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Research Notes from a Closed Society: Belarus

BY CORINA LINDEN

I meet my contact early on an October evening near the corner of Lenin and Karl Marx Streets. He greets me nervously, and we immediately set off through the gray streets. I struggle to match his rapid gait. We avoid the KGB building and the bust of Dzerzhynsky, founder of the infamous Soviet Cheka security forces and the city's favorite son. He asks that, if he must be cited, I make no reference to his current organizational associations. He fears attracting governmental attention to himself or the organization. He has good reason. Individuals who express incorrect opinions here sometimes "disappear," and organizations are often disbanded. As we pass machine-gun-toting police and soldiers, which we do often, he switches to small talk in a low Russian voice. I do the same. Fortunately for us both, I "blend." I wear gray clothes and a well-practiced grimace. It is an everyday expression in parts of the world such as this, but one unfamiliar to ever-smiling Americans, except perhaps when they experience serious abdominal discomfort. After several weeks in the field, however, the expression requires little artifice. Notwithstanding these brief interruptions, he discusses openly with me the dangerous subject of politics in his country. We pace the city into the dark hours.

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A hand-painted poster for "The Phantom Menace" at the Central Theater in Minsk.

The scene may be familiar to researchers of the Soviet era. However, this is not the Soviet Union of 1979, but rather the independent Republic of Belarus of 1999. More than a decade after the collapse, Belarus, and its capital, Minsk, in many ways remain a Soviet time capsule. The totalitarian government under president Lukashenka rules through fear, intimidation, propaganda, and state subsidies. The economy is predominantly, and unabashedly, state-run. The Cold War with the West, and with the United States in particular, is alive and well in government statements and the state-controlled press. Belarus' war on the liberty of its own citizens is yet more vigorous.

Belarus is an anomaly in its region. It is bordered by Russia and Ukraine to the east and south, but also by such post-communist progressives as Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland to the north and west. Studies analyzing the geographical diffusion of economic and political reforms marvel at Belarus' intractable "backwardness." Indeed, the pre-collapse Belarusian economy was one of the most advanced and modern in the Soviet Union. Education levels and per capita production ranked among the highest, arguably an advantageous starting point for transition. Its geographical position on the plains between Russia and Poland could perhaps have proven the foundation for a vital transit industry. These strengths might have provided the basis for a successful Belarusian market economy. Far from embracing liberalization and independence, however, Belarus remains one of the most closed and least reformed systems in the post-communist

continued on page 2

INSIDE THIS ISSUE

East Central Europe and the UW Libraries since 1990 4
Can Putin Rebuild the Russian State? 7
Demographic Change and the Fate of Russia's Schools 10
China's Image of Central Asia 14
Commentary: Who are the Uighurs? 16
Uzbek Language and Culture Program 17
Summer Programs in Slavic Languages at the UW 18
Governmental Responses to Energy Use and the Reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Russia 19
The Donald W. Treadgold Papers 20
JSIS Summer Teacher Seminar for Educators, Grades 7-12 23
Other News from REECAS 24

continued from page 1

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A babushka prays outside the Catholic Church of Simon and Elena in Minsk.

world. Belarus has largely rejected not only democracy and capitalism, but also independence itself. It retains closer ties to Russia than has any other former Soviet state, and it actively seeks full economic and political reunification with Russia.

One may see a cultural, or "civilizational," explanation for this relationship. Perhaps Belarus remains allied with Russia because it is, essentially, Russian. Byelorussian is a Slavic language remarkably similar to Russian. The two countries have substantial shared history. Indeed, the Lukashenka government actively promotes the idea that there is no distinction between Belarusians and Russians, that they are in fact one nation. But while, historically, Russian influence on Belarus has been important, Belarus also incorporated Western political, religious, and cultural traditions through its merger over the centuries with other empires, such as those of Poland and Lithuania. Many regions of Belarus, particularly in the west, were deeply integrated into the Polish Empire and Catholic traditions. Furthermore, Belarus' past resistance to Russian rule is evidenced by repeated campaigns for national independence and its linguistic and cultural distinctiveness against deliberate, explicit Russian (and then Soviet) campaigns to extinguish the Byelorussian language and culture—to 'Russify' Belarus. What would be the purpose of such campaigns if the population were already "Russian"? In addition, it is not clear from the historical evidence that Belarus was necessarily more culturally autocratic than its neighbors, as it in fact chose to establish a relatively democratic form of government during its brief existence as an independent state during the interwar years. Many Belarusians today perceive differences between Russian and Belarusian national characters, describing themselves as harder working, more sober, and often more "European." The veracity of these claims is unimportant. What is important is that many Belarusians perceive differences, and see themselves as a distinct culture.

There may be compelling economic and political reasons behind this relationship. Russia remains Belarus' most important trade partner. Belarus' largest imports are crude oil and natural gas, which it uses to generate nearly all of its energy. It has virtually no indigenous energy resources, and little hope of developing alternatives. However, rather than diversifying, it remains almost entirely energy-dependent on Russia. Why does Belarus embrace such dependence? The prices of these Russian imports are deeply discounted, even when compared with rates for other CIS members. Russia sells many energy products to Belarus at its low domestic-market prices, which are dramatically lower than world-market values. In addition, Russia has agreed to buy low-quality Belarusian goods, often as barter payments for fuel. Despite these concessions, Belarus has frequently had trouble meeting its payment obligations. Russia has been remarkably tolerant of Belarus' mounting energy debts, agreeing

to broad debt swaps, debt-for-equity swaps, and simple debt forgiveness. These sorts of concessions and soft credits amount to Russian subsidies to the Belarusian economy.

This relationship presumably holds advantages for the Russian Federation as well. Fuel export pipelines from Russia to Western Europe run under both Belarus and Ukraine and to ports in the Baltics. However, disputes regarding shipment volumes and fees with the latter countries made deals with Belarus more attractive. It proved a more predictable transit partner. Russia sells fuel to Belarus in reliable quantities and at low prices, while Belarus reliably delivers the through-put and levies low transit fees. State-dominated Gazprom, though it has occasionally put the screws to Belarus, has in general been very lenient regarding the matter of that country's debt, particularly after the election of pro-Russian Lukashenka. Gazprom is willing to pay this price in exchange for secure access routes to Western markets. Shortly after the Union Treaty was signed, Gazprom began construction on the Yamal-Hamburg pipeline, which would carry 68 billion cubic meters of gas from Siberia through Belarus to lucrative Western European markets, ensuring supply for Belarus and export routes for Russia for some time to come.

Russian security concerns *vis a vis* the West may also make Belarus an attractive partner. Issues such as eastward NATO expansion (to which Russia has vociferously objected), perceived NATO aggression in the Balkans, and renewed talk of missile defense systems in the United States (in violation of international arms control agreements) fuel concerns within Russia about US and European intentions toward Russia. Belarus may be perceived as a bulwark against Western encroachment, one of the last remnants of Russian's sphere of influence in Europe and the final remaining country in the buffer zone between Russia and NATO. The Putin administration's conservative stance on many related policies indicates that it may be willing to carry Belarus for some time.

Despite these trends, small changes are taking place in Belarus. There has been some opening in the trade regime, and a few Western imports are available to those who can afford them. There is the obligatory McDonald's, on Lenin Street in Minsk. There are also limited opportunities for private enterprise and organization. Small private companies building on Belarus' strengths in technical skills and cheap labor operate cautiously on the fringes of the economy. The first non-state institution of higher education has been established in the capital, although it carefully structures its curricula to avoid trouble with the government. There is more religious freedom than under the Soviet regime. While Eastern Orthodoxy is the most prevalent, Western forms of evangelism are spreading, and Catholicism is the fastest-growing faith in the country, particularly in the western regions.

Perhaps the most hopeful sign is the experience and attitudes of the younger generation of the Belarusian elite. While unable to express unorthodox opinions officially, many Belarusians from all sectors — academia, government, and industry — clearly understand the nature of their own system and the contrast with other countries in Europe. Although the official state media provide the same quality of information as they did in Soviet times, the small private media, along with the foreign broadcast media and access to the internet (where available), provides Belarusians important perspectives on their own country. Whether on the cold streets of Minsk or in the warm hospitality of their own homes, they articulate a discontent with the current system and an increasingly sophisticated understanding of its alternatives. How this discontent can coalesce into political action under the current conditions of political repression remains to be seen.

How long will Russia be willing, and able, to maintain economic subsidies to Belarus? What would become of the relatively stable and largely unreformed state-led Belarusian economy, should Minsk achieve its stated goal of full reintegration with the deeply troubled and more open Russian economy? Equally important, what would happen to the Belarusian economy should Russia refuse it both further subsidies and reintegration? The government of Belarus has touted its status-quo economic strategy as superior to those of other post-Soviet states, because it has minimized the profound economic contractions that affected rapid marketizers such as the Baltics for years, and which seem to have become permanent features of other so-called transition economies (such as that of Ukraine). The long-term sustainability of such a strategy is questionable, however. It is unclear what could drive such an economy in the long run, without external subsidies or the growth of rationally productive enterprise. How long can Belarus depend on the former? In the absence of market structures, how can it begin to develop the latter? ◆

Corina Linden is currently adjunct faculty at the University of Washington's Jackson School of International Studies, where she will offer a new course on Russian-European Relations this summer. She received her Ph.D. in political science from UW in 2000, and organized the Books for Belarus collection this winter.

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A Western cigarette ad promises Belarusians "Total freedom."

East Central Europe and the UW Libraries since 1990

BY MICHAEL BIGGINS

The UW Library has been developing its collection of materials about East Central Europe for close to a half-century, since the late 1950's and 1960's. Polish, Hungarian, and Czech materials were this collection's mainstays until relatively recently, when Slovak also became a significant UW program focus. Through 1989, publishing in the region remained state-sponsored and stable. Only in Poland, after the imposition of martial law in 1981, did a widespread underground literature that was inaccessible through the usual channels grow into a significant, long-term social and cultural force.

Where have the publishing industries in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic been heading in the post-revolutionary decade of the 1990's? And, closer to home, what has the UW Library been doing to keep pace and provide faculty and students with an adequate base of research materials?

The book, periodical, newspaper, and web markets in all three countries have been dynamic, growing, open, and conducive to creativity. Relatively sizable populations (from 10 million in Hungary and the Czech Republic to 39 million in Poland), compact territory, high literacy rates, and a widely inculcated culture of reading have created the markets needed to keep volume high, unit-production costs down, and profits possible. Also significantly, following the revolutions of 1989, ideology lost its grip on political and public discourse here almost overnight, and more completely than in most countries of the REECA area. Public space throughout the three societies rolled up its red banners and made way for what was to follow, presumably the free marketplace of ideas.

Initially, however, that marketplace filled to the saturation point with translations of American popular literature. In Poland, for instance, Stephen King novels began appearing in press runs of up to 300,000—or roughly one copy per 100 inhabitants. During the first three post-communist years, from 1989 to 1991, pulp literature appeared to crowd out any other form of printed material. The effect on the bottom line was advantageous, at least for those publishers who held winning properties. In Poland, gross book sales nationwide rose at rates of up to eighty percent per year, and new mass-market publishers proliferated amid seemingly endless opportunities for quick profit. All countries of the region experienced a similar boom in those early years.

In Poland, this bubble burst in 1992 as the national economy entered a downturn, discretionary spending faltered, and supply suddenly far exceeded demand. While popular literature still retained a large share of the total market at the end of the decade, it gradually ceded significant ground back to quality publishing. Long-established houses dating to the early years of the Polish People's Republic in the late 1940's and 1950's, such as Wydawnictwo Literackie, Czytelnik (Reader), and Znak (The Sign), reclaimed the leading roles in Polish intellectual life that they had held for decades. Scholarly publications, particularly those sponsored by the Polish Academy of Sciences' dozens of affiliated research institutes and the country's leading universities, continued to appear, and in many instances new series, titles, and imprints were established as vehicles for previously suppressed or neglected subject areas.

Significantly, in each of the past two years East Central Europe has been in the spotlight of the Frankfurt Book Fair, the European industry's most significant annual event. Hungary in 1999 and Poland in 2000 figured as the fair's guests of honor, occupying an entire exhibit hall and commanding their own calendar of special events.[1] The size and significance of these two markets, together with their good prospects of joining the European Union in its first phase of eastward expansion, are certain to have influenced this choice.

In Poland and Hungary, as in the Czech Republic, mass-market and specialist publishers have already attracted the

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attention of aggressively globalizing Western firms, such as the German publishing giant Bertelsmann and the Netherlands' Wolters Kluwer and Reed Elsevier. Bertelsmann owns Swiat Ksiazki (Book World), Poland's largest mail-order book club and web distributor, which has become the major retail supplier to Poland's rural population and brings in revenues of $40 million annually. Elsevier has bought Wydawnictwo Prawnicze, the country's leading publisher in the field of law, and Kluwer now owns Polskie Wydawnictwo Profesjonalne. Various German, Dutch, or British houses have similarly sought and acquired exclusive world distribution rights to a wide range of Hungarian, Polish, and Czech periodicals in the sciences, technology, and medicine.

Yet scholarly and trade publishing on uniquely Polish, Hungarian, and Czech subjects is likely to remain beneath the purview of outside investors for some time, as such literature targets non-corporate, non-affluent, and relatively small readerships. Some of the established quality publishers in all three countries are still state-owned, though most of those appear to have plans to privatize eventually. A solid cohort of new quality publishers has become active both in the capitals and in the provinces, their numbers having especially grown since around 1994. In addition, dotting the landscape are numerous smaller, lesser known, or even obscure publishers, which are regularly responsible for bringing out astonishingly good and important books. In terms of the volume, variety, and quality of what they have produced over the past eight years, these three book industries have become nearly indistinguishable from the sophisticated and diverse European models they emulate.

In the Czech Republic, long-established publishers such as Academia, Věda (both of them imprints of the Czech Academy of Sciences), Karolinum, Vyšehrad, and Mladá fronta continue to be important forces in the market; meanwhile, energetic newcomers such as Torst, Hynek, Ivo Zelezný, Libri, and Paseka (in Prague) and Votobia, Doplněk, H&H, and Host (in Brno, Olomouc, Zlín, Jinočany, and elsewhere) have already made major contributions to Czech cultural history, each by pursuing its own particular agenda in literature, the arts, history, and other fields. Three universities (Charles in Prague, Masaryk in Brno, and Palacký in Olomouc) are home to scholarly publishing houses, but only one of them (Masaryk University) produces a large volume of titles for the wider national market. Since the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993, Czech publishers have continued to enjoy the relative advantage of an auxiliary market in Slovakia, where most of the adult population is also fluent in Czech and there is a long tradition of reliance on Czech books and magazines, in addition to Slovak ones.

In Hungary, new imprints such as Balassi, Püski (in Budapest since 1989, but previously based in New York), Unikornis, Osiris, Századvég, Jelenkor, and CEU Press have made some of the most important recent contributions, alongside surviving older houses such as Akadémiai Kiadó (and the many imprints of the Hungarian Academy's various institutes), Magveto, Uj Mandatum, and Argumentum.

Being a much larger market, Poland is home to many more new publishers than its neighbors to the south. In Polish literature, publishers such as Twój Styl, WAB, Noir sur blanc, von borowiecky, Wydawnictwo Dolnoslaskie, and a5 have become the vehicles of some of Poland's leading writers, while Trio, DiG, Semper, Volumen, Bellona, Scholar, Sic!, Ksiegarnia Akademicka, and many others support work in history and the social sciences. Some of the country's healthiest houses are pre-1989 carry-overs which quietly pursued high-minded, non-partisan objectives during the communist period; besides Czytelnik, Wydawnictwo Literackie, and Znak, these include PWN, Ksiazka i Wiedza, and Iskry. Eight to ten of Poland's universities are themselves prolific publishers, accounting for a large share of the nation's scholarly output: most notable are the Universities of Warsaw, Wroclaw, Lodz, and Poznan; the Jagiellonian University in Krakow; Marie Curie-Sklodowska University in Lublin; and the Silesian University.

Since the mid-1990's, especially, all three countries have witnessed prodigious contributions to the study and reevaluation of the post-1945 and interwar (1918-1939) periods, for decades the object of ideological filtering by their government-controlled academies.[2] The



Polish Academy's Institute of Political Studies (Instytut Studiów Politycznych), Hungary's 1956 Institute (1956-os Magyar Forradalom Történetének Dokumentációs es Kutató Intezete), and the Czech Academy's Institute of Contemporary History (Ústav pro soudobé dějiny) are all post-1989

continued on page 6

continued from page 5

formations whose mission is to reconstruct the twentieth-century historical record through sponsorship of extensive archival research, the collection of oral histories, scholarly conferences, and publishing.

An answer to the second question—how the UW Library has been responding to these burgeoning markets—could begin with the table below, which shows the total output of new book titles and the approximate population of each of the four countries of the region in 1999, followed by the output of book titles in 1990 (see Figure 1).

Figure 1

COUNTRY	1999 TITLES	POPULATION	1990 TITLES
Poland	16,500 to 21,400[3]	38,700,000	10,200
Czech Republic	12,600	10,280,000	4,100
Hungary	9,700	10,090,000	7,500
Slovakia	4,800	5,390,000	3,400[4]

A rule of thumb, generally borne out by experience, suggests that no more than ten percent of a country's total publishing output will be of conceivable interest to a research institution with a corresponding area studies program, while the remaining ninety percent consists of school and university textbooks, technical manuals, translations, religious tracts, and other materials of only marginal or no interest for research purposes. Among research institutions in the United States, only the best endowed have been able or even inclined to realize collections that encompass the full ten percent of relevant publications. A corollary to the rule of thumb suggests that up to half of the relevant ten percent will be of inferior quality or of marginal interest to the institution, leaving as an ideal target about five percent of the country's publishing output—a figure which, coincidentally, roughly coincides with what the UW Library has been managing to do for its East Central European collections over the past few years.

Currently, UW acquires some 800-900 new book titles per year from Poland, 400 from the Czech Republic, about 300 from Hungary, and 200 from Slovakia. Individual titles are selected from publishers' catalogs, book reviews, and monthly trade listings, and requests for those titles are then sent to one of about twenty-five suppliers located throughout the region—including both booksellers and university or academy libraries with which UW maintains longstanding exchange agreements.

At these rates, UW continues to develop a comprehensive information resource for East Central Europe that, for scope and thoroughness, is on a par with our more recent Baltic collection. Although the Library tries to anticipate most research needs by having the materials on campus before our users realize they need them, we don't always succeed. Requests from faculty, students, and others help us learn what our users view as important. Whether general or specific, these requests are encouraged and always welcome.

This overview has omitted any mention of other publishing formats (periodicals, newspapers, audio and video recordings, CD-ROMs, and the Web), but of course



these are also crucial parts of the REECAS research base, and the Library makes steady efforts to develop them. Newsletter readers who would like to explore some introductory guides to all of these resources in more depth are invited to consult the Library's Slavic and East European Section's newly redesigned and expanded web pages at *www. lib.washington.edu/Slavics/ default.htm.* ◆

Michael Biggins is the UW's Slavic and East European Studies Librarian.

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1 Information about Poland at the 2000 Frankfurt Fair is available at *www.frankfurt-book-fair.com/portal-e/fbm-e/polen-e/allgemein_polen-e/01565/frames.html;* and about Hungary at the 1999 fair at *www.frankfurt-book-fair.com/portal-e/ungarn-e/ungarn-e/01362/frames.html*

2 Kamm, Henry. "Poland awakens to its history as communism's mirror shatters," *New York Times*, January 26, 1995, p. 1A.

3 The National Library in Warsaw recorded some 15,500 new Polish titles in 1998, based on legal depository copies received from publishers; however, the Library claims that one-third of all publishers do not observe the depository law, and estimates that another 8,000 titles are lost to the official record as a result. See *Lukasz Golebiewski, Rynek ksiazki w Polsce.* Warszawa: Magazyn Literacki, 1999.

4 Book publishing figures for Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary are rounded off from data supplied by the countries' respective statistical yearbooks. Figures for Slovakia are derived from Slovenská narodná bibliografia (1999) or interpolated from other sources (1990).

Can Putin Rebuild the Russian State?

BY STEPHEN E. HANSON

During his first year as president, Vladimir Putin repeatedly declared the rebuilding of the Russian state to be his very highest priority. Indeed, on this score there is now a remarkably widespread political consensus among Russian liberals, nationalists, and former communists: all agree that the Russian central government must find some means of enforcing its own laws, in order to reverse the nation's prolonged decline in the post-Soviet period. Prominent Western analysts and advisors, too, proclaim that successful state-building in the Russian Federation is the prerequisite for sustainable political and economic development—as well as the only means of attaining reliable control over Russia's stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction. Yet despite his thus far consistent emphasis on state-building, even Putin has been forced to admit that a "chronic mistrust of the state" on the part of Russian citizens remains an intractable problem. How, then, can the Russian state be effectively rebuilt?

I argue here that three common approaches to the problem of Russian state-building are wrong: Russia cannot create a strong state simply by implementing market reforms, by promoting nationalism, or by reestablishing political dictatorship. Instead, the effectiveness of government policy in the future will be determined by the degree to which Putin or his successors can recruit reliable officials who genuinely feel that it is their duty, and not only in their interest, to act in accordance with official institutional norms. Given the current orientations of the four political groups from which state officials might be drawn—the oligarchs, the governors, political parties, and the security services—the Russian state is likely to remain weak in the near-to-medium term. In the longer run, the outlook for Russian state-building is potentially more promising—but for this potential to be realized, both Western and Russian policymakers must defend Russia's fragile democratic institutions.

How *Not* to Build the Russian State

During the early years of post-communist transition, policymakers tended to assume that Russia's rebirth could be best guaranteed by the introduction of economic reforms. A decade later, analysts continue to debate the relative merits of "shock therapy" versus "gradualism" in transition to a market economy. What is less commonly noted is that very few post-communist countries have proven capable of implementing any formal economic policy with much consistency—especially among the non-Baltic former Soviet republics. Post-Soviet elites have discovered that economic laws issued in legislatures often have little effect on the day-to-day conduct of business. Negative phenomena like widespread barter, interference by local "mafias," wage and tax nonpayments, asset stripping, corruption, and capital flight have been pervasive problems both for initially rapid reformers such as the Russian Federation and "gradualist" countries like Ukraine.

Increasingly, both Russian and Western analysts have therefore come to the conclusion that the weak states bequeathed to post-Soviet republics from the Leninist past are themselves a major obstacle to economic reform. If this is true, ongoing governmental attempts to implement tax reform, to break up state monopolies in the energy sector, or to maintain balanced budgets—however sensible and well-intentioned—are unlikely to generate the positive economic results predicted by theory. As long as the Russian government remains unable to enforce basic property rights dependably and consistently, direct investment in the Russian economy is bound to be limited, market activity will be driven into the informal underground sector, and even the positive effects of renewed economic growth will be undermined by correspondingly high levels of capital flight. In short, a stronger Russian state may well be crucial to successful market reform—but market reform is unlikely to generate by itself a stronger Russian state.

If good economic policy is not sufficient to strengthen the Russian state, might not appeals to national pride have a more salutary effect? This, at least, has been one of the major themes of Putin's early presidency. Clearly, Putin's vocally nationalist posture during the early months of the second Chechen War played a major role in increasing his political popularity. His campaign for the presidency in 2000 emphasized the importance of a "pragmatic patriotism" that would replace the widespread cynicism of post-communist Russian society. In office, Putin restored the Soviet national anthem—with new non-communist lyrics—as well as the imperial double-headed eagle as the state emblem, claiming that the adoption of official state symbols would help to strengthen Russia's sense of national identity.

No doubt the president's appeals to patriotism are heartfelt and sincere, as first-hand observers as diverse as Gennady Zyuganov, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, and Mikhail Gorbachev have attested. Yet there are reasons to doubt the long-term contribution of Putin's nationalism to the project of restoring effective governance in Russia. For all its sincerity, Putin's conception of "Russianness" has very little discernible, specific ideological content. To be a "pragmatic patriot" does not appear to demand any particular individual sacrifices beyond a vague allegiance to the symbols of Russian state power—and even these symbols themselves are ideologically inconsistent. Meanwhile, concrete manifestations of Russia's continuing national weakness abound. The conflict in Chechnya, despite repeated declarations of Russian military victory, appears no closer to resolution; Russian military pride suffers through international embarrassments like the

continued on page 8

continued from page 7

sinking of the Kursk; and important international issues in the European Union, the Middle East, and the Balkans are addressed with little or no Russian participation. Under such circumstances, Putin's nationalist symbolism is bound to appear increasingly hollow.

Given the lack of viable alternatives, Putin must be sorely tempted to try to rebuild the Russian state through more dictatorial means. Certainly Putin's vehement attacks on—and in some cases, the subsequent arrests of—critical journalists, independent academic researchers, and unsupportive businessmen demonstrate a presidential penchant for suspending democratic norms. The "Pinochet option" remains alive in Russian political discourse—and is occasionally floated in Western analytic circles as well.

However, the notion that the strength of the Russian state could be quickly restored by the elimination of democracy is an especially dangerous myth. As the 21st century dawns, all the most powerful states in the world are liberal democracies. Even relatively successful autocracies, like the People's Republic of China, are experiencing increasing difficulty in compelling local political and business elites to conform to the dictates of central policymakers. Indeed, attempts to impose autocratic rule in weak states are as likely to precipitate total state breakdown as to generate renewed state capacity—as the disintegration of the USSR after the 1991 August coup demonstrates. Any effort to restore undemocratic rule from Moscow would arguably greatly exacerbate Russia's problems with its ethnic regions, its fractured military, and its semi-reformed economy. Finally, a formal break with democracy would undoubtedly bring to a halt all remaining efforts by the Western powers to accommodate Russian interests—which would have unpredictable geopolitical consequences.

The Key to State-Building: Reliable Rule Enforcement

All three approaches to state-building analyzed above lack any direct analysis of whether, and how faithfully, official government rules are actually enforced in practice. Yet this is the single most important factor determining state strength or weakness—in democracies and autocracies alike. Strong autocracies are those in which state functionaries consistently enforce the will of the ruling elite rather than using their power to build local personal fiefdoms. Strong democracies are those in which judges uphold the legal system rather than currying favor with local bosses, police enforce the criminal code fairly rather than fabricating offenses in order to maximize bribes, and legislators attempt to represent constituents rather than using their positions to further their own pecuniary interests. In both cases, generating some degree of genuine commitment by state officials to their regime's ideology—whether democratic or anti-democratic—appears to be crucial to successful state-building. Without this commitment on the part of state enforcers, official policies oriented toward democratic market reform or designed to reassert authoritarian hegemony are likely to be ineffective.

From this point of view, the long decline of Russian state capacity over the past few decades reflects the waning of genuine belief among elites in Marxist-Leninist ideology and the failure of attempts to define a new ideology for Russia in the post-communist period. Since the 1960's (at least), Soviet and Russian state officials alike have tended to act in terms of their short-term instrumental interests rather than in the interests of the larger institutions they formally represent. Unfortunately, this has made "principled" political behavior increasingly irrational for everyone: there is no personal or institutional advantage in enforcing laws that no one else recognizes as binding.

If the above analysis is correct, President Putin's task is daunting. To rebuild the Russian state, Putin must find some way to recruit state officials who will perceive enforcement of state policy as a moral duty, and not merely as a path to personal enrichment. However, it is not at all clear whether there is any powerful group in contemporary Russian society from which such reliable "cadres" might be drawn.

First, Putin could try to build the Russian state with the backing of "oligarchs"—that is, wealthy businessmen with personal connections to the Kremlin—using their resources to buy off potential opposition figures and to fill the Russian media with pro-regime propaganda. Indeed, despite Putin's very visible attacks on the business and media empires of Vladimir Gusinsky and Boris Berezovsky, the continuing favoritism shown to more "loyal" tycoons demonstrates the continuing importance of the politically connected business elite. State reliance on oligarchs, however, will inevitably generate more of the same "crony capitalism" that was responsible for state decline in the Yeltsin era—even if this president happens to favor different oligarchs than his predecessor.

Second, Putin could try to rebuild the Russian state with the backing of supportive governors, using a "divide and conquer" strategy, to isolate the few regional politicians who dare to challenge him. Indeed, we have seen this strategy used against former Kursk governor Aleksandr Rutskoi and the former governor of Primorskii krai, Yegveny Nazdratenko. Meanwhile, equally independent figures such as Mintimer Shaimiyev of Tatarstan and Mikhail Nikolaev of Sakha have been allowed to run for third and even fourth terms in office, in return for pledges of loyalty to Putin. Ultimately, however, reliance on largely autonomous governors for state-building, however "loyal" they may be officially, leads inevitably to Leonid Brezhnev-style quasi-feudalism rather than coherent and effective law enforcement—especially in a country as

large as the Russian Federation. Thus, the inability of the new Russian president to act consistently against governors who continue to resist publicly the enforcement of constitutional norms, despite his early efforts to weaken the power of the Federation Council and to bring regional laws into conformity with federal ones, is a disturbing sign.

Third, Putin could try to rebuild the Russian state by recruiting new state officials from the younger generation. This strategy has apparently been the inspiration for Putin's continuing attempts to build up the "Unity" party as an official "state-building party," comparable in function if not ideological orientation to the Leninist party organization of the Soviet past. Indeed, during Putin's first year, widespread publicity was given to lavish Unity party congresses in the Kremlin, and efforts were made to found Unity youth camps parallel to those of the Soviet era. However, given Unity's transparently instrumental support of the Putin government since its founding just weeks before the 1999 parliamentary elections, the party is unlikely to inspire genuine self-sacrifice on the part of its membership. Such developments as the party leadership's abortive proposal to join with the Communists in a vote of no confidence in Putin's own government—in order to force new elections and, in theory, to produce an even more completely pliable Duma—have only increased public cynicism about its political role. Putin's promotion of party leader Boris Gryzlov to the position of Interior Minister, while providing an additional demonstration of the rewards of total loyalty to the president, further undermines the credibility of Unity as an independent organization. Like previous "parties of power" in post-Soviet Russia, Unity is likely to disintegrate quickly and irreversibly the moment its political patron can no longer ensure that party membership always pays off.

Finally, Putin could try to rebuild the Russian state by relying on loyal cadres from the security services and military. Putin's own KGB background tends to suggest such an approach; certainly his memoirs are replete with praise for the state-building role of the organization in which he made his early career. Public ceremonies such as the unveiling of a new monument to Yuri Andropov near the headquarters of the former KGB also signal the important symbolic role of the security services in Putin's political project. Even more telling was Putin's decision to promote personnel from the military and intelligence agencies to head five of the seven new "super-regions" designed to facilitate central control over Russia's vast territory. The recent appointment of Putin's "second in command," Sergei Ivanov, as Defense Minister, signals a further upgrading of the role of the president's former associates from the intelligence agencies.

Yet a new Russian state built around officials from the security services is hardly likely to promote effective government in the longer run. To begin with, it is hard to imagine a genuine Russian democracy enforced primarily by officials with a KGB background; a new Russia run by the "forces of order" would almost certainly degenerate into an ugly and uninspiring autocracy, with all the negative consequences for Russia's future discussed above. Moreover, the security services and military are hardly a unified entity. Any formal attempt to promote one branch of the military or intelligence services as the key state body threatens to provoke even more serious personal and institutional splits—as Ivanov may find as he attempts to establish control over Russia's military apparatus. Perhaps for these reasons, Putin has chosen thus far to augment the influence of the security services within the framework of the 1993 Yeltsin Constitution, rather than discard this framework altogether.

Conclusion

Can Putin rebuild the Russian state? The answer suggested by the above analysis is certainly negative in the short-to-medium run. None of the social groupings from which Putin might recruit key state agents—the oligarchs, the governors, the Unity party, or the security services—are likely to produce loyal cadres who can be relied upon to implement government policy as a matter of principle rather than expediency. As a result, the gap between formal state policy and informal political and economic reality in the Russian Federation is likely to remain wide—with negative consequences for civil society, investor confidence, and geopolitical stability in the Eurasian region.

However, in the somewhat longer run, the formation in Russia of a group of state officials sincerely oriented toward the enforcement of laws cannot be ruled out. As long as political life in Russia remains open enough to allow committed political activists to mobilize in defense of civic principles, Russia's flawed electoral democracy may yet engender a state more dependably oriented toward democratic norms. Western policy toward Russia must therefore abjure impatient demands for immediate political or economic transformation. Greater Western assistance to grass-roots movements aiming to strengthen press freedom, electoral accountability, and individual human rights in Russia could be of particular importance in fostering long-term public support for democratic institution-building. Political, military, and cultural exchanges between Russia and the West should be maintained and expanded. Certainly, Western powers should avoid giving any intentional or unintentional signals supporting temporary suspensions of formal democratic procedures in the name of "state-building." ◆

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Demographic Change and the Fate of Russia's Schools

BY STEPHEN T. KERR

In 1993, I undertook an extended trip to Russia to visit new types of educational institutions emerging in the early post-Soviet era. On a late October morning in Yekaterinburg, I attended a special meeting called by a city administrator responsible for education. Those invited included representatives of all the city agencies responsible for the development and education of young children—teachers and school directors, psychologists, social workers, and representatives of the medical profession. One incident at the meeting stands out in sharp relief in my memory: the city official who had called the meeting asked each of those present to estimate the percentage of children unable to make regular and reasonable progress in school due to incapacitating physical, mental, or other conditions. Accustomed to US educational statistics that suggest somewhere between 5% and 20% of American children would fall into such "special education" categories, I was shocked to hear my Russian colleagues cite figures in the range of 50% to 70%. They provided brief explanations and examples, but the figures themselves remained in my mind, foreshadowing difficult times for the Russian educational system.

Those difficult times have now arrived for the entire country, and on a massive scale. Three factors are interacting to form what may be the most serious threat Russia's educational system and youth have ever faced. These include: (1) a legacy of compromised health from the Soviet era, (2) a series of negative general demographic trends, and (3) a set of frightful social pathologies. Together, these problems do not bode well for the schools, teachers, or students of Russia. Ultimately, the impact of these forces on the already troubled school system may pose serious threats to Russia's future as a world economic and scientific power.

The Health of Russia's Population and Children

Russians now suffer from more diseases, and die from these diseases in greater numbers and at earlier ages, than do citizens of other developed nations. A few examples are illustrative. During 1998, 364 cases of German measles were reported in the United States, at a rate of 0.13 per 100,000 people; in the year 2000, Russia reported 391,588 cases, at a rate of 1471.9 per 100,000. In Russia, infants (up to the age of one year) die at a rate of 1696 per 100,000 births; the comparable US figure is 719.8.

Infectious diseases (such as tuberculosis, influenza, HIV/AIDS, and other STDs) spread rapidly under conditions of social distress and crowding. The rate of increase in reported cases of HIV/AIDS in the past year alone suggests that Russia may be "in the first stages of an epidemic." Drug-resistant strains of TB have appeared and are spreading rapidly, with children especially affected. Their rates of infection were 1.5 times higher in 1997 than in 1990. The number of special schools for children affected with TB increased from 533 in 1992 (serving 29,200 students) to 858 in 1998 (serving 46,000 students). Authorities observe increasing numbers of children underweight at birth, and older children experiencing illness due to a lack of essential vitamins and microelements in their diet.

Russian regions are differently affected by worsening public health, with poor regions and those with a heritage of environmental problems being especially hard-hit. In the heavily industrialized regions of the former USSR, problems with air, soil, and water pollution have taken a heavy toll on children. Doctors conducting a recent survey among school children in Irkutsk found that the average child's medical records listed 5-8 illnesses, with no child completely well. Rates of illness among urban children in the *oblast'* were reckoned to be four times higher than those among children in rural areas. In Tomsk *oblast'*, during the period 1991-1997, the health of children fared worse than that of adults (with rates of illness among those under 14 increasing by 48%, and among adolescents from 15-17, by 110%). In Novosibirsk, preschool children accounted for 63% of the observed cases of influenza in 1997.

The general warning sounded by these overall health indicators is amplified when we consider four specific health factors affecting young people (and sometimes teachers) and their possibilities for success in school: drug and alcohol abuse, poor quality nutrition, sexually transmitted diseases, and psychological disturbances.

Drug and alcohol abuse. Alcohol has long been a source of social and medical problems in Russia. What has changed in recent years is the volume of consumption, and the age at which serious drinking may start. Children increasingly see alcohol and drugs as forms of recreation, and the incidence of alcohol-related psychoses among children increased by more than 15 times during the 1990's.

Drug use has also increased rapidly among the population at large, and among teenagers in particular. Between 25% and 33% of young people are regularly using drugs, and some researchers worry that the newer users come from relatively well-off families, including 75% from families where both parents are present, and where parents are professionals: engineers, teachers, scientists, etc. Data from 1998 indicate that 6522 children below the age of 14 were treated for "serious narcotic addictions."

Nutrition and the quality of food. Russian food is notoriously low in vitamins—especially vitamin C and calcium—and the restricted diet forced on many Russians by straitened economic conditions leads to protein deficiency. Scientists are concerned about the monotony of children's diets: minimal consumption of meat, fish, fruit, and vegetables leads to reduced levels of B vitamins for 10-15% of the population, and to growing problems with anemia. A lack of iodine in children's diets has become a special worry following the Chornobyl catastrophe, and some 75%

of children are said to suffer risk of early thyroid disease as a result.

Sexually transmitted diseases and the problems of abortion. The number of STD infections among Russians under 17 grew from 17,558 cases in 1990 to 45,393 cases in 1996. Rates of infection from syphillis and gonorrhea are also high and increasing rapidly: between 1990 and 1998, the number of syphillis cases among those aged 18-19 increased 47 times; for those aged 15-17, 55 times; and for those under the age of 15, 87 times. The 57,000 Russians registered with active AIDS include 951 children under the age of 14, the majority of whom are likely street prostitutes from large cities.

Psychological health. In addition to problems with substance abuse and STDs, Russia's young people face problems on a front that was almost invisible under the USSR: psychological illness. The number of schools for children with psychological problems increased from 59 in 1993 to 105 in 1998, and the number of students served there from 10,400 to 17,300; students served in special classes but located in regular schools grew from 117,300 to 190,000 over the same period. More schools have the services of a school psychologist available now than ever before, and those teachers increasingly deal with a variety of problems caused by stress and confusion in a rapidly changing society. Suicide among young Russian males aged 15-24 exceeded 50 per 100,000 people, the highest rate in the former USSR.

Changes in Russia's Demographic Profile

Russia's population has been in decline for the past eight years. In 1992, there were 148.7 million Russians; in October 2000, there were 145 million. The overall decline is about 750,000 per year. Life expectancy for males has fallen to 59.6 years, significantly below other developed nations. These changes have serious implications: the armed forces depend on cadres of incoming recruits, while the economy requires workers. Fewer young people means lowered working potential to rebuild and renovate the country.

Two specific issues come to the forefront when we consider demographics and the future of education. One—changes in family structure—pertains specifically to the fate of young people and their ability to make adequate progress in school; the other—the continuing internal migration of people from rural areas to cities—has implications for the likelihood of Russia being able to offer and support education universally throughout the country.

Family structure. Such factors as declining birth rates, increased chances for complications during or immediately after birth, male mortality and undependability, and economic and social problems have compelled many women to have fewer children. On the other hand, more children are being borne out of wedlock as young Russians become sexually active earlier, with concomitant lowered chances of such children receiving needed support during early childhood and education.

Divorce also plays a role. At the current level of 532,500 per year (1999), there are several hundred thousand children affected by divorce annually. In a setting where mothers nearly universally work, where women's salaries are still typically significantly lower than those of men, and where availability of daycare has decreased recently, single mothers face heavy burdens.

Another phenomenon of the 1990's—child abandonment—is especially troubling, for it suggests a further weakening of family bonds and an unwillingness to meet the most basic of all familial obligations. Statistics show that more than 12,000 children were placed in Children's Homes *(doma rebenka)* in 1997. If orphans are included, nearly 597,000 children were in some form of children's home or foster care in 1997, an increase from 460,000 in 1993. A relatively large number of those abandoned suffer from some form of physical or mental handicap.

Migration. Migration to, from, and within the Russian Federation has serious implications for the ability of the educational system to operate under current conditions. Two specific issues are relevant here: emigration of educated Russians, and internal migration, principally from rural to urban areas.

While the numbers have decreased somewhat since the early 1990's, the number of citizens emigrating to countries outside the CIS and Baltic states is around 80,000 per year. Many of these are the country's most educated citizens: scientists, scholars, physicians, and teachers. Their departure is a loss to the cultural capital on which Russia must draw for the tasks of internal reconstruction, and may over time make it difficult to sustain the traditionally "high tone" of the curriculum.

Migration within Russia is another aspect of the country's shifting demographics. Here, the issue is migration from rural areas and small towns into cities, with consequent threats to the supportability of rural schools. Rural population has shrunk at a rate of 3-4% per year over the past six years, while the urban population has shrunk less rapidly, at a rate of 1-3% per year. The number of rural schools has decreased annually from 48,800 in 1992 to 46,400 in 1998, while the number of city schools increased slightly, from 21,400 to 22,600.

The Social Pathologies of Contemporary Russian Life

Poverty, pollution, stress, crime, and the content of the media all affect children.

Homelessness and poverty. There is some evidence that the number of "vagabond" children has risen to as many as 5 million. Of those children eventually discharged from orphanages or children's homes, some 30% are estimated to become homeless. While increasing numbers of charitable organizations exist in Russia to address the question of homelessness, they are often poorly

continued on page 12

continued from page 11

organized and under-funded, and they often elicit hostility and suspicion from local authorities.

Environmental pollution. The consequences of the Chornobyl nuclear catastrophe in neighboring Ukraine continue to reverberate in Russia. A study in Bryansk *oblast',* the Russian region most heavily polluted by Chornobyl, found that residents were experiencing higher rates of thyroid illness and problems with respiratory, nervous, and circulatory systems. The rate of endocrine system disorders among children in the region reached 68.5 per 1000 in 1998, as compared to an all-Russia average of 25.6.

Psychological stress. A number of indicators point to increasing psychological stress on the Russian population. The number of suicides, at over 40 per 100,000 people, exceeds all other European countries except for Lithuania. Among young people, the rate of suicide is lower—about 22 in 1999—but still high in comparison with many other countries. Those who commit suicide typically have low social status, are unemployed, have recently entered the army or prison (or have recently been released), or are pensioners—all settings where there has been a change in status from a familiar or safe position to an unknown one.

Crime. Today, young Russians engage in criminal activity at a much higher rate than was the case in the Soviet Union. In 1999, nearly 11% of all crimes were committed by 14-17 year-olds, and among 1000 children of this age group, 183 will have committed a crime of some type. Those in the age groups 14-15 and 16-17 committed a disproportionate share of all crimes. Girls were implicated in nearly 40% of these crimes. Even younger children—those under 13—were charged with some 319,332 crimes. Many of the crimes involving teenagers have a sexual element: a teenager committed every sixth rape, and every third gang rape was committed either by teenagers or with their participation.

The media and children. In the West, a consensus has emerged over the past 30 years that repeated viewing of televised violence and erotica does in fact influence the way young children come to view the world. A Russian study of 116 broadcast hours examined the presence and content of televised violence and sexual episodes. The average broadcast hour contained 4.2 episodes of force or sexual content. Given that the average Russian teenager spends at least two hours per day watching television, this suggests exposure to at least 16 such acts daily. While there is a somewhat higher incidence of such material on late-night television (5.2 incidents/hour), the levels were almost as high during the morning (3.1) and day (4.6), when younger children are more likely to be watching.

On the Brink: Russia's Schools, Students, and Teachers Face Social Decay

When we consider the implications of these trends for Russia's schools and teachers, we are faced with a quandary: while the problems seem frightening, in some cases even desperate (health conditions stand out especially), the schools mostly keep operating, the teachers mostly keep coming to class and doing their work, the school directors and other administrators mostly continue to try to keep their institutions running, and the students mostly keep attending and doing their assignments. So the question arises: if the situation is so bad, why isn't it worse? Is there evidence that the system, its work, and its participants (students, teachers, directors) are actively suffering?

Schools: facing troubled reality. For rural schools, the strains show quite clearly. As noted above, many rural schools have closed recently, but the many that remain are viewed as a drag on the system. One estimate suggests that as much as one third of the $1.5 billion currently being spent on rural schools could be saved through relatively simple restructuring and consolidation. Of all the country's general secondary schools, over 70% are in rural areas; they employ 41% of the teachers, but they enroll only 29% of the students. The quality of education in rural schools is also generally considered poor, due to lack of supplies and antiquated facilities, prompting one expert to remark that their students are effectively "left out of education."

Children's health problems interact with the day-to-day operation of schools in ways that are now only a memory for most American school administrators. Large numbers of children sick with highly infectious diseases such as influenza and measles, together with the compromised immunity of nominally well children due to poor nutrition and environmental contamination, leads to a fairly high rate of school closures during the academic year for "epidemiological quarantine." Such closures have occurred regularly—and sometimes for weeks—in many major Russian cities over the past two years.

At the school level, authorities have issued warnings that school children are increasingly poorly prepared for higher education: only 40% of ninth graders are equipped for further study at needed levels, and today only a few students taking entrance exams at prestigious universities can solve problems that were easily dealt with 20-30 years ago. The factors cited above are commonly linked to these declines.

Students: into the "zone of risk." As noted above, students are increasingly enticed by drugs, alcohol, crime, early sexual involvement, and ever more explicit media offerings. They are also threatened by health and environmental risks, a weakening family structure, and the stress that comes from living in a constantly changing society. Is it reasonable to expect that they will be able to cope?

The life plans of students living in rural areas provide one clear indicator of the future. Put simply, they would rather live and work in the city. A study among young people in Penza *oblast'* revealed

that 59% of students would prefer to live in the city, and only 8% in the country (the remaining 33% were undecided). An even smaller percentage—7%— indicated they would like to work in agriculture.

The personal values that young people carry with them through the educational system and into higher education are also changing. A more economically oriented model of values now seems to predominate, with more tolerance for corruption and acceptance of criminal behavior, and a world-view in which conflict and interpersonal difficulties are seen as normal.

Teachers: will they continue to serve? Why would Russia's teachers continue to work under such conditions? In part, the answer is simply that their traditions are deep and strong. Teaching, a profession still handed down through generations, is still much more "honorable" than in the United States. For rural teachers or those in economically depressed regions, there are also few other employment options.

Rural teachers suffer special circumstances. One plaintive comment on a rural teacher's lot appeared in the journal *Direktor shkoly [School Principal]*, noting such problems as having to feed the cows and other animals before school, rounding up local unemployed workers and bribing them with vodka to cut wood for the school stove, finding the money to buy the wood to replace rotted floor boards, and consulting with parents and the school librarian about the unimaginably high costs of new textbooks. Out of 60 students in this teacher's school, 53 were ill, but they all worked on the school's allotment of farmland, growing potatoes to support the school program.

All is not stolid suffering in silence; there are in fact some signs of more open stress among teachers. One example is teacher strikes, which in 1998 involved 7695 schools and 252,000 teachers around the country. Teacher shortages have also occurred in some areas, with an overall shortage during the current (2000-2001) school year estimated at 50,000 teachers.

At the Heart of the Maelstrom: Can the Schools Build a New Social Order?

So there is the picture: sick children increasingly affected by drugs, alcohol, and poor nutrition, living lives troubled by premature sexual activity, and showing increasing signs of psychological harm from these influences; families coming apart, and a fearful sense among many people, young and old, that they need to abandon their country homes for the city to ensure economic survival; social surroundings that offer young people less a supportive environment than a virulent set of pathologies—homelessness, stress, crime, and violent, hyper-sexualized media; and schools closing in the countryside, with teachers leaving for other work or dissatisfied with the work they have. What does this suggest for the future of Russian education, and for the future of Russia?

There are some basic answers: sick children cannot learn, or cannot learn well. As long as disastrous health conditions prevail in Russia, the schools will not be able to pull out of their downward spiral. Wonderful equipment and even sound buildings are not essential, but health is as close to a *sine qua non* for education as we are likely to find. Likewise, stability—in the sense of knowing where one is living, that one has a place to return to at night, and that the people one lives with will not abuse or hurt—is also an essential prerequisite.

It is more difficult to see a clear solution to the problem of migration from the country to the city; the economic realities of urban life are simply more attractive. But the problem in Russia's hinterland is that an infrastructure that would allow consolidation has not been developed. The lack of good roads and buses and administrative inexperience in creating and managing new kinds of schools will present a challenge.

The problems with alternative "lifestyles" (recreational drugs, alcohol, sex, the media, etc.) are especially troubling for Russia, since it was relatively isolated from those influences, excepting alcohol, for so long. Schools were accustomed to students who took their work seriously, and who were not otherwise easily distracted. Now, all the influences of Western popular culture are at Russia's gates, and at the gates of its schoolhouses. Can the schools, by themselves, or with parents' help, recreate the old culture of serious purpose and intellectual rigor? It will be an interesting test of culture against culture.

Teachers are also part of this equation. To date, they have remained remarkably placid, if occasionally restless. They have willingly tolerated conditions no Western teacher would stand for more than a day or two: schools without central heating in -60° F weather, warmed by a single coal or wood stove, with layers of ice on the walls, and students and teachers working in their heaviest coats. Nevertheless, they continue to work, and have not yet found the political will or social voice to alter their lot.

Without its schools, Russia will continue to decline, and it will ultimately lose its distinctive culture of learning, developed at such cost under the Soviet regime and preserved in remarkably good shape until recently. This has serious implications for Russia's standing as a world power and contributor to—not merely a consumer of—world culture. Ultimately, all levels of the Russian government may be forced finally to take education seriously, and not merely throw it scraps. This would mark a change from the past fifteen years, and it would set a positive example for the rest of the world (including much of the West) to follow. ◆

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China's Image of Central Asia

BY DMITRY PASHKUN

Since the end of the Cold War, China has become a significant international player whose worldview and foreign policy interests have diversified. Although the cornerstone of China's foreign policy remains its relations with the great powers, fundamental changes have also occurred along China's border. Specifically, the break-up of the Soviet Union and the emergence of Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have forced the Chinese authorities to redefine their approach to Central Asia.

Before outlining the main elements of this policy and strategy, it will help to examine the roots of the China-Central Asia relationship. The relationship dates back to ancient times, when the Great Silk Road linking China and the West passed through the territory of Central Asia. During the last two millennia, Chinese rulers tried many times to take control of this strategic territory. The first such attempt was made during the Han dynasty (221 BC-AD 220), when military expeditions were launched against the Huns in 60 BC, and a Chinese viceroy installed himself in Xinjiang, which was then part of Central Asia and free of Chinese influence.

Chinese rule over present-day Xinjiang was undermined by Kushans, Huns, and Turkic and Mongol tribes starting in AD 140. For a long time thereafter, the Chinese were unable to reestablish their authority over Central Asia. Only during the Tang dynasty (618-906) did Chinese rulers make another attempt to conquer the region. The Tang emperors had the ambitious goal of subjugating all of Central Asia. However, at the battle on the Talas River in 751, the Chinese troops were crushed by Arabic tribes in one of the most important turning points in world history. After this historic battle, Chinese domination almost collapsed, and the strong cultural ties were broken. Islam spread across the entire Central Asian region, and Buddhist kingdoms disappeared for good, except in Tibet.

Chinese rulers next attempted to establish their influence in the region only in the middle of the eighteenth century, when Emperor Qian Long dispatched new military expeditions to the region in 1755-59. The emperor managed to establish indirect rule, appointing a governor-general in Kuldja (Yining) and vice-governors in Tihua (Urumchi) and Kashgar/Yarkand with the objective of guaranteeing Manchu influence without incorporating the territory into the Chinese provincial structure.

The second half of the nineteenth century saw the beginning of the period known as the "Great Game" for Central Asia, in which Russia, Great Britain, and China competed for influence in the region. Challenged by the expansionism of tsarist Russia and the independence-seeking Uighurs, Manchu authority in Central Asia began to decline. Russia strengthened its positions in the region by conquering the khanates of Khiva and Kokand and the emirate of Bukhara in the mid-nineteenth century. It annexed 440,000 km^2 of land, pushing the border of the tsarist empire 250-600 km to the east. Throughout the next several decades, Russia established direct rule over most of Central Asia, except Afghanistan and Eastern Turkestan. After the October Revolution and the formation of the Soviet Union, Central Asia became an integral part of the communist state. Meanwhile, Russia and China continued to compete for Eastern Turkestan. In 1933 and 1944, Eastern Turkestan was proclaimed an independent republic, first by Muslim fanatics, then with Stalin's support. After Stalin's death in 1953, the entire Sino-Soviet relationship was renegotiated, and in 1955 the Chinese finally recognized the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 created a new situation for China, and provided the Chinese with several new neighbor states. Beijing's reaction to the unfolding situation was surprisingly cautious, describing the developments in Central Asia as "internal affairs." Officials in Beijing confirmed that they would "respect" the choice made by the people in these countries. Problems faced by the region during its period of transition are of concern to China as well, as is the increasing activity of other players in the Central Asian arena – the United States, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and India. Regardless of the official line, Chinese leaders quite clearly understand the main threats to their security. Ethnic nationalism and Islamic revival in the Central Asian republics have compelled China to build a new strategy towards its neighbors.

As John Anderson has noted, "around a million Kazakhs lived in the Xinjiang region at the time of the Soviet collapse as well as over 7 million Turkic-speaking Uighurs. For their part, Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan provided a home to around a quarter of a million Uighurs, often with family ties across the border."[1] Chinese authorities have taken a tough stance towards any separatist or Islamic activism in Xianjiang, because they fear the newly independent states of Central Asia could provide an example for the Uighurs in their fight for independence. Because authorities in Beijing fear "that Xinjiang's restive Muslims might link up with their fellows in the former Soviet Union," they have pressured Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan to ban parties and activists fighting for an independent "Uighuristan."[2] To those Central Asian neighbors who supported the Uighurs, China sent the powerful message that it would not tolerate any interference in what it defined as its own internal affairs. The governments of Central Asian states have deferred to China on this point very quickly, promising not to provide any support or sanctuary for the Uighurs.

On the diplomatic level, China recognized the independence of the Central Asian states in December 1991. In January 1992, China signed separate communiqués on the establishment of diplomatic relations with the five states, and the presidents of Uzbekistan, Kirghizstan, and Kazakhstan visited China. In 1993, the president of Tajikistan also paid a visit to Beijing. As a result of these visits, ties between China and Central Asia deepened considerably. During Chinese Premier Li Peng's visit to four Central Asian republics in 1994,

Beijing proposed four principles as ground rules for promoting regional ties: promotion of peaceful coexistence; promotion of economic prosperity; non-interference in internal affairs; and respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty.[3] Beijing was also successful in promoting its "One China" policy. Central Asian states affirmed that the government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China, and Taiwan is an inalienable part of the Chinese territories, adding that they oppose any attempt to create "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan." The Central Asian states assured Beijing that they would not establish any form of official relationship with Taiwan.

Authorities in Beijing recognize that potential threats in Central Asia could be neutralized if the region becomes stable and economically prosperous. Accordingly, the Chinese strategy towards Central Asia has sought to maintain stability through economic development. Chinese economic and commercial penetration in Central Asia has surpassed all expectations. Trade ties have deepened considerably, with individual traders engaging in cross-border trade on a routine basis. On the official level, Chinese central authorities signed several agreements on Chinese credits to the Central Asian countries. Moreover, the Chinese economic reforms and model of development have attracted the attention of Central Asian leaders, who have talked of adopting China's model of market economics for their own. The economic boom in Xinjiang depends upon stability in the whole region of Central Asia, and on development of transportation links. The opening of the Trans-Eurasian railroad through Central Asia in 1990, and the linking of Almaty and Urumchi by railroad in 1992, ensured a long-term role for China in Central Asia. A joint Central Asian-Chinese project for reviving the Silk Road has also brought dramatic change to the Sino-Central Asian frontier.

The most ambitious plan for cooperation between China and Central Asia is the proposed construction of a pipeline that would carry Central Asian oil to China. "If the Chinese build a pipeline, Central Asia's importance to China will shift immeasurably in the 21st century, as will Chinese military attitudes towards safeguarding their strategic oil reserves,"[4] writes Dianne Smith. Implementing their new strategy of 'political stability through economic cooperation and development,' Chinese authorities have been quick to assure Russia that they have no intention of threatening Moscow's interests in the region. China considers Russia a significant player in Central Asia, and Russia and China share a common interest in deterring ethno-nationalism and resurgent Islam in the region. At a 1992 meeting between Russian and Chinese Foreign Ministers, the Russian Foreign Minister noted, "Central Asia should remain a CIS sphere of influence, and not a sphere of extremist forces, and in particular, of Islamic fundamentalism." The Chinese Foreign Minister replied that Russia and China "have common interests in preserving stability in the Central Asian region," and that Chinese policy towards Central Asia would take into account the "close ties established between Russia and the region."[5] The recognition of Russia's 'natural' interests in the region was also evident in discussions in Shanghai during April 1996, following which Russia, China, and those Central Asian states bordering China signed a confidence-building treaty involving the demilitarization of their frontiers.[6] From the Chinese point of view, the treaty has transformed this long-contested area into what Chinese scholars have called "a region of peace, friendship and cooperation."[7]

Promoting its new strategy in Central Asia is not an easy task for China; there are certainly obstacles and misunderstandings in today's Sino-Central Asia relations. Central Asian leaders, especially those of Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan, have been extremely unhappy with continued Chinese nuclear testing carried out at Lop Nor, to the east of the Kazakh border.[8] Issues of water rights and the environment also complicate relations. For example, in January 1993 Kazakhstan and China agreed to build a water-conservancy works over the Horgos River along their border, to address hydropower, flood control, and navigation concerns. Altering the river flow affects not only both signatories, but also Uzbekistan, located downstream.[9]

Despite China's concerns, recent years have witnessed a period of dialogue and cooperation, rather than the uncertainty and fear commonly found in the first years after the breakup of the Soviet Union. At the turn of the century, Central Asia represents both a potential market for China's growing economy and a source of strategically important raw materials. China has actively established ties with the new republics, and new railway links have appeared. China's strategy towards Central Asia remains to seek influence over the developing economic life of the region, and to maintain political stability through mutual cooperation. No longer a Soviet backwater, the new Central Asia could play a significant role in Asian and world politics in the years to come. ◆

Dmitry Pashkun, Lecturer at the National University of Uzbekistan, Tashkent, was recently an ACTR/ACCELS Visiting Scholar at the University of Washington.

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8 Open Media Research Institute, 113, 11 June 1996, on Kazakh reaction to the test carried out three days earlier.

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Commentary: Who are the Uighurs?

BY RACHEL NEVILLE

The Uighurs (pronounced 'wee-gers') are a predominantly Muslim people whose homeland is Xinjiang province, in western China. Uighurs often refer to their home as East Turkestan, instead of Uighurstan, to reflect its ethnic diversity: Xinjiang (which means "new dominion" in Chinese) also contains Kazakh, Kirghiz, Tajik, Hui, Tatar, and Chinese populations. The Uighurs' language is related not to Chinese but to Turkic languages spoken in other regions of Central Asia, such as Uzbek, Kazakh, and Turkish.

The Uighurs have a rich and fascinating history. Several of Genghis Khan's most trusted advisers were Uighurs, and Uighur cities such as Urumchi and Turfan were famous oases along the ancient Silk Road, where caravans stopped for provisions and lodgings on the historical trade route that was for many centuries the only link between Asia and Europe. The more recent history of the Uighurs is one of a struggle for autonomy against more powerful neighbors. In 1759, the Manchu (Qing) dynasty, which had originated in Manchuria and had already taken over what was historically China, invaded and conquered the Uighurs' ancestral land. The Uighurs rebelled repeatedly, trying to reclaim control of their homeland, and at several points in the twentieth century nearly succeeded. In the end, the Uighur leaders accepted a promise of autonomy under Chinese rule, probably because a full-scale war with China would have been devastating to the Uighur people. However, all Chinese promises were broken shortly after they were made, the last time being under Mao in 1955.

Today, the Uighur struggle for self-determination is largely peaceful. Like many other minorities in the People's Republic of China, the Uighurs struggle to maintain their culture in the face of mounting oppression from the government in Beijing. They face the same threat as the Tibetans: massive population transfers of ethnic Chinese to their homelands. The government has so actively promoted the migration of ethnic Chinese to Xinjiang that indigenous Uighurs are fast becoming a minority in their own homeland. In the past 52 years, the Chinese segment of the province's population has grown from 7% to 42%.

Beijing has suppressed any activity that it identifies with Uighur nationalism, including traditional cultural and religious practices. For example, in the city of Kulja (now called Yining) community leaders tried to revive the *meshrep*, an ancient form of penance for minor crimes. Usually such enforced penance is embarrassing but lighthearted, such as bobbing for apples blindfolded. Community leaders sought to revive the *meshrep* because young people were becoming involved with drugs at an alarming rate. It worked, and the ritual became more and more popular in Kulja. On February 5, 1997, police broke up a *meshrep* ritual and arrested the participants. This sparked massive protests by Uighurs in the city, in response to a perceived government attempt to deprive them of their cultural rights. Hundreds were arrested and many were tortured, including women and children. In a report released shortly after the incident, Amnesty International told of detainees being kept in a soccer field, forced to disrobe, sprayed with water, and then left in the freezing February cold for hours. Many lost extremities due to frostbite.

The events surrounding the Kulja protests prompted Amnesty International to carry out an in-depth review of human-rights abuses in Xinjiang, which found that the government was using especially cruel methods of torture, the likes of which had not been seen elsewhere, including Tibet. Xinjiang is also the only region where *political* prisoners, those accused of no other crime than peacefully expressing their beliefs, have been executed in recent years. One of the leaders of the Kulja *meshrep* movement, Abdulhelil Abdumijit, died in prison in October 2000. Relatives were not allowed to see his body, leaving many to conclude that he had died from torture.

Young Uighurs still maintain their cultural traditions and dress.

Probably the most famous Uighur political prisoner is Rebiya Kadeer, a Xinjiang businesswoman and leader of a non-profit organization that helped Uighur women start their own businesses and become economically independent. On her way to meet representatives from the Congressional Research Service on August 11, 1999, she was arrested and accused of passing state secrets. She has since been sentenced to eight years in prison. Relatives say she is in poor health, and they fear she is being tortured. Her

son, Ablikim Reyim, was arrested the same day and sentenced to time in a labor camp. Fortunately, he has been set free. His release coincided with an Amnesty International report that condemned China's ill treatment of Uighurs, Tibetans, and Falun Gong members. This demonstrates that, even from across the ocean, we can make a difference and help stop human-rights abuses against the Uighurs.

The Uighur Human Rights Coalition is a grassroots student activist organization whose mission is to raise awareness about the plight of the Uighurs. The UHRC has demonstrated in front of embassies in Washington, DC, and written letters to the Chinese government on behalf of Uighur prisoners. It has also written to foreign governments

on behalf of Uighur refugees, such as those who were forcibly returned from Kirghizstan and Kazakhstan to China, where they face possible torture and execution. The UHRC is starting a UW chapter. If you would like to join, or if you have questions or comments, please email Rachel Neville at *khantengri6995 @yahoo.com.* ◆

Rachel Neville is a graduate student in the Evans School of Public Affairs, specializing in Environmental and Energy Policy. She became interested in Uighur issues after spending three years in Kazakhstan, host to a large Uighur diaspora.

For further information about the Uighurs:

- ***www.uyghurs.org:*** Uighur Human Rights Coalition: Student Activist Group
- ***www.uygur.org:*** East Turkestan Information Center – Exile Group in Germany
- ***www.uyghuramerican.org:*** Uighur American Association (organization of Uighur diaspora in the United States)
- **Uigher Information Agency:** Non-profit that collects news about Uighurs.

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Governmental Responses to Energy Use and the Reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Russia

BY NATHANIEL TRUMBULL

The Russian Federation is currently presented with opportunities—related to the Kyoto Protocol's proposed flexibility mechanisms—to make a significant global impact on curbing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Even if the Kyoto Protocol is abandoned in the coming months and years, or if most of the industrial nations miss their targets by the period 2008-2012 (as is broadly expected), some of the flexibility mechanisms included in the Kyoto Protocol may be of assistance in reducing future GHG emissions. The Russian Federation is faced with this significant opportunity: it is one of only a small number of nations whose post-1990 GHG levels have already fallen dramatically, leaving it with large amounts of excess emissions credits for potential sale to other nations in the form of "emission reduction units," or "hot air."

Russia is also faced with a second, related and equally important opportunity regarding the role of energy and its own future reductions in carbon emissions. Its energy use remains inefficient, but with technological innovation and a restructuring of its energy use, Russia could continue to lower its GHG emissions. For example, Russia's vast natural resources would allow it to engage in fuel switching with relative ease.

The challenge for the world community is to provide Russia with the incentives and material support to decrease its expected carbon emissions.

Russia continues to be characterized by per capita energy-related CO_2 emissions well above the world average. In 1990, Russia was the third-largest carbon emitter, accounting for 11.23% of global emissions.[1] By 1993, those figures had fallen to a significant extent—to 8.4% of global emissions—due to Russia's dramatic industrial decline.[2] Energy production is the major source of GHG emissions in the Russian Federation, accounting for up to 98% of national CO_2 emissions.[3]

Energy and carbon intensities reflect the amount of energy and carbon consumed for a given economic output. Despite an overall decline in absolute values of CO_2 emissions in Russia since 1990, energy and carbon intensities have both grown in the post-1990 period. Russia's carbon intensity increased from 2.06 (tons CO_2/1990 US $1000) in 1990 to 2.52 in 1993, or a rise of 21.8%.[4] Indeed, Russia ranked sixth in 1993 in energy-related CO_2/GDP emissions, after Bahrain, Kazakhstan, Iraq, Estonia, and Ukraine. In other words, after 1990 Russia became even less efficient in its use of energy. Russia's economic production fell, but its energy use and carbon emissions have fallen less.

For Russia and the West, the window of opportunity for making arrangements to keep Russia's carbon emissions low, or at least from growing to their previous level, is limited. Russia's economy, after almost a decade of trouble, appears to be recovering; its widely cited growth in GDP for 2000 was a respectable 7.7%, the largest increase on recent record for Russia. Much of that growth came as a result of increased oil prices on the world market. If such growth is maintained for the next two decades, Russia will be well on its way to producing the same levels of carbon emissions for which the Soviet Union was notorious.

Russia might be receptive today to foreign direct investment, in exchange for a commitment to reduce carbon emissions. Many Russian firms, especially those with negative-added production, are ideal candidates for emissions trading of "hot air" credits in a cap-and-trade scheme. In a cap-and-trade arrangement, Russia's oil, coal, and gas firms would collectively be assigned a certain cap for a specified carbon emissions level. Other countries' firms would have the option to trade and negotiate among themselves, so as not to surpass their own caps by buying emissions credit surpluses from Russia. It would be in Russia's interests to take advantage of the financial incentives to sell such credits abroad in the future.

One of the main reasons for Russia's increased energy inefficiency has been an absence of new-technology installation and equipment replacement since 1990. A second reason for the increase in carbon intensity per economic unit has been Russia's failure to alter its fossil fuel mix in its energy production. The carbon intensity of a given fuel mix depends on the share of carbon-intensive fossil fuels in that mix. Because Russia is so rich in many different types of fossil fuels and other energy sources, including hydrological, Russia's potential as a candidate for fuel switching is significant. An examination of what policy measures could most effectively reduce Russia's GHG emissions must inevitably focus on Russia's energy use, both past and future, and on what factors could change the method of generation and efficient use of that energy.

Because Russia possesses a relatively elastic supply of different energy sources, fuel switching represents a real alternative to the present reliance on coal and petroleum energy sources. Fuel switching has been widely accepted as an effective method for reducing GHG levels.[5] The Russian Interagency Commission on Climate Change Problems, founded in 1994, the same year that the Russian Federation ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, has widely endorsed fuel switching as a desirable policy. The official Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation has called for the "expansion of the use of natural gas (from 41.4% of total energy needs in 1990 to 49-51% in 2000, and 47.6-52.5% in 2010).[6] Unlike most countries, Russia can also rely on a number of energy sources, such as hydrological and atomic energy sources, that do not emit carbon.

From the point of view of Russian economic policy makers, the predominant structural share of energy production in the Russian economy and its

continued on page 21

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continued from page 19

expected large share in future economic growth cannot be ignored. Russia generates more than half of its foreign earnings from the sale of energy sources, some of which require high levels of energy production to extract, mine, and transport. Although structurally the economy is changing toward the service sector, energy production will remain the leading economic component.

Some of Russia's energy continues to be used in such a way that it has negative added value. For example, some remote steel mills produce steel that is worth less than the energy spent on its production. This situation is still financially viable in Russia, where subsidies and government credits under recent conditions of high inflation have provided sufficient support even for unprofitable factories. The Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation identifies energy savings potential due to inefficient use of energy resources as the equivalent of "40-45 percent of present energy consumption."[7]

Russia could also reduce its overall energy use through more locally directed energy conservation measures. Combined heat and power (CHP) production is one area in which many countries have sought fuel efficiency. CHP has applications in the industrial, residential, and commercial sectors. In the residential sector, CHP provides potential savings in district heating, which Russia has in almost all of its major cities. Despite CHP's generally low heating transmission costs, typically about 10-15%, its implementation in Russia was based on the flawed premise that energy would always be available in unlimited amounts and at no real cost.[8] As a result, the systems were rather poorly constructed, and leakage remains common. Metering in buildings and apartments is almost non-existent.

A policy of constructing compact cities could have played a role in lowering energy consumption in Russia. But again, transportation and delivery systems were not always conveniently located or designed for passengers, and those systems were rarely constructed as they were designed. Conservation measures must now address the rapid emergence of privately owned automobiles among an emerging Russian upper-middle class. Moscow and St. Petersburg are reported to have experienced a four-fold increase in privately owned cars on their streets since the early 1990's. Overcrowding, delays, and poor upkeep have led many Russians away from well-developed public transportation systems and toward second-hand imports from Western Europe and Japan. At about US $0.25 per liter, gasoline is generally considered affordable.

Where energy production, efficiency, and use are concerned, Russia has many options for lowering its GHG emissions. Russia and Ukraine are among those nations holding the lion's share of available emissions credits. Russia would be able to sell surplus "permits" to nations whose own CO_2 emissions-abatement costs are higher, but with two important caveats. First, nations may be allowed to buy permits only after they have made active emissions-abatement efforts at home; that is, a ceiling may be established to limit the amount of credits that could be bought from a single nation. As one report warns, "emissions in Russia and Ukraine are likely to be considerably lower than the Kyoto target even in the absence of any abatement measures."[9] Second, Russia and other Central-East European and former Soviet nations may face criticism for not using the funds received to lower their own carbon intensity/GDP levels. However, it may be difficult to achieve significant reductions given the existing infrastructure.

Flexibility mechanisms in the (still unratified) Kyoto Protocol appear promising. Both the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation are project-based flexibility mechanisms designed to promote international investment in carbon-emissions technology. The Clean Development Mechanism targets only developing countries ("non-Annex 1" countries in the wording of the Kyoto Protocol), which excludes Russia. Joint Implementation is similar to the cap-and-trade scheme, but is primarily intended to promote technology transfer. Joint Implementation, as described in Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol, enables legal entities "... to reduce emissions from specific projects and to transfer the 'emission reduction units' ... to other parties" in an international setting.[10] An important distinction with the cap-and-trade arrangement is that the latter allows only for "spot" transactions, whereas Joint Implementation permits longer-term investment strategies and coordination.

Joint Implementation has necessarily higher transaction costs than cap-and-trade, because it requires the calculation of an emissions baseline for each project. Joint Implementation also requires advance approval of proposed projects on a case-by-case basis. Several method-based approaches for Joint Implementation have been established, which include benchmarking, top-down, and default baseline approaches.[11] Comparison-based and simulation-based evaluation approaches are also under consideration for setting emissions baselines in Joint Implementation projects.[12] Joint Implementation addresses one particularly important problem concerning Russia's "hot air" that cap-and-trade alone does not: that Russia will play such a dominant role as a seller in emissions trading that it will be able to engage in near monopolistic pricing. As one intergovernmental report warns, "... with Russia and Ukraine potentially the dominant suppliers in the market for emission permits, there is a risk that the market may be imperfectly competitive."[13] Joint Implementation would relieve some of the weight on emissions trading as the sole flexibility mechanism, with its monopolistic pricing implications. At the same time, it would provide an outlet for countries seeking to buy emissions credit after reaching their own ceilings or limits on buying (such limits are under review, in order not to privilege the richer nations, who could resort to purchasing all their carbon credits abroad).

Another advantage of Joint Implementation is that it will lead to more technology transfer than simple emissions trading in a cap-and-trade scheme. Improvements in technology could significantly reinforce Russian energy conservation efforts. For example, one Joint Implementation project already approved by the Russian side and in cooperation with US partners has been

continued on page 22

continued from page 21

an "energy efficiency district heating network project in Zelenograd (Moscow Region)."[14] Increased levels of scientific collaboration, technology transfers, and a general openness to improved review of each country's GHG emissions levels and sources might be other important benefits of Joint Implementation. Funding for the Russian scientific community has recently been so minimal that even small inflows of new funding could be crucial in stimulating new climate change research. The fact that carbon dioxide monitoring towers have still not been built in Russia underscores the need to support primary science research on global climate change.[15]

Joint Implementation projects, while especially appropriate for improving efficiency in the energy sector, might also be developed in other sectors. In the timber sector, for example, research on the role of the effectiveness and nature of forests as carbon sinks is still in its early stages. Indeed, one proposed Joint Implementation project in Russia has targeted "an increase of CO_2 absorption (forestry sector)."[16] International governance bodies would be directly involved in Joint Implementation projects. The Nordic Council of Ministers is one expert body whose existing work with Russia might play a real role in such collaboration. Given the leading work of Norway and Sweden in promoting GHG emissions research and public policy, the Nordic Council could play an important role in overseeing Joint Implementation projects in Russia and other countries.[17]

Many of the necessary conditions for establishing Joint Implementation projects in Russia already exist. Russian research scientists appear ready to lend assistance in evaluating such projects if adequate funding can be provided. Domestic and international scientific acceptance of standard methods for determining baselines for each project will be essential if a large number of Joint Implementation projects are to emerge. The emergence of a large number of experts on the topic will at the same time have the beneficial effect of creating a critical mass of inspectors who can ensure the accuracy and verifiability of each other's work. Standardized requirements for transparency and verifiable work in the scientific community will also serve to improve the reliability of global-climate change science itself. The founding of one or more independent scientific review committees would be essential to helping maintain the reputation of such scientific initiatives.

There are obstacles to Joint Implementation as well. One problem is that the Russian government has a poor track record in managing large infusions of cash. Given the government ownership of many of the same large energy-related firms that would engage in Joint Implementation, such cash inflows as those provided by emissions trading might indeed risk being mismanaged. Another problem is the political weight that fossil fuel producers carry in the Russian government. The argument can be made that the government would not be able to administer effectively the Joint Implementation mechanism. Further, the so-called "oil generals" (the oligarchy governing Russia's oil interests) might balk at the benefits of Joint Implementation, in the face of rising world oil prices, and abandon earlier commitments.

As a solution, guidelines for identification of sectors and technologies to be considered in Joint Implementation projects should be developed, in consultation with international experts. Newly established domestic and international institutions for monitoring, verifying, and enforcing compliance are crucial to the success of the Joint Implementation mechanism. A verification process is needed for the evaluation of Joint Implementation project successes and failures. Official statements on mutual initiatives to reduce GHG emissions, made by Presidents Clinton and Putin in June 2000, suggested that global climate change is indeed an issue of concern to Russian government officials at the highest level. Russia has other potentially important roles in affecting global climate change; its forests have a significant impact on worldwide levels of carbon sequestration, and steps to improve those levels could directly involve Russia.

In summary, Russia's economic downturn of the past decade provides the industrial nations of the West with an opportunity to implement the Joint Implementation mechanism in Russia, one of the world's most energy- and carbon-intensive economies. Efforts to begin the process of Joint Implementation must begin sooner rather than later. The Russian energy sector's current receptivity to such efforts may disappear tomorrow, if Russia's economy improves and its "hot air" is depleted because of increased emissions levels. Actually beginning the process may be the most difficult stage, as both Western and Russian partners must be identified. Once the success of a small number of Joint Implementation projects can be demonstrated, the benefits could become more easily understood and recognized. A positive example within Russia could also set a useful precedent for the other nations of Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union.

Nathaniel Trumbull is a PhD Candidate in the UW Department of Geography.

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1 OECD, *Climate Change Policy Initiatives, 1995/96 Update. Volume II: Selected Non-IEA Countries*, Paris: OECD, 1996a, 121.

2 Ibid, 25.

3 Berdin V. and A. Kokorin, "Implementation of UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in the Russian Federation" in *Climate Change: Mobilising Global Effort*. Paris: OECD, 1997, 39.

4 OECD, 1996a, 27.

5 Ishitani, H. and T.B. Johansson, "Energy Supply Mitigation Options," *Climate Change 1995: Impacts, Adaptations and Mitigation of Climate Change*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996b, 597.

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7 Ibid, 41.

8 Ishitani, 594.

9 OECD, *Action Against Climate Change: The Kyoto Protocol and Beyond*. Paris: OECD, 1999a, 10.

10 OECD, "Status of Research on Project Baselines under the UNFCC and the Kyoto Protocol," *OECD Working Papers*, No. 25, Paris: 1999b, 6.

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12 Ibid, 10.

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14 Berdin, 45.

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

JSIS SUMMER TEACHERS SEMINAR FOR EDUCATORS, GRADES 7-12

JUNE 27, 28, 29, 2001 • UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, SEATTLE

Spiritual Spaces Around the World

ABOUT THE PROGRAM

This three-day seminar will explore arenas of spiritual encounter throughout the world. Through lecture presentations, panel discussion, and fieldtrips, participants will be introduced to temples, mosques, cathedrals, family altars, and other less structured zones of spiritual exchange. Discussion led by UW faculty will be coordinated with Seattle's diverse ethnic and religious communities to provide registrants with a unique and fascinating cultural education.

Specific lectures will explore:

- The Role of the Church in Russian Villages
- The Day of the Dead and Family Altars in Latin America
- Spiritual Arenas of Pacific Northwest Indigenous Peoples
- Fundamentals of Mosques
- Medieval European Cathedrals
- Spiritual Zones in Today's Commercial World
- Javanese Sacred Sites
- The Role of Spiritual Zones in China

Fieldtrips will include visits to:

- White River Buddhist Temple
- Sakya Monastery of Tibetan Buddhism
- Islamic Idriss Mosque

Please note this is a preliminary program of activities and is subject to change.

GENERAL SEMINAR INFORMATION

The first day of the seminar will be held in Kane Hall, Room 210; the second and third days of the seminar will be held in Mary Gates Hall, Room 241 on the University of Washington campus, Seattle. There will be two half-day fieldtrips (bus transportation provided) in the afternoons of the first and second days. Each day, sessions will begin at 8:30 a.m., and will aim to end at 4:30 p.m. However, on fieldtrip days, participants should anticipate that they may return to campus after 4:30 p.m., if traffic is particularly congested. Participants will be asked to dress conservatively on fieldtrip days, since religious sites will be visited. Pre-registrants will receive in advance a packet containing the final program, campus map, and tips concerning dress and lunch options.

REGISTRATION INFORMATION

Registration Deadline: June 19, 2001

Space Limitations: Seminar is limited to the first 60 registrants

Registration Fee: $95.00 (checks payable the University of Washington). No refunds.

Clock Hours: 24 WA State clock hours for teachers at no additional charge (must attend the entire seminar to be received)

Questions: Contact Felicia Hecker at 206-543-4227; email: fhecker@u.washington.edu

Mail completed registration form, along with registration fee to: Felicia Hecker, Middle East Center, Box 353650, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195-3650.

Please note: Registration can only be accepted by mail and must include payment in full.

NAME ______________________

ADDRESS ______________________

CITY ______ STATE ______ ZIP CODE ______

DAYTIME PHONE ______________________

EMAIL ______________________ E-MAIL

SCHOOL ______________ GRADE LEVEL ______

Do you wish to receive clock hours? ◯ Yes ◯ No

Sponsored by the Outreach Centers in the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies and the Center for International Business Education and Research, University of Washington, Seattle.

This program is made possible in part by funding from the US Department of Education, Office of International Education and Graduate Program Services, through National Resource Center grants authorized under Title VI of the Higher Education Act.

OTHER NEWS FROM REECAS

Unfortunately, the Jackson School is saying goodbye to **PROFESSOR SABRINA RAMET.** This August, she will take up a tenured position as Professor of Political Science in the Department of Sociology and Political Science at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology in Trondheim, Norway. She will continue to work in East European studies, Church-state relations, and applied philosophy. In the short term, she will also be working on learning Norwegian. Professor Ramet will be missed here at the UW, and we wish her all the very best.

CORINA LINDEN, Adjunct Faculty in the Jackson School, will be offering a new course this summer quarter: Russian-European Relations (European Studies 498). Students will consider the following questions: Is Russia part of Europe? Will increasing conflict or cooperation characterize post-Cold War relations between the two? Does the institutionalization of European economic and security structures promote integration with or division from Russia?

Through the lens of international political economy theory, students will examine post-Cold War relations between Russia and Europe. The course will begin with a historical overview of East-West relations, including the debate between Russian Westernizers and Slavophiles. It will then focus on major issues in contemporary relations, including economic ties, security, transnational crime, Eastern Europe, and the role of regional institutions such as the EU and NATO in European-Russian relations.

SCOTT RICHARD ANDERSEN, a REECAS Master's student, has completed *Working in a World in Transformation: Twenty Stories for Twenty Years,* a commemorative collection of essays in honor of the twentieth anniversary of the East-West Institute in New York City. Andersen will be working on a book-length manuscript on the history of the East-West Institute this summer.

SUSAN SMITH, a 1997 REECAS grad, has been awarded a Fulbright-Hays fellowship. Starting this fall, she will be working for nine months in Vladimir, Ryazan, St. Petersburg, and Moscow, conducting research for her dissertation, *The Vladimir Historical Museum: The Production of History and Identity through Material Culture.* Her study will provide a description and analysis of the museum and will examine the differences and continuities between the pre- and post-revolutionary provincial museum in order to understand the extent of its importance and its role in promoting civil society both during the imperial period and in the earliest period of the Soviet regime. **ALI IGMEN,** a UW doctoral candidate, has also received a Fulbright-Hays award for research in Bishkek and Osh, Kirghizstan. He will be conducting a comparative study of cultural policies in the Republic of Turkey and the Kirghiz SSR from the 1930's to the 1950's. We offer congratulations to Susan and Ali.

REECAS NEWSLETTER

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