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Michael Anderson

Genealogical Analysis of Discourse on Ethnic Minority Protests and Its Manifestation and  
Reinforcement in News Media and State-Sponsored Art

Michael Anderson

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Reading Committee:  
Sandra Silberstein, Chair  
Gail Stygall  
Priti Sandhu

Program Authorized to Offer Degree:

Department of English

University of Washington

**Abstract**

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Michael Anderson

Chair of the Supervisory Committee:

Sandra Silberstein, Professor of English

Department of English

This dissertation uses three corpora to explore the official discourse that frames ethnic minority protests in China. It begins by exploring the diachronic changes in characterizing such protests and traces the genealogy of the Chinese discourse of terrorism. It also investigates the conditions which enabled or in some cases precipitated the discursive shifts and discusses the implications of these changes in terms of how the protests were understood and handled by the Chinese government and how the identities of protestors were constructed. After historicizing the current discourse of terrorism as driven by Islamic extremism, the research then moves on to analyzing the manifestation and reinforcement of this discourse in news media and state-sponsored art. Specifically, I examine how only the violent incidents that involve a particular ethnic minority group are identified as acts of terrorism in official news in China and focus on how the state-owned newspaper *Global Times* employs different discursive strategies to constitute divergent representations of the same incidents in its Chinese and English language versions. I demonstrate

that even though these two versions of the same news appear to be guided by different ideologies and/or different journalistic commitments and practices, they are both directed by the shared ideology of legitimating the rule of the Communist Party in the eyes of their respective audiences. This study also looks at the manifestation and reinforcement of the dominant discourse of terrorism in state-sponsored cultural events and artifacts. Focusing on the visual representations of key components of the terrorism discourse in award-winning peasant paintings and other propaganda materials, various metaphoric frames are identified in the data and discussed in terms of their contributions to constructing particular understandings of the ethnic tension and violent incidents, their causes, proper responses, and how to prevent them. Specifically, the study considers the binary representation of Uyghur people as belonging to either of the two mutually exclusive identity categories of GOOD UYGHURS and BAD UYGHURS and the implications of such a dichotomous construction on the conflict between the Chinese government and ethnic minority persons.

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## **Chapter One**

### **Introduction**

When the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region is discussed in academic or media discourses, particularly outside China, several images tend to dominate the imaginations of those with some knowledge of the region. It is China's largest province, located in Northwest China; it borders eight countries and is geopolitically very important for China, connecting it with Central Asia, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and all the way to Europe; it is marked by ethnic tension between the Han Chinese and the local Muslim Uyghurs, which frequently erupts into violence. This last image might be particularly resonant with readers because violent protests in Xinjiang have received heightened media attention over the past decade. This intensification in coverage is due in part to the worldwide prominence of terrorism discourse to interpret violent incidents involving Muslims since the events of 11 September 2001. Due to the strategic importance of the region for China's domestic social stability, continued economic growth, energy security, and foreign policy, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has made Xinjiang's integration into the rest of China a top priority, an impulse which has intensified particularly in the last two decades. As a result of this push toward integration, Xinjiang has experienced tremendous changes in political, economic, and social spheres, all of which have been mediated through discourse. As Fairclough (1992) has argued discourses are different ways of organizing knowledge and social practice, and "they do not just reflect or represent social entities and relations, they construct or constitute them" (p. 3). This dialectical relationship between discourse and society and the role of discourse in mediating changes in social structures have also been noted by other scholars (see Blommaert & Bulcaen, 2000; Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999; Fairclough, 2013; Silberstein, 2011; Van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999). These discourse analysts have also noted that a new

discourse gains prominence and power when social actors who are institutionally sanctioned support and promote it. Likewise, in the context of Xinjiang, the official discourse is backed up by both the state's hard and soft power and used as an important tool to manufacture consent and legitimate the CCP's political and ideological agenda in the region. In terms of soft power, the state uses its absolute control of education, media, and artistic expression to advance and reproduce the official discourse, while the hard power of the security and military forces is used to severely punish any social actors who promote alternative discourses. In the context of Xinjiang, the most salient aspects of this official discourse since 2001 has been the linking Uyghur discontent to terrorism, justifying China's security measures in the province as a necessary response to the threat of terrorism, and describing them as part of a so-called "Global War on Terror."

The discourse of terrorism has gained such dominance that any discussion of other aspects of social, political, and economic life in contemporary Xinjiang cannot avoid referring to this discursive framework. This official discourse limits what can be said meaningfully and intelligibly about ethnic relations and the state's policies in the region, rendering two binary positions within the discourse of terrorism to describe current events in Xinjiang. One option is to acknowledge that China is facing terrorism threats from the Uyghurs, thus providing legitimacy to the government's hardline policies. The other is to implicitly respond within the terrorist model by providing alternative discourses to frame the ethnic tension in the region. To do so almost inevitably leads to being labeled "anti-China," being punished by the state if one is living within its jurisdiction or risking delegitimization of one's position by the Chinese government if living elsewhere. Even attempts at challenging the state's discourse on terrorism may end up strengthening it by taking the basic premises of the dominant discourse, which

equate any signs or expressions of Uyghur discontent with terrorism, as valid. As Schneider (2014) states, the reactive ways in which oppositional discourses are embedded within the broader frame of the dominant discourse “could be interpreted as acts of re-enforcement rather than resistance” (p. 114). This dilemma is particularly salient in media coverage and academic research on the region’s current politics, society, and economy. Since domestic media is entirely controlled by the state, the only independent media reports on the region come from foreign media organizations. However, reports by foreign journalists also heavily rely on the discursive framework of terrorism. Generally, news stories on the region tend to be predominantly negative and concerned either with violent incidents, which are framed as terrorist attacks by the state, or the Chinese government’s new policies in the region which are in turn represented as counterterrorism measures. After the government’s views on the news events are reported, the foreign media often attempt to “balance” the government’s view by citing overseas Uyghur human rights advocacy groups that deny framing the events in Xinjiang as terrorism and offer alternative explanations for the causes of certain incidents or policy changes. However, even such reports work to reinforce the official discourse on terrorism. They mostly focus on violence or present discriminatory policies of the Chinese government as counterterrorism programs; there is hardly any reporting on the widespread state violence and state-sanctioned racism.

In academic studies, scholars face a same dilemma. Referring to the violence in the region as terrorism makes them complicit in the dominant discourse that serves to reproduce the existing structure of power relations and marginalize the groups who are most vulnerable to the effects of political violence. Discussing political violence outside of the terrorism framework or, in some cases, attempting to contextualize the motives of those represented as terrorists, will put those scholars in a situation where their expertise is questioned, or worse, they will be labeled as

“terrorism sympathizers” by the Chinese government. In either case, the discourse of terrorism dominates the discussion. Even attempts to challenge it often end up operating within the framework of the dominant discourse in order to be comprehensible, which inadvertently may work to strengthen the very discourse it opposes.

The difficulty of discussing social issues about Xinjiang without relating them to terrorism mainly stems from a relative lack of historical perspective on the discourses of social protest in Xinjiang and the genealogy of terrorism discourse more broadly. This dissertation aims to analyze these lacunae by examining the diachronic changes in the official discourse that frames Uyghur protests and the emergence of the discourse of terrorism in China. Because the view that terrorism is a social construct and the terrorist actor is a product of discourse undergirds the overall premise of this dissertation, this study does not intend to determine whether specific acts are terroristic in nature or not. Nor does this study intend to show whether certain government policies in the region are justified as counterterrorism measures, rather it focuses on the discursive construction of certain events or social actors as terrorists and the effects this has had on public opinion, ethnic relations, and the government’s policies in the region. By contextualizing the emergence of this now ubiquitous discourse of terrorism, it also attempts to provide insights into what legitimations are substantiated by employing particular discursive strategies. It also sheds light on the CCP’s ideologies on governing this multiethnic, multicultural region and integrating it into the rest of China.

Discourses do not exist in isolation. They constantly interact with other discourses and can have material effects on social and political processes and actions (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001). Therefore, this dissertation also investigates other related discursive practices, specifically news coverage and state-sponsored art—generally perceived as opposite poles of an

objective/subjective axis, they can be seen doing very similar kinds of ideological work. The focus here is on power. Even though power is not solely derived from discourse, it manifests itself through discourse and unequal power relations are often maintained and naturalized in discourse. Critically analyzing the discourses that contribute to the perpetuation of social inequality and unjust policies can expose how certain ideologies have been constructed as “truth,” whose interests they serve, whose voices they marginalize, and can point toward alternative ways of conceptualizing the same issues with potentially different results.

Even though much has been written on the history, economy, cultural identity, religious practices, and ethnic conflicts in contemporary Xinjiang, and many of these studies directly or indirectly address the issue of terrorism (Bovingdon, 2010; Brox & Bellér-Hann, 2013; Dautcher, 2009; Dwyer, 2005; Millward, 2007; Starr, 2004), very few of these studies have examined the terrorism discourse from a critical discourse analysis (CDA) perspective. This project attempts to give an account of how the discourse of terrorism came about in Xinjiang, the international and domestic factors that have contributed to its rise, and how the discourse is manifested and reinforced in various areas. Any discourse needs substantial maintenance in order to establish its dominance among many other competing discourses. As Hodges (2011) states “sociopolitical reality requires more than a single authoritative pronouncement to be established. It is through multiple overlapping discursive encounters that social meanings are constructed and contested” (p. 17). Likewise, the Chinese discourse on terrorism has had to be actively conveyed and promoted in multiple spheres and modalities in order to saturate the consciousness of those it affects and thereby achieve its dominance. In order to demonstrate the hegemony of this discourse, this study explores diverse areas in which the discourse is manifested and reinforced by the state.

## **Organization of the Dissertation**

Chapter 2 provides a brief overview of the sociohistorical contexts in which the discourses analyzed in the subsequent chapters are embedded. The importance of properly grounding discourse analysis in the sociohistorical conditions of the production and reception of texts has been emphasized by many influential figures in the field (Bourdieu & Thompson, 1991; Fairclough, 1995; Foucault, 1972; Van Dijk, 2009a; Wodak & Meyer, 2015). Foucault (1972) cautioned against attributing meaning manifested in the discourse solely to the internal constitution of texts; instead, he encouraged examining a particular discourse's "external conditions of existence, for that which gives rise to the chance series of these events and fixes its limits" (p. 229). Fairclough (1995) also noted the necessity to sufficiently historicize one's data and "specify the particular conditions within which it was generated and what its properties and shape owe to these conditions" (p. 15). Van Dijk (2009a) echoed this point and underscored the need for researchers to go beyond grammar and other linguistic properties in their analysis. He argued that in order to better "understand social and political meaning and functions of language use, one also needs to examine the relations between discourse and the contexts" (p. 28). Providing sufficient contextual information also makes the analysis of the data more transparent and shows readers how various implicatures are drawn based on the sociopolitical situation relevant to a particular analysis. The fact that many CDA scholars may not be familiar with the history, politics, and society of ethnic minorities regions of China, more specifically the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, makes the need for adequately accounting for the sociohistorical context even more urgent for this study.

Because this dissertation primarily focuses on the representation of Uyghur protests in the official discourse, I highlight in Chapter 2 the aspects of historical, political, and socioeconomic

background information that is most relevant for contextualizing the various factors contributing to and fueling the ethnic tension in the region. The Chinese government heavily relies on history as a legitimation tool in the official discourse on Uyghur protests. Therefore, the chapter begins with a brief review of the history of the region now known as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Then the chapter explores the CCP's major policy initiatives that have had a profound impact on the administrative organization, demography, economy, education, and religious and cultural life of the region. Changes in each of these areas have contributed to the discontent and grievances Uyghurs have felt towards the Chinese government. Understanding their relevance to the situation contributes to the macro-level context in which the discourses on Uyghur protests have been embedded and sets the scene for the critical analysis in the subsequent chapters.

Chapter 3 traces the genealogy of the current discourse of the “People’s War on Terror” by focusing on the shifting representations of Uyghur protests over the last 40 years. Examining four large-scale protests that took place in Xinjiang over these years and the Chinese government’s statements on those incidents, this chapter aims to historicize the discourse of terrorism in China. More specifically, the chapter identifies four major shifts in the ways Uyghur protests have been represented – first the discourse of counter-revolutionary armed rebellion, then the discourse of separatism, followed by the discourse of terrorism, finally the discourse of the People’s War on Terror. It then investigates the conditions which enabled or in some cases precipitated the changes and ruptures in discourse through which the discursive identities of protestors have shifted. It addresses the implications of these changes in discourse in terms of how the protests were understood and responded to by the Chinese government. While the earlier conceptualization of Uyghur protests did not involve moral and rational evaluation of the identities of the protestors, the later discourse of terrorism, particularly the discourse of the

People's War on Terror, denied any morality and rationality in the motives and actions of the protestors. By focusing on how the state articulated statements on Uyghur protests and tracing the discontinuities as well as surprising continuities in the discourses, this chapter points out how with each discursive shift, the Uyghur protests have been characterized as more irrational, driven by hatred, and guided by religious extremism, leading to further deprivation of any legitimacy in their grievances. This chapter helps readers understand the emergence of the discourse of terrorism in China. It also contextualizes the analyses in Chapters 4 and 5, which will focus on different manifestations and reinforcements of terrorism discourse.

In Chapter 4, I analyze the manifestation of the terrorism discourse in official news coverage of violent incidents involving Uyghurs. More specifically, by focusing on how the state-owned newspaper *Global Times* employs different discursive strategies to construct divergent representations of the same incidents in its Chinese- and English-language reportage, the chapter identifies two dominant images the Chinese government presents to domestic and international audiences. For the domestic audience, the Chinese version of the newspaper represents the party as a strong and powerful institution which is agentive in safeguarding social stability and in control of the overall security situation. With regards to the international audience, the English version portrays China as a frequent target of terrorism attacks, like Western countries around the world, and thus works to evoke the reader's sympathy. Furthermore, by constituting China as a victim of terrorism, the English version functions to justify exceptional policies in the region as a necessary and legitimate response to crack down on potential terrorists. The chapter concludes that even though the two-tiered discursive formulations in the Chinese and English versions of *Global Times* use very different discursive strategies and, in some cases, appear to be guided by different ideologies or even different

journalistic ethical commitments, they are both directed by the shared ideology of legitimating the rule of the Communist Party in the eyes of its respective audiences.

Chapter 5 explores yet another manifestation of the terrorism discourse, this time in state-sponsored cultural events and artifacts. Combining theoretical concepts and methodological approaches of critical discourse analysis and conceptual metaphor theory (CMT), the chapter more specifically focuses on visual representations of key components of the discourse of the People's War on Terror in award-winning peasant propaganda paintings as well as some other propaganda materials. Various metaphoric frames are identified in the data and examined in terms of their contributions to constructing particular understandings of the ethnic tension and violent incidents in the region, their causes, proper responses, and how to prevent them. The chapter concludes by discussing the ideological work these various metaphors perform in constructing a binary representation of Uyghurs as belonging to either of two mutually exclusive identity categories, GOOD UYGHURS and BAD UYGHURS, and the implications of such a dichotomous construction of Uyghurs on the ethnic conflict in the region.

The concluding chapter brings together threads from previous chapters and discusses the possible link between the discourse of terrorism and the seeming deterioration of ethnic relations in the region. After pointing out the apparent contradiction in the discourse concerning the cause of terrorism as simultaneously self-explanatory and mystifying, I suggest that using theoretical and methodological frameworks developed within critical terrorism studies (CTS) can illuminate some of the problems encountered in academic discourse to conceptualize ethnic conflict in Xinjiang. I then explore how the guiding principles of CTS can be applied to the specific sociopolitical conditions of Xinjiang and provide readers with a new perspective on some of the

vexing issues confronting the various actors involved. Finally, I discuss the significance of this dissertation and point out possible directions of future research.

## **Chapter Two**

### **A Brief Overview of Social, Political, and Economic Life in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region**

Critical Discourse analysis cannot take place without giving due attention to the sociopolitical and historical contexts in which discourses are embedded. Contextualization allows us to make sense of the processes through which a particular discourse has emerged and how it has interacted with other discourses intertextually and interdiscursively over time. It also illuminates a particular discourse's relationship with other nondiscursive social practices such as media and art and how they shape each other. Elaborating on the importance of providing sociohistorical contexts for the discourse analyzed, Van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999) state that there are two ways to contextualize discourse. First is to integrate "all available information on the historical background and original sources in which discursive events are embedded. The second is the exploration of the ways in which particular types and genres of discourse are subject to diachronic change" (p. 91). The latter dimension of exploring diachronic changes a particular discourse has gone through is the focus of the next chapter, while the former is the focus of this one. While it is impossible to provide "all available information on the historical background" as suggested above, I hope this chapter accomplishes the goal of offering a multilayered and multifaceted account of various government policies that have contributed to the marginalization of Uyghur people in social, political, and economic life in China and intensified their discontent and grievances. In that manner it will establish the context for discourse analyses in the subsequent chapters.

#### **Contested History**

Although the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took control of the region in 1949, the region had been under the control of China-based powers with varying degrees of control by the central government since the Qing conquest of the region in 1758. Since that conquest there have been a number of intervals during which the local population rebelled against the central government and established separate states (Millward, 2007). In this sense, Uyghur nationalists' claim that the region came under Chinese rule only 65 years ago is hard to substantiate. However, the Chinese government's assertion that the region has always been an inseparable part of China since prehistoric times is equally unjustifiable. As Millward and Perdue (2004) state, except for a period of a little over one hundred years (630s to 755), when the Tang Dynasty had firm sovereignty over the land called Xinjiang today, no sovereign power based in China proper had any control of the region until 1758 (p. 39). In fact, when the Qing Empire officially reclaimed the region in 1877 and incorporated it as a province in 1884, they named it Xinjiang (新疆), which literally means *New Territory*, implying that it had not always been part of empires based in Eastern Mainland Asia, which constitutes the territory of the People's Republic of China now. Another important distinction to note between the current form of the Chinese state and prior dynasties is that empires including the Qing did not see themselves as nation states. Their goals were to conquer other lands with distinct ethnic and linguistic composition and make them taxable subjects. In that sense, being a part of a China-based empire would have different implications than being part of a nation state as China sees itself today (Harrel, 2012). That can partly explain why during the Qing Dynasty, most local affairs were left to local elites and rulers as long as the authority of the central government was not challenged. Most importantly there was not a state mandate to push for the cultural and linguistic assimilation of local Turkic people. All this started to change when the Qing Empire collapsed and the Chinese

nationalist party, the Kuomintang, came to power in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. The pace of change significantly accelerated after the CCP won the civil war with the Kuomintang and began to imagine China as a nation state, which had profound ramifications for non-Han peoples, including Uyghurs (Bellér-Hann, 2008; Bellér-Hann, 2015; Gladney, 2004; Millward, 2007).

Without a doubt, the level of integration of the region and its inhabitants into the Chinese nation state has been unprecedented and fast-paced under the rule of the CCP (Gladney, 2004). Like the rest of China, Xinjiang has also experienced rapid changes over the last 65 years with a mixture of positive and negative results. Below I will focus on some of the notable changes in the areas of administrative mechanisms, demography, economy, culture, and education and discuss their impacts on ethnic relations in the region.

### **Policy Changes in Administrative Mechanism**

In the early years of CCP rule, Uyghurs and other ethnic minority groups in Xinjiang enjoyed relative autonomy and some control over domains such as culture, language, education, and religion. Minority cadres occupied some prominent positions in the new government. This period of relatively liberal policy was in part due to the continuation of the revolutionary spirit of equality and liberty among the common people (Bovingdon, 2010). It was also due in part to the fact that the CCP still had not consolidated its rule. Regardless, Xinjiang was still a province at the time, but the CCP had already started laying the foundation of its ethnic policies by identifying ethnic groups in China and setting up ethnic autonomous regions around the country. In 1955, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region was officially established. Yet, before designating the whole province as an autonomous region for the Uyghur people, the Party first created a number of autonomous counties and prefectures for Mongols, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Hui, Tajiks, and Xibos within Xinjiang to counter the Uyghurs' political influence. The creation of

subautonomous units within Xinjiang was “a stroke of administrative genius” (Bovingdon, 2004, p. 118) because this system significantly restricted the political weight of Uyghurs by designating more than 50 percent of the territory for other ethnic groups even though in most cases Uyghurs made up a clear majority of the population in the subautonomous area. For example, Bayingholin Mongol Autonomous Prefecture accounts for one third of the total land area of the Uyghur Autonomous Region. The Mongols in the prefecture made up less than 35 percent of the population while Uyghurs presented an absolute majority. Yet because of the “divide and conquer” policies of the CCP it was determined that the region should be a Mongol autonomous prefecture. The Uyghurs in the area were thus represented by Mongols in the government. By pitting ethnic minorities against each other not only was the CCP able to limit Uyghurs’ political representation and authority, it also created the notion that Xinjiang belonged to 13 different ethnic groups (Bovingdon, 2010). The irony is that Uyghurs had more autonomy when the region was not officially designated as a Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region due to a sheer majority in the overall population.

If creating subautonomous units for other ethnic groups restricted political influence of Uyghurs, in 1954 the CCP further curbed their political clout by establishing the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, another provincial-level administrative unit within Xinjiang, also commonly called Bingtuan. This is a unique administrative structure that exists only in Xinjiang. After the Nationalist soldiers in Xinjiang surrendered and the People’s Liberation Army took control of the region, the CCP demobilized several hundred thousand soldiers and deployed them in different parts of Xinjiang as paramilitary Bingtuan units. Since its establishment, Bingtuan has continued to incentivize Han migration from other parts of China. It currently has 2.68 million members, 85 percent of whom are Han (*Bingtuan Daily*, 2011).

Bingtuan occupies its own sovereign territory with separate administrative, judiciary, and military units. Though the Bingtuan is not under the jurisdiction of Xinjiang regional government, which is headed by a Uyghur official, by tradition the party secretary of Xinjiang, who is Han, also takes up the top leadership position of the Bingtuan. Such an arrangement effectively keeps the management of Bingtuan affairs out of the reach of any ethnic minority officials at the regional government level while the state can still coordinate the two parallel administrations in Xinjiang (Bingtuan and the regional government) through Han party officials. What role Bingtuan plays in Xinjiang is clearly stated in its mission: “contributing to the development of Xinjiang by promoting unity among ethnic groups, maintaining social stability, consolidating border defense, and shoring up the unification of the motherland” (Chinese State Council Information Office, 2003). In other words, it mainly acts as a further bulwark against any potential social disturbances by ethnic minorities (Zhu & Blachford, 2016). Because of its privileged position and impunity from local governments, Bingtuan often gets preferential treatment and has priority access to limited natural resources such as land and water, which, in turn, causes friction with local communities. In both cases, the creation of subautonomous units and Bingtuan, the very institutions of administration which were supposed to ensure social stability in the region, proved to be the main sources of ethnic tension.

### **Demographic Shifts**

Another measure that was intended to strengthen CCP control of the region is through changing the demographic composition of the region. Yuan (1990) reports that the Han accounted for 6% of the total population of Xinjiang in 1953, while Uyghurs made up 74.7% and other ethnic minorities such as Kazakh, Hui, and Kyrgyz constituted the rest. However, this figure would change dramatically over the next 60 years. By 1962 the Han population had

reached 32.9% and by 1982, 40.4% (Toops, 2004). According to 2010 statistics, the permanent residents of Xinjiang number 21.8 million, Uyghurs making up 45.8% and Han 40.5% (CNBS, 2012). This sharp increase in population not only increased the competition for scarce land, water, and other natural resources, but also exacerbated Uyghurs' marginalization in the political, economic, and social spheres. For example, in a town in Southern Xinjiang called Qaraqash, 5500 or 1.2% of the total population of 436,100 are Han and the rest are Uyghur according to statistics from 2015. However, out of 15 members of the CCP Qaraqash committee, the top governing body in the county, 11 are Han and the remaining four are Uyghurs, who have been placed in charge of less-powerful but thorny functions of the government such as propaganda, culture, education (Moyu County Government, 2015). This is the case in a town where the 99% of the population are Uyghurs; such political marginalization is even more striking in other cities, particularly in Northern Xinjiang, where the Han account for a higher proportion of the total population. As Sautman (2000) reports, there is a clear ethnic division of power, where "the very top posts at the regional, prefectural, and county levels are generally filled by Han" (p. 241). Many members of the Uyghur community recall that the political representation in the early years of the CCP rule was more reflective of the ethnic composition of the area, but now it is almost exclusively dominated by Han (personal communication). As a result, Uyghurs' voice in the local and regional politics is being marginalized and their economic standing is diminished. This has led some scholars to suggest that Xinjiang is a colony of the Chinese state (Gladney, 1998, 1999; Wilson, 2012).

### **Economic Disparity Along Ethnic Lines**

Closely related to the political marginalization caused by the changes in administrative mechanisms and demographic shifts is economic disparity in the region. The region has

experienced tremendous economic growth, particularly since the 1980s. Xinjiang's GDP per capita in 1952 was 166 Yuan. In 1978, it reached 313 Yuan although it was not a steady increase, going through significant fluctuations over the years mostly due to the disastrous effects of Mao's various ideological campaigns and the Cultural Revolution (XBS, 2013b). After the Opening Up and Reform Policies of 1978, the CCP focused on developing the coastal provinces while the regions in Western China continued to provide natural and human resources. However, sensing the potential for social and political instability in the Western provinces due to the widening regional disparity, the CCP announced "Develop the West" campaign in 1999. Being one of the provinces in Western China, Xinjiang's economy grew rapidly during this period. The GDP per capita increased to 16950 Yuan in 2007, an increase of 9.5 times, taking inflation into account, compared to 1978 (XBS, 2013a). In other words, the economy grew at an annual rate of 8.5% for 30 years, an impressive accomplishment by any standard. It is clear that there has been more material prosperity in the region compared to any other period in history.

However, as Toops (2004) points out, understanding the ramifications of development requires going beyond just numbers related to overall economic growth and GDP. He argues that development in substate peripheries must consider ethnic elements without which the full potential of development will not be realized. Economists and geographers who study Xinjiang point out that there is sharp economic disparity along the ethnic lines in the region (Chaudhuri, 2010; Fischer, 2013; Hasmath, 2014; Hopper & Webber, 2009; Howell & Fan, 2011; Howell, 2013; Szadziwski, 2013; Toops, 2004). The Han population is located in wealthier cities like a Hami, Urumqi, Changji, Shihezi, Karamay, and Korla, where there is sizable industrial development. Uyghurs are concentrated predominantly in Kashgar, Hotan, Kizilsu, Aqsu, Turpan, and Ili, where the majority of the population works in agriculture. Government statistics

and other scholarly studies show that the towns with higher percentages of minorities have lower levels of income, education, healthcare access, and employment, while the opposite is true for areas with high numbers of Han population. A study by Wiemer (2004) pointed out that in a given town in Xinjiang “every percentage point increase in the non-Han population is associated with an expected decrease in GDP per capita of 44 Yuan” (p. 177).

Fischer (2013) pointed out that even though minorities made up around 60 percent of the total population in Xinjiang, they only constituted less than 30 per cent of state sector employment in 2002. This number is much lower in sectors that pay higher wages such as natural resources extraction, energy, and finance. The energy production which includes oil, natural gas, and coal industries is the pillar of Xinjiang’s economy (Wong, 2014b). However, every level of the energy sector is almost completely dominated by the Han (Szadziewski, 2013). Various studies have reported that even though the energy sector makes up 57% of Xinjiang’s GDP, only one percent of its employees are Uyghur (Grose, 2015; Sebag-Montefiore, 2013). Ethnic discrimination and exclusionary hiring practices are often considered the main factors contributing to the low employment rates of Uyghurs in government and state-owned enterprises (Bovingdon, 2004; Szadziewski, 2013; USCECC, 2010). When government agencies or state-owned enterprises announce new job positions, they often restrict the ethnicity of potential candidates. For instance, 7757 government positions were opened up in 2013 (Civil Service Network, 2013; Uighurbiz, 2013). However, 72% of the positions were designated as Han only and 11.8% were reserved for Uyghur only, the rest did not specify ethnicity requirements, implying that anyone can apply. The other pattern in the ethnicity restriction is that the vast majority of the positions in more powerful government agencies, thus with higher wages and better benefits, are specified as Han only. The job descriptions explicitly disqualify Uyghur

applicants based on their ethnicity regardless of their education level, skills, and other qualifications. Such discriminatory hiring practices are an important factor in limiting employment opportunity of Uyghurs and restricting their economic mobility, thus exacerbating the economic marginalization of Uyghurs. The socioeconomic disparity between Uyghurs and the Han is also found to increase the health gap between the two groups and further lower the quality for life for Uyghurs in the region (Schuster, 2009), which is most clearly manifested in the life expectancy of 73.34 for Han people and 63 years for Uyghur people, a difference of more than 10 years (p. 434).

### **Cultural and Religious Restrictions**

While the political underrepresentation, economic dispossession, and widening gap in health and education are the main sources of discontent among Uyghurs, cultural and religious restrictions have further exacerbated their alienation from the state. Mentioning cultural and religious restrictions has almost become a cliché in media coverage of Xinjiang. A good deal of foreign news coverage of Xinjiang and the violent incidents there mentions in passing Uyghurs' frustration at state-imposed control over their culture and religion (Buckley, 2015; Gershman, 2010; Hunt, 2013; Martina, 2015; Tharoor, 2009). Although such reporting is helpful in giving readers some contextual information about the situation in Xinjiang, it is quite vague and does not give readers a clear idea about the severity of censorship and its potential consequences. Although some scholars have done a good deal of work in documenting the lesser known aspects of cultural restriction and the subtle ways Uyghurs resist (Bovingdon, 2010; Byler, 2017; Dautcher, 2009; Smith, 2013), many other scholars who study the minorities of Northwest China have done little research about the severity of the censorship on cultural expression and the harsh measures employed by the state to ensure Uyghurs' compliance. It is possible to attribute this to

several factors: the difficulty of getting access to Uyghur informants due to the government's restrictions or the local people's fear of retribution by the government if caught sharing their dissenting views with foreigners. While these are valid factors, the most important reason is likely a heavy reliance on information from a government whose policy is to render this repression invisible, reflected in state bias in both academic research and media coverage. No matter how questionable a government statement may be, it is often taken seriously and treated as a reliable source. Yet reports of government suppression of cultural expression in Xinjiang by Radio Free Asia, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Uyghur exiled groups are not given due attention and space in either Chinese media or academia. It is hard to find any discussion of the many other mundane forms of repression that are experienced by much greater numbers of people than the more famous cases of a few individual writers, poets, or artists.

Another aspect of the cultural restriction is a wholesale shift in education towards Chinese-medium instruction. There is a significant body of research on "bilingual" education in Xinjiang (Dwyer, 2005; Hamut & Joniak-Lüthi, 2015; Schluessel, 2007; Tsung, 2014; Wilson, 2012). These scholars differ in their evaluation and skepticism towards the government's stated goals for this shift in language policy from the prior instructional model of minority languages as the medium of instruction (MOI) to Mandarin MOI around the 2000s. The earlier works by Dwyer (2005) and Schluessel (2007) are more critical and argue that although overt goals for the policy are to raise the educational quality of minority students and increase their employment prospects, the covert goals are to dilute ethnic consciousness and expedite the assimilation process. They argue that the state is hoping that these policies will lessen the threat of separatism and anti-government sentiment among Uyghurs. Both of them point out that such rapid sinicization of the educational sphere will further increase Uyghurs' sense of being colonized

and further alienate them from the state. They also suggest some solutions that might help mitigate the negative consequences of this policy shift. However, writing more than a decade after the implementation of Mandarin-medium education, Tsung (2014) and Hamut and Joniak-Luthi (2015) accept the fact that no matter what the consequences of this policy might be, it is not going to be reversed by the government. They, therefore, take a more pragmatic approach. They examine the current state of the implementation of the language policy in various parts of Xinjiang, point out some existing problems, and offer suggestions to modify some of its excesses, not necessarily changing its general direction. However, all of these scholars agree that this language policy shift has backfired and increased linguistic consciousness of Uyghurs and heightened their sense of their culture being under assault by the government, leading to even more animosity towards the state.

The general pattern we can observe from the range of social and economic policies the CCP has implemented in Xinjiang is that all measures were designed to dilute ethnic and religious consciousness of Uyghurs as a way to solve the ethnic tension in the region. The rationale for these policies appears to be that if Uyghurs assimilate and become like Han subjects in their thoughts and behaviors, it will be easier to manage them and they will be less likely to cause problems. Paradoxically, the very policies that attempt to reengineer Uyghurs as other regular Hans deny many of the taken-for-granted basic rights enjoyed by the Han and other ethnic groups such as seeking employment outside their home villages or petitioning to get their common grievances about corruption, power abuse, land and water disputes addressed. On the contrary, Uyghurs have been labeled as terrorists for expressing their discontent. In addition, continuously singling out Uyghurs as targets of these various policies has constantly reminded them of their differences from other ethnic groups in China and resulted in strengthening their

ethnic and religious consciousness and escalating the ethnic tension in the region, the exact opposite of the intended outcome of those policies.

When discussing the apparent rise in ethnic friction in the region, the factors outlined above – the rearrangements in the administrative mechanism, rapid demographic changes, lopsided economic development, tightening government control in cultural and religious spheres, and sinification of minority education – are all important factors to consider. But this should not imply that the region was peaceful until the beginning of 1949 communist rule. In fact, as Bovington (2010) states “the political history of Xinjiang prior to 1949 was tumultuous and often violent” (p. 40). He even argues that compared to other parts of China, the overall number of collective protests in Xinjiang has actually declined, especially since the 1990s (p. 107). Chen (2011) also makes a similar observation on the dramatic rise of social protests in China proper. Citing data published by the Chinese Ministry of Public Security, Chen notes “87,000 collective incidents took place in 2005, as compared to 74,000 in 2004, 58,000 in 2003, and about 10,000 in 1994” (p. 27). At least according to the official statistics, social protests increased almost nine-fold from 1994 to 2005. What is important in this discussion is not whether the statistical pattern of social protests in Xinjiang follows that of the rest of China because if it does, then Xinjiang’s case is not any different from the rest of China. If it does not follow the national trend, then it should be good news for the CCP officials in Xinjiang. But social protests that involve Uyghurs have attained a very special status in the Party discourse, academic discussion, and in some cases captivating the attention of both domestic and international media.

In the following chapter, I examine the genealogy of the representation of Uyghur protests in the official discourse and why they attract far more attention than other collective

protests and violent incidents in other parts of China.<sup>1</sup> Focusing on four major discontinuities and shifts in the discourse surrounding Uyghur protests have experienced, I explore the domestic and international factors that have contributed and in some cases necessitated the changes in discourse. I also discuss potential effects of these discursive changes, particularly its current mutation as People's War on Terror discourse on the ethnic relations in the region.

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<sup>1</sup> Currently, 200,000 mass incidents involving Hans occur in China proper each year. However, they rarely get media attention. In contrast, major news organizations carry reports on almost every violent incident in Xinjiang.

## **Chapter Three**

### **Genealogy of the Discourse of Terrorism in China**

#### **Introduction**

Although the discourse of terrorism is a dominant framework guiding the Communist Party's ethnic policies in Xinjiang and plays a critical role in shaping its diplomatic relations with the countries bordering the region, the term *terrorism* only entered the discourse in the late 1990s. Even then, the statements articulated within this discourse and their effects were significantly different from its current use. While protests of different scales have occurred throughout the history of Xinjiang whenever powers based in China proper ruled the region (Bovingdon, 2010; Millward, 2007), their conceptualization as terrorism only started in late 1990s. This chapter explores the major continuities and discontinuities in the discourses surrounding the four largest protests in Xinjiang since 1990. The chapter also aims to examine the contingent factors which contributed to the emergence of the discourse of War on Terror in China and its later configuration as People's War on Terror and discusses the effects of these discursive changes from constituting the protestors as rational political actors in earlier periods to irrational depoliticized actors in later times. Genealogical analysis, which is often used in Foucauldian discourse analysis, is the main methodological framework to investigate the changes in the official discourse in this chapter.

First used by Nietzsche (2010) in his 1887 book *On the Genealogy of Morals*, the concept of genealogy was further developed and extensively applied by Foucault in many of his works, including *Discipline and Punish* (1977), *Madness and Civilization* (1988), *History of Sexuality* (1990). It refers to studying the processes of how certain objects of study have come into existence, how the present "reality" that we take for granted and consider "natural and self-evident" (Foucault, 1977) or what Gramsci (1971) called "common sense" is a result of certain

contingencies, transformations and discontinuities of discursive and nondiscursive practices (Saar, 2002). Genealogical analysis highlights the constructed nature of the present arrangements instead of treating them as natural and examines “the originative importance of the accidental over the allegedly inevitable” (Prado, 2000, p. 33). Explaining his view towards genealogy, Foucault (1977) writes that genealogy does not attempt to go back and recreate an unbroken continuity of the past incidents and find the true essence of the present, instead it looks for the accidents or deviations, both large and small, which continue to exert influence on the present.

As Carabine (2001) notes genealogical discourse analysis is not a research methodology with fixed how-to guidelines, instead, it is a research orientation for reading discourses and conducting analyses. Hook (2005) further elaborates on this and states that genealogy is a “methodological suspicion towards objects of knowledge,” our connection to such knowledge, and different ways and purposes for which such knowledge is used (p. 4). He also points out that it is not only a critique of knowledge, but also a close examination of any procedure of knowledge production. From a genealogical perspective, discourses are constituted by and constitutive of knowledge and power networks, a crucial focus for a Foucauldian discourse analysis. For this reason, it is worth our while to explore some of the key terms – *discourse*, *knowledge*, and *power* – and the relationship among them within a Foucauldian paradigm before delving into a more in-depth discussion of what genealogical analysis entails, how it has been applied by scholars to understand various discourses, and why this methodology is particularly appropriate for studying the discursive shifts in the representation of ethnic minority protests in Northwest China in the Chinese government discourse.

## **Discourse**

Sarah Mills (1995) offers an excellent dissection of the different ways the term *discourse* was used in Foucault's work. She quotes the following paragraph in which Foucault (1972) gave his own definition of the term

Instead of gradually reducing the rather fluctuating meaning of the word "discourse," I believe I have in fact added to its meanings: treating it sometimes as the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualizable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a number of statements. (p. 7)

She goes on to explain these three levels of discourse. She argues that what is implied in "the general domain of all statements" is discourse in its broadest sense; all texts and textual practices that have meaning in the world. At the second level, discourse as "an individualizable group of statements" suggests groups of utterances that appear to be governed by certain rules and have some commonality to them. A discourse of terrorism or anti-immigration discourses can be good examples in this sense of the term. She stresses the third definition – "a regulated practice that accounts for a number of statements" – as the one with the most appeal to scholars interested in discourse analysis. In this sense, discourse does not refer to particular textual manifestation but to the underlying rules and structures that regulate the production of particular utterances and texts. In other words, the most important distinction we have to bear in mind while conducting discourse analysis and using the term *discourse* is to make clear whether we are referring to specific textual instances or the underlying rules and structures that produce those texts and utterances. In conducting genealogical analysis in this chapter, I will mainly focus on the shifts that have occurred in discursive regulatory practices and their effects on producing different discourses and knowledges to understand ethnic minority protests over the last 40 years

in China. In order to achieve this purpose, specific textual manifestation of those discursive practices as articulated in each discursive period will be examined.

### **Knowledge and Power**

The relationship between discourse and production of knowledge is also important for this kind of analysis. Of primary interest for this study is the capacity of discursive practices to construct what counts as a legitimate knowledge and what can be uttered in a meaningful way in a particular point in history. From this perspective, knowledge is not simply a reflection of reality or an ultimate truth that can explain things, but discursively constructed in a particular way to represent social entities and relations. This view of discourse and its role in the production of knowledge was further expanded in Foucault's genealogical work (1977, 1990) by looking at knowledge through the lens of power.

Foucault rejects the conventional view of power as relying on using brute force to punish those who challenge it. Instead he views power as something that "induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse" (Foucault, 1980, p. 119). In that sense, discourse is an effect of power while at the same time is an instrument to reinforce power. Important to his conceptualization of power is the notion that power is diffuse and spread across the society; no one individual or group has absolute control of it. In this conceptualization, domination is based not just on power relations in which some individuals or groups are in control of others, but it also has the ability to generate values and ideas used in establishing and legitimating that domination (Prado, 2000). This notion is particularly useful in conducting genealogical analysis because it can help us understand the temporary and constructed nature of discourses and the contingencies under which rapid discursive changes might occur.

He also asserts that power is inseparably linked with knowledge. On one hand, power is dependent on knowledge and derives its authority from knowledge. On the other hand, it reproduces and maintains knowledge. This symbiotic relationship between power and knowledge has serious implications for understanding what is considered valid or invalid and what is sayable or unsayable under particular discursive formations and regimes of truth. This is crucial in determining the principle research questions one might ask when conducting genealogical analysis. As Jørgensen and Phillips (2002) suggest Foucault:

makes a link between truth and power, arguing that ‘truth’ is embedded in, and produced by, systems of power. Because truth is unattainable, it is fruitless to ask whether something is true or false. Instead, the focus should be on how the effects of truth are created in discourses. What is to be analysed are the discursive processes through which discourses are constructed in ways that give the impression that they represent true or false pictures of reality. (p. 14)

In this chapter, this is exactly what I hope to accomplish. By analyzing how various protests were discursively constructed in the Chinese official discourse, it is not my intention to assert that a particular account of the protests is the accurate description of what exactly happened and why and that other versions are false. Instead, the focus will be how a particular discursive representation of the events was made possible and how such representations work in the service of producing particular ethnic relations in and governance of China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

### **Genealogical Analysis**

Genealogy is the methodology used to study the role discourses play in constructing knowledges and to uncover the power and knowledge networks in different historical periods

and social contexts. Although genealogical analysis primarily focuses on studying historical texts, it does not do this in order to reconstruct a complete picture of a past society so that we can better understand a particular historical period and what exactly happened then. It also does not attempt to present a progressive, coherent, and teleological account of historical development. Or as Prado (2000) puts it, “genealogy does not claim to mine a continuous vein in which determinants of later events can be found if research is good enough” (p, 34). Instead, it focuses on inconsistencies, discontinuities, breaks, changes, and multiplicities of ideas and concepts in order to show that they are “neither discovered truths nor preordained developments, but rather the products of conglomerations of blind forces” (p, 38). In this sense, its purpose is to trace the discursive construction of knowledges over time so that we can better understand not how they operated then, but how they operate today. In other words, as many scholars point out, genealogy is the “history of the present.” In addition, genealogical analysis also involves studying the effects of such knowledge/power networks on forming “a set of political, economic, moral, cultural, and social institutions which define the limits of acceptable speaking, knowing, and acting” (Anais, 2013, p. 125). This is another hallmark of genealogical investigation. While historical methods primarily study either texts or institutions, genealogy focuses on the interrelationship between the texts and institutions and how they shape each other.

Diedrich (2005) summarizes the main characteristics of genealogical methodology in three key terms: *antisciences*, *descent*, and *emergence*. Antisciences refers to the emergence of subjugated knowledges that have been disqualified by the dominant discourses, but which can now be used to deconstruct the dominant knowledge, thus challenging its power and creating alternative space for discourses that enable wider social participation of the previously subjugated groups. Descent denotes that genealogical discourse analysis does not attempt to find

the true origins or essences of things and map their progressive and teleological development, but instead “traces lines of descent in all their complexities ... looks for discontinuities, but also, paradoxically, surprising continuities, those echoes of counter-narratives that reverberate across time and space, if only we could hear them” (p. 656). The third notion, emergence, focuses on “the moment of arising, of forces and figures in history” (p. 657) and recognizes the multiplicity of fields and domains in play to open up the possibility of talking about certain issues from alternative perspectives. She illustrates this point by analyzing disability discourse and argues that we can learn more about how a disability is enacted in different spheres both in the past and present when the disability discourse focuses not on analyzing the different ways of being disabled and learning about them but on analyzing “*how disability is done*” (p. 653, emphasis in original).

Anais (2013) aptly describes “problematizing” as a starting point for genealogists. She argues that problematizing is two-fold. On one hand, researchers operating within a genealogical paradigm study how certain practices or issues were discursively constructed as a particular kind of problem in different ways in different periods. On the other hand, they themselves problematize those problematizations that seem obvious and common sense in order to demonstrate their constructedness and destabilize their seeming constancy or taken-for-grantedness.

Probably because genealogical analysis itself makes use of the very methodology that it critiques for discursively constructing a certain thing or practice as a problem, some scholars chide genealogists for critiquing other disciplinary knowledges of being constructed while they themselves rely on the same methodology (e.g., Bartelson, 1995). Critics also point out that by exposing the discontinuities and inconsistencies in other discourses and critiquing them for

glossing over these apparent ruptures, genealogists seem to imply that their description of what happened and how they were interpreted is more accurate, thus doing exactly what they started out to oppose. However, what is neglected in this criticism is genealogists' view of knowledge as a perspective as opposed to being objective. Prado (2000) frames this argument as a difference between effective history and traditional history (history here does not refer to the discipline only, but an example of general intellectual inquiry). He states that effective history acknowledges its own cultural and temporal situatedness and does not claim any objectivity in its inquiries as does traditional history. In fact, it rejects such objectivity and argues that it is "a mask for vested interests operant in the production of its narratives" (p. 42). In other words, genealogical analysis is conducted not to replace the current hegemony of certain ideas with new ones, but to disturb what was previously considered simple truth. The following survey of illustrative genealogical studies reviews findings and insights that help frame the current study.

### **Applications of Genealogical Analysis**

Following Foucault, many scholars use genealogical analyses of social issues to problematize their currently taken-for-granted and common-sense status and demonstrate that there have been different ways of knowing and speaking about those issues in the past, that the dominance of the current discourses is only part of a change over time. The discourses that interest genealogists often tend to be those that have the most impact on the marginalized and disadvantaged groups in the society such as discourses of poverty, unmarried motherhood, unemployment, disability, etc. Carabine (2001) uses genealogy to study how sexuality is constituted through social policy with what effects. Specifically, she looks at two important policy documents produced by the British government – the 1834 New Poor Law and the 1999 Social Exclusion Report on Teenage Pregnancy – in order to examine how sexuality is

constituted through social policy in different ways over time and provide a snapshot of power/knowledge networks as manifested in social policy at a particular moment in history. Analyzing the aspects of the New Poor Law concerning unmarried mothers, she points out the powerful role the discourse of poverty played in differentiating and categorizing people into moral and immoral, that is, practicing acceptable sexual behaviors (inside marriage) and unacceptable sexual behaviors (outside marriage), and being deserving poor (elderly and widows) and undeserving poor (unmarried mothers). She also notes how the discourse of poverty interacts with other discourses of morality, sexuality, gender relations, marriage and family in constructing gendered welfare subjects in which the single pregnant woman/unmarried mother is at the center and represented as immoral. Even though there are three parties involved in unmarried motherhood – the father, the mother, and the child, men are often freed from any responsibility and even constituted as victims while the women are blamed for their actions and stigmatized as a group. The author concludes that even though the discourse of unmarried motherhood depicts a drastically different picture of those women from their lived experiences, it nonetheless plays a powerful role in constructing them as a social problem.

The New Poor Law of 1834 was the focus of another genealogical study conducted by Dean (1991). While Carabine focused on the role of this law in constructing gendered welfare subjects and provided a snapshot of knowledge/power networks evident in social policy, Dean's research traces the genealogy of the discourse of poverty in England from the early seventeenth to the early nineteenth centuries and describes the drastic shifts in discourse regarding the proper ways of treating the poor. The poor were initially treated as an important part of the nation, therefore it was considered vital for the prosperity of the whole nation to maintain them able and hardworking. Thus, providing relief to the poor was viewed as an important aspect of keeping

the nation strong and healthy. However, in the transition to capitalist modernity, a new discourse emerged which required each able-bodied male to be responsible for their own. The new discourse, which was heavily influenced by Malthus' ideas on population, played a key role in the emergence of a national labor market based on wage labor. Providing relief for the poor was drastically reduced because doing so was regarded to be taking away the incentive for them to sell their labor. It also broke from the previous mode of understanding the state's role and shaped the development of a liberal mode of governance. The author argues that such discourse emerged in response to the necessities of capitalism as the state intervened to facilitate the transitional process through instituting and reforming various social policies.

Similarly, Walters (2000) explores the genealogy of unemployment, another discourse concerning an economically marginalized group. His main argument is that the concept of unemployment did not exist until the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and has been construed in different ways over the last hundred years in Britain. He traces how unemployment was first constructed as a moral problem (unemployment was a function of deficient moral character), then as a social problem (unemployment was a social risk), and later as an economic problem (unemployment was caused by lack of marketable skills which in turn negatively affects overall economic growth). He then discusses sociohistorical contexts that enabled its construction as a different type of problem in each period and various approaches employed by different governments to manage and control it. His observation of how the same phenomenon was made knowable and problematized in radically different, sometimes even contradictory, ways is particularly poignant. He states that while in the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century being employed full-time and working regularly was considered vital for the development of strong moral character, in the new increasingly globalized economy, the ability to deal with irregular and uncertain work prospects

is viewed as a sign of strong personal character. Such discursive shifts, ruptures, and discontinuities are exactly what interest the genealogical analyst the most because as Stygall (2001) suggests, what is significant here is not the changes in the textual manifestation but the underlying rules of discursive formations that such textual changes imply. In other words, the discontinuities allow one to take a glimpse into fundamental changes in what counts as truth and what is considered legitimate and understandable ways of speaking about a subject. In addition, such analysis, as Foucault (1977a) puts it, “disturbs what was previously considered immobile; it fragments what was thought unified; it shows the heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with itself” (p. 147). Most striking and revealing in all of this is that such changes in discourse often take place independent of the subjects they speak of even though those subjects are most likely to bear the brunt of the effects of such discursive shifts.

Stenson and Watt’s (1999) genealogical analysis of the discursive shifts on the forms of government since WWII complicates this picture of clear and dramatic shifts occurring when a new discourse gains dominance. They challenge the notion that the social form of government with comprehensive liberal welfare policies that emerged in the advanced industrial nations between 1945 and the 1970s has been replaced by the rise of neo-liberal governmentality, which heavily emphasizes private enterprise, market forces, and trickle-down economics. Their examination of local government discourses reveals that the discourse of “the social” has not been completely replaced by neo-liberal discourse. Instead, it has been reformulated and given new meaning, and it exists in tension with the dominant discourse. This view on discursive discontinuity is insightful in several important ways. First, it shows that changes in discourse, particularly at the local level, sometimes take place in a less dramatic fashion. Even though the discourse at the macro- (national) level experiences a major shift, the discourse at the micro-

(local) level may not immediately follow suit. Secondly, even though a particular discourse has clear dominance at the moment and represents a clear break from a previous discourse, it does not necessarily entirely wipe out the old discourse. Often the two continue to operate in shifting relationship with each other until they come in direct opposition. Having said that, despite some variation on how rapidly the discursive shifts occur or whether new discourses replace the old ones, genealogists share the belief that the focus of this methodology is to highlight how shifts take place and explore the socioeconomic, cultural, and historical contexts that enable such discontinuities.

Emphasizing the competing, ruptured, and discontinuous nature of discourses culturally embedded in particular historical periods, Shildrick (2005) maps the genealogy of disability discourse, describing several major discontinuities it has experienced. Disability was initially understood in religious terms and the disabled body was considered unclean and subjected to exclusionary practices in the Judaic and pre-Christian era. It was also a focus of heated religious and philosophical discussions during what she calls the Christian era (through the Middle Ages) because there was no consensus as to whether disability was “an instance of god’s power to vary the natural order at will, or alternately a break with that order that signified the exclusion of the fallen and sinful” (p. 761). During that period, disability was an uncertain or undeterminable category. Then during the Renaissance and early modern periods, congenital disability was often categorized as monstrous and viewed negatively, although the author points out some examples where it was approached with fascination as well.

However, the emergence of scientific and empirical rationalism during the early modern period, which aimed to eliminate any vagueness in categorization, pursued construction of clear differences between normal and abnormal and the imposition of normativities. Instead of the

exclusionary practices of the previous periods, the new regime treated the disabled body as an illness and attempted to cure it. The next stage is the social model of disability which mainly emerged as a counter-discourse to challenge the traditional positivist models of disability and accomplishes the politicization of disability. This model, intended to achieve social justice by speaking directly to the hegemonic dominance of the sociocultural determination of disability, leads to new notions of normativities and creates new resistances. The author believes that this continued reliance on normativity is caused by seeking to counter the discourse only at the external level and failing to recognize the importance of the psychic elements that play a crucial role in constructing disability discourses. By recapping how the disability scholarship traced the genealogy of disability discourse, the author argues that even though such genealogical analyses have neatly described the many ruptures and discontinuities disability discourse has experienced, they all neglect the fundamental continuity that runs through all these discourses. She argues that ultimately the different ways through which disability has been understood are based less on the perceived abnormalities or failings of the disabled person and more on psychic anxiety of the self. Because the criteria for separating the abled and disabled is always shifting and unstable, and disabled people are too similar to everyone else, anyone could potentially become one of them. Therefore, the need for separation stems largely out of this desire to deny commonality with the disabled.

We can take from this study a genealogical approach's ability to not only trace major discursive discontinuities, but also its potential to note the surprising underlying continuity that can run through all the ruptures: in this case, inner fear of the self about the possibility of having any similarity with disabled people and becoming one of *them*. Shildrick acknowledges that there is no singular explanation or certainty about the development of discourses, urging genealogists

to seek to “uncover the domain of power/knowledge as epistemically layered and perspectival” (p, 768).

Closely related to the disability discourse is the discourse on how people overcome various physical, emotional, and mental agonies which Orgad (2009) describes as survivor discourse. She traces the genealogy of the concept of survivor in Western public discourse by analyzing its manifestation in five discursive sites namely: the Holocaust, psychotherapy, feminist discourses of childhood and sexual abuse, reality TV, and discourses of health and illness. Through examining the production and legitimation of survivor discourse in various spheres of public life, the author argues that this new discourse emphasizes the notion that only those individuals who take action to deal with various obstacles they face in life are able to survive. This dominant discourse of the survivor has turned the role into a positive one and encouraged people to embrace it. Orgad also notes a negative aspect: the discursive construction of survivors as winners, which overlooks the complex set of factors that enable some individuals to survive their life ordeals, and renders other categories of victims and the dead illegitimate and implicitly labeling them losers. Because the construction of survivor discourse requires the production of the victim in binary opposition, if the survivor is an active, positive, public, visible, self-responsible, and empowered individual, then the victim must be passive, negative, private, silent, dependent, and within a weak collective (p. 151). Orgad’s work shows the negative consequences of representing a particular group as the ideal model and associating its members with positive characteristics because it implies that those who do not fall into this category are implicitly constructed as the unworthy other and associated with undesirable attributes.

Running through all these discourses is the genealogy of a social issue, brought into existence through discursive construction, and a body of knowledge developed around it to make

the issue understandable within a particular knowledge/power context. In turn, this body of knowledge is used to legitimate positively evaluating certain people and representing them as the ideal group while negatively evaluating others and representing them as deviant and objectionable (Carabine, 2001; Orgad, 2009). The literature review also shows how the same phenomenon could be problematized in different ways and how each conceptualization might lead the dominant actors to take different approaches to address the problem (Dean, 1991; Shildrick, 2005; Walters, 2000). Most importantly, by revealing the inconsistencies, discontinuities, ruptures, and sometimes surprising continuities these various discourses have undergone over the years, these studies destabilize and challenge what are considered commonsense understandings and their effects. It is worth noting that while many of the genealogical analyses focus on discursive discontinuities, in some cases it is not easy to demarcate the breaking points between different discourses as they are likely to coexist until becoming fully contradictory with each other (Stenson & Watt, 1999). And we have seen that it is also possible that instead of (only) revealing discontinuities, a genealogist might find surprising continuities in different discourses.

Reviewing the literature on genealogical analysis not only lays out the methodological rationale for conducting this research on the genealogy of discourses on ethnic protests in China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, but also provides useful examples of different ways this methodology has been used to investigate discourses on social issues that are often taken for granted in the public sphere. In addition, due to genealogy's heavy emphasis on examining socioeconomic, political, historical contexts, using this methodology enables us to better understand contingent forces that make a particular discourse dominant in a particular historical moment. The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. First I will introduce the

data collection methodology employed in this chapter. Then the characteristics of different discursive shifts exemplified in the discourses surrounding the major protests will be analyzed. Finally, the implications of the changes in the discourse, particularly its current configuration as the discourse of People's War on Terror, will be discussed.

### **Data Collection**

Using a genealogical methodology, the rest of this chapter traces the discursive representations of Uyghur protests in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in official Chinese discourse over the last 40 years. More specifically, I focus on the official characterization of four incidents: the Baren April 5th incident in 1990, the Ghulja February 5th incident in 1997, the Urumqi July 5th incident in 2009, and the Yarkant July 28th incident in 2014. I chose these four incidents spanning a period of 25 years for several reasons. First, these are some of the largest protests in scale and have become common reference points when Chinese politicians, academics, and journalists as well as exiled Uyghur groups and foreign scholars discuss security issues in Xinjiang. Second, these incidents also left a profound impression on the collective memory of the last two generations of Uyghurs. It is not uncommon to hear Uyghurs talk about their views of state policies in relation to these incidents. Third, these incidents, especially the last three, are very similar in how they started, developed, and turned violent, and eventually how they were handled by the government. They were all triggered by what local people considered the government's unjust handling of a prior smaller incident. Except for the Baren incident, the other three incidents started out as spontaneous peaceful protests and turned violent after armed police tried to disperse the crowd with force. Because of these similarities, it would seem obvious for the events to be labeled in similar ways considering the fact that they happened in less than three decades. But that is not the case. In fact, these four

incidents were characterized very differently at the time they occurred. The disparate ways these incidents have been represented in the official discourse provide us with a clear vantage point to trace the genealogical shifts in the discursive construction of Uyghur protests against the Chinese government and its policies; they provide a snapshot of knowledge/power networks evident in the Chinese government's response to these incidents. It is also important to note that these incidents were selected mainly because they could best exemplify the discursive shifts, not because the new discourses emerged as a direct result of these four major events. Oftentimes the new discourses preceded the occurrence of those incidents and in some cases had already been applied to frame other incidents that were smaller in scale.

The textual data analyzed in this chapter primarily comprises scholarly articles published in China. Unlike in the West, academic journals in China, especially those in the social sciences and humanities, are government-owned and their content is strictly censored to reflect the official stance and attitudes towards social issues. As such, they are a reliable source to examine the Chinese government's public mode of understanding the ethnic protests in Xinjiang and the major diachronic shifts this mode experienced over time. Academic articles provide in-depth information on and analysis of the propounded root causes of these incidents and policy proposals about how to prevent them based on how they were to be understood at the time of their occurrences. Considering the relatively longer turnaround time in academic publishing, I collected journal articles that examine those incidents within two years of their occurrence, using the China Academic Journals Full-text Database (CJFD). The CJFD is the most comprehensive database for academic journal articles published in Chinese in the world. It contains 10,301 journal titles and 57,520,928 articles and is updated continuously.

The main criterion for choosing the articles was whether a particular incident is directly referenced in the article. So for each incident, key words containing the name of the incident or its official characterization at the time were entered into the CJFD database and the articles the search result produced were selected for the corpus. Academic publication has gone through tremendous changes in the last 20 years in China both in terms of quantity and quality. As a result, far more articles were published that mentioned the 2009 Urumqi incident and the 2014 Yarkant incident than the 1990 Baren and the 1997 Ghulja incidents. While most of the articles on the first two incidents in the 1990s were included, it was neither practical nor necessary to incorporate all the articles published on the last two incidents in the corpus. Therefore, when it was deemed that the addition of new articles did not bring qualitative changes to the corpus, it was considered that the corpus was saturated, and no additional articles were added. At the end, the corpus consisted of 48 articles in total, around 10 articles on each incident.

I supplemented this corpus of academic articles with Chinese newspaper articles when providing background information about those incidents. Collecting textual data from these two sources (academic and news media) in order to analyze official discourses on ethnic protests, not a very commonly practiced data collection method when conducting CDA, became a possibility mainly because of the unique nature of doing academic scholarship within the Chinese political system. I believe this approach can significantly increase the breadth of my data and analysis and contribute to our understanding of sociocultural and historical contexts within which the discourse was embedded.

The following four sections represent the major shifts identified in the discourses on ethnic protests in Xinjiang. In describing each discursive period, I first give a brief account of the major incident that best illustrates the changes that have taken place in the discourse. The

account includes background information on the events that led up to the incident, how the protest started and developed, and how the government responded. Then the characteristics of the discourses surrounding those incidents are discussed and analyzed and the changes compared to the previous discourses are highlighted. When describing certain discursive features, the excerpts from the scholarly articles in my corpus are provided. Due to space limitations, the original Chinese is included in Appendix A while their English translation is provided in the text, so that it will be transparent to readers what the analysis is based on and how my analysis of the textual data is connected to the official discourse on Uyghur protests.

#### **April 5th Baren Incident in 1990: Discourse of Counter-Revolutionary Armed Rebellion**

The first dominant framework deployed to frame protests in Xinjiang was a *discourse of counter-revolutionary armed rebellion*, which came from the CCP's ideology of viewing itself as a revolutionary party. Therefore, attempts to overthrow the communist rule in any form by any group were represented as counter-revolutionary. Discourse of counter-revolutionary armed rebellion put class struggle at its center and represented protests as the work of class enemies. The class enemies were portrayed as both domestic and international agents who used religion as a tool to achieve their political goals. Finally, the discourse also constructed the protestors as fascists and Nazis, the internationally denounced group at the time.

#### **Context**

The Baren incident took place on April 5<sup>th</sup> in 1990 in Aqtu County in Southern Xinjiang. According to official news reports, it was led by a man named Zeydin Yusup, who had founded the East Turkistan Islamic Party in 1989. In the months leading up to the uprising, Yusup and his associates actively recruited members to their party, organized training, and secured donations from local people to purchase supplies. However, in March of 1990, their activities were

partially exposed and drew the attention of local authorities, which led the group to speed up their preparation. On April 4<sup>th</sup>, around 200 hundred people gathered in the village mosque and protested against birth control which restricted the number of children Uyghur families could have to two for urban residents and three for rural residents, nuclear testing which had been taking place in Lop Nur area of southern Xinjiang since 1964, and oil extraction in the region (Bovingdon, 2004). When the local government sent officials to persuade the crowd to disperse and later armed police to quell the protest, the crowd clashed with the government representatives and the security forces, and drove them away. The next morning, protestors surrounded the village government. At this point, the government sent police, armed police, and Chinese People's Liberation Army troops to subdue the protest (Chen, 2009). After battling with the security forces, the protestors retreated into the nearby mountains, where they were ultimately crushed by the military with the help of air power (Millward, 2004).

### **Official Representation of the Incident**

The Baren uprising was initially described as a counter-revolutionary armed rebellion, the exact same label to describe the student-led prodemocracy protests in Tiananmen Square in 1989 and justify the government's bloody suppression on June 4<sup>th</sup> and subsequent crackdown on supporters of the movement. At the time, the CCP still considered itself a revolutionary party and any challenge to its rule by any group, be it ethnic minorities in Xinjiang or college students in Beijing was considered a counter-revolutionary activity. If the group happened to be ethnic minorities, they were labeled counter-revolutionary ethnic nationalists. The Baren incident took place more than a decade after Deng Xiaoping's Reform and Opening-up Policy was introduced. During this period of time, the Chinese government gradually introduced the discourse of socialist market economy and phased out the dominant discourse of class struggle which had

characterized the first three decades (1949 - 1976) of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule and had reached its height during Mao's Cultural Revolution. However, even though on economic issues, the CCP largely abandoned the discourse of centralized planned economy in favor of market economy under Deng, on political matters, the party still operated within the official Marxist and Maoist ideology. The communist ideology was still the basis of its legitimacy. At the core of this ideology was the "victor narrative," which described the CCP as a revolutionary party that led the Chinese people to win national independence in 1949 and ended China's 100 years of national humiliation since the Opium Wars in the 1840s (Wang, 2008). Therefore, any effort that attempted to undermine the victory of the Communist Party was considered counter-revolutionary. Such discourse is very dominant in the academic articles published about the Baren incident.

**Excerpt 1:** Baren Township incident was a testimony to the fact that a handful of ethnic separatists opposed the leadership of the Communist Party (of China), **opposed the socialist system, and attempted to overthrow the people's political power** and split the motherland. **Our fight against ethnic separatism is a sharp and fierce class struggle.** It is a political struggle between safeguarding the unity of the motherland and splitting the motherland and undermining ethnic unity. (Ruzi, 1990) <sup>2</sup>

**Excerpt 2: The counter-revolutionary armed uprising** that took place in Baren Township has taught us a vivid lesson on **class struggle**. It has proved that separatism actually does exist. It is not making a big fuss out of nothing, nor a scaremongering, but an iron fact, an objective reality. (Zhang, 1990)

**Excerpt 3:** Recently, a handful of separatists in Baren Township of Aqtu County have created an appalling **counter-revolutionary armed rebellion**, which completely shows that they are the agents of separatist forces at home and abroad. The harsh facts show that **the struggle between us and the separatists is a class struggle, and a political struggle.** (Turbay et al, 1990)

The dominant discourse deployed to frame the incident was the discourse of class struggle and ethnic separatism. The incident was constructed as a threat to the CCP rule with the

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<sup>2</sup> This and all other excerpts in this chapter are from academic articles published in Chinese scholarly journals. The excerpts that appear in each section are from journal articles about the incidents that are the focus of that section. The translation is mine while the original Chinese is provided in Appendix A.

aim of overthrowing the existing socialist government and replacing it with a new political order led by noncommunist parties. What is worth noting about such a characterization of the incident is that being a counter-revolutionary is not normally applied exclusively to Uyghurs as other discourses we will see later in the chapter. Any individuals or groups could be counter-revolutionaries within this discourse if their efforts are perceived as undermining the rule of the CCP. And most importantly such counter-revolutionary struggles are understood as political in nature. The primary aim of such activities is seen as usurping political power from the Communist Party. Construction of the incident as a class struggle with counter-revolutionaries is supported by arguing that the goal of the perpetrators of the incident was to establish a class-based sociopolitical order as suggested in the following statements:

**Excerpt 4: The establishment of the socialist system fundamentally eradicated the economic root causes of class exploitation and oppression** for the first time in history by replacing private ownership with public ownership so that the exploiting class will no longer exist as a class. However, **the remnants of the exploiting classes still exist**; the old ideology and the traditional views still exist; **class enemies and reactionary forces at home and abroad** who attempt to split, destroy, and subvert our socialist country still exist. The experience of the international communist movement and our own experience over the last 40 years since the founding of the People's Republic of China have proved that using religion or operating under the banner of religion to carry out separatism, overthrow the socialist country, damaging socialist ethnic unity and socialist nation building efforts is one of the important forms of class struggle in the early period of socialism. (Li, 1990)

**Excerpt 5:** On April 6 this year, a counter-revolutionary rebellion took place in Baren Township of Aktau County in Xinjiang. Its planners, under the banner of the so-called revitalization of Islam, gathered and recruited a handful of ethnic separatists and established the East Turkestan Islamic Party. They openly advocated splitting Xinjiang from the great motherland and established an oppositional political program of the so-called East Turkestan government. **Marxism believes that the slogan of national independence and self-determination only exists in the presence of ethnic oppression, discrimination and inequality. Only then the oppressed nation demands getting rid of ethnic oppression and requires political independence and equal rights.** Only under this condition, such slogans of national independence and self-determination have scientific, revolutionary, positive significance. Under the conditions of socialism, especially in our country, all ethnic groups, regardless of their size, are politically equal. **There is no oppression or discrimination of any kind between peoples.**

Therefore, the slogan calling for splitting the motherland and establishing another country is not only wrong, but also **reactionary**. (Li, 1990)

Up until the 1980s, private ownership of the means of production was strictly frowned upon within the party's discourse of socialism. It was characterized as the root cause of class exploitation and oppression and a hallmark of capitalist society. This discourse also depicts the chief characteristic of socialism as public ownership and totally rejects any room for private ownership of the means of production within the socialist economic model. It was then claimed that class exploitation was eradicated in China because there was no private ownership of the means of production.

However, as mentioned earlier, after Deng Xiaoping's Reform and Opening-up Policy in 1978, the party started to gradually move away from this binary and mutually exclusive characterization of private and public ownership belonging to either capitalism or socialism. It was argued that socialism is predominantly characterized by public ownership, but allows some room for private ownership as well, and they are not mutually exclusive. This shift in discourse facilitated China's transition from a highly centralized planned economy to a market-oriented economy. However, during this period, the discursive shift on a socialist economic model did not extend to statements articulated on political issues.

The political logics remained the same: Within the revolutionary discourse of class struggle, rebellion is only justified if there is class exploitation or oppression. Since all kinds of oppression and discrimination have been eliminated in socialist China, there is no need to pursue national self-determination. Doing so is not only wrong, but also counter-revolutionary because it would imply overturning the current political system in which class oppression does not exist and returning to the old political order, which is characterized by exploitation and oppression of one class by another one.

## **Class Struggle and Foreign Imperialism as the Root Cause of Ethnic Conflict**

The statements articulated in this discourse also suggest that conflicts between different ethnic groups are closely related to class struggle and that the elimination of class oppression implies elimination of ethnic conflicts.

**Excerpt 6: In a class society, ethnic factors and class factors are intertwined.** The main manifestation and basic content of ethnic problems are ethnic oppression and exploitation, and the resulting antagonism, discrimination, conflicts and struggles among ethnic groups. In our socialist society, we have eliminated the private ownership of the means of production, established socialist public ownership, eliminated the system of ethnic oppression and exploitation, and realized the political equality of the various nationalities... **Because class contradiction is not the principal contradiction of our society, it is not the principal factor contributing to the ethnic problems.** However, the class struggle still exists to a certain extent, and thus inevitably will have a certain impact on ethnic issues which we must not take lightly. (Janabil, 1990)

Drawing on the concept of contradiction, one of the philosophical pillars of Maoist political ideology, it was described that even though class struggle is no longer the principal contradiction within Chinese society as a result of the revolutionary war which ended with the victory of the Communist Party, there are remnants of the old class enemies who are still plotting to regain their past privileges and political dominance. Those who participated in the Baren rebellion are constructed as a small number of people who represent such elements from the old sociopolitical order. Their goal is to reestablish the class-based society that was eradicated as a result of the communist revolution and regain their class privilege. These class enemies and counter-revolutionary elements were also constituted as having foreign collaborators (sometimes vaguely defined) with ulterior motives.

**Excerpt 7: The imperialists** used the strategy of peaceful evolution in an attempt to **weaken and vanquish socialism** and caused the upheaval in Eastern Europe. In this international climate, Xinjiang's ethnic separatist forces and foreign separatist echoed each other. They carried the banner of East Turkistan, advocating independence of Xinjiang and endangering the unity of the motherland. (Turbay et al, 1990)

**Excerpt 8:** The reason Xinjiang people can stand up is under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, under the guidance of Marxism and taking the road of socialism. If the plot of ethnic separatism is allowed to prevail, **Xinjiang will become an imperialist colony and a vassal state, and will become the old Xinjiang of feudal serfdom.** The people of all ethnicities will be brought back into the hell on earth, and historical tragedies will be repeated. The freedom, democracy, and prosperity that we have waited for generations will be destroyed and lost. (Zhang, 1990)

**Excerpt 9:** Ethnic separatists collaborated with hostile forces at home and abroad in an attempt to split Xinjiang from a socialist China and **become a colony of capitalist countries.** (Ruzi, 1990)

**Excerpt 10:** Just as the ethnic separatists claimed in the counter-revolutionary rebellion in Baren Township that “there were people both inside and outside the country who supported us.” The essence of the so-called ethnic independence lies not only in splitting the great socialist motherland, but ultimately their goal is to **bring a certain ethnic group back under the umbrella of the Western imperialists and foreign reactionary forces, turning them into a colony and a semi-colonial oppressed nation and vassal state.** This is a fundamental departure from the core interests and aspirations of the masses of the various ethnicities and is bound to be firmly opposed by the masses of all ethnic groups. (Li, 1990)

In official Chinese history books, Chinese society prior to the communist revolution was depicted as semi-feudal and semi-colonial. Therefore, feudalism and imperialism were the chief targets of the revolution, each respectively represented by the domestic landlord class and the bourgeoisie class of the imperialist countries. It was possible to construct the Baren incident as a counter-revolutionary uprising because the participants were described as remnants of the old class enemies. However, just as the revolution had domestic and international targets, the construction of the Baren incident as counter-revolutionary would not be complete without considering its international component.

A number of motives were attributed to the imperialists for supporting the counter-revolutionary rebellion within this discourse. First of all, the imperialists wanted to “vanquish” socialism in China through peaceful evolution just as they did in Eastern Europe. After former communist regimes in Eastern Europe collapsed one after another during the anti-communist revolutions of 1989 and 1990, the CCP became increasingly fearful of being toppled by similar

pro-democracy movements. When the Baren incident happened, it was also constructed as being aided by Western forces who wanted to topple communist regimes in the world. The goal of the counter-revolutionary forces was described as returning Xinjiang to the old feudal society and making it a colony of Western imperialists. The people of Xinjiang would once again be oppressed by both domestic class enemies and foreign imperialist forces. It is important to point out that all of these articles mention foreign hostile forces, but never explicitly discuss which countries are specifically supporting these anti-communist party efforts. This vague notion of an enemy out there attempting to topple CCP rule is a recurring discursive strategy used in the discourse.

### **The Role of Religion**

In the discourse during this period, religion was depicted as playing a key role in the rebellion. After all the protest was planned and led by a group that called itself the East Turkistan Islamic Party. The village mosque was where the early preparation for the protest took place and where the initial protest began. However, understanding of the actual role religion played in the protest and how to prevent it in the future is very different from how its role would be constructed in the later discourses of separatism and terrorism. In this discourse, religion was primarily viewed as a tool used by counter-revolutionaries to advance their political agenda, which primarily stems from the CCP's atheistic position of viewing religion as a tool used by exploiting classes to justify their oppression of the common people. The true motive of the protestors was framed as political and worldly. They wanted to establish a separate nation called East Turkistan and end the CCP rule in Xinjiang. The religious ideology used by the protestors was described as competing for dominance with Marxism and Leninism.

**Excerpt 11: The planners of the counter-revolutionary armed rebellion in Baren wore the cloak of religion** and used the prayer times to incite religious fanaticism among the people, especially among the young people. They said “We do not believe in socialism, in the past

Marxism and Leninism dominated religion. **Now religion dominates Marxism and Leninism.**” (Ruzi, 1990)

**Excerpt 12: Using religion to carry out separatist activities** is an important manifestation of the class struggle in the socialist period. . . The oppression of humans by religion is just a product of and reflection of the economic oppression within society. Therefore, **Marx and Engels repeatedly pointed out that in order to eradicate religion, the social roots of the existence of religion must be completely eradicated**, which means eradicating all forms of class oppression. Rigorously **develop the production forces** and development and **popularization of science and education will eventually liberate people from the shackles of religion.** (Li, 1990)

**Excerpt 13:** Marxism believes that religion is a product of social development to a certain stage. It has a process of emergence, development and demise. . . Fundamentally speaking, religion is a historical legacy of the old social ideology and believes and worships the supernatural divine entities. It is the illusory and inverted reflection of the natural forces and social forces in people's consciousness. It is an idealistic (non-materialistic) world outlook. Marx has clearly pointed out that **religion is the people's opium.** Lenin also stressed that religion is the opium that anesthetizes people. (Janabil, 1990)

Within this discourse, the attitude towards religion was very much rooted in a Marxist view of religion. It was considered a false social consciousness, stemming mainly from class oppression and ancient people's lack of understanding of the natural world. Religion was compared to the spiritual opium that was used in the past by the ruling classes to control the common people and legitimate their own power and privileges. The class oppression, the root cause of the existence of religion, was eradicated as a result of the communist revolution. It was argued that now in order to achieve the complete victory of the revolution, the Communist Party should work towards liberating people from the spiritual oppression of religion through greatly developing production forces and educating the masses in science and culture. By tying religion to class oppression, the main target of the revolution, religion was constructed as a counter-revolutionary element. Thus it was rendered possible to articulate statements that fighting against religion was a continuation of the revolution and an important part of the struggle against counter-revolutionaries.

The discourse also predicted that the fight against religion would eventually end with the eradication of religion. It stated that religion goes through a process of emergence, development, and eventual disappearance as people's understanding of the natural world deepens. According to the statements articulated within this discourse, class oppression had already been eliminated. So the main task left to complete the revolution was to eradicate religion through educating people in science and technology so that people would not believe in supernatural powers and divine forces. The contradiction that arose between the professed anti-religion attitude of the party and the constitutional rights that were granted to the Chinese people regarding religious freedom was then reconciled through constructing party affiliation and one's obedience to party rules as superior to one's allegiance to the constitution.

**Excerpt 14: Communists may not practice religion** or participate in religious activities. On worldviews, **Marxism is opposed to all religions**. Communists should be radical revolutionaries, thorough materialists. (Janabil, 1990)

**Excerpt 15:** Regarding freedom of religion policy, we should not only talk about freedom of religion, but also **stress the freedom of not believing in religion**. In particular, we should emphasize not forcing young people under 18 years old to believe in religion. (Janabil, 1990)

By describing how one's affiliation with the CCP supersedes their constitutional rights, it was argued that people cannot believe in religion and become Communist Party members at the same time. The two cannot coexist because Marxism rejects all religion. It is particularly important to note this point because, as we shall discuss later in the chapter, in subsequent discourses religion was constructed as having a positive role to play in contributing to socialist construction efforts. In this antagonistic discourse towards religion, the parts of the constitution regarding freedom of religion were also interpreted to support the atheist views of the party. It was stated that freedom of religion refers to freedom to not believe in any religion. And since people under 18 are not considered old enough to be able to make an informed decision about

believing or not believing in religion, they should not be allowed to join religious activities nor should their parents be allowed to make that decision for them.

Even though religion was viewed in a very negative light and predominantly constructed as an adversary of the revolution to be eradicated, it was viewed favorably when it was used as a tool against imperialist forces by the oppressed people of the colonized countries as the following quote suggests:

**Excerpt 16:** We know that the slogan of so-called Jihad against the pagans in history was often the tool of the feudal lords and rulers for invasion and expansion. Except for under certain specific historical circumstances, such as **the invasion of the Islamic world by Western imperialists in the 19<sup>th</sup> century when the people of Islamic countries fought against the foreign invaders under the banner of protecting Islam**, Jihad was often used by the exploiting and the ruling class. The ultimate victims are still the majority of the lower class ordinary people. (Li, 1990)

Again within the revolutionary discourses of class struggle, the masses are constructed as victims oppressed either by their own ruling classes or foreign imperialists. Jihad was not a tool used by the masses. It was a tool used by the elites to expand their power. But it could have a positive role when the target was foreign invaders and the goal was national liberation under certain historical contexts. As we shall discuss later, this is a vastly different view of Jihad than would be constructed in the Discourse of Terrorism.

### **Comparing the Protestors to Fascists and Nazis**

As many Critical Discourse Analysts (KhosraviNik, 2010; Van Dijk, 2000; Wodak, 2003) have noted, one of the fundamental strategies used in the discursive construction of the Other is through positive representation of the Self and negative representation of the Other or as Van Dijk (2000) states, “the expression of polarized cognitions and the categorical division of people into ingroup (US) and outgroup (Them)” (p. 222). In this strategy, ingroup is associated with positive attributes and outgroup is associated with negative attributes. As we have seen, the outgroup, the protestors in this case, was frequently associated with domestic class enemies such

as remnants of the old feudal ruling class and bourgeois capitalists. They were also described in connection with foreign imperialists that attempt to turn Xinjiang into their colony or vassal state. In either case, the people of Xinjiang would face oppression and exploitation as a result of the protestors' actions. Besides attributing those negative identity categories to the protestors, the discourse also tied the protestors to Nazis and fascists in order to construct their status as the worst enemy of humanity.

**Excerpt 17:** A group of counter-revolutionary fascist thugs who planned and carried out the counter-revolutionary armed rebellion in the Baren Township operated under the reactionary banner of so called Islamic Jihad. **They committed Fascist crimes** against the people of all ethnic groups and aroused their indignation. They will be spit by people of all ethnic groups for generations. The banner carried by those who created the counter-revolutionary armed rebellion in Baren is the torn banner of East Turkistan which had already been sentenced to death. (Turbay et al, 1990)

**Excerpt 18: The ethnic separatists in Xinjiang, just like the Pan-Germanic Nazis, attributed all imaginary crimes to the Han people.** Whenever there was a sign of trouble, they stirred an unstoppable malice and hatred, carried out anti-Han activities, opposing and murdering Han people. The marks of knife and axe injuries on the armed police soldiers who were killed in Baren are the irrefutable evidence of that. (Han, 1990)

The construction of the protestors as fascists and Nazis is accomplished in two ways. First, their acts were stated as being no different from the violent crimes committed by fascists. Secondly, the grievances expressed by the protestors such as ethnic inequality and extraction of the natural resources in Xinjiang by the central government are equated with the Nazi propaganda of blaming the Jews for the problems of Germany before World War II. It is important to note that even though there is very little in common between the fascists of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century in Europe and the protestors in Baren, the fact that fascists were a universally condemned group is enough to justify such a comparison. As we shall see later in the chapter, even though the discourse of ethnic protests would experience many discontinuities in the subsequent years, one surprising continuity is to compare the protestors to internationally

denounced groups, albeit the identity of such condemned groups would change radically as a result of 9/11.

### **Tacit Acknowledgement of the Difficulty of Circulating Statements on the New Discourse of Separatism**

As discussed above, the dominant theme used to frame the Baren incident was that it was a counter-revolutionary armed rebellion instigated by a group of people who represented the interests of the enemies of the communist revolution. But that was not the only discourse. In the coverage of the Baren incident, one can see the beginnings of an ideological shift. The late 1980s and early 1990s marked a turning point in ideological education in contemporary China as the ideological mismatch between the theory of class struggle that still dominated the political discourse and the actual economic and social reforms that were implemented by the CCP started to become more and more pronounced. Scholars also note that after the end of the Cultural Revolution (1966 - 1976), especially in the 1980s, the CCP faced belief crises in socialism, communist ideology, and Marxism (Wang, 2008). The CCP leaders began to recognize that the revolutionary discourse and communist ideology could no longer rally people and ensure the legitimacy of CCP rule. Therefore, the party replaced the discourse of communist revolutionary victory over class enemies with the discourse of 100 years of national humiliation under foreign invasion and oppression until the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949. Under the new discourse, the Chinese people experienced great suffering and oppression not only because of the actions of the exploiting classes such as feudal rulers and bourgeoisie capitalists but also because of foreign incursion. Only the CCP was able to save China from national humiliation under foreign powers and achieve national independence. Within the discourse, what the CCP accomplished was a patriotic feat, and the party was equated with patriotism. By extension, challenging the legitimacy of CCP rule would be considered unpatriotic. As this discursive shift

was occurring at the national level, new discourses began to be introduced to explain the protests by ethnic minorities in Xinjiang. Instead of framing the protests strictly within the discourse of class struggle and communist revolution, the party began to circulate statements on separatism. However, as the following excerpt suggests, the Communist Party's initial efforts to articulate statements about separatism met with some resistance at the local level because they were deeply entrenched in the revolutionary discourse of class struggle:

**Excerpt 19:** Under the banner of East Turkestan independence, **the ethnic separatist forces at home and abroad are the main dangers that affect the overall stability of Xinjiang.** The recent counter-revolutionary armed rebellion in Baren Township has proved **that the understanding and judgment of the regional party committee was correct.** . . . The problem of ethnic separatism in Xinjiang is an old problem, not a new one. (Janabil, 1990)

It was suggested that even though the regional party leadership had circulated statements that attempted to shift the discourse towards separatism, it had not been readily accepted among local party officials. The Baren incident was portrayed as proving the correctness of the assessment of the overall situation by the party. Such an evaluation of the nature of the threat is consistent with the discursive changes at the national level. If discourse of communist revolution and class struggle was to be replaced by the discourse of national humiliation under foreign invasion at the national level, the discourse on Uyghur protests at the local level would need to be rearticulated to adapt to the new discursive shift. Although it was initially difficult to circulate statements on separatism and move away from framing ethnic minority protests within the revolutionary discourse of class struggle, as the next section shows soon the discourse of separatism would become the dominant discourse and taken for granted as a natural way, in some cases the only way, of speaking about ethnic minority protests.

#### **February 5th Ghulja incident in 1997: The Discourse of Separatism**

Although it was initially difficult to move away from a revolutionary discourse of class struggle to the *discourse of separatism*, redirecting the focus of domestic ideological education,

combined with international developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, accelerated the pace of the discursive shift. When a large scale protest occurred in 1997, the discourse of separatism had already been firmly established as the dominant framework to interpret such incidents. The new discourse constructed the goal of protestors as splitting Xinjiang from China and establishing an independent nation like the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan while omitting any references to class struggle, exploitation, and oppression of feudal and bourgeois classes, which had been the main features of the previous discourse of counter-revolutionary armed rebellion. The discourse of separatism is also characterized by its emphasis on understanding the protests through the lens of the regional history of Xinjiang and rearticulation of the role played by foreign powers in the protests. The discourse of separatism also indexes a shifting attitude towards religion and introduces the concept of terrorism as a method used by separatists.

### **Context**

Events leading up to the February 5th demonstration in Ghulja and its aftermath are well documented in scholarly publications (Bovingdon, 2010; Dautcher, 1999; Millward, 2004; Hierman, 2007; Gladney, 1999). As with many large-scale protests that have happened in Xinjiang, this incident has both immediate and deep-rooted causes. As pointed out by most scholars above, the tension in Ghulja intensified after the government began cracking down on Mashrap gatherings. Mashrap is a traditional social gathering where men sing, dance, and tell jokes. Around 1994, people in Ghulja began to form traditional Mashrap groups as a way of social activism. Besides the usual singing, dancing, and standup comedy performances, participants of the Mashrap also promoted abstinence from alcohol and drugs which were causing major social malaise among Uyghurs in the 1990s. They would supervise each other's

moral conduct, and whenever a member of their Mashrap community was reported to have used alcohol or drugs, they would publicly penalize them during their gatherings, often imposing nonphysical punishments that were intended to embarrass the person rather than actually inflicting any physical harm. The effort was quite successful, and Mashrap became very popular. However, in the spring of 1995 the local officials, concerned with the success of such grassroots organizations in influencing the public's conduct and affecting social change, banned all Mashrap activities in Ghulja. Afterwards the Mashrap leaders were briefly detained.

Then in the summer of 1996 some leaders of the Mashrap movement organized a soccer tournament which included multiple teams representing former Mashrap groups. Some reports indicate that they gained permission from the government to hold the tournament. However, several days before the tournament, the government abruptly cancelled the tournament and occupied the soccer field with tanks, stating that the site would be used for military exercises. It prompted the organizers of the tournament to stage a protest. Around 700 people quietly marched along the main streets of Ghulja after the cancellation. The government learned of the protest in advance and put the city under martial law. Even though the situation was very tense, with government soldiers armed with heavy guns patrolling the city, no violence took place on that day (Dautcher, 1999, p. 378). Both of these incidents (banning Mashrap and cancelling the tournament) and the subsequent first Strike Hard Campaign carried out in 1996 (a special political campaign during which arrests and convictions of suspected separatist are increased both in quantity and speed) significantly intensified the tension in the region.

According to most scholarly accounts, the banning Mashrap, cancelling a soccer tournament, and the Strike Hard Campaign were the main underlying causes of the April 5<sup>th</sup> Ghulja protest in 1997. But there were also reports of more immediate causes of the protest. On

February 4<sup>th</sup>, towards the end of the month of Ramadan, the local police arrested around 200 people in mosques and private religious study groups (Bovingdon, 2010, p. 126; Millward, 2004, p. 17). The next morning, at least 500 people took to the streets, protesting the arrests that had taken place a day earlier. Most accounts also report that for two hours the demonstration continued peacefully. Then the police started cracking down on the protestors, eventually firing live ammunition to disperse the crowd and arresting some. Finally, the Chinese government locked down the town for two weeks and quelled the protest. Over 100 people were killed during the incident (Dautcher, 1999, p. 380). Human rights organizations report that around 300 to 400 people were arrested in the direct aftermath of the incident and some other sources point out that the actual number was much higher (Amnesty International, 1999).

Because Ghulja was one of the biggest cities in Xinjiang and the number of participants in the protest was much higher than in the Baren uprising, there was intense reaction from the Chinese government in the subsequent months and years. As a result, there was more discussion of the incident in both political and academic circles. In the following section, the dominant discourse used to frame the incident will be examined and the new shifts that occurred in the discourse will be explored.

### **Separatism as the Dominant Discursive Frame**

There had been some effort during the previous discursive period to move the discourse more towards separatism in framing protests in Xinjiang even though it was not yet the dominant discourse. By 1997 when the Ghulja incident took place, the discourse of separatism had clearly replaced the previous discourse of revolutionary class struggle and become the dominant discourse to explain such incidents.

**Excerpt 20: Ghulja February 5<sup>th</sup> incident is a beating, smashing, looting and rioting incident** that posed a severe threat to national security. It was led by East Turkistan Allah Party,

well-planned and well-organized, violent incident. It is a powerful demonstration of the criminal activities of the ethnic minority separatists that intended to **split the motherland, damage ethnic unity, and harm social stability**. It is a frenzied attack on our people's democratic dictatorship by the criminals. In this complex separatism and anti-separatism struggle, we must see through the external phenomenon and understand its essence. We must clearly recognize that this is not an ethnic problem, nor is it a religious problem. It is a terror incident that threatens national security, damages social stability, endangers ethnic unity, and creates ethnic barriers. (Li, 1998)

**Excerpt 21: National separatism and illegal religious activities** are one of the **major threats to social stability**. The essence of national separatism and illegal religious activities is to engage in separatism and seek independence. (Liu, 1998)

**Excerpt 22:** Of course, we should also recognize that **in Xinjiang there has always been a struggle of separatism and antiseparatism**. Even today Xinjiang is facing many of the real and potential factors of instability. Ethnic separatism is one of the major dangers and insecurity elements affecting Xinjiang's social stability. Therefore, **in-depth study of the historical roots and international background of ethnic separatism will help us** deeply understand its reactionary nature and the long-term existence, complexity and difficulty of the struggle against ethnic separatism. It can also help us raise people's consciousness of opposing national separatism so that we can more effectively fight against their conspiracy and sabotage, and safeguard the territorial integrity of the motherland and the stability of Xinjiang. (Sawut, 1997)

The official characterization of the Ghulja incident was that it was a smashing, looting, and rioting incident that aimed at splitting Xinjiang from China. The struggle between separatists and antiseparatist forces was portrayed as a long-term struggle that is both complex and difficult. Note that in this discourse there is no mention of the oppression or exploitation of the class enemies that dominated the previous discourse. The separatists' goal was mainly constructed as splitting China into several smaller nations and damaging the unity among the ethnic groups.

It was strongly emphasized that the nature of the Ghulja incident was not an ethnic conflict nor was it a religious one, even though there is little doubt that being Uyghur and Muslim are two defining characteristics of the identity of the protestors. Within the dominant discourse, the term *ethnic separatist* does not apply to any ethnic group other than Uyghurs in Xinjiang. In addition, as indicated in newspaper coverage at the time, restriction on religious practice was not only one of the major long-term underlying causes of the protest but also a

trigger for it. After all the Mashrap events had been banned because they promoted abstinence from alcohol and drugs mainly on religious grounds and encouraged religious piety among their participants. Also the protest began as a response to the detention of 200 people who were engaged in religious studies at the time of their arrest.

Rather it was described only as a separatist incident that threatened the national security and social stability in China. Insisting that it was not an ethnic problem could be interpreted as an effort to downplay the protest as a response to the harsh policies towards ethnic minorities. It also marks a clear departure from the previous discourse which prioritized class struggle and regarded ethnicity as a secondary issue or a byproduct of the class-based society that would eventually disappear. Stressing separatism as a more important motivating factor in bringing protestors to the streets also indexes that the party no longer viewed itself as a revolutionary party, but as a ruling party which was given a mandate by the Chinese people to govern and build China into a strong and prosperous nation. Therefore, the challenge to its rule is not a counter revolutionary act, but one that threatens the national security and social stability which is the bedrock of the party's nation-building efforts.

The concept of social stability also emerged as a central point in the new discourse. The previous discourse regarded protests or national liberation movements as justified when there was class oppression and exploitation of one group by another. It also stated that since all forms of class exploitation in China were abolished under socialism, there was no need to stage another revolution. Attempting to do so would be considered counter-revolutionary because the revolution under the leadership of the CCP had already succeeded. However, the new discourse appeared at a time when the CCP viewed itself as a ruling party, not a revolutionary party. Within this discourse, social stability is associated with the continuation of CCP rule. Therefore,

protests against the party's policies were equated to challenging its rule and harming social stability. The discourse firmly established that the main threat to social stability in Xinjiang, and by extension the threat to CCP's rule, was ethnic separatism.

Another characteristic of the discourse of separatism which sets it apart from the previous discourse of revolutionary class struggle is its reinterpretation of the anti-central government uprisings that took place in Xinjiang before the CCP came to power in 1949. In the discourse of revolutionary class struggle, any struggle carried out by the oppressed classes or ethnic groups against their oppressors were constructed as predecessors of the grand communist revolution because they were against the Manchu emperors, who represented the interests of the feudal ruling class, or the Kuomintang, which represented the interests of the capitalist bourgeoisies ruling class. They were also depicted as an inevitable and natural result of the class-based society due to its oppression and exploitation. Therefore, only the protests that took place after the CCP came to power in 1949 were described as counterrevolutionary because they happened at a time when public ownership was replaced with private ownership and all root causes of economic exploitation were abolished as a result of the communist revolution.

However, within the new discourse of separatism, it is argued that separatism has always existed in Xinjiang, and understanding the historical trends of separatist movements would help better deal with the current instances of separatism and protect social stability in Xinjiang. The history of separatism in Xinjiang became a common lens through which to interpret the current protests. The discourse of separatism notes that since the Han dynasty, Xinjiang has been part of China and the issue of separatism has persistently plagued the central governments. What is important to our discussion is not whether the claim about Xinjiang being part of China for the past two millennia is valid or not, but what is noteworthy is the common understanding that there

have always been periodic outbursts of protests against the central government when Xinjiang was ruled by a power based in China proper. What really has changed over time is how those protests have been defined and characterized in the official discourse.

### **Shifting Focus on History as the Cause of Protests**

In the previous discourse, the Marxist historiography played a prominent role in interpreting the conflicts among the various social groups, irrespective of the basis used for delimitating these groups, be it religion or ethnicity. From the perspective of a grand historical narrative of human civilization, the class struggle was the main driving force of historical progress and all other conflicts were its byproducts. In this narrative, once the issue of class struggle is completely eradicated, all other problems of ethnic conflicts and religious conflicts would gradually disappear. Some protests occurred in socialist China mostly because the remnants of the old ruling classes wanted to regain their lost power and privileges. Therefore, the root causes of the protests were sought within a universal narrative of human history. However, since the new discourse was no longer operating under the theory of class struggle as the root cause of the protests, this grand narrative of historical progress was not particularly effective. Rather the discourse shifted its focus and attributed the historical roots of the protests in Xinjiang to particular events unique only to the history of Xinjiang, especially two independent East Turkistan Republics which were established in Xinjiang in 1933 and 1944.

**Excerpt 23:** At the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, with the development of the national liberation movements in the world and the awakening of modern national consciousness, bourgeois ethno-nationalism began to spread widely. Under the direct encroachment of imperialists, Xinjiang began to come into contact with **Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism**. The spread of these two ideologies provided the foundation for Xinjiang separatist ideology... **in early 1930s, they established separatist governments of Hotan Emirate and East Turkistan Islamic Republic.** (He, 1997)

In the discourse of separatism, the separatist ideology is traced back to the Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism ideologies that spread to Xinjiang in 1930s and described as their continuation. The statements were then extended to include those ideologies which led to the establishment of the East Turkistan Republic and expressed resolute opposition to those ideologies in order to prevent them from achieving their goal again. It also noted that such separatist attempts failed when China was weak and chaotic and it would never succeed now that China was strong and stable.

### **Foreign Involvement: Westernization, Balkanization, and Peaceful Evolution**

The involvement of foreign hostile forces in causing domestic disturbance and political instability constitutes both continuity and discontinuity in the discourse. On hand one, the role of foreign support in creating protests was a major component of the previous revolutionary discourse of class struggle. However, the motives of foreign hostile forces in providing such support were constructed differently in the discourse of separatism. The previous discourse suggests that foreign imperialists' goal in meddling in China's internal affairs was to turn Xinjiang into their colony or vassal state and reinstitute old feudal rulers who would then serve the interests of the foreign powers. In the new discourse, however, the foreign hostile forces were mainly motivated by the desire to Westernize and liberalize China or shape its political and social institutions in Western fashion, and thereby weaken it. This shift is significant because it suggests China's increased national strength and international standing and that the times when China was weak and bullied by other nations were long gone. It also speaks to the changes that took place in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union which all went through dramatic political transformations, and the communist parties in all those countries were removed from power. There was near panic in China when all those former communist nations fell one after another

and some even splintered into many smaller countries. Guarding against Westernization, Balkanization, and peaceful evolution was one of the main reasons for the emergence of the discourse of separatism and a key component of the discourse as well.

**Excerpt 24: Foreign hostile forces have stepped up the strategy of 'Westernization', 'Balkanization', and 'Peaceful Evolution' towards China,** providing material and spiritual support to ethnic separatists and greatly enhancing the dependence of the domestic separatist forces on international hostile forces. The scope of struggle extended from the domestic to the international community, which significantly increased the difficulty of our struggle against separatism. (Liu, 1998)

**Excerpt 25: Since 1990s, due to the changes in international and domestic political climate, the ethnic separatism in Xinjiang has entered a new active period.** The international reactionary forces openly support ethnic separatist activities inside and outside China; the ethnic separatist organizations inside and outside China have strengthened their aggregation, **and have infiltrated Xinjiang more and more; and have created separatist public opinion.** They attack the party's ethnic and religious policies, set up reactionary organizations, stir up trouble, assault party and government organs, instigate riots, create terrorist incidents; They also incite religious fanaticism and promote holy wars. (He, 1997)

Another major difference in the discourse in terms of foreign involvement is that in the previous discourse both foreign hostile forces and remnants of the domestic class enemies were equal partners in sabotaging the communist revolution. The cause of the protests was portrayed as originating within China with the old ruling classes intending to regain political power that was lost to the communist party and receiving support from foreign imperialists in the process. However, in the new discourse, the problem is described as mainly originating outside China. Foreign hostile forces perceive socialist China as a threat and want to westernize China and split it into several smaller countries. Therefore, they “infiltrated” and spread separatist propaganda in order to create trouble and “instigate riots.” In other words, in the discourse of separatism the foreign hostile forces were constructed as the dominant actor seeking to undermine China’s stability and enlisting the help of domestic elements in the process.

### **Shifting Attitudes Towards Religion**

Religion was one of the main components of the previous discourse. However, religion was understood in strict Marxist orthodoxy. It was constructed as spiritual opium and a product of society's internal economic exploitation and class oppression. Lack of understanding of the natural world was also pointed out as a contributing factor in why people believe in religion. The Party's attitude towards religion was very antagonistic and its eventual demise was predicted. However, the new discourse changed its hostile attitude and approached religion from the perspective of management. It is acknowledged that calling religion "opium" will only alienate a large number of ethnic minorities, and religious activities were divided into legal and illegal.

**Excerpt 26:** Ethnic and religious issues are very sensitive. **Almost all members of many ethnic minorities believe in religion.** But depending on the region, their level of education varies greatly. Majority of the fellow believers in religion generally have low level of cultural and education quality. **Their simple naïve ethnic feelings and religious rules have been manipulated by bad people to engage in illegal activities.** They could not differentiate enemies and friends and could not grasp means of dealing with certain issues, thus easily creating new instability factors. (Liu, 1999)

**Excerpt 27:** Ili Prefecture's separatism and anti-separatism struggle has proved that the Party Central Committee has correctly classified **illegal religious activities as one of the main dangers affecting Xinjiang's stability.** (Zhou, 1997)

Within the new discourse, instead of aiming to eradicate religion through advancing the means of production and educating people in science, its goal is to manage religious activities so that "bad people" cannot use it to engage in separatism. The main difficulty in managing religion is described as coming from the low "cultural and educational attainment" of the members of the religious community which limited their ability to differentiate right from wrong and made them susceptible to manipulation by hostile forces.

### **Introduction of the Concept of Terrorism**

During this period the concept of terrorism started to enter the discourse. However, construction of terrorism is significantly different from how it would be interpreted in later periods. Within the discourse of separatism, terrorism is mostly described as a strategy used by

separatists along with other strategies such as underground religious schools, publishing historical books that deviate from the official party historiography, and forming grassroots community organizations by reviving the Mashrap tradition, whereas in the subsequent discourse it became a fundamental ideology motivating protestors.

**Excerpt 28:** These ethnic separatists not only have their **reactionary organization, programs and party rules**, they also have bases **established for training core members for carrying out terrorist activities**. (Wang, 1998)

**Excerpt 29:** Having friendly relations with neighboring countries is not only necessary for peaceful development, but also for maintaining stability and cracking down on violent crimes in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. Due to its geographical location, **there have been frequent outbursts of violent terrorist activities with the aim of ethnic separatism in recent years**. Their tools for committing crime were smuggled in from neighboring countries, which is extremely detrimental to the stability and security of Xinjiang. In recently concluded meeting of Shanghai Five Group in Kazakhstan, **President Jiang Zemin signed an agreement on the “fighting ethnic separatism, religious extremism, terrorism, arms smuggling, and drug trafficking.”** It is very important in maintaining stability and promoting economic development in Xinjiang. We must seize this favorable opportunity to carry out all aspects of work, resolutely and thoroughly crack down on violent crime and maintain stability in Xinjiang. (Ding, 1999)

**Excerpt 30: Ethnic separatists in Xinjiang advocated Jihad**, establishing of counter-revolutionary political parties, using violence to harm stability, and ultimately achieving the goal of independence. . . on February 5, 1997 Ghulja Armed Riot was organized by East Turkestan Allah Party. **They incorporated internationally condemned acts of terror into its holy war strategy** and called for "the liberation of our motherland **by means of terrorist activities**." (Yang, 1997)

The Shanghai Five Group was initially established by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan with the aim of increasing security cooperation among the member states. It was later renamed Shanghai Cooperation Organization and expanded to include Uzbekistan in 2001. In 2016, India and Pakistan also officially joined the organization as member states. Originally formed to increase security confidence-building measures at the borders between these countries, they gradually enhanced military and economic cooperation and reached “an agreement on mutual respect for national sovereign and territorial integrity and nonintervention in each other’s internal affairs” (Jia, 2001, p. 26). This was particularly

significant for China because Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan are home to the largest number of Uyghurs outside China. Until this agreement was signed, Uyghur organizations within these countries were able to operate more or less freely. However, the creation of the Shanghai Five Group, especially the signing of the above-mentioned agreement in their third summit in Kazakhstan in 1998, put an effective stop to the activities of any Uyghur organizations deemed separatist by China. In exchange, these countries received massive loans and economic aid from China (Bovingdon, 2004). It was under this context that the word *terrorism* started to appear in Chinese discourse. But it was often ranked lower in priority than separatism. During this period, terrorism was not yet constructed as a coherent ideology. Certain activities such as bombing, assassination and kidnapping were considered terrorist but the aim of such activities was to eventually separate Xinjiang from China. However, the dominance of the separatism discourse changed after the September 11 attacks.

### **The Post-9/11 Ascendance of the Discourse of Terrorism**

Probably no other event played a more critical role in shifting the discourse of separatism in China than the September 11 attacks. After the attacks, the Chinese government quickly responded by strongly condemning the attacks. The condemnation was followed by statements that also depicted China as a victim of terrorism and China's terrorism fight as also part of the global war on terror.

**Excerpt 31:** Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao told Chinese and foreign reporters that there are indeed a number of ethnic separatists who want **to split Xinjiang from China by means of violent terror and establish so-called East Turkestan**. We call them East Turkestan terrorists. We have conclusive evidence that **these people have indeed created and manipulated terrorist activities in Xinjiang**. They have explicitly stated in their guiding principle that they will use violent means to achieve their goal. **This is naked terrorism**. There is also strong evidence that some of them have been trained in camps in Afghanistan. (Jiang, 2001)

**Excerpt 32:** December 9 last year, **Xinjiang Daily disclosed for the first time in its headlines a series of violent terrorist crimes** committed by three evil forces of hostile forces, ethnic separatists, and terrorists in the past decade in Xinjiang. (Zhang, 2002)

In the months after the September 11 attacks, there was a concerted effort in the Chinese official media to reconstruct past statements on ethnic separatism into the discourse of terrorism. The discourse of Global War on Terror promoted by the Bush administration in the aftermath of 9/11 enabled the Chinese government to publicize the incidents in Xinjiang to the West as acts of terrorism in hopes of gaining their sympathy, whereas prior to 9/11 violent outbursts of ethnic discontent in Xinjiang against the Chinese government were not publicized in order not to draw the international audience's attention to human rights violations in the region. Since the West was also fighting a war on terror, the new discourse allowed the Chinese government to frame what might have been considered human rights violations in an earlier period as necessary measures to fight terrorism. The statement made by the Foreign Ministry spokesman gives a clear definition of who the people the Chinese government refers to as terrorists actually are. It is those people who were labeled as separatists prior to the 9/11 attacks. *Xinjiang Daily*, the official newspaper of the CCP Xinjiang Committee, also framed the past incidents in Xinjiang as terrorist attacks for the first time in December 2001 (although academics had used the term, presumably at the government's request, several years before). The role of the 9/11 attacks and subsequent US invasion of Afghanistan were directly cited in Chinese sources as providing legitimacy to construct the *discourse of terrorism* in China and reframe the past incidents in Xinjiang as terrorism.

**Excerpt 33:** The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 shocked the world. The United States locked Osama bin Laden as the target of attack, launched a war in Afghanistan, and destroyed the Jihadists' base and the Taliban regime. The international community has condemned and opposed all forms of terrorist activities, as a result the international terrorist forces faced an unprecedented blow. **This has provided us with a rare opportunity to counterattack East Turkistan terrorist forces.** (Li, 2002)

**Excerpt 34:** This year, due to the manipulation of three evil forces of ethnic separatism, religious extremism, and international terrorism, the encouragement and support of foreign hostile forces, and the influence of the situation in neighboring countries, **China's East Turkistan separatist terrorism has entered unprecedented active period since the founding of the People's Republic of China.** The security situation has gradually degraded into a grave condition. (Duan & Peng, 2002)

The US-led global war on terror was welcomed in China as a great opportunity to link the incidents in Xinjiang to international terrorism and defend the Chinese government's policies in the region. As a result, the discourse of terrorism has emerged as the dominant discourse to understand violent incidents in Xinjiang and replaced the previous discourse of separatism. Now the participants in various protests are no longer described as separatists, rather as terrorists. The security situation was described as being in the most alarming condition since 1949 due to the high frequency of terrorist incidents. As Millward (2004) notes, such a grim picture of the security situation of Xinjiang is in direct contrast with the rosy picture painted by the regional leaders on September 2, 2001, nine days before the 9/11 attacks. At the time, speaking with foreign visitors to the Urumqi Trade Fair, Xinjiang's top party boss Wang Lequan was quoted as saying that the security situation in Xinjiang "was better than ever in history" (Millward, 2004, p. 11). The international environment during the global war on terror era enabled the Chinese government not only to successfully construct the discourse of terrorism to portray the events in Xinjiang, but also to link it with international terrorism, more specifically with Al-Qaida, in order to get the West's recognition that the Uyghur issue is also part of global fight against terrorism.

The initial efforts by the Chinese government to persuade the international community to recognize the incidents in Xinjiang as part of the global terrorism movement were met with some resistance by the West. That caused the Chinese government to accuse the West of holding a

double standard regarding terrorism, as suggested by statements such as the following which frame an argument necessitated by a lack of acknowledgment by the international community:

**Excerpt 35:** Striking the East Turkistan terrorist forces is not only an important part of our efforts to crack down on separatist and extremist religious forces, but at the same time, as shown through a large number of iron-clad facts, **combating the East Turkistan terrorist forces is also an important component of the international fight against terrorism.** (Li, 2002)

**Excerpt 36:** Terrorism is a major public threat in today's world. The East Turkistan forces inside and outside China have distinct characteristics of terrorism. However, the East Turkistan (forces) has long been playing international cards in order to obtain the support of the international community; after the September 11 incident, they fabricated lies in an attempt to escape the international counter-terrorism strikes. **A small number of countries, out of their own political considerations, always refused to recognize that the East Turkistan forces are terrorist organizations.** Because of the influence of these countries, the international academic circles do not have clear understanding that the essence of East Turkistan is terrorism. **Therefore, it is necessary to summarize the crimes committed by the East Turkistan forces from the academic point of view, and analyze and prove their terrorist nature.** (Xie & Wang, 2002)

The point of contention here is various human rights advocacy groups based in Europe, North America, and Turkey. Before 9/11, they were described as separatist organizations in the Chinese official discourse and considered as a part of the West's plot to split and weaken China. Prior Chinese efforts to curb the activities of those groups were not successful due to the refusal of those countries hosting these groups to agree to Chinese demands. However, after 9/11 in the official Chinese discourse on terrorism, those organizations are labeled as East Turkistan terrorist organizations. The West's refusal to categorize them as terrorist organizations was therefore considered as holding a double standard on terrorism. Even though China was not able to get all Uyghur human rights advocacy groups based in the West labeled as East Turkistan terrorist forces, seizing the opportunity offered by the global war on terror, China was successful to some degree in restricting the space for these organizations to carry out their activities. China also scored a major prize when in the summer of 2002 the United States agreed to designate the East

Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a relatively unknown group as a terrorist organization, in order to get Chinese support for its global war on terror initiatives.

**Excerpt 37:** On the evening of August 26<sup>th</sup>, visiting US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage held a press conference at the US Embassy in China and stated that **the United States has officially included the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) in the list of terrorist organizations identified by the United States.** This is the first time the US official announced the decision to the press. (Wang, 2002)

Millward (2004) notes that even though ETIM, a group based in Pakistan, was reported to have some links to extremist groups, it was an unfortunate error on the part of the US government to attribute all the violent incidents that took place in Xinjiang during the previous decade to this one particular group, despite the fact that even the Chinese reports blame many of the incidents on unnamed groups. During the subsequent years, this organization has also become a bogeyman to blame for violent incidents in Xinjiang even though there is little evidence to suggest that there is a unified organization that has been coordinating various protests in Xinjiang; many of the incidents were responses to local grievances rather than with any unified agenda.

### **Relabeling Past Incidents as Terrorist Attacks**

Besides the emergence of the discourse of terrorism as the dominant lens to explain violent protests in Xinjiang, another major characteristic of the discourse during the post-9/11 period is revisiting the past major incidents and relabeling them as acts of terrorism. What was initially described as a counter-revolutionary rebellion in Baren in 1990 and a separatist incident in Ghulja in 1997 were now both redefined as the beginning of terrorism in Xinjiang. In some cases, the origin of terrorism in Xinjiang was traced back to the 1930s and 1940s even though at the time the term *terror* was used to refer to the repressive actions of the Kuomintang government against the communists, and the CCP prided itself on fighting a guerrilla war against the terror of the central government led by the Kuomintang.

**Excerpt 38: The Baren incident that took place on April 5<sup>th</sup>, 1990, was the beginning of the vicious East Turkistan terrorist activities.** Since then, the East Turkistan [movement] has clearly become terrorist in nature. (Xie & Wang, 2002)

**Excerpt 39: On April 5<sup>th</sup>, 1990, terrorists in Baren Township** of Aqtu County created a counter-revolutionary rebellion, killing 8 armed police officers and paramilitary troops and severely injuring 7. (Zhang, 2002)

**Excerpt 40: On February 5<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup>, 1997, terrorists instigated and created a severe smashing, looting, and rioting incident,** killing 7 people and injuring over 200 and burning over 20 vehicles. (Zhang, 2002)

The above statements suggest two major changes in the discourse. First, the Baren incident is generally identified as the beginning of terrorism in Xinjiang. Second, even though in referring to both incidents the discourse maintained the initial characterization of the incidents in the prior discourses, the participants have been completely redefined. In the case of Baren, references to the protestors as counterrevolutionaries, remnants of class enemies, and representatives of exploiting and oppressive class have all been dropped. They are strictly reconstituted as terrorists. As to the Ghulja incident, the term *separatists* is no longer the principal identity of the protestors, instead they, too, are presented as terrorists. It is also highlighted in these statements that the Baren and Ghulja incidents are particularly important in the official discourse as watershed events. This is further confirmed in the following statement in which both the Baren and Ghulja incidents are cited as the defining events of the different stages of the emergence of terrorism in China.

**Excerpt 41: Their violent terrorist activities can be broadly divided into three stages. The first phase,** from 1990 to 1995, was focused on displaying power, manufacturing social and public panic. **They started with Baren rebellion** as a prelude and created February 5<sup>th</sup> series of bus bombings in 1992. **The second phase,** from 1996 to 1997, was focused on blowing bridges to drive out the Han and manufacturing riots. **They created the February 5<sup>th</sup> smashing, looting and rioting incident in 1997.** **The third phase** has lasted from 1998 to present. Its characteristics are **receiving direct command from international terrorist forces,** sending foreign terrorists into the country, colluding to develop domestic terrorists, and carrying out terrorist activities. (Duan & Peng, 2002)

Even though the constitution of these incidents as representing different stages of the development of terrorism in China ignores the initial characterization of the incidents in the official discourse at the time of their occurrence, the importance attached to each incident as representing major breaking points with distinct characteristics conforms to how those incidents have been identified in this paper as symbolizing discursive discontinuities that occurred in constructing dominant understandings of Uyghur protests in China. Another observation we can make about this division is that aside from describing the first period as “displaying power and manufacturing social and public panic” and the second period as “manufacturing riots,” there is no discussion of any substantial differences in the nature of these incidents. They are simply rendered as belonging to different stages. Such a lack of clear differences in the nature of these incidents may also suggest that the main reason these incidents are portrayed as falling into different phases has more to do with the discursive construction of the incidents at the time of their occurrences rather than other characteristics inherent in them. The third stage was described as continuing up to the time of writing in 2002. However, it extends beyond 2002 and covers the July 5<sup>th</sup> Urumqi incident, the most significant protest in China’s recent history.

### **July 5th Urumqi incident in 2009: Discourse of Terrorism and its Ambivalence**

Even though the 2009 Urumqi incident took place in the era of the discourse of terrorism, due to its scale and nature, it was not initially represented as a terrorist incident in the official discourse. While the media represented the incident as a beating, smashing, looting, burning, severe violent criminal incident, in-depth analyses of the root causes of the incident portrayed it as fundamentally terrorist in nature. Even though discussion of foreign involvement could be considered a continuity from the two previous discourses, the role of foreign actors was reframed, hence representing a discontinuity in discourse. The statements articulated within the

official discourse did not specifically attribute the cause of the riot to socioeconomic marginalization. However, the subsequent leadership changes and policy initiatives suggest tacit acknowledgement of the socioeconomic disparity that may have contributed to the incident.

## **Context**

On July 5<sup>th</sup> 2009, what started out as a peaceful demonstration in the People's Square in Urumqi, the regional capital and the largest city in the province, turned violent. According to official figures released by the Xinjiang government, the incident caused the death of 197 people and injured over 1700, becoming the most serious incident with the largest number of casualties in recent memory. Because the incident took place in the age of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in a large city with a population of over three million, there is more information available about the events that led to the protest and how it developed and turned violent. Since many scholars have written in depth about the events leading up to the incident and its implications for the ethnic relations and the Chinese government's policies in the region (Barbour & Jones, 2013; Finley, 2011; Millward, 2009; O'Brian, 2011), here I will provide brief background information about the incident and then focus on discussing the official characterization of the incident and the patterns manifested in the official Chinese discourse.

The initial protest in Urumqi started out as a response to Xinjiang government's inaction over the killing of some Uyghur workers in a toy factory in Shaoguan city in the coastal province of Guangdong. Beginning in 2002, the Xinjiang government has been organizing a labor transfer program under which each county in the region is charged with sending several hundred young people to work in factories in coastal provinces of China where the manufacturing activities are concentrated. There is no consensus as to whether the main motive behind the program was economic (providing employment opportunity for Uyghur youth and cheap labor to

manufacturing industries) or political (accelerating cultural assimilation to the Chinese society). It could be both as these two motives are not mutually exclusive. In either case, workers from the same town often work in the same factory and live in the factory-provided dormitories. One such group of 800 young workers from Kashgar were relocated to work in the Xuri Toy factory in Guangdong in May 2009. The Uyghur workers' presence may have stoked some resentment among Han workers. According to a Chinese government statement, a man named Zhu circulated online rumors that a Han female worker was raped by Uyghur men. This caused the Han workers to march into Uyghur workers' dormitories and randomly beat them on June 26<sup>th</sup>.

According to the official account, 2 people were killed and 118 people were injured in the incident. However, the overseas media and Uyghur witnesses report a much higher death toll. Some pictures and videos of the beating and killing were widely circulated on the internet. For days there were calls on the Xinjiang government and relevant authorities to properly investigate the incident and bring to justice those who committed the violence. However, for almost ten days there was no response from the government regarding their handling of the issue. Then calls for a demonstration began to spread on social media and Uyghur owned websites.

On late Sunday afternoon of July 5<sup>th</sup> 2009, protestors, mostly college students, began to hold a sit-in at the People's Square in Urumqi. Some protestors were even carrying Chinese flags in order to show that what they wanted was a thorough investigation of the Shaoguan incident and seeing those responsible punished. However, the security forces dispersed them with force and detained some demonstrators. As they fled the crackdown at the People's Square and spread the news of the harsh government response to their peaceful march through social media, the whole Uyghur part of the city erupted into violence. At this point, college students were no longer the leading actors in the protest. The most violent rioting took place in corners of the city

where migrant workers from other parts of Xinjiang concentrated such as Saimachang, Heijiashan, and Dawan. The violence continued until midnight and the security forces eventually put down the riot using live ammunition, killing and injuring many protestors. The next two days, the Han residents of Urumqi took to the streets in order to retaliate for what happened on the night of July 5<sup>th</sup> and beat many Uyghurs to death.

No doubt, it was one of the worst ethnic conflicts since the founding of People's Republic of China in 1949. It caused heavy loss of life on all sides and property damage. More than 300 shops and 1300 vehicles were destroyed and burned. The surprising consensus of all sides after the incident was the government's incompetence in handling the situation from the start. To begin with, there was no response from the Xinjiang government regarding the Shaoguan incident. When the news of the demonstration widely spread online, the government underestimated the seriousness of the issue and did not prepare well for what was to happen. Finally, when the demonstration did start, it was poorly handled and hastily repressed with force, which resulted in the chaos and violence that ensued. The incident had far-reaching consequences on the ethnic relations and the Chinese government's policies in the region. Hundreds of people were arrested and given harsh prison sentences without due process. Lizhi, the mayor of Urumqi, and Wang Lequan, Xinjiang's powerful longtime party secretary, were removed from power as a direct result of the incident. The internet in the region was cut off for almost a year. It also revealed the failure of long-standing policies of the CCP in Xinjiang. Tacit acknowledgement of this failure was evidenced in the two Xinjiang Work Conferences held in Beijing in 2010 and in 2014 by paramount leaders Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping, respectively. The repercussions of the incident are still being felt today; many observers cite the government

responses to the incident as further exacerbating the ethnic tension and resulting in the cycle of violence we have witnessed in the last five years.

### **Official characterization of the incident**

The incident was officially labeled as the Urumqi July 5<sup>th</sup> beating, smashing, looting, burning, severe violent criminal incident in the official discourse. The following statements are representative of the dominant description of the incident.

**Excerpt 42:** On the evening of July 5<sup>th</sup>, 2009, **a beating, smashing, looting, burning severe violent criminal incident took place in Urumqi**, killing 184 people, injuring more than 1000, and causing massive property damage. This was **a premeditated, well-organized**, beating, smashing, looting, burning incident **which was directed overseas and carried out at home**. (Lei et al, 2009)

**Excerpt 43:** Urumqi July 5<sup>th</sup> beating, smashing, looting, burning severe violent incident (below abbreviated as Urumqi July 5<sup>th</sup> incident) **is the worst violent criminal incident since the founding of new China**, causing the largest number of casualties, the most severe property damage, the highest degree of destruction, the most negative impact. It severely disturbed the excellent condition of ethnic unity and social stability in Xinjiang, brought huge loss of life and property to people of all ethnic groups, and left a deep pain in their hearts. (Ababekri, 2009)

As noted previously, it is without doubt one of the worst outbursts of violent protests in China since the end of Cultural Revolution. The most important characteristics of the incident are described as “pre-meditated, well-organized, directed abroad and carried out at home.” Each of these three qualities attributed to the incident are significant for several reasons. The official discourse put particular emphasis on characterizing the incident as being well planned and organized. Even though messages about gathering in People’s Square to demand government action on Shaoguan incident circulated widely on the internet and through social media, there were no individuals or groups that emerged as the leader of the protestors or the violence that followed the initial demonstration. The intense focus on labeling the incident as premeditated and well-organized could suggest regional leaders’ own concerns about their responsibility in poor handling of the whole incident and failing to prevent the massive chaos that ensued. Such

representation would make it easier for them to shift the blame away from themselves. It could also work to preclude any discursive construction of the incident as a spontaneous outbreak of frustration and anger that had been simmering for years under the government's harsh policies in the region. Furthermore, it can help lay the ground for the subsequent representation of the incident as acts of terrorism since terrorist attacks are generally not spontaneous.

Even though the July 5<sup>th</sup> Urumqi incident was not characterized as terrorism in the beginning, later discursive developments often depict it as “tinged with terrorism,” “has strong terrorist characteristics,” “intended to create an atmosphere of terror.” In some cases, it was plainly presented as a terrorist incident.

**Excerpt 44:** The Urumqi 7 • 5 violent criminal incident has following characteristics: First, it has a clear political goal of undermining the unity of the motherland; second, **its means are cruel and have a strong tinge of terrorism.** (Li, 2009)

**Excerpt 45:** From the above analysis, it can be seen that the **"7.5" incident is fully consistent with the typical characteristics of violent terrorism**, both in terms of its political goal, choosing targets to attack, the methods used, and the serious consequences and adverse effects caused it caused. Therefore, **the essence of the incident was a violent terrorist crime.** (Xu, 2009)

**Excerpt 46:** After the 7 • 5 incident, the Chinese government allowed open access for the media to cover the incident and reveal the truth, so that **the true reality of this violent terrorist incident would be known to the world.** (Xin, 2009)

Using the discourse of terrorism to frame the 7.5 incident created an interesting case, in which two parallel descriptions of the incident coexist. On one hand, the common refrain used to characterize the incident was that it was a beating, smashing, looting, burning, severe violent criminal incident. However, when there was a need for analyzing the root causes of the incident and explaining it within larger political and a sociohistorical trajectory of such protests in the region, it was often interpreted within the framework of terrorism discourse. This ambivalence to characterize the Urumqi incident as a terrorist incident is important to note because it indicates the still evolving nature of terrorism discourse in China.

As discussed in earlier sections, the discourse of terrorism was fairly well established at this point. However, it was mainly used to refer to incidents in which a small number of individuals or groups attack state institutions or individuals perceived as representatives of state power. Even though the Baren and Ghulja incidents were retroactively labeled as works of terrorists, the redefinition did not change the original characterization of those incidents, rather the label *terrorists* replaced the description of the participants such as “counter-revolutionaries” or “separatists.” However, when an incident is represented as terrorism, the ideological leanings associated with terrorism are constructed as the motivating factors to explain the violence rather than other factors and immediate causes that may have propelled the actors to resort to violence. The lack of any precedence in China regarding calling such a large-scale incident terrorism may have also contributed to the initial hesitation in discursively constructing of the incident as a terrorist event. However, this consideration of the scale of an incident and the number of participants in determining whether an incident is terrorism would not be a concern in the next stage in the development of the discourse of terrorism, the discourse of the People’s War on Terror, which will be discussed in the following section.

Another important feature attributed to the incident was that it was “directed abroad and carried out at home.” The foreign involvement was constructed as being made up of two components, Uyghur and human rights advocacy groups, which was presented as the public face of the foreign support for the incident, and the Western countries hosting these groups, which was presented as the behind-the-scene players.

**Excerpt 47:** This incident fully exposed that **the "World Uyghur Congress" is a violent terrorist organization.** It fully exposed its hideous reactionary face of false human rights, false democracy, true violence, and true terrorism, cloaked under the so-called "people", "democracy", "nation", "religion." (Shu,2009)

**Excerpt 48:** On one hand, the East Turkistan militant groups have changed their faces one after another; on the other hand, **East Turkistan political organizations led by World Uyghur**

**Congress have gained covert political and international financial and material support.** For China, the biggest threat lies here. (Chen, 2009)

**Excerpt 49:** If there is no **support from some Western countries and organizations**, the East Turkistan separatists are not able to survive, not to mention the launch of terrorist separatist activities. **Rabiya is just a tool created by some Western countries** to achieve their ulterior motives. (Zhai, 2009)

The incident was depicted as being directed by the World Uyghur Congress (WUC), an umbrella organization formed by Uyghurs in diaspora to represent their collective interests. Based in Munich, Germany, the WUC has branches in many Western countries and is funded through the US National Endowment for Democracy, which is a Washington-based non-profit largely funded by US Congress (Luhn, 2015). The WUC calls itself a nonviolent and peaceful group that advocates for the improvement of human rights condition in Xinjiang. However, it was constructed as the main instigator of the 7.5 incident within the official Chinese media and described as claiming to uphold democracy and human rights while in fact practicing violent terrorism. The representation of the WUC as a violent terrorist organization is achieved in two ways. First, it was discursively framed that the violence on July 5<sup>th</sup> was planned and directed by the WUC, thus calling into question the organization's public statements about using peaceful means to reach its goals. Second, the WUC was portrayed as a descendent of two groups which were deemed as terrorist organizations by the Chinese government, hence the new group would also be labeled in the same manner.

The second component of foreign involvement in instigating the 7/5 incident refers to the support that the WUC received from its host nations, namely the US, Germany, Canada, and Japan, in terms of financial support and space to carry out its political activities. Government discourses at the time stated that the leader of the WUC, Rebiya Kadeer, is a tool used by the West to contain China and that without the support of the Western nations, the WUC could not even survive, not to mention stage a violent protest in China. Since the WUC was identified as a

terrorist organization, by association the West was also implicated as sponsoring terrorism against China even though it was not exactly termed in this way. The West's support for the WUC was mainly interpreted within broader international contexts and described in terms of thwarting China's great economic rise.

One of the remarkable continuities in the discourses of Uyghur protests in the different periods we have discussed so far is the important role played by foreign countries, often specifying the West. These foreign hostile countries were described in different terms with different motives in each discursive period. In the revolutionary discourse of class struggle, they were represented as foreign imperialists that wanted to regain their colonial privileges. In the discourse of separatism, they were described as the Western hostile forces that wanted to split China into several smaller countries, Westernize China, and peacefully change it into a liberal democracy. In other words, the West's intent was framed as transforming China's socialist system and reshaping its political system after the West's. In the initial stage of the emergence of terrorism discourse, the West was not implicated as the main adversary in the fight against terrorism, after all the West, particularly the US, was considered the main target of terrorism then. During that early period of terrorism discourse, the main point of contention about the West's role lay in holding a double standard for terrorism and not recognizing that China's crackdown in Xinjiang was also part of the global war on terror. On this point, China was fairly successful when ETIM was designated as a terrorist organization by the US. However, the West was constructed as playing a different role in the discourse following the violence in Urumqi.

**Excerpt 50:** For a long time, **various hostile forces in the world do not want to see a united, stable, prosperous and developed socialist China.** Since the founding of new China, especially since the Reform and Opening-up, China has made great achievements in development, creating a universally recognized "Chinese Miracle." In the current context of the international financial crisis, China's economy still maintained around 8% growth, becoming the world's third largest economy in 2008. (Shu, 2009)

**Excerpt 51:** In recent years, **Western anti-China forces' support for the World Uyghur Congress separatist forces moved from behind the scenes to the front stage.** The instability in China's neighboring countries, frequent terrorist activities, coupled with other complex factors, have become the main external factor in continuous rise of overseas “three forces.” (Zhao, 2010)

The West was constituted as envious of China's spectacular economic growth, especially growing at the rate of 8% in 2009 while the rest of the world was mired in the Great Recession and deeply fearful of the threat posed by China's rise in the existing international order. The fact that the WUC could carry out their political activities in these Western countries was seen as an example of the West's efforts to contain China and undermine China's growing national strength. The main group that was blamed for prior incidents and also recognized as a terrorist organization by the US, ETIM, was largely absent in the discourse. Many experts on the history and politics of the region doubt the reach of overseas based Uyghur organizations in directing any activities inside China. The dichotomous construction of ETIM and the WUC as responsible for different types of incidents in the discourse also suggest that they are understood very differently by the Chinese government. The WUC, operating publicly in global cities like Washington, DC, Munich, Paris, Tokyo and advocating human rights and democracy, is associated with similar public demonstrations in Xinjiang demanding government response on the unfair handling of interethnic conflicts and other grievances. On the other hand, ETIM, a shadowy organization which is believed to operate in tribal regions of Pakistan and does not have a strong public presence like the WUC, was often blamed for small-scale attacks on government targets.

### **Acknowledgement of Underlying Factors That Caused the Incident**

Another characteristic in the discourse that distinguishes it from the previous discourses is that there was some acknowledgement of how the demonstration began and what could be underlying factors that could have contributed to the incident. The removal of two top regional

officials and the Xinjiang Work Conferences that were called to implement major policy initiatives can be observed as signs of the official recognition of the failures of the previous policies and the handling of the overall incident by the regional leaders.

**Excerpt 52:** On July 5th afternoon, more than 300 Uyghur students demonstrated in Urumqi, the capital city of the autonomous region. The police advised them to leave. **The process was peaceful throughout.** After the students were persuaded them to leave, mobs of thugs carried attack tools and suddenly started assaulting, acting recklessly, vandalizing, looting, burning, and killing. (Xu, 2009)

**Excerpt 53:** Accelerate Xinjiang 's economic development: in countering terrorist crimes in Xinjiang, **we must vigorously develop the economy ...if the government's policies cannot effectively improve Xinjiang's economic situation, it may stimulate the nationalist sentiment of ethnic minorities and provide suitable soil for the breeding of terrorism.** Comrade Deng Xiaoping once said: "When implementing regional ethnic autonomy, if we don't do a good job on the economy, then all talk of autonomy is empty. Ethnic minorities want to get some benefits within the regional autonomy; a series of economic problems are not resolved, then we will have troubles." (Zhao, 2010)

It is noted in the above statement that the initial demonstration by college students was peaceful. It also mentions that the police tried to disperse them. However, the subsequent eruption of violence was described as "sudden" and "reckless" and without any reference to the manner in which the previous peaceful demonstration was put down. Realization of the economic frustration felt by many Uyghurs, especially the rural migrant workers living in cities as one the main underlying causes of the incident, was also something that was completely absent in prior discourses.

The economy plays varying roles across shifting discourses. In fact, the revolutionary discourse of class struggle makes one of its strongest claims about the Baren incident on the basis of economic arrangement instituted by the Communist Party, which argues that class exploitation and oppression was abolished by the communist revolution therefore protesting against the system was a counter-revolutionary act. Within the discourse of separatism, economic disparity was not even considered as a contributing factor to the incident at all. It was firmly

constituted as the act of separatists who wanted to split Xinjiang from China, following the examples of former Soviet socialist republics that became independent as a result of the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and around the world. However, in the analysis of the root causes of the 7.5 Urumqi incident, even though international factors featured prominently in the official discourse, the actual policy changes that followed the incident suggest that economic inequality was recognized by the Chinese government as an important cause of the incident. As a result, the traditional carrot and stick policy – more economic incentives and harsher punishment for ethnic protests – was carried out with more rigor and on a larger scale than ever in Xinjiang’s history since 2010.

### **Yarkant July 28th incident in 2014: Discourse of People’s War on Terror**

Framing protests and government responses to them within the discourse of the *People’s War on Terror* was the most significant shift during this period. The new discourse used similar phrases to portray the fight against terrorism as analogous to the Chinese war against Japan during World War II, which required the whole citizenship to be involved. Analogizing this to a war implied that a terrorist incident could be carried out by any number of individuals, not just a small group, thus effectively removing the consideration of the number of participants in determining the nature of such incidents. The discourse of the People’s War on Terror is mainly characterized by the protractedness of this war and the need for the masses to participate in fighting terrorism. The emergence of terrorism as an object of scholarly research and the highlighting of religious extremism as the primary cause of terrorism while deemphasizing other historical and political aspects represent two major discontinuities in discourse from earlier periods.

### **Context**

On July 28<sup>th</sup> 2014, a violent incident took place in the southern town of Yarkand (also called Shache or Yarkent) in Southern Xinjiang. It happened within the backdrop of a series of violent episodes involving Uyghurs that had rocked the nation over the past two years (RFA 2014). According to the information released by the Chinese government, 37 people (35 ethnic Han and 2 ethnic Uyghurs) were killed in an attack and 13 more were injured. The government forces shot dead 57 people whom they described as “terrorists.” It also resulted in the arrest of 215 people (Tianshan, 2014a) who allegedly participated in the protest. The actual cause and details of the incident have been much disputed by overseas Uyghur exile groups (Jacobs, 2014). The government sources claim that a person named Nurmamat Sawut “organized a group of people to watch violent terrorist videos, preached separatism and religious extremism, and formed a violent terrorist gang” (Tianshan, 2014a). The mob then attacked the Elishhu township government and police station. However, the overseas rights groups, citing local witnesses to the incident, claimed that the intensification of the government restrictions on observance of Ramadan and killing of all five members of a family after a dispute over a headscarf led to the initial protest which then turned into a violent clash between the government forces and the protestors.

### **Official Characterization of the Incident**

Even though the actual number of casualties was reported to be much higher in the account of overseas rights groups, even judging from the statistics published by the government it was the largest protest since the July 5th incident in 2009, resulting in the killing and arrests of at least 300 people. The incident was characterized as a severe violent terrorist attack immediately after it took place, marking a clear break from previous discourses. Up to this point in the discourse of terrorism, the scale of the incident was an important factor to consider in

determining its nature. If hundreds of people participated in an incident, it would not be constructed outright as a terrorist attack, instead it would be labeled as a beating, smashing, looting, and burning incident. The discourse of terrorism would then be called upon to explain the underlying causes and motives of the protestors. However, by the time the Yarkant incident took place, there had been a significant shift in the discourse of terrorism. The fight against terrorism was upgraded to the People's War on Terror in May of 2014 (Trevaskes, 2016; Zhang, 2014). The addition of the word *people* is particularly important because it evokes the term *People's War* used by Mao Zedong to describe the Chinese War against Japanese invasion during WWII. It implies the fight against terrorism is not just a social stability issue to be dealt with, but problem that constitutes a national security crisis. While it was mainly the responsibility of the security forces to deal with terrorism in the previous discourse of terrorism, under the new discourse of the People's War on Terror, everyone has to participate in this national war against terrorism in the same way the masses were mobilized to fight against the Japanese aggression 70 years ago. Since national wars are fought between the armies of the different sides of the conflict, the number of those who are identified as terrorists in the discourse of the People's War on Terror could be as many as hundreds or thousands. It is precisely such a construction of terrorism as a people's war that allowed rendering the Yarkant incident as a terrorist attack instead of a riot, mass incident, or rebellion even though no other incidents involving hundreds of people had ever been described as a terrorist attack in the history of People's Republic of China. In that sense, this signals a new discontinuity in the representation of ethnic protests in the official Chinese discourse. The following statements are quite representative of the characteristics of the discourse during this period.

**Excerpt 54:** 2014 is destined to be written into the history of China's fight against terrorism. Faced with the frequent occurrence of violent terrorist activities and the increasingly complex

situation in the fight against terrorism, China's counter-terrorism efforts have intensified with full force and shown iron fists to the terrorists. In particular, **since May this year, China has entered a new stage of comprehensive anti-terrorism campaign** to severely strike down violent terrorist activities across the country, introducing incentives to report information on violent terrorism. (Zhang, 2014)

**Excerpt 55:** From its scale and casualties, **Yarkant incident is considered the largest violent terrorist incident since July 5<sup>th</sup> incident** by observers. (Zhang, 2014)

Because of the Yarkant incident and other violent attacks that took place in Xinjiang and around China, 2014 was described as a special year in China's counterterrorism history.

The Yarkant incident was not only considered the worst violent incident since the July 5<sup>th</sup> riot in Urumqi, it was also marked as the beginning of a new stage of China's war on terror, which further contributed to the consolidation of the discourse of the People's War on Terror. Clearly referencing Mao's anti-Japanese wartime strategy of the People's Protracted War, the discourse constructs the protestors in Yarkant as equivalent to the Japanese occupying forces during World War II. Mao conceived the original strategy to compensate for the Communist Red Army's disadvantages in terms of military personnel and resources. He argued that by protracting the war, depleting the enemy's resources, and focusing on mobilizing the masses, the enemy would eventually be defeated.

In constructing the war on terror in a similar manner to China's anti-Japanese war, the discourse downplays certain characteristics defining the two, while highlighting others. Most importantly, the chief motive for Mao to devise that strategy was the weakness of the Red Army compared to the Japanese. The enemy at the time was much more powerful, better trained and equipped than the Chinese communist soldiers. Immediate confrontation with the enemy would not have been advantageous to Mao's army. Therefore, they had to rely more on guerrilla-style warfare until the enemy was weakened and their supplies were drained, then more direct battles could be waged. However, now the CCP has access to massive security forces and other

resources. There is a complete asymmetrical relationship between the state and those individuals identified as terrorists in terms of strength and resources. Yet despite these vast differences, two aspects – protractedness and the need to mobilize the masses – were constructed as keys linking the current discourse of the People’s War on Terror to Mao’s characterization of the People’s Anti-Japanese War.

### **Protractedness of the People’s War on Terror and the Participation of the Masses**

While the war against Japan was considered protracted because the communist forces did not have the resources to engage in battles, the war on terror is perceived to be protracted because no matter how hard it is fought, it is not possible to defeat the enemy therefore it is necessary to brace for a long-lasting war.

**Excerpt 56:** Both incidents occurred during the severe crackdown on terrorism, which also highlights that **terrorism will not disappear because of our high pressure**. This is the characteristic of terrorism different from other common forms of violent crime. **Combatting terrorism requires us to prepare for a protracted war.** (Zhang, 2014)

The statements articulated on the protractedness of the fight against terrorism suggest that no matter how much pressure the government applies on those identified as terrorists, it is not going to be able to completely root out terrorism due to the unique status and characteristics of terrorism that distinguish it from other common forms of violent crime. While it is not clear whether what is perceived as terrorism is inherently different from other types of violent crime or their differences mainly lie in how they are constructed, these statements seem to imply that it would have been possible to eradicate other crimes when high pressure is applied, a suggestion at best questionable if not unsubstantiated.

Another development in the discourse is the emphasis it places on mobilizing the masses in the fight against terrorism. It also lays out multiple ways the masses can participate in the counterterrorism efforts. They could actively work alongside security forces in hunting down

perceived terrorists; they could provide clues about their whereabouts; they could monitor their neighbors and report any suspicious activities; they could also participate in the ideological battle against terrorism by not consuming and spreading digital content regarded as extremist by the government.

**Excerpt 57:** China's counterterrorism measures are intensive, but the terrorism has become increasingly severe. The root of the problem can be attributed to "elite anti-terrorism model." This model cannot fully meet the practical needs of anti-terrorism. **There is an urgent need to incorporate the power of the public and form the people's anti-terrorism model.** (Gao, 2016)

**Excerpt 58:** Combing through recent arrangements by the Ministry of Public Security, we can easily find that while constantly emphasizing "hitting with heavy blows, striking with ruthless hand, resolutely crushing down the arrogance of the terrorists," it has also been a consistent principle to **widely mobilize the masses, fight people's war on terror**, and advance national anti-terrorism efforts. (Zhang, 2014)

It is suggested that relying exclusively on an "elite anti-terrorism model" which is characterized by heavy use of security forces is not going to be able to achieve victory in the war on terror. It has to be coupled with mobilization of the masses, hence the term *People's War on Terror*. Such mass participation in the antiterrorism campaign was put into action when the Chinese government mobilized tens of thousands of people to capture a group of people who were allegedly plotting to carry out attacks in Hotan and Aksu (Tianshan, 2014b; Tianshan, 2014c). The pictures of the manhunt show thousands of people carrying sticks, searching cornfields, orchards, and people's homes. It was also mentioned that the security forces received dozens of tips from local people about the whereabouts of the people being hunted. Such close participation of the masses was used to construct a narrative that the victory of the People's War on Terror can only be achieved when it is also fought by the people.

### **Emergence of Terrorism as a Field of Academic Research**

This period is also marked by the establishment of terrorism studies in China as a separate field of scholarly research. Even though there have been numerous academic articles

published on terrorism after 2001, many of those articles were polemical in nature and mostly written in the traditions of Chinese historiography and Marxist scholarship, whose primary purpose was to provide legitimacy to CCP rule. However, during this period, the academic articles on terrorism began to be written in a typical research paper format which included literature review, methodology, data collection and analysis, and discussion sections. Terrorism has been increasingly treated as an object of scientific study that could be solved like other scientific challenges if adequate research is conducted to understand its nature, causes, development, and other characteristics.

**Excerpt 59:** Terrorist attacks not only create panic among the Chinese public, but also pose a serious threat to China's national security and have become a serious obstacle to China's modernization and the realization of the great Chinese dream. Therefore, it is of great practical significance to crack down on terrorist activities, **study counter-terrorism strategies and tactics**, and take the initiative in the fight against terrorism. (Zhu, 2016)

**Excerpt 60:** However, **there is no breakthrough progress in many aspects of terrorism research**. China's counter-terrorism research still faces many difficulties. **We have done very little or no research in the following areas:** counter-terrorism intelligence, quantitative analysis, emergency management, public opinion communication, technical means, risk assessment, root cause analysis, cyber terrorism, controlling video and audio materials on violent terrorism, handling tactics, curbing extremism. There is a need for further study in those areas. (Li & Mei, 2015)

Scholarly articles have articulated the need for more research on terrorism by rendering it a serious national security threat and obstacle to realizing the Chinese dream of great national rejuvenation. More research on terrorism has been constructed as key to better understanding counterterrorism strategies and tactics so that the war on terror could be carried out more effectively and victory could be achieved eventually. Reviewing Chinese research on terrorism up to 2014, Li and Mei (2015) state that even though Chinese terrorism research has achieved initial success on the definition and causes of terrorism and the nature of East Turkistan terrorism, many aspects of terrorism remain under-researched or not studied at all. Their classification of the under-researched areas of Chinese terrorism studies assumes terrorism as an

object out there which has only been studied at the surface level and awaits further research so that it could be better understood and dealt with.

The emergence of terrorism as a separate field of scholarly pursuit has had significant implications for the discursive construction of terrorists' goals and the root causes of terrorism compared to when it was primarily discussed within traditional Communist historiography and Chinese Marxist studies. In the previous mode of understanding, the terrorists' main goal was constructed to be separating Xinjiang from China and establishing an independent state called East Turkistan. However, an outright political nature of the violence has been increasingly deemphasized as religious extremism is identified as the main driving force for the violence in the region.

This shift in understanding the motivation of the "terrorists" has resulted in an intriguing incompatibility with those who had been previously identified as foreign hostile forces. In all previous discourses, the West was constructed as the foreign hostile forces, and their goals were constructed differently in each period. In the revolutionary discourse of class struggle, the West was labeled as imperialists bent on regaining their colonial privileges. In the discourse of separatism, the West's goal was constructed as attempting to splinter China, change its socialist system, and turn it into a Western style liberal democracy. In the early period of discourse of terrorism, the West was mainly accused of holding double standards on terrorism and not recognizing the violent incidents in Xinjiang as acts of terrorism. The West's support for Uyghur human rights advocacy groups was viewed as originating out of their attempts to undermine the miraculous rise of China's economic and military power. However, when the motivating factor was attributed to religious extremism, it became inconvenient to associate the West with supporting religious extremism. As a result, even though most incidents that have taken place

during this period are explained through receiving support from overseas hostile forces, those forces are now constructed as nonstate actors operating in countries with predominantly Muslim population, particularly Pakistan. Besides the shift in construction of the foreign hostile forces, other factors also have begun to be considered as the potential underlying causes for the violent incidents in the region.

**Excerpt 61:** The statistical analysis shows that **Engel's coefficient, educational level and increase in the total number of internet users** in Xinjiang have different influence on China's terrorism index. The greatest impact is the spread of the internet coverage and the growth of the total number of Internet users, followed by differences in educational attainment, and finally the Xinjiang residents Engel's coefficient. In preventing and combating terrorist crimes, we need to determine counter-terrorism measures based on the extent of the different causes of terrorism, then we can achieve the ultimate victory in the fight against terrorism. (Adiljan & Gulazat, 2016)

Departing from the more traditional interpretation of the causes of violent incidents in Xinjiang, separatism or seeking independence from China is not even considered as an important factor in understanding the motivation of the more recent protestors. The spread of the internet has been identified as the primary reason for the increase in the violence. Therefore, better online policing was proposed as a more effective method to prevent and combat terrorism. It was argued that economic factors were considered the least impactful because more violence has taken place in recent years even though the average standard of living kept rising in the same period.

## **Conclusion**

The emergence of the discourse of the People's War on Terror represents the latest shift in how protests involving Uyghurs are framed within the official Chinese discourse. Each change in discourse constructs the participants in the protests as less rational and political, and increasingly driven by religious fervor and motivated by hatred and madness. During the first period of revolutionary discourse of class struggle, revolutionary and counterrevolutionary were

considered parallel positions. Likewise, the discourse of separatism represented the protestors as rational individuals who sought a different political arrangement. In both discourses, the protestors' motives were not morally evaluated and their humanity was not called into question. Even the violence that resulted from the protests was considered a strategy used by the protestors to achieve their political goals. However, during the latest discursive development, their humanity and rationality is denied and they are constructed as evil, antihuman, antisocial beings that live outside the bounds of civilization. Even though the four incidents which have been the focus of this chapter are fairly similar to each other in terms how they started, developed, and were handled by the government, they have been represented very differently in the official discourse due to the multitude of domestic and international factors, and their representation worked in the service of the Chinese government's subsequent policies in the region.

The construction of the protests in the region as acts of terrorism driven by religious extremism has worked to obscure the legitimate grievances many Uyghurs feel about a whole host of issues, from labor disputes to environmental concerns, religious and cultural restrictions to official corruption, issues common all throughout China and often handled very differently when they occur in the rest of China. It has also limited the space overseas that Uyghur and human rights advocacy groups could operate within and had a negative impact on the attitude of foreign governments towards the Uyghur issue. Due to the hegemony of the discourse of terrorism, even the few well-established media outlets and scholars who are considered sympathetic to the plight of Uyghurs seem obliged to consider the violent protests as terrorism in order to preserve their legitimacy in wider international contexts under which any acts of violence committed by Muslims is universally condemned as terrorism.

Most importantly, it has given the Chinese government justification for the various policies implemented in the region in the name of fighting the war on terror. The most damaging aspect of such policies is not their harshness alone, even though they are some of the strictest policies towards ethnic minorities ever implemented by the Party in China. What makes these policies particularly dangerous is the level of power abuse and corruption it enables at the local level. Local governments are given enormous power to maintain social stability. They can greatly increase their operations budget using antiterror efforts as an excuse and enrich themselves. They have turned the new political climate of the People's War on Terror into a great opportunity to pocket extra money by detaining local people for minor offences and fining them. For example, for a very long time it was illegal for youth under the age of 18 to enter mosques or engage in any religious activities. But this policy was either irregularly enforced or overlooked by local officials. Now these officials are given more power to deal with such minor issues, they can lock up the offenders at local police stations and ask their family to pay a heavy fine. Because failing to pay the fine can result in their being transferred to prisons as terror suspects, at which point it is nearly impossible to get them out, many families end up paying the heavy fines. In the past, it was not too uncommon for motorists to run away from traffic police if they did not have the right documents with them. However, the People's War on Terror has vastly increased the power of traffic police to shoot such violators as terrorists. In fact, there have been a number of instances in which motorists faced police violence for minor traffic violations and were fatally shot when the situation escalated (RFA, 2016a; RFA, 2014b).

Local officials also have used this climate to increase their power in governing their districts and instituted a range of practices that would have been deemed unthinkable even 10 or 15 years ago. Such policies are considered acceptable or even necessary because of the

ideological work done under the new discursive climate of the People's War on Terror. As a result, the very discursive framework that was developed to understand and manage the ethnic protests in the region has contributed to increased dissatisfaction with the government and further violent reaction in the region. In addition, the discourse of the People's War on Terror, which views any act other than total obedience to the CCP rule as potential terrorism, has eliminated any channels for Uyghurs to express their discontent about various social issues that are commonly available to the vast majority of other ordinary Chinese citizens. Not having any outlet to express their legitimate grievances and frustrations has led many Uyghurs to stage desperate protests to call attention to their plight, which often end in violence and lead to an even harsher crackdown, a vicious cycle that has been going on for a while now.

Finally, the description of the four major incidents shows that except for the Baren incident, the others are more or less spontaneous and quite similar in their development. I believe that although the protestors had a fairly clear idea about the harsh response typically received by large-scale protests, it is probable that in each case they felt their grievances were so legitimate, that their particular situation was unique enough to justify a fair hearing from the government. But when their demands were met with brute force, the protests erupted into a violent clash. We can identify this pattern in each of the four protests and in this sense they are not very different from each other. However, their characterization could not be more different. It suggests that the violent protests are not new to Xinjiang, only their construction as terrorism is new. However, this discursive construction has brought a whole host of associations with serious consequences for the lives of people the discourse speaks of. We can hope that just as the above genealogical analysis has shown the current construction of the protests as terrorism is also not permanent and subject to change even though it seems tremendously powerful at the moment. It is possible to

challenge the discourse and make efforts to change it in a positive direction so that the vicious cycle of violence does not continue to spiral downwards; a more positive outcome is in the best interest of all parties involved.

**Chapter Four**  
**Packaging the War on Terror Discourse to Domestic and International Audiences:  
Divergent Discursive Representations of Violent Incidents in the Chinese and English  
Editions of State Newspapers**

**Introduction**

The previous chapter explored the genealogy of the discourses around violent protests in Xinjiang showing how they have been constructed differently in the official Chinese discourse over the last 35 years. More specifically, it examined the rise of the discourse of terrorism in China and its consolidation as the dominant discursive framework to understand, explain, and respond to the ethnic protests in the region. This chapter will look into specific manifestations of the discourse of terrorism in news coverage of violent incidents involving Uyghurs and discuss how the events are constructed in different ways in the Chinese and English editions of *Global Times*, a state-run newspaper owned by the Chinese Communist Party. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) will be the primary theoretical paradigm to analyze how the state's ideology on ethnic minorities in Xinjiang and the image it wants to present to the outside world guide its divergent representations of violent incidents in order to reach two audiences who are perceived to have different ideological leanings.

CDA is chosen as the main approach for this chapter because it not only provides a set of methodologies drawn from multiple disciplines for text analysis and interpretation, but most importantly, it requires researchers to focus on the role of language in legitimating and reproducing social structures and relationships of domination. It should be noted, however, that CDA is by no means a unified academic discipline (Bloor & Bloor, 2014), and there is no consensus even among its leading proponents regarding understandings of what CDA is and how it should be applied (Featherman, 2013). However, what is agreed upon among CDA scholars is a set of principles that guides their research. These principles include recognition of discourse as

social action and its role in constructing sociopolitical reality, its intricate relationship with ideology, and its emphasis on addressing social problems (Silberstein, 2011). These key characteristics, particularly CDA's focus on pressing social issues, distinguish CDA from other types of linguistic scholarship with a social dimension such as sociolinguistics, pragmatics, and noncritical discourse analysis. This overtly political and activist nature of CDA is also the reason why many critically oriented scholars are drawn to it and use it to study unequal power relations and unjust organization of human society.

### **Different Approaches in CDA**

Being a research orientation rather than an academic discipline with clearly defined boundaries, CDA employs theoretical concepts and methodological frameworks borrowed from multiple disciplines. Foucault's notion of power and knowledge/discourse networks has had a significant influence on CDA scholars' understanding of the relations of power and the role of discourse in constituting culture and society. Gramsci's (1971) concept of hegemony and Althusser's (2006) theory of ideological state apparatuses and interpellation have also expanded CDA scholars' conceptualization of how the prevailing social relations come to be regarded as legitimate and natural and how sometimes the interests of the dominant and powerful are perceived as universal interests even by the marginalized and dominated. Bourdieu calls this state doxa in which ideological effect is the strongest when ideology is provided with the facility of taken-for-granted common sense (Bourdieu & Eagleton, 1992; McKenna, 2004). Frequent references are also made to Habermas's (1984) theory of communicative action when discussing the key role linguistic communication plays in legitimating the relationship between lifeworld and systems of material production and how the lifeworld has been increasingly colonized by those systems (Bloommaert & Bulcaen, 2000).

Depending on varying degrees of emphasis CDA scholars put on these theoretical traditions and specific research methodologies they adopt in their work, there are several major approaches to conducting CDA research. One of the major approaches often cited in CDA scholarship is Fairclough's sociocultural approach or dialectical-relational approach. As can be seen from his major works which outline principles, theoretical underpinnings, and methodological guidelines of CDA, Fairclough has been focused on the role of discourse in social change (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999; Fairclough, 1992; Fairclough, 2006). He has examined the dialectical relationships between discourse and the social and grounded his analysis in various social theories. He is often credited for adapting and operationalizing Halliday's Systemic Functional Linguistics; Foucault's concepts of orders of discourse and power and knowledge; and Bakhtin's concepts of genre, intertextuality and heterogeneity for critically analyzing discourse and exploring the dialectical relationship between discourse and social events and structures in shaping and reshaping each other. Key methodological concepts and tools often used in this approach include transitivity, cohesion, intertextuality, interdiscursivity, genre and stylistic analysis, of which transitivity will prove important to analysis in this chapter for revealing varying degrees of emphasis assigned to different participants of news events in the English and Chinese versions of *Global Times*.

Another approach developed by Ruth Wodak and commonly used by other CDA scholars is the discourse-historical approach or sociohistorical approach as it is sometimes referred to. It has two important dimensions. First, following the main tenets of critical theory, it proposes three levels of critique: text immanent critique, socio-diagnostic critique and prospective critique (Wodak, 2015). While the immanent critique focuses on the apparent inconsistencies and contradictions of the discourse, criticizing it on its own terms, the socio-diagnostic critique

involves analyzing the underlying implications and ideological effects of the discourse and reflecting on the consequences of the discursive events based on various social theories and knowledge of the contexts. The third level of critique, prospective critique, is more oriented towards the future. It involves proposing specific actions that can be taken to address the issues identified in the analysis through the first two types of critique. In other words, it points to a world where the arrangement of social relations is more just and equitable. Of particular significance to analysis in this chapter is text-immanent critique, which enables us to compare English and Chinese versions of *Global Times* reports on the same news events and draw attention to the logical and factual inconsistencies in them, thus revealing the divergent ideological function each version serves on their respective audiences.

Another component of the discourse-historical approach requires going beyond pure linguistic analysis and embedding discursive actions in historical, social, and political contexts, stressing the importance of paying particular attention to the diachronic changes certain discursive actions go through (Reisigl & Wodak 2005). In this approach, context suggests four different levels: immediate text-internal context, intertextual and interdiscursive context, extralinguistic social context, and broader sociopolitical and historical context (Wodak, 2015, p. 93). Researchers are encouraged to take all four context levels into consideration. A framework consisting of five discursive strategies has been proposed for conducting analysis in the discourse-historical approach, including nomination, predication, argumentation, perspectivization, and intensification. In analyzing news discourse in this chapter, focusing on nomination and predication strategies employed in English and Chinese versions of *Global Times* will allow us to examine how the two versions of the same newspaper refer to the same social actors differently and attribute different characteristics to the same participants in news

events, whereas examining the argumentation and perspectivization strategies will be useful in showing how English and Chinese versions of *Global Times* justify and legitimize the Chinese government's handling of the violent incidents in the eyes of domestic and international audiences.

Another influential approach is the sociocognitive approach to CDA developed by van Dijk. He argues that while CDA has rightly focused on the dialectical relationship between discourse and society, in which discourse is constitutive of and constituted by society, the specific ways these two influence each other have not been adequately explained. Since discourse structures and social structures are of a different nature, they shape each other through individuals' mental representations of themselves and their social environment. Their mental models, knowledge, attitudes and ideologies serve to mediate the interaction between discourse and social structures (van Dijk, 2015). The sociocognitive approach suggests that researchers focus on discourse structures beyond the level of the sentence and examine the ideological structures of discourse, including polarization, pronouns, identification, emphasis on positive self-descriptions and negative other-descriptions, activities, norms and values, and interests. The integration of discourse, social structure, and social cognition, which are considered three key components of research within this approach, is emphasized. In other words, analysis of the ideological discourse structures should not merely define them in terms of the relevant theories and describe their relationships with other structures of ideology; but they need to be analyzed in terms of their mental representations and how they function to reproduce domination in their social contexts (van Dijk, 2015).

Even though different approaches to CDA put emphasis on different aspects of discourse analysis and are often associated with different scholars, there is a great deal of overlap among

these approaches. For example, the dialectical-relational approach and sociocognitive approach need to provide adequate background information in order to contextualize their analysis. In this respect embedding discursive actions in historical, sociopolitical contexts is not unique to the sociohistorical approach alone. Perpectivization within the discourse-historical approach that involves positioning speakers' or writers' perspectives and expressing involvement or distance, an important discursive strategy utilized by the English version of *Global Times* to present its coverage as objective and balanced to international audience, is quite similar to the intertextuality analysis proposed in the dialectical-relational approach. Nomination and predication often used in the discourse-historical approach, which refer to discursive construction and qualification of social actors, share many methodological characteristics of polarization between positive ingroup description and negative outgroup description, which is often associated with the sociocognitive approach. Even the proponents of these various approaches acknowledge the inspirations they draw from other approaches and disciplines and advocate methodological hybridity in order to increase analytical robustness. They emphasize that CDA scholars' decision on which approach or approaches to use should be based on the research questions and needs of a particular inquiry. This is exactly the approach I adopt with regards to the specific methodologies used in this chapter and more broadly throughout the dissertation, drawing from multiple traditions and approaches based on the data and needs of the particular analysis, in effect utilizing a hybrid methodology that is meaningful for this work.

### **Critical Analysis of News in CDA**

As shown in the previous chapter, the discourse of terrorism and more recently the People's War on Terror has been firmly established as the dominant discursive framework to interpret Uyghur protests in Xinjiang in government-sanctioned texts. In articulating and

disseminating this construction of the protests, the news media play a very important role. News as a site of ideological construction rather than reflection of reality is widely accepted and is often the focus of CDA research on news discourse (Bednarek & Caple, 2013; Bell, 1991; Fairclough, 1995; Fowler, 1991; Richardson, 2007; van Dijk, 1988). These works not only demonstrate how ideologies, unequal power relations, and interests of the dominant groups are revealed in the news. They also study news as an important site where ideologies and domination are (re)produced and contested. Persuasion, an important function of news discourse (van Dijk, 2006b), is often discussed as the primary means through which reproduction of dominant ideology is achieved, a point also taken up by Stuart Hall (1982) and described as “manufacturing consent.” A variety of linguistic and rhetorical devices is used to convince the target audience and construct consensus.

Besides focusing on the ideological aspect of news discourse, recent scholarship has also begun to pay attention to the constructed nature of news values or what is considered newsworthy, an area often overlooked by previous CDA studies. Bednarek and Caple (2014) argue that, just as with ideology, news values are also construed in and through discourse. Fowler (2013) expresses a similar view towards news values in the revised edition of his book on language in the news. He states that “news is socially constructed. What events are reported is not a reflection of the intrinsic importance of those events, but reveals the operation of a complex and artificial set of criteria for selection” (p. 2). Bednarek and Caple point out that although it is not new within CDA scholarship that news values are highly ideological and not a value-free neutral reflection of reality, it stopped short of conducting detailed linguistic analysis on the discursive construction of news values. They go on to provide a framework that can aid researchers in conducting linguistic analysis of how news values are constructed from the

following eight aspects: eliteness, superlativeness, proximity, negativity, timeliness, personalization, and novelty.

This chapter builds on the prior research on how persuasion is manufactured through news discourse and how news values are discursively constructed using various linguistic devices and explores their manifestation within the Chinese media context.

### **Critical Analysis of News Discourse on China**

Numerous studies on news discourse have been conducted to examine and compare/contrast how different news organizations construct news values and (re)produce ideologies. News organizations most commonly selected as a site of investigation are *The New York Times* (Sahlane, 2013), *CNN* (Chiang, 2010; Kim, 2014), *BBC* (Engelbert & McCurdy, 2011), *Al Jazeera* (Barkho, 2011). With the ascendance of China as a global power, many have also studied how China is represented in the Western media and the different ways opposing nationalist ideologies guide Chinese and Western media in their coverage of issues involving China. Li (2006, 2007, 2010, 2011) has explored how nationalist ideologies are manifested in times of national crises by examining the coverage of the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by NATO in May 1999 and the collision between a US military aircraft and a Chinese fighter jet in April 2001 in *China Daily* and *The New York Times*. Others have focused on the discursive representation of controversial issues in China's relations with the West such as human rights (Alvaro, 2013; Julian, 2011; Yin, 2007), Tibet and the Dalai Lama (Liu, 2012; Wang, 2014), currency exchange rate (Liu, 2014), attitudes rooted in Orientalism towards China (Ban, Sastry & Dutta, 2013), the SARS epidemic (Chiang & Duann, 2007; Joye, 2010), and the 2008 Beijing Olympics (Edwards, 2013; Zhang, 2012). Such scholarship further increases our understanding of the role of language in constituting ideology, particularly in the news, and

contributes to theory building in CDA. As Flowerdew (1999) notes “theory building in CDA is basically by means of case studies. Case study research is cumulative, multiple cases further confirming, developing, or questioning the results of earlier studies” (p. 1094). Case studies can strengthen the rigor of CDA scholarship by demonstrating how the theoretical and methodological frameworks of CDA can be applied to a wide range of topics and contexts. They are also helpful in continuing the theoretical and methodological proliferation and hybridization of CDA by facilitating pollination with other disciplines, providing researchers more tools to further their understanding of our complex social world.

However, the results of the scholarly works that attempt to contrast different ideologies manifested in Western and non-Western (in this case Chinese) media hardly produce surprising results. It is not unexpected that Chinese newspapers, which are owned and operated by the CCP, work to reinforce the official party ideology. The strictly ideological dimension of the work of the Chinese media is openly proclaimed and repeatedly emphasized by the Communist Party of China. Except for Liu’s (2014) study, none of the other studies explores how newspapers working under the same ideological control employ very different discursive features and strategies and even appear to operate under different ideologies while still reinforcing the hegemonic dominance of that very same ideology. Another gap in the CDA scholarship on various discourses on issues relating to China is the apparent lack of attention to the discourse of terrorism, an area that has received broad attention by many CDA scholars (Hodges, 2011; Holland, 2013; Kassimeris & Jackson, 2011; Kellner, 2004; Silberstein, 2002). While violent protests by ethnic minorities in China has been studied from the perspective of area studies, political science, anthropology, and history and sometimes referred to as “terrorism,” the discursive construction of terrorism has not been examined from the lens of critical discourse

studies. This chapter aims to fill these two gaps by examining how Chinese and English versions of the state-owned newspaper produce divergent representations of ethnic protests involving Uyghurs in China and how the construction of those violent incidents as terrorism is achieved using various tools and strategies in news discourse.

### **Data Collection**

For this chapter, I gathered news articles that appeared in Chinese and English editions of *Global Times* related to violent incidents involving Uyghurs. *Global Times* was chosen as the main source of data for this study because it is a subsidiary of the *People's Daily*, the official newspaper of the CCP, thus representing the party's ideology. It also heavily focuses on national security and international issues and events related to China (Lee, 2010), making it an ideal choice for the study of terrorism discourse. The circulation of *Global Times* is not as large as that of the *People's Daily*. However, unlike the *People's Daily*, its subscription is not mandatory for every party organ in China; and "more than half of the copies of *Global Times* are sold to individual readers on newsstands throughout China" (Lee, 2010, p. 265). *Global Times* reaches about 15 million people a day through subscriptions, visits to its website, and social media (Hornby, 2016), which is a remarkable feat for a party organ newspaper and unattainable for the *People's Daily*. The popularity of *Global Times* with average Chinese citizens has created an interesting dynamic where it represents the official CCP ideology but also has wide readership, thus having unique influence on the public discourse in China. Tianshan Net, the official news portal of the Xinjiang regional communist party, is often the sole news source for violent incidents that take place inside Xinjiang. In their initial coverage of those incidents, the Chinese edition of *Global Times* often reprints the news reports released by Tianshan Net verbatim, therefore I also included news reports from Tianshan Net in the data.

The news reports included within the corpus for this chapter span five years from 2012 through 2016. This period was chosen mainly because the discourse of terrorism had been firmly established as the dominant framework to interpret and respond to violent incidents that involve Uyghurs during this period. In addition, after a relative calm that followed the 2009 July 5<sup>th</sup> incident in Urumqi (Collins, 2015), violent incidents in Xinjiang began to occur with higher frequency beginning in 2012, reaching particularly high levels in 2013 and 2014.

A total of 110 news articles that discuss 20 incidents were selected for this study. The main criteria used for the selection of violent incidents is whether these incidents were reported by both the Chinese and English editions of *Global Times*. Even though the number of violent incidents that took place was far higher than this, many small-scale violent incidents were not reported. In some cases, even incidents which caused high casualties and would have normally been reported by the regional government went unreported if they happened around important anniversaries, national holidays, or politically sensitive times such as annual sessions of the CCP Congress and National People's Congress. Even though some of these incidents were reported by Radio Free Asia, a US government-funded news service based in Washington, DC, and corroborated by other news organizations such as *The New York Times*, *The Guardian*, and Reuters, those incidents were not included in the list of events to analyze in this study. The majority of the incidents took place inside Xinjiang, but a few others occurred in other provinces as well, most notably the October 28<sup>th</sup> Tiananmen Car Attack in Beijing in 2013 and the March 1<sup>st</sup> Kunming Railway Station Attack in 2014. For reports on those incidents that took place outside Xinjiang, the main source of news was Xinhua, the Chinese government's official press agency, not Tianshan Net. Therefore, several news reports from Xinhua were substituted for Tianshan Net for those incidents.

The very first news report that appeared on each incident was selected. Based on the content of that article, any additional news reports on the incident were collected if the later articles provide more details that were not present in the previous reports. Articles that did not meet those criteria were not included in the corpus. As a result, 26 news items from Tianshan Net and 29 news items from the Chinese edition of *Global Times* were chosen while 55 news items from the English edition of *Global Times* were included in the corpus. The number of news articles chosen from each of these three sources shows that while Tianshan and the Chinese edition of *Global Times* did not differ much in their coverage of the violent incidents in terms of quantity, the English version differs significantly in quantity and, as we shall see later in the chapter, also in quality.

Table 4.1 Number of News Reports on the Incidents Included in the Chapter

	<b>Incident location and Time</b>	<b>Tianshan Net (or Xinhua)</b>	<b>Global Times Chinese Edition</b>	<b>Global Times English Edition</b>	<b>Total</b>
1	Qarghiliq, February 28, 2012	1	2	4	7
2	Maralbeshi, April 23, 2013	2	2	3	7
3	Pichan, Lukchun, June 26, 2013	2	2	3	7
4	Hotan, Han'ერიq, June 28, 2013	1	1	1	3
5	Qarghiliq, August 20th, 2013	1	1	1	3
6	Beijing, Tiananmen, October 28, 2013	1	3	6	10
7	Maralbeshi, November 16, 2013	1	1	1	3
8	Konasheher, December 15, 2013	1	1	1	3
9	Yarkant, December 30, 2013	1	2	3	6
10	Kunming, Railway Station, March 1, 2014	2	2	10	14
11	Urumqi, Railway Station, April 30th, 2014	1	1	2	4
12	Urumqi, Morning Market, May 22, 2014	1	1	2	4
13	Yarkant, July 28th 2014	3	1	2	6
14	Kashgar, Killing of Imam Jume Tahir, July 30th, 2014	2	1	4	7
15	Bugur, September 21, 2014	2	2	4	8
16	Yarkant, November 30th, 2014	1	1	1	3
17	Kona Sheher, January 12th, 2015	1	1	2	4

18	Shenyang, July 13th, 2015		2	2	4
19	Bai, coal mine, September 18, 2015	1	1	1	3
20	Qaraqash, December 28th 2016	1	1	2	4
Total		26	29	56	111

### Data Analysis

Even though both Chinese and English editions of *Global Times* have the same editor-in-chief, Hu Xijin, and have access to the same news stories prepared by its journalists, the following analysis reveals that they demonstrate remarkable differences in linguistic devices and discursive strategies employed in their news coverage of violent incidents that involve Uyghurs. While the Chinese version of *Global Times* shares many discursive characteristics with Tianshan Net, it differs significantly from its own English version. The ideology of maintaining and reinforcing the legitimacy of CCP rule and its policies emerged in different ways in Chinese and English editions of *Global Times* depending on the perceived expectations of their respective domestic and international audiences. These differences often lead to divergent and even conflicting representations of social protests and violent incidents in Xinjiang.

### Transitivity Analysis in Systemic Functional Linguistics

In Systemic Functional Linguistics, Halliday identifies three metafunctions of language: ideational, interpersonal, and textual. Ideational refers to the representational function of language or how language enables us to make sense of our experiences in the world. The interpersonal function describes the role of language in exchanging information, while the textual function refers to how the ideational and interpersonal functions are implemented through structure and cohesion (Eggins, 2004). Ideational meaning primarily consists of two components: experiential and logical; the former is realized through the use of transitivity while the latter relies on clause complexes. Transitivity, a “fundamental and powerful semantic concept”

(Fowler, 1991, p. 70), has proved particularly enlightening in critical linguistics. It focuses on how different clause structures used by language users can be examined to understand their preferred mental construction of reality and has been employed by many CDA scholars as a useful methodological tool (Li, 2010; Machin & Mayr, 2013; Richardson, 2007; Seo, 2013). Transitivity analysis concerns *who* does *what* to *whom* under what circumstances, describing relationships between participants and the roles they play in the process described in the reporting (Richardson, 2007). In each representation, the text producer has wide-ranging options to choose from in their description of the participants in the process (often realized through noun phrases), the process itself (conveyed through verbs), and the circumstances of the process (usually expressed through adverbial and prepositional phrases). However, choosing a particular transitivity pattern to describe a certain process out of other potential choices indicates that a text producer has suppressed some other possibilities of reporting an event and encoded a certain preferred mental representation of the reality for the readers, thus giving us some insights into the ideological significance of a particular choice.

Three main types of process patterns in transitivity representation are *material*, *mental*, *relational*. Material processes refer to carrying out concrete actions or happening of events in the external world; Relational processes denote the processes of identification and classification; Mental processes indicate the internal experiences of one's feeling and consciousness. Sometimes the framework for transitivity analysis also includes verbal processes which refer to those processes of saying and expressing. The following examples can demonstrate the various transitive patterns in terms of participant/process representation:

<b>Material</b>	Rioters with machetes <b>attacked</b> a local police station in Shanshan county
<b>Relational</b>	The attack <b>is</b> still under investigation
<b>Mental</b>	The nation <b>mourns</b> Kunming victims

**Verbal** Foreign ministry spokesman Qin Gang **said** the government will crack down on terrorist activities

When certain transitivity choices are made even though possibilities of other types of transitivity patterns are allowed in a language, different ideological positions come to be associated with different language variants (Li, 2006). Thus we gain insights into how the writers perceive events through examining what social actors are included or excluded and how certain participants and processes are foregrounded or backgrounded in their reporting. This provides a useful methodological tool to understand how ideologies are constructed and reinforced through language.

### **Transitivity Patterns in the Headlines of *Global Times***

News headlines play several important roles. They convey the main summary of the news and also serve an important rhetorical function of attracting the reader (Bell, 1991, p. 189). Richardson (2007) calls this “a double function: a semantic function regarding the referential text, and a pragmatic function regarding the reader (the receiver) to whom the text is addressed” (p. 197). The semantic function describes what the text is about, while the pragmatic function focuses on how to engage the reader. The summary headlines which serve a semantic function express the abstract of the whole news article and writers’ evaluations of the events from a particular ideological perspective. On the other hand, the headlines that serve a pragmatic function, to attract readers’ attention, often highlight certain aspects of the news article which might appeal to or reinforce their readers’ ideological views, thus making them want to continue reading (Seo, 2013). However, these two functions of headlines are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Headlines can serve semantic and pragmatic functions simultaneously.

News headlines from the two editions of *Global Times* on multiple incidents have been chosen for analysis in this section in order to explore how transitivity patterns in the Chinese and

English editions of *Global Times* news headlines instantiate different discursive strategies and linguistic devices to advance the same ideology of legitimating CCP rule and its policies toward and responses to ethnic tension in Xinjiang. Each pair of examples contains Chinese and English versions of the news articles on the same incident which appeared in the Chinese and English versions of *Global Times*, respectively. The “literal” translation of the Chinese is provided along with the date of the incident. As a critical applied linguist, I acknowledge that literal translation is a nebulous concept and there is no agreement on what constitutes the “literal.” After all, whenever we are translating a piece of text, we are making linguistic choices that are associated with certain ideologies, thus excluding other choices that could have indexed different ideologies. However, since the focus in this section is the transitivity patterns, “literal translation” refers to being loyal to the original sentence structure and the original vocabulary as much as possible.

Table 4.2 Transitivity Patterns in the Headlines of Chinese and English versions of *Global Times*

- 
- 1) 张春贤：新疆形势稳定团结 (3/6/2012)  
(Zhang Chunxian: Xinjiang’s situation is stable and unified)  
No mercy for terrorists: Xinjiang party chief (3/7/2012)
  - 2) 新疆巴楚县发生暴力恐怖案 (4/24/2013)  
(In Xinjiang Bachu County, a violent terror incident happened)  
21 dead in Xinjiang terrorist clash (4/24/2013)
  - 3) 一吉普撞天安门金水桥护栏后起火 车内 3 人死亡 (10/28/2013)  
(A Jeep crashes Tiananmen Jinshui Bridge rails and catches fire, three people inside the car die)  
Three die after vehicle goes into crowd in front of Tiananmen Rostrum (10/28/2013)
  - 4) 北京迅速处置一起吉普车冲撞天安门金水桥事件 (10/28/2013)  
(Beijing swiftly handled a Jeep crashing into Tiananmen Jinshui Qiao incident)  
5 dead, 38 injured after car crash at Tiananmen (10/28/2013)
  - 5) 新疆巴楚县果断处置一起暴力恐怖袭击案件 (11/16/2013)  
(Xinjiang Bachu county resolutely handled a violent terrorist attack incident)  
Xinjiang police attack under investigation (11/18/2013)

- 6) 新疆喀什打掉一暴恐团伙 14 名暴徒被击毙 (12/17/2013)  
(Xinjiang Kashgar wiped out a violent terrorist gang, 14 thugs were killed)  
Six held after Xinjiang attack (12/17/2013)
- 7) 新疆处置一起暴恐袭击案件 击毙 8 人抓获 1 人 (12/30/2013)  
(Xinjiang handled a violent terrorist attack, killed 8 and captured 1)  
8 terrorists killed in Xinjiang attack (12/30/2013)
- 8) 习近平就乌鲁木齐火车南站爆炸案作出重要指示 (5/1/2014)  
(Xi Jinping gave important directives on the Urumqi Railway Station explosion)  
Three dead, 79 injured in Xinjiang railway station terrorist attack (5/1/2014)
- 9) 乌鲁木齐发生严重暴力恐怖案件 造成 31 人死亡 (5/22/2014)  
(In Urumqi, a severe violent terrorist incident happened, resulted in the death of 31)  
31 dead, 90-plus injured in Urumqi market explosions (5/22/2014)
- 10) 警方披露新疆轮台县严重暴力恐怖袭击案情况 (9/22/2014)  
(Police announced Xinjiang Luntai County severe violent terrorist attack situation)  
40 rioters dead in Luntai county violence in Xinjiang (9/25/2014)
- 11) 新疆莎车县果断处置一起暴恐袭击案 (11/29/2014)  
(Xinjiang Shache County resolutely handled a violent terrorist attack)  
15 killed, 14 injured in Xinjiang terrorist attack (11/29/2014)
- 12) 新疆疏勒县成功处置一起暴恐袭击案件 (1/12/2015)  
(Xinjiang Shule County successfully handled a violent terrorist attack incident)  
Six attackers killed by police in Xinjiang (1/13/2015)
- 13) 墨玉县及时处置一起暴恐袭击案件 (12/28/2016)  
(Moyu County promptly handled a violent terrorist attack incident)  
Two dead in Wednesday's terrorist attack in Xinjiang: police (12/29/2016)

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The dominant process type appearing in the Chinese version of *Global Times* news headlines is that Actors representing the Chinese government, such as local county governments, officials and the police are participating in the Material process of doing something. The government is represented as taking an active role in handling terrorist attacks, thus constructing an image of the government, and by extension the CCP, as powerful and in control. The Party is portrayed as working hard to maintain stability and protect the Chinese people. As Headlines 4,

5, 10, 12 show, the local branches of the Chinese government are represented as Actors that “handled a violent terrorist attack” (Headlines 4, 5, 7, 11, 12, 13) or “wiped out a violent terrorist gang” (Headline 6). The participants in the headlines of the Chinese version not only highlight the active role of the Chinese government, but also positively evaluate their actions through words such as ““迅速 *swiftly*” (Headline 4), 果断 *resolutely*” (Headlines 5, 11), “成功 *successfully*” (Headline 12), “及时 *promptly*” (Headline 13), which also construct the government as very competent and sparing no effort in safeguarding the security of its citizens.

The second most commonly used process type in the headlines in the Chinese version of *Global Times* is the Verbal process. This suggests that besides foregrounding the government as Actor in the Material process, the government is also constructed as Sayer in dealing with violent incidents in Xinjiang. The Sayer function is mainly focused on informing the public about the incidents or telling them that the situation is under control, which further reinforces the ideological construction of the government as *fully-in-charge* and *in-the-know* of what has happened. Headline 1 presents Zhang Chunxian, the Party Secretary of Xinjiang, emphasizing that the security situation in the region is “stable” and ethnic groups are “unified” and there is no need for concern. The Sayer role in Headline 7 is attributed to Chinese president Xi Jinping, highlighting his role in giving “important directives on the Urumqi Railway Station Explosion” and his personal involvement in handling the incident. This way of representing emphasizes the role of national and regional leaders as active Sayers of the verbal processes in the discourse of the event and suggests their commitment to guaranteeing security for the Chinese people, thus functioning to reinforce the legitimacy of their leadership position. However, as demonstrated in Headline 1, the Sayer role in the English version of *Global Times* mainly works to show that as in other Western countries, the threat of terrorism China faces is so severe that the leaders are

compelled to be resolute in their attitude and pledge to show “no mercy for terrorists.” Such a Sayer role expresses that China is also a victim of international terrorism and its leaders are resolved to punish the perpetrators and eradicate terrorism in China. Note that the remarks about the situation in the region being “stable and unified” is absent in the English version, presumably because such a construction would undermine the dominant representation of China as facing serious terrorism threats. It is the representation of China to a foreign audience as a nation plagued by terrorism which helps legitimate the extraordinary security responses and special policies implemented towards Uyghurs in Xinjiang. In contrast, representing the situation as stable, discursively reassures a populace of the competence of its government.

Another interesting pattern that emerges from the headlines is that, regardless of the scale and severity of various incidents, the Chinese headlines only convey the government’s decisiveness in handling a terrorist attack in a particular town without giving any additional information about the attack. This seems to suggest that if the death toll or casualties are emphasized, it would weaken the government’s image as a powerful protector who ensures safety and social stability for its people in return for accepting the legitimacy of one-party rule. Playing down the number of participants in a particular incident or the casualties that resulted from it also serves to portray the Party as engaged in effective governance of the minorities in the frontier region, making it safe for settlement by the Han majority. The frequent use of transitivity patterns of active constructions significantly highlights the agentive role of the Chinese government as Actor and Sayer in the process of resolutely dealing with violent incidents and projects the government as a powerful and competent entity capable of guaranteeing security for its domestic audience.

The use of Material and Verbal processes in the headlines in the Chinese version are in sharp contrast to the high frequency of Relational process in the English version of *Global Times*, something almost nonexistent in the Chinese version. The most common pattern in the English version of *Global Times* headlines is the relational: “21 dead in Xinjiang terrorist clash” (Headline 2), “40 rioters dead in Luntai county violence in Xinjiang” (Headline 10), or “31 dead, 90-plus injured in Urumqi market explosions” (Headline 9). The Relational process highlights the number of casualties that resulted from the incidents, which serves to construct China as a nation under the threat of terrorism, thus deserving the sympathy of its international audience. Such a construction not only invites an international audience to recognize the incidents as acts of terrorism and condemn them, but it also makes it their moral obligation to support China’s policies towards ethnic minorities and its counterterrorism efforts in Xinjiang.

Even though Material processes are also frequently used in the headlines of the English *Global Times*, the Actors and the Goals of the Material process are often presented in a reversed order. In other words, participants in the process are represented in passive structures such as “Six held after Xinjiang attack” (Headline 6), “8 terrorists killed in Xinjiang attack” (Headline 7), “15 killed, 14 injured in Xinjiang terrorist attack” (Headline 10), “six attackers killed by police in Xinjiang” (Headline 11). By presenting the targets of the Material process in the subject position, thus featuring them more prominently, the transitivity choices highlight the attackers’ role in causing the incidents and their own responsibility for the ultimate result of their actions, their death. It also draws the international audience’s attention to the activities of the protestors, assigning more importance to what they did that led to the violent clashes. Such passive structures also deemphasize the agentive role that the government played in the incident and forestalls the personalization of the institution as partially responsible for the conflict and

casualties that resulted from it (Fairclough, 2001). Transforming the process involved from active to passive also acts to background the shooting of the protestors by the police. As done in almost every headline in the Chinese version, an alternative representation could have foregrounded the actions of the government and stated that “the authorities resolutely handled the situation and shot all the attackers on the spot.” However, such a construction could suggest extrajudiciality of killing its own citizens without due process, a politically uncomfortable fact before an international audience. The use of the passive structure thus works to distance the government’s role in causing the casualties, thus constructing itself as a “victim” of terrorism who merely responded to actions of the Other.

Besides these general transitivity patterns demonstrated in the headlines of the Chinese and English versions of *Global Times*, there are some other characteristics observed that further reinforce the dominant ideology of constructing the Party as resolute in handling violent incidents to the domestic audience and presenting China as a victim of terrorism to the international audience.

When the attackers are represented as Actors in the Material process as in the headline about the car crash in Tiananmen, the headline in the Chinese version describes the Goal of the Actor or the target of the vehicle as “the rails” [fence] (Headline 3), which serves to minimize the damage to the Party’s image as *strong and powerful* in not being able to prevent an attack in Tiananmen, a political symbol of the Chinese state and a popular tourist spot in China. However, the English version emphasizes “crowd in front of Tiananmen Rostrum” (Headline 3) as the target of the attack, invoking sympathy of the international audience for those injured and killed in the crash and reinforcing the representation of China as a victim of terrorism. These varying transitivity patterns in the headlines of the Chinese and English versions of *Global Times* help us

to illuminate differences in how these two editions of the same news organization foreground/background, highlight/deemphasize, and evaluate different events, actions, and their participants to domestic and international audiences in order to construct the legitimacy of the Party's actions in the eyes of the respective groups.

### **Voice and Evaluative Power of Quotations**

The transitivity patterns in the news content also demonstrate a similar discursive strategy of foregrounding the government's actions in the Chinese edition and highlighting the protestors' in the English. Another noteworthy difference in the characteristics of discursive strategies used in the two editions of *Global Times* is how voices are represented in the news texts. Scollon (1998) points out four different types of voicing in news discourse: direct voicing, indirect voicing, direct voicing of the bylined author, and ambiguous voicing (p. 228). Ambiguity of voices is also noted by Bell (1991) as merging the writer's discourse with what others have said and making the statements mixed to the extent that it is difficult to distinguish what comes from the sources and what is the writer's own. Even though using direct quotations is the most evident form of representing external voices in news texts, both direct and indirect quotations play very important ideological roles. The ideological significance of quotations derives from readers' perceptions of quotations "as 'impartial' reproduction of the message of the cited sources or 'objective' transmission of facts in the words of referenced sources" (Chen, 2009, p. 208) even though writers' use of quotations is a discursive strategy carefully selected to project certain preferred interpretations and legitimate particular viewpoints.

Quotation patterns also indicate "whom the journalist finds a relevant and trustworthy source of information" (Pietikäinen, 2003, p. 591) and how text-producers relate to the views expressed in the quotations. On one hand, valuing the voices of people in power and their

opinions and analysis of particular events reinforces the dominant ideology and reproduces unequal relations of power. On the other hand, not including the voices of people whose lives are directly impacted by news events further disempowers them, decreasing their status and marginalizing their participation in the public discourse (Flowerdew et al, 2002; Van Dijk, 1995). Because of the ideological significance of voices in news discourse, many CDA scholars have studied the representation of voices: what ideological functions different types of representations serve and what effects they produce on the audience perception of the news (Chen, 2009; Jullian, 2011; Li, 2009; Scollon, 1997, 1998; Teo, 2009).

Studies have shown numerous functions quotations serve in news discourse: giving credibility to the reporting, making the news story more engaging, presenting objectivity through presenting different sides involved in the news events, distancing the text producer from the views expressed in the quotes, etc. Scollon (1998) also associates the role of direct quotation with the reporters' concern for delegating significance to the greatest degree possible to those deemed powerful, thus having high news value. He also observes that direct quotations can help news reporters achieve complete distance from what is reported, presenting the news texts as objective and free from the journalists' biases. Sinclair (as cited in Jullian, 2011) defines this as the attribution function of quotations, which signals someone else as the agent of the quote in contrast to the averral function of quotations, which points to the writer as the originator of a particular statement. Through attribution, the writer is able to express the ideological stance they want to convey through using heavily evaluative quotations without being responsible for those views.

The Chinese and English versions of *Global Times* make substantial use of both averral and attribution functions of quotations in their coverage of violent incidents involving Uyghurs.

The Chinese version mainly targets the domestic audience; its role as the CCP's mouth-piece and tool to manage national discourse is widely understood in China. Therefore, the voice adopted by the Chinese version in reporting violent incidents related to Uyghurs is often authorial in the sense that the author is the government and the journalist is merely being delegated with the responsibility to produce the news report on behalf of the government. The journalist's voice is backgrounded and inextricably meshed with the government's voice. Such mingling of the journalist's stance with the official voice is particularly notable in reports on incidents that take place inside Xinjiang. The only exception to this general rule observed in the corpus seems to be the reports in the Chinese version on the incidents that have taken place in other parts of China, in which case distinct representations of the journalist and government voices are more evident. Even though the reports in the Chinese version provide bylines of the authors just like the English version does, thus attributing the news reports to particular individuals, as Scollon (1997) notes its main purpose appears to be placing responsibility on an individual writer, if necessary guilt, rather than crediting journalists for their contribution to composing the news story. Through highlighting the institutional power of the state in the news discourse and backgrounding the journalists' voices, the Chinese version reinforces the government's position as the principal authoritative voice on major social events and presents an image of the Chinese government being in control of the situation. Moreover, it represents the government as actively handling the incidents and informing the public of the actions taken to guarantee social stability.

This is in sharp contrast with the quotation patterns used in the English version of *Global Times*. Targeting an international audience, particularly Western readers who prize media independence, the English version foregrounds the voices of individual journalists and participants of news events in its reporting through frequent use of various quotation modes that

maximize the persuasive effects of its news stories. Highlighting the role of reporters as observers in producing the news stories and distancing them from the description of the events, thus suggesting impartiality in the report, seems to be the most striking feature of the quotation patterns in the English version. *Global Times* constructs its news reports as reliable and objective accounts of the violent incidents through the discursive strategy of quotations. The process of quotation gives the impression of journalists as merely transmitting information from the referenced sources even though selection and recontextualization of quotes is highly ideological due to the role journalists (and by extension the editorial board that supervises them) play in giving or denying access to various social actors and foregrounding or backgrounding the various voices represented in news stories.

Even though the number of Chinese language and English language news articles each make up half of the total of 111 articles in the corpus, the number of sources attributed in each edition are vastly different. The Chinese version makes reference to 84 sources while the English version quotes 181 sources (see Appendix B). The quotation patterns that emerged in the quantitative data show that the English version references external sources much more frequently than the Chinese version, particularly on incidents that took place inside Xinjiang. The quotation patterns in the news reports on incidents that happened in China's interior provinces demonstrate more similarities between the Chinese and English editions. The only incident whose coverage deployed more external voices in the Chinese edition than the English edition is the Kunming Railway Station attack. Twenty-four sources of government officials, witnesses and the international community were cited in the Chinese version on the Kunming incident, which comprise almost a third of the total number of sources quoted in the reports collected from the Chinese version of *Global Times* in the corpus. Also the only references made to overseas

Uyghur human rights advocacy groups such as the World Uyghur Congress (WUC) in the Chinese version appear in the reports on an incident in Shenyang city on July 13<sup>th</sup> 2015, whereas the WUC is referenced in reports on multiple incidents that happened both inside and outside Xinjiang in the English version. Similarities in quotation patterns between Chinese and English versions of the incidents taking place outside Xinjiang suggest that the stark differences in the representations of different voices in news articles on incidents that took place inside Xinjiang are not mere coincidences or results of different journalistic traditions in English and Chinese, but instead they are strategic discursive choices with ideological significance. On one hand, it indicates a higher level of government accountability and stronger presence of the voices of ordinary people in public discourse in those interior provinces, attributing high news values to the voices of both government officials and ordinary people. On the other hand, the dominance of the government’s voice on incidents inside Xinjiang in the Chinese version suggests less government accountability and more restriction on voicing individual views in the minority region. It also emphasizes the government’s agentive role in handling the violent incidents and ensuring social stability, more importantly reinforcing the government’s position as powerful and capable of countering any challenge to its rule.

Table 4.3 The number of quotations in Chinese and English versions of *Global Times*

	Official	Expert	Witnesses	Overseas Uyghur Human Rights Advocacy Groups	International	total
Chinese version	39	7	18	2	18	84
English version	99	30	37	5	10	181

As Table 4.3 shows, the number of quotations attributed to the Chinese government at the national, regional, and local levels in the English version of *Global Times* is almost three times more than the number of quotations representing the voice of the government in the Chinese version. While the Chinese version tends to merge the journalistic voice with the government's voice and makes little distinction between the two, particularly in news reports on the incidents which took place in Xinjiang, the news reports in the English version demonstrate a very clear distance between the voices of text producers and the government and attributes each statement on the details of particular incidents to a source other than the journalists, often the government.

Table 4.4 shows three pairs of excerpts from news stories on the same incidents which can illustrate the patterns of voicing and quotations in the Chinese and English editions.

Table 4.4 Comparison of quotation patterns in the Chinese and English versions

- 
- 1) 9名暴徒持砍刀袭击新疆喀什地区莎车县公安局，投掷爆炸装置，纵火焚烧警车。公安民警果断处置，击毙8人，抓获1人。[Chinese version, 12/30/2013]  
(9 terrorists wielding machetes attacked Xinjiang Kashgar prefecture Shache county police station, threw explosives, and burned police cars. Security forces resolutely handled, shot dead 8 people and captured one.)

Eight terrorists were shot dead and another one captured by police during a terrorist attack early Monday morning in Northwest China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, **authorities said**. [English version, 12/30/2013]

- 2) 4月30日下午7时许，在新疆乌鲁木齐市火车南站站外发生一起爆炸案件，截至发稿时已造成3人死亡、79人受伤，其中重伤4人。[Chinese version, 4/30/2014]  
(April 30 at 7 pm, an explosion occurred outside the South Railway Station in Urumqi. As of the time press release, it has caused three deaths, 79 were injured, including four seriously injured.)

A blast occurred at a railway station in Urumqi, capital of Northwest China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region on Wednesday evening. The explosion happened around 7 pm at the exit of the Urumqi south railway station. The blast was centered around some luggage left on the ground between the station exit and a public bus stop, **witnesses told Xinhua**. The blast was powerful. **A man at a nearby hotel said** he thought it was an earthquake. [English version, 4/30/2014]

- 3) 沈阳市警方 13 日下午在拘捕新疆籍涉恐嫌疑人时，对蒙面持刀拒捕的 4 名暴徒采取果断行动，击毙 3 人，击伤 1 人。[Chinese version, 7/18/2015]  
(When arresting terrorism suspects from Xinjiang on the 13<sup>th</sup> afternoon, Shenyang City police faced resistance of masked knife-wielding thugs, took decisive action, shot dead three people, injuring one)

**Authorities in Northeast China's Shenyang on July 13 announced that** police shot dead three terrorists and wounded one who waved knives to resist arrest on the same day, and the suspects were from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. [English version, 7/18/2015]

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These excerpts are representative of how the Chinese and English versions of *Global Times* report on violent incidents involving Uyghurs. The Chinese version states the details of the incidents as a matter of fact without attributing the information to a particular source. Since the government is the only source of information on such matters and there is no attribution to indicate the source, it is presumed that the government is conveying the message directly to the public. However, the English version uses phrases such as “authorities said”, “witnesses told Xinhua”, “authorities in Northeast China's Shenyang on July 13 announced,” detaching the text producers from the voice of the government, thus indicating a degree of independence.

Achieving persuasive effects among international readers seems to be a key consideration for the English version of *Global Times* in its strategic use of quotations, which aims to discursively construct an image of the *Global Times* as an impartial observer and objective evaluator of the ethnic conflicts in Xinjiang. This strategy is most evident when *Global Times*, itself an arm of Chinese state media, describes reports on other Chinese media outlets as “state media” when it reports on an incident that took place in Bay County on September 18 2015. On November 23, 2015, *Global Times* published a news story headlined “State media offers in-depth coverage of anti-terrorism action in Xinjiang.” The following is the first paragraph of the article:

**Chinese State media** have recently run detailed reports on anti-terrorism achievements, especially in West China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. **Experts** believe that this

proactive and transparent step can help gain public support for and provide solid evidence of the government's response to terrorism, as the nation vows to contribute to global anti-terrorism efforts. [English version, 11/23/2015]

By referring to the reports of the incident in the Chinese language as “state media,” the *Global Times* distances itself from the Chinese state and presents the story as the work of independent journalism which transmitted the government’s statement and experts’ views on the announcement. Evaluating the government statement through the external voice of outside experts, it further builds the appearance of objectivity, thus potentially increasing its credibility and trustworthiness. It is not the goal of this analysis to show how effective such techniques prove. Importantly, the report uses an external voice to evaluate the government’s announcement as a “proactive and transparent step,” even though it was the first government report on an incident that happened two months earlier on September 18, 2015.

### **Expert Opinion as a Discursive Strategy of Evaluation**

Quotations from external sources affiliated with research institutes and think tanks are used much more frequently in the English edition than the Chinese. Experts are cited for their views on the violent incidents 30 times in the English version of *Global Times* whereas their voices are represented only 7 times in the Chinese version (see Table 4.3). Evaluations of the news participants are carried out very differently in the Chinese and English editions as well. While addressing the domestic audience, evaluations of the news events and their participants are not commonly made through the voice of experts who are perceived to be independent and knowledgeable on the issues. Instead, the government’s voice is dominant in positively evaluating the heroic actions of the security forces and condemning the actions of those deemed terrorists by the government. For example, on reporting the killing of the Imam of the biggest mosque in Xinjiang, the Chinese version directly evaluates the Imam as “著名爱国宗教人士” (a

well-known patriotic religious figure), “德高望重” (highly respectable) and his death as “令人发指” (a heinous crime). However, in the English edition, it was reported through the voice of a government agency in charge of religious affairs:

**The State Administration for Religious Affairs said in a statement** on Friday that it was "deeply shocked" by the murder and described Jume Tahir's death as a "huge loss" for the country's Islamic circle. **It described** Jume Tahir as a **knowledgeable and respected religious leader as well as a friend of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)** who supported the CCP's leadership and helped the Party and the government implement its policies of religious freedom and guide Muslims to carry out religious activities within the scope of law. [*Global Times*, July 30<sup>th</sup>, 2014]

The evaluative statements in this excerpt are all expressed through the voice of the State Administration of Religious Affairs, thus allowing *Global Times* to detach itself from the evaluation of the news event. The external voice positively evaluated Imam Jume Tahir as “a knowledgeable and respected religious leader,” “a friend of the Communist Party of China,” “a supporter of the CCP’s religious policies” and negatively evaluated his killing as a “huge loss,” “inhuman and outrageous.” The projection of *Global Times* as holding an impartial and objective attitude towards news events is further supported by frequent use of external expert voices. Experts are often mentioned along with the names of the institutions they are affiliated with, another discursive strategy with highly ideological significance.

Table 4.5 Representation of expert voice in the English version

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- 1) **Zhu Feng, a professor at the School of International Studies of Peking University**, told the *Global Times* that if the attackers had been masterminded by a separatist group, it would be a very serious incident. [English version, 2/29/2012]
  - 2) **Li Wei, an expert on anti-terrorism with the Chinese Institutes of Contemporary International Relations**, told the *Global Times* that with police reinforcing their strength in southern Xinjiang, terrorists sought to launch attacks in areas with relatively weak anti-terrorism measures. [English version, 6/27/2013]
  - 3) **Pan Zhiping, a research fellow with the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences**, told the *Global Times* that the attack was a bid by terrorists to show that they are "willing to

do anything anywhere" by starting chaos and panic in "peaceful" eastern Xinjiang, and exhibited the logic of "jihad." [English version, 6/26/2013]

- 4) **Li Guoqiang, deputy director of the Center for Chinese Borderland History and Geography at Chinese Academy of Social Sciences**, told the *Global Times* that the series of attacks have proved the necessity of establishing a State Security Committee. [English version, 11/18/2013]
  - 5) **Yang Shu, director of Institute for Central Asian Studies at Lanzhou University**, noted this is not the first time terrorists have targeted cities outside Xinjiang. [English version, 3/2/2014]
  - 6) **Wang Ping, a professor of ethnic minority studies at Xinjiang Normal University**, said all attempts to sabotage peace and orchestrate terrorist violence must be severely condemned. [English version, 5/1/2014]
  - 7) **Turgunjan Tursun, an expert on Xinjiang studies with the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences**, told the *Global Times* that the latest incident shows that these extremists have lost all reason. [English version, 7/30/2014]
  - 8) **La Disheng, a professor at the Party School of the Communist Party of China's Xinjiang Regional Party Committee**, told the *Global Times* that the extremists were trying to intimidate people, warning them that whoever who opposed their belief system would be in danger. [English version, 7/30/2014]
  - 9) Ordinary people will be able to understand the necessity of the government's anti-terrorism policy after learning from these reports that the government faces severe challenges in safeguarding the stability of Xinjiang, **Zhang Zhian, vice president of the School of Communication and Design at Guangzhou-based Sun Yat-sen University**, told the *Global Times*. [English version, 11/23/2015]
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As can be seen in the excerpts above, the voice of experts is used for different rhetorical functions. Some are quoted to give historical and geographical contexts to the violent incidents. Others are used to positively evaluate existing security measures or justify new policies, while still others serve to negatively evaluate and condemn the acts of those deemed terrorists. Using the voice of experts in the English version for these purposes instead of the direct government voice as is the norm in the Chinese version is important for several reasons. First, description of their titles such as “professor” (Headlines 1, 6, 8), “research fellow” (Headline 3), “expert”

(Headlines 2, 7), “director” (Headlines 4, 5) and the names of institutions they are affiliated with connotes their expertise and knowledge on the history and politics of ethnic minorities and border regions, international relations, and counterterrorism studies, giving a high level of credibility to their voice. Also the use of Western reporting conventions associates the coverage and the experts with Western norms of academic freedom invoking a perception of similar scholarly independence of these experts, thus assigning an air of objectivity to their opinions. It also works to deemphasize these universities and research institutes as part of the Chinese government and presents these organizations as autonomous scholarly units. Citing these experts also constructs an image of *Global Times* as providing multiple perspectives on the incident and balancing the views of different sides, thus being more credible and trustworthy. The more forceful representation of the government’s voice in the Chinese version in contrast to the expert voice in the English version further demonstrates that while both versions share and operate under the same ideology of manufacturing legitimacy for the CCP’s rule, due to the audience expectations, they emphasize different styles in their news reports. The Chinese version is more evident in its role as directly representing the voice of the government and constructs the image of government as powerful and in control of the situation, whereas the English version is more concerned with achieving the persuasive effects of the news on an audience over whom the CCP does not have direct control. Therefore, the English version puts more emphasis on constructing an image of balanced and objective reporting that takes multiple perspectives into consideration.

The function of Chinese expert voice in presenting objectivity and credibility is further underscored in its calls for the Western media to be more objective in their reporting of violent incidents in Xinjiang. Since China joined the bandwagon of the Global War on Terror doctrine promoted by the Bush administration following the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks, China has had mixed

success in gaining the West's recognition that it also faces the threat of terrorism by Uyghurs. On one hand, China was successful in getting the US government to include several groups based in Pakistan on its list of terrorist organizations. On the other hand, it has not been successful in achieving the US government and Western media's complete recognition of all incidents that take place in Xinjiang as terrorist attacks. This has frequently been a point of contention in the Chinese media. However, this frustration has been expressed very differently in the Chinese and English versions. While the Chinese version states its criticism of the Western media directly in the voice of the government, the English version often states that through expert voices.

Table 4.6 Divergent attribution of criticism of bias in Western media

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- 1) 这场在新疆展开的反恐维稳斗争也同时成为舆论战场的斗争，一些西方媒体歪曲和指责中国对暴恐势力的打击，境外“疆独”组织也借西方媒体频频发声，妄图影响新疆的稳定。[Chinese version, 7/3/2013]  
(This struggle against terrorism in Xinjiang has also become a battle of public opinion. Some Western media distort and criticize China's fight against the violent terrorist forces. Overseas "Xinjiang independence" organizations also frequently use the Western media to make statements and attempt to influence Xinjiang's stability.)
  - 2) 对于案件的恐怖主义性质，西方媒体依然集体“失声”，并继续在中国民族矛盾上大肆渲染。[Chinese version, 12/17/2013]  
(On the nature of the incident as terrorism, the Western media are still collectively silent and continue to exaggerate greatly the ethnic conflicts in China.)
  - 3) 然而西方掌握的媒体机构并不因此感到厌烦，造谣成性的世维会几乎成了它们遇事必引的“信息源”，而且它们通过对信息的编辑、排列，制造出世维会等说法听上去“更加可信”的语境。这些西方媒体摆出一副“客观”的姿态，实则无时不在对公众进行反华的舆论引导。[Chinese version, 7/18/2015]  
(However, Western-controlled media do not feel sick of this. The rumor-mongering of the World Uyghur Congress has almost become a must-quote source of information. But through their editorial arrangement, they construct a context that presents the argument of the World Uyghur Congress as "even more credible." These Western media put on an "objective" attitude, but in fact they guide anti-China public opinion.)
  - 4) "However, the West has been holding double standards in the definition of terrorism. If the East Turkestan separatists carry out evil deeds in Xinjiang, some Western opinions whitewash them as seeking 'national self-determination.' Only when their acts threaten

their domestic security would Western countries change their attitudes," Pan said. [English version, 4/25/2015]

- 5) Meanwhile, the US Embassy to China posted on its Sina Weibo account Thursday that it wished to send sincere condolences to all people affected by the "violent attacks" in Urumqi, refraining from using the term "terrorism." The post received over 16,000 comments, most questioning its "double standard" on defining terrorism. [English version, 5/23/2015]
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In the Chinese edition, as discussed above, the condemnation of the Western media for holding a double standard on terrorism is represented directly through the voice of the newspaper's editorial board which is inextricably linked with the voice of the Chinese government. Excerpts 1, 2, and 3 state that the Western media are not calling the violent incidents in Xinjiang terrorist attacks and accuse them of holding a double standard. It also criticizes the Western media for giving space to the voice of overseas Uyghur human rights groups in their media coverage, which is described as pretending to appear objective on the surface with the real motive of promoting anti-China public opinion through negative reports on China's ethnic policies. Such direct rebuke of the West to the domestic audience presents the Chinese government as powerful and standing up to foreign hostile forces in safeguarding national interests. However, as Excerpts 4 and 5 show, the English version attributes such criticism of the West to the voices of experts and the broad Chinese public. Pan's quote, an external expert voice, argues that the reason violent incidents in Xinjiang are not represented as terrorist attacks in Western media is because Western opinions consider such acts as pursuing national self-determination; it is not labeled terrorism when their own security is not threatened by such acts. The English version also uses the voice of online bloggers who commented on the statement by the US embassy in Beijing to criticize the US government for not including the word "terrorism" in designating the nature of the market attack in Urumqi. Such a discursive

strategy functions to construct the English version of *Global Times* not as a media arm of the Chinese government, but as an independent and trustworthy media organization that does objective reports through representing the voices of various participants in the news event.

### **Anonymous voice as a Discursive Strategy of Building Credibility**

The English version of *Global Times* also constructs its image of providing credible and objective news reports on violent incidents through using anonymous news sources. In news discourse, anonymity is used to indicate that the source of the news could not be named, presumably for one of for several reasons: The person who provided the information may not be authorized to talk to the press due to the sensitivity of the matter or they are afraid of being punished for leaking the information either by their superiors or by the state security apparatus. This is different from unnamed but described sources such as “a local official,” “witnesses,” “police” which refer to generic news sources. However, when anonymous sources are voiced, news articles often state that anonymity is requested very explicitly by the news source. Even though using anonymity is a standard journalist practice for protecting the safety of the news source, it can also significantly increase the perception of the news producers as being committed to providing an accurate and objective account of the news event. It can also construct the incident as having high news value due to the risk involved in publicly discussing the issue. As can be seen from the examples below, anonymous sources are frequently used in the English version. This is in sharp contrast to the Chinese version, in which statements regarding violent incidents are often made from the voice of the government and not attributed to particular sources.

Table 4.7 Strategic use of anonymous voices

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- 1) **A government official, who spoke to the *Global Times* on condition of anonymity,** said the terrorist trainers reach out to undereducated local farmers who can more easily be converted to religious extremists. [English version, 3/8/2012]
  - 2) **A senior official from Xinjiang, who asked not to be named,** disclosed Wednesday some details about the attack to the *Global Times*. [English version, 4/5/2013]
  - 3) **An official in Xinjiang, who asked to remain anonymous,** told the *Global Times* that at around 6 am Wednesday, dozens of thugs armed with knives and incendiary devices attacked the township governmental building, a police station, a station of auxiliary police and a construction site. [English version, 6/27/2013]
  - 4) **A Xinjiang official, who required anonymity,** on Monday confirmed the report to the *Global Times*. [English version, 12/17/2013]
  - 5) **An official who preferred not to be named** said Monday's attack was a typical terrorist act, as they targeted a police station and launched the attack early in the morning when police would not be on high alert. [English version, 12/31/2013]
  - 6) Two cross-country vehicles with flags that "seemed to be carrying Uyghur characters" deliberately ran into shoppers and vendors before bombs were thrown out, **a witness, who declined to be named,** told the *Global Times*. [English version, 5/23/2014]
  - 7) "I heard several gunshots from the residential building," **an anonymous store owner** told the *Global Times* on Monday. [English version, 7/14/2015]
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These examples highlight the use of anonymous sources as a discursive strategy with highly ideological significance, though not necessarily the significance expected in the West. On one hand anonymity can indicate that the journalists are committed to providing the audience with as much factual information as possible on violent incidents, so that readers can have adequate information to evaluate the nature of such incidents. Anonymous quotation can also work to heighten the news value of events because the reports are on highly sensitive issues and anonymous-sourced news articles presumably contain confidential and secretive information. Two observations can be made concerning the use of anonymous voices in the English edition. First, the content of the news obtained from sources which claimed to require anonymity is either

already publicly available in the Chinese edition or not particularly sensitive. The information obtained from anonymous sources in Excerpts 3, 4, 5 is all basic information about the incidents such as the time of occurrence, the targets and methods of the attacks. Since *Global Times* is a Chinese government paper, it would not be considered sensitive to share such details with them, particularly after the government had already released such basic information to the media. The details of attacks reported in the voice of anonymous sources in Excerpts 2 and 6 such as the attack involving two vehicles ploughing through the morning market in Urumqi were already widely circulated on social media and reported by the official Chinese media. Attributing such information to anonymous sources then is not because of the confidentiality or sensitivity of the matter, particularly considering that *Global Times* is not a foreign news organization. Moreover, Chinese journalists are not entitled to protect the identity of their news sources if the state security organizations decide to find out the source of the leak, which makes the use of anonymity not very useful from a practical standpoint. However, it does serve a very useful rhetorical function in presenting the news reports as objective and factual because it shows that the *Global Times* journalists corroborated the news by talking to multiple sources some of whom were willing to share the “truth” despite implied personal risks.

Another similar discursive strategy exclusively used in the English version that functions to increase the credibility and trustworthiness of the *Global Times* news reports is quoting the official voice as declining to comment on the incidents. As the following examples show, the phrases “declined to comment” or “declined to reveal more details” are used in English to indicate the sensitivity of the matter and that the government would not provide information when the investigation into the incidents is ongoing.

Table 4.8 “Declining to comment” as a discursive strategy of building credibility

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- 1) Chen Li, an official with Kashi's publicity department, told the *Global Times* that she was traveling to the county, more than 200 kilometers away from the city, and **declined to reveal more details**. [*Global Times*, 2/29/2012]
  - 2) Press officials in both the Kashi and Xinjiang governments **declined to reveal more details** to the *Global Times* about this case. [*Global Times*, 8/28/2013]
  - 3) Various regional government departments reached by the *Global Times* **declined to comment on the attack**, saying further investigation into the case is under way. [*Global Times*, 11/18/2013]
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While news reports in the Chinese version do not use phrases such “an official declined to reveal more details” or “officials declined to comment,” which might indicate that the government is unwilling to provide its citizens more information on issues related to the public’s safety, the English version makes strategic use of such phrases to signal the government’s commitment to provide complete information and the newspaper’s commitment to factual reporting. Even though declining to comment often suggests lack of transparency, the government’s refusal to comment is qualified by stating that the official was traveling to the site of the incident or the case was being investigated (Table 2.7, Examples 1 and 3). Both qualifying statements imply that the government officials do not have the full information on the incidents therefore they cannot comment yet, thus positively evaluating their actions and portraying them as responsible public servants. It also invites the readers to identify *Global Times* as a reliable source of information which is willing to point out instances of lack of transparency in the government reports and committed to providing accurate and factual accounts to its audience. In contrast to Chinese versions that stress immediate action, stressing caution in drawing conclusions can create credibility for both government and its media for an international audience.

### **Representing the Voice of the Overseas Rights Groups as a Legitimate Stakeholder**

The construction of the image of *Global Times* as a trustworthy source of news on violent incidents related to Uyghurs can also be seen in the representation of the voice of Uyghur human rights organizations based in Western countries as a legitimate news participant, a discursive move which is in sharp contrast with how these groups are portrayed in the Chinese version. In the English version, these groups are cited 5 times while they are quoted only twice in the Chinese version. Even more important than the quantity is the quality and contexts of the representation.

The most prominent organization among the overseas Uyghur human rights advocacy groups is the World Uyghur Congress (WUC), which is based in Munich with branches in major Western nations and is funded by the National Endowment for Democracy in the US, a bipartisan foundation with Congressional funding. When the WUC is cited in the Chinese edition, it is immediately labeled as an illegitimate organization before any specific statements made by the group are provided.

Table 4.9 Representation of overseas human rights groups in the Chinese version

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- 1) 西方媒体对此事的报道则延续了以往的调门，路透社 30 日援引“世维会”所谓发言人的声明，指责中国“直接对抗议者开火杀戮”，称“国际社会应阻止中国对维吾尔人实施镇压政策”。[Chinese version, 12/30/2013]  
(Western media coverage of the incident continued the tone of the past, On December 30, Reuters, quoting the statement made by the so-called spokesman of "World Uyghur Congress," which accused China of "directly opening fire on the protesters," saying "the international community should stop China's suppression of the Uighurs.")
  - 2) 这些暴恐分子有许多人只是炮灰，看看围绕 7·28 莎车暴恐事件和大毛拉遇害事件世维会等敌对组织在国外是如何散布谣言的。[Chinese version, 8/1/2014]  
(Many of these terrorists are just cannon fodder, just look at how the hostile organizations such as World Uyghur Congress spread rumors about the July 28<sup>th</sup> Yarkant incident and the killing of the Imam of Kashgar Id Kah mosque.)
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In both Examples 1 and 2, even though the World Uyghur Congress (WUC) is cited in the news article, several discursive strategies are used to delegitimize it. First the organization name appears inside quotation marks which suggests illegitimacy in Chinese. Then the phrase “so-called” is used to describe the spokesperson, which further diminishes the validity of the statements made by such a spokesperson. In the second example, the World Uyghur Congress is characterized as “a hostile organization” intent on spreading anti-China rumors, which implies that any statements made by this organization should not be trusted. In addition, the evaluation of the WUC is done in the voice of the newspaper, without attributing it to other sources, explicitly indicating that the newspaper’s view on the group strongly identifies with the government’s. However, the English version cites these organizations in a more nuanced way, which can both help *Global Times* construct an image of objectivity and create an opportunity to provide a counterargument to the statements of the WUC, thus having greater persuasive effects on a foreign audience.

Table 4.10 Representation of overseas human rights groups in the English version

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- 1) **Dilxat Raxit, a spokesman for the Munich-based World Uyghur Congress**, told Bloomberg that all the assailants were ethnic Uyghurs and they went to the police station to protest. [*Global Times*, 11/18/2013]
  - 2) **Rebiya Kadeer, leader of the World Uyghur Congress**, urged China's government to respond calmly to the attack and said that tension could only be reduced if China acknowledged rights issues Uyghurs face, reported Reuters. The comments were condemned by China's foreign ministry. Ministry spokesman Qin Gang said that Kadeer's group is an anti-China separatist group which has no right to represent China's Uyghur people. [*Global Times*, 3/6/2014]
  - 3) **Dilxat Raxit, spokesperson for the World Uyghur Congress**, said in an e-mail to Reuters that while he was unsure who carried out the attack, he believed Beijing's policies in the region should be examined. [*Global Times*, 5/23/2014]
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In the excerpts in Table 4.10 from the English version of *Global Times*, the voice of the Uyghur human rights group, the WUC, is represented very differently. It is not referred to as “so-called,” a “hostile organization,” or an “East Turkistan terrorist organization” as in the Chinese version. By presenting statements by a group which is ideologically polar opposite of the Chinese government on the Uyghur issue, *Global Times* discursively positions itself as an objective and trustworthy source of news that provides balanced reporting, taking the perspectives of different sides of the conflict into consideration. The news articles also make it clear that the representatives of the WUC were not directly interviewed by *Global Times* journalists. Instead, those quotes were taken from the statements the WUC made to Western news organizations such as Reuters and Bloomberg. It is worth noting that the content of what is represented through the voice of the WUC by *Global Times* is not very substantial compared to the original statements the organization made to other news outlets. In their regular statements following violent incidents, they often explain the reasons behind such attacks such as restriction of religious and cultural expression, economic and political marginalization of Uyghurs, harsh policing tactics, or the burst of arbitrary detentions in the Uyghur region (Buckly, 2013). However, what is actually quoted in *Global Times* are the least ideological parts of the original statements and concerns facts such as the ethnicity or identity of the protestors, which is already obvious by the description of the incident. Even though it is mentioned in Excerpt 3 that Beijing needs to reexamine its policies in the region, because it left out the specific policies mentioned in the original statements by the WUC, it has obscured the views of the WUC to the extent that it cannot give readers any clear indication of their position on the violence. Furthermore, when the voice of the WUC is countered as Excerpt 2 shows, it was not done through the voice of the newspaper as in the Chinese version, but through the voice of a Chinese Foreign Ministry

Spokesperson, which makes it possible for *Global Times* to distance itself from the view and preserve its image as an objective chronicler of news events.

### **Divergent Word Choices in the Chinese and English Versions**

The divergence between the authoritative reporting style dominated by a blended voice in the Chinese version and the objective reporting style dominated by attributed voices in the English version is even more evident in the word choices employed by the two versions of *Global Times* to describe the violent incidents and their participants. Although there is some inconsistency in how attackers are described depending on the location and timing of the attack, a major difference in the general pattern of characterizing various incidents and their participants can be observed between the Chinese and English versions. While the Chinese version directly labels all violent incidents as “暴力恐怖袭击案件” (violent terror attack incident) and participants as “暴徒” (thug), the English version tends to use more neutral words such as “attack,” “riot,” “attackers” and gradually build the case for characterizing an incident as a terrorist attack. The following are pairs of headlines in Chinese and English on the same incidents that illustrate the different word choices employed in the two versions:

Table 4.11 Different word choices in the English and Chinese versions

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- 1) Pichan, Lukchun Incident, June 26, 2013  
新疆鄯善发生暴力恐怖袭击案件 造成 24 人遇害 [Chinese version, 6/28/2013]  
(A violent terror attack incident happened in Xinjiang Shanshan County, causing the death of 24 people)  
Riot kills 27 in Xinjiang [English version, 6/27/2013]
  - 2) Maralbeshi Incident, November 16, 2013  
新疆巴楚县果断处置一起暴力恐怖袭击案件[Chinese version, 11/18/2013]  
(Xinjiang Bachu county resolutely handled a violent terrorist attack incident)  
Xinjiang police attack under investigation [English version, 11/18/2013]
  - 3) Urumqi, Morning Market Bombing Incident, May 22, 2014  
乌鲁木齐发生严重暴力恐怖案件 造成 31 人死亡 [Chinese version, 5/22/2014]

(In Urumqi, a severe violent terrorist attack incident happened, caused the death of 31) 31 dead, 90-plus injured in Urumqi market explosions [English version, 5/22/2014]

- 4) Kona Sheher Incident, January 12th, 2015  
新疆疏勒县成功处置一起暴恐袭击案件 [Chinese version, 1/12/2015]  
(Xinjiang Shule County successfully handled a violent terrorist attack)  
Six attackers killed by police in Xinjiang [English version, 1/13/2015]
- 

In the Chinese edition, all the titles contain the expression “暴恐袭击案件” (violent terror attack incident), which clearly indicates the official characterization of the incidents as terror attacks. However, the English version takes a different approach. First, these incidents are labeled as “riot” (Example 1), “police attack” (Example 2), “explosions” (Example 3). and the participants are referred to as “attackers” (Example 4). Although these are not positive terms per se, they are more neutral than “terror attack” or “terrorist,” suggesting a need for investigation to determine the nature of the incidents. In contrast, in Chinese if Uyghurs are involved, it seems sufficient to designate them as terror attacks. Also the government voice blended with the voice of the newspaper directly labels the incidents as terror attacks without attributing such evaluation and designation to any particular sources. However, the English edition distances itself from directly labeling the incident and tends to discursively construct them as terror attacks through the voice of the government and independent observers. The news articles on the Maralbeshi incident of November 16, 2013 can illustrate the different ways the incidents are constructed as terrorist attacks in English and Chinese editions. As Example 2 in Table 4.11 shows, the title in the Chinese edition designates the attack as a terrorist attack, while the English edition reports that the police attack is being investigated. Even though the incident was already characterized as terrorism in the Chinese version, the English version first uses more neutral terms to describe the incident as an “attack” and its participants as “people” or “attackers.” As the English version in

Excerpt 5 below indicates, the local authorities were quoted as saying that they had not yet characterized the incident as terrorism because “further investigation into the case is under way.”

- 5) Police said **11 people** were killed in an **assault** on a police station on Saturday afternoon in China's far western Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. **Nine attackers**, armed with knives and axes, were shot dead during the **attack** in Serikbuya, Bachu county in Kashi prefecture, some 1,200 kilometers southwest from the regional capital Urumqi. Two employees working with local police were killed and another two were injured, the Xinhua News Agency reported on Saturday, citing local police. Various regional government departments reached by the *Global Times* declined to comment on the **attack**, saying further investigation into the case is under way. **Chen Li, director of the Publicity Office of Kashi, told the *Global Times* on Sunday that the regional government has not yet defined it as a terrorist attack.** [*Global Times*, November 18, 2013]

Using more neutral terms in the English version and emphasizing the government's hesitancy in rushing to a conclusion creates a sense that the Chinese government takes a very cautious approach to how it characterizes violence as terrorism and only does so after careful evaluation of facts. Therefore, when violence does come to be described as terrorism, it is to be trusted. In addition, even though the government had not yet designated the incident as a terrorist attack, elsewhere the newspaper constructs a preferred interpretation of its nature through the voice of experts who point out that “From what they did and the consequences caused, their intentions are like terrorists.” Such a discursive strategy portrays the newspaper as an objective reporter of events and the government as a cautious investigator. At the same time, it also constructs a dominant understanding of the incident among readers as a terrorist attack. One way is through creating expectations: the incident had not *yet* been defined as a terrorist attack. When it finally is, it is through the voice of experts who are presented as independent and neutral.

### **Different Ways of Counting Casualties in the Chinese and English Versions**

Counting the number of casualties resulted from the violence is another area where the divergence in the neutrality of the reporting style is particularly noticeable. The Chinese version makes a very clear distinction in categorization of the death toll among the different groups

involved in violent incidents and uses different words to describe their deaths. However, the English version often describes the total casualty number and uses the same word “die” to describe deaths on different sides.

Table 4.12 Different ways of counting casualties in the English and Chinese versions

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- 1) 新疆喀什 15 日发生暴力恐怖袭击事件。造成 2 名民警牺牲。在警告无效的情况下，警方击毙暴徒 14 人，当场抓获犯罪嫌疑人 2 名。 [Chinese version, 12/17/2013]  
(A terrorist attack happened on the 15<sup>th</sup> in Kashgar, Xinjiang. It resulted in the sacrifice of two police officers. Because police warning did not work, the police killed 14 thugs and arrested two suspects on the spot.)

Local police in a township near Kashi, Northwest China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, have detained six suspects who were involved in a terrorist attack on Sunday, which killed 16 people, including two police officers and 14 attackers. [English version, 12/17/2013]

- 2) 该暴力恐怖案件造成民警、社区工作人员 15 人死亡，受伤 2 人。处置过程中击毙暴徒 6 人，抓获 8 人。 [Chinese version, 4/25/2013]

(This violent terrorist attack caused the death of 15 police officers and community workers and injured two people. In the process of handling, police killed 6 thugs and arrested 8.)

A violent clash between suspected terrorists and authorities in Northwest China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region has left 21 people dead, including 15 community workers and police officers and six of the suspects, local authorities said on Wednesday. [English version, 4/25/2013]

- 3) 公安民警果断处置，击毙 8 人，抓获 1 人，我方没有任何人员损失。 [Chinese version, 12/30/2013]

(Police took decisive action and killed 8 people and arrested 1. Our side did not suffer any casualties.)

8 terrorists (were) killed in Xinjiang attack. Police reported no casualties. [English version, 12/30/2013]

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As Excerpts 1 and 2 in Table 4.12 show, the Chinese version uses three separate categories – security forces, civilians, attackers – for describing the casualties and three distinct word choices for their deaths. The word “牺牲” (sacrifice) is used to refer to the death of police, suggesting that their death is for a holy cause. “死亡” (die) which is more neutral than the word

“sacrifice” refers to civilian deaths, while “击毙” (kill) or “歼灭” (annihilate) is used to describe the death of attackers, suggesting the active role the government played in punishing them for their acts. Explicit identification of the membership category is particularly striking in Excerpt 3, which states that “我方没有任何人员损失” (Our side did not suffer any casualties). This is in sharp contrast to the report in English which states “Police reported no casualties.” Such categorization of the participants in the news event communicates to the domestic audience positive self-presentation of the members of the ingroup and negative presentation of the members of the outgroup.

The English version reports the death toll in a very different way. The total number of casualties is first reported through statements such as “a terrorist attack, which killed 16 people” (Example 1) or “a violent clash has left 21 people dead” (Example 2). This is a sharp departure from the reporting style in Chinese in which the total number of casualties resulting from the incident is never combined, and different word choice is used to describe the death of members of different identity categories. In the English version, the specific number of casualties in each category is given as additional information using the phrase “including...” which works to deemphasize the strict membership identification observed in the Chinese version. On one hand, this discursive strategy highlights the severity of the incident for foreign readers by combining casualties suffered from different sides; this larger number can imply that China as a victim of terrorism deserves the understanding and support of the international community in its counterterrorism efforts. On the other hand, it indicates that China regrets the loss of life in the incident regardless of the membership categorization of those who were killed in the incident. Such a representation of the Chinese government as compassionate and humanitarian works to

evoke rapport with the international audience, increasing the newspaper's persuasive power and discursive effectiveness.

### **Highlighting the Symbolic Significance of the Attacks in the English Version**

Another major difference in the characteristics of the reporting style between the English and Chinese versions of *Global Times* concerns what content is foregrounded and backgrounded and which aspects of the incident are emphasized and deemphasized in the respective versions. The English version, primarily targeting a foreign audience, further highlights the severity of the violence by reviewing prior major incidents that have taken place in the region. It also underscores the symbolism of particular incidents by analyzing the timing and location in terms of their political significance. Such a construction is consistent with the overall style of the English edition because it portrays China as a victim of terrorism; therefore its counterterrorism efforts should not be criticized by the West, instead they should be considered an important component of the global war on terror.

Most reports in the English version end with a brief review of the major incidents in the region, suggesting that this particular incident is a part of a series of similar attacks. It functions to emphasize the notion of China being under the threat of terrorism and legitimates the necessity of the security measures in Xinjiang.

Table 4.13    Reviewing past incidents in the English version

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- 1) Back in May, a month after a terrorist attack in Kashi that left 21 dead, Zhang Chunxian, Party secretary of the region, wrote in an article for *Qiushi*, the Party's flagship magazine, that over the past three years the authorities have foiled more than 96 percent of planned separatist and terrorist attacks. [English version, **7/1/2013**]
- 2) On October 28, an SUV ploughed through bystanders near Tiananmen Square in Beijing, killing five and injuring 40 others. [English version, **12/17/2013**]

- 3) Terrorist attacks have increased in Xinjiang in recent years and have targeted places outside Xinjiang. On March 1, knife-wielding assailants killed 29 civilians and injured another 143 at a railway station in the southwestern Chinese city of Kunming in March. Evidence linked the attack to separatists from Xinjiang. Xinjiang was also hit by violent terrorist attacks in the past year. In an incident last June, rioters killed 24 people at the region's Lukqun Township. [English version, **5/1/2014**]
  - 4) Dozens of Uyghur and Han civilians were killed or injured in a terrorist attack in Shache county in Kashgar on July 28, 2014, when a gang armed with knives attacked a police station and government offices and some moved on to attack civilians and smash vehicles. Police officers at the scene shot dead dozens of members of the mob. [English version, **1/13/2015**]
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In each of the four excerpts above, the publishing dates of the news articles show that each article briefly reviews other incidents that took place several months prior to the one the main news story is about. It is worth pointing out that this is not emphasized in the Chinese version even though, as Table 4.1 demonstrates, 11 of the 20 incidents which were included in the corpus for this research took place in five towns: Qarghiliq, Maralbeshi, Urumqi, Yarkant, and Konasheher. Often two to three incidents occurred in each town within a span of a year, suggesting some connection between them. But the news reports in the Chinese version often treat them as stand-alone incidents without making any explicit references to the other incidents which occurred in the same town a few months prior. Presumably making a connection between the prior incidents that happened in the same town might reflect poorly on the regional officials' ability to manage the aftermath of the incidents, potentially suggesting the government's ineffectiveness or incompetence either in addressing an ongoing issue or stemming violence in the region, negatively impacting the legitimacy of the CCP's rule in the eyes of the domestic Chinese audience. However, for a foreign audience, referencing prior attacks serves to legitimate the Chinese government's policies in the region by constructing the gravity of the terrorism threat.

Another strategy that serves a similar discursive function is the emphasis on the political symbolism of the attacks in the English version. Reports in English often explain the significance of the incidents by making explicit references to their location and timing. Highlighting symbolic characteristics of the incidents represents them in ways relatable to the international audience's perception of terrorism, that is, as seeking symbolic targets. In its focus on other events and anniversaries the coverage focuses on violence, rather than its causes, countering the foreign media discourse of ethnic minorities reacting to the harsh government policies in the region and expressing grievances to specific social injustices.

Table 4.14 Highlighting symbolic significance of the incident in the English version

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- 1) A riot in a town in Northwest China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region killed 27 people, including 10 rioters on Wednesday, several days ahead of the anniversary of deadly riots in the region's capital in 2009. [English version, 6/27/2013]
  - 2) The regional government has been preparing for emergencies during the countdown to the four-year anniversary of riots in Urumqi, which led to the deaths of 197 people on July 5, 2009... He noted that the attack might have been prompted by the four-year anniversary of the deadly riots and the Islamic month of Ramadan drawing near. [English version, 6/27/2013]
  - 3) On October 28, three suspects drove a car loaded with 400 liters of gasoline and rammed into crowds just below Mao Zedong's portrait, leaving five dead and injuring 40 others. [English version, 11/18/2013]
  - 4) The Kunming attack comes as China is gearing up for the annual two sessions. The terrorists are aiming to create bigger threats and chaos. [English version, 3/2/2014]
  - 5) During an inspection tour to Xinjiang which ended on Wednesday, President Xi said that long-term stability in Xinjiang was vital to the whole country's stability and national security. [English version, 5/1/2014]
  - 6) The attack took place on the same day that the Xinjiang regional committee of the Communist Party of China announced the punishment of 17 officials and police officers, including the Party chief of Shache county, for a fatal terror attack and the subsequent death of a well-known imam in Xinjiang. [English version, 9/23/2014]
-

As the excerpts show, the English version explicitly links the timing and location of the attacks to major political events to emphasize the symbolic meaning of the attacks. The Lukqun incident of June 26<sup>th</sup> in 2013 (Excerpt 1) was reported in relation to the four-year anniversary of the largest protest that took place in Xinjiang on July 5<sup>th</sup> 2009, highlighting that the incident happened despite the government's emergency plans to prepare for the anniversary of the incident. It also implies that the attackers chose this time in order to commemorate what was viewed as the worst outburst of ethnic conflict in the region. Moreover, it foregrounds the association of the attack with religious extremism by describing that the attack happened in the Islamic month of Ramadan. In other incidents, the sensitivity of the timing is also underscored by relating the April 30<sup>th</sup> Railway Station bombing to CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping's high profile visit with the specific aim of boosting security in the region (Excerpt 5). Or in the case of the Kunming Railway Station attack (Excerpt 4), it was tied to the annual joint sessions of the National People's Congress and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in Beijing, one of the most important political events of the year in China. The description of the attack in Beijing (Excerpt 3) is particularly illustrative of how the English version puts a special emphasis on the symbolic significance of the location of the incidents. Through describing the attack as happening "just below Mao Zedong's portrait," it constructs the attack as not an ordinary violent incident, but a direct challenge to the ultimate authority of the CCP by attacking the symbol of its founder in politically the most sacred site in China. Despite the frequent references to the sensitivity of the timing and location of the incidents in the English version, the Chinese version does not frame the incidents in terms of the symbolic significance nor does it interpret the incidents as making political statements as this would not be helpful in constructing the representation of the party as powerful and fully in control to the domestic audience.

Instead, the Chinese version emphasizes religious extremism as the primary cause of the violent incidents. The attackers are often described as being radicalized and influenced by the ideology of religious extremism through videos.

Table 4.15 Radicalization from watching videos as the cause in the Chinese version

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- 1) 据他(一名知情官员)描述, 3名社区工作人员正常进行民居走访时正好撞上恐怖暴力分子聚在一起观看境外流入的恐怖活动视频, 现场还发现大量管制刀具。  
[Chinese version, 4/25/2013]  
(According to description by an official with clear knowledge of the incident, three community workers were conducting a routine visit to the residents and happened to come upon when the violent terrorists gathered to watch terror videos that flowed in from outside the borders. A lot of prohibited knives were also found at the scene.)
  - 2) 自今年8月开始, 以艾山·司马义为首, 逐步形成了有20名成员的暴恐团伙。该团伙多次聚集, 观看暴恐视频, 宣扬宗教极端思想, 制造爆炸装置、枪支, 数次进行试爆, 预谋实施暴恐活动。[Chinese version, 12/17/2013]  
(Beginning this August, with Hasan Ismail as its leader, a violent terror group with 20 members gradually formed. The gang gathered many times, watched terror videos, promoted religious extremist ideas, made explosive materials, guns, and tested several times, premeditated to carry out violent terror activities.)
  - 3) 自今年8月开始陆续纠集, 多次观看暴恐视频, 宣扬宗教极端思想, 结成暴恐团伙。[Chinese version, 12/30/2013]  
(Since August this year, they began to gather, repeatedly watched violent terror videos, promoted religious extremist ideas, formed a violent terror gang.)
  - 4) 现查明, 2013年以来, 努尔买买提与境外“东伊运”组织勾连, 组织人员收听收看暴恐音视频, 宣扬民族分裂和宗教极端思想, 逐步形成了以其为头目的暴恐团伙。[Chinese version, 11/29/2013]  
(Now it was found out that since 2013 Nurmamat colluded with overseas “East Turkistan Movement” organizations, organized people to listen and watch violent terror audio and video materials, promoted ethnic separatism and religious extremism, gradually formed a terror gang with him as the ringleader.)
  - 5) 2008年开始, 该团伙一些成员收听收看宗教极端音视频, 逐步形成宗教极端思想。[Chinese version, 11/20/2015]  
(Beginning in 2008, some members of the gang listened to and watched religious extremist audio and video materials and gradually formed religious extremist ideas.)
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In each of the excerpts above, the role of religious extremism in the incidents being reported was emphasized and interpreted as the main cause of the violence. Members of the groups who were involved in the incidents were described as having been radicalized by listening and watching audio and video materials with extremist content. In some cases, it was highlighted that such materials originated outside China, implying that the ultimate cause of the instability in Xinjiang lies outside China. Such an explanation works to justify the Chinese government's policies and deemphasize their role in exacerbating the ethnic tension in the region. It also attributes the main cause of the ethnic conflict in the region to an ideology that is detached from the physical reality of the people who were involved in the incidents. Generalization of all incidents being caused by religious extremism serves to play down other immediate factors that have directly contributed to the incidents.

Even though the English and Chinese versions of *Global Times* work to achieve the same ideological effect of legitimating the CCP's rule and its policies, they accomplish this by constructing certain tailored understandings of the nature of these violent incidents for their respective audiences through choosing to highlight different aspects of the events. The English version emphasizes the frequency of attacks and their political symbolism to construct China as a victim of violent terrorism. Therefore, its counterterrorism measures should not be criticized as discriminatory and marginalizing by the international community; instead, they should be treated as an important component of the global war on terror. The Chinese version, on the other hand, underscores religious extremism as the cause and foreign countries as the origin of the violence in the region. Such a construction works to distance the CCP's policies from being viewed as contributing to the violence and thus having a negative impact on its legitimacy in the eyes of the domestic audience. It also strengthens the nationalist ideology by constituting the incidents as a

conflict between China and foreign hostile forces, suggesting that supporting the CCP policies is an indication of being patriotic and safeguarding China's national interest.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter has demonstrated that even though both Chinese and English versions of *Global Times* work to advance the CCP's official ideology and (re)produce the legitimacy of its rule, they achieve this through using very different discursive strategies based on their perceived understanding of the expectation of their respective audiences. The English version uses discursive strategies of foregrounding the actions of the attackers and backgrounding the actions of the Chinese security forces, highlighting the frequency of violent incidents and casualties resulted from them, and emphasizing the political symbolism of the incidents. Together these strategies represent China as a nation facing a serious threat of terrorism to a foreign audience and functions to legitimize the Chinese government's various policies towards Uyghurs in the region as a necessary part of its counterterrorism measures. The English version also heavily relies on the attribution function of quotations and features external voices more prominently. This presents *Global Times* to foreign readers as an independent media organization which strives to give its readers accurate, objective, and balanced accounts of the incidents being reported, which might lead to higher persuasive effects for an international audience.

In contrast, the Chinese version emphasizes the resoluteness of the government in guaranteeing stability and security for the Chinese people through more forceful representation of the actions of the Chinese government and its leaders in handling violent incidents. Also using strict membership identification categories, the Chinese version constructs a paradigm of how each group is treated: protecting the ingroup and mourning their death and wiping out the outgroup and celebrating their extermination. It also represents the overall security situation as

“normal,” “stable,” and ethnic relations as “unified,” and downplays the seriousness of certain incidents by backgrounding the total number of casualties and providing few details about the incidents. These discursive choices work to maintain and reinforce CCP’s legitimacy as a ruling party which is competent, powerful, and in full control in the view of the domestic audience.

The analysis shows that newspapers differ in their use of discursive strategies not only because they operate under different ideologies; even operating under the same ideology, they might resort to different discursive strategies in order to appeal to different audiences. Both sets of strategies, then, support a single ideology: support of the CCP.

## Chapter Five

### **Analysis of the Visual Representation of the People's War on Terror Discourse**

The previous chapter examined how various discursive strategies were used to convey different understandings of the discourse of terrorism to domestic and international audiences. I argued that the dominant ideology guiding the news-making process in both English and Chinese editions of *Global Times* remained the same with its primary function to maintain the legitimacy of the CCP's rule and its policies. Yet, given different audience expectations, news articles on violent incidents involving Uyghurs constructed divergent representations of them in the Chinese and English versions. Such divergent representations worked in the service of reinforcing different aspects of the dominant discourse of terrorism. The domestic audience was presented an image of the Communist Party as the strong and powerful guarantor of social and political stability in China, whereas an international audience was invited to identify China as a victim of terrorism deserving their sympathy and to see its security measures towards Uyghurs in Xinjiang as a part of global fight against terrorism. News is one of many sites in which the construction and reproduction of terrorism discourse takes place. Another important area that (re)articulates the discourse of the People's War on Terror is state-sponsored cultural events and artifacts. In this chapter, I explore how the discourse was manifested visually and metaphorically in peasant paintings and other propaganda materials.

I begin by examining the relationship between theories and methodologies of metaphor studies and relevant approaches and concepts of CDA. The following section reviews how scholars have applied metaphor theories to analyze discourses on various social issues. Then, I outline how the theoretical and methodological frameworks developed in metaphor studies that will be applied to investigate visual representations of the People's War on Terror discourse in

this study. The chapter then focuses on the analysis of the metaphoric frames identified in the data and discusses the ideological work they perform in constructing a binary representation of Uyghurs as belonging to either of the two mutually exclusive identity categories: GOOD UYGHURS and BAD UYGHURS. Finally, the chapter considers the implications of such a dichotomous construction of Uyghurs on their relations with the state and the Han settlers in the region who are considered to be representatives of the state.

### **Theoretical Overlap between Metaphor Studies and Critical Discourse Analysis**

Analyzing the ideological significance of metaphor is an important area of CDA scholarship in its efforts to systematically describe and critically examine how ideologies are (re)produced in discourse. Critical discourse analysts who use metaphor theory as a lens often trace their theoretical influence to the foundational work of cognitive linguists George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. Although metaphors had been considered central to rhetoric studies since Aristotle, its prominence was diminished to a great extent during the rise of linguistics as a discipline in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, which regarded metaphors as derivative of the original meaning, thus belonging to a subfield of syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. However, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) argued that metaphor should be treated not as figurative devices that embellishes speech, but as a fundamental means to conceptualize our natural, social, and mental world. They state that metaphor works by helping us to understand more abstract and nebulous concepts in the target domain through more familiar and experientially grounded concepts in the source domain. In short, they explain that “the essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 5). This understanding of metaphor is echoed by Charteris-Black’s (2004) argument that “metaphor is a linguistic representation that results from the shift in the use of a word or phrase from the context or domain in which it is

expected to occur to another context or domain where it is not expected to occur, thereby causing semantic tension” (p. 21).

To illustrate the cognitive perspective on metaphor or conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) as it is termed, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) note that we humans first perceive the world around us and other abstract concepts through our bodily experience, which they call “orientational metaphors” (p. 15). Because we function in an upright position, we associate positive concepts such as good, moral, happy, health, alive, active, control, and status with being UP, while negative concept such as evil, immoral, sad, sick, death, passive with DOWN. Therefore, if we frame something as UP, we consciously or unconsciously perceive them as positive while the opposite is true for things framed as DOWN.

This view of metaphor as playing a central role in the construction of social realities has a strong resonance with CDA scholars’ perspective on the nature of discourse. In discourse studies, language use is seen in a dialectical relationship with its social and institutional contexts where it is constitutive of and constituted by them with significant consequences (Silberstein, 2011). Fowler also states that “different modes of discourse encode different representations of experience” (as cited in Mills, 2004, p. 6). Different representations in turn may be a guide for different actions in the future because we act based on how we perceive. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) also state that different choices of metaphor may lead us to consider certain future actions while excluding others, “which reinforce the power of metaphor to make our experience coherent” (p. 156). From a CDA perspective, this is how social inequalities and injustices are maintained and reproduced.

Apart from this shared understanding of the ideological work discourse does in shaping our understanding of social reality and our response to it, both the socio-cognitive approach to

CDA promoted by van Dijk (van Dijk, 1989, 2002, 2006a) and metaphor studies place a strong emphasis on cognition or mental modeling. Van Dijk (2009b) argues that the mind is the cognitive interface between social structures and discourse structures. Similarly, Lakoff (2003), citing research findings in cognitive sciences, emphasizes that people think in terms of frames which are “in the synapses of our brains – physically present in the form of neural circuitry” (p. 3), shaping our thinking and guiding our action.

Metaphor theory grew out of cognitive linguistics and made a case for a strong connection between our bodily experience and mental concepts and abstract thoughts (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Van Dijk (1993) argues that understanding how discourse and society are related requires examination of “the role of social representations in the minds of social actors” (p. 251). As many other CDA scholars, he believes that understanding, exposing, and challenging how social dominance and inequality is enacted, legitimated, and sustained through discourse should be the primary goal of CDA. He also argues that although powerful groups sometimes control and dominate other groups through brute force, this is ultimately too costly and ineffective. The most effective way to sustain the group’s dominance “is mostly cognitive, and enacted by persuasion, dissimulation or manipulation among other strategic ways to change the mind of others in one's own interests” (van Dijk, 1993, p. 254). As van Dijk acknowledges, this is a modification of Gramsci’s notion of hegemony for doing critical analysis of discourse, in which he shifts the focus from how power operates at the societal level to cognition. In other words, he highlights how social cognition mediates individuals and society, invoking micro/macro-level notions.

Another area where CMT overlaps with the theoretical and methodological frameworks of CDA is textual cohesion. Along with transitivity and thematization, cohesion is an integral

component of Hallidayan Systemic Functional Linguistics, a method of linguistic analysis used extensively by CDA scholars to systematically examine the linguistic features of discourse.

Halliday and Matthiessen (2014) list the following as the main types of lexical cohesion:

synonym, antonym, hyponymy, repetition, metonymy, and collocation (p. 644). They argue that collocation is the most frequently used type of lexical cohesion, stating that “words that are closely associated are likely to have a noticeably cohesive effect because collocation is one of the factors on which we build our expectations of what is to come next” (p. 649). When these closely related words are used together in a discourse, instead of functioning as static lexical elements which express fixed and stable meanings, they emerge as a dynamic process that works to construct a coherent representation of events under consideration. Because lexical cohesion is a semantic field which contains words that are related to a certain domain, the words within the domain “help to tie various components of the text together” (Morley, 2009, p. 6) and evoke a prior understanding or build a new understanding of that domain.

Although metaphor operates by mapping concepts from the source domain to the target domain and textual cohesion operates by using semantically collocational words to create a unity in the text, both “influence our cognitive experiences and predispose us to see aspects of reality in certain ways rather than others” (Li, 2010, p. 3454). This function of textual cohesion in creating a coherent representation of reality, thereby shaping our understanding of the world is most relevant to our discussion of CMT here. Li (2006) further elaborates on the relationship between textual cohesion and metaphor and states that “the repeated use of lexical items that are collocationally related serves to construct dominant metaphors that permeate the texts and such metaphors function as the organizing themes in the presentation of events, creating particular ideologies in the events” (p. 209). Of course, lexical cohesion does not have to be metaphorical.

For example, although the words “prison, jail, judge, court, investigate, sentence, convict, appeal, serve” all belong to the semantic domain of law (Morley, 2009, p. 7), they are not necessarily considered a metaphoric frame when they are used within a legal discourse. They are only considered a metaphoric frame if they are used outside legal discourse, for example to refer to an interpersonal relationship or sports competition. In other words, textual cohesion mostly works to increase the rhetorical tenor of the text in which it appears. But it can also work metaphorically. In that case, textual cohesion not only significantly boosts the semantic forcefulness of the content, but also strengthens its ideological effect by creating a certain understanding of reality that arouses strong emotions among an audience and is easily understood by them.

### **Applying Principles of Metaphor Studies in Discourse Analysis**

The shared theoretical orientation and common interest of both CDA and metaphor theory scholars in the role of language use and its effect on cognition have provided a very useful analytical framework to investigate some of the pressing social issues that concern both groups. Lakoff (1991, 2001, 2003) applied his theory to examine the rhetoric of the two Bush administrations (41 and 43) during three pivotal moments in recent US history: on the eve of first Gulf War, after 9/11 and before the invasion of Afghanistan, and on the eve of the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Restating his position that metaphors can have real world ramifications and even kill people, he identifies various metaphorical frameworks used by the two administrations to rally support for their war efforts such as the STATE AS PERSON and the FAIRYTALE OF THE JUST WAR and discusses what was considered an appropriate course of action when these metaphors were adopted and what could have been alternative ways to frame the war.

Lakoff states that when a state like Iraq is framed in terms of a person, Saddam Hussein, many other aspects of Iraq such as ethnic makeup, different religious groups, political organizations, and economic structures are deemphasized or even hidden in the metaphor. As a result, such framing shapes how people perceive the war and causes them to pay inadequate attention to a war's effects on those areas. In other words, although metaphors can help us understand more abstract and complex ideas and problems through more concrete and familiar frames, this very benefit can be manipulated in harmful and even destructive ways. He gives the example that although the portrayed enemy is Saddam only when the war begins, the bombs do not fall on that one person, and taking out that one person will not solve all the problems as the metaphor suggests (Lakoff, 2003). Most importantly, he points out that if alternative metaphorical frames were used such as WAR IS CRIME, which includes murder, assault, rape, arson, and theft, they would highlight negative and even disastrous effects of war, thus raising public awareness and forming stronger opposition to war. In a similar way, as I will discuss later in the chapter, when certain Uyghurs are represented as inherently evil and intent on causing damage, this will obscure the structural violence and other social factors that have contributed to their desperate acts and construct them as people who engage in violence because of who they are.

Others have also used metaphor theory to examine how anti-immigrant sentiment, racism, nationalism, international conflicts are framed in discourse. O'Brian (2003) examined the use of metaphors to vilify marginalized populations with the aim of justifying certain social policies directed towards those groups. Specifically looking at discourses surrounding the most restrictive immigration policies in U.S. history, the Immigration Acts of 1921 and 1924, he identified four major metaphorical themes: IMMIGRANT AS DISEASED ORGANISM,

IMMIGRANT AS MATERIAL, IMMIGRANT AS INVADER, IMMIGRANT AS SUBHUMAN ENTITY. He argues that these themes functioned to portray new immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe as fundamentally different from those already in the US and legitimated discriminatory social policies against them.

Focusing on more recent debates on immigration, Santa Ana (1999), El Refaie (2001), and Charteris-Black (2006) have all analyzed the metaphorical frames used to describe immigrants in the US, Austria, and Britain respectively. Santa Ana discusses the IMMIGRANTS ARE ANIMALS frame used in the *Los Angeles Times*, while Charteris-Black identifies IMMIGRATION IS A NATURAL DISASTER frame in the news reports about immigrants in *The Daily Mail* and *The Daily Telegraph*. Both metaphor themes of animals and natural disaster are also present in El Refaie's analysis of metaphors themes used to describe Kurdish refugees in Austrian media with the addition of a REFUGEES ARE CRIMINALS theme. These authors examine the correlation between such framing and certain anti-immigrant policies in those countries and point out its impact on the treatment of immigrants.

Closely related to the use of metaphor in anti-immigrant discourse is its role in legitimating and reinforcing racist and nationalist discourses. Van Teeffelen (1994) analyzes popular Western literature on Palestinian-Israel relations and describes how different metaphorical frames such as DESERT, FIRE, and WATER have been used to accentuate the differences between the two life-worlds so much that they take racist effects (e.g., associating Palestinians with sustaining a desert which suggests a potential threat to life and untamed primitiveness). He also emphasizes that only contextual information can give us clues as to whether such metaphors serve racist purposes. Kitis and Milapides (1997) analyze how different metaphoric frames have been used to describe relations between Greece and Macedonia, in

which Greece was portrayed as a ruthless and powerful human while Macedonia as a vulnerable victim in *Time* magazine. They have also proposed combining grammatical and lexical analysis with metaphoric frame analysis in order to better understand how argumentation is carried out both at the structural/linguistic and rhetorical levels of a text.

Another area where metaphors are used to construct social identities of US versus THEM that is particularly notable is discourses surrounding international conflicts, especially on the discourse of terrorism. Steuter & Wills (2008) extensively explore the correlation between dehumanizing characterizations of groups considered enemies of the state and human rights abuses, genocides, and other war crimes that took place around the world in different periods of time: from the portrayal of Jews and the Japanese during WWII to the depiction of Tutsi people in Rwanda, and more recent examples of media representations of Muslims during the War on Terror era. They advocate for more peace journalism, replacing the dehumanizing metaphoric frames that have dominated the current discussion on terrorism and appear only to worsen the conflicts with less destructive frames such as education and crime.

Lule (2004), also focusing on metaphor themes in the discourse of terrorism, investigated four metaphorical frames (TIMETABLE, GAMES OF SADDAM, THE PATIENCE OF THE WHITE HOUSE, AND MAKING THE CASE) used in the *NBC Nightly News* as Bush administration officials made final efforts to rally public support for invading Iraq. Echoing Lakoff (1991) and Sontag's (1990) warning that "metaphors can kill" (Lule, 2004, p. 187), he laments the news media's overreliance on the metaphoric frames provided by the administration and not using alternative frames such as CLAIMS, DEBATE, NEGOTIATION, which would have cast doubt on the official representation of the events leading up to the war and strengthened the antiwar efforts. Hulsse & Spencer (2008), Sontag (2002), Spencer (2012), and

Steuter & Wills (2010) have also examined the use of metaphors in the War on Terror discourse to dehumanize the Other, to legitimize oppression and gross human rights violations, and label entire groups of people as terrorists. The common thread that runs through all these works is that even though metaphors operate at the realm of thought, their impact reaches far beyond and is often concrete and tangible.

Even though most of these studies were conducted in Western cultural contexts and the metaphors were often applied to represent non-Westerners, the similarities between the use of metaphors in the Chinese discourse of the People's War on Terror and the contexts discussed above are quite striking. In China, the primary function of using various metaphors is also to dehumanize a segment of the Uyghur population that does not conform to the state's conceptualization of a model ethnic minority, thereby legitimating severe measures against them.

### **Reconciling Underlying Tension between Conceptual Metaphor Theory and CDA**

Despite the productive cross-pollination between CDA and metaphor theory, some scholars (Charteris-Black, 2004; El Refaie, 2001; Hart, 2008; Musolff, 2012; O'Halloran, 2007) have cautioned against conducting CDA research by directly importing the concepts of CMT, the dominant strand within metaphor studies. They point out some discrepancies in the theoretical foundations of the two theories and make suggestions on how to modify CMT concepts in order to make them compatible with the basic tenets of CDA. CMT holds that the linguistic expression of metaphors is a reflection of the underlying conceptual structures in the human mind. Lakoff (2003) even states that "most of our conceptual framing is unconscious and we may not be aware of our metaphorical thought" (p. 4). However, for CDA scholars, CMT's view on language is too deterministic in stating that language is a mere reflection of our cognitive capacity. It does not put adequate emphasis on the role of language in shaping our conceptual structures, failing to

consider the dialectical relationship between discourse and cognition (Hart, 2008). Also CMT attributes the source of primary metaphor frameworks to humans' physiological experience in the world, therefore it claims that choosing particular metaphors is unconscious. This overlooks the highly ideological nature of the process of discursive construction which involves the agentive role of language users in constituting their social reality. Another dangerous consequence of this view is that if conceptual metaphors are determined by our physiological experiences, then discriminative metaphors might then be interpreted as resulting from our biological limitations. In order to redress this theoretical discrepancy between CMT and CDA, Hart (2008) proposes conceptual blending theory which is based on mental space theory. Instead of treating metaphors as occurring between the source and target domains, conceptual blending theory holds that when metaphor is used, new mental space is constructed and structures from the two domains of a metaphor are projected onto the new space through a process of composition, completion, and elaboration. As a result, a new inferential structure emerges. This view takes the prior knowledge of individuals and other contextual factors into account and does not treat metaphor as one-way mapping from the source domain onto the target domain. In so doing, it is more compatible with CDA's dialectical relationship between discourse and social reality.

O'Halloran (2007) points out another problem with directly applying CMT concepts in CDA. He critiques the works of Lee (1992) and other CDA scholars who adopted CMT for overinterpreting or misinterpreting linguistic data at the register level as metaphors without considering readers' more frequent exposure to certain registers than others. He illustrates his point by closely examining the metaphor theme of VOLCANO identified by Lee (1992) in his discussion of racism in South Africa. He argues that although words such as *simmer*, *erupt*,

*swept through* were interpreted as originating in the domain of VOLCANO and being applied in discourse to refer to Black South Africans, thereby constituting a metaphor, his own corpus analysis shows that these metaphoric concepts are far more likely to appear in the contexts of conflicts and tension rather than describing the natural phenomenon of volcano. CMT maintains that metaphors primarily work by making abstract and obscure concepts understandable through explaining them in more familiar terms. If readers at a particular register level are more familiar with the use of words *simmer* and *erupt* as referring to conflicts, is it still valid to interpret them as metaphors? In order to reconcile the tension that arises when transplanting CMT concepts into CDA scholarship, he proposes using corpus linguistics and reader responses to assist in the analysis of metaphor themes. This can help researchers avoid overinterpreting or misinterpreting linguistic data as metaphors without considering the readers' more frequent exposure to certain registers than others. Corpus linguistics can also be a great tool for checking whether the linguistic data in texts are functioning as metaphorical or simply in their regular collocation patterns.

Another issue raised about the transferability of CMT concepts into CDA concerns the issue of mapping of the source domain onto the target domain. CMT posits that when a particular source domain is used to understand certain features of the target domain, there is no complete congruence between the two domains. Therefore, certain characteristics of the source domain which fit the ideological construction get imposed onto the target domain, while others are left out. For example, when the metaphor theme of WATER is used to discuss immigrants such as “flow of refugees” or “waves of immigrants,” it dehumanizes immigrants as a noncount entity and highlights negative aspects of water such as uncontrollability. However, other features of the source domain such as the importance of water in sustaining life is canceled out during the

metaphoric transformation. This questions the theoretical assumptions of CMT which regards the mapping process between source domain and target domain as subconscious and universal and requires examination of the factors which contribute to certain preferred understanding of metaphors. Musolff (2012) further elaborates on this point and notes that “the source domain’s ‘cognitive topology’ is open for many other mappings and can hardly act as a constraint for the choice of target domain elements or relations as input into the metaphor” (p. 308). He states that what is instrumental in the mapping process is not just knowledge of the source and target domains, but also immediate and wider sociopolitical and historical contexts that play a big part in how metaphor is understood, thereby realizing its discursive potential and achieving persuasive effects. For this reason, Musolff calls for taking discursive-pragmatic as well as sociolinguistic variation into consideration in order to make metaphor analysis more empirically and socially relevant. Other metaphor scholars (El Refaie, 2001; Gibbs & Steen, 1999) have also emphasized the importance of paying attention to the cultural dimension of metaphor. El Refaie argues that, instead of viewing metaphors as relatively fixed and universal patterns of thought, the role of social, historical, and political circumstances on the choice and specification of metaphors should also be underscored.

Besides these suggestions to adapt and make CMT more compatible with CDA, another major criticism of CMT is that the majority of research done within that approach has focused on metaphors in written texts and has paid inadequate attention to metaphors expressed in other modalities such as spoken language and gestures (although Lakoff and others deal with speeches), still or moving images, music and other types of sounds (Forceville, 2006). This focus on verbal texts, which has so far been the main means to support CMT’s claims of validity, is contrary to the fundamental tenet of CMT which views that metaphor is conceptual and that

humans think metaphorically (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Forceville (2008) argues that if metaphors mainly operate as a cognitive mechanism, then we should be able to identify and examine their nonverbal manifestations as well as verbal ones. He further states that a multimodal perspective on metaphors allows researchers to explore areas not commonly studied when the research focus is on verbal manifestations of metaphors because multimodal metaphors establish the link between the source and target domains differently, have a strong emotional appeal, and are more immediate and specific, thus giving “greater cross-cultural access than verbal metaphors” (p. 463).

When metaphors that occur in nonverbal and multimodal representations are given due considerations in critical analysis, they not only enrich our understanding of how metaphors play a role in constructing our social reality, but also expand our notions of what constitutes metaphors and how they work across different modalities. An example of an expanded notion of metaphor is that while a predominantly verbal metaphor focuses on how abstract concepts are understood through concrete objects, the visual metaphor also highlights that in fact metaphors also work through understanding concrete objects through concrete objects, which is a common type of metaphors used in commercials (Forceville, 2006).

With increased recognition and understanding of the importance of nonverbal and multimodal metaphors, numerous scholarly works have been published on explaining the theoretical and methodological frameworks of multimodal metaphor analysis (e.g., Urios-Aparisi & Forceville, 2009). Other studies used these frameworks on novel research topics, further expanding our understanding of how metaphor operates across modalities (Pérez-Sobrino, 2016; Teng, 2009; Yameng et al., 2016; Yu, 2011).

Bearing in mind the theoretical and methodological contribution of metaphor studies to discourse analysis as well as the potential pitfalls of directly applying those principles in CDA research, this chapter conducts a systematic analysis of the multimodal manifestations of metaphors of GOOD UYGHURS and BAD UYGHURS in state-sponsored paintings and other propaganda materials. After providing brief background information to the data analyzed in this chapter, internal components and structures of the complex metaphors of GOOD UYGHURS and BAD UYGHURS will be examined and the sociocultural and historical factors which have shaped those complex metaphors will be discussed. Finally, the potential impact of using such metaphoric tropes on interethnic relations in Xinjiang will be explored.

### **The Deradicalization Campaign on the Cultural Front**

As described in the previous chapter, there has been a sharp increase in violent incidents involving Uyghurs since 2012. Even though there is a great deal of variation among the incidents in terms of exact causes, the Chinese government has categorically blamed all these incidents on religious extremism and launched a People's War on Terror in 2014, a massive initiative aimed at stemming ethnic violence in the region. A deradicalization campaign on the cultural front is an important component of this initiative and includes various cultural events such as massive dancing competitions, theatrical performances, and painting competitions (Tianshan, 2015; Tianshan, 2014d; Tianshan, 2014e). The aim of these events is to promote the party ideology and educate the public about the "evils of extremism."

One such event, a deradicalization-themed Xinjiang Peasant Painting Contest, was held throughout the region in 2014. The Party stated that over 2000 peasant painters participated and produced a total of 14,000 paintings for this competition. After the initial round of competition at the prefectural level, 740 were selected for the regional competition. On November 9, 2014, the

CCP Propaganda Department and Cultural Bureau in Xinjiang announced the winners of the painting competition (Tianshan, 2014f). Ten first-prize winners, 20 second-prize winners, and 30 third-prize winners were chosen and given 20,000, 10,000, and 5,000 Yuan, respectively, as a reward (Tianshan, 2014d). Subsequently, these award-winning paintings were taken on tour throughout Xinjiang and displayed in various exhibition centers. They became an important material artifact used by the Chinese government to promote its official ideology regarding ethnic minorities.

The dominant metaphor guiding artistic expressions throughout the paintings was one of GOOD UYGHURS versus BAD UYGHURS. In Lakoff and Johnson's (1999) model, that can be considered a complex metaphor. They argue that there are two types of metaphors: primary metaphors and complex metaphors. Primary metaphors, which are directly grounded in humans' bodily experiences in the world, tend to be more widespread and even universal. Primary metaphors combine and interact with other primary metaphors to form complex metaphors. There are two major characteristics of complex metaphors. First, they are composed of other primary and/or complex metaphors, therefore they occupy a higher position in the hierarchical system of metaphors. Second, they are also heavily shaped by cultural knowledge and beliefs, therefore they are more likely to be specific to a particular cultural group and vary greatly from one context to another.

Identifying both primary and complex metaphors is a particularly effective method for metaphor analysis because it highlights the dialectical relationship between language, culture and our material conditions, which closely aligns with CDA's view on the role of discourse. On one hand, this method acknowledges universality of certain human experiences and the common conceptual frames we draw from these shared experiences. On the other hand, it recognizes the

essential role cultural knowledge and assumptions play in shaping which bodily experiences are given prominence and which other ones are downplayed in certain contexts. Identifying the multimodal manifestations of complex and primary metaphors also allows making connections between my research and the work of other scholars who have studied the use of metaphors in different spatial and temporal contexts. While the manifestations of complex metaphors in different historical periods, geographical locations, and sociocultural contexts may vary greatly, it is possible to identify certain underlying primary metaphors which are common to them all and discuss the implications of the present research in relation to the lessons learned from other situations where similar primary metaphors were used.

## **Findings**

At the highest level of the hierarchical system of metaphors analyzed in the dataset is GOOD UYGHURS versus BAD UYGHURS, which itself is composed of other complex metaphors. More general metaphors of GOOD UYGHURS ARE HUMANS and BAD UYGHURS ARE NONHUMANS are the two dominant frames in which Uyghurs are represented in these paintings, prescribing two mutually exclusive identity categories for Uyghurs in the official discourse. GOOD UYGHURS are happy, prosperous, and agentic humans who are grateful and loyal to the Party. BAD UYGHURS are nonhuman and evil beings who are engaged in futile and self-destructive activities to disturb social stability. The metaphor of NONHUMANS is further made up of other metaphors: ANIMALS, GERMS, EVIL BEINGS, and FORCES OF DARKNESS. These metaphors collectively function to ascribe the actions of those Uyghurs as inherent to their nature: they do what they do because of who they are. Such a construction not only detaches their actions from their sociopolitical and economic situations, but also removes any possibility of having legitimate grievances about different aspects of the

Chinese government's policies in the region. What follows is a discussion of specific manifestations of these metaphors and their relationships with each other.

#### BAD UYGHURS ARE ANIMALS

Representing those that the dominant group in a particular society considers objectionable PEOPLE AS ANIMALS is a recurrent metaphor used in many contexts throughout history. Lakoff and Turner (1989) explain the metaphor of PERSONS ARE ANIMALS within the cultural model of the GREAT CHAIN METAPHOR. In this metaphoric frame, different kinds of beings are hierarchically placed on a scale according to the attributes inherent to them. Lakoff and Turner (1989) state that “we think of humans as higher-order beings than animals, animals as higher than plants, and plants as higher than inanimate substances. Within each of these levels, there are higher and lower sublevels, so that dogs are higher order beings than insects, and trees higher than algae” (p. 167). According to this metaphor, different traits and behaviors are ascribed to each category. Humans, animals, plants, and inanimate objects are each characterized by “reason, instinctual behavior, biological function, and physical attributes” (p. 167). Each category in the hierarchical scale possesses attributes of the lower level category while the reverse is not true. For example, humans may demonstrate instinctual behavior, but it is not a dominant attribute distinguishing them from other categories in the scale. Lakoff and Turner (1989) also note the profound social and political consequences of using this cultural model to justify dominance of certain groups over others.

Representing a segment of Uyghur people who are deemed extremists by the government as animals is the main type of metaphor used to dehumanize them in the award-winning paintings and other propaganda materials. Eight of the 60 award winning paintings portray “extremists/terrorists” as rats. This is the most common type of animal metaphors identified in

the data. Its prominence is mainly due to the fact that the General Secretary of the CCP, Chinese President Xi Jinping, used the metaphor of rats during his highly publicized tour of Xinjiang in April 2014. He said:

The fight against terrorism concerns our national security, the fundamental interests of the people, and the overall situation of reform, development, and stability. It is a struggle to safeguard national unity, social stability, and people’s happiness. We must take resolute and decisive measures, keep the high-pressure environment, and resolutely crack down on the arrogance of the violent terrorists.... We must rely on the masses and build an impenetrable fortress, *so that the terrorists become like rats crossing the street and everyone shouting to beat them* [emphasis added] (Xinhuanet, 2014).

After that speech, the metaphor of rats was extensively used in Chinese media coverage of violent incidents and ideological campaigns in Xinjiang and became reified in the official discourse to refer to “terrorists.” Its manifestation in the paintings illustrates how a metaphor which originated in verbal form can transform into a visual form, reaching a wider audience and increasing its emotional appeal.



Figure 5.1 Rats Crossing the Street



Figure 5.2 Ending of Three Evil Forces

In Figure 5.1, three human looking bodies with the heads of rats are being beaten by a crowd of people who seem to be shouting and using forks, spades, brooms, hammer, sticks, and a pencil as weapons in the fight. They are made up of men and women of all age groups - from elementary school age children to old people. Some of them are actively beating the rat-headed creatures. Others are calling for more help and still others seem to be just watching the spectacle. Even though people are not visibly present in Figure 5.2, the same tools as in Figure 5.1 are directed at three rats with the addition of a gun. These tools can also be interpreted as representing different social groups – peasants, workers, intellectuals, and the armed forces. Combined with the direct visual representation of the masses in Figure 5.1, these two figures are clear manifestation of the discourse of the People’s War on Terror, which became the dominant discursive framework to interpret social protests in Xinjiang during this period of time. The main characteristic of the People’s War on Terror discourse is the emphasis on the need to transition from an elite model of fighting terrorism, which is led by the security forces, to a new model, which stresses the mobilization of the masses in fighting terrorism.

It is worth noting the number of rats in these paintings. In each of the paintings which feature rats, there are exactly three rats. This number may signal the three types of enemies which are often labeled as the “three forces of violent terrorism, religious extremism, and ethnic separatism” in the official discourse. Under the BAD UYGHURS ARE ANIMALS metaphor, the source domain of rats is used to understand the target domain of “terrorists.” Even though what makes the target domain a threat to the Chinese government is their activities not their innate traits, when the inherent features of the source domain that make them objectionable are mapped onto the target domain, “terrorists” are understood as inherently objectionable, suggesting that they should be treated by society in the same way as rats. This mapping of the innate traits of rats

to understand “terrorists” also functions to obscure the activities that make the target domain objectionable and attribute their actions to who they are. It implies that since it is not possible to transform rats into humans, it removes other possibilities of dealing with them through judicial or educational approaches. Therefore, the only solution left is exterminating them; just as it is morally and hygienically acceptable to beat and kill rats on sight, those deemed terrorists by the government should be dealt with in a similar manner.



Figure 5.3 Preaching “Jihad” Is Illegal



Figure 5.4 Fight against Separatism

Other animal metaphors used to represent “terrorists” are INSECTS and SNAKES. Figure 5.3 is a public welfare advertisement titled “Preaching Jihad Is Illegal.” A man in a military uniform is about to crush insects that seem to be fleeing. While the military-style uniform constructs the man as the power of the state, the caption establishes the insects as the representatives of those who adhere to extremist religious ideologies. In the Chinese context, insects are characterized by their repulsiveness, multitude, and rapid pace of reproduction. If you do not wipe them out quickly, they are likely to multiply quickly, and soon they will be out of control. Under such circumstances, the right course of action is to immediately crush them.

In Figure 5.4, an axe which bears the national emblem of China, representing the state's brute force, is chopping the heads of people who seem to be carrying a blue flag of East Turkistan and some crude weapons such as knives, machetes, and spears. The caption reads "Resolutely Strike Down the Three Forces." By inserting a snake in the midst of the people being chopped, metaphorical correspondence between the snake and those people is established. In this context the snake metaphor calls up the association of venom and corrupting evil. The snake will simply attack humans because that is in its nature. A snake is not rational or reasonable, therefore, it is futile to attempt to have a common-sense dialogue with it. Being lethal and untrustworthy are the most important traits of being a snake. When people are faced with such a lethal reptile, the most logical reaction is to resolutely strike down and kill it.

Metaphors used in these images transform people into rats, insects, and reptiles which live close to the ground and are considered particularly loathsome and destructive. They are associated with taking advantage of the existing conditions and breeding to increase their numbers at a much faster rate than other species, often at the cost of destroying the host environment. Their massive numbers alone make them a threat. Since they, particularly rats and insects, are also considered filthy and disease-carrying bodies, killing them is not considered murder, but on the contrary, a form of modern hygienic practice. When these characteristics and entailments of the source domains are mapped onto representing people who are viewed with suspicion by the government, the logical implication is that these people are not acting out of some legitimate grievances but out of animal instincts. Therefore, we should have no more qualms about exterminating them than killing a bunch of rats, insects, or snakes. Since such a characterization exclusively applies to Uyghurs, it also creates the dominant perception of Uyghurs among other ethnic groups, especially the Han Chinese, that all those who share the

same ethnicity and religious beliefs also belong to the same category of violent and irrational beings. Furthermore, even though there is a binary representation of GOOD UYGHURS and BAD UYGHURS, and the state appears to endorse the actions of GOOD UYGHURS in eradicating the BAD UYGHURS. This can lead viewers to regard the entire Uyghur population as having a tendency to engage in violence and even enjoy the spectacle of beating and killing others who are not like them. This may further deepen the interethnic mistrust and animosity between Uyghurs and the members of other ethnic groups and perpetuate the vicious cycle of ethnic violence in the region.

Several primary metaphors could be identified in the complex metaphor of BAD UYGHURS ARE ANIMALS. The main primary metaphors identified in this section are BEING GOOD IS UPRIGHT, BEING BAD IS LOW, POWER IS UP, and CONTROL IS UP. In each painting, those that represent BAD UYGHURS – rats, insects, and a snake – positioned at the bottom whereas those representing the state – different social classes, a security officer, and an axe – are featured on the top and are much bigger. These primary metaphors fall into the orientational metaphors. As Lakoff (1995) argues, positive and good are associated with up because the aspects of our life that characterize our overall well-being such as happiness, health, and life are also considered up, whereas physical illness forces us to lie down and we are down when we are dead. Also positive emotions such as happiness and excitement make us expand and rise while negative emotions such as sadness and depression make us shrink and recoil. We associate power and control with up because physical size often corresponds to physical strength, and winners are often on top of losers. Based on this observation, Lakoff (1995) notes that “doing evil, therefore, is moving from a position of morality (uprightness) to a position of immorality (being low)” (p. 184). As Michelle Obama said at the 2016 Democratic National

Convention, “When they go low, we go high.” In each of the four images that make use of the complex metaphor of BAD UYGHURS ARE ANIMALS, those who represent the state’s power are depicted as up, positively evaluating the state and implying that it is fully in control; and those considered extremists/terrorists by the state are portrayed as down, which negatively evaluates them as morally fallen and physically weak, suggesting their ultimate defeat.

#### BAD UYGHURS ARE DISEASE

Disease metaphor is another powerful frame used to refer to those labeled as extremists and terrorists in government-produced visuals, although it did not appear in the award-winning peasant paintings. Metaphors of illness and health have a long history of being used in a wide variety of contexts to justify extermination of groups perceived as a disease, most notoriously during the Nazi Holocaust (Sontag, 1990). As part of the Chinese deradicalization campaign, different government agencies used their professional expertise to produce materials educating the public about the importance of ideological conformity. The professionals in the healthcare system used their expertise in disease prevention and treatment to contribute to the campaign.

The material they produced is titled *10 Big Prescriptions for Deradicalization*. In the official introduction to the poster, it is noted that even though the symptoms of ideological and physical diseases are very different, the basic procedures for treating them are the same (Xinhua, 2014). The statement went on to explain that in both cases one has to pay attention to strengthening the immune system, getting checkups, and treating both the symptoms and the root causes of the illness. As Figure 5.5 shows, the first prescription is to increase one’s immunity. The following lines (in Uyghur) read that “we need to vaccinate against three illegals: illegal religious activities, illegal religious materials, illegal religious websites.” There is an image of a virus next to them, which suggests that the virus stands for religious activities and materials

regarded illegal by the Chinese government. A fist coming out of the vaccination seems to be directed at the virus.



Figure 5.5 Prescription One

Prescriptions six through ten focus on how to respond to different stages of infections. While Figure 5.6 depicts the proper steps to treat the disease-infected parts of the body by either using powerful medicine or surgically removing the affected areas, Figure 5.7 provides information about building up one’s immune system by getting vaccinated with “core socialist values” before coming into contacts with the contagious virus.

Figure 5.6 includes prescriptions six and eight: “Eradicating the Disease through Powerful Medicine” and “Cutting off the Source of the Disease through Surgery.” An arrow connects an image of a briefcase from which some loose papers stick out and another image which shows two tablets on a leaf. The captions of the images make clear that the briefcase represents laws which would be used as powerful medication to eradicate the disease. The metaphoric correspondence between laws and medicine is further explained in the paragraph that

follows which states that “using the authority of law, we should strike hard those people who are afflicted by the serious disease of religious extremism.”



Figure 5.6 Prescriptions Six and Eight



Figure 5.7 Prescription Ten

Prescription number eight gives instructions on the next step to take if striking down with the medicine of law is not effective in treating the disease. Surgery is provided as the final solution to treat the disease. The option of performing surgery is explained as “raising high the dagger of the law and severely punishing those engaged in religious extremism in order to eradicate the root causes of the disease.”

The best vaccination against the extremist ideology is described in Figure 5.7 as “cultivating correct views on the nation and ethnicity and developing core socialist values.” The specific methods of achieving these “correct ideological views” are described in the paragraph that follows it, which exhorts the readers to embrace “the Chinese Dream” and “proclaim the party’s benevolence and the country’s solicitude and support.”

These metaphors of illness and virus are used to describe a segment of the minority population that is deemed undesirable by the Chinese government. BAD UYGHURS are understood as disease-carrying viruses and evoke an image of dangerous and invisible beings seeking to infect the nation so that they themselves can survive. They are also described as contagious, suggesting that if they are not dealt with on time, they are likely to affect even more people with the risk of crippling the whole nation, even leading to its death. The appropriate countermeasure any responsible government should take when faced with a public health crisis infecting the “body of the nation” is to implement certain disease-control and prevention steps. The problem for Uyghurs, is that when members of a group are designated a carrier of disease and the public has been taught to perceive them in this way, the whole ethnic group can end up falling into that category of disease-carrying organisms and be subjected to the same extreme measures since there is no visible mark of one’s ideological state.

After the metaphoric correspondence between the source domain of disease and the target domain of those perceived as religious extremists is established, the central aspects of the metaphor shift to how to treat the disease. Two solutions have been proposed: providing medicine to strike down the disease and performing surgery for eradication. The surgery metaphor is particularly harmful because it entails not only removing those parts of the body directly affected with the disease, but in Chinese parlance it also suggests that healthy tissues around the infected area have to be cut out in order to protect the overall health of the body. When mapped onto the domain of ideological control, this metaphor of surgery implies that those who share similar ethnic, cultural and religious proximity to people regarded as extremists by the state may also be the target of such extreme measures. As O’Brian (2003) notes, when the public regards such derogatory metaphorical descriptions as an appropriate way of perceiving

members of certain social groups, it serves to justify certain unjust and inhumane social policies and constructs those social groups as a legitimate target of violence and discrimination. If the suspect group poses a threat to the health of the nation, taking extreme measures would be viewed as necessary for self-defense instead of being considered repressive and discriminatory policies directed at the socially marginalized group. Discussing the consequences of using illness and health metaphors, Sontag (1979) states that “only in the most limited sense is any historical event or problem like an illness” (p. 85) and argues that such metaphors will only encourage simplification of a complex situation and lead to “self-righteousness, if not to fanaticism.” This problem arises when only certain features of the source domain are assigned on the target domain, leading to partial mapping in which some other features of the source domain are backgrounded or even completely left out in understanding the target domain. Uyghurs are portrayed as a high-risk group to be affected by this disease of religious extremism since every other ethnic group in China seems to have immunity against it. However, what gets canceled out in this metaphorical mapping is the deeper analysis of the sociocultural, historical, and economic factors which make Uyghurs particularly vulnerable to those ideologies and consider those factors in actions taken to “treat the disease”.

The metaphor of vaccination in Figure 5.7 suggests that people who are at risk of being infected with the disease of religious extremism, again referring to Uyghurs, should immunize themselves with “core socialist values” and “gratitude towards the party’s benevolence.” However, this metaphor overlooks the fundamental medical principles in which the medicine prescribed has to correspond to the reality of the individual’s medical condition. Portraying the members of the target domain as diseased bodies that need extraordinary treatment cannot

generate the kind of “gratitude” the party expects among Uyghurs and would not lead them to believe that they have a stake in the “Chinese Dream.”

#### BAD UYGHURS ARE EVIL BEINGS

The metaphor of evil beings is another prominent theme systematically employed in the award-winning paintings to portray those regarded as extremists by the Chinese government. As Lakoff (1995) points out, the metaphor of EVIL or a related concept of IMMORALITY cannot be adequately comprehended without the metaphor of MORALITY. Further elaborating on this strict US-THEM moral dichotomy, Lakoff states that the world is seen:

in terms of a war of good against the forces of evil, which must be fought ruthlessly. Ruthless behavior in the name of the good fight, thus, is seen as justified. Moreover, the metaphor entails that one cannot respect the views of one’s adversary: Evil does not deserve respect; it deserves to be attacked! .... You do not empathize with evil, nor do you accord evil some truth of its own. You just fight it (pp. 186-187).

In the paintings, this binary categorization of Uyghurs as either good humans who are happy, wealthy, and beautiful or immoral evil beings who are sad, poor, and disgusting is accomplished through visually representing them as the forces of light and darkness. Metaphor scholars note that associating good and moral with light, and evil and immoral with darkness can be traced to the characteristics of human biology. Since we cannot see well at night, we are less likely to be able to avoid dangers and get hurt. In contrast, we can respond to various threats much more effectively in light. Therefore, in the human conceptual system, darkness is often associated with negative things such as fear and danger (Winter, 2014). Analyzing the use of GOOD IS LIGHT/BAD IS DARK metaphor in Western films, Forceville and Renckens (2013) also demonstrate how light and darkness frequently serve as source domains to help structure

Good and Bad in different modalities, “particularly when emphatically cued and used contrastively” (p. 168). Such contrastive use of light and darkness to represent good and evil can be observed in more than half of all 60 award-winning peasant paintings.

Figures 5.8 and 5.9, which are titled “Two Different Worlds” and “Jilbabs are the Clothing of the Foolish and the Terrorists,” are quite representative of the contrastive ways the GOOD/MORAL UYGHURS and BAD/IMMORAL UYGHURS are portrayed in bright and dark colors, respectively. Both images depict two worlds that are polar opposites of each other. In Figure 5.8, we see two families – parents (perhaps grandparents) and children. Family members seem to be of similar ages. However, the family that is wearing colorful clothing is cast in very beautiful scenery with trees and grass, and they are walking towards tall buildings at the far end. Even the roads seem to be made out of flowers or a colorful carpet. However, the family whose female members wear black Jilbab is physically located in the bottom of the painting.




Figure 5.8 Two Different Worlds



Figure 5.9 Jilbabs Are the Clothing of the Foolish and the Terrorists

Note the recurring primary metaphor of GOOD IS UP/BAD IS DOWN. They are cast in a

desolate, lifeless, and colorless setting where no grass grows and the houses are in shambles. The happy family portrayed in the upper half is turning their backs to the viewer. It can also be interpreted as rejecting the ideology of religious extremism the sad and poor family in the bottom half represents.

Figure 5.8 also references another aspect of the Chinese government's discourse on the causal relationship between religious extremism and poverty. Those who are considered as religious extremists by the government are often portrayed as antimodernity and antitechnology. In government discourses, their attitudes of antimodernity are reflected in their clothing preference – wearing dark and long robes instead of colorful modern outfits. In government discourses in general, conservative/traditional religious minority persons (who tend to prefer private religious education) are also associated with being opposed to science education and modern technology, which is then argued to be the root cause of their poverty. The relationship between radicalization and income level has frequently been the topic of investigation among scholars who study terrorism, political violence, and conflict resolution (Fair & Shepherd, 2006; Krueger & Malečková, 2003; MaleBlair et al., 2013; Najeeb & Sinno, 2010; Rink & Sharma, 2016). These studies challenge the notion that there is a strong causal relationship between poverty and religious extremism, and caution against conceptualizing the root causes of religious extremism purely in economic terms. Dominant factors which have been identified in these studies as contributing to the rise in violence associated with religious extremism include rapid urbanization (Moussaeau, 2011), disruptive economic-cultural effects of the marketization process (Krieger & Meierrieks, 2015), historically troubled social relations (Rink & Sharma, 2016), and other complex characteristics unique to the contexts and individuals (Blair et al., 2013), all of which could be used to characterize contemporary China. However, none of the

studies that investigated this relationship provides any support to the argument that religious extremism is the root cause of economic impoverishment.

Attributing Uyghur's economic marginalization to their adherence to Islam works to downplay the government's role in not being able to mitigate the sociocultural and economic effects of the transformation China experienced as it transitioned from a rural and agrarian society to an urban and industrial one. It also creates an interesting dichotomy in which the negative issues such as poverty, lower educational attainment, and violence are attributed solely to the role of individuals while the positive developments such as economic prosperity, improvement in healthcare and education, and social stability are credited solely to the leadership of the Party.

The contrast between two types of Uyghurs is even sharper in Figure 5.9. The two women on the right are wearing a red suit and a green and white dress. Even though one is wearing a headscarf and the other one is wearing a Doppa, a traditional Uyghur skullcap, both of them only have their hair partially covered by their headwear. The women on the left are completely covered in black clothes. They are portrayed as dark shadows without proper human shapes. It looks as if an evil spirit is residing in the woman on the far left and directing her to engage in some wicked scheme.

Here the metaphor of GOOD IS LIGHT/BAD IS DARK is used to dichotomously represent Uyghurs either as moral humans who are happy, wealthy, and beautiful or immoral evil beings who are sad, poor, and disgusting. In particular, one's choice of a certain clothing style is framed in this metaphor as an indicator that they are inherently evil and intent on engaging in violent acts. Darkness which is used here to visually represent more traditional Uyghurs evokes a sense that they pose a danger and a security threat to the well-being of the society. Such

invocation of fear also conditions and prepares viewers to readily accept the proposed course of action to counter the fear, ultimately legitimizing aggressive security measures implemented by the government in Xinjiang. Also such a vivid portrayal with specific examples also reinforces and maintains the already negative perception among the wider Chinese public of a sizable portion of the Uyghur population. The portrayal makes their unfavorable image even more concrete and enduring, hence further alienating Uyghurs from becoming active participants in Chinese society. It also makes use of the source domain of CONTAINER (BODY IS A CONTAINER) to illustrate a more abstract concept of demon and represent it as residing inside the body, thus achieving dehumanization of those Uyghurs. Dehumanization of those Uyghurs considered extremists by the Chinese government is further realized in the figure by erasing any facial features that normally characterize humans. Noting potential effects of such faceless representations of humans, Butler (2006) states that “those who remain faceless or whose faces are presented to us as so many symbols of evil, authorize us to become senseless before those lives we have eradicated and whose grievability is indefinitely postponed” (p. 18). Representing those Uyghurs as faceless bodies constructs them as creatures that may not experience suffering and grief as humans do, hence working to justify any punishment against them. It presents them as some bodies carrying evil spirits. When the government takes punitive actions against those bodies, the real target is the demons occupying the bodies. This metaphorical mapping also entails that since whoever is in charge of the body opened the door of the container and allowed the evil spirit to take control, they are ultimately responsible for being possessed by the evil spirit; the only way to get rid of the demon is to destroy its place of residence.

After a dichotomous representation of GOOD UYGHURS vs. BAD UYGHURS is established, it can be maintained by adapting to the demands of the discursive field. The

dominant metaphor is then extended to associate various positive attributes with GOOD UYGHURS and negative ones with BAD UYGHURS as indicated in Figures 5.10 and 5.11.



Figure 5.10 Closedness Is the Path to Darkness      Figure 5.11 Contrast

Figures 5.10 and 5.11 further build on the already established binary representation of GOOD UYGHURS vs. BAD UYGHURS to portray GOOD UYGHURS as fun-loving, education-valuing, technology-embracing, and highly productive, while constructing BAD UYGHURS as opposed to entertainment, education, and technology, hence unproductive. On the upper section of Figure 5.10, three images are framed within sunflower heads. The picture in the left sunflower head shows a group of children playing a game. The children, judging by their outfits, seem to be from different ethnic backgrounds, signaling ethnic unity. In the middle picture, presumably the same group of students are attentively listening to their teacher. Chinese characters “民族团结” (ethnic solidarity) are written on the blackboard. The third picture in the right sunflower head portrays a young woman dancing to the sound of a *dap*, a tambourine like instrument, played by a young man. Together these three pictures further reinforce the representation of GOOD UYGHURS as Uyghurs who value education and engage in various fun activities. In contrast, there are a mother and a daughter dressed in dark clothing below each

picture. It appears that the young girl wants to join the other GOOD UYGHURS, but her mother is pulling the girl away to the dark side. In Figure 5.11 titled “Contrast,” the family on the right half of the painting is portrayed as BAD UYGHURS who hold views considered extremist by the government. The woman and the little girl are wearing dark black clothing that covers every part of their body except the eyes and the man has a beard. The viewer is invited to make a link between the family’s religious view which is indicated from their outward appearance and the refusal to use modern farming technology, relying instead on an ancient plow made out of wood to cultivate their land. As a result, their land is barren and even the trees do not have leaves. In contrast, the family next to them is portrayed as GOOD UYGHURS who do not dress improperly and conducts farming using a small truck representing modernity and the embrace of technology, hence the plentiful harvest of honey melons and grapes.

It is worth noting that these paintings also make use of the aforementioned primary metaphors of GOOD IS UP/BAD IS DOWN and GOOD IS LIGHT/BAD IS DARK to represent GOOD UYGHURS and BAD UYGHURS. The contrastive metaphoric frame between the two types of Uyghurs potentially accomplishes two seemingly contradictory goals. On one hand, it portrays those considered religious extremists as backward and seems to exclude them socially as they are considered unfit to mingle with GOOD UYGHURS who are modern and active. On the other hand, it blames them for isolating themselves and constructs their exclusion from a desirable mainstream Chinese society as their own fault. Moreover, the polar representation of Uyghurs is further extended to characterize the BAD UYGHURS as Uyghurs who reject education, technology, and entertainment, hence the explanation for their sad and poor state. Despite the portrayal of BAD UYGHURS as anti-technology and anti-modernity in these paintings, in other paintings they are represented as too savvy in their skills to use internet

communication technology for watching, downloading, and spreading religious content. In fact, former Xinjiang Party secretary Zhang Chunxian said at a press conference in 2014 that the frequency of violent incidents in Xinjiang is “not an indication of government’s faulty ethnic and religious policies, nor does it prove that the government’s recent crackdown is inappropriate. It is because about 90 percent of violent terrorists use means such as VPN (Virtual Private Networks) to circumvent the Great Fire Wall and is part of the international trend” (Global Times, 2014; Wong, 2014a). Such inconsistencies as to the attributes of BAD UYGHURS exemplify how the official discourse offers contradictory and incoherent accounts for the causes of economic disparity, religious extremism, and violence in the region. While discussing economic disparity, the lack of technological skills of BAD UYGHURS and their refusal to embrace modernity is emphasized as the root cause. However, when discussing the spread of religious extremism in Xinjiang, the savviness of BAD UYGHURS in using modern technology is provided as the explanation. As long as such explanations are convenient for a particular case the Party is building, the fact that some of these statements create internal inconsistency in the discourse is glossed over. Such discrepancies in discourse are also noticeable in metaphoric representation of religion.

## RELIGION IS EVIL

Religion, Islam in particular, is also portrayed as inherently evil and directly responsible for violence and ethnic conflict in the region. Figure 5.12, titled “Misery of Hell,” comprises a chain of events. Starting from the bottom left corner and going clockwise, we first see from three people praying, watching a violent terrorism video, engaging in arson, and eventually appearing behind bars. In the center, a child that is apparently left parentless is crying. What is assumed

here is that religion, Islam in this case, is inherently violent and the cause of destruction and despair.



Figure 5.12 Misery of Hell



Figure 5.13 Extremist Forces Go to Hell

In these award-winning paintings, people who practice Islam or follow certain Islamic traditions are represented as evil. They are portrayed as either antimodernity or worse, intent on causing violence. In contrast, none of the attributes associated with GOOD UYGHURS involves any religious practices, instead they are engaged in the rituals of secularism and Chinese forms of patriotic acts. The binary representation of GOOD UYGHURS as secular and BAD UYGHURS as religious constructs a faith-based life and socially engaged life in larger Chinese society as mutually exclusive. It seems to convey the message that there are only two options for Uyghur people: on the one hand observing their religious faith leads to violence and destruction; on the other hand, living a secular life leads to prosperity, social acceptance, and happiness. Furthermore, it attributes the socioeconomic problems facing Uyghur communities to their religious belief. Kassimeris and Jackson (2012) describe such a representation as “characteristic of the problem solving approach to social management, in which the status quo is left secure and un-scrutinized, and the historical policies, inequalities, and political discriminations and grievances that have contributed to the problems are dismissed in favor of an all-encompassing

discourse of Muslim cultural dysfunction that suggests the problem is with them, not us” (p. 192).

Even though religion is constituted as evil and leading people to engage in violent acts, when religious concepts are considered useful to advance the party’s ideology, they are used as legitimate beliefs nonetheless. Figure 5.13 titled “Extremist Forces Go to Hell” is one of the ten first-prize winning paintings. It portrays four people who seem to be carrying knives and wearing suicide belts. They are being thrown into a pit of fire by a sharp-bladed sword that represents the state’s security power. As the title suggests, they will be sent to hell by the Party. Religious beliefs which were presented as evil in other paintings are used as a valid concept in this context to warn individuals not to oppose the Party’s rule.

#### PARTY IS BENEFACTOR

A closely related metaphor to the GOOD UYGHURS metaphor is the PARTY IS BENEFACTOR metaphor which characterizes the Communist Party and its representatives as the guardian of social stability, provider of economic prosperity, and architect of scientific and technological development. The Party is represented as ruthless towards those who are perceived as BAD UYGHURS and sparing no effort in wiping them out and guarding social stability, whereas it is presented as the BENEFACTOR of GOOD UYGHURS. This metaphor is clearly manifested in Figures 5.14 and 5.15 titled “Benevolence of the Party” and “Peasants and Herdsmen Learn Modern Knowledge and Scientific Technology,” respectively.

Figure 5.14 shows Tiananmen gate in Beijing on the top of which is the flag symbolizing the seat of the CCP’s power. Then a red vein connects Tiananmen to the rest of the scenes in the painting. Red, which represents blood, constructs the Party as indispensable to the continuation of life in Chinese society. On the top right, a man who is carrying an ax is shot with arrows from

every side and blood is pouring out from his body. The Chinese and Uyghur captions read “Resolutely strike down violent terrorists.” That emphasizes the government’s first priority as guaranteeing social stability and striking down those BAD UYGHURS who seek to disrupt it. Other scenes in the painting describe GOOD UYGHURS enjoying different aspects of the benevolence of the Party. Their elders are well taken care of by party cadres and kids are attending a bilingual school. They are engaged in growing cotton and trading livestock. The increased quality of life is demonstrated by the new homes with running water and a car parked in front.




Figure 5.14 Benevolence of the Party



Figure 5.15 Peasants and Herdsmen Learn Modern Knowledge and Scientific Technology

Figure 5.15 further reinforces the PARTY IS BENEFACTOR metaphor by describing the work a specific Party representative has done for GOOD UYGHURS. A Han cadre, representing the Party, is seen as guiding Uyghur farmers and teaching them the techniques of scientific farming. Her work has resulted in a bountiful harvest and led Uyghur farmers to express their gratitude to their “hero.”

This metaphor of PARTY IS BENEFACTOR constructs a transactional relationship between the Party and Uyghurs, in which Uyghurs are positioned as receivers of various benefits

provided by the Party. Such a conceptualization lays the groundwork to create the dichotomous representation of Uyghurs as either GOOD/MORAL UYGHURS or BAD/IMMORAL UYGHURS, which can be analyzed within what Lakoff (1995) calls the metaphor of MORAL ACCOUNTING. He argues that we conceptualize morality in transactional terms. If someone does something good for us, it is considered moral and it makes us indebted to that person. Since it is immoral not to repay your debt, in order to act morally, we must do something good in return. Since the Party, the benevolent sovereign, is represented as the promoter of the well-being of Uyghurs, it is immoral to act against the will of the Party. Uyghurs who seek to damage the Party's interests are represented as ungrateful and immoral people who disrupt the balance of the moral books, therefore the Party must pay them back with negative actions to restore the balance.

Perhaps, the metaphor of MORAL ACCOUNTING can best illustrate the deep gulf between how the Party and Uyghurs view each other's role in this transactional relationship. The Party considers itself as a Benefactor that has brought economic growth and technological development to the region, therefore it expects Uyghurs to repay the debt by being docile subjects. However, Uyghurs increasingly feel that the fruits of the economic growth disproportionately benefit the Han majority and that they are also politically and culturally marginalized in China; therefore, the imbalance on the moral books looks very different to them. It is worth noting that as long as metaphors such as PARTY IS BENEFACTOR continue to dominate the discourse on ethnic relations, the current gap in mutual understanding between the two sides is bound to widen and a comprehensive approach to dealing with the tension in the region will become more difficult to achieve.

## Conclusion

I would end this chapter by echoing what Lakoff and many other metaphor scholars have long stated. Metaphors shape how we comprehend ourselves and interact with our natural and social surroundings. It is not an overstatement to say that “metaphors can kill” (Lakoff, 1991, p. 1, Sontag, 1991). The results of a study conducted by Thibodeau and Boroditsky (2011) also underscore the critical role metaphors play in influencing our decision-making process in response to complex social issues such as crime. In their study, they divided their participants into two groups and presented them with a report on crime statistics on a particular city. The only difference in the report each group received was the opening sentence that framed the issue of crime: “Crime is a wild beast preying on/virus infecting the city of Addison.” Other than this, both groups were provided the same information on the city and the problem it was facing. Then the participants were asked to propose a solution to deal with the problem. Participants to whom crime was presented as a virus suggested measures in line with how a contagious disease should be treated. They proposed investigating the source of the problem, identifying how it spreads, educating the public on how to prevent its spread, and implementing social reforms to eradicate the root causes of the virus. In contrast, those to whom crime was framed as a wild beast suggested measures consistent with knowledge structures related to hunting. They proposed strengthening law enforcement by hiring more police officers and building more prisons, so that the criminals could be captured and jailed. The differences in the proposed suggestions by the two groups were not significant when the metaphor used to frame the whole report was removed in a separate experiment. The authors also reported that even though there were clear distinctions between the two groups on their suggestions to approach this complex social issue, the participants stated that they based their responses on the statistics provided in the report, not on

the metaphors in the opening statement which were used to frame the issue. From this, the researchers concluded that although metaphors often play a significant role in how we approach solving complicated social problems, their influence is often at the subconscious level.

The metaphors of ANIMALS, DISEASE, and EVIL BEINGS which have been closely examined in this chapter are vivid and visceral manifestation of the Chinese government's ideology framing Uyghurs. This ideology assigns Uyghurs dichotomous identities of either GOOD UYGHURS who are happy, prosperous, and grateful to the Party or BAD UYGHURS who act irrationally and choose self-destruction over peaceful and productive lives. The ideology also stipulates what behaviors and actions characterize each type of Uyghurs and the consequences one will face when failing to live up to the expectations of GOOD UYGHURS.

Such representations not only shape how Uyghurs are perceived and treated by the general Chinese public, they also influence how the Chinese government approaches solving the issue of interethnic relations in terms of substantive policy reform. It is frequently stressed by the Party that Uyghurs fall into two categories – GOOD UYGHURS and BAD UYGHURS – and the sole target of such a dehumanizing campaign is those who belong to the latter category. However, one of the primary functions of metaphor is to represent the whole through a part or define the whole through a particular characteristic. Since all the negative characters portrayed in various metaphors in the official discourse are Uyghurs and the main criteria to judge them is their physical appearance, metaphor is easily transformed from referring to individuals to encompassing the entire ethnic group. As a result, an entire group is deprived of their humanity. Particularly, as Forceville (2008) argues, if such representations are conveyed through visual media, certain aspects of the metaphors may be made more salient and “emotionally involving

than purely linguistic ones” (p. 463), which in turn may more forcefully reinforce and maintain the negative perception of Uyghurs in China.

History offers plenty of examples regarding what follows when a particular minority group is constantly evaluated negatively by the dominating group. Steuter and Wills (2008) have illustrated the relationship between dehumanization of certain groups and the violence and genocide against them through examining “historical examples of racist propaganda such as Nazi depictions of Jews, representations of the Japanese during WWII, and more recent examples of the first Gulf War and Rwanda” (p. 8). In another study, they have focused more on the discourse of the War on Terror and argued that there is a strong correlation between the discourse regarding Islam and Muslims following 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq and the other humanitarian tragedies which ensued in the region. In all these examples, there is a pattern in which dehumanization of a particular group precedes “abuse, oppression, and even genocide” (Steuter & Wills, 2010, p. 152).

Many of the rhetorical themes and strategies that we observe in these paintings were also widely used during the Cultural Revolution (1966 - 1976), a period known even in Chinese history as “ten years of chaos” or “ten years of darkness”. The violence, chaos, and mass hysteria created during that period were also facilitated through the use of polarizing and combative discourse that promoted violence against the discursively constructed enemy groups. During those 10 years of turmoil, anyone who did not agree with or enthusiastically support whatever policies Mao and his followers in the CCP leadership imposed would be labeled as class enemies, in a very similar way Uyghurs who express any dissent to the CCP policies in Xinjiang are characterized as terrorists. Mass killings and persecution of tens of millions of Chinese people who happened to fall into the wrong identity categories were legitimated in discourse

because they were also metaphorically constructed as parasites, vermins, snakes, and nonhuman and evil beings which did not deserve sympathy (Lu, 1999, p. 497). The result of such dangerous discourse was one of the most “catastrophic mass movements and political upheavals of the twentieth century” (Lu, 2004, p. 11). Lu (1999, 2004) also notes close similarities among the discursive strategies used to dehumanize the so-called class enemies during the Cultural Revolution to the tactics deployed in Nazi Germany and Stalin’s Russia during 1930s, a point I also demonstrated in this study. In all of these past atrocities, metaphorical dehumanization of an entire group plays a key role in framing the violence and pain those portrayed as subhuman beings experience as something fundamentally different from those experienced by the dominant group, thereby suppressing the urge to sympathize with the suffering of the target group. It also precedes mass killings and horrendous human rights abuses, something we are beginning to see in the latest developments in Xinjiang.

These dehumanizing metaphoric frames of rodent animals, insects, reptiles, disease, and evil beings are often used as the source domain because they are effective in creating an atmosphere of fear and representing the target domain as a threat. Any measure to counter the threat will be considered not only justified and necessary, but also as a noble act and performing one’s duties. This can help explain the increasingly heavy-handed and high-pressure security policies that have been implemented in Xinjiang. These metaphors also attempt to explain complex social issues affecting the people in the region through a single lens of religious extremism. The violent incidents which have taken place in Xinjiang have deep social, economic, and historical causes. While some of them are unique to the region and the relationship between Uyghurs and the Chinese government, many are also common social problems which naturally occur in any society experiencing profound transformations such as

China. According to various studies (Chen & Kang, 2016; Lee & Zhang, 2013; Tong & Lei, 2010; Wedeman, 2016), the number of popular protests or mass incidents as they are called in China increased from 8300 in 1993 to 127,000 in 2008, and to 187,000 in 2012. Currently, 200,000 mass incidents involving Hans occur in China proper each year. Research on contentious politics in China has examined different ways the Chinese government has adapted its approaches to handle mass protests. What emerges from such literature is that even though repression is always an option in dealing with mass incidents, especially with those incidents that cross geographic and class boundaries, brute force is rarely used to quell mass incidents involving Han. Contrary to popular perception of how an authoritarian government operates, in many cases, the Chinese government makes concessions to the protestors' demands and attempts to address their concerns. According to Tong and Lei (2010), "the government has accommodated close to 30 percent of the large-scale mass incidents with economic compensation" (p. 487). Perry (2009) also cites abolition of agricultural tax and enactment of property rights as examples of important policy reforms the Chinese government has implemented as a result of popular protests. The social factors which have prompted mass protests in other parts of China such as land and water disputes, corruption, poor quality of governance, environmental degradation also affect Uyghur residents in Xinjiang, with the addition of cultural and religious restrictions. Despite the commonalities with social factors which give rise to mass incidents in the rest of China, any type of social protest in Xinjiang is interpreted through a narrow lens of religious extremism and no accommodation is made to protestors' demands and legitimate grievances. Moreover, protestors are labeled as BAD UYGHURS who are then represented through a wide range of dehumanizing metaphor tropes, delegitimizing their demands and further alienating them. However, attempting to address the

issues in the region through a narrowly constructed ideological dichotomy of GOOD UYGHURS vs. BAD UYGHURS will limit the government's ability to envision comprehensive policies to effectively deal with the problems in the region; on the contrary, it will exacerbate the problems, cut off the possibility for Uyghurs to meaningfully engage with the Chinese state, and make achieving lasting peace more and more difficult.

## **Chapter Six**

### **Conclusion**

The profound sociopolitical and economic changes China has experienced since the reforms of the 1980s have been accompanied by state discourses that played a key role in facilitating these changes. An important component of such changes has occurred in the Party's discourses surrounding the governance of Xinjiang and its relations with Uyghurs, the dominant ethnic minority group in the region. The aim of this study has been to analyze these changes in discourse in light of the sociopolitical and historical contexts. This has served to center a discussion of the dialectical relationship between discursive changes and sociopolitical and economic factors which shape and are shaped by those changes in discourse. This dissertation began by tracing the genealogy of the representations of Uyghur protests since the 1980s and went on to examine the verbal and visual manifestations and reinforcement of the discourse of terrorism in news and state-sponsored art. Analyzing this genealogy showed that with each shift in discourse, Uyghur protestors were constructed as more and more dehumanized, irrational, and immoral. Their motives were presented not as goals driven by political and material circumstances, but something more sinister. In the current discourse of the People's War on Terror, the protestors are often represented as motivated by hatred and religious extremism. This characterization simultaneously renders the cause of their actions self-evident (they are hate-filled fanatics), while at the same time incomprehensible because they are self-destructive and nihilistic, valuing death over life.

This internal contradiction about the nature and causes of terrorism, being simultaneously crystal-clear and unintelligible, is further exemplified by the exponential growth of terrorism scholarship in China as in the rest of the world. Reviewing literature on Chinese research on

terrorism between 1980 and 2014, Li and Mei (2015) report that a total of 309 academic articles which contained “terrorism” or “East Turkistan terrorism” as key words were published in China during the 20 years between 1980 and 2000. However, 457 articles on this topic were published in 2002 alone, which far exceeds the total number published prior to 2001. Since then, it has been burgeoning as a field of academic study in China, with the establishment of journals, research institutions, and university majors that specialize in terrorism studies. Stampnitzky (2013) cautions against regarding the rapid emergence and consolidation of the field of terrorism studies as a necessary or inevitable response to the rise of violent protests. She states that doing so would be neglecting the symbiotic relationship between the social actors who are actively engaged in producing the discourse and their object of knowledge. As the historical background in Chapter 2 and the genealogical analysis in Chapter 3 of this study demonstrated, Xinjiang has not been historically immune to ethnic tension and has periodically experienced violent outbursts throughout history. Therefore, the boom in the Chinese terrorism discourse and its associated expertise cannot necessarily be correlated to an increase in violent protests carried out by Uyghurs. Nevertheless, there exists a paradoxical relationship between the discourse of terrorism in China and academic scholarship used to conceptualize it. If what terrorism is and what causes it are as obvious and easily understood as they are represented to be in state-sponsored art – terrorists engage in acts of violence because they are evil – there should be little need for academic scholarship to increase one’s knowledge of the phenomenon. However, if on the other hand their motives are seen as irrational, fanatical, and unfathomable as they are constructed in the very same discourse, then academics are basically engaging in futile attempts to explain the inexplicable.

This internal contradiction within the Chinese academic discourse on terrorism which is closely aligned with and shaped by the official discourse on terrorism is emblematic of many of the problems faced in terrorism studies worldwide (Stampnitzky, 2011). In the Chinese context this contradiction appears to be even more amplified due to the strict censorship and ideological control imposed by the Party. Some critically oriented scholars (Dixit & Stump, 2011; Jackson, 2007, 2009; Jarvis, 2009) have attempted to address this tension in academic discourse on terrorism by focusing on the underlying ontological, epistemological, and methodological problems that beset much of the academic discourse on terrorism. Their work is often associated with a new research paradigm called critical terrorism studies (CTS). In this chapter, I first explore how theoretical and methodological frameworks developed within CTS can provide us with valuable insights to further our understanding of various aspects of the terrorism discourse as it is conceptualized in China. I argue that the critique of expert discourse I discussed above also applies to the Chinese official discourse, since the expert discourse on terrorism closely aligns with the official discourse in the Chinese political system. I then conclude by discussing the overall significance of this study as well as areas of further research.

### **Examining Terrorism Discourse from CTS Perspective**

CTS largely grew out of the dissatisfaction of some scholars with the dominance of academic terrorism discourse that mainly looks at political violence through a mechanistic problem-solving lens. Drawing intellectual influence from the Frankfurt School of critical theory and Foucauldian poststructuralism, CTS approaches political violence from the perspective of conflict resolution and critical peace studies. In this section, I will outline four main problems in the dominant discourse on political violence identified by CTS scholars (Blakely, 2007; Breen Smyth et al., 2008; Jackson, 2007; Jarvis, 2009), namely state centrality, a problem-solving

perspective, ahistoricism, and depoliticization, and discuss how their manifestations in the context of ethnic tension in Xinjiang are similar to or different from the way they have been conceptualized in a Western context.

State centrality is primarily manifested in the discursive construction of the state as the legitimate user of violence and representation of nonstate actors as terrorists (Jackson, 2007). When political and ethnic violence is discussed, the knowledge of terrorism and the role discourse has played in constructing such knowledge is taken for granted and left unexamined. Operating within a positivist framework, such discourse treats terrorism as a natural phenomenon that exists “out there” in the physical world. Since existing state institutions are given priority over nonstate entities, states are permitted to do whatever they can to maintain the status quo and preserve their interests. While state centrality in official Chinese discourse is not particularly surprising considering the position of the CCP as the governing party, its conceptualization of any protests as terrorism unnecessarily complicates ethnic relations and has profound implications on the governance of the region. Within the Chinese discourse on terrorism, any attempts to understand specific grievances of protestors or explain the underlying social, political, and economic factors that motivate the protests are seen as being sympathetic to, or providing justification for, terrorism. This is a point which was exemplified in the Chinese government’s sentencing of a Uyghur economics professor from Central Minzu University to life in prison for speaking out against the systemic discrimination experienced by Uyghurs (Wong, 2014c; Zhou, 2014). Thus, the discourse has severely limited the possibilities for creatively dealing with Uyghur discontent. It has created a false dichotomy in which the only way to ensure the Party’s rule is to deny any legitimacy to the demands and frustrations of the local population. This mentality has led to the creation of a vast security and surveillance apparatus in Xinjiang

which works to intimidate would-be challengers of state power and severely punish those who dare to deviate from the official ideology even in the slightest way. A recent example of such policies by the state that demonstrate the level of heavy-handedness of Chinese rule includes punishing a local official in Southern Xinjiang for not smoking in front of religious elders because it was considered a sign of not being resolute in his commitment to fight religious extremism (*Seattle Times*, 2017). If the definition of terrorism is to create fear among the target population to achieve one's political goal, this and many other policies implemented by the Chinese government in Xinjiang definitely fall into that category. For these reasons, many CTS scholars argue that state violence should be included in the discussion of political violence (cf. Blakeley, 2007; Herring, 2008; Jackson, 2008).

Another area often critiqued by CTS scholars is the problem-solving approach that dominates terrorism discourse (Gunning, 2007; Jackson, 2007; Jarvis, 2009; Kassimeris & Jackson, 2012). This approach attempts to solve the problems perceived as a threat to the existing order by addressing the symptoms of the problem so that the various parts of the “prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized” (Cox, 1981, p. 208) work more smoothly. Since it does not deal with the root causes such as historical oppression, unequal policies, racism, and other injustices, it often fails to solve the problems, in some cases even exacerbating them. The worsening of the ethnic relations and growing discontent among Uyghurs in Xinjiang is a good example of the disastrous consequences of this approach. It appears that the more policies and restrictions the Chinese government implements to assimilate Uyghur people and eliminate outward indications of their discontent or defiance, the more frustration and disillusionment such attempts generate among Uyghurs, which in turn leads more people to turn to religious ideology for solace.

Believing that religion is the root cause of the ethnic tension in the region, the Party has enacted severe restrictions on Islamic practices. In Xinjiang, government employees, teachers, or students are banned from participating in any religious activities such as praying or fasting (Rahula, 2014; Al Jazeera, 2015; RFA, 2016b). During Ramadan, officials in Southern Xinjiang often require their employees to drink or eat during the day to show that they are not fasting. Uyghur employees are forced to eat a piece of fruit or drink some water in front of their bosses to appear as though they are not observing Ramadan. These Muslim employees often rationalize their eating during fasting by stating that since such drinking or eating activities is not voluntary, it would not be considered breaking the fast according to localized interpretation of religious rules of fasting. In university dormitories, school officials often attempt to enforce the ban on fasting by monitoring dormitory rooms for any activities during predawn hours during Ramadan, punishing and, in some cases, even expelling students who are caught waking up and eating before dawn. In order to avoid punishment, it has become a common practice among Uyghur college students to bring food to their bedside the night before and eat their predawn meal without getting up from their bed or turning on the light.

Another such example of appearing to follow the official rules on the surface while continuing to practice their faith concerns the way Uyghur people instill Islamic teachings in their children. The Chinese government prohibits anyone under 18 years old from participating in religious learning. Since there is no officially recognized channel for people to pass on religious knowledge to the next generation, the prohibition on Islamic instruction has led to a mushrooming of private religious study groups across Xinjiang. The list of government policy initiatives to restrict religious and cultural practices and the corresponding covert ways devised by Uyghur people to resist those policies and subvert the state's control over their bodies have

grown at similar rates. These policies are typical of the problem-solving approach to social issues and only treat and control the outward manifestation of religious practices. However, these surface controls cannot change people's ideologies. On the contrary, they often (re)produce and strengthen oppositional consciousness and alternative discourses. On the surface people might appear to be conforming to whatever rules the government imposes, but in fact they find subtle ways to continue those religious and cultural practices, often even more piously than before. Such problem-solving approaches which only focus on symptoms cannot effectively deal with the fundamental causes of the problem, rather they often end up exacerbating the underlying structural issues.

Ahistoricism and depoliticization of political violence are two other aspects of terrorism discourse that are heavily problematized in CTS. An ahistorical perspective regarding political violence ignores, willfully or not, the sociohistorical and political contexts of the conflict (Gunning, 2007; Jackson, 2007) and is not sensitive to the particular contexts from which the conflict arises (Dexit & Stump, 2011). Similarly, depoliticization also downplays the legitimate demands or grievances of disempowered social actors involved in political violence. These are precisely the main points I made in Chapters 2 and 3. Before the emergence of terrorism discourse in China, Uyghur protests were primarily analyzed in political and historical terms. The Baren Incident was represented as an example of political struggle between revolutionaries and counterrevolutionaries. The Ghulja Incident was characterized as a continuation of separatist activities that had historical roots in the establishment of the two independent East Turkistan Republics in Xinjiang in the 1930s and 1940s. However, the ahistoricism and depoliticization that dominate the current Chinese terrorism discourse offer simplistic and moralistic explanations such as "terrorists are evil" instead of examining complex historical and political

factors that contribute to the violence. They also make it easier to deprive groups or individuals of any legitimacy in their expression of genuine grievances through the many representations that construct them as irrational beings. The implication is then that reaching a peaceful solution to end the cycle of violence is considered impossible because it appears useless to attempt to dialogue with irrational beings.

### **What CTS Suggests**

To counter these issues posed by the discourse of terrorism, CTS scholars proposed the following as the guiding principles to studying political violence. The primary focus of research within the CTS paradigm is to achieve social justice and work towards ending inequality and structural violence. Several different approaches have been put forward to accomplish these lofty goals such as reevaluating the potential of existing governance structures and creating spaces for open dialogue. I suggest that these principles can be particularly applicable to the context of Xinjiang. Jackson (2009) called for dealing with the conditions that compel both state and nonstate actors to resort to violence and reimagining the current social order so that the potential of existing structures could be realized and individuals could be freed from unnecessary structural constraints (p. 6). Dealing with the underlying root causes and relaxing unnecessary structural restrictions are exactly two major themes that often come up in my conversations with many Uyghurs on the issue of ethnic relations in the region and what they indicate as their hopes for the future of the region. They are acutely aware that given China's economic and military power and the geopolitical significance of Xinjiang, efforts to seek independence are unrealistic and out of the question. However, many also express deep frustrations regarding various policies that limit their economic mobility and put unnecessary constraints on their cultural and religious practices. For example, under the constraints of the People's War on Terror, Uyghur residents of

Xinjiang cannot travel between towns, not to mention traveling to other provinces, without a permit from the government. Getting a permit is nearly impossible for people without money or connections in the government. It severely restricts their mobility, particularly those already marginalized economically, and traps them in their villages where there is little economic opportunity. If some do succeed in securing a travel permit, they have to immediately report to the local police and community centers upon their arrival at their destination and be put under the supervision of security forces and community social workers during their visit. In the cultural sphere, basic ritual practices from baby naming ceremonies, weddings, and funerals can only proceed with permits from the government and must be conducted under direct supervision of government officials (RFA, 2017). These are just a few examples of the excessive state penetration into daily life and the unnecessary and often counterproductive restrictions imposed on Uyghur people. This is exactly what is meant by CTS scholars when they argue for reimagining existing social governance structures and removing unnecessary controls that are preventing people from realizing their full potential.

Another approach proposed to achieve the stated goals of CTS is to free up space for dialogue and deliberation for those whose voices have been marginalized (McDonald, 2007). Even though such a proposal might sound overly idealistic considering the nature of governance in Xinjiang, to some extent such space for dialogue and deliberation did exist in Xinjiang in the decade following reform and the opening-up policies of Deng Xiaoping in 1978. Having such spaces fostered mutual understanding and goodwill among the members of different ethnic groups. In the 1980s, daily life in Xinjiang was not dominated by ethnic tension, suspicion, and animosity like it is today. As many observers who have been following the politics of Xinjiang also point out, the 1980s were characterized by relative openness and considered a “golden

period” in the nearly seven-decade rule of Xinjiang by the CCP. There was a relatively high degree of autonomy in cultural and religious matters. The government was also viewed quite favorably by many Uyghurs, not as a juggernaut which poses an existential threat to the whole ethnic group. There is a genuine desire among the Uyghur people to work within the system to get their grievances addressed, a point highlighted by how the 1997 Ghulja incident, the 2009 Urumqi incident, and the 2014 Yarkant incident began by peacefully demanding the government respond to their concerns. In their study on the use of Computer Mediated Communication (CMC) such as interactive online forums by Uyghurs in China, Clothey and Koku (2017) observed that even though Uyghur Internet users “promote oppositional consciousness and facilitate subtle forms of resistance” (p. 363), they detected no content that advocated physical acts of subversion against the Chinese government. In general, Uyghurs understand that the sole option, and also the best option, is to work within the existing geopolitical system to improve their conditions and ensure their ongoing existence. Bearing this in mind, the government could open up legal or administrative channels for Uyghurs to express their complaints, so that people will be able to get their grievances addressed within the state-sanctioned framework and be less likely to engage in acts of desperation.

However, both approaches advocated in CTS scholarship, reimagining the existing social order and freeing up space for dialogue, are excluded as viable solutions in the current discourse of the so-called People’s War on Terror. Within the current discourse, the persistence of the conflict in the region is understood as stemming mainly from not “cracking down” hard enough. Nearly two decades have passed since the discourse of terrorism began to emerge as the dominant ideology shaping the Chinese government’s perception of Uyghur discontent and guiding its responses and approaches in addressing the issue. It appears that each discursive shift

in dominant discourse made possible more hardline policies which have further fueled and exacerbated the ethnic tension in the region. This is the reason why this dissertation has focused on examining the diachronic changes in discursive construction of Uyghur protests and the manifestations of the latest change in news discourse and state-sponsored art. All centralized governments throughout Chinese history have faced various forms of protest at the local level, both in China proper and border regions. It was true during the dynastic period and still true today under the rule of the Communist Party. By extension, we can also state that whenever Xinjiang was ruled by a power based in China proper, protests of various scales and forms were a natural part of governance. Yet even though the protests we have seen in the last 20 years are not inherently different from earlier periods, their discursive characterization is vastly different, and this difference has produced grave implications. This dissertation used textual evidence to illustrate the socially constructed nature of China's People's War on Terror discourse. However, as Stampnitzky (2013) has noted "to show that something is constructed is not to negate its reality" (p. 5). Merely demonstrating that various forms of protests have always accompanied the rule of Xinjiang by powers based in China proper and that the most significant change in the process is in the discourse of representing the protests does not cause the discourse to lose its power. However, discourses provide social actors with knowledge that makes certain responses appear as necessary and legitimate actions while excluding others from being considered logical and appropriate. Therefore, conducting critical analysis of the discourse on how protests are represented and the ways the identities of the protestors are constructed is significant in several important ways. In this concluding section I would like to discuss the significance of this study by drawing together various strands that emerged in different chapters, and pointing out some areas for further research.

## Significance of This Study

First of all, this study historicizes and contextualizes ethnic protests in contemporary Xinjiang and increases our knowledge of the role discourse has played in their representations. Even though every measurable index shows that the CCP's control of Xinjiang is stronger than in any other period in history, the discourse of the People's War on Terror represents the region as volatile and full of ethnic violence, and has the effect of rendering *all* Uyghurs potential terrorists. All Uyghurs are thus seen as posing a severe national security threat to China. Through an analysis of the historical emergence of regulatory discursive practices which construct meaningful statements about Uyghur protests at a particular moment, this project attempted to provide sociohistorical contexts that influenced the development of the discourse in different periods and examined what power relations the discourse in each period functioned to legitimize and whose interests it served. Such shifts in discourse are not just a matter of using different words. They exist in symbiotic relationship with other social practices of security, surveillance, and law enforcement. The People's War on Terror discourse works in the service of legitimating the massive security apparatus and other discriminatory social management policies that have been implemented in the region. Regional party officials also need the discourse to expand their powers, increase their budgets, and get promotions for their services of safeguarding a "dangerous frontier region." Officials in the region often go unpunished for severe wrongdoings such as corruption and other abuses of power as long as they are resolute in fighting "terrorism" or if they can justify their actions as necessary for maintaining social stability. More importantly, the dissertation critiques the construction of terrorist subjects in the official discourse and the synonymization of the terrorist subjectivity with Uyghurness in the Chinese context. Analyzing the different ways the discourse maintains its authority to pronounce truth about Uyghur identity

also reveals the situatedness of its statements and points to other statements excluded from the dominant discursive configuration. By questioning the validity of the discourse, which makes available only two mutually exclusive, depoliticized, and ahistoricized identities for Uyghurs as model minority persons or terrorists, the dissertation has attempted to open up possibilities of alternative subjectivities that allow for multiple differences and do not necessarily fall into the polarized identity categories constructed in the official discourse.

Secondly, even though much critical research has been done on the discourse of terrorism in the Western context, relatively inadequate attention has been paid to the development of terrorism discourse in China. This study has aimed to address this gap in existing research by analyzing the genealogy of that discourse and its manifestations in different areas. This dissertation also examined the different functions the terrorism discourse serves in terms of legitimating the CCP's rule for domestic and international audiences. For a domestic audience, the discursive construction of a terrorist identity motivated by hatred and religious dogma works to portray the Hans and other ethnic groups as potential victims of terrorism and the CCP as the guardian of social stability. The discourse combines negative and positive construction of different social actors and highlights the consequences of the absence of the Party's control, which works to equate social stability and future prosperity of China with the rule of the CCP, thereby legitimating its authority. It also excludes from consideration, and falsifies, other alternative social arrangements in which the CCP is not at the center of leadership and China's success is not attributed solely to the Communist Party. As a result, the all-encompassing nature of the terrorism discourse allows the Party to represent any Uyghur protest as terrorism regardless of what the actual causes and methods are and how concrete and specific the grievances of the protestors may be. It works to delegitimize the genuine dissatisfaction of

Uyghurs with many of the policies that lead to their social alienation, economic marginalization, and political disenfranchisement, effectively reproducing the existing relations of power. With regards to the international audience, the CCP's policies in Xinjiang were long subject to criticism for discriminating against minorities and other human right violations. The terrorism discourse has provided justification for the party to continue and further tighten its policies in the region and present that as a part of global efforts to fight terrorism. This study thus sheds light on the dual functions the terrorism discourse serves in the Chinese context.

Third, this study contributes to expanding our understanding of the relationship between language and ideology. As Reisigl and Wodak (2001) have noted, "systematic studies and numerous case studies may afford CDA with careful generalization and – in the best case – also prediction" (p. 269). Flowerdew (1999) also echoed this point stating that "the approach to theory building in CDA is basically by means of case studies. Case study research is cumulative, multiple cases further confirming, developing, or questioning the results of earlier studies" (p. 1094). As another case study in CDA, this dissertation not only confirms but most importantly expands prior conceptualization of the relationship between ideology and media discourse in Chinese and Western contexts. Even though much research has been done to analyze how Chinese media and Western media construct different discursive representations of events affecting both countries, there has not been research on how the Chinese official media operating from the same ideological stance, in our case *Global Times*, differentiates their coverage based on whether the audiences are domestic readers of the Chinese version or international readers of the English version. In most of the prior research, it was argued that different constructions of major political events often reflect different, often opposing, ideological leanings, however, Chapter 4 of this dissertation has shown how different discursive strategies are sometimes used

to construct different understandings of political events in the service of advancing the same ideology.

Fourth, the visual metaphoric analysis of the state-sponsored art also explores the official ideology of how Uyghurs should behave and interact with the state and other ethnic groups. The discursive construction of certain characteristics as belonging to model minority persons creates highly idealized and often unattainable standards for being accepted by the state as its citizens and works to marginalize as potential terrorists a large segment of Uyghur people who can't meet those standards. Such binary representations of Uyghurs as either model citizens or terrorists intensifies political polarization in which differences between US and THEM are made more salient and no room is left for moderates and intermediary identity positions. Uyghurs are required to have characteristics associated with model minority persons or they would naturally fall into the categories of terrorists. Many qualities of good Uyghurs are very idealistic and require an unrealistically high level of devotion and gratitude to the party that ordinary Han people are not subjected to; those qualities are also far removed from the daily lives of Uyghurs, whereas many of the qualities associated with bad Uyghurs such as praying and the choice of clothing style are everyday social and cultural practices of Uyghur people. The only common characteristics of the identities of model minority persons and terrorists are the fact that both are very ideological and represent extreme polar opposites. Both identity categories are essentialized and imagined as homogeneous even though they include what might otherwise be very diverse and complex social groups. However, the dichotomous representations based on these discursively constructed norms remove other possibilities for Uyghurs to live within the Chinese system and still maintain their cultural and linguistic identities, thus forcing them into the categories of terrorists. As a result, the number of Uyghurs who are considered terrorists or

potential suspects has greatly increased. This has massively expanded the scope of Uyghurs targeted by the state security apparatus and intensified the level of surveillance and intrusion, further increasing resentment among the Uyghur people and exacerbating the strained relationship between Uyghurs and the state. This dissertation specifically examined how this ideology is (re)produced through both verbal and visual discourses in state-sponsored cultural artifacts. I have argued that this focus on both verbal and visual discourses strengthens the overall analysis by allowing us to examine the manifestations of the dominant discourse in multiple settings and modalities.

Finally, this dissertation demonstrates that discourses are not stable and are instead in a constant state of flux. As my discussion of genealogy in Chapter 2 demonstrated, over the course of three decades, the discursive representations of Uyghur protests went through four major shifts with profound implications on the government's policies in the region and the relations between Uyghurs and the state. Foucault (1990) stated that "discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it" (p. 101). Each discourse on Uyghur protests seemed to be, at that particular historical moment, very powerful and the ultimate "truth" which could explain the nature of the ethnic tension. However, my discussion of discursive genealogy showed how unstable and fragile each discourse turned out to be and how other sociopolitical factors set in motion sudden ruptures and discontinuities in the discourse. Hodges and Nilep (2007) also note that just as dehumanization of the Other and justification of extreme actions are achieved through discourse, bridge-building towards mutual understandings and acknowledging the Other as not completely different can also be accomplished through discourse. The People's War on Terror discourse is a powerful narrative constructed through language. What is constructed through language can of

course be deconstructed through language. Examining the structures of discourse, problematizing what is considered common sense and natural, as done in this dissertation, can also increase our understanding of how discourses of domination operate and create potentials for reconfiguring the existing hegemonic power relations; it can also facilitate an emergence of alternative discourses which will allow new possibilities for defusing tension and creating long-term peace in the region.

### **Suggestions for Further Study**

The focus of this study has been on how the state articulated different statements on Uyghur protests in different periods and the manifestations and reinforcement of these official discourses in news discourse and other state propaganda artifacts. I conclude this dissertation by pointing out several areas for further research on other aspects of the discourse of terrorism in the Chinese context. One possible direction for a future study is to include audience reception. Such a project could focus on analyzing how much of the official discourse and its associated practices are resonating with the target audience and examining whether or not, or to what extent, the effectiveness of the discourse varies along ethnic or generational boundaries. The state's discourse on terrorism is powerful. It has been imposed on the mass population of the nation with the support of the brute force of the security apparatus of the state. This dissertation has closely analyzed the structure and different components of that discourse. However, those who are recipients of the discourse bring their own ideological leanings and histories to bear in interpreting and reinterpreting the discourse. As Hodges (2011) points out, discourse "takes on a life of its own" after it is uttered and should not be considered a one-way communication from the state to its subjects who are then supposed to merely receive it as the producers of the discourse had intended (p. 113). Previous research on local audience reception of the state's

dominant ideology has focused on the discourse of harmonious society (Schluessel, 2013), the discourse of interethnic marriage as a means to improve interethnic relations (Smith Finley, 2013), and the discourse of illegal religious practices (Harris, 2013). The consensus in these three studies is that the state's discourses have been rejected by Uyghurs albeit not publicly and directly and in some cases they even strengthened intra-ethnic solidarity and "stoked pre-existing hostilities and sensitivities surrounding Uyghur–Han relations" (Smith Finley, 2013, p. 273). Analyzing audience reception of the Chinese terrorism discourse which is even more powerful and has far more severe consequences would provide valuable insights as to how the local people have engaged, negotiated, and challenged the state's discourse on Uyghur protests.

Another area that should be addressed in the future is how the dominant discourse on terrorism is (re)articulated, (re)appropriated, ignored, and challenged on social media sites by those who live in Xinjiang. The prospect of the severe punishment that follows for openly and directly challenging the state's discourse or expressing dissent has led many social media users to develop discursive strategies that implicitly and indirectly challenge the dominant discourse of terrorism and provide alternative representations of social actors or events that are deemed terroristic by the state. Such a study can focus on how social media users rely on sarcasm and other discursive tools in their cultural repertoire such as potentially contentious but vague pop song lyrics, jokes, and dark humor to resist the state's narrative of framing certain events as acts of terrorism. It can also explore the strategies deployed in constructing alternative discourses to evade the state's censorship and potential punishment while building solidarity and shared understanding of social events with others who are considered members of the in-group and who also tacitly resist the dominant discourse. Comparing the oppositional discourses employed by social media users who live in China and use Chinese and Uyghur social media platforms such as

Wechat or Weibo with those of overseas users on platforms such as Facebook or Twitter can further elucidate how oppositional discourses are expressed using different discursive strategies by social actors some of whom are subjected to strict censorship while others are not under the direct control of the state's surveillance apparatus.

Finally, I suggest expanding the scope of news discourse analysis to include foreign media's coverage of violent protests involving Uyghurs in China. In Chapter 4, the focus was on how the Chinese and English versions of *Global Times* deployed different discursive strategies to construct different understandings of violent protests to appeal to domestic and international audiences. I argued that even though they construct different representations of violent protests and appear to maintain and reinforce different ideologies on the surface, they both work to strengthen the legitimacy of the CCP rule in the eyes of their respective audiences. For further research, I suggest comparing the news coverage of violent protests by the English version of *Global Times* with other international news organizations based in other countries such as *The New York Times*, *Reuters*, and *The Guardian*. Such analysis would bring to light how the discourses of terrorism as manifested in news under these distinct political systems are similar to or different from each other, explore intertextual connections between Chinese and Western discourses on terrorism, and examine different discursive practices these news organizations with different ideological leanings employ to construct the identities of various social actors involved in the protests.

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## Appendix A

### Original Chinese Version of the Excerpts Analyzed in Chapter Three

**Excerpt 1:** 巴仁乡事件是一小撮民族分裂主义分子反对共产党的领导，反对社会主义制度，企图颠覆人民政权，分裂祖国统一的证实，我们同民族分裂主义的斗争是一场尖锐的激烈的阶级斗争，是维护祖国统一，维护民族团结与分裂祖国统一，破坏民族团结的一场政治斗争。(Ruzi, 1990)

**Excerpt 2:** 巴仁乡发生的反革命武装暴乱给我们上了活生生的一堂阶级斗争课，它证明分裂主义确实存在，这不是小题大做，更不是危言耸听，而是铁的事实，是客观存在的。(Zhang, 1990)

**Excerpt 3:** 最近，阿克陶县巴仁乡极少数分裂主义分子，制造了一起骇人听闻的反革命武装暴乱事件，这充分说明他们是国内外分裂主义势力的别动队。严酷的事实说明，我们和分裂主义分子的斗争是阶级斗争，政治斗争。(Turbay et al, 1990)

**Excerpt 4:** 社会主义制度的建立，第一次在人类历史上用公有制代替了私有制，从根本上铲除了产生阶级剥削和压迫的经济根源，使剥削阶级作为一个阶级也随之消亡。但是，剥削阶级的残余还存在；旧的意识形态，传统观点还存在；国内外妄图分裂，破坏和颠覆社会主义国家的阶级敌人和反动势力仍然存在。。。国际共产主义运动和我国建国四十年来的经验证明：利用宗教，打着宗教旗号来进行分裂，颠覆社会主义祖国；破坏社会主义民族团结，破坏社会主义建设事业，是社会主义时期阶级斗争的重要表现之一。(Li, 1990)

**Excerpt 5:** 今年四月六日发生在新疆阿克陶县巴仁乡的反革命暴乱，其策划者也是打着所谓振兴伊斯兰的旗号，纠集和网罗极少数民族分裂主义分子，建立东土耳其斯坦伊斯兰党，公开提出要把新疆从伟大祖国分裂出去，成立所谓东土耳其斯坦政府的反对政治纲领。马克思主义认为，民族独立和民族自决的口号，只有在存在民族压迫，民族歧视和民族不平等，被压迫的民族要求摆脱民族压迫，要求实现政治上的独立和平等权力的条件下，这个口号下具有科学的，革命的，积极的意义。在社会主义的条件下，尤其是在我国，各民族不论大小，在政治上一律平等，并不存在任何民族之间的压迫和歧视。因此，要求分裂祖国，另立国家的口号不仅是错误的，而且是反动的。(Li, 1990)

**Excerpt 6:** 在阶级社会里，在民族问题上交织着民族的因素和阶级的因素。民族问题主要的表现和基本的内容是民族压迫，民族剥削，以及因此而产生的民族之间的隔阂，歧视，冲突和斗争。到了社会主义社会，我们消灭了生产资料私有制，建立了社会主义公有制，消灭了民族压迫和剥削制度，实现了各民族政治上的平等... 由于阶级矛盾不是我国社会的主要矛盾，因而它也不是构成民族问题的主要原因，但阶级斗争仍然在一定范围内存在，因而也必然会对民族问题产生一定的影响，对此我们绝不能掉以轻心。(Janabil, 1990)

**Excerpt 7:** 帝国主义利用和平演变策略，妄图削弱和消失社会主义，引起东欧剧变。在这种国际大气候下，新疆的民族分裂主义势力与国外分裂主义遥相呼应，他们在新疆打起东土耳其斯坦的旗号，鼓吹新疆独立，危害祖国统一。(Turbay et al, 1990)

**Excerpt 8:** 新疆人民之所以能够站起来，是在中国共产党的领导下，以马克思主义指导，走社会主义道路的结果。如果听任民族分裂主义的阴谋得逞，新疆就会变成帝国主义的殖民地，附庸国，倒退成为封建农奴专政的旧新疆，各族人民就会重新被投入暗无天日的人间地狱，历史的悲剧就会重演，各族人民世代翘首以待的自由民主，繁荣富强都将化为乌有，毁于一旦。(Zhang, 1990)

**Excerpt 9:** 民族分裂主义分子同国内外敌对势力相互勾结，企图把新疆从社会主义的中国分裂出去，作为资本主义国家的殖民地。(Ruzi, 1990)

**Excerpt 10:** 正如在巴仁乡反革命暴乱中民族分裂主义分子所扬言的那样，国内有人支持我们，国外也有人支持我们。所谓民族独立的实质不仅在于分裂伟大的社会主义祖国，而最终目的是要把某一民族重新至于西方帝国主义和国外反动势力的卵羽下，重新沦为殖民地和半殖民地的被压迫民族和附庸国，这是从根本上背离各民族群众的根本利益和意愿的，因而也必然要遭到各民族群众的坚决反对。(Li, 1990)

**Excerpt 11:** 巴仁乡反革命武装暴乱的策划者披着宗教的外衣，利用做乃麻孜地机会，向教民们，特别是年轻人煽动宗教狂热，说什么“我们不相信社会主义，过去马列主义压宗教，现在宗教压马列主义”等。(Ruzi, 1990)

**Excerpt 12:** 利用宗教进行分裂活动是社会主义时期阶级斗争的重要表现形式。。。宗教对人类的压迫只不过是社会内部经济压迫的产物和反映。因此，马克思，恩格斯一再指出，要消灭宗教，最根本的就是铲除和消灭宗教产生的社会根源，即消灭一切形式的阶级压迫，大力发展生产力，发展和普及科学文化教育，才能使人们最终从宗教束缚解脱出来。(Li, 1990)

**Excerpt 13:** 马克思主义认为，宗教是社会发展到一定阶段的产物，有它发生，发展和消亡的过程。。。从根本上讲，宗教作为一种历史遗留下来的旧的社会意识形态，它相信并崇拜超自然的神灵，是自然力量和社会力量在人们意识中虚幻的，颠倒的反映，是一种唯心主义的世界观。马克思曾经明确指出宗教是人民的鸦片，列宁也曾经强调宗教是麻醉人民的鸦片。(Janabil, 1990)

**Excerpt 14:** 共产党员不得信仰宗教和参加宗教活动。在世界观上，马克思主义同一切宗教是对立的。共产党员是彻底的革命论者，彻底的唯物论者。(Janabil, 1990)

**Excerpt 15:** 对于宗教信仰自由政策，不能只讲信教自由，还强调不信教自由，特别是强调不准强迫 18 岁一下的青少年信教。(Janabil, 1990)

**Excerpt 16:** 我们知道所谓圣战消灭异教徒的口号在历史上常常是封建主和统治者进行侵略扩展的工具。虽然在某种特定的历史条件下，如十九世纪西方帝国主义对伊斯兰世界的入侵这种特定条件下，伊斯兰各国人民打着保卫伊斯兰的圣战旗帜抵御外来侵略，但从本

质和总体上看，往往是剥削阶级和统治者所利用，最终遭受灾难的仍然是广大下层的普通教民群众。(Li, 1990)

**Excerpt 17:** 策划制造巴仁乡反革命武装暴乱血腥事件的一伙反革命法西斯暴徒，打着所谓伊斯兰圣战的反动旗号... 他们对各族人民犯下的法西斯暴行，激起了各族人民的愤慨，并将为各族人民世代所唾弃。制造巴仁乡反革命武装暴乱流血事件的一伙法西斯暴徒们打出的政治旗帜是早已被宣判了死刑的东土耳其斯坦大土耳其主义的破烂旗帜。(Turbay et al, 1990)

**Excerpt 18:** 新疆的民族分裂主义分子，和泛日耳曼主义的纳粹分子的行径一样，把一切想象到的罪恶归于汉族人，一有风吹草动，就煽动起不可遏止的恶感和仇恨，进行反汉，排汉，杀汉活动。在巴仁乡被杀害的武警战士身上的刀伤斧痕就是铁证。(Han, 1990)

**Excerpt 19:** 打着东土耳其斯坦独立旗号的国内外民族分裂主义势力，是影响新疆稳定大局的主要危险。前不久发生的巴仁乡反革命武装暴乱深刻证明，自治区党委的认识和判断是正确的。。。在新疆民族分裂主义的问题是个老问题而不是新问题。(Janabil, 1990)

**Excerpt 20:** 伊宁市“2·5”打砸抢事件又是一场严重危害国家安全的打砸抢骚乱事件，是以东土耳其斯坦真主党为首的民族分裂分子制造的有计划，有组织的分裂，破坏活动，是我区少数民族分裂分子长期进行分裂祖国统一，破坏民族团结，危害社会稳定罪恶活动的一次集中暴露，是违法犯罪分子向我人民民主专政的国家政权发动的一次猖狂进攻。在这场复杂的分裂与反分裂的斗争中透过现象看本质，清醒地认识到这既不是什么民族问题，也不是什么宗教问题，而是一起危害国家安全的，危害社会安定，破坏各民族团结，制造民族隔阂地恐怖破坏活动。(Li, 1998)

**Excerpt 21:** 民族分裂主义和非法宗教活动是影响社会稳定的主要危险之一。民族分裂主义和非法宗教活动的实质是搞分裂，搞独立。(Liu, 1998)

**Excerpt 22:** 当然，我们也应该看到，在新疆一直存在着分裂与反分裂的斗争，即使今天的新疆也面临着许多现实的和潜在的不安定因素。民族分裂主义是影响新疆社会稳定的主要危险和主要的不安定因素之一。因此，深入研究民族分裂主义的历史根源及国际背景，有助于我们深刻认识其反动本质和当前反对民族分裂斗争的长期性，复杂性，艰巨性，提高人们反对民族分裂主义的自觉性，从而更有效的打击其阴谋破坏活动，维护祖国统一和新疆的稳定。(Sawut, 1997)

**Excerpt 23:** 19世纪末20世纪初，随着世界民族解放运动的发展，现代民族意识的觉悟，资产阶级民族主义思想开始广泛传播。在帝国主义的直接染指下，新疆开始接触到泛伊斯兰主义，泛突厥主义。泛伊斯兰主义，泛突厥主义的传入，为新疆民族分裂主义奠定了思想基础... 30年代初，他们曾在南疆建立的和田艾米尔政府和东突厥斯坦伊斯兰共和国两个短命的分裂主义政府。(He, 1997)

**Excerpt 24:** 国外敌对势力对我国加紧‘西化’，‘分化’，和‘和平演变’战略，为民族分裂分子提供了物质和精神上的援助，使国内分裂势力对国际敌对势力的依附性大大加强，斗争的范围从国内延伸到国际社会，给我们反分裂斗争增大了难度。(Liu, 1998)

**Excerpt 25:** 进入 90 年代以来，由于国内外大气候和小气候的变化，新疆民族分裂主义活动进入了一个新的活动期。国际反动势力公开支持境内外的民族分裂活动；境内外民族分裂组织加强聚合，对新疆的渗透活动日益加剧；制造分裂舆论。攻击党的民族，宗教政策，成立反动组织，煽动闹事，冲击党政机关，策动暴乱，制造恐怖事件；煽动宗教狂热，鼓动圣战等。(He, 1997)

**Excerpt 26:** 民族，宗教问题非常敏感，许多少数民族几乎使全民信教，但地区差异很大，接受教育成都不一，广大教民普遍文化素质偏低，朴素的民族感情和宗教清规戒律，已被坏人利用，已被坏人裹胁到各种非法活动中去，敌我界限难以分辨，处置手段难以掌握，处置不当容易引起新的不稳定因素。(Liu, 1999)

**Excerpt 27:** 伊犁州分裂与反分裂的斗争证明，党中央把非法宗教活动列为当前影响新疆稳定的主要危险之一，是非常正确的。(Zhou, 1997)

**Excerpt 28:** 这些民族分裂主义分子不仅有其反动的组织，反动的行动纲领和党章，还有他们为培训恐怖活动的骨干而成立的训练基地。(Wang, 1998)

**Excerpt 29:** 搞好与周边国家的友好相处，既是和平发展的需要，也是新疆地区维护稳定，打击暴力犯罪的需要。新疆地区由于其地理位置的特舒性，近年来频发的以民族分裂为目的的暴力恐怖活动，其作案工具是从周边国家偷运，走私进来，这对于新疆的稳定与安全极为不利。刚刚结束的（98 年 7 月）江泽民书记到哈萨克斯坦签署的五国协议中关于“共同反对民族分裂主义，宗教极端主义，恐怖主义，武器偷运，走私贩毒”的协议对维护新疆稳定与促进经济发展具有极其重要的意义。我们应抓住这一有利时机，开展全方面工作，坚决，彻底打击新疆的暴力犯罪，维护新疆稳定。(Ding, 1999)

**Excerpt 30:** 新疆民族分裂主义鼓吹圣战，建立反革命政党，以暴力破坏新疆稳定，最终达到新疆独立的目的。。。1997 年 2 月 5 日伊宁市武装暴乱十是东土耳其斯坦真主党组织的。。。其四是把国际社会深恶痛绝的恐怖行为纳入其圣战战略，叫嚣‘要依靠恐怖活动解放我们的祖国’。(Yang, 1997)

**Excerpt 31:** 外交部发言人朱邦造向中外记者介绍说，确实有一批民族分裂分子想通过暴力恐怖手段把新疆从中国分裂出去，建立所谓的东土耳其斯坦，我们称其为东突恐怖分子。我们有确凿的证据证明，这些人的确在新疆制造和操纵恐怖活动，他们在纲领里明确地表示要采取暴力行动，这属于赤裸裸的恐怖主义。而且也有确凿的证据表明，他们当中有一些人在阿富汗地营地接受了训练。(Jiang, 2001)

**Excerpt 32:** 去年 12 月 9 日，新疆日报在头版头条首次披露了近十年来敌对势力，民族分裂势力和暴力恐怖势力等三股恶势力在新疆进行的一系列暴力恐怖犯罪活动案件。(Zhang, 2002)

**Excerpt 33:** 2001年9.11恐怖袭击事件震惊世界，美国锁定本拉登为打击对象，向阿富汗开战，摧毁了圣战者基地和塔利班政权。国际社会纷纷谴责和反对一切形式的恐怖活动，使国际恐怖主义势力遭到前所未有的打击。为我们进一步反击东突恐怖势力提供了一次难得的机会。(Li, 2002)

**Excerpt 34:** 今年来，由于民族分裂，宗教极端，国际恐怖三股势力操纵和境外敌对市里的怂恿，支持，以及周边国家局势的影响，中国的东突分裂恐怖活动进入建国以来一个前所未有的活动期，处于逐步升级的严重态势。(Duan & Peng, 2002)

**Excerpt 35:** 打击东突恐怖势力，不仅是打击民族分裂主义，极端宗教势力的重要组成部分；与此同时，披露出来的大量铁的事实表明，打击东突恐怖势力也是打击国际恐怖主义的重要组成部分。(Li, 2002)

**Excerpt 36:** 恐怖主义是当今世界的一大公害。在中国境内外的东突势力具有明显的恐怖主义特征。但是，东突长期以来一直在打国际牌，以期获得国际社会的支持；在911事件后更是编造谎言，妄图逃避国际反恐打击。少数国家处于自身政治目的，始终不承认东突势力是恐怖主义组织。受其影响，国际学术界对东突的恐怖主义实质也认识不清。因此，有必要从学术角度对东突势力所犯罪行进行归纳总结，对其恐怖主义的实质进行分析论证。(Xie & Wang, 2002)

**Excerpt 37:** 8月26日晚，正在中国进行访问的美国副国务卿理查德·阿米蒂奇在美国驻华大使馆举行的新闻发布会上表示，美国已经正式将东突厥斯坦伊斯兰运动（英文简称ETIM）列入美国认定的恐怖主义组织地名单。这是美国官方第一次向新闻界宣布这一决定。(Wang, 2002)

**Excerpt 38:** 1990年4月5日发生的巴仁乡事件是东突恶性恐怖活动的开始。此后，东突明显地恐怖主义化。(Xie & Wang, 2002)

**Excerpt 39:** 1990年4月5日，恐怖分子在阿克陶县巴仁乡制造反革命暴乱，致使我武警，民兵等8人死亡，7人重伤。(Zhang, 2002)

**Excerpt 40:** 1997年2月5日，6日，恐怖分子在伊宁市策动，制造了严重的打砸抢骚乱事件，打死7人，打伤200多人，砸烧汽车20多辆。(Zhang, 2002)

**Excerpt 41:** 他们的暴力恐怖活动大致可分为三个阶段。第一阶段，1990年至1995年，已显示力量，制造社会和公众恐慌为重点。他们以巴仁乡暴乱为序幕，先后制造了1992年乌鲁木齐2.5公共汽车系列爆炸案。第二段，1996年至1997年，以炸桥赶汉，制造暴乱为重点。1997年制造了伊宁市2.5打砸抢骚乱事件。第三段，1998年至今，其特点使境外国际恐怖势力直接指挥，派遣境外恐怖分子入境，勾结发展境内人员，实施恐怖活动。(Duan & Peng, 2002)

**Excerpt 42:** 2009年7月5日晚，乌鲁木齐市发生打砸抢烧严重暴力犯罪事件，造成184人死亡，1000多人受伤，财产损失巨大。这是一起境外指挥、境内行动，有预谋、有组织的打砸抢烧事件。(Lei et al, 2009)

**Excerpt 43:** 乌鲁木齐7·5打砸抢烧严重暴力犯罪事件（以下简称乌鲁木齐7·5事件）是新中国成立以来在新疆发生的性质最恶劣，伤亡人数最多，财产损失最严重，破坏程度最大，影响最坏的一起暴力犯罪事件，严重地干扰了新疆民族团结和社会稳定的大好局面，给各族人民的生命和财产造成了巨大损失，在各族人民心中留下了深重的伤痛。(Ababekri, 2009)

**Excerpt 44:** 乌鲁木齐7·5暴力犯罪事件地特点: 一是政治目标明确，破坏祖国统一；二是手段残忍，具有浓厚的恐怖主义色彩。(Li, 2009)

**Excerpt 45:** 从上述分析可见，无论是从事件的政治目的、杀害对象、使用手段和造成的严重后果还是从所产生的恶劣影响来看，“7·5”事件都完全符合暴力恐怖主义的典型特征，因此该次事件的实质是暴力恐怖主义犯罪。(Xu, 2009)

**Excerpt 46:** 7.5事件发生后，中国政府第一时间开放采访，披露真相，让这起针对无辜平民的暴力恐怖事件之真相迅速大白于天下。(Xin, 2009)

**Excerpt 47:** 这次事件充分暴露了“世维会”是暴力恐怖组织，充分暴露了它在所谓“人民”、“民主”、“民族”、“宗教”等外衣之下的假人权、假民主，真暴力、真恐怖的丑恶反动面目。(Shu, 2009)

**Excerpt 48:** 一边是东突军事恐怖组织纷纷改头换面，另一边是以世维会为首的东突政治组织以更为隐蔽的方式获取政治资本和国际资助。对中国来说，最大的危险正在于此。(Chen, 2009)

**Excerpt 49:** 如果没有西方一些国家及组织的支持，东突分子连生存都是问题，更不用说发动恐怖分裂活动了。热比亚只是西方一些国家为达到不可告人的目的，而打造的一个工具而已。(Zhai, 2009)

**Excerpt 50:** 长期以来，国际上各种敌对势力不愿看到一个团结稳定、繁荣发展的社会主义中国。新中国成立以来尤其是改革开放以来，中国取得了巨大的发展成就，创造了举世公认的“中国奇迹”。在当前国际金融危机的大背景下，中国经济仍实现了8%左右的增长。2008年中国已成为世界第三大经济体。(Shu, 2009)

**Excerpt 51:** 近年来，西方反华势力对“世维会”等分裂势力的支持由幕后走向台前。而我周边国家大局动荡不安，恐怖活动频发不断，再加上其他复杂的原因，已成为推动境外“三股势力”不断升级的重要外部因素。(Zhao, 2010)

**Excerpt 52:** 7月5日下午，300余名维吾尔族学生在自治区首府乌鲁木齐市人民广场游行，警方予以劝离。此过程自始至终是和平进行的。在学生被劝离后，多股暴徒携带行凶工具突然冲出，肆无忌惮，四处沿街顺巷，打砸抢烧杀。(Xu, 2009)

**Excerpt 53:** 加快新疆经济发展。对待新疆恐怖主义犯罪问题,要大力发展新疆地区经济... 如果政府的政策不能有效地改善其经济状况,就可能刺激少数民族的民族主义情绪,为恐怖主义的滋生提供适宜的土壤。邓小平同志曾说过:“实行民族区域自治,不把经济搞好,那个自治就是空的。少数民族是想在区域自治里面得到好处,一系列的经济问题不解决,就会出乱子。(Zhao, 2010)

**Excerpt 54:** 2014年注定要被写入中国反恐斗争的史册。面对暴力恐怖活动频发、反恐怖斗争愈发严峻复杂的形势,中国反恐全面发力,密集布阵,频频向暴恐分子亮出铁拳。特别是今年5月份以来,随着为期一年的严厉打击暴力恐怖活动专项行动在全国范围内迅速展开,各地举报暴恐信息奖励政策密集出台,中国已进入全面反恐的新阶段。(Zhang, 2014)

**Excerpt 55:** 从事件规模以及造成的伤亡情况来看,莎车暴恐事件被有关人士认为是自新疆“7·5事件”之后规模最大的一次暴恐事件。(Zhang, 2014)

**Excerpt 56:** 两起事件都是在严打暴恐行动期间发生,这也凸显了恐怖活动并不会因为我们的严打高压而销声匿迹,这是它不同于其他普通暴力犯罪的一个形态和特点。打击恐怖主义需做好持久战的准备。(Zhang, 2014)

**Excerpt 57:** 我国反恐举措密集,但恐怖态势却愈发严峻,问题的根源可归结为“精英反恐模式”的症结。该模式已不能充分满足反恐的现实需要,亟须结构性地嵌入社会公众的力量,形成全民反恐模式。(Gao, 2016)

**Excerpt 58:** 梳理最近以来公安部的部署,我们不难发现,在始终强调“出重拳、下狠手,坚决把暴恐分子嚣张气焰打下去”的同时,广泛发动人民群众,大打反恐人民战争,推进“全民反恐”是一贯的思路。(Zhang, 2014)

**Excerpt 59:** 恐怖袭击不仅使我国公民产生恐慌心理,更对我国国家安全构成严重威胁,业已成为我国现代化建设和伟大中国梦实现的严重阻碍。因此,严厉打击恐怖主义活动,研究反恐战略、战术,掌握反恐斗争主动权具有重大现实意义。(Zhu, 2016)

**Excerpt 60:** 但是在许多领域并未取得突破性进展,我国的反恐研究仍然面临着许多难题,在反恐情报,定量分析,应急管理,舆情传播,技术手段,风险评估,根源研究,网络恐怖主义,暴恐音视频,处置战法,去极端化等研究内容方面仍处于空白或起步期,还需进一步深入研究。(Li & Mei, 2015)

**Excerpt 61:** 统计分析表明,新疆农村居民恩格尔系数、受教育程度和新疆互联网用户总数的增长对我国恐怖主义指数的影响度有差异。影响最大的是网络的普及和网民总数的增长,其次是受教育程度差异,最后是新疆居民恩格尔系数。我们在预防和打击恐怖主义犯罪过程中需要根据恐怖主义的成因影响程度来决定反恐措施,争取反恐斗争的最终胜利。(Adiljan & Gulazat, 2016)

## Appendix B

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Appendix C

Sources Attributed for the Quotations in the Chinese and English Versions of *Global Times*

Incident	Chinese version	English version
<p>1. Qarghiliq, February 28, 2012</p>	<p>1) 法庭 2) 新疆党委书记张春贤</p>	<p>1) A statement from the local government 2) The authority 3) Chen Li, an official with Kashi's publicity department 4) He Bing, a taxi driver in Kashi 5) Turgunjan Tursun, an associate researcher with the Institute of Sociology at the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences 6) Zhu Feng, a professor at the School of International Studies of Peking University 7) a law enforcement official in Xinjiang 8) Zhang Chunxian, secretary of Xinjiang Regional Committee of the Communist Party of China 9) Witnesses 10) Chen Bixia (a victim's wife) 11) Cheng Jizhong who witnessed the killing from his corner store 12) A government official, who spoke to the <i>Global Times</i> on condition of anonymity 13) Local experts 14) a private instructor 30-year-old Aike 15) Nur Bekri, chairman of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 16) Li Wei, a counterterrorism expert with the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations,</p>

		17) A local court in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
2. Maralbeshi, April 23, 2013	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) 据当地人讲</li> <li>2) 色力布亚镇中心经营餐馆的王先生</li> <li>3) 新疆维吾尔自治区一名知情官员</li> <li>4) 新疆维吾尔自治区外宣办主任侯汉敏</li> <li>5) 一位不愿透露姓名的应急管理专家</li> <li>6) 当地官员</li> <li>7) 一名不愿透露姓名的新疆安全官员</li> <li>8) 色力布亚当地一郭姓老师</li> <li>9) 喀什司机何先生</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) local news portal ts.cn</li> <li>2) A senior official from Xinjiang, who asked not to be named</li> <li>3) Hou Hanmin, spokesperson for the regional government</li> <li>4) an anti-terrorism official in Kashi</li> <li>5) A local restaurant owner surnamed Wang</li> <li>6) A teacher surnamed Guo</li> <li>7) Pan Zhiping, a professor with Xinjiang University</li> <li>8) An anti-terrorism expert from the Special Police College of the Chinese People's Armed Police Force</li> <li>9) A crisis management expert, speaking under condition of anonymity</li> <li>10) One security official</li> <li>11) Nur Bekri, the regional governor</li> <li>12) Enwaer Ehet, who lost both his son and brother in the attack</li> <li>13) Xie Wuzhong, a community official</li> <li>14) Helil Jelili, a policeman who was injured in the incident</li> </ol>
3. Pichan, Lukchun, June 26, 2013	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) 一名新疆官员</li> <li>2) 鲁克沁镇一位大队书记司马义·米牙孜</li> <li>3) 维吾尔族老乡阿布都热合曼·吾斯曼</li> <li>4) 鲁克沁镇镇长和鄯善县的领导</li> <li>5) 鄯善县负责官员</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) An official in Xinjiang, who asked to remain anonymous</li> <li>2) An anonymous businessman who works near Lukqun</li> <li>3) A businessman surnamed Ma in Shanshan</li> <li>4) Li Wei, an expert on anti-terrorism with the Chinese</li> </ol>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>6) 鲁克沁的维吾尔族人艾尼瓦尔</li> <li>7) 他的哥哥艾合买提·尼买尔 (victim's brother)</li> <li>8) 一位熟悉调查进展的自治区高级官员</li> <li>9) 一位新疆反恐领域的专家</li> <li>10) 木卡姆村清真寺的伊玛目</li> <li>11) 自治区党委书记张春贤</li> <li>12) 自治区负责新闻协调的官员</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Institutes of Contemporary International Relations</li> <li>5) Pan Zhiping, a research fellow with the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences</li> <li>6) A Xinjiang official on the ground Thursday confirmed the increased death toll to the <i>Global Times</i> on condition of anonymity</li> <li>7) A tourist surnamed Li</li> <li>8) US State Department spokesperson Patrick Ventrell</li> <li>9) China's foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying</li> <li>10) Police</li> <li>11) <b>Meng Jianzhu</b>, secretary of the Commission for Political and Legal Affairs of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee</li> <li>12) including <b>Yu Zhengsheng</b>, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee</li> <li>13) <b>Zhang Chunxian</b>, Party secretary of the region</li> </ul>
<p>4. Hotan, Han'eriq, June 28, 2013</p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) local government website <a href="http://www.ts.cn">www.ts.cn</a></li> <li>2) witnesses</li> <li>3) An insider from the local authorities</li> <li>4) 56-year-old Liu Ping</li> <li>5) Fang Ji, a 32-year-old man who witnessed the riots in Urumqi in 2009</li> <li>6) The US</li> </ul>

		7) Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying
5. Qarghiliq, August 20th, 2013		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) <b>Guo Shengkun</b>, minister of public security and leader of the team</li> <li>2) according to a report by People's Daily Online on Wednesday</li> <li>3) Pan Zhiping, a research fellow with the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences</li> <li>4) Li Wei, an anti-terrorism expert with the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations</li> <li>5) <b>Meng Jianzhu</b>, head of CPC Political and Legal Affairs Commission</li> </ol>
6. Beijing, Tiananmen, October 28, 2013	1) 环球时报评论员单仁平	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) according to municipal police and Beijing Emergency Medical Center.</li> <li>2) Police</li> <li>3) local police</li> <li>4) Beijing police</li> <li>5) a hospital staffer</li> <li>6) Reporters from the <i>Global Times</i> witnessed</li> <li>7) a female eyewitness at the scene</li> <li>8) The tourist from Ningbo, Zhejiang Province, who goes by the name of Renqiao1220 on her Sina Weibo account,</li> <li>9) an injured Filipino woman called Francesca</li> <li>10) The police notice</li> <li>11) Zhu Yan, a contact person with the hotel supervision squad in the Beijing Police</li> <li>12) a spokesman with the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau</li> </ol>

		13) Foreign Ministry spokesman Hua Chunying
7. Maralbeshi, November 16, 2013	1) 喀什警方	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) citing local police</li> <li>2) Chen Li, director of the Publicity Office of Kashi</li> <li>3) Dilxat Raxit, a spokesman for the Munich-based World Uyghur Congress</li> <li>4) Wang Ping, a professor of ethnic issues with Xinjiang Normal University</li> <li>5) Lu Fugui, deputy head of Xinhe county, Aqsu prefecture</li> <li>6) a communique issued last week after the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Communist Party of China Central Committee</li> <li>7) Li Guoqiang, deputy director of the Center for Chinese Borderland History and Geography at Chinese Academy of Social Sciences</li> </ul>
8. Konasheher, December 15, 2013	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) 一名新疆强力机构官员</li> <li>2) 中国外交部发言人华春莹</li> <li>3) 俄罗斯《晨报》16日文章</li> <li>4) 德国《南德意志报》评论</li> <li>5) 法新社</li> <li>6) 《纽约时报》</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) local news portal ts.cn</li> <li>2) the report</li> <li>3) A Xinjiang official, who required anonymity</li> <li>4) Hua Chunying, spokesperson of the <b>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</b></li> <li>5) Li Wei, an anti-terrorism expert with the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations</li> </ul>
9. Yarkant, December 30, 2013	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) 新疆反恐官员</li> <li>2) 近年来一直在南疆做棉花和大米收购生意的鲁先生</li> <li>3) 一位熟悉情况的反恐人士</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Authorities</li> <li>2) the Kashgar prefectural party committee</li> <li>3) official website ts.cn</li> <li>4) Foreign ministry spokesman Qin Gang</li> <li>5) Pan Zhiping, director of the Institute of Central</li> </ul>

		<p>Asia at the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences</p> <p>6) An official who preferred not to be named</p> <p>7) Xinjiang police</p> <p>8) the public security bureau of Kashgar</p>
<p>10. Kunming, Railway Station, March 1, 2014</p>	<p>1) 云南网报道</p> <p>2) 专家</p> <p>3) 一对事件亲历者夫妻</p> <p>4) 事发时正在售票大厅购票的何国栋告</p> <p>5) 亲历者杨自清</p> <p>6) 火车站附近的派出所值班岗亭民警介绍</p> <p>7) 警务人员介绍</p> <p>8) 现场民警</p> <p>9) 受伤的杨海飞</p> <p>10) 陈桂珍(死者妻子)</p> <p>11) 中国现代国际关系研究院安全与军控研究所所长、反恐专家李伟</p> <p>12) 中国人民公安大学教授梅建明</p> <p>13) 联合国秘书长潘基文</p> <p>14) 俄总统普京</p> <p>15) 路透社</p> <p>16) 英国广播公司(BBC)报道</p> <p>17) 《华盛顿邮报》报道</p> <p>18) 美国《环球邮报》</p> <p>19) 美国《外交政策》</p> <p>20) 美联社</p> <p>21) 美联社</p> <p>22) “德国之声”</p> <p>23) 日本《产经新闻》</p> <p>24) 韩国 SBS 电视台</p>	<p>1) Chinese President Xi Jinping</p> <p>2) Chinese Premier Li Keqiang</p> <p>3) Meng Jianzhu, head of the Commission for Political and Legal Affairs of the Communist Party of China Central Committee</p> <p>4) UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon</p> <p>5) French Foreign Ministry</p> <p>6) Palestinian Fatah Party</p> <p>7) Pakistan</p> <p>8) EU</p> <p>9) Panchen Lama</p> <p>10) Huang Changyuan, vice-chairman of the Xinjiang committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)</p> <p>11) Li Wei, an anti-terrorism expert at China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations</p> <p>12) Yang Shu, director of Institute for Central Asian Studies at Lanzhou University</p> <p>13) Yunnan deputies to the National People's Congress (NPC)</p> <p>14) Qin Guangrong, the provincial Party chief</p> <p>15) China National Radio</p> <p>16) confession of one captured female suspect</p>

		<p>17) Zhang Guibai, political commissar of Yunnan armed police</p> <p>18) Bekri Mamuti, a political advisor</p> <p>19) Rebiya Kadeer, leader of the World Uyghur Congress</p> <p>20) Reuters</p> <p>21) Ministry spokesman Qin Gang</p> <p>22) Pan Zhiping, a research fellow at the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences</p>
11. Urumqi, Railway Station, April 30th, 2014	1) 习近平	<p>1) Witnesses</p> <p>2) A man at a nearby hotel</p> <p>3) the publicity department of the regional committee of the Communist Party of China</p> <p>4) Chinese President <b>Xi Jinping</b></p> <p>5) A Nan-bread vendor</p> <p>6) Zhang Bin (injured victim)</p> <p>7) Zhang Jian, a resident in Tianshan District of Urumqi</p> <p>8) Ahmolla Seydul, a village official in Hami City in eastern Xinjiang</p> <p>9) Wang Ping, a professor of ethnic minority studies at Xinjiang Normal University,</p> <p>10) Yang Hongjun, general manager of Urumqi city high-speed public traffic Co. Ltd</p>
12. Urumqi, Morning Market, May 22, 2014	<p>1) 央视消息</p> <p>2) 新华社英文报道</p> <p>3) 网友@拍客骆驼刺博文</p> <p>4) 天山网消息</p> <p>5) 新疆维吾尔自治区公安厅</p>	<p>1) Witnesses</p> <p>2) Authorities</p> <p>3) Police</p> <p>4) A business runner in the market</p>

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>5) a statement issued by the publicity department of Xinjiang</li> <li>6) the Xinhua News Agency</li> <li>7) a witness, who declined to be named</li> <li>8) Some Urumqi residents</li> <li>9) A Xinjiang law enforcement source</li> <li>10) Chinese President Xi Jinping</li> <li>11) A resident in southern Xinjiang's city of Kashi</li> <li>12) Russian President Vladimir Putin</li> <li>13) the US Embassy</li> <li>14) Dilxat Raxit, spokesperson for the World Uyghur Congress</li> <li>15) A source familiar with anti- terrorism</li> <li>16) Experts</li> <li>17) Nur Bekri, chairman of Xinjiang</li> <li>18) Many Xinjiang residents from different ethnic groups</li> </ul>
<p>13. Yarkant, July 28th 2014</p>	<p>1) 新疆警方</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Xinjiang authorities</li> <li>2) news portal ts.cn</li> <li>3) the regional government</li> <li>4) analysts</li> <li>5) Xinhua</li> <li>6) Pan Zhiping, director of the Institute of Central Asia at the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences</li> <li>7) Xu Jianying, a research fellow with the Research Center for Chinese Borderland History and Geography, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences</li> <li>8) China Central Television</li> </ul>

		<p>9) Seyit, Communist Party chief of a village in Elixku</p> <p>10) the local farmer</p>
<p>14. Kashgar, Killing of Imam Jume Tahir, July 30th, 2014</p>	<p>1) 新疆方面</p> <p>2) 天山网报道</p> <p>3) 乌鲁木齐检察院</p> <p>4) 美国国务院发言人</p> <p>5) 中共中央政治局常委、全国政协主席俞正声</p> <p>6) 中共中央政治局委员、国务院副总理刘延东</p> <p>7) 中共中央政治局委员、自治区党委书记张春贤</p> <p>8) 自治区党委副书记、自治区主席努尔·白克力</p>	<p>1) China's religious authority</p> <p>2) The State Administration for Religious Affairs</p> <p>3) local police</p> <p>4) a report by Xinjiang's official news portal ts.cn</p> <p>5) a resident surnamed Mamaiti</p> <p>6) Other residents</p> <p>7) Turgunjan Tursun, an expert on Xinjiang studies with the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences</p> <p>8) La Disheng, a professor at the Party School of the Communist Party of China's Xinjiang Regional Party Committee</p> <p>9) Police in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region announced</p> <p>10) Prosecutors in Urumqi</p>
<p>15. Bugur, September 21, 2014</p>	<p>1) 新疆警方</p>	<p>1) The regional government website</p> <p>2) the Xinhua News Agency</p> <p>3) The report</p> <p>4) Xinjiang police</p> <p>5) local authority</p> <p>6) Media outlet ts.cn, a website affiliated with the Xinjiang government</p>
<p>16. Yarkant, November 30th, 2014</p>	<p>1) 天山网</p>	<p>1) local authorities</p>
<p>17. Kona Sheher, January 12th, 2015</p>	<p>1) 天山网</p>	<p>1) local authorities</p> <p>2) Zhang Chunxian, Xinjiang's Party chief</p>
<p>18. Shenyang, July 13th, 2015</p>	<p>1) 辽宁省政府官方微博 @辽宁</p> <p>2) 沈阳市公安局官方</p> <p>3) 法新社 13 日最新报道</p>	<p>1) local authorities</p> <p>2) a police statement posted by the Liaoning government on its official Sina Weibo account</p> <p>3) an anonymous store owner</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>4) 总部设在德国的“世维会”</li> <li>5) “东突信息中心”</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>4) Analysts</li> <li>5) the German-based World Uyghur Congress (WUC)</li> <li>6) The East Turkestan Information Center</li> </ul>
19. Bai, coal mine, September 18, 2015	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) 天山网</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Chinese State media</li> <li>2) Turgunjan Tursun, a research fellow at the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences</li> <li>3) Liu Zhijun, an armed police officer enlisted in a Xinjiang squadron</li> <li>4) The Publicity Department of Xinjiang</li> <li>5) Zhang Zhian, vice president of the School of Communication and Design at Guangzhou-based Sun Yat-sen University</li> <li>6) Experts</li> </ul>
20. Qaraqash, December 28th 2016	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) 天山网</li> <li>2) 路透社</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) China's Ministry of Public Security</li> <li>2) Previous reports</li> </ul>
Total	84	181