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SITREP 1 Apr 81 -
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FROM: USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PN //SCJ3//

TO: AIG 951

USCINCARRED FT MCPHERSON GA

USCINCAFRED LANGLEY AFB VA

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SUBJECT: COMMANDER'S SEMIANNUAL SITREP, 1 APR 81-30 SEP 81 (U)

- A. USCINCSO 152102Z APR 81
- B. JCS PUB 4, VOL II, PART II, CHAP 5
- C. PANAMA CANAL TREATIES OF 1977 AND RELATED AGREEMENTS
- D. SM 356-75 (UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN)
- E. JSCP FY 82 WITH ANNEXES A - M
- F. (C) COMMANDER'S SUMMARY: USSOUTHCOM CAN READILY ACCOMPLISH THE

MISSIONS OF DISASTER ASSISTANCE RELIEF AND THE SCHOOLING OF LATAM MILITARY PERSONNEL. IN THE EVENT OF A SERIOUS OR SUSTAINED THREAT TO THE PANAMA CANAL, OPLAN 6501 COULD BE SATISFACTORILY EXECUTED PROVIDED RAPID AUGMENTATION BY SELECTED AIR DEFENSE, COMMUNICATIONS, SECURITY, AND SURVEILLANCE UNITS IS EFFECTED. THE COMMAND IS PREPARED TO FULFILL ALL ASSIGNED MISSIONS WITH RESPECT TO A WIDE RANGE OF CONTINGENCIES AND THREAT SITUATIONS. MAJOR EMPHASIS CONTINUES TO BE

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PLACED ON MAINTAINING U.S. FORCES IN THE CANAL AREA AT PEAK READINESS. PERSONNEL SHORTAGES WITHIN COMPONENT COMMANDS COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT THE COMMAND'S ABILITY TO SATISFACTORILY ACCOMPLISH THE CANAL DEFENSE MISSION PARTICULARLY IN A LOW INTENSITY ENVIRONMENT. IN THIS REGARD, ATTENTION MUST BE FOCUSED ON MANNING LEVELS OF USNAVSO'S COMBAT CRAFT SECTION AND THE CRITICAL MOS SHORTAGES IN THE 3-7TH SPECIAL FORCES BN. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT FUTURE PROJECTED SHORTFALLS OF THE TYPE IDENTIFIED BE CORRECTED PRIOR TO ACTUAL OCCURRENCE. INCREASED REGIONAL ACTIVITY AND COMMAND INVOLVEMENT NECESSITATED A REQUEST FOR 25 ADDITIONAL MANPOWER SPACES FOR THIS HEADQUARTERS IN THE FY82 JMP. THESE SPACES, AS WELL AS THOSE IDENTIFIED FOR THE IN-COUNTRY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OFFICES, ARE THE MINIMUM REQUIRED AND ARE CONSIDERED ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL FOR THE CONTINUED SUCCESSFUL PERFORMANCE OF THE COMMAND MISSION. IN AN EFFORT TO EXPAND OUR REGIONAL FOCUS, THE USSOUTHCOM HEADQUARTERS WAS REORGANIZED ON 1 SEP 1981 TO FORM A PLANS, POLICY AND POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE (J-5). WE CONTINUE TO VIEW THE FORMULATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE U.S. NATIONAL POLICY FOR LATIN AMERICA AS CRITICAL. POLICY DEVELOPMENT SHOULD FOCUS ON THE REGION AS ONE WHOLE STRATEGIC ENTITY COMPRISED OF MANY NATIONS WHOSE

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INTERESTS ARE OFTEN DIVERGENT. POLICY CANNOT BE IMPLEMENTED IN A "PIECE-MEAL" FASHION. ONLY A FULLY COORDINATED, TOTAL AGENCY EFFORT, CHANNELED THROUGH A SINGLE REGIONAL UNIFIED COMMAND, CAN ACHIEVE MAXIMUM RESULTS AGAINST THE GROWING COVERT LEFTIST ACTIVITY IN CENTRAL AMERICA. U.S. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES CONTINUE TO BE INADEQUATE TO SATISFY REGIONAL REQUIREMENTS. FINALLY, COMMENCING IN APRIL 1981, DISTINCTLY FAVORABLE PANAMANIAN GUARDIA NACIONAL (GN) ACTIONS INDICATE A REVERSAL IN THEIR HERETOFORE UNCOOPERATIVE AND ALOOF ATTITUDE. IMPRESSIVE IN THIS RESPECT IS THE FACT THAT GN OFFICIALS HAVE, AT THIS EARLY DATE, EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS COMMAND'S CANAL DEFENSE EXERCISE KINDLE LIBERTY, SCHEDULED FOR FEBRUARY 1982.

{U} FACTORS WHICH IMPACT SIGNIFICANTLY ON READINESS TO EXECUTE JCS APPROVED PLANS AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 81 ARE DISCUSSED BELOW:

A. {U} PERSONNEL:

{S} {C} HQ USSOUTHCOM. THE INCREASED ACTIVITY IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE EXPANDING PRESENCE ELSEWHERE IN THEATER HAVE SEVERELY STRAINED THIS HEADQUARTERS ABILITY TO RESPOND DUE TO LIMITED PERSONNEL RESOURCES AVAILABLE. PERSONNEL FILL IS REQUIRED IN THE INTELLIGENCE,

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OPERATIONS, PLANS AND COMMUNICATIONS AREAS. CONGRESSIONALLY DIRECTED TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES (TIARA) MANPOWER AUGMENTATION OF 10 SPACES WILL HELP, BUT THE TOTAL REQUIREMENT IS MORE FAR-REACHING. ONE OF THE TIARA POSITIONS HAS BEEN FILLED TO DATE. OF THE 11 NEW POSITIONS AUTHORIZED LAST YEAR ALL BUT THREE HAVE BEEN FILLED. ADDITIONAL HELP IN THE INTELLIGENCE, OPERATIONS AND PLANS AREAS WAS REQUESTED IN FY82 JMP WHICH HAS NOT YET BEEN APPROVED.

(2) (C) 193D INFANTRY BRIGADE (PN) ASSIGNED STRENGTH (INCLUDING TENANT ACTIVITIES) ROSE FROM 95.4% TO 103% DURING THE PERIOD 1 APRIL 1981 - 30 SEPTEMBER 1981, BUT DURING THE SAME PERIOD, THE PERSONNEL STRENGTH IN THE 193D ROLL-UP READINESS REPORTING UNITS VARIED BETWEEN 79 - 89% AND NOW STANDS AT 89%. BRIGADE OFFICER STRENGTH IS AT 91% OF THE FORSCOM ODP WHICH IS 96% OF AUTHORIZATIONS. SPECIAL ATTENTION SHOULD BE FOCUSED ON THE 3D SPECIAL FORCES BATTALION, 7TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP. THIS UNIT WAS CONSIDERED FOR DEACTIVATION DURING CY80 AND ADEQUATE SF PERSONNEL WERE NOT PROGRAMMED FOR ASSIGNMENT TO THE BRIGADE. THE BRIGADE HAS BEEN CRITICALLY SHORT OF SF PERSONNEL SINCE DECEMBER 1980. THIS UNIT IS A PRIMARY SOURCE FOR PERSONNEL REQUIRED TO ACCOMPLISH THE USSOUTHCOM SECURITY ASSIST-

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{3} {C} THE CRITICAL SHORTAGE OF UNRESTRICTED LINE {URL} OFFICERS THROUGHOUT THE U.S. NAVY CONTINUES TO ADVERSELY IMPACT ON BOTH THE U.S. NAVAL STATION PANAMA CANAL AND THE U.S. NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS STATION BALBOA. NAVAL STATIONS ENLISTED MANNING IS CURRENTLY 93% WITH A DROP EXPECTED OVER THE NEXT SIX MONTHS DUE TO MASS TURNOVER IN COMBAT CRAFT SECTION OF THE OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT. COMBAT READINESS OF THE COMBAT CRAFT SECTION WILL BE SEVERELY AFFECTED. NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS STATION BALBOA IS CURRENTLY MANNED 86% OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL AUTHORIZED.

{4} {S} USAFSO SUPPORT OF USCINCSO CONTINGENCY PLANS IS LIMITED TO A PERIOD OF LESS THAN A WEEK DUE TO PERSONNEL SHORTAGES. PROBLEM AREAS ARE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR O-2A MANNING, PROJECTED LOSSES IN THE 275X0 {ROMAD} AFSC, AND SHORTAGES OF COMBAT CONTROL TEAM PERSONNEL.

B. {U} INTELLIGENCE:

{1} {S} THE VOLATILE SITUATION IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN/CENTRAL AMERICA CONTINUES. IN EL SALVADOR, INSURGENTS CONTINUE TO RECEIVE WEAPONS INFILTRATED FROM CUBA AND NICARAGUA THROUGH PANAMA, COSTA RICA, AND HONDURAS. THE SALVADORAN MILITARY HAS BEEN UNABLE TO MAKE

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SIGNIFICANT GAINS AGAINST THE INSURGENTS, WHO STRIKE AT TIMES AND TARGETS OF THEIR CHOICE. THE GUERRILLAS DEMONSTRATE A PSYOPS ADVANTAGE OVER THE SALVADORAN FORCES, AND THE BATTLE FOR INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT REMAINS CRITICAL. NICARAGUA IS CAUSING A MILITARY IMBALANCE IN THE AREA, AS IT BUILDS ITS ARMED FORCES FAR IN EXCESS OF REASONABLE DEFENSE NEEDS AND WITHOUT REGARD TO ITS ECONOMIC CONDITION. NICARAGUA SHOWS INCREASING DEPENDENCE ON CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION, AS EVIDENCED BY THE ACQUISITION OF T-55 TANKS. THE COUNTRY SUFFERS FROM A GROWING WAR PSYCHOSIS FUELED EITHER BY FEARS OF INVASION OR BY GOVT MANIPULATION TO DIVERT PUBLIC ATTENTION FROM GRN POLITICAL/ECONOMIC SHORTCOMINGS. HONDURAN ARMED FORCES ARE BECOMING MORE APPREHENSIVE OF THE POTENTIAL THREAT POSED BY REGIONAL INSURGENCY AND BY NICARAGUA. COSTA RICA REMAINS LARGELY AN UNWILLING ACCOMPLICE OF INSURGENT GROUPS OPERATING THROUGHOUT THE REGION, AND IS PRESENTLY UNDERGOING SEVERE ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES WHICH MAY PROVE DESTABILIZING. GUATEMALA'S INTENSE, AND AT TIMES INDISCRIMINATE, RESPONSE TO INTERNAL PROBLEMS CONTINUES TO ALIENATE POTENTIAL SUPPORTERS; THOUGH IT HAS SCORED NUMEROUS COUNTER-GUERRILLA SUCCESSES. THE ELECTION PERIOD MAY SEE THE RENEWAL OF INTENSE AND INCREASED VIOLENCE. COLOMBIA CONTINUES TO EXPERIENCE ACTIVE

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INSURGENCY, AND VIOLENT INCIDENTS PROBABLY WILL INCREASE AS THE MARCH 1982 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS DRAW CLOSER. IN PANAMA, MG TORRIJOS' UNTIMELY DEATH WAS FOLLOWED BY A SMOOTH POWER TRANSITION TO COL FLORENCIO FLOREZ. ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT FORESEE ANY LESSENERED POWER ROLE FOR THE PANAMANIAN MILITARY, A NEW RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE GN AND THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT IS BEING FORMED, AND A MODERATION OF PRESIDENT ROYO'S LEFTIST LEANINGS IS ANTICIPATED. CONTINUED DOMESTIC STABILITY IS EXPECTED.

{2.} {S} INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES ALLOCATED TO THIS REGION REMAIN INADEQUATE. TO SUPPORT ANY EFFECTIVE REGION-WIDE INITIATIVES, BOTH U.S. AND INDIGENOUS INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES MUST BE UPGRADED. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE CENTERS IN EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, AND HONDURAS, STAFFED BY BOTH U.S. AND HOST COUNTRY PERSONNEL, AND A REGIONAL COMBINED INTELLIGENCE CENTER, BRINGING TOGETHER PERSONNEL OF THE U.S. AND CENTRAL AMERICAN NATIONS, ARE STILL VALID ISSUES. LIMITED PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN ELEVATING LATIN AMERICAN COLLECTION PRIORITIES, BUT INCREASING NATIONAL LEVEL ATTENTION MAY ACCELERATE THIS CAUSE. INITIATIVES PROVIDING FOR A SEABORNE INFILTRATION DETECTION EFFORT AND EXPANDED HUMINT AND SIGINT COLLECTION

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ARE BEING IMPLEMENTED. THE NEED FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PERMANENT USDAO'S IN NICARAGUA, BELIZE AND COSTA RICA, AT LEAST ONE ADDITIONAL ATTACHE TO EL SALVADOR, AND RETURN OF THE MILGPS TO CHILE AND BOLIVIA STILL EXISTS, AND IS BEING REEMPHASIZED. -- A SPECIAL COMMAND TASK FORCE WHICH OVERTLY COLLECTS GEOGRAPHIC DATA, ANALYZES AVAILABLE INTELLIGENCE, AND PRODUCES INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT PACKAGES FOR SPECIFIC COUNTERTERRORISM AND EVACUATION PLANNING CONTINUES TO OPERATE WITH A SKELETON CREW ON AN AD HOC BASIS, COORDINATING ITS ACTIVITIES WITH THE JSOC. FORMAL ESTABLISHMENT OF THIS ESSENTIAL FUNCTION THROUGH JMP ACTION IS PENDING JCS ACTION. IN WORK ARE STUDIES ON GUATEMALA, COSTA RICA, AND COLOMBIA, AND UPDATES ON THOSE OF EL SALVADOR AND BOLIVIA. AUGMENTATION OF USSOUTHCOM INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS AND COLLECTION MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL, TO INCLUDE EARLY FILLING BY THE SERVICES OF THE 10 "TIARA" POSITIONS APPROVED BY CONGRESS, AND EARLY APPROVAL OF AN ADDITIONAL SOUTHCOM-INITIATED REQUEST FOR INCREASED INTELLIGENCE MANNING IS SORELY NEEDED.

C. {U} OPERATIONS:

{S}/NOFORN THE GROWING THREAT IN CENTRAL AMERICA FROM CUBAN/SOVIET ABETTED INSURGENCIES AND THE REALIZATION OF THE REGION'S PERCEPTION

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 OF NICARAGUAN ADVENTURISM REQUIRES SOME FUTURE MODIFICATION TO THE
 COMMAND'S FORCE STRUCTURE. THE FOLLOWING ARE RECOMMENDED FOR CONSID-
 ERATION:

{A} {S/NOFORN} DEPLOYMENT OF AN ADDITIONAL SPECIAL FORCES BATTALION
 WITH APPROPRIATE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS. REQUIRE-
 MENT IS BASED ON THE ADDITIONAL TARGETS BEING GENERATED BY THE GROW-
 ING NICARAGUAN THREAT WHICH AT PRESENT EXCEED THE CAPABILITIES OF THE
 CURRENTLY DEPLOYED BATTALION.

{B} {S/NOFORN} DEPLOYMENT OF A SPECIAL BOAT SQUADRON. THE SQUADRON
 WOULD AUGMENT LIMITED SURFACE FORCES NOW AVAILABLE FOR CANAL DEFENSE
 AND ARE CONSIDERED CRITICAL FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SEVERAL USSOUTH-
 COM FORCE OPTIONS REQUISITE FOR POSSIBLE ARMS INTERDICTION OPERATIONS
 IN CENTAM. IN ADDITION, THE AVAILABILITY OF THE SPECIAL BOAT SQUAD-
 RON WOULD RESOLVE SEVERAL MAJOR LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH
 DEPLOYING ADDITIONAL NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE FORCES TO THE REGION.

{C} {S/NOFORN} DEPLOYMENT OF A PSYOP COMMAND ASSESSMENT TEAM. THE
 GROWING SOPHISTICATION OF THE THREAT HAS PLACED THE U.S. ON THE DEFEN-
 SIVE. AN ASSESSMENT TEAM WOULD INITIALLY DETERMINE THEATER REQUIRE-
 MENTS FOR THE CONDUCT OF AN EFFECTIVE PSYOPS PROGRAM. IF ADDITIONAL

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PSYOPS ASSETS DEPLOYED, THE ASSESSMENT TEAM WOULD ACT AS THE COMMAND/CONTROL ELEMENT.

{2} {S} THE LACK OF AN IN-PLACE AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY CONTINUES TO BE AN AREA OF CONCERN BECAUSE OF CUBA'S INCREASED ABILITY TO PROJECT AIR POWER THROUGH RUNWAY CONSTRUCTION AND EXPANSION IN NICARAGUA AND GRENADA. NICARAGUAN PILOTS ARE TRAINING IN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT.

{3} {S} USAFSO ASSIGNED AIRCRAFT {A-7D} ARE EXTREMELY LIMITED IN THE AIR DEFENSE ROLE. PROJECTED LEAD TIMES REQUIRED FOR DEPLOYMENT OF CONUS BASED AIR DEFENSE ASSETS RENDER USSOUTHCOM VULNERABLE TO MINIMUM WARNING AIR THREATS. THEREFORE, HIGHLY RECOMMEND THAT A-7D'S BE REPLACED BY F-4 AIRCRAFT.

{4} {C} BEGINNING IN APRIL 1981, FAVORABLE PANAMANIAN GUARDIA NACIONAL {GN} ACTIONS INDICATED A REVERSAL OF THEIR PREVIOUS UNCOOPERATIVE AND DISTANT ATTITUDE. THE GN REQUESTED U.S. ASSISTANCE AND PARTICIPATION IN A GN INTERNAL DEFENSE EXERCISE. USSOUTHCOM PARTICIPATION IN THE GN EXERCISE, WHICH WAS HELD 11-15 MAY 81, CONSISTED OF ONE AIRBORNE PLATOON AND SELECTED AVIATION SUPPORT. THE EXERCISE WAS THE PRECEDENT SETTING IN THAT IT MARKED THE FIRST TIME SINCE TREATY IMPLEMENTATION THAT U.S. AND GN FORCES PARTICIPATED IN COMBINED OPERATIONS

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IN THE FIELD. THE FAVORABLE EXERCISE RESULTS ATTEST TO THE ABILITY OF THE GN TO WORK WITH U.S. FORCES AND COORDINATE COMBINED OPERATIONS IN A FIELD ENVIRONMENT.

{5} {C} IN ANOTHER FIRST SINCE TREATY IMPLEMENTATION, THE GN EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN DISCUSSING FUTURE FORCE DEVELOPMENT GOALS. PRESENT INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE GN ARE CONDUCTING FORCE STRUCTURE STUDIES AND WILL BRIEF USSOUTHCOM WHEN THE FORCE STRUCTURE PLAN IS COMPLETED.

{6} {C} THE GN HAVE ALSO DISPLAYED AN INCREASED INTEREST IN COMBINED TRAINING. TWO PLATOONS PARTICIPATED IN A 10 DAY FTX WITH THE 193D INF BDE IN JULY, FIFTEEN PERSONNEL TOOK PART IN A 193D INF BDE SPONSORED CPW IN SEPTEMBER, AND VARIOUS PLATOONS HAVE ATTENDED JUNGLE WARFARE SCHOOL FOR THE PAST SEVEN MONTHS AT FORT SHERMAN. THE GN MILITARY POLICE ALSO PARTICIPATED WITH 193D INF BDE MP'S IN COMBINED TACTICAL, TECHNICAL, AND TRAFFIC OPERATIONS. FOREMOST IN THE TRAINING ARENA, HOWEVER, IS THE GN'S EXPRESSED DESIRE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE USSOUTHCOM ANNUAL CANAL DEFENSE EXERCISE KINDLE LIBERTY.

{7} {U} BG OMAR TORRIJOS-HERRERA, COMMANDER OF THE PANAMANIAN NATIONAL GUARD, WAS KILLED 31 JULY WHEN HIS PANAMANIAN AIR FORCE AIR-

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CRAFT CRASHED NEAR OLA, PANAMA. USSOUTHCOM ASSISTED THE PANAMANIAN GOVERNMENT DURING A SEARCH AND RESCUE PHASE BY FLYING SEARCH MISSIONS, PROVIDING A COMMAND AND CONTROL INTERFACE OF GROUND AND AIR ELEMENTS AND PLACING SPECIALIZED GROUND TEAMS ON ALERT FOR POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT TO THE CRASH SITE. OUR CONCERN, AND THE DEDICATED PERFORMANCE OF THE U.S. PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN THIS OPERATION, APPEARS TO HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO RECENTLY IMPROVED MILITARY TO MILITARY RELATIONS. IN ADDITION, USSOUTHCOM PERSONNEL SUPPORTED THE VISIT OF THE OFFICIAL U.S. DELEGATION, HEADED BY MRS. GEORGE BUSH, BY PROVIDING EOD AND PHYSICAL SECURITY PERSONNEL TO AUGMENT THE UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE.

{B} {U} HELICOPTER SUPPORT TO THE OAS PEACEKEEPING EFFORT IN EL SALVADOR AND HONDURAS WAS TERMINATED ON 1 JULY 1981 WITH PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT RETURNING TO PANAMA ON 5 JULY. TERMINATION OF THIS MISSION DISESTABLISHED A VALUABLE, AND HIGHLY VISIBLE, U.S. PRESENCE IN A POTENTIALLY VOLATILE REGION.

{9} {U} A FOUR MAN TEAM FROM 36TH EOD DETACHMENT DEPLOYED TO MEXICO ON 31 JULY AND RETURNED 5 AUGUST. MISSION WAS TO PROVIDE EOD SUPPORT FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT.

{10} {U} A FOUR MAN TEAM FROM 36TH EOD DETACHMENT DEPLOYED TO MEXICO

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ON 14 SEPTEMBER AND RETURNED 19 SEPTEMBER. MISSION WAS TO PROVIDE EOD SUPPORT FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT.

{11} {C} DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD, PLANNING FOR EXERCISE HALCON VISTA WITH HONDURAS AND VENEZUELA HAS CONTINUED. HALCON VISTA IS A JOINT/COMBINED COASTAL INTERDICTION/SURVEILLANCE EXERCISE SCHEDULED TO BE CONDUCTED IN BOTH COUNTRIES DURING OCTOBER 1981. USSOUTHCOM STAFF INVOLVEMENT WILL BE SUBSTANTIAL AND IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT INCREASED ACTIVITY IN THE AREA OF OPERATIONAL EXERCISES PROVIDES FURTHER JUSTIFICATION FOR THE ADDITION OF MANPOWER SPACES.

D. {U} PLANS, POLICY AND POLITICAL MILITARY AFFAIRS.

{1} {C} PAST REDUCTIONS IN HEADQUARTERS STRENGTH ELIMINATED OR DRASTICALLY REDUCED STAFF CAPABILITY FOR PURSUING THESE VITAL FUNCTIONS. THE RECENT ESTABLISHMENT OF A J-5 DIRECTORATE WITHIN USSOUTHCOM WILL PROVIDE THE IMPETUS REQUIRED TO REVITALIZE THEM.

{A} {S} PLANS. THE CANAL DEFENSE PLAN {USCINCSO OPLAN 6501-81} HAS BEEN APPROVED AND ITS TPFDD ENTERED INTO JOBS MAINTENANCE.

OMNIBUS CONPLAN 6100 WHICH ADDRESSES ALL JSCP TASKINGS IS UNDERGOING REVISION AT THIS TIME, AND SEVERAL COUNTRY-SPECIFIC PLANS ARE ON THE SHELF. A NEW CONPLAN 6104 ON REGIONAL SECURITY DEVELOPMENT IS NOW

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UNDER DEVELOPMENT AND IN COORDINATION AT LANTCOM. FINALLY, WE HAVE RECENTLY BEEN TASKED BY JCS AND ARE NOW FORMULATING A REGIONAL ARMS INTERDICTION PLAN. THESE AND OTHER CRITICAL PLANNING TASKS ARE BEING DONE WITH LIMITED STAFF RESOURCES.

{B} {U} MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS (MTT): THE FOLLOWING MTT'S WERE COORDINATED BY USSOUTHCOM DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD.

COUNTRY	DESCRIPTION	DURATION	COMPOSITION
{A} {C} BARBADOS	MEDICAL SURVEY	16-22AUG81	2 NCO'S
{B} {C} COLOMBIA	M101-M101A1 HOW MAINT MTT	7JUN-5JUL81	7 NCO'S
{C} {C} COSTA RICA	ORD DISPOSAL SURVEY	1-7 JUN 81	1 OFF, 1 NCO
	PATROLLING SURVEY	22-28 JUN 81	1 OFF, 1 NCO
	SMALL ARMS MAINT & SECURITY ACCOUNT- ABILITY	29JUL-15AUG81	3 NCO'S
	AMMO MAINT & STORAGE MTT	30AUG-12SEP81	1 CIV, 1 NCO
	{D} {C} DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	ENGLISH LANGUAGE LAB MTT	15-27JUN81

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{E} {C} ECUADOR

VEHICLE MAINT MTT 17APR-31MAY81 2 NCO'S
 MUNITIONS MAINT MTT 3MAY-27JUN81 2 NCO'S
 TACTICAL AIR OPS
 MTT SURVEY 11AUG-23AUG81 1 OFF
 COMBAT OPS {HALO}
 MTT 27JUL-2AUG81 1 OFF
 COMMUNICATIONS
 SURVEY 1-30SEP81 2 OFF
 COMBAT OPS {HALO}
 MTT 25AUG-30SEP81 1 OFF, 4 NCO'S

{E} {C} EL SALVADOR

OPS & PLANNING
 MTT NATIONAL LEVEL 7JAN-6JUL81 5 OFF
 AVIATION MAINT MTT 25JAN-22JUL81 1 OFF, 11 NCO'S
 SMALL BOAT MAINT 28FEB-13MAY81 1 OFF, 4 NCO'S
 PILOT TRANSITION
 MTT 17JAN-14JUL81 2 OFF
 OPS & PLANNING MTT
 ZONE LEVEL 8MAR-3SEP81 1 OFF, 4 NCO'S
 ADMINISTRATIVE MTT 8MAR-3SEP81 2 OFF, 3 NCO'S

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SMALL UNIT TRAINING	8MAR-3SEP81	3 OFF, 12 NCO'S
LOGISTICS TAFT	5JUN81-4JUN82	3 OFF
MEDICAL SURVEY	15-21 JUN 81	2 EM
SMALL BOAT MAINT	15JUN-15AUG81	1 OFF, 2 NCO'S
INTELLIGENCE MTT		
SURVEY	10-18JUL81	2 OFF
MEDICAL MTT	1AUG-31DEC81	4 NCO'S
PATROL BOAT MAINT	16AUG-26SEP81	1 OFF, 1 NCO
UH-1H PHASE INSP		
MTT	20AUG-19SEP81	1 CIV, 4 NCO'S
UH-1H HELICOPTER		
TAFT	20AUG-19AUG82	1 OFF, 1 NCO
TACTICAL INTEL-		
LIGENCE SCHOOL		
ESTABLISHMENT MTT	18AUG81-16JAN82	3 OFF
UH-1H CREW CHIEF		
INSTRUCTOR MTT	22AUG-20OCT81	1 NCO
UH-1H PRODUCTION		
CONTROL MGMT MTT	6SEP-4NOV81	1 OFF

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{G} {C} HONDURAS

MTT OTHER {LIAISON} 13SEP-7NOV81 6 OFF, 1 NCO
 ELECTRICAL
 EQUIP OPERATOR 23-27AUG81 1 CIV
 UH-1H FLIGHT TEST
 MAINT PILOT MTT 31MAR-26SEP81 1 OFF
 RADIO MAINTENANCE
 MTT 21APR-22MAY81 3 EM
 INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 25APR-14MAY81 2 OFF
 ARMS INTERDICTION
 SURVEY 4-14MAY81 2 OFF, 5 NCO'S
 MAIN ROTOR HUB
 ASSEMBLY MTT 7-21JUN81 1 NCO
 ORDNANCE SURVEY 22-29JUN81 1 NCO
 COMBAT OPS {HALO}
 SURVEY 10-16JUL81 1 OFF, 1 NCO
 INTEL/PHOTO MTT 10JUL-12AUG81 1 NCO
 ARMS INTERDICTION
 MTT 10JUL-29SEP81 2 OFF, 4 NCO'S
 INTELLIGENCE MTT 1AUG-28SEP81 1 OFF

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AIRBORNE OPS MTT 30AUG-19SEP81 1 OFF, 2 NCO'S
 ACCIDENT
 INVESTIGATION

UH-1H HELICOPTER 30AUG-19SEP81 2 OFF, 1 CIV
 PARACHUTE RIGGER

SURVEY 13-19SEP81 1 OFF, 1 NCO

UH-1H ENGINE REPAIR 8-24SEP81 2 CIV

{H} {C} JAMAICA SECURITY ASSISTANCE

TRAINING 27-26JUN81 2 OFF

BASIC HELICOPTER

MECH CRS SURVEY 15-25JUL81 1 OFF, 1 NCO

MARKSMANSHIP TNG

MTT SURVEY 16-22AUG81 1 OFF, 1 NCO

MARKSMANSHIP MTT 6-26SEP81 1 OFF, 1 NCO

RANGER SCHOOL

ESTABLISHMENT

SURVEY 6-12SEP81 1 OFF, 1 NCO

{H} {C} PERU MAINTENANCE SURVEY 14JUN-4JUL81 1 OFF

E. {U} LOGISTICS: FOLLOWING SUBMITTED IAW JCS MEMO SM 646-80,

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DTD 17 NOV 80 AND APPENDIX B, J4DM 217-81, DTD 9 APR 81.

{L} {S} ARMY COMPONENT.

SUPPLY CLASS	DOS {OH}	S-RATING
CL I	50	S-1
CL II	NON-STOCKED	
CL III		
MOGAS	600	S-1
JP5	100	S-1
DFM	250	S-1
JP4	33	S-1
CL V		
{GROUND}	50	S-1
CL VIII	24	S-4

{RATINGS IN CL VIII ARE HAMPERED BY SHORTAGES IN LINES WHICH CANNOT BE STORED BECAUSE THEY CANNOT BE EFFECTIVELY ROTATED. THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY OF 1977 CAUSED FACILITY LOSSES RESULTING IN NET REDUCTION OF WAREHOUSE CAPACITY}.

{L} {S} U.S. NAVY COMPONENT.

SUPPLY CLASS	DOS {OH}	S-RATING
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CL I	50	S-1
CL II	60	S-1
CL III	DFSC SUPPLY POINT	S-1
	OVER 100 DOS	

CL V
 {GROUND} S-1
 {S} AIR FORCE COMPONENT.

SUPPLY CLASS	DOS {OH}	S-RATING
CL I	0 {NOTE 1}	S-1 {HELD BY 1930}
CL III {AIR}	25	S-1
{PACKAGE}	9 {NOTE 1}	S-4
CL V	15 {NOTE 1}	S-4
MK-82	15 {NOTE 1}	S-4
20MM	15 {NOTE 1}	S-4
CL VII MAJOR END ITEMS	35	S-2
GP VEH	45	S-1
TRAP	15 {NOTE 1}	S-4
CL VIII MEDICAL	44	S-1

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NOTE 1: WCDO OF AUG 81 ESTABLISHED OR INCREASED PURMR FOR THESE CLASSES. STOCKS HAVE BEEN REQUISITIONED BUT NOT RECEIVED.

{4} {U} REMARKS.

{A} {S} U.S. NAVY COMPONENT PROVIDES FUEL FOR ALL SERVICE COMPONENTS IN PANAMA CANAL AREA AS DFSC REPRESENTATIVE. AIR FORCE MAINTAINS 30 DOS JP4 IN ADDITION.

{B} {S} U.S. ARMY COMPONENT PROVIDES CLASS V GROUND AND CLASS I FOR ALL COMPONENTS.

{C} {S} PWRS LEVELS ARE MAINTAINED FOR IN PLACE FORCES ONLY. THE BUILDING BLOCK STRUCTURE OF OPLAN 6501 IS SUCH THAT A TAILORED PACKAGE WOULD BE CALLED FORWARD BASED ON THREAT. CLASS III IS SUFFICIENT FOR ANY COMBINATION. ACCOMPANYING SUPPLIES FOR ALL CLASSES WOULD BE SUFFICIENT UNTIL THE AIR LOC OPENED. NO AIR-TO-AIR {AIM-9} MISSILES ARE STOCKED LOCALLY.

{D} {S} RAPID RUN-WAY REPAIR {RRR} CAPABILITY. HOWARD AFB POSSESSES NO IN-PLACE RRR CAPABILITY. RRR KIT IS A SHORT FALL IN SUPPORT OF OPLAN 6501-81. HOWARD IS THE ONLY U.S. MILITARY AIRFIELD IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA AND MUST BE PROVIDED WITH THIS CAPABILITY.

F. {U} COMMUNICATIONS.

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{1} {C} SECURE HF VOICE COMMUNICATIONS, USING SUNAIR HF TRANSCEIVERS AND KY-65 PARKHILL EQUIPMENT, HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BETWEEN HQ USSOUTHCOM AND SAO'S IN COLOMBIA, NICARAGUA, EL SALVADOR AND HONDURAS.

ADDITIONAL SAO'S WILL BE PROVIDED PARKHILL EQUIPMENT AS IT IS RECEIVED.

{2} {C} SUNAIR HF TRANSCEIVERS WHICH WILL REPLACE OUTDATED AN/FRC-93 COLLINS KWM-23 RADIO EQUIPMENT ARE CURRENTLY BEING INSTALLED IN SAO'S IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA. TARGET DATE FOR COMPLETION OF THIS UPGRADE PROGRAM IS MAR 82.

{3} {C} THE ANTICIPATED ARRIVAL OF THREE AN/URC-101 MOBILE RADIO SATCOM TERMINALS IN DEC 81 WILL PROVIDE THIS HEADQUARTERS WITH A DEPLOYABLE SATELLITE CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS. ALTHOUGH PROGRAMMED AN/URC-101 EQUIPMENT WILL PARTIALLY SATISFY OUR DEPLOYABLE SINGLE CHANNEL COMMUNICATION REQUIREMENT, A CONTINGENCY SUPPORT REQUIREMENT FOR A MULTICHANNEL CAPABILITY STILL EXISTS.

{4} {C} SECURE VOICE ASSETS REMAIN AT INSUFFICIENT LEVELS TO SECURE USSOUTHCOM COMMAND AND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS AND TO ADEQUATELY SUPPORT CONTINGENCY PLAN REQUIREMENTS. THIS WAS ILLUSTRATED DURING BOTH EXERCISES BLACK HAWK IV AND NIMBLE WARRIOR WHEN INCOUNTRY SECURE VOICE

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ASSETS COULD ONLY BE PROVIDED TO SUPPORT MINIMAL SUBSCRIBER REQUIREMENTS.

{5} {C} PLANS ARE CURRENTLY UNDERWAY TO UPGRADE THIS HEADQUARTERS' JOINT OPERATIONS CENTER. THE CURRENT CONFIGURATION CONSISTS OF A WECO 306 CONSOLE AND A LOCALLY FABRICATED KEY SYSTEM NEO CONSOLE. THESE POSITIONS ARE NOT COMPATIBLE INASMUCH AS THE NEO CONSOLE IS NOT CAPABLE OF FOUR-WIRE TERMINATION. ADDITIONALLY, THE UPGRADE PLANS INCLUDE INSTALLATION OF UHF/VHF/FM SECURE RADIOS, RADIO TELETYPE AND SATCOM CAPABILITIES.

{6} {C} APPROVAL HAS BEEN RECEIVED FOR THE TEMPORARY LOAN OF A SECOND TO SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONAL RELOCATIONS ON THE ATLANTIC SIDE OF THE ISTHMUS WHICH CURRENTLY IS SERVICED BY A SINGLE NARROW BAND SUBSCRIBER TERMINAL {NBST}. INSTALLATION IS SCHEDULED TO BE COMPLETED IN APR 82.

{7} {C} A REQUIREMENT EXISTS TO DIGITALIZE THE TRANSISTHMIAN MICROWAVE LINK TO ALLOW BULK ENCRYPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS WITHIN PANAMA. CURRENTLY BOTH THE ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC SIDES OF THE ISTHMUS ARE NOW DIGITALIZED, BUT THE TRANSISTHMIAN MICROWAVE LINK, WHICH JOINS THE TWO, IS AN ANALOG SYSTEM WHICH WILL NOT PERMIT BULK

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ENCRYPTION.

{B} {U} THERE IS AN URGENT NEED TO PROVIDE STAFFING AND MANPOWER AUTHORIZATIONS WITHIN THE USSOUTHCOM COMMUNICATIONS ELECTRONICS FUNCTION AREA. THE CURRENT MANNING CONSISTS OF PERSONNEL ON LOAN FROM COMPONENT SERVICES. THE CURRENT ON-LOAN MANNING IS ABLE TO ACCOMPLISH ONLY MINIMAL, HIGHEST PRIORITY MISSION TASKING. A VALIDATED NEED EXISTS TO RESPOND TO CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRY REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE IN SURVEYING AND DEVELOPING COMMAND AND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENTS. RESPONSE IS NOT POSSIBLE AT THIS TIME. ADDITIONALLY, THE C-E FUNCTION OF THIS HEADQUARTERS IS VIEWED AS BEING COMPARABLE TO OTHER UNIFIED COMMAND J-6 STAFFS, THUS THE QUANTITY OF CORRESPONDENCE RECEIVED WHICH REQUIRES FULL STAFFING KEEPS THE INCUMBENTS NEAR SATURATION, LEAVING LITTLE TIME FOR ANY ADDITIONAL WORKLOAD. ADDITIONAL MANNING FROM THE COMPONENTS IS BEING INVESTIGATED AS AN INTERIM FIX, WITH FORMAL ESTABLISHMENT OF A CBS DIRECTORATE BEING THE FINAL FIX OF THIS PROBLEM AREA.

G. {U} FACILITIES.

{B} {U} REFUELING CAPABILITIES HOWARD AFB.

{A} AIRCRAFT FUEL TRUCK REFUEL FILL STAND WAS A PROJECT CONTAINED IN

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THE TREATY CONSTRUCTION PACKAGE. OSD INDEFINITELY DEFERRED FUNDS. IN ADDITION TO THE FILL STAND, THERE IS A REQUIREMENT FOR MODIFYING THE RAMP FUEL PITS TO PERMIT INDEPENDENT OPERATION OF THE PITS SIMULTANEOUSLY.

{B} BOTH ARE IDENTIFIED AS FY82 O&M FUNDED PROJECTS. THEY SHOULD BE FUNDED IN FY82 WITH CONSTRUCTION IN FY83.

{2} {U} PIERS RODMAN.

{A} PIERS 1 & 2: DESIGN AND ADVERTISEMENT COMPLETED TO BE AWARDED 1ST QTR FY82.

{B} PIER 3 AND QUAY WALL: REPAIRS SCHEDULED FOR DESIGN FY82.

{C} MAINTENANCE AND DREDGING OF PIERS COMPLETED.

DECL 15 OCT 87

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