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The Effects of Punishment on Observers: A Model and Empirical Demonstration

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Abstract

The Effects of Punishment on Observers: A Model and Empirical Demonstration

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Punishment is an unpleasant but necessary part of organizational life. Common wisdom suggests that punishing employees for undesirable behaviors is not as effective as rewarding them for desirable behaviors, leading managers to avoid punishment. Recent research has placed more importance on the idea that punishment is a social experience, and that more should be considered than the direct effectiveness of punishment on the behavior of the recipient. However, the way that punishment affects those who observe it is not fully understood. This dissertation proposes that the impact of punishment episodes on observers of the punishment is a function of the violation's characteristics, the violator's characteristics, and the response of the manager. It also proposes that the effects on observers are mediated by a combination of their justice perceptions and social learning. It then tests some of the propositions from that model.

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PUNISHMENT AND DISCIPLINE IN ORGANIZATIONS

People in organizations make mistakes, perform poorly, steal, cheat and do other things that are contrary to the interests of their organization (Vardi & Wiener, 1996). One of the responsibilities of managers in modern organizations is dealing with subordinates who engage in these behaviors. This often takes the form of administering some type of punishment (Butterfield, Treviño, Wade, & Ball, 2005).

The underlying assumption behind punishing employees is that the punishment somehow benefits the organization. In their seminal paper on punishment in organizations, Arvey and Ivancevich (1980, pg. 9) conclude their article by saying: “The question is not so much whether punishment is good or bad. It exists, and is found quite frequently in organizational settings. The question should be: How may punishment be best used to accomplish behavior change.” This quote suggests that benefits come about by causing a positive change in the undesirable behaviors (as well as the relevant attitudes) of employees who are punished. In fact, the majority of subjects in a qualitative analysis of the experience of managers who had administered punishment reported that they believe that the punishment “worked” (Butterfield, Treviño, & Ball, 1996). However, punishment research has raised questions about the effectiveness of punishment as a motivator of performance (Atwater, Waldman, Carey, & Cartier, 2001b).

One perspective suggests that while punishment may be effective in the short run, the long-term consequences are more likely to be negative behaviors and attitudes by the recipient, including resentment, hostility and even sabotage (Arvey & Ivancevich, 1980; Arvey & Jones, 1985; Butterfield et al., 1996). On the other hand, some studies have found positive

correlations, others have found negative correlations, and still others find no relationship. This lack of clear evidence that punishing employees is effective, coupled with warnings from some researchers that punishment has the potential to bring about a number of possible negative side effects (Luthans & Kreitner, 1975; Sims, 1979), has led some researchers to the conclusion that punishment should be avoided if at all possible (Ball, Treviño, & Sims, 1994). And indeed this seems to have become the prevailing wisdom in practice (Butterfield et al., 2005).

This is partly because not all perspectives have been given equal attention by researchers. Many punishment studies have been conducted looking only at the manager's response to a subordinate's poor performance (Ashkanasy & Gallois, 1994; Crant & Bateman, 1993; Green & Mitchell, 1979; Kipnis & Cosentino, 1969; Klaas & Wheeler, 1990; Miner, 1976; Mitchell, Green, & Wood, 1981; Mitchell & O'Reilly, 1983) or on the effects of punishment on specific subordinate behaviors that influence a punishment's effectiveness (Arvey & Ivancevich, 1980; Arvey & Jones, 1985). Relatively few studies have examined the experience of the recipients (Atwater et al., 2001b).

However, managers have more to be concerned about than just the direct effectiveness of punishment on the recipient's behavior. In recent years researchers have extended research beyond the recipient-centered approach to include looking at the experience of the manager (Butterfield et al., 1996) and at punishment as a social experience, by including the reactions of observers (Treviño, 1992). This broader perspective raises questions about the conventional idea of avoiding punishment. Since there are multiple parties involved in the punishment experience, one would need to consider multiple viewpoints before making a recommendation about the overall effectiveness of punishment.

For example, it may be that punishing an individual does indeed have the negative consequences that have been suggested by some and found in a few studies. However, it may be that avoiding punishment has negative outcomes for observers. If this were the case, then it would be the classic case of the needs of the many outweighing the need of the one, or at a minimum, that managers would need to consider both perspectives in order to find a solution that minimizes the impact on all parties.

This lack of consensus about whether punishment is effective, suggests that we don't fully understand the mechanisms involved, nor do we understand how all of the different parties experience punishment events. It also suggests that there are important variables, mediators and moderators missing, and that a clear model of the effects of punishment doesn't exist. It would be beyond the scope of a single study or group of studies to try to resolve the question of how to balance punishment so that the best outcome is achieved for all parties involved; however, it is possible to develop a model to help explain how punishment events are experienced by observers. Doing so will add a missing piece of the puzzle that will move us closer to being able to strike that delicate balance that would be the ideal. This dissertation seeks to address this gap by developing and testing a model that explains how punishment affects those who are observers of that punishment.

Previous Research on Punishment in Organizations

The concept of punishing undesired behaviors has been around for as long as there have been people, and punishment has been an important concept in religion, justice systems, society and parenting to name just a few areas (Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002). However, the inclusion of punishment research into organizations is a relatively recent addition. In their review of punishment research, Arvey and Ivancevich (1980, pg. 193)

concluded “the topic of punishment has received essentially no attention from organizational researchers.” Five years later, Arvey & Jones (1985 pg. 368) concluded that “organizational psychologists have paid relatively scant attention to negative outcomes and aversive control systems even though constructs such as discipline, punishment and discharge constitute real events in many organizations.” This is in direct contrast to the voluminous research that has been conducted on the impact of rewards on a variety of attitudes and behaviors (Arvey & Jones, 1985)

Since that time, punishment research has expanded considerably. This research can be categorized in terms of its general focus. Initially, research focused on the effects of punishment on the recipients of that punishment. Subsequently, researchers began to look at punishment from the manager’s perspective. Finally, researchers began to look at punishment research from the observer’s perspective. The next section reviews the major advances that have taken place over the last 30 years in each of these three areas. I will briefly discuss punishment from the recipient’s and manager’s perspectives to set the context for a more in-depth discussion about the state of research on observers.

Punishment from the Recipient’s Perspective

Research from the recipient’s perspective can be broken down into two categories. The first of these is research that actually examines the experience of the person being punished. The second area is research that examines the relationship between aspects of the punishment and its effectiveness in terms of influencing the behavior of the recipient. These two areas have not been researched equally, with the majority of research being placed on examining the effectiveness of punishment, especially on performance and satisfaction. I will look at each of these in turn.

Recipient's Reactions to Punishment

There have only been a small number of studies that have examined the experience of the recipient of punishment (Atwater et al., 2001b). Greer and Labig (1987) studied firefighters' reactions to requests to stop specific behavior, Atwater, Camobreco, Dionne, Avolio, & Lau (1997) examined attitudes of recipients of contingent and non-contingent punishment, and Ball Treviño & Sims (1992) looked at justice perceptions and social affect after punishment. Atwater et al (2001b) looked at both recipient and observer reactions to punishment. They concluded that recipients were more likely to report positive changes in behavior and greater cautiousness than were managers. However, recipients were also more likely to report a loss of respect for managers as well as negative side-effects such as bad feelings about the job, supervisor or organization, and the presence of negative emotions and attitudes. This is an area which needs much more research, but initial investigations seem to confirm the fear that punishment has the potential to have many negative side-effects (Sims, 1979).

The Effectiveness of Punishment

Skinner, in his book *Walden too* (1948) articulated his earlier position taken in 1938 that punishment's effects were ineffective or at best temporary and produced undesirable side effects. His position was that while early learning and behavior modification theories suggested that punishing undesirable behavior was an effective way to deal with performance gaps, subsequent research made it clear that positive reinforcement was more effective in shaping good behavior and resulted in fewer negative side effects.

This ultimately led to the perception that punishment should be avoided and rewards should be the focus of efforts to improve behavior. There are a number of reasons that

managers would want to avoid punishing employees. First, punishing someone is unpleasant for the person who is punishing. Second, there is evidence that while punishment results in improvement in the short-term, there are long-term problems that result from punishing an employee such as resentment, which can result in retaliation, further performance problems and turnover (Butterfield, Treviño, & Ball, 1996). As a result, there is a general perception that punishment should be avoided.

One important study that has emerged recently to challenge this prevailing idea was a meta-analysis by Podsakoff and colleagues (Podsakoff, Bommer, Podsakoff, & MacKenzie, 2006). They examined both leader reward and punishment behaviors and found that both reward and punishment behaviors by leaders have effects on key behaviors and attitudes of employees, but only when the reward and punishment were contingent on the recipient's actions.

Punishment from the Manager's Perspective

Another area of punishment research is examining punishment from the perspective of the manager who must administer the punishment. This research has examined how managers assess whether they have punished fairly (Butterfield et al., 2005), how they make attributions of responsibility (Mitchell et al., 1981), how they make other cognitive evaluations (Fairhurst, Green, & Snavely, 1985), the factors affecting their disciplinary style and how they use punishment (Bellizzi & Hasty, 2002), how political issues influence managers (Schnake & Dumler, 1989), as well as other manager-centric topics.

According to their model of punishment from the manager's perspective, Butterfield, Treviño and Ball (1996), suggest that managers are influenced by a set of social pressures (punishing consistently, punishing in private, etc.) which then influence a number of outcomes.

There is evidence that these issues are indeed important to managers, however, not all social pressures seem to exert the same influence. It appears that the strongest influence on a manager's perceptions that the punishment was administered fairly, is the perception that the violator knew that the behavior was wrong and expected to be punished. In addition, the more functional aspects of punishment, such as equity (punishing consistently compared to previous or concurrent punishments), contingency (punishing for a specific infraction), constructiveness, privacy, appropriateness of severity and usage of causal accounts are more influential than are managers' beliefs regarding observers' retributive justice expectations and the potential for vicarious learning (Butterfield et al., 2005). This research suggests that while managers are aware of the potential for vicarious learning, and that the observers have expectations that punishment should take place, these factors have less impact on managers' assessments that they punished fairly.

The above results suggest that managers still view punishment as primarily a dyadic interaction between the supervisor and the subordinate. There are a number of reasons why this may be the case, such as the potential for legal action by a punished employee or the fact that the manager is dealing with the violator face to face. These influences create a tendency to focus more heavily on the violator than the observers. Indeed, Butterfield et. al (2005) conclude that organizations may need to train managers on how to take both the considerations of the violator and the observers into account when punishing, including persuading them of the importance of doing so.

This stream of research has given us insights into the experience of managers in the punishment episode. This is an important area to understand because of the key role that the manager plays in the punishment episode. However, even if managers think to take observers

into account when punishing, it is hard to know how punishment will affect observers. The next section will review what is currently known about how punishment affects observers.

Punishment from the Observers' Perspective

Recently, interest has increased in looking at punishment as a social experience. Treviño (1992) developed a framework and propositions for studying how observers react to punishment. This framework set the stage for looking at punishment as a social experience where observer reactions were a function of both a direct path, where social learning affected behavior as well as in indirect path, through the observers' perceptions of justice.




Figure 1: Treviño's Framework for Understanding the Social Effects of Organizational Punishment

Treviño's model starts out proposing that punishment affects observers through a direct route (line #1) involving social learning. When an observer sees a co-worker punished, the likelihood of the observer engaging in that same misconduct is reduced and when an observer sees potentially beneficial misconduct that is not punished, the likelihood of the observer engaging in the behavior is increased. The second path involves assessments of retributive justice. This involves ideas of deservingness, responsibility, etc. The third path involves evaluation of the distributive and procedural justice assessments. This involves ideas about the appropriateness of the manager's response and due process. The last path suggests that these combined evaluations of justice influence the observer's outcomes in addition to the direct path of social learning.

Based on this model, Treviño laid out a number of propositions for researchers to follow. While this paper serves as a keystone for thinking about the social nature of punishment, only a few researchers have continued to push forward to test any of the propositions.

Niehoff, Paul, & Bunch (1998) tested several of Treviño's propositions by manipulating the severity of the response and the violator's past performance. They examined perceptions of retributive justice, fairness of punishment, desire for more punishment, attitude towards supervisor and intention to leave the organization and found that poor performers were judged as more deserving of punishment and that events were judged as more fair when the manager's response was severe. Liden et al. (1999) compared the punishment decisions of managers, individuals and groups when presented a scenario and found that managers responses were more severe than were individuals, but did not differ when the individuals made decisions as a group. Atwater et al. (2001b) conducted a qualitative study of recipients

and observers. They found that while both groups see positive results from punishment, they also were likely to lose respect for the manager, develop negative attitudes towards the organization and to see the punishment as unfair. While these papers have given us some insights into specific areas of punishment, a comprehensive program to clarify the role of observers has not emerged.

Model of the Reactions of Coworkers to Punishment Events

While Treviño (1992) laid the groundwork for looking at the experience of observers, this dissertation seeks to expand upon her ideas and create a more detailed, comprehensive model of observer reactions by introducing additional constructs and elaborating on the functional elements of previously theorized constructs. This model includes both structural and process elements and adds additional richness to the concepts first introduced by Treviño (1992). My model examines the components of a punishment episode and can be used to explain the reactions to both the violation and the punishment, as well as changes that may happen post punishment as new information becomes available. In addition, this model focuses specifically on coworkers as observers. While previous studies have only identified the effects on general observers, my interest is in observers who have a close working relationship with a violator. So, while there may be parties that take an interest in the punishment of the violator, I will limit my focus to those employees that would consider themselves to be coworkers.

Definitions

It will be helpful to define some of the key terms that I will use throughout this dissertation. This is necessary because some of these terms have been used in a number of ways by researchers, and definitions can carry with them underlying theoretical connections

that are not readily apparent. A *punishment* event involves a *violator* whose behavior has been identified as a *violation*. The *punisher* responds by administering a punishment to the *violator* who then becomes the *recipient*. The *coworker* works closely with the *violator* and observes and reacts to the misconduct of the *violator* and the response of the *punisher*. I will provide detail on each of these terms and their commonly used synonyms below.

Punishment

Punishment, discipline, negative feedback, and sanctions are terms that have been used interchangeably to describe the same phenomena. A few researchers have made distinctions between them, but in general they have been treated as synonymous. I will use the term punishment to include all aspects of these related terms.

There are two general ways to define punishment, and these definitions correspond to the two major philosophical perspectives on punishment. These philosophies are punishment as a utilitarian processes (Bentham, 1962) and punishment as a retribitional process (Kant, 1952). I will briefly discuss these two perspectives here in order to show how the adoption of each perspective changes how punishment is defined. I will discuss them again later when examining their effect on people's motives for punishment.

The utilitarian philosophy states that the purpose of punishment is to bring about some useful outcome. There are two major divisions in the utilitarian view, these are deterrence theory and incapacitation theory (Carlsmith 2002). The goal of deterrence theory is to create situations where an individual's cost-benefit analysis would result in the decision that the cost of violation behavior outweighs the benefit. The purpose of the punishment is to decrease the likelihood of the act being repeated, either by the violator or observers (Nagin, 1998). As such, it is a future-looking or prospective view on justice.

This perspective has been prevalent in the social sciences and is at the heart of behaviorist theories. The most common definition used in punishment research comes from the behaviorist tradition and specifically operant conditioning (Skinner, 1953; Skinner, 1966). This definition says that, “punishment is the presentation of an aversive event or the removal of a positive event following a response that decreases the frequency of that response.” (Arvey et al., 1980; Kazdin, 1975) Many studies by organizational scholars have used this definition.

Defining punishment this way causes problems because the outcome of the action is part of its description. In other words it defines a variable in terms of a relationship to another variable. This definition includes a theoretical statement, which causes researchers to miss or ignore events that should be included as punishment, but don't fit this description. For example, spanking a child for running into the street only becomes a punishment by this definition if the child doesn't run into the street again. If the child does run into the street then the spanking was not a punishment. So, how do I know if spanking is a punishment? Only, by observing a reduction in the behavior that it was meant to address can we determine what it was. It also requires the assumption that all behavior is a function of its consequences. This is one of the reasons that it is so hard to argue with a strict behaviorist. The definitions become circular as the variables are all defined in terms of each other.

However, the majority of organizational studies (not necessarily conducted by behaviorists) have used this or similar definitions. For example, Arvey & Jones (1985) compiled a list of the purposes for punishment which includes: direct behavior control of recipients; indirect control of observers through vicarious learning; maintenance of organizational boundary systems (rules, norms, etc.); creation of in-groups and out-groups; and the creation of the illusion of strict behavior control through harsh, inconsistent and

inappropriate application. This is a good example of thinking from the deterrence perspective on punishment and is indicative of the way most researchers have thought about punishment.

The second sub-area of the utilitarian philosophy is incapacitation theory. This theory has similar aims, but accomplishes the goal simply by removing the ability of the violator to offend again (Zimring & Hawkins, 1995). This is accomplished by life (or death) sentences in the case of criminal cases or by termination in the case of organizational infractions. Often these two motives can work in concert as when an employee is fired as an example to other employees that the behavior will not be tolerated.

The second major philosophy of punishment is the retributive perspective. This view is often called the “just deserts” theory. This theory holds that when a violation takes place the scales of justice are put out of balance. The purpose of punishment then is to restore that balance. Because of this view, concepts like “magnitude of harm” and “extenuating circumstances” are important as they allow the punisher to come up with a punishment that is proportional to the violation. These concepts are irrelevant to a utilitarian view. In this way, just deserts is a retrospective view of punishment.

This view is addressed to a much lesser extent in organizational research. This may be because of the view that retribution is somehow not civilized or that it is not the role of organizations to deal with non-utilitarian activities. Nevertheless, I will show that this perspective has important impacts in organizations, especially in terms of observers of punishment.

This brings me to the definition of punishment that I will use in this paper and which I suggest that future researchers of punishment adopt. Punishment is the application of aversive consequences or the removal of pleasurable consequences with the intention of modifying the

behavior of either the target of the punishment or observers of the punishment or with the intention of restoring a sense of justice.

Violator

The terms offender and violator are interchangeable and refer to an organizational member who has been identified as having committed some misconduct. This misconduct can range from breaking the law (e.g. destruction of property, embezzlement) to poor performance (e.g. not meeting a work quota).

Recipient

A violator becomes a recipient when the punishment has been applied. Throughout this dissertation when the term recipient is used it can be assumed that a punishment has been applied to a violator. A synonym for recipient is target. This is the structural term which identifies the person at whom the punishment is targeted. This term will not be used in this dissertation as it implies that the focus is exclusively on the violator. It is possible that a punisher is targeting the behavior of other organizational members, so this term is unnecessarily narrow.

Violation

Treviño (1992, p. 650) used the term misconduct and defined it as “behavior that falls short of the agent’s moral or technical (work) standards.” The agent in this definition would be the punisher. As mentioned previously, this misconduct can range from serious legal infractions to performance issues to ethical violations. For my purposes here I will use the term violation rather than misconduct, but keep the same definition.

Punisher

The punisher is the person who has the organizational role which allows them to apply sanctions to a violator. This most often is the violator’s manager. Therefore, we are looking at

organizationally sanctioned punishment and not punishment from peers or informal social punishment from managers, though both may take place in organizations. A synonym for punisher is agent. This is the structural term that corresponds to the target. The agent directs punishment against the violator.

Coworkers

Coworkers are specific observers who work closely with a violator. Observers have been previously defined as “third-party organizational members who take an interest in the punishment event” (Treviño, 1992, p. 650) and this definition is still consistent with the addition that they not only take interest, but work closely with the violator.

A Model of Punishment's Effects on Coworkers

The purpose of this paper is to develop a model that explains how coworkers are affected by a punishment event. This model consists of seven components: The Violation's Characteristics; The Violator's Characteristics; The Desire for Punishment; The Coworker's Assessment of the Punishment's Characteristics; The Coworker's Justice Perceptions; The Coworker's Social learning; And the Coworker's Reactions. The logic works approximately in this way. A coworker forms a desire for punishment based on the interplay of the violation's characteristics and the violator's characteristics. This desire for punishment is then compared to the coworker's assessment of the punishment's characteristics to develop justice perceptions. At the same time the information about the violation's characteristics, the violator's characteristics and the coworker's assessment of the punishment's characteristics combine to influence the coworker's behavior directly through social learning, where they see how the manager and organization responds to violations. By observing the interaction, coworkers can then choose to engage or refrain from the behavior depending on how they

perceive the cost/benefit ratio to be. The coworker's reactions are a result of their justice perceptions, their social learning, or a combination of both. The following sections provide the detailed description of each of the components and a set of propositions derived from the model.




Figure 2: Coworker Model

Component 1: Desire for Punishment

To develop a model of coworker reactions to punishment, the question first must be addressed as to why a coworker would care about the punishment of someone else. If people were not concerned about the punishment of others, then there would be no need to worry about their reactions. But people do care about what others do, and about punishing them. O'Reilly and Aquino (2011) developed a theory about why some people are more likely to identify injustices and get personally involved. Clearly, people are not merely concerned about things that affect only them. So, why do people care about the punishment of others?

Carlsmith et al's (2002) article entitled "Why Do We Punish? Deterrence and Just Desserts as Motives for Punishment" suggests that there are two main justifications for punishment that form the foundation for punishment desires. These are "just desserts" and "deterrence." The just desserts perspective suggests that when a person violates a law, rule, or social norm they put the scales of justice out of balance. The goal of punishment would be to restore that balance by assigning a punishment that is in direct proportion to the violation, thus bringing about a zero sum. The deterrence perspective suggests that punishment is a tool to prevent future harm, and that society is best served by reducing the likelihood of future infractions.

What is not initially obvious is that these two perspectives seem to be in conflict with each other in many respects. Take for example, a drunk driver that kills a person. If we could be assured that this driver would never do this again, would we be comfortable letting them go without punishment? The deterrence motive would say that if he won't do it again then punishment is not needed. However, our general sense of justice leads us to say, that regardless of whether this person will do it again, he took a life and needs to be punished. But on the other hand, when we see someone in prison that has made a true life change and become a good person, and yet is sentenced to spend the rest of their life in prison, we again feel that somehow this is unfair to keep them there when they pose no threat to society and could even be a benefit if released. This tension is present in our criminal justice system, and I would suggest that it is there in our organizations as well.

In a qualitative study of punishment from the manager's perspective, Butterfield et al. (1996) categorized managers' reports of actual punishment episodes in terms of general themes and subcategories. The items that managers talked about most often can be grouped under the

utilitarian or instrumental (deterrence) nature of the punishment. These reasons include not only an intention to change the behavior, but the recognition of the potential for social learning for observers (Bandura, 1971). While some of the manager's comments imply that they employed a just desserts perspective (e.g. concern that the punishment was appropriate in intensity) it is clear that managers work primarily from an instrumental motive.

This is in direct opposition to research on how observers think about punishment. Carlsmith (2006) conducted three studies in which he presented scenarios with varying degrees and types of harm-doing actions and then asked people to assign punishments to the violators. The scenarios were arranged such that the respondent's underlying motive (just desserts or deterrence) could be inferred from the punishments they assigned. They found that people recognize both deterrence and just desserts as equally valid motives and interestingly, that they did not feel that they had to choose between them. This may seem to conflict with the earlier position I took that these two perspectives conflict with each other. However, the results of the three studies demonstrate that the punishments the subjects assigned to the violators indicated that they overwhelmingly made punishment decisions from a just desserts position. So while people may perceive that they don't have to choose between the two, just desserts and deterrence motives may indeed be in conflict with each other.

This raises a question about managers' self-reported utilitarian orientation for punishment. Do managers think that they are punishing instrumentally, but are actually using just desserts, or are they ignoring an aspect that may be key to the perceptions of coworkers to the punishment? Regardless of the answer to that question, it is clear that coworkers react to a violation with a set of cognitive and affective responses that can be termed the desire for punishment of the individual who commits a violation. This desire is driven mainly by the

desire to restore balance. Thus, people who are aware that an infraction has taken place are placed in a position of tension where they await a resolution through punishment.

Proposition 1a: In response to a perceived violation, coworkers develop a desire for punishment.

Proposition 1b: A coworkers' desire for punishment is driven mainly from a just desserts motive.

Proposition 1c: A coworker's desire for punishment is related to the judgments about the magnitude of harm (i.e. characteristics of the violation) and extenuating circumstances (i.e. characteristics of the violator).

Component 2: The Violation's Characteristics

If we take the assumption that coworkers in general take the perspective of just desserts, we can assume that their main task in determining what punishment is deserved is to determine the magnitude of harm. This is necessary because at its heart the just desserts motive seeks to find a punishment that is proportionate in severity and restores balance (Carlsmith et al., 2002). Without an assessment of how serious the violation is the coworker cannot determine what punishment fits. This in part explains the finding of researchers that an employee will typically be punished more harshly if the behavior results in a serious outcome than if the same behavior results in no harm (Mitchell & Kalb, 1981). From a deterrence perspective this seems illogical, but from a just desserts position it makes perfect sense.

This evaluation can be broken down into two key components. These are the violation's characteristics and the violator's characteristics. When overall judgments are made, they are made by combining these two components. For example, an employee may not show up for work one day after 20 years of perfect attendance, or someone might be a habitually

poor performer who didn't get the report in on time again. However, it is useful to disentangle the items that are directly related to the act itself from the items that are related to aspects of the violator, even though they are usually thought of simultaneously.

One of the reasons for this is that certain acts have certain qualities that are independent of the violator. For example, sexual harassment is seen as more serious than tardiness, regardless of the violator's characteristics. In fact, Warr, Meier, & Erickson, (1983) found that there is considerable consensus about the rank order of severity for typical violations. The violator's characteristics end up intensifying or ameliorating the characteristics of the violation (as I will discuss in greater detail later) even though people may not make the subtle distinction in the process of forming their opinions (Robinson & Darley, 1995).

The violation's characteristics can be thought of as the "facts" related to the violation. For example, Bill was tardy or Jane told Mark that he would be promoted if he would go out with her. A key to understanding how coworkers react to the punishment of violators is to understand what about the violation matters and what about the violator matters and how the two interact. While it is valuable to decompose these two components, care must be taken in assuming that they are completely independent. They are more likely to be interdependent, where a high level of one may influence the perception of another. For example, sexual harassment as a violation would bring with it certain assumptions and attributions about the violator, even if nothing else was known about the violator. The following are proposed aspects of a violation that impact how that violation is perceived.

Moral Gravity

Moral gravity refers to the aspects of a violation that result in moral outrage in observers (Darley & Pittman, 2003). Moral outrage is the cognitive and emotional reaction to

the breaching of norms that violate the social order (Fiske & Tetlock, 1997). For example, while both stealing and murder are against the law, murder is a much greater violation of the social order and hence produces much greater moral outrage. I would suggest then, that the act of murder has a higher moral gravity than does stealing. Likewise, typical organizational infractions should differ in their moral gravity and hence the amount of moral outrage produced in coworkers. The idea is that inherent in the violation is a sense of its objectionableness.

Direct Impact

Direct impact refers to the idea that some violations result in a negative impact that can be directly experienced by the coworker as opposed to those that have no impact, or an indirect impact. For example, when a co-worker steals some office supplies the impact to the coworker is small and indirect, which is often seen as no impact. On the other hand if a co-worker calls in sick when not actually ill, and the coworker must stay late to make up for the absent worker's lost output, the impact is directly felt by the coworker.

Outcome

Outcome refers to the idea that a violation that results in a negative outcome is viewed as more serious than one that results in a neutral or a positive outcome. From a purely instrumental standpoint, the outcome should not make any difference. For example, if an employee smokes in a non-smoking area and starts a fire it should make no difference whether the fire is put out quickly, or does substantial damage. The behavior in either case is the same, and the punishment should be designed to ensure a change in the behavior. The outcome is a separate issue.

However, in reality this is not the case. Mitchell & Kalb (1981) found that the outcome makes a difference in the severity of punishment that people assigned. One might argue that there is a restitution aspect to a violation that results in a more serious outcome, but people still desire more punishment even when there is no way to assign a monetary value or restore what was lost. This again points to a just deserts motive.

Proposition 2a: Coworkers can form the desire for punishment when only given information about the violation's characteristics, i.e. even when there is no information about the violator's characteristics.

Proposition 2b: Coworkers possess a stable hierarchy of violations that can be evaluated in terms of their seriousness.

Proposition 2c: Coworkers have different rules and criteria for different violation, e.g. some serious violations will be impervious to the affect of any other variables.

Proposition 2d: Coworker's judgments about the seriousness of the violation are composed of the actions moral content, its direct impact on the coworker and the outcome of the act.

Component 3: The Violator's Characteristics

Previously I proposed that people think about a violation in a holistic manner that includes all of the available information, but that it is useful to separate out the "facts" of what has happened and the violator's characteristics. This makes sense in part because people can form judgments when they are presented only the information about the violation. On the other hand, when presented only with information about the violator, they cannot form a judgment without knowing about what took place. In this way the violator's characteristics function as a moderator of the facts. In other words, the personal and behavioral

characteristics of the violator are the extenuating circumstances that either heighten or reduce the desire for punishment.

Another way to think about the function of the violator's characteristics is as a way of assessing the amount of blame that the violator deserves. The major mechanism by which this takes place is through the attribution process (Mitchell et al., 1981). Coworkers use a number of criteria to assess the extent to which the actions of the violator can be attributed to the violator as opposed to things external to the violator. Below are the aspects that I believe to be the most important in terms of affecting the degree to which people vary their desire for punishment.

Apology

When a person has been wronged by another, apologies have been shown to have a mediating effect on aggression against the violator by the person who was wronged (Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989). Timing of the apology also makes a difference, where people seem to have a "ripeness" for receiving apologies. (Frantz & Bennis, 2005). Apologies are also shown to be effective in reducing retaliation by the wronged party, however, only when the apology is perceived as sincere (Zechmeister, Garcia, Romero, & Vas, 2004). While the effect of apologies on the wronged party is well established, there is much less research on how observers react to apologies. One could easily assume that apologies work the same in observers as they do in the offended party. However, a recent study has shown that observers are better able to assess the sincerity of an apology than is the wronged party (Risen & Gilovich, 2007). Other research has also shown that even children's perceptions of a violator are influenced by the presence or absence of apologies (Darby & Schlenker, 1989). Therefore,

an apology (or lack thereof) should act as an extenuating circumstance that impacts the coworker's desire for punishment.

Past Performance

Past performance refers to a violator's history, both in terms of violations and work performance (Treviño, 1992). From an attributional perspective a person with a history of violations is seen as more responsible for the violation (Klaas & Wheeler, 1990; Niehoff et al., 1998). Alternatively, valued employees tend to be viewed as less responsible for the violation and receive less severe and less punitive judgments and evaluations (Miller & Vidmar, 1981; Rosen & Jerdee, 1974). Therefore, violators with poor past behavior should be seen as more deserving of punishment and those with good past behavior should be seen as less deserving of punishment.

Intentionality

Intentionality is another important element in how observers make attributions of responsibility. When a violator's behavior is seen as being intentional it has a direct effect on the moral content of the violation (Malle & Knobe, 1997; Malle & Nelson, 2003). For example, our legal system has sophisticated rules to deal with all the nuances of the intention of violators. Manslaughter differs from murder in terms of whether there was intention to kill. There are even defined rules to cover the gray areas where someone should have had a reasonable expectation that death might occur. In addition a direct impact on a coworker or a violation that results in a serious outcome creates more outrage if the coworker sees it as the result of intentional actions, even if the outcomes themselves were not intended.

Personal Characteristics

Personal Characteristics are items related to the violator such as age, gender, race, family situation, etc. A number of studies have been done that show how personal characteristics can affect punishment situations. For example, Atwater, Carey, & Waldman (2001a) found that female punishers were seen by both male and female recipients as less effective and fair than their male counterparts. Their data suggest that this difference comes from stereotypes and biases. A number of personal characteristics are subject to the effects of stereotyping or biasing. An older male that is solely responsible for providing for his family will elicit a different response than a young, single woman due to these biases and stereotypes. Even with all other things held constant, it is likely that these things will impact a coworker's desire for punishment

Causality

When people are alleged to have done something wrong, a key element required to assign blame and sanctions is the presence of a causal link. Attribution is a key aspect of the formation of the desire for punishment. Alicke (1992, p. 368) states "Causal participation is the basic precondition for ascribing blame and responsibility in virtually all attribution theories of responsibility." Causality refers to the clarity and certainty of the link between the violator's behaviors and the result of the violation. Some violations are clearly the direct result of the violator's actions. But other violations may be more questionable in terms of assigning direct blame, or parceling out blame among several violators or causes.

There are two schools of thought on the blame/causality relationship. The traditional view is that a stronger perceived causation leads to more blameworthiness (Fincham & Jaspars, 1980; Schultz & Schleifer, 1983). The alternative view is that blameworthiness leads to

attributions of causation (Alicke, 1992). It is likely that both processes are at work, such that a more clear causal link will lead to more assignment of blame, while a person who is more blameworthy (poor past performance, commits an intentional violation) is more likely to be viewed as the cause. In either case, the result should be an increase in the desire for punishment.

Social Role & Status

Treviño (1992) suggested that one's social role and status impact the way that responsibility is assessed. For example, high status individuals might be held to a higher standard than individuals with lower status (Fragale, Rosen, Xu, & Merideth, 2009; Hamilton, 1978). In addition, managers have a series of role expectations that subordinates may not have (Hamilton, 1978). For example, there is an expectation that a manager should be a role model for subordinates, and when a violation takes place, more blame should be assigned because the role carried an additional expectation that was violated in addition to the violation itself.

Relationship of violator to coworker

Whereas the relationship between managers and subordinates may be characterized by trust, commitment, loyalty and delegation (Yukl, 2000) the relationship between coworkers is more typically characterized as interpersonal liking (Chi & Lo, 2003). While issues like trust and commitment may be present between people that are not in manager/subordinate relationships, those will likely translate directly to interpersonal liking. There are a number of studies that show that the more that an employee likes a coworker the more favorable that employee's evaluations of the coworker will be (Anderson & Shackleton, 1990; Cardy & Dobbins, 1986; Chi & Lo, 2003; Wayne, Liden, Graf, & Ferris, 1997). In addition, there are

situations in which two coworkers will have a history together. This historical relationship may have not only fostered feelings of liking (or disliking) but may have resulted in idiosyncrasy credits. For example if an employee did a favor for a coworker the coworker may feel a sense of obligation to the employee, which should also result in more favorable evaluations. Therefore, I expect that the relationship of the violator to the coworker will influence the coworker's desire for punishment.

Proposition 3a: The violator's characteristics serve as an extenuating circumstance to the violation's characteristics, i.e. coworkers have a predetermined general reaction to a violation that is increased or decreased by the violator's characteristics.

Proposition 3b: The coworker's judgments of how much to adjust their base-line is based on whether the violator apologizes, the violator's prior behavior, attributions of intentionality, violator's personal characteristics, clarity of the causal link, and the social role and status of the violator.

Component 4: The coworker's assessment of the punishment's characteristics

The next major component is the coworker's assessment of the punishment itself. Punishment can take many forms and can be applied in many ways. Coworkers' perceptions of justice are based on how they perceive the punishment fits the violation, and how it was decided upon and applied. Justice has multiple dimensions (Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001), and each of the aspects of a punishment are related to those dimensions differently. This model states that coworkers take their desire for punishment and compare it to the punishment's characteristics. Based on their assessment of the congruence of these factors they determine whether the punishment was fair or not. Below are the major aspects that contribute to this assessment of the punishment.

Type of Punishment (Severity)

Just as people have a relatively stable and consistent hierarchy of violations, I propose that this same type of structure exists for punishments. For example, a verbal warning is universally seen as less severe than a written warning and a termination is more severe than a suspension. To assess whether the punishment fits the violation coworkers must have a sense of the absolute strength of the punishment.

Privacy

One of the key aspects of how punishment is applied is privacy. Managers see this as one of their responsibilities in the discipline event (Butterfield et al., 1996). The Judeo-Christian culture in the United States suggests that punishment is a private matter between the manager and the violator. Yet, at the same time, managers are aware of the value of punishment as a social learning opportunity and often state that the purpose of the punishment was to set an example (Butterfield et al., 2005). This conundrum is part of the reason that managers often try to avoid punishing.

When punishment is done in private and the violation was of a public nature, the effect is the same as if no punishment was applied. On the other hand, when a violation was not known to the coworkers and the punishment is publicized, coworkers should have concerns, both about how the violator was treated and how they may be treated in a similar situation. Therefore, it may be that when the violation is widely known, the punishment should be widely known, and where knowledge of the violation is limited, so should information about the punishment be limited.

Equity, (Consistency, According to Policy)

One of the chief concerns of employees is that they are treated equitably by the organization (Adams, 1965). This is especially true of employees who receive punishment. However, coworkers should have a different perspective than the recipients. Since I have proposed that coworkers work mainly from a just deserts perspective, they should be more concerned with the appropriateness of the punishment to the violation than with the consistency with previous actions. Since there is a possibility that the coworkers themselves may be punished one day, they should still be concerned that the organization acts in a consistent manner, however, this concern should be much less than their desire for a punishment of appropriate intensity. In a similar way, employees are more satisfied when managers both reward and punish in a contingent manner. Specific to this dissertation, punishment omission (not punishing when it was deserved) resulted in less satisfaction (Hinkin & Schriesheim, 2008).

Timing

One of the key elements of traditional reinforcement theory is that punishment should be paired with the undesirable behavior as quickly as possible (Watson, 1913). This idea has been supported in general and proposed as an important element in organizational punishment (Arvey & Ivancevich, 1980; Arvey & Jones, 1985). This should hold true for coworkers as well as recipients. If a violation goes without punishment for a period of time the coworkers should see it as less fair, than when it occurs swiftly. In addition, from a social learning perspective, coworkers may learn that they can get away with something for a period of time, which might lead them to commit the violation if they believe that it is worth the benefit for the period in

which they would not receive the punishment, or if they intend to leave sooner than they expect the punishment to be applied.

Opportunity for Voice

Voice refers to the concept of having an opportunity for input into an organizational action (Thibaut & Walker, 1975). Numerous studies have shown that providing an opportunity to present one's case, or offer information is very important, even when the voice is non-instrumental (i.e. it has no effect on the outcome) (Colquitt et al., 2001). Coworkers should desire that violators have an opportunity to present information as part of the punishment process. By making sure the violator has an opportunity to present information, coworker's can feel that the punisher had complete information, thus removing uncertainty about the guilt of the violator.

Unbiased

Cognitive bias is a general term that refers to a distortion in perception or judgment that deviates systematically from reality (Huber, Neale, & Northcraft, 1987). The presence of any of the number of biases that are common in evaluation contexts (halo, availability, etc.) should decrease the positive perceptions of both recipients and coworkers. However, biases that work in favor of recipients are viewed positively by recipients, but would be viewed negatively by coworkers. For example, if a manager applies a less severe punishment to a female subordinate than to a male subordinate, it is likely that coworkers will see the punishment as unfair where the recipient might be able to justify the leniency.

Contingency (Based on specific infractions)

Contingent punishment is punishment that is clearly linked to the performance of the violator (Podsakoff et al., 2006). Ball et al, (1992, p. 311) proposed that "punishment

contingent upon undesired behavior will be positively related to subordinate's procedural justice evaluations." In like manner, coworkers should feel that a punishment related to a specific, well-defined violation is fairer than is a punishment that is not clearly linked to the violator's behaviors or one that is linked to general pattern of behavior that is not clearly specified.

Courtesy/ Respect for Recipient

Bies & Moag (1986) introduced the idea of interactional justice which focuses on the interpersonal treatment people receive in organizational procedures. An important aspect of this is the perception that an employee has been treated with respect and dignity. While this is very important for recipients, it is likely that coworkers will deal with this in a similar manner to voice, which is related concept. Coworkers should be primarily concerned with the distributive justice aspects of the punishment and only moderately interested in procedural and interactive justice as indicators of what they may expect if placed in a similar situation.

Relationship of Coworker to Manager

Leader-member exchange theory (Graen & Scandura, 1987) argues that managers treat their employees differentially and therefore have different types of relationships with those employees. The differences in these relationships revolve around trust and delegation by the supervisor, and loyalty, trust and commitment to the leader by the subordinate (Yukl, 2000). Based on this relationship those in-group subordinates would be more likely to bias their views in support of the manager, which would lead them toward viewing the punishment as being appropriate, thereby creating a judgment that the punishment was fair. While technically the relationship of the coworker to the manager is not a true aspect of the punishment event, it is an important influence and still fits nicely within this part of the framework.

Proposition 4a: Coworkers will want the type of punishment to be similar in intensity and harm to the violation.

Proposition 4b: Coworkers assessment of the appropriateness of the punishment will be based on their perception of the match between their desire for punishment and the actual punishment, i.e. punishment that results in an equilibrium will be seen as appropriate while punishment that leaves a desire for more punishment will be seen as lenient and punishment that exceeds the desire will be seen as severe, regardless of any objective measure.

Proposition 4c: Punishment that is done in private, with no information given to coworkers will have the same effect as if no punishment were applied.

Proposition 4d: Coworkers will want punishment to be equitable (consistent and according to policy) only to the extent that previous punishments have been viewed as appropriate.

Proposition 4e: Coworkers will expect that the violator will have had been given voice in the interaction, i.e. an opportunity to present their side of what happened.

Proposition 4f: The longer the punishment decision takes, the worse coworkers will react to it, unless the time is necessary to ensure that the violator given voice in the interaction, or to sufficiently investigate the situation.

Proposition 4g: Punishments which are perceived as biased will result in negative procedural justice evaluations by coworkers.

Proposition 4h: Coworkers will rate punishments that are tied directly to a specific performance of the violator as fairer than punishments not directly tied to specific incidents.

Proposition 4i: Courtesy will influence interactional justice perceptions of coworkers to a lesser extent that it will recipients.

Proposition 4j: Coworkers with close relationships (i.e. in-group) to the punisher will judge the punishment as fairer than those with a distant relationship (i.e. out-group) to the punisher.

Component 5: The Coworker's Justice Perceptions

After coworkers develop a desire for punishment and assess the characteristics of the actual punishment, they compare the two in an effort to determine if the response was appropriate. The act of evaluating whether the punishment was too lenient, sufficient, or too severe, results in a set of justice perceptions. This model differs from most others in the amount of emphasis that is placed on retributive justice. Organizational researchers have primarily focused on distributive, procedural and interactional justice. This has resulted in a force fitting of retribution into distributive justice. Distributive justice differs quite markedly from retributive justice, specifically around the ideas of deserts and comparisons to others. Below I will discuss the major conceptualizations of justice and how those aspects should come into play with coworkers of punishment events.

Distributive Justice

Prior to 1975, justice was thought of in terms of the perception of the fairness in the distribution of resources and hence was termed distributive justice (Colquitt et al., 2001). Distributive justice was based initially on Adams (1965) equity theory, which states that people are not only concerned about their outcomes, but about how their outcomes compare with others. Inputs (work, education, etc.) are compared with outcomes (salary, promotions, etc.) and a ratio of inputs to outcomes is computed. That ratio is then compared to the ratio of a selected "referent." Differences in ratios lead to perceptions of inequity and subsequently unfairness. Other strategies are used as well such as equality and need, however all of these are

attempts to create a distributive justice and all involve comparisons to others (Colquitt et al., 2001).

Distributive justice comes into play as coworkers assess how the violator has been unjustly enriched through the violation. Coworkers will evaluate whether the punishment has left the violator with any additional benefit that the coworker has not received.

Procedural Justice

Procedural justice refers to the idea that the processes by which the allocation of resources were reached were fair (Colquitt et al., 2001). Originally conceived of as process control (voice) (Thibaut & Walker, 1975) it was expanded to include other procedural elements. Leventhal, (1980) included six criteria that were part of procedural justice: 1) Applied consistently across people and across time, 2) Be free from bias 3) Endure that accurate information is obtained and used in making decisions 4) Have some mechanism to correct flawed or inaccurate decisions 5) Conform to personal or prevailing standards of ethics or morality 6) Ensure that the opinions of various affected groups are taken into account.

In a punishment event coworkers will see the punishment as more procedurally fair, when it has been done in a manner consistent with the Leventhal criteria. However, I propose that issues of procedural fairness will be of much smaller concern than will issues of retributive justice in a punishment situation, because it signals how the company deals with violators. If the coworkers expect to never be in that category, they may adopt the attitude that violators don't deserve the same consideration as other employees

Interactional Justice

The most recent area of research on justice has been on interactional justice (Colquitt et al., 2001). Interactional justice refers to the perception of the quality of the interpersonal

treatment when procedures are implemented (Bies & Moag, 1986). In a similar manner to procedural justice, coworkers will have concerns about the interactional treatment of violators only to the extent that it signals that they will be treated similarly if they are in a similar situation.

Retributive Justice

Retributive justice refers to the idea that when someone has violated a social norm, rule, or law they have harmed society and deserve to be punished in a way that is in proportion to their wrongdoing (Carlsmith, 2006). This idea has not been widely researched in organizations for a number of reasons. First, managers don't report that they think this way (Butterfield et al., 1996). The most common theme that came out of Butterfield's qualitative study was the instrumental nature of punishment. However, (Carlsmith, 2006) showed that even though people could justify both instrumental and retribution perspectives, when they chose punishments, their choices showed an almost exclusive use of the retribution perspective. It is quite likely that managers are not as instrumental as they believe.

Secondly, since there has not been much research on observers of punishment, this motive has not emerged. Coworkers have very different motives than do managers who must administer punishment. Coworkers should care much less about whether the punishment will reduce future behavior in the violator or other coworkers. They will be concerned about whether the violator got what was deserved.

Proposition 5a: Coworkers' primary consideration is for retribution or in other words, did the punishment fit the crime.

Proposition 5b: Coworkers will be secondarily concerned about whether the violator was unjustly enriched (distributive justice).

Proposition 5c: Coworkers will be tertiary concerned about how the process was conducted, how the violator was treated (procedural and interactional justice) and if the punishment deters the violator from repeating the violation.

Component 6: The Coworker's Social Learning

Social Learning is the process by which people develop knowledge about the likely outcomes of potential social activities by observing the consequences that occur for those actions for others (Bandura, 1971). In terms of punishment, coworkers who see a “model” being punished would be less likely to repeat that behavior themselves (Treviño, 1992). This relationship has been demonstrated in research. For example, Schnake (1986) found that observers who saw a coworker punished for low output subsequently produced more than those who only saw the coworker warned or not punished. On the other hand, observers who see others engage in prohibited (but self-benefiting) behaviors go unpunished should be likely to engage in those behaviors as well (Walters, Parke, & Cane, 1965).

Looking at these two ideas, we can see that in order for a punishment to result in desirable social learning (i.e. a reduction in the likelihood that the coworker will engage in it), the pay-off must be less than the consequence of the punishment (Treviño, 1992). If the violation is viewed as “worth” the punishment, social learning has still taken place, but what was learned is that the behavior should be engaged in rather than avoided.

In addition, coworkers may learn about the organization by observing how it responds to violations. This is separate from the coworker's assessment of the fairness of a punishment. For example, a punishment might be viewed as fair for the violation, but the coworker may not have been aware that the specified behavior was not allowed. This knowledge may result in the coworker deciding that she did not want to work under those restrictions. Therefore, the

other path through which an coworker's reactions should be mediated is the learning that takes place vicariously. I propose:

Proposition 6a: The likelihood that a worker will repeat a violation which a coworker has committed is related to the worker's assessment of the cost/benefit ratio of the expected punishment and the expected benefit from committing the violation, such that if it is positive, the likelihood of repeating the behavior will increase and if negative the likelihood will decrease.

Proposition 6b: When the clarification of the organization's expectations is consistent with the coworker's work preferences, the coworker's reactions will be positive (e.g. increase in commitment, more positive feelings towards the manager, etc.) and when the clarified expectations are inconsistent with the coworker's work preferences the coworker's reactions will be negative (e.g. decrease in commitment, increase in intentions to leave, etc.)

Component 7: The Coworker's Reactions

The underlying assumption in a model of coworker reactions to punishment events is that people react to punishment of others with a change in their behaviors and/or attitudes in response to the event. Of course we would only be interested in those reactions that are organizationally relevant. There are a number of reactions that have either been demonstrated or can be proposed to be related to observing a punishment episode. The following are some of the organizationally relevant outcomes that should be affected by justice perceptions and social learning following a punishment event: 1) Satisfaction 2) Commitment 3) Attitude Toward Recipient 4) Attitude Toward Manager 5) Intentions to Stay/Leave 6) Likelihood to Repeat Behavior 7) Group Cohesion 8) Loyalty 9) Trust 10) Work Performance 11) Organizational Citizenship Behaviors 12) Emotional Reactions

Proposition 7a: Coworkers' reactions are partially mediated by their perception that the punishment event was fair.

Proposition 7b: Coworkers' reactions are partially mediated by their social learning from the punishment event.

Time and Temporal Sequencing

Care must be taken not to imply that the structure of the model necessarily implies that there is a sequential movement through the stages. It is true that in order for some parts of the model to function, other parts must have information available. Perhaps the best way to think of the model is to compare it to an electronic spreadsheet. The boxes of the model would either take on specific values, or formulas using the other boxes. For example, the box corresponding to justice perceptions requires there to be information in the desire for punishment box and the punishment characteristics box (you can think of this as the familiar "divide by zero" error that occurs when a formula ends up with a zero in a denominator). If either is empty, then it would make no sense to ask for someone's perception of fairness. In this way, certain things need to occur before other things can take place.

However, just as a spreadsheet is dynamic, the values in one box can be changed by changing the values in a different box that feeds into that box. For example, one's perceptions of fairness might change dramatically if information is made available about a previous violation that the violator committed that was not known at the time of the initial justice perception formulation. In this way the model is dynamic and can change dramatically when new information is presented, which reflects the actual behavior of coworkers.

Implications

In this dissertation I test several important aspects of the model in two separate studies, but will not test it in its entirety. My intention is to lay the foundation for a body of research which I intend to pursue. In addition to my work, I hope that others will contribute as well. Below are a few implications of model.

If this model indeed explains how coworkers do react to punishment events there are several implications for managers. First, punishment that is done privately will have the same effect on coworkers as not punishing. Because of legal issues, most organizations are very careful about what information is made available to other employees about behavior and performance problems. However, if employees react negatively to a perceived lack of punishment, then HR departments may need to reconsider the policies. By no means am I advocating a modern version of “public floggings”, but when a violation is widely known, the punishment may need to be as widely communicated. At the very least there may need to be an acknowledgement that the problem was dealt with according to policy even if the details are kept private.

A second, and related issue is that a key aspect of this model is the information available to the coworkers. Since justice perceptions are a function of desire for punishment and the actual punishment, managers need to make sure that relevant information is made available. For example, if coworkers are not aware of a violator’s prior history, the manager’s response could seem harsh. Likewise if a violator offered an apology, and coworkers are not aware, the response could be seen as too lenient.

A third implication is that if relevant outcomes are a function of justice perceptions and social learning, then managers should focus on those items as a way to both diagnose reactions and to prevent negative consequences. This might lead to a compromise where managers shared the information that is necessary to satisfy the individual coworkers without widely communicating the response. If nothing else, managers should begin to think about how the coworkers feel about a punishment incident with more than just an interest in discouraging future undesirable behavior.

By understanding what issues are relevant to coworkers, managers can begin to work towards striking a balance where the best possible outcome for all involved is achieved. It may not be that the violator must be scarified for the good of the group or that they group must be harmed to help the violator; there may be ways to benefit all parties through integrating what we know about each.

STUDY 1: THE FORMATION OF THE DESIRE FOR PUNISHMENT AND CHANGES IN THE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE VIOLATOR

A key component of my model is the idea that observers are not just passive spectators in a punishment episode, but rather, they have a vested interest in seeing that justice takes place for the violator (Darley & Pittman, 2003). This means that the violator is both treated fairly by the manager (procedural justice) and that the violator receives appropriate punishment for their violation (retributive justice). In order for an observer to determine whether the punishment is sufficient, I proposed that they develop a *Desire for Punishment*, which is calculated by examining attributes of both the violator and the violation. This study is designed to test propositions around the formation of the *Desire for Punishment* in a work setting.

Violation Severity

Perhaps the most salient aspect of a violation is the global assessment of how severe it is. Some violations are seen as mild, such as fudging a time card by a few minutes and some are severe, such as embezzling company funds or sexually harassing a coworker. The judgment of how severe a violation is appears to be a common practice and there is evidence for consistent assessments by observers about the rank ordering of violations in terms of their severity (Warr et al., 1983). If observers wish to make sure that the punishment is proportional to the violation we can infer that more serious violations need a stronger response than do mild violations (Carlsmith et al., 2002). Therefore, I propose the following:

H1: Severe violations will result in a greater Desire for Punishment and a more negative Attitude Towards the Violator than will mild violations.

Relationship to the Violator

Severity is a characteristic of the violation, and the relationship of the observer to the violator is a characteristic of the violator. It is possible that the coworker's relationship will have a strong influence with coworkers being more lenient with a friend or a coworker with whom they have a good working relationship (Chi & Lo, 2003). Therefore, I propose:

H2: Coworkers who have a Good Relationship with the violator will report less Desire for Punishment and a more positive Attitude towards the Violator than will coworkers who have a Poor Relationship with the violator

Presence of an Apology and History of Previous Violations

The presence of an *Apology* and the *History* of previous violations are aspects of the violator that should impact the assessments of the observer. When violators apologize, those they have offended behave less aggressively towards them (Ohbuchi et al., 1989). It makes sense then that the presence of an *Apology* would serve a mediating function in an observer's feelings about a violation. Therefore, I propose:

H3A: When a violator offers an Apology coworkers will have less Desire for Punishment and a more positive Attitude Towards the Violator than they will when the coworker doesn't offer an Apology.

Whether the violator has a previous *History* of committing the violation is an additional characteristic of the violator that should influence evaluations. Previous work has shown that a violator's *History* of committing a violation resulted in the observer making an attribution that the violator willingly engaged in the behavior (Klaas & Wheeler, 1990). Therefore, I propose:

H3B: When a violator has a History of the violation coworkers will have more Desire for Punishment and a more negative Attitude Towards the Violator than they will when the coworker doesn't have a History of the violation

These two aspects of the violator, *Apology* and previous *History*, should each contribute to the *Desire for Punishment* and *Attitude Towards the Violator*, such that they will have an additive effect, meaning that the presence of an *Apology* and the absence of a previous *History* should result in the least negative feelings towards the violator and the absence of an *Apology* and the presence of a previous *History* should result in the most negative feelings, with the other two combinations being between the two extremes. This assumes that these two are relatively equal in strength. Therefore, I propose:

H3C: Desire for Punishment will be highest and Attitude Towards the Violator will be lowest when the violator did not apologize and has a history of the violation, while Desire for Punishment will be lowest and Attitude Towards the Violator will be highest when the violator apologized and had no history of the violation, with the other two combinations having intermediate values.

Interactions of Severity and Relationship to the Violator with Attributes of the Violator

While the aspects of the violator should have an impact on the observer's feelings towards the violator, the severity of the violation should still remain an influential factor. Therefore, I propose:

H4A: Even when presented information about a violator's apology and history, severe violations will result in a greater Desire for Punishment and a more negative Attitude Towards the Violator than will mild violations.

Likewise, the relationship with the violator should still remain relevant even in the presence of the additional information about the violator. Therefore, I propose:

H4B: Even when presented information about a violator's apology and history, coworkers who have a Good Relationship with the violator will report less Desire for Punishment and a more positive Attitude towards the Violator than will coworkers who have a Poor Relationship with the violator.

Direct Impact on the Observer and the Outcome of the Violation

The previous hypotheses dealt with the aspects of the violator and violation severity. These hypotheses in contrast deal with the aspects of the violation. The proximity of a moral issue to an individual has been shown to affect the amount of moral intensity that is created (Jones, 1991). The most proximate that an issue could get would be one that affected the individual directly. This means that when a violation directly impacts the observer, it should illicit a stronger reaction than if the violation impacts only others. Therefore, I propose:

H5A: When a violation has a negative Direct Impact on coworkers, they will have more Desire for Punishment and a more negative Attitude Towards the Violator than they will when the violation has no Direct Impact.

While the logic should be that it is the intent of the violator, or the nature of the violation itself that are important, the *Outcome* matters as well. Research has shown that when two violators have the same intent and commit the same violation, people attribute more blame and assign more responsibility to the violator (Mitchell & Kalb, 1981) when a violation results in a bad *Outcome*, and an observer should have more negative feelings towards the violator. Therefore, I propose:

H5B: When a violation has a bad Outcome coworkers will have more Desire for Punishment and a more negative Attitude Towards the Violator than they will when the violation has a good Outcome.

These two aspects of the violation, *Direct Impact* and *Outcome* should each contribute to the *Desire for Punishment* and *Attitude Towards the Violator*, such that they will have an additive effect, meaning that the absence of a *Direct Impact* and a good *Outcome* should result in the least negative feelings towards the violator and the presence of a *Direct Impact* and a bad *Outcome* should result in the most negative feelings, with the other two combinations being between the

two extremes. This assumes that these two are relatively equal in strength. Therefore, I propose:

H5C: Desire for Punishment will be highest and Attitude Towards the Violator will be lowest when the violation had a Direct Impact on the subject and resulted in a bad Outcome, while Desire for Punishment will be lowest and Attitude Towards the Violator will be highest when the violation did not have a negative Direct Impact the subject and resulted in a good Outcome, with the other two combinations having intermediate values.

Interactions of Severity and Relationship to the Violator with Attributes of the Violation

While the aspects of the violation should have an impact on the observer's feelings towards the violator, the severity of the violation should still remain an influential factor.

Therefore, I propose:

H6A: Even when presented information about a violation's Direct Impact and Outcome, severe violations will result in a greater Desire for Punishment and a more negative Attitude Towards the Violator than will mild violations.

Likewise, the relationship with the violator should still remain relevant even in the presence of the additional information about the violation. Therefore, I propose:

H6B: Even when presented information about a violation's Direct Impact and Outcome, coworkers who have a Good Relationship with the violator will report less Desire for Punishment and a more positive Attitude towards the Violator than will coworkers who have a Poor Relationship with the violator.

Interaction of Severity and Relationship to the Violator

When violations are mild and illicit weak moral intensity the relationship to the violator should impact how an observer feels about the violator. However, in the case of severe violations it is likely that the relationship will become moot. A friendship or good working relationship would confer some “idiosyncrasy credits” for minor infractions, but it would be unlikely that when the violation is major that a friendship would have enough credits to cover the debt. Therefore, I propose:

H7: Severity will interact with Relationship such that for mild violations the quality of the relationship (good or poor) will make a difference, but for severe violations the quality of the relationship will not make a difference.

Interaction of Severity with Aspects of the Violator and the Violation

In a similar fashion, observers should consider the relevant information about the behavior of the violator and nature of the violation when there is a minor infraction, but when the violation is major, the severity of the violation itself should swamp all other considerations. In other words, if the violation is severe enough it doesn't matter if there was an *Apology* or not, or who was impacted, the feelings towards the violator simply max out. Therefore, I propose:

H8: Severity will interact with apology, history, Direct Impact and Outcome such that for mild violations they will each make a difference, but for severe offences they will not make a difference.

Methods

Study Design

This study used a doubly multivariate repeated measures design where each subject was measured on multiple variables multiple times. The subjects were divided into two main groups based on instructions to either imagine that the scenarios to be presented referred to a coworker with whom they had a good relationship or to one with whom they had a poor relationship. Within each relationship group there were two violation severity conditions (Severe and Mild) and within each severity condition there was a 2x2 matrix consisting of either *Apology* and *History* or *Direct Impact* and *Outcome*. Table 1 provides a visual representation of the design. Each subject completed either the Good Relationship series (Severe Violation with *Apology* and *History*; Mild Violation with *Direct Impact* and *Outcome*) or the Poor Relationship series (Severe Violation with *Direct Impact* and *Outcome*; Mild Violation with *Apology* and *History*). Thus the Relationship and Severity conditions represent between subject factors with the other eight conditions (*Apology & History*, *Apology & No History*, etc.) being within subject, repeated measures nested inside the between subjects factors.

Table 1: Doubly Multivariate Repeated Measures Design

Good Relationship				Poor Relationship			
Severe		History	No History	Severe		Direct Impact	No Direct Impact
	Apology	AH	ANH		Good Outcome	DIGO	NDIGO
	No Apology	NAH	NANH		Bad Outcome	DIBO	NDIBO
Mild		Direct Impact	No Direct Impact	Mild		History	No History
	Good Outcome	DIGO	NDIGO		Apology	AH	ANH
	Bad Outcome	DIBO	NDIBO		No Apology	NAH	NANH

I chose this design because it allows multiple aspects of both the violator and the violation to be tested simultaneously with a minimal number of subjects. The advantages of a within-subjects design are two fold. First, it increases power by requiring fewer subjects. Since the various treatments are applied to each subject, a researcher needs many fewer subjects than he or she would using a between-subjects design. A second reason for using a within-subjects design is that it reduces the error variance that is associated with individual differences. This makes it clearer that the difference between the treatments is caused by the treatment, rather than some difference that exists between characteristics of the subject.

There are also some inherent weaknesses of the within-subject design, namely what we call “carryover effects.” Since a subject receives multiple treatments, it is more difficult to conclude that each treatment is completely independent. It is possible that the previous treatment has had an influence on the subject and therefore cannot be as confident that any given treatment would be equally effective in isolation.

One issue with having both between-subject and within-subject measures in the same study is that there can be some confounding of the two types. For example, when I am looking at the effect of Severity, the subjects will include both those who were thinking about a coworker with whom they have a Good Relationship and those who were thinking about a coworker with whom they have a Poor Relationship. It is possible that severe violations have a different effect on subjects depending on whether they have a good or poor relationship to the subject. This would make any effects more difficult to detect, but would also add more certainty about effects that were found.

In addition, each subject got either a Severe Violation with *Direct Impact/Outcome* manipulated and a Mild Violation with *Apology* or *History* manipulated, or they got a Mild

Violation with *Direct Impact/Outcome* manipulated and a Severe Violation with *Apology/History* manipulated (see Table 2 below for a visual depiction of the scenarios combined with the between-subjects factor of Relationship). The downside of this is that I do not have all scenarios for each subject. However, the alternative would have been to double the number of conditions which would have resulted in thirty-six cells and would have required the subjects to complete twice as many questions.

Sample

I obtained subjects from the StudyResponse Project at Syracuse University (<http://studyresponse.syr.edu/studyresponse>). Below is a description of the StudyResponse service taken from their homepage.

StudyResponse is an academic research project connecting researchers (such as sociologists and psychologists) with individuals willing to participate in social research. We are ethically obliged to work only with individuals over 18 years of age who have given their consent to participate in such research. StudyResponse is not a market research firm and most questionnaires do not ask about commercial products or services. You will not receive advertising or be placed on any other mailing lists. People of all nationalities are welcome to participate. In general, projects enter participants into a drawing for one of several electronic gift certificates to Amazon ranging in value from \$50 to \$250.

An invitation (see Appendix E) was sent via email to 660 subjects of which an equal number were male and female. The invitation directed the subjects to a website which contained the survey. 111 subjects completed the survey. 14 were discarded because of incomplete data and 9 were discarded for not following instructions properly. This resulted in 84 complete and usable responses.

54.8% of respondents were male. 70.6% were Caucasian, 11.8% were Asian/Pacific Islander, 3.5% were African American, 2.4% were Hispanic, 2.4% were Multiethnic, 1.2 were Native American and 1.2% identified themselves as other. Age ranged from 19 to 72 years with an average of 38.3 years. Work experience ranged from 1 to 50 years with an average of 21.4 years. 84% reported having had some supervisory experience. Data on non-respondents was available for gender, race and age. Gender and race were non-significant but age was significant ($F=12.56$ $p.<.001$) with respondents being significantly older (34.2 years for non respondents and 38.3 for respondents).

Procedures

Each subject received an email invitation with a link to the survey website. When subjects click on the link they were directed to the survey page where they are assigned randomly to one of eight conditions (see Table 2 for details of each condition). Conditions 1 through 4 correspond with 5 through 8 with the order of severity reversed (e.g. condition 1 the Severe Violation with *Apology* and *History* comes first while in condition 5 the Mild Violation with *Outcome* and *Direct Impact* comes first, however, the content is identical). This was done to test whether having a severe or mild violation first would cause a comparison bias in the responses.

Table 2: Desire for Punishment Conditions

1	Good Relationship, Severe Violation with Apology & History, Mild Violation with Outcome & Direct Impact
2	Good Relationship, Mild Violation with Outcome & Direct Impact, Severe Violation with Apology & History
3	Poor Relationship, Severe Violation with Apology & History, Mild Violation with Outcome & Direct Impact
4	Poor Relationship, Mild Violation with Outcome & Direct Impact, Severe Violation with Apology & History
5	Good Relationship, Mild Violation with Outcome & Direct Impact, Severe Violation with Apology & History
6	Good Relationship, Severe Violation with Apology & History, Mild Violation with Outcome & Direct Impact
7	Poor Relationship, Mild Violation with Outcome & Direct Impact, Severe Violation with Apology & History
8	Poor Relationship, Severe Violation with Apology & History, Mild Violation with Outcome & Direct Impact

In the Good Relationship conditions, subjects were told to vividly imagine someone that they are currently working with and with whom they have a positive relationship. In the Bad Relationship conditions they were asked to vividly imagine someone that they currently are working with and with whom they have a strained or difficult relationship. In both cases they are told that if they cannot think of a current co-worker to think of a previous co-worker, but to have a specific individual in their mind.

In the Severe Violation conditions they are told to imagine that person they are thinking of has been caught selling a stolen company laptop that had sensitive employee data. In the Mild Violation they are told to imagine that the person had called in sick to work for a week, but were really on a personal vacation. For the *Apology* and *History* conditions subjects are given four different scenarios in which the violator either did or did not apologize and did or did not have a *History* of doing the behavior previously. Likewise for the *Outcome* and *Direct Impact* conditions the subjects were given different scenarios in which the violation either had a good or bad *Outcome* and that did or did not result in a *Direct Impact* on the subject.

By combining these conditions I am able to achieve all the permutations in table 1. For example, one subject would have been told to think of someone they get along well with and then imagine that that person had stolen a laptop. Then imagine a scenario in which the laptop had been recovered (Good *Outcome*) and that the subject's employee data was on it (*Direct Impact*). Then imagine a scenario in which the laptop was not recovered (Bad *Outcome*) and that the subject's employee data was not on it (no *Direct Impact*). This would continue for the other two combinations of *Outcome* and *Direct Impact*. Then the subject would be asked to disregard all the previous information and imagine that instead the person had called in sick but was

actually taking a personal vacation. The subject would then get scenarios in which the combinations of Apology and *History* were varied. After each scenario the subjects are asked questions about their *Desire for Punishment* and *Attitude Towards the Violator*.

Measures

Desire for Punishment

The coworker's *Desire for Punishment* of the violator was measured using a three item measure consisting of two items developed by Neihoff, Paul & Bunch (1998), with a third item (question #3) added for this study. Neihoff, et al. had labeled this as "retributive justice". However, they used the measure post punishment. Since here it is used prior to punishment the items more accurately reflect the subject's feeling that the person ought to receive punishment. Therefore, I chose to label it accordingly. The two-item measure had a coefficient Alpha of .91 in the Neihoff, et al. study. For the current study the modified measure had a coefficient Alpha of .90. Responses were measured using Likert scales ranging from "strongly agree" (1) to "strongly disagree" (7). The items were:

- 1) The actions of the worker should have been punished
- 2) The employee deserved to be disciplined
- 3) It would bother me if this person was not punished

The three questions were consolidated with simple averaging after confirming their relatedness with Cronbach's Alpha. All statistics were conducted using the consolidated measure.

Attitude Towards the Violator was measured using a three-item scale developed for this study. The measure had a coefficient Alpha of .94. Responses were measured using Likert scales ranging from "strongly agree" (1) to "strongly disagree" (7). The items were:

- 1) If I were a coworker, I would be motivated to work with this person
- 2) This person is a valuable employee
- 3) If I were a coworker, I would be motivated to have this person on my team

The three questions were consolidated with simple averaging after confirming their relatedness with Cronbach's Alpha. All statistics were conducted using the consolidated measure.

To make sure that there was no ordering affect the scenarios were presented with half receiving severe violations first and half receiving mild violations first. I compared the resulting variables with a simple ANOVA to see if the order of the scenarios would impact the observer's ratings. For *Desire for Punishment* none of the means were significantly different. For *Attitude Towards the Violator* two of the eight were significant. The condition with no *Direct Impact* and a bad *Outcome* was significant ($F(1, 84)=4.15, p<.05$) as was the condition with no *Apology* and *History* ($F(1, 84)=4.45, p<.05$). In both cases receiving the severe scenario first resulted in significantly more negative judgments of the violator. However, since one of these involves attributes of the violator and one involves attributes of the violation, and one has two negative aspects and the other has one negative with one positive aspect, there doesn't seem to be a pattern that would invalidate results.

Results

Hypothesis 1 stated that severe violations will result in a greater *Desire for Punishment* and a more negative *Attitude Towards the Violator* than will mild violations. Subjects were initially only told that a violation had taken place without any details related to the violator or details of the violation other than the general description of violation. One violation involved the theft of a company laptop with sensitive employee information on it, and the other involved a

coworker reporting in sick when he or she was actually taking a vacation. Each subject received both scenarios. I ran a repeated-measures ANOVA with the Severe and Mild scenarios for each dependent variable. Since I am looking at the difference between a severe violation and a mild violation within subjects, the sample size for each cell was 85 ($n=85$). Some subjects had been told to imagine a violator with whom they had a Good Relationship and some were told to imagine a violator with whom they had a Poor Relationship. In addition, some subjects had *Direct Impact/Outcome* manipulated and some had *Apology/History* manipulated. Therefore, this is looking at the effect of severity above and beyond any effect of Relationship, *Direct Impact/Outcome* and *Apology/History*. Therefore, there is the potential for confounding which would make effects harder to find. The multivariate factor of Severity was significant ($F(2, 83)=46.50, p<.01$). For the univariate measures, *Desire for Punishment* was significant ($F(1, 84)=94.10, p<.01$) as was *Attitude Towards the Violator* ($F(1, 84)=29.95, p<.01$). The estimated marginal means showed that *Desire for Punishment* was higher in the severe case ($M=5.97$) than the mild case ($M=4.26$) and *Attitude Towards the Violator* was more negative in the severe case ($M=2.56$) than the mild case ($M=3.52$). Thus, hypothesis 1 was fully supported.

Table 3: Study 1 – H1 – Estimated Marginal Means
for Violation Severity

Violation Severity	Desire for Punishment*	Attitude Towards the Violator*
Severe	5.97	2.56
Mild	4.26	3.52

*Significant at $<.01$

Hypothesis 2 stated that coworkers who have a Good Relationship with the violator will report less *Desire for Punishment* and a more positive *Attitude towards the Violator* than will coworkers who have a Poor Relationship with the violator. I ran a repeated-measures

ANOVA between the two violations with relationship quality (good vs. poor) as a between subjects factor. Subjects had been told to imagine a coworker with whom they had either a Good Relationship or one with whom they had a Poor Relationship. There were 43 subjects who were imagining a coworker with whom they had a Good Relationship and 42 who were imagining a coworker with whom they had a Poor Relationship. Subjects all had various combinations of Severity, *Direct Impact/Outcome* and *Apology/History*, making the effect potentially more difficult to detect. The multivariate factor of relationship (a between-subjects factor) was significant ($F(2, 82)=3.77, p<.05$). For the univariate measures, *Desire for Punishment* was significant ($F(1, 83)=4.29, p<.05$) as was *Attitude Towards the Violator* ($F(1, 83)=7.10, p<.01$). The estimated marginal means showed that *Desire for Punishment* was lower when a Good Relationship was present ($M=4.86$) than when a Poor Relationship was present ($M=5.38$) and that *Attitude Towards the Violator* was more positive with a Good Relationship ($M=3.41$) than it was with a Poor Relationship ($M=2.66$). The interaction term was non-significant, showing that the effect of Relationship Quality did not significantly differ for Severe or Mild Violations. Therefore, hypothesis 2 was fully supported.

Table 4: Study 1 – H2 – Estimated Marginal Means
for Relationship Quality

Relationship	Desire for Punishment†	Attitude Towards the Violator*
Good	4.86	3.41
Poor	5.38	2.66

*Significant at $<.01$

†Significant at $<.05$

Hypothesis 3A stated that when a violator offers an *Apology* coworkers will have less *Desire for Punishment* and a more positive *Attitude Towards the Violator* than they will when the coworker doesn't offer an *Apology*. Hypothesis 3B stated that when a violator has a *History* of

the violation coworkers will have more *Desire for Punishment* and a more negative *Attitude Towards the Violator* than they will when the coworker doesn't have a *History* of the violation. I ran a repeated measures ANOVA on the four scenarios made up of the permutations of *History* and *Apology* (e.g. *History* and *Apology*, *History* and No *Apology*, etc.). Since this was again a within subjects measure where each subject had each scenario the sample size for each cell was 85. As before, some subjects were imagining a Good Relationship and some a Poor Relationship, and some had a Severe Violation and some had a Mild Violation, which could make the effect harder to detect. The multivariate factor of *Apology* was significant ($F(2, 83)=10.91, p<.01$). For the univariate measures, *Desire for Punishment* was significant ($F(1, 84)=8.07, p<.01$) as was *Attitude Towards the Violator* ($F(1, 84)=21.06, p<.01$). *History* was also significant as a multivariate factor ($F(2, 83)=11.92, p<.01$). With *Desire for Punishment* being significant ($F(1, 84)=11.12, p<.01$) as was *Attitude Towards the Violator* ($F(1, 84)=23.66, p<.01$). When the violator apologized subjects reported less *Desire for Punishment* ($M=5.15$) than when the violator didn't apologize ($M=5.34$). They also reported more a positive *Attitude Towards the Violator* when there was an *Apology* ($M=2.93$) than when there was no *Apology* ($M=2.67$). When the violator had a *History* of the violation subjects reported more *Desire for Punishment* ($M=5.34$) than when the violator had no *History* ($M=5.10$) and a more negative *Attitude Towards the Violator* when the violator had a *History* ($M=2.98$) than when there was no *History* ($M=2.65$). The interaction of *Apology* and *History* was not significant. Thus hypotheses 3A and 3B were fully supported.

Table 5: Study 1 – H3A – Estimated Marginal Means for Apology

Apology	Desire for Punishment*	Attitude Towards the Violator*
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Apology	5.15	2.93
No Apology	5.34	2.67

**Significant at <.01*

Table 6: Study 1 – H3B – Estimated Marginal Means for History

History	Desire for Punishment*	Attitude Towards the Violator*
History	5.34	2.98
No History	5.10	2.67

**Significant at <.01*

Hypothesis 3C stated that *Desire for Punishment* will be highest and *Attitude Towards the Violator* will be lowest when the violator did not apologize and has a *History* of the violation, while *Desire for Punishment* will be lowest and *Attitude Towards the Violator* will be highest when the violator apologized and had no *History* of the violation, with the other two combinations having intermediate values. This relationship is more difficult to test since it represents gradations of values. It is unlikely that each cell would be significantly different than the other cells. Therefore, I ran a repeated-measures ANOVA between the condition with no *Apology* and a *History* of the violation and the condition with an *Apology* and no *History* (the two combinations representing the extremes). Since this was again a within subjects test there were 85 subjects in each condition. As before, some subjects were imagining a Good Relationship and some a Poor Relationship, and some had a Severe Violation and some had a Mild Violation, which could make the effect harder to detect. The multivariate factor was significant ($F(83)=17.26, p<.01$). The difference between the means for *Desire for Punishment* was significant ($F(84)=12.95, p<.01$) as was the difference between the means for *Attitude Towards the Violator* ($F(84)=34.92, p<.01$). The table below shows that the means fall into the hypothesized pattern. Therefore, hypothesis 3C was fully supported.

Table 7: Study 1 – H3C – Estimated Marginal Means for Desire for Punishment

Desire for Punishment	Apology	No Apology
History	5.32	5.45*
No History	4.96*	5.22

*These two means significant at $<.01$

Table 8: Study 1 – H3C – Estimated Marginal Means for Attitude Towards the Violator

Attitude Towards the Violator	Apology	No Apology
History	2.72	2.58*
No History	3.15*	2.81

*These two means significant at $<.01$

Hypothesis 4A stated that even when presented information about a violator's *Apology* and *History*, severe violations will result in a greater *Desire for Punishment* and a more negative *Attitude Towards the Violator* than will mild violations. To test this I ran the same repeated-measures ANOVA as in hypothesis 3A (using the four scenarios made up of the permutations of *History* and *Apology* (e.g. *History* and *Apology*, *History* and No *Apology*, etc.) with severity (severe or mild) as a between subjects factor. This resulted in 42 subjects for the mild condition and 43 subjects for the severe condition. Subjects varied only on Relationship here as a potential confound. The multivariate factor of Severity was significant ($F(2, 80)=11.12$, $p<.01$). For the univariate measures, *Desire for Punishment* was significant ($F(1, 81)=24.23$, $p<.01$) as was *Attitude Towards the Violator* ($F(1, 81)=8.42$, $p<.01$). When the violation was severe, subjects reported more *Desire for Punishment* ($M=5.92$) than when the violation had no mild ($M=4.56$) and a more negative *Attitude Towards the Violator* when the violation was severe

($M=2.38$) than when the violation was mild ($M=3.24$) Therefore, hypothesis 4A was fully supported.

Table 9: Study 1 – H4A – Estimated Marginal Means for Violation Severity

Violation Severity	Desire for Punishment*	Attitude Towards the Violator*
Severe	5.92	2.38
Mild	4.56	3.24

*Significant at $<.01$

Hypothesis 4B stated that even when presented information about a violator's *Apology* and *History*, coworkers who have a Good Relationship with the violator will report less *Desire for Punishment* and a more positive *Attitude towards the Violator* than will coworkers who have a Poor Relationship with the violator. To test this I ran the same repeated-measures ANOVA as in hypothesis 4A (using the four scenarios made up of the permutations of *History* and *Apology* (e.g. *History* and *Apology*, *History* and No *Apology*, etc.) with relationship (good or bad) as a between subjects factor. This results in 43 subjects in the Good Relationship condition and 42 subjects in the Poor Relationship condition. Subjects now varied only on Severity as a potential confound. The multivariate factor of relationship was not significant ($F(2, 80)=2.93, p=.059$). For the univariate measures, *Desire for Punishment* was not significant ($F(1, 81)=3.28, p=.074$) but *Attitude Towards the Violator* was significant ($F(1, 81)=5.88, p<.05$). When the subject had a good relationship with the violator, they reported less *Desire for Punishment* ($M=4.99$) than when they had a poor relationship with the violator ($M=5.49$) and a more positive *Attitude Towards the Violator* when the relationship was good ($M=3.17$) than when the violation was poor ($M=2.45$) Therefore, hypothesis 4B was partially supported for *Attitude Towards the Violator*.

Table 10: Study 1 – H4B – Estimated Marginal Means for Relationship Quality

Relationship Quality	Desire for Punishment	Attitude Towards the Violator*
Good	4.99	3.17
Poor	5.49	2.45

*Significant at $<.01$

Hypothesis 5A stated that when a violation has a negative Direct Impact on coworkers, they will have more *Desire for Punishment* and a more negative *Attitude Towards the Violator* than they will when the violation has no *Direct Impact*. Hypothesis 5B stated that when a violation has a bad *Outcome* coworkers will have more *Desire for Punishment* and a more negative *Attitude Towards the Violator* than they will when the violation has a good *Outcome*. I ran a repeated measures ANOVA on the four scenarios made up of the permutations of *Direct Impact* and *Outcome* (e.g. *Direct Impact* and Good *Outcome*, No *Direct Impact* and Bad *Outcome*, etc.). Since this was again a within subjects measure where each subject had each scenario the sample size for each cell was 85. As before, some subjects were imagining a Good Relationship and some a Poor Relationship, and some had a Severe Violation and some had a Mild Violation, which could make the effect harder to detect. The multivariate factor of Direct Impact was significant ($F(2, 83)=4.49, p<.05$). However, *Desire for Punishment* was not significant ($F(1, 84)=.21, p=.650$) but *Attitude Towards the Violator* was significant ($F(1, 84)=8.98, p<.01$). *Outcome* was also significant as a multivariate factor ($F(2, 83)=4.92, p<.01$). With *Desire for Punishment* being significant ($F(1, 84)=8.11, p<.01$) as was *Attitude Towards the Violator* ($F(1, 84)=8.79, p<.01$). When the violation had a *Direct Impact* subjects reported more *Desire for Punishment* ($M=5.07$) than when the violation had no *Direct Impact* ($M=5.05$), however this difference was non significant. They also reported a more negative *Attitude Towards the*

Violator when there was a *Direct Impact* ($M=2.88$) than when there was no *Direct Impact* ($M=3.00$). When the violation had a bad *Outcome* subjects reported more *Desire for Punishment* ($M=5.21$) than when the violation had a good *Outcome* ($M=4.91$) and a more negative *Attitude Towards the Violator* when the violation had a bad *Outcome* ($M=2.80$) than when there was a good *Outcome* ($M=3.08$) The interaction of *Direct Impact* and *Outcome* was not significant. Thus hypotheses 5A was partially supported and 5B was fully supported.

Table 11: Study 1 – H5A – Estimated Marginal Means for Direct Impact

Direct Impact	Desire for Punishment	Attitude Towards the Violator*
Direct Impact	5.05	2.88
No Direct Impact	5.07	3.00

*Significant at $<.01$

Table 12: Study 1 – H5B – Estimated Marginal Means for Outcome

Outcome	Desire for Punishment*	Attitude Towards the Violator*
Good Outcome	4.91	3.08
Bad Outcome	5.21	2.80

*Significant at $<.01$

Hypothesis 5C stated that *Desire for Punishment* will be highest and *Attitude Towards the Violator* will be lowest when the violation had a *Direct Impact* on the subject and resulted in a bad *Outcome*, while *Desire for Punishment* will be lowest and *Attitude Towards the Violator* will be highest when the violation did not directly impact the subject and resulted in a good *Outcome*, with the other two combinations having intermediate values. Again, the same issues that applied to hypothesis 3C applied equally here. Therefore, I ran a repeated-measures ANOVA between the condition with no *Direct Impact* and a good *Outcome* and the condition with a *Direct Impact* and a bad *Outcome*, the two extreme conditions. This was again a within subjects test, so

there were 85 subjects in each condition. As was true previously, some subjects were imagining a Good Relationship and some a Poor Relationship, and some had a Severe Violation and some had a Mild Violation, which could make the effect harder to detect. The multivariate factor was significant ($F(83)=6.87, p<.01$). The difference between the means for *Desire for Punishment* was significant ($F(84)=6.91, p<.01$) as was the difference between the means for *Attitude Towards the Violator* ($F(84)=13.47, p<.01$). The table below shows that the means fall into the hypothesized pattern. Therefore, hypothesis 5C was fully supported.

Table 13: Study 1 – H5C – Estimated Marginal Means for Desire for Punishment

Desire for Punishment	Direct Impact	No Direct Impact
Good Outcome	4.94	4.91*
Bad Outcome	5.22*	5.20

**These two means significant at <.01*

Table 14: Study 1 – H5C – Estimated Marginal Means for Attitude Towards the Violator

Attitude Towards the Violator	Direct Impact	No Direct Impact
Good Outcome	3.02	3.12*
Bad Outcome	2.71*	2.87

**These two means significant at <.01*

Hypothesis 6A stated that even when presented information about a violation's Direct Impact and *Outcome*, severe violations will result in a greater *Desire for Punishment* and a more negative *Attitude Towards the Violator* than will mild violations. To test this I ran the same repeated-measures ANOVA as in hypothesis 5A & 5B (using the four scenarios made up of the permutations of *Direct Impact* and *Outcome* (e.g. *Direct Impact* and *Good Outcome*, *No Direct Impact* and *Bad Outcome*, etc.) with severity (severe or mild) as a between subjects factor. This resulted in 42 subjects for the mild condition and 43 subjects for the severe condition. Subjects

varied only on Relationship here as a potential confound. The multivariate factor of severity was significant ($F(2, 80)=5.76, p<.01$). For the univariate measures, *Desire for Punishment* was significant ($F(1, 81)=11.32, p<.01$) as was *Attitude Towards the Violator* ($F(1, 81)=8.12, p<.01$). When the violation was severe, subjects reported more *Desire for Punishment* ($M=5.74$) than when the violation was mild ($M=4.56$) and a more negative *Attitude Towards the Violator* when the violation was severe ($M=2.46$) than when the violation was mild ($M=3.39$) Therefore, hypothesis 6A was fully supported.

Table 15 Study 1 – H6A – Estimated Marginal Means for Violation Severity

Violation Severity	Desire for Punishment*	Attitude Towards the Violator*
Severe	5.74	2.46
Mild	4.56	3.39

*Significant at $<.01$

Hypothesis 6B stated that even when presented information about a violation's *Direct Impact* and *Outcome*, coworkers who have a Good Relationship with the violator will report less *Desire for Punishment* and a more positive *Attitude towards the Violator* than will coworkers who have a Poor Relationship with the violator. To test this I ran the same repeated-measures ANOVA as in hypothesis 5A & 5B (using the four scenarios made up of the permutations of *Direct Impact* and *Outcome* (e.g. *Direct Impact* and Good *Outcome*, No *Direct Impact* and Bad *Outcome*, etc.) with relationship (good or bad) as a between subjects factor. This results in 43 subjects in the Good Relationship condition and 42 subjects in the Poor Relationship condition. Subjects now varied only on Severity as a potential confound. The multivariate factor of relationship was not significant ($F(2, 80)=2.28, p=.115$). For the univariate measures, *Desire for Punishment* was not significant ($F(1, 81)=3.25, p=.075$) but *Attitude Towards the Violator*

was significant ($F(1, 81)=4.31, p<.05$). When the subject had a good relationship with the violator, they reported less *Desire for Punishment* ($M=4.79$) than when they had a poor relationship with the violator ($M=5.34$) and a more positive *Attitude Towards the Violator* when the relationship was good ($M=3.27$) than when the violation was poor ($M=2.59$) Therefore, hypothesis 6B was partially supported for *Attitude Towards the Violator*.

Table 16 Study 1 – H6B – Estimated Marginal Means for Relationship Quality

Relationship Quality	Desire for Punishment	Attitude Towards the Violator*
Good	4.79	3.27
Poor	5.34	2.59

*Significant at $<.01$

Hypothesis 7 stated that severity will interact with relationship such that for mild violations the quality of the relationship (good or poor) will make a difference, but for severe violations the quality of the relationship will not make a difference. To test this I ran the same ANOVAs from Hypotheses 3A & 3B and Hypotheses 5A & 5B with the interaction term of severity X relationship as a between subjects factor. For *Apology* and *History* this resulted in 22 subjects for the mild violation with a good relationship, 20 subjects for the mild violation with a poor relationship, 21 subjects for severe violation with a good relationship, and 22 subjects for severe violation with a poor relationship. For *Direct Impact* and *Outcome* this resulted in 21 subjects for the mild violation with a good relationship, 22 subjects for the mild violation with a poor relationship, 22 subjects for severe violation with a good relationship, and 20 subjects for severe violation with a poor relationship. No confounds exist here. The interaction was not significant for the *Apology* and *History* aspects, nor the *Direct Impact* and *Outcome* aspects. Therefore, hypothesis 7 was not supported.

Hypothesis 8 stated that severity will interact with *Apology*, *History*, *Direct Impact* and *Outcome* such that for mild violations they will each make a difference, but for severe offences they will not make a difference. Again I tested this with the same ANOVAs from Hypotheses 3A & 3B and Hypotheses 5A & 5B and examined all the interaction term permutations (e.g. severity X *Apology*, severity X *History*, etc.) For all four variables there were 43 subjects in the mild conditions and 42 in the severe conditions. Subjects differed only on the Relationship factor as a potential confound. The multivariate factor of Severity X *Apology* was not significant, ($F(2, 80)=2.26, p=.111$). For the univariate measures, *Desire for Punishment* was significant ($F(1, 81)=4.56, p<.05$), but *Attitude Towards the Violator* was not significant ($F(1, 81)=.59, p=.443$). Severity X *History* was not significant, nor were the univariate tests of *Desire for Punishment* and *Attitude Towards the Violator*.

The multivariate factor of Severity X *Direct Impact* was not significant ($F(2, 80)=2.54, p=.085$), Specifically, *Desire for Punishment* was significant ($F(1, 81)=5.08, p<.05$), but *Attitude Towards the Violator* was not significant ($F(1, 81)=.19, p=.665$). Severity X *Outcome* was not significant, nor were the univariate tests of *Desire for Punishment* and *Attitude Towards the Violator*. When there was a severe violation and the violator apologized subjects reported a lower *Desire for Punishment* ($M=5.89$) as opposed to when the violator didn't apologize ($M=5.97$). They also reported a lower *Desire for Punishment* for the mild violation when the violator apologized ($M=4.39$) than when the violator didn't apologize ($M=4.73$). Since the interaction was significant the change in the mild condition is significantly larger than the change in the severe condition.

Table 17 Study 1 – H8 – Interaction of Severity X
Apology

Severity X Apology – Desire for Punishment*	Severe Violation	Mild Violation
Apology	5.89	4.39
No Apology	5.97	4.73

**Significant at <.01*

When there was a severe violation and the violation resulted in a *Direct Impact* subjects reported a higher *Desire for Punishment* ($M=5.64$) as opposed to when the violation didn't result in a *Direct Impact* ($M=5.51$). However, they reported a lower *Desire for Punishment* for the mild violation when the violation had a *Direct Impact* ($M=4.51$) than when the violation didn't result in a *Direct Impact* ($M=4.57$). While the change in the mild condition is in the opposite direction of the change in the severe condition, it is also very small. Since the interaction is significant the change in the severe condition is larger and in the opposite direction from the change in the mild condition.

Table 18 Study 1 – H8 – Interaction of Severity X
Direct Impact

Severity X Direct Impact – Desire for Punishment*	Severe Violation	Mild Violation
Impact	5.64	4.51
No Impact	5.51	4.57

**Significant at <.01*

Therefore, Hypothesis 8 was only partially supported and only for the Severity X *Apology* for Desire for Punishment and for the Severity X *Direct Impact* combinations.

Discussion

Not surprisingly, this study demonstrated that there is a strong link between the seriousness of a violation and how much coworkers want to see the violator punished as well as the way that they feel toward the violator. However, the question of how severity relates to

other attributes of the punishment episode yielded some more interesting results. First, severity mattered on top of the other variables, both the aspects of the violator and of the violation, showing that this is a key part of the evaluation of observers. Serious violations result in more *Desire for Punishment* and more negative feelings toward the violator regardless of other factors. This would suggest that a manager should first take into account how serious the violation is before considering any other factors.

A second and somewhat surprising result was that there were only a few interaction effects between any of the variables and severity. It seems logical to suppose that severe violations might have a different structure than do mild violations. For example, one might assume that with severe violations the characteristics of the violator would be swamped by the magnitude of the violation. When someone steals a laptop with sensitive employee data on it, it wouldn't matter if this was a first violation or a repeat violation, it is so serious that the outrage makes other details irrelevant. However, I did not find that here. While seriousness made a difference, each of the other variables continued to add nuances to the coworker's assessments, either raising or lowering them. It is possible that I did not find a sufficiently severe violation, but even so that suggests that only the very most egregious violations behave this way, if in fact, severity can make other aspects irrelevant.

Another interesting finding is that relationship to the violator proved to not be very important. When only given basic information about a violation, observers do appear to give the benefit of the doubt to people with whom they have a good relationship, both for mild and serious violations. But when given information about the violator and the violation, the fact that the observer has a relationship with the violator seems to lose its strength. To be fair, the manipulation involved imagining that the violation had been committed by a coworker, so it is

possible that there would be different reactions if it were an actual person as opposed to an imagined person.

The model proposed that the formation of the *Desire for Punishment* happens by examining both aspects of the violator and the violation. The results support this assertion. The results also support the idea that these aspects seem to work in an additive way. Rather than some complicated mental calculus, observers simply add or subtract pieces of information to come up with a final judgment of how much the violator is deserving of punishment.

Implications for Practice

If as I assert, it is the case that observers determine how just a punishment is by comparing their desire to punish with the punishment severity there are a number of implications for managers. First, managers should clearly elucidate the seriousness of a violation. If observers assume a mild violation and see a strong response, or they assume a severe violation and see a weak response, they will likely feel that the punishment is unjust. And severity seems to matter regardless of what other information is obtained.

Second, when a manager perceives that observers have concerns about the response, providing additional details could alter the observer's perceptions. For example, if an observer concludes that a punishment was too severe, a manager could explain that the violator had a *History* of the violation. Or on the other hand, if a coworker felt the punishment was too lenient, the manager could explain that an *Apology* had been offered, or that the violation didn't result in a negative *Outcome*.

And third is simply a confirmation that observers do indeed have significant reactions to the violations of coworkers. Managers would be well served to keep in mind that a punishment episode is not just between the manager and the violator, but if the violation is

publicly known, then the manager does need to think about how the observers will react. At the very least they will have more negative attitudes about the violator, and if there is high interdependence in a group of team these attitudes could negatively affect performance.

Limitations

Because we are asking coworkers to imagine, they may not be able to accurately assess their true desires. For example, it may be difficult for them to actively imagine a close coworker committing a violation if that person is of high integrity. Additionally, this study only examined the formation of the *Desire for Punishment*. Presumably, upon administration of a punishment the observer's attitudes would be adjusted to take into account the new information.

Another issue is the potential for demand characteristics. This issue often occurs in a repeated-measures design. Each time the subjects get a new scenario, they see a variation on what they previously saw. It is not hard to imagine that subjects quickly could infer the point of the study by observing what was being changed at each stage. This may have influenced their responses so that they answered as they thought the question should be answered, rather than exactly how they felt. The only way to avoid this would have been to give each subject only one situation which would have required huge numbers of subjects. And lastly, since this was done using a survey panel, it is possible that subjects didn't take the study as seriously as would employees in their actual workplace.

STUDY TWO: COWORKER ATTITUDES TOWARDS A VIOLATOR AND THEIR MANAGER

The purpose of this study was to examine how the attitudes and intentions of coworkers' who observe a punishment event change as the coworkers receive and process information about the violation, details of the violator's background, specifics of the manager's response and post-response updates to information about the violator. The Coworker Model, which is a model of how the various components relate to each other, allows us make predictions about how various judgments will evolve over time. This study was based on one model of a punishment event. The design was created to allow a gradual unfolding of the events to see how the elements are related. While the exact sequence of events in any punishment episode will vary (e.g. coworkers might learn of a violation before they learn of the punishment or they might learn of both simultaneously, etc.), the model should be adaptable to any punishment situation. While the sequence may vary, the components should remain consistent.

The process model tested in this study proceeds as follows. There is a discovery that a violation has occurred. Information about the violator and the violation is obtained. Information about the manager's response (punishment) is learned. Additional information is learned about either the violator or the violation after the manager's response (this study only looked at post-punishment information about the violator).

This design allowed me to see how different aspects of information received at different times have an impact on important attitudes and intentions. In the Coworker Model I proposed that aspects of the violation and aspects of the violator interact to create a general

Desire for Punishment. In addition, the violation and violator characteristics should affect attitudes related to the violator, manager and the group. Once the punishment is applied, the coworker determines if punishment was appropriate (i.e. does it satisfy the desire). If it does not, then negative organizational outcomes are possible for the coworker as he or she perceives an injustice. However, additional information can alter the *Desire for Punishment* even after punishment has taken place. This study seeks to explore this process model and identify some of the aspects that can impact coworker's perceptions.

Stage 1: Initial Discovery of a Violation

When people observe the violation of laws, rules or social norms it typically results in a desire to see the violator punished (Carlsmith et al., 2002). The Kantian perspective suggests that this happens because violating a society's rules puts the scales of justice out of balance. When the violator is punished, that balance is restored (Kant, 1952). Therefore, we would expect that an observing coworker would foster some kind of resentment towards the offending coworker when the coworker has yet to be punished. This could include their appraisals of the value of the offending coworker as an employee, their interest in associating with that coworker, etc. At the same time, we could also expect that the observing coworker's commitment to the team and organization would decrease when a coworker upsets the social order within that unit. Therefore, I propose that:

H1A: When coworkers learn that a violation occurred, they will show a decrease in their Attitude Towards the Violator, and an increase in their Intention to Leave.

Stage 2: Introduction of Information About the Violation

Using the propositions presented earlier on the overall model, proposition 1a stated that in response to a perceived violation, coworkers develop a *Desire for Punishment*, proposition

1c stated a coworker's *Desire for Punishment* is related to the judgments about the magnitude of harm and extenuating circumstances and proposition 1d stated a coworker's assessment of magnitude of harm and extenuating circumstances is reached by evaluating the violation's characteristics and the violator's characteristics. One important aspect of a violation is whether it directly impacted the observing coworker. While there appears to be a general desire to punish people who violate social norms, that desire should be greater if the violation also directly impacted the coworker. In addition, a violation that directly impacted the coworker should exacerbate the reduction in the coworker's feelings about the violator and the decrease in organizational commitment. Therefore, I propose the following:

H1B: When coworkers learn that a violation occurred, they will show a greater reduction in their Attitude Towards the Violator, and a greater increase in Intention to Leave if the violation resulted in a Direct Impact on the coworker.

H1C: When coworkers learn that a violation occurred, they will report a greater Desire for Punishment for the violator if the violation resulted in a Direct Impact on the coworker.

Stage 3: Introduction of Information About the Violator

While my earlier hypothesis 1 involved aspects of the violation, hypothesis 2 involved aspects of the violator. One key aspect of the violator is the violator's previous performance. Niehoff et al. (1998) suggested that the general negative past performance of a violator indicates that the coworker has deliberately chosen to commit the violation and is willfully breaking the rules, thus making them more deserving of punishment. On the other hand, a general good record of past performance can provide idiosyncrasy credits, which would make them less deserving of punishment (Hollander, 1978). A previous *History* of committing a

specific violation would be the strongest example of this principle. Therefore I propose the following:

H2A: When coworkers learn that the violator had a Prior History of the violation, they will have a reduction in their Attitude Towards the Violator, an increase in their Intention to Leave and an increase in the Desire for Punishment.

H2B: When coworkers are told that a violator had no Prior History of the violation, they will have an increase in Attitude Towards the Violator, a reduction in Intention to Leave and a reduction in the Desire for Punishment.

In study one I looked at two aspects of the violator and how they affected the *Desire for Punishment* and *Attitude Towards the Violator* and two aspects of the violation and how they affected the same dependent variables. Here I am looking at one aspect of the violation and one of the violator. The Coworker Model proposes that the *Desire for Punishment* is formed by a combined appraisal of the aspects of the violation and the violator. In other words, they should each contribute to *Intention to Leave*, the *Desire for Punishment* and *Attitude Towards the Violator*.

This means that when a violator has a *History* of the violation and the violation had a negative *Direct Impact* on the on coworker, the coworker will have the highest *Intention to Leave* and *Desire for Punishment*, and the lowest *Attitude Towards the Violator*. Conversely, when the violator has no *History* of the violation and the violation didn't directly impact the coworker, the coworker will have the lowest *Intention to Leave* and *Desire for Punishment* and the highest *Attitude Towards the Violator*. In the other two combinations the values will be between the two extremes. Therefore I propose:

H2C: Attitude Towards the Violator will be lowest while Intention to Leave and Desire for Punishment will be highest when the violation had a Direct Impact and the violator had a history; Attitude Towards the Violator will be highest while Intention to Leave and Desire for Punishment will be lowest when the violation had no Direct Impact and the violator had no history; and all variables intermediate for the other two combinations.

Stage 4: Application of Punishment

If, as Kant proposed, a violation places the scales of justice out of balance, then the manner in which a manager responds to the violation will be critical in restoring that balance. If a manager responds too lightly, the scale would tip back, but still not be balanced. Or, if the manager responds too harshly, the scale could remain out of balance in the opposite direction. And if the manager doesn't respond (or appears to have not responded), the scale stays where it was. And the way that the manager responds to the violation could affect a number of important factors.

For example, the manager's response to the violation might have a direct effect on how the coworkers feel about the manager. Atwater et al. (1997) examined contingent and noncontingent rewards and punishment on follower's perceptions of leader charisma and effectiveness and demonstrated that these attitudes were indeed affected by the leader's behaviors. The severity of the response could reduce coworkers' respect for a manager and their appraisal of that manager's effectiveness.

Likewise, the way the manager responds could affect how coworkers' feel about the violator, since the response determines if the violator was treated fairly. And the response could also affect the coworkers' feelings about being in the group. This would result both from the perception that justice had or had not been restored as well as providing vicarious learning

about what could happen to them should they ever be in a situation that required a just decision from the manager. For example, Schnake (1986) found that employees who observed a coworker having their pay reduced for not meeting performance objectives had higher levels of production than those who did not observe the pay reduction.

The key to restoring justice then, would be to make sure that the punishment was appropriate to the violation. One measure of appropriateness would be the severity of the punishment. Using severity as a measure of appropriateness would mean that a mild punishment was inappropriately lenient while an appropriate punishment was proportional to the violation. And of course the absence of punishment would be inappropriately lenient to the extreme. Combining all these ideas, I propose the following for the situation where the manager appears to have done nothing:

H3A: When coworkers learn that a manager had not responded to a violation (or appeared to have not responded) they will have a reduction in their Attitude Towards the Manager, a reduction in their Attitude Towards the Violator, an increase in their Intention to Leave and an increase in the Desire for Punishment.

Earlier I had discussed the idea that at least in western culture the predominant view is that punishment is a private matter and should take place between a manager and the violator. However, the question remains as to what happens to coworkers who know of a violation but are unaware of the manager's response? Relying on the balance of justice idea discussed earlier, a mild punishment should only partially right the scales and where there is no punishment the scales are left untouched. Therefore, I should be able to see that no punishment (or no knowledge that there was punishment should leave coworkers will more extreme attitudes and intentions than merely mild punishment. Therefore, I propose:

H3B: When coworkers learn that a violator was punished, they will have a greater reduction in their Attitude Towards the Manager, a greater reduction in their Attitude Towards the Violator, a greater increase in their Intention to Leave and a greater increase in the Desire for Punishment when the manager had not responded (or appeared to have not responded) than when the punishment was mild.

When the punishment was mild, the reactions of coworkers should be similar to coworkers who observed no punishment, although it should not be as extreme. Therefore, I propose:

H4A: When coworkers learn that the punishment applied was mild, they will have a reduction in their Attitude Towards the Manager, and their Attitude Towards the Violator, and an increase in their Intention to Leave and the Desire for Punishment.

The aspects of the violation from H1B and H1C should interact with the severity of punishment. Specifically, when a punishment is mild (inappropriately lenient), the reduction in feelings about the manager and violator should be more extreme when the violation had an impact directly on the coworker, while at the same time the likelihood of leaving the organization and the *Desire for Punishment* should increase to a greater degree. Thus I propose:

H4B: When coworkers learn that the punishment applied was mild, they will have a greater reduction in their Attitude Towards the Manager, and their Attitude Towards the Violator, and a greater increase in their Intention to Leave and the Desire for Punishment when the violation had a Direct Impact.

In a similar fashion, the aspects of the violator from H2A and H2B should interact with the severity of punishment. When a punishment is mild (inappropriately lenient), the reduction in feelings about the manager and violator should be more extreme when the

violator had a prior *History* of the violation, while at the same time the likelihood of leaving the organization and the *Desire for Punishment* should increase to a greater degree. Thus I propose:

H4C: When coworkers learn that the punishment applied was mild, they will have a greater reduction in their Attitude Towards the Manager, and their Attitude Towards the Violator, and a greater increase in their Intention to Leave and the Desire for Punishment when the violator had a prior history of the violation.

And lastly, the aspects of the violation and the violator should each contribute to the relevant dependent variables when the punishment is mild. When the violation had an *Direct Impact* on the coworker, the violator had a *History* and the manager's response was inappropriately lenient, coworkers should have the most negative feelings about the manager and the violator. While at the same time, their likelihood of leaving and *Desire for Punishment* should be highest. This is because the scale of justice has been tipped the furthest in this configuration.

Conversely, the scales of justice are tipped the least when there was no *Direct Impact* and the violator has no previous *History*. For situations where there was a *History* but no *Direct Impact* or *Direct Impact* but no *History* the scales should be tipped between the two extremes. This results in the following hypothesis:

H4D: When the punishment is mild, the violation had Direct Impact and the violator had a prior history, Attitude Towards the Manager and Attitude Towards the Violator will be the lowest and Intentions to Leave and Desire for Punishment will be the highest, in addition when the violation had no Direct Impact and the violator had no Prior History, Attitude Towards the Manager and Attitude Towards the Violator will be the highest and Intentions to Leave and Desire for Punishment will be the lowest, and intermediate for the other two conditions.

A slightly different logic applies when the punishment is appropriately severe. For example, the feelings about the manager should reflect approval of the application of appropriate punishment that would be expected as part of the manager's responsibility. The violator has now been justly dealt with, so the feelings toward the violator should be more positive since the person has not benefited unfairly. So, where feelings about the manager and violator decreased and punishment desires increased in the mild condition, feelings towards the manager should not be affected, animosity toward the violator should ease but punishment desires should increase since the violator is seen as deserving of this punishment. Additionally, this should signal a fairness in the overall work environment, resulting in coworkers lessening their thoughts about leaving that were previously increased by deviant behavior. Hence, I propose:

H5A: When coworkers learn that the punishment applied was appropriately severe, coworkers will maintain their Attitude Towards the Manager and increase their Attitude Towards the Violator, and will decrease their Intention to Leave and increase their Desire for Punishment.

If a violation resulted in a *Direct Impact* on a coworker they should harbor more resentment towards the violator. When the manager gives an appropriate punishment it should mitigate the feelings, however, since they are proposed to be more extreme, the effect should be to lessen them, but not to the same extent as for those coworkers who had not been directly impacted. Therefore, I propose:

H5B: When coworkers learn that coworkers learn that the punishment was appropriately severe, coworkers will have no change in Attitude Towards the Manager, a smaller increase in Attitude Towards the Violator, a smaller decrease in Intention to Leave and a smaller increase in Desire for Punishment when the violation had a Direct Impact than when it had no Direct Impact.

Similar logic applies when the violator has a *History* of the violation. They should start from a more extreme position and therefore not move back as far as someone who believed the violator had a previously good *History*. Therefore I propose:

H5C: When the punishment is appropriately severe, coworkers will have no reduction in their Attitude Towards the Manager, a smaller increase in Attitude Towards the Violator, a smaller decrease in Intention to Leave and a smaller increase in Desire for Punishment when the violator had a prior history than when the violator had no history.

And lastly, the aspects of the violation and the violator should each contribute to the relevant dependent variables when the punishment is severe. When the violation had a *Direct Impact* on the coworker, the violator had a *History* and the manager's response was appropriately severe, coworkers should have the most positive feelings about the manager and the violator. While at the same time, their likelihood of leaving and *Desire for Punishment* should be lowest. This is because the scale of justice has been moved as far back to level as possible.

Conversely, the scales of justice are moved back the least when there was no *Direct Impact* and the violator has no previous *History*. For situations where there was a *History* but no *Direct Impact* or *Direct Impact* but no *History* the scales should be tipped between the two extremes. This results in the following hypothesis:

H5D: When the punishment is appropriately severe, the violation had Direct Impact and the violator had a prior history, Attitude Towards the Manager and Attitude Towards the Violator will be the highest and Intentions to Leave and Desire for Punishment will be the lowest, in addition when the violation had no Direct Impact and the violator had no Prior History, Attitude Towards the Manager and Attitude Towards the Violator will be the lowest and Intentions to Leave and Desire for Punishment will be the highest, and for the other two conditions the values will be intermediate.

The Coworker Model suggested that applying a punishment would satisfy to some extent the desire that the violator be punished. The amount that this desire is reduced should be influenced by whether the punishment was appropriately severe or mild (or none). A coworker in a situation with appropriately severe punishment should have lower left over *Desire for Punishment* and should more feel that the punishment was fair than a coworker in a situation where the punishment was mild or where there was no knowledge of punishment. Therefore, I propose:

H6A: When coworkers learn that a violator was punished, they will have less Residual Desire for Punishment and more feelings that the punishment resulted in Justice when the punishment was appropriately Severe than when it was Mild or None.

In a similar manner as presented before, those coming from more extreme positions should not be moved as far as those coming from more moderate positions. Coworkers who were directly impacted by a violation should remain at a higher level in their feelings that the violator still deserves to be punished more and should feel that justice was less well served than those who had no *Direct Impact*. This should be true of both mild punishment and appropriately severe punishment. Therefore, I propose:

H6B: When the violator is punished, coworkers will have more Residual Desire for Punishment and less feelings that the punishment resulted in Justice when the violation had a Direct Impact on the coworker.

Likewise the violator's *History* should make a difference in how much punishment desire remains after the punishment and how the event is seen in terms of fairness. Therefore I propose:

H6C: When the violator is punished, coworkers will have more Residual Desire for Punishment and less feelings that the punishment resulted in Justice when the violator had a History of the violation.

Since both the *Direct Impact* of the violation and the *History* of the violator are proposed to impact the *Desire for Punishment*, they should interact with each other in terms of reducing that desire and should influence how fair the punishment was viewed. Therefore I propose:

H6D: When the violator is punished, coworkers will have the lowest Residual Desire for Punishment and highest feelings that the punishment resulted in Justice when the violator did not have a History and the violation did not result in Direct Impact; the highest Residual Desire for Punishment and lowest feelings that the punishment resulted in Justice when the violator had a History and the violation resulted in Direct Impact; and intermediate values in the other two conditions.

Stage 5: Additional Information From Manager

This study initially presented information about the violation, then information about the violator and then information about the punishment. This design was chosen to try to isolate the various pieces of information from each other and see how they interacted as the event unfolded. However, a key idea in the Coworker Model was that even after a punishment had occurred and coworkers assessed how just the punishment had been, the introduction of additional details of either the violation, violator or punishment would cause the coworker to do a reevaluation of the event. This is similar to how changing one value in a spreadsheet can cause all of the related cells to recalculate.

In this study, the manager appeared and explained that the coworker had offered a sincere *Apology* and that he had taken this into account when he punished. Since appropriately severe punishment should be viewed as appropriate, telling coworkers that you considered an

Apology should not have any effect. But, for a mild punishment it should make the coworker feel better about the manager, feel that the violator was less deserving of punishment, make them more committed to the group and organization and should increase their perceptions that the justice was fair. Therefore, I propose the following:

H7A: When coworkers learn that the violator had offered a sincere apology to the manager and that the manager had used that in his decision on how to punish, and the punishment was mild, they will have an increase in their Attitude Towards the Manager, an increase in their Attitude Towards the Violator, a decrease in their Intention to Leave, a decrease in their Desire for Punishment, a decrease in their Residual Desire for Punishment and have more feelings that the punishment resulted in Justice.

H7B: When coworkers learn that the violator had offered a sincere apology to the manager and that the manager had used that in his decision on how to punish, and the punishment was severe, they will have no change in their Attitude Towards the Manager, their Attitude Towards the Violator, their Intention to Leave, their Desire for Punishment, their Residual Desire for Punishment and no change in their feelings that the punishment resulted in Justice.

Another important part of the Coworker Model was the idea that coworkers determine if a punishment was just by looking at their *Desire for Punishment* and comparing it with the manager's response. If the punishment left the coworker with no more desire to have the violator punished further, then the coworker would conclude that the punishment was fair. *Residual Desire for Punishment* is a measure of how much the coworker still would like to see the violator punished. *Attitude Towards the Manager* is a measure of how effective the manager has been in this episode. If *Justice* is the assessment of the manager's response against the desire to see the violator punished, then these two variables should be highly correlated with *Justice*. Therefore, I propose:

H8: Residual Desire for Punishment and Attitude Towards the Manager will be correlated with perceived Justice.

Methods

Study Design

This experiment was a 2X2X2 ANOVA design with two levels of punishment severity, (mild punishment & severe punishment), two levels of *Direct Impact* on the coworker (*Direct Impact* vs. no *Direct Impact*) and two levels of prior *History* of the violator (good prior *History* vs. bad prior *History*). In addition one cell containing no punishment was included in order to test the hypothesis related to the effect on the group of the punishment being conducted privately. Thus, this design tested one proposition from the punishment's characteristics (severity) one proposition from the violation's characteristics (*Direct Impact*), and one proposition from the violator's characteristics (*History*) all in the frame of the overall model discussed in chapter 1. In addition it tested for the mediating role of justice perceptions. Social learning was not directly tested in this study since, it would have required adding additional questions; I was concerned about the affect of fatigue; and role of social learning on behavior is well established (Bandura, 1971). This design allowed me to test for both within subjects and between subjects factors.

Table 19: 2X2X2 ANOVA Cells for Study 2

ANOVA Cells	Direct Impact		No Direct Impact	
Severe Punishment	Good*	Poor*	Good*	Poor*
Mild Punishment	Good*	Poor*	Good*	Poor*
No Punishment	Good*			

* Prior Behavior

Sample

Subjects were recruited through the StudyResponse Project housed at Syracuse University. A series of email invitations was sent to 268 subjects inviting them to complete an online survey in return for a \$5 credit to Amazon.com (appendixes C and D contain the email text). Subjects were all working adults over 18 years of age and consisted of an equal number of males & females. 205 subjects completed the survey for an initial response rate of 76%. Subsequent analysis eliminated 23 surveys for validity issues resulting in a final set of 182 responses (68%). Respondents were compared with non-respondents using Pearson goodness-of-fit chi-square tests. The respondent distributions did not significantly differ from non-respondents in terms of gender, age, race, work situation or education level at the $p < .05$ level.

Subjects were 48.4% male with a mean age of 38.4 years ($SD=10.3$). Subjects were 82% Caucasian, 4% African American, 7% Hispanic, 2% Native American, 3% Asian/Pacific Islander and 1% other.

Procedures

Computer Simulation Details

Screenshots of the survey structure are included in appendix E. When the subjects arrived at the survey site, they were randomly assigned to one of the nine conditions. All surveys have an identical structure, with the content of the video segments changing depending on the condition. After being assigned to a condition, the subjects were presented with the consent form that explained the nature of the experiment and their rights as subjects. The subjects were then asked to imagine that they were each an employee of the company being depicted in the videos, and that they should imagine the individuals they see were either

coworkers or their manager. They were asked to react as though the situation was real and to consider how they would felt and acted if the events actually took place.

All of the subjects were then shown a video (clip 1) of a coworker and the manager interacting in a casual, friendly exchange. After that video they were presented a set of questions designed to assess their *attitudes toward the manager*, *attitudes toward the violator* (subjects were actually asked about their attitude towards their coworker since at this stage his violation has not been revealed and in fact the term violator was never used with subjects), and *intention to leave*. All the subjects were then shown a second video (clip 2) with the same worker and manager, again in a benign, positive encounter. The same questions were again asked. All the subjects then were shown a third video (clip 3) with the coworker, manager and a new coworker, again interacting in a positive manner. The same questions asked previously were repeated a third time.

After the three positive situations were presented the subjects were then shown a video clip of the new coworker that they were introduced to in the previous segment telling them that the first coworker had been embezzling funds with which he had built a swimming pool. In one version (clip 4A) the violation resulted in a *Direct Impact* on the subject such that a planned trip that the new coworker and the subject had been looking forward to would be cancelled since the money was gone due to the embezzlement. In the other version (clip 4B) the violation resulted in no *Direct Impact* on the subject since there were funds from another source that would be diverted to allow the trip to still take place. The subjects were again presented the questions from the first video, minus the questions about *Attitude Towards the Manager* and adding questions about their *Desire for Punishment*.

The subjects were then presented another video segment in which the new coworker presents them with information about the past behavior of the violator. In one version (clip 5A) the violator has had a *History* of committing similar violations and in the other version (clip 5B) the violator appeared to have not had any previous violations. The subjects were then presented the same questions as they answered after the previous video segment.

The subjects were then presented with the video segment in which the new coworker appears and explains how the manager handled the situation. There were three versions of this segment. In the first version (clip 6A) the coworker states that as far as he can tell the manager did nothing. In the second version (clip 6B) the coworker states that the manager gave a mild punishment, which consisted of a verbal reprimand and restitution. In the third version (clip 6C) the coworker states that the manager gave a harsh punishment, which consisted of immediate termination and the filing of a police report. The subjects were presented with all questions previously asked, plus questions assessing *perceptions of fairness*.

The subjects were then shown a final segment (clip 7) in which the manager explains that one of the things that he took into consideration when deciding what punishment to apply was the fact that the violating coworker had offered a sincere *Apology*. The subjects were then presented with all the questions asked after the previous segment.

Manipulated Variables

Direct Impact of the violation was manipulated by presenting two situations. In the *Direct Impact* situation the coworker explained that a planned trip that they were looking forward to would have to be canceled because the funds had been embezzled. In the no *Direct Impact* situation, subjects were told that the planned trip would still take place because excess funds from another account would be available.

Prior History of the violator was manipulated by two situations. In the positive *Prior History* situation the coworker commented on how the employee had not had any similar problems previously. In the negative *Prior History* situation the coworker explained that this was not the first time that the employee had exhibited similar problems.

Punishment Severity was manipulated by presenting three situations. In the severe punishment situation the manager terminated the employee and filed a police report. In the mild punishment situation the manager give the employee a verbal reprimand and required the money to be paid back. In the no punishment situation the manager appeared to ignore the behavior.

Measures

Attitude Towards the Manager was measured using a four item scale developed by Neihoff, Paul & Bunch (1998). In their study, this measure had a coefficient Alpha of .88. Since I used a mixed model design where the questions were asked repeatedly within subjects as well as between subjects, I computed Alphas for each discrete instance where the questions were asked. For the current study the measure had a coefficient Alpha of .92. Responses were measured using Likert scales ranging from “strongly agree” (1) to “strongly disagree” (7). The items were:

- 1) The manager's actions demonstrated highly effective supervision skills
- 2) I respect the manager for his actions
- 3) If I were a coworker, I would feel that the manager did the right thing
- 4) If I were a coworker, I would be motivated to work for this manager

The four questions were consolidated with simple averaging after confirming their relatedness with Cronbach's Alpha. All statistics were conducted using the consolidated measure.

Attitude Towards the Violator was measured using a three-item scale developed for this study. The measure had a coefficient Alpha of .94. Responses were measured using Likert scales ranging from "strongly agree" (1) to "strongly disagree" (7). The items were:

- 1) If I were a coworker, I would be motivated to work with this person
- 2) This person is a valuable employee
- 3) If I were a coworker, I would be motivated to have this person on my team

The three questions were consolidated with simple averaging after confirming their relatedness with Cronbach's Alpha. All statistics were conducted using the consolidated measure.

The coworker's *Desire for Punishment* of the violator was measured using a three item measure consisting of two items developed by Neihoff, Paul & Bunch (1998), with a third item (question #3) added for this study. Neihoff, et al. had labeled this as "retributive justice". However, they used the measure post punishment. Since here it is used prior to punishment the items more accurately reflect the subject's feeling that the person ought to receive punishment. Therefore, I chose to label it accordingly. The two-item measure had a coefficient Alpha of .91 in the Neihoff, et al. study. For the current study the modified measure had a coefficient Alpha of .90. Responses were measured using Likert scales ranging from "strongly agree" (1) to "strongly disagree" (7). The items were:

- 1) The actions of the worker should have been punished
- 2) The employee deserved to be disciplined

- 3) It would bother me if this person was not punished

The three questions were consolidated with simple averaging after confirming their relatedness with Cronbach's Alpha. All statistics were conducted using the consolidated measure.

The coworker's *Residual Desire for Punishment* of the violator was measured by modifying the *Desire for Punishment* measure described previously. This again is slightly different than how Neihoff, et al. used it in their study. While this is post punishment, what I am measuring here is if the subject feels that sufficient punishment was applied. Therefore, I added the concept of "more" to the items to capture any residual desire. This measure had a coefficient Alpha of .93. Responses were measured using Likert scales ranging from "strongly agree" (1) to "strongly disagree" (7). The items were:

- 1) The actions of the worker still should be punished more
- 2) The employee still deserves to be disciplined more
- 3) It would bother me if this person was not punished more

The three questions were consolidated with simple averaging after confirming their relatedness with Cronbach's Alpha. All statistics were conducted using the consolidated measure.

Intention to leave was measured using a modified version of a three item measure developed by Adams & Beehr (1998). In their study, this measure had a coefficient Alpha of .88. For the current study the measure had a coefficient Alpha of .90. Responses were measured using Likert scales ranging from "strongly agree" (1) to "strongly disagree" (7). The items were:

- 1) If I were working in this group, I would be planning to leave my job for another in the near future
- 2) If I were working for this manager, I would often think of quitting this job and finding another
- 3) If I were working with this person, I would like to quit this job and find another in the near future

The three questions were consolidated with simple averaging after confirming their relatedness with Cronbach's Alpha. All statistics were conducted using the consolidated measure.

Justice Perceptions were measured using a three item measure developed by Neihoff, Paul & Bunch (1998). In their study, this measure had a coefficient Alpha of .87. For the current study the measure had a coefficient Alpha of .88. Responses were measured using Likert scales ranging from 'strongly agree' (1) to 'strongly disagree' (7). The items were:

- 1) The employee was treated fairly by the supervisor
- 2) If I were a coworker, I would feel the discipline was fair
- 3) The discipline was fair based on the behavior of the employee

The three questions were consolidated with simple averaging after confirming their relatedness with Cronbach's Alpha. All statistics were conducted using the consolidated measure.

Results

Video clips one through three were intended to set a baseline level on *Attitude Towards the Manager*, *Attitude Towards the Violator*, and *Intention to Leave*. These segments were three benign situations designed to not immediately reveal that the study's intention was to measure

responses to a coworker's violations. Therefore, the expectation was that there would be no meaningful variance on these variables. To test this assumption I ran a repeated-measures ANOVA for each of these three variables. Since this was a within subjects analysis, all 173 subjects were compared. *Attitude Towards the Manager* was not significant, however, *Attitude Towards the Violator* was significant ($F(2, 171)=20.29, p<.01$) as was *Intention to Leave* ($F(2, 171)=3.36, p<.05$). An examination of the means of the three measures showed that over the course of the three segments, subjects' *Attitude Towards the Violator* became more favorable while *Intentions to Leave* decreased slightly and then increased to approximately the same level. *Attitude Towards the Manager* became slightly less favorable, however this change was not significant.

Table 20: Estimated Marginal Means of Variables,
Clips 1-3

Video Segment	Attitude Towards the Manager	Attitude Towards the Violator*	Intention to Leave†
Clip 1	2.04	2.43	5.85
Clip 2	2.06	2.17	6.00
Clip 3	2.16	2.11	5.87

*Significant at $<.01$

†Significant at $<.05$

While these variations were not anticipated, they don't impact the subsequent results, as the first two segments were only designed to ease the subject into the punishment situations without making it initially obvious that punishment was being studied. Subsequent analyses will take the measures after Clip 3 as the baseline.

Hypothesis 1A stated that when coworkers learn that a violation occurred, they will show a decrease in their *Attitude Towards the Violator*, and an increase in their *Intention to Leave*. To test this hypothesis I computed a repeated-measures ANOVA for *Attitude Towards the*

Violator, and for *Intention to Leave* between Clip 3 and Clip 4. Clip 3 represents the baseline measure and Clip 4 introduced a violation, in which a *Direct Impact* resulted for half of the subjects and no *Direct Impact* resulted for the other half. However, at this stage I was testing for a change irrespective of the *Direct Impact*. All 173 subjects were included in the analysis.

Attitude Towards the Violator was significant ($F(1, 172)=514.84, p<.01$) as was *Intention to Leave* ($F(1, 172)=142.93, p<.01$). *Attitude Toward the Violator* had an estimated marginal mean of 2.11 after Clip 3 and 5.29 after Clip 4 indicating a more negative evaluation of the violator. *Intention to Leave* had an estimated marginal mean of 5.87 after Clip 3 and 4.76 after Clip 4 indicating an increased intention of leaving. Thus Hypothesis 1A was fully supported.

Table 21: Estimated Marginal Means for H1A

Video Segment	Attitude Towards the Violator*	Intention to Leave*
Clip 3	2.11	5.87
Clip 4	5.29	4.76

*Significant at $<.01$

Hypothesis 1B stated that when coworkers learn that a violation occurred, they will show a greater reduction in their *Attitude Towards the Violator*, and a greater increase in *Intention to Leave* if the violation resulted in a *Direct Impact* on the coworker. To test this hypothesis, I computed the same ANOVAs as in hypothesis 1A and added a between subjects factor for *Direct Impact*. 97 subjects were in the *Direct Impact* cell and 76 subjects were in the no *Direct Impact* cell. Neither the values for *Attitude Towards the Violator*, nor *Intention to Leave* were significantly different between the *Direct Impact* and the no *Direct Impact* group. Thus, hypothesis 1B was not supported.

Table 22: Estimated Marginal Means for H1B

Video Segment	Attitude Towards the Violator		Intention to Leave	
	Direct Impact	No Direct Impact	Direct Impact	No Direct Impact
Clip 3	2.14	2.07	5.87	5.87
Clip 4	5.23	5.36	4.72	4.83

Hypothesis 1C stated that When coworkers learn that a violation occurred, they will report a greater *Desire for Punishment* for the violator if the violation resulted in a *Direct Impact* on the coworker. Since there was no previous measure of *Desire for Punishment*, this hypothesis was tested using a simple one-way ANOVA between the *Direct Impact* group and the no *Direct Impact* group using the measure taken after Clip 4. 97 subjects were in the *Direct Impact* cell and 76 subjects were in the no *Direct Impact* cell. *Desire for Punishment* was not significantly greater when the violation had *Direct Impact* than when it had no *Direct Impact* on the coworker. Thus, hypothesis 1C was not supported.

Table 23: Estimated Marginal Means for H1C

Video Segment	Desire for Punishment	
	Direct Impact	No Direct Impact
Clip 4	2.21	1.96

Hypothesis 2A stated that when coworkers learn that the violator had a prior *History* of the violation, they will have a reduction in their *Attitude Towards the Violator*, an increase in their *Intention to Leave* and an increase in the *Desire for Punishment*. To test this hypothesis, I selected all subjects who had been told that the violator had a *History* ($n=77$) and then I computed repeated measures ANOVAs for *Attitude Towards the Violator*, *Intention to Leave*, and *Desire for Punishment* between the measures taken in Clip 4 and Clip 5. Clip 4 introduced the fact that there had been a violation and its *Direct Impact*, and Clip 5 introduced information about the

History of the violator. *Attitude Towards the Violator* was significant ($F(1, 76)=6.88, p<.05$), however, *Intention to Leave* was not significant nor was *Desire for Punishment*.

Attitude Towards the Violator had an estimated marginal mean of 5.25 after Clip 4 and 5.47 after Clip 5 indicating that there was a more negative appraisal of the violator. *Intention to Leave* and *Desire for Punishment* also had estimated marginal means in the hypothesized direction, however they were not significant. Therefore, hypothesis 2 was partially supported only for *Attitude Towards the Violator*.

Table 24: Estimated Marginal Means H2A

Video Segment	Attitude Towards the Violator†	Intention to Leave	Desire for Punishment
Clip 4	5.25	4.66	2.06
Clip 5	5.47	4.59	2.00

†Significant at $<.05$

Hypothesis 2B stated that When coworkers are told that a violator had no prior *History* of the violation, they will have an increase in *Attitude Towards the Violator*, a reduction in *Intention to Leave* and a reduction in the *Desire for Punishment*. To test this hypothesis, I selected all subjects who had been told that the violator had no prior *History* ($n=96$) and then I computed repeated measures ANOVAs for *Attitude Towards the Violator*, *Intention to Leave*, and *Desire for Punishment* between the measures taken in Clip 4 and Clip 5. *Attitude Towards the Violator* was significant ($F(1, 95)=29.40, p<.01$), *Intention to Leave* was significant ($F(1, 95)=8.15, p<.01$) as was *Desire for Punishment* ($F(1, 95)=3.84, p<.01$). *Attitude Towards the Violator* had an estimated marginal mean of 5.32 after Clip 4 and 4.83 after Clip 5, indicating an improvement in perceptions about the violator. *Intention to Leave* had an estimated marginal mean of 4.84 after Clip 4 and 5.07 after Clip 5, indicating a reduction in intentions to leave. *Desire for Punishment*

had an estimated marginal mean of 2.13 after Clip 4 and 2.41 after Clip 5, indicating a reduction in punishment desires. Therefore, hypothesis 2B was fully supported.

Table 25: Estimated Marginal Means for H2B

Video Segment	Attitude Towards the Violator*	Intention to Leave*	Desire for Punishment*
Clip 4	5.36	4.84	2.13
Clip 5	4.83	5.06	2.41

*Significant at $<.01$

Hypothesis 2C stated that *Attitude Towards the Violator* will be lowest while *Intention to Leave* and *Desire for Punishment* will be highest when the violation had a *Direct Impact* and the violator had a *History*; *Attitude Towards the Violator* will be highest while *Intention to Leave* and *Desire for Punishment* will be lowest when the violation had no *Direct Impact* and the violator had no *History*; and all variables intermediate for the other two combinations. To test this hypothesis I computed a simple one-way ANOVA for Clip 5 using a dummy variable representing the four combinations of Impact and *History* (No *Direct Impact* or *History* ($n=39$), No *Direct Impact* with *History* ($n=37$), *Direct Impact* with *History* ($n=57$), *Direct Impact* and *History* ($n=40$)). Repeated measures was not appropriate here since this hypothesis is not predicting the result of an individual treatment (introduction of information about the *History* of the violator) but rather is predicting that subjects who have had a different sets of treatments will uniformly differ. Only *Attitude Towards the Violator* was significant ($F(3,170)=2.93, p<.05$).

The post-hoc analysis with LSD adjustment of the means of the conditions for *Attitude Towards the Violator* showed that the No *Direct Impact/History* cell was significantly different from the No *Direct Impact/History* cell ($p<.05$) and the *Direct Impact/No History* cell ($p<.05$). However, none of the relationships were in the hypothesized direction. Rather, the relative

strength of *History* compared to *Direct Impact* was evident for all the variables, although only significant for *Attitude Towards the Violator*. Therefore, hypothesis 2C was not supported.

Table 26: Estimated Marginal Means for H2C –
Attitude Towards the Violator

Attitude Towards the Violator†	Impact	No Direct Impact
History	5.40	5.54
No History	4.83	4.82

†Significant at $<.05$

Table 27: Estimated Marginal Means for H2C –
Intention to Leave

Intention to Leave	Impact	No Direct Impact
History	4.59	4.59
No History	5.05	5.09

Table 28: Estimated Marginal Means for H2C –
Desire for Punishment

Desire for Punishment	Impact	No Direct Impact
History	2.02	1.96
No History	2.50	2.28

Hypothesis 3A stated that When coworkers learn that a manager had not responded to a violation (or appeared to have not responded) they will have a reduction in their *Attitude Towards the Manager*, a reduction in their *Attitude Towards the Violator*, an increase in their *Intention to Leave* and an increase in the *Desire for Punishment*. To test this hypothesis I selected only the subjects who were in the No Punishment group ($n=19$). I computed repeated measures ANOVAs for *Intention to Leave* and *Desire for Punishment* after Clip 5 and Clip 6. Clip 5 introduced the violator's *History* and Clip 6 introduced the manager's response. For *Attitude*

Towards the Manager I used the responses after Clip 3 and Clip 6. Clip 3 was the last time that the subjects had any interaction with the manager and hence that last time that they had responses on that measure.

Attitude Towards the Manager was significant ($F(1, 18)=73.80, p<.01$). However, none of the other measures was significant, although all of the estimated marginal means were in the hypothesized directions. The estimated marginal mean for *Attitude Towards the Manager* was 1.92 after Clip 5 and 4.47 after Clip 6, indicating less favorable feelings. Therefore, hypothesis 3A was partially supported only for the *Attitude Towards the Manager*. Additional tests were not possible here as all subjects in the No Punishment condition were also in the same *Direct Impact* and *History* conditions and data were not gathered in the other cells. This was a design decision based on the number of additional subject that would have been required to completely fill all three punishment conditions by all *Direct Impact* and *History* combinations.

Table 29: Estimated Marginal Means H3

Video Segment	Attitude Towards the Manager*	Attitude Towards the Violator	Intention to Leave	Desire for Punishment
Clip 5	1.92	4.70	5.25	2.32
Clip 6	4.47	4.68	4.95	2.39

*Significant at $<.01$

Hypothesis 3B stated that when coworkers learn that a violator was punished, they will have a greater reduction in their *Attitude Towards the Manager*, a greater reduction in their *Attitude Towards the Violator*, a greater increase in their *Intention to Leave* and a greater increase in their *Desire for Punishment* when the manager had not responded (or appeared to have not responded) than when the punishment was mild. To test this hypothesis I selected subjects who had been told that either the manager had not appeared to respond ($n=19$) and those

who were told that the manager had issued a mild punishment ($n=78$). I then ran a repeated measures ANOVA between Clip 5 and Clip 6 for the above specified variables with severity (Mild=1, None=2) as a between subjects factor. None of the variables was significant, therefore hypothesis 3B was not supported.

Hypothesis 4A stated that When coworkers learn that the punishment applied was mild, they will have a reduction in their *Attitude Towards the Manager*, and their *Attitude Towards the Violator*, and an increase in their *Intention to Leave* and the *Desire for Punishment*. To test this hypothesis I selected only the subjects in the Mild condition ($n=78$) and computed repeated measures ANOVAs for the four variables previously described. Of the four variables, only *Attitude Towards the Manager* was significant ($F(1, 77)=74.38, p<.01$). The estimated marginal means showed a significant decrease in the *Attitude Towards the Manager* from 2.16 after Clip 4 to 4.07 after Clip 5. Again, none of the other variables was significant, although this time *Attitude Towards the Violator* and *Desire for Punishment* were also not in the hypothesized direction. Therefore, hypothesis 4A was partially supported with only *Attitude Towards the Manager* being significant.

Table 30: Estimated Marginal Means for H4A

Video Segment	Attitude Towards the Manager*	Attitude Towards the Violator	Intention to Leave	Desire for Punishment
Clip 5	2.16	5.16	4.84	2.09
Clip 6	4.07	5.06	4.59	2.14

*Significant at $<.01$

Hypothesis 4B stated that When coworkers learn that the punishment applied was mild, they will have a greater reduction in their *Attitude Towards the Manager*, and their *Attitude Towards the Violator*, and a greater increase in their *Intention to Leave* and their *Desire for Punishment*

when the violation had a *Direct Impact*. To test this hypothesis I computed the repeated measures ANOVAs from 4A with the addition of *Direct Impact* as a factor (*Direct Impact* ($n=39$), no *Direct Impact* ($n=39$)). Only *Desire for Punishment* was significant ($F(1,77)=4.15$, $p<.05$). Subjects who had experienced a *Direct Impact* increased the amount that they believed that the violator deserved punishment while those who did not experience a *Direct Impact* decreased the amount. Thus, hypothesis 4B was partially supported only for *Desire for Punishment*.

Table 31: Estimated Marginal Means for H4B

Video Segment	Attitude Towards the Manager		Attitude Towards the Violator		Intention to Leave		Desire for Punishment †	
	Direct Impact	No Direct Impact	Direct Impact	No Direct Impact	Direct Impact	No Direct Impact	Direct Impact	No Direct Impact
Clip 5	2.19	2.14	5.25	5.08	4.74	4.95	2.22	1.97
Clip 6	4.23	3.98	5.23	4.88	4.47	4.70	2.09	2.18

†Significant at $<.05$

Hypothesis 4C stated that When coworkers learn that the punishment applied was mild, they will have a greater reduction in their *Attitude Towards the Manager*, and their *Attitude Towards the Violator*, and a greater increase in their *Intention to Leave* and their *Desire for Punishment* when the violator had a prior *History* of the violation. To test this hypothesis I computed the repeated measures ANOVAs from hypothesis 4A with the addition of *History* as a factor (no *History* ($n=39$) *History* ($n=39$)). None of the variables was significant, indicating that there was no difference between the Prior *History* and No Prior *History* groups. Thus, hypothesis 4C was not supported.

Table 32: Estimated Marginal Means H4C

Video Segment	Attitude Towards the Manager		Attitude Towards the Violator		Intention to Leave		Desire for Punishment	
	History	No History	History	No History	History	No History	History	No History

Clip 5	2.28	2.05	5.26	5.07	4.62	5.07	1.97	2.22
Clip 6	4.35	3.78	5.08	5.03	4.22	4.96	2.01	2.27

Hypothesis 4D stated that When the punishment is mild, the violation had *Direct Impact* and the violator had a prior *History*, *Attitude Towards the Manager* and *Attitude Towards the Violator* will be the lowest and *Intentions to Leave* and *Desire for Punishment* will be the highest, in addition when the violation had no *Direct Impact* and the violator had no Prior *History*, *Attitude Towards the Manager* and *Attitude Towards the Violator* will be the highest and *Intentions to Leave* and *Desire for Punishment* will be the lowest, and for the other two conditions the values will be intermediate.

To test this hypothesis I computed a simple one-way ANOVA for Clip 6 using the dummy variable representing the four combinations of *Direct Impact* and *History* (No *Direct Impact* or *History* ($n=20$), no *Direct Impact* with *History* ($n=19$), *Direct Impact* with no *History* ($n=19$), *Direct Impact* and *History* ($n=20$)). Repeated measures was not appropriate here since this hypothesis is not predicting the result of an individual treatment (e.g. introduction of information about the response of the manager) but rather is predicting that subjects who have had a different sets of treatments will uniformly differ. None of the variables showed significant variations between the four conditions. Thus, hypothesis 4D was not supported.

Table 33: Estimated Marginal Means H4D –
Attitude Towards the Manager

Attitude Towards the Manager	Impact	No Direct Impact
History	4.30	4.41
No History	4.17	3.41

Table 34: Estimated Marginal Means H4D –
Attitude Towards the Violator

Attitude Towards the Violator	Impact	No Direct Impact
History	5.10	5.05
No History	5.37	4.72

Table 35: Estimated Marginal Means H4D –
Intention to Leave

Intention to Leave	Impact	No Direct Impact
History	4.26	4.18
No History	4.70	5.20

Table 36: Estimated Marginal Means H4D – Desire
for Punishment

Desire for Punishment	Impact	No Direct Impact
History	2.68	2.25
No History	3.07	3.13

Hypothesis 5A stated that When coworkers learn that the punishment applied was appropriately severe, coworkers will maintain their *Attitude Towards the Manager* and increase their *Attitude Towards the Violator*, and will decrease their *Intention to Leave* and increase the *Desire for Punishment*. To test this hypothesis I selected only the subjects in the severe condition and computed repeated measures ANOVAs for the four variables previously described ($n=76$). *Attitude Towards the Manager* was not significant. *Attitude Towards the Violator* was significant ($F(1, 75)=20.39, p<.01$) as was *Intention to Leave* ($F(1, 75)=13.28, p<.01$) and *Desire for Punishment* ($F(1, 75)=12.16, p<.01$). *Attitude Towards the Violator* had an estimated marginal mean of 5.17 after Clip 5 and 5.81 after Clip 6, indicating a less favorable opinion of the violator. *Intention to Leave*

had an estimated marginal mean of 4.77 after Clip 5 and 5.22 after Clip 6, indicating a reduction in leaving intentions. *Desire for Punishment* had an estimated marginal mean of 2.34 after Clip 5 and 1.99 after Clip 6, indicating an increase in how much subjects felt the violator deserved punishment. Although *Attitude Towards the Violator* was significant, it was in the opposite direction of what was hypothesized, therefore hypothesis 5A was partially supported with *Attitude Towards the Violator* being significant but in the wrong direction.

Table 37: Estimated Marginal Means for H5A

Video Segment	Attitude Towards the Manager	Attitude Towards the Violator*	Intention to Leave*	Desire for Punishment *
Clip 5	2.21	5.17	4.77	2.34
Clip 6	2.10	5.81	5.24	1.96

*Significant at <.01

Hypothesis 5B stated that when coworkers learn that the punishment was appropriately severe, coworkers will have no change in *Attitude Towards the Manager*, a smaller increase in *Attitude Towards the Violator*, a smaller decrease in *Intention to Leave* and a smaller increase in *Desire for Punishment* when the violation had a *Direct Impact* than when it had no *Direct Impact*. To test this hypothesis I computed the repeated measures ANOVAs from 5A with the addition of *Direct Impact* as a factor (*Direct Impact* ($n=39$), *No Direct Impact* ($n=37$)). None of the variables were significant indicating that there was no difference between the *Direct Impact* and no *Direct Impact* groups. Thus, hypothesis 5B was partially supported, only for *Attitude Towards the Manager*.

Table 38: Estimated Marginal Means of H5B

Video Segment	Attitude Towards the Manager	Attitude Towards the Violator	Intention to Leave	Desire for Punishment
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	Direct Impact	No Direct Impact	Direct Impact	No Direct Impact	Direct Impact	No Direct Impact	Direct Impact	No Direct Impact
Clip 5	2.15	2.28	5.08	5.27	4.80	4.75	2.39	2.30
Clip 6	1.99	2.22	5.80	5.82	5.32	5.13	1.87	2.10

Hypothesis 5C stated that When the punishment is appropriately severe, coworkers will have no reduction in their *Attitude Towards the Manager*, a smaller increase in *Attitude Towards the Violator*, a smaller decrease in *Intention to Leave* and a smaller increase in *Desire for Punishment* when the violator had a prior *History* than when the violator had no *History*. To test this hypothesis I computed the repeated measures ANOVAs from hypothesis 5A with the addition of *History* as a factor (*History* ($n=38$), no *History* ($n=38$)). Only *Desire for Punishment* was significant, showing that when a violator had no *History* of the violation the increase in the amount that subjects thought the violator deserved punishment increased a greater amount, which again was in the opposite direction as hypothesized. Thus, hypothesis 5C was partially supported only for *Attitude Towards the Manager*.

Table 39: Estimated Marginal Means of H5C

Video Segment	Attitude Towards the Manager		Attitude Towards the Violator		Intention to Leave		Desire for Punishment†	
	History	No History	History	No History	History	No History	History	No History
Clip 5	2.26	2.16	5.69	4.65	4.57	4.97	2.03	2.66
Clip 6	1.90	2.30	6.09	5.36	5.17	5.28	1.92	2.05

†Significant at $<.05$

Hypothesis 5D stated that when the punishment is appropriately severe, the violation had *Direct Impact* and the violator had a prior *History*, *Attitude Towards the Manager* and *Attitude Towards the Violator* will be the highest and *Intentions to Leave* and *Desire for Punishment* will be the lowest, in addition when the violation had no *Direct Impact* and the violator had no *Prior History*, *Attitude Towards the Manager* and *Attitude Towards the Violator* will be the lowest and

Intentions to Leave and *Desire for Punishment* will be the highest, and for the other two conditions the values will be intermediate.

To test this hypothesis I computed a simple one-way ANOVA for Clip 6 using the dummy variable representing the four combinations of *Direct Impact* and *History* (No *Direct Impact* or *History* ($n=19$), No *Direct Impact* with *History* ($n=18$), *Direct Impact* with no *History* ($n=19$), *Direct Impact* and *History* ($n=20$)). Repeated measures was not appropriate here since this hypothesis is not predicting the result of an individual treatment (introduction of information about the response of the manager) but rather is predicting that subjects who have had a different sets of treatments will uniformly differ. None of the variables showed significant variations between the four conditions. Thus, hypothesis 5D was not supported.

Table 40: Estimated Marginal Means for H5D -
Attitude Towards the Manager

Attitude Towards the Manager	Impact	No Direct Impact
History	1.79	2.03
No History	2.20	2.41

Table 41: Estimated Marginal Means for H5D -
Attitude Towards the Violator

Attitude Towards the Violator	Impact	No Direct Impact
History	6.05	6.13
No History	5.54	5.54

Table 42: Estimated Marginal Means for H5D -
Intention to Leave

Intention to Leave	Impact	No Direct Impact
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History	5.15	5.19
No History	5.49	5.07

Table 43: Estimated Marginal Means for H5D -
Desire for Punishment

Desire for Punishment	Impact	No Direct Impact
History	1.82	1.85
No History	2.08	2.25

Hypothesis 6A stated that when coworkers learn that a violator was punished, they will have less *Residual Desire for Punishment* and more feelings that the punishment resulted in *Justice* when the punishment was appropriately Severe than when it was Mild or None. To test this hypothesis I selected all subjects and used a one-way ANOVA with Severity as the factor (Severe=1, Mild or None=2) on the measures taken after Clip 6. One-way ANOVA is appropriate here because there were no previous measures of Residual Desire for Punishment or Justice (since this only makes sense post-punishment) and I am testing for their current state as opposed to the change that has taken place.

For *Residual Desire for Punishment*, Severity was significant ($F(2, 171)=23.84, p<.01$) with the Severe condition having a mean of 3.77 and the Mild/None condition having a mean of 2.68. For *Justice*, Severity was also significant ($F(2, 171)=112.87, p<.01$) with the Severe condition having a mean of 2.11 and the Mild/None condition having a mean of 4.39. Thus, hypothesis 6A was fully supported.

Table 44: Estimated Marginal Means for H6A

Residual Desire for Punishment*	Severe	Mild/None
	3.77	2.68

*Significant at $<.01$

Justice*	Severe	Mild/None
	2.11	4.39

*Significant at $<.01$

Hypothesis 6B stated that when the violator is punished, coworkers will have more *Residual Desire for Punishment* and less feelings that the punishment resulted in *Justice* when the violation had a *Direct Impact* on the coworker. To test this I used a one-way ANOVA with *Direct Impact* as the factor. Neither variable was significant. Hypothesis 6B was therefore not supported.

Hypothesis 6C stated that when the violator is punished, coworkers will have more *Residual Desire for Punishment* and less feelings that the punishment resulted in *Justice* when the violator had a *History* of the violation. To test this I used a one-way ANOVA with *History* as the factor. Neither variable was significant. Hypothesis 6C was therefore not supported.

Hypothesis 6D stated that when the violator is punished, coworkers will have the lowest *Residual Desire for Punishment* and highest feelings that the punishment resulted in *Justice* when the violator did not have a *History* and the violation did not result in *Direct Impact*; the highest *Residual Desire for Punishment* and lowest feelings that the punishment resulted in *Justice* when the violator had a *History* and the violation resulted in *Direct Impact*; and intermediate values in the other two conditions. To test this I used a one-way ANOVA with the dummy variable representing the four combinations of *Direct Impact* and *History* as the factor. Neither variable was significant. Hypothesis 6D was therefore not supported.

Hypothesis 7A stated that when coworkers learn that the violator had offered a sincere *Apology* to the manager and that the manager had used that in his decision on how to punish, and the punishment was mild, they will have an increase in their *Attitude Towards the Manager*, an

increase in their *Attitude Towards the Violator*, a decrease in their *Intention to Leave*, a decrease in their *Desire for Punishment*, a decrease in their *Residual Desire for Punishment* and have more feelings that the punishment resulted in *Justice*. To test this I selected subjects that were told that the punishment was mild and ran a repeated measures ANOVA on the all variables between video clips 6 and 7. In video clip 7 the manager explained that the violator had offered a sincere *Apology* and the manager had taken that into account when making the decision how to discipline.

Attitude Towards the Manager had a significant improvement ($F(1, 77)=11.23, p<01$), as did *Attitude Towards the Violator* ($F(1, 77)=13.36, p<01$). *Desire for Punishment* ($F(1, 77)=10.54, p<01$) and *Residual Desire for Punishment* ($F(1, 77)=5.07, p<05$) both decreased. *Intention to Leave* and *Justice* changed in the hypothesized direction, but were not significant. Therefore, H7A was partially supported for *Attitude Towards Manager*, *Attitude Towards the Violator*, *Desire for Punishment* and *Residual Desire for Punishment*.

Table 45: Estimated Marginal Means for H7A

Video Segment	Attitude Towards the Manager*	Attitude Towards the Violator*	Intention to Leave	Desire for Punishment*	Residual Desire for Punishment†	Justice
Clip 6	4.07	5.06	4.59	2.14	2.68	4.35
Clip 7	3.74	4.82	4.68	2.43	2.90	4.23

*Significant at $<.01$

†Significant at $<.05$

Hypothesis H7B stated that when coworkers learn that the violator had offered a sincere *Apology* to the manager and that the manager had used that in his decision on how to punish, and the punishment was severe, they will have no change in their *Attitude Towards the Manager*, their *Attitude Towards the Violator*, their *Intention to Leave*, their *Desire for Punishment*, their

Residual Desire for Punishment and no change in their feelings that the punishment resulted in *Justice*.

To test this I selected subjects who had been told that the punishment had been appropriately severe and ran a repeated measures ANOVA on all the variables between video segments 6 and 7. None of the changes was significant; therefore, H7A was completely supported.

Table 46: Estimated Marginal Means for H7B

Video Segment	Attitude Towards the Manager	Attitude Towards the Violator	Intention to Leave	Desire for Punishment	Residual Desire for Punishment	Justice
Clip 6	2.10	5.81	5.23	1.99	3.77	2.11
Clip 7	2.17	5.66	5.22	2.00	3.96	2.18

Hypothesis 8 stated that *Residual Desire for Punishment* and *Attitude Towards the Manager* will predict perceived *Justice*. To test this hypothesis I ran two multiple regressions with *Residual Desire for Punishment* and *Attitude Towards the Manager* being regressed on *Justice* for the measures taken after Clip 6 (when the punishment was revealed) and after Clip 7 (where the apology was explained.) In both situations *Residual Desire for Punishment* and *Attitude Towards the Violator* were correlated with *Justice*. After clip 6 *Residual Desire for Punishment* and *Attitude Towards the Manager* accounted for 85% of the variance in *Justice* ($R^2=.85$, $F(2, 170)=498.67$, $p<.01$). After Clip 7 the relationship remained very similar with the predictors accounting for 76% of the variance in *Justice* ($R^2=.76$, $F(2, 170)=275.74$, $p<.01$). I found that both *Residual Desire for Punishment* ($\beta=-.13$, $p<.01$) and *Attitude Towards the Manager* ($\beta=.93$, $p<.01$) significantly predicted *Justice* at Clip 6 and at Clip 7 ($\beta=-.11$, $p<.05$) and ($\beta=.91$, $p<.01$) respectively. Therefore, Hypothesis 8 was completely supported.

Discussion

This study was designed to observe the unfolding process of a punishment episode. Coworker's attitudes were predicted to be fluid and dependent upon what information to which coworker has access. Information can come at various times and in different configurations. This study explored one possible scenario to try to generalize principles that might apply to other punishment scenarios.

The first question had to do with examining the role of aspects of the violation (here as *Direct Impact* on the coworker) and of the violator (here as *Prior History* of the violator) and how they impact *Desire for Punishment*, *Attitude Towards the Violator* and *Intention to Leave*. *Desire for Punishment* is proposed to be a key process variable in this model that reflects the coworker's combined assessment of aspects of the violation and the violator. *Desire for Punishment* becomes the standard against which the punishment is measured which then results in perceptions of *Justice*. *Attitude Towards the Violator* and *Intention to Leave* are seen as important outcome variables on their own. The first several segments of the model explored how these variables change and interact.

When subjects were initially informed about the violation of a coworker, they had a significant reduction in their *Attitude Towards the Violator* and an increase in their *Intention to Leave*. Just the fact that a coworker has committed a violation may increase the likelihood of turnover or transfer to another group for another coworker. In addition, the employee's more negative appraisal of their coworker presents a number of potential problems, especially if the employee must work directly with the violator.

Some subjects were told that they were directly impacted, in that a planned trip they were looking forward to would be cancelled due to the violation. However, those for whom

the violation had a *Direct Impact*, did not significantly differ from those who experienced a violation with no *Direct Impact*. It is possible that the manipulation here was not strong enough. It is possible that since they were not actually looking forward to the hypothetical trip they did not experience it as a real impact. Or possibly, the magnitude of the violation was such that the effect of the *Direct Impact* was simply swamped. Combining it with the revelation of the violation itself was a design decision made to reduce the number of times the subjects were asked questions, but this decision may have prevented the *Direct Impact* from receiving sufficient attention. But it is also possible that contrary to the conventional wisdom that says we care more about things that affect us personally, we place more emphasis on the breaking of social norms than on how it impacted us individually. Unfortunately, although subjects did have information about the general nature of the violation (i.e. that money was misappropriated), since this was the only aspect of the violation that was tested I cannot support the conclusion that the providing of additional details about the specific nature of the violation has an impact on coworkers.

At the next stage I examined what happens when information about the violator (the *Prior History*) is provided. When the violator had a *History* of the violation it did significantly affect the coworkers' *Attitudes towards the Violator*. Attitudes significantly worsened when there was a *History*. However, it did not increase their turnover intentions nor how much punishment they felt the violator deserved. On the other hand, when coworkers learned that there was no *Prior History*, their *Attitude Towards the Violator* improved and *Desire for Punishment* and *Intentions to Leave* were reduced. This may suggest that when information about a violation is first received, coworkers take a "worst case" position and are more easily moved by mitigating information than additional confirming details. Managers need to be aware that

when employees are aware of the *Prior History* of a coworker who has committed a violation those employees' attitudes may be significantly higher or lower depending on whether the violator has committed the violation before, although since this study looked at receiving information after learning of the violation I cannot say for certain that knowing the *Prior History* before the violation would have the same effect.

Now, because subjects had differing information about the *Direct Impact* and *History* aspects it was reasonable to think that the two should interact, e.g. knowledge of a violator's *Prior History* should affect a subject who had been directly affected differently than one who had not been directly affected. The interaction of *Direct Impact* and *History* turned out to be non-significant with the exception of *Attitude Towards the Violator*, which was still not in the hypothesized configuration. The analysis simply showed the relative strength of *History* over *Direct Impact*. In fact, in order to find the hypothesized interaction I would have needed to have two relatively equal factors but since *Direct Impact* was so weak I was not able to see the expected effect. In summary, coworkers react strongly when they find out another coworker has committed a violation. There isn't any support for the idea that specific additional details of the nature of the violation make a difference. Additional information about the violator did make a difference with contrary positive information being more powerful than confirming negative information. And since *Direct Impact* was not significant there were no meaningful interactions with *Direct Impact* and *Prior History*.

The next issue was how coworkers would react to information about how the manager had responded to the violation. One of the big concerns for this study is the common perception, at least in the U.S. that punishment should be a private event between a manager and the violating employee. I suggested earlier that when coworkers were not informed about

a punishment, it was the equivalent of not punishing. The question then needs to be addressed as to what happens when no punishment is applied. Not punishing had a serious impact on the coworkers' opinion of the manager, but not on the other aspects. However, not punishing did not significantly differ from punishing mildly. So, managers should realize that when a subordinate has committed a violation that is known by the violator's coworkers, punishing in private may preserve the dignity of the violator, but it will likely result in a lack of respect for the manager. However, the same is true when the manager is lenient to the violator. While it appears that not punishing or punishing mildly hurts the coworkers' opinion of the manager, it doesn't appear that either of these results in increasing the likelihood that a subordinate would leave the group or company.

The relationship was quite different for an appropriately severe punishment. When the punishment is severe, subordinates' feelings towards their manager stayed the same, suggesting that they saw that level of punishment as being appropriate and therefore, the manager was performing his or her function satisfactorily. What was interesting is that subjects actually decreased their intentions to leave when they saw the manager take strong action. However, they also had a stronger disapproval of the violator and more of a sense that he or she deserved to be punished when the punishment was strong. It is possible that their attitudes shifted when the manager took action. For example, the strength of the punishment may have caused them to reconsider how serious the violation was. For managers this may mean that subordinates are willing to adjust their appraisals upward when the manager punishes more than the coworkers would have but are unwilling to adjust them downward when the manager is more lenient.

One of the key aspects of this model was the idea that aspects of the violation, in this case its *Direct Impact*, and aspects of the violator, in this case his *Prior History*, would interact with the punishment in a systematic way. Unfortunately, I was not able to see consistent relationships between these variables. The *Direct Impact* failed to make a difference, *Prior History* made a difference prior to punishment, but once the punishment was applied the nuances of these details seemed to disappear. My assumption was that there would be a detailed calculus weighing individual aspects of violation and violator, however, the data seem to suggest a more heuristic approach.

For example, at this stage I also measured *Residual Desire for Punishment*. This measures the extent to which the coworker feels that more punishment is deserved. In the severe condition the mean was 3.77, suggesting that on average subjects felt the punishment was appropriately severe (in contrast the mean for the mild condition was 2.68 suggesting they would have preferred more punishment). This remained true regardless if the violation had *Direct Impact*, or the violator had a *Prior History* as well as the combinations of the two. This suggests to me that there was a more direct path that took place in their reasoning. There was a serious violation; therefore, it deserves a serious punishment. The other variables ended up being just noise that made a minor difference before the punishment came, but afterwards were unimportant.

This may be different for violations that are less serious, which suggests added complexity for the model. The relationships proposed may only work within a certain range. Outside of that range there may be a completely different set of principles at work. However, this can only be speculation at this point since I only tested with a serious violation. This was a design issue since having multiple offence levels would have doubled or tripled the sample size

and it is difficult to be certain that a violation will be universally interpreted as minor, moderate or serious (the serious violation can be used with the most confidence, as these tend to be more universally agreed upon as you increase in seriousness.)

The coworkers' perceptions of *Justice* were also significantly different between the mild and severe conditions. The severe punishment was judged to be generally fair while the mild condition was seen as somewhat unfair. Another key part of the model was the proposition that coworkers' Justice perceptions are formed by comparing how much Desire for Punishment they had and then comparing it with the manager's response. If they still had a desire for more punishment then that would result in their feeling that the punishment was unfair. Residual Desire for Punishment should indicate that assessment and therefore should correlate very highly with Justice. Indeed Residual Desire for Punishment and Justice were correlated, but it only accounted for 22% of the variance. However, *Attitude Towards the Manager* was also correlated with Justice and accounted for 76% of the variance. So it was possible that a coworker could still want more punishment for the violator and still conclude that the punishment was fair.

Limitations

The major limitation of this study is that it is using subjects who are not part of an existing group as well as using relatively superficial and contrived film clips. It is possible that individuals who are members of a longstanding group would react differently to a punishment event than would people who are new to a group or to people who are imagining themselves as part of a group. It is also possible that people will react differently to the punishment of someone that they have an on-going relationship with as compared to a hypothetical person. This should not invalidate the data, but simply means that coworker's reactions may be more

variable or more intense than what I found here as everyone encountered the punishment of someone that they did not have a personal *History* with.

A second limitation was that there was only one scenario, which included a severe violation. Most likely, there is a different relationship between the variables in the model depending on how serious the violation is. Since this was a serious violation, it may have limited the influence of some of the variables. However, testing with multiple violations was deemed excessively difficult in terms of finding subjects as well as being overly expensive.

A third limitation is that only one configuration was tested. For example, people might learn about *Prior History* first and then *Direct Impact*, or they might find out about everything including the punishment all at once. Without testing multiple configurations it is not possible to fully rule in or out some of the observed or not-observed relationships.

A fourth issue is the potential for demand characteristics. This study differs from the previous study in that subjects are not getting multiple versions of the same scenario. However, they do get new information at each stage about either the aspects of the violation or of the violator. It would not be surprising for subjects to infer the questions that I was trying to answer, and thus there is the potential that they answered in a way consistent with their implicit theory of punishment rather than their actual feelings. The only way to avoid this would be to talk to subjects during the process of an actual punishment episode, which for a number of reasons is very difficult to do.

DISCUSSION

General Discussion

This dissertation's purpose was to shed light on the experience of coworkers when a member of their group commits a violation of organizational rules and procedures and when a manager responds to the event by punishing or not punishing. Study one was focused on a specific part of the punishment model that involves the formation of the *Desire for Punishment*. From this study, it is clear to see that coworkers are interested in the violating behaviors of other coworkers. Subjects had no trouble expressing changes in their attitude toward a violating coworker, nor did they have any trouble determining the extent to which they felt that this coworker deserved punishment.

Another part of the model that was validated here, is that aspects of the violation and the violator work together to influence the strength of the *Desire for Punishment* and attitudes towards the violator. By changing whether the violator had a *History* of previous violations and whether he or she apologized, coworker's *Desire for Punishment* and attitude toward the violator changed in predictable ways. Likewise, changing aspects of the violation such as the *Direct Impact* and the *Outcome* of the violation resulted in predictable changes to these two variables.

What was somewhat surprising was that *Direct Impact* was not as strong as the *Outcome* of the violation. The clear assumption is that people care more about things that directly relate to them. What showed up was that the *Direct Impact* had an influence on how they felt about the coworker, but not as much how much they wanted them punished. Study two appears to have had a very weak manipulation of *Direct Impact*, but this study did a fairly good job of clearly pointing out the *Direct Impact*, so it appears that this is not just a study design artifact. It

is, of course possible that since these were scenarios the direct impact variable was simply not as salient to the subjects.

In a similar fashion, relationship to the coworker seemed to be more strongly related to the coworker's *Attitude Towards the Violator* than it was to their desire to see the violator punished. The act of having a subject imagine a coworker in a hypothetical situation is a weak manipulation, but it did show effects for how they felt about the violator. So it is possible that the *Desire for Punishment* is more heavily influenced by other factors than it is by the relationship to the violator.

In addition, study one clearly showed that the severity of the violation is an important factor in how much coworkers wish to see a violator punished and how they feel towards that coworker. This is not surprising, but does highlight that one of the first things that managers should consider in a punishment episode is the moral gravity of the offense.

Another interesting finding is that there didn't seem to be different structures for mild and severe violations. For example, it is logical that having a good relationship with a coworker might affect how you feel about him or her for a mild violation, but for a severe violation your relationship would make no difference. However, I found no indications that coworkers utilized this kind of logic. Below is a list of the hypotheses from study one and their results.

Table 47: Summary of Findings for Study 1

H1:	Severe violations will result in a greater Desire for Punishment and a more negative Attitude Towards the Violator than will mild violations.	Fully Supported
H2:	Coworkers who have a Good Relationship with the violator will report less Desire for Punishment and a more positive Attitude towards the Violator than will coworkers who have a Poor Relationship with the violator	Fully Supported

H3A:	When a violator offers an Apology coworkers will have less Desire for Punishment and a more positive Attitude Towards the Violator than they will when the coworker doesn't offer an Apology.	Fully Supported
H3B:	When a violator has a History of the violation coworkers will have more Desire for Punishment and a more negative Attitude Towards the Violator than they will when the coworker doesn't have a History of the violation	Fully Supported
H3C:	Desire for Punishment will be highest and Attitude Towards the Violator will be lowest when the violator did not apologize and has a history of the violation, while Desire for Punishment will be lowest and Attitude Towards the Violator will be highest when the violator apologized and had no history of the violation, with the other two combinations having intermediate values.	Fully Supported
H4A:	Even when presented information about a violator's apology and history, severe violations will result in a greater Desire for Punishment and a more negative Attitude Towards the Violator than will mild violations.	Fully Supported
H4B:	Even when presented information about a violator's apology and history, coworkers who have a Good Relationship with the violator will report less Desire for Punishment and a more positive Attitude towards the Violator than will coworkers who have a Poor Relationship with the violator.	Partially Supported Desire for Punishment Not supported Attitude Towards the Violator Supported
H5A:	When a violation has a negative Direct Impact on coworkers, they will have more Desire for Punishment and a more negative Attitude Towards the Violator than they will when the violation has no Direct Impact.	Partially Supported Desire for Punishment Not supported Attitude Towards the Violator Supported
H5B:	When a violation has a bad outcome coworkers will have more Desire for Punishment and a more negative Attitude Towards the Violator than they will when the violation has a good outcome.	Fully Supported
H5C:	Desire for Punishment will be highest and Attitude Towards the Violator will be lowest when the violation had a Direct Impact on the subject and resulted in a bad outcome, while Desire for Punishment will be lowest and Attitude Towards the Violator will be highest when the violation did not directly impact the subject and resulted in a good outcome, with the other two combinations having intermediate values.	Fully Supported

H6A:	Even when presented information about a violation's impact and outcome, severe violations will result in a greater Desire for Punishment and a more negative Attitude Towards the Violator than will mild violations.	Fully Supported
H6B:	Even when presented information about a violation's impact and outcome, coworkers who have a Good Relationship with the violator will report less Desire for Punishment and a more positive Attitude towards the Violator than will coworkers who have a Poor Relationship with the violator.	Partially Supported Desire for Punishment Not supported Attitude Towards the Violator Supported
H7:	Severity will interact with Relationship such that for mild violations the quality of the relationship (good or poor) will make a difference, but for severe violations the quality of the relationship will not make a difference.	Not Supported
H8:	Severity will interact with apology, history, direct impact and outcome such that for mild violations they will each make a difference, but for severe offences they will not make a difference.	Partially Supported Severity X Impact for DFP supported Severity X Apology for DFP supported

Study 2 was designed to explore a greater portion of the model and expand on the findings and ideas from Study 1. Study two can be thought of as more of an examination of how the attitudes of coworkers change through the unfolding process of a violation and punishment. The entire model is based on the premise that observers, and in this case coworkers have a vested interest in the fact that a coworker has committed a violation. Both Study 1 and Study 2 examined this question. At the first stage in Study 2 I found, consistent with Study 1, coworkers' attitudes towards violating coworkers do become more negative when they find out that a coworker has committed a violation. And simply knowing that someone had done something wrong increases the likelihood that they would leave the group. Both studies confirmed that employees do care about the fact that a coworker has committed a violation.

The next major idea is that aspects of the violation and violator make up the *Desire for Punishment*. One aspect of the violation is *Direct Impact*. Both studies examined the role of *Direct Impact* on the coworker. At stage 2 in Study 2 I examined how aspects of the violation influence a coworker's attitudes. In Study 1, *Direct Impact* turned out to be important for how coworkers felt about the violator, but it didn't increase how much they wanted the coworker punished. In Study 1, the manipulation was strong and clear. However, in Study 2, the manipulation of *Direct Impact* was weak. Subjects were told that they would miss a business trip that they were looking forward to. In hindsight, many subjects might have a hard time imagining a business trip that they were "looking forward to," and therefore, *Direct Impact* had no effect in Study 2. However, combining the two studies it does appear that while *Direct Impact* would seem like a major consideration in punishment episodes, it appears weaker than the other variables that I examined.

One aspect of the violator is the presence or absence of a prior *History*. Both studies also examined the *History* of the violator. In Study 1, the violator's *History* was important for both the coworker's attitude towards them and how much they wanted them punished. In Study 2 I looked at a more complicated situation. The introduction of information that the violator had a *History* impacted the coworker's attitude about the violator, but not how much they wanted him or her punished, or their feelings about leaving. However, finding out that there was no *History* affected all three variables. So, in the case of information about a violator, information that indicated that the violator was a repeat offender had less impact than information that the violator was a first time offender. This suggests the possibility that coworkers may be making assumptions about the violator. In this situation it may be that the

hidden assumption is that someone who violates has a *History*. Confirmation of that assumption has less effect than does contradictory information.

In both studies I predicted that the variables would have an additive effect. I found that effect in Study 1 but not in Study two. Again, it is quite likely that the weak manipulation of *Direct Impact* was responsible for the lack of an effect.

The next major step in the model is the application of punishment, or perhaps more accurately the awareness on the coworker's part of the application of punishment. An important part of my theory is that when punishment is not made public, it is the same as if the punishment had not taken place. This is only important if people react in a negative way to a lack of punishment. I assumed that all variables would be made worse by the assumption that manager had not punished. However, contrary to that assumption, not punishing the violator only affected the coworker's feeling about the manager.

This is a key finding because managers need to realize that while not punishing a violator may not impact how the coworkers interact with the violator, it does impact how the coworkers respect the manager. The other interesting twist was that there were no significant differences between a mild punishment and no punishment. Since I had not detected any differences between mild and no punishment, as should be expected, I found the exact same relationship for mild punishment as I did for no punishment. This suggests that there are negative effects from not punishing severely enough, but those effects do not seem to be stronger as the punishment gets milder. The unanswered question is, where does the point lie where the change take place? It may be that there is a step function or threshold where everything below an appropriate level behaves one way and everything above that behaves differently.

The next set of questions had to do with how *Direct Impact* and *History* acted in mild punishment situations. Oddly enough only, *Direct Impact* had an effect. The possible explanation is that *Desire for Punishment* is only low when there is a mild offense and a no *Direct Impact*. Care has to be taken here again given that the manipulation of *Direct Impact* is suspect. *History* had no effect here on mild violations. And consequently I found no additive effect by looking at the various combinations.

The next set of questions looked at *Direct Impact* and *History* acted in severe punishment situations. There were some very interesting findings when the punishment was appropriately severe. I assumed that the by the fact that the punishment was appropriately severe, it would mean that the *Attitude Toward the Manager* would not change. There is always a problem with a null hypothesis being proposed, but the logic here dictated it. However, care must be taken since there could be many explanations for not finding anything. I had also assumed that coworkers would feel better towards a coworker once the coworker had been punished appropriately, but instead I found that attitudes worsened. This suggests that managers may have little ability to influence coworkers in terms of making their attitudes towards a violator more positive. Likewise, coworkers actually increased their assessment that the violator was deserving of the punishment when it was appropriately severe. This makes sense, in that just because someone has been punished, a coworker should not stop feeling that they were deserving. However, I also found that *Intentions to Leave* were lower, giving an indication that at some level coworkers approved.

As with mild punishments, I looked at the affect of *Direct Impact* and *History* in severe punishments. The only findings consistent with my hypotheses were those related to the *Attitude Towards the Manager*. As I hypothesized, there were no changes in *Attitude Towards the*

Manager, but there were no changes in any of the variables so, any interpretation of the proposed null hypothesis must be done with careful reservation. And lastly, in this section, I had also proposed an additive interplay of the variables in a serious violation, but found no affects.

The next portion of the model proposed that coworker's justice perceptions are formed by comparing their *Desire for Punishment* with the actual punishment and determining if the punishment had satisfied their desire. This was fully supported. When punishment is appropriately severe, coworkers have greater feelings of justice and have less desire to see the violator punished more. At this stage the aspects of the violation (*Direct Impact*) and the aspects of the violator (*History*) did not have any additional predictive ability.

Another key aspect of the model was the idea that information presented after the punishment event could impact the coworker's feelings about justice. In Study 2, the manager introduced information that the violator had made a sincere *Apology*, and that the manager had taken that into account when deciding on a punishment. For the mild punishment it resulted in increase attitude about the manager, better feelings towards the violator, less feelings that the violator deserved punishment and less desire to have more punishment applied. It did not change coworkers intentions to leave or their feeling that the punishment was just. When the punishment was severe coworkers had no change in their attitudes after the violator apologized. Again, I was proposing a null hypothesis, so care must be taken, but given that I am comparing two situations where only the severity of the punishment is different and I found significant effects in one condition and no effects in the other, I feel more confident in stating that the null was supported here. One potential problem is that the punishment was to fire the employee, so providing information about the fact that an *Apology* was considered in

that decision would on its face be something that one would assume would make no difference.

The final question in this study, was how the perceptions of *Justice* and *Residual Desire for Punishment* correlated with *Attitudes Towards the Manager*. I found that there was a strong correlation between these three items. This suggests that a manager can influence coworker's Justice perceptions by the way they handle the punishment episode. If, as other researchers have suggested, justice is a mediating variable to things such as turnover, OCB, etc., then managers can, through the careful punishing of violators, control some of these negative outcomes.

Table 48: Summary of Findings from Study 2

H1A:	When coworkers learn that a violation occurred, they will show a decrease in their Attitude Towards the Violator, and an increase in their Intention to Leave.	Fully Supported
H1B:	When coworkers learn that a violation occurred, they will show a greater reduction in their Attitude Towards the Violator, and a greater increase in Intention to Leave if the violation resulted in a Direct Impact on the coworker.	Not Supported
H1C:	When coworkers learn that a violation occurred, they will report a greater Desire for Punishment for the violator if the violation resulted in a Direct Impact on the coworker.	Not Supported
H2A:	When coworkers learn that the violator had a Prior History of the violation, they will have a reduction in their Attitude Towards the Violator, an increase in their Intention to Leave and an increase in the Desire for Punishment.	Partially Supported, only for Attitude Towards the Violator
H2B:	When coworkers are told that a violator had no Prior History of the violation, they will have an increase in Attitude Towards the Violator, a reduction in Intention to Leave and a reduction in the Desire for Punishment.	Fully Supported

H2C:	Attitude Towards the Violator will be lowest while Intention to Leave and Desire for Punishment will be highest when the violation had a Direct Impact and the violator had a history; Attitude Towards the Violator will be highest while Intention to Leave and Desire for Punishment will be lowest when the violation had no Direct Impact and the violator had no history; and all variables intermediate for the other two combinations.	Not Supported
H3A:	When coworkers learn that a manager had not responded to a violation (or appeared to have not responded) they will have a reduction in their Attitude Towards the Manager, a reduction in their Attitude Towards the Violator, an increase in their Intention to Leave and an increase in the Desire for Punishment.	Partially Supported only for Attitude Towards the Manager
H3B:	When coworkers learn that a violator was punished, they will have a greater reduction in their Attitude Towards the Manager, a greater reduction in their Attitude Towards the Violator, a greater increase in their Intention to Leave and a greater increase in the Desire for Punishment when the manager had not responded (or appeared to have not responded) than when the punishment was mild.	Not Supported
H4A:	When coworkers learn that the punishment applied was mild, they will have a reduction in their Attitude Towards the Manager, and their Attitude Towards the Violator, and an increase in their Intention to Leave and the Desire for Punishment.	Partially Supported only for Attitude Towards the Manager
H4B:	When coworkers learn that the punishment applied was mild, they will have a greater reduction in their Attitude Towards the Manager, and their Attitude Towards the Violator, and a greater increase in their Intention to Leave and the Desire for Punishment when the violation had a Direct Impact.	Partially Supported only for Desire for Punishment
H4C:	When coworkers learn that the punishment applied was mild, they will have a greater reduction in their Attitude Towards the Manager, and their Attitude Towards the Violator, and a greater increase in their Intention to Leave and the Desire for Punishment when the violator had a prior history of the violation.	Not Supported
H4D:	When the punishment is mild, the violation had Direct Impact and the violator had a prior history,	Not Supported

	Attitude Towards the Manager and Attitude Towards the Violator will be the lowest and Intentions to Leave and Desire for Punishment will be the highest, in addition when the violation had no Direct Impact and the violator had no Prior History, Attitude Towards the Manager and Attitude Towards the Violator will be the highest and Intentions to Leave and Desire for Punishment will be the lowest, and intermediate for the other two conditions.	
H5A:	When coworkers learn that the punishment applied was appropriately severe, coworkers will maintain their Attitude Towards the Manager and increase their Attitude Towards the Violator, and will decrease their Intention to Leave and increase their Desire for Punishment.	Partially Supported only for Attitude Towards the Manager and Intention to Leave.
H5B:	When coworkers learn that coworkers learn that the punishment was appropriately severe, coworkers will have no change in Attitude Towards the Manager, a smaller increase in Attitude Towards the Violator, a smaller decrease in Intention to Leave and a smaller increase in Desire for Punishment when the violation had a Direct Impact than when it had no Direct Impact.	Partially Supported only for Attitude Towards the Manager
H5C:	When the punishment is appropriately severe, coworkers will have no reduction in their Attitude Towards the Manager, a smaller increase in Attitude Towards the Violator, a smaller decrease in Intention to Leave and a smaller increase in Desire for Punishment when the violator had a prior history than when the violator had no history.	Partially Supported only for Attitude Towards the Manager
H5D:	When the punishment is appropriately severe, the violation had Direct Impact and the violator had a prior history, Attitude Towards the Manager and Attitude Towards the Violator will be the highest and Intentions to Leave and Desire for Punishment will be the lowest, in addition when the violation had no Direct Impact and the violator had no Prior History, Attitude Towards the Manager and Attitude Towards the Violator will be the lowest and Intentions to Leave and Desire for Punishment will be the highest, and for the other two conditions the values will be intermediate.	Not Supported
H6A:	When coworkers learn that a violator was punished,	Fully Supported

	they will have less Residual Desire for Punishment and more feelings that the punishment resulted in Justice when the punishment was appropriately Severe than when it was Mild or None.	
H6B:	When the violator is punished, coworkers will have more Residual Desire for Punishment and less feelings that the punishment resulted in Justice when the violation had a Direct Impact on the coworker.	Not Supported
H6C:	When the violator is punished, coworkers will have more Residual Desire for Punishment and less feelings that the punishment resulted in Justice when the violator had a History of the violation.	Not Supported
H6D:	When the violator is punished, coworkers will have the lowest Residual Desire for Punishment and highest feelings that the punishment resulted in Justice when the violator did not have a History and the violation did not result in Direct Impact; the highest Residual Desire for Punishment and lowest feelings that the punishment resulted in Justice when the violator had a History and the violation resulted in Direct Impact; and intermediate values in the other two conditions.	Not Supported
H7A:	When coworkers learn that the violator had offered a sincere apology to the manager and that the manager had used that in his decision on how to punish, and the punishment was mild, they will have an increase in their Attitude Towards the Manager, an increase in their Attitude Towards the Violator, a decrease in their Intention to Leave, a decrease in their Desire for Punishment, a decrease in their Residual Desire for Punishment and have more feelings that the punishment resulted in Justice.	Partially Supported for Attitude Towards the Manager, Attitude Towards the Violator, Desire for Punishment, Residual Desire for Punishment
H7B:	When coworkers learn that the violator had offered a sincere apology to the manager and that the manager had used that in his decision on how to punish, and the punishment was severe, they will have no change in their Attitude Towards the Manager, their Attitude Towards the Violator, their Intention to Leave, their Desire for Punishment, their Residual Desire for Punishment and no change in their feelings that the punishment resulted in Justice.	Fully Supported
H8:	Residual Desire for Punishment and Attitude Towards the Manager will be correlated with	Fully Supported

	perceived Justice.	
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Implications for Theory

The area of observers' reactions to punishment is still relatively unexplored, despite calls for extending research on punishment in general (Arvey & Ivancevich, 1980; Arvey & Jones, 1985) and on observers specifically (Treviño, 1992). The expanded model and the two studies in this dissertation extend what is known about the reactions of observers. The model creates a framework and a guide for constructing tests of coworkers' reactions. It also introduces a structure that can be compared and contrasted with how managers and recipients of punishment think about and react to punishment. By understanding the differences, managers will be better able to consider all affected parties when making decisions about how to respond to violations.

Study one explored in detail, the idea of the formation of a *Desire for Punishment* which has not been explored in organizational research. It also demonstrates the value of separating out components of the violation from the violator, and provides insights into how those two aspects interact to form the *Desire for Punishment*. In addition, It demonstrates the importance of information in the punishment process and how perceptions are easily influenced by the inclusion or exclusion of even small amounts of information.

Study two examines the model in general and shows how an element from each of the components of the model contributes to the formation of a *Desire for Punishment*, justice perceptions, social learning and relevant outcomes. It provides a method of validating the structure of the model and provides insight into how people react at various stages of the punishment episode. Prior to running this study, my belief was that punishing in private was

detrimental to coworkers because it was the same as not punishing at all. However, what was indicated was that a manager needs to make sure that punishment that is public is severe enough. A mild punishment made public may not be any more effective than no punishment at all. And the person hurt most by not punishing severely enough is not the violator or the coworker, but the manager him or herself.

The second study also validated the idea that there is a weighing of a *Desire for Punishment* against the actual punishment and this results in justice type perceptions. This has many implications. For example, if a manager knows coworkers felt that the punishment was too lenient, he or she could provide information about positive aspects of the violator or violation which would change the *Desire for Punishment*, and a greater sense of justice would happen without having to adjust the punishment. And Study 2 demonstrated that these post-punishment adjustments can take place.

One final implication is that there is a close link between how coworkers feel about how just a situation is and how they feel about the manager. When a manager does something even to someone else and the outcome is perceived as unjust, coworkers lose respect for their manager. Managers should be thinking not only of how they will feel about having to punish someone, but about how their other subordinates will feel about them if they don't or if they punish too leniently.

Implications for Practice

Managers who punish should think about how other organizational members will react to punishment. By assessing key coworker attitudes and cognitions (perceptions of justice and social learning) managers can determine how these coworkers will likely react. Once they know how coworkers are feeling and thinking, this model suggests way that managers can intervene.

For example, if a manager finds that coworkers feel that the punishment has been overly harsh, then they might provide information about the outcomes of the violation, or about the violator's previous *History*. The model suggests that changing the perception of various aspects would change the perceptions and cognitions and as a result, the key resulting behaviors.

In addition, it demonstrates that negative consequences result when coworkers are aware that a violation has taken place. While it may seem prudent to try to keep the punishment as private as possible to avoid issues with the violator, including possible legal repercussions, keeping the punishment private has the same effect as if no punishment was applied. This does not mean that managers necessarily have to publicize all the details of the response, but they might want to at least let coworkers know that the violation was dealt with according to policy if the violation was publicly known.

Managers may wish to take actions similar to what is done by the legal profession. For example, when a lawyer is disciplined for an infraction the bar publishes that discipline while withholding the name of the lawyer. This serves to a warning to others that engaging in this behavior will be dealt with in a similar manner if other attorneys engage in the same behavior. Of course, this would be difficult to do on a group or even a departmental basis, as keeping the anonymity of the violator would be almost impossible, but if for example, a company-wide newsletter provided a vague enough description, it might serve the function of at least letting employees know what behaviors are not tolerated and how they will be responded to. And those who did know about the violation will see that management has responded and can privately get details, should they be concerned that the event was not handled properly.

Limitations

Because the model is complex and comprehensive, it is difficult to test it all at one time. It is likely that the individual aspects interact with each other, both within components and between components. While I have suggested that certain elements may have more impact than others, I did not test these aspects against each other.

In addition, these studies, like most studies on punishment are simulations and not examinations of actual punishment episodes. People may act differently when they are dealing with real people that they know and real situations that affect them. There were obviously issues with people only imagining that these things happened. They were imagining people, or pretending that actors were coworkers and managers, they were imagining that things impacted them or didn't impact them, etc. In a real work situation, it is reasonable to expect that there might be much stronger reactions to these kinds of situations. The main challenge in doing this type of research in actual work situations is that one would either have to use deception, by telling coworkers in an intact work group that a coworker had committed a violation, or one would have to be watching for one of these violations to occur and then jump in as it unfolded.

However, since people rapidly form into groups it would be possible to use ad hoc groups, set up as part of a training exercise or even student groups to explore some of these relationships. Appropriate human subjects considerations would apply since some deception would be unavoidable, but it would be possible to increase the realism. One final limitation is that while there have been qualitative studies of the experience of the manager and the experience of the recipient, there have not been any qualitative studies of the experience of an observer or coworker.

Future Research

There are a number of areas that remain open to explore. First, the model itself should be tested more fully to see if its structure holds up. Each component could be studied to see the relative strength of each of the aspects of the components. One of the main ideas presented here is that managers need to balance the effects on recipients with the effects on coworkers. Studying both recipients and coworkers simultaneously would add valuable insights into how to strike this balance. Lastly, since there have been no qualitative studies of the experience of a coworker, this should be investigated. There may be other factors that influence their perceptions and through the interview process some of what we think matters might turn out to be unimportant.

Conclusion

Punishment will remain a part of manager's responsibilities, and with the changing workplace may become more of an aspect for self-managed teams. Understanding how all parties react in these situations is necessary to make sure that the punishment is effective for all parties involved. I have attempted to add greater detail to our knowledge about how coworkers react to punishment. This area is not as well explored as others, but may have the greatest impact to the greatest number of people and to the organization in general. This dissertation adds an important piece to the puzzle that should help researchers and practitioners to be more effective in an unpleasant, but essential function in organizations.

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APPENDIX A: STUDYRESPONSE SURVEY INVITATION FOR DESIRE FOR PUNISHMENT

Participant [ID]: New Survey Invitation

Dear StudyResponse Project Participant:

We are requesting your assistance with a study conducted by a researcher at the University of Washington on the topic of Attitudes towards Coworkers. You must be at least 18 years of age to participate in the survey. The study will take you approximately 20 minutes to complete. Please note that if you choose not to respond now you will receive a reminder in a week's time.

This study is anonymous, so please do not enter any identifying information into the research instrument except your StudyResponse ID, which is [ID]. The researcher has pledged to keep your data confidential and only to report aggregated results in any published scientific study.

In appreciation of your choice to participate in the project, we will enter you into a random drawing for a gift certificate to Amazon.com. The researcher has provided StudyResponse with funding for 2 gift certificates to Amazon.com worth \$60 each. The drawing for the 2 gift certificates will be held on March XX, 2008. Note that your StudyResponse ID number is [ID] (also shown in the subject line of this message) and that you must enter that number into the survey to be eligible for the random drawing.

Follow this link to participate:

<http://studyresponse.syr.edu/sr1540jpredir.asp?srid=999999>

Participation in this study is voluntary and you may withdraw from participation at any time. If you have any questions about the study you may contact the researcher directly:

Jeff Peterson
University of Washington
Ph: 425 773 6262
Email: jgpeters@u.washington.edu

We very much appreciate your participation in the StudyResponse project and your willingness to consider completing this study.

You received this email because you signed up as a research participant for the StudyResponse project, which is based at Syracuse University's School of Information Studies, in Syracuse NY, USA. You also provided a confirmation of that signup in a subsequent step. The StudyResponse project has received institutional review board approval (#02165),

affirming our commitment to ethical treatment of research participants. Although StudyResponse is not a commercial service and does not send unsolicited email, the project complies with the obligations of the 2003 CAN-SPAM act. In accordance with the act, you have the following options for ceasing participation in the StudyResponse project:

1. You may simply reply to this email with the word UNSUBSCRIBE in the subject.

2. You may use our self service account management interface at: <http://istprojects.syr.edu/~studyresponse/studyresponse/update.htm>


3. You may contact a staff member of the StudyResponse project using the contact information provided below.

For further information about the StudyResponse project, you may contact a member of the StudyResponse staff:


StudyResponse Project; Director: Jeffrey Stanton; Hinds Hall, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13244-4100, 315-443-7267, SRhelp@syr.edu

APPENDIX B: SCREENSHOTS OF SURVEY SITE FOR DESIRE FOR PUNISHMENT

Upon arrival a brief description of the study is given with an explanation that they will be assigned to one of eight variants which consist of four conditions with reverse ordering to control for order effects.



They then go to a page that randomly assigns them to one of the eight surveys.



The conditions consist of the combination of Relationship to the Violator and Violation Severity. Subjects are first assigned to one of two Relationship categories (Good or Poor) and then within each category to a Severity condition (Mild or Severe). Subjects get either a Mild Violation with manipulations of Impact and Outcome, followed by a Severe Violation with manipulations of Apology and History, or they get a Severe Violation with manipulations of Impact and Outcome, followed by a Mild Violation with manipulations of Apology and History. Each condition has a variation switching the order (i.e. one with the Mild Violation first and one with the Severe Violation first).

Each variation has an identical welcome screen.

The screenshot shows a Windows Internet Explorer browser window titled "Punishment 2A - Windows Internet Explorer". The address bar contains the URL: <http://www.questionpro.com/akira/TakeSurvey?id=802691&responseCheck=false>. The main content area features the following elements:


- Header:** "Michael G. Foster" in a large serif font, with "SCHOOL OF BUSINESS" below it. To the right, "UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON" is displayed in a smaller font.
- Progress Bar:** A horizontal progress bar with a green segment on the left, labeled "5%" below it.
- Text:**

Thank you for participating in this study. Your participation is voluntary and you may discontinue at any time. Please try to answer all of the questions, however, you are free to skip any questions that you do not wish to answer.

This survey is anonymous and no personally identifiable information will be asked for or obtained. We would like to gather some general information about you, but again we have no way of linking back to you. When you are ready to answer some demographic questions click "Continue."
- Image:** A photograph of a man in a white shirt and dark vest sitting at a desk with a computer, looking at the screen.
- Button:** A rectangular button labeled "Continue" centered below the image.
- Text:** "Please contact jgpeters@u.washington.edu if you have any questions regarding this survey."

The browser's status bar at the bottom shows "Done", "Internet", and "100%".

Each variation also has an identical demographics screen.



Punishment 2A - Windows Internet Explorer

http://www.questionpro.com/akira/TakeSurvey.jsessionid=daa_tiryIQni24

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UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

35%

What is your marital status?
-- Select --

What is your gender?
-- Select --

How many years and months of work experience do you have?

What is your age?
-- Select --

Which of the following best describes your current role in industry?
-- Select --

Have you ever had supervisory responsibility for another employee?
-- Select --

Please contact jqpeters@u.washington.edu if you have any questions regarding this survey.

Done Internet 100%

Half of the conditions have a screen asking them to select a coworker that they have a good relationship with and half ask them to imagine a coworker that they have a difficult relationship with.



Punishment 2A - Windows Internet Explorer
http://www.questionpro.com/akira/TakeSurvey.js;sessionid=daa_tiryIQni24

Michael G. Foster
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UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

40%



In this study we are interested in how situations influence people's attitudes about others whose behavior they observe. You will be asked to vividly imagine situations and how you would feel in that situation. Please do your best to imagine how you would feel in each of the situations.

To help you make this more vivid we would like you to select a coworker (past or present) with whom you have a good working relationship and strong interpersonal liking. Once you have picked a person, vividly imagine him or her in your mind. When you have selected a person proceed to the next step.

[Continue](#)

Please contact jppeters@u.washington.edu if you have any questions regarding this survey.

Done Internet 100%

Subjects are then presented with either this series of screens, which is the Laptop incident with manipulations of Violation Impact and Outcome followed by the Illness incident with manipulations of Apology and History, or the alternate version contained at the end marked as Variation B, which has the Laptop incident with manipulations of Violator Apology and History followed by the Illness incident with manipulations of Impact and Outcome. Variation A (Laptop incident, manipulation of Violation Impact and Outcome)

Punishment 2A - Windows Internet Explorer
 http://www.questionpro.com/akira/TakeSurvey;jsessionid=daa_tiryIQni24

Michael G. Foster
 SCHOOL OF BUSINESS
 UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

45%

In the following section you will see a chain of email messages from a corporate communications department. You will receive an initial email followed by updates as information becomes available. Please think about them as though you were working for the company. The company's general communication strategy is to communicate information as quickly as possible, which sometimes results in incomplete information at any given moment, however, this method has proven successful in the past.



You will be asked questions about your attitudes after each communication. While the information in the emails may not be validated, you should treat the information at each step as if it is accurate. Before continuing, please vividly recall the person that you selected in the previous step.


Imagine that the following series of emails are about the person that you have selected and are imagining.

Continue

Please contact jgpeters@u.washington.edu if you have any questions regarding this survey.


Done Internet 100%

Subjects are shown this screen with sets up the scenario.



This screen is then presented which has four scenarios manipulating Impact and Outcome, presented in random order.

Punishment 2A - Windows Internet Explorer
 http://www.questionpro.com/akira/TakeSurvey.jsessionid=daa_tiryIQni24



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70%

Scroll down, read the email message and answer the questions.
 Please proceed only after you have completed any previous sections.
 Do not proceed to the next segment until you have answered this section.
 Once you have completed a set of questions, please do not scroll up and change previous answers

From: Corporate Communications
 To: Undisclosed Recipients
 Subject: UPDATE: IMPORTANT INFORMATION REGARDING A STOLEN LAPTOP

We currently believe that your personal employee information was not on the stolen laptop. Also, the latest report indicates that the laptop has not been recovered and the employee data is at risk.

Corporate Communications

This email represents our knowledge as of the moment regarding the stolen laptop. Additional investigation is still being conducted and we will update you as it is available. We apologize for any confusion that these communications may cause, but we believe that it is important to communicate information as quickly as we have it so that appropriate precautions may be taken.

Please answer the following questions:

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
I would be motivated to work with this person	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
This person is a valuable employee	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I would be motivated to have this person on my team	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The actions of the worker should be punished	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
It would bother me if this person was not punished	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The employee deserves to be disciplined	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Done Internet 100%

Subjects are then presented the “illness” section
Variation A (Illness with manipulations of Violator Apology and History)

Punishment 2A - Windows Internet Explorer
http://www.questionpro.com/akira/TakeSurvey.jsessionid=daa_tiryIQni24

Michael G. Foster
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75%



In the following section you will receive an email message from a manager and a co-worker describing a situation. Please think about them as though you were working for the company and that the manager was your manager and the coworkers are people in your workgroup. Assume that you are working as a salaried employee, i.e. you are not eligible for overtime.

You will be presented with several hypothetical scenarios. You will be asked questions about your attitudes after imagining the scenario. Before continuing, please vividly recall the person that you selected in the previous step. This person will be the one referred to in the emails

Please clear your mind of the previous information about the laptop incident, i.e. treat it as if it didn't happen, which of course it didn't.

Please take a moment and vividly recall the person and then proceed.

Please contact jgpeters@u.washington.edu if you have any questions regarding this survey.

Internet 100%

Subjects are shown this screen with sets up the scenario.

Michael G. Foster
SCHOOL OF BUSINESS
UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

80%

From: Bill Jones
To: Bill Jones' Distribution List
Subject: Working this weekend

I have just been informed that one of our key team members will be out for a week with an illness. This is a key week for this project and we have several important deliverables that were supposed to be in to the client by this Friday. With this member out there is a possibility that we will miss the deadline. I may be asking some of you to work extra hours to get this done. The client is concerned about this situation and it could jeopardize the relationship. I am trying to make this situation work, and things are changing by the minute. I will inform you as soon as I hear anything so that you can adjust your plans as needed. Please watch for further emails.

Bill Jones

Five minutes later you receive this email from your coworker.

From: Tommy Vance
To: My good buddy
Subject: RE: Working this weekend

I happen to know for a fact that this "illness" is a personal trip!

TV

Please answer the following questions:

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
The actions of the worker should be punished	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The employee deserves to be disciplined	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I would be motivated to work with this person	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
This person is a valuable employee	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
It would bother me if this person was not punished	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I would be motivated to have this person on my team	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

[Continue](#)

Please contact jgpeters@u.washington.edu if you have any questions regarding this survey.

Subjects are presented with four scenarios manipulating Apology and History in random order in this section.

Punishment 2A - Windows Internet Explorer
 http://www.questionpro.com/akira/TakeSurvey.jsessionid=daa_ttryIQni24

Michael G. Foster
 SCHOOL OF BUSINESS

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

100%

Scroll down, read the email message and answer the questions.
 Please proceed only after you have completed any previous sections.
 Do not proceed to the next segment until you have answered this section.

Assume that you know nothing about this incident except what was in the first two emails from your manager and the coworker. Clear your mind of any other information that has been presented in this survey about the person that that you have been thinking of and answer only based on the following scenario.

Imagine that the week after you received the email from you manager and co-worker you received this email from the same coworker you received the first email from.

From: Tommy Vance
 To: Team distribution list
 Subject: Our co-worker's "Illness"

I just ran into our "ill" coworker and received a very sincere apology that I was asked to pass along to everyone else. It seems like this was a first time use of the "I'm sick, but not really" ploy. Just thought you might want to know.

Tommy

Now answer the following questions as you would if you had only received the original two emails, plus the email above.


Please answer the following questions:

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
It would bother me if this person was not punished	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The actions of the worker should be punished	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The employee deserves to be disciplined	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I would be motivated to work with this person	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I would be motivated to have this person on my team	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
This person is a valuable employee	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Done

Inte Punishment Study 2 100%

Subjects then are thanked for participation.



B Variation (Laptop incident with manipulations of Violator Apology and History)

Punishment 2B - Windows Internet Explorer

http://www.questionpro.com/akira/TakeSurvey.jsessionid=daa_tiryIQni24

Michael G. Foster
SCHOOL OF BUSINESS

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

45%

In the following section you will receive an email message from corporate communications describing a situation. Please think about this as though you are an employee of the company and that the other people involved are your coworkers



After the initial email, you will be presented with several hypothetical scenarios. You will be asked questions about your attitudes after imagining the scenario.

Please take a moment and vividly recall the person that you previously selected and then proceed.

Imagine that the following series of emails are about the person that you have selected and are imagining.

Please contact jgpeters@u.washington.edu if you have any questions regarding this survey.

Done Internet 100%

Subjects are shown this screen with sets up the scenario.

Punishment 2B - Windows Internet Explorer
 http://www.questionpro.com/akira/TakeSurvey.jsessionid=daa_tiryIQni24

Michael G. Foster
 SCHOOL OF BUSINESS
 UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

50%

From: Corporate Communications
 To: Undisclosed Recipients
 Subject: IMPORTANT INFORMATION REGARDING A STOLEN LAPTOP

An employee of the company was apprehended in a sting operation involving the sale of a stolen company laptop. At this time we do not have all the details. There was some employee personal data on the laptop, but we don't know which employees are affected as yet. We also don't know if the laptop was recovered or is still out there. Please expect additional information as we get it.

Corporate Communications

Please answer the following questions:

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
The actions of the worker should be punished	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The employee deserves to be disciplined	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I would be motivated to work with this person	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
It would bother me if this person was not punished	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I would be motivated to have this person on my team	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
This person is a valuable employee	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Please contact jqpeters@u.washington.edu if you have any questions regarding this survey.

Internet 100%

Subjects are presented with four scenarios manipulating Apology and History in random order in this section.

Punishment 2B - Windows Internet Explorer

http://www.questionpro.com/akira/TakeSurvey.jsessionid=daa_tiryIQni24

Michael G. Foster

SCHOOL OF BUSINESS

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

70%

**Scroll down, read the email message and answer the questions.
Please proceed only after you have completed any previous sections.
Do not proceed to the next segment until you have answered this section.**

Assume that you know nothing about this incident except what was in the first email from corporate communications. Clear your mind of any other information that has been presented in this survey about the person that you have been thinking of and answer only based on the following scenario.

Imagine that the week after you received the email from you corporate communications, you received this email from a coworker.

From: Tommy Vance
To: Team distribution list
Subject: Our co-worker's theft

I just ran into our coworker who stole the laptop and received a sincere apology (I really do think it was sincere) that I was asked to pass along. You might also be interested in the fact that this is not the first time this has happened. Just thought you might want to know.

Tommy

Now answer the following questions as you would if you had only received the original email, plus the email above.

Please answer the following questions:

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
I would be motivated to have this person on my team	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The employee deserves to be disciplined	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I would be motivated to work with this person	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
This person is a valuable employee	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The actions of the worker should be punished	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
It would bother me if this person was not punished	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Done Internet 100%

B Variation (Illness incident with manipulations of Impact and Outcome)

Punishment 2B - Windows Internet Explorer

http://www.questionpro.com/akira/TakeSurvey;jsessionid=daa_tiryIQni24

Michael G. Foster
SCHOOL OF BUSINESS

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

75%



In the following section you will receive an email message from a manager and a co-worker describing a situation. Please think about them as though you were working for the company and that the manager was your manager and the coworkers are people in your workgroup. Assume that you are working as a salaried employee, i.e. you are not eligible for overtime.

You will receive a series of emails. You will be asked questions about your attitudes after each email. Before continuing, please vividly recall the person that you selected in the previous step. This person will be the one referred to in the emails

Please clear your mind of the previous information about the laptop incident, i.e. treat it as if it didn't happen, which of course it didn't.

Please take a moment and vividly recall the person and then proceed.

Please contact jgpeters@u.washington.edu if you have any questions regarding this survey.

Done Internet 100%

Subjects are shown this screen with sets up the scenario.

Punishment 2B - Windows Internet Explorer
 http://www.questionpro.com/akira/TakeSurvey.jsessionid=daa_tiryIQnl24

Michael G. Foster
 SCHOOL OF BUSINESS

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

80%

From: Bill Jones
 To: Bill Jones' Distribution List
 Subject: Working this weekend

I have just been informed that one of our key team members will be out for a week with an illness. This is a key week for this project and we have several important deliverables that were supposed to be in to the client by this Friday. With this member out there is a possibility that we will miss the deadline. I may be asking some of you to work extra hours to get this done. The client is concerned about this situation and it could jeopardize the relationship. I am trying to make this situation work, and things are changing by the minute. I will inform you as soon as I hear anything so that you can adjust your plans as needed. Please watch for further emails.

Bill Jones

Five minutes later you receive this email from your coworker.

From: Tommy Vance
 To: My good buddy
 Subject: RE: Working this weekend

I happen to know for a fact that this "illness" is a personal trip!

TV


Please answer the following questions:

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
The actions of the worker should be punished	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The employee deserves to be disciplined	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
It would bother me if this person was not punished	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I would be motivated to work with this person	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I would be motivated to have this person on my team	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
This person is a valuable employee	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Please contact jqpeters@u.washington.edu if you have any questions regarding this survey.

Done Internet 100%

Subjects then are thanked for participation.



**APPENDIX C: STUDYRESPONSE SURVEY PRE-NOTICE COWORKER
ATTITUDES TOWARDS A VIOLATOR AND THEIR MANAGER**

Participant [ID]: New Direct Payment Study Information

Dear StudyResponse Project Participant:

Thank you for your ongoing participation in StudyResponse Projects.

We are pleased to let you know that researchers at University of Washington have selected you to participate in their upcoming study on the topic of "Attitudes Towards Coworkers and Managers". To be eligible for this project, you must be at least 18 years of age; you must be employed and must be a US citizen. Within a day you will receive the invitation message with the link to complete the study.

In appreciation of your choice to participate in this project, the researchers have provided for a \$5 gift certificate to Amazon. You are guaranteed to receive \$5 AFTER the completion of the survey and accurately entering your StudyResponse ID in the survey.

We thank you in advance for taking part in this study.

We appreciate your interest and participation in StudyResponse.

- The StudyResponse Staff
srhelp@syr.edu

You received this email because you signed up as a research participant for the StudyResponse project, which is based at Syracuse University's School of Information Studies, in Syracuse NY, USA. You also provided a confirmation of that signup in a subsequent step. The StudyResponse project has received institutional review board approval (07-199), affirming our commitment to ethical treatment of research participants. Although StudyResponse is not a commercial service and does not send unsolicited email, the project complies with the obligations of the 2003 CAN-SPAM act. In accordance with the act, you have the following options for ceasing participation in the StudyResponse project:

1. You may simply reply to this email with the word UNSUBSCRIBE in the subject.
2. You may use our self service account management interface at:
<http://studyresponse.syr.edu/studyresponse/update.htm>
3. You may contact a staff member of the StudyResponse project using the contact information provided below.

For further information about the StudyResponse project, you may contact a member of the StudyResponse staff:

StudyResponse Project; Director: Jeffrey Stanton; Hinds Hall, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13244-4100, 315-443-7267, SRhelp@syr.edu

**APPENDIX D: STUDYRESPONSE SURVEY RECRUITMENT EMAIL
COWORKER ATTITUDES TOWARDS A VIOLATOR AND THEIR MANAGER**

Participant [ID]: New Direct Payment Survey Invitation

Dear StudyResponse Project Participant:

We are requesting your assistance with a study conducted by researchers at the University of Washington on the topic of "Observer Punishment Model Lab Study". To be eligible for this project, you must be at least 18 years of age; you must be employed and must be a US citizen. The study will take you no more than 20 minutes to complete. If you choose not to respond within the first week, we will send you a reminder in one week.

This study is anonymous, so please do not enter any identifying information into the research instrument except your StudyResponse ID, which is [ID]. The researchers have pledged to keep your data confidential and only to report aggregated results in any published scientific study.

Please note that upon receiving your completed survey (*as per the conditions specified by the researcher), we will issue a \$5 gift certificate to Amazon of your choice. StudyResponse will start issuing the certificates approximately a week after the researcher receives the completed survey.

Note that your StudyResponse ID number is [ID] (also shown in the subject line of this message) and that you must enter that number into the survey to be eligible for the direct payment.

Follow this link to participate:

[http://studyresponse.syr.edu/sr2381jpredir.asp?srid=\[ID\]](http://studyresponse.syr.edu/sr2381jpredir.asp?srid=[ID])

Participation in this study is voluntary and you may withdraw from participation at any time. If you have any questions you may contact one of the following:

Jeff Peterson
University of Washington
jgpeters@u.washington.edu
425-773-6262

We very much appreciate your participation in the StudyResponse project and your willingness to consider completing this study.


You received this email because you signed up as a research participant for the StudyResponse project, which is based at Syracuse University's School of Information Studies, in Syracuse NY, USA. You also provided a confirmation of that signup in a subsequent step. The StudyResponse project has received institutional review board approval (07-199), affirming our commitment to ethical treatment of research participants. Although StudyResponse is not a commercial service and does not send unsolicited email, the project complies with the obligations of the 2003 CAN-SPAM act. In accordance with the act, you have the following options for ceasing participation in the StudyResponse project:

1. You may simply reply to this email with the word UNSUBSCRIBE in the subject.
 2. You may use our self service account management interface at: <http://studyresponse.syr.edu/studyresponse/update.htm>
 3. You may contact a staff member of the StudyResponse project using the contact information provided below.
- * Conditions apply. In case of any clarifications, please feel free to contact us at SRhelp@syr.edu

For further information about the StudyResponse project, you may contact a member of the StudyResponse staff:
StudyResponse Project; Director: Jeffrey Stanton; Hinds Hall, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13244-4100, 315-443-7267, SRhelp@syr.edu

APPENDIX E: SCREENSHOTS OF SURVEY SITE FOR COWORKER ATTITUDES TOWARDS A VIOLATOR AND THEIR MANAGER

The survey structure is the same for all nine conditions. The variations are created by placing different versions of the videos in the segments to manipulate, Impact, Apology and Punishment Severity.



The screenshot shows a web browser window titled "Condition Assignment". The page header includes the name "Michael G. Foster" and "SCHOOL OF BUSINESS" on the left, and "UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON" on the right. Below this is the logo for "WOODBURY SCHOOL of BUSINESS" with "STAN VALLEY" and "GVU UNIVERSITY" above it. The main content area contains the following text:

Thank you for participating in this research study on feelings and attitudes towards coworkers. Your participation is voluntary and you may discontinue at any time. Please try to answer all of the questions, however, you are free to skip any questions that you do not wish to answer.

This survey is anonymous and no personally identifiable information will be asked for or obtained. When you are ready to begin click the link below the picture.

Below the text is a photograph of a man in a white shirt and dark vest sitting at a desk with a computer monitor and a desk lamp. Below the photograph is a blue button with the text "Click Here to take the survey".

1A

10%

Michael G. Foster
SCHOOL OF BUSINESS

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

WOODBURY
SCHOOL OF BUSINESS

Feelings and Attitudes Toward Coworkers and Managers



In this study we are interested in how coworkers feel about other coworkers and their managers. You will see a series of short video clips involving people in common work situations. These clips include employees and a manager.

We would like you to imagine that the employees that you see in the videos are your coworkers and that the manager is your manager. Please do your best to imagine how you would feel if you were actually a member of this work group.


In a real work situation you might need more information than is presented here in order to make some of the judgments that we are asking you to form. However, we ask you to base your answers on your general impressions from the videos given the information presented. The "Neither Agree or Disagree" answer should be used for when your feelings are ambiguous, not to indicate that you don't have enough information.

Before proceeding, make sure that your sound is enabled so that you can hear the dialog in the video clips.

[Continue](#)

Please contact jgpeters@u.washington.edu if you have any questions regarding this survey.

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The image shows a screenshot of a web browser window. The browser's title bar displays "1A". Below the title bar, a progress bar indicates that 21% of the page has loaded. The main content area features the following elements:

- Header:** "Michael G. Foster" in a large blue serif font, with "SCHOOL OF BUSINESS" in a smaller blue sans-serif font below it. To the right, "UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON" is written in a small blue sans-serif font.
- Logo:** The "WOODBURY SCHOOL of BUSINESS" logo, which includes a green square with "WOODBURY" and "SCHOOL of BUSINESS" text, and a smaller green square with "OVU" and "UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON" text.
- Text:** Two paragraphs of text: "In this segment you will see Mike, who is the manager and Bill who is an employee." followed by "Imagine that Bill is your coworker and that Mike is your manager."
- Video Player:** A black rectangular video player with a white play button in the center. Below the player is a control bar with a play/pause button, a progress bar showing "00:00" to "00:00", a volume icon, and a full-screen icon.
- Text:** Two more paragraphs of text: "When you are ready to watch the video, click on the play button." followed by "After the video completes, scroll down and answer the questions below."

The browser window has a vertical scrollbar on the right side, and the page content is framed by a purple border.

1A

Please answer the following questions based on your impressions from the video that you just watched.
Some questions refer to the manager (Mike) and some questions refer to your coworker (Bill).
You may replay the video if you need to.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
The manager's actions (Mike) demonstrated highly effective supervision skills	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I respect the manager (Mike) for his actions	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If I were a coworker, I would be motivated to work for this manager (Mike)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If I were a coworker, I would feel that the manager (Mike) did the right thing	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
This person (Bill) is a valuable employee	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If I were working for this manager (Mike), I would often think of quitting this job and finding another	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I would be motivated to have this person (Bill) on my team	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I would be motivated to work with this person (Bill)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If I were working with this person (Bill), I would like to quit this job and find another in the near future	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If I were working in this group, I would be planning to leave my job for another in the near future	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

[Continue](#)

Please contact jgpeters@u.washington.edu if you have any questions regarding this survey.

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The image shows a screenshot of a web browser window. The browser's title bar displays "1A". Below the title bar, a progress bar indicates that 31% of the page has loaded. The main content area features the following elements:

- Logo for Michael G. Foster, SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON.
- Logo for WOODBURY SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, with "DUVU" and "UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON" text.
- A text instruction: "In this segment you will again see Mike (the manager) and Bill (your coworker)".
- A video player interface with a large white play button in the center of a black video frame.
- A video control bar below the frame, showing a play button, a stop button, a progress bar with "00:00" on both ends, a full screen button, and a volume icon.
- Text instructions: "When you are ready to watch the video, click on the play button." and "After the video completes, scroll down and answer the questions below."

The browser window has a vertical scrollbar on the right side, and the page content is framed by a purple border.

1A

Please answer the following questions based on your impressions from the video that you just watched. Some questions refer to the manager (Mike) and some questions refer to your coworker (Bill). You may replay the video if you need to.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
If I were a coworker, I would feel that the manager (Mike) did the right thing	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If I were a coworker, I would be motivated to work for this manager (Mike)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The manager's actions (Mike) demonstrated highly effective supervision skills	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I would be motivated to have this person (Bill) on my team	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
This person (Bill) is a valuable employee	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I would be motivated to work with this person (Bill)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I respect the manager (Mike) for his actions	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If I were working with this person (Bill), I would like to quit this job and find another in the near future	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If I were working for this manager (Mike), I would often think of quitting this job and finding another	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If I were working in this group, I would be planning to leave my job for another in the near future	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

[Continue](#)

Please contact jgpeters@u.washington.edu if you have any questions regarding this survey.

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The image shows a screenshot of a web browser window. The browser's title bar displays "1A". Below the title bar, a progress bar indicates that 42% of the page has loaded. The main content area features the name "Michael G. Foster" and "SCHOOL OF BUSINESS" in a serif font, with "UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON" in a smaller font to the right. Below this is the logo for "DUVU WOODBURY SCHOOL OF BUSINESS". A paragraph of text reads: "In this segment you will see Mike (the manager) Bill (your coworker) and Jim who is another coworker." Below the text is a video player with a black frame and a white play button. The video player's control bar shows a play button, a stop button, a progress bar with "00:00" on both ends, a volume icon, and a full-screen icon. Below the video player, two lines of text provide instructions: "When you are ready to watch the video, click on the play button." and "After the video completes, scroll down and answer the questions below." A horizontal line is visible below the second line of text, and a scroll bar is visible on the right side of the browser window.

1A

Please answer the following questions based on your impressions from the video that you just watched.
Some questions refer to the manager (Mike) and some questions refer to your coworker (Bill).
The questions do NOT apply to Jim.
You may replay the video if you need to.

	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
If I were a coworker, I would be motivated to work for this manager (Mike)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
This person (Bill) is a valuable employee	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If I were working in this group, I would be planning to leave my job for another in the near future	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If I were a coworker, I would feel that the manager (Mike) did the right thing	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If I were working for this manager (Mike), I would often think of quitting this job and finding another	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I would be motivated to work with this person (Bill)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The manager's actions (Mike) demonstrated highly effective supervision skills	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If I were working with this person (Bill), I would like to quit this job and find another in the near future	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I would be motivated to have this person (Bill) on my team	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I respect the manager (Mike) for his actions	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

[Continue](#)

Please contact jgpeters@u.washington.edu if you have any questions regarding this survey.

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1A

52%

Michael G. Foster
SCHOOL OF BUSINESS

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

WOODBURY
SCHOOL OF BUSINESS

In this segment, Jim (the new coworker introduced in the previous segment) has stopped by your office to give you some information about Bill (your coworker that was introduced first)

When you are ready to watch the video, click on the play button.
After the video completes, scroll down and answer the questions below.

1A


Please answer the following questions based on your impressions from the video that you just watched.
 These questions refer to Bill (not the worker in the video).
 You may replay the video if you need to.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
If I were working with this person (Bill), I would like to quit this job and find another in the near future	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The actions of the worker (Bill) should be punished	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If I were working in this group, I would be planning to leave my job for another in the near future	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I would be motivated to have this person (Bill) on my team	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I would be motivated to work with this person (Bill)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
This person (Bill) is a valuable employee	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
It would bother me if this person (Bill) was not punished	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If I were working for this manager (Mike), I would often think of quitting this job and finding another	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The employee (Bill) deserves to be disciplined	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

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1A

63%

Michael G. Foster
SCHOOL OF BUSINESS

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

WOODBURY
SCHOOL OF BUSINESS

In this segment, a few days have passed and Jim has again stopped by your office with information about Bill.

▶

00:00 00:00

When you are ready to watch the video, click on the play button.
After the video completes, scroll down and answer the questions below.

1A

Please answer the following questions based on your impressions from the video that you just watched.
 These questions refer to Bill (not the worker in the video).
 You may replay the video if you need to.

	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
It would bother me if this person (Bill) was not punished	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The actions of the worker (Bill) should be punished	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I would be motivated to work with this person (Bill)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
This person (Bill) is a valuable employee	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I would be motivated to have this person (Bill) on my team	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If I were working for this manager (Mike), I would often think of quitting this job and finding another	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If I were working with this person (Bill), I would like to quit this job and find another in the near future	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The employee (Bill) deserves to be disciplined	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If I were working in this group, I would be planning to leave my job for another in the near future	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Please contact jgpeters@u.washington.edu if you have any questions regarding this survey.

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1A

73%

Michael G. Foster
SCHOOL OF BUSINESS

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

D.V.U. UNIVERSITY
WOODBURY
SCHOOL OF BUSINESS

In this segment a few more days have passed and Jim has stopped by your office again, this time will information about Mike's response to the situation with Bill

00:00 00:00

When you are ready to watch the video, click on the play button.
After the video completes, scroll down and answer the questions below.

1A

Please answer the following questions based on your impressions from the video that you just watched.
These questions refer to Bill (not the worker in the video).
You may replay the video if you need to.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
The manager's actions (Mike) demonstrated highly effective supervision skills	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
This person (Bill) is a valuable employee	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If I were working in this group, I would be planning to leave my job for another in the near future	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If I were a coworker, I would feel that the manager (Mike) did the right thing	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If I were a coworker, I would be motivated to work for this manager (Mike)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If I were a coworker, I would feel the discipline was fair	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I would be motivated to have this person (Bill) on my team	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I respect the manager (Mike) for his actions	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If I were working for this manager (Mike), I would often think of quitting this job and finding another	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If I were working with this person (Bill), I would like to quit this job and find another in the near future	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The employee (Bill) deserves to be disciplined	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The actions of the worker (Bill) still should be punished more	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The actions of the worker (Bill) should be punished	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
It would bother me if this person (Bill) was not punished	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The employee (Bill) still deserves to be disciplined more	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
It would bother me if this person (Bill) was not punished more	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The employee was treated fairly by the supervisor	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The discipline was fair based on the behavior of the employee	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I would be motivated to work with this person (Bill)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

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The image shows a screenshot of a web browser window. The browser's title bar at the top displays "1A" and a progress indicator showing "84%". The page content includes the following elements:

- Header:** "Michael G. Foster SCHOOL OF BUSINESS" on the left and "UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON" on the right.
- Logos:** The logos for "GWU UNIVERSITY" and "WOODBURY SCHOOL OF BUSINESS" are centered below the header.
- Text:** A paragraph reads: "In this segment Mike has come by your office to talk with you about his response to the situation with Bill."
- Video Player:** A large black rectangle with a white play button icon in the center. Below it is a video control bar with a play button, a stop button, a progress bar (showing "00:00" on both ends), a volume icon, and a full-screen icon.
- Instructions:** Below the video player, two lines of text read: "When you are ready to watch the video, click on the play button." and "After the video completes, scroll down and answer the questions below."

1A

Please answer the following questions based on your impressions from the video that you just watched. These questions refer to Bill (not the worker in the video). You may replay the video if you need to.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
The employee was treated fairly by the supervisor	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The actions of the worker (Bill) still should be punished more	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The manager's actions demonstrated highly effective supervision skills	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If I were a coworker, I would be motivated to work for this manager	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I would be motivated to work with this person (Bill)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I respect the manager for his actions	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If I were a coworker, I would feel that the manager did the right thing	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
It would bother me if this person (Bill) was not punished	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If I were working with this person (Bill), I would like to quit this job and find another in the near future	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The employee (Bill) deserves to be disciplined	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
It would bother me if this person (Bill) was not punished more	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The actions of the worker (Bill) should be punished	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If I were working for this manager, I would often think of quitting this job and finding another	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If I were a coworker, I would feel the discipline was fair	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The employee (Bill) still deserves to be disciplined more	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If I were working in this group, I would be planning to leave my job for another in the near future	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I would be motivated to have this person (Bill) on my team	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
This person (Bill) is a valuable employee	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The discipline was fair based on the behavior of the employee	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

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1A

100%

Michael G. Foster
SCHOOL OF BUSINESS

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

UTAH VALLEY UNIVERSITY
WOODBURY
SCHOOL of BUSINESS

Have you ever had supervisory responsibility for another employee?
-- Select --


Please Enter Your StudyResponse ID

This survey is for research purposes and it is important that responses be accurate and thoughtfully made.

Should we use your responses for our analysis?

Use my responses for your research
 Don't use my responses, they don't represent my true feelings

Continue



VITA

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Assistant Professor of Business Management

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Education

- Ph.D. Foster School of Business, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, 2012 (expected)
Emphasis: Organizational Behavior and empirical demonstration Dissertation Title: The effects of punishment on observers: A model
- M.S. Foster School of Business, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, 2008
Emphasis: Business Administration
- M.B.A. Marriott School of Management, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT, 1997 Emphasis: Strategy and Information Systems
- B.S. Brigham Young University, Provo, UT, 1995 Major: Family Science

Academic Experience

- 2008 - Current Assistant Professor of Business Management, Utah Valley University; Orem, UT
- 2003 - 2008 Teaching Assistant, University of Washington Business School; Seattle, WA.

Research Interests

Punishment in Organizational Settings, Organizational Justice, Ethics, Leadership and Power
Evolutionary Psychology

Publications

Leavitt, K. N., Mitchell, T. R., Peterson, J. G. (2009). Theory Pruning: Strategies to reduce our dense theoretical landscape. *Organizational Research Methods*, 13(4), 24

Working Papers

- Peterson, J. G. "A process model & validation of observer reactions to violations" (On-Going)
Empirical article on how observer attitudes towards violators change over time.
- Peterson, J. G. "Ethical Inertia: Ethics are for people who aren't already in Hell" (On-Going)
Paper proposing the construct of Ethical Inertia
- Peterson, J. G. "Evolutionary Psychology in Organizational Research:" (Writing Results)
Theory paper on EP including a methodology for applying EP theory in organizational research
- Peterson, J. G. "The development of the desire for punishment" (Writing Results)
Empirical article on the influence of various aspects of a violation and violator on observer attitudes

Academic Honors and Recognitions

Best Paper Award for Academy of Management Research Methods Division and Organizational Research Methods Journal 2010

Nominated for Faculty Excellence Award 2010

Nominated for Instructor of the Quarter Award, Foster School of Business, University of Washington Winter Quarter 2006

George W. Tyler Scholarship Foster School of Business, University of Washington 2004

Evert McAbe Endowed Fellowship, Foster School of Business, University of Washington 2003-2004

Beta Gamma Sigma, Marriott School of Business, Brigham Young University, 1996

Phi Kappa Phi, Brigham Young University, 1996

Service - Department

Hiring Chair, Management Department 2009

Lead Instructor MGMT 3010 2008-2010

Lead Instructor MGMT 3000 2009-current

Lead Instructor MGMT 6500 2010-current

Service - School

MBA Admissions Committee 2009-current

MBA Curriculum Committee 2009-current

MBA Strategy Committee 2009-current

AACSB Assessment Committee 2009-current

PIE Committee 2009-current

CAL Steering Committee 2011-current

Co-Chair, Managing Growth through Technology Committee 2011-current

Service - Field

Session Chair, Academy of Management Conference 2007

President, Doctoral Business Student Association 2004-2005

Reviewer, Academy of Management 2003-2007 OB, OM, CM, MS Divisions

Reviewer, Academy of Management Journal, 2003-2007

Reviewer, Academy of Management Learning and Education 2008-current

Professional Affiliations

Academy of Management

SIOF

Society for Personality and Social Psychology

Professional Experience

Slalom Consulting Consultant Mar 2006 – 2008

Microsoft Corp/
Volt Information Sciences Program Manager Jan 2005 – Jan 2006

Intel Corporation Program Manager Jan 2001 – Sept 2003
Marketing Manager Sept 2000– Dec 2001

Grant Thornton LLP Manager Sept 1998 – Sept 2000

Claremont Technology Group Consultant June 1997 – June 1998

Consulting Clients

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