

Influences on the CIA's Creation

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Abstract

At the end of World War II, the United States' wartime intelligence agency, the Office of Strategic Services, was left in a difficult position. The State Department and War Department believed that there was no need for such an agency. William Donovan, the Director of the OSS, was not convinced that his station was of no use. The United States needed an agency with international capabilities for assistance in foreign policy and counterintelligence. The attack on Pearl Harbor was a glaring failure of military proficiency and served as a point that an independent centralized intelligence agency was necessary. The rise of the Soviet Union and its expansive Communist ideology was more reason for global security and surveillance. This research study aims to accurately determine the cause for the rise of the CIA with the introduction of the National Security Act of 1947.

Table of Contents

Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction.....	4
Chapter 2: Literature Review.....	7
Chapter 3: Methodology.....	13
Chapter 4: Analysis.....	19
Chapter 5: Conclusion.....	45
Chapter 6: References.....	48

Chapter 1: Introduction

In September 1947, President Harry S. Truman signed into law the *National Security Act*, which among other uses, created the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). It is widely believed that the growing tensions between the U.S.S.R. and the United States led to the creation of the agency for reasons of national security. After all, an intelligence agency's goal is to provide its nation with timely and accurate information about the happenings around the world. However, there may be reason to believe that the Soviet Union was not the only factor that played a critical role in the development of the United States' first peacetime intelligence agency. The objective of this study is to be able to pinpoint what factor had the biggest role in the development of the CIA.

A prior study has suggested that there were three probable causes for the Executive Branch to conclude the need for the CIA. (Jeffreys-Jones, 1997). The first reason, and the most popular, was the growing threat of the Soviet Union. Tension brewed between the East and West before World War II officially ended. President Roosevelt and President Truman had their suspicions about the intentions of Joseph Stalin after the war ended and Europe laid in ash. In 1946, George Kennan, a U.S. diplomat to Russia, wrote that the Soviet Union was set on expansion and needed to be contained at all costs. (Kennan, 1946). This telegram inspired the Truman Doctrine, President Truman's foreign policy on containment.

The second possibility was the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. The attack by the Imperial Japanese was a complete surprise, since it was known at the time that Japan had a smaller fleet than the United States. Being that it was as devastating as it was, there were those who wondered if it could have been prevented or partially negated if the United States had an intelligence agency to discover these threats before they happened. Some view Pearl Harbor as an absolute

intelligence failure, given that the relationship between the United States and Japan had soured since 1898 and steadily worsened over time (Kahn, 1991).

The third possibility offered by Jeffreys-Jones is that the CIA was the least-worst answer to America's foreign policy problem. Throughout American history, government officials and citizens alike despised intelligence agencies because they were seen as a form of government power, spying, and tyranny (Wonderium, 2021). However, government officials were starting to believe that a peacetime intelligence agency would be necessary to play an active role in the world. However, there were still many people, especially within the Department of Defense, that despised the idea of an intelligence agency. People such as Secretary of War Henry Stimson, who said in 1945, "This seems most inadvisable" about the CIA. While Secretary Stimson was not the only objector, those who were for the agency eventually got their way, though an agreement had to be made by both parties given that they needed to work together.

Prior studies and evaluations into the formation of the CIA, such as Tim Wiener's *Legacy of Ashes*, use qualitative methods to evaluate sources and reach a conclusion. This is standard for any historical document analysis methodology. Limitations vary such as the usage of previously classified documents. Every few years, the CIA and White House release classified documents which can range from government memos to transcripts. Given that Jeffreys-Jones' book was published in 1997, there is a possibility that newer information has been released through the Freedom of Information Act. It is already clear that it was multiple at the same time, but what is not clear is the importance of each through the eyes of the Executive Branch. The contribution of this research study will be a quantifiable answer. While remaining qualitative, the method of content analysis allows for a pseudo-numbers approach to solving the question and provide further insight into the internal discourse analysis of 1940's government. The research question I

will be testing in this study: Which internal factors played the biggest role in the development of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947?

Chapter 2: Literature Review

The literature review will begin with a historical analysis that develops background information on the societal climate of the time. There are also guiding questions or information presented that represents major elements of the analysis, which will be identified. Two main sections are contained within this review. The first is historical background information. This includes readings that focus on specific events that played an influential role in shaping the intelligence sector of the United States. The second category are the sources which shaped the methodology of my research considerably, either by listing important figures or assisted in the framing of my research question.

Historical Background Information

The modern intelligence agencies of the United States such as the CIA and NSA can be traced back to the OSS, or Office of Strategic Services. Started by William Donovan, the unit consisted of two main departments. One was concerned with the operational aspects of intelligence such as surveillance, sabotage, and counterintelligence (nps.gov, 2017). The other was focused on the research and analysis portion of intelligence. Their effectiveness in World War II provided somewhat mixed results. Many of their sabotage and rescue missions were great successes, and their research department produced high quality information on the enemy. However, the OSS also shared in several embarrassing failures and poor organization. This along with the less-than-favorable reputation Donovan acquired put the organization on poor terms with many government officials and the President of the United States, Harry Truman.

William Donovan tried extremely hard to push the idea of a secret intelligence agency to those within the State Department. The idea was to mirror something akin to Great Britain's long

standing intelligence service, MI6. An agency adept in all things covert. Despite the attempts to sell his idea, there were many individuals who hated the idea of such an organization being housed within the United States, especially outside of wartime (Troy, 1981). Those within the military were the strongest opposition. They believed it was an extremely undemocratic idea. However, such an agency would also steal positions from within the military with a specialty in intelligence gathering. Whatever the case may be, the history between America and intelligence agencies was a complicated one.

Intelligence agencies within the United States are not unique to the mid-20th century, despite the attention towards this period. Intelligence has been a part of the United States since the start of the Revolutionary War with a consistent buildup to the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947 (irp.fas.org, 1996). Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the history is the lack of intelligence usage, even during times of war. Many of those in positions of government as well as most of the public believed that state intelligence was a form of government power, and hence frowned upon. While the primary usage of this literature is to give background context to American intelligence prior to the end of World War II, it also gives plenty of information on the formation of the agency itself.

Distrust of intelligence agencies were not only for their potential to operate against the American people, but in the way it operated in wartime. Counterintelligence and espionage were fantastic tools practically speaking but considered very dirty and unbecoming of a professional fighting force, especially in the early years of the United States (Wonderium, 2021). Every wartime agency or group formed during war was quickly dissolved after conflicts had ended, leaving no room to pursue covert operations or tactics. However, the attack on Pearl Harbor in

1941 was a dramatic shift for the nation and its needs for intelligence, since it was surmised that the attack could have possibly been prevented had we invested in our intelligence services.

Pearl Harbor itself was considered a total failure of military intelligence and led to serious doubts about America's ability to defend itself from surprise attacks. After several internal investigations, it became even more clear that intelligence services were lacking even more during peacetime, as tensions between Japan and the United States had been rising for over two decades, and no one anticipated an attack from the Japanese (Kahn, 1991). This fact led to even further chaos as tension with the Soviet Union began to rise as well, leaving many to wonder if another surprise attack was possible.

Walter Bedell Smith was the acting American Ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1946. During his time in Moscow, his meeting with Stalin would produce information that sent American intelligence into a frenzy to find out as much as they could about the Soviet Union. In April, Smith met with Stalin to discuss the U.S.S.R.'s plans for possible expansion. During the meeting, Stalin expressed that he viewed the United States and Great Britain as the two main enemies of the Soviet Union. He also expressed that he was planning on expanding his territory but would not give a specific answer as to how far he was willing to go (Smith, 1950). This obviously needed to be found out by the acting intelligence agencies of the West as soon as possible.

As time went on in Washington, President Truman was in dire need of rallying support against the growing Soviet threat in Greece. If they were successful in incorporating them into the Iron Curtain, they potentially had the entirety of Europe under their influence in time. President Truman considered the United States responsible for saving the rest of the free world.

Senator Vandenberg gave him a sound piece of advice. Truman needed to make a speech that rattled the entire American public into fearing the possibility of Soviet power (Acheson, 1987). What followed was one of his most important speeches, known as the “Truman Doctrine.”

The Truman Doctrine was an address given by President Truman that described the United States’ new method of foreign policy. Spearheaded by George F. Kennan in 1946, containment was the preferred approach to dealing with communism. It was a way to carry out the Marshall Plan, the economic relief plan for Europe, effectively. It also aimed to widen the scope globally, rather than sticking to Europe by itself (Truman Doctrine, 1947). The main difference between the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan was the promise of defending any nation that was under the threat of communist influences. This foreign policy was paramount to the creation and the actions of the CIA in its first decade, but also the entirety of its operation into the present. Using the CIA to perform surveillance across hotspots of the world for communism was almost the entire reason for its formation (Truman Doctrine, 1947).

Whatever the case may be, the CIA was ultimately created with the introduction of the National Security Act (National Security Act of 1947). This bill introduced several changes, such as forming the United States Air Force. Most importantly, it authorized the official creation of the Central Intelligence Agency and gave it very generous privileges, such as complete privacy from the public and the direct authority to answer only to the President of the United States. This statute, while incredibly important, is one of two bills that profoundly shaped the agency and its actions throughout the entirety of its existence. This would be The Central Intelligence Act of 1949

Critical Research Additions

After the end of World War II, the United States was left in a unique situation. The growing threat of the Soviets was something on the mind of almost everyone within the government. To combat this emerging threat, the U.S. would need to have eyes and ears around the world, something only an intelligence agency could do. However, this is not the only theory surrounding the formation of the agency. American history professor Jeffreys-Jones lists two additional possible explanations gathered from historical document analysis. The growing Soviet threat is one of them, but the others are Pearl Harbor, and the outcome of the least unpopular opinion for the growing need for foreign intelligence (Jeffreys-Jones, 1997). Pearl Harbor was a disaster for the United States and could have possibly been prevented had we invested more resources into intelligence services. Despite the growing support for intelligence, there were still many people against the idea. That is why the third idea examines it from a view of compromising viewpoints. In other words, the CIA was the least “bad” idea for conducting foreign intelligence in a world that will soon demand it.

Everything surrounding the Central Intelligence Agency was surprisingly messy. Its foundation, its charter, early espionage, sabotage, and intelligence methods were elementary at best which caused significant issues and embarrassments internally. Tim Weiner, author of *Legacy of Ashes*, uses over 50,000 historical documents about the CIA to describe the shaky start of the Central Intelligence Agency. Key figures which helped propagate the modern intelligence system are explored thoroughly through documents that were either written themselves or by their peers (Weiner, 2011). While the book itself focuses on the start of the CIA to modern day, there is an

excellent level of information about the formative years which provided great direction for finding key personnel and details surrounding them.

The quantitative portion of this study will act as a form of supplementary counting to the qualitative analysis present at the beginning of my research. Modeled from David Hannah's and Brenda Lautsch's article on the additions of quantitative works within a qualitative analysis, its usage will be very important for the validity of my findings. What separates supplementary counting from other forms of quantitative additions is the lack of central contributions (Hannah et al, 2011). Rather, supplementary counting is designed to provide newer insights to a previously established qualitative analysis. This is more suited to the type of analysis being conducted within my study.

Krippendorff's textbook on the methodology for performing content analysis walks the reader through the intricacies of quality analysis work. The lessons in framing and evaluating sources were critical for the creation of this research study. An inference and personal interpretation in content analysis are pillars to the method itself, and Krippendorff explains how to provide the right information prior to supplying one's own interpretation to give basis to the claim (Krippendorff, 2004). Therefore, this study aims to replicate Jeffreys-Jones' research question about the possible influences of the CIA while using Krippendorff's methods of analysis to provide a definitive answer to the question through qualitative and quantitative results.

Chapter 3: Methodology

The overarching design for this research will be a case study into the development of the CIA and its influences. This was chosen because case studies excel at forming an understanding of complex issues spanning over a broad array of sources (Gaille, 2018). It also allows easy use of multiple methods of research and investigation. The methodology for this study will be document analysis with an emphasis on content analysis in both quantitative and qualitative means. A mixed methods approach to research is advantageous for my research question for two reasons. Firstly, it allows for a broader scope of data collection and source connection. With qualitative research focusing strictly on historical document analysis, the confines of methods for disposal can be somewhat narrow and limit the amount of data one can collect. The second reason is for synergy because qualitative and quantitative analysis can compliment each other extremely well since quantitative data provides tangible evidence while qualitative analysis explains it in depth.

Content analysis is a method that focuses on recurring themes and patterns in language to find certain meanings behind the writing in question (Krippendorff, 2004). When correctly utilized, content analysis will be focusing on the document itself with attention to the written contents, authors, and recipients. The linguistic side of the analysis will focus on how many times specific themes appear in writing and how they are used. All data will be viewed through different contextual lenses to find connections which will then be formed into one coherent analysis and evaluation.

All data used within this capstone's analysis are primary sources. These include memorandums, letters, addresses, and books that are either written by or for nine individuals deemed highly influential for their role in creating the Central Intelligence Agency. These are

William Donovan, John Magruder, Sidney Souers, Richard Park Jr., Henry Stimson, Harry Truman, Walter Bedell Smith, George Kennan, and Hoyt S. Vandenberg. These nine men were chosen from Tim Weiner's *Legacy of Ashes* because of their consistent appearance in the formation period of the CIA or were credited in being directly involved in the decision-making process from 1945 to 1947. Interpersonal communication between these nine individuals were chosen because it will most likely provide the most accurate information they believed at the time. Writing between colleagues is much more straightforward than addressing the public and will therefore carry a certain amount of truth. The only exception is to this rule in Walter Bedell Smith's book, *My Three Years in Moscow* which details his time as an ambassador to Russia. While released to the public, it does contain important information that molded American intelligence priorities. This source, however, will not be used in the quantitative analysis due to its status as an autobiography and not a historical document.

Secondary sources relative to the analysis are Jeffrey-Jones' *Why was the CIA Established in 1947*, and Tim Weiner's *Legacy of Ashes*. Jones' article formed the basis of my research question that will be testing by providing the three possible options for the CIA's existence. These are the attack on Pearl Harbor, the growing threat of the Soviet Union, and the CIA being the least-worst solution to America's growing foreign policy issues. Since the author uses historical document analysis, this study will be able to replicate and build off his findings by providing additional results. Weiner's *Legacy of Ashes* was used as a guide for finding relevant historical figures and archives for further research and exploration. While the book itself is scathing of the CIA, I am only using it for a basis of information.

The analysis will be split into three sections. The first is a basic content analysis which analyzes the broader context of each source and provide a general overview of all sources within

the analysis. The second is an analysis of the themes each source covers and categorizes them. The third is an analysis that quantifies each instance a specific topic or theme is written. These themes are Pearl Harbor, Soviet Union, and logistics / bureaucratic politics. Documents that focus on Pearl Harbor need to be a strong emphasis on the attack and the subsequent intelligence failure or the growing need for intelligence because of Pearl Harbor. The Soviet Union theme applies to any documents that focus on the threat of the U.S.S.R. This is also applicable to a focus of Communism and Joseph Stalin because all are connected to the West's fear of the Soviets. Logistics and bureaucratic politics are more intricate topics. While very few direct sources mention the word "logistics" and none use "bureaucracy," Sidney Souers makes mention of the logistic and bureaucratic issues facing the Central Intelligence Group while acting as its director. This idea of logistical failures and rival arguments are present in such a high degree that I have opted to make them one of the central themes of this analysis.

The procedures for the analysis vary. The first analysis with the aim of providing general overview will be a simple summary of the content within each document in chronological order. The second analysis will categorize each document based on their strongest themes while providing an alternative summary that focuses on the theme in question, with more attention being brought to specific entries, paragraphs, or quotes. The third analysis is a quantitative analysis of all sources except Walter Bedell Smith's *My Three Years in Moscow*, since it is a book and not a historical document. Each source will have the number of times a theme is directly mentioned in text with a comparison to all other sources and a final tally presented at the end.

The limitations of this study manifest themselves in two distinct ways. The first is the difficulty of obtaining certain sources. Much of the information written at the time was

classified, so access is granted through the Freedom of Information Act. However, several sources are kept inside the President Archives and only exist as physical copies. Unfortunately, being unable to obtain these does reduce the pool of potential sources for the analysis. The second limitation is the difficulty to obtain information through the Freedom of Information Act. While it is a fantastic tool for tracking information, it can be challenging to find specific documents. If a source is mentioned in another piece of literature and doesn't contain the official title for the source, it can be impossible to locate at times. The third limitation is personal bias. Content analysis is at the researcher's discretion for what and how a source is evaluated. This can cause some level of human error.

With these limitations, I believe it is still prudent to continue with the preferred methodology. Addressing the possibility of bias first, all historical figures and sources were chosen based on their relevance to the topic. The analysis will include many direct quotes from all sources, so their words will be much more presently displayed than my own. The problems with the accessibility of sources are still present, but there is currently a wide array of quality sources that are easily available. While there are still definitely sources that are unused that could be relevant, I am confident that the number of sources already included have produced a realistic depiction of the intelligence community's buildup in the mid-20th century.

Primary Source Documents

“*Park Report*” Richard Park Jr. to President Harry Truman, March 12, 1945

“*Memorandum for Donovan*” Henry Stimson to William Donovan, May 1, 1945

“*Memorandum for Donovan*” John Magruder to William Donovan, May 2, 1945

“*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Strategic Services to President Truman*” William Donovan to President Harry Truman, August 25, 1945

“*Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Strategic Services to President Truman*” William Donovan to President Harry Truman, September 13, 1945

“*Report on the Intelligence and Security Activities of the Government*” Herald D. Smith to President Harry Truman, September 20th, 1945

“*Memorandum From the Director of the Strategic Services Unit, Department of War, to the Assistant Secretary of War*” John Magruder to John J. McCloy, October 20, 1945

“*Report by the Director, Strategic Services Unit, Department of War, to the Assistant Secretary of War for Air*” John Magruder to Robert A. Lovett, October 26, 1945

“*Memorandum From the Director of the Strategic Services Unit, Department of War, to Secretary of War*” John Magruder to Robert P. Patterson, February 4, 1946

“*Memorandum by the Director of the Strategic Services Unit, Department of War*” John Magruder to Unknown, February 14, 1946

“*The Long Telegram*” George Kennan to James F. Byrnes, February 22, 1946

“*My Three Years in Moscow*” Walter Bedell Smith, March-April 1946

“*Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence*” Sidney Souers to National Intelligence Authority, April 29, 1946

“*Memorandum From President Truman to Secretary of War*” President Harry Truman to Robert P. Patterson, May 16, 1946

“*Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence to the National Intelligence Authority*” Sidney Souers to NIA, June 7, 1946

“*Draft Letter from President Truman to Attorney General Clark*” President Harry Truman to Tom C. Clark, August 7, 1946

“*Memorandum From Attorney General Clark to President Truman*” Tom C. Clark to President Harry Truman, October 1946

“*Testimony on National Security Act of 1947*” Hoyt S. Vandenberg to Department of War, April 27, 1947

Nine Individuals Responsible for the CIA's Creation

George Kennan - A foreign service officer assigned to the American embassy in Moscow in 1946.

Harry Truman - 33rd President of the United States

Henry Stimson - United States Secretary of War from 1940-1945

Hoyt S. Vandenberg - Chief of Staff of the Air Force

John Magruder - Deputy Director of the OSS and SSU

Richard J. Park - Chief White House military aide to President Franklin D. Roosevelt

Sidney W. Souers - The first Director of Central Intelligence

Walter Bedell Smith - United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1946-1948

William J. Donovan - Director of the OSS

Chapter 4: Analysis

Analysis I: Chronological Overview

This section of the analysis is a chronological overview of all documents present in the study. This is designed to be the baseline for all research moving forward and to understand the writing within each historical document or piece of literature. The analysis is performed by first reading the entirety of the document in question and then pulling direct quotes that represent the broader focus of the document. The more of the author's work that is seen, the more authentic the analysis being presented will be.

Results of Analysis I

The *Park Report* was an evaluation of the Office of Strategic Services produced by Colonel Richard Park Jr. The evaluation was requested by President Roosevelt but was delivered to President Truman after Roosevelt's death in April of 1945. Within the report, Park examined the many negative aspects and qualities of the OSS. "If the OSS is permitted to continue with its present organization, it may do further serious harm to citizens, business interests, and national interests of the United States" (Park, 1). "General MacArthur even refuses to allow the OSS to operate in his theater" (Park, 1). "If the OSS is investigated after the war, it may easily prove to have been relatively the most expensive and wasteful agency in the government" (Park, 2). There were some positive aspects to the organization within the report: "There are elements and personnel that can and should be salvaged. It has performed some excellent sabotage and rescue work. Its Research and Analysis section has done an outstanding job" (Park, 2).

Park's recommendations for the OSS or any centralized intelligence agency appeared to be quite bleak. "It is recommended that the useful elements of the OSS, such as the Research and Analysis Section and certain valuable individuals be retained either temporarily in the OSS or

transferred to some appropriate agency” (Park, 3). “It is recommended that, although a world-wide secret intelligence coverage for the benefit of this government in the post-war period is necessary, a new agency with such superstructure as Donovan proposes be vetoed in favor of an organization along the lines of the one now in operation in the Western Hemisphere in which President Roosevelt appointed the Directors of Military Intelligence, Naval Intelligence, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to cooperate.” (Park, 3). The final blow against the OSS in a post-war setting was written at the end of the report. “Activities under [Sabotage], [Subversive Activities], [Subversive Propaganda], cannot be engaged in by any democratic nation which seeks peace and has no ambitions for conquest” (Park, 55).

The *Memorandum for Donovan* from Secretary of War Henry Stimson was a response to Donovan’s idea of a centralized intelligence agency. “This matter has received the most careful consideration in the War Department which is entire agreement with the objective you are seeking. Our differences, however, have to do with your method of reaching that objective.” (Stimson, 1). Stimson did not want any of the military’s capabilities outsourced to an outside agency. “From the War Department’s point of view, it is vital that the responsibility should not be separated from the authority to discharge this responsibility and since security against foreign aggression is the primary concern of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy, it seems to me that the authority to carry out this responsibility should remain with them.” (Stimson, 1). Stimson ended the letter with desire for further discussion at a later time, “The Departments of State, War, Justice, and the Navy have together examined the proposed central intelligence service and are in substantial agreement that it should not be considered prior to the termination of hostilities against Germany and Japan.” (Stimson, 2).

The *Memorandum for Donovan* from OSS Deputy Director John Magruder is an analysis of the letter sent to Donovan from Henry Stimson described above. “After studying Mr. Stimson’s letter, I find it consistent with a position firmly held by the Army, Navy, and State Departments with respect to the powers of the Director” (Magruder, 1). The way Magruder saw the situation with developing an intelligence agency, there were two options.

“You have two principal courses of action: a. To proceed with the development of political pressures on the President stronger than those existing in four or more old-line departments and sufficient to defeat them on the issues of the independent directorate and the immediacy of the establishment. Option b. To present your views as to the advantages of the independence of the directorate but stressing the vital necessity of immediate action – admitting a willingness to compromise on the former to attain the latter” (Magruder, 2).

In Magruder’s opinion, he thought the second option would be considerably more amicable and lead to a smoother transition of responsibility within the State Department (Magruder, 2).

The *Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Strategic Services to President Truman* from OSS Director William Donovan is a summary of his plans for a modified central intelligence agency that is more approachable for the State Department. “All major powers except the United States have had for a long time past permanent worldwide intelligence services, reporting directly to the highest echelons of their governments. Prior to the present war, the United States had no foreign secret intelligence service. It never has had and does not now have a coordinated intelligence system” (Donovan, 20). Donovan’s biggest concern was for foreign policy. “American policy could be based upon information obtained through its own sources on foreign intentions, capabilities and developments as seen and interpreted by Americans” (Donovan, 20). His attempt to compromise for the President came in the form of two safeguards. “That such an agency should be prohibited from carrying on clandestine activities within the United States and should be forbidden the exercise of any police functions either at

home or abroad” (Donovan, 20). The second safeguard was allowing the agency and its director to answer only to the President. “That since the nature of its work requires it to have status it should be independent of any Department of the Government (since it is obliged to serve all and must be free of the natural bias of an operating Department). It should be under a director, appointed by the President, and be administered under Presidential direction, or in the event of a General Manager being appointed, should be established in the Executive Office of the President, under his direction” (Donovan, 20). The importance of national defense was another tactic Donovan used to sway the President to his side.

“That this agency, as the sole agency for secret intelligence, should be authorized, in the foreign field only, to carry on services such as espionage, counterespionage and those special operations (including morale and psychological) designed to anticipate and counter any attempted penetration and subversion of our national security by enemy action” (Donovan, 21).

This may have been a reminder of Pearl Harbor, where the Japanese Navy attacked the Pacific Fleet by surprise and severely hindered the U.S.’s naval capabilities and is considered a glaring intelligence failure.

Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Strategic Services to President Truman

from OSS Director William Donovan is a short letter warning the President to not abolish the Office of Strategic Services.

“I understand that it has been, or will be, suggested to you that certain of the primary functions of this organization, more particularly, secret intelligence, counterespionage, and the evaluation and synthesis of intelligence—that these functions be severed and transferred to separate agencies. I hope that in the national interest, and in your own interest as the Chief Executive, that you will not permit this to be done” (Donovan, 1945).

Donovan also argues that the partial or whole removal of the OSS would cause further issues.

“Whatever agency has the duty of intelligence should have it as a complete whole. To do otherwise would be to add chaos to existing confusion in the intelligence field” (Donovan, 1945).

The *Report on the Intelligence and Security Activities of the Government* from Herald D. Smith to President Harry Truman was an evaluation of the current intelligence landscape from the Bureau of the Budget's perspective. "No one believes they can continue the same scale in the post-war period. On the other hand, no one believes that we can safely permit our foreign intelligence activities to revert to the equally unplanned basis that existed in the pre-war period." (Smith, 2). Smith argued that the national intelligence structure was mediocre at best and was hampered by inefficient department structures and bureaucracy within Washington. The need for one centralized agency to coordinate efforts was required. "Pearl Harbor, simply as one example, is less of a failure from any one department than of an inadequacy of our total intelligence operation" (Smith, 4). It was evident to the budget bureau that something needed to be done about the United States' growing need for intelligence. "Our needs for foreign intelligence have broadened beyond the point where they can be met by the activities of a single intelligence agency. Nor do they fall into simple mutually exclusive subject categories such as "military," "economic," and "political" which permit easy assignment of responsibilities among a few intelligence agencies" (Smith, 8). "Our relations with Russia, Argentine, Spain, and China need to be viewed in terms of points at which our interests coincide or clash as nations and peoples, not solely in terms of whether the "leaders" in these countries are "friendly" or "hostile" (Smith, 9). This was something that a proposed central intelligence could do efficiently and effectively.

Memorandum From the Director of the Strategic Services Unit, Department of War, to the Assistant Secretary of War from OSS Deputy Director John Magruder to Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy is a discussion about the need for a foreign intelligence agency. Magruder argued that the establishment of a foreign intelligence service would greatly benefit each department within the Department of Defense. "The Secretary of the Navy has proposed that the

Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy join in vigorous support of a plan for the establishment of a national foreign intelligence organization under a director charged with working responsibilities, who would serve and report to the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, as a group” (Magruder, 1945). Magruder pushed the idea for a central intelligence hub where all collected information was synthesized, and clandestine operations could be planned and carried out.

“The national foreign intelligence organization should serve as the central agency within the government for the comprehensive analysis and synthesis of information concerning foreign nations. All departments and agencies of the government which collect such information, whatever may be the manner of collection, should be required promptly to deposit with the national foreign intelligence organization such part of the information collected in such form as may be required by the national foreign intelligence organization. The information thus deposited will be collated, analyzed, and incorporated into comprehensive studies. This is not intended to interfere with the appropriate activities of the several agencies now engaged in the collection of such information. It is designed to accomplish the pooling of their product” (Magruder, 1945).

This of course came with the lack of any police power on national soil. The idea of being a separate entity from the War Department also gives much needed flexibility for surveillance and observation worldwide.

Report by the Director, Strategic Services Unit, Department of War, to the Assistant Secretary of War for Air from OSS Deputy Director John Magruder to Assistant Secretary of War for Air Robert Lovett is a set of recommendations for the centralized foreign intelligence service. Magruder stressed that the role of an intelligence agency was to undertake all clandestine and covert operations from the military and leave all overt missions to their respective branches:

“In general outline, the most desirable organization and program for the foreign intelligence activities of the United States Government for the future would involve a continuation of the present department services with the addition of a central foreign intelligence unit. To this unit would be delegated some of those functions now carried on, by necessity or choice, by the

present services but which are not strictly related to their functions. The present departmental services would be expected to continue their operations without change, under the sole limitation that they concern themselves primarily with the overt collection of foreign intelligence peculiar to their respective activities, together with the evaluation, analysis, and dissemination of such intelligence” (Magruder, 74).

Magruder also argued that World War II exemplified the need for the services of an intelligence agency. “Preceding paragraphs have brought out clearly the need which the American Government has for a central foreign intelligence service as exemplified by conditions during the recent war. The need for a central foreign intelligence service has long existed, but it has been heavily underscored by the national experience during the past four years” (Magruder, 74). Magruder was also quite blunt as to why the United States needs an independent agency for covert operations. “To put it baldly, such operations are necessarily extra-legal and sometimes illegal. No regular government department, be it War, State or Navy, can afford to house such operations within itself or otherwise identify itself with them. Independence of association with them is therefore essential” (Magruder, 78).

Memorandum From the Director of the Strategic Services Unit, Department of War, to Secretary of War from OSS Deputy Director Magruder to Secretary of War Robert Patterson is a request for a status update on the Strategic Services Unit, which was the analysis portion of the OSS after the rest of the organization was abolished. “Since then, the liquidation of its wartime activities has been practically completed. Profitable intelligence operations have been maintained, but the assets of the organization continue to be sapped by attrition of high-grade personnel, and its morale lowered at a rate accelerated by continuing obscurity in the Unit’s future” (Magruder, 251). Since the SSU was only analytical and in an interim position departmentally, Magruder had great concern for what to do with the agency since all its wartime and collection capabilities were dissolved. “Since the establishment of the Central Intelligence

Authority on 22 January 1946, the disposition of the SSU with respect to that Authority has remained undecided” (Magruder, 252). Magruder was also concerned with the future of the SSU and its relation to the new Central Intelligence Group since many of those within the State Department believed that the OSS had a less than stellar reputation, and by association meant that the SSU was just as bad.

“I refer to criticisms from various sources of certain aspects of SSU tending to raise doubt as to its value as an entity for use in the Central Intelligence Group. Some of the criticisms take the cheap and familiar form of innuendo reflecting on the competence of the personnel and security of the Unit. Distorted facts and sheer opinions are expressed by individuals who could not be familiar with the current methods of operation, assets, or, if given favorable conditions, the potentialities of the organization” (Magruder, 252).

Magruder’s recommendation was for an expedited appraisal of the SSU to determine the program’s worth and possible future.

Memorandum by the Director of the Strategic Services Unit, Department of War from Magruder to an unknown recipient is once again about the construction of a centralized intelligence agency. However, it is much more focused on the status of the SSU and how it can be utilized. “The War Department considered itself responsible for liquidating the wartime activities and liabilities of the parent organization, while maintaining the SSU as a going concern held available for central intelligence when established. The activities of the Unit not related to strict intelligence purposes have now been liquidated. The remaining assets are now fully operational and available for employment in the central organization” (Magruder, 1946). It was for this reason that Magruder needed the SSU to lose its interim status and become either operational or incorporated into a greater program.

The Long Telegram was written by State Department analyst George Kennan to James Byrnes about the Soviet Union’s foreign policy and how the U.S. can combat them both diplomatically and by force if necessary. Kennan described the Soviet mindset as being

surrounded by anti-communist capitalist nations. “USSR still lives in antagonistic “capitalist encirclement” with which in the long run there can be no permanent peaceful coexistence. As stated by Stalin in 1927 to a delegation of American workers” (Kennan, 1). The USSR was also very state-oriented, “Everything must be done to advance the relative strength of the USSR as a factor in international society. Conversely, no opportunity must be missed to reduce the strength and influence, collectively and well as individually, of capitalist powers” (Kennan, 3). Kennan also described their tactics for influence. “Russians will participate officially in international organizations where they see [the] opportunity of extending Soviet power or of inhibiting or diluting [the] power of others there” (Kennan, 9). This also worked side by side with their efforts to combat western ideologies as well, “Russians will strive... to develop Soviet representation in, and official ties with, countries in which they sense strong possibilities of opposition with Western centers of power” (Kennan, 10). The description of communist implantation into societies was also noted. “A wide variety of national associations or bodies which can be dominated or influenced by penetration. These include labor unions, youth leagues, women's organizations, racial societies, religious societies, social organizations, cultural groups, liberal magazines, publishing houses, etc.” (Kennan, 12). These were naturally the easiest ways for communism to come to the West. Kennan made a point to recommend the start of intelligence gathering and surveillance of the Soviet Union. “Our first step must be to apprehend, and recognize for what it is, the nature of the movement with which we are dealing with” (Kennan, 16).

My Three Years in Moscow is a book written by Walter Bedell Smith and is a firsthand account of his experiences as the Ambassador to the Soviet Union. When Smith had the opportunity to meet with Joseph Stalin, he asked him questions about Soviet foreign policy and

his intentions moving forward after the war. Through this conversation, it was revealed that Stalin had a list of grievances with the United States, primarily that they sided with Churchill's statement against the Iron Curtain. "Is it possible that you really believe that the United States and Great Britain are united in an alliance to thwart Russia?" I asked. "Da [Yes]", Stalin replied." (Smith, 53). When asked, "What does the Soviet Union want? How far is Russia willing to go?" Stalin replied, "We're not going to go much further" (Smith, 53).

Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence by inaugural CIG Director Sidney Souers to presumably the National Intelligence Authority was a status update on the current needs of intelligence regarding national security. Souers reported an immediate need for intelligence on the Soviet Union. "There is an urgent need to develop the highest possible quality of intelligence on the U.S.S.R. in the shortest possible time. By informal agreement, a Planning Committee, composed of a coordinator from the Central Intelligence Group (C.I.G.) and representatives from the State Department, Military Intelligence Division (G-2), Office of Naval Intelligence (O.N.I.) and the Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff-2 (A-2), has been formed and has drawn up a plan to coordinate and improve the production of intelligence on the U.S.S.R. This plan has been approved informally by all members of the Intelligence Advisory Board and is now in operation" (Souers, 346). Another working committee would oversee compiling all relevant and factual information about the U.S.S.R. into a formal digest for the President.

Memorandum From President Truman to Secretary of War from President Harry Truman to Secretary of War Robert Patterson is a short letter discussing the possible future directors of the CIG. "I discussed his successor with General Eisenhower and suggested to him that Lieutenant General Vandenberg was the proper man to succeed Admiral Souers. General Eisenhower told me that he needed General Vandenberg and he recommended Major General

Bonesteel to me” (Truman, 354). Truman wanted to make sure that the removal of Vandenberg wouldn’t cripple Eisenhower’s military prowess, and only wanted Vandenberg if his absence didn’t form a considerable negative impact.

Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence to the National Intelligence Authority from Sidney Souers to the National Intelligence Authority is a progress report on the CIG’s operations. In the report, Souers expresses that he is quite happy with the consultants provided to him and mentions George Kennan as one of them, with his stellar work as a foreign service officer in Moscow. The plan for urgent intelligence gathering on the U.S.S.R. was approaching completion but was running into various logistical issues, mainly the coordination of intelligence information. “Some of these problems, particularly in the third category, require urgent interim solutions. Among these problems for which interim solutions have been evolved or initiated are the liquidation of the Strategic Services Unit, the development of intelligence on the U.S.S.R., and the coordination of scientific intelligence” (Souers, 359). Souers concluded that the planning phase of CIG activities was complete, and the next phase was to begin the operation of a centralized intelligence service.

Draft Letter from President Truman to Attorney General Clark from President Truman to Attorney General Tom C. Clark is a short letter discussing the transfer of responsibilities from the FBI to the CIG in Latin America. “Under date of August 8, 1946, the members of the National Intelligence Authority communicated to you a request that the Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel presently charged with intelligence coverage in Latin America be retained at their posts until the representatives of the Central Intelligence Group can take over in an orderly and efficient manner. It is my desire that in the national interest this request be

granted” (Truman, 1946). This would be a major step towards developing the FBI as a national agency to make room for the international capabilities of the CIG.

Memorandum From Attorney General Clark to President Truman from Tom C. Clark to President Harry Truman is a plan for an intelligence agency with world-wide capabilities.

“Secret world-wide intelligence coverage for the benefit of the United States Government must have as its primary objectives the providing to the executive branches of the Government basic data on a world-wide scale upon which plans may be formulated and action taken, and the insuring of internal security from the threat of infiltrating foreign agents, ideologies, and military conquest. Intelligence coverage must be had immediately” (Clark, 48).

Clark also mentions the prior existence of flexible and effective agencies. “There is in operation in the Western Hemisphere an intelligence plan based on simplicity of structure and flexibility of operations which has functioned efficiently, secretly, and economically since prior to Pearl Harbor, and has proved its adaptability to world-wide coverage by the effectiveness of its operation in the Western Hemisphere field” (Clark, 48). He finishes with a warning that without proper direction or a charter, it could very easily turn into secret police. “A hazard in intelligence operation is the possibility of a charge being made that the organization is a “Gestapo.” Also, a police agency which engages in intelligence operation may be called a “political police.” Both charges are obnoxious to American citizens” (Clark, 50).

Testimony on National Security Act of 1947 is a transcript from Hoyt S. Vandenberg and is addressed to the Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Secretary of the Navy, and Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy about the National Security Act of 1947. In the address, Vandenberg is trying to convince the members of the War Department that the need for an independent and centralized intelligence agency is real within and outside of the United States. His approach to swaying the opinions of each secretary was to consistently acknowledge the shortcomings that lead to Pearl Harbor. “I See that the people of this country, having experienced the disaster of

Pearl Harbor and the appalling consequences of a global war, are now sufficiently informed in their approach to intelligence to understand that an organization such as ours — or the Intelligence Divisions of the Armed Services, or the F.B.I. — cannot expose certain of their activities to public gaze” (Hoyt, 3). Hoyt also compared the U.S. to its allies as well as its former enemies and their development of effective intelligence agencies. “I think it can be said without successful challenge that before Pearl Harbor we did not have an intelligence service in this country comparable to that of Great Britain, or France, or Russia, or Germany, or Japan” (Hoyt, 3). The committee in charge of investigating Pearl Harbor was also paramount in Hoyt’s address, “The Joint Congressional Committee to Investigate the Pearl Harbor Attack reached many pertinent conclusions regarding the short-comings of our intelligence system and made some very sound recommendations for its improvement... ask the question asked by the Pearl Harbor Committee, with the finest intelligence available in our history —why was it possible for Pearl Harbor to occur?” (Hoyt, 4). Hoyt’s final mention of Pearl Harbor was a plea to pass the new bill, “All of these findings and recommendations have my hearty concurrence. In the Central Intelligence Group, and its successor which this bill creates, must be found the answer to the prevention of another Pearl Harbor” (Hoyt, 5).

Analysis II: Thematic Analysis

This portion of the analysis is an overview of the themes present in all documents within the study. This allows for the easy categorization of documents and their central reoccurring themes. In a sense, this focuses more on the macro themes of each paper, rather than the specific instances a word or theme is used in writing. This analysis was performed similarly to the first analysis. Each document is read in full, whilst using quotes directly from the writing which emphasize the overarching message of the document that the author was trying to convey.

Results of Analysis II:

Logistics and Bureaucratic Politics

The *Park Report* highlights primarily issues with Policy, but does reference communism, albeit once. Park's main argument was that the Office of Strategic Services was a bigger hindrance to the United States rather than an asset for intelligence. "If the OSS is permitted to continue with its present organization, it may do further serious harm to citizens, business interests, and national interests of the United States" (Park, 1). U.S. General Douglas MacArthur, the Commander of the Army in the Pacific theater, refused to allow the OSS to operate. The State Department refused to be responsible for the OSS in countries where the State Department is accredited (Park, 1). There was also the issue of wasting monetary resources. "With a \$57,000,000 budget, \$37,000,000 of which may be expended without provision of law governing the use of public funds for material and personnel, the possibilities of waste are apparent" (Park, 2). The communist element of the report was on the questionable members brought into the OSS overseas. "It appears probable that many improper persons have penetrated into OSS - some who cannot handle themselves, some with questionable backgrounds, and some who may be plants for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence agencies. The Communist element within the

OSS is believed to be in dangerously large proportions” (Park 1). The conclusion of the report recommended a policy change. Any future agency similar to the OSS should work alongside the preexisting intelligence agencies within the government (Park, 4).

Memorandum for Donovan from Secretary of War Henry Stimson to OSS Director William Donovan was a discussion on the implementation of a new intelligence agency. Stimson was concerned with the collection of unanimous votes by all heads of the War Department. Stimson was also concerned with the removal of responsibility from these departments to people outside of them, which a centralized intelligence agency would do. “I agree entirely with you that coordination of the intelligence effort relating to national security must be attained, but I do not think the coordinating authority should engage in operations. The inevitable tendency would be to expand its operating functions at the expense of the operating agencies which have very definite responsibilities” (Stimson, 1). Finally, Stimson and all other department heads agreed that the issue of intelligence should not be looked at again until after the war with Germany and Japan had ended (Stimson, 2).

Memorandum for Donovan from OSS Deputy Director John Magruder to OSS Director William Donovan is an analysis of the next steps Donovan can take to promote his idea of a centralized intelligence agency to those within the Executive Branch. He could either build up enough political pressure on President Truman alone that it overshadows everyone else in the State Department or he could stress the immediate need for action and be willing to compromise on his goal. Magruder implored Donovan to take the second option, “Despite your known desire to fight it out to “unconditional surrender” ... it is my personal belief that you will not be able to array sufficient pressure, in Congress or elsewhere, to cause the President to buck the line-up of the department heads” (Magruder, 2).

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Strategic Services to President Truman from OSS Director William Donovan to President Truman is Donovan's attempt to compromise with the President following the advice given to him from John Magruder. "The defects and dangers of this situation have been generally recognized" (Donovan, 20). Donovan wanted to make note of the growing need for an intelligence agency in the United States with the intention of aiding foreign policy. He also wanted President Truman to be assured that this would not become gestapo-type agency or political police, as they would be restricted from operating on American soil and under direct authority of the President, meaning that there would be no middleman or mixing of directives. Donovan finishes by assuring President Truman that an intelligence agency such as the one he is proposing would stop any attempted enemy strike at national security, a reminder of the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor. "That this agency, as the sole agency for secret intelligence...designed to anticipate and counter any attempted penetration and subversion of our national security by enemy action" (Donovan, 21).

Report on the Intelligence and Security Activities of the Government from Herald D. Smith to President Truman is a report on the implications of dismantling the standing OSS. Within the report, Smith touches on logistics, the threat of communism, and Pearl Harbor. Smith begins with the need for an intelligence agency in a post-war environment, but with less capabilities than in wartime. There is also mention of logistical issues within the framework of the intelligence sector. "The conversion of this information into intelligence was hampered by a number of causes, including some basic weaknesses in our structure in Washington" (Smith, 2). However, Smith does take some pressure off the currently standing intelligence community, "Pearl Harbor, simply as one example, is less of a failure from any one department than of an inadequacy of our total intelligence operation" (Smith, 4). His report ended with several

recommendations moving forward, the most important being the advice to not abolish the OSS, but to expand its capabilities. “There must be a more widespread understanding of intelligence and a more widespread participation in the development and implementation of plans for improved intelligence in government” (Smith, 15).

Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Strategic Services to President Truman is a short letter between OSS Director William Donovan and President Truman that highlights bureaucratic issues that were plaguing the early intelligence field. In this letter, Donovan is asking President Truman to heavily reconsider his idea of abolishing the OSS, as it would cause further disruptions in an already chaos-filled setting. “The various functions that have been integrated are the essential functions in intelligence. One is dependent upon the other” (Donovan, 1945).

Memorandum From the Director of the Strategic Services Unit, Department of War, to the Assistant Secretary of War from John Magruder to John McCloy is a proposition for the new centralized intelligence agency. Since McCloy is the Assistant Secretary of War, Magruder tries to appeal to him by mentioning that those within the Department of Defense will benefit greatly from a foreign intelligence agency, especially with the advent of atomic energy and the new power the United States possessed following the end of the war. “The need for such a foreign intelligence service has long existed and has been heavily underscored by the national experience during the war just ended. The implications of the pivotal position which the United States occupies in world affairs, and the incalculable consequences of the release of atomic energy, call for the immediate establishment of such an organization” (Magruder, 1945).

Report by the Director, Strategic Services Unit, Department of War to the Assistant Secretary of War for Air from John Magruder to Robert Lovett discusses the benefits of having

an intelligence agency capable of clandestine work. Magruder advocated for the need based on the needs of the United States during World War II. If the agency were disconnected from the rest of the Department of Defense, it would give it much needed breathing room to perform extra-legal and illegal tasks for national security. “No regular government department, be it War, State or Navy, can afford to house such operations within itself or otherwise identify itself with them. Independence of association with them is therefore essential” (Magruder, 78).

Memorandum From the Director of the Strategic Services Unit, Department of War, to Secretary of War from John Magruder to Secretary of War Robert Patterson was a request for a status update on the Strategic Services Unit. In its current interim status, the unit was not operational due to the lack of any oversight or mission set. Magruder was also concerned with the Strategic Services Unit failing to be absorbed into any future intelligence agencies due to their previous reputation of being unreliable. “Both the irresponsible criticism of the organization and the justifiable queries as to the appropriate nature and scope of its functions are causing indecision and delay respecting the future employment of SSU. The delay is serious. In the national interest, immediate and authoritative study should be given to the problem” (Magruder, 252).

Memorandum by the Director of the Strategic Services Unit, Department of War from John Magruder to an unknown contact focuses on the importance of the agency’s existence. The analytic side of the SSU is all that remained after the liquidation of its departments, so Magruder thought it was imperative that it was absorbed into another capable organization. “It will not be possible for SSU much longer to continue effective operations in its present interim status. Lack of specific directive permitting long-range plans and commitments has seriously affected its logical development. Personnel has already begun to melt away. Apart from its scheduled

reduction in operational strength from 9138 to 1967, the attrition has been particularly heavy among key personnel. Furthermore, from the budget viewpoint, the War Department cannot continue to justify for any substantial period the maintenance of a provisional intelligence organization separates from its established Military Intelligence Division” (Magruder, 1946).

Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence to the National Intelligence Authority from Sidney Souers to the National Intelligence Authority is a progress report on the CIG and its efforts to conduct intel gathering on the Soviet Union. It is a mix of both bureaucratic policy and communism. While Souers expresses that he is pleased with how operations are going, he does list some logistical issues that are slowing intelligence gathering. These include, “Provision for monitoring press and propaganda broadcasts of foreign powers, Coordination of collection of intelligence information, Coordination of intelligence research, and Essential elements of information” (Souers, 360). All of which were operations that the CIG declared as their primary roles.

Memorandum From Attorney General Clark to President Truman from Attorney General Tom Clark to President Truman is a plan for a secret world-wide intelligence program. Within the plan, Clark touches on the policy aspect, communism, and Pearl Harbor. The role of an intelligence program to Clark was the procurement of information around the world for the Executive Branch. This would help foreign hostile agents, ideologies, and conquests. This is most likely about communism. Clark also points to the fact that flexible and economically safe agencies have existed in the Western Hemisphere prior to Pearl Harbor occurring. The biggest hurdle in the development of this plan was the threat of any agency becoming political police, so there needed to be intentional roadblocks to prevent this possible outcome.

Results of Analysis II:

Pearl Harbor

Testimony on National Security Act of 1947 from War Department Director of Intelligence Hoyt S. Vandenberg to the Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Secretary of the Navy, and Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy about the upcoming bill, The National Security Act of 1947. Within the address, Vandenberg makes it clear that the United States requires an intelligence agency with a focus on foreign policy and surveillance. “In my opinion, a strong intelligence system is equally if not more essential in peace than in war. Upon us has fallen leadership in world affairs. The oceans have shrunk, until today both Europe and Asia border the United States almost as do Canada and Mexico” (Hoyt, 1). While attributing the need to America’s growing global presence and national interests, he consistently stresses the importance of preventing another Pearl Harbor eight separate times. These ranged from the intelligence failure Pearl Harbor was, how there wouldn’t have been a Pearl Harbor if we had a centralized intelligence agency, and how we may prevent future attacks in all forms with this new development in national security. Vandenberg used Pearl Harbor as a consistent talking point because he was addressing those who felt the impact of Pearl Harbor the worst, both in actual resources and credibility as an institution.

Results of Analysis II:

Threat of the U.S.S.R.

The Long Telegram from George Kennan to James Byrnes was an analysis on Soviet foreign policy and how the United States should respond both back at home and globally. Kennan painted the entire Russian ideology as one that only acts on the will of the state and for its advancement. A part of this was the need to spread its influences anywhere that it could, especially if it clashed with Western democracy (Kennan, 10). The subversion and implantation of communism was also a very real threat, described as worming its way into social organizations, magazines, and publishers (Kennan, 12). The idea that Russians were brutes who did not understand any reasoning but only force was apparent to Kennan, “Soviet power, unlike that of Hitlerite Germany, is neither schematic nor adventuristic. It does not take unnecessary risks. Impervious to logic of reason, and it is highly sensitive to logic of force (Kennan, 15). Kennan recommended that immediate intelligence gathering on the Soviets was the first step to combating them, and that an effort was made on educating the public, “We must see that our public is educated to the realities of the Russian situation. I cannot overemphasize the importance of this” (Kennan, 16).

My Three Years in Moscow by Walter Bedell Smith is an autobiography of Smith’s time in Moscow as the American ambassador to Russia. The biggest influence Smith had over discourse with the Soviet Union was his personal meeting with Joseph Stalin. In this meeting, they went over Soviet intentions for expansion. Stalin believed that the United States was one of the biggest threats towards the Soviet Union at the time. He also didn’t specify how far he was going to expand, only that it was going to be “not much further” (Smith, 54). Once Smith relayed

this information back to the State Department, there was further concern about what the relationship with the Soviets would look like.

Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence from Sidney Souers to the National Intelligence Authority was an urgent warning about the growing threat the U.S.S.R. posed to the United States. Souers recommended an immediate effort to produce the highest quality of information on the Soviets in the shortest amount of time. “The purpose of this Directive is to formalize the temporary agreement and establish it as a project under the coordination of the Director of Central Intelligence. The mission of the project is to develop and pool the appropriate resources of all agencies of the United States Government to insure the production of the highest possible quality of intelligence on the U.S.S.R. and its peripheral areas in the minimum time” (Souers, 346).

Analysis III: Quantitative Content Analysis

The purpose of this analysis is to provide a quantitative aspect of the study and determine how many times, in writing, each theme or word is mentioned. This will act as supplementary counting and add to the previous findings of the qualitative analysis to provide further insight into my research question. In contrast to the prior analysis, this focuses on the micro themes and transcends the overall theme of the document. This analysis was performed by first reading all documents in full and counting the appearances of each theme or word with a final tally provided at the end. Walter Bedell Smith's *My Three Years in Moscow* has been excluded from this analysis due to the source being a book and not a historical document.

Figure 1: Influences on the CIA's Creation by Document

Document	Logistics and Bureaucracy	Communism / Soviet Union / U.S.S.R. / Stalin	Pearl Harbor
Park Report	4	1	0
Memorandum for Donovan (Stimson)	1	0	0
Memorandum for Donovan (Magruder)	1	0	0
Memorandum by Director of OSS	3	0	1
Memorandum from Director of OSS	1	0	0
Report on Intelligence and Security Activities	5	1	3
Memorandum from Director of SSU	1	0	0
Report by the Director of SSU	1	0	1
Memorandum from Director of SSU	1	0	0
Memorandum from Director of SSU	1	0	0
The Long Telegram	1	67	0
Memorandum by Director of Central Intelligence	3	7	0
Memorandum from President Truman	1	0	0
Memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence	2	2	0
Draft Letter from President Truman	1	0	0
Memorandum from Attorney General Clark	2	1	1
Testimony on National Security Act of 1947	1	0	8
Total	30	79	13

Discussion

The analysis revealed a few considerable details about the influences on the CIA's creation. Out of all the reoccurring themes, Communism made the most appearances in writing with a total of 79 separate uses. The next being logistics and bureaucratic politics with 30 separate instances. The theme with the occurred the least was Pearl Harbor with only 13. While Communism is the leader within the quantitative analysis, I believe this leaves a distorted view on history without at least some context from the previous analysis.

Communism was written as a concern only twice prior to George Kennan's message, *The Long Telegram* which contained 67 of the total uses of the theme. Given that *The Long Telegram* was a message which strictly focused on the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, Stalin, and the possible ways the United States could contain Soviet expansion, it is not surprising that it contains so many uses. After Kennan sent his message, we see more consistent use of Communism as a threat which aligns with the start of the Cold War.

Pearl Harbor was only used sparingly by those who were in favor of a centralized intelligence agency to advocate for its usefulness in counterintelligence operations. Pearl Harbor was considered a military intelligence failure as well as a failure of the intelligence system. While rarely used, it is seen in Hoyt Vandenberg's address on the National Security Act eight separate times. I believe this was strategic as his audience were members of the Department of War, the men who ultimately felt responsible for the disaster.

Logistics and bureaucratic politics were mentioned at least once in every single document. Throughout these documents, there is always a discussion about the implementation or removal of an intelligence agency or organization. The OSS, SSU and CIG all faced bureaucratic issues during their lifetimes which were documented by their respective directors.

Immediately following the end of World War II, many in Washington wanted to return to the ways before the war. This being the lack of any active international intelligence agency. William Donovan and his compatriots believed that the need for such an agency was still present. This feud continued until the rise of the Soviet threat, where the bureaucratic arguments changed from the removal of the intelligence establishment to how they can be supplied and used efficiently.

I believe that the theme with the least bearing on the CIA's development was Pearl Harbor, with its usage being almost purely strategic. The bureaucracy of the matter was a constant pressure on its development, but the Soviet Union was what advanced the intelligence field into what it became.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

The implications of this historical evaluation present themselves in a few ways. There are not many policy-specific lessons or legislative pieces that can be directed towards the intelligence community. Rather, this study highlights important aspects of organizational planning, especially at the bureaucratic level. Throughout these documents, it is apparent that most of them are discussions about how to move the plan for intelligence forward or to keep it where it always has been.

The first implication is the need for a strong logistical framework whenever you are conducting an operation or organization that handles the collection and analysis of time-sensitive information. This is presently seen in both of CIG Director Sidney Souers' letters to the National Intelligence Authority. He was the one who requested the immediate development of high-quality surveillance gathering on the Soviet Union, which dictates that it is done efficiently and with haste. Souers' second letter addressed to the NIA was about the progress of the effort, but how it was impeded through poor logistics. A consistent issue Souers had was the coordination of efforts toward their common goal. The procurement of information, research, and clandestine methods were all severely lacking for an agency that is supposed to specialize in these tactics and procedures. This culminates into a simple lesson; consider the resources at your disposal first before continuing a large-scale, inter-departmental operation in any field of government.

The second implication is knowing how to appeal and persuade different audiences when pushing an agenda or idea that needs bipartisan support or cooperation. This is best seen in Hoyt Vandenberg's address to members of the Department of Defense about the necessity for the National Security Act of 1947. Within the address, Vandenberg continually mentions Pearl Harbor as a reason to form an intelligence agency with counter-intelligence capabilities. Eight

separate times, Vandenberg assures them that no attack like Pearl Harbor will ever take place again and that there is a new need for centralized intelligence within the United States. In all other persuasive letters among the nine individuals chosen for their impact on modern intelligence, very few mention Pearl Harbor as a reason for a new agency. Vandenberg uses it fervently here because of who he is addressing. Since the attack occurred, Pearl Harbor was considered a failure of military intelligence capabilities. It was a scar that the Army and Navy could not justify. Vandenberg used that and almost exploited it, convincing them that an agency outside of the Department of Defense needed to be given that responsibility.

The third implication is for policy construction and the usage of political pressure to achieve goals. This is best seen in OSS Director William Donovan and his right-hand man, John Magruder. William Donovan, as head of the OSS during World War II, had a dream to create an intelligence agency akin to MI6 in Great Britain. An organization tasked with important intelligence, counterintelligence, information synthetization, and clandestine field operations was something that the United States could use after the war ended. Many people did not see eye to eye with Donovan and his idea, especially those within the Department of War. President Harry Truman was also not fond of Donovan's ambitions. John Magruder advised Donovan to start building political pressure on the President slowly to allow his plan to, in a way, slowly take shape through compromise. Magruder acted on this himself, writing to many members of the Department of War to support the idea and advocate its necessity. Eventually, Magruder and other swayed individuals held important positions within government and brought the idea to fruition due to their tenacity and pressure.

These implications can be applied in many scenarios, from business to government. Strategic framework, pressure through allies, and logistics are important aspects for any goal

which requires teamwork and resources. When people's jobs and more importantly, when their authority is at stake, an appeal needs to be made to compromise their position. While this can be considered immoral and sometimes unjust, it is due to these actions that the United States has one of the best intelligence networks on the globe. Difficult decisions need to be made to make progress in a world where enemies are plenty in number and warfare is asymmetric. Everything can be traced back to a few men who leveraged their positions within the State and War Department.

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