistance through their behavior, use of space and discourse: "resistance, tricky and stubborn procedures that elude discipline without being outside the field in which it is exercised, and which should lead us to a theory of everyday practices, of lived space, of the disquieting

familiarity of the city” (ibid. p.96). For instance, the “making do” is “artistic tricks and competitions of accomplices into a system that reproduces and partitions through work or leisure.” (ibid. p.29) In silent production through consumption, the “making do” is “an art of using those imposed on it” (ibid. p.31). The “*la perruque*” is identified as “...the worker's own work disguised as work for his employer ...The worker who indulges in *la perruque* actually diverts time (not goods, since he uses only scraps) from the factory for work that is free, creative, and precisely not directed toward profit” (ibid. p.24-26). In addition, the “walking in the city” means that people such as ordinary walkers, who have blind understanding of dominative plans of urban spaces, alter these spaces via making use of them (ibid.).

These two types of resistance identify themselves by targeting governance and authorities’ properties, reputations and production. In doing so, people under governance mitigate or violate authorities’ claims or advance their own claims. In the first type of resistance, self-organized people aim at directly attacking authorities for consequential or revolutionary results. In the second type, the weak target authorities’ properties, belongings and reputation with overt complicity in Scott’s examples. In Certeau’s resistance in everyday life, ordinary people use/consume authorities’ materials, goods, spaces, time and discourse as means of production for their own claims. In the power relation of governance and the governed, the operation of these two types of resistance radiates power from the governed to the governance.

## **B. Pattern of Rural Migrants’ Resistance**

Rural migrants’ resistance occurs frequently in manufacturing towns. Rural migrants rarely are the beneficiaries of the authorities’ governance, frequently encountering constraints, restrictions, and repression in the governance. However, the three social unrests and the young man washing his skin demonstrate that rural migrants can deploy the two types of resistance.

In the talent market in the central square, rural migrants occasionally complain in public about industrialists' exploitation. Once, a 30-year old rural migrant told anyone who would listen about the wage arrears owed to him, and complaining about his boss who fled the town after the bankruptcy of his furniture factory. While walking to a booth of a recruitment company associated with the government, he met a journalist who worked for the town government's newspaper and was interviewing company staff. Complaining to the journalist, the rural migrant expected help from her.

The rural migrant spoke loudly and sighed, "My boss fled away and did not pay us several-months' salary. Several workers tried to contact the media to report it. We also expected to get help from the government... But we could not find any connections. We thought about protest. Several of our village fellows (his fellow workers) had a plan to gather in the entrance of the town and block the road. We hoped to attract others' attention... But finally, we could not form a consensus to group together ..."

"The Labor Bureau in your town compensated you, did it not?" the journalist asked.

"No, it did not..."

"... You cannot block the road in the entrance of the town because your protest will change the substance of your action and become a violation of public security if you block the road. Once it happens, the government will not help you. My newspaper will not report your story any more..." the journalist immediately advised and warned him.

"Do you have business cards with you? I want to contact you in the future," the rural migrant did not insist in protest but hoped to contact the government's media. He asked the journalist again but she remained silent until he finally left.

Rural migrants encounter the constraints of governance at once upon leaving their hometowns for manufacturing towns. Through migration, rural migrants expect an increase of income, an escape of the hardship in rural settings, better-off lives and self-development (Li, 2003; Liu & Zhang, 2006; Luo & Wang, 2003). In manufacturing towns, they are

economically better off with salaries higher than farmers' income. However, they also encounter problems of governance because they find themselves: (1) politically distant from local residents, (2) socially discriminated against, (3) and economically exploited, thereby gaining few opportunities of self-development. Enmeshed in these problems, the 30-year old rural migrant is exploited by his boss, cannot receive help from the town government and village collectives, so he has no other option but to protest in the streets. These problems inevitably induce rural migrants' resistance to the three authorities and their governance.

Rural migrants barely have any formal political legitimacy for resistance. They do not have formal political bargaining power with the three authorities. They have no voting rights in manufacturing towns. Rural migrants' only choice of resistance in manufacturing towns is to challenge the authorities' governance. As the journalist advised, the government does not permit rural migrants to self-organize in gathering meetings, parades or protests demonstrating their requests. In public spaces such as parks and squares of manufacturing towns, the government exhibits relevant regulations written on signs and banners. Currently, the government can exhibit its comparatively permissive stance to rural migrants' strikes more than before (Butollo & Brink, 2012). However, it might ban or put down these protests as long as it perceives rural migrants' protests as a threat to social stability and manufacturing production. In the 2010 Honda Strike, the Guangdong government was not directly involved and left the door open for workers' struggle and negotiation with industrialists (ibid.). In contrast, in rural migrants' social unrests in Zengcheng, Shaxi, and Guxiang, local governments displayed no patience with the conflict between local and non-local people, and demonstrated zero tolerance for rural migrants' protests, immediately sending police or troops to suppress the riots (Browne, 2011; Page, 2011; Sudworth, 2012). In Dongguan, the government demonstrated its firm decision to severely crack down on crimes including rural migrants' self-organized social unrests:

... [Government agencies] cooperate to accomplish the tasks of stabilizing public security. In 2004, over one thousand workers in the Xingxiong Shoe-making factory in Dalingsha Town and the Xingang Shoe-making factory in Chang'an Town gathered, challenged social stability, and sabotaged facilities of production and

consumption. This group event is a representative case [threatening public security] (DICP, 2008 p.279)

Nowadays, the state and local governments are empowering rural migrants, however, at a slow pace and with much limitation. The problems remain as constraints to rural migrants. First, rural migrants have a few *de jure* representatives in the government of host cities but the government selects these representatives. Recently the Dongguan government selected several distinguished rural migrants to be representatives in the local People's Congress, the People's Political Consultative Conference (PPCC) and the CCP (People's Daily, 2011, August 02). Nevertheless, rural migrants do not vote for any of these representatives. Second, the state is reinforcing the labor law and enforcing the protection of rural migrants' labor rights. Between 2008 and 2012, the percent of migrant workers with wage arrears declined each year, reported as 4.1%, 1.8%, 1.4%, 0.8% and 0.5% respectively (NBSC, 2013, May 27). However, at local levels, rural migrants may still potentially become victims of industrialists' exploitation without contracts or with informal contracts such as oral agreements. In 2012, half of the rural migrant population still did not sign contracts with their employers (ibid.). The 30-year old rural migrant in the scene above is one such victim, while the town government has no established system to withdraw arrears of wages. Third, labor unions are not rural migrants' own organizations bargaining for their benefits yet. Labor unions have few effects in helping rural migrants in the construction and building industry to withdraw arrears of wages (Pun et al., 2012). For instance, rural migrants selected their own representatives instead of the labor union to organize the 2010 Honda strike (Liu, 2011, August 03). Rural migrants in the big shoe-making factory plant in the village tell me that their labor union only organizes them to travel on holidays. Fourth, exclusive local rural norms are adhered to in manufacturing towns. Local people's exclusion of rural migrants triggered rural migrants' resistance in the three social unrests described above. The government's empowerment of rural migrants emphasizes economic aspects, especially regarding wages, but is still rather weak in the political and social aspects.

Under constraint and with limited empowerment, rural migrants mainly implement their own tools of rural norms, regionalism and class identities for self-organized resistance.

For instance, in the three social unrests, the majority of the demonstrators were rural migrants from Sichuan Province, who called their Sichuan fellows nearby for help. This gathered a large group of rural migrants escalating the protests to riots in only one or two days. In addition, rural migrants have strong class emotions and identities, e.g. dissatisfaction of their working environment and hate of industrialists' exploitation, encouraging their organization for labor struggle (Pun, 2005 & 2012). For instance, in the 2010 Honda Strike, aware they were subject to serious exploitation, young rural migrants went on strike and bargained with their bosses for a raise of salaries (Liu, 2011, August 03).

A general pattern of rural migrants' self-organized resistance is that they mostly target industrialists or rural collectives while seeking help and justice from the government. In their riots, rural migrants under village collectives' repression seek social justice and equal rights with indigenous villagers from the government. In their riots, they expect to withdraw arrears of wages from industrialists. A rural migrant in his 40s tells me a story about a strike in his factory:

... In 2008, we had not received wages for a couple of months at that time. Several hundred workers decided to petition in front of our village committee building and then the town government building. On the way, they met several persons who wore uniforms and claimed themselves police or cadres from the labor bureau. These people persuaded these workers and sent them back to our factory. When these workers came back, factory security guards detained the workers organizing the petition and sent them to a police station. Our factory forced the rest of workers to resign with a little pay... It is definitely collusion between the government and the factory, is it not? Otherwise, did my factory hire people to pretend to be officials?

Self-organized resistance is not a part of rural migrants' everyday life. The two rural migrants in their thirties and forties all expect to receive justice from the government although they recognize that the government collaborates with the other two authorities and might not provide support. When the government does not respond to rural migrants' requests, unexpected consequences might take place. In the forty-year old rural migrant's case, his fellow workers' strike was destroyed without empowerment from the government.

In the thirty-year old rural migrant's case in the talent market, the government journalist remained silent to the rural migrant's request for help, and the rural migrant finally ceased his public speech and left the market. Yet, in the social unrest of Shaxi Town, riots finally took place when the town government and the village collective rejected rural migrants' petitions.

The second type of rural migrants' resistance occurs constantly in their everyday life. Police install signs warning against theft, tricks, and deception in public areas of manufacturing towns. Petty crimes unnoticeably take place anywhere, and rural migrants are victims in most of these cases. Still, a few petty crimes target the authorities. For instance, security guards and managers steal shoes and materials from their factories. Anonymous rural migrants stick small posters and tags advertising services for falsifying official stamps and certificates in public spaces on almost every wall and street light pole.

In line with their governance, rural migrants do not directly criticize, satirize, humiliate or make fun of the authorities and their agents in front of them but do so behind their backs from time to time. For instance, when a few village police examined the village and passed by rural migrants, some secondary landlords mocked, "These bandits (*tufei*) search and loot here again." When a couple of rural migrants saw several female police standing some distance away and reinforcing the installation of the digital entrance guard system mentioned in chapter five, they pointed to the police and said, "Those woman bandits..."

Rural migrants rarely criticize the CCP's regime and the state directly, although criticism of the government's corruption, and the factory and village collectives' exploitation and repression is common in rural migrants' daily conversation. They seldom criticize specific individual officials, foreign industrialists, managers or indigenous villagers because they do not know of them. In their everyday discourse, rural migrants usually criticize and target the concept of the authorities' agents, e.g. the corrupted official, the village rich, the exploitative industrialist and the bandit-like police. After their criticism or complaint, they often like to give a conclusion: "The CCP state is good but it is those corrupted officials, disgraced village cadres, and exploitative bosses who wrong!" Partly due to their political

and social segregation, they often do not know the names of leaders and officials in the city, towns and villages. Nevertheless, they have strong emotions against any repression resulting from their governance, simultaneously targeting government agencies while holding a strong belief in the state's capacity to help them.

In the residential compound of the village, rural migrants partially succeeded in resisting exploitation through noncooperation. In the installation of the digital entrance guard system in their rental housing, rural migrants overtly agreed with government officials and village police to install digital lockers and sensors or apply for temporary resident cards (TRCs) but covertly refused to pay for the installation and the application from their pockets. In their actions, secondary landlords refused to pay money to buy the locker. Thousands of rural migrants in the compound did not visit police stations for the application of the TRC. This prevented the government and the village collective from moving their management of rental housing forward. At last, secondary landlords and indigenous villagers separated the cost of the locker and sensor. In addition, the village police team had to reduce the cost of a TRC from 30 *yuan* to 8 *yuan* so that most rural migrants would accept the price and visit the police station to complete the application.

Certeau's concept of resistance in everyday life such as the "*la perruque*", "making do" and "walking in the city" is inevitably common in rural migrants' lives, almost imperceptibly resisting governance in covert ways. In the street recruitment, rural migrant job seekers reuse medical examination proofs as qualified materials multiple times, regardless of factory regulations that job seekers must have medical examinations conducted in clinics assigned by the industrialists. Factory recruiters might shirk their work by resting, chatting, reading novels or leaving early for lunch. They also disguise their shirking and consume working hours for their own uses through "*la perruque*": they may pretend to be recruiting workers while taking a nap or asking other recruiters to take their positions temporarily while leaving for meals. They also elude the authorities' inspection by "making do". Disguising their factories' address on recruitment posters, a few recruiters in a village temporarily visit other villages in order to camouflage themselves under village police's surveillance and hire

more unskilled workers. Rural migrants use/consume materials and time to make their products or alter authorities' production.

Rural migrants also use/consume spaces and alter their functions for their own production of spaces by the tactic of "walking in the city". In the early reform, a number of rural migrants left factory dorms to live in self-built farm sheds or empty tomb caves built by indigenous villagers. They succeed in using village collectives' materials such as wood and rice straws or products such as tomb caves as their free lodges. Nowadays, they choose to live in rental residential compounds but continuously rearrange the spaces of the compounds for their own uses. For instance, several secondary landlords add canopies above alleys and turn the alleys into a better place for relaxing and chatting with neighbors. Several others place stoves and tables, and add water pipes to the alleys to turn them into their kitchens. In the village, rural migrants broke fences at the center of the grand road creating a shortcut for themselves between the natural village and the rural migrants' living zone. These cases and other similar ones constantly take place in manufacturing towns and nudge governance without activating significant reactions from the authorities. Refusing to pay fees, many rural migrant vendors occupy sidewalks or squares with their booths in villages and towns. When government officials or village cadres chase them away, they will still come back in another time or occupy sidewalks and squares in other places.

Thus, rural migrants engage in two types of resistance in manufacturing towns: (1) self-organized and consequential resistance such as riots, strikes, protests, petitions and disputes; and (2) individual and temporary resistance such as petty crimes, tricks, rumors, humiliation, gossip, satire, criticism, and consumption for rural migrants' own production through the "making do", the "*la perruque*" and the "walking in the city". Rural migrants' resistance directs power exercises toward the governance and authorities although its purposes can be multiple. Directly affecting the governance and seeking social justice, rural migrants organize themselves in the first type of resistance. In the second type of resistance, rural migrants' cautious resistance with calculated complicity may seek social justice or self-benefit. Rural migrants use/consume the authorities' products, spaces and time, and operate their new production for self-beneficial purposes.

## II. The Third Type of Resistance: Production of Rural Migrants' Self

### A. Technologies of the Self as Resistance

For analyzing care for the self, Foucault develops technologies of the self: (technologies of the self) permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality (Foucault, 1988). In technologies of the self, Foucault stresses self-examinations of souls and activities of “worrying your souls” for caring for the self (ibid.). For instance, for accessing the reality of the world, Stoics examine themselves through four types of technologies of the self: (1) lettering friends and disclosing the self; (2) examination of the self and conscience through reviewing what has been done and will be done; (3) the *askesis* (self-discipline) of the progressive consideration of the self, or mastery over oneself; and (4) the interpretation of dreams (ibid.).

In two aspects, my research considers technologies of the self in relation to resistance. The first is that technologies of the self are a form of resistance because migrants may use them to mitigate or deny authorities' claims, or to advance their own claims. For instance, Stoics use self-examination to achieve objectives such as better access to reality, and avoid losing the self and missing the reality. In other words, the Stoics' use of technologies of the self helps them resist any possibility of inserting illusions such as materialistic desires in their belief into the self. Thus, Stoics retreat from armies and towns to the countryside for their spiritual access to their true self. In the case of Christianity, Christians practice their technologies of the self in (1) confession and *exomologesis*: a dramatic expression of the situation of the penitent as sinner which makes manifest his status as sinner; and (2) Christian *askesis* and *exagoresis*: a renunciation of the self for a complete obedience to someone else and of the reality for accessing another layer of reality (ibid.). Through these two types of

technologies of the self, Christians resist the temptation of sin, e.g. desires and pride, and claim to win eternity from death.

My research does not dispute other scholars' understanding of Foucault's interpretation of Stoicism and Christianity. Rather, it stresses that people's own claims of changing the self can be a form of resistance to any external claims and actions from authorities. In a change of the self, Stoics progressively move back to a true self while Christians gain a new self. Both Stoics and Christians practice their technologies of the self and shape their different/new identities. To Stoics, each step of progressive consideration of the self creates a polished identity with a closer relationship to the true self. To Christians, their renunciation of an old self through baptism creates new identities of being saved or invigorated as Christ's followers or missionaries.

The second aspect of consideration is how we study rural migrants' technologies of the self for their resistance. My research contends that it is necessary to examine rural migrants' bodies, behaviors, actions, speeches and writings as the expression of technologies of the self in order to understand rural migrants' self-examination of their thoughts and souls. In other words, it is the only through the study of expressions of technologies of the self that we can understand how they form a kind of resistance. As Scott (1985) argues, researchers rarely understand the purpose of peasants' actions if peasants do not explicitly explain it. Foucault studies ancient Greek and Christian technologies of the self through archives: their relevant speeches and writings in history. Likewise, for my research, it is crucial to examine the expression of rural migrants' technologies of the self beyond overt forms of resistance such as strikes and protests.

For studying rural migrants' technologies of the self as resistance, my research analyzes the ways in which rural migrants form their identifications. Rose (1999, p.43) argues for a method of understanding a governable subject itself: "One can analyze...the formation of identifications through the inscription of particular ethical formation, vocabularies of self-description and self-mastery, forms of conduct and body techniques." Likewise, my analysis makes inquiries into rural migrants' identities through their own

claims; how rural migrants practice their souls and thoughts through conduct in order to claim their identities; how they resist authorities through their identifications; and the consequences of their resistance.

In an analysis of the case of the young man washing himself, he applies his special technologies of the self and in a way resists governance. When factory recruitment posts openly indicate a preference for high-suzhi workers, and reject workers with unusual appearance such as long hair and tattoos (Appendix 3), rural migrant job seekers are very likely to obey these requests in the posts and internalize the discriminatory norms of appearance. The young man imagines that a pro-technology factory prefers workers with clean and light skin, which a technician or a poly-tech graduate should have. He dislikes his dark skin which identifies him with his fellow villagers, so he seeks a new identity of light skin he imagines as desired by industrialists. Thereby, he attempts to whiten his skin through continuous washing of his arms and hands in order to transform his identity. He also cares for himself through dreaming of higher salaries and accessing better welfare in the new town. In caring for himself, he votes by foot: he leaves other towns with the typical manufacturing industry for the new town. By doing so, he expects to develop a new self and resists staying in the low-paid and risky work, although he is still eager to work for industrialists.

Thus, rural migrants establish claims over their identity in manufacturing towns through their technologies of the self, forming a third type of resistance. In this type of resistance, rural migrants claim their own identities and govern themselves. Although rural migrants' exercise of these technologies can be indirect, unorganized, occasional, and compliant with authorities or used by authorities, this exercise advances rural migrants' own claim of caring for themselves. In comparison with the first and second type of resistance in which rural migrants outwardly target and resist authorities, rural migrants' technologies of the self are inward power exercises with the purpose of caring for themselves, which has the potential to challenge authorities and their governance.

## B. Rural Migrants' Technologies of the Self: Production of the Self through Consumption

In manufacturing towns, migrants produce their selves through their consumption, both in exercising the rural norms of low consumption and in the imitation of high-mass urban consumption. As discussed in chapter four, most rural migrants with low income have to consume low-price goods and prefer free services. By contrast, many rural migrants who are mostly young like to consume better goods and services as urban residents usually do. For instance, they buy computer desktops or laptops, surf the internet, visit night clubs, sing Karaoke, wear name brand clothes, and imitate Chinese pop stars' hairstyles. In terms of socioeconomic status, however, rural migrants do not fully lose their rural identities, nor do they become fully integrated as urban workers. They can belong to either or both the rural or urban sector, or, as some have argued, compose a third sector differing from the dual urban-rural sectors (Whyte, 2010; Wu, 2010). Their ambiguous status has blurred and fragmented traditional peasant and urban worker identities (Pun, 2005). As the popular name of rural migrant workers (*nongmingong*) denotes, both peasant and urban identity exist in rural migrants' socioeconomic characteristics.

Through the production of the self, rural migrants claim their own identities to resist being pigeonholed as cheap labor in the manufacturing industry and designated as secondary citizens by the authorities. In moving to the city, many rural migrants hope to transform their peasant identity into an urban one. Rural migrants exercise and produce their peasant and/or urban selves through two types of consumption. In the first type of production of the self, rural migrants claim their peasants' identities through low consumption. In the second type, rural migrants claim a new identity mimicking urban residents through an imitation of urban consumption. In doing so, rural migrants reproduce themselves in relation to peasants or urban residents while advancing their own claims and will, as well as resisting the production of cheap factory labor and secondary citizens.

### 1. Massive Low Consumption and Claim of Peasants' Identities

Rural migrants in manufacturing towns engage in what I call “massive low consumption.” This seeming oxymoron arises because migrants’ total consumption is at once ‘massive’ in terms of their large population, but quite low at the scale of the individual due to their low income. Migrants, therefore, consume inexpensive goods and utilize free services wherever possible on a massive scale. In the retail street of the village, the most popular items are cheap clothes, accessories, and box lunches of Chinese fast food, all of which street vendors sell. In rural migrants’ residential compounds in the village, the rental fee of a room is usually 10 *yuan* to 30 *yuan* per day while a hotel by the village center may charge several hundred *yuan* per day. Every evening, enormous amounts of rural migrants leave their factories and crowd the retail street, demonstrating the massive scale of their low-consumption.

Under “massive low consumption”, rural migrants construct their identities in two different ways. First, migrants consume public goods and occupy public spaces according to rural norms. Rural migrants squatting on sidewalks, sitting on open grounds such as vacant lots and lawns, and sleeping on park benches are all common scenes in manufacturing towns. In front of factory entrances, workers frequently sit or squat on sidewalks in the late afternoon and evening when they finish their shifts and wait for buses. Generally, they use public spaces for rest: playing with their cellphones, having cigarettes, or occasionally chatting with their coworkers and friends.

In one village in the town I studied, village collectives simply laid out several stone benches in a grid on the dirt of a small street park. Flourishing trees offer shade that attracts migrants looking for a spot to hide from the burning sunlight of South China. Instead of sitting on these short and narrow benches, many of them lie down, squeezing their legs or laying on their side. Other migrants in the park may talk loudly nearby and honking vehicles drive by. However, both men and women display an impressive ability to rest and sleep on benches, sidewalks, and streets (Figure 7.2). These rural migrants are not homeless—they usually leave the park after their nap, and no one sleeps there over night. They prefer to rest and sleep in a clean and quiet place, as people commonly enjoy.

Nevertheless, as their village fellows and ancestors do, they are accustomed to dirt and soil.

Closeness to the land and soil is a major part of peasants' identity. Peasants live and die for their land. Fei Xiaotong (1948/1992 p.37&38) sheds insight on peasants' "soiled" identity with his own experience:

Country people cannot do without the soil because their very livelihood is based upon it... City dwellers scorn country people for their closeness to the land; they treat them as if they were truly 'soiled.' But to country people, the soil is the root of their lives. In rural areas, the god represented in the most shrines is Tudi, the god of the earth. Tudi is the god closest to human nature... When I went abroad for the first time my nanny slipped something wrapped in red paper into the bottom of my suitcase... In the package was dirt that she had scraped from her stove.

In a traditional Chinese rural society, it is a mundane scene to see children chasing each other in open rural land for fun while adults team up to water farmland (Fei, 1946). In another example, peasants in Gao village in Jiangxi province fight to death with neighbor villagers in order to claim ditches and water draining crops as their own resource (Gao, 1999). Similarly, in his analysis of the French peasants' festivals, Lefebvre (1991) argues that peasants find their pleasure and order through their association with the earth, their land, which is presented humanly, e.g. being wounded harrowed by the plough, and sexually, e.g. being fruitful. Land and soil are not dirt but the essence of everyday life to peasants.

Nowadays, Chinese farmers still maintain their tie to land and soil as intrinsically embedded in their spirit, culture, and life. In the over five hundred villages in Dongguan, land God temples are commonly worshipped. Village collectives commonly build one temple for each natural village. Most of these temples have never wanted sacrifices to land Gods: indigenous villagers light incense and red candles or place fresh fruits as offerings from time to time. In the village, factory buildings and rental houses have alcoves for the land God's plaque worshiped by indigenous villagers or foreign

industrialists from Hong Kong or Taiwan. In the preserved farmland on the far west of the village, farmers from remote villages in Guangdong rent farmland from the village collective and build their sheds by the farmland. Wearing clothes covered with soil stains, they step into the watered farmland and plant water spinach, a type of vegetable common in South China. When they rest, they sit on ridges between pieces of farmland, smoking and chatting.

As indigenous villagers claim sovereignty to their land in Dongguan, rural migrants maintain their own sovereignty through various ties to their hometowns. These migrants own their property such as land and housing in their hometowns. They may also share dividends of village economic cooperatives. Importantly, as strangers in Dongguan, they may value their social relations with village fellows in their hometowns. As discussed on the effectiveness of CALH in chapter three, quite a few rural migrants are not active in applying for local *hukou* and not willing to become Dongguan citizens. Two independent surveys from Dalingshan Town government and Dongcheng District government indicates that rural migrants' biggest concern with their property is land.<sup>98</sup> One rural migrant worker quoted in the survey says:

I am under a contract of land in my hometown, and my wife and children are living in my hometown. Each year, [my family] can receive a little welfare and some dividends [from my village]. My children can claim their land for building sites and other types of land in the future. If we locate our *hukou* to Dongguan, we are obligated to give up land and benefits in my hometown. Once [I] lose my job in Dongguan, it will become a problem to make a living.

Rural migrants' own sovereignty legitimates their power of claiming peasants' identities, at least a portion of them. It is common to display their rural identities by building their houses in their hometowns. Few migrants in my interviews expect to settle down permanently in Dongguan. Instead, no matter if they are relatively poor or rich,

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<sup>98</sup> See *Report of credit accumulation of local hukou in Dongcheng District*, XSMB (n.d.), accessed on July 24, 2013, retrieved from <http://dxxgr.dg.gov.cn/7030.html>

Also see *Report of credit accumulation of local hukou in Dalangshan*, *ibid* (n.d.), accessed on July 24, 2013, retrieved from <http://www.chinesetools.eu/tools/chinese-to-pinyin/index.php#transcribe>

young or old, diligent or lazy, most of them save money to build their houses. By doing so, they plan to return to the countryside when they age. For instance, one middle-aged couple in the big factory took nine months leave from their jobs in order to go back to their hometowns and build a house for themselves and their son. Several relatively rich secondary landlords have purchased market-rate apartments in their town centers even though villages have redistributed their land to other farmers. Owning their houses and embedded in social relations in their hometowns, they identify themselves as rooted in the countryside and can retreat from local sovereignty in Dongguan at last. One young rural migrant compares Dongguan and his hometown in Guizhou province:

In recent years, inflation in my hometown quickly went up. Here (Dongguan), a bowl of rice noodle costs five *yuan*. It costs eight or ten *yuan* in my hometown. A bottle of beer costs five *yuan* here, but ten *yuan* in my hometown... I have a group of friends and relatives there [my hometown]. It also costs me a lot to play poker (gambling) and share decent cigarettes with them...]. In comparison, life in here [Dongguan] is simple... However, we do not have land here. I will still build my house back in my hometown.

Rural migrants can behave in the same way as their ancestors and village fellows farming in their hometowns. They do not regard themselves as abnormal or secondary Chinese but as farmers with an unbreakable relationship with land and soil. Characteristic of massive low consumption, most of them have no interest to pay for their rest and leisure by consuming tea or food in restaurants or teahouses. Caring little for the government's guidance of 'civilized' behavior and paying little attention to the locals' discrimination, they sit on sidewalks, squat on soil, chat with each other, smoke, and play with their cellphones, or spit, even though a sign reminding to keep a public order of a park or square is beside them. In doing so, rural migrants claim and reproduce their farmers' identity instead of following the government's guidance or subjecting to the local's discrimination. Claiming a farmer's identity tied to land and soil, they temporarily occupy the space and alter the use of space for the reproduction of themselves, sitting, sleeping, or spitting instead of walking or consuming goods in streets. Rural migrants,

then, may serve as the authorities' labor force, but they resist the authorities' attempts to guide them into 'civilized' urban behavior.

The second method of reproducing peasants' identities in the city is through taking advantage of free services for leisure and relaxation. In a rural migrants' residential compound, there is a square surrounded by shop houses. Every night, one of the storeowners organizes a free dancing event from 7:30pm to 10:00pm. This storeowner provides stereos, CD players, Microphones and operational staff. There is a temporary stage made of a steel base and wooden deck. Usually, one staff member operates the stereos as a DJ while another one leads rural migrants in dances on the stage. Nevertheless, occasionally several rural migrants including children step on stage and lead dances. A few women bring towels and hot water pots. Several actively participate in dancing and skillfully move their bodies with the rhythm of the music, while others simply surround the stage, watching the dances and enjoying the event. Although some of the music has rhythms that might normally call for a particular style of dancing, no one is willing to follow any formula. The youth typically move and shake their bodies at faster paces than others. Many middle-aged dancers were very skillful, rotating and jumping with elegance. Several elders moved slowly and clumsily but followed their own beat. One night when I was there, a man danced in wildly exaggerated motions. He was so out of rhythm with the music that a little kid leading the dance screamed to the staff, "Look at that guy! His body movement is so huge. His butt goes everywhere!"

Just like the man swinging his body on a large scale, rural migrants fully took advantage of the dancing event, exercised their autonomy, and demonstrated their own choices. I had a quick chat with one onlooker to understand the event.

"Could you please tell who hosted the dancing event?" I asked.

"It is that DJ's boss... This event takes place every night... It is to improve people's livelihoods [here]. We come here very often," the onlooker replied.

"It seems that the boss is benevolent," I followed his answer.

“This...probably is true...but he also activates his business in the square through our dancing event.”

Meanwhile, the DJ paused the event and complained to a few people asking him to play their favorite music:

“I know some of you prefer to ballroom dance and do not like group dance. But I have my principle—only play ballroom dance music after group dance... You can complain to my manager, but I have my principle. I play music in this order every night... All of us migrate out of our hometowns to work here. [We should] understand and appreciate each other a little bit.”

Even though their low consumption might benefit authorities, and their choices and autonomy might conflict with each other, rural migrants could reconcile quickly for practicing their technologies of the self, dancing collectively in this event. After speaking loudly through his microphone, the DJ started to play music, and people immediately gathered again, moving bodies in rhythms.

In manufacturing towns, there are many similar activities going on for migrants. Some businesspersons provide rural migrants free movies and TV shows, gathering crowds in front of their stores. In the village, a super market shows free movies, mostly action movies, in a parking lot by the retail street every evening. Without chairs, many rural migrants stand, sit or squat on concrete ground, watching movies projected on a temporary two-by-two-meter. Occasionally, village police drop by. Rather than interrupt the show, they often stay and watch. In other cases, companies rent an open space in the village and host shows or games of entertainments, send out free samples, and introduce rural migrants to their products such as local beers and electronic products. Rural migrants crowd around the shows, attending games and enjoying themselves.

In all these free events and activities of dancing, watching movies or shows, or enjoying small free presents, rural migrants reproduce their physical labor as a part of their peasant identities rather than as a commodity sold to industrialists. According to

Marxism, workers' everyday life such as their work, leisure and family life in capitalism is an alienation of labor (Lefebvre, 1991; Marx et al. 1867/1952). When workers produce goods, they inevitably objectify their labor and individuality into these goods, and capitalists own these goods by paying wages, which are smaller than the labor value in terms of price, to workers, and exploit the rest of the value as surplus value (ibid.). The alienation of labor is a devaluation of the human world and the loss of reality for workers: workers become commodity for sale; workers' labor, e.g. physical power, turns into an object in the process of objectification of labor and lose its human nature (Lefebvre, ibid.). In factories, rural migrants sell their labor at cheap prices, around 2,000 to 3,000 *yuan* a month that they cannot save much after spending for their basic needs, intensively working 70-to-80 hours a week. In factory dormitories or rental housing, they have to accept the alienation of labor in order to pay for accommodation. Rejecting the alienation of factory labor, however, rural migrants find their joyfulness, relax themselves, restore their vigor and still regain their physical labor after working all day long. Similar to rest and relaxation by squatting on sidewalks or soil, rural migrants consume these free spaces, leisure, entertainments and products in order to enjoy themselves and reproduce their labor.

Rural migrants retrieve their peasant identities through gaining physical labor without alienation, and therefore can take further actions to resist governance. In their participation in dancing, watching movies and shows, and taking free presents, migrants achieve autonomy and self-organization, and fulfill their own desires. In the dancing activity, they can choose music and dancing styles they like, and dance in groups while coordinating body movements by themselves. In watching movies and shows, they choose whether they join in the activities, take presents, buy retailers' products or not under their own will. Few rural migrants purchase retailers' goods when attending these activities. Instead, they enjoy themselves while they move their bodies with the music and relax their minds through playing games or watching action movies and shows. In so doing, they care for their own livelihood, enjoying themselves. As a result, they restore their natural human physical power after losing it through their intensive work every day. It is true that they have to go back to the factory to work the next day. Nevertheless, in

terms of resistance, firstly, they manage to regain their labor and individuality without being alienated in the assembly line. Second, they can take further action of resistance as against things like reassignments of their jobs after their reproduction of labor through free services.

## 2. Mimicking Urban Residents by Imitating Urban Consumption

Massive low consumption is prevalent but not the only style of consumption. Urban consumption deeply influences rural migrants in villages. Even though the village is away from the urban center of Dongguan, it is not a remote Chinese village. Under rapid economic growth, there has been wide scale, yet polarized, development in Dongguan's villages. In one natural village, there is a high-rise hotel standing by the intersection between the grand road and the retail street. It is the tallest building in the village, with golden ornamentation on the roof and window frames. Its four-story-high canopy in front of the main entrance is a mimic of European classic architecture style: grand Roman-style columns and a golden parapet with architraves on the top. With its high-end services, this hotel is only for the rich: industrialists, some indigenous villagers and government officials. Rural migrants never enter it and could not afford the luxurious consumption in which a meal might cost them one-month's salary. Nevertheless, they can always see the hotel as a symbol of high-end consumption in the village. If customers are not satisfied with the inexpensive inns and food, rural migrants in the retail street might point to the high-rise hotel for an alternative while emphasizing its high expense.

Urban consumption is not only a symbol. It also catches rural migrants' desire and attracts them to experience and practice it on themselves. One of the rural migrants' favorite and most expensive goods is cellphones. There are around twenty small telecommunication stores in the retail street that sell a large number of inexpensive emulations of name-brand cellphones. While a cellphone normally costs over one thousand *yuan* in urban markets, some retailers in the street sell cellphones with a "factory price" (*gongchang jia*) around two hundred *yuan* that retailers claim is close to manufacturing cost. In the retail street, there is also a KTV, a nightclub, a skating rink,

two internet bars and many cellphone stores, all of which are common in the town centers or any urban center in Chinese cities. At night and on weekends, young rural migrants fill these places. In addition, some of them stand out with stylish hair that mimics pop stars, earrings and necklaces, and tattoos on their arms, necks, or backs. Some of them may wear American-brand jeans and Nike shoes with locally made T-shirts or dress suits with slippers. Rural migrants can be attracted by and learn from urban consumption and mimic luxurious consumption practices even given the constraints of their low salaries.

Given the desire of learning or mimicking urban consumption, young rural migrants can easily spend all of their savings within a short period. After this, they have to find a factory job quickly. In the street recruitment, one man in his thirties complained about his obsession with internet surfing to me, while seeking a job with higher salary. He blames himself for spending so much money in internet bars with his uncontrolled hobby while a factory recruiter urges him to quit wandering in the retail street and work in the factory.

While some rural migrants are actively involved in factory production, some others choose a different path. In villages, it is common to see some young rural migrants wandering around in the streets. They select a lifestyle of temporary unemployment interspersed with short-term periods of (several months) employment. Their lives in the city follow a pattern of working for several months before quitting their jobs to enjoy their lives in internet bars, playing computer games, singing karaoke, roller skating, and strolling through towns, before looking for new jobs when their money runs out. Some of them work in a factory for only a couple of days—if they do not like a factory, they immediately quit and try another one. A group of young rural migrants wandering in a retail street told me that they could not bear the rigid requirements of the factory in the first day and quickly quit their jobs the next day. Playing with his friends and smoking, one of them boasted to me that he had travelled to most areas in Dongguan for fun over the past several years but could not remember how many factories he had worked for.

It is common for rural migrants to counterfeit their identities in order to work in the factory. Advertisements for counterfeit stamps and certificates are commonly adhered on walls and light poles. One rural migrant in his 40s claims that he used his younger brother's ID card in order to work in his factory while showing me his ID Card. Factory recruiters told me that their factory found out that some child workers who were under sixteen used fake ID cards to obtain work in their factories. One girl was discovered to have used her elder sister's ID card in factory recruitment and could not pass the last step of examination to sign a contract in the factory. Rural migrants change their identities by hiding their real ages, forging a young and energetic self and deceiving the factory in order to turn themselves into the kind of labor that the factory demands.

In other cases, young rural migrants cultivate themselves for developing a new self to suit the city's labor market. Various professional schools in the industries of computers, graphic and mold designs, make up, marketing and management are popular in towns and villages. Targeting young rural migrants' will for self-development, a professional training school advertises its education in streets: "do not waste our short youth in the long assembly line; when you walk into our school, you will find out what a junior high school graduate is doing." For several thousand *yuan*, young rural migrants can receive local professional training in several months and receive a professional certificate. However, no one guarantees that these migrants can change their career and have a stable urban life. In Songshanhu, young rural migrants expect better career development through their preparation. For instance, some of them start to prepare their resumes and give compliments in their self-evaluation in order to find a good job in Songshanhu instead of other towns.

As the young man whitens his skin, rural migrants intend to change their identities in order to be better off. It is the extension of the process of the rural-urban migration for farmers to reject their rural identity and seek a new identity as an urban resident while leaving their hometowns. In the process within manufacturing towns, rural migrants change their appearance to mimic iconic pop stars or businessmen as successful urban people. They counterfeit their identity in order to identify themselves as the young and

energetic adults the manufacturing industry demands. In addition, they attend various professional training classes to cultivate and educate themselves in order to gain a new urban identity such as young professionals, technicians, make-up artists, office clerks and the like for moving up in or out of the manufacturing industry.

Thus, this technology of the self is a mimicking technique for rural migrants to match their identities to successful urban residents. In this technique, rural migrants first target an iconic image, e.g. appearance and behavior of successful urban people such as technicians, pop stars and businessmen as their models of imitation. Second, they buy products and services, e.g. a faked ID card or a certificate of professional training class, imitating urban identities through the style of urban consumption. Third, they can quickly equip these products and services to mark themselves with new identities mimicking urban people. Just as some factories make bootlegged iPhones to profit in the local market, some rural migrants transfer their identities to a level similar, but not identical, to urban people to try to gain an upper hand in the urban labor markets. However, just as imitation iPhones can mimic the outer shell but does not function as well as the genuine article, these rural migrants practicing their mimicking technique reach for, but rarely touch, the reality of urban people's self within the governance in manufacturing towns.

### 3. Vote by Foot

Rural migrants can choose to desert manufacturing towns in a way of voting by foot. As many soldiers' desertion destroy an army (Scott, 1985), a great number of rural migrants' desertion from the manufacturing industry can diminish production and shake the industry. Their practices of producing the self of migrants facilitate their resistance to stabilizing manufacturing production. As floating population, rural migrants with their peasants' identity or imitation urban residents' identities reproduce their labor force and can choose to vote by foot: escape from the manufacturing production, the governance in manufacturing towns or certain authorities' control. For instance, in 2008 after the global financial crisis, around 20 million rural migrants returned to their hometowns even when some factories were desperately looking for labor (NBSC, 2010, March 19; Zonghe,

2009, February 02). Today, the lack of labor is still a big problem for factories in Dongguan due to the rapidly diminishing rural labor surplus. By withholding their labor from Dongguan, rural migrants can seriously impact the governance in manufacturing towns.

Claiming to be rooted in their hometowns, rural migrants' sovereignty empowers their rural identities against the governance in manufacturing towns. Their land and houses that rural migrants either build on their land or purchased in hometowns are their economic security as well as symbols of their sovereignty and rural identities. They disobey the governance by sending money back and investing in their hometowns, as well as planning a future to leave manufacturing towns. As soldiers are eager to return to their families and thereafter desert their troops (Scott, 1985), rural migrants may dream to reunify their big families in hometowns, and plan ahead to quit their factory jobs and leave Dongguan someday.

Claiming rural identities, rural migrants as the floating population form their group actions to walk away from the town's governance. In the one-to-two-month long Chinese Spring Festival travel season, rural migrants move back to their hometowns before the festival and come back to the coastal area to work afterwards each year. Unlike urban residents, including my own family and many other urban residents who may choose to stay in the city for the festival, most of the over-200 million rural migrants routinely move back and forth between their hometowns and manufacturing towns such as Dongguan in the travel season. Once a year, they return for a reunion with their family members, relatives and friends, and engage in all kinds of local rural traditions in their hometowns. In the travel season, manufacturing production inevitably drops down every year.<sup>99</sup> In another example, skilled rural migrants do not actively join in the application for local *hukou* of Dongguan. One of the reasons is that they would like to maintain rural identities to maintain their interest in their rural land, loosened family planning for rural

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<sup>99</sup> The number of industrial products in the winter quarter (January to March), when the Spring Festival occurs, is the smallest in the products of the four quarters in a year. For instance, the industrial products in the four quarters in 2010 are 32.246, 47.838, 481.82, 53.02 billion *yuan* in Dongguan, respectively. See DSB (2011, p63&64).

households and social ties in comparison with the uncertainty of completely relinquishing their rural *hukou* for receiving the local urban *hukou*.<sup>100</sup>

With the will of transforming their identities and claiming their new self as urban residents, rural migrants, especially young rural migrants, may choose to leave the typical manufacturing industry for a better life. Some of them such as the young man washing his skin expect to work in the pro-technological town instead of others. Some others will choose temporary unemployment. With several months' salary, they can live in manufacturing towns for a couple of months. Through unemployment, they gain their free time and enjoy their urban lives. There is no statistical data on the number of temporary unemployed in Dongguan, but in my field studies, I observed many young rural migrants who prefer temporary work in small factories to long-term employment in big factory plants. In fact, labor-outsourcing companies specializing in recruiting temporary workers for factories thrive in Dongguan.

Rural migrants' vote by foot occurs not only when they leave for their hometowns but also when they stay in manufacturing towns. Rural migrants' unemployment threatens governance by weakening manufacturing production. When a large number of rural migrants leave for their hometowns in either the Chinese Spring Festival travel season or after the global financial crisis, the manufacturing industry dramatically decreases. When those young rural migrants choose to be employed temporarily for several months, factories lose their control of labor. One of the two women recruiters explains to me the reason, "In the assembly line, an unskilled worker has to take a period, say, one month to get familiar with the production, [and to learn] cooperation with other workers and the management... It is impossible for the assembly line to continue to run when a group of workers suddenly quit [their] jobs." When groups of rural migrants suddenly leave the factory from time to time, manufacturing production becomes inefficient.

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<sup>100</sup> See XSMB, (n.d.), *Report of credit accumulation of local hukou in Dalangshan*, accessed on July 8, 2013, retrieved from <http://www.chinesetools.eu/tools/chinese-to-pinyin/index.php#transcribe>. Also see *ibid*, (n.d.), *Report of credit accumulation of local hukou in Dongcheng District*, accessed July 8, 2013, retrieved from <http://dngxgr.dg.gov.cn/7030.html>

Figure 7.2 Rural Migrants within Low Consumption Resting in a Street Park



A street park of a village is installed with simple and crude facilities of concrete benches and trash bins. With peasants' identities reaching land, soil and nature and in low consumption, rural migrants behave their "soiled" and regardless conduct in rest to restore their physical labor force.

Figure 7.3 Two Young Woman Rural Migrants Imitating Urban Consumption



Two young woman rural migrants are using a cellphone to take photos of themselves. Carrying a locally made handbag, one of them dresses stylishly, like an urban girl.

Source: Photos by the author

### III. Impact of Rural Migrants' Resistance to Governance

Rural migrants' resistance urges the three authorities to reform their governance practices continuously. Rural migrants' self-organized social events can shake the foundation of the governance and alerts the authorities to invest more resources into governing rural migrants and stabilizing society. Rural migrants' cautious resistance through petty crimes, deception and tricks urge the three authorities to search for new governing technologies of management and services for rural migrants. Rural migrants' vote by foot through temporary desertion of the manufacturing industry reproduces their own identities and advances their own claims, and drives the authorities to reduce exploitation and discrimination. Rural migrants' resistance pushes the authorities to continuously modify their governance into a more delicate and disciplinary formation, e.g. the "invisible filter" of the governance in non-factory areas, than formal rigid and coercive governance, e.g. the "invisible wall" of the *hukou* system. The authorities adjust their political rationality, advance governing technologies, and develop governable spaces with respect to rural migrants' resistance in order to maintain the manufacturing production.

Of the three authorities, the government is taking the leading role in transforming manufacturing towns and reforming governance to alleviate resistance. The government intends to resolve rural migrants' resistance through the operation of its pastoral power. As the government claims:

"The unprecedented industrialization and urbanization with the large scale of migration brings up various contradictions and problems while greatly vitalizing the development and progression of society. [The government] can only follow mechanisms of the society, carefully deal with contradictions within the masses... continuously reduce and solve these contradictions, thereby solving problems at the local level.... In so doing, [the government] can improve the development of the harmonious society." (Source?)

Seeing rural migrants' increasing resistance as unsettling society, the government reinforces the necessity of its guidance of rural migrants: it regards their resistance as contradiction within the masses and expects to resolve the problem of resistance through the government/cadre-mass relation.

In response to resistance, the government may repress rural migrants' organizational resistance but it also attempts to guide rural migrants in order to eliminate their desire to participate in social events in the first place. On the one hand, the government could wave its "stick" and suppress the three rural migrants' social events before they escalated into urban riots. Although the government's repression of these social events is outside the scope of everyday life on which my research focuses, it is important and worthwhile to our understanding of the reaction of the governance under rural migrants' extreme resistance. On the other hand, a choice of guidance can succeed in dissolving the potential for rural migrants' social events to occur. In response to rural migrants' potential organizational resistance, the government in Dongguan reinforces its guidance instead of expanding its repression. For instance, responding to the social event in Xintang Town of Zengcheng, government officials in Zhongtang Town in Dongguan which is next to Xintang immediately reached out to rural migrants whose village fellows were involved in the social unrest and, according to the government, alleviated their agitation and stabilized society (People's Daily, 2011, August 02). Government officials reach and understand rural migrants' thoughts, educate them to comply with law, and thereafter maintain social stability.

Rural migrants' resistance also triggers the alteration of the three authorities' collaboration. With respect to resistance such as rural migrants' strikes, the government may empower rural migrants instead of prioritizing the other two authorities, especially industrialists. In addition to the state exhibiting its care for rural migrants through issuing opinions to local governments and society, some local governments and other state agencies take actions to empower rural migrants against industrialists at local levels. In the Honda Strike in Foshan, the government did not collaborate with foreign industrialists. Instead, scholars in a university acted as the government's agents to work with both the industrialists and young rural migrants, and bring them to negotiations and help them to reach consensus. The government highlights that it has been investigating industrialists' behavior of wage arrears and withdrawn 1.53 billion *yuan* for over one million rural migrants (ibid.). In the case of the 30-year old rural migrant's wage arrears, the journalist noted to the rural migrant, "My town established a compensation system. Enterprises must pay a security fee for avoiding arrears of wages. Even though the boss runs

away, workers can still claim an amount of reimbursement from the government.” Nowadays, the government does not necessarily collaborate with industrialists in every circumstance.

Resistance triggers the authorities to rely on disciplinary governing technologies, e.g. examination, more than coercion and punishment. It is Sun Zhigang’s resistance of the police’s examination and detention of rural migrants that caused the abolishment of the custody and repatriation procedure (CRP) in 2003. Rural migrants’ cautious resistance and temporary tactical resistance weaken the authorities’ overt coercion through exploitation, e.g. mandatory requirements of registration and charging various fees. The government of Dongguan is proposing to assign selected rural migrants instead of indigenous villagers to administer other rural migrants in their residences (XMSB, 2012 December). The government expects that this can draw more connection between administrators/managers and rural migrants, and thereby facilitate effective governance. In addition, the 2010 Foxconn suicides alerted foreign industrialists to pay greater attention to rural migrants’ working conditions and reduce coercive factory exploitation. Since early 2013, the big factory plants in the village have adjusted workers’ off-duty time from 9:30pm to 7:30pm while maintaining the same salaries as before, due to a request from its American headquarters. The authorities are reducing direct repression and punishment but relying more on subtler disciplinary techniques.

Regarding rural migrants’ vote by foot, the authorities are transforming manufacturing towns in order to maintain manufacturing production and continuous economic growth. This results in two types of spatial reconfigurations. The first is that both the government and foreign industrialists relocate manufacturing industry from the coastal area to inland China in order to absorb local farmers. For instance, when the Guangdong government is relocating the labor-intensive and low-value-added manufacturing industry out of the PRD, Foxconn has moved its plants with hundreds of thousands of rural migrant workers from Shenzhen to towns of inland cities such as Chengdu, Wuhan and Zhenzhou after 2010. The second is that the government is renewing dilapidated factory buildings, villages and towns while turning villages into urban communities. Through renewal, the government intends to destroy these dilapidated settings and may plan urban settings for pro-technology industries. As in Songshanhu, the government

expects to turn rural land into urban land in order to control urban development, continuously upgrade industrialization, and govern rural migrants accordingly in the future.

In summary, rural migrants resist the authorities' governance, especially its coercion, repression, and exploitation. My research identifies three types of rural migrants' resistance: self-organized social events, individual resistance through consumption as production, and their production of the self. Although their self-organized social events do not prevail in daily life, rural migrants' industrial disputes, strikes, and riots have escalated in terms of number and scale during recent years. In their everyday life, individual rural migrants can consume authorities' "belongings" as production for rural migrants' benefit temporarily and tactically. These "belongings" can be authorities' properties, products, reputation, trust, stories, spaces, time, etc. Through this consumption, rural migrants turn authorities' "belongings" into their own while producing their own properties, products, spaces, and enjoyment.

Moreover, rural migrants also produce their peasant identities and imitate urban residents' identities through consumption as their technologies of the self. This, in a way, resists their identities defined as rural migrants, e.g. floating population and secondary citizens. Rural migrants claim peasants' "soiled" identity, consume cheap or free products and services, and restore their physical labor and reject the authorities' attempts to alienate it into manufacturing products. In addition, some rural migrants who are mostly young also claim urban residents' identities by mimicking urban high-end consumption. By doing so, they look on themselves as urban residents, resist their current poor economic conditions as well as relatively low social status, and might expect to improve themselves. Under the motivation of producing their own self, rural migrants can take actions of vote by foot: either temporarily, periodically, or permanently moving back to their hometowns, or moving from one town to another in order to find better jobs in high-tech factories. This vote by foot is a desertion from manufacturing production and can weaken or might destroy either individual factories or the whole production base of manufacturing towns.

## Conclusions

### I. Transforming Governance of Rural Migrants: “Invisible Filters” in Manufacturing Towns

The governance of rural migrants in non-factory areas—town and village centers, as well as rural migrants’ living zones in manufacturing towns—has strengthened the treatment of Chinese rural migrants as ongoing resources of factory labor during the reform period. Reinforcing the effect of labor supply and industrialists’ governance in factories, this governance in non-factory areas acts as an “invisible filter”, screening some rural migrants for inclusion as qualified factory labor and excluding the rest. These “invisible filters” involve local authorities’ implementation of their governing technologies interrelated with development of manufacturing towns. The screening mechanism of “invisible filters” is the local authorities’ heterogeneous conduct for dividing, segregating, examining, policing, selecting, reaching, cultivating, and finally organizing rural migrants while accordingly shaping the spaces of town and village centers, as well as rural migrants’ living zones. As a result, local authorities absorb a few high-*suzhi* rural migrants who are young, docile, devoted, skilled, and higher educated into advanced programs in factories while including most rural migrants as ongoing resources of cheap labor, and excluding the rest as dangerous personnel. In contrast, rural migrants who are not simply obedient may resist their governance.

My dissertation summarizes these “invisible filters” through a model of the governance of rural migrants in manufacturing towns (Chart 1). Building on Nicholas Rose’s frame of governance, this model consists of the following five points:

1. There are three governing authorities—local governments, village collectives, and industrialists—in manufacturing towns.

2. The three authorities operate three types of governmentalities—the government’s pastoral power, the village collectives’ sovereignty over village space, and industrialists’ factory discipline.
3. The authorities are encountering three major problems: (a) the rapidly diminishing rural labor surplus across the nation; (b) the labor-intensive, low-value-added, and environmentally polluting characteristics of the typical manufacturing industry; (c) and rural migrants’ escalating resistance.
4. The authorities’ purpose of governance is to sustain manufacturing production by maintaining a safe rural migrant labor force.
5. To resolve the problems and achieve their goals, the authorities implement various governing technologies that shape spaces of non-factory areas accordingly, in order to conduct different types of rural migrants. As “invisible filters”, this governance includes certain types of rural migrants in corresponding factory programs and excludes the rest.

My dissertation unfolds several findings with respect to the five points of the model. First, regarding point two, it contends that the government in a way attempts to maintain its pastoral power through the mass line and the development of *suzhi* as the basis of the government/official-migrant relations that succeeds and transforms the historical CCP/cadre-mass relation. On the one hand, the government implements the mass line to reach, understand, research, and cultivate rural migrants, and may care for a few high-*suzhi* rural migrants by providing urban welfare and services. On the other hand, both the notion of *suzhi* and the mass line create a moral frame that assigns values to rural migrants as either safe labor or as the *lapsi* of development. Local governments and village collectives, then, establish a system of policing migrants according to these value judgments.

Second, regarding point three and four, the three authorities aim at maintaining manufacturing production and the security of rural migrants in order to resolve the three problems. In general, the three authorities have been collaborating with each other for decades. Nowadays, industrialists collaborate with village collectives to maintain the production of the labor-intensive manufacturing industry in villages. The government directs

village collectives to govern rural migrants in rental housing and requests industrialists to secure workers in factories. Nevertheless, in order to sustain production through establishing a labor-qualified, technology-intensive, and ecological manufacturing industry, the government excludes village collectives and the typical manufacturing industry outside Songshanhu.

Third, regarding point five, the authorities' spatial governance as "invisible filters" has been transforming since the 2000s. The authorities have developed governing technologies that increasingly differentiate between skilled and unskilled rural migrants. The "invisible filter" in town and village centers incorporates a few young, docile, devoted, higher-educated, skilled rural migrants as local residents and in advanced factory programs but still socioeconomically excludes the majority as it has since reforms began. The government and industrialists operate governing technologies such as locally defined *suzhi*, the CALH, and talent markets to form the "invisible filter". The heavy investment in spaces of town and village central squares symbolizes the government's ideals such as the "well-off" and "happy" society, and cultivates rural migrants to follow the guidance of the "invisible filter".

"Invisible filters" in rural migrants' living zones in villages—retail streets and rural migrants' residential compounds—which village collectives develop and partition, serve factories unskilled rural migrants. Industrialists and village collectives turn major retail streets into labor markets as a new "invisible filter" through which industrialists with specific gender preferences only select young, healthy, docile, and low-educated rural migrants as unskilled workers, and exclude the rest. In rural migrants' rental housing, the operation of the program of governing rural migrants by managing rental housing has been forming another new "invisible filter". This operation, in a way, exhibits Panopticism in registering, partitioning, and monitoring both rural migrants and rental housing to exclude a few rural migrants as dangerous personnel and include the rest as resources of unskilled labor. As a result, the "invisible filter" with which village collectives' exercise their sovereignty diminishes the government's guidance of developing rural migrants' well-being at the local level of villages where most rural migrants live and work.

Implementing green governmentality, the government plans and develops nature and resources of the territory of Songshanhu, and matches higher-educated and skilled rural migrants as well as other people with different layers of the territory according to the measure of quality (*suzhi* to rural migrants). The government implements science, local culture, and housing development to assign and develop quality in different layers of the territory. By doing so, the government can locate people with different levels of *suzhi* into corresponding layers with similar levels of quality due to the legitimacy of developing the labor-qualified, technology-intensive, and ecological manufacturing industry. This is also a new “invisible filter”, which only includes a few higher-educated and skilled rural migrants on the periphery of the town and excludes the rest.


In contrast, rural migrants’ may resist coercion, repression, and exploitation associated with the governance by implementing their power technologies and reshaping the spaces of manufacturing towns (Chart 1). There are three types of rural migrants’ resistance: (1) self-organized social events such as disputes, petition, strikes and riots by temporarily occupying manufacturing towns; (2) individual consumption of the authorities’ “belongings” such as products, properties, reputation, time and spaces as production of rural migrants’ own “production”; and (3) production of their self by consumption. In particular, with respect to point three, rural migrants exercise their technologies of the self for producing their own identities as either a peasant or an urban resident. Choosing low consumption as one of their technologies of the self, most rural migrants claim “soiled” identities in peasantry and restore their labor, which they can temporarily own instead of selling to industrialists. Mimicking luxurious urban consumption, some young rural migrants imitate urban residents’ identities, and resist being cheap labor and migrants. As a result, rural migrants can upset manufacturing production by “voting by foot” through voluntary unemployment and desertion from manufacturing towns. In response to rural migrants’ resistance, the authorities must continuously alter their governance in order to satisfy the needs of migrant labor.

From a historical perspective, my dissertation contends that “invisible filters” in manufacturing towns succeeds the governance of farmers in people’s communes and has

been transforming during the reform era. Even though the governance of people has changed dramatically from Mao's regime to the present, some elements of current governance reflect the genealogy of historical formations of political rationalities and governing technologies. The mass line, the *hukou* system, the policing system, and the technique of mobilizing people to examine others, which emerged and governed the masses such as farmers in Mao's period, have been resilient in governing rural migrants. Local rural norms and rigid factory discipline, which had been prevalent in China before 1949, have also been revived and become dominant in manufacturing towns through the reform. In addition, governance involves many new elements such as the continuous development of manufacturing towns, the notion of *suzhi*, the CALH, and green governmentality. At the same time, some elements of governance such as the CRP dominated for a time before being abandoned. All these heterogeneous power forces structure, shape and reshape these "invisible filters" through the reform period.

"Invisible filters" emerged and changed due to the transformation of governing technologies and spaces of non-factory areas in manufacturing towns. When the state initiated a reform of the *hukou* system, which had divided the urban and rural sectors as "an invisible wall", "invisible filters" emerged through the authorities' implementation of their governing technologies and development of manufacturing towns. The three authorities cooperated and shaped local-artery-oriented and polarized spaces of towns and villages through their skewed development. A "filter" of high-end development in town centers and the *hukou* system excluded all rural migrants to villages. In villages, another "filter" of exclusive local rural norms in village centers segregated and marginalized most rural migrants into industrial zones where industrialists desired to turn them into docile cheap labor by rigid factory discipline. Through the reform, the authorities have been continuously adjusting their governing technologies and developing non-factory areas. The two "invisible filters" in town centers and villages transforms accordingly while new ones emerge in rural migrants' living zones as concluded above. As a result, the "invisible filters" transform rural migrants' population, communities, labor division, and behaviors, as well as conduct them to be ongoing resources of cheap factory labor.

Chart 1 Governance of Rural Migrants and Their Resistance in Manufacturing Towns



## II. Further Research Questions

My dissertation identifies three directions for further research questions regarding my three research themes of rural migrants, governance, and manufacturing towns. The first question is why rural migrants become cheap labor. In other words, it asks what causes rural migrants to become cheap labor. This is a broad question, but we have already recognized many independent variables such as markets, the *hukou* system, low education and skills. Future research can include more independent variables such as rural economic conditions, public goods in manufacturing towns, and rural migrants' perception and expectation of their future development. For answering this question, future research should study the correlation between these independent variables and contribute to more effective and efficient decision making such as resource allocation and reforms of institutions for a continuous improvement of rural migrants' social status and economic conditions.

Second, future research can focus on a portion of Foucaultian governance. For instance, it can continue to study the authorities' governmentalities and formation of knowledge by paying attention to the authorities' non-discursive practices (accumulation and production of their discourses). It can also study the interaction among the three authorities and rural migrants: how the authorities reduce high transaction cost in a continuous *hukou* reform, the maintenance of social stability and the transition of manufacturing industry while sustaining the development of rural migrants and manufacturing towns. Moreover, it can also study a specific governing technology, e.g. the *hukou* reform of CALH or the policing system of governing rural migrants through managing rental housing. Alternatively, it can study and propose new governing technologies such as a development of public housing and NGOs serving rural migrants in manufacturing towns.

Finally yet importantly, further research should study not only manufacturing towns in the PRD but also other types of manufacturing towns in different regions. In East China, the socioeconomic conditions might be very different from manufacturing towns in South China. For instance, local collective or private economies in East China are stronger than in South China. Relations between local and non-local people might vary according to regional difference. In

addition, some FDI, e.g. Foxconn, with local governments have been establishing their new factory plants in inland China. This stimulates further industrialization and urbanization, and may form new manufacturing towns. Thus, further research should pay attention to these manufacturing towns in East or inland China.

## Appendix

### Appendix 1 Factory Recruitment Poster (Selection) in Town Centers (2013)

**Dongguan CS Furniture Factory Recruitment**

**Domestic Marketing Department**  
Regional Manager (2 persons):  
Applicants must be female only, single, with secondary-vocational diploma or above, 20-to-25 years old. They shall have positive attitudes, unbeatable marketing strength, creative spirits, strong psychological *suzhi* (quality), good professional morality, excellent negotiating skills and business etiquette, consideration of whole situation, and good teamwork habits. Fresh graduates preferred (trainings provided)! Offer free meals and lodges. Salary is negotiable. A-level offices!

**Development Department**  
Craft Professional (4 persons):  
Applicants must be male only, with high school diploma or above, 18-to-45 years old. They must be able to read design documents and craft samples, and make wood-made or plank-made furniture (with strong practical skills). Working experience of operating boring machines is preferred. Salary is negotiable. Offer free meals and lodges. (Salary is equal to basic salary plus over-time payment. Overall salary is 5,000-to-6,000 *yuan*.)

**Quality Control Department**  
Wood Smith (2 persons), Wrapping Staff (1 person), Painting Staff (2 persons)  
Overall Salary: 2,500 to 3,600 *yuan* per month  
Applicants must attend junior high school or above, be 22-to-40 years old, and have over half-a-year working experience of quality control. Working experience of the furniture industry is preferred. No gender preference. Applicants shall be familiar with technical procedures, can deal with accidents, have a few abilities of making judgment and observation, and strong abilities of articulation and communication.

**Sofa Department**  
Trainee (3 persons)  
Overall Salary: 2,000-to-2,500 *yuan* per month. No requirement of gender, education, or diploma.

Source: Collected by the author

### Appendix 2 Factory Recruitment Poster in Retail Streets of Villages (2012)

**Dongguan TC Toy Factory**  
(Sincerely Welcome Your Enrollment)

Taicheng Toy Factory is a large toy enterprise, with over 2,000 employees and a 7,500-square-meter footprint of plants. We have plenty of customers and sufficient capital. Our major products are rubber-or-electronic toys and souvenirs that we sell to Japan, Europe, United States, and Southeast Asia. There are internet bars, a super large entertainment-and-sport center, a super market, restaurants, and clinics. We serve breakfast and mid-night meals. For fulfilling the demand of production and customers, we hire workers who are healthy, 18-to-35 years old, honest, practical and positive. We welcome bitter-bearing, diligent, obedient, careful and discreet persons!

(A) The assembly program, print program, molding program, and hand-painting program hire several *pugong* (ordinary workers). The salary is 5.4 *yuan* per hour. Experienced workers can apply for piece-rate wages. (Note: workers in the molding program have 2-*yuan* bonus per day, and workers in the hand-painting program have 4-*yuan* bonus per day.)

(B) The mechanic-painting program hires several unexperienced and experienced workers. The minimum wage is 1,700 per month. Overtime payment is 5.4 per hour. (Note: workers have 4-*yuan* bonus per day. Experienced workers can apply for piece-rate wages and have overall wages around 2,100-to-2,800 *yuan*.)

(C) New workers in the assembly program have at least 1,700 *yuan* per month and up to 2,100 *yuan* per month.

(D) All workers can receive an employment wage of 30 *yuan* per month when employed over half a year, and of 50 *yuan* per month when employed over one year.

(E) The factory pays wages by the end of each month on time. Workers can settle with the factory and resign jobs after the period of probation.

Contact Phone: \_\_\_\_\_ Address: \_\_\_\_\_

Source: Collected by the author

Appendix 3 Factory Recruitment Poster (Selection) in Songshanhu (2012)

**Dongguan CM High-tech Limited Cooperative Recruitment**

**1. Electronic Technician**

Occupation: full time; Gender: male; Job Opening: two persons; Salary: negotiable; Job Location: Songshanhu; Education: college specialty or above; Working Experience: two years or above; Age: 23 to 40

Requirement and Duty:

1. Compose schemes and plans of testing products
2. Compose documents and examples of testing products
3. Establish testing environment of projects; Update testing software; Configure testing systems
4. Organize testing products; Integrate testing work
5. Compile software-testing reports; Evaluate testing software
6. Improve testing procedures and qualities
7. Provide technical guidance, trainings, support for the testing

Eligibility:

1. Education of college specialty or above in electronic and information engineering, applied electronics, or relevant disciplines;
2. Over 2-year working experience in software testing or relevance;
3. Familiarity with basic theories of testing software; knowledge in popular testing tools, testing procedures and regulations;
4. Good learning ability and positivity; capability of intensive work;
5. Excellent team-work spirit and prudent working attitude

**2. Worker**

Type of Occupation: full time; Gender: no preference; Positions: 3 persons; Salary: negotiable; Location: Songshanhu; Education: junior high school; Working experience: no requirement; Age: 18-to-35; No tattoos

Requirement

Applicants must be diligent, be used to work overtime, have good attitude. Soldering experience is preferred. Applicants who have no working experiences but are willing to start working from the bottom can be under consideration.

Overall salary (without overtime payment) is over 1700 *yuan* per month.

Structure of Salary: monthly salary = basic salary (1,250 in probation and 1,350 in formal employment) + full-attendance reward (100) + food stamp (260) + on-duty bonus + technique bonus + overtime payment + annual bonus + other welfare

Our company's working schedule is eight hours a day and five days a week. It offers official holidays with salaries by law. Overtime payment corresponds to the Labor Law. It provides free-charge dormitories (1-4 person/room). Dormitories are adjacent to Yuehe Lake and the retail center.

Source: Collected by the author

Appendix 4 Factory Recruitment Registration Form in Retail Streets of Villages (2012)

Name	Gender	Archive materials	
Home region	Birth date	Item check list a. Registration form b. Copy of ID card c. Seven one-inch photos d. Labor contract e. Medical examination form f. Consent form	Photo
ID card number			
Household address			
Experience			
Specialty			
Height	Weight		
Did you work in relevant factories?			
Your former factories are		Pre-work training	
Father	Mother	Training date:	
Partner	Children	Programs of training:	
Introducer	Chronic diseases (No concealment. Please notify them to the factory.)	a. Factory regulations	
Emergency contact		b. Fire protection	
Contact information		c. Safety and quality control	
Heath		d. Factory song	
		e. Basic standing and marching behaviors	
		Training result:	
		Training officials' signature:	
Mandarin		<p>1. Applicants have proved and promised that they fill this form by themselves and all of their materials are genuine. According to Article 26 in the Labor Contract Law, applicants' any fakeness and mistakes on the form are a violation of truth and deceptions leading <i>danwei</i> or enterprises to employ the applicant. Thereby, the contract is invalid, and applicants agree to take all responsibility of legal and civil compensation, and leave the factory unconditionally.</p> <p>2. If applicants refuse to sign contracts after one-month employment, they do not satisfy criteria of employment during the period of probation. The factory can dissolve the contract at once and does not pay any compensation by law. Applicants must leave the factory unconditionally.</p> <p>3. In employment, applicants whose ID cards or legal working status become invalid are considered that they resign or refuse to extend their contacts. Applicants must leave the factory unconditionally.</p>	
Factory's decision			
Factory program's decision			
Interview result			
Probation and qualification			
Special techniques	Working experience		
Probation period (Two months)			
Applicant signature			

Source: Factory recruitment handouts collected by the author

Appendix 5 Factory Recruitment Registration Form in Talent Markets of Town Centers (2013)

<b>1. Basic information</b>	Name		Home region	Gender	Photo	
	Birth date		Marriage	Ethnicity		
	Height		Computer skill	Highest degree		
	ID card number		English skill	Contact		
<b>2. Education/Training</b>	Time		School	Program	Diploma/Certificate	
<b>3. Working experience</b>	Time	Company	Program	Occupation	Salary	Reason of dismissal
<b>4. Ability/Specialty</b>						
<b>5. Start date of employment</b>						

Source: Recruitment company's handouts collected by the author

## Appendix 6 Guiding Questions for Open-ended Interviews

### A. Rural Migrant

Key concerned questions are how they observed, perceived, acted in and reacted to the governance; and how the governance affects the town, especially the non-factory area (retail streets, rural migrants' residences, and town central squares), and their lives in their observation. With respect to different types of rural migrants, specific guiding questions are the following.

#### 1. Rural Migrant Secondary Landlord

I am interested in how secondary landlords manage rental housing and regulate their rural migrant tenants. Examples of guiding questions are: Where do you come from? Where are your hometowns? Why do you choose to be a manager of the rental housing? How do you select and regulate rural migrants as safe tenants? How do you protect your apartment buildings and other properties, as well as prevent thefts and robbery? How do you follow/conflict with the government's requirements, cooperate with the government, e.g. village police or town officials, and organize rural migrants for securing the rental housing? What are your attitudes and reactions to the government's management and services? What do you expect to improve the current condition, e.g. anti-petty crimes and the government's management of rental housing? What do you know about the historical development of residences and the village? What is their experience of being former factory workers? How did you find factory jobs years ago?

#### 2. Rural Migrant Factory Recruiter

I am interested in how and in what procedure they hire proper rural migrants for factories. Examples of guiding questions are: Where are your hometowns? Why do you become a recruiter? When did your factory start to recruit rural migrant workers at the retail street? How do you select and guide proper rural migrants for your factory? How do you compete with other recruiters to hire more workers? What spatial methods, e.g. control of the street, do you use for the recruitment? How does your factory regulate your work and control/guide prospective rural migrant workers? How does your factory cooperate with the village collective and the government for the recruitment? How do you reinforce the recruitment in order to hire more workers? How do rural migrants respond to the recruitment regarding their attitudes and actions? What are your attitude and responses to rural migrant job seekers? What do you know about the historical development of the village? How did you find factory jobs years ago?

#### 3. Rural Migrant Tenant

I am interested in their reactions under the surveillance of secondary landlords, village collectives, and the government. Examples of guiding questions are: Where are your hometowns? Why do you choose to move out of factory dorms and live in the rental housing? Do you have any experience of safety and bad luck in the residence, e.g. being stolen or robbed, and what are they? What is your experience of being regulated by the village police, security guards, and secondary landlords? What are your reactions? What are your experience and attitude of joining in the government's political and social-cultural activities? How do you interact with and expect to interact with secondary landlords, the

village collective, and the government? What are your feeling and expectation of change about your residences?

#### 4. Rural Migrant Job Seeker

I am interested in their methods, attitudes and objectives of job seeking. Examples of guiding questions are: Where are your hometowns? How do you choose your favorite factories where they prefer to work? Why do you choose to or not to be employed? What are your concerns in your job seeking? How do you secure yourself not to be cheated or exploited in the employment? What do you usually do when unemployed? What are your attitudes and feelings about the recruitment and recruiters? What are your experience and attitude of joining in the government's political and social-cultural activities? What do you expect to happen to improve the employment?

#### B. Government Agent

I am interested in what policies/regulations/programs/activities the government proposed to manage and serve rural migrants, and how the government implemented them. Examples of specific guiding questions are: How the government manages the rental housing (with what departments, in what procedure, using what kinds of technologies)? How do village collectives develop their villages? How does the government plan to redevelop it? What political, socioeconomic and cultural activities does the government propose for rural migrants in town and village centers? How does the government organize and activate these activities? Why does the government choose certain approaches of strengthening policies and actions? How does the government propose to increase and protect rural migrants' employment? How does the government attract talent and skilled workers? What effort has been accomplished in the employment? What are the ideas of planning and designing the new town of Songshanhu, and remodel the rental housing in the village in order to regulate rural migrants' migration and employment? What does the government's general plan of developing the new town? How does the government carry out the plan? What new efforts and approaches is the government implementing and will do?

#### C. Indigenous Villager

I am interested in their interaction with rural migrants and their observation of the development of their villages. Examples of specific guiding questions are: How does your village collective develop the industrial zone, the retail street, rental housing, and other parts of your village? What is the current proposal of redeveloping your village? How, where and what do your daily activities take place in interactions with rural migrants?

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