

279, 14:14b) they have groundlessly taken lightly (輕重) their selection. Most of the tz'u-shih (prefects) are soldiers or men who have earned merit (in battle?)(wu-fu, hsün-jen 武夫勳人, or a capital official who is not able to perform his duties who is then sent out to the provinces. Among the (military officials) who are (折衝 :break through the enemies lines--courageous?) and bold (果毅) and who are talented and strong, they first are appointed as chung-lang-chiang (中郎將), and only second after that are they appointed to posts in the chou (pref.). ~~xxxx~~ the frontier, we treat these positions even more lightly. As for those people whose talents are fit for occupying the position of magistrate (tsai wei 宰官) and who can be selected for office on the basis of their virtuous behavior, we cannot obtain one out of ten of them. The reason why the people are not at ease (secure, under control, mian 未安), is really because of this (situation).

Wei Hsüan-t'ung

... In the time of emperor Kao-tsung (650-683), Wei Hsüan-t'ung (魏玄同) submitted a private memorial on the fact that the Ministry of Personnel in its selection of men for office (sōn'gō, hsüan-ch'ü) was not exhausting the right methods for obtaining the right men. The memorial said:

feudal times
 人 士
 有 無
 定 常
 主 君

280, 14:15a) "The various states (kingdoms) of the past are equivalent to the chün and hsien of today. The scholars (shih) did not have regular rulers (ch'ang-chün 士無常君) but the people had their fixed (designated) local chiefs rulers (ting-chu 定主). Each (of the district magistrates?) searched for his assistants on his own and each of them selected brave and worthy men. Only the ta-ch'en (taesin) (chief officials) ~~xxx~~ were appointed by the king's court, and that ~~xx~~ was all. (in Chou times?) When the Ch'in dynasty combined (all the states) of the world, they abolished the hou (marquises--feudalism) and established the shou (prefects). The Han dynasty followed this (system) sometimes continuing (an old system) and sometimes changing it (hyōn yuhyōk

有治(治)有革

). The chu-hou (feudal lords) were able to appoint their own subordinate officials who received stipends of 400 shih (sōk) or less, but with regard to their chief officials (ta-kuan) who were like prime minister (fu-hsiang 傅相), then the Han (court) appointed them.

280, 14:15a). In the chou and chün (pref. and commanderies), such(assistant officials as) the (掾吏) (督郵) and (從事), were all appointed by the mu-shou (牧守). Beginning with the Wei and the Chin dynasties (these posts) were taken over (reverted to) by the Ministry of Personnel (Li-pu), and this was continued in turn to the present time. ~~They~~ They searched for talented on the basis of the knife and the pen (by examining people in the use of the knife and pen), and they investigated behavior by using (looking into) the written ledgers (how well people handled ledgers or account books), and (because of this), the evils in the laws have long been (in existence) (this bad method has long been in use).

Generally speaking, the princely man of virtue (chün-tzu) favors (places weight on) conservatism (continuing in old ways: yin-hsün 因循) and abhors (憚: shies away from) ~~change~~ (k'ai-tso 改作) changing and creating (new things), but when ~~he~~ (you have a situation where something) has to be done, then one is obliged to ~~exercise~~ exercise the clarity of ~~his~~ independent? (solitary) foresight (tang un tok kyōn chi myōng 常運獨見) and determine affairs (ceremonies, rules, deportment? 儀) that are the most important thing that majestic, and/we are obliged ~~to~~ to ~~do~~ do at the present time is to carry out a change and reform in the current practices of the bureaus of personnel management (hsüan-ssu 選司). How is that (even though) the empire so great (in size) the the number of scholars and people are so numerous, and yet we entrust (the selection of officials) to the hands of only a few men? Even if they were as fair as a balance scale and as clear (in their understanding) as a mirror of water, still their strength (capacity) has its limits and their bright ness (intelligence) will reach ~~in~~ a blocking point (has its limits). How much worse is it when the men occupying this responsibility at times are not the right kind of people and are prone

14:15b)

to conform with the influence and profit (considerations of power and profit)? appointed Chou Mu-wang (king Mu of Chou) (周穆王) ~~was~~ Po? (伯也) to the post of t'ai-po-cheng (太僕正), saying: "Choose your subordinates

Wei & Chin took over
 app't of
 sub-mag
 assistants & clerks
 Han: 88
 Knife used to
 check mistakes
 hence 刀筆
 means handling
 of ledgers
 by clerks

伯也
 伯也
 伯也

280, 14:15b) with care. Even though the (post of) t'ai-p'u-cheng was a chung-ta-fu(中大夫 :middle rank official), still he entrusted him with the responsibility of selecting his own subordinates, so that this was also the case with the san-kung and chiu-ching (3 top officials and 9 ministers).

According to the chou-li, the t'ai-tsai(太宰) and nei-shih(內史) were both in charge of (granting) rank and salaries. (爵祿) and of appointing and dismissing officials (p'yech'i 廢置) especially and ssu-ma(司徒, 司馬) were separately in charge of recommending worthy men for office and of reporting them (to the throne, to their superiors)(chao-shih 詔事). One ought to divide up these responsibilities (for appointment) among several offices and command them by means of several offices (jobs, chih).

Each of them should search for their own small (officials, subordinates) while the king appoints the important ones. In the past, even in the worthless (inconsequential, ku-ku 區又) Sung dynasty, you still had the lament of P'ai Tzu-ya(裴子野) (note: see the Sōn'gō kosōl section (for more on him)(end note) How much more (is this the case) in the present time?

Furthermore, in undertaking government affairs and in occupying the position of an official, one cannot be without learning (hsüeh). To appointment people to office who have studied ancient (ways) and have them discuss (and determine) affairs is the system (that should be used). In ancient times even though there were many worthy men who continued (to come forth) down through the ages, the so-called chou-tzu(冑子 :eldest sons (Matthews), Han, II, 86 eldest legitimate sons of emperors down to the chief officials) had to be judged on their studies?

enroll at school (載諸學) and study the six rites in order to regulate their natures (hsing). (Han, II, 88, the six rites means the: 冠禮, 婚禮, 喪禮, 祭禮, 鄉禮, 相見禮).

They had to have a clear understanding of the seven teachings (ch'i-chiao Han, II, 88, education dealing with relations between father and son, elder and younger brother, husband and wife, ruler and subject, elder and younger, and friend and friend) in order to increase their virtue. They had to elevate

munbōl

280, 14:15b) their talents only after which they were sent ~~xxx~~ out to serve (as officials). But at the present time the sons and younger brothers of noble families and relatives (of the royal house) (kwich'ōk chaje 貴戚子弟) have as their foundation of support family connections (munbōl yu so 門閥有素). By means of their official rank and the protection privilege they themselves are high (they are highly regarded, they regard these things as important) (chaūm cha ko 資蔭自高), and they commonly seek office early (in life). They take the examinations lightly and they have given up their studies. This is goodly (really) to be deplored. In addition the merit officials and the three guards (hsün kuan, san-wei 勳官) and others who are irregular officials (liu-wai chih t'u 流外之徒) do not wait to be recommended (selected) (for posts in) the chou and hsien (local pref. and districts) but are chosen directly by means of the writing and comprehension (examinations) (ch'wi chi ê sō p'an 取之書判). I fear that this is not (in accordance with) the principle of placing virtuous behavior first (as the main criterion for selection) and talent and skill last (as the least important of criteria).

14:16a)

Recommend

This memorial was not accepted, and later on Wei Hsüan-t'ung submitted another memorial which said: "I have ~~xx~~ seen the royal decree (chih-shu 制書) and it orders (lets) every official of third rank recommend scholars (shih), and it allows officials down to the 9th rank also ~~x~~ to recommend people. This is the intention of the sage court for filling vacant places. It is only that if praise and blame (pōp'yōm 褒貶) are not strictly made clear, then ~~h~~ there will be no great distinctions between what is done well and what is in error, and because of this people at the top will not be concerned about dismissing (bad officials) and holding them responsible, and those at the bottom will not conduct thorough ~~investigations~~ searches (for men of talent) and people will be lax in complying with the order (to find men for office) and will not be careful in their recommendations. Furthermore, only a worthy man can know (another) worthy man (only worthy men can judge or distinguish who else is a worthy man). Even though the ranks of (two) people

階秩

280, 14:16a) may be the same, their human talents were of different grade. If a man, moreover advances in office to an excessive degree (beyond what he as an individual is qualified for), then how would his intelligence be up to knowing (the quality of) other men? If at the present time we want to strive to obtain truly talented men, we first ought to select a man to be in charge of recommendation (chü-chu ^{舉主}). The reason why a stream runs clear is because it is pure at the source, and the reason why a shadow is square and straight is because the original object is square and straight.

(流清以源潔, 影端由表正)

If you are not detailed (careful) (in determining) the actions and abilities of the man in charge of recommending people for office (chü-chu) and yet hold him responsible ~~for~~ if he recommends people who are commonplace or excessively (bad), then it cannot be done. (You cannot hold somebody responsible for recommending bad people if you don't make sure that he is an able man himself.)

--. Emperor Kao-tsung once lined up his court attendants and charged them

with not advancing (recommending) good and worthy men (for office). The prime minister (tsai-shunhsiang), Li An-chi (李安期) stepped forward and said: There were not sage emperors and bright kings who did not work hard at seeking worthy men and employing them. Moreover, in a town of ten households, there has to be some men who are loyal and trustworthy.

14:16b)

How much more (people must there be who are loyal and trustworthy) in an empire so broad. How could we not have courageous and accomplished men?

It is only that in recent times when a high official recommends someone and bring him in (to the government), the person immediately meets with clamor and criticism (hsiao-pang ^{讟謗}) that he is creating a clique (faction: p'eng-tang). The people who are ruined and wrongfully injured by this cannot redress (their grievance: explain the situation), while those in office (who have made the recommendations) ~~are~~ are damaged (injured). This is the reason why people think of shirking (their duty to recommend people) and compete with one another to remain silent. If the emperor (is honest? ^{唐已})

*Criticism
factionalism*

280, 14:16b) and summons (scholars?) and strives to search out (men of talent) without distinguishing between friends and enemies, but only appoints to office those who are able, ~~xi~~ and does not accept slander, who would not be as sincere as possible. ~~xi~~ Everything depends on the emperor; its' not something that the officials can control." The emperor profoundly agreed with this.

Liu Hsiang-tao

-In the time of Kao-tsung (650-84), Liu Hsiang-Tao (劉祥道) submitted a memorial on the evils of the recommendation (selection of officials--sōn'gō) system. He also memorialized, saying: "T'ang Yu (Emperor Yu) conducted a review ~~of the~~ of the records (of officials) every three years, and after three such reviews (san-kao), he either dismissed ~~the~~ the ignorant or promoted the bright (intelligent). In the two Han dynasties people who were appointed to office also held their posts for a long time. This is the reason why people ~~have~~ had clan names (shih 氏) on the basis of their official posts and why ~~there~~ there were surnames such as "granary" and (sou? superintendent of education? 庾). Since the Wei and Chin dynasties there is nothing worth recording (about that period).

At the present time, those people in posts are subject to four reviews of their performance (ssu-kao--four year terms with a review after every year?) after which they are transferred (to a different post). Since the officials know that when their term is up they will be transferred (how can they help but be anxious about being forced out of office?), and when the people see the officials being transferred (so frequently), they must feel that they can treat them without respect (pi hui ku-ch'a 必懷苟且). There is no way to expect that you can put men, who are going to be dismissed (shortly), in charge of people who have no respect for them, and ~~expect~~ hold (those

frequent transfer

officials) responsible for improving and changing customs and mores. I request that the four reviews of performance (ssu-kao) be conducted and in accordance with the law (method) for selection (of officials) that officials be given

raises in rank while ~~remain~~ at their posts, and only after 8 reviews (pa-kao--8 years in office) should permission be given for the selection (of a replacement?) *that man for a different post?*

8 yrs.

281, 14:17a) Even though one cannot dare to hope that everybody will revert to purity and simplicity (in their behavior), nevertheless in terms of sending off old officials and greeting new ones, it truly will reduce the toil and concern involved. (with too frequent g transfers)."

Fu Hui-shen

--. In the ^{lung}Shen-~~king~~ period of Emperor Chung-tsung--first emperor after Empress Wu, 705-707), Lu Hui-shen (盧懷慎) (Han, II, 89, pure and honest man who attained post of PM) submitted a memorial which said:

"I hear that Confucius said: 'After a state has been governed for a 100 years, you can overcome ~~κ~~ (the use of) cruel (punishments) and do away with the death penalty.' (為邦百年可以勝殘去殺). He

also said, 'If someone appoints men (to office), for one year (month?), it will all right, but if for three years, then ~~κ~~ I can get something accomplished.' (苟有用我者期月而已三年有成)'

long-term

Therefore the Book of Hisory (shu) says: They reviewed their performance after three years and compared (judged) their merits. ^{κCh'eng Tzu-san}Tzu-san (子產) was a worthy man (Han, II, 89, worthy prime minister of the state of Ch'eng during the ^{but he} Spring and Autumn period), ~~κ~~ was in charge of government for several years (before) achieving (moral) ~~κ~~ the transformation (of his country). (Despite the fact that

he was a worthy man, it took him a number of years~~x~~ to educate (transform) his people). How much (more time would it take) for a man of ordinary talents?

In my opinion in recent years the officials and their assistants in the chou and hsien (pref. and districts) dismount from their carriages and begin to take charge of government affairs, and at the most (they are on the job) one or two years, and at the least, three or five months before they are suddenly transferred or removed. There is no talk of reviewing their (performance).

transfer

If perhaps several times (for them to be transferred) pass by and they are not transferred, then people immediately cock their ears and listen (for the other shoe to fall?), and they plan to move their feet (jump?) and look around and compete for a change to advance. They do not give a thought to being honest and having a sense of shame. Also what time to they have for improving mores and customs and spreading education? (enlightenment) or

term too short!

281, 14:17b) post of shih-lang (侍郎) in the San-sheng (三省), that they were to select someone who had held the post of tz'u-shih (刺史), and that if there was a vacancy in the post of lang-kuan (郎官), they were to select someone who had held the post of hsien-ling (district magistrate). they should select

It was also decreed that ~~in xxxxxxxxx~~ capital officials ~~xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx (xxxxxx)~~ who had ~~xx~~ ~~xxxxx~~ of talent and knowledge, ~~that xxx appointing xxx to xxx xxx xxx~~ and appoint them to the posts of tu-tu (都督) and tz'u-shih (刺史). And that they 14:18a) should take tu-tu and tz'u-shih who had experience in government office and appoint them capital officials. That they should see to it that in their going out and coming in (sending officials out to the provinces? and bringing them to the capital from the provinces?), they should always be equal (and fair), and that these should become standard regulations permanently (forever). This was based on the recommendation of Chang Chiu-ling (張九齡).

At the time Chang Chiu-ling was the tso-shih-i (左拾遺), and he submitted a memorial which said: "With regard to the masses of the people, there is not one of them who does not depend for his life (livelihood) on the district magistrate (hsien-ling) nor x dwell (depend on) the prefect (tz'u-shih) for his livelihood. These are (the officials) who are closest to the people. In appointing those who are close to the people, we ought to obtain worthy and talented men, and in the method by which we appoint people to office, we ought to take selection (the selection of them) seriously, but at the present time many of the prefects and district magistrates are not men of talent. Among the capital officials, those who have served in the prefectures and districts (chou-hsien) have done so either because they had some personal connections (yōnsin yu ~~xxxx~~ 緣身有累) or have ~~had~~ achieved nothing outstanding while in office. The regard the appointment to the post of magistrate (x mu-shou 收守) as being kicked out (of the capital, ch'ih-ch'u? 任逐之地). Or when you get to the military officials (wu-fu 武夫) or irregular officials (liu-wai 流外) (who are appointed local magistrates), they (use it as an opportunity) to accumulate rank and gain time in office (grade).

Left
app 4 to district mag.
= exile

281, 14:18a) You cannot (expect) to have the empire in harmony (well-governed peace ~~and~~) if you fail to take into consideration the talents (of men, hwahap 和洽) in this way. In ancient times the tz'u-shih (prefects) were

brought in (to the capital) to be san-kung (high ~~is~~ ministers), and the lang-kuan 郎官: subordinate bureau officials) were sent out (to the provinces) to be magistrates (officials) over 100 li's worth of territory (tsai pai-li 宰百里)

In my view it is strange that recent customs have ~~become~~ become as ~~deflected~~ deflected and lightly (regarded) as this (p'yōngyōng 偏輕). At the present time at court, the officials and scholars only come in (to the capital) and do not go out (to the provinces as magistrates), and this is because in their private considerations (planning), they regard this as beneficial to themselves.

The capital has become a place where the capped and gowned (officials, scholars) ~~fast~~ gather together, a place from which ~~the~~ reputation and name emerges

14:18b)

(is obtained). They just follow (the lead of others) and attach themselves (to others) and without even trying they succeed (in making their official careers). It is different (strange) for someone to leave for the outer frontiers, and for this reason it is greatly profitable for them to stay in the capital and not be in the outer (provinces). ^{provincial posts} The best thing is

to make the posts of prefect and district magistrate (tz'u-shih, hsien-ling) important. If someone has not held the posts of tu-tu or tz'u-shih, then

even though he has passed a high level examination (kao-ti 高第), he should be able to be appointed to the post of shih-lang or minister (lieh-ching 列卿).

And if a man has not held the post of hsien-ling (district mag.), then even though he is good at governing, he should not be appointed to the post of tai-lang

(臺郎) or chi-she (執事). Even though a man holds a post of tu-tu or shou-ling (守令) in a distant place, then also with regard to either

sending him out to the provinces or calling him into the capital, he should ~~not~~ be appointed to a capital post ^{before} ~~until~~ (he has spent) ten years (in a provincial post), or he should ~~not~~ be sent out into the provinces ^{before} ~~until~~ he has spent

~~in~~ 10 years (in a capital post).

281, 14:18b) If we do not do this and rectify our ~~errors~~ mistakes so that (these errors) become established as standard customs, then because of the fact that people planning for their own benefit (will become prevalent), we will not be able to govern the empire.

In addition, in ancient times, the way they selected and employed good and worthy men was either by choosing those who had fulfilled their responsibilities (ch'ing-chih 稱職) or by summoning (to court) those who lived far off but whose reputations had been heard of, or appointing people that they had taken a look at, and this was the reason why scholars (shih) cultivated their basic (pure) behavior and had ~~not~~ plans that good fortune would strike them (they would fall luckily into a post). At the present time the empire is not well governed, but affairs are piling up by the day, and truly it is because we are not rectifying the root of things but are only working on the branches (inconsequential matters). What I mean by the branches (minor items) is that the regulations of the Ministry of Personnel gives rise to the movement of over thousands of (requirements)(paperwork).
clerks
The ~~officials~~ who wield knife and pen have to take care of the smallest of matters and regulate things which are scattered and in confusion; they are sunk (mired) in words and ink (paperwork). In my opinion, ledgers and

*bureaucracy too complex
clerks in charge*

282, 14:19a) record books are only for recording what people have laid aside and forgotten, and that is all. But at the present time, on the contrary, we are busy searching in detail through the ledgers and are not regarded the matter of finding human talent as urgent. Indeed, how is this different from dropping your sword in the middle of a stream and then carving a notch on your boat to record (where you lost it?) while you continue to (float) even further past it? This is truly enough to injure the mind. (cause concern).

Generally speaking, when you call (praise?) an able man in the Ministry of Personnel, then you say that (he proceeded?) from (the post of?) hsien-wei (縣尉) and was given (the post of?) chu-fu (主簿), and from (the

282, 14:19a) post of chu-fu, he was given (the post of) hsien-ch'eng (県丞). This is how the bureau of personnel selection is aware of (the necessity) for writing (letters, literacy) and is good at understanding the proper order (degree, of advancement) of officials. It is only that in basing (a decision?) on whether (a man) is suitable or unsuitable (for a post), in many cases no mention is made of whether the man is worthy or worthless. How then would they not err (in their appointments)? If the emperor does not regard the shang-shu and shih-lang (侍郎) of the Li-pu (Ministry of Personnel) as worthy men, they he definitely should not appoint them to these posts, but if he has appointed worthy men (to these posts), then how would they not be able to who were talented (good) men? Because it is difficult to judge human talent even from ancient times they were careful (about selecting men for office), and of 10 men selected, they (only) took five. If this is a way (method) that can be adopted, then at the present time allocate the fact that we appoint men to office on the basis of rank and consider that they are naturally able, then from the beginning we are lacking in the (true) intention of having officials select men of talent. This thus causes criticism that at times we divide official posts equally among people and that in fact the official bureaus are not able to obtain men of talent (for office). In my opinion, the problem with the personnel ministry lies in the fact that we have not changed the laws. Changing the laws is extremely easy. It depends on the emperor broadly carrying it out, and that is all."

(note: Chang Chiu-ling also said: "If we were to carry out a refined (thorough) investigation of the men (who are to be appointed to the posts of) tz'u-shih and hsien-ling (prefect and magistrate), then every year those people who suited for selection within the territorial jurisdiction ought to be reviewed (kao, examined) as to their talents and behavior, and only after that should (they, their names) be sent to the tai (臺) :censurate? (Han, II, 93, glosses ~~zhix~~ tai with shang-shu), and the tai should also/evaluate the merits or demerits of the chou or hsien on the basis of how many (men in them) can be

writing

vs. -
appoint
based
on
rank

✓ 14:19b

県丞

尚書

侍郎

臺

(1)

282, 14:19b). (If it ~~done~~ is done like this then,) ~~nothing~~ If you are cautious in ~~select~~ whom you select for the hsien-ling, then you are sure to select a man of talent, (2) If the Ministry of Personnel (bases its decisions) on accomplishment (talent), there will not be many (people it selects) who are common in talent or dare (to make errors, violations). At the present time the people (that the ministry) selects every year operate by concocting a myriad number of plans, but the granaries and treasuries of the capital have been emptied (because of it, of them). They dare (to commit transgressions) and exceed (what is their place, their due) as much as this, and yet they want to continue in the old ways and carry out the government (of the state) without changing the system, so that it only leads to an increase (in the number of) laws, bother and confusion, and the confusion and mixing together of worthy with ignorant men, and that is all. Furthermore, by examining them (the ones who are selected) on the basis of poetry or p'an (判 *comprehension* :essays?) as means of determining whether their talents are good or not causes us to abandon (leave out) worthy men and men of princely virtue (chün-tzu) (from the selection process. This is ~~a~~ a mistake in government in an enlightened age and it ~~is~~ what any man of knowledge would deplore. Moreover, even though the empire is wide and the court is full (of people), it is still possible to distinguish who the scholars are who are bright and worthy (outstanding), but if we allow calumny and praise to be mixed together in confusion (便與譽相 *乱*) and we are not clear in what we should listen to and accept, there is nothing worth discussing further (about it). If we know who the worthy and able men are but we fail to ~~appoint~~ appoint them to office in the (proper) order, then ~~who~~ how would we (be able to) appoint a man prime minister (who should be prime minister? (高用彼相 ?)). At the present time whenever there is a vacancy in an official post, we might promote somebody from a lower rank. For this reason from time to time people say that we have neither outstanding men nor stupid men, that all we are interested in is whether we can get somebody or not (any warm body). Naturally, pure discussion (ch'ing-i) (true criticism) does not stand up (~~cannot~~ cannot be established), and people's reputations and

印設

高用彼相

comprehension :essays?

便與譽相 乱

282, 14:19a) ~~xxxxxx~~ proper conduct (chōl) are not cultivated. Good scholars

(in the meanwhile) preserve their wills (keep their minds in proper cultivated and wait for spirit) ~~xxxxxx~~ the opportunity (for being appointed to office--hou-shih while

~~and~~ mediocre men actively pursue obtaining office and change their behavior

(yōkcho ^{易操}). If the court appoints people to office on the basis of good

reputations, the sons of the scholars will also (indeed) ~~xxxxxx~~

& regard self-cultivation as a profitable thing, and wherever profit comes

out (wherever the path to profit lays), there many people will move to it,

and that is all. If reputation and profit (ming-li ^{名利}) do not come out

from (arise from) the purification and cultivation (of oneself, of one's

virtue), then most people will revert to insa (^{人事} :trying to buy influence by giving and receiving gifts; personal connections and influence). At the least,

this will result in a desultory search and appointment & (of men to office),

and if there is one (more degree of) change (for the worse), it will result

in fawning on people and private (considerations, influence holding sway in

personnel decisions), And at the worst (greatest) ~~xxxxxx~~ (partisanship

based on personal feelings? pun'üi ^{分義} :Han, II,94 glosses this with^

chōngbun üiri ^{人情義理}) will be permitted, and if there are two

(more) changes (to something worse), it will result in the formation of cliques

(p'eng-tang). And this is all because education and enlightenemnt (kyohwa)

has become ~~xxxxxx~~ gradually soaked (water-logged). Therefore, when people

are appointed to office, we cannot help but investigate (them) to distinguish

between the worthy and the stupid. We cannot err in the search for scholars; ~~we~~

~~must~~ (if we do so) scholars will have to carve (good principles?) into their

minds and maintain good g thoughts, and the administration of punishments

(punishment and government) will clear up by itself. This is a most important

matter upon which the rise or ~~fall~~ fall (of the state depends). How can we

not maintain watch (over this)?"

→ 14:20a) --. In the 13th year of the k'ai-yüan year period (725, Hsüan-tsung),

Emperor Hsüan-tsung because the Ministry of Personnel was not administering its

PROFIT MOTIVE AS A MEANS OF INDUCING SELF-CULTIVATION

置十銓賦

282, 14:20a) personnel selection examinations fairly (pu kung), he ^{appointed} ~~dismissed~~ ^胡 ~~man~~ ^山 (separately) to conduct ^官 ~~officials~~ ^判. (note: The Li-pu shang-shu, Ts'ai ? and the Yü-shih chung-ch'eng (御史中丞) Yu Wen-? (宇文弼) and others, 10 men altogether, were in charge of administering the p'an^判 examination. When they were about to finish they were summoned to the inner palace to make a decision, but the Li-pu shang-shu and the shih-lang all were not able to participate. The memorial (p'iao ^表) of Wu K'o^{吳兢} said that the emperor had mistakenly accepted words of slander and did not trust his officials, and this was not the way (for a monarch) to sit on the throne and govern the people, spread sincerity and sway the people to compliance. In the past in the Wei dynasty, Ming-ti once suddenly went to the Shang-shu-sheng, and the shang-shu-ling, Ch'en ? (陳旉) got down on his knees and asked the emperor, "Where is your majesty going?" The emperor replied, "I want to inspect the books of the the sheng's affairs." Ch'en replied: "This is the responsibility of the officials; it is not what the emperor ought to approach (do). If I have not met my responsibilities, then dismiss me from office. The emperor was abashed and returned (to the palace). Ch'en P'ing (陳平) and Ping Chih? (丙吉) were prime ministers (tsai-hsiang) under the Han dynasty, but still they did not reply (to the throne) on the amount of cash and grain and they did not ask about the people who had died by the wayside. Therefore, since ancient times, from the son of Heaven down to the ministers and scholars, each of them keeps to his own job, and does not suddenly invade (the jurisdiction of another) or overstep (his bounds). How much more so in the case of our ruler of 10,000 chariots; how could he be able to go down and conduct ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ (investigate) matters pertaining to the selection examinations on writing and judgement (shu-p'an ^{書判})? (end note)

And the next year (the emperor) resorted the old system (of the Ministry of Personnel).

--. In the 18th year of the k'ai-yüan year period (730), P'ei Kuang-ting (裴光庭) was appointed Li-pu shang-shu. He drew up a set of qualifications

282, 14:20a) for office based on rank. The worthy and the ignorant were all treated alike (as one string); they had to meet the qualifications before they could be selected and appointed to office. Time limits were set (for serving in a grade) and moving up (to the next) grade, and one could not skip grades. Those who had been stagnating for a long period of time (in one place) and who could not get (promoted) all thought this was good and called (system) this/a sage proposal. (note: Prior to this, the Hsüan-ssu chu-kuan (選司注官) even though he conducted the p'an (判) examination (judgment, comprehension test?) in order to determine a person's official rank, in general he just took a look to see if the man was able or not, and for that reason sometimes people were promoted out of order, or old people might occupy low positions, and there were examination passers (ch'ulsin 出身) who had not been able to obtain (an official) salary for over 20 years. P'ei Kuang-ting then proposed the establishment of qualification by rank (hsün tzu-k'o 循資格), and (as a result) some abandoned (dismissed) officials were selected and brought in (gathered into the govt). Few high officials were selected while many low officials were selected. They didn't ask whether they were able or not. If they just fulfilled (the requirements) of rank, they were recommended (for office). If a person had not been impeached, he was promoted and was never demoted, and all the stupid and common types were happy, while the outstanding men of talent were disconsolate.)(end note)

14:20b)

Sung Ching (宋璟) fought against this, but he could not win (his fight). And after this an edict was issued that if there happened to be any exceptional men of high talent or virtuous behavior, they were to be chosen for office without respecting the order (of their rank). But despite this edict, there were no such cases, and the officials in charge only did what was convenient for themselves and only maintained the letter of the law and upheld the regulations and followed the regulations for (appointing people exclusively on the basis of) their rank, and that was all. (note: When P'ei Kuang-ting died, the ta-ts'ang po-shih (大常博士), Sun Wan (孫琬)

offered the opinion that

282, 14:20b) offered the opinion that P'ei Kuang-ting's system of appointing people to office on the basis of rank (only) ~~was the wrong way to encourage~~ ~~and~~ people (to the proper behavior), and he requested that P'ei g be given the posthumous title of k'o(克 :able?), but his son sued this and the posthumous name was changed.)(end note)

INDENTED SECTION (Pan'gye's comments): I note that (an) Tung Chung-shu (董仲舒) of the Han dynasty said that what was regarded as meritorious in ancient times was to establish (distinguish between) ranks (ch'a 差) on the basis of (the ability to) entrust responsibilities to officials meet official responsibilities and fulfill one's duties (imgwan ch'ingjik 任官稱職). They did not regard accumulating long periods of time (in office as ~~worthy~~ worthy, as the basis for granting rank). Thus, talk of time ~~of~~ of labor & (service) (time in grade: yōllo 年勞) already existed ~~by~~ by the Han dynasty, but they never regarded this as the method for appointing people to office. Later on, Ts'ai Liang (崔亮) of the Later Wei dynasty and P'ei Kuang-ting of the T'ang dynasty were the first one's to establish a law using this as the exclusive means (of granting ~~rank~~ office). They merely consulted the official registers to see who came first and who last in terms of the ~~number~~ amount of time served (in office) and on the basis of this carried out ~~what~~ was called "the selection and evaluation of men (chōllyang inmul-cha 衡量人物), but it was only an empty name (instead of a real system), and that was all. Former Confucians said that men of worth and talent lay low at the bottom because the system of qualification by rank (chagyōk 資格) ~~blocked~~ blocked them (from office, from advancement). The reason why the performance of official duties was neglected (abandoned) at the top was because the system of rank qualification (chagyōk) ~~is~~ governed (who was selected). The reason why the scholars were

283, 14:21a) lacking in honesty and a sense of shame was because they ~~competed~~ fought for rank (chagyōk), and the reason why the people suffered under a tyrannical government and cruel laws was because there were large numbers of men (officials) who had qualified for their posts on the basis of rank (alone). And the

283, 14:21a) reason why all affairs had been rounded off and were handled badly (were full of evils), and the reason why the clerks were lax and dissolute, and the reason why the laws and institutions were ruined and destroyed and * could not be saved were all because of the mistake (made) about (appointing men to office on the basis only of) rank (chagyōk)"

How true, & these words are!

--. Liu CHih (劉秩) in discussing (this situation) said: Among officials there are the great and the small, and with regard to talent, there are those who are short (deficient) and those who are long (have a lot of it). You should appoint those with much talent to great official (important official posts), and those who are short on talent to small (unimportant) official posts.

If the job and the man both match each other, then both merit and work will be managed. This is why/Meng Kung-wei? (孟公綽) ~~was~~ made the Elder (lao) of Chao-Wei (趙魏老 (large states); he could not be (was too great a man to be) appointed ta-fu for ~~the~~ (small states of) T'i? and Hsüeh (魯薛).

With regard to the appointment of officials in recent times, they have been simple, and in the use of the officials, everything has been prepared. There is not one person & who does not attend to his official duties, so how could things be so mistaken? Because of this, the people ~~lose~~ lose their long (good) points and the officials have lost their (ability) to manage (things, conduct government). Under the system of the three dynasties of antiquity, a family had its hereditary occupation (shih-yeh 世業), and a state had its hereditary officials (shih-kuan 世官). Confucius said: "If (the skill) of medicine is not practiced for three generations, you shouldn't drink (the doctor's) medicine." Shih-mu? (史墨) said, "The people who acted as officials 14:21b) in ancient times maintained their occupations from one generation to the other, and morning and night they ~~gave~~ thought that ~~if~~ if they lost their occupations one day, then death would have arrived (it would be tantamount to death). This was because they knew that if an occupation is not practiced over the generations, then the work cannot be done with refinement skill.

a Tang official who attained the rank of刺史

Clon inheritance of occupation

283, 14:21b) This is why the Chou was able to obtain (talented) men (for office. (SEEMS TO BE A CONTRADICTION WITH EARLIER OPINIONS--HEREDITARY

OFFICE-HOLDING IS HERE SEEN AS A GOOD THING. MAYBE IT'S JUST THE EMPHASIS ON LONG-TERM OFFICE TENURE) In the past the I family and the Huo family (義, 和) were in charge of the land of the empire (t'ien-ti--heaven and earth), and the Liu family (劉) generation after generation used to train dragons (yu-lung 擾龍. The Chi (籍) family generation after generation were population in charge of people (ssu-jen 司人). The Yü family and the K'o family (庾, 庫氏) generation after generation were in charge of disbursements and receipts (the treasury). The Chih family (制氏) generation after generation (hereditarily) was in charge of casting (bronze) bells. These were their work. When it came to later generations, because hereditary ministers seized power to improve their own private gates (families) and thus lowered (held in contempt) the public interests (public, official houses) lord's (king's) house (kung-shih)), The (state of) Ch'i (齊) was seized by the Tien family (田氏). The (house of) the state of Lu (魯) was weaker than three families. (At the present time) we have eliminated the mistaken (institution) of hereditary ministers (shih-ching 世官), but we have not restored the (good) system of hereditary occupations (shih-yeh), thus medicine, artisanry, divination (筮) and mathematics (calculation) have gradually declined (become mor obscure, less well done), and in general it is because of this (the lack of hereditary occupation). Generally speaking when you want to weave cloth or ~~xxxx~~ carve a piece of wood, you don't ask someone nearby (who happens to live nearby) to do it; you have to look for a good, and this is because the weaving of silk and the varving of wood is not what people who happen to live nearby are able to do. Silk and wood ~~xx~~ are light (inferior) things, yet without a k skilled worker, they cannot be made. How much (is this the case) with the assistants of emperors or kings who have the responsibility of governing the state. How can we help but be careful in selecting the right (for k this)? Therefore in building a large house, you first select the carpenter, and only after that

yes

世官, PAD
BUT 世官
世官 GOOD

around left right artisan

283, 14:22a-b) How much worse is it when there are large numbers of people (to evaluate), and the eyes and ears (of the ministry of personnel officials) are ~~not~~ ~~not~~ sufficient for the task? It is not that their understanding is not bright or that their selections are not done with skill; it is the law that makes it this way. A cultured (wen) emperor would deplore this error and would want to correct it (eliminate it). Generally speaking, when a vessel fills up, it leans over, and when a law has long been in operation, in the end it leads to evil (it is corrupted). This is the reason why true kings saw change as the means to regulate the laws and why they would ~~not~~ take the times into account when establishing ~~their~~ government. In ~~con~~sidering the method of selection and appointment of officials in former ages, they all had (systems wherein) investigation and recommendation of people was done at the chou and fu (local pref.) levels, but after/years and generations, the errors and mistakes gradually got deeper, until the Ch'i and Sui dynasties, when there was no way to overcome the evils. And many of the people who were appointed to office (ch'i-shu 置署) did so via requests for favors (ch'ing-ch'a 請詔). For that reason those people who discussed the issue at that time felt that appointing people on the basis of private (feelings, interest) was not as good as people recommending themselves (officials doing their own recommendations? tsu-ch'u 自舉), and that the commission of excesses in the provinces was not as good as handling it in the capital. This was the reason why they abolished the authority of the chou and fu (local districts) (to make appointments, returned recommendations) and shifted that responsibility to the Ministry of Rites. This method that was used to rectify the situation at the time and to punish evils is not a perpetual statute for governing a state that cannot be cut (~~shan~~ eliminated). At the present time this law for the Ministry of Personnel has become contracted (wrinkled 蹙 :Han, II, 100 glosses this with--has run its limits), and we ought again to abolish it and change it. We cannot just follow it as it is and sit by and maintain an evil situation. In my humble opinion at the present time the selection of men has not yet become a settled

instit. reform
 justification for reform

請詔

shift from local to central selection

time for change

men who are selected for office

283, 14:22b) ~~xxxxxx~~ are not people who are permanently settled in (residents of) their villages (toch'ak ^{土著}), so there is no necessity for basing (the selection of people) on the villages and alleys (local residential districts). Not only is their? intelligence (understanding of people) not clear, but we also cannot exclusively rely on the Ministry of Personnel (alone, to make selections). If you look closely into the systems of ancient times and adjust them to the present circumstances (hsiang-tu ku-chih when any official ~~xxxxxx~~ are ch'e liang chin i 詳度古制, 折量今宜), then I would say that ~~xxxxxx~~ are of rank 5 and up and all the bureau chiefs ~~should be~~ promoted to the posts of chief minister (tsai-ch'en ^{宰臣}), then the Ministry of Personnel should participate in the discussion (of this). And with regard to officials of rank 6 or less or the subordinate officials (liao-tso ^{僚佐}), ~~the~~ ~~permitted to be hired and appointed as (magistrates of 2) xohu xia xfu~~, then ~~the responsibility for selecting them~~ the chou and fu (magistrates) should be permitted to hire and appoint them (on their own) (pi-yung ^{辟用}), and thus the responsibility for selection (of officials) will all be entrusted to the four quarters (of the empire), and the final decision will ~~xxxx~~ revert to the two ministries (of personnel and war). We must first select the district magistrates (mu-shou ^{牧守}), and only after that give them authority (to select and evaluate candidates for office). Those people with a high (record of achievement) should be appointed first, after which it will be memorialized to the throne for approval. As for those with a low record of accomplishment, they should be judged as idiots (wooden people ^{聽板}) and should not be appointed to office. If the selection of district magistrates or military commanders is not done fairly, then the Ministries of personnel and war should be able to participate and make recommendations. The sage king with his bright eyes and perfect hearing should listen and look far and wide and punish those who violate (the proper methods of selection) for private reasons and who are not careful in making recommendations. In minor cases, people can be reprimanded and dismissed from office, and in major cases they

adjusting ancient systems to present

折量今宜 詳度古制

split system in 2
top officials selected by center; low officials by locality

284, 14:23a) they can be punished. If responsibility is placed for achieving results in the appointment of people to office, who would dare not be diligent? If it is done like this, then those people who falsify appointments by grafting in the (wrong) names, those men who are lacking in talent and poor in their conduct, those who covet the property of others, who take bribes, who are lazy and weak, and who are deceitful, on the day that the edict is issued, will be dismissed from office as soon as the ^{sound} ~~tone~~ (of the edict being read) is heard. If you calculate in round numbers of that eight ~~of~~ or nine people out of 10 will be removed from office, then there will be plenty of official positions (to be filled). If the matter (recruitment) is done carefully and the officials are circumstpect (careful), then worthy men will come forward themselves without having to be encouraged, while the unworthy men will retreat themselves without having to be suppressed. If we eliminate the (temporary) authority (granted) by the Sui dynasty, and restore the beautiful system of ancient times, then we will be able to obtain all the talented men (for office) and the good fortune for the empire will be great."

almost
無為
in 14:23b

14:23b) →

Timothy: 18
p. 101
四大

(note: ^{Shen} Chen Chi-ch'i also said: In recent generations there are people who have lost rank and salary for a long time (the errors in the granting of rank and salary) have gone on for a long time. The error is to be found in none other than four great excesses (ssu-t'ai 四大), and that is all. If you ask what they are, then (the first is) that too many people have been allowed into ~~office~~ the gates of office (there are too many gates for admitting people into office). The families of the sons of the nobles (sejo chi ka 世貴之子) have been too superior (exalted, well treated) ~~and~~ ^E the salaries (of officials) have been too ~~large~~ generous. The orders to maintain surveillance over this have been too weak. I request that we investigate the ancient systems in order to clarify this. Kuan-tzu (管子) ^{benefits?} said: "If profit (li) comes out of a single hole (source?), then the state will have no enemies (noone who can stand up to it). If it comes out of two holes, the army will not crouch (bend) before anyone (誰). If it

1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9) 10) 11) 12) 13) 14) 15) 16) 17) 18) 19) 20) 21) 22) 23) 24) 25) 26) 27) 28) 29) 30) 31) 32) 33) 34) 35) 36) 37) 38) 39) 40) 41) 42) 43) 44) 45) 46) 47) 48) 49) 50) 51) 52) 53) 54) 55) 56) 57) 58) 59) 60) 61) 62) 63) 64) 65) 66) 67) 68) 69) 70) 71) 72) 73) 74) 75) 76) 77) 78) 79) 80) 81) 82) 83) 84) 85) 86) 87) 88) 89) 90) 91) 92) 93) 94) 95) 96) 97) 98) 99) 100)

PM
of 1911

284, 14:23b)

comes out of three holes, than you will not be able because of this to raise an army (chü-ping, 舉兵). If it comes out of four holes, the state definitely will fall. Former kings knew that this was so they put a stop to (blocked off) being supported by other people (Han, II, 101, the practice of consuming the product of other people's labor), and they made narrower the route to profit (li), and they saw to it that the people would not be able to engage in idleness, and that everybody had an occupation. But in recent times there are tens and hundreds of holes (sources, places) from which salary and profit come out (emerge), and there are many people who have the mind to divide up into many branches (factions?) (人多歧心), and their minds flow and leak out and are lost and cannot be controlled.

Generally speaking, if the number of people who enter office are many, then those who engage in agriculture and artisanry (industry) are even fewer. If the number of those in agriculture and industry are small, then there are not enough goods (物). If there are not enough goods, then the state is impoverished.

And this is the reason why I say that the gates for allowing people into office are too many (t'ai-ta 太多). In the Li (禮), it says: "Even the first son of the Son of Heaven is a shih (士: ordinary scholar, student?) Since

there is nobody in the empire who is regarded as noble & from birth (t'ien-hsia wu hsieng erh kuei che 天下無生而貴者 even someone as exalted as the crown prince is in the same rank as the shih (scholar). Therefore, Wang Liang (王良) of the Han dynasty left his post as ta-ssu-tu (大司徒) and was buried at (蘭陵), and later on when Kuang-wu-ti (of the Later Han) arrived there on an imperial tour, he finally (for the first time) exempted his sons and grandsons living in the town from miscellaneous labor service.

The son of a prime minister (ch'eng-hsiang 丞相) was not able to get a reduction in his household taxes (hu-t'iao 戶調). But recently all of the families of the officials of the nine grades (ch'iu-p'in) (regular officials) are not required to pay taxes (or labor service) (pu-cheng 不征). And the sons and younger brothers of the exalted ones, who have the yin (protection)"

too many bureaucrats

pt. #2

Par

No Basis for status by birth

pt. #2

no tax reduction on son of P.M. 蔭

284, 14:23b) privilege, receive again (for a second time) the blessing and encouragement (of the state), and all of them live with a grave demeanor and order people around and just sit and eat. How can the common people endure this? And this is why I say that the families of the sons of the nobility (sejo chi ka 世貴之家) are too exalted (superior 優).

The reason why former kings managed scholars was in order to control goods. (hsien wang chih-shih so-i li-wu ye 先王制士所以理物也).

The reason why they established salaries (for officials) was so that these would take the place of (officials) having to cultivate the fields (themselves). The farmers, artisans, and merchants had ~~to~~ manage their work (take care of their work) and perform labor service while the scholars had to concern themselves with encouraging others to work and controlling them. Even though the ranks

of the scholars were regarded as valuable (noble 貴) because of their skill in planning? and their virtue in the way (feng-yu tao-i 因猷道義, in terms of their joys and difficulties and their advantages and disadvantages

(li-hai) they were not very far from (the situation) of the farmers, artisans, merchants and others. The shih (scholars) of later generations would play the music of the bell and the drum and erect ~~high~~ high pavilions and carry

their pleasures to extremes while the peasants and artisans were whipped on the back and buttocks ~~as~~ as their strength was used for labor, and (the shih) received (thus) their support (for their own) livelihoods.

14:24a) Obtaining an official post was like ascending a god (sōn 仙), while those who did not have office were like those submerged in a stream. The difference between the pleasure of the former and the difficulties of the latter were as distant from one another as heaven and earth.

Those who were at the top in their receiving support (from those below) were warmly treated (hu 厚), while those at the bottom in the levies and exactions made upon them, were heavily (burdened). If the support (feng-yang 奉養) (received by officials from the common people) is warm (厚 excessive), then it stimulates their desires, and if the levies and exactions (on the

vs. hereditary aristocracy!

F is ideal keep the bureaucrats close to the people

Keep close to people

then, in later times, become a separate class!

social gap

284, 14:24a) people) are heavy, then the people below do not have the wherewithal to live (make a living). For this reason disreputable types risk death in order to follow after those above them (the officials), and they concoct deceitful (methods) in order to enter (the ranks) of the officials (to become officials). They do this not only to seek profit (for themselves), but also to avoid injury. And this is why I say that the salaries and benefits (to the officials) are too liberal (~~too~~ t'ai-hu 太厚).

Item #2

According to a saying (yü 語: of old?), "If you do your best and still cannot do something, then stop." (ch'en-li chou-lieh pu-neng-che, chih 陳力就列不能者止). In the past, Li Ying (李膺) and Chou Chü (周舉) were tz'u-shih (prefects), and the shou-ling (守令: district magistrates) were fearful, and magistrates from more than 40 walled towns took account of the situation and turned in their seals and resigned. Why is it that they did not hold on to their salaries and enjoy prosperity?

For that ~~the~~ reason the Han dynasty laws were beyond compare (pu k'o lun 不可倫). From the time that the Sui dynasty changed the laws pertaining to the selection (of men for office), then even the stupidest of ~~women~~ men wriggled like insects, nonetheless if they were only able to take advantage of one thing or pass one examination, and get selected for a post, then ~~office~~ people were given office only on the basis of their rank. Officials who were travelling around had a retinue behind them bowing and scraping, and they received mounds of emoluments and salary, and after four years on duty, they were dismissed. Because they made connections (with powerful men: inyōn 因緣) and exploited the people (ch'im'ō 侵漁), then on the day when they were dismissed, their wives and families (children) were wearing luxurious clothes, and their servants and horses were fat, ~~and~~ and (but?) they "~~leaned~~ on their backs and looked up to" the sarim (forest of scholars). When the limit on their office was up, they were selected again (for another post); when their term was over, they started again, and if they made no major mistakes, until the time they died they never left office. According to one popular saying: "For a man

Item #3

problems began in Sui

mimicking (pretending to) die
284, 14:24a) to become an official is like dying; there has never been a
case of one who has finished (gone) and not come back again. Being an official
is as easy as this, the emoluments they enjoy being as plentiful as this,
and the laws being as magnanimous (liberal) as this, and the (opportunity to)
plunder (the people, make exactions) being as heavy as this, then who wouldn't
try to avoid (these kind s of) difficulties and go in the direction of what was
profitable (advantages) (li) to him? And this is why I said that the
orders making people responsible and to account were too thin.

Profit in
office-holding
沈

Ch'en Chi-ch'i. 陳旣節
In the past ~~the state of ch'i~~ considered that what should be done was
to lighten the salaries and benefits (profits--of the officials) and make heavier
the control over them and their ~~responsibility~~ responsibility (tokch'aek 督責), to make it so that even
untalented men who left their seats empty and put their seals of office down
by their side, and who bowed and yielded (to others) and were appointed to
office, they would not dare accept (the appointment--because the chance for
getting into trouble by not meeting their responsibilities would be too great
and they wouldn't have that much to gain from a low salary). And with regard
to the people, (he felt) the (state) should ease up (be magnanimous) on the
levying of misc. labor service and make them secure in the lands, and ensure that
the farmers, merchants, and artisans each took joy in their occupations. If
you cannot make the laws stricter and the labor service (tax) requirements
more liberal yet still want to use the laws to block the route to advancement
(into office) and prevent corrupt people (from becoming officials), this
would be tantamount to trying to block a stream with a pile of scattered earth;
the force(of the water) would definitely not be stopped."

Dee Pot...
Reaction on Exams.
P.269

summary on
T'ang S.Y.
Ssu-yin
check T'ang-shu
75

雜議

--.Miscellaneous Opinions (Discussion) On the Selection of Officials (sōn'gō chab'ūi)

Some might say that...
The capital/of the emperors and kings were of necessity grand and prosperous
(洪輿). "Wheels and spokes (came from the four quarters)" (They were the
hub of the universe: 輞輞). But only after
(sa-mul 土物) gathered there in great numbers, ~~only after which~~ could they be
called great.

14:24b
或曰
T.T. 18:
P.102

284, 14:24b) If authority (ch'üan 權) were scattered among the chün (commanderies) and kuo (kingdoms), then the people from distant areas would not come (to the capital), and the capital city would ~~be desolate~~ (索). What about that? (How could that be any good)?

To this I would reply: For several hundreds and thousands of years from ancient times to the Sui dynasty, the responsibility for the selection of officials (sōn'gō) was all (always) divided up among the chün and kuo. At the time of the ~~emperor~~ emperors Wen, Ching, and Wu (文景世帝) of the Han dynasty the capital came to be vastly populated (shu 庶) and rich. The hundred shops and nine markets (were so crowded that) the people could not turn around to look and the carts could not turn around. And the prosperity and extravagance was also said to have been extreme. How was it necessary (for the capital) to be aided by simply the (centralized) selection of scholars for office (sōn'gō) for things to get this way? People are (supposed to) have fixed places to reside without any extra (excess) people around. If there are too many people floating around (without anything to do), then there will be few who are settled down (on the land). Since the Sui dynasty abolished the method of provincial selection (wai-hsüan 外選) and summoned all the people of the empire (to the capital) and gathered them in the capital, in the spring they return and in the fall they ~~come~~ go (back and forth) with the season) like birds gathering or clouds coming together such that all the production of the area within the passes is offered as food ~~is~~ for the sustenance of people wandering (into the capital) from the four directions. For this reason the strength of the people was used up in transporting firewood and ~~food~~ grain and the wood and grain became as expensive as sandalwood and pearls. Because of this it was said that these people (the people summoned to the capital as officials?) ~~had made the capital~~ our Eastern capital/desolate. (If not them) then who ~~was~~ responsible for the desolation? (because of the above problem, one might say that failure to concentrate recruitment in the capital would lead to the desolation of the capital).

decentralization of selection until the Sui

there was already enough centralization for the need of selecting in the system

Sui dyn. abolished local selection

too many people seeking office waste of resources

284, 14:24b). Moreover, if authority is distributed to the choux and chiin and people are recommended for office from the place in which they live, then the people living in the four directions (in the provinces) will have no desire to go to distant places; they will just stay at home and regard their (studies?) occupations with respect, yet official salaries will still be provided of itself (naturally). Even if official salaries should not be provided, they still will never abandon their occupations (jobs)(duties, yehō). If the path to office is cut off in the provinces and is concentrated in the capital, then people will be sparing of their time (that they use for agriculture and their regular occupations?) and they will covet salaries., and who would be willing to stay secure (at home)? For sure they would sell off their land (膏田) and use up their family property (wealth) and use up their food and money on the road ~~(in the provinces)~~ travelling back and forth. This would make of them people who had forgotten their homelands and were wandering ~~out~~ around the country. If you compare the overcrowding of the capital (with useless people) with their being productive in the provinces, which is better? If you compare the prosperity of one capital with the prosperity of 10,000 kingdoms, which is better? How much more so in the case of a true king who ought to make his whole empire prosperous; how is this to be compared with having ~~crowded~~ crowded streets and shops (only in the capital)?

Some might say that the gates for recruitment to office have been opened for a long time, and those who have come in (been appointed to posts) have already become numerous. If we were to reform this law, then the old names (same old people) ~~would not be able to advance in the world, and it would cause people of ordinary talent to be appointed to office, but there would be no places in which to accomodate them; and when they left office (withdrew) there would be no places for them to practice (study). Where would these people go in the future?~~ 不足以致身

To this I would reply:

人繫賢愚

284, 14:24b) Human beings (jen: whether human beings are good for being officials or not) depends on whether they are outstanding (worthy) or stupid; the job (yeh) follows (depends upon) whether it is flourishing or in decline. If a worthy man has been obtained to fill (as low a post as) granary clerk, then the worthless ones among the scholars (shih) would rather (more likely) be afraid to appear among the ranks of the scholars. It has been this way since ancient times; it is not just in one generation (that this has been true). Therefore, the tradition (chüan? Tso-chüan?) says: (Han, II, 106, gbooses hou with kings)

業隨業音

p.285

285, 14:25a) "The surnames of the three queens are at present commoners."

庶

At the present time (the number of the) saryu (士類: scholars) has become wide (broad, numerous) and we cannot abolish them by force; all we can do is to lock the old gates (which allowed people into the official class) and not allow new people in, keep the route to office steep (strict) and not allow excessive numbers of people to be appointed. Within about a dozen years no new people will come (be taken in), and the old ones will be used up (eaten up; will retire). We will wait for the number of people to become small, only after which will the number of officials be reduced. In general each man has an excess of (plenty of) his own talents (particular talents), but because people are always immersed in (fallen into) their feelings and desires, you have to keep things strict and always (get people) to use their talents to the utmost. If you draw them (out?), then (their talents become?) long (good); if you (cause them?) to propper (give them glory? (榮之), then (their talents will be?) short (bad). It all depends on effort (pyön 勉) and that is all. For that reason the sajok (yangban?) (士族) all receive instruction from their fathers and elder brothers, and their roots are deep in the intelligence and brightness of their natures

士類

official posts

引之

glorify them

榮之

勉

士族

cut down on opportunities for people to become officials
takes about a decade to cut down on the no. of officials
attribution

Han, II, 106

285, 14:25a

(But?) generally because they rely on the line of office (官緒: 官緒), hereditary office-holding?), they have no fear of drowning (湮淪) * drowning (墊溺). For that reason they never cultivate (themselves) and it is rare that their reputations or their righteousness stands up (are established). This is because their instruction (teaching) makes it that way. If only good people are selected and those without talent are rejected (abandoned), then those who move forward will receive rank and emoluments, and those who move to the rear (are rejected) will fall into the mud (fall by the wayside). Everyman will then be excited so who would not jump forward. If this happens, then the people of middle rank will all be long on talent. Even though it is said: "Be careful in selecting (men)," if you abandoned (this method?), where would you go (to find men of talent?)(Han, III, 106)(慎選捨之何適).

vs. MANSU

Some might say: If you consider the laws of the state (kuo-chia chia-ling 甲令), then in general in recommending and selecting men, basically you search for talent and virtue; you do not select (people) on the basis (of their ability to write) letters and poetry (wen-ssu 文誦). Therefore it says in the statutes (lü 律) that if someone recommends a man who is not right (the right kind of man), then he suffers (the penalty) of transportation (tu 徒). In the commentary (to the laws), it states: If a man is said to behave contrary to virtuous behavior, then regard him as inferior (德行乖僻者). If he resides in the chou or chün, then the lien-shih (廉使) will report (his name) (to the court), and if he resides ~~in the court~~ at the court, then from time to time (those people) will be promoted or dismissed. By this means one can be careful and diligent (in recommending people for office?) and it will be sufficient for handling the matter (of recommendation). If the officials in charge (yu-ssu 有司: of personnel?) continue in the same bad habits (因循) and do not take responsibility, then gradually the matter (of personnel recommendation) will be done badly. At the present time

report on performance

285, 14:25a) we only have to repair (fix up) and carry out the old orders (regulations). Why is it necessary to change anything?

To this (I) would respond: In the chou and the chün, shih (scholars) are recommended (kung 貢) on the basis of their virtuous behavior, while (wei 徵) examines of talent the Board of Rites selects men/on the basis of letters and poetry.

The examination officials examines men for their learning on the basis of the t'ieh-wen (帖 問 examinations), and the Boards of Personnel and War chooses officials on the basis of shu (書) and p'an (判).

This is all provided for in the laws (regulations). We only have to fix up certain laws. Moreover, if virtue has no form (does not take form) and talent ~~ix~~ does not have a vessel? (惟德無形, 惟才不器), then even though you ~~you~~ seize it with your hand, you cannot do it, and even though you listen with your ears, you cannot hear it; and you cannot know where it is. So then ~~you~~ how can you be able to distinguish (men of virtue and talent) and use them (in office)? At the present time the Boards of Rites and Personnel both consistently (use, rely on)

belles-lettres and poetry, and because of this people of talent are far removed from this (from them). When officials recommend people, they should only obtain the best and the worst and that is all. It is rare that over several

year's time they even get one man from a tao (province, circuit). But in one chou you have several dozen men who either tread the normal (right path) but are stupid and dumb (循常諱兮 董駭愚鄙者), or may be honest and diligent and respectful, but are obscured by other

people, or are good at deception and committing excesses, but remain hidden without a word about them getting out. How can you ever hear about them? If the selection of men for office is not entrusted to the outside

(provinces, localities), and if in appointing men to office they are not held responsible for performance, then the source of (water) will be opened but it will not be led downstream. If scholars are selected on the basis of letters (their ability to write), and people are given posts on the basis of rank, then ~~ix~~ even though you cite the laws to them and even though

(等)

帖 問

書

判

惟德無形, 惟才不器

循常諱兮 董駭愚鄙者

14:25b

vs. letters
vs. rank

285, 14:25b) you hold up the ax to them (threatening punishment), it will do no good. Unless this is changed, it will not be all right.

Some might say that: In the past in the Later Han dynasty in selecting scholars (for office? in the exams?), the students (chu-sheng 諸生) were tested in classical learning, and the scribes (wen-li 文吏) were tested in composition of memorials, so that in recommending men (chū jen), they tested them in writing (wen), and that this was the institutes (method) of former kings, but you alone regard this as wrong for the present time. Why?

I would respond to this that: In the Han dynasty those who were recommended (kung 貢) were only the wang-kuan (王官 :officials of kings, princes), and that was all. Generally speaking, with regard to the chūn and kuo (commanderies and kingdoms) of the Han dynasty, every year the recommended scholars (kung-shih 貢士) were all appointed as lang (郎) and they were divided up among the three shu (署). They accumulated talent (experience and skill on the job?) and then awaited summons (for office). There were no regular posts. Therefore, at the outset it was necessary to test their skills and see whether they had any ability or not. And when it came to the liao-li (僚吏 : officials) of the chūn and kuo, then all of them were appointed (shu 署) by the fu-chu (府主 :local magistrates?). Then when the order came down, they were appointed to office. When were they ever recommended as "guests"? (賓貢). They were never given examinations. As for the petty officials and clerks in the distant villages and districts, or the clerks of ferry stations and frontier districts, all of them were recommended to the ministry of personnel, or they went up to the sheng (省 :province?) to receive an examination. This started in the Sui dynasty. It was not an ancient law.

No exams

Sui dyn. exams

285, 14:25b) Some might say that if you allow the "outer" chou (wai-chou 外州 :prefectures) to hire and summon (officials (pi-chao 辟召), then definitely it will lead to the local magistrates (appointing) their friends, or local powerful people making requests (that they be appointed) or neighbors offering goods (brbies), and (as a result) there will be many people (who are appointed to office) who are not truly talented. Wouldn't this be excessive? How about that?

✓ To this I would reply: You really do have this. However, these are excesses, compared to the number of requests made of the Ministry of Personnel, any worse? Moreover, the magistrates (mu-shou 牧守) of the chou and chün (prefectures and districts) since ancient times have been said to share (with the king) the governance (of the state). With respect to whether the traces (records record they have left behind) is either good or bad, the laws provide for review of performance (and promotion or demotion: chōnch'oe 殿最). They share with the king his concern for the country (punyo 分憂), and they assume responsibility for accomplishment (ch'aeksōng 責成), so how would they dare go to excess in selecting people (for office, chü)? Even though many years go by and people are lazy, and the laws are long (in use, on the books), and evils arise, and Heaven's net gets spread out (恢疎) so that deception and mistakes are permitted, and friends and acquaintances are ~~appointed~~ recommended for office, and improper requests and personal considerations (operate in the appointment of men to office) so that 5 out of 10 men are exceeding the law, still the situation will be such that half (the people appointed) will still be preserving the correct way. But if (you leave things in the hands of) the Ministry of Personnel, then not even one out of ten (will be doing things right). I ask you to try ~~in~~ talking about (discussing?) this. Generally speaking, when it comes to the selection of officials (chōnhyōng 銓衡), they are selected only on the basis of the shu (written exam? 書) and p'an (判 :judgment), and when it comes to their being appointed to office, they simply use official rank (kwanja 官資)

285, 14:25b) 且 (as the basis for the decision). If a person is good at the shu and p'an (examinations), how does that mean that he would have the ability to be an official? (shan shu-p'an che he pi li nang? 善書判)

14:26a

者何必吏能

and if a person has a beautiful (high) record of official rank, how would that prevent him from being greedy (an extortionist)?

Even (美資歷者寧好貪吏). /If a man is fully qualified in terms

of his official rank and is skillful in the use of the pen and he is regarded as the most 且 correct (best) person by the Ministry of Personnel (Li-ts'ao), when he is appointed to office, his ability (to perform as) an official has still not been thoroughly investigated.

If (such a man) should in nature be good at following others (管人), then he should be put in charge of a post of chu-pien(? 主辦事: where he

manages and takes care of business, some matter). Or if his talents are suited to taking care of difficult business (matters), then he should be given the post of san-yüan (散員: Han, III, 108 a post that has a name but no official duties), or from time to time given suitable responsibilities, for this would also be good fortune (for the man). This would 且 not be something that the Ministry of Personnel would be able to know about.

People who can write but who are worthless are able to be promoted to posts within a matter of days, but people who can be used in office but do not know how to write spend their whole lives without advancing (to a post). How much worse is it in the case of those who in taking the shu and p'an (examinations) use other people to take the tests for them, or who get other people to substitute for them (on these tests), or who have those sitting next to them substitute for them, or who in approaching the work? take off their clothes (?), or who prior to the deadline have someone help them out. Thus one man who has superior talent can combine (perform the exams for?) four or five, 且 while only one or two people out of ten write the compositions (on the exams) themselves. How much worse 且 it in the case of those who falsify (answers) or commit deception, use false names and touch feet?. And in addition to this, the clerks take bribes.

285, 14:26a) Even though (someone) might accumulate a record of mistakes (wrongdoing), who would fault him? And if a man who has been recommended does not have official rank, then even though his name is correct (he has a good reputation?), yet still he would be ~~x~~ axed (cut). Moreover, I hear that in ancient times the sons, younger brothers, and relatives of the kung and ching (high officials) each had their punsu (分數 : status) determined in accordance with how high or low the position (of their relatives) (or: the position of each was determined by their status), and there were no limits established as to whether one, two, three or four of them (people from the same family?) could be obtained (for office). The ming-ching (明經 : examinations?) of the Li-pu (Ministry of Personnel) etc. was also done this way. ~~This was excessive~~ If only a small number, they (this) was called sheng-li (省例). Was this not a violation of law? If both (practices) are regarded as violations (excesses), this then is a hundred times worse.

Some might say that, even if the Ministry of Personnel exceeds the law (in its practices), still it stops with just one agency, whereas if the chou and chün (districts) commit excesses (in the recruitment of men), there are many gates (places, where wrongdoing can be done). If they are relatively equal in their commission of wrongdoing, then wouldn't the best thing to do be to close off the many gates and return everything to a single gate (agency)?

To this I would reply: Even though the excesses committed by the chou and chün (districts) would be many, it would be easy to abolish them make changes in them. If the Ministry of Personnel commits excesses, then even though it is only one agency, it cannot be changed (abolished). Why is this so? At the present time, the method for the selection of personnel is to select all men of talent at the Ministry of Personnel and appoint them to posts in the chou and chün (districts). If talent and position do not match up, then there is confusion and responsibilities will not be met. If the tz'u-shih

285, 14:26a) is held responsible (for this), then he will say that the order appointing (the man) an official came from the Ministry of Personnel (Li-ts'ao), and I do not dare abolish (cancel) it. If the shih-lang(侍郎) is held responsible (for a bad appointment), then he will say, we appointed the man to office on the basis of an examination of his shu, p'an, (examinations), and an investigation of his rank, so there is no way to guarantee the man's past (record). If you hold the ling-shih(令史) responsible, then he will say that he investigated the man's^{origins,} record and his comings and goings, and carried out (the appointment on that basis) and that he doesn't know anything else (about it). When the common people receive harm, who is to be held responsible for the fault? If the mu-shou (moku, magistrate) is himself in charge of (selecting) and using (appointing subordinates?) (chayong 自用), then the crimes (criminals?) will in the future take flight (abandon) somewhere. (若牧守自用則罪將焉逃) Definitely, if there is a violation of the law at the chou or chün (pref. or district) level, and you just change the tz'u-shih(刺史: prefect), then you can reform (change, hyök 革) things. But if an excess is committed in the Ministry of Personnel (Li-pu), then even if you change (transfer) the shih-lang(侍郎), it will do no good. Generally speaking the "nine streams" (chiu-liu 九流) are/broad and numerous that one cannot know them (all) (in detail), and this is because the law makes it this way. (fa shih-chih jan 法使之然); it is not the fault of the cheng-ssu(正司: official in charge?). Therefore, it is said, even though the gates (agencies) are many (i.e., when you put responsibility on the many magistrates), it is easy to change (a magistrate), whereas even though the gate (agency--Ministry of Personnel) is only one, you cannot change it (so easily), and it is because of this.

14:s6b

Some might say: At the present time there is much favoritism among people (jen to cheng?) and for that reason they are long on fear and calculation. (Thus) ~~the selection~~ in the selection of officials, law and order is bound to be lost. So there is nothing as good proper administration (kanggi)

285, 14:26b) as the order (laws) currently in use.

borrow

To this I would reply: Do not ~~take~~ principles from ancient times;

I beg you to take examples from right before your eyes to prove (your case).

At the present time in each tao (circuit), the Chieh-tu-shih (節度使),
lien

Tu-tuan-~~ting~~-shih (都團練使), Kuan-ch'a-shih (觀察使), and Tsu-yung-shih

(租庸使) all select themselves their own subordinate officials,

from the p'an-kuan (判官) and fu-chiang (副將) down. And

even though there might be some favoritism among them, yet when you

consider it overall, seven out of ten (choices) are good ones. Thus

at the present time the method of hiring one's subordinates (pi-li chih fa

辟吏法) is currently in practice. It is only that it has not extended
down to the chou and hsien (pref. and district) level, and that is all.

One can see what the advantages and disadvantages are. How would standards

be lost and order be destroyed (if we decentralized the recruitment process)?

If we were to allow the various shih (circuit, provincial officials)'s

subordinates be appointed by the Ministry of Personnel (Hsüan-ts'ao 選曹),

then how would we get people to take charge of serious matters of border

defense and tax collection?

Someone might say: In the last few years we have always seen assistant

officials (she-kuan 攝官) in the chou and hsien, and all of them are

officials that the mu-shou (moku) has appointed himself (tzu-shu 自署).

But government is shoddily carried out in many cases and there has been
of long-term plans

no discussion (of this) for a long time. When they just barely become

officials, they have already (learned to?) look out for their own livelihoods

(making a living). What with greeting new officials and sending off old

ones, the burdens and annoyances are extremely great. If, at the present

time, we were to allow the chou and chün (officials) to summon and hire

(chao-pi 召辟) (their own subordinates), then you can imagine what

the difficulties would be like. How about this?

285, 14:26b) To this I would reply: All the officials of the state receive appointments from the court (chao-ming), but the she-kuan (assistants) ^(on an ad hoc basis) posts are filled whenever there is a vacancy. If they were all filled at one time, then in a short space of time all business would definitely come to a halt. Even if all the people ran off, there would be no way to fix responsibility, and even if an official compiled a good record, yet an official would not become accomplished. (Officials) would only do what was convenient for themselves. What could they expect from not doing things in a shoddy way? If official posts were neither moved around nor taken away and (local officials) were allowed to appoint their own assistant officials and these assistants were (the local officials?) responsibility, then above (in the higher posts?) people (subordinate officials) would repay (their superiors?) for having faith in them (chih-chi ^{知己}), and below they would regard as profitable the honor of being included in official ranks, and all would compete to exert their knowledge and effort. Would there be anybody who would not give his all? If at the present time we ~~were~~ always ~~to~~ appoint good men and give them posts in distant places several thousand li away, and

286, 14:27a they have to take their families with them these long distances which is very difficult and burdensome. And then a ^{year} ~~week~~ later, they have to move somewhere else and they are on the road (~~again~~) again). When they calculate the time that they will spend as officials before being terminated, they will realize that their reputations will not be made by people who know them. And their future posts will be determined by an investigation (of their official rank, so they cannot be careless about this. Who would be careless about it? (end note) (T'ung-t'ien, ch. 18, p.103 of my edition. 6th point ends here. 7th point is omitted by Yu)

~~Articles~~ Articles for Reform of the Recruitment System (TT, ~~17~~ 18, p.103)

(請改革選舉事條). With regard to civil and military officials at the capital and in the provinces of rank 5 and up (note: men ^{監司} who ought not to be recommended (chu-i ^{注推}) by the Personnel Bureau (hsüan-ssu))

286, 14:27a) With regard to the above, I request that the tsai-hsiang

(PM? **宰相**) have general supervision over their advancement and appointment, and that the Ministries of Personnel and War (Li-pu,

Ping-pu) participate in this by indicating their approval or disapproval.

With regard to the Shang-shu (**尚書**) and Shih-lang (**侍郎**) of the Ministry of Personnel, as to the above (as to them), I request that

they discuss ~~affix~~ civil officials of rank 5 and up, and that they

appoint (chebae **除拜**) officials of rank 6 and below and that they investigate and report on any unfair cases of personnel appointments.

(note: If there are cases where the chief officials of capital bureaus or the ^{civil prov. gov.} Kuan-ch'a-shih (kwanch'alsa) ~~xxxx~~ (governors?) or tz'u-shih (**刺史**:
prefects) have appointed subordinate officials whose talents do not match

~~their~~ responsibilities of their posts, or where in making appointments

they have "turned their backs on what is right" (kung) or have shown

private favoritism, then (the shang-shu and shih-lang) should be

able to investigate and report this and submit a memorial of impeachment;

if no ~~in~~ wrongdoing has occurred in the appointment of men to office, they

should not be able to raise (questions).)(end note) When there is some

case to investigate, then the lang-chung (**郎中**), tz'u-shih (**刺史**),

yüan-wai-lang (**員外郎**), p'an-ch'eng (**判成**), shih-lang (**侍郎**) and shang-shu (**尚書**) will sign it, and after that it will be carried out.

(Note: If all the chief officials have committed some other violation, then the agency in charge of investigations will on their own take responsibility

for submitting a memorial of impeachment. It is not something that the

Ministry of Personnel should investigate, and for that reason I have

(here) stated that, "if it is not a matter of wrongdoing connected with

a personnel appointment, they should not be able to raise the case.")(end note)

With regard to other matters under their jurisdiction, refer to old

(practice). If it is heard that some ~~xxxx~~ wrongdoing has been committed

in a personnel appointment by a chief officials and the Ministry of Personnel

impeachment

T.T.

18

chief sec.

under secretary

V.P.B.

286, 14:27a) has not raised the case, then I request that it be entrusted to the ~~Yü-shih-tai~~ Yü-shih-tai (御史臺) who will impeach them. And if the Yü-shih-tai does not raise the case, then the Tso-yu (左右) will impeach them. (note: Refer to the Ta-tien, (where it says that) if the Yü-shih has an impeachment case and does not take responsibility for it, then the Tso-yu-ch'eng (左右丞) can submit a memorial of impeachment.)(end note)

With regard to the Shang-shu and shih-lang of the Ministry of War (Ping-pu), I request that they take charge of discussing military officials 14:27b) of rank 5 and up. ~~and appoint them to offices (ch'uan).~~ With regard to officials of rank 6 and below, they will appoint them, and they will also investigate cases where appointments have not been fair (correct). (note: If there are cases where the chief military officials of the military guards (chün-wei) or the chieh-tu-shih or tu-tuan-lien-shih have appointed officers whose talents do not fit their posts, or who in making appointments have used favoritism rather than fair (impartial criteria), then they will be able to investigate and submit a memorial of impeachment. If it is not a case of wrongdoing in a personnel appointment, they will not be able to raise the case.)(end note)

If there is a case to be investigated, or if there is something to be impeached at the tai-sheng (? 臺省), then it will be done in accordance with the law for the Ministry of Personnel. As for other matters under their jurisdiction, they should act in accordance with old (precedent). With regard to the tribute recommendees (kung-chü-jen 貢舉人) recommended every year by the Ministry of Rites (Li-pu), I request that these be abolished. If separately, there are talented scholars learned in the classics, I request that they be selected by the Kuo-tzu-chien (KukchagaM) or the Six Schools. (note: That is, the Kuo-tzu-chien, T'ai-hsüeh, ssu-men-hsüeh, Li-hsueh (law), Shu-hsüeh (writing school), etc.)(end note)

With regard to the recommendations and selections of the Ministry of War, I request that these be abolished. (Note: In the Sui dynasty, they established

286, 14:27b) the che-ch'ung-fu (折衝府) for the purpose of dividing up the military garrisons and troops scattered around the empire. In the time of Empress Wu (Wu T'ai-hou), in the sheng-p'ing period of peace and tranquillity (684-705), they established the military examinations (wu-chü 武舉) for fear that people would fight with one another (as a means of gaining power?), and both root and branch of the military officials and military selection (recruitment situation) were taken care of. Now at the present time both in the capital and in the outer areas there are military units everywhere and there are many officers (備裨將校) stationed around. Really we ought to establish some method to reduce them. (But if we did so), how could we again stretch out (open up?) the gates and induce people to come in (and serve as military officers?) How much the worse since these people are not brave and courageous men. They only call themselves military officials; they are not good enough to defend (anything). Even though you were to train them in the use of the bow and arrow, they wouldn't be able to fight. They can just sit around and enjoy their salaries and emoluments and look for ways to avoid labor service. We ought to abolish all of them now and put an end to illicit advantage.) (end note)

With regard to capital officials of rank 6 and below (note: those who ought to be recommended by the bureau of personnel (hsüan-ssu)), I request that each of these be entrusted to the chief official of ~~his~~ his office who will select them himself. Those who are appointed for the first time will be called ~~xx~~ she (-kuan 攝(官)), and only after that will the Ministries of personnel and war be informed. Those ministries will then memorialize, and an imperial edict will be handed down informing 14:28a) the agency, and the man will become a regular official (cheng-kuan). The investigation (kao 考) of the man's (record, the keeping of his file?) will commence from the day that the memorial reporting his appointment (by his superior official) is received. As for the salary of the she-kuan,

Regarding

286, 14:28a) each of them will receive half. ~~what~~ an assistant official (tso-kuan 佐官) of a fu or chou, ~~what~~ (note; the following officials are not included in this: 別駕, 少尹, 五府司馬, 赤令), from the ch'ang-shih (長史) down to the hsien-ch'eng and hsien-wei (縣丞尉) (note: Even though the ch'ang-shih and ss-ma of the chou are in the category of rank 5 officials and down, they also will be treated the same as ~~rank 6~~ rank 6 officials)(end note), each of them will be selected by the chief official (ch'ang-kuan) of the chou or fu, on his own. (Their selection) will not be limited to local ~~people~~ people or "guests" (t'u, k'e 土客) (from other districts), and the system for reporting the appointment of cheng-she (regular or assistant, temporary? 正攝) officials will be the same as that for capital officials of rank 6 and below. With regard to distant frontier chou, or chou where (prisoners?) are kept under restraint?? (羈縻), this will be entrusted to the kuan-ch'a-shih of the tao (province), who will be allowed together (with the ~~magistrate?~~ magistrate?) to make selections of personnel and to fill posts.

With regard to the sheng-shih shih-ling (省守市令) ~~what~~ of the upper prefectures (chou), the ch'an-chün po-shih (參軍博士) of the middle prefectures, and the p'an-ssu (判司) of the lower prefectures (note: the lu-shih (錄事) and ch'an-chün (參軍) are not included in this category)(end note) and the hsien-ch'eng (縣丞) of the middle and lower (hsien) and lower, and the/officials of the post-station, ferries, and garrisons, I request that the tz'u-shih (prefect) in charge fill those posts, after which he will report it to the ministries of personnel and war. And the ministries of personnel and war will grant a certificate after which these people will become officials. In all cases do not use memorials (to the throne). The quotas of these officials will not be able to exceed the old system. And even though the ministry of personnel has not yet reported, all of them will be given full salaries. If they have received a sheng-tieh (省牒), then while they are in office, they will

286, 14:28a) the same as a regular official, but after they leave office, 14:28b) they cannot be called an official. If the official office of a prefecture ~~is~~ does not report (an appointment of these petty officials) because the man's record has not been outstanding, then I request that no time limit be set for hearing (receiving a report on them). With regard to the chou and hsia (prefectures and districts), I request that things be done in accordance with old (procedures). The prefectures should be divided into three grades (note: upper, middle, and lower) and the districts into 5 grades (chih(赤), chi(畿), upper, middle, and lower). As for other designations, such as (望望右佐輔), I request that these names be abolished. (note: if the grades and ranks are too numerous, then it will take too long for officials to advance. Officials will be shifted rapidly in clerks' jobs and officials won't be on the job long, and government (administration) will be done haphazardly. I request that these many grades be ~~xxxxxxxx~~ reduced so as to elicit better morale, and then it is to be expected that the talents of officials will not be blocked off.)(end note).

With regard to the qualifications and experience (cha-ryōk 資歷) of officials of rank 6 and below, I request that 5 years be a full term of office. (note: T'ang Yao and Yu Shun(唐虞) kept officials on the job for 9 years before transferring them. Since the Wei and Chin dynasties all officials held posts for 6 years. Our state, following the Sui dynasty, made 4 years (the standard term of office). In recent times this was cut further to the san-kao (three inspections of performance records--three years). At the present time, three or four years is too short a time, while six or nine years is too long a time, so I request that a limit of 5 years be set, which would be close to hitting the mark.)(end note).

If there is anyone whose talent, behavior, management of affairs, and record is exceptional, I request that he be considered for a promotion and transfer (to a higher post)

Han, II, 116
In the Tang
the area
near the
capital was
called the 四輔
and the outer
areas.
大輔 + 四輔
divided into
上中下.

赤 畿 望望右佐輔

資歷

唐虞

double

286, 14:28b)

With regard to those whose qualifications and experience are such that they should be transferred to assist (some official), I request that ^{old} the/s system (for doing this) be ~~simplified~~. (note: ~~Chan~~ Adjusting the old system to do this means the qualifications and order for transferring officials. It is only that if one official has also filled his term of office, he may be immediately appointed and summoned to office, and there will be no ~~ex~~ numbers ~~to~~ (quotas) for selection?)(end note)

If there is someone whose talents, behavior, management of affairs and record is exceptional, I request that he be allowed to skip a grade and be promoted. When each chief official makes a substitute selection, if the old subordinate officials have committed some violation or are not suited to their jobs, then I request that they be transferred as convenient. If they have not committed any violations, then all of them should wait for their terms to be up, when their records will be investigated. Those who have not completed their terms of office cannot be transferred.

If among the men under the jurisdiction of the provincial ^{諸首使} shih (governor) and subordinate officials of the prefecture or district who are exceptional 287, 14:29a) in conducting government affairs, or who are knowledgeable in intelligence and planning, or whose behavior or learning is refined and developed, or whose talents and skills are able and outstanding, or who are talented but haven't had a x chance to show it (develop it), or who are hiding their virtue in the hills and gardens (in the countryside), or who are qualified to hold an inner (capital) official post but (whose talents) are not suited to a prefecture or district, (then report them to the Ministry of Personnel)(end note). t

If there ~~are~~ any military officers who are good at military planning or have military skills, or are qualified to be guards, or can command men, then I request that without limit as to number their chief official be allowed to report their talents, behavior, skill in planning and strategy and send it off to the court, and all will be reported to the Ministries of Personnel

bureaucratic appointments, in T'ang ⁷⁸ ~~89~~ imgwān kowōl

287, 14:29a) and War, and each will establish an official bureau in order to handle them and investigate their talents and abilities and appoint them to high or low offices. If there is a vacancy in an official post or a special appointment, then appoint them to office in accordance with their talents. (note: as in the case of Kuang-lu-hsün(光祿勳) who was in charge of the san-shu-lang(三署郎)(end note)

With regard to those who recommend ~~p~~ them for office, the recommender obtains will be raised in grade and advanced in rank. If you get a man who ~~is~~ (recommends an outstanding and eminent) man, then transfer him to another post. (note: If he appoints his own subordinates himself, then even though he obtains an outstanding man, do not give him a reward.)(end note)

--. Misc. Articles on Prohibitions? (K~~u~~myak chapcho (following along in the T'ung-tien, 18, p.103, column 3)

禁約雜條

-. With regard to the various shih (of the candidates for subordinate posts?) officials, I request that their records, virtues, behavior, talents, and abilities be written down clearly, and that they request the man be given such-and-such a post or such-and-such an office. In all cases, they first will report this to the Ministry of Personnel and Ministry of War.

governor 諸使

14:29b) (note: If the provincial governor (various shih) memorialized that an official should hold a post concurrently, then he should distinguish whether the other post is civil or military; he should not take into account the original post. If the man is to assume a post in a prefecture or district, then report it to the Ministry of Personnel; if a military post, then report it to the Ministry of War.) (end note)

The ministries of personnel and war will copy out the report and memorialize it. (note: It will state that we have received a report from such-and-such a governor (shih), such-and-such a military bureau (chün-ssu), and such-and such a chou or fu)(end note). ~~The original report~~ Each person listed on the original report will submit a file (report). Each governor, bureau, and prefecture will make one copy (for the files)

通典

287, 14:29b) -. If the recommended official during his term of office commits some wrongdoing , or does not act in accordance with the letter of recommendation, or commits a crime serious enough to be punished by transportation~~or worse~~, then the person who recommended him will also be held responsible (be implicated) (note: the man who committed the crime will be dealt with in accordance with regular law)(end note)

(If a recommender has recommended) one man (who goes bad), then one year's salary will be taken from him. (note: as for provincial governors who do not receive salaries, as in the case of rank 3 officials, the fine will be converted to cash and calculated in accordance with (going rates) at the time.)(end note)

If two men, then take away his imperial warrant. (note: for those who have no warrant, then reduce his color (of his garments?) from purple to red, or from red to green, or from green to jade)(end note)

If three people, then take away his ~~rank~~ grade (kye) and rank (ch'ae). (note As for those who have a rank but no grade, or have a grade but no rank, then in addition take away their warrant and merit award)(end note)

If four men, then relieve him of his current post. (note: If he has already left his post, then relieve him of his post ex-post-facto)(end note)

If five men, then reduce his official (~~rank~~) post) (note: ~~Kuan-ch'a-shih~~ Chieh-tu-shih and Kuan-ch'a-shih will be dropped to be prefects (tz'u-shih), and prefects will be dropped to be shang-tso (上位), and all will be stationed at frontier chou)(end note)

If six men, then take away his name (ming). (Note: Even though he may have recommended more than six bad men, just stop with taking away his name.)(end note)

If there is a case of a man who has committed the crime of embezzlement punishable by exile or worse, then double the punishment. (note: double means that if there~~x~~ is one man who has committed a crime, ~~x~~ treat it as if it were two, if two men, then as if it were 4, if three men, then as if it

287, 14:29b) were six. The crime will stop at three men.)(end note)

If, after a man has recommended someone for office, he finds out about the man's wrongdoing and reports it and impeaches the man himself, 14:30a), then I request that he not be indicted.(punished) (note: this refers to someone who has recommended someone without knowing about his wrongdoing)(end note)

- . In the case of an official who has recommended someone for office after taking a bribe, or who has recommended a man of no talent because he was friendly with him, or because he was swayed by the man's request for office, or who recommended someone even though he knew the man to be no good, & such men should be punished with one degree of punishment. All such men should be punished for deceiving their superiors (lord, country) and there should be no limits on an official in terms of the redemption price for his crime (maejoe 贖罪).

On the case where a man has recommended someone who asked him to do so, both of them will be regarded as criminals, and the one who sought the office will be regarded as having been an accomplice in the crime.

Generally speaking, human beings are born with desires, and if there is no lord (to control them), then it results in confusion (lan). Since the lord (ruler) cannot manage govern by himself alone, he therefore establishes his officials. In ancient times in the reigns of Yao and Shun (T'ang and Yu), (the kings) all asked the people (about who would be good officials?), and Shun recommended the 8 ylian and the 8 ? (八元八凱) and Ssu-yao (四岳) recommended (夔龍, 稷, 契). This was what was called the great way for appointing men to office. Coming down to the three dynasties of antiquity, they selected men from the hsiang and tang (鄉黨) and only after that did they appoint them to office. This system was gradually prepared (accomplished, perfected). As for the way of the Ch'in and Han dynasties, even though it was not modelled after the ancients, men were still recommended from the villages (閭塾)

Handwritten notes in Chinese:
Han, 124
Ancient times
高辛氏 had 8 talented sons
people called them
the 8 talented sons were
called the 8
Han, 124
the chiefs of the 四岳

贖罪

四岳

夔龍, 稷, 契

鄉黨

閭塾

287, 14:30a) so that (recruitment) was still based on a man's actions, and with regard to the assistant officials in the chün (commanderies) and kuo (kingdoms), all of them were recommended by (the localities) themselves, and only after candidates were examined on their effectiveness (qualifications) were they sent up to the royal court. As for the capital officials, they were also able to seek out eminent people for their subordinate officials. It was only in the Eastern Han dynasty that for the first time an office for recruitment (hsüan-chih **選職**) was established, 14:30b) but the system used for the selection of men still was based on former regulations. Tso-hsiung (**左右雄**) recommended that a time limit be placed (on recommended appointments?) and at the time no one dared to make a false recommendation. And this is the reason why the two Han dynasties were famed for their many scholars.

In the Wei and Chin dynasties they established the nine grades (chiu-pin **九品**) and established (the post of) chung-cheng (**中正**). They were more interested in a man's pedigree (lun-fa **論父**) and rarely examined a person for his actions and abilities. The responsibilities of the Ministry of Personnel (hsüan-ts'ao) became even more respected and important, and the (provincial) posts of prefect (tz'u-shih), t'ai-shou (**太守**) as well as the capital posts of ching-yun and ta-fu (**御史, 太尉**) were all appointed by the ministry of personnel (li-pu). Nevertheless, in terms of the hiring of men (pi-chao **辟召**) and the recommendation of men in the villages (hsiang-li chih chü **鄉里之舉**), there was no change from the old regulations. After the ying-chia period (**永嘉** :307-313 AD), the empire became divided and remained in confusion for more than 300 years, and during this time each (of the kings) inherited a legitimate title (cheng-hao **正號**). (nine families) And in general there were nine surnames, which generally did not change.

The laws of the Wei and Chin dynasties were all in confusion, and there was little that was well governed, and there is not much worth considering (in this period). Whether kyohwa (**教化** moral transformation, good government and virtue?) prevailed or not depended on whether a state was on the rise or

論

287, 14;30b) or on the decline. The three rulers of the Wei dynasty all liked to compose verse, and in the Chin, Sung, Ch'i, and Liang (晉宋齊梁) dynasties, the habit of letters was stimulated (fanned). The writing style was not refined and phrases (writing style) was beautiful and pretty, but the evil practice of elegance and prevarication extended down to the Sui dynasty. Moreover, since the three dynasties of antiquity the only dynasty whose laws and institutions can be recommended and praised are the house of Han, and in continuing the glories of the Han, there has been none to compare with our T'ang dynasty. / When the dynasty was first founded we inherited the extreme evils of writing style, but it can be said that

288, 14:31a) we met a time (when things could be reformed), / The high ministers did not discuss methods to rectify the evil in substance but continued in the old practices respecting the literary customs. The fact that learning was not purified was truly because of this. If you consider the past, there was never an age in which there not people who made recommendations about the selection and recruitment (system). Some said that because there were too many officials the people were troubled, and they asked that the number of officials be reduced. Some said that there were too many ranks and grades and were concerned about rapid advancement (in grade). Some complained that the selection of people for magisterial posts was taken too lightly. Some said that selecting people for office on the basis of words (what they said, wrote) was not as good as seeking people for office on the basis of their deeds. All of these (commentators) knew what the fault was, but they could not discover the cause for the problem. Why so?

If you look into the Ch'in method, then they only obtained people for office on the basis of their knowledge of agriculture and warfare (neng yü chan) In the Han dynasty they had tests (k'o) on filial piety and brotherly respect (孝悌), diligence in tilling the fields (li-tien), worthiness and goodness (hsien-liang) and straightness and rectitude (fang-cheng), and from time to time

曲與戰
農

考悌

科

加田

賢良

方正

14:31a) they summoned and hired these people (for office). Every (each of) year from the 200,000 people in/the chün and kuo 2 (commanderies and kingdoms), only 1 man would be recommended (kung 貢). Generally speaking, at that time, the number of people recommended from throughout the empire was scarcely more than a 100 men, so that in examining and selecting people, they had to obtain men of talent and ability. Since that time, things have become more complicated (burdensome) and expanded.

Handwritten: Han - only 100 men recommended

In our k'ai-yüan and t'ien-pao periods (Hsüan-tsung, 713-42, 742-56) there were several x thousand men recommended 2 (kung-chü 貢舉) in one year, but what with family connections (munja 門資), military merit, (special recommendations) for skill and talent, the various kinds of clerks and petty officials, the miscellaneous categories 2 (of examinations) the hundred (kinds of) families and the thousand paths (to office)--there were so many people obtaining office that they ~~could not even~~

Handwritten: Tang - several thousand

14:31b) be recorded. Compared to the Han period, the number of officeholders increased ~~xxxxxxx~~ by several tens or hundreds. How could they help but give importance to the establishment of an office of personnel and the creation of a number of grades or ranks, and the establishment of limits on recruitment in order to hold down (the number of officials)? It is normal for people to want to advance, and every one respects glory and success. To ascend the heights, one must start from below. One has to begin (a journey) from a near place in order to get to a distant one. If one definitely rushes x2 (towards) a goal, he will ultimately get there. How could such a person have any time for remaining (in a lower position) in order to compile a good record?

In the Ch'in dynasty there were 40 chün (commanderies), and ~~the~~ in the two Han dynasties there were over a hundred kuo (kingdoms). The prefects (t'ai-shou 太守) were brought into the capital to be high ministers (kung, ching 公卿), and the capital bureau chiefs (lang-kuan 郎官) were sent out to the provinces to be district magistrates. ~~xxxxxxx~~

288, 14:31b) When it was convenient, men were put in charge of affairs.

writing style?

~~Paper-work~~ was simplified (簡畧其文); there was nothing which was a matter of right or wrong (it was not a question of people being able to do things or not), but officials were just held responsible for accomplishment and results. If men were entrusted (with responsibility), remuneration they regarded it seriously, and ~~remuneration~~ and encouragement was also esteemed.

At the present time (in the T'ang dynasty), the number of district tallies comes to 350; the number of chün-hsien (districts) has dropped to about 8 or 9 (?). We are not able to obtain (for office?) eminent men from the towns and (thus) we are not able to exclusively (control) ~~things~~ matters so that they come out advantageous (as opposed to sickly).

Whenever the 8 governors? (pa-shih 八使) or the ten lien (十連) want to make a move, they have to memorialize it to a superior. Their positions are low, the respect shown them is thin, their power is small, and their responsibilities are taken lightly; one can truly say that the situation is troubling. It is difficult for people to skip a grade in being recommended for office, but it is easy for them to get a post--and this is truly reasonable (what would seem to be in accord with reason).

At first, Ts'ui Liang (崔亮) of the Later Wei dynasty became the Shang-shu (尚書) of the Board of Personnel (Li-pu). He did not inquire as to whether a person was smart or dumb but only made his decisions on the amount of time the man had spent in office (chōnghae ilwōl 停解日月) in lower posts. At the time everybody who had been stagnating (in office) praised his ability, 14:32a) but the loss of talent in the Wei dynasty truly began with the administration of Ts'ui Liang.

Wen-ti of the Sui dynasty was basically not a learned man. He stole the empire and did not want to divide up his power; he abolished the right of the chou and chün (magistrates) to hire (pi 辟) (subordinates on their own authority), and he abolished the (system) of recommending (men of talent) from the local villages (hsiang-li). All appointments of capital and

** Han, W, 124
In ancient times, the Son of Heaven set up 方伯 in areas 1000 li (from the capital) and made the Kingdoms (國) as 連. There were 10 連 were the countries of the 方伯
time in grade!*

Wen-ti

288, 14:32b) provincial officials were under the control of the Ministry of Personnel (Li-ts'ao). For a man to gain the ranks of officialdom all depended on the chih-cheng (執政), and the chih-cheng participated in (interfered in) the job of the Ministry of Personnel (Li-pu).

The Ministry of Personnel controlled all the power of the choux and chün (pref. and districts). This was not in accord with (? 因微) the basic intent (principle) of ~~giving~~ being most sincere in the establishment of the state (t'i-kuo ch'u-cheng 體國) and of handling affairs of the world as a surrogate for Heaven (tai-t'ien li-wu 代天理務). As a result, order was lost in the selection of men, and there were excessive numbers of people who were appointed to office. How could one expect that with a territory of 10,000 li in which one has gathered together (scholars) from the nine streams (chiu-liu 九流) (of learning) that the ~~best~~ selection of men of talent and the appoint of them to office should be left to the decision of the Ministry of Rites (alone)? How could (that office) determine who is superior and inferior in terms of talent and action and search for those who are free from error with just a short investigation? Would they indeed make mistakes?

Later on, the officials (yu-ssu 有司) put writing style as the prime criterion for (the selection of) men of worth, and with regard to distinguishing between men, they were selected (chosen) on the basis of (their performance in the) shu and p'an (書判 : exams). Everybody went along with the fashion (mi-jan 靡然) and respected this. ~~xxxxxx~~ The stream (of learning) became muddled and confused, and that is the reason that the reading of the classics was ~~xxxxxx~~ overturned and ~~xxxxxx~~ neglected (倒緩). Taking the examinations was the same as solving the game of hiding an object inside a plate (sabok 射覆 : from Han-shu). They also established standards for qualifications and established a system of quotas for recruitment (selection). They put pressure on the ranks, order (order 厭例) (Han, III, 122: pressured and made? regulations for advancement)

rank 5-

288, 14:32a) and displayed fixed limits (deadlines, for taking the exams?). They distributed (official posts) equally and cut off (the opportunity) for people exceeding limits (regulations). They also sealed over the names (on exam papers) and examined them, and they divided up responsibilities (for examining candidates) among 10 officials of the personnel ministry. What they were doing was take care of the branch of things without clarifying the root (basis) (of the matter). To have put the Ministry of Personnel in exclusive and total charge (of recruitment) was a mistake in drawing up ~~regulations~~ standards, and to have relied on letters and composition as the means for selecting scholars was the least consequential of ways to find talent; and the shu and p'an examinations was also the worst of ways to (test ability) in letters and composition (munsa ^{文詞} (talented)). In general, the fundamental way of running a state is to rely on (good) men, and the welfare (profit or harm) to the people of the fields depends on officials and government (kwanjōng--administration). If you want to discover the proper way of managing affairs, then it depends on keeping officials in their posts for a long time. And the way to keep officials in their posts for a long time depends on reducing (the number of) ranks and grades. If you want to reduce the number of ranks and grades, it depends on the refined (skillful) methods of selecting men for office. If you want to be skillful in selecting men for office, it depends on reducing the number of names and categories (of posts?), so that there are few scholars while there are large numbers of farmers, artisans and merchants. Only then will you be able to cut down on the numbers of officials, and only then will you be able to keep the common people at ease (secure). One ought to consider the difference between a well-governed (state) and one in confusion and read in detail conditions of both ancient and contemporary times, and establish the fairest and most correct way of doing things and rectify former mistakes. One might either permit (officials) to hire subordinates on their own authority (pi-chao ^{辟召}) or allow a system of

limits

14:32b) Personnel

long time!

289, 14:33a) recent regulations. He analyzed what was of advantage and what was harmful and profoundly was faithful to the circumstances, and true and what he wrote was extremely important/for rectifying the extreme

14:33b)

evils that arose in later ages. Nevertheless, if you are only able to regulate the world by creating institutional forms (hsing-chih 形制) but do not know how to penetrate the world in order to transform it through teaching (chiao-hua, kyohwa), then you will not be able to do a thorough job. If you want to govern the world (empire) well, then the chief and assistant officials of the capital bureaus, the chou and the chün should be selected and appointed at court, and as far as their subordinates and assistants are concerned, they should be allowed to select and hire them themselves (hsüan-pi 選辟), and importance should be placed on laws pertaining to rewards and punishments. It definitely ought to be done like this. However, it is necessary to promote the schools and create the habit of acting in conformity with li (propriety), and having the villages and local communities (hsiang-tang) select men (for office). Only after it is done like this, will you get it (have it right).

Villages
30p 選

-in the reign of Te-tsung (780-805), Lü Chih(陸贄) became the t'ung-p'ing chang-shih(同平章事) and he submitted a memorial which said: The most urgent aspect of the proper way of governing(a state) depends on obtaining good men, but the difficulty of knowing good men is such that even sages and philosophers find it difficult. If you listen to what a man says, then you still cannot guarantee his behavior. If you look for people with proper behavior, then you possibly might leave behind men of talent. If only only evaluate a man's performance and effort, then deception and lying will flourish and there will rarely be any straightforward and straight (square) men who will advance. If you go along with (rumors) of a man's reputation, then there will be an increase in competition and chasing around among men, and there will more scholars who are stagnating (in low posts) and in retirement (than

2899, 14:33b) you can count). It is necessary to prepare a detailed (report) of the essentials and the less essential (root and branch) and examine the will and behavior (of a person), and only after that will you be able to know ~~xxx~~ which men preserve the proper way and have talents that can be used. You should not allow people who search for reputation and disguise themselves to practice deception (lying). This is the reason why they had the law (method) of village recommendation (hsiang-li chii-hsian) in former ages and the system of allowing semi or officials to hire (their own subordinates). This is the reason why by clarifying the examinations on the classics, broadening the search for talented men, providing guarantees (proof) of behavior and ability, the need for people to rush around (in pursuit of official posts) is eased. In the past, ~~kn~~ the Chou dynasty, Po ? (伯冏) was appointed t'ai-p'u (太僕), He was ordered: Be careful in choosing your subordinates. Do not (choose them) on the basis of their clever words insinuating countenance (巧言), their pleasing facial appearance (令色), their use of flattery (便辟), or their insinuating looks (側媚). Just choose proofs (evidence) good men (kilsa 吉士). On the basis of this then (we can see)/that appointed ancient dynasties (royal courts) ~~xxxxxx~~ their important officials and their important officials were able to select their own subordinate officials. While I ~~waxawaxking~~ "await punishment for crime" as Prime Minister (tsai-hsiang), I recommend to the throne that we should establish a system for searching for talented men and investigating officials. What this would be is that the chief officials of the various bureaus, together with their ~~xxxxx~~ assistants and the posts of kung-feng (供奉之職) of the liang-sheng (兩省) combined should conduct an investigation of effort and performance on the job, and we should increase our encouragement and appointment of (good men), and the prime minister to the throne should recommend these people/for appointment to office. As for other posts, such as the subordinate officials of the taiksheng (臺+省), I request that we entrust it to the chief officials (of these agencies) to

14:34a

village rec. hiring subord.

vs. clear words

✓

供奉之職

臺+省

289, 14:34a) to select them and to draw up a document which ~~xxx~~ points out
and true abilities
their ~~xxxx~~ talents/and memorialize it to the throne for approval.

recomm-
+
guarantee

And once a person has been recommended, it should stand as a guarantee
for him for the rest of his life. And in each letter of recommendation, there
shall be contained a description of the circumstances leading to the
recommendation and appointment. If an outstanding man is obtained, then
upgrade his evaluation and increase his rank. If a man is not what he
was cracked up to be (silsil 失實), then take away his salary and fine
him. (If a man is good), then reward and promote him as soon as possible,
14:34b) and if he errs, then dismiss him right away. And do not stop
just with recommending and appointing people to lower positions, but
you should also examine and test the important officials. The purpose of
this is to see what kind of x men were recommended who in previous
(letters of recommendation?) were said to have been outstanding.

Te-sung then ordered that this be carried out, but in a short time
(after a short time) somebody said to the emperor: "All the people recommended
by the various bureaus have been recommended on the basis of personal feeling
(favoritism), and for that reason we have not obtained able and talented
men." The emperor then secretly (privately) said to ~~xi~~ Lü Chih: "From now
on I am changing (this system of) ~~xxxxxxx~~ appointment. You should
select men for office yourself and do not entrust it to the (chiefs of)
the various bureaus."

制勅命之

Lü Chih also memorialized: The system of this dynasty calls for
imperial appointments of all officials of rank x 5 and up, and the
prime minister ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ should offer his opinion on them.
As for officials of rank 6 and below, they are appointed by a chih (旨).
The Board of Personnel selects men of talent and appoints them to office (shu-
chih 署職). The imperial order (chao-chih 詔旨) has the character, "I
have heard" (I approve) written on it. (note: (旨) is pronounced
with a falling tone. men (命) means chou-men 奏命). The kao-shen (告身)
office warrant of officials of rank 6 and below all have the character, men, on it.

In the k'ai-y'uan period (713-42, Hsüan-tsung), the posts of chi-chü (起居), yu-po? (遺補), and yü-shih (御史) seem all to have been included in the Ministry of Personnel (Hsüan-ts'ao).

personal favoritism

After this time ~~the~~ favored officials gained control of the court and did away with fair recommendations (kung-chü 公舉) and carried out (appointments) on the basis of personal ~~xxxxxxxx~~ favors (favoritism).

Appointments to high posts (Chou-hsing, the road to Chou, royal road 周行) as well as common rank could not be carried out unless it had the approval of the prime minister at the time. At the present time, since my recommendations have been carried out, there have been ~~xxx~~ scarcely a dozen men (recommended for office). With regard to their qualifications and reputations, there is nothing to be ashamed about, and with regard to their actions and abilities, I have not heard of any wrongdoing or deficiencies, ~~xxxxxxxx~~ but some people who are discussing this question are quick to speak out and bother the emperor's sage intelligence. From this one can understand also that it is difficult to carry out the (proper) way. I request that those people who are complaining be directed to write out ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ facts and to verify what is true or false. Anybody who has made a g bad recommendation (of an official) should be punished, and anybody who has falsely said someone was good (when he was bad) ~~xxxx~~ should be held responsible. If the name of the p main person involved (the recommender?) is not revealed, it is not possible to distinguish or investigate (punish) people. If both the bent and the straight ~~xxx~~ how (coins) are strung on the same string, then ~~what~~ will people have ~~xx~~ faith (in the value of a string of cash)? Furthermore, there are only a few prime ministers (chief ministers, tsai-hsiang), so how would they be able to know too many scholars (people)? One ~~xxxxxx~~ by right investigate (candidates) from many aspects and question them. If a system of public selection is converted to a private one (based on familiarity and vaforitism), then human feelings will definitely play a large role.

290, 14:35a

290, 14:35a) Moreover, the tsai-hsiang (prime ministers), chief ministers today used to be of state) of ~~the present time~~ the chief officials of (before they were promoted) the tai and sheng (^{臺省}) ~~of the past~~, while the chief officials of the tai and sheng today will be the tsai-hsiang (prime ministers) of the future. (They are the same men:) it is only their office titles that have changed. If their actions and performance were not outstanding ~~then at the time when they became chief officials~~ how would they not be able to recommend one or two of their subordinate officials, ^{but} ~~and~~ when they attained the position of tsai-hsiang, they ~~would be able~~ ^{would be able (all of a sudden qualified)} to select all their subordinate officials? The reason why there is such anxious debate over this is because there is much confused thinking about it. Generally speaking, a man who holds a high position (tsun-che ^{尊者}) is in charge of the essential matters (ling chi yao ^{領其要}), while those who occupy low positions (pi-che ^{卑者}) have responsibilities for the details. 蓋尊者領其要, 卑者任其詳). This is why the rulers select their ministers and their ministers select the bureau chiefs, and the bureau chiefs select their assistants and subordinate officials. The greater and more exalted the responsibilities, the fewer the number of 14:35b) people selected (by an official). As the process of examining people gradually descends, the matter of recommending (inferiors) gradually is taken more lightly. In appointing and advancing people into office, you should not violate the requirements of order (rank), and in selecting people for office, you should not err in the categories of men (outstanding or stupid). With regard (to distinguishing) the types of men (ryu ^類 :whether smart or dumb), you have to know in detail what their actual behavior is, and when you have rank order, then you close off opportunities for people making requests for office. If you want to strive to obtain the best men, there is no easier method than this. In searching for talent you should emphasize a broad investigation (of men) and in examining and testing people, and ~~through investigation of talent~~ you should emphasize thoroughness.

appoint
sub.

behavior
not
rank