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**RULERS AND SOLDIERS: PERCEPTION AND MANAGEMENT OF THE
MILITARY IN NORTHERN SUNG CHINA (960-CA.1060)**

University of Washington

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Rulers and Soldiers: Perception and Management

of the Military in Northern Sung China

(960-ca. 1060)

by

John Richard Labadie

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

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Doctoral Dissertation

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BIBLIOGRAPHIC ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|--------------|---|
| <u>HCC</u> | <u>Hu-ch'ien ching</u> |
| <u>HCP</u> | <u>Hsu Tzu-chih t'ung-chien ch'ang-pien</u> |
| <u>HYC</u> | <u>Hua-yang chi</u> |
| <u>JLKI</u> | <u>Ju-lin kung-i</u> |
| <u>KCTI</u> | <u>Kuo-ch'ao chu-ch'en tsou-i</u> |
| <u>LCC</u> | <u>Lin-ch'uan chi</u> |
| <u>LPC</u> | <u>Lung-p'ing chi</u> |
| <u>LS</u> | <u>Liao-shih</u> |
| <u>SHY</u> | <u>Sung hui-yao chi-kao</u> |
| <u>SMCTI</u> | <u>Sung ming-ch'en tsou-i</u> |
| <u>SS</u> | <u>Sung-shih</u> |
| <u>STCLC</u> | <u>Sung ta chao-ling chi</u> |
| <u>TK</u> | <u>Wen-hsien t'ung-k'ao</u> |
| <u>TTSL</u> | <u>Tung-tu shih-lueh</u> |
| <u>WCC</u> | <u>Wu-ch'i chi</u> |
| <u>WCMC</u> | <u>Wu-ch'ao ming-ch'en yen-hsing lu</u> |
| <u>WCTY</u> | <u>Wu-ching tsung-yao</u> |
| <u>WYHC</u> | <u>Wu-i hsin-chi</u> |

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The objective of this dissertation is to explore the Northern Sung rulers' perceptions of the military's character and role, and to examine the means by which they managed the military forces. Although some events and trends extend beyond the period, I will concentrate on the period 960-1060 because it includes many different circumstances that affected the development of military management. This period covers the transition from the near-anarchy of the Wu-tai to the unification under the Sung, the consolidation of power by the first Sung rulers, a protracted war with the Khitan/Liao followed by a treaty and an uneasy peace. By the end of the period, the Sung had become involved in a war with the Tangut Hsi-Hsia in the Northwest, and the Khitan had begun to press for a revision of the treaty terms. All of these changes affected--and were affected by--the developing relationship between the civil and military branches of the government.

As in most civilizations, military force and warfare have played a significant role in the history of China. The rise and fall of dynasties was always accompanied by violent conflict of one degree or another, and China was periodically torn by internal rebellion or menaced by external invasion. Warfare and its practitioners have never been far from center stage in Chinese history. At the same time, as Lu Chia 陸賈 reminded Han Kao-tsu 漢高祖 (r. 206-195 B.C.), an empire can be conquered--but not ruled--from horseback.¹ A civilian bureaucracy, and by extension a civilian ruler, were necessary to carry on the efficient administration of the country. The two imperatives of security and efficient government generated a tension between the military and civil branches of government that lies at the heart of civil-military relations.

We are dependent, for our view of the Chinese military, upon records composed by Confucian scholar-officials, and it is necessary to guard against the bias introduced in favor of the civil at the expense of the military. It has been a common assumption among Chinese historians that the Sung dynasty was militarily weak and that the military establishment was closely controlled by the civil government. Yet little effort has been

made to examine the dimensions of that weakness (if indeed it existed) or to explore the mechanisms and effects of that control.

Chinese Views of the Military

A long-standing assertion among those who study China is that the Chinese have looked down on war, military affairs, and military men in general. Although this concept may be valid for isolated cases, it obscures more than it illuminates. The great Chinese military strategist, Sun-tzu (ca. 400 B.C.), for example, says: "War is a matter of vital importance to the state . . . the road to survival or ruin." But he puts armed combat last in a list of ways to defeat the enemy.² Of generals, Sun-tzu says: "Now the general is the protector of the state" and ". . . when the army is employed, the general first receives his commands from the sovereign."³ The general has final authority on the battlefield and, if necessary, can ignore interfering orders from the ruler.⁴

The military's importance was also recognized during the Sung: "Throughout history, generals have been the arbiters of human destiny and the masters of the country's peace and safety."⁵ However, strongly negative views began to appear in later periods, especially during the late Ming and early Ch'ing when nationalistic historians

deplored the fall of the Ming to Manchu conquerers. Wang Fu-chih 王夫之 (1619-1692) criticized most Sung generals as incompetents who cared only about advancement. Military training was only empty show, "playing" with the troops. By engaging in military expeditions, the ruler was merely "trifling" with the fate of the country.⁶ Ku Yen-wu 顧炎武 (1613-82) pointed out the separate status of military officials who were not required to fulfill the same strict mourning requirements upon the death of a parent as were civil officials.⁷ One inference that could be drawn is that military officials were of lower status and thus less was expected of them. Speaking of the Sung, Ku noted that graduates of the Sung Military Academy did not distinguish themselves in defense of the country at the fall of the Northern Sung.⁸ These negative opinions, as well as others, no doubt contributed to the impression that the Chinese denigrated the military, and this impression has influenced modern historians.

Fang Hao says that the Sung could not afford to disband its armies because of the Liao threat, yet they could not afford to fight for fear of defeat. The armies were composed of criminals and old soldiers who could eat but not fight, and constant recruitment was necessary to maintain fighting strength.⁹ However,

Fang Hao fails to explain how constant recruiting of young soldiers produced an army that was weak and ineffective, nor does he attempt to investigate beyond the assertion that the Sung army was large and weak.

Another modern historian, Ch'ien Mu, says that the Sung was militarily weak and that the Sung military was a despised group.¹⁰ He implies--but never clearly demonstrates--a cause and effect relationship between the two facts. In spite of Sung T'ai-tsu's efforts to demobilize following the pacification of the South, pressure from the Khitan forced the government to maintain a large military force. The army was gradually filled with old, weak, and poor-quality soldiers. The armies continually increased in size and appetite, and by 1065 they absorbed some five-sixths of the government's revenue.¹¹ According to Ch'ien Mu, because the Sung continued the Late T'ang and Wu-tai practice of branding or tattooing soldiers, people came to despise soldiers as criminals. In fact, the saying "Good iron is not made into nails nor good men into soldiers" was coined during the Sung.¹²

Ch'ien Mu stresses the weakness of the Sung and faults the Sung for learning all too well the lessons of the Late T'ang. Yet, he sees only the negative side of the evidence. One could just as easily say that the Sung

solved the problem of civilian control of the military. There were no serious rebellions or military coups d'etat of the type that destroyed the T'ang and so disturbed the Wu-tai period.

Lei Hai-tsung says that, prior to the Ch'in dynasty, everyone was liable for military service; after the Ch'in, there was a division within society between those who fought and those who did not. In this division, according to Lei, lies the beginning of the "non-military culture" of China.¹³ He cites as evidence the fact that military officials were subordinate to civil officials during the Han and T'ang. He also says that military power is the basis of a country, but that power must be controlled by the emperor as the supreme warlord (大軍閥). Civil government and a strong ruler are necessary to govern a country. According to Lei, this concept has existed in China for a long time, and the best illustration is Sung T'ai-tsu's demotion of his three top generals (see Chapter II). They were willing to accept lower status in exchange for stability.¹⁴

Most historians concentrate on the ultimate failure of the Sung to resist external aggression as evidence for the military weakness of the Sung. Chang Yin-lin, for example, touches briefly on the structure of the Northern Sung military system, and then moves on to lengthy

discussions of why the Sung fell to the Mongols. In the end, he says, powerful families within the government drew off funds that should have been spent on defense and concentrated military forces at the center of the country instead of at the borders.¹⁵ This seems more a failure of government policy than a failure of the military system.

The problems of Sung military weakness, control, and status are a reflection of later scholars' preoccupation with the fact that the Sung fell to barbarians. In their search for reasons, scholars have laid heavy blame on the military and have created a negative image of the Chinese military. The idea that the military were despised, based on the traditional Confucian image, has appeared in various modern works which attempt to apply it to all of Chinese history.¹⁶ However, this idea has come under increasing criticism.

In his study of a Sung text, Boodberg offers a clearer view of the problem:

Confucian scholars are often quoted as making attacks on all forms of military activity, and their denunciations of militarism are frequently advanced to prove "the inherent peace-loving character" of the Chinese nation. It would be easy to prove, however, that most of these invectives hide behind them political motives and are not built on a consistent pacifist basis. For most of the political philosophers of China the civil and military functions are closely bound together. The Wen 文 and the Wu 武 are the two poles of political activity.¹⁷

Fairbank's view that the Chinese disesteemed war and considered it an admission of bankrupt policy¹⁸ is strongly disputed by Wallacker. He notes the large corpus of literature on military subjects and points out that ping 兵 and war are not synonymous. Ping includes a whole panoply of coercive activities (including bribery, friendship, co-optation, false intelligence, et cetera) of which armed combat was only the last step.¹⁹

Finally, A. W. Sariti has taken issue with the presumed pacifism and anti-militarism of the Sung government. A deliberate civilistic policy, a careful examination of the country's economic conditions, and a realization of the difficulty of waging aggressive warfare against a nomadic group all combined to convince Sung policy makers to avoid an expansionistic and adventuresome foreign policy. None of these factors implies a pacifist policy.²⁰

The Sung Military Problem

The Sung founder, T'ai-tsu (r. 960-997) was faced with the fundamental problem of managing the military so as to achieve a balance between military strength and control. A small and weak army cannot protect the country internally or externally. An army that is too

strong and not sufficiently controlled by the civil government could eventually supplant the civil government. There were three important aspects of this military problem. The first was to provide security against external enemies to the North and West. The second was to consolidate the government's hold over the rest of China and to prevent internal rebellions and banditry. Finally, the ruler had to secure the throne against the type of military intervention that had destroyed the T'ang.

The Northern Sung rulers largely solved the military problem through a combination of institutional mechanisms and personal relationships. Institutional mechanisms--involving promotion and assignment policies, deployment strategies, training doctrine, education--helped to create and manage a large and effective military force. Northern Sung rulers fostered personal relationships as a tool to manage their generals, to bind them with an ethic of service to the ruler and, by extension, to the country. As a result, the Khitan and Hsi-Hsia were kept at bay through both military action and judicious bribery. There were no significant internal rebellions. The few insurrections that did occur were quickly put down by government troops. Lastly, the

military never threatened the security of the throne as had happened during the T'ang.

It is this problem and the means by which it was solved that mark the significance of the Sung military experience. The Sung was able to avoid the chaotic experience of the T'ang and Wu-tai periods through a conscious choice of a non-aggressive, non-expansionistic policy and through the choice of a civilistic government at the expense of the military establishment.

Chung-wen ch'ing-wu 重文輕武 , "emphasize the civil, de-emphasize the military," was a policy begun by the first Sung ruler and continued by his successors. The existence of this policy has been used by historians as evidence for the low status of the Sung military and as the basic reason for the Sung's weakness.

James T. C. Liu says that modern historians of China are influenced by the bias of traditional historians. They are content to state the policy and move on to other matters without stopping to examine how the policy was applied and its effects on the military as a whole. Fortunately, Liu has made an effort to examine the social and political status of military officers within the context of this policy.²¹ Although I do not agree with all of Liu's conclusions, he has taken a much-needed

step beyond superficial examination of military status in the Sung.

The basic problem here lies in understanding the meaning of the Sung policy. Chung-wen is clear enough, but ch'ing-wu can have various levels of meaning: look down upon the military as a profession; reduce the independence of the military; use civilians to command the armies; accept the military as a necessary evil but use it only as a last resort. No doubt all of these levels of meaning operated in the execution of policy at one time or another. I would suggest a fifth, perhaps more fundamental, level of meaning: remove the military (and military force) from the very powerful position that it had during the Late T'ang and Wu-tai periods. That is, alter the proportion of civil and military authority in government and increase civil authority at the expense of the military, so that the military becomes subordinate to the civil.

These questions and problems are significant because later historians have labelled the Sung as weak. The Sung fell to barbarians, they say, through military weakness and mismanagement. I disagree. If the Sung record was perhaps less glorious than that of the T'ang, it was because the Sung chose to avoid the mistakes of the T'ang. If the military were of lower status, it was

because the military were put into their assigned place within the bureaucratic hierarchy--subordinate to and controlled by the civil arm of the bureaucracy. It does not necessarily follow that the Sung resorted to total disarmament or that it adopted a pacifist or anti-military attitude. I think that the issue of weakness is, at best, a misleading one.

The Place of the Sung Experience
in Military History

Finally, I want to place the Sung experience in the context of general military history and the history of civil-military relations.

Specialists in the T'ang and Wu-tai periods have spoken of the growth of "professionalism" and "professional" military forces whose existence continued into the Sung.²² The term "professional" has also been attached to the growth of the Sung civil service bureaucracy as described by Kracke.²³ Yet, few have examined the appropriateness of this term to the Chinese context. In some cases, it has been used interchangeably with "hereditary" or "mercenary."²⁴ What does the term "professional" actually mean? Can it be usefully applied to the Sung context to understand civil-military relations or is it merely an anachronism? In modern concepts, military professionalism lies at the heart of

civil-military interaction, and modern tools can be useful in judging its applicability to the Sung experience.

Modern researchers in the area of civil-military relations have ignored or overlooked the Chinese experience, concentrating only on recent, Western experience. For example, Amos Perlmutter states:

One outstanding characteristic of the contemporary nation-state is that its citizens belong to one political community, under a single regime whose area of control has defined territorial boundaries, governed by a bureaucracy and a central political order.²⁵

Allowing a reasonable elasticity in the definition of terms, this description could also be applied to Sung China, and many political and governmental phenomena characteristic of "modern" societies can be found--in one form or another--in the China of many centuries ago. Indeed, proponents of the Naito hypothesis have asserted that, because of important changes in social, economic, and political structure, the history of modern China begins in the Sung.²⁶ Thus, my interest is twofold: Can modern studies help us to examine the Sung experience; can the Sung experience be used to modify or amplify modern theories?

Modern studies of civil-military relations have generally been based on Western military experience since the French Revolution. They have focused on the issues

of military professionalization and military intervention in politics. "Intervention," in this context, refers to the military's usurpation of political or governmental functions normally denied to them by law or custom. It is not simply participation by the military in the governmental process (e.g., as advisors to the head of state, military governors under martial law, et cetera) or pursuit by the military of its organizational goals and priorities within the government. It is, rather, a short-circuiting of the normal process, to the exclusion of the civil branch of the government. There are four extended studies that have basically covered the ground of civil-military relations.

Samuel P. Huntington says that the military institutions of any society are shaped by two forces: a functional imperative stemming from threats to the society's security; a societal imperative rising from social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society.²⁷ Military institutions which reflect only social values may be incapable of fulfilling their military functions; military institutions driven only by functional imperatives may be impossible to control. The interaction of these two forces creates the problem of civil-military relations, and Huntington

feels that the solution lies in the professional character of the officer corps.

The profession of arms--like any other profession--is characterized by three things: expertise, corporateness, and responsibility. Military expertise is in the "management of violence" (a term coined by Lasswell), and this expertise is applied in the service of the state which (ideally) has a monopoly on the means of violence. Corporateness is both a feeling of self-conscious identification among military men and a set of institutions and practices which mold the officer corps into a social unit. Responsibility is to the state, for whom the military functions as an expert advisor within its competence of military action and security.

In Huntington's view, control over the military can best be achieved by maximizing military professionalism leading to what he calls "objective civilian control."²⁸ The military professional is politically sterile and neutral. He does not intervene because to do so would be unprofessional. Huntington has been criticized for falling into a petitio principii--at best it is only a proof by definition--and some theorists have reached quite the opposite conclusion.

One such is Bengt Abrahamsson who applies to the military the same basic professional characteristics of

a specialized, theoretical knowledge, a set of ethical rules governing a member's behavior, and a high degree of corporate cohesiveness.²⁹ He further identifies two types of military professionalization. The first is an historical transformation of military institutions; the second, a transformation of individuals through a socialization process and the internalization of certain values and outlooks. The first type of professionalization creates a politically powerful and often highly independent social structure; the second type molds the individuals who will man it.

The professional ethic thus generated is aimed at regulating the military man's behavior toward both his client and his professional colleagues. The military's "client" is the state, and a conflict arises between the expert advisor who knows more than the client and the client who must decide the course of action. As a corporate body, the military has both normative influence--the ability to affect diffusion of certain values relevant to its area of concern--and political power--the ability to overcome resistance in the actual decision process.

Abrahamsson concludes:

To the extent, then, that military professionalization . . . is effective--and to the extent that there are differences between military and civilian values and objectives--

civilian control of the military establishment will be impaired.³⁰

However, social and political circumstances have as much effect on civil-military relations as do military institutions and values.

S. E. Finer discusses the relationship between the political culture and the military establishment.³¹ The military does not, of itself, possess the legitimate claim to govern, nor does it have the administrative ability to govern a complex society and economy. Hence, the importance of what Finer calls the "political formula," the basis for a claim to legitimacy by the government. The "will of the people" and the "divine right of kings" are examples,³² though the formula may change with time. Since the military must find its legitimacy within the government structure, the principle of civilian supremacy is just as important to control of the military as is professionalism.³³ Civilian supremacy, however, is dependent upon the level of political culture. A high level of political culture exists when:

- 1) the political formula is generally accepted;
- 2) the complex of civil procedures and organs which comprise the political system are generally considered authoritative;

3) public involvement in and attachment to these civil institutions is strong and widespread.³⁴

According to Finer, when the level of political culture is high, the likelihood of military intervention is low.³⁵

Although he is an admirer and student of Huntington, Amos Perlmutter (The Military and Politics in Modern Times) offers a "fusionist" theory that rejects the dichotomy between civil and military functions in a complex society. Both the military and civilians, he says, share in a symbiotic process of developing and implementing national policy. Although military professionalism can exist without exclusively corporate behavior, it is the corporate (not the professional) orientation of the military that determines the level and scope of political intervention by the military. If the state threatens the corporate or organizational integrity of the military, then the military is more likely to take a hand in politics.

Thus, Perlmutter goes beyond both Huntington and Finer. Both the impetus to intervene and the resistance against intervention can spring from the same corporate orientation. What, then, is the independent factor? He says:

Political conditions dictate the nature of civil-military relations. A stable, sustaining, and institutionalized civilian regime can hardly succumb to military pressure and rule. Nor can the military establishment, the most dependent bureaucracy of the modern nation-state, challenge a well-established political order.³⁶

Military professionalism neither facilitates nor hinders stable civil-military relations or a stable political order. Both are determined by the strength of the political order.

Huntington's definition of "profession" and its application to the military have been generally accepted by other writers on the subject.³⁷ Teitler, for example, merely restates Huntington's characteristics at greater length in his introduction.³⁸ Argument arises, of course, as to the relative importance of the elements in Huntington's analysis and to the conclusions that follow from them. For the purpose of this dissertation, I have adopted Huntington's three criteria of military professionalism--expertise, corporateness, and responsibility--and I will attempt to demonstrate that they can be found, in one form or another, within the military establishment of the Sung dynasty.

It is not my intention to discover "shoots" of professionalism in the Sung: I doubt if the concept as it is used today even existed then. Nor do I expect to prove or disprove modern theories of civil-military

relations. I have found, however, that there was a conscious effort by the first Sung rulers to regularize some aspects of the military system, to create a corporate esprit, and to inculcate an ethic of subordination and service. At the same time, there were generals who tried to carve out an area of exclusive competence for the military and to assert a principle of corporateness and a responsibility to a higher authority. These efforts and their effects can best be examined and understood by using the modern paradigm of military professionalization and civil-military relations as a tool to assess the "modern" aspects of the Sung military experience.

NOTES

- ¹Pan Ku, Han-shu, 13/66.
- ²S. B. Griffith, trans., Sun-tzu, The Art of War, 63; 77-78.
- ³Ibid., 102.
- ⁴Ibid., 81, 128.
- ⁵HCP, Yung-lo ta-tien ed., 12399/14.
- ⁶Wang Fu-chih, Sung-lun, 2/33-36.
- ⁷Ku Yen-wu, Jih-chih lu, 15/33b.
- ⁸Ibid., 17/37-39.
- ⁹Fang Hao, Sung-shih, 44-48.
- ¹⁰Ch'ien Mu, Chung-kuo li-tai cheng-chih te-shih, 78-84.
- ¹¹Ch'ien Mu, Kuo-shih ta-kang, 400.
- ¹²Ch'ien Mu, Chung-kuo li-tai . . . , 82.
- ¹³Lei Hai-tsung, Chung-kuo wen-hua yü chung-kuo te ping, 125-26.
- ¹⁴Ibid., 134-36.
- ¹⁵Chang Yin-lin, Chang Yin-lin hsien-sheng wen-chi, 982;996.
- ¹⁶Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, 422. "And the fact remained that the military were just as despised in China as they were in England for two hundred years"

- ¹⁷Peter Boodberg, "The Art of War in Ancient China," p. xv.
- ¹⁸F. A. Kierman, ed., Chinese Ways in Warfare, 7.
- ¹⁹B. E. Wallacher, Review of Kierman, Chinese Ways in Warfare, in Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 35 (1975), 339-46.
- ²⁰A. W. Sariti, "A Note on Foreign Policy Decision-Making in the Northern Sung", Sung Studies Newsletter, 8 (1973), 3-11.
- ²¹Liu Tzu-chien, "Lüeh-lun Sung-tai wu-kuan ch'ün-tsai t'ung-chih chieh-chi chung-te ti-wei", in Aoyama hakase koki kinen shi ronso (Tokyo, 1974), 477-87.
- ²²D. C. Twitchett and A. F. Wright, Perspectives on the T'ang, 31, 33.
- ²³E. A. Kracke, Jr., Civil Service in Early Sung China.
- ²⁴Wang Gung-wu, The Structure of Power in North China during the Five Dynasties, 11.
- ²⁵Amos Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times, 21.
- ²⁶Hisayuki Miyakawa, "The Naito Hypothesis", reprinted in J. T. C. Liu and P. J. Golas, Change in Sung China, 4-8.
- ²⁷S. P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State.
- ²⁸Ibid., 83ff.
- ²⁹Bengt Abrahamsson, Military Professionalization and Political Power.
- ³⁰Ibid., 17.
- ³¹S. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback.
- ³²A Chinese example would be the "mandate of Heaven."

³³A good discussion of legitimacy may be found in Jacques van Doorn, "The Military and the Crisis of Legitimacy," in Harries-Jenkins and van Doorn, The Military and the Problem of Legitimacy, 17-39.

³⁴Finer, 78. The question arises as to the meaning of "public" in the Chinese, and more specifically the Sung, context. I offer the following operational definition: that portion of the population who are politically conscious, politically articulate, and who have some voice--however small--in the political process. In Sung China, the "public" then would be restricted to the literati, holders of official ranks and titles, and local elites who exercised some influence through official or family ties. The vast majority of the populace could only acquiesce in the form of government or "vote with their feet" through tax evasion, desertion, or violent rebellion.

³⁵Ibid., 126.

³⁶Perlmutter, 281.

³⁷The universality of Huntington's categories has recently been questioned. See D. E. Albright, "A Comparative Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations," World Politics, 32.4 (July 1980), 553-576.

³⁸G. Tietler, The Genesis of the Professional Officers' Corps, 6-8.

CHAPTER II

DIMENSIONS OF THE SUNG PROBLEM

The problems and circumstances that faced the Sung did not begin with the founding of the dynasty. The Sung inherited the results of policies and events that occurred all throughout the T'ang and Wu-tai periods. Efforts to avoid previous mistakes and reverse trends from the past shaped Sung military policy. In addition, imperial policies, the existence of powerful enemies on the frontiers, and the demands of warfare all had an impact on the way the Sung managed its military forces. Military management was one part of the process of creating and developing a civilian government. I would like to examine the historical background of Sung military problems and the context in which these problems were solved.

Late T'ang and Wu-tai Periods

The composition, status, and locus of power of the military changed drastically over the centuries of T'ang

rule. The first century of the T'ang was marked by an aggressive and expansionist policy that sent Chinese armies into Mongolia and Manchuria, across the Pamirs in Central Asia, and into both Tibet and northern Korea. The core of these expeditionary forces were units drawn from the fu-ping 府兵, or militia; purely Han Chinese forces were bolstered by the addition of troops supplied by non-Chinese allies (most notably the Uighurs). In some cases, enemy chieftains surrendered with their forces and served in T'ang armies under Chinese commanders.¹

The fu-ping militia system, which the T'ang had inherited from the Northern Chou (557-589) and Sui (589-618) consisted of some 600 military units whose members were drawn from well-to-do farming and landlord families, some of whom were related to the Imperial house. Militia members served in rotation as part of the emperor's guard at the capital, and they were required to serve on the frontiers and in the expeditionary armies. Initially, service in the military was considered an honor, and the officer corps was dominated by the same families who often supplied high officials for the civil bureaucracy. These families had a tradition of military service spanning several generations.² However, the

"honor" of military service gradually disappeared as the fu-ping system began to break down by the end of the seventh century.

T'ang T'ai-tsung's (r. 627-649) conquests in Central Asia had been achieved through a series of short, sharp, and successful campaigns which exploited the strengths of the militia system: that is, a large pool of well-trained and highly motivated soldiers who could be quickly assembled, dispatched as an expeditionary force, and then demobilized after the campaign. However, as military campaigns became more protracted and less successful (for example, those against the Tibetans and the Koreans), it became necessary to create standing armies, both for long service in the field and for strong frontier defense. At the same time, internal migration to find new agricultural land in the South and to escape service and tax burdens gradually eroded the militia system and the tax system upon which it was based.³

Originally, frontier garrisons were quite small, and the main military force of the T'ang was concentrated in the large expeditionary armies (hsing-chün 行軍). Prolonged warfare and the need for a strong frontier defense required the formation and maintenance of large permanent armies in the border areas. Manpower requirements could no longer be met by the militia

system, and the T'ang turned more and more to the use of non-Chinese, both as soldiers and as military governors in frontier regions.⁴

A military governor (tu-tu 都督, later chieh-tu shih 節度使) usually served as a prefect and held concurrent offices with authority over local taxes, finances, and administration. This authority combined with military command was considered necessary for the effective control of a border area.⁵ However, it also precipitated a dangerous concentration of military and civil powers in peripheral areas at a time when the centralized military apparatus--the fu-ping--had fallen into disrepair. The T'ang government began to use non-Chinese as military governors under the mistaken assumption that they would be politically neutral.⁶ The most notorious and troublesome of these governors was An Lu-shan 安祿山 (d. 757).

The rebellion (755-763) of An Lu-shan, though eventually suppressed, nearly destroyed the T'ang dynasty and shifted the focus of power from the central government to the provinces. Frontier armies formed the backbone of both the rebellious forces and the forces used to put down the rebellion. Unfortunately, by relying on armed forces commanded by military governors,

the T'ang government lost most of its control over the provinces by the end of the rebellion.

Despite the efforts of later T'ang emperors to reverse the trend, most military governors remained outside effective central government control. The most independent were those governors who had rebelled and then surrendered in return for government confirmation of their offices and authority in the provinces.⁷ These governors--such as Hsüeh Sung 薛嵩 (governor of Hsiang-chou 相州, 763-773), Li Pao-ch'en 李寶臣 (of Ch'eng-te Chün 成德軍, 763-781), and T'ien Ch'eng-ssu 田承嗣 (of Wei-po 魏博, 763-779)--paid nominal allegiance to the central government while manifesting many attributes of separate rulers.

The independent existence of these provinces did not depend solely upon raw military strength. In general, the military organization combined with the civil structure of local government to control taxation and prefectural operations. As Charles Peterson points out, ". . . military commanders did not simply exercise the powers of prefects and magistrates; they were the prefects and magistrates."⁸ At the same time, governors controlled the appointment to both civil and military offices. They used this power to appoint only those with whom they had close personal ties or those who had previously

proved their worth.⁹ Thus a strong network of personal relationships held together a hybrid prefectural and provincial structure, based upon a closely identified civil and military authority. The importance of personal ties, especially in the military context, continued through the Wu-tai period and into the Sung, where it was turned to the benefit of the central government. Finally, according to Pulleyblank, the costs of operating a provincial government were lower than those required by the central government, and peasants were apparently willing to acquiesce in military rule in return for lower taxes.¹⁰

During the ninth century, T'ang emperors eventually managed to re-assert a measure of central control over some of the provinces, but they could not hope to do so at the expense of provincial governors. In many cases, the only way that the government could collect any tax from the provinces was through the use of a quota system in which the largest share was retained at the provincial level.¹¹ In this way, the T'ang government could extract some income--and theoretical allegiance--from the provinces, while still recognizing political realities. It is interesting to note that provincial governors made positive efforts to remain, at least officially, a part of the T'ang empire.¹² The stamp of

legitimacy provided by allegiance, however tenuous, to the central government was necessary to help forestall rebellion from below that could remove a governor just as he had eliminated the government from control of his province. Military power alone was not a sufficient basis for rule.

The T'ang succumbed to further rebellion and exhaustion at the end of the ninth century, and China disintegrated into the swirling political chaos of the Wu-tai (907-960) period. Underlying the confusion of the Wu-tai period--the formation and destruction of small states, the rise and fall of dynasties within a few years, the ebb and flow of palace intrigue--was a concerted and long-lasting effort to restore centralized power and control. This effort succeeded, according to Wang Gungwu, not by destroying the chieh-tu shih system but by adapting the system to serve central ends.¹³

During the Wu-tai period, the center of gravity of political and military power lay in the provinces. Some leaders who had developed strong provincial governments became emperors themselves, and thereby inherited the same problem faced by the T'ang emperors, to wit: How to maintain effective control over government and army and avoid the very circumstances that had destroyed the T'ang.

The rulers of Later Liang 梁 (907-923) incorporated provincial military leaders into the palace hierarchy, making them part of the governmental structure, so that they functioned not only as soldiers but also as bureaucrats. Gradually, military command became a function of court position and political status, rather than the opposite.¹⁴ Also, rulers began to use those personally loyal to them as a means of crossing the gap between inner, palace officials and outer, regular officials of the bureaucracy. They were, in effect, personal retainers of the emperor, beholden to him for their status and influence and distinct from other officials. Rulers gradually extended the purview of their trusted servants to include military as well as bureaucratic oversight. Drawn from the ranks of both the minor civil bureaucracy and the military, these men formed a group of trusted, trained, and competent personnel upon whom the emperor could rely. They thus formed a network of personal relationships linking the emperor with his civil and military officials.

Similarly, the rulers of Later T'ang 後唐 (923-937) and Chin 晉 (937-947) created and developed the Emperor's Army as a counterforce to the personal armies of provincial governors. Li Ssu-yuan 李嗣源 (Emperor Ming-tsung 明宗 of Later T'ang,

r. 926-933), for example, established such an army as a large and powerful force under the direct command of the emperor. Its primary function was to put down revolts against the throne.¹⁵ In following years, the Emperor's Army emerged as the strongest military force in the empire, and control of it was vital to the security of the emperor's position.

Thus, various rulers of North China during the Wu-tai period succeeded in restoring a measure of central control that thwarted provincial independence. On the one hand, officials from the provincial organizations, both civil and military, were incorporated into the emperor's court as palace officials, bureaucrats, and officers of the Emperor's Army; their interests became identified with those of the central government. On the other hand, the creation of the emperor's own personal army reduced the military threat from non-central forces. What held the whole structure together was the personal relationship between the emperor and his officials and soldiers. Wang Gungwu points out that a government based on personal ties is inherently unstable, and that the traditions of a bureaucratic government were necessary for stability. Bureaucrats recovered much of their influence between 926 and 936 because "there was no satisfactory alternative to the form of government they

provided."¹⁶ The maintenance of personal relationships, and the restoration of bureaucratic forms were important forces throughout the consolidation during the Chou and the eventual unification of China under the Sung.

The Chou 周 dynasty (951-960) marks the end of the Wu-tai period. The Chou rulers were able to pull together the proper elements for a sustained--and largely successful--reunification campaign in North China that set the stage for the Sung reunification of all of China. To provide economic stability, Chou emperors restored land to refugees, returned fallow land to cultivation, reduced the amount of land held by Buddhist temples, and increased the amount of copper coinage.¹⁷ They also instituted necessary military reforms.

By the time of the Chou dynasty, the Emperor's Guard (formerly the Emperor's Army) had grown so large and so powerful that the emperor had lost much of the personal contact and control previously exercised by the Later T'ang and Chin rulers. In fact, the Guard had become a powerful political force in its own right, and it had begun to interfere in the imperial succession.¹⁸

Chou T'ai-tsu 周太祖 (r. 951-54) organized the first elements of the Palace Corps (tien-ch'ien chün 殿前軍) as an elite unit to protect the emperor;

it served as a counter to the power of the Emperor's Guard.¹⁹ He also created the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Palace Corps, a unified command for all Corps units, and appointed his own relatives to fill the post. His successor, Shih-tsung 世宗 (r. 954-59), not only increased the size and strength of the Palace Corps but also--using military defeat as a pretext--shook up the command structure of the Emperor's Guard, executing some commanders, cashiering others, and filling the vacated positions with officers loyal to him.

Shih-tsung also increased the effectiveness of both units by eliminating unfit troops and instituting new training programs. The man chosen to oversee the selection and training was Chao K'uang-yin 趙匡胤 (927-976) who later rose to the post of Supreme Commander of the Palace Corps. The efforts of Chou Shih-tsung to upgrade the Emperor's Guard and Palace Corps succeeded in giving him a military force second to none.

The Palace Corps soon became the stronger force. The very best soldiers were funneled into the Palace Corps, and the Emperor's Guard received somewhat inferior soldiers. At the same time, Shih-tsung created three supreme command ranks for the Palace Corps and eliminated the separate cavalry and infantry command echelons. This increased the rank and prestige of the

Palace Corps commander while shortening and strengthening the chain of command within the Corps itself. Thus, Shih-tsung gradually reduced the relative strength of the Emperor's Guard, but he had also created, in the Palace Corps, a strong, unified command structure and fighting force that could--and eventually did--interfere in politics.²⁰ Based upon his power as Supreme Commander of the Palace Corps and upon the personal loyalty of most of the upper-level officers in the Corps, Chao K'uang-yin seized the throne in 960 and became the first emperor of the Sung dynasty, T'ai-tsu.

The Sung Founding

The "praetorian" coup²¹ of Sung T'ai-tsu differs from others during the Wu-Tai period only in that it was the last. The Sung faced many problems but remained free of coups d'etat. Although the backing of the Palace Corps was necessary to his usurpation of the throne, Sung T'ai-tsu could not remain strictly a military leader. Finer notes that the military lacks both the legitimate authority to govern as well as the technical ability to administer the political structure of a complex society and economy.²² If force equals right then a greater force succeeds to that right. A government must legitimate itself in order to avoid further replacement.

Sung T'ai-tsu faced the same problems that had plagued military governors in the late T'ang and emperors during the Wu-tai. A military force cannot rule of itself but needs the legitimizing aura of a higher authority; a civil bureaucracy is necessary for effective administration. Thus, Sung T'ai-tsu had to seek legitimacy as a civil ruler and to tighten control over the military forces at his disposal. His efforts to achieve the former--arranging the abdication of the last Chou emperor (a child of seven), restoring the prestige of the bureaucracy, and adopting the traditional trappings of imperial rule--are beyond the scope of this study. However, his initial efforts to control the military require some discussion.²³

From the very beginning of his reign, T'ai-tsu followed a deliberately civilistic policy, intending to foster the growth of a state governed by civil institutions, informed by civil values, and driven by civil imperatives. A class of literati-bureaucrats that had gained strength during the Wu-tai period was encouraged and fostered by T'ai-tsu in order to help buttress his legitimacy and consolidate his authority, and to provide an effective government administration. Part of T'ai-tsu's policy was to "strengthen the trunk and weaken the branches" (ch'iang-kan jo-chih 強幹弱枝)

by concentrating the best military forces around the capital and by building up the central administration at the expense of the prefectures. Another part of this policy is usually referred to by the pithy, though sometimes misleading phrase, "chung-wen ch'ing-wu."

One of the first and probably most famous actions taken under this policy was the removal of the highest ranking generals from active command. According to contemporary sources, T'ai-tsu invited Shih Shou-hsin 石守信 (928-84), Wang Shen-ch'i 王審琦 (925-74), and several other generals to a banquet. Over cups of wine, the emperor reportedly discussed with them his worries about the security of his throne and the dangers of further military takeovers, then he said:

Why don't all of you relinquish your military authority, leave the court, and serve as prominent military governors. You could select a convenient and good piece of land and a mansion . . . establish a permanent inalienable estate. You could get many singers and dancing girls, drink daily, and enjoy their company to the end of your natural life. Furthermore, I promise all of you to arrange marriages (between my family and yours), and then between the ruler and officials there would be no suspicions on either side.²⁴

The next day, all three retired.

Why was T'ai-tsu's ploy effective? When T'ai-tsu commanded the Palace Corps under Chou Shih-tsung, he had as comrades many officers who later became his leading

generals. Indeed, he was part of a "brotherhood" of ten general that included Shih Shou-hsin and Wang Shen-ch'i.²⁵ He formed close relationships with these generals; Shih Shou-hsin was one of the major actors in the coup that put T'ai-tsu on the throne. No doubt the emperor relied upon his friendship with these generals to induce them to step down for his benefit. In addition, each one knew that he was not strong enough to resist the combination of forces that the emperor could marshall against him. Finally, they had all seen the chaos and instability of the previous years, and perhaps they were willing to exchange the rather precarious life of a soldier for some security.

What is important in this episode is the personal, explicit contract struck between the emperor and his closest military commanders. In exchange for retirement and support of the regime, the generals would be provided with wealth, comfortable sinecures, and security for their descendants. Note that this agreement is not with the government but with the emperor himself. He says, "I (chen 朕) promise. . . ." ²⁶ I think that this transaction also served as a clear indication to other soldiers of the new structure of civil-military relations that was being built, an example of the new relationship between the military and the ruler. Officers who

supported the throne could look forward to rewards and good treatment. Barring death in battle (which comes with the job) they could even look forward to a comfortable retirement.

From the very beginning, Sung rulers were faced with the need to balance conflicting--if not mutually exclusive--necessities. On the one hand, T'ai-tsu desired to create a civilistic state while strengthening imperial power and control. On the other hand, military strength was needed for the pacification and unification of the country and to protect against external enemies. Therein lay a conflict between a strong, effective military establishment and one that was under complete government control. The tension that was produced by this conflict is evident in the way the Sung reacted to the various threats to its existence.

Sung Vulnerability to External Threat

There were basically three external factors that played a large part in Sung military policy: the Hsi-Hsia to the northwest, the Khitan to the north, and the lack of defensible natural borders.

The Hsi-Hsia were a federation of Tibetan tribes, the Tanguts, who lived on the borders of both the Sung and the Liao empires. Their economy was based on

agriculture and stockbreeding, and they existed more-or-less as a client state of the Liao. By themselves, the Hsi-Hsia were no more than an annoyance to the Sung. The Hsi-Hsia raided and skirmished with the Sung in the 990's, and they started a war with the Sung in 1038. Both episodes ended inconclusively, and the Sung bought peace through payments of money and goods. The greatest threat of the Hsi-Hsia was that they might act in concert with the Khitan against the Sung, attacking China's unprotected flank while the Sung was engaged with its more powerful adversary to the north.²⁷

The Khitan were a collection of semi-pastoral Tungusic tribes of proto-Mongol origin who inhabited parts of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. Although the majority of the Khitan were farmers, a sizeable minority depended on animal husbandry, hunting, and fishing for a living. This mixed economy provided surprising strength. As Wittfogel puts it, ". . . the new empire's subsistence economy was in the main agricultural; its power economy in the main pastoral."²⁸

Khitan tribal cavalry greatly disturbed the frontier areas through the end of the T'ang dynasty, but it was not until the confederation of the tribes under A-pao-chi (872-926; reigned as Liao T'ai-tsu, 907-26) at the beginning of the tenth century, that the Khitan

became a serious threat to the security of China. Their power was due to superior cavalry tactics and a tight-knit social and military organization based upon the ordo (whence comes the English word "horde"), originally the ruler's body guard. The combination provided a highly mobile and well-organized striking force.

From 902 to 925, A-pao-chi conquered, intimidated, or otherwise "pacified" other tribal groups, including the Jurchen to the east and the Turkic and Tibetan tribes to the west.²⁹ It was left to A-pao-chi's successor, Liao T'ai-tsung (r. 926-47) to turn the Khitan military south toward the rich Chinese lands. Since the Chinese themselves were not united, the Khitan were quite successful in gaining influence, and sometimes actual control, over parts of North China.

Shih Ching-t'ang 石敬瑭 (d. 942) overthrew the Later T'ang Li Tsung-k'o (himself a usurper) in 936 and appealed to the Liao for assistance against other competitors for the throne. Liao T'ai-tsung personally led his forces to aid Shih Ching-t'ang, and he later declared Shih emperor of the Chin dynasty (晉 937-47).³⁰ In return, Shih Ching-t'ang ceded sixteen prefectures (in what is now Hopei, Shansi, and Chahar) to the Liao.³¹ This gave the Liao control of territory (generally referred to as the Sixteen Northern

Prefectures) well inside the Great Wall. In addition, the Liao accepted the Northern Han 北漢 (951-79) as a client state when it replaced the Later Han 後漢 (936-951) in Shansi.³² With such a strong Khitan presence inside the Wall, it was inevitable that the Sung and the Liao would eventually collide.

From the very beginning, therefore the Sung was deprived of China's traditional barriers against invasion from the north. Because of the cession of the Sixteen Northern Prefectures, the mountains and their easily-defended passes were in the hands of the Khitan. Once they had transited the mountain passes, the Khitan cavalry could sweep across the flatland and reach K'ai-feng in a few days. Fortresses and fortified cities were fairly secure, but the capital was vulnerable. There was some discussion of moving the capitol to the more secure city of Loyang, but by that time, K'ai-feng had become an important commercial center and the terminus of the canal transporting grain from central and south China.³³ This basic geographical disadvantage was a definite factor in defense planning, and the first Sung emperors made concerted efforts to recover the lost territory and restore China's traditional boundaries.³⁴

After the pacification of the South and the consolidation of his rule, T'ai tsu personally led an expedition against the Northern Han capital in 969. It was unsuccessful,³⁵ but T'ai-tsu never gave up the intention of subduing that state. His brother and successor, T'ai-tsung (r. 976-997), took up the effort, finally conquering the Northern Han in 979.³⁶ According to the Liao-shih, the fall of Northern Han not only triggered a Liao attack on the Sung but also sparked a long-lasting enmity between the two states.³⁷

The most fundamental question in dealing with the Khitan was that of offensive or defensive strategy. After the Sung defeat at Ch'i-kou Kuan 岐溝關 in 986, expansionistic ardor cooled somewhat, and the Sung adopted a generally defensive posture. The third emperor, Chen-tsung 真宗 (r. 998-1022), was less aggressive than his predecessors, but recapture of the northern territories remained as an expression of revanchist sentiment.³⁸ After the Sung had opted for a defensive stance, the question still remained of the best type of defense, active or passive.

Proponents of an active defense advocated positive military action carried even into Khitan territory, not so much to capture objectives but to spy out enemy plans, break up his concentrations, and harass his supply lines.

The modern equivalent would be "reconnaissance in force." In 988/8/10, Kuo Shou-wen 郭守文 (935-984) advised the emperor to employ fast moving units of cavalry and archers to ambush the enemy.³⁹ The next month, Yüan Chi-chung 袁繼忠 (938-92) ignored orders to remain within his fortress, complaining: "This is fine for keeping the peace, but what use is it for resisting invasion?"⁴⁰

Advocates of a passive defense called for static, positional warfare based on the defense of cities, fortresses, and other strategically-located strongpoints. The invading enemy would be allowed to exhaust themselves by penetrating into Chinese territory. Unable to capture anything of value or importance, the enemy would then have to withdraw for lack of supplies. The policy was summed up succinctly in 987: "If the enemy invades, resist; if he withdraws, do not pursue."⁴¹ In the end, the Sung compromised on an uneasy combination of the two policies, and the emperor continued to receive conflicting advice from both sides. As late as 1042, the question was still subject to discussion. Ou-yang Hsiu 歐陽修 (1007-1072) pressed for an aggressive policy: a show of force and unexpected attacks to break up alliances. He quotes Sun-tzu': "To attack the enemy's plans is the first tactic: next is to

attack his communications . . . strike where least expected." However, Fan Chung-yen 范仲淹 (989-1052) advised exactly the opposite: strong forts, defense in depth, avoidance of full-scale battles.⁴²

A further problem concerned the disposition of troops inside the borders. In 986, Sung Ch'i 宋琪 (917-996), a Minister of Justice, cautioned against dispersing cavalry all along the border; they would not be able to concentrate against an invading force.⁴³ Chang Chi 張洎 (933-997), an official in the Finance Ministry, recommended, in 989, a concentration of forces in three border commanderies to report on Khitan activities and to attack any invasion forces.⁴⁴ Even the emperor (Chen-tsung) could not make up his mind. In 1002/2, he said, ". . . If we spread our forces out in separate garrisons . . . then the army's strength will be fragmented, and it will be difficult to halt the enemy's attack."⁴⁵ A year later, the emperor ignored the advice of his generals and dispersed the forces so as not to put a strain on the people's capacity to supply the armies.⁴⁶ It is axiomatic that a thinly dispersed force is locally weak at any point and easily penetrated. However, in Sung China, concentration of forces could easily exhaust an area's agricultural output.

The Sung essentially abandoned aggressive warfare when it became obvious that they could not support it without mobilizing the entire country for war. To do so would have negated the deliberately civilistic policies of the first rulers. However, recovery of the Sixteen Northern Prefectures remained official Sung policy, and it was used by some civil and military officials to attack those who favored a policy of accommodation with the Khitan. An active defense might, it was feared by some officials, only provoke the Khitan and cause a full-scale war. On the other hand, a passive defense would allow enemy forces to roam about at will on Chinese territory; this was abhorrent to many officials in the government. While all the debates were going on, and defense policies changed back and forth, the Sung armies continued to grow both in size and in cost.

The constant threat of a Khitan invasion made it necessary for the Sung to maintain a large standing army. Uncertainty about Khitan capabilities, as well as the possibility of an alliance between the Liao and the Hsi-Hsia, forced the Sung to maintain a very long defensive line. Sung armies grew constantly from 960 onward, and even in peacetime it was difficult to demobilize any significant number of soldiers. The government could not ensure sufficient employment for

demobilized soldiers and feared that they would turn to banditry or other disruptive behavior. The total number of soldiers increased from 370,000 in 960 to 660,000 in 995. In 1017, twelve years after the Treaty of Shan-yuan which ended the fighting between Sung and Liao, the armies had swelled to 900,000. The war with the Hsi-Hsia in 1038 brought an increase in troop strength to 1,250,000.⁴⁷

All of these troops cost a great deal of money. For soldiers in the Imperial Guards, the government provided salaries, clothing, armor and weapons, food and housing. Soldiers in the prefectural armies received a smaller salary, armor and weapons, and a smaller allowance for food and housing. All were given rewards and supplementary bonuses at regular intervals (see Chapter IV for a more detailed discussion of these matters). According to Wong Hon-chiu, expenses only for soldiers in the capital in 997 amounted to 11 percent of the total government income.⁴⁸ Imperial Guard armies at that time comprised slightly more than half of the total Sung forces, but not all of them were stationed around the capital. It was estimated, in 1064, that 60-70 percent of state revenues was expended on the armies.⁴⁹ Military operations, especially during the war against the Hsi-Hsia, raised prices and increased

the government's cost of doing business. Wong feels-- and the data seems to bear him out--that rising military expenditures made it difficult for the Sung government to achieve a significant surplus and contributed greatly to the financial crisis that occurred in the later years of the Northern Sung.⁵⁰

Thus, the Sung was vulnerable both externally and internally. Vigorous and aggressive enemies on the borders required the maintenance of a large military establishment. Even during times of peace, the army could not be eliminated because there was some doubt among officials about how far the Khitan and Hsi-Hsia could be trusted. Maintenance of a large army put pressure on government revenues and stimulated much discussion about how to provide security at a reasonable price. The Sung response to all of these factors influenced--and was influenced by--Sung management of the military establishment.

The Development of Sung Military Management

There are three distinct phases in military management during the first 100 years of the dynasty. Arbitrary, ad hoc policies of recruitment and employment were abandoned in favor of the development of institutional mechanisms for managing the military. Close personal relationships between the ruler and his soldiers

gave way to more distant and impersonal ones. Also, the relationship between the military and the government changed considerably.

The Hsu Tzu-chih t'ung-chien ch'ang-pien contains over seventy cases of significant military contribution to the decision-making process from 960-1060. These contributions were not simply after-action reports submitted by generals but involved advice to the emperor on military matters, opinions in policy discussions, and requests for the implementation of specific policies. Seventeen of these cases occurred between 960 and 997 (the reigns of T'ai-tsu and T'ai-tsung). Fifty occurred from 998 to 1010 (the first thirteen years of Chen-tsung's reign). From 1010 to 1060, the military input declined to almost nothing. These changes in the military voice reflect the development in military management and the evolution of the military's new place as part of the government structure.

During the first period (960-997), China was ruled by two vigorous, expansionistic emperors. The Sung fought almost constantly against the Khitan, and major battles marked turning points in Sung military policy. In addition, the central government consolidated its control over the rest of China, gradually eliminating the remaining independent states in central and south

China. The social structure, economic infrastructure, and government bureaucracy all grew in size and complexity under the influence of new peace and stability that settled over most of China. The military stalemate on the northern frontier eventually brought temporary peace to that area.

Chen-tsung, who ruled during the middle period that I have identified, was much less aggressive and decisive than his predecessors. He negotiated a treaty with the Liao in 1005, inaugurating a long period of peace marred by only a few minor skirmishes. Yet, defense policy was constantly discussed at court, and military influence in government was never higher than during this period. The Sung and Liao remained at peace throughout the eleventh century, and it was not until the middle of Jen-tsung's reign that the Sung again went to war on a large scale, this time against the Hsi-Hsia.

Fundamental questions were raised during the third period about the nature and character of the military establishment. Problems of recruitment, training, and deployment of forces received much scrutiny; a plan to replace the regular armies with an extensive militia system was instituted and later abandoned. In addition, the balance of effective military power began to shift from the interior to the frontiers. It was during this

period that military influence at court declined, and civilian officials monopolized the highest military command functions with, I think, unhappy results for the military power of the Sung.

Throughout all these periods runs the theme of constant change and adjustment, not only of the internal structure and dynamics of the military establishment but also of the relationship between the military and the civil government. These changes were a function of the characters of the emperors who ruled and the military officers who served, the adjustments of the armies to changing strategic, tactical, and administrative requirements, and the growth, articulation, and sophistication of the civil government.

Kracke has identified three periods in the development of the bureaucratic sponsorship system during the Sung which correspond fairly closely with the periods that I found in the development of military management.⁵¹ Generally speaking, the process seen by Kracke was one of slow, careful beginnings that accelerated through a period of systematization, followed by a period of consolidation and extension of previous practices. This correspondence may only be fortuitous, but it demonstrates the process of growth and change in the

government of which the military was a part. The changes in the way the Sung managed its military forces did not occur in a vacuum; they were but one factor in the social and institutional changes so characteristic of the Sung. Indeed, as I hope to demonstrate, the military gradually relinquished its separate status and became one more part of the government bureaucracy.

The First Phase: 960-997

Sung T'ai-tsu first concentrated on pacifying the western and southern portions of China. In order to protect his back, he adopted a non-aggressive stance toward the Khitan in the north and allowed northern border commanders a large measure of autonomy. Although complete control of China was not to be achieved until the reign of T'ai-tsung, T'ai-tsu turned his attention northward in 969, laying siege to the Northern Han capital of T'ai-yuan. In the face of sickness among his troops,⁵² a stout defense by the garrison, and the imminent arrival of a Khitan relief force, T'ai-tsu withdrew after a short campaign. The Sung settled back into a defensive posture and did not attack to the north again until the reign of T'ai-tsu's successor.

In 979, Sung T'ai-tsung launched an extensive campaign to eliminate the state of Northern Han. After five months of hard fighting and many victories, Sung

forces captured T'ai-yuan. Inspired by this triumph, the emperor wanted to continue northward and capture Yu-chou 幽州 (modern Peking), the key to regaining the Sixteen Northern Prefectures. The emperor ignored protests from his generals that the troops were exhausted (and annoyed at receiving no reward for their efforts) and pushed his forces north to invest Yu-chou. T'ai-tsung surrounded the city with four armies, leaving a fifth army to guard his communications to the south and placing a sixth to the north and east to stop any relief forces.

Unfortunately, the Khitan attacked from the mountains to the west, where they were least expected, and threw the Sung forces into disorder.⁵³ Again, through a combination of exhaustion, strong defense of the city, and arrival of a relief force, the Sung forces were forced to withdraw. T'ai-tsung departed in the middle of the night, ordering his generals to re-group and withdraw. The pursuing Khitan caught the Sung forces at the Kao-Liang River 高梁河 (west of Peking), soundly defeated them, and very nearly turned the retreat into a rout.⁵⁴ There is some speculation that the disgruntled Sung troops declined to press their attacks and thereby contributed to the defeat, but the evidence is not conclusive.⁵⁵

T'ai-tsung's aggressive ambitions were only cooled, not extinguished. Sung forces defeated the Khitan forces at Man-ch'eng 滿城 (in modern Hopei) in late 979; and T'ai-tsung was only just dissuaded from making another attempt on the North in 980.⁵⁶ In 986, the emperor accepted advice to take advantage of the facts that the new Liao emperor was very young and that state affairs were controlled by his mother and her favorite. After a great deal of discussion, T'ai-tsung launched a three-pronged attack into Khitan territory aimed at capturing Yu-chou.⁵⁷ All three columns were very successful, penetrating deeply into Khitan territory and capturing many towns. This success made T'ai-tsung worry about the speed of the advance, and he cautioned his commanders not to outpace their supply columns.⁵⁸ His worries were well-founded, for just as the most advanced column--commanded by Ts'ao Pin ran low on supplies, Khitan cavalry cut their communications to the rear. Instead of waiting for reinforcements, Ts'ao advanced to Cho-chou 涿州 in twenty days of hard fighting, only to retreat for lack of men and material. The pursuing Khitan forces defeated Ts'ao's army at Ch'i-kou Kuan 岐溝關 (southwest of Peking) and then caught the remnants of Ts'ao's force with their backs to the Sha 沙 River. The Sung troops panicked and fled into the

river where they drowned or were slaughtered in such large numbers that "The Sha river ceased to flow".⁵⁹ Only a sharp counterattack by Li Chi-Hsüan 李繼宣 prevented a complete debacle.⁶⁰

T'ai-tsung ordered a complete withdrawal to defensive positions along the frontier. Ts'ao Pin and several other generals were relieved of command and demoted.⁶¹ The emperor replied to criticism of the campaign by saying that his only aim was to drive out the Khitan and restore China's traditional borders. He placed the blame solely on generals who had exceeded their authority and had not followed the planned strategy.⁶²

In 979, T'ai-tsung had taken personal command of the expeditionary force and had participated in the fighting. The defeat did not diminish his enthusiasm for attacking the Khitan. The Sung had, after all, eliminated the Northern Han state, and the failure to capture Yu-chou could be passed off as the result of over-confidence. After 986, however, there could be no doubt that the Sung had tried its best to carry the war to the enemy and had failed. Dissuaded from taking personal command, T'ai-tsung had turned the enterprise over to his generals who failed him through poor planning and (to be charitable) an excess of zeal. Though the

Sung armies could fight effectively when properly supported, it is obvious that the Sung was not capable--logistically and perhaps even temperamentally--of carrying on aggressive warfare over long distances against a strong and determined enemy.

At any rate, the initiative passed to the Khitan, who continued to attack and harass the border areas, while Sung forces remained on the defensive, merely responding to Khitan incursions. The situation gradually settled into a stalemate which was not broken before the end of the tenth century.

Both Sung T'ai-tsu and his brother, T'ai-tsung, were strong, aggressive military men who had served in the Imperial Guards prior to becoming emperor. Both were assertive in outlook and active in the pursuit of military affairs. The record is replete with instances of both emperors taking personal command of field operations.⁶³ Sung Ch'ang-Lien, a modern historian, feels that T'ai-tsung was not the equal of his elder brother in combat experience and tactical knowledge; T'ai-tsung did not know how to use his generals properly and was the first to flee when things went awry.⁶⁴ This is, I think, an overly harsh judgment. T'ai-tsung did accept the challenge of personal command and there is every indication that he maintained the loyalty and

affection of his generals and kept up an active participation in military affairs throughout his whole reign.

The thrust of military management during this period was toward consolidation. Generals and troops who submitted were incorporated into the Sung armies. The best soldiers were siphoned off and assigned to the Imperial Guards concentrated in the capital area. Both emperors were directly involved with their somewhat heterogeneous armies, and formal mechanisms for managing the armies had not been fully worked out. Whatever was successful was acceptable. In addition, two important features of these early reigns were the personal relations between emperor and general and the good treatment accorded military commanders.

Generals who did well were personally rewarded by the emperor. In 979, the emperor praised Yang Yeh for his knowledge of frontier affairs and for his understanding of the enemy's character and strategy. Yang was made the Administrator of Tai-chou 代州 and T'ai-tsung lavished other rewards on him as well.⁶⁵ Punishment for generals who failed was sometimes reduced by the emperor in light of past service, and as occurs in most armies, final victory covered up mistakes made along the way. In 988, Li Chi-lung stripped I-chou 易州 of its

defense units in order to launch an attack against the invading Khitan. The undefended city fell to the Khitan, but later Li defeated the Khitan forces and drove them back across the border. T'ai-tsung overlooked the temporary loss of the city (and the fact Li Chi-lung had exceeded his authority) and passed out rewards all around.⁶⁶

By and large, military commanders were demoted or punished for military errors. Few were punished for political reasons. One notable exception was Ts'ao Pin who was accused in 983 of having too strong a control over his army, of gaining the allegiance of his soldiers (te shih-chung hsin 得士象心), of misappropriating funds, and various other charges. The emperor ignored advice to reject the charges and removed Ts'ao from the Bureau of Military Affairs and from some of his other concurrent posts. However, the emperor recalled his previous service and continued to treat him well.⁶⁷ Ts'ao was restored to the Bureau of Military Affairs in 998.

All of these instances point to an affirmation and execution of the contract struck in 960 between T'ai-tsu and his generals and extended, by implication, to the rest of the military. Tenure in service, status, and good treatment were given in exchange for service to

the state (as embodied in the emperor). It is important to note that generals who failed were demoted, reprimanded, or otherwise punished; but they were not executed. In 986, one general who hid rather than face the enemy (surely a capital offense in any modern army) was merely banished.⁶⁸

Military influence in policy-making during this period was not negligible. Chang Yung-te, for example, had supported T'ai-tsu's bid for power, and he was invited to court as a reward. In 960, when the emperor wanted to attack the Northern Han, Chang warned against impetuously attacking T'ai-yuan (the Northern Han capital) because the Khitan would come to its aid. It would be better, he said, to build up irregular forces to harass and disrupt Han agriculture and to send spies to keep an eye on Khitan movements. The emperor accepted his advice.⁶⁹ Three years later, T'ai-tsu also concurred with Chang's advice on command structure and military appointments.⁷⁰

T'ai-tsung was equally receptive to military advice. In 979, he asked Ts'ao Pin why both Chou Shih-tsung and Sung T'ai-tsu had failed to take T'ai-yuan. Ts'ao replied that Shih-tsung's troops had lost their nerve after a single defeat; sickness had rendered T'ai-tsu's efforts unsuccessful. T'ai-yuan was not especially

strong, he said, and with the present armies, capturing T'ai-yuan would be ". . . like kicking over a rotten stump."⁷¹ In spite of his civilian advisors' advice that it was too dangerous and not worth the risk, T'ai-tsung decided to launch an expedition against T'ai-yuan. "Circumstances are different now," he said, "the enemy are weak and we are strong."⁷² No doubt Ts'ao's advice agreed with what the emperor wanted in the first place. However, it should be noted that the campaign was successful up to the capture of T'ai-yuan, when the emperor ignored the wishes of his commanders and pushed farther north into Khitan territory. The result was the Sung defeat at Kao-liang Ho.

In some cases, T'ai-tsung was initially skeptical of military proposals but later approved when the efficacy of a policy was demonstrated. Ho Ch'eng-chu had previously proposed the creation of t'un-t'ien 屯田, agricultural farms tilled by soldiers, as a means of strengthening the defense of the northern borders and of reducing military costs.⁷³ Though not persuaded of its usefulness, T'ai-tsung allowed Ho to proceed with the creation of t'un-t'ien on a limited scale in Ho-pei. After a few years, the value of the project became obvious and, in 993, Ho was made responsible for extending the t'un-t'ien system throughout Ho-pei.⁷⁴

T'ai-tsu's advisors were divided, on the subject of war with the Khitan, into three groups. The "war" and "defense" parties, which included both military and civil officials, differed on the issue of an aggressive, expansionistic policy versus a strictly passive and defensive posture. The "peace" party opposed active warfare and urged peace with the Khitan including, if necessary, appeasement through money payments.⁷⁵

Sung T'ai-tsu was interested in peace only insofar as it allowed him to concentrate on consolidating his hold on the southern and central areas of China. Although it was T'ai-tsu's desire to regain China's northern territory, his armies never directly faced the Khitan in battle. The "peace" party had little voice or influence at court during this period. T'ai-tsung continued his brother's generally bellicose policies, but he also exchanged envoys with the Khitan.⁷⁶ At the same time, he pursued an aggressive strategy against both the Northern Han and the Khitan until the Sung defeat in 986.

Neither the Sung nor the Liao was strong enough to force a decision after the Sung defeat at Ch'i-kou Kuan, and the military situation on the frontier settled into a stalemate, broken occasionally by minor raiding. It was during this period that the group urging peace and

disarmament became more prominent at court, and the major question was no longer that of peace or war but that of peace or a strong defense. The defensive policy can be seen in efforts to create rich paddies, moats, dikes, and swampy areas on the frontiers to hinder Khitan cavalry operations. The peace party favored avoidance of conflict, reduction in forces, and negotiation for peace. These two policies were actually more complementary and mutually reinforcing than they were antagonistic.⁷⁷

The Second Phase: 998-1010

Chen-tsung inherited the military stalemate on the frontier and the defensive orientation of the post-986 period. He also reaped the fruits of his predecessors' centralizing policies. T'ai-tsung had gradually extended his control over the border generals. In 999, Chen-tsung began to appoint Palace Guard generals to important border commands and to give frontier generals commands in the Palace Guard, concurrent with their border posts.⁷⁸ This directly contradicted the policies of previous rulers (see Chapter IV), but it further extended central control over the armies and reduced the psychological separation, as it were, between the inner and outer parts of the empire. It also suggests the institutional changes that were beginning to replace

earlier policies with more regular systems. Both frontier and central armies were to be part of the same military system and the system itself but a part of a larger governmental organization.

By far the most important event of this second phase was the Treaty of Shan-yuan in 1005 which formally ended forty years of conflict between the Sung and the Liao. By the beginning of the eleventh century, both sides had grown restless. Every autumn, the Khitan armies moved south to test the Sung defenses and plunder wherever they could. The Sung forces were usually able to contain or repel such incursions, but the army's defensive posture and capabilities were a constant worry to the emperor. Some generals, Wang Ch'ao for example, wanted to strengthen the frontier defenses and even to intercept Khitan forces before they reached Sung territory. Chen-tsung, however, was reluctant to provoke the enemy and his policy remained reactive rather than anticipatory or preemptive.

The Khitan cavalry began to move southward in force at the beginning of 1004. Chen-tsung ignored advice from both military and civilian officials to attack the Khitan forces first. From April through June, 1004, Sung and Khitan forces had made contact in a series of small skirmishes along the border, with the victories and

defeats about evenly distributed. The main Khitan thrust began in mid-October (ninth intercalary month) and the emperor was urged not only to commit his forces in a concerted attack but also to go to the front, if not to command, then at least to inspire the armies. However, Chen-tsung did not order an attack into Khitan territory until late November. By late December, Sung forces were fully engaged and the emperor--after considerable vacillation had gone to the front. After a great deal of fighting, neither side emerged with a clear advantage. Sung forces had blunted the enemy attack, but the armies were fully extended and they expected the arrival of Khitan reinforcements at any moment. The Khitan, for their part, had lost as many battles as they had won, and they had failed to capture several important Chinese strongholds. The resulting peace treaty was a product of stalemate, and it had as much to do with the machinations of officials on both sides as with the wishes of the two rulers.

According to contemporary accounts, there were generals of both sides who surrendered (or were captured), were given official ranks by their captors, and entered into the service of their former enemies.⁷⁹ Quite often, these generals were sent as emissaries to their former rulers and were not used to lead troops

into combat. The most famous of these was Wang Chi-chung 王繼忠 (d. 1022), a high-ranking general, who was captured by the Khitan early in 1004, lavishly rewarded, given official rank, and employed as a go-between in an effort to make peace.⁸⁰ That Chen-tsung and his advisors were willing to accept Wang as an emissary indicates the Sung desire to make peace. Not only was war on the Khitan a drain on manpower and revenue, but the Hsi-Hsia had begun to attack along China's northwest frontier. Wang was a useful tool who could be repudiated by the emperor if negotiations failed. Chen-tsung's chancellor, K'ou Chun 寇準 (961-1023), also played an important part. He urged the emperor to take personal command in the field, no doubt intending to improve the Sung bargaining position by avoiding a large-scale defeat. Also, he was the chief negotiator for the Sung.

The Treaty of Shan-yuan, concluded early in 1005, provided that the Sung would pay annually 100,000 ounces of silver and 200,000 bolts of silk for the purposes of "subsidizing the military expenses" of the Liao. In addition, the Sung emperor agreed to consider the mother of the Liao emperor as a "junior aunt."⁸¹ Although the treaty ended the fighting, military problems continued to be a matter of concern.

Reductions in military forces began in 1005. Imperial Guard units were withdrawn to the capital and replaced with militia forces on the frontier.⁸² At the same time, Chen-tsung was reluctant to reduce defense capability too much, and he tried to maintain frontier forces without arousing Khitan suspicions or breaking the treaty.⁸³ Forces were further reduced as the period of peace lengthened. In 1008 for example, Chen-tsung ordered the infantry directorate of the Emperor's Guard to reduce the size of the Pao-ning 保寧 army, retaining only one-quarter for garrison duties and releasing the remainder to agricultural work or to the prefectural reserve.⁸⁴

The emphasis during this period was on maintaining a defensive capability while reducing forces and cost. Both civil and military officials said that vigilance on the borders could not be relaxed even in peacetime. After a period of reduction of forces, troop strengths began to grow again by 1010 to replace old and ineffective soldiers and to fill the gaps in China's long frontier defense.

The most important feature in this second phase of military management is the visibility and influence enjoyed by high-ranking generals in policy discussions. From 998 to 1010, there were fifty cases of generals

offering advice, criticism, or recommendations to the emperor. This development reflects both the high status of military commanders and the personality of the emperor.

Chen-tsung had inherited the throne from his father, T'ai-tsung, but he was much less warlike and aggressive than either of his two predecessors. He was not a soldier, but he had not had the experience of field command, and there is every indication that he was not as competent and decisive as previous Sung rulers. An incident in 1004 reveals both Chen-tsung's shortcomings as a decision-maker and his relationship with his senior generals.

I have previously noted Chen-tsung's reluctance to provoke the Khitan by a preemptive attack on their approaching forces and his vacillation in the face of conflicting advice to go to the front and assume command. Late in 1004, when Khitan reinforcements were expected and the situation looked quite grim, some of the emperor's advisors urged him to retreat and--if necessary--abandon the capital to the enemy. Chen-tsung asked K'ou Chun for advice, and he replied:

Your advisors are cowardly and stupid; they talk like old farmers and women. Right now the enemy is upon us, danger is all around. We can advance a bit, but we dare not retreat even one inch. The forces in Ho-pei anxiously await your arrival

to restore their spirit. If you retreat, they will fall apart.⁸⁵

When K'ou Chun left the emperor's presence, he met the commander-in-chief of the Palace Corps, Kao Ch'iong, and said, "You have been well treated by your country, how will you repay it?" Kao replied, "I am a soldier; I am willing to devote my life." They both returned to the emperor and Kao confirmed K'ou Chun's analysis of the situation, adding:

All our families are in the capital; we cannot abandon them and flee south. . . . If the emperor will advance to Shan-chou, the army will fight hard and the enemy will not be difficult to defeat.

The emperor decided not to retreat and to go on to Shan-chou. However, his progress was somewhat dilatory. At one point, the emperor halted to confer with his advisors. When Kao Ch'iong again urged the emperor to press on, he was insulted and ridiculed by one of the civil officials. Kao replied:

You have gained your position through literary accomplishments. Now when the enemy is upon us you treat me with disrespect. Why don't you compose a poem, and perhaps by reciting it you can make the enemy retreat?

Kao commanded the entourage to advance, and they moved off, carrying the reluctant emperor with them. A bit later, the emperor ordered another halt. This time, Kao beat on the emperor's litter bearers and shouted

"Why have you stopped? We've come this far, why hesitate?" Chen-tsung gave in and finally arrived at Pei-ch'eng 北城 (modern Ho-pei) where he mounted the northern city gate and displayed the yellow dragon banner. The assembled armies cheered, and morale increased tremendously.

This incident illustrates several points. First, it shows Chen-tsung's indecision and lack of confidence in vital military operations. It is hard to imagine T'ai-tsu or T'ai-tsung dithering so, especially in the face of the enemy. Second, Kao Ch'iung was a very senior general who had served both previous emperors. He had also been a close associate of Chen-tsung's father. The emperor eventually gave in to his age, experience, and status; and this provides a clue to the relationship between Chen-tsung and his generals. They knew more about warfare than he did, and he had to acknowledge their expertise and make use of it. Third, one sees a bit of the antagonism that existed between civil and military officials. To be fair, there were other factors that influenced the emperor's action (or lack of action). Any large-scale military action to the north would leave the Sung vulnerable to a Hsi-Hsia attack from the rear. Also, if the Khitan achieved a major victory and broke through the Sung lines, the

emperor was liable to be captured. However, Chen-tsung was incapable of firm decision, and he had to be forced into the proper course by the actions of his generals.

Chen-tsung was willing to accept advice from all sources within the government, and he often solicited advice from his generals on military matters. In 1001, he summoned Kao Ch'iung to consult on the proper punishment for units who had abandoned their positions during recent border fighting. Kao Ch'iung replied:

Soldiers who disobey should be punished according to military law. However, last year you declined to punish them for the same offense. How can you do it now? Moreover, you can't transfer them now without ruining morale.⁸⁶

The emperor concurred with his judgment.

On matters of frontier defense, Chen-tsung relied on such experts as Ts'ao Wei and Ho Ch'eng-chu. Ho continued as the chief of all t'un-t'ien operations in the Ho-pei area, and the emperor expanded and extended the development of these defensive measures under Ho' direction.⁸⁷ In 1005, Ts'ao Wei advised the emperor to select archers from among the border tribes as a supplement to the regular forces, and he suggested that the government give the tribes supplies and remit taxes in order to stimulate their loyalty.⁸⁸ During the later years of Chen-tsung's reign, Ts'ao submitted many

memorials and recommendations regarding border defense; the emperor usually concurred.⁸⁹

When Li Yun-tse was Administrator of Ts'ang-chou 滄州, he was promoted to a very important post in the military inspectorate. Li declined on the grounds that strategy and active command were not his long suit, but the emperor replied: "You are my expert in logistical planning; it is not necessary for you to go into combat." Thereafter, no orders could be sent from the capital to military units without Li's approval.⁹⁰

Another general, Ma Chih-chieh, submitted a memorial in 1002 suggesting the use of local militia forces as a source of replacements for the Imperial Guards. The emperor approved his plan.⁹¹ Chen-tsung also consulted Ma on border defense problems. Ma criticized the current emphasis on masses of cavalry, recommending instead that smaller cavalry units be used to scout terrain, gather intelligence, and ambush Khitan raiders.⁹² Ma Chih-chieh was clearly an exponent of the defensive rather than offensive school of strategy. Chen-tsung also consulted Yang Yen-chao because of his experience in border warfare. The emperor asked for his opinions on both present strategy and future defensive plans. However, Yang's recommendations were considered inappropriate and rejected.⁹³

Chen-tsung was not reluctant to grant Wang Ch'ao and other generals discretionary authority (p'ien-yi ts'ung-shih 便宜從事) when necessary. In 1004 and again in 1007, the emperor allowed selected generals freedom of action because either fluid circumstances or distance precluded prior approval for action.⁹⁴ On the other hand, Chen-tsung did not hesitate to demote Wang Ch'ao for failure in his mission.

The Third Phase: 1010-1060

Defence and other military matters lost their urgency for policy makers at the Sung court as the period of peace lengthened. This third phase was, for the military, a period of routinization and regularization. Also, the military voice, which had been so strong from 998 to 1010, almost disappeared from the policy-making process, and civilians began to exercise control over not only government policy but also the military establishment itself. With only a few exceptions (see below) I could find no significant instances of military advice or opinion as had occurred during the two previous periods that I have identified. In 1042 for example, Li Chao-liang responded to discussions about militia forces by recommending that farmers in certain districts be registered and trained as archers; this policy would

provide trained defense forces at a relatively low cost.⁹⁵ Such examples of advice from the military, however, are rare.

Although there was no significant warfare with the Khitan, friction between the Sung and Hsi-Hsia, which had been simmering for a long time, erupted into full-scale war in 1038. The Khitan, however, were still seen as a threat, especially when they began to demand more land and payments from the Sung in 1042. In 1042 and again in 1043, Ou-yang Hsiu warned that the most important adversary was not the Hsi-hsia but the Khitan. They would use China's troubles as an opportunity to increase their demands for more territorial concessions. Ou-yang recommended a vigorous and aggressive Sung response on both fronts to overawe the Khitan and to frustrate any alliance between the Khitan and the Hsi-Hsia.⁹⁶ In 1044, Han Ch'i 韓琦 (1008-75) and Fan Chung-yen advised strengthening defenses on both the northern and western borders, lest a concentration of forces in one area create a dangerous vacuum in the other. "Peace," they said, "is temporary and discretionary, but war and defense are basic and permanent" (以和好為權宜以戰守為實務). It was necessary to deter the enemy through strength and preparedness.⁹⁷

One also sees, during this period, an increasing concern with the costs of maintaining an ever-growing army and recommendations to reduce those costs by replacing the regular armies with militia forces. In 1034, an official noted the high cost of regular cavalry and infantry units on the border and recommended replacing regular troops with prefectural forces. Regular units, stationed around the capital, would be sent to the front only in case of invasion.⁹⁸ The emperor agreed with his assessment. Li Chao-liang's recommendation of 1042 has already been noted.

In contrast to these ideas on militia use are some views expressed in previous periods. When T'ai-tsung wanted to recruit local militia (i-chün 義軍) in 987, his civil advisors argued strongly against it. The fields would not be plowed, said one. Another replied that farmers are not trained to be soldiers. Once recruited, they would desert and become bandits. The best solution, he said, was to rely on the skill and talents of good generals.⁹⁹ As will be discussed in Chapter IV, Chen-tsung was extremely reluctant to draft local militia in 1002. Such a policy would have been disruptive, militarily as well as agriculturally. However, what was considered a last resort in 1002 had become a viable alternative only thirty years later. This change in

policy (and perception) is but one of many that occurred during Jen-tsung's reign.

One reason for these changes is the new cast of characters on the scene after 1010. On the one hand, Jen-tsung (who came to the throne in 1023) was even further removed from the aggressive, military character of previous rulers. When Jen-tsung ascended the throne, the Sung had been at peace for nineteen years, and for a further fifteen years little disturbed that peace. Jen-tsung did not have to act as a military leader in combat, and he seemed to be more interested in promoting the welfare of the peasants. Not only was he more likely to turn to his civilian advisors than to his generals, but, in 1023, he ended the practice of personally inspecting the Palace Guards.¹⁰⁰ On the other hand, almost all of the generals who had served as the mainstay of previous reigns had died. Their sons and grandsons did not have the prestige of having been present at the founding of the dynasty or of participating in the important campaigns of the late tenth century. Nor did they have the close personal relationships with the emperor that their forebears had enjoyed with T'ai-tsu and T'ai-tsung. Consequently, they did not usually rise to high rank. What one sees is the rise of newer, younger officers who were as dependent on political

connections as they were on family background or personal prowess. For example, Yang Wen-kuang (son of Yang Yen-chao) was a member of Fan Chung-yen's personal guard in Shensi and served as a subordinate of Han Ch'i.¹⁰¹ Ti Ch'ing, who rose from the ranks, gained officer status through the military examinations, and achieved high rank, was a protege of both Han Ch'i and Fan Chung-yen.¹⁰²

Another important trend noticeable during this period is the shift from the rather ad hoc military management practices of the early Sung to more regularized, routinized systems. Though some of these systems and policies were initiated under Chen-tsung, they came to fruition only in later years. Military command positions on the borders, for example, were gradually brought under stricter control (see Chapter IV). Military examinations and a military school were established to provide competent and trained officers; a military temple was built in the capital as an attempt to define and foster ethical norms for soldiers. Military encyclopedias, compendia of historical precedent and tactical doctrine, were written and published for military use.

Within the military itself, promotions became routinized to the point that some critics felt that

efficiency had been affected. In 1043, Ou-yang Hsiu complained that military effectiveness had suffered due to a lack of competent commanders. The court, he said, had not taken the trouble to select men of talent. Instead, the court had merely followed rank-precedence in selecting officers for promotion.¹⁰³ One may contrast this with Chen-tsung's reign. Appointment and promotions were not made haphazardly, of course, but in 1005 the emperor complained about the lack of a standard procedure for the promotion of officers. If rank-precedence were followed, he said, talented officers might be overlooked; but it was necessary to have some method for filling command positions as they became vacant.¹⁰⁴

Finally, one sees an effort to put supply, equipage, and recruitment on a more regular basis. In 1010, Li Yun-tse had complained that when troops were levied, they had to supply their own weapons, food, clothing, and horses. This often led to poor performance or desertion.¹⁰⁵ The push for a larger militia can be seen as an effort to ensure a steady and reliable supply of soldiers, independent of the vagaries of the recruitment system. Indeed, many officials (including Fan Chung-yen and, later, Wang An-shih) wanted to replace armies with militia. During Jen-tsung's reign, there was a general

effort to put the supply of arms and horses on a more regular and reliable basis.¹⁰⁶

Perhaps the most significant trend in military management during this third phase was the gradual shift in the military command function from generals to civilian officials. Not only was the military under civil control, but the Hsi-hsia war was conducted with civilians in the highest command positions. The bestowal of "discretionary authority" is one indicator of this trend. Such authority was usually reserved for generals in previous periods, but Jen-tsung granted it almost exclusively to civil officials (Ti Ch'ing is the notable exception).¹⁰⁷ Fan Chung-yen and Han Ch'i were given this authority in 1043, in spite of their previous lack of success.¹⁰⁸

Input from the military seems to be conspicuous by its absence in the formulation of policy and strategy. The military continued to fill the lower command ranks, but both supreme command in the field and strategic planning at court were monopolized by civilians. Both Fan Chung-yen and Han Ch'i offered plans and advice to the emperor on the conduct of the Hsi-Hsia war, and both took command on the battlefield.¹⁰⁹ They were not terribly successful.

Han Ch'i was sent to direct military operations in 1041. During his tenure as commander, the Hsi-Hsia severely defeated the Sung armies, killing several generals and destroying their forces. Han Ch'i was demoted one rank and sent to another assignment.¹¹⁰ Although the Hsi-Hsia won more battles than they lost, the Sung military effort was not uniformly unsuccessful. Ti Ch'ing, for example, won several victories in the early years of the war, and the conflict was brought to an end after the death of the Hsi-Hsia emperor, Chao Yüan-hao 趙元昊, in 1048.

Concluding Remarks

James T. C. Liu has developed a typology for Northern Sung emperors that reflects not only the personalities of the emperors but also their relationship with the administrative apparatus of the government.¹¹¹ The "organizing" types, such as T'ai-tsu and T'ai-tsung, were strong executives who made most of the important decisions and paid relatively attention to their advisors. "Maintenance" type emperors were less administratively active and were mostly concerned with maintaining the institutions left by their predecessors. They left much of the government business to their officials and acted primarily as a final arbiter when policy conflicts arose. Liu identifies Chen-tsung and Jen-tsung as

maintenance-type emperors. "Reforming" emperors, such as Shen-tsung, were perhaps as active as organizing-type emperors, but less skilled. In their efforts at reform, they drew more power to themselves, but then turned it over to officials who supported the reform program. These officials often used this power against their opponents, generating opposition both to the reformers and to the reforms. "Ineffectual" emperors like Hui-tsung withdrew from the exercise of their duties, turning over their power to favorites.

Liu's typology sheds some light on the development of military management. In the military sphere, T'ai-tsu and T'ai-tsung certainly fit into the organizing type. They made the important military decisions, took active command of military forces, and consulted their generals much less often than did later emperors. They were strong executives both at court and on the battlefield. Chen-tsung and Jen-tsung exhibited their maintenance-type characteristics in military affairs as well. Chen-tsung tended to leave military operations to his generals and, in many cases, deferred to their opinions. Military officials were much more prominent during the first half of Chen-tsung's reign when military problems were most urgent. After the borders had quieted down, Chen-tsung turned more to his

civil advisors. Jen-*tsung* did not take as active a part in military affairs as had the founders of the dynasty, and he placed greater reliance on civil officials for the conduct of military operations.

However, both Chen-*tsung* and Jen-*tsung* went beyond simply continuing previous military policies. They modified and even reversed some military policies established by T'-ai-*tsu* and T'-ai-*tsung* (see Chapter IV), and they instituted new policies for the rationalization of the military system. The characterization of Jen-*tsung* as a maintenance-type emperor helps to explain why he appointed civilians to positions of military command. Since he had distanced himself from military affairs, it is not surprising that Jen-*tsung* turned to his close and trusted civil officials in a time of crisis. Chen-*tsung* and Jen-*tsung*, both maintenance-type emperors, ruled at a time when the civil bureaucracy had begun to grow and develop into a sophisticated managerial elite. The subordination of the military to the civil is one part of that developmental process.

The development of military management from 960 to 1060 that I have described was a continuous process, and there are few, if any, extraordinary events to mark the turning points. Yet, change clearly did take place, and the relationship between the civil government and its

military arm was not the same in 1060 as it had been a century earlier. Along the way, emperors, generals, and officials had appeared and disappeared bringing new attitudes, new expectations, and new relationships. Both the civil government and the military establishment had to cope with growth and decay as the changing circumstance of peace and war brought new demands and difficulties, new perceptions of the military and its role, and new ways of managing the military.

NOTES

¹E. G. Pulleyblank, "The An Lu-shan Rebellion and the Origins of Chronic Militarism in Late T'ang China," 35-39.

²E. G. Pulleyblank, The Background of the Rebellion of An Lu-shan, 61-63.

³C. A. Peterson, The Autonomy of the Northeastern Provinces in the Period Following the An Lu-shan Rebellion, 4.

⁴Pulleyblank, Background, 68-73.

⁵Peterson, 6.

⁶Pulleyblank, "Origins," 40.

⁷Ibid., 49.

⁸Peterson, 125.

⁹Ibid., 140.

¹⁰Pulleyblank, "Origins," 53.

¹¹Peterson, 79-80.

¹²Ibid., 171-72.

¹³Wang Gungwu, The Structure of Power in North China during the Five Dynasties, 3.

¹⁴Ibid., 103.

¹⁵Ibid., 158.

¹⁶Ibid., 171.

¹⁷See E. H. Worthy, The Founding of Sung China, 950-1000: Integrative Changes in Military and Political Institutions, Chapter Two, for a discussion of these measures.

¹⁸Li Tsung-k'o was placed on the Later T'ang throne by officers of the Emperor's Army in 934. He lost the throne in 937 when most of the army submitted to Shih Ching-t'ang (Chin Kao-tsu, r. 937-42). See Wang Gungwu, 187-91.

¹⁹Worthy, 146.

²⁰Ibid., 153-60.

²¹Praetorianism is discussed throughout Perlmutter, The Military and Politics. See also: D. C. Rapoport, "A Comparative Theory of Military and Political Types" in S. P. Huntington, Changing Patterns of Military Politics, 71-101.

²²Finer, The Man on Horseback, 12ff.

²³See Worthy, Chapter Four for a discussion of these matters.

²⁴Worthy, 175. I have followed Worthy's translation. The interpretations are my own.

²⁵Ibid., 165.

²⁶HCP, chapter 2/10-11.

²⁷For information on the Hsi-Hsia, refer to Lin Lü-chih, Hsi-Hsia shih.

²⁸Karl A. Wittfogel and Feng Chia-sheng, History of Chinese Society, Liao, 115.

²⁹Ibid., 528.

³⁰LS, 3/38-39.

³¹LS, 4/44-45; also 37/437.

³²LS, 5/65-66; 6/70.

³³See Li Chen, "Lun Pei-Sung kuo-fang chi ch'i kuo-yun te hsing-fei", in Sung-shih yen-chiu chi. 4 (1969), 469-72.

³⁴HCP, 30/1.

³⁵HCP, 10/1-10.

³⁶HCP, 20/8-9.

³⁷LS, 36/433; See also biography of Yeh-lu Hsiu-ke, 83/1299.

³⁸HCP, 73/9-10. In 1010, Chen Yao-sou suggested that a flanking force strike for Yu-chou as a response to any Khitan invasion. A somewhat earlier example (987) occurs in HCP, 28/6.

³⁹HCP, 29/9-10.

⁴⁰HCP, 29/11.

⁴¹HCP, 28/2. It reads: 來則禦之, 去則勿逐.

⁴²HCP, Yung-lo ta-tien edition, 12399/22-24.

⁴³HCP, 27/5.

⁴⁴HCP, 30/1-2.

⁴⁵HCP, 51/15.

⁴⁶HCP, 55/19.

⁴⁷Lo Ch'iu-ch'ing, "Pei-Sung ping-chih yen-chiu", Hsin-ya hsueh-pao, 3.1 (1957), 223-24.

⁴⁸Wong Hon-chiu, Government Expenditures in Northern Sung China, 59.

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰Wong Hon-chiu, 175-76.

⁵¹Kracke, Civil Service, 190-91.

⁵²According to HCP 20/1, both soldiers and horses became ill from eating kan-ts'ao, or licorice root (Glycyrrhiza glabra), which grew in the area where they were camped.

⁵³Sung Ch'ang-lien, "Kao-liang ho chan-i k'ao-shih." Ta-lu tsa-chih. 39.10 (1969), 32.

⁵⁴See Ch'eng Kuang-yu, Sung T'ai-tsung tui-Liao chan-cheng k'ao, 48-65 for a description of this campaign.

⁵⁵Sung Ch'ang-lien, p. 29.

⁵⁶HCP, 21/10.

⁵⁷HCP, 27/1-6.

⁵⁸SHY, ch 175, ping 8.5.

⁵⁹LS, 83/1300.

⁶⁰HCP, 27/10-11. For characters and dates of Sung generals, see Appendix A.

⁶¹STCLC, 94/345-46.

⁶²HCP, 27/11-14.

⁶³SHY, ch. 175, ping 7.1ff. "ch'in-cheng."

⁶⁴Sung Ch'ang-lien, 336.

⁶⁵HCP, 20/19a.

⁶⁶HCP, 29/11-12. See Appendix B for biographical sketch of Li Chi-Lung.

⁶⁷SS, 258/8981; also HCP, 24/1. See Appendix B for biographical sketch of Ts'ao Pin.

⁶⁸SHY, ch. 175, ping 8.6.

⁶⁹HCP, 1/18.

⁷⁰HCP, 4/15.

⁷¹SS, 258/8981.

⁷²HCP, 20/1-2.

⁷³For a discussion of the t'un-t'ien system, see Chao Chen-chi, "Sung-tai t'un-t'ien yü pien-fang chung-yao hsing." Chung-hua wen-hua. no. 3.2 (1970). 80-82.

⁷⁴HCP, 24/2-3.

⁷⁵See Ch'en Fang-ming, "Sung-ch'i mi-ping lun-te chien-t'ao." Kuo-li pien-i kuan kuan-k'an. 4.2, 47-64 for a discussion of the peace, war, and disarmament questions.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 48.

⁷⁷Ch'en Fang-ming also feels that the peace and disarmament question was closely tied to the policies of chung-wen ch'ing-wu and chiang-kan jo-chih. See ibid., 59.

⁷⁸Lo Ch'iu-ch'ing, "Pei-Sung ping-chih yen-chiu", 206-208.

⁷⁹See Chiang Fu-tsung, "Shan-yuan chih meng-te yen-chiu," in Sung-shih yen-chiu chi. V. 4, 174ff.

⁸⁰His biography occurs in both the Sung and Liao dynastic histories. SS, 279; LS, 81.

⁸¹Yeh Lung-li, Ch'i-t'an kuo-chih, 20/2b-3b; See also Wittfogel and Feng, 586.

⁸²HCP, 59/6.

⁸³HCP, 59/18.

⁸⁴SS, 187/4573.

⁸⁵See HCP, 58/10-13 for the following incident. See Appendix B for biographical sketch of Kao Ch'iong.

⁸⁶HCP, 48/9-10. SS, 289/9693 gives the date as 1000; I have relied on the more complete text.

⁸⁷Chao Chen-chi, "Sung-tai t'un-t'ien . . .", 80.

⁸⁸HCP, 60/5. See Appendix B for biographical sketch of Ts'ao Wei.

⁸⁹For examples, see: HCP, 83/1; 86/7; 86/13.

⁹⁰HCP, 57/8 (1004).

⁹¹HCP, 51/7. See Appendix B for biographical sketch of Ma Chih-chieh.

- ⁹²Ch'en Fang-ming, "Sung-ch'i mi-ping lun . . .", 56.
- ⁹³HCP, 54/18.
- ⁹⁴SHY, 175/ping 8.12; 179/ping 14.1.
- ⁹⁵SS, 190/4706-07. See Appendix B for biographical sketch of Li Chao-Liang.
- ⁹⁶HCP, Yung-lo ta-tien ed., 12,399/17-21; HCP, 141/9.
- ⁹⁷HCP, 149/1-2.
- ⁹⁸HCP, 114/15; see also note 80.
- ⁹⁹HCP, 28/3.
- ¹⁰⁰TK, 157/1371.
- ¹⁰¹SS, 273/9308-09.
- ¹⁰²SS, 290/9718-21; also HCP, 145/17. See Appendix B for biographical sketch of Ti Ch'ing.
- ¹⁰³HCP, 142/6; 144/1-2.
- ¹⁰⁴SS, 149/4879.
- ¹⁰⁵HCP, 74/11.
- ¹⁰⁶SS, 197/4911 ff; 198/4930.
- ¹⁰⁷Lo Ch'iu-ch'ing, "Pei-Sung ping-chih yen-chiu", 222.
- ¹⁰⁸SHY, 179/ping 14.2.
- ¹⁰⁹Lin Lu-chih, Hsi-Hsia shih, 93.
- ¹¹⁰Ibid., 97.
- ¹¹¹James T. C. Liu, "An Administrative Cycle in Chinese History: The Case of Northern Sung Emperors." Journal of Asian Studies 21.2 (1962), 137-152.

CHAPTER III

PERCEPTIONS OF THE MILITARY

The way that the military was perceived played an important part in management of the military system during the Northern Sung. Opinions about the military affected defense policy, strategy, and use of the Sung armies. In this chapter, I will examine the views of the emperors and civil officials, as well as those of generals on the nature and character of the military establishment, on deployment and use of military forces, and on the military's role in government. Discussion of perceptions (and changes in those perceptions) will generally follow the three phases in military management identified in Chapter II.

Imperial and Civilian Views

Civil officials were basically conservative in their views on military policy. While they acknowledged the importance and necessity of armies, many felt that warfare was dangerous and disruptive; the territory gained was not worth the potential losses in men,

material, and possibly Chinese land. Civil officials continually complained about the cost of maintaining the armies and about their declining effectiveness. The issue of cost will be taken up in more detail in Chapter IV. Civil officials often argued that field commanders should be given more authority but, at the same time, they were anxious to control the armies through better systems of rewards and punishments. The changes in civil officials' opinions about the military, reflect the changing nature of the external threat, developments in military management, and the changing dimensions of civil-military relations.

The First Phase: 960-997

As discussed in Chapter II, this period coincides with the reigns of T'ai-tsu and T'ai-tsung. It encompasses the founding of the dynasty, consolidation of power over central and south China, aggressive warfare (until 986), and an uneasy stalemate with the Khitan. Although both emperors favored active warfare, civil officials tried to act as a brake on aggressive military action.

First, there is the case of Chancellor Fan Chih 范質 (911-964) who remonstrated with T'ai-tsu in 963 against a military expedition into Ho-tung (controlled by the Northern Han). Fan stressed the cost of the

campaign and the burden of supply and transport that it would place on the peasants. He noted the size of the empire already gained and asked if the six or seven prefectures of Ho-tung were really worth the cost.¹ T'ai-tsu decided to attack, but the Sung gains were short-lived.

Two civil officials criticized T'ai-tsu's campaign against the Northern Han in 969. Li Kuang-tsan 李光 晷 said that the capture of T'ai-yuan was not worth the effort. Taking it would bring no gain, losing it would be no real disgrace. In the meantime, the campaign would only drain the national treasury and exhaust the people. Delaying the withdrawal from T'ai-yuan would exacerbate the problems caused by bad weather and sickness among the forces.² Hsieh Hua-kuang 薛化光 proposed a defensive posture. He advised building stockades near T'ai-yuan and on the western border of Ho-pei in order to prevent Khitan incursions. People should be moved into the area and given land for farming. In this way, the area would be pacified and defense strengthened.³ The emperor accepted this advice (as well as that of Chief Councillor, Chao P'u) and withdrew his forces from T'ai-yuan.

When T'ai-tsung planned a campaign against T'ai-yuan in 979, Ts'ao Pin asserted that victory would

be quite easy this time (see Chapter II). However, the Chief Councillor, Hsieh Chü-cheng 薛居正 (912-81) reminded T'ai-tsung of previous failures:

(Chou) Shih-tsung previously attacked T'ai-yuan, but they stayed in their fortresses and did not fight, relying upon relief from the North; the (Chou) armies grew weary and withdrew. T'ai-tsu defeated the enemy . . . drove out their people and spread (Chinese settlers) throughout the area . . . and yet it is extremely dangerous. The land is not good for developing into farmland, and losing it would not be a disaster. I wish that the emperor would carefully consider this move.⁴

The emperor, however, had already made up his mind and pressed on with the expedition.

The next year, T'ai-tsung again wanted to mount an expedition against the Khitan, and was dissuaded by two civil officials. Li Fang 李昉 (925-996), a Han-lin Academician, said that there were insufficient people available to transport supplies and grain for a northern expedition. The disruption caused by such a campaign would ruin the crops. It would be better, he said, to wait a year to build up the treasury and stockpile supplies, and to train more troops.⁵ His recommendations were echoed by Chang Ch'i-hsien 張齊賢 (943-1014) who advised that the Sung concentrate on internal strength and peace rather than on active aggression. It is important, he said, to choose good generals, to rely on human talent rather than on large numbers of troops.

Then the borders would be quiet, the people secure, the fields well-tended, the food supply sufficient, and so on.⁶

The debacle at Ch'i-kou Kuan in 986 was precipitated by several military officials, including Ho Ling-t'u 賀令圖 (948-86) and his father Ho Huai-p'u 賀懷浦 (d. 986). They said that the internal affairs of the Liao were disordered and Liao officials were disaffected because the Liao emperor was still a child and affairs of state were conducted by the ruler's mother and her favorite. The Sung should take advantage of this fact to attack and seize Yu-chou.⁷

Li Chih 李至 (947-1001), a Privy Councillor, dissented, saying that the necessary increase in forces as well as the campaign itself would be too costly in men and material. The enemy was certain to fight fiercely in the defense of such important territory. Seeing that the emperor's mind was made up, he suggested three possible plans: the best plan was for the emperor to stay in the capitol and guard the ancestral temples; the next best was for the emperor to encamp in a strategic (and well-defended) pass and direct operations through his generals; the worst plan would be for the emperor to take direct, personal command of the campaign.⁸

Sung Ch'i 宋琪 (917-996) supported Li's position in a long memorial. Sung discussed routes of march, the use of terrain where Khitan cavalry would not be effective against the Chinese infantry, the proper areas for assembly and concentration, and the use of rivers to transport flanking forces into the Khitan rear areas. He also examined the relative strengths and weaknesses of Khitan and Chinese forces. The Chinese strength, he said, lay in the defensive. Accordingly, the Chinese should build strong stockades and fortresses along the border and remain in them through the winter. In the spring, when Khitan horses are weak from lack of fodder, the Chinese can attack the Khitan and drive them northward. Sung Ch'i also offered his advice on army organization, command structure, weapons, and the proper tactics for both pursuit and retreat. His final recommendation, however, was that military action was costly and disturbed the people; it should be used sparingly and only as a last resort.⁹

T'ai-tsung's Chancellor, Chao P'u also criticized the campaign, saying that--in spite of glowing reports from the field--the outcome was still very much in doubt. He went on to say that when troops are under arms for an extended period, they are liable to revolt. Chao said that the emperor had been listening to unscrupulous

advisors who had misled him. Success in the campaign would only benefit the emperor, while failure would harm whole country.

T'ai-tsung replied that his only intention was to drive out the Khitan and restore China's original borders. He blamed the generals for going too far and starting a war, when his aim was merely to save the people subjugated by the Khitan.¹⁰ This was certainly a self-serving explanation on T'ai-tsung's part, but both Chao P'u and Li Fang concurred in placing the blame for defeat on the generals. Had the generals followed the plan, they would have won; but they didn't and lost.¹¹ Other civil officials were quick to demand the death penalty for generals who had failed.¹² T'ai-tsung, to his credit, only transferred and demoted them. They continued to serve in command positions, and most were eventually promoted to higher rank. With the Sung armies in disarray, Chao P'u advised withdrawing behind secure borders; when the borders were secure, the emperor need do nothing warlike.

In 987, T'ai-tsung suggested recruiting peasants in Ho-pei and Ho-nan into I-chün 義軍, or local militia units. Li Fang said that most people are trained to be farmers, not soldiers; if recruited into a militia, many would take the opportunity to become bandits.

Wang Yuan-hsi 王元僊, Metropolitan Prefect of K'ai-feng was more explicit. Recruiting and training the peasants was a good way of controlling vagrants and unruly elements, he said, but they would not be very useful in battle. Such a practice would also be expensive. It would be better, he continued, to choose talented generals, give them adequate authority, and send them to the borders. A large militia would be of limited value. The people of Ho-nan don't know how to fight; the people of Ho-pei had had more experience against the Khitan and should be recruited into the regular armies.¹³

A further opinion was offered by Chao Fu 趙孚 (924-86), a Palace Censor. Chao advised negotiation rather than war. War, he said, is too dangerous and costly. The Khitan do not want war and the attendant disruptions; they would prefer peace.¹⁴ The emperor agreed that his advisors were correct and decided to give the matter more thought.

T'ai-tsung invited all officials in 989 to offer comment, criticism, and plans for border defense against the Khitan. Chang Chi 張洎 (933-77), an official in the Ministry of Finance, replied that China had lost the traditional geographical advantages of holding the mountain passes. The present policy of closing up the

cities and defending many strongpoints only splits the Sung forces and allows the Khitan to come and go at will. He recommended concentrating the forces in three strategic areas, building new forts, and sending out active reconnaissance forces to report on Khitan movements. The forts would stop the Khitan advance, and the armies could strike from the flanks.¹⁵ Chang criticized the army's performance during the campaign of 986. Troops and commanders, he said, did not know each other, discipline was lax and orders confused; if the emperor failed to make clear the rewards and punishments, then the army would be of no use in future battles.¹⁶

Wang Yu-ch'eng 王禹偁 (954-1001), an official in the Institute of History, noted that the armies were not unified and that the commanders lacked clear authority. He recommended specific designation of command on the border, that three mutually-supporting armies be formed, and that rewards and punishments be clarified. Externally, he said, the Sung should use spies to break up Khitan alliances while making alliances with other border tribes to protect China's flanks. Soothing the border people with gifts and kind words would turn them against the Khitan. Internally, he recommended cutting expenses by reducing the number of officials. The government should make the selection of

officials more vigorous, and it should equalize the status, opportunities, and rewards between civil and military officials. Senior officials--both civil and military--should help to determine policy, and field commanders should have the authority to make operational decisions. The emperor approved of his recommendations.¹⁷

Finally, another civil official, T'ien Hsi 田錫 (940-1003), an Administrator of the Secretariat said that the most important factor in defense preparedness was to select good generals and give them the appropriate authority. The ruler should not hinder them with set strategies and required formations (chen-t'u 陣圖). Instead, let them act as circumstances dictate and don't hesitate to use the older, more experienced generals. The emperor should cut back on waste and use the surplus to inspire the armies through increased rewards.¹⁸

Chang Chi again criticized military policy in 990, offering three policies of his own. The best policy, he said, was to build defensive forts, to put up a strong defense against invasion, but not to pursue the Khitan beyond the border. The next best was to sue for peace, negotiate a treaty, and buy off the Khitan. The worst policy would be to attack and try to settle the issue in one big battle.¹⁹ Chang's emphasis on a defensive posture is a bit of a departure from his recommendations of the previous year.

The Second Phase: 998-1010

During this period, war with the Khitan heated up again, major battles were fought, and a peace treaty was concluded that inaugurated a long period of peace. The military emerged as a strong and vocal force in the making of defense policy, and both civil and military officials cautioned against dismantling the defense forces even though China was at peace. Civil officials stressed the importance of giving sufficient authority to commanders, but they also began to worry about controlling the military, especially after the fighting had ended.

Chu T'ai-fu 朱台符 (chin-shih of 992) a deputy fiscal intendant, submitted a memorial on military affairs in 999. He began by saying:

The basis of the country is agriculture; its advantage lies in abundant harvests. The army is the fate (ming 命) of the country; its merit lies in achieving victory. The life or death of the country is wrapped up in these two.²⁰

Then he criticized the government's policy of restricting generals in the field with required formations and constant orders from the court. Generals are the ruler's claws and teeth, he said, and they should be given full authority. He quoted Sun-tzu on the subject of interference from the ruler:

To order an advance without knowing if the army can advance, to order a retreat without knowing if the army can retreat, is called hindering the army.

Chu said that if the ruler does not trust a general, he should not use him; if the ruler wants to use a general, he should not doubt him. The ruler need only select good commanders and give them full authority; make the rewards and punishments clear and consistent. Then the ruler need have no worries. The traditional militia system, Chu said, cannot be adapted wholesale but should be examined in light of present circumstances. Local militia units coupled with armed colonies in the border areas might reduce expenses and relieve supply problems.²¹

The emperor ordered Ch'ien Jo-shui 錢若水 (960-1003), Prefect of K'ai-feng Prefecture, to prepare a defense against an expected Khitan invasion in 1000. Ch'ien replied in a memorial listing several imperatives. It was necessary, he said, to select as defense area commanders only those who were fully knowledgeable about border affairs; they should be made responsible for border patrol and supplied from government depots. The government should recruit border people into the local militia and reduce their taxes by way of reward. Further, the government should reduce the military supply burden on the people by encouraging production through incentives and subsidies; three years' supply of

military goods should be stored in frontier areas. Finally, he criticized the maintaining of large regular forces on the frontiers and predicted problems of control in the future. The system of rotating frontier duty had fallen into disrepair, he said, and it should be overhauled to reduce the number of regular garrisons on the frontier.²²

Ch'ien Jo-shui complained in 1003 that the army was becoming arrogant. Generals were not adhering to orders; it was growing increasingly difficult to correct, restrain, and admonish them. He said: "If they are like this in peacetime, what would they be like in time of war?"²³

Chen-tsung seems to have had mixed feelings about the military. In 1002, he complained:

Every time I meet with my generals they always discuss the pros and cons in great detail; but these are usually things that everybody knows. However, when matters are already upon us, no one is able to come up with a good strategy.²⁴

On the other hand, he said in 1004:

Generals and soldiers are the mainstay of the country, the great foundation of previous reigns. They bear the responsibility for the defense of heaven and earth, and all strive to discharge this duty.²⁵

Of course, the first of these quotations is part of a conversation within the court and the second a proclamation for public consumption. It is clear, however,

from other evidence (see Chapters II and IV) that Chen-tsung respected his generals and welcomed their advice.

Ch'en Kuan 陳貫 (968-1039), a civil official who was known for his writings on military strategy, submitted a memorial on border defense in 1005. Part of the border area, he noted, is marshy, rocky, and easily defended; part is flat and suitable for cavalry. The latter part should be occupied and neutralized first or else the Sung defense would be vulnerable. He also complained that some generals were advancing by favor rather than by competence. In the event of war, they would be of little use. Finally, he suggested recruiting local militia for border defense and leaving defense of the capital to the Imperial Guards who were less familiar with border conditions.²⁶ A few months later, General Ts'ao Wei echoed Ch'en's recommendation, advising the emperor to recruit border people as archers to act as a vanguard for the regular forces. The government, he said, should provide arms and supplies and--as a reward for service--provide land and remit taxes.²⁷ The comments of Ch'en Kuan--and those of Ch'ien Jo-shui in 1000--indicate that the system of rotating frontier defense (see Chapter IV) was no longer completely fulfilling its intended function. Apparently, some

Imperial Guard units serving on the borders were simply sitting in their fortresses and not maintaining the necessary degree of readiness. Therefore, it was necessary to rely on local residents for their knowledge of the area.

In 1007, Chen-tsung remarked to his civil advisors that some generals and military officials were saying that peace with the Khitan was not good for China.

Wang Tan 王 旦 , a Chief Councillor, (957-1017) replied:

There are some among the civil officials of like opinion. But we have been at peace for three years now. Aside from the lack of fighting and the reduction of expense, the people have been relieved of the supply burden.

The emperor continued: "Some say that when the Khitan see how rich and fertile the land is . . . they will attack."

Feng Cheng 馮 拯 (958-1023), Assistant Executive of the Secretariat replied: "When the border is not quiet, the generals are pleased; they consider that it will bring them profit."²⁸ Apparently, negative opinions about the peace were acceptable in civil officials but suspect in generals.

The Third Phase: 1011-1060

The strength of military influence in defense policy began to wane after 1010 and almost completely disappeared as the peace lengthened. Although there was little fighting, the armies continued to grow and to

consume a larger and larger portion of government revenue, prompting much discussion on ways to reduce military costs. War with the Hsi-Hsia found civil officials monopolizing not only the defense policy process but also the highest military command positions. Nevertheless, control of the military was considered a much more pressing problem than it had been during previous periods.

In 1028, the Investigating Censor of K'ai-feng, Wang Yen 王 浚 (d. 1044) complained that regular army units along the borders were using up the government's substance without producing anything. He suggested training people for militia service to fill up the depleted ranks of the regular forces or even to replace those forces with militia units. Any soldiers surplus to requirements could be used to cultivate t'un-t'ien. These policies, he said, would reduce the need for (and costs of) regular army forces.²⁹

In 1034, Ch'en Lin 陳 琳, a Commissioner of Finance, compared the cost of maintaining regular troops in Ho-pei and Shensi in fortresses with that of opening t'un-t'ien to cultivation. The cost of supporting one soldier in a garrison, he discovered, would support three soldiers settled on t'un-t'ien. Not only was there a drain on the treasury, but the army itself was

deteriorating. Ch'en suggested replacing Imperial Guard units with units drawn from the prefectural forces. They would be sufficient to maintain security against small incursions. In the event of a large invasion, Guard units could be dispatched from the interior.³⁰

The Hsi-hsia began to threaten China's western border in the 1040's. At the same time, the Khitan began to press for a revision in the terms of the Treaty of Shan-yuan which would give them more land. These two events caused a debate in the Sung government that went on for over ten years--and was never really settled. When Fan Chung-yen was in charge of the defense of Yen-an Fu 延安府 in 1040, he advised against any aggressive, punitive expeditions against the Hsi-Hsia. It would be better, he said to consolidate the country's inner strength; then the Hsi-Hsia would not dare attack.³¹ Han Ch'i, who was Pacification Commissioner of Shensi, advocated the opposite strategy: a plan to move into Hsi-Hsia territory, harass the Hsi-Hsia, and break up concentrations to prevent an attack on China. Fan Chung-yen refused to cooperate with Han Ch'i, and both fared badly in the ensuing battles.³²

In spite of his poor performance at Yen-an, Fan Chung-yen continued to advocate a passive, defensive policy.³³ He submitted a long memorial on defense in

1042, recommending a passive defense based on strong forts and deep moats. China should have defense in depth, he said, with border forts to prevent minor raids and fortified cities to defend against deep penetrations. An expedition against the Khitan was not a good idea in Fan's opinion. First, it would leave the capital, which had no defensive works, vulnerable to a flank attack by the Hsi-Hsia. Second, the soldiers would not want to leave their families and would therefore be less effective in combat. The army could lose a decisive battle, leaving rear areas open to attack. Finally, in the event of a defeat, the emperor would be vulnerable to Khitan pressure in their demands for more territory.³⁴ Fan's was a totally defensive strategy, stressing a firm defense, strong forts, a well-regulated army, and avoidance of full-scale battles.

In 1043, Han Ch'i advised Jen-tsung not to go north to fight the Khitan. To do so, according to Han Ch'i, would leave the capitol, the ancestral temples, and government granaries unprotected. In any event, such a move would be in violation of the treaty. Instead, he suggested reforming government administration and repairing border defenses in order to strengthen the country internally. The government, he said, should select

generals according to the old system: that is, choose on the basis of merit and ability rather than on seniority.³⁵

Fan Chung-yen and Han Ch'i jointly submitted a memorial on defense in 1044. They observed that the Hsi-Hsia had caused trouble in the past and were sure to do so in the future. Since the Hsi-Hsia were vassals of the Khitan, fighting between the Sung and the Hsi-Hsia would give the Khitan an excuse to intervene. If the Sung concentrated to meet one enemy, the other could strike at places left undefended. They recommended using border militia to guard the frontier and spy on enemy movements. The government should repair and refurbish the t'un-t'ien system, train local militia for defense, and strengthen fortress defenses near the capitol. Also, they recommended accelerating training within the regular armies and paying special attention to the selection of competent generals.³⁶ Fan Chung-yen's position in this memorial is consistent with his previous statements, but Han Ch'i's advice here is quite different from that he gave four years earlier. Perhaps his previous experience as a field commander had convinced him that a passive defense was better.

The distinguished scholar and statesman Ou-yang Hsiu, then a Palace Censor, favored a more aggressive policy

against both the Khitan and the Hsi-Hsia. China should put on a show of force to intimidate enemies and prevent alliances; vigorously attack one enemy before he is ready, and use the victory to overawe other enemies. Ou-yang quotes Sun-tzu, "To attack the enemies plans is the first tactic, next is to attack his communications . . . strike where not expected . . ." and then applies this concept to the present situation.³⁷

Ou-yang Hsiu continued to stress an aggressive policy. In 1043, he said that the greatest threat to China was not the Hsi-Hsia but the Khitan. The Khitan would use China's troubles with the Hsi-Hsia as an opportunity to press for more concessions. If China showed weakness, the Khitan would only press harder; if China responded strongly, they would back off. Increasing payments to the Khitan would only increase their appetite. The present situation, he said, can only end in a fight, and the government should be prepared.³⁸

Ou-yang Hsiu also discussed the selection of competent commanders. Good generals, he said, can only come from within the army. He proposed a system of constant training, testing, and selecting leaders from smaller and smaller groups. Ten-thousand company commanders would be selected from the whole army; one thousand battalion commanders would be selected from

among the company commanders; and so on until one man remained as the supreme commander. According to Ou-yang Hsiu, not only would this system produce the most competent generals, it would create a well-trained army in the process.³⁹

Ou-yang Hsiu's recommendation is a very strong statement for a standing army led by a professionalized officer corps. His advice was ignored, I think, because it went against a strong sentiment among civil officials in favor of increasing the militia at the expense of the regular armies. Ou-yang Hsiu's ideas also ran counter to one of the reforms proposed by Fan Chung-yen (whom he supported) in 1043-44 which stressed the use of local militia. When the emperor turned against the reforms after 1044, both Fan Chung-yen and Ou-yang Hsiu fell from power and office. Fan died in 1052, and Ou-yang did not regain an influential position for over ten years. In the meantime, other officials had become influential in defense policy.

Assistant Commissioner of Military Affairs, Fu Pi 富弼 (1004-83), submitted two major memorials on defense matters in 1044. In the first, he noted that military preparedness had declined throughout a long period of peace. At the same time, both the Hsi-Hsia and the Khitan had adopted many Chinese ways and had grown

quite strong. China had disregarded these enemies, had not maintained the defenses, and was now caught between the combined enemies. He proposed policies (twelve in all) to remedy the situation. The government should fortify selected areas and station troops there. However, the armies should not remain shut up in the cities--which allows the enemy to penetrate--but should remain mobile to meet enemy thrusts. Units should be relocated every two years to reduce strain on the supply system. Fu advocated a fairly aggressive policy against the Khitan; China should send forces to break up enemy concentrations, harass advancing forces and cut their supply lines, and so forth. At the same time, the Sung should incite rebellion among Chinese people under Khitan control and should also subvert Khitan vassals and allies.⁴⁰

Fu Pi's second memorial was mostly a description of the poor state into which the armies and defense policy had fallen. He compared the successes of T'ai-tsu and T'ai-tsung's time--when the armies were not shut up in fortresses but free to move about--with the poor performance of Chen-tsung's reign--when the armies were ordered to stand fast and not sortie against the raiders. Why, he asked, are present armies not the equal of T'ai-tsung's? The orders from the court are not clear,

there is friction between the civil officials and field commanders, and orders are not carried out properly. There is too much wrangling over policy, and decisions are applied in fits and starts (暫行復止). No one is willing to take responsibility for important decisions. In addition, Fu said, government expenditures have increased, and revenues are exhausted: military supplies are almost used up, the depots are empty. Yet he feared that the people could not bear more taxes. Finally, Fu said that there were few capable, experienced generals to lead the armies; the soldiers were arrogant, discipline was lax, and the armies were not well-regulated.⁴¹

Fu Pi was not the only official to discuss the problems of control and discipline. Palace Censor Wen Yen-po 文彥博 (1006-1097) urged in 1040 that command authority and military law be strengthened to counter lax discipline within the armies. Unless commanders had the authority to inflict capital punishment, he said, orders would not be obeyed, and China would not be able to resist invasion.⁴² In 1045, Investigating Censor Li Ching 李京 reminded the emperor of a troop rebellion in Pao-chou 保州 the previous year. He pointed to the T'ang experience of an uncontrolled military and said that border commanders

were not selecting good officers and not disciplining their troops. The government, he said, should remove commanders who were lax in their duties and replace them with more diligent officers.⁴³

After the Sung armies' mediocre performance against the Hsi-Hsia, civil officials again criticized confusion in the military command structure and lack of clear authority. In 1052, Ti Ch'ing was sent to put down a rebellion among the Man ~~蠻~~ 蠻 tribesmen on China's southern border. A civil official said: "Ti Ch'ing is a general and should not be given complete authority. A civil official should be sent as second-in-command." Another official replied:

The reason that our armies have been defeated is that the commander's authority is fragmented and incomplete. Orders are confused and discipline is not maintained. Ti Ch'ing came from the ranks; if we send a civil official as second-in-command, it will undercut his authority. This is like following the path of an overturned cart.

He went on to say that, given full authority, Ti Ch'ing would succeed.⁴⁴ A compromise of sorts was achieved: Tseng Kung-liang 曾公亮, a high-ranking civil official and author of a military encyclopedia (see Chapter IV), was sent along as an observer, and Ti Ch'ing did put down the rebellion.

Size of armies, as well as lack of discipline, was also considered a problem. In 1048, discussions were

held concerning defensive preparations in Ho-pei. Some officials advocated dividing Ho-pei into four military areas and increasing the size of forces stationed there. Hsia Sung 夏竦 (985-1051), a civilian member of the Bureau of Military Affairs, pointed out the dilemma: concentration of forces would put too much military power in one area; dispersal would weaken defensive capabilities. Ho-pei defenses were later reorganized to provide a more acceptable trade-off between control and effectiveness.⁴⁵ In the same year, Chang Fang-p'ing 張方平 (1007-91), a Finance Commissioner, suggested that officers not be promoted from within the same unit. This would prevent sons, brothers, and relatives by marriage from forming interlocking relationships within the army; also, commanders would not be able to promote their favorites.⁴⁶ By contrast, Chen-tsung readily agreed to requests from Ts'ao Wei, in 1007 and 1012, that officers in border garrisons be promoted within their own units as a means of increasing efficiency and morale.⁴⁷ Also during previous reigns, sons had often served under their father's commands before posting to other assignments. Han Ch'i had complained, in 1048, that military forces were too fragmented. By 1062, he had begun to worry about the difficulty of controlling such

large concentrations of border troops with central units whose effectiveness had declined.⁴⁸

Changes in Civilian Perceptions of the Military

The ways in which the military and military problems were perceived changed considerably over the 100 years that I have studied. During the early years of the dynasty, civil officials saw the military as a necessary--but expensive--element in the country's security. By the 1060's, many were becoming uneasy about the military as a threat to the country. Cost and control were the main elements that influenced the civil officials' perception of the military.

The perception of China's military situation and aims also changed. The issue, up until 986, was how to use the armies effectively to attack China's external enemies and to regain lost territory. Later, the issue was how to keep the external threat at bay, how to prevent the invasion and capture of Chinese territory. The problem in the 1040's was to avoid fighting and reduce the risk of losing decisive battles that would put the country in jeopardy. Over a 100 year period, the idea of restoring China's lost territory had substantially given way to the concept of limiting the possible damage of a military action.

Early critics of military policy complained about the cost of warfare; later critics complained about the cost of maintaining large military forces. Civilian advisors to T'ai-tsu and T'ai-tsung said that warfare drained the treasury and loaded the people with a heavy burden of supply and transport. Suggestions were made to reduce costs by eliminating waste; any surplus should be used to increase military rewards as a spur to greater effort. As previously noted, an official suggested reducing costs and increasing supplies by offering incentives and subsidies to suppliers. Few officials thought about reducing the forces. After the fighting stopped, however, many civil officials felt that the problem of cost lay not in warfare but in the military itself.

Beginning in the 1030's, officials thought to solve the cost problem by replacing the regular forces with militia. Militia soldiers were not as effective as regulars, but they were certainly cheaper. An intermediate step in this perceptual change can be seen in the early years of Chen-tsung's reign. In 999, a recommendation was made to use militia to supplement regular military forces in colonies for frontier defense. In 1005, it was felt that China should use militia to defend the borders and rely on the Imperial Guards to defend the

capital. Officials serving the first three emperors felt strongly that strengthening the militia would only lead to an increase in banditry and disorder; yet some of Jen-tsung's advisors saw the militia as a solution and not as a problem.

Other civil officials serving Jen-tsung worried less about controlling banditry than about controlling the military. When officials of T'ai-tsu and T'ai-tsung's reigns complained that discipline was lax and that rewards and punishments were not strictly enforced, it was usually because these deficiencies prevented the armies from achieving victory. When Jen-tsung's advisors complained about discipline, they were worried that the military would become arrogant, independent, and ultimately uncontrollable. Concentration of forces--seen as a supply problem in early reigns--became a potential threat to government control over the military by 1060. Some officials thought that strengthening the militia would offset the excessive (they thought) concentration of regular garrisons on the frontier.

Military Views

Civilians seem more prominent in the process of making defense policy, but it is usually because they are more lengthy (one is tempted to say "long-winded")

in their memorials. No memorial on defense issues is complete without a review of the T'ang and Wu-tai experience, and memorials harking back to the Han or even the Chou are not uncommon. Often a disquisition on historical geography is included. The military are usually more succinct. They identify the problem, make a recommendation, and stop. Nonetheless, generals were not reluctant to assert their exclusive competence and special responsibility in the field of military operations. They were prepared, if necessary, to change or ignore imperial orders if battlefield circumstances required, and they did not hesitate to act on their own initiative.

One perception among civil officials that did not change was that military commanders should be given clear authority and a certain freedom of action on the battlefield. The military, for their part, agreed with this assessment and urged their rulers to leave fighting to the generals. The military seldom spoke of their place and function in the larger society. They confined their remarks to specific military problems and attempts to define their own area of exclusive competence and responsibility vis-a-vis the civil branch of the government.

Compared to the civil officials, the military remained quite consistent in their ideas on defense policy from 960 to 1060. The military perspective on expertise, duty and responsibility, and military employment did not change appreciably over the period. I have therefore chosen to treat the military views topically in order to bring out the main currents of military thinking within the same chronological framework sketched earlier.

The military often stressed their exclusive competence in warfare and the special responsibilities of a military commander. For example, T'ai-tsung ordered the use of a particular formation for the march on Man-ch'eng during the 979 campaign. Several commanders felt that units were too spread out and could not support each other, so they changed to a more secure deployment. The overall commander, Chao Yen-chin 趙延進 (927-99), said that he would take responsibility in case of failure. A victory resulted, and the emperor did not criticize him for changing the orders.⁴⁹

Li Chi-lung had supported Chao Yen-chin's actions in 979, and in 988 he had the opportunity to elaborate a bit on the idea. Li decided to sally out from a fortified city to attack Khitan raiders. When a subordinate protested that this was contrary to orders,

Li replied: "Outside the palace precincts (閤外), the commander must act independently . . . only then can one repay the country."⁵⁰ In this case, the immediate result was the loss of the city, and Li escaped punishment only by driving out the Khitan in the end. Li Chi-lung was the first to assert the military's monopoly on war. When T'ai-tsung announced in 990 that he would take personal command in the event of another Khitan invasion, Li replied in a memorial:

. . . to face the enemy and die in battle is the lot of a soldier . . . how could one accept military command and then relax in luxury with a high salary, not bothering to guard the cities and ward off invasion?

He went on to urge that the emperor not take command but leave war to the generals.⁵¹

In a conversation with the emperor in 1010, Ma Chih-chieh noted that military skills were a specialized, experiential type of knowledge:

Chen-tsung:

It is hard to find talents among generals. Now among all the civil and military officials, there are certainly worthy men, but we don't know them until after they have proved themselves in combat.

Ma Chih-chieh:

A general's skills cannot be learned simply by sitting. Instead, one must experience the changing circumstances of actual combat.⁵²

Ma explained the need to control possible Khitan access routes all along the border by building forts and establishing garrisons in the most vulnerable places. Attacks should be met with strong counterattacks. He noted that some generals liked to use large cavalry units. However, he said, Chinese cavalry is of limited value. It is most effective in small units used for reconnaissance and for attacking small concentrations of enemy troops. Ma also advised relying on fortified cities as focal points for military operations.⁵³ The emperor praised Ma and gave him a suit of steel chain-mail armor.

The idea of a soldier's special duty and responsibility to the country remained quite strong even though the military's influence in policy-making declined after 1010. In 986, Yang Yeh was induced--by veiled accusations of cowardice--to participate in an attack, much against his better judgment. Yang lured the Khitan into a trap, but another commander led his troops off in search of the enemy and failed to support Yang's effort. In the ensuing melee, Yang was captured by the enemy.

Yang Yeh said:

I have been well treated by the emperor, and it is my duty to guard the border and destroy the enemy . . . yet the army has been led to defeat. How dare I stay alive in a foreign land?

Thereupon, he starved himself to death.⁵⁴

Commanders of course, were expected to bear the consequences of their actions. Ts'ao Pin and several generals were demoted for their failure in 986. Ts'ao Pin was punished as much for exceeding his orders as for losing the battle. So angry was the emperor at the death of Yang Yeh that he demoted P'an Mei 潘美, Yang Yeh's commander, three ranks for not keeping his subordinates under control.

There was also the case of Che Yu-ch'ing who rose from his sickbed in 995 to lead his forces against a Khitan raid. When his mother sent servants to summon him home for medical treatment, Che replied:

For generations, my family has received the favor of the country. If the enemy is not destroyed, it would be my fault. In the face of the enemy, how could I abandon my soldiers just to suit my own needs. To die on the battlefield is only one's duty.⁵⁵

He died from his illness on the next day, after driving off the Khitan.

Two incidents during the second period of military management illustrate different aspects of a soldier's responsibility. Early in 1000, when promotions were being handed out, a middle-ranking officer, Yen Tsan 延贊 (died later that year) declined his promotion, saying:

Your servant's monthly salary amounts to several thousand cash, but I use less than half of it.

I am quite fortunate, but I feel I have not really fulfilled my responsibility to the country, and I dare not aspire to promotion.

Both the emperor and Yen Tsan's fellow officers were impressed by his attitude.⁵⁶ I have already mentioned Kao Ch'iuung's expression of his responsibility to the country ("I am a soldier, I am willing to devote my life"). Implicit in his actions at Shan-yuan with the emperor is the concept of the commander's authority on the field of battle. Sometimes it is necessary--as Sun-tzu points out--to ignore the orders of the emperor if they run counter to what the general knows best. However, a general's responsibility worked both ways. He was responsible for the security and defense of the country and for the welfare of the troops under his command. Kao Ch'iuung was strict with his soldiers. He tried to keep them lean, fit, and mindful of their duty. Kao feared that the armies would become lazy and weak by drawing lavishly from the government granaries. On an inspection tour, he came upon units drawing rations and reminded them: "There is peace on the frontier and you sit here eating your fill. This truly is proof of the emperor's benevolence."⁵⁷ Yet he was quick to defend the army's interests. When he found that grain for the troops was either lacking or spoiled, he complained to the emperor:

Defense forces on the frontiers have to endure cold and hardships, yet their grain tastes like salted beans. The officials get the best of the monthly rations . . . how can we treat the armies this way?

At the same time that he made this complaint, Kao also enforced harsh discipline on those (within the army) who tried to make trouble over the poor food supply.⁵⁸

Kao Ch'iuang thus tried to maintain an effective military capability while looking out for the welfare of the armies.

The ethic of service and responsibility, like the idea of the military's special expertise, persisted into the third period of military management. Jen Fu 任福, a Brigade Commander in the Imperial Guards, took part in an expedition against the Hsi-Hsia in 1041. The Sung commanders believed faulty intelligence that the enemy force was small, and they advanced into an ambush. Jen Fu's brigade was surrounded, and he was wounded several times. Finally, Jen Fu said: "I am a general and my troops have been defeated; I can only repay the country with my life." Whereupon he charged the enemy and was killed.⁵⁹ Obviously, someone lived to report Jen Fu's words and deeds. But even if Jen Fu's stirring speech was apocryphal and only supplied by his eulogist, it was nonetheless considered an appropriate sentiment for a soldier.

When forces sent to put down the Man rebellion in 1052 had been severely defeated, Ti Ch'ing offered to resign from the Bureau of Military Affairs and lead the suppression campaign, saying:

I came up from the ranks. If I do not go to war, I have no way to repay the country. Let me take a few hundred cavalrymen . . . and I will bring back Chih-kao's head as a present for the emperor.⁶⁰

Sung generals were basically conservative and pragmatic concerning defense policy and military employment. They advocated military action when they felt it was necessary, but they also understood the economic and social impact of warfare. For example, when Ma Chih-chieh was Administrator of Ting-chou in 988, he was notified of a government plan to use large numbers of people from Ho-nan to transport supply grain to the frontiers in Ho-pei. Ma pointed out that such a large-scale movement of people would consume 30-40 percent of the grain transported. He suggested several alternate plans for gathering grain from areas closer to the frontiers and thereby saving money. The emperor agreed and the people of Ho-nan were left undisturbed.⁶¹ In the same year, Ho Ch'eng-chu, a border general, reported on defense preparations in the north and northeast against the Khitan. He suggested using the advantages of topography by building dikes and

moated strongpoints, by flooding fields and using swampy areas and water courses to frustrate Khitan cavalry. Defense of these areas would be provided by soldiers settled in military farms (t'un-t'ien 屯田) who would tend the crops and drill during the slack season. More important strategic places (and areas having fewer water obstacles) would be defended by regular troops. He summed up thusly:

Don't worry about the numbers of troops; worry about their being arrogant and unspirited.
 Don't worry about the generals; worry about . . . lack of proper planning.

T'ai-tsung accepted his advice, and the plan was carried out.⁶²

Chen-tsung often turned to his generals for advice on military matters. In 999, Ho Ch'eng-chü reported that people in Hsiung-chou 雄州 were crossing back and forth across the border to buy and sell horses (apparently with the connivance of some local civil officials). This was a mistake, Ho said, and if such traffic was not stopped, defense of that area would be seriously compromised.⁶³ Later that year, a victorious general asked permission to pursue a retreating Hsi-Hsia force across the border. Chen-tsung asked Wang Chao's advice, and Wang (fearing an enemy trap) replied: "Although the army has achieved a victory, the character of the enemy is hard to fathom.

I would suggest making sure of our border defenses."

Chen-tsung accepted his recommendation.⁶⁴

Ho Ch'eng-chü submitted a long memorial on border defenses in 1000. He suggested using fortresses, dikes, and moats against cavalry, and he criticized the performance of some border generals during the recent Khitan incursions. He said that the ruler should choose competent generals to defend the frontiers, pay them well, give them authority, and stand behind their orders. Good leadership, strong fortresses, and a stockpile of food and supplies would do much to guarantee secure borders.⁶⁵

Chen-tsung asked Wang Ch'ao again for advice on defense matters in 1001. Wang submitted two sets of plans and diagrams dealing with tactical formations and with a plan to disperse supplies and troops in positions along the borders. From these positions, they could quickly concentrate to oppose an attack.⁶⁶ The emperor praised Wang and, a few months later, summoned him from the frontier to ask about defense preparations there. Wang said that, during the previous year, cavalry units had been added to the military force in his area; he proposed that a Provost Marshal, (tu-pu shu 都部署) be appointed to command the larger force. When the emperor considered promoting Wang Ch'ao to the post, some

of his civil advisors strongly protested against increasing Wang's authority. Chen-tsung replied that Wang had already been entrusted with command, and he ordered the Bureau of Military Affairs to evaluate Wang's fitness for command. The Bureau, seeing the emperor's confidence in Wang Ch'ao, quickly returned a positive recommendation, and Wang was promoted.⁶⁷ This episode clearly demonstrates the trust that Chen-tsung had in the advice, competence, and loyalty of one of his senior generals; it also points up the friction generated between civil officials and generals who were competing for the emperor's attention.

Both Li Chi-lung and Wang Hsien urged the emperor, late in 1003, to leave the conduct of warfare on the borders to his generals. Li said that border generals had previously been selected and entrusted with border commands, they knew the terrain, and they could do the job properly. It was not necessary for the emperor to command in person. Wang Hsien had requested retirement in 1003 (he was seventy-one), but the emperor refused and asked him to lead an expedition against the Khitan. Wang Hsien advised against raising an army (and exhausting the country's resources) to no purpose. The Khitan may not invade, he said, or the Khitan and the Hsi-Hsia might combine against China. Current

recommendations to attack Yu-chou are unwise; such an effort requires unity in the country. "Now the ministers of state, and the common people as well, are all speaking with different minds: how could we carry it out?"

Wang Hsien recommended selecting good generals, training troops, and repairing the fortresses--all to provide a good defense.⁶⁸ Wang's recommendations took on a more aggressive tone in 1004 when the Khitan actually did invade. He recommended that previously demoted generals be reinstated to command positions; their talents and ardor would be useful in the coming battle. He also criticized the policy of splitting the army along three independent routes. It took long for the armies to concentrate. Rather, he said, the forces should advance in three mutually-supporting wings; the army's total strength could be quickly brought to bear at any one point.⁶⁹

Later in 1004, as the Khitan attack developed, Wang Hsien suggested a flanking attack to menace the Khitan rear and to capture Shan-yuan if the Khitan retreated. He strongly urged the emperor to proceed to the front, gather the armies, and meet the main enemy thrust at Shan-yuan. Part of the force could then sweep around and attack the Khitan from the rear.⁷⁰

Wang Hsien, Kao Ch'iung, and others urged the emperor to

go to the front, but it is clear that the emperor's function was to inspire the soldiers, not to take personal command of operations. As described in Chapter II, Chen-tsung eventually did go to the front, and the Sung armies rallied to stop the Khitan.

Li Yun-tse, Administrator of Ying-chou 瀛州, memorialized the emperor in 1005 on the subject of the recent treaty. He noted that there were some generals who felt that the peace was not to China's advantage. In choosing border defense commanders--who would oversee the carrying out of the treaty--it would be best to dismiss those who did not favor the treaty. Chen-tsung was quite pleased with Li's advice, saying: "If my border generals are all like Li, how can I have any future worries about the northern borders?"⁷¹

When the Hsi-Hsia ruler, Li Chi-ch'ien, died in 1003, his son, Li Te-ming wanted to submit to the Sung while still consolidating his hold on the border areas. A border general, Ts'ao Wei, had cautioned then against leaving strategic areas in the hands of someone of doubtful loyalty:

The father caused trouble for 20 years; now the son is weak and wants time to gain strength. Later he will be strong and unmanageable. We should strike now and capture him.

The emperor ignored Ts'ao's advice and tried to placate Li Te-ming with gifts and titles. By 1006, Li had

become a problem on the frontier, and Ts'ao again advised: "Te-ming has a contrary heart. If we don't quickly clip his wings, he is sure to fly away." This time the emperor followed his advice, and Li Te-ming was contained by Chinese troops.⁷²

Ma Chih-chieh, on two occasions, advised a cautious and conservative approach to dealing with the Khitan. In 1008, when the Khitan began to make small-scale raids along the border, some generals stressed the continuing military threat, even though the two countries had been at peace for three years. Civil officials at the court also advised a strong military response. Ma Chih-chieh suggested sending a general to point out the treaty violations to the Khitan. The emperor agreed; a general was sent to caution the Khitan, and they withdrew.⁷³ In 1009, Ma advised against a border magistrate's request to annex some Khitan territory as farmland. Such an act, he said, would only require increased expenditures for defense of the area, and it could provoke the Khitan.⁷⁴

Ts'ao Wei was often consulted by the emperor about military problems on the Ho-pei borders which were vulnerable to Khitan raids. On one occasion, Ts'ao presented maps and analyses of strategic areas in Ho-pei. The emperor had copies made for the Bureau of Military Affairs and for other generals to use in defense

planning.⁷⁵ Also in 1010, Li Yun-tse criticized the methods of supplying troops in border areas, as well as the practice of using banished people as soldiers. Li said that, when released from service, they often turned to banditry and extortion in the countryside. In addition, he advised the emperor on the possibility of a Khitan attack upon Jurchen tribes (in Manchuria) and upon Korea. The problem was how the Sung should respond if Korea asked for aid against the Khitan. Helping Korea would violate the Sung treaty with the Khitan. Li recommended putting off the Koreans. In the end, the Khitan did not attack, and the issue was never tested.⁷⁶

The lengthening period of peace made it difficult for Sung rulers to concentrate on military preparedness, in spite of warnings that vigilance could not be relaxed. Chen-tsung was reluctant to approve more defense expenditures. When Ts'ao Wei asked for permission, in 1014, to build up border defense units and construct forts, Chen-tsung grumbled:

Frontier generals are good at using troops, but they just don't understand that peace is the best solution. For years (commanders in) Ho-pei have been asking for an increase in forces. . . .⁷¹

Nonetheless, he grudgingly approved Ts'ao Wei's request.⁷⁸ In 1019, Chen-tsung asked Li Yun-tse why he had continued to build and repair forts in Hsiung-chou

in possible violation of the treaty. Li replied that he was only preparing in case of future problems: ". . . if we do away with the defensive preparations, we can't foresee what the Liao will do." Chen-tsung agreed and allowed him to continue.⁷⁹

During the reign of Jen-tsung, the military were seldom heard in defense policy deliberations. Wang Te-yung was one of the few exceptions. Wang was quick to defend the military sphere of competence from outside interference. When the empress wanted one of her favorites appointed to a military post under Wang Te-yung's command in 1033, Wang refused, saying: "Military appointments are a matter of military administration; I cannot allow it." Jen-tsung later heard of this and promoted Wang to the Bureau of Military Affairs, where he often consulted Wang on frontier defense issues.⁸⁰ On one such occasion in 1040, Wang said:

During the Hsien-p'ing and Ching-te periods (998-1007), the emperor (Chen-tsung) supplied the generals with required formations. Although the soldiers fought hard . . . there was little mutual support and the result was many defeats. We should not use chen-t'u but allow the commanders to fight as circumstances dictate. This will produce a better result.⁸¹

In spite of Wang's recommendation, the government continued to use chen-t'u as an expression of tactical doctrine.

The military perspective on defense policy was surprisingly consistent over the 100 year period that I have studied. Military advice to the throne was usually conservative and realistic, and it usually addressed specific problems at hand rather than larger, theoretical issues of the military's role and character. Generals seemed to prefer direct action, but it would be a mistake to assume that the military were always in favor of war. The examples of Wang Ch'ao, Wang Hsien, and Ma Chih-chieh show that the generals understood the costs of military operations and felt that war should be avoided unless absolutely necessary.

In 1042, Chang Fang-p'ing echoed Chu T'ai-fu's earlier assessment of the military's vital role: "Throughout history, generals have been the arbiters of human destiny and the masters of the country's peace and safety."⁸² It is difficult to tell if these statements constitute approval or condemnation of the fact. At least they stand as a contemporary appraisal of the importance of the military to the existence of the government and the lives of the people.

NOTES

¹KCTI, 120/4083-86.

²HCP, 10/8-9; also SMCTI, 120/3-4.

³HCP, 10/9.

⁴HCP, 20/1-2.

⁵HCP, 21/11.

⁶SMCTI, 129/2-4.

⁷HCP, 27/1. Both Ho's were killed during the ensuing campaign.

⁸SMCTI, 129/7-8.

⁹HCP, 27/1-6.

¹⁰HCP, 27/11-14.

¹¹HCP, 27/14-15.

¹²HCP, 27/16.

¹³HCP, 28/3-4.

¹⁴HCP, 28/4.

¹⁵This is one illustration of the classic tactical maneuver of cheng 正 and ch'i 奇. The terms refer to the ideas of "fixing" and "toppling." In the military sense, this means to fix the enemy in position by one kind of maneuver, and then to strike from the side or rear with another force. See B. F. Wallacher, "Two Concepts in Chinese Military Thought." Language, 42.2 (1966). 195-99.

- 16 HCP, 30/1-5.
- 17 SMCTI, 129/25-30.
- 18 SMCTI, 129/16-25.
- 19 HCP, 31/4-6.
- 20 HCP, 44/7.
- 21 HCP, 44/6-10.
- 22 SMCTI, 130/14-18.
- 23 HCP, 46/16.
- 24 HCP, 51/5.
- 25 SHY, 175/ping 8.12; 179/ping 14.1.
- 26 HCP, 59/14.
- 27 HCP, 60/5.
- 28 HCP, 67/18.
- 29 HCP, 106/13.
- 30 HCP, 114/15.
- 31 SMCTI, 132/5-7.
- 32 JLKI, shang 4-5.
- 33 SMCTI, 132/18-23 (1041).
- 34 HCP, Yung-lo ta-tien ed., 12399/22-24.
- 35 SMCTI, 134/15-17.
- 36 HCP, 149/1-6.
- 37 HCP, Yung-lo ta-tien ed., 12399/17-21.
- 38 HCP, 141/9-11.
- 39 SMCTI, 64/10-14.
- 40 SMCTI, 135/1-35; HCP, 150/16-30.

- ⁴¹HCP, 153/14-15.
- ⁴²KCTI, 120/4091-92.
- ⁴³HCP, 157/4.
- ⁴⁴WCMC, 8.2/6.
- ⁴⁵HCP, 164/5-6.
- ⁴⁶HCP, 163/10.
- ⁴⁷HCP, 65/7, 77/12.
- ⁴⁸TK, 152/1328.
- ⁴⁹HCP, 20/27-28.
- ⁵⁰HCP, 29/11b.
- ⁵¹HCP, 31/9b-10a.
- ⁵²HCP, 73/9b.
- ⁵³HCP, 73/10.
- ⁵⁴HCP, 29/19a; see also SHY, 175/ping 8.7.
- ⁵⁵HCP, 38/8.
- ⁵⁶HCP, 46/9b.
- ⁵⁷WCMC, 4.3/1-2.
- ⁵⁸WCMC, 4.3/3-4.
- ⁵⁹Lin Lu-chih, Hsi-Hsia shih, 96-97.
- ⁶⁰SS, 290/9717.
- ⁶¹LCC, 87/6; SS, 278/9450.
- ⁶²SS, 273/9328.
- ⁶³HCP, 44/15.
- ⁶⁴HCP, 45/10.
- ⁶⁵HCP, 47/1-2.

- ⁶⁶HCP, 50/19.
- ⁶⁷HCP, 52/7 (1002).
- ⁶⁸HCP, 55/17; SS, 268/9239 gives the date as 1002.
- ⁶⁹HCP, 56/5; SS, 268/9239-40.
- ⁷⁰HCP, 57/8; see also note 15.
- ⁷¹HCP, 59/11.
- ⁷²SS, 258/8985; LCC, 90/57.
- ⁷³LCC, 87/8; WLCC, 87/6-8.
- ⁷⁴HCP, 71/14.
- ⁷⁵SS, 258/8985.
- ⁷⁶HCP, 74/11 and 13a.
- ⁷⁷HCP, 82/10.
- ⁷⁸HCP, 83/16.
- ⁷⁹HCP, 93/13-15
- ⁸⁰SS, 278/9567.
- ⁸¹SS, 278/9468.
- ⁸²HCP, Yung-lo ta-tien ed., 12399/14.

CHAPTER IV

MANAGEMENT OF THE MILITARY SYSTEM

The large and complex Sung military system required sophisticated management which changed as the Sung military situation changed from 960 to 1060. In this chapter, I will examine the structure of the military system, the career patterns of generals who commanded the armies, and the formal and informal methods by which Sung rulers kept control over the military establishment and used it for their own ends.

The Major Components of the System

The Sung armies were composed of three types of forces: Imperial Guards (chin chün 禁軍); prefectural defense forces (hsiang-chün 廂軍); local militia (hsiang-ping 鄉兵). A fourth category, indigenous border militia forces (fan-ping 蕃兵) were usually considered to be another type of local militia.¹ Of these, the Guards and the prefectural forces constituted the "regular" armies of the Sung.

The mission of the Imperial Guards was to protect the emperor, to ensure the security of the capital area, and to provide an expeditionary force for border defense and attacks into enemy territory. The Guards were divided into the Emperor's Guard and the Palace Corps, administered by the Emperor's Guard Bureau (Shih-wei ssu 侍衛司) and the Palace Corps Bureau (Tien-ch'ien ssu 殿前司) respectively. Distinct from these two units were the Imperial Elite (pan-chih 班直), the Emperor's personal bodyguard.² The basic organizational unit was the battalion (chih-hui 指揮) of 500 men, and battalions were combined, in varying numbers, to form regiments (chün 軍) and brigades (hsiang 廂). The Guards numbered approximately 190,000 in the first years of the dynasty but reached a peak of 830,000 in the 1040's and declined in number after that time.³

Soldiers were inducted at all levels within the military, but the common soldier's usual route of advancement was from the prefectural forces or the Imperial Guards to the four Upper Armies (shang-chün 上軍) who were special Guard units stationed in each of the four quarters of the imperial capital, to the Imperial Elite. In each case, the best soldiers were selected to fill vacancies in the next higher unit.⁴ Those soldiers who reached the Imperial Elite were tested

for fitness and personally inspected by the emperor before being enrolled.⁵ Soldiers in the Guards who became unfit for duty were downgraded to a "reserve" status (sheng-yuan 剩員) and employed as corvé laborers, or as temple and granary guards. This process was part of the first Sung rulers' policy of centralization. Not only did they gather the best military units around the capital area, but they also ensured a steady flow of high-quality soldiers into the Imperial Guards. Correspondingly, the prefectural forces were deprived of the best forces; they would pose less of a threat to central authority.

The hsiang-chün 廂軍 were those prefectural (or personal) armies left over from the military separatism of the Wu-Tai period. Rather than trying to break up those armies or incorporate them wholesale, Sung T'ai-tsu decided to disarm them and siphon off the best soldiers for his own use. Prefectural forces came under the operational control of the Emperor's Guard Bureau, but their recruitment, supply, and peacetime deployment were administered by the Ministry of War. Aside from serving as a replacement pool for the Guards, the basic function of the hsiang-chün was to provide corvé labor for the government; units were parcelled out to the various prefectures to repair roads and bridges,

dikes and moats, city walls and border defense stockades.⁶ To prevent any concentration of local military power, units were sometimes divided between two prefectures, or one civil official might have administrative responsibility for forces scattered over several prefectures.⁷ Rising from a low of 180,000 at the beginning of the dynasty, the numbers of the hsiang-chün fluctuated between 400,000 and 500,000 for the first 100 years of the dynasty. During the late 1070's, the number declined sharply as hsiang-chün functions, responsibilities, and personnel were incorporated into the pao-chia 保甲 militia system.⁸

During the early part of the Sung, the better quality prefectural units were given military training, but the majority were not trained lest they serve as a focus for rebellion.⁹ However, beginning in 1041, prefectural units were given the same military training as Guard units and were used for border defense in much the same way as Guard forces had been used previously.¹⁰ In fact, the burden of border defense began to shift in the 1040's from the Guards to the prefectural armies and local militia. The government felt that they could get the same effect at less cost (see below) and avoid the problems of declining efficiency that had begun to appear in the Guards. This was a reversal of

T'ai-tsung's policy of centralization, and some officials warned about the weakening of central control.¹¹

Local militia forces (hsiang-ping) 鄉兵) were not part of the regular Sung armies, but they played an ever-increasing role in defense against foreign invaders. Although some volunteered for service, most militia soldiers were peasants drafted from area household registers, each household supplying one or more able-bodied men according to its size.¹² Weapons, clothing, and training were supplied by the government. Involuntary service was made more palatable by the fact that service was limited to the local area, and, in the absence of a military emergency, a militiaman was free to pursue his own affairs. One advantage of the militia system was that the soldiers were quite familiar with the terrain and with the Khitan and other enemies who often raided the border areas.¹³ Also, a militia soldier would presumably be more vigorous in the defense of his own home area.

After the middle of the eleventh century, local militia became especially important along the northwest and western frontiers. In 1041, there were over 260,000 militia in Ho-pei and Ho-tung.¹⁴ Although there were many kinds of units under various names, the I-yung 義勇 and Kung-chien shou 弓箭手 units in Ho-pei,

Ho-tung, and Shen-hsi were the most important and best known.¹⁵ In 1064, a heated court debate focused on the issue of militia forces. Han Ch'i, a civil official, said that the militia approximated the T'ang fu-ping and was an excellent way to obtain a strong defense. He requested that the peasants be organized into I-yung militia units. The emperor approved, and in Shan-hsi over 130,000 people were registered. Ssu-ma Kuang 司馬光 (1019-86) argued that militia training would be but empty show and that militia forces would be useless against the enemy. The emperor ignored his argument, and the plan went forward.¹⁶

In addition to Chinese militia, there were also the fan-ping 蕃兵, militia units composed of non-Chinese tribesmen living in the northwest border regions. These units were organized, equipped, and trained along the same lines as the Chinese militia, and tribal leaders were given cash payments, military ranks, and command over their own tribal militia. Fan-ping units were most useful for scouting, infiltration, intelligence gathering, and as a vanguard for regular troops moving beyond the border. Their knowledge of the terrain and of enemy movements was superior to that of Chinese troops, yet fan-ping units were kept small enough to pose little effective threat to regular Chinese forces.¹⁷

Thus, the Sung relied upon an army composed of long-service, volunteer regulars supplemented by local militia and non-Chinese irregulars.

Recruitment and Training

The first and most obvious sources of trained soldiers were the various armies already in existence at the beginning of the Sung. T'ai-tsu commanded Chou Shih-tsung's Palace Corps, and most of his troops and subordinates immediately swore allegiance to the new ruler. Some military leaders surrendered immediately, but others, such as Wang Ch'ao, submitted only after defeat in battle. In any case, the Sung founder was faced with the task of incorporating into his army large numbers of troops of disparate quality and undetermined loyalty. The more reliable units were given new names and inducted wholesale into the army.¹⁸ Other units were sent to garrison duty in less-sensitive places and separated from their commanders who were given low-level administrative positions away from the border areas.

Non-Chinese forces who submitted to the Sung were also incorporated into the Sung armies. The Sung-shih lists both Khitan and Po-hai 浮力海 units as part of the Imperial Guards and the Palace Corps, respectively.¹⁹ This practice provided the Sung with trained soldiers (usually cavalry) and helped to bind submitted tribal

leaders more closely to the Sung through prestigious military ranks and titles. However, it was not without drawbacks.

During the two major expeditions against the Khitan in 979 and 986, Sung successes caused the voluntary surrender and submission of enemy commanders with their troops. In one case, over 40,000 troops surrendered en masse.²⁰ One may wonder, and with good reason, about the effective loyalty and reliability of these soldiers. Just prior to the disastrous battle of Ch'i-kou Kuan in 986, military leaders who had previously surrendered began to have second thoughts and were planning to change back to the Khitan side. Their plan was discovered, and they were bought off with rewards and more-impressive official titles.²¹ Fortunately, this method of filling the armies was not the mainstay of the Sung military establishment.

The Sung relied primarily on recruitment of volunteers to keep the armies up to strength. T'ai-tsu would personally select men from his Guard of the proper size and physical characteristics; these men were then sent out to the prefectures to serve as models for recruiting officials. Later, wooden figures were constructed and used for the same purpose.²² Sources of recruitment were many and varied. Some soldiers were

selected from already existing militia units; others were the sons or relatives of men in the army. Men who had been sentenced to prison or exile were permitted to enlist, and in areas of famine and natural calamity, people were taken into military service as a form of disaster relief. Enlistees were examined for physical defects, tested for skill and prowess. Those in excellent condition would be sent to the capital for induction into the Guards; the less fit would be diverted into the prefectural forces. Each new soldier received money, food, and clothing; the so-called "long-service soldiers" (ch'anq cheng chih-ping 張 征 之 兵) were tattooed on the face to discourage desertion.²³

As a result of the above practices, a large part of the army was made up of criminals, the unemployed, and other marginal and socially undesirable types. On the one hand, this was considered "using the cruel and fierce to protect the good."²⁴ On the other hand, one general complained in 1010 that criminals made poor soldiers and inevitably terrorized the population. Later, Wang An-shih also stressed the unreliability of the type of soldier in the regular armies.²⁶ The induction of the distressed during times of famine swelled the army's ranks and reduced the threat of starvation. It also diluted the quality and effectiveness of the military forces.

In 998, Li Yun-tse 李允則 enlisted over 10,000 soldiers from his command area during a famine, but he had to delay the start of a campaign because the new soldiers were hungry, ill, in poor condition, and untrained.²⁷

A further problem inherent in the recruitment system was the fact that local officials were rewarded or reprimanded depending on the number of men they supplied for induction into the army. Under this kind of pressure, an official would accept (or coerce) almost anyone regardless of his fitness for service. Consequently, large numbers of low quality soldiers swelled the ranks of the Sung armies.²⁸ Under such a system, the desertion rate was, of course, quite high, and a lengthy court debate in 1072 considered the punishment for desertion. Originally, a soldier who was absent for more than three days incurred the death penalty. The deadline was later extended to seven days. Some officials wanted to extend it to ten days, but after much discussion, the emperor decided to stay with the seven-day limit.²⁹ That this discussion took place at court is an indication not only of the growing problem of desertion but also of the decline of discipline and control within the armies.

Occasionally, the government was tempted to try conscription. In 1002, Chen-tsung ordered the drafting of young men in the capital area as a response to the growing Khitan threat. Officials in Ho-pei also asked permission to conscript men for their regular forces. The emperor was reluctant to allow it:

. . . previously when the militia in Ho-pei and Ho-tung was organized, the people were promised that they would never be drafted into the regular army. Now if we register them for regular army service, it would be a breach of faith.

When Lü Meng-cheng 呂蒙正 (946-1011), a chief councillor, pointed out that there was no other way to get replacements and further requested permission to draft able-bodied men in Ho-nan, the emperor replied: "If we do this, there will be trouble, but since the army has not been re-inforced and the numbers are declining, we have no choice." The plan was put into effect, but officials continued to point out the liabilities of drafting local militia into the regular armies. They said that the people would be upset and the crops would not be harvested; even if the men were not called up for active service, the uncertainty would cause unrest.³⁰ It is clear that conscription was to be used only as a last resort, and even then implemented very cautiously.

After having been inducted into the Guards, soldiers were assigned to the cavalry or infantry and trained in

sword and spear fighting, mounted and dismounted archery, ambush tactics, and maneuvering under the direction of flags, gongs, and drums. The soldiers' skills were tested at large-scale reviews and inspections, often under the eye of the emperor. Cavalry and infantry units trained together, one standing fast while the other maneuvered. Soldiers practiced the use of both the longbow and the crossbow, shooting either at ringed targets or at straw dummies. Their ranking and rewards were determined both by accuracy and by the strength of the bow they could draw.³¹

Detailed information on daily training routines is scanty, but much can be gleaned from the types of exercises conducted at the frequent military reviews and inspections. Since reward was directly and immediately linked to performance, soldiers had ample incentive to practice. T'ai-tsu would personally inspect his Guards. Soldiers were provided with wooden-headed arrows and felt-padded jackets; pairing off at a suitable distance, they would shoot at each other. Those who missed or who could not avoid an opponent's arrow were thrashed; those who hit their opponents or who avoided being hit were rewarded. Cavalrymen fought on horseback using

wooden staves in place of swords. The winners were rewarded.³²

T'ai-tsung followed his brother's methods and added a few of his own. Archery competition consisted of shooting at willow wands or suspended balls of yarn. Soldiers were graded on the basis of how well they could draw a very heavy bow several times without flagging.³³ Reviews and inspections kept the soldiers on their toes. In 999, Chen-tsung presided over a grand military review of 200,000 troops under the direction of Wang Ch'ao. Using only flag and drum signals, Wang put his forces through a complex set of attacks and withdrawals, left and right flanking movements, and extended and close formations without error. The emperor was greatly pleased and handed out rewards all around.³⁴ Generally speaking, enlisted men and the more junior officers were selected for promotion on the basis of their performance in training and during inspections or contests. Conversely, those who did poorly or who were unfit were transferred to the reserve, to the prefectural armies, or were released from the army altogether. These training and inspection procedures were used in the capital armies and Imperial Guards; there is every reason to believe that much the same methods were used at lower levels.

A soldier's salary was quite low and formed but a small part of his income. Monthly pay for soldiers in the Upper Armies was 1000 "cash" (wen 文; 1000 文 = 1 kuan 貫) and 500 wen for those in the lower armies. Prefectural forces were paid 300-500 wen per month and received allowances of food and clothing. Militia soldiers were paid in rice during the post-harvest training periods.³⁵ Officers' pay was much higher, ranging from four to sixty kuan; a regional commandant (chieh-tu shih) drew about 400 kuan.³⁶ According to Wong Han-chiu, 500 wen in 970 would purchase about seven pecks (tou 斗) of rice, enough to feed one or two people for a month. In 1074, the same amount would purchase only five pecks of rice. Soldiers felt that their pay was too low and came to depend on the periodic (and often quite lavish) rewards that were distributed throughout the armies.³⁷

Rewards were distributed to all ranks on a regular basis and as a recognition of individual merit on the battlefield. Gifts and rewards were given to the soldiers during the annual Imperial sacrifices, during the Dragon Boat Festival (fifth day of the fifth month) and at the Winter Solstice. Soldiers on frontier duty and those performing corvéé service received cash

supplements at the beginning of each season of the year.³⁸ A military encyclopedia written in 1005, the Hu-ch'ien ching 虎 鈐 經 (Seal of the Tiger) lists things used for rewards:

Embroidered robes, gold and silver belts, gold and silver vases, gold and silver cash of weight one ounce; booty captured from the enemy, such as money, women, wine and food, saddles and horses, bows and arrows. All these are suitable for giving to the army.³⁹

Fixed cash amounts were awarded based on the number of prisoners, horses, or enemy heads taken by a soldier.⁴⁰

Generally speaking, rewards and subsidies amounted to several times the value of each soldier's pay.⁴¹

During the first fifty years of the dynasty, the system of rewards and punishments, although adhering to certain general precedents, operated mainly at the discretion of the emperor. He was free to give or withhold rewards, to promote or demote, to punish or pardon as he saw fit. The lack of a fixed tariff, as it were, for both rewards and punishments caused no little friction.

After the fall of T'ai-yuan 太原, the Northern Han capital in 979, T'ai-tsung wanted to continue northward into Khitan territory and capture Yen-chou. However, the soldiers were tired and disgruntled at receiving no reward for their efforts in assaulting T'ai-yuan. For this and other reasons, the extended

campaign failed, and the emperor was forced to order a retreat three months later. He expressed his anger by refusing to distribute any rewards at all for the campaign.⁴²

It was not until later in the reign of Jen-tsung that concerted efforts were made to systematize the application of military rewards and punishments. Whereas the Hu-ch'ien ching contains only a few lines about rewards, the Wu-ching tsung-yao (Essentials of Military Classics) 武經總要, presented to the emperor in 1044, devotes an entire, detailed chapter to rewards and punishments.⁴³

Promotion and transfer were an integral part of the Sung system of training, inspection, and reward. As previously noted, there was a regular flow of soldiers from lower-status units up to the Imperial Guards and Elite units. In like manner, there was a quite detailed system of promotion and transfer for officers. Every three years, military officers were promoted within their own units, transferred to other units, or transferred and promoted according to a set order of precedence. Eligibility for promotion was based on performance during tests and inspections.⁴⁴ The emperor, of course, could use the system as he wished. In 984, T'ai-tsung ordered a wholesale redistribution of officers below a certain

rank in one part of the Palace Corps. As he explained to his councillors:

In transferring officers, I chose first those who were obedient and could control their subordinates; military valor was a secondary consideration. If an officer will not follow orders, then his soldiers will not obey.⁴⁵ Though they be brave, what use are they?

These rules of promotion and precedence did not apply to the highest ranking military commanders. They served at the pleasure of the emperor and were transferred, promoted, demoted, or cashiered depending on military skill, previous success or failure, and the nature and quality of their personal relationships with the emperor. T'ai-tsu and T'ai-tsung used men who had previously been fellow officers and colleagues in the Guards, generals who submitted and swore allegiance, lower-ranking generals who showed promise, and Imperial relatives by marriage. Both rulers often showed leniency to generals in view of previous merit, and they overlooked disobedience that brought a successful result. However, they never hesitated to demote a general who incurred Imperial displeasure. Again, it was not until the later years of the dynasty that an attempt was made to regularize the selection and employment of generals. Both the Hu-ch'ien ching and the Wu-ching tsung-yao devote considerable space to

these matters.⁴⁶ In 1063, there was even some discussion of making generals retire at age 65.⁴⁷

There were several advantages that accrued from the way that the Sung armies were organized and employed. The frequent review and testing of soldiers and officers, with reward or promotion based on performance, ensured that the Imperial Guards were well-trained. Also, the best soldiers were drained off from the prefectural forces and sent to the Guards. This meant that forces most closely controlled by the central government would be stronger than any peripheral army units. The various types of Guard and militia forces allowed a great deal of flexibility in the combination and deployment of the armies. Rotation of units to frontier duty provided training in frontier conditions. Finally, a rough set of checks and balances was achieved between Guard units inside and outside the capital city and between the Guard armies stationed at the capital and those stationed on the frontier.⁴⁸

These advantages, however, conceal certain drawbacks inherent in the system. By relying on a volunteer regular army, the Sung found it difficult to institute a compulsory draft when it became necessary. Sung rulers feared (apparently with good reason) that drafting peasants would cause disruption, and perhaps even

rebellion, in the countryside. It was necessary to maintain military strength; but Sung recruitment policy did not bring in the best type of people. Criminals, the unemployed, and those banished to the frontier were inducted into the armies. Also, induction into the army was used as a method of famine relief. Many soldiers knew no other trade, and the government was reluctant to demobilize soldiers lest they turn to banditry for a living. Finally, the balance between central and peripheral forces was fairly delicate and depended on a rough equivalence of forces at the capital and on the frontiers. Beginning in the 1030's, more and more Guard units were garrisoned on the borders (see Chapter III), and the preponderance of Guard forces coupled with a growing militia caused no little alarm among civil officials.

The Background and Career Patterns of Sung Generals

Thus far, I have discussed the Sung military system in rather general, broad-brush terms. I have been constrained in this by the available sources. Chinese documentary records by and large deal with the military in aggregate terms. Battles are won or lost, with so many killed or captured; cities are lost or captured, and forts are built in some places but not others; training

is carried out according to certain methods, units are transferred, generals are promoted or cashiered; and so on. The best modern studies of the military are those which can trace the career patterns of groups of enlisted men or commissioned officers and thus generalize about career patterns for the whole army. Some studies focus on recruitment and social mobility of the soldier. Yet such studies are difficult--if not impossible--using Sung records in which soldiers are seldom mentioned in groups of less than battalion size and in which only the most prominent generals are mentioned by name. I have concentrated on some of these prominent generals in an attempt to cast some meager light on the life of a professional soldier in the Sung dynasty.

In order to study the experience of civil-military relations during the early Sung, I selected twenty-three high-ranking generals whose names, exploits, and opinions appear frequently and prominently in the Hsu Tzu-chih t'ung-chien ch'ang-pien (see Appendix A). The criteria for selection were quite basic and simple: that a general be consulted by the emperor--or that he offer advice--on military policy; and that there be enough source material to allow a reasonably thorough investigation of the general's career. In some cases,

I have also included other family members to provide a better picture of a general's family ties and background.

All twenty-three generals followed the same basic path in their military careers. Service in low-ranking posts was followed by promotion to positions of more responsibility and command scope. Success in battle brought reward and promotion; administrative or logistical competence was recognized and rewarded. Finally, a general's career was capped by appointment to the highest positions of military command and responsibility, with a voice at the highest levels of national policy. Those who stumbled along the way were demoted until they had sufficiently redeemed themselves.

It is possible to divide the generals into two basic groups, although any classification scheme must be somewhat arbitrary and subject to qualification. Border generals, such as Ma Chih-chieh and Ho Ch'eng-chü, were those generals who spent the bulk of their careers serving in border areas in the North and West, with border force commands and assignments; long tenure (up to twenty years) in a border command was not unusual. Central government generals, such as Ts'ao Pin and Chang Yung-te, were generals who held high command rank in the Imperial Guards, who were dispatched from the capital to lead

expeditionary forces, or who reached high position in the Bureau of Military Affairs. Some men served in both capacities, and in some cases, a general's ranks and appointments overlapped the distinctions that I have drawn. I have tried to base the classifications upon each man's full career. Appendix A shows the groupings within these two categories, and Appendix B provides biographical details for some of the more prominent generals.

Family ties were important in military service. Of the fourteen families identified, one-half saw perpetuation of military service across generational lines. Six of the generals that I have studied received an officer's commission and first posting through his father's yin privilege,⁴⁹ and nine served first under the command of their fathers (or other relatives). These latter cases may have been a disguised form of the yin privilege, or the young officers may only have been serving a sort of apprenticeship before receiving a regular appointment; the sources are not clear on this point. In two cases (Che Wei-cheng and Ho Chi-yun), an officer succeeded to his father's command upon his death. Family ties also worked in a less-formal fashion. Ts'ao Pin successfully recommended his son for

appointment in 999,⁵⁰ and Kuo K'uei was made an officer upon the death of his elder brother in action against the Hsi-hsia.⁵¹

Another important category includes those generals who were close associates of the emperors; some were imperial relatives, others were colleagues who had served with T'ai-tsu under the Chou or with T'ai-tsung before he ascended the throne. Ts'ao Pin's maternal aunt, for example, was the consort of Chou T'ai-tsu; Li Ch'u-yun's daughter was consort to Sung T'ai-tsu. Both generals were close advisors to the throne, as were their sons.

A few generals, like Wang Ch'ao, Ho Chu-yun, and Wang Ch'üan-pin, submitted to T'ai-tsu in 960 and were taken into the Imperial Guards or Palace Corps. Ts'ao Pin, who had served with T'ai-tsu as a commander in Chou Shih-tsung's Guard, remained aloof and did not try to ingratiate himself with the new regime in 960. T'ai-tsu summoned him to court and asked: "We used to be colleagues. Why are you now so distant?" Ts'ao replied: "I have served the court of Chou and am closely related to the house of Chou. . . . Should I humbly seek a new office or try to perpetuate my position, it would be wrong."⁵²

T'ai-tsu, impressed with his honesty and integrity, welcomed Ts'ao into the court and appointed him to the Bureau of Military Affairs. Chang Yung-te had also served with T'ai-tsu, and both T'ai-tsu and T'ai-tsung relied upon his experience and advice.

Kao Ch'iuang, Wang Ch'ao, and Wang Hsien all served in T'ai-tsung's Guard before he became emperor and were his close associates. According to one story, T'ai-tsung was so drunk one night that, when he climbed on his horse to return home, he couldn't find the reins or the stirrups. Kao Ch'iuang took the reins in his left hand, with his right hand made a stirrup for T'ai-tsung's foot, and so led his master home. The emperor T'ai-tsu saw this and praised Kao's loyalty and service, rewarding him lavishly as well.⁵³ When T'ai-tsung ascended the throne, the stars of those who had been in his Guards also began to rise.

Although family ties were important in the Sung military, they provided but one route to success. Not every general began as an officer. Ti Ch'ing, perhaps the most colorful general of the eleventh century, was the son of a farmer. He enlisted as a private soldier and rose through the ranks of the Imperial Elite. In 1038, he was promoted to battalion commander in the Guards, and for the next few years, he often served in

the vanguard of expeditionary campaigns against the Hsi-Hsia leader, Chao Yuan-hao 趙元昊 . Over a period of four years, he fought in twenty-five battles and was wounded eight times. More than once, he continued to fight even when seriously wounded.⁵⁴ When Ti Ch'ing enlisted, he had been tattooed on the face, following the custom in the Sung armies at the time. The emperor, Jen-tsung, suggested that he have the tattoo removed after he had become a famous general, but Ti Ch'ing declined:

The emperor promoted me because of my merit and did not inquire about my background. This tattoo shows the reason why I am here, and I want to retain it as an inspiration for others in the army.⁵⁵

Ti Ch'ing was quite successful as a combat commander and not at all bashful about his accomplishments. After one successful campaign, he boasted:

I regulated discipline and clarified rewards and punishments; the enemy could not gain any advantage. I saw from the enemy's flags that they could not withstand a cavalry attack; and I was right. I climbed a tower and observed all the enemy's dispositions. I don't say much, but my plans are well-made. What famous general of ancient times could do better?⁵⁶

However, he was a bit more circumspect when speaking with the emperor about his rewards: "I only relied upon the emperor's strategy. The battles were won by my generals' valor . . . how can I accept high office?"⁵⁷

In the absence of extensive personal writings by the generals that I have studied, it is difficult to find anything more than hints about their "self image" as soldiers. It is possible, however, to identify a few characteristics shared by the generals. They were basically utilitarian and pragmatic, with a preference for direct action. For example, when Ts'ao Pin was a member of the Bureau of Military Affairs he became frustrated with the delays and bickering among civil officials who hesitated to send troops against Hsi-Hsia incursions. Ts'ao finally (and angrily) asked that he be put in command: "I request to serve in the forces myself; then there will be no more wrangling."⁵⁸

I have already described Li Chi-lung's stripping a city of its defenders in order to pursue the retreating Khitan, as well as Kao Ch'iung's actions at Shan-yuan in 1004.

These anecdotes reveal an impatience with the wrangling of court officials and petty restrictions. Yet, as we have seen in previous chapters, they were also prudent and careful (Li Chi-lung was perhaps a bit impetuous, but he was not foolhardy). Though quick to speak out on matters of military strategy, policy, and employment, the generals were basically self-effacing in matters of civil politics and their own merits

(Ti Ch'ing is a notable exception). The most important characteristic is a strong sense of their own integrity and honor as soldiers. The strongest statements made by these generals are those that begin, "I am a soldier. . . ." There is no observable sense of inferiority vis-a-vis the civil branch of the government.

On the other hand, there seems to have been a clear understanding of the limits of their role as professional soldiers. When Ts'ao Pin was asked by the emperor (in 967) for advice on filling civil offices, Ts'ao replied: "I am an inspector of military forces: it is not my place to comment on civil appointments."⁵⁹ Yet, these limits were to be observed by both sides. When civil officials complained about his methods of enforcing discipline, Ti Ch'ing replied: "Military affairs are not the responsibility of civil officials."⁶⁰

An investigation of the careers of the twenty-three generals reveals a common progression through the ranks and appointments. Beginning as a junior officer (or Guardsman) in the Imperial Guards, an officer would then be promoted within a few years to battalion commander (chih-hui shih 指揮使). A term of service as a military inspector (chien-chün 監軍) would be followed by a regiment or brigade-level command (tu 都 chih-hui-shih). Longer service or success in

battle brought promotion to the headquarters command level of the Guard or the Palace Corps. At various points in his career, an officer might be sent to the borders with a commission as a Prefectural Administrator, Chief Commissioner (tu-tsung kuan 都總管), Militia Commandant (t'uan-lien shih 團練使), or regional defense Commandant (fang-yü shih 防禦使) in approximately that order of ascending rank. The highest military post in the frontier (corresponding in rank and prestige to headquarters command rank in the Guards) was the Regional Commandant (chieh-tu shih 節度使). The pinnacle of a general's career was appointment to the Bureau of Military Affairs. It was also quite common (after 999) to hold rank in the Guards and a frontier appointment concurrently.

What is surprising about this system is its very regularity. I found no general, among the twenty-three that I studied, who gained his rank or appointment solely through political or personal influence to the exclusion of more rational criteria for promotion. If a general, such as Ma Chih-chieh or Ts'ao Wei, was sent to troubleshoot a difficult prefecture or to command a campaign, it was because he had previously demonstrated his competence. The personal relationships that Ts'ao Pin and Kao Ch'iung enjoyed with their rulers no doubt

contributed to their influence at court. However, the emperors clearly found their advice practical and timely, and officers moved up or down according to their performance.

Several questions occurred (or were suggested) to me as I researched this subject, for example:

Were border generals more or less aggressive on the battlefield than central generals?
Did central generals try to gain influence, power, or command at the expense of border generals?
Did one group gather more rewards, promotions, or demotions.
Is there a "typical" general?

Based upon what I have found in the sources, I am compelled to answer a qualified "No" to all of these questions for the period 960-1060. Aggressiveness seems to have been about equally distributed among both groups, and the best combat commanders seemed to know the proper circumstances for both boldness and discretion. A general's influence at court depended upon his demonstrated abilities and the aptness of his suggestions rather than upon his area of operation. Authority and command were part of the assignment; assignments could be (and were) withdrawn at any time. Although border generals served longer in their posts than central generals, they were transferred from time to time, and there is every indication that they hold their commands solely at the emperor's pleasure.

Border generals tended to offer complaint or advice about border-related problems, while central generals concerned themselves with more general questions of military preparedness. Of course, aside from a few minor internal problems, the Sung military effort was directed outward against foreign tribes, so almost all defense discussion and planning focused on the frontiers. If anything, border generals were allowed a bit more flexibility in seeing to the defense and administration of their areas. This reflects the quite pragmatic policy of the Sung rulers toward frontier administration. If what a general proposed made a positive contribution to the area's defense, no one would argue. If not, he could be replaced.

A negative answer to the above questions points to several conclusions. First, the Sung military establishment was well-regulated and relatively free from political factions and intrigue. Second, there was a fairly regular and rational system of rank progression and rotation of assignments. Such a system provided a measure of stability and predictability in an officer's career and greatly reduced the need to seek influence or patronage outside the system. Third, there was a large measure of homogeneity among the officer corps based on traditional military virtues, acceptance of the

legitimacy of the Sung ruling house, and acquiescence in the principle of civil control over the military. They all accepted (or were socialized by) the same set of values and assumptions.

Institutional Mechanisms of Military Management

Edmund Worthy has identified several methods by which the Sung rulers tried to maintain control over the military establishment.⁶¹ The first has already been discussed: the strongest and best-equipped units were concentrated around the capital, proof against any uprising in the prefectures. At the same time, military authority at the highest levels was split. The Palace Corps Bureau and the Emperor's Guard Bureau, staffed by the military, controlled the training and administration of the Guard armies but did not have the command authority to deploy the armies in the field. Such orders could only come from the Bureau of Military Affairs, which was staffed by both civil and military officials. Thus, civilians acted as a check on the military at the highest levels of authority, and--with the separation of administration and command authority--no one office or official had complete control over the armies.

When units were dispatched on a campaign, troops and commanders were drawn from different areas, and a field

commander's authority was withdrawn at the end of the campaign. In addition, each army was accompanied by an Inspector General (chien-chün 監軍) who was independent of the field commander and reported directly to the emperor. Only the most trusted officers were used in this capacity. As a further means of preventing the concentration of military power, Sung rulers left unfilled the two top command positions (Supreme Commander and Vice-Supreme Commander) in the Emperor's Guard and the Palace Corps; often the next lower ranks down to the Provost Marshall were also left vacant. Consequently, the highest ranking officers were the commanders of the cavalry and infantry armies, but no one general had control of both.

The division between central authority and border command was also reinforced. Although border generals were allowed a great deal of autonomy, no border general held concurrent rank in the Palace Corps or Emperor's Guard.⁶¹ The converse was also true. No general was given the opportunity to build a power base encompassing both central and peripheral military forces. This restriction was not enforced after 999.

The most important part of the military system, involving both training and control, was the "rotating frontier defense" system (keng-shu fa 更戍法)

established by T'ai-tsu. Every one or two years, units rotated between duty on the border or in other outlying areas and billets near the capital. Units sent out from the capital were assigned to one of three kinds of duty: t'un p'o 屯泊, garrison duty at frontier strongpoints or other border areas; t'un chu 屯駐, garrison duty at strategic areas within the interior; chiu-liang 就糧, transport of supplies from the capital to outlying areas.⁶³ According to the Sung-shih, the purpose of this rotation was:

. . . to accustom the soldiers to work and hardship and to equalize duty and rest. Therefore, the generals will not be able to acquire exclusive authority over their troops, and the soldiers will not be able to grow arrogant and lazy.⁶⁴

During the first fifty years of the Northern Sung, there was a constant flow of men and supplies back and forth across the empire. However, as early as 1000, there were complaints that the keng-shu fa was not working as it should (see Chapter III) and that Guard units were unfamiliar with frontier conditions. There were increasing complaints during the 1030's about the cost of maintaining the system. The system apparently was neglected during the long period of peace after 1005, and it began to operate less and less efficiently. During the reign of Shen-tsung, some officials feared that if the soldiers did not know their commanders, and

commanders did not know their troops, they could not be relied upon in time of war.⁶⁵ The keng-shu fa was finally abolished in 1074 in favor of a system of some ninety chiang 將 which were established as training areas.

Chiang referred both to the unit and to the training area itself. Each chiang contained about 3000 men and was commanded by a general who was responsible for training his soldiers and leading them into battle.⁶⁶ The main purpose of the chiang was to improve the quality of the armed forces through better training, and both Imperial Guard troops and prefectural forces were assigned to chiang. Beginning in 1074, chiang were established around the capital area and in Ho-pei. The system was gradually extended to areas of Che-chiang, Huai-nan, Fukien, and Kwangtung. In the event of a defense problem, chiang troops would be dispatched to the scene; afterwards, they would return to their garrison area.

Chiang commanders were subordinate to the Palace Corps and Emperor's Guard Bureaus, but they were given a great deal of independent authority and were not answerable to any of the civil officials in the areas where they were stationed. The chiang commander had almost complete control over the training and deployment

of his force. Although Imperial Guard units were still stationed at the capital, establishment of the chiang system greatly weakened the degree of direct control over the military forces enjoyed by previous Sung rulers.

Historian Fang Hao feels that, in addition to its purely military benefits, the keng-shu fa also provided a means for dispersing military force throughout the country so that strategic places would be defended but the bulk of the armies would be maintained under central control. Previous problems of "the tail wagging the dog" (wei-ta pu-tiao 尾大不掉) could not recur.⁶⁷ However, the keng-shu fa required a great deal of attention on the part of the government. When this attention was lacking, the system gradually fell into disrepair, and the training and quality of the military forces suffered. The chiang system probably improved the training problem, but it scattered military forces all over China, and it was a clear departure from the policies of control and centralization adopted by the Sung founder. In 1126, Sung forces in the north were insufficient to repel the invading Jurchen, and other Sung armies could not concentrate in time to defend the capital.⁶⁸

Worthy clearly demonstrates the checks and balances built into the military system by T'ai-tsu and T'ai-tsung. The Elite Corps protected the Emperor. The Palace Corps

and Emperor's Guard balanced each other, and within each the infantry and cavalry were in balance. Palace armies offset other forces around the capital, and central armies were more than a match for any prefectural or local militia force.⁶⁹ Any unit that rebelled could be checked by other forces, and all the reins of military power and authority came together only in the hands of the emperor.

Military command positions on the borders were gradually brought under more strict central control through the use of eunuchs as military inspectors, the use of chen-t'u 陳圖, and the replacement of soldiers by civilians in higher administrative positions along the frontiers.

T'ai-tsu and T'ai-tsung used eunuchs as messengers, unofficial inspectors, and even as military commanders; this caused a certain amount of friction with the generals. For example, when a rebellion in Ssu-ch'uan required a major military effort by the Sung in 994, Ma Chih-chieh, commanding the vanguard, came into conflict with the commander of the expeditionary force, the eunuch Wang Chi-en 王繼恩 (?-999). Wang wanted absolute control of the operation, and Ma refused to relinquish his own proper authority. Consequently (perhaps as a punishment), Ma was detached to defend

P'eng-chou with less than 500 troops. Ma requested reinforcement, but Wang ignored his request. When the city was attacked by 10,000 Khitan soldiers, Ma fiercely and successfully defended the city until relief arrived, losing over half of his command in the process. He was commended and rewarded by the emperor for his bravery and competence.⁷⁰

The appointment of eunuchs to the military inspectorate began during the reign of Chen-tsung, who felt that eunuchs could be trusted to serve his interests exclusively and to submit reliable information. Jen-tsung continued the practice but came under heavy criticism. In 1038, civil officials complained that eunuchs were usurping generals' command authority in the field and causing battles to be lost.⁷¹ Two eunuch inspectors took over command of troops on the battlefield in 1040 and led them to defeat. As a result, Jen-tsung was persuaded by civil officials to eliminate eunuchs from the military inspectorate. Jen-tsung resumed using eunuchs as inspectors within a few years, and by 1054, eunuchs were once more an official part of the inspectorate.⁷²

During the reigns of Chen-tsung and Jen-tsung, the use of eunuchs as military inspectors was more of an annoyance to the military than a serious impediment to

military operations. It was not until the reign of Shen-tsung that eunuchs began to interfere seriously with military affairs.⁷³ From 1068 until the fall of the Northern Sung, eunuchs became more powerful in military affairs; some were even appointed as Regional Commandants.⁷⁴ Southern Sung rulers did not allow eunuchs to interfere in military matters, and--in search of a scapegoat--they laid much of the blame on the eunuchs for the fall of the Northern Sung.⁷⁵ Modern historians, like Ch'ai Te-keng and Lo Ch'iu-ch'ing, also blame the eunuchs, but I think that their indictments are overstated. Eunuchs certainly did cause problems, but they were only part of the general decline in Sung military preparedness after 1060.

Chen-t'u are diagrams of battle formations, tactical maneuvers, orders of march, and the like. The most famous are the pa chen-t'u 八陣圖 attributed to Chu-ko Liang 諸葛亮 (181-234) of the San-kuo period. They were often handed down by the emperor for his generals' use in training and in combat, and sometimes generals would submit chen-t'u for the emperor's consideration. Both T'ai-tsu and T'ai-tsung often supplied their generals with chen-t'u, but their generals just as often ignored or modified them as circumstances required. As long as the outcome was

successful, little punishment followed the breach of orders. Chen-tsung also made use of chen-t'u, but they are most numerous during the later years of Jen-tsung's reign. There was much discussion of the offensive or defensive nature of traditional chen-t'u, of which plans could be retained and used, and of which new plans were most suitable. Although T'ai-tsung had secretly admitted that chen-t'u were a means of regulating his generals,⁷⁶ by Jen-tsung's time they had become no less important as part of the strategic and tactical planning process.⁷⁷ There were dissenting views, of course. In 1040, Wang Te-yung pointed to the military failures of Chen-tsung and said that they were due to his use of chen-t'u which tied generals down in static formations and limited necessary initiative and tactical innovation. He advised the emperor to eschew the use of chen-t'u and instead concentrate on choosing competent generals, but without much success.⁷⁸

Faced with the problems of national consolidation and aggressive, warlike neighbors, both T'ai-tsu and T'ai-tsung had used high-ranking generals to fill civil as well as military offices on the frontier. In addition, both had allowed border generals a large degree of administrative and fiscal autonomy. As the threat of war declined after 1005, however, both

Chen-tsung and Jen-tsung moved to restrict the freedom of border commanders and to separate the military and civil lines of authority. Chen-tsung removed many military officers from their posts as prefectural administrators and military intendants, replacing them with civilians. Generals were retained in the important positions in the most strategic areas. Ho Ch'eng-chu and Li Yun-tse, for example, continued to serve as Pacification Commissioners (an-fu shih 安撫使) in Ho-pei.⁷⁹

Jen-tsung carried this policy even further, filling almost all civil posts on the border with civil officials. There was a strong feeling among the emperor's advisors that military officials would not be as effective in securing the people's welfare. Also it was felt that military officials should not be allowed to control the highest office in any border area. In most cases, military officials were relegated to deputy or staff roles in support of civil officials.⁸⁰ Attempts were also made to regularize the process of appointing officials to the border areas. Fan Chung-yen and Han Ch'i reported, in 1043, that civil and military officials considered service on the borders to be a hardship and were therefore reluctant to go. They recommended that the length of tour be standardized at three years, and the emperor

agreed. One result of all these policies is that civilians began to encroach upon strictly military functions and offices (see below).

Another aspect of military management during the Northern Sung was the formal education and training of officers in strategy and tactics. There was a large body of theoretical knowledge collected as a basis for reference, study, and training. The "art of war" (ping-fa 兵法) had traditionally been a proper subject for scholarly study, and the Sung not only inherited a long line of studies on the subject but also produced its own. As Boodberg puts it:

. . . throughout China the most pacific scholars began to turn their attention to things military and to questions of national defense. Memorials to the Throne, admonitions to reform, military manuals, new commentaries on ancient military classics, and essays on methods . . . began to pour into the capital from every quarter of the vast Empire.⁸¹

Boodberg refers specifically to the reigns of Jen-tsung and later emperors, but--as I have shown in previous chapters--memorials and remonstrance were submitted from the beginning of the dynasty, and the first military encyclopedia appeared during the reign of Chen-tsung.

The Hu-ch'ien ching was presented by the emperor by Hsü Tung (a former judge in a military command prefecture) in 1005 as a guide to the conduct of warfare, a comprehensive handbook for use by a strategist or general in

planning campaigns or solving tactical problems. It deals with such subjects as selection of generals, assessment of terrain, defense of cities, signals, and tactical formations. In the preface, Hsü Tung said that the methods of Sun-tzu are mysterious and subtle; Hsü tried to make them more clear and understandable. Where Sun-tzu is aphoristic and rambling, Hsü is detailed and well-organized. For example, in the chapter on "Attack by Fire," Sun-tzu deals with fire only in vague, almost cryptic, terms. Fires should be used ". . . when the moon is in Sagittarius, Alpheratz . . . for these are days of raising winds." Also, "When fire breaks out in the enemy's camp, immediately coordinate action from without."⁸² The whole chapter gives only general advice. Hsü Tung, however, is much more detailed and practical:

If a general is to make use of a fire, he must first know what day it is. Next he should follow the direction of the wind. In attacking a city or destroying a stockade, if the wind is favorable, he should use flying fire (arrows) . . . if the enemy is upwind and starts a fire, he should also start one to stop the other fire.⁸³

To his credit, Hsü Tung not only elaborates on the principles of Sun-tzu but also refutes those principles when they run counter to his own.

The Wu-ching tsung-yao, presented to the emperor Jen-tsung in 1044, is a military encyclopedia compiled by a committee headed by Tseng Kung-liang a member of the

Bureau of Military Affairs. It is much longer and more comprehensive than the Hu-ch'ien ching and includes chapters on rules of strategy, tactics, camps, siege and defense of towns, and river fighting. In addition, there is a geographical analysis of the Sung empire from a military perspective, and the second half of the book consists of selected examples from the military history of China. The sections on tactics, formations, and weapons are especially detailed, with many drawings and diagrams.

The concepts and tactics discussed in the Wu-ching tsung-yao were not only drawn from ancient texts but also absorbed from the recent military experience of the Sung. During the northern expedition on 986, a small Sung force was able to mislead a larger Khitan force by using flags, banners, drums, and gongs dispersed behind cover to simulate troop units. The Khitan withdrew rather than fight what they thought was a superior force.⁸⁴ This kind of tactic is discussed at length in the Wu-ching tsung-yao section entitled "Using few to attack many."⁸⁵ In a different battle, Sung forces had attacked the eastern end of the Khitan line. When the action had gone on for some time without a clear advantage for either side, the general ordered part of his force to attack from the west, flanking and routing

the Khitan.⁸⁶ It was a perfect example of the cheng and ch'i tactics (see Chapter III, note 15) discussed at great length in the section on "ch'i forces" which concludes with a specific reference to recent Sung experience:

In our own time, during the Wei-hsi period (984-87), the Khitan invaded our borders in unconstrained greediness and not encumbered by provisions or baggage trains. . . . Our combat forces were divided into several tens of units for ambushing. Concealing themselves in critical places along the frontier, they awaited the enemy invasion. Then, together with the main army, they fiercely attacked the enemy front and rear. By day, they falsely displayed flags behind groves of trees in order to mislead the enemy. At night, from concealed ambush in the countryside, they used drums to frighten the enemy. Assailed from all sides, they enemy could not plunder, whereas our forces could support each other.⁸⁷

Both of these encyclopedias contain a body of specialized and detailed tactical doctrine based on historical precedent and recent experience, and these tactics were actually used by commanders on the battlefield. These two books were written by civilians, but both authors were knowledgeable about military affairs. The writing and compilation of military treatises continued into the reign of Shen-tsung (1068-86) and beyond,⁸⁸ but most are general, historical, or theoretical. None makes as much of a contribution to the education of a professional soldier as do the Hu-ch'ien ching and the Wu-ching tsung-yao.

Finally, education, as well as combat experience, was considered important for a soldier. In 1041, when Fan Chung-yen took command of defense forces against the Hsi-Hsia, he gave his protege, Ti Ch'ing, copies of the Ch'un-ch'iu, the Tso-chuan, and the Chan-kuo tse, saying: "To be a general, one must understand books; ordinary bravery is not enough."⁸⁹

Formal military education and examination first came into use during the eleventh century. The two "regular" channels of appointment for military officers were the military examinations (wu-chü 武舉) and the imperial military school (wu-hsüeh 武學). Chen-tsung created a military selection system, but he did not put it into effect on a regular basis.⁹⁰ He did, however, lay the foundation for later rulers. In 1029, Jen-tsung initiated a formal military examination and the next year personally conducted the final examination of officer candidates. At that time, military examinations were given by the Ministry of War, and civil examinations were given by the Ministry of Personnel. This reflected the separate status of the military within the government. When war with the Hsi-Hsia ended in 1049, the wu-chü were abolished; they were reinstated in 1053 at the urging of civil officials who stressed the need for trained officers.⁹¹

Candidates were selected on the basis of their understanding of strategy and tactics and then ranked in order by their skill at riding and shooting. The ability to understand plans and strategy was considered most important, the ability to ride and handle weapons less so. Ssu-ma Kuang criticized the inclusion of a test of martial arts on the grounds that it would eliminate some who had good minds for strategy but less skill with weapons. Su Shih argued exactly the opposite, saying that a strategist who could not fight would be of limited value on the battlefield.⁹²

The imperial military school was established by Jen-tsung in 1043 at the Wu-ch'eng Wang temple (see below) with a high-ranking civil official as chief instructor.⁹³ Critics of this school said that previous military heroes had not required special schooling. It was sufficient for them to read and understand the writings of the military sages. After only three months, Jen-tsung gave in and abolished the school. Other advisors, however, felt that military education was vital. In 1050 and again in 1063, advisors said that the empire needed those skilled in wu as well as those knowledgeable about wen. Generals who had received no training in military science (as opposed to the martial arts) would not be able to employ the armies effectively.⁹⁴

Emperor Shen-tsung re-established and greatly elaborated the examinations and school systems. He appointed both civil and military officials to instruct at the military schools. Students took an entrance examination or were recommended by senior officials for entrance. They studied the martial arts as well as the writings of such traditional military experts as Sun-tzu and Wu-ch'i 吳起 (d. 381 B.C.); after three years of study and a final examination, they were given official rank. Testing for both the military school and the military examination was combined under the supervision of the Ministry of Personnel.⁹⁵ When the need for officers was greater than the supply available through regular channels, the examination process was by-passed, and military officials were appointed on the basis of recommendation.⁹⁶ Frantzell refers to the military school as a "war college."⁹⁷ This is somewhat misleading as, in modern usage, the term usually refers to advanced staff and command-level military education. The Sung military schools were for initial military training for officers, analogous to the Royal Military College at Sandhurst or the United States Military Academy at West Point.

As part of an effort to systematize and regularize the selection and training of officers, the government also tried to instill ethical norms into the military

through the establishment and maintenance of military temples. Temples were dedicated to the Prince of Martial Accomplishments (Wu-ch'eng Wang 武成王), honoring Lü Shang 呂尚 (title: T'ai-kung Wang 太公望), an advisor to the ancient house of Chou.

Although the cult of T'ai-kung Wang began much earlier--during the Warring States period, the state of Ch'i 齊 honored him as a master strategist and soldier--it gained great impetus during the T'ang dynasty. In 731, the emperor established a temple to T'ai-kung Wang opposite the temple dedicated to Confucius. Military examination candidates were required to offer sacrifice there, and generals would offer libations at the temple before proceeding to a new command.⁹⁸

In 962, Sung T'ai-tsu ordered the construction of a temple dedicated to Wu-ch'eng Wang to display the names of historical generals and heroes. When it was completed, T'ai-tsu inspected the temple and ordered the name of one general, Po Ch'i 白起, stricken from the lists:

This one killed those who had already submitted.
He is not an example of military virtue. How
could he be honored along with the others?⁹⁹

Sacrifices at the Wu-ch'eng Wang temple were the same as those at the temple dedicated to a paragon of civil virtue, Wen-hsüan Wang 文宣王.¹⁰⁰ This equivalence is one indication that military and civil virtues were

considered of equal value. Jen-tsung continued the upkeep of the temple, adding some names and restoring some that had been removed by previous emperors. In 1043, he ordered that the imperial military school be housed in the Wu-ch'eng Wang temple. Maintenance of the temple continued through the remainder of the dynasty and lasted well into the Ming.

Personal Relationships as a Management Tool

Worthy asserts that T'ai-tsu and T'ai-tsung relied more upon institutions and systems and less upon individuals to manage the armies.¹⁰¹ I disagree, and I hope to demonstrate that both T'ai-tsu and T'ai-tsung consciously strove to maintain close, personal relationships with their generals as part of the process of controlling the military establishment. In spite of rules and precedents regarding rewards and punishments, these emperors did not hesitate to intervene, lavishing rewards on a general or ignoring accusations of misconduct and pardoning a general's mistakes.¹⁰² Both T'ai-tsu and T'ai-tsung took an active part in campaigns and personally led their armies. They were closely involved with the military both as participants and as rulers. Chen-tsung continued to maintain personal relationships with his generals, even though he was less directly

involved in the conduct of military operations. The strength and importance of a personal relationship between the emperor and the military began to fade after 1010. As I have discussed in Chapter II, Jen-tsung was less oriented toward the military and more likely to turn to his civil advisors in matters of policy. Jen-tsung even ended the practice of personally reviewing the Imperial Guards. Also during Jen-tsung's reign, the various institutional mechanisms of the military system (examinations, schools, promotions, et cetera) reached a stage of development capable of supplanting the previous more personal methods of providing control, cohesiveness, and morale.

T'ai-tsu and T'ai-tsung made positive efforts to create, foster, and maintain a personal relationship with the military forces. For example, in 963, T'ai-tsu sent a message to the army of Kuo Chin 郭進, a rather fierce soldier and disciplinarian: "You should obey orders; I might pardon you, but Kuo Chin can execute you." When Kuo's guard retreated, he executed several pour encourager les autres. The emperor supported Kuo against false accusations and approved of his methods in handling troops.¹⁰³ During the siege of T'ai-yuan in 969, T'ai-tsu summoned Ho Chi-yun to his presence and ordered him to intercept the Khitan relief

column, adding: "Tomorrow, I expect to hear of your success."¹⁰⁴ Ho won a battle and sent his son to report it to the emperor.

During the same campaign, Sung troops had been repulsed several times from the walls of T'ai-yuan. When a guard officer volunteered to lead the assault force to the top of the wall, T'ai-tsu addressed his guards:

You are all soldiers whom I have trained myself; there isn't one of you who isn't worth 100 of the enemy. We have been close comrades, sharing good fortune and ill. I would rather not conquer T'ai-yuan than have you throw yourselves upon the enemy's swords and rush impetuously into certain death.¹⁰⁵

The soldiers were visibly moved and cheered the emperor.

In a different vein, T'ai-tsung was forced to intervene, at the beginning of the 979 campaign, in a dispute over precedence among his generals. Ts'ao Han 曹翰 objected to his place in the order of battle and demanded that another general trade places with him. When the other man refused, T'ai-tsung mollified Ts'ao by praising him as the general best qualified for the particular task.¹⁰⁶ One month later, T'ai-tsung directed Ts'ao Kuang-shih 曹光實 to oversee supplies. Ts'ao objected that he wanted a combat command, and the emperor replied, "Supplies are very important, it is certainly a task worthy of your efforts."¹⁰⁷

The important feature of each case mentioned above is the very personal nature of the emperor's action. Kuo Chin was assured of command authority and imperial support, and both Kuo and Ho knew that the emperor was directly interested in their activities. For this part, Ho Chi-yun sent his son--not just the regular courier--to inform the emperor of victory. At T'ai-yuan, the emperor was visible on the battlefield to inspire the troops and share their hardships. T'ai-tsung did not simply insist that his officers obey orders; he took the trouble to convince individuals of their importance to the overall effort. Clever psychology, to be sure, but the personal relationship was strengthened nonetheless.

There were also other cases. Early in T'ai-tsu's reign, Li Han-ch'ao 李漢超 (d. 977) commanded an important border prefecture. He fell into the habit of borrowing money from the local landowners and not repaying it. When a delegation of landowners complained to the emperor, T'ai-tsu pointed out that, while in the past the Khitan had plundered their countryside, Li Han-ch'ao's protection had eliminated that nuisance. He dismissed them, saying: "In the past when the Khitan plundered, you never came to complain; only now when Han-ch'ao borrows your money do you complain." T'ai-tsu said to Li's mother, "Your son is out of money but rather

than tell me he takes it from the people." T'ai-tsu then gave Li money so that he would not harass the people in his area. Li Han-ch'ao was always asking for more troops and, when he did not get them, sent his son to appeal to the emperor. T'ai-tsu said:

If your father is not able to manage things for me, I'll wait until the Khitan chop off his head. I have plenty of generals who can do the job, but I will not increase the number of troops.

He then gave Li Han-ch'ao money and gifts. Li was inspired (and no doubt a bit embarrassed) by the emperor's generosity, and he redoubled his efforts to keep the Khitan at bay.¹⁰⁸

T'ai-tsu thus solved two problems at once. He stopped Li's harassment of the people, and he strengthened his personal ties with an important general. Rather than relying on institutional means (transfer, demotion, reprimand) to settle Li or increasing Li's strength by sending more troops, T'ai-tsu piqued his pride and obtained his gratitude and service. It is quite likely that T'ai-tsu knew the weakness of institutional controls at his disposal and chose to deal with a strong general in a vital defense area through more personal methods. In 970, Kuo Chin was accused of overstepping his authority. T'ai-tsu replied: "Kuo Chin has guarded the western mountains for over 10 years, so that

I have had no worries from that direction. . . ." The emperor let it be known that he would not listen to reckless accusations against his generals and he continued to treat them well, thereby strengthening their loyalty.¹⁰⁹

Personal relationships were also strong between members of the military. In 964, when Ts'ao Pin commanded part of the expedition to pacify Ssu-ch'uan other generals allowed their troops to plunder and lay waste to the conquered cities. Ts'ao kept discipline among his forces and was rewarded by the emperor. When Ts'ao campaigned in Chiang-nan 江南 in 974, he feigned illness and did not attend to affairs for several days. When his subordinate commanders came to his tent to inquire about his illness, Ts'ao said:

My sickness is not one that can be cured by medicine. You must all show your sincerity and swear not to kill indiscriminately in the conquered cities.

His subordinates all swore to obey, and Ts'ao's illness miraculously disappeared.¹¹⁰

Chen-*tsung*, like his predecessors, actively fostered personal relations with his generals and soldiers. In 1001, he personally intervened and reduced the punishment for soldiers who had deserted from one of the armies near the capital. They had not yet received any salary, he said, and therefore should be given lighter punishment.¹¹¹

When Wang Hsien asked to retire in 1002, the emperor transferred him to an easy post, saying: "You were an official under previous rulers and earned much merit in the service of the country. You may take your ease in Ho-yang."¹¹² In 1004, the emperor praised Ho Ch'eng-chu's knowledge and ability and said: "We should choose a prestigious post for him as a reward." Ho was made Administrator of Shan-chou a few days later.¹¹³ When Ho Ch'eng-chu was accused of incompetence in 1006, the emperor overlooked his faults in view of past service and rewarded him well.¹¹⁴ These instances were really an affirmation and extension of the personal contract that T'ai-tsu had made with his generals in 961.

Other cases also illustrate the close relationship between Chen-tingsung and his generals. When Ts'ao Pin fell ill in 999 and requested retirement, Chen-tingsung asked him to recommend qualified officers. Ts'ao Pin recommended his two sons, Ts'ao Wei and Ts'ao Ts'an.¹¹⁵ In 1006, when Ho Ch'eng-chu requested retirement, Chen-tingsung allowed him to choose his own successor. Ho chose Li Yun-tze, a close associate and subordinate.¹¹⁶ Both of these cases show the trust and respect that the emperor felt for these two generals. Ts'ao Pin and Ho Ch'eng-chu may only have been trying to place family members or friends in power, but--judging from the records--their choices were good

ones. In any case, Chen-*tsung* respected their judgment. There were many long-lasting relationships among generals, in the early years of the Sung, based on friendship, mutual respect, and service together. Wang Ch'ao and Wang Hsien, for example, often served in the same unit or in the same command; Li Yun-tze (Ho Ch'eng-chu's protege) interceded on behalf of Wang Ch'ao when he was demoted for missing a rendezvous at Shan-yuan in 1004.

There was a negative side to the personal interest of the ruler. In 977 members of the Imperial Elite complained when they did not receive their customary reward after the Imperial Sacrifices. T'ai-*tsung* angrily replied: "What I give out is a matter of my favor and benevolence. How can there be an established custom?" He executed or banished several of the complainers.¹¹⁷ Clearly, the Guards were directly beholden to the emperor for whatever they received. The emperors' relations with the military were usually of a more positive and rewarding nature.

It is clear from the above that Sung rulers used personal relationships as a tool for managing the military forces. Early emperors especially relied on personal ties as an important supplement to institutional mechanisms that were untried or not yet fully effective. The first three emperors also recognized and permitted

the formation of personal networks within the military. These intra-service ties would reinforce the bonds of trust and respect between general and ruler as long as everyone knew that reward, promotion, and influence ultimately flowed from the ruler. Sung rulers took care to make this point quite clear. The development of more rational and formal systems of military management during Jen-tsung's reign made loyalty and service less of a personal matter, and only then did civil officials grow concerned about interlocking relationships within the military.

Civilians in Command

The Sung military did not have a complete monopoly on military command. It was possible for civil officials to exercise command over military forces, but this required a formal transfer from the civil branch to the military. A case in point is that of Liu K'ai 柳開 (947-1000). Liu was an official in the Palace Censorate who often spoke on military matters. During the 986 campaign, Liu K'ai proffered some advice about fighting the Khitan; it was ignored, but events proved Liu correct. In 987, Liu K'ai requested a more active part in the defense of the country:

I have received extraordinary favor and have not yet been able to repay the country. I am only

40 years old and still strong and vigorous. Now the Hsiung-nu (alluding to the Khitan) have not yet been destroyed. I request that your majesty give me several thousand troops to guard the war-infested northern territories. I would restore Yu (chou) and Chi (chou), and even though I give my life on the battlefield, I would have no regret.

The text continues:

Since the emperor wanted to use both civil and military officials to settle the banditry and rebellion (of the Khitan), he ordered that civil officials with military abilities be allowed to transfer to the military.¹¹⁸

Liu K'ai, Liu Chih 劉墀, Cheng Hsüan 鄭宣, and Chao Tsai 趙戡 all transferred to the military branch.

Liu K'ai was made Administrator of a border prefecture, and he enjoyed modest success as a military official. Although he was demoted two ranks in 990 for imposing excessive punishments, Liu continued to submit memorials on defense matters.¹¹⁹

Another example occurred in 1000. Chen-tsung ordered T'ien Hsi to recommend qualified civil officials for transfer to military service within five days. T'ien Hsi replied that civil officials with military talents were hard to find (especially on such short notice) and, in any case, civil officials were reluctant to transfer to the military.¹²⁰ Unfortunately, T'ien Hsi doesn't say why they were reluctant to transfer.

The point of these two cases is that officials were required to transfer from the civil to the military

side of the government. Although T'ai-tsung wanted to use the talents of both civil and military officials, he still wanted to keep the military and civil systems apart, hence, the necessity of a formal transfer. It is not clear if officials could transfer at the same level of rank, although Liu K'ai received a bit of a promotion in transferring. The military, then, were clearly seen as soldiers, not as bureaucrats masquerading as soldiers or vice-versa. A military official who served as the Administrator of a military prefecture was clearly a soldier filling an office with some civil responsibilities; a general, such as Ma Chih-chieh, appointed to the Bureau of Military Affairs, remained a general. Neither became a civil official. The Bureau of Military Affairs, which assisted the emperor in making military policy and in managing the military system, was staffed by both civil and military officials. However, the highest army command ranks were reserved for generals.

This situation began to change after the reign of T'ai-tsung. Chen-tsung had observed, in 1008, that using men trained in the Confucian manner as generals "makes ill use of their talents."¹²¹ However, after 1010, Chen-tsung began to appoint more and more civilians to the Bureau of Military Affairs where policy was formulated at the highest level. This trend continued

into the reign of Jen-tsung; fewer positions on the Bureau of Military Affairs were available to military men, and then only at the level of Assistant Councillor.¹²² Jen-tsung went even farther by appointing civil officers to military command positions.

For instance, Fan Chung-yen and Han Ch'i were given command of large military forces during the war against the Hsi-Hsia. In 1040, they shared the responsibility for the defense of Shensi. When the Hsi-Hsia attacked, Fan Chung-yen refused to cooperate with Han Ch'i because of a complete difference of opinion over strategy. Han Ch'i allowed his troops to be lured out of strong defensive positions by a feigned enemy withdrawal; lacking support from Fan's forces, Han Ch'i's troops were surrounded and badly mauled in the subsequent ambush.¹²³ Both Fan Chung-yen and Han Ch'i were demoted, but they continued to command military forces.

In 1041, however, Lü I-chien 呂夷簡 (978-1044), Chief Councillor to Jen-tsung, criticized the appointment of civilians to military command positions. Making specific reference to the losses suffered in Shensi the previous year, he said that having civilians in command is bad for military administration and discipline. First, it reduces the court's control because officials are divided up into factions; policy decisions and reports

from the field tended to reflect factional alignments. There is no open discussion of the pros and cons of military policy. Second, court officials tend to ignore the recommendations of experienced generals and border officials. This angers the military, reducing efficiency and depriving the high command of important and useful information. Finally, he said, civilian commanders interfere with the system of rewards, rations, and supplies, thereby reducing the morale of the soldiers.¹²⁴

It is not clear from the sources why civilians were appointed in increasing numbers to the Bureau of Military Affairs and to battlefield command positions, but one can speculate about some possible reasons. As discussed in Chapter II, Jen-tsung was much less familiar with military affairs, and he had distanced himself from his generals. He had not maintained the kind of personal relationships, based on respect and trust, with his generals that previous rulers had fostered. Jen-tsung was more likely to turn to his civil officials for assistance in making policy. Officials of the Bureau of Military Affairs (mostly civilians) would no doubt put the blame for lack of preparedness squarely on deficiencies in military command and execution rather than on deficiencies in

government policy. At the same time, both Fan Chung-yen and Han Ch'i were known to be competent officials, familiar with military affairs; moreover, Fan had made a name for himself as a reformer. It is not so surprising that Jen-tsung would put more trust in these civilians than in his generals. As it turned out, Jen-tsung's policy of civilianization was a poor tool for managing the military.

Civilian intrusion into the military high command and trends in the promotion system made it desirable--if not necessary--for generals to develop client-type relationships with high-ranking officials. Ti Ch'ing, who was Fan Chung-yen's protege, is a good example. This situation, in turn, made the military vulnerable to the kind of factional infighting characteristic of the Sung bureaucracy. In some cases, a general's competence was less important than the support or opposition of civil officials. In 1043, for example, Ou-yang Hsiu was able to block the appointment of Li Chao-liang and another general on the grounds that they had no talent. The emperor considered them competent but dropped the matter in the face of opposition.¹²⁵ Political opposition a year later almost prevented the appointment of Ti Ch'ing as a military intendant; it was only through the support of the Prime Minister that Ti Ch'ing received

the appointment.¹²⁶ In 1054, Lü Ching 呂景, a Palace Censor, urged that civil and military officials be selected on the basis of merit and competence, without consideration of party affiliation (無以朋黨疑臣下). It would be incorrect to overstate the influence of political factionalism on the Sung military. It was neither pervasive nor pernicious, but it is more evidence of the extent of civilian interference in military affairs.

Civilianization of the military high command, I feel, contributed to a certain loss of military expertise at the highest levels of defense policy. Otherwise competent civil officials lacked the kind of experience necessary to conduct military operations. Policy and command both suffered, as shown by the lackluster performance against the Hsi-Hsia. The kind of political dealing described above is much less noticeable during earlier reigns, and it is an indication of the extent to which the military had lost its separate status and had been drawn into the government apparatus.

Effects of Routinization on the Military System

The thrust of military management after 1010 was toward rationalization of the military system.

The establishment of the military examinations and the military school were part of an effort to regularize the recruitment and selection of officers. They provided not only an administrative mechanism for selection but also a clearly-defined body of military knowledge and objective standards by which officers would be judged. Chen-t'u, which gave standard solutions for tactical problems, became very important military tools for the conduct of campaigns during the reign of Jen-tsung, and military encyclopedias gave advice on everything from the selection of generals and distribution of rewards to tactical formations and the defense of fortified cities.

Weapons, as well as tactics, were standardized during the Northern Sung. Sergej Skoljar, who refers to the Sung as "the Golden Age of projectile artillery,"¹²⁸ notes that the Sung standardized the types of projectile catapults and associated equipment; weight and materials of projectiles were also standardized.¹²⁹ The Wu-ching tsung-yao devotes almost twenty pages to catapults, detailing specifications of each type, number of men required to operate it, weight of projectile, and range.¹³⁰ Another full chapter describes the various types of bows, axes, swords, and halberds used in combat, each with a specific purpose.¹³¹

The promotion of officers also became routinized in the later years of Jen-tsung's reign, to the point where some thought it detrimental to military efficiency. In 1043, Ou-yang Hsiu criticized the appointment of a general who had had no victories in six years. Ou-yang complained that the government insisted on following rank-precedence in promoting generals without bothering to seek out the more-talented officers. As a result, he said, important tasks were given to incompetent commanders.¹³² Han Ch'i echoed Ou-yang Hsiu's complaint a few weeks later. The government, he said, should follow the old system and select generals for merit and ability regardless of rank-precedence.¹³³ It is evident from these criticisms that there was a regular system of promotion based on rank and longevity, and that the system of the 1040's was different from the more informal methods used earlier in the dynasty.

It is reasonably clear from all the information available that the personal relationship with generals which were fostered by the first three Sung emperors permitted the kind of assessments that put the right men in the right places. Jen-tsung (and later emperors) did not know their generals as well. Therefore, they could only rely on the advice of civil officials and on the normal bureaucratic procedures of promotion by seniority.

During Jen-tsung's reign, impersonal systems replaced personal contact and knowledge. This is not to say that promotion based on seniority invariably produced incompetent officers, the complaints of critics notwithstanding. It is reasonable to suppose that the truly incompetent were weeded out at the lower levels. Such a system no doubt provided a measure of security for officers in that they could be sure of promotion and reassignment on a regular basis. On the other hand, such a promotion system could have a depressive effect on an officer's initiative.

There are several advantages to military standardization and routinization. Standardization makes it easier (and cheaper) to manufacture, repair, and replace weapons, and it eliminates many other logistical problems. Tactical manuals encourage uniform and efficient training. Military operations can be made more a science than an art, and the army is less dependent on the military "genius." On the other hand, the standardization of tactics and regular systems for selection and recruitment can have a stifling effect on initiative and imagination. A kind of "careerism," in which an officer is content to do his job and avoid mistakes, creeps in, dulling an army's keen edge. Although the sources offer

no direct evidence, this could be one of the reasons why the Sung armies began to decline in efficiency after 1030.

Reversal of Previous Policies

Policies established by T'ai-tsu and T'ai-tsung for managing the military establishment had been almost completely reversed by 1060. Both T'ai-tsu and T'ai-tsung had used military officials to administer border prefectures. In 1004, Chen-tsung appointed a civilian as Administrator of an important frontier prefecture. When Li Yun-tse suggested that the civil official be replaced with a military man, Chen-tsung replied that the civilian had done well so far and seemed competent. He concluded ". . . it is not a general principle that military officials should govern border areas."¹³⁴ Chen-tsung thus began the process of installing civil officials in positions once reserved for soldiers; Jen-tsung continued and expanded this policy (see above).

T'ai-tsu and T'ai-tsung had not allowed Imperial Guard generals to hold border commands, nor had they given border generals concurrent ranks or positions in the Guards. Chen-tsung began to appoint Guard generals to border posts in 999, and Jen-tsung appointed several border generals to positions in the Guards.¹³⁵

Ma Chih-chieh was a border general but he held Guard rank and was a member of the Shu-mi Yuan;¹³⁶ Li Chao-liang served as Regional Commandant of several important border prefectures and also as Vice Commander-in-Chief of the Palace Corps.¹³⁷ This reversal of earlier policies was intended to extend central control over the peripheral areas and to bind border generals more closely to the central government.

Both Chen-tsung and Jen-tsung increased the number of Imperial Guard units permanently stationed on the frontiers by transferring Guard units from the capital and by creating new units drawn heavily from prefectural and militia forces.¹³⁸ This completely contradicted T'ai-tsu's policy of "strengthening the trunk and weakening the branches"; it eventually reversed the balance of military power between the capital area and the frontier. Large army forces on the borders not only put pressure on the peasants' ability to supply them but also provoked worries that the government would not be able to control them. "Rotating frontier duty" (keng-shu fa) was allowed to fall into disuse, thereby increasing the imbalance of military forces within the empire.

These forces were certainly large enough to threaten the government's existence, but their ability to protect

the country was subject to doubt. T'ien Hsi, during the first year of Chen-tsung's reign, praised the military's performance in terms of the military "virtues" of protecting the country against cruel invaders, pacifying and uniting the people, and so on.¹³⁹ By the 1040's, however, civil officials like Fu Pi were measuring the army's mediocre performance against the costs of maintaining large numbers of fractious and ill-disciplined soldiers.¹⁴⁰

The Problem of Cost

The problem of cost is significant in that it affected the formulation of military policy and was the basis for much discussion and criticism of the military. Cost considerations were one of the main factors in the strong move toward a militia-based military system after 1060. Also, later historians have criticized the "buying off" of the Khitan and Hsi-Hsia as evidence of Sung military weakness. What, then, were the true costs involved? The following bits of information provide a glimpse of the general picture.

As early as 1008, civil officials began to compare the costs of keeping the peace or fighting a war. One reminded the emperor that, since the treaty with the Khitan, the northern frontiers were at peace; although the Sung paid out every year to the Khitan, the payments

amounted to less than 1 percent of the cost of military operations.¹⁴¹ In 1028, a civil official complained about the costs of maintaining regular troops on the borders. It would be better, he said, to train peasants as militia to take over border defense duties. Regular troop strength could thus be reduced, and surplus soldiers could be used to help cultivate the fields.¹⁴² Fu Pi criticized the decline in the country's military preparedness in the forty years since the Treaty of Shan-yuan. Still, he said, the peasants had not been troubled by warfare for nearly forty years; the yearly payments (to the Khitan and Hsi-Hsia) were a nuisance, but they amounted to only 1 or 2 percent of the cost of a war. In his view, the Treaty of Shan-yuan was not a mistake. Fu Pi went on to propose a series of policies to increase preparedness and reduce costs.¹⁴³

Civil officials also complained of the burden that supporting the regular armies placed on the peasants. In 1047, Chang Fang-p'ing drew a direct connection between the distress of the people and the cost of maintaining an army. He compared the 150,000 soldiers with which T'ai-tsu gained the empire with the one million soldiers of his own time. Chang did not even include all of the militia and prefectural forces in his totals.

The people, he said, could not support this, and the defense of the country would suffer unless costs were reduced.¹⁴⁴ In 1054 and again in 1055, Fan Chen 范鎮 (1008-88), an official in the Censorate, noted the large increase in the size of the armies. The cost of such increases, he said, could only come from the people. The government would do better to enrich the lives of the peasants than to increase the armies. He proposed relying on the militia to provide defense at a lower cost.¹⁴⁵ Finally, in 1057, a Finance Commissioner calculated that the cost of supporting one regular soldier in garrison on the border could support three militiamen. The cost of regular garrisons in Ho-pei and Shensi was absorbing 30 percent and 50 percent, respectively, of the tax revenues of those two areas. Not only was the cost going up, he said, but the regular garrisons were not very effective. His solution was to eliminate the regular units and replace them with prefectural forces.¹⁴⁶

The problem of attaching numbers to the complaints mentioned above is made more difficult by the fragmentary nature of the data. In many cases, figures for only a few of the categories of expenditure are given, and there are no figures at all for some years. Also, military expenditures include not only cash but commodities as well. It is not easy to tell what one ounce of silk

wadding or a bushel of fodder is worth. Therefore, the cost data can only be suggestive of certain trends.

I have made some rough calculations of military expenses, based on information collected by Wong Hon-chiu, for the purpose of comparison.¹⁴⁷

Military expenditures amounted to 43 percent of total state expenditure in 1048 (for which year the data are most complete). With this benchmark in mind, I compared the salaries (in kuan, strings of 1000 copper coins) of the Imperial Guards with those of non-Guard forces. Non-Guard salaries fluctuated between 66 percent and 31 percent of Guard salaries from 975 to 1041. According to Lo Ch'iu-ch'ing, until 1041, Sung armies were about equally divided between Imperial Guards and other forces.¹⁴⁸ Thus, based on salaries, the Guards were two to three times more expensive than other forces.

Salaries for the militia and prefectural forces fluctuated between 37 percent and 3 percent of total military expenses from 975 to 1041. Combined military salaries dropped to 13 percent of total military expenses in 1041, but I think that this merely reflects better reporting of other cost data. Salary figures do not include weapons purchases, rewards, and other expenditures. Specific figures are not available, but it is safe to assume that the Imperial Guards were better

provided for in equipment than were other units. In any event, it is clear that militia forces caused much less of a drain on the treasury.

Appeasement payments were really a negligible cost. In 1021, payments to the Khitan amounted to only 6.5 percent of total military expenditure; in 1044, payments to both the Khitan and the Hsi-Hsia came to only 2 percent of the military outlay.¹⁴⁹ According to Wong, appeasement payments were always less than 1 percent of total state expenditures,¹⁵⁰ hardly a significant drain, especially when compared to military costs. On the other hand, the Sung could not rely completely on bribery to keep enemies at bay. Had the Sung not maintained a defensive capability, the Khitan would undoubtedly have extorted more. The Khitan did press for a larger payment in 1042 when the Sung was fully engaged against the Hsi-Hsia. The Sung could not fight two enemies at once and was forced to give in to the Khitan demands.

The problem of military and defense costs was a worrisome one for Sung officials. Most of the suggested solutions involved replacing regular forces, to one degree or another, with militia. The reforms of Wang An-shih during the reign of Shen-tsung carried this to the point of doing away with the army altogether and

relying on a pao-chia militia that combined both military and police functions. For a variety of reasons, political as well as military, this policy was abandoned, and the Sung returned to a standing army system. The problems of cost were never completely solved, and cost considerations were important in both the military and political solutions to the Sung military problem.

Aspects of Professionalization

During the period of history that I have examined, Northern Sung rulers made a positive effort to manage the military by placing it on a rational and systematic basis. Regular systems of promotion, supply and deployment, as well as the changing uses of chen-t'u, are indications of this trend. The modern professionalization paradigm sheds a certain light on the military experience of the Sung. Two of Huntington's criteria, as discussed in Chapter I, are expertise and corporateness. Evidence of both can be found in the way that the Sung rulers managed the armies.

An important aspect of the growth and development of the military establishment was the effort at military education. Perlmutter identifies two of the stages in the evolution of the modern military as ". . . the incorporation of the military professional" (in which the academies played a central role as the locus of training

and expertise) and ". . . the institutionalization of professionalism by an academic dogma called 'grand strategy' which became the ideology of the professional officer."¹⁵¹ It is not useful, in the Sung case, to speak of "grand strategy" or of established academies. Yet, the Sung did have a well-defined body of organizational, strategic, and tactical doctrine specific to the military establishment. The military encyclopedias produced during the Sung provided a ready reference source for the practical aspects of military operations, and the more general treatises charted the historical and theoretical boundaries of the military art. The military examinations and military schools, though short-lived, were an effort to place the selection and training of officers on a systematic basis with a body of professional knowledge that would be common throughout the officer corps.

Corporateness, Huntington's second criterion, is both the identification of oneself as a soldier, part of a larger group with clearly-defined characteristics, and a set of vocational institutions which mold the officer corps into a unit. At one level, corporateness is fostered by rituals and symbols which provide a cohesive force for the group. At a more advanced level, the institutional structure provides mechanisms for the

transformation of individuals through a socialization process. The symbol and ritual process in the Sung was well provided through the grand military reviews such as the one commanded by Wang Ch'ao in 999 (see above), and through the emperors' personal inspection of the Palace Guard. The whole panoply of symbol, insignia, and pageantry was maintained throughout the dynasty to reinforce the corporate esprit of the military. However, the socialization process within the officer corps was much more diffuse and less formal. The government did try to generate a corporate identity within the military through the establishment of military temples, but other forces were probably stronger. Since many officers came from families that had been in military service for generations, they no doubt absorbed both an identification as professional soldiers and the appropriate values and orientations from the family itself.

All of these policies and actions can be seen as part of a general effort by the government to enhance the expert, corporate--and, as Huntington would have it, professional--nature of the military establishment. Where the Sung departs most from the modern model of professionalization is in the importance of personal relationships that existed within the military and between the military and the ruler.

NOTES

¹SS, 187/4569.

²See Worthy, 151-161 for a detailed Table of Organization of the Imperial Guards.

³Chin Yü-fu, "Sung-tai ping-chih k'ao-shih," 163.

⁴SS, 187/4571-4573.

⁵TK, 155/1352.

⁶TK, 152/1325.

⁷TK, 156/1356.

⁸Chin Yü-fu, 168-69.

⁹SS, 189/4639; also, Li Li-chen, "Sung-tai te ping-chih," 35.

¹⁰SS, 189/4642.

¹¹Lo Ch'iu-ch'ing, "Pei-Sung ping-chih yen-chiu," 208-10.

¹²SS, 190/4705.

¹³Li Li-chen, 35.

¹⁴Chin Yü-fu, 170.

¹⁵SS, 190/4706.

¹⁶SS, 190/4708; also TK, 156/1357-58.

¹⁷SHY, 175/ping 8.4; TK, 152/1327.

¹⁸SS, 187/4571.

- 19 SS, 187/4586.
- 20 SHY, 175/ping 7.8-7.9.
- 21 HCP, 27/9.
- 22 SS, 193/4799.
- 23 TK, 152/1327.
- 24 Ibid.
- 25 HCP, 74/11a.
- 26 HCP, shih-pu 拾補, 6/14-15.
- 27 SS, 324/10479.
- 28 SS, 193/4800; TK 152/1328. Judging from the sources, this problem was first noted in the 1020's and continued through the Northern Sung.
- 29 SS, 193/4811.
- 30 HCP, 52/1-2; 52/4-5.
- 31 SS, 195/4853-4.
- 32 TK, 157/1371.
- 33 Ibid.
- 34 Ibid.; see also HCP, 45/5b.
- 35 Wong Hon-chiu, "Government Expenditures in Northern Sung China," 4-5.
- 36 Ibid., 65-66.
- 37 Ibid., 11.
- 38 TK, 152/1326.
- 39 HCC, 78.
- 40 SHY, 181/ping 18.1.
- 41 Wong Hon-chiu, 12-14.
- 42 HCP, 20/10-11; 20/25-26.

⁴³WCTY, ch. 14; See also SHY, ch. 181/8.2ff.

⁴⁴SS, 196/4877.

⁴⁵SS, 196/4878.

⁴⁶HCC, ch. 2; WCTY, ch. 1.

⁴⁷SS, 194/4829-30.

⁴⁸Worthy, 195-196.

⁴⁹Yin-pu 蔭補. "This practice extended to certain officials of higher titular office the privilege of nominating for entrance into the civil service one or more of their sons or other family members. . . ." Kracke, Civil Service, p. 73.

⁵⁰SS, 258/8982.

⁵¹SS, 290/9722.

⁵²WCMC, 1.2/3.

⁵³HYC, 49/2.

⁵⁴SS, 290/9718.

⁵⁵SS, 290/9719.

⁵⁶WCMC, 8.2/6.

⁵⁷HYC, 47/16.

⁵⁸WCMC, 1.2/10.

⁵⁹HCP, 8/3.

⁶⁰WCMC, 8.2/8.

⁶¹Unless otherwise noted, the following discussion is drawn from Worthy, 163-197.

⁶²Worthy, 178.

⁶³Chin Yü-fu, 162-63.

⁶⁴SS, 4627.

⁶⁵Ibid.

- ⁶⁶Information on the chiang is drawn from Lo Ch'iu-ch'ing, 242-50 and Chin Yü-fu, 165-68.
- ⁶⁷Fang Hao, Sung-shih, 42.
- ⁶⁸Chin Yü-fu, 168.
- ⁶⁹Worthy, 196-197.
- ⁷⁰LCC, 87/6; HCP, 36/4.
- ⁷¹Ch'ai Te-keng, "Sung huan-kuan ts'an-yü chun-shih k'ao," 202.
- ⁷²Lo Ch'iu-ch'ing, 216.
- ⁷³Ch'ai Te-keng, 189.
- ⁷⁴Lo Ch'iu-ch'ing, 254.
- ⁷⁵Ch'ai Te-keng, 217-18.
- ⁷⁶Wu Han, "Chen-t'u ho Sung-Liao chan-cheng", 32.
- ⁷⁷Ibid., 31.
- ⁷⁸Ibid.
- ⁷⁹Ibid., 220.
- ⁸⁰Ibid., 222.
- ⁸¹Boodberg, I.
- ⁸²Griffith, 141.
- ⁸³HCC, 6/44.
- ⁸⁴HCP, 27/7a.
- ⁸⁵WCTY, 3/18.
- ⁸⁶HCP, 27/6b.
- ⁸⁷WCTY, 4/10-11.
- ⁸⁸See Boodberg, "The Art of War in Ancient China"; also Lennart Frantzell, Dr. Her's Comprehensive Essays on the Art of War, the Her Bor-shyh Bey Luenn.

⁸⁹HYC, 47/17; for other versions, see WCC, 19/5 and SS, 290/9718.

⁹⁰Hou Chao-wen, T'ang-Sung k'ao-shih chih-tu shih, 164.

⁹¹Ibid., 165; also, SHY, 144/hsüan-chü 17.5.

⁹²Hou Chao-wen, 165.

⁹³SHY, 55/ch'ung-ju 3.28; Hou Chao-wen considers this the first military school in Chinese history. See Hou, 160.

⁹⁴SHY, 55/ch'ung-ju 3.28.

⁹⁵Hou Chao-wen, 166-67.

⁹⁶Ibid., 175-76.

⁹⁷Frantzell, 16 and note 37.

⁹⁸T'ao Hsi-sheng, "Wu-miao chih cheng-chih she-hui te yen-pien", 231. The sources are not clear on whether this requirement was actually enforced or existed only on paper.

⁹⁹SHY, 16/li 16.5.

¹⁰⁰T'ao Hsi-sheng, 233.

¹⁰¹Worthy, 189.

¹⁰²See Worthy, 184, for one example.

¹⁰³HCP, 4/21b; see also SS, 273/9336.

¹⁰⁴HCP, 10/15.

¹⁰⁵HCP, 10/8; also see SHY, 175/ping 7.4 for a less elaborate account.

¹⁰⁶HCP, 20/2.

¹⁰⁷HCP, 20/4.

¹⁰⁸JLKI, shang 11.

¹⁰⁹HCP, 11/8.

- 110 WCMC, 1.2/3&7.
- 111 TK, 152/1327.
- 112 HCP, 52/2.
- 113 HCP, 58/1.
- 114 HCP, 63/6.
- 115 SS, 158/8982.
- 116 HCP, 64/3.
- 117 TK, 152/1326.
- 118 HCP, 28/6.
- 119 According to HCP, 46/16b, Liu Chih was killed in action, and Cheng Hsüan died without achieving any special merit. There is no information on Chao Tsai.
- 120 HCP, 46/19b.
- 121 HCP, 68/9a.
- 122 Lo Ch'iu-ch'ing, 201 and note 2.
- 123 JLKI, shang 4-5.
- 124 JLKI, shang 19. Lü was a political opponent of Fan Chung-yen.
- 125 HCP, 142/6; 144/1-2.
- 126 Lo Ch'iu-ch'ing, 222.
- 127 HCP, 176/11a.
- 128 S. A. Skoljar, "L'Artillerie de jet a l'epoque Sung", Etudes Song in Memoriam Etienne Balazs, Series 1, #2. 124.
- 129 ibid., 124.
- 130 WCTY, 12/39-57.
- 131 WCTY, ch 13.
- 132 HCP, 142/6b.

- 133 SMCTI, 134/16b.
- 134 HCP, 57/8a.
- 135 Lo Ch'iu-ch'ing, 206-7.
- 136 LCC, 87/8.
- 137 SS, 464/13563.
- 138 TK, 156/13567-7; Lo Ch'iu-ch'ing, 208-10.
- 139 T'ien Hsi, Hsien-p'ing chi, 21/16-19.
- 140 HCP, 153/14b-15a (1044).
- 141 HCP, 70/16b.
- 142 HCP, 106/13a.
- 143 SMCTI, 135/2a-b.
- 144 KCTI, 120/4103-11.
- 145 KCTI, 120/4103-11.
- 146 TK. 152/1328.
- 147 Wong Hon-chiu, "Government Expenditures in Northern Sung China", 155-57 and Appendix A.
- 148 Lo Ch'iu-ch'ing, 223-4.
- 149 Appeasement payments:
- | | |
|-----------------|--|
| Liao (1021) | 100,000 oz. of silver; 200,000 rolls of silk |
| Liao (1044) | 200,000 oz. of silver; 153,000 rolls of silk; |
| Hsi-Hsia (1044) | 72,000 oz. of silver; 153,000 rolls of silk; 300,000 catties of tea. |
- See also Wittfogel and Feng, History of Chinese Society, 326-27.
- 150 Wong Hon-chiu, 158.
- 151 Perlmutter, 30-31.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The Northern Sung basically solved the military problems that it faced at the beginning of the dynasty. The Khitan and Hsi-Hsia were kept at bay through a combination of military and political methods. There were no significant internal rebellions. The military were kept under control and did not threaten the security of the throne. In other words, the Sung was able to maintain an armed force effective enough to ward off foreign threats yet fully under the control of the civil government. This was accomplished by effective management that combined institutional mechanisms and personal relationships, drawing the military into the government apparatus.

The Sung armies did not maintain the same level of effectiveness throughout the 100 years that I have studied. Some decline was inevitable during the long peace following the treaty of Shan-yuan in 1005. However, many of the difficulties that hampered the military were

not strictly military problems but were due to decisions made by the government. Later rulers reversed or did not continue policies established by T'ai-tsu and T'ai-tsung; also, the government never found a completely satisfactory way to demobilize excess soldiers, and reduce military costs. After 1010, many decisions about military command, deployment, and employment were made without full military participation in the decision process. The Sung government thus failed to use its military leaders to the best advantage.

The Sung Place in Chinese Military History

In order to assess the significance of the Sung experience, I will briefly examine the military experience of two previous dynasties, the Han and the T'ang. The Sung shared some of the same problems and institutional forms of these two dynasties but differed significantly in its methods of military management.

The Former Han Dynasty (220 B.C.-8 A.D.)

The first Han ruler, Han Kao-tsu (r. 206-195 B.C.), was a commoner who led a successful rebellion against the Ch'in dynasty. He established a government based on the foundation laid down by the Ch'in emperors and did not initiate major reforms or pursue an expansionistic

policy. His successors initiated and developed new institutional mechanisms for governing the country, including recruiting men for a bureaucratic service, reducing the large administrative units to more manageable size, and reorganizing the financial administration.¹ Externally, the Han faced the Hsiung-nu 匈奴, Turkic tribes related to the Huns who invaded Europe, and the Han strategy was to defend its positions on the northern and northwestern frontiers, to enlist allies on the flanks of the Hsiung-nu, and to deter the enemy through limited offensives.² The pacifistic policy of Han Wen-ti (r. 179-157 B.C.) allowed the Hsiung-nu to renew their attacks on China which eventually led to the extensive (and expensive) campaigns of Han Wu-ti (r. 140-87 B.C.). Wu-ti fought against but did not subdue the Hsiung-nu, and he came under heavy criticism for the excessive cost and disruption caused by his campaigns.

The Han military system depended on conscription. Every able-bodied male between the ages of twenty-three and fifty-six was liable for two to three years of service divided between guard duty on the frontier and service in the interior. Those who did not want to serve could hire a substitute.³ Large standing armies were not maintained, but forces were gathered from the

various commanderies in order to form expeditionary armies. At the end of the campaign, the armies were broken up and units returned to their regular duties.⁴

The Han also adopted a t'un-t'ien system on the frontiers aimed at making the military self-supporting.

Civil and military duties were not clearly differentiated. Wu-ti made no distinction between civil and military officials. Officials switched back and forth between civil and military posts, and senior commandery officials had military responsibilities. Although there were generals who spent their entire careers in military service, some were of aristocratic origin (having been enfeebled by the Han founder) and were appointed due to their relationship to the imperial court. Other generals had mixed backgrounds, including one who started out as a criminal.⁵ There was no established group of generals; officials were appointed (by the emperor) to command positions as the occasion required and given fairly sweeping discretionary and disciplinary authority.⁶ Punishment for failure was correspondingly harsh. In 129 B.C., for example, when Han forces lost a major battle, Wu-ti pardoned the common soldiers but not the generals: "(These) generals have already been given into the charge of the Commandant of Justice, who is to apply the law and execute them."⁷

Such a policy no doubt convinced some generals to surrender to the enemy rather than face the emperor's wrath.

The Sung dynasty, like the Han, had to face a strong external enemy while--at the same time--building new forms of government and modifying existing ones. However, the Sung armies were based on a volunteer regular army supplemented by militia forces; conscription was viewed as a last (and least desirable) resort. One important difference between the Sung and the Han is that the Sung maintained a clear differentiation between civil and military officials. Also, the Sung tried to foster--through training, recruitment, and employment--the professional development of the military as an identifiable group within the government. Sung generals did not have as much independent authority as Han generals, but they were not liable to the same harsh punishments for failure.

Another important difference is that the Sung founders set out to build a civilistic state, making a deliberate effort to elevate the civil over the military. The Sung had learned from the military experiences of the T'ang and Wu-tai periods. The Han tried hard to expel the Hsiung-nu but could not because the Hsiung-nu were too strong. In the Sung case, the rulers chose not to put the military to a test of its full strength.

The T'ang Dynasty (618-907)

The T'ang founder--some of whose ancestors had come from non-Chinese tribal aristocracy--was the most successful of the scores of rebels who rose against the Sui. T'ang Kao-tsu (r. 618-26) and his successors inherited and further extended a government and military system based on maturing institutions that had developed under the Northern (non-Chinese) and Sui dynasties. The T'ang expanded westward to secure its trade routes with Central Asia and beyond, against opposition from weak and loosely-organized nomadic tribes. Within China, Kao-tsu kept the country under strict military control, maintaining twelve large armies near the capital.⁸

At first, T'ang military forces consisted of armies-on-campaign (hsing-chün) created on an ad hoc basis by conscription on a local or regional scale, by incorporation of defeated enemy units, and (later) by mobilization of militia units.⁹ Kao-tsu disbanded the twelve armies late in his reign, and their place was taken by militia units (fu-ping) concentrated in areas near the capital and under central government control. Militiamen entered service at the age of twenty and were released at age sixty five. In return for their periodic service, they were granted exemption from tax and corvee obligations. Officers were usually chosen

from the best families in the area, and service in the fu-ping was usually seen as a privilege rather than an obligation.¹⁰ Militia units were rotated to the capital on a periodic basis for training, and units were also sent to guard the frontiers. There were long-service garrisons on the frontier (composed mostly of Turkic cavalry), but the T'ang relied primarily on the small and self-sufficient fu-ping units as a source of trained soldiers. Militia units were too small to pose a threat to the government.¹¹ There was no clear division between civil and military roles during the early T'ang, and military governorships were held by civil officials.

The reign of Kao-tsung (r. 649-83) marked the apex of T'ang military power. Chinese influence and control extended through most of central and east Asia. Yet Kao-tsung's conquests had overextended and overtaxed China's military and financial capacity. In addition, the rise of powerful new states in central Asia forced the T'ang to retrench militarily and to contract its borders.¹²

Military reform, which began in 710, was a response to the resurgence of Tibetan and Turkish tribes and the appearance of the Khitan on China's northeastern border. The centralized fu-ping system was too cumbersome to respond to the demands of mobile warfare on the frontiers;

the method of mobilizing armies was too slow and extemporized to provide an adequate defensive capability. Hence, large permanent frontier garrisons were established under the command of military governors with extensive powers. Within a short time, 85 percent of the military forces were under the control of these military governors.¹³ After 730, there were career generals (many of whom were non-Chinese) with long terms of service on the frontiers. These factors, as well as the decline of the armies under direct central control, led to the problems of the late T'ang that I have described in Chapter II.

The Sung rulers adopted a much less aggressive policy than did T'ang rulers, and they set out from the start to establish a civil state, free from military domination. Sung standing armies were maintained, mobilized, and deployed in a more regular manner than were T'ang armies. Also, the Sung used far fewer non-Chinese in their military forces. The Sung had obviously learned from the T'ang experience, and it was able to maintain strong forces on the border, yet keep them under strict government control and management. Frontier generals were given a certain leeway in their operations, but the government incorporated all parts of the military into one system that was part of the larger

government apparatus. Although civil and military identities were clearly separate, the military was not an independent entity.

The "Weakness" Issue

The Sung has been criticized by historians as being militarily weak, especially when compared to the Han and the T'ang. The issue of weakness is really a "red herring" that obscures the important differences in circumstances that faced each dynasty.

The Sung rulers chose not to build an aggressive, militaristic state, considering the previous T'ang experience and the nature of China's immediate neighbors. The T'ang was initially surrounded by nomadic tribes who sometimes formed loose but unstable and short-lived confederations. During the eighth century, these tribes began to form stable, agrarian societies based on the Chinese model.¹⁴ The Tibetans, who had grown into a powerful kingdom, the Turks, and the Khitan all threatened the T'ang during its later years. The growth and development of external enemies continued into the tenth and eleventh centuries, so that the Sung was faced with much stronger and more dangerous enemies than the T'ang. Fu Pi noted in 1046 that China was caught between two enemies who had adopted Chinese customs, laws, and methods and who therefore were able to match

China's strength.¹⁵ Finally, the Sung--like the Former Han--achieved its objectives: to deter aggression, to keep the enemy out of Chinese territory. The Sung aim was not to subjugate either the Khitan or the Hsi-Hsia. In spite of its rather mediocre record against the Hsi-Hsia in the 1040's, the Sung achieved a definite moral victory in stopping the Hsi-Hsia raids and in forcing the Hsi-Hsia ruler to renounce the title of "Emperor" and accept Chinese suzerainty.¹⁶

There are also historiographical questions involved in the issue of Sung weakness. Later historians criticized the Sung for being weak, but they did it from the perspective of later periods and using different criteria. They have criticized the Sung defeat by the Jurchen, compared the Sung military power (unfavorably) to that of the Han and T'ang, and faulted the Sung for not recovering the Sixteen Northern Prefectures. As for the last, the territory had been formally ceded to the Liao by a Chinese ruler in control of the area. When the Sung tried to recover it, they were--technically speaking--invading another country. Why should the Sung be held responsible for the loss of this territory, and why should its recovery be demanded as proof of Sung strength? Part of the answer, I think, lies in expressions of Han nationalism by later historians

against non-Chinese rule. China was occupied and subjugated by the Mongols (and later the Manchus and even the Japanese), and the Sung is a convenient scapegoat for having started the process.

The idea of military weakness is, at best, a slippery concept. The Sung armies were not weak since they had proved themselves many times on the battlefield; the Khitan and Hsi-Hsia invasions were ultimately repelled. Certainly some of the military's problems were due to decisions made by Sung emperors and their civil officials. By the middle of the eleventh century, defense policy was made at the highest levels with little reference to the most competent military advice. If an instrument is not used properly, it is unreasonable to blame the instrument. Finally, what appears as weakness was actually the result of the Sung rulers' preference for a political--as opposed to a military--solution. The Sung rulers did not seek the destruction of the Khitan and the Hsi-Hsia. Negotiation and gift-giving were a cheaper way (both fiscally and politically) of securing the frontier.

There is a continuity in the development of military systems from the late T'ang into the Sung in that the focus was turned inward upon the military itself instead of outward against the foreign threat. The changes in

military institutions and forms that continued into the eleventh century produced a new relationship between the government and its military forces. It is in this new relationship and the institutional changes that spawned it that one can see some of the "modern" aspects of the Sung experience.

The Sung Place in Comparative Military History

The Sung experience of military management exhibits some features which are characteristic of modern military establishments. One may consider the Sung's relevance to the modern paradigm of professionalization and civil-military relations within the context of the three phases of military management identified in Chapter II.

The first phase of military management (960-997) was a period of consolidating control, of incorporating disparate military forces into an effective--but controllable--military establishment. Personal relationships were an important supplement to management practices that were just being put into practice. The military strongly emphasized their exclusive competence in war and their special responsibility of service.

The experience of civil-military relations during the second phase (998-1010) can be seen as the incorporation of the military establishment into a distinct

and identifiable part of the government bureaucracy. The relationship between the military and the state became what Perlmutter calls "symbiotic" in the development and implementation of national policy; both groups share in the process of government.¹⁷ Chen-tsung sought advice from both civil and military officials. Advice from either side was evaluated on its merits, and I could find no real evidence that input from the military was automatically considered to be inferior. At the same time, the military continued to assert their expertise (and attendant responsibility) in the area of military affairs. Though others could give advice, they said, only the military had the knowledge and experience to implement strategy on the battlefield.

Although the military were vocal in the defense of their status as "experts," there is no question that the emperor--as civil head of the government--was in control both of the formulation and execution of policy. Kao Ch'iung's actions at Shan-yuan were not lèse majesté, considering the emperor's hesitation in the face of military necessity. Even though the emperor was inexperienced and diffident, it is important to note that the generals did not take advantage of that inexperience to intimidate or supplant him. The military needed the legitimation that flowed from the emperor as head of

state as much as the emperor needed the "management of violence" provided by the military.

During this period, the military establishment emerged as a pressure group within the government, exerting influence on behalf of military goals and needs. Competition indeed existed, for influence, for funds, for or against a specific policy. But it was competition within the system. McKinlay notes that the existence of the military as a pressure group does not imply that the military has become a political group in competition with the existing political structure.¹⁸ The Sung military during Chen-tsung's reign were not a "party" seeking to control policy or to replace another party. Rather, they were incorporated as one part of the bureaucracy, sharing, like other groups within the bureaucracy, in the formulation of policy.

The bureaucratization of the military continued into the third phase of military management (1011-1060) with increasing routinization and regularization of military systems. The government also tried to put the selection, training, and promotion of officers on a regular basis, with a defined body of professional knowledge as a standard for all officers. On the negative side, the boundary between civil and military

roles began to blur a bit as civilians were appointed to positions of military command.

Examples of Huntington's criteria are visible in all three phases. Both the military and the rulers acknowledged the military's importance to the security of the country. The military asserted, and the government accepted (at least at first), the military's exclusive expertise in matters of war. Grand reviews, inspections, and other pageantry enhanced the military's corporate identity, and the government made an effort to create a formal ethic of military service. These categories and examples are not always discrete. They blend and reinforce each other. Assertions of expertise and responsibility enhance the feelings of a corporate character within the military. The military temples do as much to define the military identity as they help to articulate a military ethic.

Conspicuous by its absence in all of the Sung discussions on military policy is any kind of a military "ideology" voiced by the military establishment. However, van Doorn provides an explanation that fits the Sung case. He says that ideology is not usually systematic and coherent except at the level of institutional politics. When the military finds its place within the larger state ideology, it has no need to

formulate its own. Van Doorn also notes that a corporate ideology is a product of the military system itself; it is not a view of the society as a whole but of the military's function and position in the society.¹⁹ We only get glimpses of the corporate ideology of the Sung military: statements about the military's expertise, its role as the guarantor of the country's security, and so on. But, as the military found its legitimation within the larger Confucian political structure, and within the prevailing Neo-Confucian ideology, there was little impetus to create an elaborate ideological position.

The Sung differs most from the professionalization model in the reliance on personal relationship as a management tool. Personal relationships were strongest during the first two phases and began to decline with the rationalization of military systems during the reign of Jen-tsung. The importance of personal relations in the military should not be surprising, considering the great stress that Confucian teachings place on personal relationships. As Kracke puts it:

In comparison with our Western political concepts, obligations were determined less by abstract institutions and rules, and more by personal ties and personal character. The state was symbolized in the personal relationship of the Emperor to Heaven, the source of his authority, and to the people of the state, his children, to whom he owed care in exchange for their fidelity and help.²⁰

In Confucianism, newly resurgent during the Northern Sung, reliance on a man's character, moral conduct, and behavior was much more important than reliance on laws and institutions, and this idea appears often in advice to the emperor on military problems. The modern concept of "corporateness," as applied to the Sung, must be modified by the Chinese philosophical background.

According to Perlmutter, the danger of military corporateness lies in its potential isolation from the political community. When this corporateness is threatened by the government, the military may react to protect its own interests.²¹ The personal relationships fostered by the first Sung emperors (and reinforced by Confucian tradition) allowed the emperors to affirm and maintain the separate identity of the military establishment and, at the same time, to draw it into the larger political community. Because there was less isolation from the society, military corporateness was less likely to be threatened, and the military became one of the many organizations serving the emperor. An officers duty--like that of any civil official--lay in service to the country.

Professionalization of the Sung military, which ran parallel to that of the civil bureaucracy, began during the Wu-Tai period and continued into the eleventh century.

As the civil bureaucracy moved toward greater control over governmental functions, the military moved toward greater subordination to the civil authority. The military took its place as part of the government structure, and there seems to have been a widespread acquiescence to the principle that the civil authority was supreme. Yet, why did the military not protest (or even revolt) against its diminished role and status?

One could argue, as Huntington does, that the military was professional, and it did not intervene because professionals do not intervene; but this merely begs the question. Perlmutter, however, provides a better clue to the problem:

The military on the whole demonstrates little skill or imagination in seeking or manipulating public support. Instead it weighs the consequences in terms of the conflicts concerning professionalism versus clientship and corporate orientation versus autonomy and decides whether or not to intervene. . . . The objectivity dictum in civil-military relations depends not so much on the degree of the fulfillment of military corporatism as on subordination to the client, and acceptance of the popularity of the regime, which makes commitment to professional values irrelevant.²²

In the Sung case, the government did not directly threaten the corporate interests (which were relatively weak) or the identity of the military. The military establishment became part of the government; when civilians monopolized the highest defense policy posts

and were placed in command positions during the 1040's, this development affected only the highest, institutional level which links the military system with the larger political structure. The managerial, professional level of the military was not disturbed.²³ At the same time, the civil government was strong (and legitimate) enough to forestall intervention by the military. As Finer would explain it, the level of political culture in China was high enough that the military could find legitimacy only within the government structure; the possibility of intervention was therefore quite low. Thus, Perlmutter and Finer help to explain how the Sung was able to avoid the military problems that overtook the T'ang.

The professionalization of the Sung military was, of course, not as fully developed as that of modern armies. It was much more a transformation of institutions and organizations than of individuals (Abrahamsson's categories). The long-term process was one of regularization and routinization through recruitment and promotion procedures, examination, supply systems, and so on. The effort to transform individuals through military education and the inculcation of ethical norms, though important, was short-lived and somewhat haphazard. The process was, in the end, incomplete. By placing civilians in positions of military command, the government deprived itself of

the most competent military advice (and military command) at the highest levels.

Sung rulers perhaps traded off too much effectiveness to gain more control, and military affairs fell into a state of confusion and disrepair after 1060. Lo Ch'iu-ch'ing says, and I would agree, that the problem with the Sung military was not that the systems established by T'ai-tsu and T'ai-tsung were flawed but that these policies were not followed by later rulers.²⁴ In the end, it was not that the military intervened in politics but that civilian officials intruded into the military sphere.

Early Sung rulers were able to manage their military forces so as to achieve a high degree of security against foreign and domestic threats and yet avoid the kinds of problems that eventually destroyed the T'ang. Modern studies of civil-military relations can be used to examine and understand the Sung experience. By the same token, there are many aspects of Sung military management that demonstrate that concepts and categories identified in these studies are not exclusively modern or Western.

NOTES

¹M. Loewe, "The Campaigns of Han Wu-ti", in Kierman, Chinese Ways in Warfare, 77.

²Ibid., 82.

³H. H. Dubs, The History of the Former Han Dynasty, Vol I/80, II/176; Loewe, 90.

⁴Dubs, I/135; Loewe, 90.

⁵Loewe, 87.

⁶Dubs, I/256; Loewe, 87, 107.

⁷Dubs, II/45.

⁸D. Twitchett, ed., The Cambridge History of China: Volume Three, 174.

⁹Ibid., 162.

¹⁰Ibid., 208.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid., 279.

¹³Ibid., 362, 415.

¹⁴Ibid., 35-37.

¹⁵SMCTI, 135/2b-4a.

¹⁶See E. I. Kycanov, "Les guerres entre les Song du Nord et le Hsi-Hsia" in Etudes Song in Memoriam Etienne Balazs, Series 1, #2, 110-111.

¹⁷Perlmutter, The Military and Politics, 4-5.

¹⁸R. D. McKinlay, "Professionalization, Politicization, and Civil-Military Relations" in van Gils, the Perceived Role of the Military, 252.

¹⁹J. van Doorn, "Ideology and the Military," Introduction to Janowitz and van Doorn, On Military Ideology.

²⁰Kracke, Civil Service, 22.

²¹Perlmutter, 31-32.

²²Ibid., 34.

²³See van Doorn, "Ideology and the Military" for a discussion of these terms.

²⁴Lo Ch'iu-ch'ing, 269-70.

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APPENDIX A

LIST OF GENERALS STUDIED

Chang Ying 張穎

Yung-te 永德 (928-1000) **

Che Tsung-yuan 折從阮

Te-fang 德房 (d. 964)

Yü-hsun 御勳 (938-977)

Yu-ch'ing 御卿 (957-995) **

Wei-cheng 惟正 (succeeded father)

Wei-hsin 惟信

Wei-chung 惟忠

Wei-ch'ang 惟昌

--Several grandsons, all military

Ho Fu-chin 何福進

Chi-yün 繼筠 (927-71) *

Ch'eng-chü 承矩 (946-1006) *

Chiu-ling 九齡

Kao Pa 高 霸

Kan 乾

Ch'iung 瓊 (935-1006) **

Chi-hsün 繼 勳 Sung general

Chi-hsüan 繼 宣 Sung general

Kuo K'uei 郭 達 (1022-1088) **

Li Chao 李 肇

Ch'u-yün 處 耘 (919-966) **

Chi-lung 繼 隆 (950-1005) **

Chao-liang 昭 亮 (fl. 1040's) *

Chi-hsün 繼 恂

Chi-ho 繼 和 (962-1008) *

Li Ch'ien-p'u 李 謙 溥

Yun-tze 允 則 (953-1028) *

Ma Ch'uan-i 馬 全 義

Chih-chieh 知 節 (955-1019) *

Ti Ch'ing 狄 青 (1008-1057) **

Ts'ao Yun 曹 芸

Pin 彬 (931-999) **

Ts'an 王 案 (948-1019) **

Tsung 琮

Wei 王 璋 (973-1030) *

- Wang Ch'ao 王超 (fl. 960-1004) *
- Te-yung 德月 (987-1065) **
- Wang Ch'uan-pin 王全斌 (907-976) *
- Wang Hsien 王顯 (932-1007) **
- Yang Hsin 楊信
- Yeh 業 (d. 986) *
- Yen-chao 延昭 (958-1014) *
- Wen-kuang 文廣
- 3 other sons--all in Imperial Guards

* Border generals

** Central generals

APPENDIX B

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES

The purpose of this Appendix is to provide more extensive biographical information on the most prominent generals studied in this dissertation. These generals were active both on the battlefield and in discussions at court on military affairs. Their lives and careers are more fully documented in the sources than are the lives of most generals. The biographies are arranged alphabetically.

Kao Ch'ing (935-1006)

Both Kao Ch'iung's grandfather and father were well-known military figures during the Wu-tai period. Kao Ch'iung started out as a bandit, was captured, and only narrowly escaped execution.¹ T'ai-tsu, when he was still the military commander of the capital area, heard of Kao's military prowess and enlisted him as a member of his own guard. One of Kao's colleagues in the Guards was Wang Ch'ao, who had submitted to the Sung after defeat at

the hands of Ts'ao Pin. Kao Ch'iung became a close associate of T'ai-tsung.

Kao's star began to rise upon the accession of Tai-tsung to the throne in 976, and he was made a battalion commander in the Imperial Elite. Kao commanded the archer and crossbow units for the assault on T'ai-yuan in 979, and he commanded the rearguard during the retreat from the unsuccessful assault on Yen-chou. When the enemy pressed hard upon the retreating Sung forces, Kao personally rallied and inspired his rapidly disintegrating units. They turned and drove back the Khitan pursuers, allowing the emperor and the rest of the Sung army to withdraw in good order. As a reward he was promoted to Regimental Commander (tu chih-hui shih 都指揮使) in the Emperor's Guard and later to Brigade Commander (hsiang 廂 tu chih-hui shih). He was also made Militia Commandant for Hsi-chou 西州.² The emperor wanted to punish laggard generals, but Kao Ch'iung dissuaded him:

These generals performed well at T'ai-yuan, yet they have received no reward for their efforts. Is it reasonable to be angry and punish them?³

In 980, Kao was accused of neglecting his duties to secure the border areas through regular patrols. He was demoted to Battalion Commander and transferred to Hsu-chou 許州 (Honan). When army units there rebelled,

Kao personally confronted them and cowed them into submission. For this he was promoted to Regimental Commander in the Emperor's Guard and further rewarded by the emperor.⁴

Kao Ch'iuang was relieved of his command in 988 (the reason is not clear) and was sent to Tan-chou 潭州 (Shantung) as Regional Defense Commandant (fang-yu shih 防禦使). However, one year later, Kao was promoted over other generals to Commander-in-Chief of the Palace Corps and Infantry Commander-in-Chief of the Emperor's Guard.⁵ It is a measure of the emperor's regard for Kao Ch'iuang's ability and integrity that he was given concurrent command rank in both parts of the Imperial Guards. Kao assumed command of the T'ai-yuan garrison, and he controlled his forces very strictly, even reducing rations to prevent the troops from becoming lazy and arrogant in peacetime.⁶ From 995 to 998, Kao served as Regional Commandant of Pao-ta military prefecture 保大軍 (Shensi), and in 998 he was made Commander of the Guard at T'ai-tsu's tomb.⁷

In 1000, Kao Ch'iuang was consulted by Chen-tsung about troop strength levels of the various armies. Kao suggested that deficiencies in the prefectural armies be made up by incorporating those soldiers who had been rejected for service in the elite guards. Some civil

officials objected, saying that Kao was suggesting this in an attempt to create a personal power base in the army units. Kao's answer gives some clue to his self-image as a professional soldier: "I have devoted my life to the service of my country. How could anyone distrust my motives?"⁸

Kao Ch'iuung's important part in the events preceeding the Treaty of Shan-yüan have been discussed in Chapter II. He was quick to disclaim any personal success. After the conclusion of peace, Li Chi-Lung and several other generals were congratulating themselves and arguing about who had done the most. Kao reminded them of their place in the scheme of things: "The emperor's martial virtue defeated the enemy in a single stroke. How can the rest of us claim any special merit?" The other generals were suitably embarrassed.⁹

Kao Ch'iuung was an experienced campaigner and a competent general who had served his country well under three emperors. His personal relationship with T'ai-tsung gave him an influence beyond his rank, and, though he never served as a member of the Bureau of Military Affairs, his was an influential voice at court. He took part in strategy discussions, presenting the emperor with maps and plans, and in 1005, he successfully remonstrated with the emperor against excessive force

reductions and reduced promotion opportunities that followed the peace treaty.¹⁰

Li Chi-lung (950-1005)

Li Chi-lung's career got off to a rather poor start. He entered military service through the yin privilege of his father, Ch'u-yun 虞耘, an Assistant Commissioner of Military Affairs. Shortly afterward, his father became involved in a dispute with another general. The other general was pardoned, but Li Ch'u-yun was demoted and banished to a distant prefecture. His father's enemies contrived to have Li Chi-lung removed from his post.¹¹

Li took part in the expedition to pacify South China in 974-75. He shared the responsibility for the security of the supply trains to Sung forces in the south and defeated several attempts by the enemy to cut the supply line. The emperor T'ai-tsu was pleased with Li's performance and, mindful of his father's previous service, wanted to give Li a good appointment. During the siege of T'ai-yuan in 979, Li served as Intendant-inspector (t'i-chu tu-chien 提舉都監) of one of the main armies. He led several assaults on the city wall, and though his troops suffered heavy casualties, they fought well. When the Sung armies moved on to

Yu-chou, Li shared command of the vanguard and was quite successful, capturing several cities.¹² Li was promoted to Militia Commandant of Huan-chou in 980. The Khitan raided the border, and Li withdrew to better defensive positions, inadvertently leaving other units unsupported. They were severely mauled by the enemy, but Li Chi-lung was acquitted of negligence by a court of inquiry.¹³ From 984-88, Li took active part in the campaigns against the Hsi-Hsia ruler, Li Chi-ch'ien.

Li Chi-Lung was one of the few commanders to return from the disastrous campaigns of 986 with a record of success and with his forces intact. While other generals were demoted and scolded, Li was praised by the emperor for his tactical abilities and command discipline.¹⁴ As a reward, he was made Administrator of Ting-chou, Defense Commissioner of Wu-chou, and Cavalry Provost Marshal of the Emperor's Guard.¹⁵ In 988, Li was promoted to Cavalry Commander-in-chief of the Emperor's Guard and was made Regional Commandant of T'ao 洮 and Pao-shun 保順 prefectures (Shantung). The Khitan invaded with 80,000 troops, but Li defeated and drove them back beyond the frontier using only 20,000 troops.¹⁶

The emperor issued orders in 993 to reduce the defenses in Hsia-chou 夏州. Li Chi-Lung, then Regional commandant of Ching-nan 靜難 prefecture,

asked the emperor to rescind his order. Hsia-chou was vital to the defense effort and should be built up, not reduced. The emperor did not reply. Li chi-ch'ien had again rebelled in 993; in 996 he badly defeated two large forces sent against him. In an effort to bring some unity and stability to the campaign, the emperor made Li Chi-lung Chief of Military Plans for the western frontier.¹⁷ Li was appointed Regional Commandant of Ch'en-chou 陳州 and Chen-an 鎮安 military prefectures (Honan) in 997, and he commanded the emperor's entourage during the advance to Shan-yüan in 1004.

Li Chi-lung was a vigorous, courageous field commander and an excellent tactician. As discussed in Chapter III, he was also a very independent general and an outspoken advocate at court for the military's point of view. His son, Li Chao-liang, whose career flourished in the 1040's, was no less successful than his father.

Li Chao-liang held a succession of middle-grade posts through most of his career, such as: Administrator of Tai-chou 代州 (Hopei), Defense Commissioner of Ning-chou 寧州, Regional Supervisor of Yen-chou 延州 (Shensi). His experience was gained in command and administrative positions in the border regions, and his reputation was extensive there. When troops in Pao-chou rebelled, they refused to deal with anyone but

Li Chao-liang. Summoned by the local commander, Li rode up to the city without armor or weapons and induced them to surrender.¹⁸

Li later rose to the rank of Provost Marshall of the Emperor's Guard, Regional Commandant and Regional Supervisor of Kan-te military prefecture 感德軍, Administrator of Ting-chou. He was once accused of incorporating units of the Pao-chou defense force into his own personal command, but the charge came to nothing. Li ended his career as Regional Commandant of several important prefectures and Vice-Commander-in-Chief of the Palace Corps.

Li Chao-liang was an excellent administrator and leader. When many units had become lax during the long years of peace, Li maintained the training and discipline of his troops. Trouble makers were punished or executed, and Li's soldiers feared and respected him. He once demoted an Imperial Guardman who lost his bow during an Imperial inspection. Discipline in the Guards improved as a result.¹⁹

Ma Chih-chieh (955-1019)

Ma Chih-chieh's father, Ch'üan-i 全義 held high command rank under the house of Northern Chou. He submitted to Sung and had a brief but spectacular career

as a combat commander under Sung T'ai-tsu. Ma Chih-chieh obtained his first posting, as a troop inspector in P'eng-chou 彭州 (Ssu-ch'uan). Though only eighteen, he displayed the abilities and confidence of an experienced general. In 978, he took part in the defense of Ch'in-chou 秦州 (Kansu) and, in 980, was transferred to T'an-chou 潭州 (Hunan) as troop inspector.²⁰ Ma came under the influence of the Defense Commissioner of T'an-chou, Ho Ch'eng-chu. He was impressed by the way Ho used his literary and cultural accomplishments in running an efficient administration, and he changed his attitude toward the value of literary pursuits for a general. By the time of his death, Ma had completed over twenty chüan of his own writings.²¹

Ma was posted to Po-chou 博州 (Shantung) in 985. After the Sung defeat by the Khitan at Chün-tzu Yi 君子馬澤 (Hopei) in 986, Ma directed the re-building of fortifications and the strengthening of the area's defensive preparations. The local people did not appreciate his efforts, fearing that they would only provoke a Khitan attack; but when the Khitan returned, the defenses were too strong and they were obliged to withdraw.²²

In 988, Ma was assigned as Administrator of Ting-yuan 定遠 prefecture (Aniwei). When he heard of

a plan to use large numbers of people from Ho-nan to transport supply grain to the frontiers in Ho-pei, Ma pointed out that such a large scale movement of population would consume 30-40 percent of the grain transported. He suggested several alternate plans for gathering grain from areas closer to the frontiers and thereby saving money. The emperor agreed, and the people of Ho-nan were left undisturbed. Ma enforced strict discipline among his troops who were in the habit of robbing and otherwise abusing refugees in flight from Khitan raids.²³ The next year, Khitan raids caused much destruction and dislocation of population in Shen-chou 深州 (Hopei). Ma was sent to oversee the recovery and, within several months, had accomplished the necessary repair and resettlement. He was also sent to restore order in Pao-chou 保州 (Ssu-ch'uan) after a local uprising.²⁴

Ma filled a succession of high-ranking posts in Ssu-ch'uan finally destroying the rebel forces in 998. A number of Ch'iang 羌 tribesmen had been captured by Sung forces during the campaign. Ma ordered them sent home, saying: "They are men. Do they not also cherish thoughts of their homelands?" Thereafter, he had no more trouble with the Ch'iang tribes.²⁵ In 1001, when Ma was Administrator of Ch'eng-tu 成都, he discovered and

put down a plot against the government, executing or transferring all the leaders. Since the 960's, wealthy families had been responsible for supervising and guaranteeing the shipment of tax grain from Ssu-ch'uan to the capital. As a result, some had grown quite rich but most had been bankrupted. Ma Chih-chieh instituted a system of government commissioners and military officials to handle the grain transport. Henceforth, government revenue increased and fewer bankruptcies occurred. When Ma was transferred to the post of Administrator of Yen-chou 延州 (Shensi) in 1003 the people of Ssu-ch'uan gathered along the roads and wept as he departed.²⁶

As Administrator and Chief Commissioner of Chen-chou 鎮州 (Hopei) in 1004, Ma instituted strict regulations for defense and discipline (thieves, for example, were executed). Consequently, both soldiers and civilians were well behaved. Sufficient tax revenue was collected to support defensive preparations, and an excellent intelligence-gathering system provided information about Khitan movements. The Khitan were unsuccessful in the whole area. Later that year, when Wang Ch'ao's advance at Shan-yuan was stalled at a river, Ma Chih-chieh constructed a bridge overnight (Wang still hesitated to advance and was demoted). Chen-tsung praised Ma's

ability and initiative, marking him for employment in more important matters.

Ma Chih-chieh was appointed Administrator of Ting-chou and General Transmission Official of the Bureau of Military Affairs in 1005, and later he was made Honorary Grand Protector and Signatory Official of the Bureau of Military Affairs. In 1008, when the Khitan began to make small-scale raids along the borders, some generals stressed the continuing military threat. Civil officials at the court advised a strong military response. Ma Chih-chieh suggested sending a general to point out the treaty violations to the Khitan. The emperor agreed; a general was sent to caution the Khitan, and they withdrew.²⁷

The Sung had been at peace for about eight years, and civil officials continually urged reductions in defense expenditures and force levels. As Assistant Commissioner of Military Affairs in 1012, Ma strenuously opposed any cutbacks. He often advised the emperor on military affairs, and the emperor usually agreed with him.²⁸ Ma continued to serve in high posts and to enjoy the emperor's confidence. In 1017, he was appointed Administrator and Chief Commissioner of Ta-ming 大名, Administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs, and Honorary Grand Marshall. Ma requested retirement due to

his failing health, but the emperor would not allow it, continuing instead to heap more rewards and offices on Ma. When Ma died in 1019, the emperor lavishly rewarded his sons and grandsons.²⁹

Ma Chih-chieh was a general skilled in tactics and strategy. He could build an effective defense from scarce resources and could use small, weak forces to defeat larger enemy forces. At the same time, he was an effective administrator who looked to both the advancement of government policy and the welfare of the civilian populations in the areas under his control. Active in literary pursuits, he had many friends among the ranks of the Confucian literati and scholar-officials. Ma Chih-chieh was described by Wang An-shih "as a man who gave no thought to his family when he saw his duty for the country (見國而已不知家室) and as "a hero of the age."³⁰

Ti Ch'ing (1008-1057)

Ti Ch'ing was perhaps the most colorful Sung general of the eleventh century. The son of a farmer, he enlisted as a private soldier and came up through the ranks of the Imperial Elite (san chih 散直). In 1038, he was promoted to battalion commander in the Guards, and for the next few years, he was usually in the vanguard of

campaigns against the Hsi-Hsia leader, Chao Yüan-hao 趙元昊. Over a period of four years, he fought in twenty-five battles and was wounded eight times. More than once, he continued to fight even when seriously wounded.³¹ His success increased, and his reputation for ferocity grew in like manner. In 1039, Ti Ch'ing was given command of newly enlisted soldiers. He had not had time to train them properly when an enemy force approached. Ti Ch'ing prominently displayed his flags in front of his troops; when the enemy realized who commanded the opposition, they turned and fled.³² Ti Ch'ing was soon promoted to regimental commander in the Palace Corps and Militia Commandant of Hui-chou 惠州 (Hopei). He also gained some important patrons at court.

In 1040, one of Ti Ch'ing's superiors recommended him to Fan Chung-yen and Han Ch'i. Both Fan and Han recognized Ti Ch'ing's abilities and undertook to further his career. Fan gave Ti Ch'ing copies of the Ch'un-chiu and Tso-chuan and urged him to study them carefully. Ti Ch'ing became quite well read, and he studied the military science and generalship of the Ch'in, Han, and succeeding periods.³³

Ti Ch'ing continued to rise in rank and prestige throughout the 1040's, due as much to his own merits as

to his high-ranking sponsors. He was made Provost Marshal of the Palace Corps, Pacification Commissioner of Mei-chou 眉州 (Hopei), Regional Commandant of Pao-an 保安 and An-yuan 安袁 prefectures (Shensi). Later, Ti Ch'ing was promoted to Assistant Commissioner of Military Affairs, and made Administrator of Yen-chou and Regional Commandant of Chang-hua.

The high point of Ti Ch'ing's career came in 1052 with the rebellion of the Man 蠻 tribesmen under Nung Chih-kao 侬智高 in Kuang-yuan chou 廣源州 (Kwangsi). After forces sent to put down the rebellion had been severely defeated, Ti Ch'ing resigned from the Bureau of Military Affairs to lead the suppression campaign.

Upon his arrival at the front, he ordered his subordinate commanders not to seek battle until the situation had been stabilized. A few disobeyed his orders and were defeated. Saying, "When orders are not obeyed, battles will be lost," he had them executed.³⁴ The Han-lin Academician, Tseng Kung-liang continually pressed Ti Ch'ing about the choice of tactics to be used against Chih-kao. At first, Ti Ch'ing ignored him and then replied:

Discipline in the army is not yet established, and since the defeat at Kuang-yuan, rewards and punishments have not been made clear.

I must first re-establish discipline and make clear the rewards and penalties. Then I can attack.³⁵

Ti Ch'ing regrouped the defeated Sung forces and set out methodically to defeat Chih-kao. By observing the enemy's flags and dispositions, Ti Ch'ing determined that they were all infantry and therefore vulnerable to cavalry. He attacked with cavalry and scattered the enemy forces. In the many fierce battles that followed, Ti Ch'ing was usually in the front lines and the thickest part of the fighting. Chih-kao finally took refuge in a fortified city, only to be besieged by Ti Ch'ing's forces. During the night, Chih-kao fired the city and escaped. Ti Ch'ing's subordinates reported that Chih-kao had undoubtedly perished and urged Ti Ch'ing to report his success to the emperor. Ti Ch'ing replied: "How do you know it's not a false report? I would rather lose Chih-kao than mislead the emperor for my own benefit."³⁶ Chih-kao fled to Yunnan where he was eventually captured and executed. Ti Ch'ing was restored to the Bureau of Military Affairs after his triumphant return in 1053 and made Regional Commandant of Hu-kuo military prefecture 護國軍 (Shansi). As a member of the Bureau of Military Affairs until his death, Ti Ch'ing drew up many plans for border defense and often advised the emperor on military affairs.

Ti Ch'ing was a man of few words and a careful, thorough general. He never attacked until his forces were in order, and he considered all possible options before going into battle. Though he enforced strict discipline, he shared all hardships with his soldiers, and he personally led them into battle. In spite of his reputation for ferocity, he was prudent and not blood-thirsty. He once refused to follow a retreating enemy force, fearing a trap. When chided by another officer, he said: "We have already won; why jeopardize the victory? There is no profit to be gained in this pursuit."³⁷ Although he was successful and famous, Ti Ch'ing had no illusions about himself. When Fan Chung-yen and Han Ch'i tried to claim that he had famous ancestors, Ti Ch'ing replied: "I came from a peasant family and am just a soldier. How could I make such a claim?" On the subject of his tattoo, he said: "Although I am famous, I can't forget my origins."³⁸ Such personal humility did not extend to questions of professional competence. When civil officials complained about his methods of enforcing discipline, Ti Ch'ing snapped: "Military affairs are not the responsibility of civil officials."³⁹

Ts'ao Pin (931-999)

Ts'ao Pin's father, Ts'ao Yun 曹云, was a military commander and Regional Commandant under the Later Han. In 948, Ts'ao Pin was assigned as a junior officer in his father's command. He later served in the personal guard of Chou Shih-tsung and filled several high-ranking command and administrative positions as well. As an officer in Shih-tsung's guard, Ts'ao Pin was a colleague of Chao K'uang-yin (Sung T'ai-tsu), but he was wary of T'ai-tsu's ambitions and remained cool toward him. There is, however, a story that when Ts'ao Pin was "Steward of the Wine and Tea" for the Chou court, T'ai-tsu came to him and asked for wine. Ts'ao Pin replied, "This wine is just for court officials; it is not good enough for you." Thereupon, he poured a better quality wine for T'ai-tsu.⁴⁰ The story may be apocryphal, but when T'ai-tsu gained the throne, he wanted Ts'ao as one of his officials.

Ts'ao Pin, however, remained aloof. He felt that it would be improper to try to ingratiate himself with the new regime since he had been an official under the Northern Chou. T'ai-tsu, however, impressed with Ts'ao Pin's honesty and integrity, appointed him to the Bureau of Military Affairs as a Transmitter of Directives.⁴¹

In 964, the emperor mounted an expedition into Ssu-ch'uan; Ts'ao was appointed as a military inspector to the invasion force. During a successful campaign other generals wanted to destroy surrendered cities and slaughter the inhabitants, but Ts'ao put a stop to it. Some generals were so busy enjoying the captured spoils of war that they lost control of their troops who looted and plundered indiscriminately and got completely out of hand. Ts'ao restored discipline, put down a small-scale rebellion among a few army units, and rebuked the commanders involved. The emperor was very angry, punishing the lax generals and promoting Ts'ao Pin to Regional Commandant. When Ts'ao demurred:

Others were punished . . . I earned no merit,
yet I alone have been lavishly rewarded.
This is not a good example for others . . .

the emperor replied:

You have had extraordinary success . . . to
punish evil and encourage the good, this is how
to inspire other officials.

Ts'ao accepted without further comment.⁴²

Ts'ao Pin served as Troop Inspector of the vanguard under the emperor's personal command of the campaign to seize T'ai-yuan in 968. In 974-5, he commanded the expeditionary forces against the Southern T'ang in Chiang-nan. He successfully pacified the area and prevented his soldiers from plundering, gaining the

allegiance of the people of Chiang-nan by his leniency. The emperor promised a great reward for his successes in this campaign. When Ts'ao was congratulated by one of his subordinates on his good fortune, he replied: "I only relied on the will of heaven and the emperor's good strategy. If I have achieved success, how is it to my credit?" The emperor rewarded Ts'ao with money, but he returned it. Finally, the emperor made him a Commissioner of Military Affairs (shu-mi shih 樞密使), Honorary Grand Marshall (chien-chiao t'ai-wei 檢校太尉), and Regional Commandant of the military prefectures of Chung 忠 and Wu 武 (Ssu-ch'uan).⁴³ After the pacification of T'ai-yuan in 979, Ts'ao received further honors.

Ts'ao was slandered by a civil official in 983, removed from the Bureau of Military Affairs and demoted to Regional Commandant of T'ien-p'ing 天平 (Shantung).⁴⁴ However, T'ai-tsung remembered his previous service, gave him the honorary rank of Duke of Lu 魯國公, and continued to treat him well.⁴⁵ Ts'ao's poor showing during the campaign of 986 resulted in his further demotion, but a year later he was promoted to Regional Commandant of Wu-ning 武寧軍 (Kiangsu), and in 997 made Regional Commandant of P'ing-lu 平盧 (Shantung). Upon the accession of Chen-tsung in 998, Ts'ao Pin was

restored to the Bureau of Military Affairs and to several of his former titles. When Ts'ao fell ill in 999, the emperor sent his own personal physician to attend him. Ts'ao died at the age of sixty-nine, leaving seven sons, three of whom became generals.

Ts'ao Pin was considered the first general of the empire, in competence and honor above the others. He said of himself, "As a general, I have killed many people," yet he prevented his troops from wanton killing.⁴⁶ The example of Ts'ao Pin was later invoked by Chinese scholar-officials serving under the Mongols in order to admonish them against indiscriminate slaughter in the conquest of China.⁴⁷ Ts'ao Pin maintained strict discipline among his forces (with an occasional lapse) and gained the respect of the people in the areas that he pacified. At court, he was open and generous, yet respectful and careful of his position; he was never obstinate and never publicly found fault with others.⁴⁸ Ts'ao Pin, even when in disgrace, was often consulted about military affairs, and the emperor usually agreed with his suggestions.⁴⁹ Though careful not to exceed his brief as a military advisor (see Chapter IV), Ts'ao was quick to act when military necessities were being ignored.

After Ts'ao had been restored to the Bureau of Military Affairs, the Khitan began stirring up trouble in the North, and Li Chi-ch'ien rebelled in the West. Ts'ao Pin urged immediate and decisive military action. Strong forces of archers and infantry should be dispatched to defend strategic places, put down the rebellion, and drive out the Khitan. A civil official temporized, saying that supplies were inadequate, the affected areas too distant, and the troops ill-prepared; other policies should be tried first. When other civil officials agreed, Ts'ao angrily requested that he be put in command: "I request to serve in the forces myself; then there will be no more wrangling." The civil officials were very unhappy with Ts'ao Pin.⁵⁰ Chen-tsung hesitated for a time, but eventually found that Ts'ao Pin's policy was the necessary one.

Ts'ao Wei (973-1030)

Ts'ao Wei's military career began in service as a member of his father's guard when Ts'ao Pin was Regional Commandant of Wu-ning (987). When Ts'ao Wei was nineteen, his father recommended him for a command in the campaigns against the Hsi-Hsia rebel leader Li Chi-ch'ien. Ts'ao Wei was successful when other commanders were not, and in 997 was promoted to

Administrator of Wei-chou 渭州 . He was transferred to Chen-shu 鎮戍 (Kansu), a year later and, through a combination of strict discipline within his forces, soothing words, and bestowal of imperial largesse, he pacified the border tribes and weaned them away from Li Chi-ch'ien.⁵¹

Ts'ao was also a competent and clever tactician. In 998, when a Hsi-Hsia force raided and then withdrew, Ts'ao Wei led a column to recapture the horses and other animals seized by the enemy. After a long chase, one of his subordinates advised him to relinquish the animals and re-group against counterattack. Ts'ao feigned disorder and thereby enticed the raiders to return. He sent a message to their leader, "You have come a long way and I would not take advantage of your fatigue. Let us both rest a while and then fight." The enemy commander agreed, and after a short rest, Ts'ao's force fell upon the raiders and beat them badly. Ts'ao explained:

I took advantage of their cupidity to entice them (故為貪利以誘之). A short rest after a long march only reduces the strength and spirit. Therefore, I was able to defeat them.⁵²

From 1008 to 1014, Ts'ao was assigned to various command positions in Ho-pei and Shensi. He pacified many of the border tribes, recruited local militia, and

fortified strategic places. "If Ch'in and Wei have any future alarms," he said, "this is where the fighting will be." In this he was quite right; his efforts were important in repelling later Hsi-Hsia attacks.⁵³

Ts'ao Wei's method of recruiting local tribesmen for defense departed from the usual Sung practice. In most cases, tribesmen were organized and trained in much the same way as Han Chinese units. However, the government made no effort to provide the soldiers with logistical support. Ts'ao recruited soldiers to open up waste lands which were then used for the support of infantry (usually archers) and cavalry units. Those who were fit for military service were given two ch'ing 頃 of land (about fifteen acres) on which to raise a cavalry horse. The horse was later examined by officials. If the horse was fit, the soldier was given an extra fifty mou 畝 of land (about 7.5 acres) for the upkeep of one cavalry horse or infantry soldier. Border tribesmen were organized into battalions (chih-hui 指揮) of 300 men, and forts and t'un t'ien 屯田 were built all along the border areas. Thus, the border areas were populated, the local militia strong and well-trained.⁵⁴

The emperor often consulted Ts'ao Wei about defense problems in Ho-pei and Shensi. In 1010, Ts'ao presented the emperor with maps of Ching-yüan 涇原 and

Huan-ch'ing 環慶 (Kansu), showing cities, mountain passes, river crossings, and other strategic places. The emperor had several copies made for use in the Bureau of Military Affairs and for generals who were being transferred to that area.⁵⁵

In 1015, Ts'ao was made Militia Commander of Ying-chou 英州 and the Administrator and Pacification Commissioner of Ch'in-chou 秦州 (Kansu). He regularized the salt-pond industry in that area so that more income went to the primary producers instead of the middlemen. He also brought the border people more under Chinese law by forbidding the usual practice of paying a cash or kind indemnity as punishment for murder. Ts'ao petitioned and won the emperor's consent to use tribal leaders as civil and military officials in border areas.⁵⁶

Ts'ao was not content to leave the details of his command to subordinates; he often made personal inspections of his area. On one such tour in 1015, he came to a city with large wooden shields erected on top of the walls. When Ts'ao became angry (though proof against arrows, the shields would interfere with an active defense of the walls), the city leaders protested. "But its always been done this way!" Ts'ao's reply was sarcastic--"Well we certainly must not change it, must we?"--as he ordered the shields torn down.⁵⁷

Li Te-ming kicked over the traces again in 1019, and when other generals had been unsuccessful in putting down the disturbance, Ts'ao Wei was appointed Pacification Commissioner (An-fu shih 安撫使) of Ch'ing-chou 慶州, Regional Supervisor (Kuan-ch'a shih 觀察使) of Hua-chou 華州 (Kansu), and sent to deal with the problem. When Li Te-ming's tribal allies heard of Ts'ao's appointment, many of them went home or submitted to Ts'ao.⁵⁸ Ts'ao returned successful and was made a Signatory Official of the Bureau of Military Affairs.

In spite of his military success, Ts'ao Wei ran into a bit of political trouble at court. When K'ou Chun retired as Chancellor in 1020, he was succeeded by Ting Wei 丁謂. Ting disliked Ts'ao Wei, whom he considered as insubordinate. He accused Ts'ao of being part of K'ou Chun's clique, and Ts'ao was demoted. Ting Wei left office in 1022, and Ts'ao was restored to his post as Regional Supervisor of Hua-chou and, in addition, made Administrator of Ch'ing-chou 青州 and Lai-chou 萊州 (Shantung).⁵⁹

Ts'ao Wei was made, in 1025, Administrator of T'ien-hsiung 天雄, Regional Supervisor and Regional Commandant of Chang-hua 彰化. In 1027, he requested transfer to a less exacting post due to illness.

Court officials said that Ts'ao Wei was a famous general and should not be allowed to sit idle. Accordingly, he was made Administrator of Ting-chou 定州, a most prestigious post.⁶⁰ His final assignment, in 1029, was as Regional Commandant of Chang-wu 彰武.

Ts'ao Wei was a general on active service for forty years, and was never defeated in battle. He was well-read in both the Ch'un-ch'iu and the Tso-chuan, and he served Chen-tsung as an expert advisor on border defense problems.

NOTES

¹SS, 289/9691.

²SS, 289/9692.

³HYC, 49/2.

⁴SS, 289/9692; HYC, 49/2-3.

⁵See Worthy, 155-60 for a Table of Organization of the Imperial Guard armies.

⁶SS, 289/9692-3.

⁷Ibid.

⁸HYC, 49/4-5.

⁹WCMC, 4.3/3.

¹⁰SS, 289/9693.

¹¹SS, 257/8962-3.

¹²SS, 257/8964-5.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴LPC, 9/3.

¹⁵WYHC, 10/20.

¹⁶WYHC, 10/21; LPC, 9/3.

¹⁷WYHC, 10/22.

¹⁸SS, 464/13563.

¹⁹Ibid.

- ²⁰LCC, 87/6.
- ²¹LPC, 10/4; WCMC, 3.4/4.
- ²²LCC, 87/6; HCP, 27/22.
- ²³LCC, 87/6; SS, 278/9450.
- ²⁴LCC, 87/6.
- ²⁵LPC, 10/4.
- ²⁶LCC, 87/7.
- ²⁷LCC, 87/8
- ²⁸SS, 278/9452
- ²⁹LCC, 87/8.
- ³⁰LCC, 87/8-9.
- ³¹SS, 290/9718.
- ³²WCMC, 8.2/2.
- ³³SS, 290/9718.
- ³⁴SS, 290/9719.
- ³⁵WCMC, 8.2/2-3.
- ³⁶LPC, 11/6-7.
- ³⁷WCMC, 8.2/2.
- ³⁸WCMC, 8.2/13.
- ³⁹WCMC, 8.2/8.
- ⁴⁰WCMC, 1.2/3.
- ⁴¹Ibid.
- ⁴²Ibid.
- ⁴³SS, 258/8980.
- ⁴⁴LPC, 9/8-9.

- 45 SS, 258/8981.
- 46 WCMC, 1.2/9.
- 47 Sung Lien, Yuan-shih, 158/3713; 160/3759.
- 48 LPC, 9/9.
- 49 WCMC, 1.2/5.
- 50 WCMC, 1.2/10.
- 51 LCC, 90/57.
- 52 WCMC, 3.5/2.
- 53 HCP, 76/8; LCC, 90/58.
- 54 LCC, 90/58; WCMC, 3.5/6.
- 55 LCC, 90/58.
- 56 LCC, 90/58-59.
- 57 WCMC, 3.5/4.
- 58 LPC, 9/11.
- 59 SS, 258/8985; WCMC, 3.5/1.
- 60 LCC, 90/59.

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