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# LANGUAGE AND MEDIA IN THE PROMOTION OF THE BRETON CULTURAL IDENTITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

by

David P. Winterstein

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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Signature: 

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**ABSTRACT**

**LANGUAGE AND MEDIA IN THE PROMOTION OF THE BRETON CULTURAL IDENTITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION**

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Prior to the explosion in the number of global communication links in the 20th century, nation-states were the primary international communicators. However, with these new developments, groups both larger and smaller than nation-states have begun to communicate their own identities in the interconnected world. This resurgence of cultural groups is an important part of socially anchoring individuals within the vague impersonality of the global flow of information. Examining the process by which groups situate themselves through the negotiation of their cultural identities can help understand the roles played by mass media in the 21st century. This dissertation examines one such group, the Bretons, focusing upon the relationship between their language, media use, and the promotion of their identity by understanding mass media as arenas in which identity negotiation takes place.

This dissertation combined a variety of qualitative data in order to provide as complete a picture as possible of Breton language media use and the roles it plays in identity negotiation. Data from in-depth interviews were supplemented by an analysis of political documents and a content analysis of Breton language media products.

The Bretons use the media to help promote their language and to restore a sense of confidence in it as a public part of society, but their effort is hampered as the current political and economic environment in which these media operate constrain their

effectiveness. As a result, incorporating the idea of a flow of information, perhaps as a Breton microcosm of the global information flow, would improve the Bretons' ability to use the media to promote their own identity. Furthermore, such a flow would help the Bretons situate themselves within the larger French and European social contexts, making their identity an inclusive means of viewing the world rather than an exclusive fence by which to shut it out. The expanding number of global cultural interactions taking place requires this type of inclusiveness and understanding of others to avoid serious conflicts between value systems.

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# INTRODUCTION

A bep liv, marc'h mat
A bep bro, tud vat*

– Breton proverb

By giving expression to our thoughts and emotions, language is central to our identity as individuals and as members of social groups. Media use may not seem like an integral part of the relationship between language and identity. However, mass media use has become so omnipresent that we tend to take it for granted. In Morin's words (1975, p. 82) "mass media usage is inscribed within daily life." It is not a leisure activity that breaks the routine, but rather it fits into a routine. For instance, we come home from work or school and perhaps turn on the TV; or we listen to the radio while driving the car; or we start the day by reading a newspaper at the breakfast table. As a result, the information we gain and the pleasure we receive from our media use have become integral to our existence. Furthermore, we tend to incorporate the information we learn from the media into our lives with little critical thought; that is, we tend to accept it at face value. Thus, despite being part of an almost unconscious social learning process, these media do play a major role in helping us to construct a sense of who we are and where we fit into the world outside our heads.

Extending our knowledge of the world is one significant reason we use the media. With the presence of satellite transmissions, cell phones, and up-to-the-minute news, we have the ability to learn about many unfamiliar things, and these become quickly incorporated into our understandings of the world. Although we do receive information from the media about a diverse range of subjects, we tend not to think much about this information. For this reason, Morin (1975, p. 251) wrote that "the more the unknown

* In every color, a good horse / in every country good people (le Coadic, 1998).

becomes familiar, the more the familiar becomes unknown." This is to say, that perhaps we have quite a wide range of knowledge, but this knowledge does not extend very deeply on any one subject.

Not only is our range of knowledge perhaps extensive while limited in depth, but we also all have some expertise, in the form of experiential knowledge, about the media. However, we often take this as a reason to avoid serious critical thinking about our interactions with them. Because we all interact with media on a frequent basis, it is very difficult to distance ourselves from them in order to study them critically (Wolton, 1990).

These two points then raise a crucial problem: upon what are our identities based if the information upon which they are founded is so superficial and is accepted virtually without question? This question is at the heart of the study of identity in the discipline of communications. International communication researchers have been concerned with the types of information we receive from around the globe for nearly as long as it has been possible to transmit over such long distances. While a review of the entire history of international communications is neither the goal of this study, nor necessary, a small step backward can help situate the current subject, the language and media roles in identity promotion and protection, more precisely.

From the studies of information flow that began as early as the late 1960's and became a mainstay of international communication research in the 1970's and into the 1980's, researchers have taken notice of groups on the margins of world society. Early studies on information flow focused on lack of information in certain areas (Schiller 1969; Galtung, 1971; Mowlana, 1971; Gerbner & Maravanyi, 1977). These areas, when investigated from a systemic level, were generalized among authors such as Galtung (1971)

to the "Center" and "Periphery" or "North" and "South." These latter denotations referred most often to the northern and southern hemispheres of the globe. While developed in the late 1960's and early 1970's, these notions still hold true despite incredible advances in communication technologies. Behind the flow studies is the often implicit and sometimes even explicit goal of more even access to information in all parts of the world as well as from all parts of the world. Also implicit in the unequal flow of information is a discrepancy in the quality of information we have about others. While quantity is by no means a sufficient factor in the quality of information, we as humans tend to fill in the blanks with our own "common sense theories." That is, we make up plausible, though often far from true, links between the bits of information that we do know. For instance, at various points in history, different groups believed that the sun rotated around the earth, that one would fall off the edge of the earth if one approached it too closely, or that if one stayed out past midnight, one risked being taken away to hell by the spirits of the dead. The fact that we have neither achieved a more uniform flow of information nor categorically improved its quality lies not in faulty or improperly conceived technologies, but rather in the human element involved in producing and manipulating these structures.

Studying identities and the media roles within them can be seen as an attempt to examine this human element. This is a tradition that started in some sense with post-colonial researchers (cf. Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 1963). These and other works brought up the fact that nations emerging from disbanded colonial structures could not participate fully in the world (diplomatically or economically) without proper access to information in formats and with perspectives that were convenient for the local population.

The post-colonial viewpoint, though not central to this study in any formal sense, does help characterize the importance of the study of identity generally speaking.

Turning more directly toward the idea of identity in communication research and in social research broadly construed, we must keep in mind the issues of access to and quality of information, which come out of both information flow studies and post-colonial studies. Collective identity as a research subject in general has been explored across nearly all disciplines in the social sciences and humanities during the last half-century or more with a huge growth in the last 10-20 years. The communication technology explosion and the wide variety of media now available across the globe have greatly increased the number of identity studies in communications research over the last decade. Most studies of identity have focused on national identities as nations have until recently held a monopoly on international communication. However, the rapid developments in communication technologies over the last 50 years and especially over the last two decades have helped other groups manifest their identities as well. As a result, the study of national identity must be supplemented by studies of supra-national identities and sub-national identities.

Europe, or more precisely, the European Union (EU) is a prime example of a supra-national entity attempting to build and promote its own collective identity. In fact the formation of a European identity has been described as essential to the political and economic success of a unified Europe. The European context also provides us with a myriad of examples of sub-national groups now asserting their own identities, both in concert with the national identities of the states with which they share territory and in opposition to these larger identities. This paper will examine one of these sub-national groups, the Bretons.

I happened upon the Breton case almost by pure chance, but in retrospect, the Bretons provide a very unique and significant situation in which to explore the concept of cultural identity. In seeking a case in which language played a prominent role in defining the group's identity, I looked toward France, which has a long but covert history of coercing the various regional groups that make up the country into using the French language almost exclusively. The historical reasons behind this will be taken up in depth later as they form an integral part of Breton history as well. The Bretons were among several regional groups in France that I contacted, and they were among the most eager to discuss their situation with me. The fact that they also have one of the more developed regional media systems in France was a happy coincidence. A second fortuitous point is that the Bretons have also been quite open to the idea of developing the European Union since the first mentions of a greater Europe in the immediate post-WWII period. Again, several parts of their history give rise to this mindset on the part of most Bretons.

Also important to the Breton case is its relationship to other marginalized cultural groups seeking to promote their own identities throughout Europe and the rest of the world. While occupying a place similar to that of their Celtic neighbors, the Irish and the Welsh, the Bretons do not benefit from having an official recognition of their language by the French state. The Irish and British governments do make a place for Irish and Welsh respectively. This lack of recognition puts the Bretons more on a par with groups such as the Corsicans and the Basques, also regions within the French state. The fact that Corsica is an island and that the Basque country spans the French-Spanish border introduce new elements that increase the complexity of their situations. Understanding these differences between the contexts in which various cultural groups exist is an important part of comprehending how

they use the media to negotiate their own particular identity. That the Breton case poses a specific set of questions related to the idea of identity promotion is, as a result, a vital part of this study.

I also looked to France because, as part of the highly developed European media arena, it offers a diverse media system, incorporating many facets of print, broadcast, and recently the developing electronic media. The Bretons, in turn, have some access to these important tools for the promotion of their identity. With this great variety available, the question then becomes how these media and the language they carry are integrated into this identity promotion process.

In the Breton case, as with many other identities at all three of the levels mentioned above, language plays both symbolic and communicative roles in the process of identity promotion. Indeed, Anderson (1991) wrote that language, print language in particular, was a vital part of the rise of the nation-state. In the case of a regional group such as the Bretons, language can be even more important as most government and educational institutions belong to the state within which the region exists (France in the Breton case) and not to the region itself. From this perspective, it is no great leap to the importance of media roles in collective identities as most all mass media rely to some degree upon language. This paper will examine in depth, these links between language, media, and the promotion and protection of identity. The study is the product of 10 months spent in Brittany, during which time I interviewed both Bretons employed in producing Breton language media content and those who make up the audiences for these media as well.

The first chapter will examine the research that has been done to this point on the subject of identity and will present some guiding principles for how the concept can best be

understood in the case to be explored. In order to do this, I will define and trace the evolution of perspectives on identity across several disciplines, notably history, political science, sociology, and psychology. The chapter will then consider the role played by language within the proposed understanding of identity. Additionally, the chapter will present some specific ways in which media can be used for identity promotion and protection both generally and in the Breton case within the European context in particular. By way of summarizing these theories, the chapter will conclude with a description of the approach I used to understand the complex nature of the media role in the Breton identity.

With this framework in mind, chapter 2 will discuss the methodological perspective that I bring to this project and within this point of view, the methods employed in the study. Here I will present an explanation for the use of a qualitative research perspective, which the concept of identity almost demands for a clear and complete understanding. Within this perspective, I will describe in depth the interview and content analysis procedures that formed the basis for my understanding of the Breton case.

Using the theoretical framework established in the first two chapters, chapter 3 will present a historical picture of Brittany and the Breton people. This history can give us some clues as to how the modern Breton identity came to be as well as providing a look at the dilemmas presented by conflicting perspectives on their past. This brief look at Breton history will by no means be a comprehensive look at the several thousand years time that has elapsed since the first humans inhabited Brittany, but will instead focus on the points which seem to have a continuing relevance today. This is to say, the points that influence the modern Breton identity: its Celtic roots, a notion of a Breton territory, a history of cultural openness, and an attachment to its language.

Within the historical context proposed in chapter 3, chapter 4 will discuss the modern Breton language environment. Specifically, I concentrate upon who the Breton speakers are and how they understand their place within modern social life in Brittany, France and the EU. As policy structures this environment, an analysis of linguistic policies will also help situate the discussion.

Chapter 5 will continue the ideas developed in chapter 4 by bringing these elements to a description of the Breton language media environment. Policy and history will again be used to provide the framework in which Breton media content is produced. The content itself will be discussed in chapter 6.

Chapter 7 will examine this content from the perspective of the media professionals who created it. The focus will be on the context in which these workers carry out their job and on the ideals that underlie their decisions. To summarize their thinking on the subject, the chapter will conclude with their own ideas on improving their industry.

Chapter 8 will present an understanding of the Breton language media audiences from two points of view: that of the media professionals, and that of the audience members themselves. Through an understanding of the audiences, we can begin to understand not only how content is developed in support of the Breton identity, but also how it is interpreted within Breton society.

Chapter 9 asks the question: what now? Painting a picture of the media environment will help illuminate the process through which the Bretons interact with the media in the process of negotiating their identity. Language and media are after all but small parts of the identity negotiation process, and just how they contribute to the other elements involved are

vital considerations, not only for media professionals, but also government officials, audience members, and the general public as well.

# CHAPTER 1
# A FRAMEWORK FOR THINKING ABOUT LANGUAGE, MEDIA, & IDENTITY

In order to situate this examination of the Breton case, it is important first to lay a few ground rules. Clarifying the structure is of utmost importance as close examination of the relationship between language use, media, and identity requires a large amount of sorting through ambiguous concepts such as nations, culture, or identity, which all seem to be used with a variety of meanings and in a variety of circumstances. This fluidity of definition is not limited to the domain of common usage either; it also afflicts academic writing. However, the ambiguity of these terms should not be taken as a sign of their weakness as explanatory tools. Rather, this is due to the fact that, as Miller (1995, p. 17) stated, "nations are not things that exist in the world independently of the beliefs people have about them, in the way that, say, volcanoes and elephants do." This is to say, while natural phenomena, Miller's "volcanoes and elephants," exist outside of the human mind, the nation, as well as the region, and one's identity, are concepts constructed by people as ways of locating themselves in their social world (see also Matson, 1966).

One of the key problems with defining the concepts related to collective identities is that we (in the research community as well as in common usage) tend to start from a spatial orientation. That is to say most authors who have considered collective identities have started from a description of the physical collective about which they intend to theorize. In fact however, the collective, whether it be a nation, a state, a region, an ethnic group, or any other such appellation is still a socially constructed concept as mentioned above. Starting from the spatial description of the group is an error tantamount to attempting to describe an identity by enumerating a list of attributes that define the group. It rigidifies the debate and

presents a number of other difficulties that prevent clear explanation of the phenomena actually under consideration. We must return to the fact that the social nature of the identity is what is most important and that the spatial or territorial element is but one fraction of a cultural identity.

However, one must not take this statement as a total condemnation of the descriptive power of these concepts. They do afford us some insight and should not be thrown out the window. For this reason, I include a brief description of some conceptual terms that have been prominent in the literature on identities. This may seem hypocritical to condemn them as a starting point and then to commence at that same point, but I begin here by way of showing why it is more important to think of cultural identity rather than national identity, regional identity, or ethnic identity or any other such specific case of cultural identity.

## Conceptual Explanation

### *Geopolitics: Regions, Nations, and States*

What exactly is a region? In trying to define a region, one is confronted with a huge range of different meanings. Petrella (1978) took up this question and explains some of the varying uses of the term "region." He mentions that the most prominent problem is one of scale. The ideology behind the usage of the terms nation and region has led to the assumption that a nation is a nation-state (see below for more on this distinction). As a result, calling a particular area a region almost necessarily subordinates it, and by extension its inhabitants, to the larger nation-state in which it lies. A second important distinction that Petrella makes is that it is often unclear as to whether one is speaking of an administrative region or a cultural region. This point is of particular interest in the Breton case as the

administrative region of Brittany contains four departments[1] while, the historic cultural region of Brittany covers a geographic area that includes a fifth department that administratively belongs to another region (Pays de la Loire) within France.

As we look at the French geopolitical organization more closely, we find another distinction that must be made with respect to the term *region*. In common usage, "region" with a lower-case "r," refers to the geographical entity (an entity which is defined historically and culturally rather than administratively), whereas "Region" with an upper case "R" refers to the Regional Council (also known as La Région Bretagne, but to eliminate confusion, I will continue to refer to it as the Regional Council or the Breton Regional Council - CRB)– the political body governing the region (Sophie – interview). However, it must be noted that, as the government is only concerned with the administrative regions (which as mentioned do not necessarily match up with historical, cultural regions), legal and political references to "region" with a lower-case "r" indicate the current administrative region consisting of four departments in the Breton case.

It is precisely for these inconsistencies that, as Petrella (1978) stated over 20 years ago, many minority groups seek to avoid calling themselves "regions," or speaking of "regional" identity. This is quite clearly the case in Brittany as all of my interview participants spoke of Brittany ("Bretagne") and not of the Breton region ("la region de Bretagne"). However the other terms groups have used to denote their status are not

---

[1] At the French revolution, the country was divided up into departments so that the government could be closer to the people. Originally, the departments were constructed so that citizens would not have to travel more than a day's journey to reach their representative at the prefecture (the department seat). The department is the rough equivalent of a county in the United States. Administrative Brittany is composed of the departments of Ile-et-Vilaine, Cotes-d'Armor (previously Cotes-du-Nord), Finistère, and le Morbihan. Historically, Brittany's geography contained the area surrounding Nantes as well, which roughly corresponds to the department of Loire-Atlantique (previously Loire-Inférieure).

without their own inherent difficulties. For example, Scotland is but one among several groups which prefer the term "nation without a state."

This distinction, the nation without a state, brings up another important division that must be made, notably the difference between nations and states. In common usage, we often tend to confound the two (cf. Miller, 1995). Furthermore, common French usage of the word nation refers to the state with the implied link to nationalism, which due to the still important influence of WWII has a negative meaning (cf. Simon, 1999). However, this blurs the line between two important components. A state is the political apparatus set up to govern a nation (or in many cases several nations gathered together within the boundaries of a given state – Petrella, 1978; Miller, 1995). The term nation-state, which is usually simplified to state, implies the fact that there are very few states today that have a population made up exclusively of people of one nationality. Further, the state is for the most part a modern political conception, which only truly came into existence in the late 18th and early 19th centuries.

If the state is the political apparatus, then what is the nation? The nation is a grouping of people within the state. However, it is not just any grouping, as one could conceive of innumerable different ways to categorize the variety of people inhabiting a given state (not the least of which is the region described above). Confusingly, national identities are "created" or manipulated by states in an attempt to link the nation (or the people) to the state (or government apparatus) in order to legitimize its exercise of power. For example, the French nation goes to great lengths (as do most nation states) to promote its own national identity. Additionally, the French nation attempts to promote a specific view of the Breton identity (along with the other indigenous and immigrant cultural identities) in an

effort to manage these diverse groups existing within its borders. It is for this reason that we can speak of national identity referring to a public sentiment of attachment to the national group (and for the same reason that we see Simon's (1999) description of the French definition of nation – see above). Leaving aside the problems with the term identity which I will address later, a nation is a group of people who are bound together by various characteristics, that set them apart from others, and by institutions that link them to the state (for instance, government, education, or religion). However, it is important to take note of the fact that the nation is "a" grouping and not "the" grouping of people within the state. This is important because most states were not constructed on cultural grounds but by wars or by treaties, which most often means that states have people of several nationalities within their borders. It is precisely for this reason that I believe nations such as Scotland prefer to call themselves "nations without states" as they were a separate political entity at one point in their history. This, as we will see in the discussion of Breton history in Chapter 3, is also the case with Brittany; where for about 1000 years between the Roman Empire and the treaty of union with France, Brittany was a largely independent political and cultural entity, including a medieval kingdom at one point (but not a state in the modern conception).

We must ask at this point, how then does a nation differ from an ethnicity? If both are culturally defined groups existing within a state (the political framework), what sets them apart one from the other? Some researchers have defined a nation as an ethnicity that has achieved a status in which it has its own institutions and a degree of political autonomy. Miller (1995) explains this using the American nation as his example (though he confounds nation and state for he actually means the American *state* according to his own definition of a state). In examining the American state he points to the coexistence of American nationality

and ethnic identity noting the many hyphenated Americans (e.g. Italian-Americans or Irish-Americans, p. 20). By this he implies that ethnic identity is one's cultural identity and national identity is one's relationship to the state. This, quite obviously illustrates the confusion between these terms. It is for this reason that I propose a more useful discussion should start with the recognition of all of the above terms (regions, nations, states, and ethnicities) as specific cases of the broader category of cultural identity.

*Culture*

Shifting to a broader category of cultural identity does not, however, remove all obstacles to the discussion. Both culture, from which cultural, and identity are concepts as difficult to manage as those briefly outlined above. Before moving to problems with defining identity, let me first address culture. One person can have a variety of facets to his identity and many authors refer to each of these facets as *an identity* in and of itself (e.g., sexual, political, racial, ethnic, or national identities which could all potentially be coexistent in the same individual). This explains our need to qualify identity by saying cultural identity, but we still have not figured out what "culture" or "cultural" actually mean. Miller (1995, p. 25) proposes that members of a given nation share a "common public culture," though, he too remains quite vague about what exactly constitutes this public culture, preferring to define it negatively. That is, he notes that this common public culture need not be monolithic, it need not be restricted to a kinship group or any other narrowly defined group, and its elements need not be present equally in every member of the group.

It is perhaps easiest to understand the concept of culture through a concrete example. As the nationalist movement in Brittany, while still in existence and regularly visible in the press and other areas of Breton public life, has shifted away from political

independence in most cases (with the exceptions of Emgann – the Breton independence party and POBL – the Breton federalist party – see the glossary for a definition of Emgann and Appendix A for a description of these two parties), its current focus is on socially relocating Bretons in the context of their historical traditions. Most notably, in the past 30 years Brittany has seen an incredible growth in the popularity of traditional music, dance, art and even traditional sports (such as gouren – see glossary) in addition to efforts to promote and protect the Breton language. Petrella (1978) would argue that cultural identity would be an accurate term for discussing all of these areas of Breton life, but would go further, as he makes the case for a more comprehensive definition of cultural identity including political, economic, psychological, and social aspects of a given society. That is to say, all of the concepts created by groups of humans would constitute part of this broad definition of culture. Petrella justifies this extremely broad conception of cultural identity for the reason that he says identity-based movements are now much more complex than they were in the past. Previously such movements were more one-dimensional, whereas modern identity promotion often involves an interrelationship between economics, culture, and politics. Hamelink (1983) agrees with this, saying that often we must look at the factors underlying a given group's claim to cultural autonomy, as often it is economically or politically motivated and simply using culture as a means to an end. Seen in this far-reaching manner, ethnic, regional, national or even supra-national identities can be understood as specific cases that fall under the broad umbrella of cultural identity.

*Identity*

Now we must ask: what exactly is identity? This is clearly no simple task as scholars from a wide variety of disciplines have studied cultural identities and have proposed an

equally wide range of theories about these identities. The relevance to many fields of social study provides important evidence of the complexity of identities. However, much early work ignored the strides being made in other disciplines. Many of these early studies ran into difficulty attempting to define the general characteristics that constitute cultural identities. As could be expected, many different characteristics were found and elaborated, but they could neither be generalized across identities nor across social settings. This inability to adequately delineate the features of a given identity let alone to find features common to all identities forced researchers to take a new tack. More recent work on the topic has sought to describe the complexities of cultural identities while still allowing for the inherent differences created by human nature interacting in an infinite variety of environments. Integrating several of the newer approaches generates a framework that permits a more accurate study of identities. This framework affords some general guidelines for examining identities while emphasizing the importance of the unique context that shapes each group.

Given the great proliferation of work upon which to draw, current thought on cultural identities draws valuable insights from several different disciplines. Schlesinger's (1991, 1993, 1997) sociological work brings us the most important element of the modern understanding of cultural identity; the notion that the development and maintenance of an identity over time is an active process. This is to say that an identity is never a fixed set of characteristics but involves the negotiation between members of the group, outsiders, and the social environment inhabited by the actors. Conceiving identity as a process involving maintenance, protection, and promotion avoids the problems inherent in attempting to create a fixed list of characteristics that must be present in all identities. While this might

seem to be a means of avoiding any description of the concept of cultural identity at all, this is far from the case. Rather this allows for a more fluid and dynamic description which in turn affords us a richer picture of the identity in question. By understanding that cultural identities are continually renegotiated, we allow ourselves the possibility of learning not only about the issues important to a particular group, but also how identities evolve in relation to changing influences, both internal and external. Hamelink (1983) has discussed this as the idea of cultural adaptation: the principle that cultural protectionism does not work because a given identity must continually reassess its relationship with its existing circumstances and with the outsiders with whom it has contact.

This constant process of identity negotiation is focused around four concepts or what I will call four axes. Schlesinger (1993; see also Smith, 1992) has proposed that cultural identities center around elements of inclusion, exclusion, time, and spatial continuity. *Inclusion* is paramount among these, as it comprises the set of attributes that define the members of a given group. Without a sense of what it means to be a member, no group could reasonably be expected to maintain any sense of cohesion. As can be seen in research on individual cultural groups, a variety of different categories have been central to outlining any given identity. For example, Barbrook (1992) found that up until the 1960's, broadcasting in Ireland placed strong emphasis on Roman Catholic values as the Catholic faith was and continues to be a pillar of Irish national identity. In New Zealand, Fitzgerald (1991) found that bonds of kinship were especially important for the diaspora community of Cook Islanders. In Brittany, MacDonald (1989) found that some of the more radical members of the Breton speaking community would refuse to interact with her when she spoke either French or English. She found that language was a vital symbol of the Breton

cause and access to the community was strictly limited to those who spoke Breton.[2] Many other case studies complement these examples showing a wide variety of attributes constituting group membership. The choice of which attributes form the essential core of a given identity will naturally be unique to both the social and natural environments in which the group exists. While a certain set of attributes forms a vital anchor for any group, we must also keep in mind that these attributes evolve continuously and new traits develop and old ones fade away over time through the negotiation process.

The fact that each identity is maintained around a unique set of constantly evolving attributes illustrates two particularly important concepts. First, focusing on the identity process as negotiated by a given group reinforces the necessity of examining identities within their specific context. Out of context, it would be impossible to explore the influences common to the group's unique social position. Secondly, concentration on the dynamic process reinforces the need to recognize the complex and constantly changing nature of the human environment that shapes any one identity.

*Exclusion*, the second axis of identity negotiation, is implied by inclusion for a set of characteristics by which one is judged to be a group member can also define an opposing set of characteristics that prevent others from being part of the group (Schlesinger, 1991). Because individuals use cultural identities as tools for locating themselves in the vast social world, an identity must be able to set its members apart from the masses of other people who make up that social world. Therefore, in order to differentiate group members from everyone else, an identity must not only contain characteristics that make one a member of

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[2] At the time I conducted my field research, this was no longer the case. Even self-classified militant Bretons were willing to speak with me in French (as my Breton was not yet adequate for conducting an in-depth interview).

the group but also those attributes which deny membership to others. This stems from a basic human need for categorization as a means of simplifying the complex world in which we live. Also, we, as group members, would not derive any benefits from membership if the group did not somehow set us apart from others. Thus, belonging to the group implies the benefits of a pool of resources greater than could be obtained by any one person as well as the sense of personal importance afforded by being a member of a group.

As could be expected, exclusion creates a whole new range of problems as it can add a divisive aspect to cultural identities (Meyrowitz, 1985). Those who are denied group membership are also denied the benefits and security associated with it.[3] However, exclusion need not be seen as a negative force if it can be given a role that does not imply antagonism. Taking a dynamic look at identities makes exclusion less of a divisive force, as it avoids fixing the exclusive criteria. By accepting the historical nature of identities, and recognizing adaptation through the developmental process, it becomes clear that group membership is only an attribute and not a barrier to others. Therefore, because an identity changes over time, fewer stigmata are attached to being an outsider; there is a possibility of obtaining the benefits of membership.

A further point concerning exclusion is that while it can involve closing off a given group from the outside, a much more democratically constructed identity must look outward and adapt to external influences rather than simply raising barriers to them (cf. Hamelink's (1983) argument on cultural adaptation cited above). This is essential if the claim to autonomy for a cultural identity is inscribed in a pluralist debate, as is the case in Brittany. Bringing up the issue of cultural pluralism loses all its argumentative force if the group

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[3] Many modern conflicts center around reactions by groups who feel alienated from the benefits enjoyed by a dominant group or who feel threatened by the dominant group (e.g., Kosovo).

raising this point remains isolated, preventing outsiders from entering. Why does this matter? It matters quite simply because most cultural claims are made to counter a majority group that has pushed the given group to the economic, cultural or political margins of society. Maintaining a very closed set of exclusionary criteria subjects the minority group to the same set of problems for which it condemns the majority oppressor. An extremely rigid set of exclusionary principles denies the group the ability to adapt to the changing conditions of the world in which it exists. As a result, recognizing the historical, evolutionary nature of criteria for exclusion is crucial to a pluralist, democratic discussion of cultural identity promotion.

As this evolutionary process is important to understanding inclusion and exclusion, *time*, the third axis, is vital to our conception of identity negotiation for two opposing reasons. First, the passage of time implies the possibility for adaptation as the group reacts to new influences. On the other hand, continuity over time is essential if group identification is to remain salient. Continuity implies the idea of a shared memory of history. While interpretations of this history can change in reaction to new influences, the events remain as core elements that provide continuity. For an identity to continue as a viable group affiliation its members must share some memories; that is to say that they must have a common history together. In order for a group to feel a sense of unity based upon its set of inclusive and exclusive elements, these elements must be perceived as important. A sense of shared history links each of these elements in the identity maintenance and promotion process. For instance in Belgium and in Switzerland as well as in France, language has been an important element in defining identities because it has been a central point of contention throughout the modern history of these nations (MacDonald, 1989; Reece, 1977; van der

Bulck & van Poecke, 1996). The sharing of memories over time accomplishes two goals; it provides events around which to rally the group, and it helps bind different generations of the group together. This second aspect of time is essential if an identity is to maintain any sense of continuity in spite of its naturally evolving nature (see above, Miller's description of "common public culture").

The concept of shared memory or shared history must not however be construed to imply that all members of a given cultural group must think or act exactly alike. Like the required flexibility in criteria for inclusion and exclusion, the conception of continuity over time, must be equally fluid.

Very similar to the concept of shared history over time is the idea of *spatial continuity*, the fourth axis for identity negotiation. Most identities relate themselves to a specific home territory, a place of origin. This is even true of diaspora communities that often have a strong sense of loyalty to a homeland from which they migrated. For example, Gillespie (1995) found that many members (especially first generation migrants) of the Punjabi community in Southall, England felt more attachment to India than to the UK. Whether a region associated with the historical origin of a given ethnic group or a state set up by treaty or war, territory can be a powerful symbol for a cultural identity as it represents a place where that particular shared history is held in high esteem (Smith, 1992). Just as shared conceptions of the past help anchor a group, so does a territorial homeland to which individuals can look for inspiration. The concept of spatial continuity is also very important to the Bretons in France as will be seen in the historical discussion in chapter 3.

**Identities as Cultural Tools**

If we accept that cultural identities are negotiated along the four axes mentioned above – inclusion, exclusion, time and spatial continuity, understanding the roles played by language and media in these negotiations requires that we then ask how various elements take hold, evolve, or fade out over time. Schudson (1989) proposes a set of cultural factors that can help explain the life cycle of elements that make up an identity. First he discusses *retrievability*, the possibility that the members of a given group are able to access a cultural object and make use of it as part of their identity. To simplify, a retrievable element of an identity is one that is readily accessible by the majority of the group. For instance, recent historical events or highly dramatic events are more easily remembered than mundane happenings or those that took place in the distant past. This is especially relevant to the discussion of language in relation to regional identities as the prohibition on use of a given language can be a highly dramatic event. The example of language prohibition in Brittany is a quite dramatic event even though it took place in the early 1790's (in the first instance) just after the French Revolution (Nouvel, 1977). In this instance, banning the teaching of local languages (teaching Gallo, the other language spoken in Brittany was banned as well, as were all regional languages in France) helped turn them into symbols around which to galvanize resistance to the imposition of the French language and of French authority. The shock of a ban on these groups' mother tongues was and remains highly retrievable across Breton society.

Just as group members must be able to retrieve a given cultural object, major institutions operating in the social environment must also retain that object as well (Schudson, 1989). *Institutional retention* has the influence of providing a kind of legitimacy for

the given symbol. To continue with the language example, a language that is used in major institutions can more easily be seen as important or legitimate than a language that is not used in these arenas due to its more public role in society (Kilborn, 1993). De Swaan (1991) outlined these institutions that help provide legitimacy for languages as law, government, business, education, and mass media.

The institutional role of language presents a difficult case as it can serve two functions, operating symbolically and communicatively. Furthermore, the line between these two functions is rarely clear. The authority granted a language used in major institutions is symbolic of the language's legitimacy within a society, but this legitimacy is perceived precisely *because* the language is used communicatively. This line between language as a symbol and as a means of communication may seem to blur because the two are often closely linked in the process of negotiating an identity. However, Edwards (1985) argues for distinguishing between the communicative and symbolic aspects, as the more instrumental, communicative properties of language would logically require the use of one language for administrative efficiency.

On the other hand, in their review of language and identity studies, Sachdev & Bourhis (1990, p. 216) explained that,

> Much social-psychological research has suggested that language and identity appear to be reciprocally related: language-use influences the formation of group identity and group identity influences patterns of language attitudes and usage. For instance, results of early studies using multidimensional scaling procedures have shown that ethno linguistic group members identified more closely with those who spoke their native tongue than with those who shared their cultural background or geographic origin...

This counters Edwards' ideas by proposing that the symbolic and communicative aspects are critically linked to each other. Returning to the Breton case, many modern Breton speakers (with the exception of some of the more militant proponents of Breton nationalism) use their language very little as French is more convenient for daily interaction with others (MacDonald, 1989). French is used in all national, regional, and departmental[4] institutions in France, and in order to negotiate the larger French society, Bretons, like everyone else, must use the established administrative channels. On the other hand, as noted above, the symbolic presence of one's language in such institutions as government is a powerful marker of its status as a legitimate language. In this sense, Breton speakers might like to see their language used communicatively in social institutions, but this communicative use would serve a more symbolic role, as in Sachdev & Bourhis' conception, than it would a utilitarian one. The Diwan[5] are a good example of the symbolic function of the communicative aspect of language. The fact that children are being taught to use Breton in school symbolizes the revitalization of the language as a functional part of society. That is, it provides institutional recognition of the language. However this action remains largely symbolic, as most of these students are required to use French outside school grounds in order to communicate effectively with the majority of the larger society.

While retrievability and institutional retention are important, they will not occur if a cultural object has no *rhetorical force* (Schudson, 1989). A cultural object must create and maintain significant interest in order to be retained as an element of group identity. If we take language as a symbol, it must then be significantly important and relevant to group

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[4] Departments are the smaller political divisions within France, similar to counties in the US.
[5] Diwan means "seed" and is the name of an organization of private, Breton-language primary and secondary schools. These schools operate on the principle of immersion, meaning that Breton is the sole language of instruction.

members in order to displace other possible unifying characteristics for that group. For example, language is not a major concern for Scottish national identity (Douglas Bicket, personal communication, January 31, 2000). On the other hand, the fact that languages other than French were banned in France after the revolution gives language more rhetorical force as a symbol of Breton identity.

A rhetorically forceful element might catch the attention of a group, but it will not remain an identity attribute for any length of time if it is not perceived as fitting in with the existing set of group ideals. One major test of the longevity of a cultural object as a symbol of identity is *resonance*, the degree to which the cultural object fits with the value system of the audience (Schudson, 1989). Here we see the importance of temporal continuity as well. In spite of the fact that identities do evolve over time, a cultural attribute must fit with the existing predominant conception of the identity if it is to be incorporated. Language is also a very resonant cultural object in France as a whole and in Brittany in particular as linguistic expression in cultural and artistic forms has played a dominant role in social life since the renaissance (MacDonald, 1989; Reece, 1977).

Significant *resolution* is also a key factor in the continued acceptance of a cultural object as a useful element of an identity (Schudson, 1989). Even if a cultural object has rhetorical force and resonance, it may dwindle in effectiveness if it does not promote direct action of some kind. That is, a cultural object has high resolution when it is successful at encouraging active social participation by those who use it. Language, simply by its use, involves an active understanding of a cultural identity and thus has a quite high resolution. For example, if language can be understood to have a symbolic component (which as mentioned above is often closely linked with its communicative role), it encourages thinking

about one's identity simply through the acts of speaking, writing or reading. Because this thinking is motivated by an activity (actual language use), this is an element with high resolution. This is certainly the case for the Breton identity. For example, MacDonald (1989) described early Breton cultural revival attempts in which nearly any activity was considered "Breton" as long as participants spoke the Breton language.

To summarize then, negotiating identities occurs around the axes of inclusion, exclusion, time and space. Concerning the modern Breton case, language plays an important role with respect to each of these axes of negotiation. The Breton language is used as both a criterion for inclusion of members as well as for exclusion of outsiders. Furthermore, the prohibition on Breton language use provides a shared memory around which to galvanize group members across generations and in the face of new social challenges. Finally, modern Bretons trace their linguistic roots on the Armorican[6] peninsula back to the appearance by Celtic peoples from the British Isles after the decline of the Roman Empire.[7] Thus, the Breton people tie their identity to the peninsula on which they live through their linguistic heritage in the region.

Furthermore, we can view Schudson's criteria as ways in which the cultural objects that form the attributes of each of these areas will take hold as defining parts of identities. A look at the role of language in Breton history also gives us a sense of how retrievability, rhetorical force, resonance, institutional retention, and resolution can be seen as influencing factors on the acceptance of cultural objects as points of identification.

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[6] Armorica is the Gallic name for Brittany still sometimes used by modern Bretons to describe their home territory.

[7] It should be noted that historical records of the Celts' origins in Brittany (the Armorican peninsula) are subject to debate and in MacDonald's words, "the relationship between the Brittones and modern Bretons is to be found in philology rather than in biology" (1989, p. 109).

**Imagining Cultural Identities**

That identities are negotiated and evolve around the above aspects demands further explanation. Not only are identities influenced by their surroundings, they must also be recognized as social constructions. This means that the negotiation of identities is based upon what now seems an almost common-sense notion that they are "imagined communities" to borrow the term Anderson applied to nations (1991).[8] This is to say that large cultural groupings, nations among these, are big enough that we do not know all of our fellow group members and thus must have some indirect bonds that tie us together and offer some sense of unification.[9] Without some indirect bond how could we possibly feel any sense of relationship to millions of people whom we do not know at all? Furthermore, if we take, as Anderson does, the special case of the nation-state, a modern political entity that very rarely has a homogeneous population, there must be some way to bring together groups that often have quite different value systems. These diverse groups must be united in some way for the concept of the nation to have meaning. Without a shared sense of its importance, a nation would not be able to carry out its most basic administrative tasks. As a result, group members, specifically those in leadership positions, must find means of creating bonds, making existing values symbolic of group membership. This is the point upon which Schlesinger (1997) draws in stating that groups have a need for a set of shared memories.

A common language is one such way of uniting a large group of people. First, a common language facilitates the administration of the nation. Furthermore, as noted above,

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[8] While Anderson was discussing the development of the nation-state in particular, it too can be seen as a specific type of cultural identity. The nation-state is important as it is the major political division in the modern world system, but his idea applies equally well to regional groupings such as the Bretons.

[9] These groups can be seen in contrast with tribes or other groups based upon kinship in which one knows all the other members.

media can be seen as institutional carriers of language and cultural values. This in turn makes them important tools for disseminating the cultural links that maintain an imagined community. In fact, Anderson (1991) centers his discussion of the historical appearance of the nation-state on the ability to extend government control through the use of print media. Prior to the rise of print media, messages were much more difficult to disseminate to an audience as large and diverse as the typical population of a nation-state.

Just as the group needs to create and maintain bonds with its citizens, so also do the citizens need a reason to believe in that group. Taking a social psychological view of identity can help explain these ties of identification. Bloom (1990) illustrates this perspective based upon Freud's emphasis on the basic human instinct for survival. Groups can assist human survival in two ways: they can offer benefits which could not be attained by any one individual acting alone and groups can help keep members secure from external threats. Bloom extends these general group characteristics to the special case of the nation. Thus perceived security and benefits provide reasons for the individual to accept the unifying authority of a nation-state. Bloom further proposes a "national identity dynamic," the willingness of group members to act to help preserve the group when it is threatened from the outside.

This national identity dynamic can be extended to regional identities as well which, as in the case of Brittany, are quite similar to national identities excepting the fact that they lack an autonomously governed territory of their own. For example, the development of the Diwan and the several Breton nationalist parties in Brittany can be seen as reactions by the Breton people to outside threats to their identity.

Because of the fact that identities are socially constructed through interaction between the state, the citizens, and outsiders, the process of negotiating these identities must take place in social arenas. As the media frequently carry messages from or about the nation-state, they provide one of the prime arenas for the negotiation of national identities (Rivenburgh, 1997). While operating on a smaller scale than a nation-state, the diverse composition of even a regional cultural group requires a means of sharing identity related messages.

**Cultural Identities in the Media**

This leads to another point, which is that media, by giving wider access to messages about identity, facilitate group cohesion. That is, media serve as links between major institutions and the people. The activities of identity maintenance, promotion, and protection are carried out in environments in which value systems are present *and* in conflict with competing ideals. By competing with outside ideas as well as other internal ideas in the media and other social arenas, an identity continually adapts to its current circumstances (Hamelink, 1983). Rivenburgh (1997) makes an important extension of Bloom's national identity dynamic (see above) proposing that mediated messages can invoke national identification. That is, audiences can be motivated in support of their nation through viewing mediated portrayals of the state interacting with outside groups. In this sense, mediated messages can be seen to support the group and have even quite often been understood as the cultural arm of the government in countries whose broadcasters operate on the public service model. Expanding beyond the informational function played by media content, Sampedro (1998) found that exchange students often read newspapers from their home country, not so much for the information provided, but to regain a sense of

identification with their familiar native culture. Thus, both as providers of nationalistic information and as fora for cultural expression, media are important tools for identity negotiation.

This understanding of media as arenas for the negotiation of cultural identities implies a fundamental difference from past ways of looking at the media-identity relationship. Often media have been viewed in the context of how their content helps construct or shape identities. However, this introduces an element of technological determinism that affords media too much power and as a result, group members play a more passive role in shaping their identity. It is important to realize that there is much more to an identity than its representation in the media and exploring media as spaces where the negotiation process takes place allows for this more complex conception (Waisbord, 1998, Schlesinger, 1993). As a result, we need to explore media use as one forum in which identity negotiation takes place. For example we need to explain not how media define the language roles for Breton speakers but how this group uses media to negotiate its identity around language and other symbols as well.

**Regionalism vs. Globalism**

Two additional elements of a new understanding of cultural identity are closely linked and can be discussed in tandem. While national identities have often been the focus of research on cultural identities, smaller, regional identities also play an important role in the modern world. These regional identities can be seen as evidence of resistance to the homogenizing influences of the process of globalization (Belay, 1996; Castells, 1997). Hamelink (1983) identifies this resistance as the fear of cultural synchronization; group members fear the loss of uniqueness of their identity. If an identity is understood as a fixed

construct, then fear of synchronization could represent a reason to become defensive of one's identity. However, if an identity can be renegotiated through interaction with other groups, it will be able to grow and strengthen itself as it relates to outside influences. This is an important point in practice as well as for research into identities as group members must try to envision their identities as adaptable to new influences.

This notion fits into the concept of pluralism (also called multiculturalism or cultural diversity). Usually the recognition of regional identities is undertaken in efforts to protect the diversity of cultural ideas present in the human social environment. This has been proposed, similarly to the protection of biodiversity in the natural environment, as essential to maintaining the world by balancing the variety of existing values against one another. This would facilitate a greater number of voices and thus not only provide more opportunities for identities to strengthen themselves through interaction with other groups, but also force identities to avoid becoming fixed, defensive, and reactionary by requiring them to adapt to outside influences. This dynamic process can only happen with continual popular involvement in one's group identity. Here again, regional identities are important as there is as yet little popular involvement in extremely large, amorphous concepts such as Europe (Smith, 1992). In order to maintain this process of adaptation, a given identity must be a part of the individual's daily life. Europe as a point of identification has no shared values that play daily social roles as yet. Also, a rich range of regional values provides a greater possibility for cultural interactions between groups that can further strengthen cultural diversity.

The idea of cultural pluralism also adds an understanding of the right to hold one's own values. While this right has begun to receive consideration as a cultural human right by

a wide range of international organizations in the 1990's, it has its roots in the charter of the United Nations (1945). Increasingly, regional cultural groups are interpreting this as a mandate for greater manifestation of their voice in both national and global arenas.

As a result, while many more economic, political, and cultural interactions are taking place on a global level, the human social need for a local focus for daily life has pushed regional groups to the fore. People need a concrete social anchor clearly related to their daily experience. This has been quite apparent in the case of the European Union's attempts to create a single market for broadcasting. Originally envisioned as a means of competing on economic terms with the influx of American cultural products, the single market idea ignored the heterogeneous reality of European broadcasting. For example the initial Television Without Frontiers Directive, signed in 1984, attempted to create pan-European broadcasting. Attempts such as La Sept, a pan-European cultural television channel, have received little popular attention as there is only a very small cosmopolitan elite who are interested in cultural forms which originate in other European cultures (Emmanuel, 1992). This effort as well as studies showing unique preferences for language (as well as translation methods – for material in non-native languages - Kilborn, 1993), have forced a change in EU broadcasting policy (Gifreu, 1996). Subsequent efforts at creating a wider market have focused on sharing cultural products through the creation of cross-distribution networks and through co-productions (see for example the MEDIA – 1992 and MEDIA II – 1995 programs – Collins, 1994).

Collins (1994) outlines this shift as a modern manifestation of the free-flow vs. dirigisme debate, essentially the difference between viewing media content as an economic good versus as a means of cultural expression. While those in favor of competing

economically in the modern global media market realize the necessity of a large audience base from which to draw the support and resources necessary for expensive productions, they do so, perhaps unintentionally, at the expense of smaller regional and local voices. Dirigistes, on the other hand, favor the democratic public service ideal, which protects and promotes regional media as fora for cultural expression. Dirigistes look at media from a political stance rather than from a purely economic perspective.[10]

In the dirigiste vein, several researchers have examined the influence of greater European control over broadcasting (we can look at European control over broadcasting as an example a beginning of looser national control over broadcasting environments). Burgelmann & Pauwels (1992) note the many difficulties of creating a single broadcasting market, among them the fact that most media content produced in Europe is closely aligned to national cultural interests and thus rarely has widespread popularity outside its country of origin. Sampedro-Blanco & van den Bulck (1995) as well as Garitaonandia (1993) have argued that not only do smaller nations have problems in an unregulated economic market, but so do regional broadcasters. Again, the size of these broadcasters' markets (such as regions within Spain, Belgium, or the Netherlands) prevent them from generating as much revenue to develop new media products in comparison with larger national markets such as France or the UK.[11] Given these findings, dirigistes have argued that it is necessary to implement a regulatory structure that would ensure the maintenance of a wide range of voices in the European media market (Kaitatzi-Whitlock, 1996).

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[10] However, it must also be noted that while dirigisme is the guiding principle in France, the public service model is most often defined nationally rather than regionally and current practice thus focuses more attention on French cultural expression rather than on regional cultures.

[11] This is due to the fact that the ability to generate revenue is related to market size whether the media system is funded by advertising, subscription, or license fees.

From this brief summary of the debate between pluralism and free trade in the EU there are several points that can be instructive for the study of cultural identities and for the Breton identity in particular. First, we must look at the amount of contact a group has with outside influences. These provide instances in which the group can renegotiate its values in relation to new ideas. The process of globalization has greatly increased the ability for regional groups to have a wide range of outside contact that was formerly reserved for states. Additionally, the developing principle of cultural rights as human rights further strengthens the position of regional groups vis-à-vis the national and supranational political structures in which they exist. Without preserving a wide variety of cultural *others* in the social world, the range of ideas with which any given group can interact is reduced. This would mean a narrower range of ideas available for public debate, possibly hindering some cultural adaptations. Finally, we must understand how these interactions are represented in the media and how cultural groups use media in promoting their identity. As such, examining broadcasting and how it is viewed culturally becomes a very important issue.

For the Bretons in particular, assessing the ways they interact with the outside world means exploring their relationship with the French nation and also with the EU as regions gain importance in the new Europe.[12] As part of the relationships between these regions and France and the EU, we must examine how the Breton people are integrated into society and how their cultural rights are being safeguarded. By looking at the role of broadcasting, and other media as well, we can begin to form a picture of the identity negotiation process as it is shaped by the Breton context.

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[12] The development of the Committee of the Regions as well as the EU Charter on Regional and Minority Languages both point to a greater awareness of the importance of regional diversity within the EU.

**Study Design**

Through a review of the wide range of literature on the subject, it has become possible to integrate some of these ideas into a framework that provides useful guidelines for exploring the complex issues surrounding cultural identity. First, and most importantly, a cultural identity must be seen as a dynamic process of negotiation and renegotiation rather than as a static entity. This process of negotiation is a result of the interaction of group members with their social environment. Secondly, because cultural identities are negotiated by their members, we can say that they are socially constructed, or "imagined" in Anderson's (1991) words. Thirdly, media are arenas in which this construction process can take place as they are carriers of cultural expressions. Finally, this entire process of identity negotiation has become increasingly important as cultural groups find they have a growing amount of contact with outside influences due to an expanding number of global interactions, both mediated and direct.

One important feature of recognizing cultural identities as dynamic forces is that they cannot be understood if examined outside of their natural context. That is to say that identities, whether regional, national or supranational, evolve in relation to their social environment and to study them outside of this environment would be to remove some of the influences that shape their unique character. Therefore, in the case of the Breton identity, this group must be situated politically within the French national as well as within the EU supranational setting. The Bretons define themselves, at least in part, in reaction to these larger political entities and understanding this relationship is central to presenting a complete picture.

Just as the political setting shapes identities, the historical circumstances out of which they have evolved is also a major factor in explaining their current situation. This involves understanding past political developments as well as comprehending traditional means by which groups have expressed their social and cultural values.

Another important consideration that comes from exploring identities as dynamic forces is that all actors involved in identity negotiation must be studied as well. A cultural identity is the product of the interaction between group members as well as with those outsiders who help link the group to the larger social setting. For this reason, painting an accurate picture of the media role in an identity must include an examination of both producers and consumers of messages as well as those who introduce new ideas to the group.

By exploring not only the attributes of an identity, but also its setting and the interactions taken by the actors involved in its maintenance, promotion and protection, we can begin to create a rich description. Only by accounting for this level of complexity can we effectively understand the role that identities play in the human social world. This role is increasingly important as abilities to communicate have improved to the point where global contacts are a reality for more than just elite national leaders.

Taking these ideas into consideration it is now possible to pin down some areas crucial to understanding Breton media use. Specifically, this inquiry will focus on five broad areas.

*Area 1: The Breton Media Environment*

Questions describing the Breton media environment will include: What types of media use the Breton language? Print? Broadcast? Others (such as theater and music)? Who

owns these media - governments? Cultural organizations? Private Companies? How are these media organizations structured? Politically and economically, how do these media fit into the national media context? How do these media work with other regional institutions such as education and government? How does French national media policy affect the organization and operation of these media organizations? How does EU media policy affect the organization and operation of these media organizations?

*Area 2: Breton Media Content*

Questions directed at an understanding of the nature of Breton media content will include: What are the types of Breton language programs? How do these programs address issues of cultural identity promotion or protection (implicitly or explicitly)? Do these programs promote the Breton language? If so, how? Do they focus on a revival of cultural values? If so, how? What are the specific themes addressed across the range of regional media? Do different media address issues of cultural identity in different ways? If so, how? How is the Breton identity defined within media content in relation to France and to the EU?

*Area 3: Breton Media Producers*

How do Breton language media producers perceive the role of their media products in relation to their cultural identity? What are the values that they seek to promote in their programming? How do they envision their product (informational? educational? entertaining? a means of building the community?)? What outside influences shape their work? How do they feel their medium addresses the social needs of their audiences (instilling a sense of regional pride? Promoting language? Promoting political identity?)?

How do Breton media producers understand their organization's relationship to EU media policy?

*Area 4: Breton Media Audiences*

Who are the Breton media audiences (demographic characteristics - size, age, profession, status within the community, status within the larger nation and within the EU, education)? How do these audiences perceive the role of Breton language media products in relation to cultural identity? What values do the audiences seek in Breton language media? How do audiences express their identity in relation to media products (Pride in seeing mediated representations of their values? Language learning? Political affiliation?)? How are Breton language media integrated into the daily lives of the audiences? How do media audiences relate their Breton identity to the nation and to the idea of a common Europe?

*Area 5: The EU and Regional Media Policy*

How do regional media outlets in general and Breton media outlets in particular fit within EU policy? Does current EU policy affect the organization and operation of regional language media outlets? Has EU policy been effective in facilitating the regional media activities that can help promote and protect cultural identity? What are the EU policy mechanisms that have helped (or hindered) this process?

The focus on these five areas will help achieve a comprehensive understanding of the media role in promoting the Breton cultural identity. By combining data on content, policy, audiences, and producers within the context of the existing media environment, the interrelationships between these areas that form the media system can be viewed in their natural setting. This conception of regional media use in the process of identity promotion

and protection provides a holistic perspective indispensable for effectively situating the Bretons in the larger national and European arenas.

# CHAPTER 2
# METHODOLOGY

In the previous chapter, cultural identity was described as being a process negotiated around the four axes of inclusion, exclusion, time, and spatial continuity. Additionally, the roles played by language and media in this negotiation process were described as being tailored to the situation in which the identity developed. As shown by the broad categories which form the present conceptual framework for studying Breton media use in the identity negotiation process, adequately describing an identity requires a structure that casts a wide yet flexible net. This is necessary to avoid developing an understanding of this identity in a manner incomprehensible to those most concerned, namely the Bretons themselves. For this reason, a highly directed approach would risk not only missing important aspects of the Breton identity not readily evident to the researcher examining from a perspective exterior to the Breton culture, but also describing the situation in a manner incompatible with the Bretons' world view.

Ensuring that the present discussion of Breton identity "makes sense" to the Bretons themselves has a couple of implications. First, as stated in the previous chapter, identities are socially constructed. That is, those who define themselves through a given identity are the ones who, over time, construct, promote, and protect the identity in relation to the world in which they live. As a result, a researcher, when examining a given identity from the outside, cannot effectively describe the identity without understanding how those who live within its bounds define it. To revisit Miller's (1995) statement, identities differ from natural phenomena, such as "elephants or volcanoes," in the sense that while the physical world exists outside of the human capacity to describe it, identities do not. Put another way, Geertz (1973, p. 5) wrote, "...man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself

has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning." This means that understanding a cultural identity, and by extension language and media use in the identity promotion process, requires understanding how the given group comprehends itself.

All this is to say that identities are not natural phenomena that can be understood by simple observation. Whereas one can begin at least a preliminary investigation of elephants by observing them to get a sense of their basic exterior physical characteristics, an identity has no such physical aspect. When studying socially constructed concepts such as identity, one must combine knowledge gained from observation of social practices with an understanding of subjective meanings (Berger & Luckman, 1966). As a result, simply observing a group of people and inferring cultural specificities runs many risks. Simon (1999) provides an interesting example of this in his discussion of the Breton identity. He includes in his identity, the "appearance," "the character," and other items in a catalog of traits corresponding to "Bretonnité,"[13] his term for the Breton ethnicity. The end result of this list amounts to a rather rigid stereotype based upon an understanding of 19th and early 20th century Breton peasant farmers and fishermen.

The second point implicit in an exploration of the Breton identity in relation to its meaning to the Bretons themselves comes out of the first. Because identities are socially constructed by groups of human minds, any explanation of an identity must take into account the influences, both internal and external which shape the thoughts and actions of the given group. Geertz (1973, p.12) states this quite concisely saying, "culture is public because meaning is." In other words, the interactions between people are what create

[13] The term Bretonnité and this meaning (Breton ethnicity) are also in wide use amongst most other French language social researchers concerned with the Breton identity.

meaning, not simply thoughts in an individual's mind or even shared ideas held by one specific group. For instance, examining the Breton identity in isolation from its relationship to French national identity would require setting aside much historical information about interactions between the two that have shaped the modern Breton way of life. Furthermore, much of Breton identity is concerned with what delimits it from French identity; that is with what sets Bretons apart from other French citizens (or as many of my interview participants would say, what sets the Bretons apart from the French).

These two points, that identities are socially constructed and that they are critically linked to their social contexts, flow directly from the underlying philosophy behind qualitative social research. First the qualitative perspective focuses on the meaning people ascribe to social situations (Jankowski & Wester, 1991). This is part and parcel of the identity negotiation process. The concept of identity is centrally concerned with just how people make sense of their social world. Ethnography, a prominent qualitative methodology, attempts to explicate the informal logic of everyday practices (Morely & Silverstone, 1991). While this study can by no means be considered an ethnographic study in the strict sense, the qualitative interview, the major source of data in the present case, finds its roots in the ethnographic perspective. Furthermore, identity negotiation is intertwined with everyday practices such as language and media use. As a result, a qualitative perspective is quite ideally suited to the study of identity.

The qualitative perspective also favors inductive research. This is to say that theory develops from the research process and not as an hypothesis fixed prior to the exploration. It is for this reason that the conceptual design discussed at the end of chapter 1 consists only of broad "areas of inquiry" and not of specific hypotheses to be tested. In other words,

generalizations developed from this study will consist of my interpretations of the identity negotiation process in which the Bretons are engaged. While one might think that the researcher's interpretations could well be irrelevant to the process of identity negotiation of which he is not necessarily a participant, this is not the case as the researcher's sense making process does not differ from the participants' sense making process. In other words, neither my interview participants nor I were simple spectators in this project, and this study thus reports my second order interpretations of the Breton identity (Matson, 1966). For this reason, it is important to cast a wide net with the project so that my interpretations come as close to those made by the Bretons themselves as is possible. Geertz (1973) termed this idea of keeping close to the text, the actual concrete practices of media use for Breton identity negotiation in this case, "thick description."

For example, if an understanding of Breton media use were based upon the basis of a few select variables, say for instance, solely upon an analysis of Breton televised news (a brief six minutes per day), one could reasonably question the accuracy of such a portrayal (and the resulting picture most probably *would* be flawed). However, by examining a wider range of influences on Breton media use within the identity negotiation context, my presentation of the subject can more closely approach the Breton understanding of their own interactions with the media.

Achieving an accurate description of an identity, well rooted in its cultural context can also be checked through the use of multiple methods. This is so that information gleaned from one part of the study can be verified despite the fact that both presentation and reception of this information are subject to interpretation (Jankowski & Wester, 1991; Potter, 1996). In other words, using a variety of types of data and levels of investigation

allow the checking of information obtained from any one source with a variety of other sources to complete the picture and verify that my interpretation of a given activity remains true to the Breton context.

Qualitative, humanistic study, drawing on ideas from semiotics, also privileges examination of language as a representation of a given context (from Barthes, 1967). This is to say on one level that language grows out of the context in which it develops and on another level, that individuals adapt their language use to their specific social context. As such, understanding the role played by language in Breton identity negotiation is a vital part of understanding the identity itself. Finally, the media, as carriers of language can provide important public indications of language use and thus of cultural meaning.

In keeping with the qualitative philosophy, this project relies upon in-depth interviews and textual analysis as the bases for interpreting Breton-language media use and identity promotion as set out in the areas of inquiry developed in Chapter 1. These two methods allow an exploration from the Breton point of view, in the Breton context, and they also combine a variety of types of data.

**Interviews**

Because the major part of Breton identity involves the Breton understanding of their place in the social world, and because they are the ones engaged in media use in their language, interviews made up the primary data source. These were 47 in-depth, semi-directed interviews with 49 people occupying a variety of positions in relation to Breton society. All interviews were conducted between May 2000 and March 2001. The in-depth, semi-directed interview format varied in length between 45 minutes and two hours, largely dependent upon the time the participant allotted for our conversation and her

loquaciousness. The average interview lasted roughly one hour. Semi-directed means that while I did approach each participant with a set of questions specific to her role in relation to the Breton media system and the Breton identity, I did not impose any fixed structure on our conversation (following Park, 1993; Rubin & Rubin, 1995). For instance, if the speaker seemed more interested in or had more to say about the organization of her specific type of work rather than the content produced, I continued with the flow of ideas rather than forcing her to discuss subjects I had envisioned as being relevant prior to the meeting. In this way, if the participant, who was usually chosen for her specific knowledge or role, had a different understanding of the issues at hand, I allowed her to explain concepts in her own terms and through her own way of viewing the world (following Rubin & Rubin, 1995; Seidman, 1998). Furthermore, as my interview participants were definitely more knowledgeable about their own identity (given my position as an outsider), giving them some license to describe their situation from their own perspective enabled me to access the level of complexity with which they view the world rather than relying on a somewhat simplified view based solely upon my observations (from Weiss, 1994).

Choosing interviewees was done with a couple of important criteria in mind. First, it was important to access information about the full range of media included in Breton society. Therefore, participants were sought out from television and radio stations broadcasting in Breton as well as from the Breton language press. Given the low penetration of home Internet access in Brittany (and France in general where only 13% of the population has access – Médiamétrie, 2001), I did not emphasize new media in the interview process. A second group of participants was chosen from among representatives of those Breton cultural organizations who have extensive interaction with the media. The

final grouping of Breton interview participants came from among "ordinary" citizens. That is to say, these interviews took place with Breton speakers, encountered over the course of my stay in Brittany, who were willing to discuss their media use in relation to their conception of their own identity. This last group was important as these participants provided me with information about the way the Breton media audience perceives Breton language media content.

In addition to the Breton participants, other participants were chosen from among government officials who take part in language or media related policy issues. These officials held posts at the regional (Breton), national (French) and European Union (EU) levels. Those participants at the EU level were representatives of EU bureaus concerned with regional media issues having branches in Brittany.

The selection of interview participants from all of the groups mentioned above was initiated with the help of several key contacts who have a wide knowledge of the Breton culture, community, and context. With the assistance of these key contacts, I was able to gain access to a quite complete list of people and organizations involved in Breton language media production, as well as in the Breton cultural community in general.

While many experts on qualitative interviewing recommend a process of multiple interviews with each subject, this was only possible in a very few cases (Rubin & Rubin, 1995; Seidman, 1998; Weiss, 1994). In the instances where more than one interview was possible, this policy was followed, but the majority of the participants only had time in their schedule to meet once. As a result, the rapport developed with the interview subjects was perhaps less than optimal, but the details provided by the Breton media content and political document analyses helped fill in any gaps in the interview information.

Thus by selecting interview participants from all aspects of the Breton language media system and from the cultural and political organizations which form its context, the interview process was able to cover the wide range of ideas present and to accurately situate them in their setting. As participants were asked to speak from their personal as well as their "official" work-related point of view, the information they provided was less oriented toward answering questions posed by the researcher and more toward explaining their relationship to their cultural identity and its expression in the media.

Because participants were asked to speak about both their professional and personal lives, it was important to keep their statements private. As required by the University of Washington human subjects division, participants were asked to give their express permission, by signing a consent form, for the use of their statements (See Appendix B for a sample of this form). As part of the regulations governing the involvement of human research participants, I have used a set of pseudonyms to separate vital information from any specific speaker (see below for a description of the means used to choose pseudonyms). Though most participants felt this was an unnecessary precaution, I have followed through with this policy in the present report.

The vast majority (all but three) of the interviews were conducted in person and recorded with an audiocassette recorder. The three interviews that were not conducted in person were conducted via telephone due to a lack of available time and resources to seek out these participants. It was not possible to record these phone conversations, and for these interviews, participants' words were noted on paper. Recording the interviews allowed me to transcribe the exact words of my participants permitting me to retransmit their thoughts in their own voices. During the transcription process, I left the material in the

original language, French in most cases (see below), and simply transcribed the conversations word-for-word. The transcriptions were not full transcriptions, which is to say that not every word on the tape was reproduced on paper. However, the majority of each conversation was transcribed; omissions were made when the conversation digressed to unrelated topics if they were judged to have no bearing on the issues concerning this project.

I personally translated all the interview material. The translations, while following as closely as possible, the exact words used by my participants, seek to accurately represent the meaning. In other words, the meaning of a given citation has been given priority over a precise literal translation. This was a necessary convention for a variety of reasons. First, the linguistic and syntactical differences between French and English make a literal translation awkward to read and often incoherent. Secondly, many of my interview participants used idiomatic expressions, which are nearly always culturally based, and thus a literal translation would change the meaning if not totally obscuring it. Finally, technical terms, like idiomatic expressions often add non-standard meanings to common words. This is the case in English as well and for that reason much of the media industry jargon or "insider knowledge" could not be translated literally either. As a result, the translations present in this version stick to my participants' precise words whenever possible, but diverge in cases where capturing the correct meaning required such a deviation. Two participants (Jakez and Aurèlie) wanted to conduct the interview in English, and the quality of their English was adequate for allowing this. Their words were not changed at all where they have been reproduced in this text. However, all other interviews were conducted in French.

**Content Analysis**

Complementing the interviews conducted with Breton media workers and audiences is a content analysis of materials from some of the major Breton language media outlets. The television episodes were viewed in Breton with French subtitles. France 3 television organized a viewing session of a series of episodes representing the range of subjects covered on their two current Breton language programs *Du-Mañ, Du-Se*, and *Red an Amzer* (see the glossary for information on these programs). These episodes were supplemented with a viewing of additional tapes of these programs from the collection at the Médiathèque des Langues at the Université de Rennes 2. Skeudenn Bro Roazhon and Skol an Emsav provided the last six episodes of the 2000 season of *Skeudenn Roazhon*, the program they jointly produced with TV Rennes, as well. This sample of television series was augmented by the analysis of several issues of *Sell Ta!*, a magazine on videocassettes in Breton sold by subscription, and a viewing of two Breton language films, *Brezhonek Leizh o Fenn* and *Ur Sulvezh Ordinal...Pe Dost.* The *Sell Ta!* episodes and the films were accessed through the Médiathèque as well and through two provided by several interview participants. A sample of issues of *Bremañ*, the Breton language news monthly was selected from the archives kept by the paper. The sample used consists of all the double issues (one printed each summer for the months of July and August) and several special issues covering topics selected in concert with the *Bremañ* staff for their relationship to the Breton culture. In addition, the complete *Bremañ* volume from the year 2000 was analyzed. Given that both of these samples (video and print) are purposive samples in that they were selected for the range of ideas they presented, neither can be said to be representative. However, they do provide important information with which to complement and verify the interview data. Additionally, though

the samples cannot be said to be statistically representative, this was not the goal behind the content analysis; it was undertaken to access the widest possible range of information so as to be able to accurately characterize the available Breton language content.

In the analysis of audiovisual media, all topics were noted as well as the general themes underlying these topics. The unit of measure was the show segment. More specifically, instances of the language used to evoke these themes (where possible) were noted. Explicit mentions of Breton identity and the language used to describe it were also noted. Finally, instances of Breton language promotion and the terms used to describe this language promotion were noted as well (see Appendix C for sample code sheet). In the cases of *Red an Amzer* and *Du-mañ, Du Se*, the information obtained from the viewing of these programs was augmented by that provided in publicity materials given to me by the station during my interviews with the staff of these two shows.[14] Themes and the relationship to the Breton identity were understood from explicit elements in the programs, thus following a concrete link to the comments made by participants during the interview portion of the study.

While the video portion of the content analysis covered all of the content in the programs, analysis of *Bremañ* was limited to an examination of the subjects covered as evident in the titles and themes of the issues in the sample. For this portion of the analysis, the unit of measure was the article, (more specifically, the headline). The analysis of *Bremañ* was conducted by examining the headline for each article in order to determine its subject. In cases where the headline did not provide enough information, the lead paragraph of the article was consulted to augment the cues provided in the title. While a much more

[14] Similar complementary materials were not available for the other video elements of the content analysis.

complete analysis would have been able to consider the full text of each article, time constraints and a limited budget for translation assistance prevented a more in-depth examination.

Translation of the article titles and subjects was undertaken by the author and verified with the help of Loig, a fluent Breton-speaking student at the Département Breton et Celtique at the Université de Rennes 2. Loig independently translated 10% of the *Bremañ* headlines into French, and his translations were then matched against my own to judge the accuracy of my work. All translations matched identically, not on content as the choice of synonymous terms based upon vocabulary preferences made that impossible, but on meaning.[15] This is to say that the headlines translated by Loig guided me to code the articles in the same manner as I had done through my own translations.

Although other media content does exist in Breton (see the description of the Breton media environment below for a full description of media offerings in Breton – Chapter 6), it was not possible to incorporate all of this material into the current analysis given the modest translation budget. As a result, the above materials were chosen for their wide circulation and for the fact that they are well known amongst Breton speakers. These were also the media most frequently discussed by participants during the audience interviews.

By analyzing the actual content present in Breton language media products, I was able to access concrete examples of the concepts discussed both by producers and audience members during the interview portion of the study. These explicit examples provided not

[15] In spite of the fact that there were no translation differences in the sample used for verification, calculation of the error rate with a 95% confidence level leaves a possible 7% upper bound on translation errors given the sample checked.

only verification of the interview statements, but also an added richness to the understanding of the values and ideas important to the mediated expression of the Breton identity.

**Political Document Analysis**

The political document analysis is an examination of reports, decrees, laws, and letters from three levels of government; the Breton regional government, the French national government, and the European Union. These materials were examined to fill in necessary background for the understanding of the technical, legal, and political aspects of statements made during the interviews. The materials were obtained from a variety of sources, most notably: the centers for documentation and publications of the Breton Regional Council (CRB), the High Audiovisual Council (CSA), the General Delegation to the French Language (DGLF), the MEDIA program, and the European Bureau for Lesser-Used Languages (EBLUL). Further documentation was obtained through Websites maintained by relevant organizations and from library collections at the Université de Haute Bretagne, Rennes 2 and the Bibliothèque Nationale de France. The document analysis also contains information from several proprietary reports produced by the governmental agencies mentioned above.

The information in the political documents was used to describe the political and legal contexts in which Breton language media organizations operate. Often, interview participants referred to laws and regulations by name, number, or date without stating the precise goal of these documents. As a result the document analysis provided the additional background necessary.

A further important aspect of the political document analysis is that it provides clues as to how the various levels of government view the Breton identity and its expression in the

media. As political documents summarize the conceptions held by current government representatives, they can be taken as a measure of how the majority of the political elite views the issues surrounding Breton language, media and identity (with the inevitable political compromises taken into account).

**Summary – Reporting the Story of Breton Media Use**

As this study seeks to understand the Bretons' own conceptions of their identity and the roles played by language and media within this identity, it was important to leave the data in the words of the participants as much as possible. This kept a sense of their expertise in discussing their worldview and avoided excess interpretation of their sense-making process (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). In reporting long quotations, I have eliminated the majority of the *sounds of thinking*, the "ums" and "uhs" that naturally occur in conversations. Such deletions are denoted by two dots ".." An additional type of break in a speaker's words is also important to mention. To maintain focus in the report, digressions have also been extracted from the interview citations included. These deletions are indicated by three dots "..." With these two exceptions, the interview data presented has been left unchanged aside from translation.

I've employed another common convention, the use of pseudonyms to protect the privacy of my interview participants, as well. All pseudonyms were created with the following scheme: participants with French given names or who spoke no Breton were given French pseudonyms while those with Breton given names or who spoke Breton were given Breton pseudonyms.

A check on the quality of the measures used in this study is performed by the inherent methodological design. That is to say, seeking verification from the other sources

of data tested the reliability of the information provided by any one source. For instance, as mentioned above, interview data was checked against content analysis data and political document analysis data. Furthermore, during the interview process, participants were asked about ideas and concepts put forward in previous interviews. In this way, the different competencies of each interview participant acted as means for verifying the accuracy and richness of the concepts described. In addition to checking participants' interpretations of their own identity, I asked some questions about my own interpretations of the issues at hand. This process of cross-checking between the variety of methods used is standard among qualitative studies and follows guidelines outlined by Jankowski & Wester (1991), Potter (1996), Rubin & Rubin (1995), Seidman (1998), Strauss & Corbin (1990), and Weiss (1994).

By verifying my interpretations during the data collection process, and by leaving this report in the words of my participants where possible, I have based my account of the language-media-identity relationship on a foundation laid by the Bretons themselves. As a result, the theoretical conclusions made are developed from the Breton understanding of their own identity rather than by a structure I imposed from the outside.

# CHAPTER 3
# HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE MODERN BRETON IDENTITY

> "...to forget, and I will venture to say, to get one's history wrong are essential factors in the making of nations, and for this reason, the progress of historical study is often dangerous for nationalism."
>
> – Ernest Renan*

## Forgetting History or Renegotiating Shared Memories?

The "forgetting" and "getting one's history wrong" of which Renan spoke in his address to a conference on the subject of nations and nationalism in Paris in the late 19th century points to the process of interpretation that is involved in both the writing and understanding of shared histories, one of the fundamental axes of cultural identity negotiation (Renan, 1997). The concept of time (Schlesinger, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1997) or a shared interpretation of historical events can help us situate the modern Breton identity and the media system that operates within it. With this thought in mind, the present chapter is not intended to be an exhaustive history of Brittany nor of the Breton people and their identity, but rather an exploration of some of the elements that have been retained and reinterpreted as elements of the modern Breton identity at the beginning of the 21st century.[16] Specifically, this historical summary will discuss three issues that have had a great impact on Breton identity: its Celtic roots, the notion of a Breton homeland, and a tradition of looking outward.

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* Renan, 1997.

[16] Also, many quite detailed histories of Brittany have already been written. See for example: *Toute l'Histoire de la Bretagne: des Origines à la Fin du XXe Siècle* (Monnier & Cassard, 1996), *Histoire Générale de la Bretagne et des Bretons* (Pelletier (ed.), 1960), or *Histoire Littéraire et Culturelle de la Bretagne* (Balcou & Le Gallo (eds.), 1987).

**The Bretons: A Celtic People**

One important element of modern Breton cultural identity is the tracing of its roots back to the Celtic tribes that inhabited much of Europe around 1000 B.C. This is a point around which Renan might well be able to say someone "got it wrong" as there is a great difference of opinion as to the details of the link between the ancient Celts and the modern Bretons. However, one aspect is certain; this link is important. One can see evidence that the Bretons do in fact think of themselves as a Celtic people in everything from traditional decorative motifs such as the triskelion to cultural gatherings such as the InterCeltic Festival held annually in Lorient.

The picture becomes a bit blurred though when one asks just exactly what it means to be "Celtic." Certainly, the Breton language is a Celtic language; it is related closely to Welsh and Cornish, and more distantly to Irish and Scots Gaelic. This linguistic link is in fact the sole characteristic held in common between the various ancient Celtic tribes (Cassard & Le Quéau, 1998). The term "Celtic" was first used to describe the group of languages spoken by these tribes and is actually derived from a Greek term for these groups who were found between Bohemia and Bavaria to the north of the Greek empire in the 5th century BC (Galliou, 1996).

Exactly how the ancient Celtic peoples arrived in modern Brittany, Wales, Scotland, and Ireland from their perch in central Europe north of Rome is not very well documented (ibid.). Some historians follow the theory that the majority of the prehistoric Celts were inhabitants of the European continent and the peoples of the British Isles became "Celtified" through contact with their continental neighbors rather than through an important migration during the last 500 years before Christ (ibid.). The Celts were not

actually one people, but five Celtic tribes did have settlements on the Armorican peninsula, the territory occupied by modern Brittany (see figure 1).[17] Though conquered by the Roman Empire, these Celtic tribes in Brittany were not completely Romanized, but were rather pushed aside. As the Roman Empire began to spend more of its energy fighting enemies to the East, the Gauls and the Franks, the Celts in what is now Great Britain were able to reassert a presence in Brittany. Invasions by the Angles provided additional motivation for this migration back to the continent. This "re-Celtification" represents the most recent influx of Celtic people into Brittany and probably explains the close link between the Welsh, Cornish, and Breton languages (ibid.). These immigrants from Great Britain who came between the 5th and 10th centuries AD were much less Romanized than the Armoricans (Croix & Guiffan, 1977). The Armoricans had however kept their Celtic language (Gallic) throughout the occupation by the Roman Empire. This is because they were more or less left to their own devices while Roman leaders focused more attention on the eastern border areas from which enemies might most likely invade (ibid.). As a result, there is evidence that Gallic was still spoken in Armorica in the 6th century (Abalain, 1995).

However, their greater contact with the Romans naturally meant that the Armoricans underwent greater Roman influence than was the case with the Welsh and Irish Celts, the medieval immigrants (see figure 2). Among these immigrants were the Seiz Breur – the seven founding saints of Brittany. These monks, Malo, Samson, Brieuc, Tugdual, Pol

[17] These five tribes, the Osismii, the Venetes, the Coriosolites, the Riedones, and the Namnetes were arranged roughly around the ancient centers; the Namnetes around modern Nantes, the Riedones around modern Rennes, the Venetes around modern Vannes, the Coriosolites in the Cotes-d'Armor, and the Osismii in Finistère (Croix & Guiffan, 1977).

Aurélien, Corentin, and Patern, founded the seven dioceses that made up the original Breton Catholic religious structure (Favereau, 1993; Chardronnet, 1985).[18]




**FIGURE 1: THE GALLO-ROMAN TRIBES OF THE ARMORICAN PENINSULA**[19]

[18] Malo founded the diocese of St. Malo, the town which bears his name, Samson – the diocese of Dol, Brieuc – the diocese of St. Brieuc, Tugdual – the diocese of Tréguier, Pol Aurélien – the diocese of Léon around St. Pol de Léon, Corentin – the diocese of Cornouaille around Quimper, and Patern – the diocese of Vannes. To these were later added the dioceses of Nantes and Rennes.

[19] Figure adapted from Delumeau (1969, p. 79).




**FIGURE 2: 5TH-7TH CENTURY CELTIC MIGRATIONS TO BRITTANY AND WESTERN EUROPE**[20]

*Modern Celts in Brittany*

This historical link between Celtic peoples has become an important part of modern Breton identity despite the fact that it is a highly contested element. The Celtic link has been emphasized as an element of the modern Breton identity since the end of WWII in the revival of traditional artistic forms. A notable example, *Bodadeg ar Sonnerien* (BAS – see Appendix A for a description of BAS) – reborn in 1946, was influential in the revival of traditional instrumental music, especially the binioù (see glossary) and the bombard (Monnier & Cassard, 1996). Through their efforts to re-popularize these traditional

[20] Figure adapted from Pelletier (1995a, p. 28).

instruments, this group also brought into vogue the "pipe band," a primarily Scottish and Irish tradition.

The result of this blending of traditions is that there is a division many among the intellectual elite in the Breton movement about placing emphasis upon their "Celtic-ness." For example, Marc-Antoine, a professor of Breton and Celtic studies in his 50's, described this link favorably during our interview, saying,

> The Celtic concept is new, but older than the last decade. It comes from the immediate post-war period when Bretons didn't want to associate themselves with anything *plouc*, which is to say peasant, nationalist, provincial or protest oriented. For example, the departments of Celtic studies in Rennes and Paris were, at this time, the only ones in France. By calling them *Celtic* studies, we could approach the very interesting questions of Breton language, culture, and history without the stigma associated with the term *Breton*. Also, Celt is a bit of a fuzzy term, which is to say that it adds a bit of mystery, which perhaps makes the subject more interesting (italics mine).

Marc-Antoine, as a Breton and an academic, realized that part of his interest in studying Breton culture came from the need he felt to reverse the stigma attached to the language and culture. Thus, Celtic became a euphemistic term used to talk about Breton culture in a more positive sense.

Following this idea, some Bretons feel that this Celtic link is a way of manifesting a more outward looking cultural identity as well. Yves, a musician also in his 50's who works for an association that archives traditional Breton musical works, said,

> what has had a significant role in the development of Breton culture, has been the reattachment of the Breton entity to the larger Inter-Celtic ensemble, or at least to Western Europe. At the same time in this sense, that certainly gave back to Bretons, too accustomed to being considered drunken, dirty *ploucs* by the rest of France, at least by the power center, and the Scottish, Irish, and Welsh examples were certainly contributions, at least from the 1950's onward, but I think

> there's a higher plateau that we've arrived at after the 50's and the examples of what was done elsewhere were an enormous inspiration for us (italics mine).

For Yves, this inspiration means that by looking toward Celtic neighbors, the Bretons have been able to learn about the process of promoting their own identity. Janig, a woman in her late 40's who works for a Breton language TV station, shares this point of view.

> In fact, everything that is considered Breton or Celtic really has the wind in its sails right now with this cultural renaissance, music, culture, businesses in Brittany who... saw that the culture could actually bring in revenue. And who go along with this cultural renaissance and who take part too. And this conjunction between economy and culture is certainly an important event that dates from the 1990's.

For Janig, economics are important to the link between the Bretons and their Celtic neighbors. Through an emphasis on cultural products, she sees a way to move beyond the traditional Breton role in the French economy, that of low-end agricultural production and fishing.

On the other hand, there is a sentiment that the idea of Celtism unites too many unrelated elements to be a useful concept for the Breton identity. Brieg, a cultural association director in his 40's, mentioned by way of example that at the InterCeltic Festival in Lorient in July 2000, TV Breizh had a booth set up to publicize its upcoming debut but not a single word of Breton was to be found in any of its materials. Brieg was very adamant about the fact because that the term "Celtic" was originally used to describe the family of languages to which Breton belongs, groups operating under the guise of a Celtic identity should be more conscious of language.

He also saw it not as a means of looking outward, but another means of introversion for the Breton culture. He mentioned a TV Breizh advertisement publicizing James Bond movies dubbed into Breton, but only the ones featuring Scotsman Sean Connery in the lead role. Another TV Breizh example he gave was an advertisement promoting live coverage of rock music concerts that discussed only groups from Celtic countries such as U2 (Irish) and several well-known Welsh bands. In his view, if the Breton culture is to look outward, it should not stop at the borders of its Celtic neighbors either but should be accepting of all exterior forms of expression.

Gwenole, another director of a cultural association in his 50's, is also very concerned about the modern interpretations that the term Celt has taken on. At my first mention of the word, he said, "It's a very dangerous idea." He then clarified, saying, "the only thing 'Celtic' about the Bretons is the language. Language, on the other hand is a very profound means of thought and expression." After this explanation, he returned to the danger of Celtic-ness giving the examples of the modern acceptance of the Galicians as a Celtic people (which he called a joke) and the bagpipe, noting that the more popular *binioù bras* (see glossary) is actually the Scottish bagpipe while the more rarely seen *binioù kozh* is the bagpipe that was historically played in Brittany. He summarized this fear of too much haphazard inclusion by saying,

> one can't really say much because everything is mediatized,
> radio and TV announcements take on the character of truth.
> We're in a world, and the Internet accents this even more,
> where the truth means little to the majority. What's
> important is what people say.

This mediated popular extension of the concept of Celtic heritage is too large a cultural distinction for Gwenole. While being Breton is a very important part of his identity,

enlarging this to "the Celtic world" introduces too many elements he considers extraneous to his being. In addition, he feels that the media have played a role in expanding the definition of "Celtic" too far beyond its original meaning. This over expansion thus means a loss of control over the future of the Breton identity for Gwenole.

The elusive nature of the relationship between Bretons and their "Celtic-ness" is not only apparent in the variety of understandings of the term Celtic, but also in its influence. While some, like Brieg and Gwenole, date its presence back as far as the 19th century with its roots in linguistic studies, others, such as Janig, place it as recently as the 1990's. Rather than showing ignorance on the part of one or the other of these Bretons, this discrepancy can be taken as an indication of when the idea of a Celtic link became important to various domains of Breton life. Modern Breton academics began to take interest in the Breton culture and its Celtic roots as a subject of inquiry as early as the immediate post WWII era, while the economy is just beginning to realize the importance of a relationship with cultural activities. It is this popularity or consumer relationship that has been important in the reinterpretation of the Bretons' Celtic roots beyond the academic sense and even beyond the prior cultural meaning to make them a part of a larger public culture.

In spite of the ambiguity surrounding the conception of their Celtic roots, this idea remains central to the Breton identity. Whether as a euphemism for putting a positive spin on the Breton culture, as a means for seeking a sense of community with others confronted by a similar situation, or as a way to enlarge the economic market for cultural goods and services, Celtism is a highly retrievable and rhetorically forceful element of Breton history.

**Breton Territory: A Shared Notion of Conflict**

While attachment to a Celtic heritage may be a topic of debate, the notion of a Breton territory is much more universally accepted. However, this is not to say that this element of the Breton identity is free from contention. At the time the *Seiz Breur* immigrated to Brittany, the peninsula was made up of three small kingdoms that were by no means unified into any larger political body. The closest any feudal lord came to unifying Brittany was Waroc'h, a feudal leader who became the Vannetais chief in 578 and who conquered Rennes in 579 and Nantes in 587 (Abalain, 1995). Waroc'h, however, could never quite make these areas submit to his control (Croix & Guiffan, 1977). The first feudal leader who was able to unite all of Brittany was Nominoë, who successfully defeated French King Charles the Bald in 845 (see figure 3). Charles did not take this defeat well and as such did not recognize Brittany as one kingdom until 857 when Erispoë, Nominoë's son, became the Breton leader. However, it was at this point, that Brittany became recognized as its own freestanding political entity (such as political entities were in the medieval period where any sense of nation was embodied by the ruler of the given territory). Brittany remained a kingdom for somewhere between 50 years and nearly two centuries depending on how one determines what constitutes a kingdom (Cassard & Le Quéau, 1998; Le Coadic, 1998).[21] The link with the French kings was not however completely broken as Alan II, Barbe-Torte, called upon them and the Normans for assistance in chasing away the Vikings who came to pillage in the mid 10th century (after which the Normans took advantage of their position and invaded Brittany themselves – see figure 4) (Cassard & Le Quéau, 1998). Because of this link to the French kings, which became stronger over time, Alan II's grandfather, Alan I

[21] Again we see here a discrepancy in how Breton history is interpreted. Cassard & Le Quéau opt for the more conservative estimate while Le Coadic states that the Breton kingdom lasted for two centuries.

the Great (890-907), is sometimes recognized as the last Breton king (Pelletier, 1995a; Croix & Guiffan, 1977).




**FIGURE 3: THE BRETON KINGDOM (845-857)**[22]

[22] Figure reproduced from Abalain (1995, p. 20) by permission from the publisher.




**FIGURE 4: 10TH CENTURY NORMAN INVASIONS OF BRITTANY**[23]

After this brief period as its own kingdom, Brittany was recognized as a Duchy, paying tribute to the French kings, but largely left to its own devices in terms of governance (this corresponds roughly from the 10th to the 16th centuries – see figure 5 – Le Coadic, 1998). During this period, Brittany's rulers made their home at the Ducal Palace in Nantes. Anne, Duchess of Brittany (1488-1514), became Queen of France as well through marriage to French kings Charles VIII in 1490, and upon his death in 1499, his brother, Louis XII (Pelletier, 1995a; Cassard & Le Quéau, 1998). While these marriages were arranged by the French in order to obtain the Breton territory for France, Anne was able to retain some autonomy for the Breton people.

[23] Figure adapted from Balcou & Le Gallo (1987, plate 8 between pp 26-27).




**FIGURE 5: DUCHY OF BRITTANY (10TH TO 16TH CENTURIES)**[24]

The Ducal period is considered to have ended with the signing of the Treaty of Union Between Brittany and France in 1532 (Pelletier, 1995a). While giving the Breton peninsula to France, this treaty reserved important rights for the Bretons. The Bretons kept the right to vote on any tax levied by the French king, Breton nobles would only be forced to serve in French armies if combat took place on Breton soil, the Etats Régionaux de Bretagne would continue as the Breton parliamentary body, and Bretons would be judged by Breton laws, not by French laws. Though the Breton Dukes were no longer the rulers of their territory, these provisions of the treaty helped them retain a good deal of power over their possessions.

[24] Figure adapted from Pelletier (1995a, p. 57).

While the Treaty of 1532 let Brittany preserve a good deal of its sovereignty, the French rulers between 1532 and the revolution in 1789 took every measure to regain the aspects of Breton rule that they had signed away earlier. For example, in 1554, Henri II created the Parlement de Bretagne, a legislative body to compete with the Etats Régionaux. In his parliament, half of the members came from the Breton nobility while the other half were nobles loyal to the French crown (Cassard & Le Quéau, 1998). This effort misfired though, as many of the non-Breton members of the parliament became accustomed to Breton laws and over time began to prefer them to the French laws that they were supposed to be protecting. Similarly, in the last half of the 17th century, Louis XIV imposed a series of taxes on the whole of France, Brittany included, in order to pay for the war he was conducting in Holland and for his extravagant lifestyle at Versailles (ibid.). Brittany was not given the option of voting on these taxes as per the treaty of 1532. Though not always successful, these attempts to reduce Breton autonomy during this period are remembered as part of a territorial struggle between Brittany and France.

The French Revolution had a profound impact upon Brittany as well. As mentioned earlier, the treaty of 1532 allowed Bretons to be judged by their own laws (which dated back to the Très Ancienne Coutume de Bretagne of 1320[25]). Because Breton law was not as severe as French feudal codes, the Breton peasants were not as supportive of the

[25] The Très Ancienne Coutume de Bretagne was a legal code that was concerned with order and the Christian spirit (Chardronnet, 1985). It was much more egalitarian than French law, reserving fewer privileges for nobles. For example most of the Breton peasants were required to give much smaller portions of their harvests to their feudal lord. Many Breton peasants even owned their own property.

revolution.[26] As a result, many Bretons were branded as royalists, which made them targets for revolutionary troops. This meant many Bretons were considered enemies of the Republic and killed during the Revolution and the Reign of Terror (1790-1793).

With the implantation of the French Republic, Brittany, like the rest of the country, was divided into administrative departments, each intended to be small enough to permit anyone within a given department to travel to the Prefecture in a day or less by horse (Simon, 1999).[27] Thus, at the revolution, Brittany, like all of the other historical cultural regions of France, ceased to exist, at least in official political terms. An often cited principle of the French Republic was, and still is in some circles, "la République une et indivisible" – the Republic, one and indivisible. In the Jacobin spirit in which this slogan was conceived, this meant that no one could be Breton, Basque, or from any other region; all people were to be French and only French. This nationalism, along with the egalitarian rule of law, was to be the unifying force of the new Republic in the eyes of the revolutionaries. The Jacobin concept of equality understood recognition of separate regional identities as being preferential treatment of certain groups. Because of this, the Republic, in which all were equal, could not make distinctions between regional identities. The new territorial identification was to be with the nation of France rather than one's region of origin.

While this nationalistic fervor may have won out at the time of the revolution, the importance of a more local understanding of territory to cultural identity can be seen in

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[26] One of the major causes of the French revolution was the inequity between the Nobility and the Clergy (together composing 5% of the population), and the third estate (95%), the common people (Bertaud, 1992). In Brittany, many peasants owned their own land and were not forced to give huge portions of their goods and money to their feudal lords (Gallet, 1992). Breton taxes were on the order of 4 times lower than taxes around Paris at the time (Pennec, 1993).

[27] The departments into which Brittany was divided are the Cotes d'Armor (previously Cotes du Nord – the name change occurred on March 8, 1990 – Abalain, 1995), Finistère, Ille-et-Vilaine, Loire-Atlantique, and le Morbihan.

several attempts to "remake" France's regions in the early 20th century. The first attempt in 1919, proposed by then trade minister Clémentel, did not take, but was most notable for bringing the question of regions to the attention of the French parliament (Denais & Perrut, 1991; Rémond, 1993). There were a couple of other unsuccessful attempts at regionalization that took place before WWII, but France had to wait until 1982 with the Deferre Law[28] for regions to exist again, administratively speaking (ibid; Favereau, 1993; Monnier & Cassard, 1996). However, these regions do not necessarily correspond to the historical cultural regions that existed prior to the French nation. Sophie, a Breton regional government official described the process of re-regionalization in this way:

> In reality, they [the State government] tried to keep the regions as close as possible to the names of the existing departments. But at the same time to calculate populations and roughly equivalent revenue and things like that. So it was a bit bureaucratic if you will, without too much preoccupation with history. Then, precisely what poses a problem for Brittany, because Brittany ought to include the Loire-Atlantique. However, if they'd done that, the Pays de la Loire would have been a long narrow region and they wouldn't have known from where to give it another department. And we would have had five departments and [Pays de la Loire] only four. In [giving Loire-Atlantique to Pays de la Loire], that made five for them but of smaller dimensions. Or at least more compact. And us, it was almost the historical region of Brittany. And when one looks at a map of the regions, one understands that it couldn't be anything but a poor compromise between what was desirable, that is to say large regions, and what was possible while still maintaining the departments. But when one looks at the region of Alsace, there was never any question of making a larger Alsace-Lorraine region, never.. I think that at some point, the politicians wanted to make regions and have the departments disappear but that was impossible. One of the reasons for this is that each department has its own elected officials. Thus, if you remove that structure, you remove an

[28] Law no. 82-213, signed March 2, 1982. The law was named for Gaston Deferre, then Mayor of Marseille and a close political friend of President Mitterrand, who pushed the legislation through the parliament.

> election. This means you've removed someone's little fiefdom somewhere, a little territory. This wasn't the case at all in Germany or the Netherlands. So, to the question of regionalization, one must add on the level below, the problem of departments, and above, the fact that the French state did not want to renounce any of its power.

As Sophie mentioned, modern administrative Brittany lacks the department of the Loire-Atlantique, which contains Nantes, the old ducal capital (see figure 6). Thus while the historical territory associated with Brittany includes what is now five departments, the modern administrative region only includes four. This modern division has provoked many debates and polls asking Bretons whether or not the region should be restored to its historical limits. The response is quite strongly in favor of the reattachment of the Loire-Atlantique to Brittany.




**FIGURE 6: MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE BRITTANY**[29]

Through our exploration of Breton political history, we have seen that territory, as a concept, has been a subject of conflicts in Brittany since the arrival of the Roman Empire. The continual battles between political leaders of various stripes have meant that the Breton cultural homeland has been the object of many manipulations over the last 2000 years. The changes and disputes have transformed territory into a subject of which Bretons are constantly reminded. As a result, negotiation around the axis of territory is a major component of the Breton identity.

## Looking Outside of Brittany – Trade and Europe

Part of the reason Breton territory was so highly sought after is due to its strategic location on the European continent. Brittany was a very prosperous region historically as its

[29] Figure adapted from Reece (1977, p. xxiv).

central position in Western Europe and many natural inlets that made good seaports gave it the ability to trade with peoples from the Mediterranean to Northern Europe. Louis XIV, embroiled in a war with the English, cut off the lucrative linen trade between Brittany and England. At this point in Breton history, the only remaining trade was the infamous triangular trade conducted out of Nantes, the selling of African slaves to plantations in the new world in exchange for sugar and other goods for Europe (Cassard & Le Quéau, 1998).

Trade as a practice not only brought goods in and out of Brittany, it also brought an exchange of people and ideas as could well be expected. This openness to other cultures and ideas can be seen in modern Brittany as well. As mentioned earlier, the InterCeltic Festival held each summer in Lorient, is a major reunion of musicians and artists from Celtic backgrounds. Performers come from Ireland, Scotland, Wales, and even Galicia to share their music, art, and experiences.

Another important cultural gathering is the Douarnenez Film Festival, which focuses on cinematic production from marginalized groups throughout the world. Originally, the festival began as a one-time effort to promote Breton films, but as Ninog one of the organizers said the response was so enthusiastic that they made the decision to continue annually, choosing a different cultural group each year. The festival always includes a competition for Breton language films, but the theme for the majority of each year's festival focuses on a specific region. In past years, the festival has exhibited Yiddish, Inuit, Maori, and Italian regional films.

When asked if this outward regard was important to him as a Breton, Jakez, a Breton professor in his 30's working at the teacher training academy (IUFM), replied,

> Oh yeah, in my opinion it is. It has always been and it still is the case now true, in commerce, fisheries, even our farmers.. One thing that they are is that they're open to the world. In many ways, they export, but they also discuss, they go to Brussels. Yeah, it's part of being Breton is opening yourself to the world, exchanging, getting cultural influences from the outside, back from the Spanish, from the Flemish influences in the 15-16th century, down to the mixing of the musics from the Berbers or the Africans or whatever they're experiencing at the moment.

Gurvan, a cultural association worker and radio host in his 20's, also mentioned this inclusiveness of the Breton culture in a discussion of musical influences.

> It's a relatively recent phenomenon. Breton music is now combining with jazz, other traditional musical styles, whether from eastern European countries, gypsy music, Romanian music, music from the Maghreb, North Africa, India, the Pacific islands.. There's a lot of blending which shows that Breton music is very open and Breton musicians are open to other styles. And that's the future, this blending.

Socially, the Breton culture has also been quite open, making a place very early for women in the public sphere. Youenn, an 80-year-old teacher and former broadcaster, mentioned that the

> Order of the Ermine, an honor awarded [by the ICB] to those who have contributed extensively to the promotion of the Breton culture comes from a tradition started in 1364, which even then could be given to a woman. Even then gender equality existed in Brittany.

This inclusion of women in public life goes back to the importance of long-haul fishing to the Breton economy when women had a much more public role in society as their husbands were absent for months at a time.

In addition to its social openness, Brittany has maintained a fairly outward looking political posture as well. Many of my interview participants also pointed out that "Brittany is, along with Alsace, the 'most European' of any region in France." What did they mean by

this? They were discussing the vote on the ratification of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty of European Union. While much of France actually voted against the treaty, the five Breton departments as a whole (surpassed only by Alsace) voted overwhelmingly (60%) for the treaty (Favereau, 1993).

Just as Brittany supported the EU at the ballot box, Bretons feel that the EU has also helped them. Jakez spoke of this relationship by saying,

> It has [helped]. It probably has, but not as much as it should have, because the opposition within the French society is still quite strong. As you know, the Bretons have saved the "Yes" for the Maastricht referendum.. The French nationalists as Charles Pasqua for example even said, "Les Bretons c'est comme des cochons"[30] because we saved the "yes" and he was so mad at us. We saved the "yes" together with the Alsatians. So of course, one of the only possibilities that we can see for more freedom of action is the Europe of the regions, but I'm aware that a lot of center French citizens, for them it's irrelevant you know. They don't have as many connections as we have with across the seas or with the Spaniards or the Basques. They live in a continental country and they just can't see that.. We live on a peninsula, so of course we're open to the world; by taste, by want as much as by obligation.

While Jakez does acknowledge reasons for the lack of French sympathy for the EU, he notes that Bretons do hope that their support for the European Union will translate into a European influence upon the French government to change its linguistic policy in their favor. However, he sees little concrete action being taken at present. Furthermore, few Bretons, know exactly what the EU will be able to do for them. Goneri, a retired professor of Breton studies turned volunteer radio host, stated cautiously, " I get the impression that yes.. I believe Europe will serve to lower disproportionate French pride." Paol, a television host in his 30's, had little idea how, but said, "I think that it [Europe] can't be other than an

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[30] "The Bretons are like pigs."

added richness." Soaz, a self-described dyed-in-the-wool Breton language militant in her 40's, summarized the faith in the EU saying, "yes I think that it helps because of the fact that we're not alone, we're in the same boat with other regional languages." Thus, for these Bretons, the EU vaguely represents a larger sense of community where they can find solidarity with other minority language groups who understand their situation.

Some participants did have a more specific idea about EU importance for the Breton culture. Most of these were government officials who dealt directly with European policies. For example Per, a television announcer and one of the few non-government officials to speak clearly about the idea, stated:

> The idea has helped a lot, because the French have had to see a variety of other ways to relate to regions.
>
> The French do good work in many areas, but there are still some domains where we have been a bit slow because of the omnipresence of the state.

Marc-Antoine, a professor, echoed this thought saying,

> Europe is of great importance in helping greater expression for the Breton culture. During the interwar period, let's say 1930, France was an empire, the 3rd Republic. To maintain the empire France had to be very nationalistic. If not, we would have had problems with the Vietnamese, the Africans, the South Americans and the Maghrebins. On top of that, we had to confront enemies closer at hand like the Germans. After the Second World War, Europe was very important because it was a mediating power. That is to say that it kept the peace between the European states. It was a counterbalance to the states that stabilized them a little bit. Also, Europe brought a period of greater democracy because of this power.

Gurvan, a cultural association worker, added a linguistic component to the importance of the EU:

> Yes, in any case, the opening of Europe, yes. Yes that couldn't be other than a good thing. It's important to have common languages whether it be English or French, but above all it's important not to destroy the richness that our languages provide.

However, uncertainty as to how exactly the European system will help the Bretons is quite prominent. Michel, a radio announcer in his 40's, summarized this feeling saying,

> One problem with Europe – one has the impression that the elected officials don't do anything or don't know the right things to do because we don't know them, whereas inside the region one runs the risk of having too shortsighted a vision. It's an extraordinary challenge.

Sophie, a regional politician, began to explain this shortsightedness in relation to the variety and ambiguity in definitions of regions:

> The serious problem that we have in France and I still take great care to raise this question when talking about Europe. To receive a subsidy from the EU, one must work with three European regions. A Frenchman understands from this, "me, I'm Breton, I'm going to work with Alsace and let's say Aquitaine." And he cannot understand that "three European regions" means one in France one in Germany and one in Ireland or Italy. We're completely Franco French. I explain that to say that regionalization completely traumatized the French. That is to say that since the French revolution, we've only had one division, which was the department. And France is divided, elected officials included, between departmentalists, for whom the department is perfect, and regionalists who are generally younger people or those who've taken a different route to political office; who have found.. a different way of political thinking. And as long as France continues in the present fashion, piling structures one on top of the other, we'll never get this sorted out.

Despite the misunderstandings and uncertainty about the EU, some participants did have more precise ideas about what looking toward the EU could do for Brittany. Yves spoke of the EU's potential both for funding and as an alternative to the nation-state political structure.

> For the last few years, Europe has funded a certain number of cultural activities. So that is in fact something new that has helped. Currently, we have a project for a TV show being evaluated by the EU. It's something that 10 years ago, it would have been very difficult to have. Even if Europe existed, for this type of thing, that would have been much les evident. And then, Europe is also an interregional organizational structure.

Gwenole expanded on this idea of a new type of organizational structure saying,

> The great hope of all the regionalists in other countries, it's Europe. And it's also the reason for which those we can call sovereignists, those who are against the idea of a Federal conception of Europe, who want to keep the most possible power in the hands of the states, are so angry right now with the European Charter of Minority and Regional Languages, they're so hostile to the idea of giving up any sovereignty. Certainly for us it's a great hope. If we look outside France, all the great nations are countries that make an important place for their regions. This has been the case since 1949 in Germany. What's funny about that is that France insisted vehemently ... that Germany be a federal republic in order to weaken it, to dissuade it from rebuilding its militaristic structure. It was important not to reconstitute an important capital and we imagined that this system would weaken Germany politically. And the result, it's that we've given Germany the structure that favors initiative that favors greater democracy, so that they are way more adapted to the modern world than a centralist state. I think we gave Germany a very nice gift.

In addition to representing a new organizational structure, Brendan, an artist, sculptor, and filmmaker, talked about the EU as a source of additional funds to help develop the Breton culture:

> And later, Europe because Europe like you said a bit earlier, has a policy of recognition of regional identities, notably of languages that have been marginalized, marginalized by the attitude of centralist and imperialist states. So, we, finally, I am in a region that is part of the group of regions that are the least developed if you will that are called the 5B regions and Europe gives money to these regions for regional cultural development. And so I take part in a commission, I'm the

> vice-president of the cultural commission of the Local Action Group for Central West Brittany (GALCOB). So we do get money from Europe. And we finance and, this is actually quite a healthy sum, we finance all the local cultural activities that promote the culture, so dance, music, language obviously, the arts, everything that is cultural and representative of the Breton culture. Of course film, too.

While acknowledging the new possibilities for funding, Jakez was a bit skeptical as to the influence the EU has had, focusing on the fact that France enters into this equation as well:

> Well there are small things, like the very existence of a budget line in Brussels, and of the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages means that some projects that never would have gotten any funding do get funding through that. And usually when you get money from Europe, the local authorities think, well that's not too bad, we're gonna help as well. But for other things, you've probably heard of the Charter for Minority Languages, everybody says in the Council of Europe that it has been written for France, for nobody else but for France, because most other countries have applied those requirements for years. So it was written for France, so that's why it's so weak and that's why you can choose articles from it that really really don't mean anything. But even in that version it hasn't been signed by France. So Europe can do so much, but if France still resists whatever efforts Europe is trying to make, it's not gonna happen.

Limited knowledge of EU policy and skepticism as to its influence is not totally unwarranted however as Francis, a current employee of the Breton Cultural Council (CCB) and former EBLUL worker in his 20's, stated,

> The EU does have a budget line for minority languages but there's only one call for proposals per year at the moment. However, there are other European policies that can be used by members of the CCB. Although it's true that this isn't something that we've really mastered yet.

He then went on to say,

> The EBLUL is rather anecdotal. It has a symbolic importance for linguistic minorities. I'd say for the EU as well. It's always nice to be able to say we support cultural and linguistic diversity. We have the EBLUL. It's sort of a little toy. In terms of the EU budget it's not much. In legal terms it's nothing at all. And then, on a more concrete level, we're really in a "Europe of states."

Thus while Francis sees the EBLUL as a bit unorganized and "anecdotal," he did give the following explanation for these problems:

> I think that it's something that's not so easy to make function properly. Notably because it regroups linguistic minorities from all over the EU that are not at all alike in their importance, socio-linguistic and historical characteristics, or political representation; also many of the representatives are there to defend their own group or organization and not for Europe.

To summarize his comments on the EBLUL, Francis said,

> The EBLUL plays a more symbolic role of information dissemination. It sometimes also acts as a lobby to the European Union.

This symbolic role is perhaps the reason most of my interview participants were unable to put a finger on exactly what the European contribution to their identity promotion efforts will be. This symbolic role is compounded to some extent by the general lack of knowledge about the EU political structure. Socially and culturally the Bretons look outward, but they feel constrained at the political level because response has yet to match expectation. Furthermore, jumping over the national bureaucracy to deal with the EU means learning a whole new and as yet unfamiliar structure. While the EU and its agencies have begun to offer subsidies and grants in some cases, the regulatory structure surrounding these forms of assistance is not well understood as Sophie and others noted.

This look outward toward Europe and the European Union, spawned by the necessity of bypassing a French government seen as not accommodating its regional minorities, is a modern manifestation of Breton cultural openness. Combined with a sense of community with their Celtic neighbors and an intense attachment to their country, this openness is a vital element of the Breton identity. These historical roots are tied to a further anchor that unites the Bretons, their language. More than just a way to communicate, the Breton language is a unique marker of who the Breton people are. The role played by language in the Breton identity can be understood by examining its history of being one of the *other* languages spoken in France.

## Understanding the History of the Breton language

### *Political and Economic History of the Breton Language*

While much has happened since the 13th century, the French and Breton languages have been in a tug-of-war since then in Brittany for it was at this point that French began to emerge as the preferred administrative language (Abalain, 1995). In 1539, the use of French was codified with the edict of Villers-Cotterêts, in which French King François I proclaimed that all official acts must be written in French. This edict, however, was intended to make the shift from Latin to French and not intended to disrupt popular use of local languages (Poignant, 1998). The founders of the French Republic reinforced this act in 1794 with a law that stated,

> No public act can, in any part of the territory of the Republic, be written except in the French language [...] and any administrator or public official, any government agent who speaks, writes, or legislates, in the context of his duties, court proceedings, judgments, contracts or other acts in general composed in idioms or languages other than French shall be brought before the criminal court of his place of residence,

> condemned to a six month prison sentence, and removed from his post (Abalain, 1995, pp. 38-39).

While it should be noted that this statute only lasted six months, it did however represent a change from the beginning of the revolution (1789) when the founders had decided to publish laws in all the languages spoken in France (since only a small minority of people actually spoke French throughout the new nation, it would be difficult for the majority to understand the Assembly's decisions – ibid.). Abalain (1995) notes that this early phase of using the local languages and dialects in order to initiate the citizens of the new nation in its laws had actually accorded these languages a semi-official status.

However, the new government did not really want people using languages other than French and measures began to be taken towards this end. Beginning in 1790 with a study conducted by the Abbé Grégoire, the French state began to move toward a monolingual system. This perspective is well summarized by the Abbé's statement to the Committee for Public Instruction in 1793,

> Thus these local jargons will disappear imperceptibly, these patois spoken by six million French people who do not speak the national language because, and I cannot repeat this too often, it is important to have a policy to extirpate this diversity of crude idioms that prolong infantile thought and outdated prejudices (Abalain, 1995, p.41).

Later that year, Breton, along with all the other regional languages, was excluded from the national education system. Not only was education not conducted in Breton, but speaking Breton was punished as well. Since that time there has not been a statute reinstating Breton as a language of France. This statement does require a bit of clarification though, for there have been some more recent laws relating to the Breton language in France and its educational system.

In spite of its prohibition, as Breton was the language spoken by the common people of Brittany and was primarily transmitted orally, there were still about one million Breton speakers at the beginning of the 20th Century (Broudic, 1995). This is also due to the fact that the majority of Bretons lived a rural agricultural life and did not go to school (or attended infrequently). French, being the national administrative language, was most often heard in urban areas. For these rural inhabitants, Breton remained the language of daily interactions. However, with the two World Wars, Breton men, like their counterparts from all over France went to the front and passed through Paris on the way. Along with what they heard from their fellow soldiers, the sights of Paris raised their awareness of the world outside the Breton peninsula. With this came the realization that the rest of France was progressing, without Brittany, and obtaining modern conveniences such as electricity, automobiles, and indoor plumbing, which were still very rare in Brittany. Gaston, a legal administrator said that at the time, "Brittany was one of the most backward provinces in Europe. In the 60's there were very few tractors in the fields, rather one saw horses."

To afford the modern life that the Bretons saw outside Brittany, one had to go to school. Herein lay a problem: parents began to send their children to school to improve their lot in life, and the children were forbidden to speak the only language they knew at home, Breton. Several of my interview participants as well as many secondary sources spoke of "la symbole." La symbole was often an old, broken wooden clog (the traditional footwear of the Breton peasants) or some other such icon of peasant life attached to a string that could be hung around a student's neck, should he be caught speaking Breton in class. The offending student then had to continue wearing the symbol until he in turn caught another of his classmates speaking Breton. The student left with the symbol at the end of the school

day often had to perform a menial task such as cleaning the lavatories. In some cases, the student also had to wear the symbol home to show his parents his errors. As a result, whole generations of school children learned that it was shameful to speak Breton, and that French was the only acceptable public language; a very difficult lesson when at home and in one's daily life, Breton was the only language used. This practice, while by no means universal (there were some teachers who were sympathetic to Breton speakers or did not believe in "la symbole" as an effective teaching mechanism), was quite widespread in the national educational system up until around 1960 (Hélias, 1975; Lebesque, 1977; Broudic, 1995; Lukian – interview; Youenn – interview; Brendan – interview; Berc'hed – interview; Gwenole – interview).

As a result, many parents came to understand that the only means of social promotion for their children was to remove the Breton language from their lives and replace it with French (Favereau, 1993). In fact, psychologists and educators in the 50's and 60's advised some parents like Gweltaz and Sandrine, a couple in their 60's whose families spoke Breton and Gallo respectively, that teaching their children Breton alongside French could be detrimental to the children's development.

However, wanting, as parents do, a better life for their children has meant that this language change for educational purposes became quite important in Brittany. Gaston, a judge on the Breton administrative tribunal, mentioned that, "Bretons have always achieved very good results on the baccalaureate (the exam required for university entrance in France) and in the universities because we see it as a means of emancipation." Data collected by the Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (INSEE) in 1999 do indeed show that Brittany currently has a higher success rate on the baccalaureate exam than the

national average (83.9% of the Bretons who took the exam passed compared to the national average of 78.4%, Baudille & Mounier, 2000). Unfortunately this motivation to succeed within the structure of the modern French state came with the cost of losing their language.

While removing Breton from schools was important, perhaps a greater influence upon the language occurred in 1902. In that year, priests were prohibited from using Breton during mass as well (Broudic, 1997). While not every priest followed this order,[31] it still had a huge effect upon public perception of the Breton language for at the time, 50% of the population of Lower Brittany was still monolingual, speaking only Breton (Favereau, 1993, Broudic, 1999).

As there were very few media outlets in Breton at the time (see chapter 5 for description of the Breton media environment), and most Breton speakers were not often taught to read their language either, the turn of the twentieth century can be seen as a point at which the use of Breton began to decline. While the actual numbers of Breton speakers did not decline too noticeably from this point though until the 1950's, the ideas that led to this decline were put in place at the turn of the 20th century. It was however, precisely during the post-WWII rebuilding that it became more painfully evident that Brittany was quite behind the rest of France in economic terms. As mentioned above, learning French became an ever-greater necessity because social promotion in Lower Brittany as most of the area still did not have electricity, telephone service, heating, or indoor plumbing. Even as late as the 1960's Brittany was still very poorly equipped with what now can be considered rather ordinary modern conveniences. For example, in 1962, only 55% of Breton homes

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[31] It should be noted that some priests realized that they needed to preach in a language understood by their congregations, and these continued to use Breton (Favereau, 1993; Youenn – interview; Brendan – interview; Lukian – interview).

had running water, 22% had a bathtub or shower, 10% had central heating, and 27% had indoor toilets. It took until the 1980's for the average Breton home to reach parity with the rest of France in these areas (Sainclivier, 1989). WWII had been a time of relative prosperity for Brittany as its agricultural base was pressed into service to feed most of the rest of France. However, with the end of the war, the French national re-development program favored the large industrial farms of the North and East of France over the smaller owner-operated farms of Brittany (ibid.). It is this change in agricultural policy that helped convince many Breton parents to abandon the idea of teaching their children their language as mentioned above. This policy change is also the concrete action that most influenced the rapid decline of the use of Breton, which has so strongly marked the post-WWII era in Brittany.

The use of French in schools, the army and in urban life (which began to supplant rural existence after WWII) can be seen to have helped foster a negative identity on the part of Breton speakers. The fact that Breton was ignored, and in some instances censored, devalued the sense of self worth among those who spoke the language (Elegoët, 1986). Furthermore, the process of industrialization, which favored exchanges between regions and later with foreign countries, reinforced this psychological devaluation as well. These exchanges required a common language and French was the easy answer to this problem. This change led to a division that still exists between culture and economy as the French language was associated with economic well being, and the Breton language with cultural identity for the Bretons (Laurent, 1990).

This dichotomy has begun to change though as much of the Breton economy comes from tourism now; fishing and agriculture, still the two largest employment sectors have

become increasingly industrialized and small farmers and fishermen face many difficulties today (Devaux, 1997, Malpot, 1999). Tourism, while a flourishing business, remains limited to the summer months by quite damp cool winter weather.

If we consider tourism as an arena where culture and economy come together, the modern Breton economy has started to favor its own identity. Along with tourism, art and music have been important factors in the modern Breton economy, and more importantly in the cultural resurgence. Brittany is second only to the Parisian region in the production of new musical albums in France (Malpot, 1999; Yves – interview). Brittany also has developed an important book editing industry, becoming one of the leading publishers among the regions of France (Gwenole – interview).

Despite the developing cultural economy in Brittany, the prohibition of their language and the subsequent need to abandon it for French in order to make their living has created a still highly contentious relationship between the Breton and French cultures. The question of regional languages within France has become of such great importance to the state's future, that in 1998, Prime Minister Lionel Jospin commissioned a report on the status of these languages. This report very adroitly chose to speak of the French legislative history with its regional languages as actions undertaken for the promotion of the Republic. In this way, the report's writer, Bernard Poignant – mayor of Quimper, spoke in inclusive terms rather than setting up a conflict between the state and the regions. From this point of view he then suggested the initiation of a concrete plan for the promotion and protection of France's regional languages saying, "Doing nothing would be to choose their disappearance, at least their marginalization" (Poignant, 1998, p. 8). Poignant's very judicious word choice was necessary to appease political opposition and shows the necessity of understanding the

role of centralist politics without completely condemning current leaders for the actions of their predecessors who were acting in other contexts.

However, nearly every interview participant with whom I spoke was more than able to quote two famous speeches made by French leaders. The first of these is the statement made by Anatole de Monzie, then minister of Public Instruction, who declared before the opening of the Breton Pavilion at the 1925 Universal Exposition that, "for the linguistic unity of France, the Breton language must disappear" (Abalain, 1995, p. 44-45). The second, dating back less than 30 years, was the statement made by president Georges Pompidou in 1972 at Sarre-Union. Here he said, "there is no place for regional languages and cultures in a France destined to mark Europe with its seal" (Abalain, 1995, p. 45).

Finally, in 1992, Article 2 of the French constitution was amended to begin with the phrase, "the language of the Republic is French" (*la Constitution de la République Française*, 1958). This modification occurred in the context of the negotiations on the Maastricht treaty of European Union and was originally destined to protect French against incursions made by languages spoken outside the French territory such as English, but has often been invoked to counter France's own regional languages (Abalain, 1995; Poignant, 1998). The most notable example occurred in the 1999 debate over the ratification of the European Charter on Regional and Minority Languages. France's Constitutional Council ultimately found the preamble to the charter incompatible with Article 2 and proscribed its ratification (Decision 99-412 DC, 1999).

Thus, regardless of one's political leanings, interpretation of the history between France and Brittany is filled with tension. It is this tension in the French national political environment that shapes linguistic and cultural politics in France at the beginning of the 21st

century. As made clear by Poignant's statement quoted above, rapid action is necessary to save these languages, but longstanding political traditions are difficult to displace. Though part of a turbulent history, language, like the other elements of their culture, is a highly retrievable and resonant element of the modern Breton identity

# CHAPTER 4
# THE BRETON LANGUAGE TODAY: A PILLAR OF MODERN BRETON CULTURE

Because a shared concept of history is important to negotiating a modern identity, it is important to see how the Bretons' historical roots have influenced who they are today. Specifically, this chapter will focus on relating the issues discussed in the previous chapter to the picture of who speaks Breton today and how these speakers are distributed throughout Brittany. Additionally, I will analyze current language policy as a means for understanding the context in which Breton speakers live and use their language at the beginning of the 21st century.

## Geography of the Breton Language Environment Today

Though many of my interview participants spoke of having found Breton speakers all across the globe, the vast majority live in Brittany, as could be expected. Before describing who speaks Breton, a picture of Brittany will help develop the territorial context. Culturally, Brittany consists of the administrative region of France which includes four departments: Côtes-d'Armor, Finistère, le Morbihan, and Ille-et Vilaine, to which we can add a fifth department, the Loire-Atlantique, historically part of the Breton kingdom and Duchy.[32] The population of the administrative region according to the 1999 census was 2,906,197. The department populations are: Côtes-d'Armor – 542,373, Ille-et-Vilaine – 867,533, Finistère – 852,418, and the Morbihan – 643,873 (Conseil Général des Côtes-d'Armor, 2000; Conseil Général de l'Ille-et-Vilaine, 2000; Conseil Général du Finistère, 2000; Conseil Général du Morbihan, 2000; Baudille & Mounier, 2000). When the Loire-Atlantique (pop. 1,134,266) is added to this the population totals 4,040,463 (Conseil Général de la Loire-Atlantique, 2000). Currently, Brittany is still one of the most rural regions of France

[32] The department of the Loire-Atlantique is now part of the region Pays-de-la Loire.

with 42.67% of Bretons living in rural areas (25.99% is the national average of people living in rural areas throughout France, Le Coadic, 1998). One further distinction that is necessary to make is that Brittany is traditionally divided into Upper Brittany – roughly the historically Gallo speaking Eastern half – and Lower Brittany – the Western Brittophone half.

*Language: Breton Speakers Today*

Given the historical importance of language to the modern Breton identity, we should now rightly ask, who among the people described above speak Breton today? The majority of the population now speaks French, and one rarely if ever encounters monolingual Breton speakers at the time of this writing. Compared with 100 years ago when half the population of Lower Brittany only spoke Breton, the numbers have been inverted; now 80% of this same group speaks only French (Broudic, 1999).[33] However, even those who do not speak Breton, affirm an attachment to the language as part of their culture and express a desire (at least when asked by pollsters) to see it continue to exist through use in schools, the media, and elsewhere in public, most notably on road signs. An overwhelming 88% of the population of Lower Brittany responded that they thought it important to preserve the Breton language, and 60% responded affirmatively, when asked by a 1997 TMO-Regions poll, whether or not they approved of bilingual road signs (Office de la Langue Bretonne, 1999; Broudic, 1999). Brieg added that in Upper Brittany:

> It's that the Breton language is perceived more and more as an identity marker, even amongst people who have never spoken Breton and the language is completely absent in their family history. Either they came from Upper Brittany or they are from outside of Brittany. People want to learn this language, to make it their own, and to go a long ways with it. Either just to understand the words of a song, or to read a

[33] Of course this is only considering French and Breton without taking into account other languages that are currently learned as second languages, such as Spanish, German, or English.

> book, or to make it the language they use daily with their family and in which they bring up their children. That too, is something that's happening.

Given this attachment to their language, it is important to note a few details about the current state of the Breton speaking community at the beginning of the 21st century. The latest figures available, from the 1997 TMO-Regions poll mentioned above[34], found that about 240,000 people still speak Breton on a daily basis (Broudic, 1999).[35] While this represents a loss of 760,000 Breton speakers since the end of WWII when researchers estimate that there were still around one million in Lower Brittany, it also marks a relative stabilization since 1991 when the same poll found 250,000 Breton speakers. The current number represents about 20% of the population of Lower Brittany. However, this also means that the vast majority of lower Bretons (80%) can be considered monolingual, speaking only French (ibid.). Along with this disquieting fact is that two thirds (67%) of the Breton speakers in Lower Brittany are over 60 years old. The study further found that there are only 13,000 Breton speakers younger than 40 years old. The poll did however note that it was unable to count children learning Breton in immersive or bilingual classes now available. It is also important to be aware that these numbers are only for Lower Brittany. Upper Brittany has started to see a rise in the number of Breton speakers within its boundaries too as many Lower Bretons have migrated toward Rennes and Nantes in order to find work. In fact, Nantes has the largest number of Breton cultural associations of any area in Brittany (Brieg – interview).[36]

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[34] The French census does not ask questions about language, so the only data available is through privately funded polls like the one discussed here.

[35] These people answered "very well" or "fairly well" when asked by the poll about their Breton speaking abilities.

[36] This is also partly due to the fact that Nantes is by far and away the largest city in Brittany.

The largest percentage of Breton speakers live in Lower Brittany in the western half of the Côtes-d'Armor (20% of the population of the department), followed by 17% of the population of the Finistère and 10 % of the population of the western Morbihan (Office de la Langue Bretonne, 1999). However, as mentioned above, the Breton Language Office (OLB) estimates that 12% of the population of Rennes speaks Breton as well (Brieg – interview).

While no official statistics exist for Upper Brittany, this suggests a changing landscape for the language. Brieg, an OLB representative, described the modern Breton landscape in this way:

> One cannot deny that historically, traditionally, Breton was spoken in certain places in Brittany and not in others. Ok, that said, if you go into any bookstore, and you buy a book about the Breton language, you will invariably find in it the same map of Brittany cut in half which gives the impression that I'm sure before coming to Brittany you could have thought that east of this line, the language had no presence, no reality, nothing. And then, once on the other side of the line, you would enter into a zone where suddenly one could hear people speaking this language, where one would see the language, hear it, etc. The language would have an important presence. And the reality is quite different. The reality is that that map that one finds in all the books, it is a photograph of the linguistic state of Brittany in 1850 or 1900, and certainly not in 2000. And in fact it is an image that is supported as much by people opposed to the Breton language as by certain defenders of the language. This image is supported by those opposed to the language because it's obviously already something to be able to say "stop bothering us with your Breton; in any case, you never existed beyond that line there. To the east of that line, bilingual road signs or school classes are completely unjustified." That could be a reason to continue this vision of things. On the other hand,.. a group of those defending the language and the culture have also continued to think in terms of this map because, in the current deplorable linguistic situation in which Breton is, it's a way to reassure oneself on the contrary to say that "*there's* our

> sanctuary. That is truly the Breton language's homeland even if everything else is falling down around us"
>
> ...The Breton language has stopped receding in a linear fashion. Now one can no longer consider Lower Brittany to be the Breton zone; Lower Brittany now resembles a piece of Swiss cheese with holes that keep getting bigger until the final result which would be the total disappearance of the Breton language...So, on one hand, this Breton speaking zone, it's a fantasy. It's not real. It doesn't exist anymore.
>
> On the other hand... there was the phenomenon of Breton speakers from Lower Brittany who came to live and work in Upper Brittany. There's a statistic often cited for Rennes for example; it was a poll taken up by the City of Rennes which found that 12% of the population was able to express themselves in Breton or capable to understand it a little. All that is difficult to measure, but people who could keep up a small fluent conversation. Twelve percent of just over 200,000 [an approximation of the population of Rennes], that's nothing to sneeze at, especially when there are only 250000 people left capable of speaking the language [in Lower Brittany]. If for example, just in the city of Rennes, one adds between 10 and 15000, that's something. If one imagines that something along the same lines is going on in Nantes, in St. Nazaire, etc, that could change things. That, that's a reality. Now, obviously these are passive Breton speakers, or I might call them clandestine Breton speakers, because it's true that when you go to the post office, to the bank, or wherever, and you talk to the person working there, first, you don't know where they're from, and you're far from imagining that to one out of 10 of these people you could speak Breton.

*Being a Breton Speaker Today*

With this changing linguistic geography in mind, one rapidly comes to the realization that speaking Breton is now a conscious choice made by those who use the language. Because many speakers are as Brieg said, "clandestine" speakers, and the percentage of Breton speakers is so low, using the language is an active process, not the natural process of speaking a language that is found in all parts of a given society. However, the fact that

speaking Breton is a choice is also an important factor in shaping a durable culture for Marc-Antoine. He pointed out that,

> We have ups and downs with the Breton culture. There was a wave of cultural creation between roughly 1970-1980 but it was very contentious. Between 82-92, there was an off period, but we're starting to do new, much more durable, things that will help maintain the culture and the language in the future, so there's no worries for the Breton culture. Yes, it's more ephemeral because we don't have anything concrete that shows our Bretonnitude. If one is French, he can show that with all the papers that say this: passport, identification card, etc. but because one must choose to show one's bretonnitude, it's more durable. One does not choose to be either French or Breton, but at the same time, one must take action to be part of the Breton culture.

He gave an example to illustrate the actions that Bretons are taking, to show their identity along with the language. Making the choice to speak the Breton language is often difficult because of the geographical "holes" of which Brieg spoke. As a result, cultural gatherings are ways where those interested in the Breton language and culture can find each other. Marc-Antoine said,

> The Festoù-noz and Pardons are in part a means by which people can meet – to better their social life. Not to reintegrate – we're not that far removed, but simply as a means to meet. One always adapts to life as it is now, one interprets the world in that way... Also, the Festoù-noz are a means of showing the Breton culture to France and to others. It's a means of changing the negative identity of the past. Now that we can, we want to show our culture to others.

While more and more Breton people are making the choice to speak Breton, Gwenole points out that this is also a great risk for the language. During our first conversation he said,

> The language is no longer spoken in a passive manner. It's a language that is carried by militants, by those who are truly committed, who think that there's a value in knowing several

> languages, notably the language of one's roots and so it's a very different situation. That means that the Breton language will not die out in the 21st century, but it will be a language that is all the same in a very difficult situation.

In another conversation, Gwenole expanded upon what he meant by "a very difficult situation."

> It's very difficult for children to remain attached to the Breton language. In the past, people didn't have a choice. They lived, up until the 1950's, in rural areas or coastal areas where fishing was their livelihood and they were forced to speak Breton because everyone spoke it and someone who didn't speak Breton wasn't part of the community. Today, it's the opposite. Bretons have become urban dwellers. They've picked up and moved en masse into cities. Now, between 2/3 and ¾ of the Breton population lives in cities which was not at all the case in 1950. So in 50 years, Brittany has become very rapidly urbanized in spite of being behind the other regions of France and Europe. Then today, French is everywhere. So bringing up one's children in Breton, if one speaks Breton at home, if they go to a bilingual school where there will be above all Breton in the classroom, but when they pass through the classroom door and into the school yard, often it's French that becomes the language of their play because that's the language they've heard with their cousins, their neighbors, and all the rest of the time when they're not in school. It's French that they will have heard on the radio and on TV. It's French that they have seen everywhere, everything is written in French. French is everywhere. So the Breton language is a language that is very much threatened, like all minority languages.

Because of the fact that French is ubiquitous in Breton society, and there is still a remaining stigma attached to speaking Breton, Janig summed up a need for "therapy," saying, "exterior recognition is essential so that Bretons can think that it's ok to be a Breton."

Stigma aside, new generations of Bretons need a reason to continue speaking their language. In order to prove to young people that the Breton language is useful, Gurvan

states that the availability of "work in the Breton language is the future of the language. If there is no work that one can have and speak Breton, young people won't continue to speak it."

Since using the Breton language has become a matter of choice, it is important to explore some of the reasons the Bretons are making this choice. For Brendan, language is the "genetic code" for the social world. He went on to explain this, saying,

> ...language is not just a means of communication, but it is also a philosophical tool that shapes the people who live within this culture. That's why for me the Breton language must be brought back to a functional state. And why Bretons must be permitted to think in their language again, which is completely different from the French language.

Michel, a radio station director in his 40's, also felt that language was an important means for accessing a culture and a way of seeing the world. He explained,

> A language is a door, a means of access. There are lots of things, writings, books, a whole imagination. I think a language is more than just naming objects, obviously it's literature, its images that are carried by the words... It's perhaps through language that one can access the roots of a culture. Language is made for speaking, but also for reading. I think that what one can understand through a vocabulary, through a language, is something that a French language translation is incapable of transmitting. That's very very important... I believe there are things that get lost when one loses mastery of a language. There are things that we can no longer feel, that we can no longer verify for ourselves.

Gurvan also felt that the language gave an important point of access to the culture, and he gave an example that highlights this point very well,

> One can be Breton without speaking Breton, that's obvious. And no one should be forced to learn Breton. On the other hand, I'm for the idea of having Breton offered in all schools. Maybe just an initiation, like we had an initiation to English in primary school, just a half hour or an hour per week just to plant the seed.. The importance of the Breton language is

> enormous. We have a literature, songs, words, a whole vocabulary. For example the Osara in the Maghreb... they have about 30 different words for sand.

Lukian, a radio journalist in his 40's, related this idea about the practice of language to the thought process and to cultural reflection, saying,

> When a language disappears from one day to the next, it's an entire culture that disappears at the same time because the way of thinking that is implied in the practice of that language is important too.

Several interview participants mentioned this disappearance or loss of culture. Jakez linked the loss of the culture with the disappearance of the language as well, saying,

> ... I've often thought that the Welsh speak English through the medium of Welsh, whereas the Irish speak Irish through the medium of English. So it looks a if the Irish have kept their culture while they've more or less lost most of their language, and that the Welsh.. have kept their language, but they've lost so many other things. They've lost their singing, well they only have choir singing now, but they've lost their dancing, their old singing, a lot of things when you think about it. So it's hard to know at this very moment whether the Breton culture can survive the loss of the language. But there's a whole aspect of the pleasure of the sounds .. of the puns that you can make, the expressions, of the richness of saying things in one language that you wouldn't say in the other language. Having been a reporter for 10 years in the news for example, our crew would be composed of three or four people, a cameraman, a reporter in French, a reporter in Breton. The angle at which we would look at the same subject in French or in Breton would be completely different. Not only because of the language, but because of the people you interview because of the language that you've chosen or that you have to work with. If you go to a new factory that's opening, automatically the French reporter will go and see the boss, I will ask them about this new product that they're gonna have or whatever, and you're gonna get the langue de bois[37] for most of the time. If you go and look for a Breton speaker, you sometimes have the boss, but rarely. You'll have

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[37] "Langue de bois" – literally "wooden language" means "the party line" or the standard response used to evade discussing the real issue.

> somebody that's working at the lowest level in the factory, and that can be quite interesting as well. It's a completely different viewpoint. Completely different way of using language. Maybe simpler. More to the point. More down to earth.. the mere pleasure of hearing a language being spoken with all of its expressions.. Even if it's Robert Redford that's on the screen, but the actor that has dubbed him is great and really sounds like a horse whisperer from the north of Brittany, it's great, you know. We need it.

For many Bretons, and their counterparts in other regional groups, the idea of "losing culture" is related to a fight against cultural homogenization. Gwenole was one participant who sees his choice to speak Breton as part of this fight against the homogenizing effects of an increasingly global society. He spoke of globalization and the idea of cultural pluralism as a means of fighting racism and atavistic nationalism, saying,

> [Globalization leads to] more tolerance, but we're beginning to become uprooted. We also need to promote traditions and identities. We need to dig into the heritage left by previous generations for the richness it offers, and at the same time, develop it through exchanges with... other peoples. I have a very strong image in mind of a tree that has no roots; this tree gets uprooted by the slightest storm. Whereas a tree that puts down deep roots to find the water and minerals it needs to grow will be able to grow tall and accommodate lots of birds on its branches. I think human beings are a little like that. A human being without roots, one can choose one's roots,... but one must have roots in order to have a point of reference from which to communicate with the rest of creation.

This theme of creativity also came out in my conversation with Ninog, who works with the organizing association for the Douarnenez film festival.

> I want to discuss language in terms of creation since others will discuss it in terms of communication. I think that language, like fashions or cuisine, or art in general or the plastic arts, is part of a universe into which a camera can go for making a documentary or a fictional film. And language, I believe it's a part of the universe that we want to depict. And we're always shocked, to take a caricature, to see a Japanese

> movie dubbed into French or Chinese. It's unbearable to see people who look like that, in that particular setting, in those particular stories, told in French. For me, language is not decorative. It's part of a larger whole.

While many of the younger Bretons who have had to make a decision to speak Breton view their language as a cultural or political symbol, many of those who were raised speaking Breton did not see their language in this way. Youenn, a native Breton speaker, spoke of the Breton language as being, not a choice, but part of who he is. This constitutive relationship was more typical between older Breton speakers and their language than amongst the younger speakers who actually had to make a decision to learn the language. He said,

> I was born in an entirely Breton speaking environment. I'm 80 years old. I was born in a rural area. My parents were peasant farmers. And all my ancestors, grandparents, great grandparents, spoke only Breton and not French. With the exception of my parents who learned a little French. My father learned the most because during the war of 1914-1918, he found himself in a French-speaking environment, where he picked up a bit of French. But in a very imperfect way. And in any case, the only language that I spoke as a child until I was five or six and went to school was Breton. So for me, the language is consubstantial if you like.

*Evolution – Standardization of the Breton Language*

With the development of mass media in Breton came a new problem on top of the stigma attached to the Breton language within the French national education system. While hearing their language on the radio and later on television made a great stride in giving back some public confidence in the Breton language, the media have also standardized the language. As an orally transmitted language in a rural area where people often did not travel much outside of their local commune (as was the case in the 19th century), Breton developed a huge variety of dialects and local particularities. Four traditional dialects are usually

described by linguists: Cornouaillais, Léonard, Trégorrois, and Vannetais (see figure 7). Cornouaillais is spoken around Quimper in what is now roughly the southern half of the department of Finistère. Léonard (also called Léonais) is spoken in the region around Brest, the northwest Finistère. Trégorrois is spoken in the Northeast Finistère and eastern Cotes d'Armor. Vannetais is spoken in the Morbihan, and while the other three dialects are quite similar to each other, Vannetais has a different sound with many more soft consonants than the other three (Gweltaz – interview). In addition, nearly every commune had some unique expressions. Among members of the *Emsav*, the Breton movement, this is considered to be an important richness of the Breton language. Jakez, a professor of primary and secondary education, stated this saying,

> It's essential (a modern image of Breton culture), but linguistically we're gonna have to keep to the color of the language, it can't possibly sound like Breton spoken with a French accent or absence of dialectal color, a complete absence. That'd be a big mistake to be very standard. It has to be standard because it's television, but it can't be monocolored. It's gonna have to reflect the variety of geographical, age, and all sorts of varieties that compose the Breton speaking community.




**FIGURE 7: BRITTANY'S 4 TRADITIONAL DIALECTS**[38]

Berc'hed, a radio announcer echoed this thought, saying,

> Dastum (cultural association collecting Breton musical heritage) has collected many songs, but very little in the way of language has been collected. The richness of the language, the spirit of the language, the way, the manner of saying things. Very little has been collected in that area. There is an association being created right now in Carhaix that wants to create groups of people all around Brittany to get people together every once in a while so that they can share what they still know of Breton. Expressions, everything that makes up the richness of a language, because it's not sufficient simply to translate from French into Breton with flat speech that doesn't have any flavor.

Thus, there is a real problem when most of the people who learn Breton now are learning it as a second language. Youenn, a retired teacher and radio announcer, added to this thought, saying that, "as far as the diversity of dialects goes, we do need to be vigilant

[38] Figure reproduced from Abalain (1995, p. 5) by permission from the publisher.

against the tendency to lump all the richness of the language together to make a unified whole. We need unification, but diversity and richness too."

While acknowledging this need for richness and diversity, Lukian, a radio journalist, also sees a need for a dynamic conception of the Breton language. "It's not something that's fixed in time." He explained,

> It's true that when young people speak amongst each other, they have a manner of speech that is not like that of adults, let's say their codes, their own language. One sees that in French, one sees that in English, one sees that in every language. And Breton can't escape this either. When kids talk together for example at the Diwan school or in class, they invent new ways.. but that doesn't shock me knowing that it's a phase and all returns to order later. But it's true that spoken language can sometimes surprise, collide with.. A language doesn't remain static though either.

And he continued, saying that the "[Breton] dialects lose a bit with formal education.. Some of this will remain in my opinion.. and on the radio we're obliged to standardize a bit as well."

On the other hand, among those of anti-Breton sentiment, these many linguistic differences are taken as reasons why Breton is "not really even a language." Between these differences and the fact that Upper Brittany has traditionally spoken Gallo - a "langue d'oil" (a relative of French) – since the Norman invasion in the 10th century, many defenders of the French language have justified keeping Breton out of public life by saying that the Bretons do not have a proper language as people from one town to the next cannot understand each other (Loig – interview; Brendan – interview; McDonald, 1989, p. 128).

Though the Breton language has had many trials just during the 20th century, it continues to be an important part of the Breton cultural identity. Perhaps the hardships incurred by the use of their language have ingrained a sense of fighting spirit in those who

speak Breton. In spite of its decline this perpetual state of conflict continues to mark the culture. Goneri, a retired professor turned radio host, discussed this idea saying,

> .. there is a bit of exorcism required here too. Because Breton speakers were forbidden to speak their language at school, you see, often they've internalized this prohibition, and they think that by speaking Breton they are in so many words guilty. So that feeling must be exorcised so that they're at ease in their language, not only in speaking it, but also in seeing that it's a beautiful language, that it merits being on the radio, and by consequence, there is a rehabilitation of the dignity of the Breton language to be put in place then in the minds of those who speak it. We have an injured, traumatized people and not all their wounds have been healed. And thus, this Breton aggressiveness where it exists is related to this fact. It's still related to that. If you take a bird with an injured wing and you try to clean the wound, you run the risk of getting pecked. And well, the Bretons are like that bird. Even if you want to help that beast. They fight back because the hurt somewhere. It's very important and if our leaders understood this a bit better, and if they took that into consideration, they would say, look there's been some cultural damage committed over there and well, we need to approach the task in another fashion, but that's not possible; the politicians can't reason in that manner. They need to have a mother's heart you see.. But politicians don't have a mother's heart; they don't have a heart at all.

Before this soothing of the wounds could begin, the recognition of their status was needed. Youenn spoke about this self-recognition saying,

> That's not specific to Brittany. One sees more or less the same thing in other regions that have minority languages.. The people are beginning to become conscious of factors in their identity, which is something that we did much less in the past. The Breton language wasn't in a position of opposition and the language for them is a completely natural thing. They didn't even see the need to teach it. That's the parents' attitude. Why teach our children Breton? They speak it out of necessity. On the other hand, they saw the utility of learning French because it's through French in any case that their children could gain access to jobs and hope to rise up the social ladder because there were no possibilities to have a career in the Breton language. That's it. And then little by

> little, we became aware of course first, why this language, which is just like any other language, couldn't have the same dignity. Then little by little that entered into people's thinking in a gradual manner [through contacts with other peoples and other minority languages at festivals and other cultural gatherings].

Janig, in discussing her upbringing, stated that the children who have been raised in Breton families have been forced to choose to speak their own language:

> ...my own parents speak French very poorly. They learned French at school, but they didn't go to school much. When they taught me to speak, they taught me to speak in French. And it's me, who had to say to myself at a certain point, *I* want to speak Breton. Because obviously, since we spoke Breton at home, I understood, but I had to decide at a given point to speak it. It's because they were so ashamed. You can imagine what that means in terms of damaging children and a family, etc. when parents must teach a language they don't understand very well to their children. It's terrible. And our generation is very much marked by that in Brittany...

This fighting spirit has led to a dissipation of anti-Breton sentiment, which is now less prominent at the start of the 21st century if not on its way to extinction (see Chapter 6 p. 157 for more on anti-Breton attitudes). Youenn spoke of a changing attitude saying

> I want to emphasize a change that's been occurring over the past couple of decades. One no longer runs into declared adversaries to the Breton language at least in the Breton world. There are some reservations, but there is no longer the hostility that existed in the past. There's no longer a war against the Breton language.

While anti-Breton sentiment is disappearing, Alan, a CRB employee in his 20's does perceive it lingering in French policy. As a result, he sees a need for a legal recognition of the Breton language. He stated,

> The problem now is that we're not in a country where business leaders, the Regional Council, towns, Social Security, and the rest will take the initiative to use Breton. Never.

> Because the constitution forbids it. It's the law, which is idiotic. By definition it's idiotic to found the legitimacy of a language in the law, it's recognizing that a general authority delegates part of its sovereignty and recognizes a language. For me, a language exists by itself, and no law in the world can say whether a language can exist, or not, has the right to live or not. It's a human cultural phenomenon, like cuisine or a biological phenomenon. One cannot say that everyone will have flat feet or everyone will wear size 10 shoes. Now normal human biological development favors linguistic diversity. So we're stuck. We are currently completely stuck, because the officialization of the Breton language through the European Charter [failed]. So we cannot have laws for the moment.. I regret it, but it's vital.. in my opinion [the Breton movement] wants to recreate a little France on the Breton scale. The same system; that is to say force people to speak Breton in the same way that France forces people to speak French. That's a very very bad thing.

Soaz, on the other hand, did not see the French government position as forbidding the use of Breton. She said rather that it is more important that,

> Local governments quit being afraid. Some are waiting for the European Charter to get signed. They say, but the Charter was rejected, it wasn't signed by France, but we have enough of a legal life in France.. We need local political will... I think that a road sign like that in a town that doesn't have the habit of doing that is a comfort for the people who speak Breton and a real advertisement for the Breton language. So we must do it. We need the local governments to do some work.

Here, Soaz wants the Bretons to take charge of their own language promotion to show the French state that they merit consideration and to prove to themselves that their language and identity are important. This grassroots action is necessary because of the government stance on regional languages. The government position comes partly from bureaucratic inertia in current policy that reflects the historical roots of the linguistic perspective developed at beginning of the republic.

**Regional language policy**

The dominant rhetoric that France uses in its international relations is that it is a champion of linguistic pluralism in its fight against the overwhelming presence of English around the world. Through organizations such as la Francophonie, France has a very active agenda for the promotion of the French language in the international sphere, notably in the Olympic Games, UN meetings, and other international diplomatic efforts. The Délégation Générale à la Langue Française (DGLF), a branch of the Cultural Ministry and the national political instrument of the language, also works to promote the use of the French language in the UN and the EU (DGLF, 1999a).

However, as many of my interview participants noted, the fight for linguistic pluralism takes on a different flavor however within the country's borders. For this reason it is important to look at a variety of policy levels, notably the European Union policies, French state policies, and Breton regional policies. Though French was given the official status of national language with the 1992 constitutional amendment, Jean-Pierre stressed the fact that this statement was originally intended to protect the French language from encroachment by its neighboring English from the exterior. However, it has been employed in numerous instances to slow or halt the recognition of the other languages spoken within France's borders.

Jean-Pierre continued his description of the State position on regional languages, by describing how French policy views these languages,

> Since 1998 the task of promoting regional and minority languages was added to the DGLF's mission. So we should see in detail what these regional languages are. The languages traditionally spoken on French territory and the minority languages spoken in France and in the overseas departments... and what we call minority languages that do

> not have any territorial attachment. These are, in general, languages spoken by immigrant populations, but which have been in France for a long time. So, that definition concerns Yiddish, West Armenian,..., Romany – the gypsy language, dialectal Arabic, and Berber... Why this choice? Primarily because of the critical mass represented by the numbers of speakers of these languages.

Jean-Pierre went on to say how the DGLF works with these languages,

> This year, the budget for the year 2000, we have three million francs destined [for the promotion of regional languages]. Of that, two million francs are sent out through the regional offices, the Regional Directorates for Cultural Affairs (DRAC), and the rest finances actions directly through the central administration... [financing] is the primary fulcrum of our actions. We respond to demands for financial aid that, in general, come associations working in the regional and minority language domain. It could be for the organization of a colloquium. It could be for the organization of an artistic exhibition or a festival. For example, this Sunday in Toulouse, there's a meeting organized by an association called the world languages forum. The central group is a team of Occitan speakers who have organized round-tables, conferences and then in one of the central squares in Toulouse, stands with books, records, etc. So it is bigger than just the Occitan language. It goes back to, and this is important to the cultural ministry, the cultural minister... cultural pluralism, linguistic pluralism, which is sort of the guiding principle for the DGLF. Across this financial aid, there is a policy that is beginning to be developed. We consider regional languages as part of the national heritage, which is to say, the heritage of all French people.

Armand, who works for the Regional Directorate for Cultural Activities (DRAC) in Brittany, added a bit of precision to Jean-Pierre's description, saying,

> The state seeks to support the collection and development of linguistic heritage. And that's where one sees the difference between the government position and the militant position. That is to say, the state sees regional languages, Breton for example, in terms of heritage. A heritage that can be living. But what the Breton language militants see is some thing different. That is, not only part of their heritage, but they see it as a living language in and of itself, and not just as their

> heritage. The state also seeks to develop the observation of linguistic practices. And then to promote the teaching of Breton. For that, last year, 1999, the Breton Language Office (OLB) was created. It is an organization that receives funding from the Regional council.. and from the DRAC, which is to say, the State. The state gave one million francs for the Breton Language Office's operations in the year 2000. The Office works on these notions of observation of linguistic practice, collection, promotion of language teaching, and language promotion in general... So the state does not actually do this itself, but supports the association, the OLB...What's important to note about the DRAC is that our role is not to initiate action. We support projects, and structures that have their own projects.

Armand sees a passive role for the French state concerning the promotion and protection of regional languages. This aspect can be seen quite clearly in the two major areas of current French policy directed toward these regional languages: education and the media.

**France –permission vs. action**

Despite a generally passive role played by the French government vis-à-vis regional languages, there is one notable piece of legislation promoting the use of Breton. The Cultural Charter, signed by then President Valéry Giscard-d'Estaing, was the first global recognition of the importance of the Breton regional culture and language. This charter included explicit augmentations in the time and resources devoted to the Breton language and culture notably in the areas of education and media. In publicizing the idea for this charter, Giscard-d'Estaing gave a speech that Gwenole summarized,

> The official discourse was that the time has come to stop this policy of ...making regional languages and cultures disappear. Today French citizens pose no problems... all French people are proud to be French. There were great trials, the two successive wars with Germany where the French people showed their solidarity, their patriotism, and now we're in a world that's becoming more and more uniform, that's losing a lot of its identity, a world that's becoming banal and sad. It is important to preserve a variety, diversity, and within

> France, within the French culture, there is a place for regional languages and cultures. They are the richness of our country and we must, now that they are facing great difficulties, help preserve them. And what was important about this is that it was the first time the president of the French Republic seemed to consider the Breton culture.

The charter came at the beginning of a wave of laws aimed at the decentralization of the French political structure. The Bretons also perceive the Cultural Charter as part of a major shift in French language policy, which is still under development. Gwenole summarized this feeling by saying, "that means, that until VGE,[39] the policy was to refuse a place, any protection, any teaching, any legal status for minority languages and cultures." The 1982 Deferre law provided a more extensive, nationwide recognition on various levels of the principles embodied in Giscard-d'Estaing's Cultural Charter. One of the most remarkable parts of the Cultural Charter is that it outlines specific resources in support of the Breton language and culture that are to be created and gives details as to their funding in a joint effort between the State government, the Region, and the departments – all five of the departments that make up Brittany's historical territory. The most important institutions created by the Cultural Charter were the Breton Cultural Council (CCB) and the Breton Cultural Institute (ICB). The CCB is the organization responsible for the projects outlined in the Charter and the ICB was designed to be a gathering place for the various associations involved in the promotion and protection of the Breton language and culture. In this context, the ICB was also charged with the study of Brittany's cultural needs in a very holistic way. This is to say that the ICB works to unite social, economic, cultural, and political ideas about the development of the region (*Charte Culturelle*, 1977).

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[39] VGE is the soubriquet often given to President Valéry Giscard-d'Estaing, taken from his initials.

The wave of progressive legislation in the late 1970's and early 1980's that led regionalization has faded, as witnessed by the passage of the 1992 amendment. The constitutional amendment of 1992 reaffirmed French as the official state language. This amendment can be seen as part of a new conservatism that has entered into French politics in the Post-Cold War era. Other notable examples include the rise in popularity of the ultra-right-wing political party, the National Front, whose slogan is France for the French, and the Toubon law on the use of the French language (see below).

*Education*

Before the Breton language was recognized in other domains of public life, it was allowed back into the educational system. The first formal permission allowing the use of France's regional languages was in the area of education, in 1951. The Deixonne law, named after its writer, stated notably in Articles 3 and 6 that,

> Any teacher who asks can be authorized to consecrate each week, one hour of activities directed toward the teaching of elementary notions of reading and writing of local languages and to the study of selections from the corresponding literature (Article 3).
>
> In high schools and junior high schools, the teaching of regional languages and dialects as electives, as well as folklore, literature, and popular local arts, can take place within the context of directed activities (Article 6).

Further articles of the Deixonne law extended these permissions to higher-level university education as well. The one notable exception to this policy was in the first two years of university curricula, the Diplôme des Etudes Universitaires Générales (DEUG),[40] where no such provision was made. Aside from this exception, the most notable part of the

[40] The DEUG is the first level university degree, awarded after two years of university study of a particular subject.

Deixonne law is that, unlike the Cultural Charter which would come later, its wording denotes permission but no concrete government policy steps. To clarify, article 3 states that "any teacher who asks," thus putting the onus on the actual teachers and not instituting the teaching of regional languages as part of national educational policy. Again, article 6 states that "the teaching... can take place..." Here again, no policy steps are proposed; while regional languages are given a legal right to exist in the educational system, there is no provision for making this part of a coherent area of study.

The gap left by the Deixonne law in giving permission for the teaching of regional languages, was finally filled in 1975 with the educational statute passed July 11th, in which article 12 stated, "the teaching of regional languages and cultures can be dispensed through the entire length of the school system" (law 75-620, 1975). However, again, one should note the wording "can be dispensed;" still permission without concrete action.

In 1984, the Savary law on higher education showed the beginning of an evolution in French politics relating to regional languages. Article 7 of this law states,

> [the public higher educational system] ensures the promotion and enrichment of the French language and of the regional languages and cultures. It participates in the study and value of national and regional heritage (law 84-52, 1984).

Here, there is no longer mention of simple permission, but a direct order. The higher education system "ensures" and "participates." These goals are now specific directives toward the public university system. At this point, the beginning of the development of a new relationship between France and its regional languages can be seen. The second sentence quoted above notes the study of "heritage." This mirrors the current state understanding of regional languages expressed above by Armand. Current state politics view regional languages as part of France's history, and thus they are of patrimonial

importance. This is quite different from the sentence immediately preceding which spoke of "promotion and enrichment," a more dynamic view of languages that we would likely call the study of *living languages.*

At the end of the 1980's, French educational law was concerned with producing workers capable of changing with the rapidly evolving workplace. In this context, Article 1 of law 89-486 stated,

> Primary schools, junior high, high schools, and establishments of higher education are charged with the transmission of work related knowledge and methods. They contribute toward favoring equality between men and women. They dispense a curriculum adapted, in all its content and methods, toward the economic, technological, social, and cultural changes in the country and the larger European and international environments. This training can include the teaching at all levels of regional languages and cultures.

This article shows a return to the idea of permission that was visible in the Deixonne law and perhaps this softening of tone is related to the fact that this law extends permission for regional languages to exist in vocational training as well as general education. As seen with the earlier laws, the process of language integration has required a series of gradual steps.

Most recently, the Toubon law (94-665), passed in August 1994 on the heels of the 1992 constitutional amendment reaffirming French as the official national language, did take precautions to avoid revoking permissions already granted to regional languages. Notably articles 11 and 21 stated,

> The language used in teaching, exams, and competitions, as well as in dissertations and theses in public and private teaching establishments is French, except in cases justified by the requirements for teaching regional or foreign languages

> and cultures or when teachers are foreign associates or invited guests (Article 11).
>
> The dispositions of this law are to be applied without prejudice toward the legislation and rulings related to France's regional languages and do not oppose their use (Article 21).

Thus while the Toubon law was expressly written to strengthen the position given to the French language within France and most notably in relation to other languages in the international sphere, it was not intended to remove the teaching or use of regional languages from the national educational system.

What can be seen from this brief look at French linguistic and educational policy in relation to the use and teaching of regional languages is primarily a sense of tentativeness. In spite of the passage of the Cultural Charter between the state and Brittany, which outlined clear policies for integrating the Breton and Gallo languages into the educational system, national level educational laws currently rest at granting permission for educators to teach them. Since the Cultural Charter there have been no specific policy actions taken on the part of the national government to show that regional languages are more than an academic or patrimonial subject of study.

**Brittany - the Region**

The Cultural Charter signed by President Valery Giscard-d'Estaing and the Deferre law that followed on its heels, necessitate a look at the policy structure below the state as well, notably the Region. The Region is at the same time a source of hope and great disagreement for the Bretons. A first remarkable point is that in policy terms the only document that refers to the historical region of Brittany is in fact the 1977 Cultural Charter. Subsequent documents all refer to the administrative region (described in Chapter 3). It is perhaps easiest to start with the disagreements as sorting through the problems can serve to

clarify a picture of Breton Regional language policy. Sophie described the main problem as one of understanding, saying

> De-concentration, that's the state in the regions. That is to say, the state has a budget, and as a function of the demands made by the regional directors [the DRAC's], it gives out what are called regional credits that permit support for books, plastic arts, all sorts of things but through the State. That is to say as a function of state policies. For example the cultural policy of the State doesn't really integrate regional cultures. This is because it's the idea of decentralization that takes care of them. The state considers that regional cultures are in fact the Region's responsibility. And we [the Regional Council] think that the state ought to do something for regional cultures. This is where the militant struggles come from, whether in Corsica, the Basque Country, Brittany, or Alsace...Another ambiguity is that the de-concentrated credits come out of national taxes. Regional credits come from regional taxes, but they're much smaller than the national credits. So you understand the pain, to exaggerate a little, of people who are in the context of a particular identity, whether it be the Bretons, the Corsicans, or the others, it is true for everybody, but to speak us, for the Bretons, we pay taxes, and then we must pay again to hear our language on television. You don't have to pinch a militant, he'll tell you that within the space of five minutes. A concrete example, we have here a regional TV station, but it's not ours. The famous France 3 West. It's owned by the state. It's a de-concentrated station. We have, since the Regional Council has existed, given money to this station in order to augment the Breton language program offering. And the militants are furious. At the same time they're happy to hear Breton but furious because Breton money is being paid twice for the same thing [the license fee is a state tax, and also goes toward the funding of France 3 West as part of the State broadcasting system].

Though the differences between the various levels of French government are often poorly understood, the Region is seen in a much more favorable light than is the state. Jakez notes,

> The Regional Council have helped in a big way actually, bringing some funding for the design of the Breton language

> programs for France 3. They have for the past two years, and now and again they renew. Only two weeks ago, there was an article in the press showing the President of the Regional Council signing yet another contract with the president of France 3 West to help produce Breton programs. And being a public body, they couldn't really help TV Breizh directly because it's a private venture as you know, but what they might do is to help independent producers to produce things that they will then sell to TV Breizh. Apparently that's one thing that they can do and they have already mentioned that they would do it. But from the state itself. I can't see, no, apart from the fact that the money for France 3 is state money, but it's the money that we paid from the *redevance* [license fee], which is 800F [sic] a year. When I pay 800F a year, I'm not paying to see only five minutes of my language on the screen every day. I'd be expecting a lot more than that (italics mine).

Brendan concurred, saying, "The Region is more and more interested in the development of the Breton culture. That's becoming clearer."

The Region does have a difficulty in promoting the Breton language and culture, which comes from the fact that it is nevertheless, a part of the French governmental system. Sophie described this,

> We are obligated to promote the ensemble of cultures. Because there are in effect, within the context of identity, identity surpasses the simple fact of the language. If not, we would only have one department and little bits of two others [Finistère and parts of the Côtes-d'Armor and Morbihan]. But what is quite remarkable is that I always feel like I'm in exile here, because for me, Brittany starts at Carhaix. But I realize that from the outside, Brittany actually starts at Rennes... If we want to promote a Region, it is important to say that it has an identity. And for that identity to function, it has to be linked to the language, but not just to the language. This is where all the work we do for theater, music, dance, creativity in the Region comes in, because, it's true, we are in a civilization where the immediate language is French all the same.

The regional government thus sees itself in the position of developing a viable regional identity in spite of the fact that only 20% of the population speaks the language. However, language can be seen as one of the underpinnings of this culture (even for those who do not speak it).

*Education*

Education in Breton, through the *Diwan* schools, has now been in existence since 1977. Also, the national education system (in 1983) and the Catholic private school system (in 1990) have both started bilingual classes (French/Breton) within their structure, called *Div Yezh* and *Dihun* respectively, as a result of pressure from the Breton community. This pressure, combined with lobbying from other regions in which languages other than French are spoken, has over time started a process of educational change from the draconian policies of the revolutionary period

In autumn 2000, the *Diwan* schools finally were recognized by the national education system and given a special status within it so that they can receive state funding to continue operation (at the time of writing, the policy for putting this status into practice was however, still under negotiation). In all three of the educational tracks, there is still a severe lack of teachers. The demand for Breton language education far exceeds the number of teachers certified each year (Jakez – interview; Soaz – interview; Katel – interview).

As a result of its attempts to develop a regional identity, the CRB has been more active in promoting the Breton language than the state government. In fact, as seen with educational changes, the Region ahs even pushed the state government to take new action.

**Europe**

The European Union faces even greater challenges than does the French state in relation to regional languages because they must integrate the needs of 15 different nations and the hundreds of regional languages spoken within these nations. This difficulty becomes evident when we compare the differences between the functioning of the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages (EBLUL) – the primary EU organism for dealing with regional language issues, and the EU media policies.

First, the EBLUL is a quite minor part of the EU policy scheme. Soaz described the EBLUL as follows,

> In fact its rather important because it is the only European organization that is concerned with languages and cultures... so the office is organized a bit like an NGO with two representatives for each EU member state. Only two because its based on the schema of member-states. There are two for France, but two for Ireland, and two for the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, they only have one recognized minority language, Frisian. Ireland just has Gaelic, but they have two representatives. In France, we have a bunch, like Italy, and we still only get two representatives. At the beginning we didn't think that was very fair, but on the other hand, we're obliged to have contacts across Europe, so it's not so bad. But it's not easy to find people who are both interested at the grass-roots level and at the EU level.

Soaz then described some of the EBLUL's functions, saying,

> We do some lobbying of the European Commission to obtain funds. There's a budget line that is voted by the European Parliament every year, which is about € 3 million.[41] That's not a lot but it could get the ball rolling... If people on the ground, for example, in a little town in Corsica or the Basque Country can have € 50 thousand[42] to start a project, local and regional, and even state, subsidies will come a bit more easily. So it's more to help give projects a little push.

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[41] Approximately $2.64 million (exchange rate € 1 = $0.88).
[42] Approximately $44 thousand (exchange rate € 1 = $0.88).

However, the symbolic role played by the EU does have an important and more concrete manifestation in the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages (hereafter The Charter). The Charter was the subject of intense debate in Brittany and in France from its conception in 1992 through the failed process of ratification in 1999. Jean-Pierre, a worker for the DGLF in Paris, discussed the ratification debate, saying,

> The constitutional council decided that this Charter could not be ratified by France because it gave, most notably in its preamble, collective rights to certain communities based upon their languages... and this was considered incompatible with French constitutional principles. It's not at all in the republican tradition. For an American that could seem surprising because I know that different groups there are recognized in public life and in policy. Here that was judged incompatible and consequently France could not ratify the Charter. In any case, the prime minister, after the constitutional council's decision not to allow ratification, said that he had however decided to put into action the majority of the obligations to which France wanted to subscribe under the Charter. What we cannot do under the aegis of the charter, we were doing already and will continue to do.

As Jean-Pierre mentioned, French Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin, has said that the government intends to put into action the 39 points that were found acceptable by the Constitutional Council. However, many of my interview participants hold little hope that this will actually happen. Jakez stated,

> No I don't think that's the case so far. The government has said that they will apply the 39 points that they were going to sign hadn't it been for what Jacques Chirac asked the Conseil Constitutionnel to study. But it's taking them a long long time. I think that they're pushing it as far as they can, until the presidential election actually. To maybe give us something small six months before the election so that yet again seeing as our heart is usually on the left, we'd vote for them, but I'm not sure about that. I was in Paris yesterday actually, at the Ministry of Education, and we've been fighting for 10 years I'd say for a special exam, a special competitive exam to recruit bilingual teachers, and it's been no, no, no,

> no, and now it's yes, but we can't make it next year. It's gonna have to be in two years time. And what's happening in two years time? the election..

Because European policies must be ratified by national governments, the state perspective is always reintroduced into the debate. Thus, as noted in the discussion of the Breton tradition of looking outward, the perceived benefits of EU policies are clouded by impressions of the French state.

The interrelationship between policy levels and the interaction between government agencies means that though each group works with different aspects of linguistic policy, the resulting regulatory structure must be understood as a whole. To summarize, linguistic policy has long kept the Breton language out of public life though recent changes are very slowly being incorporated. As a result, the Breton language is still seeking to establish a foothold in modern Breton society. One important arena in which the Bretons would like to see their language play a more prominent role is in the media. Chapter 5 will examine the regulations that focus on language use in the media in order to understand how they facilitate this process of integrating Breton into public life.

# CHAPTER 5
# THE BRETON MEDIA ENVIRONMENT: POLICY AND REGULATION

Understanding the tentative regulatory place held by the Breton language within French society begins to explain why the Breton media system is very limited even now as we enter the 21st century and the era of digital television and the Internet. In fact, Cormack (1998) would not even accord it the status of "media system" as it is so minimal and partially dependent upon the French system.[43] Quite a concerted effort is required to receive information through the medium of the Breton language. In spite of this, media do play an important role in the process of negotiating the modern Breton identity.

Before explaining its identity negotiation role, it is indispensable to understand the layout of the Breton language media system. Within the general context of language regulations discussed in chapter 4, I will outline the regulations that govern the use of the media. With the growing importance of the European Union as a political entity, European media regulations related to minority languages will be examined together with French national policies.

## Regulating Breton Media

While the education system in France leaves the question of regional languages up to the individual teachers rather than making a coherent curriculum choice, there are some concrete notions of duty toward regional languages in regulations concerning the public broadcasting system. Since current media law is based upon the restructuring that took place in 1986, this is a good starting point for understanding the place held by regional languages within the French broadcast arena.

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[43] I will however continue to call it a media system in the broader sense implying a variety of media working in the Breton cultural environment.

As the Breton media system is a subset of the French media system, and by extension, of the European system as well, understanding these two structures can offer some initial reference points. In general, France operates on a heavily centralized public service model with primarily national media produced in Paris.

*Press Regulations*

The press system in France is quite well developed and benefits from legal protection of freedom of expression that is fairly standard in the modern western world. This protection dates back to 1881 when the current press regulatory statute was first developed (*loi sur la liberté de la presse*, 1881). This law is founded upon the principles in Article 11 of the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen*, written in 1789 at the very beginning of the French Republic. Article 11, similar to the US' 1st amendment states that,

> Freedom to communicate ideas and opinions is one of the most precious rights of man; all citizens can therefore speak, write, print freely, except to answer for abuses of this freedom in cases determined by the law.

The *Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen* was adopted by the *Constitution of 1946*, which governed the 4th Republic. Finally, the current constitution, adopted in 1958 at the start of the 5th Republic is based upon the *Declaration* and the *Constitution of 1946* (*Constitution de 1958*). The 1958 constitution also adopted the 1881 press freedom law which has been the legal context for print media since the time of its writing. The 1881 law, while similar in spirit, contains quite a few points that differ from US press regulation, though none of them affect use of the Breton language in print media and so will not be discussed here.

The majority of the elite daily press is published out of Paris. However, there is also a very strong regional press and Brittany is home to the only French daily currently publishing more than 500 thousand copies per day, *Ouest-France* (Lazar, 1991; Diffusion

Contrôle, 2001). All the national and regional dailies are however published in the French language.

*Radio Regulations*

Since the regulation of radio and television broadcasting in France are closely linked, the evolution of this structure will be discussed below in the context of the laws concerning television. However, there are some points unique to radio broadcasting and important to the shape of the Breton language broadcast media environment which should be pointed out.

The radio system in Brittany, following regulation by the High Audiovisual Council (CSA) and its local branch of the Radio Technical Committee (CTR – the part of the CSA charged with monitoring frequency allocation for radio stations broadcasting in France – the CTR is divided into regions to cover the country more effectively), is organized into a system of six categories designed to maintain equilibrium among the various types of broadcasters in the radio industry (Michèle – interview). Radio stations in category A are those stations operated by cultural associations, they are non-profit, and are limited to 20% of their revenue from advertising sources – the rest coming from the association operating the station and government subsidies (Michèle – interview; Franceschini et al., 1996). These broadcasters typically have a frequency that can be heard over a small area (a radius of roughly 30km or 18.75 miles), but are the stations most able to cater to the Breton language audience, as they can reflect the local particularities of the Breton language and are not subject to the pressures of the advertising market. As mentioned, these stations are eligible for a variety of government subsidies at state, regional, and local levels. The state has been reluctant to give aid to stations broadcasting in languages other than French, though some

category A stations have received government assistance through a program called "emplois jeunes" in which the government pays 80% of a full-time salary (the other 20% to be covered by the company or organization in question) to help place young people in the workplace. On the other hand, the Breton Regional Council (CRB) has been an important source of support for non-profit Breton language radio. Sophie, a CRB representative described this aid saying,

> ... we finance radios in part, not entirely, but we give subsidies to the Breton language low power radio stations. Next year we are going to try to calculate this as a function of the number of hours of Breton on their schedule.

This calculation is intended to promote an augmentation of the quantity of Breton on the airwaves, as naturally, more Breton would mean increased funding.

Categories B – local independent commercial stations, C – local commercial stations affiliated with a national network, D – national theme-based commercial stations, and E – national generalist commercial stations, are present in the Breton radio landscape but do not offer much in the way of programming in the Breton language. This is largely due to the fact that they seek wider audiences in order to live by their advertising revenues, but also in the cases of categories C, D, and E, due to the fact that their programming is heard throughout France and thus cannot be specific to any one particular region.

The radios in category A have a very strong presence in Brittany composing 28%, or 86 of the 307 frequencies licensed in the larger West region (this includes the four Breton administrative departments, and three other departments: the Loire-Atlantique, Maine et Loire, and the Vendée). This is the largest category, followed by category D – 26% (80), category C – 18.9% (58), category E – 14.3% (44), and category B – 12.7% (39) (CSA, 2000; Michèle – interview). The category A radio stations with programming scheduled in Breton

are Radio Bro Gwened in Pontivy, Radio Catholique de France (RCF) Rivages in Brest, Arvorig FM in Commana, Radio Kerne in Ploneïs, Radio Kreiz Breizh in St. Nicodème, Radio Emeraude in Lesneven, and AlterNantes in Nantes.

The last category, F, consists of the public broadcasting service and is the other important source of Breton language programming (category F broadcasters operate 171 frequencies in the greater West). Both broadcasters in this category, France Bleu Bretagne Ouest in Quimper (alternately called France Bleu Breiz-Izel – FBBO or FBBI) and France Bleu Armorique (FBA) in Rennes are part of the Radio France system (the name change from Radio Bretagne Ouest and Radio France Armorique occurred in September, 2000 as part of a PR campaign for the public service radios in France). As such, they benefit from the license fees collected from broadcast users in France. They do not however benefit from funding from the CRB, for as Sophie, a representative at the CRB stated,

> ... we do not finance RBO, which is the state radio, because from the beginning, it's been operating at least in part in Breton and we think that this is its duty, and that's its strong point because it's always done well. So you see the tensions we're faced with in this area.

However, being a part of the public broadcasting system does not mean that the Breton language has readily found its place even on FBBO, which was initiated as a bilingual project. Lukian, an FBBO journalist summed up the difficulties, saying,

> It's true that we're a bit frustrated, because I know that the old director, we had some quite strong words with him because he wanted to modify the schedule without conservation (of the Breton language timeslots). We even spoke to the CEO of Radio France, the old CEO, and I asked him, "is your policy at the moment Mr. Director in chief," our great Parisian god who'd come to visit us.. and I asked him, "is it your policy to eliminate regional languages from Radio France." And his response was, "Breton has a place on the radio, and this place must be maintained." And

> so then I explained to him, that there had been attempts to destabilize (the Breton programming) etc.. and his response was clear it had never been a question of suppressing, of crossing Breton or any other language off of the Radio France schedule, on the contrary.

Lukian was frustrated by the fact that despite the clause in the public service radio charter (Article 6) which states that they are required to "...contribute to regional language expression," he had seen many attempts to reduce the Breton presence since the station's inception in 1982 (DGLF, 1999b, p. 162). He described this gulf between policy and practice, saying,

> Our old boss..., he had decided to ghettoize us a little more – let's eliminate the morning because apparently, finally, that's the opinion he had. In the morning it makes a bad impression to hear this gibberish, it enervates people and so we should put move it all to the evening. We moved to the evening and then during the day, at the outer limit we can have a little, two minutes here, two minutes there, or even the same two minutes that get rebroadcast in fact which is also irritating because that's also the house policy as well. Instead of doing interviews that are a bit longer which we could use, we make recordings for the news that are one minute long maximum. Instead of having the same response, we could dig a little deeper and have two or three, let's say *more*, responses, which show a bit of variety. The current policy is to limit the number and the length of the interviews – we do the minimum in fact.

This inconsistency between policy and practice can also be seen in the dwindling number of hours broadcast in Breton by FBBO (see Chapter 6). There is however no quota on number of hours or percentage of broadcast time that must be devoted to regional languages. Such proposals have been considered too much of an imposition on the freedom of expression of radio stations.

Despite the diminishing time devoted to the Breton language, the most important outlets on the radio still come from the public and non-profit sectors. The ability to regulate

state and non-profit broadcasting has been important in making a place for a Breton media system. The importance of regulation is equally pronounced in the television industry.

*Television Regulations*

Until the Fillioud law passed in 1982, broadcasting (as mentioned above, this includes radio as well) was entirely in the hands of the French national government (Kuhn & Stayner, 1999). This meant that all radio and television transmissions were operated by the Office de la Radio et Télévision de France (ORTF, formerly Radiodiffusion-Télévision de France - RTF). In 1959, broadcasting had become a part of the national landscape as a branch of the Post and Telegraph ministry (PTT). In 1964, this became too much additional work for the PTT and the ORTF became an independent body, though still part of the national government. At this same time, in 1964, the ORTF instituted a second television channel that became the voice of the regions (Lazar, 1991). The most important result produced by this second channel was the opening of the Regional Information Bureaus (BRI) in the various regions outside of Paris. At the outset, these regional bureaus were mainly a means of gathering news to disseminate on the national broadcasts emanating from Paris. These regional bureaus did however have some airtime in which to show their own programming. Consequently, this is the moment when television broadcasting began in Brittany, and as we will see a bit later, the Breton language has also existed on television since this time.

It was only in 1968 that advertising was permitted on television in France as well. There was the sentiment that the quality of programming would be better if it were not subject to advertising influences. There is still some of this sentiment left in current French media regulation and in public perceptions. While radio broadcasting had been opened to

advertising since 1951, the great expense coupled with the scarcity of the television spectrum kept commercial messages off the screen until 1968 (Lazar, 1991). Prior to 1968, television broadcasting was entirely publicly funded, primarily through a system of license fees. The license fee is still a major source of revenue for the broadcasting system as the owner of a color television pays 751FF per year (around $115 at current exchange rates) (Franceschini et al, 1996). In 1988, the license fee budget amounted to 7,498 million Francs. Following this permission in 1972 was a law limiting advertising revenue to 25% of the total of all broadcasting revenues.

In 1973, the ORTF created a third channel, still under the aegis of the national government. As mentioned earlier, the state monopoly did however end in 1982. At this time the ORTF was disbanded and replaced by the High Audiovisual Communication Authority (HACA), which was independent from the state government. This change took place in the wave of legislation aimed at decentralizing the French government. With the institution of the HACA came the creation of the low power radios, small radio stations operated by cultural associations. The cultural association has a long history in France, its importance recognized by an official legal status since 1901 (*loi relative au contrat d'association*, 1901). This law permits associations to operate, and receive state assistance, given a non-profit, cultural orientation. Thus, the 1982 allowance for radio broadcasting by these associations permitted a new range of voices on the French airwaves (Lazar, 1991). The state did not give up its ownership of the broadcast spectrum in 1982 and still maintains its ownership of these frequencies, but did consent to let other operators use this public good. This opening of the airwaves to cultural associations was the beginning of a long, slow move toward privatization of the audiovisual system. Also included in this set of new media laws

was an increase in the allowable proportion of revenues from television advertising to 80% (Lazar, 1991). Thus with these two developments, the state monopoly was clearly receding. In 1984, these new laws permitted the creation of the first private channel, Canal+, which operates on a subscription basis (subscribers are sold a decoder which allows them to receive the scrambled signal).

Two further changes should be noted to the regulatory body concerned with the French media system. In 1986, the National Commission on Communication and Liberty (CNCL), which had even greater freedom from the state government as it elected its own president, replaced the HACA. Previously, the French President had named the leaders of the HACA (Lazar, 1991). At this time, the change in regulatory bodies was accompanied by a major overhaul of the regulatory system itself and it is from this point that current French media law has its roots. In 1986, the first French television channel (TF1) was half-privatized, that is, half of it was sold to a private company. Also at this time, the 5th and 6th channels, La Cinq and M6 – both private, were created as well (Lazar, 1991).

Finally, in 1989, the CNCL became the High Audiovisual Council (CSA), which is the current regulatory body. The CSA is composed of nine members, three appointed by the President of the Republic, three by the president of the National Assembly (the lower body of the French parliament), and three by the president of the Senate (the upper parliamentary body, Lazar, 1991).

It was not until law 2000-719, passed in August, 2000, that the quota system included France's regional languages in its count of "works of French language origin." Prior to this time, the media regulatory statute's Article 27 only considered French language works in this category as per the 1990 amendment to the law which stated that "at least 60% of the peak

hour broadcast must be composed of films and audiovisual works of European origin, and of at least 40% films and films and audiovisual works of French language origin" (loi 86-1067, 1986 – modified 1990). This law holds for all terrestrial as well as cable and satellite broadcasters operating in France (including those broadcasting from other nations). However, as Alan, a regional cultural ministry worker pointed out, this meant that until August 2000, French language programming from Quebec (imported) counted toward the 40% requirement, but Breton language programming (although produced in France) did not. As a result, until very recently, Breton language programming was in the same category with programming imported from Germany, the UK, or any other non-francophone European country.

This quota system has had other important effects upon the French national media landscape as it led to the April 1992 demise of La Cinq; La Cinq had spent the majority of its operating budget on importing American television series and thus could not meet the new requirements and still stay on the air (Chaniac, 1999). The fifth channel is now time-shared between La Cinquième, a French public broadcaster specializing in cultural programming which covers daytime hours between 7am and 7pm, and ARTE, a joint Franco-German cultural channel which broadcasts on the same frequency between 7pm and 7am (ibid.).

The current law, the August 2000 amendment to the 1986 regulation, has set the limit on advertising for the public channels France 2 and France 3, not in terms of budget percentage, but in terms of time. Advertising cannot occupy more than eight minutes per broadcast hour on either of these stations (Loi 2000-719, 2000), the rest of their budget coming from license fees, sponsorships, and sales of their original productions (CSA, 1997).

Several considerations come from this central media regulatory document. First, article 20, Section 1 states,

> The use of French is obligatory in the ensemble of programs and commercial messages of the radio and television organisms and services, whatever the mode of broadcast or distribution with the exception of cinematographic and audiovisual works in their original versions.
>
> Subject to the dispositions in article 28, section 2 e - second paragraph, of the present law, the previous paragraph does not apply to musical works of which the text is, entirely or in part, written in a foreign language.
>
> The obligation outlined in the first paragraph is not applicable to programs, program segments, or commercials included in these programs that are conceived to be integrally broadcast in a foreign language or of which the goal is language learning, nor in rebroadcasts of cultural ceremonies.
>
> When the programs or commercial messages targeted by the first paragraph of the present article are accompanied by foreign language translations, the French presentation must be as readable, audible or intelligible as the foreign language presentation (law 86-1067).

Article 28, referred to above, states,

> The substantial proportion of French language musical works or those works interpreted in a regional language in use in France must be a minimum of 40%, of which at least half must come from new talent or new productions, broadcast at hours of significant listenership by each radio broadcasting service authorized by the CSA for the portion of its programs composed of musical variety.

This relates primarily to radio broadcasts and to video music broadcasts, but was also changed by the same CSA decision mentioned above that allows for the use of France's regional and minority languages within the 40% limit. Article 33 translates these regulations to cable and satellite broadcasters,

> the Conseil d'Etat, upon advice of the CSA, sets, for each category of radio or television broadcast services distributed by cable or satellite... The dispositions concerning the respect of the French language and the francophone influence as well as those related to the radio broadcasting of musical works of French expression or interpreted in a regional language in use in France

Public service broadcasters, being funded by government collected license fees are subject to additional regulations. Article 43 states,

> [Public service broadcasters] present a diversified program offering of news, culture, knowledge, entertainment, and sport in digital and analog modes. They favor democratic debate, exchanges between different segments of the population as well as social classes and citizens. They ensure the promotion of the French language and develop cultural and linguistic heritage in its regional and local diversity. They work toward the development and the broadcasting of intellectual and artistic creativity, civic economic, social, scientific and technical knowledge, as well as to education about the audiovisual and media sector.

In 1987, Article 6 of the Radio France charter listed among the network's obligations that, "[Radio France] ensures that its local stations contribute to the expression of regional languages" (*Décret du 13 Novembre, 1987*).

A 1990 modification to the media regulation codified the recognition of regional languages saying,

> Works directed entirely or primarily in their original version in French or in one of the regional languages in use in France constitute cinematographic or audiovisual works of original French expression (Décret n° 90-66 du 17 janvier 1990).

Following this change in 1994, France Television (the parent company of France 2 and France 3 Television stations) added Article 16 to its charter, which states, "the company contributes to the expression of the principal regional languages spoken in the territory of metropolitan France" (*decree 94-813*, 1994).

The songs of "original French language expression" referred to in radio regulations, were modified to include regional languages with the CSA's decision in January 1997 that included the following precision, "Song of French expression: any song interpreted in French or a French regional language..."(*La Lettre du Conseil Superieur de l'Audiovisuel*, 1997, p. 3).

Funding for audiovisual production through grants from the National Film Center (CNC) was extended to regional language productions in 1995 through article 6 paragraph III of decree 95-110, which states

> The sums so calculated [in the previous paragraphs of the decree] up to a maximum of 25% for audiovisual works on the list of reference works that were directed entirely or primarily in their original version in French or in one of the regional languages in use in France and where production expenses were spent entirely in France.

In 1997, this was extended to co-productions as well through Decree 97-449.

Though the majority of regulations governing broadcasting have been altered to include regional languages in the recent past, this recognition is still evolving and as a result these regulations often lack precision and clarity. This is to say that because decentralization is a very new idea, and an unwanted one in some circles, it is poorly administered. Also, the evolving concept of the republic has not been clearly redefined at present. While a shift in its understanding has been in process practically since the beginning of the 5th Republic and certainly since the signature of the Cultural Charter, the discrepancies between old and new definitions have not been reconciled nor effectively communicated to the public. This is especially true in regions such as Brittany which have a vested interest in seeing such an evolution and still feel traumatized by the past model upon which the Republic operated.

*European Influences on the Media System in France*

The European Union has some influence on the French broadcasting structure as well. The most notable is the now nearly famous Television Without Frontiers (TVWF) directive aimed at creating a larger European audiovisual market. This directive set quotas for the amount of "non-European" material acceptable in a given station's broadcast schedule. These quotas were further shaped by French legislation as seen above. The other major European influences on Breton broadcasting has come through language and cultural programs and not through media related programs. In spite of the often-tangential relationship of its programs to Breton media, the EU, mostly through providing financial assistance, has some influence on the Breton media system.

However, notably absent from my discussions with Breton media professionals was the EU's MEDIA programs. These programs were designed in light of the TVWF directive to promote audiovisual translation (dubbing, sub-titling, etc.) and distribution so that small state and regional media markets could participate in a larger European media market. Christophe, who works for the MEDIA program in Brittany, described its four main functions as providing information in the interest of supporting the periphery of the region (Brittany), financial assistance for production, facilitating contacts between audiovisual professionals, and providing professional training. The fact that this program, designed ostensibly to help groups such as the Bretons participate in a European media market, has had such little influence is partially explained by Sophie's comment that there's a misunderstanding, by producers in France generally and in Brittany more specifically, about how regions are defined (see Chapter 4 – p. 88). Christophe helped explain the problem as well saying,

> There's no real provision for regional languages in the MEDIA program. It's really oriented toward promoting media products that could interest international audiences. Additionally we don't support short films... As a result projects seeking MEDIA funding must have fairly universal themes not specific to a tiny part of the European audience.

As a result, the MEDIA program has not as yet supported any Breton language audiovisual production, and as mentioned above, the majority of European influence on the Breton media system has come through language and cultural programs rather than media programs.

The MEDIA+ document, the current incarnation of the MEDIA program developed as an extension and expansion of the MEDIA II document, outlines its main challenge as, "the exploitation of works at the international level" (p. 4).

Under this heading, the document continues, saying,

> In the context of developing digital distribution methods, taking account of the international dimension of the market is no longer an option for the producers and distributors of European content, but a vital necessity.
>
> In particular, mastering the diverse modes of distribution at international level is the cornerstone of any strategy for developing the European content industry (p. 4).

What is important here is that in considering "the international dimension" the document still shows evidence of planning at a national level rather than taking a culturally based vision of media production. The document then goes on,

> The support mechanisms set up at European level must take account of national diversity by being complementary to national and regional policies and by bringing the added value of the European dimension.
>
> Community aid must therefore concentrate on attaining industrial and structural objectives, while nevertheless bearing in mind the specific needs of countries and regions with a low

> audiovisual production capacity and/or small geographical or language areas (p. 5).

The precision added here begins to account for markets that do not correspond to nations, and shows some awareness of the difficulties inherent in smaller markets. Following this, the MEDIA + document states,

> The European Union must give priority to establishing automatic mechanisms or support mechanisms for companies based on market performance with a view to generating structural effects in the sector (p. 5).

Here, it is vital to note that support is based upon market performance, which favors previously established broadcasters over those trying to create a niche for their work. Again this favors national broadcasters in the majority of cases within Europe. Additionally, this statement reminds us of the economic foundation of the EU. The above statements lead to the following description of actions to be taken within the scope of the MEDIA + program.

> The new opportunities for exploitation opened up by digital technology provide new scope for both creation and distribution that must be taken into account. It is, however, difficult at this stage to assess the real consequences of these developments in the medium and long term. The approach adopted by the support systems in order to strengthen European operators must be pragmatic, in synch with the audiovisual market and reflect the changes in the sector (technological neutrality). To this end, it is necessary:
>
> – to set up and develop an information system for monitoring developments in the market in response to technological developments (pilot projects),
>
> – to make regular assessments and make the necessary adjustments to the support mechanisms,
>
> – to set up an information system for exchanging experience with Member States with a view to achieving synergy (p. 5).

Again it is quite clear that the creation of an economic market is the primary goal of the MEDIA+ program, and in spite of the fact that it has ostensibly been put in place to help a diverse group of media interests work together, the focus is on creating one system that competes economically rather than culturally. This can be seen in the explanation of how the MEDIA + program developed out of an evaluation of its predecessor, MEDIA II.

> Given this new environment, the results of the evaluation of the MEDIA II programme and of consultations undertaken by the Commission, an increase in the programme's resources appears to be necessary. This increase is, in particular, justified by:
>
> - a greater consideration of the specific needs of the industries in countries with lower audiovisual capacity and/or restricted geographic and linguistic area;
>
> ...Various underlying factors can be cited to explain this situation. First of all, the European marketplace has traditionally been split up into national/language markets. National and European works are distributed by a large number of companies operating in one and the same country, which often sustains only a small market. Moreover, these companies are under-capitalised, and are hard-pressed to keep pace with the constantly rising financial investment that is needed to promote and publicise the works which they distribute. Finally, few of them have the resources to engage in investment upstream of distribution in the form of pre-purchases of distribution/dissemination rights and thus take an active part in financing productions with high commercial potential (pp. 8, 37).

Because the focus here is on "productions with high commercial potential," many works envisioned with a cultural purpose in mind or with culturally specific themes are weeded, perhaps unintentionally, out of consideration for funding from the MEDIA+ program. Thus, in spite of the so-called "cultural exception" developed during the GATT negotiations, and which is still considered with respect to media products, the MEDIA+ program is clearly designed as an economic measure.

Even though an economic logic seems to be the primary driving force behind the MEDIA+ program, it does maintain as one of its objectives to, "... support multilingualism in European works (dubbing, subtitling and multilingual production)" (p. 39).

However, because the program's primary goal is to create a pan-European media market, this support for multilingualism is based upon the aforementioned "high commercial potential." Seeking out such works, again means searching for media productions that can be understood by audiences that span a variety of backgrounds as cultural values tend to influence interpretations of the content in question. As a result, works explicitly supporting the cultural goals of one particular group within the EU are rarely if ever funded, even to dub or subtitle them into other languages.

Europe as a concept has largely been an economic grouping and with respect to media is manifestly such. This poses no real hindrance to the idea of using media for the purposes of regional language and identity promotion, but it does little in the way of helping either. In this sense, there is a bit of schizophrenia in the development of Europe. This is to say that documents like the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages make statements about the active promotion of media use by regional groups, while economic plans (which are the primary focus of European practices) such as the MEDIA program and its successors MEDIA II and MEDIA + focus more on how to make a competitive European industry out of the various existing national, regional and local media systems. For instance, under the MEDIA II program, proposals for production aid required a project to involve three or more different regions of Europe (MEDIA II). This practice has been continued in the MEDIA + program, which promotes the goal of encouraging,

> ...independent producers to produce works (feature films, documentaries and animated films) involving at least three broadcasters in several Member States belonging to different language zones (p. 40).

This part of the MEDIA + document stresses the relationship between cultural and economic values, and the above statement is explained by two additional paragraphs,

> Support for the production of international sound tracks (music and effects) for European films: appropriate support for the production of international sound tracks (music and effects) for European films with strong dissemination potential, aimed at facilitating exploitation of the work in numerous countries and the production of high-quality versions in various languages...
>
> The criteria applied in selecting the beneficiaries may include provisions to distinguish between projects according to budget category. Particular attention will be paid to audiovisual works which are likely to raise the profile of European heritage and cultural diversity.

However, while there might be some compatibility of values and ideas between regions, many cultural products such as television shows or films are quite specific to their original intended audience. In this sense, profitability on a European scale is not as feasible for media productions destined for cultural use.

By no means is this to say that neither can media use for cultural identity promotion be profitable nor can it take interest in other regions as well, but this does produce a stumbling block as projects must be conceived which have a very wide, often more generalized appeal. For instance, programming in the Breton language is likely to be limited to an audience of Breton speakers (Kilborn, 1993). The MEDIA programs do provide assistance for translation of programming (subtitling, dubbing, voice-overs, etc.), but again, three or more language markets must be envisioned by the translation project.

A second stumbling block presented by the MEDIA programs (and by most European financial efforts) is that they require matching funds from local sources. This may not be a problem in every nation, but in France, very little funding for regional language media production has come from the state. The CRB has undertaken some of this duty, and funds productions as it can, but has a limited budget. As a result, few Breton productions are eligible for European funding.

There is also an incompatibility between the stated goals of the MEDIA + program and the proposed means of evaluating this program. In none of the areas to be considered in the evaluation, is there mention of regional media. This is to say that all evaluations are based on countries and national markets. Thus cross-regional production is actually evaluated as cross-national production. This presents a difficulty for Breton media, and perhaps this is why according to Cormack (1998), the Breton media arena does not qualify as a media system. The state of semi-dependence upon the French media system disqualifies Breton language media productions from being evaluated on their own within the MEDIA program.

Thus the main problem with the European policy environment is that its two goals, promoting the diversity of the various peoples living within its member states, and promoting economic growth for Europe as a whole are poorly integrated. Furthermore, those on the ground, that is to say regional media professionals who wish to work within these programs in order to receive funding and other assistance, do not understand these policies very well.

**Summing up – implications of current policies**

After a brief look at the policies that govern the use of regional languages in France and Europe, with special attention to media policies, the overarching idea that comes to mind is a lack of clarity. In pointing out this ambiguity, it is important to remember what Marc-Antoine said on the subject. "There are no legal limits that forbid media in Breton; it's above all a question of money. How do you support them with such small audiences?" This is to say that media content is increasingly seen as a product even where a public service model exists. As a result, serving the diverse range of public needs, including those of regional language groups like the Bretons, has been subordinated to market pressures. The next chapter will give an overview of the landscape and content of the media that operate in Breton within this amorphous regulatory landscape.

# CHAPTER 6
# REPRESENTING IDENTITY: BRETON MEDIA CONTENT

Because current regulations focus on permission rather than promotion, individual projects are the order of the day with respect to the Breton language. This has meant that Breton language media content has been very limited throughout the history of its presence. Despite this fact, there are several key features to keep in mind concerning both print and audiovisual media. This chapter traces the history of Breton language media in order to develop a picture of modern offerings.

## Writing in Breton

As the Breton language was an orally transmitted language until very recently, there is not a great deal of Breton written literature in existence (reading and writing in Breton have only been formal parts of the education system since the institution of the Diwan schools in 1977). However, the language does have a literary history and a small core literate elite as well. The earliest Breton text was the *Catholicon*, a French, Latin, Breton, trilingual dictionary written by Jehan Lagadeuc in 1464 (Abalain, 1995). This was followed by Pierre le Baud's *Compilation des Croniques et Ystoires des Bretons* in 1480, and his *Livre des Croniques des Roys, Ducs et Princes de Bretaigne Armoricaine, Aultrement Nommée la Moindre Bretaigne* in 1505 (ibid.). Also existing from the 16th century is Alain Bouchart's *Les Grandes Croniques de Bretaigne*, published in 1514. There were some other minor works published in the 17th and 18th centuries, but the next widely known works come from Theodore Hersart de la Villemarqué (Kervarker in Breton) who published the *Barzaz Breiz* in 1839 and also wrote or transcribed many theatrical works in Breton (Cassard & Le Quéau, 1998; Abalain, 1995). Because of the fact that Breton was primarily an oral language, spoken by common people rather than written or read by elites, these theatrical works are more plentiful and are considered by some to be a

more accurate representation of the Breton literary tradition. Many of these works were religious in nature and the Catholic Church was also the first group to start a weekly magazine in Breton.

## The Development of Breton Media

### *The Modern Breton Press*

While there is no daily Breton language press to speak of, there have been several weekly magazines dating back to the mid-19th century. As mentioned above, the Catholic Church printed these earliest Breton language chronicles. The first publication was a weekly, *Feiz ha Breiz*, printed between 1865 and 1884 (Broudic, 1995). *Feiz ha Breiz* had a high of 1700 subscribers in 1870 (Gwalarn, 2000). Another Catholic weekly, *Kroaz ar Vretoned*, printed between 1898 and 1920 (except for the war years 1914-1918 – Gwalarn, 2000), followed *Feiz ha Breiz* (Broudic, 1995).

After WWI, secular magazines began to appear. In 1919, Olier Mordrel and Morvan Marchal started *Breiz Atao* a political and literary monthly representing the Breton Youth Union. *Breiz Atao* would last until 1944 (Gwalarn, 2000). In 1925, Roparz Hemon started *Gwalarn*, an "elitist literature magazine," which also lasted throughout the interwar period until 1942 (Calvez, 2000, p. 16). Gwalarn was Hemon's attempt to promote a written literary tradition as an intellectual complement to the existing popular Breton tradition. During the Second World War *Arvor*, was published as well from 1942 to 1944 (Broudic, 1995). However, none of the secular magazines from this period ever achieved a circulation greater than 1000 copies (Gwalarn, 2000).

After WWII, many more secular publications appeared. *Al Liamm*, a literary magazine was started in 1945, printed under the name *Tir-Na-nOg* until 1946, and is still

published today. It has a subscription base of around 800 and is published bimonthly (Goulc'han – interview). Between 1957 and 1977, *Brud*, another literary magazine was published until a lack of funds provoked its demise. Since 1977, it has continued under the name of *Brud Nevez*. *Brud Nevez* publishes 10 issues per year and currently has a subscription base of about 300 with an estimated readership of around 400 (Morvan – interview; Abalain, 1995). *Al Lanv* has been published on a quarterly basis since 1980 and, along with *Al Liamm* and *Brud Nevez*, is one of the other better-known Breton language magazines. Content is split between literature, mostly from young writers not yet at the level accepted by *Al Liamm* or *Brud Nevez*, and articles about important political events across Brittany and from around the world. *Al Lanv* has never had more than 400-450 readers; most of who are subscribers, though the magazine is sold in a dozen stores around Brittany (Riwal – interview). Two lesser-known periodicals are *Hor Yezh*, another literary magazine, published quarterly since 1957 and *Kannadig Imbourc'h* (originally published as *Imbourc'h: Kellaouen ar studi*), a Christian religious monthly, started in 1969. Additionally, the students of the Lycée Roparz Hemon in Brest publish *Hemon Magazin* in which they showcase student creative work.

Several children's magazines have also been published in Breton. *Moutig* (started in 1993), a joint effort with the Euskal Kultur Erakunden, a Basque cultural association, was very short-lived; publication stopped in 1996 due to lack of funds (Soaz – interview). Other children's magazines have included *Bemdez*, *Cholori*, and *Talabao*; the latter two published by Diwan (Abalain, 1995). *Louarnig*, a new children's magazine started publication at the beginning of the 2000-2001 school year.

Finally, two specialized publications, *Deskiñ* and *Kannadig*, published by the Breton Teacher's Union (UGB) complete the printed Breton language offering. *Deskiñ* discusses

theory and practice of teaching in Breton while *Kannadig* discusses the current news relating to the Breton language teaching profession, including legislation, and promotion of the teaching of and in Breton.

The height of Breton language press, to this point, was 1973 when there were 48 titles being printed. Of these 17 were entirely in Breton. By 1990, the number of titles with Breton on their pages had dropped to 26, with 10 entirely in Breton (Gwalarn, 2000). Currently, there are still 10 Breton titles: *Al Liamm*, *Al Lanv*, *Bremañ*, *Brud Nevez*, *Deskiñ*, *Hemon Magazin*, *Hor Yezh*, *Kannadig*, *Kannadig Imbourc'h*, and *Louarnig*. However, this selection perhaps not quite as diverse as it seems since *Al Liamm*, *Al Lanv*, *Bremañ*, *Brud Nevez*, and *Hor Yezh* are the only general titles, the others being specific to a particular audience. Additionally, none of these magazines are sold at newsstands, they are sold primarily through subscriptions, with the exception of *Kannadig Imbourc'h, which* is a free publication (the stores that sell *Al Lanv* are not news-stands but specialized stores selling Breton books and artifacts).

Among these publications, one finds very little news. While many of the magazines publish a short resume of events happening in their domain of interest, only *Bremañ* can be considered to be a news-oriented publication. With no Breton language dailies or weeklies, *Bremañ*, a news monthly that was started in March 1980 by Skol an Emsav, is the major print news organ for the Brittophone community. This magazine has a subscription base of 1000 and an estimated readership of 3000 based upon questionnaires sent out to subscribers in 1999 (Skol an Emsav, 1999; Nolwenn – interview). A single journalist reports most of the news for *Bremañ*. Additional reports are submitted by Skol an Emsav association members and subscribers to the magazine as well.

In spite of the fact that not all of the content is written by professional journalists, the journalistic quality of the magazine has made several important leaps. First, the magazine was originally titled *Bremañ, kazetenn ar stourmoù e breizh* – Bremañ, The Opposition Newspaper in Brittany. In order to reach a larger public, the editors decided to change the focus of the magazine to a more general news format. The perception was that since the militant voice was (and still is) such a minority in the Breton community, it was perhaps turning away potential readers who, although Breton speaking, were not interested in the nationalist struggle. It should be noted that the journal started in 1980 as a result of activities that took place throughout the 1970's. At this time, the Breton movement was more politically oriented than it is now. Thus, after five years as the journal of the Breton struggle, *Bremañ* became simply a Breton language general news magazine. The second major leap made by *Bremañ* was taken in 1999, when Skol an Emsav was able to hire a full-time journalist for the magazine. Up to this point, all of the content had been produced by Skol an Emsav association members or by subscribers who mailed (or more recently emailed) articles to the magazine. By hiring a journalist, *Bremañ* gained the ability to cover events and issues from the perspective of a trained professional who can devote her time exclusively to reporting and writing news stories (Nolwenn – interview).

In addition to the Breton language press itself, the two major French language dailies do make a token gesture toward the Breton language. Each Tuesday, *le Télégramme de Brest et de l'Ouest* (hereafter *le Télégramme*) prints a short chronicle of regional cultural activities in Breton. *Le Télégramme* also prints an electronic summary of its daily front-page headlines in Breton on its Website (the translation from French is performed by the OLB). The other major French language daily, *Ouest-France*, does not print any of its contents in Breton as it

seeks a larger audience including parts of the neighboring regions of Normandy, and the Loire Valley (neither of which are Breton speaking regions). *Ouest-France* does however print a short Breton language lesson in its Sunday supplement (these lessons are also available on the *Ouest-France* Website). Both the print and Web versions of these lessons are written in French. *Ouest-France* has however printed two 50-page supplements about the region in November 1997 and March 1999, which were edited in a Breton language version (Soaz – interview; Gwalarn, 2000).

The majority of the Breton language press is then written by Bretons and for Bretons. Due to the importance of storytelling in Breton culture, print matter tends also to have a literary focus as well. As a result, we can say that print media in Breton are very much oriented toward a small segment of the population that is interested in this literary tradition.

*Breton on the Radio*

Radio, like the modern Breton language press, got its start after WWII. Oddly, this was initially propelled, not by the French government itself, but by actions taken during the German occupation. French language radio broadcasting had existed in Brittany since June 1, 1927. However, from 1927 until 1930, the antenna in Rennes was just a relay station for broadcasts emanating from Paris. In 1936, production studios were finally built in Rennes (Ullman-Mauriat, 1999). In spite of this, the Breton speaking community had to wait until November 1, 1940 under the German occupation to hear their language on the airwaves. The Breton offering consisted of a half-hour program presented weekly from Rennes by Louis Nemo, a Breton intellectual figure known by the pseudonym Roparz Hemon (the same man who started the literary magazine, *Gwalarn*), until June 3, 1944 (Calvez, 2000). While this was a first for the Breton language, it must be noted that, at this point in history,

the majority of Breton speakers could not pick up the station as they lived primarily in Lower Brittany (see figure 7 p. 95) and not around Rennes, which is on the Eastern edge of Brittany. This station, Radio Bretagne, had the capability to transmit its signal within a radius of about 50 km of the antenna at the PTT in Rennes (Calvez, 2000). So as Youenn noted, "it was sort of like pouring water into a basket." He reinforced this point by saying, "Hemon's program was also very intellectually oriented and thus not well suited to the majority of Breton speakers of the period even had they been able to receive it." However, with the end of the War and the departure of the Germans, Hemon's program came to an end. Because of the link to the German occupation, Breton has retained an image of being "the language of collaborators" which had a very detrimental impact in the post-war reconstruction period (Calvez, 2000). This sentiment, though much less prevalent, is still present nearly 60 years later.

The French 4th Republic kept the German idea of a Breton language radio program for as Goneri noted, "[the French Government] couldn't do less than what [the Vichy government] did under German protection" (Goulc'han & Goneri – interviews). Thus in December 1946, Radio Armorique, the Radio France station in Brittany, initiated a new 30-minute weekly program presented by Pierre-Jakez Hélias, a noted author who had also been director of the Resistance newspaper, *Vent d'Ouest* (Gwalam, 2000).[44] Also, with the installation of a new transmitter at Quimerc'h in the department of Finistère, the majority of the Breton speaking community could listen to Hélias' program (Calvez, 2000).

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[44] Hélias also had no links to Hemon. The government directive setting up the new radio program stipulated expressly that no one having had links to the program presented by Hemon would be allowed to work with Hélias' program (Calvez, 2000).

This half-hour was the only Breton language program one could hear on the radio for quite some time. Though Hélias retired from this program in 1958, a series of other hosts continued it through to the present. Between 1958 and 1975, the program was expanded gradually from one half hour to one hour (Youenn – interview). Additionally, in 1964, a 5-minute (later doubled to 10 and again to 20 minutes) daily news summary was added to the Breton language radio offering (Youenn – interview).

In 1982, Radio France opened a new regional station in Quimper, Radio Bretagne Ouest (RBO – now France Bleu Bretagne Ouest / France Bleu Breizh Izel FBBO/FBBI). At this time also, Radio Armorique in Rennes became Radio France Armorique (RFA – now France Bleu Armorique - FBA). RBO started with 12 hours per week in Breton and an additional 21 hours per week that were presented bilingually in French and Breton (Gwalarn, 2000). Currently, FBBO's Breton language offerings have dropped to 16 hours weekly plus four daily news-briefs that together total about 15 minutes (FBBO, 2001; Lukian – interview). FBBO no longer has any bilingual programming; its current shows are broadcast either in French or Breton, but not both.

The fact that Radio France was the only Breton language broadcaster was mainly due to the fact that broadcasting was a state monopoly until 1982. In 1977, a Breton language spoken news service, Kazetenn ar Vro Plinn, was started and was distributed to subscribers in Central Brittany on cassettes. Following the end of the state broadcasting monopoly, Kazetenn ar Vro Plinn developed into Radio Kreiz Breizh (RKB) in 1984 (Radio Kreiz Breizh, 2000). RKB's goal has always been bilingual transmission, taking into account both Breton and French speaking audiences in Central Brittany. Initially, RKB broadcast 20 hours per week in Breton (Gwalarn, 2000). At present, the RKB schedule contains 15 hours

per week in Breton. RKB's broadcasts can be heard throughout the center of Brittany (Tadeg – interview).

While RKB was still offering cassettes to its listeners, Radio Bro Gwened (RBG), the first low power radio to broadcast in Breton, started broadcasting from Pontivy in 1983 in both French and Breton. Currently, the station transmits four hours of Breton language programs per day during the week. These programs can be heard across the majority of the department of the Morbihan (Berc'hed – interview).

More recently in 1998, two other non-profit radios were started: Radio Kerne in Ploneïs and Arvorig FM in Comanna, which broadcast entirely in Breton. Like RKB and RBG, these two new radios have a limited broadcast zone, with Radio Kerne covering the western part of Cornouaille (the southern part of the Finistère – Elouan - interview), and Arvorig FM covering most of the Leon (from the Crozon peninsula to Trébeurden - Tristan – interview). Both of these stations are in operation from 7am to 7:30pm daily with about half of the program day reserved for a variety of shows – including local news magazines and cultural interviews, and the other half for music. Additionally, Radio Emeraude broadcasts 30 minutes daily in Breton from Lesneven.

Because these stations that are run by cultural associations have very small budgets, their program offerings often change. Also, small budgets force these stations to rely heavily on content produced by volunteers. This was the case with AlterNantes a radio station in Nantes specializing in new and alternative music. At one point they had volunteers who presented as much as four hours per week in Breton. However, at the time of our interview, all of these volunteers had moved on to other, more lucrative prospects (Michel – interview). To compensate for the fact that they cannot pay all of the talent required for a full day's

broadcast, the four main Breton language radios (among those backed by cultural associations) have organized a network of program sharing (Berc'hed – interview; Elouan – interview; Michel – interview).

Other Breton language programs can be heard on the Catholic radio station in Brest, Radio Rivages, which broadcasts about 5-6 hours weekly in Breton (including daily prayers and canticles as well as some programming that is not religious in nature). Though funded by the Catholic church (and thus not eligible for state funding), RCF Rivages and its sister stations are not extremely wealthy either. As a result, the Catholic stations in St. Brieuc and Vannes offer very little in the way of Breton language programming, because, as Goneri noted, they do not have the necessary staff to maintain these offerings.

*Breton on TV*

French television broadcasting developed as an extension of radio and followed a similar development, though more tightly controlled by the government. Given this high level of government involvement, it was quite remarkable that in 1964, the regional director of France Television made the decision to air a 90-second weekly news summary in Breton. Youenn mentioned that while 90 seconds per week was not a substantial portion of the station's programming even at the time, this was an important step for the Breton language as 1964 also marked the opening of regional news bureaus (BRI's) in the French broadcasting system. Prior to 1964, television broadcasting was completely nationalized and emanated from Paris. This is to say, that in a token fashion, the Breton language has been present since the beginning of regional broadcasting in France.

In 1971 the Breton language gained a slightly larger presence on French television with the appearance of *Breiz o Veva*, a 15-minute cultural magazine program in Breton,

presented by Pierre-Jakez Hélias. *Breiz o Veva* was aired every two weeks. Then in 1977 *Triweh ha Tri Ugent*, another 15 minute program, was added to the Breton TV schedule on the alternating weeks when *Breiz o Veva* was not shown. In 1979 *Triweh ha Tri Ugent* was dropped in favor of one weekly 20-minute program, *Breiz o Veva. Breiz o Veva* was then expanded to 26 minutes (30 minutes minus commercial time[45]). After dividing FR3 (which controlled regional broadcasting on both radio and television) into Radio France and FR3 (France Régions 3 – the television half) in 1982, a new FR3 television bureau was opened in Brest (Kuhn & Stayner, 1999; Gwalarn, 2000; Mikael – interview). *An Taol Lagad*, a 4-½ minute Breton language news summary shown at noon, was broadcast from this new bureau. The old FR3 station in Rennes continues to produce the Breton language cultural programs.

The program *Breiz o Veva*, always the mainstay of the Breton language offerings on French public service television, has undergone two name changes since this split becoming *Chadenn ar Vro* in 1982 and then taking on its present title, *Du-mañ, Du-se*, in 1994 (Gwalarn, 2000; Mikael – interview). Its format, the cultural magazine, has remained the same, though the variety of topics covered has followed the interests of the time period as well as those of the hosts and producers.

One more recent addition to the Breton TV line-up was made in 1998 with *Red an Amzer*, a 40-minute weekly Breton language talk show that covers news and cultural events in Brittany through the eyes of two journalists and a guest.

These programs together, *An Taol Lagad*, *Du-mañ Du-se*, and *Red an Amzer* represented 68 hours of Breton language programming in 1999 out of a total of 1020 hours

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[45] A 1968 law permitted television advertising as a means of financing production (Lazar, 1991). However, this was very strictly limited. For example, under the original provision, only food, household electrical appliances, and textiles and clothing could be advertised at all. The law also limited advertising revenue to 25% of the state broadcasters' revenue. This regulation remained in place until reforms made in the mid 1980's (Kuhn, 1995).

produced by France 3 West over the course of the year (France Television, 1999; France 3 Régions, 2000; Gwalarn, 2000). However, these hours must be situated in the schedule to better understand them. *An Taol Lagad* is shown Monday through Saturday during the school year (it is not shown during the summer) starting around 12:15pm in the context of the noontime regional news hour. A 30-second segment including the weather and calendar information is rebroadcast just before 7pm at the beginning of the regional news hour as well.[46] This 30-second rebroadcast of *An Taol Lagad* is the most propitiously situated segment of Breton language programming on France 3 Iroise. In 1996, 51.2% of the total TV audience was tuned to the 7pm regional news hour on France 3. This can be contrasted with a national average of 43% of the audience watching France 3 for the same time period. Additionally, during the noon regional news-hour when *An Taol Lagad* is originally broadcast, the national average was 17.6% of the TV audience watching France 3 for the 4th quarter of 1996 (in 1998, 20.3% of the audience was watching France 3 in Brittany and Pays de la Loire which together make up the zone covered by France 3 West. However, *An Taol Lagad* itself received 3.2 % of the audience in 1998[47]) (CSA, 1997; Langues Régionales, 1999). Mikael also noted that *An Taol Lagad* is transmitted from the Brest based France 3 Iroise station and is thus received in the majority of lower Brittany, but not at all in upper Brittany.

While *An Taol Lagad* is situated within a fairly important time segment in terms of viewership, the other two Breton programs, *Du-mañ Du-se* and *Red an Amzer*, are located in veritable broadcasting backwaters. *Du-mañ Du-se* is shown at 4:30pm on Saturday afternoon

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[46] The exact time that each of these two broadcasts starts varies. *An Taol Lagad* starts at the end of the local French language news program and as such is subject to any variance its length. French television, contrary to American television, does not follow a strict schedule of starting programs on the hour or half hour. The evening rebroadcast of the weather segment usually starts around 6:56pm, but this start time can vary 2-3 minutes in either direction as well.

[47] Each percentage point represents 6965 viewers for the zone in which *An Taol Lagad* is shown (Langues Régionales, 1999).

and in 1998, received an average audience of about 1.7% of those watching television at the time in Brittany (Langues Régionales, 1999). *Red an Amzer* is shown at 11:45am on Sunday mornings and received an average viewership of 1.6% of the television audience at the time (ibid.).

While the public broadcaster, France 3 West and its local branch, France 3 Iroise, provide the majority of the Breton language television offerings, there are a few scattered instances of Breton on the commercial airwaves. Eurosport, a pan-European sports cable channel did broadcast the 1998 world cup soccer matches in Breton (all 64 matches that it broadcast were available with a Breton language commentary – Gwalarn, 2000).

Two other commercial channels broadcast programs in Breton on cable networks in Brest and Rennes. In Brest, a local cable channel, TV Brest, broadcasts a 30-minute program produced by the Sell Ta! video workshop every two months. This program is styled after the hour-long video magazine that Sell Ta! sells by subscription (see below). In Rennes, TV Rennes, another local cable channel, broadcasts *Skeudenn Roazhon*, a 15-minute cultural news program in Breton on the third Saturday afternoon of every month (it is then rebroadcast at other times during the month following). *Skeudenn Roazhon* does have an advantage over programming on France 3, in that despite the few cable subscribers in Brittany, there is the possibility for re-broadcasting. Gurvan noted,

> Cable reaches about 80,000 homes in.. Rennes. And so the show is broadcast each 3rd weekend of the month. Actually, starting on the 3rd weekend of the month and then it's rebroadcast. The first time is on Saturday at 4pm. It's broadcast about 20 times which allows, even if there aren't too many people who watch TV Rennes continuously, it means that by rerunning it, we reach many more people.

Additionally, as mentioned above, the OLB has taken on the task of subtitling *Skeudenn Roazhon* into French (as of the 2000 season) to make its content available to a wider audience.

On September 1, 2000, the first commercial channel to regularly offer Breton language programming, TV Breizh, was started. TV Breizh is also the first regional digital cable channel in France. TV Breizh originally had planned to be completely bilingual thanks to the possibility of having two sound channels on a digital station. Budget constraints have limited this effort so far though. The Breton language sound channel is however available for two hours of children's programming each day, and for portions of several of the talk shows presented on the station. TV Breizh also runs a series of 30-second "commercials" throughout its 18-hour program day that teach the viewer Breton vocabulary and expressions. In addition, the channel is beginning to offer feature films dubbed into Breton (the hope is to offer one film per week in Breton as their stock of dubbed material grows over time). Two other series are being developed for the 2001-2002 school year that will teach viewers Breton history and language (Collery, 2000).

TV Breizh is also faced with the reality of cable and satellite television in France. Currently, very few people in France, let alone in Brittany, have cable or direct to home satellite service (TV Breizh is also available on France's two major satellite providers CanalSatellite and la Télé Par Satellite – TPS). In 1999, prior to the start of TV Breizh, 10,977,000 people had cable or digital satellite service (this is roughly 18.5% of France's population of 59,329,691 – Médiametrie, 2000; CIA, 2000). This number was split between 4,745,000 cable subscribers and 6,232,000 satellite system subscribers (an individual breakdown of the satellite figure was not available for each of the two satellite services

included in the study – CanalSatellite and TPS – nor was it possible to find numbers of subscribers for Brittany alone). However, given the great migration of Bretons to the Parisian basin after WWII, coupled with the fact that all of Paris has had access to cable since 1992, allows TV Breizh to cater to a major part of the Breton diaspora. With that in mind, TV Breizh does manage to offer about 16 hours per week in Breton for the lucky few who are able to receive its signal (one interview participant informed me that while his cable service did offer TV Breizh, it was not part of the basic channel selection – This is where TV Breizh was originally to be located on the cable services that carried it – Janig – interview; Goulc'han – interview; TV Breizh, 2001).

The only other manner in which to watch Breton language programs is through the Sell Ta! video workshop. Sell Ta! produces a magazine program in videocassette format called *Sell Ta!*, which it sells by subscription to about 400 people. The cassettes are produced roughly on a quarterly basis and contain coverage of major news events, recipes, sports, language lessons, cartoons, and short film episodes. Brendan summed this up stating that "Sell Ta! attempts to provide a variety of different elements in its cassettes so that they could interest all the members of a family of subscribers."

Because of the limited television offerings in Breton, many of the producers with whom I spoke had great hopes for the arrival of digital television, which is slated to begin broadcasting in 2001 through the public service. Per summed up this hope, saying,

> Digital will change [the lack of Breton programming] because we will be able to design our own schedule within the region and completely turn the situation around. Right now it is Paris that gives us our regional slots, and with digital, it will be the regions that allocate time for national programming.

Thus there's not much in the way of Breton language media, but members of the Breton community hold out hope for the future, with possibilities offered by changes in legislation, public opinion toward the Breton language and media technologies.

**What kinds of content are currently available in Breton?**

In spite of these limits to Breton language media offerings, the Breton speaking community does pay attention to how it is represented in print and on the airwaves.

*Television*

Television is perhaps the most visible medium employing the Breton language as the same program reaches a larger audience than is the case for any of the other media. However, just because it receives the most attention, does not make it the most appreciated or relevant from the Breton cultural perspective.

That said, Breton language television programs have changed over the last decade. They have become much more information oriented, at the expense of fictional programming. For instance, *Du-Man, Du-Se*'s previous incarnation, *Chadenn ar Vro*, aired fictional works and more entertainment oriented programming as part of its format. *Du-Man, Du-Se* has not continued this tradition.

Ordinarily, *Du-Mañ, Du-Se* is composed of two 13-minute segments with a commercial break between them. These shorter segments are more economical to produce within the show's limited budget. Because the budget is so small, France 3 also relies upon a system of co productions to fill out *Du-Mañ, Du-Se* programming. Through this system of co productions, Brenda said,

> Once a month, we show a 26-minute documentary, which is good for the producers, the station, and the viewers. Subjects have included country-dances attended by seniors, Breton speaking prisoners in Brest (*Brezhoneg en Toull*), the *Bagad de*

> *Lann Bihoue*, and a series on 20th century Breton writers which is going to be expanded to include 10 authors.

Nicolas, who worked on the production of *Brezhoneg en Toull* and the documentary about the *Bagad de Lann Bihoue*, described how these differ from the traditional format shown on *Du-Man, Du-Se*:

> [*Brezhoneg en Toull*] is truly a 26-minute documentary that's not necessarily limited to something that could be done in Breton. It was effectively the role this language played in the prison, and how, through the medium of this language, these two prisoners in particular, because they spoke also with some of the Breton speaking guards, recreated their own little world, a little cocoon that was fairly comfortable in relation to the existence lived by the other prisoners. The relationship to the language put them into a more familial situation in fact.
>
> After that, we did a portrait of the most famous Bagad in the world, which is called le Bagad de Lann Bihoue and which is at the naval air base near Lorient. We did a double-version. That is to say, a French version and a Breton version. This meant that some of the interviewees were different from one version to the other.

The result of productions like those developed by Nicolas and the other outside producers who work with France 3 is that content is slowly beginning to change into something different than what it was 3-5 years ago. It is slowly beginning to discuss modern aspects of the Breton identity.

Mikael described how it came about saying,

> The way the show was written was in some ways determined by the conditions under which it was started. Of course I had a few extra resources to do it once we decided to create it two years ago. The choice we made, deliberately, was to situate ourselves... in a niche that we had not used or very little anyway. That is to say the talk show. So my goal for the subject is to put... how shall I say... a personality on the hot seat and get him to say a bit of what he has in his head or his heart in the context of a show that has a ... variable atmosphere... So the goal is to have a guest each week and

> there are two of us to... interrogate this guest and to make... to confront him with all sorts of questions about more or less current events. Not up to the day of the show, because the show is pre-recorded for a variety of reasons. At the same time technical reasons, and ... essentially also because we decided to subtitle the show in French. That takes a bit of time, and so we have to record the show at least a week before the broadcast. Sometimes a bit less, but that's sort of rare. And so the goal is to have a guest, we're two interviewers, two journalists, who talk with this person, the guest, so that people learn something or feel something, an emotion or that they learn something yes, in spending 45 minutes, 40 minutes in our company. With one other little element...considering a diverse range of opinions. That is to say that from one week to the next... if I list my guests over a year, there will be Breton militants, writers, elected officials from the right and the left, union representatives, etc. a diversity of situations and opinions.

He concluded this discussion saying, "*Red an Amzer* follows Breton cultural production, publishing, cultural events, festivals, the initiatives that are passed." Mikael explained this wide variety of subjects, building on his earlier comment about a diverse range of guests as well as part of his understanding of the type of content that public service broadcasting should provide.

> In any case, that's the mission of the public service television in France and so also of the regional station and I can't conceive of how it could be otherwise. By that I mean that it would be completely unthinkable in my mind and in the minds of the directors of this station at which I work, I think, to let the station be monopolized by one point of view whatever it was. It's not because we express ourselves in Breton that we can forget about journalistic rules or the general operating guidelines of the public service media. Perhaps in the private sector that's different, I don't know, but in the public service in any case, it's like that, and that's an idea that I respect.

Similar in subject matter to *Red an Amzer*, *Skeudenn Roazhon* takes a look at Breton cultural life in Upper Brittany. *Skeudenn Roazhon* is however, much more local as it talks only about Rennes and its surrounding area. Gurvan described it, saying,

> It's a 15-minute show that is.. co-produced between Skeudenn Bro Roazhon and TV Rennes and now it's subtitled with the help of the OLB. It's students, I'm the host, but there are students that participate and other Breton cultural figures in Rennes. And we try, in 15 minutes it's difficult, but to reflect a bit of the Breton cultural life in Rennes with some news, a book review, one longer report, music if there are artists that just put out a record, voilà.

While the majority of the television content is targeted toward current Breton speakers, TV Breizh has taken a different approach to providing Breton language content, focusing on new generations of Breton speakers. Janig described TV Breizh's Breton language offering, saying,

> There will be two hours a day for children, systematically; one hour in the morning and one our at the end of the day. That will be every day. Plus two hours on Sundays, two extra hours for children. There will be around 10 talk shows each week. On these 10 talk shows, there will be one that is always in Breton every week. We will try to keep to that, which won't be easy, but we will try, and we will sub-title it. And then the three magazines, sports, land, and sea, we try as much as possible to do certain reports in Breton subtitled in French. That's not easy because we refuse to say it's sufficient for someone to speak Breton for us to put him on TV. That's sort of the France 3 attitude. For us, that's not sufficient. This person must have something interesting to say, because speaking Breton just for the sake of speaking Breton isn't enough... and also, the majority of the population that speaks Breton is over 50 or 60 years old. and the young generation learning to speak it again, all the children and young people today who are becoming more numerous, we prefer to occupy ourselves with them and propose cartoons, movies, fiction. We'll begin to dub next year, to accommodate this need and to permit them to live normally in Breton rather than only taking an interest in the

> people over 60 if you like... But it's important that we have lively things in Breton.

TV Breizh takes changing the televised image that one sees of the Breton language and culture very seriously. Janig summarized a necessity to look outside of Brittany, saying,

> ...the base line for the channel is "The world through the Celtic Channel." So of course we're interested in what goes on elsewhere. Sometimes a little pretext is necessary to relate things back to us, but I think we'll make more and more links with the rest of the world. For example, we have a show about Bretons around the world. That allows us to travel to the four corners of the planet and to discover through this show, which is a little bit of an adventure show, and in which the Breton expatriates are sort of a pretext for doing other things. That permits us to get a bit of fresh air and take an interest in the whole world.

Jakez summarized Breton language television content, saying,

> I think that .. [the director at France 3 West] is news oriented himself, so it gave the whole picture a very news orientated color. Also the very first television program that was through the medium of Breton was news and it was only one minute per week, with [the first anchor], but it was news. So it sort of gave the momentum for more news. Also the fact that news are by no means cheap, but the fact that they do them already in French means that the infrastructure is there, as in camera crews, some men and women, studios for news, so adding Breton to that was only a minor addition in terms of budget, you know.

However, the nearly exclusive focus on news and information poses a real problem for Jakez, who continued, saying,

> ..I have two children who are fluent in Breton. It's one of their native languages, but there is no way that they're gonna watch anything in Breton on television now. I mean they might pass by when I'm watching the news .. and on Sundays and Saturdays, they wouldn't be interested in the subjects and people that they'd be seeing on screen. So for my children, and for all the children and teenagers and learners, and also too for the image of the language. That it's not just about farming or the traditional things, but you can also dream, you

> can also tell tales, you can also show love stories through the medium of Breton. That's probably why I changed myself. I love the news and I think that's probably what I'm best at, but I feel that there's a need for something else. On TV Breizh there won't be any news, which is a pity in a way. I would have liked to have international news talking about Hungary and California in the Breton news through the medium of Breton. There won't be that because it's apparently too expensive, but the other aspect will be there and I think that this is where I want to work right now.

Jakez described a feeling that was quite prevalent among many Bretons; the idea that media offerings need to branch out beyond news programs. As the audience is not one homogeneous group, neither should the programs be so uniform.

Taking a look at the content present in Breton language television shows several important attributes related to the point Jakez made. First, when looking at a sample of Breton language television show segments (primarily from *Du-Man, Du-Se* and *Red an Amzer*), only two out of 107 took place outside of Brittany (see table 1). Furthermore, while one of these was a special edition of *Red an Amzer*, the other was a segment on one of the *Sell Ta!* videocassettes. That is to say that the overwhelming majority of content had to do with events or issues taking place within Brittany.

**TABLE 1: LOCATIONS REPRESENTED IN AUDIOVISUAL CONTENT**[48]

| Segment Location | Frequency (n=107) | |
|---|---|---|
| | Count | Percentage |
| Brittany | 105 | 98.1 |
| Africa | 1 | .9 |
| Western Europe | 1 | .9 |

[48] Audiovisual content includes the selection of *Du-Man, Du-Se* and *Red an Amzer* episodes along with 6 episodes of *Skeudenn Roazhon*, 2 installments of *Sell Ta!*, and the two films, *Brezhoneg 'Leiz o Fenn* and *Ur Sulvezh Ordinal...Pe Dost.*

When the themes of these shows are examined, there is a similar though not as dramatic concentration. While there were 17 different themes covered in the same 107 audiovisual segments, just the four most frequently shown themes comprised over 65% of the television content (see table 2). These themes, Fine Arts including performing and decorative arts (the theme of 24 show segments), History – both natural and cultural (20), the Environment (15), and Language (11), are all domains that can be considered a part of the traditional Breton heritage, as they are elements that have been emphasized throughout the Breton cultural movement. Furthermore, only Politics (8), the Media (7), and the Economy (5) occurred five times or more in the sample. Of these, the segments dealing with politics covered Breton regional politics, those about the media discussed developing Breton media outlets or the need for such, and those about the economy talked about the economics of traditional Breton trades such as fishing, farming, or clog-making.

**TABLE 2: THEMES REPRESENTED IN AUDIOVISUAL CONTENT**[49]

| Segment Theme | Frequency (n=107) | |
|---|---|---|
| | Count | Percentage |
| Fine arts | 24 | 22.4 |
| History | 20 | 18.7 |
| Environment | 15 | 14.0 |
| Language | 11 | 10.3 |
| Politics | 8 | 7.5 |
| Media | 7 | 6.5 |
| Economy | 5 | 4.7 |
| Literature | 3 | 2.8 |
| Travel | 3 | 2.8 |
| Education | 2 | 1.9 |
| Fiction | 2 | 1.9 |
| Society | 2 | 1.9 |
| Cuisine | 1 | .9 |
| Entertainment | 1 | .9 |
| Human Rights | 1 | .9 |
| Portrait | 1 | .9 |
| Sport | 1 | .9 |

[49] As with locations, the sample includes the selection of *Du-Man, Du-Se* and *Red an Amzer* episodes along with 6 episodes of *Skeudenn Roazhon*, 2 installments of *Sell Ta!*, and the two films, *Brezhoneg 'Leiz o Fenn* and *Ur Sulvezh Ordinal...Pe Dost.*

Thus, we can see that Breton language audiovisual media remain extremely focused on Breton culture and rarely extend beyond the Breton territory. This introspection is not entirely without benefit however. The one long-format film, which has been broadcast on two different channels within the French media system, provided Bretons a unique opportunity to look at the impact their language has on its speakers; something not afforded by the bulk of the Breton language television programming. Mathieu, a member of the production crew, described this documentary, *Brezhoneg 'Leiz o Fenn.*

> ...we produced an hour-long film called *Brezhoneg 'Leiz o Fenn*, which means Breton in Their Heads. For a year, we followed the first high-school students to have completed all of their schooling and who passed the baccalaureate in Breton for the first time. Well, they weren't the first ones to pass the baccalaureate in Breton, but they were the first to go to school in Breton from kindergarten through the baccalaureate. And so we wanted to see a bit of what was going on in their heads. How they lived this experience, to have learned everything in Breton, the fact that they lived at the same time in a world where they were the minority.. It's very different when one speaks about a minority language, it's as if it was an abstract entity, but when its an individual who speaks that language, he himself is in a minority position, and it's interesting to see how he lives that on a daily basis. How in fact he thinks in Breton, and some of them said they have the impression that they're foreigners in their own country because at root, their thoughts are in Breton, and they have trouble finding people with whom they can express their thoughts, feelings, and experiences, outside their group of friends.

What is important from this film is the idea that media can play a role in the differentiation process. *Brezhonek Leiz o Fenn* was an exploration of what it means to be a part of the Breton speaking community. It is this type of content, like the more innovative *Du-Mañ, Du-Se* and *Red an Amzer* segments, that can afford Bretons a more complex look at their identity and its place in society.

*Press*

One advantage the press has over audiovisual content is a greater variety of themes in its repertoire. However, it is also the least visible medium in terms of audience numbers. *Bremañ*, the most widely distributed Breton language magazine, only reaches about 3000 people per month. Despite its small readership, the magazine attempts to cover a wide range of issues. Nolwenn described what one would find on the pages of *Bremañ*, saying,

> We try to have the important news from the month, whatever made the most noise. Certainly the language problem returns systematically. But we try to approach it in a different way so that the article is still interesting to read. For the double issue [just sent to press at the time of our interview] I can tell you that that's about half the issue. The rest is international news, often in-depth. That is to say, that there's an article about the two Asias. There's an article about the problems concerning the war in Colombia. We always have the perspective of the colonized so perhaps we have a different way of reacting to events than a paper coming from a state. We have the point of view of a country trying to live in a greater Europe.

The "language problem" is certainly the most frequently discussed theme in *Bremañ*. An analysis of the themes present showed that in both when *Bremañ* was the militant journal of the Breton struggle (prior to 1986), and currently, language was by far the most visible of all subjects covered (30 of 89 articles prior to 1986, and 47 of 330 articles after). It is important to note though, that while language represented 33.7% of the articles prior to 1986, it slipped to 14.2% of the articles after that time. Given its enormous importance to the Breton community, this change can be attributed not to a reduced emphasis on language by the paper, but rather an increase in the variety of other topics covered. While there were 23 different themes present before the editorial change, there were 36 themes present following the shift (this is significant at the $p < .05$ level when a chi square test is performed). Education was the second most discussed topic both before and after the

editorial change as well (9 and 30 articles respectively). It is at this point in a listing of the themes present in *Bremañ* that the editorial change starts to be come evident. Media, notably articles about the limited place occupied by the Breton language in the media or the movement for a Breton language television station, were covered as much as education prior to the editorial change (9 articles), but were only the fifth most important theme after the change (24 articles). Another way to look at this difference is to say that while Language (30), Education (9), Media (9), the Environment (8), and Literature (6) were the five most frequent themes before the editorial change, Language (47), Education (30), International News (26), the Economy (25), and the Media (24) were the five most important after the change (see tables 3 and 4).

TABLE 3: THEMES IN *BREMAÑ* BEFORE THE EDITORIAL SHIFT (1980-1986)

| Article Theme | Frequency (n=89) | |
|---|---|---|
| | Count | Percentage |
| Language | 30 | 33.7 |
| Education | 9 | 10.1 |
| Media | 9 | 10.1 |
| Environment | 8 | 9.0 |
| Literature | 6 | 6.7 |
| Fine Arts | 3 | 3.4 |
| Breton Politics | 2 | 2.2 |
| Conflict | 2 | 2.2 |
| Cuisine | 2 | 2.2 |
| Economy | 2 | 2.2 |
| Politics | 2 | 2.2 |
| Celts | 1 | 1.1 |
| Elections | 1 | 1.1 |
| Festival | 1 | 1.1 |
| Imprisonment | 1 | 1.1 |
| International | 1 | 1.1 |
| Other French Regions | 1 | 1.1 |
| Political Parties | 1 | 1.1 |
| Social Work | 1 | 1.1 |
| Sport | 1 | 1.1 |
| Undefined | 5 | 5.6 |

**TABLE 4: THEMES IN *BREMAÑ* AFTER THE EDITORIAL SHIFT (1987-2001)**

| Article Theme | Frequency (n=330) | |
|---|---|---|
| | Count | Percentage |
| Language | 47 | 14.2 |
| Education | 30 | 9.1 |
| International | 26 | 7.9 |
| Economy | 25 | 7.6 |
| Media | 24 | 7.3 |
| Environment | 23 | 7.0 |
| Breton Happenings | 15 | 4.5 |
| Literature | 11 | 3.3 |
| Other French Regions | 11 | 3.3 |
| Conflict | 9 | 2.7 |
| Human Rights | 9 | 2.7 |
| Breton Politics | 8 | 2.4 |
| Fine Arts | 8 | 2.4 |
| Religion | 7 | 2.1 |
| Elections | 6 | 1.8 |
| Editorial | 5 | 1.5 |
| Race Relations | 5 | 1.5 |
| Celts | 4 | 1.2 |
| Festival | 4 | 1.2 |
| History | 4 | 1.2 |
| Imprisonment | 4 | 1.2 |
| Other Regions | 4 | 1.2 |
| Political Parties | 4 | 1.2 |
| Politics | 4 | 1.2 |
| European Union (EU) | 3 | .9 |
| Social Work | 3 | .9 |
| Studies | 3 | .9 |
| Cuisine | 2 | .6 |
| French Politics | 2 | .6 |
| Minority Peoples | 2 | .6 |
| Breton Regions | 1 | .3 |
| Disarmament | 1 | .3 |
| Exhibition | 1 | .3 |
| Influential Person | 1 | .3 |
| Obituary | 1 | .3 |
| Protest | 1 | .3 |
| Sport | 1 | .3 |
| Undefined | 11 | 3.3 |

What is even more telling, however, than the increase in variety is the increase in number of locations covered. Prior to the editorial change, 81 of the 89 articles (91%) were

about topics within Brittany. Two articles (2.2%) were written about Eastern Europe and one each about France, another non-national region, the Middle East, Celtic Countries, the Americas, and Asia. Thus, before 1986, *Bremañ 's* focus was clearly on Brittany (table 5). After the editorial shift, *Bremañ 's* content has still primarily focused on Brittany (183 of 330 articles – 55.5%), however, many more locations have started to show up as well (table 6). For example, while there were eight locations covered before the editorial change, there were 13 covered after it (this difference is significant at the $p < .001$ level when a chi square test was performed). France (27 articles) was the second most frequently covered location after the change and this can be seen as quite logical when we note that the Bretons locate their identity in opposition to French national identity. Other frequently covered areas were Eastern Europe (16), other non-national regions (16 articles on groups such as the Basques, the Catalans, the Kurds, or Palestinians), Asia (10), Global Issues (10 – it should be noted that there were also fewer "truly global" concerns recognized during the earlier time period as well), and the European Union (9).

**TABLE 5: LOCATIONS BEFORE THE EDITORIAL SHIFT IN *BREMAÑ* CONTENT (1980-1986)**

| Article Location | Frequency (n=89) | |
|---|---|---|
| | Count | Percentage |
| Brittany | 81 | 91.0 |
| East Europe | 2 | 2.2 |
| Africa | 1 | 1.1 |
| Americas | 1 | 1.1 |
| Celtic Countries | 1 | 1.1 |
| France | 1 | 1.1 |
| Middle East | 1 | 1.1 |
| Regions | 1 | 1.1 |

**TABLE 6: LOCATIONS AFTER THE EDITORIAL SHIFT IN *BREMAÑ* CONTENT (1987-2001)**

| Article Location | Frequency (n=330) | |
|---|---|---|
| | Count | Percentage |
| Brittany | 183 | 55.5 |
| France | 27 | 8.8 |
| East Europe | 16 | 4.8 |
| Regions | 16 | 4.8 |
| Asia | 10 | 3.0 |
| Global | 10 | 3.0 |
| European Union (EU) | 9 | 2.7 |
| Celtic Countries | 7 | 2.1 |
| West Europe | 7 | 2.1 |
| Americas | 6 | 1.8 |
| Africa | 4 | 1.2 |
| Middle East | 4 | 1.2 |
| Australia | 2 | .6 |
| Undefined | 29 | 8.8 |

What is interesting about the locations covered in *Bremañ*'s articles is that they are not necessarily about places in close geographic proximity to Brittany. Such proximity is often seen as an indicator of what gets covered in the press of a given locale, but it seems to be less important than a sort of cultural proximity. Many of the Eastern European countries are, like non-national regions, in the process of building a cultural identity (national identity in the cases of the newly independent Eastern European countries – of which Croatia and Macedonia – cultural groups splintered off into nations). This accurately describes the point at which the Bretons find themselves in the cultural identity negotiation process as well. Thus *Bremañ* has started to look beyond Brittany and to present a Breton perspective on world news. The magazine takes this point of view as a means of answering questions about its own identity.

Having examined briefly both television and print media, we can now compare these two representations of the Breton identity. While television presents a very traditional

cultural picture of the Bretons, the press leans more toward a view of Brittany as a larger society, not bounded solely by its heritage. Another way to say this is that, as mentioned above, television covers Brittany almost to the exclusion of other destinations (only two show segments of 107 explored other places), and focuses on the fine arts (24 segments), history (20), the environment (15), and the Breton language (11). On the other hand, in spite of the fact that almost two thirds of *Bremañ*'s coverage concerned Brittany, it did report on 12 other areas of the world (a chi-square test showed that this differed from the television sample significantly at the $p<.001$ level). Additionally, while the Breton language was the most important (77 of 419 articles), *Bremañ* covered a rather different set of themes, including education (39), the media (33), the environment (31), the economy (27), and international news (27). A chi-square test also showed that the difference in range of themes between *Bremañ* and the television sample was significant at the $p<.001$ level.

Thus from a look at the range of themes and locations covered in both television programming and print news, the two points made above become clearer; television represents a view of Brittany focused upon the Breton territory and its cultural heritage while *Bremañ* situates Brittany within a larger social world that includes more than just traditional ideas. It should be noted that this fits generally within the two conceptions about the Breton language; the government position viewing Breton culture as an element of French heritage and the Breton perspective which sees the Breton culture as a living way of life. This is an important distinction to make, because as we will see later in the exploration of audience perceptions of Breton language media, these traditions are but one aspect of their identity. However, it is necessary to use caution when making this generalization about the cross-media differences because the television programs differ in genre from *Bremañ*. Both the

television programs are culturally oriented, *Du-Mañ, Du-Se* being a cultural magazine and *Red an Amzer* being a culturally situated talk show. On the other hand, *Bremañ* has become a news outlet that can be likened to a daily newspaper (except of course for the obvious difference in periodicity).

*Radio*

Radio offerings in Breton have always been much more diverse than print or television content, given that there are more hours devoted to Breton on the radio (especially since the advent of the low power stations in 1982). Youenn gave a lengthy description of his public radio program, which, though no longer on the air, inspired many of the current programs. One can also see the roots of current public television programming in his description as well.

> The Breton language show on the radio was never a pure news program. It was essentially a cultural magazine or a variety show. I had to satisfy a very diverse clientele. I tried at least to provide something for all categories of Breton speakers from the uneducated who only spoke the language, to those who had a literary knowledge of the language. So my programs were very different from those presented by Pierre Hélias. He was a writer, a man of great imagination, and he wrote well. He wrote little sketches. That was, at the time, a form that was very highly prized on French language radio programs too. It was a genre that many people liked at the time, kind of light theater that was presented by two or three characters, with a funny topic. And since he had a talent and the imagination for writing, he wrote a sketch each week. These sketches made up the material for his shows. And then a bit of initiation to the popular literature of the time. He took for example fables from the Middle Ages and adapted them into Breton. But all that was already for older Breton speakers without much culture, other than the oral culture in which they lived.
>
> But while I was the program host, I couldn't do that sort of thing. I wasn't able to. I didn't consider myself capable of writing shows like that. All the same, I had to find material

> somehow. So I searched through everything I could read in Breton in the various magazines. I set about revisiting these works and with the help of my wife I often adapted these texts. So I took a little bit left and right. I "stole" everything that was available. But there was nothing written specifically for radio programs. That didn't come about until much later. I used literature, stories, fables, songs; I surrounded myself with as many volunteer collaborators as was possible. I spent days collecting material all around the Breton speaking part of Brittany. I created a network of correspondents so that I could put together on a Sunday, singers, storytellers, people who could carry on a dialog in Breton. And then I showed up with a sound truck to record and collect their material to help me put together the show. I also tried from the start to give the show a bit more of a youthful color to show that the Breton language wasn't simply a privilege for the old, but that children could also take an interest. And that was the case. In the 50's and 60's, the Ar Falz movement and the French Union for Civic Arts Education (UFOLEA) organized story-telling contests, and singing contests where Breton songs were often sung. The Catholic milieu had the same thing as well. Bleun Brug organized similar contests. I recorded the finalists from these contests. And I could.. let people hear children's voices, adolescents, and listeners liked this a lot. People said, ah look, Breton isn't dead at all. Then my show also had news, but purely cultural news.. otherwise, sketches, but elaborated from existing texts, literary works, interviews (about a Breton island for example).. Keravel presented a cultural political chronicle too. Political without being controversial though. It was called *Aman Emgleo Breiz*, and consisted of 10 minutes about a current topic.. I also pointed out cultural events and gave that kind of information when I had it.

Most of the other public radio hosts on the air now have kept up with the style of program that Youenn made popular.

Private radio stations have often kept this cultural bias as well, but as Goneri mentioned, they have a bit more liberty to explore other cultural forms. His program discusses Breton literature, and he described it as follows:

> ..It's extremely varied because first of all, Breton literature isn't very well developed is it? For centuries, Breton was only

the oral language of a peasant people, fishermen who didn't know how to read or write Breton, and even less in French, because they didn't know it. And so the rare Breton productions were religious texts translated from French. And often very poorly translated. Frankly, they weren't very interesting. Anecdotal, ethnological, ethnographical interest maybe, but not literary at all. We had to wait for the middle of the 19th century for the appearance of the *Barzaz Breiz* clearly, in 1839, for the cultural elites to take interest in the Breton language. So it was at this moment that there was a renewed interest, around 1839, and we're still experiencing that now. First point.

Secondly, Breton literature has become rather compact, and as a result, has had a lot of trouble getting rid of its militant aspect you see, because of the necessity to fight for the defense of the language, etc. So too often, we see this come out in texts. At the same time, one would hope to have a book with a story or poems in which it's not always a question of Brittany or the Breton language. That's our little sin. But the young people who are writing today are very conscious of that and we're beginning to have some acceptable productions and I see for Breton literature, and this is clear in other languages too without a doubt, that to merit the literary label, it must be able to be translated. At that point, the merits of the work in question do not stem from the language in which it's written, but from the content, right? Currently, we have, happily, two or three experiences with Breton texts that have been translated into French and which were magnificent in French too, which is to say that the content was good and not simply the language. That's our ambition, to have works that are acceptable..

Young people who are writing now have the ambition to give a universal dimension to their writing that can touch anyone's heart, wherever he lives, even if he reads the text in translation. That's important. Sometimes we reproach the Breton movement for closing itself off into a narrow localism. And it's true; we're too small to not be exposed to that temptation sometimes. So I think we must fight to accept at any price, and not to lock up our little identity. No isolation. Calm, normal affirmation of our identity, not aggressive, or closed off from the modern world.

Literature is quite a common topic on Breton radio, and television, programs because, as mentioned in chapter 3 quite a strong publishing industry has developed in Brittany. Furthermore, as Gweltaz, a retired teacher noted, story telling has played an important role in Breton culture. Riwal gave this as the reason that many short stories are printed in *Al Lanv*, saying, "It's a genre [the short story] that's very popular in Breton." Jules, a radio host for the public service broadcaster, also liked to discuss literature in his radio program because, "it's about people's lives and their dreams."

Enora, working for a low power radio station, discussed other aspects of day-to-day life in her show. She described it as

> ...a sort of magazine program in fact, with music, announcements of upcoming events, and then there's a different topic every day. The topics are cuisine, gardening, medicine, nature – about 15 minutes. A small Breton lesson. Yes and an economic/social rubric too. And then aside from that, there's often a little interview on a subject that could be one of a variety of things. About a festival going on at the time, or an exhibit.

This focus on everyday local social life is a part, not just of her show but also of the whole station's mission. Enora also described the program following hers, saying,

> There's a half hour that is very different from the following hour. I've been working on this first half hour; it's old musical recordings. I play longer musical selections, and between them there are announcements for upcoming events. So it goes by rather quickly... And after that, in the next hour, [the show's host] goes and interviews someone at their home. So it's usually some one or a couple of people or a topic and they discuss it with some more music as well... Today for example, it was two men who used to go from farm to farm making cider. There, it was the history of a part of their past lives.

Just as Enora covers music in her broadcast, it is also not just one theme, but the primary subject matter for Gurvan's radio show. He describes his program in terms of the importance of music to the Breton identity.

> It's above all a show about music because it's important to know that right now in Brittany, Breton musical production, typically, specifically Breton, whether in Breton, Gallo or with Breton instruments, that's growing in importance, and that's an area that has been around for 10 years. And it's only accelerating. We often say, it's a fad, it wont last, it will, like in the 1970's, disappear, a priori, but now I think it's much more profound than that. It's that people have re-appropriated their music whether traditional or based on traditional forms. So on the show, called *Sul Gouel Bemdez*.. it's an expression that means "let's party," a large portion is taken up with music. Nevertheless, there are always guests too. One principal guest that you'll hear for about an hour of the show on a current topic, but broken up by music. That could be a book, it could be a play that is being staged, it could be a new magazine, it could be an association, or students organizing such and such an event, it could be an artist for such and such a record. So there's one principal guest and then some others who talk about expositions of lesser importance, less important events. We talk a lot about music of course, but festoù-noz too. It's important to know that in Brittany, there are an enormous number of festoù-noz. So there is a large portion dedicated to music and announcements for festoù-noz. And there is something in which I take great pleasure because I've been doing this show now for seven years. Its that people have come to see me later and they've said, "yeah, when I heard your show and all that, I liked the music but I didn't understand what you were saying, and that makes me want to learn Breton. And now these people speak Breton. That's fantastic; it's a great pleasure.

*Changes for the future: Teaching Bretons about their culture*

As in the case of the listeners Gurvan described, radio content, and to an extent television and print content as well, focused on daily Breton cultural life has opened many Bretons to their language and heritage. Having looked at the range of content present in the

various Breton language media, we can start to piece together the importance of this content. Speaking again about the role of literature, Goneri said,

> The majority of Breton speakers know nothing about what is written in Breton. That's because this language was never taught until quite recently. And so, I'm not talking about the young people here, let's say the main group of Breton speakers between 40-80 years old, who know absolutely nothing at all about written Breton, which has existed primarily since 1925, lets say. Now there are splendid pages that we have tried to make available to them. And so, we start by word of mouth, trying to perhaps give them the desire to go buy the book. And above all, these are works about the country they know. So it's a very necessary pedagogical operation. Because the average Breton speaker from the country or the coast, is rigorously illiterate, he doesn't know how to read, and he no longer knows how to read his language while his grand parents do, because they read the Life of the Saints in Breton en the evenings or little religious books that weren't brilliant but at least they were something. They also had Breton canticles during mass. With the current massive francisation, such as has been taking place since the mid 1950's, all these derisory crutches, but which were at the same time quite precious, disappeared. And consequently, there are people now who speak Breton, but who've never in their life seen modern written Breton. And it's important to spread the word about these books with slight dialectical adaptations, because we have to adapt a little right? ... It's a sort of acculturation to written Breton for those for whom it's the language of their heart, their daily language.

Thus, Goneri also hopes to use his radio program as a means for bringing a variety of aspects of their culture to the Breton people. This is of vital importance to a group that got pushed to the margins by the French nationalization process of the 19th and 20th centuries, but Jakez said for this learning to continue and to grow, Bretons need,

> As much as they can, you know, there's so little at the moment. There's five minutes of news a day. I'm not gonna tell you because you know too well. They need a lot more of everything. They need international news in Breton, at the right time of the day, which is in the evening as opposed to a

> quarter past 12pm. They need children's programs of course, for the more and more numerous families that are bringing up their children through the medium of Breton, or send their kids to school through the medium of Breton. They need fiction if we could make them but that's a question of money, and of having actors and comedians and everything and scriptwriters and the whole lot, which we don't really have at the moment. They need really everything. Now the priority for me would be all the entertainment and fiction approach because we have a lot of documentaries, we have some news, but all the rest is missing. All we have for entertainment is music, you know, music clips and things like that but we need all the rest, like films, animation, all of that.

Mathieu, a film director and professor also concerned about those Breton speakers currently growing up, said,

> ...there is a generation of young people who need these films to exist, who need to know things about the Breton culture, and to know things about the Breton language, and then there is an immense risk that people will remain completely amnesic without knowing their own history, their own language, their own roots.

All this is to say that the Bretons have very few sources of information about their culture and look to the media to fill in the gaps. However, the media themselves represent only scattered fragments of Breton life.

Alan, a young CRB employee, returned to the discussion of news to say that what is available needs to be more complete. For him, the necessity was not necessarily the language per se, but rather a coherent look at Brittany as its own entity. In this context he hoped for a radio

> That doesn't necessarily speak Breton, and that doesn't just talk about Brittany, but also discusses international ideas. And that's where globalization enters into this for me. When one produces a radio program in Rennes, one needs to have a third of the news cover Brittany, a third about the local area, and a third about international subjects, including France.

> And it shouldn't be 50% French, 5% Breton and the rest about Rennes, which is the current journalistic practice.

Goneri wanted to see changes to the Breton radio landscape as well, saying,

> The most important thing right now would be a true university, a popular oral university. That is to say we need to have on the Breton radio, the equivalent of France Culture. But not culture as concocted by Paris right? Culture as perceived at the regional level in Brittany where there is a popular culture and language.

Berc'hed also saw a need for a wider range of ideas in radio programming. She wanted to hear more

> ...debates and then to talk about modern life, because often our interviews are with one person, two people, but we rarely talk to more. It's true that debates on local radio stations aren't always extremely interesting. We need to find people with something to say and that's not necessarily easy. More debates, more things that touch people's lives. That could be love, death, divorce, child development..

One way of providing an expanded media offering and of improving the Breton media ability to look outward, beyond the borders of Brittany would be to work with the French language media. Mathieu described a split between the two languages that share the public service airwaves, saying,

> ...Around 93-94 I started to work as a director on a more regular basis for the Breton language shows and finally I abandoned work in the French language, because inside France 3 there is a real sort of division.. that is to say that from the time one starts to work for the Breton language shows, one is considered a bit like a second-class director. It's like the language itself. Someone who starts to learn the language. I see, my daughter is in a bilingual school, and at the beginning when she started to learn Breton people really asked if she would continue to understand French. There was a sort of panic by some people I knew. Now I see, she's 10, the capacity she has, on the contrary, to learn other languages. She's learning others, and not only her ability to learn languages, but I also see a mental opening at the same

> time, that this has given her. That is to say, the ability to imagine that the world, one can say "the world" in a whole bunch of different ways, and there is no one way to see the world, no one way to express oneself, no one way to speak. And on the other hand, I think, the intellectual and philosophical opening that that can give, because I believe that in the conditions we live in, we're capable to educate children about multiculturalism. There's always a temptation to isolate but there's the inverse that goes with that which is a greater openness.

This split, or rather reducing this gap, is part of the process of integrating the Breton language into the media flow rather than ghettoizing it into a backwater of isolated events scattered around an overwhelmingly French language system.

To summarize, Breton language media offerings, because of their limited quantities and availability do present a very fragmented and incomplete picture of Breton cultural identity. As a result, the first step toward providing the quality of information and entertainment required to help the Bretons understand their place in society is to expand the quantity of Breton content. Naturally, more does not necessarily mean better, but it is impossible to move beyond the distorted localized picture that exists now without devoting more time and space to the Breton language and culture. The Bretons are negotiating their cultural identity based upon a very fragmented picture of the world where there is a considerable focus on local literary and artistic issues as well as on traditional practices, but little else. Furthermore, Breton media content is produced in very small areas, leaving a series of puddles of media content rather than the flow to which the Western world has grown accustomed in the early twenty-first century.

# CHAPTER 7
# PRODUCING AN IDENTITY: INSIDE THE BRETON MEDIA PROFESSION

Because the majority of policy decisions regarding the Breton language media system have ambiguously left decisions to the marketplace, it is important to understand the actual practice; how media professionals themselves work within this context. Though the Region, the State, and the EU may still be unsure of their role in relation to the Bretons, those who work in the Breton media system, whether as producers, journalists, technicians, editors, or writers are much more certain in their common goal of cultural identity promotion. With this goal in mind, they are well aware of the fact that many gaps exist in the representations of their identity in the media. How they see their role in the effort to change this heavily influences how they undertake their specific contribution. However, as seen in chapter 6, the content they produce is subject to a variety of factors that constrain their efforts, including technological and financial limits as well as the uncertainties present in policy and management.

## A Breton Perspective

Like the majority of Bretons, those who work in Breton media outlets feel a strong attachment to Brittany (the territory) and to their language. Whether in the press or audiovisual domains, the media professionals who spoke with me strongly evoked these sentiments. Brendan, a sculptor and filmmaker, explained his perception of this attachment.

> I myself think that one is from the place where one feels comfortable... and in fact, it's because of that that I believe in Brittany there are an enormous number of people who are, who come from elsewhere, and alight in Brittany because it suits them well. There are many people who come for different reasons and who are admitted and accepted by the Bretons because like the Indians, the Bretons, they're a primitive people, in the proper, non-pejorative sense of the term, who have a tradition of being receptive to strangers.

> There are many people who come for different reasons and there's absolutely no problem at all integrating them from the moment they work in the same direction as us.. that they have a respect for what's going on here, etc.

Because of this strong attachment to their cultural identity, Breton media professionals feel they are better equipped for meeting for their audiences' needs than their French-speaking counterparts. Soaz noted the rarity of finding Breton in the mainstream press, saying

> ...I was solicited by *Ouest-France* last year or the year before when they published some special sections; they published two separate 50-page sections in Breton. They were a one-time deal, but perhaps it's a sign of something.

Aside from these two "one-time deals" and the weekly article in *le Télégramme*, one must turn away from the mainstream press in order to find the Breton language. The "something" Soaz refers to is clearly a greater, more regular public presence in the press for the Breton language.

The fact that one rarely finds Breton in the mainstream press is not new and it was the Bretons' desire to present their own perspective that originally led to the creation of *Al Lanv* and *Bremañ* as militant chronicles of the struggle for the Breton language. This commitment to a Breton point of view did not go away when the *Bremañ* staff decided to become a more general news organ. Nolwenn described this transformation in relation to rather standard conceptions of journalism, saying:

> We decided to transform the paper into a general Breton language newspaper and not a revolutionary tool, that is, about the struggles in Brittany. We survived five years and it worked well, but we needed to reach a higher level. And I think that this higher level brought us a lot more subscribers even from around the world. Because we see the news, we see the events.. we try to be current, obviously it's only a monthly... But it's important to know that when we became

> a general newspaper our readership doubled if not tripled, and what's more we began to take note of international events, as well as those in Brittany, through the eyes of Bretons living in Brittany. That is to say, that even *Ouest-France*, which is a huge daily, sometimes, it's clear that we don't have the same interpretation of a given event. We don't have the same approach or the same conclusion even though we don't have to teach the readers a lesson... and two years ago we hired a young journalist fresh out of school, she'd just passed her exams and just begun to learn Breton. She'd learned Breton over two years at the time. And she wanted above all to practice journalism in Breton because she was a militant at heart and that's what she wanted, to be a journalist and work in Breton. We took her on and clearly, since hiring her, we've seen that our workload has lightened and also that we have a better connection to the news we cover. That is to say that here we receive the stories, but aside from the times when I can go to a demonstration, which is always at night or on week-ends because I do this as a volunteer, but in retrospect, she could go to the places where events were taking place to interview those involved, whether on the subject of agriculture, organic production, oil spills, she went there too, birds, the Guérande salt flats, because they were in danger from the black tide as well. She could go do all that, and often we've reported things well in advance of *Ouest-France* or *Le Télégramme*. Because there is, amongst all those of us who work for *Bremañ*, such a strong a feeling of belonging to Brittany, that we feel perhaps the need to give good information, and because of that we turn perhaps toward more targeted information that could bring something to our readers.

While *Ouest-France* and *Le Télégramme* both cover news of Brittany, Nolwenn made it clear that the Breton language perspective is often different than the French language perspective. Nolwenn feels that the *Bremañ* staff's connection to the Breton identity allows the paper to provide news that is more adapted to its audience's needs. This is to say that she sees *Bremañ*'s news as important and useful to its readers.

Just as useful as presenting information targeted to those sharing the Breton identity, looking outwards is also a very important part of the media producers' conception of their

content. This too is an integral part of presenting information from a Breton perspective as it allows the audience to situate themselves and their identity within a wider social world. For example, Michel said,

> We do make claims to our Breton cultural identity. For us, it's above all not to enclose ourselves in a little bubble and say Brittany, Brittany. For us that means nothing. Brittany is in Europe, and in the outside world. And it's this desire; it's above all yes, to defend Brittany, to defend the language, to defend the culture, but not at all by rejecting others. And I think that what's been going on in Brittany the last few years is important. Its exactly opposite from the withdrawal one can see in Yugoslavia. It's the artists when... there is a great deal of blending in music, a whole lot of interest in others. And I think that's very interesting for Brittany. If it weren't about that, we wouldn't take any interest. We wouldn't get involved.

However, this outward look is in part a product of changes to modern Breton society. In his description of the book reviews that are printed in *Al Liamm*, Goulc'han, who used to work for *Al Liamm*, mentioned that "the criticism I have of the notes [they] now write up, its that sometimes they're not connected to Brittany. They [the current book reviewers] responded that it's important to think about all sorts of subjects, but that doesn't interest me so much." Goulc'han enjoys reading about his country and feels much more of a connection to literature about Brittany than about countries with which he is not familiar. He has a different view than the current book reviewers primarily because of a generational difference. We can trace this difference through the different opinions given by these interviewees, starting with Goulc'han's statement, where we see that older Bretons often tend to think in terms of the Brittany that they grew up with where mobility was much more restricted. This begins to change a bit with Brendan's statement, where we see evidence that he recognizes the changing demography of his identity that comes with the greater mobility

of younger generations. Finally, those Bretons who are joining the workforce now, or who have been there a relatively shorter period of time – like Yann, one of *Al Liamm's* current book reviewers – recognize that an attachment to Brittany is important because the Breton identity is interconnected with a much larger social world as well.

**Promoting the Breton Language: Hearing a New Old Voice**

While providing content from a Breton perspective and situating this point of view in a larger social context are important, many of the professionals with whom I spoke were also aware that they play a sizeable role in promoting the Breton language as well. Given the historically contentious relationship between the French government and the Breton language as well as its association with the German occupation, public affirmation of the Breton language has not always been possible. Now this has become feasible due to an evolution in Breton thought. Janig said that she,

> ... started doing radio in Breton in '78 and then TV in Breton... but the idea of a Breton language television station, 20 years ago, even 10 years ago, seemed completely hare-brained, unrealistic, impossible. People weren't ready... [the idea] wasn't in people's heads. No one would have imagined that it could be possible, and now for the last three or four years we've seen that change a bit, people are becoming more and more attracted to the idea in fact.

Seeing and hearing Breton on TV has now become an important goal in the last decade. In the early and mid-1990's, there was a significant movement seeking the creation of a television station entirely in Breton. When the TV Breizh project was announced at the end of 1998, the majority of this movement shifted to support the new undertaking, which seemed to have enough momentum and financial backing to be a substantial contribution to the Breton language and culture (TV Breizh is the personal project of Patrick Le Lay, the CEO of TF1, and a very well-known media mogul in France). Support, not only for TV

Breizh, but also for the more general idea of media in Breton began to surface as the new station began to take shape. Nolwenn described this new support, saying,

> There were lots of media professionals who spit on the language before, who signed up for intensive Breton courses. This by way of saying, that at the end of the day, the economy is the nerve center of the battle, and that the language must work economically as well. [in this 3rd stage of the Breton movement] it is absolutely critical to look outward not only to Europe but also to the world. And this 3rd generation of Breton militants must also play on economic factors.

Aurèlie, a producer in her 40's agreed, saying, "Of course, being chosen by people who make money out of the media, for your language, means that your language can have people make money out of it so then your language becomes important."

Mikael's understanding of the role media play in promoting the language also provides evidence of this change in thinking. He explained the Breton language role on France 3, saying, that the station makes a place for Breton first and foremost,

> ...because there are people who express themselves in Breton daily [70,000 people in Mikael's estimation] and 360,000 people who are able to understand it, so it's absolutely normal to have a program in Breton.

He further explained this, saying "it makes the Breton language visible." Per concurred, noting that "Speaking Breton is now a choice, but the public service should take that into consideration because there are a large number of people making that choice." This is to say that part of the duty of the public service broadcasters is to accommodate the needs of a plural society, and in France, Breton speakers play a part in that society.

Berc'hed discussed the psychological impact of providing visibility in terms of changing the impression Bretons have of their language.

> I think that the radio played an important role in people's re-appropriation of their language. All of the sudden, their language that had been despised, that they were forced to forget, their parents' language, the language they heard as children, was on the air. And that's no small achievement. That lets them think, "I'm no worse than the next person."

Thus, for Berc'hed, broadcasting the Breton language also means reversing the guilt internalized by those Breton speakers who'd lived through the repressive era of the past. She continued this explanation with an example of her station's programming, saying,

> The morning show is very close to the people. There's a need for proximity. One likes to hear about local issues. It's important for the older people as it gives back some of their pride. [We use a] very local Breton. The radio is also important for the people learning Breton who don't have other opportunities to hear the language without it. And it's even important for non-Breton speakers. Some of them listen as well, for the music of the language, and simply for the music.

Thus, by presenting the Breton language, media professionals feel they are able to bring back the audiences' confidence in their language. Furthermore, getting both Bretons and others to hear their language helps it to reclaim a place in public life, and through this process, rekindle a desire for people to use it.

Paol, who works for *Du-Mañ, Du-Se*, also saw this need for maintaining a close relationship with the audience in order to give voice to a group of people that is rarely if ever present in the mainstream media.

> I think it gives a chance to people who would never get on television because with the strong influence journalists have, by definition they only treat events that just happened and in a very brief manner, it's a chance to take the time. A journalist would never let someone speak for 10 minutes. Or then, during a round-table debate. And there, we have people in their daily lives, and in fact they open up their own history, their heart, their passion, their knowledge, and that's fantastic. These are never the truly great moments in television,

> because after the 3rd take, it's much les spontaneous and these people aren't necessarily actors. It's true that TV is a fairly heavy medium. When you have a team that arrives with a cameraman, a sound technician, etc.. [you lose a bit of the spontaneity of a conversation] But all the same, I think it's truly we give people the occasion to speak in a relaxed fashion about what they know well.

The ability to give a voice to the disenfranchised is even easier for the small low power radio stations because of the fact that they are not dependent upon ratings and advertising revenues for their operating budgets. Michel was very proud of this, saying,

> We're lucky to be free to not run ads, and to not be promotional stations. And if we don't feel like talking about a certain record, we don't talk about it. And the artists, we only receive those who are of very high quality but at the same time, we're not subjected to the rules of big promotional contracts. We have an incredible liberty. On the other hand, we're much less rich than the others. Of course, but I think that the radio industry is conscious of that, if one wants to be very very rich, one can't do this type of programming... the other stations can't do this kind of stuff any more. They don't talk, they don't exchange, it's advertising, it's promotion, it's the film of the century, its always the movie or the record or the book that's coming out next week, it's always the best, and then a month later, there's always a new best. It's to sell, it's all for the cash register. We don't have that kind of constraint. With that in mind, we can do things that are much more interesting, and above all give voice to people that get heard very very little.

Hearing Breton and other marginalized voices has also been the impetus behind a film festival held annually in Brittany since 1978. Ninog talked about the film festival, which is held in Douarnenez, as a way of stimulating audiovisual production, but also as a means of giving voice to the Bretons and other groups in similar situations:

> At the festival we hope to become a bit more of a driving force, to find a way to stimulate creation in Brittany too. Because we're a bit frustrated that we haven't seen any feature films, even in French, produced by local directors. It's for financial reasons but also more ambitious reasons. We want

> to be a bit more ambitious because we've noticed that at certain points when there have been feature length documentaries or fictional films, that did get shown in theaters later, Bretons go watch these movies. They want to see these movies, want to see movies that talk about their country.

Thus being attached to their identity has pushed media professionals to work toward integrating their language into the economic arena as well as promoting its importance to the cultural fabric of Brittany. It is precisely by resituating the Breton language within the media system that these media workers hope to spur its use in public life.

**Institutional Constraints: Media Economics and Media Politics**

However, Mikael, felt that while giving a voice to the Bretons is important, this same call for pluralism meant that public service television was subject to some different constraints. First, not all of the scorn for the Breton language has left Breton society, and the French society that is interwoven with it. For example, Mikael told how a viewer had recognized him on the street and had complained about the Breton programming, saying, "we speak French in Brittany too!" Secondly, public television, which must now compete for advertising francs with private stations, must seek a larger audience than the local radio stations. As such, he saw France 3 in a difficult position as far as explicitly promoting the Breton language because as he said, "there are still some people who don't like that, and this is the problem with 'mass media' that you have to try to please everyone." Thus, Mikael felt constrained by the general principle of audience maximization guiding the operation of modern television stations within the French system more than by his ties to the Breton culture.

Television is by no means the only medium that is subject to constraints external to the Breton identity. Gerard, who works for the DRAC, mentioned that the state is in a very

difficult position for funding media, from books and other print materials to audiovisual projects because,

> [taking book publishing as an example] the problem is one of viability of a project in relation to distribution. But that can be generalized to small publishers, not simply those who publish in Breton... We can't make it artificial either. We want to support our heritage, but without creating something artificial. That is to say which corresponds to a very small percentage of the population with absolutely phenomenal assistance... There's a real need for professionalism amongst small editors, authors, etc. not only in the Breton language and culture.

Here, Gerard echoes the economic imperative that is present in European Union media policy with his implication that the French state is concerned with promoting a strong publishing market. This is to say that just because a book on a particular subject has been written does not mean that it is worthy of publication and the state's goal is not to force the market to accept a work that would not already meet an editor's selection criteria.

Because a broad audience is so crucial to advertising supported media, the low power radio stations are perhaps the media best adapted to the Bretons' local needs. However, this feature is also a serious problem due to these stations' often-precarious financial status. Michel discussed this dilemma, saying,

> At present, we have an enormous problem, and that is that because part of our producers are volunteers, after about 3-4 years, either they get married, or they're students and move away, or they start a real career, which means that for the last six months, we've only had a quarter of an hour per week (in Breton). So we try, one to motivate people, and two above all for the beginning of the new school year in September to go and exchange programs with the other Breton radio stations so that we can hear Breton again at AlterNantes. So there are already some small projects, but AlterNantes is trying to become more professional and so today we won't put someone on the air who steps off the train this morning from Paris saying I want to speak Breton on the radio. We

> study their project, we do a tape in the studio and see if we can't put them in touch with other people who have the same interests. It's true that all that takes time, but today, the radio associative is trying to become more professional as well. So we have 3-4 projects that, in light of the date, will start in September after the summer. Currently... in fact some Breton professors in Nantes who teach young kids and adolescents who will in fact provide an accompaniment to their courses with a 15-minute radio program that we'll rerun several times. That permits us to show to our other listeners that in Nantes and elsewhere in the Loire-Atlantique there are Breton courses, and it also lets the parents of these students get together around the Breton programs and to have a concrete idea of how their children are learning Breton in class. So for the moment, it's very minimal this year for the last six months, but we have the desire to reintroduce Breton language programming. That could be also; we have some projects for poetry series. When we say that we're a free expression station, it's not necessarily political debates or ideological debates. That can also be theater, poetry, all sorts of things.

As a result, while the low power radio stations have more freedom to express their own ideas, they are not always able to make their voice heard due to their limited budgets.

Because the Breton language media, including the state funded public service broadcasters, have difficulties obtaining adequate funding, nearly all the interview participants lamented the fact that there is not enough Breton present in the media. Per, who works for *An Taol Lagad*, put this quite succinctly, noting that his program's daily six minutes is, "a minimal presence, but it's the only regional language news program." Generally, as it concerns all the other Breton language media content too, this is as much an economic problem as a political one. Lukian discussed at length the amount of Breton on FBBI, which in his mind seems to be diminishing,

> We started in August 1982 and before that there was another station, Radio Armorique that was part of France 3, then there were the agreements between France 3 and Radio France , with Radio France taking into its camp all of the

radio stations existing here and there, the local or regional stations that were at the time part of France 3. And we moved from France 3 to Radio France. We worked out of Brest at the time. We came to Quimper because Radio France, it's very centralized, but it's also centralized in terms of the decentralized districts. We're in the department capital because it's where the prefecture is, which is not the largest town in the department, but we're by the prefecture. So we started here and it's changed a bit since then. At the beginning, to summarize, the station operated on the basis of a well-integrated bilingualism. There was a mix of French and Breton throughout the day. We even had programs with hosts who could speak Breton and French in all parts of the day. We had news in the morning, at noon also and then again in the evening. And the problem that arose quite rapidly, we were two Breton speaking journalists, my colleague Ivon, who's still here, and myself, and when we started, we rapidly ran into the problem that we were stretched way to thinly, we didn't have the numbers, and so we ended up doing a lot of desk work, reworking press releases and doing almost no live reporting. That was the beginning period. It was sort of disorderly if you will. And then little by little, our timeslots were reduced. Instead of having an hour at noon, this news hole was removed to concentrate solely on the morning and the evening. And then that allowed us to have someone who did the morning news and who could then go and do some reporting for the evening program. So, after that, we had to hire additional staff because also, the journalists had to be able to take days off, have a weekend here and there. There was all that to take into consideration, which happened little by little. So the radio worked globally on a bilingual basis like that for quite a few years, from the beginning up until Thierry became director. When the first director left [a Breton cultural militant], when his successor arrived it was no longer the same. We returned to a model more like a typical Radio France station in fact. We found someone who had been a journalist, who'd been a director of other stations maybe in the France 3 system and who then moved over into the Radio France system. And then, that's when we began to feel the change. The station evolved toward less bilingualism during the daytime hours, in fact practically none at all. And so there was nothing left but the morning Breton language news. Even so between 1:30 and 2pm in the middle of the afternoon they kept a half hour long bilingual program, which

> was actually more Breton than French. And this show was the bilingual meeting for the middle of the day. Then there were the evening news and then a program that ran from 6-8:30pm. Actually it really started after 7pm because of the France Inter news. [Now] we have the morning news, three minutes at 6:15am, 5-6 minutes at 7:15 and 3-4 minutes at 8:30am and after that in the morning, there is no longer any Breton programming. At noon there's no longer anything. One must wait until 6:30pm for the evening news. After the news, then Jules' show is in Breton and lasts two hours – until 8:30pm. It's true that in the past, we had a station that started at 6am until 11 or 12 at night. And that, that also came from Paris. The funding undoubtedly diminished too. Or the radio changed. They wanted to spend less money and so they cut back on personnel and also on hosted programming. With the advent of satellites, we found ourselves with programming that came from Paris and was distributed by satellite to all the local stations. So while all afternoon, we'd had hosts presenting well-targeted programs, we saw all those timeslots disappear. So we began to see ourselves in a network that broadcast from Paris and .. we have the same programs obviously, the schedule has become more uniform across the country.[50]

To some extent, the need for economic efficiency holds true across all media within the Breton system. However, doing this while still maintaining program quality comes from knowledge about the audience. Michel, while not a Breton speaker himself, brought up the important consideration that producing quality media output for the Breton identity is not *only* about the language. He explained that,

> In Nantes, Breton was never actually the language. So the AlterNantes project was never to create a radio 100% in Breton, not even 50%. It was rather, in terms of magazine subjects to investigate the political, economic, and social problems of the Breton region; and also to defend... the reattachment of the Loire-Atlantique, for the sake of coherence; and then to have, here and there, 2,3,4 hours depending on our projects, five hours of Breton per week. It's either people from here who propose a Breton language

[50] The names of Lukian's colleagues at the station have been changed to protect the anonymity of his statement.

> show or it could be shows from other low power radio stations in Brittany that we run, an exchange of programming that we replay. But because of the fact that we're in Nantes where Breton was never spoken, I'd say that it's more beyond the majority of the population, the Breton language is not necessarily that important. So it's more symbolic in a sense that we have links, clearly important links, with the other stations that have a lot of Breton language programming.

Thus while technological and political imperatives are important, knowledge of audience needs is critical to developing quality content from and for the Breton perspective.

*From Volunteerism to Professionalism*

Because of the need to think economically as well as culturally, professionalism has become a theme of increasing importance across all Breton media outlets. Riwal, an editor for *Al Lanv*, gave an example of what becoming more professional can do for a media outlet, saying that state funding...

> ... it also means lots of paper pushing and well we don't really have a lot of time to take care of all that. It's effectively for that reason that we must become professional. That's the second stage. Either we will succeed in employing people who as part of their job description seek funding in a professional manner and we can send in applications, or otherwise in 10 years we will disappear. It's either one or the other. The most striking example even though it's not exactly a magazine, is An Here for the media.. For book publishing. They went from being a militant publishing house to being a professional editor. It's the only way to be able to continue... They exist within the public sphere and have economic importance that permits them to be an important actor..

Many other interview participants also felt that professionalization in terms of better quality content, a better understanding of the media business, a better relationship with the audience, and improved revenue from the media product would help them better respond to the needs of the Breton community. Gurvan explained this saying, "volunteerism works for

a while, but we must have professionals if things are to advance." Michel expanded on this, saying,

> So then, our project, if we can become more professional, if we can begin to have a very high quality sound, we can interest a large audience, even recording studios. And even the really big recording studios, they have some artists that they know won't be able to get a start anywhere except on these slightly marginal alternative stations, but who have a sizeable audience all the same.

Here, Michel sees professionalism as a means of making the Breton language sell as a media product. Brendan echoed Michel's feelings, describing his current productions,

> Our films are still of fairly mediocre quality because we're not professionals, we're still learning our profession. But this process, it's the one the Welsh went through 14 years ago when they decided to create a Welsh language TV station. And it has enormously stimulated film production in Wales, to a point where they have a sizeable body of work. And they created over 4000 jobs directly from the TV station, film production etc. And now, they're at the point where they're not only producing for themselves, but they export to the countries that are the most advanced in the field, that is to say, Japan and the US. They're able to sell their short films, cartoons, animated films, etc. because they're top quality. That's where we hope to be in 10 years or so.

Jakez was also adamant about improving quality, saying,

> The ideal situation would be that the programs would be so attractive that they would actually entice people into maybe learning Breton or wanting to be fluent in Breton in order to watch those programs that look so attractive. The offer is so huge that if you don't have quality, and I have children so I know what they're like, that they'll switch over to anything that's best. So if TV Breizh is not good, doesn't sound good, is not technically good, or doesn't have animations that move as well as the animations in French or English, they won't be bothered, they just won't watch TV Breizh no matter how much you pay for it every month for them.

Not only is professionalization important for the producers in Jakez' view, it is also important from the audience viewpoint as they form the market for Breton media products. With hundreds of media offerings available in French, Breton media content must be able to compete or it will be weeded out due to lack of ability to generate revenue.

Professionalization also means specialization so that media professionals can have the particular knowledge sets to adequately treat a variety of subjects with a level of expertise that allows them to provide interesting commentary on a given topic. Elouan summed up this idea, saying, "...if we were more numerous, perhaps specializing a bit more on what we do best so that we can have greater richness in our program content."

With this specialization, Elouan described some new possibilities that he hoped would open up,

> Perhaps more real news subjects. Because it's very difficult to find for example subjects about the working world because there are so few working people who speak Breton right now. They're mostly retired, so it's very easy to cover patrimonial subjects because there are tons of retired people and associations who are interested in their heritage and who speak Breton. But a topic for example like a strike at the hospital or even just going to the hospital to see how it operates. In a word, to cover more of local life. That isn't to say that heritage is not part of the local reality, but there's a whole part of life that we have trouble covering because we can't find Breton speakers. Perhaps we'll start to find more now... but they're neo-Breton speakers. But these people there are still active members of society, though often when we interview them, it's more concerning their militant activities since the majority of them are militants. And so we talk a bit about that and the Breton language and the fights and the difficulties for the language. We generally interview these people for that, but it's true that we could also go see them for their jobs, and what they do elsewhere.. and perhaps we'll do that when we're not forced to.

The possibility of covering more subjects was important to Paol, too. He noted, "we could do all sorts of things, including silly things. On the tons of channels that exist around the world, one sees dumb game shows, all sorts of things. Everything is possible." In terms of this desire for variety, many other media professionals also had high hopes for what TV Breizh might bring to the Breton media situation. Paol continued, saying,

> I don't know myself what TV Breizh will do. At the beginning, I believe they talked a lot about doing some really great stuff, showing films for example... I say that whatever they do in Breton is positive.

Related to the possibility more and better Breton media products is the idea of developing creative potential within the Breton media. Mathieu spoke of this need,

> To train young creators.. But I don't think creativity can be taught. It exists in relation to life, in relation to an imagination, and in relation to desires. We simply need to give these creators the tools they need. If the tools aren't created, these creators will go elsewhere or have difficulty expressing themselves.

Though professionalism is vital to the economic success of the Breton media (indeed all media operating in open markets), there is a catch because a certain amount of investment is required to achieve this professionalism. Unfortunately, the sore lack of funds is common to all the media that produce Breton language material. The media professionals with whom I spoke attributed this to a variety of factors. First, politics play a very important role in their eyes. Nolwenn was clearly at odds with the government position toward assisting *Bremañ*, saying,

> We live off of our subscriptions, which doesn't give us an extraordinary budget. And we had some assistance from the Council General of the Finistère, which was cut off two years ago because apparently, they don't assist the Breton language press. That is to say that the French language, being the official language of the republic for the last few years, any

> organ edited in a language other than French receives neither state aid nor any other aid.

Mathieu, an independent director who works with the France 3 Breton language shows *Du-Man, Du-Se* and *Red an Amzer*, had a similar view of the limited budget France 3 has for supporting production. He noted,

> We had a very mitigated reception [for our ideas], which in fact made up our minds to create our own production company. We created this company to back projects that we wanted to see done on television because in any case, public television has a tendency to co-produce in the sense that this allows them to use their equipment and personnel more optimally. But since we are in a situation of dependence on television stations in the region which are not regional television stations – France 3 is a national station with a regional window, and so it has a budget, financial means, etc. completely dependent on Paris, the central entity. In fact, we have a station that resembles one in an underdeveloped country.. The stations in the regions, in the sense that they have difficulty obtaining adequate financial means from the center, have a tendency to develop co-production arrangements. Quite often, France 3 supplies the technical equipment, the people, so the labor, and the co producers, the private production companies, go searching for the money from government, and private organisms. That often puts the private producers in very precarious, very delicate financial situations.

As a result, the lack of funding through France 3 hinders the development of a Breton media industry, and at the same time it has stimulated the creation of alternative outlets.

However, Brendan discussed the fact that the creation of the newest Breton media outlet has not remedied the funding problems, saying,

> Then, TV Breizh, it is indeed a hope... but we're a little disappointed because we don't think they have enough means to promote the production of films. You have to pay. We would have hoped. They're starting on the 8th of August. We would have hoped that they'd gather all the Breton

> producers, and they'd say, here's the budget we can offer for co-production with your studios of films that we'll show on our station. But we will start to pay you now so that you can actually start to work. Well, no, No! And what they do buy from us, it is really at a minimal price that has absolutely no connection with what we expected or with what we need to cover production costs. So we're a bit disappointed. It's better than nothing, in fact, since our films will be shown one day. But they're asking for the world, they practically want us to give them our films. What does that accomplish, that's the old economy if they do that. A very small price, 6000F,[51] to show a 52-minute production six times. They're asking us to continue being militants. That's nice, but how will we eat?

Some of this anger comes from the fact that TV Breizh is funded by some of the most well known deep pockets in the French business world and in international media circles as well (Francois Pinault – owner of two major French department store chains, Patrick Le Lay – the CEO of TF1, Rupert Murdoch and Silvio Berlusconi all hold shares of TV Breizh – Allain, 1999). This means that TV Breizh is in quite a difficult situation. On the one hand, many people like Brendan, assume that the wealthy backers mean that the station should have a huge budget, rather than the quite limited 100MF ($13.1 million[52]) they cobbled together to get under way. Janig described the financial difficulties at TV Breizh, noting,

> There are lots of challenges: to prove that a regional private station is viable without state subsidies, and I can tell you that that's not easy. We have all the possible obstacles in lots of areas, economically in particular. We receive no remuneration from TPS or CanalSat. I think we are the only television channel on the satellite system that is not financed by the state that receives no remuneration other than stations like the Shopping Network, commercial stations in any case. That's truly a very very big handicap. We are under financed and under equipped.

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[51] $786 based on a conversion rate of 7.63F/dollar.
[52] This is based on a conversion rate of 7.63F/dollar.

On the other hand, there is a well-documented mistrust of big money in Brittany (cf. le Coadic, 1991). Janig discussed TV Breizh's narrow path, saying

> His [Patrick Le Lay's – TV Breizh CEO] idea has changed a bit. I think that at the beginning, he was all set for a sort of TF1 in Brittany, and then progressively, he came to say that it would be somewhere between TF1 and ARTE, and just recently he said, that it might be ARTE Brittany, which worries me a little, because that doesn't help our cash flow. All that by way of saying that he's let the idea ripen. He also has come to understand Brittany and the expectations of the Bretons a bit better, when he saw what was going on during our PR presentations. For example, last December we made a presentation in Guingamp, and we were expecting it to be a little difficult, because that's truly the heart of Brittany, and on top of that they're rather, they vote mostly socialist, communist, there's still a communist core up that way. We expected to run into it head on, because we're the big nasty capitalists sweeping into town, and in fact we had some very interesting discussions with the people in the room, and that was good for them, because we let them know what we were trying to do. And it was also good for us, and I think for Patrick Le Lay who had the nerve to step into that situation... I think that changed his idea about the project.

TV Breizh must seek not only to establish itself among cable television stations; it must also conquer public impressions of its funding sources in order to gain the support of the Breton people, its primary audience.

Thinking about the relationship between France 3 and its new competition, Aurèlie anticipated the influence that TV Breizh might have on the existing media offerings,

> The more surprising thing is that I was discussing with some people from France 3 last week, and I was asking, "Do you think there is some fear or competition or whatever?" And one fellow said that the more incredible thing is that no one is caring, so I don't know. If I was in charge of a television station, I think that knowing that another channel will start would be of some interest for me. But France 3 is very centralized as is everything in France so Rennes has a very limited power, but even though it's exciting. You have been doing something for years and years on your own and now

> there is somebody else.. and a comparison will exist... at least it's exciting, but I guess they are not too happy about it.

At the France 3 West bureau, the arrival of TV Breizh was not necessarily viewed negatively though. Brenda who works with *Red an Amzer* and *Du-Mañ, Du-Se*, noted that,

> TV Breizh is a positive development – there will be more Breton programming and that's already good news. Competition is also a plus. The public service needs to think about the role played by regional languages; the public has a right to quality programming because of the license fee they have to pay, and we can expect more from public television.

At France 3 headquarters in Paris, the station's administration was starting to take notice though and echoed Brenda's positive outlook as well. Frédérique, who works on regional program coordination out of the Paris office, said,

> I think it's very very good news for France 3 to have some sort of competition, because that will permit us to clarify a bit more what we're here for and to better direct the resources we have toward the things the private sector can't provide.

*A Limited Presentation*

Finding new alternatives, like TV Breizh is a first step toward drawing more funding toward Breton language media, but the current lack of funds also translates to the impossibility of covering issues and events beyond the local area in which a given station operates. Lukian, summarized this idea, saying,

> Sometimes it's a lack of means. It's true that we don't move around. We don't have the possibility of doing that. I think it's worth more to have a different sound, a different recording for each news hole.

Radio Kreiz Breizh, though it had only been in operation for a short time, had the same problem. Elouan noted that,

> ... I think we've had a bit of contact with some stations in Wales, but it hasn't gone very far... Already, we've had lots

> of work just setting up the station. As a salaried employee, I've been content to do my shows, but they [the station's management] don't have that expectation or the money to put toward outside relations. Maybe in the future it will be more of a priority.

Mathieu, a director, was quite concerned about the fact that this restricted coverage also had further implications beyond just limiting the amount of information available to the Breton speaking community.

> I found that in working in the very restricted atmosphere of the Breton language programs, because it's truly a very small space, nothing at all – there's not much in the way of subject matter produced – 80 hours per year [the projected time allotted to Breton language programming for 1999 – actually 68 hours were produced] is absolutely derisory, and I've always tried within this space to come up with projects that were cultural documentaries. I stood up for the idea that one can speak about anything in Breton, one could just as easily describe the life of a painter as interview a peasant. One could also easily talk about things that concern places other than Brittany. One could very easily talk about Australia in Breton. And so I tried to escape what I found to be a very simplistic programming schema that consisted of TV in Breton, with Bretons, for Bretons on the subject of Breton. That was the tendency with the Breton language programming. That is to say that the programs talked about the Breton language with people who spoke Breton, in Breton and for Bretons. It was a truly self-absorbed vision. It's not that Breton will become an international language, but that Bretons could have something to say about this language, about this culture, I'd say in the concert of language and cultures on the planet.

Covering more topics by itself is not the only problem though. Jakez added that,

> There are the institutional obstacles that exist on France 3, which means that there are so few programs and they're on at the worst time of the day and the week. So that's one type of problem. You know, in order to have a public, you have to make sure that the public is there at home ready to watch television. But of course they won't because they think the audience is too small for that.

Paol concurred, saying,

> I'd also say that it's too bad that there are only two shows on TV. One, the magazine program [*Du Man, Du Se*] and the other, which is a sort of talk show, a debate [*Red an Amzer*], actually something that for me is more suited to the radio in fact. But we need to do lots of other things. Several years ago, people who were working in radio and television, in French and Breton too, imagined a decentralized radio system, but that could work for television as well. That is to say a base, like Rennes where all the production took place, and where the administration was, and then to have stations in St. Brieuc, Morlaix, Quimper, Vannes, or Lorient and Carhaix for example in central Brittany in order to avoid leaving people out, but for the moment that's just a utopic vision.

The minimal presence of the Breton language in the media has made TV Breizh a hope for many people inside the media industry and outside it as well. However, Nicolas, in discussing his work producing content for the new station, noted that even TV Breizh faces economic challenges that threaten to dilute the presence of the Breton language, saying,

> The programs on which we're working right now are in French. Breton is a drop in the bucket. It will be a few words at the beginning of a show and a few words at the end, and then when an interview subject speaks Breton, we'll run the interview in Breton and subtitle it. But TV Breizh is asking us for programs in French, that's clear. TV Breizh is a commercial station financed almost exclusively through advertising, partnerships, and sponsoring too, but principally through advertising, and so they have to reach an audience. They'll have a little bit of Breton because that's their plan, that's clear, but at the same time they have to find an audience. As for the public, we know well that the vast majority doesn't speak Breton. So, they must have French programs as well. There, it's sort of uneasy, because a lot of Breton speakers have been hired by the channel, including by us here. The guy across the way here, who is our director in chief for the TV Breizh projects; he's an old France 3 employee who worked for the Breton language shows, and we're asking him to work in French.

Coupled with this problem is the necessity for more diverse programming, especially in the public service media. Per stated, "[with such a limited offering] it's a very narrow path between being too local and not local enough, this is the problem that afflicts France 3 all over France." Lukian also noted that this is especially important for the Breton speaking audience, because as noted in Chapter 4 nearly everyone already speaks French and can thus understand the French language programming.

> Here the editor in chief, he'd like to see subjects in French and then the same thing repeated in Breton. And me, I've always defended a different point of view. Let's try for a little more diversity because we're working for people who are already French speakers.. We should find different interview subjects, and above all different perspectives. That's very important.

Brenda explained some of the reasons for this focus, saying, "France 3 is not rich enough to produce all its own content, so there's a system of co-productions in place."

Mikael added,

> We also have to try to be in phase with the station, which means that we needed a show that's typical of the time-slot that we've been given. Also, to reach a wider audience, we changed to subjects that rely more on images, and we've begun to subtitle them as well, since 1995-6.[53] The subtitling was added in response to the demands of our non-Breton speaking viewers. With the subtitling, we doubled our audience from 8-10% up to 15-18%. Some people claim that the subtitling bothers them, but I'm curious to see what happens with TV Breizh, which will have the possibility of having two sound channels.

Mikael also said that France 3's Breton language offering has, "no children's programming because of the time slot." Here he showed that while he works for a regional branch of France 3, he feels compelled to offer roughly the same kind of programming that

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[53] France 3 has subtitled *Du-Man Du-Se* and *Red an Amzer* since 1996 (Guyot, Ledo Andión, & Michon, 2000).

the other regions of France 3 offer at given hours of the day. In this sense, while France 3 West is regional, it must conform to a national model, which hinders its ability to truly cater to regional televisual needs.

*Branching Out to Represent the Modern Breton Identity*

Nicolas, a producer, was also disappointed by the limited program offering on public television. He said,

> The offering [on France 3] is all the same quite poor. We want to use Breton to do something else: it's for that that we worked on *Brezhoneg en Toull*, Breton in Prison. In general, what's done on the France 3 West programs, and many people have offered this criticism, everyone is beautiful, everyone is kind, and when people speak Breton, they're very nice. And there, we found two convicts in a prison... one who killed his wife and the other locked up for rape. These aren't very respectable citizens, far from it. And we learn a bit about their story in the film, but we don't spend a lot of time on that. What interests us is how they reconstruct their lives today, building among other things on their roots, their culture, and their language. But from the start, these aren't good little Bretons who speak Breton, they're criminals. It was interesting for us to work on something that one doesn't see very often, since it's mostly a consensus around the language and then nice things. There's no controversy, everything's a bit flat. So this is the sort of thing we wanted to do.

Gurvan also mentioned an extra consideration because of the fact that his show is heard on public service radio. He was the only producer to acknowledge Gallo, the third language spoken in Brittany. He said,

> We can't forget the Gallic identity which is perhaps less militant. It's less different from French culture. Mostly a language difference. It's true that Gallo is a little like French, but there is an identity in Gallo country. There is a very strong culture too. It's true that we need to develop that on the public service radio station too. I don't always get the impression that we respond to the expectations of all the audience. The Breton culture is better known, but we cannot

> forget the Upper Breton traditions. Even if I'm a Breton language militant, they deserve a voice too. Since it's a 2-hour show, I force myself to balance my musical programming between music from Upper Brittany and music from Lower Brittany. Since the show is primarily broadcast in Upper Brittany, it's the show for Breton speakers in Upper Brittany, or the Brittophones as we say now. But I'd say that 80% of the audience in Upper Brittany and Ille-et-Vilaine that listens to my show don't understand Breton, but listen for the music, for the atmosphere, for the musical selection, because there are very few shows that are this specific. So I force myself to play songs in Gallo too, from upper Breton traditions, traditional music and even contemporary, but from Upper Brittany. Let's say that I try to play as many Gallo songs as Breton songs. On the other hand, all my interviews are in Breton during the show, except at the end where I re-announce all the festoù-noz in French. But throughout the 2-hour block, I only speak Breton.

Gurvan points out that while the public service media are supposed to cater to the whole range of groups within society, the reality is that this does not always happen.

*Finding Sources*

Providing diversity of subject matter is however not always simply a matter of station politics. Elouan added another consideration that compounds the difficulty of the Breton media professional's job:

> Generally we think about it [providing a variety of subjects] but sometimes it's very difficult to find Breton speakers. It's not as easy as in French. With some topics, sometimes we have to work with what we have, and sometimes we're not completely satisfied with what we're able to do but we don't have too much choice either.. We still have to report the story. Generally.. as one begins to cultivate more contacts, it becomes easier to find people. Even so, we try to work on subjects that can teach the audience something. Me, in any case, I truly worry about doing something, because anyways, since there are practically no Breton language programs, people will listen anyways, the people who are really motivated by the Breton language. Already the Breton speaking audience wouldn't make that effort if they didn't like it, they wouldn't listen. What's more, it's not a good way to

> work. The ideal is that they learn as much from listening to a Breton language program as from a French language program. That's very difficult, because we have very limited funds and personnel above all. And we're also obliged to report on everything whereas we're not experts in all of them. That's what was in the minds of the people who created this station, to have a quality station, not necessarily to produce tons of programming hours, but perhaps to do less and make it something that people could listen to and take an interest in. That isn't to say that all of our programs are magnificent. Far from it, because we're also learning on the job, and there are very few professionals to help us. Me, I know some people at RBO who comment. But little by little, I think we're progressing and our programs become more and more interesting, and little by little, the station gains a reputation and thus an audience. But it's difficult since we don't have a way to measure our audience to see if we've really reached our goal there.

However, learning the ropes, and finding interview subjects is a complicated task.

Elouan further commented on the difficulty of finding interviewees:

> The hardest part is finding Breton speakers, because it's difficult to find people who will give an interview in Breton. There are two principal types of refusals because there are people who are perhaps around 60-70 years old and who actually have a fairly limited Breton in fact. These are the people we call "terminal speakers" who often have doubts about their capacity to speak Breton on the radio and because of that, they don't want anyone to hear them because they think their Breton isn't good enough. Or then again, they could speak very well and it would sound fine, but they don't want to speak. There are other refusals, these are the people who speak Breton very well, were brought up speaking it, generally they're around 80 years old, and they don't want to talk either because of the shame of speaking Breton, and that comes out of their education. It's right around this age that people have a very hard time understanding why there's so much interest in Breton now and not in the past. So most of the refusals come from people around this age. The ideal in fact, are the people between 70 and 80, they generally speak Breton well, but that also depends on the region, because the language shift didn't always take place at the same time in every area, but over all, it's these people who speak Breton well and also want to change their minds, and so who don't

> refuse to speak as often. The only refusals that I've had personally have been people who were over 80. At least refusals because of the shame of speaking Breton. On the other hand, it's quite often that people around age 60 or just a bit younger say that they don't speak Breton well enough for the radio. That happens quite frequently, but the problem is that this will happen more and more often because we'll start to have more and more Breton speakers in this category. It's that now, more and more, we have neo-Breton speakers who learned from night classes or through the bilingual schools. I'm a bit reserved, but not everyone has the same point of view. Personally, and this is not at all the policy of Radio Kerne, I don't much like [interviewing people who've learned Breton through school] because it's often Breton that's generally quite difficult to understand, for the traditional Breton speaking audience lets say, and it's far from being perfect. There are always syntactical problems, or flagrant pronunciation errors, but that's normal because it's a language they've learned like me when I speak English. It can't be as good as people who are native speakers. Since we still have the opportunity to interview native speakers, I feel like we ought to profit from their knowledge because they'll be a lot harder to find in 10 or 20 years, and at that moment we'll have to make do with whoever's around. But people who've learned Breton [in school] necessarily have a lower quality Breton. That's not to say that I refuse to interview neo-Breton speakers though. I do it because there are some who have very interesting things to say and it's important in any case to give them a voice and then that's also part of the reality of the Breton language today. The majority of the Breton speakers are still native speakers, so it's normal to give them more of a voice. As we go along, that will change, and for us, the content of our programming will change as well.

Berc'hed agreed with Elouan saying, "The problem that exists, is trying to find someone who can speak about a given subject."

Gurvan had the same problem (though further accentuated by the fact that all the Breton speakers in Upper Brittany are either transplants or learned the language through the educational system). He said, "Breton speakers, they're around. But finding someone who actually has something to say about a specific event, that's not always easy."

Television does not escape from this difficulty either. As Paol said,

> You have to show them that you respect them. For that, it's important to speak to them in French first, because in that way you show them that you're on an equal level. When you're not a family member or someone close, you're automatically suspect. [I have to convince them that they have ] something to teach me. You have to show them that you're from their world. Often even people who have a particular profession and who are native Breton speakers have difficulty speaking in Breton because at work they don't use Breton but speak French.

Paol continued, noting that this is one factor that is unique to minority languages,

> There's also, in my line of work, a sort of valorization of the Breton language. That is to say, that I prefer to have native Breton speakers, people who speak Breton well. Already that's a weird question because it's a question that would never get asked. Someone who works in television in the US would never say, "oh, I wanted to do a story on such and such a topic, but the people I needed to talk to didn't speak English well enough."

Per, while acknowledging the difficulties of working with a limited population of Breton speakers, had a more positive view of the pool of possible interview subjects. He said,

> Lots of neo-Breton speakers in the working world are highly educated and have a fairly good accent. They make a real effort... Also older people who speak Breton every day they also have a good accent. It's only those who are a bit disconnected from the Breton speaking environment and who don't speak it very often who are difficult to understand. Sometimes though, even they work out all right since the interviews are very short, but we try to avoid that if it's possible.

Brenda also felt the importance of including newer Breton speakers as interviewees. She said,

> For me, it's important to let the entire Breton speaking world have a voice. It's important to let everyone speak. If we wait

> until everyone speaks Breton perfectly, we could be waiting 200 years.

She felt that waiting for new generations of Breton speakers to "get up to speed" with their language might turn off young people to the language if they saw its speakers as an elitist group who shunned those without a high level of mastery.

Per also said, "you have to find Breton speaking interview subjects, and often it's workers rather than bosses or directors. That's a plus though because we try to be a mirror of the country by showing its functionality and its dysfunctionality." By this he meant that often workers are more frank in their discussion of problems than are management. As a result, speaking to younger Bretons who are members of the workforce and who are perhaps not the spokespeople or leaders sought out by French media professionals can give Breton media content a more working-class perspective than its French language counterpart.

*Finding an Audience*

The limited Breton population is also significant in terms of finding an audience for these media. This is especially crucial in the case of television. Jakez spoke about the intersection of technology with the geography of the Breton speaking population, saying

> I'd say that the target public, at least statistically, I'm talking about the Breton programs, which will be only a small minority of the programs on TV Breizh, to be aware of that. Most of their programs will be in French and just in French. But for the Breton programs, the target audience would be the native speakers of Breton, or the everyday speakers of Breton, and those people are living in the countryside or in small towns that wouldn't have cable. They wouldn't be among the wealthiest, and so they wouldn't have the satellite or the multiplex, and so I'm not sure whether they'll buy that. You'll have to ask [the TV Breizh staff] because they actually did market research, and they know themselves who will be watching TV Breizh basically. And I don't think it's the 60-year-old retired farmer that'll watch TV Breizh. I'd say it'll be

> more the middle class big city or smaller city middle aged family.

Finding an audience is also a concern for France 3, as it must compete with private stations for the advertising portion of its budget. As a result, Mikael discussed the difficulty of placing the Breton language news, *An Taol Lagad*, within the France 3 schedule, saying

> ...the choice we made, was indeed to show the Breton news only on the western half of Brittany, that is to say, essentially the Breton speaking zone. There was a bit of give and take, because before, it's true that we had *An Taol Lagad* all across the Breton region, in all four departments. But our time slot was very poorly placed. Around noon, that is to say, much too early to give us a very interesting audience. And it was also right at the start of the programming block, that is to say, right at the start of the regional time slot because it was unthinkable to show a Breton news program across the whole region at the time when one would reach the maximum number of viewers. For example in Rennes, here we would have, actually in Brittany generally speaking, I think that if we had done that, we would have seen a very rapid loss of viewers because those who don't know Breton wouldn't have a clear interest in watching a Breton language news program. So the formula we imagined, was in part to integrate the Breton news into the rest of the news programming, which wasn't exactly the case before, and at the same time to quit showing it except for in the western part of the region, which allowed us to put it at a more favorable time... favorable, because in the west of Brittany, people are more used to living with the Breton language, they hear it around them, and so they're not shocked by a Breton news program. In Rennes it's less easy to explain, and so we don't see a rapid flight by the viewers by showing the news at 12:20 or 12:25 pm. So it was sort of a double choice in some sense. In exchange for better placement within the regional programming block, we decided to restrict the broadcast to the Breton speaking zone, and so the news can be seen, *An Taol Lagad* can be seen, not only in the Finistère, but also in the western half of the Côtes d'Armor and a large part of the Morbihan.

Finding an audience is a problem for France 3's other Breton language programming as well. Paol acknowledged that the Breton programming is not shown during peak TV viewing hours, though he believed that,

> ... Breton speakers are accustomed to having their programming at hare-brained hours, and once they've figured out when the shows are on, they adjust and are able to watch the shows. So, in television scheduling terms, you can say that it's good, it's not good, it would be better elsewhere. Now one could say that 5:00 pm Saturday afternoon is also teatime. People have gone shopping or out to wash their car or to visit uncle Frank, and they're returning home at about that time, at least during the winter, they turn on the TV, have a coffee, and watch the show. And this is the era of the VCR too.

Gurvan talked about the scheduling of his radio show in upper Brittany, saying,

> The show is broadcast Thursday evenings between 7:20 pm and 9:20 pm, so just after the France Inter news. The same France Inter news that is broadcast on almost all the Radio France stations. And then [my show] is rebroadcast Saturdays, from noon to 2:00 pm on Radio Blue, the medium wave station... It's not too poorly placed, but 7:20-9:20 puts me in direct competition with television all the same.

Jules discussed the scheduling of Breton programs and the fact that Breton language airtime on public radio has declined as subsidiary problem to the other concerns of the station.

> They always talk about the equilibrium between the two languages on this station today. But the station starts at 6:00 am and goes off the air at 10 pm, there are two and a half hours of Breton in that time and they talk about equilibrium. That's well balanced. That is to say that between 8:30 am and 6:30 pm one will not hear a single Breton word. That's 10 hours. That's balance to Radio France...[the removal of the noontime Breton language show] happened sort of accidentally. I do not think there was a real desire to remove the Breton program at that time there. I believe that it was a stupid oversight by a guy who did not think about what he was doing. That is to say he signed a contract with someone

> who asked for a raise, and to give that raise, he had to give this person a half-hour more on the air. So he extended his program. "Oh shit, there was Breton there. Oh well, we'll put the Breton a bit later." So the first thought was the raise for the guy who asked for it, who was at the time one of the hosts, I wouldn't call him a star, but one of the shining lights on the station. And later, the Breton program was accommodated, moved a bit later. There was no real desire to take away Breton programming then. It was, "oh shit, I screwed up, and now it's too late"... I don't believe for a minute there was a policy against the Breton language. It's worse than that. It's dramatically worse. It's indifference, so much so that they don't even know that it exists anymore. It's off in a corner. It's late in the evening, it's worse than a policy against, this indifference. Ignorance.

Because Breton language programming garners a smaller audience, it has been subordinated to audience concerns for other programming as well. While this relegation to odd hours makes it difficult to reach the Breton speaking audience, it does have a positive side. Lukian described this point, saying,

> I think that in Breton, we've kept a bit more editorial liberty.. in content and the way we broadcast it too. [in the French language programs on the radio] they consider that the radio product is a bit like on television, for people with a sloped forehead, not too intelligent. Lets stay at the strict minimum, a very basic radio..

Jules agreed, saying,

> I believe it is not by chance. I can't completely explain why. Yes! There is a clear reason. It's that the management of this bilingual station never was bilingual. The first director was, but since then, not even a little bit... Thank heavens, the Breton language shows were never really affected by this phenomenon because of the management's ignorance we have been left very free to do what we want as long as we stay within the framework, but inside that framework, whatever we want.

In addition to scheduling problems, the variety of dialects and regional differences in the spoken language creates another challenge for finding an audience for Breton language

media. Per mentioned that this is one of his concerns, saying, that *An Taol Lagad* uses "a local Breton since the Finistère is the zone on which the program reports." He continued, saying, "However, our speech is standardized a bit, to avoid multiplying obstacles to comprehension, and it's important to speak with a good clear accent."

Paol agreed with Per about the standardization, noting that this has led to some Breton speakers having even less of a voice than their peers,

> TV for years, always in fact, has already forgotten one dialect, the Breton from the area around Vannes.. simply because at the beginning, we worked out of Brest. And later out of Rennes for the production process. Radio too, was in Brest, and so when you listened to Radio programs on FR3 before 1982, they talked a lot about Brest and the area around it. Now the radio is in Quimper, so one hears a lot about Quimper and the 30 kilometers around Quimper. I believe it's human stupidity, or a lack of time to go there, because for the same job, you have to drive an hour extra. That's as true for producers, the people who think up the shows, who often come from the northern part of Brittany and not so much from the south, and as a result, they know their own area better. So it's clear that they have more contact, more understanding, more program ideas about the country they know. So it's true that we have a tendency to privilege what can be found north of the line between Rennes and Brest, and that's too bad. There are places where we never go in central Brittany, around Rostrenen. It's rare that we go and do a show from there.

This problem is also related to the fact that media, by their highly visible position in the public sphere tend to set standards for language. Jakez commented on the variety of dialects and the fact that the media are obligated to choose from among them, saying,

> I don't see that as a problem because as you know, television has a screen and has pictures that can help people understand a dialect that they would not normally understand fully on the radio where they would have no other help. And as you said yourself, television has to have a wider, because it's so expensive, has to have a wider broadcasting area than a cheaper radio, unless it's a very cheap TV like TV Brest or

> TV Angers or whatever like that which is not what we want you know. But I think that the dialect varieties are very much in the people's heads. They've been made to think that they can't understand the dialect that's next door, but in fact they do understand a lot more than they say. And I'm saying that because I've reported all across Brittany for 10 years through the medium of Breton and I was speaking my variety of Breton, I was not speaking all the varieties of Breton to the various people and I always managed to get quality interviews with them about any sort of subjects from north to south, to east to west.

For Jakez, understanding the local particularities is more a perceived problem than a real one. However, Gurvan qualified this, saying, "television is a vector for unifying a language, even if there are specific ways of speaking Breton, like the Vannetais dialect or the Leon dialect. But we still need to hold onto its richness."

Mikael also believes in holding onto that richness, mainly for comprehension purposes, saying,

> the Goéland School around 1925-1930 set the written standard, but it is a sort of sterile constructed, Breton. This Breton has not been imposed on all speakers, only those who've learned it as a second language for the most part.

As a result, native speakers often have difficulty understanding this new, academic variety of Breton.

Whether promoting an academic form of the language or not, Lukian saw a positive side to the normative role played by the media. He mentioned that radio,

> ... becomes a bit of a vector for new words sometimes, of neologisms, because with Breton too.. here one gets into the linguistic aspect of things.. there are different schools that overlap a bit, the schools that consider Breton as a language in the process of dying out with all the mixing and borrowing that are happening, and then there's a school that is a bit more dynamic.. that is fighting so that the language can continue to survive.. and can, like all other languages invent neologisms instead of bastardizing itself. So one sees

> interviewees now, who, I'm thinking of the president of the Agricultural ministry.., or his assistant or others, who call sometimes when they have to go speak Breton somewhere, they call me or one of my colleagues to ask, "hey, how can one say such and such a thing without just using the French word with a Breton accent." And that is an evolution, and there are others who even integrate new words, telephone, one can say telephone in Breton, but we also say pellgomz. So people are starting to say pellgomz. One realizes that radio succeeds in doing certain things that are fairly ordinary in fact.

A problem related to the plethora of accents and differences among Breton speakers is the relationship to French. Unique to television among the media examined is the question of language transfer. The Breton language press is sufficiently specialized that translation is not much of a question, and radio obviously is not subject to the pressures of translation. However, on television, the search for a broad audience brings up the question of how to access those viewers who might be interested in a Breton language program but who don't speak the language.

Brenda, herself a native Breton speaker said, "subtitles are distracting, especially for those who understand Breton at a high level. We could be broadcasting in an original version first." Her statement implied that it would be fine to show these programs in a subtitled version at a later point for the French speaking audience. She also mentioned the possibility that has become available with digital television of having two sound channels – one for the Breton original and another for a version dubbed into French as is the plan for TV Breizh.

The constraints placed by the need for language translation, combined with the lack of money and time devoted to the Breton language restrict the ways in which it can be used for promoting the Breton identity. Implied in the concept of language translation is the idea

that the majority of the audience does not speak Breton. This in turn, means that by translating programming, producers are reinforcing the minority status of the language. These problems are compounded by the fact that media workers are only just beginning to move from volunteerism to professionalism.

**Needs for the Future of the Breton Media System**

Taking these limits on the Breton language media system into account, media professionals recognized several ways to improve the content they produced, and its role in Breton life. Nolwenn, herself part of the *Bremañ* team said,

> For me, the press is very important. That there's the Internet, that's very nice, that there's television, that's very nice, that there's the radio, perfect, but I think we'll always need a written tool. For me a paper is something more important perhaps, because whether on the radio, TV, or Internet, it's all very ephemeral. That is to say that one can swallow the news, understand it poorly, interpret it in an anarchic or fantastic manner, and because of that, reproduce something that isn't well thought out in our minds. And at least with the press, there's a written record to fall back on which to me is worth its weight in gold. We can advance in the world of the 3rd millennium, and paper is still something very very important. I hope it always stays that way. Obviously, people are trying to "go paperless," but I believe we need, speaking in human terms, to read in any case, and to have something in one's hands. That hasn't stopped *Bremañ* from also having created a website, because what is nice about the Internet, and obviously everyone is saying this, it's that one can reach out to the whole world. And in light of our financial means.. our paper isn't even sold in newspaper kiosks, because we don't have the means. So we gain subscriptions by word of mouth, at stands se set up [at festivals and cultural gatherings] and through classes. It's a network that's a bit limited at the end of the day...
>
> And it's clear that we need a daily as well. But a Breton language daily, for that it will be much more difficult to have, because we need a readership. People are lazy in their reading habits when they don't read every day. That is to say one can hear and watch images, one can listen to the radio, and even

> if one doesn't understand everything, one gets the gist. But reading requires a bit of extra effort. And so for a readership, I think it's important to have a daily, that's true, but we must give ourselves extraordinary means both financially and in terms of human resources in order to do it.

She sees providing a daily record of happenings written in Breton as a way to actively connect Bretons with their language and identity.

Becoming better integrated into Breton life is also important to the producers with whom I spoke. At TV Breizh, there is a hope that the station will be able to take on a more mainstream role in Breton society in the future. Janig discussed this, saying,

> I'd like the station to be broadcast terrestrially so that everyone could receive it, that's clear. I'd also like to be a bit more financially comfortable, and to have a few more employees to work on the project. And as for my ambitions that are still just dreams, in the coming years, if this works, on a concrete level, I think we'll start to do news one day or another, because if this works, we cannot remain without any daily news. And also, I'd really like to start a soap-opera... a popular one like the British know how to do, like *Coronation Street*, even the Welsh have *Pobol Y Cwm*... I would like to put together, in Brittany, a show like that, it could be a half-hour or an hour per week... a popular show but one that follows characters from Brittany. From a little village between the land and the sea, on the coast, because there are in Brittany, characters that are so so different diverse in all sorts of colors, funny or tragic. I think there's truly material for a good scriptwriter... there's stuff for doing magnificent things. We have a sublime countryside, we have incredible characters. I think there's truly material that could make habitual viewers and that at the same time would be very Breton in the sense, with the idea, that it would not be a Parisian thing. One sees so many things centered on Paris or the suburbs... All that exists outside of Paris and its suburbs has a very very small place on television and I would like to have a fictional program that does that. And one day if we can do what the big national French stations do and finance films, that would be fantastic, but we're not yet there.

Others agreed. Mathieu, speaking more generally, said, "we must learn to take part in a dialog with the whole planet in a sincere and true manner, in terms of who we are. We are a little country, but there are things we know how to do, there is a culture particular to this country." Brenda added, "language is the means of communication; we need to speak about everything in Breton. France 3 shows speak about Brittany above all. We need to be more international." In other words, Breton language media offerings need to become part of an information flow within society.

Thus, a greater presence for the Breton language would help contribute toward making it a more natural part of Breton life. Bretons need to be able to find their language anywhere within the flow of information rather than being forced to seek out a small set of specific times or places in which they can find their language in the media. Nolwenn looked toward radio for this, saying,

> I think we must have a Breton language radio network... for me, the radio is the first thing most people do before reading the newspaper even. And so if there was a Breton language radio everywhere from Nantes to Brest, for me that would be an extraordinary bet. They're trying to do it by satellite, through a satellite network. I don't know if they'll succeed one day, but the project is already there.

She also felt that TV Breizh could start toward this process of getting people accustomed to finding Breton at all hours of the day, saying,

> Perhaps it's a private station, but it's the only station that will propose Breton language shows at all hours of the day. I do not know what it will be yet, because I can't tell what the difference will be between what they've promised and the reality of what will be done. I want to believe they will succeed. For the moment we saw the report they presented to the Regional Council and there was not a single word of Breton in their press release or in the speech made by the director. But for me, TV Breizh is a hope, because they'll

> have shows in Breton for children, and the children need just that as another link together with family and school.

One of the major problems caused by the fact that their language is so isolated within the media offerings available to the Bretons is that they are much more susceptible to being cut off from information they need. Though rare, Youenn described a situation in which he was censored for his broadcasts. This case, while one of only two during his career, was the event that made him decide to leave the media.

> It was in 1974, it was an extremely agitated time in Brittany. These were the years the FLB multiplied its bombings. But there was a bit of an uprising at that time. There were numerous bombings, but that was just part of the context. In 1974, the FLB, just put on the Index, I nevertheless mentioned that a support group for parents of prisoners was created in Brest and Quimper. It was the equivalent of what's now called Skoazell Breizh, which is a movement run by Pierre Loque, that tries to put together funds to pay for lawyers to help families of people held in temporary confinement. All of them were released later... in 74, in my weekly TV show, I mentioned the creation of this support committee for families of political prisoners at the time. The news, in my mind, did not constitute anything seditious in the sense that it was printed in the daily too. The daily notified me, and me, I gave the information without commentary, just the information like that, but I wasn't live that day. It was filmed. And watching the show later, I noticed that, as they say, I'd been sugar coated. I wanted to have an explanation from [the regional director]. I said, "If it's like that, I'm going to take my marbles and go home."

Youenn explained why being censored like this was an even greater problem for a Breton language journalist than for a French language journalist, saying, "if a journalist in Paris is sanctioned, it goes almost unnoticed, but here in Brittany, since my show was the only one, being taken off the air corresponded to suppressing all the Breton programming."

Creating a true flow of Breton language information would help avoid the potential for silencing this voice that is already pushed to the margins of French society. Currently,

Breton media producers, though proud of and committed to learning about themselves and the rest of the world from their own point of view, need adequate funding and training to build their ability to represent their identity within the media. With these tools, they could then present a modern picture that takes into account the complexity of Breton life in the 21st century. This is however somewhat circular reasoning, as developing a flow of Breton language information requires investment, and investment requires the possibility for a return. To find ways to promote Breton language media formats and schedules that can create this possibility, those working in the industry need to consider their audience.

# CHAPTER 8
# BEYOND FOLKLORE AND COSTUMES
# BRETON MEDIA AUDIENCES

Media professionals discussed their goals for improving the content they produced in terms of better promoting the Breton identity. Among these objectives were more diversity of content and format. In order to achieve these ends, one of the most important concerns is learning about the audiences for Breton language media. Understanding the Breton media audiences is a crucial first step toward integrating media use with the promotion of the Breton language and identity. This chapter takes a look at the Breton media audience from the point of view of the professionals creating content and from the perspective of the audience members themselves.

## The audience as seen from the eyes of producers

Because they lack the funds for this type of research, Breton media outlets actually know very little about their audiences. As a result, most of these media operate based on the assumptions of the media professionals themselves. This problem afflicts the whole media system to some extent. FBBI journalist, Lukian, described his audience in terms of how the Breton speaking community is viewed in public life, saying,

> In 1980 when I was starting out in the [radio] business, one interviewed mostly older people because we thought that that was the audience we were addressing. And we've figured out since then, that was 20 years ago too, that the listeners, at least the Breton speaking ones aren't necessarily old folks, but there are people in their 40's and even younger. All things considered, we had a poor understanding of the audience. And so we had to rethink our selection of interviewees. We look for active members of society and not retirees. But often one heard that, I remember on old deputy (government official) who said "Now I'll speak in Breton, for my little old folks" - read, my constituents, the old folks in retirement homes or at home who vote for their meal-ticket. I'm going to speak Breton for them. And this politico there, changed

> his speech when he found out that Breton, which he spoke very well, could have another value too, other than what he considered at that moment. That is to say, he discovered that Breton was a part of the cultural heritage, his heritage, and the history of Brittany, we can even say of Europe if we expand things a bit. He began to reflect on the subject in a new way.

Thus recognizing that the Breton audience, like all audiences, is heterogeneous can help integrate the Breton language into a media flow. RBG, the local low-power radio station in the Morbihan, also envisions a younger audience for its programming. Enora said,

> The morning show, *Liv an Amzer*, we imagine that the audience is a bit younger. Our idea then is that the show from 10:30 to 12:30 is more for the old folks, but at the same time, there are lots of young people that listen to it. They listen because there's pure Vannetais Breton, Breton speakers from birth. They [the younger audience members] want to learn Breton.

And Berc'hed, her colleague, added that, "the morning and evening shows, then target a younger audience, but not too much younger. These aren't shows for teen-agers. It [our audience] is rather ages 25-70, 80, 90, in fact."

Gurvan envisions a wide-ranging audience for his radio program in Upper Brittany as well, saying

> There's not necessarily a typical audience member. Yes there is, it's someone who likes Breton music, because 80% of the music played on the program is Breton. Setu [that said], I use a fairly dynamic language, I'm not a neo-Breton speaker, but I have a quite rapid rate of speech and also there are lots of students in Rennes. So I'd say that the listeners range in age between 10 and 70. but there are quite a few young people in my opinion. There are lots of young listeners because there are lots of young people interested in Breton music. All you have to do is go to a fest-noz in Rennes on a Thursday night, and you'll see that the average age is around 21-22 years old.

However, even the local low-power radio stations sometimes suffer from a split conception of their audience. Like Enora, Berc'hed, and Gurvan, Elouan has a fairly young conception of his audience, but when asked if new technological advances like the Internet could help his program reach more people beyond the broadcast radius, he said,

> We didn't think that was such a hot idea, because it's very very expensive. I think it cost more than 150 thousand francs for the first year, a grant from the Council General of the Finistère. And for a rather limited audience I think. There are people who will go to the site, that's for certain, but maybe a thousand people. The Breton speaking audience interested in that is really limited. It's nice to be able to do that kind of thing, but our objective, right from the start is to reach the maximum number of people locally. And first off, to have a quality station, to have the technical means for working in a network with the others [local Breton radios] and we would have liked to have seen this money go toward that instead. The grants from the Council General of the Finistère are rather small as it is. And they gave more for this project than for the actual operation of the stations in fact. That's the reservation we have here; since it's being done, all the better, and we're taking part in any case. It's a good thing, but we don't think it's a priority. What's more, the Internet audience is a young urban group, in fact the contrary of the Breton speaking audience.

Here Elouan, while conscious of the demographics of the typical Internet user in France, also takes into account the current demographics of the Breton language itself (see Chapter 4). In some ways, hoping for a young audience is important in terms of building for the future. On the other hand, Elouan is also thinking of the present, where most of his listeners, at least statistically, will be over 60.

Mikael sees the France 3 audience mostly as the older generations who learned Breton at home. "Our typical audience is 60 plus. There are some young people, but not many, mostly adolescents and up."

Because of the statistical data that show Breton speakers as primarily those over 60, much of the content across all media is geared toward this age group. However, maintaining an audience means adapting to the new generations that are learning the language too.

**Audience Needs From Their Own Perspective**

Though age was a primary concern for media professionals, audiences themselves had other concerns, which show that they have a very different conception of who they are. While the media professionals are concerned with keeping an audience interested, one of the biggest problems facing audience members is finding Breton language media content. Tangi, a radio technical worker in his 30's, said,

> I sometimes watch FR3 on Sundays [*Red an Amzer*]. It's the only thing there is on TV [in Breton]. I rarely watch on Saturdays [*Du-Man, Du-Se*], because first of all, it's during the daytime and I'm usually doing other things, and then it's not always at the same time. I get the impression that it's always changing [the time] so I haven't taken up the habit of watching it.

Tangi had the same difficulty with watching *An Taol Lagad*, as he said, "No, I've never seen it; it's really poorly placed (in the middle of the day)." His complaint is that, being an active member of the workforce, he is not at home at noontime and thus cannot watch the only Breton news that exists.

Gurvan also mentioned the difficulty of listening to the low-power radio stations, saying he listened to,

> ...RBO or Radio Kerne when I go to the Finistère. Let's say the low-power stations in general. RBG, RKB, when I'm in their areas, I try to tune them in, but it's not always easy.

The audience in Upper Brittany feels this difficulty of finding Breton language programming quite strongly too. Aziliz, a teacher at Skol an Emsav in her 20's, spoke about

the lack of any daily news in Upper Brittany, saying, "If for example in Upper Brittany, there was, like in Lower Brittany, the 5-minute news flash every evening that summarizes the news in Breton, I would watch it I think." Gwenola, who works for Skol an Emsav, agreed, saying, "When I'm at my parents' house, yes the news, the five minutes in Breton, I watch them every day, every day. And I find it very interesting precisely because it talks about everything."

Small broadcast zones, weak signals, and a hilly landscape often make reception difficult. The audience runs into difficulties because the media flow is broken geographically and temporally.

Gwenola's comment raises an additional point relating to Breton audiences as well, the ability to use a language to discuss any topic. Goneri also stressed this idea, stating that this could be achieved only by

> ...approaching in an accessible form of Breton, all the problems of cultural, economic, religious life like in a truly democratic country where there's no fear, where all subjects are broadcast, and it's all there. There are no taboos, there is nothing left unsaid by the Republic. No, science progresses in spite of borders and customs agents.

Here Goneri points to the real lack of diversity in Breton language programming (see chapter 6). The Bretons want to use their language to explore the world, not simply to trace their heritage.

Tangi also felt that when he did watch, it was hardly worth the trouble. He described *Red an Amzer*, saying, "It's old hat. I think that for a TV program it lacks creativity. There's no drama, nothing new, it's always talk shows. It's sort of radio on TV." Here Tangi lamented the fact that with only two programs, the Breton language media offering is nothing like its French counterpart in terms of its ability to cater to a varied audience.

Gwenole agreed saying, "often [the programs] are nothing more than having people speak." Noting that their budget was probably too small for more extensive or innovative programming options, he explained,

> What I've seen is not very good. They [the programs] give a very old, passé image of the Breton language. They interview old people, country folk, above all. One does not see lots of images of the modern world in the Breton language programs. It's very rare that there are soccer games announced in Breton. It's very rare that one sees a documentary on China or other countries in Breton, almost never things like that. It's always the old-time peasant world, old people in the retirement homes. That image turns people away from the Breton language.

Gurvan, had a similar response when asked about his own media consumption habits, saying,

> I read *Bremañ*, yes. The other literary monthlies when I've got the time. *Al Liamm* or *Brud Nevez*. It's really quite rare that I watch France 3 Brittany. I watched it more before. Some time ago when the shows were of a better quality. Because now I think its terrible. Before, they made an effort, and now there's no creativity, there's no production of new films etc.

Gwenola was of the same opinion, saying "France 3 for example, I find that ¾ of should be thrown out, I watched it for a while out of support for the cause, because there's nothing else to watch, but I got sick of it, and I quit watching." When asked what was wrong with France 3's programming, she said,

> Everything! It's true that they don't have much money, but with the money they do have, they could do something very good. The problem is that the director thinks that only old people speak Breton, so he only produces programs for the old folks. It's as simple as that. Either old or about traditional Breton subjects, how to make clogs, etc. But what we want to see is a show in Breton but not necessarily about Brittany or Breton culture.

These problems of which Gwenola spoke have driven Anna, a Breton language teacher, to the point of no longer using much in the way of Breton media offerings at all. She said,

> There was a time when I watched out of support. Sometimes there were interesting programs, but if they spoke Breton it was inevitably to talk about the Breton language as such, or about Brittany, Breton music etc. There's a saturation point. If I do watch television, I'd like it to be something that looks outward into the world. It doesn't give the impression of having that kind of openness. It gives the impression of something contemplating its navel if you will. And Breton, in that case, I don't care about it any more, I'd prefer to talk about something else.

Aziliz, a colleague of Anna's and a teacher herself, also felt this way, saying,

> In the car I listen to the radio, but it's for the music above all. That said, when I'm in Lower-Brittany and I come across a station where they're speaking Breton, I leave it on. But otherwise, the TV, I'm not going to get up Sunday morning just for that, because it totally turns me off.

These younger Bretons want their media content to reflect the modern context of their identity, by branching out beyond traditional themes.

Alan, who works in the CRB, further viewed the inward look to the France 3 programming as a station policy problem,

> So France 3 has, across Brittany, 40 minutes in Breton every Sunday. When there's no French Open or other sports events that liquidate the Breton programming. And there are between five and eight minutes in Lower Brittany. So there's only that on TV. For that reason, I have high hopes for TV Breizh, even if it's a satellite channel, we'll be able to hear about modern things in Breton all throughout the day. This will be a rupture, because the France 3 policy, also the director's policy, is anti-Breton, anti-Breton language, a Jacobin policy. That is to say that several times when he was interviewing peasants, he'd only speak about peasants. That is to say a dead world that has no economic future. You've got to be serious. I worked with the peasants, I helped them

> to survive until retirement, but I know that economically, it's completely utopic to think of preserving rural society. That gives a very retrograde and unrealistic image to the Breton language. It's not just folklore and costumes.

Herve, a computer scientist, had a similar sentiment to Alan, saying,

> All the same, France 3 has a problem. It's that there aren't very many programs. It's almost derisory what they offer. What's more, the shows they do have are for the old folks. [The director] knows what he's doing. Sundays, it's the equivalent of the French language programs like *7 Sur 7*,[54] a show that doesn't interest anyone under 25 at all. And then after that, there are people who watch in order to learn the language, but that's a problem too, because once they reach a certain level of mastery, they'll quit watching the show. Saturdays, it's a bit better, going to see people, different careers, things like that but it lacks in quantity, it lacks in quality, and there's not enough variety. Then speaking of the target age groups, there's a real problem. It's a real problem because it's clear that the future of a language is with the children. We can't just make shows for old people.

The lack of creativity was not the only criticism from audience members. Gwenola also disliked the fact that *Du-Man, Du-Se* and *Red an Amzer* are subtitled, saying, "I'm not bilingual, I speak Breton, but my eyes are attracted to the subtitles. It doesn't help me." She then continued, "and what's more, the French shows are not subtitled in Breton, so I do not see why they're obliged to subtitle all the Breton shows." She resented the lack of equality between Breton, her language, and French on France 3.

Aziliz also disliked subtitling, adding, "above all, now that on television, the means exist for choosing whether one wants French, Breton, or other languages, so I do not see the reason for subtitling. It's ridiculous." Here she was referring to the possibility on digital

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[54] *7 Sur 7* is a news magazine program that features interviews with political figures along the lines of Meet the Press in the US.

television of multiple sound channels, a capability becoming more widely available, but not yet implemented by France 3 which is still planning its digital format.

Anna and Herve felt similarly, even going to the extent of hiding the subtitles by covering the bottom of the screen with a piece of cardboard. Herve explained, saying,

> It's true that it could be useful for people who are learning to have the subtitles to see what it's about and then to find the words. But after that, once people reach a higher level, I think it's very bad. It's very bad because it's easier to read. There's a natural tendency to do the least possible, especially for those learning Breton as a second language.

These Bretons criticize the media available to them so strongly because of their attachment to their identity. They want mediated representations of their identity to include all the diversity that makes up Breton life.

*A Silver Lining?*

Because of the poor quality of Breton language media content and the difficulty of seeking it out, TV Breizh was a great hope for many Breton speakers who want to see their language in the media. Gwenola, having seen some of TV Breizh's press releases, said, "I find that the TV Breizh formula responds very well to the demand." She also said that while she did not currently have a satellite connection, she planned to subscribe so that she could receive TV Breizh. Many interview participants were at least seriously considering a satellite subscription to receive the new station.

Tangi, like Alan (see above), simply looked forward to the fact that it would mean an increase in the amount of Breton on television, saying,

> In any case, it cannot be other than an added dimension. For us, it has to be a plus in light of the few shows in Breton that are on TV. Even if TV Breizh only has one hour per day, that will still be one more hour than we have now.

Herve also looked forward to TV Breizh, saying

> I think where TV Breizh is important, even though there are lots of detractors, and lots of people who will say it was done by Le Lay of TF1 – there are those who say it's a commercial station, we shouldn't deceive ourselves when we need clean water. A station has to make money to survive. So being commercial is not necessarily a fault. Doing things poorly on purpose, yeah, that's a defect, but thinking about profitability is completely legitimate. What's more.. Le Lay has a heart all the same. The principal benefit of TV Breizh will be for the children.

Soaz took this realistic approach to thinking about TV Breizh as well, saying,

> I don't know how much will be in Breton, and how much will be in French, but in any case, it's interesting because it defines itself as a Breton station. So it's a Breton perspective, whether in French or Breton. And you'll say, private station and all that. Actually, that's not a problem. It's an interesting initiative and it will force the public service to get moving. It will provide some competition and I think we will see some changes in the public service station.

Here, Soaz, Herve, and Tangi realize that a new voice will hopefully mean a new perspective representing their identity.

Not everyone was excited about TV Breizh though. Some Bretons were cautious of the fact that they had seen very little about their language in TV Breizh's promotional materials and presentations. Brieg explained this fear, saying,

> I'm not equipped to receive TV Breizh and I won't subscribe because right now, I'm waiting to see it. Right now if I subscribed, I would truly have the impression that I'd been completely manipulated by a simple marketing scam.

He explained the chief reason for this reservation, saying,

> The choice was not to offer news saying that France 3 does it very well. How does France 3 do it very well? First the news can only be seen in half of Brittany. It's six minutes long. It's only local news concerning Lower Brittany. No, what we expect is the TF1 news in Breton.

Here Brieg is aware that TV Breizh's concern is creating a television station, and then to promote the Breton culture, as a secondary goal. Because of this ranking of priorities, the new station has considered its budget before addressing the Breton language. However, the result is not up to Brieg's expectations.

The fact that TV Breizh's offering does not meet some Bretons' expectations has led many to consider other media more highly. Tangi, while intrigued by the idea of TV Breizh, was also in favor of being realistic. In view of the small number of Breton speakers and the current limited availability of funding, he said,

> Aside from the press, which is something different, concerning audiovisual media, the medium that costs the least is radio. For me, I've said this for a long time; we must have a public service radio station entirely in Breton. It's our right. Of the kind that's done in other European regions. What's more, radio is an easy medium.

The easiness to which Tangi referred was the fact that radio is a much simpler technology than television. Secondly, because radio, especially low-power radio, is very local, it can accommodate the various dialects and regional particularities of the Breton language.

The simplicity of radio was also important for Soaz. She expanded on Tangi's thought, saying,

> Also, a network of Breton language radio stations. We absolutely must have a wide network so that wherever one is in Brittany, one can turn on the radio in the morning, and have Breton in one's ear, because listening to the radio in Breton while having one's morning coffee demands much less effort than buying a weekly, or going to read something. And the radio, people think that television is important because of the impact of the images and all that, but for me it's an added complement, but the radio is hyper-important because one can do other things while listening to the radio. We cannot forget the radio.

To the technological ease that Tangi brought up, Soaz adds that radio is "culturally easy" too. That is to say, it takes little effort to fit radio into one's day and into one's culture. Because one can listen to the radio while engaged in other activities, it is a way to bring the Breton language and culture to audiences who are perhaps less militant in their desire to incorporate these elements into their lives.

The Bretons also place a good deal of hope in the print media, though more for the ability to cover a wide range of topics than for ease of accessibility. Covering a diverse variety of themes was important to audience members for developing Breton language thinking on ideas that were previously only discussed in the French language environment.

Tangi, also an avid reader of the Breton language print media, said,

> First, [I like] *Al Liamm* and *Brud Nevez* because they're literary things. And then the little articles that show up in *Ouest-France* or the *Télégramme*, but they're always more or less anecdotal. They're not really serious articles... like *Bremañ*, when they do an in-depth article on a subject, it can be very good. *Bremañ*, the articles in *Bremañ* are not specific to Brittany. That can be very nice.. the war in Kosovo, it could be about black Africa, it could be about AIDS.. It's a magazine in Breton, on all subjects, even if there are lots of articles related to the Breton language or European minority languages, all the same, it's a magazine that's open to the whole world.

While enjoying *Bremañ* and finding it informative, he said, "Monthly is not enough, it needs to come out every week."

Soaz agreed, saying

> Let's not dream. Let's dare. I think that it would be very difficult to do a daily, because there's probably not enough people, and because we cannot just have news that people have already read somewhere else. That's also reality; we must take that criterion into account too. But a good Breton weekly, I think, has a place and is necessary, because if people do not read, discover, if a language doesn't serve to discover

> the world, whatever the language, that's a problem. It will stop. It will vegetate. A language is always made for discovering the world, discovering others and discovering the world.

In addition to being too infrequently published, a secondary problem with the press that Tangi noted was, "What lacks in the press is a paper that is not militant (not in the pejorative sense), but a paper like *Ouest-France* except in Breton. There, the papers like *Al Liamm* or *Bremañ* are still more or less militant press."

Herve also disliked the militant nature of much of the Breton press. He liked to read,

> *Bremañ* when I have time. I quit subscribing though because it doesn't really correspond to my interests. It was too political. What interests me more are society features. On the other hand, I subscribe to *Al Liamm* because it's a literary magazine. And for my children, I subscribe to *Louarnig*. I also read certain news-groups on the Internet.

He went on to describe what he meant by saying that *Bremañ* was "too political," saying,

> There has to be a difference between the language and the content. It's difficult to do something in Breton without being militant. That's still the problem right now. When one does something for the Breton language, one doesn't have the same freedom as one would in French. We don't have the same liberty because as soon as one writes something in Breton, already it's a militant act for the Breton language. While in French, that's not the case. We are obligated to do it in Breton because if we don't there's no one else who will do it for us.

By saying that the Breton press is "too political," audience members were showing the desire to have their language become a natural element of their identity not simply a symbol of the Emsav. They did not want to be forced to take a stand in relation to their language; they simply wanted to use it.

Herve also saw another need. He was very much against the Breton movement in spite of the fact that Breton was the language that he used at home with his family and in as much of his public life as possible. Because of his view of the Breton movement he felt that, "What's important is variety, because it's nice to do serious things but a language lives because it can be used to talk about anything. Talking about anything means humor too, and that's something that's missing."

Anna, though not a big fan of the mass media in general, did see another important piece missing from the Breton TV offering. She hoped to see more films, "That's what I watch in French when I do watch. We could have them in Breton." French television stations often show several movies per week. Unlike US television, which shows mostly content produced explicitly for television broadcast, French stations rely more heavily on screening feature films for drawing in an audience (Mazdon, 1999). This is likely to explain Anna's desire to see more films in Breton, as it is one of the common French television genres with which she is probably familiar.

The audience members' perceptions of Breton language media content shows that they desire a more diverse range of ideas but also a more diverse range of types of content through which to access these ideas.

The producers still tend to think of their audiences as being monolithic, not yet being completely aware of how Breton society is changing. Because many of these media professionals are also members of the Emsav, they sometimes see their audiences as reflections of themselves. While perhaps a very natural tendency, the narrow range of Breton language media offerings means that this type of thinking can have serious consequences for the audience which does not feel part of the Emsav. Like Anna, all

members of the Breton media audience have an "off" button but very limited channel changing options. This is to say, if they do not like what they see and hear in Breton they have two options: tune out or use French language media. Using French language media poses a sizeable problem though, because if enough Bretons do this, their own perspective will become structured through representations of the French identity rather than the Breton identity. As a result, media professionals need to study their audiences carefully in order to keep in step with their needs.

# CHAPTER 9
# CONCLUSIONS

Examining the relationship between language, media use, and the Breton identity has raised some important issues with respect to the more general notion of media as tools to be used in the identity negotiation process. Policy decisions, media professionals, audiences, and the content itself shape the Breton media environment. These influences have important consequences because of the fact that the resulting media environment represents the Breton identity back to the Bretons themselves as well as to others.

While in actuality there are no longer any legislative or regulatory limits on the usage of the Breton language in the mass media, Marc-Antoine's question (see chapter 5), "How do you support [the Breton media] with such small audiences?" points toward the greatest limitation upon the Breton media system: money. Because French and EU policies are increasingly directed toward the creation and maintenance of large, internationally competitive media markets, advertising revenue is the driving force. Translated to the Breton level, this means that media outlets do not want to take a chance on content targeted toward an audience that is narrowly bounded both geographically and linguistically. This fact, combined with increased competition for advertising money by the public service broadcasters, has meant that little initiative has been taken to air new Breton language material. Another result is that Breton language content has been relegated to odd hours at the edges of the public service schedule and to the non-profit sector.

Breton media professionals feel constrained by this lack of money and by a lack of adequate outlets for their work. Many struggle to change the image they portray of the Breton identity, but they are limited by the formats promoted by the media that exhibit their work. Because they are largely dependent upon the public service media as the primary

outlets for their work, Breton media professionals are subject to national level policy decisions that limit potential audiences and restrict funding for development of new types of content. Without improved funding and a more inclusive regulatory structure, media professionals feel that they are unable to develop higher quality content.

The limits placed upon the Breton media profession do not go unnoticed by the audiences. Audience members feel disengaged from the material they see and hear in the Breton language because they do not identify with it very well. Because there is very little content available, they are forced to hunt through the backwaters of program schedules to find their language. Additionally audience members feel that when they do come across media content in their language, it portrays Breton culture in a manner that does not fit with their own impressions of their identity.

The content that audiences find in the Breton media environment has been stereotypically traditional folklore. The focus, even of the more creative and informative broadcast content is resolutely centered on the Breton people and their language, treating issues of literary artistic, and linguistic heritage. Radio content, though more diverse, has an extremely local focus. This is partly due to the small broadcast radii of the stations with Breton language programming. Print content represents a slightly more diverse view of the world but has a limited audience as few people read Breton. Further, print content is often viewed as being too militant, and therefore missing the mainstream Breton reader. As a result, the Breton language media environment cannot be said to be adapting well to changes in the modern Breton identity.

Because of the severe limitations on the media environment, the Breton people are forced to return to the French language and its associated cultural point of view in order to

fill in the gaps in their information needs. To understand the consequences of the necessity of relying upon French media content, it is important to take another look at the set of criteria Schudson proposed for integrating cultural objects into a given identity. Within the structure of this study, the elements of institutional retention, retrievability, and resolution were most important to the Breton case and it is in these three areas that some precision can be added to Schudson's ideas.

**Revisiting Institutional Retention**

Institutional retention can be passive (unintentional effects of the structure) or active (intentional policy). What do we mean by this? To take the French nation as an example, prior to 1992 in the 5th Republic, one could say that the government had an unintentional policy for retaining the French language. While arguments could be made for institutions such as the Académie Française and various other cultural organizations designed to promote the French language as being an active policy of promotion, these organizations aside, the simple fact that the government uses the French language as its means of communication is a form of institutional retention. However, without any explicit statement such as now exists in Article 2 of the constitution, this institutional retention was simply a side effect of the government's administration process. This is the same process that is at work in French legal permission given to its regional cultures to use their own languages. The national government, by offering the possibility, allows the system to accommodate regional languages such as Breton, but there is no policy for making sure that they actually are put into use.

On the other hand, the implementation of just such a specific policy ensuring the ability to use Breton or any other regional language would be an active form of institutional

retention. It is this type of protection that is called for in the *European Charter for Minority and Lesser Used Languages* and in international documents like the draft *Universal Declaration of Linguistic Rights* written in 1996.

Institutional retention can also be positive (inclusive) or negative (exclusive). Anatole de Monzie's statement that "for the linguistic unity of France, the Breton language must disappear," is a clear example of a negative or exclusive concept of institutional retention. This sentence, and the policy idea that lies behind it, implies that France has a linguistic identity and the Breton language cannot exist within it if that identity is to continue to be viable. On the other hand, Valéry Giscard D'Estaing's statement that France's regional languages are part of "the richness of this country," implies an inclusive idea of institutional retention. While he would not disagree that French is clearly the dominant language in France, the former president's words did not exclude regional languages from existing within his conception of France and the French identity. In fact, he explicitly made a place for regional languages as elements of a more inclusive French identity.

Perhaps the most important addition to the concept of institutional retention is that public perception matters greatly. Passive positive institutional retention can lead to the perception of a negative or actively exclusive policy. Though there is no ban on the use of the Breton language, no measures are undertaken to ensure that it *is* used either, and the state government does not put any funds into use specifically for the maintenance, promotion, or protection of the Breton language. Any funding that goes toward France's regional languages comes primarily through financing for other cultural domains of which language forms a subsidiary part. As a result, a large number of my interview participants

have the impression that the state continues a policy of repression, while in fact it is simply taking very little action *for or against* the language.

To understand how the institutional retention of the Breton language is perceived, it is important to note several factors. First, the definition of what "retention" actually is: what role actually should the Breton (or any other regional) language play in public life? Is the language *just* a symbol? Or is it a more active part of social life? Can one navigate daily existence through the bias of the particular language? Having toured these questions in the conversations conducted with the interview participants, we can say that because the Breton language has such a minimal presence, its current role in the media system at present is still almost purely symbolic. One cannot expect to wake up in the morning and undertake an entire day of public social life in Breton.

Secondly, the resources applied toward the stated role of the language must be considered. Is there enough money allocated to make the language an effective part of a given institution? Are enough human resources allocated to make the language important to a given institution? Also important in understanding resource distribution for improving the institutional retention of a minority language is the policy through which these resources are put into action. The French government directs most of the resources allotted for incorporating regional languages into the media directly from the state government. This is to say that large portions of these resources are spent in Paris, by the central government and are not disbursed through regional offices that often have a more complete understanding of local issues and needs.

Thirdly, public knowledge of the institutional role – publicity – is important. The manner in which the language is to be retained by a given institution, whether the media, the

government, or the educational system, must be made known to the public that has a vested interest in the language's visibility.

Fourth, economics are important. While the resources applied toward the process of institutional retention are important, the possibility of making an economic profit from this is important as well. How so? Can children educated in the regional language get jobs using that language later in life? Children, the future speakers of a language, must have a reason to continue using that language. These children are already all bilingual in the case of Breton and most other European minority languages. They all learn the official state language used where they grow up. If they cannot use their local language later in their active life, they have the fallback of the official language and will not hesitate to use it if necessary.

Lastly, are companies using the language able to make money? This is especially important for the media. If no one reads, listens to, or watches Breton language media, they cannot continue to exist without massive public assistance. And finally, do government representatives see that public investments in the language provide benefits for their constituents?

To change public perceptions about the government's commitment to the Breton language requires incorporating it into more areas of civic life. This requires spending money to develop programs that actively promote language use and then to publicize these programs to the public. In short, the government needs to think about how society can use the language rather than just about preserving a symbol.

*How Can the Media Help?*

Concerning public, state-run media, giving a larger place to the Breton language can work toward creating a more active perception of institutional retention. This also improves

the audience's perception of state willingness to retain the language given the greater visibility this would provide for the language. In other words, visibility is one of the primary means of publicizing a language policy, and this is something that the media can do well.

More use of the language also works toward making the language profitable. First, it publicizes the existence of the language and shows that Breton too has a role in "modern" life. Here, more Breton language media content is important in all media. The image is important because so few people have much knowledge of the language, its use, and its history. Portrayed as "a part of the Breton heritage," it will only appeal to those audience members for whom heritage is interesting. As a result, variety is important. All audience members, in their own way, expressed a need for greater diversity in Breton language media offerings and this cannot happen without greater quantity as well.

The Breton language media "circle" is also a very insular group – most media professionals know each other. While there are different opinions within this group, practically all have to work together in some fashion. As a result, the product seems uniform in spite of many expressed desires to change the content produced. Also, audience feedback is very limited and media professionals' knowledge of the audience is even more minimal. These factors could be overcome by increasing the quantity of Breton language content, which would, as mentioned above, help make the language profitable.

**Retrievability of the Breton language and its expression in the media**

Schudson's idea of "retrievability" also affects the public impression of the place made for the Breton language by the French government. The best example of this is *An Taol Lagad*, the Breton language news flash on France 3 West. Since this program is only visible in the Western half of Brittany, not all the Breton speaking population has access to

it. This may not seem like such a problem since the majority of Breton speakers do live in the Western half of the region, but in fact, it poses more of a difficulty than at first glance. First off, the Breton language itself is a highly retrievable element of the Breton identity. Secondly, as several of my interview participants mentioned, the geography of the Breton language has changed over the last 100 years. This means that many of the Breton speakers, who used to be concentrated in the Western half of the region have now spread (whether looking for work or for other reasons) across the ensemble of the territory. These Breton speakers, now living in Upper Brittany, still hold onto their language as an important, or highly retrievable, part of their identity. As a result, the fact that they are not able to see *An Taol Lagad* becomes a much greater problem. These people, while still Bretons like their compatriots in Lower Brittany, seem to be cut off from information in their language. Since France 3, the public service station, produces *An Taol Lagad*, these Upper Bretons have the impression that the French government continues its policy of regional language repression.

Thus, a consideration which seems logical from the television production perspective applied by France 3 – there is likely to be a greater potential audience for *An Taol Lagad* in Lower Brittany – is seen by Upper Bretons as a repressive act.

**Resolution: Symbol or Tool**

Resolution, the part of Schudson's description of the strength of cultural objects related to the promotion of activity, is one area absolutely critical to the Breton case. While at the outset, I stated that speaking Breton is a direct action promoted by its use as a cultural symbol, the action promoted is in fact quite limited. There are two aspects to this limitation. First, in spite of the fact that polls show that the majority of Bretons across all five departments making up the historical region are in favor of protecting and promoting the

language, only a small percentage of these people actually do speak the language. As a result, for those who do not speak Breton, the language remains purely symbolic, no more actively representing the Breton identity than a picture of the Breton Parliament building or a postcard of the rugged coastline dotted with lighthouses. The language is held up as a pillar of Breton identity, but if it is not used as a communication tool, it does not promote action on behalf of that identity.

Relegation of the language to a purely symbolic status is related to the nature of mass media, which normally represent a flow of information. This is to say, that Bretons anywhere in Brittany (like their peers all across France) can turn on the radio or television or pick up a newspaper any day of the week, at any moment and read or hear the French language. To continue with the flow metaphor, they are simply tapping into this flow at a given point, to receive information.

While the concept of a flow of information is not new to media studies, it is an important point to keep in mind with respect to cultural identity negotiation. This idea of a flow does not describe Breton language media. Even with TV Breizh, which has increased the possibility for finding Breton on TV at more hours of the day, Breton language programming (and press) is still an event. Rather than being able to receive information in Breton at any time of the day, Breton speakers must seek out those moments at which they can see or hear their language. In the case of *An Taol Lagad*, the news returns to French very quickly, after the brief four minutes in Breton. In the case of other terrestrial TV broadcasts, Breton speakers must seek out their programming in backwater time slots, which means that the Breton language is not part of the mainstream of the media flow. As a result, Breton television programming resembles film more closely than the modern idea of television.

Radio is a slightly different case, but it does not represent a flow of Breton language information either. While there are two stations that broadcast entirely in Breton from morning until evening, the flow is interrupted spatially rather than temporally. Outside the 30-50 km radius in which one can receive these stations, this flow of Breton language information ceases to exist and one reenters a situation that closely resembles the description of television broadcasting described above. This is to say that outside the range of these two stations, the Breton language offering is very limited, between two hours daily and two hours weekly, depending on where in Brittany one tunes-in to the radio.

One could say that the Breton press more closely approximates the media flow to which we have become accustomed in the modern world. However, this flow is more of a trickle than anything else. This is to say that the most frequently appearing periodical is a monthly (with the exception of the daily headline summaries in the online version of *Le Télégramme* or the weekly article printed in its paper version). Thus while *Bremañ*, *Al Liamm*, or one of the other Breton language magazines might sit on the coffee table or the desk for the entire time until the next issue arrives, the flow of information only shows up in fits and starts. One must wait an entire month between *Bremañ* issues and even longer in the other cases.

Because there is no continuous information flow in their language, Breton speakers are forced to return to French if they wish to fill in the gaps between Breton media offerings that exist in time and space. As a result, while the momentary ability to receive information in their preferred language may be a source of great pleasure to Breton speakers, the constant interruptions do not incite them to much direct action on behalf of their language. Put another way, the fact that Bretons are only able to interact with the media in their

language on an extremely infrequent basis means that only a very dedicated few who are completely committed to living their lives in Breton can use the language as a communication tool. There are moments when recourse to French is necessary. If Breton language media could be used as tools in the manner that French language media can, they could become an active element of the Breton identity.

Secondly, where the Breton media do promote direct action, whether political or cultural, they are perceived as being "militant." While my interview participants liked the idea that *Bremañ* printed what they felt were quality in-depth articles from a Breton point of view, they felt that the magazine's emphasis on language and cultural politics was too forceful. This is largely related to the fact that there are a very limited number of voices that get heard in the Breton language media landscape. It also follows from the more militant origins from which *Bremañ* hails. On the other hand, *Bremañ* promotes action, but is perceived as being quite pushy.

Because the militant position is not as popular with the majority of Bretons, especially those who are native speakers, language as an element of their identity has a quite low resolution. Native speakers use Breton because it is the language their parents taught them and as such is natural. This is to say that the language, not a tool or a symbol, is rather constitutive of who they are; they speak the language that has been a natural part of their experiences and emotions from birth. Younger Breton speakers, however, were forced to make the choice to speak Breton. As a result, resolution is higher for them; using the language is a political choice rather than a basic necessity. In this sense, the symbolic role of the language gains greater importance when these younger Bretons chose to speak the

Breton language because it becomes a symbol of who they are and not simply a part of their being.

A third part of the reason that the Breton media do not present a highly resolved call to action on behalf of the language is the content focus. More specifically, the public impression of this content has low resolution. Television, the most widely diffused medium that represents images of the Breton identity, is perceived to present an "old" image of the country and people. This translates to an understanding of the language and culture as historical phenomena, not in the general sense that they have existed through time, but in the more specific sense that they are out-dated and no longer correspond to modern life at the beginning of the 21st century. Through these representations, media content contributes to a passive interpretation of the language as a museum piece rather than a living, dynamic part of a modern cultural identity.

The government perspective on regional languages, which is to see them as part of the national heritage, further reinforces this understanding. As such, the government sanctions, in a sense, this view of regional languages as objects to be preserved in various collections and exhibitions.

Thus while as an object of study, language as an element of the Breton cultural identity must be considered from each of the perspectives Schudson proposes, the reality is that all of these concepts work together. As a result, retrievability, institutional retention, resolution, rhetorical force, and resonance can be seen to influence each other to form a complete picture of the role played by language in the Breton identity.

Given these additions to Schudson's conception of cultural objects and how they work in the Breton case, how does this affect the identity negotiation process? First, the idea

of negotiation is impaired because content that presents only one aspect of the Breton identity serves to fix meanings about it. By not representing a variety of approaches to the Breton identity, the media restrict the number of ideas that are available for consideration. Change becomes much more difficult when new alternatives are not incorporated into the public sphere. The result is a static conception of the Breton identity resting upon patrimonial issues.

Secondly, the fact that access to Breton language media is unequal across the Breton territory effectively changes the public landscape of the language. The fact that a map of the language now looks "like a piece of Swiss cheese" in Brieg's words is compounded by the inability to receive information in Breton in the "holes" of the cheese. Without this information, there is little incentive to use the language and as a result, the holes are encouraged to grow larger, further altering the geography of the linguistic component to Breton identity.

Finally, the negative public perception of French institutional retention of regional languages means that speaking Breton, while a marker of the Breton identity, is seen as an element that excludes one from being French. This continues the dichotomy between the two languages and encourages an exclusive point of view from the Breton side as well. Whereas language does not have to exclude others if it is not a symbol of repression, this is the message implicit in understandings of French regional language policy.

Working from both perspectives, Breton and French, to create a true flow of Breton language information will not instantly alleviate all the problems that these groups face together, but it will help the Bretons to take greater control over the development of their

identity. This is indeed a laudable goal if French society is truly interested in promoting diversity and resisting the homogeneity seen in globalism.

Looking to the Irish and Welsh again, where steps have been taken to improve the public use of these languages, a local language flow does not provide a remedy for all of the problems. Many younger Irish people think only of Gaelic as an academic subject since they are forced to learn it in the school system. Similarly, while the Welsh language has been incorporated into the Welsh media system, many cultural traditions have been renegotiated along more "English" lines. In spite of the fact that local language information flow is only the beginning of a policy of true cultural diversity, it is a vital step for groups that link their identity to their language. Both the Basques and Corsicans have on occasions resorted to violence because the dialog between their cultures and the French state has primarily followed a top-down model (where the French state government has dictated local language policy). Creating local language information flows can be one way to start the process of restoring balance to these cultural interactions.

**Where to go from here in studying the media-identity relationship?**

Continuing work to understand the roles language and media play in the identity negotiation process should focus on several key elements taken from this study. Developing Schlesinger's idea of negotiation can be facilitated by the concept of an information flow in the media. The idea of a flow allows the negotiation process, itself a dynamic interaction between people and their environment, to be based upon an equally dynamic set of data about this environment. This recognizes that even a loose framework like the one employed here is simply a snapshot of an identity at a given point in time and that the various environmental and social forces at work continue to evolve.

Work on the identity negotiation process should also continue as a collaborative effort between researcher and participants as in this study. Extending the interactions between the researcher and participants builds trust, which in turn helps the researcher to access more accurate data from which to interpret media use and identity negotiation patterns. A more involved study could also examine a greater percentage of the media content available to further complement the interview data.

Though this study relies heavily on the example of language to more concretely illustrate the issues discussed, the framework outlined is general enough in scope to allow for the discussion of any number of elements of an identity. As such, developing a library of case studies is not limited by the ability to examine identities based upon language used as an example here. This framework then should be further developed not only with cases such as the Bretons in France but also with other groups including migrant, refugee, and post-colonial cultures. These types of groups add further complexity to the understanding of identities, as their historical circumstances are quite different from the regional groups in France.

While this examination of the media role in the Breton cultural identity promotion process takes some important steps in developing a concrete understanding of the media identity relationship, they are but first steps. Cultural identities, whether among groups just finding their voice, or among groups that have long been engaged in the struggle for recognition, are fundamental components of who we are as human beings. These components are gaining in importance as we try to anchor ourselves in an increasingly vague social world subject to influences from the four corners of the globe. In this context,

understanding the identity process is vital for human rights and for a democratic conception of our social and communicative environments.

## GLOSSARY OF BRETON NAMES AND TERMS

| Breton term | ENGLISH EQUIVALENT | Description |
|---|---|---|
| *Al Lanv* | The Rising Tide | Name of a political news and literary magazine published since 1980 |
| *Al Liamm* | The link | A bimonthly literary magazine published entirely in Breton since 1946. |
| *Aman Emgleo Breiz* | Understanding Brittany Now | The name of a news segment broadcast on the Breton language public service radio program in the 60's and 70's. |
| *An Taol Lagad* | A glance | The title of the televised Breton language news brief, shown on France 3 Bretagne in the Western half of Brittany. |
| *Ar Falz* | The Sickle | A literary magazine originally published by the cultural group of the same name started in 1933. |
| *Arvor* | The Sea | A literary magazine published between 1942 and 1944. |
| *Bemdez* | Always | A children's magazine published by An Here. |
| Binioù | Bagpipe | The binioù kozh or "old bagpipe" is a traditional Breton instrument. Through contact with Irish and Scots musicians, the Scots bagpipe (binioù bras or large bagpipe) has actually become more prevalent in Brittany than the indigenous binioù kozh. The binioù kozh differs in that the "bag" is smaller and it includes only one small pipe. The sound is thus higher pitched than that of the Scots bagpipe, which has a larger "bag" and three longer pipes. |
| bombard | traditional Breton oboe | The bombard is a small double reed instrument with a flared bell producing a sound that is more piercing than that of the classical oboe. It is often played in a duo together with a binioù. |
| Breizh | Brittany | The Breton language name for Brittany – also used as the name of TV Breizh – TV Brittany |
| Breiz Atao | Brittany Forever | A political and literary monthly representing the Breton Youth Union started in 1919 by Olier Mordrel and Morvan Marchal |
| *Bremañ* | Now | A monthly Breton language news magazine published by Skol an Emsav |

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| *Brezhonek Leizh o Fenn* | Breton on the mind | The title of an hour-long documentary film about some of the first students to go to school, both primary and secondary education, entirely in Breton, through the Diwan schools. |
| *Brud* | Renown | Literary magazine published entirely in Breton between 1957 and 1977. |
| *Brud Nevez* | New Renown | A continuation of *Brud* still published today. |
| *Chadenn ar Vro* | The Country Channel | The previous title of *Du-Mañ, Du-se* (prior to 1996). This incarnation of the Breton cultural magazine shown on France 3 Ouest television in Brittany showed fictional works as well as cultural documentaries. *Du-Mañ, Du-se*, produced by a different staff, no longer airs fictional works. |
| *Cholori* | Joyful Noise | A children's magazine published by the Diwan school program |
| *Dalc'homp sonj* | Let's Remain True to the Idea | A research periodical started in 1980 |
| Dihun | Awakening | The name given to the bilingual education system set up by the Catholic schools in Brittany. |
| Div Yezh | Two Languages | The name given to the bilingual education set up by the French national public school system. |
| Diwan | Seed | The name given the cultural association that operates a Breton language school system. |
| *Du-mañ, Du-se* | Our House, Your House | The title of a Breton language television program about regional cultural life shown on France 3 Bretagne. |
| emgann | Combat | Usually this term is used to refer to the Breton independence party of the same name. |
| emsav | to rise up | This is the name given to the Breton movement (all aspects: political, cultural, social, linguistic, etc.) by the Bretons themselves. |
| Feiz ha Breiz | Faith and Brittany | A weekly newspaper published by the Catholic church in Brittany between 1865 and 1884 |
| fest-noz (pl. festoù-noz) | night festival | Originally celebrated by peasants in Lower Brittany after certain collective workdays. The fest-noz was characterized by group dances led by singers or a duo composed of a binioù and a bombard player (Le Coadic, 1998, p. 32). «Les festoù-noz – a l'origine – |

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|---|---|---|
| | | célébré «par les paysans bas bretons après certaines journées de travail. Danses collectives animées par des chanteurs ou un couple de sonneurs (binioù et bombarde)». Modern festoù-noz are often led by musical groups that include electric and electronic instruments and have been inspired by rock and jazz as well as Breton traditional music. The collective dances are still an important part of modern festoù-noz, which have seen a rebirth in the 1990's. This is one of the unique features of the fest-noz in that it is an opportunity for people of all social classes and generations to come together. |
| gouren | wrestling (literally, "the sport for men") | A traditional form of wrestling practiced in Brittany, which has been revived since the 1970's and now thrives with competitions throughout Brittany and Europe. |
| *Gwalarn* | Northwest | A literary magazine printed between 1925 and 1942. The name is still used by a cultural association. |
| *Hor yezh* | Our Language | Name of a magazine started in 1957 |
| *Imbourc'h* | Research | A religious, intellectual magazine started in 1969 |
| *Kroaz ar Vretoned* | Cross of the Bretons | A weekly newspaper published by the Catholic church in Brittany between 1898 and 1920. |
| *Louarnig* | Little Fox | Name of a children's magazine started in 2000 |
| *Moutig* | Pretty | Name of a children's magazine edited briefly in the early 1990's |
| pellgomz | Telephone | Literally "far talker" |
| *Planedenn* | Planet | A magazine started in 1979. |
| Plouc | A "hick" | An uncultured, inelegant peasant. This is a pejorative stereotype applied to Bretons by the French who considered themselves to be "more cultured." |
| *Red an Amzer* | As Time Passes | The title of a Breton language television news talk-show shown on France 3 Bretagne |
| *Sell Ta!* | Look! | The title of a Breton language video magazine available by subscription. |
| *Skeudenn Roazhon* | A view of Rennes | The title of a Breton language television magazine detailing the goings on of the Breton-speaking community in Rennes shown on TV Rennes, a local cable television channel. |

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| *Skol Vreizh* | Breton School | A supplement to Ar Falz discussing issues relating to education in Breton – started in 1965 |
| *Talabao* | | A children's magazine published by the Diwan school program |
| *Tir Na Nog* | The Land of the Young | Actually Irish Gaelic, not Breton – this was the original name of the magazine *Al Liamm* from 1945-1946 |
| *Triweh ha Tri Ugent* | Seventy Eight | A short-lived Breton language televised cultural magazine, broadcast on FR3 between 1977 and 1979. |
| *Ur Sulvezh Ordinal...Pe Dost* | An Ordinary Sunday... Almost | A Breton language short fictional film produced in 1994 by one of my interview participants for France 3 Ouest television. |

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## APPENDIX A
## ORGANIZATION AND ASSOCIATION DESCRIPTIONS

**Bodadeg ar Sonerien (BAS)** – Musicians' Assembly – a cultural association developed to promote Breton traditional music and help musicians develop their skills in performing this music.

**Comité Technique Radiophonique (CTR)** – Radio Technical Committee – The Comité Technique Radiophonique is the technical arm of the CSA that oversees radio broadcasting in France. Each region has its own branch of the CTR that monitors all the broadcast radio frequencies in its geographic territory. The CTR also processes applications for new radio licenses and mediates disputes between license holders. The ultimate decisions on all matters are made nationally by the CSA, but it tends to follow the recommendations made by the CTR branches as they have the most direct contact with the broadcasters themselves (Michèle, interview).

**Conseil Général** – the conseils généraux are the departmental level governing bodies. There is one for each department in France, thus Brittany (the administrative region) has four Conseils Généraux.

**Conseil Régional de Bretagne (CRB)** – Breton Regional Council – alternatively called the Région Bretagne – the CRB is the body that governs the administrative region of Brittany (the four departments of Ile-et-Vilaine, Côtes-d'Armor, Finistère, and Morbihan).

**Conseil Supérieur de l'Audiovisuel (CSA)** – High Audiovisual Council – the CSA is roughly the current equivalent of the US Federal Communications Commission. That is, it is the national-level administrative body that overseas broadcasting in France. In 1986 the Commission Nationale de la Communication et les Libertés (CNCL) was initiated to take the place of the dysfunctional Haute Autorité de la Communication Audiovisuelle (HA), the first attempt at regulating the audiovisual sector at the time of the breakup of the state monopoly (the Organisation de la Radio et de la Television Française - ORTF). In 1989 the CNCL evolved into the CSA. The most notable difference between the CSA and the FCC is that the CSA itself has the power to punish delinquent broadcasters, with a range of sanctions from a verbal warning to confiscation of the broadcasting license (cf. Lazar, 1991 for a full description of the transition between these various systems). However, perhaps most shocking to the American sensibility is the fact that the CSA can also impose financial sanctions on delinquent broadcasters amounting to 5% of the broadcaster's revenues or require the insertion of corrections or apologies (Lazar, 1991).

**Délégation Générale à la Langue Française et aux Langues de France (DGLF)** – the DGLF is the national level administrative body charged with ensuring the proper development of the French language and with its representation both within France and externally. Recently, in 1998, the DGLF added the other languages spoken in France to its slate. This change had much to do with the debate over French signature and ratification of the European Charter for Minority and Lesser Used Languages.

**Emgann** – started in 1983, Emgann (*combat* in Breton) seeks independent political status for Brittany and is the most militant of the Breton political parties.

**European Bureau for Lesser-Used Languages (EBLUL) – Bureau Européen des Langues Moins Répandues (BELMR)** – the EU organization that deals specifically with minority languages and with integrating them into the Union.

**Pobl – Parti d'Organisation de la Bretagne Libre** – (party for the organization of a free Brittany) – a political group seeking autonomy for Brittany in a federalist regime since 1984. This party is a current manifestation that grew out of Strollad ar Vro (SAV).

**Skol an Emsav** – literally translated, school for the Breton movement. Skol an Emsav is a cultural association that teaches evening courses in Breton language and history to adults in Rennes and its surrounding area. The association once covered the whole of Brittany as it was the first such group, but its functions outside of the greater Rennes area have been taken over by other associations better suited to each local setting. Members of Skol an Emsav agree to "live in Breton," which is to say that as much of their daily lives are conducted through the medium of the Breton language as is possible. Skol an Emsav publishes the Breton language news monthly, Bremañ.

**Strollad ar Vro (SAV)** – "le parti fédéraliste et européen" – created in 1972, SAV sought political autonomy for Brittany in the context of a federalist system. For this purpose, they looked outward toward Europe rather than toward France as the federalist power. In 1984 POBL took over this position.

# APPENDIX B
# CONSENT FORM

Project Title: **LANGUAGE AND MEDIA IN THE PROMOTION OF THE BRETON REGIONAL IDENTITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION**

Field Work: Spring & Summer 2000 in Brittany, France

Investigator: **DAVID WINTERSTEIN**
Doctoral Candidate
School of Communications
University of Washington
Box 353740
Seattle, WA 98195 USA

Interview Consent Form

## PURPOSE

This study addresses the importance of regional identities and their relationship to the globalization of the modern world. Specifically, this research will focus upon regional language media and their unique ability to provide an arena for the expression of local cultural values. An examination of the Breton regional identity will facilitate this exploration of the role of language and media in shaping cultural identity. This in-depth exploration will begin building an understanding of the language-media-identity relationship that can lead to better accommodating diverse cultural groups into their larger national and supra-national contexts.

## PROCEDURES

The best experts on a regional group are you, the members of that group. Therefore, if you choose to participate in this study, this is what you can expect:

1. During the interview, I will ask you to describe the context of your experiences with regional language media, I will ask you to provide details about these experiences, and I will ask for your reflection upon these interactions and upon your understanding of your regional identity.

2. In order to accurately represent your ideas, I will use an audio tape recorder to record our interviews.

3. At any point, if you do not wish to continue, for any reason, you may stop the interview.

## OTHER INFORMATION

All information collected during this project will be kept confidential. Your name will not be made available to anyone else and will not be used in the written report. Your interview transcript will only be identifiable by a code number and upon transcription, I will destroy the audiotape. Upon completion of my dissertation, I will destroy the code key that links your name to the transcript thereby insuring the confidentiality of your statements. If you would like to see the written report upon its completion, I can arrange to send you a copy.

_____ _____

Signature of Investigator Date

The study described above has been explained to me. I voluntarily give permission to be audio taped. I have had an opportunity to ask questions about this study. I understand that future questions I may have about the research or my rights as an interview subject will be answered by the investigator listed above.

_____ _____

Signature of Interview Subject Date

## APPENDIX C
## SAMPLE CODE SHEET – REGIONAL MEDIA CONTENT ANALYSIS

**Series Title:**_____

**Episode Title:**_____

**Episode Date (original airing if known – otherwise production date):**_____

**Length (if known):**_____

**Medium:**_____

**Producer:**_____

**Host:**_____

**Guests:**_____

**Primary language:**_____

**Translation (subtitling, dubbing, etc. if any):**_____

Topic:

Themes:

Specific language used to evoke these themes:

Explicit Mention of Breton Identity (code all):

Specific language used to describe the Breton Identity:

Breton Language Promotion:

Specific language used to evoke ideas about language promotion:

## APPENDIX D
## IMPORTANT DATES IN BRETON CULTURAL HISTORY

1000-0 BC – appearance of Gallic (Celtic) tribes (Osismii, Namnetes, Coriosolites, Riedones, Venetes) on the Armorican peninsula (Armorica – Gallic name for Brittany)

50 BC – Roman invasion of the Armorican peninsula

150 AD – evidence of Christianity in Armorica

476 – Fall of the Roman Empire – end of Roman control of Armorica and subsequent Breton rejection of the Roman institutions.

5th-10th centuries – immigration of Celtic peoples from Wales and Ireland including the Seiz Breur, the seven founding saints of Brittany – the "re-Celtification" period.

579 – Vannetais Chief, Waroch, takes control of Rennes.

587 – Waroch takes control of Nantes.

845 – Breton leader, Nominoë (king 826-851), defeats French King, Charles le Chauve (the Bald), in battle and unites Brittany as a kingdom

851-857 – Reign of King Erispoë, son of Nominoë

857-874 – Reign of King Salaun cousin of Erispoë (After assassinating Erispoë)

874-890 – Period of struggle the heirs of Erispoë and Salaun.

890-907 – Reign of King Alain I, Le Grand

939 – Alain II, Barbe-Torte (Duke – 939-952) re-conquers the territory ruled by Nominoë after a chasing out the Norman invaders. These Norman invasions are what brought the Gallo language to Upper Brittany.

11th century AD – End of serfdom for Breton peasants. This established a smaller gap between the nobility and the people in Brittany than in the rest of France where serfdom continued up until the revolution.

1341-1365 – War of Breton Succession between the houses of Montfort and Penthièvre. The English kings supported the Montforts, while the French king Charles de Blois was married to Jeanne de Penthièvre. Eventual victory of Jean de Montfort, but his reign was one of little power.

August 10, 1488 – La Traité du Verger – After a French victory over Brittany, this treaty gave France all sovereign rights over Brittany.

1532 – l'Acte d'Union de la Bretagne a la France – the Act of Union between France and Brittany (also called the Traité d'Autonomie de Bretagne – the Treaty of Breton Autonomy) – signed between Claude, Duchesse of Brittany, and François I gave the Breton territory to France but retained four important rights for the Bretons. 1) The right for Bretons to vote on any tax levied by the French king. 2) The right of Breton nobles to serve in French armies only when fighting on Breton territory. 3) The right to the continued existence of the Etats Régionaux de Bretagne – the Breton parliamentary body. 4) The right for Bretons to be judged by Breton laws and not by French laws

1532-1680 – Brittany as a province of France gained considerable wealth through seagoing trade with England, Holland and Spain. The Spanish trade in the 16th century was especially lucrative as the Bretons were able to cash in on the wealth brought back from the Spanish colonies. Trading with the English and Dutch took place mostly in the 17th century, a period of expansion for these two countries. Brittany further enriched itself through an important Atlantic fishing industry (cod from the Northern ports and from Nantes; sardines from the southern ports). Inland, agricultural products bolstered the Breton economy. Linen was produced in the Léon; hemp in the Trégor, near Locronan, and around Vannes and Rennes. These led to an important textile trade with England. Beef and cider also became two important agricultural products.

1539 – François Ier decrees at Villers-Cotterêts that "all official acts be written in French" (Denez, 1998).

1554 – institution of the Breton Parliament by King Henri II of France to compete with the Breton Etats Régionaux. This competition failed when members of parliament came to prefer Breton laws to the French laws they were to protect.

1638-1715 – reign of Louis XIV - France began to demand more in tribute from Brittany as the French economy was in a period of stagnation, not compatible with the court lifestyle of Louis XIV. War with England cut off this lucrative trade route, leaving only Nantes to profit from trade (the triangular trade).

1674 – Revolte des Bonnets Rouges – Revolt by the Bretons against new taxes on stamped paper and tin tableware imposed by France without a vote by the Breton Etats Régionaux.

1789 – French Revolution – removed regional territorial distinctions in favor of a nationalist spirit. Departments were instituted as the local territorial administrative units.

1793 – Révolte de la Chouannerie – Breton royalist revolt against the chaos of the new republic that included many new taxes, counterfeit money in circulation, and prohibitively high prices for nationally produced goods.

October 26, 1793 – the Constitutional Convention decrees that "French shall be the sole language used in schools."

1804-1815 – reign of Napoleon 1. During his reign, Napoleon prohibited the use of Breton in public schools.

19th century – Some industry restarted after the revolution in Brittany in canneries, shipbuilding, pottery, and metallurgy, but most of the population was engaged in agricultural activity (still 23% of the population in 1914 at the start of WWI).

1865-1884 – publication of *Feiz ha Breiz* – a weekly Breton language magazine edited by the Catholic Church.

1898-1920 – publication of *Kroaz ar Vretoned* – a weekly Breton language magazine edited by the Catholic Church.

1925-1942 – publication of *Gwalarn*, a literary magazine started by Roparz Hémon.

1933 Yann Sohier founds the cultural movement, Ar Falz (the sickle), to bring the idea of saving the Breton language to schoolteachers. This is accompanied by a public campaign, Ar Brezhoneg Er Skol (ABES – Breton language at School).

1939-1945 – WWII – many Bretons joined the resistance – Brittany and the mountainous regions held the strongest enclaves of resistance fighters. A few Bretons, hoping for the possibility of an autonomous Breton state in the case of a Nazi victory, sided with the Germans.

1940, November 1 – Roparz Hémon presents the first Breton language radio program. His program, during the German occupation, lasted until June 3, 1944.

1942-1944 – publication of *Arvor*, a weekly Breton language magazine.

1945-1958 France's 4th Republic

1945-1964 - RTF

1946, December 21 – Breton language radio broadcasts by Pierre-Jakez Hélias, instituted by Radio France under the 4th Republic. Hélias continued this program until December 1958 (Calvez, 2000).

1946 – *Al Liamm* is started

January 11, 1951 – the Deixonne law (N. 51-???) is passed, allowing students to take regional language (including Breton) classes.

1958 – Beginning of France's 5th Republic

January 25, 1959 – Charlez Ar Gall replaced Hélias on the Breton language radio broadcasts.

1964-1974 - ORTF

1964 – first television broadcast in Breton

1969 – Referendum on the creation of Regions as administrative units within France fails. With this failure, de Gaulle leaves the office of the President.

1969-1974 – Pompidou presidency.

1969 – la Comite d'Action Progressiste pour la Langue Bretonne conducted a study and found that in Lower Brittany there were one million people who understood Breton and 500,000 who spoke it on a regular basis.

1971 – first Breton language television program *Breiz o Veva*, broadcast bimonthly. Later it would become weekly. In 1971, the program was 15 minutes long. In 1979, it was extended to 26 minutes.

1973 – FR3 is charged with broadcasting in regional languages where they are spoken.

1974-1981 –Giscard d'Estaing presidency.

1974 – Dihun, a monthly magazine printed results of a study by J. C. Bozec which reported that of the 1.5 million inhabitants of Lower Brittany, 685,250 were capable of speaking Breton (44.3% of the population), and 385,650 spoke Breton daily (25.7% of the population).

1977 – President Giscard d'Estaing signs the Charte Culturelle de Bretagne, creating the Conseil Culturel de Bretagne, the Institut Culturel de Bretagne, and the Agence Technique Culturelle.

1977 – the Diwan private schools are started with the opening of the first primary school class.

1978 – a new TV program, *Triwec'h ha Tri Ugent* (78) is shown along with *Breiz o Veva* on FR3.

1980 – Bremañ – the Breton news monthly publishes its first issue.

1981-1995 – Mitterrand presidency. Mitterrand put into practice a regionalization plan following up on ideas from Giscard d'Estaing.

1981 – president Mitterrand signs into law a Licence in Breton for the Université de Rennes 2 Haute Bretagne.

1982, March – the Deferre law (N. 82-213) creating administrative regions is passed.

1982 – Radio Bretagne Ouest (a decentralized branch of Radio France) starts broadcasting from Quimper (currently 15-17 hours per week in Breton).

1982, December – first broadcasts of *An Taol Lagad* – a 20-minute weekly Breton language news summary. *Chadenn ar Vro* is also started at this time (taking the place of *Breiz o Veva*).

1983 – Radio Bro Gwened starts broadcasting out of Pontivy – currently four hours per day in Breton.

December 30, 1983 – the first bilingual (French-Breton) classes are proposed as part of the National Education system.

1984 – creation of Radio Kreiz-Breizh, broadcasting 20 hours/week to the Breton language.

1984 – *Chadenn ar Vro* is lengthened to 1 ½ hours weekly

1985 – Fanch Broudic reported on *An Taol Lagad* (the Breton language television news segment) a total of 650,000 Breton speakers in Lower Brittany of whom 400,000 spoke it regularly.

1985 – creation of the CAPES degree in Breton (Certificat d'Aptitude Professionnelle de l'Enseignement Secondaire – a teaching certificate held by teachers and professors in the French educational system).

1987 – Alternantes starts broadcasting, primarily in French but with some Breton programming.

1989 – institution of the DEUG degree in Breton (Diplôme d'Etudes Universitaires Générales). With this fixture, a complete university degree program from first year through doctorate now exists.

1990 – opening of bilingual, Breton-French classes in the Catholic private school system.

1990 – *An Taol Lagad* is changed from a 20-minute program shown each Saturday, to 4 ½ minutes each day, weekdays.

1991 – a survey by TMO Régions reported that there were 250,000 Breton speakers in Lower Brittany or 21% of the population.

1992 – a constitutional revision changes article 2 of the Constitution to read "le français est la langue de la République." Officially, none of the regional languages spoken in France exist yet.

1994-95 *Chadenn ar Vro*, the Breton language television magazine is renamed *Du-mañ, Du-se.*

1994 – the Toubon law is passed, reinforcing the use of the French language within France. Since this time it has been invoked as a means of slowing the growth of regional language use.

1995-present – Chirac presidency.

1997 – a follow-up survey by TMO Régions reports 240,000 Breton speakers (those who responded "fairly well" or "very well" to the question of whether or not they could express themselves in Breton). This represents 20% of the population of Lower Brittany.

1998 – Radio Kerne and Arvorig FM start broadcasting – entirely in Breton.

1998 – France 3 Ouest starts broadcasting *Red an Amzer*.

2000 September 1, TV – TV Breizh starts broadcasting as a basic channel on several cable and two satellite networks (TPS and CanalSatellite).

2000 – Radio France Armorique and Radio Bretagne Ouest change names to France Bleu Armorique and France Bleu Breizh Izel, respectively.

## APPENDIX E
## LIST OF ACRONYMS

| | |
|---|---|
| ARB | Armée Républicaine Bretonne |
| BELMR | le Bureau Européen des Langues Moins Répandues (French name for the EBLUL) |
| CAPES | Certificat d'Aptitude de Professorat de l'Enseignement Secondaire |
| CELIB | Comite d'Etudes et Liaisons des Intérêts Bretons |
| CNCL | la Commission National de la Communication et des Libertés |
| CRB | le Conseil Régional de Bretagne |
| CSA | le Conseil Supérieur de l'Audiovisuel |
| CTR | le Comite Technique Radiophonique |
| DEUG | Diplôme d'Etudes Universitaires Générales |
| DGLF | la Délégation Générale à la Langue Française et aux Langues de la France |
| EBLUL | European Bureau of Lesser Used Languages (English name for the BELMR) |
| EU | European Union |
| FCC | Federal Communications Commission (US) |
| FLB | Front pour la Libération de la Bretagne |
| FR3 | France Regions 3 – name of France 3 Television prior to 1993 |
| HACA | la Haute Autorité de la Communication Audiovisuelle |
| INSEE | Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques |
| ORTF | l'Organisation de la Radio et de la Télévision Française |
| POBL | le Parti d'Organisation de la Bretagne Libre |
| PTT | Poste Téléphone et Télégraphe |
| RBG | Radio Bro Gwened |
| RBO (RBI) | Radio Bretagne Ouest (Radio Breizh Izel) – name of France Bleu Breiz Izel prior to 2000 |
| RKB | Radio Kreiz Breizh |
| RTF | Radiodiffusion-Télévision Française |
| SAV | Strollad ar Vro |
| TPS | La Tele Par Satellite – one of the main Direct-to-home satellite services in France |
| UDLR | Universal Declaration of Linguistic Rights |
| UGB | Unvaniezh ar Gelennerien Brezhoneg (Breton Language Teachers Union) |
| UN | United Nations |

# CURRICULUM VITA

**David P. Winterstein**
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## EDUCATION

Ph.D., Communications – November, 2001 - School of Communications - University of Washington

Dissertation Title: *Language and Media in the Promotion of the Breton Cultural Identity in the European Union*

Dissertation Advisor: Professor Nancy K. Rivenburgh

MA, Communications - June, 1997 - School of Communications - University of Washington

Thesis: *A Comparative Frame Analysis of* New York Times *Coverage of Nuclear Testing in China and French Polynesia, 1992-1996*

BA, Communications - June, 1993 - University of California, San Diego

Université de Grenoble 1991-1992 - Grenoble, France - UC Education Abroad Program

## TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Visiting Lecturer – School of Communications – University of Washington – 2002

Global Networks, Local identities – Winter, 2002 University of Washington, Tacoma Campus

Basic Concepts in New Media – Winter 2002 – Seattle Campus

Instructor – School of Communications – University of Washington – 1999, 2001

Basic Concepts in New Media - Autumn, 2001

Introduction to Mass Communication - Summer 1999, Autumn 1999, Summer/Autumn Interim 2001

Adjunct Instructor - Department of Communication Studies, Seattle University - Media, Society, & the Individual - Winter, 2000

Teaching Assistant - School of Communications - University of Washington 1996-1998

Global Communication - Autumn 1998 - with Professor Kevin Kawamoto

Introduction to Mass Communication - coordinating TA - Spring 1998 - with Professor Kathleen Fearn-Banks

Introduction to Mass Communication - Winter 1998 - with Professor Gerald Baldasty

Navigating Information Networks - Autumn 1997 - with Professor John Bowes

European Media Systems - Spring 1997 - with Professor C. Anthony Giffard

Communications in International Relations - Winter 1997 - with Professor Nancy Rivenburgh

Global Communication - Autumn 1996 - with Professor Kevin Kawamoto

## PUBLICATIONS

Winterstein, D. & Bicket, D. (2001). Regional Powers and Global Politics: *New York Times* Framing of Nuclear Testing in India and Pakistan. *Inter/Sections*, 1 (1). pp. 35-48.

Winterstein, D., Dolliver, K., DeBeer, A. S., & Giffard, C. A. (1997). US Network Evening News Portrayal of the New South Africa. *Ecquid Novi*, 18 (2). pp. 173-195.

Giffard, C. A. & Winterstein, D. (1996). Assessing the Impact of IPGRI's Public

Awareness Programme: Print Media Coverage of Topics Related to Plant Genetic Resources,

1986-1996. Report submitted to the International Plant Genetic Research Institute.

## CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

Winterstein, D. & Bicket, D. (1999, July). *Regional Powers and Global Politics:* New York Times *Framing of Nuclear Testing in India and Pakistan.* Paper presented to the 1999 conference of the International Association for Mass Communication Research - Leipzig, Germany.

Winterstein, D. (1999, May). *Pluralism or Imperialism? La Francophonie and Language Rights Among Interconnected Nations.* Paper presented to the 49th annual conference of the International Communication Association, San Francisco.

Winterstein, D. (1998, July). New York Times *Coverage of Nuclear Testing in French Polynesia and China: A Comparative Frame Analysis.* Paper presented to the 48th annual conference of the International Communication Association, Jerusalem, Israel.

Winterstein, D., Dolliver, K., DeBeer, A. S., & Giffard, C. A. (1997, May). *US Network Evening News Portrayal of the New South Africa.* Paper presented to the 47th annual conference of the International Communication Association, Montreal, Canada.

## RESEARCH INTERESTS

The relationship between language, media use, and the process of cultural identity negotiation

Issues concerning global communication structures, processes, and content and their relationship with societies at governmental, social, and individual levels. This includes roles played by the increasingly global nature of emerging communications technologies.

Media use concerning environmental issues with a specific focus on the environment as a social movement. Within this area I concentrate on global topics such as nuclear weapons and waste, ozone depletion, and global warming

Qualitative research methodologies - using ideas from ethnography, cultural studies and textual analysis to interpret media use and the construction of meaning

## RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

Research Assistant - School of Communications - University of Washington 1995-1996

Content Analysis with Professor C. Anthony Giffard - Summer 1996

Library Research with Professor Diane Gromala - Spring 1996

Survey Research with Professor Katherine Heintz-Knowles - Winter 1996

Library Research and Course Development with Professor Nancy Rivenburgh - Autumn 1995

## AWARDS

Foreign Language and Area Studies Fellowship (FLAS) - 2000-2001 Grant from the West Europe Center at the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington for dissertation fieldwork in France during the 2000-2001 academic year.

European Union Center Graduate Student Research Award - Spring 2000 - Grant from the European Union Center - University of Washington for dissertation fieldwork to be conducted in France during Spring and Summer Quarters, 2000.

David C. Fowler International Travel Fellowship - Spring 1998 - For presentation of: "New York Times Coverage of Nuclear Testing in French Polynesia and China: A Comparative Frame Analysis." to the 48th annual conference of the International Communication Association, Jerusalem, Israel.

## OTHER EXPERIENCE

Graduate Curriculum Transformation Project Assistant - School of Communications, University of Washington - Spring 1999

Research Mentor Center Coordinator - School of Communications, University of Washington - Winter 1999

Assistant Website Administrator - School of Communications, University of Washington - Winter 1999

Copy Writer / Editor - Cox Interactive Media Seattle, WA - Summer 1998.

## SERVICE

Volunteer - Research Mentor Center, School of Communications, University of Washington - 1996 - 1999. This center (operated primarily by graduate student volunteers) assists undergraduate communications students with writing and research on communications course assignments.

## ACADEMIC ASSOCIATION MEMBERSHIPS

International Communication Association, graduate student member

National Communication Association, graduate student member

Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communications, graduate student member

## LANGUAGES

French - Advanced written, read, and spoken proficiency

Italian - Intermediate written, read, and spoken proficiency

Breton - Beginning written, read and spoken proficiency