

21st Century European Populism: Boundaries of Inclusion and Exclusion

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Abstract

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What factors determine if a populist movement will bend ideologically left or right? Specifically looking at Europe, I investigate why populism takes left-leaning ideological manifestations in Southern Europe (Spain and Greece) versus the right-leaning variations of Northwestern Europe (United Kingdom, France, Germany). I posit that inclusive populist movements tend to fall on the right of the political spectrum. All populist movements are centered on “the people”, which the populist claims to represent, in opposition to an enemy. Thereby, the degree of inclusion/exclusion in a populist movement is linked to who is identified as “the enemy”. Understanding who is identified as “the enemy” by a populist movement requires us to contextualize its fruition within a particular set of collective values. Different inculcations of populism are possible due to particularities in political values and attitudes which catalyze a unique cultural reflection. Southern Europe, through *Occidentalism* and its effect on political

culture, has come to possess political values and attitudes that brought inclusive populist movements into power.

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Introduction

Populism – political or social movements characterized by the way it latches onto negative sentiments and popular dissatisfactions with democratic politics – has emerged as a global phenomenon in recent years¹. Central to populist movements is the creation of an enemy and the denigration of representative democracy². Thusly, scholars understand populism to be a latent phenomenon of democratic states, because it can manifest unexpectedly and ubiquitously³. However, populist manifestations are not all the same because the circumstances that catalyzed populist sentiments are unique: no rigid ideology or philosophy drives populist sentiment⁴. Populist expressions are informed by conditions such as location, temporal moment, and political climate.

In contemporary Europe, the impact of populist movements has varied, ranging from simply garnering media attention to catalyzing electoral wins that exert control over national governments. These movements differ in regard to the identified enemy, and their ultimate goals. For example, in Northern and Western Europe right-wing populist movements have gained a salient position within politics⁵. Contrastively, Southern European populist movements lean left on the ideological spectrum. This is exhibited by the fact that Podemos and SYRIZA,

¹ Some scholars assert that it is impossible to coin a universal definition of populism. See Paul Taggart, *Populism* (Philadelphia, PA: Open University Press, 2002), 10.

² Javier Zarzalejos, “Populism in Spain: An Analysis of Podemos,” *European View* 15, no. 2 (2016): 185.

³ Luke March, “Left and Right Populism Compared: The British Case,” *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 19, no. 2 (2017).

⁴ Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, “Populism,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies*, ed. Michael Freeden and Marc Sears (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2015): 494-495.

⁵ Gregor Aisch, Adam Pearce, and Bryant Rousseau, “How Far Is Europe Swinging to the Right?” *The New York Times*, May 22, 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/05/22/world/europe/europe-right-wing-austria-hungary.html>.

left-wing populist movements in Spain and Greece, have gained prominence in recent years like their right-wing Northern and Western populist counterparts⁶.

There is consensus in scholarship that the contemporary populist movements of the West were catalyzed by the 2008 economic recession and the wave of immigration from warzones in the Middle East and Central Asia to Europe⁷. Following the 2008 global recession, unemployment rates and home foreclosures skyrocketed. Beyond the direct impact of the recession, national governments and even the European Union began to implement austerity measures. These policies led to a decline in welfare-state protections and manifested into a multi-pronged economic turmoil, which led to large demonstrations expressing public discontent, notably in Spain and Greece⁸. Beginning in 2014, Europe saw surges of refugees fleeing civil and sectarian wars in Syria and Afghanistan namely, as well as other countries⁹. In 2015, more than 1.2 million refugee and asylum seekers crossed into Europe¹⁰. This further fueled populist sentiments via concerns of cultural identity and security. These concerns caused some European populist parties to include migrants into their construction of “the enemy”.

These phenomena catalyzed the rise of new populist movements, and in some cases the resurgence of other older populist parties in Europe. In the United Kingdom, France and Austria, the protuberant populist parties have existed long before the contemporary, but they only gained

⁶ Tamar Lagurashvili, “Rise of Radical Left-Wing Parties in Europe: Comparative Analysis of Syriza and Podemos,” *4Liberty*, March 06, 2016, <http://4liberty.eu/rise-of-radical-left-wing-parties-in-europe-comparative-analysis-of-syriza-and-podemos/>.

⁷ Jasper Muis and Tim Immerzeel, “Causes and consequences of the rise of populist radical right parties and movements in Europe,” *Current Sociology* 65, no. 6 (2017).

⁸ Owen Jones, “There is a model for the new politics we need. It's in Spain,” *The Guardian*, June 22, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/22/politics-spain-podemos-radical-europe-uk>; BBC Staff, “Greece profile - Timeline,” BBC News, June 19, 2017, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17373216>.

⁹ BBC Staff, “Migrant crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven charts,” *BBC News*, March 04, 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911>.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

notoriety in recent years¹¹. In the United Kingdom, the U.K. Independence Party (UKIP) gained eminence with the success of the Brexit Leave Campaign in 2016. In France, National Front experienced significant gains with Marine le Pen making it to the second round of the 2017 French Presidential election and gaining 33% of the total vote. In Austria, the Freedom Party won the 2016 parliamentary elections, catapulting Sebastian Kurz, 31, to become the youngest leader in the EU. While these parties have existed for several decades, other right-wing movements that have gained electoral success formed more recently. Right-wing populist parties in the Netherlands, Sweden, and Germany emerged closer to the contemporary, with the formation of the Party for Freedom (2006), the Sweden Democrats (2010), and the Alternative for Germany (2013) respectively.

The left-wing populist parties of Europe, most notably in Spain, are fairly new to the political arena. In Greece, SYRIZA was formed in 2004 with their focus aimed at combating austerity measures¹². In 2015, SYRIZA party chairman Alexis Tsipras assumed the role of Prime Minister after forming a coalition government¹³. Podemos, under the leadership of Pablo Iglesias, emerged as a political force in the 2014 European Parliamentary elections¹⁴. After the 2015 national elections, Podemos became the third largest party in the national Parliament¹⁵. The major issues for Podemos and SYRIZA are economic-based, including but not limited to EU-imposed austerity measures. This diverges notably from the concerns with culture, EU membership, and immigration which are salient among the Northern and Western populist movements, in addition to economic concerns.

¹¹ Gregor Aisch, Adam Pearce, and Bryant Rousseau, "How Far Is Europe Swinging to the Right?," *The New York Times*, May 22, 2016.

¹² BBC Staff, "Greece profile - Timeline," *BBC News*, June 19, 2017.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ BBC Staff, "Spain profile - Timeline," *BBC News*, August 21, 2017, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17955805>.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

As a result of the 2008 economic crisis and the mass migration into Europe in 2014, Southern European countries were confronted with identical political and economic turmoil as their Northern and Western counterparts. However, the populist movements they inspired are distinctly dissimilar. Southern European constituencies have coalesced around left-wing populist parties while Northern and Western Europe have not. In fact, Northern and Western populist movements went the polar opposite direction on the ideological spectrum by developing prevalent far-right populist parties.

In other words, European countries did not have similar manifestations in their populist political responses when faced with the same pressures of migration and economic uncertainty, in addition to a common governance structure under the European Union (neo-liberalism). Instead, manifestations of populism in Southern European countries are starkly divergent in their locale on the political spectrum compared to their northern counterparts. This begs the question as to why?

This thesis claims that the legacy of a historical power relationship among European countries accounts for the different inclinations and characteristics of populist movements in Southern European and Northwestern European countries. More specifically, I argue that the historical imposition of Northwest Europe, through defining boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, on to Southern Europe was entrenched to the degree that it catalyzed in the latter the production of a differing set of values in relation to political stress. Values surveys and populist party media in the form of official websites, reveal that Spain and Greece closely align with regard to the links between values and attitudes toward governance (both on the level of the European Union and domestically); at the same time, the values and attitudes in Northern and Western Europe states also reflect this harmony. I argue that notwithstanding the similarity

between political and social contexts that trigger populist movements, such as economic hardship and mass immigration, left leaning inclinations of populism in Spain and Greece derive from a cultural context. Namely, these left leaning populist inclinations are the result of a historical inferiority complex generated by the imposition of Northern and Western European cultural and governance paradigms. Ultimately, this inferiority complex created a schism in how political and economic turmoil manifest on the level of democratic governance.

Alternatively, a demographic explanation for why this divide exists in Europe's populist uptick would view the populist electorate that votes as the central factor that drives political inclinations; this perspective embraces that populisms grounded in an older, rural political base tend to lean right as opposed to a younger, urban grounded populism. Right-wing populism in the U.K., France, and other Northwestern countries tend to draw support from the older voters¹⁶. This contrasts with the demographics of Podemos and SYRIZA voters who tend to be younger¹⁷. Geographical demographics in Europe bolster this perspective: populist support in Northern and Western Europe is concentrated in rural areas, while populism in Southern Europe appeals more broadly to both urban and rural voters¹⁸. Right-wing populism dominates in the North and West because rural voters tend to be more conservative than their city counterparts, while left-wing populism draws support in the South due to urban voters who tend to be more educated and socially liberal.

¹⁶ Rick Lyman, "Like Trump, Europe's Populists Win Big With Rural Voters," *The New York Times*, December 06, 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/06/world/europe/europe-poland-populism-rural-voters.html>.

¹⁷ Guillem Vidal, "Challenging business as usual? The rise of new parties in Spain in times of crisis," *West European Politics* 41, no. 2 (2016).

¹⁸ Fernando Betancor, "Just who are Podemos?," *OpenDemocracy*, 2014, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/fernando-betancor/just-who-are-podemos>; Stathis Kouvelakis, "After Syriza's Victory, Confrontation or Capitulation," *Jacobin*, <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/01/syriza-greece-victory-kouvelakis-left/>.

While compelling, the agent-centric focus of a demographic explanation does not consider larger superstructures such as culture. Thusly, the demographics of populism may itself be a function of tension between hegemonic culture and subcultures. In this way, voter demographics and political orientation are construed more as an epiphenomenon than the causal result of an electorate's age and geographical location.

The recent political history of Spain and Greece under autocratic, authoritarian national governments and their more recent admission into the European Union yields another alternative explanation. Both Spain and Greece emerged from dictatorships in the 1970s, long after North and West Europe had institutionalized democratic governance structures. The recent memory of dictatorial governance renders both Spanish and Greek voters circumspect of supporting far right political parties in large numbers¹⁹. Furthermore, Spanish and Greek voters are more likely to personally know someone who left the country due to the autocratic government prior to the 1970s, making them less hostile to immigrants²⁰. Additionally, Spain and Greece decided to join the EU far more recently and are therefore more interested in redressing their issues with the EU as opposed to trying to leave it, which is a common theme among European right-wing populists²¹.

This historical argument for populist inclinations anticipates my focus on the cultural roots of political attitudinal leanings. Recognizing how the collective experience of despotism impacted and shaped the cultural values of Spain and Greece brings to the fore the role that collective experience plays in shaping populist inclinations. When considered in tandem with

¹⁹ Tobias Buck, "No right turn for Spanish politics," *Financial Times*, January 17, 2017, <https://www.ft.com/content/414246f6-dbe4-11e6-86ac-f253db7791c6>.

²⁰ Owen Jones, "There is a model for the new politics we need. It's in Spain," *The Guardian*, June 22, 2016.

²¹ George Kyris, "Greece has its problems with the EU, but it is in no hurry to leave," *The Guardian*, June 13, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/13/greece-problems-with-eu-would-never-leave>.

these countries' recent decision to join the EU, we can understand the EU as an international institution whose management continually reestablishes Northwest Europe as the source of power in the EU. This recapitulation might trigger a surge of collective sentiments reminiscent of earlier negative experiences related to the power relationships that put Southern European nations in an inferior position. The integration of the Euro currency in Spain and Greece, in the 2000s, is also related to the *currency of values* that drive populist movements.

Populist movements in Southern Europe have been influenced by the legacy of political and cultural subordination by Northwestern states. Occidental constructs of inclusion and exclusion, or more accurately, resistance to them, are a heretofore unexamined influence on populist movements in Spain and Greece. The relegation of Spain and Greece by the Northwest is something that the populist movements in these countries seek to remedy while the populist movements in the Northwest aim to sustain their superior position. In order to achieve these goals, Northwestern populist movements have included immigrants into the construction of “the enemy” as they are seen as an obstacle to maintaining the Northwest’s position. However, in Spain and Greece, populist anxieties center upon elevating their status within the EU through economic success, and therefore, immigrants have not been included into the grouping of “the enemy”.

Literature Review

The Origins of Contemporary Populism

Populist ideology is premised on the assumption that political legitimacy is granted from “the people”²². The concept of a citizenry endowed with authority to govern, also influenced the

²² Paulina Ochoa Espejo, “Populism and the Idea of The People,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Populism* (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2017), 607-608.

political processes that led to the emergence of modern democratic states, consequent to the weakening power claims to divine right by European kings. Kaltwasser et al. explain that it was the idea of popular sovereignty that led to the idea of a democratic constitution which grants the state its authority to govern in the name of the people²³. In this way, populism may be construed as a presupposition of representative democracy itself,²⁴ which accounts for the ubiquity of populist phenomena in democratic states. Ultimately, populism capitalizes on popular dissatisfactions that are endemic to democratic governance.

There is a dearth of studies on populism that reach beyond institutions, populist parties, and politicians²⁵. Recently, however Aslanidis has advanced a vital observation regarding a link between grassroots movements and populist political parties, which reveals that populism is neither solely a top-down nor a bottom-up phenomenon. Ostiguy also notes that populism is “a two-way phenomenon, centrally defined by the claims articulated and the connection established between the leader and supporters, a relation that displays both a socio-cultural and a politico-cultural component”²⁶. A study of populism that acknowledges the fluidity of the relationship between grassroots populism and institutional populism yields a new vantage point for investigating the social and cultural factors that catalyze and shape national populist sentiment.

In order to situate my discussion, I will briefly provide an overview of the history of the word populism. The classification of ‘populist’ used to designate ideological orientations and sentiments associated with sociopolitical phenomena emerged in the late 19th century. The word populism was first used in the English language in the late 1890s by newspapers, which utilized

²³ Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser et al, “Populism: An Overview of the Concept and the State of the Art,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Populism* (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2017), 3.

²⁴ Jan-Werner Müller, *What is populism?* (London: Penguin Books, 2017), 20.

²⁵ Paris Aslanidis, “Populism and Social Movements,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Populism* (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2017), 321.

²⁶ Pierre Ostiguy, “Populism: A Socio-Cultural Approach,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Populism* (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2017), 73.

the term to refer specifically to the US American People's Party²⁷. The People's Party was a response by rural America to industrialization which combined both reactionary and progressive ideals; it became a prominent national movement until it was ultimately absorbed into the Democratic Party²⁸. Since then, the concept of populism has evolved to refer to a zeitgeist in the contemporary academic and electoral parlance. Politicians from the UK, Russia, and France to the Philippines and many Latin American countries²⁹ have invoked the term to designate their political position³⁰. European populism in the 20th century began with the emergence of Pierre Poujade's anti-tax protest movement (Poujadism) in the 1950s which brought Jean-Marie Le Pen – who would eventually form the populist party National Front in the 1970s – into French national politics³¹.

Notwithstanding these different contexts, the concepts of populism align with regard to one specific idea, namely that the ideology implicitly assumes a division between “the people” and “the corrupt elite”³². In this manner, claims that a populist party genuinely represent the sentiments of national subjects implicitly catalyze significant doubt on liberal democracy³³. Populist politicians mostly appeal to society through a categorization of the established political parties and politicians as corrupt – labeling them as unrepresentative of the people while claiming to be able to serve the polity better.

For this reason, we must consider the critical proviso undergirding populist ideology which is that it pits ‘the people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’. Central to this distinction, moreover,

²⁷ Kaltwasser et al., “Populism: An Overview of the Concept and the State of the Art,” 495-497.

²⁸ Ibid, 495.

²⁹ Ibid, 498.

³⁰ Carlos de la Torre, “Populism in Latin America,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2017), 195.

³¹ Kaltwasser et al., “Populism: An Overview of the Concept and the State of the Art,” 499-500.

³² Ibid, 498.

³³ Müller, 39.

are rhetorical strategies organized around notions of inclusivity and exclusion that consistently permeate populist expressions. These discursive parameters undergird my analysis of the multiple manifestations of populism in Europe: I approach populism as a grassroots force driven by specific sociocultural conditions that generate or reconfigure boundaries of collective inclusivity. Preterossi suggests that social parameter related to inclusion and exclusion account for the demagoguery that imbues populist rhetoric, which he claims capitalizes on people's grievances with democratic politics³⁴.

Inclusion and exclusion in populist rhetoric devolve on fluid concepts of who comprises “the elite”, though all forms are unanimous in their perception of “the elite” as corrupt. Pessimism, a preeminent populist sentiment, derives from frustrations with “the elite”, often those endowed with power over institutions of liberal democracy. Enmeshed as they are within larger sociohistorical factors that determine the object, or enemy, excluded by populist discourse³⁵, populist expressions are imbued with an inherent historicity that accounts for the political leanings, either, left or right, of specific European forms³⁶.

To the extent that populist rhetorical strategies emphasize external enemies, Stavrakakis has demonstrated how it delineates in-groups and out-groups; who are deemed to comprise “the people” represented by populist rhetoric³⁷. Those who are excluded embody the (elite-grounded) sources of frustration with the political system. As my analysis will illustrate, the designation of enemy is variously assigned to groups such as immigrants, racial minorities, and people from

³⁴ Geminello Preterossi, “Hegemony versus Populism,” trans. Michela Russo, *Política Común* 3 (2012); Emmanouil Mavrozacharakis, Dimitrios Kotroyannos, and Stylianos I. Tzagkarakis, “Mediterranean Left-Wing Populism: The Case of SYRIZA,” *European Quarterly of Political Attitudes and Mentalities* 6, no. 2 (2017).

³⁵ Kaltwasser et al., “Populism: An Overview of the Concept and the State of the Art,” 498.

³⁶ Javier Zarzalejos, “Populism in Spain: An Analysis of Podemos,” *European View* 15, no. 2 (2016): 185.

³⁷ Yannis Stavrakakis, “Discourse Theory in Populism Research Three Challenges and a Dilemma,” *Journal of Language and Politics* 16, no. 4 (2017): 524-530.

geographical locations, all of whom are identified as part of the corrupt system³⁸.

This thesis argues that the identification of enemies in populist rhetoric deployed in Northwest Europe, Spain and Greece is linked to a nation's process of inclusion into the European Union community, which itself was shaped by implicit boundaries of cultural inclusion and exclusion. It further claims that these boundaries exerted an influence on national identity formation, and the way a nation's populace perceives itself on the world stage. I will demonstrate how these earlier experiences of inclusion and exclusion among the international community continue to exert influence on the shape and contours of populist perceptions of "the enemy". This legacy accounts for the ideological inclination, left or right, that distinguishes populist rhetoric deployed in Spain, Greece and Northwestern European nations.

Scholarly Approaches to Studying Populism

Populism – and politics in general – are studied at different organizational levels, the macro and micro. Large political phenomena are the manifestation of many micro-level events. Heinz Eulau explains,

The virtue of the micro-macro perspective lies in its sensitizing the observer to the complexity of social and political things and giving him or her a handle to bring some kind of order...by introducing the notion that human action can be observed on different levels of structural complexity³⁹.

Thus, the direction of influence between the macro and micro level is not unidirectional, because micro-level politics are affected by and affect larger macro-level political phenomenon and vice-versa. A multi-level analysis of populism provides nuances that capture the development of populism as a multifaceted political phenomenon that reverberates through multiple

³⁸ Claudia Alvares and Peter Dahlgren, "Populism, Extremism and Media: Mapping an Uncertain Terrain," *European Journal of Communication* 31, no. 1 (2016): 47-48.

³⁹ Heinz Eulau, *Micro-macro Dilemmas in Political Science: Personal Pathways through Complexity* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996), 237.

organizational levels within society. That is to say, populist leaders garner power through voters, but these voters are then reciprocally influenced by these populist leaders who then further influence larger populist frames and so on.

Macro-level analysis of populist phenomena focuses sizeable political phenomenon, such as elections and positioning of political elites. These analyses aim to explain policy implications, institutional changes, and governmental functions. Political elites, like politicians, are more regularly analyzed as they hold power in government, and therefore, are more visible to the public eye. Thus, in a study of populist movements, macro-level investigation centers upon populist political party leaders and populist politicians.

However, because I am studying populism as a grassroots phenomenon, we must examine populism at the micro-level as well. Populism studied at the micro-level is more broadly focused on the people that support populist parties and politicians. This is because the study of politics on the micro-level engages with individuals as minute political figures. The issues that people deal with daily, such as livelihood, ethnic divides, and community, all influence people as politicized subjects⁴⁰. Thereby, we should understand micro-politics as intrinsically tethered to people's daily concerns.

Huang et al. furthers this line of reasoning by explaining that collective memory and collective identity are forms of knowledge that are able to influence micro-level in the form of political attitudes⁴¹. This approach appreciates politics as a social activity done within established groups of people. Moreover, politics is bound to the participants' way of knowing themselves – both individually and as part of the broader group – and the historical narrative

⁴⁰ Noah Theriault, "The Micropolitics of Indigenous Environmental Movements in the Philippines," *Development and Change* 42, no. 6 (2011): 481.

⁴¹ Li-Li Huang, James H. Liu, and Maanling Chang, "'The Double Identity' of Taiwanese Chinese: A Dilemma of Politics and Culture Rooted in History," *Asian Journal of Social Psychology* 7, no. 2 (2004): 164.

which contextualizes their existence⁴². This means that micro-level analysis can allow scholars to investigate the link between political attitudes and participants' way of knowing themselves – both individually and as part of the broader group. Thereby, the micropolitics of populism yield insight into the smaller frames of political attitudes. This in turn can provide a nuanced understanding of how to examine populism regarding events that occur at the smallest level of politics.

This slant shifts the focus of politics to the individual and appreciates that their quotidian behavior is where more substantial political structures originate. In this vein, micropolitics help to illuminate the orientation and meaning of a political undertaking⁴³. Political phenomenon, like populism, can be defined by the actions of the people more so than the manifestation of the effort itself. In this regard, micro-level politics is how macro-level politics come to fruition, and thereby, micro-politics come to define macro-political phenomenon. Matthew Scherer offers a concise articulation of the topic: “Micropolitics contributes to the formation of desire, belief, inclination, and judgment in political subjects. Its regulations take place at local and individual levels”⁴⁴. Micropolitics, in the form of behaviors and attitudes, allow us to probe populism as a multilayered political phenomenon.

Additionally, specific attitudes that undergird a specific collective's micropolitical inclination may be construed as a form of resistance against larger hegemonic forces. Antonio Gramsci explains that subaltern groups resist larger hegemonies through reinterpreting the values of a dominant group⁴⁵. This resistance to hegemony occurs through micro-level shifts that

⁴² Ibid, 151.

⁴³ Luke Yates, “Rethinking Prefiguration: Alternatives, Micropolitics and Goals in Social Movements,” *Social Movement Studies* 14, no. 1 (2014): 2.

⁴⁴ Matthew Scherer, “Micropolitics,” *Encyclopædia Britannica*, December 17, 2015, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/micropolitics>.

⁴⁵ “On Italian History,” in *Selections from Prison Notebooks*, ed. Quentin Hoare, trans. Geoffrey N. Smith, by Antonio Gramsci (London: Electric Book Company, 1999), 202-203.

underlie a given counter-hegemony, which in turn make micro-politics essential to crafting resistance to forms of hegemony⁴⁶. Therefore, micropolitical proclivities can pose a reactionary challenge to more considerable political impositions.

The standards and practices of the European Union can be thought of as a hegemonic force within Europe. The Northwest and Spain and Greece each have a different relationship with the European Union as a form of hegemony, as do the populist movements in these countries that seek to resist this hegemony. This is because these countries have unique paths that they took to become a part of the European Union community which in turn shaped their respective relationships with it. In this perspective, European Union norms are a hegemonic force which European populism seeks to challenge, and as noted, resistance to hegemony originates in micropolitical frames i.e. political attitudes. Thus, an in-depth examination of political attitudes can aid in explaining the impact that European Union has had on European states through creating differing levels of inclusion and exclusion within Europe.

Micropolitical implications of Populism in Northwest countries of EU and Southern European countries

Attitudes and values associated with populist movements in Southern European countries reveal a network of micropolitical factors that collectively bespeak the desire to resist hegemonic power associated with Northwestern states of the EU. The different ideological orientations of European populist parties can be situated within distinctly different political attitudes and values between Northwestern Europe and Spain and Greece. This is because values, as a part of micro-level political phenomenon, are related to peoples' day to day activities as they choose some of

⁴⁶ Alan Hunt, "Rights and Social Movements: Counter-Hegemonic Strategies," *Journal of Law and Society* 17, no. 3 (1990): 315.

their values over other ones when they make decisions; thus, values are highly influential in attitudinal orientation⁴⁷.

Additionally, values orient cultural production because values are learned through social contact, which produces similar value patterns within cultures⁴⁸. Maleki and Hendriks explain that cultural values have a variety of influences within politics that influence patterns of political behavior⁴⁹. Therefore, cultural values can be influential in determining individual preferences of government affairs and one's political ideology. Thereby, political values underpin the way people vote in elections and navigate politics, including populism.

Moreover, values are both an expression of culture and a part of culture⁵⁰. This explains the unique national values which influence populist attitudes. Values and culture intersect to influence politics. National culture is influential to the particular form of democracy that a nation practices⁵¹. Maleki and Hendriks explain that national culture determines how citizens engage with democracy, both concerning their level of participation and why they participate; they note that Spain and Greece's national cultures have shaped democracies with low participation and protest participants⁵². Within Europe, this means that states and regional differences contribute to different political cultures.

Thereby, a democratic culture is not a given, nor is it the same in every democratic state. Historical events shape the processes that create democratic culture. A conception of culture as a product of history means that the past matters in determining the nature of democratic political

⁴⁷ Laura Parks and Russell P. Guay, "Personality, values, and motivation," *Personality and Individual Differences* 47, no. 7 (2009): 680; Lilach Sagiv et al., "Personal values in human life," *Nature Human Behaviour* 1, no. 9 (2017): 630.

⁴⁸ Parks and Guay, 676.

⁴⁹ Ammar Maleki and Frank Hendriks, "The relation between cultural values and models of democracy: a cross-national study," *Democratization* 22, no. 6 (2014): 21.

⁵⁰ Parks and Guay, 680-81.

⁵¹ Maleki and Hendriks, 10-13.

⁵² Ibid, 13.

culture. For example, Dénes explains that the way that European states deal with historical traumas is significant in function of democratic governance⁵³. Historical traumas may manifest into democratic politics at certain temporal moments⁵⁴, therefore strengthening the saliency of certain aspects of a given political culture. Thereby, the feelings invoked by historical travails are not static, but change depending on contemporary events. The historical distresses latently cast into segments of national culture affect shared values due to the relationship between culture and values.

The historical and continuing imposition of the Northwestern Europe onto its Southern counterparts, a distressing experience, inevitably affected particular collective values which steered how their regional cultures were shaped. Understanding that values orient cultural production means that culture also refracts larger historical frames within Europe. The varying degrees of inclusion and exclusion of European states during the formation of Europe (as an idea), and the European Union, shaped the national political cultures of Europe. Historical experiences of inclusion and exclusion within the European Union community have influenced and fashioned populist perceptions of “the enemy” within Europe. These experiences of inclusion and exclusion stem from a form of Occidentalism, and its experience by European polities is highly influential on how they view themselves on the international stage.

Populist attitudes and culture have been shaped by Occidentalism’s legacy

Within the European continent, Northwestern Europe has become the centrifuge of power which created a superiority complex where the rest of Europe is not seen as equals by Northwestern Europe. Notably, Southern European states have been subordinated in relation to

⁵³ Iván Zoltán Dénes, “Making Democratic Political Culture,” *European Review* 21, no. 4 (2013): 553.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, 554-56

their Northern and Western counterparts. This contemporary division is the result of historical processes that were brought to fruition in the decline of feudalism, continuing through integration states into the European Union, and contemporary European politics⁵⁵.

Occidentalism explains the lasting effects of the Northwestern superiority complex on Southern Europe. With the root of this division in mind, the creation and implications of European Occidentalism can be evaluated in three areas: European history of Enlightenment and the industrial revolution, the creation of the European Union, and the contemporary politics of the European Union.

Before diving into the creation and perpetuation of Occidentalism, it is necessary to trace the genealogy of the term. Occidentalism in this context stems from Edward Said's term "Orientalism"⁵⁶. Colonial powers created oriental studies with the aim of producing knowledge regarding non-European people – knowledge which did not hold true to reality, but instead created misrepresentations that justified colonial rule and cultural superiority⁵⁷. The term Occident defined Europe, while the Orient came to define non-European cultures. The Orient was an idea used to describe anything that was different and within Europe. In the attempt to make Europe a distinct entity, what was considered the Occident and Orient played out on the European continent too. Dianotto explains that, "...because the center of political, economic, military, and cultural hegemony has now shifted to the northern countries... [Northern Europe] can now find in southern Europe their own internal "other" space"⁵⁸. When Northern Europe

⁵⁵ Ricardo J. Quinones, *North/South: The Great European divide* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), 3-17.

⁵⁶ James G. Carrier, "Occidentalism: The World Turned Upside-down," *American Ethnologist* 19, no. 2 (1992): 203.

⁵⁷ Carl Niekerk, "Between Orientalism and Occidentalism: Culture, Identity, and the "Clash of Civilizations", in *Approaches to Kurban Said's Ali and Nino*, ed. Cori Crane and Carl Niekerk (Boydell and Brewer, C. Hurst & Company, 2017), 247.

⁵⁸ Roberto M. Dianotto, "A South with a View: Europe and Its Other," *Nepantla: Views from South* 1, no. 2 (2000): 379.

emerged as the powerhouse of the continent, it relegated parts of Europe that were not part of this nexus of power to a form of subordinate otherness.

The origin of Occidentalism's superiority complex lies in the end of the European feudal era. Richard Quinones explains that this situation resulted from three historical events: the decline of Southern European states' geopolitical power and influence, the rise of Protestantism, and emergent intellectual disagreement⁵⁹. Together these events have coalesced to create the contemporary relegation of the South as substandard to that of the North. As states in Northwestern Europe began to amass their wealth and power from colonial expansion, Southern European states began to see theirs' decline. The disparity in geopolitical power was further exacerbated by the Industrial Revolution, which began in England and quickly spread to other states in the proximity. Southern Europe industrialized significantly later than their counterparts in the Northwest, leading to a discrepancy in geopolitical power and influence⁶⁰.

The creation of the European Union, and integration of states into it, further intensified the disparities of power within Europe. The European Union created institutional and legal complexes, which embedded the legacy of Northwestern superiority into contemporary government superstructures⁶¹. The early members of the EU crafted the entry requirements and essentially created the model for what an EU country should be. Other than Italy, which was a founding member of the European Economic Community (the precursor to the EU), Southern states had to conform to prerequisites and policies that some original members did not follow themselves⁶². Governance in European states is similar regarding democratic principles, but

⁵⁹ Quinones, 8-9.

⁶⁰ Ibid, 144.

⁶¹ Fabrizio Tassinari, "The Crystal Curtain: A Postscript on Europe's North-South Divide," *The International Spectator* 49, no. 3 (2014): 124-26.

⁶² Ibid, 130.

dissimilar in the manifestation of democracy into praxis, which reflects their differing historical legacies.

The states of Southern Europe emerged as democracies relatively close to the time they joined the EU, at least compared to the temporal gap between democratization and EU membership of the Northwestern European states. Portugal, Spain, and Greece underwent different unique paths to democracy, compared to the Northwestern European countries⁶³. Their democracies came to fruition in the decline of authoritarian states, whereas countries like the U.K and France arrived at democracy differently: with the end of empires coinciding with the gradual decline of the divine right of European kings. Additionally, because democratization occurred later for Southern Europe, in the 19th and 20th centuries, it led to governance issues like clientelism and patronage, resulting in greater dissatisfaction with the governments in the South by civil society⁶⁴.

Furthermore, Northern European states guided Southern states' paths to democratic governance in a hegemonic fashion as they established the requirements to join the EU, thus coupling Southern European dissatisfaction with civil society with Northwestern political hegemony⁶⁵. Magone explains that this led to a weaker integration of the South into the EU market compared to other Euro-members⁶⁶. Thus, the subordination of southern Europe by northern Europe continues into contemporary European Union politics. The Euro crisis can be

⁶³ Georgios Tsirdis, "Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective: Democratic Transitions in Portugal, Greece, and Spain" (Master's thesis, Utrecht University, 2007), January 2007, 5-13, accessed February 23, 2018, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/27705276_Southern_Europe_in_comparative_perspective_democratic_transitions_in_Portugal_Greece_and_Spain.

⁶⁴ Ibid, 122.

⁶⁵ José M. Magone, *The politics of southern Europe: integration into the European Union* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003).

⁶⁶ Ibid.

attributed to a divide in practices and standards of governance within Europe⁶⁷. It has been further entrenched by “meridionalism” and ultimately placing blame on the South for its inability to meet economic reforms⁶⁸. The talk of a North-South divide economic success feeds Euroscepticism of Southern countries, which is why it is problematic that reforms use Northern Europe as the model. Southern Europe is expected to be able to conform to the expectations of Northern Europe whether or not they have the institutional capacity to facilitate these expectations. Therefore, through this rhetoric, the Southern states are acutely aware of their relegation through Northwestern states’ discourses on EU politics.

Another salient example of the contemporary expectations that stem from the imbalance of power within the EU is immigration. EU immigration policy is dominated by the interests of North and Central Europe, and is not implemented by Southern European countries effectively due to a lack of capacity to do so, and thus, Southern countries signed immigration agreements for political expediency⁶⁹. A side effect of this is the creation of a large shadow economy in Greece that provide jobs to illegal migrants⁷⁰. Immigration policy primarily focuses on Northern concerns as most immigration agreements were created before Southern states joined the EU. By not cracking down on the shadow economy which provides cheap labor, Southern states implicitly encourage illegal migration for economic benefits⁷¹.

Gramsci’s work on counterhegemonic cultural resistance⁷² can be used to explain the results of European Occidentalism. Europe is a culturally diverse superstructure and the

⁶⁷ Fabrizio Tassinari, “What Really Divides Northern and Southern Europe?” *Huffington Post*, 2014, accessed December 28, 2017.

⁶⁸ Tassinari, “The Crystal Curtain: A Postscript on Europe’s North-South Divide,” 126.

⁶⁹ Martin Baldwin-Edwards, “The Emerging European Immigration Regime: Some Reflections on Implications for Southern Europe,” *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 35, no. 4 (1997): 497.

⁷⁰ *Ibid*, 508.

⁷¹ *Ibid*.

⁷² Gramsci, 202-03.

dominant culture of the EU stems from Northern and Western Europe⁷³. Thereby, Northwestern Europe has come to manipulate the culture of Europe. It influences the beliefs, perceptions, and values of the EU as a result of the historical decline of Southern Europe, the monopolization on standards of the EU, and contemporary imbalance of state power within the EU.

The standpoint of the Northwest has become the dominant European ideology and established the accepted European cultural norms. Their imposition has resulted in their respective ideology being understood as universal, and ultimately it justifies the status quo as what is beneficial for all EU states as opposed to an artificial construction that serves to benefit the Northwestern states⁷⁴. Through this historical experience, Northwestern states have established what it means to be European and have relegated Southern states to a lower status due to their perceived otherness.

Cultural values are underlain with common ideas about what a given social collective considers desirable, and therefore, what they should be encouraged to pursue. Some values can become more salient because they preserve social and cultural “arrangements”⁷⁵. This is why political leaders are granted legitimacy when they pursue these goals. In this case, when populist leaders attempt to maintain or improve their polity's positionality i.e. a position of superiority or inferiority within the EU.

Remember that populism always seeks to create an external enemy which creates in-groups and out-groups; how broad the given grouping is matters to the degree of inclusion or

⁷³ Wolfgang Streeck, “German hegemony: Unintended and unwanted,” *Eurozine*, September 23, 2015, accessed March 1, 2018, <https://www.eurozine.com/german-hegemony-unintended-and-unwanted/>.

⁷⁴ Creston Davis and Eleni Xilakis, “The New European Hegemony; Or, Dispatches From The Neoliberal Front,” *Huffington Post*, July 5, 2016, , accessed March 1, 2018, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/creston-davis/the-new-european-hegemony_b_10792924.html.; Alan Bullock, Stephen Trombley, and Alf Lawrie, *The New Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought* (London: HarperCollins, 2000), 387-88.

⁷⁵ Lilach Sagiv et al., “Personal Values in Human Life,” *Nature Human Behaviour* 1, no. 9 (2017): 634.

exclusion expressed by a populist movement⁷⁶. An inclusive grouping allows for most, if not all, of the polity to be a part of the populist movement. Conversely, an exclusive grouping forms a favored portion of the polity and rejects parts of the society by associating them with the enemy. Within Europe, who is identified as the enemy by a given populist movement can be explained by contextualizing populism's fruition within the set of collective values that expose the legacy of Occidentalism.

The inferiority complex of Southern Europe, caused by the historical and continuing legacy of Occidentalism, has manifested into a divide in political values and attitudes between Northern and Southern Europe. Whether it is conscious or subconscious, Southern European values aim to change the status quo, while Northern values attempt to maintain the privileged position of the North within the EU. Values continually reconsecrate the formation of culture, whereby, the dissimilarity in values renders distinct political cultures which eventually impact democratic inclinations. Different inculcations of populism are feasible due to idiosyncratic political values and attitudes which catalyze unique cultural reflections. Southern Europe, through Occidentalism and its effect on political culture, has come to possess political values and attitudes that brought inclusive populist movements into power. These inclusive populist movements bend towards the ideological left while the exclusive populist movements of the Northwest lean to the ideological right.

⁷⁶ Stavrakakis, "Discourse Theory in Populism Research Three Challenges and a Dilemma," 524-30.

Data, Methods, and Analysis

Data

I chose to use three different survey questions from the 2017 Standard Eurobarometer 88 in order to emphasize the likenesses and discrepancies between attitudes in the Northwest of Europe and Spain and Greece⁷⁷. I selected the UK, France, and Germany to represent the Northwest due to their influence within the EU. The fieldwork for the survey was conducted between May and November 2017. The number of surveyed participants range from 1,008 respondents each in Greece and Spain to 1,565 respondents in Germany. There were 1,072 respondents in France and 1,334 respondents in the United Kingdom. The interviews were conducted in face-to-face format in the national languages of each respective country, and respondents were found using “random-route” procedures.

In order to conduct the analysis of whether the national populist parties in fact catered to the attitudes exhibited in my survey analysis, I examined the homepages of the most prominent populist parties’ webpages in the UK, France, Germany, Spain, and Greece: the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), National Front, the Alternative for Germany (AfD), Podemos, and SYRIZA, respectively. I limited my analysis to the parties’ homepages to limit the volume and scope of my analysis. Additionally, marketing suggests that the homepage of a website determines whether someone will be drawn into exploring the site further⁷⁸. These website homepages were examined in a relatively similar temporal period which ranges from 17 January to 24 January 2018. The webpages of each party’s website were written in the national language

⁷⁷ European Commission (2017).

⁷⁸ Gitte Lindgaard et al., “Attention Web Designers: You Have 50 Milliseconds to Make a Good First Impression!,” *Behaviour & Information Technology* 25, no. 2 (2006): 115.

of the country from which they originated. Therefore, I used the translate function on Google Chrome to convert the national languages from each webpage into English – except for the UKIP webpage which was already in English.

Methods

To analyze the results of the survey questions, I utilize descriptive statistics such as the mean and standard deviation. The mean displays the average percentage value for each response to a given survey question, which provides a measure for comparability between the countries. Even though the mean can be skewed by inevitable outliers that exist, it establishes a basis from which to compare the different European countries. The survey data reflects a degree of European collectivity as expected, which is why deviations from the mean are informative as they are representative of differences from that shared European collectivity.

I also use the standard deviation to analyze the survey data. The standard deviation provides insight into the distribution of the individual countries survey values from the mean. A smaller standard deviation indicates that the percentage values are grouped close to the mean, which implies more agreement among the countries. A large standard deviation suggests the opposite – less agreement among the relevant countries. The greater number of standard deviations a value is from the mean highlights the extent to which a survey value is not in coincidence with the other values. But, the sample size for the standard deviation in these surveys is only five (the UK, France, Germany, Spain, and Greece) which means that standard deviation can be heavily influenced by outliers. Bearing in mind this provision, the standard deviation still can be used to show the level of agreement between these five countries.

In order to analyze the rhetorical patterns of webpages of the predominant populist parties, I implement a content analysis. I coded for the following words: immigration, security,

border, terrorism/terrorist, Islam, refugee, economic, gender equity/women/feminism, multiculturalism/multinationalism, financial/economic elite, corruption, and labor. I chose these codes in two manners. First, I made an initial list which I thought captured sentiments based on the language from the survey questions. Then I added and merged additional terms that appeared to be salient from my exploration of these populist political parties' homepages. I then situate these terms in the broader context of the respective websites.

Data Analysis Introduction

All forms of populism cast the image of the average citizen – the people – against an enemy. The prominent populist parties in Spain and Greece identify “the enemy” of “the people” as the national government, the European Union, and the financial elite versus the UK, France, and Germany, where “the enemy” refers to the aforementioned actors as well as immigrants and Islam. By incorporating immigrants and Islam into “the enemy,” the populist movements in the Northwest establish clear criteria for excluding populations from the implied cohort, “the people,” whose values populist politicians claims to represent. Conversely, the predominant populist parties in Spain and Greece have a greater degree of inclusion for who can be considered a part of “the people” in that they do not incorporate immigrants and refugees into the implied group of “the enemy”.

As my analysis will demonstrate, populist movements premised on a broader level of inclusion tend to be left-leaning on the ideology spectrum. Specifically, I will show how attitude surveys conducted by the European Union Commission, known as the Eurobarometer, reflect values that are shaped by the different degrees of inclusion and exclusion espoused in political discourse. These questions focus on asking respondents to identify what they consider to be the most important issue facing the EU and their national country, as well as, their level of trust for

the EU. Through these questions, it is evident that the values that drive these attitudes bear traces of the nationally unique implicit boundaries of cultural inclusion and exclusion created in the formation the European Union Community. In the Northwest, these boundaries are reflected in the clustering of concerns about immigration, security, and Islam. On the other hand, Spain and Greece have economic-based trepidations that are the central driver of attitudes related to populist sentiment due to their different experiences with the confines of inclusion and exclusion in the creation of the European Union.

The findings of my survey analysis are reinforced by rhetorical patterns in political expression posted on the webpages of the major populist movements in these aforementioned countries. To reiterate, in order to limit the scope and volume of the data, I chose to probe only the home page of each of these parties' webpages. A content analysis reveals the centrality of the concept of an enemy for shaping populist voters' political attitudes. Xenophobia and security concerns emerge as dominant themes in populist rhetoric in the UK, France, and Germany. In Spain and Greece, populist party rhetoric devolves on economic concerns. Teasing out the criteria for inclusion and exclusion embedded in each populist parties' rhetoric brings to the fore the catalyzing role played by Occidentalism in national and cultural identity formation processes.

Attitudinal Survey Data Analysis

Values underlying collective populist attitudes in the southern European nations of Spain and Greece are shaped by these states' experience of exclusion during the formation of the European Union, which is situated within Northwestern European Occidental prejudices. Therefore, in this section I will analyze three different survey questions from the Standard Eurobarometer 88 in order to highlight the similarities and distinctions between attitudes in Northwestern Europe and Spain and Greece.

The results of the following survey questions evince these differences in attitudes, and through these we can understand why Spain and Greece have left-leaning inclusive populist sentiments. The survey data reflects a degree of European collectivity as expected, which is why deviations from the mean are informative as they are representative of differences from that shared European collectivity. Spain and Greece have populist movements centered on economic frustrations while the Northwest's populists are focused on immigration, terrorism, and the welfare state. It is the differing base concerns of these countries that lead to Spain and Greece having inclusive populist movements and the Northwest having exclusive ones. Attitudes regarding immigration, terrorism, the welfare state, and economics in the UK, France, and Germany differ from Spain and Greece. The following survey questions highlight that immigration and terrorism have been coupled in the UK and France, and that welfare state matters are a bigger concern for Northwestern Europe. These attitudes laid the conditions for exclusionary populist movements. But, the economy is a bigger concern for Spain and Greece compared to the Northwest which leads Spain and Greece towards inclusive populist movements.

Table 1: What do you think are the two most important issues facing the EU at the moment?

	Immigration	Terrorism	Econ Situation	Member states finances
<i>UK</i>	32	31	23	13
<i>France</i>	32	37	18	13
<i>Germany</i>	47	29	13	22
<i>Spain</i>	26	48	20	18
<i>Greece</i>	37	35	31	28

Table 1 depicts the results of what respondents thought the two most important issues facing the EU were⁷⁹. This survey question serves to highlight the political attitudinal differences that Spain and Greece compared to Northwestern Europe through the topics of immigration, terrorism, and the economy. Immigration and terrorism, which have become

⁷⁹ The original survey question had thirteen options for the most important issue facing the EU and listed the response values for all twenty-eight EU countries. I chose the three issues highest values for the five countries I am exploring.

increasingly linked in contemporary political discourse⁸⁰, dominate as the most important concerns overall with the highest mean and median values⁸¹. However, Spanish survey respondents stand apart from the others in their disjointed level of concern for immigration and terrorism. Spain is the country with the highest concern for ‘terrorism’ of the set, but interestingly it is the country with least concern for ‘immigration’. This suggests that the matters of immigration and terrorism have been uniquely decoupled from each other in Spain compared to the other countries.

Like Spain, Germany also stands out in its notably different levels of concern for immigration and terrorism. However, the matters of immigration and terrorism have not been decoupled in the same manner. Germany is the country with the highest level of concern for immigration, but the country with the lowest level of concern for terrorism. Thus, German respondents place an emphasis on immigration which could underlie xenophobic attitudes. Conversely Spain emphasizes terrorism, but not immigration, exhibiting a disconnection between immigration and terrorism. Spanish respondents are not as heavily concerned with immigration which can serve to explain why they do not include immigrants into the populist creation of “the enemy”.

Table 1 shows the prominence of economic matters in Greek political attitudes. While immigration and terrorism did appear to be the most pressing issue on average between all countries, economic related concerns were also prominent, especially for Greece. The values for Greece in regard to the categories ‘economic situation’ (of the EU) and the ‘finances of member states’ were much higher and almost two standard deviations away from the averages for those

⁸⁰ Stephen Castles, “International Migration at a Crossroads,” *Citizenship Studies* 18, no. 2 (April 2014): 191.

⁸¹ See appendix.

categories⁸². Conversely, the UK and France were almost one standard deviation lower than the average in regard to ‘member state finances’ and were close to average for ‘economic situation’. Germany followed this negative deviation in the category ‘economic situation’ and was close to the average value for ‘member states’.

For Spain and Greece, the saliency of economic-based concerns over immigration and security concerns demonstrates that these two countries have a different perspective as to what the threats and remedies are to changing or maintaining their status within the EU. It is the domination of economic-centered issues, which are influenced by a legacy of exclusion within the European Union community, that foster the political atmosphere necessary for inclusive populist parties in Spain and Greece. Political attitudes in Spain and Greece show that respondents believe economic success will bolster their position relative to the other EU countries. Podemos and SYRIZA play on these tropes of political discourse and continue to shape them, but they still reflect populist attitudes based in economic-related concerns, as opposed to immigration and security concerns.

Table 1 demonstrates the divide in political attitudes about the EU between the Northwestern states and Spain and Greece. Immigration is a predominant concern for all five selected countries, except notably for Spain. The respondents in the UK, France, and Germany are more concerned with immigration and security issues facing the EU compared to Spain and Greece, which are more apprehensive in regard to the economy.

These results are indicative of the presupposition that immigrants are thought to be a hindrance to the EU countries in the Northwest. The results illuminate why immigrants are excluded from populist movement’s grouping of “the people” in the UK, France, and Germany,

⁸² See appendix.

while Spain and Greece are encumbered by the European economic climate, leading them to a populist sentiment that is less exclusionary. Their populist movements solely blame the EU for their economic problems, and national government, not groups in society such as immigrants.

Table 2: What do you think are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment?

	Unemployment	Immigration	Health and social security	Rising prices/inflation/cost of living	Terrorism	Econ Situation	The education system	The environment, climate and energy issues	Gov Debt
UK	10	20	30	21	25	13	11	6	7
France	40	17	8	13	33	11	11	13	11
Germany	7	40	13	9	20	3	22	20	3
Spain	58	7	11	8	13	34	6	3	12
Greece	49	18	11	9	1	44	4	0	30

Table 2 examines the same question as Table 1, but in regard to national context and the value percentages change quite drastically. The major concerns evinced in this question display a larger variation in political attitudes than those in the EU-focused question previously explored. The UK, France, and Germany have national concerns which are far less economic-focused than Spain and Greece.

Examining the top three major concerns in each country helps highlight the differences in political attitudes in this survey question. In the UK, ‘health and social security’, ‘terrorism’ and ‘rising prices/inflation/cost of living’ are the major concerns. In France, they are ‘unemployment’, ‘terrorism’, and ‘immigration’. In Germany the most pressing concerns are ‘immigration’, ‘the education system’, and a tie between ‘terrorism’ and ‘the environment, climate and energy issues’. Through these three countries, it is apparent that immigration and terrorism are salient topics along with welfare state concerns.

Through these predominant concerns we see the catalyst for exclusionary populist movements in the UK, France, and Germany. Fears of immigration and terrorism can be used to support xenophobia⁸³. Immigration framed through the lens of foreigners taking jobs and

⁸³ Eleonore Kofman, Sawitri Saharso, and Elena Vacchelli, “Gendered Perspectives on Integration Discourses and Measures,” *International Migration* 53, no. 4 (2013): 79.

welfare state benefits from nationals⁸⁴ also serves to explain how these attitudes are indicative of a high level of exclusion. In these discourses, immigrants are viewed as a threat to the superior position of the UK, France, and Germany and their desire to maintain that position.

Immigration and terrorism anxieties further illuminate differences in political attitudes between the mentioned countries. In regard to immigration, Spain is significantly less concerned with the matter compared to the others – its value for the category is more than a standard deviation away from the mean⁸⁵. However, Greece, did fall closer to the mean for immigration⁸⁶. But, the level of concern for terrorism shows that for Greek respondents, less of an association between immigration and terrorism exists.

A significant variation exists between Spain and Greece and Northwest Europe in what respondents identified as the most important issue. In Spain, the biggest concerns are ‘unemployment’, the ‘economic situation’, and ‘terrorism’. Terrorism is in the top three concerns for Spain like the UK and France, but value (13%) is much lower than those of the UK and France (25% and 33%). In Greece, ‘unemployment’, ‘economic situation’, and ‘government debt’ dominate as the most important concerns. Both Spain and Greece have the highest concern for unemployment among the five countries and both are almost a standard deviation away from the mean⁸⁷. Though France is largely concerned with unemployment, Spain and Greece are much farther from the mean⁸⁸.

Also, the concerns of Spain and Greece are centered upon macroeconomic problems, in that, their levels of concern for employment are matched by their concern for the economic

⁸⁴ P. C. Emmer, “Europe and the Immigration Debate,” *European Review* 12, no. 3 (2004): 330.

⁸⁵ See appendix.

⁸⁶ See appendix.

⁸⁷ See appendix.

⁸⁸ See appendix.

situation. Thusly, unemployment is linked wholly to economy in general. Spain and Greece are more concerned with the economic situation of their countries at 34% and 44% respectively compared to the UK, France, and Germany at 13%, 11%, and 3% correspondingly. The survey question in Table 2 reveals a degree of homogeneity between Spain and Greece, as they have similarly high levels of concern for unemployment and the current economic situation of their country, highlighting their view as to what impedes their elevation in stature.

Spain's third most concerning issue was terrorism at 13%, but this value is still less than the average and much less than the value for the UK, France, and Germany⁸⁹. Greece was even further from the others', with a mere 1% value for terrorism. Though terrorism may pose a security concern, the concern is not rationalized to be part of a problem stemming from immigration for Spain. Greece's third largest concern is government debt at 30%, situating Greece almost two standard deviations away from the average for government debt⁹⁰. In this survey question, Greece's economic inferiority within the EU and the desire to change that is apparent. Spanish and Greek survey respondents are unique from their Northwestern counterparts in political attitudes regarding what concerns them the most. Spain and Greece are more economic focused, while the Northwest of Europe is more centered on immigration, terrorism, and welfare state concerns.

Possibly, the countries of Northwestern Europe intertwine these issues, seeing them as a combined threat to their superior position in the EU. This can be evinced in that though immigration and terrorism were not the most important concerns for either the Northwest or South, the Northwestern states are still more concerned with immigration and terrorism than Spain and Greece. The perceived most pressing issues facing Northwest Europe, versus those of

⁸⁹ See appendix.

⁹⁰ See appendix.

Spain and Greece, serve to portray the differences in populist attitudes towards who is considered to be a part of “the people”. In Spain and Greece, the cohort of “the people” is a much broader category, because for Podemos and SYRIZA the key to remedying their relegation is by improving their economies, which does not depend on excluding immigrants. For the UK, France, and Germany, respondent’s attitudes suggest that they believe that in order to maintain their superior position, they must have a larger degree of exclusion for who can qualify to be a part of “the people”.

Table 3: For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it: The European Union.

	Tend to Trust	Tend to Not Trust	Don't Know
<i>UK</i>	29	59	12
<i>France</i>	33	56	11
<i>Germany</i>	47	42	11
<i>Spain</i>	44	47	9
<i>Greece</i>	23	74	3

Political attitudes regarding the European Union as an institution provides another window into the differences between the Northwest and Spain and Greece. Table 3 depicts levels of trust these five countries have for the EU. Most notably, the UK and France have similar levels of trust and distrust for the EU. Furthermore, all the countries listed, except Germany, overwhelmingly do not trust the EU. Spain is split in this attitude with a roughly equal amount trust and distrust for the EU. Strikingly, Greece has the highest level of certainty in their overwhelming distrust for the EU.

Germany is the only country in the five chosen countries that exhibits a more trustful than distrustful view of the EU. This can be explained by Germany’s dominating role in EU politics and governance. The UK, France, Spain, and Greece all have a higher level of distrust than trust in the EU. However, Spain and Greece are not identical with the UK and France. Both the UK and France have similar levels of trust and distrust of the European Union at 29%-59% for the UK and 33%-56% for France. The coincidence in these levels of trust and distrust demonstrate the similarities between the UK and France versus the similarity between Spain and Greece.

Spain and Greece both tend not to trust the EU. While still holding an overall distrustful view of the EU, Spain is almost evenly divided on the matter of trust in the EU. Spain is split with a 44% trust, 47% distrust and 9% don't know. Noting Spain's subordination within the EU, the respondents' level of trust can be understood in that EU membership is beneficial to Spain⁹¹ even though they have been relegated to a lower status within it.

Greece intensely stands apart from the rest in that it has the largest level of distrust in the EU. Also, Greece has the lowest level of 'don't know' responses at 3% which is also much lower than the mean of 9.2%, thus evincing a high degree of certainty in their attitude towards the EU. Respondents from Greece tend not to trust the EU because it is to blame for the continued lack of ability to remedy their inferior position within Europe.

Populist parties utilize dissatisfaction with the established political systems to garner support. All the populist parties in these countries have a dissatisfaction with the EU, but their reasons are different. The exclusive, right leaning populist parties in the UK and France have political bases that are dissatisfied with the EU due to immigration, terrorism, and neoliberal policies. These countries believe they can maintain their superior position within Europe without being part of the EU, perceiving it as a crutch. Exemplars of these concerns were evinced by the UK Leave campaign in 2016 which was championed by the UKIP⁹² and Marine Le Pen's French presidential run in 2017⁹³. In Germany, the AfD has yet to make the impact that UKIP and National Front have, which could be explained by the overall high support for the EU as evinced

⁹¹ Miren Etxezarreta et al., "Spain in Crisis: The Role of the EU," Corporate Europe Observatory, March 23, 2012, accessed April 27, 2018, <https://corporateeurope.org/2012/03/spain-crisis-role-eu>.

⁹² Nigel Farage, "NIGEL FARAGE: Why We Must Vote LEAVE in the EU Referendum," Express.co.uk, June 21, 2016, accessed May 1, 2018, <https://www.express.co.uk/comment/expresscomment/681776/nigel-farage-eu-referendum-brexit-vote-leave-independence-ukip>.

⁹³ Jon Henley et al., "Macron Beats Le Pen in French Presidential Election – as It Happened," The Guardian, May 08, 2017, accessed May 1, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2017/may/07/french-presidential-election-emmanuel-macron-marine-le-pen>.

in this survey question. In fact, until the recent German election in 2017, the AfD did not receive more than 5% of the popular vote⁹⁴.

The left leaning, inclusive movements of Spain and Greece are based in economic grievances as noted in the previous survey questions. The base of their populist frustration coupled with the trust levels, noted in Table 3, have created a different political climate for populism than those in the Northwest. In Spain, the level of trust for the EU is split, making Euroscepticism a less attractive angle for Podemos. While Greece has the highest level of distrust in the EU, both Greek citizens and their government do not want to leave the EU⁹⁵ because even in “best-case scenario” the effects would be stark⁹⁶. Therefore, populism in Spain must contend with the mixed level of trust for the EU, and Greece cannot take the Eurosceptic position like the Northwest due to the country’s economic position. The distance from Eurosceptic outlooks also distances from Spain and Greece from the xenophobia that can underlie Euroscepticism⁹⁷.

Populist Party Homepage Content Analysis

As previously mentioned, the degree of inclusion/exclusion in given populist movement can be explained by the regionally unique political attitudes stemming from the legacy of Occidental inclusion and exclusion. Survey respondents illustrated that Spain and Greece’s main concerns are economic-based and that those of the UK, France, and Germany are centered on immigration and terrorism. In this section, the conclusions of my survey analysis are

⁹⁴ Seán Clarke, “German Elections 2017: Full Results,” *The Guardian*, September 25, 2017, accessed April 30, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2017/sep/24/german-elections-2017-latest-results-live-merkel-bundestag-afd>.

⁹⁵ Richard Galpin, “Nervous Greeks Worry Brexit May Lead to Grexit,” *BBC News*, June 26, 2016, , accessed April 30, 2018, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36629145>.

⁹⁶ Ernst & Young Global Limited, *Economic Consequences of a Grexit* (London: Ernst & Young Global Limited, 2015).

⁹⁷ Carlo Ruzza, “Populism and Euroscepticism: Towards Uncivil Society?” *Policy and Society* 28, no. 1 (2009): 88.

strengthened by dissecting the rhetorical patterns of dominant populist parties in these countries. I show how the conclusions of my survey analysis are mirrored in an analysis of the predominate populist parties rhetorical patterns.

In order to conduct the analysis of whether the national populist parties in fact catered to the attitudes exhibited in my survey analysis, I examined the homepages of the most prominent populist parties' webpages in the UK, France, Germany, Spain, and Greece: the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), National Front, the Alternative for Germany (AfD), Podemos, and SYRIZA, respectively⁹⁸. Using a content analysis of the websites for these populist political parties, I demonstrate that these parties do indeed refract the political attitudes accentuated in the survey analysis, which ultimately stem from Occidentalism's legacy and serve to explain the varying degrees of inclusion and exclusion between populist parties.

Table 4: Coding Key and Frequency

	UK/ UKIP	France/ National Front	Germany/ AfD	Spain/ Podemos	Greece/ SYRIZA
<i>Immigration</i>	2	8	3	0	0
<i>Security</i>	0	0	2	0	1
<i>Border</i>	1	0	0	0	0
<i>Terrorism/terrorist</i>	1	1	0	1	0
<i>Islam</i>	0	2	1	0	0
<i>Refugee</i>	0	0	1	0	0
<i>Economic</i>	2	2	2	1	2
<i>Gender Equity/Women/Feminism</i>	4	1	0	2	6
<i>Multiculturalism/Multinationalism</i>	0	0	0	5	1
<i>Financial/Economic Elite</i>	0	0	0	5	0
<i>Corruption</i>	0	1	0	4	0
<i>Labor</i>	0	0	0	1	4

Table 4 depicts that immigration and xenophobic undertones dominate rhetoric on the website of UKIP, National Front and AfD. In stark contrast, economic related topics and gender equity are stressed by Podemos and SYRIZA webpages. Furthermore, when these terms are noted by the populist parties in the UK, France, and Germany, their contexts are quite different

⁹⁸ I used translate functions when analyzing websites that were not in English.

compared to how Spain and Greece utilize them. In order to unpack what these values elucidate, I will provide descriptions of the parties' websites to parse these coded terms.

It is worth noting that events that were unfolding in these countries during the timeframe may have influenced these results. However, though events in the moment may have influenced the frequency of the coded terms, the respective populist parties in these countries decided how to situate these in events in their discourses. Thereby, how these events are situated in context serves to provide insight into how these populist parties bend them to match the political attitudes of their base.

I focused on the EU specific webpage of UKIP⁹⁹ as that is where the party posts most of its content. UKIP's website homepage largely centers on immigration, economics and women's rights issues. However, in contextualizing the rhetoric on economics and gender they are stated in a manner different than those of Spain and Greece. Economic related content centers on the idea that the UK has economic strength rather than economic turmoil. The UKIP webpage cites this economic strength as the reason for leaving the EU which is portrayed as less economically endowed. Additionally, diction centered on women's rights and equity issues appear only in relation to the Middle East (Saudi Arabia) and immigration. The word women is used to state that "...traffickers of women and children taking advantage of EU open borders..." revealing that the word is being invoked in order to criticize EU immigration policy¹⁰⁰. The concern with immigration, the suggestion that the UK is economically superior, and commentary about women's rights particular to the Middle East evince the exclusionary aspects that define the UKIP.

⁹⁹ "UKIP MEPs," UK Independence Party in the European Parliament, accessed January 25, 2018, <https://web.archive.org/web/20180125053304/http://www.ukipmeps.org/>.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

The homepage for National Front¹⁰¹ largely focusses on immigration. Compared to the other coded terms, immigration appeared much more frequently. The webpage devotes two of its four pinned videos to immigration. All of the pinned articles pertaining to immigration portray immigration as an epidemic which is threatening France. These articles allude to a French birth rate which is lower than the rate of immigration, French residence applications which are dominated by asylum applicants, and France as “suffering” from continually increasing immigration. These statements suggest that France is in peril and “the French” are ceasing to exist.

Islam is referenced in two separate locales, the first in suggesting that Islamists that are held in prisons pose a danger to guards and next in a tab labeled “Radical Islam”. Content on economics and corruption are also found on the webpage, but are not given the same focus as immigration and Islam. Economics and corruption were mentioned less frequently and only given one article or tagline. The predominant concerns are indicative of xenophobic sentiments where immigrants and Islam are singled out as political concerns. This observation is further highlighted in the image of women holding a French flag, captioned “defend my flag” and another image of the French flag with text reading “proud of my flag” which suggest a nativist connotation. Together the overtures towards immigration, Islam, and French nativism highlight a high level of exclusion in the National Front and who specifically is excluded from “the people”.

¹⁰¹ “The Official Site for the National Front,” Front National, accessed January 21, 2018, <https://web.archive.org/web/20180121002043/http://www.frontnational.com/>.

In Germany, the website homepage of the AfD¹⁰² contained less coded terms than the National Front, but of the few that did appear they were evidentiary of xenophobic sentiments. Together, immigration, security, Islam, and refugee made up the bulk of coded words. The website lists five policy areas that are of particular concern for the AfD, three of which are devoted to the subjects: asylum and immigration, Islam and identity, and protection and security of citizens. These stated policy focus areas demonstrate who the AfD does not see as part of its party.

Two other areas related to the exclusion of immigrants and Muslims from the AfD's grouping of "the people". Chiefly, on the tab labelled immigration/asylum, there is a picture of a girl in a hijab writing the word asylum suggesting that immigration policy is coupled with Islam. Furthermore, immigration was connected to one of the two references to economics in a statement reading "...Economic gain through uncontrolled immigration is a fairy tale"¹⁰³. This declaration illustrates a rationale that immigrants undermine the economic position of Germany. The domination of immigration and allusions to Islam serve to reinforce who the AfD has excluded from their image of "the people", and thus its overall bend towards exclusionary political attitudes.

From the UKIP, National Front, and AfD, it is apparent that the same political attitudes stressed in the survey questions are shared by the dominant populist parties in the UK, France, and Germany. These positions exhibited by the Northwestern populist parties are symptomatic of the exclusionary legacy of Occidentalism in that the process of Orientalism made Northern Europe a distinct entity – politically, economically, and culturally¹⁰⁴. Any deviation from this

¹⁰² "Alternative Für Deutschland," Alternative Für Deutschland, accessed January 21, 2018, <https://web.archive.org/web/20180121211931/https://www.afd.de/>.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Dainotto, 379.

internalized positionality is seen as a threat. This is why the populist parties in the UK, France, and Germany engage in the practice of problematizing Islam as something to be feared and tied to security. Through Northern Europe's categorization of Islam as an Oriental-based other, it is quintessentially excluded from Northern Europe. Through associating immigrants with economic obligations, the Northwestern countries exhibit the view of immigrants as monetary burdens that threaten to undermine their economic positionality.

Spain and Greece have populist parties that are markedly different than their Northwest counterparts per their differences in salient rhetoric found on their website homepages. Table 4 displays that immigration and security are far outmatched by economic and equity-related rhetoric for Podemos and SYRIZA. The diminutive concern with immigration and security, coupled with concerns rooted in equity, led these populist parties toward high degrees of inclusivity. Additionally, the coded terms are not used in relation to immigration or xenophobia by Podemos and SYRIZA, but solely in regard to fairness.

The homepage for Podemos¹⁰⁵ is highly centered on economic grievances, multinationalism, and gender equality. It is quite clear that Podemos associates bankers and the EU with the blame for the economic woes. The homepage of Podemos has five different videos with the title "The Plot" but each with a different subheading reading "corruption", "the light", "precariousness", "benefits", and "housing". These five videos all have the same 30 second opening sequence of a younger, middle-aged man putting on a business suit while flashing to banks in the background. In each of these videos, economic related issues and sometimes corruption are highlighted.

¹⁰⁵ "Podemos," Podemos, accessed January 26, 2018, <https://web.archive.org/web/20180126013029/https://podemos.info/?lang=en>.

In one video, a young couples' piggy-bank is smashed by the banker and he takes the money. In a different video, the banker takes the light bulb from a couple's dinner. In the video titled "Precariousness", the banker is seen firing an employee while in the video titled "Benefits" the banker gives a man an empty envelop with the words "unemployment benefits" written on it. In the final video labeled "Housing", the banker is seen evicting an elderly couple from their home. In each of these videos, the banker is portrayed with a cold, unemotional demeanor as he does the tasks mentioned above. The videos all end with statistics about Spain's economy, workers, or the oligarchy that enable the banks. This portrayal of bankers shows who the enemy is for Spain's populist movement: the banks and government.

Podemos uses its homepage to make direct overtures towards inclusion. In the only two references in regard to women, they are both made to suggest that women do not earn as much as men and are pushed into certain jobs. Additionally, the webpage has cartoon slideshows and videos about what Podemos believes should be done with Catalonia. These cartoons read that Spain should be a "plurinational" state and goes as far to suggest that without a multinational Spain the country will cease to exist. Moreover, in the only reference to terrorism, there is not conflation or linkage to immigration or Islam. These observations all point to a high level of inclusivity and an enemy that is narrowly defined as the financial/political elite.

SYRIZA also has a website homepage¹⁰⁶ that is centered on economic concerns and women's equity. Labor is referenced most frequently among all the terms: once in the labor policy tab and another three times in labor related written articles or speech transcripts that are

¹⁰⁶ "SYRIZA," SYRIZA Coalition of the Radical Left, accessed January 17, 2018, <https://web.archive.org/web/20180117191005/https://www.syriza.gr/>.

posted on the website. Of the economic related terms, the frequency of the term labor suggests that (un)employment is a primary concern of SYRIZA.

The webpage also has many direct references to women's equity, feminism, the Me Too movement, and gender-based violence. There is a tab for "Feminist Policy", a pinned article about policy suggestions to combat violence against women, and pinned tweets about gender-based violence in university settings. The party also has a pinned tweet stating that the Me Too movement has largely neglected to fully include "black and brown women", suggesting that the movement needs to be more inclusive to be as effective as possible.

For SYRIZA, the homepage included nothing on terrorism, Islam, or immigration. Their webpage only had one tab for security too. The centrality of labor and gender equity coupled with the lack of immigration and security concerns suggest that the party has a high degree of inclusion. This can be further evidenced by the suggestion that the Me Too movement needs to do more to include women from nonwhite racial backgrounds.

The high degree of inclusion indicated by the webpages of Podemos and SYRIZA align with the results from the survey analysis and can be contextualized as stemming from political attitudes that are the result of Occidentalism's effect on political values of the Spain and Greece. These countries' political values seek to remedy their position with the EU and their relegation by the Northwestern states in Europe. This means that these parties hold the EU and Northwestern Europe accountable for their relegation and economic turmoil, not immigrants and internal cultural differences.

Ultimately, the websites of the UKIP, National Front, the AfD, Podemos, and SYRIZA demonstrate that the dominant populist parties are inculcated by the political attitudes accentuated in the survey questions. The concern with immigration and security for the UK,

France, and Greece have coalesced to form populist parties with high degrees of exclusion and a propensity towards xenophobia. On the other hand, the economic centered concerns of Spain and Greece created inclusive, left-leaning populist parties.

Data Analysis Conclusions

My data analysis highlights the divergence in who is identified as part of “the people” and “the enemy” through two prongs, public discourse and populist party rhetorical patterns. All of the populist movements that I explored in my data analysis demonstrate that the European Union and national governments are understood to be “the enemy”. However, Spain and Greece have populist parties with the propensity to construe an economic-based enemy. Contrarily, populists in the UK, France, and Germany situated the construction of “the enemy” within xenophobia through their rejection of immigrants and Islam as being a part of the inferred faction of “the people”.

The historical manifestation of the legacy of inclusion and exclusion, created within the European continent through Occidentalism, serves to explain why we see a divergence between countries in the Northwest and Spain and Greece. In other words, the nationally distinct degree of inclusion and exclusion of these aforementioned states into the European Union community created differences in national political attitudes. The concern for immigration, security, and Islam, derives from an Orientalized fear of the other and a desire to protect the position of the Northwest within the European status quo. The economic-based concerns of Spain and Greece are the result of being relegated into a position of economic inferiority by the Northwest through a historical process of Occidentalizing. These different, distinctive legacies of Occidentalism served to produce nationally unique political cultures that molded regionally specific political values and political attitudes. As my analysis demonstrated, the populist movements with higher

degrees of inclusion produced left-leaning populist parties and exclusionary populist movements brought right-leaning populist parties to fruition.

My survey analysis utilized attitude surveys conducted by the European Union Commission in the Eurobarometer. What respondents identified as the most important issue facing the EU or their national country were different. The most important issue for respondents changed depending on what aspect of their identity they were asked to consider (European versus national). When asked to consider a question that supposed European identity within the question, a higher degree of homogeneity was apparent in that the top three answers were amalgamated on three answers (immigration, terrorism, economic situation). But when asked to consider the same question in a national context, the top three responses were divided among nine different answers. This suggests that when respondents considered themselves Europeans they had more in common and considered themselves to be a part of the Occident locale. But when asked to consider their nationality, the internal division of Europe based on an internal Occidentalism were extenuated.

Though greater homogeneity was apparent in the survey question that asked respondents about issues facing Europe, dissimilarities still existed. The UK, France, and Greece all appear to have coupled the issues of immigration and terrorism as noted by their similar levels of concern for each. But, Greece is unique in that it was more concerned with the economic and financial issue more than any of the countries. Germany and Spain, however did not appear to couple the issues of immigration and terrorism as they had great variance between the two values. Nonetheless, Spain is concerned with terrorism more than immigration, and Germany is the opposite with immigration being a bigger concern than terrorism.

The importance of economic-related concerns in Greece, and Spain's lack of concern for immigration is evidence for how Occidentalism has shaped the concerns of these two countries differently than their Northwest counterparts who prioritize immigration. Spain and Greece are in a situation where the issue of terrorism is disassociated from immigration, and economic-related anxieties dominate populist fears. The cultural and political superiority complex of the Northwest created by Occidentalism has made these states weary of immigration and difference. These factors compounded to produce deferring degrees of inclusion to populists grouping of "the people".

The national contextualized survey question further elucidates the internalized effects of Occidentalism on political attitudes in these five countries. Nationally, the Northwestern countries identify terrorism and immigration to be a threat more than Spain and Greece do. The economic situation and unemployment are identified as the biggest concerns for Spain and Greece and far outmatch the same categorical values of the UK, France, and Germany. From the political attitudes displayed in these survey questions, it becomes evident that the political discourses in each of these countries are discrete. The differing responses to these questions reveal distinctive values based on political discourses which embrace distinguishing levels of inclusion and exclusion.

The results of my survey analysis were supported with a content analysis of the webpages of the foremost populist parties in the UK, France, Germany, Spain, and Greece that suggested a similar result. The rhetorical patterns in political expression found on these webpage aligned with the political value patterns and attitudes found to exist within the analyzed attitudinal surveys. The populist phraseology expressed by the leading populist parties in the UK, France, and Germany suggested a convergence upon issues related to immigration and security

manifesting into xenophobic undertones on the parties' webpages, while populist party rhetoric in Spain and Greece focuses on economic apprehensions.

Superficially, the frequency of the terms related to immigration and security were more numerous in the webpages of the UKIP, National Front, and AfD evidencing political rhetoric based in the idea of exclusion. While in the webpages for Podemos and SYRIZA, immigration and security were mentioned far less, and instead economics and equity dominated the political rhetoric. These numerical values for the frequency of terms related to immigration, security, economics, and equity are indicative of where the concerns are for these parties. These values are symptomatic of who is included in these populist parties' determination of "the people" and who is included in the creation of "the enemy".

Upon exploring the context in which these terms are situated within the webpages, it is further apparent that the political rhetoric espoused by these populist parties are in harmony with the populist anxieties expressed by the attitudinal survey questions. The webpages of the populist parties in Northwest Europe linked immigration with Islam and the supposed loss of national identity. Furthermore, when the UKIP, National Front, and the AfD did use rhetoric relating to economics or feminism, the terms were used to advocate for immigration control or to negatively portray Islam and the Middle East. The anxieties about immigration and Islam resulted in Northwestern Europe populist parties possessing a higher degree of exclusion from the category of "the people" to the extent that immigrants and Muslims became a part of "the enemy".

Podemos and SYRIZA frequently espoused political speech related to economics, gender equity, and multiculturalism, suggesting that these parties have high degrees of inclusivity in who "the people" are considered to be. Though the dominant populist parties in Spain and

Greece do not express explicit support for immigration, their political discourses implicitly signal that they do not perceive immigration and Islam as “the enemy” like the UKIP, National Front, and AfD do. The websites for Podemos and SYRIZA are strikingly absent of the nationalist and xenophobic rhetorical overtures made by the populist parties in Northwestern Europe.

The racialization of the Spanish and Greek by the North¹⁰⁷ serves to explain why the populist movements in these countries have not focused on xenophobia. Furthermore, the multinational composition of Spain and the salience of the Catalonia debate serve to encourage inclusivity. Spain and Greece are acutely aware of their perceived inferiority by Northwest and seek to remedy their subordination by reaching a higher economic status within the EU. This is why Podemos and SYRIZA possess a high degree of inclusivity – they blame the EU and its financial system for its troubles, not immigrants.

The analyzed attitudinal surveys and the homepages of the most prominent populist parties in the UK, France, Germany, Spain, and Greece provide examples of the compounding effects of Occidentalism within Europe. By untangling the term populism from the typical left-right political spectrum, and instead unpacking the criteria for inclusion and exclusion embedded in the political attitudes of populist movements and their manifestations into national populist parties’ rhetoric, we can better understand how populist movements orient themselves. This process of disentangling brings the catalyzing function played by Occidentalism in the construction processes of European national and cultural identity to the forefronts of our understanding of populism in Europe.

¹⁰⁷ Victor Satzewich, “Whiteness Limited: Racialization and the Social Construction of “peripheral Europeans,”” *Histoire Sociale* 33, no. 66 (2000): 277.

Afterthoughts

This thesis has been an attempt to understand populism as a contextually derived political phenomenon from a particular set of collective values and attitudes. A two-way relationship between society and populist leaders shapes expressions of populism. This way, populist movements are fashioned within specific contexts of the society in which they arise and are continuing to be contoured by interactions between the macro level and micro level of the movement.

The UK, France, Germany, Spain, and Greece, have illustrated that larger frames, such as mass immigration and neoliberal economic strategies influence populism. However, how a populist movement emerges and contends with these larger frames is country specific. For the UK, France, and Germany, populist frustration coalesced through channels that played on tropes of xenophobia and security anxieties. In Spain and Greece, the desire to remedy longstanding economic inequalities between them and the Northwest of Europe influenced populist grievances. The deferring manifestations of populist grievances within Europe stem from the legacy of Occidentalism. Through this, we see that hegemonic power structures and counter-hegemonic resistance constructs populist movements differently depending on where a country is at in this imbalance.

The populist parties and political figures that have emerged within Europe bear features that show the relationship between micro and macro, or the top and bottom of the movement. As revealed in my data analysis, value and attitude expressions are undercurrents within populist movements. The populist parties that I analyzed had rhetorical patterns that reflected the concerns that survey respondents communicated in the Eurobarometer attitudinal survey. These

results further strengthen the proposition that when scholars study populism, they must situate it within the national context in which it has arisen.

Furthermore, the relationship between the top and bottom of a populist movement has implications for how we should think about why populist movements emerge. The emergence of these populist movements was not an inevitable outcome of the legacy of Occidentalism within Europe. Instead, we should think of Occidentalism as something that created the circumstances for these varieties of populist movements to emerge. France's National Front and Marine Le Pen did not invent hostility towards immigrants, but they did use this hostility to appeal to voters and in doing so, took part in shaping the discourse on immigration. Similarly, SYRIZA did not bring economic equity into politics as a new entity because it had already been an issue for people in Greece.

Through this observation, it is notable that the values and attitudes shaped by Occidentalism influenced the populist parties and politicians and vice versa. For example, immigration and economic equity are discourses that populist politicians can draw upon, but when they do, they shape these discourses in new ways and apply them to different contexts or previous contexts differently. The mutual influence that the bottom of a populist movement shares with the top highlights the unique aspect of populism to draw upon popular discontents and shape them into a political force which then refracts these discontents into new avenues.

These observations are necessary when we consider what our response as a society should be to populism. Aslanidis notes that populism is likely to remain a force in democratic politics stating that, “the ability to translate the dull mobilization of single issues into broad and colorful struggles over identity... testifies to the increasing relevance of populist

mobilization”¹⁰⁸. With this observation in mind, it would be simplistic to think that populism will merely disappear by voting for politicians who are not populists. In fact, because of the relationship that the micro and macro level of populism share with each other, we see that the populist politicians in Europe are playing on concerns of voters to the same degree. We should think of populism as the manifestation of politic tribulations, and therefore, the embodiment of them.

In this manner, populism is a symptom of more significant problems rather than the problem itself. To dismiss populism as a political force is to dismiss anxieties that created populist movements. Populist political parties and grassroots populism can give rise to positive and negative outcomes for societies¹⁰⁹. Therefore, we think about how to respond to populism; we should remember that populism does not occur in isolated levels of society. Responses to populism must contend with the positive and negative aspects of populism and cannot be a one size fits all approach¹¹⁰. We should seek to understand the micro level of populism and better respond to the anxieties expressed in political attitudes.

¹⁰⁸ Aslanidis, 321.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, 317.

¹¹⁰ Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, “Populism and the Question of How to Respond to it,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2017), 489.

Appendix

What do you think are the two most important issues facing the EU at the moment?

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Median
<i>Immigration</i>	34.80	7.85	32
<i>Terrorism</i>	36	7.42	35
<i>Economic Situation</i>	21	6.67	20
<i>Member state finances</i>	18.80	6.38	18

What do you think are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment?

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Median
<i>Unemployment</i>	32.80	23.10	40
<i>Immigration</i>	20.40	12.05	18
<i>Health and Social Security</i>	14.60	8.79	11
<i>Rising Prices/Inflation/Cost of Living</i>	12	5.39	9
<i>Terrorism</i>	18.40	12.16	20
<i>Economic Situation</i>	21	17.22	13
<i>The Education System</i>	10.80	6.98	11
<i>The Environment, Climate and Energy Issues</i>	8.40	8.08	6
<i>Government Debt</i>	12.60	10.36	11

For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it: The European Union.

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Median
<i>Tend to Trust</i>	35.2	10.11	33
<i>Tend Not Trust</i>	55.6	12.34	56
<i>Don't Know</i>	9.2	3.63	11

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