The History of an Incident and its Lessons:

Communal Violence Among Arabs in Israel

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

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

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

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

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Abstract

The History of An Incident and Its Lessons:

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A violent incident took place between two Palestinian Arab villages in Galilee, Israel. One village is prominently Druze, and the other is Christian. The dissertation provides a background history on these communities and the way they traditionally manage conflicts. It also contextualizes such incidents in the structure of state policies and their effects on the relationship between the different religious groups.

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Acknowledgements

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I am also indebted to the support of my partner, friend, and intellectual companion, Sunaina. I am very thankful for that.

Dedication

For my family and friends, those who are present with me even when they are physically not. For Sunaina who supported me all the time.

For so many people who came into my life and helped me to go on despite the difficulties faced all the way through.

For those who I met, that were very able intellectually, but for a reason or another were not able to continue, which made me insist on my goal and dream.

Introduction

On April 11th 1981, a soccer game took place between teams from two neighboring Palestinian Arab towns within the State of Israel: Kafr Yassif, which is predominantly Christian (55%), and Julis, an all-Druze town[1]. The game took place in Kafr Yassif, and it was a decisive game in that it would decide which of the two teams would proceed to the upper soccer league in Israel. During the game, a fight took place between the fans of the two teams. During the fight, a person from Julis was stabbed (by his own knife). The game continued and Julis won the game. Then fighting resumed between the fans, and a man from Julis threw a bomb grenade at the Kafr Yassif crowd and injured a few of them. At night, the man from Julis, who was stabbed during these fights, died in the hospital. A teenager from Kafr Yassif who was injured by the bomb grenade also died in the hospital.

Attending the game with my friends, none of us expected all this to take place. We were excited to watch the game, but this excitement turned to be a disappointment after seeing people fighting, people being beaten and injured. Although Julis won the game, their fans were beaten in the fight that took place during and after the end of the game. I had also imagined that it must have been humiliating for fans from Julis to be beaten, regardless of who started the fight. From that evening, I was around family members, friends, and people in village discussing the consequences of the soccer game fiasco. What would the people of Julis do? We were aware of the arms they had, because most of them served in the army. No one was sure if they would attack the whole village to take revenge, or whether they would just attack those who were suspected in the killing of the fan from Julis. We were also aware of the efforts that were underway for achieving *Sulha*- a conflict resolution method used in Arab tradition to prevent further violence and bring an end to conflicts between parties. For a few days, we saw police vehicles around the village, which made us feel that the situation is serious. Some were saying that the police guaranteed that there would be no attack

[1] The Arabs here are Israeli citizens, unlike those in the territories occupied after the 1967 war.

emanating from Julis. Other did not believe that. They argued that the Druze will attack and take revenge, and many felt unease about it but argued that Julis was most likely to attack only those suspected of the killing. Feeling unsure about the consequences, some families left the village and sought refuge in neighboring villages by friends and relatives. My father said that we are not going to leave, because he did not believe that Julis would attack random people in the village. So, my family stayed in Kafr Yassif and did not leave the house.

My father was right and wrong at the same time. On Monday, the 14th almost three days later, Julis attacked Kafr Yassif. My relatives' homes that were located on the main route of the village were attacked. Our house was saved since we lived in the older part of the village, where old narrow alleys makes it hard for cars to pass through easily. I still remember sitting in the classroom, when we heard automatic guns shots. The teacher went out to see, since the school was located in the center of the village near the local council from where the shots were heard. The school director decided that when the shooting stopped for a bit around the school, that he and teachers will help the students to go home, fearing that if we remained in the school, that another jeep with automatic machine guns might get into the school and put hundreds of students in danger. I ran home like all other students, guided by our teachers who asked us to take the narrow alleys on the way home. I arrived home and saw that all my family was there, and many of my nephews and nieces were taking refuge at our house, since it was the closest to their schools and kinder-gardens.

For over an hour or so, we stayed quietly at home, hearing shots and shouts in the near by streets. After some time, when the shooting and the noise stopped, we got calls from our relatives that the attack was over, yet we needed to stay at home as a precaution. We remained at home for more few hours. Then I decided to walk out with my brothers and sisters. We wanted to go to see our relatives whose homes we heard were attacked. They had managed to escape from the house during the attack and none of them was harmed, only their homes and cars. The streets and homes that we passed through looked terrible. We saw

burned homes, cars, and it looked like a post war scene. We arrived at my uncles' house. People started to get out and talk about what took place. People were very shocked.

For several days after that event, people were talking about how the attack took place, and how the police behaved, and how the attack took place. Those who saw what took place were the center of the conversation, wherever I went around the village. Some blamed the case on those who participated in the fight during the soccer game, those who were suspected of the killing of the fan from Julis. Others blamed the local council for not trying enough to stop further deterioration. Some argued, if we were like the Druze drafted in the Israeli army, we would have had arms, we would have been able to defend ourselves, or even the attack would not have taken place. Some blamed the police for not doing what it ought to do-prevent or stop the attack. Others argued further that their families had friends in neighboring villages and Kibbutzim who had arms and came to help, were prevented by the police from entering the village. Many questions, and many thoughts and analyses were shared among the people for days, even weeks.

The tense atmosphere in the village remained for weeks, until the *Sulha* took place weeks later in May 1981. People were angry at the police, at the government for not allowing independent investigation to take place regarding the police behavior. Many argued that the government must have been behind this, or it wanted to cover up for some individuals in the ministry of interior security, and that is why they were pushing people in Kafr Yassif to accept the *Sulha* without the condition of an independent investigation. The claims made by many suspecting the government's role in the incident, and government's response did not escape my mind, nor the shock of the event after many years.

My aim in this dissertation is to answer questions that I and many in Kafr Yassif had about the event. The police claimed that they acted in this laissez-faire manner in order to prevent more casualties by not getting involved in the incident. Inhabitants of Kafr Yassif argued that the police did not respond more actively because they were actually complicit in the event; many residents felt that the

police were interested in further infighting between the two towns and that this was in line with the policies of state authorities towards the Arab Palestinian community in Israel. Local residents also pointed out that the relationship between the two towns was very friendly until the event and that the violent event could not be characterized as rooted in a historical enmity or as an act of revenge between the two communities.

I had conversations with people in the village and the region about it several times since then. The dominant analysis of the event was that the Druzes in Julis were used by the government, with help of leaders in the Druze community, to attack Kafr Yassif and punish it for its history of resistance to state policies. In these conversations, it was often pointed out to the attempt by the state authorities to instigate internal violence, to still fear in the Arab community as a means of silencing it, and as an attempt to make life much less safe for them and to encourage Arabs thus to leave the country as a result of fear and the feeling of insecurity.

My research investigates the claims made by the police and Israeli government as well as the claims made by the community in Kafr Yassif. I will discuss the findings of the research by attempting to answer the two main questions that emerge from the research: first, was the state behind the event as eye witnesses claimed? Second, was the relationship between the two communities prior to the event really as peaceful as the inhabitants claimed?

The research is multi disciplinary. It tackles the issue of state society relations, and the question of policies implementations in weak or strong states. It also complements the top-bottom approach of historiography, in which the state and elites' voices dominate. The bottom up approach that is also utilized here complements the narrative of the state and allows for better understanding of the event. I also make use of archival work, including local archives from the Kafr Yassif local council, as well as the local newspapers, that add to the state centered interpretation. And finally, in the field of anthropology, the research utilizes the extended fieldwork, accompanied by intimate knowledge of the community

studied, their history and language. I believe that local voices are important to include in researching such incidents, and they are even more important when the case has not been studied before, as is the case in this dissertation.

The specific contribution of the research is that it examines through this case study the relationship between state policies and communal/ethnic violence, the intertwining of history with modern problems, and the role of external as well as internal factors in creating group violence. It is known that states do not declare some policies openly, and researchers often wait decades till states archives are declassified. What I suggest instead is rather to investigate states' policies by examining repeated actions of state authorities and to draw a conclusion of undeclared yet discernable policy in regards to the issue under investigation, which will help to shed light on states' policies at earlier stage, even when these policies are often practiced without being openly declared.

Finally, the study demonstrates how societies manage violence and conflict when governments or authorities do not, or cannot, intervene. These questions are especially important now that there is an increased interest in research in the minority-majority relationship around the world, which is perceived as the most serious threat to global security[2].

The dissertation provides an analysis that will examine several layers of this issue-the violence between two Arab Palestinian villages and its larger implications in the chapters that follow. The next chapter will review the literature on nationalism and ethnic conflicts and evaluate how the literature in this field can help shed more light on the event. Chapter three will provide a brief historical background about the Palestinian community in Israel, the Druze, the Druzes in Israel, and the two villages—Julis and Kafr Yassif, and the history of communal relationship, mainly among Druzes and Christians. The chapter will also review the history of the relationship between the two villages. Since there is not much material on this particular topic mainly through oral histories by local members of the Palestinian Arab community in Israel, and also because there is an

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[2] Ghanem & Mustafa (Eds.), 2004, *A state against its Citizens*, p.3.

argument that communal relationship in the region could have bearing on the communities around them, I will also examine the relationship between the Druze and non-Druze Arabs in the area more generally, in order to learn if there is any history of violence that might help shed light on the event in Kafr Yassif.

In the fourth chapter, I review the policy of the Israeli state towards the Palestinian Arab minority, summarizing the main points in these policies in general and focusing particularly on their effects on the communal relationships between the different religious communities within the Arab community in Israel. I will also try to identify if there is a pattern in the actions of the state, authorities, and police that could reveal more about the motivations and meanings of police behavior in this specific event. The fifth chapter will present the event based on the field research I have conducted in Galilee, Israel from 2003-2005, including conversations with eyewitnesses, historical research in local archives, and then to report and analyze media coverage of the event, and see how these two sources complement each other. In this chapter, I will also discuss similar incidents that took place within the Arab community and try to see whether there is a pattern that can be discerned to shed more light on the communal relations as well as on state authorities' behavior in such incidents. Finally, in the sixth chapter, I will discuss in the conclusion what was found and learned from researching this incident.

In some parts of the dissertation I chose to discuss briefly a certain topic while expanding more when dealing with another. The reason for that is either there is lack of available information about it, such as the case when I discuss the history of the Druze village-Julis. In another case, I chose to talk briefly about the historical background of the Palestinians in Israel, because this topic comes again in the chapter that discusses the state policy towards them from which enough will be learned about this community. I also provide a list of further suggested readings on that topic for those who are interested in getting more information. On the topic of the Druze community, I discuss the issue with more details because there little written about this community, and also because it will shed

more light on the event that took place in Kafr Yassif in 1981 and puts is in a larger context.

Finally, I would like to address the concern of possible partiality in my research. The possible partiality could be in regards to two issues. The first, is that since I am from Kafr Yassif, I might have prejudice against Julis. To put this issue to rest, I argue from the start that people from both villages are guilty of taking part in the violence. Regardless of the state role in it, I believe, that the Arab community is responsible for dealing with group violence regardless of the causes or circumstances. There have been many incidents were a fight between individuals from different families, or faiths, or villages, that led to group violence to include whole families, sects, or villages. This is something that goes beyond states policies. It is a phenomenon that ought to be dealt with by individuals and leaders in the Arab community.

Secondly in regards to the first possible bias, my research is not about assigning blame, but rather understanding of why the event took place, was the relationship between the two villages peaceful prior to the event, and what internal dynamics might have helped to turn the two villages against each other. I believe that both villages are victims of history and the manipulation of thereof leaders and individuals from within and from without.

In regards to my second possible bias against the state of Israel, I will deal with it by the following. First, I argue that communal and ethnic violence is not a specific phenomenon that exists in Israel alone, but it happens in many places in the region and elsewhere. So, the case in Israel is not an exception in regards to this issue. Secondly, even though these events happen in many places, and the real or imagined causes for them are often manipulated, I argue that in modern times, states are solely responsible for the security of their citizens, whether in India, Spain, or Israel. Thus, my argument is that states bear the main responsibility if violence takes place among groups under their authorities. This is true for Israel, as well as any other country in the region and beyond. This is even more true for strong states. In weak states, the question is to address the factors that make the

state weak and unable to protect its citizens. Furthermore, Individuals and groups can always be manipulated to take part in violence against each other, as history has shown. Often, it is impossible to understand the rationale that makes these individuals and groups participate in violence. Since, it is commonly accepted among scholars that states are rational, despite some contrary arguments in some cases, the focus of inquiry regarding this phenomenon ought to be the state and state's institutions, their action or inactions, their abilities or inabilities to insure the safety of their citizens and prevent group violence within their borders.

Furthermore, I will point to other cases in my dissertation that deal with similar incidents that took place in Israel, so that it is not seen as a displaced critique against the Israeli government because of what took place in Kafr Yassif. Using other cases will help shed more light on whether there is a pattern of behavior by states authorities in other villages and towns. I will also put the context of the event in the general relationship between the state of Israel and its Palestinian Arab citizens. Putting the incident in this larger context will help shed light on the event itself and help examine whether the states authorities' behavior in the Kafr Yassif incident is an exception not the norm.

Finally to address the two possible levels of possible biases, I argue that all cultures, regardless of religion or ethnicity, are not immune from violence. Furthermore, all states regardless of what political system they have are also not immune from violence against populations under their sovereignty. The main question in the dissertation is my concern with the policies of the state and how these affect the relationship between the different ethnic or religious groups in it. It is not a defense on behalf of any group, nor an attack on any specific group or a state. My hope is to keep this in mind in the different parts of the dissertation so that the analysis will help add a new insight in the field of ethnic or communal violence.

Chapter I.

Nationalism: Theories and applications

In this chapter, I will discuss the main theories that explain nationalism, types of nationalism, and their consequences, and the main causes of ethnic conflicts. And in the second part, utilizing some of the theories and approaches to nationalism and ethnic conflicts, I will illustrate the case study in my dissertation.

I. A. Explaining nationalism

The significance of ethnic conflicts is seen in events in the Balkan, Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Middle East. Nationalist conflicts proved to be the most bitter and intractable of conflicts, the most costly in terms of lives ad resources, and the most resistant to mediation-solution, and the most destabilizing to the economic, social, and political stability of states, regions, and the globe at large (Smith, 1998)[3].

Originating in Europe, nationalism spread and was adopted as a way to replicate the successful model of the western nation-state in the rest of the world. Nationalism seemed to be the way to modernity and development (Smith, 1998). Some scholars (Grosby, Van den Berghe) argue that the phenomenon of nationalism is not completely modern. They argue that at least some nations had perceived themselves as such for hundreds and thousands of years. Scholars (such as Smith) argue that some aspects of nationalism have deeper longer history than modernists would accept. Yet, most scholars agree that nationalism is modern in its political meaning (Snyder, 1954)[4]. According to Esman, only since the 19th century, has the term acquired its current political meanings and institutional power; a process of formation or growth of nations, sentiments or consciousness of belonging to the nation, a language and symbolism of the nation, a social and political movement on behalf of the nation, and a doctrine and ideology of the nation (Esman, 1994).

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[3] Anthony D. Smith (1998). *Nationalism and Modernism.*
[4] Louis Snyder (1954). *The Meaning of Nationalism.*

Nationalism is an ideology that places the nation at the center of its discourse and concerns and seeks to promote its well-being. Nationalism's goals are: national autonomy, unity, and identity. So, it is an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity, and identity for a population some of whose members deem it to constitute an actual and potential nation based on territory, culture, and or ethnicity. The goals of national movements could be either independence-secession/liberation, autonomy within the state, or independence and unification across national-states borders (Hutchinson, 1994).

While there are different kinds of nationalist ideologies such as religious, secular, conservative, radical, imperial, secessionist...etc. according to Smith, they all share one thing: the pursuit of nationhood, and basic common elements with the following basic prepositions: The world is divided into nations, each with its own character, history, and destiny, the nation is the sole source of political power, loyalty to the nation overrides all other loyalties, the individual's freedom is guaranteed through belonging to a nation, every nation requires full self-expression and autonomy, and finally global peace and justice requires a world of autonomous nations. (Kedouri 1960, Smith 1991)

John Breuilly as well as Kedouri, among many scholars, argues that nationalists, in reality, rather often suppressed the self-expression, autonomy, and character of their nations when it suited their interests or the alleged interests of their own nation. And they have also often resorted to violence and coercion rather than persuasion in the pursuit of their goals.

Nationalism, it is argued, becomes of paramount importance to people in times of crises of nation-building, conquest, external threat, disputed territory, or internal perceived dominance of a hostile ethnic or cultural group. Nationalism demands the rediscovery and restoration of the nation's unique culture, and identity; and this means returning to one's authentic roots in the historic cultural community inhabiting its ancestral homeland. The nation is a form of public culture and political symbolism and ultimately of politicized mass culture, that

seeks to mobilize the citizens to love their nation, observe its laws and defend their homeland (Kedouri, Freeden).

Membership in the nation is, for some, inborn or ethnic and not acquired (Fichte and German nationalism), or chosen-voluntary-civic and acquired after birth. Hans Kohn describes these two forms of nationalism as Eastern and Western nationalisms, where Western nationalism is a more benign form based on the idea that the nation was a rational association of citizens bound by common laws and shared territory, whereas Eastern varieties of nationalism were based on a belief in common cultural and ethnic origins, and as such tended to regard the nation as an organic whole, transcending the individual members, and stamping them from birth with an indelible national character. In the West, a strong bourgeois was able to build a mass-citizen nation with a civic spirit, whereas the East lacking such bourgeoisie class provided fertile soil for organic conceptions of the nation and for authoritarian and mystical forms of nationalism (Kohn, 1955)[5].

Hechter (2001) divides nationalism into the following types: State building nationalism that aims to form a state for a group before being part of any other nation state, peripheral nationalism that exists among a group within the borders of already existing nation state, irredentist nationalism that exists among a group that aims to extend the border of the state to include or incorporate territory of adjacent state, and finally unification nationalism that aims to unify already existing states that are culturally similar.

Other scholars have divided nationalism of different types based on different bases- territory, race, as movement from above, Risorgimento nationalism, integral nationalism, or decolonizing nationalism[6]. But, as Smith argues, typological discussions are not helpful since at the end, one needs to deal with the problems and consequences of nationalism rather with what type it is.

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[5] Hans Kohn (1955). *Nationalism, Its Meaning and History.*

[6] John A. Hall. "Nationalisms: classified and explained." Daedalus v122 n3 (Summer 1993): pp1(26).

Smith argues further that the argument that civic nationalism is more liberal than ethnic nationalism is not grounded. He argues that the so-called civic nationalism can also introduce illiberal and xenophobic policies such as the case with France after the revolution, where the nationalism of the majority is the dominant state nationalism and minorities were not protected to develop and observe their own nationalisms. And this is also still the case with many civic nationalisms in different western states (Vital, 1990). Similarly, Anthony Marx (2003) points out that English and French nationalism were born during bitter wars and had nothing civic or liberal about them at the start[7].

To analyze the consequences of nationalism scholars have explained this phenomenon in many ways, but the four major paradigms, even though each category contains scholars that differ in method and explanation, are divided as primordialists, perenialists, modernists, and postmodernists.

Primordialists argue that nationalism existed since the beginning of history. This view was developed first by the German philosophers Herder and Fichte. This school of thought was aided by what was once thought to be scientific research about race and also by the social Darwinist's theory of social evolution. As Van den Berghe (1978, 1995) argues, this explains why people who have no direct relations to each other but are taught to believe that they do are prepared to nurture and defend and to treat unknown co-ethnics as if they were kin. Scholars of this school attempt to understand the passion and self-sacrifice characteristic of nations and nationalism by deriving them from the primordial attributes of basic social and cultural phenomena like language, religion, territory, and especially kinship. Primordialists point to the link between ethnicity and kinship, and ethnicity and territory, and the ways they generate powerful sentiments of collective belonging. Nationalist violence is thus explained here as being irrational as well as deterministic (Van den Berghe, Grosby).

Perenialists view nations over the long history and point to the role of their long term components of historical development. Nations and nationalisms are,

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[7] Anthony Marx (2003), Faith in Nation.

for them, continuous or recurrent in history. They point to the fundamental ethnic ties of nations, rather than the process of modernization. (Fishman, Armstrong, Seton-Watson, Connor, Horowitz). They point to the function of language and ethnicities, the power of myths of origin and familial metaphors, in rousing popular support for nationalism. They point to the continuous and recurrences of the ethnic phenomena. Nations are recurrent phenomena even if they change their form of expression, but there were always some at all historical times. These scholars don't agree completely with the rational or with the irrational explanations of ethnic and religious violence, yet draw much on the irrational explanations in their analyses.

Modernists argue that nationalism is an instrumental phenomenon neither primordial nor natural. Scholars of this school seek to derive nationalism and nations from the process of modernization, and how states, nations and nationalisms, and their elites, have mobilized and united populations in ways to cope with modern conditions and modern political imperatives (Gellner, Hobsbawm). Modernists point to the role of discursive networks of communication and of virtualized activities and symbolism in forging national communities. Mann, Breuilly, Tilly, and Giddens for example demonstrate the formative role of the state, warfare and bureaucracy on nationalism. Brass and Hechter point to the decisive role of political elites and their strategies, and finally Nairn, Gellner, and Kedouri point to the intelligentsia and their decisive role in the formation of national identity and violence.

Thus, Druzes, like other religious groups in the Middle East, would be seen by Smith as ethnic groups, each having its own specific identity. These identities developed over history where during different political systems, especially, minorities, were granted an autonomous civil and religious status, which has helped create a separate identity from the majority. These groups also, suffered at times persecution, which strengthened their sense of besieged communities, and common destinies.

Finally, postmodernists reveal and point to the fragmentation of contemporary national identities, and to the emergence of post-modern global culture. They both extend the modernist paradigm to explain how nationalism has been changed (Bhabha, Chatterjee, Yuval-Davis), and point to the fictitious, and therefore unstable dynamics of identity formation in plural western societies (Anderson).

Drawn from the four paradigms just summarized, there sprang mainly five approaches that scholars have adopted to explain the nature and causes of nationalism. These approaches are:

1. Socio-cultural (Ernest Gellner), which links nations and nationalism to the need to generate 'high culture' for modernization and industrial development. Nationalism is sociologically necessary phenomena of modern industrial emerging in the transition to modernization. It is an expression of a literate, school transmitted high culture supported by specialists and by a mass, standardized mandatory, public education system. Individualism, modernity, and nationalism support each other in this context.

2. Socio-economic, Marxian (Tom Nairn, Michael Hechter, Eric Hobsbawm), which derive nationalism from the interests and the individual's rational working-economic and social of the world economy and industrial capitalism, with its class conflict and regional inequality, out of inequality between developed and underdeveloped regions. It is a result of nationalist elite/leaders' rational calculations to maximize their benefits and or power. In similar vein, Marxist explanation (Eric Hobsbawm) argues that nationalism is created as an elite and capitalists manipulation of the masses, and is tied to capitalism's need for larger territories and markets. Nations owe much to the invented traditions, which are products of social engineering and serves to advance the interests of the ruling elites who channel these traditions to the masses.

3. Political (Charles Tilly, Anthony Giddens, Michael Mann, John Breuilly), point to the relationship of nationalism to the sources of power, elites,

and the modern state. Nations and nationalism forged through the modern professionalized state, either directly or in opposition to specific (imperial, colonial…) states, as a state sovereignty protection mechanism.

4. Ideological (Elie Kedouri), according to which nationalism is a belief system, a form of religion, and links it emergence and power to changes in the spheres of ideas and beliefs. It is a European origin with the breakup of empires traced to the Kantian idea of self-determination, and it had destructive effects on the non-European peoples when an alienated intelligentsia adopted this doctrine in their native ethnic and religious traditions.

5. Modernist/post-modernist (Anderson, Chatterjee), view nationalism as created and imagined identity to achieve political goal, through the construction of invented tradition, and an imagined community. This view emphasizes nationalism's constructed character. Nations are thus imagined political communities used to fill the void left by the decline of cosmic religions and empires and monarchies.

To be sure, these are not mutually exclusive, and there is considerable overlap in these explanations, but each model stresses different aspects of the phenomenon.

Smith (1998) argues, that the cultural and psychological importance of nationalism that it exerts on people in every continent and the way it aspires them and resonates among them so strongly, suggests that we pay closer attention to the symbolic elements of language and ideology of nationalism and to the moral, ritual, and emotional aspects of the discourse and action of nations and national groups. Thus, he argues that we need to focus on the non-rational demands as well as on the rational ones in understanding and explaining this phenomenon.

It is also important to mention here that despite the variation of their theoretical origin and methodological approaches, most scholars agree on the problematic nature of nationalism and consequent conflicts arising from it. But, aspects from these different schools, such as economic, political factors, as well as, the subjective symbolic and socio-cultural elements emphasized by these

schools, as well as the fact that scholars of all schools share the same concerns about the nature and the consequences of this phenomenon, are important points to keep in mind.

In fact, if we try to understand the origins of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is possible to synthesize these various approaches to show how they can all contribute to an understanding of how two national identities developed against each other. Nationalist conflicts can arise and develop in the context of international politics and often are affected by external factors that are not the making of groups' concerned. In other words, nationalist conflicts can be often affected by internal and external factors.

Explanations that focused on the internal dynamics of nationalism can help us understand much about such issues. Yet, such explanations are not sufficient. As Leonard Binder point out to in his work "Ethnic Conflict and International politics of the Middle East" external factors also affect, ignite, or create nationalism. These factors are often in my view ignored and not much explored in thee studies of nationalism. The relationship between international politics and ethnic conflict was also pointed to by Hechter (2000) in regards to the case of the former Yugoslavia.

Ethnic conflicts are hardly free from external effects, and many conflicts turned into protracted violence only when there are external forces that aid this party or another in conflict. External support can be in many forms; i.e. financial, military, political, and legal. This support could come from different sources such as states, coalition of states and or organizations.

The Israeli Palestinian conflict cannot be understood without taking into consideration the role of external forces in it. Even though, the conflict have been caused initially by two national movements with conflicting goals, it is only after the issuing of the Balfour declaration by the British government, which gave the Zionist movement a kind of legal support of their goal to establish a Jewish state in Palestine, that the conflict became serious. Later, the Zionist movement was helped much by donations and support of international Jewish organization and

by the help of the British mandate government from the 1920s till the late 1940s, thus leading to the start and increase of violence between Arabs and Jews, when Palestinian Arabs felt threatened by a movement that was coming to establish a state for the Jews, not for all citizens and especially not for all of them, and when they saw the British colonial regime was helping the Zionist movement in achieving that goal. Since then, the legal, political, financial, diplomatic and military help (with varying degrees) that both Palestinians and Zionists/Israelis have received from external actors over the last decades has only helped to keep the conflict violent.

This is also the case when one examines the Kurdish question in Turkey. It is true that the PKK capitalized on historic and economic grievances that the Kurds in Turkey had, yet the PKK was mostly able to fight against the Turkish state with the help of many parties including neighboring Syria. When Syria asked the PKK leader Ocalan to leave its territory and dismantled PKK training camps in Syria, under Turkish pressure, and stopped aiding the PKK, the violence between the PKK and the Turkish army decreased. Resat Kassaba[8], in his study on the Kurdish-Turkish conflict, argues that regardless of external factors, the Kurdish question would not have disappeared in Turkey. It is also worth adding to this well founded argument, that, also, without external support; legal, economic, political, and or militarily, both groups in conflict would not have been able to sustain the fight in this long conflict.

These two examples are among many other cases in Africa, Europe, Asia and the Middle East, thus help explain where external forces, if not creating the conflict and violence, helped to turn it into a protracted violent process. Thus, more attention is needed to the role of external/international factors in the phenomena of ethnic conflicts (Hironaka, 2004).

Further, I argue that in cases of ethnic conflicts many approaches should be adopted in order to better understand the start of nationalist strife and its

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[8] Resat Kasaba (2000). "Kurds in Turkey: A National Movement in the Making." In Ehnopolitical Warfare, edited by Chirot and Seligman, pp.163-178.

development. To illustrate my argument, I will discuss the conflict that took place with the break-up of Yugoslavia. Several explanations were presented to explain what took place with the collapse of Yugoslavia and why conflicts between Serbs, Croats, Bosnian Muslims, and Kosovo Albanians occurred.

One explanation of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia focused on the ancient/historical animosity that the Balkan had for centuries. The claim was that the 1990s conflict was a reoccurrence of past and ancient hostilities. Scholars don't take this explanation seriously but many do trace the conflict to the late 19th century (Ivo Banak, Aleksa Djilas). A second explanation focused on the nationalist extremist leaders who wanted to retain or expand power and control over territory. According to this explanation, Serb leaders, especially, were not willing to give up power and allow leaders of other groups to control population and territory and secede into separate political entities[9].

A third explanation, such as that of Susan Woodward, looked into external factors to the conflict. One part of this explanation concerns the halt of aid to Yugoslavia after the cold war. It is argued that the Western countries (especially the US) were aiding financially the former Yugoslavia during the Cold War in the context of their policies of containing and fighting communism. This financial aid was used by the Tito government to distribute resources to the different republics. Yet, when the Cold War ended, the foreign aid was stopped and led to reduction of financial resources to the government in Belgrade and consequently to the different provinces. This led to alienation and dissatisfaction of the different provinces, which started to call for secession from the discriminatory central government. Another aspect of the external factors affecting the conflict was the recognition and aid of Germany and other European states to the Croats, which pushed the sides more for confrontation than to dialogue and compromise.

These are the main explanations to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. In fact none of these explanations is wrong in and by itself. Yet, to understand fully what took place in the former Yugoslavia more than one/single explanation

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[9] See Hechter (2000), *Containing Nationalism.*

should be included to better understand and explain that conflict. Thus, all three explanations are better combined to help understand what took place there. This is also true for any other conflict, where multiple explanations/approaches should be utilized to understand the start and course of an ethnic strife (Misha Glenny, 2000).

Furthermore, some scholars have focused on instrumental explanations for ethnic and religious violence, others have based their explanations on primordial and emotional, irrational factors. Yet others have combined both approaches to explain the many violent conflicts among the different religious and ethnic groups around the world. I believe that both instrumentalist and non-instrumentalist approaches are required in addition to external factors to understand the eruption of ethnic and religious violence.

Although many scholars have argued that the end of the Cold War has caused many civil wars, other scholars have disputed that argument. For example, David Laitin and James Fearon argue, in one of their articles[10], that although grievances are not irrelevant and should be addressed, these grievances—economic, historical, are often proxies of the conflict and violence. They argue that weak states are the major cause for inter groups' violence. They also argue that the spread of democracy and tolerance for minorities are tools in the right direction, so also is economic growth, yet the immediate focus of analysis of this phenomenon is in the strength of the state and its policing abilities that are the most important guarantee to prevent or control groups' violence. This might be true in some cases, but it would not suit the case in my dissertation, since, as will be explained in later chapters, Israel is a strong state with highly centralized and efficient security system.

Another approach of instrumental emphasis to explain nationalism is advocated by Hechter (2000), who argues that nationalism is a form of collective action that supplies jointly produced goods. His explanation is based on historical

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[10] Laitin and Fearon, "End of Cold War is not the cause. (Civil Wars)." USA Today (Magazine) 131.2691 (Dec. 2002): 6(1).

study of the Ottoman Empire. The driving force for it is found in modern states' attempts for centralization of further control of territory and population. He argues that groups' actions towards violence are a result of calculation of costs and benefits to that mobilization and action. Thus, the solution to nationalist violence lies in economic and social decentralization, and through governments' incentives that makes it more costly for groups to take such actions. This could explain why Arab nationalism, which many Christian Arabs joined and many led this movement, appeared in the early 20th century when the signs of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire had become clear, and as European influence rose. Thus, it is possible to see Arab nationalist leaders as wanting to take advantage of this new reality and form a state on their own independent from the Ottoman Empire, and supported by the Europeans.

Paul Brass (2003)[11] argues that proximity of communities with historical grievances, real or imagined, is a factor in causing violence, yet these factors are often proxies for other causes. In his study of religious violence in India, he argues that political leaders, especially in the period of election campaigns, instigate violence in order to help voters turn out. This is especially true to leaders of extremist political parties, who exploit prior communalism and polarization. He found in some locations in India a kind of institutionalized riot system, used by competing political leaders in the search for further power and control. Yet, What Brass does not explain is that in West Bengal for example the leftist government was successful in preventing group violence between Muslims and Hindus. This indicates to me that the state government system and seriousness about taking preventive actions and strong policing ought to be more of a determining factor in explaining violence. Focusing on state's actions or inaction can better explain why extremist political leaders are unable to do what other political leaders were able to do in states studied by Brass (Varshney, 2000). Still, this explanation can help understand why some Druze leaders in the Kafr Yassif event worked to

[11] Paul Brass (2003), *The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India.*

agitate the Druzes to take revenge against Kafr Yassif in an attempt to strengthen their position within the Druze community, as we shall see later.

Donald Horowitz (2001)[12], on the other hand is less keen on the instrumentalist explanations of groups' violence. He argues that emotional, psychological, and often irrational irruptions of violence among groups can hardly be understood in only instrumentalist explanations. He asks us to try to understand how emotional factors such as fear, hatred, and anger are central to this phenomenon. He credits violence between groups to many factors, among which, is a history of antipathy, precipitant event that arouses anxiety, anger and justification for revenge, and finally sense of little risk in using violence. His solution lies around these causes. In his view preventing violence, if possible, is through the lack of precipitant event, lack of feeling of threat among groups, lack of historical antipathy, and firm policing.

In my view, the most possibly achievable factor here is the firm policing. Historical antipathy is so present in so many countries among many groups, yet violence does not take place in all these case. This is actually similar, though more narrowly focused than the Latin and Fearon explanation which claims that ethnic violence occurs largely because of weakening state structures. Effective policing is, of course, only one aspect of effective states, and in some cases, even a strong state may not wish to police a potential conflict, but the role of the state, whether positive or negative, remains crucial. Furthermore, overcoming historical antipathy, as much as it is desired, it will need a long time to achieve. In the case of precipitated incidents, I argue that it is hard to control. Individuals' actions are so unpredictable, and they ought not to lead to group violence, when they take place. It is also hard to control historical incidents and prevent them from taking place. Similarly is the sense of justification for group revenge among some groups. Yet, all these internal factors to the groups themselves are positively better to overcome in the long run. The only two immediate factors that need to be

[12] Donald Horowitz (2001), *The Deadly Ethnic Riot.*

tacked are the firm policing, and the sense that group violence or revenge will not go unpunished.

Thus, although there are many useful points in many such studies discussed here as well as in the many other studies related to the many cases of ethnic and religious violence, I tend to argue that the nature of policing and state systems are the most important points of analysis of why violence takes place in some countries and not in others. This is not in any way to dismiss economic and historic grievances, as well as leader's manipulation. It is often also true that these grievances are manipulated to justify such acts.

A further measurement of state's policies regarding this phenomenon is needed to examine whether the state in question is keen at preventing violence. This further measurement lies in the examination of the state policies towards those religious or ethnic groups in conflict and in the manner that state authorities behave during and after such violent incidents. These two further layers of analyses can help to discern whether there is a pattern of state authorities' behavior that can tell about such policies.

More specifically, I find Horowitz's theory, in addition to Brass's, as most suitable and can explain my case study. According to such theory, there historical antipathy between Druze and Christian Arabs was present. This subject will be explored further in the next chapter. But it is worth also noting that what Ken Jowitt calls, a barricaded identity can explain the identity of many religious groups in the Middle East. Jowitt, building on Weber's theory (1968), argues that barricaded identity restricts the possibility of exit and entry to and from the group. Jowitt further argues that the honor of a person is treated as the honor of the group. Citing Chirot (1995), he argues that such barricaded identities lead to large scope of violence, where an attack on an individual justifies revenge against a whole group of the attacker[13]. Thus, we have here a historic antipathy between two groups of barricaded identities.

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[13] Ken Jowitt (2000), "Ethnicity: Nice, Nasty, and Nihilistic", in Chirot and Selgiman (2000).

Also, a precipitated event took place, where a fan from Julis was killed during the soccer game, and many other fans as well were beaten. Furthermore, a community's justification and acceptance of revenge was present also in this case, where the Druzes of Julis collectively attacked Kafr Yassif, and there was no opposition to the revenge known. In addition, local leaders manipulated the event, instead of working for calm, to strengthen their power within their communities. Finally bad policing also played a role in the Kafr Yassif Julis case.

Taking both Brass's and Horowitz's theory further, I argue to contextualize the event in what Ian Lustick's called Israeli policy of co-optation and control vis-à-vis the Arab minority. Lustick argues that the Israeli policy of control of its Arab minority worked well because Israeli governments were able to co-opt leaders and make them benefit from the system, by also a sustained low level repression of mobilization against state policies. Lustick argues further the Israeli state devised this system of control without publicly declaring it. Through economic dependence and co-optation of local leaders and their help, Israel was able to control the Arab community and prevent its mobilization against the state. These mechanisms were used as a tool in the Israeli policy of "divide and rule" in order to reinforce already existing religious and other internal divisions. This system was carried out through local clients and practiced even by Israeli low level officials without even the need for government permission. This might also help explain the police behavior during the incident in Kafr Yassif.

Furthermore, Lustick argues, that the Arabs in Israel had only the Communist party as relative venue of access to education and economic mobility and employment. Many Arabs joined the Communist party and received free education in the previously communist states in Europe, and many opened their own private businesses when their returned within their own community. It is worth noting here that many residents in Kafr Yassif were members in the Israeli Communist Party and have taken advantage of these privileges, which help

explain why economically residents in Kafr Yassif were better educated and better off economically compared to residents in Julis[14].

Putting this economic factor aside for a minute, I argue further, that it is possible to understand Israeli policing of inter communal violence in the Arab sector, as a part of that policy of control. Allowing internal fighting within the Arab community can help the state in its policy of controlling the community so that it never becomes a threat to the state security and objectives.

Understanding the event in the framework of Brass's and Horowitz's theory and connecting that general theory to Lustick's specific work on the Arab minority in Israel, is helpful to understand this event, but it can also possibly explain other cases elsewhere, where violence against and among religious groups is explained through these two approaches, where internal factors are important, yet external factors such as policing and contextualizing the issue of policing in the context of state relationship to these groups can help explain the context of police behavior and how much is that part of a larger picture of state-society, and majority minority relationship.

I. B. Applying theories to the case study

Building on the previous part utilizing mainly the explanations put forward by Brass, Horowitz, and Lustick, I will discuss the history of the development of identities of the Druze as well as Christians in the Middle East, particularly in the region around Israel/Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, and try to explain what happened in Kafr Yassif. Then, I will discuss the relative historical information, but much more about those groups will be explored as necessary in the other chapters of the dissertation[15].

To start with, I argue that these groups have developed overtime a religious identity as a result of multiple factors, namely the creation of separate

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[14] Ian Lustick (2000), "Control and Stability of Jewish-Arab relations in Israel", in Chirot and Seligman, pp. 215-234.

[15] More information about the Druzes and Christians will be discussed in chapter 3 and 6. I will use in this part as much as needed to elaborate my theoretical framework for the case.

religions, history of persecution, and policies of separate self rule/government in social/civil affairs, and colonial policies of 'divide and rule', in addition to leaders' interest in acquiring power as leaders of separate groups. Thus, groups' separate identities have developed over time and as a result of many internal and external factors.

There is a difference between Druzes and Christians, most importantly, that Christians as a religious community existed much earlier in the region. Yet, some Christian churches appeared later in time, such as the Protestant Church. The similarity between Druzes and Christians is that they are both minorities in the region that is dominantly Sunni Muslim, and they are also minorities in Israel where the majority are Jews.

Communal antipathy: Historic and current, political and economic

Historical antipathy between Druzes and Christians started in the late Ottoman rule and its attempts for political and economic reforms, which played in Lebanon, at the time of increasing European political and economic influences in the region, and affected politically and economically the different religious groups and helped create the grounds for Druze-Christian fighting. The violence between Druzes and Christian Maronites in Lebanon and Syria might have affected the historical memory of the local communities in Israel, as will be explained further in chapters 3 and 6.

This historical antipathy was further strengthened when the economically marginalized Druzes in Israel sided with the state since 1948, while the Christian community remained within the Arab national movement sphere of politics, and chose to be in the camp opposing state policies. The fact that Druzes were drafted in the Israeli army, as a result of state authorities' decision in an agreement with leaders in the Druze community, put the Druzes on a course further from the rest of the Arab community. Further more, both villages played a role in these two opposing political directions, where Kafr Yassif, as we shall see in the next

chapters, played a major role in the politics of opposition and resistance to state policies.

Also, economics might have played a role in this hostility. In Palestine-Israel, Druzes constituting a small poor minority, having in general little ownership of land, were mainly working as laborers on lands of other communities such as the local Muslim and Christian Palestinian community. After 1948, having sided with the state of Israel, and becoming part of the Israeli military helped the Druzes gain a better economic mobility, yet many Christians remained enjoying higher standard of living, enjoying, which was helped by the higher level of education, including, for some, university degrees.

Kafr Yassif resembled that picture to some extent. Residents of Kafr Yassif, the majority of whom are Orthodox Christians, have enjoyed a higher living standard, helped by the many local businesses created in the village, and by the large number of secondary education degree holders. Many Kafr Yassif professionals provided health, legal, and other services that many in the neighboring villages used. The fact that Kafr Yassif had local schools, clinics, doctors, lawyers, engineers, businesses, and shops, was a cause of envy that neighboring villages had against it.

Precipitated incident: Violence during the soccer game

In the violence that took place during the soccer game many Druzes from Julis who came as fans of their soccer team were beaten physically by fans from Kafr Yassif. Also, as a result of the violence, one fan from Julis was killed. The physical beating of many fans from Julis and the killing of one of the played major factor in the urge and justification for revenge that Druzes in Julis had. They certainly felt humiliated and injured by that. Furthermore, killing one of their fans did not help much in limiting the need for revenge on their part. Also an

important factor was the justified collective act of revenge within the community, which is a custom present among these communities.

Local leaders' role: Manipulation of masses to strengthen their power

As explained elsewhere in the dissertation, local Druze leaders have made a deal with the state of Israel to better improve their political and economic status. Their main source of internal political power comes from people within the Druze community. Thus, when leaders' such as Jaber Dahesh-Mu'addi, not only did not work to prevent the masses from taking revenge, but helped in the planning, he was acting as a guardian for the honor of the community who will stand next to them when they are hurt by other groups. Even though he might have an affinity to the person from Julis who was killed in Kafr Yassif, his moves, as historically he acted, were always self serving to increase his political power and image within his own community, and to the Israeli political establishment. As a political leader who served in the parliament and the government, his voting power base is within the Druze community, and residents in Kafr Yassif have historically also opposed such persons, and Dahesh had a history of political struggle and competition against leaders in Kafr Yassif who opposed state policies, in which Dahesh played a role as a co-opted leader, who wanted to silence opposition within the Arab community. The soccer game incident served him well to take revenge against Kafr Yassif, and to consolidate power within the Druze community.

Getting away with violence

In the calculations of violence and revenge against Kafr Yassif, the Druzes in Julis were well aware of their connection to the state. Many of them served in the army and the different state's security organs and had enough weapons at hand. Many of them were also aware of previous use of these arms by Druzes and the fact that the state did not take actions against them. They also were aware, having planned for the revenge on such a large scale, that the police will not stop

them, and that they were not going to be persecuted in courts, which also what happened. Thus previous history and police behavior on the ground gave a green light for them to attack feeling secure to commit large scale violence against another village without any legal consequences. In addition to that, they were also aware that people in Kafr Yassif are mostly not armed and they won't be able to resist the attack.

Bad policing

The police behavior is another factor that helped in the development of the event. After the end of the soccer game, the police was called upon to increase presence in the two villages. The police did so partially by deploying between 20-40 policemen in the two villages. The police was further informed that an attack against Kafr Yassif was imminent, and that more presence was needed, yet the police rejected that scenario and promised leaders and residents in Kafr Yassif that there will be no attack.

When the attack started, the police was able to block tow of the three entrances to the village, were help was coming to Kafr Yassif from neighboring villages and Kibbutzims. Yet, somehow the police was unable to block the third entrance from the attackers came.

Furthermore, when the attack was taking place, the police proceeded to retreat in the face of the attackers without any single bullet shot as a warning or deterring signal to them. The police did not use any of its available tools to block, slow, and or prevent the attack.

This bad policing seems as a pattern not as an aberration, failure or weakness, especially when compared to other cases, that I detail in chapter 5. Thus, the police behavior in this incident is to be taken as a part of larger context of similar behavior in other incidents, and is better understood when put in the larger context of state policy towards the Arab community in Israel, which Lustick's calls the policy of control.

Police behavior and state policy

The role of the police in the incident, when put in the context of state policy and relationship towards the Arab community, will be clearer to understand. As Lustick explained the policy in the framework of co-optation and control, Israel have managed since 1948 to suppress any mobilization by the Arab community through different mechanisms of repressions based on co-optation of leaders, and of distribution of some economic and political privileges that helped the state control the minority and possible collective mobilization against state policies. Having internal fighting and violence within the Arab community certainly help further divide the community, and makes it harder to collective mobilization against the state. Thus, internal divisions and antagonisms are exploited, and internal incident such as that in Kafr Yassif help polarize further the different groups.

All these factors put together, which are the making of historical economic and political developments and of internal and external nature to the community, can help us understand better what took place in Kafr Yassif, and might help explain repeated group violence in other countries. They will be further discussed in the following chapters, the first of which will start with the historical background of the Palestinian community in Israel including the history of Druzes and the two villages in question as well as the history of communal relationship in the region than I will discus the state policy towards the Palestinian community, than will discuss the event and similar incidents, and finally in the conclusion will show how all these factors contributed each on its own and collectively to what took place in Kafr Yassif.

Chapter II.

Historical background

This chapter will discuss the historical background of the Palestinian community in Israel. Since one of the two villages involved in the incident is a Druze village, I will also provide a general background about the Druze religion then talk about the Druzes in Israel. I will also provide information about the two villages themselves—Kafr Yassif and Julis. Finally, I will discuss the history of the two communities—Christians and Druzes. This chapter serves to provide a background to the field research in order to gain familiarity with the community that is being studied in this work. I will only discuss information that I see as relevant to the topic of this dissertation, and I will suggest further readings to those interested to learn more in depth about any particular issue that will be discussed here. Finally, some parts in this chapter will be shorter, as the case when I talk about Julis, because of the lack of available information about it.

II. A. Palestinians in Israel

The Palestinians in Israel have lived on the land for centuries. Even though the modern definition of that identity did not take hold until the late 19th early 20th century. Jews, Muslims, Druze, and Christians have for a long time inhabited the land. The people who lived in Palestine/Israel, have at times defined themselves according to religious or other political, familial, or regional affiliations. Since the early 16th century, the region fell under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, and many people became to define themselves as Ottomans as well. Administratively, the region was divided into different districts at different times. After WWI and the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, Britain and France—victorious in the war, divided the Middle East among themselves in accordance with their pre war agreements. France took over Syria, which was divided later to become two states—Syria and Lebanon, and Palestine fell under the British Mandate. The British government helped to establish a Jewish state in Palestine in line with their pre war promise to the Zionist movement in what became known as

the Balfour Declaration. After it became clear that the native Palestinian Arabs were opposed to that plan, and violence took place between Jews and Arabs, Britain passed on the Palestine question to the United Nation in 1947 in order to decide the future of the land. The United Nation issued a partition resolution for Palestine, according to which two states in Palestine to be established; one Jewish and one Arab. The Arabs rejected the resolution, and when Britain withdrew from Palestine, the Zionist Organization declared the establishment of the state of Israel, and war broke out between the Jews and Arabs, whose conflicting goals could not be accommodated.

In the war, the Druze community in Israel and as in what was seen as a continuation to pre war cooperation by some of their leaders with the Zionist movement, sided with Israel, despite that fact that there was an opposition to that cooperation by some leaders in the community in Israel as well as in Syria and Lebanon. But, as a result of economic and military conditions on the ground the pro Israeli side within the Druze community was able to swing the Druzes to the Israeli side. Many factors within the Druze community played in favor of siding with Israel. For one, the Druzes needed the permission of Israeli Generals to be able to access their fields, and the Israeli dominant military presence in the area of Galilee helped the Druzes in the decision to side with the Israel. Also, being a small minority that is marginalized economically and politically, and realizing that Israel was the winning party in the war, some Druze leaders were able to swing the community to the Israeli side[16]. Furthermore, during the fighting, the Arab League Army's hostile relation to some Druze village who did not take a clear stand with the Arab side, played also a role in swinging the Druzes to side with Israel[17].By the end of the war and with the hostilities between the Arab states

[16] Parson, 2000. The Druze Between Palestine and Israel 1947-1949.

[17] For more discussion on this topic see the previous cited source as well as, Robert Betts (1988) The Druze, Samy Swayed (1998) The Druzes: An Annotated Bibliography, and Kais Firro (1992) The History of the Druzes. I will also discuss some their writings on the subject in the following parts of this chapter.

and Israel, the Druzes in Israel were cut off completely from their co-religious in Syria and Lebanon.

The rest of the Arab Palestinians, Muslims and Christians, who remained, were either fighting against Israeli troops, or stood on the side for the lack of arms and because of the fact that most of the fighting on the Arab side was managed by Arab armies and led by Arab commanders from the neighboring countries[18]. Many Muslims and Christians in Palestine/Israel were part of the Arab and Palestinian national movement. These two religious groups, being land owners, and being in the political leadership of the country stood against Israel, which they saw as part of Western colonial hegemony of the region[19]. Furthermore, many Christians (Greek Orthodox, Latin Catholics, and Protestants) who were also among the elites in the Palestinian society, as also the case in the Arab society at large, were also educated in Western schools that had been established since the 19th century in the Middle East, and many of them pursued their education in Western countries. Through this education, they were exposed to ideas of nationalism, and many of them were among the leaders of the Palestinian and Arab national movement.

By the end of the 1948 war only 160,000 Arabs remained inside Israel (about 15% of the total Palestinian population), a minority equal to 12.5 percent of the new country's population at the end of 1949[20]. Thus, the Palestinians in Israel became overnight a minority and were disconnected from the rest of the Palestinian and Arab people. The majority of urban elites including political, social, economic, educational and religious leadership, left the country, and those who remained on the land were left almost leaderless except for the Israeli Communist Party.[21].

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[18] Eugene Rogan and Avi Shlaim (Eds.) (2004), The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948.
[19] For more on this issue, see the "War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948," edited by Avi Shlaim and Eugene Rogan.
[20] Findley, 1995, Deliberate Deceptions, p.90.
[21] Baladna Manual , 2004, p.157.

It is worth noting here that one of strong holds of the Israeli Communist Party was in Kafr Yassif—one of the two villages in this case study. Also as important, as Ilana Kaufman (1996) had discussed in her study of the Israeli Communist Party, that this political party was the only organization in Israel that allowed Arabs to become members. Furthermore, the Israeli Communist Party included Arab socialists who believed in the communist ideology and communist struggle as the only solution to the conflict, but the party also included Arab nationalists, since it was the only party available for Arab activism. With time, other parties allowed Arab citizens to become members, first of whom was the MAPAM, a left-wing Zionist party, which many Arabs joined and through which they hoped to improve the conditions of their daily lives[22].

In the following decades, the number of Arabs in Israel increased, due, among other reasons, to natural growth, and improved health services. In 2003, the population of Israel numbered 6,658,300, Jews are about 81.6% (5,052,000) and the Arabs are about 18.4%[23]. The Arabs are divided into 1,004,600 Muslims, 138,500 Christians, and 106,300 Druze[24]. The Palestinians live in over 100 villages, 10 towns/cities, and in 6 mixed cities. There are about 65 Arab villages that are unrecognized officially by the state. 29% of the Arabs live in Arab cities, 8.4% live in mixed cities, and 56% live in Arab villages, and the remainder (about 7.1%) live in the unrecognized villages[25].

These Palestinians who remained within the borders of the state of Israel inherited the conflict between Jews and Arabs over the land in Palestine, and with that also the aftermath of hostilities that was caused by the violence between Jews and Arabs since the early 20th century. Thus, they were treated with suspicion and

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[22] For more on this topic, see Fauzi Al-Asmar (1975), To Be An Arab In Israel.
[23] This number is not totally accurate since it includes residents of East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights that Israel occupied in 1967 war and annexed these territories later own.
[24] Camile Mansour (ed), 2004, Israel: A General Survey, p.196.
[25] Rouhana, Saleh, Sultany, 2003, Voting Without Voice, p.57.

contempt from early on by state authorities and they also resented the state and its policies[26].

After 1948, the state of Israel gave those Palestinians who remained as Israeli citizens a new designation. They became known as Israeli Arabs, even though many have developed and continue to develop a specific Palestinian identity that takes into account the fact they are citizens of the state of Israel. Also, many have maintained their local and religious identity[27]. But, as Rouhana (1997) has shown in his study, the development of Palestinian identity, through internal and external factors, has become antagonistic to and alienated from the Israeli national identity, and, that the majority of them define themselves as Arabs or Palestinians.

Describing these Palestinian Arabs in Israel, Mahmoud Mi'ari argues that these Palestinians are a national minority ruled by a Jewish settlers' majority. Even though they are considered legally Israeli citizens they are an oppressed minority alienated in its homeland and excluded from active participation in the state and policies[28]. Similarly, it is argued that the situation of Palestinians in Israel has many similarities to that of the Palestinians in the territories occupied after the 1967 war. They both share a similar distorted pattern of development characteristic of native societies in colonial-settler states[29]. Similarly, the Palestinian social structure under Israeli rule can be viewed as the outcome of a system of internal colonialism, resulting in a distorted class structure, a peasantry that is alienated from its land, and, in cities, a pattern of development dependant upon and peripheral to the Zionist dominant society[30].

According to Sultany, Arab citizens in Israel are an indigenous minority in a state that at its core regards equality between Arab and Jewish citizens as a threat and impossibility. The state belongs to and was created for Jews who in

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[26] Rabinowitz, Dan and Khawla Abu-Baker, 2005, Coffins on Our Shoulders, p.9.
[27] For more on this topic, see Rashid Khalidi (1997) Palestinian Identity and Nadim Rouhana (1997) Palestinian Citizens in an Ethnic Jewish State.
[28] in Baladna 2004, p.156.
[29] Said &Hitchens, Blaming the Victims, 2001, p.275.
[30] Ibid, p.278.

turn fulfill the very purpose of its existence. This political system and historical reality makes it almost impossible for the state theoretically to assume a neutral position towards its citizens. The Arab citizen continue to be seen as a threat to the state's security and goals, and they remain without full citizenship, and without full substantive and equal political rights[31].

Despite relative improvement, the economic development of the Palestinians in Israel is slow. They lost their agricultural basis mainly as a result of the state's policy of land confiscation, which the state allocated for the Jewish sector. At the same time, the state did not encourage industrialization in the Arab sector, and thus the Palestinian Arabs became mostly a labor supply for the Israeli Jewish economy. Even though their living standard has improved, over the years, there is huge gap between the Arab and the Jewish standard of living in Israel, where the average income of Israeli Arabs is about 10,000 U.S. dollars and the Jewish Israeli is 15,000[32].

Even though this background is true for most Palestinians, some religious communities had a slightly different experience. Druzes, for example, serving in the Israeli Army, had different access possibilities to the Israeli economy and politics. Druzes participated more actively in the Israeli Zionist political parties, and had better access to some job sectors, especially those connected to security. Yet, despite that, they also suffered from land confiscation. Funding for local councils, health and education was also less than that enjoyed by the Jewish community.

More of the situation of this community will be discussed through this chapter as well as the following chapters, in which the dynamics of Druze-non Druze and specifically Christian-Druze relationship will be further explored. Since there is little known about the Druze community and religion, I will turn to that in the next part in order to get some familiarity with this community.

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[31] Sultany, Citizens without Citizenship, 2003, p.10.

[32] For more on this subject, see also Gershon Shafir (1989) Land, Labor, and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, and Michael Shalev.

II. B. Druzes

In the following I will offer a brief background on this community, first by providing historical and regional information about them, and then talk specifically about the Druze community in Israel, as much as it is relevant to the dissertation[33].

II. B. 1. In general

The Druzes are an Arabic speaking Islamic Shi'i-Ismaili sect with formal origins in the 11th century (around 1017 AD) Egypt that was ruled then by the Fatimid caliphate that espoused the Ismai'li branch of Shi'a Islam[34]. Initially, the Druze religion was adopted by Al-Hakim, the Fatimid Caliph, who was seen by Druzes as the leader of the community. After his death, the new leadership in Egypt persecuted the Druzes, and most of them escaped to today's Syria, Lebanon, and Israel[35]. The induction of new members officially stopped in 1044[36]. As a result of persecution, the Druzes held together a tightly knit community and kept their faith in secret[37]. Only those members of the community who demonstrate piety and devotion and who have withstood the lengthy process of candidacy are initiated into the teachings of the faith[38]. In the Druze community, political and religious leaders share the leadership of the community[39].

This religious minority lives today in Lebanon, Syria, Israel, Jordan, and in smaller communities elsewhere around the world[40]. In the 1990s nearly one million Druzes live in a number of communities, 400-500,000 in Syria, 300-400,000 in Lebanon, and 5000-20,000 in Jordan. There are 60,000 Druzes living

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[33] For in depth information on the Druze, see also Samy Swayed, Kais Firro, Laila Parson, and Robert Betts.
[34] Betts, 1988, .4.
[35] Firro, 1992, p.5.
[36] Ibid, p.21.
[37] Betts, 1988, p.20.
[38] Swayd, 1998, p.14.
[39] Betts, 1988, p.24.
[40] Swayed, 1998, p. xix.

in today's Israel, another 15,000 in the Israeli occupied Golan Heights, and approximately 90,000 elsewhere around the world[41]. In the Middle East, the Druzes are a minority group that lives predominantly in the mountainous regions of today's Lebanon, Syria, and Israel.

For many Druzes, the Druze community is considered as Muslim and as Arab. Even the physical buildings of the Druzes looked like mosques[42]. Their religious courts run according to the Hanafi Islamic Sunni religious legal school[43]. Yet it is worth noting they are also a religious sect that is a minority within the majority dominant Sunni Islam which historically refused to recognize any new branch of Islam; yet some Druze scholars and historians define themselves as Druzes as Arabs and this is accepted by most Druzes as well[44]. Furthermore, Druzes have traditionally played major roles in the social and political makeup of the Islamic and Arabic worlds[45]. These arguments are used here not to present a deterministic judgment of Druze identity, but only as a counter balance to Israeli representations of the Druzes, which either describe them as a dishonest group that hides its identity in order to avoid the wrath of the ruling majority, or as an ancient group that shares much with the Jewish people and religion[46]. Furthermore, being Arab does not mean that they are not Druzes. It does not also mean that at some times Druze identity was stronger, and that both identities shift according to different historical circumstances.

Druzes have also prayer sites, and religious centers that the community utilizes for social gatherings. Only the religious members know the principles of their faith, and the rest are members in the community by birth[47]. There is not much about the religion to add here except for the often mentioned concept of

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[41] Ibid, p.5.
[42] Firro, 1992, p.47.
[43] Salman Falah, 2000, The Druzes in the Middle East, p.146.
[44] Firro, 1992, p.20.
[45] Swayd, 1998, p.5.
[46] Laila Parsons, Druze between Palestine and Israel.
[47] Membership by birth in the religious communities in the Middle East is not particular to the Druzes. This is the case with all other communities, since there is no marriage outside the church, and thus children of married couples are registered as the religion of the parents at birth.

Taqiyya-dissimilation, which is defined as hiding someone's true faith and act as loyal members of the dominant religion wherever they live. This characteristic attributed to the Druze is often criticized by many scholars and many Druzes as well, because it ignored the reality and the economic and political factors that affect the Druzes' political decisions[48].

According to Swayed (1998), Druzes have not in general been among the educated, and in general education was not available and accessible to all. While this is true of most Middle Eastern peoples, it has been more so in non-urban areas such as the areas where most of the Druze populations are found. Formal education was not available in many villages until the 20th century. Elementary reading and writing skills were often passed informally from the few educated Druze elders who were trained in the religious doctrine to a small number among the Druze youths who might eventually become initiated. European missionaries helped establish schools in some parts of the Druze areas during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with the villagers paying part of the costs. As in most Middle Eastern societies, the growing availability of formal education and professional training slowly eroded traditional occupations, but provided new professions and opportunities for many Druzes[49].

Within Druze villages and small towns, the predominant means of subsistence for several centuries was and has been agriculture. Until this century, landowners and peasants dominated the Druze economic landscape. Most Druzes have been small scale lessees of land from the landowning families, but the increase in the Druze population and decrease in the amount of land has caused some members of the sect to work in nearby cities while maintaining their residents within the villages. These urban jobs have often been in the unskilled sector[50].Whether in Syria, Lebanon, or Palestine, the traditional social structure of the Druze was based on the extended family or hamula[51]. Finally, living in

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[48] More on this, see Firro, and also Betts.
[49] Swayd, 1998, p.6.
[50] Ibid, p.5.
[51] Firro, 1992, p.178.

mountainous areas, the Druzes were able to distance themselves from central governments and often were able to escape taxation and military conscriptions and which helped them keep their social structure intact[52].

II. B. 2. In Israel

There is little information available about the Druzes in general. And even less on the Druzes in Palestine/Israel, especially during the Ottoman period (1516-1917), and the British mandate (1917-1948). According to Falah (2000), this is due to the fact that the center of Druzes activities were then in Lebanon and Syria. Druzes in Palestine were only mentioned in passing. Furthermore, neither the Ottomans nor the British recognized the Druzes in Palestine as a separate religious group even when in the 19th century they did so in regards to Druzes in Lebanon and Syria, thus the lack of separate information about them[53]. Also, the lack of much information about the Druzes in Palestine might be due to the fact that the Druzes there were much smaller in number than those in Syria or Lebanon, or due to the fact that when Druzes in Lebanon or Syria got the attention of the Europeans in the prelude to their colonization of the region, the Druzes in Palestine were not such an important factor in their calculations and planning for the colonization[54].

In Israel, the Druzes live in few villages in Galilee and on the Carmel Mountain. In general, the Druzes have lived in mountainous areas since these areas were the most defensible[55]. The exact date for the origin of Druze settlement in Palestine is hard to ascertain, yet from the different sources available, they seemed to be there since the establishment of the religion in the 11th century and from then until the creation of the state of Israel there were different waves of migration from and to Palestine to and from the neighboring lands[56]. These

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[52] Falah, 2000, p.35.
[53] Ibid, p.57.
[54] Falah, 2000, p.58.
[55] Firro, 1992, p.4.
[56] Falah, 2000, pp.59, 63.

migrations from and to Palestine were as a result of responding to different political and economic changes that were taking places in the region[57].

At the beginning of British rule of Palestine the number of Druzes was about 7,028 (about 1 percent of the total Arab population) residing mainly in eight villages in Galilee and Carmel Mountain areas. This number increased to 9,148 in 1931[58]. During the British mandate period there were three censuses conducted (1922, 1931, 1945), in which the number of the Druzes increased from 7,028 out of 757,182 total population to 14,858 out of 1,810,037. Yet their percentage from the total population dropped from 1% to 0.8% due to the increased number of Jewish immigrants coming from Europe to Palestine, whose percentage increased from 11% in 1922 to 31% in 1948 (Falah, 2000, p.68). In 2003 they numbered around 100,000, which constitute about 1.5% of the total population and 9% from the Arab community in Israel[59]. Currently, Druzes live in the Galilee, north of Israel in 18 towns and villages, in 11 of them they live on their own, in the remaining 7 they live with other Arab religious groups[60]. The huge increase of numbers over these years was mostly due to improved health services combined with a high birth rate, and to the inflation of numbers due to the inclusion of Golan Heights Druzes (taken from Syria in 1967) in the Israeli census.

Unlike the Druzes in Lebanon and Syria, the Druze society in Palestine/Israel was characterized by relatively equal distribution of small land among all families of a particular village[61]. The number of Druzes settlements in Palestine was much larger than that of today. Many of these towns and villages were deserted during migrations and wars. The last of these was the 1948 war[62], which led to the destruction of some and the evacuations of other villages.

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[57] Firro, 1992.
[58] Ibid, p.314.
[59] Al-Mithaq, 2005, p.25.
[60] Falah, 2000, p.68.
[61] Firro, 1992, p.315.
[62] Falah, 2000, p.65.

In Israel, the office of the spiritual head of the Druzes has for several generations been hereditary in the Tarif family of Julis in western Galilee[63]. One of the Druze's religiously important sites for prayers and holidays gatherings is in Kafr Yassif. Druzes in Israel live a village traditional society[64]. Not many Druzes were educated expect for a few[65]. By 1990 there were only 374 Druze academics holding university degrees of the 66,000 total number of Druze, where in Kafr Yassif (a village numbering around 6,000 at that time) alone there were 476 academic degree holders, more than the entire Israeli Druze community altogether[66]. Druzes from the different villages used to go to the four main high schools in Kafr Yassif and Rameh, Tarshiha and Shafa'amr. Only since 1975 have Druze villages started to have their own high schools[67].

After the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, the Israeli policy of "divide and rule" has treated Druzes differently from other Palestinians within its borders by providing them limited upward mobility through military and governmental channels. Even so, Druzes still face discrimination in the Israeli job market, in the education system, and in the military service itself. Most important, nearly 80 percent of Druzes' land has been confiscated by the Israeli government[68]. 95 % of the Druzes were living on farming by the year 1948, but by 2003 only 5% do so. This is as a result of the Israeli policy of land confiscation of Arab citizens including the Druze in order to make the Arab population depended on the state as a source of living and in order to co-opt them[69]. This situation is also faced by many people in different countries in the modern era through the process of modernization. Yet, what is different here is that fact that lands are confiscated only from Arab citizens, including Druze, but not from Jewish citizens, since the lands were Jews live are mostly either state owned lands

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[63] Betts, 1988, p.22.
[64] Falah, 2000, p.110.
[65] Ibid, p.75.
[66] Al-Mithaq, 2005, p.27.
[67] Falah, 2000, p.201.
[68] Swayd, 1998, p.6.
[69] Al-Mithaq, 2005, p.25.

or lands that are owned by Jewish international organizations and leased on a long term basis to them. Thus, the loss of land as a result of the land confiscation policy pushed more Arabs out of the agricultural sector of the economy.

II. C. Christians

Since the attack on Kafr Yassif was targeted mainly against Christians, I will provide some information about the Christians in the region, but mainly in the village itself. Yet, before turning to the history of the village, it is worth introducing some basic information about the Christians in the region.

Unlike the Druzes, Christians did not exist in the region as a singular unit, but there were many churches that were part of the history of the region. Since the establishment of the religion during the Roman period, the Christians in the region suffered persecution until the 4th century when the Roman Empire adopted Christianity as a state religion. Yet, even after that, many eastern Christian Churches that did not want to side with Rome were also targeted and persecuted at times by the Roman Empire.

Christians existed in different countries in the region from Egypt, to Iraq and to Palestine. In Syria, Christians belong mainly to the Orthodox as well as the Catholic Church. In Lebanon, the majority of Christians are followers of the Maronite Church, which is recognized by the Pope. Some Maronites supported the Crusaders between the 11-13th century invasions and occupations of the region, and consequently they suffered retribution on the hand of the Muslims after the defeat of the Crusaders. As a result they confined themselves to the mountainous areas of Lebanon, where also Druzes lived. In Palestine, Christians are predominantly Orthodox, and the Catholics are the second largest group among them while Protestants are the smallest.

During the Islamic rule in the region starting in the seventh century, Christians were considered an autonomous religious minority with a *dhimmi* status, where they were given freedom to run their own civilian and religious affairs, and pay special tax to the state. This toleration of religious affairs did not

mean legal, political, or even economic equality. The situation of Christians in the region fluctuated according to the ruling dynasty and according to political changes in the region. Thus, when for example the Crusaders invaded the region, some Christians sided with them, which led to backlash against Christians when the Crusaders were defeated. It is worth mentioning here also that Christians that were not recognized by the Pope were also targeted by the crusaders as well.

This *dhimmeh* minority status of the Christians continued through the Ottoman period under the millet system with increased autonomy. Later on, with the introduction of *tanzimat*-reforms by the Ottoman government during the 19th century which granted its subjects legal equality regardless of religion, Christians started to enjoy more room for economic mobility. This meant that the Muslim majority that has enjoyed a dominant political and economic status in the Empire faced new competition from the non-Muslim minorities, such as Jews and Christians.

At the same time, the 19th century also witnessed an increasing economic and military power of some European countries. Those countries were able to extract from the Ottoman Empire protection rights towards the different Christian communities in the region. France became the protector of Catholics in the region, Britain of the Protestants, and Russia of the Orthodox community. This new dynamics also affected the relationship between the different communities and the Ottoman Empire. The two main disadvantaged groups in this new context were the Muslim Sunni majority as well as Greek Orthodox Christians, while Catholics mainly benefited especially from their new relationship to France—a dominant economic power at the time. This point is worth remembering since it will reflect on the Maronites-Druzes relationship, which I will discuss in the last part of this chapter.

This economic disadvantage of the Orthodox Christians might have affected the relationship between the Christians in the region and the European states. Except Christian Maronites in Lebanon, Christians in the region played a disproportionate role in the late Ottoman period and during the 20th century Arab

nationalism. This is more so in regards to Orthodox Christians, who are also the largest Christian religious group in Galilee, where the two villages in my study are located. Christian Orthodox have sided and often led the Arab nationalist movement[70].

It might be true also that as a minority they preferred to be under a secular political system rather than a religious one. Another factor for Christians leaning towards the Arab nationalist camp might be also due to the fact that many Christians attended European schools established by missionaries in the region, and many of them also studied further in Europe. The exposure to Western education and culture also led to exposure of European intellectual traditions, nationalism among them. Thus, many Christians followed Arab national movement and in Palestine-Israel did not side with the Israeli state, but remained in general in oppositional camp to the state policies[71]. This general historical political development of Christians, and of Druzes discussed earlier in the chapter, was also reflected in the two villages as we shall see next.

II. D. The two villages

In the following I will discuss the history and information about the two villages. As we will see, information about Julis is much less available. This might be due to different political and economic history of the two villages, and the role they played in the recent history of the region.

II. D. 1. Julis

A Druze village located in northwestern Galilee, Israel, that has the seat of the Druze community's spiritual leader in Israel, which has been in the Tarif family. The population of the village is 100 percent Druze and was in 1983 about

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[70] For more on Arab nationalism, see also Dawisha (2003), Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century.

[71] For more on the Christians in the Middle East, see Christians in the Holy Land edited by Michael Prior and William Taylor, 1994, also Bruce Masters, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World: The Roots of Sectarianism, 2001, and finally Tarek Mitri, Who Are the Christians in the Arab World? International Review of Mission 88.352 (Jan 2000): p12.

3,036[72]. According to Falah (2000), Julis is an old village as some Ottoman documents indicate. In 1921 the village had 441 inhabitants, and in 1948 about 800, and today about 5,500. The increase of the number of Druzes in Julis is due to the improved health services in Israel, and also due to the fact Druzes like Jews get a double funding child money from the state, because they serve in the Israeli army. The local council in the village was established in 1967. In 1963 the villages was connected to water lines and in 1969 to electricity. Today, there are two elementary schools, middle school, and one high school in the village. There are health clinics and services, post, telephone and other services[73].

The majority of Druze men in Julis, like the rest of Druzes in Israel, serves in the Israeli army, and after the military service many work in security related jobs, Israeli factories, and government offices. Not many people work in the private business sector. Trade and economic activity in Julis, compared to its neighbor-Yirka (neighboring Druze village), or Kafr Yassif (neighboring non-Druze village) is much less dynamic, since the village is not as large and as central in its location, and did not have historically a dynamic economic activity such as markets, which for example Kafr Yassif had, and which also was a center for economic activity in the region.

Until the late 1970s, Julis had only elementary schools, and students who wanted to continue high school education came to Kafr Yassif Yani High School. Since the late 1970s, the Israeli governments established few high schools in Julis and other villages, which freed them from traveling outside the village to seek education. Small number of people went further in education in Israeli universities.

Despite the fact that parts of their lands were confiscated by the state of Israel after 1948, and the discrimination against Druzes compared to Jewish Israelis even though they serve in the army we well, the village has a good relationship with the Israeli authorities. Many of its inhabitants are members of

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[72] Betts, 1988, P.125.
[73] Falah, 2000, p.95.

the Likud or the Labor Party, as well as Jewish religious parties, and some follow Israeli leftist Jewish political parties. Arab Parties and the Israeli Communist Party have hardly any followers in the village. With some exceptions, this is in general the case in regard to political orientation of Druze villages in Israel.

This political orientation is a result of the historic political development of the community especially since 1948. Also, serving in the Israeli army, where soldiers are indoctrinated with state ideology, is a possible factor for that. Service in the Israeli army also created a space for Druzes to be exposed more to political views of Jews who serve in the army. But, many Druzes also join these parties for political and economic benefits. As Michael Shalev and Gershon Shafir have shown in their studies on Israeli economy, many of the economic activities of the state were owned by the state that was for long dominated by the Labor party. Thus, many employment opportunities in Israel have historically been channeled through the Labor party, especially in the early decades of Israel's existence. In addition, the political parties that participate in the government coalition gain, as a result, political and economic power which they use to attract supporters to whom they can distribute benefits. The Druzes in this regard are not an exception.

II. D. 2. Kafr Yassif

It is one of the earliest villages in Galilee to have its own local council that was established in 1920s, with 870 inhabitants at the time[74]. In 1988, of Kafr Yassif's total of 5,163 people, Druzes were 4%, Christians were 55% and Muslims were 41%[75]. Kafr Yassif has one of the three main Druze religious sites that Druzes visit and gather in[76]. The Majority of Christians in Kafr Yassif belong to the Greek Orthodox Church, and the rest are either Latin Catholics, or Protestants.

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[74] Falah, 2000, p.82.
[75] Betts, 1988, P.125.
[76] Falah, 2000, p.171.

In 2003, the Kafr Yassif Council published a map with information about the village and its history. According to this map, Kafr Yassif had a local council since 1924. Kafr Yassif is located in the Western Galilee on Highway 70, 12 kilometers northeast of Akka. It is considered an important commercial center in the region and links the neighboring villages to the highway and near by cities. The village is built on three hills, near the Lebanese borders in the north, and the Carmel mountains in the south, and the Mediterranean in the west.

The area of the town is 1715 acres half of which are covered by olive trees. Only 37% of the area of the town is under the control of the local council, the remaining are under the state and quasi-state authorities such as the Jewish National Fund (JNF). The population of the town in 2000 is 9,000, and is composed of Christians (55%), Muslims (40%), and Druze (5%). Approximately 30% of the residents came as refugees from other destroyed Galilee villages during the war of 1948. Thus, the improved health services, as well migrant refugees who came to settle in the village all added to the increase in the number of its residents.

The inhabitants work as wage laborers in offices, schools, businesses and out of the village factories and companies, also as business owners of shops, clinics and other forms of independent occupational forms, and some small minority work in farming.

Archeological remains indicate the existence of an ancient settlement from the Phoenician and Canaanite periods. Until the middle of the 19th century the town also had a Jewish community, and a well cared for Jewish cemetery that can be visited to this day. The Jewish community at that time left the village for better economic conditions in other nearby cities and or abroad. During the 1870s the first elementary school of the Orthodox Church was established and it continued to operate until the end of the First World War. In February of 1939 the British burned approximately half of the buildings in the town as a reprisal for underground Palestinian nationalist activities against the British.

The town now has 3 elementary schools, one middle school, and one high school that have been in existence for over 50 years. It also has a cultural center, a library, and an old age-elderly center, sports hall and playing fields. Religious institutions include five churches, two mosques, and one Druze prayer center. There are two bank branches, a post office, and various social centers. Health services in the town include: a health clinic of the General Histadrut Health Fund, a family health center and two first aid clinics. Kafr Yassif enjoys a good economic situation compared to the neighboring villages. This might have been one of the resentments that Julis had against them, despite the fact that they are a mile or so away from each other and they had a history of good relations[77].

In November 1975, the Israeli Communist Party-Kafr Yassif branch issued a single issue publication on the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the local council, which provides further information about the socio-economic and political background of the village. Even though this is a publication that might be influenced by scoring points for the Communist party, it does not contradict the different sources of information about the village and its history.

According to the publication, land ownership in Kafr Yassif was not concentrated in the hand of few families as was the case with other towns and villages during the Ottoman and British periods. This fact allowed many families to have property and allowed many to get education for their children, which later also helped in creating large number of individuals gaining higher education level[78]. The British repression of the village in 1939 and the burning of many houses by British troops, for helping anti British revolts, helped to foster the national and political awareness of the residents. These are the main factors that shaped the progressive politics of the people in Kafr Yassif[79].

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[77] *Ma'ariv* 17th, 1981, p.27.
[78] Israeli Communist Party, Kafr Yassif Branch, special publication in the 50th anniversary of the local council, p.2.
[79]Israeli Communist Party, Kafr Yassif Branch, special publication in the 50th anniversary of the local council, p.4.

A branch of the Communist Party was established in Kafr Yassif in 1948, which with other progressive political groups such as the Arab Popular Front fought against the military regime imposed by the Israeli government on them. One of the events that marked the political history of the village was in 1949 when the military government came to transfer many residents who did not have Israeli identity cards-being refugees from neighboring villages. In response a mass popular resistance act took place in which people laid down on the ground preventing the military trucks from entering the village, an incident which took place numerous times later, which helped limit the government's ability to deport many of Kafr Yassif residents[80]. Such incidents became known to the media, and in the 1950s made the French philosophers-Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir to come and visit the village after learning about this history. According to the publication, political activities of the village against the governmental policies of oppression and ethnic cleansing and land confiscation and the terror of the military government against the village inhabitants won Kafr Yassif a prominent name in national politics among the Palestinian citizens in Israel[81].

The publication also mentions that poetry festivals have been taken place in Kafr Yassif since the 1950s and in which many prominent Palestinian poets participated, such as Rashed Hussein, Hanna Abu Hanna, Samih Al-Qassim, and including some who attended schools in Kafr Yassif, such as Mahmoud Darwish, made Kafr Yassif further known within the country as a center for cultural activities[82].

Furthermore, the publication claims that with the Kafr Yassif Democratic Women, the Arab Popular Front, the local council, the communist party waged a campaign to protest against the government imposed military regime and national oppression of Palestinians in Israel, and against the arrests, deportations and

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[80] Ibid, p. 6.
[81] Ibid, p.6.
[82] Ibid, p.15.

waves of political and economic intimidation against many people in the village[83]. The head of Kafr Yassif local council in the 1950s-Yani Yani, with others initiated to create a national political body that could bring together all progressive groups to fight against the government policies of national oppressions, and discrimination, land confiscation, house demolitions, and military regime to terrorize the public. This led to the creation of the Arab Popular Front, an alliance building that was copied in other Palestinian Arab towns which united many leftist and nationalist political groups, an alliance that sought to serve the Palestinian Arab community and fight against the state's racist policies[84].

In an article in the Arab Studies quarterly (ASQ) on the political history of the village during the 50s and 60s, Ahmad Sa'di confirms what is written and narrated by locals about the village political history of coalition building and resistance to government policies. Sa'di discusses the politics of the village and the relationship to the state since the late 40s early 1950s[85]. According to Sa'di, since the establishment of the state the MAPAI (meaning the governing Labor Israeli party) policy was that of co-opting local leaders and instigating conflicts among various factions. Yet, the Kafr Yassif case during the Military Rule proposes an alternative to the official paradigm of a 'co-opted acquiescent minority'.

Sa'di argues that Kafr Yassif was an unusual case among Arab villages. It was the only village with an elected local authority, which continued to exist after the establishment of the State of Israel. Its local authority was established by the Mandatory Government on 1 December 1925. Yani Yani, the mayor before 1948, was able after 1949 to forge a collation between nationalist and Communists and lead the local council for another decade. This is what came to be called the Popular Front, which played a major role in defining Arab politics beyond the

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[83] Israeli Communist Party, Kafr Yassif Branch, special publication in the 50th anniversary of the local council, p.17.
[84] Ibid, p.19.
[85] Ahmad Sa'di, "Control and Resistance at Local-Level Institutions: A Study of Kafr Yassif's Local Council Under the Military Government" ASQ, 23 (3), Summer 2001.

local council in Kafr Yassif by presenting an example of unity among the Arab Palestinians in Israel, asking the state to recognize them as such, and demanding a change in the policy of the state against the Arab citizens, and a solution for the internal and external refugee problem. This political behavior of the Kafr Yassif local council and leadership angered the state and its functionaries in the area. State authorities worked to change the political atmosphere in Kafr Yassif fearing it would influence other villages and towns. The government worked to create fractions and disputes among the different political factions in the village. It also encouraged religious factions to participate in the elections in order to undermine a nationalist politics of the village and its leadership. The Kafr Yassif political stands led to state authorities' punishments in the 1950s and 1960s, through political and economic repression[86].

It is clear from this informational background about the two villages that Kafr Yassif was a source of more writings and that Julis has only brief and basic information about it. This is due to the fact that Kafr Yassif had its own local council much earlier, it had much more economic and political activities than Julis, and played an important role in the local politics of the Arab Palestinian community in Israel. Kafr Yassif and its local leaders played major role in the politics of coalition making and resistance to state policies, and it was a site where many important political leaders received education and became part of the national politics of the Palestinian community in Israel. It is also clear from the previous information that, contrary to Julis, Kafr Yassif had a problematic relationship with the Israeli authorities.

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[86] Sa'di, Ahmad H. "Control and Resistance at Local-Level Institutions: A Study of Kafr Yassif's Local Council Under the Military Government." Arab Studies Quarterly (ASQ, 23 (3), Summer 2001.

II. E. History of communal relations

This part will study the relationship between the Druze and rest of the religious groups in the Arab community in the region in general as well as between the two local communities in Israel's Galilee. The sources drawn on here are both of local first hand sources and conversations with local leaders over many years as I was growing up in the region, as well as secondary sources on the subject to examine how peaceful or otherwise that relationship was prior to the event in 1981. The relationship between Druzes and Christians in the region will revolve around the Druzes Maronites relationship, as I shall discuss later, because the Maronites were the only Christian community that lived side by side in Mt. Lebanon with the Druzes. This relation due to different factors, that will be discussed later, turned into direct conflict and violence. In Israel, the majority of Christians are Greek Orthodox, and that is especially so in Kafr Yassif. Thus, there, I will discuss the history of the two villages only, since there is no evidence of Druze-Christian Orthodox conflict and violence prior to 1948 in Palestine/Israel. Before, I start to discuss the history of these relationships, let me add some general remarks about these communities.

While Christians in Lebanon were for some time a majority in that geographic area, in Palestine-Israel, both Christians and Druzes have been religious minorities for centuries. It is also generally argued that the Druzes have a tradition of strong communal sense binding them together and that the Druze community has acted for a long time as a unit in times of peace and war[87]. This could also be said about other religious communities in the region, where religious identity has been for long time a dominant factor in shaping the actions of individuals in those communities.

Another point in the history of the Druzes that might help explain the solidification of their identity is their political history. For example, during the 18th century Ottoman rule in the region, Druzes, led by the Druze Ottoman governor of Mt. Lebanon-Fakhr Al-Din Al-Ma'anni, succeeded in establishing a

[87] Swayd, 1998, p.15, Betts, 1988, p. xiii.

semi autonomous principality, yet, that did not last for long for the Ottomans were able to regain control of the area. Still, the Druzes were able to continue to play a major role in the politics of the region. This was evident again with the rise of Sultan Pasha Al-Atrash who fought along with the Arabs against the Ottomans and later against the French colonial rule after the end of WWI. Yet, except, for the Al-Ma'anni period in the 18th century, the Druzes never had any politically organized territory under their rule, but were as many other religious communities under the rule of other regional and global powers.

Talking of Druze community as such does not mean that the Druze community is all unified and had lived peacefully among itself. In fact, there are many examples that prove the opposite. There were among the Druzes competing political powers that had fought against each other since the 19th century, and this is still the case in Lebanon, were competing leaders from different families and different political orientation have worked, to dominate the Druze politics. At this moment, the most dominant Druze leader in Lebanon is Walid Jumblat, whose father was a major political figure in Lebanon in the 1950s to the 1970s, and whose nationalist pro Nasserist political orientation put him at odd with some political groups in Lebanon, and with Syria until his mysterious death in an airplane crash in the 1970s. The crash was suspected to be the making of his political opponents, especially Syria, even though no proof for that theory is available yet.

Yet, despite these divisions within the community, one can justifiably talk of Druze politics, as one can speak about Shi'a, Sunni or Christian politics in Lebanon, not dismissing the different competing camps within each religious community. Yet, especially in Lebanon, since the political structure is based on confessional arrangement that was put into practice by the French when they created Lebanon as a political entity, confessional identity is still the dominant. In Syria, the Druzes do not play a political role as group, since the political system is run by the Ba'th nationalist party that has been dominated also since the 1970s by Alawites, who are themselves yet another religious Shi'I sect. The Ba'th politics

has also suppressed religious politics in Syria, as it was seen in the 1980s struggle of the state and an oppressed Muslim movement, and as was the case with the Druzes in early years of the state[88]. In other words, religious communalism in Syria, unlike in Lebanon, has been successfully repressed, at least until now.

In Israel, as discussed earlier, Druzes at large are co-opted within the Israeli political system and political organizations. The Druzes in the Syrian Golan Heights—occupied by Israel in the 1967 war, do not however, serve in the Israeli army, and had refused the accept Israeli identity cards, or the Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights, and they still remain loyal to Syria and hope to be reunited with Syria and the rest of their Druze community there. Siding with Israel could be also risky for Druzes in the Golan Heights since many of their family members live in Syria.

In addition to these political configurations, it is also argued, that there is a strict observance of non inter-marriage among the religious Arab communities[89]. Obviously, the strict observance of communities' social boundaries does not help in creating more cooperative relations among the different religious groups, and also makes it harder to establish cross cutting relations across these boundaries. This makes it easier to manipulate politics from within each group as leaders appeal to group solidarity, but it also makes it easier to do the same from exterior by acting through communal leaders, especially in times of conflicts. Barricaded identity—religious or ethnic in this sense does not allow easy entrance and exit to membership and can be very negatively exploited in times of crises between different groups[90].

The strict social boundaries between the religious communities are not a new or recent phenomenon. Firro argues that since the early history of the region, and in regards to the Druzes since the Islamic period, and during the Ottoman era,

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[88] See more on this issue in Rogan and Shlaim (2004).
[89] Falah, 2000, p.112.
[90] For more on this see Daniel Chirot and Martin E.P. Seligman (2002), *Ethnopolitical Warfare: Causes, Consequences, and Possible, Solutions*. Especially related in this extensive work, is the chapter "*Ethnicity: Nice, Nasty, and Nihilistic*" by Ken Jowitt.

the history of the Druze community evolved within the framework that allowed it to preserve its traditional characteristics as a close-knit religious community Ottoman economic, political, and administrative structures, based mainly on subsistence economy, and the prevailing decentralization policy prevented an aggregation of several communities forming one linguistic ethnic group[91] 20th century colonial rule did not change that situation. In fact, colonial regimes further exploited the religious differences, where France for example, was pushing for creating religious states in Syria and Lebanon in order to keep control.

Yet generally, despite such defined communal boundaries, and despite some periodic warfare among different religious groups, inter communal relationship were not usually considered hostile or violent. As far as the relationship between the religious communities, the Druzes were known for their tolerance to other religious groups[92], and historically they lived peacefully with all other religious communities[93]. This argument is also supported by the few 18th-19th century available sources from European travelers, who observed Druzes in Palestine as having good relationship with the other religious communities[94].

Yet, in mid 19th century, clashes between Druzes and Christian Maronites took place in Mt. Lebanon and spread to the neighboring areas in Syria. The clashes started as a quarrel between individuals, and later spread to include group violence. The background to these clashes is a bit complex. Scholarly opinion seems to be, that, the backgrounds of the conflict goes back to the Ottomans' policy of establishing the millet system that supposedly gave autonomy to different religious communities. It is argued that this system also helped create friction more than unity among the different religious communities in the Middle

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[91] Firro, 1992, p.353.
[92] Falah, 2000, p.110.
[93] Ibid, p.176.
[94] Ibid, p.58.

East[95]. Also the Ottomans exploited religious differences and elites' competition over power from these communities and played one against another[96].

The political and legal equality that were instituted by the Ottoman reforms provided Christians more room for economic gains. During the 19th century, European powers' economic influence in the Ottoman Empire increased. The symbol of such increased power was seen in the privileges these countries received that allowed them to have protective rights towards the different religious communities in the region[97]. The Catholic Maronites in Lebanon came under the protection of France. Then, European powers pushed the Ottoman to relinquish control of North Lebanon to the Maronites and the south to the Druzes[98]. Through land registration reforms enforced by the Ottomans in the 19th century, and the increasing interests if European countries, mainly France, that was interested in the silk and cotton industry in the region, the Druzes there felt alienated economically and politically while their neighbors in those areas-The Christian Lebanese Maronites were benefiting in this new reality. These economic, and political difference led to charged atmosphere between Druzes and Maronites, and a fight between two individuals from these two different communities spread to include the entire communities in 1854. These fights, spread to Syria, and still mark a strong point in the collective memory of these two communities, and helped to consolidate these religious identities.

Thus, through the reforms in late Ottoman rule and the start of intervention of Western powers, and later colonization, the Druzes in Lebanon and Syria came to be considered a separate political as well as religious community[99]. From the 19th century on the differences and conflicts that appeared between the Druze and Christians were further exploited and manipulated by

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[95] Firro, 1992, p.231.
[96] Ibid, p.235.
[97] Falah, 2000, p.59.
[98] Swayd, 1998, p.29-30.
[99] Falah, 2000, p.48.

colonial European powers[100]. In Lebanon, Europeans exploited both communities--Druze and Christian, and nourished hostile attitudes between the two groups[101]. In sum, conflicts and violence erupted between religious communities in the mid 19th century as a result of historic development, late Ottoman policy of divide and rule and European powers that were eager to establish a base in the Middle East. Sectarian differences were used and strengthened to develop spheres of influence in the region[102].

With the end of WWI, and establishment of French Mandate system in Syria, and then the French creation of Lebanon, the French established a sectarian government arrangement that favored the Christian Maronites, and this remained in Lebanon after the end of French colonization in 1946. The sectarian government arrangement was, and still is, a point of discontent and conflict in Lebanon to this day and played a role through the history of the Lebanese state and the different periods of conflicts and direct violence between the different religious groups that culminated one more time in the 20th century during the Lebanese civil war that took place between 1975 and 1989. During the civil war political and religious groups fought against each other as well as among each other, influenced by economic and political dissatisfaction with the confessional political arrangement of the political system in Lebanon. Each group fought in order to gain more power and worked to change the system to its advantage. The civil war was also equally influenced by internal and external factors such as the presence of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and its growing influence in the country. This development was not favored by Syria, which had never accepted the creation of Lebanon, a territory it considered to be taken out of its historical larger Syria. Syria then intervened to help crush the PLO's growing influence and insure a regime arrangement that would be loyal to Syria. The war

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[100] Firro, 1992, p.257-8.
[101] Swayd, 1998, p.30.
[102] Ibid, p.30.

then involved many political and religious groups in Lebanon, each fighting to maximize its influence in the country.

During the civil war, Druzes fought at different times against different groups. Christians-Druze fighting was also present. While the main two camps were the Christian Maronites supported by Syria against the PLO, Shi'a Muslims, and leftist and nationalist groups on the other hand, this picture changed often according to shifting political crises. At times, parties of the same camp fought against each other[103]. This picture was even further complicated with the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1978, and later in 1982, also to crush the PLO and secure a reliable regime in Lebanon that would be politically favorable to Israeli security interests. During the Israeli invasion and occupation of part of Lebanon, the Druzes were approached to cooperate, yet this failed, as Atshi (1996) argues. The Druzes in Lebanon were not willing to risk their status in future Lebanese political arrangement, in case Israel withdrew. Furthermore, Israeli interest in creating a hegemonic Maronites' dominated system was contrary to the Druzes' historic antipathy to that group. Furthermore, internal Druze competition might have further helped the Druzes of the Jumblat's faction to refuse to cooperate, fearing that a later possible Israeli withdrawal might lead to the Arsalan's faction's prominence to lead and represent the Druzes in Lebanon.

This situation was much different that what took place in Palestine Israel. It is true that in the clashes between Jews and Arabs as a result of conflicts over land and resources[104], some Druzes were part of the two main Arab political anti Zionist camps (Hussaini camp, Nashashibi opposition camp) in Palestine, and many Druzes took leading roles in those camps[105]. Yet, when the conflict between the Zionist movement and the Arabs intensified before, during and after WWII, like the rest of the Arab religious communities, some of the Druzes supported the

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[103] For more on the civil war in Lebanon see Farid El-Khazen (2000) The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon 1967-1976, and Samir Khalaf (2002) Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon.
[104] Falah, 2000, p.72.
[105] Ibid, p.82-83.

Jews[106]. As elsewhere in the region, colonial authorities sought to establish relationships with individuals from each community, especially minorities, in order to use them when possible to undermine the Arab national movement's quest for unity and liberation from colonialism[107]. This was the case with early Zionist and later Israeli government policy that was aimed at separating the Druze from the rest of the Arabs and convincing them that they are a different ethnic group[108].

Furthermore, after being cut off from traditional leadership in Lebanon and Syria and much more marginal in number and economic wealth, some local Druze leaders cooperated with Israel (with the Zionist movement at the time), and used, as Kais Firro argues, the violent repression that some Druze villages faced and economic exploitation at the hand of the Arab fighters during the 1930s 1940s to win the loyalty of the general Druze community to the Israeli side. This was also helped by economic and military considerations. Druzes needed the permission and help of the Israelis to farm their lands during the military upheavals of the 1947-1949, and also they saw that the Israelis were the winning party, as Laila Parsons explains. These factors helped leaders in the Druze community, such as Jaber Dahish-Mu'addi from Yirka, to swing the whole community to the Israeli side[109].

This historical development might explain why in Israel the Druze became more separated from other communities over time, while in Syria the Druze were able to associate and harmonize their Druze particularism with Arab nationalism without loosing their communal identity[110]. In Israel/Palestine it was only after the creation of the state of Israel, that the Druzes became recognized as not only a separate religious, but also a distinct ethnic community[111].

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[106] Firro, 1992, p.320-1.
[107] Ibid, p.310-311, also Betts, 1988, p.83.
[108] Betts, 1988, p.24-25.
[109] See Laila Parson in "The War for Palestine".
[110] Firro, 1992, p.353.
[111] Falah, 2000, p.75.

Separation of the Druze from the Arab Palestinian citizens was sought and encouraged by Israeli authorities and was successful to some extent. The Israeli authorities have tried to create in the mind of the Druzes the notion that that they are a separate ethnic group different from the Christian and Muslim Palestinian Arabs[112].

Firro agrees with this argument and elaborates further that this relationship was not one sided. It is true that the Zionist movement was interested in establishing a good relation with the Druzes to separate them from the larger Arab community. Yet, that was also coupled with the interest of some Druze leaders who wanted to benefit from the power changes, which led to the establishment of special relationship between the Druzes and the state of Israel[113]. This is not to minimize the fact that the Zionist movement worked to divide the different Arab religious communities and to create a discord between the Druzes and other communities[114]. Even prior to 1948 when there were some clashes between Druzes and non Druzes and community leaders came to make *Sulha*-peacemaking, the Zionist movement through its agents in the community did their best to sabotage these efforts of reconciliation[115]. While Firro here is talking about the pre 1948 period, many community members argue that this policy still hold ground till this day, and many have argued that this is what happened during the conflict between Kafr Yassif and Julis in 1981 during a period, we should remember, of great tension within neighboring Lebanon where communal conflicts were raging and Israel was becoming increasingly involved.

In Israel, Druzes were encouraged by the state of Israel to adopt a separatist identity in relation to Arab or Palestinian nationalism[116]. Israel, with the help of some Druze individuals, was able to enforce military conscription on the Druzes in 1957, and Israel also used these leaders in its tactics to divide the

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[112] Betts, 1988, p. xiii.
[113] Firro, 1992, p.323.
[114] Ibid, p.324-331 and 244-245.
[115] Ibid, p.347-349.
[116] Firro, 1992, p.363.

different Arab religious communities and to further de-politicize them, and in 1961 the Israeli authorities recognized the Druzes in Israel as a religious community as well as a national one to further separate them from other Arabs. In 1967 the government established a separate section to deal with the Druzes separately from the Arab department, and in1976 did so in the education ministry[117]. But all these attempts did not pass without opposition on the part of some of the Druzes, but the Israeli state with its loyalists in the community was able to crush any new leadership from forming a strong alliance with non-Druze Palestinian Arabs[118].

Thus, by exploiting the pre existing economic and historic grievances of the Druzes, Israel further separated the Druzes from other Arabs within Israel[119]. This separate identity was further helped by the military service and later on separate education[120]. After being recognized as a separate religion in 1957, the Druzes were also allowed to establish their religious courts in 1961, at which time they adopted the Lebanese Druze religious courts laws and regulations[121]. In 1975 the Israeli government authorized the separation of the Druze section from the general non-Jewish minority section that administered Israeli non-Jews in all levels of their lives including education[122]. Since 1975, Israeli government, worried about Druze youth of losing this separate identity, has established for them their own separate education school system that encourages Druzes separate identity[123].

Al-Judhour (The association for the guarding and strengthening of the cultural roots of the Arab Druze), issued *Al-Mithaq*-a single issue publication in summer 2005 on the state of the Druzes in Israel. It argued that the obstacles that prevented Israeli Druzes from maintaining and strengthening their Arab identity

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[117] Ibid, p.363-4.
[118] Ibid, p.364.
[119] Falah, 2000, p.55.
[120] Ibid, p.55-56.
[121] Ibid, p.145.
[122] Ibid, p.164.
[123] Falah, 2000, p.164.

were and still remain: 1) The nature of the state of Israel as a state for the Jewish people rather than for its all its citizens, which does not allow the Druzes to grow as a part of the Arab community in such a state; 2) The compulsory military service that belittles the Druzes' Arab identity and separates them from the rest of the Arab community in this state; 3) The Israeli educational system that has worked to de-educate the Druzes about their national identity and worked to install in them a separate identity as a group in the service of the state, and which has led to low self esteem and low educational achievement among the members of the Druze community[124].

According to *Al-Judhour*, Israeli authorities imposed a split between the Druzes and the rest of the Arab community and have been using the Druzes against the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories since the imposition of the mandatory military service in 1955[125]. *Al-Judhour* further argues that the Druzes' military compulsory service in Israel has been used to harm the unity of the Palestinian Arab community[126]. It is further argued that the number of Druzes in Israel does not exceed 100,000 (1.5% of the total population) a the moment (around 2003), and in 1948 the Druzes were 13,000 out of the one million population, so that the imposition of military service on them was not a military or security necessity, but a needed for a propaganda to bolster Israel's "democratic claims" abroad as well as creating further division within the community inside the state[127]. Furthermore, the state has worked against any attempt to unify the Druze community within the larger Arab community in many ways and found some collaborators from within the community to help in these policies of divide and rule[128].

It is further argued that the Druze educational system designed by the state of Israel has promoted a distinct image of Druze values that emphasize peace,

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[124] *Al-Mithaq*, 2005, Pp. 2-3.
[125] *Ibid*, p.3.
[126] *Ibid*, p.5.
[127] *Ibid*, p.5.
[128] *Al-Mithaq*, 2005, p.10.

love and loyalty to the state, highlighting the Druze participation in the security of the state, the special relationship between the Druze and Jews. The guide for teachers in the Druze schools issued by the Israeli ministry of education aims to separate Druze holidays, even though in the past Druzes considered themselves to be part of Islam[129].

All these different policies of separations helped to create further divide between Druzes and non-Druze Arabs in Israel, in my view were important part of the causes of the violent clashes that started in the 1980s. It is true that violence had been taken place in Israel/Palestine between the several different religious communities for some 50 to 60 years before that, but such a large scale attacks of Druzes against Christians in these Arab villages in Galilee had not been common before the 1980s.

These violent incidents are often followed by discussions in the Arab community about the causes of such recent trend. While living in Israel, I had many conversations with members of the local community about this phenomenon. Some felt that particular individuals were responsible, namely those who were collaborators and worked on behalf of the government to incite violence and divisions. Others accused zealots from different families or religious groups, who built on historic religious, economic and political antagonisms to exploit these historic differences. Many have attributed the increase of violence within the Arab community to crowding and or poverty, or to the lack of avenues to fill free time in the Arab villages and towns. Some argued that violence increased in the Arab Palestinian community as a symptom of the besieged oppressed minority where oppressed members turn against each other violently because they have no hope to change the oppressive status they live under within the Israeli political system. Some argued that the state is not interested in ending this phenomenon and even encourages it. Yet, others felt that the state did not provide an inclusive national identity, and so, encouraged local and religious identities to develop as a compensation to deal with the current modern world

[129] *Ibid*, p.16.

with all its uncertainties. But this also, according to some, reflects the failure of the community itself to achieve an overarching unified identity that can override local, familial, and or religious identities. Yet, this is the case in many other countries in the Middle East and beyond when states do not furnish the different historically divided groups with a civil, secular modern unified identity.

According to one view, incidents such as what took place in Al-Maghaar show the weak relationship between the different religious groups in the Arab community[130]. It is true that the Palestinian Arabs pride themselves that the religious identity was not a factor up to the 1970s as their sense of national identity was still strong[131]. When in the 1980s and 1990s the religious identities were enforced in the Arab community in Israel as a result of internal and external forces, conflicts between two individuals from different religions, often led to conflicts between the two communities and did not stop at the individual level. These factors explained earlier in the dissertation are of regional and global scale, where in the 1980s more religious identity was asserted by people in the region and beyond due to local economic, and regional and global economic, social and political changes and trends.

It is true that there was a shift to religious identity regionally and even globally, but Bishara further argues that the cause for this situation is also because Israel had failed to create collective civil society where the law organized the relationships and conflicts among the individual, except when the conflict is between an Arab and a Jew[132]. This is a trend all over the Muslim world and in many other countries around the world. Similarly to many other countries that includes minorities, as Bishara argues further, Israeli anthropological studies on the identity of the Arab citizens, concludes that they are attached more to locality or religion, ignored that Israel itself did not allow the development of an Arab national identity for this group and that Israel did not create a state as a national

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[130] *Al-Mithaq*, 2005, p.19.
[131] Bishara, Azmi, in Baladna, 2004, p.176.
[132] Bishara, 2002, The Ruptured Political Discourse, p. 162.

homeland for the Palestinians and that the feeling of alienation resulting from the nature of the state of Israel as a Jewish state and policy towards them pushed them towards other identity, local or religious, as place of safety under such conditions[133]. It is important here to remember that what was going on in Israel was part of a larger trend, and this played right into the hands of Israeli state that actually welcomed such a change. As Adeeb Dawisha argues[134], the regional trend for the resurgence of religious identity was due to the failure or defeat of Nasserism and Arab socialism, and particularly the failure of 1967 war, which left the entire Arab world looking for new ways out of its predicament.

It is thus argued that the religious tensions within the Arab community in Israel that had increased in the recent period are a reflection of the situation that this community has found itself in. The reasons for that are many, but most important four factors are a result of internal and external nature. First, the historic religious divisions between the different religious groups that have managed to remain powerful dominant and some times primary identity for many members. Secondly the failure of the Arab community to create a solid unified national identity that can overcome all other sub-identities. Thirdly the Arab Palestinian community's lack of national identity being not full citizens included in the main national identity of the state. Fourthly, as a result of the state's policies from preventing them from developing a separate unifying identity. Strangely, some of the same factors were at work in other Arab countries, most notably Lebanon, but to some extent in Syria and Iraq, too, thus leading to increasing religious polarization in the entire region. Ironically, the fact that Israeli Arabs are not only subjected to the power of the Israeli state, but also moved by some of the same forces affecting the entire region, including some Israel's worst enemies.

Among the internal factors is caused by internal political competition on local elections since it is the only space that Palestinian Arabs had a room to

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[133] Bishara, 2002, The Ruptured Political Discourse, p.146.
[134] Adeeb Dawisha (2003). Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair.

claim some power or authority, since their participation in national Israeli politics is limited and marginalized by the nature and policies of the state[135]. I would further argue that these tensions have been also affected by the increase of religious fundamentalism in the region especially since the late 1970s, which has caused further communal tensions and divisions.

It is correct to argue that generally religious communities in the Arab community in Israel did not have a history of violent relationship. It is true that there were strict social, and sometimes political, boundaries between the different religious groups historically, but these boundaries were exploited in modern history and were further deepened by the policies of the state and its nature. This is the history of all nationalisms-what needs to be analyzed is how various communities adapted to being included or excluded from various nationalizing projects. Finally Israeli authorities built on past colonial experiences and tactic and manipulated the relationship between the different communities, and in the case of the Druze helped to create much more divisive relationship, by recognizing the Druze as a separate religious group, then as an ethnic group, conscripted the Druze in the army, and created separate offices in the government for them to cover all aspects of their lives including education. Also, from the many instances, some of which are mentioned here, Israeli authorities directly allowed violence to take place between Druze and other religious Arab communities, and also intervened to sabotage internal indigenous conflict resolution attempts.

Summarizing the information about the two villages and communities, we can see from the last two chapters: a possible political antipathy that was strengthened since 1948, a possible economic envy against Kafr Yassif, a possible historical religious antipathy between Christians and Druze that developed since the violent clashes in Lebanon and Syria in the 19th and 20th century, and historical polarization between the two religious communities were intermarriage was hardly possible between them. The 19th century violent clashes in Lebanon

[135] Mansour, 2004, p.242-243.

took place between Christian Maronites and Druzes. During the Lebanese civil war (1975-1989) again Druzes and Christians fought against each other. In the Palestinian Israeli conflict, and especially since 1948, the Druzes took the Israeli side, while the Christians, Orthodox in this case, stood in opposition to Israeli government policies. This Israeli context of Druzes-Christian Orthodox dynamics was well reflected in the two villages.

Finally, I argue, as we shall see later, there is another internal issue that caused the violent event in Kafr Yassif, which I will discuss in the fifth chapter in the context of the presenting the event. These internal factors, which are the precipitated incident, and justification and toleration for collective punishment, might have been affected by the historical antagonism of Druzes and Christians in the region, as well as Druzes and non Druze Arabs in Israel after 1948. I also argue further that the shift to increased violence between Druzes and non-Druze Arabs in Israel could be understood as part of the state policy, which Ian Lustick defines as a policy of control. In the framework of such policy, as I have discussed in chapter two, internal fighting and further internal divisions is a development that makes it harder for the Arab community to mobilize against the state, which they see as discriminatory towards them. The Israeli policies and relationship towards the Arab citizens will be explored in the next chapter, which help contextualize Lustick's framework of control.

Chapter III

State policy

In this chapter, I will discuss the policy of the state of Israel towards its Arab Palestinian citizens in order to examine the claims made by many community members. Many of the people I had conversations with viewed the event in Kafr Yassif as embedded in a larger context and history of policies of a state that has been hostile to them. Furthermore, they considered the incident in Kafr Yassif as one example of the Israeli state's history of policies undermining the Palestinian Arab community and aiming at dividing it further to impede any attempt at unity, and make it easier to control.

In the section that follows, I will provide a brief overview of three main aspects of the historical development of the state: its creation and its nature or type, its general policies, and finally its policies related to the identity of the citizens of the state. In my view, all these issues have a direct connection to the relationship of the state to its citizens, in that they reveal how the state views and treats its citizens--in this case, the Palestinian Arabs, and it will help us understand and confirm or disconfirm the claims made by community members against the Israeli authorities. Finally, doing this will also help contextualize Ian Lustick's framework of control, and provide a larger picture to that framework. If in some parts, the discussion seems repeating discussions about the same topic or issue, it is in order to provide room for different interpretations from scholars of different backgrounds.

III. A. State history and background

The state of Israel was created by the Zionist Movement, with the help of Britain and other Western countries[136]. Britain, which was the colonizing power in Palestine after WWI, helped to establish a state for the Jewish people in Palestine without consulting with the native Palestinian inhabitants of the land, and to their opposition. As the claims of both—Arabs and Jews were not possible

[136] For more information on this subject, see also *One Palestine Complete*, by Tom Segev, 2001.

to accommodate, Britain took the case to the United Nations. In 1948, the United Nations issued a plan to partition Palestine into two states: one Jewish in over 54% of Mandate Palestine and the other Arab on the remaining territory, even though Jews constituted less than one third of the population. When the Zionist movement declared the independence of the state of Israel and Palestinian refugees started storming the neighboring Arab countries, the Arabs refused to recognize the creation of the state of Israel, war started between Israel and Arab states that ended in 1949 in the Armistice Treaties.

The borders of the state of Israel after the war included about 78% of Mandate Palestine, thus annexing more land than the UN partition plan had allocated to Israel and also including more Arab villages in Galilee which had actually been designated as part of the Arab state in Palestine according to the UN partition plan. Yet this additional annexed land on which Arab Palestinian people were living was not considered occupied territory by the international community. As a result, about 160,000 Palestinian Arabs, mainly living in Galilee, became Israeli citizens. These Palestinian Arabs suddenly became citizens of a new state and, over night, became a minority on their own lands after having lived as a majority there for a long time. They found themselves citizens of a state that was created primarily for the Jewish people, and that was built on the lands that Palestinians had lived on for hundreds of years. It was a state that came into being as a result of war with the Palestinians and Arabs, to which this community belonged, which further complicates the relationship between the state of Israel and its Palestinian Arab citizens, as we shall see in the following discussion.

There has been much discussion of the nature of the state of Israel and the important role this plays in shaping the relationship between the state and its non-Jewish minority. The main paradigms on the nature of the state of Israel range between colonial settler-state, system of control, ethnic democracy granting some rights to the Palestinian minority, and /or minimal-nominal democracy[137].

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[137] Rabinowitz, Dan and Khawla Abu-Baker, *Coffins on Our Shoulders: The experience of Palestinian citizens of Israel*, 2005, pp.5-6.

Kimmerling argues that Israel is better described as a system of control that enforces rule through military and police force rather than a state with "deeply divided society" as Smooha argues, or as a system of "internal colonialism," as Zureik claims[138]. Haidar, on the other hand, argues that the Israeli state's historical realities have led to the building of a highly centralized political system that is concerned first and most with security. This emphasis on security has shaped the state's relationship to the indigenous population[139]. Yet, Sultany argues that it is not security concerns but the nature of Israel as a state created for the Jewish people that make it impossible for it to reconcile with the existence of non-Jews among its population. While the state sees the Palestinian native Arabs as a demographic threat to its Jewish character, it encourages Jewish immigration to the land[140].

There is also no agreement among scholars whether the state of Israel can be considered a democracy or what form of democracy it is. Some studies on the nature of political system in Israel define it as a theo-democracy and others describe it as an ethnocracy--ethnic democracy. Both the notions of ethnocracy or religious-theodemocracy are based on the Judaization of the state and marginalization of the Arab minority within the state's political and geographical borders as well as the legal status of Jewish organizations abroad. There are also those who define Israel as undemocratic state[141]. According to this view, the fact that Israel is defined as a Jewish state concerned with the welfare of the Jewish people, to whom its resources are primarily devoted, makes it obvious that it cannot be considered a democracy for all its citizens. Yiftachel and Ghanem (2001) agree with this definition-theocracy- and argue further that the state is concerned not only with the well being but also with maintaining the dominance of the majority (Jewish) and the marginalization of the minority (Arab) and initiate policies to that end. For example, the law of immigration only serves

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[138] Kimmerling 1989, The Israeli State and Society, p.266.
[139] Haidar, 1997, The Palestinians in Israel and the Oslo Agreement, p.10.
[140] Sultany, Citizens without Citizenship, 2003, p.142.
[141] Ghanem &Mustafa, 2004, A State Against Its Citizens, p.5.

Jews, as does the law of land ownership, and state funding for local councils. Furthermore there are practices of everyday cultural domination that reinforce the Jewish character of the nation. Yet, it could be argued that it would be better to define the system as ethnocracy, because despite the religious component, being Jewish is treated as an ethnic matter, not a religious one, and non-believing Jews are accepted in it.

According to Sultany, Israel is a democracy in form only, even according to the Israel Democracy Institute[142]. Israel shares certain characteristics of a democratic state, which makes Israel a formal democracy but not a democracy that is, in practice, inclusive and neutral towards all ethnic and religious groups living within it. Israel is by definition a Jewish ethno-religious state and there is thus a clear policy of exclusion of those who are not Jews[143]. Sultany further observes that fundamental democratic principles such as the principle of complete equality are not accepted in Israel yet[144]. Thus, and according to Findley, Israel's exclusive character as a Jewish state does not allow non-Jews to be equal citizens neither as individuals nor as a group[145]. The marginalization, discrimination, and practices of inclusion and exclusion against non-Jewish Arab citizens negatively affect all aspects of their lives: economic, social, cultural, national, and political[146].

Mansour argues that democracy requires two main principles; equality, and the wellbeing of all its citizens, including its minorities. If these two principles are not upheld, then the state becomes an apartheid state[147]. Bishara argues further that, Israel cannot be defined as a democratic state, because it does not separate religion, nation, and state. Also, undemocratic principles are evident in legal and constitutional realms that are central to the definition of democracy,

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[142] Sultany, Israel and the Palestinian Minority, 2003, p.108.
[143] Haidar, 1997, p.11.
[144] Sultany, Citizens Without Citizenship, 2003, p.16.
[145] Findley, 1995, p.93.
[146] Ghanem, 2003, Identities and Politics in Israel, p.20.
[147] Mansour, 2004, p.75.

such as the principle of citizenship[148]. According to Kook, the Zionist leadership mixed Jewish religion and political ideology to create a hybrid religious-national state that is culturally and politically exclusive for Jews[149]. Kook warns against confusing democracy with other forms of government. Even if the state uses democratic mechanisms of exclusion, such states cannot be considered fully democratic[150].

Uri Davis views the state as a Jewish settler state the state that was created after the 1948 conquest. Its settler character is enforced through the waves of Jewish immigration and by the taking over of the natives' lands[151]. Uri Davis argues further that Israel is a colonial settlers' project that is based on displacement of non-Jews (Palestinian Arabs) and on segregation of Jews from non-Jews[152]. For Davis, Israel, backed by laws and parliamentary legislations, is an apartheid system for Jews versus non-Jews[153]. The exclusion of non-Jewish citizens in Israel from the many benefits and rights (such as land purchase, among other things) were covered up by many legal structures in Israel to avoid the critique of being branded as an overtly apartheid state[154]. Davis argues that the apartheid regulations in Israel are different from those of Apartheid South Africa, yet it is the overarching legal reality that determines the quality of everyday life and circumstances of all inhabitants of an apartheid regime[155]. This system was veiled by ceding critical areas of immigration, settlement, and land administration in Israel to international Zionist organizations that are constitutionally committed to Jews and to promoting the interests of Jews only[156]. While in South Africa, apartheid was imposed by whites on blacks, in Israel it is practiced by Jews

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[148] Azmi Bishara, From the Jewishness of the State till Sharon: Studies in the Contradictions of Israeli Democracy, 2005, p.16.
[149] Kook, The Logic of Democratic Exclusion: African Americans in the United Stated and Palestinian Citizens in Israel, 2002, p. viii.
[150] Kook, 2002, p.4.
[151] Mansour, 2004, p.3.
[152] Davis, Uri, Israel: An Apartheid State, 1987.
[153] Ibid, p.9, 15.
[154]Ibid, p.53.
[155] Ibid, p.55.
[156] Ibid, p.60.

against non-Jews[157]. Yet Israel's need for and reliance on international public support and financial and military external aid has made it difficult to declare its system openly as an apartheid system[158].

According to Bishara, all attempts to define the nature of democracy in Israel, by using terms such as ethnic democracy and theo-democracy, are simply attempts at disguising the true nature of the state. In his view, these are attempts to create a theory of Israeli democracy, rather than applying the theory of democracy and testing it in the actual case of Israel[159]. Bishara thus is arguing that instead of doing the opposite, scholars have been attempting to examine democracy by testing it on Israel as a model, defining it sometimes as democracy, ethnic democracy, theo-democracy...etc., thus to normalize an abnormal case.

Summarizing the different views on the nature of the state of Israel and its political system, it is important to point to that fact that despite the disagreements on the definition of the state, most scholars agree that Israel can be considered fully democratic for some, not all. While is not fully democratic for Arabs, it is fully democratic for Jews. In such systems, public opinion among Jews still counts, and it is also true that there is opposition among Jews to the policies of the state. Thus, this nature of the state and its reliance on international support are two issues that influence the decision making, policies and practices of the state regarding its Palestinian Arab minority.

III. B. General policies of the state

It is true that the issue of minority-majority relations is not particular to Israel, as Kimmerling (1989) observes. There is also a broad agreement among scholars that the major problem facing many states is the issue of minorities, which is often considered more serious than any danger from external sources. Yet, this issue is more problematic when these minorities are not only

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[157] Ibid, p.26.
[158] Ibid, p.25.
[159] Bishara, 2002, p.57.

discriminated against but also seen as illegitimate elements even in democratic societies[160]. Legitimacy here is meant to include political as well as economic demands on the part of the Palestinian minority in Israel.

In Israel, the situation of Palestinian citizens in Israel should be seen as part of a pattern of domination in a colonial-settler system, in which economic growth intensifies the extent of class exploitation and racial domination. State control of labor exchanges and economic development policies ensure that Arabs would remain outside the developing sector of the economy and within an institutionalized, secondary labor market[161].

These institutionalized exclusions were discussed in an earlier analysis by Sabri Jiryis. Jiryis provided a detailed account of the legal and other forms of discriminations practiced by the state against the Palestinian community in Israel, from land confiscation to legal exclusions of benefits[162]. In a similar vein, Kretzmer[163] argues that discrimination against Palestinian citizens in Israel is made by legally favoring Jews over non-Jewish citizens. Ian Lustick defines these Israeli policies as "policies of segmentation, cooptation and control"[164]. He argues that the state of Israel has since its inception worked to divide the Arab community and co-opt leaders who were willing to collaborate against the collective interests of the Arab Palestinian community. The state has used various methods of control to undermine Palestinian Arab attempts to organize and mobilize in order to achieve national, economic, and social equality with the Jewish citizens of the state. The method of control exercised by Israel over the Palestinians generally falls into two categories: segmentation between Jews and non-Jews, in the areas of physical segregation, educational funding, goals, and economic discrimination, supporting Jewish economic and land development

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[160] Kimmerling, 1989, p.134.
[161] Said & Hitchens, *Blaming the Victims*, 2001, p.275-277. See also Michel Shalev (1992), and Gershon Shafir (1996).
[162] Sabri, Jiryis, The Arabs in Israel, 1978.
[163] The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel, 1991.
[164] Lustick, Ian. 1980. *Arabs in the Jewish State: A Study in the Control of a National Minority*, p.77.

while at the same time while confiscating lands from the Arabs. Second, the state practiced co-optation of some Palestinian leaders with its patronage system of favors and punishments, embedded in dependence on the state and the Jewish sector where the Arabs are the main labor providers[165].

Despite his discussion of these discriminatory state policies of discipline and punishment, Lustick argues that Israel cannot be called a police state. In contrast, Abu Nimer argues that there is a strong security inspection network among Arabs in Israel that prevents them from expressing their political views freely for fear of losing employment opportunities[166], which is an example of disciplining and surveillance policies that police states deploy. Many scholars have documented various repressive policies that the state of Israel inflicts on its Palestinian population, which concludes that there is a pattern of repressions and violence against the Palestinian citizens that cannot be considered random events. These events are part of a pattern of instilling fear among the Palestinians in Israel, such as the massacres committed in Kafr Qassim in1956, Land Day in 1973, and during the demonstrations in October 2000. These events involved, for example Israeli crackdown and shooting and killing of Palestinian Israeli citizens for peacefully protesting state policies.[167]. While this might seem as a pattern of police state for Arabs, it doe not seem so for Jews.

Haidar (1997) argues that sensitivity to international public opinion has contained Israeli policy towards its non-Jewish citizens, which made Israel grant an official citizenship to the non-Jewish population and limited Israeli plans for the expulsion of the minority. This external constraint also prevented Israel from using openly racist laws to discriminate against the Palestinian minority. As a result, Israel has created laws that are ambiguous and flexible and so allow the government to discriminate against the Palestinians without appearing to be overtly racist[168]. Furthermore, the size of the remaining Palestinian community in

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[165] In Said &Hitchens, 2001, p.277.
[166] Abu-Nimer, 1999, Dialogue, Conflict Resolution, And Change, p.107.
[167] Davis, 1987, p.7.
[168] Haidar, 1997, p.11.

Israel (11%) was also a factor encouraging the Israeli government to grant them citizenship. Since the population was seen as small in number and not constituting a threat to the state, there was a perception by various Israeli officials that it could be easily dominated and controlled[169]. A second internal factor to explain the granting of Israeli citizenship to the Palestinian minority was the existence of liberal Jewish groups who were interested in giving the Palestinian political and civil rights, though with some limitations.

On the other hand, the official recognition given to the state of Israel from the international community had led to the suppression of the issue of the minority within its borders--even though Israel had exceeded its mandated geographic borders as stipulated by the UN 1947 partition plan. Thus the issue of the Palestinian community in Israel has been constructed as a local issue within the framework of minority rights rather an as a significant international issue of national self determination[170].

In contrast to Haidar's view of Israel's ambiguous and covert discriminatory laws and policies, Davis argues, instead, that religious and minority rights have been subject to outright violations in Israel[171]. Following the establishment of the state of Israel, the Israeli Arabs-Palestinians were placed under a military regime that regulated every aspect of their political, economic, social, and personal life[172]. The military regime ruled over all Palestinian inhabitants under the governance of the state and practiced arbitrary detentions, deportations, seizure of land from non-Jews, forfeiture and demolition of property, and land confiscations[173]. Many of these military rules and policies are still inflicted on the Palestinian Arabs in Israel. Davis argues that, ultimately, this militarization of governance is linked to the fact that the state of Israel is committed to the Judaization of the state and internal repressions of non-Jews.

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[169] Ibid, p.12.
[170] Haidar, 1997, p. 12.
[171] Davis, 1987, p.24.
[172] Ibid, 36.
[173] Ibid, p.66-67.

Judaization is a term that can be equated to ethnic cleansing, dispossession and or dislocation of Palestinians in favor of Jewish settlements and resettlements. Kook argues further that it is true that the military regime was imposed from 1948 to 1966. Yet, informally, the basic principle of military rule, emergency laws, is still in place for the Palestinian Arab community in Israel. This principle has been ongoing since 1948, can be invoked any time, and the destruction of homes, land confiscation, and other forms of discrimination continue on every level[174].

Another tangible policy of discrimination is the refusal of housing and property ownership to Palestinian citizens in Israel because they are not Jewish, as mandated by the charter of the Jewish National Fund (JNF) which was adopted by the Israel Land Agency (ILA)[175]. Kook points out that those strategies of exclusion were implemented in the curtailment of central civic, political, and property rights in Israel[176], and this is enforced legally and politically by the state[177]. Also, Palestinians have been excluded from membership in the Israeli cabinet and from every single ruling coalition in the Israeli government[178].

Kook argues that the national and political exclusion of Palestinian citizens has been a fundamental part of Israeli democracy[179], and this is evident in the Israeli legal code. In Israel and according to Supreme Court ruling (5394/92), the principle of equality is a relative and not an absolute one[180]. Kook argues that the system in Israel is built on different legal mechanisms of covert and overt discrimination against non-Jews (Palestinians) in Israel, legally and in practice, has been acknowledged and documented by Israelis and non-Israelis alike[181]. Expropriation of land owned by Palestinian citizens has been practiced by Israel all along since 1948, even though the right to property ownership is considered a

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[174] Kook, 2002, p.68-71.
[175] Kook, 2002, p.3.
[176] Ibid, p.6.
[177] Ibid, p.8.
[178] Ibid, p.59.
[179] Ibid, p.6.
[180] Ibid, p.81.
[181] Ibid, p.82.

fundamental right and one of the main pillars of democratic systems[182]. Furthermore, Palestinian citizens are considered a demographic burden-problem to the Jewish Israeli state, and, Immigration of Jews to Israel/Palestine has the greatest impact on the Palestinians for these immigrants replace Palestinians in the labor market and also provide a pretext for the state to expropriate more lands from the Palestinians[183].

According to Kook, if there changes took place (such as the military regime from 1948-1966), these changes in democratic policies of inclusion are best understood as part of an effort to stabilize the regime and not a radical shift in Israeli state ideology or thought[184]. According to her, changes in practices of inclusion and exclusion of democratic states anywhere in the world out to be explained not from society-centered explanations, but are based mainly on states' attempts to insure political and economic stability in response to external and internal conditions[185].

Furthermore, Judith Shuval argues that segregation in Israel between Jewish and Palestinian citizens is institutionalized in several areas of life and informal contact between the two groups is minimal[186]. At the core of the state's relationship to its Palestinian Arab citizens is what some scholars describe as a politics of transfer and exclusion and domination, and the notion of transfer of Arab citizens as an appropriate solution is held by the majority of Jews in Israel[187].

According to Sultany, racism and discrimination against the Palestinian Arab citizens are processes that are deeply entrenched in Israel ideologically as well as in practice[188]. This was apparent, for example, when the legislature passed new laws responding to the demands of the relatively disadvantaged Oriental

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[182] Ibid, p.92.
[183] Ibid, p.171.
[184] Ibid, p.182.
[185] Kook, 2002, p.183.
[186] Judith Shuval, in Kimmerling 1989, p.229.
[187] Ghanem, &Mustafa, A State Against Its Citizens, 2004, p.4.
[188] Sultany, Israel and the Palestinian Minority, 2003, p.12.

Jews, but yet when some of these laws were found to benefit Arabs they were quickly revoked. Another example was also, when the Encouragement of Large Families Law was enacted and enforcers/the state realized that Arabs would be primary beneficiaries, the law was quickly rescinded. In another case, university admissions policies were adopted to accommodate underprivileged populations in the state and bring them into the higher education system. When it was discovered that Arabs, rather than the targeted residents of Jewish development towns, were the primary beneficiaries of these changes, universities reverted to their original admission policies[189].

Furthermore, Sultany argues that the policies of the state are often manifested in the treatment of Palestinian Arab citizens at the hands of the Israeli security, which at some times are more significant than others. According to Sultany, during the mass protests of October 2000, Israeli authorities acted brutally in response to the demonstrations that took place within Palestinian community in Israel, similar to its practices in the Occupied Territories. Through the 2000 events, it became apparent, once again, that Arab citizens lack meaningful and substantive citizenship in the State of Israel. The process of exclusion, alienation and delegitimization of Palestinian citizens in all areas of life in Israel is apparent. Laws that have been enacted after 2000 restricted the political rights of Palestinian minority and its ability to exercise an already limited political power inherent by virtue of the definition of the state as a Jewish state. This discriminatory approach is evident not only on the upper levels of the political system in Israel. A number of public opinion surveys, conducted by leading Israeli research institutes and the press, indicate a pervasive attitude of hostility, prejudice, and hatred toward Palestinian Arabs and a discourse of hate is readily apparent and dominates public debate, public consciousness, and reality itself[190].

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[189] Sultany, 2003, Israel and the Palestinian Minority, p.16.
[190] Sultany 2003, Citizens without Citizenship, pp.9-10.

Furthermore, Sultany argues that the government decisions on policies towards the Arab Palestinian citizens often involve individuals in the policy development process from the Israeli security agencies, reflecting the powerful role of the General Security Service (GSS, also known as the Shabak or the Shin Bet), which is under the administrative control of the Prime Minister's Office. The GSS appears to dictate central policy on many matters related to Palestinian citizens of Israel, a policy that sees Arabs as a security problem. When the military administration ended in 1966, the methods for controlling and overseeing the Arab minority changed and the GSS became the primary body involved in these tasks[191]. Those government advisors on Arab affairs who come from the security agencies often see the Palestinian Arab citizens as a fifth column, which often serves as a pretext for their exclusion and marginalization, and makes them a target of hatred and racism, and provides a justification for discrimination against them[192].

Finally, Findley argues that one of the mechanisms of exclusion and discrimination is according to Findley lies in the military service. Not drafting the Palestinians in the Israeli army is a way to exclude them from benefits and privileges and rights that are awarded to those who serve in the army[193]. Yet religious Jews who do not serve in the army enjoy these privileges because they are exempt on religious and not national grounds. According to Findley, discrimination against the Palestinian citizens living in Israel is endemic and is embodied in Israel's laws and government regulations[194]. In sum, according to Abu Baker and Rabinowitz, economic stagnation, underdevelopment, unemployment, and poverty in the Palestinian community are inextricably linked to long-standing government policies of neglect and discrimination[195].

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[191] Ibid, pp.87-88.
[192] Ibid, p.116.
[193] Findley, 1995, p.90.
[194] Ibid, p.91.
[195] Rabinowitz & Abu Baker, 2005, p. 7.

III. C. Policy on identity

Having provided an overview of Israel's general policies towards its Palestinian Arab citizens and the relationship of the state towards them in the previous sections, I will now look specifically at the policies of the state towards the Arab community in regards to their identity, in relationship to experiences of inclusion and or exclusion, and the identity that was constructed for them by the state.

Kook argues that the Israeli legal code clearly reveal the boundaries of Israeli national identity and formally distinguish between Jews and Palestinians, as in the case of the Law of Return-Law of Nationality and citizenship, the law governing public and property ownership, and political association and assembly[196]. The nationality of the state of Israel is declared as Jewish[197] and the nationality of Palestinian Israelis is stated as Arab, not Israeli, in the identity card issued by the state[198]. Thus, the exclusion of Palestinians from the state's main privileges and national identity is a core principle of the state.

The state policy of exclusion worked on many levels. First, the state segregated the two groups, Jews and Palestinians, from each other. Than, it has worked to solidify a unified identity for its Jewish citizens, while excluding non-Jews. While on the other hand, the state has worked to create a fractured identity for the Palestinians because their unity is seen as a potential threat to the state. The Palestinian citizens of Israel are given different identification categories such as Arab, Muslim, Christian, Druze, and these appear on their government-issued identification cards[199]. These policies, according to Abu Nimer, are still in place for the boundaries dividing Arabs as Muslims, Christians, or Druze are still emphasized by the state[200].

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[196] Kook, 2002, p.82.
[197] Ibid, p.60.
[198] Ibid, p.67.
[199] Haidar, 1997, p.16.
[200] Abu Nimer, 1999, p.31.

According to Kook, the identity of Palestinian citizens in Israel lies as expected outside of the homogenized and constructed core identity of the nation[201] that defines itself as Jewish and Zionist. Furthermore, religious membership is the prime marker of national membership in Israel[202], and the fact that Palestinian Arabs are not Jewish, nor Zionist, means that they fundamentally do not belong. Instead, the Israeli authority has constructed for them the category of "Israeli Arabs"[203], trying to accommodate them somehow into the identity of the state, yet simultaneously excluding them. Underlying this policy is an attempt to uproot the identification with anything Palestinian by trying to create a hybrid identity of being neither Arab Palestinian nor Israeli. Finally, the use of labels such as Israeli Arabs, Druze, Muslims, and Christians helps to undermine the existence of any political or national identification, and the use of the term "minority" also denies them a distinct cultural identity[204].

The state has used many tools to undermine the national identity of Palestinian Arabs. One tool was the educational system[205]. The education in Israel is structured to instill nationalist pride among Jewish students while among the Arabs it used for pacification and loyalty to the state of Israel and ignorance of Palestinian Arab history, culture and identity[206]. Since its inception, the state of Israel and its institutions have worked to weaken the national identity of the Palestinian Arab community[207]. The state of Israel has banned many political associations that its Palestinian citizens have tried to form since the 1950s[208]. The right to political association of citizens is fundamental to democracy, yet it can

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[201] Kook, 2002, p. ix.
[202] Ibid, p.8.
[203] Ibid, p.67.
[204] Ibid, p.67-68.
[205] Haidar, 1997, p.79.
[206] Abu Nimer, 1999, p.33.
[207] Somayya Sharqawi, Baladna Manual, 2004, p.7.
[208] Kook, 2002, p.97.

not be practiced freely in Israel by its Palestinian citizens[209]. This Israeli system of control does not allow the Palestinian citizens develop an alternative center[210].

Another tool that the state used to exclude and further fragment the identity of Arab Palestinians is policies of birth registration. In the registration of births of Jews, it is not required to declare the confession of the religious affiliation of the newborn child (such as orthodox or reform) but Palestinian Arab citizens are registered according to their religious affiliations (Muslim, Druze, Christian). Furthermore, the citizenship of a Jewish child is registered as Israeli while that for the Palestinian Arab is left blank[211]. Religion and nationality are included in the same box on the birth certificate for Palestinian Arabs, while they are divided into two different categories for Jewish persons[212]. The state has also controlled and manipulated the relationship among different groups within the Palestinian community and often exaggerated difference and conflicts[213]. According to Sami Mir'i, the Israeli authorities have aimed, historically and at present, to transform the collectivity of Palestinian Arabs in Israel into a divided set of religious communities, and attempted to diminish national Palestinian Arab identity through the creation and exaggeration of religious differences and conflicts[214].

According to Azmi Bishara, the state tried further to divide the Arabs in Israel in many ways and practices such the drafting of the Druze into the military and denial of their identity as Arab, to the treatment of the Arabs as religious minorities in the tradition of the Ottoman millet system, which was not an Israel invention in origin. The state of Israel, further, imposed military rule on its Palestinian Arab citizens till1966, under which, the Arab villages were divided into distinct closed areas, and were prohibited from moving between areas without the permission of the military governor. The military rule thus worked to

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[209] Ibid, p.98.
[210] Kimmerling, 1989, p.266.
[211] Davis, 1987, p.26.
[212] Ibid, p.29.
[213] Ibid, p.19.
[214] in Baladna Manual, 2004, p.47.

further distances members of the community from each other. In addition, the state imposed on Palestinian citizens the old colonial policy of divide-and-rule and encouraged internal differences, based on family, geographic, or religious backgrounds[215].

Furthermore, Bishara argues, it is true that Palestinians and Arabs always had religious and other identities. Yet since 1948, the state as a modernizing agency has not help create a unified identity for them. Thus, given that Israeli identity does not include fully the Arab citizens, therefore there became a need to fill the vacuum by them using other forms of identities available at hand such as religious, local, or familial[216]. Instead of recognizing them as a national minority with a specific national Arab identity, to some extent Israel succeeded in creating new identities to replace a single, unifying identity. That is especially so true when the urban cultural centers that Arabs had were destroyed by Israel, and it is a fact that urban culture helps to diminish and even replace local and religious identities[217]. Even more, Druze identity is constructed by the state not only as a separate religious category but also national identity distinguishing Druze from the rest of the Arab community[218].

Bishara also points out that many Arabs believe that religious and family conflicts were aggravated by design of the state and colonialism and its sources are largely external. In fact, colonialism did not create such identities even though it manipulated them and exaggerated them in order to control them according to the classical colonial principle of 'divide and rule'[219]. It is also true that colonialism manipulated religious identities and politicized them, yet the situation was not all that perfect and peaceful before colonialism[220]. Furthermore, it is also true that the state recognizes its Arab citizens not as a national group but as a collection of minority groups and often created conflicts among these different

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[215] in Baladna, 2004, p.157.
[216] Bishara, 2002, p.70-71.
[217] Ibid, p.157-158.
[218] Ibid, 2002, p.108.
[219] Ibid, p.153.
[220] Bishara, 2002, p.154.

religious groups as history has shown[221]. The state of Israel encouraged local familial and religious identities in the Arab sector, so as to allow the state to not treat the individual as one with full equal civil rights, but as individual that belongs to a group, where the solution to his grievances are better addressed through the group or among the groups. It is also true, at the same time, that there was no real attempt by Arab national leadership in Israel to work to create a unifying national Arab identity, and when they tried the state was fast to destroy and sabotage such attempts[222].

In general, Israel kept the system that was present during the British Mandate regarding the non-Jewish communities, which was a copy of the Ottoman millet system. But the Jewish community was released from that system and its legal status changed to become the dominant community having the main and sole authority of the state, who also determined the status of other communities as it wished. Thus, the state of Israel cancelled the millet system in regards to the Jewish community, and reinforced it on the rest of the religious communities[223].

Furthermore, Israeli authorities recognized the Druze a separate religious community in 1957, and later created for them separate religious courts according to religious courts law of 1962, in which for the first time, a separate religious court was established for the Druze community in Israel. Prior to that, Druze community members were under the authority of the Muslim religious court, dealing with issues of marriage and divorce[224]. This is also the case in Education. Israel established a centralist educational system with separate branch for the Arab sector, and later it established a separate branch for the Druze community[225].

Even after fifty years, the Israeli educational objectives and the programs designed for Palestinian schools still fail to reflect the community's identity as a

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[221] Ibid, p.158.
[222] Ibid, p.163.
[223] in Mansour, 2004, p.10.
[224] Ibid, p.101.
[225] Ibid, p.329-330.

Palestinian Arab national minority[226]. Through this centralist Israeli educational system, identities such as "Israel's Arabs", Israeli Arabs", were enforced[227], and then also enforced further sub-identities, especially religious, as the main identity as the dominant category. The education system was used to eradicate the Palestinians' national, cultural, and historic identity[228].

III. D. Policy conclusions

From the discussion of this chapter, it becomes clear that the relationship between the state of Israel and its Palestinian Arab citizens is problematic, and was entangled in the history of the Palestinian Israeli conflict. The purpose of the discussion here was to provide a background to the history of that relationship in order to better understand the behavior of the police during the event in Kafr Yassif.

First, it is important here to keep in mind that the police in Israel fall under the authority of the Ministry of Interior, thus the government. Also important is that the state has a centralist political system (versus federalist system that of the United States), and that Israel is a small state territorially and has large number of security forces compared to the size of the country and the population. Furthermore, security forces have allowed violence to take place among the Palestinians, and as also it was stated earlier, they don't hesitate to use violence against them, which is contrary to the behavior of the state when it comes to violence within and or against the Jewish community[229]. Also, it is has been proven fact that discrimination and racism by state police, state prosecution, and courts, are very evident in Israel since it inception[230].

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[226] Rabinowitz, Dan and Khawla Abu-Baker, 2005, p.8.
[227] Ibid, p.13.
[228] Ibid, p.55.
[229] www.arabs48.com May 17th 2005.
[230] Rabinowitz, Dan and Khawla Abu-Baker, 2005, p.8.

Finally, it is true that secrecy is at the core of government work and it is hard to find proofs for government policies and actions that are not declared[231]. Yet in this case there is enough evidence, as discussed so far, of a clear state policy that is negative towards the Arab Palestinian citizens. Thus, even if state policies are not declared, it is possible to deduct the aims and goals of the state towards a minority through its behavior towards this minority.

While it is possible that police fails at sometimes to implement order and carry on policies, in this case, when the behavior of negligence is repeated, as we shall see in the following part, I argue that such behavior ought to be contextualized as a part of policy of the state. Also, as Lustick argued, these policies of low level repressions and control were carried also by low level officials without the need for permission of superiors and it was understood as part of such policy. Based on the discussion of the nature of the state of Israel and its relationship to the Palestinian Arab community, it is fair to argue that the incident in Kafr Yassif is part of policy of the state of Israel to allow or encourage violence among the different Palestinian Arab religious sects as a means of control and as a means of preventing possible mobilization of the community against the state.

Baruch Kimmerling advises us to free ourselves from Israeli centric approaches[232] also from Zionist centric approaches, arguments, and explanations, when discussing Israeli state and society. This is, I find, to be helpful point since the study of this issue is often attacked as being not objective. Objectivity here, as Kimmerling argues, will help us to see the picture of the state of Israel, its society and its policies regarding the Palestinian Arab community al along since 1948. The most important change in Israeli policy towards its Arab citizens after 1966 is that the policy of national discrimination became acknowledged officially and thus put an end to the argument whether there was such a policy or not[233]. There

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[231] Burton, 1984, Global Conflicts, p.72.
[232] Kimmerling 1989, p.239.
[233] Bishara, 2002, p.38.

were modifications and changes in the conditions of the Palestinians in Israel, yet these changes left three issues intact: 1) discrimination of allocation of resources and funding vis-à-vis the Jewish sector, 2) the state of Israel remains the state of the Jewish majority in its nature, essence and practice, 3) that the Arabs in Israel are not recognized as a national group-community but as a selection of different religious communities[234]. This exclusion is a result of the fact that Israeli identity was built on Zionist principles similar to European ethnic national identities. It is built on concepts of land, militarism, secularism, and animosity to everything eastern especially Arab[235]. Thus there is popular among the Jewish majority in support for the status quo in Israel, and the change is not in sight. As Stasliulis and – Yuval-Davis (1995), Israeli Jewish Western Zionist identity is built on the exclusion of the native Palestinian[236]. The formal and practical exclusion of Arab citizens in Israel did not change much since the inception of the state in 1948, and has been practiced by governments of Labor and Likud[237].

In this context I will discuss in the next chapter the event and its outcome. I will also use another two examples of violence between different religious groups within the Palestinian Arab community. This will serve to help understand what happened in Kafr Yassif in a comparative lens so that a larger picture can be drown on how historic divisions and developments in the Palestinian Arab society, where religious groups value their religious identity above the national identity, and where they legitimate group violence in revenge to individual's act against another individual from a different religious community. It will also help us conceptualize how the state was able to use these internal factors to further implement its policy of control of the Palestinian Arab community.

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[234] Bishara, 2002, p.53.
[235] in Ghanem, 2003, Identities and Politics in Israel, p.44.
[236] Ibid, p.50.
[237] Ibid, p.184-185.

Chapter IV

The event and its outcome

In this chapter, I will first provide the details the event and its aftermath. In the first part, I will provide a summary of what took place in Kafr Yassif in April 1981 based on my field research consisting of information collected through conversations with eyewitnesses and local leaders, as well as utilizing local council archives. Then, in the second part, I will explore the media coverage of the event to understand whether the media reports might add to our understanding of what happened in Kafr Yassif, and also to examine how Arab and Hebrew press represent the event. In this third part, I will briefly discuss two other events, where violence took place between religious groups within the Palestinian Arab society, from which I hope to get better understanding of the community as well as the state.

IV. A. Field report

As mentioned in the introduction, on April 11, 1981, a soccer game took place between Kafr Yassif and Julis and violence among the fans of the two teams took place. People from both sides were injured; one person from Julis was taken to the hospital and died there, as happened to one person from Kafr Yassif. Although fighting during and about soccer games is common all around the world but what was different here is that although police were actually present during the fighting, they did nothing to stop it.

When news broke of the fights that had taken place during the game and their unfortunate outcome, the mayor of the local council in Kafr Yassif, Nimer Morcos, called the head of the local council in Julis in order to prevent any further escalation of violence. Morcos requested that a meeting be held between the heads of the local councils of the two villages. The head of the local council of Julis initially accepted Morcos' offer to meet but later declined, arguing that pressure from some families in Julis forced him to change his mind. However, according to Morcos and others, it was pressure from Israeli government officials

that made the mayor of Julis reject the invitation to meet. Morcos then called for a special meeting of the local council in Kafr Yassif, which took place on the night of Saturday, April 11, 1981. In the meeting, the mayor and council members discussed possible steps that the Kafr Yassif council should take in order to tackle the issue at hand.

Soon after this, the Kafr Yassif local council initiated contacts with Palestinian Arab community leaders from the region. They came to help with the goal of resolving the conflict between the two villages, a common practice in Galilee whenever a conflict or violence in the community arises. The delegation, called *Jaha* in Arabic, was comprised of community leaders who often participate in such cases when called upon by the parties involved in conflict. It started its work of talks with the two villages' leaders in order to reach a settlement satisfactory to both parties, in accordance with the Palestinian Arab traditional practice of *Sulha*.

The *Sulha* reconciliation committee initiated contacts with leaders in Julis on the night of April 11 and was optimistic after making initial contacts with community leaders in Julis. However, by the end of the next day when the Sulha committee members left Julis and returned to Kafr Yassif, they informed Morcos that they had failed in achieving a *Hudna*-truce, because the demand by Julis was that the Kafr Yassif council should first identify the killer of the Julis victim. But according to the Kafr Yassif local council, this was impossible to do because the identity of the killer was unknown and it would be unfair to place such a serious accusation against an individual without being fully confident about the killer's identity. The council also argued that a few people from Kafr Yassif had been arrested, and the police should have been able to identify the killer through their own investigation.

As soon as the head of the Kafr Yassif local council learned that the reconciliation committee had failed to achieve a truce, he asked the *Sulha* committee to contact the head of the regional Israeli police headquarters, David Franco, to inform him of the seriousness of the situation so that the police could

take the necessary steps. Many of the committee members contacted Franco, and Morcos himself personally called him to request an increase in the police presence in both villages to prevent the situation from deteriorating, especially after hearing rumors of possible attack against Kafr Yassif. Despite these pleas, Franco's reply was simply that there were enough police forces in the village's police station and there was no need to ask the regional police branch to send more police. Morcos then also called a Knesset member from the Israeli Communist Party, Mair Vilner, and asked him to intervene with the Israeli Minister of Interior in order to increase the police force in the area, which Vilner did. It is important here to note that the Israeli political system is very centralized. The government includes an interior minister who is responsible for the internal security and is responsible for the different internal security bodies, including the police. Furthermore, the police force in Israel has a regional branch in addition to different local police stations. It is also important to note that the size of each region is very small and the police can maneuver easily between the different locations within the region and can quickly redeploy forces when called upon.

It is interesting to note here that Nimer Morcos is a Communist in fact a leader in the Israeli Communist party. While on one hand he believes in modern solutions to violence, where the state and the justice system are responsible for issues concerning violence in the society, he also could not ignore the traditional ways of life of his own society, and worked also within the framework of the traditional methods of conflict resolution that are common in Arab society. So, on one hand, there these multiple contacts on local, regional, and state levels were being initiated, and many people from Kafr Yassif continued to contact the local and regional police stations whenever they saw unusual activities, such as armed men in jeeps driving around the village, and asked repeatedly for more police. On the other hand, the local council kept contacting the reconciliation committee members and asked them to continue their dialogue with the people of Julis in order to achieve a truce. However, all these efforts were unsuccessful in preventing the violence that people anticipated and feared.

So, at 2 p.m. on Tuesday, April 14, 1981, an attack started against Kafr Yassif and lasted until 3:45 p.m. Local sources from Kafr Yassif testify that hundreds of people from Julis participated in this destructive attack, some arrived by vehicles, but the great majority of them arrived on foot and returned after the end of the attack; the distance between the two villages is about half an hour on foot. Among the aggressors, there were a number of individuals wearing the uniform of the Israeli army and the border security units. In the attack, arms from the Israeli military and different security units were used, such as vehicles, automatic machine guns, and bombs; this added to the fear of the people in Kafr Yassif who realized that the attack was serious and that the state seemed to be behind it, especially because the police was present in good numbers (about 40 policemen) but stood watching and did not intervene to stop the attack.

The beginning of the general attack on the village was signaled by an explosion in the local council building in Kafr Yassif, caused by an armed group from Julis in a jeep that threw bombs into the building and fired at it. Groups of aggressors then spread throughout the main streets of the village, shooting, bombing, burning houses, stores, and cars and destroying property inside houses and stores. The way this attack unfolded had all the characteristics of a military operation, suggesting that it was well planned by the attackers and was not really spontaneous. The attackers communicated with each other through military wireless equipments and were coordinating with each other all the way through the attack. The violence continued for almost two hours without any retaliation from the inhabitants of Kafr Yassif, who were not armed.

The outcome of the attack on Kafr Yassif was: two fatalities, 10 people injured, 85 homes destroyed and burned, 17 stores burned and destroyed (among them a pharmacy and a textile factory), 31 cars and one tractor burned and destroyed, and external damage to the elementary school, the Catholic Church that is located on the main street in the village, the post office, and a bank in the village. In addition to this destruction, there were private libraries that were

damaged and destroyed and that included rare books and two doctoral dissertations. The attack targeted mainly Christians in the village.

Conversations with members of the local Kafr Yassif council and literature produced by it about this incident point to significant issues regarding the behavior of the Israeli security forces, before and during the event, that underline the general argument about the role of state that this case study demonstrates. Three minutes after the start of aggression, Morcos had called the regional as well as local police stations asking for immediate assistance to defend the unarmed inhabitants of Kafr Yassif. Morcos had also called leaders from neighboring villages to intervene, and called also the ambulance station in the region asking for immediate help with the casualties in the village.

Despite these calls no additional Israeli security forces came to Kafr Yassif until after the end of the attack, although it lasted 1.75 hours and the regional police station in Acre is only ten minutes away. To make matters worse, the Israeli security forces put blockades and checkpoints at the entrances of the villages and left open only the road that connects Julis with Kafr Yassif, which was the route through which the attackers entered and exited the village. Furthermore, the security forces also prevented delegations from neighboring towns, villages, and Kibitzims (Jewish Collectives) who wanted to enter the village and stop the attack. The police also did not allow ambulances to enter the village to take away the injured.

According to Nimer Morcos, the mayor of Kafr Yassif, the Kafr Yassif - Julis incident was part of a state strategy to stir up inter-communal tensions and violence among Palestinian Israelis. Morcos argued that dividing local Palestinian communities inside Israel had a larger political significance for the state wanted tensions between Arab communities in Israel to spill over to the situation in Lebanon at the time. The incident in Kafr Yassif in 1981 occurred at a moment when Israel was preparing for the war in Lebanon and wanted to create Christian-Druze infighting so that these tensions would exacerbate friction among the Druze and Christians in Lebanon. According to Nimer Morcos, Israel hoped

that weakening these communities would help provide an advantageous situation for them in the war in Lebanon that they were planning to fight in the coming few months. This opinion is supported by the analysis of why Israel went to war in Lebanon in 1982 by Lebanon-based correspondent Jim Muir, who observed that one purpose of the Israeli war on Lebanon was to exacerbate internal conflicts in Lebanon. He further argues that there is a great deal of evidence that the Israelis helped fuel and encourage the Christian-Druze conflict' in the Chouf region of Lebanon[238]. This point is also illustrates that violence between two religious groups in one country could have ramifications on the relationships of similar religious groups in neighboring countries. This also shows, that even though historically Druzes and Christians Catholic Maronites, who had a history of communal violence, took place in Lebanon, it could have also affected the relationship between Christians in general, even non Maronites, and Druzes in neighboring regions such as Galilee where the event took place.

Nimer Morcos argues that the Kafr-Yassif event is similar to the massacre in Kafr-Qassim in 1956, when Israeli security forces killed and injured many Arab Palestinian citizens. Both incidents were part of governmental attempts to instill fear and divisions within the Palestinian community before launching a war with the neighboring Arab countries, as was the case in their attack on Egypt in 1956 or with the Palestinians. The difference in this event, according to his view, was that the attack was made to appear as being perpetrated by an Arab village-an Arab religious community against another, while in fact the attack was almost certainly orchestrated by the Israeli security forces or at least with their full knowledge.

According to Imam 'Abed, the Imam of Kafr Yassif who has participated in many *Sulha*-making efforts in the region, the event in Kafr Yassif was a plan by the government using its functionaries in the village and the region. He observed that the *Sulha* was not conducted properly at the end in its overall process, but was still achieved as a result of fear on the part of Kafr Yassif

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[238] quoted in Said &Hitchens, 2001, p.106.

residents, having been intimidated by the "government's men" in the area who forced the *Sulha* on them while leaving out the condition they had put forward for an independent inquiry into the event. Imam 'Abed also noted that Julis leaders behaved in accordance with government officials' demands, but not according to the tradition of *Sulha* making, which is why the initial efforts for the *Sulha* failed and led to the attack on April 14.

In many conversations, people pointed to the "government's men" without naming them most of the time. In some conversations, people talked about "the men" from the Prime Minister's Office for Arab Affairs. This is an office of advisors, who supposedly are experts on Arab affairs, who advise the prime minister on issues and policies concerning the Arabs in Israel. Most of these men have professional background in the Israeli military and intelligence. At some occasions, people mentioned the name of Jaber Dahesh-Mu'addi, who is a Druze leader and a politician. His history goes back to the days before the establishment of the state, where he was contacted by Jewish leaders and was induced into cooperation against the rest of the Palestinian Arab community. In return for his work to secure the Druze community to side with Israel, he was given many political posts such as being in the office of the prime minister. He also ran in the national elections on the top of an Arab list, which worked to weaken the hold of the Israeli Communist Party that was the strongest party within the Palestinian Arab community in Israel. He also had a history of attacks against the Kafr Yassif local council, when it was led by Yani Yani who was mentioned earlier in the part that discussed the history of the village. Yani, as mentioned there, led a local and regional coalition of socialist and nationalist Arabs in Israel, a coalition that aimed at resisting state policies. Thus, Kafr Yassif was always an obstacle to Jaber Dahesh-Mu'addi who was basically working to secure votes for his party that was allied with the ruling Israeli parties.

Going back to the incident, Imam 'Abed has argued that the demand for naming the killer from Kafr Yassif was just as long as it was known, yet in large scale fighting surrounding the soccer game case, was impossible. Imam 'Abed

further always maintained that the police arrested 4suspected killers from Kafr Yassif, and if Julis wanted to, they could have attacked these four suspects' families, but not the whole village, namely not the whole Christian community in Kafr Yassif who were the main target of the attack. Imam 'Abed argued that this is not common behavior that the Arab community is accustomed to. Although violence takes place, the community often is able to resolve disputes especially when the case is so complicated and the killers are not publicly known. He believes that if the Julis leaders were really going by the tradition, they would have accepted the apology of Kafr Yassif, keeping in mind that a person from Kafr Yassif also was killed during the soccer game fighting. But, since the killing location was in Kafr Yassif, then Kafr Yassif was obligated according to tradition to apologize and seek *Sulha*, and *Sulha* is often achieved reconciliation at some point without further escalation of violence and counter violence.

As a resident of this area I also had a many conversations with Elias Jabbour from Shafa'amr, who is well known locally and internationally for the peace-making efforts he has been involved with in the area. Jabbour is also the author of a book about the principles and mechanism of *Sulha* making (*Sulha*: Traditional Palestinian Conflict Resolution, 1996), – the first local or indigenous publication on the topic that details the history, the process, and dynamics of this process. Our conversations were made more significant, and relevant to contemporary events, by a shocking event that coincidentally took place one day when I was present. Hours after I had left Jabbour's home in Shafa'amr on the 24th of August 2006, a Jewish male wearing Israeli army uniform, opened fire on a bus going to this Arab town and murdered four Palestinian Arabs and injured many others from that town, using an army weapon.

According to Jabbour, the relationship between Julis and Kafr Yassif was always friendly and neighborly, and in the past he had never heard of any conflicts between the two villages in his lifetime and in local memory. Not only had there been no tensions between the two communities, he observed that many people from Kafr Yassif had actually found refuge in Julis during different

periods of political unrest in the area (for example during late Ottoman period, British colonization, and the 1948 War). Yet Jabbour did not deny that there was some resentment by local Palestinian Muslims and Druzes towards Christians because of their educational and financial and educational achievements. He also acknowledged that some Palestinian youth of Christians and Muslim backgrounds were critical of the Druze and insulted them because they served in the Israeli army. Jabbour suggested that these were factors that might have helped to precipitate the event between Kafr Yassif and Julis.

According to Jabbour, the initial *Sulha*-making failed and the attack on Kafr Yassif was not stopped because of several possibilities. The first mistake was the fact that the killer was not named by the mayor of Kafr Yassif, even though the police arrested three residents from Kafr Yassif and it was difficult to single someone out from a group engaged in violent fighting. Jabbour thought that Kafr Yassif leaders should have worked harder to find out who was the killer was and give his name to leaders in Julis, while seeking *Sulha* to prevent an act of revenge against him. The second mistake was that Julis did not accept the *diyyah* (sum of money given by one party which if accepted by the other seals a commitment to engage in resolution of the conflict through *Sulha*). Their refusal to accept the *diyyah*, according to Jabbour, demonstrated they were not following the tradition and were not interested in *Sulha*, which means that they were going to take revenge. It also implied that they might have been affected by more powerful parties than the *Sulha* committee itself. Here, Jabbour argues that the *Sulha* delegation or *Jaha*-community leaders- was in reality weaker than some other parties that were involved in the conflict, meaning the government and its men in the area. This imbalance of power might have affected the effort to bring about conflict resolution before the situation deteriorated further because of these external forces.

In Jabbour's view, the police was responsible for not preventing both incidents of violence; during the soccer game as well as the attack on Kafr Yassif that took place three days later. In his perspective, based on an understanding of

the traditional Arab approach to conflict, the police ought to have taken seriously the warnings of the Kafr Yassif council that violence was impending. It is also noted that the police in Arab areas is familiar with such traditions in the community. If the police were genuinely unable to prevent fighting during the soccer game, they should have at least been able to prevent any further violence after the gravity of the situation became apparent and it was clear that that further violence was likely to happen. Jabbour noted that the police behavior was similar to that during the events in Al-Maghaar in 2005, when for two days a Druze mob roamed the town of Al-Maghaar burning the stores and homes of Christian residents while the police was watching. According to eyewitnesses of the event, some members of the police force even participated in these attacks along with the Druze mob (I will discuss this event in more details at later part in this chapter).

Jabbour has often astutely observed that the state is generally presumed to embody modernity and modern technologies of regulation such as modern law, so it comes as no surprise that that state is not interested in traditional methods of conflict resolution. In this, the state of Israel is not an exception. But more than that, in the case of the Kafr Yassif attack, the Israeli authorities were not initially interested in supporting traditional methods of conflict resolution that might have helped reduce tensions and contain conflicts within the Arab community, because a unified Palestinian Arab community is not desired by the state of Israel, but rather is seen as a threat. The state of Israel works to divide and rule the Palestinian Arab community, and when internal elements, causes, or conditions are available then a conflict is exploited by the state to further divisions and animosity among various religious and familial groups. But, later on, the state, was pushing for *Sulha* in order to end the case without much noise and without allowing Kafr Yassif to achieve its main condition, which was the establishing of an independent investigation of the police behavior during the event.

Thus, a *Sulha* was finally achieved after few weeks. It is true that the *Sulha* was achieved under pressure from people connected to the government

(individuals from the Office of Prime Minister for Arab Affairs, including Jaber Dahesh-Mu'addi), which according to those many I talked to was means of pressure to eliminate the demand made by Kafr Yassif to establish an independent investigation into the event as a prerequisite for conflict resolution. Jaber Dahesh Mu'adi and one official from the Prime Minister Office on Arab Affairs, joined with armed men, visited the different people in the village, especially those whose relatives were killed in the event, and kept the pressure and some were threatened to drop the condition that Kafr Yassif insisted on so that *Sulha* could be concluded. Kafr Yassif's leadership resisted first these pressures and kept asking for an independent investigation that would look into how and why the police handled the event in this manner.

However, Kafr Yassif representatives finally accepted the *Sulha* with Julis because they were afraid of further escalation. Some of the individuals from Kafr Yassif that I have talked with also argued that the residents of Kafr Yassif did not respond to violence with violence simply because they were afraid to do so, since Julis is an armed village and the government appeared to be backing them. According to the *Sulha* agreement, violence was condemned but no responsible party was assigned guilt. According to Arab tradition, the affected residents in Kafr Yassif were each rewarded with a sum of money as compensation for the damage they suffered to life or property. The amount of money each received depended in the damage that befell that person or family. Thus, some were given few thousand Israeli Shekels (equal to hundreds of U.S. dollars) and others were given much more, especially those who had death or physical injury through the attack. Those families received each about 100,000 dollars. These sums are often collected from wealthy individuals within the community. Also, in this case, the government contributed more than half of the money, in accordance with the recommendations of its investigation committee.

After the attack ended, it is notable that the village of Kafr Yassif did not seek revenge for the damage and fatalities caused by assailants from Julis, but rather sought a truce with the attacking village. This is because of fear as I

mentioned earlier, but also as the people in Kafr Yassif have often emphasized, because the event was seen as exemplifying a plan by the Israeli government to stir up communal fighting and the people of Kafr Yassif did not want to fall for the divisive plans of the state, which were seen by them as aiming to divide the Palestinian Arab community and create internal fighting among its different religious communities.

The fact that people in Kafr Yassif did not respond violently under such circumstances, even if it was out of fear, shows also their rational behavior and ability to calculate consequences to reactions that go beyond mere emotions and the need for revenge. It is also important to emphasize that Arab tradition does not seek "complete justice," as Elias Jabbour points out, because it acknowledges that this may not help in ending tensions between fighting parties. Arab tradition does not see the state justice system as sufficient for bringing harmony and peace to society, especially if disputing parties live in close proximity to each other. Thus, Kafr Yassif's response of avoiding revenge and using *Sulha*-peace making is actually the more common practice in most cases in which violence takes place between individuals, groups, or villages in Arab society.

IV. B. Media coverage

In this section, I will summarize the media coverage of the event and its aftermath as a way to examine how the events were represented in the media and examine the historical record and perspectives of different media sources. As part of my research, I examined the coverage of the event in the major print media outlets in the country both in Arabic and in Hebrew. The newspaper that covered the event in greatest depth was *Al-Ittihad*[239]. This is understandable because it was the only Arabic newspaper in Israel at the time, and its coverage is concentrated on issues of the Palestinian Arab community in Israel. I also analyzed the media

[239] *Al-Ittihad* is published by the Israeli Communist Party. As earlier stated, this party was the only voice for the Palestinian Arabs in Israel, and its publications were also a space of expression to many Arab writers, poets, and politicians as well.

coverage in Hebrew newspapers, focusing mainly on the major Hebrew newspapers in the country, namely *Ha'aretz*, *Ma'ariv*, and *Yedeot Ahronot*. These Hebrew publications only covered the event for a week or two after it took place.

I will start first by discussing the coverage in *Al-Ittihad* shortly after the event took place, and then present my findings from the newspapers in Hebrew. I will then discuss *Al-Ittihad* coverage a few months after the event took place, following up on related issues such as the *Sulha*-making process and the committee that was appointed by the government to investigate the incident. This part is organized in the form of discussing one newspaper at the time, in order to illustrate two points. The first point is that of the Arab press, was accusatory towards the government in its handling of this event and an argument that situates the event in Kafr Yassif in a larger context of the state policy towards the Arab Palestinian community. This is also understandable considering the history of the community and the state's policies towards it. Yet, the coverage in the Arab newspaper did not take issue with the fact that the perpetrators of violence were both Arabs. There was hardly any questioning of why such collective violence took place and the critique focused on the police and the Israeli government at large. The second point is that the Hebrew press first treated the event in Kafr Yassif as an isolated case, and even though the Hebrew press is not very objective in its coverage of such events in the Palestinian Arab community as I will discuss later, yet one can notice that there was an exception to the rule.

As we shall see, there were some dissenting voices critical of the government and police behavior and the way they handled the event in Kafr Yassif. The difference between Arab and Hebrew press in Israel is that of perspective and of ways of representation as well as interpretation. The Hebrew press in general took the official narrative without putting it into the context of the complicated relationship between the state and the Arab community. Also, the Hebrew press voiced some similar views of the Arabs as did some government officials, such as cultural explanation of violence in Arab society, without

explaining why the police did nothing to prevent the violence. On the other hand, Arab press-*Al-Ittihad*, had a completely different perspective. The newspaper saw the event as a part of state policy towards the Arab community, and was speaking in a tone that is similar to that of defense of the Arab community by accusing the state of ill intentions and mishandling the affair on purpose to harm the Arab Palestinian community. We shall see these two different perspectives through the discussion of the different reports on the event and its aftermath soon. Yet, both perspectives--that of the Arabic and Hebrew press-- are to be understood in the context of the conflict between the two communities, and the long history of dehumanization that has gone along with it.

Yet, what is important to point out here is that, in this case, the coverage of the event in these different newspapers did not dispute what happened in Kafr Yassif and did not contradict generally my field research or even what is commonly believed in these communities. There were clear expressions of indignation about police and government behavior during and after the event. This was the case both in Hebrew, even though the tone was much softer here, and Arabic newspapers with strong accusatory tone and much more critical of the Israeli government and authorities. Furthermore, the Arab press covered the event much more extensively and over a longer period of time. So, the organization of this part serves to show two points; one that the difference in the interpretation of the event by the Arab news paper and the Hebrew newspapers, and also to show that the Arab newspaper for the reasons discussed before showed more details about the development of the event and its aftermath.

Starting with *Al-Ittihad*, it is interesting to take note of the rhetoric that some commentators used in reaction to the event. *Al-Ittihad* published an article on April 14, 1981 by Nazir Majalli titled "Enough Bloodshed." Majalli, a well known leader and writer in the Arab community, wrote:

> "We should not help those who wish us evil, and want to ethnically cleanse us from our homeland. The authorities are willing to us their men

among us, arm them and fund them so that internal fighting increases. We have resisted internal divisions and fighting for long and we ought to stay that way and not fall into the trap placed by the authorities." (p.6)

Majalli noted further that two popular committees were established in both villages to make hudna in preparation for achieving *Sulha*, and hoped that they succeed in their efforts and such incidents would not be repeated. This is in accordance with Arab tradition of conflict resolution, according to which the two parties to the conflict establish a representative committee for each to represent their views during the reconciliation process. These two committees are contacted through the *Sulha* committee that negotiates between the two sides. The *Sulha* committee is established by a group of leaders from the community who have experience in this process[240].

It is also interesting to note that Majalli speaks in the form of 'we'-on behalf of the Arab community in Israel. This posture of representation was and still is very common in Arabic newspapers in Israel. This is because these newspapers feel that they represent the Palestinian community in Israel, since this is their most accessible outlet to get their views out. It is clear that those who write about the community's relationship to the government have a clear disdain for the policies of the government and speak in the name of the collective Arab community, as is the case with publications of many minority groups around the world. There is a strong feeling and belief among members of the Palestinian community in Israel reporting on historical events that the state was built on the destruction of the Palestinian community, and that the state is still interested in driving out those Palestinians who remained and became Israeli citizens. These articles also express a belief that the state is interested in and encourages internal fighting, and the community has to combat these government policies.

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[240] for more details about this issue and any related topic to the *Sulha* making process, see Elias Jabbour, Sulha-Making, 1996.

In the same issue of *Al-Ittihad*[241], in an article titled, "Internal strife is not good for us all." The writer expressed worries about the internal unity of the Palestinian Arab community, which is a theme that was dominant in the *Al-Ittihad* coverage. The repeated stress on internal unity in *Al-Ittihad* shows concerns about it, and thus it seems to me that it is perceived as somehow fragile, which is why it seems so important to emphasize it continuously.

In describing the event sparked by the soccer game, an article on April 16th revealed more details about the incident surrounding the soccer game. It reported that fighting took place among fans from both villages, and one person from Julis was injured and later died in the hospital. Two other people from Julis and another neighboring village, Abu Snan, were injured. At the end of the game, a person from Julis threw a hand grenade at the Kafr Yassif local council square, killing one person and injuring four others from Kafr Yassif. The article further reported that the police was present during the game and the fighting, and even though their help had been requested and they had about twenty policemen present, they did not intervene. The article reported that on Saturday and Sunday evenings, a large police force was deployed between the two villages[242].

On April 17, 1981 article titled "The Kafr Yassif Massacre is planned against us all: Christians, Druzes and Muslims: The Arabs in Israel threaten with a strike if the government does not allow an independent investigation, a demand that was refused by the government" (pp.1, 8). The article reported that the Committee for Arab Local Councils, which consists of all heads of Arab local councils in Israel, declared a strike on Thursday, April 16, in solidarity with the people of Kafr Yassif and their local council who suffered a massacre while the police was watching. The Committee also declared that the incident was not due to communal strife but clearly planned by the authorities and called for an investigation. The Committee also called on the government to disarm people

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[241] *Al-Ittihad,* April 14 1981, p.6.
[242] *Al-Ittihad,* April 14 1981, p.6.

who had weapons at home and prohibit them from carrying arms beyond and outside their duty[243].

Here is it worth noting the language used. The event was described as a massacre, even though only three people in Kafr Yassif were killed, in addition to those who were injured. It might be seen as such, in my view, because the writer wanted to exaggerate the event. Or, as often happens in such conflicts, every event is seen as part of the larger context, where the numbers are not the issue, but the repeated killing of members from one group or another. It is also clear from this report, that Arab writers were not inwardly reflecting enough of why such things happen in the community, even if the government had some hand in it.

Furthermore, this article indicates that it was not only the people in Kafr Yassif and journalists writing for *Al-Ittihad*, but also the Committee of the Local Arab Councils, thus talked again in the form of collective voice of the whole community that expressed a critique of the government's aim of suppressing the Palestinian community in Israel and creating internal tensions between different Arab religious communities. The media report demonstrated a wide concern among the Palestinian Arab community about the government allowing those who serve in the Israeli military to carry arms when they are off duty, referring specifically to Druze who serve in the military and keep their arms when they go home after completing the military service. They also stated that the Kafr Yassif local council extended its strike for another two days in protest of the statement of the interior minister-Yousif Burg- a statement in which he stated the police acted properly in Kafr Yassif and that there was no need for independent investigation[244].

The article also commented, "The Kafr Yassif local council accuses the authorities of being behind this event using its local collaborators in an attempt to create an atmosphere that will help the authorities to destroy the Palestinians after

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[243] *Al-Ittihad*, April 17th 1981, p.1.
[244] *Al-Ittihad*, April 17th 1981, p.1.

they already took their lands[245]. This is further an illustration that any event is considered connected to the historical conflict between the Palestinians and Israelis. It also serves as an indication of further worries that beset the community as a result of the attack, taking into consideration the continuous fear that the Palestinian Arab citizens in Israel live under because they are often presented as a demographic problem for the state. So, no wonder that such incidents are taken into the context of being under existential threat.

In describing the failure of the police in this incident, the report argued that the local council called not only the police commander in the area but also Knesset members and the interior minister, Yousif Burg, who promised to take care of the issue, yet did not prevent the attack. The police force that was present did nothing, but even prevented people fromYirka, another Druze neighboring village, and people from other neighboring villages and Kibbutzim from coming to help. Here, it worth noting two points that problematize the simple interpretation of communal conflicts within the Arab community itself, as well as between the Arab and Jewish community. The fact that people from neighboring Druze village tried to enter Kafr Yassif for help, shows that the event should not be taken as Druze versus Christians conflict. Furthermore, there is a sizable minority in Yirka (the neighboring Druze village) that has an antagonistic politics towards the state. There is a strong anti-draft movement in Yirka, and also sizable minority that belong to the Israeli Communist Party. These particular political orientations in the Druze village of Yirka that seem different from the general picture of the Druze community is interesting to note. Similarly, the fact that neighboring Kibbutzim members also came to help the people in Kafr Yassif, complicates the Jewish-Arab relationship that is too often presented as a simple dichotomy. Here it is worth noting, that many Kibbutzim members are Jews who belong to the leftist and liberal political parties in Israel. Also, some Arabs are members in these parties. Thus, it might be this political left leaning connection

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[245] *Ibid*, p.1.

between Arabs and Jews that played a role in making members in the Jewish Kibbutzims want to come to help the Arabs in Kafr Yassif.

In the report, also the head of the Committee of Arab Local Councils, Ibrahim Nimer, accused the authorities of being behind the event, because the *Sulha* committee was still working to resolve the issue and traditionally people do not attack at while reconciliation negotiations are going on. Many Arab local councils expressed their support for Kafr Yassif and its local council and held the authorities responsible, and asked why the authorities normally bring very large number of security forces when they are coming to demolish Arab homes, yet in such incidents of intra-Arab violence only a few policemen are sent, and they simply stand around watching.. They asked why, when an Arab is killed in Kafr Yassif or Julis they do nothing. The Israeli security forces always claim they are not prepared only when there is no harm done to Arabs[246].

Al-Ittihad, April 17th, also wrote that according to *Ma'ariv*, the Israeli newspaper, there was a suspicion that some generals in the police were aware of the intensity of the situation and did nothing to prevent it. The general commander of the Israeli police, Arieh Avetzan, admitted in a media conference on the 15th of April that the police had failed to handle the situation in Kafr Yassif properly. The Kafr Yassif local council declared an extension of the local strike in protest of the statement made by the interior minister, Yousif Burg, to *Ma'ariv* that the police had acted properly, as his final assessment of the situation. The head of the regional Jewish Ga'ton council, Bouneo, condemned the attack and declared, in the name of the Jewish local councils in the area, their intention of sending a protest letter to the minister of police asking for an investigation. Mapam MP, Haika Grossman, also sent a letter to the minister of police and the interior minister asking them to come to Kafr Yassif and see for themselves how the police acted "properly," as the interior minister claimed to the media. Many Jewish Zionist parties from the left condemned the attack and asked for an investigation of the role of the police in not preventing the massacre. The Union

[246] *Al-Ittihad*, April 17th 1981, p.1.

of the Arab Students condemned the attack and the behavior of the police and security forced and held them responsible for the event. Also the report pointed to a *Ma'ariv* editorial on April 15th, questioning how it was possible that a state could have tight control on arms permits and arms-carrying, and yet the attackers had so many automatic machine guns and grenades. Similar statements were made in other newspapers such as *Ha'aretz*, *Davar*, and others[247]. This is also interesting point, where *Al-Ittihad,* when it suited its purposes, used the Hebrew press as a confirmation of its narrative and interpretation of the event. Yet, when the same press is seen as not objective it is often declared as an arm of the state and not an independent body.

A few days later, *Al-Ittihad* argued that there was popular and parliamentarian support for the Kafr Yassif local council's demand for establishing an independent investigation committee. This seemed to be wishful thinking on the part of the Kafr Yassif local council for the support for an independent investigation was mainly in the Arab community, and among a few Knesset members. The government created its own investigation committee later on, but not an independent one. The article also stated that Jewish and Arab solidarity delegations came to Kafr Yassif and a campaign for donations to help the village started around the country. MKs from MAPAM and from Likud who came to witness the aftermath of the attack on Kafr Yassif firsthand also supported Kafr Yassif's call for investigation. *Sulha* attempts are supported by the Association of Arab Local Councils and The Druze Local Councils[248]. Here again, Al-Ittihad being a voice of the Communist Party among the Arabs took a traditional line of Arab and Jewish cooperation. The article showed that the hope of having liberal and conscious Jewish officials is still possible. Yet, this hoped for cooperation did not materialize. The Jewish liberal parliament members did not put the Kafr Yassif case forward on the Knesset agenda, and did not press enough for the appointment of an independent investigation. This could be either

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[247] *Al-Ittihad*, April 17th 1981, p.8.
[248] *Al-Ittihad*, April 21st 1981, p.1.

that they felt less concerned about the Arabs and did not want to possibly implicate the Israeli authorities in the event, or it could be just a political electoral calculations since they do not have much vote in the Arab sector, or they were busy with other issues of more immediate concern to their party politics. Or perhaps there weren't enough number of parliament members that were strong enough to push for an independent investigation.

Furthermore, according to the *Al-Ittihad* report, even Zionist newspapers condemned the behavior of the police during the event in Kafr Yassif. For example, *Ma'ariv* on April 15th asked why the police did not take the warning of the Kafr Yassif local council seriously and the police claimed that no attack was coming from Julis. Also, an editorial in '*Al-Hamishmar* on April 15th condemned the racist statement made by the government advisor of Arab affairs, Binyamin Gur Arieh, that what happened in Kafr is part what happens in the Middle East, and not because the police in Israel did not prevent the event[249]. Here again, instead of explaining why the Israeli security allowed this to take place, Gur puts the blame on the 'violent nature of Arab society'. Suddenly the state is represented here as powerless entity that cannot change traditional "blood feud" in the Arab society. Here, it is also worth mentioning that *'Al-Hamishmar* is a Hebrew newspaper that is issued by the Israeli Communist Party. Thus, it is understandable that an opposition newspaper can be accusatory towards the government.

The article also stated that the military police was investigating the claim that some Israeli soldiers dressed in their uniform took part in the attack on Kafr Yassif[250], something that Israeli government officials did not talk about openly in their comments about the event. It seems here that the government selectively chose to ignore many points surrounding the event that might point more blame to the army and its personnel, as well as to the police.

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[249] Ibid, p.5.
[250] *Al-Ittihad*, April 21st 1981, p.6.

On April 24th 1981, *Al-Ittihad* argued further that the Authorities were still conspiring against the unity of this nation of all its religious communities. Israeli interior minister Yousif Burg's declaration of appointing an investigation committee by the government was a way to bypass the creation of an independent investigation and to avoid taking responsibility, especially when it was announced by the racist Israel Koenig (who had advised the government about ways of making Galilee more Jewish by taking more lands from the Arabs and encouraging their emigration). According to the newspaper, the inquiry into the events ought to be independent in order to be able to investigate the police behavior. The article also expressed disappointment that the Labor MKs did not stand by their promise to call on the Knesset for an independent investigation[251].

A week later, on April 28th 1981, *Al-Ittihad* reported that the Likud government had sent its "men"--Jaber Dahish-Mu'addi and Yoram Katz, the government advisor for the north district, among others--accompanied by soldiers and police to intimidate and force Kafr Yassif to accept the *Sulha* without an independent investigation. According to the report, Likud and government officials came to Kafr Yassif accompanied by hundreds of soldiers and police officers to intimidate and force the local council and the people of the town to accept the *Sulha* and drop the conditions for an independent investigation committee. The newspaper reported further that on Saturday the 25th of April, while delegations from Jewish neighboring towns were in Kafr Yassif to see for themselves what took place and to show solidarity with the people, a military jeep (#1623369) stopped and a soldier shouted at delegation members asking them not to believe what was being said to them, and that all those in Kafr Yassif were terrorists and what happened here is not enough[252].

The article also reported that on April 24th, the Catholic Church in Israel condemned the attack and put the sole responsibility for it on the government for not protecting the lives of its citizens. The church also stated that the police

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[251] *Al-Ittihad*, April 24th 1981, p.1.
[252] *Al-Ittihad*, April 28th 1981, p.6.

explanation for its behavior during the event was not convincing[253]. It is worth noting here, that in the incident, the building of the Catholic Church in Kafr Yassif was shot at by the attackers who were passing through the main streets of the village. Yet, those who were personally attacked, and those who whose properties were damaged were mostly Greek Orthodox Christians.

Al-Ittihad, on May 1st 1981, reported that the "authorities' men" in the area were conspiring against the mayor of Kafr Yassif[254]. It seems here that there was a belief that there were people in the community who were working for the government and not in the interest of the community. The report stated that the tough stand taken by the mayor of Kafr Yassif in blaming the government and in demanding an independent investigation to look into the police behavior was seen as a threat to the government. It stated that the government put its collaborators in the area to conspire against the mayor and intimidate him to drop off these demands and resume the *Sulha* talks without any conditions in order to put an end to the affair. This view was supported by the members of the community who said that during the days after the event, armed men in cars were driving around the area were the mayor lived, who were believed to be looking for the mayor. How accurate this was is hard ascertain, even though many people I talked to said that they saw armed men in cars around the area, but what was their intention is difficult to say. Yet, the mayor of Kafr Yassif was hiding in different friends' homes during those days to avoid being attacked by those men.

In the same issue, it was also reported that the *Sulha* committee resigned as a result of government pressure to establish a larger committee with people who had ties to the government, and avoid sharing the amounts needed for reparation for the people in Kafr Yassif[255]. The government seemed to be pressing for ending the affair without much noise about the police behavior during the

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[253] *Ibid*, p.6.
[254] *Al-Ittihad*, May 1st 1981, p. 1.
[255] *Al-Ittihad*, May 1st 1981, p.8.

event, and also without taking any responsibility for reparations that were needed for the people affected in Kafr Yassif.

In general, there is a clear difference in the coverage between *Al-Ittihad* and the Hebrew press regarding the event. One important issue is that there were many details mentioned about the event and its aftermath, which is due to the extensive coverage that was made by *Al-Ittihad.* Another difference was in their perspective regarding the government intentions and the context in which this event was presented, which the Arabic press saw as being part of a larger state policy toward the Arab Palestinian community. Even though the Hebrew press questioned the behavior of the police and the government responsibility for what took place, they seem to not put in a larger context of state policy towards its Palestinian Arab citizens, and they seem to emphasize the 'violent' culture of Arab society.

For example, *Ha'aretz* had a front page story by Ilan Shihori with the headline: "Blood revenge for the killing of a soccer fan." The article's author chose to emphasize the supposed tradition of "blood revenge," thus seemed blaming Arab society rather than the government and police for allowing the attack to happen, let alone conspiring the event as *Al-Ittihad* implied. Yet, Ilan Shihori further commented that calls for revenge were heard during the funeral of the Julis resident, yet the police did not take them seriously[256]. Here, Shihori clearly blamed the police for not taking seriously the warning of possible revenge by Julis against Kafr Yassif, but he did not see this as systemic police and state behavior regarding violence in Arab society, in contrast to *Al-Ittihad's* view, which also neglected to discuss why Druzes in Julis wanted to take revenge, and what factors could have contributed to it. Thus, while the Hebrew press in general was focusing on the nature of violence in Arab society, Arab press was totally ignoring it. It was ignored that the violence against the fans of Julis and the killing of one of them was one major cause that led Julis to seek revenge. It was also

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[256] *Ha'aretz*, April 15th 1981, p.1.

ignored that group violence and collective revenge was present in the society, and that such thing was expected without government involvement.

Another *Ha'aretz* article reported that the Arab local councils were striking in protest against the police failure in Kafr Yassif, which they claimed led to the violence[257]. It is revealing to note that the Hebrew press referred to the heads of Arab local councils and not to the Committee for Arab Local Councils. Even though, this is a committee that was formed by elected Arab local councils to represent them collectively and decide on issues of concern to the community. However, the Israeli government never officially acknowledged local Arab political organizations and the Hebrew press seemed to toe the government line and not acknowledge the committee by its officially declared name. This is an important point to keep in mind, since there is much criticism within the Arab community of the bias in the Israeli media coverage regarding issues within the Arab community, pointing to the Israeli media as being generally very nationalist-Zionist and acting as a government organ in their portrayal of Arabs.

An example on how the Hebrew newspapers dealt specifically with the event or how they turned it around or used it to reinforce internal divisions is article by Yehuda Arian in *Ha'aretz*, April 17th 1981 who reported that Julis representatives accused Kafr Yassif for the failure of the reconciliation committee in a press conference, holding them responsible for killing the soccer fan, not issuing condemnation of the attack, and refusing to come to Julis to apologize (p.3). However, while some parts of this report might be true as mentioned earlier, yet the Kafr Yassif local council condemned the violence against Julis soccer fans and declared that it was impossible to name the person who stabbed the fan from Julis, because there was no one that informed the local council about the identity of the person in question and because the police was in charge of the investigation and interrogation. It is also interesting to note here that the Hebrew press reported what was presumably the perspective of Julis on this incident, especially regarding the failure to reconcile after the soccer game violence as being the

[257] *Ha'aretz*, April 16th 1981, p.1.

cause of the large attack on Kafr Yassif. Similarly, the Hebrew newspaper *Yedeot Ahronot*, in an article published on April 17th 1981, reported that the suspects in killing and provocation of the incident were arrested in Kafr Yassif, (p.4), an announcement which appeared a bit late since they were actually arrested on the 11th of April after the soccer game. Thus, the Hebrew press seemed to focus on the event as merely internally caused and managed without much role of the police or Israeli authorities.

An exception to this general coverage in the Hebrew press was the report in *Yedeot Ahronot*, April 15th 1981. This article reported that the attackers on Kafr Yassif jumped out of a military jeep and opened fire on people in Kafr Yassif, leaving the village in shock. The report even mentioned that people from Kafr Yassif described the event as a "pogrom," and that there was a suspicion that the soldiers who took part in the attack belonged to the Druze unit in the Israeli army (p.1). It is clear that this report was sympathetic to Kafr Yassif residents and that it did not put the blame on them as the previous report indirectly did. The same *Yedeot Ahronot* report also went a step further than the other Hebrew newspapers in linking the Israeli army to the attack through the possible participation of the Druze unit from the Israeli Army. The same article in *Yedeot Ahronot* also reported that high officials in the police described the attack in Kafr Yassif as the worst incidence of violence within the Arab community in the history of Israel, and that the village looked as if it had survived a war. According to the vice-general commander of police himself, there were 45 policemen present in the village yet they were unable to prevent the attack[258]. The report also clearly describes the actual significance of the event as being one of the worse events that took place in the country's history.

Ma'ariv, April 15th 1981 (p.1), reported on the incident under the headline, "One more dead in Kafr Yassif." The article claimed that "tens" of assailants were involved in the attack (p.3), thus minimizing the number of people attacking. The article described the killing of the Julis resident as a "murder" (p.5), but also

[258] *Yedeot Ahronot*, April 15th 1981, p.2.

stated that the police owed Kafr Yassif and the larger public in Israel an explanation for the attack (p.5). This is another example of the general representation of the incident in the Hebrew press, for they were unable to deny that the police acted improperly, yet the incident was minimized in size and scope. The day after this article appeared, *Ma'ariv* reported that police behavior in Kafr Yassif was under internal investigation, but that the interior minister refused to allow an independent investigation into the event, maintaining that the police acted appropriately[259]. It is important to note here that the refusal to allow an independent investigation into the incident leads one to be suspicious of the government. This is true in any country. As a result it is hard to point to what was happening within the security forces during the event. Thus, it remains difficult to assign responsibility to a certain person in the security apparatus or the government.

Alof Hareoveni wrote an article in *Ma'ariv*, on April 17th 1981, with the dramatic headline, "Two days after, blood is boiling between Julis and Kafr Yassif"(p.27), emphasizing again the supposedly "violent nature of Arab society" with its image of anger seething in Arab" blood". Despite this language, Hareoveni also asked how was it possible that tens of heavily armed people could attack Kafr Yassif and wage havoc for more than an hour that the police were unable to stop[260]. Although Hareoveni underestimated the number of assailants, he still acknowledged that the attack was horrific and the police did nothing to stop it. An important point, according to the reporter, is that the weapons used in the attack belonged to the Israeli army. Security forces and general observers are aware that Israeli weapons can be found in abundance in Druze villages and it is also public knowledge that arms were used in Druze villages in internal disputes[261].

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[259] *Ma'ariv*, April 16th 1981, p.1.
[260] *Ma'ariv*, April 17th, p.27.
[261] *Ibid.*

In this article, the reporter, Hareoveni, points to four important issues: first, the use of Israeli military weapons in the attack; second, the abundance of arms in Druze villages more generally; third, the use of Israeli military weapons in previous incidents of violence in Druze villages; and fourth, that all this was not secret but was known to Israeli security forces as well as many others. These four points are very revealing in that that they confirm my own findings based and what is generally said in the area about the use of Israeli military arms in the attack with the knowledge of Israeli security forces. The Israeli army does not allow this storage of weapons to take place in Jewish towns and cities for while it is true that Israeli Jewish soldiers go home with their rifles, missiles and bombs are not present in large quantities in Jewish towns. Also, it has never happened that these arms were used in Jewish towns and villages, while it is known, as the article confirms, that these arms have been previously used in Druze towns and villages. This fact suggests that the police and Israeli security forces should have taken into account these well known facts if they really wanted to prevent the attack on Kafr Yassif.

Hareoveni also observes that Kafr Yassif's local economy was more dynamic, compared to other Arab villages in Israel. He suggested that this economic factor might have been one of the reasons behind the resentments of Kafr Yassif by Julis, despite the prior history of good relations[262]. This observation confirms two issues that emerged in my research. One is that the two villages had a history of good relations prior to the event. The second is that the Kafr Yassif's relative economic wealth might have been a source of resentment in neighboring Arab Palestinian villages. It is true that there might have been discontent that Kafr Yassif had provided local services for a long time that neighboring villages needed. For example, high school education, health services, and public transportation were only available in Kafr Yassif until the early 1980s.

In the same article, Hareoveni stated that the government advisor on Arab affairs for northern Israel, Yoram Katz, claimed that the *Sulha* process did not

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[262] *Ma'ariv* 17th, 1981, p.27.

work quickly because the elders were losing prestige and influence within their community; in Katz' view, a new generation was claiming leadership in the Druze community and was not willing to abide by the older generation's requests or demands. Katz also noted that because Druzes serve in the Israeli army they are resented by other Arabs in Israel. According to Katz, the attack was the result of these internal tensions, in addition to the Arab custom of blood revenge according to which one is allowed to seek revenge within 48 hours of a killing[263].

Some of the points raised in this article merit further discussion. First, the issue of generational differences in the Druze community is true, to some extent, for the older generation of leaders might be indeed losing their former control over the community. Yet, this change is a bit exaggerated because it is also true that in the case of serious incidents, community elders are recognized for they still play an important role even if there are generational differences or power struggles. Furthermore, how corrects is this change warrant further research, since it is an area that is still understudied.

Second, it is correct to note that the tradition of blood revenge exists in Arab society. Yet, it does not happen every time there is a killing, since *Sulha*-making is often successful in preventing blood revenge. Yet, what is also important is that the government advisor was well aware of the existence of this tradition, as the case with many other Israeli officials, yet it seems that this 'tradition' was not taken into consideration by the Israeli authorities after they were informed about the conflict between Julis and Kafr Yassif.

By May 1981, *Al-Ittihad* ended its extensive coverage of the Kafr Yassif affair. The Kafr Yassif issue appeared again in the newspaper in November when news broke about the government investigation committee. On November 13th 1981 (p.8), *Al-Ittihad* reported that the Kafr Yassif local council demanded that the government set up an independent investigation committee. The council sent a letter to the government committee asking it to release its findings and questioned the delay in announcing the findings of the committee. The report

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[263] *Ma'ariv*, April 17th, p.27.

noted that the local council had never heard from the committee since its appointment by the government in May 1981.

On November 20th 1981, *Al-Ittihad* reported (p.7) that the government appointed investigation committee responded to the Kafr Yassif local council that the findings were under print; and that the committee would first send the report to the interior minister who in turn was responsible for providing it to the Kafr Yassif local council. On December 8th 1981 (p.6), *Al-Ittihad* further reported that the "investigation" committee of the Kafr Yassif incident had distorted the facts and freed the police from any responsibility. It also blamed the committee for taking at face value the police account of its own behavior and the course of the event.

It was observed in the pages of *Al-Ittihad* (December 11th, 1981) again that the report issued by the investigation committee ignored the testimonies of the Kafr Yassif council and of eyewitnesses, freed the police from any responsibility and freed the government from the responsibility of paying reparations to the affected people in Kafr Yassif. Another article recommended that the government pay reparations to the people in Kafr Yassif since the arms used in the attack belonged to the Israeli army[264].

The last article in the pages of *Al-Ittihad* on the Kafr Yassif affair appeared on December 15th 1981. It reported that representatives of Kafr Yassif had renewed their call for an independent investigation and criticized the slow work of the government investigation criticized its findings (p.6).

In summary, we can see that *Al-Ittihad* was the newspaper that covered the event most extensively, even though at the time the newspaper was only being published twice a week; while the major Hebrew Israeli newspapers were issued daily, they covered the event for only a few days. This discrepancy could be due to the fact that *Al-Ittihad* was the only Arab newspaper at the time and it served as the voice of the Arab Palestinian community in Israel. *Al-Ittihad's* relation to the community might have also played a role in its seemingly harsh criticism of the

[264] *Al-Ittihad*, December 8th 1981, p.6.

event and the police and government policies involved. Perhaps this blinded *Al-Ittihad* from being more critical of the unnecessary violence that took place during that event and urging the community to reflect on this phenomenon and addressing it more directly. The newspaper, while correct to question the behavior of the Israeli authorities during and after the event, it should have also discussed the issue of violence in Arab society. The coverage of the newspaper as I mentioned in the beginning of this part, is possibly part of the dehumanization that both sides Arabs and Jews have been doing since the start of the conflict. In such an environment, the media is only a tool in that conflict, not an independent organ, that it ought to be covering and investigating. The total absence of self criticism in *Al-Ittihad* of the Arab community is clear here. The Arab community is presented as a victim of manipulating government officials who wish them nothing good. Yet, this interpretation and presentation does also present the Arab community as passive subjects. What is the role of those who took part in the violence is not discussed. Also, the fact that the violence did not continue after that, show two things. It is either that the community is strong enough to resist that policy or that Jewish community in Israel and its political leaders are not all for such policy. The fact that there was never an independent investigation of such incident established, one never can never know with absolute certainty whose failure exactly was it, and whether there was a general consensus in the government towards such incident or not.

Contrary to the *Al-Ittihad* reporting, the reports in the Hebrew press seemed to be in line with the government's narrative, even though there were articles questioning the police behavior during the event. The Hebrew press was very critical of Arab society, implying that its supposedly violent nature and culture was to blame for the event. The Hebrew-language media seemed to give voice to the government officials and to the people in Julis more than those in Kafr Yassif. This might be due to the greater access they had to government officials, but it also could be that the Hebrew press trusted government officials more than the eyewitnesses in Kafr Yassif.

According to Mansour, in the first decades of the state, the state intervened and controlled directly the press in Israel. Yet, even after the privatization of the 1980s, the state still plays a major role in control of the media[265]. I would add to this that the Hebrew press in general, even if it is not controlled, is nationalistic and anti Arab, being part of the society that is susceptible to anti Arab racism as was discuss in the previous chapter. It is thus not unusual to see Hebrew press parroting government lines and narratives to what happened in Kafr Yassif. What is really remarkable in the Hebrew press, is the few dissident voices that seem able to distance themselves from that line.

In assessing the findings of my research and the media coverage of the event, it is clear that the people in Kafr Yassif blamed the police and state for the event and put it in a larger context of state policy to harm the Palestinian Arab community who are citizens in Israel, yet their wellbeing and unity is not desired by the state. On the other hand the government official seem to put the blame on the violent nature of Arab society and on long standing blood revenge habit and take little responsibility if any in what took place there.

In order to add to our understanding of these competing claims and difference in opinion as to what happened in Kafr Yassif, I will discuss in the next part similar incidents from which I will try to discern whether what happened in Kafr Yassif can be also explained in that context.

IV. C. Similar incidents

In the following, I will summarize and discuss two violent events that took place among different religious groups within the Palestinian Arab community in Israel proper as well as in the West Bank. From these incidents, we can understand more about how violence takes place in the Arab society, and also how Israeli authorities and police behaves during such incidents.

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[265] Mansour, 2004, p.425.

The Taybeh incident

Reporting on inter-communal violence that took place in the West Bank near Ramallah Fred Bush, summarizes an event where Muslims attacked Christians in the West Bank village of Taybeh. He summarizes the event as follows:

Tragic event that occurred between families from the Muslim village of Deir Jarir and the Christian village of Taybeh, both of which are located a few miles northwest of Ramallah. This was presented in the Jerusalem Post and also by Daniel Pipes in the New York Sun on September 13th as a pogrom by Muslims against Christians, and even as the main reason why Christianity is dying in its birthplace. According to eyewitnesses, there are strained relationship between Islamic extremists and the Christian community and this complicates this relationship further.

For ten years, a Muslim woman named Hiyam from the village of Beit Jarir had been working at a sewing shop in Taybeh owned by a Christian man named Majdi Khourieh. She was thirty-two years old, unmarried and pregnant. One day she was found dead, and someone from her family was suspected of doing that. Her family members accused Mahadi Khourieh of being the father, an accusation which he denied. Elders of Taybeh went to Beit Jarir to ask for a period of *hudna* (quiet-ceasefire) while that matter was being investigated. The elders of Beit Jarir refused.

On April 10th, tens of young men from Jarir arrived in Taybeh. They set fire to Mahadi Khourieh's home, as well as to those belonging to other members of his extended family. All in all, seven houses were torched, but no one was harmed. Residents of Taybeh began calling on Palestinian, Israeli, and American authorities to intervene (several residents of Taybeh are American citizens). The Israelis arrived first in three jeeps, after the first house had been torched, and watched. They did not intervene.

The Palestinian police, coming from Ramallah, had to pass through Israeli checkpoint to arrive in Taybeh. They were held at the checkpoint for three hours.

The U.S. consulate in Jerusalem persistently called the Israeli military to allow the police to pass through, an intervention that may have facilitated their eventual passage to Taybeh. The Palestinian police arrived after 3 hours of the attack and dispersed the crowd, arresting 13 of the young men from Deir Jarir.

The next day, Sunday the 11th, the mayor of Ramallah came to Taybeh, and along with the elders of Taybeh went to Beit Jarir to ask for hudna. The community leaders condemned the attack and agreed to the hudna declaration with several stipulations, which after 6 months will lead to *Sulha*-conflict resolution. In the meantime, police patrols have remained in Taybeh as needed and the Palestinian Authority has put all its weight into solving the conflict. No violence took place since then[266].

Al-Maghaar incident

On February 11th mob of Druze men attacked shops and homes belonging to Christians from Al-Maghaar in Galilee, Israel. For two days the attackers burned and looted shops and homes of their fellow Christian residents of Al-Maghaar. The incident started when a young Christian boy from the village was accused of posting a photo of a Druze female from the village on the internet, an accusation that the young man denied. Very soon, an organized havoc against Christians' properties took place, and Christians were attacked physically wherever they were found in the village. These attacks lasted for two days, and the Israeli police did not do anything to stop it. In fact, some eyewitnesses argued that some policemen took part in these attacks. The village was sealed, and no entry or exit was allowed for two days. Arab community leaders from the village and the surrounding are started to intervene to stop the violence. A *Sulha* procedure took place and after few months the dispute was settled by compensating the Christian residents for their material losses.

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[266] Fred Bush, What Happened in Taybeh, Justice and Peace in Israel/Palestine Group, September 23rd 2005.

As an eyewitness reporting on the event in Al-Maghaar, Sa'id Nafaa', the writer, who is a Druze himself, argues that people have become accustomed to call themselves by religious affiliation as the Israeli Authorities had taught them to define themselves. According to Nafaa' the problem that took place in Al-Maghaar is not about a personal dispute between individuals. Rather, there is a sizeable minority among the Druze who got accustomed to attacking Christians just because they are Christians. This is not the first time, and it won't be the last. The police who were present during the events were asked to at least throw gas bombs in order to disperse the attackers, yet the answer was the they do not have orders to do that. The police was also asked to let the fire department vehicle enter the village to bring the fires down, and the police answered again that they do not have orders for that either. Things only calmed down when people from neighboring villages were able to enter the village and bring quiet to it. According to Nafaa' such incidents are part of the state policy to also force the Christians to join the army so they also will be able to have weapons and protect themselves[267].

Reporting on the event in Al-Maghaar, Al-Ghad argued that there is a plan by the Israeli establishment to hurt the unity of the Arab community by dissolving it, and implant in it internal fighting and violence in order to hurt its readiness for resistance and isolating it from having political influence in Israel[268]. This is not an isolated incident. The authorities went far in this policy on many occasions and implanted this criminal behavior for example in Nazareth when it created the "shehab al din" crisis, and put the city into confrontation between the different religious groups. In the incident, the government gave a permit to the Islamic movement to start rebuilding a mosque in the location that was declared by the Israeli court a property of the Nazareth municipal council. This was after the Islamic movement declared the location to be a holy site of a prior mosque—shihab al din, while the municipality was planning on building parking spaces for the crowded part of downtown Nazareth. When the court decided that the lot is

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[267] www.arabs48.com: February 15th 2005.
[268] Al-Ghad, May 2005, p.5.

the property of the municipality, members in the Islamic movement attacked Christians and their properties in the city, while the police stood around watching. This same policy was implanted in Al-Maghaar, where the horrific pogrom took place where tens of houses where burnt just because the owners belonged to a certain religious group, and many people escaped from the town out of fear of a possible massacre, not practiced by the government but by a group from this community against another. Al-Ghad warned against falling into this trap that the government has been setting for the Arab community[269].

Further reporting on the even in Al-Maghaar, Al-Ghad displayed a slogan that was written on the entrance to the village after the incident. The slogan was "Welcome to Fallujah, everything happened in the presence of the Israeli police"[270]. It is true that it is an exaggeration to equate both events, yet the deep feeling of some among the people in Al-Maghaar resembles that of being massacred without government intervention and with government consent.

Another report on Al-Maghaar appeared both in Al-Ittihad and in Fasl Al-Maqaal on the 23rd of March of 2005. The report argues that what happened in Al-Maghaar on the eve and day of February 11th 2005 is the final proof, as was the case with many previous violent clashes based on religious grounds in the different Arab villages and towns, that there is a state planned programs to create further divisions and hostilities among the Arab community different religious groups. The state authorities planned these attacks and in at least some cases were informed of in advance and did not do anything to prevent them[271].

It is clear from the media coverage here that the Arab community and its mouthpiece-*Al-Ittihad* faults solely the police and government for what took place in Kafr Yassif, and the event is put in the context of some designed government policy to harm the Arab community. The newspaper here does not take a neutral side to investigate the event but rather functions as a spokesman for the Arab

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[269] Ibid.
[270] Al-Ghad, May 2005, P.6.
[271] Al-Mithaq, 2005, p.33.

community, ignoring the existence of group violence in the community and why is that still sanctioned. The fact that these incidents take place in the community is not questioned and is not challenged in a way that will put some blame on the community also regardless of the government's stand on it.

On the other hand, the fact that such events take place under the eyes of the police is not questioned nearly enough or investigated thoroughly by the Hebrew language media that tends too easily to put the blame on the nature and culture of Arab society by representing it as inherently violent. This is the position of Israeli government officials as well. Both sides' approaches are not helpful to understand the causes of such incidents and does not allow self criticism and objective analysis. What it rather does, is to result in too much simplification and one sided reporting.

What I can conclude from this chapter are two points. One point is that group violence and collective revenge is present in Arab society. In such incidents, dispute between individuals turn sometimes into violence among groups to which these individuals belong. It is also clear that this group violence is justified by the community, in which either historic and or economic grievances are exploited sometimes and manipulated by individuals in these communities who rally the whole community to take revenge against another group.

It is also clear that the Israeli authorities and police tend to not act to prevent or stop violence among groups within the Arab community. Such behavior cannot be accidental nor can it be due to failure or weakness of state apparatus. As I discussed earlier, Israel is a strong state, with strong functioning security apparatus. Israel is also a state that is small in size and the number of its security forces is large enough to act swiftly if it wishes to. This has been clear in many cases when Israeli governments decided to do just that. I have mentioned some examples when Israeli authorities acted swiftly to crush even peaceful collective Palestinian Arab protests, for example what took place in Galilee in October, 2000. Thus, I argue that even if violence in Arab society is not created by the state, it is tolerated and not prevented by Israeli security forces. The

context of such behavior is in Ian Lustick's term—a system or policy of control. In the conclusion, I will try to summarize the main issues in the dissertation by lining the theories of ethnic conflicts and Lustick's framework of Israeli policy towards the Arab minority in order to have a better analysis of violence among the different religious groups in the Palestinian Arab society.

Conclusion

In concluding this dissertation, I argue that violence happen every where, and that no society, religion, or political system is immune from violence. Thus, it is crucial to explain violence by focusing on state policies and actions rather than looking for all the answers in the type of political system—democratic or not, or to seek explanations by looking at group cultures. How state's policies and actions affect the relationship between the different religious or ethnic communities under its authorities is often critical variable. The focus of inquiry ought be on how states view their citizens and the different religious and ethnic communities under their authority, how inclusive or exclusive these systems are, what policies that states initiate towards the minority/majority groups. Antagonisms among different groups exist in so many places in the world, yet violence is not present in every case, or even in most of them[272].

In regards to the incident discussed in the dissertation, which I presented the question, was not how a soccer game turned violent among the fans from the two teams, because violence in sports is so common everywhere. The main question was why the police that was present during the game did not try stop it, and how three days later Julis attacked Kafr Yassif, an attack that lasted almost two hours and caused much damage to property, deaths, and injuries to number of residents. All of this took place under the eyes of the Israeli security forces that were present and stood watching.

I have discussed the government account of what took place in Kafr Yassif. Police and government officials claimed that the authorities did not expect the attack against Kafr Yassif to materialize, and that the police acted appropriately, and finally that such violence is part of the Arab Palestinian culture. These claims were partially also stated by some Hebrew language media outlets.

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[272] David Laitin and James Fearon, "*Explaining interethnic cooperation.*" American Political Science Review, Dec. 1996.

In this dissertation I have shown that there were internal factors that led to the violence. There was a history of antagonism between the Druzes and Christians in the region, especially in Lebanon, and this might have had ramification on those communities in neighboring regions. This historic difference was further enforced after 1948, when Druzes in Israel sided with the state, while Christian Palestinians stood in the opposition. This historic antagonism was also affected by the economic situation. In Palestine, Druzes enjoyed less economic status than Christians did. After the creation of the state of Israel the economic status of Druzes improved yet still was surpassed by the economic performance of the Christian Palestinians who also were more educated. This economic divide between Druzes and Christians in Israel was also reflected in the economic reality of the two villages, where Kafr Yassif—a predominantly Christian village enjoyed a better standard of living.

Among both Christian and Druzes there also existed religious identities that can be considered 'barricaded' in Jowitt's terminology. Borrowing Jowitt's term, and Chirot's explanation, such identities are easily manipulated in group violence and counter collective revenge. Druzes in Julis felt that the physical beating that some of them suffered, and the killing of one of their soccer fans in Kafr Yassif was actually an attack on the whole Druze community in Julis and thus justified collective revenge against the whole Christian community in Kafr Yassif.

Furthermore, similarly to Brass's explanation of communal violence in India, there were local politicians who exploited the incident to foster their power within the Druze community. Jaber Dahesh-Mu'addi who is a Druze leader did not work to contain the emotions of people in Julis, but to the contrary, as some locals told me, encouraged revenge, especially against Kafr Yassif, which was a historically a stumbling block to his goal of politically dominating the Arab community.

Thus, in the context of Horowitz's explanation of ethnic violence, the following conditions where present: a historic antagonism, a precipitating

incident, and a sense of justified collective revenge. Furthermore, and critically important, there was a sense by the perpetrators of violence that they were going to get away with their crimes. Druzes had used violence among each other, using heavy arms in previous incidents, but always without any legal ramifications. While this was often intra Druze violence, the perpetrators felt even more confident that the violence against Christians in Kafr Yassif wouldn't be different, since the Druzes were allies of the state, while Christian Palestinians are in the political opposition to state policies. Finally, bad policing was also evident in the incident. This last point leads me to the next issue regarding state responsibility and contextualizing it within Lustick's framework of control.

First, it is important to reiterate that Israel is a strong state, and if it was interested in stopping the attack it would have done so. Keeping in mind that the political, economic, and educational system in Israel is highly centralized and controlled by the central government[273], and according to Migdal, Israel is very effective state that is very effective at enforcing its rules and policies[274]. Thus, I argue that the police behavior is to be contextualized in what Ian Lustick has shown to be a long term, consistent Israeli policy toward the Arab community designed to prevent its mobilization. According to Lustick, this policy often went undeclared and low level government officials did not even need to turn to their supervisors for approval.

The government's refusal to allow an independent investigation makes the police behavior even more suspicious, and consequently, makes it hard to ascertain who is responsible; whether the police behavior was in accordance with the local commander's orders, or whether it was a result of orders from higher echelon officials in the government.

When comparing the incident with the other two incidents detailed in the last chapter, one cannot but conclude that there is an evident, similar behavior within the Israeli security forces when violence takes place within the Arab

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[273] Haidar, 1997, p.14.
[274] in Kimmerling 1989, The Israeli State and Society, p.3.

community. Thus, it is not far fetched to conclude further that this could be a designed state policy whether it is declared as such or not.

This conclusion fits well in the context of Lustick's explanation. One of the methods of impeding mobilization of a group against the state is the existence of internal divisions within that community. Thus, when such incident take place within the Arab community, it is expected that the Israeli security forced are not going to act as swiftly as when violence takes place against or within the Jewish community.

In this work, it was very helpful to not rely solely on government official narrative about the event without examining their merits by testing actions of the state in similar incidents. It was also very valuable to incorporate local voices through field research and literature pertaining to the specific incident and similar incidents that took place in the Arab community and views emanating from the community in regard to the state's responsibility, policies, and actions towards the Arab community in Israel in general and about policies and actions that affected their identity and consequently the relationship among the different religious communities in the Palestinian Arab society in Israel. It is unlikely that I would have been able to have access to such information if I had not been a native of this region and a long time resident who grew up hearing many of the stories about the event. Of course, that was not, of itself, nearly enough, but by comparing these narratives to published accounts, and with conflicting statements of the various parties involved, it became increasingly clear that a coherent explanatory narrative could be constructed. I argue that peoples' narratives can complement and open new windows when discussing history of states and their policies. Relying only on official narratives and statements, can only limit our knowledge, and as this case showed, can lead to misinformation and wrong conclusions about how and why certain incidents occur. This is possible while one can at the same time incorporate factors that the community itself overlooks often and points always for external causes of violence.

The explanations for violence that was explored in the dissertation, whether it was voiced by the Arab community or media, Hebrew press, or by Israeli officials ought to be situated in the context of the relationship between the Palestinian Arab community and the state of Israel as a result of the historic conflict between Jews and Arabs in Palestine, where one side dehumanizes the other, and where one groups blames every problems on the other side.

Thus, it is possible to see from the history of the Palestinian Israeli conflict that the Israeli state is not a neutral state towards the different religious or ethnic groups living under its authority. It is a state whose very raison d'etre is to further the welfare of the Jews, not of the Palestinian Arab minority. Israeli governments have allowed large scale group violence in the Arab community without taking any steps to stop or reduce it, and in the case of the Druze still allows them to keep large stocks of arms that have been so far used only in group violence against each other or against the other religious groups in the Arab Palestinian community.

On the issue of states' policies, I have argued that declared state's policies ought not to be taken at their face value, rather they ought to be measured by the way they are practiced on the ground. I believe it is not a cynical approach to not easily trust governments, rather it is a realistic approach to test governments' policies and statements by the way they are implemented. Policies ought to be judged if and whether and how effectively they are implemented not just according to official statements aimed at local and international opinion.

The other issue that is of concern here is what to do when states do not declare certain policies publicly, which is not uncommon. This is even more so when it comes to issues of violence, discrimination, and oppression of minorities. Waiting for decades until states' archives of previous periods might reveal some of these policies is not very helpful. In any case, governments try as much as possible to hide intentions and actions when it comes to such issues. Furthermore, finding out about such policies at later times is not helpful if we are concerned about the lives of people that could be sacrificed and violence that can risk not

only the groups concerned but the state itself, if not the region and beyond. Thus, it is more effective and necessary to find out much earlier about government policies towards minorities.

It is possible to achieve that by examining the nature of the state and the ways it views its minority groups, examining the general policies of the state towards the minority/majority, and finally by examining patterns of behavior of governments and state authorities towards these minority groups. Scholars ought to investigate how state's security bodies behave during and after a violent event. If there is a pattern of violence against certain group that is repeated and the government does not take actions in order to stop these attacks, it is either an indication of the state's inability to do so, or its interest in allowing and promoting violence against its minority groups. If the state is strong, as in Israel, then the nature of its intervention, or failure to intervene in cases of inter-communal violence further reflects more general policies.

On the other hand, as far as the community itself is concerned, it is also true that the Palestinian community in Israel was unable to create a unifying identity able to overcome local, familial, and or religious identities. While the state has been exploiting and manipulating their differences, they have failed to overcome their own differences, which is why fights between individuals has turned groups against each other on several occasions. Furthermore, it seems also from the violent examples used in the dissertation, that group violence is sanctioned or at least still accepted or tolerated by the community. This is something they cannot blame on anyone else but themselves and such behavior ought to be challenged by community members and leaders. This issue of groups' violence and justified collective revenge can also be seen in other places of the world, and thus there much in common to compare and analyze from this case.

Regarding religious groups' violence in the Arab society, what are the prospects for either deterioration or improvement in their relations? Will the various religious groups be able to create a unifying identity that can overcome any other familial, religious, and regional sentiments? Can Arabs in Israel end

groups' violence and hostility toward each other? The strict social boundaries between the different religious communities in the Arab society ought to be overcome not by converting all groups to a single religion, but by allowing all religious groups to develop and prosper, without intimidation or repression and discrimination. Religious affiliation need to be contained within the personal/private sphere of individuals. This is in part the duty of the members of the community itself as well as the political and religious leadership of the community. If a unifying identity based on shared history and experience and the situation that the community finds itself in Israel are not enough of factors to create a unified identity, at least the community can work to create a culture of tolerance to religious differences, and a culture that does not sanction or tolerate group fighting.

This also depends on the state of Israel, and whether it will remain a settler Jewish state that separates Jews from Arabs, that excludes the native Palestinian Arabs from participating in and shaping the national agenda and the policies of the state, in order to become a state that is inclusive to all its citizens, regardless of one's ethnic or religious affiliation, a state that is inclusive to all its citizens, where they equally enjoy the benefits and participate in the duties of citizenship. This is even more necessary in states that call themselves democratic, modern, and liberal. Yet as it is argued by many scholars, the relationship between the state of Israel and its Arab citizens seems to remain hostage to the larger Palestinian Israeli conflict, which does not appear solvable at this time.

So, if under the current political circumstances, the state of Israel does not see that as possible, it could at least help in better policing the safety and security of all its citizens by acting promptly when such violent incidents take place. In the end, internal fighting among the different religious groups will not bring any good to the state as a whole. Quite the opposite, because if violence is allowed to escalate too often, this is quiet likely to radicalize young Israeli Arabs and make them more dangerous to the state.

Ethnically biased democracy based on religious or ethnic supremacy of the majority is a recipe for instability and sooner or later will lead to disastrous results to all parties concerned, and in this case, to the region surrounding it, and global stability in general.

In essence, this dissertation is concerned with the question of conflict—ethnic, religious or otherwise. The argument is not that conflicts are preventable or that this phenomenon can ever disappear. The main concern is how these conflicts turn violent, and how these conflicts or differences can be manipulated from within and from without. Explaining these dynamics help to achieve two goals. One goal is that it helps to unveil the essentializing cultural argument about violence, according to which there is no solution to the phenomenon. The second goal is that it looks for political and historical explanation, which can help explain incidents by looking for concrete material factors, which when considered can bring about a better understanding of this phenomenon and may help keeping future ones under control.

Why some state are able to prevent ethnic and communal violence and others are not? This brings us to the discussion of what hinders some sates from preventing group violence. The weakness in the mechanism, ability, and intentions of the state become the key issues of analysis. Then, we can, in my view, make a better analysis to this phenomenon that can help eliminate many such incidents.

Finally, I hope that this work shows once more how important it is to use interdisciplinary research. From this, it was possible to complement gaps that each discipline might cause when studying such questions. Human relations are too complex to be understood through single disciplinary analysis. Using this methodology allowed me to bridge the gap between formal political science, history, anthropology, and personal experience. This approach helped me explain why a seemingly small incident at one time really reflected a much larger problem, and why this, in turn, revealed something very important about the

nature of inter-communal violence in the Middle East, and perhaps elsewhere as well.

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NEWSPAPERS, SINGLE ISSUE PUBLICATIONS, AND WEBSITES

Al-Ittihad, April 14th,1981. Nazir Majjali, "Enough Bloodshed". P.6

Al-Ittihad, April 14th 1981, p.6. "Internal strife is not good for us all: Efforts are already on their way to prevent further complications in the events between the Kafr Yassif and neighboring Julis caused by irresponsible people from both sides", and "Kafr Yassif local council condemns the crime that took place during the soccer game and describe the crime as a crime against us all."

Al-Ittihad, April 17th 1981, pp. 1,8. "The Kafr Yassif Massacre is planned against us all: Christians, Druze and Muslims. The Arabs in Israel threaten with a strike if the government does not allow an independent investigation."

Al-Ittihad, April 21st 1981. Popular and Parliamentarian Support for Kafr Yassif' local council demand for investigation committee. Pages 1,2,5,6

Al-Ittihad, April 24th 1981. The Authorities are still conspiring against the unity of this nation of all its religious communities. Pages, 1, 2, 3, 7, 8

Al-Ittihad, April 28th 1981. The Likud government sends its men-Jaber Dahish and Yoram Katz-the government advisor for the north district, among others, accompanied by soldiers and police to intimidate and force Kafr Yassif to accept the Sulha without independent investigation. Pages 1, 3, 6.

Al-Ittihad, May 1st 1981. The authorities men in the area conspiring against the mayor of Kafr Yassif, pages 1, 8

Al-Ittihad, October 9th 1981. The Reconciliation Committee resigns under government pressure. P.8

Al-Ittihad, November 13th 1981, The Kafr Yassif local council demands the government investigation committee to issue its findings, p.8.
Al-Ittihad, November 20th 1981. The investigation committee findings are under print. P.7

Al-Ittihad, December 8th 1981. The "Investigation" committee in Kafr Yassif events plays with facts and frees the police from any responsibility. P.6

Al-Ittihad, December 15th 1981. Representatives of Kafr Yassif renew their call for an independent investigation, p. 6.

Ha'aretz, April 15th 1981. Blood revenge for the killing of a soccer fan. Ilan Shihori, P.1-2

Ha'aretz, April 16th 1981. The Arab local councils are striking in protest against the police failure in Kafr Yassif. Pp..1-2

Ha'aretz, April 16th 1981. Kafr Yassif after the violence. By Yoram Mizrahi, p.9

Ha'aretz, April 17th 1981. Julis representatives accuse Kafr Yassif for the failure of the reconciliation committee. By Yehuda Arian. P.3

Ma'ariv, April 15th 1981. One more dead in Kafr Yassif, p.1

Ma'ariv, April 15th 1981. Tens attack Kafr Yassif. p.3

Ma'ariv, April 15th 1981. Murder in Kafr Yassif. p.5

Ma'ariv, April 16th 1981. Police behavior in Kafr Yassif is under investigation, p.1
Ma'ariv, April 17th 1981. Two days after, blood is boiling between Julis and Kafr Yassif. By Alof Hareoveni, p.27

Yedeot Ahronot, April 15th 1981. The attackers jumped from a military jeep and poured fire on people in Kafr Yassif, the village was in shock, it was a pogrom. Pp.1-2.

Yedeot Ahronot, April 16th 1981, Kafr Yassif the day after, p.3

Yedeot Ahronot, April 17th 1981. Suspects in killing and provocation are arrested in Kafr Yassif, p.4.

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www.arabs48.com: February 15th 2005: "Al-Maghaar... Sa'id Nafaa'"
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Appendix A
Map of Palestine-Israel



Curriculum Vitae

Magid Shihade
Interdisciplinary PhD program in Near/Middle Eastern Studies
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CURRENT RESEARCH

- Dissertation: Focus hinges on the use of traditional Arabic conflict resolution/management methods, and how societies manage and contain violence in the case of the state's unwillingness or inability to intervene. The research is based on field work in Galilee, Israel/Palestine. The research deals with the subject of state-society relations, and examines the relationship between states' policies and internal violence.

EDUCATION

University Of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA, beginning 1998

- PhD Candidate (ABD) in Near East/Middle East Interdisciplinary program.
- Master's degree in International Studies/Middle East track at the Jackson School for International Studies, 2001.
- GPA 3.75

University Of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, USA, 1995-1998

- Graduated Cum Laude with a BA degree in Political Science and German, 1998.
- Certificate in West European Studies, 1998.
- GPA 3.6

NON-DEGREE EDUCATION

Katholische Universität Eichstätt, Eichstätt, Germany 1992-1994

- Courses completed; Political Science, German, and Theology.

University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany 1986-1987

- Studied German and passed the language qualification exams to enter German universities.
- Studied at the law school for one academic year.

Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel 1984-1985

- Courses completed; Islam, and Middle Eastern history.

WORK EXPERIENCE

- Instructor in Modern Middle East History and Politics, Vista College, Berkeley, California, since Fall 2005.
- Visiting scholar at the Middle East/South Asia Studies, University of California at Davis, as of September 2004.
- Lead Teaching Assistants at the Near East Department-University of Washington 2001-2003.
- Teaching Assistant in Arabic at the University of Washington 2001-2003.
- Teaching Assistant in Hebrew at the University of Washington 1998-2001.
- Teacher of Arabic at the Washington Academy for Languages, Seattle, WA 1998-2003.
- Consultation and translation work for documentary film, "Another Side of Peace", dir. By Allen Frick and Gretchen Burger, 2003.
- Played a leading role with Michael Moore the TV series "The Awful Truth", Volume 3, Episode 11 "Weapons Inspector", 1998.
- Chosen by the University of Pittsburgh to serve as a tutor for the national project: "America Reads", 1997.
- Counselor and Tutor, the Youth Center of Galilee, Israel, 1990-92.
- Work as a counselor and Interpreter with refugees while living in Germany.

LECTURES

- Co-Presenting a paper "Borders and Checkpoints: Arab American/Asian American Studies. At the International Conference-Mapping Arab Diaspora, organized by the Center for Arab American Studies, University of Michigan, April 27-29, 2006.
- Presented a paper at the Korean Association of Middle Eastern Studies International Conference, The Middle East: At a Crossroad of Change. Title of Paper: Communal Violence in Israel: States and Enforced Identities", October 15th, 2005.
- Presented a paper at the International Annual Social Science Conference in Honolulu, Hawaii, June 2003 on Ethnic Conflicts; from case studies to theories.
- Presented a paper at the Annual Middle Eastern History Conference, University of Chicago, May 2003, on Ethnic Conflicts in Israel and in Palestine.
- Presented a paper at CODEP at the University of London-UK on "Explaining Violence in the Palestinian Israeli Conflict" in June, 13th, 2002.
- Participated in Teach-in at the University of Washington on Post September 11- Middle East and the United States past relations and prospects for the future.

- Debate on the Israeli Palestinian Conflict on May 8th, 2001 at the University of Washington.
- Talk on Voice of Seattle public television station on May 29th, 2001.
- Presentation on Post Zionism and the Peace Process at the Greater Pacific Northwest Regional Middle East Seminar- University of Washington, Seattle, WA Feb. 2000.
- Lecture on Palestinian Israeli conflict, Peace Resource Center, Western Washington University 1998-9.
- Lecture on the Middle East for the Council of World Affairs, Pittsburgh, PA 1997-98.
- Participates in teach-ins in high schools in the Seattle Area, and hold talks on current issues in the Middle East.

PUBLICATIONS

- "After Arafat," EPRIC, The European Rim Policy Analysis and Investment Council- On Line Journal *Prevelion*, Feb. 2003.
- "US presence in Iraq," *Spring Hill Review: A Journal of Northwest Culture*, Volume IV, Number 5, May 2004.
- Book review of "Punishment, Communication, and Community." by R.A. Duff, *International Criminal Justice Review,* 15(1), 2005.
- Book Review of "Dancing Arabs", by S. Kashua, *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Summer 2005.
- "Internal Violence: State's Role and Society's Responses." Accepted for publication in *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Fall/Winter 2005.
- Growing up Political in Israel, in a forthcoming volume edited by Adam Jones titled: "Third World Men: An Anthology", Zed Books, Fall 2006.
- "Communal Violence in Israel: States and Enforced Identities," in *The Middle East at the Crossroads of Change*, (published proceedings of the 14th Annual International Conference of Korean Association of Middle Eastern Studies), Seoul, S. Korea, October 2005.
- Co-Wrote an article "Meeting Asian/Arab American Studies: Thinking Race, Empire, and Zionism in the U.S." in the Journal of Asian American Studies (Forthcoming).

HONORS/AWARDS/GRANTS

- Foreign language fellowship (FLASS), University of Washington, 2003-2204.
- Nominated by the Interdisciplinary PhD program for the Elizabeth Kerr MacFarlane Scholarship, 2003.
- University of Washington Middle East Center's Schwartz Fellowship, 1999-2000.

- Cum Laude, University of Pittsburgh, 1998.
- Honors Convocation, University of Pittsburgh, 1998.
- Golden Key National Honor Society, 1998.
- University of Pittsburgh Dean's Undergraduate Research Fellowship (CURF) 1997.
- University of Pittsburgh Honors College Research Grant to conduct a survey on the Peace Process in the West Bank 1996.
- University of Pittsburgh Dean's Honors List 1995-98.

MEMBERSHIPS

- Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC)
- Council for the National Interest (CNI)
- Council of World Affairs of Seattle
- Western European Studies Politics Club
- Middle Eastern Studies Association of America (MESA)
- Golden Key National Honor Society
- Arab Student Union at the University of Washington
- Senator representing the Near East Department at the Graduate Student and Professional Senate (GPSS) at the University of Washington Since 1999.

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCIES

- Fluency in Arabic, Hebrew, German, and English.
- Reading ability in French, Persian.