

“Scotland’s Future in Scotland’s Hands”: Identity, Memory, and Grievance in the
2014 Scottish Independence Referendum

Elizabeth D. Reams

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Sabine Lang, Chair

Deborah Porter

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Elizabeth D. Reams

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Abstract

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Elizabeth D. Reams

Chair of the Supervisory Committee:

Associate Professor of European and International Studies, Director of the Center for West
European Studies, Interim Associate Director for the Henry M. Jackson School of International
Studies, Sabine Lang

Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies

The 2014 Scottish independence referendum was a benchmark moment in the history of Scottish nationalism, resulting directly from the Scottish National Party’s landslide victory in the 2011 Scottish parliamentary elections and indirectly from the gradual growth of the Scottish nationalist movement. Scottish nationalism is rooted in grievances against the British state, particularly the democratic deficit surrounding Scottish representation in the British government, as well as the survival of the distinct Scottish identity, perpetuated since the 1707 Act of Union through the legacy of Scotland’s unique civic institutions. Scottish collective memory has

cemented national grievances in Scottish society and serves as a tool for nationalists to mobilize popular support, as happened during the 2014 referendum campaign. In their official campaign rhetoric, the SNP utilized collective memory of national grievances, especially that of the democratic deficit, to justify independence as the only course of action to ensure Scotland's prosperity.

In this paper, I present an overview of the historical development of Scottish nationalism and the independence movement from the 1707 Act of Union to the 2014 referendum. I then outline the ideological foundations of Scottish nationalism—grievance, collective memory, and institutional legacy—reviewing the scholarship and theories supporting these mechanisms and analyzing how they interact to shape the Scottish national movement. I then review the scholarship surrounding identity and nationalism in political discourse generally and in Scotland, as well as of other scholarship focusing on the 2014 referendum as an expression of Scottish nationalism. I then analyze the SNP's campaign rhetoric—specifically the SNP government's independence manifesto and speeches made by First Minister Alex Salmond and Deputy First Minister Nicola Sturgeon for the Yes Scotland campaign—focusing on how the SNP constructed Scottish national identity and, most important, how they justified Scottish independence. I then investigate how the SNP's rhetoric affected popular mobilization leading up to the referendum, before offering concluding thoughts on the likelihood of a second independence referendum.

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Introduction: The Independence Referendum and Scottish Nationalism

The enduring conundrum of Scottish independence came into sharp focus on September 18, 2014, when the Scottish electorate took to the voting booth to decide their nation’s future: a continued union with England, Wales, and Northern Ireland, or a separate and sovereign nation-state. The 2014 referendum resulted directly from the Scottish National Party’s landslide victory in the 2011 elections for the Scottish parliament as well as the British government’s subsequent decision to allow a referendum to take place.¹ The modern Scottish National Party (SNP) has long based its political platform on Scottish independence; and its electoral dominance of the Scottish parliament gave greater salience to its demands as the referendum debate played out. The referendum outcome against independence has done nothing to dispel these demands; calls arose for a second referendum within a year of the first, and they have only become louder since the June 2016 “Brexit” vote to leave the European Union.²

These demands for sovereignty are tied to the strain of Scottish nationalism that arose beginning in the late 1960s and that took a distinctly civic form as social and economic interests in Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom (especially England) diverged, even as cultural ties remained intact.³ Since the late 1970s, modern Scottish nationalism has consistently sought to advance the argument in favor of autonomy. The movement’s political clout increased throughout the 1980s and early 1990s as successive Conservative governments in Westminster were perceived to have failed to protect Scottish interests. This understanding of British-Scottish relations contributed to a “democratic deficit” wherein Scottish voters who broadly supported

¹ Neil McGarvey, “The 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum and Its Aftermath,” *Social Alternatives* 34, no. 3 (2015): 36, *Academic Search Complete*, EBSCOhost; James Mitchell, *The Scottish Question* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 273–274.

² Katrin Bennhold, “Amid Divisions in U.K. Over ‘Brexit,’ Nicola Sturgeon Calls for New Referendum on Scottish Independence,” *The New York Times*, March 13, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/13/world/europe/scotland-referendum-independence.html?_r=0.

³ Mitchell, *The Scottish Question*, 9–16.

left and center-left parties felt unrepresented in the UK parliament.⁴ The democratic deficit continues strongly to inform the nationalist argument: as will be investigated in Chapters 4 and 5 of this paper, the SNP, under party leader and First Minister Alex Salmond and Deputy First Minister Nicola Sturgeon, invoked this grievance throughout official rhetoric (including the government’s independence manifesto and Salmond’s and Sturgeon’s many speeches) during the 2014 referendum campaign.

Under the leadership of the Scottish Labour Party and particularly the SNP, Scottish nationalists adopted the goal of establishing a social democratic state in Scotland, which would better correlate with Scottish values of equality, social justice, and the protection of public welfare than did British neoliberalism.⁵ The rising strength of the SNP in recent years, embodied in the party’s 2007 and 2011 majorities in the Scottish parliamentary elections, has continued to place this issue at the center of the British constitutional debate, and the 2014 referendum remains a benchmark for judging the practicability of the nationalist dream. It is for this reason that I will analyze the SNP’s campaign rhetoric, including their independence manifesto and speeches given by Salmond and Sturgeon: their arguments illustrate how and why nationalists perceive an independent Scotland to be necessary.

⁴ Ben Jackson, “The Political Thought of Scottish Nationalism,” *The Political Quarterly* 85, no. 1 (2014): 50, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-923X.2014.12058.x>; David McCrone, “Understanding the Nation: The Scottish Question,” in *The Fate of the Nation-state*, ed. Michel Seymour (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004), 226; McGarvey, “Scottish Independence Referendum,” 35; Mitchell, *The Scottish Question*, 14–15.

⁵ Jackson, “The Political Thought,” 52; Alex Law and Gerry Mooney, “Devolution in a ‘Stateless Nation’: Nation-building and Social Policy in Scotland,” *Social Policy and Administration* 46, no. 2 (2012): 163, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9515.2011.00829.x>; McGarvey, “Scottish Independence Referendum,” 39. It should be noted, however, that some scholars view the nationalist dream of a social democratic Scotland with skepticism: implementing social democratic policies on the model of the Nordic states—the argument most often made by Scottish nationalists—would require changes in Scottish attitudes about economic competition, relations between trade unions, businesses, and the government, and increased taxation, which such scholars see as unlikely to occur. See Malcolm Harvey, “A Social Democratic Future? Political and Institutional Hurdles in Scotland,” *The Political Quarterly* 86, no. 2 (2015): 249–250, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X.12155>; Bill Paterson, “Questioning the ‘Common Sense’: Was Scottish Independence Really an Alternative to UK Neoliberalisation?” *Capital and Class* 39, no. 3 (2015): 494–495, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0309816815607245>.

The social and political elements comprising Scottish nationalism—civic values of equality and diversity, better democracy, social justice, and public welfare—are closely bound to the constitutional relationship between Scotland and the UK, dating back as far as the 1707 Act of Union.⁶ As will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 1 of this paper, following the Union, England allowed (and even encouraged) Scotland to maintain its own systems of law and local administration as well as its educational and financial institutions and the Kirk, its national church and the backbone of all other institutions.⁷ These institutions persisted through the incorporation of Scotland into the UK central government, through representation in Westminster and through the establishment of the Scottish Office and the Scottish Secretary in 1885.⁸ The Scottish Office in particular served to voice Scottish concerns in the government, especially those relating to the allocation of resources; as James Mitchell puts it, “[the] Scottish Office became the Oliver Twist of Whitehall, always asking for more.”⁹ Implicit in this relationship was the assumption that Scotland would receive favored treatment in Whitehall and Westminster.

This acquiescence on the part of the British state ultimately led to the 1979 and 1997 referendums on devolution in Scotland. Both referendums resulted in majority support for reconvening the Scottish parliament (which was abrogated with the Act of Union), but the 1979 referendum included a caveat that 40 percent of the total electorate had to vote “yes” in order for the initiative to pass, and only 32.8 percent did so.¹⁰ The 1997 referendum, called by the first Labour government since 1979, emphatically approved the Scottish parliament (with support for

⁶ Jackson, “The Political Thought,” 50; Murray Stewart Leith and Daniel P. J. Soule, *Political Discourse and National Identity in Scotland* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 3–5; David McCrone, “A New Scotland? Society and Culture,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Scottish History*, ed. T. M. Devine and Jenny Wormald (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 684.

⁷ McCrone, “Understanding the Nation,” 218; Mitchell, *The Scottish Question*, 17–37.

⁸ Mitchell, *The Scottish Question*, 30–33.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 61.

¹⁰ McGarvey, “Scottish Independence Referendum,” 35; Mitchell, *The Scottish Question*, 182–185.

devolution of taxation powers), with a 74.3 percent “yes” vote.¹¹ The Scottish parliament first convened in 1999 with a Labour and Liberal-Democrat coalition government, but since 2007 the SNP has held the majority of seats.¹² The SNP’s decisive victory in the 2011 elections—winning 53 of the 73 constituency seats and 69 of the total 129 seats—established Scottish independence as a front-burner issue in British politics.¹³ Once again, the British government followed the established pattern of conceding to Scottish demands, with the Conservative government under Prime Minister David Cameron approving a referendum on the matter within the life of that Scottish parliament.¹⁴

However, the Scottish nationalist movement at the heart of devolution and the push for independence represents an anomaly in the broader study of nationalism. Historically, nationalism has been expected to arise under conditions of foreign rule or the oppression of an ethnic or national identity. Therefore, scholars have been divided as to whether Scotland would develop a salient nationalist movement, based on its countervailing history of inclusion and participation in the British state. Those who have addressed it, such as Benedict Anderson, Michael Hechter, and Tom Nairn, either downplayed its significance or misinterpreted the facts.

Hechter, for instance, justified Scottish nationalism within his model of “internal colonialism” through the distinct institutions Scotland maintained after the 1707 Act of Union, which he argued created a “segmental” division of labor based upon Scotland’s unique culture.¹⁵ While these institutions were essential for preserving Scottish identity and culture, as Jack Brand points out they were not necessarily important vehicles for the early nationalist movement, as

¹¹ McGarvey, “Scottish Independence Referendum,” 36; Mitchell, *The Scottish Question*, 247–251.

¹² McGarvey, “Scottish Independence Referendum,” 35.

¹³ Lukas Audickas, Oliver Hawkins, and Richard Cracknell, *UK Election Statistics: 1918–2017 (Briefing Paper Number CBP7529)*, House of Commons Library (2017), 53, available at <http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7529>.

¹⁴ McGarvey, “Scottish Independence Referendum,” 36.

¹⁵ Umut Özkırımlı, *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 78, 82.

they did not fuel desire for a separate Scottish state; furthermore, far more Scots were employed by British colonial or administrative institutions than by the (considerably smaller) Scottish institutions, suggesting that their value was more symbolic than politically or economically practical.¹⁶

Nairn commits a similar oversight in constructing his theory of “uneven development”: Scottish nationalism cannot be explained by exploitation or unequal status as compared to the British state, as Scotland enjoyed the same level of industrialization as Britain as a whole, as well as inclusion in British government.¹⁷ Anderson, on the other hand, treats Scottish nationalism minimally in his analyses because of its lack of linguistic differentiation from the rest of the UK (with Scots and Gaelic being spoken only by small minorities) and because of its inclusion in the British political system; for Scottish nationalism to hold political salience, in Anderson’s view, it would require one or more of these arguments for cultural repression and exploitation by the British state.¹⁸

I aim to address the question of why Scottish nationalism has had enough strength in recent years for its main political proponent, the SNP, to secure the referendum on Scottish independence in 2014. The Scottish independence debate, stemming from the broader question of Scottish nationalism, raises the further question as to why a democratic nation with relative autonomy over its internal political and social affairs and with recognition of its distinct identity

¹⁶ Jack Brand, “Nationalism and the Noncolonial Periphery: A Discussion of Scotland and Catalonia,” in *New Nationalisms of the Developed West*, ed. Edward A. Tiryakian and Ronald Rogowski (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985), 281; Anthony D. Smith, *Theories of Nationalism*, 2nd ed. (London: Duckworth, 1983), xvi; see Brand and Smith quoted in Özkırımlı, *Theories of Nationalism*, 122.

¹⁷ Özkırımlı, *Theories of Nationalism*, 75, 121; Jackson, “The Political Thought,” 50–52; Tom Nairn, *The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-nationalism*, 2nd ed. (Champaign, IL: Common Ground Publishing, 2015), 104–106, 289–290. Nairn was also criticized for treating Scotland (and, for that matter, such core nations as England and France) as historical givens, most likely because Nairn was himself a Scottish nationalist; see Özkırımlı, *Theories of Nationalism*, 125.

¹⁸ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 3rd ed. (New York: Verso, 2006), 88–90.

from its parent state should need to be independent at all. Scholars of Scottish nationalism broadly agree that there is a very real and distinct Scottish identity, based on history, culture, civic institutions, and economic, social, and political preferences.¹⁹ Scotland itself constitutes a nation, based on the definition of a nation as a political unit—principally on the basis of devolution and the return of a Scottish parliament in 1999, but also on the basis of Scotland’s history of independence prior to the 1707 Act of Union.

I contend that the Scottish nation and distinct identity have survived three centuries of envelopment within the UK through the path-dependency of Scotland’s informal civic institutions as well as the collective memory of Scottish autonomy and, most important, grievances against the English-dominated British government, as exemplified in SNP campaign rhetoric. The prevailing counterweight in favor of the Union has long centered on the economic and social stability that a unified Britain could afford. The tensions between those forces—one for separation, the other against—will remain at the heart of the independence debate, and even with a continuation of the Union, Scottish nationalism will remain a potent factor in British politics.

In this paper, I will first discuss the historical origins and background of the Scottish nationalist movement, with particular attention to its evolution within the boundaries of the British state. I will then consider the scholarly literature surrounding themes of nationalist grievance, collective memory, and institutional legacy, before analyzing how these ideological mechanisms interact to shape Scottish nationalism and the arguments in its favor. I will next review the scholarly debate surrounding the political discourse of national identity, especially as it relates to Scotland, in order to situate my research within this dialogue. I will then conduct a rhetorical analysis of the SNP government’s independence manifesto and speeches given by

¹⁹ McCrone, “Understanding the Nation,” 217; Mitchell, *The Scottish Question*, 9, 12–14.

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Salmond and Sturgeon during the campaign, focusing on how they constructed Scottish identity and justified independence. Rhetorical analysis will allow for an in-depth examination of the nationalist argument as presented by the SNP, with particular consideration to why independence matters for Scotland. Finally, I will examine how mass mobilization occurred during the referendum campaign and to what extent the SNP’s political rhetoric affected the mobilization process, before offering concluding thoughts on my arguments and on the potential for a second Scottish independence referendum in the future.

Chapter 1: Scottish Nationalism in History—Scotland in the United Kingdom

Scottish nationalism—as a political movement aimed at creating a sovereign Scottish state—first appeared in the 20th century, but its roots can be traced as far back as the 18th century and the aftermath of the 1707 Act of Union. Although the UK has enjoyed roughly 300 years of stability, the Treaty of Union was signed amid tense relations and provoked hostility from Scots who preferred partial, largely economic union to the full subsumption of the Scottish government under Westminster.²⁰ Initial dissatisfaction and frustration with the slow economic gains of the Union, coupled with broken promises by Westminster regarding protection of Scottish institutions, led to a “motion in the House of Lords in June 1713 to repeal the Treaty of Union,” which was blocked by only a slim majority vote.²¹ The 1712 Toleration and Patronage Acts—which undermined the security of the Kirk by giving greater authority in church matters to local landowners—were particularly upsetting to Scots, and fueled support for the Jacobites, those who sought to restore the Stuart house to the monarchy and who were perhaps the strongest supporters of Scottish separatism in the early years of union (as Daniel Szechi puts it: “many Jacobites saw themselves as patriotic Scots first and Stuart loyalists only second”).²²

Despite this early turbulence, opposition remained largely inconsequential throughout the 18th and 19th centuries: the Union had enough support in both England and Scotland to survive the early attempts to dissolve it, and it became increasingly popular as the economy began to

²⁰ T. M. Devine, “Three Hundred Years of the Anglo-Scottish Union,” in *Scotland and the Union 1707–2007*, ed. T. M. Devine (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008), 3. As Allan Macinnes argues, the English parliament sought full political incorporation of Scotland into the Union in order to gain control over Scottish labor and resources; see Allan Macinnes, “The Treaty of Union: Made in England,” in *Scotland and the Union 1707–2007*, ed. T. M. Devine (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008), 67.

²¹ Devine, “Three Hundred Years,” 4.

²² Devine, “Three Hundred Years,” 4; Christopher A. Whatley, “The Making of the Union of 1707: History with a History,” in *Scotland and the Union 1707–2007*, ed. T. M. Devine (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008), 24; Daniel Szechi, “Scottish Jacobitism in its International Context,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Scottish History*, ed. T. M. Devine and Jenny Wormald (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 357.

prosper.²³ Between c. 1750 and 1850, Scotland experienced explosive rates of urban and industrial expansion, faster than all other areas of Britain or Europe; these developments fundamentally altered Scottish society, creating a modern, dynamic economy.²⁴ Furthermore, the 18th century saw transformational growth of the Scottish intelligentsia, the group traditionally responsible for fostering patriotism and nationalism.²⁵ Prominent figures of the Scottish Enlightenment—such as Adam Smith and David Hume—helped to raise Scotland’s stature within the Union, ushering in “a golden century of Scottish high culture.”²⁶ National poet and hero Robert Burns kept the Scottish identity alive through his publications of Scottish folk songs and stories, ensuring that Scotland’s distinctness remained in the fabric of the Union as opposition cooled and support for the Union and Empire grew.²⁷ Burns in particular remains an almost mythical figure in Scottish collective memory, with monuments and the Burns Night holiday in celebration of his legacy.²⁸

In the 19th century, influential elites such as Sir Walter Scott simultaneously championed an imperial British Scotland and protected certain features of Scotland’s distinct identity and institutions. For example, at virtually the same time that Scott arranged a royal visit to Scotland for King George IV—for which he drew heavily from Highland culture in order to assert the king’s familiarity with the Scottish people—he also published his *Letters of Malachi Malagrowther*, which attacked government proposals to prevent Scottish banks from printing their own notes following a financial crisis across the UK that had significantly greater effects in

²³ Devine, “Three Hundred Years,” 4; Whatley, “The Making of the Union,” 29.

²⁴ T. M. Devine, “The Spoils of Empire,” in *Scotland and the Union 1707–2007*, ed. T. M. Devine (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008), 91.

²⁵ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 71.

²⁶ Alexander Broadie, “The Rise (and Fall?) of the Scottish Enlightenment,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Scottish History*, ed. T. M. Devine and Jenny Wormald (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 374.

²⁷ Devine, “Three Hundred Years,” 11; Cairns Craig, “The Literary Tradition,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Scottish History*, ed. T. M. Devine and Jenny Wormald (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 99.

²⁸ Craig, “The Literary Tradition,” 100.

England than in Scotland.²⁹ Scott argued that Scottish people and institutions should not be penalized or forced to suffer economic restrictions because of problems affecting England, a contention that remains part of the nationalist platform today.³⁰ Scott also published several histories of the Scottish nation that both celebrated Scotland’s position within the UK and reinforced Scotland’s distinction from England and Wales.³¹

The unique Scottish press also aided in the consolidation and transmittance of Scottish identity within the Union, with papers such as *The Glasgow Herald*, *The Scotsman*, *The Scots Magazine*, and *The Edinburgh Review* reporting on and dissecting provincial or local affairs and events, Scottish culture, religion, and politics, as well as British affairs, politics, and foreign relations.³² Widespread consumption of this Scottish media meant that Scots maintained their sense of self even as many of them became increasingly British in their work and lifestyles. Participation in imperial projects helped develop a sense of Britishness among the Scottish people, especially those living abroad in the Empire. As Tom Devine notes, “throughout the eighteenth and for much of the nineteenth centuries, Scottish educators, physicians, soldiers, administrators, missionaries, engineers, scientists and merchants relentlessly penetrated every corner of the Empire and beyond.”³³ In eagerly pursuing the benefits of the British Empire, imperial Scots ensured that, while their national identity remained salient, demands for renewed autonomy in Scotland virtually disappeared.

²⁹ Mitchell, *The Scottish Question*, 19–20; Iain McLean, “Challenging the Union,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Scottish History*, ed. T. M. Devine and Jenny Wormald (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 637.

³⁰ Mitchell, *The Scottish Question*, 20.

³¹ Magnus Magnusson, *Scotland: The Story of a Nation* (New York: Grove Press, 2000), xiv.

³² Graeme Morton, “Identity Within the Union State, 1800–1900,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Scottish History*, ed. T. M. Devine and Jenny Wormald (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 474; Mitchell, *The Scottish Question*, 36.

³³ T. M. Devine, “Imperial Scotland,” in *Scotland and the Union 1707–2007*, ed. T. M. Devine (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008), 110; see also Douglas Hamilton, “Scotland and the Eighteenth-century Empire,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Scottish History*, ed. T. M. Devine and Jenny Wormald (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 426.

Scotland’s agricultural, industrial, and urban revolutions in the late 18th and early 19th centuries were largely top-down processes, fueled by the wealth acquired from Scottish participation in imperial trade, colonial administration, and mercantilism.³⁴ Tobacco, cotton, and sugar plantations in the colonies, for example, provided fortunes that could be invested in agriculture and industry back in Scotland.³⁵ As previously stated, the domestic economic prosperity that accompanied these revolutions encouraged unionist sentiment, as the rising standard of living—especially for elites—was so closely tied to opportunities offered by the Empire.³⁶ However, the unionism that flourished in imperial Scotland was not anathema to Scottish nationalism, as Tom Devine points out. According to Devine:

The British Empire ... had a potent influence on Scottish national consciousness and identity. For the Scots elite in the years before 1914 nationalism was not in conflict with the Union but rather was closely integrated with it. The Empire was the means by which the Scots asserted their equal partnership with England after 1707.³⁷

The Empire also provoked concerns among the nationalist minority in the mid-19th century, though, as they feared it dominated all other Scottish affairs in Parliament; these anxieties added to broader demands for greater representation for Scotland in Westminster and Whitehall, and even contributed to a nascent home rule movement.³⁸

Many Scottish offices and institutions were maintained after the Union for economic and social reasons: it was easier to let Scotland keep most of its own educational, legal, and judicial institutions and look after its own domestic affairs. These institutions implemented the policies of the state with distinctly Scottish interpretations, aided by the Scottish Office and Scottish

³⁴ Devine, “The Spoils of Empire,” 93–94.

³⁵ Devine, “The Spoils of Empire,” 96; Hamilton, “Scotland and the Eighteenth-century Empire,” 434–436; Esther Breitenbach, “The Impact of the Victorian Empire,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Scottish History*, ed. T. M. Devine and Jenny Wormald (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 534.

³⁶ It should be noted, however, that imperial Scotland had high levels of inequality, with the population split between a small but enormously wealthy elite, still growing middle classes, and a large and extremely poor lower class; see Devine, “Imperial Scotland,” 116–118.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 110.

³⁸ Morton, “Identity Within the Union,” 475.

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Secretary in Whitehall. Established through the Secretary for Scotland Act of 1885, the Scottish Office originally focused on local education in Scotland, gradually obtaining greater jurisdiction over Scottish affairs within the British government.³⁹ The Scottish Secretary, in tandem with the 45 Scottish members of the House of Commons and the 16 Scottish peers, served as “a focal point for ... grievances and claims,” giving a specific voice within Westminster and Whitehall to Scottish nationalists and their concerns.⁴⁰ Especially as the British government expanded its interventionist welfare state throughout the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries, greatly impacting Scottish society and the Scottish economy, the Scottish Office and Secretary played an important role for Scottish nationalists by successfully arguing for special treatment of Scotland by the Treasury.⁴¹

Scottish nationalism saw considerable growth beginning in the 20th century, particularly as the Empire began to decline and the ties that had connected Scotland to the rest of the UK since the 1707 Act of Union became increasingly strained. As Allan Macinnes put it: “The fortunes of the Union have been umbilically linked to the Empire. As the British Empire has declined in the twentieth century, Union has moved from a constitutional fixture to a constitutional option.”⁴² Following the First World War, Scottish nationalists began to push for greater control over local and regional governance: their efforts manifested in the Scottish Home Rule Association (SHRA, established 1918); the National Party of Scotland (NPS, founded in 1928) and the SNP (created through the 1934 merger of the NPS and the Scottish Party); and the

³⁹ Mitchell, *The Scottish Question*, 31. Ewen Cameron elaborates upon the initial limitations of the Scottish Office, detailing how much of Scottish administration within the UK government fell outside of the Office’s control until the late 1930s, over 50 years after its creation; see Ewen A. Cameron, “The Politics of the Union in an Age of Unionism,” in *Scotland and the Union 1707–2007*, ed. T. M. Devine (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008), 128.

⁴⁰ Mitchell, *The Scottish Question*, 33.

⁴¹ *Ibid*, 51.

⁴² Macinnes, “The Treaty of Union,” 69–70.

Scottish Convention (established 1942) and Scottish Covenant (published in 1950).⁴³ Each of these organizations connected Scotland’s declining economic prospects with declining imperial opportunities and viewed Scottish autonomy as the best means for improving the situation in Scotland.

The SHRA notably drew support from the early labor movement in Scotland, representing a shift in Scottish political preferences that would have a considerable impact on the later nationalist movement.⁴⁴ Although the SHRA was unsuccessful in its bid for devolution—due largely to minimal interest in Scottish home rule among the broad majority—and dissolved less than ten years after its founding, it nonetheless embedded home rule within the Scottish consciousness.⁴⁵ Building upon the SHRA’s foundations, the NPS and (later) the SNP gave political voice to demands for home rule, though this voice was initially weak. The Scottish public in the interwar and early postwar years strongly favored reforms aimed at addressing unemployment, welfare, and an urban housing crisis, with little interest in devolution; the NPS (as well as the smaller Scottish Party) thus remained ineffectual and marginal politically.⁴⁶ After its formation, the SNP suffered from similar setbacks, compounded by internal conflict between the majority of radical former-NPS members and those of the more moderate Scottish Party.⁴⁷ The SNP and the move for home rule more broadly were sustained through these trying years only by the common idea that Scotland was a distinct nation; even if every Scottish nationalist did not necessarily want a Scottish Parliament, the seeds for such a development were present within the SNP.

⁴³ Mitchell, *The Scottish Question*, 90–96, 100–103.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 90.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 90–91.

⁴⁶ Ewen A. Cameron, “The Stateless Nation and the British State since 1918,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Scottish History*, ed. T. M. Devine and Jenny Wormald (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 626–628; Mitchell, *The Scottish Question*, 91–92, 94.

⁴⁷ McLean, “Challenging the Union,” 639; Mitchell, *The Scottish Question*, 96.

Interest in devolution may have been limited through the Second World War, but the 1950s saw a rise in popular support for Scottish home rule as economic and social preferences in Scotland became increasingly liberal. Arriving on the heels of strict wartime and postwar austerity programs, the Scottish Convention served as an engaging cross-party promoter of Scottish home rule; its successor, the Scottish National Assembly, provided an influential platform for Scottish nationalism with its publication of the 1950 Scottish Covenant, a White Paper and petition to Westminster in support of devolution.⁴⁸ As Conservatism in Scotland began a steady decline in these years and especially after 1960, support for the SNP began to grow. The 1967 election of SNP member Winnie Ewing to Parliament probably did more for modern Scottish nationalism than anything before it: more than any of the earlier moves by the SHRA or similar institutions, it opened Scottish politics to an alternative constitutional future, making a Scottish Parliament look much more hopeful.⁴⁹ A distinct Scottish political space was now firmly embedded in Westminster and Whitehall, regardless of the SNP’s fluctuating support in subsequent elections.

The increasing political and electoral influence of Scottish nationalists convinced the UK’s Labour government under Prime Minister Harold Wilson to allow a referendum on devolution in the 1970s. Whitehall was primarily concerned with larger economic issues and the North Sea oil reserves (over which the government wanted to retain absolute control), and saw devolution as a way to appease Scottish nationalists without losing all power in the region.⁵⁰ Wilson’s government established the Royal Commission on the Constitution in 1969 in order to assess the practicability of devolution, largely as part of an effort to appease nationalists and

⁴⁸ Leith and Soule, *Political Discourse*, 19; Mitchell, *The Scottish Question*, 100.

⁴⁹ Mitchell, *The Scottish Question*, 113–114.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 156.

avoid separatism as a force in Scottish politics.⁵¹ The Commission argued in favor of a “semi-federal system” of government that would transfer many of the responsibilities of the Scottish Office (in such areas as education, environment, social services, health, legal affairs, etc.) to a new Scottish Assembly.⁵²

Following the Commission’s report and in the wake of the SNP’s growing popularity, Wilson proposed Scottish devolution in 1974 as part of Labour’s platform.⁵³ After several years of debates surrounding the issue, Westminster passed the 1978 Scotland Act, detailing the specific powers that would come under a devolved Scottish Assembly as well as the rules and restrictions of a referendum. Most important, unionists added an amendment to the Act stipulating that 40 percent of registered voters needed to support devolution in order for a “yes” vote to pass (as mentioned in the Introduction of this paper).⁵⁴

The campaign for the 1979 referendum provided a valuable lesson for campaigners in 1997 and in 2014: the nationalists appeared disorganized and disjointed as compared to the unionists, who crafted a cohesive message in support of the “no” vote.⁵⁵ Although neither side operated under an umbrella campaign, the unionists in the Conservative and Labour parties worked together far better than any of the nationalist groups; furthermore, while Labour “officially supported” devolution, many in the party campaigned for the “no” vote or else maintained a noncommittal attitude, sending “mixed signals” to their voters.⁵⁶ Since Scottish voters also were divided in their desire for devolution—with practical concerns over protecting

⁵¹ T. M. Devine, “The Challenge of Nationalism,” in *Scotland and the Union 1707–2007*, ed. T. M. Devine (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008), 144–145; McLean, “Challenging the Union,” 641.

⁵² Mitchell, *The Scottish Question*, 170.

⁵³ McLean, “Challenging the Union,” 641.

⁵⁴ Mitchell, *The Scottish Question*, 178–179.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 182.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 183.

government spending and welfare outweighing the ideological concerns over Scottish autonomy—unionists could ensure a “no” vote.⁵⁷

The election of a Conservative government under Margaret Thatcher in 1979 initiated over 15 years of governments in Westminster that enjoyed little support in Scotland: in the general elections between 1979 and 1997, Labour consistently received the largest share of the Scottish vote; the Conservatives received their highest share of just 31.4 percent in 1979, with their support falling ever further after that point.⁵⁸ According to Ewen Cameron, “Conservative governments deprecated government intervention, sought to reduce public expenditure, and berated the Scots for their apparent dependence on the state,” an argument that only fueled Scottish grievances against a government seen as hostile to their needs.⁵⁹ The rise of Margaret Thatcher and the Conservative Party in 1979 helped restore strength and support to what had appeared to be a foundering SNP and home rule movement, as the democratic deficit became a potent force in Scottish-British relations.⁶⁰

Thatcher’s economic and social policies provided focal points for Scottish grievances against a seemingly antagonistic government. According to Mitchell, “Thatcherism in its various guises—pro-poll tax, anti-EC [European Community], anti-devolution, pro-privatization and sundry other elements identified subjectively and selectively—was becoming Scotland’s Other.”⁶¹ The poll tax in particular—also known as the community charge, a flat-rate tax on all adults meant to replace local residential property taxes—was a contentious issue for Scots, and

⁵⁷ McLean, “Challenging the Union,” 641; Mitchell, *The Scottish Question*, 184.

⁵⁸ Audickas et al., *UK Election Statistics*, 20.

⁵⁹ Cameron, “The Stateless Nation,” 621.

⁶⁰ Aileen McHarg, “The Constitutional Case for Independence,” in *The Scottish Independence Referendum: Constitutional and Political Implications*, ed. Aileen McHarg et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 104; Colin Kidd and Malcolm Petrie, “The Independence Referendum in Historical and Political Context,” in *The Scottish Independence Referendum: Constitutional and Political Implications*, ed. Aileen McHarg et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 39; Mitchell, *The Scottish Question*, 223 and 224.

⁶¹ Mitchell, *The Scottish Question*, 234.

remains so to this day.⁶² Local government has long held an important position in Scottish society, harkening back to the Kirk’s authority in local affairs up until the mid-19th century, when a structure of local government was put into place; the poll tax eliminated one of the primary sources of revenue for local government in Scotland, undermining its power.⁶³

Moreover, the implementation of the poll tax in Scotland one year prior to its implementation in England rankled Scottish sensibilities, as many Scots viewed this as “vengeful at worst, at best a quasi-colonial treatment of Scotland as a laboratory for radical experiments in fiscal policy.”⁶⁴

Despite Thatcher’s overtures toward Scotland, as well as the symbolic gestures of her successor John Major, Scots were united in their dislike and distrust of her and her government, and by the late 1980s Scottish nationalists from all political parties again began to push for devolution.⁶⁵ The Campaign for a Scottish Assembly (CSA, established 1980) led the revamped home rule movement, publishing its *Claim of Right* in 1988 as an assertion of Scotland’s right to self-government, if not full self-determination; significantly, the CSA also paved the way for the cross-party Scottish Constitutional Convention (launched in 1989), which was instrumental in securing the 1997 referendum on devolution.⁶⁶

The Constitutional Convention consisted of hundreds of members primarily from the Labour and Liberal Democrat parties, with proportional representation from the much smaller Green and Democratic Left parties; the SNP notably chose not to participate, because of political

⁶² Peter Smith, “Lessons from the British Poll Tax Disaster,” *National Tax Journal* 44, no. 4 (1991): 421, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41788932>; Kidd and Petrie, “The Independence Referendum,” 41.

⁶³ Peter Smith, “Lessons from the British Poll Tax,” 421; Kidd and Petrie, “The Independence Referendum,” 41.

⁶⁴ Kidd and Petrie, “The Independence Referendum,” 41.

⁶⁵ Thatcher made numerous visits to Scotland during her premiership, giving annual speeches at the Scottish Tory conference as well as attending the General Assembly of the Kirk in her later years in office; see Mitchell, *The Scottish Question*, 193. After the election of 1992, Major stressed support for the Union while softening the Conservatives’ approach to Scottish home rule; see Kidd and Petrie, “The Independence Referendum,” 42; Mitchell, *The Scottish Question*, 239.

⁶⁶ Kidd and Petrie, “The Independence Referendum,” 42; Mitchell, *The Scottish Question*, 218–219, 234–236.

tension with Labour.⁶⁷ When Tony Blair became Prime Minister in 1997, he pushed devolution to the front of the government agenda, calling for a referendum within the year.⁶⁸ The Conservative governments of the past 15 years—Scotland’s Thatcherite “Other”—bolstered popular support for home rule, and both provisions of the referendum (support for a Scottish Parliament and support for taxation powers) passed with substantial majorities: a Scottish Parliament was approved with a 74.3 percent “yes” vote, and reconvened in 1999 after the 1998 Scotland Act gave it constitutional legitimacy.⁶⁹

Both umbrella campaigns—Scotland FORward and Think Twice—had learned from the mistakes of 1979: the pro-devolution political parties behind Scotland FORward (namely the SNP and Labour) worked together to craft a cohesive message and lead a strong campaign with little inter-party dissent, while those who favored the constitutional status quo (primarily the Conservatives) mainly avoided antagonizing the majority of Scots who opposed them.⁷⁰ Furthermore, the fast-paced progression from Labour’s victory in the 1997 general election to the referendum only a few months later left little time for lengthy debates in Parliament or the imposition of such requirements as the voter threshold of 1979.⁷¹ In any case, few doubted that the referendum measures would pass, as the electorate voted broadly along party political lines, with grievances surrounding Thatcherism firmly in mind; as Mitchell points out, “what mobilized opinion was opposition to the Conservatives. The memory of the Conservatives in government was still fresh.”⁷²

⁶⁷ Mitchell, *The Scottish Question*, 235.

⁶⁸ McLean, “Challenging the Union,” 642; Mitchell, *The Scottish Question*, 245.

⁶⁹ McGarvey, “Scottish Independence Referendum,” 36; Mitchell, *The Scottish Question*, 247.

⁷⁰ Mitchell, *The Scottish Question*, 249–250.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 248, 251.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 249.

The 1998 Scotland Act, written with input from and the approval of all of the major political parties in Scotland and Westminster including the SNP, defined the powers reserved by the UK Government, so that there could be no confusion as to the remit of the Scottish Parliament.⁷³ The Act also outlined elections for the new Parliament in such a way as to prevent any party from achieving an overall majority, using the Additional Member system: out of 129 Members, 72 would be elected from the existing constituencies represented in Westminster using first-past-the-post guidelines, and 56 would be elected from regional party lists using the d’Hondt method.⁷⁴

The first elections for the Scottish Parliament occurred in May 1999; Labour won the most seats and formed a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats, while the SNP became the largest opposition party, having won the second highest number of seats.⁷⁵ The Labour-Liberal Democrat government was reelected in 2003, and throughout its tenure the Scottish Parliament became characterized by significant spending on public goods and services, but with little emphasis on the outcome of initiatives or programs.⁷⁶ Moreover, Labour’s support had been slowly declining even before devolution, and after eight years at the head of the Scottish Government the party had come to be perceived as too much under the control of British Labour.⁷⁷

⁷³ McLean, “Challenging the Union,” 643.

⁷⁴ David McCrone, “Scotland Out the Union? The Rise and Rise of the Nationalist Agenda,” *The Political Quarterly* 83, no. 1 (2012): 69, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-923X.2012.02262.x>; Mitchell, *The Scottish Question*, 248; *Scottish Parliament Electoral System Fact Sheet*, Scottish Parliament Information Center (2011), 2, available at <http://www.parliament.scot/parliamentarybusiness/15882.aspx>. The d’Hondt method uses a mathematical formula to allocate additional seats to political parties based on the number of regional votes they receive: the total number of regional votes cast for a party is divided by the number of constituency (and regional) seats already won by that party, plus one; this formula is repeated for each party on the ballot for all of seven available seats in a region, with the denominator changing each round for the party that won a regional seat in the previous round.

⁷⁵ Mitchell, *The Scottish Question*, 253.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 260–261.

⁷⁷ For example, Jack McConnell, Scottish Labour leader and First Minister from 2001, backed both the replacement of the Trident missile system and the Blair government’s stance on the Iraq War, both widely unpopular among Scots; see Mitchell, *The Scottish Question*, 266.

These factors contributed to (but did not fully explain) the SNP’s first majority win in the 2007 Scottish parliamentary elections: the party won the most seats by one ahead of Labour, and after the Liberal Democrats refused to enter a coalition with either Labour or the SNP, the SNP formed a minority government with the support of the two Green party MSPs.⁷⁸ Some in the SNP viewed their victory as a new popular mandate for their platform regarding independence, as well as the chance to prove their hand at governance; however, party leadership under new First Minister Alex Salmond asserted that an SNP government would only pursue a referendum on the issue, and listed independence last in their published priorities.⁷⁹ Overall, the Scottish electorate voted for the SNP because they perceived the party as the most likely to stand up against Westminster and to protect Scottish interests.⁸⁰

The SNP government proved to be competent and pragmatic, with a strong focus on building Scotland’s economy.⁸¹ Furthermore, unlike the Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition, the SNP government focused as much on the outcomes of its new policies and initiatives as on public spending, and tracked its progress and performance in public reports.⁸² For these reasons, and despite minimal improvements in party performance in the 2010 UK general election, the SNP secured its victory in the 2011 Scottish parliamentary election, though its outright majority could not have been predicted.⁸³ With such a strong popular mandate for SNP leadership, many politicians and political thinkers considered a referendum on independence now to be unavoidable, even if the broader Scottish public did not strongly favor constitutional change.⁸⁴

⁷⁸ Kidd and Petrie, “The Independence Referendum,” 46; McLean, “Challenging the Union,” 643; Mitchell, *The Scottish Question*, 268.

⁷⁹ Mitchell, *The Scottish Question*, 269–270.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 270.

⁸¹ Kidd and Petrie, “The Independence Referendum,” 46; Mitchell, *The Scottish Question*, 271.

⁸² Mitchell, *The Scottish Question*, 270–271.

⁸³ Kidd and Petrie, “The Independence Referendum,” 47; Mitchell, *The Scottish Question*, 272–273.

⁸⁴ Kidd and Petrie, “The Independence Referendum,” 47.

Several scholars have argued that the SNP’s 2011 victory had little to do with Scottish nationalism, but I contend that nationalism did play a role, if unconsciously. Aileen McHarg and James Mitchell, for example, claim that the SNP won such a strong majority because the party had proved to be responsible in governance, and voters saw the party as the most likely to protect Scottish interests against interference from London.⁸⁵ However, such sentiment suggests a nationalist viewpoint because voters made their decisions with Scotland and its “Other” in mind; even if the majority of voters did not favor Scottish independence, they did favor protecting Scottish interests from interference in Westminster. Once again in Scotland’s history, Scots viewed Westminster as antagonistic to their needs and supported a domestic government focused on Scotland’s prosperity.

Plans for the referendum came together relatively quickly after the 2011 election: following debates in the Scottish parliament and negotiations with Westminster, Salmond and Prime Minister David Cameron signed the Edinburgh Agreement in October 2012, legitimizing the referendum and informally launching the campaigns for and against independence.⁸⁶ Yes Scotland and Better Together had formed in May and June 2012, respectively, and from their inception focused on arguments and counter-arguments surrounding the central issues facing an independent Scotland.⁸⁷ These included economic, political, and security concerns that had plagued Scotland for years prior to 2014, such as: income inequality and a low level of job opportunities (linked to a long pattern of de-industrialization and a shift to a service-based

⁸⁵ McHarg, “The Constitutional Case,” 101; Mitchell, *The Scottish Question*, 274.

⁸⁶ Andrew Tickell, “The Technical Jekyll and the Political Hyde: The Constitutional Law and Politics of Scotland’s Independence ‘Neverendum,’” in *The Scottish Independence Referendum: Constitutional and Political Implications*, ed. Aileen McHarg et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 325–327; McGarvey, “Scottish Independence Referendum,” 36.

⁸⁷ Carlos Neira Cortizas and Sandrina Ferreira Antunes, “‘Yes Scotland’ versus ‘Better Together’: How Did It All Happen?” (paper published by the Centre Maurits Coppieters, Brussels, 2016), 8; James Mitchell, “The Referendum Campaign,” in *The Scottish Independence Referendum: Constitutional and Political Implications*, ed. Aileen McHarg et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 87–88.

economy); the future of the National Health Service and the welfare system; the availability and ownership of North Sea oil; and the future of the widely unpopular Trident nuclear missile system.⁸⁸ While an in-depth examination of these subjects lies beyond the scope of this paper, they did serve as important factors in the SNP’s estimation of how an independent Scotland would function and relate to the UK.

Some of these issues once again related to specific actions by Westminster that lacked Scottish support, such as the bedroom tax approved by Cameron’s Conservative government in April 2013: this tax removed housing subsidies for social tenants who had at least one spare bedroom, and it had an enormous negative impact across the UK.⁸⁹ The bedroom tax served as an example of how Westminster’s control over the most fundamental policy areas affecting society (fiscal, foreign, security, and social policies in particular) prevented Scotland from addressing its core social concerns. For the SNP, these issues all stemmed from the democratic deficit in Westminster, and in their view independence provided the only reasonable solution to improve Scottish society.

Crucially, Scottish nationalism both fueled and benefited from a steady deterioration of the British identity within Scotland. Between 1974 and 2007, the percentage of Scots who identified as Scottish rather than British in the Scottish Election Studies and the Scottish Social Attitudes surveys increased from 65 to 71 percent; when given the more nuanced choice between “Scottish not British,” “more Scottish than British,” and “equally Scottish and British” identities,

⁸⁸ Emmanuel Dalle Mulle, “New Trends in Justifications for National Self-determination: Evidence from Scotland and Flanders,” *Ethnopolitics* 15, no. 2 (2016): 215, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2015.1008786>; Law and Mooney, “Devolution in a ‘Stateless Nation,’” 169; McCrone, “A New Scotland,” 676–677; Mitchell, *The Scottish Question*, 277, 282; Andrew Scott, “Economics and National Autonomy,” in *The Scottish Independence Referendum: Constitutional and Political Implications*, ed. Aileen McHarg et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 163–164.

⁸⁹ Mel Nowicki, “A Britain That Everyone Is Proud to Call Home? The Bedroom Tax, Political Rhetoric, and Home Unmaking in U.K. Housing Policy,” *Social & Cultural Geography* (2017): 3, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14649365.2017.1296179>.

the total number of Scots identifying as primarily Scottish averaged roughly 63 percent between 1992 and 2007.⁹⁰ This decline of Britishness in Scotland coincided with the years of Conservative government that lie at the heart of Scottish national grievances, as described above, though the percentage of Scots identifying as mainly Scottish was already high when Margaret Thatcher came to power. Scottish nationalism thus can be linked to the steady disintegration of the British identity over the course of the 20th century, largely as a result of the disappearance of common British projects such as the Empire and the growth of the democratic deficit in Westminster. This strong base of patriotic Scots gave the SNP and other nationalists the support necessary to increase their political influence and make independence a constitutional option.

This chapter has examined how Scottish nationalism originated and evolved over the centuries since Scotland joined the UK, but understanding how it became salient enough that the SNP could secure a referendum on independence necessitates an analysis of its theoretical foundations. These foundations shaped the 2014 independence debate and continue to inform the Scottish nationalist platform today. The following chapter will explore the scholarly arguments behind these theories, as well as how these theories interact to structure Scottish nationalism.

⁹⁰ John Curtice, “How Firm Are the Foundations? Public Attitudes to the Union in 2007,” in *Scotland and the Union 1707–2007*, ed. T. M. Devine (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008), 212–215; David McCrone, *Understanding Scotland: The Sociology of a Nation*, 2nd ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 160–161. In a series of surveys conducted between 2000 and 2006, Frank Bechhofer and David McCrone similarly found that respondents prioritizing Scottish identity averaged around 74 percent, while 22 percent identified as equally Scottish and British; see Frank Bechhofer and David McCrone, “Imagining the Nation: Symbols of National Culture in England and Scotland,” *Ethnicities* 13, no. 5 (2012): 555, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796812469501>.

Chapter 2: Scottish Nationalism’s Ideological Foundations

Scottish nationalism draws heavily upon three ideological mechanisms: national grievance, both economic and political; collective memory; and institutional legacy. National grievances have reinforced Scottish distinctiveness over the years as Scottish and British interests have diverged and Scots have seen their voices drowned out by a government lacking their support. Collective memory cemented past grievances in present narratives by perpetuating the ideas of Conservatives in Westminster as Scotland’s antagonistic “Other” and reaffirming Scotland’s history of independence. Institutional legacy ensured the survival of Scottish identity across generations following the 1707 Act of Union and Scotland’s incorporation into the UK. Many scholars have studied these mechanisms and their applications within nationalist movements more generally; understanding their arguments will facilitate a deeper analysis of Scottish nationalism specifically.

Grievance shapes national identity and can take multiple forms, each equally salient: cultural and social grievances, economic grievances, or political grievances all serve to unite and mobilize national groups in pursuit of their own nation-state. Collective memory often serves as a nationalist tool to mobilize popular support, by drawing upon past national heroes or a golden age in the nation’s history in order to draw attention to present woes. Collective memory can also refer to past grievances that have echoes in present situations. Institutional legacy comes from both the formal institutions of a government or organization and the informal values of a people; once embedded in society, both types of institution are unshakeable and can safeguard national identity against a foreign “Other.”

Nationalism in all contexts strives for the political autonomy of a national group, united by common ancestry, language, or, invariably, memory and grievance; since the 18th century,

nationalism has structured world order, serving as an inescapable framework for international relations. As Umut Özkırmılı remarks: “Nationalism does matter—as the fundamental organizing principle of the interstate order, as the ultimate source of political legitimacy, as a readily available cognitive and discursive frame, as the taken-for-granted context of everyday life.”⁹¹ This rings true in Scotland as much as in any independent nation; the referendum provides the clearest political example of Scottish nationalism, but everyday instances can be found in the Scottish Saltire, tartanry, Scottish bank notes, and other banal components of national identity.⁹²

Following an examination of the theories behind national grievance, collective memory, and institutional legacy, I will explore in detail how these mechanisms shape the Scottish nationalist argument.

Chapter 2.1: National Grievance

Grievance serves as the most powerful foundation of nationalism, providing the basis for the mass mobilization that is necessary for success. Nationalist movements first appeared in the late 18th century, as cultural/social, economic, and political transformations across Europe and the Americas allowed various national groups to claim autonomy on the basis of grievances against their parent states.⁹³ Such groups could be culturally oppressed based on language, religion, or tradition, economically disadvantaged by a wealthier or more industrialized core nation or state, or excluded from political institutions by elite “Others” from another national group. Nationalist discourse utilizes these grievances to consolidate national identity, particularly in groups such as the Scots whose cultural differences from their parent state are relatively

⁹¹ Özkırmılı, *Theories of Nationalism*, 2.

⁹² Michael Billig theorized about “banal nationalism” in his book of the same title, arguing that such everyday, unconscious expressions of national identity tie together national groups, which allows for mobilization against those that threaten them. See Özkırmılı, *Theories of Nationalism*, 171–174.

⁹³ *Ibid*, 72.

minimal (with both national and state identities sharing a common language, religion, or history, for example). In most historical cases of nationalism, though, grievance has served as the trigger for national groups to mobilize in pursuit of their independence.

Scholars who have analyzed cultural and social grievances have focused on how social changes, particularly through the advancement of literacy in the modern era, allowed national groups to unite around their specific identities and to mobilize against an oppressive “Other.” Theorists such as Anderson, Ernest Gellner, and Miroslav Hroch all have studied extensively such cultural/social transformations.⁹⁴ For example, in his seminal work *Imagined Communities*, Anderson argued that language was in large part the basis of most national identities, as the rise of vernacular “print-capitalism” in the 16th century—especially in terms of religious texts, which became accessible to almost anyone for the first time—allowed diverse groups of people who spoke the same language to identify and relate with each other.⁹⁵ Nationalist grievances arose when governing elites rejected or suppressed these vernacular languages in favor of a dominant or official “language-of-power” within a multiethnic empire or state (e.g., English replacing Gaelic in Ireland, or French replacing Breton in France).⁹⁶ Exclusion from sociopolitical institutions or government structures based on cultural or ethnic identity also can act as a source of nationalist grievance, as happened in the American colonies in the 18th century.⁹⁷

Similarly, Gellner posited that national identities coalesced when literacy became widespread and communication technologies advanced as a result of industrialization in the late 18th and 19th centuries: culture became the focal point around which national groups unified.⁹⁸ National identities resulted from “high cultures” pervading an entire social group, such that every

⁹⁴ Ibid, 98.

⁹⁵ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 44–45; Özkırımlı, *Theories of Nationalism*, 108.

⁹⁶ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 45, 78, 86–90; Özkırımlı, *Theories of Nationalism*, 110, 112.

⁹⁷ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 57–58; Özkırımlı, *Theories of Nationalism*, 111.

⁹⁸ Özkırımlı, *Theories of Nationalism*, 100–101.

individual felt loyalty to their culture and to those who shared it.⁹⁹ Grievances would thus arise in conditions identical to those described by Anderson: in multiethnic empires or states, if one culture were oppressed or subjugated by another. Hroch took a parallel view of national identities and the grievances that would lead to nationalist movements: identities formed around shared cultures, based on language, traditions, social structures, and history.¹⁰⁰ Grievances formed as a result of one cultural or social group antagonizing or suppressing another, generally within multiethnic empires, as in Anderson’s and Gellner’s theories. Hroch also noted that, in many cases, these grievances connected to memories of historical independence or political autonomy, as in much of Central and Eastern Europe as well as East and Southeast Asia.¹⁰¹ Hroch’s analysis illustrates how these mechanisms can interact to shape nationalist movements by arousing particular nationalist sentiments.

Economic theorists such as Nairn and Hechter examine how economic development and the rise of capitalism in the modern era sparked national grievances as certain regions or groups enriched themselves at the expense of others. In Nairn’s understanding, national grievances formed in peripheral countries within multinational empires—such as those of Britain and France—as they experienced an uneven level of economic development as compared to the core.¹⁰² As the core pillaged the periphery for its resources while returning no concrete benefits, elites in the periphery developed these national grievances as a means to unite their group and mobilize against their oppressors.¹⁰³ National identities formed around elites who sought to reclaim their nation’s resources and to pursue their own, fast-paced economic development.¹⁰⁴

⁹⁹ Ibid, 102–103.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, 114, 116.

¹⁰¹ Ibid, 118.

¹⁰² Nairn, *The Break-up of Britain*, 27, 290; Özkırımlı, *Theories of Nationalism*, 75.

¹⁰³ Nairn, *The Break-up of Britain*, 289, 291; Özkırımlı, *Theories of Nationalism*, 75.

¹⁰⁴ Nairn, *The Break-up of Britain*, 292.

The economic grievances of the elites (as well as the masses) made national identities necessary as sources of power against the “Others” constituting the core nations.

Just as Gellner and Hroch held similar views to Anderson of cultural and social grievances, so Hechter’s analysis of economic grievances shares many of the same factors as Nairn’s. Hechter, however, focused on how nationalism and grievance developed within one multiethnic state, such as the UK, Russia, or even the United States, identifying his theory of “internal colonialism”: in such states, the larger core dominates the peripheries both economically and politically, taking advantage of the peripheries’ resources for its own gain.¹⁰⁵ This relationship creates vast inequalities between the core and the peripheries: most of the state’s wealth is concentrated in the core, while a “cultural division of labor” keeps the most prestigious and lucrative jobs within the core as well.¹⁰⁶ Therefore, grievance arises as the peripheral groups form national identities based on their shared economic and social positions as well as their treatment by the state.

Those scholars who have examined political transformations—such as the rise of the modern state, the introduction of universal suffrage, and the changing character and growing role of elites—contend that grievance results from the growth of nations within larger states or empires who aspire to statehood themselves.¹⁰⁷ Paul Brass, John Breuilly, and Eric Hobsbawm all have analyzed nationalism from this perspective. According to Brass, national identity serves as an instrument for political elites to mobilize support among the masses against an “Other” (either from a different or, in some cases, the same group) attempting to seize the elites’ power or resources.¹⁰⁸ National grievances revolve around this question of political power: when one

¹⁰⁵ Özkırımlı, *Theories of Nationalism*, 79.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 80.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 83.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 88.

group contests the power of another, the antagonized group will seek to consolidate that power or else rebel against their oppressor.¹⁰⁹ This often occurs in multiethnic states where minority groups feel inadequately represented or else mistreated by the political elite and turn to nationalism as a route to power.

Breuilly, likewise, sees national identity and nationalism as tools for elites within the modern bureaucratic state to seek, exercise, and justify their control of state power: elites used national identity as a means of connecting the masses to the state and ensuring their loyalty.¹¹⁰ Elites also used national identity to mobilize their particular group against a larger state, to reform their present state, or to unite their group with culturally similar groups within a new state.¹¹¹ In Breuilly’s theory, as in Brass’s, political grievances form against an “Other” that either exerts power over such national elites, or else threatens to do so. Grievances can also form within groups who feel that those in power do not represent their national interests. Breuilly’s main argument, though, focuses on elites: those who already hold considerable influence within a group form these grievances on the basis of their desire for political power, and they construct national narratives around their grievances in order to mobilize the masses to their cause.

Hobsbawm, more than Brass or Breuilly, bridges the divide between theories of cultural and social grievances and political grievances. Hobsbawm views national identity as a political invention by elites, created in response to massive social and economic transformations during the modern era.¹¹² Echoing Anderson, Hobsbawm argues that national identities could not arise before the invention of mass printing and the widespread rise in literacy, which made mass

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, 93.

¹¹⁰ Ibid, 84–86

¹¹¹ Ibid, 87.

¹¹² E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 9–10; Özkırımlı, *Theories of Nationalism*, 96.

education in national languages possible.¹¹³ Elites crafted national identities and their associated traditions as a means of securing mass loyalty, in order to mobilize their national group in pursuit of political power.¹¹⁴ Thus, grievances result from the same conditions in Hobsbawm’s view as they do in Brass’s and Breuille’s: elites in multiethnic states (or elites in ethnically homogenous states who do not hold political power) develop political grievances against the state that can be turned into national narratives to mobilize the support of the masses.

Nationalist movements rarely assert just a single grievance, however, and therein lies the primary weakness of the theories discussed above. Most often, nationalists draw upon multiple grievances to support their cause; the sentiments that drive national movements cannot be reduced to one or another complaint. Economic grievances are often rooted in cultural or political differences, as was the case with postcolonial nationalisms: the core nations of Nairn’s and Hechter’s theories exploited the peripheral nations economically, often because of the stark cultural differences that existed between them. Likewise, political grievances can stem from cultural oppression, as happened within the smaller nations that made up the Habsburg and Ottoman empires, for example. Furthermore, cultural grievances can develop from the perception of economic or political injustices being based upon cultural differences. Moreover, grievances do not have to be recent to inform nationalist arguments, as will be demonstrated in the following section.

Chapter 2.2: Collective Memory

In all cases, nationalists construct and disseminate their narratives by using such cultural tools as collective memory, the common view of a shared past among a group. Collective memory can refer to a common remembrance of an event the group experienced, but it often

¹¹³ Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 10; Özkırmı, *Theories of Nationalism*, 96.

¹¹⁴ Özkırmı, *Theories of Nationalism*, 94–95.

refers to shared narratives, both oral and written, known throughout the community. According to Yadin Dudai, collective memory “refers to three entities: a body of knowledge, an attribute, and a process”: the body of knowledge relates to the narratives that form the core of collective memory, the attribute refers to an image of the past, and the process involves the changes to collective memory wrought by individuals over time.¹¹⁵ Collective memory, thus, is changeable and can be manipulated by nationalists to meet their needs. Edward Aspinall provides an example of this in investigating how nationalists in a region of Indonesia used memory to shape and mobilize identity and grievance within their national group, looking specifically at how grievance and the collective memory of past grievances can be used to construct the national narrative.¹¹⁶

James Wertsch has produced extensive research on collective memory and its use within nationalist movements. He and Henry Roediger set out to define collective memory as a tool for identity construction and mobilization, arguing that collective memory represents a “static base of knowledge” shared by a community.¹¹⁷ Collective memory thus differs from what Wertsch and Roediger call “collective remembering,” which recalls Dudai’s “process” of altering or reconstructing memories and narratives.¹¹⁸ Collective remembering is thus more politically contentious than collective memory, because it involves individuals changing narratives in order to suit such purposes as nationalist mobilization.¹¹⁹ However, if collective remembering refers to

¹¹⁵ Yadin Dudai, *Memory from A to Z: Keywords, Concepts, and Beyond* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 51; see Dudai quoted in James V. Wertsch and Henry L. Roediger, III, “Collective Memory: Conceptual Foundations and Theoretical Approaches,” *Memory* 16, no. 3 (2008): 318–319, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09658210701801434>.

¹¹⁶ Edward Aspinall, “The Construction of Grievance: Natural Resources and Identity in a Separatist Conflict,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51, no. 6 (2007): 951, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002707307120>.

¹¹⁷ Wertsch and Roediger, “Collective Memory,” 319.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 319.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 319.

the act of changing collective memory, then collective memory cannot be a static concept, since it will continually be altered.

Collective memory and remembering further differ from strict histories, as Wertsch and Roediger note, because they purposely take a biased view of the past: national groups use collective memory to shape their identity and cement loyalty among their members, an act that is inherently self-serving.¹²⁰ Collective memory thus resists change when confronted with historical evidence that contradicts it, because, as Wertsch and Roediger put it, “the past is tied interpretively to the present.”¹²¹ In other words, the historical accuracy of collective memory matters less than its usefulness to the community as a narrative of identity. Furthermore, collective memory often becomes so tightly woven into the fabric of a society that even when new information can change it, the change is largely superficial.¹²²

Nationalists disseminate collective memory through what Wertsch calls the “cultural tool kit,” a set of reproducible and transferable tools that allow memory to be shared.¹²³ These tools include spoken narratives (such as speeches, stories, and performances) as well as written narratives and such banal communications as calendars and, in contemporary society, the Internet; all of these constitute an “external symbolic storage” for memory, which allows memories to be shared.¹²⁴ Narratives, both spoken and written, serve as especially valuable tools for nationalists in terms of mobilization, because they can add emotion to shared memories that

¹²⁰ Ibid, 320.

¹²¹ Ibid, 320.

¹²² James V. Wertsch, “National Narratives and the Conservative Nature of Collective Memory,” *Neohelicon* 34 (2007): 24, 33, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11059-007-2003-9>.

¹²³ James V. Wertsch, “The Narrative Organization of Collective Memory,” *Ethos* 36, no. 1 (2008): 121, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-1352.2008.00007.x>; Wertsch and Roediger, “Collective Memory,” 322.

¹²⁴ Wertsch, “Narrative Organization,” 121; Wertsch and Roediger, “Collective Memory,” 322.

other cultural tools may lack.¹²⁵ For example, nationalists may draw upon the memory of national heroes or a national golden age within a broader narrative in order to inspire patriotic loyalty from their group, in effect rallying their audience to join their cause.

Collective memory thus serves to maintain and to reshape national identity, as well as to mobilize nationalist sentiment. As will be discussed below, however, other factors often are necessary to ensure the protection of national identities and narratives within multinational states.

Chapter 2.3: Institutional Legacy

Institutional legacy—the path-dependency by which formal economic and political institutions as well as informal cultural and social institutions continue to influence society long after they may have disappeared—is just as important as collective memory in preserving and shaping national identity. Institutions, including organizations and governments as well as societal values or norms, structure national groups and provide vectors for mobilizing nationalist sentiment because they become embedded in society. Informal institutions of cultural values or norms are particularly “sticky” or difficult to change, and are capable of weathering significant shocks, such as political regime change, war, or economic crisis.

In their analysis of the impact of political and economic institutions on a nation’s level of prosperity, Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson argue that institutions develop over time through the interaction between institutional drift (cumulative institutional changes that result from conflict over wealth and power in a society) and critical junctures (turning points in history that typically overthrow previous political and economic institutions, allowing for institutional

¹²⁵ Jan Assmann, “Cultural Memories and National Narratives: With Some Relation to the Case of Georgia,” *Caucasus Context* 3, no. 1 (2007): 40; see Assmann quoted in Wertsch and Roediger, “Collective Memory,” 323–324.

change).¹²⁶ Institutions, which can be absolutist and extractive (those that enrich a narrow, ruling elite at the expense of the majority of the population) or pluralistic and inclusive (those that represent and support broad sections of society), perpetuate themselves through what Acemoglu and Robinson call a “vicious” and “virtuous” circle, respectively.¹²⁷ These “circles” equate to institutional legacy: in most of the historical cases examined by Acemoglu and Robinson—principally in Africa and Asia—colonists established the institutions in question, and these institutions effectively survived after decolonization and continue to affect the governance and societies of these countries.

Valentina Dimitrova-Grajzl takes a similar position on institutional legacy in her investigation of governance in Central and Southeast Europe. She asserts that the divergence in institutional quality between the Central European states and the Southeast European (Balkan) states since the end of the Cold War can be explained by institutional path dependency and the historical legacy of the Habsburg and Ottoman empires.¹²⁸ Dimitrova-Gajzl shares Acemoglu and Robinson’s contention that the historical legacy of inclusive institutions puts states on a productive path toward good governance, while extractive institutions lead to poor governance. The institutional legacy of the informal norms and formal practices of the Habsburgs allowed the Central European states to establish institutions well suited to modern democracy and a market economy; meanwhile, the institutional legacy of the Ottomans has made the Southeast European states less successful.¹²⁹ Institutional legacy thus proves to be a powerful mechanism for shaping economic, political, and social values and behavior.

¹²⁶ Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty* (New York: Crown Business, 2012), 101, 108–109.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 79–81, 107, 113.

¹²⁸ Valentina Dimitrova-Grajzl, “The Great Divide: Ottoman and Habsburg Legacies on Transition,” *SSRN* (2006): 3, <https://ssrn.com/abstract=983720>.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 3.

Robert Putnam presents the case for how institutional legacy can shape identity in his analysis of the strong political and economic divide between the north and south of Italy. Through his investigations he found that civic communities lay at the roots of this inequality. The northern regions, which had a long history of strong civic communities, featured stable governments that were generally comprehensive in their programs, responsive to their constituents, and organized on the basis of equal representation and horizontal networks; furthermore, citizens of the northern regions on the whole were actively involved in local civic associations.¹³⁰ The southern regions, by contrast, were generally unstable, inefficient, unresponsive, and organized around a hierarchical or vertical system of patron-clientism and exploitation.¹³¹ The South had a very weak history of civic traditions, and it was consequently less economically and politically successful and plagued to a much greater degree by distrust and inequality than the North.¹³² Putnam’s argument demonstrates how institutions—through the norms and practices that they uphold—can affect the choices and identities of the individuals and communities that rely upon them. Once institutions become embedded in society, the norms and practices attached to them continue to affect identity across generations.

Chapter 2.4: Grievance, Memory, and Legacy in Scotland

As expressed at the beginning of this chapter, national grievances, collective memory, and institutional legacy all inform the historical development and the primary arguments of Scottish nationalism. National grievances especially play a vital role in differentiating Scotland from the rest of the UK. The political grievance of the democratic deficit (referenced in the Introduction and in Chapter 1) has shaped nationalist arguments for the past three decades, as

¹³⁰ Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 121–137, 150–151.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 121–137, 150–151.

¹³² *Ibid.*, 121–137, 150–151.

Scots have repeatedly seen Conservative governments elected to Westminster that received a minimal share of the Scottish vote. Considering that Scotland holds only 59 seats (compared to England’s 533) and with Scottish political and social interests diverging from those of much of the rest of the UK, Scottish voters likely cannot expect a Westminster government of their choice.¹³³ For that reason, economic grievances against policies such as the poll tax and the bedroom tax (discussed in Chapter 1) also will remain salient in Scottish affairs, adding to the nationalist debate.

The collective memory of the democratic deficit ensured that this grievance remained at the fore of Scottish voters’ minds, especially in the 2014 referendum campaign. While this argument applied to the Conservative government under David Cameron, it also referred to the government under Margaret Thatcher from 1979 until 1992, which was deeply unpopular among Scots. Collective memory of Thatcher’s premiership served to mobilize those Scots who had forgotten, as well as the 16- and 17-year-olds voting for the first time.¹³⁴ Collective memory has also served to preserve the Scottish identity and culture within the Union: tributes to Robert Burns or William Wallace keep the memory of national heroes alive, and the anniversary of the Battle of Bannockburn reminds Scots of their heroic, independent past.¹³⁵

Furthermore, Scotland’s institutional legacy ensured that the Scottish identity survived after the formation of the Union, even as Scots became active participants in British domestic and imperial endeavors. Values of social equality and justice are central to the Scottish identity; they are an inheritance from the Kirk and the other formal pre-Union institutions that survived

¹³³ Audickas et al., *UK Election Statistics*, 17, 21.

¹³⁴ See Stephen Tierney, “The Scottish Independence Referendum: A Model of Good Practice in Direct Democracy?” in *The Scottish Independence Referendum: Constitutional and Political Implications*, ed. Aileen McHarg et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 61, for discussion of the extension of the franchise for the referendum.

¹³⁵ Devine, “Three Hundred Years,” 11–12; David Ditchburn and Catriona M. M. MacDonald, “Bannockburn, World War I, and the Referendum,” *The Scottish Historical Review* XCIII.2, no. 237 (2014): 161–162, <https://doi.org/10.3366/shr.2014.0213>.

after Scotland joined the UK.¹³⁶ Institutional legacy ensured that these and other Scottish values remained embedded in society through the present. Moreover, the Scottish institutions that survived the Union allowed for a sense that Scotland needed oversight of its own affairs as well as special treatment within the British government, leading to the establishment of the Scottish Office and, eventually, to calls for home rule. Thus, devolution, arguably, could have emerged from the institutional legacy of a pre-Union Scotland, with the independence debate representing the next step.

Understanding the ideological foundations of Scottish nationalism provides necessary context for analysis of the SNP’s referendum campaign. In order to recognize the SNP’s justifications for why Scotland should become an independent state, we need to examine how these mechanisms did or did not inform the independence debate. Rhetorical analysis of the SNP’s campaign narratives can illuminate the role of these ideological mechanisms in shaping the nationalist argument. Previous scholarship demonstrates the value of rhetorical analysis of nationalist discourse in understanding national narratives and arguments for self-determination; the following chapter presents a review of this scholarship and analyzes how it intersects with other types of research regarding Scottish independence.

¹³⁶ Bechhofer and McCrone, “Imagining the Nation,” 551, 552, 555; Mitchell, *The Scottish Question*, 19.

Chapter 3: The Political Rhetoric of Scottish Nationalism

Rhetoric, defined here as oral or written communication with intent to persuade an audience, broadly serves as one of the most useful mobilization tools for nationalists. Political discourse provides an opportunity for nationalists to construct their version of their identity and history, disseminate their arguments to the masses, and call for public support of their goals. Political rhetoric also allows nationalists to engage their opponents in debate and to justify their claims for independence on the national (or international) stage. For these reasons, nationalist rhetoric can provide scholars with unique insight into the patterns and practices of nationalist movements: by analyzing what nationalists have said with regard to their identity and their grievances, scholars can better understand how nationalist mobilization occurs, whether it will occur in various cases, and to what degree nationalists will be successful in rallying support from the public.

Several scholars have examined how national identity factors into Scottish political rhetoric, both generally and in a comparative analysis of the referendum’s umbrella campaigns. Other scholars have conducted more theoretical studies of nationalists’ use of rhetoric as a tool for popular mobilization. For example, Matthew Levinger and Paula Franklin Lytle demonstrate how nationalists utilize a “triadic structure” of their national history in their rhetoric—which they argue “juxtaposes idealized images of the nation’s past and future conditions with a degraded present”—in order to mobilize support among their followers.¹³⁷ Levinger and Lytle contend that nationalists favor primordialist narratives of their nation because they are so effective at mobilizing audiences: by contrasting a glorious past and utopian future with a degraded present, nationalists illustrate how the conditions of the nation have changed and how they can be

¹³⁷ Matthew Levinger and Paula Franklin Lytle, “Myth and Mobilisation: The Triadic Structure of Nationalist Rhetoric,” *Nations and Nationalism* 7, no. 2 (2001): 177, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1469-8219.00011>.

improved through collective action.¹³⁸ According to Levinger and Lytle, nationalist rhetoric inspires collective action by first establishing the tensions between the nation’s past, present, and future, by diagnosing the causes of national decline, and then by prescribing the actions that will reverse that decline (e.g., voting for independence).¹³⁹ The SNP’s campaign rhetoric largely fits this template, especially with its strong emphasis on the present problems facing Scotland within the UK.

Murray Leith and Daniel Soule provide a far more specific analysis of Scottish political rhetoric and how the different political parties have constructed and sought to mobilize national identity. Leith and Soule utilize both statistical discourse analysis and rhetorical analysis of all Scottish political party manifestos published between 1970 and 2010, examining how they employ the Scottish nation and identity as either independent and sovereign or autonomous within the UK.¹⁴⁰ Although unionists and nationalists adopted different strategies and desired outcomes, both shared similar views of the Scottish identity, a testament to its survival and incorporation within the British consciousness.¹⁴¹ Furthermore, Leith and Soule identify a common device—the metaphor of the Scottish nation as a person, complete with its own feelings and actions—used by all political parties to underscore their argument: for the nationalists, Scotland is a strong and capable actor held back by the yolk of Union; for the unionists, Scotland is a productive member of a family, who may only be successful within that family unit.¹⁴² Leith and Soule’s claims exemplify the usefulness of rhetorical analysis for understanding how nationalists justify their goals and mobilize their group.

¹³⁸ Ibid, 177–179.

¹³⁹ Ibid, 186.

¹⁴⁰ Leith and Soule, *Political Discourse*, 38.

¹⁴¹ Ibid, 37, 41.

¹⁴² Ibid, 63–64, 66–67, 70.

Emmanuel Dalle Mulle adds to the argument in favor of rhetorical analysis of nationalist discourse in a similar study to that of Leith and Soule. Dalle Mulle contends that modern Scottish nationalist rhetoric—like that of other democratic nations seeking autonomy from a larger state—focuses less on a history of foreign rule or of persecution and protection of a cultural identity, but rather on collective social and economic goals of improved democracy, welfare, and economic growth.¹⁴³ This is a stark contrast to Levinger and Lytle’s argument about the nationalist rhetorical triad, suggesting greater variation within the broad field of nationalist discourse.

Dalle Mulle, like Leith and Soule, examines a large data sample, looking at SNP manifestos published between 1968 and 2011 in order to identify long-term trends.¹⁴⁴ According to Dalle Mulle, rather than seeking immediate or abrupt independence, the SNP opts for a more gradual approach, following the “next logical step” from political devolution.¹⁴⁵ The SNP justifies independence through separatism in stages as well as continued involvement in regional institutions.¹⁴⁶ Ultimately, support for the rhetorical strategies and arguments of the SNP comes from normative factors such as self-determination as a right for all nations, institutional differences and the relationship between the separatist region and its parent state, and the electoral behavior of the region’s population that generally supports gradual independence.¹⁴⁷ Dalle Mulle minimizes the impact of grievances such as the democratic deficit or memories of a glorious past in mobilizing Scottish nationalist sentiment, which makes his argument unsatisfactory as an explanation for the 2014 referendum campaign.

¹⁴³ Dalle Mulle, “New Trends in Justifications,” 211.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 214.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 217.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 212.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 220–224.

Some scholars, such as Carlos Neira Cortizas and Sandrina Ferreira Antunes, have analyzed the rhetoric of both the Yes Scotland and Better Together umbrella campaigns, though they have generally utilized discourse analysis as opposed to a close reading of the campaigns’ narratives. Neira Cortizas and Ferreira Antunes looked at the broad discursive strategies of the two campaigns within their official publications: how they constructed their arguments, how they treated Scotland and the Scottish identity, and what specific choices they presented for an independent Scotland.¹⁴⁸ Unlike Dalle Mule, Neira Cortizas and Ferreira Antunes also emphasized how the Scottish public responded to campaign messages, looking at opinion polls conducted before, during, and immediately following the referendum; Leith and Soule conducted a similar inquiry, though their data represented more general opinions on Scottish identity and nationalism.¹⁴⁹ Neira Cortizas and Ferreira Antunes’ research has contributed considerable insight into the details of the campaign overall, but their analysis of the rhetoric—especially that of the SNP—does not provide a sufficient answer as to why Scottish nationalists deemed independence necessary.

Similarly, though closer to my contention that close rhetorical analysis provides the clearest understanding of nationalist arguments, Kevin Adamson and Peter Lynch examined both umbrella campaigns’ arguments regarding Scottish national identity and Scotland’s place within or without the UK, looking specifically at constitutional positions. Adamson and Lynch favored rhetorical analysis as a means of mapping “party ideology, the formation of group identities and political mobilization,” looking at speeches given by campaign leaders following the formations

¹⁴⁸ Neira Cortizas and Ferreira Antunes, “‘Yes Scotland’ versus ‘Better Together,’” 7, 10–13.

¹⁴⁹ Leith and Soule, *Political Discourse*, 82; Neira Cortizas and Ferreira Antunes, “‘Yes Scotland’ versus ‘Better Together,’” 13–14.

of Yes Scotland and Better Together in 2012.¹⁵⁰ Looking at speeches given by members of both sides, Adamson and Lynch focused on how the two campaigns drew divisions between Scotland and the rest of the UK; in their view, this rhetorical construction provided the strongest means for understanding how the Scottish public might be affected by the campaign.¹⁵¹ Adamson and Lynch identified three broad narratives used by the SNP to mobilize support: democracy, relating to the democratic deficit grievance; fairness, relating to the social values and preferences central to the Scottish identity; and devolution, relating to Dalle Mulle’s argument of gradual separatism and the natural progression from devolution to independence.¹⁵²

These rhetorical and discourse analyses contribute to a much broader study of the 2014 referendum. Numerous scholars have examined Scotland’s economic data in contrast to the SNP’s economic promises for an independent Scotland in order to understand the viability of Scottish independence. Bill Paterson and Malcolm Harvey, for example, both contrasted the SNP’s stated goal of establishing a social democracy in Scotland with the actual economic policies currently in place, finding that the social-democratic ideal did not align with the current reality of British neoliberalism.¹⁵³ Other scholars, such as Robert Liñeira and Daniel Cetrà, have conducted comparative economic studies of Scottish and other independence movements, such as that of Catalonia or Quebec, to identify which circumstances would best allow for independence to be possible and, consequently, which movements might have the strongest claims.¹⁵⁴ Further studies have focused on public opinion in Scotland and across the UK regarding independence, investigating the constitutional and government policy preferences of

¹⁵⁰ Kevin Adamson and Peter Lynch, “Yes Scotland and Better Together: Mobilizing and Neutralizing National Identity for the 2014 Independence Referendum,” (paper presented at the annual conference for the Political Studies Association, Cardiff, United Kingdom, March 25–27, 2013, https://www.psa.ac.uk/sites/default/files/95_164.pdf), 4.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 5.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, 7–9.

¹⁵³ Harvey, “Social Democratic Future,” 249–250; Paterson, “Questioning the ‘Common Sense,’” 494–495.

¹⁵⁴ Robert Liñeira and Daniel Cetrà, “The Independence Case in Comparative Perspective,” *The Political Quarterly* 86, no. 2 (2015): 257, 259–262, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X.12157>.

each national (or, within Scotland, each regional) group, in order to determine how desirable independence really was as compared to further devolution or the status quo.¹⁵⁵

None of this previous scholarship looks at the data from the referendum campaign that I have collected, and its focus lies on the viability of Scottish independence, or how an independent Scotland might function, rather than the reason for why Scotland should be independent. Furthermore, only Adamson and Lynch fully utilize the method of rhetorical analysis that I plan to apply in order to answer my question: why does a democratic nation with both acknowledgment and protection of its distinct identity as well as relative autonomy over its domestic affairs need to be independent from its parent state? Rhetorical analysis provides a deeper understanding of the actual arguments made by Scottish politicians, as well as a more nuanced understanding of how audiences may have interpreted political messages than would survey or statistical data alone.

The limitations of the literature on Scottish nationalism and Scottish independence lie in the fact that few scholars have analyzed the 2014 referendum as an expression of Scottish nationalism. Most literature on the referendum itself focuses on its economic, social, and political characteristics and its implications for the UK and for other nationalist movements, with little consideration of how the SNP expressed their arguments or of how mobilization occurred. Adamson and Lynch, Dalle Mulle, and Neira Cortizas and Ferreira Antunes come closest to engaging this question, but their collective research does not provide a sufficient answer; moreover, in the case of Adamson and Lynch or Dalle Mulle, their most recent data come from 2013, before the 2014 referendum campaign entered its full swing. An in-depth examination of

¹⁵⁵ Britt Cartrite, “The Impact of the Scottish Independence Referendum on Ethnoregionalist Movements in the British Isles,” *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 50, no. 4 (2012): 526–529, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14662043.2012.729733>; Ailsa Henderson, Charlie Jeffery, and Robert Liñeira, “National Identity or National Interest? Scottish, English, and Welsh Attitudes to the Constitutional Debate,” *The Political Quarterly* 86, no. 2 (2015): 266–273, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X.12163>.

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nationalist mobilization during the referendum campaign, driven by the SNP as the primary pro-independence political party, would fill this void and provide substantial insight into justifications for self-determination when independence is actually on the table.

Chapter 4: The Scottish National Party’s Referendum Rhetoric

In order to demonstrate the SNP’s justifications for independence, I will conduct a rhetorical analysis of the preface, introduction, and “Chapter 1: The Case for Independence,” from *Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland*, the SNP government’s independence manifesto, as well as campaign speeches given by Alex Salmond and Nicola Sturgeon in the months leading up to the referendum on September 18, 2014.¹⁵⁶ I will focus on identity construction (achieved through the use of metaphor and constitutive rhetoric calling forth the Scottish people), collective memory, and assertions of grievance (achieved through the dissociation of Scots and their interests from the “Other” of Westminster that controls and disadvantages Scotland).

Chapter 4.1: Constructing the Scottish Identity

Leith and Soule’s metaphor of the personification of the Scottish nation provides useful insight into the SNP’s strategy for evoking Scottish national identity in their rhetorical narratives. The strongest example of this metaphor comes from the constant refrain of the SNP’s campaign, as quoted from *Scotland’s Future*: “Scotland’s future should be in Scotland’s hands.”¹⁵⁷ This catchphrase repeats in each of Salmond’s and Sturgeon’s speeches:

The referendum is not about this Party, or this First Minister, or even the wider Yes campaign. It’s about putting Scotland’s future into Scotland’s hands.

It’s the clearest demonstration we could have that Scotland’s future must be in Scotland’s hands.

¹⁵⁶ Alex Salmond’s keynote speech at the SNP Spring Conference, April 12, 2014; Alex Salmond’s speech at Yes Scotland’s final rally, September 17, 2014; Nicola Sturgeon’s speech at the Scottish Council for Development and Industry, March 3, 2014; Nicola Sturgeon’s speech at Yes Scotland’s final rally, September 17, 2014. See appendices for transcriptions.

¹⁵⁷ Scottish Government, *Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland* (Edinburgh: APS Group Scotland, 2013), ix.

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To vote “no” is to leave Scotland’s future in Westminster’s hands. I believe that it is time to take Scotland’s future into Scotland’s hands.¹⁵⁸

This idea of Scotland as a person, with its own “hands” that can take hold of its own destiny, demonstrates that Scotland is a strong collective body capable of looking after itself. By separating Scotland as an individual entity from the other national bodies of the UK, the personification of Scotland reinforces the distinct Scottish identity that forms the heart of the nationalist movement. Scotland can and should be its own agent, in charge of its own affairs, in order to protect itself from the machinations of Westminster (or as Sturgeon put it, leaving “Scotland’s future in Westminster’s hands”).¹⁵⁹

This particular incarnation of the personification metaphor—“Scotland’s future in Scotland’s hands”—carries considerable significance because Salmond, Sturgeon, and others from Yes Scotland repeated it so often throughout the campaign. It served as a continual reminder that Scotland would always be a separate entity, within or without the UK, as well as asserting that Scotland would thrive under independence. The personification of Scotland further emphasizes Scottish distinctness in *Scotland’s Future*, in which the SNP government wrote: “There are now few people who still argue that Scotland does not have the strength or capacity to be independent.”¹⁶⁰ Again, Scotland—as opposed to the Scottish government or the Scottish people—appears as an active agent in its own affairs; Scotland itself has the strength to achieve and excel in independence.

The SNP government also crafted Scottish identity in the referendum campaign through constitutive rhetoric, distinguishing the Scottish people as those living in Scotland. Maurice

¹⁵⁸ From top: see Appendix A, 67; see Appendix B, 76; see Appendix C, 86. Nicola Sturgeon, in her speech at the final Yes Scotland rally, quoted this refrain rather differently, leaving out the metaphor: “Standing on the eve of the chance each and every one of us in this country of ours has tomorrow, with a simple cross on a ballot paper, to take control of the future of our country into our own hands”; see Appendix D, 88.

¹⁵⁹ See Appendix C, 86.

¹⁶⁰ Scottish Government, *Scotland’s Future*, 54.

Charland articulated the concept of constitutive rhetoric in his analysis of the Quebec government’s 1979 white paper on independence, which first introduced the *Québécois* identity.¹⁶¹ The SNP government drew upon this idea, constituting Scots as “the people who care most about Scotland – the people who live and work here.”¹⁶² The SNP government tied Scottish identity to Scotland itself: its physical territory, where the Scottish people live; this sentiment echoes the study conducted by Frank Bechhofer and David McCrone that found many Scots to view Scotland’s physical landscape as one of the strongest symbols of the Scottish nation.¹⁶³ Importantly, the SNP government did not specify cultural or ethnic markers of the Scottish identity; the Scottish people include anyone who makes Scotland their home, a fact reflected in the characterization of Scotland as a “diverse and vibrant country.”¹⁶⁴

Chapter 4.2: Justifying Independence: Collective Memory and National Grievance

In regard to justifications for independence, the SNP government utilized collective memory as part of their cultural toolkit in order to mobilize the emotions of Scottish voters. Following Levinger and Lytle’s rhetorical triad, the SNP government evoked a primordialist view of Scotland, remarking, “Scotland is an ancient nation.... Our national story has been shaped down the generations.”¹⁶⁵ The manifesto goes on to state, “If we vote for independence, the eyes of the world will be on Scotland as our ancient nation emerges—again—as an independent country.”¹⁶⁶ This quote in particular illustrates how the SNP evoked a memory of independence and statehood based on national narratives as opposed to experience.

¹⁶¹ Maurice Charland, “Constitutive Rhetoric: The Case of the *Peuple Québécois*,” *The Quarterly Journal of Speech* 73, no. 2 (1987): 135, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00335638709383799>.

¹⁶² Scottish Government, *Scotland’s Future*, ix.

¹⁶³ Bechhofer and McCrone, “Imagining the Nation,” 555.

¹⁶⁴ Scottish Government, *Scotland’s Future*, viii.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid*, viii.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid*, 3.

Collective memory of a glorious past also arose in Alex Salmond’s speech at the final Yes Scotland rally in Perth on September 17, 2014, the day before the referendum. Salmond evoked national heroes Adam Smith and Robert Burns, saying:

It is an extraordinary thing that we have Westminster politicians who actually believe that they can tell the nation of Adam Smith that we are not able to run our finances as a country; who can tell the nation who produced Robert Burns that we don’t understand the importance of internationalism. We did produce Adam Smith and Robert Burns: Adam Smith, who founded economics, but who also argued that no society can be content and happy if the great part of its citizens lives in poverty; Robert Burns, who loved Scotland as dearly as any man ever could, but also understood the humanity of mankind the world over.¹⁶⁷

Smith and Burns are two of Scotland’s most popular figures: Burns even has his own holiday (see Chapter 1); by recalling their memories, Salmond reminds his audience of the historic greatness of Scotland. In this context, pairing the memory of Smith and Burns with current grievances against Westminster, Salmond illustrates the contrast between Scotland’s past, in which economic and cultural pursuits flourished, and Scotland’s present, characterized by subordination to another power.

This contradiction highlights the core of the SNP’s arguments in favor of independence: the economic, political, and social grievances stemming from the democratic deficit. These grievances appear in the SNP’s rhetoric through dissociative arguments, which juxtapose “appearance” against “reality,” “good” against “bad,” or “ideal” against “practical” in order to reconcile two conflicting ideas or situations.¹⁶⁸ In this case, an independent, sovereign Scottish government is that “ideal appearance” as dissociated from the “practical reality” of the predominantly English government of the UK. Scots are dissociated from (a predominantly

¹⁶⁷ See Appendix B, 77.

¹⁶⁸ James Jasinski, *Sourcebook on Rhetoric: Key Concepts in Contemporary Rhetorical Studies* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2001), 176–177, Kindle.

English) Westminster that makes decisions against Scottish wishes and interests, especially in terms of economic measures that negatively impact Scotland.

The democratic deficit grievance recurs frequently throughout the SNP’s campaign rhetoric. A few examples from *Scotland’s Future* include:

Westminster governments, rejected at the ballot box in Scotland, will no longer be able to inflict the poll tax or the bedroom tax on the most vulnerable people in our society.

That is the real democratic value of independence—the people of Scotland are in charge. It will no longer be possible for governments to be elected and pursue policies against the wishes of the Scottish people.

Decisions on economic policy, international relations, defence spending and priorities, social security benefits, taxation and other public spending would be made in Scotland by governments accountable to the Scottish people and not by Westminster governments we often do not support.

With independence, Scotland will always get the governments we vote for. For 34 of the 68 years since 1945, Scotland has been ruled by Westminster governments with no majority in Scotland. Policies are imposed on Scotland even when they have been opposed by our elected Westminster MPs.¹⁶⁹

In each quote, the ideal of an independent Scotland—a Scotland that would no longer be ruled by governments with no Scottish mandate, in which Scots made decisions for themselves—contradicts the reality of a government in Westminster that still makes the most important decisions affecting Scotland, regardless of devolution or the wishes of Scots. The last quote in particular highlights this reality, stating the amount of time Scotland has spent under a government without a Scottish mandate, an unavoidable situation given Scotland’s minority of seats in Westminster (see Chapter 2). This quote also demonstrates how collective memory reinforces Scottish grievances: the SNP did not limit its complaints to the Conservative government under David Cameron at the time of the referendum, but drew upon Conservative

¹⁶⁹ Scottish Government, *Scotland’s Future*, x, xi, 37, 41.

governments stretching back to the Second World War (of which many voters would have no direct experience) in order to underscore the depth of the democratic deficit.

The dissociative argument constructing the democratic deficit within SNP rhetoric takes its simplest form in the previously mentioned refrain, “Scotland’s future in Scotland’s hands.” This phrase not only evokes the distinct Scottish identity, but also implies that Scotland’s past and present were and are out of the control of Scots. The ideal of an independent Scotland, in which Scottish governments could fix the economic and social problems facing Scotland, juxtaposes the implied reality of a Scotland that does not have full control over its affairs.

These rhetorical devices and narratives form the heart of the SNP’s arguments for independence. The SNP contended that Scotland needed to become independent—despite the level of autonomy it had acquired through devolution, and despite the historical protections and concessions the Scottish identity has received from the British government—because the British government, embodied in Westminster and Whitehall, no longer represented Scottish interests or values. The democratic deficit had become too deep, and only independence would give Scotland full control over its economic and social policies, as well as letting Scotland enter the world stage as a nation-state equal to its peers. However, the independence referendum failed to provide a “yes” vote. The following analysis of the mobilization that did (and did not) occur as a result of the SNP’s campaign might provide an answer as to why—though an in-depth investigation is beyond the scope of this paper.

Chapter 5: Effective Mobilization in the Referendum Campaign

Mass mobilization played a vital role in the 2014 referendum campaign, particularly within Yes Scotland. Yes Scotland, far more so than Better Together, notably included high levels of grassroots and popular, citizen-led campaigning prior to the referendum.¹⁷⁰ Scottish voters showed a very high level of engagement during the referendum campaign and an extremely high turnout of 84.7 percent for the vote itself (in fact, the highest voter turnout for a UK election “since the introduction of universal suffrage”).¹⁷¹ The SNP largely led the media campaign for Yes Scotland, while local citizen groups led the campaign “on the ground,” working to register voters as well as to mobilize support through events such as the “Yestival,” a festival featuring artists in favor of independence.¹⁷² While these efforts did not secure a “yes” vote in the end, they did ensure that 97 percent of the Scottish electorate registered for the referendum (a remarkable feat on its own); they also promoted the perception of a positive campaign run by Yes Scotland, though it is unclear whether or not this affected voters’ choices.¹⁷³

Voter engagement also surged via social media, as individuals took to sites such as Facebook or Twitter, as well as the comments sections on Internet news sites and forums, to express their opinions and engage in debate.¹⁷⁴ The drawback of social media, particularly in comments sections, lies in the low level of interaction between participants: most simply shared their individual views, without engaging in meaningful deliberation.¹⁷⁵ In the case of the referendum, at least, Stephen Quinlan, Mark Shephard, and Lindsay Paterson found that online

¹⁷⁰ Mitchell, “The Referendum Campaign,” 90–92.

¹⁷¹ Tierney, “Scottish Independence Referendum,” 62.

¹⁷² Mitchell, “The Referendum Campaign,” 87, 91.

¹⁷³ Mitchell, “The Referendum Campaign,” 92; Tierney, “Scottish Independence Referendum,” 62.

¹⁷⁴ Stephen Quinlan, Mark Shephard, and Lindsay Paterson, “Online Discussion and the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum: Flaming Keyboards or Forums for Deliberation?” *Electoral Studies* 38 (2015): 193, 202, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2015.02.009>.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 202.

discussion was broadly positive, civil, and policy-focused, contradicting many of the arguments against referendums as means of deciding public policy.¹⁷⁶ This underscored the high level of engagement among voters, as they focused on the hard economic and social issues of the referendum as much as, if not more so than, partisan loyalties and beliefs.

The British press also played a crucial role in mass mobilization, providing the public with factual arguments regarding the issues of the referendum as well as opinions concerning the choice at hand. British and Scottish publications almost universally opposed independence (though many were ostensibly neutral on the issue), with only the *Sunday Herald*, a Scottish regional paper, openly supporting a “yes” vote.¹⁷⁷ The press generally framed the referendum as a pragmatic choice between different policy agendas, rather than an ideological choice about self-determination, though in the few weeks preceding the referendum date, questions of identity and governance became more prominent.¹⁷⁸ Significantly, the press also exponentially increased the number of articles focusing on campaign performances by politicians and campaign leaders, in what Marina Dekavalla calls the “strategic game” frame: the press effectively portrayed politicians in competition with one another, polarizing audiences along partisan lines.¹⁷⁹

Despite media manipulation or campaign efforts, though, many voters decided on their choice almost as soon as the referendum was announced. Figure 1 illustrates how a majority of voters claimed to have “always known” their preference, while others were split as to when they came to their decision. Few voters, though, decided on their choice in the weeks leading up to the referendum. This might imply that the SNP’s campaign had minimal effect on voter preference, though mass mobilization in terms of voter engagement proved extremely high.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid, 202.

¹⁷⁷ Mitchell, “The Referendum Campaign,” 89–90.

¹⁷⁸ Marina Dekavalla, “Framing Referendum Campaigns: The 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum in the Press,” *Media, Culture, & Society* 38, no. 6 (2016): 801, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0163443715620929>.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid, 800–801.




Figure 1: When did you make up your mind how you would vote in the referendum?¹⁸⁰

However, as Figure 2 demonstrates, many of those Scots who voted “yes” did so because of their concerns regarding the democratic deficit, which the SNP referenced as their primary grievance in their campaign rhetoric. This fact implies the SNP’s rhetorical narrative did affect mass mobilization both in terms of people’s reasons for voting as well as their level of engagement in the referendum process.

¹⁸⁰ “When Did You Make Up Your Mind How You Would Vote in the Referendum?” What Scotland Thinks, September 19, 2014, <http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/when-did-you-make-up-your-mind-how-you-would-vote-in-the-referendum>.




Figure 2: What was the most important reason for you to vote “yes” in the referendum? (Asked only of “yes” voters)¹⁸¹

Furthermore, as Figure 3 highlights, voters overwhelmingly viewed Yes Scotland as the more persuasive of the two umbrella campaigns: more than double the percentage of respondents selected Yes Scotland as the most persuasive than selected Better Together, and 20 percent more respondents considered Yes Scotland to be more persuasive than found neither campaigns to be persuasive. The responses were far more evenly split when asked about the campaigns’ level of trustworthiness, with Better Together receiving slightly more votes than Yes Scotland, as shown in Figure 4. Both campaigns were found to be more trustworthy than not, however, indicating a relatively high level of integrity and honesty from both campaigns.

¹⁸¹ “What Was the Most Important Reason for You to Vote Yes in the Referendum? (Asked Only of Yes Voters),” What Scotland Thinks, September 19, 2014, <http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/what-was-the-most-important-reason-for-you-to-vote-yes-in-the-referendum-asked>.



Figure 3: Have Yes Scotland or Better Together been the more persuasive campaign?¹⁸²

¹⁸² “Have Yes Scotland or Better Together Been the More Persuasive Campaign?” What Scotland Thinks, September 16, 2014, <http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/have-yes-scotland-or-better-together-been-the-more-persuasive-campaign>.




Figure 4: Have Yes Scotland or Better Together been the more trustworthy campaign?¹⁸³

These opinion polls, published around the date of the referendum, underscore the effect of the SNP’s campaign rhetoric on mass mobilization: given that more voters found Yes Scotland to be the most persuasive and that an overwhelming percentage of “yes” voters went to the referendum poll with the democratic deficit in mind, the SNP’s rhetoric clearly made an impression. Without survey data, it is impossible to know whether the independence manifesto or the speeches that I analyzed had any particular impact—or whether other examples of SNP rhetoric proved more effective—but these opinions support the argument that the SNP’s rhetoric in general had a positive effect on mass mobilization during the referendum campaign.

¹⁸³ “Have Yes Scotland or Better Together Been the More Trustworthy Campaign?” What Scotland Thinks, September 16, 2014, <http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/have-yes-scotland-or-better-together-been-the-more-trustworthy-campaign>.

Conclusion: The Break-up of Britain?

In my research, I sought to answer two main questions: the first, why Scottish nationalism has had enough strength in recent years for its main political proponent, the Scottish National Party, to secure the referendum on Scottish independence in 2014; and the second, why a democratic nation with relative autonomy over its internal political and social affairs and with recognition of its distinct identity from its parent state should need to be independent at all.

In answer to the first question, I contend that Scottish nationalism—which has existed on the margins of Scottish society since the signing of the 1707 Act of Union—gained steadily increasing influence in Scottish and British politics beginning in the 1960s because of the deterioration of the common British identity. The distinct Scottish identity has survived through centuries of union because of the legacy of both Scotland’s formal institutions (particularly its national church, the Kirk, which was responsible over many years for providing basic public welfare, but also its judicial and educational systems) and informal institutions (Scottish social values, particularly of equality and justice). Although Scots were active, eager participants in British government and, especially, imperial endeavors—establishing a sense of Britishness in their foreign (if not domestic) relations—they saw this as a means of asserting their equal membership in the Union, a source of national pride and one of the vectors for Scottish nationalism.

However, as the British Empire disintegrated in the first half of the 20th century, Scots lost what had been their strongest, most important tie to the British identity. In the postwar years, the common British project of the welfare state—of which Scots were also active supporters—replaced the common British project of Empire. When Conservatives came to power in 1979 and Scottish interests quickly diverged from those of the rest of the UK, the British identity began

steadily to lose its significance north of the border, allowing the Scottish identity to gain ever-greater salience.

These changes in Scottish society—the decline of Britishness in the face of divergent social and political choices in Scotland—inform the answer to my second question: I argue that the SNP mobilized in their referendum rhetoric national grievances relating to a democratic deficit in the British government (as well as unjust economic policies that resulted from the deficit) through the use of collective memory as a tool to shape Scottish voters’ attitudes. The democratic deficit in particular served as the primary justification for seeking Scottish independence.

Following the 2014 referendum, the SNP won a supermajority—56 of 59 seats—of the Scottish seats in Westminster at the 2015 UK general elections.¹⁸⁴ They did less well, however, in the 2016 Scottish parliamentary elections, claiming 63 out of 129 seats and choosing to lead a minority government; the Scottish Conservatives, surprisingly, became the second largest party in the Scottish parliament ahead of Scottish Labour, winning 31 seats.¹⁸⁵ Calls for a second referendum came almost immediately after the first (though not without debate among SNP leaders, notably Nicola Sturgeon, who became First Minister after the resignation of Alex Salmond), but Westminster has firmly denied that any such referendum will take place; 2014 truly might have been a “once in a generation” opportunity, as Alex Salmond put it in his preface to *Scotland’s Future*.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁴ Audickas et al., *UK Election Statistics*, 21.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid*, 54.

¹⁸⁶ Bennhold, “Amid Divisions in UK”; Chris Green, “General Election 2015: Scottish Independence Referendum Will Be the ‘First Line’ of Next Year’s SNP Manifesto, Says Former Deputy Leader,” *Independent*, April 30, 2015, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/generalelection/general-election-2015-scottish-independence-referendum-will-be-the-first-line-of-next-years-snp-10216628.html>; Scottish Government, *Scotland’s Future*, viii.

The June 2016 “Brexit” referendum on the UK’s membership in the European Union, however, appears to have reopened the Scottish independence debate in Westminster. Scotland voted overwhelmingly in support of remaining; the result to leave the EU prompted fiercer calls for a second referendum on Scottish independence, so that Scotland might be able to stay in (or rejoin) the EU without England.¹⁸⁷ “Brexit” has sparked greater antagonism between the Scottish Government and Westminster, embodied in the relationship between First Minister Sturgeon and newly appointed UK Prime Minister Theresa May, and adds to the grievances utilized by the SNP. A second referendum on Scottish independence may still be in the distant future, but as the UK continues its withdrawal from the EU, tensions between its component nations are likely to rise, as will the voices challenging the constitutional status quo. The break-up of Britain may yet be on the horizon.

¹⁸⁷ “EU Referendum Results,” BBC News, accessed August 2, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/politics/eu_referendum/results; Severin Carrell and Libby Brooks, “Nicola Sturgeon: Second Scottish Independence Poll Highly Likely,” *The Guardian*, June 24, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/24/alex-salmond-second-scottish-independence-referendum-is-certain>; Libby Brooks, “Scottish Independence: Draft Bill Published on Second Referendum,” *The Guardian*, October 20, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/oct/20/second-scottish-independence-referendum-bill-published>.

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Appendix A: Transcript of Alex Salmond’s SNP Conference speech, April 12, 2014

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Italicized text in brackets represents a best guess at what was said.

It’s great to be at our conference here in Aberdeen.

And we’re here as ordinary members of the Scottish National Party.

But we are the most privileged members of the SNP in our entire 80-year history.

For this generation—this generation has the opportunity our forebears could only dream about.

We’re no longer just members of a political party, [*mumbling*].

We’re now part of a greater movement, a movement of young, old, women, men, trade unionists, business people, writers, artists.

It’s a movement of glorious diversity, reflecting our country’s rich spirit.

It’s dedicated to a common goal to build a better Scotland, to create a fairer society, to become an independent country.

And make no mistake: the momentum is with this campaign.

People are coming towards us.

Political public meetings are being revived.

Halls have been crowded across Scotland as we discuss our nation’s future.

And the messages from the hundreds who attend the meeting are amplified a hundred times over through the social media and the campaign momentum continues on.

Now, can the No campaign match this?

Well, not really.

To do it you have to first organize meetings, and then you have to get people wanting to turn up.

Last month the BBC finally discovered this grassroots campaign was underway and tried obviously to cover both sides of the debate.

The problem was that the No campaign struggled to find them any grassroots group to film—or even a single grass root.

It was a bit like what happened just a few weeks back when the London and the Scottish cabinets met the same day here in Aberdeen.

What a contrast that made.

We met in Portlethen church hall in a public meeting with hundreds of people.

The London Cabinet met in private behind the security screen in the headquarters of Shell Oil.

Big oil meets big government with small ideas.

So let me repeat—let me repeat my offer to David Cameron.

Prime Minister, we can drum up a crowd for you in Scotland.

All you have to do is say “yes” to a debate.

I mean, what can you possibly be frightened of?

Just think how well your deputy did debating UKIP!

And let’s think about it: if the fourth and fifth parties in Scotland can have a television debate then why not the First Minister and the Prime Minister?

So let us at last have that debate about the future of this country in an open and democratic way.

And let us agree to do it now.

Of course not everyone is feart on the No side.

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One man is still game.

Alistair “help me Rona” Carmichael is in there fighting hard for the Westminster establishment. Last month Alistair was on home turf in Shetland—a safe distance, he must have felt, from Nicola Sturgeon.

I’ve been reading the Shetland News, which has the motto: “Great is the truth, and it will prevail,” and I saw that Alistair had not lost his touch.

After a debate with Mike Mackenzie, MSP, and local activist Danus Skene, the Shetland News reported: “A show of hands revealed that Mackenzie and Skene had succeeded in widening the gap between yes and no from a single vote to 22.”

Great is the truth and it will prevail.

The problem for the No campaign is this: the more the people of Scotland hear the case for No, the more likely they are to vote Yes.

And no wonder.

They are the most miserable, negative, depressing, and thoroughly boring campaign in political history.

They are already out of touch with the people and are now, I fear, they’re losing touch with reality.

Lord Robertson told a startled Washington that the “forces of darkness” are getting ready to celebrate a Yes vote.

The “forces of darkness”!

Darth Vader, Ming the Merciless, the Klingons, Lex Luthor: they’re all watching this debate intently.

Mind you, I’m told the Daleks ain’t too happy.

Word has reached them that Dr. Who is to be banned from an independent Scotland.

Delegates, that is the No campaign: totally laughable and completely ludicrous.

There is though a serious point.

We are engaged in a consensual constitutional process, which will be decided at the ballot box. It’s not a unique process, but it is rare and precious, and it’s something which should be cherished.

The referendum in Scotland is being held up to the world as an example of best practice.

As an example.

We should do everything in our power to keep it that way and each and every one of us carries that individual responsibility.

A people exercising their right to self-determination in a lawful, agreed, respectful, democratic manner is not a threat but a noble thing.

The Yes campaign is positive, uplifting, hopeful and must always stay that way.

That is the basis on which we shall win this referendum and shall win our independence.

Now friends, there was something else that caught my eye in the report on the Shetland debate.

It was this passage, and I quote: “Local architect Iain Malcolmson said he had never been an SNP voter but would vote yes in September.

“Half his family are Geordies, and on a recent trip south for his grandmother’s 90th birthday he had asked for their views.

Their response was ‘Of course you should vote yes.’”

Now this touches on a fundamental truth.

Many people who have never voted for our party will be voting Yes.

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And the referendum is not about this Party, or this First Minister, or even the wider Yes campaign.

It’s about putting Scotland’s future into Scotland’s hands.

And a Yes vote in September is not a vote for an SNP government in 2016.

It’s a vote for a government in Scotland that the people of Scotland choose, pursuing policies the people of Scotland support.

It’s a vote for a government in control of tax, the economy, social security, employment, immigration, oil and gas revenues, European policy, and a range of other areas currently under Westminster control.

That might be the SNP, it might be Labour, it might be a coalition.

I can tell you what it won’t be.

It won’t be a government led by a party with just a single Member of Parliament in Scotland.

It won’t be a government dismantling the welfare state, privatizing public services.

In an independent Scotland we can give this guarantee: the era of Tory governments unelected by the people of Scotland, handing out punishment to the poor and the disabled—these days will be gone and gone for good.

Now, the Westminster establishment, as you would expect, is fighting hard to maintain its grip on Scotland.

David Cameron’s government is producing edict after edict opposing independence.

Members of the House of Lords have given us their unelected, distilled, wisdom from underneath their ermine robes.

All of it is designed to tell Scots how impossibly difficult it would be to run our own country.

And they’re backed up all the way by a Labour Party leadership that has totally lost its way.

That has lost touch with the values of Labour voters, that supports illegal wars, a cuts commission to roll back the social-democratic gains of devolution, and the Tory assault on social security.

Independence will be good for Scottish Labour.

The Labour Party, freed from Westminster control, will have the chance to return to core values, many of which we in this party agree with.

Indeed, many of which we share.

But there is something that the Scottish National Party will never agree to, will never be a part of, something which we will campaign against with every fiber of our being.

The leadership of the Labour Party are hand in glove with the Tories in a shameful attempt to run Scotland and its people down.

And this is the difference: the Westminster establishment telling Scots what we can’t do, running Scotland down.

The Scottish National Party stressing what we can do, building Scotland up.

So let’s look at the reality of Scotland’s history.

Scotland’s contribution to humankind has been immense: great Enlightenment philosophers, our commitment to science and medical advancements, innovators, industrialists, educators, inventors.

I’m just back from Scotland Week in New York.

There is enormous interest in Scotland, huge profile.

It helped us gain over a thousand jobs this week alone.

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In the opinion of American historians, Scotland “invented the modern world,” something, of course, we wouldn’t claim for ourselves, but nonetheless don’t mind repeating as often as possible!

But still today—modern Scotland: more top universities, per head, than any other country; a hot bed of life sciences; brilliance in creative industries; a world-class food and drink industry; manufacturers exporting across the world; 25 percent of Europe’s off-shore wind and tidal potential; 60 percent of the European Union’s oil reserves; a government 100 percent committed to building a better future.

We will not let anyone tell the people of Scotland that we’re not good enough to run our own country.

Friends, a short distance from this center is a vibrant, busy Aberdeen harbor.

It’s full of vessels servicing Scotland’s thriving oil and gas industry.

They will be here for many, many decades to come.

And the oil and the tax revenues will continue to flow for many decades to come.

What a shock this scene must be for the opponents of independence, because in the 1970s they said No to self-government because they told us that all of the oil would be gone by now.

In the 1980s they said No, though the Tories were laying waste to the steel industry, the car industry, and the coalmines.

In the 1990s the doom-sayers were still saying No because they said we weren’t capable of running our schools and hospitals.

That’s the No campaign: wrong in the ‘70s, wrong in the ‘80s, wrong in the ‘90s, wrong again today.

In September it is time to say yes.

Delegates, Scotland has got what it takes.

Our Parliament, working together, produced free personal care for the elderly.

We’ve passed world-leading climate change legislation.

And this party in government has restored free education.

We’ve kept Scottish Water in public hands.

And there is no better example of why decisions about Scotland are best taken in Scotland than the future of our Scottish National Health Service.

At Westminster the NHS is being softened up for privatization.

The Tories are forcing through a costly, confusing, harmful top-down re-organization.

Nurses are being denied the pay rise that they deserve.

Scotland has gone down a very different route.

We reject the free market in health.

We’ve abolished prescription charges.

Nurses in Scotland are getting their recommended pay rise.

So let us be absolutely clear, conference.

It is because we have control of the health service that we can give this pledge: Scotland’s National Health Service will never be up for sale.

Scotland is a wealthy country.

We more than pay our way.

As an independent nation we would be the 14th most prosperous country in the developed world.

The UK are 18th.

Is anyone seriously meant to believe that the 14th most prosperous country in the developed world cannot sustain itself as an independent country?

Of course they don't, which is why the ratings agency Standard & Poors—not known for their unbridled optimism on any country’s prospects—Standard & Poors said in February: “Even excluding North Sea output—even excluding North Sea output—Scotland would qualify for our highest economic assessment.”

And so, in September, the people of this wealthy country will face a choice between two futures. One future is to put our faith in Westminster, in a system where the five richest families own more wealth than the poorest 12 and a half million people, where charities are warning of a “poverty storm engulfing Scotland,” where families with children need emergency food aid. Delegates, these aren’t reasons for putting our faith in Westminster or the Westminster system, these are reasons to get rid of the Westminster system.

Now, all of us know, in campaigning for Yes, an independent Scotland will not get every decision right.

There will be choices to be made and there will be challenges to be faced.

The point is to be equipped with the powers we need to meet these challenges.

Not to shrug our shoulders and accept Scotland as a region of a grossly unequal country, but to take responsibility, to build a more resilient economy, to create jobs and opportunities.

And we can do this by capturing a sense of shared national purpose, a shared national mission to build a fairer and more prosperous country, by giving our companies a competitive edge in taxation, by reindustrializing Scotland, by building a lasting social partnership.

But more than anything, whether we succeed or fail in our ambition will be down to one factor: the talents and abilities of our people.

So the days of wasting talent and denying opportunity must end.

And yet charities tell us that up to 100,000 more Scottish children are set to grow up in poverty because of the Westminster government’s actions.

So we will stop the poverty-creating policies.

The minimum wage must rise at least in line with inflation.

And in the first year of an independent Scotland we shall abolish the Bedroom Tax.

But to release the potential of our people, we must do more.

That is why we will put into action our independence plan to transform childcare.

It’s a plan that was put to me first by the late Professor Ailsa McKay of Glasgow Caledonian University—a university whose motto is “For the Common Weal”—and a woman who was passionate in her belief that independence could change Scotland for the better.

We will start the process by transferring money from Westminster’s priorities to Scotland’s priorities.

We will save £50 million a year because we won’t be paying for the House of Lords, sending MPs to the Commons, or funding the Scotland Office.

In a time of tight resources we do not believe it is right to go ahead with David Cameron’s married couples tax allowance, a policy that discriminates against widows, single parent families, and which only benefits one-third of married couples.

For us, childcare for all families is the priority, not tax breaks for a few.

And we will have another priority.

Spending £100 billion over a generation on a new generation of nuclear weapons is an obscenity.

And, therefore, let me give this cast-iron guarantee: a Yes vote on September 18th is a vote to remove these weapons of mass destruction from Scotland once and for all.

And doesn’t this crystalize the choice between two futures?

Westminster wants to renew a weapons system that can destroy the world.

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In an independent Scotland, we will build a system of childcare, which will be the envy of the world.

Now let me tell you why this plan—the Ailsa McKay plan—is so important.

It is about changing the destiny of Scotland’s poorest children.

Early years’ education and childcare benefits the most those families who have the least.

For many parents, childcare costs can be crippling.

These costs are a barrier to work, and work is the real route out of poverty.

With devolution we are investing more than a quarter of a billion pounds over the next two years to expand childcare.

But to transform childcare, we need the powers of independence.

Some people say, “Well, it could be done under devolution.”

But under devolution nearly 90 percent of the tax generated on women’s employment earnings goes straight to the Westminster Exchequer, not to Scotland.

In an independent Scotland, with control of our budget, our resources, our taxation, we can invest far, far more in our children’s future.

High quality, universal childcare and early learning for all of Scotland’s children—that’s the independence pledge.

Delegates, transforming childcare will open up opportunity for many, many more women in Scotland.

But our ambitions must go much further: an equal opportunity to join the workforce, an equal opportunity within the workforce.

In an independent Scotland we will want our companies to aspire to at least 40 percent female participation on their boards.

And we will have the power to enforce the Equal Pay Act.

This issue of equality, of equal opportunities, is of the highest importance.

Shona Robison is the minister in charge of equality in the Scottish Government, so today I have asked Shona to join the Scottish Cabinet as a full member and to also take on specific responsibilities for pensioners’ rights.

The Scotland we are seeking to build will be an equal Scotland, a Scotland where everyone has the opportunity to make the most of their talents.

Youth unemployment is the single biggest challenge we face in meeting that goal.

The Scottish Government is working hard to tackle this blight of joblessness among the young.

We have 25,000 and more modern apprenticeships, we’re working with the voluntary sector, and there’s the guarantee of work or training place for every 16- to 19-year-old.

Sir Ian Wood’s Commission is producing exciting proposals, which will align our education and training systems ever closer to the work place.

That work has been overseen by Angela Constance as the only Minister for Youth Employment in Europe.

Today I have asked Angela to become a full member of the Scottish Cabinet and to take full responsibility for work training and the implementation of the Wood Commission.

Why these appointments are important is that they underline our commitment to equality, to pensioners, to helping the young people of Scotland into the workplace.

And, subject to Parliamentary approval, with these two outstanding ministers in the Scottish Cabinet, we will practice what we preach.

The Cabinet is our board as a country, and women will make up 40 percent of the members of the Scottish Cabinet.

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Now, in this speech, I have stressed that an independent Scotland will be an inclusive Scotland. There are many different colors and threads woven into the Scottish tartan, and all must be celebrated.

We need to mobilize all of the talents and all of the potential of all of our people.

And we have to reflect that in how we will proceed, after September the 18th, in the approach that we will take to bring Scotland together as we prepare to move forward.

With a Yes vote on September the 18th, that work will begin.

An all-party, “Team Scotland,” negotiating group, including non-SNP members, will be convened.

It will secure expertise from across the political spectrum and indeed beyond Scotland.

That group will begin negotiations with Westminster before the end of September.

The discussions will be held in accordance with the terms of the Edinburgh Agreement.

That means with respect and in the interests of everyone in Scotland and indeed the interests of everyone in the rest of the UK.

The campaigning rhetoric will be over; the real work will begin.

And in March 2016, Scotland will become an independent country and join the international family of nations.

Delegates, last week, as the great life of Margo MacDonald has been celebrated, many pictures were posted showing Margo out campaigning for independence down the years.

In one, which is on the cover of this week’s Holyrood Magazine, a young Margo is outside the old Royal High School in Edinburgh, holding a big poster of a loveheart with the words: “Yes, We Love you Scotland.”

In this referendum debate we often hear that sentiment.

For some, it will be a love of the astounding natural beauty of our country, the rich diversity of the life and the landscape.

But our cause is about more than landscape, more than history, more than legends, no matter how romantic or how moving.

The historian J. D. Mackie once wrote of Scotland’s significance and vitality as a human community.

I think that’s what it was for Margo; she didn’t just love Scotland, she loved Scots.

She loved people, and she held the unshakable conviction that we can do better for and by our people.

And this referendum will be won when we, as a people, no longer feel we need to ask of others: “Tell me what will happen to us?”

It will be won when the people of Scotland say: “We are going to take the future into our own hands.”

The eyes of the world will be on Scotland in September, watching, intently, to see what we will do.

When the polls close and the voting has been done, let us resolve this.

Let us keep the eyes of the world on Scotland.

Not to see how we are voting, but to watch in admiration at what we are building.

Building a new and better country.

Let us take all our ideals, all our talent, all our commitment, and all our energy.

Let us build a nation that carries itself with pride and humility in equal measure.

That looks to its own but gives to the world as much as it possibly can, which yields to no one in compassion but to no one in ambition.

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And that, come independence day, that country to walk tall among the nations of the Earth.

On that day, on every day thereafter.

This is our moment. To be a beacon of hope. A land of achievement. Our country, our Scotland, our independence.

Appendix B: Transcript of Alex Salmond’s final Yes Scotland rally speech, September 17, 2014

WeeWildyCamper. “Campaign Speech of Destiny – Alex Salmond (3 of 3).” YouTube video, 00:27:45. Posted September 17, 2014. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Kj3D5Fit2o>.

Italicized text in brackets represents a best guess at what was said.

This, in my estimation, has been the greatest campaign in Scottish democratic history, and it follows, therefore, that you are the greatest campaigners in Scottish democratic history.

Now, I was struck by a message from our reports.

They say that if Scotland votes for independence tomorrow there can be no going back, and that is absolutely true.

You see, Scotland has had an example of that over the last few weeks, have we not?

When we staged the greatest Commonwealth Games in history in the great city of Glasgow.

And all of us would have had our highlights from that great festival of sport and culture.

One highlight was that wonderful South African singer, Pumeza Matshikiza, when she sang Hamish Henderson’s anthem “Freedom Come All Ye” at the Opening Ceremony.

“So come all ye at hame wi Freedom,

Never heed whit the hoodies croak for doom.

In your hoose a’ the bairns o Adam

Can find breid, barley-bree and painted room.”

One of the most moving renditions of that great anthem—Freedom and Democracy—that we’ve ever heard.

But the point of the Commonwealth Games is this: that 71 nations and territories across the Commonwealth of Nations—just about every single one of them have become independent from Westminster government over the last hundred years.

And do you know what they have in common, these countries rich and poor, large and small, lucky and unlucky?

Not one of them, friends, has any intention of going back under Westminster rule.

Now we return to the eve of the most exciting day in Scottish democracy.

And we meet here not to celebrate, not to presume, not to preempt.

As Nicola’s just told us, the latest poll has us at 49 percent; that means that we are the underdogs in this campaign, as we always have been.

We know that the Westminster establishment will fling the kitchen sink and half the living room, and probably most of the bedroom at us before the close of poll at 10:00 tomorrow night.

And therefore it behooves each and every one of us, recognizing that underdog status, to campaign with our utmost ‘til 10:00 tomorrow evening, to persuade our fellow citizens that independence is the right road forward for Scotland.

And the message to everyone watching, listening, and deciding across Scotland: tomorrow is our opportunity of a lifetime.

Why are we having this opportunity, this wonderful thing, this peaceful, democratic, consented ballot?

As Elaine C. Smith reminded us a few minutes ago, so many countries have had to struggle so hard for their independence.

All we have to do is go into a polling station and put a cross on a piece of paper.

We’re having a—let’s be under no illusions about this—wonderful democratic experience because the Westminster parties agreed to it, because they thought they had it in the bag. They thought all they had to do was agree to it, see off Scotland, and then it wouldn’t matter. And, therefore, we can have no assurance that we will ever have such a chance again.

This is our opportunity of a lifetime, and we must seize it with both hands.

It has been my privilege in this campaign to share the leadership with famous names—and I want to hear them all recognized—famous names from the Labour movement in Scotland who are supporting Yes, from our colleagues in the Green Party who are supporting Yes, from our colleagues in the trade union movement who are supporting Yes, from the [*three or five*] thousand businessmen and -women across Scotland who are supporting Yes, and, above all, to that vast spectrum of Yes campaigners of no political persuasion whatsoever who have been out campaigning day after day.

We’re a [*mumbling*] group of all parties and of none, but what unites us is hope for the future, what inspires us is having the dignity of being an equal nation, and what will drive us tomorrow and the days to follow is a passion for a better Scotland.

If we win tomorrow—and that is in the hands of the people—it will be because thousands of individuals across the communities of Scotland have become leaders in these communities. What we have proven in this campaign is that every person in this land, in this nation, matters. Because that grassroots engagement, the like of which no one has ever seen before, this is the greatest democratic experience in the history of Scotland.

You’ve already made Scotland a much better place as a result of that campaign, and, as First Minister, I thank each and every one of you for that campaign and that improvement across Scotland.

We ran an extraordinary campaign.

On-line, on the phone, on the doorstep, we have met millions of fellow citizens, from Shetland to Stornway, to Dundee, to Dumfries.

We’ve made our cities and communities parts of discussion emboldened with confidence, and as Nicola rightly said each and every one of us has our campaign stories.

Our stories from the campaign, these moments of insight, of humor, of passion, of commitment that make campaigning so worthwhile.

I’ve got two that I want to share with you.

First, two weeks past Monday was my first absolute realization that something extraordinary, something special was happening.

In the city of Dundee I saw a queue of people, men and women, queuing up patiently to put in their registration forms to register to vote.

Now, any of the youngsters who are sixteen or seventeen making sure that they were getting the vote for the first time—and, incidentally, haven’t we been vindicated in extending the vote to sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds?

These were people who were on the register, who were moving onto the register for the first time because they sensed something really important was happening.

These were people who were in their 40s and 50s—they’d probably not been on the register since the Poll Tax, ladies and gentlemen—frankly who were people who didn’t give a stuff for political parties, or the political process, or any politician, including this one—these were people who sensed this was something different.

You know, I was so struck by this, the following night at a huge meeting in Kilmarnock, I said to that meeting in Kilmarnock, I said: “Yesterday in Dundee, I saw something that I never thought I would see in my entire political life.”

I paused for dramatic effect, and somebody in the audience in Kilmarnock shouted out, “A Tory!”

It wasn’t a Tory; it was these people patiently queuing to make sure they were on the register to vote, and I spoke to them.

I spoke to each and every one of them, and each and every one of them wasn’t queuing patiently to vote No, they were queuing to vote Yes for their country and Yes for independence.

The second story is from part of the process of Ferguson Shipyard in Port Glasgow on the lower Clyde, a shipyard threatened with closure and workers threatened with redundancy.

And the two shop stewards in that yard, John and Alec—one a Celtics supporter, one a Rangers supporter—dragging each other all the time, but absolutely firm and united in their absolute determination to secure a future for their coworkers in Ferguson.

And because of the intervention of one of Scotland’s greatest job creators, Jim McColl, that future of that shipyard is now secure, and John and Alec and their fellow workers have now been vindicated.

I was looking at the latest job figures for Scotland: the latest job figures are 45,000 Scots have found employment, an increase of 45,000 in the last three months.

Employment and jobs in Scotland have moved to a record level.

Female employment in Scotland is at a record level, the fastest increase on record.

And I was thinking to myself of the contrast: on the one hand, we have the Prime Minister, calling into the Rose Garden in Downing Street the [mumbling] parties, desperately trying to get them to do something he wasn’t able to do himself and say something effectively negative about the Yes campaign.

And what a contrast between that fear-mongering in Downing Street and people like Jim McColl and John and Alec, the shop stewards of Ferguson, who are getting on with the job of creating employment in Scotland and making this country prosperous.

[Mumbling] this campaign, this great cross-party and non-party community campaign, as we are now living in the most politically engaged country in Western Europe.

In an era which is meant to be defined by political apathy, that is an astonishing achievement of which campaigners should be immensely proud.

But the reaction of the Westminster establishment to this demonstration of “people power” is telling, is it not?

It is the reaction of the powerful few who believe that they always know what is best for the many, that power should be in their hands.

So the Westminster parties cobbled together the separate, contradictory proposals for what they say are more powers, none of which offers any answers to the issues that this nation faces.

Do we not remember Alistair Darling trying to explain what the three job-creating powers for the Scottish Parliament [were to be]?

[First, there was] the work program, which pays people poverty wages.

That is still the insipid, [mumbling] offer of absolutely nothing.

Something was offered first in the spring of this year; it was repackaged last week, and now rehashed again yesterday.

Do people really feel that Scotland was going to settle for a desperate, last minute offer of next-to-nothing, when we have tomorrow, in our own hands, the ability to take every job-creating power?

[chants of “Yes, we can”]

That last minute, tepid offer of next-to-nothing is not even in their gift to offer.

There’d be the Westminster MPs and the House of Lords who still have the power.

There is the Prime Minister’s own back-benchers planning a blood-bath, that say they’ve been crystal clear, that they’ll fight tooth and nail to prevent any serious tax and economic powers being devolved to Scotland.

So, within 24 hours of this last minute, vague intervention from Westminster, it has fallen apart at the seams.

It’s the clearest demonstration we could have that Scotland’s future must be in Scotland’s hands. Tomorrow, we can deliver for Scotland real power: the power to choose hope of a fair opportunity over despair.

We can write a new chapter in the story of this ancient nation.

It’s the best opportunity we shall ever have to enshrine the things that we cherish most: principles of equality, of social justice, a National Health Service properly funded and always in public hands.

[But now, attentions gravitate] to the older generation to whom we owe such a debt, who *[took hold of powers]* from a powerhouse parliament to offer hope for our young people, who *[led a collection]* on childcare to ensure equality of opportunity and parents the chance to return to work, *[who fought]* the Bedroom Tax in developing a just welfare system that *[mumbling, drowned out by screams]*, and who *[chanced]* to remove the obscenity of weapons of mass destruction *[from our soil]*.

It’s a guarantee that only independence can give, that after Thursday, Scotland will always, at each and every election, get the government that we vote for, not the government that someone else votes for.

To those who remain undecided, I simply say this: tomorrow, for a few precious hours during polling day, the people in Scotland hold in our hands the exclusive sovereign power to define our nation for the future.

It’s the greatest, most empowering moment that any of us will ever have: Scotland’s future, our country, in our hands.

For my part, I ask only this: make this decision with a clear head and a clear conscience.

Know that by voting “yes,” what we take in our hands is a responsibility like no other: the responsibility to work together to make Scotland a better nation.

Independence is not a magic word.

Are there things that go wrong for any nation?

Yes, of course there are.

Are there challenges to overcome?

Undoubtedly.

But my question is this: who better to meet these challenges for this nation than the people who live and work in this nation?

The question of trust in this election is trust in ourselves, trust in each other.

In Scotland, we’ve always had the wealth of resources and the talent.

We know that with independence, we’d start as one of the richest countries in the world, a top 20 nation according to the Financial Times.

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There’s no doubt in this campaign the argument has been won that Scotland could be a hugely successful independent country.

But what has emerged in this campaign is something very new, and it’s changed Scotland forever. I’ve met it in every community that I’ve been in in the last few weeks: confidence, belief, empowerment, an understanding that working together Scotland can be a global success story, a beacon of economic growth, a champion of social justice.

That is who we are as a nation.

It is an extraordinary thing that we have Westminster politicians who actually believe that they can tell the nation of Adam Smith that we are not able to run our finances as a country, who can tell the nation who produced Robert Burns that we don’t understand the importance of internationalism.

We did produce Adam Smith and Robert Burns: Adam Smith, who founded economics, but who also argued that no society can be content or happy if the great part of its citizens lives in poverty; Robert Burns, who loved Scotland as dearly as any man ever could, but also understood the humanity of mankind the world over.

So for us, Scotland’s success can only be asserted when poverty for so many is replaced by employment and opportunity for so many.

Our pledge to Scotland is that in the Scotland we seek, no one should be left behind; as a nation, we’ll stand or fall together.

And, therefore, the job of cementing that unity begins, for us, on Friday morning, because democracy is about tolerance and respect for those who have a different view.

Why? Because we are with them and they are with us.

We are one nation, a cohesive and inclusive society.

If the vote goes against us, I pledge to accept that result with dignity and with respect for the people.

But if the vote is “yes,” I have no doubt whatsoever that there will cease to be a No campaign and a Yes campaign: there shall be a Team Scotland to take this nation forward.

The Edinburgh Agreement was signed by myself and the Prime Minister.

The key clause in that Edinburgh Agreement consenting this referendum was Clause 30, which said that after the result both governments would accept it.

Then they would sit down and get on with the job of working in the best interests of the people of Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom.

Because the central proposition has become the entire campaign, because it’s as simple as it’s profound: and that is, of course, that the best people, the very best people, the people who’ll care most and make the best decisions about this country are the people who live and work in Scotland.

That is the proposition.

This opportunity is truly historic.

There are men and women all over Scotland, looking in the mirror and knowing that the moment has come.

It’s our choice, our opportunity, and our time.

To our friends in the rest of these islands, I say this: all we seek is a relationship of equality and friendship, a new, better, harmonious relationship founded on our enduring bonds of family and culture.

In an independent Scotland, you’ll find your closest friend, most honest counsel, and most committed ally.

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What we seek is a relationship of equals to our mutual advantage.

To the people of Scotland, I simply say this: when the pages of books yet unwritten speak to generations yet unborn of this time and this place, of Scotland today, what story is it they will tell?

They can say that those of us, we who live at this very special time, recognized a priceless moment for what it was; that those who saw this chance did not balk it, that those who were given this moment did not let it pass by.

We’re engaged in a conversation with our fellow citizens, but we’re also engaged in a conversation with the future.

We have the opportunity; we have the chance to create a more prosperous economy, certainly, but also to create a fairer society.

We want to wake up on Friday morning—the first day of creating a better country—wake up knowing we did this; we made it happen.

The vote isn’t about me; it’s not about the SNP, or the Labour Party, or the Tories, or any political party—it’s about you.

It’s about your family, your hopes, your ambitions.

Don’t let them tell us we can’t.

Let’s do this now.

Ladies and gentlemen, friends, we are still the underdogs in this campaign.

Each and every one of us has a job tomorrow; each and every one of us to convince our fellow citizens to vote by majority for a new dawn for Scotland, for that land of prosperity and also of fairness.

It is given to us to have that task at this time.

So let’s get to it, and let’s do it now.

Thank you very much.

Appendix C: Transcript of Nicola Sturgeon’s Scottish Council for Development and Industry speech, March 3, 2014

Scottish Government. “DFM – Scottish Council for Development and Industry Speech.” YouTube video, 00:31:03. Posted March 3, 2014.
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oQ8GIp82UnU>.

Italicized text in brackets represents a best guess at what was said.

I’m absolutely delighted to be here in Glasgow on a sunny spring morning, if that’s not tempting fate, and want to begin by thanking you, Ross, and thanking SCDI for hosting this event today. The founding mission of the SCDI was, of course, to examine and consider the industrial, commercial, and economic problems with which the country is faced and endeavor to arrive at solutions.

And the theme of my presentation today—how we best equip ourselves, as a country, to address the challenges we face—seeks very much to take a similar approach.

It is now, as you will no doubt have picked up from the press over the weekend, less than 200 days to go to the referendum on the 18th of September.

As Ross put it in the invitation he sent to you, the debate is underway in earnest.

I certainly know from addressing meetings up and down the country that people are very closely engaged with all of the issues and all of the arguments that matter as we look forward to this most important decision and opportunity for our country.

And two further things are very clear to me as I travel around the country.

Firstly, the economic health of Scotland is the central issue for many, if not for most, people as they make up their minds on independence.

And by that I mean, obviously, the strength and stability of the economy, as well as the implications for the living standards of individuals and their families.

And, secondly, there appears, to me anyway, to be a consensus that the powers currently available to the Scottish Parliament, and indeed those additional powers contained in the Scotland Act 2012, are inadequate to tackle the challenges that will face Scotland in the future. In other words, most people that I speak to do not want the status quo to be the outcome of the referendum.

There is a strong view, which is borne out by opinion polls and borne out very strongly by the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, that more powers for the Scottish Parliament are essential to meet the aspirations of the Scottish people and address these key challenges that we face as a country.

So my central point today is that the only way to secure any additional powers, but also to ensure that any new powers are substantial enough to meet those challenges, is to vote “yes.”

Now, as a nationalist—as a lifelong nationalist—I believe that Scotland should be independent, because that is the natural and best state of affairs for all nations.

But that view—which was once described by my late colleague Professor Sir Neil MacCormick as existential nationalism—is not really what drives and powers my support for independence, nor do I think you have to be a nationalist in that sense to vote “yes” in September.

Instead, independence for somebody like me—who Neil would have described more as a utilitarian nationalist—is about equipping ourselves with the powers that we need to succeed as a nation, an economy, and a society.

It is very much about powers for a purpose.

So it is, in my view, a very hardheaded analysis of what constitutional option will equip Scotland best for the future that should lead to a decision to vote “yes.”

The five key challenges facing Scotland, both now and in the future, as I see them, are these: firstly, how can we build a more sustainable economy better able to withstand the inevitable economic ups and downs, and compete with the gravitational pull of London and the Southeast? Secondly, as our population ages, in common with countries around the world, how can we boost the number of people in Scotland of working age?

Thirdly, how can we protect and improve our public services?

Fourthly, how can we protect pensions and the postwar welfare state from those at Westminster who seem intent on dismantling social security?

And, lastly, how can we improve living standards and reduce the gap between rich and poor, so that we do have genuine equality of opportunity for all children in Scotland?

And today, with reference to each of these challenges, I want to set out why I believe a “yes” vote is essential if we are to secure that better future.

And I will also set out why I believe that any proposals for more powers which may or may not be brought forward by those parties advocating a “no” vote will fall short of what we need, and they’ll fall short on the grounds of substance, the lack of a common plan, and the absence of any guarantee on delivery.

Now, in *Scotland’s Future*, the independence white paper, the Scottish Government set out the facts and the figures that demonstrate that Scotland can be independent.

Indeed, I think it’s really important that we don’t allow the often-polarized nature of this debate to obscure the fact that it is now, in fact, common ground across the campaigns that Scotland can be a successful independent country.

A *Financial Times* analysis summed it up very well last month when it said: “An independent Scotland could expect to start with healthier state finances than the rest of the UK.”

The FT, in that same analysis, also noted that an independent Scotland would rank in the top 20 countries in the world in terms of GDP per head, with a higher ranking than the UK.

We have a resilient and a diverse economy with key strengths in a range of sectors, like food and drink, tourism, creative industries, life sciences, financial services, manufacturing.

You in this room know that better than anybody.

Even without oil revenues, the size of our economy per head is almost the same as the UK’s; with oil and gas, it is some 20 percent larger.

For each and every single one of the past 32 years, we’ve generated more tax per head of population than the UK as a whole.

And just last Thursday, the global credit ratings firm Standard & Poors said this: “Even excluding North Sea output and calculating per capita GDP only by looking at onshore income, Scotland would qualify for our highest economic assessment.”

So the point I’m making is that there’s no doubt that Scotland can be a successful independent country.

But what really, really matters in this debate is why we should become independent.

And in my view, we should—indeed, must—become independent to secure the powers we need to meet the key challenges that we face and must address for the future.

Of course—and I want to stress this point—independence is not a magic-wand solution.

It does not mean we will get everything right.

It doesn’t mean that there will not be change and adjustment.

Whether or not we succeed will depend on our abilities and the wisdom of the decisions we take, but that’s true for all independent countries.

The experience of the Scottish Parliament demonstrates that taking decisions in Scotland works. On health, education, and justice, we’re already able to take decisions that are right for our circumstances and that address the issues we face.

Independence will complete the powers of our existing parliament to enable us to do the same on the economy, on welfare, on pensions, and immigration.

To address the first challenge that I spoke about—the need to build a more sustainable economy—independence will give us powers over tax and employment, and in the white paper the Scottish Government set out how we would start to use these powers to grow and to rebalance the economy, boost productivity, and create an environment in which businesses will flourish—the kind of environment in which our existing businesses will want to stay and to which new businesses can be attracted to locate.

So we would use tax powers to cut corporation tax.

We would half the rate of air passenger duty with a view to eventually abolishing it altogether.

And both of these policies are examples of how we would use the powers of independence to seek to give Scottish business a competitive edge in the face of the gravitational pull of London.

The London “suction effect,” as it was described—I thought, rather unkindly—by Vince Cable, is powerful; and unless we’re able to take action, to level the playing field, and to give ourselves the ability to compete, the risk is that we will lose out.

So we need to have the powers to take action to protect investments and jobs here.

Using employment powers, we would establish a “social partnership” approach with a convention on employment and labor relations to address issues like the minimum wage and labor productivity.

We would examine the best way of securing employee representation on company boards, and set a target for women’s representation on company and public boards.

Future independent Scottish governments would also have powers to boost manufacturing—for example, by looking at issues such as capital allowances and access to finance.

And we can use our vast potential in renewable energy as a basis for re-industrializing Scotland and rebalancing our economy.

So, with the powers of independence, we can set a clear plan to put our economy on a more competitive, sustainable, and inclusive path.

On the second challenge that I have identified—how we can grow our working age population—independence will give us powers over immigration and, by putting us in charge of spending and revenue, enable us to transform the provision of childcare in Scotland, a move that is essential if we are to raise substantially the level of female participation in the workforce.

All developed countries face democratic pressures; Scotland is not unique in that respect.

And, of course, we should never forget that the fact that more of us are living longer is a good thing; it’s something to be celebrated, not bemoaned.

But, that said, to boost economic growth, increase tax revenues, and help pay for public services and pensions in the long term, we do need to expand the number of people working in Scotland.

In *Scotland’s Future*, we set out a plan to use the powers of independence to achieve this goal.

So, starting by making some very different decisions from Westminster—such as on defense spending and by not proceeding with David Cameron’s married-couples tax break—we would embark on a phased transformation of childcare.

The commitment for universal childcare to be available for all children, aged one to five, for the same number of hours as children spend at primary school, would create—in and of itself—create directly 35,000 jobs.

But, more importantly than that, it would enable more parents, particularly mothers, to enter the labor market.

And if we can reach the levels of female participation in the workforce achieved in Sweden, for example, that would mean an extra £700 million of revenues being raised every year.

And, in an independent Scotland, those revenues would stay here in Scotland.

And I want to stress: that’s not an ideological point; it’s a practical point, because it’s the additional revenue generated by such a policy that will enable us to fund the extra childcare places for the long term.

Under Westminster, however, the revenue would flow to the Treasury in London, and the Treasury would decide how much of that we got back.

So, as Professor Sir Donald MacKay—a former chairman of Scottish Enterprises—said recently, in evidence to the Parliament’s Economy Committee, no financially responsible Scottish Government would dare to implement the childcare proposals under the fixed block grant funding of devolution unless they were prepared to take an axe to existing programs.

So this is a transformation that can only happen with a “yes” vote.

Indeed, when I come on in a few moments to talk about the additional powers that may be offered by other parties, I’ll subject them to what I’m calling the “childcare test” to demonstrate why I believe that they are likely to be inadequate for our needs.

Independence would also enable us to set immigration policy in line with our economic needs, rather than having it set to meet the political needs of a government under pressure from UKIP. Control over immigration means that we could, for example, reinstate the post-study work visa that enabled international students who are educated here to stay for a period after graduation and contribute positively to our economy.

We could also establish a points system to encourage immigration that was appropriate to our economic and labor market circumstances.

And we could signal an end to what I consider to be quite disgraceful UKIP-inspired Westminster rhetoric that discourages talented individuals from coming here to contribute to our economy.

So there is an ability with the powers of independence to put in place a plan to grow the working population and get more people into jobs.

On the third challenge that I identified—how to protect and improve our public services—the need for powers to be transferred from Westminster to Scotland is, I would argue, urgent.

On health and education, the Scottish Parliament has already resisted the privatization and the tuition fees route favored by Westminster; and, of course, we brought forward important reforms like “Curriculum for Excellence” and a focus on prevention and early intervention.

South of the border, by contrast, we hear repeated warnings that the Conservatives are taking the first steps towards a U.S.-style health system.

Now, we, of course, already have policy independence in Scotland on health and education, but because of the way public services are funded in Scotland there is a real threat from this Westminster privatization agenda.

If public spending on health in England is replaced by private spending, that will trigger cuts to public spending in Scotland, and that will clearly make it much harder to deliver high quality services here.

Now, of course, that will be on top of the UK-wide £25 billion of cuts, extra cuts, planned by George Osborne, and the £4 billion of cuts for Scotland that would result if the Barnett Formula is scrapped, as so many Westminster politicians say they want.

So to meet the challenge of protecting and improving public services, it’s essential that we gain the financial powers of independence.

And that urgency is even more evident if we’re to meet another of the major challenges facing Scotland in the future: the need to protect the postwar welfare state.

A recent study from the National Institute of Economic and Social Research said that it cost between six percent and eight percent less to provide the state pension to individuals in Scotland. Yet the age at which people in Scotland can claim the state pension is to rise with no consideration for our circumstances, and far from pulling risk and sharing resources, the current Westminster government seems intent on nothing less than the dismantling of the social security system.

The leader of the Labour Party in Scotland said, and I quote: “The UK government is going beyond any pretense that this is about welfare reform, and is planning an all-out assault on the low-paid, the disabled, and the most vulnerable in our communities.”

I found it hard to see how anyone who believes that to be true can possibly countenance leaving social security powers in the hands of Westminster.

The Scottish Government’s plan for social security in an independent Scotland is for a system that supports people into work, prioritizes employability, integrates with the tax system, and provides a safety net that can be relied upon by all of us in time of need.

We believe in the Universal Principle and we believe in the imperative to protect the most vulnerable, so we would abolish the Bedroom Tax, we would halt the rollout of universal credit and reform pension and welfare arrangements to better protect the position of women in work and in retirement.

These are choices that are only available if we trust ourselves to run the social security system.

And, finally, on the challenge of improving living standards and closing the gap between rich and poor, once again I would argue there is a clear need for the powers of independence.

The UK is, right now, one of the most unequal countries in the developed world: living standards have been falling for those on middle and low incomes; the gap between rich and poor is getting wider.

Scandalously, it’s estimated that at least—at least—50,000 more children will by 2020 be living in poverty as a result of Westminster policies.

Those on the lowest incomes have been suffering the most.

We’ve seen the minimum wage consistently fall behind the cost of living.

In an independent Scotland, we will have the power to ensure that the minimum wage rises in line with inflation, and we would use the convention on employment and labor relations to examine, in partnership with business, how we can make more progress on policies like the living wage.

So on all of the key challenges we face—growing the working population and creating jobs; building a sustainable and secure economy; protecting public services; maintaining a decent social security system; and helping to close the gap between rich and poor—my argument is that we need the powers of independence.

We need personal tax powers, business tax powers, social security powers, employment powers, powers over our budget, powers over the minimum wage, immigration powers, and the powers

to represent Scotland internationally; in other words, the same toolbox of powers that other independent countries take for granted.

And we need that, I believe, if we are to make Scotland the country we all know that it can be. Of course, some people say that the best option for Scotland is not independence, but additional powers short of independence.

I would say, firstly, that I think it is really positive that all mainstream parties are now discussing more powers.

The debate seems to me to be no longer about the principle of taking decisions in Scotland, but simply about the extent of the powers to be transferred, and I think that is a positive development.

But I want, for the remainder of my remarks, to demonstrate why I believe that extended devolution is not the best option, nor one that we can rely on to be delivered.

I will start with the obvious point that the option of more powers short of independence is not actually on the ballot paper in September.

Indeed, it was the UK Government and other opposition parties that insisted there was no third option of further devolution put to the people.

So, as a matter of simple fact, the only referendum outcome that will guarantee more powers is a “yes” vote.

But that’s not the only reason, I believe, that more powers option falls far short of what we need. That conclusion is one that is based on an analysis of the maximum that each party is likely to propose and an assessment of the extent to which these proposals would enable us to address the challenges that I have spoken about.

Now, I should also say at this point that neither Labour, nor the Liberals, nor the Tories have yet come up with their final proposals; but certainly in the case of Labour and the Liberal Democrats, we have a clear idea of where they will end up in the shape of the Labour Interim Report on Devolution and the report prepared for the Liberals by Sir Mingus Campbell.

And I would argue that they both fall short of what we need on the three grounds that I’ve mentioned: substance, the lack of a common plan, and the absence of any guarantee on delivery. To take the Labour Party’s Interim Report, it recommends devolving income tax—though, if we’re to believe what we read in the newspapers, that’s currently the subject of deep divisions within the Labour Party—and possibly air passenger duty, which was first recommended by the Calman Commission in 2009.

But that report expressly rules out the devolution of corporation tax or national insurance, oil and gas revenue, or any substantial power over the welfare state.

These proposals would make the Scottish Parliament responsible for something like 26 and a half percent—barely a quarter of all taxes raised in Scotland.

Westminster would continue to control the rest.

The Liberal Democrat commission also proposes that income tax and APD are devolved, along with capital gains tax and inheritance tax, and that corporation tax revenues are assigned to Scotland, rather than devolved.

These plans would give us devolved responsibility for about 27.7 percent of taxes raised; assigning corporation tax revenues to Scotland represents about another five percent.

But oil and gas revenues would remain with Westminster, as would the power to set corporation tax and the power over immigration and welfare.

The Liberal commission also proposes the end of the Barnett Formula and its replacement with a needs-based grant to fund the balance of government spending in Scotland.

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Now, Scotland’s public finances are healthier than the UK’s—I covered that earlier on. But removing the Barnett Formula without giving us full access to all of the tax revenues generated in Scotland and the powers to grow the economy would risk blowing a significant hole—worth up to about £4 billion—in Scotland’s budget.

And make no mistake: the power to reform or abolish the Barnett Formula does lie with Westminster.

The UK Parliament can make any changes to the powers of the Scottish Parliament that it likes, and we know that many politicians at Westminster are itching to cut Scotland’s budget, so they may well see this as the opportunity they’ve been waiting for.

So, my point is that the emerging proposals of the No parties are at best inadequate and at worst could be damaging.

They wouldn’t equip us with the powers to boost the number of people working in Scotland through sensible immigration policies or transformative childcare.

They fail the childcare test that I mentioned earlier.

I indicated earlier that a transformation in childcare could raise an additional £700 million per year in revenues from enabling more women to work.

That money would come from, for example, income tax, national insurance contributions, indirect taxes like VAT, and corporation tax.

With the full powers of independence, all of those revenues stay here to fund the policy for the long term.

Under the proposals of either Labour or the Liberals, less than £200 million of those revenues would stay in Scotland.

These limited proposals for fiscal devolution mean that the responsibility for the vast majority—around three-quarters of Scottish taxes—would remain with Westminster.

That hardly adds up to fiscal responsibility.

Significant economic taxes—notably corporation tax, but also oil and gas revenues—would remain with Westminster; we would be unable to use these powers to shape a competitive business environment and build a sustainable economy.

There are no proposals, so far, for employment to be devolved to enable us to set the minimum wage, or address the gender gap on company boards, or promote the social partnership approach to industrial policy that we propose.

And, of course, we would continue to be powerless to protect the vulnerable from the impact of the dismantling of the social security safety net.

In short, the emerging proposals for more devolution are demonstrably inadequate to meet the challenges—the big challenges—we face as a country.

But I would suggest they fail on two further grounds.

There is no common plan agreed between the No parties; Labour in particular seems split from top to bottom on the issue of more powers for Scotland.

And given the difficulties in agreeing a position within just one of these parties, there seems to be little chance of all three of them agreeing a common position before September, as the No campaign director seemed to concede only yesterday.

But, surely, if people are to be asked to take any set of proposals seriously as an alternative to voting “yes”—which, remember, is the tangible option on the ballot paper—they need to know that it will be delivered by whichever party or parties forms the next UK government; anything less, I think, is unacceptable.

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And finally, as I indicated earlier, there is no guarantee of delivery of any more powers; to be blunt, there is no “more powers” option on the ballot paper that people can put their cross against as a way of ensuring that there’s no way back for the politicians who promise more powers now. Whether or not we choose independence on the 18th of September is entirely in our hands, entirely in the hands of the Scottish people; whether or not there is further devolution is entirely in Westminster’s hands.

We saw that clearly in the experience of the Calman Commission and the recent Scotland Act. The Scottish Government was elected in 2011 on clear manifesto commitments to extend the measures in the then Scotland Bill.

Scottish Parliament subsequently backed these proposals, but Westminster refused to countenance them and failed to deliver even all that Calman himself had recommended.

And those with longer memories than me will recall the experience of the 1979 referendum, 35 years ago on Saturday there, when a Westminster government asked Scotland to vote “no” on the promise of a better package and then failed to deliver.

With independence, decisions about what powers our Parliament has cease to be Westminster’s to take, because sovereignty passes to Scotland.

And like all other countries, we will choose on certain issues to pool and share our sovereignty with others; we will do so bilaterally with the rest of the UK, we will do so multilaterally with the European Union.

We can and we would choose to share our currency with our neighbors in a Sterling Zone, recognizing that such an arrangement would not just be in our interests, but also—despite the campaign rhetoric to the contrary—in the interest of the rest of the UK too.

But those will be our decisions.

So this is my contention today: Scotland is facing challenges now and in the future, challenges that we must address if we are to build a strong and sustainable, fairer, and more prosperous country.

To tackle those challenges, we need independence, but not as an ideal or as an abstract notion, but for the specific powers it will give us, powers that we will have the ability to use for the purpose of meeting the challenges we face.

The Yes side in this campaign has set out plans for how we would use those powers to create that better country.

The No campaign has no plan: they ask you to leave it to Westminster and hope for the best. None of the No parties has so far produced substantial proposals capable of meeting those national challenges: there is no joint agreement, there is no timescale, there are no guarantees. To vote “no” is to leave Scotland’s future in Westminster’s hands.

I believe that it is time to take Scotland’s future into Scotland’s hands.

So, I’ll leave you with this final thought: on the 18th of September, for just a few short hours between 7:00 am and 10:00 pm when the polls are open, each and every one of us will have control over our country’s future.

The future of Scotland will quite literally be in the hands of the people who live and work in Scotland.

We will be a fully sovereign people.

And we’ll know, shortly after the polling stations close, whether we’ve kept control of our country’s future or handed it straight back to Westminster.

I believe we should not, must not give it up.

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I believe that Scotland’s future should stay in Scotland’s hands, so that we can, together, build that better, fairer, more prosperous country that we all know is possible.
Thank you very much indeed.

Appendix D: Transcript of Nicola Sturgeon’s final “Yes Scotland” rally speech, September 17, 2014

WeeWildyCamper. “Campaign Speech of Destiny – Nicola Sturgeon (2 of 3).” YouTube video, 00:11:09. Posted September 17, 2014. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8J9WS0beFc8>.

Italicized text in brackets represents a best guess at what was said.

Friends, here we are, standing on the cusp of our moment in history. Standing on the eve of the chance each and every one of us in this country of ours has tomorrow, with a simple cross on a ballot paper, to take control of the future of our country into our own hands and to keep it there forever.

I want to thank each and every one of you, and each and every campaigner across this country from the bottom of my heart for the part you have played in this wonderful campaign. This has been the campaign of my life; it has been the campaign of our lives. Don’t let anyone tell you differently: this has been a wonderful campaign, and we can say with confidence that before the polls open tomorrow morning at 7:00 am, our country has already changed forever and for the better.

I have never known in my lifetime this country to be as energized, as enthused, as informed, as inspired, and as empowered, as we have been as a nation in recent weeks and months. It has been wonderful; this country has come alive, democracy has reawakened. We have in our hands right now control of the future of our country, and tomorrow is our chance to keep it there.

You know, I could tell you a million different stories from the campaign trail. I could write a book of the stories; maybe, one day, I will. I have met so many wonderful people over these past months; it has been such an enormous privilege.

And let me say this: I have met wonderful people who are Yes supporters, and I have met wonderful people who are No supporters.

Thank you.

We, right now, are engaged in a passionate, robust debate, and that is as it should be because this matters; it is important.

But, on Friday, we cease to be the Yes campaign and the No campaign, and we become one country, moving forward, united together.

We can tell a million stories, but I want to share just two with you, two of my highlights from the campaign trail.

One was around a month ago, in my hometown of Irvine where I was campaigning, and a wee boy came up to me and said that he was devastated that he was too young to vote. He was only eight years old, but he wanted to play his part, so he had made me this lucky Saltire loom band, and he made me promise that I would wear this loom band every single day until polling day.

Well, Leon, if you’re watching, I’ve kept my promise, and I wore it! I will wear it with pride when I vote “yes” tomorrow morning.

My second highlight was a debate last week, last Thursday night, in the Hydro Arena in Glasgow, in front of 8,000 16- and 17-year-olds.

“Scotland’s Future in Scotland’s Hands”:
Identity, Memory, and Grievance in the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum

When I walked into that arena last week, I was struck with two emotions: the first was terror at having to address possibly the most intimidating audience I have ever faced in my life; the second was confidence.

As I looked out at these intelligent, engaged, informed young people, my heart was filled with confidence and belief in the future of this country of ours.

So, friends, it has been—the road to this moment has been a long and a winding one, and many of the people who started down this road many, many years before I was born are not with us to cast their vote tomorrow.

When I cast mine, I will think of them, and I will do so with respect and with gratitude.

But more than that I will think of the next generation, because it’s for my niece and my nephews and for every child in this country that I will vote “yes.”

It is to give them a better future; that is what is within our grasp tomorrow.

So, here we are standing on the eve of our moment of decision, our moment of opportunity.

I don’t know if all of you have been on the stump today, and gathering here this evening have had a chance to catch up with the latest opinion polls, but the most recent opinion poll published this evening puts “yes” at 49 percent.

Can we, tomorrow, take that over 50 percent?

Yes we can!

We will do so, friends, if we work as if, to paraphrase the great Alasdair Gray, we are in the first day of a better nation.

Tomorrow we have 900 minutes, between 7:00 am and 10:00 pm, to persuade a majority of our fellow Scots not to hand control of our country back to the Westminster establishment, but to keep that control in our own hands so we can protect our National Health Service, create jobs and opportunities for our young people, and make sure that never again do we have a Tory government that we haven’t voted for.

Friends, I believe in my heart that day will break on Friday to a “yes” vote, a bright new dawn for this great old nation of ours.

Let’s go out tomorrow and make that happen.

You know, one of the truly wonderful things about this campaign is that it has not been about politicians; it has been about people, communities, families, people discussing with each other, informing each other, coming to their own carefully considered decisions.

It’s not been about politicians.

But the politician I am about to introduce to you has done more than any other politician to bring us to the point we are at this evening.

He is my mentor, my friend.

He is the leader of the SNP; he is the First Minister of Scotland.

He is, quite simply, to me and to thousands of others an inspiration.

I want you to give the warmest of welcomes to the First Minister of our country, Alex Salmond.