Assembling the Chinese City: Production of Place and the Articulation of New Urban Spaces in Wuhan, China

William S. Buckingham

A dissertation

submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

University of Washington

2014

Reading Committee:

Kam Wing Chan, Chair

William Beyers

Matt Sparke

Dan Abramson

Program Authorized to Offer Degree:

Geography

© Copyright 2014

William S. Buckingham

University of Washington

Abstract

Assembling the Chinese City: Production of Place and the Articulation of New Urban Spaces in Wuhan, China

William S. Buckingham

Chair of the Supervisory Committee:

Professor Kam Wing Chan

Department of Geography

Studies of China's urban development largely rely on a handful of metanarratives, appealing for their concision, but failing to account for the spatial specificities of the Chinese city. These narratives are founded on structural capitalist explanations of place-making including neoliberal urbanism, market transition, new institutional economics, urban entrepreneurialism, and various discourses surrounding the "world" or "global" city. The resulting strands of China-based urban studies reveal, at best, a partial understanding of the dynamics shaping contemporary Chinese cities. This dissertation seeks to reinterpret the production of the Chinese city through assemblage theory and articulation. Assemblage identifies the multitude of diverse and interweaving sociopolitical relations that construct an identifiable, if dynamic, urban imaginary. However, assemblage has been criticized for its inability to incorporate power relations

into its networks. I argue here that assemblage is useful in understanding the various ways actors interpret, imagine, and inhabit the city. Articulation then becomes useful in explaining how those ideas are implemented through a framework of power relations. In the case of China, multiple ideologies and cultural logics inform the understanding of cities. However, these ideas are articulated through the primary technologies of rule the PRC has employed since its founding: the dual structure and the Leninist, top-down, spatial hierarchy. Rather than dismissing these as institutional relics of Maoism, this dissertation argues that they are foundational tools for the party-state's governance of society that transcend the historical eras of Maoism and post-Maoism. The first half of the dissertation deconstructs the metanarratives of neoliberalism and market transition, and examines the continued importance of the dual structure. The second half shows how the Chinese city is assembled and articulated through practices of place production in Wuhan, the largest city in central China.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Figures iv

List of Tables v

Chapter One

Introduction: Encountering Chinese Cities 1

1.1 Encountering Chinese Cities 1

1.2 Urbanizing China: Literature Review 12

1.3 Theoretical Framework: Assembling an Articulation 38

1.4 The Case Study: Wuhan 55

1.5 Structure and Methodology of the Dissertation 70

1.6 Conclusion: Wuhan Emergent 78

Appendix 1 82

Chapter Two

Uncorking the Neoliberal Bottle: The Confines of Neoliberal Critique for Interpreting Urban Change 85

2.1 Introduction 85

2.2 Neoliberal Critique and the Geography of China's Development 88

2.3 Urbanization as Primitive Accumulation or "Accumulation by Dispossession" 101

2.4 Neoliberalism in Chinese Intellectual Debates 107

2.5 The Limits of Accumulation by Dispossession 111

2.6 Uncorking the Neoliberal Bottle 117

2.7 Conclusion: Assembling China's Transformation beyond Scale 119

Chapter Three

The Dual Structure: Disassembling China's Market Transition 126

3.1 Introduction 126

3.2 The "Holy Trinity" through the Ages: Mechanisms and Operation of the Dual-Structure 135

3.3 Mobility and the Hukou System: Change and Continuity 141

3.4 Mobility and Entitlement Distribution: Beyond the Hukou System 144

3.5 Changes in the Trinity 148

3.6 Localization of Hukou Control 156

3.7 Entitlement Changes: Why does the Hukou still matter? 160

3.8 Hukou Conversion, Rural Citizenship, and the Creation of China's "Villages-in-the City" 165

3.9 Conclusion: The Dual-Structure, Chengzhongcun, and Rural-Urban Dynamics in the City 174

Chapter 4

Schizophrenic Cities: *Chengzhongcun*, Global Cities, and the Production of Informality 175

4.1 Introduction: The Persistent Myths of Marginality 175

4.2 Does China have Slums? 179

4.3 Urbanization, the State, and the Emergence of *Chengzhongcun*: Spatial Hierarchy and Spatial Patterns 190

4.4 Global Cities, Global Slums: World Cities Discourse and Informal Imaginaries 199

4.5 Conclusion "In but not of the city": Beyond Ambiguity, Incompleteness, and Transition 215

Chapter 5

Wuhan Articulated: Policy Mobility and the Production of Place in The Assemblage of Wuhan's Three Towns 220

5.1 Introduction: Mr. Digging around the City and *Da Wuhan* 220

5.2 Interpretations of Chinese Space 225

5.3 Visions of the Municipality: Assembling and Promoting *Da Wuhan* 233

5.4 The City Assembled: How History Shapes Urban Development in Wuhan 238

5.5 Articulating Wuhan: Building the New Central Business District 255

5.6 Conclusion: Paradox Cities 267

Chapter 6

Assimilating the Periphery: Territorial Politics and Rural-Urban Integration 269

6.1 Introduction 269

6.2 Interpreting Chinese Spaces: *Desakota* and Spatial Determinism 270

6.3 Territorial Politics and Land Regimes 276

6.4 Expanding Wuhan: Centers, Peripheries, and Rural Urban Integration 284

6.5. Conclusion: Rural-Urban Integration and the Dual-Structure 303

Appendix 2 307

Chapter 7

Appropriating Rights: *Chengzhoncun* Transformation 309

7.1 Introduction: Debt and Development 309

7.2 *Gaizao:* The Transformation of *Chengzhongcun* 312
7.3 Wuhan's Redevelopment Plan: Aggressive 'Marketization' of the Village 319
7.4 Conclusion 341
Chapter 8
Conclusion: Assembling an Articulation Of Chinese Cities 346
8.1 Introduction 346
8.2 Theoretical Contributions 346
8.3 Implications: Who Has a Right to the Chinese City? 351
8.4 Shortcomings and Potential Avenues for Future Research 358
Reference List 361

List of Figures

Figure 1.1 The New High-Rises of Liede “Village” 2

Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.3 The reconstructed turtle pond, ancestral temples, and village gates of Liede 3

Figure 1.4: The City Yet to Come: Billboards blocking village demolition from street view 4

Figure 1.5: The City Actual: Behind the billboards 4

Figure 1.6 The 7 Main Districts of Wuhan that make up the 'Three Towns' of Hankou, Hanyang, and Wuchang 56

Figure 1.7 Wuhan Municipality, including outlying districts 57

Figure 1.8 A map of the Old Urban areas from around the time of the Wuchang Uprising (1911) 57

Figure 1.9 Wuhan railway connections to major Chinese cities 58

Figure 1.10 Formal Spatial Administration of Wuhan Municipality 63

Figure 1.11 Built-up areas of Wuhan Prefecture 64

Figure 4.1 Donghu village near the Wuhan Institute of Technology caters to students with cheap food options, and low-cost rentals to students wanting to move out of the dorms 184

Figure 4.2 Posters on lamp posts and building walls in the village routinely advertise apartments for rent 185

Figure 4.3 Sprawling Slums of Rio de Janeiro 187

Figure 4.4 Kibera on Nairobi's outskirts 187

Figure 4.5 Slum Islands in Guangzhou: Shipai village in Tianhe District 188

Figure 4.6 Several disconnected *chengzhongcun* in Haizhu District, Guangzhou 188

Figure 4.7 *Chengzhongcun* in Jiang'an District, Wuhan 188

Figure 5.1 The Changjiang Bridge built after the establishment of the PRC was the first bridge to span the Yangtze, connecting Wuchang and Hankou (seen in the distance) directly 237

Figure 5.2 Foreign Concessions lined the Yangtze River bank of Jiang'an District until Wuhan was captured by the Japanese in 1938 242

Figure 5.3 The Frank Wick Building and The Customs House (under construction on the right) dominated Hankou's British Concession 243

Figure 5.4 The Customs House today houses municipal government offices 243

Figure 5.5.-5.8 Wuchang Remembered (Clockwise from top left) The Wuhan Uprising Memorial Hall, Statue commemorating the Wuchang Uprising, a statue of Sun Yatsen that stands at the entrance of the Wuchang Uprising Museum, and the Yellow Crane Tower 245

Figure 5.9 Hubuxiang Snack Street offers a smorgasbord of traditional breakfast foods 246

Figure 5.10 Wuhan's Spatial Structure: Three Towns and Supporting Outlying Districts 248

Figure 5.11 Rendered image of Wuhan's future CBD in Hankou 255

Figure 5.12 Rendered image of Oceanwide International Town in the CBD 257

Figure 6.1 Wuhan Country Garden Estate promises an idyllic and green habitat unavailable in the central city 300

Figure 6.2 A luxurious dining room inside a villa in the Country Garden Estate. Source: Wuhan Country Garden Estate 300

Figure 6.3 In a promotional image that could have been painted by Norman Rockwell, The Wuhan Country Garden Estate sells the suburban dream to Wuhan 301

Figure 6.4 Divorcing form, function, and cultural meaning: developers in Hannan plan a church tower to anchor the New Town 307

Figure 6.5 Row houses and canals draw on images from Amsterdam and other European cities 308

Figure 6.6 Italian plazas are recreated for Hannan New Town 308

List of Tables

Table 1.1. Administrative Units of Wuhan (2011) 62

Table 1.2 National Level Development Zones in Wuhan Municipality 68

Table 1.3 Formal and informal designations within Wuhan Municipality 81

Table 2.1 Some Theoretical Explanations of Transformation under Chinese Reform 89

Table 3.1: The Holy Trinity over Time 149

Table 3.2 Why hukou still matters: Hukou-based services in Wuhan 160

Table 3.3 Urbanizing Villages: Land Ownership, Citizenship, and Entitlement Changes 170

Table 5.1 Creditors Repaid by 2009 Bond Issued By the Oceanwide Real Estate Development Company 264

Table 5.2 Selected Loans to Oceanwide Subsidiaries for the Development of Wangjiadun CBD (2002-2013) 266

Table 6.1 Main Districts and Outer Districts Compared (2011).....285

Table 7.1 Sources of Wuhan's Total Municipal Debt (2010-2012) 311

Table 7.2 Wuhan's Annual Debt (2008-2011) 311

Table 7.3 Actors in chengzhongcun redevelopment.....320

Table 7.4 The Four Conversions.....328

Table 7.5 Resident Classification and Entitlement to Compensation in Gusau Shu Village.....339

Chapter One
Introduction: Encountering Chinese Cities

1.1 Encountering Chinese Cities

On the eve of the Asian Games in November of 2010, I visited the host city of Guangzhou. This trip marked my own return to China for the first time since 2005. Guangzhou had undertaken a massive development project along the Pearl River still being completed just days before the games would open that included an entirely new Central Business District, sports stadiums, open plazas, and cultural museums. At first glance, Guangzhou was a stunning city, and its new CBD was indeed impressive—wide traffic lanes, smooth-running expressways, new skyscrapers, grand bridges crossing the Pearl River. This was not like the China I had experienced more than a decade previously that was just beginning to come to terms with its new place and rising position in the world. Even in Beijing and Shanghai, the old and new China were in constant confrontation with each other as statues of Chairman Mao looked out onto billboards for Coca-Cola, and businessmen and city officials wove their newly acquired luxury sedans through a steady mass of bicycles, mopeds, and antiquated state-produced vehicles. Guangzhou in 2010 was a city broadcasting confidence, achievement, and wealth. Moreover, it was a city whose potential was only just beginning to be truly understood. Guangzhou was modern, clean, and vibrant.

Yet in some inexplicable way, it was also, frankly, a boring place. Motorcycles had recently been banned from all of Guangzhou's streets, and traffic, while frequently congested, was orderly and flowed smoothly. The new Central Business District was

shiny and dramatic, but Potemkinesque, still largely uninhabited and unused. The Chinese people I had met in my many travels throughout China previously were inspirationally curious, both excited and somewhat awed by the country's rapidly changing circumstances and engagements with the world beyond. In Guangzhou, that spirit struck me as absent, replaced by the fashionably-dressed malaise and apathy toward strangers found in all the world's wealthiest metropolises.

Figure 1.1 The New High-Rises of Liede "Village". Photo by author

One day, in the company of a graduate student at Zhongshan University, I walked from the campus to the new CBD. He pointed out the "greenway", an expressway dotted with shrubberies and trees to make it "green." As we crossed the Liede bridge, I saw the outcome of Guangzhou's first successful and fantastically expensive *chengzhongcun* redevelopment overlooking the river and bordering the Western edge of the CBD—Liede 'village' was now a complex of 30-story apartment buildings, the traditional village culture memorialized by a turtle pond and a handful of ancestor worship halls (Figures 1.1-1.3). *Chengzhongcun,* (literally 'city surrounding village') are rural villages that are surrounded by urban construction but are not politically, administratively, or socially integrated with the city, and are as much a feature of China's breakneck urbanization as the skyscrapers, sports stadiums, and

shopping centers that receive more media attention. Unlike these sites of monumentalism, however, *chengzhongcun* are not celebrated, but hidden by municipal planners, overlooked by globalization's celebrants, and eagerly slated for demolition by

Figures 1.2 and 1.3 The reconstructed turtle pond, ancestral temples, and village gates of Liede. Photos by author

municipal officials and other city boosters.

The Asia Games were for Guangzhou what the 2008 Olympics were for Beijing: an opportunity to demonstrate the city's cosmopolitanism, its wealth, and capability to be a central node in the global economy. The Pearl River Delta's days as the world's factory, were on the wane, with migrant textile and assembly workers to be replaced by bankers, investors, real estate developers, attorneys and accountants. Reminders of the more recent past, not just socialist, but the intermediate period of cheap manufacturing assembly, were being demolished and disappeared. Guangzhou had been sanitized for visitors' protection.

This sanitization was highlighted for me by a *chengzhongcun* that had been the site of sizable protests, nail houses, and violent encounters between villagers, demolition crews, and police. The village bordered a major thoroughfare that would deliver dignitaries and other officials to the Asian Games. As protests had delayed the village's

redevelopment, several nail houses,[1] piles of rubble, and other unsightly remnants of the *chengzhongcun* remained. These were hidden from visitors, however, by a continuous wall of billboards bedecked with images of blue skies, modern skyscrapers, grassy lawns, cottages, and other symbols of middle-class bliss (Figure 1.4-1.5).

Figure 1.4 The City Yet to Come: Billboards blocking village demolition from street view. Photo by author

Figure 1.5 The City Actual: Behind the billboards. Photo by author

This vision of an urban future so immediately contrasted with the remnants of Guangzhou's recent urban past that city leaders, developers, and investors could not totally erase. For me, this image highlights many of the paradoxes of Chinese cities where members of the communist party are business leaders, peasants are landlords, real

[1] Nail-houses" (*dingzi hu*) have become, perhaps, the most prominent symbol of individual resistance against uncontested redevelopment in China's villages. They arise when residents refuse to vacate their homes even after demolition of the rest of the village has already been carried out. Residents may act as a single household, or in cooperation with other households in the village. Nail-houses make a dramatic visual impact, standing isolated in a cleared lot or amid piles of rubble. The most famous case occurred in Chongqing when a single family maintained their home for two years. Developers cut power and water and dug a 10-meter pit around the home while the family capitalized on media attention to generate publicity and support for their cause. The family eventually settled in 2007, but the case sparked important national debates in the press and burgeoning social media sites throughout China about private property and individual rights.

estate development companies are managed by city officials, and environmental sustainability is achieved through highway construction (i.e., the Guangdong "Greenway"). This dissertation is born out of these and other paradoxes of the Chinese city, and in a small way, attempts to understand some of the apparent contradictions of China's urban development.

Neoliberalism has emerged as the premier theoretical explanation of urban change and transformation around the globe within geography and urban studies in general. It brings coherence to the chaotic and wildly unpredictable trajectory of urban transformation around the world. For China scholars such as Fulong Wu, it is a useful framework for interpreting the production of urban space, as cities "have become increasingly important geographical targets and institutional laboratories for various neoliberal experiments, e.g. place-making, urban development corporations, public-private partnerships, new forms of local boosterism, and property-led redevelopment," (He and Wu, 2009, pp. 283).

Neoliberalism gives urbanization a familiar and recognizable shape in a wide variety of local contexts, yet it also limits the way the complex social relations that give shape to urban spaces are imagined. For Gibson-Graham, the identification of neoliberalism in diverse locales "affords the pleasure of recognition, of capture, of intellectually subduing that one last thing; it offers no relief or exit to a place beyond," (Gibson-Graham 2006, 4). Under the assumption that capitalism's ascendancy in China is inevitable, if not complete, many scholars employ a structuralist framework of capitalism to explain its spatial change. In this logic, China's present-day spatial organization is the outcome of a globalized process of capital accumulation where the state engages primarily as the

organizers of "urban entrepreneurialism" and place-making to attract capital. This approach engages an established tradition of critical scholarship, loosening the bonds of Area Studies and "Chinese exceptionalism". On the other hand, strict adherence to capitalist spatial logics leaves many features of China's urban landscapes unexplained. The uninterrupted rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), no matter how decentralized and even fragmented its authority might be, continues to dominate China's political and economic order, preventing free market economics from achieving the ideological hegemony that is often presumed in the English-language literature.[2] Moreover, the legacies of state socialism continue to dominate China's spatial political economy in the form of the dual structure that divides rural and urban China. Structuralism fails to capture a vast range of forces because it treats capitalism as an external force acting *on* local cultures (as in Smith, 2002; Castells, 2004; Peck and Tickell, 2002). To understand the development of Chinese cities we must explore the complex interrelations among agents nested in state hierarchies, among cities and individuals inside and outside China, and the strong and weak networks that constitute social life and economic activity. While New Institutional Economics (NIE) gives due attention to the way institutions *alter* the trajectory or character of capitalism, they are still treated either as speed bumps on an otherwise smooth path of market transition, or as historically contingent entities for the regulation of market transactions (Kornai,1992; Naughton, 2007).

[2] On the fragmented rule of the CCP, see Cheng Li (2012)

This chapter first offers a brief review of the central role taken by neoliberal critique in human geography over the last decade with special attention given to the works of David Harvey, Brenner and Theodore, and Peck and Tickell. Especially important for urban geography is Brenner and Theodore's 2002 article that called for the study of "actually-existing neoliberalism." In this section, my primary aim is to provide an overview of debates about the relevance of neoliberalism to China's overall development story since 1978. Next, I offer a brief glimpse into some of the major intellectual debates related to neoliberalism within China that are not often given attention in the West. Here, I want to draw attention to the different ways neoliberalism is acknowledged and conceptualized by Chinese scholars. Of central importance to these debates is the historical difference between state-economy interactions in recent Chinese history when compared with capitalist countries in the West, contestations over the ability of markets to limit or exacerbate political violence in Chinese society, and the primacy given to stability in Chinese political arguments. Various trends in Chinese intellectual and political thought over the past two decades, while often in conflict with each other, share a desire to avoid the wholesale adoption of Western practices, including neoliberalism.

I then turn to the central tenet of neoliberal critique as it relates to urban studies, the theory of primitive accumulation, or "accumulation by dispossession" which is seen as the driver of contemporary urbanization in developing countries. I conclude with a detailed critique of prominent urban scholars working on China who employ primitive accumulation and "neoliberal urbanism" as a framework for understanding contemporary urbanization. Scholars of Chinese urbanization have latched on to neoliberal critique as a means of engaging broader geographic theory. Yet in doing so, they risk oversimplifying

the evolution of Chinese cities and urban institutions, and erasing spatial difference for the sake of the unifying and totalizing theory of spatial change that is "neoliberalism."

1.1.1 China's Urban Paradox

"When we talk of a resurgent Asia, people think of the great changes that have come about in Shanghai. I share this aspiration to transform Mumbai in the next five years in such a manner that people would forget about Shanghai and Mumbai will become a talking point," Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India, Oct. 2004 (quoted in *Press Trust of India*, 10/6/2004).

"Gradually, the word [Shanghai] has shifted from a proper noun to a verb, being invoked in Mumbai's desire to "shanghai itself" or "be shanghai-ified," with no relation whatsoever to the traditional dictionary meaning of 'shanghai,' to force or trick into a place of undesirable position. In these new references, the Chinese metropolis is a clean, slum-free city, with tall skyscrapers and impeccably modern infrastructures. Even though most of Mumbai's politicians and bureaucrats have only a vague idea of the governance practices in Shanghai, they implicitly attribute the "shanghai-ification" of Shanghai to China's single party state, less public agitation, and seemingly limitless budgets," Xuefei Ren and Liza Weinstein, "The Shanghai Effect: Political Devolution and Mega-Project Development in China and India"

"This area of Zhejiang province, 60 miles from Shanghai, has become the subject of public and media scrutiny after more than 16,000 dead pigs were found in tributaries of the city's river, the Huangpu, a source of tapwater," Nicola Davison, *The Guardian* 3/29/2013

Chinese cities over the past decade have frequently been trumpeted as new models of success, demonstrations of China's return to greatness and the inevitability of the "Chinese century." Jonathan Woetzel of the McKinsey Institute writes that "China now has a historic chance to reinvent not only its cities but the very idea of a city. The choices that its city leaders make will shape not only its buildings but also its society, and indeed the world," (Woetzel, 2011). Renowned architect William McDonough saw China as an opportunity to implement revolutionary green technologies as expressed in an interview with *Newsweek*: "I want to see solar power cheaper than coal, but to get the

speed and scale to do that fast, you need a place like China," (Underwood, 2005; see also May 2010). Chinese cities are heralded as sites of innovation with the capacity to alter how cities are built, fueled, and inhabited, not for any inherent features of the Chinese themselves, but for the breakneck pace with which city builders appear willing to remake urban space. As demonstrated in the first two quotations that open this chapter, much of the world's focus has been on the glitter and glamour of a reborn Shanghai, but the Chinese laboratory of urban development extends across the entire country, from the megalopolises of the Eastern seaboard to villages of the Tibetan plateau. In developing model 'eco-cities', China has no rival. The state-run *Xinhua* news agency reports that it will have "100 model cities, 200 model counties, 1,000 model districts, and 10,000 model towns by 2015," (cited in Wong and Pennington, 2013). These eco-model developments supposedly demonstrating the innovation of Chinese planning and a commitment to sustainability after thirty years as the 'world's factory' are frequently nothing more than facades: for example, the ecovillage of Huangbaiyu had attracted only two households to move in a year after its completion (May, 2010). The wind power turbines that line the streets of Tianjin's eco-city are reportedly not connected to the electric grid of the city (Wong and Pennington, 2013). More troublesome is the paradox of hundreds of eco-projects being built amidst a national urban system marred by some of the most intensive environmental destruction on Earth. In the tradition of China's Great Wall, a continuous layer of smog stretching from Beijing to Shanghai is now visible from space and urban residents are taking to suing municipal governments over air pollution levels (Lee, 2014).

This collision of innovation and devastation is at the center of China's urban paradox. Environmental devastation, however, is only one aspect of Chinese cities that

calls their model status into question. Income inequality, lack of affordable housing, unrestrained urban construction creating massive 'ghost cities', rising municipal deficits, exclusionary institutions that inhibit mobility, displacement of populations, the loss of arable land, and government corruption, however, do not dissuade China's urban boosters of the long-term viability of its urban development model. Rather they are but caveats in an otherwise rosy urban future. Chinese cities are typically immune from the pathology of informality that infuses other studies of the urban global south. "No one is denying that Chinese cities don't have problems including unequal income distribution, pollution and growing traffic congestion," writes architect Adam Mayer, "yet China's megacities seem to have largely avoided social dangers such as violent crime, disease and slum proliferation that plague urban areas of other developing countries," (Mayer, 2011). It is the contention that China has achieved something that has eluded most of the world that is the hallmark of Chinese exceptionalism in its present form: uninterrupted economic growth free from the instability and social struggles that have accompanied the development project in the Global South.

China scholars have long been accused of failing to draw connections between their empirical work and theoretical trends in the social sciences (see for example, Leys, 1981). The so-called "Chinese exceptionalism" is not just characteristic of English-language China studies, but is increasingly prevalent among Chinese academics and government officials. Efforts over the past decade to bridge this gap in the subfield of urban studies have largely focused on the experience of Western cities as historical models for China's market transition, and as case studies of neoliberal urbanism (He and Wu, 2009; Wu, 2008, 2009, 2010). It is increasingly rare to find studies of China in the

context of cities in the global South. Chinese cities are instead trumpeted as models of success, demonstrations of China's return to greatness and the inevitability of the "Chinese century."

Yet the narrative of success is belied by environmental devastation, rising inequality, and thousands of protests over land expropriation each year on the urban periphery. Western scholarship frequently promotes the argument that China's urban problems arise from an unfinished transition—a process that must ultimately erase its past in order for market solutions to succeed. This narrative of "urban convergence" measures China's progress toward the full realization of advanced capitalism, with Shanghai and Beijing cast in the role of "world-cities-in-the-making" (Yusuf and Wu, 2002; Lo and Yeung, 1996; Taylor 2000; Li 2012). There is a fairly obvious underlying tautology here that capitalist development can and should be understood linearly and universally across time and space. Deng Xiaoping's maxim that China would "cross the river one stone at a time" suggested that the path would be discontinuous, gradual, and cautious (Shirk, 1993; Meisner, 1996), yet for most analysts, what is waiting on the other side of the river is rarely called into question. There is no question as to where China is headed and what kind of cities China is building (urban convergence), it is only a matter of how long it will take.[3] China's hope is in its capacity to homogenize—to replicate an idealized urban political economy rooted in Western experiences. There is an

[3] For market transition's adherents (and critics), identifying where China is in the capitalist development timeline is something of a cottage industry (Zhang and Peck, 2013). Walker and Buck (2007), while not dealing with *cities* specifically compare present-day China to the United States in 1890.

opportunity, some analysts observe, to innovate, to improve on the Western experience, but the basis for city-making remains more or less the same. When cities of less-developed countries are held in comparison, it is as urban China's antithesis to demonstrate the superiority of the Chinese development model. Slums, in this narrative, are a problem of weak states, the poor, and the undeveloped, none of which could be applicable to China the economic giant.

1.2 Urbanizing China: Literature Review

1.2.1 Assumptions

> "At a time when the USA has lost much of its global prestige and influence resulting from such failures as the war in Iraq and the September 2008 financial meltdown on Wall Street, when many developing countries are seeking lessons from China with the endorsement of experienced Western economists, and when economists, political scientists, geographers and planners are trying to make some sense of China's dramatic economic, urban and spatial transformations it is high time to ask what is the basic nature of China's authoritarian capitalism and why it has persisted in the last three decades without any signs of abatement," Laurence Ma, 2009

If the Chinese city is indeed some kind of model for the developing world, it is imperative to ask, what kind of spaces are being constructed in Chinese cities? What makes a city distinctively a "Chinese" city, and what, if anything, should developing countries be emulating based on the Chinese urbanization experience? For both its boosters and its critics, there is tremendous misunderstanding about the process of city-building and place-production in Chinese cities. This dissertation is an attempt to address this gap through a holistic analysis of a single Chinese city, Wuhan. There are several assumptions prevalent in the Chinese literature, several of which are inherently contradictory, that I am particularly interested in deconstructing:

a) Chinese cities are a rare story of **development success**. Economic growth has been achieved without the social disruption and problems associated with development elsewhere. Chinese cities are committed to harmony and sustainability. Chinese cities, for example, do not have slums or crime.

b) The success of Chinese cities is largely attributable to the **strength and unity of the party-state.** In general, the strength and unity of the party-state have enabled municipal authorities to undertake ambitious development projects with little resistance and the unchallenged authority of the Chinese Communist Party in governing Chinese cities facilitated the 'success' of urban development. The implication is that democracy would have inhibited or obstructed China's successful development.

c) China's urban transformation is best understood as part of a larger process of **transition from socialism to capitalism** (the "market transition")

d) China's urban transformation may be best understood **as a neoliberal one**

e) Problems with China's transition are largely the result of **contradictions between old and new institutions**: remnants of the socialist past and new institutions for the regulation of capitalism (the New Institutional Economics school).

There continues to be disconnect between the theoretical foundations of present-day China analysis, and the actual processes of policy conceptualization, formulation, and implementation that drive urban developments. This dissertation seeks to redress this gap through an analysis of these processes in Wuhan, the largest city of central China. Before proceeding with this empirical analysis, however, some theoretical steps must first be

taken. Structural and neoclassical explanations of urban development that reduce Chinese cities to globalized processes of neoliberalism, capital accumulation, and urban entrepreneurialism have achieved such prominence that it is necessary to systematically dismantle them before an empirical investigation of the Chinese city can begin in earnest. The first three chapters engage what I see as the three primary theoretical lenses through which China's urbanization are viewed. While each contributes toward understanding particular aspects of the urbanization process, neither stands on its own to explain the current outcomes and future trajectories of Chinese cities. However, when various strands of the theoretical literature are interwoven into the specific *processes* of city-building, a clearer picture of how we might understand the Chinese city is possible. The final chapters then, highlight the ideologies, policies, and actors driving specific city-building projects in Wuhan municipality.

1.2.2 The Scale of a Neoliberal Transition?

For some of the most widely read urban scholars, the transformation is best understood as a neoliberal transition: "The elements of neoliberalization, e.g. privatization and commodification, drastic inter and intraurban competition, and radical urban socio-spatial transformation, are emerging in China. Evidently, self-driven neoliberalism has penetrated urban China . . . More importantly, a new mode of urbanization, namely neoliberal urbanization, is emerging," (He and Wu, 2009: 284; also He and Wu, 2007)

In today's Chinese city, one indeed finds every manifestation of a 'neoliberal global order.' There are spaces of outlandish wealth in the commercial districts of Shanghai and the gated communities of Beijing, inhabited by the transnational recipients,

owners, and managers of capital flows and exchanges evocative of global cities, wealth, and fast-paced growth and development (Pow 2009; Wu et al 2005; Xu and Yang 2009). Yet these spaces coexist with pockets of extreme poverty (Meng et al, 2005; Fang et al, 2002; Khan and Riskin, 1998, 2005), wealth and investment has depended on the labor of underpaid and unprotected rural migrants (Lee, 1998; Chan, 2010; Ngai, 2010; Gong, 2013) and growth and development is often based on the confiscation of peasant lands at the hands of city officials and real estate developers (Chen, 2012; Tsing, 2010; Zhao and Webster, 2011). Depending on one's political predilections, China Urban can simultaneously demonstrate the power and potential of globalization and the depravity and injustice of a neoliberal world order.

Neoliberal critique has been incredibly useful in identifying and explaining specific processes of accumulation by dispossession and urban entrepreneurialism that are undeniably a part of China's urbanization process (McGee et al 2007; Lin, 2009). Still, neoliberalism has been too casually tossed about as an explanation of China's urban transformation. Castells was one of the first major urban theorists to connect China to generalized theory of spatial organization under global capitalism. In his description of the Pearl River Delta, Castells writes:

> "It is not the traditional megalopolis identified by Gottman in the 1960s on the north-eastern seaboard of the United States. Unlike this classical case, the Hong Kong-Guangdong metropolitan region is not made up of the physical conurbation of successive urban/suburban units with relative functional autonomy in each one of them. It is rapidly becoming an interdependent unit, economically, functionally, and socially… but there is considerable spatial discontinuity within the area, with rural settlements, agricultural land, and undeveloped areas separating the urban centers, and industrial factories being scattered all over the region. . . The internal linkages of the area and the indispensable connection of the whole system to the global economy via multiple communication links are the real backbone for this new spatial unit." (Castells 2004, 439).

Castells sees space as the *expression* of society, which is, itself, ultimately an expression of global capitalism. As this spatial organization is occurring in a wide variety of

differing local contexts, this expression must have its roots in some kind of universal phenomena. For Castells, it is the "dominant elites", the transnational capitalists whose expression of society is recreated in spaces across the globe. Through the flows of the network society, the ideals of a global network society are diffused across space. For Castells, the network creates, expands, and directs the organization of the local. The most local actors can hope for is to participate in, but not reshape the network.

He and Wu (2009) cite Brenner and Theodore's (2002) call for the study of "actually-existing neoliberalism" to understand how Chinese municipal officials are integrating with networks of global capitalism through an orientation toward 'neoliberal urbanism'. Similar claims are made most emphatically in much of George Lin's work (Lin, 1997, 2001, 2009; McGee et al, 2007). In this context, China's urban transition becomes a product of its 'neoliberal turn.' They argue that China's neoliberal turn is path-dependent, so the importance of existing institutions are recognized. However, I believe this does not go far enough. The weight of China's socialist institutions is so great as to undermine the utility of ideological explanations. Neither the "network society" nor neoliberalism on their own can explain the structures of unequal power in the Chinese system that create economic inequality. For example, Harvey writes of the intensive inter-urban competition underway in the Pearl River Delta where "each city is now trying to capture as much business as possible by outbuilding its neighbors, often with duplicative results," (Harvey 2005, 132). This is most certainly true, and has been a concern for scholars and government officials from a variety of political and economic backgrounds. But Harvey's explanation stops with the flows of capital made possible by state-owned banks and gives no attention to how the hierarchical state system promotes

this kind of competition through a process of evaluation that places a premium on cadres' ability to generate economic development, increase GDP, promote capital construction, and other economic factors within their jurisdictions that have not required rational planning on a regional scale (Whiting 2001, Yang and Wang 2008, Kung et al 2009; Chan 2004). In other words, the particular way space is organized and regulated in the Chinese context is obliterated by Harvey's commitment to the belief that space is always remade "in capital's image". Harvey believes that the party has "lined up against the masses" on the side of capital and the business elite: "China, we may conclude, has definitely moved toward neoliberalization and the reconstitution of class power," (Harvey 2005: 151). Yet it is one thing to identify the existence of socioeconomic inequality, and quite another to take that inequality as proof of a neoliberal order.[4] This is not to deny that the rural population and working class holds a subjugated position in China's evolving political economy, but the binary of Party-State and the Masses that Harvey clings to overlooks the multiple pushes and pulls of competing interests that determines state action, and does not recognize the dual structure of Chinese society that dates back to the 1950s (Cheng and Selden, Chan and Zhang 1999; Chan, 2009). A more intricate analysis of contemporary China's political economy is necessary to identify root causes of inequality that extend beyond the grand narrative of global capitalism. As I argue below, what matters for China is not necessarily the dialectic of the bourgeoisie and the

[4] This also ignores the conflicting signals emanating from Beijing and elsewhere particularly under the administration of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao that have sought, perhaps in vain, to alleviate the plight of rural farmers and migrant workers, and to move away from the ever-sharpening inequality that was a hallmark of the 'development at any cost' mentality in the Jiang Zemin years. -

proletariat, but rather the subjugation of rural households, resources, and land to the demands of municipal governments.

A rigorous understanding of China's urban transformation need not dismiss the observations of neoliberal critics, but also must foreground the institutions of spatial and political control created by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). These institutions are not 'remnants' or 'legacies' of a socialist past as they are so frequently described, but technologies of power actively employed by the party, state, and local officials to regulate and control urban spatial economies and politics. We must look more carefully, then, to the horizontal and vertical constructions of state power that leave wide spaces for conflict within the state and party, how central policy is transmitted through the hierarchies of government to the local level, and how responses to central policy are interpreted and at times exploited by actors along the way to generate unpredicted outcomes for economic growth, inequality, and patterns of spatial change. As Pickvance comments, "the idea that groups readily fall into line with planned changes in policy inspired by new ideologies announced from above is a fallacy," (Pickvance, 2011, 52). While Pickvance's comments are a direct critique of neoliberalism as explanation, they are just as insightful for considering how party dictums related to building a harmonious society, a new socialist countryside, or rural-urban integration are realized in urban policy outcomes. Perhaps more importantly, we must investigate the dual structure that regulates the ability of people to inhabit, use, occupy, and effect change in different kinds of space. The regulation of Chinese space does not fall neatly in accordance with Marxian class-distinctions of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, but according to administrative and conceptual categories that erect boundaries between neighborhoods,

between cities, and, most importantly, between rural and urban spaces (Tang and Chung 2000, 2002; Tang 2014, Chan 1994).

Neoliberal critique, to some extent, has attained such prominence within China studies due to the broader influence on geography of scale. Scale theory insists that it is both possible and necessary, especially when our object of analysis is the city, to consider the range of different geographical scales through which all action is organized, and how actions within different spatial scales are articulated together (Smith 1996, 2003; Brenner 1999, 2001). In other words, cities differ due to different connections with the global scale. Cities that are generally understood as succeeding in the present age (e.g. World Cities), are those that successfully "jump scales" so that what takes place in New York City is not understood as a localized act, but a global one. According to Neil Smith, scale organizes social activities within a hierarchy from the scale of the body to the local, regional, national and global (Smith 1992). Rescaling is the rearticulation of territorial power through processes of territorialization and de-territorialization (Swyngendouw, 2000). Within the frameworks of "actually existing neoliberalism" and "neoliberal urbanism", rescaling is understood as the decentralization of central state authority to individual cities (Swyngendouw and Baeten 2001). While this process rescales the authority to take action, the kinds of action necessary are increasingly understood as set through the circulation of ideas and policies at the *global* scale. In other words, "best practices" are established at the global scale while implementation is carried out at the scale of the city, and meaningful resistance can only occur when individuals "jump scales" to articulate their demands on the global scale (Smith 1992, 1993, 1996; Marston 2000). Despite a repeated insistence that scale is relational and not an "ontological given"

(Smith, 1992; Taylor 1984; Swyngendouw 2000), scale analysis quickly resorts to a discourse of hierarchical spatial organization with the global scale firmly entrenched at the top, where differences across cities are explained by the way they are inserted and relate with the world economy (MacLeod and Goodwin 1999).

In China, scale has been used to explain the practice of "city-leading county" that grants exceptional authority for the municipality to govern and control assets and resources of the surrounding countryside (Ma, 2005, 2008). Moreover, "scale jumping" or the "penetration of scales" is used to explain the power of one scale over higher level scales. New York, London, and Tokyo are frequently cited examples of cities whose influence transcends the city scale to greatly influence national and global scales. In the context of China, "scale-jumping" may be used to examine Beijing and Shanghai's national influence. In Hubei Province, for example, the formulation of the "Wuhan 8+1 City Circle Plan" places Wuhan at the center of a multi-city regional development project, and as the provincial capital, has a separate authority that at times rivals the nominally higher-ranked provincial government (See Chapter 6). Scale is indeed a tempting device for understanding changing central-local relations in the post-reform era. Decentralization, is viewed as a primary feature of China's development (Lin, 1997), but the capacity for the local state to capture and control revenue and other assets within its territorial jurisdiction signifies the "rescaling" of authority and power. Decentralization, relaxation of *hukou* controls, the establishment of new urban units, and the expanding borders of major cities have been seen as signs of rescaling (Ma, 2005).

The question is not really whether or not these processes of spatial reorganization are happening as described in a wide range of literature (Chung and Lam 2004; Chan

2010). Clearly they are, and it would be foolish to argue that the reform era has not fundamentally changed the relationships among individuals, local states, national states, the international community, and so on. However, I am not convinced that organizing spatial change according to scale is revealing or useful. First, as scale theorists acknowledge, the hierarchy of scales is not a pregiven, but is a "complex historical-geographical achievement," the outcome of ongoing conflicts and power struggles (Latham and McCormack, 2010). Scale analysis, however, tends toward predetermining all action, subsuming it to an existing web of relationships and institutions, a product of the way a particular scale resonates with higher-level scales. Despite a focus within China studies on central-local "scale relations," scale analysis almost always takes the global as its reference point. In this way, all spatial change is once again theorized as the outcome of global capitalism. Local actors are seen as primarily oriented toward making appeals to lure capital from out of the ether of the global scale. Urban construction is reduced to urban entrepreneurialism and capital attraction. Scale analysis privileges and reifies the power of capitalism as something "out there" that acts on lower scales while remaining immune to all local action and activity.

Cities, indeed, a majority of the sites social scientists deem worthy of study, predate capitalism in some form or another. Place-making is not just about entrepreneurialism and capital appeals, it is also the bringing together of "place and human capacity" (Zaloom, 2012). In both the types of buildings created and their use by inhabitants, value beyond and outside of capital is created. Sites reflect the networks, connections, and lines of relationality that go into their conceptualization and actualization. As such, they are heterogeneous and reflect a multitude of interests, ideas,

and ways of inhabiting, occupying, and imagining the city. Scale analysis too often represents "The City" as a social whole, "bounded, organic and solid" implying a "homogenous unity, an implication that contradicts all modern urban experience and ignores all its fissures and fractures," (Bender, 2012).

Scale is ill-equipped to make sense of the heterogeneity of city space. For example, at what scale should we view *chengzhongcun*? The inhabitants of *chengzhongcun* include original village residents, rural-urban migrants (many of whom might share a place of origin, many of whom do not), low-income urban residents, college students seeking an alternative to dorms, and recent college grads just getting started in the city (Zheng et al, 2009; He et al, 2010). Some *chengzhongcun* are entirely residential while others contain a hybrid of agricultural, entrepreneurial, industrial, commercial and other activities (Tian, 2008). Some create and maintain intensive linkages with the surrounding city, others are almost entirely self-enclosed. To what scale do *chengzhongcun* and the individuals who inhabit and utilize them belong? At the same time, *chengzhongcun* are not an isolated feature of individual cities, but are a shared attribute of cities all over China. Moreover, there is a clear relationship between the intensity of the city's connections to the global economy and the scope and prominence of *chengzhongcun.* Scale analysis would lead us to view the creation and elimination of *chengzhongcun* as a process of "territorialization", the rescaling of urban authority—yet the move away from agriculture toward other economic activities and the transformation of village space generally precedes the informal incorporation by external urban units. In terms of demolition, *chengzhongcun* by definition have already formed linkages with the city in one way or another before they are targeted for redevelopment.

As an alternative, assemblage enables us to imagine the networks, connections, and lines that sometimes emerge into a scale (i.e., the city) without reducing the social and political to a product of scaled capital relations (deLanda et al, 2013)—viewing scale as social effects does not make them less real, but it does so "without reducing the power or reality of the effects they create," (Latham and McCormack, 2010). At the same time, it allows us to reject the totality of scale—we can at once recognize there is an entity called "Wuhan" that emerges from its multiple components, but its relevance for social action is neither constant nor consistent. Migrants, for example, engage in anonymous market relations in the rental of housing and entrepreneurial space and employment (Solinger, 1999, Meng and Zhang 2001; Fan 2002). However they also participate in familial and social networks that take place within the destination city and in their homeplace (Morband, 2006; Zhang Li 2001, Liu et al 2012). In their resistance to wholesale elimination, original residents of *chengzhongcun* draw on multiple and overlapping identities, connections, and relationships that are simultaneously based on their status within and beyond the city scale (Chapter 6). Policy mobility is not just about the diffusion of ideas from a globally-scaled starting point, but horizontal exchanges between diversely located actors. District and municipal officials participate in exchanges in people's congresses, international conferences, personal connections, study tours, and the rotation of high-ranking officials in the *nomenklatura* system (Chan 2004). Wuhan's place within the province and nation is not pre-defined *a priori* by existing and fixed scalar relations, but by the physical presence of provincial party and government bureaus inside of Wuhan. This alone should suggest that Wuhan, as the capital of Hubei, gives shape to the province just as the province shapes the city. Efforts to construct a

unified imaginary of Wuhan as seen through municipal and provincial documents expresses one potential trajectory for future urban development, but does not necessarily make it a reality. The expansion of Wuhan governmental offices into surrounding districts and the expansion of infrastructure (especially roads) extends relations and connections that capture and direct value, but does not subsume local sites to a totalizing scaled authority any more so than the construction of high-speed rail links to Guangzhou and Beijing subsumes Wuhan under a distantly constructed scale.

Employing assemblage and actor-network perspectives on the city allows for an expanded understanding of the agents and objects that engender change and create localized ideas and uses of space. Scale analysis that presupposes the hegemony of global capitalism disallows for any meaningful social action that does not overtly dismantle that scale, a proposition that seems out of reach for the majority of actors whose world is largely experienced through personal and localized encounters. Through assemblage, the potential sites of action and the capacity of different agents to create social change are multiplied beyond the singular scale of 'global' resistance. It is a multiplication of the actors involved in the making of a place, so there is an "increase in the number of contingencies and points of potential intervention, thus increasing opportunities for responsible action," (Bender, 2010). I will further articulate my intent with the use of assemblage theory below, but first, there other prominent discursive narratives informing Chinese cities that require attention.

1.2.3 Transition to and from what? Chinese Socialism, Capitalism, and the dual structure

Prominent analyses of China's urbanization begin with the assumption that China is in the process of transitioning from socialism to capitalism (Naughton 1996, 2007; Lardy 1998, 2004), or to paraphrase David Bray, China studies have substituted a teleology of capitalism for a teleology of socialism (Bray 2005). Yet, institutions for the regulation and governance of a "socialist" political economy persist in the reform period. Those of the greatest importance are the continued authority of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the multiple institutions of the dual structure that differentially regulate rural and urban categories of space (Xu 2011; Chan 1998, 2009, 2010). To explain the persistence of these institutions, scholars draw on the "New Institutional Economics" to describe China's transition as path-dependent, but still recognizable as a market transition.[5] The primary assumption that distorts these analyses is that the socialist institutions of the dual structure are *remnants* or *legacies* of Maoist era that come into conflict with private, market-oriented developments under 'reform socialism,' (Kornai, 1992; Coase and Wang, 2012). An analysis of China's urbanization must understand these institutions not as archaic remnants impeding capitalist transition or last-ditch efforts by the state to reign in the inevitable tide of capitalism, but as active and evolving

[5] Douglas North's initial analyses of relations among institutions and individuals called for a nuanced approach to path-dependence (North, 1991), but it has been used in much of the Chinese literature as a catch-all means for explaining away divergences from both neoclassical and neoliberal models of urban development (Wu, Lin, 2009).

instruments of state power to regulate social and political forces including, but not limited to, capitalism (Xu 2011, Deng 2012).

In the transition literature, socialism is taken for granted to mean state ownership of the means of production. Contradictions, then, are often seen as a matter of efficiency: socialist institutions which are based on state ownership cannot possibly function effectively for the regulation of capitalism and the safeguarding of economic efficiency. Government interventions in the economy based on a legacy of state ownership naturally create inefficiencies. Socialism also denotes a degree of redistribution on the basis of need to prevent inequality across society—production is to be valued for its *use* value to society as a whole rather than serve as a foundation for capital accumulation. In Victor Nee's first incarnation of market transition, he importantly framed the transition of what China *had been* and *what it would become* as a difference between the beneficiaries under state socialism versus markets: under state socialism, the beneficiaries are not "the people" but the redistributors (primarily cadres), whereas under markets, the beneficiaries are the direct producers (Nee 1989). This is all well and good in an ideal-type command economy, but there was a larger structure to Chinese socialism at work that Nee and his intellectual descendants did not identify. Chinese socialism from the PRC's inception was established in emulation of a Stalinist model to enable the state's accumulation of capital, and that accumulation regime was based on the extraction of resources from one sector to be transferred to the other. Cadres and political functionaries certainly benefitted from their positions as overseers of the redistributive economy, but in the grand scheme of Mao's China, the urban industrial sector was the ultimate winner in this decidedly unequal system of

exchange premised on the exploitation of the peasantry (Bideleux 1985). As this dissertation argues, this basic relationship continues today, sustained by the dual structure and Leninist power structure.[6]

Transforming Chinese socialism is not about resolving a binary of socialist equality versus capitalist efficiency, it must begin with an understanding of a particular development model where a minority of the population profits from the repression of the majority. Deng Xiaoping famously said that it no longer mattered the color of the cat so long as it catches the mouse. The cat, however, still has a master. These are the Chinese characteristics of socialism with the primacy of the party as paramount: a Leninist structure that governs and regulates China's economy regardless of private or state-ownership classifications while creating wildly different life opportunities for its population in either realm. The development model continues to be based on and regulated by the exploitative dual structure. Transition frameworks construct the marketization of the economic system as a path to resolve inefficiency while largely ignoring the conflicts that arise from lack of political participation, inclusion, and citizenship such as those created by the *hukou* system. While marketization itself creates new inequalities within political and administrative categories, the inequalities of Chinese

[6] By "Leninist" hierarchy or power structure, I refer to the complex, top-down organizational structure of government, bureaucracy, and state-owned corporations. Leninist institutions are also characterized by "rigid rules" for monitoring and evaluating cadres throughout the hierarchy (Heilmann 2005; Shirk 1993; Lieberthal 1992).

socialism persist. These are not contradictions *between* systems, but contradictions *within* Chinese socialism that includes both state *and* market.

Despite the shortcomings of the transition narrative, the increased attention to institutions in urban development has provided some insight into the processes giving cities their basic developmental trajectories.[7] The dual structure as an institution has had a tremendous impact on the spatial outcomes of Chinese cities as they engage new kinds of institutional and organizational relationships. One such outcome is the *chengzhongcun. Chengzhongcun* are villages that are spatially encompassed or encroached upon by a nearby city. Due to a number of institutional barriers, the villages retain somewhat independent status and are not incorporated into the city proper, and frequently retain their administratively rural status (Zhang 2005). *Chengzhongcun* differ profoundly from patterns of suburban expansion familiar in the United States. Suburbs in the West were generally understood as driven by changes in residential demand as residents of the urban core moved to the city's outskirts, a process of the "inside moving out." C*hengzhongcun* are often driven by industrial growth, and population growth is almost entirely driven by the "outside moving in"—that is to say, populations in the hinterlands moving closer to the city and an influx of interprovincial migrants attracted by new industrial employment and the availability of affordable housing which they

[7] For example, political institutions and incentives that encourage certain kinds of urban construction and development (Cartier, 2001), the role of "socialist land-masters"—bureaucratic and other public organizations with *de facto* ownership of large tracts of urban land that influence development plans for both state and private actors (Hsing, 2006; 2010), the importance of the spatial administrative hierarchy for the allocation of public resources (Chan, 2009) and cadre incentive structures (Whiting, 2002).

cannot obtain in larger urban centers (Zhang and Zhao 2003, Song et al 2008). Yet there is increasingly a higher number of people from the city moving to the *chengzhongcun*, particularly college students (Zheng et al 2008, Liu et al 2010, He et al 2011).

While *chengzhongcun* can vastly differ in their appearance, environment, economic and population structures, they share several common features. They form on the outskirts of very large cities, they accommodate a large number of migrants (migrants outnumber "locals" by a ratio as high as 30:1 in some locations), and are marked by rapid and often unchecked transformations of the economy, landscape, and built environment (Zhang 2005, Webster and Mueller 2002). The Chinese press, government officials, and even English-language scholarship portray *chengzhongcun* as sites of unruliness, disorder, and social decay, but they also play a vital role in China's current development strategy, and are among the most dynamic spaces in China today.

There are countless articles on China's urbanization in the reform period, yet the phenomenon of *chengzhongcun* is barely noticed in most Western literature, or treated simply as a planning issue. However, in the words of Michael Leaf, *chengzhongcun* provide "an entrée into consideration of both the vision of the future city . . . and a particular component of the underlying political economies of development at local levels," (Leaf 2007, 169). *Chengzhongcun* offer a window into the contestations of power among multiple scales of the state to define development goals, capture revenue and other spoils of the development and urbanization process, and individual and household struggles to create and adapt to new kinds of communities and spatial constructions. Unfortunately, most of the existing literature on *chengzhongcun* takes its analysis no further than to represent them as aberrations of a poorly developed land

market—*chengzhongcun* and the dramatic social and spatial transformations they embody are reduced to the consequence of economic inefficiencies (Tian 2008). The problems associated with *chengzhongcun*—chaotic construction, crime, and poverty—are blamed on the *chengzhongcun* themselves rather than the underlying social and economic institutions that continue to unfairly divide rural and urban spheres.

At the same time, many *chengzhongcun* have been reclassified as "urban," but they have not been fully assimilated into the urban imaginary. Zhang Li's description of Zhejiangcun in Beijing is particularly perceptive: "A village within the city stands as an anomaly, something out of place and incompatible with the existing urban order of things," (Zhang Li 2001, 19). They are simultaneously within and outside of the city. This is true in practical terms as they are often physically within the jurisdiction of the city but outside of its conceptual space. They serve the city, but are not fully part of it. They are highly localized and often self-governed, but in numerical terms, their population is dominated by thousands of "outsiders," migrants without local *hukou*. As city governments claim rights to the use of land and the power to determine local futures, they increasingly become sites of contestation as well. Although city governments have an overwhelming advantage in whatever contests arise, they are contested nonetheless. Additionally, the people who inhabit urban villages, both local and non-local, continually re-imagine what it means to be rural or urban. In so doing, they challenge the spatial basis of state-society relations in contemporary China.

1.2.4 Making Places: Urban Entrepreneurialism and the Global City

In reference to Edward Soja's well-known maxim "it all comes to LA," Fulong Wu notes that "it" is now all coming to China as well:

> "On the one hand, China is still a pre-modern developing country that is experiencing modernity and urbanization; on the other, the most ostentatious self-expression of postmodern architecture, which is not even possible in Western economies, is solicited for place-making," (Wu and Yeh, 2006: 16).

The drive to eliminate *chengzhongcun* from China's urban cores coincided with the prevalence of 'world cities' discourses in Western urban studies (Friedmann 1986; Knox and Taylor 1995; Sassen 2001; Beaverstock et al 1999) that had a tremendous impact on Chinese urban planners and municipal leaders. World Cities discourse had great appeal for pro-market scholars, journalists, urban planners, city boosters, and municipal officials around the globe. It resonated with contemporary intellectual shifts that decentered the nation-state from political economy and other forms of analysis that increasingly identified cities as the defined geographic locales in which the abstract ideas of globalization were being actualized (Brenner and Theodore 2002). In identifying a handful of characteristics that constitute a world city, it also resonated with the "end of history" thesis and capitalist triumphalism that increasingly squeezed alternative modes of city-building and governance from policymakers' toolkits (Fukuyama 1989). With New York City and London (and to a lesser extent, Tokyo) acknowledged as the crème de la crème of world cities, the already growing influence of neoliberal policy packages were amplified. In working backwards to universalize the particular historical and economic transformations of New York City and London in the 1980s and 1990s, world cities discourse established a set of practices and ideals that the collective actors organizing urban development could emulate, a package of neoliberal policy prescriptions that gave priority to capital attraction (especially foreign), massive investment in transportation and network infrastructures, monumentalism, and creation of new sites for mass consumption (Taylor, 2000, Shin and Timberlake 2000). Identified as

central nodes with immense power and control over the global economy, "world city" status took root in the urban imaginaries of city boosters around the world (Thornley and Newman 2011, Yulong and Hamnett 2002).

The world city discourse also encouraged the transformation from managerial governance in cities to "urban entrepreneurialism" first identified by Harvey (1989). Even if cities could not rival the financial, cultural, and political influence of the elite urban centers, they could mimic their physical forms and embrace the new "entrepreneurial" spirit of governance. Cities from Baltimore to Beijing increasingly competed for corporate headquarters, large transnational corporations, international financial institutions, law firms and stock exchanges.[8]

For Chinese planners, the world city crated a model for the projection of authority, wealth, and modernity in the built environment. These qualities can be instrumental to state legitimacy as demonstrations for both residents and foreign observers of the remarkable capacity of the Chinese state to project its will. Increasing cynicism over Western models coupled with growing confidence in their own development regimes and cultural-political imperatives to establish a more distinct

[8] For example, the cottage industry of ranking world cities often use these features as primary indicators of world city status. See Beaverstock et al (1999); Godfrey and Zhou (1999). Global City rankings are also employed by private firms. Global management consulting firm AT Kearney has created its own rankings since 2008, stating that, "Globally integrated cities are intimately linked to economic and human development. By creating an environment that spawns, attracts, and retains top talent, businesses, ideas, and capital, a global city can generate benefits that extend far beyond municipal boundaries," http://www.atkearney.com/research-studies/global-cities-index/full-report

identity have influenced a shift in city-building in Asia, captured in *Worlding Cities*, a collected volume edited by Ong and Roy (2011). In the introduction, Ong argues that "city ambitions" are "reimagined in relation to shifting forms and norms of being global" and "inter-city" should not just be a qualifier for "competition" but also comparison, referencing, and modeling. Ong's opening analysis highlights the ways cities in Asia imagine and construct themselves that are not always in reference to unifying principles of capitalist logic, but that are actively about creating or recreating unique and separated identities. At the same time, modeling and inter-referencing practices lead to an archetypical Asian city that symbolizes order and a strong state, prosperity and sustainability, and most importantly, *success*. Again, scale analysis is a tempting, yet inappropriate framework for understanding this circulation of policy ideas and best practices. Place-making practices are not disseminated downward from the globe to "lower" scales. It is through the horizontal individual and collective networks of exchange and relationships within and beyond borders that place-making practices circulate.

Even if Chinese city-makers are attempting to carve their own urban identities, the world cities discourse promoted the use of urban space to project globally. While it is useful to unseat neoliberalism's theoretical dominance, it is naive to dismiss the continued prominence of not just Western capitalism from Asian cities, but also the important referencing and modeling in the West that continues to play out, particularly in Chinese spaces of monumentalism and consumption. More importantly, the image of an all-powerful and capable urban governing regime is undermined by environmental devastation, staggering levels of inequality, and protests in opposition to state-led

expropriation of collective land. Through the 1980s and 1990s, urban officials often made spurious claims that "China has no slums", and this is still an exhortation that can be heard inside and outside the country. Further undermining these claims is UN-Habitat data that identifies China as having the most slums and the highest absolute number of slum dwellers in the world (UN Habitat 2003, 2010)[9]. A more recent and moderated version of the "no slums" refrain holds that "China has no slums like the ones found in India or Brazil"-- a tacit acknowledgement that while China may have slumlike areas, they do not exhibit the sprawl or physical dilapidation of prototypical slums in the global South.

1.2.5 Summary

The preceding frameworks each have their advantages and disadvantages for understanding the contemporary Chinese city. Neoliberal critique employing primitive accumulation/accumulation by dispossession does illuminate some of the logic behind the breakneck construction, investment, and expansion underway in most Chinese cities. Yet it is ultimately totalizing, reducing the heterogeneous and diverse interests of state agents and other social actors involved in city-making and Chinese cultural traditions to the imperatives of global capital. The dual-structure framework highlights the continued relevance and adaptability of Maoist-era institutions in the reform era, undermining a market transition narrative that projects linear progress from socialism to capitalism. It also sheds light on the local state's power to employ such institutions in the practice of

[9] However, China ranks fairly low in slum dwellers per capita.

biopower for the discipline of the largely migrant workforce and the regulation of city space. However, the dual-structure is not as rigid or confining as it once was, and while I have argued that we need to be skeptical of 'reforms' that appear to herald the death knell of the *hukou* system (Chan and Buckingham, 2008), rural and urban boundaries have been profoundly altered by decades of reform, and are being reformulated again as municipalities attempt greater control and coordination of their hinterlands. Finally, World Cities discourse presents a set of characteristics or features that municipal officials and civic leaders around the globe should aspire to for their cities. The presence of slums, old, dilapidated housing stock, chaotic traffic, and informal markets are the most visible symbols of 'backwardness' that must be eliminated to improve the city's image and appeal to capital investment. Yet the ways in which local actors imagine the city, the ways in which local populations live the city, and the ways in which populations resist the bulldozer of state-led property development complicate the world-city imaginary. The World City ideal is confounded by the reality of Chinese cities that remain messy, heterogeneous, and unpredictable.

The Chinese city, then, is not a site that can be comfortably wrapped in any of the discursive blankets that dominate contemporary urban geography. For too long, urban geographers working on China have been trapped by the state's formal definition of rural and urban and their own preconceptions of what characterizes each sector. The story of decentralization simply replaces the national "scale" of China with an urban one that does not really alter the way hierarchy and spatial power are understood (Lin 1999, 2009). The dual structure has been considered as an institutionalized protection for cities against peasant incursion, or preserving farmland against the threat of overdevelopment and

industrialization (Chan 1994). Such frameworks have their usefulness, yet they also reproduce a spatial dialectic that distinguishes rural and urban spaces according to state constructed boundaries rather than the processes, production, and exchange that goes on inside of rural territories. This promotes intellectual assumptions that legitimize state regulation of *who* should be doing *what* and where, rather than promoting the agency of rural subjects to make alternative life-choices. Rather than a technology of state power that separately regulates and governs urban or rural space, the dual structure is more and more becoming one of many tools for municipal governments to regulate existing territories and incorporate more territory within their direct and indirect governance. Attempts to modify, adapt, or reform the dual structure, especially the *hukou* system, do not start from a premise of enfranchising rural peasants or bringing the spatial economy in line with market-capitalist logics, but from bureaucratic and technical demands for cities to manage the pace, scale, and character of economic development. Although the diffuse and overbounded territory of the Chinese city continues to be beset with institutional barriers between rural-urban sectors (as well as between units of the same type), they are more and more coming to be, not just imagined as a single territory, but actualized in economic, political, and social practice seeking to unify the city in the production of a shared desire among multiple interests to construct and assemble a modern, world-class city (Hsing, 2010).

In this context, to ask "is China neoliberal" is a fruitless endeavor because it never has been a yes or no question. Instead, we need to examine the multiple networks of ideas and power, the movement of people across space, and, yes, capital, to understand the vast ontological assemblage of the contemporary Chinese city. In the context of

debates about the drivers of China's economic development, Fligstein and Zhang (2011) note that "there is some empirical support for all of these positions," [10] suggesting that a far more flexible approach to understanding Chinese cities and their political economies is necessary, one that allows for multiple economic ideas, but also for the ways people may adjust their behavior according to spatial, temporal, and social contexts. That China's cities have adapted to expand their potential for greater levels of capital accumulation does not give capital explanatory power for China's spatial transformation and political economy. Nor can any single logic, be it *guanxi*, the institutional straitjacket of the dual structure, or state-imposed policies for modernization. Because a system or decision is conducive to capital accumulation does not mean it is compelled or driven by it. For this reason, I agree in part with the arguments made by Ong (2007, 2011) and others who argue that Chinese cities are *assemblages*. However, neither Ong nor Siu have made a systematic analysis of the Chinese city in terms of assemblage theory, per se. I also share the concerns of assemblage's skeptics who question the ability of the framework to accommodate questions of power (Brenner et al, 2007, Featherstone, 2011). In order to understand the Chinese city, the task, then, is to

[10] Fligstein and Zhang specifically refer to the conflicting accounts of China's development based on literatures on market transition scholarship, the developmental state, and cultural arguments based on *guanxi.* As they write: "The main theoretical problem is that the factors that are supposed to have led to Chinese economic growth are also held to have made that growth less than it could be, or the factors that had driven economic growth at one time period became barriers later. Given there is some empirical support for all these positions, this implies that the empirical work is probably based on a non-random or narrow sample. Part of this reflects the size of the country and the heterogeneity of the development projects. But more importantly, this reflects the limits of empirical study and the lack of systematic, overarching theoretical thinking about what is happening.

disassemble the assemblage—to sort out the competing, converging, and interrelated interests that envision, construct, regulate, and inhabit the Chinese city.

1.3 Theoretical Framework: Assembling an Articulation

"Experience both sustains the urban imaginary and disrupts it. The urban imaginary, like history, is incorporated into the urban assemblage, but that in turn prompts yet another formation, transformation, and realignment of networks. This mobility opens up space fissures and fractures in our experience that protect us from the dangers of reification," (Bender, 2010, 318).

Assemblage as I use it here arises from Manuel DeLanda's reconstruction of Deleuze (DeLanda, 1997, 2006; DeLanda et al 2013). Rather than viewing all social phenomena and entities (i.e., cities) as *mental constructions*, DeLanda argues that social entities are *real*, but are products of "specific historical processes, and whatever degree of identity they have, it must be accounted for via the processes which created them and those that maintain them" (DeLanda et al 2013). For DeLanda, Deleuze's 'neo-realist ontology' can be used to solve problems of agency and structure linking micro and macro processes without resorting to the hierarchical structure of scale: "In this ontology all that exists in the actual world is singular individual entities whose main difference from each other is spatio-temporal . . . There are no totalities such as 'society as a whole', but a nested set of singular (unique, historically contingent) beings nested within one another like a Russian doll," (Ibid., 6). The city (or for that matter, the region, nation, and so on) "emerges" as a whole from the multiplicity of its components (built environment, infrastructure, individuals, organizations and institutions, government), and must be continuously maintained by the interactions among the parts: "Interacting persons yield institutional organizations; interacting organizations yield cities; interacting cities organize the space in which nation states emerge and so on. This changes the very way in which the problem of

agency and structure is posed since the term "structure" illegitimately conflates several scales and deprives organizations and cities of causal agency." (Ibid.)

Analysis of cities through assemblage theory, then, must being with the interactions among individuals and what we might call "micro-assemblages"—the neighborhoods, institutions, and organizations that make up the city. In this framework, notions of power can be explicitly addressed in exploring the agency required to maintain or reproduce the type, scale, and frequency of interactions through laws, social norms, the regulation of space, and discursive production. Social change, here, is the outcome of active efforts to challenge or otherwise alter those interactions.

1.3.1 Strengths of assemblage theory

Out of the empirical chapters, I attempt to identify how the city of Wuhan emerges as a messy, dynamic, yet, still uniquely identifiable place. Multiple actors assemble the city of Wuhan, not out of a prepackaged toolbox of neoliberal or market construction, but through the alternatively collaborative and competing visions of what it means to build, construct, live in, move about, and inhabit the city. Assemblage theory avoids the straitjacket of Marxist structuralism that reduces agency to the singular motivation of capital accumulation. In confronting the complex influences and interests that motivate actors within an urban site, assemblage decenters the totalizing tendencies of political economy and Marxist critique without ignoring the very real injustices and inequalities that capitalist logics create, exacerbate, and perpetuate. Yet it carries the potential to embed capitalism and economic interest within an intricate network of overlapping and at times contradictory motives and interests coming together in a dynamic urban space. Following McFarlane and Anderson (2011), assemblage allows us to "describe alignments or wholes

between different actors without losing sight of the specific agencies" that form them. It is "a form of relational thinking that acknowledges the agency of wholes *and* parts." It is also the play between "stability and change, order and disruption." For Chinese cities, assemblage can move us beyond the linear and tautological narrative of market transition to acknowledge the impulses and incentives created by a Maoist political organization developing and engaging capitalist economies. We can consider, for example, how a collective memory shaped by the ghosts of the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, and the Tiananmen Square massacre influences engagements with capitalism, markets, and a rapidly changing culture. Additionally, it shines a light on the way the one-party state and Marxist-Leninist institutions like the *hukou* system bend but do not break to accommodate shifting social and political desires of officials at every level of China's governing regime. Thinking of these forces as components of a path-dependent market development (Lin 1999, 2010; Clarke et al 2008; Peck and Zhang 2013) reduces these forces to quirks in an otherwise familiar and recognizable march to capitalism.[11] Assemblage can simultaneously be conducive to a decentering of capitalism and political economy while not ignoring or underestimating its relevance.

Assemblage also overcomes the shortcomings of scale analysis that gives too much primacy to scaled hierarchies. Ignoring for the moment the presumed supremacy of the global scale, the domestic hierarchy of government is too frequently assumed as absolute

[11] Fulong Wu has attempted to position "path-dependence" in opposition to convergence narratives (e.g. Wu, 2004), but his own accounts of neoliberal urbanism, explored in Chapter 2, tend to reaffirm a trajectory toward neoliberalism, albeit with some institutional divergences. Moreover, he does not differentiate "market transition", a term he uses with great regularity, from "convergence".

in the urban literature. The spatial hierarchy of China's governance from the central government to the township is well-established (Chan and Hu, 2003). However, these do not represent actual scales of action and authority. In an environment of experimentation, urban action is negotiated within a wider range of local political actors, and local cadres tolerate or even encourage activities that openly defy the dictates of higher levels while paying lip-service to the latest proclamations from Beijing in formal documents (see, for example, Abramson, 2011b). Even in the structured hierarchy of the party-state, outcomes are not easily predicted by central policy—it is the criss-crossing relationships, tensions, and negotiations in regional governing structures that reveal the constraints to central authority. In Lin's analysis of land politics, for example, he takes central mandates on farmland protection at face value (Lin, 2009). Cai and Wang similarly uses central proclamations on labor and *hukou* reform as proof that China has developed beyond the Lewis transition (Cai and Wang 2008, 2010). But as Allen reminds us, "Just because the central state is 'higher up', institutionally and geographically, does not pre-judge whose will eventually prevails," (Allen, 2011, 155). It is the relationship between "levels of governments" that matter—formal institutions of government operate alongside, but also within, complex forms of networked governance (Allen and Cochrane 2007).

In assemblage theory, the future is less predictable than the "market transition" or neoliberal thesis suggests because of the inevitable shifts in alignments and relationships that make up assemblages. A straightforward political economy approach, then, is ill-equipped to deal with the unpredictability of social and political action. Assemblage embraces the "friction" that leads to unintended consequences and unpredictable outcomes of policies developed 'elsewhere' in their actualization on the ground (McCann, 2013).

When all authority is negotiated, the wider range of 'local' political actors open up persuasive, and potentially manipulative ploys to skew agendas and steer growth targets in directions that may not have been fully anticipated by 'national' (and other) actors" (Allen and Cochrane, 2007). Instead of attempting to explain away theoretical contradictions, assemblage embraces them. As Allen tells us, "the appeal of assemblage is its ability to grasp how something heterogeneous as the nation-state or the region hold together without ceasing to be heterogeneous," (Allen, 2011).

In addition, assemblage acknowledges the dynamism of actors who may hold a variety of beliefs, and behave differently at different times. Clarke et al (2008), for example, provide data showing that business transactions in China are predominantly made on the basis of rational-choice. This data is employed to reject the thesis that familial and place-based relationships (*guanxi*) drive industrial and business organizations. At the same time, anthropologists and some sociologists continue to assert the primacy of *guanxi* to understanding Chinese economic behavior (Kipnis 2006, 2007; Nonini 2008). But as DeLanda points out, individual behavior need not conform to the dictates of "rational-choice" or the dictates of routine and traditional procedures. Instead, he asks, "why can't it be both?" (DeLanda et al, 2013) People often make "rational" choices, matching means to an end, in "high intensity situations in which new problems must be solved or where subversive solutions must be invented." But there is also a following of traditional routines in which the existing social order (i.e. *guanxi*, Confucianism, paternalism) is routinely reproduced. "Clearly, both situations coexist in social reality all the time." (Ibid. 72)

1.3.2 Assemblage as Critique

For DeLanda, the idea that history moves through stages, is an ontological trap that is difficult to escape for intellectuals from neoclassical economists to neo-Marxists. The linear and progressive view of history imbues nearly every commentary on China's developments. The 'modern' history of China begins sometime in the mid-late late 19th-century with the Tongzhi Restoration and "self-strengthening" movement characterized by the selective adoption of Western technologies. This period includes increasingly intensive interactions with European and American powers, the ceding of territories, the forced creation of open ports, and multiple rebellions culminating in the 1911 collapse of Imperial system. Neither the Republic of China founded in 1911 or the People's Republic established in 1949 were able to simply erase away thousands of years of political, bureaucratic, and cultural history (no matter how hard Mao and the Gang of Four may have tried). The initiation and carrying out of widespread reforms over the past several decades does not mean that three decades of Maoism never happened, to say nothing of the thousands of years that preceded them. The reform era is built on the past, and continues to be built on the structures of socialist institutions and the party-state. In most political science and economic treatments, this is characterized as path-dependence (i.e. 'path-dependent capitalism' or 'path-dependent neoliberalism', see for example, Wu 2010, Young 2014). While acknowledging that the past will influence the present and future, it is inherently misleading to describe history as path-dependent. It reaffirms the linear movement of countries through historical stages by allowing for a token amount of diversity in the final outcomes. But the path and history still have an end, and in China's

case, this is largely seen as a quirky, yet ultimately recognizable variant of capitalism (Peck and Zhang, 2013).

Market transition narratives are incapable of seeing past profit-rationality because the past is held as something that happened "before", and its lingering effects simply the result of institutional lag. This is most prominently displayed in analysis informed by the "new-institutional economics" (NIE). The character of Chinese capitalism and Chinese cities here are the result of contradictions between socialist and capitalist institutions[12] (Kornai 1992, Qian and Wu 2003, Lin 2012). That these contradictions will dissipate as more fully capitalist institutions are established is the underlying assumption of market transition theory and has informed the research of prominent commentators on China (Nee 1989; Lardy 1998). It is a logic that is deployed to justify dispossession, expropriation, inequality, forced evictions, environmental destruction, and massive layoffs for the sake of a harmonious future. Under Mao, repression and violence against the people was similarly justified as necessary for building socialism. Today, it is necessary for the construction of 'socialism with Chinese characteristics.' Of "transition" Chinese critic Wang Hui writes that it is a myth which claims that "the unemployment, inequality, and decline of social security will be erased once the utopia of free markets are actualized," (Wang Hui 2003, pg. 8).

NIE, while explaining the ongoing importance of the CCP and socialist institutions to understanding the Chinese political economy, constructs a false dichotomy between

[12] This argument is made most explicitly by Kornai () and North (). Their influence can be seen in the work of prominent Chinese economists Wu Jinglian () and Justin Yifu Lin ().

socialism and capitalism, and between state and market. In Phillip Huang's lengthy review of this work, he cautions that market transition views:

> "take for granted that 'transition' means a total transition from plan to market, socialism to capitalism. Neither considers 'transition' from the point of view of the coexistence of the two, and hence both neglect the nature of their changing interrelationship," Philip Huang (2011)

Additionally, it does not consider the way the state consciously employs the supposed contradictions between socialism and capitalism to serve as the foundation for its accumulation regime, and to advance an agenda for the production and reproduction of state power that, while adapted to be conducive to capitalist relations, is not beholden to or driven by them.

1.3.3 Powerless Assemblages

While assemblage opens avenues toward a non-totalizing understanding of the creation of social space, it has been critiqued for epistemological and methodological failures. For Brenner et al (2007), it cannot account for the hierarchies of capitalist-based power, the "context of all contexts" that give sites their ultimate functional identity. Just as assemblage sought to undo the totalizing of all space and society under capitalist logics, it was itself seemingly unable to adequately incorporate capitalism into its frameworks. Stuart Hall's disillusionment with Laclau and Mouffe's version of articulation is applicable to assemblage as it is used today: "there is no reason why anything is or isn't potentially articulable with anything else. The critique of reductionism has apparently resulted in the notion of society as a totally open discursive field," (Hall 1986, quoted in Hart 1996: 146). Indeed, in their contribution to the edited volume *Urban Assemblages*, Latham and

McCormack launch an insightful criticism of scale and political economy analysis in interpreting globalization.

> ". . . what we want to argue is that, if the central methodological precepts of [actor-network theory] are followed and we start by assuming in the first instance that world is flat, then we will end up with some very different accounts of what globalization is and how it is unfolding than if we start from the notion that the world is fundamentally and intrinsically hierarchical and scalar in nature," (Latham and McCormack, 2010, 54).

Latham and McCormack's case study to display the kinds of social phenomena capital-centric renderings of globalization are ill-equipped to capture is the explosion of urban marathons in major cities around the world. I find it to be a rather disappointing demonstration of assemblage's capacity to reimagine the city following their powerful theoretical critique of scale. While it may be used as an example of globalization that is not beholden to capitalism, I am uncertain why it is an example that *matters*. It does not really even shed light on the ways in which social relations stretch across national boundaries to support events like urban marathons or how social groups mobilize around these kinds of events. Given even this failure, it is not surprising that it should say nothing of urban policy-making, the production of urban poverty and inequality, race and class-based segregation, gender, justice, or the environment—in other words, any of the social conditions that give meaning and purpose to social science research.

1.3.5 Are 'Powerful' Assemblages Possible? Assembling an Articulation of Chinese Political Economy

There is nothing intrinsic about assemblage that should disallow questions of power. Existing studies may be overzealous in attempting to unseat capitalist frameworks to the point where the very existence of capital and power are removed from view. Latham and

McCormack's marathons may very well exist independently of capitalism, but they exist in a world imbued with it, so I believe it is reasonable to ask how capitalist interests may attempt to co-opt social phenomena it did not necessarily create. At the same time, once social phenomena are touched by capital, it does not necessarily mean they must be utterly defined by it. We have to ask how and why particular assemblages come into being, how are they maintained, how they are challenged, and what effects they have in combination with capitalist interests in producing or hindering social justice. A form of assemblage that recognizes power must recognize that capitalist relations are one of the multitude of relations that give a place meaning, even if it is not the only one.

Stuart Hall sought a balance between rejecting economic reductionism yet still acknowledging power and capital through *articulation* in seeking to understand race in apartheid-South Africa

> "… we cannot thereby deduce *a priori* the relations and mechanisms of the political and ideological structures (where such features as racism make a decisive reappearance) exclusively from the level of the economic. The economic level is the necessary but not sufficient condition for explaining the operations at other levels of the society (the premise of non-reductionism). (329)

For Hall, the correspondence between political-ideological and economic structures cannot be assumed, but must be demonstrated for each historical case—a glaring hole in the work of Fulong Wu (Chapter 2).

> "One must start, then, from the concrete historical 'work' which racism accomplishes under specific historical conditions-as a set of economic, political and ideological practices, of a distinctive kind, concretely articulated with other practices in a social formation. These practices ascribe the positioning of different social groups in relation to one another with respect to the elementary structures of society; they fix and ascribe those positionings in on-going social practices; they legitimate the positions so ascribed. In short, they are practices which secure the hegemony of a dominant group over a series of subordinate ones, in such a way as to dominate the whole social formation in a form favourable to the long-term development of the economic productive base. *Though the economic aspects are critical, as a way of beginning, this form of hegemony cannot be understood as operating purely through economic coercion,*" (Hall 1980, 338)

Scholarship in South Africa confronted similar issues to those in China today in confronting what many viewed as contradictions between a capitalist society and one that maintained institutionalized racism as a fundamental structuring of social organization and social relations (Hart 2007, Wolpe 1990). Much like the market transitionists claims about China today, apartheid and racial ideology were taken as an extension of segregation, a "hangover" from previous historical epochs that would be remedied by a fuller embrace of liberal capitalism due to its dependence on a supply of "free labor." In rejecting this claim, leftist critics drew on "articulation" to argue that South African capitalism emerged from segregationist practices, so that the particular mode of production was not just path-dependent, but thoroughly integrated and entwined with the racial ideologies of segregation and, later, apartheid (Wolpe, 1990). Apartheid, then, was not an archaic residue of a bygone system of colonial social relations, but a means of sustaining and reproducing a particular articulation of capitalist relations (Hart, 2007).

Crucial to this interpretation of apartheid was a rejection of economic reductionism that assemblage also seeks to address but is still attentive to structures of domination/subjugation underpinning capitalism in its various forms (Featherstone, 2011). It is this *articulation*, the linking together of capitalist and non-capitalist forms, that both neoliberal critique and new institutional economics have been ill-equipped to capture in descriptions of post-Maoist China. Capitalism, in each case, is still held as something that exists "outside" China, penetrating and taking over, albeit in an uneven fashion. This allows us to distinguish "socialist" and "capitalist" institutions but in a wholly unsatisfactory way when it comes to understanding China's particular mode of production. Instead, analysis needs to begin from an understanding of how all of China's institutions

join together in articulating a particular mode of production that at once bears the hallmarks of contemporary capitalism, but arises from its historical specificities (or to use Soja's terms, the spatial specificities) driven by a variety of political and ideological motives, and carries a unique set of consequences and outcomes for social groups that do not neatly align with traditional class categories (Hall, 1980).

My intent is not to deny the utility of Marx in unpacking the exploitative character of capitalism whatever its form. But it is not enough to start with a set of assumptions about how capitalism functions and then attempt to apply them with some modification to existing historical conditions. Here lies the conceptual and methodological failure of "actually-existing neoliberalisms" in that its application reduces spatial specificities to abnormalities that have no real effect on the structuring of class relations. Analysis of Chinese cities under this framework does not engage questions of how or why, but is reduced to questions of "how many", a cataloguing of neoliberal symbols ranging from dispossessed farmers to the development of gated communities. The cause and effects of these socio-spatial phenomena are assumed *a priori* with no real investigation into the specific mechanisms through which they operate.

Researchers inside and outside of China continue to underestimate the impact and uniqueness of China's dual structure. Rather than an aberrant feature of China with which capitalism finds a way to adapt, the dual structure both *articulates* and *articulates with* a mode of economic relations specific to the historical and spatial contexts of China. The dual structure in China is more than an inequality between rural and urban economies reflected in the two-society Lewis Model. It is the organizing framework through which social, political, and economic relations take place. It is not just a policy that can be

abolished through a single act of the State Council nor is there any indication that it will fade away as reforms deepen. The dual structure, much like apartheid, creates a completely different set of political and legal structures through which individuals engage in all kinds of social and political relations on the basis of their "rural" or "urban" status.[13] It is not just an outcome of uneven development (as in the Lewis Model) but a *cause* as it imposes material and legal limits on the life opportunities of rural people.

The dual structure itself is produced within the various apparatuses of China's state hierarchy. The ability of the political center in Beijing to impose its will throughout the hierarchy is, perhaps, not what it once was, but should not be underestimated or dismissed as a relic of the pre-reform era. George Lin, tellingly, opens his book *Red Capitalism in Southern China* with the Chinese proverb, "the mountains are high and the emperor is far away." Lin uses this maxim to suggest how decentralization and flexibility have replaced the command economy of Maoism, allowing for greater local experimentation and divergence from central mandates. Yet this flexibility was not a power wrested from the center through political struggle, it was granted. This position is clearly reflected in the recent White Paper issued by the central government on Hong Kong:

> "As a unitary state, China's central government has comprehensive jurisdiction over all local administrative regions, including the HKSAR.[14] The high degree of autonomy of HKSAR *is not an inherent power, but one that comes solely from the authorization by the central leadership.* The high degree of autonomy of the HKSAR is not full autonomy, nor a decentralized power. It is the power to run local affairs as authorized by the central leadership. The high degree of autonomy of HKSAR is subject to the level of the central

[13] My use of the terms "rural" and "urban" here and in most cases throughout are intended to reflect legal-administrative categories of classification by the Chinese state in terms of both population and land. It is a distinction that, as will be shown, is more or less independent from a conceptual mode of livelihood, lifestyle, or even location that is typically associated with the terms.

[14] HKSAR: Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

> leadership's authorization. There is no such thing called 'residual power.'" (State Council 2014, emphasis added)

While the specific conditions of Hong Kong has its obvious unique characteristics, the implications for all local governments are clear. The center continues to be the final arbiter of local action, an authority that is routinely exercised through the *nomenklatura* system. Moreover, the center's will can and does change even though policy directions have displayed far greater stability than during Mao's reign. As the recent removal from office and arrest of Bo Xilai demonstrates, however, yesterday's model cadre can still become today's pariah. The emperor may be far away, but his shadow remains long.

The dual structure was developed as an instrument (or technology of rule) for political and economic regulation on a spatialized basis. Firmly rooted in Maoist economic goals that privileged heavy industry, it secured the capacity of the center to appropriate surpluses through the state hierarchy while authorizing local cadres to implement directives, oversee ideological education, and restrict mobility both within and between sectors. Under the command economy then, the dual structure was an instrument of domination for the regulation of a particular (Maoist) mode of production. As an instrument of spatial governance, it has not only survived Mao, but served as the institutional basis through which a Chinese capitalism has developed. Contradictions in the Chinese economy are not always the result of a conflict between capitalist and socialist institutions, but at times also reflect a contradiction between the expectations engendered by an orthodox understanding of how capitalism should work and the concrete articulation of capitalism within the dual structure and spatial-administrative hierarchy of the Chinese state.

In fact, the articulation of race and capital by South African scholars may serve as a firmer theoretical basis for interpreting China's transformation today than any generalized theory of transition. There are three insights from Stuart Hall's seminal piece on articulation that are particularly useful for interpreting China's transformation through the dual structure. First, as I have already suggested, pre-capitalist economic relations may become integrated with new. From this perspective, the dual structure is not a "hangover" of Maoism that requires eradication for capitalism to take root, but an integral building block to the DNA of capitalism in China. Second, Hall describes apartheid as an example of "deal-making" between white elites and the white working class. Apartheid was a "workable compromise" that allowed both groups to benefit from subordinating native labor. Similarly, the dual structure enables the state to regulate who benefits most from the country's economic development by sustaining a large pool of cheap labor for urban construction and development, and facilitates relatively generous social protections for urban *hukou* residents. What Harvey has historically dismissed as "militant localisms" often target localized structures of oppression that create and reproduce divisions within working classes. Calls to the labor class to "unite and fight" do not adequately consider the structural differences in which different "classes" of labor stand in relation to capital (Hall, 1980).

Finally, as Hall writes, "the tendency to combine capitalism with 'free labour' can, under certain historical conditions, be combined with certain forms of "forced" or "unfree" labor. The consequences are a system which necessarily will have political and legal structures that "elaborate more than one form of citizen status," (331). Taking this even further, it is entirely possible for more than one system of relations to coincide within a

society at any given time, even at the individual level. The openness and fluidity of assemblage allows room for the multiplicities of connections, networks, and ways of being that go into the building and inhabiting of a place. Articulation allows us to consider how the multiplicities interact, engage, integrate with and bounce off of capitalist modes of production. This dissertation, then, seeks to "assemble an articulation" of Chinese cities through a study of the multiple forces urbanizing Chinese space.

1.3.4 Research Questions

Assemblage theory enables us to reformulate the assumptions about China's urbanization without entirely dismissing the insights they have generated. When those assumptions are reformulated, a new set of questions emerges that opens up new ways of understanding China's overall development, and urbanization in particular that drive this dissertation:

- *What kind of development emerges from the hierarchy of the Leninist party-state?* Instead of making claims about the positive relationship between a strong, authoritative state and achievements in economic development, an overarching theme of this dissertation is to ask what kind of development occurs from such an arrangement. Certainly much of the pace of China's economic growth can be attributed to the state's authority, the lack of democratic inclusion in urbanization, especially regarding migrants and original residents of *chengzhongcun* creates a system of growth without social justice that is inherently inimical to the rhetoric of the "harmonious society."

- *How are policy goals developed at the top of the spatial administrative hierarchy actualized and articulated in local development plans?* The party-state is not as homogenous as it appears. Local authorities frequently acting either directly or indirectly against central dictums and mandates have informed the developmental trajectory of Chinese cities. Often times, local authorities and agents manipulate central rhetoric to act on their own self-interests.

- *What motives drive processes and outcomes of place-production?* Not only are cities across China actively engaged in processes of city-building and urban construction, but municipal actors are attempting to build particular kinds of places. However, the reductionism of place-production as a means of attracting capital is too simplistic. Moreover, places are not made solely from the blueprints of official planning. Changes in Chinese cities can best be understood as an ongoing and continuous process of official city-building and place-making *and* the occupation and use of space by individual actors and agents that transcends any pre-reform/post-reform division of time.

- *What are the consequences of the dual structure for China's urbanization?* What social problems that do emerge are, in-part, the result of authorities' continued reliance on institutions created under state socialism for social control and for controlling patterns of development. These problems are not limited to political repression, but include economic inefficiencies, exacerbated inequality, highly limited opportunities for class mobility, and environmental devastation. This is not a model for other developing countries to replicate as suggested by such widely-read figures as Jeffery Sachs or Thomas Friedman.

- From these analytical questions, a larger question emerges: how can we come to understand the interweaving connections, associations, and social and political relations that come together in the assemblage of the Chinese city.

1.4 The Case Study: Wuhan

Wuhan is the capital city of Hubei province and the largest prefecture-level city in central China. Wuhan is also a major economic, educational, and transportation center linking Eastern and Western China. During the Ming Dynasty, Wuhan was referred to as "九省 通衢" (*jiusheng tongqu*), the "thoroughfare to 9 provinces" because it is accessible by land or water from nine provinces. Wuhan is divided into 13 administrative districts, but the historical identity of the city is rooted in the "three towns" (Wuhan *sanzhen*) of Hankou, Wuchang, and Hanyang whose boundaries are created by the intersections of the Yangtze and Han Rivers. Arising from focused development strategies over the past several decades, each has developed a distinct role within the broader spatial economy of Wuhan. These historical roles are increasingly captured by municipal officials and planners in constructing a promotable and marketable Wuhan, and in creating functional links with surrounding areas.

As a result of the second Opium War (1856-1860), Hankou was made an open port. British and other Western powers were hopeful that Wuhan could create stronger integration of inland markets and the more rapidly industrializing Eastern ports (Han and Wu 2004)—ironically, this very logic is at the foundation of place-promotion in Wuhan today. While Hankou emerged as an important trading center for the region, Hanyang to the south across the Han River grew as a manufacturing center, with Wuchang opposite the Yangtze River established as a political and military center for the region. The three

towns were united as Wuhan by the Republic of China in 1927, and re-established in 1949 following the formation of the People's Republic. Each regime further entrenched the historical roles of the three towns, although there was some diffusion of industrial activity across the city as a result of Maoist planning priorities.



Figure 1.6 The 7 Main Districts of Wuhan that make up the 'Three Towns' of Hankou, Hanyang, and Wuchang

The administrative category of Wuhan is a bewildering assemblage of diverse sites with differential connections to the greater municipality, making it difficult, if not impossible, to identify a singular "Wuhan." Wuhan administratively is composed of 7 main city districts (*zhucheng qu*, Figure 1.6) and 6 other districts variously referred to as outlying (*yuancheng qu*), suburban, or rural districts (Figure 1.7).[15] These only scratch

[15] *Zhucheng qu* is often translated as "central district" but this can be somewhat misleading given how the term is used in English-speaking cities. Hongshan, especially has large pieces of farmland, while Qingshan's "main city status" derives primarily from the presence of Wuhan Iron and Steel despite a historical lack of



Figure 1.7 Wuhan Municipality, including outlying districts

the surface of how different parts of Wuhan are represented. The Old City Area refers to the historical urban core formed in the earliest stages of Wuhan's development, generally dating back to the building of foreign concessions. The old city area accounts for only a fraction of present-day Hanyang, Jiang'an, Qiaokou, and Wuchang Districts, primarily clustered along the Yangtze River (Figure 1.8). The New City Area roughly correlates with the administrative boundaries of Wuhan City from 1949-1978 (primarily Hanyang, Qiaokou, Jianghan, Jiang'an, Wuchang, and Qiaokou Districts), while the Suburban area references recently urbanized sub-districts on the urban edge. The rural area describes predominantly rural and agricultural areas in the outlying regions (Wang 2010). Yet even these basic divisions of



Figure 1.8: A map of the Old Urban areas from around the time of the Wuchang Uprising (1911) ***Source: City of Art***

centralized urbanization in the area (Huang, 2011). This classification is largely administrative, although in most of the documents I reviewed, the Three Towns make up a far more important category for how Wuhan's "central" city is understood.

Wuhan's space are utterly inadequate to capture the dynamics of spatial morphology, economic, social, and political relations that are underpinned by Wuhan's geography. On top of this, there are a plethora of categories, subdivisions, neighborhoods, and districts, some administrative-political, some conceptual, some used for planning purposes. It can thus be quite difficult to precisely pinpoint what we are talking about when referring to "the" city of Wuhan.

The historical roles of the Three Towns have greatly influenced the trajectory of development in the post-reform era, giving defined roles to each of the three towns, but also limiting to some degree their ability to negotiate new and creative identities under a rapidly shifting economic structure. Hankou and Wuchang are obvious beneficiaries of an increased focus on knowledge-based and financial services.



Figure 1.9 Wuhan rail connections to major Chinese cities

Wuhan is an ideal case study for research into a number of issues related to urban development in China. Cities in central provinces are far less studied than the three largest development poles in Bohai, the Yangtze River Delta, and the Pearl River Delta. However, it is still heavily engaged in acts of urban entrepreneurialism, place promotion, and policy boosterism that negotiates both the global economy, but more importantly, its own role within the national urban and spatial hierarchy that historically privileges East over the center and West. While not direct beneficiaries of the Develop the West program like Chongqing and Chengdu, Wuhan's leadership has actively promoted the city as the central hub for the national economy, connecting the booming cities of the eastern seaboard with the developing cities in the West. Wuhan uses its inattention to create a locational advantage connecting east and west and north and south. Promotional literature frequently makes reference to its central place in two prominent railways, the Beijing-Guangzhou high-speed line running North-South and the Shanghai-Chongqing line running East-West (Figure 1.9)[16]. A greatly expanded international airport and heavy investment in infrastructure and new construction projects under the leadership of Wuhan Party Chairman Ruan Toufa makes Wuhan a pivotal city in the evolving economic geography of China. Wuhan's leadership hopes to be in a prime position to capture the windfall as export-oriented manufacturing is already beginning to shift inland from the Pearl River Delta. As part of the promotion of Wuhan, the city has also undertaken an ambitious *chengzhongcun* redevelopment program. While the scale of

[16] Map by author, distances from Wuhan to various cities calculated using http://www.chinatrainguide.com/

chengzhongcun is not of the magnitude found in the Pearl River Delta, it is still significant. When redevelopment programs began Wuhan was home to roughly 139 *chengzhongcun* with 356,000 residents. The ways in which Wuhan addresses these challenges demonstrates:

- How party rhetoric and ideology is articulated and, at times, manipulated in the implementation of localized urban policy and urban developments
- The ways in which Wuhan engages in "best practices" and other forms of policy mobility in its urbanization strategy. Not only do Wuhan's leaders emulate successful models from elsewhere, but make clear attempts to establish itself as an innovative city
- The centrality of place-making and place-promotion in China's urban development
- The conflicts that arise from the ways in which Chinese cities are imagined by planners and officials, and the use and creation of space by individuals and neighborhoods through routine acts of inhabiting the city

1.4.1 Definitions: What in the world is Wuhan?

The administrative category of Wuhan is a bewildering assemblage of diverse sites with differential connections to the greater municipality, making it difficult, if not impossible, to identify a singular "Wuhan." A bewildering universe of administrative classifications, informal designations, and nicknames characterize the spaces of the city (See table 1.3 in Appendix 1 at the end of this chapter). Wuhan was formed through the consolidation of the "three towns" of Wuhan: Hanyang, Wuchang, and Hankou (*Wuhan*

sanzhen). In common parlance, the "old city area" refers to the areas built up during the foreign concession period but accounts for only a tiny fraction of present-day Wuhan's territory. The "new city area" roughly corresponds with Wuhan City's administrative boundaries during the Maoist period (1949-1978) and consists of today's Hanyang, Jianghan, Jiang'an, Qiaokou, Qingshan, and Wuchang districts while the remaining territory was largely organized along county lines. Hongshan was added as "a newly urbanized central district" in 1996, and Wuhan took the unprecedented step of abolishing all counties and converting all of its territory into "urban districts". This move alone did little to substantively transform rural residents' quality or character of life, but it centralized territorial authority under the municipal government, giving it the administrative and bureaucratic power over the peripheries unmatched by most other Chinese cites.

1.4.1.1 Wuhan Administrative Categories

Analysis of the Chinese city must begin with an understanding of its place within the hierarchy of the PRC (Chan, 2009). While some have used the spatial administrative hierarchy to correlate with scales (national, regional, city) (Cartier, 2011), it is more complex than this neat ordering suggests. As a prefecture-level city, Wuhan is formally ranked below the province. However, as the provincial capital, Wuhan has considerable independence from provincial oversight within Hubei, and bypasses provincial-level bureaus when negotiating tax obligations and other conditions.

Wuhan municipality refers to the 13 districts of the prefecture city, its urban districts, development zones, towns, townships, street offices, and villages (Table 1.1). The municipal government refers to the government bureaus and offices at the level of

the municipality. In Wuhan, the municipal government is headquartered in Jiang'an District, occupying several buildings that date from the European concessions. Each of the 13 districts have their own government offices, and are classified as urban, though this does not necessarily correlate with residential or livelihood patterns (Wang, 2012). Within each district there is a range from 4-16 sub-districts, and dozens of street offices (Table 1.1). Most towns and townships have been reorganized into sub-districts and street offices, and the same is true of village committees in most of the central districts (Wang, 2012).[17]

Table 1.1. Administrative Units of Wuhan, 2011

District	**Sub-District Offices (*xiaoban shichu*)**	**Street Offices (*shequ*)**	**Village Committees (*nongcun jitihui*)**	**Towns**	**Townships**
Jiang'an	16	173	14		
Jianghan	13	116			
Qiaokou	11	139	11		
Hanyang	11	131	6		
Wuchang	14	196	2		
Qingshan	10	113	12		
Hongshan	13	147	16		1
Dongxihu	8	77			
Hannan	4	18	29		
Caidian	8	28	283	2	1
Jiangxia	12	52	268	2	1
Huangpi	13	65	589	1	2
Xinzhou	10	58	550	3	
Total	**143**	**1313**	**1780**	**8**	**6**

Source: Wuhan State Statistical Bureau, 2012

[17] Between 2004 and 2011, the number of village committees in Wuhan declined from 2052 to 1780 while the number of street offices rose from 1086 to 1311 in the same period (WHSB, various years)

However, village committees are still the predominant basis for sociopolitical organization in most of the outlying districts. Within the central districts, towns are still referenced casually as neighborhood designations, but they no longer have a formal status. As all of the city is considered urban, there are no counties and no real distinction between towns and street offices. Formerly a subordinate of towns in the older spatial administrative hierarchy, villages and *chengzhongcun* especially do not fit neatly into the spatial administrative hierarchy within the city.

Figure 1.10 Formal Spatial Administration of Wuhan Municipality[18]



Which of the categories in the above diagram are urban, and which are rural? The answer is all of them (or none of them depending on your perspective). Many of the

[18] Special development zones are formally classified as "national-level" and "provincial-level" according to the governmental level that approves their establishment. It is not indicative of how or by what entity they are governed. National-level development zones are run as quasi-independent districts under the authority of the municipal government. Provincial-level development zones are typically managed at the district level, with approval of their establishment needed by the provincial government.

development zones include tracts of farmland, many of the villages are *de facto* urban communities with population densities higher than the city average. Even the central districts contain large segments of agricultural land. Figure 1.11 displays a satellite view of Wuhan using Google maps. While it should not be taken as a precise and up-to-date representation of Wuhan on the ground, it clearly demonstrates the haphazard and discontinuous character of Wuhan's urban, built-up areas.

Figure 1.11 Built-up areas of Wuhan Prefecture



While not a perfect measure, the boundaries of the third ring road roughly approximate the actual urban area of Wuhan City and is used in planning and government documents frequently as a frame of reference. Yet this does *not* correlate with any combination of districts, at which level meaningful statistics about how the spaces of Wuhan are lived and used are readily available. An ecological approach to "urban" carries with it preconceptions of landscapes and spatial forms (Wang 2012). Due to the dual structure in China, however, urban has a different meaning as a spatial category of administration and governance that is unrelated to population density and activity. All of Wuhan is administratively urban, despite the predominance of farming and traditional village habitats in much of the territory in outlying districts. Nor should Wuhan Municipality be considered a functional metropolitan zone[19] (Ibid.). The very existence of the ongoing project of rural-urban integration, while attempting to bring some semblance of functional complementarity to the municipality, reveals the depth of disconnect between the urban core and some of the outlying districts.

1.4.1.2 Describing Wuhan: Orderings and Imaginings

Even though they do not perfectly capture the spatial diversity of the municipality, the formal boundaries do matter. While Wuhan is unusual for the degree of territorial authority vested in the municipal government, street offices are the geographic access point for social welfare and public goods, and can be an important determinant for the quality of public goods available to residents in urban and rural areas. Interdistrict

[19] Although, this is part of what Wuhan's city leaders are attempting to build under the idea of *Da Wuhan*, explored in more detail in Chapters 5-7.

transactions remain complicated by their administrative borders and crossing urban-rural boundaries within the district has been an obstacle for both sociopolitical integration of the city's inhabitants and unified planning and economic integration of Wuhan.

The three towns are probably the most prevalent imagining of Wuhan, but this simple imaginary is belied by a plethora of spatial categories, classifications, and concepts. In Wuhan's master plan, the municipality is at times presented as a tiered hierarchy of the central city (*zhucheng*), suburban areas (*xincheng*), central towns (*zhongxin zhen*), and small towns (*yiban zhen*), a series of concentric development rings encircling the urban core demarcated by the 2nd and 3rd ring-roads, and 7 urban clusters. It is also presented as a unified totality, an agglomeration of separate districts converging toward common development goals. Wuhan's Party Secretary Ruan Chengfa and Mayor Tang Liangzhi frequently speak to the building of a "Greater Wuhan" (*da wuhan*), a megacity that is at the heart of the 'rise of the Central region'—connecting and elevating central China in national and global circuits of investment, exchange, trade, and ideas. Yet in practice, a singular, unified identity frequently does not travel much further than the local neighborhood much less the vast territory that is Wuhan Municipality.

How we begin to define, much less investigate, the city of Wuhan depends largely on what we want to know, and what, if anything, we wish to compare it to. One thing that is clear is that cross-country comparisons with Chinese cities fall victim to a number of errors when taken-for-granted spatial categories are not interrogated carefully. Even seemingly simple questions such as "urban population" collapse under the weight of China's administrative classifications (Chan 2003).

1.4.2 Economic Development Zones

The creation of economic development zones has played an enormous role in localized strategies of economic development (Table 1.2), offering a host of benefits including tax holidays and other subsidies for investing corporations. Strategic development of national zones is coordinated among provincial, municipal and district officials and are utilized to enact long-term development goals such as industrial upgrading, industrial agglomeration, development of luxury housing markets, and ecotourism. National development zones also spawn sub-zones of their own, such as the Optic Valley Software Park in Hongshan, a subsidiary of the Eastlake High-Tech Development Zone, and the Wuhan Export Processing Center established by the Wuhan Economic and Technological Development Zone in Hanyang. While municipal planning supports and builds off of the trajectories of the three national level development zones, they have considerable independence from municipal governance. This is particularly true for the Eastlake Hi-Tech Development Zone which functions as a *de facto* independent district within Wuhan, occupying 518 square kilometers of territory with as many as 700,000 permanent residents. More than half of Wuhan's 78 universities are located in the zone, as well as numerous state laboratories, engineering centers, and national scientific research institutes, in addition to two sub-zones, the Huashan New Eco-City and the Future Science and Technology Town. Each district has also established its own economic development zone with a variety of industrial specializations, but most are small (between .5-2.5 sq. km). These are denoted as Provincial level zones, designating administrative rank, though they are administered at the district level.

Table 1.2 National Level Development Zones in Wuhan Municipality

Wuhan Economic and Technological Development Zone	1993	Hanyang	Automotive (Dongfeng Motors); Appliance assembly
Wuhan Eastlake Hi-Tech Industrial Development Zone	1988	Hongshan	Optical communications, laser technology, microelectronics
Wujiashan Taiwanese Industrial Zone	1992	Dongxihu	Food processing, logistics and telecommunication

Source: en.wh.gov.cn

In addition to the national and provincial level development zones, the Wuhan Iron & Steel Corporation (WISCO) is a major economic player in the region. Beginning production in 1958, it was a key national industry and the centerpiece of Wuhan's production under the command economy. While it has significantly restructured itself in the reform period, it remains one of the largest State-Owned Enterprises in China. In fact, WISCO has grown in the reform period, merging with 11 smaller factories and ore mining facilities in the region in 1985, and merged with the Echeng Iron and Steel Company in Ezhou, and the Kunming Iron and Steel Company in Yunnan Province. In total, WISCO employs more than 100,000 people. Though WISCO's main facilities are located in Qingshan district independent of any development zone, it owns subsidiaries throughout Wuhan's three main development zones, and has been particularly active in developing the EHDZ. Additionally, WISCO maintains mining, alloy, production material, shipping ports, and other supply subsidiaries in development zones throughout the 8+1 circle including Xiantou, Xinzhou, Ezhou, and Huangshi (the cities of Wuhan, Ezhou, and Huangshi are referred to as Hubei's "metallurgical corridor"). It is Hubei's

number one exporter, and in 2007, established its own shipping and logistics company in Hong Kong in 2007 to further expand its supply chains.

1.4.3 Spatial Classification and Case Studies: From *Da Wuhan* to the *Chengzhongcun*

Despite the fact that most planning and urban construction is organized at the district level, other ways of conceiving of the city inform the urban imaginary of Wuhan. On the one hand, the state and other social actors imagine and attempt to enact Wuhan as a megacity, a sum greater than its parts captured as "*Da Wuhan*". On the other hand, this overarching goal must be negotiated within the institutional confines of the dual structure and administrative framework of the spatial hierarchy. For these and more complex sociocultural reasons, the enactment of "Greater Wuhan" is an uneven and halting process that will be explored in further detail in the second haf of the dissertation.

Somewhere between the district and *Da Wuhan* are the "Three Towns" of Wuhan (*sanzhen Wuhan*), Hankou, Hanyang, and Wuchang. Hankou (Jiang'an, Jianghan, and Qiaokou) and Wuchang (Wuchang and Qingshan) are made up of multiple districts. Individually, the Three Towns are designated with specific roles within the city's development, but taken together, they form the core of Wuhan's urban identity and imaginary. These identities and their development are the focus of Chapter 5.

The final two chapters consider how administratively rural spaces interact with the urban realm. Separate programs under a larger project of "rural-urban integration" highlight the ways the dual structure continues to influence both rural and urban sectors. Chapter Six studies an outlying district, Hannan, as an example of both rural-urban integration and the realization of *Da Wuhan*. On the one hand, agriculture is reorganized

as small peasant plots are consolidated into large-scale industrial farms. On the other hand, the northeastern portion of the district is receiving massive investment from the municipality and development banks so that it may become a residential and industrial suburb for the Wuhan Economic and Technological Zone in Hanyang. Chapter 7 returns to the central districts for analysis of *chengzhongcun gaizao*, a process that does not eliminate the dual structure, but attempts to banish all traces of collective ownership from inside the Third Ring Road.

1.5 Structure and Methodology of the Dissertation

"And so these men of Indostan
Disputed loud and long,
Each in his own opinion
Exceeding stiff and strong,
Though each was partly in the right,
And all were in the wrong!"
--from John Godfrey Saxe, "The Blind Men and the Elephant"

The fable of the blind men and the elephant has been used as a metaphor for other social phenomena debated by academics (e.g., Sparke on globalization, 2012). Though it is oft-repeated, it is perfectly suited for what I am attempting here. In the story, six blind men attempt to sort out the "truth" of the elephant through touch—each man touching a different part of the animal. One man touches the legs and exclaims it is built like a mighty tree, while another man touches the trunk and declares it like a snake, and so on. Each is, in their own way, correct, but ultimately fails to appreciate that what makes an elephant isn't its individual parts, but how those parts come together to form a uniquely interconnected entity.

Urban geographers working on China have taken on the character of the blind men in the story. There is a growing wealth of empirical data related to Chinese cities arising from ethnographic work and surveys and from innovative means of conducting meaningful quantitative analysis despite the sheer unreliability of Chinese statistics. As I argue in this dissertation, however, there is a pressing concern to rethink the way these empirics are deployed. Too often they are tacked onto existing, Western-oriented frameworks (i.e. neoliberalism) to either prove or disprove the model's relevance to the Chinese case. This is ultimately fruitless as what is 'proven' in one instance can be readily 'disproven' in another with a different (or even the same) set of data (Zhang and Fligstein 2012).

At this juncture, it is not possible to construct a set of data that will effectively "explain" China or even Chinese cities. Instead, this dissertation is a radical deconstruction of the primary narratives that inform the way existing data is deployed in efforts to explain the development of cities in the reform era. The first three chapters disassembles the discourses of neoliberalism, market transition, and World Cities through theoretical analysis, critical literature review, textual analysis, and "thick description". Where possible, especially in Chapters 3 and 4, I supplement this generalized analysis with examples from the primary case study of Wuhan. The deconstruction of these narratives is done in order to reassemble their various strands and components into a more accurate, if disorderly, representation of the Chinese city beginning in Chapter 5. Predominant urban theories that attempt to understand Chinese cities are rooted in Western urban experiences, falling victim to what Wingshing Tang has called "random

conceptual indigenization and appropriation," (Tang 2014). This is a conceptual theme I will emphasize in Chapters 5 and 6.

The final two chapters use the case of Wuhan in an attempt to show the potential for an "assembled" theory of cities to articulate the messy forces that come together in the Chinese city. My purpose isn't to show that *one* explanation of Chinese cities is superior to the others, but that there are a multitude of coexisting and even contradictory causes, explanations, and ways of understanding the city that cannot be reduced to any one of its components.

As I argue, none of the above approaches can singularly explain the character and trajectory of Chinese cities. Instead, it is necessary to consider how multiple actors with multiple motives and interests in shaping the city interact with different ideas about cities and with each other in the process of urban construction. Considered in such a way, the city can be "assembled" from the coalescence of ideas, motives, and relations that give shape and meaning to the physical and imagined space that is the "Chinese city." This theme is weaved into the narratives of the final three chapters that explore urban development policy, construction projects, and acts of resistance against the local state's development-at-any-cost agenda. Chapters Five and Six pick up this thread by examining how the entity of "Wuhan" is assembled in the interrelations of actors and institutions in the process of city building and citizen-making.

In summary, three sets of discourse are commonly mobilized in academic efforts to explain the spatial organization of Chinese cities. These discourses are critically explored in Chapters Two through Four. Chapter Two examines a broad range of scholars from mainstream political economy to Marxist critics who employ capitalist

logics to understand the transformation of the Chinese political economy and the various effects they have on cities. This group includes the most well-known and widely read political economists who navigate China's sometimes circuitous "market transition" and study the impacts of "incomplete" transition (Naughton, 1995, 2007; Lardy) and the "new institutional economics" that emphasize path-dependence with a particular focus on private property rights and the contradictions between socialist and capitalist institutions (Kornai 1992, 1997; Liew 2005, Clarke et al 2008). While decidedly different in tone, structural critiques of China's neoliberalism also tacitly accept capitalism's explanatory power for interpreting urban change in China (Walker and Buck 2007, Castells 2004). Critique here is centered on theories of "accumulation by dispossession" that view China's transformation as manifestation of global capitalism's ascendancy with urban expansion as an ongoing 'spatial fix' for global and domestic capital (Harvey 2005, He and Wu 2011, Wu 2008, 2009; Peck and Zhang 2012).

In Chapter Three, I return to the 'transition' narrative through an exploration of China's ongoing dual structure. Chan is at the forefront of scholarship on the foundational importance of the dual-structure and, especially, the *hukou* system that frames China according to the material and conceptual borders between politically charged notions of *rural* and *urban* space (Solinger, 1999; Selden and Cheng 1994; Chan 1994, 2009, 2011, 2012; Chan and Zhang, 1999; Wang 2005). Chan especially is concerned with how government agents at all scales employ socialist institutions to manipulate markets, from state-ownership of telecommunications to municipal governments' use of the *hukou* system to regulate labor markets and reduce the cost of public welfare (see also Huang, 2008). Furthermore, the dual-track land system that

differentially governs rural and urban territory gives exceptional power to municipal authorities to wrest away collective land for urban expansion and construction (Hsing, 2011; Tang and Chung, 2002; Lin, 2009). Originally institutions of the Maoist command economy, they have been adapted in the present to facilitate economic growth while not challenging the CCP's political *and* economic authority (also Bray, 2005).

Finally, Chapter Four explores the contradictory, yet ultimately interrelated discourses of World Cities and slums that hold a strong influence on China's urban imaginary. The positive connotations of World Cities discourse have had a tremendous influence on municipalities' road maps for construction of the 'model Chinese city', encouraging monumentalism, sites of commercial and cultural consumption, and high-capacity transportation infrastructure, while the implications for exacerbated inequality is largely unaddressed. Municipal authorities use urban construction to demonstrate their capability as leaders—the physical manifestation of their city's success. At the same time, the World City's converse—the urban slum and its inhabitants are further marginalized and denigrated as roadblocks in the path toward urban greatness. The World City's creation relies on the destruction of slum areas. These logics are prevalent in journalistic accounts and state discourses in Chinese cities that seek to legitimate the demolition of *chengzhongcun* and justify the second-class citizenship and regulation of rural-urban migrants.

In Chapters Five through Seven, I ask how the often separate and disconnected parts of Wuhan come together to form a singular entity. In particular, I am interested in showing how notions of place-production and policy mobility need not be limited by neoliberal explanation. Instead, historical identities that predate and transcend not just

the pre/post- reform era, but the formation of the People's Republic of China are interwoven with newer narratives of constructing the new socialist city. These notions are woven onto the institutional hierarchy of spatial administration and the dual structure. The "three towns" of Wuhan (Hankou, Hanyang, and Wuchang) are carved out by the Yangtze and Han Rivers and the urban landscape is interrupted by dozens of lakes and smaller rivers. Since the 1950s, municipal leaders have attempted to shorten the physical distance among the three towns, through bridges and, as of December 2012, a subway tunnel. By incorporating historical identities of the urban core into contemporary practices of place-production, Wuhan emerges from the complementary and coordinated construction of place in each of the three towns.

Chapter Five opens with an introduction to the historical identities of the Three Towns. The ways in which ideas and visions for the city emerge in the urban imaginaries of policymakers, planners, and developers are used to show the eclectic sources from which they are drawn. Adopting and adapting "best practices" from a variety of place-making strategies, the vision for a *Da Wuhan* is assembled. This chapter employs government publications, speeches and statements from policy leaders, news reports, and planning documents to understand how Wuhan's urban imaginaries are assembled. The second half of the chapter is a case study of the new Central Business District (CBD) currently under construction in Hankou. While the urban imaginary of Wuhan does not rely on any single ideological trope in its assemblage, the physical construction of new sites does require capital, often in vast sums. How the assembled vision of the city is realized in financing the CBD demonstrates how Wuhan articulates a particular spatial economy that is not reducible to capitalist social relations, but cannot avoid them. State

and market are so intertwined in developing the Chinese city that separating one from the other is a dubious proposition. In the process of financing urban development, Wuhan articulates a particular model of political economy. In addition to the secondary sources listed above, my research into the financing of the CBD draws heavily from corporate documents including bond filings, annual reports, and prospectuses.

These themes continue in Chapter Six with an emphasis on how vague yet idealistic proclamations from Beijing are articulated in the processes of urban construction. At the same time, local actors may manipulate central proclamations to advance their own development agendas. While municipal authorities can remake the built environment of the city with relative ease, the city's inhabitants have proved to be far less malleable. Chapter Seven shifts focus to the process of *chengzhongcun gaizao* (transformation) where the state attempts to transform villagers into "urban residents." While the notion of converting rural 'peasants' into urban residents can be viewed as window-dressing for the local state's accumulation by dispossession, it speaks to the ways in which state-society relationships are being transformed by urbanization, but *gaizao* and rural-urban integration take place in the context of the very dual structure they purport to be eliminating.

1.5.1 Methodological Issues

My analysis of Wuhan in particular is informed by two research trips in 2011 and 2012. My conversations with academics and residents of Wuhan and my own observations of the rapid changes under way were invaluable for how I understand those changes. However, my field work was nowhere near as fruitful as it might have been. In 2011, I made connections with several contacts at a local university who assured me that

they would be able to assist me when I returned for more in-depth fieldwork the next year. Despite their personal warmth and generosity, however, it soon became clear upon returning that their ability to connect me with the district and municipal authorities I sought was less than advertised. My own discomfort at pressing my hosts and difficulties in communicating my needs exacerbated these problems. In addition, the timing of my second trip was less than ideal. A lengthy and highly publicized villager-led protest against, among other things, state-forced urbanization, expropriation, and cadre corruption was just drawing to a close in Wukan, a village in Guangdong Province. While the protest had reached a resolution by the time I arrived in Wuhan, its impacts were still being felt by officials dealing with land issues. Just days before my arrival, another political maelstrom was touched off with the removal of office and arrest of Bo Xilai, the party-secretary of Chongqing and member of the Politburo who was overseeing the national pilot reforms for "rural-urban integration". These two events combined to create a frosty environment for an American graduate student researching urban land politics. A more coordinated strategy with my local contact for accessing city officials and planners may have been able to overcome this hurdle, but as it was, his own contacts in government were already aware of my primary interest in *chengzhongcun*. In the end, I failed to arrange any formal interviews with local officials that could have been tremendously helpful in understanding the various motives and interests that I believe drive urban policy and planning in Chinese cities. It is my hope that the theoretical framework driving this dissertation can be useful in conducting more extensive empirical research in the future.

The secondary sources that inform much of Chapters 5-7 include Chinese newspapers and periodicals and government statements, publications, and websites. These sources are like rose-tinted glasses as Chinese media is largely controlled, or strongly influenced by the government. Yet as referenced previously my interest here is not in constructing hard sets of generalized data about investment, GDP, housing prices, or other economic indices. These outcomes are important, but my concern is primarily with how visions of the city are assembled and promoted. The flowery praise for Wuhan's future promoted by Wuhan Party Secretary Ruan Chengfa and disseminated through local media is precisely the kind of evidence I am interested in: the discourses, tropes, ideas, and policies that are touted and privileged in constructing *Da Wuhan* as an idea. A second strand of my argument, that the dual structure and spatial administrative hierarchy are the primary structures through which the construction of Wuhan is articulated relies, at times, on my own inferences and interpretation of local-state action. Here, my concern is not with motives (e.g. "Does the Wuhan government really want to end the dual-structure?"), but process (e.g. what tools of the state are employed in the implementation of policy). I believe the conclusions I draw are reasonable based on the evidence I am employing.

1.6 Conclusion: Wuhan Emergent

There is no denying the incredible growth in GDP, living standards, and life opportunities, for the majority of the Chinese population. That it has been achieved without the apparent social disruption associated elsewhere is a more contestable claim. With urban construction and real estate development now at the forefront of economic growth, there are literally tens of thousands of protests over land expropriation each year

(Sargeson 2013; Chen 2011; Yeh et al 2013). The claim that Chinese cities do not have slums can be easily dismissed—they are simply shaped according to the particular institutional alignments that regulate and govern space in the Chinese system, but otherwise share many of the features and serve many of the functions of slum settlements throughout the developing world.

The party-state's control of development has also prioritized some sectors over others, and privileged some social groups at the expense of others (Bideleux 1985; Solinger 1999; Chan 2009, 2010). The party-state's ability to silence critics, ensure that protests remain localized and isolated from each other, and quash any kind of social organization that could challenge its authority. This maintains the appearance of social order, but it is not accomplished without violence or injustice (Sargeson 2013; Guo 2001; Bernstein and Lu 2001; Li and O'Brien 2006). Those groups who have historically been the most exploited and least rewarded for China's development 'success', rural-urban migrants and peasants, are forced to sacrifice their own fortunes in the name of development.

Additionally, the party-state is a far more fractured organization than is typically recognized. In part, this is because inner-workings at the highest levels mostly take place inside the "black box" of politburo politics. Yet we can get a clearer picture of the party-state's ruptures when turning our attention to the heterogeneous formation and implementation of policy in Chinese cities that translates central ideology in often unpredicted ways. At the same time, the *nomenklatura* system and circulation of 'best-practices' through cadre exchanges, study-tours, and incentives for promotion create

contradictory incentives for city officials that continue to prioritize growth and stability over justice and harmony (Whiting 2001; H. Chan 2004; Burns 1994).

The central hypothesis of this dissertation is that the idea of a "market transition" is a misnomer that leads to misunderstanding of how socialist institutions are employed by agents at different levels of government to achieve state development goals. The dual structure is not a "legacy" of the socialist past, but the foundational tool of China's development model. It is not only the basis for China's development model, but a major source of continued inequality, oppression, and social injustice inside and outside Chinese cities. Studies that view China's transition as "incomplete" fail to recognize the intentionality of maintaining institutions that enable the state to continually and regularly intervene in economic and social relations.

That China is somehow "transitioning" to a peculiar but ultimately recognizable form of capitalism subsumes all other ways of understanding social relations within the city. Both neoliberal critique and market transition models view urban place-making as projects for appealing to *capital* that ignores the institutions of spatial hierarchy and central-local relations that shape city-building goals and targets.

The claims of this dissertation, then, are as follows:

1) China's development model is based on two key technologies of government that are continuous, if adapted, with Maoist-era institutions for political and economic regulation: the spatial administrative hierarchy, and the multiple institutions of the dual structure. These are not aberrations in an otherwise capitalist society, but are the basis for a particular model of development that tentatively engages market forces in order to strengthen state power and

maintain party legitimacy. In the reform era, it is these institutions that articulate a Chinese political economy.

2) Despite the continued authority of the party-state and the dual-structure, there are cracks and fissures within that allow some actors to manipulate these institutions for their own ends.
3) Neoliberalism as an ideology has only partial explanatory use for understanding urban development in China because reform and city-building are viewed as means to the end of capital accumulation. Thus, capital accumulation is given causal power in the reform era. This economic reductionism is ill-equipped to understand the organizations and individual actors who are motivated by a diverse set of interests and ideas that exist independently from capitalist motives.
4) Through attentive exploration of the process of city-building, place-production, and the ways in which cities are lived in, used, and inhabited, these complex motivations can be better understood.

Rather than a singular ideological zeitgeist, I hope to show how modern-day Wuhan is a constant process of making and remaking, an assemblage of past experiences, present needs, and future visions. It is through the coexisting, if contradictory, visions of constructing and inhabiting the city that Wuhan emerges. Plans are drawn for the future, but those plans are pulled into unexpected trajectories by the past and by the immediate demands of the present. It is in the coalescence of these various threads that "the sprawling and imaginary concept of the urban temporarily solidify into the experience of a city," (Legg, 2011).

Appendix 1

Table 1.3 Formal and informal designations within Wuhan Municipality[20]

Designation	**Chinese**	**Designation Type**	**Description**	**Administrative composition**
Old City Area	老城区	Informal	The basis of the Three Towns. Areas built up during the foreign concession period, primarily along the Yangtze River front in Hankou Wuchang, and Hanyang.	Parts of Jiang'an, Wuchang, and Hanyang
New City Area	新城区	Informal	Roughly correlates to the Wuhan City boundary from the founding of the PRC until 1978. Small pockets of agricultural activity remain but almost entirely urbanized.	Jiang'an, Jianghan, Qiaokou, Hanyang, Wuchang, Qingshan
Suburban Area	近郊区	Informal	Newly urbanized areas on the urban periphery. Includes recently incorporated tracts of the New City Area, large portions of land in the east and southeast of Hongshan District, and newly urbanized areas in the 'outlying' districts	South-Southeast Hongshan, parts of Huangpi Dongxihu, Xinzhuo, Caidian on the borders of central districts
Rural Areas	远郊区	Informal	Predominantly agricultural areas, including central and small towns	Huangpi, Caidian, Dongxihu, Jiangxia, Hannan, and Xinzhou
Outlying Districts	远城区	Formal administrative designation	Administrative classification for the 6 districts of Huangpi, Caidian,	Huangpi, Caidian, Dongxihu, Jiangxia, Hannan, and Xinzhou

[20] Sources: Usage and translations for designations from Old City Area through Outlying Districts from Wang (2012). Classifications such as development zone are common usage. Other terms are largely culled from Wuhan Comprehensive Master Plan, 2006-2020 and translated by the author. I have left *chengzhongcun* untranslated as English translations of the spatial form are problematic (Chung, 2010).

			Dongxihu, Jiangxia, Hannan, and Xinzhou. Largely though not entirely agricultural	
Main City Districts	主城区	Formal administrative designation	Administrative classification for the 6 districts of the New City Area plus Hongshan. Mostly urbanized but some pockets of agricultural activity remain, especially in Hongshan.	Jiang'an, Jianghan, Qiaokou, Hanyang, Wuchang, Qingshan, Hongshan
Development Zones	开发区	Formal administrative designation	Three national level zones, multiple smaller development zones in each district, sub-zones within the national zones. Semi-autonomous.	National Zones: Hongshan, Hanyang, and Dongxihu. Provincial Development Zones in all districts
Central city	中心城市	Informal	Primarily along the Yangtze River front in the 3 towns, though larger than the Old City Area	Jiang'an, Jianghan, Qiaokou, Wuchang, Hanyang
Main towns； town centers	主城镇；中心镇	Informal; planning designation	Former county seats in the outlying districts, relatively agglomerated urban areas in the outlying districts	Huangpi, Caidian, Dongxihu, Jiangxia, Hannan, and Xinzhou
Small towns	一般镇	Informal	Smaller agglomerations in the outlying districts	Huangpi, Caidian, Dongxihu, Jiangxia, Hannan, and Xinzhou
New Towns	新镇	Informal	Towns in the outlying districts, primarily on the periphery of the main city districts	Huangpi, Caidian, Dongxihu, Jiangxia, Hannan, and Xinzhou
Urban clusters	主城租群	Formal Planning Designation	Planning designation for industrial organization in the main city districts; districts also classified into several sub-zones	Jiang'an, Jianghan, Qiaokou, Hanyang, Wuchang, Qingshan, Hongshan
New City Clusters	新城租群	Formal Planning Designation	Planning designation for industrial organization main districts' periphery combined with	All Districts

			bordering areas of the outlying districts	
Chengzhongcun	城中村	Formal and Informal	Villages where farmland is partially or entirely expropriated for urban construction, villagers retain housing plots. Scattered throughout all central districts, particularly between 2nd and 3rd-Ring Roads.	Primarily in Jiang'an, Jianghan, Qiaokou, Hanyang, Wuchang, Qingshan, Hongshan
Villages	村庄	Formal administrative designation (Administrative Villages) Informal (natural villages)	Natural and administrative villages (consolidation of several natural villages), include housing and farm tracts. Land may be used for non-agricultural functions	Huangpi, Caidian, Dongxihu, Jiangxia, Hannan, and Xinzhou
Street offices	街道办	Formal administrative designation	Administrative classification—lowest urban rank in spatial administrative hierarchy	All Districts
Districts	市区	Formal administrative designation	Administrative classification, below the municipality	Jiang'an, Jianghan, Qiaokou, Hanyang, Wuchang, Qingshan Huangpi, Caidian, Dongxihu, Jiangxia, Hannan, and Xinzhou
Riverfront Development Area		Formal Planning Designation	Planning designation, Portions of Hankou, Hanyang, and Wuchag targeted for high-end commercial and residential development along the Yangtze Riverfront.	Portions of Jiang'an, Jianghan, Qiaokou, Wuchang, Hanyang

*Informal here refers to terms often used in official government and planning documents but does not refer to a specifically bounded territory or defined geographic area.

Chapter 2

Uncorking the Neoliberal Bottle: The Confines of Neoliberal Critique for Interpreting Urban Change

2.1 Introduction

Neoliberalism has emerged as the premier theoretical explanation of urban change and transformation around the globe within geography and urban studies in general. It brings coherence to the chaotic and wildly unpredictable trajectory of urban transformation around the world. For China scholars such as Fulong Wu, it is a useful framework for interpreting the production of urban space, as cities "have become increasingly important geographical targets and institutional laboratories for various neoliberal experiments, e.g. place-making, urban development corporations, public-private partnerships, new forms of local boosterism, and property-led redevelopment," (He and Wu, 2009, pp. 283).

Neoliberalism gives urbanization a familiar and recognizable shape in a wide variety of local contexts, yet it also limits the way the complex social relations that give shape to urban spaces are imagined. For Gibson-Graham, the identification of neoliberalism in diverse locales "affords the pleasure of recognition, of capture, of intellectually subduing that one last thing; it offers no relief or exit to a place beyond," (Gibson-Graham 2006, 4). Under the assumption that capitalism's ascendancy in China is inevitable, if not complete, many scholars employ a structuralist framework of capitalism to explain its spatial change. In this logic, China's present-day spatial organization is the outcome of a

globalized process of capital accumulation where the state engages primarily as the organizers of "urban entrepreneurialism" and place-making to attract capital. This approach engages an established tradition of critical scholarship, loosening the bonds of Area Studies and "Chinese exceptionalism". On the other hand, strict adherence to capitalist spatial logics leaves many features of China's urban landscapes unexplained. The uninterrupted rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), no matter how decentralized and even fragmented its authority might be, continues to dominate China's political and economic order, preventing free market economics from achieving the ideological hegemony that is often presumed in the English-language literature.[21] Moreover, the legacies of state socialism continue to dominate China's spatial political economy in the form of the dual structure that divides rural and urban China. Structuralism fails to capture a vast range of forces because it treats capitalism as an external force acting *on* local cultures (Smith, 2001). To understand the development of Chinese cities we must explore the complex interrelations among agents nested in state hierarchies, among cities and individuals inside and outside China, and the strong and weak networks that constitute social life and economic activity. While New Institutional Economics (NIE) gives due attention to the way institutions *alter* the trajectory or character of capitalism, they are still treated either as speed bumps on an otherwise smooth path of market transition, or as historically contingent entities for the regulation of market transactions (Kornai,1992; Naughton, 2007).

[21] On the fragmented rule of the CCP, see Cheng Li (2012)

This chapter first offers a brief review of the central role taken by neoliberal critique in human geography over the last decade with special attention given to the works of David Harvey, Brenner and Theodore, and Peck and Tickell. Especially important for urban geography is Brenner and Theodore's 2002 article that called for the study of "actually-existing neoliberalism." In this section, my primary aim is to provide an overview of debates about the relevance of neoliberalism to China's overall development story since 1978. Next, I offer a brief glimpse into some of the major intellectual debates related to neoliberalism within China that are not often given attention in the West. Here, I want to draw attention to the different ways neoliberalism is acknowledged and conceptualized by Chinese scholars. Of central importance to these debates is the historical difference between state-economy interactions in recent Chinese history when compared with capitalist countries in the West, contestations over the ability of markets to limit or exacerbate political violence in Chinese society, and the primacy given to stability in Chinese political arguments. Various trends in Chinese intellectual and political thought over the past two decades, while often in conflict with each other, share a desire to avoid the wholesale adoption of Western practices, including neoliberalism.

I then turn to the central tenet of neoliberal critique as it relates to urban studies, the theory of primitive accumulation, or "accumulation by dispossession" which is seen as the driver of contemporary urbanization in developing countries. I conclude with a detailed critique of prominent urban scholars working on China who employ primitive accumulation and "neoliberal urbanism" as a framework for understanding contemporary urbanization. Scholars of Chinese urbanization have latched on to neoliberal critique as a means of engaging broader geographic theory. Yet in doing so, they risk oversimplifying

the evolution of Chinese cities and urban institutions, and erasing spatial difference for the sake of the unifying and totalizing theory of spatial change that is "neoliberalism."

2.2 Neoliberal Critique and the Geography of China's Development

Critical neoliberal theory over the past two decades has come to dominate urban geographers' approach to poverty studies, political and social movements around the globe, gender, race, economic development, and global inequality. Following Brenner and Theodore (2002) and Peck and Tickell's (2002) calls for greater attention to the intersection of neoliberal discourse and practices of urban governance, urban geographers have increasingly identified cities as the critical site of neoliberalism's implementation. Within China studies, the preponderance of neoliberal theorizing has coincided with increased attention to the role of cities in China's changing political economy (Wu 2004, 2007; Ma 2005; Ma and Wu 2005; McGee et al 2007; Tang and Chung 2002). Given these overlapping agendas within China and urban geography, locating the intersection of neoliberalism and city development is an inevitable target of China scholarship.

However, there are some inherent contradictions between a theory that gives primacy to the market as the ultimate arbiter of sociopolitical conflict with private property rights as an ultimate social good; and China, a country where the market arguably remains subjugated to the priorities of the central and local state, and all land is legally owned either by the state or rural collectives. This chapter explores the contradictions of neoliberalism in its application to the Chinese context with particular attention to the multiple ideological and theoretical influences at play in the formulation of urban

Table 2.1 Some Theoretical Explanations of Transformation under Chinese Reforms

	School	Representative Authors	Key terminology	Key research question(s)	Primary subjects/objects of research
(1)	Neoliberal hegemony	David Harvey (2005), Walker and Buck (2008), George CS Lin (2009)	Primitive accumulation; accumulation by dispossession; spatial fix	How has neoliberalism and capitalism penetrated China?	The nation-state; labor markets, national investment, foreign-direct investment
(2)	"Actually Existing Neoliberalism"	Shenjing He and Fulong Wu (2009), Fulong Wu; Lawrence Ma (2005)	Accumulation by dispossession; neoliberal urbanism; urban boosterism	How have local governments promoted and developed their cities through neoliberalism? How is neoliberalism implemented on the local scale?	Municipal government; policy making and policy mobility; land expropriation; welfare and social security
(3)	Neoliberal subject-making (Foucauldian)	Lisa Hoffman (2009); David Bray (2005, 2009); Gary Sigley (2006); Lisa Rofel (2007); Pgu Ngai (2005)	Chinese governmentality; citizenship; suzhi	How do neoliberal modes of governance interact with socialist tropes in post-reform subject-making?	The workplace, home, social life; state-society interactions
(4)	New Institutional Economics	Victor Nee (1989, 1991); Janos Kornai (2000) Douglas North (1997); Yingyi Qian and Barry Weingast (1997)	Market transition; path-dependence; property rights; "incomplete" property rights regime	What contradictions in the economy emerge when socialist and capitalist institutions co-exist?	Institutions of economic regulation; institution building
(5)	Socio-cultural explanations	Andrew Kipnis (2007); Donald Nonini (2008);	Suzhi, guanxi	How do cultural ideals and local histories shape engagement with national and global markets?	Social relationships, family relationships

planning in Chinese cities, and the effects these influences have had on *chengzhongcun* redevelopment in Wuhan. It is also troubling that neoliberalism is frequently employed by geographers with little critical debate over its basic assumptions. The nuances of its diffusion, implementation, and evolution are debated, but its essential character is rarely called into question *within* geography. While there are a handful of exceptions (Gibson-Graham, 2006, Barnett 2010) within geography, there are two extreme poles where neoliberalism is either ignored altogether (as found with a good deal of quantitative geography), or assumed as an accepted truth. Research calling neoliberalism's explanatory power into question or demanding greater precision in the substance of neoliberal critique is largely published in journals of sociology and anthropology. While there is considerable overlap among these categories, the predominant schools of thought that engage neoliberal causality for the trajectory of Chinese reforms are identified in Table 2.1.

First, many neo-Marxist geographers, especially David Harvey, have used China to demonstrate global neoliberalism's unfettered advance throughout the world (Harvey, 2005; Walker and Buck 2007) (Row 1). This body of work characterizes neoliberalism as a hegemonic ideology originating in Europe and the United States acting *upon* countries outside the core (Peck, 2004; Peck and Tickell, 2002), either ignoring altogether or severely limiting local, cultural and historical specificities that shape diverse societies (Smith, 2002). Other researchers, drawing on Theodore and Brenner's concept of "actually-existing neoliberalism" attempt to show how China has employed neoliberal tropes in the specific spatial-political-historical contexts of post-Socialist China (Row 2). This line of analysis is most evident in the work of prominent urban China scholar

Fulong Wu, but it has been an important foundation for urban research in a range of locales over the last decade (Boyle et al, 2008; Goldstein 2012; Leitner et al 2012).

Several scholars building on Nikolas Rose employ Foucauldian notions of governmentality or "neoliberal governmentality" to partially resolve some of the most glaring shortcomings of neoliberal theory in the Chinese context (Row 3). Arguing that China is not a model case for the erosion of state power by capitalism, these authors seek to demonstrate the "marriage between neoliberal and anti-neoliberal elements" in governing practices and the social regulation of daily life (Bray 2005, Hoffman 2010). New Institutional Economics (Row 4) focus on the interaction and contradictions between socialist and capitalist institutions under market transitions (discussed in Chapter One). Led by anthropologists, sociocultural explanations for China's political economy emphasize institutional continuities and the social basis of political and economic relations (Nonini 2009; Kipnis 2007, 2009). A final school that will be discussed in Chapter 3 focuses on the continued importance of socialist institutions, especially the rural-urban dual structure, for regulation and interventions into Chinese society.

2.2.1 China and Neoliberal Hegemony

Framing Chinese development in the reform era under the umbrella of neoliberalism rests on the premise that Chinese policy has been ideologically swayed by the insidious spread of neoliberal ideology. At the heart of critical anti-neoliberal theory's ascendancy in geography is David Harvey. Harvey has written extensively over the past two decades on the ideological hegemony of neoliberalism throughout the globe,

with a critical eye frequently turned toward China (Harvey 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009). Neoliberalism, for Harvey is:

> "a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices . . . if markets do not exist then they must be created, by state action if necessary. *But beyond these tasks the state should not venture*. " (Harvey, 2005, 2).

The state under neoliberalism must limit its market interventions due to the supposed superiority of market signals and the state's susceptibility to powerful interest groups aiming to distort the market. Due largely to political shifts under Thatcher in Great Britain and Reagan in the United States, and the opening and reform of the Chinese economy begun in 1979, Harvey argues that neoliberalism has achieved hegemonic status in shaping political economic institutions and policy decisions. It is first and foremost, a *global* ideology determining political discourse from the United States to Sweden, from Brazil to Malaysia. It has "become incorporated into the common-sense way many of us interpret, live in, and understand the world," (Harvey, 2005, 3).

Anti-neoliberal critics of Chinese development, including Harvey, rely on several characteristics of the reform period that restructured scale-relations to conclude China is, if not a fully neoliberal country, at least headed in that direction (Walker and Buck, 2007). Of particular interest are the processes of fiscal decentralization, the "privatization" of public goods as a means of primitive accumulation, and urban entrepreneurialism. Although, these processes bear only superficial commonality with similar trends in Western and other developing countries, the arguments follow a very simple, if tautological thread: neoliberalism over the past 30 years, in the words of

Harvey, has "swept across the world like a vast tidal wave of institutional reform and discursive adjustment" (Harvey, 2007). China *has* undergone sweeping institutional reform and discursive adjustment over the past 30 years. Therefore, China's institutional reform is neoliberal by nature.

Harvey's analysis, however, leaves quite a few dots unconnected. Following Michael Peter Smith's general critique of Harvey (Smith, 2001; also Tilly, 1988), Harvey's focus on the global scale creates a lack of specificity that overlooks the local political and social relations that mediate class relationships. In *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, we see what Tilly (1988) earlier identified as a glaring shortcoming in Harvey's work: an inattention to the structure and agency of the state and other social actors that conflates the mere existence of capitalist interests with the full realization of neoliberal capitalism (coted in Smith, 2001). Corresponding with the emergence of corporate power in China, a disenfranchised and exploited labor class is also visible (Gong 2013; Chan et al 2013; Ngai et al, 2010). However, corporate power and labor dynamics are imbued with profound social, cultural, and political dynamics that are not captured by the linear diffusion of neoliberalism across space.

2.2.2 Skepticism toward Neoliberal Hegemony

Donald Nonini (2008) argues that the only evidence actually offered by Harvey for the case of neoliberalism in China is that its market reforms coincided with a neoliberal turn in the United States and Great Britain. While there are most certainly neoliberal *influences* at play in China particularly among certain elements of the ruling class and economic elites, neoliberals represent only one of many voices creating domestic economic policy. Even among economic elites benefitting from privatization

and liberalization within the Chinese economy, it is arguable whether or not they retain enough independence from the Chinese state to truly be considered part of a transnational business class that pays no heed to the reference of international borders suggested by Castells (2004) and Sparke (2005) among others (Dickson, 2003; Chen and Dickson 2010). Hoffman (2010) for example, shows how many professional Chinese use international connections, especially education and training in Western universities to supplement, not replace, their identity as Chinese citizens. Many of the wealthiest people in China are either directly or indirectly supported by the Party-State, and continue to rely on connections to the state to expand business empires (Dickson 2007). Nonini is critical of what he sees as a general conflation of *neoliberalism* with *capitalism*. The difference for Nonini is that neoliberalism is inherently about transforming governing practices within existing capitalist states, specifically "the relationship between capitalist markets, the individual, and the state," (149) whereas what is underway in China today is the creation of economic, technical, legal, and political arrangements to "invent capitalism".

We might also extend Nonini's critique to include a conflation of capitalism with markets. One of the first events to herald changing times under Deng Xiaoping was the reemergence of spontaneous farmer's markets in Chinese villages, towns, and even cities. The availability of alternative and more diverse sources of food and other goods coming from the countryside in urban areas weakened the state's control over the allocation of goods and, especially price controls, but such markets operated independently and differently from state-regulated capitalism that would develop under Jiang Zemin in the 1990s. The emergence of flexible, market practices in some areas of China, therefore, does not *ipso facto* translate into neoliberal restructuring simply because Reaganomics

and Thatcherism were simultaneously rolling out in the West. That China's current system is conducive to accumulation does not mean that it is defined by it—captialism "does not dictate its own conditions of existence" (Nonini 2008, 150)--it can and does operate in a variety of contexts, but its causal impact on states, cities, and cultures is not predetermined. Capitalism need not be fetishized as immune to the contextualization that any other social phenomenon is routinely subjected to in critical scholarship. Capitalism is acted on by local agents, subjected to manipulation by diverse interests with motives and desires that may or may not be strategically aligned with capitalist goals. It is out of the interrelations among a multitude of actors, institutions, and ideas, not the simple variations of global capitalism that the Chinese city emerges.

Accepting the hegemonic status of neoliberal discourses in China as a matter of course leads to misunderstanding the basic function of China's economy, faulty interpretations of reform outcomes, and misdiagnoses of the primary challenges facing continued social and economic transformation. For example, on the 'proletarianization' of China, Harvey writes, "In so far as neoliberalism requires a large, easily exploited, and relatively powerless labour force, then China certainly qualifies as a neoliberal economy," (p. 144). This is spurious reasoning--neoliberalism "requires" a large exploitable labor force, China has a large exploitable labor force, therefore China is neoliberal. But how is this labor force kept exploitable? What techniques of political power are employed to create and sustain this class of workers? How do workers accommodate or resist their exploitation? For Harvey, it is the neoliberal 'tsunami', an external force imposing its will on the Chinese labor force. Yet, China's labor force is kept powerless and exploitable not by the ravages of a neoliberal order, but by the

resilience of the *hukou* system, an institutional foundation of China's decidedly non-market economy under Mao that maintains an unequal balance between the registered population of cities and rural areas. What is crucial to recognize is that the *hukou* system sustains a low-wage labor force for China's factories, but its greater function is in reducing state costs of urbanization. Thus, it is as much a system of state regulation as it is of protecting capital interests. One of the *hukou* system's key functions in the 1960's and 1970's was to serve as an institutional basis for the redistribution of wealth from rural to urban areas. This was accomplished by linking access to state-provided goods, especially grain-rations, to household registration. In the present environment, access to public housing has been a key service linked to the place of *hukou* registration that has maintained a division of labor in the present context as well as a means of determining eligibility for certain types of employment (see Wang 2005; Zhang 2002). Furthermore, Huang (2008) argues that the central government put a credit squeeze on the rural sector in the 1990's, hindering entrepreneurial prospects for peasants. The lack of available credit and other barriers to entry in rural entrepreneurship created a condition where the only reasonable means of obtaining non-agricultural income for rural residents was through migratory searches for wage labor. The intense competition for wage labor that resulted combined with the institutional prejudices inherent in the *hukou* system to severely suppress wages for rural-urban migrants (Huang 2008 122-3; Meng and Zhang 2001). The unfair and unjust environment for migrant labor has given China a tremendous advantage for its participation in the global market (it is the primary reason for the so-called "China price", see Harney 2008), but it is an outcome of state socialist

policies seeking to *control* the market, protect urban residents, control population, and reduce state costs and obligations for urban workers (Chan 2009, 2010; Young 2014).

Neoliberal theory purports that local societies and political structures are so inherently weak that *any* engagement with capitalism inevitably leads to their assimilation. (Smith 2002) Yet China has taken advantage of globally predominant neoliberal trade policies without adopting a neoliberal stance for itself. Rural-urban inequality in China does not derive from privatization or the supremacy of free market ideology, quite the opposite. Huang (2008) points out that the 1980s was a period of wide-scale *marketization* of the countryside, and the outcomes lifted hundreds of millions of peasants out of poverty as they engaged in productive entrepreneurialism, creating new wealth and opportunities for improved livelihoods without significantly undermining the collective culture of the village. The shocking inequality that for many defines China's development model today did not emerge until the state reasserted its power to divert resources from the countryside into the city. Instead of a *tabula rasa* for the institution of free markets, the state had at its disposal a legacy of interventions in practices of land ownership, distribution, and access to public goods built over the preceding decades of state socialism. Especially after 1992, local governments proved adept at utilizing the peculiar spatial governing practices and policies of the Chinese state that directed the fruits of reform and development away from rural households toward municipal governments and quasi-private developers (Tang and Chung, 2002).

Nonini, then, questions the validity of neoliberal frameworks applied to China on the basis that China is 1) not historically a capitalist country and 2) lacks a historical engagement with liberalism that could serve as a foundation for any evolution toward

something called neoliberalism. He is not alone. While not explicitly addressing neoliberal theory, skeptics of China's commitment to the "capitalist road" include Minxin Pei (2006) and Yasheng Huang (2008) who instead focus on the vast state interventions that create a decidedly non-market political economy. Liew (2005), meanwhile, argues that the communist party's ability to reinvent itself in the reform era has sustained its monopoly on political power. When combined with China's unique history (especially socialist legacies) and geography, the party's influence continues to steer China toward non-neoliberal economic strategies. China's engagement with neoliberalism, says Liew, will be "a loose hug rather than an intimate embrace."

However, for Harvey and others, a country need not be committed to capitalism at all in order to be in "the embrace of neoliberalism." The history of neoliberalism for Harvey, is an exploration of either "a Utopian project providing a theoretical template for the reorganization of international capitalism or as a political scheme aimed at reestablishing the conditions for capital accumulation and the restoration of class power," (Harvey 2007, 28). He goes on to claim, "the principles of neoliberalism are quickly abandoned whenever they conflict with this class project." Neoliberalism, then, when it is not a system of economic organization, is a convenient ideological tool with which a wealthy elite can easily subjugate the majority with a rhetoric of individual liberty and freedom. Harvey's sleight of hand here is a neat rhetorical trick. If a country is advocating and implementing policies in accordance with neoliberal doctrine, then we can reasonably assume it is neoliberal. If it is advocating and implementing policies that diverge from neoliberal doctrine, then it is also neoliberal, so long as its ultimate aim is to

divert resources into the hands of a privileged class. Neoliberalism, in this vein, is an elite strategy for the control of wealth, empty rhetoric to justify "class restoration."

The problem is, different countries have different class histories, and the basis for conflict over class claims on national resources is frequently based on factors other than oversimplified relations among capital, bourgeoisie, and the proletariat.[22] But for Harvey, local difference does not alter the core truth of neoliberalism, it may only change its superficial form, becoming, in his words, "neoliberalism with Chinese characteristics." As much as recent Marxist geographers have deplored the "aspatial" nature of neoliberal advocates like Thomas Friedman, the concept of space and local difference in Harvey's vision of neoliberalism reduces local difference to dependent variables of the particular form neoliberalism will take in different national contexts, or economic reductionism on a global scale.[23] Pickvance succinctly unsettles Harvey's interpretation of Chinese neoliberalism by pointing out that "to call it neoliberal with Chinese characteristics is to fail to see that the Chinese characteristics are in contradiction with neoliberalism" (Pickvance 2011: 56).

The contradictions noted by Pickvance are not resolved because of the vagueness with which China geographers define neoliberalism on the one hand, and a tendency to oversimplify or even misrepresent political, economic, and social change in China in the reform period on the other. More importantly, geographers frequently take neoliberalism

[22] This argument will be expanded in a later chapter

[23] This economic reductionism is the primary basis for Michael Peter Smith's (2002) criticism of Harvey and Castell's theoretical framing of global practices.

as an external agent of change, much like a computer virus, a pre-existing condition that insinuates itself into national politics, trickling down into every nook and cranny of Chinese life. These perspectives ignore the ways in which states and individuals problematize their own cultures and histories when advancing political and economic change, a process that itself shapes and reconfigures the theories and practices of political economy throughout the world. While neoliberalism as a contemporary movement finds its origins in Britain and the United States, other actors have been equally important in constructing the ideologies that shape the global economy today, and ignoring these locally specific developments gives a false impression of neoliberalism as a globally hegemonic ideology sprouting whole out of the west. In exploring neoliberal authoritarianism in Mexico, for example, Patricia Martin argues that Mexican neoliberalism (and its contestations) grew out of local contexts and traditions of authority, the state, and society. Rather than taking a "global spread" view of neoliberalism, these internal transformations "reverberate and reinforce" the shifts ongoing in the global north (Martin 2007, 53). China, in particular has used its growing economic and political power as well as its historical antipathy toward Western dogma to influence thinking on a variety of political and economic issues and on appropriate modes of governance for developing countries (Mohan and Power 2009). This influence has not received significant attention among Western theorists who dismiss China's political economy as "in transition" between socialism and capitalism rather than as a unique political economy worthy of investigation in its own right (Walder 1996).

2.3 Urbanization as Primitive Accumulation or "Accumulation by Dispossession"

As fundamental to the transformation of non-capitalist society, primitive accumulation, most commonly represented as enclosure, commodification, or privatization, has a long history within traditional political economy debates (Glassman 2006). While there is some degree of consensus on what primitive accumulation does, there is more controversy on what it signifies, For Webber (2008, 2008b), one of few scholars to explicitly engage the theory in the Chinese context, primitive accumulation represents the transformation of agrarian labor into an industrial proletariat, an ongoing and continuous process of rural transformation, urbanization, and industrialization. In Hall (2012), it is the means through which capitalist relations are generalized in a given society, and the identification of primitive accumulation as the origin point of capitalist relations is largely dependent on how we define the boundaries of capitalism. For Hall, a focus on primitive accumulation "opens up the possibility of unifying widely divergent instances of enclosure, commodification, and privatization in terms of the specificity and dynamics of capitalism, but in doing so, it poses us a range of tangled and potentially unresolveable problems," that include a failure in the literature to account for local motives of accumulation that go beyond resistance to presumably externally imposed conditions (Hall 2012: 17).

David Harvey brought primitive accumulation and, later, "accumulation by dispossession" into the forefront of geography. For Harvey, the key link between geography and capitalism is that capital accumulation occurs within a geographical context that creates specific geographic structures, including the spatial dialectics of core-

periphery, urban-rural, and global-local (Harvey 2001). He further identified spatial organization and geographic expansion as crucial elements of capital accumulation. The "imperative" for accumulation requires capital to overcome spatial barriers (the so-called "annihilation of space by time"). Accumulation is the engine of creative-destruction, constructing new transportation and locational structures projected into existing structures (i.e., nation-states), while non-capitalist modes of organization (understood tautologically as "pre-capitalist") provide untapped markets for capitalist expansion, and capitalism itself becomes dependent on "the continued contribution of products and money from non-capitalist societies," (Harvey 2001: 251).

The key contribution of "accumulation by dispossession" is the observation that rather than reflective of a discrete moment in historical time, primitive accumulation is an ongoing, historical process (Harvey 2003; Glassman 2006). However, Harvey's construction of space is little more than a chessboard on which capital arranges the means of production, and in which capitalist modes of production always hold a position of dominance over other social forms. Because Harvey's space is so readily "annihilated by time", the persistence of non-capitalist forms of social organization, the agency of the state and other actors to mobilize around non-economic motives, and the possibility to engage capital without becoming subjugated to it are ignored. In practice, the employment of primitive accumulation to understand concrete historical situations often relies on three related presumptions: 1) *capital is always dominant:* non-market social forms are situated solely within a tautology of market evolution that persist only as remnants once they have been "penetrated" by capitalism (Webber 2008b) 2) *capital is its own agent*: the agency of accumulation processes are ascribed to capital itself, and the

state is reduced to little more than "capital's agent" (Smith 2001; Hall 2012) 3) *states and people are motivated primarily by economic interests:* processes that create or encourage accumulation are always driven by economic (primarily, capitalist) concerns (Hall 2012).

Presumptions about primitive accumulation are persistent currents through the recent literature on Chinese urbanization and land development (see the analysis of George Lin's work below). While it is laudable to connect China studies more concretely to geographic theory, reliance on the assumptions of primitive accumulation have left us an extremely narrow frame with which to view the transformations and trajectories of China's space and economy as dictated by capital interests.

2.3.1 The Limits of Actually Existing Neoliberalism in China Urban Studies

Brenner and Theodore's call to study "actually existing neoliberalism" (2002) was aimed at giving greater attention to the specific processes through which neoliberalism works in divergent societies, especially at the urban scale. This had a profound impact on urban scholars of China who could now readily link their empirical work to a theoretical package with universal claims, overcoming the criticism of "Chinese exceptionalism" in China scholarship. It also gave influential geographers the authority to describe China's reform and development as "decidedly" neoliberal despite apparent contradictions (Ma 2005; Harvey 2005), and gave China's urban scholars a renewed focus on processes of primitive accumulation and urban entrepreneurialism (McGee et al, 2007; Lin 2009).

It is my view that "actually-existing neoliberalism" is among the most detrimental concepts to emerge in urban geography in recent decades. In practice, it serves as little more than pretense to explain away local differentiation as part of a generalized

patchwork of capitalist practices. As Brenner et al criticize assemblage for decontextualizing cities from global capitalism (2011), “actually existing neoliberalism” decontextualizes cities from their individual histories and relations which are subsumed as variants of capitalism and capitalist structures. He and Wu (2009) argue that "actually existing neoliberalism" is a useful framework for interpreting the production of urban space, as cities "have become increasingly important geographical targets and institutional laboratories for various neoliberal experiments, e.g. place-making, urban development corporations, public-private partnerships, new forms of local boosterism, and property-led redevelopment," (He and Wu 2009: 283). The last of these, "property-led" redevelopment, is the focus of their 2009 paper, approached implicitly as a process of primitive accumulation whereby ownership of collective land is wrested away by private development companies. He and Wu consider three elements of China's urban development as decidedly neoliberal: shifting decision-making to local state authorities (decentralization), commodification of urban land, and the privatization of housing provision (ibid. 285). While the former is an explicitly political move, it has facilitated accumulation through the commodification of land and privatization of housing. Shifting local decision making and responsibility for revenue generation encouraged local political units to become economic decision-makers, and fostered urban entrepreneurialism. Urban development, "which used to be the obligation of the state," they argue, "has now been transferred to the pre-mature market," (ibid. 290). The resulting transformation of land and housing corresponds directly with central features of traditional accumulation: the commodification and privatization of land, the forceful

expulsion of peasant populations and the conversion of various forms of property rights into exclusive private property rights (Harvey 2001).

The presentation of urban development in China as led by capital is a purely subjective and, in this case, arbitrary position defining the transfer of urban real estate to private developers as central, but the transfer of property and wealth within the organization of the state is equally important.[24] Indeed, the claim that urban development is taking place under the *authority* of the market and not the state is premature. The development of commercial real estate that supposedly integrates Chinese territory with global circuits of capital is at times incidental to the opening of new spaces of state-sponsored and imagined urban modernity, and the local state's imperative to generate revenue for social spending and other centrally mandated projects for local governance. Understood in this light, capital accumulation in China represents a transfer of wealth from individuals and collectives *to the state*. Yet there is no contradiction between a theory that purports to shift state resources to private ownership, and a state practice that manipulates its property rights regime to ensure *state* accumulation because once capital "penetrates" a society, its dominance is ensured. In other words, "China's neoliberal

[24] Hsing (2006, 2010) for example, has documented the tensions between governments and what she calls "socialist land masters", agencies, party and military offices, universities, and State Owned Enterprises with direct access to large quantities of urban land. Additionally, there are sharp conflicts over land disposition among the Bureau of Land Management, Urban Planning Bureaus, townships, and municipalities. The transformation of land and real estate development is not simply a story of linear privatization, that is the transfer of public goods into private hands. Instead, Hsing identifies a complex mix of multiple state actors, private, and foreign owners, and socialist land masters who cause urban growth to be organized around competition and coalitions within the state.

urbanization optimizes market operations and maximizes the interest of the state-led regime of accumulation," (He and Wu 2009: 296). While China's urbanization may be highly problematic for conditions of equality, fairness, and social justice, the idea that it reflects optimal market operations is indefensible. The conditions under which land transfers take place guarantee the state's involvement and capture of revenues. How can a system be portrayed as neoliberal while simultaneously seeking as its primary aim to "maximize *state-led* accumulation," which is antithetical to the most primary tenets of neoliberal dogma? I believe there is a need to distinguish accumulation undertaken to advance state (or some other actor's) goals and accumulation undertaken purely for profit. Doing so would enable us to interrogate the assumption that the existence of accumulation is necessarily in support of capitalism or neoliberalization.

Without disputing any of the most basic claims about *how* urban development takes place in China, the utility of neoliberalism as an explanatory concept is lacking. He and Wu suggest that once we accept neoliberalism as *the* predominant paradigm of urban political economy, then we can readily link Western and Chinese logics of urbanism. They claim that "similarities can be found" between China and the West "in the most essential aspects of neoliberalization." This "essential aspect" is the "institutionalization of growth as the primary goal of the state," (299). They further point to similarities in local state tactics for "neoliberalization" introducing "new elements such as capital subsidies, place-promotion, supply-side intervention, and local boosterism, into its central urban policy," (ibid.). What we do find, however, is that China continues to rest on a mixture of "market logic and state authority logic." However, this state authority is only employed when it is necessary to balance neoliberalism's progress with societal

contestation. While neoliberalism's progress in China is halting, its ascendancy is inevitable and irreversible.

Perhaps it is the concept of a neoliberal essentialism that is most troubling about their arguments in that it effectively erases any significance of local variation for understanding how Chinese cities work. "Neoliberal theory," writes Daniel Goldstein, "may be sketched on the backs of cocktail napkins from the Washington Hilton, but that is not the extent of it," (Goldstein, 2012). Yet to deny neoliberalism its essentialist nature is not to trivialize capitalist influences on urban development. It is to investigate "neoliberalisms" as:

> "not merely locally variegated instantiations of global ideas but fully lived realities in which people and states have their own theories, and elaborate their own discourses and critiques, about the worlds they inhabit and the ways in which these should be organised. 'Actually existing neoliberalism(s)' are more than curious local manifestations of global norms, but sets of theories and practices about the world that are fundamentally the products of local history and experience . . . and impactful of lived daily reality," (Ibid. 305).

It is here, then, that assemblage becomes useful for understanding the ways in which capitalism and neoliberal theories are substantiated in local practices of urban development. If there is not one core element of neoliberalism that can characterize a "neoliberal city", then it is more fruitful to explore the diverse strands of intellectual discourse that embrace, reject, and adapt a wide set of theoretical, cultural, and moral beliefs into the production of urban spaces.

2.4 Neoliberalism in Chinese Intellectual Debates

Very little attention is paid in English-language scholarship to the intellectual debates about the relationships among the state, capital and society in contemporary

China. These debates have been an important part of China's transformation over the past three decades. Here, I can only offer a brief glimpse into a very active and dynamic world of Chinese intellectual and political discussion that has sought to influence China's evolving urban developments.

In the first decade of reform after Deng Xiaoping's rise to power, reforming China's political system was an integral component of the transformations taking place. However, the mass protests and state crackdown centered on Tiananmen Square in 1989 took democratic reform off the table. By the time economic reforms had been put back on track by Deng Xiaoping's Southern Tour in 1992, the Soviet Union had collapsed, and the disintegration of Yugoslavia had already begun. The social and political upheavals in China in 1989 and the dramatic collapse of European socialism had profound effects on intellectual thought about China's future. While the so-called "End of History" was a time for Western triumphalism, in China, it was a time of serious reflection as the state and intellectuals grappled with themselves, with the direction the country should take, and the appropriate relationship between the state and the economy, and the state and its subjects. A variety of intellectual currents came to the fore in the decade after Tiananmen, and while they frequently conflicted with each other, they tended toward agreement that a strong and capable state was vital for future stability.

Neoconservatives, typified by the leadership of Jiang Zemin, argued that a strong state was necessary for stability. The alternative was anarchy, political disintegration, and regionalism (Fewsmith 2008). This line of thinking affirmed the belief that economic development was of primary importance, and that social and political democracy in any form was only possible with economic development. Meanwhile, the

so-called "New Left" was highly critical of reformers, and skeptical of Western intellectual traditions. Best represented by Wang Hui, the "New Left" (a term of derision) doubted the ability of economic development and unfettered marketization to deliver social justice or equality. Some, like Cui Zhiyuan attempted to renew attention to the value in Maoist thought while staying cautious of the radicalism of the Maoist era (Fewsmith 2008; Wang 2003).

In each of these lines of thinking, the state is prominent, and both Neoconservatives in their support of incrementalism and a strong central state, and the "new left" in their criticisms of Western, especially neoliberal and neocolonialist ideology, draw on a desire to find a development path that was uniquely Chinese, and reject the wholesale adoption of a neoliberal ideology. The suffix "with Chinese characteristics" is often added as a punch line by Western observers, yet underlying this caricature of Chinese ideology is a serious effort to construct a state not defined by Western models and ideals. That these concerns have penetrated the highest levels of the party and the state is evidenced by the policy agendas at the highest levels since the turn of the century, starting with the Develop the West program begun in 2002, but really picking up under the administration of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao. Hu and Wen have placed social development, fairness, and equality at the center of the political agenda, and while they have not always delivered on their rhetoric, they have clearly shown a continued willingness to abandon Euro-American dogma.

Intellectual engagements with China and neoliberalism have become trapped into ultimately futile debates that can be summarized as “China is neoliberal” (He and Wu 2011; Harvey 2005; Wu 2010, Walker and Buck 2007), “China is not neoliberal” (Nonini 2008; Kipnis 2007), and “China is somewhat neoliberal, but not totally” (Liew 2009). To

me, this debate largely misses the point—neoliberal critique situated in China has done nothing to demonstrate the ways in which neoliberalism takes shape in different contexts, nor has it shed light on the ways in which a multiplicity of interests, actors, and phenomena give form to the contemporary Chinese city. Neoliberalism is a chameleon word that represents a set of basic ideas more than a proscribed set of policies. Key among these ideas is that markets should be unregulated, that the state should not intervene in the economy, and that the role of the state is to guarantee private property rights. These ideas have their advocates in China (Zhang Weiying for example), and some are very influential. But countertrends running through Chinese policy and thought over the past two decades has prevented it from becoming hegemonic. Nor is the advocacy of these principles predictive of urban outcomes. Private property rights, for example, have been used by local states to justify the expropriation and sale of collective land, and by villagers to justify their rights to refuse expropriation (Chen 2013).

Most decisively, neoliberalism in the advanced capitalist world is about the state withdrawing from economic regulation to enhance private, capitalist accumulation. Where the state intervenes, it is on behalf of private capital, often against the interests of the common good, or even against the interests of the state itself. In China, the state intervenes in the economy to enhance its own authority, legitimacy, and power, to engage in accumulation for the benefit of the state. Increasingly, the state is intervening in the economy to redistribute income across provinces, to improve the conditions for the rural population, and to expand the provision of public goods and services. This is an overwhelming task, and it has advanced haltingly. Perhaps as some recent scholars

suggest, the harmonious society is most indicative of a "Polanyi countermovement" that offsets the worst excesses of capitalism (Lim 2014, 2014b).

2.5 The Limits of Accumulation by Dispossession

George Lin is one of the most prominent geographers writing on China's urbanization and land development today. Lin's work is most often empirical, and grounded in the experiences of the Pearl River Delta (Lin 1997, 2001, 2004). Lin is strongly influenced by David Harvey, especially with regard to "accumulation by dispossession" as a driving force in China's spatial change (McGee et al 2007; Lin 2009). Lin's well-received 2009 book *Developing China: Land, Politics, and Social Conditions* is rich in empirical data, providing an ambitious overview of land development over the past two decades. Yet Lin also reveals what Michael Peter Smith called the "intellectual confines" of Harvey's theory. The book opens with a direct quotation from Marx on primitive accumulation, thrusting Marxist political economy, and by extension, Harvey, to the forefront of his analysis. Lin recognizes the hybrid character of China's land system, and queries how land use and land systems are shaped by localized social, economic and political conditions. However, due to the tautology of Marxist political economy, Lin cannot escape the limiting binaries of structure and agency and the historical inevitability of capitalist ascendancy. Thus, social conditions are determined in response to "historical change", economic conditions are confined to capitalist penetration, and political conditions are only understood in terms of central-local dynamics within the state. In each of these, a discrete and static 'inside' is acted on by a dynamic external force: global capitalism acts on the state, which in turn acts on society to create the social conditions under study.

According to Harvey, the role of the state under neoliberalism is to "create and preserve an institutional framework" of free markets for the exchange of private property (Harvey, 2005). Asserting private property rights over public goods, which then monetizes collective property and integrates it with "global flows of capital" is the very definition of primitive accumulation (Harvey, 2001; Glassman 2006). In China, the expropriation of rural land for urban construction is central to the current accumulation regime. Yet China's property rights, especially with respect to land, are commonly understood as ambiguous. This ambiguity has been a focus of research on China's spatial changes over the past decade (Ho 2001, Ho and Lin 2003, Whiting 2001, Whiting et al 2008,). In particular, scholars have explored how agriculture, industry, and real estate have expanded despite the lack of full privatization advocated by classical economic theory (See Huang 2008 for an alternative interpretation). For students of political economy, the question becomes, how has China managed to sustain capital accumulation without full privatization? Lin adroitly critiques the positioning of ambiguity within the property rights literature on China from two perspectives. First, in an approach clearly influenced by Douglas North, ambiguity is seen as the source of inefficiencies and social conflict because legal definitions of rural property rights are easily overwhelmed by the political power of the state (examples include Putterman 1993; Li Tian 2008). On the other hand, Peter Ho argues that ambiguity gives the state flexibility to adapt to markets, intervene when necessary, and maintain a large measure of control over development patterns (Ho 2001).

According to Lin, both perspectives share four common assumptions: property rights are preconditions for land development, property rights are defined by the central

state and disseminated in a top-down process, property rights will be uniform and consistent across space, and there is a causal relationship between the clarity of property rights and the character of land development (with an especially strong influence on the degree of social conflict over land and territory). Yet property rights in China are often constructed locally to be followed later by formal state recognition, while local experiments and variations continually challenge central policy. Hsing (2010) also demonstrates how residents of communities in urban centers, in *chengzhongcun*, and on the rural fringe shape property rights through political contestations over territoriality. Property rights, then, are not neatly formed at the center and disseminated uniformly across China: they are eminently local, contested, and dynamic. Lin further argues that clarity of property rights, and the reaction to them, is dependent on the contextual factors of "political and social conditions". The belief that ambiguity is inherently violent or disruptive is belied by the comparative experiences of Russia and Eastern Europe. Whether or not China can sustain economic growth without privatization, the idea that clarity is necessary for growth and stability is completely undermined by the past thirty years of world history. In fact, so Lin argues, evidence demonstrates the forceful production of "clarified" property rights, not their ambiguity creates social conflict (Lin, 2009, 32-35). Ambiguity of property rights is largely irrelevant in a context of such uneven political power between the urban state and rural collectives.

Land in particular is subject to considerations beyond the scope of either classical economics or neo-Marxist political economy. Lin is right to assert that neoliberal frameworks for land development in China are too simplistic because in China, capitalist logics are mediated by cultural views of land as fundamental for social security,

livelihood, and by the ideological prominence of land in the construction of CCP legitimacy. Land is not simply a commodity, but has multiple and conflicting meanings for individual farmers, village cadres, municipal governments and the central state. Unfortunately, this assertion, as well as the substantive critique of "ambiguity" is soon forgotten as his analyses return to a rational-choice model of resource contestation where social conditions are confined to responses to historical change, economic conditions are confined to capitalist penetration, and political conditions are only understood in terms of central-local dynamics within the state. In each of these, a discrete and static 'inside' is acted on by a dynamic external force with global capitalism acting on the state, which in turn acts on society to create the conditions under study. Where he begins his work with a critical exploration of the assumptions about land and property in political economy, his own analysis becomes trapped by the limited agency allowed any force other than capital when accumulation by dispossession is taken as the driving force of history, and when central-local relations are reduced to a binary, scalar analysis.

Harvey identifies land development as the primary "spatial fix" for capitalist overaccumulation, the means through which land is brought into the mainstream of capital accumulation. Lin does not dispute the primacy of capital accumulation in spatial change, but he does argue that Harvey overestimates the role of global capital, suggesting that capital formation and sources of production and consumption are far more domestically-driven (Lin 2009: 45). Still, land development is fundamentally driven by the "imperative of accumulation by dispossession." The politics of land development revolve around coalitions of local state agents and private developers forming in competition with rural collectives for the capture of capital accumulation. I believe Lin

misses the opportunity to explore an aspect of the relationship of capital, politics, culture, and space that are obscured whenever capital is given a dominant position in any localized "hybrid" of these layered social forces. Just because a phenomenon or local practice may be of use to global (or even local) capital accumulation that does not mean that the phenomenon itself is caused or driven *by capital*.

Lin acknowledges that the central state has multiple goals for land development that *include* capital accumulation, but he does not address the motive for accumulation by the different actors. In Marxist land economics, accumulation occurs for its own sake, as a "spatial fix" for overaccumulation, but what is the motive for local governments and rural collectives to accumulate? What are they accumulating, and for what purpose? In standard political economy, accumulation is not seen as a strategy but as *the goal*. But is this always the case? Furthermore, Lin has created an overly simplistic division between urban governments and peasants, ignoring the interweaving of rural and urban society at the urban fringe and the tremendous transformations that have taken place within rural society. China's *de jure* rural population is too diverse for motives to be ascribed to a unified "peasant" class.

A focus on material processes of land development obscures the intentions and outcomes of relevant actors who may engage or accept accumulation processes in order to achieve other desirable outcomes. It is thoroughly demonstrated that China's accumulation process encourages inequality, political oppression and socioeconomic exclusion, but it is ontological fallacy to assume that the creation of capital surpluses shares a causal relationship with social injustice. More attention needs to be given to how ideas about social justice, equality, and social integration are constructed differently

through localized relationships of space, power, and culture, and how the negotiation among those forces determines and legitimates the creation and distribution of capital surpluses (Gibson-Graham 2006). Instead of engaging these complexities, Lin too casually substitutes the agency of domestic capital for that of global capital.

After carrying out his critiques of property rights discourse and neoliberal critique, Lin presents his framework for understanding land development. Studies of land development, he argues, must investigate the fundamental motives to engage in land development by the actors involved situated in a structural dimension that is historically and geographically specific. In short, he falls back on a structure-agency dialectic, and as later chapters unfold, it is clear that "structure" is given far more weight than "agent". What agency is evident relies on what is essentially an adaptable rational-choice model: individual and household strategies adjust to historical and political conditions, but are primarily motivated by economic self-interest while analysis of the state centers on the "functioning and repositioning of the socialist state" (Lin 2009: 54) through the now standard historical division of 1978. Even though it is not his intent, this thrusts land development into an oversimplified binary of pre and post reform that cannot help but emphasize change over continuity, and global dynamism over staid local culture. Indeed, capitalism is regularly used as a synonym for history, the history that the Chinese state has rejoined following Mao's death. Before the 1978 watershed, China was a "rare" place where the "natural course" of the evolution of the economy and society were distorted and disrupted (Ibid. 72).

Whereas assemblage theory offers the opportunity to consider how the present is built on the past, Lin's perspective erases three decades of Chinese history, and leaves no

room to consider how the transformation of China under Mao continues to shape the trajectories of its development. Holding the past and future as stark and contrasting moments in a teleological evolution of capitalism "shuts down the terrain of transition itself to critical inquiry" and risks overlooking the internal continuities, contestations, and mechanisms of social change (Martin 2007). In assemblage theory, cities and their forms are sedimentary, with the present layered unevenly on the past. Therefore, rather than portray an arbitrary break with the past, assemblage allows for the continuation of Maoist logics of state and governmental regulation and intervention in multiple aspects of city-making, simultaneously acknowledging the rapid and dramatic transformations under way.

2.6 Uncorking the Neoliberal Bottle

Forcing Chinese cities and urbanization into the neoliberal bottle severely limits our ability to understand a relationship between past and present that is deeper and more complex than the simple institutionalization of capitalism. To identify the growth-first logic of the Chinese state as evidence of its neoliberalism is to ignore the thirty years of socialist development practice between 1949 and 1979. The growth-first logic of the Chinese state clearly predates the reform era and the neoliberal movement, as evidenced most explicitly in the Great Leap Forward. For that matter, economic growth, while frequently taking a backseat to Cold War geopolitics, was a fundamental goal of the United States and Europe in their engagement with developing countries in the Keynesian era. Taking a longer historical view of how China has mobilized political and social relations around economic development goals belies an understanding of the present as a complete break with the past and points to a modification of state tactics to achieve long-

standing development goals. However, once the pervasiveness and inevitability of neoliberalism are accepted, scholars fixate on state strategies that seek to appease neoliberalism's opponents without undermining its general ascendancy. In this way, all social and political action is confined to its basic relationship to capitalism. As David Bray succinctly puts it, China studies have replaced a "teleology of Marxism for a teleology of modernity," (Bray 2005) that is plagued by a similar devotion to history's unidirectional march. As much as capitalism is acknowledged as taking on hybrid forms (Peck and Tickell 2002, Peck and Zhang 2010), *capital* is always given dominance over its other parts.

Urban studies, whether centered in Europe or Asia, must be understood in the ways in which the city is embedded in structures, networks, and processes larger than itself (Cinar and Bender 2007; King 2007). However, this is not to *reduce* the city to those external relations, which is what happens when urban geographers become singularly focused on identifying the neoliberal. We must be aware of *competing* narratives of the city that relate not singly and consistently to global capital, but also to nationalist projects, projections of state power, and cultural symbols that do not follow a narrowly Westernized conception of urbanism that is and always shall be construed as neoliberal (Ong 2011). In addition, the agency of residents of China's urban villages, migrant workers, and dispossessed farmers, and their role in assembling the Chinese city deserves greater attention. At the same time, diverse motives drive the actions of state agents, party-members, and the intellectual elite in both enabling and resisting acts of primitive accumulation. Greater attention to the ways in which neoliberalism is contested in China, and the alternative tropes, ideologies, and worldviews actors employ not just in

overt opposition to neoliberal policies but in the daily contestations over urban development and urban imaginaries could serve to decenter neoliberalism from Chinese analysis, and give a more complete picture of how urbanism takes shape in different societies.

2.7 Conclusion: Assembling China's Transformation beyond Scale

Critiques of neoliberalism has taken a dominant position within the geographic discipline. In the simplest terms, neoliberalism is employed to explain and describe the most recent phase of worldwide capitalism. Studies of China grounded in neoliberal critique have taken their influence from Brenner and Theodore's influential call to study "actually existing neoliberalism." That is, to explore the path-dependent, contextual, and highly localized variations of processes of neoliberalization in various parts of the world. I agree with the sentiment that neoliberalism is not proceeding universally throughout the globe in a uniform fashion. However, this model of investigation leaves the concept of neoliberalism as little more than an empty shell for the packaging of case-studies in diverse locales. In their studies of "actually-existing neoliberalism" in Chinese cities, scholars have simply documented change, and then declared it neoliberalism. Attaching the neoliberal moniker to studies of urban change does little to illuminate the processes of urban transformation in China, nor does it deepen our understanding of how neoliberal ideology and practice is (or is not) differentially understood and employed over space and time.

Neoliberalism is theorized within geography as the restructuring and dismantling of a particular mode of state regulation of capitalism--Fordist-Keynesianism--from a single epoch in Western history (post-World War II until the early 1980s (Harvey 2005;

Peck 2010). But what of a country like China which was not Keynesian, but had its own set of institutions for regulation of the economy firmly entrenched? Scholars need to do more than just acknowledge the path-dependence of Chinese neoliberalism. Deeper understanding of China's spatial political economy requires serious consideration not just of where China is perceived to be headed, but to consider where it has come from. Neoliberal analysis does not consider fully how the trajectory of China's past creates different fault lines and different sets of contradictions from those experienced in the Western countries in which neoliberalism is originally theorized. This includes wholly different notions of class relationships and structures, a different basis for understanding individual and collective rights, the relationship between the state and civil society and between the state and the economy.

Ultimately, I believe that David Harvey and Wang Hui separately highlight the greatest problem with neoliberalism as a conceptual category--the ideology of freedom and competition that it purports is frequently a mask for the assertion of class or state power, monopoly, and inequality. In the United States, this is evidenced in the systematic revocation of labor's right to collectively bargain while corporations are granted unlimited rights of free "speech" through campaign contributions, or the regulation of the most environmentally destructive industries by industry insiders. In China, it is evidenced by the ways in which state power and economic control have translated into the collusion of state and private actors (who are, at times, indistinguishable) in redistributing state and collective property to enrich themselves and advance their careers. However, the conversion of "rural" land for state accumulation (which is, in part, used to fund urban social welfare programs) is not the same as

privatizing or eliminating social welfare. There is a commonality of protecting class interests at work in the interplay of the state and economy in both countries, but *the classes are different*, the elite's relationship to the exploited classes is fundamentally different and cannot be distinguished from the realm of state officialdom, and the mechanics of exploitation operate through an entirely different set of institutional structures, social norms, and from a very different source of political legitimacy. Harvey and Wang take neoliberalism's hollowness as one of its principal features. If it is little more than an ideological front, then it is a mask for something far older than Thatcherism, the Chicago school, or even economics: the exploitation and oppression of a particular social group for the benefit of another. The first step toward "decentering" neoliberalism is to acknowledge it as ephemeral and excavate the diverse sources of injustice and inequality within the Chinese city.

Regardless, ascribing reform to the 'neoliberalization' of China erases the complexity of interweaving ideas that motivate policy. Brenner et al's primary critique of 'assemblage urbanism' is that it decontextualizes cities from hierarchical structures of geopolitics and political economy (Brenner et al, 2011). Assemblage, they argue, is only useful "when it is mobilized in the context of a broader repertoire of theories, concepts, methods and research agendas that are not derived internally from the assemblage approach itself," (Brenner et al, 2011, 230). They are skeptical of its ability to supersede traditional political economy as an "alternative mapping of the urban social universe," (Ibid. 232). Instead, they are concerned that it "displaces" rather than "dialogues" with the "questions, concerns, and orientations of political economy," (Ibid.). I believe this criticism largely misses the point and the utility of assemblage. Materials, objects, and

actors, in their ontological imagination, cannot be removed from geopolitics and global capitalism. "It is essential," they claim, "to consider the political-economic structures and institutions *in which they are embedded*," (Ibid. 234, emphasis added). This position, to me, reflects precisely the strength and even the need for assemblage theory—political economy cannot escape the belief that structure supersedes and even exists outside of social relations. Capitalism, especially global capitalism is the ultimate context in which all social action takes place, in whose "image" space is shaped. Social change and activism are only viewed as productive as a contestation *against* capitalism, allowing worldwide movements to be dismissed as "militant localisms." This is, again, a function of scale-analysis that prioritizes The Global and trivializes local agency. The advantage of assemblage is that it allows us to envision how the political-economic structures and institutions Brenner et al give priority to *emerge* from the relationality of social objects. Social relations are not embedded in structures and institutions, they are themselves productive of structures and institutions, including, but not limited to, the institutions that regulate and manage capitalist relations. Social change occurs, not simply through revolutionary consciousness and class struggle, but in the often subtle and gradual shifting of relations in local sites. The dynamism and diversity of urbanization, of cities as existing entities, is too chaotic to be captured by flow charts or scales.

Social change emanating from the state, as argued by social philosopher Manuel DeLanda, can be understood in material terms through the mobilization of resources to effect change, and as expressive in the building of solidarity and establishing new forms of legitimacy (DeLanda et al 2013; Delanda 2006, 2007). Legitimacy especially can take different forms: the legitimacy of the state as viewed through the eyes of its citizens, but

also the legitimacy of new behaviors and activities for local-state actors, social organizations, and individuals. As China's central government promulgated new policies, local governments increasingly recognized their expanding jurisdictions over economic activities.[25] The center, lacking the necessary material resources and political solidarity at the center to enact wholesale changes via consensus, delegated most aspects of reform to particular local sites. The local sites as well as higher-level officials with vested interest in the reform's success, mobilized state resources, but also personal networks of overseas Chinese whose relationships with their hometowns had survived the Maoist era (Shirk 1993; Rawski 1994; Hsing 1998). This also encouraged localities to move faster than the central government in reforms due to perceived support from prominent leaders, especially Deng Xiaoping, as well as the time-lag between the center becoming aware of rule-breaking and its ability to discipline localities (Huang 2008). To a large, extent, this pattern repeated itself in multiple sites, villages, towns, districts, and cities, provinces all moved at different paces. The most fundamental change of China's reforms was not a shift in the relationship between the state and capital, *but a fundamental change in the interrelations between the components of the Chinese state*. In particular, Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang led reformers in a concerted effort to alter the relationship between central and local governments to enable greater flexibility (Yang 1994). When local sites demonstrated successful engagements with reform, they were either given legitimacy or deligitimized through central proclamations. Moreover, central

[25] The phenomenon of localized economic authority has been recognized in diverse perspectives on China's reforms, including Naughton 1995; Lin 1997; Oi 1999; Yang 2004.

statements were at times contradictory. Overt statements of opposition would not always lead to direct discipline or intervention in local sites—allowing processes to continue, yet moderating the pace at which they would spread to other localities. When localized reforms moved faster than national policy, localities put pressure on the center to quicken or alter its pace and priorities.

It is my view that these complex interrelations among different actors are best viewed as operating along networks, rather than through scalar relations, even though these networks sometimes operate within a nested hierarchy of official rank and authority. While actor-network theory has been slow to recognize the unevenness of actors within networks, i.e., power (Bender 2010), there is no reason networks should only be only imagined as existing horizontally. Ignoring for the moment the presumed supremacy of the global scale in neoliberal critique, the domestic hierarchy of government is too frequently assumed as absolute in the urban literature. The spatial hierarchy of China's governance is well-established. However, these do not represent actual scales of action and authority. As the well-known proverb says, "the mountains are high and the emperor is far away." In an environment of experimentation, urban action is negotiated within a wider range of local political actors, and local cadres tolerate or even encourage activities that openly defy the dictates of higher levels while paying lip-service to the latest proclamations from Beijing in formal documents (see, for example, Abramson, 201x). Even in the structured hierarchy of the party-state, outcomes are not easily predicted by central policy—it is the criss-crossing relationships, tensions, and negotiations in regional governing structures that reveal the constraints to central authority. In Lin's analysis of land politics, for example, he takes central mandates on farmland protection at face value.

Cai Fang similarly uses central proclamations on labor and *hukou* reform as proof that China has developed beyond the Lewis transition. But as Allen reminds us, "Just because the central state is 'higher up', institutionally and geographically, does not pre-judge whose will eventually prevails," (Allen, 2011, 155). It is the relationship between "levels of governments" that matter—formal institutions of government operate alongside, but also within, complex forms of networked governance (Allen and Cochrane 2007).

Thus, China's reform cannot be understood as a linear process of movement from point A (socialism) to point B (market capitalism). Rather, we must examine the intensity with which interrelations of actors and institutions are constrained and enabled by the various norms and institutions of the state that frame them. The casual force given neoliberalism on China has important consequences because it leads to the misdiagnosis of many of China's social ills, especially regarding inequality. In fact, such problems do not always stem from the contradictions of advanced capitalism, but from the contradictions of China's own regulatory institutions. Diagnosis of China's urban problematics cannot be based on understandings derived from the transformation of Keynesianism. A deeper understanding of China's ongoing urban industrialization must start with the institutions of Chinese economic intervention and social regulation. In short, we must begin with China's *dual structure*, the subject of the next chapter.

Chapter Three
The Dual Structure: Disassembling China's Market Transition

3.1 Introduction

A linear and progressive view of history imbues nearly every commentary on China's developments (Marks 1985; Barme 2008). The 'modern' history of China begins sometime in the mid-late late 19th-century with the Tongzhi Restoration and "self-strengthening" movement characterized by the selective adoption of Western technologies. This period includes increasingly intensive interactions with European and American powers, the ceding of territories, the forced creation of open ports, and multiple rebellions culminating in the 1911 collapse of Imperial system. Yet, neither the Republic of China founded in 1911 or the People's Republic established in 1949 were able to simply erase away thousands of years of political, bureaucratic, and cultural history (no matter how hard Mao and the Gang of Four may have tried). Likewise, the initiation and carrying out of widespread reforms over the past several decades does not mean that three decades of Maoism never happened, to say nothing of the thousands of years that preceded them.

For DeLanda, the idea that history moves through stages, is an ontological trap that is difficult to escape for intellectuals ranging from neoclassical economists to neo-Marxists (DeLanda 2007). It is for this reason that DeLanda describes history as *accumulative*. In the Chinese context, this suggests that the reform era is built on the past, and continues to be built on the structures of socialist institutions and the party-state.

In most political science and economic treatments, this is characterized as path-dependence (i.e. 'path-dependent capitalism' or 'path-dependent neoliberalism') in the works of Fulong Wu, among others. While acknowledging that the past will influence the present and future, it is inherently misleading to describe the present age as a path-dependent transition to capitalism. It reaffirms the linear movement of countries through historical stages by allowing for a token amount of diversity in the final outcomes. But the path and history still have an end, and in China's case, this is largely seen as a quirky, yet ultimately recognizable variant of capitalism (Peck and Zhang, 2013).

Market transition narratives that have dominated mainstream accounts of China's reform are incapable of seeing past profit-rationality because the past is held as something that happened "before" and its lingering effects are simply the result of institutional lag. This is most prominently displayed in analysis informed by the "new-institutional economics" (NIE). The character of Chinese capitalism and Chinese cities here are the result of contradictions between socialist and capitalist institutions (Kornai, 2000; Qian 2000, Lin 2012). That these contradictions will dissipate as more fully capitalist institutions are established is the underlying assumption of market transition theory and has informed the research of prominent commentators on China (Nee 1989; Lardy 1998). It is a logic that is deployed by the state to justify dispossession, expropriation, inequality, forced evictions, environmental destruction, and massive layoffs for the sake of a harmonious future. Under Mao, repression and violence against the people was similarly justified as necessary for building socialism. Today, it is necessary for the construction of 'socialism with Chinese characteristics.' Of "transition" Chinese critic Wang Hui writes that it is a myth which claims that "the unemployment,

inequality, and decline of social security will be erased once the utopia of free markets are actualized," (Wang Hui 2004, pg. 8).

NIE, while explaining the ongoing importance of the CCP and socialist institutions to understanding the Chinese political economy, constructs a false dichotomy between socialism and capitalism, and between state and market. In Phillip Huang's lengthy review of this work, he cautions that market transition views:

> "take for granted that 'transition' means a total transition from plan to market, socialism to capitalism. Neither considers 'transition' from the point of view of the coexistence of the two, and hence both neglect the nature of their changing interrelationship," Philip Huang (2011)

Additionally, it does not consider the way the state consciously employs the supposed contradictions between socialism and capitalism to serve as the foundation for its accumulation regime, and to advance an agenda for the production and reproduction of state power that, while often conducive to capitalist relations, is not beholden to or driven by them (Lin 2006).

As discussed in Chapter 2, urban scholars working on China rely heavily on neo-Marxist geographers to inform their theoretical understanding of China's urbanization model,[26] assuming an essentially capitalist organization of China's political economy that is misplaced. More attention needs to be given to the impact of one-party rule on socioeconomic dynamics, and the foundational role the Leninist-socialist system

[26] Harvey's notion of "urban entrepreneurialism"is particularly emphasized in McGee et al (2007). Harvey's chapter on China in *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (2005) is frequently referenced in Lin's work. Wu (2004, 2006) repeatedly cites Harvey and Neil Smith to inform his interpretations of Chinese urbanization; He et al (2009), also relying heavily on Smith, claim China is undergoing "neoliberal urbanism." , see also He et al, 2009. See also, Walker and Buck (2008).

continues to play in the Chinese political economy despite dramatic transformations of the past thirty years. This is not to say that capitalist organization plays no role in urbanization, but it continues to be subordinated to the state-centered order of things that rests on the division of China's rural and urban space and population. It is generally accepted that the state plays an important role in the creation of urban social order and that global capitalism will interact with local cultures in a non-uniform way (Leitner et al 2007; Peck and Theodore 2010; Jessop 2002, 2002b). However, it is important to draw attention to the far-reaching dualism of Chinese governance that disrupts and distorts a supposedly capitalist (or any other) organization of space. The dual system, with the state as its architect, is an institutionalized barrier between formally recognized categories of rural and urban space, territory, government, and populations that dominates China's spatial order and economic development.

Despite criticisms, the "urban bias" is strong in China, manifesting itself in two fundamental ways. First, China's spatial political economy since the founding of the PRC is based on *an extractive model of development* between rural and urban sectors. The extractive model goes beyond creating preferential policies that divert public and private resources from rural development into urban construction, to overtly expropriate the rural sector's own resources for use in urban and industrial development (Chan 2010; Bideleux 1985; Wong 1992). The model did not disappear with the onset of the reform era, rather, it has adapted to suit a changing domestic and global political-economic environment. Second, the extractive model of development is sustained by a host of institutions that not only strip the rural sector of resources, but establish a dual-track system of rights and welfare for rural and urban populations (Chan and Zhang 1998;

Wang 2005). I argue here that "rural and urban" duality is *the conceptual and material foundation for the Chinese state's organization of space.*

Marxist and neo-Marxist studies of urban transitions assume rural and urban society are fixed as a relationship of productive forces, and this logic informs the agency and class character ascribed to urban residents, private developers, state agents, and peasants in China research. Rurality here connotes engagement in agricultural activity, and proletarianization of the peasantry is central to social and economic transformation. However, rural identity is as much *political* as it is economic. Since the onset of reforms, China's peasants have readily transformed their relationship with the productive economy, millions have abandoned agricultural work for factory jobs and entrepreneurship and still others are landlords for migrant workers. This change has created many of the expected contradictions of industrial capitalism (i.e. draconian working conditions for migrant workers), but the larger struggle between 'peasants' and the urban regime has been over the transformation of rural political identity. That political identity as peasants, as rural, was premised on fixing peasants' role in the industrial economy through the collective system, but it has taken on far greater significance, defining nearly every aspect of Chinese socioeconomic life. This is the dual-structure that not only defines the rural sector's relationship to factors of production, but just as significantly, defines the rural population's relationship to the state. In this chapter, I argue that the reform era has done far more to unhinge the former relationship than it has the latter.

To appreciate the mechanisms of the dual structure's central pillar, the *hukou* system, is to literally "see like the state" which systematically and continually has

counted, organized, and classified its population and territory to advance centrally mandated goals for political obedience and economic development (Scott 1998). But the *hukou* system is not the only institutional tool available to the state for spatial interventions. Diverging institutional regulations and governing practices for the disposition of economic production, administration, property rights, employment, distribution of public goods and social welfare have all served to maintain the dual-structure that privileges the urban-based political and economic elite in an industrial strategy that straddles the pre- and post-reform eras.

This chapter lays the groundwork for an understanding of China's spatial organization based on the dual-structure that divides rural and urban space, and separates rural and urban people. In the next section, I briefly review the role of the dual structure in the Maoist era. Next, I show how the dual-structure, rather than retreat into the shadows of history, has adapted to suit the changing needs of a China that is increasingly integrated with the global economy, and for the increasing authority of municipalities to independently govern and regulate their jurisdictions independently from the center. For NIE scholars, the Chinese city is the outcome of inherent contradictions between socialist and capitalist institutions, so the ways in which they collaborate in the production of city-space is misrepresented. The Chinese city emerges in part from the interweaving, overlapping, and contested *relations* between socialist and capitalist institutions, agents, and motives. Particularly unrecognized in the transition literature is the way the party-state employs socialist institutions to maintain control over markets, while also using markets at times to discipline social groups within the party.

The third section highlights changes to the dual-structure that allow for increased mobility but continue to regulate and constrain rural populations. Despite the repeated attention drawn to the hukou's continued role in sustaining the dual-society, it continues to be dismissed as an anachronism from a bygone era. The main evidence for the supposed "relaxation of the hukou" is the 200 million and growing migrants who have left their home villages for towns and cities across China. I believe that the link between the *hukou* system and population mobility is poorly understood. To address this, I draw attention to changes to agricultural and urban labor policies (especially adoption of the Household Responsibility System and changes to employment practices in cities) that have facilitated increased mobility, but have left the basic operation of the *hukou* system intact. In addition, I hope to dispel the perception that *decentralization* of hukou control is in any way equivalent to a *relaxation* of hukou control. While there is now far greater variation in local hukou policy, cities throughout the country continue to use the *hukou* system to economize on urbanization, and to exclude rural migrants from urban citizenship and access to urban public goods regimes.

In the fourth section, I examine more closely the actual benefits still associated with urban hukou. The benefits of hukou status are casually referenced in Western reports, but details are rarely given. While there is great variation of urban *hukou* benefits in China's cities, I highlight some of the specific benefits to *hukou* citizenship in the city of Wuhan. (Later I will probably add some reference to other cities as well).

In the fifth section, I turn to the rural sector, and explore the rights and entitlements of rural residents to land. I then turn to how contestation over those rights lies at the heart of conflicts over urbanization and drives the creation of "villages-in-the-

city" in the collision between rural and urban spatial orders. I offer a framework that will be a basis for understanding spatial change and rural transformation under China's urban system in future chapters. I conclude with some reflections on the role of the dual-structure in the ongoing transformation of "villages-in-the city" that will be picked up again in later chapters.

3.1.1 Assemblage and the Dual Structure

Delanda and assemblage theory in general has been criticized for an inability to account for power and unequal relations—an uncritical 'levelling' of all actants that leaves questions of imbalance and unequal power bracketed by what Brenner et al label "naïve objectivism," (Bender 2012; Brenner et al 2011). However, this need not be so. Delanda does not argue that cities emerge as the sum of their components, rather emergence occurs as the outcome of *relations* among multiple components. Power, in this framework, should be understood as the ability to manipulate or alter existing relationships, create new ones, or to capitalize on shifting relationships among other actors. Moreover, Delanda is insistent that components have a unique identity that exists with or without our own imagined perception of them. For Brenner et al, this ignores the "context of contexts", the structures of capitalist political economy that conditions all social activity. Yet, assemblage does not grant actors an essentialism that exists outside of power—identities emerge from spatial-historical processes and relational dynamics that can include systems of power. The point is that these systems of power do not exist outside or independently of their components. China's political economy is articulated through this dual structure. In other words, we should not be inquiring how capitalism

influences the form of the Chinese city, but how Chinese capitalism emerges (or is articulated) *from* the assemblage of the city.

From this lens, the employment of socialist era institutions in regulating and managing the reform economy is evidence not of the roll out of neoliberalism, but as an effort by political actors to alter relationships among various actors involved in urban development (including actors physically outside the city itself). The *hukou* system was originally developed to maintain a rigid boundary between industrial and agricultural activity, and to prevent rural-urban migrations. It was a mechanism for entitlement distribution and labor allocation under the direct control of the central government through the command economy. In the first period of reform, the central government loosened its direct control over rural livelihoods, the goods available in markets, and the places where rural residents could work. Over the next two decades, municipal governments asserted their ability to intervene in their own labor markets and entitlement distribution. In other words, the central government simultaneously altered its relationship with rural residents and urban governments. In the act of rural entrepreneurship and rural-urban migration, peasants capitalized on this change, shifting their own relations with fellow villagers, the village, towns, cities, and urban labor markets. In capturing the regulatory jurisdiction over migration controls and entitlement distribution, municipal governments increased their ability to intervene in the relational dynamics between rural migrants and the city.

In short, I argue that the *hukou* system and challenges to it are ultimately about shifting relationships among multiple actors. No single actor, including the state, has the capacity to single-handedly control this process—it is dependent, among other things, on

the agency of villagers, the demands for urban construction, industrialists' locational decisions and labor requirements, diverging pressures from horizontal and hierarchical levels of government, and shifting patterns of spatial development. Understanding changes to the *hukou* system, then, is to understand how it is used to alter and influence relationships among these actors.

3.2 The "Holy Trinity" through the Ages: Mechanisms and Operation of the Dual-Structure

For more than five decades, the dual-structure has been sustained by the *hukou* system, but the actual mechanisms through which it discriminates and divides the population are often elusive. Economistic treatments of China discussed in the previous chapter treat the *hukou* as an anachronistic holdover from a bygone era of central planning. Others, most notably Kam Wing Chan and Wang Fei-ling, consider how the state and especially municipal leaders have adapted the *hukou* for regulating and disciplining labor in a greatly decentralized Chinese economy. This body of work raises important questions for integrating rural and urban China, but risks reducing the dual structure to a purely economic intervention into the 'natural' laws of labor supply and demand. Wang (2005) and Deng (2012) highlight the intrinsically political nature of the *hukou* system that is interwoven into CCP strategies for governance and regulation of the citizenry. Reforming the *hukou* system, then, is not just about economic rationalization, but wholesale transformation of state governance and the relationship between citizens and the state. Localized efforts at reforming the *hukou* system have revealed just how deeply rooted China's rural-urban division is, and how that division has come to define the political, social, and cultural meaning of "rural" and "urban" in contemporary China.

3.2.1 Historical Functions of the Dual Structure

Despite the CCP's success in achieving a unified country in the narrow sovereignty/ territorial sense, it was simultaneously responsible for creating a rigid separation between China's rural and urban sectors that divided the population in a significant and long-lasting way. Under Mao, in pursuit of a rapid Soviet-type industrialization program, the CCP oversaw the creation of a highly unequal dual-society composed of a protected urban proletariat (beneficiaries of the "iron rice bowl") and a disenfranchised peasant class (Chan 1994; Chan and Zhang 1998). Members of the urban class worked in the priority and protected industrial sector and had access to (at least basic) social welfare and full citizenship as it was defined by the CCP. On the other hand, peasants were tied to the land, compelled to produce an agricultural surplus for industrialization and were expected to fend for themselves independent from state beneficence under a policy of "self-reliance" (Chan 2010). Any movement from the rural to urban sector was tightly controlled and generally forbidden.

The *hukou* system was not merely a means of limiting rural–urban population and labor mobility, as it is commonly depicted, but also a system of social control aimed at excluding the rural population from access to state-provided goods, welfare, and entitlements. Indeed, in the Maoist era, the ban on rural outflow, along with an array of related measures, such as the collectivization of farmland and the restriction on its conversion to non-agricultural uses, ensured that rural populations remained bottled up in the countryside. These measures effectively circumscribed the peasantry's economic,

social, and political opportunities and rights, creating a massive pool of super-low-cost rural labor tied to land of very little market value—a *de facto* underclass.

This was the period of China's "primitive socialist accumulation" that forced great sacrifice on the peasant majority in the service of industrial development (Bideleux 1985). As in other communist states, maintaining such an unbalanced and unequal system of exchange required a series of institutional constraints to prevent flight from the rural sector and to ensure compliance with the mandates of the command economy (Bideleux 1985; Kelly 2008). This "holy trinity" of controls over the rural sector is represented in Table 3.1. Unequal exchange was carried out in the countryside through the compulsory sale of grain to the state at low prices as well as the sale of urban-produced agricultural inputs at inflated costs, all the while withholding state investment and social welfare from villages and villagers. Widespread and frequent political education, propaganda campaigns, and cadre inspection tours emphasized principles of self-reliance and grain-only production, and discouraged non-agricultural and sideline enterprises. The *hukou* system was paramount in this period as an institutional barrier preventing peasants from entering the urban sector and enjoying the far greater privileges associated with urban life and the "iron rice bowl." Compliance within the system was conducted through the agricultural collective system, cadre oversight, and community-level monitoring.

3.2.2 Dual Structure in the Reform Era

Despite Marx's initial conception of primitive accumulation as a historically bounded moment in the evolution of capitalist societies, Glassman (2006) proposes that primitive accumulation is ongoing and incomplete, and that in certain contexts, industrial

classes can benefit from measures that prevent full proletarianization because they reduce the costs of social reproduction. Suppressing the ability of the excluded to join the ranks of the urban working class (the so-called "iron rice bowl") has been the premise organizing China's spatial political economy since the early 1950s. In effect, Glassman's theory of ongoing primitive accumulation is mirrored in the economic rationale behind the *hukou* system and dual-structure in the reform era. From the perspective of the urban industrial sector, the hukou has served an important, even positive function by postponing a Lewis Transition.[27] Under a system of institutionalized exclusion, the industrial (urban) sector is able to continually suppress wages in the "traditional sector" while achieving a high rate of economic growth and technological advancement, preventing the modern sector from "drowning" under a "sea of unskilled labor," (Wang, 2005). While Chinese cities are undoubtedly challenged by the mobility of more than 200 million migrant workers, their institutional exclusion from formal housing markets, urban social welfare, schools, and other elements of urban transition suppresses migrant wages and reduces their costs to the urban state.

Underneath the surface of China's far-reaching transformation, one easily discovers the continued interventions of the socialist state at work in the dynamics of rural-urban relations. Whether we choose to now call it "primitive capital accumulation"

[27] Under A.A. Lewis' model of economic growth, initial capitalist development is fuelled by the influx of cheap labor from the traditional (agricultural) sector. With a near 'infinite supply' of cheap labor, industrial profits remain high while wages do not rise. Once labor becomes scarce, wages must accordingly rise along with manufacturing costs and consumer prices. The challenging period where the modern sector must adjust to these changed circumstances is the "Lewis Transition."

instead of "socialist accumulation," the unifying ingredient is the sacrifice of China's peasants in the name of industrialization. In fact, it is somewhat surprising how effectively the state has been able to adapt the institutions of the command economy to suit the needs of a changing economic environment. For example, while much has been made of the relaxation of migration controls in the reform era, enabling the movement of hundreds of millions of peasants from the countryside to cities and towns across China, peasants' engagement with the urban sector is strictly limited by their inability to obtain local *hukou*, and thus, equal participation in urban life (Solinger, 1999). At the end of the 1990s, a stock of at least 120 million rural people were flowing between the countryside and China's cities, and the migrant stock reached 200-220 million as of 2010. Restrictions to urban integration imposed by the *hukou* system, however, means the vast majority of these migrations are not accompanied by a *hukou* transfer. Instead, rural-urban migrants in the city are still subject to a host of discriminatory practices that are thoroughly documented elsewhere (Chan, 1994; Knight and Song 1999, 2001; Solinger, 1999; Wang, 2004; Wu and Treiman 2004; Wang, 2005; Chan and Buckingham, 2008). Despite the exhaustive description of the obstacles the *hukou* system creates for rural-urban migrants, it is nothing short of stunning to see the casual frequency with which many China observers will comment on the "relaxation" of *hukou* controls. Access to affordable family housing, health care, school enrollment for children, and social security are some of the most important restricted public goods that inhibit permanent migration and make migrations particularly difficult for families. Migrants are also cut off from obtaining bank mortgages, from participating in housing markets, and from access to subsidized housing (Wu, 2004). Although still viewed in official and popular parlance as

"temporary," many migrants have been living in cities for ten years or more (Chan 2009; 2010). Furthermore, government at every scale does not recognize their urban status, and their needs are not considered in planning for infrastructure, housing, or the provision of public goods. While they are *de facto* urban residents, they are *de jure* rural. The suppression of migrant wages throughout the reform era has additionally served as a *de facto* subsidy for export-oriented industries, the so-called "China price" based on cheap labor that has driven Chinese growth (Harney, 2008). Furthermore, by absolving urban governments from financial responsibility for the well-being of millions of their citizens, the *hukou* system has also suppressed costs of urbanization for local governments. In fact, what the above demonstrates is not relaxation of controls, but transformation of the *hukou* system so that it may continue to function as it has in the past, exploiting rural labor to meet the needs of China's urban-based industrial sector.

It is apparent that the principle behind the "holy trinity" of state exploitation of the rural sector is not a relic of China's socialist past, but has adapted to suit the changing role of the rural sector in post-reform industrialization and urbanization. While the pre-reform urban sector relied on the countryside as a source of cheap surplus production through grain (and as a consumer of urban-produced agricultural inputs), post-reform China now exploits the rural sector as a source of cheap labor and land. Table 3.1 demonstrates this evolution of the "holy trinity" in the reform period. As discussed above, the *hukou* system, while not preventing rural-urban migration as it once did, continues to serve as a significant obstacle to *permanent* migration, continues to prevent migrants' integration into the "urban public goods regime", and effectively suppresses the cost of industrial production and urbanization by encouraging a highly circular flow of

low-wage rural labor. Migrants have been kept largely docile in the city through strict monitoring by city police and factory managers.[28] In the most recent wave of peasant exploitation, the rural sector is a source of cheap land for industrial development and urban construction. The dual-track property rights regime as enshrined in the Chinese constitution and the Land Administration Law (LAL) lays the institutional groundwork for urban governments to expropriate land at bargain values from the rural sector while the political power urban governments are able to wield over rural areas ensures compliance.

3.3 Mobility and the Hukou System: Change and Continuity

Reforms to the *hukou* system have been sporadic and non-uniform across China. Hubei Province, for instance, abolished agricultural and non-agricultural distinctions in 2004. The Hebei provincial capital of Shijiazhuang briefly experimented with allowing rural-urban migrants to obtain urban *hukou* in 2004, and Zhengzhou, Henan Province briefly allowed dependents of local hukou holders to transfer. At least ten cities in 2010 abolished the temporary residence permit, the legal document allowing rural migrants to work in cities (even though such legal documents are frequently ignored anyway), converting to a residency permit that would theoretically allow the holder to convert their *hukou* in seven years should they meet certain requirements.[29] Chongqing and Chengdu were seen as the vanguards of *hukou* reform as part of larger experimentations with rural-

[28] A word about Foxconn and last years protests (Honda?), the GZ police brutality case?

[29] While these policies were publicized in Chinese media, they have either not actually been implemented, or they consist of so many conditions as to effectively render hukou transfer impossible for the vast majority of migrants. For example, Zhang (2010)

urban integrations before Bo Xilai's removal from office. In most cases, *hukou* transfer is only allowed for migrants originating within the municipal borders, and few models of reform deal directly with interprovincial migrations. In some cases, as in Shijiazhuang and Zhengzhou, local authorities have reversed reforms out of fear of being overwhelmed by the pressures migrants would place on municipal services and infrastructure. The residency permit conversion plan was widely publicized in Chinese media, but has not been implemented.

This section addresses two questions regarding changes to the *hukou* system that have taken place over the last three decades. First, why have *hukou* reforms failed to alleviate rural-urban inequality, and second, why are some rural residents hesitant to convert their hukou even when given the chance?

Hukou reforms have not made significant impacts on rural-urban inequality or social stratification. There are two reasons for this. First, changes to the hukou system itself are mostly reactionary, seeking to bring a legal basis for increased mobility already under way due to changes in other institutions of the dual sector. Second, urban governments have exploited their broad discretion to set local hukou policy in order to attract the "best and the brightest" from the countryside and other urban areas while preventing the full migration of unskilled workers, farmers, and their dependents, i.e., the vast majority of China's actual and potential migrant population. With a current stock of more than 200 million migrants in China, it is clear that the mobility restrictions inherent in the *hukou* system are not what they once were. Yet, as I argue here, this is more due to changes in the other pillars of the dual-structure: the end of compulsory grain sales, the erosion of the urban *danwei* system, the dissolution of the state's monopoly on labor

recruitment, and the need for cheap labor in cities have facilitated rural migrations. However, the *hukou's primary function as a mechanism for sociopolitical regulation and entitlement distribution remains unchanged.* The existing literature casually suggests but does not adequately describe the relationship between *hukou* status and mobility. Formal changes to the *hukou* system have narrowly focused on eliminating restrictions to mobility that are largely irrelevant in the present era without changing the ability of non-local hukou holders to access public services, subsidies, and other entitlements of local citizenship in their destination areas.

What's more, millions of people with rural status throughout the country have refused or resisted opportunities to change their status. Even though hundreds of thousands of rural people have already converted their hukou under the Chongqing reform (most are already *de facto* urban residents living on city fringes), many are resisting, and there have been reports of officials putting pressure on individuals to convert against their will. More commonly, the local state often includes *hukou* conversion as an integral component of settlement packages with villagers in land expropriation deals. Unimpressed villagers frequently hold out for more immediate financial compensation. With urban *hukou* almost universally acknowledged as granting the holder superior socioeconomic status, why have so many resisted conversion? There are two fairly straightforward incentives for maintaining rural status. First, rural households are allowed greater flexibility under the state's family planning policy to have more than one child (Mallee 2000). Second, rural status and inclusion in a rural collective entitles households to use and benefit from freely distributed agricultural and

residential land.[30] These allocated plots of land are the foundations of rural livelihood and social security, and households are hesitant to surrender them even when they have abandoned agriculture for urban employment or non-agricultural activities (Oi 1999; Lin 2009). As I will demonstrate later, villagers in *chengzhongcun* especially have famously made their fortunes through the ability to profit from their *de facto* ownership of rural land. Importantly, this fortune is not based on the marketization of land (i.e., integration of land markets) but is made possible, even necessary, by the dual structure that differentially governs rural and urban land (Chung and Unger 2013). Surrendering the advantages of rural status, then, is about more than an administrative transfer between economic sectors, it is interwoven with the wholesale transformation of an individual's relationship to the state, and the political conversion of rural peasants into urban residents (*shiminhua*) while forcing them to surrender their claims of ownership of collective land and property. Reforming the dual structure, then, necessitates the restructuring of rights, opportunities, and security of rural residents through a reformation of their relationship to the state that is deeply entrenched in state institutions and cultural heritage (see Chapter 7).

3.4 Mobility and Entitlement Distribution: Beyond the Hukou System

Under the command system, the *hukou* system is generally understood as the key mechanism that regulates mobility between the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors

[30] In practice, agricultural land, once allocated, remains with the household and is inheritable by descendants.

of the Chinese economy. However, mobility restrictions were dependent on other key institutions of the command economy.

3.4.1 Mobility and Consumption: What you could consume and where you could consume it

As a mechanism for entitlement distribution, the *hukou* controlled what you could consume and where you could consume it. Daily necessities, public services, consumer goods, housing, and unemployment benefits were allocated through the state apparatus in both urban and rural areas. In urban areas, entitlements and rations for consumer goods were accessed through a household's work unit or *danwei* (Walder 1988). In rural areas, goods and services were distributed through the collective system at the level of the production team or brigade (Chan et al 1984; Friedman et al 1991). Decisions over resource allocation and distribution within the urban sector were made by the central government, while rural collectives were expected to be self-reliant. Generally speaking, individuals only accessed services and purchased goods within the work unit or rural production team to which they belonged, and opportunities for consumption outside of state rationing were highly limited if not impossible (Chan 1994). The *hukou* was the formal registry and means of identification for determining *where* an individual could access goods and services necessary for daily survival within a spatialized hierarchy of inclusion and exclusion. It restricted mobility by only allowing individuals to engage in consumption in the place assigned to them by their *hukou*.

3.4.2 Mobility, Employment and Livelihood: Where you could work and what work you could do

As a mechanism for labor allocation, the hukou system controlled where you could work and to a lesser extent, what job you could do. Prior to 1979, the state strictly controlled the ability of individuals to determine their occupation. Urban-based industry, enterprises, and other work units lacked the authority to directly recruit new employees. Labor allocation was determined by the state through a host of government bureaucracies (sometimes in cooperation, often in competition with each other) with jurisdiction over different economic sectors.[31] The *danwei* system has been described as a patronage-dependency relationship between the state and urban workers, offering employees an "iron rice bowl," a lifelong obligation of the enterprise to its workers, but also requiring a lifelong commitment from the workers to the enterprise (Deng 2012). This relationship could be quite costly to the state, and so the state had an incentive to prevent new entrants from joining the privileged urban-industrial sector. Eligibility for employment in the formal, state-protected urban sector, then, was largely determined by *hukou* status, and recruitment agencies favored those already "inside" the urban sector, only bringing in outsiders on a temporary basis (Deng 2012).

[31] Similarly, rural villages could not freely employ farmers from other areas to work in their fields, nor could peasants easily engage in non-agricultural activities. Rural areas were committed under the command economy to sell production to the state, and could not escape those commitments.

3.4.3 Mobility and State Authority: Who Categorized You

In order to strictly regulate and control the functions of entitlement distribution and labor allocation, the state took direct control over all *hukou* conversions. Rural to urban conversions (*nongzhuanfei*) were rare, stemming primarily from adjustments to the urban economy (Cheng and Selden 1994; Chan and Zhang, 1998).[32] The state approved individual hukou status change (hukou relocation or conversion) for acceptance into institutions of higher education, labor recruitment under the authority of state bureaucracies, cadre promotion to the township level, and very infrequently, through marriage or to assist in the supporting of dependents. Additionally, entire populations had their hukou status reassigned and converted in cases where the state appropriated agricultural land for purposes of industrial expansion. In all cases, *the state* designated *hukou* status, set yearly quotas for conversion approval (less than 0.1% of the population), and carried out changes through the bureaucracy.

In sum, the *hukou* system restricted mobility in three ways: as a mechanism for entitlement distribution, the hukou controlled what an individual could consume and where it could be consumed; as a mechanism for labor allocation, it controlled where an individual could work and eligibility for certain kinds of employment; and in order to further regulate and control these functions, the state took direct control over all *hukou* conversions. Here, I argue that in the reform era, only the second of these functions has

[32] It is noteworthy that the dual structure in China created such imbalance between sectors that while rural-urban conversion was a dream to be aspired to, urban to rural transfers were most commonly a form of punishment carried out by the state against targeted individuals.

undergone fundamental change. The degree and quality of entitlements have evolved to reflect the increased availability of market allocation of goods. Yet the distribution of entitlements continues to be determined entirely through the hukou system. Second, the state's power to control hukou conversions has been fragmented and decentralized, but hukou authority still remains with the state, only at the local level. Even the outright abolition of *nongzhuanfei* is less important than the localization of the *hukou's* importance.

3.5 Changes in the Trinity

Only the state's direct intervention in recruitment and employment decisions has undergone fundamental change arising from 1) the nationwide adoption of the household responsibility system in 1983, giving peasants more freedom in their choice of livelihood, 2) the creation of special economic zones that allowed direct recruitment of employees by enterprises, practices that diffused across the entire country over the following decades, and 3) the related erosion of the *danwei* system as the key distributor of goods and services for urban workers. These changes moved China's political economy closer to a market-oriented system of labor allocation and distribution, not only facilitating but necessitating greater labor mobility. In the realm of entitlement distribution, however, where its function is consistent with its role in the command economy, the *hukou* continues to indirectly restrict and obstruct population mobility (Table 3.1).

Table 3.1: The Holy Trinity Over Time

	Suppression of Income	**Preventing Conversion**	**Monitoring and Compliance**
Rural Production (1952-1983)	Unequal exchange: compulsory sale of grain to state	*Hukou* system prevents rural-urban outflows; non-agricultural or sideline activities prohibited	Rural collectives, city police
Rural Labor (1983--)	Cheap Labor: Rural migrant labor in near "infinite" supply	*Hukou* system prevents unregulated, *permanent* settlement, denies access to urban public goods regime	City police, factory managers, employment bureaus
Rural Land (1992--)	Cheap Land: State (urban) monopoly on land conversion, sale of use-rights	Land Administration Law (LAL), dual-track property rights regime, land rights administered through hukou system	Hierarchy of urban governance; policy of "city-leading-county" State apparatus

3.5.1 Household Responsibility System: Life Opportunity Changes

Increased mobility and opportunity for China's rural population would not have been possible without dramatic transformation of the collective system, in part sustained by the *hukou* system. By 1956, a mere seven years after the founding of the People's Republic, all of rural China was placed under the collective umbrella. The rural system was hierarchical and cellular--vertically, all spatial units answered to the authority of their superiors within the collective system, and villages were isolated from each other, from the old market towns, and from the urban sector. As Deng (2012) shows, Marshall's now standard framework of citizenship in modern nation-states was only partially

applicable in socialist China: the collective system created for peasants a host of obligations to the state, but deprived them of most of their rights, a system described as "socialist serfdom" (Whyte, 2010). Initially, CCP-led land reform distributed property directly to peasants, generating broad political support for the party through the first stage of national rule. Collectivization reversed the property rights assigned to peasants by land reform, however, unambiguously retracting the rights to individual ownership in rural China (Deng, 2012). Furthermore, under collectivization, the fruits of rural production no longer belonged to those who labored for it, but to the collective. All agricultural production was pooled by work teams or production brigades and turned over to the state, with a portion redistributed within the work team for subsistence. The government, in return offered little in the way of support for peasants whose primary encounter with the state was limited to the frequent propaganda and mobilization campaigns intended to discourage sideline production and non-grain cultivation. Villages (or work teams) were expected to be self-reliant, receiving little or no assistance from higher levels within the collective or from the state. Top-down monitoring within the hierarchical collective system ensured grain turnover and adherence to political orthodoxy in the villages (at least on the surface), and the hukou system prevented escape from the rural sector.

As of 1978, then, peasants had no right to individual ownership of land, no right to choose their occupation, no right to dispose of the fruits of their own labor, and no right to choose where they lived. More than thirty years later, they still face tremendous challenges and obstacles, but the Household Responsibility System (HRS) that would take full effect nationwide by 1983 began a foundation on which the rural population

could make rights claims over some of their life opportunities. The HRS was a grassroots movement first experimented with in Fengyang County, Anhui Province, in 1978. Its central premise was to restructure economic relations between agricultural households and the state, touching off tremendous change in rural livelihoods, lifestyles, and life opportunities (Yang 1998; Putterman 1993). Under HRS, agricultural production would no longer be entirely pooled with the village. Instead, individual households committed to a quota of grain production for sale to the state at administratively set prices. Any production beyond the quota could be sold in market exchange or at higher prices to the state. More importantly, this freed individuals to engage in other economic activities so long as their annual quota was met.[33] In many respects, this was not the beginnings of a *transition* to market capitalism but a return to pre-collective era agricultural practices.

Nationwide implementation of HRS had two immediate outcomes. Peasants appeared to respond well to the capacity to profit from their own labor for the first time in a generation as agricultural productivity saw a rapid and substantial boost (Putterman 1993; Oi 1999). However, the liberating effects on peasant labor revealed massive underemployment in the countryside, a possibility state planners had previously refused to acknowledge or accept. Coinciding with a relaxation of state control over labor recruitment in the urban sector and an increasing demand for goods and services outside of state channels, the Household Responsibility System enabled China's farmers to leave

[33] While the quota could generally be met by direct farming, as off-farm employment and migration increased, some households began meeting the quota by purchasing grain on the market.

the countryside for towns and cities. This was the origin for what would soon become the most rapid and massive period of spatial reorganization in human history[34].

3.5.2 Changes to Employment Practices in the Urban Sector

The initial flows of rural-urban migration would not have been possible without corresponding changes in the urban sector. The two most important reforms enabling population mobility were changes in accepted labor recruitment practices, and the erosion of the state monopoly of urban resources. In the command economy, labor recruitment for factories and other urban-based work units was not controlled by enterprises, but by state agencies charged with allocating labor within the state sector which included almost all urban employment (Deng, 2012).

A core feature of the first four Special Economic Zones (SEZ) setting them apart from the mainstream Chinese political economy was the ability of enterprises within the zones to directly recruit labor. Following practices developed by generations of successful overseas Chinese entrepreneurs, many enterprises chose to recruit rural migrant labor, a preference that is usually attributed to their willingness to work hard for low wages and a belief that rural workers will be more docile and malleable than an informed, urban proletariat (Lee 1992; Gong 2014). However, unlike a typical urban Chinese enterprise, the state made no commitments to the enterprise or its workers for social protections, welfare, or guaranteed employment, following the precedent that

[34] I use the term "spatial reorganization" here instead of "urbanization" in reference to the particular form of China's urbanization that is characterized as "incomplete" or "partial" (Chan). This will be discussed in-depth in Chapter 4.

emerged in the 1970s for hiring "temporary" rural workers in urban units. In other words, employment in an SEZ would not serve as a springboard for urban residence or citizenship through hukou change: theirs was an "incomplete urbanization" (Deng 2012). The creation of SEZs and the diffusion of SEZ employment practices throughout the country altered the rights of employers rather than employees. If the Household Responsibility System gave rural people the ability to leave the countryside, SEZ's gave them a destination. However, neither would give them equality with formal urban residents or full citizenship in cities. Some thirty years later, rural-urban migrants face the same basic truth today when they come to China's cities: they can obtain employment, but not citizenship.

Revisions to hukou regulations did not begin until the process described above was already well under way. From this perspective, the standard language adopted in China's migration literature suggests that "relaxation of hukou controls" permitted increased mobility for China's peasants. In fact, the relaxation of hukou controls, where they have occurred, were largely a response to mobility that was already taking place. From the state's perspective, changes to hukou regulations were an effort to reassert state monitoring and policing capacity for an increasingly diverse, mobile, and changing urban populace.[35]

[35] For an overview of the wide variety of hukou revisions, many of them short-lived, see Chan and Zhang (1998), Wang (2005).

3.5.3 Withdrawal of the State Monopoly of Urban Consumption

A second transformation in the urban realm that enabled rural mobility was the erosion of the state's monopoly on urban consumption (*who could consume what and where they could consume it*). The state, rather than directly allocate resources to urban residents, subsidized urban workers through their employers. In its ideal form, this practice was represented by the *danwei* system. The *danwei* provided employees (and often, but not always, their families) with employment, housing, education, and other consumer goods (bicycles, for example). In reality, nowhere close to a majority of urban residents were part of the *danwei* system, but all work units followed the same general principles of resource distribution and monitoring (Walder 1988).

Unlike the watershed of the Household Responsibility System, there was no singular dramatic moment of collapse for the *danwei* system, but the state monopoly over the distribution of urban consumer goods gradually dissipated beginning in the 1980s, although housing is still subsidized by the *danwei* in many instances. Rural residents began entering the urban sphere in the early 1980s, first selling agricultural products in informal markets, followed by their entry into other small-scale services. Urban entrepreneurship also began to emerge, both from within and from outside the existing urban population (the famous clothing production and retail enterprises in Beijing's *Zhejiangcun* are an excellent example of the latter, Zhang 2002). Taken together, these changes established the beginnings of some market channels for the delivery of goods and services, first to fill in gaps left vacant by the state, and later competing with and even replacing state operations.

The significance of these changes for population mobility is that full membership in an urban work unit was no longer a precondition for urban survival. Food and other consumer goods were accessible outside of formal channels, and urban markets continually increased their capacity to accommodate ever greater numbers of rural migrants. From the onset, there was a vital need for housing (among other spaces) in order to sustain migrations to the city. As we will see later, this need was met in an unusual and, one assumes, unexpected fashion that helped create a new spatial form unique to China: the *chengzhongcun*. The interwoven transformation of the rural and urban spatial political economy created the conditions under which *chengzhongcun* would emerge. As it turned out, sustaining urban development over the succeeding decades would also come to depend on them.

In summary, changing incentives and obligations for peasant households within the rural political economy brought about by the Household Responsibility System coincided with changes to the regulation of labor recruitment practices and the erosion of the state's monopoly of urban resources. Institutional changes within each half of the dual-structure enabled peasant mobility, but the *hukou* system continued to serve as a barrier between the two, preventing rural migrants from fully integrating into the urban sphere. Under the dual-structure, rural migrants in the city can obtain employment, but not the full set of rights and entitlements that come with localized urban residency. The exclusion of the *de jure* rural population from urban public goods regimes, while less prohibitive than in in the command economy, still carries profound implications for life opportunities and pathways. Although the "public goods" accessible with hukou status

are greatly changed, it is mistaken to consider changes to the dual-structure as an outcome of "relaxation of the hukou."

3.6 Localization of Hukou Control

Coinciding with the broad-based and far-reaching decentralization of government that has been a hallmark of China's post-1978 political economy, hukou management and conversion authority is increasingly delegated to local governments. Through the 1990s, the hukou system was "nationally set" but "regionally adjusted" according to the basic principle that migration up the spatial hierarchy remained strictly controlled, while parallel migrations between similarly ranked spatial units and migration downward on the spatial hierarchy should be allowed and even encouraged (Wang, 2005, 66). Today, *hukou* management is effectively under the control of local governments.

The pattern of policy guidance with wide latitude for local variation is an approach taken to many areas of China's reform, and extends beyond national-regional scales. Regarding hukou policy, we see a similar relationship between the province and cities within the province, and even within the city as districts take more direct control of their own hukou management so long as they adhere to the general principles or spirit of policy set at the municipal (or higher) levels. Issuances from higher up on the administrative hierarchy frequently speak of goals and desired outcomes, leaving details to be worked out at the local level. An example from hukou reform can be found in the policies allowing for the unification of household hukou status through marriage.

Despite the tendency to overstate *hukou* relaxation, some of the more draconian elements of China's *hukou* system that separated families have been eased since 1998.

For the first time, children were allowed to inherit either parent's *hukou*, marriage partners were given more flexibility to unify their hukou status, and elderly parents (and other dependents) were allowed the opportunity to move with their adult children settled in urban centers. The national policy announcing these significant advances was published by the State Council in 1998 (*Notice on Ministry of Public Security and Resolution of Outstanding Issues of Hukou Management,* State Council Document #24). The document proposes rather vague but lofty goals for hukou reforms that include "advancing relations between the party and government and the masses," encouraging a reasonable degree of population mobility to promote economic development and social progress while still maintaining control over large-city population growth (State Council 1998). The document itself suggests four policy directions that have largely been adopted in most cities throughout the country. However, the policy leaves tremendous latitude for regional variation. It contains four main components:

1) Inheritance of hukou status: Prior to 1998, hukou status was inherited through the mother. The 1998 reform states unequivocally that all newborn children can now inherit either parent's hukou. However, it also calls for retroactive application to children already forced to register based on their mother's hukou status. The speed and manner with which retroactive registration changes are carried out is left open, but "priority should be given" to children of pre-school age.

2) Separated Spouses: Here, the document explicitly calls for the relaxation (*fanquan*) of hukou policies that prevent spouses from having the same hukou status in the same locality. However, the specific conditions under which spouses would be eligible for

conversion are vague, stating only that spouses of citizens "settled in the city for a *certain number of years* (*yiding nianxian*)" should be allowed to convert their hukou.

3) Elderly dependents: The document declares that men over the age of 60 and women over 55 who require assistance from their children should be allowed to settle in the city.

4) Investment in the city: The document also legitimizes the practice of granting hukou conversions for people who invest in the city. Considerations should be given to individuals and their families who invest in industrial projects, purchase commercial housing, have legitimate and stable jobs or livelihoods, and have lived a "certain number of years" in the city. The thresholds for industrial or real estate investment are left open, and no concrete definitions are given for what makes a job "legitimate and stable" (合法稳定的职业或者生活来源), or how long "a certain number of years" might be.

In closing, the document calls on each province, region, and city to develop specific policies in accordance with the document's "spirit" (*jingshen*) combined with the local economy, social development, and affordability. Predictably, different cities have adhered to the policy's "spirit" in different ways, and adopted specific policies at different speeds. Yet in most cases, the process is cumbersome. In Wuhan, the Municipal Public Security Bureau has issued policies regarding hukou conversions according to each of the four principles. To apply for marriage-based hukou conversions, for example, couples must provide their partner's local registration, a copy of their marriage certificate, hukou booklet and identification card, and family planning certificate to the local police station's hukou department (Wuhan Municipal Ministry of Public Security 2007). Even within Wuhan, there is variation in how the law is applied. In central urban districts, eligibility is restricted to spouses 35-years of age or older *or* if the couple has been married for at

least 10 years. In outlying districts (*yuancheng qu*), the thresholds are 30-years old or 5 years of marriage (Wuhan Municipal Ministry of Public Security, 2007).

Even greater regional variation occurs regarding item 4, granting hukou conversions in return for investment. Urban governments have manipulated this policy to attract investments and talent from beyond its immediate borders--this function of hukou policy is explicitly and consistently stated by government officials, analysts, and media reports. Hukou conversion, then, is a carrot dangled in front of the "best and the brightest" to purchase their own citizenship. Beijing's central urban districts require potential hukou transferees to have paid 800,000 RMB in taxes for three consecutive years, and to have hired 100 employees (at least 90% of them local) (Li and Li, 2010).[36] In the 1990s, many cities granted so-called "blue-seal" hukou to households that purchased real estate. Top-tier cities like Shanghai and Guangzhou cancelled the practice citing too many new applicants, but the practice continues in cities like Wuhan. Wuhan *hukou* is relatively cheap when compared with Beijing's entry-conditions. Wuhan allows individuals to convert their hukou if they have purchased either a) real estate in the central urban areas valued at 300,000 RMB or higher, or b) a construction area of 120 sq. meters at any time since October 7, 1996 (Wuhan Housing and Security Management Bureau 2009). In fact, Wuhan and other interior cities are using the relative ease of obtaining local citizenship as an incentive to lure skilled workers and professionals from cities like Beijing and Shanghai.

[36] This practice was recently abolished in Beijing.

3.7 Entitlement Changes: Why does the Hukou still matter?

Recent survey evidence suggests that many migrants no longer consider the hukou an important consideration in their settlement decisions (Zhu Yu, 2011), and the growth of market solutions within the Chinese political economy, for some observers, has rendered the *hukou* irrelevant. Despite the delinking of *hukou* status and subsistence, the *hukou* clearly remains an integral component of CCP governance, social monitoring and regulation. Evidence of its continued relevance is found in the continued attention its management receives from government officials and regular citizens, and the difficulties local and central authorities face in attempts to reform, if not abolish, the hukou. Internet forums, including those hosted by district and municipal governments, are replete with complaints about individual hukou status, and reveal the regular population's pervasive confusion about individual hukou and regulations. The way in which municipal governments dangle hukou status as a lure for the nation's wealthy and talented suggest that it still has some value. But what is this value? As most goods and services are now available through non-state channels (i.e. the market) the state does not

Table 3.2 Why hukou still matters: Hukou-*Based Services in Wuhan*

Permits and licenses:
Obtaining driver's license
Obtaining marriage license
Updating family planning registries
Government Services
Job search assistance for college graduates
Low to no fees for schools (until 2011
Wuhan Housing Fund (subsidies for home purchases)
Health Insurance
Social security
Sitting for comprehensive exams (including high school and college entrance exams)
Restrictions
Employment in large multinationals, hospitals, banks, and other financial institutions (technically illegal but still ongoing practice)

monopolize consumption activities through the hukou system, but it still maintains a set of entitlements. What are these entitlements and how important are they? Who has access to them and what is their significance?

Employing National Bureau of Statistics data, Li and Luo (2010) estimate that nationwide, annual subsidies to urban housing, medical insurance, education, and social security are equivalent to 4,275 RMB per capita.[37] Access to these subsidies is dependent on *hukou* status. Using the city of Wuhan as an example, this section explores some of the benefits exclusive to official, local-hukou holding urban citizens. Wuhan's Human Resources and Social Security Bureau identifies several benefits for Wuhan hukou holders including assistance in finding employment for graduates and protections of individual workers' rights, higher fees for schools for non-residents, labor and social security protections, access to the Wuhan Housing Fund, and restrictions to employment eligibility in certain fields.(WHRSS 2010). In addition to these benefits, non-local hukou holders must return to their hometowns for several government services such as updating family planning registries, obtaining and renewing a driver's license, and applying for a marriage license.

3.7.1 Health Insurance

Wuhan local hukou holders are entitled to receive the "5 protections" of health care, maternity care, pension, unemployment and work injury insurance. Coverage of

[37] Estimates on the actual difference in social spending vary widely. Kam Wing Chan, using DRC data, estimates a 2500 RMB annual differential. There is, however, general agreement that rural-urban migrants are falling fall short of urban residents when it comes to governmental social spending.

Wuhan city's basic health care coverage plan is restricted to individuals who possess urban hukou status for the city of Wuhan (*wuhan chengzhen huji*). Despite the province's 2004 announcement that agricultural/non-agricultural hukou distinctions were abolished, and that all residents of Hubei would receive a single residency (Hubei), urban status and Wuhan residency are still employed to determine eligibility for the city's medical insurance program[38]. Furthermore, non-urban populations eligible for rural cooperative insurance programs are specifically named as ineligible to receive coverage under the urban plan. While some long-term residents without local hukou are eligible for coverage, they are subject to significantly higher deductibles and fees. Wuhan's official residents (with local, urban hukou) pay only 50 RMB per year for participation in the program, while people without local hukou must pay 340 RMB per year (Wuhan Human Resources and Social Security Bureau, 2010). Moreover, participation in the scheme requires a one-time buy-in payment (common practice in other cities with similar programs) that is prohibitive for the average migrant worker.

3.7.2 Education

Children of migrants faced exorbitant fees to send their children to school. In addition to any regular fees, non-local hukou holders in Wuhan were forced to pay an

[38] There are some notable exceptions to this rule: minors with urban status in a different city enrolled in Wuhan city schools are eligible for coverage under the plan, as are farmers dispossessed by urban construction and expansion in Wuhan's outlying districts. Additionally, "long-term residents" without Wuhan hukou can be considered, but what qualifies as "long-term" is not specified.

annual 500 RMB "non-local student fee" (*waidi shengyuan peiyang fei*) to enroll their children in primary school. High-school student fees were prohibitive for non-locals who had to pay anywhere from 10,000 to 40,000 RMB depending on the school's rank (WHRSSB, 2010). These fees were banned by the central government in 2010—but *hukou* and educational opportunities are still intimately connected. Crucial national examinations that establish a student's chances for advancement can only be taken in the home place. As a result, the vast majority of migrant students withdraw from school after grade 9 and return home where investments in schools are typically lower than in destination cities.

3.7.3 Housing Fund

Employees with Wuhan *hukou* status are eligible for participation in the Wuhan Housing Provident Fund. Founded in 1992, The Housing Fund is a savings program for individuals and households for the purchase of housing. The fund is also involved in construction of affordable housing units through low-interest loans to developers and individuals. The fund itself directly oversees the management of housing units as well as the funds of its depositors. From July 2011 to June 2012, the Housing Fund managed the sale of 18,484 individual units, and received 978 million RMB in deposits from 1.73 million workers. Participation in the program, and therefore eligibility for housing assistance, is restricted to Wuhan hukou-holders.

3.7.4 Employment

The central government abolished the practice of discrimination in employment opportunities for migrant workers, but it is still common in many cases. The HRSS

bureau site states that non-local hukou holders will be restricted from employment in large multinational enterprises, hospitals, banks, and other financial institutions.

From the above examples, it is clear that an individual's *hukou* status still plays a major exclusionary role in shaping China's rural-urban divide. *Hukou* conversion through investment and for high "suzhi" candidates only allows transfers for those who will maximize productivity and minimize urban government expenditures on social support. However, there has been a clear shift in the regulatory capacity of *hukou* management from the central government to individual municipalities. The withdrawal of the center from *hukou* management and entitlement distribution transformed the way individuals and households encountered the state in towns and municipalities. Moreover, it has transformed the relationship between lower-level political units and with higher levels of government. As a result, market-driven decision-making has increased, but still within the limited parameters allowed for by the local state. Migrants may find urban employment, but only in certain fields; they may settle in the city, but only if they meet extraordinary requirements; they may live in the city, but must face a highly prohibitive housing market. Yet migrants have still had a tremendous influence on China's cities and on the places they have migrated from. An accounting of the Chinese city must include migrant workers, recognizing them not just as victims of capitalist exploitation, but as agents of change.

3.8 Hukou Conversion, Rural Citizenship, and the Creation of China's "Villages-in-the City"

The term *chengzhongcun* means "village-in-the-city" or "village-surrounded by the-city". It is often translated erroneously as "urban village".[39] *Chengzhongcun* represent a departure from standard models of urbanization because of the dual structure. As Chung (2009) puts it, urban expansion in China does not, by necessity, integrate rural settlements into the urban organizational structure. However, rural settlements in the case of *chengzhongcun* do become *urban* in their essential nature: they are *de facto* urban while remaining *de jure* rural.[40] Due to rapid urban expansion, villages surrounded or engulfed by city developments form "village islands". Although urban expansion into the countryside is a common feature of all urbanizing countries, these villages are a special case because rural and urban systems function side-by-side.[41] In the process of urbanization, they are surrounded by the urban environment and become what would generally be understood as urban spaces. Instead of being integrated by the urban sphere, however, "villages in the city" are actually circumvented by formal urban development so that they maintain their administrative rural status.

---

[39] Chung (2010) distinguishes the extreme disorganization of *chengzhongcun* from the idealized, formally planned urban villages in Western planning practice. Liu et al (2010), however, point out that *chengzhongcun* do in fact share some features of the Western ideal, particularly pedestrianism and enclosed, self-sufficient neighborhoods.

[40] The *de facto* vs. *de jure* issue in China's urban population statistics is examined in detail in Chan (2007).

[41] Rural and urban systems here refers to the administrative, social, and political organization of rural and urban space, however, the economic activities in both spheres is decidedly non-agricultural in nature. This differs from the *desakota* concept which sees *agricultural* and non-*agricultural* activity functioning in one space.

The next section reintroduces this segment of the *de jure* rural population inhabiting China's cities: the residents of *chengzhongcun* who have used the single resource at their disposal, land, to engage and profit from the urban economy while remaining institutionally embedded in the rural sector. While in many cases they are able to accumulate far greater wealth than their migrant counterparts, they are still subject to many of the discriminatory outcomes of the dual-structure. Theirs too, is an incomplete urbanization and a denial of citizenship that has shaped the pathways open to China's *de jure* rural population. *Chengzhongcun* emerge from and are sustained by the collision of lingering rural land rights, state expropriation, and the denial of urban citizenship to villagers and migrants.

3.8.1 Rural *Hukou*

The rights and entitlements associated with hukou status are integral elements that define citizenship in the modern PRC. While non-local, largely rural migrant workers are denied access to the benefits of urban citizenship, they do maintain their own distinctive rights that others cannot access. First of all, local entitlements are locally defined just as with any jurisdiction. So whatever resources the village has for distribution are dependent on membership within the village. Typically, benefits are not distributed or allocated by the local state, but depend on the income generated by collectively-owned property (Po 2012). Second, family planning is lax for agricultural population. The primary benefit of hukou in a rural area is the right to allocated agricultural and/or residential land. This land can be used, benefitted from but not sold. It is the basis for rural livelihood in the post-commune era, utilized as a means of livelihood directly through agriculture, informal leasing, village-based leasing, sideline production, or rental

housing. In the absence of adequate social protections provided by the state, land continues to be understood by villagers as the most basic guarantor of social security for the rural population.

3.8.2 Categories and Conversions: Evolution of the Rural-Urban Interface

To understand its management, allocation, and utility, I divide rural land into three categories here: allocated agricultural land, allocated residential land, and collective land.[42] Agricultural land is allocated to individual households for farming, residential land is allocated to households for housing plots, and collective land is used for local cadre offices, public spaces (i.e. basketball courts and markets), or collective enterprises (retail or industry). In each case, village leadership takes responsibility for the accounting and distribution of land to individual households. However, farming and housing plots are typically allocated according to pre-collectivization familial ownership. When villages inhabit spaces on the urban fringe, or they are overtaken by urban expansion, they frequently become *chengzhongcun*, or villages-in-the city. Chengzhongcun form when *allocated agricultural land* is expropriated ("greenfield urbanization") by the local state but at least a portion of residential plots (*zhaijidi*) and collective land (usually referred to as economic development land or EDL) is retained by the village.[43] Until recently, this form of land expropriation typically did not result in

[42] The distribution of land in practice is frequently based on household claims to ancestral lands and can be inherited by future generations.

[43] The practice of retaining economic development land was initially confined to Guangdong Province. In Shenzhen, village cadres would negotiate with district governments for an average of 6-8% of village land

hukou change: village residency and the associated entitlements and exclusions remained defined by village membership. Under this type of expropriation, villagers' *livelihood* is changed, but their *residency* is not.

Chengzhongcun are "urban" only inasmuch as they are located within a territory claimed as urban by the local state. Politically and socially they are rural spaces, even after transformation has taken place (Chung 2014; Po 2012). As Hsing has argued, villagers in *chengzhongcun* have stronger claims to political and social rights than migrants because their rights *unambiguously* derive from the collective ownership of rural territory (Hsing 2010). *Chengzhongcun* are objectionable to urban leaders because they unhinge the urban order of "scientific" planning. They bring rural chaos to an urban order. As such, they are vilified and denigrated by urban elites. The source of difficulty in capturing *chengzhongcun* is not in the ambiguity of residents' property rights, but their insistence on defending and protecting those rights in the face of state violence and coercion (Chen 2013).

China's mode of urbanization characterized by the incomplete integration of rural land and the maintenance of rural sociopolitical identities produces new kinds of subjects in the city. Even as residents and migrants change their livelihoods and lifestyles in the city, *chengzhongcun* reproduce village-based class-dynamics. While migrant workers leave the village to become workers, villagers in the *chengzhongcun* stay in their village to become landlords to migrant workers and entrepreneurs. This reveals a changing

---

to be retained as economic development land, with reported highs of 15% (Po, 2012). This practice has spread, however. The method for retained land in Wuhan will be discussed in Chapter 6.

relationship and class structure among segments of the "rural" population that is underappreciated in traditional Marxist class-dynamics. Urban economic change creates the demand for migrant workers but their housing and social identity remain embedded in a "village" setting (Zhang et al, 2003). In short, actors who are defined by their political-cultural identity as "rural" are separated from the "truly urban" even when their economic livelihood is part of the urban fabric. For this reason, proletarianization is an unsatisfying description of China's *de jure* rural population living and working in the city. Instead, the dual structure under reform produces a new type of socioeconomic disciplining that channels migrants and villagers into new class subjectivities as "*nongmingong*" (rural workers) and urban villagers (Siu 2006; Bach 2010; Ngai and Lu 2010).

3.8.2.1 Independent Villages

Table 3.3 charts village urbanization through three stages of state expropriation and urbanization from the 1980s to the present in terms of changes to land ownership, hukou type, and responsibility for social well-being. Villages that have not undergone urban-state led expropriation may have undergone processes of *in situ* urbanization and industrialization, but their key feature is that all original village land remains in collective control in *de jure* rural status. In these villages, all land is owned by the collective, village residents most likely possess a local/agricultural hukou, and social protections and services are the responsibility of the village collective. Resources for the village collectives generally derive from village owned collective enterprises, either through land leasing and rental, or TVEs and other entrepreneurial activities. Villages receive very little if any fiscal transfers from higher levels of government.

3.8.2.2 Greenfield Expropriation: Creation of Chengzhongcun

A consequence of Deng Xiaoping's watershed southern tour in 1992 was to affirm economic growth as the priority of local governments. To facilitate economic development, local governments engaged in massive land grabs throughout the 1990s, expropriating greenfields on the urban periphery for economic development zones, commercial developments, and government offices among other urban construction

Table 3.3: Urbanizing Villages: Land Ownership, Citizenship, and Entitlement Changes

	Before Greenfield Expropriation	***After Greenfield Expropriation***	***Chengzhongcun Redevelopment***
Type of Land	**Ownership**	**Ownership**	**Ownership**
Farmland	Collective	State	State
Residential	Collective	Collective	State/Private
Economic Development Land	Collective	Collective	Collective (as joint-stock companies)
Hukou Type	**Status/Locality**	**Status/Locality**	**Status/Locality**
	Agricultural/Village	Agricultural/Village Agricultural/City	Urban/City--Street
Entitlements:	**Responsibility**	**Responsibility**	**Responsibility**
Social Protections	Collective	Collective (Residuals from EDL)	Collective (Residuals from EDL)/State
Services	Collective	Collective	State

projects, with the latter two gaining momentum since the turn of the century. This is the process that created *chengzhongcun,* or "villages-in-the city" (referred in the table as "greenfield expropriation). Especially in the cities of the Pearl River Delta, *chengzhongcun* first emerged due to the high demand for new construction land by municipal governments. In order to expedite the process of converting collective lands

on the urban fringe, city governments expropriated farmland (the "green field" approach) but left housing plots (*zhaijidi*) in the village untouched to keep compensation costs down. Additionally, many villages were able to negotiate with urban governments for the right to Economic Development Land (EDL), a small portion of land that remained under village control to be used for commercial or industrial activities.[44] For the most part, retained development land and housing plots remain under village control and outside the control of urban regulatory regimes. Due to their proximity to urban areas and new development projects, many *chengzhongcun* have favorable locations that are attractive destinations for migrant workers and additionally facilitate informal links with the changing urban and economic environment surrounding the village. Most village residents have long ago turned to non-agricultural pursuits, built new houses, and turned their older quarters into rental units for housing and other economic activities for rural migrants who are excluded from the formal urban sector because of the dual-structure. Over the last two decades, *chengzhongcun* played a crucial role in the development of Chinese cities, particularly in the Pearl River Delta. First and foremost, villages provided the land for urban construction, industrial relocation, and economic expansion. At the same time, their partial (at best) integration with the city enables rural-urban migration at minimal costs to the local state, and provides livelihoods for dispossessed farmers whose agricultural land is the fodder for urban expansion. They have become a fixture of

[44] Po (2012) reports that most villages retain 6-8% of village land for EDL. Hsing (2010) says that some villages were able to negotiate a figure as high as 15%.

China's post-Mao urbanization (unlike other countries where they have been a much more transitional phenomenon.)[45]

As the table shows, this type of greenfield expropriation simply transfers ownership of one category of village land from collective to state ownership. In reality, the amount of residential land and economic development land is not constant, but an outcome of negotiation between the local state and village authorities ranging from 6-8% of the expropriated land to as much as 15% in some cases (Po 2008, 2012; Hsing 2010). Public services, social welfare, security, and infrastructure within the village remain the responsibility of the collective. In some cases a hukou conversion is involved, converting agricultural hukou into non-agricultural hukou, but the hukou is bound to the immediate locality of the village within the larger urban structure (meaning that a member of the village does not necessarily have access to services or entitlements of other urban residents). The loss of greenfield land obviously has profound impacts on the livelihood of villagers, removing agriculture as a viable option. In this way, greenfield expropriation intensifies the transformation of rural livelihoods in the reform era, but does not change the political division marking the dual rural-urban dual society (Chan and Zhang 1998).

3.8.3.4 Transformation and Redevelopment: Chengzhongcun Gaizao

The transformation of *chengzhongcun* is still largely a work in progress in China's cities that seeks to dissolve, at least in principle, the division between rural and urban

[45] De Soto (2002) describes in great detail the process through which informal housing on the urban periphery is eventually integrated into the formal urban system in Peru.

citizenship for a limited group of the *de jure* rural population. This process, in various stages in cities throughout China, seeks the transformation and redevelopment (*gaizao*) of villages in the city. Transformation of villages-in-the-city has proved an arduous, complex, and drawn-out process for urban governments that consider them a blight on urban progress and modernity. The process is complicated, because governments must not only negotiate the final expropriation of rural property, but also orchestrate the social and political transformation of rural residents into urban citizens through their integration into the urban public goods regime, a humungous task given the entrenchment and historical scale of the dual structure. This topic will be explored in greater detail in an upcoming chapter, but for now, I want to highlight how it relates to the sociopolitical changes discussed above. Ideally, the state successfully expropriates all remaining village land which is then typically sold to private developers. Villagers surrender all claims to land, but are generally entitled to a piece of commercial development through apartment ownership. In some cases, a portion of economic development land may also be returned to the village under the ownership of a joint-stock cooperative. Villagers are formally incorporated into the urban public goods regime, and their *hukou* status is registered with the local street office.[46] Villagers children are entitled to enrollment in city schools, and land infrastructure and development is the shared responsibility of the local state and private developers.

[46] The lowest level of urban government under the district.

Transformation has proven a highly successful model for governmental capital accumulation and the transfer of collective land into developers' hands, but outcomes for villagers have been uncertain and uneven (Po 2008, 2011; Siu, 2007; Webster et al 2011; He and Wu 2011).

3.9 Conclusion: The Dual-Structure, Chengzhongcun, and Rural-Urban Dynamics in the City

As I have argued in this chapter, *chengzhongcun*, rather than the outcome of an "ambiguous" property rights regime is not indicative of an oversight or failure of transition, but an overt strategy of spatial governance first employed by Mao that continues into the reform era and beyond. It is collision of a dual-track land regime differentiating rural and urban property rights, urban-state power, and the denial of urban residency to *in situ* villagers and rural-urban migrants. Chengzhongcun and their ongoing transformation in China's cities reflect the social and political dualism of China's spatial system that will be elaborated on in future chapters. As a spatial unit straddling the rural-urban divide, *chengzhongcun* take on an unusual and disruptive form for the formal urban development regime. Rather than challenge the dual-structure, they shine light on its prominence and foundational relevance to China's spatial political economy. In conclusion, I want to draw attention to some of the ways in which *chengzhongcun* highlight how rural-urban dualism takes place *within* China's cities that will be recurring themes in future chapters.

Chapter 4

Schizophrenic Cities: *Chengzhongcun*, Global Cities, and the Production of Informality

"Without the official citizenship in the city provided by a valid household registration card, this immense mass of poor peasants (currently estimated at 100 million) had no legal entitlement to social services or housing. Instead, they became super-cheap human fuel for the export sweatshops of the Pearl River Delta and the building sites of Shanghai and Beijing, while housing themselves in makeshift shacks and overcrowded rooms at the edge of the cities. The return of capitalism to China brought with it the squalid urban shantytown."

--Mike Davis, *Planet of Slums*

"During scholarly debates on the future trajectory of China and India, Chinese researchers are wont to raise the issue of slums and slum clearance as "evidence" of China's superiority to India, for China has no slums, which, truth be told, is a dubious claim . . . The vision of a sanitized, manicured city, with neither slums nor scavengers, is as fallacious as it is misleading."

--Ni Tao, *Shanghai Daily News*

4.1 Introduction: The Persistent Myths of Marginality

China's recent and speedy urbanization has drawn the attention of media and scholarship around the world. China's glitzy new skyscrapers, expressways, and state-of-the-art railroads have been in the limelight, but the plights of the disadvantaged in the reform era, especially rural migrant labor and a relatively new class of landless farmers,

have also received substantial reporting and analysis.[47] How one judges the prospects of China's fast-paced development for the well-being of China's disadvantaged depends largely on how one reconciles these disparities in present-day Chinese society. Unfortunately, examinations of China's economic development are dominated by a discourse of "market transition" that reduces the conflicts and contradictions of China's political economy to side effects of the CCP's gradualist approach to reform. This is especially apparent in studies of rural-urban inequality. In this framework, spatial inequality and social injustices are treated as inevitable, if unfortunate, byproducts of transition or legacies of a fading socialist past that will be remedied as China's march toward market capitalism progresses. In the previous chapter, I argued that rather than focusing on transition and what China may or may not become it is more fruitful to explore the continuities of the Chinese system that sustain the pre-reform dual-structure dividing rural and urban society.

In this context of the dual structure, Chinese municipal officials respond to discourses of global and model cities in formulating long-term urban development plans. Rural-urban inequality is a long-lasting, inherent, and intentional feature of the Chinese spatial political economy that forms the basis for its current accumulation regime, yet it frequently comes into conflict with developer and officials' vision for constructing the

[47] There is a voluminous literature on these issues. On restrictions facing rural-urban migrants see Solinger (1999), Wang (2005), Wu and Tremain (2005). See Wu Weiping (2002, 2004) on issues specific to housing. On the rise of the dual-society, see Chan and Zhang (1998) and Chan (2007) On landless farmers, see He et al (2009). On the increase of urban poverty and unemployment in the reform era, see Solinger (2002), Wu (2004), Liu and Wu (2006).

model Chinese city. As urban boundaries have expanded over the past thirty years, rural and urban space becomes interwoven, but not integrated. The most obvious physical manifestation of the dual structure in contemporary Chinese cities is the *chengzhongcun*, village islands in a sea of urban monumentalism. Chinese cities, then, are in part, the product of the dual structure where the 'rural' is both a foundation for urban accumulation as potential sites for investment and construction, and an obstacle to the unfettered control of city space by municipal officials. The local state forces *de jure* rural space into a schizophrenic mode of being—at once rural and urban, vital to the state's interests but constantly denounced as obstructive to the state's urban imaginary, vibrant and bustling sites of social and economic activity with no future.

4.1.1 Global Cities, Global Slums

In 1979, Janice Perlman published her important study of Rio de Janeiro's *favelas*. At that time, Perlman argued that scholars, policy-makers, leftists, rightists, and middle-class liberals held "strikingly similar stereotypes regarding city-ward migrants." These groups shared in a belief that rapid urbanization was causing "hordes of rural peasants" to invade the city. Migrants, seen as unprepared for urban life and unable to adapt enclosed themselves in parochial urban ghettoes, slums, and squatter settlements that manifested the most extreme cases of social disorder within their communities: family breakdown, social anomie, rampant crime violence and vice. Moreover, these communities *ruralized* the city, importing "maladaptive rural values," adhering to a "culture of poverty" that simultaneously produced fatalism and pessimism within the slums while deteriorating the larger urban environment. Slum-dwellers' only possible recourse was to become a "seething frustrated mass" of economic despair and social-political unrest. Perlman

called these stereotypes the "myths of marginality", a subjectification of slum-dwellers that did not correspond with her own encounters with the inhabitants of *favelas* (Perlman 1979).

What is remarkable about Perlman's description is how little attitudes have changed. Three decades later, the editors of one collected volume must still argue against the sentiment that "many policymakers and scholars still view urbanization as harmful and hope to somehow retard or even reverse it. To them, the concentration of poverty, slum growth, environmental problems and manifold social disturbances in cities paint a menacing picture," (Martine 2008). Nowhere is this menace more prominently on display than in Mike Davis' widely-read *Planet of Slums*. Yet this pessimism is increasingly confronted by a growing consensus that continued urbanization is the only possible path for long-term poverty reduction and sustainable development around the globe. As key nodes in global networks of capital distribution, accumulation, and investment, cities are prominent in wide-ranging political and economic studies from a broad ideological spectrum. As argued in Chapter 2, both critical and mainstream studies of cities have privileged the agency of capital at the expense of other social actors. When slums, slum-dwellers, and other groups outside the middle-class or urban elite are acknowledged, they are treated primarily as a homogenized mass: from the right, they are unable to integrate with urban society either because of cultural obstinacy or state intrusion. From the left, they are frequently portrayed as unwitting victims of neoliberal globalization, their agency only acknowledged when it is overtly oppositional to global

capital interests.[48] Striking a balance between demonstrating the very real conditions of poverty and socioeconomic exclusion abundant in urban locales, and acknowledging the dynamism, social cohesion, and agency of city-dwellers that persists in spite of the subjugation in local urban hierarchies proves to be a tremendous challenge in the creation of a more progressive urban politics. Instead, urban studies perpetuate the image of a homogenous and universalized urban space.

This chapter reviews the discursive and policy practices that produce informality in Chinese cities, particularly circulating around the production and elimination of *chengzhongcun* from the urban landscape.

4.2 Does China have Slums?

Official Chinese discourse is, in practice, ambivalent towards the existence of slums. Official documents recognize "shantytowns" (棚户区--penghuqu) and villages-in-the-city (城中村--chengzhongcun) as preferable to the pernicious connotations of "slum" (贫民区—pinminqu, which translates literally into “poverty district”). While there are problems with the data used by the UN to classify slum-dwellers, it is clear that, despite municipal officials’ efforts at hiding them, there are agglomerations within Chinese cities that share many of the features common to slums around the world: high-density populations,

[48] It should be noted that there is considerable overlap in characterizations of the urban poor from ideological perspectives

illegal or informal buildings, high concentrations of rural migrant populations, and an active informal economy.

4.2.1 International Definitions and Chinese Ambiguity

Slums in popular, governmental, and even academic treatments frequently lack definitional clarity. They are difficult to pin down because of contextual variation--even within the same country different local standards for housing create different perceptions of what is and is not a slum (UN Habitat, 2003). As complex, dynamic, social-spatial forms, slums defy simple or neat characterization. There, are however, a bundle of characteristics frequently associated with settlements or neighborhoods that are broadly recognized as slums. These include a lack of basic services, substandard housing, an abundance of illegal and inadequate building structures, overcrowding and high population densities, unhealthy living conditions, residential insecurity (in terms of tenure and legal status), poverty, social and economic exclusion (Ibid.). Socially, and more controversially, slums are characterized as spatial containers for poverty and despair. The harshest treatments portray slum-dwellers as apathetic, resigned to their fates of perpetual impoverishment and marginality. Slums are dominated by informal economic activities. In terms of governance, slums are generally seen as abandoned or ignored by the state, excluded from government investment in infrastructure and services. Political authority may not rest with the local city council, but with local clans, kinship networks, crime bosses, or criminal gangs. Additionally, urban elites frequently accuse slums of imposing negative externalities on the city. Whether real or imagined, slums are seen as sources of environmental degradation, crime, and social unrest disruptive to overall urban development.

UN-Habitat further delineates different kinds of slum according to location in the city and the security of tenure. It distinguishes "slums proper" (inner-city areas in decline or disrepair) from peripheral shanties and other "spontaneous" urban developments (informal settlements including unsanctioned subdivisions, land invasions, and other squatter settlements). According to international standards, Chinese cities do have inner-city neighborhoods that meet the former definition of slum housing, legacies of the centrally-planned industrial housing and temporary buildings in varying degrees of quality, particularly on waterfronts and riverbanks. These are particularly prevalent in declining industrial provinces of the northeast and inland cities where modern urban redevelopment has yet to outpace socialist urban decay. *Chengzhongcun* fall more in line with the second type as "legally ambiguous" subdivisions of collective property in the city.[49]

The United Nations also classifies slums according to housing tenure status and property. Security of tenure reflect institutional prejudices against collective or alternative forms of ownership, emphasizing individual, private property as the primary means of achieving security, lending slum policy recommendations toward the de Soto approach of titling (UN Habitat). [50] Though they do not fit neatly into any category, *chengzhongcun* combine multiple tenure statuses. Buildings are often owner-occupied

[49] Technically illegal but generally tolerated, many former state-owned housing units are also subdivided for migrant housing, especially in cities like Shanghai where *danwei* and state-housing was prominent under the command economy.

[50] There are significant criticisms of UN Habitat's methodology for defining slums and approaching slum development (Gilbert 2005, 2007). I do not dispute these critiques here, rather, I use UN standards only as a means of comparing China's cities based on international standards of slum identification.

with original village residents residing in one floor of the building and renting out the rest. In more prosperous villages, owners have bought an apartment elsewhere and may hire migrants to serve as building and rental managers. However, the majority population in a typical *chengzhongcun* is migrant tenants who are either renting or sub-renting from original village residents.[51]

4.2.2 Are Chengzhongcun Slums? Legal Authority, Ownership, and Residency

The literature on informal settlements and slums frequently employs the terminology of "ambiguity" to describe property rights and the occupation of urban space by migrant populations (Tian 2008; Bromley 2009; Musembi 2007). In the Chinese context, legal ambiguity derives from migrants' place of residence in potentially illegally subdivided housing and their status as migrants. Yet there is no real ambiguity in a legal sense. Simply put, migrants have no legal claims, whatsoever, over property they use in *chengzhongcun*. Municipal authorities frequently bemoan village residents for ignoring building standards and regulations governing sub-divisions. Given their administrative independence from the municipal government (either formal or *de facto*), municipalities actually lack a clear legal authority to enforce zoning and building codes within *chengzhongcun* because they do not fall within the jurisdiction of the municipal government. In response to the "rural building craze" of the 1990s and early 2000s, the

[51] In some cases, rural migrants lease entire buildings from indigenous villagers and act as "secondary landlords" renting out individual rooms to other migrants. The practice is particularly prevalent in the Pearl River Delta.

central government passed universal guidelines for village construction, usually limiting their height to 4-6 stories, and placing restrictions on use and transferability of property (Sargeson 2002). However, this is regulated under the authority of central and provincial, not municipal, authorities. Villagers are clearly in violation of height guidelines, and municipal governments frequently criticize *chengzhongcun* for illegal building and illegal construction (Tang and Chung 2002). Still, municipal governments often lack legitimacy and capacity to transplant municipal codes to the village short of full-scale expropriation and conversion of collective land, so village residents continue to build on their residential plots. Despite their role as conduits for the transmission of government policy, village cadres ignore building code concerns as they are frequently profiting from illegal construction themselves (Ibid.).

Migrants who live in *chengzhongcun* may or may not have legal status in their destination. Membership in the village collective is determined solely through *hukou* status, and so migrants are excluded from any ownership claims by law and custom. Prices in formal commodity housing markets are beyond the reach of the vast majority of migrants. Migrant participation in industrial and commercial property in the formal urban sector is also infinitesimally small. *Chengzhongcun* are a chief alternative for migrant housing and small-scale entrepreneurship.[52] The economic use of collective property by non-locals is subject to a variety of local interpretations, but it in most cases,

[52] Though migrant entrepreneurship in the informal urban sector occasionally takes on a larger scale, with textile production in Beijing's *Zhejiangcun* by migrants from Zhejiang province the most well-known example of this. See Zhang (2002)

it is informal if not outright illegal because migrants either do not or cannot obtain government-issued permits to operate shops, workshops, or factories. Locating economic activity within *chengzhongcun* offers migrants some protection from state intrusion into their urban livelihoods as municipal officials rarely intervene directly in the operation of village economic activities.

Migrant habitation within *chengzhongcun* is similarly ambivalent depending on how local housing codes are interpreted. However, their tenure is relatively secure because they are insulated from police intervention by the liminal status of *chengzhongcun* and the limited capacity of police to harass migrants since 2003.[53] Therefore, it is difficult to determine conclusively whether *chengzhongcun* with large migrant populations are "illegal settlements on public land" or "legal settlements on public land." What is clear, however, is they have no capacity to resist expulsion—migrants are excluded from participating in negotiations among local villagers, district authorities, and developers prior to *chengzhongcun* redevelopment. Regardless, migrant

Figure 4.3 Donghu village near the Wuhan Institute of Technology caters to students with cheap food options, and low-cost rentals to students wanting to move out of the dorms

[53] The primary reason city police rarely intervene is due to a lack of capacity—funding and allocation for services like the police are largely based on the *hukou* population. *Chengzhongcun* village collectives commonly hire their own private security forces (Po, 2012).

Figure 4.4 Posters on lamp posts and building walls in the village routinely advertise apartments for rent.

and local populations in *chengzhongcun* have little incentive to upgrade within the village. Members of the collective are incentivized to upgrade to the point where they can maximize short-term rental profits, but few go beyond this due to the ever-present threat of state expropriation of collective property. Additionally, most residents are dependent on rental incomes from migrants for their livelihood (Figures 4.1 and 4.2). Given their insecure urban status, studies find China's migrant workers even less-inclined to spend on housing than in other countries (Zheng et al 2009). Any upgrades to property by collective ownership that increases rents will deter migrants. They are also the first casualty of collective redevelopment, entitled to no compensation or resettlement subsidies.

Most middle-class and elite urban residents, on the other hand, seek the security and status of formal property markets. Even if residents could access the capital investment necessary to make their properties appealing to wealthier urban residents, their tenure status would remain insecure.[54] Incentives for self-improvement among

[54] There is a large informal property market for the middle-class in collective areas in many urban suburbs. See Hsing (2010). However, this kind of large-scale development is not possible in the highly built-up areas of inner-cities.

villagers, then, are constrained by their own insecurity, and the insecurity of others. In the short-term, they depend on incomes from renting to migrants with insecure urban status who oppose improvements that would raise rents. In the long-term, their capacity to maintain control over their collectively-allocated property is unsettled by nation-wide campaigns to eliminate *chengzhongcun*.

Chengzhongcun, then, clearly share several properties with slum and informal settlements around the globe. Key among these properties is an insecurity of tenure that stems from municipal governments' relatively unchallenged authority to expropriate collective land and remake urban spaces. Yet because they are dispersed in relatively small agglomerations throughout China's cities, they can be easily missed by the casual observer. In the world's more well-known and visible slums, such as Nairobi's Kibera and the *favelas* of Rio de Janeiro, there is frequently a clear border between the formally planned city and a large sprawling slum settlement on the outskirts (Figures 4.3 and 4.4). The *chengzhongcun*, however, are interwoven with the formally planned area of cities. Instead of the sprawling oceans of poverty envisioned in Michael Davis' *Planet of Slums*, Chinese cities should be characterized more as "slum islands" (Figures 4.5-4.7). Unlike Kibera and other high population slums that are centered in IGO and NGO slum discourses, with hundreds of thousands of residents within a single, connected area that is designated as a slum, Chinese cities may have hundreds of small, disconnected areas with individual populations ranging from 2,000-30,000.[55]

---

[55] Comprehensive data on individual *chengzhongcun* populations are not maintained, but many are in the 1500-2500 person range, with few containing more than 10,000 people.

Figure 4.3 and 4.4 Sprawling Slums of Rio de Janeiro (top) and Kibera on Nairobi's outskirts (bottom)[56]

[56] Figures 4.3-4.7 by author using Google Maps.

Figure 4.5 and 4.6 Slum Islands in Guangzhou. Shipai village in Tianhe District (Top). Several disconnected *chengzhongcun* in Haizhu District, Guangzhou (bottom)



Figure 4.7 *Chengzhongcun* in Jiang'an District, Wuhan

Despite the spatially divergent form of *chengzhongcun*, they still share the basic qualities and serve similar functions characteristic of slum settlements around the world, including:

- high rural-urban migrant populations
- unplanned, informal building
- administrative distinctiveness from surrounding city
- social and economic relations that are only tenuously connected to the surrounding city
- can have extremely high density
- concentrated sites for informal economic activities
- primary locations for the provision of low-income housing
- they are frequently denigrated in a discourse promoted by government officials and public media as sites of backwardness, criminal activity, and other characteristics unbecoming of a "modern" city

In other words, if we are to accept that the general conditions that lead a given community to be characterized as a slum to be valid, Chinese cities clearly contain thousands of slums that house millions of people. A Chinese exceptionalism that proposes a city without slums is without basis in fact. China's slums, however, have arisen in a relatively rare institutional environment—the dual structure—that gives them

a unique form that is often overlooked in descriptions of Chinese cities, but does not alter the substance they share with slums elsewhere.[57]

4.3 Urbanization, the State, and the Emergence of *Chengzhongcun*: Spatial Hierarchy and Spatial Patterns

Rural industrialization in the 1980s fueled development, including the transformation of the rural sphere that renewed contacts and interactions with the urban system of cities and towns after decades of state-inflicted isolation (Shue 1989, Guldin 1992). The population growth and physical transformations of the Chinese countryside in this period has been referred to as *in situ* urbanization, or "urbanization from below," (Ma and Lin 1993, Ma and Fan 1994, Zhu 2000, 2002, Shen et al 2002). Featured prominently in southern Jiangsu Province, Guangdong's Pearl River Delta, and elsewhere through the 1980s and 1990s, "urbanization from below" was marked by the growth of town-and-village enterprises (TVEs), while local officials worked to provide employment and fund social welfare in the village (Oi 1999, Whiting 2000, Gilley 2001). Furthermore, towns (the lowest ranked urban unit in China's spatial political hierarchy) on the outskirts of major cities absorbed large proportions of rural migrants, taking advantage of the relaxation on migration controls and the employment opportunities offered by TVEs. Urbanization from below entailed the physical transformation of rural space, the transition from agricultural to industrial modes of production, and in many cases, a major increase in the wealth and power of local officials. Huang characterizes all of this

[57] There are some similarities between China's dual structure differentiating collective and state land and colonial practices in Kampala, Uganda (Nuwagaba 2006).

activity as informal, presumably because it emerged outside of formal state planning although it often took place under the guidance or, at least, tacit support, of local cadres (Huang 2011).

This rural-based pattern of urbanization inverted by the end of the 1990's as city governments played an increasingly important role in China's development strategy. Throughout imperial history, China's size and the difficulties of overland travel had engendered discrete regional city systems, however provinces and counties were the basis of spatial organization, a pattern that persisted through most of the Maoist years (Cartier 2002, 2011; Ma 2002, 2005). However, the cumulative effect of policy shifts in the 1990's relocated political power at the scale of the city under the official policy of "city leading county" *shiguanxian*, (Tang and Chung 2000, Ma 2005, Huang 2008). Despite China's supposed market transition away from hierarchical control to a market economy, the exercise of power, control of resources, and capture of revenue remains firmly embedded in the national spatial administrative hierarchy (Chan 2009). A place's rank within the spatial hierarchy and its administrative classification as rural or urban (agricultural or non-agricultural) are two of the most important indicators of local officials' ability to access resources on a regional, national, or even global scale, as well as their ability to exploit the resources of subordinate units in the regional economy.

The importance of administrative rank and classification has motivated widespread administrative reshuffling as spatial units attempt to move up in the hierarchy, and cities and towns attempt to bring more and more units into their jurisdictions (Chung and Lam 2004, Ma 2005, Shen 2005). From 1978 to 2001, the number of prefecture-level cities increased from 98 to 265, and county-level cities

increased from 92 to 393. Including all categories, the number of cities in China grew from 193 to 677 in the same period. Urban districts increased from 388 in 1976 to 808 in 2001 (Chung and Lam 2004). Some 70% of China's population, while not necessarily urban in lifestyle or occupation, is being administered by urban governments. Much of this reclassification reflects contestations of power over land and resources between different levels of government, but also by the competitive repositioning of localities to gain advantages in national and foreign markets (McGee et al 2007) as local bureaucrats tend to believe that a city enjoys greater advantages in attracting investment than a village or town (Chung and Lam 2004).[58]

The sheer quantity of locales becoming reclassified as urban reveals just how much of the country is now institutionalized under this new form of urban-centered governance (Tang and Chung 2000, Chung and Lam 2004), and has important implications for regional development, the governance of space, and interactions between the Chinese state and rural society. For all the attention China's massive decentralization has received, countering trends of state expansion at the local level are just as important to understanding its governance of space. Urbanization is a kind of "state-ization," what Painter describes as the "intensification of the symbolic presence of the state across all kinds of social practices and relations," (Painter 2006: 758). The system of "city leading counties" has institutionalized entire regions through the local construction of formal,

[58] While some have referred to this 'administrative urbanization' as an example of 'scale-jumping', it is more a reflection on party and government officials' attempts to access more of the state's resources than an attempt to expand the influence of the locality.

economic, political, and cultural institutions (Yang and Wang 2008). Moving from rural to urban categories of space is not just a conceptual change, but is predicated on the introduction of a greater state presence at the local level in the form of more cadres, increased funds for public construction, and stricter regulation of society (Ma 2002). You-tien Hsing argues that urban politics have become organized around land development projects that "consolidate and actualize" territorial power with success in interstate competitions dependent on the capacity of state agents to discipline and coordinate subordinate units and the moral capacity to maintain legitimacy (Hsing 2006). Disciplining by municipal governments is conducted through dual processes of totalization and localization--the spatial practices that institutionalize rural areas and include them in their network of government while drawing on the resources and agents within their jurisdictions to make those networks more and more restrictive (Tang and Chung 2000, 2002).

4.3.1 The creation of chengzhongcun and the production of informality

It is in the context of these twin processes of totalization and localization that *chengzhongcun* are created as rural islands existing simultaneously within and outside the urban sphere. One of the key goals of *chengzhongcun* reform is to formally integrate these rural spaces within institutions of urban governance, but the dual-track land institution and the *hukou* system continue to obstruct these goals. Informality in China, then, is a social and economic construction produced largely by the self-declared "formal" urban sector. Agents driving a particularized vision of the city produce informality in the classification of some groups or behaviors as ill-suited to that vision,

i.e. “rural migrants” and “villagers in the city.” Spatial governance in China lacks a uniform technique for integrating rural and urban space due to the maintenance of institutions of the dual structure. Rural settlements, once on the urban periphery, become *urban* in their essential nature as the city engulfs their agricultural land. While remaining *de jure rural* they are *de facto* urban.[59] Due to rapid urban expansion, villages surrounded or engulfed by city developments form “village islands”. Although urban expansion into the countryside is a common feature of all urbanizing countries, these villages are a special case because rural and urban systems function side-by-side.[60] In the process of urbanization, they are surrounded by the urban environment and become what would generally be understood as urban spaces. Instead of being integrated by the urban sphere, however, "villages in the city" are actually circumvented by formal urban development so that they maintain their administrative rural status. Residents of *chengzhongcun* are defined as informal within China’s spatial imaginary by their politically distinct identity as “villagers” and their occupation of legally rural space.

Residents of *chengzhongcun* have used the single resource at their disposal, land, to engage and profit from the urban economy while remaining institutionally embedded in the rural sector. While in many cases they are able to accumulate far greater wealth than their migrant counterparts, they are still subject to many of the discriminatory

[59] The *de facto* vs. *de jure* issue in China's urban population statistics is examined in detail in Chan (2007).
[60] Rural and urban systems here refers to the administrative, social, and political organization of rural and urban space, however, the economic activities in both spheres is decidedly non-agricultural in nature. This differs from the *desakota* concept which sees *agricultural* and non-*agricultural* activity functioning in one space.

outcomes of the dual-structure. Theirs too, is an incomplete urbanization and a denial of citizenship that has shaped the pathways open to China's *de jure* rural population. *Chengzhongcun* emerge from and are sustained by the collision of rural land rights, state expropriation, and the denial of urban residency to villagers and migrants. Their dual-existence in a simultaneously rural and urban world marks them as informal.

Therefore, *chengzhongcun* arise from China's model of "incomplete urbanization" in three ways. First, the vast majority of rural migrants under regulation of the *hukou* system are excluded from formal urban residency and cut off from many life opportunities and sectors of the housing market. Second, indigenous villagers are similarly excluded from urban residency. While many cities have eliminated rural *hukou* for people living within municipal boundaries, their status remains ambivalent as their well-being remains dependent on their connection to the village. Third, the space of the village lies outside the administrative allocation of resources and is not integrated with urban infrastructure. Their informality is further produced and reinforced in a series of discursive practices that identify them as inimical to the Chinese city envisioned by its boosters.

4.3.2 Pathological Communities: Academic Research on Chengzhongcun

Research on *chengzhongcun* generally converges around a handful of recurring themes. While the Chinese literature is voluminous, the majority focuses on *chengzhongcun* as a planning problem—the eventuality of their destruction is not questioned, their analysis is reduced to strategies for demolition. Much of the literature in either language focuses on whether or not *chengzhongcun* are positive or negative contributors to urbanization, occasionally situating them in the broader context of

informal housing, but more often treating them as uniquely Chinese spatial forms.[61] In her analysis of the discourses surrounding Brazil's *favelas,* Perlman identified three distinct camps that continue to resonate in contemporary debates about informal housing and settlements, and are clearly represented in the analyses of *chengzhongcun*. One camp described *favelas* as "pathological" communities ("slums of despair"), while others accepted them as inevitable aspects of urbanization. A third camp saw *favelas* as communities "striving for elevation", a gateway to urban stability and success for rural-urban migrants that were essential for enabling integration with the city ("slums of hope"). These discourses remain unsettled today, and continue to be reflected in popular works like Mike Davis' *Planet of Slums,* Douglas Saunders' *Arrival Cities,* and Hernando deSoto's influential *The Other Path*.[62] In contemporary discourses about China's cities, *chengzhongcun* are frequently portrayed as pathological spaces—"cancers" on urban development. Alternatively, they are described as unfortunate but necessary side effects of rapid urbanization. However, their function as "gateways" to the city for rural migrants as suggested by Saunders is complicated by the dual-structure which affects land rights and the prospects for urban citizenship.

---

[61] Po (2011) also links *chengzhongcun* to broader discourses about slums. She makes special note of the political sensitivity within China about acknowledging the existence of slums.

[62] Mike Davis' *Planet of Slums* (2005) is probably the most widely read perpetuation of the "pathological community". De Soto (2000) is certainly the most widely known advocate today for empowering slum-dwellers through titling, while the slum-as-gateway argument has most recently been advanced by Saunders (2010). The most nuanced analyses of slums and informal urbanization in recent years has come from African urban studies—see especially Simone (2004), a collected volume by Bryceson and Potts (2006), and Myers (2011).

4.3.3.2 "Cancer" Arguments

The popular view of *chengzhongcun* within China is that they are a "cancer" on Chinese urbanization--they are presented as dens of crime and pornography that inhibit the creation of a modern, urban society, particularly in the popular press but this view is also clearly reflected in official state publications and statements by municipal officials (Xie 2003; Tian 2008). From the perspective of municipal regulators and planners, *chengzhongcun* are indubitably problematic, as they are shielded from city regulations by their administratively independent status. The dubious jurisdiction of urban regulations over *chenghzongcun*, itself a product of China's dual structure, has enabled villagers to build rental housing and business spaces that are not obliged to accommodate fire and safety codes. Additionally, petty and violent crime rates within *chengzhongcun* are relatively high, though systematic evidence of this is scarce, and most of the crime occurs against other migrants (Siu 2006; Hong 2012; Liu et al 2009). Original village residents who have profited from renting out their land are accused of exploiting their position for selfish gain, while some reports even blame them for holding the city hostage by refusing to surrender their land to city officials. The second-generation of local villagers are further portrayed as spoiled and lazy. Resentment toward villagers for their ability to profit from their post-reform position is exceptionally potent, with much of the hostility arising from middle-class and urban elites (Bach, 2010).

4.3.3.3 "Necessary Evil" Arguments

While acknowledging the many problems and challenges in *chengzhongcun*, most English-language researchers present them as, at worst, *a necessary evil*. Paralleling research on Latin America's informal sector, particularly housing on the urban periphery, studies in defense of *chengzhongcun* argue that they provide necessary services the local

state is either unwilling or incapable of offering.[63] These scholars connect the functions of *chengzhongcun* to those of "slums" in Latin America and elsewhere in the developing world. Many *chengzhongcun* particularly in the cities of the Pearl River Delta also serve as vibrant centers of informal economic activity providing key support for the formal economy (see Xue and Huang, 2008 Yin, et al 2009).

4.3.3.4 Transitional Spaces

Additionally, some researchers claim that *chengzhongcun* serve as a space where peasants and rural migrants can be "eased" into the formal urban sector (while minimizing costs of transition for the local state (He et al, 2010)[64]. However, there is a paucity of even anecdotal evidence demonstrating how either migrants or villagers successfully transition from *chengzhongcun* into the formal urban market.[65]

Taken as a whole, these writings have been valuable in providing accounts of what is happening on the ground on China's urban margins. However, they have not provided theoretical insight into the spatial mechanisms which create *chengzhongcun* or the political contestation among interest groups in *chengzhongcun* redevelopment. Research on *chengzhongcun* has been overly descriptive, and largely divorced from the

---

[63] Most importantly, housing for migrant workers and other low-income urban residents, see Zhang et al, 2003; Zhang Li, 2005; Song, Zenou and Ding, 2008; Liu et al, 2009, He et al 2010. While not identifying them as such, Davis refers frequently to *chengzhongcun* in *The Planet of Slums* (2005). Saunders (2010) includes a case study of a *chengzhongcun* in Chongqing as an example of an "arrival city"—a transitional gateway for rural migrants to enter the urban economy and modern society, but even his anecdotal examples of migrants in the city demonstrate the precariousness of their urban existence as much as their successful transition.

[64] For a global perspective on the slum as "transition" see Saunders (2011), discussed in Chapter One

[65] Current and recently graduated college students often take advantage of the low-rents in *chengzhongcun*. In these cases, *chengzhongcun* may indeed be transitional. However, they make up a small minority of CZC inhabitants nationwide. See Zheng et al, 2009.

institutional context in which they emerge and exist. Only recently have attempts been made to theorize their development. Leaf's (2007) preliminary effort suggested several theoretical propositions on *chengzhongcun,* considering them from perspectives of land-use, social identity, self-help housing, and governance, but this too fails to address the institutional dualism that shapes Chinese space. A more general critique of the preceding research is that even when sympathetic to their inhabitants, scholars rarely overcome the dominant state narrative that positions *chengzhongcun* and the rural sector overall as backward, anti-modern obstacles to the fulfillment of the vision of China's urban future (Siu, 2007, Bach, 2010). At a superficial level, this is reflected in the common language employed across various types of *chengzhongcun* research--the words, "hotbed" (of crime, vice, .etc), "disorderly" and "chaotic" are almost mandatory descriptors of villages in the city. Of greater consequence, this framework excuses modern urbanism and the local state from responsibility for poverty and crime. Instead, fault is placed on village residents and rural migrants who are conveniently concentrated within *chengzhongcun*. It is a nimble reframing of contemporary discourse that allows the problems of cities in modern China to be blamed on the rural sector. Once this framework is accepted, the only logical solution to the challenges presented to urban governments by *chengzhongcun* is to eliminate them, perpetuating the dominance of urban regimes, and the systematic silencing of indigenous villagers and migrants' rights in the city.

4.4 Global Cities, Global Slums: World Cities Discourse and Informal Imaginaries

Chinese cities are more and more part of the conversation regarding the developmental trajectories of cities around the world (Angel, 2010). Within the wider

transition narrative, "urban convergence" is deployed to measure China's progress toward the full realization of advanced capitalism, with Shanghai and Beijing cast in the role of "world-cities-in-the-making". There is a fairly obvious underlying tautology here that capitalist development can and should be understood linearly and universally across time and space. There is no question as to where China is headed and what kind of cities it is building; it is only a matter of how long it will take.[66] When cities of less-developed countries are held in comparison, it is as urban China's antithesis to demonstrate the superiority of the Chinese development model. Slums, in this narrative, are a problem of weak states, the poor, and the undeveloped, none of which could be applicable to China the economic giant.

As I argued in the preceding chapters, the cumulative effect of the "transition" narrative is to reduce differences in Chinese and Western political economies to a consequence of time as opposed to place, culture, or politics, or as a matter of subtle discrepancies in the formulation of capitalist institutions.[67] Moreover, they contribute to the predominance of the approach that views Chinese cities as perpetually in transition between a socialist past and a capitalist future. Chinese cities are too rarely considered as they *are now*: evolving and adapting to the constant struggle to provide for the needs of a growing urban population. Like cities throughout the developing world, Chinese cities

---

[66] For market transition's adherents (and critics), identifying where China is in the capitalist development timeline is something of a cottage industry. Walker and Buck (2008), while not dealing with *cities* specifically compare present-day China to the United States in 1890.

[67] As in the burgeoning "Varieties of Capital" literature; Peck and Zhang 2012

are faced with tremendous challenges: large-scale migrations from the countryside, overwhelmed physical infrastructures, inadequate fiscal resources for the provision of public services and social welfare, and a diverse mix of people from a variety of backgrounds trying to find their way in the city and with each other. Chinese cities have developed some unique means of meeting these challenges. In other respects, they have attributes that would be recognized most anywhere in the world.

Eliminating *chengzhongcun* is informed in part by the discourses and circulations of knowledge that produce a set of policy packages for building the "model Chinese city." In an international context, Chinese urban development was strongly influenced by the idea of the "world" or "global" city in the last decade. Under the direction of the CCP, discourses of sustainability, rural-urban integration, and the 'well-off'', harmonious society circulated within China to influence urban policy and planning goals. Slums and informality, however, are both integral and inimical to the global city ideal—integral in providing affordable housing and social support for low-wage service workers without whom the urban economy could not function, and inimical in their aesthetic and mental disruption of an ordered, vibrant metropolis. I will return to these themes in Chapters 5 and 7.

4.4.1 Global Cities: World Cities Discourse

The drive to eliminate *chengzhongcun* from China's urban cores coincided with the prevalence of 'world cities' discourses in Western urban studies (Friedman; Sassen; WCR) that had a tremendous impact on Chinese urban planners and municipal leaders. World Cities discourse had great appeal for pro-market scholars, journalists (especially Thomas Friedman), urban planners, city boosters, and municipal officials around the

globe. It resonated with contemporary intellectual shifts that decentered the nation-state from political economy and other forms of analysis that increasingly identified cities as the defined geographic locales in which the abstract idea of globalization was being actualized. In identifying a handful of characteristics that constitute a world city, it also resonated with the "end of history" thesis and capitalist triumphalism that increasingly squeezed alternative modes of city-building and governance from policymakers' toolkits. With New York City and London (and to a lesser extent, Tokyo) acknowledged as the crème de la crème of world cities, the already growing influence of neoliberal policy packages were amplified. In working backwards to universalize the particular historical and economic transformations of New York City and London in the 1980s and 1990s, world cities discourse established a set of practices and ideals that the collective actors organizing urban development could emulate, a package of neoliberal policy prescriptions that gave priority to capital attraction (especially foreign), massive investment in transportation and network infrastructures, monumentalism, and creation of new sites for mass consumption. Identified as central nodes with immense power and control over the global economy, "world city" status took root in the urban imaginaries of city boosters around the world.

The world city discourse also encouraged the transformation from managerial governance in cities to "urban entrepreneurialism" first identified by Harvey (1989). Even if cities could not rival the financial, cultural, and political influence of the elite urban centers, they could mimic their physical forms and embrace the new "entrepreneurial" spirit of governance. Cities from Baltimore to Beijing increasingly

competed for corporate headquarters, large transnational corporations, international financial institutions, law firms and stock exchanges.

For Chinese planners, the world city created a model for the projection of authority, wealth, and modernity in the built environment. These qualities can be instrumental to state legitimacy as demonstrations for both residents and foreign observers of the remarkable capacity of the Chinese state to project its will. Increasing cynicism over Western models coupled with growing confidence in their own development regimes and cultural-political imperatives to establish a more distinct identity have influenced a shift in city-building in Asia, captured in *Worlding Cities*, a collected volume edited by Ong and Roy (2011). In the introduction, Ong argues that "city ambitions" are "reimagined in relation to shifting forms and norms of being global" and "inter-city" should not just be a qualifier for "competition" but also comparison, referencing, and modeling. Ong's opening analysis highlights the ways cities in Asia imagine and construct themselves that are not always in reference to unifying principles of capitalist logic, but that are actively about creating or recreating unique and separated identities. At the same time, modeling and inter-referencing practices lead to an archetypical Asian city that symbolizes order and a strong state, prosperity and sustainability, and most importantly, *success*.

Even if Chinese city-makers are attempting to carve their own urban identities, the world cities discourse promoted the use of urban space to project globally. While it is useful to unseat neoliberalism's theoretical dominance, it is naive to dismiss the continued prominence of not just Western capitalism from Asian cities, but also the important referencing and modeling in the West that continues to play out, particularly in

Chinese cities spaces of monumentalism and consumption. More importantly, the image of an all-powerful and capable urban governing regime is undermined by environmental devastation, staggering levels of inequality, and protests in opposition to state-led expropriation of collective land. Through the 1980s and 1990s, urban officials often made spurious claims that "China has no slums", and this is still an exhortation that can be heard inside and outside the country. Further undermining these claims is UN-Habitat data that identifies China as having the most slums and the highest absolute number of slum dwellers in the world (UN Habitat 2003, 2010)[68]. A more recent and moderated version of the "no slums" refrain holds that "China has no slums like the ones found in India or Brazil"-- a tacit acknowledgement that while China may have slumlike areas, they do not exhibit the sprawl or physical dilapidation of prototypical slums in the global South.

4.4.2 Global slums: International Discourses of Informality

Early theoretical engagements with informality concentrated in Latin America, adopting a structuralist position that framed informality as either a distinct sector or as a lower circuit in the hierarchy of a single urban economy (Santos 1977). For neo-Marxists, the informal sector was a means of perpetuating primitive accumulation by subsidizing the cost of living in the formal sector through the supply of low-cost goods and services, and providing a low-cost pool of labor for corporations **(**Centeno and Portes 2006, Glassman 2006**)**. Sassen (2001) and others illuminated informality to the global

[68] However, China ranks fairly low in slum dwellers per capita.

North, demonstrating the rise of informal labor in major nodes of the global economy as part and parcel of their neoliberal development. The economism of these early studies, however, overlooked the informal development of a wide range of social relations, infrastructure building, and service-provision (Myers, 2011). Still, mainstream discourses have proven persistent in asserting that informality arises from the perseverance of rural thinking, social relations, and forms of livelihood. The influx of rural migrants into cities has been commonly portrayed as the "ruralization" of the city, or the urbanization of poverty. Both frameworks suggest some degree of responsibility for urban poverty in the rural sector—contributing to a focus on rural development instead of improving the environment for incoming migrants.

Recent works on informality centered in African cities, however, challenge these notions in creative and inventive ways. Simone, for example, criticizes the impulse in urban studies to categorize and classify behavior in cities as "urban or rural" or "traditional or modern" or "assimilation or resistance". Patterns of urban social and economic development are not so easily classified. Efforts to obtain necessities or achieve specific development goals are platforms for "elaborating ways of using the city and ways for residents to use each other," that are not always easy to pin down (Simone, 2004,5). In other words, individuals and communities engage the infrastructures of the state as well as the cracks in state regulation to carve their own identity, to create their own networks of social reproduction, and work toward life goals that do not always gel with the state-approved path of post-colonial/post-socialist modernity. The mechanisms of economic and political reformation are often unclear with actors and networks crossing

private/public boundaries, leading to "flexible configurations of associational life" and "deterritorialized frameworks of social reproduction and political identity".

Even less understood are the “ways in which state agencies and other formal institutions act informally or act to produce informality,” (Myers, 2011, 73). Critical scholars have grown increasingly impatient with rigid dualities dividing “formal and informal” sites and behaviors, and have begun to argue for an approach to urban studies that questions how the informal and formal come together to produce contemporary cities (Mbembe and Nuttall 2008, AlSayyad 2004, quoted in Myers, 2011). While these studies have, to some extent, come to undermine the utility of the “informal sector” framework for understanding urban development, they highlight what Myers identifies as a “common tension” between “modernist ideas of how cities should look and work—the formal city—that sometimes make little sense, and an alternative, fluid, ambient—informal—city that is getting by on its own, if perhaps barely so,” (Myers 79). This approach connects with the separation between how the city is built and how the city is “enacted”.

Informality in the city, then, is as much an outcome of hierarchical social relations as it is a product of unregulated or uncontrolled urbanization. In the process of city-making, governments, social organizations, and political actors construct arbitrary standards of where certain groups of people can or should live, and what kinds of work they should do. Another way of considering Myers’ point is to acquiesce to the probability that there is never going to be a universally accepted standard of informality applicable in all places, but the way informality is constructed or understood in different sites can reveal a great deal about social relations and the politics of space. Conflicts arising from these

tensions are prevalent in the urbanization process, both in the physical expansion of cities, and in daily struggles to define urban rights, urban belonging, and urban citizenship. As argued by Thomas Bender, cities are always "unfinished", they are made and remade constantly in the collaboration and contestation of different actors and interest groups in the urban environment. Confrontations between past and present, rural and urban, tradition and modernity are manifested physically in the space of informal settlements. In other words, informality *emerges* from multidirectional relationalities among diverse people, places, and organizations. It is simultaneously an assemblage in its own right and a component of the overall assemblage from which "the city" emerges.

These general debates about slums and informality have implications for our understanding and interpretations of China's urban development, and the emergence of *chengzhongcun* in particular. Informality is a social and economic construction produced largely by the self-declared "formal" urban sector. It is a form of social relations that subjectively frames human subjectivity, the functional and aesthetic value of sites in the city, and the activities people conduct in urban spaces. Returning to my understanding of relational power within assemblage theory, actors (especially the state) mobilize discursive, political, and financial capital around a particularized vision of the city—itself strongly influenced by national and global circulations of knowledge about the ideal city. Informality occupies the space between municipal boosters' desires and the material and even spiritual needs of people inhabiting the city. Elite ordering of city space is maintained by discursive practices that categorize certain kinds of urban space as informal, rural, or illegal, rendering them conceptually outside the city, and thus subject to state and private intervention.

While informality is a dynamic outcome of social, political, and economic relations in the city, it is manifested materially onto historical, but dynamic, institutions and sites throughout the city. Therefore, research into informal communities cannot fixate on them as outcomes of neoliberal diffusion, but as outcomes of globally-mobile policy and ideals converging with internally dynamic institutions and practices. *Chengzhongcun* are not simply the most recent expression of urban poverty, the dystopian side of China's urbanization model. They are complex and dynamic spatial forms produced and constrained by urban institutions, changing urban desires, and a changing urban population. Their inhabitants are motivated by equally complex and dynamic desires that often conflict with the roles allowed them by elite urban development. That *chengzhongcun* persist in nearly every major Chinese city speaks to the incapacity of urban boosters to strictly control urban development. They are certainly an unintended consequence of China's urbanization model, but they have become the primary platform through which the excluded "use the city and each other."

Contestation and urban conflicts arise from (largely) state-led efforts to eliminate, if not informality itself, at least the spatial manifestations of informality (i.e. slum clearance, slum upgrading). Frequently, the tension between the formal—imagined--city, and the informal—lived-in city—erupt in grassroots protests and occasional violence. Neo-Marxist scholars are inclined to portray such protests as indicative of struggles over accumulation by dispossession (Pgu). It is tempting to be skeptical of the protests' broader significance because they are not likely to link with broader, anti-systemic movements that challenge the foundation of global capitalism (Harvey's 'militant localism'). Indeed, local media reports and Chinese microbloggers often decry villagers

who resist expropriation for selfish motives to increase their personal compensation. More than just enhance the self-interest of contained communities, however, these protests make an important collective claim on the meaning of citizenship, and the enactment of individual rights to the city.

4.4.3 Institutionalizing Informality: Political Power and Property Rights

The predominant theoretical perspective in English literature on *chengzhongcun* is part of a larger body of work studying the nature and consequences of China's "incomplete" property rights regime.[69] The implicit assumption of this research is that a functional real estate market with fully clarified [r.e. private] property rights would resolve the "problem" of *chengzhongcun*. However, this greatly simplifies the scope and extent of the dual structure in shaping land conflict in China. In China, as with its population, land is subject to a different set of rules depending upon its rural or urban status. All urban land is officially owned by the state, while rural land remains under collective ownership. However, in neither case does the law specify who may legitimately represent the state or collective. Although this is not clearly specified in China's laws, urban governments have asserted *de facto* control of urban land within its jurisdiction as village cadres have done for collective land. Rights-claims to land in the last two decades, then, are essentially political in nature, and the ability to assert

[69] Regarding *chengzhongcun*, the property rights argument is most clearly demonstrated in Tian (2008) where the new institutional economics influence of Douglas North is evident. For general arguments about land and property rights in China, see Ho, 2001; Chung and Lam, 2004; Lin and Ho, 2005; and Lin, 2009. For a general critique of property rights work on China, see Haila (2007).

ownership is reflective of a unit's political power within the state hierarchy (Hsing, 2006, 2010).

Transferring urban land into private hands is made possible by a change to the 1988 constitution that separated land *use* from ownership, allowing for the private development of urban lands while maintaining official state ownership of all land. China's Land Administration Law (LAL), originally promulgated in 1986 (since revised), makes important distinctions between rural and urban land. Rural land is owned by the collective, and collective units may allocate, change use, and benefit from land, but may not sell or transfer use-rights. Urban land, on the other hand, is owned by the state and may be sold or transferred (Ho, 2001; Chung and Lam 2004; Lin and Ho 2005; Ding 2007). This legal framework has provided nominal legitimacy for the capture of rural farmland by urban governments at minimal cost. However, because property within *chengzhongcun* maintains its collective status, villagers have few legal options to engage their land in the formal urban sector. The uncertain legal status of property in *chengzhongcun*, therefore, impels villagers to build-up housing plots for rental purposes in order to maximize short-term profits before the inevitable, if long-delayed, next wave of expropriation.

There are clearly ramifications of China's property rights structure for the unequal balance of power between the rural and urban sectors. However, scholars who focus on property rights issues place their emphasis on the letter of Chinese law when it is the political power municipalities wield over rural areas that is just as, if not more, crucial. Moreover, complex intra-village sociopolitical relations have a significant impact on the development of urbanizing collectives and negotiations with the local state over

redevelopment outcomes (Siu 2012, Po 2008, Chen 2013). The institution of clarified private property rights are no guarantor of villagers' rights in disputes over expropriation without a political and judicial structure that would support villagers when conflicts with the state arise (Zang, 2010).[70] As of yet, this is clearly not the case, and city governments' ability to exploit rural resources is as much a function of their political power as it is a function of China's legal system. In fact, the "fuzziness" of rural property rights has probably been villagers' best defense in their disputes with the state. In best-case scenarios, village leaders have been able to negotiate better compensation packages for villagers, offering a modicum of defense against unrestrained state expropriation. Villagers appear to have fared far better in their disputes over property with urban governments than urban residents whose neighborhoods face redevelopment in large part because of their ability to assert collective-based territoriality over village land (Hsing, 2010), and the person of the village head who is able to represent the village with some degree of recognized authority while remaining outside the formal state system (Po, 2008, 2012).[71]

The story of peasant exploitation of agricultural production and rural labor is by now familiar, but the rural-urban divide is furthered in the present day by the urban exploitation of rural land. Under Mao, China's land was regulated by a system of

[70] In a review of dozens of cases involving land disputes, Zang finds that courts are in general willing to rule in favor of complainants against village leadership, but not in cases against local government.

[71] There is tremendous variation in the outcomes of village-state negotiations over land, however. Village leadership is often easily co-opted by the state. However, in cases where villages are able to present a "united front" they are often able to negotiate far better terms with the state. Po (2008) and (2010) presents some evidence and analysis of the variation in village economic cooperatives and their ability to negotiate with the local state.

property rights designed to maximize the central state's ability to control unequal exchanges between the rural-agricultural and urban-industrial sectors. In effect, China's property rights regime serves a similar function today. The two main differences are that one, land now has value, and two, control over the rural-urban interface has been decentralized, with greater authority resting in the hands of municipal officials (Tang and Chung 2002; Ma, 2005). However, the rural sector remains a major source of revenue for the urban sector. By preventing collectives from the ability to sell land, rural residents are deprived of their greatest potential source of capital, and the profits from land development accrue to urban governments and private developers. This injustice is exacerbated because urban citizenship, which is a limited possibility for most migrants to begin with, typically necessitates the surrender of any claims to rural property.[72]

In China's present-day spatial political economy, c*hengzhongcun* are the rural migrants of land--*de facto* urban but *de jure* rural. While rural migrants are controlled through the *hukou* system, rural land is controlled through the LAL and the political power of the municipality is reflected in the principle of "city-leading-county". Municipal governments usually assert claims to represent the state in matters of land development, and as a result, have established a monopoly on the sale and transfer of land-use rights. The compensation farmers receive from local governments for land

[72] Rural residents on the urban fringe have participated reticently in localized hukou reform programs because of this requirement. Additionally, surveys reveal that obtaining urban hukou is a relatively low priority for rural-urban migrants. Some observers have interpreted these results as suggestive of the hukou's diminished relevance for rural livelihoods, but they have not adequately considered the role of hukou in determining land rights.

expropriations bears no relationship to a fair market value that accounts for locational value, potential use, or the loss of security villagers derive from their land, but strictly its value as cropland (Tian, 2008). However, once land is converted to urban status, the state is free to sell use-rights at market value.[73] Increasingly, these use-rights are for commercial real-estate development rather than public use or industry (Kung et al 2009). In short, the costs of land transfers are determined through administrative measures while profits are set by the market (He et al, 2009). This dual-track land system creates a "profitable asymmetry" with low costs for rural-urban transfers and high profits for urban transactions (Lin and Ho, 2005). Coincident with an asymmetry of power between urban governments and rural spaces under their administrative control, urban officials have all but a free hand in wresting land away from villages and villagers. In some locales, land-use right sales are as much as 50-60% of local revenues (Ding, 2007; Chan and Su, 2008). Urban governments took control of rural land conversions and transfers with a lack of transparency and disregard of fairness to ensure that they retained the revenues generated from land sales.[74]

In summary, rural land is a source of revenue for urban governments because they have held a virtual monopoly control of farmland conversion and the distribution of urban land-use rights (Lin 2009), what He et al (2009) refer to as the "hidden subsidy" of

[73] Chinese law now requires commercial use-rights to be sold in open, public auction. Base rates are calculated from average land values for the surrounding area over a three year period (Hsing 2006).

[74] Xu et al (2009) have documented, among other changes, a number of steps taken by central and provincial governments to reassert control over rural land conversions in the last two-three years, but it is unclear at this stage if and how these changes will alter the existing imbalance between urban governments and villages.

Chinese urbanization. Urban governments, then, have a strong incentive to expand their territorial control over rural land in the urban periphery which they may quickly convert into governmental revenue (Hsing 2010).

It is not only in their creation as by-products of city government land-grabs that *chengzhongcun* have subsidized urban expansion, however. As discussed above, *chengzhongcun* have not only provided livelihoods for what would otherwise be landless farmers, but that income is derived by providing affordable housing for millions of migrant workers and other low-income urban residents at almost no cost to the local state (Wu 2004, 2008, He et al, 2010). Under the household responsibility system, their use-rights to land have been the primary source of social security for Chinese peasants. This function of land-use rights continues in *chengzhongcun*, providing dispossessed villagers with an alternative source of income independent of the formal urban sector or local state welfare. Allowing the continued presence of *chengzhongcun* indefinitely postpones local governments' responsibility to integrate disenfranchised villagers into the urban public goods regime or to provide low-income housing for migrant workers. In addition, most *chengzhongcun* operate entirely independent of the city budget, and must self-finance public safety, sanitation, and even schools.[75] Village self-reliance continues even after villages are nominally made urban.

[75] See Po (forthcoming) on the fiscal separation between the city and chengzhongcun. The burden this places on village finances is substantial—according to her research, three-quarters of village income in Dongguan was spent on physical infrastructure, public security, health, education and welfare. The economic downturn in 2008 left 63% of villages in Dongguan in deficit.

In an intangible, but no less meaningful way, *chengzhongcun* spare the local urban population from many of the negative effects of rapid urbanization. Overcrowding, crime, and challenges to public safety are issues closely associated with urbanization and rapid economic and social change. Given the political and legal organization of China's urban space, however, these problems are to some degree isolated inside of *chengzhongcun* with the burdens associated with urbanization carried disproportionately by villagers and migrant workers.

4.5 Conclusion "In but not of the city": Beyond Ambiguity, Incompleteness, and Transition

If *chengzhongcun* (as well as other issues related to rural land ownership) are the consequence of an ambiguous or incomplete property rights regime, then the obvious solution is to clarify property rights. However, the terminology of "incompleteness" suggests the dualism of Chinese land is but a temporary result of Chinese gradualism instead of an institutional design of the rural-urban structure running through the entire history of the PRC. In my view, the organization of Chinese property rights does not reflect their incompleteness, but rather the selectivity with which the state applies market principles in pursuit of state interests. This logic misses the point of China's urban development, a problem common in studies that treat China's economy as an issue of "market transition." [76] Nee's 1991 revision of market transition created an unfortunate (if

[76] Nee (1989) initially claimed that as markets are introduced, state agents will lose their ability to exploit their position relative to direct producers, resulting in lessened inequality. This claim could hardly be sustained, however, given the obvious continued role of cadres in the rural economy, and the widening levels of inequality across multiple sectors. Nee (1991) argued that this was a consequence of the *partiality* of Chinese reforms which left political agents with broad powers over the economy despite the introduction

unintended) precedent for the study of China's development in the reform era and beyond--aberrations in the Chinese economy including severe inequality and social injustices are too often seen as products of partiality.

Similarly, the term "incomplete urbanization" (referenced above) has been used by many scholars to describe the outcome of China's urban growth. This is a concise terminology that captures the continued barriers to the integration of *de jure* rural spaces and populations within a *de facto* urban environment. Furthermore, it highlights the degree to which the dual structure prevents China from breaking out of its exploitative, low-wage labor model of economic growth. Yet there is a risk of teleology in the language of "incompleteness" that paints inequality and injustice as side effects of development that will somehow dissipate once transition is "complete." The injustices inherent in China's urbanization process run much deeper. That social groups in any given place experience urbanization differently is not unique to China. Throughout the world, ethnicity, race, religion, gender, and class informs the way people interact with each other and with the cities they live in. However, China is unusual in the degree to which social groups are identified, differentiated, and discriminated against on the basis of their administrative position within territorial demarcations between rural and urban space. Yet, it would be quite surprising for commentators to identify racial divisions in American cities as symptoms of "incompleteness". Race is deeply embedded in the

---

of limited markets. Despite concerns that the dualism of Nee's model was simplistic, tautological, and not borne out by the empirical evidence of Chinese reform (Stark, 1992; Szelenyi and Kostello, 1996; Xie and Hannum, 1996; Walder 1996), "market transition" has moved from a sociological predictor of inequality to a catch-all descriptor of China in the reform era and beyond.

cultural, historical, economic, and political fabric of American cities. Likewise, the rural-urban division is more than an outcome of an "incomplete" process, the denial of rights and citizenship is the very foundation of China's urbanization under the Chinese Communist Party—it is, in fact, the defining feature of "urbanization with Chinese characteristics."

According to the market transition logic, as China's transition progresses, most (if not all) economic problems will disappear, though how exactly the contradictions within a "socialism with Chinese characteristics" will be resolved is still to be determined. However, it is far more fruitful to present Chinese development and urbanization, not as the product of incompleteness, but as Walder (1996) suggests, as an independent and unique spatial economy "whose features are to be investigated." Put another way, I prefer to examine the spatial economy of China as it actually exists rather than what may or may not one day emerge. C*hengzhongcun* do bear a close relationship to the nature of China's property-rights regime, but "partiality" and "incompleteness" are not useful frameworks for analysis. Instead, *chengzhongcun* reveal the degree to which Chinese property rights are an institutional design giving power to higher-levels of the state hierarchy to control and benefit from the resources held at lower levels. In particular, *chengzhongcun* are the product of China's dual structure, a structure that is decidedly *not* merely a product of transition.

As Wang Hui argues, transition is a myth perpetuated by the emergence of state capitalism which claims that "the unemployment, inequality, and decline of social security will be erased once the utopia of free markets are actualized. The Chinese state imposes market policies, and then uses the disorder they create to justify its continued

existence and control," (Wang 2004, pg. 8). Rural industrialization coupled with the increasing role of markets in urban economies created conditions for great flows of rural-urban migrations as well as massive farmland conversions on urban peripheries. Villagers in the periphery, still locked out of much of the formal urban sector, turned to informal housing markets as their primary means of capitalizing on the economic growth of China's cities. Urban governments, however, decried the villagers' efforts as disruptive to the urban environment and development, justifying further expropriation of village property. Thus, the local state has exploited villagers' response to the introduction of markets by the local state to legitimate more state-led expropriations and demolitions of village land.

Therefore, incomplete urbanization is the product of a transition logic that perpetually postpones the attainment of social justice for the vast majority of China's population. Peasants especially have been subsumed by this rationality before when their livelihoods and social relationships were sacrificed for the goal of socialist transition under Maoist industrialization. Today, their sacrifice continues under the guise of market transition and urban development. In China today, as in its pre-reform past, the dual structure that differentially governs people and land creates incentives for rural people to join the urban sector while simultaneously maintaining barriers to their entry. At the same time, urban space in China has become a privileged and exclusive realm with strong barriers to entry for outsiders--even when "outsiders" are physically inside the urban sphere. Barriers do not just exist for rural populations, but as rural land has undergone

rapid transformations, they bear relevance for the land itself.[77] The result is an institutional system that impacts the course of China's urban transition in multiple ways—freezing the vast majority in a perpetual liminality between rural and urban. In the case of China's population, the *hukou* system and perpetually low-levels of state investment in human capital in the countryside serve as barriers to migrants' full integration into the urban sector. At the same time, there is no uniform system for the integration of urbanizing villages or neighborhoods into the formal urban system, and the transition of space becomes a highly contested, time-consuming, and politically delicate process. The end result of these twin obstacles to China's urban transition is marked by a massive but highly circular population of migrant labor with relatively low rates of permanent migration and high levels of engagement with the informal economy. The spatial manifestation of this dualism in the cities are *chengzhongcun*, physical demonstrations of China's bifurcated social and economic structure that has not wavered since the beginning of the reform era.

[77] An alarming recent trend is the construction of "walled villages" begun experimentally in Beijing in 2010, turning *chengzhongcun* into gated compounds. Without a hint of irony, this *de facto* segregation of migrants from the rest of the city was trumpeted by the Beijing Party Secretary as a positive step toward "rural-urban integration," (Gao, 2010).

Chapter 5

Wuhan Articulated: Policy Mobility and the Production of Place in The Assemblage of Wuhan's Three Towns

"At what point does the sprawling and imaginary concept of the urban temporarily solidify into the experience of a city?"—Simon Legg, 2011

5.1 Introduction: Mr. Digging around the City and *Da Wuhan*

Wuhan's future as more than just a way station along China's high-speed rail lines is dependent on constructing Wuhan as a site with the capacity to capture some of the human and financial capital that rides on the intricate transportation networks that continue to connect the city across wider expanses of national and international territory. Secretary of the Municipal Party Committee Ruan Chengfa has been the most prevalent and prominent actor constructing and enacting the vision of "*da Wuhan*." "Da" is the character for large or great, but its usage here suggests that Wuhan will become more than just a big or even great city. When deployed by Ruan, it implies Wuhan's potential to rival even Shanghai as China's "second-city". Under the leadership of Ruan, Wuhan has embarked on a multi-decade mission that is as ambitious as it is costly. The cornerstone of this mission is the creation of the Wuhan City Circle.

5.1.1 Wuhan Under Construction

In 2008, Ruan Chengfa, a native of Huangpi (near Wuhan), was appointed Party Secretary of Wuhan. Ruan reflects the larger transition in leadership backgrounds from the engineering class of previous regimes to the economically trained generation coming

to prominence in cities like Wuhan. Ruan was an official in the Wuhan Clothing and Footwear Company from 1975-1982 before joining the party in 1982 and seeking his postgraduate degree. Ruan began graduate school at Wuhan University on the heels of the Tiananmen Square protests and ensuing crackdown. By the time he was finished with a degree in economic management, Deng Xiaoping had conducted his famous "Southern Tour", jumpstarting the rapid economic growth of the 1990s under Jiang Zemin's leadership. He rose through the ranks of various Wuhan party offices before being named Party Secretary of Huangshi city (a medium-sized industrial city southeast of Wuhan) where he served from 1998 to 2004. From 2004 to 2008, Ruan served as Vice-Governor of Hubei Province where he was in charge of finance. His appointment to the Wuhan Party Secretary position coincided with a monumental to boost Wuhan's economic development, regional influence, and national prominence: the Wuhan City Circle or 8+1 plan.

Wuhan's profile within Hubei rose significantly in 2003 when the provincial government announced the "Wuhan City Ring" development strategy (武汉城市圈), also known as the "8+1" strategy.[78] Discursively, the 8 + 1 plan significantly departed from development patterns in the Pearl and Yangtze deltas which were characterized by intercity competition and a lack of coherent regional planning by pegging the industrial development of surrounding cities to Wuhan's economy. This plan places Wuhan at the center of a 100 km development zone that effectively incorporates 8 nearby cities into

[78] "8+1" refers to the 8 cities of Huangshi, Ezhou, Xiaogan, Huanggang, Xianning, Xiantou, Qianjiang, and Tianmen plus Wuhan.

Wuhan's development planning. At the time of the plan, the 8+1 cities accounted for about 1/3 of Hubei's land area, and 59% of its GDP. It was consciously articulated in government documents and media reports as an effort to promote the central Yangtze River region to comparable status with the three major growth poles of the East.[79] The strategy had no real teeth, however, until it was approved by the State Council in 2007 and identified as an experimental test site for the development of sustainable cities. Known in Chinese as 两型 社会 *liangxing shehui*, the "two-oriented society" is an experimental project aimed at bringing an ecologically sustainable approach to China's urbanization.[80] The English translation is rather clunky but can be generally understood as a policy orientation toward urban sustainability. The two orientations referenced in the Chinese shorthand are "resource saving" (资源节约型, *ziyuan jieyue xing*) and "environmentally friendly" (环境友好型, *huanjing youhao xing*). In its phrasing, *liangxing shehui* joins ideological constructions of China's development such as the *xiaokang shehui* (moderately well-off society) and *hebi shehui* (harmonious society). For convenience, I will henceforth refer to *liangxing shehui* as the "Sustainable Society".

In practice, implementation of the 8+1 and Sustainable Society programs in Wuhan serve as *de facto* recognition by the center of the validity of Wuhan's ambitious goals. It elevates Wuhan as a major growth pole for the national economy connecting

[79] The Bohai Development area consisting of Beijing, Tianjin, and several NE provinces, The Yangtze River Delta, and the Pearl River Delta.

[80] While I am skeptical about the long-term sustainability the "liangxing shehui" plan can actually bring to Chinese development, my interest here is in its usage as a tool for place-promotion and place-production in Wuhan. The science of sustainability is beyond this dissertation's scope.

Western and Eastern growth clusters. It was also, at the time, only the fourth city and the first non-centrally administered city to be given such a high degree of authority over regional economic development beyond its municipal borders. Achieving the goals for coordinated development in the 8+1 and the Sustainable Society models also necessitated, at least in theory, efforts to breakdown the dual structure by ending the separate governance of rural and urban space within the zone. As such, Wuhan's city circle plan joined Chongqing-Chengdu as a major site for experimenting with rural-urban integration, a topic I will return to in the next chapter.

It is in this context that Ruan Chengfa took office as the paramount leader of Wuhan in 2008. With an apparent mandate from Beijing to engage in large-scale projects over a vast geographic territory, Wuhan under Ruan is a massive and seemingly interminable construction site. Ruan is dubbed in the press as "Mr. Digging Around the City," (a play on the Chinese characters of his name). It is a title he has embraced: "If I stop construction, I will be worried for the city and the people living here." Construction, to Ruan, symbolizes progress, transformation, and advancement. If this is so, then Secretary Ruan is certainly in the vanguard of urban progress. Ruan carried on with and expanded on a $120 billion master plan devised for the city in 2006. In 2010 alone, 5,000 construction projects broke ground in the city, and as of 2013, Wuhan had more than 13,000 ongoing projects, an average of 1.3 construction projects per sq. km. For Ruan, this scale of construction is necessary for Wuhan to compete internationally "on behalf of the state" and to become a central city in the country. Ruan, then, manufactures a marriage of urban construction and nationalism where economic development is a

patriotic duty, and urban construction is the manifestation of Wuhan's commitment to national development via its own economic growth.

Whatever Ruan's vision for the city, he is not working with a blank canvas, and Wuhan cannot simply push forward into a future disconnected from its past. Wuhan has an important place in China's modern history that continues to inform present-day development. In addition to its pre-communist roots, modern Wuhan is also a product of the dual structure. The dual structure is not just an institutional presence that influences the trajectory of Chinese capitalism—it is the DNA of China's political economy that is present in every aspect of its development since the founding of New China.

In the three preceding chapters, I examined the most prevalent discourses employed in urban studies of China, neoliberalism, market transition, and World Cities, and found them individually lacking. Yet none are explicitly "wrong" about Chinese cities either. Instead, it is necessary to consider how multiple actors with multiple motives and interests in shaping the city interact with different ideas about cities and with each other in the process of urban construction. In the following three chapters, I explore how these and other forces coalesce to create the "experience" of Wuhan. Wuhan's development over the past decade cannot be clearly explained by any of the frameworks described in the previous three chapters, but elements of each are clearly present in the narrative presented below. That presence does not, however, give any one of them singular causal power. Instead, the city must be "assembled" from the coalescence of ideas, motives, and relations that give shape and meaning to the physical and imagined space that is the "Chinese city."

The next three chapters give attention to the relationships, interactions, and changing understandings of space that "temporarily solidify into the experience" of Wuhan through the production of place in Wuhan's Three Towns. This understanding is not limited to the flows of global exchange, but also includes the way city planners and inhabitants of the city connect, interpret, and recreate the city's past. To assemble *Wuhan* as an identifiable and coherent space requires investigation of the geographic, historical, administrative, and institutional boundaries that divide the city, the political vision of a unified greater Wuhan, and the experiences and memories that bring Wuhanese together. The Han and Yangtze rivers mark the boundaries of Wuhan's "three towns", its 13 districts, dozens of neighborhoods and *chengzhongcun*. At the same time, the ideological practice of place-production and place-promotion solidifies the city as an assembled whole greater than its divided and bounded parts, a city that emerges from the daily interactions and exchanges between different actors, the circulation of knowledge, both in its dissemination by state agents, and the regular living and inhabiting of the city, and the promotion of Wuhan as a 'model' Chinese city in media and government reports and exchanges.

5.2 Interpretations of Chinese Space

Out of the ideological and institutional forces influencing the development of Chinese cities examined in Chapters 2-4, various attempts to explain the general trajectories of China's urban development in the reform era have been undertaken. This chapter opens with two related efforts to articulate the "spatial specificities" that characterize Chinese cities in the reform era. A number of economists and sociologists

employed market transition, conceptualizing space as a container for the evolution and progression of capitalism. Geographers, led by TG McGee, articulated the *desakota* thesis where rural-urban distinctions were reified in the attempt to explain the origins of rural industrialization as independent from the institutions that bifurcated spatial categories (McGee 1991). Neither was able to satisfactorily account for the diversity of forces and sociopolitical relations giving shape to China's spatial development. Two sources are particularly useful in exploring how the Chinese city is assembled. Soja's theorization of the post-metropolis takes a broader understanding of what constitutes 'urban', and opens investigations of the city to a number of different methods and concepts with a particular emphasis on the 'relational' city. Practices of policy mobility, place-promotion, and place-production reveal the diversity of influences shaping authorities' city-building practices. All of these efforts, however, take place in the continuing institutional boundaries of the dual-structure. Yet the dual structure itself is not a static variable. It, too, is adapted, molded, and remade through shifting social, political, and economic relations.

5.2.1 Market Transition: Determinism of Time

Market transition was initially a theorization of the effect of markets on inequality and state power (Nee, 1989; 1992; Cao and Nee, 2000). Nee's core claim was that cadre advantages would decline to the extent that markets replace redistribution as the dominant mode of economic allocation. Market transition was characterized as a process in which the economy transforms from a bureaucratically controlled command economy toward a market economy. The outcome was a focus on a linear path marked by state

withdrawal and marketization. It has been criticized as a simplistic claim resting on a false dualism between markets and state allocations, (Walder, 1996; Xie and Hannan, 1996). Critics argued that the transition to markets has no inherent outcome for inequality and justice: "what matters are the variable institutions and conditions that define markets" (Walder, 1996, 1061). Attention to the actual mechanisms through which markets evolve within existing (and also evolving) societies rather than a dualistic "transition" can potentially lead to a more nuanced understanding of China's political economy as seen in the "varieties of capitalism" approach (Peck and Zhang 2013).

Despite its obvious shortcomings, the language of market transition has insinuated itself into the academic and everyday discourses of Chinese political economy where problems of inequality, injustice, environmental destruction, and deplorable labor conditions are products of a partial transition to markets. This is evident in both critical and mainstream economic accounts of China's 'transition."[81] The implication is that the inevitable outcome of China's economic development is confined to adherence to free market principles, and ignores the ways in which capitalism itself creates inequalities and other social ills. Such a narrow view cuts off alternative trajectories for China's future,

---

[81] Nick Lardy is probably the most well-known economist promoting the idea that China's problems stem from a failure to fully adopt core principles of free-market capitalism in interviews, lectures, and print-media. For several examples, see the recurring *Wall Street Journal* feature http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2012/01/16/eight-questions-nick-lardy-sustaining-chinas-economic-growth/ and http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2012/11/02/lardy-vs-pettis-debating-chinas-economic-future/

While a bit more nuanced in other works, the simplified 'transition' narrative is evident in Naughton's textbook on China's economic development (2007), but it also appears in critical Marxist perspectives as evidenced by journal titles such as "China's Changing Urban Governance in the Transition Towards a More Market-oriented Economy" (Wu, 2002).

and limits opportunities for justice. It also creates a misinformed narrative of China's transformation that paints the state-market relationship in simplistic terms of withdrawal and advance, rather than more careful consideration of the way states and markets adapt, evolve, and co-constitute each other in a rapidly and constantly changing structure of social relations.

Market transition is fundamentally ill-equipped to capture the process of urbanization because there is only room for two states of being: what the city was and what the city will become. It lacks the imagination to conceptualize what the city actually *is*—how a dynamic and shape-shifting political economy is articulated in the moment. Diversions from the predicted course are then seen as setbacks, and distance from the presumed end-state is a lack of progress because cities are viewed as little more than containers for the unfolding of global capitalism.[82]

5.2.2 Opening the City: Myers, Soja, and the Post-Metropolis

In *African Cities*, Garth Myers provocatively asks, "what if Lusaka is the post-metropolis?" This is not to say that Lusaka, or any African city is somehow more representative of the post-metropolis idea than its typical Los Angeles context. Rather, Myers is prompting urban geographers to flip the standard ontology of spatial theorization that fixates on determining whether or not cities around the world "fit" theoretical models generated in the West (i.e. "actually-existing neoliberalism" or

[82] From the left, transition is viewed in a similar way, but judgments are reversed: each step the city takes away from an imagined socialist city that probably never existed is met with dismay.

"market transition"). Instead, Myers starts his analysis from Lusaka (and other cities across the African continent)—informed by the general propositions of the post-metropolis made by Soja, but not bound inextricably to them. In this way, African and other regional urban studies can begin to "speak back" to the broader geographic discipline. It is not Myers nor my intent to investigate Wuhan in order to find out if there are elements that emulate, mimic, or otherwise resemble Los Angeles, Shanghai, or Singapore. I want Wuhan to be more than just a case study to prove or disprove some ideal-type of the post-metropolis, but to be a generative case for understanding the common features that characterize the current generation of cities while maintaining recognition of the spatial specificities of Chinese urbanism that make each city space unique. The utility of the post-metropolis idea is how it opens city space to accommodate vastly diverse forms spread over larger swathes of territory than had been previously imagined in standard urban models.

In the *Post-Metropolis* and other works, Soja attempted to assemble a spatial theory that could make sense of the dramatic changes taking place in cities throughout the industrialized world. Soja took Los Angeles as most indicative of urban patterns emerging in the last decades of the twentieth century under a period of industrial restructuring characterized by diffuse cites lacking a distinctive urban core, sprawl on unprecedented scales, and a reorganization of the balance of private and public space. Furthermore, cities were extending their influence and making connections far beyond their borders through what Castells called the "space of flows". Critical explorations of these phenomena centered on structural transformations in the global economy, including the new international division of labor, the increased mobility of capital across

international borders, the emergence of "global cities", and the "crisis of capitalism" that generated new "flexible accumulation regimes" under the rubric of neoliberal hegemony. These discourses were critiqued for their over reliance on familiar structuralist accounts of spatial organization while giving only nominal recognition to the localized forces that were shaping cities around the globe (see Chapter 2), as well as being overly focused on a handful of so-called "world cities." Soja sought, in his analysis of Los Angeles, to bridge the macro and microlevel analyses of space that could balance tired arguments of "structure vs. agency" through an emphasis on the co-constitutive characters of space and society. This perspective, applied to the "urbanization of the region" demonstrated effectively that as "socially constructed scales of human spatiality from the local to the global," cities were filled

> "not just with activity and intentionality, but also with built in tensions and potential conflicts, with openness and freedom as well as enclosure and oppression, with the perpetual presence of geohistorically uneven development, and hence with politics, ideology, and what, borrowing from Michel Foucault, can be called the intersections of space, knowledge and power" (7).

Cities, in other words, may be nodal points for the unfurling of global capitalism, but they are also key locales connecting local political action with all sorts of movements and action in other locales (Soja, 2010). A key insight for reading Chinese cities is Soja's belief that cities represent both the material actualization and active production of social relations. That is to say, social relations, (including, but not limited to the market or state power), remain "abstract and ungrounded" until they are "specifically spatialized" in urban forms filled with movement and change (Soja, 2010: 9).

In this chapter, I document the spatialization of ideologies and dictums that emanate from the center in the urban construction of Wuhan. This spatialization occurs

through the circulation of ideas and networks of association among policy planners, municipal leaders, private developers, and other actors with an interest in particular kinds of place-production. At the same time, some actors including local officials and developers exploit and manipulate central ideology in the implementation of development plans. Divergence from idealized urban forms are amplified by actors who are not included in the official urban imaginary but are nonetheless a vital part of the city's daily functions. Through their habitation and use of urban space beyond formal planning, sites take on a more complex form and character than the top-down hierarchy of spatial administration or trickle-down scale analysis would suggest.

Before carrying on, some caveats are necessary. While grounded in traditional Marxist political economy, I believe Soja's analysis of the 'post-metropolis' is compatible with assemblage because of its emphasis on social relations. For Soja, it is the act of multileveled territorial relations that produces the postmetropolis, a process that is not dissimilar from the principle of emergence that informs Delanda's viewpoint on cities. To some extent, Soja's analysis of the post-metropolis does rely on the primacy of globalized capitalism in influencing changing patterns of urban form. However, in seeking new ways of understanding how present-day Los Angeles comes into being, he shows how LA is enacted through both the reorganization of global capitalism and the interactions and networks of actors stretching across the region. For Soja, the post-metropolis indicates a shift away from the neatly ordered cities imagined in the Chicago School brought about in part by changes in the international division of labor and technological advancements. I am not trying to fit Wuhan or other Chinese cities into this precise model. The inspiration I take from Soja is not in how he saw capitalism

changing LA, but in the ways in which he sought to challenge accepted notions of how cities are imagined and constructed by exploring the city from the ground-up. Chinese socialism, when examined through city making, becomes tangible as a process enacted in the construction of the city and in the way it is lived—it becomes an *articulation* of spatial arrangements that are assembled out of a multitude of social and political relations, networks and hierarchies of power, and circulations of knowledge, capital, and policies. My aim here is not to argue that Wuhan is a replicate of Los Angeles, but to demonstrate the "spatial specificities" that shape Wuhan's spatial transformation over the last decade.

These changes reflect what I see as the simultaneous production of a distinctively Chinese metropolis and a more generalizeable diffusion of the city into a regionalized metropolis that is continuous with the historical and institutional frameworks of the party-state's spatial organization, but seeks out broader coordination of planning on a regional scale. In the Wuhan context, this urban diffusion takes place under an increased centralization of authority in the municipal government, the spatial administrative framework that along with the dual structure articulates China's spatial economy and spatial transformations. Through an investigation of the way Wuhan is assembled out of the three towns and the outlying district, the "spatial specificities" of Chinese cities can be articulated, both as a site for the development and engagement of capitalism, and as distinctive sites for the enactment of other goals ranging from the personal to the ideological.

5.3 Visions of the Municipality: Assembling and Promoting *Da Wuhan*

Wuhan's leaders have engaged in practices of place-promotion that attempts to position the city as *the* central hub that brings every corner of the country together. Policy boosterism, according to McCann, is the "sociospatially produced and power-laden inter-scalar process of circulating, mediating, (re)molding, and operationalizing policies, policy models, and policy knowledge," (McCann 2011, 6). Rather than articulating particular practices of globally determined scales, however, policy mobilities in China are frequently tied directly to networks of state power. Through the promotion of 'best practices' and policy models, municipal authorities advance an "extrospective" Wuhan, a city that hopes to enact policies with implications beyond its own administrative borders. In what McCann calls the "constant repetition of certain narratives of 'success'" (Ibid.10), Wuhan, like cities across China engages in a barrage of place-promotion trumpeting its ability to articulate the demands of a modern, global economy and the ideological calls that emanate from Beijing. This style of urban branding has deep roots in the PRC as city and rural officials alike attempted to demonstrate their "redness" in the height of the Maoist era[83]. The party-state encouraged this socialist-style place-promotion through the granting of awards and official recognition—a practice that continues in the present. Local street offices, hotels, manufacturers, village committees and even individuals display plaques that announce their "model" status according to one form of criteria or another. Driven by a mix of

[83] For instance, Dazhai and Daqing

"competitive boosterism", personal advancement, and a "genuine desire to cooperate and share insights for a perceived greater good,"(Ibid. 10), municipal authorities promote localized policy models as legitimate articulations of typically vague central proclamations.

Policy mobility rests on the practices through which municipal authorities learn from the policies of others and teach others about their own policies. Such exchanges routinely take place in the attendance and hosting of national and international conferences, or the use of mega-events such as Olympic games (McCann, 2011), and the Shanghai Expo in 2010. Especially common in China going back to the Maoist practice of the mass-line (from the masses to the masses), cadre study tours are a frequent form of knowledge exchange, policy circulation, and the promotion of "best practices." Exchanges such as these encourage the diffusion of "policies that work" (Peck, 2011) while avoiding rigid central mandates. In the articulation of the eco-city, rural-urban integration, and *chengzhongcun* redevelopment, municipal authorities advance Wuhan as a national city.

Yet even this circulation is bound by the spatial and administrative hierarchies of the PRC—study tours are most commonly hosted by higher-ranking cities for visiting cadres from lower-ranking sites—and the focus of Wuhan's place-promotion is as the model and leader for *central* China only. Policy circulation is also profoundly and explicitly political (Peck, 2011). Certainly, the prominence and high rank of Bo Xilai contributed to the national attention to the "Chongqing model" of rural-urban integration. At the same time, CCP politics, political hierarchies, and cadre evaluation shape

boundaries for localized reforms, preventing experimentation from departing too far from central orthodoxy.

Ainwah Ong has most vocally and persuasively argued against the “neoliberal tsunami” and Marxist structuralists, seeking a more nuanced understanding of the forces shaping Chinese cities. The strength of Ong's analysis is that she highlights ways cities in Asia imagine and construct themselves that are not always in reference to unifying principles of capitalist logic, but that are actively about creating or recreating unique and separated identities. At the same time, modeling and inter-referencing practices lead to an archetypical Asian city that symbolizes order, a strong state, prosperity, sustainability, and most importantly, *success*. For Ong, Chinese cities are assemblages—a “milieu in constant formation,” and a “nexus of situated and transnational ideas.” Interventions in the urban process by designers, planners, and officials "promiscuously draw upon ideas and objects and find allies in multiple sources that are recontextualized for resolving urban problems," (Ong, 2011, 4). Ong makes a persuasive argument that urban entrepreneurialism in the Chinese context is not just about appealing to capital, but utilizing capital in order to remake the city into something that is imagined through a host of competing visions and imaginings for a uniquely Chinese modernity.

Ong prioritizes Asian “interreferencing”, the creation of “new solidarities, coalitions, and new configurations of urban society” that belie an understanding of global urban discourse as one based primarily on competition. Instead, they serve to construct new “forms and norms” of being global: “Inter-city should not just be a qualifier for competition but also comparison, referencing, and modeling,” (Ibid., 20).However, in her eagerness to unseat the centrality of Western mimicking, Ong, much like the *desakota*

writers of the 1990s, simply replaces a rigid Western urban imaginary with an "Asian" one that ignores the interactions between West and East that contribute to the remaking of Chinese cities, and privileges an Asian cosmopolitanism without reference to the interrelations of state actors at multiple levels that go into the physical construction of the city. While it is useful to unseat neoliberalism's theoretical dominance, it is naive to dismiss the continued prominence of not just Western capitalism from Asian cities, but referencing and modeling *from* the West that informs Chinese urban imaginaries. While I agree with her general thesis, Ong erects an unnecessary division between city-making in Asia and elsewhere, as if Western cities are not themselves the outcomes of inter-referencing and transnational exchanges. Meanwhile, Helen Siu, while making the most forceful claims that Chinese cities are "assemblages" binds her analysis of *chengzhongcun* to a peasant-citizen dialectic that reaffirms state-produced boundaries, social hierarchies and class-distinctions rather than suggesting how a new kind of city might emerge from the interrelationship of historical legacies, class identities, and changing circumstances brought about through urbanization.

Wuhan is using a variety of place-promotion strategies to position itself as the link between the develop*ed* coast and develop*ing* West—the so-called "H-Shaped Economic- Development Model. In this way, municipal leaders produce a particular geography of China with Wuhan as a crucial node connecting all points of the national economy, and serving as a gateway to the East and beyond. Wuhan is made to be an integral part of the booming Jiangnan region *and* the Develop the West program through the construction of an imagined "Yangtze River Economic Belt." Several major expressways and rail-lines converge in Wuhan, including high-speed routes to

Guangzhou and Beijing. This conjunction of road, rail, and water "gives greater prominence to Wuhan's position of strategic importance as a junction of water and land transportation in China," ("Wuhan's Advantages"). In their own promotional literatures, each district repeats the municipal government's positioning of Wuhan as "the transportation junction connecting the east and west, linking the north and the south," (Ibid.). The new Central Business District (CBD) under construction in Hankou forms the northern point in a triangle of major development projects in each of the three towns. Intensifying the linkages among the three towns, outlying districts, and the world beyond relies on massive public investment in road, river, rail, and subway transportation networks. Tianhe International Airport is located in Huangpi District, north of Hankou. Serving 13 million passengers per year with a high cargo-shipping capacity, it is connected to Hankou through the Airport Expressway, and to Hanyang and Wuchang by the Third Ring Road. Tianhe went global with the completion of its international terminal in 2010 (Tianhe). A bulk of provincial and municipal spending on Wuhan also goes to upgrading numerous ports along the Yangtze River, improved rail

Figure 5.1 The Changjiang Bridge built after the establishment of the PRC was the first bridge to span the Yangtze, connecting Wuchang and Hankou (seen in the distance) directly

transport (including the high-speed rail running between Wuhan and Guangzhou), and expansion of expressways and bridges.

Despite seven bridges spanning the Yangtze River as of 2010, travel across the three towns is difficult. During rush hour, a bus ride from Hankou to Hongshan can take upwards of 90 minutes, and taxi drivers are reluctant to cross the Yangtze. A 27 km subway tunnel connecting Wuchang and Hankou began carrying passengers on December 28, 2012. At a cost of $2.37 billion, the subway crosses the Yangtze in 3 minutes and connects Guang'gu to the new CBD area. It is expected to carry 500,000 passengers a day, about half of the daily cross-river traffic, and will hopefully alleviate the crushing gridlock on Wuhan's bridges ("China to Open 1st Subway across Yangtze River").

5.4 The City Assembled: How History Shapes Urban Development in Wuhan

Rather than a linear progression from socialism to capitalism, DeLanda takes a *geological* view of history where the terrain is shaped and molded by what has been previously laid down. City builders do not only reference globalized tropes of the 'world city', but the city's own past as a source of innovation, cosmopolitanism, and internally generated concepts of urban modernity. Thus, the city at any given site and any given moment, is not just a reflection of what one set of interests hopes the city will one day become, but also social and political relations that are always imbued with historical memory. Wuhan played a central role in China's early modernization under the Qing, was the flashpoint for the 1911 revolution that ended the dynastic system, and was an important industrial center in the PRC's command economy. Even as Wuhan

construction crews demolish old buildings and neighborhoods in favor of skyscrapers and commodity housing, this new, global Wuhan is still being built on a historical geography of diverse and discrete localized identities, resources, and institutions. It is in the coexistence of multiple historical sources that new spaces and the city of Wuhan emerges.

The rest of this chapter has two purposes. First I argue that the ideas, knowledge, and discourses of place-production in Wuhan is about building more than just a receptacle for capital and capital accumulation. Wuhan as a coherent whole, its "cityness", if you will, is assembled from historical memory and experience, networks of political and social connection, and interreferencing of spatial models in China, Asia, and the world. Central to Wuhan's identity are the "three towns" (Wuhan *sanzhen*) of Hankou, Wuchang, and Hanyang whose boundaries are created by the intersections of the Yangtze and Han Rivers. Arising from focused development strategies in each town over the past several decades, each has developed a distinct role within the broader spatial economy of Wuhan. These historical roles are increasingly captured by municipal officials and planners in constructing a promotable and marketable Wuhan, and in creating functional links with surrounding areas. The three towns are the central nodes of the 8+1 plan, and it is here that efforts are focusing to construct a coherent and unified identity for *da Wuhan*.

While the construction of Wuhan should not be reduced to economic determinism, neither should the role of capital, finance, and investment be ignored. However, inserting "neoliberal urbanism" as explanation for urban development does not do justice to the complexities of land acquisition and development. This is the

fundamental flaw of what Tang calls "random conceptual indigenization" which involves:

> "searching for those Western concepts that seem to depict approximate patterns, and applying them to urban China. A Western concept is chosen merely on the basis that it exhibits more or less similar descriptive features to the concerned Chinese phenomenon . . . Not having undertaken a critical understanding of the Chinese context and processes, the China researcher conceives of urban space in China as if it were a spatial container that we fill with features identified by the Western concept *rather than perceiving it as a structure that the context and processes help produce*," (Tang 2014, 47-48, emphasis added).

The corollary, Tang continues, is that "the space of the present urban China could be understood without knowledge of its past. These are precisely the kinds of problems Stuart Hall's insights into articulation can help avoid by carefully investigating the Chinese context and processes.

What's more, Tang warns us, the spatial specificities of that articulate China's spatial structure should not be reduced to "a signifier to the Western representation with the assumption that within an absolute space called China, there is something that is Chineseness, not Westernness," (Ibid. 48). These signifiers predominantly give tacit acknowledgment of the party and/or state's unusual degree of authority and tendency to regulate social behavior, the "Chinese characteristics" of a variety of –isms.[84] Yet they do not give justice to the context, processes, and complexities of spatial production in China's cities that is at the heart of my own understanding of articulation. Here, Tang has identified my own concerns with the new institutionalism critiqued above and in the

[84] Tang's examples of this, he notes, are always italicized, include "*a strange manifestation* of overaccumulation", *localized* neoliberal urbanism", and "urban governance *with the reassembling state*,"(Tang, 2014, 48).

opening chapter that shows appreciation for how institutions influence the trajectory of market transition, but they simply divert or distort a naturalized and idealized form of capitalism that exists in few places outside of liberal economic social theory.[85]

Following the next section which shows how the three towns of Wuhan have been "assembled", I undertake a rigorous analysis of the process of developing Wuhan's new central business district in the hope of generating a "critical understanding of the Chinese context and structure." I am hoping, here, to follow Tang's call for a more "open history" and "open geography". I am picking up Wuhan's historical geography at a very late chapter in Wuhan's story with the establishment of foreign concessions in 1860. There is much to be gleaned about how Chinese cities are understood, inhabited, and governed from a study that digs deeper into China's dynastic past, but with some remorse, it is beyond the scope of this particular articulation of Wuhan's cityspace.

5.4.1 Assembling the Three Towns 1: From Foreign Concessions to the New CBD

As much as the Han and Yangtze mark the physical boundaries of the three towns, international and national politics have shaped their identity in the modern era. The British, hoping to find a bridge to potential inland markets, compelled the Qing to make Hankou an open port after the second Opium War (1856-1860). The British were the first to establish a concession zone in Hankou in 1861, followed by the Germans, Russians, French and Japanese at the turn of the century (Figure 5.2). The foreign

[85] The second half of Tang's critique of China urban studies is "random conceptual appropriation" that I will explore in more detail in the next chapter.

powers did not leave as profound a mark on present day Wuhan as they did in the more well-known Shanghai concessions, yet they contributed to the foundation of Wuhan's modern political and social geography (Han and Wu 2004).

Figure 5.2 Foreign Concessions lined the Yangtze River bank of Jiang'an District until Wuhan was captured by the Japanese in 1938.
Source: //hankou.virtualcities.fr/Maps/Collection.

Hankou emerged as an important trading center for the region, buttressed by a strong foreign presence, river ports, and the Peking-Hankow express. The former concessions, now a part of Jiang'an District, are preserved along 3.6 km of the Yangtze River. Harry A. Franck, an American travel writer described Hankou in the 1920's as *"*a bustling city, wholly Western in its architecture and layout, even though completely surrounded by China, its buildings looming high into the air."[86] In 1927, the Republic of China unified the three towns as "Wuhan". After the fall of Nanjing to Japan, Hankou served as the temporary capital of China until its capture by the Japanese in 1938. Japanese forces were subjected to intensive firebombing by American planes from 1944-1945, reducing much of the old city to rubble.Despite a

[86] Quoted in Thomas, G. H. (2004). *An American in China, 1936-1939: A Memoir*. Greatrix Press.

Figure 5.3 The Frank Wick Building and The Customs House (under construction on the right) dominated Hankou's British Concession. Source: http://hankou.virtualcities.fr/Photos/Images

century and a half of wars, revolutions, and upheavals, the same logic that propelled the British into Wuhan in the 19th century continues to guide its development today. Wuhan's boosters promote it as a central transportation hub linking East and West. Disparaged as symbols of imperialism throughout the Maoist era, meanwhile, the architecture of the concessions has more recently been recast as an iconic symbol for Chinese cities, demonstrating cosmopolitanism and a history of openness and modernity that predates the post-Mao reform era (Rihal, 2005; Figures 5.3 and 5.4). The largely preserved French Concession in Hankou, for example, is employed by municipal officials to promote the city as a site for French investors. While the Hubei provincial government occupies classic Soviet-style monoliths in Wuchang, the municipal government is housed in several of the old concession era buildings in Jiang'an.

Figure 5.4 The Customs House today houses municipal government offices. Photo by author.

5.4.2 Assembling the Three Towns 2: Memorializing Wuchang

If Hankou is the capital of Wuhan's modernity, Wuchang across the river celebrates and memorializes the state (Figures 5.5-5.8). While Hankou celebrates Wuhan's potential role in the global circulation of financial and commercial exchange, Wuchang across the river memorializes a history of revolution and houses the provincial government. Wuhan's central position in the country contributed to its selection as a manufacturing base for the Qing Dynasty's "New Army" founded in 1900. Two revolutionary organizations, the Literature Society and the Gong Jin Hui were active in recruiting soldiers and officers of the New Army to their cause. With most of Wuhan's army dispatched to quell demonstrations in Sichuan, the two groups planned to launch their own uprising on October 16 of 1911 with Wuchang as the command post. However, a week prior to the planned uprising, a bomb being built by revolutionaries in the Russian concession of Hankou accidentally exploded. Investigating police discovered documents linking the factory to leaders of the Literature Society and Gong Jin Hui. Facing eminent arrest, they launched the uprising that night in Wuchang. So it was that China's revolution was born followed two days later on October 11 by the capture of Wuchang and the establishment of the Republic of China. These events are memorialized the Memorial Hall of the Wuchang Uprising opened on the centennial of the revolution. Situated at the north end of a massive open square, it is a sleek, post-modern building of 22,000 sq. meters, its exterior painted a "revolutionary red." On the south end is a statue commemorating the role of workers in the uprising. Across the road is a brilliant flower garden popular with tourists and locals. Unlike the stark space of the Memorial Hall square, the flower garden is warm and inviting, with benches, pathways,

and frequent special displays of floral and other arrangements. This garden leads to a striking statue of Sun Yatsen that welcomes visitors to The Revolution of 1911 Museum established inside the "Wuchang Red Tower", the former headquarters of the Qing government in Hubei, and the Hubei government headquarters for the Republic of China.

Figure 5.5 -5.8 Wuchang Remembered (Clockwise from top left) The Wuhan Uprising Memorial Hall, Statue commemorating the Wuchang Uprising, a statue of Sun Yatsen that stands at the entrance of the Wuchang Uprising Museum, and the Yellow Crane Tower

This blend of traditional and modern forms is an appropriate tribute to Wuchang's curious hybrid of imperial, republican, and communist cultural heritage. The Hubei Museum displays thousands of ancient historical relics demonstrating the region's

imperial history and relevance, while also maintaining a permanent exhibit of noteworthy members of the CCP from Hubei since the formation of the party in 1933. Historical tropes and styles are drawn on in the recreation of Wuhan's long history. The "Uprising Gate", a key battleground in the uprising in Wuchang was rebuilt to commemorate the centennial of the revolution in 2011 based on original blueprints. The wall, one of nine original city gates, had collapsed prior to the formation of the PRC. The gate wall frames a grassy park with panoramic views of Wuchang surrounded by new upscale housing developments. Combining dynastic and revolutionary history with the commercialism of present day real estate development, the Uprising Gate is a perfect representation of the multiple dynamics that coalesce into Wuchang's current cultural identity. The Yellow Crane Tower, originally built in 223 AD during the Warring States period, has been destroyed and rebuilt multiple times. It was last destroyed in 1884, having been rebuilt by the Qing only 16 years previous. Wuhan managed to survive without a Yellow Crane Tower for nearly 100 years before it was rebuilt in 1985. The current incarnation is located 1 km from its original location atop Sheshan (Snake Hill), employing Qing architecture and is one of the premier tourist sites in central China. Traditional street vending is recreated (and regulated) in *Hubuxiang* (Figure 5.9), a twenty year old alley near the banks of the

Figure 5.9 Hubuxiang snack street offers a smorgasbord of traditional breakfast foods. Photo by author.

Yangtze River offering a "kaleidoscope of breakfast choices," ("A Wuhan Walkthrough").

As export-processing and other industries have begun moving their operations inland, the promotion of education institutions capable of promoting a highly skilled work force is integral to intercity competition. Wuchang alone has 52 institutions of higher learning including the prestigious Wuhan University, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, and Wuhan Technical University (the *alma mater* of former Premier Wen Jiabao), and the city as a whole boasts of 700,000 enrolled students, 736 scientific and design institutes, 10 key state laboratories, and 450,000 technicians ("Wuhan Advantages"). The existence of high-quality schools and a booming intellectual environment also promotes Wuhan as a desirable destination for professional and academic elites. . Meanwhile, the Western-oriented cosmopolitanism of the historic concessions is recreated in the Guang'gu shopping area of Wuchang. Guang'gu (Optics Valley) is a massive commercial complex south of the East Lake in Wuchang that embodies Wuhan's local-global connections. It is host to numerous international and Chinese brands including McDonald's, Starbucks, Carrefour, restaurants and shopping centers. A multistory mall architecturally mimics similar sites across Asia. Guang'gu also contains a pedestrian shopping street intended to evoke old Spanish neighborhoods while simultaneously referencing the more famous walking street of Nanjing Lu in

[87] In an online interview, Secretary Ruan insisted that the snacks found in Hubuxiang were "more delicious than you can find in Beijing." Although it was said in a light-hearted manner that nonetheless reveals the extent with which Ruan attempts to promote Wuhan as the equal of China's most famous cities.

Shanghai.[88] Guang'gu is also a high-tech industrial center, proximate to the East Lake Hi-Tech Development Zone, an important piece of Ruan Chengfa's efforts to model Wuhan as a sustainable city. The commercial, governmental, and cultural advantages make Wuchang an attractive destination for technology firms. Lenovo, for example, established the largest smartphone base in China in Guang'gu in October of 2013, an $800 million investment with 10,000 employees ("Lenovo Mobile and Internet Base (Wuhan) put into operation").



Figure 5.10 Wuhan's Spatial Structure: Three Towns and Supporting Outlying Districts

Two sub-zones within the Eastlake High-tech Development Zone typify Wuhan's place-production efforts under the context of the Sustainable Society: the Wuhan Future Science and Technology Town, and the Huashan New Eco-City. The Huashan Eco-city

[88] The street is literally called the "Wuhan Optical Valley World City Walking Street" (*Wuhan Guanggu bu xingjie*)

near the Ezhou border is a focal point for developing the Sustainable Society within the Wuhan City Circle. Planners hope for Huashan to become "a world-class eco-city and new urbanization demonstration area." Building the idealized eco-city necessitated the relocation and expropriation of farmland from 12000 farmers, a task that only accounted for a small portion of the 14 billion RMB invested by the China Development Bank and provincial and municipally-owned finance companies. Much of the investment has gone toward upgrading Yangtze River port infrastructure and transport logistics ("Wuhan Huashan New City Overview").

The Future Science and Technology Town attempts to consolidate scientific and corporate R&D in Wuhan. Promotion of the town is infused with the language of the "harmonious society," yet also emphasizes that it will be distinct from Wuhan proper as seen in the slogan, "A Separate City, A Flourishing Town," and its primary slogan, "Land of Innovation, City of the Future". Goals for the town include cultivating innovative research teams, research and development institutions, innovative enterprises, and "1-2 revolutionary strategic industries," that are not specifically named. Planners hope to attract over 100,000 scientific and technical experts to the town by 2020. It has already attracted 24 billion RMB in investment from Deutsche Telecom, Huawei, China Mobile, and 6 other Fortune 500 companies ("Wuhan Future City")

Pre-Emptive Class Boundaries: Housing in the Zone

Huashan and the Future Science and Technology Town also reflect efforts to address the problem of Wuhan-brain drain. A Ruan lamented soon after becoming Municipal Party Secretary, Wuhan's universities churn out some of the most talented and intelligent graduates in the country, but it is very difficult to keep the talent in Wuhan.

Residential planning in the EHDZ reflects the belief that providing a built environment for a model Chinese city must be attractive to the right kind of people. In the EHDZ, 31.08 sq. km, or 19.7% of urban construction land in the zone, has been allotted for residential use to accommodate nearly 1 million people. Residential planning for the zone is strongly oriented toward class segregation—creating different neighborhoods and housing types for very specific class-identities.[89] While it is noteworthy that plans are being made to specifically accommodate 145,000 migrant workers, they are relegated to single-occupancy apartments located in or near industrial areas. More than 800,000 "permanent" residents will be distributed across "two belts, five tracts, and 8 dots" in the development zone. Residential planning is divided into Class-One and Class-Two areas. Class-Two areas are "people-oriented and top quality" with building density limited to 30% and a provision of green space to be no less than 35% of the total area. Specific occupational classes are identified with higher-class communities: world-class scientists and entrepreneurs, overseas returnee scholars and senior executives of corporations, R&D personnel of enterprise, management personnel of companies, overseas returnee scholars and high-ranking executives of corporations, middle-level management personnel of enterprises, management staffs and research personnel ("Residential Land Use Planning").

[89] We might begin with the relocation of farmers and expropriation of farmland that coincides with each new development in the zone.

5.4.3 Assembling the Three Towns 3: Made in Hanyang

When reformer Zhang Zhidong was appointed governor-general of Hubei-Hunan in 1889, he oversaw the establishment and laid the foundation for Wuhan's modern industrial base. Reforms in Hubei that prioritized industrialization, modernizing the armed forces, and expanding and improving education were the subject of national and international attention. In Sun Yatsen's words, "Zhang Zhidong created the men of Hubei who overthrew the Manchu court. Zhang was a great revolutionary who never spoke of revolution," (Quoted in Feng, 2014 p. 131). Zhang oversaw the establishment of new universities in Wuchang that provided breeding grounds for revolutionary thought, while a modern industrial base was constructed in Hanyang. The Hanyang Ironworks went into operation in 1894, it was hailed as the "greatest factory in Asia" producing 50-60 tons of finished steel every day. Prior to the opening of the Anshan Steel Works, Hanyang produced 90% of China's iron and steel. The Hubei Arsenal, renamed the Hanyang Arsenal in 1907, was the largest weapons manufacturer in China. The presence of China's largest steel and weapons factories marked Hanyang a vital strategic site, and its rapid occupation by revolutionary forces was crucial to the uprising's long-term success both in Hubei and beyond (Ibid.).

While old city areas on the riverbanks are now being remade as sites for commodity housing and consumption, Hanyang's industrial tradition remains strong. Much of Wuhan's infrastructure had been destroyed during World War II. Under the command economy, much of the country's metallurgical, manufacturing, and electronics employment was based in the region, and it was responsible for roughly 30% of total iron and steel production (Li and Lu, 1995). These emphases were a boon to automotive,

machinery, and heavy equipment industries in Hubei, notably, Dongfeng Motors which rose to prominence in the 1970s and has thrived in the reform era. While still carrying on its manufacturing and heavy industry tradition, Hanyang's industrial roots are to be memorialized in the Zhang Zhidong and Hanyang Iron Works Museum at the site of the old iron works, with ground breaking on the project beginning in 2013.

Hanyang's industrial legacy is not just an item of historical memory. It continues to be conceived as an important industrial center. The Wuhan Economic and Technological Development Zone (WEDZ) was the first development zone in Wuhan. Founded in 1991, it was approved by the State Council as a "National Development Zone" in 1993. After being granted "open city" status in 2000, it became the first export processing zone in Central China. The WEDZ occupies 200 sq. km just outside Wuhan's 3rd Ring Road in the southwest of Hanyang district. The automotive industry occupies a central place in the WEDZ and Wuhan's overall development strategy.[90] Major firms located here include Dongfeng Motors and joint-ventures between Dongfeng and Puegot, and Dongfeng and Honda. The WEDZ hosts 6 automobile factories, 16 automobile R&D centers, and 180 parts manufacturers, almost all of them associated directly or indirectly with Dongfeng (WEDZ).[91] The WEDZ, Dongfeng Motors, and Wuhan universities are

[90] Capturing the dubious wisdom of superficial inter-referencing, the WEDZ official website declares, without irony, its ambition to turn Wuhan into the "Oriental Detroit".

[91] The second pillar industry of the WEDZ is electronics. Midea, one of the largest electric appliance producers in China, owns the Little Swan Electric Appliance Company in the WEDZ, employing 3000 people and producing at least 1,000,000 refrigerators and freezers each year (Midea). Haier constructed its own development park within the EDZ in 2002, becoming the primary producer of air conditioners in Central China. Haier stated their intent to use the development zone as a hub for marketing and manufacturing in the region (Haier). In 2004, the Haier Wuhan Water Heater Production line was established just north of

also recipients of national support under the "863 Program", playing an important role in developing electric and hybrid automotive technology.[92] Dongfeng, in particular, is a national leader in developing hybrid cars and busses (Sun, 2012). Participation in partnerships with researchers at Tsinghua University and manufacturers in Tianjin, Shanghai, and Shenzhen, demonstrates Wuhan's worthiness to be included among China's elite cities. (Sun, 2012).

Hanyang and the WEDZ also serve as an anchor for the industrial development of smaller cities beyond Wuhan's boundaries. Several sub-prefectural cities to the west of Wuhan on the Jianghan plains are identified in 8+1 plans as supporting sites for the WEDZ. This support includes a 600 million RMB Auto Trading Market in Xiantao intended to centralize auto sales, repair, and small parts production for the region. The WEDZ also signed an agreement with Honghu City[93] in January, 2012 to the southwest to build the Xintan Industrial Park. As an extension of the Wuhan Economic and Technological Zone, the Xintan Industrial Park is eligible for the privileges of a national development zone. The WEDZ also relies on petrochemical, aluminum alloy, electronics, and auto parts production in Qianjian.

---

the WEDZ. TPV Technology, the world's largest PC monitor and 4th largest LCD television manufacturer, runs two plants in the WEDZ producing LCD monitors.

[92] The "863 Plan" was established in 1986 under the Ministry of Science and Technology, aimed at promoting hi-tech research and development in China through financial and policy support for certain projects. In the 10th 5-year plan, development of electric vehicles became a priority project under the "863 plan".

[93] Honghu is a county level city under Jingzhou City southwest of Wuhan.

5.4.4 Summary

Place production in Wuhan operates within a historical memory of Western and Japanese imperialism, revolution, and innovation that contributes to an urban imaginary of Wuhan that is as at once cosmopolitan and patriotic. These historical roles have greatly influenced the trajectory of development in the post-reform era, giving defined roles to each of the three towns, but also limiting to some degree their ability to negotiate new and creative identities under a rapidly shifting economic structure. Wuhan today is composed of 7 central districts and 6 other districts variously referred to as suburban, outlying, or rural districts.[94] Hankou and Wuchang are obvious beneficiaries of an increased focus on knowledge-based and financial services that is not just a matter of image but has real consequences for the developmental trajectories of the three towns. Coupled with the limitations to internal mobility and access to public goods across city districts, there are material consequences to the way Wuhan is divided and imagined. A clear set of locational roles emerge from a mixture of historical legacies and projected development plans. It is in part through these complementary and overlapping roles that Wuhan emerges from the 13 districts (Figure). Yet as I have highlighted here, these roles are not purely defined by entrepreneurial efforts of capitalist-oriented city officials, but emerge from an ongoing spatial-temporal process that transcends pre-reform/post-reform or state/private divisions.

---

[94] Today, the area referred to as Hankou consists of three separate districts, Jiang'an, Qiaokou, and Jianghan. Wuchang consists of Wuchang and Qingshan. Hongshan, while not historically a part of Wuchang, is the most rapidly urbanizing district and is part of the main blah blah

5.5 Articulating Wuhan: Building the New Central Business District

Throughout China, new Central Business Districts (CBDs) have superseded 1990s "development zone fever" as the centerpiece of urban development in China. For example, Guangzhou's CBD was a twenty year endeavor costing billions of dollars in investment and infrastructure. Completed in time for the 2010 Asian Games, Guangzhou officials projected their own vision of "success" so crucial to contemporary intercity competition, giving impetus to accelerate similar projects elsewhere.

Figure 5.11 Rendered image of Wuhan's future CBD in Hankou. Source: www.whcbd.com

Wangjiadun as a conceptual and material space is an assemblage as imagined by Ainwah Ong. The announcement of the Wangjiadun plan begins with a passage from Burgess' Concentric Zone Model—the Wuhan City Circle plan is very much an attempt to recreate Burgess' concentric zones (minus the inner-urban poor, of course). In its design and conceptualization, it emulates "best practices" from Shanghai's Pudong, Guangzhou, and other new CBD's around the country while incorporating national and global discourses of eco-cities and sustainability. Yet for these conceptualizations to be realized requires the acquisition of land, the mobilization of investment capital, demolitions and relocations, and the implementation of new policies and practices of

governance. It is through the investigation of *process* that the development of Wangjiadun can be seen as both assemblage *and* articulation.

Wuhan's new CBD (Figure 5.11) is the outcome of strategic collaboration and extensive negotiation between city, provincial, and private actors. In 2002, China Oceanwide Holdings Group and four other companies established the Wuhan CBD Investment and Development Company (WCIC) to oversee the investment, design, development, construction, and management of the CBD with the stated goal of "building a modern service center in central China," that reflects "International Commonalities, Wuhan Characteristics (*guoji gongxing, wuhan tese*) ," (WHCBD). These and other slogans suggesting the interweaving of city, party, and capital bedeck construction sites in the CBD (for example, "Based on China, Face the World, and Serve the Nation"). The CBD's chosen location, a 266 hectare site of a former air force base, is itself informed by the particularities of the urban land regime. As with the selection of Hannan for rural-urban integration (Chapter 6), Wangjiadun was a desirable site for redevelopment because it contained large tracts of state-owned land that would not require drawn out negotiations with local residents for land expropriation. The CBD straddles the boundaries of Qiaokou and Jianghan districts, sandwiched between two district-level development zones, Zhongshan Park, and major transportation routes, giving coherence to a greater Hankou. This location also allows for the development of contemporary and stylistic architectural design that will not disturb the historical sites of the former concessions along the riverbank in Jiang'an. Wuhan Tower, designed and developed by the Shanghai Greenland Company, one of the largest state-owned

enterprises in Shanghai is a centerpiece of the CBD.[95] Upon completion, Wuhan Tower will be the second largest tower in China, and third largest in the world at 438 meters and over 300,000 sq. m of floor space. In addition to hosting financial and commercial services, the CBD includes multiple high-end residential projects with names like "Yinghai Garden" and 15 hectares of green space. Centering the CBD is the Oceanwide International Town, a series of high rise buildings overlooking a long plaza (Figure 5.12).

Figure 5.12 Rendered Image of Oceanwide International Town in the CBD http://www.whcbd.com/en_us/projects/soho_town.shtml

The CBD has become a centerpiece for Wuhan's place promotion, marking it as a "model" Chinese and global city. Every delegation that visits the construction site is heralded by corporate and media press releases—including foreign ambassadors, investor groups, provincial and municipal officials, representatives of national ministries, and other visitors (e.g. WHCBD 2009). Their stated approval not only promotes Wuhan's national and international image, but also serves to reinforce local legitimacy of urban construction projects. State granted awards and media recognition affirm the narrative of Wuhan's "success." Boasting the "second-highest" tower in China is one of countless points of

[95] Shanghai Greenland is also responsible for the Hannan New Town, a major project of rural-urban integration discussed in the next section.

pride for municipal boosters. In one of the more esoteric pieces of Wuhan's self-promotion, the city announced a bird-nest shaped skybridge that will connect the Intercontinental Hotel and Wuhan International Expo Center. At 45 x 40 meters and weighing 1500 tons, the bird nest will be the largest "midair ellipsoid steel link corridor nationwide," (Zhang 2013).

Yet actualizing the CBD has been a drawn-out, complicated, and costly process. Behind the glossy renderings of the future Hankou is a 20-year process that is only just beginning to show signs of realization. The evolution of the Wangjiadun Central Business District perfectly demonstrates the criss-crossing and intersectionality of state and market in transforming Chinese cities. Its location is made possible by a change in State Council zoning regulations and the transfer of 4,000 mu of centrally-located property from the military to the municipality. It is funded by a combination of bonds issued by a plethora of state-owned development corporations and quasi-private firms and central bank loans, guided by the municipal leadership's drive to make Wuhan the crown jewel of Central China. It also demonstrates the complexity of sorting private and public from each other, and establishing with any certainty which is which.

In the process of building a new CBD, building a "new socialist countryside", and transforming *chengzhongcun*, a primary role for the municipal government is real estate speculator. The state-owned Central Development Bank (CDB) is a major actor in financing local development projects, particularly infrastructure. According to Sanderson and Forsyth, the Central Development Bank did not "crowd out other lenders of capital . . . it sucked them all in," (Sanderson and Forsyth, 2012, 9). Loans from the development bank, as they describe it, are tantamount to loan guarantees by the central

government: the Central Development Bank issues bonds to raise funds which are then used to help local governments establish financing vehicles (LGFVs). Once the CDB has backed a project, commercial and other state financing vehicles (including provincial-level investment trusts) follow suit. In Wuhan, examples of LGFVs involved in the development of Wangjiadun include the Hankou Airport Relocation Company and the Wuhan Investment and Development Company. This also includes roughly 2 billion RMB in loans from the development bank to the Wangjiadun Central Business District Investment Company in 2002, an LGFV that began as a state-private partnership, but as the process unfolded, ownership of the company, and its CDB loans, gradually shifted to the private investor, Oceanwide Holdings.[96]

In 1999, 4000 mu (roughly 266 hectares) of land straddling the Hankou districts of Qiaokou and Jianghan, an area known as Wangjiadun, was owned by the Chinese Air Force, maintaining a largely unutilized air force base in the heart of what municipal leaders increasingly hoped to become the city's commercial and financial center. Noise and pollution from the base as well as traffic bottlenecks that arose around the base's perimeter made it a wrench in the gears of Hankou's development dreams (Wuhan SASC 2012). Yet it is politically infeasible for a municipal authority to make any kinds of demands on a branch of the Chinese military for land, a classic example of what You-tien Hsing terms "socialist land masters" (Hsing, 2006). However, the State Council in 1999 passed new

[96] The Central Development Bank has also been a major provider of financing for some of the major infrastructure projects described earlier in the chapter, including the subway tunnel and newest Yangtze River Bridge (Miller, 2012).

regulations governing allowable locations for airports relative to population centers, a move that not only justified, but mandated the base's relocation. In a tremendous boon for the Wuhan government, the State Council approved the transfer of all 4,000 mu under municipal control once the Air Force had found and built a suitable relocation site (one was eventually chosen and developed in the outlying district of Xinzhou). To prepare for the property's eventual development, the city of Wuhan established the Hankou Airport Relocation Company (HARC) in 1999 with a registered capital of 100 milion RMB (WuZheng 1999, No. 92). A cooperative agreement to develop a new CBD in Wuhan was signed by five development companies in February of 2002, though no firm plans were yet made public: Oceanwide Holdings, based in Shenzhen, HARC, the Guangcai Construction Company (a subsidiary of Oceanwide), the Beijing Zhongguancun Development and Construction Company, and Stone Giant Light Technology Holding Company, establishing the Wuhan Wangjiadun Central Business District Construction and Investment Company (WCIC) to oversee planning and development with startup capital of 400 million RMB. In January of 2003, then Party Secretary Li Xiansheng confirmed that Wangjiadun would become the location for a new Central Business District with basic planning completed in 2004 ("Wangjiadun Early Blueprint").

At this point, it is unclear exactly what entity was steering CBD development, but it was certainly a close collaboration between municipal officials, planners, and a mix of state and private financing. The new air base in Xinzhou was completed in 2006, by which time HARC had raised significant funds for the development of road and water infrastructure, clearing of the base property, and acquiring additional land on the periphery of the former base. In 2006, HARC acquired 13 agricultural plots and 4 tracts of urban

construction land (Sina 2011). The next year, it acquired 1313 mu more, increasing the land under its control by roughly 30%. In preparation for development, HARC oversaw the demolition of some 600,000 sq. meters of housing and other buildings, and accelerated construction on new roads, with an initial 724 million RMB loan interest-free from the Bank of China Hubei Branch with the assurance of more to follow (Ibid.). Additionally in 2007, the municipal government issued a 15-year plan for the completion of the Wangjiadun CBD, with basic infrastructure to be completed by the end of the 11th 5-year plan (2012). The expected cost for the first stage was estimated at 4.9 billion RMB, 3.2 to be paid for by HARC with the rest coming from state banks including the Bank of China, CITIC, Bank of Communication and the Industrial Bank of China. Some estimates for total infrastructure alone for the CBD were as high as 16.9 billion RMB (WPB).

While HARC (renamed the Wuhan Central Business District Holding Company in 2008) was busy clearing a path for new development, China Oceanwide was gradually increasing its stake in WCIC. Oceanwide is one of many real estate giants in China that have been accused of practicing "idle land appreciation" (*zuodi shengzhi*) to increase share values—purchasing massive plots of land at low prices and letting it remain idle while peripheral developments increase the value of the land.[97] The practice also contributes to an artificial scarcity of land, driving up housing and other prices. In 2004, WCIC paid 1.8 billion RMB and 72 million RMB in deed taxes to the municipal government as a claim on Wangjiadun. As of 2007, Oceanwide's stake increased to 60% after buying out Stone Giant.

[97] A Guangzhou Daily story reported that Oceanwide owned holdings in Beijing that had remained idle for as long as 6 years, and plots in Shanghai that had been idle for 10 years.

After as much as 6 billion RMB in infrastructure development and demolition of the old airport the estimated land value around Wangjiadun was at least 6.5 million RMB/mu. With a 60% stake, the added value to Oceanwide's shares alone was in the billions.[98] Meanwhile, Oceanwide continued to buy out its partners in WCIC, obtaining an 80% stake prior to 2010 when a Beijing subsidiary of Oceanwide purchased the remaining 20% of WCIC for 888.74 million RMB, placing the entire development for the entire CBD under its control (*Chutian Jinbao* 8/12/2010).

While a lot of money and land has changed hands in the process of developing the CBD, progress in its actual construction has been slow. Although the municipality's windfall for the sale of use-rights to Wangjiadun pales in comparison to the profits Oceanwide stands to make as the sole *de facto* owner of the WCIC (expectations are that the CBD will attract 100 billion RMB in investments by 2020), it has also absolved itself of responsibility for developing Wangjiadun with infrastructure costs largely being overtaken by Oceanwide. In 2009, ground finally broke on Wuhan Tower and the Oceanwide International Town, although construction on Wuhan Tower did not actually begin until December of 2013.

Funding for these projects and the significant infrastructure investments already made are largely debt-financed. The initial startup funds for the WCIC included a 200 million RMB loan from the state-owned Chinese Development Bank. As of January 2009,

[98] The precise value-added to Wangjiadun is difficult to pinpoint as actual housing and commercial spaces have yet to be built, much less sold. One report estimated that Oceanwide had increased the value of its stake above its investments by more than 3 billion RMB in 2008.

Oceanwide had received 3.8 billion RMB from the state-owned China Construction Bank, and announced a new 7.86 billion RMB credit line for continued development primarily in Wuhan and Beijing (Oceanwide Report 2012, 2013). The company issued 3.2 billion RMB in corporate bonds in part to pay for Wangjiadun construction costs and to make payments on bank loans, including debts to the state-owned Hubei Branch of the Central Development Bank, the Jianghan Construction Bank, and the Jianghan Communication Bank (Table 5.1).

Hankou, then, is the site for Wuhan to establish and entrench its premier financial and commercial position in central China, and facilitate its desired actualization as the horizontal and vertical link at the center of the country's major growth poles. The details of the Wangjiadun case are influenced by the spatial specificities of the Chinese land and property rights' regimes, but the larger pattern is familiar to neoliberal critique: the selling-off of state resources and the transfer of public goods into private hands. Indeed, China Oceanwide obtained use-rights to Wangjiadun at 1600 RMB/sq. meter and intends to sell or lease properties for upwards of 14,000 RMB/sq. meter. Perhaps the argument could be made that this is a demonstration of China's new neoliberal urbanism. However, the "neoliberal urbanism" of Wuhan's development is only straightforward when taken in isolation. The process of developing the Wangjiadun business district has included multiple interventions by the local state, at the very least, a collaboration of state agencies, municipal and district cadres, and quasi-private developers. It would not be an overstatement, however, to claim the state *orchestrated* the development of Wangjiadun through these public-private intersections.

Intersections of party and corporate power, state and business financing, development and capital accumulation are so intensively intertwined that crony capitalism (or "crony socialism?") may not be a sufficient moniker for what is taking place in China today. The Oceanwide Group is registered as a private company based in Shenzhen, founded in 1985. Founder and chairman Lu Zhiqiang is not only Vice-Presdent of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and deputy Chairman of the China Minsheng Bank—he is also a member of the standing committee of the 12th Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. With extensive lines of credit issued from state-owned Wuhan-based banks, the future of Wuhan is intimately connected to the ability of Oceanwide to

Table 5.1 Creditors Repaid by 2009 Bond Issued By the Oceanwide Real Estate Development Company

Lending bank	Bank Type	Date of repayment	Interest Rate	Repayment amount
Oceanwide Construction Bank—Shenzhen	Oceanwide Subsidiary	9/18/2009	7.938	280 million RMB
Bank of China—Shenzhen	State-Owned	3/27/2010	8.019	200 million RMB
CDB Hubei Branch	State-Owned	11/25/2009	7.83	130 million RMB
Wangjiadun CBD Development Company	State-Owned	5/25/2010	7.83	225 million RMB
Construction Investment Corporation Bank, Jianghan Branch	State-Owned	7/12/2009	6.237	100 million RMB
Bank of Communications, Jianghan Branch	State-Owned	7/14/2009	6.327	100 million RMB
Total				1.04 billion RMB

Source: finance.sina.com.cn

successfully finance and carry out the development of Wangjiadun. Land acquisitions, development, and construction carried out "privately" by Oceanwide is largely funded through party-state investment. With over a billion RMB in loans coming due in 2009 and 2010, Oceanwide issued 3.2 billion RMB in corporate bonds to pay back loans and continue financing development projects including Wangjiadun. The major creditors included four state-owned banks, three of them based in Wuhan, and a subsidiary of Oceanwide (Table 5.1).In fact, these interconnections extend beyond Wuhan. The main purchasers of the bond include private and state actors that have tied at least a portion of their fiscal futures on Wuhan's CBD. Major holders of Oceanwide's bonds include Ping An Insurance Group and its subsidiaries. Ping An's ownership structure has been described by one commentator as "murky," and in a 2012 report, the *New York Times* found that then Premier Wen Jiabao's family and associates owned $2.2 billion worth of stock in the insurance giant (Barboza 2012). Other major bond-holders include the National Social Security Fund, a 700 billion RMB reserve for future social security payments, and two state-owned banks, the Bank of China and the China Construction Bank (Oceanwide Report 2013). Major shareholders include Yuan Shaobin, the President of state-owned CITIC Construction and three state-owned international trusts based in Jiangsu, Beijing, and Yunnan. The Sichuan Trust is a major creditor for the Wuhan Tower and Wuhan Oceanwide Plaza with 1.5 billion RMB invested in the two projects. Sichuan Trust is a subsidiary of Sichuan Hongda, a mining and chemical company based in Chengdu. Among its shareholders are the state-owned Jiangsu International Trust and Yunnan International Trust that are also heavily invested in Oceanwide.

None of this on its face suggests that the state is exerting undue influence on Oceanwide's business decisions that would imply a "subversion" of market capitalism.

5.2 Selected Loans to Oceanwide Subsidiaries for the Development of Wangjiadun CBD (2002-2013)

Borrowing Entity	Year	Lending Entity	Ownership Type	Amount of Loans (1 million RMB)
WCIC	2002	Central Development Bank—Wuhan Branch	State-Owned	200
WCIC	2002	Central Development Bank—Wuhan Branch	State-Owned	1,840
WCIC	2010	Wuhan Bank of Communications	State-Owned	100
WCIC	2011	Shenzhen Development Bank—Wuhan Branch[99]	Mixed	400
WCIC	2011	Jiangsu International Trust	State-Owned	600
WCIC	2012	China Merchants Bank—Hanyang Branch	Private	700
WCIC	2012	Lujiazui International Trust Investment Company[100]	Private	5,000
WCIC	2013	Hankou Bank	State-Owned	130
Wuhan Oceanwide Plaza Company	2012	Sichuan Trust	Private	1,500
Wuhan Tower Development Company	2013	Ping'an Bank—Wuhan Branch	Private	500
Wuhan Tower Development Company	2013	Sichuan Trust	Private	1,000

Source: CITIC Securities

[99] Formerly a state-owned bank, the Shenzhen Development Bank was merged into Ping An in 2012.
[100] Lujiazui International Trust is a private company based in Shanghai's Pudong District. According to its company profile, it is involved in all sorts of real estate development and infrastructure projects, including organizing and developing resettlement housing.

Every actor involved has a reason to be motivated to increase Oceanwide's accumulation of capital, so there is a capitalism at work here. But is it possible, or even desirable from an epistemological standpoint to attempt to isolate the "market" from the "state"? Wangjiadun is an example of the way Chinese capitalism is articulated in urban developments where state and private capital interests are so intimately intertwined that it is impossible to differentiate them.

A superficial analysis of the transfer of land to Oceanwide could easily conclude this is an example of neoliberal urbanism—the privatization of public land. Yet in the analysis I have offered above, the process of developing Wangjiadun leads me to conclude that private capital is not manipulating the state in order to accumulate capital. Rather, the state is employing and regulating capital to achieve its own development goals. This intertwining of state and capital interests is the first way in which Wuhan's spatial structure is articulated.

5.6 Conclusion: Paradox Cities

During one of my stays in Wuhan I resided in the foreign students' dormitory of a local university. In late March, a message was posted to the billboard of the lobby announcing that water would be shut off for the day. When I enquired about the reason, a friend told me there had been an explosion at the district water treatment center, and they were taking the day to clean any toxic pollutants that could be entering the water supply as a result. I asked when the explosion had taken place. I was surprised when he said it happened at the end of December. It took the district three months to take action on a potential source of contamination for the drinking supply of more than a million people.

Chinese cities over the past decade have frequently been trumpeted as new models of success, demonstrations of China's return to greatness and the inevitability of the "Chinese century." Municipal officials engage this narrative as both motive and justification for massive urban construction projects, driven by the marriage of self-interest, urban boosterism, and as a means of spatializing party-state ideology. The anecdote above, symbolic of the environmental devastation under way in China, undermine this simple narrative. At the same time, they underscore the motives of urban officials to trumpet their progress toward livability, sustainability, and the construction of an eco-city without surrendering the commitment to economic development through industrialization, export processing, and the swallowing up of agricultural and forestland for urban construction. The discourse of success, promulgated through media reports, hosting visiting cadre tours, and attendance at national and international conferences cannot be interrupted by such trivialities as unbreathable air, undrinkable water, and unpassable roads. Instead, the very actions that contribute to environmental decline—industrialization, expansion of transportation networks, river shipping, and industrial agriculture, are repackaged as green alternatives for the livable, world-class city. It is this re-packaging of Western concepts of the livable city for purposes of spatial governance that make up the second half of Tang's critique of the urban China literature: "random conceptual appropriation." It is to this critique that I turn to in the next chapter through an exploration of Wuhan's program of rural-urban integration.

Chapter 6
Assimilating the Periphery: Territorial Politics and Rural-Urban Integration

6.1 Introduction

From China experts in academia to popular authors across the political spectrum, descriptions of China's urbanization over the past several decades tend to employ a common grab-bag of vocabulary. The scale of China's urbanization is at once unprecedented, breakneck, explosive, and massive. They also deploy a variety of numbers that similarly convey the magnitude of China's urbanization (e.g. Tom Miller's *China's Urban Billion*). Yet the territorial politics that structure China's urbanization are underexplored. While the dual structure has been explicitly addressed as a state intervention to regulate and govern migration, its role in defining the rural-urban interface is poorly understood. Emphasis is largely on differential property rights regimes in rural and urban areas, but not the ways in which rural peripheries are increasingly brought under the planning and governing purveyance of municipal governments.

Wuhan in particular has extended authority over its hinterlands to an unusual degree under the "8+1" and "Sustainable Society" policies. Of special interest is the project of rural-urban integration (*chengxiang yitihua,* hereafter RUI) that in principle eliminates the barriers to integrated planning raised by institutions of the dual structure. Before launching into the Wuhan's experiments with RUI, I open this chapter with

another "random conceptual indigenization" that prevailed in peri-urban studies in the 1980s and 1990s, the "*desakota* thesis."

6.2 Interpreting Chinese Spaces: *Desakota* and Spatial Determinism

In the mid-to-late 1980s, a group of urban scholars began reporting observations of patterns of urban construction and industrialization across East and Southeast Asia that were unfamiliar to any existing urbanization models. Distinguishing them was a spatial organization where rural and urban forms, structures, and livelihoods were interwoven in a discontinuous pattern. These dispersed observations crystallized into the *desakota* thesis first put forth by TG McGee in 1989 that had a strong influence on China geographers. There was great appeal in the *desakota* thesis as an alternative approach to understanding spatial forms independently of models built on the experiences of Western cities. While the broader field of urban studies was coalescing around structural explanations for urban forms, the discourses of world cities, and studies at the time that were primarily focused on the former Soviet bloc countries but of obvious relevance to China, studies of market transition. Based on his own research in Indonesia, McGee's concept of the *desakota* (also referred to as "Extended Metropolitan Regions") suggested a previously unrecognized spatial organization that blurred traditional rural-urban boundaries. The term was intended to capture the mixture of agricultural and non-agricultural landscapes near or between large cities that did not fit neatly into traditional classifications of rural or urban space (McGee 1989; Ginsberg and McGee 1991). McGee's initial "desakaota thesis" was followed by a plethora of localized case studies across Asia identifying desakota regions in Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand as well as China.

Especially active in extending the "deasakota thesis" to explain China's urbanization were two McGee protégées, George Lin and Andrew Marton who picked up on the desakota framework as a means to explain patterns of rural industrialization in the Pearl and Yangtze River Deltas (Lin 1996; Marton 2002). This was important work for its recognition of new geographies of industrialization and to some extent, it helped to subvert rigid dichotomies between rural and urban economic activity. However, the "desakota thesis" failed to identify any kind of causality for the formation of *desakota* in various locales (Tang and Chung 2002). Dick and Rimmer rejected the thesis out of hand, claiming that the descriptions of *desakota*, with their focus on types of economic activity (distinguished as agricultural or non-agricultural), overlooked the universal cosmopolitanism that characterizes urban life—a conflation of *industrialization* and *urbanization* (Dick and Rimmer 1994). In this sense, they argued that *desakota* spaces were, if anything, transitional, and moving toward convergence with Western cities, a proposition that was challenged as ethnocentric by Wu and Ma (2005).

In retrospect, there was a deeper problem with the *desakota* literature that goes beyond its thin theoretical foundation. Efforts to highlight divergence from Western experience failed to recognize the shifting patterns of urbanization already underway in Europe and North America. These phenomena have been (and continue to be) studied under countless names: edge cities, exurbanization, megacities, boomburbs, and the postmetropolis, to name but a few (Garreau 1991; Lang and LeFlurgy 2007; Knox 2008). The *desakota* literature, at best, identified some of the spatial specificities of Chinese urbanization—the highly localized institutional, economic, and cultural impulses shaping

developments in different sites—but there was no discernible effort to link the phenomena to any shared experiences or influences that could transcend local variation.

In his work on Kunshan in the Yangtze River Delta, Andrew Marton argued convincingly that locales and places are more fundamental to the production of industrial space than is generally recognized. On a process he terms "rural agglomeration", he writes:

> "Industrial space in the countryside was constructed through processes and mechanisms of growth, rather than through the efficient allocation of enterprises across the economic landscape. Industrialisation itself largely depended upon the capacity of local actors to negotiate and manage access to the means of production and markets. Under such conditions, decisions about the precise location of enterprises were in most cases not subject to the economic logic of conventional factors. That is, industries in the delta produced economic space without being 'held hostage' to pre-existing spatial distributions of supply and demand," (Marton 2002, 35)

His analysis of the local forces in Kunshan that generated industrialization in the Yangtze River Delta's countryside leads him to conclude that "external economies, the dynamics of agglomeration, and the role of large cities and other exogenous forces, while important, are apparently less significant in determining the precise character of local and regional transformation in the delta than are endogenous forces," (Ibid.: 37). He proposes that distinctions between rural and urban space are irrelevant for understanding spatial transformation in the Delta: "by rejecting this rural-urban dichotomy the conceptual framework can accommodate spatial patterns and morphologies which conform clearly to neither." (Ibid: 39).

My problem is not with Marton's description of the processes underway in the Yangtze River Delta, his emphases on the local environment, or even his rejection of the

rural-urban dichotomy. It is only by adopting a conceptually rigid understanding of "urban" that this economic process cannot be accommodated under the urban umbrella. Moreover, by adopting the term "rural agglomeration" (based on a translation from a Chinese study), he reproduces the very binary of rural and urban that he seeks to oppose with the claim that there is a distinctively rural form of industrialization that exists outside of conventional, urban-based logics. Marton also overlooks the far more salient political and legal ramifications underlying rural-urban distinctions in the Chinese context where rural is as important a legal/conceptual classification as it is descriptive of any particular spatial formation, lifestyle, or economic activity. The incentives for rural industrialization created by the institution of the household responsibility system, decentralization of finance, surplus rural labor, and local revenue imperatives resulted from reforms that modified, but did not abandon the dual structure. The result was that capital and labor continued to face restrictive, albeit somewhat relaxed, boundaries between the rural and urban sector, and prevented the agglomeration of early-reform industrialization in urban centers. The greater point to be made about spatial transformation in the Yangtze River Delta is that agglomeration was occurring, albeit in a more diffused pattern than would be predicted in older models of urbanization.

With their focus on subverting rural-urban dichotomies and identifying difference from the West, *desakota* writers privileged rural/local spaces at the expense of larger processes. It is not a coincidence that the most dynamic areas of rural industrial growth in the 1980s and 1990s were located near and cultivated ties with major urban centers. According to Barry Naughton, Shanghai in the Yangtze River Delta and Hong Kong in the PRD exemplified the way major urban centers provided "investment, subcontracting

relations, skilled technical and managerial personnel and information about market access" that facilitated rural industrialization (Naughton, 1995, 82). Naughton explains China's rural industrialization as an outcome, in part, of spillover from the continued strict economic controls over urban economies through the 1980s that inhibited private entrepreneurship and investment. Marton, Lin, McGee, and other advocates of the *desakota* thesis missed the point of the "quilted" pattern of agricultural and non-agricultural economic activity in the Chinese countryside in arguing the declining importance of agglomeration. In fact, the *desakota* were early markers of China's regional urbanization that continues today—a process that has been subsumed by urban-based territorial politics made possible by increased urban autonomy that allowed for sprawl, relative autonomy in employment and entrepreneurial endeavors (for *hukou* residents), tolerance of an informal economy, and commodity housing (Naughton, 1995). In short, China's rural-urban interface created (by accident or by design) a regional *synekism* that facilitated rapid development on a regional scale. However, by the end of the 1990s, municipalities and urban planners asserted their authority over the region. While economic development of suburban areas continued, it occurred under the increased capacity of urban centers to direct the development of its hinterlands.

Lost here was the opportunity to connect the evolving industrial geography of Chinese capitalism to the reformulations of cityspace taking place in the West—a chance to do more than wait for Western theoretical models to take shape and either emulate or reject them, but to make Chinese urban studies a central point for the building of spatial theory and city-making. At the same time the *desakota* thesis had its greatest cachet, the field of urban studies based in the West was undergoing significant transformation as

scholars attempted to reconceptualize notions of "the city" and "city*ness*" and accommodate new patterns of sprawl, exurbanization, and urban diffusion. For Soja, the outcome of effective agglomeration, no matter its morphological distinctiveness was *synekism*, the economic, cultural, social, and political stimulus created by intraurban effects, interurban linkages, and the regional network of cities that more and more frequently crossed rural and urban boundaries. "Cityspace," he writes, "is more complex than a singular urban core," (Soja, 1999, 16). One of the more fundamental processes examined in his work on Los Angeles is the "urbanization of the region" –a framework that could be more fruitful for understanding dispersed urbanization processes than the desakota framework which emphasizes isolated agency in independent locales. We should not be looking for porous borders between city and country space, but for the way "every individual city seems increasingly to contain the entire world within it," (Soja, 1999, 152). From this perspective, the "urban" is more than capable of accommodating the kinds of *in situ* industrialization taking place in the Chinese countryside over the first two decades of reform.

As an inductive theory of urbanization based on localized studies, the *desakota* thesis avoided some of the pratfalls of random indigenization, but it never addressed the structures and processes that created the hybridized spaces under observation. Ultimately, *desakota* studies failed to capture the forces driving mixed patterns of development due to a lack of engagement with the dual structure. Without a thorough investigation of the institutions regulating rural and urban space, the *desakota* thesis lacked explanatory power. Case studies were largely reduced to an observation that patterns of urbanization were somehow different in the Chinese context. Unexplained,

however, was what that context was and it how it came into being. In the reform era, the dual structure encouraged *in situ* urbanization not because of some unique feature of China's peasantry (their *Chineseness*), but through the structures of spatial governance that continued to differentially regulate rural and urban space. Although the invisible walls between city and country that once prevented unplanned mobility have become penetrable, the architecture of the dual structure continues to govern the rural-urban interface, and it is under this context that the rural-urban integration project unfolds.

6.3 Territorial Politics and Land Regimes

I understand China's territorial politics to be the multi-levelled contestation between spatial units in China's political hierarchy over the power and authority to regulate, distribute, and utilize land in a geographic area. Over the first decade of the PRC, the Chinese Communist Party gradually instituted a top-down Leninist political organization with space as a fundamental organizing principle for the delegation of power and economic organization. The most recognizable division was made between *agricultural* and *non-agricultural* space (Chapter 3), but the spatial hierarchy also organized power according to a variety of geographic categories. These categories were not invented out of thin air, however. As Cartier notes, every regime in China beginning from the dynastic era has maintained the same basic territorial governing system (Cartier 2011). What does change, however, is the ways in which the spatial administrative hierarchy is employed in negotiating relationships within it.

6.3.1 Separate Stoves: Rural Industrialization[101]

The industrial geography of the PRC in its first thirty years is most aptly characterized by a rigid bifurcation of rural-agricultural and urban-industrial space.[102] Despite the CCP's success in achieving a unified country in the narrow sovereignty/ territorial sense, it was simultaneously responsible for creating a rigid separation between China's rural and urban sectors that divided the population in a significant and long-lasting way. Under Mao, in pursuit of a rapid Soviet-type industrialization program, the CCP oversaw a "one country-two systems" approach to spatial governance, creating a highly unequal dual-society composed of a protected urban proletariat (beneficiaries of the "iron rice bowl") and a disenfranchised peasant class. Members of the urban class worked in the priority and protected industrial sector and had access to (at least basic) social welfare and full membership in the urban community.

On the other hand, peasants were tied to the land, compelled to produce an agricultural surplus for industrialization and were expected to fend for themselves independent from state beneficence under a policy of "self-reliance" (Chan 2010). This dual system was implemented in a totalitarian way that met with very little resistance. Any movement from the rural to urban sector was tightly controlled and generally forbidden. The *hukou* system was not merely a means of limiting rural to urban population and labor mobility, as it is commonly depicted, but also a system of social

[101] The phrase "Separate Stoves" in this context is borrowed from Tsai and Wang's influential 2004 article, "Between Separate Stoves and a Single Menu: Fiscal Decentralization in China."
[102] In addition, there were some efforts to industrialize inland provinces, most notably under the "Third Front" programs of the 1960s (Naughton 1988).

control aimed at excluding the rural population from access to state-provided goods, welfare, and entitlements. Indeed, in the Maoist era, the ban on rural outflow, along with an array of related measures, such as the collectivization of farmland and the restriction on its conversion to non-agricultural uses, ensured that rural populations remained bottled up in the countryside. These measures effectively circumscribed the peasantry's economic, social, and political opportunities and rights, creating a massive pool of super-low-cost rural labor tied to land of very little market value—essentially a de facto underclass. In short, the purpose of the dual structure in China's economic development has historically been to exploit the rural, agricultural sector in order to fund the urban industrialization program.

6.3.2 Constraining Urbanization: Maoist (dis)incentives for Rural Industrialization

China specialists in this period took these rural transformations as indicative of a new kind of industrialization immune to the conventional impulses of agglomeration, supply and demand, and spillover effects from big city expansion. Lin (1996) for example, argued that transportation technologies and flexible labor logics made agglomeration unnecessary in the Pearl River Delta. Oi (1999) emphasized cadre leadership and entrepreneurship, while Zhu (2000, 2002) added cultural explanations (among other arguments) for the success of rural industrialization in Fujian. While all of these factors were crucial to the success or failure of individual rural industries, they did not explain the nearly universal commitment to industrialization in the countryside beginning in the 1980s. China's rural industrialization, I argue, was shaped primarily by the dual-structure's *perpetuation*, not its alleviation. Implementation of the Household

Responsibility System (Chapter 3) illuminated a massive supply of surplus labor in China's countryside. The perpetuation of restrictive migration policies limited mobility options for surplus labor outside of so-called "3 D" work (dirty, dangerous, and degrading). Isolated from state financial contributions, villages in the reform era faced rising fiscal obligations for the provision of social welfare and public goods. These twin incentives of surplus labor and financial obligation combined with increased freedom to engage in non-agricultural activity encouraged the development of rural industries in the form of Town and Village Enterprises (TVEs). Social goals of employment combined with a tax structure that made rural industries desirable even if they were not profitable (Kung and Zhang 2012).

Rural industrialization, from the state's perspective, was advantageous as much for its potential to contain urban expansion as it was for improving rural living conditions. A series of simplistic slogans masking as policy in the 1980s and 1990s discouraged movement to China's largest cities (i.e., "Leave the land but not the village") with only limited success. When Zhao Ziyang was ousted and ultimately replaced by the Shanghai party chief Jiang Zemin in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square massacre, it signaled the end of the rural sector's dominance of the reform agenda. The Shanghai-based Jiang and the so-called "Shanghai clique" shifted policy focus to urban reform and state-led city investment (Fewsmith 2008). With political reform seemingly on permanent hiatus under Jiang, governmental authorities reasserted their economic leadership at all scales with the full support of Deng Xiaoping. Shanghai's influence exploded in the 1990s, becoming the new model of Chinese urbanization and cosmopolitanism. Throughout the country, development capital began shifting into urban

development, and municipal leaders sought political means to control as much of these capital flows as possible (Huang 2008).

3. *Rise of the Municipality: City Leading County and the Urbanization of the Region*

Under the transition narrative, the return of urban prominence to China's political economy was necessary to balance the inefficiencies and externalities caused by rural industry. In contrast, Huang (2008) argues that relative declines in the rural economy resulted at least in part because of changes to central government policy that reaffirmed the primacy of urban political units. Changes to China's fiscal and tax codes in 1994 and 1999 made rural industries less appealing for local cadres, while policies also emerged to make credit in the rural sector more difficult to obtain (Wong and Bird 2008). With individual households lacking access to any formal credit markets in the countryside, entrepreneurial prospects for peasants withered in the 1990s. The lack of available credit and other barriers to entry in rural entrepreneurship created a condition where the only reasonable means of obtaining non-agricultural income for rural residents was through migratory searches for wage labor. The intense competition for wage labor that resulted combined with institutional prejudices inherent in the *hukou* system to severely suppress wages for rural-urban migrants (Huang 2008: 122-3). State investment in core cities skyrocketed in the 1990s while rural gains in the previous decade were undermined by

state policy, the perpetuation of the *hukou* system, and increasingly negative discourses of peasants as intrinsically obstructive to development.[103]

The Jiang Zemin years in China saw what some urban geographers view as an active rescaling of the exercise of power within China's spatial hierarchy (Ma 2005). By the end of his administration, municipal governments had attained a prominent position within the spatial political hierarchy, wielding considerable control over existing urban territories and rural territories on the periphery. This power stemmed from the municipality's growing adroitness at exploiting the dual-track land regime for its own gain—putting urban governments in position to not only monopolize rural land markets, but to determine trajectories of development in the countryside. Localities had a clear incentive to give their jurisdictions the best possible position within the spatial administrative hierarchy. Given the growing authority of urban governmental regimes to control and regulate capital and land resources, local cadres were eager to expand existing urban territories, or to reclassify rural areas as "urban." Ma (2005) identified three major strategies to achieve urban "rescaling": *xiangaishi* converting cities into counties, *shiguanxiang* cities administering counties, or *shidaixian*—cities leading counties, and *chexian shequ* cities annex suburban counties. The restructuring of territorial power was intended by the center to facilitate regional coordination and diffuse urban values into the countryside. In practice, it has encouraged the "totalization" of spatial power under the urban umbrella through the adoption of spatial practices that

[103] This discourse was affirmed even by parties sympathetic to rural concerns as in the "Three Rural Problems"

institutionalize and subordinate former rural areas as urban places within a network of state power (Tang and Chung 2002: 45). Place-based competitiveness further encourages cadres to build more restrictive networks, enabling local actors to monopolize accumulation and development practices.

On the surface, the changing dynamics of place-politics in China's urban landscape appear to correlate well with similar shifts in Europe and North America—interurban competitiveness, urban entrepreneurialism, rescaling and scale-jumping, and territorialization are but a few of the trends identified as intrinsic to the neoliberal turn in urban development since the 1980s (Brenner and Theodore 2002b). These trends were picked up on by prominent China scholars and rolled out as a means of linking with the broader field of urban geography (See Chapter 2). However, there is a fundamental difference between the kinds of place-based competitiveness observed in the West and what was going on in China's urban areas. While Western cities were supposedly "rescaling" in order to capture greater flows of globalized capital, Chinese territories were reorganizing in order to capture greater resources from within the state. In other words, the interest in administrative urbanization, while at times couched in terms of appealing to capital investment, was mapped directly onto the spatial administrative hierarchy of the party-state. Scale analysis, especially with its emphasis on the global, decenters the nation-state, characterizing the reterritorialization of cities as a strategy to leap-frog the state and tap directly into global capital flows. Localities in China, however, were boosting their rank in order to enhance their power *within* the state hierarchy, expand access to state resources, and to control the trajectories of resources within their borders. At the same time, in places like Wuhan, local governments also

attempted to expand its territorial power over the hinterlands for similar reasons. I am not trying to suggest that global capital flows have no influence on the trajectories of China's urban development, far from it. However, the role of the global needs to be tempered with a balanced understanding of how it plays into China's internal spatial politics.

The political economy dynamics discussed above are an important component of the "spatial specificities" characterizing Chinese cities over the last two decades. These political practices and discursive imaginaries are driving China's state-building since the turn-of-the-century through what Hsing (2010) calls the "urbanization of the state." While her employment of the term is not always intuitive, it highlights a shift in governmental logics from one that strictly divides rural and urban space to one where all space is imagined as integrated with an urban political economy. However, this is not the extinction of China's dual structure, in fact, in many respects, it is driven by it. Unequal power relations between urban and rural units, and differential access and influence within higher levels of state authority are a huge incentive for rural officials to reclassify their jurisdictions as urban. Moreover, in practice, the expanding territorial control of cities moves the rural-urban relationship from a system of "separate and unequal" to a system of "integrated inequality" where spaces and populations are nominally absorbed into the urban governance regime but only inasmuch as that practice privileges the interests of the urban core.

In addition to the structural flaws to the *desakota* thesis described above, the case studies were also noticeably limited in their geographic scope. Situated primarily in the

Yangtze and Pearl River Deltas, *desakota* studies articulated a type of development that arose from regional geographies characterized by relatively independent villages with strong historical identities and resource bases. Wuhan demonstrates a substantially different spatial politics where power is highly concentrated in the municipality. The concept of *da Wuhan* espoused by Party Secretary Ruan and Mayor Tang challenges the kinds of in situ urbanization and "spontaneous" industrialization that characterized *desakota* studies. Here, rural industrialization and urbanization is as much a reflection of the colonization of the rural periphery by the urban core. The project of rural-urban integration (RUI) in Wuhan is resulting, not in an integrated *system* of spatial regulation, but the subordination of interests on the periphery to the needs of the central city while not altering the substance of the dual structure in any way.

6.4 Expanding Wuhan: Centers, Peripheries, and Rural Urban Integration

The administrative division with the most relevance for planning, policy, and life-opportunities in the Wuhan Municipality is the division between the seven central and six outlying districts (Table 6.1). In 2011, outer districts accounted for almost 90% of municipal area, but only 42.3% of its population. However, they account for 93% of the city's population with rural registration.[104] There are also vast discrepancies in per capita income between the central and outlying districts, an issue common to municipalities throughout China.

[104] Although agricultural and non-agricultural *hukou* distinctions were abolished by Hubei in 2004, the Wuhan Statistical Bureau continues to report and publish data based on these categories (Chan 2010).

Table 6.1 Main Districts and Outer Districts Compared (2011)

	Population	Population with Rural Registration	Area (1,000 Hectares)	Per Capita Annual Disposable Income (RMB)[105]
Main City Districts % of City Total	4,772,867 57.7%	170,929 6.1%	888.42 10.5%	27,170.7
Outer Districts % of City Total	3,499,518 42.3%	2,635,518 93.4%	7,605.99 89.5%	17,878.7
Municipal Total	8,272,385	2,806,447	8,494.41	23,239.8

Source: Wuhan Bureau of Statistics 2012

Moreover, inequality is greater across the outlying districts than it is in the central districts. Central Districts report almost no difference in per capita disposable income across the six districts, while income ranges from a high of 23,145 RMB in Dongxihu to a low of 16,915 RMB in Xinzhou (WBS 2012). This is almost entirely accounted for by differences in non-rural household income. The relatively prosperous outlying districts are the beneficiaries of the diffusion of industry and major economic development zones—Hannan and Caidian border Hanyang and the Wuhan Economic Development Zone and play an increased role in providing supporting industries for major companies

[105] The difference between income in these figures is distorted by the difference between suburban incomes in the outer district and truly rural areas further away from the center.

located there. Hannan in particular has been the focus of Wuhan's rural-urban integration project (discussed below). Meanwhile, two-thirds of Dongxihu's labor force is employed on state-owned farms that supply agricultural products for processing in the national – level development zone (WBS 2012).

Rural-urban inequality has been a pressing concern for national leaders and was made a priority by the administration of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao. The discrepancies in income, opportunity, and rights between rural and urban residents in China is well known (Whyte 2009; Chan 2010). Less recognized is the degree to which rural-urban inequality plays out *within* municipal borders. Through the 1980s and 1990s, municipalities including Wuhan expanded their jurisdictions to control ever greater swathes of territory on the hinterlands. The outlying districts have served municipal leaders as a source of land for continuing urban construction and expanded territorial authority in the reform era. Yet the more Wuhan develops, the greater the dissonance between the globally-oriented urban form of the central city and limited opportunities on the periphery. It is for this reason that municipal regimes have embraced the rhetoric of "rural-urban integration" through the lens of building the Sustainable Society within the 8+1 framework. In connecting the region through transportation networks and a reorganization of the region's industrial geography, Ruan and other leaders of Wuhan hope to realize the dream of *Da Wuhan*.

6.4.1 Visions of the City: *Da Wuhan* and Rural-Urban Integration

In the fall of 2000, Li Changping, a rural cadre in Hubei Province submitted a letter to Premier Zhu Rongji criticizing unfair tax burdens on peasants used to pay for a bloated and inefficient rural bureaucracy. The letter was later published in a newspaper

and circulated broadly (eventually turning into a book). The letter not only raised public awareness and sympathy for rural problems, but made the "three rural problems" (*sannong wenti*) a regular part of national political discourse. Two years later, the decidedly city-centric President Jiang Zemin declared to the 16th National Party Congress that a "widening urban-rural gap impedes China's efforts realize the task of building a well-off society," (cited in Ye 2010). In order to remedy this, Jiang announced the necessity for "coordinated urban-rural development" (*tongchou chengxiang fazhan*). Reformulating China's development model to enhance participation of the rural sector was a major initiative of Jiang and Zhu's successors, President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao. From 2004, the State Council under Wen reintroduced the annual Central Document No. 1, a device used to publicize the direction of rural reforms in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Under Wen, the annual Central Document No. 1 was a means of identifying problems of rural development and articulating development and policy priorities. Bridging an increasing gap in rural-urban development was critical to their larger plan of building a "harmonious society" (Ibid.). They called for enhanced funding for culture, education and health targeted at the countryside, a commitment to "give more, take less, and be more flexible," encouraging industry that would support agriculture and cities to support rural areas, equal access to basic urban and rural public services, and the establishment of a social insurance system to cover both urban and rural areas (Ibid.). By 2006, Hu and Wen encapsulated the cumulative proposals from these

documents into the policy of "building a new socialist countryside,"[106]and it was a centerpiece of the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010).[107]

In 2007, urban-rural integration (*chengxiang yitihua*) attained prominence as a roadmap toward achieving coordinated development, and its importance was affirmed in 2010's Central Document No. 1 (*Xinhua* 2/1/2010). Rhetorically, rural-urban integration (*chengxiang yitihua*, hereafter, RUI) seeks to overcome the structural divisions between rural and urban areas to form an "organic whole." According to Hubei Party Secretary Huang Chuping, rural-urban integration is fundamentally about providing "equal development and development opportunities" in rural and urban areas, and allowing rural residents and farmers greater opportunities to "share in the fruits of development," (Huang, 2010). It is tacit acknowledgement that China's development model has profoundly failed rural residents and farmers over the past two decades. Combined with the task of "building a new socialist countryside," rural-urban integration is the centerpiece of national strategies to remedy the so-called "three rural problems",and to bring regional coherence to urban development. Moreover, rural-urban integration is situated within the broader aims of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao's administration to create a

[106] See "Opinions on the Positive Development of Modern Agriculture for the building of a new socialist countryside (《关于积极发展现代农业扎实准进社会主义新农村建设的若要于意见》, 12/31/2006).

[107] There were a variety of substantive reforms in this period, most notably the abolishment of agricultural taxes in 2006 and the establishment of a new rural cooperative medical system in 2003. Other programs included the establishment of a minimum purchase price for many categories of agricultural products, increased subsidies for agricultural inputs, and some subsidies for education (Ye 2010).

"harmonious society," one that is not racked with such dramatic spatial, social, and economic inequalities.

While it has long been a buzzword in party documents, rural-urban integration was thrust to the forefront of national policy in 2007 when Chongqing and Chengdu were chosen as national comprehensive "experimental zones" for implementing RUI. Although the charisma and cult of personality surrounding Chongqing's Party Secretary Bo Xilai received the lions' share of media attention before his ultimate removal and arrest in 2012, there is a strong commitment to reforms within the Chongqing bureaucracy that enacted the most ambitious affordable housing, land administration, and *hukou* reforms in the country.

On December 31, 2007, the State Council articulated the main features of RUI: integrating planning, industrial layout, infrastructure, public services, employment, and social management. In October of 2008, the Third Plenary Session of the CPC called on all party and government agencies to prioritize rural development, with 2020 set as the target date for achieving basic RUI according to the six integrations listed above (Blue, 2011; Xinhua, 10/12/2008). In particular the Plenum work report emphasized balancing rural and urban development—a paradigm shift that sought, at least in name, to remove the conceptual separation of rural and urban development.

It is noteworthy that this announcement took place in the context of the global financial meltdown which saw a general shift in thinking about the Chinese economy, with many arguing for the need to shift away from the export-model of development toward domestic consumption. Increasing consumption of the rural population has the potential to sustain Chinese development over the next two decades (Bin, 2008).

Additionally, contradictory interests at different levels of government had put increased pressure on rural residents to give up their farmland. At higher levels, officials were concerned with the inefficient use of farmland, particularly arable land left unused due to rural-urban migrations as part of broader, long-standing concerns with domestic food-security (Lin, 2009). Municipal governments, meanwhile, were driven by revenue and development imperatives to claim more rural land for urban construction. Recognizing that changes were needed in the land allocation system, alternatives were politically charged—full privatization of rural land was on the table prior to the plenum, but was ultimately dismissed for ideological reasons, as well as fear that it would create a mass of landless peasants who would overwhelm urban areas (Ibid.). Clearly, dramatic rural reforms could not move forward without constructing a more integrated social safety net and labor force.

It was certainly not the first time the party had promoted rural development, but with Hu Jintao and especially Premier Wen Jiabao's active support, the proclamations of the Plenum were buttressed by local agendas. As with many other major initiatives emanating from Beijing, RUI is more a set of broad objectives than a detailed set of policy prescriptions, giving municipalities flexibility to develop localized strategies for implementation and experimentation. While the Plenum did not advance specific policy changes, it served as legitimation for such experiments, and by the end of the year, cities across China had announced comprehensive rural-urban integration plans. A series of general practices have emerged from these cities' engagements with RUI: elimination, at

least in name, of rural-urban *hukou* distinctions,[108] the conversion of agricultural land on the margins to urban construction land, road construction to improve transportation networks, and building commodity housing to replace traditional village homes. Of these, road infrastructure has taken the lion's share of revenue. For example, the World Bank reports that in its participation in Chongqing's RUI program, $115 million of its $184 million program is going to road improvements, primarily connecting villages to wider transportation networks (Ji, 2013). Tangible achievements in expanding health insurance and social safety nets have been less visible.

6.4.2 Integration or Assimilation? RUI in Practice in Hannan District

"Your life as it has been is over. From this time forward, you will service us,"
--Locutus of the Borg, *Star Trek: The Next Generation*, "The Best of Both Worlds"[109]

I open this section with reference to popular science-fiction because the municipal officials behind the juggernaut of China's urban expansion, like the Borg, do not seek out cooperation, collaboration or even coordination with their outlying, rural districts. Once the urban center successfully penetrates the rural-urban boundaries of the dual structure,

[108] Several cities and even some provinces have done away with separate rural and urban hukou for residents of the same municipality. However, in practice, this has not meant equal access to urban public goods. Individuals are still bound to their place of registration at the level of the neighborhood street office or village. See Chan 2013, Chan and Buckingham 2008. It is also notable that even where rural-urban hukou have been discontinued, state statistical bureaus and government agencies still track agricultural and non-agricultural populations. The 2010 census also made this calculation, see explanation in Chan 2013.

[109] In the Star Trek Universe, the Borg are a species of human-synthetic hybrids who expand relentlessly and assimilate all other species it encounters. While they are seen as a violent and conquering juggernaut by non-Borg, the Borg themselves portray themselves as a positive force: "We only wish to raise the quality of life for all species," says one Borg to those who oppose assimilation. The ultimate goal of the Borg is to achieve perfection by adding the biological and technological distinctiveness of species to their own: "Your culture will adapt to service us."

the process of assimilating the countryside into the service of central urban planning can be swift and complete.

The other half of Wingshing Tang's "random conceptual indigenization" discussed in the previous chapter is of use here: random conceptual appropriation. Appropriation here is less a characteristic of scholarship but of appropriation where "only those concepts or aspects of concept beneficial to the governing are introduced to the country," (Tang, 2014: 49). In the random appropriation of globally-produced knowledge, best practices, and mobilized policies, government actors do not reveal ideological commitment to the conceptual whole, but instead act as legitimation of state policies because they are grounded in "scientific" principles. Western (and non-Western) constructions of knowledge are presented as rational, best-practices but adopted selectively in order to maintain or create a new basis for state power. This is a sharp contrast to the serious confrontations with Western political traditions in the late-Qing conducted by scholars like Yan Fu and Liang Qichao (Huang 2008). In fact, it is possible the randomness Tang suggests goes further than just representations of particular western concepts, and imbues every facet of governance: "As time proceeds, there is always a need for the city-dominated fractions within the state to rationalize this urban-biased policy by coining new concepts," (Tang 2014: 50). The end result for Tang is that, consciously or not, Western concepts "mediate the crushing of the everyday life of people in Chinese cities," (Ibid. 57).

The city-region imagined in the 8+1 plan and the industrial reorganization necessary to build a sustainable society rely on "random conceptual indigenization and appropriation" to form a "scientific basis" for expropriation, forced migration, and the

continued subjugation of rural livelihoods and spaces. Skeptics view many RUI programs as coercive, indicative of forced proletarianization, resulting in widespread dislocation of farmers and rural residents who are often packed into newly built apartment complexes while their land is transformed for urban development functions (Zheng 2010). RUI may often be little more than ideological window-dressing for continued land grabs by municipal and district officials. In Chongqing, for example, rural residents were offered urban *hukou* in exchange for surrendering their claims to allocated village land. In theory, this exchange is voluntary, and rural residents are not obligated to surrender their use-rights immediately. However, in practice, there have been numerous reports of strong pressure from local officials and village cadres to participate in the program (Yuen 2014; "Invisible" 2010).[110] In many cases, development projects geared toward RUI prioritize urban interests in the construction of luxurious commodity housing for commuters in central districts. RUI is also ideological legitimation for the transfer of high-polluting industrial activity from central districts to the surrounding countryside. This is evident in Wuhan where polluting industries are required according to the city's master plan to relocate outside the Third Ring Road (WHP 2010). In other cases, villages adopt plans that mimic the urban built environment without addressing the needs of actual residents (May 2010).

Municipal leaders have focused on rural-urban integration as a means of promoting Wuhan according to official discourses on development since 2009. In

[110] Universities in Chongqing are reportedly under pressure to make sure students convert their rural *hukou* following enrollment (Zhang 2010).

functional terms, this has resulted in rapid growth in investment, infrastructure construction, agricultural modernization projects, and the construction of commodity housing in Wuhan's outer districts. In particular, there has been a concerted effort to construct a commodity housing market in the outlying districts, both for the resettlement of agricultural households, and the suburbanization of housing for urban professionals. There is an underlying vision informing RUI in Wuhan that treats the outlying districts as a frontier of empty space, a *tabula rasa* for the creation of a suburban landscape to support the three towns and, especially, Hanyang. Rural-urban integration, for all of its lofty rhetoric, is still framed by the dual structure it seeks to transcend and in its implementation, is manipulated to secure urban-centered goals.

The centerpiece of Wuhan's RUI is Hannan District, southwest of the industrial centers of Hanyang. It is the most sparsely populated district in Wuhan and one of the poorest. Only some 25,000 of its 110,000 people was registered as non-agricultural in 2009 when RUI programs began, and just under two-thirds of its labor force was engaged in farming, forestry, or fishing industries. That rate almost tripled in four years, with 69,000 people registered as urban in 2013 (Hannan Government). Hannan is organized into 49 natural villages, 4 street offices, and four state-owned farms. It was chosen as the pilot for Wuhan's RUI, in part, because of these characteristics: "Hannan's small scale and low population means there will be relatively little institutional friction, and will lower the costs of reform . . . Choosing this site as the pilot area for Wuhan's rural-urban integration will be conducive for exploring ways to develop the 'two-oriented society'," (Hannan CPC 2008).

In the District Party Committee's announcement of the pilot project, explicit reference is made to rural-urban integration as a means of developing the harmonious, well-off society and the sustainable city. It is also an acknowledgment of the vast inequalities of China's dual-structure: "The Wuhan region currently faces the problem of unbalanced economic and social development. Vast differences exist between the downtown city, outskirts, and rural areas . . . Hannan reform experiments in rural-urban integration will explore effective ways to accelerate development and narrow the rural-urban gap, especially between the central city and the outlying districts and showcase achievements in economic construction, reform, and development." (Ibid). In short, the rural-urban integration pilot in Hannan is promoted as an opportunity to showcase Wuhan as a model of reform and economic development for the region and the country.

Hannan was also chosen because of its geography. It is located on the Yangtze River to the south of Hanyang, and already connected to several major transportation networks, including the Beijing-Zhuhai and Shanghai-Chengdu expressways. Its location places Hannan in an optimal location to absorb industries required to locate outside the Third Ring Road by the Wuhan Master Plan. Furthermore, a relatively large portion of Hannan's arable land was owned by four state-farms. Combined with the low starting population density, the city hoped to face fewer struggles and costs over land expropriation while connecting it to the central city and regional transportation networks would be relatively simple (Ibid.). Hannan was also the "gateway to the southwest" of the Wuhan City Circle, linking the oil and mineral fields of the Jianghan Plains to the autocentric industries of the WEDZ.

5.6.3.3 Project Goals and Ideology:

The primary spatial effect of the dual structure is to limit the mobility of population and resources across administrative borders. RUI in Hannan does not eliminate these barriers, nor invite the residents of Hannan to live or work in the Three Towns. Instead, it lays the groundwork to establish the district as a focal point of suburban housing for Hanyang District and the WEDZ and a new site for industrial development. RUI operates under the principle of the "6 Integrations" (*liuge yitihua*)—integrating rural-urban planning, industrial layout, infrastructure, services, employment, and social management (Ibid.). Hypothetically, RUI targets the end of the dual-structure, or at least the material inequalities that are its most obvious manifestation, as its objective. In practice, RUI has focused on rescaling agriculture, concentrating secondary activities in industrial parks, improving infrastructure (especially port and road access), and building commodity housing. Northeastern Hannan, closest to the WEDZ, is being transformed into a commercial suburban space for the managers and professional workers who make Hanyang's modern industrial development possible. Over the first four years of the pilot project, growth in investment in fixed assets and industrial output value in Hannan outpaced all other districts. Sales of commodity housing over the same period increased at an annual average rate of 53.9% (WBS 2012). The purchase of commodity housing came from a mixture of relocating farmers and the development of high-end housing for commuters from the central districts. Relocation of farmers and rural land conversions were also used to partially fund development (Hannan CPC, 2012).

Hannan's development plans include several different strands: residential consolidation, agricultural upgrading, increased industrialization, and the creation of a

suburban commodity housing market. In terms of agricultural upgrading, the initial plans called for the wholesale resettlement of the district's farmers as part of a residential, commercial, and industrial reorganization. Residential infrastructure, housing, and government services were concentrated into the main city, Shamao, three central towns, and 16 central villages. Hannan's 102 "peasant settlements" to be consolidated into 16 "rural new communities" in order to free up land, both for agricultural agglomeration and to free up more land for other uses (Hannan CPC 2008). A major part of agricultural development is to create a virtuous (if odorous) circle where 12 farms of 10,000 pigs would provide more than just food, but become a major source for biofuels and fertilizer, captured by the phrase: "Pig, swamp, electricity, vegetables; "sunshine, energy, peasant life." The rescaling and industrialization of agriculture is also highlighted in Shuiyi Village where farmers have turned away from traditional crops in favor of monocropping lettuce, overseen by the Shanghai Jihong Distribution Company (Gongzi +Hezuo 2010). This corporate-village partnership is dubbed the "company + cooperative + farmer road to riches," (*gongzi + hezuo she + nonghu de zhifu zhilu*).

Integration was also to take place by transplanting the model of *chengzhongcun* transformation in Wuhan's urban core (next Chapter) to the village collectives and collective economic organizations in Hannan to encourage urbanization and farmers were assured preferential housing, employment support, school placement, and social security in exchange for giving up their village collective identity, and by extension, any claims over land.

Within Hannnan, governmental offices, and residential and commercial areas are concentrated around Shamao City on the west bank of the Yangtze. The Mayi River, a

tributary of the Yangtze, cuts through the northern territory of Hannan, while the Dongjing River further north marks its boundary with Caidian District. Hannan is connected directly to the Wuhan Economic Development Zone in Hanyang to the northwest by the Wujian Expressway. Hannan has built several industrial parks to the north and south of Shamao. Located to the north of Shamao Bay, the Hannan Economic Development Zone built in 1997 is by far the largest with a total area of 10,000 mu hosting 55 industrial enterprises. Most of these industries have been established since 2006 when the district government dramatically expanded its investment in infrastructure for the park. A further boost to the zone began after the launch of the RUI pilot project with more than 400,000 square meters of new factory space built between 2009 and 2013. In total, Hannan expanded industrial parks from 5 sq. km to 45 sq. km in the first four years of RUI (*Jingchu Wang*, 1/14/12).[111]

The industrial structure of Hannan reflects a vision of *Da Wuhan* where the outlying districts serve as spokes in an industrial supply chain serving central district industries. It is in this spirit that at least six auto parts companies have either established new operations or expanded existing plants in Shamao and the Hannan development zone since 2009 as suppliers for Dongfeng Motors in Hanyang, spearheaded by the Jiahua Automobile Plastics Company and an auto parts manufacturing park expected to be

[111] Other industrial parks, largely constructed from converted farmland, are especially focused on agriculture supporting industries. For example, south of Shamao, village farmland was converted into the Xinfu Industrial Park in 2009 targeting agriculture-supporting industries. The backbone of Hannan's industrial sector for decades has been the Huang He Tractor Company, with 400 employees. It relocated to a new 38,000 sq. meter complex in the Xinfu Park at the end of 2012.

completed by 2016 (Hubei China News). Creating an integrated regional network for Dongfeng Motors is not just about boosting Hannan's GDP, but enhances the presence and power of one of the city's cornerstone industries. The municipality has also channeled funds into upgrading the shipping capacity of the Shamao Bay ports as well as the aforementioned road construction projects. The new Nangang Port opened in 2014 with the capacity to carry 600,000 automobiles per year from Hannan down the Yangtze (Liao 2014). There is also a high concentration of building material companies manufacturing glass, plastic valves and the like serving construction development. Hannan's supporting role for the WEDZ in Hanyang is a major driver for the massive investment in transportation infrastructure connecting Hannan and the WEDZ. In an unusual move, the Hannan government paid 500 million RMB to the municipality to cover toll charges on the Han-Hung Expressway, allowing free passage between Hannan and the central city ("Chen Caifeng" 2012). A deputy in the Hubei provincial government reportedly marveled that a car could now reach central Hanyang in 20 minutes and Wuchang in 40 minutes from the center of Shamao Town (Ibid).

Suburban Dreams: Commercial Housing and Road Infrastructure

Hannan has been equally active in enhancing the district's "livability" in order to appeal to investors as well as to encourage settlement of urban elites in new suburban spaces, spending hundreds of millions of RMB on water and electric infrastructure, telecommunications, and landscaping (Hannan District). Since beginning the RUI pilot project, private and state developers have undertaken a frenzy of commodity housing construction in Hannan. Between 2009 and 2013, 4,781,840.98 sq. meters of commercial and residential housing projects have been planned for or completed along with new

schools (Xie et al 2013). Leading the way in central Shamao is the Wuhan Real Estate Development Company, a quasi-state agency. North of Shamao along the Wu-Jian expressway connecting Hannan to the central city, the Wuhan Country Garden Real Estate Development Company is engaged in several projects designed to appeal to a new suburban class of Wuhan and foreign residents.

The Country Garden Real Estate Company is a massive, multinational corporation with holdings throughout Asia, boasting $49 billion in profits in 2012 (Country Garden 2013). The majority of its projects are in Guangdong Province, but it has been expanding progressively over the past several years. It is but one of countless real estate developers in China attempting to capitalize on global city discourses of cosmopolitanism, consumerism, and green living (Figure 6.1). In Hannan alone, Country Garden committed to a 4.8 billion RMB investment covering 10 separate

Figure 6.1 Wuhan Country Garden Estate promises an idyllic and green habitat unavailable in the central city. Source: Wuhan

Figure 5.2 A luxurious dining room inside a villa in the Country Garden Estate. Source: Wuhan Country Garden Estate.

projects in 2012 (“Wuhan Country Garden 4.8 billion”)

Figure 6.3 In a promotional image that could have been painted by Norman Rockwell, The Wuhan Country Garden Estate sells the suburban dream to Wuhan

The Wuhan Country Garden Estate in northeastern Hannan is an idyllic complex of European-style villas. Promotional literature boasts that the grounds include an international bilingual school, a European-style commercial waterfront plaza, a 5-star hotel, and a 36-hole golf course. Multilevel townhouses for sale include banquet rooms, master suites, and sun-terraces on the top floor (Figure 6.2). The marriage of state and private developer interests is manifest in its promotional literature, boasting of the 4 billion RMB invested in the region leading to improved schools, business support services, hospitals, and shopping and leisure activities to make the area inhabitable for urbanites. Additionally, transportation improvements, according to brochures, now enable potential residents to reach the center of Hanyang in 20 minutes or less. Not wanting to rely solely on the state, the developer built and manages its own kindergarten and primary schools for use exclusively by residents (County Garden, 2012). Other housing projects bear similar monikers evocative of “McMansion” estates in the United States (Knox, 2010). Examples include, Venice Sunshine, International Garden, Happy Home Court, Forest River, and River City Spring Court.

Amsterdam on the Ma’yi River

Wuhan leaders and developers also attempt to upgrade the city’s status within the national urban hierarchy through mimicking and emulation of place-making

practices in other cities. In November of 2012, the Hannan district government and the Shanghai Greenland Holdings Group (a state-owned company) announced plans for the Hannan New Town, a 4 billion RMB project to build a "European-style town" in Hannan over the next 3-5 years for consumption and tourism (*Changjian Ribao* 11/09/2012). The new town is intended to provide housing for white collar workers in the automotive industry and professional support services. It will also function as an "eco-tourism" zone (*shengtai luyou qu*), a peculiar designation for what essentially amounts to a multibillion dollar development that will contribute to Wuhan's competitiveness in the automobile industry ("Wang Weiguo" 2013). The Hannan New Town emulates similar projects in Shanghai, Tianjin, Beijing, and Chengdu. It is but one of dozens of examples in media and government promotional literature that reaffirms Wuhan's regional leadership by emphasizing some aspect or attribute of Wuhan as the first, biggest, or best in Central China. Hannan New Town will be surrounded by the Ma'yi River and supplemented by multiple man-made rivers, canals, and lakes. The planning area is to the east of the Hannan Development Zone, connected by a new bridge. It is easily accessible to the Wu-Jian Expressway connecting Hannan directly to Hanyang and the Wuhan Economic Development Zone. The New Town, then, is being built to attract both high-quality professionals working in Hannan, but also to attract potential commuters working in Hanyang.

The project in its entirety is a chimerical orgy of European architectural styles. Traditional styles become "filtered" through the lens of Chinese planning. Tu Wasi, lead designer interprets European planning traditions as emphasizing "terrain, sunlight, and water networks". He translates these practices to the Ma'yi River with

reference to “Siena, Italy; Barcelona, Spain; and Amsterdam, the Netherlands” for replication. “Upon completion, the public will enjoy various types of European architecture, including Baroque, Mediterranean, Tudor, and French neo-classical styles,” (Hannan New Town). Plans identify seven distinct areas according to the European style they will imitate: Dutch and French, German and French, British, Dutch and Italian, and two zones of multiple mixed styles.

Noticeably absent from these designs is a “Chinese style”. The commitment to European styles is so resolute that designers have proposed to place a church at the center of the New Town: “In traditional European towns, the church is an integral part of the central built environment; it has an absolute and irreplaceable command of the center of the city. As an authentic European style town, a towering church building will become the center of the town buildings and iconic symbols to showcase its European style,” (Hannan New Town). It is difficult to conceive of a more clear-cut demonstration of the kinds of spaces that could emerge out of random appropriation. Other European elements include a large plaza in front of the church modelled after Siena, Italy’s Piazza del Campo, colorful row houses lining newly built canals, and cobblestone pedestrian streets (see images at the bottom of this chapter). The borrowing and referencing is explicit—photographs of the original reference points are included with the publicly displayed images of building proposals. We can credit the designers then, at the very least, for citing their references.

6.5 Conclusion: Rural-Urban Integration and the Dual-Structure

The development of suburban housing in Hannan has little to do with the internal development of the district. Indigenous villagers are being relocated into

apartment buildings distant from the new suburban enclaves in the northeast—their obligation to the city circle and sustainable society is to maintain ecological purity in Wuhan's outermost edge so that employees in new commercial and industrial parks will have a pristine environment in which to live. Rather than tearing down the dual structure, the "integration" of Hannan depends on it for the successful construction of *Da Wuhan.* Hannan's villagers will undoubtedly benefit from the overall project—incomes have risen, housing quality has improved, and basic infrastructure has been utterly transformed. Farmers are not prevented from joining the new urban class of Hannan, in fact, through employment training programs and other policy supports for farmers willing to move into Hannan's towns or Shamao, the government is actively encouraging mobility between the sectors while simultaneously encouraging the industrialization of agriculture. This support has its limits, however. Hannan's residents are not being offered subsidies to move into Wangjiadun or offered new housing on the East Lake shore—what movement is possible is limited to the boundaries of Hannan District.

After five years and billions of RMB invested in Hannan, the municipal party committee announced that beginning in January of 2014, Hanan's functions would gradually be blended into the Wuhan Economic and Technological Development Zone (WEDZ). Although Hannan is keeping its district status and maintaining its administrative structure, the new plan calls for "unified leadership, unified planning and construction, and the integration of overall development," (Li 2013). Since January, the breakneck pace of investment in Hannan has actually increased. The district alone was planning to invest $1.5 billion in new projects. The Hannan

Development Zone and WEDZ, now integrated as an "open zone", are coordinating the development of new automobile assembly plants and an aviation production center is in the planning as well ("Wuhan Hannan Universal Aviation"). Shanghai Greenland's development of the European New Town is set to break ground this year, a long-term investment expected to reach 40 billion RMB (*Ludi wuhan xiangmu* 2014). All told, Hannan intends to carry out "99 projects for 64 billion RMB" including ongoing, new, and future developments (Wang 2014). The subordination of the district to the development zone is justified as necessary for the building of a balanced development pattern around the three towns.

Place-making, place-production, and policy mobility in Wuhan through the development of sites for cultural and commercial consumption, and its actualization of RUI demonstrates both how central rhetoric is articulated in the planning and policy formulations of specific sites, and how that rhetoric may be manipulated or exploited to advance ulterior agendas for urban development. It may be tempting to subsume Wuhan's development under the larger narrative of 'actually-existing neoliberalism' and ongoing primitive accumulation. This approach, however, privileges one interest (capital accumulation) over others, and assumes that accumulation is the end game for urban development.

Place-production in Wuhan demonstrates a more complicated spatial politics. It is the hierarchy of the state, not the promiscuous flexibility of capital that must foreground analysis of Chinese spatial change. These processes have certainly expanded opportunities for capital investment and accumulation, giving real estate developers a central role in the city's urban development. Yet, as I argued in Chapter Two, that a site

is conducive to capital accumulation does not automatically mean that it is driven by it. There is a much broader range of interests, motives, and behaviors engaged in building Wuhan than neoliberalism alone can explain. First of all, local officials attempt to enhance their status not simply in order to "jump scales" according to the dictates of global capitalism, but to improve their rank within the state apparatus. Both the privately-invested development of the new CBD and the state-orchestrated capture of Hannan as a *de facto* subsidiary of the WEDZ, Wuhan municipality enhances and expands its territorial power within Hubei and the country as a whole. Wuhan has deployed the ideologies of the sustainable city and rural-urban integration in a largely successful campaign to exert a consolidated authority over the broader region of the Jianghan. In this sense, Wuhan is not emulating the global cities of New York or London, but attempting to replicate the regional authority of China's centrally administered cities.

Secondly, the dual structure remains prominent even in efforts that claim its elimination as a goal. In the rural-urban integration of Hannan with the WEDZ, the future of the rural population is dictated by the interests of an urban core that absorbs the periphery as a site to host the transplantation of industry, and as a site of suburban housing for workers in the city. Rural-urban integration in practice perpetuates the totalization of municipal control over the rural periphery, and recreates the class inequalities generated by rural-urban differentiation.

Appendix 2

In promoting the development of Hannan New Town, a series of posters made public on the New Town's website combine plans for the new town with the Western architectural and planning traditions they derive from. Below are three examples of the posters.

Figure 6.4 Divorcing form, function, and cultural meaning: developers in Hannan plan a church tower to anchor the New Town

Figure 6.5 Row houses and canals draw on images from Amsterdam and other European cities

Figure 6.6 Italian plazas are recreated for Hannan New Town

Chapter 7
Appropriating Rights: *Chengzhoncun* Transformation

7.1 Introduction: Debt and Development

Wuhan has undergone a physical and spatial transformation over the past decade to match any of its counterparts on the coast, and with 11,000 construction projects presently under way as of this writing, the city's leaders are clearly not slowing the pace of urban construction. The development of the new CBD in Wangjiadun and the transformations underway in Hannan are only two components of the monumental undertaking that is the realization of *Da Wuhan.* This monumental undertaking, however, comes with an equally monumental price tag. Wuhan is by no means the only Chinese city facing significant debt, but it may hold the dubious claim to the *largest* municipal debt in the country.

In 2012, the Hubei Treasury office published an investigation of Wuhan's finances that revealed the city was in debt to the tune of 203.7 billion RMB (Table 7.1-7.2). According to the report, Wuhan will average 31 billion RMB annually in debt servicing alone in 2013 and 2014, or roughly 100 million RMB per day ("Wuhan Man Chengwa"). In a BBC interview, Wuhan Mayor Tang Liangzhi justified the debt:

> "If we analyze the issue from the perspective of how financing promotes our economy and increases city value and consider financing scales, structure, and sources, we can see that our debt is safe, controllable, positive, and payable. . . Debt for Chinese cities is mainly for infrastructure construction and projects that enhance people's lives. This is

> different from the focus on the virtual economy that is seen in Western countries," Tang Liangzhi, *How China Fooled the World.*

Regardless of whether Wuhan's debt is being put forward to enhance people's lives, roughly 40% of Wuhan's annual revenues must now go toward debt servicing. The largest source of revenue for municipal government over the past decade comes from "land premium revenues" derived from the sale of land-use rights. In 2012, Wuhan's revenues from land sales jumped 62% to 94.99 billion RMB, the highest in the country, and more than its total revenues for any single previous year. However, the next year revenues had dropped again to 46 billion RMB through September ("Wuhan Man Chengwa" 2013). These wildly fluctuating revenues combined with increasing spending prompts the municipal government to find more land to sell, but the vast, underutilized tracts that formed the base for Wangjiadun and other large-scale development projects are, for the most part, dried up. While the infrastructure may be enhancing people's lives (though ceaseless complaints about how traffic caused by the endless construction suggests otherwise), it is also resulting in skyrocketing real-estate prices. A 240 mu (0.16 sq. km) tract in Jianghan District recently sold for 9 billion RMB that will translate into floor costs of 12,000 RMB/sq. m (Ibid.). If Chinese leaders are indeed adopting a neoliberal approach, then the principle of "responsible government spending" may have been lost in translation. In his BBC interview, Tang Liangzhi declared that Wuhan would spend $327 billion, or 2 trillion RMB, over the next five years to transform Wuhan into a megacity. In 2014, the city

planned to spend 150 billion RMB in urban construction and 200 billion in real estate development alone ("Debt-Ridden" 2014).[112]

Table 7.1 Sources of Wuhan's Total Municipal Debt, 2010-2012

	Amount (Billion RMB)	Percent of total
Bank loans	376.365	86%
Bonds	27.148	6%
Debt Lending	9.332	2%
Special Borrowing	4.239	1%
Other	20.102	5%
Total	437.185	100%

Table 7.2 Wuhan's Annual Debt 2008-2011

	Consolidated Revenues (Billion RMB)	**Debt (Billion RMB)**	**Debt Ratio**
2008	**36.428**	**74.76**	**205%**
2009	**56.773**	**132.809**	**234%**
2010	**74.413**	**157.255**	**211%**
2011	**105.822**	**143.528**	**136%**

Data for both tables collected from the Hubei Treasurer's Investigation, cited in "Wuhan Man Chengwa"

An obvious question is, where will the money come from, especially given the declining supplies of land available for urban construction? The local government relies primarily on increasing land values to attract investment and loans in its local government finance vehicles (Sanderson and Forsyth, 2012). Having exhausted the easy

[112] Chinese media was fond of reporting that this was roughly equivalent to the entire construction and infrastructure budget for Britain, captured by the headline, "One Wuhan Equals One England" (*yige Wuhan dengyu yige Yinguo*) despite a nearly 20:1 GDP advantage in Britain's favor.

supply of land on the urban periphery, the city turns inward to the final reserves of land that, from the urban government's perspective, remain undeveloped: the *chengzhongcun*. However, as a source of revenue, local government finance depends on the state's ability to ensure that compensation, relocation, and demolition costs of *chengzhongcun* development is below the market price (*Ibid.*). The redevelopment of *chengzhongcun* space is more complicated than the relocation of an airport. Transformation of Wuhan's *chengzhongcun* sets in motion a process that restructures the fundamental relationship between villagers in the city and the state. Yet this process does not eradicate the dual structure. It is on the basis of the dual structure that *chengzhongcun* demolition is justified and through which the redevelopment and relocation process is structured.

7.2 *Gaizao:* The Transformation of *Chengzhongcun*

The city is assembled out of more than the concrete, steel, and glass that go into its construction. It emerges from the often unpredicted ways in which humans occupy, inhabit, and interact with the physical and symbolic objects within urban space. As I have shown in the previous chapters, the party-state continues to employ the institutions of the dual structure in its ongoing efforts to regulate how, by whom, and for what purpose urban space is used. The dual structure is not a monolithic force, however. Like all state technologies of rule, there are cracks and fissures that are manipulated by a variety of actors in their inhabitation of urban space.

The reform era has transformed rural residents' relationship to the means of production as hundreds of millions have converted from farmers to factory workers, service employees, construction workers, entrepreneurs, and landlords. Yet municipal authorities and rural residents have been less successful in transforming their political and

social relationships with and within the urban sector. Another facet of rural-urban integration as described in Chapter 6 is the attempt to integrate 'rural' residents and village space with urban society through the practice of *chengzhongcun gaizao* (transformation) and to a lesser extent, *shiminhua*.[113] *Gaizao* is not only about the demolition or redevelopment of the physical sites of *chengzhongcun*, but is a state-led process that redefines the relationship of the village to the city, of the villagers to the village, and of villagers with each other. As a practice of organized and intentional subject-making on a massive scale, it seeks to undo, not just the sociocultural organization of Maoist collectives, but thousands of years of village social relations. Yet *gaizao* does not seek to create an empowered urban citizen, but an idle, passive subject who will clear the way for the juggernaut of urban development. Despite the relatively anemic conceptualization of citizenship imagined under rural-urban integration, the transformative ideology behind *gaizao* has real material and social effects for village inhabitants that will be explored in this chapter.

This chapter engages two of the research questions identified in the introduction to the dissertation. On the one hand, it investigates not only what kind of development emerges from the hierarchy of the Leninist party-state, but also how that kind of development is received by *chengzhongcun* residents deemed obstructive to development goals. It also considers the consequences of the dual structure for China's urbanization

[113] *Shiminhua* can be literally translated as "making urban reseidents". While the term is frequently referenced in documents related to *chengzhongcun gaizao*, it is more frequently employed in policies related to rural development.

that result in a highly unequal urban society that replicates the dual rural-urban society first identified by Chan and Zhang (1998). Rather than resolve the supposed contradictions of China's dual-track land regime-- increasing private land transactions in the urban realm and the collective ownership of property in villages—*chengzhongcun gaizao* in Wuhan uses the dual structure to justify their elimination and then reproduces the injustices that led to their creation in the first place.

The fundamental failure of the transition narrative from a neoclassical perspective is that it identifies inequality as largely arising from economic *inefficiencies* of state interventions in the economy that are yet to have been handed over to market functions. On the other hand, neoliberal critics view inequality as an outcome of the inherently exploitative character of capitalism. Each leads to profoundly different policy conclusions but none that are capable of dealing with the kinds of inequality created by China's dual structure. The ways in which China's urban transition is framed by the dual structure is reinforced in its deployment by municipal authorities as the basis for the removal of *chengzhongcun* from urban space.

Under a narrative of transition, *chengzhongcun gaizao* could be viewed as an important and necessary step toward disassembling one of the core institutional divisions that bifurcate rural and urban society within the boundaries of the city. Yet in practice, it does not unseat the centrality of the dual structure to China's urbanization, nor does it create conditions of social, political, or economic equality in the city. Instead, it perpetuates the state's imposition of injustice on the rural sector, legitimizing the local state's incursions in the name of integration and the protection of villagers' rights and interests. Originally designed to maintain a static if unequal division between rural and

urban, the dual structure has evolved in the hands of local authorities to be an adaptive and dynamic tool for the active expropriation of collective and individual property for the segments of society unfortunate enough to be tagged with a non-urban identity.

I take a different view of *chengzhongcun gaizao* in Wuhan. Municipal authorities and local media employ the language of rural-urban integration and the building of a harmonious society while advancing an agenda that enables the local state to expand its control over urban development. *Gaizao* deploys a state-constructed terminology of integration and transformation to legitimate the final expropriation of village property in the city, another quick fix for Wuhan's addiction to construction. The very existence of the dual structure as a cause of inequality is used as justification for *gaizao* but does not transform any of its institutions. Instead, *gaizao* operates within the institutional framework provided by the dual structure in that it moves a select group of people (original village residents) from the rural category to the nominally urban one while ignoring the interests of any other village inhabitants. Yet even as *gaizao* attempts to placate villagers, it triggers a kind of "citizen consciousness" among them as they draw on a variety of discourses to legitimate their own resistance to expropriation. These discourses are generated from a diverse set of logics: market rationale, cultural tradition and familial piety, and a history of peasant sacrifice toward the building of New China. In doing so they highlight a form of injustice that is largely unrecognized by the communist party locally or at the center. These stories emphasize the basic unfairness of *gaizao* as it only attends to issues of distribution (as in the surrender of rights to land in exchange for company shares or reaching an acceptable exchange value for village property), Other forms of attachment to place are more difficult to reduce to economic

exchange and value, and more difficult to reproduce in the monolithic commercial housing complexes that are replacing Wuhan's *chengzhongcun.* In the end, it is difficult to view *gaizao* as a final stage in Wuhan's market or urban transition, bringing all players into a unified, integrated system. Instead, it reinforces the subordination of rural or non-urban (from the state's perspective) interests to urban development that is at the core of the dual structure in its current adaptation.

7.2.1 Redevelopment and Subject-Making: *Gaizao* and Conversions

The sale of land from *chengzhongcun gaizao* is a component of Wuhan's development budget for the next two years. However, debt-servicing is not the only motivation. Transforming *chengzhongcun* resembles what Painter refers to as "state-ization", the "intensification of the symbolic presence of the state across all kinds of social practices and relations," (Painter 2006: 758). The reallocation and reorganization of physical space and resources are the driving forces behind Wuhan's *chengzhongcun* redevelopment plans, but it also reformulates the representations and symbols of the state and state power as it relates to individuals and their place within it. Encounters with a changing state in Wuhan can be observed in the ways people act on their status as citizens—calling on the state in protest of land expropriations, in migrants' demand for the payment of wage arrears, .etc—but also in the ways the excluded or disenfranchised carve out their own spaces of being as in migrant enclaves in Beijing (as in Zhang's *Strangers in the City*) or the way migrants refuse participation in officially sanctioned codes and regulations that categorize them as outsiders. It is in the process of transforming *chengzhongcun* that "people inhabit and encounter" the Chinese state and how they "react to its everydayness and their sense of what it is to be a citizen, client,

and/or subject," (Corbridge et al, 2005, 11), but also how they inhabit and encounter each other through the binary categories of 'local' and 'outsider.' Moving from rural to urban spatial categories is not just a conceptual change, but is predicated on the introduction of a greater state presence at the local level in the form of more cadres, increased funds for public construction, and stricter regulation of society (Ma 2002).

In Wuhan, as in other Chinese cities, urban politics have become organized around land development projects that "consolidate and actualize" territorial power with success in interstate competitions dependent on the capacity of state agents to discipline and coordinate subordinate units and the moral capacity to maintain legitimacy (Hsing 2006, 2010). Disciplining by municipal governments is conducted through dual processes of totalization and localization--the spatial practices that institutionalize rural areas and include them in the network of government while drawing on the resources and agents within their jurisdictions to make those networks more and more restrictive (Tang and Chung 2000, 2002). It is in the context of these twin processes that *chengzhongcun* are created as rural islands within the urban sphere. One of the key objectives of *chengzhongcun* reform is to formally integrate these rural spaces within the institutions of urban governance, but the dual-track land institution and the *hukou* system continue to obstruct these goals.

The modernizing influence of urbanization is given greater attention in the Chinese literature than in English-language research which tends to emphasize property rights and economic issues (Li Y. 2008, Li 2005, Xie 2002). While both schools emphasize the "incomplete" transformation of the rural sector, the persistence of rural attitudes, values, and ideas in *chengzhongcun* is highlighted by Chinese authors who

bemoan the low "*suzhi*" or quality of rural migrants and villagers (Li 2008). Western anthropologists have also advocated a *suzhi* approach to understanding social and political relations of rural-urban inequality in the city. Rachel Murphy (2002, 2004) has argued that improving migrants' *suzhi* is a strong motive for the central government to encourage migrations. In the idealized stories of rural-urban migrations, the rural migrant is gradually urbanized by encounters with city people and customs. Yet this kind of personal urbanization may not be taking place in the *chengzhongcun* setting which is physically and socially separated from the city. Some studies have shown that migrants in *chengzhongcun* rarely enter the city proper, and according to Zhou and Cai (2008) frequently describe their lives as boring, monotonous, even "tasteless Rather than becoming exposed to new ways of thinking, migrants here are often "transplanted from remote villages . . . their contacts are either among themselves or with natives who are peasants. So the rural way of life gets reproduced and reinforced . . ." (Zhou and Cai 2008, 240). Not only is the *de jure* rural population denied access to certain kinds of services associated with city life, the residents of *chengzhongcun* continue to imagine themselves, and be imagined, as rural (Siu 2008, 2012; Bach, 2006). More than just a political and economic project, then, *gaizao* also targets the "persistence of rural attitudes" in villages. In this sense, *chengzhongcun* reform seeks to be truly transformative, yet in practice, it maintains many of the institutional and informal barriers of the dual structure that isolates villagers within the city.

7.3 Wuhan's Redevelopment Plan: Aggressive 'Marketization' of the Village

Wuhan, beginning in 2004, adopted an ambitious *chengzhongcun* redevelopment program. Wuhan has promoted a market-based approach to redevelopment, and village reconstruction is geared toward freeing up land for public auction to private developers while private developers are given considerable freedom in designing individual redevelopment projects. This contrasts, for example, with Shenzhen's *chengzhongcun* redevelopment program characterized by strong local-state intervention and district-level coordination of reform plans (Chung, 2010). Given the importance of "demonstration effects" to Chinese urbanization and development, I believe a thorough understanding of the results of redevelopment schemes is crucial to understanding the future trajectory of Chinese urbanization. Accounts gleaned from local Chinese news sources and even some scholarly research tend to be repetitive and commonly regurgitate the goals of reform spelled out in government documents with little comment on actual achievements.

7.3.1 Interest Groups in Chengzhongcun Redevelopment

Transformation of the *chengzhongcun* is an intricate process of negotiation among a variety of state and non-state actors. In some analyses, this is a simple division of the state, private developers, and village collectives (Bai, 2007), but to fully grasp the process of *chengzhongcun* and Chinese urbanization requires a more nuanced understanding of the agents involved.

Table 7.3: Actors in *chengchongcun* redevelopment

Actors	Goals	Role in *chengzhongcun* Development	Research approaches in urban studies
State Agents			
Central and Provincial Governments	Coordinate regional economic development, maintain social order and cohesion	Policy declarations; approval of urban development plans	Federalism; Developmental State; State Capitalism
Municipal Government	Maintain social order, increase municipal revenues, investment, and urban development; construct 'modern' city; eliminate urban inefficiencies	Design of urban master plans, development of citywide strategies for redevelopment; charge specific agencies with overseeing redevelopment	Urban entrepreneurialism; place-making; place-production; slum clearance; global city construction; subject making
District Governments	Maintain social order, increase municipal revenues, investment, and urban development; construct 'modern' city	Implementation of city plans; negotiate with and moderate disputes between developers and village-level actors (often carried out via street offices)	Urban entrepreneurialism; place-making; place production rural-urban integration
Developers	Profit motives	Design and carry out urban construction and redevelopment	Primitive accumulation; accumulation by dispossession
Collective Agents			
Joint-stock corporations	Maximize payments for expropriated land; maintain base for future economic activity; maintain village welfare and income	Negotiate on behalf of villagers with districts, developers, manage village budget, handle village business, investment, and welfare affairs	Village corporatism; rural urban integration
Village residents	Maximize payoff for expropriated property;	Vocalize interests and demands to village leadership; *de facto* owners of 'village' land	Rightful resistance; Dispossession; Right to the City

1) *State Agents*

a. Central and Provincial Levels: This analysis largely focuses on the municipal level and below, but they still play an important role in *chengzhongcun* development and reform. Central and provincial levels create the institutional environment in which urban expansion takes place, and may more directly intervene in city development by designating specific roles for cities in regional and national economic planning, i.e., the Wuhan City Circle

b. The Municipal Government: Chinese cities today are not only competing for global capital, but also for a favorable position in the regional and national spatial hierarchy (McGee et al, 2007; Wang and Yang, 2008). These factors influence city officials involved in municipal planning, and the role of *chengzhongcun* in the realization of those plans. As described above, the city-leading-county policy gives the municipality a tremendous amount of power to control territory and resources, and to design economic strategies for growth over a broad region under the *city-leading-county* system. Municipal governments promulgate five-year plans, urban master plans, and other official documents that represent specific policies relevant to *chengzhongcun* reform, and promote a certain vision of the city that *chengzhongcun* reconstruction will serve. Sales from *chengzhongcun* land are also an important source of revenue for municipal and district authorities.

c. *District Governments:* Most scholarly studies do not give adequate attention to the importance of the district in Chinese urbanization. In Wuhan, the district level is allocated tremendous responsibility for implementing city policy, particularly in the negotiation and mediation of *chengzhongcun* land conversions and sales to developers. Wuhan Party Secretary Ruan Toufa publicly charged district leaders as "personally responsible" for the success or failure of *chengzhongcun* redevelopment.

2) *Developers*

a. For the most part, developers' motivations are predictably profit-oriented. However, unlike in economies with a strong regime of private property rights, developers in China often do not negotiate directly with villagers in land transactions. Instead, developers negotiate with agents of the district and municipal government and joint-stock companies that represent the collective economic interests of the village. Individual villagers are rarely consulted directly unless they resist expropriation in the form of "nail houses" (see below). Who are the development companies in Wuhan?

3) *Collective Agents*

a. *Joint-stock companies:* Joint-stock companies are a common feature of *chengzhongcun* in China created to manage collective property and economic entities that may distribute shares to villagers. They frequently sponsor or subsidize social services and social security benefits (Liu Y. et al, 2009). Shares are usually distributed according to years of service in

the village, which has caused some grumbling among villagers. They play an important role in *chengzhongcun* transformation as the nominal representatives of villager interests in negotiations with district and municipal officials and developers. It is unclear exactly how successful joint-stock companies are in representing villager interests.

b. *Villagers:* Villagers have the most direct stake in *chengzhongcun* redevelopment, but the least amount of power in negotiating the process (Guo, 2001; He et al, 2009). As described above, villagers do not directly negotiate the transfer of their land or property with developers or the government. Instead, their desires must be expressed to the joint-stock company or other village organizations if they are to be heard at higher levels. When villagers feel their interests are not heard, they may petition higher levels of government directly, or express their frustration in protests and demonstrations (Guo, 2001; O'Brien and Li 2006).

The ways in which these actors participate in *chengzhongcun* redevelopment is rarely articulated, but tends to rely on transition narratives (see Chapter 3). The central government, in response to engagements with global capitalism, created a package of incentives that rewarded urban units and encouraged lower scales to pursue urban development strategies—this includes municipal "territorialization", subjugating lower-level territories to municipal authority and incorporating wider territories into centralized urban planning. Due to pre-existing institutional structures, China's urban development was bifurcated by the dual structure, creating pockets of rurality within the city. Two related narratives of transition suggest that these pockets are aberrations of the moment—

a side-effect of incomplete marketization and incomplete urbanization that are only visible as a snap-shot in time. It is not a matter of if, or even how, but of when the duality of Chinese cities will be erased. *Gaizao* is an effort to speed along this transition, to catch Chinese cities up with a normalized model of urban development. Not only will the elimination of pockets of poverty satisfy central mandates, it will enhance individual cities' ability to penetrate global scales by appealing to capital investment and participating in global capital exchanges. By doing so, the rhetoric of rural-urban integration can be realized.

Chengzhongcun gaizao not only does not overcome the dual structure, it is built upon it. Through the "four conversions", *gaizao* facilitates the transfer of resources (land and property) from one category of the dual structure to the other by targeting certain members of "non-urban" society for forced conversion.

7.3.2 Redevelopment Policy and the "Four Conversions"

Wuhan began a comprehensive overhaul of *chengzhongcun* in September of 2004. The specific policies for *chengzhongcun* renewal are outlined in the "Policies and Regulations on Comprehensive Reform of Wuhan City *Chengzhongcun*," (*wuhanshi chengzhongcun zonghe gaizao zhengce guiding)*. In principle, *chengzhongcun* reform gives priority to protecting villager interests while using the market to solve problems (Wuhan Government Document 13). In promoting urban reform and redevelopment, the municipal government and local press emphasized *chengzhongcun* as "obstacles" to continued urbanization, and criticized illegal building detrimental to citizens' health. The Wuhan Party Secretary at the time, Li Xiansheng, called illegal building within

chengzhongcun "a malignant tumor of urban development," (Hu 2004) and one newspaper ran an enthusiastic report entitled "Goodbye, Wuhan's Chengzhongcun!" (*Zaijian*! *Wuhan chengzhongcun*, 2009). The case of a building collapse that killed 14 construction workers in one village was used in the press as an example of unbridled, illegal building by self-interested villagers to generate public support for the elimination of *chengzhongcun* from Wuhan (Hu 2004).

In total, municipal officials identified 56 *chengzhongcun* inside and 84 *chengzhongcun* outside the third-ring road. 16 pilot villages were selected to undergo transformation (WASS 2006). The first stage in the Wuhan plan is the comprehensive restructuring of village institutions according to these conversions**:**

- Converting peasants into residents (*nongmin zhuanwei jumin)* wherein villagers' *hukou* status is converted from the village to the urban street office or neighborhood committee.[114]

- Converting village committees into neighboring committees (*cunweihui bianwei juweihui)* dissolves existing collective governing organizations and integrates *chengzhongcun* into the formal urban administrative hierarchy.

[114] Hubei province adopted a unified household registration system (*chengxiang yi de huji dengji*) in 2004, eliminating the distinction between agricultural and non-agricultural households. However, this did not equalize entitlements. Instead it was part of a broader trend toward localization of *hukou* controls where benefits were defined less by *hukou* status, but more by *hukou* location (Chan and Buckingham, 2008). *Hukou* conversions in the context of Wuhan's *gaizao* converts *hukou* registration from the village to the neighborhood community that it is merged with.

- Converting collective enterprises into joint-stock corporations (*jianti jingji bianwei hunheshi gufenzhi jingji shiti)*.

- Converting collective land into state land (*jianti tudi biancheng guoyou tudi*).

The city declared basic restructuring of the pilot villages complete as early as November 2005 (though no action had been taken in physical relocation or reconstruction). In the final count, the pilot villages restructured over 200 million RMB in collective assets, with a payout of 146.4 million RMB in social security payments and compensation, and distributed stock shares to 6708 people (Ye & Zhuang 2005). Additionally, more than 11,000 villagers across 32 villages had reportedly obtained Wuhan city *hukou* as of January 2006, though whether or not this put them on equal footing with other Wuhan residents is unclear.

After the village stock companies have formulated development plans, land is made available for public auction. It is this aspect of aggressive land commodification that has come to characterize the "Wuhan model" of *chengzhongcun* redevelopment. Despite the rhetoric of "using the market," the base value of village property for compensation is still determined through city and village committee appraisal and negotiations, and it is this value that is used to determine the opening price for public auctions ("Wuhan Shenzhen" 2005). On October 21, the first plots of land were made available for public auction in Shahu, Wuchang district when a developer paid 150 million RMB for 90,000 sq. meters of land (Wang 2005). Construction on the Shahu Friendship International project began on the land 5 months later, and was completed in May 2008. The project, which included 12000 square meters of green space, high-rise apartment buildings, and commercial office and retail space with an emphasis on high

fashion, is hoped to be a model for *chengzhongcun* redevelopment. However, as of February 2009, only 14 villages had progressed far enough to begin construction on redevelopment projects, while only six village projects including the Shahu Friendship developement were considered complete. At the same time, illegal building and self-built housing in Wuhan's *chengzhongcun* are still prominent (Xie 2009). In response to this slow progress, Secretary Ruan Chengfa held a special meeting on April 18, 2009, and called on district heads to take "personal responsibility" for redevelopment of *chengzhongcun.* Ruan also announced that he would lead a special work group to manage transformation of the old city and *chengzhongcun* redevelopment. Furthermore, the heads of 8 city departments signed "responsibility pledges" in 2010, promising to complete transformation of all 56 *chengzhongcun* within Wuhan's 3rd-ring road by the end of 2011. In addition, Wuhan's standing committee promised cash rewards of up to 2 million RMB for villages that finish redevelopment ahead of schedule. In a statement released to the press, Ruan said, "There is no question about whether or not to transform the old city and *chengzhongcun,* we must transform them and transform them as quickly as possible . . . changing the face of the old city and improving the quality of life of village residents must be the end result," (He, Zhang, & Li 2009).

The process of *gaizao* reflects a political, social, and economic transformation of village residents within the city with two distinct components: to redistribute collective property, and redefine rights of citizenship so that villagers' sociopolitical belonging is transferred from the village to the city. These functions combine to separate the historical relationship between economic and social functions in the village collective and enable the municipal government to capture collective property for broader development goals.

Table 7.4 The Four Conversions

Conversion	Chinese	Type of conversion	Realignment of status or property	Implementation
1) Converting village collective economic organizations into modern economic organizations; converting villagers into shareholders	*jianti jingji bianwei hunheshi gufenzhi jingji shiti*	Redistribution of villager property (individual and collective)	From individual villagers and entrepreneurs to the joint-stock company	Village Corporation or management company, usually headed by cadres is converted into a joint-stock company; villagers surrender individual claims over village property in favor of shares
2) Converting peasants to urban residents	*nongmin zhuanwei jumin*	Sociopolitical alignment	From village to street office	The villagers' hukou status is converted from rural to urban, from the village identity to a new or existing street office
3) Abolishing the village committee and establishing the neighborhood committee	*cunweihui bianwei juweihui*	Sociopolitical alignment	Village to street office	Village committee is dismantled, village residents are integrated with an existing street office or a new one is created
4) Converting collective land into state-owned land	*jianti tudi biancheng guoyou tudi*	Redistribution of villager property (individual and collective)	From individual villagers and the collective to the district government	Village land is expropriated by local government for development.

The process of *gaizao* is predicated on the "Four Conversions" (*sige zhuanbian*) listed in Table 7.4.[115] The first three conversions ultimately are necessary to enable the

[115] In some documents, the two components of converting village economic organizations into modern economic organizations and converting villagers into shareholders are listed separately and thus referred to as the "Five Conversions" (*wuge bianhua*)

final conversion that allows the state to oversee the sale of collective land to private and semi-private developers.

Economic Reorganization

Converting village collective economic organizations into modern economic organizations; converting villagers into shareholders

Conversion one, consisting of two parts, creates a village joint-stock company, and brings all village property (including land and property obtained through village allocation) under the ownership and management of the company. This not only allows for greater coordination of development in the village, but also streamlines the conversion of collective land to state-owned land. By consolidating all village assets under one umbrella, villagers lose any legal basis for individual claims on their property. While this is primarily a redistribution of property, it has significant implications for villagers' rights. As *shareholders,* villagers have a voice (albeit limited) in the disposition of property and an expectation to receive income, but surrender individual claims over their shares of that property.

Administrative Reorganization

Convert peasants into urban residents; convert village committee into neighborhood communities

In theory, Wuhan's *chengzhongcun* reform provides a safety net for those displaced by village restructuring. Additional protections are written into the law for villager employment following restructuring. All workers are entitled to urban social security benefits and villagers who are unable to find work are to be issued a "re-

employment preference card" (*zai jiuye youhui zheng)* to access unemployment benefits. What's more, districts will be allocated special funds to provide free skills and jobs training for villagers. Women over 55 and men over 60 may access urban social security for a one-time buy in. Research in other locales has shown that most residents continue to rely on the village for income and other benefits (Po, 2012; Chen, 2010).

Expropriation of collective land

Converting collective land into state-owned land

The conversion of collective land into state-owned land has received the lion's share of scholarly and official attention, not just for *chengzhongcun* redevelopment, but in the overall process of Chinese urbanization. On the one hand, it highlights the dual-track land regime and so-called "ambiguous" property-rights regime (Chapter 3). On the other, it is a clear manifestation of urban-state-led strategies for local financing that generates local revenues through the transfer of collective land to both the local state and private developers (Chapters 2 and 5).

The details of land conversions differ from city to city, but there are common features. Contact between developers, district officials and the village is usually limited to village leaders who act as middle-men between village and city/developer interests. It is up to village cadres to obtain the signatures of other villagers. Not only does this incentivize developers to maximize direct benefits to cadres, but it also creates conditions for cadres to put undue pressure on other villagers to acquiesce to developer and government demands. Cadre capacity and political skill within the village plays a

tremendous role in explaining the variability of redevelopment and expropriation outcomes.

The value of collective property is negotiated between the joint-stock company and the district government, and the final value must be agreed upon by 2/3 of the village shareholders, a value that establishes the minimum bid in open auctions. The final expropriation payment is calculated based on two assessments: the value of land (based on average land value in the surrounding area) and the value of villager property. It is the second calculation that engenders the most controversy and conflict. After asset and land valuations are made, village land is classified in one of several categories: land is sold by the city in public auction or utilized for other municipal planning purposes. Policy documents encourage officials to develop plans that protect the interests of the villagers, and "mobilize the active participation of the villagers to build their ideal home," (Wuhan Government Document # 13). Adopting plans based on consensus is intended to minimize protests over unfair land expropriations, although it has not avoided all complaints of unfairness. The base price sale returns to village 'shareholders' and any revenue above the base price is divided between the village and municipal government: 60% to the village for the construction of infrastructure and 40% to the municipality for "coordinated urban infrastructure and planning."

7.3.3 Transforming the Villager: *Suzhi* and the Shareholder Citizen

In holding up a handful of villages as successful models of *chengzhongcun* transformation, municipal leaders and local media especially highlight three crucial ingredients of the 'model' village and villager: self-reliance, self-improvement, and

entrepreneurship. Taken together, these characteristics promote a village conversion model that alleviates the municipality from fiscal responsibility for integration with the city.

A Wuhan reporter highlighted the disparate and unpredictable futures for transformed *chengzhongcun* in a 2010 report on the thriving Xudong Village and the precarious Hanxi Village (Zhou 2010). According to Zhou, Xudong Village was one of the earliest villages to begin the transformation process in Wuhan. The city required land belonging to the village for construction of the Second Yangtze River Bridge. In 1991, village leaders negotiated a 10 million RMB settlement in exchange for the land. Village chairman Xiang successfully persuaded the village to use the money to establish village enterprises. Capitalizing on development surrounding the new bridge, Xiang set up a taxi company, rented village space for advertising, and constructed a joint-venture shopping mall ready for use when the bridge opened in 1995. The village also established schools and awards college scholarships to deserving students. Pensions and retirement benefits were also allocated through the village, with local residents becoming eligible for benefits at 55.

Zhou presents Xudong as a happy marriage between municipal development goals and *chengzhongcun* redevelopment—much needed infrastructure improvements placed the village at the gateway to one of two (at the time) bridges crossing the Yangtze River in Wuhan. Moreover, the revenues generated by the village corporation reduce costs to the city for urban development, guaranteeing villagers' public welfare and social security independently of the city budget. Yet just as frequently, municipal planning directly contravenes existing village economies. In Qiaokou's Hanxi Village, most village

revenue was derived from more than 800 building materials and hardware stores. However, Hanxi will be displaced by the new CBD. Facing elimination, villagers stopped investing or upgrading village infrastructure. Malaise toward village development, in turn, increased the district government's impetus to intervene in infrastructural development. The Qiaokou district government undertook construction in 2006 of a new building materials market near Hanxi to host Swedish megastore IKEA and other chains that will completely supplant the indigenous village market. Xudong's redevelopment created new opportunities for the village residents, but Hanxi's redevelopment obliterates two decades of entrepreneurship.[116]

Wuhan's "model" *chengzhongcun*, however, is Zhuyeshan, the first village in Hubei to convert to a "modern economic organization", incorporating the Wuhan Zhuyeshan Group Company, Ltd. In November of 2003 with 349 villagers becoming shareholders in the corporation (Zhang 2003). Investments and risk-taking are encouraged by giving a disproportionate share of the company to corporate managers (typically composed of former village committee members). In Zhuyeshan, 25.26% of the 4375 shares are held by the management committee with the rest distributed among the rest of the population. In 2004, the Zhuyeshan Company, focused on auto services, real estate, and a 28000 sq. meter trading market was one of the 30 most profitable enterprises in Wuhan ("Chengzhongcun qiye", 2004). The corporate and shareholding structure adopted in Wuhan is based on a model first developed in Hangzhou, Zhejiang

[116] Zhou's report provided much of the insight and data about Xudong and Hanxi

Province that grants village corporate managers a greater stake in the company than average villagers.[117]

Zhuyeshan is upheld as a model for Wuhan's *chengzhongcun* reform because the village "took it upon itself to change its thinking", realizing that *gaizao* was about more than "renovation and relocation" but a comprehensive and systematic reform of the spatial system that would require equally dramatic transformation of "peasant thinking," (Wuhan Government). This mental evolution was achieved first through the village leadership in the late 1990s and disseminated throughout the village through a series of training programs and educational activities. Zhuyeshan's success is portrayed as an example of self-development, yet the degree of state intervention is evident in the municipal government's own depictions. Regular organization of study tours to other provinces combined with formal training from the provincial and municipal government encouraged village leadership to embrace new development models for the village. Three village leaders obtained advanced degrees from the Hubei Provincial Party School in 1997, and current Zhuyeshan Party Secretary and company president Chen Zhifu obtained a Master's degree in economics.[118] In 1999, the Wuhan College of Economic

[117] When villages in Hangzhou first incorporated, shares were allocated equally among all villagers with several former cadres obtaining positions as managers of the new shareholding company. Managers were frustrated by risk-averse villagers who only wanted to maintain their present earnings (derived mostly from rentals) and were unwilling to invest in new endeavors. One village sought to resolve this issue by splitting shares into two categories—standard shares and higher-risk shares with participation in the second category voluntary. This encouraged villagers to engage in some risky investments without completely surrendering the security offered by standard shares. The early success of these investments also had a demonstration effect, encouraging more hesitant villagers to participate.

[118] It is telling of China's priorities regarding rural development that Chen who now essentially runs one of the wealthiest *urban* operations in Hubei was selected to represent "farmers" to the Provincial Party Congress in 2012.

Management established a special program for Zhuyeshan residents under the age of 40 ("Chengzhongcun Qiye").[119] The village later created a personnel training program to pass on the spirit of entrepreneurship cultivated by village leaders. Leading up to the official conversion to a shareholding corporation, the village conducted a series of "shareholder training" programs to teach villagers how to maximize their benefits from the new system. Municipal-village cooperation continued after the village's incorporation in 2003. In 2004, the village signed an agreement to send 44 villagers to a one-year program at one of two local universities for management and technical training. A member of the municipal party committee oversaw the signing of the agreement, bringing added publicity to this 'successful' model of *chengzhongcun* redevelopment (Ibid.).

Emphasis on model villages for *chengzhongcun* transformation hearkens to the "learn from Dazhai" campaigns under Mao. It is not just their financial and economic acumen that is celebrated, but a moral judgment based on self-reliance, self-awareness, and self-improvement. The flipside of this moral coin is that villages that do not successfully navigate their urban transformation fail not due to their own socioeconomic conditions, but because of some inherent moral failing. The villages upheld by the local state as models for redevelopment emphasize duties, obligations, and self-reliance. *Gaizao*, then, seeks to create a passive form of citizenship that placates villagers by the

[119] The goals of the coursework were to "teach party spirit and corporate governance," emphasizing the blending of party and business goals.

prospect of income from shares in the joint-stock company, but does not create conditions for active social and civic participation.

Disputes over *chengzhongcun* redevelopment arise along multiple fronts within the village, between villagers and developers, and between villagers and the local state. First, intravillage conflicts arise when the majority of villagers have accepted redevelopment plans and compensation, but some households hold out. Frequently, these disputes cast village leaders and average residents against each other. Village leadership often aligns with the local government and actively advocates for developer interests. Accusations of corruption, especially in the form of direct payouts from developers, and receiving extra compensation for expropriated property are not uncommon. These scenarios often overlap with resistance pitting residents directly against local government and private developers. Village protests against unfair expropriation have been the major source of conflicts with the state over the past decade. In these protests, villagers call, not just for larger compensation packages, but for local governments to represent and protect their rights and interests. Protests have resulted in frequent clashes between villagers and police forces. Additionally, there have been accusations of thugs hired by developers intimidating villagers unwilling to vacate with threats of violence.

7.3.4 The Spatial Basis of Rights: The Demolition of Gusaoshu Village

As the CCP and central government continue to espouse the principles of the "harmonious society," the "well-off society" and a society based on the "rule of law", the enactment of these principles is frequently manifested through displacement, repressive tactics, and outright state-sanctioned violence. In municipalities like Wuhan, it is, in fact,

these very ideals that are employed to legitimate the massive urban construction overseen by Secretary Ruan.

Gusao Shu Village is located in the north of Jianghan District, about 1 km south of the Third Ring Road.[120] Typical of villages around the country on the outskirts of major cities, Gusao Shu began to urbanize in the 1990s, becoming the host for a number of industries relocated from the city center, including printing, garment, and paint production plants. The area surrounding Gusao Shu reflected Hankou's rising fortunes, energized as a growing financial hub for central China. Real-estate values in the immediate vicinity of Gusao Shu, estimated at 1000 RMB/sq. meter in 1990, averaged 7,500 RMB/sq. meter in 2012 (Shu 2013). High-rise commodity homes for downtown Hankou commuters, relocated urban core residents, and new arrivals to Wuhan multiplied over the years, while Gusao Shu hosted many migrants (some 1900 in 2010), handicraft enterprises, and small commercial shops. The increasing population density of the surrounding area coupled with its proximity to the Third Ring Road, the Wuhan-Beijing and Wuhan-Guangzhou rail lines made traffic a growing problem. The area became colloquially described as "300,000 people drilling 3 holes" (*sanshi wan ren zuan sange dong*) because there were only 3 north-south arterial roads in Jianghan (Ibid.). While piecemeal infrastructure improvements were undertaken by the district over the past two

[120] The name of the village is a testament to the tragic honor of Chinese peasants—*gusao* (aunt) and *shu* (tree) represent an old tale of an abused woman whose husband abandoned her for long periods at a time. When she expected her husband to return, the woman hung herself from a tall tree that marked the village entrance so that she would be the first thing he saw when coming home.

decades, the atrocious traffic conditions and perceived need of intensive transportation upgrades made Gusao Shu and other *chengzhongcun* in the area targets for demolition and relocation.

The Gusao Shu Road reconstruction program is an ambitious 2.7 billion RMB overhaul of Hankou's transport infrastructure, including a new 6-lane expressway running north-south with multiple interchanges that links Hankou directly to the Tianhe Airport, a subway line extension (including a new stop at Gusao Village), and a large bus terminal. In addition, a rotating railway overpass, the largest of its kind, opened in January of 2014. Accompanying these infrastructure upgrades is what is locally known as the "curse of Man Chengwa"—large-scale demolitions and real estate development. The historic village and residents of Gusao Shu are a notable, if ironic, casualty of the upgrading of Gusao Shu (Shu 2013).

In October of 2010, an agreement between the Fuxing Huiyu Development Company and the city-owned Wuhan Finance and Housing Demolition Company was announced under the auspices of Wuhan's comprehensive transformation of *chengzhongcun* to redevelop 574 acres of urban land in Gusao Shu and the surrounding vicinity, allocating 4.7 billion RMB for relocation settlements. The buyout for the original 961 villagers of Gusaoshu was set at 372,000 RMB ($59,572) per person. In addition, the Gusaoshu collective would receive ownership of two commercial buildings as a source of continued income after redevelopment ("Hubei Fuxing" 2010).

Resistance is encouraged in part by Wuhan's formal policy for relocation and resettlement negotiations. As described above, resettlement plans require the approval of 2/3 of village residents. In practice, developers deal primarily with village cadres who

are incentivized to persuade the rest of the village. However, even with the village leaderships' influence, a substantial minority can be overruled in the resettlement decisions. Moreover, other residents have no say in the decision and often receive lesser compensation packages (Table 7.5).

Table 7.5 Resident Classification and Entitlement to Compensation in Gusau Shu Village

Type of resident	**Number of residents**	**% of all residents**	**Compensation entitlements for relocation**	**Process for determining compensation value**
Original residents	961	13.2	Compensation for land and relocation fees	Negotiated between village cadres and district government
Urban Residents	2565	35.2	Relocation fees	State calculations based on average property values in the surrounding area
Converted Residents	2369	32.5	Relocation fees	State calculations based on average property values in the surrounding area
Migrants	1397	19.2	None	NA
Total	7292			

Data compiled from: "Hubei Fuxing" 2012.

The dual structure remains paramount in the state's approach to protecting 'peasant rights and interests' that are codified not by their inhabitance of space, but by the

location of their formal *hukou*. Gusao Shu includes 961 original residents. The area was also home to 2,565 urban residents who purchased commodity housing, 2,369 converted residents (formerly rural residents who converted their *hukou* status, 1,397 migrants without local *hukou* for a total of 7,292 people. Yet, the Fuxing Development Company and the city's contract was only signed by 650 of the 961 original residents, just over the 2/3 requirement for relocation and redevelopment to proceed. In short, only 13% of the village's actual population has any negotiating authority with the district over compensation for relocation, a right that is derived from the villagers' status as members of a rural collective. The urban residents who account for 67.8% of the village population have no legal claim to land, but are entitled to compensation for relocation. However, there is no legal entity recognized by the state that can represent their interests and negotiate relocation fees. As a result, the local state faces minimal obstacles in calculating compensation for the urban residents. As non-local residents according to their *hukou* status, migrants are entitled to no compensation for relocation.

In summary, only 13% of the local neighborhood is given any voice whatsoever to negotiate with the state. When you exclude the 300 villagers who refused to sign the agreement, that figure drops to 9.1%. It should hardly be surprising, then, that this process is not conducive to social harmony. In Gusao Shu, roughly 300 village residents were joined by many urban residents in refusing to vacate their homes. In the first two years after demolitions began, sporadic protests and violence erupted between residents and developers. Locals have reported gangs of young men, supposedly hired by developers, walking through the village tagging buildings with the Chinese character for "demolish" (this symbol is not just graffiti, it is used by demolition crews to distinguish

buildings that are cleared for removal from those that are not). Encounters between villagers and these gangs often lead to violence. The violence came to a crescendo on September 2, 2011. According to witnesses, a gang of men dressed in black carrying knives, metal pipes, and bricks entered the village shouting and threatening locals who would not vacate their homes. As the confrontation between the gang and villagers escalated, a local college-student was stabbed to death while his father and uncle were seriously injured. The gang fled the scene before police arrived and no one was held accountable for the student's death ("Wuhan *baoli*" 2011). Similar incidents are common in the Pearl River Delta where villagers have demonstrated greater willingness to obstruct demolition crews and developers (Chen, 2012).

7.4 Conclusion

He et al (2010) argue that the arrangement between the formal urban sector and *chengzhongcun* is a trade-off, an implicit understanding whereby city governments forego some of the immediate profits they could accrue through immediate and wholesale expropriation of village property, while villagers surrender any claims on the city budget.[121] This is essentially the same relationship between the state and village that existed prior to reform, speaking to the persistence of the dual structure not just as effect, but as an enduring feature of the Chinese spatial system. As *chengzhongcun* demonstrate, the dual structure can no longer simply be understood as an institutional

[121] Hsing (2010) adds that village leaders agree to carry out some state policies such as the one-child policy in exchange for relative non-interference.

relationship between two separate sectors, but as the principle governing the development of urban space within Chinese cities. As a long-term strategy this arrangement presents some obvious inadequacies. The large number of *chengzhongcun* is viewed by city-officials as obstacles to the implementation of rational city planning and the realization of long-term city-building goals. Moreover, while the wealth of *chengzhongcun* residents is certainly highlighted in the Chinese media, government-led land expropriation is by no means a guarantor of wealth, particularly for villagers on the outskirts of cities and in inland cities where the demand for migrant housing is less pressing.

Despite nearly universal opposition to *chengzhongcun* from the urban sector (including government and public opinion), removing *chengzhongcun* has been no easy task. He et al (2010) argue that *chengzhongcun* create "vacuums of state power", but this is an incomplete representation. The rural sector in the PRC has long been positioned as self-contained and self-reliant. The expansion of Chinese cities into the countryside reflects the attempt of local governments to extend their power over the rural hinterlands. In earlier stages of urban development, *chengzhongcun* served a useful purpose, economizing urbanization as a cheap source of land and revenue for urban construction, as a source of income for villagers dispossessed of their farmland, and as a source of affordable housing and cheap consumer goods for migrant workers and urban residents. With the supply of cheap land dwindling and facing massive fiscal debts, the fiscal interests of the municipality are better served by eliminating *chengzhongcun.* However, urban governments have discovered that villages have erected their own symbolic walls that slowdown the steamroller of municipal territorial authority. As a result, city

governments have faced tremendous difficulty in eliminating *chengzhongcun* despite the nearly universal disapproval of them within the urban sector.

It is notable, then, that the most prominent "success-stories" for *chengzhongcun* redevelopment have depended on two key components resulting directly from villagers' refusal to acquiesce to government expropriation. First, the government has surrendered much of its claim to the immediate profits of land-transfers, allowing more of the profit from land conversions to accrue to the villages. Second, they have occurred in places where the commercial value of land was so great that private developers would be willing to pay enough for use-rights to indefinitely guarantee the livelihoods of villagers without relying on local government support. It is clear that a trade-off continues after redevelopment where the state foregoes some profit in exchange for the continuation of village self-reliance. As China urbanizes, the dual structure continues to shape the terrain of social and political relations in the Chinese city. Yet as the easy supply of land disappears on Wuhan's periphery disappears, the imperative of clearing the remaining *chengzhongcun* from the urban landscape is strengthened.

While urban citizenship (*shimin*) in China is frequently understood in terms of *entitlements* (as in much of the *hukou* literature), the rural population is discussed in terms of "rights and interests" (*quanyi*). In Wuhan, government documents regarding *shiminhua* and *chengzhongcun* elimination state "protecting villagers' rights and interests" as a top priority. Official language and state action makes clear, however, that villagers' rights are not a set of principles for individuals to act on or claim *from* the state. Rather, they are a set of principles defined *by the state* that reduces villager interests to a negotiated sale price of collective assets. *Chengzhongcun* redevelopment targets

villagers' collective rights, minimizes their ability to secure socioeconomic rights, and closes off avenues for civic participation by individuals and groups that oppose the local-state urban development project. Smart and Lin argue that political and economic decentralization has "localized citizenship" where entitlements and exclusions are determined locally rather than through any national framework (Smart and Lin, 2007). This hints at the importance of *hukou* and local management for entitlements and rights, but citizenship in the sense that I understand it is more than just a set of obligations and duties for the state and individuals. There is a deeper implication for individual rights and freedom from the state that is definitively absent from the integration of *chengzhongcun* inhabitants into the urban system in favor of a more passive concept of *jumin,* or resident. As should become clear below, *chengzhongcun gaizao* does not transition villagers into fully integrated participants in urban society, but acts more as a roadmap for the final transfer of village property under the authority of urban development.

Gaizao as it is conceived by the municipality does not actually seek to create *citizens*, but passive subjects whose rights remain understood as a matter of *nongmin quanyi*—peasants' rights and interests. The distinction is important in that it justifies the quashing of villagers' voice and participation in the production of urban space because 'rights and interests' are defined, not by the villager, but by the state with an emphasis on *distributional* rather than *social* justice (Young, 2004).[122] In their refusal to quietly

[122] To demonstrate this difference, the primary changes in the rules governing *chengzhongcun* expropriation are concerned with the weighted value of particular kinds of property—from the base value

accept state definitions of their rights, however, villagers produce a kind of citizenship based on individual and collective acts of resistance. They do not passively accept their fate. Despite a prodigal literature on the complex components of Chinese citizenship, the "local rural"—that is, the residents of *chengzhongcun* who occupy a conceptually and administrative *rural* space, but physically inhabit what has been transformed into *de facto* urban space—are largely omitted from the discussion. Even if *gaizao* is not an attempt to create a Weberian citizen independent from the state, the state-led orchestration of villager conversions into 'urban residents' (*nongmin bian jumin*) has been met with grassroots mobilization of resistance drawing on multiple sources of legitimacy to resist state-led expropriation of villagers' property. While their ultimate effects are limited, it reflects a largely unrecognized ability of individuals and groups within *chengzhongcun* to resist the bulldozer of state development and give voice to their own interests.

---

of land covered under early regulations over land conversion, Wuhan policies today include all kinds of fixtures and home improvements such as plumbing and light fixtures, copper piping, floor tiles, .etc. However, the ability of villagers to actively participate in urban society, to reject wholesale expropriation of their property, or to even influence the kinds of developments that will take place in the village remain largely unprotected by law and depends more on individual, and highly variated capacities to negotiate with state and developer agents.

Chapter 8
Conclusion: Assembling an Articulation Of Chinese Cities

8.1 Introduction

The urbanization of China has been described as one of, if not the, most consequential shifts in the 21st-century. Not only does China's urban transition have tremendous significance for the 1 billion people expected to be living in Chinese cities by 2030 (Woetzel et al 2009), it also shapes the economic trajectory for the world as producers and consumers rely increasingly on commodity and financial exchanges involving China. It is also an important case for the developing world. With an unprecedented and uninterrupted rate of economic growth over some three decades, it has understandably been studied for its potential to be a model of development. Yet for all the attention China's transformation has received from policymakers, politicians, journalists, and academics, its urban transition continues to be poorly understood. The consequences are not insignificant—the lessons from China's urban transition are important.

8.2 Theoretical Contributions

This dissertation seeks an understanding of Chinese cities based on two complementary frameworks, assemblage and articulation inspired in part by David Featherstone (2011) who found value in the methodological and epistemological openness of assemblage, but suggested that adding articulation to the mix could supplement assemblage's limited ability to address issues of power. Assemblage in this

dissertation has been a particularly useful tool for decentering the totalizing discourses of market transition and structuralist critique because of its emphasis on networks and ideas that do not justify their existence through the creation of capitalist relations. The assumptions about China's development process have greatly limited the ways in which Chinese cities are imagined, described, and understood. The most frequent approaches to scholarly analysis of Chinese cities rely on structuralist or neoclassical explanations for social and political change. Such explanations are critiqued in Chapters 2-4:

- Neoliberal critique privileges capital accumulation over all other motives and interests (Chapter 2)
- The market transition narrative fails to adequately account for the role of Maoist era institutions (e.g. the dual structure) as state technologies of rule for managing, regulating, and controlling economic development, especially at the level of the municipality. As China's party-state continues to identify itself as socialist, it is disingenuous to treat socialist institutions as leftovers from a socialist past. Such an approach identifies features of China's urbanization such as *chengzhongcun* as side effects of an incomplete transition rather than as the basis of its development model (Chapter 3).
- Various discourses surrounding slum development and 'Global/World Cities' have limited place-production and place promotion to motives of capital accumulation where cities are little more than the spatial outcomes of global capitalism/neoliberalism (Chapter 4).

- *How are policy goals developed at the top of the spatial administrative hierarchy actualized and articulated in local development plans?* The party-state is not as homogenous as it appears. Local authorities frequently acting either directly or indirectly against central dictums and mandates have informed the developmental trajectory of Chinese cities. Often times, local authorities and agents manipulate central rhetoric to act on their own self-interests.

- *What motives drive processes and outcomes of place-production and place-promotion?* Not only are cities across China actively engaged in processes of city-building and urban construction, but municipal actors are attempting to build particular kinds of places. However, the reduction of place-production as a means of attracting capital is too simplistic. Moreover, places are not made solely from the blueprints of official planning. Changes in Chinese cities can best be understood as an ongoing and continuous process of official city-building and place-production *and* the occupation and use of space by individual actors and agents that transcends any pre-reform/post-reform division of time.

- *What are the social consequences of the dual structure for China's urbanization?* What social problems that do emerge are, in-part, the result of the PRC's continued reliance on institutions created for social control, for controlling patterns of development, and achieving a certain type of industrial-based development. After Tiananmen, Chinese officials have been largely successful in separating political and economic reforms, at least in official discourse. However, just as economic decisions have political repercussions, a system based on political repression has long-term and deep-seated economic consequences

including economic wastage, exacerbated inequality, highly limited opportunities for class mobility, and environmental devastation. This is not a model for other developing countries to replicate.

Assemblage theory enables us to reformulate the above assumptions without entirely dismissing the insights generated by the past decade of research into Chinese cities. When those assumptions are reformulated, a new set of questions emerges that opens up new ways of understanding China's overall development, and urbanization in particular:

Assemblage is useful in identifying social relations and non-hierarchical networks that shape how the city is lived, used, and experienced, as well as how ideas and policies about place-making and urban development circulate among policymakers, planners, and developers who are actively involved in building the city (Chapters 5 and 6). However, to suggest that capital is not hegemonic in Chinese society is not to suggest that it has no bearing on the process of urban development. Articulation enables the researcher to link the seemingly nebulous networks of assemblage to the structures of power through which development and capital are directed.

As I have argued, the central components of the structures of power that articulate China's political economy are the twin institutions of spatial administrative hierarchy and the dual structure. In Chapter 5, I showed that the leadership of Wuhan's party and state apparatus have been instrumental in directing the ways in which capital is invested in the city. In the evolution of the new CBD, a kind of "entrepreneurial urbanism" emerges in which visions for the city were created through officials and offices of party, government, and planning departments while private and state capital intermarry in the financing and

implementation of these plans. There is no basis for distinguishing urban development as led by the state or by markets.

The assemblages and articulations of Chinese place-production continues in Chapter 6 through the Hannan Rural-Urban Integration pilot case. Rural-urban integration in particular is carried out through the spatial administrative power structure that subjugates rural space for urban needs. What began as a project proclaiming to be aimed at reducing inequality between rural and urban populations has become a project to create a suburban residential and industrial space for the Wuhan Economic and Technological Development Zone, a means for shifting population and employment pressures outward from the central city.

The majority of Wuhan's revenues for the above projects is derived from land sales. Having exhausted much of the supply of cheaply available land on the urban greenfields, the municipality returns inward toward the *chengzhongcun* for a resupply of premium urban real estate. However, expropriating village property for urban development is complicated by the dual structure. Rather than taking down the barriers between rural and urban space and population, however, *chengzhongcun gaizao* in Wuhan moves a select group of villagers from one category to the other. The rights and interests of residents who are expelled from the village is not determined by markets or class, but by *hukou* status. The dual structure is employed by urban officials discursively to justify the elimination of *chengzhongcun* (Chapter 4) while the process of *gaizao* relies on the dual structure to minimize the costs of expropriation.

This returns me to the basic questions that drove this research: is there a Chinese model of urbanization worth emulating? What kind of city emerges from this urbanization model?

8.3 Implications: Who Has a Right to the Chinese City?

A final issue that drove this research is to question the validity of China as a development model. Instead of making claims about the positive relationship between a strong, authoritative state and achievements in economic development, we should be asking instead what kind of development occurs from such an arrangement. Certainly much of the pace of China's economic growth can be attributed to the state's authority, but this also comes at a significant cost, not just to the economy, but to the people. It is not just civil or political rights that suffer under the CCP regime. The lack of democratic inclusion in urbanization creates a system of growth without social justice that is inherently inimical to the rhetoric of the "harmonious society."

China's recent development model has relied to a large extent on urban construction and expansion, what Sanderson and Forsyth call the "secret sauce" of China's economic growth (Sanderson and Forsyth, 2012). This urban construction is largely debt financed and has depended on the cheap expropriation of land from the administratively rural population within municipal boundaries to attract investment. As Hsing (2010) argues, this shifted local governmental priorities from increasing industrial growth to increasing land value (see also Han and Kung 2012). Thus the investments in infrastructure that Mayor Tang Liangzhi touted as "improving people's lives" also sustains the cycle of governmental financing: new roads and parks raise the potential

long-term value of area real estate, thus increasing the local state's ability to secure long-term loans for its state-owned financing companies.

However, this model is highly exploitative in that it depends on the suppression of compensation for the *de facto* owners of land that this process depends on. As described in Chapter 7, *chengzhongcun gaizao* is an important part of the municipal leadership's efforts to build *Da Wuhan*, but what kind of city emerges from this process? Perhaps more importantly, who is this city for?

The ability for the inhabitants of Chinese cities to act on their own needs is undermined by a totalizing discourse of urban modernity that is utterly dismissive of alternative forms of living, inhabiting, and moving about the city. In fact, given the imperatives of revenue generation and cadre promotion, China's urban growth model is fundamentally hostile toward the persistence of alternative values. In this sense, Young's critique of rights in the Western liberal democratic tradition is useful for understanding the way rights and interests are identified in Chinese cities. Young's critique of this understanding of rights and citizenship begins with the Marxist obsession with *distribution* as the only mechanism for achieving justice. Justice, though, is about more than the distribution of resources and slicing up the economic pie among social groups. Young emphasizes the social division of labor, the normalization of institutions and practices, and the limits to decision-making power as the principal sources creating injustice and inhibiting substantive forms of citizenship (Young 1989, 2002, 2006, 2011).

Young's analysis is still useful when we move away from liberal-democratic contexts by focusing on the social and political practices used to reproduce the hierarchy of occupations and limit the capacity for certain groups and individuals to attain higher

status in different social contexts. In Chinese cities, the practitioners of Chinese urbanization employ a similar construction of universal ideals for urban citizenship under the rubric of the "harmonious" and "well-off" society that rewards self-cultivation, consumption, entrepreneurship and harmony. Moreover, the *hukou* system continues to define and shape the borders of inclusion and exclusion within urban society and between political units. Second, institutions and practices create expectations about characteristics individuals ought to exhibit, reflected in discourses of *suzhi* and self-cultivation within rural-urban integration policy and promotion.

In China, peasant and villager rights are framed around the term *quanyi*, or 'rights and interests'. What those rights and interests are tend to be a matter of state and party deliberation that is largely defined in terms of distribution—compensation for lost property, access to urban-based welfare and social security, but unsurprisingly, ignores the more robust form of justice that comes from opposing domination and oppression. Residents of the *chengzhongcun* may debate the compensation they receive for demolition of their property, but they are given little to no voice in either the outcomes of spatial transformations or their own roles in the new city that emerges from the rubble of village demolitions. To the extent that no Chinese citizen is granted the kind of civil liberties associated with democratic society, residents of the *chengzhongcun* are not exceptional. I found no substantial evidence that villagers in Hannan were included in the construction of their "new socialist countryside" or that residents of Hankou were clamoring for a new central business district. Still, villagers and farmers in China are subject to a larger degree of oppression due to the ways in which *chengzhongcun* and rural life are denigrated as backwards and in need of intervention while passive, hard-

working, entrepreneurial urban residents who contribute, but do not make demands on, the state, are normalized as an ideal for model villagers to strive for at the same time they are largely denied the means of achieving them.

One of the core arguments of "right to the city" advocates is that all persons who are affected by changes to urban space should have a voice in decision-making processes. The scope of right to the city can be as mundane as public forums for neighborhood development programs, or, more radically, to give people a voice in mobility decisions for corporations (Purcell, 2014). On its face, it is obvious that such a radical vision of urban participation is far from reality in present-day China. It is a relatively simple exercise to show the many ways China's modern urban development violates most every principle of the 'right to the city'. The users of *chengzhongcun* space, official residents, "small property rights" holders, and migrants, have no voice with which to influence the trajectories of urban construction and development that demand *chengzhongcun* demolition (Po 2012), nor did original villagers have input in the decisions that led to the urbanization of the villages in the first place. Policies that affect urban residents from affordable housing to access to education and health care are controlled almost entirely by state actors through the institutions of the political hierarchy and the *hukou* system. Urban master plans and comprehensive plans are constructed through an elite, non-transparent process by municipal planning experts and politicians to be approved by provincial and central bureaucrats. The entire process of *chengzhongcun* transformation is itself oriented toward creating a negotiated agreement on collective land's exchange value. It is a way of thinking that appears wholly incompatible with the local state's

articulation of peasants' 'rights and interests' as reducible to an artificially low monetary compensation for their land and property.

Yet, there is still a place for the philosophy of the right to the city in considering the future of Chinese cities even if it is difficult to see the dissolution of the authoritative local state in the immediate future. Attoh (2011) accuses "right to the city" studies of vagueness in much the same way I have criticized 'actually-existing neoliberalism'. Certainly, he is right to assert that within the right to the city we will find rights that "not only collide, but are incommensurable" (674), but this is a procedural issue as much as it is an ontological one. Within the liberal-democratic tradition, rights frequently collide (right to privacy vs. right to security is an example of contemporary debate in this vein in the United States), and private property rights frequently come at the expense of other people's right to use and inhabit space. Attoh's analysis of rights, and most critics who hang the vague/utopian label on the "right to the city" is embedded in the liberal democratic tradition of rights, one that Purcell argues is inhibiting of a true "right to the city." In his reading of Lefebvre, rights are not natural or god-given as they are in the liberal-democratic tradition, but the outcome of political struggle. They are "political claims to possible rights that will require mobilization and struggle. His goal in articulating these new rights is precisely to initiate this struggle. . . it would involve people in all sectors of society becoming active and reclaiming political power from the state," (Purcell, 2014, 146) in order to "close the gap" between the people and the state, toward a "world beyond the state and beyond capitalism."

The strength of the right to the city is that it is both a means and an end: while a utopian ideal of urban space is proffered, it also articulates a *process* for expanding

transparency, participation, and inclusiveness in all kinds of political-legal systems. In theory, the conflict between different sets of rights in the liberal-democratic system are resolved through the electoral process, public hearings, and jurisprudence. Yet they are also resolved by lobbyists and government elites in boardrooms, cocktail parties, and golf courses. The right to the city shifts the process from backrooms to the front yard so that all those affected by changes to urban space participate in decision-making.

The current structure of "rural" transformation does *not* give those impacted by spatial changes a significant voice in redevelopment plans—redevelopment is more often than not a collusion of village cadres, developers, and district officials. But the right to the city is not something that is *granted* by the state, it is a right that is demanded through political action and social movements. Individual nail-houses and collective social resistance as seen in Wukan and, on a smaller scale, in Gusao Shu are a material demonstration of the right to the city in action, a direct claim against the state made by residents' of *chengzhongcun* who demand not only greater transparency in the remaking of urban space, but also demand the ability to continue to inhabit the city.

Resistance to the tidal wave of urban development and demolition offers a small glimmer of hope that Chinese cities need not always develop in a way that reduces rights to a bundle of economic benefits reflected in expropriation negotiations or access to mass-consumer goods in new malls and shopping centers. Villagers are not overtly challenging capitalism or state authoritarianism, but they are challenging the local state's ability to impose its will wherever and whenever it so chooses. In doing so, villagers enact their rights as citizens as they dispute the very means through which they are made "citizens". They also illuminate the contradictions of attempting to construct a

"harmonious society" without even a modicum of democratic practice, questioning whether social harmony is possible when it is wielded as a tool of state power by municipal and district level officials. Given the political history of the PRC and the ongoing repression of the rural class documented here, these are meaningful advances. Moreover, while not directly linking to issues such as labor rights, fair pay and other issues affecting migrants, collective and individual protests have slowly altered the direction of central policy away from the "development at any costs" mentality that characterized the Jiang Zemin administration toward greater balance of social and community interests as represented in the Hu-Wen goal of building a "harmonious society."[123] While not actively making contacts with each other, the protests against unfair expropriation are linked in spirit with the beating to death of a young migrant worker in Guangzhou in 2003,[124] migrant worker strikes in factories across China (Chan and Ngai, 2009), and the much publicized suicides by workers at Foxconn plants in 2010.[125] Taken together, they have been meaningful catalysts for discussion, activism and political change that could mark significant steps to address the injustices of China's

[123] The most exceptional act of resistance in recent years took place in 2011-2012 in Wukan village. The full implications of the Wukan movement cannot be explored here, but it was noteworthy that villagers acted collectively, preemptively, and made some efforts to link the villages' interests with universal principles of justice and equality.

[124] In March of 2003, Sun Zhigang, a recent college graduate from Wuhan working in Guangzhou, was detained by police for living in Guangzhou without registration and badly beaten. While awaiting repatriation to his hometown in jail, Sun died from his injuries. The case provoked a strong public outcry, leading to 18 arrests of officials. Eventually, the central government reduced police powers to hassle migrants, and abolished forced repatriation.

[125] Thirteen workers committed suicides at two Foxconn facilities in China in 2010. They attraced a great deal of attention in the West because of Foxconn's production of Apple products, receiving extensive coverage by the *New York Times* and other media outlets—see Duhigg and Barboza (2012). For an academic treatment, see Chan and Ngai (2010).

dual structure. In this way, it may be possible to articulate a Chinese right to the city that can be put to practical use in articulating a deeper form of social justice for the disenfranchised victims of the Chinese urban development machine, even if it is still far from a place 'beyond the state and capitalism.'

8.4 Shortcomings and Potential Avenues for Future Research

A major weakness of this research was the lack of access to both public officials and individual residents of Wuhan. The vision for *Da Wuhan* I've constructed here is derived from publicly available reports and data. I have been unable to speak to the way those reports are understood, interpreted, used, or ignored in the day-to-day governing of Wuhan, or in the way they are received by residents of the city. In particular, the ways in which urban inhabitants of all types resist the state vision of the city is not explored here. A more ethnographic investigation of Wuhan's place-making is necessary to supplement and support the arguments I've made here, and is a potential target of future research.

While I have argued that Wuhan as an assemblage is a unique site, it is also adopting development approaches common to cities across China, in terms both of debt-financing and major planning projects including the creation of city circles, rural-urban integration, *chengzhongcun gaizao*, and the construction of new central business districts. Research into these mechanisms and processes of place-production and urban development in other Chinese cities could enrich the findings here. Reaching beyond China's borders, I am interested in conducting more research into the way these processes are being replicated or recreated in developing countries. More comparative work on urban development in developing countries could begin to bridge the gaps created from the exceptionalism of Chinese research. In particular, while I have portrayed a particular

process of urban development here, I have not spoken to the replicability (or desirability) of this model for other locales.

Touched on only briefly in this dissertation, the issue of environmental sustainability and construction of the "eco-city" have been a major focus of urban discourse in China over the past several years. This stretches well beyond Wuhan, from the "Guangdong Greenway" to the Huangbaiyu Ecocity experiment. The techno-scientific evaluation of China's urban environmentalism is beyond my skill set, but I am quite skeptical that the swallowing of China's farmland for urban construction, megaprojects, development zones, and highways can be offset by guaranteeing a certain portion of green space for all new developments. Research into the environmental impacts of China's urbanization and more focused evaluations of what offsetting impacts the new discourses and practices of sustainability are actually having is an important part of understanding China's urbanization model.

Finally, the long-term viability of Wuhan and other Chinese cities' development models based on debt-financing to generate land revenues for the municipal government is obviously finite. Despite central reports condemning the massive debts incurred by local governments, Wuhan's announcement that it will spend 2 trillion RMB in the next five years speaks both to the inertia of debt-financed development (for the massive investments already made to 'pay off' requires more investment) and the lack of alternative means of finance in the current system. How China's cities and the national financial system respond to the growing debt of local governments will be one of the most crucial tasks in the coming years. Skeptics of the Chinese development model have forewarned of an impending slowdown in the Chinese growth machine for decades, yet

its leadership has been surprisingly adept at prolonging sustained growth. Alternative models and trajectories of reform for China's urban finance are a potential avenue for future research into the making of Chinese cities.

Understanding the production of Chinese cities requires continued research into the "Chinese characteristics" that shape its development along paths that cannot be predicted by archetypical models of capitalism (or socialism). While Chinese capitalism, such as it is, is subservient to the state and articulated through socialist institutions, Chinese socialism is based on asymmetrical relations of power and access to resources along rural and urban lines. These characteristics should not be treated as an afterthought, but as the primary focus of research. Otherwise, the deployment of totalizing theories reproduces the misunderstandings generated by "random conceptual indigenization and appropriation" of Western ideas. As long as the Leninist power structure remains in place, the dual structure and *hukou* system will be the basis through which China's political economy is articulated, and the way they continue to be adapted to state-led plans will be key to understanding the future of China's cities.

Reference List

A Wuhan Walkthrough: *Hubu Xiang*. Retrieved August 1, 2013 from http://english.people.com.cn/205040/8226828.html

Abramson, D. (2011a). Transitional property rights and local developmental history in China. *Urban Studies*, *48*(3), 553-568.

Abramson, D. (2011b). Places for the gods: urban planning as orthopraxy and heteropraxy in China. *Environment and Planning-Part D*, *29*(1), 67.

Allen, J. (2011). Powerful assemblages? *Area*, *43*(2), 154-157.

Allen, J., & Cochrane, A. (2007). Beyond the territorial fix: regional assemblages, politics and power. *Regional Studies*, *41*(9), 1161-1175.

Angotti, T. (2006). Apocalyptic anti-urbanism: Mike Davis and his planet of slums. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, *30*(4), 961-967.

Ash, R. (1988). The Evolution of Agricultural Policy," *The China Quarterly*, *116*, 529-555

Ash, R. (1991). The Peasant and the State," *The China Quarterly*, *127*, 493-526

Ash, R. (2006). Squeezing the peasants: Grain extraction, food consumption and rural living standards in Mao's china. *The China Quarterly*, *188*, 959-998.

Attoh, K. A. (2011). What kind of right is the right to the city? *Progress in Human Geography*, *35*(5), 669–685.

Bach, J. (2010). "They come in peasants and leave citizens": Urban villages and the making of Shenzhen, China. *Cultural Anthropology*, *25*(3), 421-458.

Barboza D. (2012, Oct. 26). Billions in hidden riches for family of Chinese leader. *New York Times,* p. A1.

Barmé, G. R. (2009). China's flat earth: history and 8 August 2008. *The China Quarterly*, *197*, 64-86.

Beaverstock, J. V., Smith, R. G., & Taylor, P. J. (1999). A roster of world cities. *Cities*, *16*(6), 445-458.

Bender, T. (2012). Post-script: Reassembling the City: Networks and Urban Imaginaries. 303--324. In Farías, I., & Bender, T. (Eds.), *Urban Assemblages: How Actor-Network Theory Changes Urban Studies*. Taylor & Francis. 303-324.

Bernstein, T. and Lu X. (2003). *Taxation without Representation in Contemporary Rural China*, Cambridge University Press.

Bideleux, R. (1985). *Communism and Development*. Methuen.

Bloom, D. (2013, Dec. 12) China's smog is so bad you can see it from space: millions at risk from 'crisis point' pollution." *The Daily Mail.* Retrieved May 29, 2014 from http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2522963/So-bad-SPACE-China-smog-grounded-planes-left-millions-risk-pollution-remains-crisis-point.html

Bramall, C. (2006). The last of the romantics? Maoist economic development in retrospect. *The China Quarterly*, *187*, 686-692.

Bray, D. (2005). *Social space and governance in urban China: The* danwei *system from origins to reform*. Stanford University Press.

Boyle, M., McWilliams, C., & Rice, G. (2008). The spatialities of actually existing neoliberalism in Glasgow, 1977 to present. *Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography*, *90*(4), 313-325.

Brenner, N. (1999) "Beyond state-centrism? Space, territoriality, and geographical scale in globalization studies." *Theory and society 28*(1), 39-78.

Brenner, N. The limits to scale? Methodological reflections on scalar structuration." *Progress in Human Geography 25*(4), 591-614.

Brenner, N., and Theodore, N. (2002a). Cities and the Geographies of 'Actually Existing Neoliberalism.' *Antipode 34*(3): 349–79.

Brenner, N., & Theodore, N. (Eds.). (2002b). *Spaces of neoliberalism: urban restructuring in North America and Western Europe* (Vol. 4). Blackwell Publishing.

Brenner, N. (2004). *New state spaces: Urban governance and the rescaling of statehood.* Oxford University Press.

Brenner, N., Madden, D. J., & Wachsmuth, D. (2011). Assemblage urbanism and the challenges of critical urban theory. *City*, *15*(2), 225-240.

Bromley, D. W. (2009). Formalising property relations in the developing world: the wrong prescription for the wrong malady. *Land Use Policy*, *26*(1), 20-27.

Burns, J. P. (1994). Strengthening central CCP control of leadership selection: the 1990 nomenklatura. *The China Quarterly*, *138*, 458-491.

Cai, F. & Wang, M. (2008). A counterfactual analysis on unlimited surplus labor in rural China. *China & World Economy*, *16*(1), 51–65.

Cartier, C. (2001). *Globalizing South China*. Wiley.

Cartier, C. (2002). Origins and evolution of a geographical idea: the macroregion in China. *Modern China*, 79-142.

Cartier, C. (2011). Urban Growth, Rescaling, and the Spatial Administrative Hierarchy. *Provincial China*, *3*(1).

Castells, M. 2004. *The Power of Identity: The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture*. Information Age Series. Wiley.

Centeno, M. A., & Portes, A. (2006). The informal economy in the shadow of the state. In Fernández-Kelly, P., & Shefner, J. (Eds.) *Out of the shadows: political action and the informal economy in Latin America*. Penn State Press. 23-48.

Chan, A., Madsen, R., & Unger, J. (1984). *Chen village: The recent history of a peasant community in Mao's China*. Univ of California Press.

Chan, C. K.-C. (2012). Class or citizenship? Debating Workplace Conflict in China. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, *42*(2), 308–327.

Chan, H. 2004. Cadre Personnel Management in China: The *nomenklatura* system 1990-1998. *China Quarterly*. 2004: 703-734.

Chan, J., Pun, N., & Selden, M. (2013). The politics of global production: Apple, Foxconn and China's new working class. *New Technology, Work and Employment*, *28*(2), 100-115.

Chan, K.W. (1994). *Cities with invisible walls: Reinterpreting urbanization in post-1949 China*. Oxford University Press.

Chan, K.W. (2007), Misconceptions and complexities in the study of China's cities: Definitions, statistics, and implications, *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, 2007, 48, No. 4, pp. 383–412.

Chan, K.W. (2009a). Measuring the urban millions. *China Economic Quarterly.* March, 21-26.

Chan, KW (2009b). Population, migration, and the Lewis turning point in China. In Cai F. & Yang D. (Eds.), *The China Population and Labor Yearbook, Volume 1*. Brill.

Chan K.W. (2009c). The Chinese *hukou* system at 50. *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, 50 (2), 197-221.

Chan, K.W. & Buckingham, W. (2008). Is China abolishing the *hukou* system? *The China Quarterly*, *195*, 582-606.

Chan, K.W., & Hu Y. (2003). Urbanization in China in the 1990s: New definitions, different series, and revised trends. *The China Review*, 3(2), pp.49-71.

Chan, K.W., & Zhang L. (1999). The *hukou* system and rural-urban migration in China: Processes and changes. *The China Quarterly*, 160, 818–55.

Chéncǎifèng: Chéngxiāng yītǐ huà? Qǐng dào hàn nán kàn "shìdiǎn! (2012) [Chen Caifeng: Rural-urban integration? See the Hannan pilot!] Retrieved Aug. 4, 2014 from http://news.cnhubei.com/gdxw/201201/t1950625.shtml.

Chen, H. (2013). *Villages-in-the-City and urbanization in Guangzhou, China*. Dissertation University of Washington. http://hdl.handle.net/1773/22625

Chen, J., & Dickson, B. J. (2010). *Allies of the state: China's private entrepreneurs and democratic change*. Harvard University Press.

Chen, X. (2011). *Social protest and contentious authoritarianism in China*. Cambridge University Press.

Cheng, T. and Selden, M. (1994). The origins and social consequences of China's *hukou* system. *The China Quarterly* 139, 644–68.

Chengzhongcun qiye zai gaige zhong chixu fazhan. [Chengzhogcun enterprises sustained development in transformation]. Accessed March 27, 2012 from http://www.whzx.gov.cn/web/ggrd/ggrd_39.htm

China to open 1st subway across Yangtze River on Dec. 28. Retrieved June 15, 2013 from *http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/photo/2012-12/15/c_132043266.htm*

Cinar, A., & Bender, T. (Eds.). (2007). *Urban imaginaries: Locating the modern city*. University of Minnesota Press.

Chung, J. H., & Lam, T. (2004). China's cities in flux: Explaining post-Mao administrative changes. *The China Quarterly, 180,* 945–964.

Chung, H. (2009). The planning of "villages-in-the-city" in Shenzhen, China: The significance of the new state-led approach. *International Planning Studies, 14*(3), 253–273.

Chung, H. (2010). Building an image of villages-in-the-city: A clarification of China's distinct urban spaces. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, *34*(2), 421-437.

Chung, H., & Unger, J. (2013). The Guangdong model of urbanisation: Collective village land and the making of a new middle class. *China Perspectives*, (3), 33.

Chung, H. (2014). Rural transformation and the persistence of rurality in China. *Eurasian Geography and Economics*. 54(5-6), 1-17.

Chutian Jinbao (2010). Shídì tànfǎng wángjiā dūn CBD wǔhàn fàn hǎi "wǔ de" yíyún. [Wuhan Oceanwide Gains Supremancy of Wangjiadun Site] 8/12/2010.

Clarke, D., Whiting S., & Murrell, P. (2008). The role of law in China's economic development. In Rawski, T. & Brandt, L. (Eds.), *China's great economic transformation*. Cambridge University Press.

Coase, R., & Wang, N. (2012). *How China became capitalist*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Collier, S. J., & Ong, A. (2005). Global assemblages, anthropological problems. *Global assemblages: Technology, politics, and ethics as anthropological problems*, 3-21.

Country Garden (2013) *Country Garden Holdings Company, Ltd. Annual Report.* Retrieved June 7, 2014 from http://www.bgy.com.cn/enn/relation/report.aspx

Davis, M. (2006). *Planet of Slums*. Verso.

Davison, N. (2013, March 29). Rivers of blood: the dead pigs rotting in China's water supply. *The Guardian*. Retrieved June 2, 2014 from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/29/dead-pigs-china-water-supply

Debt-ridden Wuhan to spend $329b in 5 years (2014, Feb. 19). *China Daily*. Retrieved June 30, 2014 from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-02/19/content_17292881.htm.

De Landa, M. (1997). *A thousand years of nonlinear history*. Zone Books.

DeLanda, M. (2006). *A new philosophy of society: Assemblage theory and social complexity*. Continuum.

DeLanda, M., Protevi, J., & Thanem, T. (2013). Deleuzian interrogations: A conversation with Manuel DeLanda and John Protevi. *Tamara Journal for Critical Organization Inquiry*, *3*(4) 65-88.

Deng J. (2012) *Insiders' entitlements: Formation of the household registration (huji/hukou) system (1949-1959)*. Dissertation, Queen's University. http://hdl.handle.net/1974/7292

De Soto, H. (2002). *The other path: The economic answer to terrorism*. Basic Books.

Dick, H.W. & Rimmel, P.J. (1998). Beyond the third world city: Geography of south-east Asia," *Urban Studies*, 35(12), 2303- 2321

Dickson, B. J. (2003). *Red capitalists in China: The party, private entrepreneurs, and prospects for political change*. Cambridge University Press.

Dickson, B. J. (2007). Integrating wealth and power in China: the communist party's embrace of the private sector. *The China Quarterly*, *192*, 827-854.

Fan, C. C. (2002). The elite, the natives, and the outsiders: Migration and labor market segmentation in urban China. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, *92*(1), 103-124.

Fang, C., Zhang, X., & Fan, S. (2002). Emergence of urban poverty and inequality in China: evidence from household survey. *China Economic Review*, *13*(4), 430–443.

Featherstone, D. (2011). On assemblage and articulation: On assemblage and articulation. *Area*, *43*(2), 139–142.

Fewsmith, J. (2008). *China Since Tiananmen: From Deng Xiaoping to Hu Jintao*. Cambridge University Press.

Fishman, Robert (1987) *Bourgeois Utopias: The Rise and Fall of Suburbia*. New York: Basic Books.

Fligstein, N., & Zhang, J. (2011). A new agenda for research on the trajectory of Chinese capitalism. *Management and Organization Review*, *7*(1), 39-62.

FlorCruz, M. (2014, Feb. 25). Another Chinese first: Pollution is so bad, man sues government for damages and compensation. *International Business Times.* Retreived July 2, 2014 from http://www.ibtimes.com/another-chinese-first-pollution-so-bad-man-sues-government-damages-compensation-1557856.

Frazier, M. W. (2010). *Socialist insecurity: pensions and the politics of uneven development in China*. Cornell University Press.

Friedman, E., Pickowicz, P., & Selden, M., (1991). *Chinese village, socialist state*. Yale University Press.

Friedmann, J. (1986). The world city hypothesis. *Development and Change*, *17*(1), 69-83.

Fukuyama, F. (1989). The end of History. *The National Interest*, *16*(4).

"Fúxīng gǔfèn: Qiāndìng "gūsǎo shù cūn "chéng zhōngcūn" zònghé gǎizào jiànshè xiàngmù hézuò xiéyì shū" (2010, Oct. 20). [Fuxing shares: Sign comprehensive transformation of Gusao Shu village construction cooperation agreement]. Retrieved June 4, 2014 from *http://finance.ifeng.com/stock/gsgg/20101020/2742048.shtml*.

Gao, H. (2010, Oct. 4). Migrant 'villages' within a city ignite debate. *New York Times*. P. A8

Garreau, J. (1991). Edge cities: Life on the new frontier. *NY: Doubleday*.

Gibson-Graham, J. K. (2006). *A postcapitalist politics*. University of Minnesota Press.

Gilbert, A. (2005). Book review: the challenge of slums: global report on human settlements 2003. *Progress in Human Geography*, *29*(1), 118-120.

Gilbert, A. (2007). The return of the slum: does language matter?. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, *31*(4), 697-713.

Gilley, B. (2001). *Model rebels: The rise and fall of China's richest village*. University of California Press.

Ginsburg, N. S., Koppel, B., & McGee, T. G. (Eds.). (1991). *The Extended Metropolis: Settlement Transition Is Asia*. University of Hawaii Press.

Glassman, J. (2006). Primitive accumulation, accumulation by dispossession, accumulation by 'extra-economic'means. *Progress in Human Geography*, *30*(5), 608-625.

Godfrey, B. J., & Zhou, Y. (1999). Ranking world cities: multinational corporations and the global urban hierarchy. *Urban Geography*, *20*(3), 268-281.

Goldman, M. and Perry E., eds. (2002). *From comrade to citizen: Struggle for political rights in China*. Harvard University Press.

Goldstein, D. M. (2012). Decolonialising "actually existing neoliberalism". *Social Anthropology*, *20*(3), 304–309.

Gong, Y. (2014). Manufacturing towns in China: Governance, space, and conveyance of rural migrants to the assembly line. Dissertation, University of Washington. https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/handle/1773/25056

Gōngsī +hézuòshè +nónghù" xiéshǒu gòng jìn duōfāng shòuyì (2010). [Company + Cooperative + Farmer" hand in hand for mutual benefit] *Wuhan Nongji Wang.* Retrieved August 4, 2014 from http://zsdw.wuhanagri.gov.cn/whnjw/news_content.aspx?id=844.

Gries, P. H. (2004). *China's new nationalism: Pride, politics, and diplomacy*. University of California Press.

Guldin, G. (1992) *Urbanizing China*. Greenwood Press.

Guo, X. (2001). Land expropriation and rural conflicts in China. *The China Quarterly*, *166*, 422-439.

Haila, Anne (2007). The market as the new emperor. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 31(1), 3-20.

Hall, D. (2012). Rethinking primitive accumulation: Theoretical tensions and rural Southeast Asian complexities. *Antipode*, *44*(4), 1188–1208.

Hall, S**.** (1980). Race, Articulation and Societies Structured in Dominance. *Sociological*

Theories: Race and Colonialism, Paris: UNESCO, pp. 305-345.

Han, L., & Kung, J. K. S. (2012). Fiscal Incentives and Policy Choices of Local Governments: Evidence from China. *Hong Kong University of Science and Technology Working Paper*.

Han, S. S., & Wu, X. (2004). Wuhan. *Cities*, *21*(4), 349 – 362.

Hannan CPC (2008). Zhōnggòng hàn nán qū wěi hàn nán qū rénmín zhèngfǔ guānyú yìnfā hàn nán qū chuàngjiàn wǔhàn shì chéngxiāng yītǐ huà gǎigé shìyàn qū zǒngtǐ fāng'àn de tōngzhī. [Announcement of the Hannan rural-urban integration pilot program]. Retrieved August 4, 2014 from http://www.hannan.gov.cn/news.do?method=showNews&netyId=151&newsId=31999

"Hannan Government" (2013). Hannan.gov.cn Accessed August 4, 2014

Hannan New Town. Retrieved August 4, 2014 from http://www.whhnxc.com/index.html.

Harris, P. (2002). The origins of modern citizenship in China," *Asia Pacific Viewpoints* 43(2) 181-203.

Harney, A. (2008). *The China price: The true cost of Chinese competitive advantage*. Penguin.

Hart, G. (2007). Changing concepts of articulation: political stakes in South Africa today. *Review of African Political Economy*, *34*(111), 85-101.

Harvey, D. (1989). *The condition of postmodernity: An enquiry into the origins of cultural change*. Wiley.

Harvey, D. (2001). *Spaces of capital: Towards a critical geography*. Routledge.

Harvey, D. (2003). *The new imperialism*. Oxford University Press.

Harvey, D. (2005). *A brief history of neoliberalism*. Oxford University Press.

Hayden, D. (2003) *Building suburbia*: *Green fields and urban growth 1820-2000*. Vintage Books.

He, S., Z. Li, & F. Wu. (2006). Transformation of the Chinese city, 1995-2005: Geographical perspectives and geographers' contributions." *China Information* 20 (3), 429–56.

He, S., Liu, Y., Wu, F., & Webster, C. (2010). Social groups and housing differentiation in China's urban villages: An institutional interpretation. *Housing Studies*, *25*(5), 671-691.

He, S., and Wu F. (2007). Socio-spatial impacts of property-led redevelopment on China's urban neighbourhoods. *Cities* 24 (3), 194–208.

He, S., and Wu F. (2009). China's emerging neoliberal urbanism: Perspectives from urban redevelopment." *Antipode* 41 (2), 282–304.

He, Z., Zhang, C., & Li, L. (2009, April 20). Wǒ shì qiánglì tuījìn jiù chéng hé chéng zhōngcūn gǎizào. [Strongly promote the city's old city and *chengzhongcun* transformation]. Accessed April 27, 2013 from http://www.whbc.com.cn/rdzt/2009yearzt/lxsh/lxshjcsp/200904/t20090420_1005.shtml

Ho, P. (2001). Who owns China's land? Policies, property rights, and deliberate institutional ambiguity. *The China Quarterly*. 394-421.

Ho, P. and Lin G. (2003). Emerging land markets in rural and urban China: Policies and practices. *China Quarterly*, *175*, 681-707.

Hoffman, L. M. (2010). *Patriotic professionalism in urban China: Fostering talent*. Temple University Press.

Hsing, Y. T. (1996). Blood, thicker than water: interpersonal relations and Taiwanese investment in southern China. *Environment and planning A*, *28*, 2241-2262.

Hsing, Y. T. (2006). Land and territorial politics in urban China. *The China Quarterly*, *187*, 575-591.

Hsing, Y. T. (2010). The great urban transformation: politics of land and property in China. *OUP Catalogue*.

Hu, W. (2004, Nov. 6). Wǔhàn shì zhǎng nùchì chéng zhōngcūn làn gài sīfáng piànqǔ chāiqiān bǔcháng xiànxiàng. [Wuhan Mayor angry over *chengzhongcun* relocation compensation fraud]. *Wuhan Wanbao*. Retrieved Oct. 1, 2009 from http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2004-11-06/12004833257.shtml.

Huang, P. C. (2011). The theoretical and practical implications of China's development experience: the role of informal economic practices. *Modern China*, *37*(1), 3-43.

Huang, Y. (2008). *Capitalism with Chinese characteristics*. Cambridge University Press

Huang, Y. (2011). *Chengshi tudi kaifa ji kongjian fazhan: yi Wuhan shi weili*. [Urban land and spatial development: A case study of Wuhan City]. Huazhong University of Science and Technology Press

Húběi fúxīng kējì gǔfèn yǒuxiàn gōngsī guānyú yǔ wǔhàn shì jiānghàn qū gūsǎo shù cūn cūn wěi huì (2013). [Hubei Fuxing Huiyu Development Company on Wuhan, Jianghan District Gusao Shu Village Committee] Retrieved 2/4/2014 from http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/t/20101021/07158816447.shtml

Invisible and heavy shackles (2010, May 6). *The Economist*. Retrieved August 1, 2014 from http://www.economist.com/node/16058750.

Jessop, B. (2002a). Liberalism, neoliberalism, and urban governance: A state–theoretical perspective. *Antipode*, *34*(3), 452-472.

Jessop, B. (2002b). Time and space in the globalization of capital and their implications for state power. *Rethinking Marxism*, *14*(1), 97-117.

Jessop, B. (2012). The world market, variegated capitalism, and the crisis of European integration. In Nousiou, P., Overbeek, H., & Tsolakis, A. (Eds.), *Globalisation and European Integration: Critical Approaches to Regional Order and International Relations.* Routledge. 91–111

Ji Y. (2013). China - Chongqing Urban-Rural Integration Project : P086446 - Implementation Status Results Report : Sequence 05. Washington, DC: World Bank. Retrieved Aug. 4, 2014 from http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/12/18698391/china-chongqing-urban-rural-integration-project-p086446-implementation-status-results-report-sequence-05.

Kelly, D. (2008). Reincorporating the Mingong: Dilemmas of Citizen Status. In Nielsen, I., & Smyth, R. (Eds.), *Migration and Social Protection in China*. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co. 17–30.

Khan, A. R., & Riskin, C. (1998). Income and inequality in China: composition, distribution and growth of household income, 1988 to 1995. *The China Quarterly*, *154*, 221–253.

Khan, A. R., & Riskin, C. (2005). China's household income and its distribution, 1995 and 2002. *The China Quarterly*, *182*, 356–384.

Kipnis, A. (2006). Suzhi: A keyword approach. *The China Quarterly*, *186*, 295-313.

Kipnis, A. (2007). Neoliberalism reified: suzhi discourse and tropes of neoliberalism in the People's Republic of China. *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, *13*(2), 383-400.

Knight, J. and Song L. (1999) *The rural urban divide: Economic disparities and interactions in China*. Oxford University Press.

Knight, J. and Song L. (2001). Economic growth, economic reform, and rising inequality in China. In Riskin, C., Zhao, R., & Li, S. (2001). *China's Retreat from Equality: Income Distribution and Economic Transition*. M.E. Sharpe. 84-124.

Kornai, J. (1992). *The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism: The Political Economy of Communism*. Oxford University Press.

Kornai, J. (2000). What the change of system from socialism to capitalism does and does not mean. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 27-42.

Knox, P. L. (2008). *Metroburbia, USA*. Rutgers University Press.

Knox, P. L., & Taylor, P. J. (Eds.). (1995). *World cities in a world-system*. Cambridge University Press.

Kuàisù tuījìn tí shìqì, jù jù zhǔtuō jì hòuwàng qū réndà zhǔrèn wángwèiguó diàoyán hàn nán xīnchéng (ōuzhōu fēngqíng xiǎo zhèn) tuījìn qíngkuàng (2013, Nov. 15). [Director of Hannan New Town Research calls for the advancement of Jinti gas, has high hopes for the European town]. Retrieved Aug. 4, 2014 from http://www.whhnxc.com/xcyw/496.jhtml

Kung, J., Cai Y., and Sun X. (2009). Rural cadres and governance in China: Incentive, institution, and accountability." *The China Journal*, 62, 61-77.

Kung, J., Xu C., and Zhou F. (2009). From industrialization to urbanization: The social consequences of changing fiscal incentives on local governments' behavior." in Joseph E. Stiglitz, ed., *Institutional Design for China's Evolving Market Economy*, forthcoming. Retrieved Dec. 1, 2012 from http://www.sef.hku.hk/~cgxu/publication/KXZ_Industralization_3-31-09b.pdf.

Lang, R. E., & LeFurgy, J. B. (2007). *Boomburbs: the rise of America's accidental cities*. Brookings Institution Press.

Lardy, N. R. (1998). *China's unfinished economic revolution*. Brookings Institution Press.

Lardy, N. R. (2004). *Integrating China into the global economy*. Brookings Institution Press.

Latham, A., & McCormack, D. P. (2010). Globalizations big and small: notes on urban studies, Actor Network Theory, and geographical scale. In Farías, I., & Bender, T. (Eds.), *Urban Assemblages: How Actor-Network Theory Changes Urban Studies*. Taylor & Francis. 53-72.

Leaf, M. (2007). Chengzhongcun: China's urbanizing villages from multiple perspectives. In Song, Y. & Ding C. (Eds.), *Urbanization in China: critical issues in an era of rapid growth*. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 164-184.

Lenovo Mobile and Internet Base (Wuhan) put into operation (2013) Retrieved Aug. 4, 2014 from http://en.hubei.gov.cn/news/newslist/201312/t20131220_483453.shtml

Lee, C. K. (1998). *Gender and the South China miracle: Two worlds of factory women*. University of California Press.

Lee, J., & Zhu, Y. P. (2006). Urban governance, neoliberalism and housing reform in China. *The Pacific Review*, *19*(1), 39-61.

Legg, S. (2011). Assemblage/apparatus: using Deleuze and Foucault. *Area*, *43*(2), 128-133.

Leitner, H., Peck, J., & Sheppard, E. S. (Eds.). (2007). *Contesting neoliberalism: Urban frontiers*. Guilford Press.

Leys, S. (1981). The China experts. *Quadrant*, 25(4), 17-22.

Li, C. (2012). The end of the CCP's resilient authoritarianism? A tripartite assessment of shifting power in China. *The China Quarterly*, *211*, 595–623.

Li H. (2012). "Global city and world class urban agglomeration: Regional view of Beijing global city development," *Planners* 6.

Li X. (2013) "Wǔhàn kāifā qū zhěngtǐ tuōguǎn hàn nán qū tuījìn dà hànyáng yītǐ huà fāzhǎn" [Wuhan Development Zone to integrate development with Hannan for the promotion of greater Hanyang] *Changjiang Ribao* 12/31/2013. Retrieved August 4, 2014 from http://news.cnhan.com/html/shizheng/2013/1231/15511.html.

Li Y. (2008) "*Jin shinian lai guonei 'chengzhongcun' yanjiu shuping,"* [Review of Urban Village Research in Recent Decades]. *Journal of Beijing City University*. No. 6

Liao Q. (2014) "Mín zī tóurù 20 yì hàn nángǎng zuó kāi gang" [2 billion RMB invested Nangang Port opened yesterday]. *Chutian Daily*. Retrieved August 4, 2014 from http://news.whjs.gov.cn/content/2014-04/02/content_318995.htm

Lieberthal, K. G. (1992). Introduction: the 'fragmented authoritarianism'model and its limitations. In Lieberthal, K.G. & Lampton D. (Eds.), *Bureaucracy, politics, and decision making in post-Mao China*, 1-30.

Liew, L. (2005). China's engagement with neo-liberalism: Path dependency, geography and party self-reinvention. *The Journal of Development Studies*, *41*(2), 331-352.

Lim, K. F. (2014a). 'Socialism with Chinese characteristics' Uneven development, variegated neoliberalization and the dialectical differentiation of state spatiality. *Progress in Human Geography*, *38*(2), 221-247.

Lim, K.F. (2014b). Spatial egalitarianism as a social 'counter movement': on socioeconomic reforms in Chongqing. *Economy & Society.* Forthcoming.

Lin, C. (2006). *The transformation of Chinese socialism*. Duke University Press.

Lin, N. and Chen C.J. (1999). Local elites as officials and owners: Shareholding and property rights in Daqiuzhuang, In Oi, J. and Walder, A. (Eds.), *Property Rights and Economic Reform in China*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 145-170.

Lin, G. (1997). *Red capitalism in South China: growth and development of the Pearl River Delta*. University of British Columbia Press.

Lin, G. (2001). Evolving Spatial Form of Urban-Rural Interaction in the Pearl River Delta, China. *The Professional Geographer*, *53*(1), 56-70.

Lin, G. (2004). Toward a post-socialist city? Economic tertiarization and urban reformation in the Guangzhou metropolis, China. *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, *45*(1), 18-44.

Lin, G. (2006). Peri-urbanism in globalizing China: A study of new urbanism in Dongguan. *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, *47*(1), 28-53.

Lin, G. (2009). *Developing China: Land, politics and social conditions*. Routledge Contemporary China Series. Routledge.

Lin, J. Y. (2012). *Demystifying the Chinese economy*. Cambridge University Press.

Liu S. (2008), J*ianti tudi zitihua yu nongcun chengshihua: beijingshizheng gezhuang cun diaocha*," *Beijing University Journal* no. 6

Liu, Y., He, S., Wu, F., & Webster, C. (2010). Urban villages under China's rapid urbanization: unregulated assets and transitional neighbourhoods. *Habitat International*, *34*(2), 135-144.

Liu, Y., Li, Z., & Breitung, W. (2012). The social networks of new-generation migrants in China's urbanized villages: A case study of Guangzhou. *Habitat International*, *36*(1), 192-200.

Lo, F. and Yeung Y. (1996). *Emerging world cities in Pacific Asia*. United Nations University Press.

Ludi wuhan xiangmu zhadui kaifa touzi 400 yi jian Hannan ouzhou fengqing xiaozhen (2014). [Greenland's Wuhan project to invest 4 billion RMB to develop European-style town]. *Ying Shang Network.* Retrieved Aug. 4, 2014 from http://hb.winshang.com/news-233536.html.

Ma, L. J. (2002). Urban transformation in China, 1949-2000: a review and research agenda. *Environment and Planning A*, *34*(9), 1545-1570.

Ma, L. J. (2005). Urban administrative restructuring, changing scale relations and local economic development in China. *Political Geography*, *24*(4), 477-497.

Ma, L. J. (2009). Viewpoint: China's authoritarian capitalism: Growth, elitism and legitimacy." *International Development Planning Review* 31 (1): 1–21.

Ma, L.J. and Fan, M. (1994), "Urbanization from below: the growth of towns in Jiangsu, China." *Urban Studies*, 31(10), 1625-1645.

Ma, L. J., & Lin, C. (1993). Development of towns in China: a case study of Guangdong Province. *Population and Development Review*, 583-606.

Macleod, G., & Goodwin, M. (1999). Space, scale and state strategy: rethinking urban and regional governance. *Progress in Human Geography*, *23*(4), 503–527.

Mallee, H. (2000). Migration, hukou and resistance in reform China. *Chinese Society. Change, Conflict and Resistance, London. New York*.

Marks, R. (1985). The state of the China field: or, the China field and the state. *Modern China*, 461-509.

Martin, P. (2007). Mexico's neoliberal transition: Authoritarian shadows in an era of neoliberalism". In Leitner, H., Peck, J., & Sheppard, E. S. (Eds.). (2007). *Contesting neoliberalism: urban frontiers*. Guilford Press. 51-70

Marston, S. A. (2000). The social construction of scale. *Progress in human geography*, *24*(2), 219-242.

Martine, G. (2008). *The new global frontier: Urbanization, poverty and environment in the 21st century*. Earthscan.

Marton, A. M. (2002). Local geographies of globalisation: rural agglomeration in the Chinese countryside. *Asia Pacific Viewpoint*, *43*(1), 23-42.

May, S. (2011). Ecological urbanization: Calculating value in an age of global climate change. Roy and Ang, eds., *Worlding Cities: Asian Experiments and the Art of Being Global*. Malden, MA: Wiley Blackwell pp. 98-126

Mayer, A. (2011, April 30). How China's megacities have avoided problems of other developing countries," *New Geography* Retrieved March 29, 2014 from http://www.newgeography.com/content/002205-how-china%E2%80%99s-megacities-have-avoided-problems-other-developing-cities.

McCann, E. (2011). Veritable inventions: cities, policies and assemblage. *Area*, *43*(2), 143-147.

McFarlane, C., & Anderson, B. (2011). Thinking with assemblage. *Area*, *43*(2), 162-164.

McGee, T., Lin G., Wang, M., Marton, A., & Wu J. (2007). *China's Urban Space: Development under Market Socialism*. Routledge Studies on China in Transition. Taylor & Francis

McGee, T.G. (1991). The emergence of *desakota* regions in Asia: Expanding a hypothesis. Ginsburg, Norton, Bruce Koppel, and T.G. McGee, .eds.

Meisner, M.J. 1996. *The Deng Xiaoping era: An inquiry into the fate of Chinese socialism, 1978-1994*. Hill and Wang.

Meng, X., & Zhang, J. (2001). The two-tier labor market in urban China: occupational segregation and wage differentials between urban residents and rural migrants in Shanghai. *Journal of comparative Economics*, *29*(3), 485-504.

Meng, X., Gregory, R., & Wang, Y. (2005). Poverty, inequality, and growth in urban China, 1986–2000. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, *33*(4), 710-729.

Mobrand, E. (2006). Politics of cityward migration: an overview of China in comparative perspective. *Habitat International*, *30*(2), 261-274.

Mohan, G., & Power, M. (2009). Africa, China and the 'new'economic geography of development. *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography*, *30*(1), 24-28.

Murphy, R. (2002). *How migrant labor is changing rural China*. Cambridge University Press.

Murphy, R. (2004). Turning peasants into modern Chinese citizens:"Population quality" discourse, demographic transition and primary education. *The China Quarterly*, *177*, 1-20.

Musembi, C. N. (2007). De Soto and land relations in rural Africa: breathing life into dead theories about property rights. *Third World Quarterly*, *28*(8), 1457-1478.

Myers, G. A. (2011). *African cities: Alternative visions of urban theory and practice*. Zed Books Limited.

Naughton, B. (1988). The Third Front: defence industrialization in the Chinese interior. *The China Quarterly*, *115*, 351-386.

Naughton, B. (1996). *Growing Out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1978-1993*.

Naughton, B. (2007). *The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth*. MIT Press.

Nee, V. (1989). A theory of market transition: From redistribution to markets in state socialism. *American Sociological Review*, 663-681

Nee, V. (1991). Social inequalities in reforming state socialism: Between redistribution and markets in China. *American Sociological Review*, 267-282.

Nee, V. (1996). The emergence of a market society: Changing mechanisms of stratification in China. *American Journal of Sociology*, 908-949.

Ngai, P. (2005). *Made in China: Women Factory Workers in a Global Workplace.* Durham: Duke University Press.

Ngai, P., Chan, K. C. C., & Chan, J. (2010). The role of the state, labour policy and migrant workers' struggles in globalized China. *Global Labour Journal*.

Ngai, P., & Lu, H. (2010). Unfinished proletarianization: self, anger, and class action among the second generation of peasant-workers in present-day China. *Modern China*.

Nonini, D. M. (2008). Is China becoming neoliberal?. *Critique of Anthropology*, *28*(2), 145-176.

Nuwagaba, A. (2006). Dualism in Kampala: squalid slums in a royal realm. In Bryceson, D. F., & Potts, D. H. (Eds.). (2006). *African Urban Economies: Viability, Vitality, Or Vitiation?* Palgrave Macmillan. 151-65.

O'Brien Kevin, J., & Lianjiang, L. I. (2006). Rightful resistance in China. Cambridge University Press.

Oceanwide Report (2012). *Oceanwide Construction and Investment Company Annual Report, 2012.* Retrieved August 1, 2014 from http://www.chinaoceanwide.com/

Oceanwide Report (2013). *Oceanwide Construction and Investment Company Annual Report, 2013*. Retrieved August 1, 2014 from http://www.chinaoceanwide.com/

Oi, J. C. (1999). *Rural China takes off: Institutional foundations of economic reform*. Univ of California Press.

Ong, A. (2007). Neoliberalism as a mobile technology. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, *32*(1), 3-8.

Ong, A. (2011). Introduction: Worlding cities, or the art of being global. In Roy, A. & Ong, A. (Eds.), *Worlding cities: Asian experiments and the art of being global*, 1-26. Wiley & Sons.

Paik, W., & Lee, K. (2012). I Want To Be Expropriated!: the politics of xiaochanquanfang land development in suburban China. *Journal of Contemporary China*, *21*(74), 261-279.

Painter, J. (2006) Prosaic geographies of stateness. *Political Geography* 25(7): 752-774.

Peck, J. (2011). Geographies of policy From transfer-diffusion to mobility-mutation. *Progress in Human Geography*, *35*(6), 773-797.

Peck, J., & Theodore, N. (2010). Mobilizing policy: Models, methods, and mutations. *Geoforum*, *41*(2), 169-174.

Peck, J. and Tickell, A. (2002) Neoliberalizing space. *Antipode* 34 (3), 380-404.

Peck, J., & Zhang, J. (2013). A variety of capitalism… with Chinese characteristics?. *Journal of Economic Geography*, *13*(3), 357-396.

Pei M. (2005) *China's trapped transition*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Peng, T. (2011). The impact of citizenship on labour process: state, capital and labour control in South China. *Work, Employment & Society*, *25*(4), 726–741.

Perlman, J. E. (1979). *The myth of marginality: Urban poverty and politics in Rio de Janeiro*. University of California Press.

Pickvance, C. (2011). The limits of neoliberalism: Is the concept of neoliberalism helpful in the study of urban policy? In Kunkel & Mayer (Eds.), *Neoliberal Urbanism and its Contestations: Crossing Theoretical Boundaries*. Palgrave MacMillan. 46-62.

Po, L. (2008). Redefining rural collectives in China: Land conversion and the emergence of rural shareholding co-operatives. *Urban Studies*, *45*(8), 1603-1623.

Po, L. (2011). Property Rights Reforms and Changing Grassroots Governance in China's Urban—Rural Peripheries: The Case of Changping District in Beijing. *Urban Studies*, *48*(3), 509-528.

Po, L. (2012). Asymmetrical integration: public finance deprivation in China's urbanized villages. *Environment and Planning-Part A*, *44*(12), 2834.

Pow, C.P. 2009. *Gated communities in China: Class, privilege and the moral politics of the good life*. Routledge Pacific Rim Geographies. Taylor & Francis.

PM Says Lets Make Mumbai Number 1 City (2004, Oct. 6). *Press Trust of India*, Retrieved Aug. 21, 2004 from http://www.rediff.com/news/2004/oct/06pm.htm.

Purcell, M. (2003) "Citizenship and the Right to the Global City: Reimagining the Capitalist World Order," *International Journal of Urban Regional Research.* 27(3) 564-590.

Purcell, M. (2014). Possible Worlds: Henri Lefebvre and the Right to the City. *Journal of Urban Affairs*, *36*(1), 141–154.

Putterman, L. (1993) *Continuity and change in China's rural development: Collective and reform eras in perspective*. Oxford University Press

Qian, Y. (2000). The process of China's market transition (1978-1998): the evolutionary, historical, and comparative perspectives. *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, *156*(1), 151-179.

Qian, Y. and Jianlian W. (2003) "China's Transition to a Market Economy: How Far Across the River?" in Hope, N. C., Yang, D. T., & Li, M. Y. (Eds.), *How Far Across the River? Chinese Policy Reform at the Millennium*. Stanford University Press. 31-64.

Rawski, T. G. (1995). Implications of China's reform Experience. *The China Quarterly*, *144*, 1150-1173.

Ren, X..and Weinstein L. The Shanghai effect: Political devolution and mega-project development in China and India. *Center for the Advanced Study of India*. Retrieved from https://casi.sas.upenn.edu/iit/renweinstein Accessed March 12, 2014

Rihal, D. (2005) "Foreign concessions historiography and urban heritage in China: the case of the Hankou concession [Historiographie des concessions étrangères et patrimoine urbain en Chine :le cas de Hankou] Second Congress of Reseau Asie-Asia Network, Paris, France.

Rofel, L. (1999). *Other modernities: Gendered yearnings in China after socialism*. Univ of California Press.

Rofel, L. (2007). *Desiring China: Experiments in neoliberalism, sexuality, and public culture*. Duke University Press.

Sanderson, H., & Forsythe, M. (2012). *China's superbank: debt, oil and influence-how China Development Bank is rewriting the rules of finance*. John Wiley & Sons.

Sargeson, S. (2002). Subduing "the rural house-building craze": attitudes towards housing construction and land use controls in four Zhejiang villages. *The China Quarterly*, *172*, 927-955.

Sargeson, S. (2013). Violence as development: land expropriation and China's urbanization. *Journal of Peasant Studies*, *40*(6), 1063-1085.

Santos, M. (1977). Spatial dialectics: The two circuits of urban economy in underdeveloped countries. *Antipode*, *9*(3), 49-60.

Sargeson, S. (2013). Violence as development: land expropriation and China's urbanization. *Journal of Peasant Studies*, *40*(6), 1063-1085.

Sassen, S. (2001). *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo*. Princeton University Press.

Saunders, D. (2011). *Arrival City: The Final Migration and Our Next World*. Knopf Canada.

Shi, S.-J. (2012). Towards Inclusive Social Citizenship? Rethinking China's Social Security in the Trend towards Urban–Rural Harmonisation. *Journal of Social Policy*, *41*(04), 789–810.

Shi Y., & Hamnett, C. (2002). The potential and prospect for global cities in China: in the context of the world system. *Geoforum*, *33*(1), 121-135.

Shin, K. H., & Timberlake, M. (2000). World cities in Asia: cliques, centrality and connectedness. *Urban studies*, *37*(12), 2257-2285.

Shirk, S. (1993). *The political logic of econmic reform*. University of California Press.

Shu H. (2013). *Gūsǎo shù lù cāngsāng biànqiān zhōubiān fángjià "tiào zhǎng"* [Changing fortunes around Gu Sao Village]. *Wuhan Real Estate Portal* Retrieved Feb. 20, 2014 from http://news.fdc.com.cn/sd/574218.shtml.

Shue, V. (1994) "State Power and Social Organization in China," in Migdal, J., Kohli, A. & Shue, V. (Eds.), *State Power and Social Forces*, Cambridge University Press. 65-88.

Sigley, G. (2006). Chinese governmentalities: Government, governance and the socialist market economy. *Economy and Society*, *35*(4), 487-508.

Simone, A. (2004). *For the city yet to come: Changing African life in four cities*. Duke University Press.

Siu, H. F. (2007). Grounding displacement: Uncivil urban spaces in postreform South China. *American Ethnologist*, *34*(2), 329–350.

Smart, A., & Lin, G. C. S. (2007). Local Capitalisms, Local Citizenship and Translocality: Rescaling from Below in the Pearl River Delta Region, China. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, *31*(2), 280–302.

Soja, E. W. (2000). *Postmetropolis: Critical Studies of Cities and Regions*. Wiley.

Soja, E. W. (2010). *Seeking spatial justice*. University of Minnesota Press.

Solinger, D. J. (1999). *Contesting citizenship in urban China: Peasant migrants, the state, and the logic of the market*. Univ of California Press.

Sjoberg, Orjan (1992) "Underurbanisation and the Zero Urban Growth Hypothesis: Diverted Migration in Albania," *Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography*, 74 (1) pp. 3-19.

Smith, M. P. (2001) *Transnational urbanism: Locating globalization*. Blackwell Publishers.

Smith, N. (1992). Contours of a spatialized politics: homeless vehicles and the production of geographical scale. *Social Text*, *33*(1), 55-81.

Smith, N. (1993). Homeless/global: scaling places. In Bird, J., editor, *Mapping the futures*, Routledge, 87–119.

Smith, N. (1996). "Spaces of vulnerability: the space of flows and the politics of scale." *Critique of Anthropology* 16, no. 1: 63-77.

Smith, N. (2002). New globalism, new urbanism: gentrification as global urban strategy. *Antipode*, *34*(3), 427–450.

Smith, N. (2003) "Remaking scale: competition and cooperation in pre-national and post-national Europe." *State/space: A reader* 228: 57-59.

State Council (1998). "*Notice on Ministry of Public Security and Resolution of Outstanding Issues of Hukou Management,* State Council Document #24." [*Guówùyuàn*

pī zhuǎn gōng'ān bù guānyú jiějué dāngqián hùkǒu guǎnlǐ gōngzuò zhōng jǐ gè túchū wèntí yìjiàn de tōngzhī]. Retrieved August 12, 2012 from http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=67485.

State Council (2014, June 10). Chinese State Council white paper on 'One Country, Two Systems' policy in Hong Kong. Republished in *South China Morning Post*, June 10, 2014. Retrieved June 15, 2014 from http://www.scmp.com/print/news/hong-kong/article/1529167/full-text-practice-one-country-two-systems-policy-hong-kong-special.

Sparke, M. (2005). *In the space of theory: Postfoundational geographies of the nation-state* University of Minnesota Press.

Song, Y., Zenou, Y., & Ding, C. (2008). Let's not throw the baby out with the bath water: the role of urban villages in housing rural migrants in China. *Urban Studies*, *45*(2), 313-330.

Su H. and Chan K.W. (2005). "*Tudi zhengyong yu difang zhengfu de xingwei*. [Urbanization, Land Expropriation, and Local Government Behavior] Hong Kong Baptist University, The Centre for China Urban and Regional Studies, Occasional Paper No.58.

Swyngedouw, E. (2000). Authoritarian governance, power, and the politics of rescaling. *Environment and Planning D*, *18*(1), 63-76.

Swyngedouw, E., & Baeten, G. (2001). Scaling the city: the political economy of'glocal'development-Brussels' conundrum. *European Planning Studies*, *9*(7), 827-849.

Swyngedouw, E., Moulaert, F., & Rodriguez, A. (2002). Neoliberal urbanization in Europe: large–scale urban development projects and the new urban policy. *Antipode*, *34*(3), 542-577.

Tang, W. S. (2014). Governing by the state: a study of the literature on governing Chinese mega-cities. In Berg, P. & Bjorner, E. (Eds.), *Branding Chinese Mega-Cities: Policies, Practices and Positioning*, Edward Elgar Publishing, 42-63.

Tang, W.S. and Chung, H. (2000). Urban-rural transition in china: Beyond the *desakota* model. In Li Siming and Tang Wingshing (Eds.) *China's Regions, Politics and Economy: A Study of Spatial Transformation in the Post-reform Era*, 275-308, Chinese University Press.

Tang, W. S., & Chung, H. (2002). Rural–urban transition in China: illegal land use and construction. *Asia Pacific Viewpoint*, *43*(1), 43-62.

Tao N. (2011) Kick that old ragman off the bus. *Shanghai Daily News.* August 15, 2011.

Taylor, P.J. (1984). Introduction: geographical scale and political geography. In Taylor, P. and House, J.,(Eds.) , *Political geography: recent advances and future directions*. Croom Helm, 1–7

Taylor, P. J. (2000). World cities and territorial states under conditions of contemporary globalization. *Political geography*, *19*(1), 5-32.

Thomas, G. H. (2004). *An American in China, 1936-1939: A Memoir*. Greatrix Press

Thornley, A., & Newman, P. (2011). *Planning world cities: globalization and urban politics*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Tian, L. I. (2008). The chengzhongcun land market in China: boon or bane?—a perspective on property rights. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, *32*(2), 282-304.

Tsai, K. S. (2004). Off balance: The unintended consequences of fiscal federalism in China. *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, *9*(2), 1–26.

Tsui, K., & Wang, Y. (2004). Between Separate Stoves and a Single Menu: Fiscal Decentralization in China. *China Quarterly*, *177*, 71–90.

Tu, Y. (2011). Citizenship with Chinese characteristics? An investigation into Chinese university students' civic perceptions and civic participation. *Frontiers of Education in China*, *6*(3), 426–448.

Tyler, T. R. (1990). Why people obey the law: Procedural justice, legitimacy, and compliance. Princeton University Press.

UN Habitat (2003) *The challenge of slums: Global report on human settlements.* UN Habitat.

Underwood, A. (2005). Designing the future. *Newsweek*. 5/15/2005.

Retrieved March 29, 2014 from http://www.newsweek.com/designing-future-118699.

Walder, A. G. (1988). *Communist neo-traditionalism: Work and authority in Chinese industry*. University of California Press.

Walder, A. G. (1996). Markets and inequality in transitional economies: Toward testable theories. *American Journal of Sociology*, 1060-1073.

Walker, R., & Buck, D. (2007). The Chinese Road. *New Left Review*, *46*, 39.

Wang, B. (2005, Oct. 21). Wǔchāng de wáng bōlán bù jīng, shí yuè guàpái jìngjià rèliè. [Wuchang Wang Bolan a hot October auction listing]. *Yifang Wang*. Accessed Oct. 3, 2009 from http://news.fdc.com.cn/sd/36367.htm%2010/21/2005.

Wang B. (2014). Hàn nán nǐ tóu 646 yì yuán jiànshè 99 gè zhòngdiǎn xiàngmù. [Hannan to invest 64.6 billion *yuan* in 99 construction projects]. *Changjiang Daily* 4/2/2012. Retrieved Aug. 4, 2014 from http://news.whjs.gov.cn/content/2014-04/02/content_318995.htm

Wang F. (2005). *Organization through division and exclusion: China's hukou system*. Stanford University Press.

Wang, H. (2003). *China's new order: Society, politics, and economy in transition*. Harvard University Press.

Wang M. (2012). *Dynamics of housing attainment in urban China: A case study of Wuhan*. Unpublished Dissertation. University of Washington: Seattle, WA.

Wang, Z. (2012). *Never forget national humiliation: Historical memory in Chinese politics and foreign relations*. Columbia University Press.

WASS (2006) Wǔhàn shì "chéng zhōngcūn" zònghé gǎizào zhōng tǔdì fángchǎn chǔzhì yánjiū. [Research on Wuhan city's comprehensive transformation of land and property disposal]. Wuhan Academy of Social Sciences. Retrieved April 25, 2013 from http://www.wuhanass.org.cn/news/200964/n1101259.html.

Webber, M. (2008). The places of primitive accumulation in rural China. *Economic Geography, 84*(4), 395-421.

Webber, M. (2008b). Primitive accumulation in modern China. *Dialectical Anthropology, 32*(4), 299-320.

Webster, D., & Muller, L. (2002). *Challenges of Peri-urbanization in the Lower Yangtze region: The case of the Hangzhou-Ningbo corridor.* Asia/Pacific Research Center.

Wee, S. Chinese man becomes first to sue government over severe smog. *Reuters*, February 25, 2014. Retrieved Aug. 3, 2014 from http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/25/china-pollution-idUSL3N0LU1U220140225

WHCBDB Wuhan Central Business District Investment and Development Company, Ltd. http://www.whcbd.com/

WHCDB (2009, May 6). Lúzhìqiáng dǒngshì zhǎng yǔ wǔhàn shì shì zhǎng ruǎnchéngfā huìwù yánjiū wǔhàn CBD kāifā jiànshè gōngzuò. [Chairman Lu Zhiqiang and Wuhan City Chairman Ruan Chengfa Meet to Investigate the Development and Construction of the Wuhan CBD]. Retrieved Aug. 4, 2014 from http://www.whcbd.com/html/2008/13/2559.shtml.

Whiting, S.H. 2001. *Power and Wealth in Rural China: The Political Economy of Institutional Change*. Cambridge Modern China Series. Cambridge University Press.

Whyte, M. K. (Ed.). (2010). *One country, two societies: rural-urban inequality in contemporary China* (Vol. 16). Harvard University Press.

Woetzel, J. (2011). China's Cities in the Sky. Retrieved May 21, 2014 from http://voices.mckinseyonsociety.com/chinas-cities-in-the-sky/.

Woetzel, J., Mendonca, L., Devan, J., Negri, S., Hu, Y., Jordan, L., & Yu, F. (2009). Preparing for China's urban billion. *McKinsey Global Institute*. Retrieved Aug. 10, 2014 from http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/urbanization/preparing_for_urban_billion_in_china.

Wolpe, H. (1990). *Race, class & the apartheid state*. Africa World Press

Wong, C. P. (1992). Fiscal reform and local industrialization: the problematic sequencing of reform in post-Mao China. *Modern China*, 197-227.

Wong, C.P. (2009). Rebuilding government for the 21st century: Can China incrementally reform the public sector? *The China Quarterly. 200*, 929-952

Wong, C., & Bird, R. (2008). China's fiscal system: a work in progress. *China's Great Economic Transformation*, 429-466.

Wong, S. and Pennington, C. (2013, Feb. 13). Steep challenges for a Chinese eco-city," *New York Times Green Blogs.* Retrieved March 29, 2014 from http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/13/steep-challenges-for-a-chinese-eco-city/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.

Wu, F. (2004). Transplanting cityscapes: the use of imagined globalization in housing commodification in Beijing. *Area*, *36*(3), 227-234.

Wu, F., Xu, J., & Yeh, A.G. (2006). *Urban development in post-reform China: State, market, and space*. Taylor & Francis.

Wu F. (2007) *China's emerging cities: The making of new urbanism*. Routledge.

Wu, F. (2008). China's great transformation: Neoliberalization as establishing a market society. *Geoforum*, *39*(3), 1093–1096.

Wu, F. (2009). Land development, inequality and urban villages in China. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*. *33*(4), 885–889.

Wu, F. (2010). How Neoliberal Is China's Reform? The Origins of Change during Transition. *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, *51*(5), 619–631.

Wu, F., Xu, J., & Yeh, A. G. O. (2006). *Urban Development in Post-Reform China: State, Market, and Space*. New York: Taylor & Francis.

Wu, W. (2004). Sources of migrant housing disadvantage in urban China. *ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING A.*, *36*, 1285-1304.

Wu, W. (2008). Migrant Settlement and Spatial Distribution in Metropolitan Shanghai. *The Professional Geographer*, *60*(1), 101-120.

Wu, X., & Treiman, D. J. (2004). The household registration system and social stratification in China: 1955–1996. *Demography*, *41*(2), 363-384.

WASS (2006).

Wuhan's Advantages. Retrieved March 15, 2012 from http://english.wh.gov.cn/publish/english/category/11/120120416161453001 2.html.

Wǔhàn bàolì qiángchāi zhòngshāng sān yèzhǔ chāiqiān bàn pī zhǐ kèkòu dàbàn bǔcháng kuǎn (2011, Sept. 5). [Wuhan violence, three injured; most homeowners claim

compensation is being withheld]. Free Asia Television. Reprinted and accessed April 11, 2012 from http://news.boxun.com/news/gb/china/2011/09/201109060126.shtml.

Wǔhàn bìguìyuán 48 yì xiàngmù luòhù shāmào. (2012). [Wuhan Country Garden 4.8 billion RMB projects located in Shamao] Retrieved Aug. 4, 2014 from http://wh.house.sina.com.cn

Wuhan Bureau of Statistics (2012). *Wuhan statistical yearbook 2011*.

Wǔhàn CBD: Wángjiā dūn shāngwù qū dǎzào wǔhàn xīn xīnzàng (2011). [Wuhan CBD: Wangjiadun Business District to be Wuhan's New Heart]. Retrieved Aug.4, 2014 from http://wh.house.sina.com.cn/biz/.

Wuhan Eastlake Hi-Tech Development Zone (2012, Oct. 6). Residential land use chart. Retrieved Aug. 4, 2014 from http://en.wehdz.gov.cn/planning/1697.jhtml.

Wǔhàn hàn nán qū tōngyòng hángkōng chǎnyè yuán tóuzī zǒng'é: 80000 Wàn měiyuán. (2013, Nov. 8). [Wuhan Hannan Universal Aviation Production Park investment total: 800 million RMB] Retrieved Aug. 4, 2014 from: http://www.chaoren.com/tourongzi/rongzixiangmu/2013-11-08/87841.html.

Wǔhàn hàn nán qū shī huà tiányuán juéqǐ xiàndài xīnchéng. [Wuhan City, Hannan District: Pastoral poetry to a modern new town]. Retrieved Aug. 4, 2014 from http://www.hb.chinanews.com/zhuanti/hn/index.html

Wuhan Housing and Security Management Bureau (2009) *Wàilái rénkǒu zài hàn gòufáng rúhé bàn hùkǒu.* [*Hukou* management for outsiders buying property] Retrieved July 30, 2012 from http://www.whfg.gov.cn/upload_files/whfcj/contents/486/14462.html

Wuhan Huashan New City Overview. (2012, May 7).Retrieved Aug. 4, 2014 from http://en.wehdz.gov.cn/introduction/344.jhtml.

Wǔhàn 'mǎn chéng wā' zhàitáigāozhù měi rì xū chánghuán 1 yì yuán zhàiwù (2013, Sept. 21) [Wuhan's "Man Chengwa" to repay 100 million yuan of debt daily]. *Xinhua Net.* 9/21/2013. Retrieved June 30, 2014 from http://news.qq.com/a/20130921/003672_all.htm.

Wuhan Municipal Human Resources and Social Security Bureau (2010) *Wǔhàn hùkǒu de yōudiǎn*.[Wuhan hukou benefits] Retrieved July 27, 2012 from http://www.whrsj.org/view.asp?id=50.

Wuhan Municipal Ministry of Public Security (2007). *Fūqī tóukào------hùkǒu qiānyí xìliè zhi* [Policy on Couples Seeking Hukou Transfer]. Accessed Jan. 24, 2014 from http://jwzx.wuhan.net.cn/137/.

Wuhan SASC (2012). Zhōngyāng shāngwù qū gàn fāng píng tóngzhì xiānjìn shìjì. [Central Business District Made Possible by the Advance Work of Comrade Fang Ping]. Wuhan State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administrative Committee. Retrieved Aug. 4, 2014 from http://www.whgzw.gov.cn/8/318/335/337/1428.html.

Wuhan Shenzhen "chengzhongcun" duibi (2005). [Wuhan Shenzhen "chengzhongcun" compared". *Lingdao Juece Xinxi, 22*.

Wuhan welai keji cheng jieshao. [Wuhan Future City Introduction]. Retrieved Aug. 4, 2014 from http://www.futurecity.gov.cn/show.asp?yt=&id=1668.

Wǔhàn wángjiā dūn shāngwù qū lántú chū xiàn míngnián wánchéng guīhuà fāng'àn. (2003, Oct. 21). [Wangjiadun early blueprint for planning to be completed next year].]. *Sohu Business*. Retrieved Aug. 4, 2014 from http://business.sohu.com/39/77/article214697739.shtml.

WuZheng 1999 No. 2. Municipal People's Government on the Formation of the Hankou Airport Relocation Company. [Shì rénmín zhèngfǔ guānyú zǔjiàn wǔhàn shì hànkǒu jīchǎng qiān jiàn kāifā yǒuxiàn gōngsī de pīfù]. Wuhan Municipal Government.

Xie B. (2009). Wǔhàn chéng zhōngcūn gǎizào yíng zuì jiā shíjī ruǎnchéngfā: Zài nán yě yào tǐng guòqù [Ruan Chengfa on Wuhan chengzhongcun gaizao: redouble efforts to get through]. *Hubei Ribao*. Accessed October 21, 2010 from http://www.hb.xinhua.org/newscenter/2009-02/17/content_15709617.htm

Xie, Y., & Hannum, E. (1996). Regional variation in earnings inequality in reform-era urban China. *American Journal of Sociology*, 950-992.

Xie, Y., & Wu, X. (2008). Danwei Profitability and Earnings Inequality in Urban China. *The China Quarterly*, *195*.

Xie Y., Li Y., and Wang X. (2010) "Hannan invests hundreds of millions" [Hàn nán tóuzīguò yì yuán xīn yī zhōng luòchéng shǐyòng "gēn shū" qiánwǎng "pěngchǎng] *Hubei News.* Retrieved from http://www.hb.chinanews.com/news/2010/0823/60579.html. Accessed August 4, 2014.

Xie Z. (2003). *Huajie chengshihua jincheng zhong de 'chengzhongcun' wenti.* (The Question of Eliminating Urban Villages from Urbanization) *Theory and Practice of Special Economic Zones,* No. 8

Xinhua (2010) "China urges more efforts for rural-urban integration" Retrieved Aug. 4, 2014 from

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2010-02/01/content_9408673_2.htm.

Xu, C. (2011). The fundamental institutions of China's reforms and development. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 49(4): 1076-1151.

Xu, M., & Yang, Z. (2009). Design history of China's gated cities and neighbourhoods: Prototype and evolution. *Urban Design International*, *14*(2), 99-117.

Yang, D.L. (1990). Patterns of China's regional development strategy. *The China Quarterly, 122*, 230-257.

Yang, D. L. (1998). *Calamity and reform in China: State, rural society, and institutional change since the Great Leap Famine*. Stanford University Press.

Yang, D. L. (2004). *Remaking the Chinese leviathan: Market transition and the politics of governance in China*. Stanford University Press.

Yang, D. L. (2012). *Beyond Beijing: Liberalization and the regions in China*. Routledge.

Yang, D. Y. R., & Wang, H. K. (2008). Dilemmas of local governance under the development zone fever in China: A case study of the Suzhou region. *Urban Studies*, *45*(5-6), 1037-1054.

Ye, X. (2010). China's urban-rural integration policies. *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs*, *38*(4), 117-143.

Ye Z. & Zhang Z. (2005, Nov. 15). Wǔhàn "chéng zhōngcūn" biàn shēn chéng gǔfèn gōngsī. [Wuhan *chengzhongcun* become joint-stock companies]. *Chutian Jinbao*. Retrieved Aug. 7, 2014 from http://ga.baijuyi.com.cn/news/htm/2212.html.

Yeh, E. T., O'Brien, K. J., & Ye, J. (2013). Rural politics in contemporary China. *Journal of Peasant Studies*, *40*(6), 915-928.

Young, I. M. (1989). Polity and group difference: a critique of the ideal of universal citizenship. *Ethics*, 250-274.

Young, I. M. (2002). *Inclusion and democracy*. Oxford University Press.

Young, I. M. (2006). Education in the context of structural injustice: A symposium response. *Educational Philosophy and Theory*, *38*(1), 93-103.

Young, I. M. (2011). *Justice and the Politics of Difference*. Princeton University Press.

Young, J. (2013). *China's Hukou System: Markets, Migrants and Institutional Change*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Yuen, S. (2014). China's new rural land reform?: Assessment and prospects. *China Perspectives*, (1), 61.

Yusuf, S., & Wu, W. (2002). Pathways to a world city: Shanghai rising in an era of globalisation. *Urban Studies*, *39*(7), 1213-1240.

Zaijian Wuhan Chengzhongcun (2009, Dec. 23). [Goodbye Wuhan *chengzhongcun*]. Retrieved August 21, 2014 from http://www4.cnhan.com/gb/content/2009-12/23/content_1088395.htm.

Zaloom, C. (2012). The city as value locus: Markets, technologies, and the problem of worth. City as Value Locus: Markets, Technologies, and the Problem of Worth. In Farías, I., & Bender, T. (Eds.), *Urban Assemblages: How Actor-Network Theory Changes Urban Studies*. Taylor & Francis, 253-268.

Zarrow, P. (1992). From subject to citizen. *Chinese Institute of Modern Research.* 42, 155-177

Zhang, L. (2001). *Strangers in the city: reconfigurations of space, power, and social networks within China's floating population*. Stanford University Press.

Zhang L. (2005). Migrant Enclaves and Impacts of Redevelopment Policy in Chinese Cities. In Ma, L.J.C. and Wu, F. (Eds.), *Restructuring the Chinese City: changing society, economy and space.* Routeledge. 218-233.

Zhang, L. (2012). Economic migration and urban citizenship in China: The role of points systems. *Population and Development Review, 38*(3), 503-533.

Zhang, L.,, Simon X.B. Zhao and JP Tian, (2003) "Self-help in Housing and Chengzhongcun in China's Urbanization*," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, Volume 27.4 912-37

Zhang, L., & Wang, G. (2010). Urban citizenship of rural migrants in reform-era China. *Citizenship Studies, 14*(2), 145–166.

Zhang N. (2013). Largest "Bird Nest" in the air to be built. *Changjiang Weekly*. 12/13/2013.

Zhang, R. (2003, Nov. 13). Xíngzhèng cūn zhuǎn wéi gǔfènzhì qǐyè zhú yè shāncūn quántǐ cūnmín biàn gǔmín. [Administrative villages into joint-stock companies: All the villagers of Zhuyeshan become shareholders]. *Hubei Ribao*. Accessed Jan. 2, 2014 from http://www.cnhubei.com/200311/ca362228.htm

Zhang X. (2010). Chongqing Universities Pressure Students to Change their *Hukou*. *Economic Observer Online*. http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/homepage/briefs/2010/11/02/184638.shtml Accessed August 4, 2014

Zhao, Y., & Webster, C. (2011). Land dispossession and enrichment in China's suburban villages. *Urban Studies, 48*(3), 529-551.

Zheng, S., Long, F., Fan, C. C., & Gu, Y. (2009). Urban villages in China: A 2008 survey of migrant settlements in Beijing. *Eurasian Geography and Economics, 50*(4), 425-446.

Zheng Y. (2010, Nov. 26). China's forced urbanization puts land before people. Retrieved Aug. 4, 2010 from http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2010-11/26/content_21431130.htm.

Zhou, H. (2010). Xúdōng cūn dàiyù" chéng lǐ rén xiǎngshòu bù dào [City people do not enjoy the "Xudong Village" treatment]. *Changjiang Shangbao*. Accessed May 11, 2012 from http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2007-03-30/065611528309s.shtml

Zhou, M., & Cai, G. (2008). Trapped in neglected corners of a booming metropolis: Residential patterns and marginalization of migrant workers in Guangzhou. *Urban China in transition*. In Logan J. (Ed.), *Urban China in Transition.* Blackwell Publishing. 226-249.

Zhou Yixing (1991). The metropolitan interlocking region in China: A preliminary hypothesis. In Ginsburg, N., Koppel, B., and McGee T.G. (Eds.), *The Extended Metropolis, Settlement Transistion in Asia*. University of Hawaii Press. 89-112.

Zhu, Y. (2000). ""In Situ Urbanization in Rural China: Case Studies from Fujian Province."" Development and Change 31(2): 413-434.

Zhu, Y. (2002). ""Beyond large-city-centred urbanisation: in situ transformation of rural areas in Fujian Province."" *Asia Pacific Viewpoint* 43(1): 9-22.