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Melvin P. Thatcher

Kinship and Government in Chu during
the Spring and Autumn Era, 722-453 B.C.

Melvin P. Thatcher

A dissertation
submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

University of Washington

2004

Program Authorized to Offer Degree:
Department of History

UMI Number: 3131235

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Abstract

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Melvin P. Thatcher

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In this dissertation I explore the structure of kinship among the ruling elite, factors affecting the development of lineages and their ability to participate in the political process, and the structure and operation of the state government of Chu. In Chapter 1 the ethnic origin of the ruling house is traced to the Hua Xia people of the Central Plains. Chapter 2 demonstrates that the dominant mode of succession to the rulership was father to son as it was in the states of the Central Plains. I address the question of the nature of kinship in Chu in Chapter 3 and conclude that the ruling elite were organized into lineages that were fundamentally the same in structure and development as in the states of the Central Plains. Chapter 4 deals with the formation of royal and non-royal lineages and the ability of the king to dispense and control access to economic resources that were necessary for the growth and development of politically effective lineages. Chapter 5 details the political institutions through which the king governed, namely the central and local government and the royal household staff.

Particular attention is given to structural dynamics in the central government and issues involved in classifying certain offices as royal household staff. The operation of Chu government is considered in Chapter 6. I show that governing was the enterprise of the king, other members of the royal house, and their agnates of royal lineage. The mature king was ever-present in the day to day operation of government. He appointed and promoted officials, dominated decision making, and dispensed rewards and punishments. Royal agnates were eligible by birth to serve in the government, but they were not selected as representatives of their lineages. With one exception, Chu lineages did not have the hereditary right of appointment to high office. The personal style of the king's rule is manifest in the competition between officials for influence, his ability to use royal household staff as an alternative to government officialdom, and in the *ad hoc* assignment of duties to officers. The kings of Chu reigned *and* ruled.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
List of Figures	iii
List of Tables	iv
Introduction	1
Chapter 1. Origins of the Ruling House	28
Ancestral Origin	33
Geographic Origin	42
Ethnic Origin	64
Cultural Origin	81
Conclusion	86
Chapter 2. Royal Succession	90
Succession in Chu	92
Western Zhou Period	93
Spring and Autumn Era	97
Conclusion	105
Chapter 3. Kinship Structure	110
H. G. Creel on Chu Kinship	111
Chu Kinship Structure	114
Corporate Activities	120
Ritual Activity	120
Political Activity	123
Conclusion	134
Chapter 4. Lineages	135
Lineage Origins	138
Lineage Formation	147
Lineage Resources and Development	151
Goods	152
Land	154
Graft and Corruption	168
Connections	169
Official Appointments	171
Conclusion	178
Chapter 5. Government Structure	181
Central Government Offices	184
<i>Mo'ao</i> (莫敖)	185
Chief Minister (<i>lingyin</i> 令尹)	196
Grand Marshal (<i>dasima</i> 大司馬)	199

Structural Relationships: Chief Minister, Grand Marshal, <i>Mo'ao</i>	201
Tripartite Division of Upper and Middle Level Offices	204
Changing Preferences for "Left" and "Right" Offices	206
Chief Minister Subordinates	211
Grand Marshal Subordinates	216
<i>Mo'ao</i> Subordinates	221
Lower Level Offices	226
Local Government Offices	229
Royal Household Staff	235
Grand Tutor	240
Grand Intendant	242
Senior Palace Doorman	244
Historians	247
Artisan Master	250
Conclusion	254
Chapter 6. Government operation	256
Court Politics	257
Royal Activity	260
Social Bases of Recruitment	263
Appointments and Promotions	273
Decision Making	288
Rewards, Punishment, Suicide	294
Authority of Office Versus Personal Influence	304
Central Government Versus Royal Household Staff	311
Functional Differentiation	319
Conclusion	323
Conclusion	329
Glossary of Chu Personalities	343
Bibliography	353
Appendix 1. The Scribal Tradition and Historical Writing in Zhou China: From Bronze Inscriptions to the <i>Zuozhuan</i>	375
Appendix 2. Pedigree of the Kings of Chu	397
Appendix 3. Lineage in Spring and Autumn China	406
Appendix 4. Pedigrees of Royal Lineages	477
Appendix 5. Royal Household Staff	516
Appendix 6. An Investigation and Interpretation of the Office of Shenying	552
Appendix 7. Recruitment Tables	579
Appendix 8. Chief Minister Appointments	585

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Number	Page
1. Zhu Rong Clans Localities Map	44
2. Chu Migration Path Map	48
A1. Royal Pedigree: Early Generations (1)	398
A2. Royal Pedigree: Early Generations (2)	400
A3. Royal Pedigree: Western Zhou Generations (1)	401
A4. Royal Pedigree: Western Zhou Generations (2)	402
A5. Royal Pedigree: Spring and Autumn Generations (1)	403
A6. Royal Pedigree: Spring and Autumn Generations (2)	404
A7. Royal Pedigree: Spring and Autumn Generations (3)	405
A8. Relationships around the <i>Zong</i> Head	464
A9. Agnatic Descent Groups Descended from Duke Dai of Song	469
A10. Hierarchy of Ancestral Temples and Agnatic Descent Groups	474
A11. Dou Pedigree	478
A12. Cheng Pedigree	481
A13. Wei Pedigree	486
A14. Qu Pedigree	488
A15. Yang Pedigree	505
A16. Nang Pedigree	507

LIST OF TABLES

Table Number	Page
1. Ruling House-Lineage Power Continuum	13
2. Geographical Distribution of Zhu Rong Clans	45
3. Royal Succession in the Western Zhou Period	93
4. Royal Succession in the Spring and Autumn Era	98
5. Succession Modes in Various States	108
6. Royal and Non-royal Lineages by Members' Offices	138
7. Central and Local Government Offices	183
8. Royal Household Staff	238
9. Kings of Chu: First Year of Government Activity	261
10. Central Government Appointments by Social Status, 706 - 479	264
11. Chief Minister, Grand Marshal, and <i>Mo'ao</i> Appointees, 706-605	265
12. Chief Minister, Grand Marshal, and <i>Mo'ao</i> Appointees, 604-552	266
13. Chief Minister, Grand Marshal, and <i>Mo'ao</i> Appointees, 551-479	267
14. Government and Staff Appointments by Social Status, 675-479	270
15. Appointments by Department, Office, and Social Status, 675-479	273
16. Top Central Government Officers, 701-479	277
17. Previous Offices Held By Chief Ministers	284
18. Decision Makers, 706-477	289
19. Frequency of Recorded Advice	293
20. Forms and Reasons for Punishment of Officials	298
21. Chief Minister, Grand Marshal, and <i>Mo'ao</i> Activities, 701-478	320
A1. Events and Speeches in Bronze Inscriptions	384
A2. <i>Chunqiu</i> and Jiantu Covenant Participants Lists	458
A3. Chief Ministers by Relationship and Descent or Social Status, 706-605	580
A4. Grand Marshals by Relationship and Descent or Social Status, 706-605	580
A5. <i>Mo'ao</i> by Relationship and Descent or Social Status, 706-605	581
A6. Chief Ministers by Relationship and Descent or Social Status, 604-552	581
A7. Grand Marshals by Relationship and Descent or Social Status, 604-552	582
A8. <i>Mo'ao</i> by Relationship and Descent or Social Status, 604-552	582
A9. Chief Ministers by Relationship and Descent or Social Status, 551-479	583
A10. Grand Marshals by Relationship and Descent or Social Status, 551-479	583
A11. <i>Mo'ao</i> by Relationship and Descent or Social Status, 551-479	584
A12. Chief Minister Appointments, 706-479	587

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express deep gratitude for the influence that the late Professors Jack L. Dull and Father Paul L. M. Serruys had on my graduate studies. Professor Dull taught me me to be thorough and to tackle hard questions. I was motivated by his confidence in me and his unstinting support. Father Serruys instilled in me a love for classical Chinese language. He set me on the path of socio-political history of the Spring and Autumn era through his choice of an historical anecdote in the *Shiji* as my first translation project. I would also like to thank my dissertation supervisory committee members for their encouragement and support. Professor Patricia B. Ebrey graciously accepted this surprise carryover from Professor Dull's tenure. Professor Carol G. Thomas has been with me from the beginning and has always given me the boost that I needed to keep going. Professor Stevan Harrell gave me hope that I would be permitted to defend by sharing a similar situation that occurred in his department. My thanks goes to all three for taking the time to read and comment on each part of this dissertation. Finally, and most importantly, I wish to express appreciation and gratitude to my wife Tuan for the decades of encouragement and support that she has provided and to my children for accepting the sacrifices that were imposed on them.

DEDICATION

To my wife Tuan, our children, and grandchildren.

Introduction

The history of Chu during the Spring and Autumn era (722-453 B.C.) begins in the *Zuozhuan* with a meeting in 710 between the states of Chen and Zheng that was held because "they began to be afraid of Chu."¹ It ends in 476 with the recording of a successful military attack on three Yi groups and their submission to a covenant with Chu.² During the course of the era Chu extended its territorial control from the southwestern part of modern Hubei Province to include most of the region between the Han and Huai rivers in the north and the Yangzi River in the south. Chu was transformed from a small, remote state in the south into a head-to-head competitor with the powerful northern state of Jin for hegemony over the states of the Central Plains. While its military might and territorial expansion instilled great fear in the leaders of the other states, the stability and effectiveness of its government was strongly admired by them.³ As *the* enemy from the south, Chu was demonized in the north as one of "them," the Man Yi; yet it was continuously forced to deal with numerous rebellions by the Man Yi peoples in its heartland (see Chapter 1). It was in Chu that Daoist philosophy apparently had its start,⁴ but the sons of the king and the ruling elite of Chu

¹ ZZS 5:16b (95, Huan 2).

² ZZS 60:14a (1047, Ai 19).

³ See, for example, the mixed comments of Confucius and Mencius (Hu Shengwen 1995).

⁴ Zhang Zhengming 1987:234-52.

were educated in the Ru tradition of the Central Plains.⁵ Blending elements from the cultures of its multi-ethnic population, a distinctive regional culture emerged in Chu during the Spring and Autumn era, a culture that has captured the interest of scholars both in China and in the West.

Kinship and Government in Ancient China

How was this great, complex, and somewhat enigmatic state governed?

Scholarly studies of socio-political institutions of ancient China have long made the connection between kinship and government organization and administration, especially in the Western Zhou period that preceded the Spring and Autumn era. Perhaps the clearest statement is by Wang Guowei in his "Discussion of Yin and Zhou Institutions 殷周制度論." To explain Zhou's success in establishing its own empire after overthrowing the Shang (Yin), he develops the following thesis:

[If one] desires to observe how Zhou was able to stabilize the kingdom, [one] must begin from its institutions! The major differences between the institutions of the Zhou people and the Shang are: (1) The institution of establishing a son (i.e., legitimate successor) and a legal wife. From that was born the institutions of *zongfa* and mourning. And [originating] from them, there were the institutions of granting territory to sons and younger brothers [and] superordinating the Son of Heaven and subordinating the various lords. (2) The institution of ancestral temples. [And] (3) the institution of exogamous marriage. These items all are what Zhou used to control the kingdom. . . .⁶

⁵ A newly appointed tutor of the heir apparent of King Zhuang was advised to teach him the annals of the state, genealogy, poetry, rites, music, edicts, didactic discourses, old historical records, and the instructional classics (GY 17:1a-b [378-79, "Chuyu" *shang*]). Confucian and Daoist texts on bamboo slips were recently discovered in the grave of a mid to late fourth century Chu person who is thought to be the heir apparent's tutor (Li Xueqin 1998, 1999:40, and 2000; Hubeisheng Bowuguan 1997, Xing Wen 1998, and Allan and Williams 2000).

⁶ Wang Guowei 1921:453-54.

欲觀周之所以定天下，必自其制度始矣。周人制度之大異於商者，一曰立子立嫡之制。由是而生宗法及喪服制。并由是而有封建子弟之制，君天子臣諸侯之制。二曰廟數之制。三曰同姓不婚之制。此數者，皆周之所以綱紀天下。

Although scholars have challenged the idea that institutional discontinuity in the change of dynasties from Shang to Zhou was as sharp as Wang proposes,⁷ the notion of a functional connection between kinship and government institutions is widely accepted.

Zongfa 宗法 has been translated as "law of the kindred" or "lineage law" but is probably best understood as "lineage method" because it is a concept that is used to describe how kinship was structured and worked during the Zhou period (ca. 1087-222 B.C.).⁸ This kinship system was based on the rule of primogeniture whereby the eldest son succeeded his father as head the lineage (*zongzi* 宗子). The head was duty bound to provide for lineage members who were in turn obligated to respect and obey him. The lineage and its bundle of duties and obligations were replicated through the formation of senior (*dazong* 大宗) and junior segments (*xiaozong* 小宗). Within the latter, senior and junior segments also formed, so that a junior segment at a higher level became a senior segment in the next lower level of kinship organization. The roles of participants in ancestral rites at each level reinforced the superior-subordinate relationships. Faithful performance of the duties and obligations kinship was the glue that ensured the efficacy of the system.

⁷ Creel 1970:102-108.

⁸ See the "Da chuan" 大傳 and "Sang fu xiaoji" 喪服小記 chapters of the *Liji* for the earliest descriptions of different aspects of *zongfa* (LJZS 32-34 *passim* [589-622]).

The traditional view of the Western Zhou period (ca. 1087-771 B.C.) is that this kinship system served as the basis for the selection of court officials by the Zhou king and the installation of close and distant agnates in territorial outposts to provide protection for the royal domain. This method of appointing officers and conferring territory, the so-called *fengjian* system (often translated as "feudal system"), was followed by the lords of the Zhou outposts. The duties and obligations of kinship controlled interaction between the Zhou court and its outposts and between the territorial lords and their officers.⁹

The *zongfa* and *fengjian* systems are generally thought to have continued into the Spring and Autumn era.¹⁰ However, by the middle of the era, there is evidence of the decline of these institutions, particularly the sense of duties and obligations of kinship inherent in *zongfa*. Despite the rise of the institution of hegemony (*ba* 霸), which had the professed aims of respecting the king and protecting the weak, the royal house of Zhou lost respect and authority, and the strong states vanquished the weak ones and appropriated their people and territory. In some states ministerial lineages related to the ruling house challenged its authority. In other states, lineages unrelated to the ruling house overthrew it and established themselves as rulers. Land and tax reforms were introduced to establish central control over lineage controlled territory and resources that had been beyond the reach of the state. However, even though the structural and behavioral influence of *zongfa* declined precipitously over the centuries,

⁹ Wang Guowei 1921:451-81; Zhao Boxiong 1990:48-90.

¹⁰ See, for examples, Tong Shuye 1969:57-58 and Lewis 1990:8, 33-36.

the ideology of kinship was still given lip service in the conduct of government and foreign relations by the independent states of the Spring and Autumn era.¹¹

What about Chu?

The views of three leading American scholars below will show that there are differences in approach to the problem and in opinions about the role of kinship in the politics and processes of Chu government.

Commenting on the fact that the royal house of Chu was not replaced by ministerial lineages, as happened in a number of other major states of the era, the late Professor H. G. Creel argued that its centralized control over the state was "unique." Chief ministers were appointed by the kings from among male relatives on the basis of ability and experience; the king replaced and punished them "almost at will." Hereditary offices were few. Among the signs of its emerging bureaucracy was a system of centrally controlled local administration in the form of the *xian*. Creel stated that Chu was able to centralize better than the northern states, in part, because there "was a difference in the kinship structure of Chu, before it became completely assimilated to Chinese culture." The corporate kinship group called *shi* 氏, so common in the north, may not have existed in Chu until late in the Spring and Autumn era. Thus, unencumbered by such kin groups the royal house of Chu was able to centralize its rule more thoroughly.¹²

¹¹ For useful discussions of this subject, see Xu Fuguan 1972 and Huang Junjie 1977. Also see Hsu Cho-yun 1965 and Lewis 1990.

¹² Creel 1964:89-98; also see references to Chu in his 1971 work on ancient Chinese statecraft.

In his seminal study of social mobility during the Spring and Autumn era, Cho-yun Hsu employs the concept of a "familistic state" in which "the ruler reigned but did not rule." As the head of the household, he shared power with its members through appointments to office, but he could not remove them because they were "born to rule." The closest male kin of the ruler, his brothers, had first call on the position of chancellor. Thus, the ruler's sovereignty was not absolute; in terms of authority and respect, he was more or less regarded like any other member of the household.¹³

However, Professor Hsu maintains that this situation did not prevail in Chu, where the "rulers apparently had much more real authority than their counterparts in the northern states." Like Creel, he notes absence of hereditary offices and the ability of the king to punish the chief minister and, in some cases, their families.¹⁴ Citing evidence that most chief minister appointees hailed from royal lineages, he concludes: "These data reveal that the ruling house held the balance of power and that the Chu sovereign was strong enough to destroy even the most powerful of the noble families."¹⁵

Commenting on the appointment of three royal kinsmen as chief ministers in the Warring States era (453-222 B.C.) as evidence for continued activity by the "royal family," Hsu observes that Chu had "adopted the Chinese lineage system relatively late, but seems to have preserved the system in its full vitality when the Chinese states in the

¹³ Hsu 1965:78-80.

¹⁴ Hsu 1965:85-86.

¹⁵ Hsu 1965:97.

north had evolved in another direction."¹⁶ Thus, a "Chinese" style kinship system was ultimately key to sustaining the fortune of the royal house and its ability to rule.

A recent study by Barry B. Blakeley challenges what he terms "[t]he prevailing understanding of Ch'u court politics," namely that (1) the rulers of Chu were "unusually powerful individuals" in comparison to the rulers of other states, and (2) their "power was due (at least in part) to a high degree of political participation by lineages of the royal clan, which supported and defended royal authority."¹⁷ This article, which builds on his dissertation and a subsequent series of articles,¹⁸ is a defense of his evolving concept of the "kinship state" in early China.¹⁹

At a hypothetical level, he argues that dynastic systems often produce young and/or inept rulers who provide opportunities for royal kinsmen to dominate the court, and that particular attention must be given to the age of the kings of Chu at the time of ascension to the throne. While acknowledging the participation of lineages of the "royal clan" in Chu politics, he claims they would not seek to strengthen the throne because it would not be in their best interests. Finally, he faults previous studies for not

¹⁶ Hsu 1965:46-47.

¹⁷ Blakeley 1992:1. Blakeley has published another article (1999) that is based on this and his earlier studies. However, it is not as detailed; so the latter have to be consulted in order to evaluate his analysis and line of argument. Of these studies, the 1992 article provides his strongest argument concerning Chu, hence it is the focus of scrutiny here.

¹⁸ Blakeley 1970, 1977, 1979a, and 1979b.

¹⁹ In his dissertation, Blakeley put forward the Aidan Southall's concept of "segmentary state," which is based on segmentary kinship and political systems in African societies (1954), as an analytical model for understanding state and society in ancient China (Blakeley 1977). In the present article, he speaks of the "clan state" which is ruled by a "proprietary clan." "Clan" is defined as the larger proprietary kinship group *within a regional state* (not, as is customary, the supra-state *xing* 姓) (1992:3 [note 7]). In a more recent work, he presents the notion of "kinship state," which he says is developed in the present article (1999:52 [note 6]). In this kind of state, the "proprietary clan" must rule, not the ruler.

making a distinction between the main lineage and the collateral lineages of the "royal clan" and failing to take into consideration their disunity and mutual competition for control of the throne.²⁰

Blakeley maintains that in Chu, as in other states, the royal clan had a "constitutional claim" to participate in court politics and share power with the ruler and that this limited the latter's authority and freedom to fill positions in the court. Priority had to be given to the main lineage of the royal clan when making appointments to office, but its collateral lineages could benefit from securing hereditary offices, although these were few in Chu. He asserts that the political behavior of lineages in Chu was the same as in other states.²¹

Blakeley argues that during periods of "young and/or otherwise docile kings" and of "activist kings," "at best the kings controlled state affairs about on par with the lineages and, at worst, considerably less," while the identity of true power in post-regency years, the king or the lineages, is unclear. He claims that while kings were more effective in changing long-established patterns in the lineage composition of offices, the changes effected by lineages were longer lasting.²² Finally, he concludes:

. . . although a few Ch'u kings (mostly usurpers) had an impact on Ch'u court politics . . . , the lineages, contrary to the prevailing view, were more of a factor than the throne. . . . There were kings who attempted to exploit the tension among the lineages, but none ever permanently impinged on their right to participate and their potential to dominate the throne. In other words, the 'clan state' remained intact.²³

²⁰ Blakeley 1992:1-3.

²¹ Blakeley 1992:3-4.

²² Blakeley 1992:29-31.

²³ Blakeley 1992:6-33.

In my opinion none of these three views gives a completely satisfactory analysis of interrelationship between kinship and government in Chu during the Spring and Autumn era. Creel and Hsu assume that Chu was "non-Chinese;" so its kinship system was originally different from that of the northern "Chinese" lineage system that was adopted by Chu only after a period of acculturation to the Chinese way. Blakeley does not comment on Chu ethnicity, but he subscribes, tentatively, to Creel's assessment of the nature of kinship there. I shall challenge the assumption about origins in Chapter 1 and demonstrate that their conclusion about Chu kinship is incorrect in Chapter 2.

Creel and Hsu concentrate their analysis on the "royal house," using the term both in the strict sense of the king and his closest agnatic kinsmen and in an expanded sense that includes its "branches" (i.e., lineages descended from former kings). Thus, they fail to make the distinction between the main lineage and the collateral lineages of the royal clan that is important to Blakeley's interpretative model. He, on the other hand, makes a serious error in separating the king from the main lineage in his analysis. Consequently, the conclusion that Creel and Hsu reach about the power of the ruling house, in its expanded sense, and the strength of the king relative to their counterparts in the northern states is closer to the historical reality than are Blakeley's findings. I make this clear in my analysis of the operation Chu government in Chapters 6.

Genesis and Evolution

This dissertation is a continuation of work on the relationship between social and political systems and institutions in the Spring and Autumn era (722-453 B.C.) that

began as my M.A. thesis on the nature and exercise of political power in the state of Jin. My thesis delineated the role of kin groups in the creation and operation of institutions of the central government and in the distribution of political rights and privileges within Jin society.²⁴ Whereas clan relationships were virtually ineffectual as determinants of political conduct, lineages became the principal actors in the political arena.

In order for a politically effective lineage to develop in Jin, a source of wealth independent from the control of the state ruler had to be established. Utilizing private wealth, a lineage was able to recruit a private army and extend its influence in the state *vis-à-vis* other lineages and the ruling house. Social and political conditions in the state fostered the concurrent development of a number of new strong lineages; thus, the stage was set for radical changes in the social composition of political power and the structure and operation of state government. The new lineages, as a group, secured control of political power in Jin and worked out a *modus vivendi* for consolidating and sharing the newly won gains. The principle of seniority was established and became manifest in systematic appointments and promotions as high offices in the central government were rotated among the heads of the dominant lineages.

The right to hold high offices traditionally went to the head of the senior sub-lineage. This practice gave rise to intra-lineage strife as cadet sub-lineages sought to establish their own economic bases and identities separately from their natal lineage in order to position themselves to contest for political power and the hereditary right to the highest offices in the government. Access to wealth was through the lineage, so

²⁴ Thatcher 1973.

there was a tendency on the part of ambitious lineage members to turn their stewardships over lineage territory to the advantage of their own families and sub-lineages.

As the heads of senior sub-lineages became cognizant of the potential entry of additional competitors into their fragile world of shared power by this means, they acted collectively to deny upstart cadet lineages hereditary access to significant offices. Since the process of lineage segmentation weakened the solidarity of the lineage and left it vulnerable to exploitation by another lineage, or a combination of lineages, seeking to eliminate it from the political scene, politically astute lineage heads began to deny their lineage mates stewardships over lineage territory. In order to ensure central control, the head appointed personal retainers as administrators of lineage territory.

After the powerful Han, Zhao, and Wei lineages managed to block internal competitors and eliminate external competing lineages, they divided the state among themselves in 453. They ultimately replaced the ruling house of Jin and became the ruling lineages of independent states bearing their respective names. The participation of lineages in the political process produced a proto-bureaucracy with systematic appointments and promotions with high offices filled on the basis of seniority rather than heredity. The exigencies of intra-lineage solidarity produced techniques of central control over localities that were extended to the administration of the new states..

Having intensively studied and analyzed social and political developments in Jin, I turned to the states of Qi, Chu, and Qin, the remaining powerful states of the

Spring and Autumn era, to isolate similarities and differences with a view to making generalizations about lineage and institutional development in the formation of the Qin empire which brought the Eastern Zhou period to an end in 221 B.C.²⁵ My research revealed that these states and Jin represent four points on a ruling house-lineage power continuum (see Table 1 below for a summary). I concluded that:

The key to understanding . . . [developments] . . . in these four states is the social composition of political power in the state. In a state where politically active lineages either did not exist or were not effective, the ruler could control structural and operational changes in the state government. In a state where lineages were strong and had to be taken into account in the political process, the ability of the ruler to control operational change was greatly circumscribed. Where structural change occurred, it was initiated by the ruler and designed to consolidate his position *vis-à-vis* rivals in the ruling house and/or enhance his ability to rule, . . . [T]he utilization of unrestricted territorial rights as remuneration and reward for office-holders created the economic basis for the growth of lineage strength, thus giving rise to socio-economic conditions which made significant operational change inevitable regardless of the will or intent of the ruler. As lineages grew strong enough to become factors in state politics, the ruler sought to accommodate them by appointing lineage heads to important government offices. When more than one lineage in the state secured the hereditary right of appointment, the stage was set for sharing political power among the lineages through the development of systematic promotions on the basis of seniority. The ruler's loss of control over appointments and promotions undermined his ability to retain control over decision making and other important aspects of state government as lineages expanded their collective power at the expense of the ruling house.²⁶

²⁵ For the results of this inquiry, see Thatcher 1977-1978 and 1985.

²⁶ Thatcher 1985:45. I originally presented this concept as "four stages of institutional development," but as Professor Stevan Harrell has pointed out my findings describe the conditions that prevailed in these states and may, therefore, be more appropriately described as "points on a continuum."

Table 1. Ruling House-Lineage Power Continuum

State	Ruling house	Lineage	Government
Qin	Supremacy never threatened	Members of ruling house served on staff. No politically active lineages.	Ruler dominated decision making and directed all state business. Unstructured staff. No systematic appointments and promotions. <i>Ad hoc</i> assignment of duties. Unrestricted access to ruler.
Chu	Strong	Members of royal house and royal lineages dominated key government positions, but lineages did not establish the hereditary right to office.	King directed state business and was the primary decision maker. Ruled through central government hierarchy and/or royal household staff. No systematic appointments and promotions. Specific duties but <i>ad hoc</i> assignments were normal. Personal influence transcended authority of office. Relatively unrestricted access to ruler.
Qi	Relatively strong	Ruler shared power with lineages with the hereditary right to office. Old and new lineages co-existed as fillers of old and new offices respectively.	Ruler generally dominated state business but was supplanted late as chief decision maker. Dual hierarchy of old and new offices. Systematic appointments and promotions based on seniority. Ruler used personal aides to circumvent high officials. New ministerial offices were created and co-existed with old offices, each with particular spheres of competence.
Jin	Weak	Non-ducal lineages replaced and disenfranchised ducal lineages in political arena. New lineages won hereditary right to hold office.	Ruler lost control of decision making and state business. Old offices subordinated to new offices in official hierarchy. Systematic appointments and promotions based on seniority. Specific rights and duties. Authority of office transcended personal influence. Controlled access to ruler.

Source: Thatcher 1986:44-45.

This dissertation amplifies the forgoing by providing a detailed study of the kinship system and the structure and operation of government in the state of Chu during the Spring and Autumn era.

Scope

The state of Chu was established early in the Western Zhou period during the reign of King Cheng as an outpost of the kingdom of Zhou that was charged with pacifying the Man Yi people in the region south of the royal capital. Progressively moving southward down the Han River to the vicinity of its confluence with the Yangzi river in the southern part of modern Hubei Province, Chu successfully established a territorial base from which it gradually expanded its control and influence through military action in the surrounding area and eventually to the east and north. By the time that Chu emerged in the historical record in 710, it was already striking fear in the hearts of northern states.²⁷ During the course of the Eastern Zhou period, Chu extinguished at least sixty states.²⁸ It competed with Jin for political hegemony over the states of the Spring and Autumn era for nearly a century, losing first to Jin at the Battle of Chengpu in 632, then defeating it and winning the hegemony at the Battle of Bi in 597, only to lose again at the Battle of Yanling in 575.²⁹

Archaeological finds, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, reveal that by the middle part of the Spring and Autumn era a distinctive regional culture had developed in Chu that spread to states under its domination. These discoveries gave rise to a wave

²⁷ ZZS 5:16b (95, Huan 2).

²⁸ He Hao 1989.

²⁹ Shu Zhongshu 1992:212-215.

of articles and conferences dedicated to the history and culture of Chu as scholars debated its ethnic and cultural origins. The traditional view of northern origins was vigorously challenged by advocates of eastern, western, and southern (or indigenous) origins. A compromise view of Chu as a multi-ethnic state with indigenous and external cultural elements and a ruling elite that originated in the north seems to have the upper hand in the debate.³⁰

While the question of Chu ethnicity can be legitimately raised, much of the zeal in the debate undoubtedly has been driven by the "unified multi-national state" policy of the Chinese Communist Party. The policy is summed up in the words of veteran United Front cadre Zhang Zhiyi, who coincidentally hails from Wuhan in the former territory of the Chu:

There are two contrasting ways of resolving the question of nationalities: one is the way of national oppression . . . It does not admit the existence of national minorities within the frontiers of China, but, on the contrary, looks upon the nationalities as merely branches --- or clans --- of the Han people. This is the way of splitting up the nationalities; this is the discredited way followed by generation after generation of feudal rulers . . . ; this is a blind alley which we absolutely can never follow again. The other way is that of the equality of nationalities; this is the way of the Communist Party. It recognizes the complete equality of the nationalities of China regardless of whether they are advanced or backwards, large or small. . . . This is the way of nationalities unity; this is the bright way indicated by Marxism-Leninism.³¹

The impact of this policy is explicitly manifest in the introduction and conclusion to Gu Tiefu's *Chuguo minzu shulue* 楚國民族述略 (*An Overview of*

³⁰ See source citations in the discussion of this topic in Chapter 1 below.

³¹ Moseley 1966:46-47.

Chu Nationalities) published in 1984. Commenting on the treatment of minority nationalities in classical sources, he says:

Therefore, the method of dividing up nationalities in the "Wang zhi" chapter of the *Liji* ("*Book of Rites*") is a product of the Great Nationality ideology of the class society. In our socialist country under the dictatorship of the proletariat, it has nothing at all in common with the nationalities policy of no repression, no discrimination, and all nationalities are completely equal.

He begins the conclusion of his work saying: ". . . In the preface I previously said that the rise and fall of a multi-national state has a great deal to do with how well it manages relationships between the nationalities."³²

Intellectuals in China are under obligation to implement the multi-nation state policy in their research and writing, and they do it. Consequently, while our knowledge about historical and modern non-Han nationalities has increased greatly, the possibility that the questions raised and positions argued by some scholars may be colored by this policy has to be considered when using their works.³³

I present the case for a northern origin of the ruling elite in Chapter 1. The ancestral roots of the royal house are reconstructed by drawing data from historical sources and verifying them in written sources originating from Chu itself. The identity of localities associated with the progenitors of the ruling house and their most likely migration route to the site of the Spring and Autumn capital of Chu near modern Jiangling are presented in a summary of He Guangyue's work.³⁴ To unravel the issues

³² Gu Tiefu 1984:3, 137.

³³ For a state sponsored illustration of this policy, see Ma Yin 1994. For a recent review article about ethnic studies in China and the West, see Blum 2002.

³⁴ He Guangyue 1988.

of ethnic origin, I compare the early pedigrees of Xia, Shang, Zhou, and Chu and present cultural evidence associating Chu with the Xia in particular. References to Chu as "Man Yi" by several of its own kings and others are analyzed and interpreted in their political and historical contexts with particular emphasis on relations between Chu and the Man Yi during the Spring and Autumn era..

The history of royal succession is discussed in Chapter 2 because of its relevance to the questions of origins and power relations between the king, other members of the royal house, and royal lineages.

H. G. Creel's argument that the structure of kinship in Chu was different from that of the northern states is the topic of Chapter 3. I focus on the meaning and usage of the key terms "*xing*" 姓, "*shi*" 氏, "*zong*" 宗, and "*zu*" 族 to examine problems with his evidence. By articulating the structure of kinship in Chu, comparing it to similar kin groups in the northern states of Qi and Jin, and reviewing evidence for corporate activities and inter-lineage alliances, I demonstrate that kinship in Chu was structured and behaved like it did in the northern states

Chapter 4 provides a comprehensive survey of the lineages of Chu during the Spring and Autumn era. I present evidence for the origins and/or existence of royal and non-royal lineages and compare the process of lineage formation with the northern states. The types, sources, and availability of economic resources are explored at length in order to explain the general inability of lineages to develop sufficient strength to claim significant roles in the political process.

I treat the development and structure of the government in Chapter 5 to set the stage for an examination of the operation of Chu government. Central government, local government, and royal household offices and positions are identified and classified. I present evidence for three divisions of high and middle level officials in the central government and analyze changes in their structural relationships. Questions concerning the local government office of *xian* administrator and its rank in Chu officialdom are explored. Finally, I delineate the royal household staff, which provided the king an administrative alternative to the central government, and justify my classification of selected offices.

The roles of the king and lineages and the king and his officers in the operation of Chu government are described and analyzed in Chapter 6. I begin by considering the king's participation in government in terms of age at succession, the scope of his government activities, and how he participated in them. The social dynamic in Chu court politics is clarified by determining the mix of royal agnates and non-royals who received appointments by institution and level over time.

To establish who was in control of government, I review the roles of the king and his officers in making appointments and promotions, the criteria that were considered, and limitations on the king's exercise of these powers. Findings on the social basis of recruitment and the history of the appointment process are brought to bear on the question of whether lineages had the hereditary right of appointment to

government offices. An examination of the decision making process reveals who was in control under particular circumstance and how decisions were made.

The personal style of royal rule and the state of the structural development of officialdom are manifested in other aspects of the operation of government and court politics. I discuss the rationale for, and the king's use of, rewards, punishments, and pardons to reveal the extent of the king's control over his officers and staff. Examples of competition between officers within and between levels and institutions, the king's ability to use royal household staff to bypass central government officers, and the *ad hoc* nature of official duties and assignments are used to demonstrate the personal style of the king's rule and the rudimentary state of structural development.

Many Chu personalities appear in this dissertation. Although an individual may be known by a number of names in historical sources, I generally hold to one of those names in my discussion. The dates and all of the names of individuals mentioned here are presented in the glossary following Chapter 6.

Sources

The best source for information about personalities, institutions, and events in Chu during the Spring and Autumn era is the *Zuozhuan*; I have used the *Chunqiu*, the *Guoyu*, the *Shiben*, and the *Shiji* as supplementary sources. Where appropriate, I have also consulted contemporary writings from Chu on silk, bamboo, and bronze, as well as later works of philosophers, eclectics, and anecdotalists from the Warring States era and

the Qin-Han period. I have garnered evidence from archaeological reports about material culture which has a bearing on the question of origins of the ruling house.

The identity of the compiler, the provenance, the era or date of compilation, and the nature of the *Zuozhuan* have been the subjects of scholarly debate for at least two millennia. Modern scholars have added a new dimension to the debate, namely doubts about the historical reliability of the *Zuozhuan*, particularly the reliability of speeches that it records.³⁵

The modern debate turns around the roles of orality and literacy in the transmission of anecdotes, information, and speeches that appear in the *Zuozhuan*. Bruce and Taeko Brooks seek to rescue the *Chunqiu* from scholarly oblivion and establish it as a genuine product of, and the only reliable historical source for, the Spring and Autumn era. They consider the *Zuozhuan* to be a fanciful historical narrative that was produced in ca. 312 B.C., during a period of transition from orality to literacy as modes of transmission, to legitimize the territorial ambitions of the ruler of Qi. Thus, they judge it to be an unreliable source for Spring and Autumn history.³⁶ Yuri Pines, who uses the *Zuozhuan* as a source for the intellectual history of the Spring and Autumn era, places strong emphasis on the scribal records (i.e. "short historical narratives") as its primary source. He maintains that the most of its speeches were faithfully rendered in contemporary scribal records.³⁷ David Schaberg employs the

³⁵ For comprehensive reviews of this long running controversy, see the text and notes in Schaberg: 2001:315-24 and Pines 2002:26-34.

³⁶ Brooks and Brooks 1998:6, 8, 256.

³⁷ Pines 2002:18-26.

Zuozhuan to study the forms and uses of rhetoric. He acknowledges that there is evidence for the use of reliable written sources but argues that oral tradition was the major source used by its compilers. He claims that its speeches were transmitted orally and reflect the intellectual needs of the time of their latest transformation.³⁸ Is there room for compromise on the roles literacy and orality and the *Zuozhuan*?

My opinion is that the *Zuozhuan* is a form of historical writing that grew out of the Zhou scribal tradition's concern with events, dates, and speech (see Appendix 1). Its style and contents reflect the sources upon which the compiler(s) drew, such as official documents, annalistic histories, historical narratives, other treatises, and oral reports and traditions that, for the most part, originated at or near the time of the events that they recorded or portrayed. Compilation was completed, probably by a man from the state of Lu,³⁹ a some time between 453 B.C., the year of its final entry which notes the demise of the Zhi lineage of Jin at the hands of the Han, Zhao, and Wei lineages,⁴⁰ and the early to mid-fourth century when there is evidence for its circulation in the writings of Mencius (390-305).⁴¹ The reliability of the *Zuozhuan* as a source for Spring and Autumn history is confirmed by, among other things, the contents of bronze inscriptions and other textual materials recently discovered at Chu sites that are used in this dissertation.

³⁸ Schaberg 2001:26-27, 315-24.

³⁹ Pines 2002:29.

⁴⁰ ZZS 60:28a-29b (1054-55, Ding 4).

⁴¹ Liu Zhenghao 1966:3 (preface).

Methodology

I have used a grounded approach to collecting and interpreting data from the primary historical sources. All references to Chu in the *Zuozhuan* and the *Guoyu* were arranged into a chronological history. Topical data were then extracted from the history and interpreted with the help of commentaries as needed. The work of Qing scholars on Spring and Autumn genealogy and institutions were checked at this point to take advantage of their knowledge of the primary sources. After analyzing the data and forming conclusions, I turned to the works of modern scholars for their insights. The command and use of primary sources and their conclusions were evaluated against the data. Sometimes I had my conclusions confirmed and other times challenged.

In my attempt to be precise, I have tried to heed Professor James L. Watson's admonitions to social historians to be clear about and accurate in their use of the anthropological terminology to describe kinship and about the meaning of the terms that are used by the Chinese themselves.⁴² Having been guilty of confusing terms such as "family" and "lineage" or "lineage" and "kindred" in the past, I did an extensive review of writings about kinship by anthropologists working outside of China and by anthropologists and social historians working on Chinese kinship. This was followed by a study of the uses and meanings of *xing*, *shi*, *zong*, and *zu* in early historical sources, namely bone and bronze inscriptions, the *Zuozhuan*, and the *Guoyu*. Only after doing this did I decide that the social anthropological concepts of clan and lineage were

⁴² Watson 1983:89-94.

suitable for describing and analyzing ancient Chinese kinship (see Appendix 3 for specific findings).

Nomenclature

The key actors on the political stage in Chu came from the royal house, the royal household staff, and royal and non-royal lineages. "Royal agnates" is used in this dissertation as a collective term for members of the royal house and of the royal lineages that were descended from former kings.

The royal house (*wangshi* 王室) was comprised of the ruler and the sons and grandsons of rulers. The wives and daughters of the ruler and sons of rulers, and perhaps the wives of grandsons of rulers, may also be considered as members of the royal house. It was a recognized socio-political entity in the state of Chu. A complaint was lodged in 515 against two notorious troublemakers that, among other things, they had "weakened our royal house" 弱寡王室.⁴³ A local *xian* administrator had to step in and "stabilize the royal house" 定王室 in 479 after a son of the exiled heir apparent rebelled, killing his uncles, who were serving as chief minister and grand marshal, and seeking to depose the king.⁴⁴ While one can argue, as Blakeley does, that the ruling house was the "main lineage" of the ruling Mi 芊 clan,⁴⁵ I refer to it as the

⁴³ ZZS 52:19a-b (909, Zhao 17). This particular charge alludes to the machinations that resulted in the king taking to wife a bride that had been intended for his heir apparent, then posting the heir apparent to a frontier town where he was charged with planning rebellion and driven into exile. See the discussion of the career of Junior Tutor Fei Wu Ji in Appendix 5 below.

⁴⁴ GY 18:11-a-b ("Chuyu" *xia*, 422). This event is also discussed below in Chapter 5 and Appendix 8.

⁴⁵ Blakeley breaks the "royal clan" into the main lineage, which was "composed of the hereditary lord and his closest agnatic kinsmen [essentially, his brothers, nephews, uncles, and

"ruling house" in this dissertation for this is how it was perceived and the way that it participated in the political process.

Starting from Xiong Tong 熊通 (King Wu 武王, r. 740-690), who ruled at the start of the Spring And Autumn Era, the rulers of Chu used the title of *wang* (王 "king") within their realm. The "Hereditary House of Chu" chapter of the *Shiji* says that in the 37th year of his reign, angered at having been rebuffed by the royal house of Zhou when he requested more respect for Chu, Xiong Tong declared,

"My ancestor Yu Xiong was the tutor of King Wen [of Zhou]. [He] died prematurely. King Cheng elevated my progenitor, then ordered [him] to reside in Chu with a commission of the fields of a viscount or baron. The Man Yi all have been led to submission, but the King [of Zhou] has not increased [our] rank. I will simply honor myself!" Then he made himself King Wu.⁴⁶

first cousins])," and collateral lineages that were comprised of "descendants of the agnatic kin." (Blakeley 1992:3)

⁴⁶SJHZKZ 40:10 (646). This was not the first time that a ruler of Chu had usurped the title of "king." Xiong Qu 熊渠, who lived during the time of King Yi (r. 894-879) of Zhou, feeling the rush of success in pacifying the Man Yi in the Jiang-Han region and taking advantage of the decline of the royal house of Zhou and a general malaise among the states allied to it, declared, "Since I am a Man Yi, [I] do not share the titles of the Central States" 我蠻夷也，不與中國之號諡。 Then he proceeded to install his three sons as kings of different parts of his realm. However, during the reign of repressive King Li, he rescinded their titles out of fear that Zhou was going to attack Chu; see *ibid.*, 40:7 (645).

According to He Guangyue, Xiong Qu's grandfather Xiong Dan 熊黜 and his father Xiong Yang 熊楊 had already used "king" as their titles. He offers the "*Chuwang Jun Zhong*" 楚王顛鍾 as proof for Xiong Dan, arguing that "'Jun' 顛 is 'Dan' 黜, they both mean 'big head' 頭大." For Xiong Yang, he cites the "*Chuwang You Zhang Zhong*" 楚王盭章 鐘 inscription and claims that "'You' and 'Yang' 楊 had the same pronunciation and were interchangeable. 'Zhang' 章 means 'to manifest greatness.'" (1988:193) His proofs, which are based on the inscription alone, are insufficient.

Li Ling summarizes the arguments of leading commentators on "*Chuwang Jun Zhong*," all of whom place it in the mid-Spring And Autumn era or later, and concludes on the basis of vessel's form and style of ornamentation that it belonged to King Gong of Chu (r. 590-560) (1986:363-64). Li also says that the "*Chuwang You Zhang Zhong*" was cast by King Hui Xiong Zhang 惠王熊章 (r. 488-432) in *ibid.*, 367 and (1984:88-89). Since "Xiong" is always written as 盭 in bronze inscriptions (Li Xueqin 1988:87 and Li Ling 1991:50), Li's identification of You Zhang as Xiong Zhang can be accepted; also see Shirakawa 1962.4:537-38.

吾先鬻熊，文王之師也。蚤死。成王舉我先公，乃以子男田令居楚。蠻夷皆率服，而王不加位。我自尊耳。乃自立爲武王。

Prior to the time of King Wu, rulers of Chu are identified as *zi* (子 "viscount") in inscriptions produced by other states, while at least two rulers are referred to as *gong* (公 "duke") in Chu inscriptions. After King Wu, the rulers of Chu consistently refer to themselves as "king" in bronze inscriptions.⁴⁷ Perhaps because the use of "duke" and "king" were regarded as aberrations by the other states, the compilers of the *Zuozhuan* refer to the rulers of Chu more frequently as "viscount." Since the present study is about Chu from its point of view, all rulers after King Wu are referred to as "king."

The sons of Chu rulers are referred to as *wang zi* 王子, "king's son," or *gongzi* 公子, "ducal son," in the *Zuozhuan* and in the *Guoyu*. *Gongzi* is used more frequently than *wangzi* in the *Zuozhuan* by a ratio of 33:6. Only one scion of the ruling house is referred to by both terms, namely King Ling (靈王, r. 540-529) who is identified as Wangzi Wei 王子 圍 three times and Gongzi Wei 公子 圍 seven times. *Gongzi* is used in the names of Chu men twice in the "Jinyu" section on the *Guoyu*, while *wangzi* is employed for a third Chu man in the same section and for one man in the "Chuyu" section. Since, according to classical historical texts, the rulers of Chu held the rank of *zi* (子 "viscount") in the Zhou system rather than *gong* (公 "duke"), the term *gongzi* seems to be, in this instance at least, a convention employed by the compilers of the *Zuozhuan* and of the *Guoyu* in the sense of "ruler's son."

⁴⁷ See Gu Tiefu 1981 and He Hao 1993:66.

From the perspective of Chu, *wangzi* is the correct term as seen in bronze inscriptions cast by several Chu notables, including Wangzi Shen 王子申, who is thought to be either Right Marshal Gongzi Shen 公子申 or Chief Minister Zixi 子西 (Gongzi Shen 公子申),⁴⁸ and Wangzi Wu 王子午, who has been identified definitively as Chief Minister Zigeng 子庚 (Gongzi 公子午).⁴⁹ He Hao notes that "[in] Chu bronze inscriptions, whenever *gongzi* of Chu cast vessels themselves, in all of the inscriptions they refer to themselves as '*wangzi*,' they never referred to themselves as '*gongzi*' . . ."⁵⁰ Although *wangzi* is clearly the correct term, *gongzi* and *wangzi* are not translated in this study when they are used as part of the names of individuals.

Grandsons of the rulers of Chu are referred to as *wangsun* (王孫, "king's grandson") in the *Zuozhuan* and in the *Guoyu* or *gongsun* (公孫, "ducal grandson") in the *Zuozhuan*. All occurrences of *wangsun* in the *Guoyu* are found in "Chuyu" sections. As in the case of *wangzi*, *wangsun* is the correct term from the Chu perspective. Nevertheless, to spare readers who check sources confusion, *gongsun* and *wangsun* are left untranslated when they are used in conjunction with the name of an individual.⁵¹

⁴⁸ In his discussion of the *Wangzi Shen zhan* 王子申盞 inscription, Qing scholar Ruan Yuan argued on the basis of similarities in script and style that this vessel comes from the era of King Hui of Chu and belonged, therefore, to his Chief Minister Zixi rather than Right Marshal Gongzi Shen. Guo Moruo 1935:167a and Shirakawa 1962:-4.534-36 accept Ruan's argument.

⁴⁹ This is the conclusion of Li Xueqin in *Xin chutu tongqi yanjiu* 新出土銅器研究 (Beijing, : Wenwu, 1990), 10; cited in Zhang Suqing 1998:167, note 53.

⁵⁰ He Hao 1993:65.

⁵¹ In the *Zuozhuan* under the year 479, *wangsun* should be translated as "king's grandson" when it is used twice as a term of direct address for Sheng 勝 (Administrator of Bai 白公), who was the grandson of King Ping: "Ping, the son of Ziqi saw him [and] said, 'Why are [you], the king's grandson, sharpening [the sword] yourself?'" 子期之子平見之曰王孫何自厲也 in ZZS 60:4a (1042, Ai 16) and "Zilü said, 'King's grandson, suppose that [you] were able to pacify the state, rectify the royal house, and extend your protection to it, that would be my, Qi's, wish'" 子闔曰王孫若能安靖楚國，匡正王室，而後屁焉，啓之願也

The royal house stands at the center of the socio-political history of Chu in the Spring and Autumn era. The king and his royal agnates made government their business. They all benefited from ensuring that the ruling house maintained its right to rule through the person of the king. Its strength was surpassed only by the ruling house of the state of Qin. I now begin the discussion of kinship and government in Chu by examining the origins of its ruling house.

ibid., 60:5b (1043, Ai 16). Sheng is identified as Wangsun Sheng 王孫勝 in GY 18:9a (417, "Chuyu"xia).

Chapter 1

Origins of the Royal House

The question of the origins of the people and culture of Chu has been the subject of much scholarly inquiry because of the recent archaeological discovery of its distinctive culture, which arose in the middle to late Spring and Autumn period and flourished during the Warring States period.¹ From textual and archaeological evidence, there can be no doubt that Chu was populated by many ethnic groups that made significant contributions to the development of "Chu culture." Its people and culture did not come from a single source.² However, the historical and other primary written materials that provide most of the information for this dissertation concern the people who made up the ruling elite of Chu, their beliefs and customs, and their history and institutions. Since, as shall be shown in succeeding chapters, the ruling elite was dominated by the kings of Chu and their royal agnates, this chapter will focus on the ancestral, geographic, ethnic, and cultural origins of the royal house.³

¹ For a few reports of academic conferences that dealt the topic of Chu origins in the 1980s, see Yin Weizhang 1981, Cao Meng 1982, Yan Fanzhong, 1982, Chu Bi 1983, and Wang Xiong 1689:106.

² Peters 1999:108.

³ In his review of the chaotic state of the study of the "ethnic origins" (*zuyuan* 族源) of Chu between 1930-1980, Shu Zhimei offers the following critique: (1) With regard to the group (*zu* 族), one has to be clear about which group and what time period are under investigation. (2) A distinction must be made between the royal house and the ruling elite of Chu and the "Chu people as a whole" (*quantu Chu ren* 全体楚人) because the composition of the general population changed over time with the conquest of neighboring states and territorial expansion. (3) There is no necessary relationship between cultural origins and ethnic origins, since cultural borrowing by newcomers to a locality is a natural occurrence. (4) The use

As maintained by Wang Guanggao, the debate on ethnicity boils down to the question of whether the ruling house was ethnically Hua Xia or Man Yi.⁴ The Hua Xia people claimed descent from the Yellow Emperor who is commonly believed to have been from the Qiang tribe and to have hailed from the region of modern Gansu and Shaanxi to the west of the Central Plains. Many of his early descendants migrated into the Central Plains where they established territorial bases that were centered in the eastern region of modern Henan.⁵ In extant historical sources the Hua Xia people are often shown in conflict with tribal groups that were known as Rong, Di, Man, and Yi. These tribal names are traditionally associated respectively with non-Hua groups in the west, north, south, and east from the perspective of the Central Plains.⁶ The use of these names, however, is rather loose in primary sources where they are often used in combination as generic terms for tribal groups in the north ("Rong Di") and in the south ("Man Yi"). "Man Yi" is employed in this sense in the discussion that follows.

The question of Hua Xia versus Rong Di and Man Yi tribes goes back to the Eastern Zhou period and earlier. The *Zuo zhuan* contains some strong, sometimes pithy, negative statements about the tribal groups, particularly the Rong Di. For example,

of locality names to trace ethnic origins is a legitimate methodology because people take locality names with them as they move about. However, this approach must be based on reliable historical evidence. And (5) one must exercise the same kind of circumspection in using similarities in the pronunciation of words to trace ethnic origins or else run the risk of making non-existent historical connections (1983:67). Others who have apparently have taken their cue from Shu and focused their search on the ethnic origins of the royal house and the ruling elite as a way of coming to some sort of meaningful conclusion include Li Yujie (1988:2-3) and Wang Guanggao (1988:3-6).

⁴ Wang Guanggao 1988:30.

⁵ Wang Guanggao 1988:14-16.

⁶ A convenient summary of *Chunqiu* and *Zuo zhuan* information about these tribes is found in Legge 5:122-35 ("Preface").

when a spokesman for the king of Zhou declined war booty presented by Jin from its victory over the state of Qi in 589, he is reported saying:

[When] the Man, Yi, Rong, and Di do not apply the king's edicts, are lewd and drunken, and destroy the norm, [and] the King gives the order to attack them, then there is presentation of booty, [and] the King personally receives and rewards it so as to punish the disrespectful and encourage the meritorious. When brothers and consanguines invade and defeat the King's guidelines, [and] the King orders to attack them, [one] simply reports the fact, and does not present [the booty of] his achievement so as to respect close relationships and prevent wanton behavior.⁷

蠻夷戎狄不式王命，淫泆毀常，王命伐之，則有獻捷，王親受而勞之，所以懲不敬，勸有功也。兄弟甥舅侵敗王略，王命伐之，告事而已，不獻其功，所以敬親暱，禁淫慝也。

Twenty years later, Wei Jiang of Jin is said to have remarked:

"If we belabor our troops with all the Rong, and Chu attacks Chen, we surely will not be able to rescue it; that would amount to abandoning Chen. All the Hua [states] will certainly rebel. The Rong are animals. [If we] capture the Rong and lose the Hua, is there nothing then that cannot be done?⁸

勞師於戎，而楚伐陳，必弗子宮之能救，是棄陳也。諸華必叛。戎，禽獸也。獲戎，失華，無乃不可乎。

Both of these partisan statements reflect the Hua Xia view of themselves as a discrete group that was politically and morally superior to the tribal groups. The latter were not deserving of treatment by the same standard of behavior that the Hua Xia were supposed to accord one another.

⁷ ZZS 25:24b-25a (430-31, Cheng 2).

⁸ ZZS 29:22a (506, Xiang 4).

An important distinction between the Hua Xia and the Rong, Di, Man, and Yi was also made in the cultural sphere. This is clear in the words of the chief of the Jiang Rong, who when threatened with arrest by Fan Xuanzi of Jin in 559, allegedly said: "Our, all the Rong, drink, food, and clothing are not the same as the Hua, gifts do not circulate [between the Hua and us], and [our] languages are not [mutually] apprehensible--what evil are [we] capable of doing?"⁹ 我諸戎飲食衣服不與華同，贄幣不通，言語不達，何惡之能爲。 In this case we are informed of cultural differences by the leader of a tribal group; so the perception of differences was not as one-sided as some may be prone to presume.

Nicola di Cosmo provides a timely antidote to the anti-tribal rhetoric of the East Zhou period in a recent study that focuses on Hua Xia relations with the northern tribal groups. He argues that while cultural differences undoubtedly existed between ethnic groups, the lines were not as sharply drawn as they are in statements that appear as part of the political rhetoric of the times. He rightly points to evidence that a state of enmity did not always prevail between the Hua Xia and the Rong Di; covenants were made with them and alliances were formed through intermarriage. Consequently, pejorative statements that stress moral and cultural difference must be taken with a grain of salt.¹⁰

⁹ ZZS 32:8b-10a (558, Xiang 14).

¹⁰ Di Cosmo 2002:93-126.

H. G. Creel provides an excellent overview of Chinese-Barbarian relations during the Zhou dynasty except for his views about Chu (1970:194-241). He argues that the distinction between "Chinese" and "barbarian" was blurred for much of the time. While there is little negative rhetoric about "the barbarians" in Western Zhou sources, derogatory statements become more frequent in Eastern Zhou sources. Nevertheless, he argues that the line between Chinese and barbarian was not firmly drawn and uses the state of Chu to illustrate his point. He notes that while Chu wanted to join the exclusive political club of Chinese states, its culture and

The relationship between the Jiang Rong and the state of Jin is an excellent example of di Cosmo's general point. In leading up to his comment on cultural difference noted above, the Jiang Rong leader rehearsed how his forbearers had been treated kindly by a former ruler of Jin, who gave them territory even though his state was itself in dire economic straits. He said that ever since then, the Rong had fought faithfully at the side of Jin in numerous military campaigns. Thus, one most note, that while acknowledging cultural differences with Jin, he downplayed the negative impact that they should have on the present and future relationship between their two peoples.¹¹

Di Cosmo's observations apply to the relationship between the Chu and the Man Yi as well. As the history of Chu-Man Yi relations that is described below shows, there were periods of peace and cooperation in addition to rebellion and war. There is evidence very early of cultural-ethnic fluidity in the transformation of one branch of the Mi clan into Man. The rise of the distinctive Chu culture in the mid to late Spring and Autumn era was based on threads from indigenous cultures and influences from the north, east, and west. It testifies of the fact that the cultural divide between ethnic groups was traversable and bridgeable. Nevertheless, we cannot minimize cultural difference to the point the peoples of China become a single undifferentiated mass.

institutions were in no way inferior, and the Chinese states did not look down upon it. With the aid of textual materials and cultural artifacts that have been excavated by archaeologists since the publication of Creel's book, I argue in the following sections that the royal house was ethnically and culturally related to the Chinese states in the north; so it was not as different as it might have been had its royal house actually been "barbarian."

¹¹ ZZS 32:8b-10a (558, Xiang 14). Di Cosmo does not cite this anecdote.

Particular ethnic groups did have their own unique cultural traits, and they are useful in identifying their origins.

The evidence presented hereunder will show that the ruling house of Chu originated in the northern territory of the Hua Xia people; it was not Man Yi and indigenous to modern Hubei province where the state was centered during the Spring and Autumn era. The state of Chu was established early in the Western Zhou to subjugate and pacify the Man Yi people south of the royal Zhou domain. The ruling house was related to the Hua Xia people, while many of its subjects and neighbors were Man Yi groups. Looking ahead, one should expect to find structural similarities in the societies of the ruling elite of Chu and their counterparts in the Central Plains to the north.

Ancestral Origin

The putative ancestry of the ruling house of Chu is recorded in the *Shiben*. This is the earliest extant Chinese genealogy and is believed to have been compiled during the Warring States Period. It is generally regarded as the primary source of the genealogical pedigree found in the "Hereditary House of Chu" chapter of the *Shiji* which does not differ significantly from it.

According to these two sources, the ruling house of Chu descended from Emperor Zhuan Xu 顓頊, who was the grandson of the Yellow Emperor 黃帝. Wu Hui 吳回, or Zhu Rong 祝融 (the name of an office that he held), the great, great, great-grandson of Zhuan Xu, beget Lu Zhong 陸終. Lu Zhong beget six sons, of

whom the youngest, Ji Lian 季連, became the progenitor of the Mi 羊 clan to which the royal lineages of Chu belonged. After Xue Xiong 穴熊 (aka, Nei Xiong 內熊), who was the grandson of Ji Lian, the generations of Chu are untraceable until Yü Xiong 鬻熊), who served King Wen, the founder of the Zhou dynasty (for the complete pedigree of the kings of Chu, please refer to Appendix 2).

Commenting on the generations that are missing between Xue Xiong and Yü Xiong, the "Chu Hereditary House" chapter of the *Shiji* says "[Xue Xiong's] descendants are obscure; some were located among the central states, some were located among the Man Yi; [one] is not able to record their generations."¹² 其後中微，或在中國，或在蠻夷，弗能紀其世。

All of the generation links in the ruling line that descends from Yü Xiong are known and can be safely regarded as reliable. But what about the claim that he descended from Zhuan Xu? Wu Hui? And Ji Lian? Who were actually believed to be the ancestors Yü Xiong and the ruling house of Chu? These questions can be addressed through an examination of primary sources from Chu and a related state and of references to the ancestry of Chu in the *Zuozhuan* and in the *Guoyu*. This will be done by working down the pedigree from Zhuan Xu to Yü Xiong.

Names mentioned in the early generations of Chu ancestry are found in source documents from Chu and its cousin state Zhu 郟, which is believed to have been founded by descendants of the fifth son of Lu Zhong. Qu Yuan, the famous poet of the third century BC, who was member of the royal lineage that descended from Qu Xia,

¹²SJHZKZ 40:5 (645).

the son of Fenmao, ruler of Chu, declared his lineage in the opening line of the "Lisao" 離騷 saying, "[I am] a descendant of Emperor Gaoyang. My august grandfather is called 'Bo Yong'."¹³ 帝高陽實苗裔兮。朕皇考曰伯庸。 According the *Shiben*, Gaoyang was the Emperor Zhuan Xu. Song Zhong of the Han Dynasty comments that "Zhuan Xu was his name; Gaoyang was his title as ruler of all under Heaven."¹⁴ 顓頊名，高陽有天下號也。 Wang Guanggao says that "Bo Yong" is "Zhu Rong." He argues that "Bo" and "Zhu" are interchangeable because both mean "elder, senior" and that "Yong" and "Rong" are interchangeable on the basis of sound.¹⁵ Divination texts written on bamboo slips found in a Chu burial site, Baoshan Grave No. 2, near Jingmen, Hubei, dated to 292 invoke the names of Lao Tong, Zhu Rong, and Yü Xiong.¹⁶ Lao Tong, also known as Juan Zhang 卷章, is the father of

¹³ *Chuci buzhu* 1:2b-3a (12--13).

¹⁴ *Shiben*, Wang Mouji edition, 4-5.

¹⁵ Wang Guanggao 1988:7-8.

¹⁶ Baoshan mudi zhujian zhengli xiaozu 1988.5:25-26. Also see Hubeisheng Jingsha tielu kaogudui 1991:34-36.

Some modern scholars think Lao Tong is also mentioned in the famous Chu silk manuscript by the name of Nu Tong in a passage that says, "... [his] son's son was called Nu Tong, that one begat four sons" 子之子曰女童，是生四子； He Guangyue 1988:2. This interpretation assumes that *nu* 女, *mu* 母, and *lao* 老 are interchangeable, the latter two based on references to the Queen Mother of the West as Xiwangmu 西王母 in the *Shanhaijing* and Xilao 西老 in the *Huainanzi*; see An Zhimin 安志敏 and Chen Gongrou 陳公柔 1963.9: 55-56.

However, Li Ling argues rather persuasively that within the cosmogony presented in this text Nu Tong should be understood as Nu Gua 女媧, the wife of Fu Xi 伏羲, with the four sons being the hereditary administrators of earth and fire, who were first the descendants of Zhong 重 and Li 犁 and later members of the He 和氏 and Xi 羲氏 lineages; see Li Ling 1985:65-68. Li and Cook translate this text as follows: "He (Bao Xi or Fu Xi) then married Zuwei [...]s granddaughter, named Nu Tian. She gave birth to four [...] children] . . ."; see Li and Cook 1999:174. Since the Chu silk manuscript is about cosmogony, not genealogy, this section being an account of the formation of the earth and the origins of the sun, the moon and the four seasons, Li's argument makes the most sense.

For the identification of Yü Xiong in the bamboo divination text see, Li Xueqin WW 1988.8:87-88.

Wu Hui, or Zhu Rong.¹⁷ A bronze inscription created by the Duke Ding of Zhu (r. 613-574) states that he was the descendant of Lu Zhong 陸終,¹⁸ the son of Wu Hui and father of Ji Lian, the founder of the Mi clan. Thus, in the "Lisao" by Qu Yuan and the bamboo divination texts as well as a bronze inscription from the related state of Zhu, Chu progenitors Zhuan Xu, Lao Tong, and Wu Hui (Zhu Rong), Lu Zhong, and Yü Xiong are found in primary sources that are connected with Chu.

¹⁷ Li Xueqin cites mention of Wu Hui (Zhu Rong) in the *Chugong Ni fu* inscription, which dates from the reign of King Xuan of Zhou (r. 827-782), as confirmation of the genealogical relationships posited in the Zhu Rong tradition. He attributes this interpretation to Ding Shan (1980.2:74-75). Earlier commentators Wang Guowei 1921:890 ("Ye yu Chugong zhong ba" 夜雨楚公拔) and Shirakawa 1962.4:528 did not find "Wu Hui" in the text of this inscription. Wang Guanggao argues that this is not a Chu bronze (1988:24, 55). Li Ling also casts doubt on the identification of Wu Hui in the inscription (1991:48).

Zhu Rong is also mentioned in the famous Chu silk manuscript, a reference which Li Xueqin takes as an important clue to the origin of the Chu people (1980.2:74-75). Other than confirming that Zhu Rong was a figure in the traditions of Chu, this reference which shows Zhu Rong taking orders from Yan Di, has no genealogical relevance for the pedigree of the ruling house of Chu.

A number of scholars, however, think otherwise. For example, Shang Chengzuo argues that this passage confirms the tradition that Yan Di was the ancestor of the Chu people; see Shang Chengzuo 1964:9:16. In a gloss on this passage, Li Ling writes:

"The 'Haineijing' 海內經 chapter of *Shanhaijing* regards Zhu Rong as the descendant of Yan Di, moreover [it] declares that Zhu Rong begat Gong Gong 共工, and the Chu people of the Mi clan name, according to the "Zhengyu" chapter of the Guoyu that records the words of the Historian Bo 史伯, were one of the so-called 'eight clan names of Zhu Rong.' These all show that what the silk manuscript records about Yan Di, Zhu Rong, and Gong Gong in a later passage reflects the traditions of Chu." (1985:71)

The fact that these Yan Di, Zhu Rong, and Gong Gong were part of Chu's tradition is confirmed indeed, but the contexts in which they occur say nothing about genealogical relationships. Li changed his mind in a later article where, after reviewing the relevant classical texts and recently discovered textual materials, he states that he was mistaken in accepting the foregoing references as the genealogical tradition of Chu origins. He concludes, "In sum, we think that at the present the tradition of the origins of Chu that is the most systematic and has the most basis in ancient writings is still the *Shiben*" (1991.2:47-48).

¹⁸ Wang Guowei 1921:894 ("Zhugong zhong ba" 郟公鍾拔) and Li Xueqin 1980:75-76. See Guo Moruo 1935:191b-192a for the identity of the maker of the bronze.

A reference to early progenitors in the Chu pedigree also appears in a *Zuozhuan* passage that explains why Chu extinguished the state of Kui 夔 in the autumn of 634 .

It states:

When the Viscount of Kui did not sacrifice to Zhu Rong and Yü Xiong, the officers of Chu reprimanded him. [He] said, "When our former King Xiong Zhi was sick, the ghosts and deities did not forgive him, so he hid himself in Kui. Because of that, he lost Chu; so why should we sacrifice to them?"¹⁹

夔子不祀祝融與鬻熊，楚人讓之。對曰我先王熊摯有疾，鬼神弗赦，而自鼠于夔。吾是以失楚，又何以祀焉。

Thus, Kui was extinguished for failing to perform rites to the common ancestors that its ruling house shared with that of Chu.

When Duke Huan (r. 806 -771), the founder of Zheng, inquired of Historian Bo 史伯 whether he could find safe haven in the southern region should Zhou be overcome by its problems, the *Guoyu* notes that he spoke of the pedigree of the ruling house of Chu saying,

Moreover, [they] are descendants of Zhong Li. When that Li acted as fire master for Gaoxi, [he] used grand brilliance and liberal generosity, the lights of Heaven and the power of the earth to illuminate [i.e., bless] the Four Seas; therefore, [Di Gao] commissioned him "Zhu Rong (Dispenser of Light)." His accomplishments were grand, indeed!²⁰

且重黎之後也。夫黎爲高辛氏火正，以淳耀 敦大，天明地德，光照四海，故命之曰祝融。其攻大矣。

¹⁹ ZZS 16:7b--8a (265, Xi 26).

²⁰ GY 16:1a-2a (365-67, "Zhengyu").

Commenting on this passage, Wei Zhao says, "'Zhong [and] Li are the names of offices. The 'Chuyu' [chapter] says, 'Zhuan Xu then ordered *nanzheng* Zhong to manage Heaven and *beizheng* Li to manage the Earth.' [This passage] means that ancestors of Chu acted in these two offices."²¹ 重黎官名。楚語曰顓頊乃命南正重司天，北正黎司地。言楚之先爲此二官。

In a discourse about the Five Offices that controlled the five basic elements of nature, the *Zuozhuan* says "The fire master's [office] was called '*zhu rong*'" 火正曰祝融 and notes that "Mr. Zhuan Xu had a son called 'Li' who became *zhu rong*."²² 顓頊氏有子曰犁，爲祝融。Based on this anecdote and the "Chuyu" reference cited by Wei Zhao, many scholars have argued that Zhong and Li were two individuals not offices. They maintain that Sima Qian has confused them as one in the "Hereditary House of Chu" where he says that "Juan Zhang begat Zhong Li" 卷章生重黎, who served Di Gao as fire master and was awarded the title of *zhu rong* for meritorious service.

Sima Qian clearly takes "Zhong Li" as the name of one person, for he writes that when Zhong Li failed to completely extinguish a rebellion by Gong Gong, Di Gao punished him and "had his younger brother Wu Hui act as Zhong Li's successor, and [he] again occupied the office of fire master and became Zhu Rong."²³ 以其弟吳回

²¹ *Ibid.*, 16:2a (367, "Zhengyu").

²² ZZS 53:6b, 10a (923, 925, Zhao 29).

²³ SJHZKZ 40:2-3 (644).

薦重黎後，復居火正，爲祝融。◦ Sima Qian's use of "Zhong Li" is consistent with the *Guoyu* passage quoted above.²⁴

One could, perhaps, argue that the Chu ruling house was descended from Zhong Li since Wu Hui was made his successor, but Wu Hui is the Zhu Rong reckoned by Chu as its progenitor. After recounting the glorious posterity of those who mastered control of Heaven and Earth, namely the ruling houses of Xia, Shang, and Zhou, Historian Bo observes that Zhu Rong was one who was able to do those things but "his descendants, comprising eight clan names, in Zhou did not yet have the [noble ranks] of marquis or count" 其後八姓於周未有侯伯. According to Wei Zhao, the so-called "eight clan names of Zhu Rong," were Ji, Dong, Peng, Tu, Yun, Cao, Zhen, and Mi.²⁵ These surnames were borne by the sons and grandsons of Lu Zhong, who was the son of Wu Hui, or Zhu Rong.

Historian Bo goes on to note that during the Xia dynasty, Kun Wu, the state founded by Fan 樊, the first son of Lu Zhong, or his descendants, and under the Shang dynasty the states of Da Peng, Shi, and Wei, which were founded by Lu Zhong's third son Qian and his descendants, had the rank of count. States bearing the clan names Dong, Peng, and Tu were extinguished during the Xia, Shang, and Zhou dynasties respectively, whereas those with the clan name of Yun and Cao were merely inconsequential, remotely located, satellite statelets beholden to the ruler of Zhou. There were no extant states with the clan name of Zhen.

²⁴ Wang Guanggao 1988:17 also argues that Zhong Li is the name one person not two.

²⁵ GY 16:2b (367, "Zhengyu").

Finally, Historian Bo concludes his assessment saying,

Does the revival of [the Zhu] Rongs perhaps reside in the Mi clan name? [The states of] Kui and Yue[zhang] are not sufficient to be commissioned. The Man Mi have become Man. Only Jing (i.e., Chu) truly has outstanding virtue. Should Zhou fall, [Jing Chu] must rise up, I predict!"²⁶

祝融之興者，其在半姓乎。夔越不足命也。蠻羊蠻矣。
。唯荆實有照德。若周衰，其必興矣。

The early generations of Wu Hui through Ji Lian, the founding ancestor of the Mi clan of Chu are, thus, accounted in this anecdote in the *Guoyu*.

In the *Zuozhuan*, King Ling (r. 540-529) is reported to have laid a genealogical claim to territory in the state of Zheng saying, "Formerly my August Ancestor's elder brother Kun Wu made his residence at Old Xu. Now the officers of Zheng covet and rely on its fields and do not give it to me. Suppose that I ask for it, [will] they give it to me?"²⁷ 昔我皇祖伯父昆吾，舊許是宅。今鄭人貪賴其田，而不與我。我若求之，其與我乎。As noted above, "Kun Wu" is the name of the state founded by Lu Zhong's eldest son, Fan, or his descendants. So from the perspective of King Ling, a descendant of Ji Lian, who was Lu Zhong's youngest son, "father's elder brother" (*bofu* 伯父) was the correct term of reference for Kun Wu.

All but one of the links in the *Shiben* and "Chu Hereditary House" versions of the early generations of the ancestry of the ruling house of Chu from Zhuan Xu to Ji Lian, the first ancestor to receive the clan name Mi have been found in primary written

²⁶ GY 16:2b-3b (367-70, "Zhengyu," text and commentary).

²⁷ ZZS 45:35b-36a (794, Zhao 12).

sources that are indisputably from Chu and the related ruling house of Zhu as well as with references in the *Zuozhuan* and the *Guoyu*. Consequently, the undocumented link, namely Cheng 成, the son of Zhuan Xu, can also be assumed to reflect how the ancestry of Ji Lian was viewed. Fu Ju 附沮 and Xue Xiong, respectively the son and grandson of Ji Lian, also were not documented, but can perhaps be accepted on the strength of the positive evidence for their antecedents. The importance of Wu Hui in the pedigree is evident in the fact that the descent group that was comprised of his descendants was identified by his honorific title Zhu Rong. Of the states that its member clans founded, only the state of Chu of the Mi clan was deemed politically potent at the end of the Western Zhou era.²⁸

Note should be made that all of the sources utilized in the forgoing discussion originate in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States eras; so they represent the genealogical views that were held during the Eastern Zhou period after Chu had become a major player in the world of interstate politics. Consequently, one can justifiably ask whether the putative descent from Zhuan Xu, which links the ruling house of Chu by genealogy to many ruling houses of the Hua Xia states in the Central Plains to its north, was a later fabrication that was politically motivated.²⁹ I think the

²⁸ Li Ling 1991:48-50 questions whether the six sons and the eight clans of Zhu Rong were really related by blood. He argues that this group of clans represents a territorial group rather than a consanguineous group. From the tradition, there is no doubt that each "clan" was domiciled in a different locality, but this does not negate the possibility that they were related by blood. At this time, the phenomenon of siblings, as the founders of locality based descent groups formed by fission from their natal group, having different *xing* is comparable to later times when lineages belonging to the same clan bore different *shi* 氏 (lineage surnames).

²⁹ While discussing the genealogical claim of the state of Wu to be senior to King Wen and Wu of Zhou, Creel says: "Genealogies appear to have figured largely in the process of merging

answer is negative. Qu Yuan, who drank deeply of the local culture, had no ulterior motive for stating his ancestry. The divination texts were not made for public display or consumption. The bronze inscription by Duke Ding of Zhu was a private document. People from other states, Kui and Zheng, recognized the early progenitors of Chu. King Ling's genealogical claim to Old Xu would not have been regarded as spurious at the time. The geographic, ethnic, and cultural evidence that will be presented below all speak for a northern origin for the ruling house of Chu that is consistent with the tradition of descent from Zhuan Xu.

Geographic Origin

There are a wide variety of views with respect to the geographic origins of the Chu people and the route of their migration, if any, to Hubei. Advocates of a northern origin point to eastern Henan on the Central Plains (*zhongyuan* 中原) as the native place of the Chu people. Various migration routes are proffered: a westerly route through Henan to Shaanxi, then south down to southwestern Hubei,³⁰ a southwesterly move through the Nanyang Basin and the Suizao Corridor to southwestern Henan,³¹ and a southerly route to the Huai River then to the Yangzi and up to the Jiang Han region in Hubei.³² Advocates of an eastern origin claim variously that the Chu people originally

the populace of what we now call China into a single people." He notes that Chu claimed descent from a "very early Emperor." While allowing for the possibility that some such claims may be valid, he argues the most are not (1970:225).

³⁰ He Guangyue 1988:163-211.

³¹ Li Yujie 1988:1-8. Wang Guanggao 1988:28-29 also posits movement between central and southwestern Henan but does not specify the route.

³² Ma Kailiang 1982.2:77-81.

resided in Shandong, Hebei, and Henan,³³ or that they were natives of the Lower Huai River Basin who moved southward to the Yangzi River, then followed it up to southern Hubei.³⁴ Proponents of a southern origin argue that the Chu people were either indigenous to southern Hubei³⁵ or moved up from the South to central Henan, then back south to southwestern Hubei.³⁶ Finally advocates of a western origin claim that the Chu people migrated southeastward down the Han River to the vicinity of the Yangzi River,³⁷ or that they originated west of central Henan, through which they passed enroute to southwestern Hubei via Shandong, Jiangsu, and Anhui,³⁸ or that they were actually fire-worshippers from Media.³⁹

³³ Hu Houxuan 1934-35.

³⁴ Guo Moruo 1954:258-66. Guo put forth his argument in 1930 in the first edition of this work.

³⁵ Lin Huixiang 1937.1:94-107 argued that "the Chu people probably were originally a southern ethnic group that had been established at Jing Mountain in the Jiang Han region at least from mid-Shang" and that "the Miao people 苗族 were surely the progenitors of Chu" (cited and partially quoted in Shu Zhimei 1983:66).

³⁶ Fan Wenlan 范文瀾 made this argument in 1942 (see Shu Zhimei 1983:66).

³⁷ Jiang Liangfu 1979:19.

³⁸ He Yizhang [1988].

³⁹ Cen Zhongmian (1958) offered three proofs for this view: (1) The character 'xiong' 熊 was part of the royal title of almost every ruler of Chu starting with the Yü Xiong, the first ruler. Xiong is derived from 'ahura,' the term for 'ruler' in Zoroastrian scriptures. (2) 'Mo'ao' 莫敖, the name of one of the highest offices in Chu, is derived from 'moju,' the Zoroastrian term for 'teacher.' And (3) 'Mi' 羊, the clan name of Chu, which was pronounced *mjie* in ancient Chinese, had the same sound as *me'ia*, or Media. Cen's argument has been soundly rejected for insufficient evidence by Chen Pan (1969:2.11) and for methodological shortcomings by Shu Zhimei (1983:66-67).




Figure 1. Zhu Rong Clan Localities

Note: With the exception of Kun Wu, only one location is shown for states that are associated with more than one locality in Table 2. States for which a county level locality is not known have not been plotted.

**Table 2. Geographical Distribution of States Founded
by the Eight Clans of the Descendants of Zhu Rong**

Son/grandson	Clan	States	Location
Fan 樊 (Kun Wu 昆吾)	Ji 己	Kun Wu 昆吾	Wei 衛 then 舊許 . (1) Puyangxian, Hebei 河北濮陽縣 then Xuchangxian, Henan 河南許昌縣(Cheng Faren) (2) Yuncheng, Shanxi 山西運城 then Xinzheng, Henan 河南新鄭 (Dong Lizhang)
		Su 蘇	Sumen Mtn. in Huixian, Henan 河南輝縣蘇門山
		Gu 顧	Gucheng, Fanxian, Shandong 山東范縣顧城
		Wen 溫	Wenxian, Henan 河南溫縣
		Dong 董	South of Wanrongxian, Shanxi 山西萬榮縣南
Huilian 惠連 (Canhu 參胡)	Dong 董	Zongyi 鬲夷	Wei Zhao says that Dong <i>xing</i> segmented from Ji <i>xing</i> GY 16:3a (369, "Zhengyu"). North of Dingtaoxian, Shandong 山東定陶縣北 then Jiuzong Mtn. north of Lixian, Shaanxi 陝西醴縣北九嶷山 then Xiaoganxian, Hubei 湖北孝感縣 Cheng Falian says "Canhu can't be traced."
		Huanlong 豢龍	Wenxixian, Shanxi 山西聞喜縣
		Dapeng 大彭 (Pengzu 彭祖)	Pengcheng 彭城. Tongshanxian, Jiangsu 江蘇銅山縣
Qianjian (Pengzu 彭祖)	Peng 彭	Shiwei 豕韋	Wei in Huaxian, Henan 韋河南滑縣
		Zhuji 諸稽	Northwest of Zhuchengxian, Shandong 山東諸城縣西北
		Zhouren 舟人	Vicinity of Xinzheng, Henan 河南新鄭
Qiuyan 求言 (Kuairan 鄒人)	Yun 妘	Wu 鄒	Southwest of Yanshixian, Henan 河南偃師縣西南
		Kuai 鄒	Xin Zheng 新鄭. Wei Zhao says that Qiuyan was enfeoffed at Kuai, while his descendants were enfeoffed in the other places GY 16:3a (369, "Zhengyu") Between Xinzheng and Mixian, Henan 河南新鄭密縣間 (Cheng Faren)
		Lu 路	Northeast of Luchengxian, Shanxi 山西潞城縣東北

Table 2 continued

Son/grandson	Clan	States	Location
		Piyang 偃陽	15 li south of Fengxian, Shandong 山東峰山縣南15里
An 安	Cao 曹	Zou 鄒	Shandong
		Ju 莒	Shandong
		Zhu 邾?	<i>Shiben</i> says Caoxing is Zhuguo. Zhu was located between Qufu and Zouxian, Shandong 山東曲阜鄒縣間
? (son of An)	Zhen 斟	Zhenguan 斟灌	Shouguangxian, Shandong 山東壽光縣
		Zhenzou 斟鄩?	Gongxian, Henan 河南鞏縣; established state in Puyang, Henan 河南濮陽 moved to Zhenguan in Shouguangxian, Shandong 山東壽光縣
Jilian 季連	Mi 羊	Kui 夔	Diguixian, Hubei 湖北秭歸縣
		Yue 越	vicinity of Zhang Mtn. and Zhang River in Anluxian, Hubei 湖北安陸縣章山章水
		Manmi 蠻羊	Pu 濮. Southern Hubei.
		Jing 荆	Jiangling, Hubei 湖北江陵

Sources: GY 16:2b-3a (368-69, "Zhengyu"--text and commentary); Cheng Faren 1967; 43-44; Li Xueqin 1980; He Guangyue 1988:25-162; Dong Lizhang 1993:597-98, 609.

In view of the apparent validity of the traditional view of the ancestral origins of the royal house of Chu discussed above, Li Xueqin has sought to bring some order to this chaotic situation by drawing attention to the location of the places associated with the eight Zhu Rong clans as important indicators of the origins of the Chu people,⁴⁰ which shall be understood here as the royal house and ruling elite. As evident in Figure 1 and Table 2 above, although the Mi clan states, which were founded during the Western Zhou period, are in modern Hubei, judging from the location of the states of

⁴⁰Li Xueqin 1980.

the other clans, the geographic origins of the royal house of Chu is clearly connected with the provinces of Shaanxi, Shanxi, Henan, and Shandong.

In his recent monograph, *Chu yuanliu shi* 楚源流史 (*A History of Chu Origins and Migration*), He Guangyue has used historical place names in combination with historical events recorded in classical and inscriptional sources and other evidence to supply authoritative answers to the questions of where the Chu people came from and what route they took to reach modern day Hubei. In the remainder of this section, his argument is summarized with comments on certain problematic aspects. The migration path that he proposes is plotted in Figure 2 below starting from the first place that is associated with the progenitors of the Chu ruling house.




Figure 2. Chu Migration Path

Commenting on the *Lushi Chunqiu's* claim that Ruo River 若水 was the birthplace of Zhuan Xu, He Guangyue identifies the Ruo River with the upper reaches of the Dadu River 大渡河 in modern day Sichuan.⁴¹ Zhuan Xu moved east from there and finally settled and died at Diqiu 帝丘, in what is now Puyang, Henan, in the Spring and Autumn state of Wey 衛. The *Zuozhuan* says Wei was the "abode of Zhuan Xu" 顓頊之虛.⁴² Wu Hui, or Zhu Rong, established his residence nearby in modern day Xin Zheng, Henan at the place that became the capital of the Spring and Autumn state of Zheng; the *Zuozhuan* says this was the "abode of Zhu Rong" 祝融之虛.⁴³ His youngest son, Ji Lian, settled at Chuqiu 楚丘, or modern day Huaxian, Henan, which was not far from the abodes of his progenitors Zhuan Xu and Wu Hui, or Zhu Rong, and from whence his descendants took their tribal name Chu.⁴⁴

According to He Guangyue's reconstruction, the Chu descendants of Ji Lian followed a migratory route that took them first in a southeasterly direction into Shandong, then west across Henan to Shaanxi, from whence they moved south to Henan and Hubei. The place name Chuqiu was given to their first stop at Caoxian, Shandong.

⁴¹ Gu Tiefu (1984:6-14) argues that the Chu people were northerners descended from Zhuan Xu and Zhu Rong rather than indigenous people, or Man Yi, from the south. But based on the concentration of clans descended from Zhu Rong in the eastern part of Henan, he says that Zhuan Xu came from the east rather than the west. In a more recent work, Gu (1988b:18-19) defends his position by arguing the places associated with Zhuan Xu and his predecessors and successor are all in eastern China, mainly in the territory of the Eastern Yi (*Dong Yi* 東夷).

⁴² He Guangyue 1988:3. See ZZZS 48:11a (839, Zhao 17--text and commentary). Later Fan, the eldest son of Wu Hui, established the state of Kun Wu at this site, which according to the *Zuozhuan* became known as the "abode of Kun Wu" 昆吾之虛 (*ibid.*, 40); also see ZZZS 60:10a (1045, Ai 17--text and commentary).

⁴³ He Guangyue 1988:9. See ZZZS 48:11a (839, Zhao 17--text and commentary).

⁴⁴ He Guangyue 1988:172, 179.

Under pressure from the growing power of the Eastern Yi late in the Xia era, they moved southwest to Xiong 熊 in Xinzheng, Henan, which was located just north of the state of Kun Wu. This is believed to have originally been a domicile of the Yu Xions 有熊氏, who were descended from the Yellow Emperor. He speculates that the ruling house of Chu adopted the name "Xiong" at this place.

Their next move was a short distance to the south to Mount Xiong 熊山 in Yancheng, Henan. In the late Xia or early Shang eras, facing the territorial expansion of Shang from the east, the Chu people moved west into the Jing Mountain 荆山 region in the vicinity of Yuxian, Henan. He considers this to be the place where, according to the New Edition version of the *Bamboo Annals*, the residents of Jing were attacked by Shang and forced into submission during the 21st year of the reign of Di Gui 帝癸, or Jie 桀, the last ruler of the Xia dynasty.⁴⁵

By mid-Shang, the Chu tribe moved further west to the Jing Mountain region in Lingbao, Henan under military pressure from the Shang. He Guangyue argues that the rugged terrain in this area fits the topographical and directional conditions of King Wu Ding's pacification of the Jing Chu 荆楚 region as described in the following passage from "Yin Wu" 殷武 ode in the "Shang Song" 商頌 section of the *Shujing* ("Book of Odes"): "Urgently [King] Wu of Yin energetically attacked Jing Chu/[He]deeply

⁴⁵ This version of the *Bamboo Annals* is not an authentic Zhou period source as proven conclusively by Wang Guowei. However, he argues that ninety-nine percent of its contents are based on other sources with the years and months added as the only pure fabrications. Wang traces the source of this particular entry to the *Yuejueshu* 越絕書, a Eastern Han compilation based in part on earlier oral traditions. This source does not give a year for the submission of Jing but rather notes that it occurred in the time of Cheng Tang of Shang 商成湯, the conqueror of the Xia dynasty and founder of the Shang; see Wang Guowei 1927:188, 213.

penetrated its defiles [and] gathered the inhabitants of Jing . . . [He said], 'Oh you [people] of Jing Chu dwell in the region south of [our] capital.'⁴⁶ 撻被殷武，奮伐荆楚。深入其阻，衰荆之旅。 。 。 維女荆楚，居國南鄉。 As supporting evidence for his argument, three oracle bone inscriptions are cited from King Wu Ding's era which indicate that he received a bride or concubine from Chu,⁴⁷ evidently an early example of "princess diplomacy" to create good relations between Shang and the Chu tribe, presumably in the wake of the foregoing incident.

Eventually the Chu people were forced by the Shang to move west again to Jing Shan on the north side of the Wei River 渭水 in Chaoyi, Shaanxi. This is the place where the Yellow Emperor and Yu (founder of the Xia dynasty) are traditionally believed to have cast bronze tripods. Thus, He maintains that the move by Chu was to form an alliance with near and distant kinsmen (descendants of the Yellow Emperor) in opposition to the Shang. Several topographical names that figure later in the migration history of Chu are found here. He suggests that the name "Ju River" 沮水, which is also found in the Jing Shan region of Hubei, was taken by Chu from the Ju River in this place and claims that the name of Danyang 丹陽, an early seat of Chu, was derived

⁴⁶ MSZS 20.4:9a-b (804). The preface to this ode says that it was composed for a sacrifice to Gao Zong 高宗 who is identified by commentator Mao Qiling as King Wu Ding of Shang. Also see comments and compare translation in James Legge 4:643-44.

Opinions about the location of Jing Chu mentioned in the ode vary. Han commentator Zheng Xuan, who says that it was located on the other (south) side of the Fangcheng Mountains, is followed by Shu Zhimei and Wu Yongzhang, who argue that references to southern countries (*nanguo* 南國 or *nanbang* 南邦) and southern territory (*nantu* 南土) in the *Shijing* always refer to the Jiang Han region (1980:65-66). Duan Yu (1982) places it east and south of the Shang capital in the vicinity of southwestern Shandong and northern Anhui. He Guangyue's Jing Mountain near Lingbao is located in the far western part of Henan.

⁴⁷ He Guangyue 1988:181.

from Chaoyi's Danyang Cave 丹陽洞 . Local tradition says this cave was once the dwelling place of Laojun 老君, whom He regards as Lao Tong, a direct line ancestor of the ruling house of Chu.⁴⁸

Moves late in the Shang era brought Chu and the Zhou people together. First, under more military pressure from the Shang, Chu moved further west up the Wei River to the vicinity of Mount Chu 楚山 and the Chu River 楚水 in Qianyang, Shaanxi. From there, they joined their distant kinsmen, the Zhou people, in opposing the Shang. At this time the Zhou were based nearby to the southeast at Mount Qi 岐山 . As evidence of the relationship between Chu and Zhou, He points to bone inscriptions discovered in 1977 at Qishan which show the subservience of Chu to Zhou prior to the latter's move to Feng 豐 under the leadership of King Wen.⁴⁹

When Zhou moved eastward to Feng, Chu followed suit, settling just to the east of it in the Jingxi valley in Jingxi, Shaanxi. He says that they brought along the name Jing by which the stream flowing through the valley became known. Chu began its move southward into Hubei from here.

Its first stop was south of the Zhongnan Mountain pass in Shangxian, Shaanxi in the vicinity of Mount Chu and the Chu River . He Guangyue says that this is the

⁴⁸ He Guangyue 1988:182-83.

⁴⁹ He Guangyue 1988:183-84. He Guangyue also says that Chu poet Qu Yuan offered a recollection of this move from Chaoyi to Qianyang in the "Tian Wen" section of the *Chuci* when he wrote: "Moving and hiding near Qi, what could [one] rely upon?" 遷藏就岐，何能依。 The foregoing translation of this passage attempts to capture the way He apparently reads it; unfortunately he does not explain his interpretation. The context in which the passage occurs and commentaries on it suggest Qu Yuan was speaking of the move by King Wen of Zhou to Mount Qi; see CCBZ 3:33b-34b (190-92).

location of Chu King Promontory 楚王之尾, the burial place of the King Jili 王季 歷 according the Wei section of the *Zhanguo* and notes that there are seven or eight sites within 100 square *li* in the vicinity of Shangxian that bear the names Chu or Jing. He accepts the position of modern scholars Shi Quan and Xu Dekuan that Shangxian was the location of the first capital of the state of Chu. He also supports the view that Yü Xiong, one of King Wu's close associates, was the first ruler of Chu. The oracle inscription, "The Viscount of Chu came to report," that was discovered at Qishanxian, Shaanxi in 1977, and the proximity of Shangxian to the Zhou capital are offered as corroborating evidence.⁵⁰

Precisely because Chu was nearby, it was able to join the covenant meeting that King Wu held at Qiyang.⁵¹ The *Guoyu* reference to this event quotes Shuxiang of Jin saying: " Long ago King Cheng covenanted with the various rulers at Qiyang. Chu, being considered Man from Jing, provided firewood, arranged the materials for sacrifices to the mountains and rivers, and joined the Xianbi to keep the fire; therefore, it did not join the covenant."⁵² He Guangyue notes that the role of Chu on this occasion

⁵⁰ He Guangyue 1988:85-86. See Yu Weichao 1980:6 and Guo Tiefu 1984 for more on the oracle bone inscription cited here.

⁵¹ He Guangyue 1988:186. This seems like a forced argument, particularly in view of the unanimous view of classical texts that it was King Cheng's meeting, but it has some merit. The "Rang Wang" 讓王 chapter of the *Zhuangzi* says that Boyi and Shuqi came to Qiyang to see if there really were people who possessed The Way out west. Disillusioned with King Wu, they left north for Mount Shouyang, where they starved themselves to death. (ZZJJ 28:194; see longer account in LSCQXJZ 12:119-120) Sima Qian's biography of Boyi says that when Shuchi and he arrived (at Qiyang), King Wen died, and King Wu launched an attack on Shang (SJHZKZ 61:7-11 (846-47). The *Zuozhuan* states that a "spring hunt" 蒐, or preparation for war, was held at Qiyang (ZZZS 42:26b [730, Zhao 4]). Thus, from the traditions passed on in the *Guoyu* and in these sources, King Wu was based at Qiyang, where an alliance covenant and war preparations were made, and from whence he attacked Shang.

⁵² GY 14:8a (337, "Jinyu 8").

is consistent with the oracle inscription found at Zhouyuan which says that Chu and Wei brought firewood and argues that Chu was relegated to this role because the office of *zhu rong* was held by its ancestors. He rejects King Cheng as the convenor of the meeting because he had moved the capital further away to Hao, thus the king would not have needed to come back to hold a meeting; this is a case of confusing the character "Cheng" 成 for the "Wu" 武 of King Wu's name. The occasion for the meeting was to organize an assault on Shang with participants from nearby localities.⁵³ However, King Cheng had hunted here at the foot of Mount Chu 楚麓, according to the "*Junding*" inscription, because Chu and Zhou enjoyed close relations in his time.⁵⁴

After the Zhou conquest of Shang, He Guangyue argues that Yuxiong moved from Shangxian southeastward down the Dan River to its confluence with the Xi River 淅水. There he established a new capital named Danyang 丹陽 (literally "sunny side of the Dan") on the north bank of the Dan River in the vicinity of modern day Xichuan, Henan.⁵⁵

⁵³ He Guangyue assumes that the people from the West who were part of the conquering force that King Wu led against the Yin capital at Shang were participants at Qiyang. The Mu Shi 牧誓 chapter of the *Shujing*, which purports to record the oath by King Wu on this occasion, says he was accompanied by loyal vassal lords (presumably Hua states), high officials of his own state, and the following non-Hua groups: Yong 庸, Shu 蜀, Qiang 羌, Mao 鬃, Wei 微, Lu 盧, Peng 彭, Pu 濮 (SSZY 11:15b [158]; see also SJHZKZ 4:24-25 [69-70]). The modern location for Yong is Yunyang, Hubei, Shu is the northern part of Sichuan, Qiang is in the far west, Mao is in the southern part of Shanxi, along the Yellow River, Wei is Meixian, Shaanxi, Lü is Xiangyang, Hubei, Peng is Pengxian, Sichuan, and Pu is Jingzhoufu, Hubei; see Qu Wanli 1973:58.

⁵⁴ He Guangyue 1988:185-86.

⁵⁵ He Guangyue 1988:187. The location of Danyang has been one of the most hotly contested issues in the historical geography of Chu. Scholarly opinion has been sharply divided for nearly two millennia. The "Geographical Treatise" of the *Han Shu* locates it in modern day Dangtu, Anhui. The "Jiang Shui" 江水 chapter of the *Shuijingzhu* places it at modern Zigui, Hubei. A commentary on the *Shiji*, quotes Xu Guang of the Jin dynasty as saying that it was in

The "Chu Hereditary House" chapter of the *Shiji* states that "[King Cheng] enfeoffed Xiong Yi among the Man of Chu, granted him the fields of a viscount or baron, and domiciled him at Danyang."⁵⁶ 封熊繹於楚蠻，封以子男之田，姓羊氏，居丹陽。 Many scholars interpret this passage to mean that the state of Chu was established with the enfeoffment of Xiong Yi, who was the great-grandson of Yü Xiong. However, the *Shiben* simply says, "Yü Xiong of Chu resided at Danyang."⁵⁷ 楚鬻熊居丹陽。 He Guangyue argues that Yü Xiong was actually the first ruler of the state of Chu and that his rank was viscount; this is evident in the oracle bone inscription noted above which says "The Viscount of Chu came to

modern Zhijiang, Hubei. Tang scholar Du You maintains that it was originally at Zigui, then relocated to Zhijiang. And Qing scholar Song Xiangfeng situates it in modern Xichuan, Henan. For overviews of these arguments and the scholarly discussion that they spawned through the 1960s, see Cheng Falian 1967:45-47 and Chen Pan 1969:104a-109b.

Archeological discoveries during the last quarter of the twentieth century have rekindled the debate about the location of Danyang. It has been a lively topic at numerous academic conferences (for examples of conference reports, see Yin Weizhang 1981, Yang Fanzhong 1982, and Wang Xiong 1989). Supporters for the most of the views above can be found in recent literature: Zigui (Shu Zhimei and Wu Yongzhang 1980, Yang Kuan 1981, and Wen Bigui); Zhijiang (Huang Shengzhang and Niu Zhongxun 1979, Yu Weichao 1980:4-7, Gao Yangqin and Cheng Yaoting 1980, Liu Hehui 1985, Zuo Peng 1995); and Xichuan (Feng Yongxuan 1980, Pei Mingxiang 1980, Gu Tiefu 1988b:32-36). Multiple locations for Danyang during the Western Zhou period have also been argued: Shangxian, Shaanxi to Danxi (Xichuan) (Shi Quan 1988:174-99 [this is a revision of an article co-authored with Xu Dekuan in 1982]; Hu Shaohua 1994:242-52); Danxi to Jingshan (Nanzhang, Hubei) (Zhang Zhengming 1982:64-66, Li Yujie 1988:18-21), Danxi to Nanzhang (Wang Guangao 1988:340-76), and Danxi to Zigui to Ju and Zhang rivers region (Zhijiang) (Liu Xinfang 1988). All but the first of these views bridge the old Zhijiang and Xichuan theories. In terms of archaeological finds, evidence for the northern origin of the ruling house, and the political history of Chu during the Western Zhou, the move of Danyang from modern Xichuan to the Jingshan Mountains and the upper catchment of the Ju and Zhang rivers makes the most sense. (See Blakeley 1988 for a thoughtful review and evaluation of the arguments for the various views).

⁵⁶ SJHZKZ 40 5-6 (645).

⁵⁷ SBBZ (Zhang edition), 38.

report." Xiong Yi could not have lived as early as the reign King Cheng if his great grandfather served Kings Wen and Wu of Zhou.⁵⁸

He Guangyue cites the discovery of Western Zhou and Spring and Autumn remains at the Longcheng site in Xichuan, Henan as evidence that this was a capital of Chu. The burial of Chief Minister Zigeng, which was excavated here, was in keeping with a widely shared Spring and Autumn tradition of sending the corpses of nobility to their ancestral place for burial. When the Duke of Zhou took refuge in Chu to escape slander shortly after King Cheng began to rule Zhou, it was located here, not far from the Zhou capital at Haojing,⁵⁹

He Guangyue also identifies Danyang as the location of Chu when, according to the "Qing *gui*" 禽簋 inscription, it was attacked by a force led by King Cheng, who was aided by the duke of Zhou and the latter's son, Boqin. He argues that Boqin, the Duke of Lu, was first enfeoffed at Lushan 魯山 in modern Lushan County, Henan,⁶⁰

⁵⁸ He Guangyue 1988:189. Guo Tiefu also identifies the Viscount of Chu as Yü Xiong (1981:72-73).

⁵⁹ See SJHZKZ 33:12 (564).

⁶⁰ According to the "Zhou Annals" of the *Shiji*, King Wu had previously enfeoffed the Duke of Zhou, the father of Boqin, at Qufu (in modern Shandong), although he never took up residence there SJHZKZ 33:3 [565]. This presents a problem for He Guangyue's point which he does not address. However, other modern scholars argue that the Duke of Zhou was never given Lu (Qufu), rather he was enfeoffed at the old site of Zhou near Qiyang, hence the rank and title that he bore was "Duke of Zhou." As proof they cite the earliest accounts of the enfeoffment of Boqin at Lu which are found in Spring and Autumn sources. The second stanza of the "Bi Gong" 闕宮 ode in the "Lu Song" 魯頌 section of the *Shijing* says, "The King said, 'Uncle, I [shall] establish your eldest son and cause him to be marquis at Lu. [May he] greatly enlarge your domain and act as a support to the House of Zhou.'" 王曰叔父，建爾元子，俾侯于魯。大啓爾宇，爲周室輔。(MSZS 22:5a [778]). Under the year 506, the *Zuozhuan* includes a speech by Ziyu 子魚 of Wey in which he relates,

Formerly, when King Wu conquered Shang, King Cheng stabilized [the state] and chose and established [those of] outstanding virtue in order to protect [the frontiers of] Zhou.

from whence he participated in the attack on Chu at Danyang, about 200 km to its

Therefore, the Duke of Zhou assisted the Royal House administer all under Heaven. When Zhou was peaceful, [the King?] set apart the Duke of Lu with a grand chariot, a large banner with entwined dragons, the Xiahou jade, the Fengfu bow, and citizens of Yin amounting to six lineages, the Tiaos, the Xus, the Xiaos, the Sos, the Changshaos, and the Weishaos, and ordered them to lead their lineages to gather their branches, and to lead their agnates to emulate the Duke of Zhou and use the edicts of Zhou. Thus [the King] ordered him to serve in Lu in order to glorify the outstanding virtue of the duke of Zhou. [The King] gave him territory that was expansive and rich, the offices of invocator, *zong[ren]*, diviner, and scribe, lower ranking officers, and bronze vessels. He received the people of Shangyan, was appointed by means of the "Boqin" [document], and enfeoffed at the [former] residence of Xiaohao. (ZZZS 54:15a-17a [947-48, Ding 4])

昔武王克，成王定之，選建明德，以藩屏周，故周公相王室，以尹天下。於周爲睦，分魯公以大路大旂，夏后氏之璜，封父之繁弱，殷民六族，條氏徐氏蕭氏索氏長勺氏尾勺氏，使帥其宗氏，輯其分族，將其類醜，以法則周公，用即命于周。是使之職事于魯，以昭周公之明德。分之土田陪敦，祝宗卜史，備物典策，官司彝器。因商奄之民，命以伯禽，封於小皞之虛。

Neither account mentions the enfeoffment of the Duke of Zhou at Lu. The notion of his enfeoffment at Lu appears in later Warring States sources such as the *Mengzi*, which evidently served as the point of reference for Sima Qian's "Basic Annals of Zhou" version.

These scholars argue that before Boqin was enfeoffed at Qufu, he was served in the office of Grand Invocator 大祝 in the Zhou. He was installed as Duke of Lu in the vicinity of Lushan, Henan before the military campaign to pacify the eastern region. Following the pacification of the east, including the state of Shangyan, he was enfeoffed again at Qufu. The second enfeoffment is implied in the continuation of the "Bi Gong" ode which says at the start of the third stanza, "Then he commissioned the Duke of Lu and ordered him to be marquis in the east, and gave him mountains and streams, agricultural land and dependencies" 乃命魯公，俾侯于東，賜之山川，土田附庸 (MSZS 22:5a [778]). Speaking in behalf of the king of Zhou in 533, Earl Huan of Zhan 詹桓伯 is alleged to have said, "... Coming to the time when King Wu conquered Shang, Pugu and Shangyan were my eastern territory" 及武王克商，蒲姑商奄吾東土也 (ZZZS 45:3b [778, Zhao 9]). Thus, Boqin's second enfeoffment evidently occurred following his participation in the subjugation of Shangyan. Ziyu appears to have recalled the second enfeoffment of Boqin. Lu, the name of his original fief, was carried over to the new territory, where he ruled as the Duke of Lu. Kang Shu, founder of Wey, is also believed to have been enfeoffed twice, first at Kang, which was located within King Wu's own domain, and second at Wey in the east; see comment by Song Zhong in SBJB, 349 and the discussion in Qu Wanli 1957:67.

southwest. Afterwards he attacked the Eastern Yi and Yan in the east where he ultimately settled and established the state of Lu.⁶¹

⁶¹ He Guangyue 1988:187-89. Scholars disagree over the reading of 禁. Guo Moruo interprets it as Chu 楚 with the signific "woods" 林 and the phonetic *qu* 去. Guo relates this character to 楚 in the "*Ling gui*" inscription which he interprets as Chu with the signific "woods" 林 and the phonetic *shu* 疐. Guo argues that both of these inscriptions refer to the same event, namely an attack on Chu, which was located in Shandong (Guo Moruo 1935:11b-13b) Chen Mengjia reads 禁 as Gai 蓋, which he equates with Yan 奄, noting that both mean "to cover" and were pronounced the same in antiquity. So this inscription, according to Chen, refers to an attack on Yan, a state allied to Shang which was located in Lu territory and whose population was eventually given to Boqin, the Duke of Lu, by King Cheng of Zhou. (see ZZS 54:16b-17a [947-48, Ding 4]). Shirakawa questions Chen's equation of 禁 with Gai. However, he speculates that this inscription may be closely connected to the battle to suppress Yan and suggests that the event that it describes may have happened early in the reign of King Cheng before Boqin was enfeoffed in Lu (Shirakawa 1962.1a:103-110).

In his transcription of *Qing gui* inscription, Shirakawa does not translate 禁, apparently not taking sides in the interpretation of this character. However, in his discussion of the "*Ling Gui*" inscription, he cites the "*Qing gui*" inscription as one of three occurrences of "Chu;" so he evidently finally came to the same conclusion as Guo Moruo. The "*Ling Gui*" inscription says "When the King attacked the Earl of Chu, he was located at Tan 炎" 隹王于伐楚白，在炎. Shirakawa disagrees with both Guo and Chen Mengjia with regard to the location of Tan. Guo identifies it as the state of Tan 鄆, which was located in modern Tancheng County, Shandong. Chen agrees on the state of Tan (鄆 or 潭) but maintains that during the early Western Zhou, it was located at modern Pingyun County, Shandong to the northeast of Tancheng. Shirakawa, arguing on the bases of references to Tan 炎 in other inscriptions from the reign of King Cheng, holds that the Tan in this inscription was in neither of those places, but rather located in the upper reaches of the Huai River drainage closer to Chengzhou (see 1962.1a:257-61).

Yang Kuan originally accepted the explanation of Guo and Chen that Tan 炎 was the state of Tan and the attendant view that Chu originated in the east, but then changed his mind to argue, particularly against Chen, that Chu could not be numbered among the Huai Yi tribes who bore the *xing* of Ying 嬴 and that Tan "definitely . . . is not Tan 鄆 or Tan 潭." He says that the former view is based on a misreading of the following line in the *Yi Zhou shu*: "In all those who were attacked amounted to seventeen states of the Xiong Ying group (*zu* 族 i.e., tribe)" 凡所征熊盈族十有七國. Chen punctuated the line by adding a comma between Xiong and Ying. This reading allowed him to identify Xiong with Chu, whose ruling house bore the *shi* of Xiong, and Ying with various Eastern Yi groups of Ying tribe 盈族, who were the objects of numerous eastern military expeditions by Zhou (see Chen Mengjia 1956.2:78). Yang claims that the "Xiong Ying" should be regarded as one group rather than two (that is, the two characters are a compound term rather than independent nouns). He argues his case by citing Yang Shipai's gloss, which says, "Xiong is a variant of Ying 嬴. Note *Zuozhuan* Xuan 8 has primary wife Miss Ying 夫人 嬴氏, [while] Gong[yang] and Gu[liang] write Miss Xiong 熊氏; thus the three characters Xiong, Ying 盈, and Ying 嬴 were interchangeable." Noting that there was a clear distinction between the use of *xing* 姓 and *shi* 氏 in antiquity, Yang says that if two

While He may have the sequence of these events right, one cannot be sure that the expedition did not take place before the enfeoffment of Boqin at Lu. Reference in this inscription to Boqin by name suggests that his enfeoffment, which occurred at least three years prior to his father's death,⁶² may not have transpired yet. Father and son, both residing at the capital of Zhou and serving in the court of King Cheng, probably joined the expedition from there at its outset.

The next move by Chu was to Mount Ju 沮山, subsequently renamed Mount Jing 荆山, which was located south of Danyang and west of the Han River in modern Baokang, Hubei. Two rulers of Chu are associated with this move in classical texts. Alluding to the humble beginnings of the four great powers of latter part of the Spring and Autumn era, namely Chu, Yue, Qi, and Jin, the "Feigong *xia*" 非攻下 chapter of the *Mozi* notes, "Xiong Li of Chu was first enfeoffed among the Jushan Mountains."⁶³ 楚熊麗始封睢山間。 Under the year 530, the *Zuozhuan* quotes the chief minister of Chu as saying, "Formerly, when [our] former king [*sic*] Xiong Yi hid in the Jing Mountains, riding in a firewood cart and dressed in ragged clothing, he dwelt among the grass and weeds and paced the mountain forests in order to serve the Son of Heaven."⁶⁴ 昔我先王熊繹辟在荆山，篳路藍縷以處草莽，拔涉山林，以事天子。 Since Xiong Li was the grandfather of Xiong Yi, He

groups were meant, then the expression should have been Mi, Ying 羊盈 since "Mi" was the *xing* of Chu and "Xiong" was its *shi*. (1981:101-102).

Duan Yu's refutation of Yang (1982:61-62) is unconvincing

⁶² SJHZKZ 33:18-19 [569].

⁶³ MZJG 19:96.

⁶⁴ ZZS 45:35b [794, Zhao 12]. Translation modified from Hu Zhihui 胡志揮 and Chen Kejong 陳克炯 1996.2:1167.

Guangyue suggests that Chu resided at Danyang during the period of Yü Xiong to Xiong Yi. The latter was actually the one who moved from Danyang to Jingshan. He argues that the *Mozi* has mistaken Xiong Li for Xiong Yi and that it is unlikely that Xiong Yi, whose capital was at Danyang, would have come back to there from Jingshan.⁶⁵

The timing of this move is a bit problematic, for the *Zuozhuan* says that Xiong Yi served King Kang together with Lü Ji 呂緄, Wangsun Mou 王孫牟, Xiefu 夔父, and Qinfu 禽父,⁶⁶ while the "Hereditary House of Chu" chapter of the *Shiji* says that the foursome served King Cheng.⁶⁷ Since Qinfu (Boqin, Duke of Lu) started his service during the reign of King Cheng and died after the latter's death, perhaps the service of all four straddled the reigns of King Cheng and King Kang, his son. Although He Guangyue suggests that the move by Chu was probably the result of relentless military pressure from Zhou, in view of the tradition of loyal service associated with himself and his predecessors to the kings of Zhou from the time of King Wen, the move could have been just as well been to pursue pacification of the Man in the south.

Regardless of the motivations and timing of the move, as evident in the many military encounters attested in classical historical texts and numerous bronze inscriptions, relations between Zhou and Chu had turned hostile by the reigns of King Zhao and King Mu of Zhou.⁶⁸ When Chu allegedly rebelled against Zhou, King Zhao

⁶⁵ He Guangyue 1988:189-90.

⁶⁶ The four are, respectively, the sons of the founders of the states of Qi, Wei, Jin, and Lu.; see ZZS 45:35a [794, Zhao 12--text and Du commentary].

⁶⁷ SJHZKZ 40:6 [645].

⁶⁸ He Guangyue 1988:191-93.

led an expedition against it and drowned crossing the Han. King Mu continued his father's crusade against Chu.

While Chu was fending off Zhou, it was busy pacifying the Man tribes in the Jiang Han region in the midst of which Jingshan was located. The "Chu Hereditary House" chapter of the *Shiji* says that by the reign of King Yi, Zhou was in a weakened state and losing its grip on the vassal lords. Taking advantage of the situation, "Xiong Qu was extremely [successful] in obtaining the harmony of the people between the Han and Yangzi Rivers. Then he raised troops and attacked Yong and Yangyue and reached as far as Eh." 熊渠甚得江漢間民和，乃興兵伐庸麇月至于鄂。

Emboldened by his success, "Xiong Qu said, 'I am a Man Yi, [so I] do not share the titles of Zhou.'" 熊渠曰我蠻夷也，不與中國之號諡。 He then proceeded to install his three sons as kings in different parts of the realm. This development caught the attention of Zhou. Xiong Qu, worried that oppressive King Li of Zhou might attack Chu, eventually rescinded use of the title of "king."⁶⁹

⁶⁹ SJHZKZ 40:6-7 (645). According to He Guangyue, Xiong Qu's grandfather Xiong Dan 熊黜 and his father Xiong Yang 熊楊 had already used "king" as their titles. He offers the "*Chuwang Jun Zhong*" 楚王頽鍾 as proof for Xiong Dan, arguing that "'Jun' 頽 is 'Dan 黜, they both mean 'big head.'" For Xiong Yan, he cites the "*Chuwang You Zhang Zhong*" 楚王龔章鍾 inscription and claims that "'You' 龔 and 'Yang' 楊 had the same pronunciation and were interchangeable, . . ." See He Guangyue 1988:193. His proofs, which are based on the inscription alone, are insufficient. Li Ling summarizes the arguments of leading commentators on "*Chuwang Jun Zhong*," all of whom place it in the mid-Spring and Autumn era or later, and concludes on the basis of vessel's form and style of ornamentation that it belonged to King Gong of Chu (r. 590-560) (1986:363-64). Li also says that the "*Chuwang You Zhang Zhong*" was cast by King Hui Xiong Zhang (r. 488-432) in *ibid.*, 367 and (1984:88-89). Since "Xiong" is always written as 龔 or 龔 in bronze inscriptions (see Li Xueqin 1988 and Li Ling 1991:50), Li's identification of You Zhang as Xiong Zhang can be accepted.; also see Shirakawa 1962.4:537-38.

According to He Guangyue, after Xiong Tong (King Wu, r. 740-690) resumed use of the title "king" in 704, he moved the capital of Chu 300 plus *li* from Jingshan Mountains southeastward down the Ju River to the fertile plain at modern Dangyang, where he named his new capital Danyang. Archaeological finds at Jijiahu after 1974 yielded the remains of Spring and Autumn era Chu burials and an ancient city. In 1978, a Chu town with mid-Spring and Autumn artifacts used for palace construction and surrounded by Chu burials was discovered. Early Spring and Autumn era bronzes in the Zhou style were found in the vicinity of Jijiahu at Wen'an and Bailizhou, five with inscriptions. Middle to late Western Zhou tiles in the style found at Qishan were uncovered nearby at Moupan Mountain.⁷⁰

King Wu died in 690 during battle in the 51st year of his reign and was succeeded by his son, King Wen (r. 689-675). The "Chu Hereditary House" chapter of the *Shiji* says, "When King Wen Xiong Zi was installed, he was the first to make [his] capital at Ying."⁷¹ 文王熊貲立，始都郢。 He Guangyue accepts the traditional view that Ying was located at Ji'nancheng, north of modern day Jiangling, Hubei where the Ju and Zhang rivers converge and flow into the Yangzi. Facing the rich Han and Yangzi plain to the east, guarded by mountains to the West, bordered on the south by the Yangzi, and having an open route to the Central Plains on the north, this was an ideal spot for the capital of an emerging power in the Spring and Autumn era.⁷²

⁷⁰ He Guangyue 1988:195-98.

⁷¹ SJHZKZ 40:11 (646).

⁷² He Guangyue 1988:198-200. The location of Ying has been a matter of significant scholarly debate in recent decades (see Blakeley 1990 and 1999:12-13).

Professor Shi Quan (1988; this work includes a compilation of the author's previous

publications on this topic) has devoted his academic career to arguing that the traditional views of the location of Chu place names are incorrect because they are based on the location of places that were established after A.D. 555 following the southwestward migration of people and place names. Shi says, "Beginning from this year, the ancient city of Jiangling which was located in the middle reaches of the Han River on the Yicheng Plain disappears, and another 'Jiangling' city begins to appear at [its] present location on the northern bank of the Yangzi River." He argues that geographical treatises from the Tang-Song era and later, especially the works of Qing scholars, developed a comprehensive system of explanations that have come to be regarded as matters of fact. However, he says that pre-Tang sources present a different picture of where Chu places were located (*ibid.*, 480). Shi Quan's challenge to the traditional view of the location of Ying at Ji'nancheng, Jiangling is supported by a number of scholars (Zhang Zhengming 1982:66-7, Yu Zonghan 1984:97, Hu Shaohua 1994:259-74). However, there are still many who disagree with his argument for the ruins found Huangcheng, Icheng as its site (for an example, see Guo Dewei 1979:44; Li Xueqin 1984:123-34).

Archaeological evidence, or the lack thereof, presents another significant challenge to the traditional view of modern day Jiangling as the location of the Chu capital Ying. Many scholars, including, Shi Quan (1988:418-19), argues that the graves excavated nearby at Ji'nancheng, the site of ancient Jiangling, are for lesser nobility and commoners, and the artifacts uncovered date from the late Spring and Autumn era and proliferate in the Warring States period when there is evidence for a major city there; so it could not have been the location of the capital of Chu from the early part of the Spring and Autumn era (for an example, see Li Yujie 1988:53-56). Wang Guanggao focuses on archaeological evidence found inside the Ji'nancheng ruins to argue that it was never the capital but rather only a mid to late Warring States city of Chu (1988:377-460).

Defenders of Ji'nancheng as the site of the early capital argue, among other things, that the absence of graves of high nobility is not fatal (no pun intended) because of the common practice of burying the nobility in their ancestral place. Cultural relics in the style of the Central Plains that date from the Western Zhou and early Spring and Autumn era and have been found along the Ju and Zhang Rivers as well as in the vicinity of Ji'nancheng are offered as evidence for the early settlement and development of this area. One should not expect to find evidence for the city wall of Ying in the early Spring and Autumn era because it was not walled until 519 (Liu Bincheng 1981 and 1982). One could also argue that the appearance at Ji'nancheng of quintessentially Chu cultural artifacts from the late Spring and Autumn era cannot be used as evidence that the capital was not located there earlier because a distinctive "Chu culture" was itself a late development (see below).

A study of 597 graves recently excavated at Jiudian in Jiangling County, classifies the graves into two groups; the first group belongs to the "Jiang-Han form of the Ji-Zhou cultural system" (i.e., Central Plains culture) and the second group are Chu graves. The periodization of the graves in the first group spans the late Western Zhou to mid-Spring and Autumn eras, whereas the second group covers the late Spring and autumn to late Warring States eras. Although the author of the study maintains that the capital of Chu was probably not established at Ji'nancheng until the early to mid-Warring states (Yang Baocheng 1996), the physical evidence coincides with the traditional view of Chu settlement, which would have the seat of power and the ruling house centered in this area by the end of the Western Zhou and early Spring and Autumn eras.

Guo Dewei argues that while the first capital called Ying was located at Huangcheng near Yicheng, by 617 it had been relocated to the site of early Spring and Autumn ruins found at

The capital of Chu remained at Ying until the waning years of the Spring and Autumn era when King Zhao (r. 515-489) was forced by repeated military invasions and defeats by the state of Wu to move out of Ying in 504. A temporary center of government was established northward at the site of the capital of the former state of Ruo 郢. Ruo was located at the confluence of the Yan (now Man) and Han Rivers north of modern day Zhongxiang, Hubei. He Guangyue says that King Zhao moved the capital back to Ying towards the end of his reign.⁷³ The capital could have been at Ruo for as long as nine years. The *Zuozhuan* says the move to Ruo was made so that Chief Minister Zixi could "reform his government administration in order to stabilize Chu."⁷⁴ 改級其政，以定楚國。 Stabilization was achieved by 495, the 21st year of the reign of King Zhao.⁷⁵

Ethnic Origin

Opinions about the ethnic origin of early Chu people vary with the assertions about their geographic origins. One view is that the ruling elite of Chu had its ethnic roots among the Hua Xia people of the Central Plains, whereas the masses that it ruled were comprised of various Southern Man groups that were indigenous to the localities subjugated by these outsiders from the North.⁷⁶ Another view maintain that they were

modern Jijiahu which is 35 km northeast of the Ji'nancheng site. An invasion force from Wu drove King Zhao out and destroyed the capital in 506. King Hui (r. 488-432) returned to the area and rebuilt the capital at Ji'nancheng during the middle years of his reign (1997).

⁷³ He Guangyue 1988:200-203. Some modern scholars argue that Chu never returned its capital to Ying; see Feng Yongxuan 馮永軒, "Shuo Chudu" 說楚都, JHKG 1980.2:18.

⁷⁴ ZZS 55:7b-8a (961, Ding 6).

⁷⁵ ZZS 56:20b (985, Ding 15).

⁷⁶ Zhang Yinlin 1950:24-26.

Man Yi 蠻夷, being classified variously as Eastern Yi (*dongyi* 東夷),⁷⁷ Huai Yi 淮夷⁷⁸ and *Man/Miao* 蠻苗.⁷⁹ Lastly, there is the theory that the progenitors of Chu came from Media in Western Asia.⁸⁰ The first of these views is the most credible for genealogical and cultural evidence place the ruling elite of Chu firmly in the Hua Xia ethnic and cultural complex.

The rulers of the Xia and Chu both claimed descent from the Yellow Emperor through Zhuan Xu. According the "Basic Annals of Xia" in the *Shiji*, the ancestry of Yu, the founder of Xia, is as follows:

The father of Yu was called "Gun." The father of Gun was called "Emperor Zhuan Xu." The father of Zhuan Xu was called "Chang Yi." The father of Chang Yi was called "Yellow Emperor." Yu was the great grandson of the Yellow Emperor and the grandson of Emperor Zhuan Xu.⁸¹

⁷⁷ Hu Houxuan ((1934-35) argues that the progenitors of Chu were Eastern Yi who were related to the Shang people. Based on the places associated with Zhuan Xu, his predecessors and successor, and the geographic distribution of localities associated with him, he concluded that Zhuan Xu was an Eastern Yi whose people had moved into the Central Plains by his time.

⁷⁸ Guo Moruo 1954:258-66. This argument, which was advanced by Guo in 1930, has been refuted by Yang Kuan (1981:101-102).

⁷⁹ Fan Wenlan 范文瀾 argued in 1942 that Chu was a branch of the Miao. His argument has been developed further in 1981 by Long Haiqing 龍海清 and Long Wenyu 龍文玉 (see Shu Zhimei 1983:66). Ding Yongyuan argues for a San Miao 參苗 origin (1987). See Xia Jianqin's refutation of the Longs' argument (1982.5:62-66) and their rejoinder (1983.3:68-73). Tang Jiahong rejects the Miao theory with the following conclusions: (1) As to the 'San Miao' prior to the Shang and Zhou eras, their main area of activity was in the middle Yellow River region, [and] definitely not in the middle Yangzi drainage; (2) as to the Chu people (some say 'proto-Chu'), their main area of activity was in the Henan and Shandong region, also not in the middle Yangzi drainage; (3) the progenitors of the Chu people and the San Miao definitely did not come from the same origins, the Chu people were a branch of the Hua Xia ethnic group of the Central Plains, while the San Miao may have an ethnic relationship with the Miao of medieval or later eras; (4) fixing the "San Miao culture" and the "proto-Chu culture" among the Neolithic culture remains of the middle Yangzi drainage is on weak grounds, laden with contradictions, and lacks persuasiveness (1983:78).

⁸⁰ See note 26 above.

⁸¹ SZHZKZ 2:2 (41). The character *di* 帝 is translated as "Emperor." One could, perhaps, argue that it should be translated "Ancestor," but *di* is clearly used as the title of an office here, for the sentence following this quotation reads, "Yu's grandfather Chang Yi and father Gun both,

禹之父曰鯀。鯀之父曰帝顓頊。顓頊之父曰昌意。昌意之父曰黃帝。禹者，黃帝之玄孫而帝顓頊之孫。

Zhuan Xu was the final common ancestor of the ruling houses of Chu and Xia as Chu was descended through a different son named Cheng.

According to the early genealogical tradition, Shang and Zhou, the other great dynastic houses of the Central Plains, were also related to Chu. They both claimed descent from the Yellow Emperor through his great grandson, Emperor Ku 帝嚳.

According to the "Basic Annals of the Five Emperors" in the *Shiji*, the ancestry of Emperor Ku, who was also known as Gao Xin 高辛, is as follows: "The father of Gao Xin was called 'Qiao Ji.' The father of Qiao Ji was called Xuan Xia, The father of Xuan Xia was called 'Yellow Emperor'."⁸² 高辛父曰蟠極。蟠極父曰玄囂。玄囂父曰黃帝。 Qie 契, the founding ancestor of the Shang house, was born by Jian Di, the second wife of Emperor Ku, while Hou Ji 后稷,⁸³ the founding ancestor of the Zhou house, was born by the emperor's first wife Jiang Yuan 姜原。⁸⁴ Thus, in terms of the genealogical tradition, the ruling houses of Xia, Shang, Zhou, and Chu are all of the same stock, although Chu is related more closely to Xia.

Some scholars believe that Chu was a branch of the Xia clan (*shizu* 氏族).

Jiang Liangfu argues that that the Chu people were actually descended from the Xia.⁸⁵

not attaining to occupy the position of emperor (*di wei* 帝位), served as officers (or subjects)." 禹之曾大父昌意及父鯀皆不得在帝位，爲人臣(*ibid.*, 2:2-3 [41]).

⁸² SJHZKZ 1:19 (27).

⁸³ SJHZKZ 3:2 (54).

⁸⁴ SJHZKZ 4:2 (64).

⁸⁵ Jiang Liangfu 1959:18-19.

Yao Yixin offers three reasons, in addition to the genealogical connection for considering Chu and Xia to be of the same clan: First, Jing Chu was attacked by King Wuding of Shang, as noted above, because it was a branch of the Xia clan whose rule had been overthrown by the Shang. Second, references to a yellow bear myth in the poetry of Qu Yuan and in traditions stating that Gun and Yu were transformed into yellow bears suggest a close connection between the myths and traditions of Chu and Xia. And third, the traditions of Xia and the employment of "bear" (*xiong* 熊) as the lineage name of the royal house of Chu, suggest that the bear may have been the totem of both peoples.⁸⁶ Yao's first reason is merely conjecture, while the latter two reflect a shared culture. The traditional pedigrees of Chu and Xia show that although both claimed descent from Zhuan Xu, the founder of Chu was not a descendant of the founder of Xia.

Wang Guanggao says that the patriline of the ruling house of Chu was Hua Xia, while its matriline was Man Yi. Starting with "born of woman" as the ancient definition of clan name (*xing* 姓), he argues that Mi, the clan name of Ji Lian, the founding ancestor of the ruling house, must have come from his mother because five of his brothers each had unique clan names that were different from his and their father, Lu Zhong, whose clan name was Ji. Ji Lian's mother hailed from Gui Fang 鬼方氏. "Gui Fang" was the name of a country in the west that belonged to the Mis, who were a branch of the Western Qiang.⁸⁷

⁸⁶ Yao Yixin 1982:53-56.

⁸⁷ Wang Guanggao 1988:18-21.

In the traditional view of Chinese social historians, prehistoric matrilineal descent groups were replaced by the emergence of patrilineal descent groups by historical times. While Wang says that the patrilineal system was already well-established by the time of Lu Zhong and Ji Lian, he posits a bilineal kinship system in order to make his argument for the dual nature of the ethnicity of the ruling house of Chu.⁸⁸ His argument can be rejected for a number of reasons: First, in the patrilineal, patriarchal, and polygamous society of the Zhou period, the clan name, whatever the nature of its origins in the hoary past, was passed on from father to child as the surname of the patriclan. Such was the case with the ruling house of Chu which bore Mi, the clan name of Ji Lian, its founding ancestor. Second, ethnicity was determined by the father not the mother. For example, Duke Wen of Jin, who, like Ji Lian, was born of a Da Rong 大戎 mother, was not regarded as a Da Rong himself.⁸⁹ Finally, there is no historical evidence from Zhou sources for the coexistence of matrilineal and patrilineal descent groups within the same society.

Gu Tiefu asserts that if a *Shanhaijing* passage that says Zhu Rong was the great grandson of Yan Di, the brother of the Yellow Emperor, were true, Zhu Rong would have been Hua Xia. However, he argues that this supposed descent was the result of the deification of Zhu Rong under the influence of the Five Elements concept of Yin Yang thought in the Warring States and Qin-Han eras. He points to the association of Yan Di and Zhu Rong in the silk manuscript discovered at Shazidanku is

⁸⁸ Wang Guanggao 1988:29-31.

⁸⁹ Li Mengcun and Chang Jincang 1988:27.

evidence that Chu itself was influenced by the Five Elements concept. He maintains, however, that the genuine history of Zhu Rong and his descendants shows that they were Eastern Yi not Hua Xia.⁹⁰

As discussed in the section on ancestral origins above, the bamboo slips discovered in grave no. 2 at Baoshan have disproved the notion that Zhu Rong was the descendant of Yan Di and confirmed the traditional view that he was descended from the Yellow Emperor through Lao Tong. The occupant of the grave is believed to have been buried in 316,⁹¹ which places him in the middle of the Warring States era. However, whether influenced by the Five Elements theory or not, Chu people evidently believed the ancestry that made them Hua Xia.

The notion among modern scholars that the ruling house of Chu was ethnically Man stems from the close association of Chu with the Man in early periods of its history, a northern bias in the historical record, and several alleged declarations by rulers of Chu that they were "Man Yi" 蠻夷.⁹² Careful reading of the relevant texts will show that this interpretation is mistaken.

Speaking of the descent from Ji Lian, the founder of the Mi clan to which the ruling house of Chu belonged, the "Hereditary House of Chu" notes that the generations between his grandsons Rong Xiong and Yü Xiong cannot be traced because "some [descendants] were located in the central states and some were located in Man Yi."⁹³

⁹⁰ Gu Tiefu 1984:14-20 and 1988b:18-19.

⁹¹ Hubeisheng Jingsha tielu kaogudui 1991:1.

⁹² For one of many examples that are too numerous to cite, see Wu Yongzhang 1988:39.

⁹³ SJHZKZ 40:5 (645). This comment is reminiscent of the observation by Historian Bo who, when speaking of the whereabouts of the Zhu Rong clans of Ji, Dong, Peng, Tu, Yun, and

或在中國，或在蠻夷。◦ From the parallelism in this passage, "Man Yi" clearly refers to a territory.

The "Hereditary House of Chu" says Xiong Yi, the great grandson of Yü Xiong, "was enfeoffed in/among Chu Man" 封於楚蠻。⁹⁴ In this instance "Chu Man" should be understood as referring to the territory occupied by the Chu Man, but whether one interprets the preposition *yu* 於 as "in" or "among," it is clear from the context that Xiong Yi was an outsider and, thus, not Chu Man.

"The Hereditary House of Chu" states that during the time of King Yi of Zhou:

Xiong Qu (the great-great-grandson of Xiong Yi) obtained the peace of the people between the Jiang (Yangzi) and Han [rivers], then raising troops, [he] attacked Yong [and] Yangyue [and] reached as far as E. Xiong Qu said, "Since I am a Man Yi, [I] do not share the titles of the Central States."

熊渠甚得江漢間民和，乃興兵伐庸楊粵至于鄂。熊渠曰我蠻夷也，不與中國之號謚。

Thereupon, he installed his three sons as *wang* 王 ("kings") at three different localities, of which "all were located in Chu Man territory along the upper part of the Jiang (Yangzi)"⁹⁵ 皆在江上楚蠻之地. Yong, the first state attacked by Xiong Qu was Man.⁹⁶ From this passage, one can say with certainty the Chu was the name of a region and Man was a term for its original inhabitants. "Chu Man" in the reference to the enfeoffment of Xiong Yi was a short form of "Chu Man zhi di" ("land of the Chu

Cao at the end of the Western Zhou, is alleged to have said, "Some are located with the royal house [of Zhou]; some are located among the Yi and Di; there are none who can be completely counted." 或在王室，或在夷狄，莫之數也。◦ (GY 16:3a [369, "Zhengyu"]).

⁹⁴ SJHZKZ 40:5-6 (645).

⁹⁵ SJHZKZ 40:6-7 (645).

⁹⁶ See the Zhengyi commentary in SJHZKZ 40:6 (645).

Man") in this passage. The distinction between the ruling house of the state of Chu, which was developing in this region, and its original inhabitants is clear. In declaring "I am Man Yi," Xiong Qu was asserting his political independence from Zhou rather than stating his ethnicity.

On two occasions officers of Jin, the archenemy of Chu, are quoted in the *Guoyu* saying the Chu was Man Yi or Man. The first instance occurs on the eve of the epic battle of Yanling in 575 as Fan Xie and Luan Shu debate whether to avoid battle with the "Man Yi" (i.e., Chu). In the end, Luan Shu led Jin to victory over Chu and wrested the hegemony from it.⁹⁷ The second occurrence is at the Song Covenant of 546, when Jin and Chu competed for precedence. This is the occasion on which Shuxiang of Jin, as noted earlier, said that "Chu, being Man from Jing" 楚為荆蠻, was relegated to tending the fire and not permitted to join the Qiyang covenant.⁹⁸ On these occasions, "Man" and "Man Yi" are used as derogatory references to Chu rather than as descriptions of the ethnicity of its rulers.⁹⁹

⁹⁷ GY 12:4b-5a (304-305, "Jinyu 6").

⁹⁸ GY 14:7b-8a (336-37, "Jinyu 8"). Modern Chinese translations render this phrase as "Because Chu belonged to the Man Yi states of the Jingzhou region" 因為楚屬於荊州地區的蠻夷之國 (Dong Lizhang 1993:550), "Chu State was considered to be Jing Man" 楚國被認為是荆蠻 (Wu Guoyi, et.al. 1994:439), "at that time Chu was still only a Man state of Jingzhou" 那時候楚國還不過是荊州的蠻國 (Huang Yongtang 1995:530).

"Jing Man" is clearly used as place name in the *Zuozhuan* account of the exile of Wangzi Chao. When he was driven out of the capital of Zhou in 516, Wangzi Chao and his followers "fled to Chu" 奔楚. Subsequently in a message sent to the rulers of the various states, he is alleged to have said, "This unworthy one, shaken and forced to flee abroad, has taken refuge in Jing Man, and does not yet have a place to go." 茲不穀，震盪播越，竄在荆蠻，未有攸底。 (ZZZS 52:6b-10b (902-904, Zhao 26). By this time "Jing Man" was another way of referring to the state of Chu.

⁹⁹ Wang Guanggao 1988:30-31 attributes the forgoing declarations by rulers of Chu and the claims by others that Chu was Man Yi to the dual nature of the ethnicity of its ruling house.

The final use of "Man Yi" with reference to Chu is by Wangsun Wei while on a diplomatic mission to Jin prior to 511. The *Guoyu* relates:

Duke Ding gave him a banquet. Zhao Jianzi, sounding the jade [on his girdle] as he assisted, asked Wangsun Wei, "Is the *baihang* 白珩 (a precious girdle pendant gem) of Chu still around?" [He] responded, "It is so." [Jianzi] asked, "How long has it been a treasure?" [He] replied, "It has never been a treasure. The thing that Chu treasures is called Guan Shefu . . . There is also Left Historian Yixiang . . . There is also the marsh called Yunmeng . . . These are the treasures of Chu State. As for that *baihang*, it is the toy of our former kings. What is there to treasure in it? . . . As to the beauty of the clinking [of jade], Chu, even if it were Man Yi, would not be able to treasure [it]."¹⁰⁰

定公饗之。趙簡子鳴玉以相，問於王孫圍曰楚之白珩猶在乎。對曰然。簡子曰其為寶也，幾何矣曰未嘗為寶。楚之寶者曰觀射父。 . . . 又有左史倚相。 . . . 又有藪曰雲連徒洲。 . . . 此楚國之寶也。若夫白珩之玩也，何寶之有。 . . . 楚雖蠻夷，不能寶也。

This anecdote shows that the ruling elite of Chu did not share the view of its detractors that it was a Man Yi state.

In the case of Shu Xiong, a hapless scion of the ruling house, whose descendants became Man, the distinction between the ruling elite and the Man Yi is crystal clear.

Historian Bo of Zheng, recounting a succession struggle among three surviving sons of Xiong Yan for the rulership of Chu, says, "Shu Xiong escaped the difficulty in Pu and became a Man" 叔熊逃難於濮而蠻. Wei Zhao's commentary states, "Pu was a

Chu could be regarded as Man Yi because the matri-group of its founder was Western Qiang; there need be no other explanation. This is an appealing argument, but, as noted above, it is based on the existence of a bilineal kinship system for which there is no evidence in historical sources for the Zhou period.

¹⁰⁰ GY 18:8a-9a (415-17, "Chuyu" *xia*). Compare modern Chinese translations which interpret "Chu sui Manyi" to mean "Even if Chu is regarded as a Man Yi state" (Dong Lizhang 1993:686-87), "Chu State although it is a Man Yi country" (Wu Guoyi .et. al. 1994:549-50), and "Although our Chu State is regarded as Man Yi" (Huang Yongtang 1995:659).

Man town . . . Shu Xiong, fleeing difficulty, ran to Pu and followed Man customs."¹⁰¹

濮蠻邑。 。 。 叔熊逃難奔濮而從蠻俗。 Prognosticating the political

resurrection of the house of Zhu Rong, Historian Bo said,

As to the rise of [the descendants of] Rong, perhaps it will be located in the Mis. Kui and Yue are not sufficient to be mandated. The Man Mi are Man indeed! Only Jing (i.e., Chu) truly has outstanding virtue. When Zhou declines, it will surely rise, I predict! Jiang, Ying, and the Jing Mi will truly take turns troubling the various rulers [of the states in the Zhou kingdom].

融之興者，其在羊姓乎。羊姓，夔越不足命也。蠻羊蠻矣。唯荆實有昭德。若周衰，其必興矣。姜嬴荆羊實與諸姬代相干也。

Commenting on this passage, Wei Zhao says, "'Man Mi' refers to Shu Xiong in Pu

following Man customs."¹⁰² 蠻羊謂叔熊在濮從蠻俗。 Thus, in the mind of

Historian Bo, the descendants of Shu Xiong were disqualified because they had adopted the ways of, or become, Man. But the Mi of Jing (i.e., the ruling clan of Chu), who were of outstanding virtue and by implication not Man, were eminently qualified for a major political role in the future. Had the ruling clan of Chu been Man too, the author of the *Guoyu* would certainly not have attributed "outstanding virtue" to it.

The ethnic distinction between the ruling elite of Chu and local Man Yi peoples was ever present from the Western Zhou through Spring and Autumn periods. The state of Chu was created/recognized by Zhou to serve as one of its defensive outposts.

Located south of the royal domain of Zhou, like the holders of other early benefices, the

¹⁰¹ GY 16:1b-2a (366-67, "Zhengyu"--text and commentary). See also SJHZKZ 40:8 (646) which is probably based on the *Guoyu* account but makes no mention of Shu Xiong "becoming Man." Note that in this source Shu Xiong is known as "Shu Kan" 叔堪.

¹⁰² GY 16:3a-b (369-71, "Zhengyu"--text and commentary).

rulers of Chu had the charge of pacifying and subjugating hostile local tribes. In the case of Chu, this meant the southern people, who are often referred to by the general term "Man" or "Man Yi." As noted above, the state of Chu was established in the territory of the Chu Man, or the Man of the Chu region. After its relocation further south, deeper into Man territory, Xiong Qu expanded the borders of Chu by attacking the Man at Yong (modern Zhubei County, Hubei) and the other places.¹⁰³ Assuming the rulership of Chu two generations after Shu Xiong took refuge among the Pu in southern part of modern Hubei Province, "Fenmao thereupon began opening the Pu [region]" 蚡冒於是始啓濮, thus commencing the fulfillment of Historian Bo's prophecy about the political future of Chu.¹⁰⁴

Fenmao was succeeded by younger brother Xiong Tong 熊通 who employed the military abilities of Guan Dingfu 觀丁父, a prisoner of war from Ruo, "to conquer Zhou and Liao, subjugate Sui and Tang, [and] greatly open up the various Man [territories]."¹⁰⁵ 克州蓼, 服隨唐, 大啓群蠻。Elaborating on these events, Sima Qian states:

In the 35th year [of the reign of King Wu], Chu attacked Sui. Sui said, "I am not guilty of anything." Chu said, "I am a Man Yi. At present, of the various rulers, all are making rebellion and invading one another or killing each other. I, having worn out armor and desiring therein to observe the government of the Central States, request the royal house to make my title more respectable." When an officer of Sui went to Zhou in behalf [of Chu] and requested it to give Chu [more] respect, the royal house did not comply; [so he] returned and reported to Chu.

¹⁰³ Hereafter the location of Man places is according to Cheng Faren 1967.

¹⁰⁴ GY 16:7a (377, "Zhengyu").

¹⁰⁵ ZZS 60:9b (1045, Ai 17).

In the 37th year, Xiong Tong of Chu, being angered, said, 'My progenitor Yü Xiong, who was the tutor of King Wen, died early. When King Cheng elevated my progenitor by [giving him] the fields of a viscount and baron and ordering [him] to reside in Chu. Of the Man Yi, all were led into submission, but the King [of Zhou] did not increase [his] rank. I shall simply give myself [more] respect.' Then [he] installed himself as King Wu, made a covenant with the officers of Sui, and left. Thereupon [he] began to open up the Pu territory and possess it."¹⁰⁶

三十五年，楚伐隨。隨曰我無罪。楚曰我蠻夷也。今諸侯皆爲叛相侵，或相殺。我有敵甲，欲以觀中國之政，請王室尊吾號。隨人爲之周，請尊楚，王室不聽，還報楚。

三十七年，楚熊通怒曰吾先鬻熊文王之師也，蚤終。成王舉我先公，乃以子男田令居楚。蠻夷皆率服，而王不加位，我自尊耳。乃自立爲武王，與隨人盟而去。於是始開濮地而有之。

Thus, living among the Man Yi, Xiong Tong, like his progenitor Xiong Qu, asserted his political independence from Zhou in 706 by declaring, "I am a Man Yi." Two years later, assuming the Zhou title of "king," which Xiong Qu had usurped then abandoned, King Wu resumed the task of pacifying the Pu and taking control of their territory. He apparently achieved mixed results for six years later in his reign, the Lu Rong 盧戎, a southern Man group, joined the state of Lo to severely defeat an army from Chu that was led by Mo'ao Qu Xia.¹⁰⁷

In 615, "the various Shu" (*qun Shu* 群舒), who were located in modern Shucheng and Chaoxian in Anhui, rebelled against Chu, leading to military action by

¹⁰⁶ SJHZKZ 40:10-11 (646). The *Zuozhuan* account for the years 706 and 704 which describes the confrontation and battle between Chu and Sui, is evidently not Sima Qian's source for this anecdote for none of its details are given there.

¹⁰⁷ ZZS 7:14b-16a (124-25, Huan 13).

Chu against Shu, Zong, and Chao.¹⁰⁸ Two years later Chu attacked Shu Liao 舒蓼 (modern Shuchang, Anhui) as part of a surprise assault on the various Shu.¹⁰⁹ In 611 the Rong attacked famine stricken Chu from the southwest and the southeast. The various Man rose up in rebellion against Chu under the leadership of the officers of Yong. At the same time, the officers of Jun led the Hundred Pu (Bai Pu 百濮, located in modern Shishou, Hubei) against Chu, who defeated them after fifteen days of fighting. In the end, under the leadership of King Zhuang (r. 613-591) and with the support of troops from Qin and Ba, Chu won over the various Man and made a covenant with them, then extinguished Yong.¹¹⁰ In 601, a decade later, Chu attacked and extinguished Shu Liao because of its roles in the rebellion of "all the Shu" (*zhong Shu* 衆舒).¹¹¹

Pacification and subjugation of the Shu remained a concern of Chu through the next century. Taking advantage of Jin's major victory over Chu on the battlefield at Yanling in the previous year, Shu Yong 舒庸 (modern Shucheng, Anhui), in league with Wu, attacked and laid siege to four towns of Chu in 574, the 17th year of the reign of King Gong (r. 590-561). However, Chu responded by extinguishing Shu Yong in a

¹⁰⁸ ZZS 19b:5b (330, Wen 12).

¹⁰⁹ ZZS 19b:16b (335, Wen 14). In his commentary on "Shu Liao" 舒蓼 in this passage, Du Yu simply says, "that is, the various Shu" 即群舒 (*ibid.*). On a later occurrence of "Shu Liao," he notes that this term was "the name of two states" *erguo ming* 二國名; see ZZS 22:7b (379, Xuan 8). Kong Yingda, however, refers to Du's *Chunqiu shili* to show that *erguo ming* is a permutation of *yiguo ming* ("the name of a single state" 一國名), for Du identifies Shu, *qun* Shu, Shu Liao, Shu Yong, and Shu Jiu as five names in his listing of Spring and Autumn era place names (*ibid.*). Yang Bojun, who regards "Shu Liao" as the name of one kind of the various Shu, takes Du Yu to task for his "mistake," ignoring Kong's correct explanation of it; see CQZZ 2:694-95). Commenting on Du's earlier gloss on *qun* Shu, Kong notes that the *Shiben* gives the following Shu sub-groups: Shu Yong, Shu Liao, Shu Jiu, Shu Long, and Shu Bao (ZZS 19b:5b [330, Wen 12]). Thus, Shu Liao was the name for a single entity.

¹¹⁰ ZZS 20:2b-4b (346-47, Wen 16).

¹¹¹ ZZS 20:7b (379, Xuan 8).

surprise counterattack.¹¹² The accomplishments of King Gong are enumerated in the following *Zuozhuan* anecdote about the selection of his posthumous name in 560:

When King Gong was sick, he told [his] officers saying, "[Although] I was not charismatic, when small [I] managed the altars of state. When [I] was ten years old, [I] lost/mourned my former ruler. Not yet familiar with the instructions of my tutor and protector, I received many blessings, [but] because of not being charismatic, I lost the military force at Yanling, thereby disgracing the altars of state and making my officers worried, [my mistake] was great indeed! If by the cleverness of my officers I can protect my head and neck in order to die (naturally), during the spring and autumn [rites] and burials, whereby [I] follow [my] former ruler to the ancestral temple, please make [my posthumous title] "ling" ("clever" 靈) or "li." ("oppressive" 厲). You choose between them." There were none who responded. After five orders, then they agreed.

In the autumn, when King Gong died, Zinang led the discussion [about his] posthumous title. The officers said, "[Our] ruler had a charge, indeed!" Zinang said, "What do you think about making his title "gong" ("respectful" 共)? Majestic was [our] Chu State, yet [he] governed it [and] pacified and took possession of the Man Yi; pacifying and rectifying [the region of] the Southern Sea, [he] subordinated all of the Xia [states]; and yet he recognized his shortcomings, can that not be referred to as *gong* ("respectful"). I request to name him posthumously 'Gong'." The officers followed him.¹¹³

¹¹² CQZS 28:20b (481, Cheng 17).

¹¹³ ZZS 32:4b-5a (555-56, Xiang 13). In this passage, the sentence *yan zheng nanhai yi shu zhuXia* 奄征南海，以屬諸夏 is problematic. The commentaries of Du Yu, Hong Liangji, and Takezoe are silent. Legge translates, "his expeditions went rapidly forth along the sea of the south; and he subjected the Great States" (Legge 4:458). Yang Bojun's comment, "The *Shuowen* [says], 'Yan means big.' The 'Huang Yi' 皇矣 ode in the 'Da Ya' 大雅 section of the *Shijing* says '*yan you Sihai* ("broadly possessing the Four Seas" 奄有四海) (CQZZ 3:1002 is followed by recent translators. The modern English translation reads "... and sent great expeditions to the southern sea, and he subjected the various feudal states" (Hu Zhihui 1996:759). Modern Chinese translations render it as follows "raising a great [force], [he] attacked [the states of] the southern sea, and allowed them to be subordinated to the states of the Central Plains" 大舉征伐南海，讓它們從屬於中原諸國 (ZZYW 284) and "raising a great [force], [he] attacked [the states of] the southern sea, and allowed them to be subordinated to the Central States" 大舉征伐南海，讓它們從屬於中國 (ZZQY 840). Neither Yang's commentary nor any of these translations are correct.

The *Guoyu* version of this story and Wei Zhao's commentary help interpret this sentence:

When King Gong was seriously ill, [he] summoned the officers [and] said, "[Since] I am

not charismatic, losing the occupation of [our] former ruler [and] defeating the military force of Chu State are my mistakes. If [I] can preserve my head and neck unto a natural death, it is only that, as to the case of that whereby in the annual rites [I] follow [our] former rulers, [I] request to be 'Ling' or 'Li.'" The officers agreed and promised.

The King died. Coming to the time of his burial, Zinang led the discussion about [his] posthumous name. The officers said, "The King had a charge, we dare say!" Zinang said, "It cannot [be followed]. One who serves [his] ruler puts first his abilities [and] does not follow his shortcomings. Majestic was [our] Chu State, yet [our] ruler managed it; pacifying and rectifying the southern seas, [his] instructions reached to all of the Xia. His glory was great indeed. Having that glory, yet [he] recognized his mistakes, can [that] not be called "respectful" 恭. If [one should] put first [his] ruler's abilities, then [I] request to make [his posthumous name] 'Gong.'" The officers followed him (GY 17:2b (382, "Chuyu" *shang*).

恭王有疾，召大夫曰不穀不德，失先君之業，覆楚國之什，不穀之罪也。若得保其首領以歿，唯是春秋所以從先君者，請爲靈若厲。大夫訐諾。

王卒。及葬，子囊議諡。大夫曰王有命矣。子囊曰不可。夫事君者，先其善，不從其過。赫赫楚國，而君臨之；撫征南海，訓及諸下；其寵大矣。有是寵也，而知其過，不可不謂恭乎。大夫從之。

Conspicuously absent is mention of the Man Yi. *yan zheng nanhai* 奄征南海 in the *Zuozhuan* is rendered as *fu zheng nanhai* 撫征南海 in the *Guoyu*. According to Wei Zhao, "*Fu* means *an* ('to pacify'). *Zheng* means *zheng* 'to rectify'. *Nanhai* ('southern sea') means 'Man Yi'" 撫，安也。征，正也。南海，蠻夷也。(*ibid.*). Thus, he mistakenly reads the preceding sentence from the *Zuozhuan*, *fu you Man Yi* "pacified and controlled the Man Yi" 撫有蠻夷, into this passage, but *yan* and *fu* are, indeed, interchangeable on the basis of meaning. *yan* in the sense of *fu* is found in the "Han Yi" 韓奕 ode of the "Da Ya" section of the *Shijing* in the line "*yan shou bei guo*" ("pacified and received the northern states" 奄受北國) (MSZS 18.4:10a [683--text and commentary]). The meanings of *yan shou* and *yan you* in the "Huang Yi" ode quoted by Yang Bojun are virtually identical. and both terms are interchangeable with *fu you*; in each case *yan* means *fu*. In the *Zuozhuan* passage under consideration, *fu you* and *yan zheng* are parallel verbs both in syntax and in meaning. Their merging into *fu zheng* in the *Guoyu* version is proof that *yan zheng* in the *Zuozhuan* account means *fu zheng*.

This author's translation of *yan zheng nanhai yi shu zhuXia* ("pacifying and rectifying [the region of] the Southern Sea, [he] subordinated all of the Xia [states]") is closer to previous English translations than to the modern Chinese translations. Like Wei Zhao, the latter evidently assume that *nanhai* is an allusion to Man Yi states. By their interpretation, the Man Yi states of *nanhai* were attacked and subordinated to the Xia states of the Central Plains. This is, however, an erroneous interpretation *nanhai* and a misreading of *yi shu zhuXia*.

Cheng Faren begins his discussion of *nanhai* by quoting the words of King Cheng (r. 671-626) of Chu when his state was attacked by the state of Qi in 656, "You dwell [in the] northern sea, [and] I dwell [in the] southern sea, because of that [even our] wild horses and oxen

楚子疾告大夫曰不穀不德，少主社稷。生十年而喪先君。未及習師保之教訓而應受多福，是以不德而亡師于鄢，以辱社稷，爲大夫憂，其弘多矣。若以答復之靈獲保首領以歿於地，唯是春秋窳窳之事，所以從先君於禰廟者，請爲靈若厲。大夫擇焉。莫對。及五命，乃許。

秋，楚共王卒，子囊謀諡。大夫曰君有命矣。子囊曰君命以共，若之何毀之。赫赫楚國，而君臨之，服有蠻夷，奄征南海，以屬諸夏，而知其過，可不謂共乎。請諡之共。答復從之。

The contrast between King Gong's humble self-assessment and Zinang's hyperbolic eulogy is striking. Considering the military and diplomatic events that have survived in the historical record, King Gong seems closer to the mark. Other than the military victory over the Shuyong, during his reign Chu was primarily occupied with competing with Jin for the loyalty of Chen and Zheng as they strove to secure hegemony over the Central States. Chu lost the hegemony that it had won during the reign of his father, King Zhuang, when it was defeated by Jin in the battle at Yanling in 575. Commenting on the posthumous names that the dying king proposed, Du Yu says, "[He] desired to

do not meet each other" 君處北海，寡人處南海，唯是風馬牛不相及 (see ZZZS 12::10b [201, Xi 4]). He then goes on to offer three possible definitions of *nanhai*, namely, Nan Man 南蠻, the region between the Han and Yangzi Rivers where Chu got its start, and his choice, the Yunmeng Marsh 雲夢澤 which was located to the west of Ying, the Spring and Autumn capital of Chu (1968:91-93). This, too, is incorrect.

The correct interpretation can be drawn from the continuation of King Cheng's remarks, "I never considered that you would invade my territory. What is the reason?" 不虞君之涉吾地也。何故。 (ZZZS 12:10b [201, Xi 4]). In the speeches that are attributed to King Cheng and Zinang in the *Zuozhuan*, *nanhai* is an allusion to the territory of Chu. Chu expanded the territorial sphere of its dominance or influence in the south by subduing the Man Yi and either extinguishing its neighboring Xia states or forcing them into submission. *Yan zheng nanhai yi shu zhuXia* refers to the latter process, which is expressed in the *Guoyu* account by the phrase "[his] instructions reached to all of the Xia."

receive a bad posthumous name wherewith to return to his former rulers."¹¹⁴ 欲受惡諡以歸先君也。Zinang, on the other hand, purposively stressing his king's good points, credited him with all of the achievements of his predecessors including subduing the Man Yi peoples and establishing dominance over the *zhu Xia* states that stood between Chu and its powerful northern competitors.

During the remainder of the Spring and Autumn era, Chu contended with the Shujiu, Manshi, and Pu. In 549 Wu called on the Shujiu people, who were located at modern day Shucheng, Anhui, to rebel against Chu. When they rebelled in the following year, Chu laid siege to the state of Shujiu, dispersed its population, and extinguished it. The Shujius 舒鳩氏, however, maintained their group identity, for when the non-Hua state of Tong rebelled against Chu in 508, they were used as a decoy by Wu to lure Chu into battle.¹¹⁵

In 526 Chu took advantage of chaos in the Rong Man state of Manshi, which was located in modern day Ruyang, Henan, to kill its untrustworthy ruler and take possession of it. Chu then repented of this action and installed the son of the slain ruler in his stead. Finally in 491, after vanquishing the Yihu, who according to Yang Bojun were originally a sub-group of the Man Yi tribe of Chu, Chu laid siege to Manshi. The ruler of Manshi fled to Jin with his people, where they were captured by Jin and handed over to the Chu force which took them captive and transported them back to Chu.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁴ ZZS 32:5a (556, Xiang 13).

¹¹⁵ ZZS 35:28a (611, Xiang 24), 36:11a-b (622, Xiang 25), and 54:7b-8a (943, Ding 2).

¹¹⁶ ZZS 47:14b (825, Zhao 16) and 57:20b-21b (999-1000, Ai 4).

Chu organized a flotilla in 523 to attack the Pu as part of its strategy to strengthen its ability to compete with the northern powers for hegemony over the Central States.¹¹⁷

Considering the purpose traditionally attributed to the creation of the state of Chu and the long and tumultuous history of its relations with Man Yi groups and states in the territory that it came to dominate, the ruling house (and elite) of Chu clearly were not people who were indigenous to the region. The ethnic connection with the Hua Xia states of the Central Plains that is suggested in their shared genealogies is clearly evident in the cultural traditions and practices of the ruling house and elite of Chu.

Cultural Origin

While it is true that Chu was a "southern state" and it was a region with great cultural diversity,¹¹⁸ cultural evidence for the origins of the ruling house and elite point to the north. Commenting on the implications of archaeological discoveries in the late 1970s and early 1980s for the origins of Chu culture, China's top contemporary archaeologist, Yu Weichao, has noted the influx of Central Plains culture during the Western Zhou era in the Exi region in the south, where he posits the origins of the

¹¹⁷ ZZS 48:22b (844, Zhao 19).

¹¹⁸ Heather A. Peters says that since the state was originally located in the Dan River valley and located mainly south of the Han and Huai rivers, "Chu therefore was a 'southern state' not only in the eyes of its Central Plains neighbors to the north, but in fact geographically, topographically, climatologically, gastronomically and . . . culturally" (1999:99). I have no argument with this definition, but her article is about cultural diversity in Chu from Neolithic times through the Warring States era; it is not focused on the culture of the ruling elite.

Wang Guanggao says that to arrive at a conclusion about the ethnic origins of the ruling house, one must start with the foundation of the state, which he fixes in the early Western Zhou at the time of Yü Xiong and locates in the Dan-Xi region, like Peters. However, he maintains that prior to this time the ancestors and people of Chu were always located north of the Jiang Han region; therefore, he says the ruling house was from the north (1988:4, 46-47).

distinctive elements of Chu culture. He takes this as evidence of the establishment of the Chu state which had close relations with the Zhou court. The amalgamation of indigenous cultural traditions with the elements from the culture from the Central Plains produced "the true culture of Chu."¹¹⁹

While arguing that the Chu culture was neither the "direct continuation" of a indigenous culture nor the "direct extension" of the culture of the Central plains, Yang Xiquan makes the following observations: During the Xia, Shang, and Zhou eras, the cultural influence of the Central Plains moved into the Jiang-Han region, eventually interrupting the development of the indigenous culture. Although the ancestors of the ruling lineage of Chu came from the Central Plains, because of intermarriage with the indigenous population the Chu people were of mixed blood and hence cannot be equated with the people of the Central Plains.¹²⁰

Yang gives a variety of evidence for the influx of Central Plains culture into what came to be the territory of Chu. The stamped earth and square shaped walled cities of Chu, which arose during the Zhou era, and those of the Central Plains are in the same style and tradition. The buildings, and particularly palaces, found in both places share the same architectural design and method of construction.

From the Western Zhou onward, the Central Plains practice of showing social rank in burials was also widely followed in the Jiang-Han region. Adherence to the Central Plains funerary traditions is manifest in the classes of cemeteries, types of

¹¹⁹ Yu Weichao 1982:5-6. See also, Xu Shaofu 1999:21-32.

¹²⁰ This is perhaps a reasonable assertion, but the *Zuozhuan* does not record any marriages between the ruling elite of Chu and indigenous peoples; see Thatcher 1991:43, Table 1.6.

casketry, array of funerary objects including chariot fittings and horse tack, chariot and horse pits, and live human burials.¹²¹ Worthy of note is the fact these practices start and end later in Chu, as one would expect from the migration history of the ruling house. As Yang notes, the value placed on chariots and horses is itself significant evidence of the presence of northerners who used chariots and horses for transportation and warfare, while southerners preferred to travel by boat and engaged in naval combat.

The development of indigenous bronze casting during the Neolithic period was interrupted by the extension of political control from the north into the Jiang-Han region which brought with it the fully developed bronze culture of the Central Plains. Bronze vessels found at Banlongcheng and Qingkou, Yidu are identical with Shang bronzes of the Erligang era. Bronze vessels dating from the late Shang through the middle Spring and Autumn era closely resemble Central Plains bronzes from the same period.¹²²

Regarding the origins of Chu culture, Li Xueqin, China's leading scholar of pre-Qin history, concludes his survey of bronze vessels in the Han and Huai river regions saying, that of the bronzes reviewed,

. . . all that belong to the early Spring and Autumn era, regardless of whether they were cast by the people of Huang, or Zeng (Sui), or Chu, the styles 形制 mostly continue the old [styles] of the Western Zhou, the inscriptions are terse and perfunctory, meaning that the culture of this region was primarily under the

¹²¹ Nie Fei notes that the number of meat stands (*zu 俎*) ornamentation on caskets found in Chu burials conforms the Zhou practices that were intended to show social status (1988).

¹²² Yang Quanxi 1989. Lothar von Faulkenhausen, surveying archaeological finds in Chu territory, notes similarities with Western Zhou in the ornamentation and assemblages of bronze ritual vessels as well as burial customs, concludes saying: "we arrive at a picture of Chu during the Spring and Autumn era as a polity very much in the Zhou mold" (1999:514-25).

influence of the Central Plains and, moreover, relatively underdeveloped. After the mid-Spring and Autumn, the form of the bronze vessels, handicrafts, and the style of characters in inscriptions all manifested definite unique traits, gradually forming a new tradition with Chu as its center. At this time, regardless of whether it was the Zeng (Sui) state or Cai State of the Ji clan name, they could not avoid being drawn into the sphere of this cultural tradition. When we study "Chu culture", [we] must pay attention to the historical development that is manifest in the bronze vessels of Chu.¹²³

Li's conclusion is echoed by Gao Chongwen. He has compared the style of the bronze tripods of Chu with those of other states, particularly in the Central Plains, and from the southern regions studied by Li, as well as from the states of Wu and Yue to its southeast and Ba and Shu to its west. Gong notes the strong influence of the bronze culture of the Central Plains on Chu and concludes that the unique culture of Chu really came into its own after the mid-Spring and Autumn era.¹²⁴

The connection between Chu and the Zhou court is explicit in the similarities in their ritual traditions. Based on sixth century inscriptions on ritual bronze vessels from Chu, Constance A. Cook has concluded that the ritual tradition of Zhou was perpetuated in Chu:

The terminology of these . . . inscriptions can be traced, phrase by phrase, to earlier Western Zhou inscriptions; it is also echoed through the ritual rhetoric of contemporary inscriptions of other states. This clearly suggests that Chu participated in a continuous scribal tradition, one inherited from the Zhou, and disseminated throughout China.¹²⁵

The ritual practices and scribal tradition that enabled them migrated south with the ancestors of the ruling elite of Chu.

¹²³ Li Xueqin 1980a:58.

¹²⁴ Gao Chongwen 1983:1-18.

¹²⁵ Cook 1999:72.

Divination practices and texts from Chu sites also provide evidence of a cultural link with the people of the Central Plains. The methods used in creating oracle bones that date from the early to middle Spring and Autumn era, excavated at Xiaojialing in Yicheng, Hubei, reveal a close connection with the oracle bones of the Western Zhou court that were discovered at Zhouyuan.¹²⁶ Commenting on divination texts found on bamboo slips excavated at Chu sites that date to the fourth century BC, Li Ling notes that despite the millennium that separates them in time, the connection between the divinatory practices of Chu and the Shang and Western Zhou is clear. Not only did they practice divination by "crack-making" and "stalk-casting," in Li's opinion, "the formulaic structure of the language of the Chu documents show that they are traceable in a single continuous line back to the divinatory inscriptions of the Shang and Western Zhou." Moreover, hexagrams are represented numerically in the same way in both traditions.¹²⁷

Calendrical practices evident in bronze inscription and on bamboo slips from Chu sites closely resemble the tradition of the Central Plains. As in the Zhou court and other northern states, years were recorded by number, astrological phenomena, and events. Regarding the latter method of dating, Chu practice differed only in detail, such as noting national events rather than personal events.¹²⁸

Cultural affinities with the northern Xia dynasty are evident in the writings of Qu Yuan, the great Chu poet, of the Warring States era. Noting, among other things,

¹²⁶ Hubeisheng wenwu kaogu yanjiusuo and Ichengxian bowuguan 1999:30-31.

¹²⁷ Li Ling 1990:71-72.

¹²⁸ Liu Binzheng 1988.

several poetic references to the struggle between the kings of Xia and the Mighty Archer, David Hawkes has observed that "it is a fact that the Chu aristocracy were extremely tenacious of what they believed to be their Xia connection."¹²⁹ Jiang Liangfu argues that since Chu carried on the historical tradition of the Xia, Qu Yuan, who may have been a keeper of the official history of Chu, provides more details about the history of Xia than Zhou in his poetry.¹³⁰ Yao Yixin points out that in traditional historical sources, starting with the *Shangshu*, Gun appears in a negative light because he was executed by Emperor Yao, allegedly for failing to control the great flood after nine years of trying. However, Gun is always treated sympathetically by Qu Yuan, who regarded Gun as a hero who actually controlled the flood through his son Yu. He sees this viewpoint as a reflection of the popular culture of Chu.¹³¹

The bearers of the high culture of Chu were northerners whose ethnic roots were in the Central Plains rather than in the south where they settled as immigrants. The development of a distinctive Chu culture and its appearance after the middle of the Spring and Autumn era was a concomitant of the solidification of the territorial base of the state of Chu and the extension of its sphere of influence northward and eastward.

Conclusion

Chu origins has been one of the hottest topics in Chu studies in recent decades. In this chapter I have argued that its ruling house originated in the Central Plains of

¹²⁹ Hawkes 1985:21; see pp. 19-24 for his full argument for a northern origin for the culture of the elite of Chu.

¹³⁰ Jiang Liangfu 1979:18-23.

¹³¹ Yao Yixin 1982:57-58

northern China. According to the genealogical tradition of Chu itself, the ruling house descended from Zhuan Xu, who was also the common ancestor of the northern Xia, Shang, and Zhou dynasties. The veracity of this tradition and the line of descent of Chu through Zhu Rong has been confirmed in classical texts and recently excavated inscriptional sources of Chu provenance.

The geographic distribution of the ancestral places of the clans descending from Zhu Rong stretch across the north from Shaanxi to Shandong, with the highest concentration being found in east central Henan. The migration of the ancestors of the Chu ruling house from vicinity of modern Xin Zheng, westward across Henan to Shaanxi, then southward into Jiang Han region of southern Hubei where it was located at the start of the Spring and Autumn era has been plausibly traced by He Guangyue through the study of historical place names associated with Chu, buttressed by textual, inscriptional, and archaeological evidence.

Early in the Western Zhou period, the state of Chu was established by King Cheng of Zhou in territory inhabited by the Man Yi south of the Zhou capital as a reward for the loyal service of Yü Xiong to Kings Wen and Wu. Charged with pacifying the Man Yi south of the Zhou capital Hao, the ruling house of Chu worked its way down the Han River drainage to the vicinity of modern Jiangling on the north side of the Yangzi River in southern Hubei where the Spring and Autumn capital of Ying was located.

Although several rulers of Chu allegedly claimed to be Man Yi, contextual analysis has shown that these were claims of political independence from Zhou rather than declarations of ethnicity as some have supposed. No love was lost between the ruling house of Chu and the indigenous inhabitants of the territory where the state of Chu ultimately established its home base and sphere of political influence. Man Yi pacification, which began in the Western Zhou, continued apace until the mid to late Spring and Autumn era as Chu solidified its territorial base in the environs of Ying and expanded territorial control eastward into the region between the Huai and Yangzi Rivers in modern Anhui Province.

The arrival to the Jiang Han region of the northern invaders from the Central Plains is richly attested in the material culture uncovered by archaeological digs at sites dating from the Western Zhou into the mid-Spring and Autumn era. Pre-existing indigenous cultures were eclipsed or arrested by the intrusion of the bronze culture, palace architecture, and fortifications in the style of the Central Plains. The emergence of the distinctively Chu culture, which is an amalgamation Central Plains and indigenous elements, coincided with the pacification of the Shu in the east during the sixth century.

Thus, from the perspectives of ancestral, geographic, ethnic, and cultural origins, the northern, or Central Plains, roots of the ruling house is clearly evident. As shall become clear in the discussion that follows, this connection is also manifest in the

modes of succession to the kingship of Chu and in the organization and functioning of its descent groups.

Chapter 2

Royal Succession

Succession to the rulership was the most critical event in the life cycle of a ruling house. The succession process affected the lives and fortunes of the ruler, the ruler's sons and their mothers, other members of the ruling household, and the political life of the state.¹ Father to son and brother to brother were normal modes of succession. When ailing Duke Xuan of Song (r. 747-729) yielded the throne to his younger brother He, he allegedly said, "When the father dies, [his] son succeeds [him]; when the elder brother dies, his younger brother succeeds [him]; [this] is a constant rule everywhere. I should install He."² 父死子繼，兄死弟及，天下通義也。我其立和。 Concerned about not having a designated heir, Duke Zhuang of Lu (r. 693-662) is said to have asked Shuya, his second younger brother, whom to make successor. Shuya recommended the duke's eldest younger brother Qingfu saying, "[The son] succeeds, then [the brother] succeeds; [this] is the norm of Lu. Qingfu is present, he can be made successor, what worry have you."³ 一繼一及，魯之常也。慶父在，可爲嗣，君何憂。 Thus, alternating succession between sons and brothers was perceived to be normal practice.

¹ For the impact of heir selection on female consorts of the ruler, see Thatcher 1991:34.

² SJHZKZ 38:23 (613).

³ SJHZKZ 33:572.

Heir selection was a matter of urgent concern for the ruler, the ruling household, and government officials. As evident in the forgoing examples, the ruler was free to designate his own heir. When counseled against setting aside his designated heir apparent without cause, Duke Ling of Qi (r. 581-554) claimed this right, stating emphatically, "[The choice] resides with me alone!"⁴ 在我而已。 If the ruler failed to designate his heir apparent, made a poor choice, or died while his heir apparent was too young to succeed him, his high officials could take matters into their own hands to make or change the selection after he died.⁵

Agnates in the ruling household made up the pool of potential successors. With respect to the designation of a son as heir apparent, there was a preference for the eldest son, but he could be set aside in favor of another son for any reason. There was also a preference for sons by primary wives over sons by secondary wives and concubines. The pecking order for succession by sons is succinctly stated in a speech attributed to an officer of Lu in 542:

When the heir apparent dies, if he has a younger full brother (*mudi* 母弟), then install him. If none, then install the eldest [half-brother]. If their age is equal, then select the most worthy. If the sense of duty is equal, then divine [the selection]. [This] is the Way of antiquity.⁶

大子死，有母弟，則立之。無，則長立。年鈞，則賢。
。義鈞，則卜。古之道也。

⁴ ZZZS 34:4b-5a (585-86, Xiang 19).

⁵ For an excellent example from the state of Jin, see ZZZS 19a:9b-10b (315, Wen 6).

⁶ ZZZS 10:14b-15a (685-86, Xiang 31).

Thus, the preferred order of selection was by seniority among both sons by the first primary wife and sons by other wives and consorts.

Succession in Chu

Scholarly opinion about the mode of succession to the rulership of Chu is divided. Five modes have been suggested, namely, father to son, primogeniture, ultimogeniture (or junior right), fraternal, and designated heir.⁷ Two oft quoted statements from the *Zuozhuan* about Chu which hint of ultimogeniture require notice: First, when consulted by King Cheng (r. 671-626) about selecting Shangchen 商臣 as his heir apparent, Chief Minister Zishang 子上 is alleged to have said, "Chu State's selection [of the Heir Apparent] has always been located in the youngest one."⁸ 楚國之舉，恒在少者。 Second, on the eve of a coup d'etat in Chu in 529, an officer of Jin observed that "When the Mis [i.e., the ruling house of Chu] experience disorder, [they] will actually install the youngest brother; [this] is the norm of Chu."⁹ 羊姓有亂，必季實立，楚之常也。 Keeping in mind these assertions of a possible rule of ultimogeniture, which would have made Chu significantly different from other states, succession to the rulership of Chu from its inception in early Western Zhou (see Table 3 below) through the Spring and Autumn era (see Table 4 below) shall now be reviewed in order to arrive at an understanding of the normal mode of succession in the ruling house of Chu.

⁷ Tang Jiahong 1988:1 and Liang Zhongshi 1988.3:59.

⁸ ZZS 18:5b-6b (299, Wen 1).

⁹ ZZS 46:10b (808, Zhao 13).

Table 3. Royal Succession in the Western Zhou Period

Name	Reign	Modes of Succession	Special Circumstances
Yü Xiong	Wen		
Xiong Li		son	
Xiong Kuang		son	
Xiong Yi	Cheng	son	
Xiong Ai		son	
Xiong Dan		son	
Xiong Sheng		son	
Xiong Yan		younger brother	selected by Xiong Sheng
Xiong Qu	Yi/Li	son	
Xiong Zhihong		second son	eldest son made heir apparent died early
Xiong Yan		youngest brother	killed Zhihong's heir apparent son?
Xiong Yong	Li	son	reigned 10 years
Xiong Yan		younger brother	reigned 10 years
Xiong Shuang	Xuan	eldest son	reigned 6 years
Xiong Xun		youngest brother	victor in brothers' succession struggle
Xiong E		son	
Ruo'ao	You	son	

Source: "Hereditary House of Chu," *Shiji*

Western Zhou Period

From the time of the creation of state of Chu during the reign of King Cheng of Zhou 周成王 (r. 1115-1079), the position of ruler was normally passed from father to son, but whether it was the eldest son is not always clear.¹⁰ According to the "Hereditary House of Chu" 楚世家 chapter of the *Shiji* 史記, the rulership passed from father to son for four generations after Xiong Yi 熊繹 was invested with territory by King Cheng. Xiong Sheng 熊勝, the great grandson of Xiong Yi,

¹⁰ See Appendix 2 for the pedigree of the rulers of Chu.

according to this source, "took [his] younger brother Xiong Yang 熊楊 [and] made [him] successor."¹¹ 以弟熊楊為後。 No clue is given as to the reason for this aberration

According to the "Hereditary House of Chu," Xiong Yang was succeeded by his son Xiong Qu 熊渠, who had three sons (listed in order of birth) Kang, 康, Hong 紅, and Zhici 執疵. Kang, who was the designated successor, preceded his father in death. Here the text becomes garbled; it says, "When Xiong Qu died, his son Xiong Zhi Hong was installed. When Zhi Hong died, his younger brother committed murder and was installed in his place; [he] was called Xiong Yan."¹² 熊渠卒，子熊摯紅立。熊摯紅卒，其弟弒代立，曰熊延。 The name "Zhi Hong" and the turgidity of this passage have given rise to much commentary about who was involved and what actually happened. The earliest commentaries argue that Xiong Zhi, not Xiong Zhi Hong, was removed because of illness rather than killed¹³ Qing scholar

¹¹ SJHZKZ 40:5-6 (645).

¹² SJHZKZ 40:6-7(645).

¹³ This is the conclusion of Jiao Zhou of the kingdom of Shu Han (221-263), who is cited in the *Suoyin* and *Zhengyi* commentaries, while Later Han (25-220) commentator Song Jun, quoting Le Han, is cited in the latter; see SJHZKZ 40:3b (546).

These and other early commentators (see below) were evidently influenced by an episode in the *Zuozhuan* passage under the year 634, which says that when the officers of Chu reprimanded the Viscount of Kui for not sacrificing to Zhu Rong 祝融 and Yü Xiong 鬻熊, the viscount said, "When our former ruler Xiong Zhi was ill, the ghosts and deities did not forgive him; so he hid himself in Kui. Because of that, he lost [the rulership of] Chu; so why should I sacrifice to them?" 我先王熊摯有疾，鬼神弗赦，而自鼠于夔，是以失楚，又何祀焉； see ZZZS 16:7b-8a (265, Xi 26). Commenting on this passage, Du Yu (A.D. 222-284) says:

Zhu Rong, the fire chief of Gao Xin, was the distant ancestor of Chu. Yu was the twelfth generation descendant of Zhu Rong. Kui was invested separately by Chu; therefore, it [had] also performed their sacrifices for generations. . . . Xiong Zhi, the legitimate heir of Chu was ill [and] did not obtain to succeed to the throne; therefore, he

Liang Yusheng maintains that "Zhi Hong" was actually two names for the sons of Xiong Qu, namely Zhi and Hong, with Zhi being his eldest son. He argues that Zhici was installed as ruler in place of Zhi, who had been removed because of illness, and changed his name to Xiong Yan. He also suggests that some text is missing from the passage.¹⁴ Takezoe claims that "Zhi" is an interpolation; so, the text should read "his

was separately invested in Kui.

祝融，高辛氏之火正，楚之遠祖也。鬻熊，祝融之十二世孫。夔，楚之別封，故亦紹其祀。

Commenting on a passage in the "Zhengyu" chapter of the *Guoyu* concerning which of the descendants of Zhu Rong would become powerful in the south, Kong Zhao 孔晁 said, 'When] Xiong Yi's great-great-grandson Zhi was ill, the officers of Chu removed him [and] installed his younger brother Yan. Zhi exiled himself in Kui. His descendants were meritorious; [so] the king commissioned [them] to be viscounts of Kui;' 熊繹玄孫摯有疾，楚人廢之，立其弟延。摯自棄于夔。子孫有功，王命爲夔子; cited in Liang Yusheng 188.22:4a-b (454). Later Wei Zhao (204?-273?), commenting on the same passage as Kong said, "The sixth generation grandson of Xiong Yi called 'Xiong Zhi' had a terrible illness. The officers of Chu removed him and installed his younger brother Xiong Yan, Xiong Zhi voluntarily exiled himself in Kui. His descendants had accomplishments; [so] the king [of Chu?] commissioned [them] to be viscount[s] of Kui." 楚熊繹六世孫曰熊摯有惡疾，楚人廢之，立其弟熊延。摯自棄於夔，其子孫有功，王命爲夔子; see GY 16:3a (369, "Zhengyu" 鄭語). Kong and Wei were clearly influenced by both the *Zuozhuan* and *Shiji*. However, since neither one mentions "Zhi Hong," they do not appear to have had access to the wording in our version of this succession incident from the "Hereditary House of Chu."

¹⁴ Liang's argument is as follows:

In my opinion, Xiong Zhi and Xiong Hong were elder and younger brother. The two men both were Xiong Qu's sons. How can [the text] come to say "Xiong Zhi Hong"?!?! [If one] refers to the *Zuozhuan* [under] the year Xi 26, [it] says that when Zhi was ill, he went into hiding [and] lost Chu. The sub-commentary [of Kong Yingda] says, "The 'Hereditary House [of Chu]' does not have this event; [so we] know neither to which ruler Zhi was heir nor when he was invested in Kui. Kong Chao's commentary on the "Zhengyu" [chapter of the *Guoyu*] says, '[When] Xiong Yi's great-great-grandson Zhi was ill, the officers of Chu removed him [and] installed his younger brother Yan. Zhi exiled himself in Kui. His descendants were meritorious; [so] the king commissioned [them] to be viscounts of Kui.' [I] also do not know what he relied upon." Kong's sub-commentary is like this.

Wei Zhao's commentary [on the *Guoyu*], which has been passed down until the present, is based on [the commentary of] Kong Chao, but [as to] Xiong Yan succeeding

son Hong was installed. When Hong died" He maintains further that four characters were omitted, presumably following "When Hong died," namely, 子熊摯立 ("his son Xiong Zhi was installed"); thus, the passage would read, "When Hong died, his son Zhi was installed [as ruler]. His younger brother killed [him] and was installed in his place; [he] was called 'Xiong Yan.'" Takezoe dismisses the differing accounts of regicide and hiding and removal as being differences in transmitted traditions.¹⁵ If his emendation is correct, then the rulership of Chu finally devolved onto the youngest son of Xiong Qu as the result of turmoil in the ruling house. In any case, the transmission of the rulership from brother to brother apparently occurred during abnormal circumstances.

Xiong Yan was succeeded by his eldest son, Xiong Yong 熊勇, who died after reigning six years and was replaced by a younger brother, Xiong Yan 熊嚴. The reason for this instance of brother to brother succession is not known. Xiong Yan, who died in the tenth year of his reign, had four sons. He was succeeded by his eldest son,

Hong [and] being installed [as ruler], the two commentaries of Kong and Wei both omit the generation of Hong. Only Wei emends "Yi's great-great-grandson" as "Yi's sixth generation grandson" [thus] agreeing with the "Hereditary House [of Chu]."

I suspect that Xiong Qu had four sons. The eldest was Zhi, next Hong, next Kang, [and] next Zhici. As to the instance of the "Hereditary House [of Chu]" saying that Xiong Qu sired three sons, [it] considered Kang to be eldest son, Hong to be the second middle son, Zhici to be the youngest son, and did not count Zhi; it must simply have been because [he] had been removed [due to] illness [and] went into hiding [that it] did not again classify him [as one of the sons]. Xiong Yan should be Zhici. Since [he] was installed as a replacement, [he] changed his name.

The *Shiji* is clearly wrong in combining Zhi and Hong into a single person in both the "Generation Tables" and "Hereditary House [of Chu]" chapters. Moreover, since it says Hong died, then he was not killed by regicide indeed! And as to the case of it saying "died by regicide," [Zhici] probably killed [Zhi's] son. The *Shiji* clearly has omitted text." (Liang Yusheng 1887:22:4a-b [454])

¹⁵ SJHZKZ 40:7-8 (646).

Xiong Shuang 熊霜, who reigned six years then died, throwing the royal house into turmoil as his three younger brothers fought to succeed him. One died, another fled, and the youngest, Xiong Xun 熊徇, became ruler of Chu.¹⁶

During the five generations from Xiong Xun to Fenmao 蚡冒 (r. 757-741), sons succeeded fathers as rulers.¹⁷ This era of apparent normalcy in the Chu ruling house bridged the transition from the Western Zhou period to the Eastern Zhou period. The pattern of father to son transmission of the rulership in normal times and brother to brother succession in abnormal times continued on into the Spring and Autumn era, or first part of the Eastern Zhou period (see Table 4 below).

Spring and Autumn Era

When Fenmao died, Xiong Tong 熊通, his younger brother, murdered the son and legitimate successor of Fenmao, and assumed the rulership himself. In the 37th year of his reign (607), he appropriated the title of king, becoming known in history as King Wu 楚武王 (r. 740-690).¹⁸ He was succeeded by his son, King Wen 楚文王 (r. 689-675), who had two sons by a wife whom he had taken away from the ruler of Xi.¹⁹ He was succeeded by his eldest son, whose posthumous name is Du'ao 堵敖 (Zhuang Ao 莊敖, r. 674-672). Du'ao reigned for two years before being killed, allegedly in self-defense, by younger brother Xiong Yun 熊惲, who replaced him and is known as King Cheng 楚成王.²⁰

¹⁶ SJHZKZ 40:8 (646).

¹⁷ SJHZKZ 40:8-9 (646).

¹⁸ SJHZKZ 40:9-10 (646).

¹⁹ ZZS 9:9b (156, Zhuang 14).

²⁰ SJHZKZ 40:12-13 (647). Du'ao is the name given in the *Zuozhuan*, and Zhuang'ao is

Table 4. Royal Succession in the Spring and Autumn Era

Name	Reign	Modes of Succession	Special Circumstances
Xia'ao	763-758	son	
Fenmao	757-741	son	
King Wu	740-690	younger brother	murdered nephew
King Wen	689-675	son	
Du'ao	674-672	eldest son	
King Cheng	671-626	younger brother	committed regicide
King Mu	625-614	son	forced father's suicide
King Zhuang	613-591	son	
King Gong	590-560	son	
King Kang	559-545	secondary son	
Jia'ao	544-541	son	
King Ling	540-529	uncle	committed regicide
Zigan	529	younger brother	usurped throne during coup d'etat
King Ping	528-516	youngest brother	ascended throne after coup d'etat
King Zhao	515-489	secondary son	heir apparent forced to flee state
King Hui	489-432	son	

Sources: *Shiji* and *Zuozhuan*.

The kingship of Chu passed from father to son for five generations from King Cheng to Jia'ao. (r. 544-541), although not without event. For example, King Cheng was forced to commit suicide in 626 by his heir apparent Shangchen (King Mu 穆王, r. 625-614) after allegedly planning to replace the latter with a younger son by another wife. The *Zuozhuan* reports that he had been forewarned of this scenario:

Earlier, when [King Cheng] was going to make Shangchen heir apparent, [he] consulted Chief Minister Zishang about it. Zishang said, "You are still young [literally, "your teeth have not yet (come in)"] and furthermore [you] have many

found in the "Hereditary House of Chu chapter of the *Shiji*.

favorites [i.e., consorts]. [If you ever want to] demote him, then there will be chaos. Chu State's selection [of the Heir Apparent] has always been located in the youngest one. Moreover, that person, with the eyes of a wasp and the voice of a wolf, is a cruel man. [He] cannot be installed [as your heir apparent]."²¹

初楚子將以商臣爲大子，訪諸令尹子上。子上曰君齒未也，而又多愛。黜乃亂也。且蠶目而豺聲，忍人也。不可立也。

²¹ ZZS 18:5b (299, Wen 1). Regarding "furthermore [you] have many favorites" *duo ai* 多愛, Legge translates this statement as "You are also fond of many [of your children]" (Legge 5:230). However, the "Hereditary House of Chu" renders *duo ai* as *duo neicong* 多內寵, or "many concubines" (literally, "inner [chamber] favorites"); see SJHZKZ 40:16 (648).

Du Yu interprets *ju* 舉 to mean "to install" (*li* 立) (ZZS 18:5b [299, Wen 1--Du commentary]). He is followed by Yang Bojun, who says that the meaning of this sentence is the same as that of "When the Mis experience disorder, [they] will actually install the youngest brother; [this] is the norm of Chu." 羊姓有亂，必季實立，楚之常也。Chu would always install the youngest son (CQZZZ 2:510). Takezoe comments, "It is the *ju* of 'discard and acquire' (*fei ju* 廢舉). Du explained it based on the event; therefore, [he] said 'install' 廢舉之舉也。杜因事解之，故曰立。(ZZHJ 8:7).

Recently Liang Zhongshi has argued that Du and Yang are wrong. He says that the *ju* of "discard and acquire" is at least a step in the right direction, but argues that it means "to make a move or take action" (*judong* 舉動). In his view, Zishang's words were specific to the situation at hand. Rather than generalizing about succession in Chu, Zishang, who alluded to the trouble that would ensue if King Cheng were to later demote Zishang, meant that when there is a disturbance (i.e., action) in Chu, the rule of succession was that the position of ruler went to the youngest son. He takes the statement about the Mis, which was made by an officer of the state of Jin in a different time and place, to be confirmation that he is correct (1988).

Liang's interpretation of *ju*, however, is off the mark. Zishang was asked about the wisdom of selecting Shangchen as heir apparent. Within this context, *ju* is the *ju* of *juba* 舉拔 "to lift or pull up," that is, "to select or choose." It is frequently used in this sense in the *Zuozhuan* in comparable contexts. For example, an officer of Jin is said to have offered the following observation in 597 about the way officials were appointed in Chu,

"As to the way [its] ruler selects (*ju*) [officers], within [his] clan name, he chooses (*xuan* 選) among those who are close [kin]; outside [his] clan name, he chooses among the old [faithful] (i.e., the descendants of former officials); selections do not ignore virtue; rewards do not neglect achievements." (ZZS 23:6b [390, Xuan 12]).

其君之舉也，內姓選於親，外姓選於舊。舉不失德，賞不失勞。

In another example, harking back to the early years of the Western Zhou period, we are told, "The Duke of Zhou selected (*ju*) [Cai Zhong 蔡仲] [and] made [him] his own officer;" that is, Cai Zhong was given a private appointment by the Duke of Zhou 周公舉之，以爲己卿 (*ibid.*, 54:19b [949, Ding 4]).

Unfortunately, King Cheng did not heed the chief minister's warning.

The succession of King Kang 楚康王 (r. 559-545) occurred under special circumstances, for he was not the chosen heir apparent of his father King Gong 楚共王 (r. 590-560). The *Zuozhuan* relates the following anecdote about how King Gong selected his heir apparent:

Earlier on King Gong had no heir apparent [by a primary wife]. [He] had five favorite sons [by concubines] [but] had not established an heir among them. So he conducted wide ranging sacrifices to all the tutelary deities and prayed, "I request the deities to choose [one] among [these] five individuals and make him lord the altars of state." Then he showed a piece of jade to all of the tutelary deities saying, "The one who stands on top of this jade and bows, [will be] the one chosen by deities; who would dare go against them?" Then, joining [his consort] Ba Ji 巴姬, [he] secretly buried the jade in the courtyard of the main ancestral temple, [then] ordered the five individuals to fast and enter in order of seniority to perform obeisance. King Kang straddled it, King Ling's elbow was on top of it, Zigan and Zixi both were far from it. King Ping, being young and carried in arms, entered bowed twice; both times he pressed [his hands] on the knot [on the jade's chord].²²

初共王無冢適。有寵子五人，無適立焉。乃大有事于群望，而祈曰請神擇於五人者，使主社稷。乃遍以璧見於群望曰當璧而拜者，神所立也，誰敢違之。既乃與巴姬密埋璧於大室之庭，使五人齊而長入拜。康王跨之，靈王肘加焉，子干，子皙皆遠之。平弱，抱而入，再拜，皆厭紐。

Thus, King Ping (r. 528-516), the youngest of King Gong's five sons by concubines (*shuzi* 庶子)²³ was chosen by divination as his heir apparent. However, before King

²² ZZS 46:9a-b (808, Zhao 13).

²³ A son's status was determined by his birth mother's status and his birth order. The first son born to a legitimate wife, was a *dizi* 適子 ("first son," also written 敵子). Other sons by a legitimate wife were *yuzi* 餘子 ("additional sons"). Sons born to concubines were *shuzi* 庶子 ("son of concubines"; see Du Yu's comment concerning the employment of three classes of sons of high ranking officials in the state of Jin in ZZS 21:13a-b (336, Xuan 2). In the *Zuozhuan* under the year 538, King Ling is called "the son of a concubine of King Gong of Chu" 楚共王之庶子; see ZZS 42:29a (732, Zhao 4). In an entry in 529, Zigan is also described as the

Ping could assume the throne, two of his elder brothers would precede him as rulers of Chu. When King Gong died, he was succeeded by the first mentioned son King Kang, who, "based on being the eldest, was installed [as king]" 康王以長立.²⁴ Thus, seniority triumphed over minority as the future King Ping, whose name was Qiji 棄疾, was set aside.

King Kang was succeeded for a short time by his son, posthumously named Jia'ao 郟敖 (r. 544-541). When Jia'ao ascended the throne in 544, his father's younger brother Wangzi Wei 王子圍 became chief minister. Commenting on these changes, an envoy from the state of Zheng allegedly said, "That is what can be called 'unfitting.' [Wangzi Wei] will be sure to replace him [and] flourish. Beneath the pine and the cypress, grass does not grow."²⁵ 是謂不宜，必代之。松柏之下，其草不值。 In 541 Ziwei, whose thinly veiled ambition to become king was frequently noted and much discussed during his tenure as chief minister,²⁶ strangled Jia'ao to death, killed the latter's two sons and other officers who were close to him, forced two of his own younger brothers, Zigan 子干 and Zixi 子皙, to flee to other states, then usurped the throne, becoming King Ling (r. 541-529).

When a messenger charged with reporting the death of Jia'ao to the state of Zheng was asked what he would say about his successor, he replied, "[It is] my officer

son of a concubine; see *ibid.*, 46:10b (808, Zhao 13).

²⁴ ZJHZKZ 40:33 (652).

²⁵ ZZS 39:4a (665, Xiang 29).

²⁶ Tales about the kingly ambition of Wangzi Wei constitute virtually the entire historical record of the reign of Jia'ao; see ZZS 39:4a (665, Xiang 29), 40:2a-b (679, Xiang 30), 40:10a (683, Xiang 30), 40:22b-24b (689-90, Xiang 31), 41:3a-4a (697, Zhao 1), 41:4a-11a (697-701), 41:29a (710, Zhao 1), and 44:3a (759, Zhao 7).

Wei." 寡大夫圍。◦ Significantly, his report was changed by an aide of Wangzi Wei to say, "King Gong's son Wei was the eldest."²⁷ 共王之子圍爲長。◦ Jia'ao and his sons were dead, and King Gong, his father, evidently had no other sons. Wangzi Wei, the eldest surviving son of King Zhuang, had made sure that the throne would be his.

King Ling's arrogance and mistreatment of others finally caught up with him in 529 when some of his victims or their survivors took advantage of his absence from the capital to start a rebellion.²⁸ Gongzi Qiji, the youngest brother of King Ling who had been selected to be King Gong's heir apparent and was now serving as administrator of Cai, had his older brothers, Zigan and Zixi, called back from exile. With the support of the people of the former states of Chen and Cai, the three brothers joined the rebels in an assault on the capital of Chu. Directing the attack, Gongzi Qiji sent two men into the capital to kill the heir apparent and another son of King Ling. Thereupon, Zigan was installed as king, Zixi and Qiji became chief minister and marshal respectively. Qiji sent an agent to lure the Chu force at Qianqi away from King Ling.²⁹

King Ling, hearing that all of his sons had been killed, fled away from the capital in despair. Upon reaching Yan, he was taken in by Taro Master Shen Hai 芋尹申亥, whose father Shen Wuyu 申無宇 had been treated leniently on two

²⁷ ZZS 41:29a-b (710, Zhao 1).

²⁸ King Ling had been camped at Qianqi 乾谿 since the previous year, providing support for siege that he had ordered on the state of Xu 徐; see ZZS 45:28a (790, Zhao 12). An anecdote in GY 10a-11a (397-399, "Chuyu" *shang*) ties the rebellion to King Ling's refusal to heed to follow the remonstrances of Zizhang, Administrator of Bai 白公子張, against his cruelty.

²⁹ ZZS 46:4a-6a (805-06, Zhao 13).

occasions when he had opposed King Ling. When King Ling strangled himself to death at his house, Shen Hai buried two of his own daughters alive with him.³⁰

King Ling's death, however, did not end the turmoil in the capital. Zigan had chosen to reject an earlier warning to kill Qiji. Now the latter used Dou Chengran 鬥成然 to trick Zigan and Zixi into believing that King Ling had returned to the capital and that a mob was coming to kill them. Consequently, they both committed suicide, and Qiji finally became king of Chu. Dou Chengran was made chief minister.³¹

When King Ping died in 516, he was succeeded by King Zhao (Heir Apparent Ren 大子壬, r. 515-489), who was one of his younger sons but not his original heir. While serving as administrator of Cai from 531, King Ping had sired a son , Jian 建 , whom he made heir apparent. Upon securing the kingship in 528, he had appointed Wu She 伍奢 to be the tutor (*shi* 師) and Fei Wuji 費無極 to be the junior tutor (*xiaoshi* 小師) of Heir Apparent Jian .³² Fei conceived and executed a scheme to get rid of Jian and Wu She when he failed to ingratiate himself with his charge (see Appendix 5).

Of the succession and installation of King Zhao, the *Zuozhuan* says:

9th month. King Ping died. Chief Minister Zichang, desiring to install Zixi (a secondary son of the king), said, "Heir Apparent Ren is young. His mother is not the first wife (*shi* 適); Wangzi Jian actually betrothed her. Zixi is older and fond of goodness. Install the elder, then [succession will] be smooth. Establish goodness, then [the state] be well-ordered. [If] the making of a king [will] be smooth, and the state [will] be well-ordered, can (we) not strive [for it]?" Zixi became angry and said, "That is to upset the state and to blacken the name of

³⁰ ZZS 46:6a-7a (806-07, Zhao 13).

³¹ ZZS 46:7a-8a (807, Zhao 13). See also GY 19:3b-4a (428-29, "Wuyu").

³² ZZS 45:22a-23b (787-88, Zhao 11), 48:21b (844, Zhao 19).

our ruler and king. When the state has outside help, [the helping state] cannot be annoyed. When the King has a legitimate heir, [succession] cannot be disrupted. Defeating close kin urges on enemies, disrupting succession is unlucky, [and] I would be the recipient of its [bad] reputation. Bribe me with all under Heaven, [and] I still would not go along, I dare say! What would become of the state of Chu? [We] must kill the chief minister." The chief minister was frightened; so he installed King Zhao.³³

九月。楚平卒。令尹子昌欲立子西，曰大子壬弱。其母非適也，王子建實聘之。子西長而好善。立長則順，建善則治。王順，國治，不可務乎。子西怒，曰是亂國而惡君王也。國有外援，不可瀆也。王有適嗣，不可亂也。敗親速讎，亂嗣不祥，我受其名。賂吾天下，吾濫不從也。楚國何爲。必殺令尹。令尹懼，乃立昭王。

When the fate of Heir Apparent Jian is taken into account, the ascension of King Zhao, which appeared to be a simple case of father to son transmission of the kingship, was anything but smooth and orderly. As in other states, when faced with a young heir apparent, there was a strong preference for installing an older agnate as successor, although in this instance the king's chosen successor was ultimately installed. Ironically, King Ping had sired Heir Apparent Ren by the woman who should have been the wife of Heir Apparent Jian.

The final case of royal succession in Chu during the Spring and Autumn era occurred in 489. When King Zhao sensed that he was going to die, he ordered each of his three older brothers to become king. Zixi 子西 (Gongzi Shen 公子申), who had refused the kingship previously, and Ziqi 子期 (Gongzi Jie 公子結) were not willing to serve. Zilü 子闔 (Gongzi Qi 公子啓) finally relented and agreed after being

³³ ZZS: 52:6a-b (902, Zhao 26--text and Du commentary).

commanded five times to take the position. However, after King Zhao died, he changed his mind and is reported to have said,

Our ruler and king set aside his sons and yielded [the throne]; dare we, his servants, forget our ruler? Following the ruler's order accords with the way things should be done. Installing the ruler's son also accords with the way things should be done. [These] two [opportunities] to do things the way that they should be done cannot be overlooked.

君王舍其子而讓，群臣敢忘君乎？從君之命，順也。
立君之子，亦順也。二順不可失也。

So the three brothers did the right thing, taking precautionary measures to ensure internal stability, then bringing in the deceased king's son, Zhang 章 (King Hui 惠王, r. 489-432), and installing him as king.³⁴

Conclusion

The outstanding characteristics of the succession regime in Chu from the beginning of statehood in the Western Zhou through the Spring and Autumn era are as follows: (1) The ruler selected his heir apparent, or successor, from a candidate pool that included all of his sons and his brothers. This is clear in the examples of selection by Xiong Sheng, who chose his younger brother, in the Western Zhou and Kings Cheng and Gong, who selected sons, and King Zhao, who picked a brother during the Spring and Autumn era. (2) The ruler could, at his pleasure demote his designated heir apparent and install another in his place, as is evident in the anecdote about King Cheng and Heir Apparent Shangchen and demonstrated in the case of King Ling and Heir Apparent Jian. (3) In normal times (i.e., the ruler lived a relatively long life and there

³⁴ ZZS 58:3a (1007, Ai 6).

were no regicides, succession struggles, or coups d'etat) father to son transmission of the rulership was the dominant mode of succession in both periods. (4) While there was a clear preference for selecting a son, with only two explicit examples of selection of the eldest son, namely Xiong Zhuang in the Western Zhou and Du'ao in the Spring and Autumn era, the rulers of Chu evidently did not follow a rule of primogeniture in selecting their heirs apparent.³⁵ (5) Since there is only one example of selection of the youngest son, namely King Ping, and him by divination, there was no rule of ultimogeniture. Finally, (6) fraternal succession occurred mostly under abnormal conditions. This mode of succession occurred upon the death of the heir before his father, as in the case of succession by Xiong Zhihong in the Western Zhou. It also followed the premature death of the ruler, perhaps before a son was born or old enough to succeed him, as is likely in the instance of the succession of Xiong Yan 熊嚴 in the Western Zhou. It resulted from regicides committed by Xiong Yan 熊延 in the Western Zhou and Kings Wu, Cheng, and Ling during the Spring and Autumn era. A succession struggle where the heir apparent son was too young to succeed may have caused the turmoil that produced Xiong Xun's succession in the Western Zhou. And finally, brothers Zigan and King Ping claimed the throne in a *coup d'etat* late in the

³⁵ Ye Youming argues that fraternal succession was the mode of succession in Chu until the middle of the Warring State period when the Central Plains system of primogeniture was adopted (1987:270-79). Li Yijie argues that a change from fraternal succession to father to son transmission was occurred after King Wu and that succession by the eldest son was established after King Ping (1988:120-22). He Hao and Zhang Jun 1984 and Blakeley 1999:54-55 state that succession by the eldest son was *the* mode of succession in Chu at all times. I have presented all of the evidence here; father to son transmission was the dominant mode during the Western Zhou period and the Spring and Autumn era.

Spring and Autumn era. Since all recorded instances of succession by younger brothers occurred in abnormal times, "When the Mis [i.e., the ruling house of Chu] experience disorder, [it] will actually install the youngest brother; [this] is the norm of Chu," should be viewed as a statement of historical fact; the conclusion should be that this is what always happened, not that it was a rule.³⁶ In Chu, rulers designated their successors, usually preferring sons over brothers.

Attitudes towards age and succession deserve a final comment. While the ruler designated his own heir and primogeniture was not the rule, seniority was considered positively in Chu in the context of succession. As seen above, when King Gong divined among his five favorite sons to select his heir apparent, they entered the court in order of seniority. The youngest of these sons, King Ping, who was chosen by divination, was still a babe-in-arms. When King Gong died, his young heir apparent was set aside in favor of King Kang who was installed because he was the oldest of the five favorite sons (not the oldest son of his father). Three of the remaining sons usurped the throne in seniority order! King Ling, after committing regicide by killing his nephew, King Kang's successor, justified his ascension by drawing attention to his seniority. When King Gong's heir apparent King Ping overthrew King Ling by coup d'etat, he temporarily deferred the kingship to elder brother Zigan, before taking the throne for himself. When King Ping died, the chief minister wanted to set aside his young heir apparent and install Zixi, who was an older secondary son of the king, in part, because

³⁶This is also the conclusion reached in He Hao and Zhang Jun 1984, Liang Zhongshi 1988, and Blakeley 1999:54-55.

he was older and his age would facilitate a smooth succession . Rather than presaging a shift towards primogeniture, this attitude was more a reflection of a utilitarian approach toward succession; age was perceived to make a difference in how the successor would perform.

Table 5. Succession Modes in Various States during the Western Zhou and Spring and Autumn Eras

State	Western Zhou			Spring and Autumn		
	Son	Brother	Other	Son	Brother	Other
Chu	12	4		11	4	1
Lu	6	5	1	11	3	
Wei	9	1		10	5	8
Jin	8	1	1	17	2	6
Zheng				13	7	1
Cai	7			12	2	2
Qi	9	2		10	6	
Chen	7	2		12	2	
Song	7	2	1	10	3	2
Totals	65	17	3	106	34	20

Sources: *Shiben* and "Hereditary House" chapters of *Shiji*

Tang Jiahong has demonstrated conclusively that the succession regime in Chu was fundamentally the same as in the other states.³⁷ His conclusion is substantiated in the Table 5 above which compares modes of succession in Chu and a number of other states. Father to son and fraternal succession occurred in every state. Father to son was the dominant mode of succession with every son eligible for selection as heir apparent.

³⁷Tang Jiahong 1988. Ye Youming argues strongly that it was not the same because fraternal succession was the mode in Chu (1987). However, as shown here, the evidence supports Tang's position.

The circumstances surrounding fraternal succession in Chu and the other states are also similar. Everywhere fraternal succession was frequently associated with domestic disorder such as regicide, succession struggles, etc. Excluding succession in Chu, thirty-three of forty-three instances of fraternal succession in the other states involved domestic disorder. The relatively infrequent cases of fraternal succession that did not involve disorder usually occurred as a result of the ruler selecting his younger brother as heir apparent or the untimely death of the ruler shortly after his installation. The "other" field masks the important fact that all instances of succession other than father to son and brother to brother were limited to members of the royal house; that is, cousins or uncles who were sons and grandsons of a former ruler. All but one of these cases (including Chu) involved domestic disorder.

Chapter 3

Kinship Structure

During the Spring and Autumn era the state of Chu was ruled by relatively strong kings. They were assisted in the central government and on the royal household staff by members of the royal house, more distant royal agnates, and persons who were not related to them. Although lineages of royal and non-royal origin existed in Chu, they were weak in terms of political influence and economic strength in comparison to lineages in other states.¹

The presence of a strong ruling house and generally weak and politically ineffective lineages through most of the Spring and Autumn era contrasts sharply with the situation in the northern states of Qi and Jin, particularly the latter. In those states strong, territorially based lineages were able to win the right, as lineages, to participate in the political process. By utilizing this right, they were eventually able to take real political power away from the ruling house and to finally replace it altogether, becoming ruling houses themselves.

This remarkable contrast suggests that social, economic, and political conditions in Chu may have been fundamentally different from those of the northern states. In this

¹ Blakeley breaks the "royal clan" into the main lineage, which was "composed of the hereditary lord and his closest agnatic kinsmen (essentially, his brothers, nephews, uncles, and first cousins)," and collateral lineages that were comprised of "descendants of the agnatic kin." Below the royal clan, there were "independent clans" that were unrelated to it (1992:3-4).

chapter I will focus on the structure of kinship in Chu society. The evidence presented here and in the general discussion of kinship terms in Appendix 3 will show that the structure of kinship in Chu was essentially the same as it was in the north where its ruling house originated. As demonstrated in Chapter 1, the ruling house and royal agnates, who dominated the ruling elite, were of the same ethnic stock as the rulers and elite of the Hua Xia states of the north. The similarities in kinship structure between Chu and the northern states is consistent with that conclusion. During the course of this dissertation I will explore and explain the functional disparities noted above through the interaction between the kinship and political systems of Chu.

H. G. Creel on Chu kinship

The late Professor H. G. Creel took the position that the kinship structure of Chu society was different from that of the northern states. His main points were that: (1) "the institution of *shi* may originally have not existed in Chu at all, but may have been taken over in the course of the [Spring and Autumn] period, as part of the process of acculturation from the north;" and (2) "aristocratic kinship groups in Chu do not appear to have been 'corporations'; they do not seem to have had any recognized heads."²

Rao Zongyi has objected to the Creel's basic argument. In the first instance, he says that Creel has made too much of an alleged statement by a local Chu official to Confucius which reflects a different attitude in Chu toward the mutual responsibility of father and son in protecting each other from the consequences of violating the law.³ He

² Creel 1964:78-179.

³ Rao Zongyi 1969:308 (note 80); also see LYZS 13:7a (118).

further argues that there were many, presumably northern style, lineages stemming from the ruling house of Chu. Most of his evidence is for the Warring States period, but he alludes to a *Zuo* reference to "*wangzu*" (王族, "royal sublineages") in the Center Army of Chu in 547 as evidence of the existence in Chu of the concept of *zongzu* 宗族, the basic lineage structure which was common in the north.⁴ He also takes the advice of a sixth century Chu man to instruct the heir apparent in the "generations" as evidence that Chu lineages kept genealogies in the Spring and Autumn era.⁵

Rao has not effectively countered Creel. The bulk of his evidence is drawn from the Warring States period, or after Chu had undergone, according to Creel, a "process of acculturation from the north." Moreover, his interpretation of *wangzu* in the military context mentioned above is open to dispute. For example, in this instance Takezoe interprets *zu* to mean "subordinates";⁶ that is *wangzu* refers to the king's personal military units.

To support his contention that the institution of *shi* 氏 may have been adopted under the influence of the northern states during the Spring and Autumn era rather than having been an original Chu institution, Creel surveyed references in the *Zuo* and found that *shi* is used in connection with Chu surnames only fifteen times with all occurrences falling after 546, or in the final third of the Spring and Autumn era. He gave special attention to the Ruo'ao group, which was decimated in an unsuccessful coup attempt in 605, claiming that it was not a *shi* in the northern sense of the term.

⁴Rao Zongyi 1969:308-309 (note 80); also see ZZZS, 37:16a (636, Xiang 26).

⁵Rao Zongyi 1969:309 (note 80); also see GY 17:1b (380, "Chuyu" *shang*).

⁶ZZHZ 18:20.

His reasons were twofold: (1) its Dou and Cheng components had different surnames; and (2) it had no recognized head. He also regarded as significant the fact that "Ruo'aoshi" appears several times in the *Zuozhuan*, while *shi* is not used in combination with "Dou" or "Cheng." From this evidence he concluded that the author of the *Zuozhuan*, being unable to find a term which would adequately describe the Chu phenomenon, had resorted to using the northern term *shi*.⁷

The evidence presented by Creel has several problems. First, and less important, is the fact that three of the fifteen references to Chu surnames + *shi*, which he cited, have nothing to do with Chu itself. Two references are to a certain woman known as Weishi 蕩氏, who was a concubine of Meng Xizi of Lu.⁸ Although Wei is found in Chu as a surname, there is no indication that this woman came from there. The other irrelevant reference is to the flight of a Chu rebel to refuge in Kuihuangshi 頽黃氏, which was located in the neighboring state of Wu.⁹

The more serious problem is in focusing on *shi* as a means of gaining insight into the kinship structure of Chu in comparison to the northern states. As discussed in detail below in Appendix 3, the terms "*xing*" 姓 and *shi* cannot be taken as reliable guides to kinship structure, for they merely mark surnames which were used to establish the identity of groups of supposedly consanguineous kin. *Xing* distinguishes surnames of kin groups formed in the hoary past which by Spring and Autumn times functioned

⁷ Creel 1964:179 (note 118).

⁸ ZZS 45:18b-19b (785-786, Zhao 9, text and commentary); these are references B and C in Creel 1964:179 (note 118).

⁹ ZZS 60:6b (1043, Ai 16, text and commentary); on the common use of *shi* in place names see ZZHJ 30:32. This is reference O in Creel 1964:179 (note 118).

as clans, and *shi* marks the surnames of lineages of more recent vintage.¹⁰ They are not, however, structural terms.

As demonstrated in Appendix 3, the key terms that are used in pre-Qin sources to describe kinship structure in the north and in the south are "zong" 宗 and "zu" 族. The nature of the kin group and its place in the general kinship structure of a particular society must be determined on the basis of contextual analyses of the use of these terms.¹¹

Chu Kinship Structure

In the historical record of the state of Chu for the Spring and Autumn era at least three levels of kinship can be shown to have existed above the family (*jia* 家), namely, the higher order lineage, the basic lineage, and the sublineage. A higher order lineage is composed of more than one basic lineage which acknowledge common descent from a remote ancestor, while claiming their particular descent through different relatively recent progenitors.¹² Ritual or chronological senior and cadet distinctions may exist

¹⁰ Tong Shuye 1969:62-63.

¹¹ For a discussion of *zong*, *dazong* 大宗, and *xiaozong* 小宗 in the *Liji* in the context of *zongfa*, see Cheng Yaotian 524:1a-30a (5789-5803).

¹² The term 'higher order lineage' is borrowed from Freedman 1966:20-21, where it is defined as ". . . a local lineage . . . grouped with other local lineages on the basis that the ancestors of these lineages are all descended agnatically from a common ancestor, the whole unit in turn being based on an ancestral hall or other piece of property." Whereas Dou and Cheng lineages of Chu traced their specific origins through separate progenitors, they acknowledged the common descent of those progenitors from Ruo'ao. This was the genealogical justification for the higher order Ruo'ao lineage. Although the possession of a common ancestral hall is perhaps implied in an allusion by Ziwen to ancestral sacrifices in ZZS 21:21a-b (370, Xuan 4), there is no explicit reference to this or any other corporate property belonging to the higher order Ruo'ao lineage. This does not, however, negate the utility of 'higher order lineage' in this or similar applications, for Freedman has overemphasized the importance of common ownership of property in his definitions of lineage types; see Ahern 1976:1-16 and Cohen 1990.

among related lineages at this level. A basic lineage may be composed of a senior sublineage and one or more cadet sublineages which trace their descent from the lineage founder through different descendants of the latter. The head of each family was potentially the founder of a sublineage under the right circumstances, just as the head of a cadet sublineage was potentially the founder of an independent lineage. In Chu all of these groups were capable of mounting substantive, corporate action on the basis of kinship ties. Herein lies the dynamics of its kinship structure.

The nature of kinship structure in Chu can be clearly illustrated through a brief survey of the early history of the descendants of Ruo'ao (r. 790-764) who constituted the higher order lineage, which was known as Ruo'aoshi. The basic lineages, known as Dou and Cheng, which made up the higher order Ruo'ao lineage traced their descent from Ruo'ao through different individuals. The Dou lineage is thought to have been divided into at least three sublineages, two descending from Dou Bobi 鬥伯比 (fl. 706-704) and one descending from Dou Lian 鬥廉 (fl. 703-701).¹³ Dou Bobi and Dou Lian are both regarded as sons of Ruo'ao, although there is textual evidence only for the royal parentage of Dou Bobi.¹⁴ The Cheng lineage is first represented in the historical record by Ziyu 子玉 (Cheng Dechen 成得臣, d. 632),¹⁵ who is identified either as the grandson or the great-grandson of Ruo'ao.¹⁶ In the higher order Ruo'ao lineage, which

¹³ CQSZP, 48a-b.

¹⁴ ZZS 21:22b (370, Xuan 4).

¹⁵ ZZS 15:7a-b (250, Xi 25).

¹⁶ See the discussion of this relationship in appendix 4.

was more loosely structured than either of its segments, the Dou lineage was the senior segment and the Cheng lineage was cadet in standing.

Dou Ziwen 鬥子文 (fl. 664-633), the eldest son of Dou Bobi,¹⁷ was acting as head of the senior segment, and presumably titular head of the higher order lineage, when he unsuccessfully advised his younger brother to kill an infant son, lest the latter grow up and bring ruin to the Ruo'aos.¹⁸ When that son, Dou Ziyue 鬥子越 (d. 605), went on an official visit to the state of Lu in 618, his arrogant behavior prompted the prediction that he "would make certain to extinguish the senior lineage (*zong*) of Ruo'aos,"¹⁹ 是必滅若敖氏之宗, namely the Dou lineage. When Dou Ziwen was on his deathbed some time between 613 and 611, he called the members of his sublineage (*zu*) together and advised them to clear out quickly in order to avoid trouble if Dou Ziyue should become chief minister.²⁰ This advice was given by Ziwen in his role as head of the senior sublineage of the Dou lineage. He then went on to tearfully express his concern for the fate of the ancestral spirits of the higher order Ruo'ao lineage, which he headed by virtue of his position in the Dou lineage, asking "Since ghosts still seek for food, will the ghosts of the Ruo'aos not perhaps starve?"²¹ 鬼猶求食，若敖氏之鬼不其餒而。

In 607 an official of Jin, speaking of Dou Ziyue, who was now chief minister of Chu, is reported to have said, "Since that one's *zong* struggles [for power] in Chu, I

¹⁷ ZZZS 21:22b (370, Xuan 4)

¹⁸ ZZZS 21:21a (370, Xuan 4).

¹⁹ ZZZS 19a:22b (321, Xi 9).

²⁰ ZZZS 21:21a (370, Xuan 4).

²¹ ZZZS 21:21a-b (370, Xuan 4).

predict that it probably will collapse. [Let us] for the time being increase its affliction."²² 彼宗競于楚，殆將斃矣。姑益其疾。 In this passage *zong* should be understood to refer to the Dou lineage, which was the senior segment of the higher order Ruo'ao lineage. Members of the Dou lineage had virtually monopolized the top central government posts of chief minister and grand marshal since 703. However, during the past two decades that monopoly had been broken by members of the Cheng and Wei lineages, some of whom had resorted to treachery to unseat Dou and make room for themselves.²³

Paranoia and lust for more power were probably the chief factors which drove Dou Ziyue to rally the various segments of the higher order Ruo'ao lineage (若敖氏之族) to attack and kill Grand Marshal Wei Jia 蔿賈 and rebel against King Zhuang in 605.²⁴ When the coup attempt was crushed, the higher order Ruo'ao lineage was

²² ZZS 21:9a (364, Xuan 2). The interpretation by Du Yu of *jing* 競 as *qiang* 強 ("strong") in *ibid.*, (Du commentary) has been accepted by subsequent commentators; however, within the context of Chu politics at this time, *zheng* (爭 "compete, struggle"), an acceptable alternate reading, seems more appropriate.

²³ Circumstantial evidence suggests that Cheng Daxin might have been part of a plot to remove Chief Minister Dou Zishang 子上 (Dou Bo 鬥勃) from his post. During a confrontation with Jin in 627 Zishang wanted to ford a river to attack the adversary, but Cheng Daxin persuaded him to withdraw a short distance in order to let the Jin force come across the river. The Jin leader took advantage of this move to announce that Chu had retreated from battle, then he left the scene with his troops to return home. When Zishang returned to the capital of Chu, Heir Apparent Shang Chen accused him of taking a bribe, and as a result he was executed by King Cheng (see ZZS 17:18b-19a [291-292, Xi 33]). Complicity of Cheng Daxin in this affair is suggested by the fact that he appears five years later as the next chief minister (*ibid.*, 19:2b [311, Wen 5]) and that he continued to serve in that capacity through the regicide of King Cheng in 626 at the hands of Heir Apparent Shangchen (*ibid.*, 2:5b-6b [299, Wen 1]).

Wei Jia was able to move into the position of grand marshal after causing the execution of Chief Minister Dou Ban in ca. 611. When Dou Ziyue was promoted from grand marshal to replace Dou Ban, Wei Jia was appointed to fill the vacancy which was created (see *ibid.*, 21:21a [370, Xuan 4]).

²⁴ ZZS 21:21a-22b (370, Xuan 4).

virtually extinguished. As to the Dou lineage, one grandson of Ziwen was spared and given office in memory of his grandfather's loyal service.²⁵ The Cheng lineage was not totally annihilated at this time either, for in 530 Cheng Hu 成狐 was charged with being "a remnant of Ruo'aos" 若敖氏之餘 and executed.²⁶ The worst fears of Ziwen for the higher order Ruo'ao lineage were realized in the aftermath of the abortive coup, for it was dissolved and its ancestral sacrifices to Ruo'ao were terminated.

The fact that the Dou and Cheng lineages, both claiming descent from Ruo'ao, were identified collectively by the name Ruo'aoshi in contrast to their royal kinsmen who descended through the offspring of his heir is similar to reference in Qi to two collateral lineages descending from Duke Hui 齊惠公 as the Two Hui (Er Hui 二惠).²⁷ In both instances identification of collateral lineages with their royal progenitor is first made in the third, or grandson, generation as a sign of lineage fission. References to the Dou and Cheng lineages as Ruo'ao is like continued reference in Jin to the Zhonghang and Zhi lineages as Xun following their formation via fission of the Xun lineage. These similarities are indications that kinship groups in the southern state of Chu and the northern states of Qi and Jin were viewed in the same way and subject to the same process of lineage fission.

Creel uses "Ruo'aoshi" to illustrate his contention that the kinship groups of Chu were not corporate entities and did not have recognized heads. He caps his argument

²⁵ ZZS 21:22b (370, Xuan 4).

²⁶ ZZS 45:28a (790, Zhao 12).

²⁷ ZZS 42:17a (726, Zhao 3); reference to Gongsun Chai and Gongsun Zao, whose sons succeeded them as ministers (*xiang* 相) in Qi.

with the supposed northern practice of identifying both the *shi* and its head by use of the compound of surname + *shi*, a sign that "the head of the *shi* was regarded as its virtual embodiment." From references cited by Creel, one can clearly see that the northern kinship group to which he is comparing the Ruo'aos is the basic lineage such as the Ji lineage of Lu and the Luan, Fan, and Zhonghang lineages of Jin.²⁸ This can be regarded as a methodological error. The Ruo'aos, as a higher order lineage, are not strictly comparable to a basic lineage and should not be expected to have an equally well-defined structure.

A more fitting comparison can be made with the higher order Xun lineage of Jin after its division into the Zhonghang and Zhi lineages. As mentioned above, Zhonghang and Zhi continued to be identified as Xun in recognition of their common root. The fact that Zhonghang was senior to Zhi was never forgotten, but in normal circumstances Zhonghang and Zhi pursued their particular interests in the political arena, sometimes at the expense of each other. The nature of the appointment and promotion system in Jin enabled the head of the Zhi lineage to advance to higher positions in the central government than the head of the Zhonghang lineage at times.²⁹ The higher order Xun lineage was more loosely structured than its basic lineage segments. The fact that the head of Zhonghang lineage was also head of the higher order Xun lineage only becomes apparent in the historical record under exceptional circumstances. For instance, during a political crisis in 550, the youthful head of the

²⁸ Creel 1964:181 (note 119).

²⁹ Refer to Thatcher 1973:193-195.

Zhi lineage looked to him for guidance.³⁰ In all of these respects the higher order Xun and Ruo'ao lineages were alike.

Corporate Activities

In the socio-political history of Chu during the Spring and Autumn era there is ample evidence of corporate activity involving all levels of kinship. Whereas the business of states in this period focused on the performance of sacrifices and warfare,³¹ the corporate activities of kin groups were centered on ancestral rites and the struggle for political rights and power.

Ritual Activity

Regarding ancestral rites, the concern expressed by Ziwen about the threat that his nephew Dou Ziyue would ultimately pose to the continuity of rites for the ancestral spirits of the higher order Ruo'ao lineage³² would have been understood and shared by his counterparts at the head of lineages in the north. More than a century later in 506 a younger brother of Yun Administrator Dou Xin 鬥辛 (fl. 528-505) sought to avenge his father's earlier execution by King Ping (r. 528-516) by killing the latter's heir and successor King Zhao (r. 515-489), who was passing through Yun as he fled from the capital of Chu. However, Dou Xin cautioned him saying, ". . . Extinguishing [one's] lineage (*zong*) and abolishing [ancestral] rites is not filial. . . . If you must violate that, then I will kill you."³³ 滅宗廢祀非孝也。 . . . 必犯是，余將殺

³⁰ ZZS 35:10a (602, Xiang 23).

³¹ ZZS 27:10b (460, Cheng 13). For more on this topic, see Lewis 1990.

³² ZZS 21:21a-b (370, Xuan 4).

³³ ZZS 54:26a (952, Ding 4).

女。 By such a harsh threat, Dou Xin was thus able to avert calamity for the Dou lineage and the cessation of its ancestral rites.

The corporate nature of the performance of ancestral rites, which required the material support and actual presence and participation of members of the relevant kinship group, made such rites valuable as social control mechanisms. This fact was acknowledged in statutes of Chu State which were allegedly formulated by Qu Dao 屈到 (fl. 558). Of them, the *Guoyu* records a speech by his son which says:

When [Qu Dao] held political authority in Chu State, his laws were engraved in the hearts of the people and stored in the royal archives. [If one] carries them back [in time], [one] can equate [them] with [the laws of] the Former Kings. [If one] carries them forward [in time], [one] can use [them] to instruct later generations. Therefore, even if there were no Chu State, there are none among the various rulers who would not praise [him].

His statutes on offerings have it that "[For] the ruler of the state, there is the ox offering. [For] the great officer, there is the ram offering. [For] the [lesser] officer, there are the pig and dog offerings. [For] the commoner, there are the fish and broiled meat offerings. As to fruits, beans, dried meats, and pickled meats, offer them [in appropriate amounts] according to the status [of the deceased]. Do not present precious items. Do not display extravagance. . . .

夫子承楚國之政，其法刑在民心而藏在王府。上之，可以比先王。下之，可以訓後世。雖微楚國，諸侯莫不譽。其祭典有之曰國君有牛享。大夫有羊饋。士有犬之奠。庶人有魚炙之薦。籩豆脯醢則上下共之。不羞珍異。不陳庶侈。

When Qu Dao was on his deathbed, he personally instructed his lineage elders (*zonglao* 宗老) to use a particular kind of plant in sacrifices that would be performed to himself; however, after his death his son prevented them from doing so because it

would have violated the forgoing statutes on offerings, being improper for someone of his rank.³⁴

At an unspecified date between 516 and 506 young King Zhao was taught the importance of ancestral sacrifices by Guan Yifu 觀射父. Concerning the importance of observing the proper sacrifices according to status of the deceased, Guan taught that "when the distinctions of status (literally, 'upper and lower') are in proper order, then the people will not be rude 上下有序，民則不慢." When King Zhao asked whether sacrifices can be eliminated, Guan replied, "Sacrifices are the means whereby [one] shows filial piety, pacifies the people, calms the state and the [ministerial] families, and stabilizes the one hundred officials. [Sacrifices] cannot be stopped. . . ." 祀所以昭孝，息民，撫國家，定百姓也。不可以已。 He then went on to explain how the performance of sacrifices was used to reinforce political and kinship ties. Concerning the latter, Guan said:

The husbands and wives [in the families/lineages] of the one hundred officials select their best time, offer their sacrificial victims, present their millet vessels, take care of their cleaning, are cautious with their bright colored dress, offer their sweet spirits, lead their children and agnates (*zixing*), do their offerings at the appropriate time, reverence their invocator and rites officiator, and speak their harmonious words; thereby, [they] openly sacrifice to their ancestors, reverently and correctly, as though [they were] close to them. On that occasion, [they] unite their communities, friends, and in-laws, and bring closer [their] brothers and kinsmen. On that occasion, [they] halt their many afflictions, end their malicious slander, unite their excellence, bond their familiarity, and enhance their status distinctions; thereby, [they] strengthen their agnates (*xing*).

百姓夫婦擇其令辰，奉其犧牲，敬其粢盛，絜其糞除，慎其采服，禋其酒醴，帥其子姓，從其時享，虔

³⁴ GY 17:3a (383, "Chuyu" *shang*).

其祝宗，道其順辭，以昭祀其先祖，肅肅濟濟，如或臨之。於是乎合其州鄉朋友婚姻，比爾兄弟親戚。於是乎弭其百苛，殄其讒慝，合其嘉好，結其親暱，億其上下，以申固其姓。

Therefore, sacrifices were indispensable and should be anxiously performed by every segment of society, from the ruler through the commoners.³⁵ The performance of ancestral rites were clearly a corporate undertaking of descent groups in the state of Chu. There is no reason to assume that this kind of activity was later in origin or different in substance and purpose than in the northern states.

Political Activity

Lineage based political activity in Chu appears sporadically in historical texts and can be divided into two periods which are separated by approximately seventy-five years of relative inactivity. The first period extends from 675 to 605 and is characterized by basic and higher order lineages acting alone. The second period covers from 529 to the end of the Spring and Autumn era record for Chu in the 470s. It is distinguished by the revival and spread of political consciousness among lineages and the formation of inter-lineage alliances. By "political consciousness" I mean the desire to establish political rights for the lineage and the awareness that this could be accomplished through lineage solidarity and by allying with other lineages in taking political action.

Chu first appears in the historical record for the Spring and Autumn era in 710.³⁶

Details of its social and political history begin in 706 with King Wu (r. 740-690)

³⁵ GY 18:2b-5a (404-409, "Chuyu" *xia*).

³⁶ ZZS 5:16b (95, Huan 2).

directing activities and taking counsel from Wei Zhang 蕢章 (fl. 706-703), who became founder of the Wei lineage, Dou Bobi, who became founder of the senior Dou sublineage, and Xiong Shuaiqiebi 熊率且比 (fl. 706).³⁷ The formation and development of the royal Wei and Dou lineages can be traced from this point in time. However, the first record of political activity by a lineage does not appear in historical texts until 676. In this year the *Zuozhuan* states that Ba State was able to take advantage of disorder in Chu which was caused by the lineage (*zu*) of Yan Ao 閻敖 after he was executed for deserting his post as administrator of the *xian* of Nachu 那處.³⁸ Following this incident only the Dou lineage and the higher order Ruo'ao lineage are shown engaged in lineage based political action until the demise of the latter in 605.

The first evidence of lineage based political activity by the Dou lineage results from action taken in 664 to revive its political fortune. After Dou Bobi and Dou Qi 鬥祁 (fl. 690) had served consecutively as chief administrators at the turn of the century, the fledgling Dou lineage, which was in the process of separating from the royal Chu lineage, apparently lost influence with the king, for the next person to appear in the historical record as chief minister is Gongzi Yuan 公子元 (d. 664), a son of King Wu who served during the reign of his nephew King Cheng (r. 671-626). However, this situation was rectified in 664 when Gongzi Yuan provided the Dou with an excuse to move against him. Having been frustrated two years earlier when he attempted to seduce his sister-in-law, who was the dowager-queen,³⁹ Gongzi Yuan moved into the

³⁷ ZZZS 6:16b-17a (109-10, Huan 6).

³⁸ ZZZS 9:16a (159, Zhuang 18).

³⁹ ZZZS 10:14b (177, Zhuang 28).

royal palace in 664 with the intention of satisfying his carnal desires. When upbraided by Dou Lian, who was grand marshal and is regarded as the founder of a cadet Dou sublineage, Gongzi Yuan had him seized and cut off his hands. Dou Ban 鬥班 (fl. 666-664), who was a son of Dou Lian, then attacked and killed Gongzi Yuan. Thereupon, Dou Ziwen, the eldest son of Dou Bobi and head of the senior Dou sublineage, was made chief minister.⁴⁰ Thus, two sublineages of Dou appear to have colluded to obtain revenge and political advantage in eliminating a rival and regaining the top administrative post in the central government. The fact that they had helped to save the royal house from scandal must have helped their cause.

Through the remaining decades of the seventh century the Dou lineage grew in power and influence, reaching a level which was unprecedented and unequaled during the Spring and Autumn era, as its members received many appointments to offices in the central government and local administration and on the royal household staff. There were, however, other aspirants for political power, even among their own blood relatives. For example, in 637 Ziwen (known as Chief Minister Ziwen) resigned his post in favor of an ambitious cousin Cheng Ziyu, even though the Cheng lineage was cadet in standing to the Dou lineage within the higher order Ruo'ao lineage and despite the fact that the move was not welcomed by his colleagues in government.⁴¹ Four years later he was applauded by other elder statesmen when he recruited troops in a particular locality without using force and in half the time as Ziyu, who had been assigned the

⁴⁰ ZZZS 10:18b-19a (179-180, Zhuang 30).

⁴¹ ZZZS 15:7a-b (250, Xi 23, text and Du commentary). "Ziwen" follows the pronunciation given in the commentary by Du Yu.

same task in another locality.⁴² However, in spite of this apparent rivalry within its ranks, the higher order Ruo'ao lineage rallied to the support of the chief minister in the following year, thus providing our second example of lineage-based political activity.

When Ziyu insisted on fighting Jin in 632 against the wishes of King Cheng, the king let him have only a token number of additional troops to augment those which were already in the field with him. Among the supplementary troops were six one hundred man contingents from the higher order Ruo'ao lineage (若敖氏之六卒).⁴³ Since Ziyu was hoping to score a victory in order to silence his detractors such as Wei

⁴² ZZS 16:10b-11a (266-267, Xi 27).

⁴³ ZZS 16:19a-20a (271, Xi 28). The abridged account of the battle at Chengpu in GY 10:15b-16b (274-276, "Jinyu" 4) is in basic agreement with the *Zuozhuan* account, but it mentions neither the conflict of will between King Cheng and Ziyu nor the king's meager dispatch of troops. However, a later allusion to the battle in ZZS 17:4a (385, "Chuyu" *shang*) mentions both of these matters. Regarding the troops, the *Guoyu* attributes the following statement to Wangsun Qi 王孫啓: "... only the Donggong [soldiers] and the Xiguang [battalion], those ones, have come The Ruo'aos have deserted [him], indeed! 唯東宮與西廣寔來。 . . . 若敖氏離矣" Thus, if this version is to be believed, the Ruo'ao did not unite in support of Ziyu.

The *Guoyu* quote of Wangsun Qi, who is alleged to have been a Chu refugee in Jin advising it on military matters, is included in a speech by Shengzi of Cai, who gives four examples of how Jin had used Chu refugees to the disadvantage of Chu. ZZS 37:12b-17b (635-637, Xiang 26) records the same speech in 547, also giving four examples. However, only three of the Chu refugees are mentioned in both the *Guoyu* and the *Zuozhuan* versions, namely the administrator (*gong* 公) of Xi, Yongzi, and Wuchen, who was the administrator of Shen. Instead of Wangsun Qi, who the *Guoyu* says fled to Jin at the time of the murder of Chief Minister Gongzi Yuan in 664 (*ibid.*, 10:18 [179, Zhuang 30]), the *Zuozhuan* refers to Fenhuang, a son of Dou Ziyue who took refuge in Jin following the unsuccessful coup in 605 (*ibid.*, 21:21a-22a [370, Xuan 4]). Since the role of Fenhuang on the side of Jin in the battle of Yanling in 575 is documented in *ibid.*, 28:8a-b, 13a-b (475, 478, Cheng 16) and GY 12:5b (306, "Jinyu" 6), the *Zuozhuan* version of the speech by Shengzi of Cai can be regarded as more reliable than the *Guoyu* rendition. Wangsun Qi is not mentioned elsewhere in the *Guoyu* and does not appear at all in the *Zuozhuan*. Moreover, the *Guoyu* version of the speech contains a number of historical errors, the most serious being the attribution of advice given by Fenhuang at the battle of Yanling in 575 to Yongzi, who, according to the *Zuozhuan* version of the speech, was active in the battle of Pengcheng two years later. Consequently, the historicity of the Wangsun Qi anecdote in the *Guoyu* is questionable at best.

Jia,⁴⁴ the Ruo'ao contingents probably insisted on joining him in order to save lineage honor. During the battle they fought in the Center Army under the leadership of Ziyu, while their kinsmen Dou Zixi (d. 617) and Dou Zishang led the Left Army and the Right Army, respectively. Unfortunately Chu was soundly trounced by the Jin force in the battle of Chengpu, and the disgraced Ziyu ended up committing suicide.⁴⁵

The third and final example of lineage based political activity in this first period is the unsuccessful coup attempt by the higher order Ruo'ao lineage in 605. After the demise of Ziyu the struggle for political power intensified with the Dou, Cheng, and Wei lineages being the chief competitors. Ziyu is thought to have been replaced as chief minister in 632 by Wei Luchen 蔦呂臣 (fl. 637-632), who had been a vocal critic of his appointment five years earlier.⁴⁶ However, by 627 the position of chief minister was occupied by Dou Zishang. As noted earlier, in that year he took what proved to be deleterious advice on the battlefield from Cheng Daxin, who was the son of Ziyu, for which he was later slandered by Heir Apparent Shangchen and executed by King Cheng.⁴⁷ Shangchen had borne a long-standing grudge against Zishang for opposing his selection as heir apparent.⁴⁸ Since Cheng Daxin was appointed the next

⁴⁴ ZZS 16:19b (271, Xi 23, text and Du commentary). In 633 the youthful Wei Jia had cast aspersions on the military prowess of Zheng Dechen; see *ibid.*, 16:10b-11a (266-267, Xi 22).

⁴⁵ ZZS 16:20a-23a (271-273, Xi 23).

⁴⁶ CQDSB, 23:3b (1452). This supposition is based on a remark by Duke Wen of Jin, who upon hearing of the death of Ziyu is alleged to have said, "Wei Luchen will surely become chief minister . . ." 蔦呂臣實爲令尹 (see ZZS 16:27a [275, Xi 28]). There is, however, no evidence that he actually assumed the position.

⁴⁷ ZZS 17:18b-19a (291-292, Xi 33).

⁴⁸ ZZS 18:5b (299, Wen 1).

chief minister, he may have been part of a plot to eliminate Dou Zishang. When he died in 615, his younger brother Cheng Jia 成嘉 (fl. 615-613) became chief minister.⁴⁹ Two years later Dou Ziyi 鬥子儀 (d. 613), who was a grandson of Dou Lian, and Gongzi Xie 公子燮 (d. 613), who had been tutor to Heir Apparent Shangchen but was denied appointment to the position of chief minister after the execution of Zishang, joined in an unsuccessful attempt to unseat Cheng Jia and take possession of the top central government posts.⁵⁰ These events represent a revival of rivalry between the Dou and Cheng lineages, and, in Dou Ziyi, and attempt by a member of a cadet sublineage of the Dou to get into high office, probably the office of grand marshal that had been held by his grandfather.

Members of the Dou lineage reclaimed the top positions of the central government at some time between 613 and 611. Dou Ziyang, who was the son of Ziwen, was appointed chief minister and Dou Ziyue was made grand marshal, both occupying positions formerly held by their fathers.⁵¹ In ca. 611 Artisan Master Wei Jia, who was the son of Wei Luchen, caused the execution of Dou Ziyang by slandering

⁴⁹ ZZZS 19a:5b (330, Wen 12). Cheng Daxin is not identified as chief minister until the time of his death, but he would have been appointed by 626.

⁵⁰ ZZZS 19b:16b-17a (335-36, Wen 14); GY 17:4a-b (385, "Chuyu" *xia*). For the relationship between Dou Lian, who was also known as Dou Sheshi, and Dou Ke, see CQSZP, 48a.

⁵¹ ZZZS 21:21b (370, Xuan 4). Whereas Dou Ziyang and Dou Ziyue are only identified in these positions in 605 in background data for the abortive coup attempt, the appointment probably occurred between 613, when Chief Minister Cheng Jia is last mentioned (*ibid.*, 19a:16a [335, Wen 14]), and 611, when Dou Ziyue and Wei Jia were given command of troops by King Zhuang (*ibid.*, 20:3a-4b [347, Wen 16]). By the time of the latter event, Dou Ziyang had probably been murdered and Dou Ziyue and Wei Jia then moved into the positions of chief minister and grand marshal, respectively. This is also the conclusion of Song Gongwen (1988:263, 322).

him. Dou Ziyue was advanced to fill the position of chief minister, and Wei Jia was appointed to replace him as grand marshal. Given the alleged nefarious character and bad reputation of Dou Ziyue, a conspiracy between himself and Wei Jia to eliminate cousin Ziyang, who was presumably head of the senior Dou sublineage, is not beyond the realm of possibility. Regardless, Dou Ziyue reportedly hated Wei Jia, who had been a critic of Ziyu prior to the battle at Chengpu.⁵² Therefore, he rallied the fighting men of the basic lineages of the higher order Ruo'ao lineage in 605 to capture and murder Wei Jia.⁵³ Since Wei Jia had been involved in the disgrace and elimination of leading members of the Dou and Cheng lineages, this instance of corporate action may be seen as an attempt to avenge the honor of the higher order Ruo'ao lineage.

The stakes, however, appear to have been even higher, for Dou Ziyue next used the Ruo'ao troops against King Zhuang (r. 613-591). The king sought to avoid a violent confrontation by offering the living sons of three former kings to the rebels as hostages. When this offer was rejected, King Zhuang and his loyalists proceeded to extinguish (*mie* 滅) the higher order Ruo'ao lineage.⁵⁴ This meant that the ancestral sacrifices to the lineage founder were terminated. This was the ultimate negation of the driving force behind the attempted *coup d'état*, the only one staged by a party other than members of the royal house in the Spring and Autumn era.

The rebellion of the higher order Ruo'ao lineage appears to have been motivated by the desire to permanently secure political rights and power for its segments. The

⁵² ZZZS 16:10b-11a (266-267, Xi 27).

⁵³ ZZZS 21:21a (370, Xuan 4).

⁵⁴ ZZZS 21:21a-b (370, Xuan 4).

Wei lineage, which had traditionally been on good terms with reigning kings, was descended from Fenmao (r. 757-741), who was the grandson of Ruo'ao, or from an earlier ruler.⁵⁵ In the former case, it would have been more closely related to King Zhuang than were the Dou and Cheng lineages. Awareness on the part of the latter lineages that their privileged status was gradually being undermined with increasing generational distance from each successive king may have been the factor that compelled them to act in unison as the higher order Ruo'ao lineage on this occasion.

The demise of the higher order Ruo'ao lineage ended monopolization of top central government appointments by the Dou and Cheng lineages. This event prepared the way for a seventy-five year period in which members of the royal house and/or the royal household staff became the principal agents of the kings of Chu in conducting state government.

During the period between 605 and 529 historical sources record no overt corporate political activity by the lineages of Chu, but the way was being prepared for its revival on a broader base. King Zhuang appointed Wei Ailie 蔦艾獵 (fl. 598-597), the son of Wei Jia, chief minister in the place of Dou Ziyue.⁵⁶ The circumstances of this appointment suggest that it was influenced by the loyal service of the Wei lineage to the kings of Chu and that Wei Ailie must have been considered a safe choice in the wake of the abortive Ruo'ao coup. However, the locus of influence was actually shifting away from royal lineages and their members to the uncles and brothers of the

⁵⁵ See Appendix 4 for a discussion of the question of whether Fenmao was the father of Wei Zhang, the presumed founder of the Wei lineage.

⁵⁶ ZZS 22:15b (383, Xuan 11); see CQSZP 49b for pedigree of Wei Ailie.

king in the royal house and members of the royal household staff. In terms of central government positions, excluding the hereditary office of *mo'ao*, fifteen of nineteen appointments which are known to have been made between 605 and 552 went to members of the royal house. Wei Ailie is the only member of a royal lineage who is shown either as chief minister or grand marshal (see Chapter 6).

After the execution of Chief Minister Zinan 子南 and his partisan Guan Qi 觀起 in 551 by King Kang, Wei Zifeng 蔦子馮 (d. 548), the son of Wei Ailie, was appointed chief minister. He became locked in a struggle with a personal advisor to the king for influence in the conduct of state business. The struggle between the chief minister and the royal household staff continued through the tenure of his successor Qu Jian 屈建 (d. 545).⁵⁷

When King Kang and Qu Jian died in 545,⁵⁸ the king's young son replaced him and the boy's uncle, Wangzi Wei, became chief minister.⁵⁹ From this position, Wangzi Wei totally dominated state government. In 543 he killed Grand Marshal Wei Yan 蔦掩, who was the son of Wei Zifeng, and confiscated his household wealth.⁶⁰ Finally he usurped the throne in 541, either killing or forcing into exile all but one member of the royal house.⁶¹

⁵⁷ ZZZS 35:5a-6a (600, Xiang 22) and 36:11a (622, Xiang 25). For pedigree of Wei Zifeng, see CQSZP, 49b.

⁵⁸ ZZZS 38:32a (657, Xiang 28).

⁵⁹ ZZZS 39:4a (665, Xiang 29).

⁶⁰ ZZZS 40:16a (683, Xiang 30). See CQSZP, 49b for pedigree of Wei Yan.

⁶¹ ZZZS 41:29a-b (710, Zhao 1).

As King Ling (r. 540-529), he chose members of royal lineages and a political refugee to fill central government appointments; however, he actually governed through his royal household staff, virtually ignoring central government officials and, perhaps, allowing some of those posts to become vacant (see Chapter 6). At the same time he stripped Wei Ju 蕩居 (fl. ca. 541), Dou Weigui 鬥韋龜 (fl. 538-529), and Dou Chengran (d. 528) of territory which had become regarded as their private property.⁶² As a result of these developments, Wei Ju and Dou Chengran led their respective lineages to form an alliance with other lineages which had been deprived of their official duties. In 529 the alliance joined other rebellious parties to topple King Ling.⁶³

The rebellion against King Ling marked the return of lineage based political activity in Chu. Loss of position and influence and maltreatment by the royal house and the royal household staff served to elevate the level of political consciousness within Chu lineages. Changing attitudes towards territorial rights during this period created the opportunities for private accumulation of wealth by lineages and their members. The political gains which could be made by using wealth to attract supporters and private soldiers strengthened the resolve of lineages to fight for permanent political and territorial rights. Their common plight and shared aspirations gave rise to collective awareness among the various lineages that they had to unite to improve their situation and secure their rights. Consequently, an inter-lineage alliance was formed between the Wei and the Dou lineages, the first of its kind in the recorded history of Chu.

⁶² ZZS 46:3a-b (805, Zhao 13).

⁶³ ZZS 46:4a (805, Zhao 13).

The next evidence of inter-lineage alliance is found in 528, when King Ping executed Chief Minister Dou Chengran and extinguished the Yang lineage. Among other things, the king's concern about the closeness between Dou Chengran and the Yangs 養氏 and their insatiable demands precipitated such drastic action. Fortunately, for the Dou lineage, Dou Xin, the son of Dou Chengran, was relocated to Yun, where he was allowed to continue sacrifices to its ancestors.⁶⁴ The Yang lineage was comprised of the descendants of Yang Youji 養由基, who had served continuously in either the royal garrison or central government from 597 to 558.⁶⁵ Since none of his posterity are shown in official positions, the assumption may be made that the Yangs were among the lineages who had been relieved of their positions prior to alliance with the Wei and Dou lineages in 529. With Dou Chengran in a key position with excellent access to the king and royal resources, the Yang lineage apparently sought to further improve its well-being. However, having been put on the throne with the help of the larger alliance, King Ping was well aware of the danger inherent in letting this relationship continue to flourish; so he ended it.

The purge of Left Deputy Chief Minister Xi Wan 郤宛 (d. 515) and his partisans in 515 reveals another complex inter-lineage alliance. On this occasion the Xi and the royal Yang 陽 lineages were extinguished, and the Bo 伯 lineage was forced into exile. The Jin lineage remained in the capital, where its members complained loudly about the deaths of Jin Chen and his younger brothers at the hands of Fei Wuji

⁶⁴ ZZS 47:4b (820, Zhao 14). For pedigree of Dou Xi, see CQSZP, 48b.

⁶⁵ For the composition of the Yang lineage, see ZZS 47:4b (820, Zhao 14, Du commentary) and Appendix 4 below.

費無極 and Yan Jiangshi 鄢將師, the perpetrators of the purge.⁶⁶ Xi Wan was allegedly extremely popular with the inhabitants of the capital. The heads of these lineages apparently aligned their lineages with his to form a notable political faction there. Although Fei Wuji and Yan Jiangshi obtained their immediate objective this time, their success was short-lived, for Chief Minister Zichang, who had been their unwitting accomplice, was soon persuaded to execute them and extinguish their lineages in order to diffuse the virulent public reaction which followed the purge.⁶⁷

Conclusion

The preponderance of references to *shi* after 546 led Creel to conclude that the kinship system of Chu was originally different from that of the northern states and that it became like theirs only after a period of acculturation from the north during the Spring and Autumn era. However, when those references are understood within the total context of the social and political history of Chu during this period, their late appearance can be understood as a textual manifestation of the revival and spread of corporate lineage activity after the mid-sixth century rather than as a sign of the development of a northern style kinship system. Whereas the acquisition of significant territorial rights by lineages and the collective emergence of lineages as political actors are developments that occurred later in Chu than in the states to its north, the kinship systems of Chu and the northern states were fundamentally the same from the beginning of the Spring and Autumn era.

⁶⁶ ZZS 52:18a-19b (908-909, Zhao 27).

⁶⁷ ZZS 52:20b-21b (910, Zhao 27).

Chapter 4

Lineages

In this chapter I provide a more detailed view of the royal and non-royal lineages of Chu. To amplify the discussion presented in Chapter 3, the origins of the various lineages are explored briefly, then attention is turned to the process of lineage formation. The sources and types of lineage wealth are examined at length. I pay particular attention to the way that the king utilized land as emolument and reward for service and meritorious achievements and its implications for lineage development.

Reference to a number of notable secondary works will quickly reveal that certain scholars have identified more Chu surnames that allegedly originated or existed during the Spring and Autumn era than will be discussed here. However, the authors of such sources have often simply collected surnames, or supposed surnames, without regard to the presence or absence of supporting evidence in reliable sources for the period. The *Shiben* 世本, which was compiled during the Warring States era and is the earliest extant genealogical work,¹ contains a number of Chu surnames allegedly derived from Spring and Autumn personalities but which cannot be documented in other sources.² Wang Fu (ca. A.D. 76-157) adds more surnames of this variety that

¹ Pan Guangdan 1933:107.

² Eight reconstructions of the *Shiben* text have been collected and published in *Shiben ba zhong* 世本八種, (cited hereafter as SBBZ). Among these, the edition of Mao Panlin 茆泮林 is regarded as having been compiled in the most conscientious fashion, that is, it includes only data that have been attributed to the *Shiben* by earlier scholars who had access to an

cannot be documented.³ Cheng Gongshuo (A.D. 1171-1207) has mistakenly included the names of several offices in his catalog of Chu surnames.⁴ In his wide ranging and relatively indiscriminate search for *Shiben* fragments, Qing dynasty scholar Qin Jiamo has perpetuated many of the claims of Wang Fu, despite the fact that most of them cannot be traced to the *Shiben*.⁵ Since surnames were used as identification by

original text (SBBZ, "*Shiben chuban shuoming*" 世本出版說明, 5). The Mao edition passes on the following undocumented surnames for lineages that allegedly originated or existed in Chu during the Spring and Autumn era: Ziwu 子午氏, Chuji 楚季氏, Dou Ban 鬥班氏, Dou Qiang 鬥彊氏, Qing Fu 慶父氏, Sheqi 涉其氏, and Ta 它氏 (SBZSLS 71-73, 81-83, 90-91).

The most curious of these supposed surnames is Sheqi, of which the *Shiben* fragment says, "Among the great officers of Chu was Sheqishi. This was Sheqi Nu of the Spring and Autumn [era]" 楚大夫有涉其氏。春秋涉其孥是也。(SBZSLS 90). In the *Zuozhuan* the three characters *she qi nu* 涉其孥 cannot be construed as the name of a man. They occur in the following context: "At the time King Zhao fled to Sui, when he has about to ford [the river] at Chengqiu, Indigo Master Wei forded (i.e., carried across) his children (*she qi nu*) but did not give the boat to the King" 楚王之奔隨也，將涉於成臼，藍尹臺涉其孥，不與王舟。(ZZZS 50:3b [959, Ding 5]). The proof of the accuracy of this reading is found in the *Guoyu* version of the incident: "When the Wu officer entered the Chu [capital], King Zhao departed and fled. When crossing [the river] at Chengqiu, he saw Indigo Master Wei carry his children (*dai qi nu*). The King said, 'Carry me.' Wei [responded], 'From the times of our Former Kings there have been none who have lost their capital. Now you have lost it; it is your fault.' Then he abandoned the King" 吳人入楚，昭王出奔。濟於成臼，見藍尹臺戴其孥。王曰戴予。對曰自先王莫墜其國。當君而亡之，君之過也。遂去之。(GY 18:6b [412, "Chuyu xia"]).

³ Among the many surnames recorded by Wang Fu, the following are derived from the names of Spring and Autumn Era personalities but undocumentable as lineage surnames in historical sources for the period: Yingqi 嬰齊氏, Zigeng 子庚氏, Zinan 子南氏, Xi 西氏, and Shan 善氏 (QFLJ 35:175).

⁴ CQFJ 14:8a. Cheng considers the names of the offices of archery master (*lianyin* 連尹) and artisan master (*gongyin* 工尹) to have been the names of lineages in Chu. Whereas Archery Master Xianglao 連尹襄老 was indeed the father of Heiyao 黑要, the latter did not take his father's name as surname (ZZZS 25:20a [428, Cheng 2]). Cheng's suggestion that the six persons whom he lists as bearing the supposed surname of Gongyin were blood relatives is totally without basis in historical fact. The known lineage names of holders of the office of artisan master are Dou (ZZZS 19a:24a-b [322, Wen 10, Dou Yishen]) and Wei (ZZZS 21:21b [370, Xuan 4, Wei Jia], 60:13a [1047, Ai 18, Wei Gu]). The surnames of the remaining Artisan Masters listed by Cheng are not known.

⁵ Qin Jiamo includes all of the alleged surnames cited in Note 3 above (SBJB 172-174). Although he appears to have considered virtually all references to pre-Qin dynasty names as ultimately deriving from the *Shiben*, a sweeping methodology for which he has been roundly

lineages, sources such as these suggest that many more lineages originated or existed in Chu during the Spring and Autumn era than can be documented in reliable historical sources.

In the following discussion the two criteria that have been used to identify Chu lineages are: (1) More than one person bearing the surname appears in a Chu context in an historical source that is reliable for the Spring and Autumn era. In cases where specific kin relationships are not explicitly identified in a text, kinship has been assumed. Whereas such an approach would be foolhardy in later eras when surnames were used by the general population, it is relatively safe in the Spring and Autumn era because surnames were primarily restricted to royal and noble lineages.⁶ Therefore, when persons with the same surname come from the same state at this time, kinship can be reasonably assumed. (2) When just one person is shown bearing a surname in a Chu context, he is considered as coming from a Chu lineage only when the origins or existence of his lineage in Chu can be traced in or safely inferred from reliable sources. In other words, this discussion of lineage in Chu will be restricted to lineages that can be documented in historical sources that are reliable for the Spring and Autumn era. In the absence of corroborative evidence in a reliable historical source for the period, the fact that lineages in later periods may have taken their surname and claimed descent from an historical personage who lived in Chu during the Spring and Autumn era cannot be taken as proof of their origin or existence at that time.

criticized (SBBZ "Chuban shuoming" 4-5), unlike other more cautious scholars (see note 2 above and SBLSKZ 64), Qin was still not misled by references to *she qi* as a Chu surname.

⁶ Xu Fuguan 1972:317-320.

Lineage Origins

On the basis of the criteria outlined above twenty-five lineages can be shown to have originated or existed in Chu during the Spring and Autumn era. Of these, six descend from kings of Chu and nineteen are of non-royal descent.⁷ Two of the latter lineages, Cai and Xu did not establish long-term residence in Chu. In the following table the various lineages are arranged according to descent and the types of offices that were held by their members:

Table 6. Royal and non-royal lineages by types of offices held by lineage members

Office type	Royal lineages	Non-royal lineages
Central government	<i>Dou, Wei, Qu, Cheng, Yang, Nang</i>	<i>Peng, Yu, Yang, Wu, Xi</i>
Local government	<i>Dou, Qu</i>	<i>Yan, Shenshu, Shen, Zhong</i>
Royal household staff	<i>Dou, Wei, Qu</i>	<i>Guan, Peng, Shenshu, Shen, Yang, Wu, Bo, Ban, Zhong, Fei, Yan</i>
Unknown		<i>Xiong, Cai, Xu, Tangxi, Jin</i>

Sources: *Zuozhuan* and *Guoyu*.

Note: All lineage names are italicized upon first occurrence. This table does not include the Ruo'ao surname. The Ruo'aos were a higher order lineage that was comprised of Dou and Cheng segments that were lineages in their own right and are shown above.

I will now present evidence for the origins and/or existence of these lineages in Chu according to the royal and non-royal categories.

The royal lineages in Table 6 are branches of the royal house that completely broke off from it and adopted distinctive surnames to mark their independence (refer to

⁷ The supposed Chu lineage surnamed Shen 沈氏 or Shenyin 沈尹氏 that is said to have descended from King Zhuang (see, for example, SBBZ, CQFJ, CQSZP) is not counted here. See the discussion in last section of Appendix 4.

Appendix 4 for a discussion of the pedigrees of these royal lineages and issues related to their reconstruction). Sublineages of the royal house that either did not split from it or which can be seen splitting from it during the Spring and Autumn era will be mentioned later. Among the royal lineages whose members are known to have served in some type of official position, the earliest was known by the surname of Dou 鬥氏 and traced its descent from Ruo'ao (r. 790-765). Dou Bobi (fl. 706-699), the son of Ruo'ao according to the *Zuozhuan*,⁸ is the first Spring and Autumn personage who can be reasonably assumed to have served in the office of chief minister (see Chapter 5). The Cheng 成氏 lineage, which is first represented in the historical record by Cheng Ziyu (d. 632) who ended his career as chief minister, also descended from Ruo'ao, although the specific line of descent is not known. Together the Dou and Cheng lineages, claiming descent from Ruo'ao, constituted the higher order Ruo'ao lineage (see Chapter 3 above). Wei Zhang (fl. 706-703), who is thought to be the son of Fenmao (r. 757-741) and grandson of Ruo'ao, is regarded as the founder of the Wei lineage. He served at the same time as Dou Bobi in an unspecified but influential position close to his uncle, King Wu (r. 740-690).⁹ The Qu 屈氏 lineage descends from Qu Xia 屈瑕 (d. 699), the son of King Wu and great grandson of Ruo'ao, who served as the first holder of the office of *mo'ao* 莫敖 in the central government.¹⁰ The Yang 陽氏 lineage, which produced Chief Minister Zixia 子瑕 (Yang Gai 陽匄, d. 519),¹¹ is

⁸ ZZS 21:22b (370, Xuan 4).

⁹ ZZS 6:16b (109, Huan 6), 7:3b (119, Huan 7), 7:5a (120, Huan 9).

¹⁰ ZZS 7:13a-b (124, Huan 12).

¹¹ ZZS 48:12a (839, Zhao 17).

said to have descended from Wangzi Yang 王子陽, son of King Mu (r. 625-614). The Nang 囊氏 lineage descended from Wangzi Nang 王子囊 (fl. 576-559), a son of King Zhuang (r. 613-591) and grandson of King Mu. The Dou, Cheng, Wei, and Qu lineages were all established before the end of the seventh century. The founding ancestors of the Yang and Nang lineages were, perhaps, born during the latter part of that century, but the process whereby their descendants broke away from the royal house to form independent lineages occurred during the first three-quarters of the sixth century.

The origins of only six of the nineteen non-royal lineages are relatively clear. The oldest of these is the Guan 觀氏 lineage which may have descended from Guan Dingfu 觀丁父 (fl. eighth century), a prisoner of war from the state of Ruo 郟 who was employed as a military commander by King Wu of Chu.¹² The probable founder of the Peng 彭氏 lineage is Peng Zhongshuang 彭仲爽 (fl. 689-680) of the state of Shen 申, another prisoner of war who was appointed chief minister by King Wen in ca. 689 and is credited with the subsequent subjugation of Shen and the state of Xi 息, two states of great strategic importance to Chu because of their location on its northern frontier.¹³ The Shenshu 申叔氏 lineage was comprised of the descendants of Shen

¹² ZZS 60:9b (1045, Ai 17). None of the dates for accomplishments attributed to Guan Dingfu in this passage can be ascertained with any degree of confidence. His capture by Chu and the actions that followed may have transpired prior to 706, the date of the first reference to Chu affairs in the *Zuozhuan*.

¹³ ZZS 60:9b (1045, Ai 17). Shen was located 20 *li* north of the seat of present day Nanyang *xian* 南陽縣 in Henan on the upper reach of the Bo River, where it was situated on the approach from Jin in the north to the Chu capital and in a position to withstand the advances of Qin from the northwest; see Cheng Faren 1967:104, 280 and Map 3. Xi was located in the upper drainage of the Huai River 30 *li* north of present day Xixian 息縣 in Henan, standing

Administrator Shuhou 申公叔侯 (fl. 635-632), apparently a native of Shen, which was now a *xian* of Chu.¹⁴ The Shen 申氏 lineage is thought to have descended from Wenzhi Wuwei 文之無爲 (fl. 617-595), who may have succeeded Shuhou as administrator of Shen and was perhaps also a local native.¹⁵ The Bo 伯氏 lineage was

between the capital of Chu and the states of Zheng 鄭 to the north and Chen 陳 and Cai 蔡 to the northeast; *ibid.*, 310 and Map 5.

¹⁴ ZZS 16:8a-b (265, Xi 26). Shuhou was also known as Shen Shu 申叔, apparently meaning "Shu of Shen"; see *ibid.*, 16:19a (271, Xi 28). The fact that his descendants became known by the latter appellation (*ibid.*, 24:9a [408, Xuan 15]) and continued to claim Shen as home (*ibid.*, 17:22b [466, Cheng 15]) suggests that Shen was their ancestral place. However, it definitely was not the benefice (*shiyi* 食邑) of Shuhou that subsequently became the territorial base for his lineal descendants, who then drew their lineage surname from it, for from the time of Peng Zhongshuang, Shen was a *xian* of Chu, administered by central government appointees, of whom Shuhou was merely one. But the significance of that appointment was sufficient to set his descendants apart from other Shen natives, thus providing the socio-political impetus for the rise of the Shenshu lineage, its name taken from that of the illustrious first ancestor rather than from a place to which neither he nor they had ever exercised exclusive rights.

¹⁵ Wenzhi Wuwei is shown in 617 as one of three military marshals during a training exercise, known euphemistically as a "hunt" (ZZS 19b:24b-25b [322-23, Wen 10]). The other marshals were *xian* administrators, one being explicitly identified as Administrator of Qisi 期思公 in the *Zuozhuan* text, and the other, Zizhu, being the administrator of Xi *xian* 息公 mentioned elsewhere in *ibid.*, 18:18a (305, Wen 3). Takezoe takes the reference to Wenzhi Wuwei as Shen Zhou 申舟 in *ibid.*, 24:3a-b (405, Xuan 14) as evidence that he was probably administrator of Shen at this time (ZZHZ 8:65). In view of the Chu practice of mustering *xian* troops, particularly those of Shen and Xi, to fight the northern states, as in ZZS 16:2b-4b (263, Xi 25), 18:18a (305, Wen 3), 16:27a (275, Xi 28, text and Du commentary) 26:14a-b (442, Cheng 6), and 26:21a (446, Cheng 8), and the fact that the other marshals on this occasion were *xian* administrators, who were undoubtedly present as leaders of their respective *xian* troops, the identification of Wenzhi Wuwei as administrator of Shen is acceptable.

CQZSZJZSZ 537 cites a number of late sources in making the argument that Wenzhi Wuwei was of the lineage called Wen 文氏, which descended from King Wen of Chu 楚文王, and that Shen was his benefice. He and Zhang 1984:11-12 also accept this view adding that he later took "Shen" as another surname.

'Wenzhi Wuwei' is a strange name because of the use of the character "zhi" 之, which can function as a possessive marker in this kind of construction; thus, literally interpreted the name can mean Wen's Wuwei (Wuwei of Wen)," and this makes sense. However, there is no other evidence that a Wen lineage, whether its name was derived from the posthumous name of a Chu king or from some other source, existed in Chu during the Spring and Autumn era. The deletion of *zhi* to form Wen Wuwei in LSCQXJZ 20:269 and HNZ 9:144, which can be regarded as a contraction of Wen *zhi* Wu-wei (provided that Wen + *zhi* are not considered as "Wenzhi," or a compound proper noun), does not necessarily mean that this was the intent of those late Warring States and early Han works. Rather, it may mean that they did not know what

founded by Bo Zhouli 伯州犁 (d. 541), a refugee from Jin who arrived in Chu in 576 and was subsequently appointed to the royal staff position of senior intendant.¹⁶ The establishment of the Bo lineage is confirmed, albeit ironically, by its flight to the state of Wu 吳 during a political purge in 515.¹⁷ Finally, the Tangxi 堂谿氏 lineage was founded in 505 by Fugai 夫概 of Wu who took refuge in Chu after failing to usurp the kingship of his native state.¹⁸

to do with *zhi*; so they dropped it altogether.

The *Lushi chungiu* and *Huainanzi* references just cited are both variants of the *Zuozhuan* account of the demise of Wuwei. In ZZS 24:3a-b (405, Xuan 14) he is referred to as Shen Zhou instead of Wenzhi Wuwei; thus, Wen Wu-wei in the *Lushi chungiu* and *Huainanzi* is a departure from the original story. There note is made of the fact that Shen Zhou presented in court (*jian* 見, perhaps "saw") Xi, whom Du Yu identifies as his eldest son (*ibid.*, Du commentary), before leaving Chu for Qi on his last mission. In the following year (594), the son, who was known as Shen Xi 申犀, is shown making a speech in which he refers to Shen Zhou as Wuwei (*ibid.*, 24:9a [408, Xuan 15]). If Wuwei were a member of a Wen lineage, his son would have been known as Wen Xi instead of Shen Xi.

As for the suggestion that Shen was the benefice of Wuwei, it can be rejected because there is no evidence that Shen was relegated to benefice status at any time after its subjugation by Peng Zhongshuang in ca. 688 (see note 15). From that time forward, Shen was always a *xian* of Chu that was administered by an appointee of the central government. The identification of Wuwei, his son, and his descendants by the surname Shen, which was undoubtedly derived from the place Shen, suggests a close connection with that locality. But that connection could not have been based on a benefice at Shen.

Wenzhi Wuwei, serving as administrator of Shen, established a reputation in the 617 military exercise, which may have been a factor in the promise by King Zhuang to attack Song if Wuwei were killed while passing through it to Qi in 595 and the king's obvious outrage upon learning of his murder. Perhaps because of his meritorious service as administrator of Shen, he came to be identified with the place, even though it was not his benefice and its administration passed on to others who were not his kin. Identification by "Shen" would also have been possible if Wuwei were from one of the established lineages of former Shen State that were still an active local elite with which the central administration of Chu had to reckon as late as 632 (ZZS 16:27a [275, Xi 28]).

¹⁶ ZZS 27:24b (467, Cheng 15), 28:7b (475, Zhao 14).

¹⁷ ZZS 54:22a (950, Ding 4). This passage states that the lineage of Boshi (i.e., Bo Zhouli) 伯氏之族 fled to Wu upon the assassination of Xi Wan. Du Yu understands this to imply that the Bos were partisans of Xi Wan (*ibid.*, commentary), but CQSZP 53a wrongly infers that Xi Wan 郤宛 was a member of the Bo lineage, the son of Bo Zhouli and father of Bo Pi 伯髡. If this were so, the next line in the *Zuozhuan* anecdote would not read, "the grandson of Bo Zhouli, Pi," 伯州犁之孫 .

¹⁸ ZZS 55:2b (958, Ding 5).

The founders of these lineages either hailed from other states that were adversaries of Chu or from recently subjugated territory; thus, Chu apparently sought to benefit from their strategic knowledge or local connections by giving them employment in key positions. The wealth, prestige, and impetus necessary for lineage formation to occur were derived from these official appointments. The only possible exception to this pattern is the Tangxi lineage, whose members are not shown in official posts and who took its surname from a place rather than from its founder. Unlike the other lineages that originated prior to the mid-sixth century, the Tangxi lineage was founded at the end of it amid signs of significant changes related to territorial control (see below).

Of the thirteen non-royal lineages whose origins are not known, seven existed in Chu before the mid-sixth century. The Xiong 熊氏 lineage is represented by five persons, all of whom appear in contexts suggesting that they were either in the personal service of kings or loyal to them from 706 to 479.¹⁹ Gu Donggao supposes that Xiong may have been a royal lineage,²⁰ perhaps because Xiong was a name commonly borne by kings of Chu.²¹ However, there is no evidence for such a line of descent. If the Xiong lineage were related by blood to the royal house of Chu, the relationship was more likely one that stemmed from their common descent from Yu Xiong 鬻熊, who was the grandfather of Xiong Yi 熊繹, the first ruler of Chu.²² Inasmuch as the Xiong

¹⁹ ZZS 6:16b-17a (109-110, Huan 6); 23:19a (397, Xuan 12), 23b-24a (399, Xuan 12); 51:22b (896, Zhao 25); 60:4b (1042, Ai 16).

²⁰ CQDSB, 11:27b (1276).

²¹ Wen, 1967:73-74.

²² SJHZKZ, 40:5-6 (645, text and *Kaozheng* commentary) and HSBZ, 30:34a (890).

do not appear to have descended from a ruler of Chu, they are regarded here as a non-royal lineage. When Yan Ao was executed for deserting his post as administrator of Nachu (some time after 686), his lineage (*zu*) rebelled, and in the winter of 676 Ba State was able to make use of it in attacking Chu.²³ The descendants of Yu Quan 鬻拳 (fl. 675) are said to have continued in the position of senior palace doorman, the appointment that was conferred upon him after he cut off his own feet as voluntarily self-inflicted punishment for coercing his king by threatening him with a knife during the decision making "process."²⁴ The first of three Pan 潘氏 who either held positions on the royal staff and/or were favorites of kings of Chu was Pan Chong 潘崇 (fl. 626-613). He served on the royal staff initially as tutor to the heir apparent, then jointly as grand tutor and chief of the palace guard after his charge had committed regicide and usurped the throne.²⁵ The first member of the Wu 伍氏 lineage to appear in the historical record for Chu was Wu Can 伍參 (fl. 597), a favorite of King Zhuang.²⁶ As a result of the machinations of sycophant Fei Wuji, in 522 the Wus were eliminated as a factor in the internal politics of Chu.²⁷ The Yang 養氏 lineage (*zu*), which was annihilated in 528 because of its unfortunate alliance with a chief administrator who fell out of favor with the king,²⁸ is thought to have descended from Yang Youji (fl. 597-558), who served many years as an officer in the royal garrison before being

²³ ZZZS 9:16a (159, Zhuang 18).

²⁴ ZZZS 9:17a-b (160, Zhuang 19).

²⁵ ZZZS 12:5b-6b (299, Wen 11).

²⁶ ZZZS 23:10b (392, Xuan 12).

²⁷ ZZZS 49:2b-4a (852-53, Zhao 20).

²⁸ ZZZS 47:4b (820, Zhao 14).

appointed palace stable master in 558.²⁹ The earliest reference to a Zhong , the last of the non-royal lineages to appear in Chu prior to the mid-sixth century, is to Yun Administrator Zhong Yi 鍾儀 (fl. 584-582), who claimed to have come from a family of hereditary musicians, himself being an accomplished lute player.³⁰ Confirmation of the veracity of this claim is found in the appointment of Zhong Jian 鍾建 (fl. 506-505) to the royal staff position of music master in 505.³¹

The existence of another six lineages can be verified during the latter half of the sixth century. In the counter coup that toppled King Ling (r.540-529) in 529, the rebels were able "to take advantage of the followers of the four lineages (*zu*) to enter [the capital of] Chu."³² 因四族之徒以入楚。 Two of the four were the long established Dou and Wei lineages, or segments thereof, while the others originated in the petty states of Xu and Cai, both of which were currently in the orbit of Chu.³³ The members of the latter two lineages mentioned in connection with the coup of 529 are Xu Wei 許圍, who had been hostage in the Chu capital since 533 when the population of Xu 許, which was then a protectorate of Chu, was relocated to a new site,³⁴ and Cai

²⁹ ZZZS 23:16a (395, Xuan 12) shows Yang in the position of spearman on the right in the *youkuang* 右廣 chariot outfit of the royal garrison in the battle of Bi in 597. He was still a member of the royal garrison in the battle of Yanling in 575 (*ibid.*, 28:9b-10a [476, Cheng 16]). For his appointment as palace stable master in 558, see *ibid.*, 32:24b [565, Xiang 15]).

³⁰ ZZZS 26:25b-26a (448, Cheng 9).

³¹ ZZZS 55:4a (959, Ding 5). Although this appointment came about ostensibly as the result of his marriage to a younger sister of King Zhao who insisted on the union, having been carried piggyback by Jian across a river during the flight of the royal house from the capital of Chu during the previous year (*ibid.*, 54:25b [952, Ding 4]), the choice of the office would certainly have been influenced by the hereditary role of the Zhong lineage.

³² ZZZS 46:5b (806, Zhao 13).

³³ ZZZS 46:3a-4b (805, Zhao 13).

³⁴ ZZZS 45:2a-3a (777-78, Zhao 9).

Wei 蔡洧, who was a favorite of King Ling but whose father had been killed in 531 when Chu extinguished the state of Cai 蔡 and made it into a *xian*.³⁵ Following the successful 529 coup, King Ping (r. 528-516) returned the population of Xu to its original place and restored Cai to statehood;³⁶ thereafter, the portions of the lineages of Xu Wei and Cai Wei that had come to Chu probably returned to their respective native states. As the result of popular backlash against their bloody elimination of the lineage and partisans (*zu dang* 族黨) of Left Deputy Chief Minister Xi Wan in 515, Fei Wuji and Yan Jiangshi were executed and their own lineages (*zu*) were completely annihilated in order to appease the outraged populace of the capital.³⁷ Fei, who was perhaps the most notorious sycophant in Chu history, was appointed junior tutor to the heir apparent in ca. 528, and thereafter he became the principal source of political instability in the Chu capital until his execution.³⁸ Yan also served on the royal staff in the position of *youling* 右領 at the time of his death.³⁹ Xi Wan, whose personal popularity engendered the jealousy of Fei and Yan, may have been a refugee from the state of Jin, where the Xi lineage was eliminated from commander-official status during the purge of 574.⁴⁰ Among the partisans of Xi was Jin Chen 晉陳, who was killed together with his sons and younger brothers. This untoward development sent other members of the lineage (*zu*) of Jin Chen into the streets of the capital in vociferous

³⁵ ZZS 45:21b (787, Zhao 11).

³⁶ ZZS 21a-b (814, Zhao 15).

³⁷ ZZS 52:18a-b and 20b-21b (908 and 910, Zhao 27).

³⁸ ZZS 48:21b (844, Zhao 19) for the appointment of Fei.

³⁹ ZZS 52:18a (908, Zhao 27) for the appointment of Yan.

⁴⁰ ZZS 28:23b-26b (483-484, Cheng 17).

protest, perhaps precipitating the unrelenting criticism of the chief administrator that ultimately resulted in the decision to punish Fei and Yan.⁴¹ Given the penchant in Chu for referring to recent arrivals by the names of their native states, as in the cases of Xu Wei and Cai Wei, for example, there is reason to believe that the Jin lineage may have hailed from Jin state like its Xi ally. Thus, four of the late appearing Chu lineages may have had out of state origins.

During the Spring and Autumn era the socio-political system of Chu tolerated the rise of indigenous lineages and the establishment of lineages of foreign origin. The system was dominated by kings who usually controlled appointments to positions in the central government and on the royal staff as well as the economic rewards that went with such appointments. Consequently, the indigenous lineages, particularly those of royal origins which would seem to have an inside road to wealth and power, were not able to obtain the resources and influence that would have enabled them to gain control of the system and prohibit, if they had so desired, the entry of foreign lineages into it.

Lineage Formation

Data relevant to the formation of lineages in Chu are not plentiful; consequently, a complete explanation of the way lineages were formed is not possible. For example, there are no data that can be used to explain why several sons of Ruo'ao were known by the surname Dou.⁴² Qin Jiamo attributes this phenomenon to the fact that Chu was a southern Man Yi state 蠻夷國 with an unfathomable naming

⁴¹ ZZS 52:19a-b (909, Zhao 27).

⁴² Dou Bobi, Dou Lian, and Dou Qi.

custom.⁴³ However, as concluded in Chapter 2 above, despite the alleged assertion by one ruler that he was a Man Yi,⁴⁴ the evidence about origins shows that the royal house of Chu came from Hua Xia territory in the Central Plains of the north.⁴⁵ As another example, there are no data in primary sources that provide reliable clues to the derivations of the surnames Dou, Wei, Qu, and Cheng, which could, if known, give valuable insights into the factors that facilitated the segmentation of these lineages from the royal house. Nevertheless, on the basis of available data a general picture may be drawn of lineage formation and the factors on which it was based.

The formation of lineages via the process of segmentation is evident in the history of the royal lineages of Chu. As noted above, the derivation of four of six surnames of royal lineages is not known. However, the remaining royal lineages clearly took the names of their respective progenitors as surnames in the third generation as a sign of their independence from the royal house. As noted above, Chief Minister Yang Gai was the grandson of Wangzi Yang, and Chief Minister Zichang 子常 (Nang Wa 囊瓦, fl. 519-506) was the grandson of Wangzi Nang, both progenitors being the sons of kings. Since taking the name of the grandfather, or lineage founder, as surname was one of the common ways of acquiring a surname in other Spring and Autumn era states,⁴⁶ the process of lineage segmentation in Chu must have been similar to that

⁴³ SBJB 171.

⁴⁴ SJHZKZ 40:7 (645).

⁴⁵ See the views of Rao Zongyi 1969:273-315 and Li Xueqin 1980:74-77.

⁴⁶ ZZS 4:12-13a (75-76, Yin 8, text and commentary).

elsewhere, at least in terms of the derivation of some surnames and the number of generations required for a sublineage to completely break off from its natal lineage.

A contemporary example that is particularly fitting here is found in the Chao 朝氏 lineage of the neighboring state of Cai, a state that was reputedly founded by the Ji clan to which the royal Zhou house belonged. The Chao surname first appears in 529 at the end of a period (531-529) during which Cai, being situated on the northern frontier of Chu, had been incorporated into Chu territory as a *xian*. In that year, Chao Wu 朝吳, an influential local resident, was instrumental in starting a coup that ultimately toppled King Ling of Chu and resulted in the restoration Cai to statehood.⁴⁷ Wu was the grandson of former Grand Tutor Zichao 太師子朝 (fl. early sixth century),⁴⁸ whose name became the surname of the lineage that was comprised of his descendants in the third generation.

As revealed in extant historical sources, members of the Dou, Wei and Qu lineages were known by their respective surnames from the first generation, namely from the founder onward. Again, this is not unusual when considered in the context of the practice in other states of the Spring and Autumn era. For example, Xun Shou 荀首 (fl. 597-583), who founded the Zhi 智氏 lineage in Jin, was known as Zhi Shou 智首, and his son Xun Ying 荀盈 (d. 559) was also known by Zhi, even though the fission of the Zhi lineage from its natal Xun lineage was not completed until the next, or third, generation (see discussion in Chapter 3). In such cases as these, the process of

⁴⁷ ZZS 46:4b-5b, 8a (805-07, Zhao 13).

⁴⁸ ZZS 37:12b (634, Xiang 26--text and Du commentary); 46:4b (805, Zhao 13--text and Du commentary).

lineage formation via the segmentation and fission of existing lineages seems to have run the same course as the formation of the Yang, Nang, and Chao lineages. The difference in the use of surnames may be attributed to the fact that the latter surnames were derived from the personal names of lineage founders, while the Dou, Wei, and Qu surnames were derived from other sources associated with and used to distinguish the founders of their lineages from their contemporaries.

As sons and uncles of kings, founders of the royal lineages of Chu were eligible for appointments to offices in the central government and other significant roles in the conduct of state affairs (see Chapter 6). Founders of the Dou, Qu, and Nang lineages held offices in the central government, and the founder of the Wei lineage was a close advisor of the king. Although nothing is known about the founder of the Cheng lineage or Wangzi Yang, who founded the Yang lineage, the assumption may be made that they were also the recipients of royal appointments like the others. None of these individuals had the hereditary right to serve or to hold a particular position; their selection was made by the reigning king from among the pool of eligible members of the royal house. Consequently, the honor and prestige that accrued to them as a result of their respective appointments and the accompanying emoluments and other economic benefits undoubtedly stimulated and facilitated the establishment of a corporate identity among their posterity that was centered on the illustrious ancestor on whose good fortune they traded.

Lineage Resources and Development

Throughout the Spring and Autumn era wealth that could be used as the basis for lineage formation and for the development of political power was derived almost entirely from the economic rewards and benefits of service in the government or on the royal staff rather than from private sources. Access to crown wealth was generally attained directly through official emoluments indirectly via the misappropriation of state resources, or by establishing dependency relationships with persons who had access to position and resources. Because of the relatively tight regulation of land rights by the crown, lineages were generally not able to establish permanent bases for the private accumulation of wealth that would have enabled them to recruit supporters and followers sufficient in number to effectively establish the right, collectively or individually, to participate in the political process on a lineage basis. However, there are signs during the last century, in particular, of the Spring and Autumn era of important changes in this situation that would ultimately lead Wu Qi 吳起 (d. 381) to warn his king in the middle of the Warring States period that, "High officials are too influential and lords of manors (*fengjun*) are too numerous. When conditions are like this, then upward [they] impinge on the master, and downward [they] oppress the people. This is the road to impoverishing the state and weakening the military."⁴⁹ 大臣太重，封君太衆。若此則上僭主而下虐民。此貧國弱兵之道也。

⁴⁹ HFZJJ 4:14 (165).

Official emoluments in the state of Chu appear to have consisted of two main types, namely goods and income from land grants, or exclusively assigned territory. 'Goods' refers to animate or inanimate objects, such as servants, livestock, grain, sacrificial vessels, musical instruments, precious metals and currency, that could be dispensed from existing pools or stores at the disposal of the crown apart from whatever goods were associated with land grants. Since land grants did not, as a rule, become permanent lineage property, grantees had effective rights only to the income that could be generated from the territory that was granted or assigned to them. Therefore, in principle all emoluments consisted of movable property as opposed to real estate.

Goods

The importance of movable property and the use of goods as a form of official emolument can be illustrated from a comparison between Chief Minister Zichang who was serving during the last quarter of the sixth century, and Chief Minister Dou Ziwen, who had served during the middle of the sixth century. The *Guoyu* records that when Dou Qie 鬥且 met Zichang in court, the latter talked only of "accumulating goods and collecting horses . . . 'just like,'" in the view of Qieting, "' a starving wolf was there'."⁵⁰ 蓄貨聚馬。 . . . 如餓豺狼焉。 In relating the incident to his younger brother, Qieting referred to the old days when a balanced distribution of goods insured that the needs of the state and of the people were both satisfied, recalling that:

Formerly, when Dou Ziwen thrice quit as chief minister, he had not one single day of stores because he took pity on the people. . . . Every time King Cheng paid out Ziwen's emolument, [the latter] was sure to flee. Only after the King

⁵⁰ GY, 18:5a (409, "Chuyu" *xia*).

desisted, would [he] return. When someone addressed Ziwen saying, "Why is it that while others spend their lives seeking wealth, you flee from it?", [he] responded saying, "As for the reason for becoming involved in government, it is to provide for the people. If the people were mostly destitute while I were taking wealth from it, that would amount to looking after the people in order to enrich myself. Death would come [upon me] without delay, indeed! I flee death; it is not that I flee wealth."⁵¹

昔門子文三舍令尹，無一日之積，恤民之故也。...成王每出子文之祿，必逃。王止，而後復。人謂子文曰：人生求富，而子逃之，何也。對曰：夫從政者，以庇民也。民多曠也，而我取富焉，是勤民以自封。死無日矣。我逃死，非逃富也。

In contrast to Ziwen and his times, Zichang was pursuing a dangerous course by unrestrainedly accumulating goods while earning the enmity of the people, who were being deprived of basic necessities because of his greed.⁵² Goods and livestock produced by the population of Chu were gathered into the warehouses and stockyards of the crown to provide for the royal house and meet the official payroll.

Goods were also used to attract able persons into the service of the crown and as rewards. Both of these uses can be illustrated from the history of the Wu lineage. The *Zuozhuan* reports that after Chief Minister Qu Jian was persuaded that the recall of Wu Ju 伍舉 (fl. 547-533) from exile in Jin would be in the best interest of the state, and he had presented his case to King Kang (r. 559-545), the decision was made to increase the "emolument and rank" 祿爵 of Ju on his return in 547.⁵³ The *Guoyu* indicates that Qu Jian had already promised to "double his household wealth (*shi*, i.e., movable property)" 倍其室 as enticement to return. Jiao Ming 椒鳴 (fl. 547), a son of Ju who had

⁵¹ GY, 18:5a-b (409-10, "Chuyu" *xia*). Compare ZGC, 14:11a (281).

⁵² GY, 18:6a (411, "Chuyu" *xia*).

⁵³ ZZS 37:17b (637, Xiang 26).

remained in Chu, perhaps on an estate that had been previously granted to his exiled father, was sent to escort him back to the capital.⁵⁴ The promise of goods was also used several decades later, but in a different way, in an attempt to secure the return from exile of Wu Yuan 伍員 (fl. 523-494), a grandson of Wu Ju, whose father and brother had been murdered in a ruthless purge at the capital in 522.⁵⁵ The *Lushi chunqiu* states that when a man of Chu had an encounter with a wanted man, he said, "According to the laws of Jing (Chu) State, the one who takes Wu Yuan will be granted a high noble rank and receive a stipend amounting to 10,000 taels."⁵⁶ 荆國之法，得五員者爵執圭，祿萬櫓。 Similar kinds of goods may have been offered in the reward that was given to Grand Marshal Wei Yan by King Kang in 548, after it had been refused by Chief Minister Qu Jian, who gave credit for the successful quelling of a rebellion by Shujiu groups, the occasion for the reward, to the strategy proposed by his predecessor, Wei Zifeng, the father of Yan.⁵⁷

Land

With respect to income producing territory, five types of land grants appear to have been made to individuals by kings of Chu in the Spring and Autumn era: (1) territory that went with appointment to office; (2) land as reward for meritorious service (*shangdi* 賞地, *shangtian* 賞田); (3) quasi-private territory to provide for the

⁵⁴ GY 17:6a (689, "Chuyu" *shang*). Wei Zhao defines *shi* as "wives and concubines, goods and materials" (*qi qie huo cai* 妻妾貨財) in *ibid.*, 12:5a (305, "Jinyu 6") and "household wealth" (*jiazi* 家資) in *ibid.*, 17:4b (386, "Chuyu" *shang*).

⁵⁵ ZZS 49:2b-4a (852-53, Zhao 30).

⁵⁶ LSCQXJZ 10:101 (text and commentary). The name of Wu Yuan is 伍員 is written here in a variant form 五員.

⁵⁷ ZZS 36:16b-17a (624-25, Xiang 26).

continuation of certain lineages; (4) private territory for the maintenance of special foreign refugees and their families and entourages; and (5) conferred estates (*fengyi* 封邑) with full control over land, population, and revenue transferred to the recipient.

Textual evidence for each type of land grant is not plentiful and is limited to the last 150 years of the era. This does not necessarily mean, however, that in former times there were no instances of individual or lineage rights to territory and/or its produce. Rather it probably reflects the generally rigorous application of the land use regulation mentioned by Han Feizi, who wrote: "According to the laws of Chu State, when emoluments were given to an official, after but two generations [the crown] took back the land."⁵⁸ 楚邦之法，祿臣再世而收地。

Referring to the state of Jin at the time of the reign of Duke Wen 晉文公 (r. 637-628), the *Guoyu* states that "the Duke ate from tribute [from the people], high officials ate [from income] from settlements (*yi*), and lesser officials ate [from income] from fields (*tian*)."⁵⁹ 公食貢，大夫食邑，士食田。The idea that emoluments paid for government service were land based and followed this pattern in the various Spring and Autumn states is a commonly expressed axiom in writings on high antiquity.⁶⁰ However, the evidence in Chu is not particularly good in this regard.

⁵⁸ HFZJJ 7:2a (259).

⁵⁹ GY 10:14a (271, "Jinyu 4").

⁶⁰ For an example, see Li Yanong 1962:51-53.

One commentator has argued that Qu was the income producing territory of *Mo'ao Qu Xia*, seventh century founder of the Qu lineage,⁶¹ but such a place name cannot be documented in the state of Chu in the Spring and Autumn era.

In attempting to explain the origin of the Shen surname 沈氏, which is alleged to have existed in Chu, Zheng Qiao (A.D. 1104-1162) claims, "Chu had the settlement of Shen. Gongzi Zhen 公子貞 [or Chief Minister Zinang], the son of King Zhuang was enfeoffed at Shenlu 沈鹿; therefore, [his descendants] became the Shens." ⁶² 楚有沈邑。楚莊王之子公子貞封於沈鹿，故爲沈氏。 There is, however, no reliable evidence for this view. Although Shenlu was a Chu place during the period,⁶³ Gongzi Zhen was not associated with it. Moreover, as noted above, he is known as the founder of the Nang lineage.

Takezoe suggests that Shen may have been one of the income producing territories of Shen Zhuliang 沈諸梁 (fl. 499-477), who is said to be the son of *Shenyin Xu* 沈尹戌 (d. 506). ⁶⁴ This argument turns on the notion that Xu was the administrator of a place called Shen. However, there is no evidence that Shen was ever the name of a *xian* or a place in Chu during the Spring and Autumn era (see Appendix 6).

Ying Shao says that Xu founded the She 葉氏 lineage, the surname coming from his supposed income producing territory of She,⁶⁵ which was, in fact, a *xian* of

⁶¹ CCBZ 1:1b (10).

⁶² *Tongzhi*, "Shizu lue," 26:451.

⁶³ ZZZS 7:3b (119, Huan 9).

⁶⁴ FSTY 2:5a-6b.

⁶⁵ FSTYYW 6:141. We are used to reading 葉 as "Ye", but the correct reading here is

Chu. Zhuliang is known to have been the local administrator at She and to have retired there,⁶⁶ but whether or not he founded a lineage with that surname, the notion that he would have been granted territorial rights to She would require a revision of the prevailing view of Chu *xian*.⁶⁷

Since Wei 蔦 and Yang 養 appear in Chu as place names⁶⁸ and surnames, there is a possibility that the lineage founders were granted a right to income from those places, but lineage members are not shown in association with them, and no such connection has been suggested by others.

From the latter half of the sixth century, there are four references that connect individuals to places in contexts suggestive of the existence of exclusively assigned income producing territories:

First, in the *Guoyu* account of the his recall from exile in 547, Wu Ju is referred to only as Jiao Ju 椒舉,⁶⁹ whereas in the *Zuozhuan* version of this event, he is identified as Wu Ju.⁷⁰ However, in both sources one of his sons is called Jiao Ming. The *Zuozhuan* does not use the name Jiao Ju until he has become the closest and most influential advisor of King Ling in 538,⁷¹ having been a crucial collaborator in the king's

"She" (ZZZS 21:17b [368, Xuan 3--Du commentary]).

⁶⁶ ZZZS 57:20b (999, Ai 4) and 60:7a (1044, Ai 16).

⁶⁷ For discussions of the institution of *xian* in Chu, see H. G. Creel 1964, and Paul Wheatley 1971:180-82.

⁶⁸ For the place name Wei, see ZZZS 16:10b-11a (266-67, Xi 27), and for Yang, see *ibid.*, 53:15b (928, Zhao 30).

⁶⁹ GY 17:3a-6a (383-89, "Chuyu" *shang*).

⁷⁰ ZZZS 27:12b-17b (634-37, Xiang 26).

⁷¹ ZZZS 42:18a-28a (726-52, Zhao 4).

seizure of the throne three years earlier.⁷² Since Jiao 椒 is interchangeable with Jiao 湫, which was the name of a locality in Chu,⁷³ the suggestion that it is the name of a settlement is plausible,⁷⁴ the implication being that Wu Ju had some claim to it.

Because his identification with territory of his son is not likely, Ju had probably been granted the right to income from Jiao prior to his flight into exile and his subsequent recall. If not, then the reference to Jiao Ming is an anachronism, for the Jiao land grant would probably have taken place after 541 as compensation for services rendered to King Ling by Wu Ju. The fact that Jiao did not become a surname of Ju's descendants suggests that the territory of Jiao reverted to the crown in the third generation according to the usual practice.

Background to the volatile situation in the Chu capital that facilitated the overthrow of King Ling in 529 provides three more plausible examples of individuals who had rights to income producing territory as part of their normal compensation for services rendered. Among the individuals who were offended by King Ling after his enthronement in 541 were Wei Ju, whose fields were seized by the king, and Dou Weigui and his son, Chengran, whose respective settlements at Zhongchou 鍾攀 and Man 蔓 were also confiscated by him.⁷⁵

These are the first instances in Chu history where individuals are clearly identified as having territorial rights. Although the offices held by Wei and the two

⁷² ZZZS 41:29a-b (710, Zhao 1).

⁷³ ZZZS 9:17a (160, Zhuang 19).

⁷⁴ See commentary by Wei Zhao in GY 17:6a (389, "Chuyu" *shang*).

⁷⁵ ZZZS 46:3a-b (805, Zhao 13).

Dou are not revealed, the assumption can be made that their right to control certain territory was granted in return for services rendered either in the central government or to the royal house. By taking away their territories, King Ling violated the rights of the grantees to enjoy the related economic benefit for two generations. Consequently, Wei Ju and Dou Chengran, his father having apparently passed away, joined the "agnates [of those] who had lost their duties"⁷⁶ 喪職之族 (and official stipends) during the reign of King Ling and other disenchanted parties in creating disorder in the capital. Although Chengran had been appointed suburb administrator at the capital in compensation for his loss of the settlement of Man, he still became one of the key internal supporters of his former patron Gongzi Qiji 公子棄疾, the younger brother of King Ling. Qi Ji took advantage of the chaos to lead a rebel force into the capital and claim his long-denied right to be king of Chu.⁷⁷

The only relatively explicit reference that connects control of income producing territory in Chu with the holding of office is found in the *Zhanguo*. There, the assertion is made that She Administrator Zigao 葉公子高 (Shen Zhuliang) went from rags to riches as the result of taking control of state government after putting down an attempted coup d'etat in 479, taking note of the fact that subsequently he "ate [from income] from fields amounting to 600 *zhen*" 食田六百畝.⁷⁸ The *Zuozhuan* makes

⁷⁶ Shen Yucheng also interprets the translates this passage as follows: "... the relatives of those people who had lost their positions" (ZZYW 437). *Zu* can be understood to mean "agnates" in context, but in view of a later reference to this anecdote to the "followers of the four lineages" *si zu zhi tu* 四族之徒, I believe it means "lineage."

⁷⁷ ZZS 46:4a-9b (805-09, Zhao 13).

⁷⁸ ZGC 14:11a-b (281-82).

no mention of this benefit in his brief tenure in the positions of chief minister and grand marshal, though he must have been, or become a man of means, for within the same year he voluntarily relinquished power and went into retirement at She.⁷⁹

In addition to being granted territorial rights with appointment to office or in return for other services rendered, an individual could also become the recipient of a land grant for meritorious service, particularly in battle. The king's parceling out land for such purposes was a practice that Chu shared in common with other Spring and Autumn era states.

The earliest instance of reward territory recorded in references to Chu history in classical texts is the case of the lineage territory of the descendants of Chief Minister Wei Ailie. At some point between his return from success in the battlefield at Heyong 河雍 in 597 and his death in ca. 595, he is said to have either selected by himself or advised his sons to choose the infertile and undesirable (some say haunted) land at Chinqiu 寢邱 as the site of his/their land grant from King Zhuang in order to ensure that his posterity would be able to retain possession of it.⁸⁰ Some of the late Warring States and Early Han texts use this anecdote to explain how, of the descendants of early officials in Chu, only Wei Ailie's had managed to avoid losing their lineage territory the crown, despite the existence of the two-generation land use limitation that was customarily applied to land grants to officials.⁸¹

⁷⁹ ZZS 60:7a (1044, Ai 16).

⁸⁰ See the reference to Sun Shu'ao 孫叔敖 in HFZJJ 7:2a (259), HNZ 18:306, LSCQXJZ 10:101, LZZ 8:96.

⁸¹ See HFZJJ and HNZ in the preceding note.

From the more historically reliable *Zuozhuan*, evidence is available for the granting of land to the meritorious and for the nature of private control, or the cost to the state, of land grants. When Chief Minister Zizhong 子重 (d. 571) returned from successful military action against Song in ca. 594, he asked King Zhuang for permission "to take [land] from Shen and Lü [*xian*] to use as reward fields" 取於申呂以爲賞田. At first the king agreed, but he was later persuaded to reverse his decision by Shen Administrator Wuchen 巫臣, (Qu Wu 屈巫, fl. 597-582) who, as the local representative of the central government, argued that by placing the requested land under the control of a private party, Shen and Lü would, for all intents and purposes, cease to exist as *xian*, and being thus stripped of the means of filling state levies, their strategic importance as bulwarks against invasions from the North would be lost.⁸² In other words, a private land grant would have deprived the state of control over the resources of the affected area. Thus, if a grantee were able to acquire control of productive and heavily populated territory, he and his kinsmen would have an excellent base for accumulating private wealth and recruiting numerous followers and private soldiers. From the point of view of the royal house, the wisdom and utility of reclaiming crown control of land grants after a two generation interval is readily apparent.

Regarding the granting of quasi-private territory for the continuation of ancestral lines, "quasi-private territory" refers to territory that functioned simultaneously as a local unit of state government and as lineage property. For example, in Jin State a

⁸² ZZS 26:16a (443, Cheng 7). See Hu Shaohua 1990:70-71 for Lü as a *xian*.

number of *xian* that were regarded as territory of the Han 韓氏 lineage also filled military levies for the state.⁸³ There is one reasonably good example of this kind of territory in Chu. The *Zuozhuan* records that in 528, after executing his longtime associate Dou Chengran (Chief Minister Ziqi 子旗), King Ping "sent Dou Xin (the son of Chengran) to reside (*ju*) in Yun in order to not forget former loyal service" 使鬥辛居郟以無忘舊勳. That is to say that the lineage of Dou would be allowed to continue there. By way of contrast, the lineage of a certain Mr. Yang, a partisan of Chengran, was annihilated on this occasion.⁸⁴ During the seventh century, Yun was an independent state with marriage ties to the royal house of Chu, but by 584 it had been reduced to the status of *xian* in Chu and was administered by Zhong Yi.⁸⁵ The selection of Yun as the site for locating the descendants of Chengran was, perhaps, not by chance, for the mother of Dou Bobi, founder of the Dou lineage, was a native of Yun, and Dou Ziwen was born there prior to its loss of statehood.⁸⁶ In 528 Dou Xin and his brothers moved to Yun, where two decades later he still served as *xian* administrator, and one of his brothers became known as Yun Huai 郟懷 (Dou Huai 鬥懷, fl. 506).⁸⁷ In view of the context of his assignment to Yun and the direction in which changes in the land tenure patterns of Chu seem to have been moving, particularly after the mid-sixth century, Dou Xin appears to have been wearing two hats, those of

⁸³ ZZS 43:12a (747, Zhao 5).

⁸⁴ ZZS 47:4b n(820, Zhao 14).

⁸⁵ ZZS 26:16a (443, Cheng 7).

⁸⁶ ZZS 21:28b (370, Xuan 4).

⁸⁷ ZZS 54:25b-26a (952, Zhao 14); GY 18:7a-b (413-14, "Chuyu" *xia*).

government official and landlord, as he presided over what amounted to quasi-private territory.⁸⁸

The grant of territorial rights to foreign refugees was a practice commonly followed by Spring and Autumn era states. When Shuxiang 叔向 was consulted about emoluments appropriate for two ducal sons from Qin and Chu who had arrived in Jin to seek "employment" (i.e., political asylum) in ca. 541, he is said to have replied, "Ministerial rank officials (*qing*) of major states [should receive] fields amounting to [500 hectare], and first rank great officers (*shang daifu*) [should receive] fields amounting to [100 hectare]. . . ."⁸⁹ 大國之卿一旅之田，上大夫一卒之田。 As with most formulae of this type, the actual practice was not so orderly. For example, when Wu Ju fled from Chu to Jin a few years earlier in 547, his hosts were allegedly prepared to give him rights to a *xian* which would have made his wealth comparable to that of Shuxiang.⁹⁰

When exiled Heir Apparent Zijian 太子建 (fl. 523-522) took up residence in Zheng State following his flight from Chu in 522, he was given a private settlement (*siyi 私邑*).⁹¹ King Zhao (r. 515-489) of Chu appears to have made this type of land grant to two ducal sons from Wu who came seeking refuge in 512. In a transparently political act that was calculated to send a message to archfoe Wu, "[King Zhao] granted

⁸⁸ The conventional view of *xian* administration in Chu is that lineages were never allowed to control *xian* like they were in other states.

⁸⁹ GY 14:10b-11a (342-43, "Jinyu 4").

⁹⁰ ZZS 37:17b (637, Xiang 26).

⁹¹ ZZS 60:3b (1042, Ai 16). The date of this event is not revealed.

them [rank and land] (*da feng zhi*) and . . . sent [them] to dwell in Yang."⁹² 大封之，而。 。 。使居養。

When Fugai usurped the kingship from his brother in Wu and then was driven out in 505, he fled to Chu where his descendants became known by the surname Tangxi, after the name of the valley where they settled.⁹³ In spite of the fact that Fugai had been one of the most aggressive leaders in the Wu force that had occupied the capital of Chu in the previous year, King Zhao must have also installed him in Tangxi in a manner and for reasons similar to his handling of the land grant to the earlier arrivals from Wu State.

Since neither Yang nor Tangxi are identified as *xian* of Chu during the Spring and Autumn era,⁹⁴ they may have constituted more strictly private territorial grants than one such as that given to Dou Xin. The degree to which they may have become private in fact cannot be determined from existing sources. In the case of the "private settlement" of Heir Apparent Jian in Zheng, the oppressed tenants were able to bring suit against their landlord, thus securing an investigation by state authorities that resulted in his execution.⁹⁵ In view of the nature of Chu government and traditional restrictions on territorial rights, the situation in Chu may have been similar to this, if not more tightly regulated by the crown.

⁹² ZZZS 53:15b (928, Zhao 30--text and Du commentary).

⁹³ ZZZS 55:2b (958, Ding 5).

⁹⁴ Hu Shaohua 1990.

⁹⁵ ZZZS 54:24b (951, Ding 4).

The *Zuozhuan* does not specify the kinds of rewards dispensed by King Zhao after an invasion force from Wu 吳 was driven from the capital of Chu in 506.⁹⁶ However, the *Zhanguo* relates that a certain Meng Gu 蒙穀, who had rescued the statutes of Chu from the capital in the thick of the invasion and later returned them to facilitate restoration of order, had "conferred upon (*feng*) him high noble rank and fields amounting to 600 *zhen*" 封之執圭，田六百畝. Claiming that he had acted solely for patriotic reasons, Meng Gu fled the capital to avoid accepting the reward.⁹⁷ Although this story appears to be a variation on the *Zuozhuan* account of the flight of Shen Baoxu (fl. 506-505), to avoid his reward on this occasion,⁹⁸ the nature of the reward that was allegedly offered to Meng Gu is believable.

The *Zuozhuan* states that Chief Minister Ziguo 子國 (Gongsun Ning 公孫寧, fl. 479-477) was installed (*feng* 封) at Xi 析 after leading Chu to victory over the troops of Ba State in 447.⁹⁹ He Hao regards the grant of Xi to Ziguo as the beginning of the institution of *fengjun* 封君 in Chu. He says that a conferred estate was like a benefice (*shiyi* 食邑, *caiyi* 菜邑) in that the recipient of a conferred estate was actually given control of the land, its population, and its revenue. This type of land grant was unprecedented in the history of Chu,¹⁰⁰ heretofore, land grant recipients have received only temporary rights to income from crown territory.

⁹⁶ ZZS 55 4a (959, Ding 5).

⁹⁷ ZGC 14: 12a-b (283-84).

⁹⁸ ZZS 55:2a-3a, 4a (958-59, Ding 5).

⁹⁹ ZZS 60:13b (1047, Ai 18).

¹⁰⁰ He Hao 199173-74. Li Yujie says that Chu always had benefices that were under control of lineages and out of reach of the king, but he offers no historical evidence to support his claim (1988:82-83, 89-90).

He Hao believes that this is the type of land grant that was given to Luyang Wenzhi by King Hui (r. 488-432) in ca. 478.¹⁰¹ The *Guoyu* says that "when King Hui gave (*yu*) Liang to Luyang Wenzhi" 惠王以梁與魯陽文子, the latter declined acceptance on the grounds that he was afraid that one of his sons and grandsons might, under certain adverse circumstances, take advantage of its strategic border location to commit a treasonous act and bring about the cessation of ancestral rites directed toward himself. Consequently, King Hui deferred to his sentiments saying, "As to the way that you are benevolent towards others, [you] do not forget your sons and grandsons, and [your] liberality extends to Chu State; [so I] dare not but follow you [in your desire]." 子之仁人，不忘子孫，施及楚國，敢不從子。 Then he "gave him Luyang."¹⁰² 與之魯陽。

Among the five types of land grants discussed here, the most common types in Chu were the right to income from certain territory extended at the time of appointment to office in the government or on the royal staff and as reward for meritorious service. Although there is no textual evidence for these kinds of grants prior to the sixth century,

¹⁰¹ Commenting on the identity of Luyang Wenzhi, Wei Zhao says, "[He] is Luyang *gong*, the grandson of King Ping [and] son of Marshal Ziqi." 平王之孫，司馬子期之子魯陽公也。 (GY 18:9a [417, "Chuyu" xia]). He Hao says that he is the Luyangjun mentioned in the *Mozi*, where Sun Yirang identifies him as Gongsun Kuan, the son of Marshal Ziqi, who was himself appointed as marshal in 478 (MZJG 11:260). He argues that "Luyangjun" is the correct term of reference because King Hui gave him Luyang; he did not appoint him as *xian* administrator (*xiangong*). Therefore, he was a *fengjun* like his cousin Ziguo (1991:73 [text and note 7]). If this event occurred after 478 when Gongsun Kuan was made marshal, then He Hao is definitely correct.

¹⁰² GY 18:9a (417, "Chuyu" xia). Modern editions and translations of the *Guoyu* have dropped *ren* 人 from the first clause 子之仁人 in this passage, but I retain it because the clause makes perfect sense in this context. See *Guoyu* 2:582; Dong Lizhang 1993:694-95; Wu Guoyi, et. al. 1994:551; and Huang Yongtang 1995:659-60.

this is not proof that they did not exist from a much earlier time. In the sixth century the restriction on land use rights to two generations was beginning to breakdown; consequently, textual evidence for individuals and the territory with which they were associated begin to appear. For example, the grant of territory to the descendants of Wei Ailie early in the century was cited because that territory had not been reclaimed by the crown after two years. On the other hand, at the end of the third quarter of the century, the fields of Wei Ju and the settlements of Dou Weigui and Dou Chengran were noteworthy because they had been reclaimed prematurely.

The appearance of grants described as *feng* in the final quarter of the sixth and in the early fifth century is an even more significant indicator of the deterioration of the two-generation rule, for within the context of a land grant the term *feng* implies the right to perpetual control by generations to come, as in the restoration of Chen and Cai *xian* to statehood status in 529 by King Ping of Chu as reward for the support of the local populace in his successful *coup d'etat*.¹⁰³ That *feng* appears in texts shortly after evidence from the grants of quasi-private territory for the continuation of certain lineages is representative of logical change in land tenure patterns. In this respect, its use in connection with the granting of possibly private territory for the support and maintenance of politically important refugees and their families and for territorial rewards for meritorious service and has added significance, for it may indicate by this time a willingness on the part of the crown to relinquish some of its administrative rights together with economic privileges in special cases. Despite this late

¹⁰³ ZZS 46:4b, 8a (805, 807, Zhao 13).

development, reversion of territorial rights to the crown after a few generations appears to have been the normal practice throughout most of the Spring and Autumn era.

Graft and corruption

Under these circumstances acquisition of an economic base sufficient to support lineage formation and development was primarily dependent upon the favor of the king in dispensing government and royal staff appointments. Consequently, some officials turned to graft and corruption in order to maximize the economic and political gains that were made possible through holding office. In 571 Right Marshal Gongzi Shen 公子申 was executed after taking bribes from a number of petty states "to put pressure on" 以偪 the chief minister and right deputy minister.¹⁰⁴ Twenty years later Chief Minister Zinan apparently siphoned off some state resources to enrich (cement ties with) one of his favorites, Guan Qi , who "not yet having an increase in emoluments, possessed horses numbering tens of teams" 未益祿而有馬數十乘, thus giving rise to official concern and the execution of both men by order of King Kang in 551.¹⁰⁵ Since Zinan was the uncle of the king,¹⁰⁶ he could only have relied on the resources of the state made accessible through his central government appointment to provide extras for his man.

When Grand Marshal Wei Zifeng was appointed to replace Zinan as chief minister in 551, he wisely followed counsel to rid himself of eight favorites "of whom all, although having no [official] emoluments, had many horses" 皆無祿而多馬;

¹⁰⁴ ZZS 29:8b (499, Xiang 2).

¹⁰⁵ ZZS 35:5a-b (600, Xiang 22).

¹⁰⁶ CQSZP 47b.

thus, he was able to gain the confidence of King Kang.¹⁰⁷ Zifeng, who was from the long established Wei lineage, may have used lineage resources to reward these partisans; however, the implication of this passage seems to be that he might also have been suspected of diverting state resources for personal benefit.

As noted above, Chief Minister Zichang, who served in the post from 519-506, was known for the avarice that he displayed while in office, depriving the general population of its share of goods and horses while enriching himself. He also gained notoriety for extorting fine gifts, namely apparel and steeds, from the rulers of petty states who came to pay homage to the king of Chu, refusing to allow them to return home for three years until his demands were finally met in 507.¹⁰⁸ Thus, Chu officials were evidently presented many opportunities, both internally and externally, to exploit their positions to increase their wealth and to provide for their followers.

Connections

As suggested in the foregoing references to the favorites of Zinan and Wei Zifeng, attachment to persons in or potentially in power was another important means of increasing personal and lineage wealth in the form of movable property such as horses. Although the founder of the Guan lineage had served as a military commander, his descendants had to form dependent relationships with other persons in power in order to have access to wealth and keep the lineage viable. Guan Cong 觀從 (fl. 551-529), the son of Guan Qi, was in Cai 蔡 in the service of Chao Wu 朝吳 at the

¹⁰⁷ ZZS 35:5b-6a (600, Xiang 22).

¹⁰⁸ ZZS 54:9a-10a (944, Ding 3).

time of his father's execution in 551. He was the principal agitator and prime mover of the Cai based rebellion in 529 to take advantage of internal disorder in Chu to oust King Ling, install the king's youngest brother, Cai Administrator Gongzi Qiji, as King Ping, and win restoration of statehood for Cai.¹⁰⁹ As a result of his pivotal role in the affair, King Ping allowed Cong to have his choice of jobs; whereupon, he asked for a diviner's position in the tradition of his ancestors and was appointed divination master on the royal staff,¹¹⁰ the position that was probably held by Guan Zhan 觀瞻 (fl. ca. 479).¹¹¹ Thus, close connections with the right people secured wealth, position, and survival for the Guan lineage. This route to wealth and position, which served as the bases for the development of lineages in Chu, was common throughout the Spring and Autumn era.

An earlier example is that of Pan Chong, the first member of the Pan lineage to appear in the historical record for Chu. In 626 Chong, as tutor to Heir Apparent Shangchen, counseled his charge, who was about to be set aside by the king in favor of another son, to stage a *coup d'etat*. After Shangchen forced his father to commit suicide and replaced him as King Mu, he gave the movable property (*shi* 室) that he had accumulated as heir apparent to Chong, promoted him to the royal staff position of grand tutor, and also made him chief of the palace guard.¹¹² For several generations thereafter, the Pan lineage enjoyed a close and advantageous relationship with the kings of Chu as part of their personal retinue and staff.¹¹³

¹⁰⁹ ZZS 46:4b-7b (805-07, Zhao 13).

¹¹⁰ ZZS 46:8a-b (807, Zhao 13).

¹¹¹ ZZS 60:13a (1047, Ai 18). The event referred to here occurred in 479.

¹¹² ZZS 12:5b-6b (299, Wen 1).

¹¹³ Refer to the careers of Pan Chong and Pan Dang in the *Zuozhuan*.

Official appointments

Royal and non-royal lineages, whether indigenous or foreign in origin, owed their formation and/or their development and existence in Chu largely to the economic benefits derived, directly or indirectly, from official appointments. This is especially evident in instances where particular lineages were given or were able to establish the hereditary right to fill certain offices in the central government and on the royal staff. Among the royal lineages, only the Qu lineage had the hereditary right to fill a particular office, namely the office of *mo'ao*, a right that sustained the lineage from the time of its founder at the end of the sixth century through the end of the Spring and Autumn era (see Chapter 6).

With regard to non-royal lineages, the Yu lineage may have originated before the formation of Chu State, but its perpetuation during the Spring and Autumn era was assisted by the hereditary claim of the descendants of Yu Quan to the central government position of senior palace doorman.¹¹⁴ Whereas the privilege was enjoyed by the Yus because of the reputation of their ancestor, other hereditary claims to royal staff positions appear to have been based on special skills or occupations that were passed down from generation to generation within the lineage. Since the members of the Zhong lineage were traditionally musicians,¹¹⁵ the surname itself is also the name of a musical instrument (bell) commonly used in high antiquity, the identity of the Zhong lineage and its ability to sustain itself as a lineage entity appear to be inseparably

¹¹⁴ ZZS 9:17a-b (60, Zhuang 19).

¹¹⁵ ZZS 26:25b-26b (448, Cheng 9).

connected with its hereditary occupation in the royal court of Chu. The assumptions may be safely made that Yun Administrator Zhong Yi first came to the king's attention as a court musician¹¹⁶ and that, although other extenuating circumstances contributed to the appointment of Zhong Jian to the royal staff position of music master, namely his marriage to the king's sister,¹¹⁷ the choice of position was influenced by the hereditary occupation of Zhong lineage members. Members of the Guan lineage were also able to obtain appointment to the position of divination master on the royal staff because of the hereditary role of the ancestors in the divining process. In the case of Guan Cong, whose appointment secured the future of the lineage for the remainder of the Spring and Autumn era, this fact is made explicit in the historical record.¹¹⁸

Lineages that were fortunate enough to obtain hereditary rights to office or to possess traditional occupational skills that qualified their members for particular positions had special access to official appointments by the king. Consequently, they had an inside track to the royal treasury for economic support that they required in order to establish and perpetuate their lineage identity. Nevertheless, because that support did not include permanent land grants, these lineages were not able to establish independent sources for income and the private accumulation of wealth.

With territorial control, the prime source for private accumulation of wealth, systematically reclaimed by the state, the sublineages that aspired to segment from their natal lineage had to rely mainly on repeated appointment by the king of their members

¹¹⁶ Zhong Yi was an accomplished lutist; see ZZS 26:25b-26b (448, Cheng 9).

¹¹⁷ ZZS 55:4a (959, Ding 5).

¹¹⁸ ZZS 46:8a-b (807, Zhao 13).

to either government or royal staff positions in order to have access to the wealth required for sustaining growth and development in size and influence. The most outstanding example of this developmental process is the Dou lineage whose members managed to secure ten of seventeen known appointments to the offices of chief minister and grand marshal in the central government, as well as several royal staff and local administrative appointments, between 706 and 605. When offices held by Dou are combined with those occupied by their Cheng cousins in the higher order Ruo'ao lineage, the descendants of Ruo'ao received thirteen of the seventeen appointments just mentioned, clearly dominating the upper echelon of Chu officialdom during this period (see Chapter 6). As mentioned above, by 632, after less than half of these appointments had been made and during the lifetimes of the grandsons of Ruo'ao, Dou and Cheng had acquired sufficient wealth and prestige to enable them to attract and maintain six hundred private soldiers who were sent into battle under the banner of the Ruo'ao lineage. Unfortunately Dou Ziyue destroyed the higher order Ruo'ao lineage and nearly brought about the extinction of the Dou lineage itself when he led the Ruo'ao soldiers in an unsuccessful attempt to depose King Zhuang in 605. Thereafter, the sole surviving sublineage of Dou was placed on essentially the same footing as non-royal lineages as it sought to re-establish its economic base and regain political influence.

In the story of the revival of the Dou lineage after its narrow escape from extinction in 605, the importance of right connections, official appointments, and graft and corruption are all evident. At the time of the annihilation of the higher order

Ruo'ao lineage, (Dou) Kehuang 克黃 (fl. 605) was restored to his position as remonstrance master in the central government and allowed to continue the sublineage of his grandfather Chief Minister Ziwen, due to the exemplary and meritorious conduct of the latter.¹¹⁹ By the generation of Kehuang, himself representing generation number five (if Ruo'ao is counted as generation number one), the all-important blood relationship with the royal house, which was instrumental in facilitating the Dou/Cheng dominance of the chief minister and grand marshal positions prior to 605, was already precariously distant.

Despite the fact that he was able to continue one Dou line, the position of Kehuang and his descendants must have been further weakened by the unsuccessful coup attempt that year. Consequently, at an unspecified date before 560, Dou Weigui placed his own son, Chengran, in the service of Gongzi Qiji when the latter, still a babe-in-arms, was selected as heir apparent to King Gong (r. 590-560). The *Zuozhuan* implies that Weigui sought, thereby, to secure the future of his posterity, gambling that the prospective king would indeed survive the tumultuous years ahead in which his four elder brothers, who had been passed over, would surely contend with each other and himself for the kingship.¹²⁰

During the reign of one of those brothers, King Ling, who usurped the throne in 541 by killing the reigning king--his nephew--and the latter's offspring and driving two of his own brothers into exile, Dou Qiji 棄疾 (fl. 536), who is thought to have been the

¹¹⁹ ZZS 21:22b (370, Xuan 4).

¹²⁰ ZZS 46:9a-b (809, Zhao 14).

father of Weigui and the son of Kehuang, served in the central government position of palace stable master.¹²¹ Since King Ling selected him to replace one of the exiled brothers who held that position,¹²² and the king showed a strong proclivity for having his own men in official posts in the central government, Dou Qiji appears to have successfully attached himself to the king prior to the latter's usurpation of the kingship (see Chapter 6).

Weigui is also shown on assignment from King Ling in 538 together with Gongzi Qiji, the only brother of King Ling who was allowed to remain in Chu. However, before 529 King Ling stripped him of Zhongchou, the territory that is identified in the historical record as his place.

Chengran suffered a fate similar to that of his father no later than 529 when King Ling took away Man, the place with which he was intimately identified, also being known as Man Chengran, and made him suburb administrator at the capital. This twist of fate is said to have driven him into the service of Gongzi Qiji, who had been appointed administrator of Cai 蔡公 in 531.¹²³

When Chengran and his Dou lineage joined other disgruntled lineages and individuals to create civil disorder in the capital in 529 and act as principal internal supporters for the overthrow of King Ling, Gongzi Qiji was able to mount a successful *coup d'etat* from his base in Cai. After seizing the throne as King Ping, he named

¹²¹ ZZS 43:22b-23a (752-53, Zhao 6).

¹²² ZZS 41:29a-b (710, Zhao 1), reference to Zixi.

¹²³ ZZS 46:3b (805, Zhao 13); 45:22a-b (788, Zhao 11).

Chengran as his chief minister.¹²⁴ However, once in office, Chengran soon ran afoul of his patron, one charge being that "having drawn close to Mr. Yang, his demands were insatiable" 與養氏比，而求無厭, the implication being that he was using the spoils of office to solidify an unholy alliance. Thus, he aroused the concern of King Ping who, consequently, brought these proceedings to an abrupt end in 528 by executing Chengran and extinguishing "the lineage of Mr. Yang" 養氏之族.

Nevertheless, King Ping allowed the lineage of Chengran to continue in view of his long and faithful service by sending Dou Xin, son of Chengran, to take up residence in Yun where is served as *xian* administrator.¹²⁵ Two decades later he still remained there, and one of his brothers had become known as Yun Huai 鄖懷.¹²⁶ The road back from near extinction in 605 to the apex of the central government in 529/528 had been a long and arduous one of the Dou lineage, involving all of the human and physical resources at its disposal. Ironically that success led to its ultimate eclipse as a force in Chu politics.

In one way or another the economic base that supported the formation and development of lineages in Chu during the Spring and Autumn era was derived from service in the government or on the royal staff. Whereas graft and corruption and dependency relationships with persons in official service or potentially in power were among the means utilized to accrue wealth, employment in the government or on the royal staff and meritorious service provided the more common and legitimate modes of

¹²⁴ ZZS 46:7b-8a (807, Zhao 13).

¹²⁵ ZZS 47:4b (820, Zhao 14).

¹²⁶ GY 18:7a-b (413-14, "Chuyu" *xia*).

access to the crown's coffers. Emoluments and rewards were comprised of goods and the right to income from revenue producing territory that was customarily reclaimed by the crown after two generations. Consequently, lineages were only able to accumulate movable property as opposed to real estate.¹²⁷ This situation left them virtually dependent upon royal appointments for continued access to crown resources as the chief means of building up their economic base to support lineage members and attract additional supporters, particularly prior to the sixth century.

From early in the sixth century attitudes toward land grants began to change as grantees conceived of ways to secure the permanent retention of territorial rights by their descendants in spite of the two generation restriction on land use privileges. By the end of the second half of the century breakdown of the land use restriction had accelerated with the kings breaching it by prematurely reclaiming territorial rights in some instances and by making lineage maintenance grants that were implicitly permanent in other cases. The reactions of Wei Ju and Dou Chengran to the confiscation of their "private" territories by King Ling in ca. 529 may have been as much as expression of their claim to real ownership of the lost property as a complaint against the violation of their right to enjoy revenue from it for at least two generations. Before the mid-fifth century and the end of the Spring and Autumn era some territorial rewards for meritorious service were granted on an apparently permanent basis and included more comprehensive private control than in previous times. Thus, during the

¹²⁷ Another example, when King Ling killed Grand Marshal Wei Yan in 543, he confiscated his moveable wealth *not* land of which he apparently had none (ZZZS 40:16a [683, Xiang 30]).

course of the last 150 years of the Spring and Autumn era, particularly after the mid-sixth century, the possibility of establishing bases independent of the crown for the private accumulation of wealth gradually became a reality for the lineages and sublineages of Chu. This development created the economic bases for social and political changes that were taking place in the state.

Conclusion

The lineages of Chu may be divided between those of royal and those of non-royal origins, with members of the former dominating central government offices and of the latter monopolizing royal staff positions. The majority of the lineages that appear in extant historical sources for the Spring and Autumn era either originated or existed in Chu before 551. The mid-sixth century may be taken as a benchmark in the socio-political history of Chu because of the subsequent appearance of control over territory as a factor in lineage development and signs of rising lineage consciousness in political affairs. Previously service in the central government and on the royal staff provided access to emoluments and state resources that could be turned to strengthening a lineage or one of its segments, but appointments were generally controlled by the king and emoluments were temporary. Under normal circumstances, blood ties to the royal house determined eligibility to serve in the central government; however, with the exception of the Qu, royal lineages did not have the hereditary right to serve in particular positions or to serve at all. Among the royal kinsmen individuals were selected to serve according to the requirements and whims of the king. The kings of

Chu were, thus, able to effectively control the social, economic and political fortunes of individuals, families, and lineages among their royal kinsmen. Perhaps due to the specialized nature of services required, non-royal lineages whose members served on the royal staff were able to establish more easily their hereditary right to particular offices. Nevertheless, individuals and lineages represented on his personal staff were totally dependent on the favor of the king for their status, position, and income. Consequently, with the notable exception of the higher order Ruo'ao lineage and its Dou and Cheng segments that sought without success to gain control over its own destiny in 605, during the first two-thirds of the Spring and Autumn era the lineages of Chu did not become major political entities.

From the sixth century, particularly its latter half, the historical records reveals significant economic and related social changes that became important factors in the revival and expansion of corporate activity by lineages in the politics and government of Chu State. Among the most important developments were the changing attitude of the king and the grantees toward land grants and the gradual breakdown of the crown's practice of reclaiming land use rights two generations after grants were made to officials as emoluments or rewards. This created the possibility of establishing permanent and private control over territory that could provide the individual and his kinsmen with a source of wealth that was effectively independent of the royal treasury. Whereas previously one had to rely on emoluments, rewards, and graft while in office to obtain sufficient material resources to attract supporters and followers, now privately

accumulated wealth and the prestige that went with it could be used even more effectively toward the same end.

This development fostered increased awareness among kinship groups of the fruits of influence and power. At the sublineage level the assumption can be made that heightened corporate consciousness may have facilitated the process of lineage segmentation whereby the Nang and Yang lineages were formed during the sixth century and other royal sublineages can be seen moving toward lineage status in the first half of the fifth century. At the lineage level it motivated formation of inter-lineage alliances to pursue individual and collective lineage rights in the sphere of state government and politics.

Chapter 5 Government Structure

Attention will now shift to the political stage on which the kings and ruling elite of Chu performed. In order to lay the institutional foundation for an examination of how government operated in Chapter 6, I provide an overview of the structure of government in Chu during the Spring and Autumn era. Based primarily on contextual evidence, the various offices that appear in the *Zuozhuan* and in the *Guoyu* are classified as belonging to the central government, local government and royal household staff. The term "government" is used here to encompass both the outer, or political, offices of the court and the inner, or royal household, offices of the palace because, as shall be shown in the next chapter, the kings of Chu governed through both institutions.

The discussion proceeds as follows: The central government offices are subdivided into high, middle, and lower level offices. Particular attention is paid to evidence for the development of and changes in the hierarchical relationship between the highest officials, namely the chief minister, the grand marshal, and the *mo'ao*. The emergence of three divisions headed by these offices is delineated and the hierarchical relationships between their respective subordinates are examined. Local government offices are discussed and the possibility of structural implications for the central

government is considered. The offices of the royal household staff are identified and classified by probable functions, and the arguments for the inclusion of selected offices in this category are presented.

In the table of Chu offices at the end of his study about the office of chief minister, Song Gongwen breaks the offices of Chu into four groups: (1) "*qing* rank officers", (2) officers close to the king and the heir apparent," and (3) "central [government] *daifu* rank officers," and (4) "*xian* and other local government officers."¹ The *qing/daifu* system of ranking officials was widely followed in the Spring and Autumn era and provides a useful way of comparing offices between states, but I have chosen to not follow it here because, with one exception, the ranks of Chu offices are not revealed in the sources utilized in this study.² Instead my classification is based on the relative positions of offices in the official hierarchy of Chu.³

¹ Song Gongwen 1988:319-72.

² An officer of Jin is quoted in 575 as alluding to Chief Minister Zizhong and Marshal Zifan as "the two high rank officials" (*erqing* 二卿) (ZZZS 28:7a-b [475, Cheng 16]). So it is clear that the rank of Chu offices could be established with reference to the *qing/daifu* system of ranks employed in other states, but this there are no references to these ranks from the point of view of Chu. For more on this topic, see Thatcher 1985:30-32.

³ There are several other significant differences in Song's study and mine that should be noted. I do not include offices or officeholders that are found only in isolated references in sources from the late Warring States and Qin-Han era. My list of royal household staff offices is longer than his because we differ as to which offices belong to central and local government and to the royal household staff. Unfortunately, Song's does not present the logic for his overall classification scheme. His data are presented for specific offices in tabular form with brief comments. Our differences are taken up at relevant points in the present chapter and in Appendix 5 where there is sufficient evidence to enable meaningful discussion.

Table 7. Central and Local Government Offices

Central Government Offices

Upper and Middle Level

- Chief minister (*lingyin* 令尹)
- Left deputy chief minister (*zuoyin* 左尹)
- Right deputy chief minister (*youyin* 右尹)
- Grand marshal (*dasima* 大司馬 or *sima* 司馬)
- Left marshal (*zuosima* 左司馬)
- Right marshal (*yousima* 右司馬)
- Mo'ao* 莫敖
- Remonstrance master (*zhenyin* 箴尹)
- Archery master (*lianyin* 連尹)
- Palace stable master (*gongjiuyin* 宮廄尹)

Low Level

- Director of masses (*situ* 司徒)
- Director of punishment (*sibai* 司敗)
- Fortifications engineer (*fengren* 封人)
- Functionary (*yousi* 有司)
- Qingyin* 清尹

Local Government Offices

- County administrator (*xianyin* 縣尹 or *xiangong* 縣公)
 - Sheriff (*sima* 司馬)
 - Neighborhood headman (*yin* 尹)
-

Sources: *Zuozhuan* and *Guoyu*.

Central Government Offices

As shown in Table 7 above, the government offices of Chu that appear in the *Zuozhuan* and in the *Guoyu* can be classified as upper, middle, and lower level central government offices and local government offices.⁴ In chronological order of first

⁴The most extensive treatment of Chu officialdom is by Qing scholar Gu Donggao. Comparison of his Chart 10 "Officialdoms of the Various States" (*Lieguo guanzhi* 列國官制) (CQDSB 10, *passim.*), which lists more than 60 offices. The present study divides Chu officials between royal household staff and central government. Comparison of Tables 1 and 2 below will reveal the absence of certain offices that Gu has identified. The explanations of these omissions, working through Gu's Chart 10 from the beginning, are as follows: (1) *Lingren* 冷人 (CQDSB 10:16a [1245]) is the hereditary occupation of Zhong Yi whose actual office was *Yungong* 鄭公, or administrator of Yun County (ZZZS 16:16a [443, Cheng 7], 25b [448, Cheng 9]). (2) *Kai bu* 開卜 (CQDSB 10:15a [1245]) is used as a verb + object combination in the examples cited by Gu rather than as a compound noun for the name of an office. Thus, the ancestor of Guan Cong "assisted in making divination" 佐開卜 (ZZZS 46:8a-b [808, Zhao 13]), and Guan Zhan was "the great officer in charge of making divination" 開卜大夫 (ZZZS 60:13a [1047, Ai 18--see Du commentary]). Their office was divination master (*buyin* 卜尹), the same as the appointment received by Guan Cong. In this section of Chart 10, Gu shows the following offices in other states: *buzheng* 卜正, *bushi* 卜士, and *buren* 卜人. All of these titles are close to *buyin* in construction. Under the state of Zheng, Gu also shows *kai bu* as an office, however, this is again based on the Ai 18 gloss by Du just cited. (3) *Yu rong* 御戎 (CQDSB 10:19b-20b [1247]) is as verb + object in the sense of "drove the *rong*-chariot" (i.e., the king's war chariot) in the example cited by Gu (ZZZS 25:22b [429, Cheng 2]). (4) *Wangma zhi shu* 王馬之屬 (CQDSB 10:24b [1249]) appears in juxtaposition to the "gentlemen of the capital" 都君子 in the sense of "those who attend the royal steeds" in Gu's example (ZZZS 32:15b [907, Zhao 27--text and Du commentary]). (5) In Ai 16, *yin men* 尹門 (CQDSB 10:26b [1250]) is verb + object in the full sense of "control the door" to describe the function that was performed by the lieutenant of rebel Wangzi Sheng, administrator of Bai in controlling access to the place they had hidden young King Hui (ZZZS 60:6a [1043, Ai 16]). (6) *Hou ren* 候人 (CQDSB 10:31a [1253]) does not refer to the office of the Chu emissary who was sent to Jin in Xuan 12, for his office was junior intendant (*shaozai* 少宰) (ZZZS 23:12b [394, Xuan 12]). *Hou ren* occurs in the counsel offered by Sui Ji 隨季 of Jin, who said " *Qi gan ru hou ren*" 豈敢辱候人, where it is used in opposition, and as a parallelism, to the Chu emissary's prior rhetorical question, "How could [we/Chu] dare seek to offend Jin?" *Qi gan qiu zui yu Jin* 豈敢求罪于晉 and has the sense of "How could [we/Jin] dare to insult [Chu]." Therefore, *hou ren* (literally, "the waiting man/men") is best understood as alluding to the Chu force which was facing that of Jin on this occasion, both parties claiming legitimate interests in setting the affairs of Zheng State in order and intending no offense to the other in fielding a full complement of armies to get the job done. All of this was part of the posturing that was done on the eve of the colossal battle between Chu and Jin at Bi in 597 (ZZZS 23:3a-20a [389-397, Xuan 12]). And finally, (7) there is no reason for inferring that the shaman (*wu* 巫) who predicted an untimely end for King Cheng, Chief Minister Ziyu, and Marshal Zixi was a government official (CQDSB 10:34b [1254]). Du Yu suggests that he was merely a local

occurrence (dates in parentheses) in the *Zuozhuan*, upper and middle level offices are as follows: *mo'ao* (701),⁵ chief minister (690),⁶ grand marshal (634),⁷ left deputy chief minister (598),⁸ right deputy chief minister (575),⁹ right marshal (571),¹⁰ and left marshal, remonstrance master, archery master, palace stable master (558).¹¹ The discussion in this section prepares the way for discussing the structure of the central government by focusing on the high offices of *mo'ao*, chief minister, and grand marshal and the evolution of their structural relationships to each other.

Mo'ao

Mo'ao, the first mentioned office, is the most unusual office in Chu government in a number of ways. "*Mo'ao*" is linguistically unique as an official title, for it stands out as the only Chu language term used as a title.¹² He Guangyue argues that *mo'ao* is a survival of the ancient language of the Hua Xia people from the Central Plains. Its linguistic origins are found in the language of the Western Qiang people, of whom Zhuan Xu, the first ancestor of Ji Lian, the founder of the Mi clan of the Chu, was one.

shaman from Fan (ZZZS 19a:23b [322, Wen 10]).

⁵ ZZZS 7:9b-10b (122, Huan 11).

⁶ ZZZS 8:9a-b (140, Zhuang 4). Susan Weld understands *zuoyin* as "minister of justice" based on the record of legal cases recorded on bamboo slips dating from the Warring States era that were found in the recently excavated grave of *Zuoyin* Shao Tuo 邵佗 (1999:77-78). Her translation reflects the role played by Shao Tuo in the administration of local legal cases. However, I do not use it here, because it masks the position of the *zuoyin* as the subordinate of the chief minister in the Spring and Autumn era. Like other officers of the time, the *zuoyin* performed whatever duties were assigned to him.

⁷ ZZZS 16:8a-b (265, Xi 26).

⁸ ZZZS 22:15b (383, Xuan 11).

⁹ ZZZS 28:3b (473, Cheng 16).

¹⁰ ZZZS 29:8b (499, Xiang 2).

¹¹ ZZZS 32:24a-25a (565-66, Xiang 15).

¹² Rao Zongyi 1969:283.

Following the interpretation of Tang Jiahong, who says that "*ao*" was a "generic term for 'head of family' (*jiazhang* 家長)," He maintains that *ao* was the term for the "chief" (*qizhang* 酋長) of a clan or tribe. The title of "*da'ao*" ("great chief" 大敖) was held by Zhuan Xu and passed down among his descendants in the Central Plains. *Ao* was used in Chu as a term of respect in the names of kings and individuals with overtones of its original meaning. As to *mo'ao*, arguing from the use of homophones of "*mo*" in terms for "elder" in the dialects of various historical minority groups, as well as the modern Chaozhou dialect, He maintains that it means "*da'ao*."

Cai Jingquan gives a derivative of this argument which I summarize as follows: *Ao* was originally synonymous with *wang* ("king"). It did not appear in the name of a ruler until Ruo'ao (r. 790-764); thereafter it was used in the names of rulers Xiao'ao and Fen Mao. Mo 莫 was the posthumous name (*shi* 諡) of Fen Mao; so he was actually called Mo'ao, and his descendants were known as the Mo'aos 莫敖氏. After Xiong Tong appropriated the title *wang*, becoming King Wu (r. 740-690), the meaning of *ao* was downgraded, and it became a term for lineage head (*zongzu shouling* 宗族首領). Thus, "*Mo'ao* Qu Xia" means "Mo Lineage Head Qu Xia." So the heads of the Dou and Wei lineages should also be labeled as Dou *ao* and Wei *ao*, respectively. *Mo'ao* did not become the name of an office until after King Wu created the office of chief minister. The head of the Mo'aos should have been the first chief minister but the lineage had been discredited by Qu Xia's performance in the battlefield (see below). Consequently, King Wu appointed Dou Qi, whose progenitors had demonstrated

military prowess, chief minister and created the office of *mo'ao* which was filled only by a Qu, the senior lineage of the Mo'aos, until well into the Warring States era.¹³

This argument is not acceptable for lack of evidence. There is no historical evidence that *mo* was the posthumous name of Fenmao or that *mo'ao* was the lineage name of his descendants. Likewise there is no evidence for lineage name + *ao* in the sense of "X lineage head." "Wei Ao" is the only construction of this type, but "Ao" is a personal name in this case.¹⁴ The remainder of Cai's argument is merely speculation.

Liu Jie argues that *ao* was a tribal name or term (*buzu de ming* 部族的名); therefore, *mo'ao* could not have been the name of a government office, as stated in the commentary by Du Yu on the first *Zuozhuan* reference to it.¹⁵ This view can be soundly rejected. The existence of a *mo'ao* office in the central government of Chu is clearly attested in the context and language of every recorded *mo'ao* appointment. Among nine new appointees in a major facelift of central officialdom in 558 was Qu Dao, who "acted as (or became) *mo'ao*" 爲莫敖. Chief minister and grand marshal offices were also filled at this time.¹⁶ Another shake-up seven years later resulted in the appointment of three new individuals to serve as chief minister, grand marshal, and *mo'ao*.¹⁷ When the new chief minister died in 548, *Mo'ao* Qu Jian 屈建 became chief minister, and Qu Dang 屈蕩 (fl. 558-548) acted as *mo'ao*.¹⁸ Finally, when the king of

¹³ Cai Jingquan 1991.

¹⁴ See Appendix 4 discussion of the Wei pedigree.

¹⁵ Liu Jie 1948:224. The convoluted argument offered by Liu for *ao* as tribal name in *ibid.*, 181-84 is not convincing. Nevertheless, he is followed by Wen Chongyi 1967:73.

¹⁶ ZZS 32:24a-b (565, Xiang 15).

¹⁷ ZZS 35:5b (600, Xiang 22).

¹⁸ ZZS 36:11a (622, Xiang 25).

Chu executed Qu Shen 屈伸 for treason in 537, he "made Qu Sheng act as *mo'ao*" 以屈生爲莫敖 and sent him on assignment with the chief minister.¹⁹ In each case *mo'ao* is used specifically as the title of a central government office in which someone was appointed to act. A *junzi yue* 君子曰 gloss on the 558 appointments takes them as evidence of the ability of Chu to put the right man in the right office (*neng guan ren* 能官人, literally "able to office the man/men").²⁰ *Mo'ao* was clearly an office of the central government.

The office of *mo'ao* has been equated with a variety of offices including: *sikong* (司空, "director of public works"), *sima* ("marshal"), *zuotu* 左徒, *wuguan* (巫官, "shaman"), and *zongbo* 宗伯 or *zongzheng* 宗正 (respectively, Zhou and Han terms for the chief of the "imperial clan office"). The cases for these views will be considered briefly here.

Ming scholar Dong Yue says Chu "changed the office of *sikong* to be *mo'ao*"²¹ 改司空爲莫敖. He does not give the reasons for his conclusion. Perhaps he was influenced by Gao You's comment on *mo'ao* 莫囂 in the *Huainanzi*. Gao says, "*Mo* means 'big'. *Ao* means 'the masses'. [It] was the office that managed the great masses, an official of Chu."²² 謨，大也。囂，衆也。主大衆之官，楚卿大夫。In any case, there is no corroborating evidence for this view; so it has been correctly rejected as being "baseless."²³

¹⁹ ZZS 43:6b (744, Zhao 5).

²⁰ ZZS 32:24a-b (565, Xiang 15).

²¹ Miao Wenyuan 1987:1.74. Ding Yongyuan appears to accept this view (1987:120).

²² HN 19:340.

²³ Xiao Bing 1980:112; He Guangyue 1988:324.

The argument for *sima* hinges on the accuracy of the identification by Qing scholar Shen Qinhan of *Mo'ao* Daxin 莫敖大心, who is mentioned in the first Chu section of the *Zhanguo* as giving his life in the Battle of Boju in 506, with Left Marshal *Shenyin* Xu.²⁴ I agree with Song Gongwen's conclusion that the identification is not correct for two reasons: (1) There is no documentary evidence that Daxin was another name of *Shenyin* Xu. And (2) in the *Zuozhuan*'s account of the run up to the Battle of Boju, Xu was on his way to the Fangcheng region to gather troops when Chief Minister Zichang precipitously engaged the invasion force from Wu; so he could not have been the *mo'ao* who died during that battle.²⁵

From the history of grand marshal and *mo'ao* appointments, it's clear that *mo'ao* and *sima* were two distinct offices. Wei Zifeng was appointed as grand marshal and Qu Dao as *mo'ao* in 558.²⁶ Gongzi Yi 公子懿 was made grand marshal and Qu Jian *mo'ao* in 551.²⁷ Finally, Wei Yan was appointed grand marshal and Qu Dang was made *mo'ao* in 548.²⁸ There is no reason to confuse the two offices of *mo'ao* and grand marshal.

Jiang Liangfu opines that the strange old term *mo'ao* was discarded for "*zuotu*" during the Warring States era as one of the moves that was calculated to bring Chu closer to the states of the Central Plains.²⁹ The biography of Qu Yuan in the *Shiji* states

²⁴ Shen Qinhan 1884:1.12b (6663). Wen Chongyi 1967:59-63 also supports this view.

²⁵ Song Gongwen 1988:268-71. Xu actually perished as the result of wounds suffered in a later encounter with Wu troops at Yongshi on his way back to the capital of Chu which had been invaded by the victors at Boju; see ZZZS 54:25a (952, Ding 4).

²⁶ ZZZS 32:24a-25a (565-66, Xiang 15).

²⁷ ZZZS 35:5b-6a (600, Xiang 22).

²⁸ ZZZS 36:11a (622, Xiang 25).

²⁹ Jiang Liangfu 1979:24. Liu Xianmei 1982:60 also equates *zuotu* with *sanludaifu* and *mo'ao*.

that Qu Yuan "acted as the *zuotu* of King Huai of Chu" 爲楚懷王左徒,³⁰ while the preface to the *Chuci* says he "was employed with King Huai as *sanlü daifu*. The duty of the *sanlü* was to manage the royal lineage's three surnames, namely Zhao, Qu, and Jing."³¹ 仕於懷王，爲三閭大夫。三閭之職，掌王族三姓，曰昭屈景。 Commenting on the office of *zuotu*, Jiang reasons and argues as follows: "According to my investigation then *mo'ao* is the *zuotu* spoken of by Qu [Yuan], it also is the extension of the office of *sanlü daifu* that was held by Qu [Yuan], [thus] *mo'ao*, resembling the *zongzheng* of Han and later [times], was a specialized duty in charge of the royal lineage, . . ."³² "In the Spring and Autumn and Warring States [eras], all *mo'ao* were relatives [of the kings] (*zongqin* 宗親) and were always promoted to [the office of] chief minister; [since this] tallies perfectly with the promotion of the Prince of Chunshen 春申君 from *zuotu* to chief minister, then *mo'ao* should be [the office of] *zuotu*."³³ "Qu Yuan served as *zuotu*, [which] is a refinement of the traditional title *mo'ao*; *mo'ao* probably was the head of the lineage office and concurrently the one who was knowledgeable about astronomy."³⁴

³⁰ SJHZKZ 84:2 (1009).

³¹ CCBZ 1:1a (10). "Lü" 閭 is a residential term that means, depending on context, "neighborhood" (*li* 里), "door" or "gate" (*men* 門), "neighborhood gate" (*limen* 里門), and a place where clusters of people dwelled, etc. (see JJZG 1:159).

³² Jiang Liangfu 1979:24.

³³ Quoted in He Guangyue 1988:323. Jiang's claim that *mo'ao* were always promoted to chief minister is historically incorrect, for of the eight *mo'ao* who are known to have served during the Spring and Autumn era, Qu Jian is the only one who was made chief minister. For the promotion of the Prince of Chunshen from *zuotu* to chief minister, see SJHZKZ 40:78-79 (663).

³⁴ Quoted in Xiao Bing 1980:112.

Jiang's argument can be rejected for at least two reasons: (1) It assumes that since Qu Yuan was a member of the royal Qu lineage, he could have only served as *mo'ao*, the hereditary office of the Qus. This is patently not the case, for members of the lineage served in a number of different offices during the Spring and Autumn era including chief minister, tutor, and local administrator. And (2) whereas the office of *mo'ao* was held only by members of the Qu lineage, the Prince of Chunshen, who was named Huang Xie 黃歇, was not a Qu; so *zuotu* could not have been a different name for the office of *mo'ao*.

Xiao Bing rejects the foregoing views and argues that *mo'ao* was the office of shaman. His basic assumption is that the population of Chu was overwhelmingly indigenous people of the south. Thus, it is probable that their sun and fire gods were conflated with the gods of nature and ancestral deities of the eastern region and the Central Plains, namely Zhuan Xu, Wu Hui, Lu Zhong, and Zhong Li. He argues that as Chu expanded southward, it deposited its customs and traditions in the southwestern border regions; so the origins of the meanings of *mo'ao*, *lingbao* (靈保, "shaman"), and *lingxiu* (靈修, "priest king") can be extrapolated from terms of reference for "shaman" among the tribal groups of that region. There he posits linguistic bridges that "cause one to suspect that *mo'ao* and *lingbao* are terms of address for the shamans of ancient southern tribes." Xiao also suggests that *ao* and other linguistically and semantically related terms for chief and priest (or chief-priest) and elders (*mao* 髦) may have been derived from this source. Finally, he argues that *ao* is interchangeable

with 囂 (*ao*) which is synonymous with other words that have the meaning of calling with a loud voice. Noting that shouting was a trait of the shaman's invocation, he concludes that the linguist roots of 敖, 髦, and 囂 are connected to the shaman's call.³⁵ This argument can be rejected because, as demonstrated in Chapter 2 above, the ruling house and elite of Chu were not indigenous to the south. *Mo'ao* was a term from their lexicon, not that of their local subjects.

He Guangyue maintains that *mo'ao* was the same office as the *da zongbo* 大宗伯. He follows Zuo Yandong who has argued that since Qu Yuan succeeded [*sic*] to the office of *sanlü daifu*, the latter name must be the common term for *mo'ao*. Furthermore, because the *sanlü daifu* managed the affairs of the royal Zhao, Qu, and Jing lineages, the office of *mo'ao* is comparable to the *zongbo* of the Zhou people.³⁶ He Guangyue cites a *mo'ao* 莫囂 seal and the appearance of *da mo'ao* 大莫囂 on bamboo strips found in the grave of Marquis Yi of Zeng, who was buried at some time between 433 and 400B.C., as proof that *mo'ao* was the *da zongbo* of Chu.³⁷ Note must be made that the office of *zongbo* in Zhou was the antecedent of the Han and later office of *zongzheng* to which Jiang Liangfu likened the office of *mo'ao*.³⁸

This argument turns on a systemic relationship between the offices of *mo'ao* and *sanlü daifu* for which there is no direct evidence. Qu Yuan's having served in the latter office does not necessarily mean that it was the office that is known as *mo'ao* in other

³⁵ Xiao Bing 1980:113-15.

³⁶ Liu Xianmei 1982:59-60 gives the same argument.

³⁷ He Guangyue 1988:324. For the identity of the principal and dating of his burial, see Hubeisheng Bowuguan 1989:459-64.

³⁸ Huang Benji 1845:1.3.

contexts. There is no hint of lineage management duties in the historical record of the activities of *mo'ao* who served during the Spring and Autumn era. Likewise, *da mo'ao*, which was probably an office of Zeng, does not appear in a lineage context in the bamboo slips cited by He.³⁹ Consequently, there is no solid evidence that supports this interpretation.

A clue to the origin and the nature of the *mo'ao* office may be found in the list of subordinates arrayed under it in the appointments of 558. *Mo'ao* subordinates named are: remonstrance master (*zhenyin*), who is said to have been the officer in charge of admonishing the king;⁴⁰ archery master (*lianyin*), who is believed to have been in charge of archery units;⁴¹ and palace stable master (*gongjiuyin*). The interpretations of these titles have been based chiefly on the meaning of their component words rather than the roles that they actually performed. Nevertheless, there could be a connection between the title of the office and its later function. For example, the character "zhen" in *zhenyin* has the meaning of "basting needle;"⁴² therefore, the original function of this office may have been "needlework master." A transition from a role having to do with

³⁹The spring during which the *da mo'ao* traveled to a certain place is merely used to date an entry in the bamboo slips (Hubeisheng Bowugan 1989:490-501).

⁴⁰ZZHJ 10:30 (see gloss on *zhenyin*).

⁴¹ZZZS 32:24a-b (565, Xiang 15--Kong commentary which follows Han commentator Fu Qian). Qing scholar Hong Liangji accepts this interpretation in one instance (CQZZG 2:537) and suggests an alternative reading of Administrator of Lian (*ibid.*, 2:442). Luo Ruihe 1984 rejects both of these views and argues that *lian* 連 is an early form of *nian* 輦 ("sedan chair" or "carriage") was the name of the office in charge of chariots. He might be right.

⁴²SWJZGL 4:1972a-b.

needles to needling someone as remonstrance master is not an unimaginable path in the evolution of this office.⁴³

Actual roles, however, fail to show the specialization hinted by titles and are, in fact, not dissimilar to one another, a reflection of the basic lack of role specialization that was also commonplace in the upper-level central government offices of other Spring and Autumn Era states. The titles of these three offices were probably originally descriptive of specific household, or palace, functions but role specificity was altered with the assignment of an increasing variety of non-household roles and the gradual transfer of these positions to the state government.⁴⁴ Their subordination to the *mo'ao* suggests that the latter may have been a high ranking position on the royal household staff of the king.⁴⁵ In the transition from household to state offices, traditional relationships persisted, but role specificity was lost.

The vehicle for entry of the office of *mo'ao* into the highest echelon of Chu officialdom was Qu Xia, a secondary son of King Wu.⁴⁶ He comes across in the

⁴³ Ruan Yuan 403-05 records suggestions that the remonstrative connotation of *zhen* is derived from the acupuncture function of needles in curing illness.

⁴⁴ See Liu Shiwei 1918 for a discussion of the household origin of government offices.

⁴⁵ Cai Jingquan's argument that the duties of the *mo'ao* were "to manage the affairs of the royal lineage [and] to educate the boys of the royal lineage" is completely without basis in fact (1991:74). He compares it to the office of *gongzu daifu* 公族大夫 in other states which was of such importance that ministerial rank officials competed for it; actually the latter was a lower level office that was of no interest to officials of high rank, at least in Jin. Admitting that there is "no clear record of the *mo'ao*'s duties" in historical sources, among other indirect evidence, he argues that Shen Administrator Shushi 申公叔時, who dictated the curriculum for the heir apparent to a newly appointed tutor, must have been a Qu because by this time the office of Shen administrator was being passed down in the Qu lineage. The historical record shows only one Qu in this office, namely Qu Wuchen; this was not a hereditary office (see Song Gongwen 1988:361-64).

⁴⁶ CQSZP 46b.

historical record as a man who showed great promise and enjoyed the confidence, and possibly favoritism, of his father, the reigning king, during his tenure as *mo'ao*, but who was also prone to excessive pride and headstrong arrogance.

On what was perhaps his first important state assignment in the position of *mo'ao*, Qu Xia showed some signs of a lack of self-confidence when confronted with a crisis. At the head of full-fledged army enroute to a covenant-making session in 701, he became concerned about the sudden appearance of armies from hostile states bent on attacking his force. In quick succession, Dou Lian offered Qu Xia battle strategy, persuaded him not to seek additional troops from the king, and dissuaded him from divining about a fight, the outcome of which was in no doubt whatsoever. Subsequently, the battle was victoriously joined at Pusao 蒲騷, and he went on to complete his original mission.⁴⁷

The following year *Mo'ao* Qu Xia himself suggested military strategy which proved to be successful in the battlefield.⁴⁸

He had become over-confident of his military prowess by 699. Upon observing his pompous behavior as he led troops out of the capital to attack the state of Lo 羅, Dou Bobi advised the king to send additional men to rescue him from certain defeat, but his counsel was rejected. Thereupon, Deng Man 鄧曼, the principal wife of King Wu took the case of Dou Bobi up with her husband, arguing, among other things, that he meant that physical punishment was needed in order to strike fear in the heart of the

⁴⁷ ZZS 7:9b-10a (122, Huan 11).

⁴⁸ ZZS 7:13a-b (124, Huan 12).

mo'ao. In her view, the victory at Pusao had made Qu Xia so over-confident that he would rely only on himself and not take the adversary seriously. Furthermore, she declared that he would fail to make adequate preparations if King Wu did not take steps to settle him down. A man was sent, but too late to reach him. Already underway, Mo'ao Qu Xia circulated word among his men that punishment was in store for anyone who dared to offer remonstrance. Subsequently, with troops in disarray and without preparations equal to the task, Qu Xia led the army of Chu to an ignominious defeat; whereupon he committed suicide.⁴⁹

The office of *mo'ao* continued after the death of Qu Xia and was filled only by his descendants, members of the Qu lineage.⁵⁰ The fact that this was the only major Chu office to be monopolized by a single lineage pinpoints the time of its elevation to central government level to the rise of Qu Xia and also suggests that special conditions, which are noted at the end of the following section, led to this creation of this office.

Chief Minister

Because *mo'ao* is the first major Chu office mentioned in the historical record, it has been assumed to have existed prior to the creation of the office of chief minister.⁵¹ For example, Qing scholar Gu Donggao speculates that the office of chief minister did not yet exist at the time Qu Xia served as *mo'ao*.⁵² And modern Japanese scholar Yamazake Michiharu claims that the creation of the office of chief minister in ca. 690,

⁴⁹ ZZS 7:14b-15b (124-25, Huan 13).

⁵⁰ CQDSB 10:44a (1259).

⁵¹ Song Gongwen 1988 provides the most thorough treatment of this office. See also Wu and Shu 1980 for a succinct overview of its history and functions.

⁵² CQDSB 23:1a (1450, "Preface"). Li Yujie also shares this view (1988:46).

or after the demise of *Mo'ao* Qu Xia, was a major reform carried out by King Wu.⁵³ In my view, neither of these positions are correct, for there is reason to believe that the office of chief minister existed earlier at the central government level than did the office of *mo'ao*, and that the entry of *mo'ao* into the central government structure was, in fact, the institutional innovation which is attributable to King Wu as described above.

The first reference to chief minister (*lingyin* 令尹) in the *Zuozhuan* occurs in the year 690 when Chief Minister Dou Qi 鬥祁 and *Mo'ao* Qu Zhong 屈重 (fl. 690) are shown in command of a Chu force.⁵⁴ The year 690 can be taken as the latest possible date for the creation of the office of chief minister, but it cannot be safely assumed to have been the actual year for such a development.

The beginning of service to the kings of Chu by members of the Dou lineage, which provided five of thirteen chief ministers who are known to have served between 690 and 598,⁵⁵ is traced to Dou Bobi, who was the most influential advisor of King Wu from 706-699, rather than to Chief Minister Dou Qi.⁵⁶ This suggests that Bobi may actually have been the first Dou to occupy the post of chief minister. Although his office is not revealed in extant texts, the recorded actions of Bobi, who was an uncle of King Wu,⁵⁷ are consistent with those of chief ministers in later times (see Chapter 6). In 706, over the reservations of another advisor, he persuaded the king to accept a peace

⁵³ Yamazake Michiharu 1972:211-13.

⁵⁴ ZZS 8:4a-b (140, Zhuang 4).

⁵⁵ CQDSB 10:1a-6b (1451-53). Note that Gu has overlooked Peng Zhongshuang (ZZS 60:9b [1045, Ai 17]). Also refer to Chapter 6 below.

⁵⁶ GY 18:7a (413, "Chuyu" xia).

⁵⁷ CQSZP 46a.

emissary from Sui 隨, a state that Chu had under siege.⁵⁸ When conditions were right two years later, he first spurred Chu to attack Sui, then when it sued for peace, he talked King Wu into accepting the initiative in spite of the king's own inclination to annihilate Sui.⁵⁹ The record to this point gives credence to the observation of Gu Donggao that from the beginning of substantive references to Chu, "Dou Bobi controlled the state and managed planning."⁶⁰ 鬥伯比當國主謀議。

The futile attempt by Bobi to persuade King Wu to send troops to aid irrepressible *Mo'ao* Qu Xia in 699 followed the sudden rise of this favored and ambitious son of the king during the previous two years. Besides perhaps genuine concern for the outcome of the Lo campaign and personal jealousy, institutional rivalry was a factor in the action of Dou.

Kings of Chu customarily selected top officials (chief minister, grand marshal, *mo'ao*) from among the royal house, generally uncles or brothers of the king, and royal lineages (see Chapter 6). Whereas Dou Bobi was the uncle of King Wu and Qu Xia was a secondary son of the latter, Dou was senior to Qu in both age and generation. Therefore, the probability is high that Dou Bobi occupied the position of chief minister from the early years of the reign of King Wu, long before Qu Xia became politically active. Nevertheless, in three short years the influence of his person and his office were jeopardized by Qu Xia in the position of *mo'ao*.

⁵⁸ ZZS 6:16b-17a (109-110, Huan 6).

⁵⁹ ZZS 7:3b-4a (119, Huan 8).

⁶⁰ CQDSB 23:1a (1450, "Preface").

This development gives a clue to the probable circumstances under which the office of *mo'ao* rose to the central government level. In the Spring and Autumn Era the power struggle between rulers and holders of major offices sometimes resulted in institutional innovation as rulers attempted to circumvent the existing structure by placing new emphasis on previously minor functional roles, usually one in close proximity to the ruler,⁶¹ or by creating altogether new positions.⁶² In this case the *mo'ao* office rose to prominence on the eve of the final decade of the sixty year reign of King Wu, by which time he may have felt growing impotence in relation to his top officials, particularly Dou Bobi. In his secondary son, Qu Xia, King Wu had a convenient alternative both in the man, who was ambitious and assertive, and in the position, an existing household staff role which could be logically extended to function at the broader state level. Thus, the office of *mo'ao* assumed a place in the central government structure to counter the power of long-established high offices and their occupants.

Grand Marshal

When considering *sima* 司馬 data, care must be taken to distinguish the various uses of this title in order to avoid confusion about the structure of government. In Chu "*sima*" was used in the titles of positions in three analytically distinct entities: (1) central government, (2) regular military, and (3) local administration. Central government marshals (*sima*) were participants in both civil and military affairs, with

⁶¹ For a discussion of the office of minister (*xiang* 相) in Qi, see Thatcher 1977/78:149-151.

⁶² For a discussion of the reforms of Duke Wen of Jin, see Thatcher 1977/78:153-159.

emphasis on the latter where they were often assigned command positions (see Chapter 6). In the regular army, marshals (*sima*) were low-ranking officers responsible for maintaining discipline among the troops.⁶³ At the level of local administration, the *sima* functioned in the role of sheriff.⁶⁴ Gu Donggao makes a distinction only between local and other *sima* in Chu, failing to note the difference between marshals in central government and regular military roles.⁶⁵ Of principal concern here are marshal offices in the central government.

The first explicit reference to marshal in Chu is in 634 when Marshal Zixi 子西 and Chief Minister Ziyu 子玉 led Chu troops to victory over Kui 夔.⁶⁶ However, there is reason to believe that the office existed long before that time.

The activities of Dou Lian between 703 and 701 are consistent with those of later marshals. In 703 he was ordered by King Wu to lead a punitive force against Teng 鄧, a task which he accomplished with great skill in administering a sound defeat.⁶⁷ In his advisory role to Mo'ao Qu Xia in 701, Dou again exhibited his prowess in military strategy, and, more importantly for the issue at hand, he spoke authoritatively about the

⁶³ ZZS 19b:24b-25b (322-23, Wen 10), note the role of Wenzhi Wuwei and compare it to the role of the marshal of the center army (中軍司馬) in Jin in *ibid.*, 29:13a-15a (502-03, Xiang 3--Wei Jiang 蔦絳 was acting as marshal of the center army at this time). The low-ranking position of marshal in the Chu and Jin military order performed the same function of maintaining discipline among the troops.

⁶⁴ ZZS 49:3a (853, Zhao 20) for the marshal of Chengfu.

⁶⁵ CQDSB 10:5b-8a (1240-41) and 45b-46a (1260).

⁶⁶ ZZS 16:7b-8a (265, Xi 26). For the office of Zixi at this time, refer to *ibid.*, 16:8a-b (265, Xi 26).

⁶⁷ ZZS 7:5a-b (120, Huan 9).

role of divination in warfare, a matter which was traditionally the prerogative of the marshal.⁶⁸

In view of the dominant role of the members of Dou lineage in Chu officialdom (six of twelve chief ministers and three of four explicitly identified marshals) between 706 and 605, when it was dealt a near fatal blow by King Zhuang (r. 613-591),⁶⁹ the probability that Dou Lian was marshal is high. There is, however, no reason to assume that he was the first person to hold the office of marshal in the central government of Chu. Marshal, like chief minister, was an office of the central government prior to the advent of the *mo'ao*.

Structural Relationships: Chief Minister, Grand Marshal, *Mo'ao*

The structural relationships between the offices of chief minister, marshal, and *mo'ao* at the turn of the seventh century B.C. are not clear. Gu Donggao contends that the chief minister and *mo'ao* are mentioned on equal terms in 690; therefore, their relative hierarchical standing is ambiguous.⁷⁰

Yamazake Michiharu, whose evaluation of the status of the office of chief minister is influenced by Wen Chongyi,⁷¹ argues that from the time of its creation in ca. 690, the chief minister was the highest office.⁷²

⁶⁸ ZZS 7:9b-10b (122, Huan 11). For the right of the marshal to divine in matters related to warfare, refer to *ibid.*, 48:12a-b (839, Zhao 17).

⁶⁹ See Chapter 6 below. CQDSB 23:1a-5b (1451-53) does not include the names of Dou Bobi (mentioned above) and Dou Ban (Ziyang) (for the latter, see ZZS 21:21b [370, Xuan 4]).

⁷⁰ CQDSB 23:1a (1450, "Preface").

⁷¹ Wen Chongyi 1967:43-51.

⁷² Yamazake Michiharu 1972:212-213.

In view of the fact that when more than one office are mentioned in the same reference, the *Zuozhuan* usually lists them in order of descending rank,⁷³ the 690 reference to "Chief Minister Dou Qi and *Mo'ao* Qu Zhong" may lend some credence to the argument by Yamazake. However, *Mo'ao* Qu Zhong was the principal actor in this incident. Although King Wu died enroute to attack Sui, Dou Qi and Qu Zhong carried on as though nothing had happened, and when Sui had been subdued, Qu went in to covenant with it as if he had been commanded to do so by the king.⁷⁴ Thus, the conclusion may be drawn that Sui would have expected the *mo'ao* to play the role of covenant-maker under normal circumstances. In Spring and Autumn times covenant making was not the sole prerogative of the highest official in a state, but it was a role which he frequently filled (see Chapter 6). Therefore, the relative standing of chief minister and *mo'ao* in this anecdote must still be regarded as ambiguous.

The sudden and powerful rise of *Mo'ao* Qu Xia between 701 and 699 confused structural relationships within Chu officialdom. Occupants of the established offices of chief minister and marshal either found themselves acting in roles subordinate to, or saw their influence eclipsed by, the *mo'ao* as King Wu increasingly relied on the holder of this office. The ambiguous relationship between chief minister and *mo'ao* and the expected covenant making role of the latter in 690 may be taken as evidence that, even after the suicide of *Mo'ao* Qu Xia on the heels of a military debacle, King Wu

⁷³ This is especially evident in references to officers of Jin; for examples, see ZZS 19b:6b-7a (330-31, Wen 12), 23:3b-4a (389, Xuan 12), and 27:15b-16a (463, Cheng 13).

⁷⁴ ZZS 8:9a-b (140, Zhuang 4).

continued to place weighty responsibility on the office of *mo'ao* and, perhaps, showed preference to it above the others.

The favored status of the *mo'ao* was short-lived, however, for after 690 it assumed a place in the official hierarchy which was decidedly inferior to both the chief minister and the marshal. In the historical record for the remainder of the Spring and Autumn Era, the position of chief minister at the apex of officialdom can be readily confirmed. The record of promotions and appointments reveals that chief minister was the ultimate promotion, for although individuals were promoted from other offices to chief minister, there was no movement from chief minister to another official post. The dominant position of the chief minister is evident in the record of official activities, which shows that the chief minister was the most active Chu official in major areas of activity--diplomatic, military, and domestic. Chief minister was also the Chu official who was most frequently involved in decision making, where his role was second only to the king in importance. In 543 the central government office of marshal was referred to as "assistant of the chief minister" (*lingyin zhi pian* 令尹之偏).⁷⁵ The appointment and promotion record shows that marshals were promoted to chief minister more often than any other officials (three of eight cases where the previous office of the chief minister is known). The second-ranking position of the marshal in terms of the frequency of activity is also confirmed in the record of official activities.⁷⁶ After 690 the office of *mo'ao* is not shown in a role comparable to either chief minister

⁷⁵ ZZS 40:10a (683, Xiang 30).

⁷⁶ See Chapter 6 below for supporting details for the conclusions about government operations that have been stated here.

or marshal. It is usually merely mentioned in lists of appointments which, when all three offices are identified, confirm the ranking in descending order of chief minister, marshal, and *mo'ao*.

Tripartite Division of Upper and Middle Level Offices

In the appointments of 558 mentioned above, there is evidence of a tripartite division of Chu officials at the upper and middle levels as follows: (1) chief minister with right deputy chief minister as subordinate; (2) grand marshal with right marshal and left marshal as subordinates; and (3) *mo'ao* with remonstrance master, archery master, and palace stable master as subordinates.⁷⁷ This is the fullest description of high and middle level officialdom in Chu, but it is not complete. There was also a left deputy minister who was subordinate to the chief minister.⁷⁸

As to the ultimate hierarchical relationships suggested by the list of appointments in 558, Takezoe has arrived at the erroneous conclusion that the offices were listed in order of subordination throughout; that is, just as the right deputy chief minister was subordinate to the chief minister, so was the grand marshal subordinate to the right deputy chief minister.⁷⁹ By extension of this line of argument, the *mo'ao*

⁷⁷ ZZS 32:24a-25a (565-66, Xiang 15).

⁷⁸ For the first mention of this office, see the reference to Left Deputy Minister Zizhong in ZZS 22:15b (383, Xuan 11).

⁷⁹ Takezoe makes this argument to explain why Marshal Wei Zifeng is shown leading a contingent of shock troops out from the Right Army camp in 555. Although there is no textual evidence for doing so, he assumes that "Right Deputy Chief Minister Pirong (Gongzi Pirong 公子罷戎, fl. 564--558) led the Right Army, and [Wei] Zifeng acted as assistant" (ZZHJ 16:22). Whereas the right minister is mentioned nowhere in the *Zuozhuan* account of this incident, Chief Minister Zigeng and Marshal Wei Zifeng are among those shown leading in battle (ZZS 33:14a-15a [578-79, Xiang 18]); therefore, if, as also assumed by Takezoe without textual evidence (ZZHJ 16:21-22), Zigeng was commanding the Left Army (which is not identified in the *Zuozhuan* version), then there is better reason for assuming that Wei Zifeng, not

would then be subordinate to the left marshal because it appears after that office in the list of appointees.

Whereas the order of appearance in a list can often be taken as evidence of hierarchical standing, care must be taken to understand the appointments within their historical and structural contexts before doing so. For example, to conclude that promotion from grand intendant to chief minister occurred in 541, when appointments to both offices are listed simultaneously,⁸⁰ would be incorrect, for the grand intendant vacancy existed as the result of the murder of its previous occupant.⁸¹ Moreover, the role which the new grand intendant was to play in subsequent events warranted mention of its entry into that office. Although some grand intendants wielded considerable influence in the conduct of state government, it was not because the office had a place in the structure outlined here. There is no supporting evidence for the hierarchical relationship that might be inferred from the 541 notice.

The 558 appointments were made to appease the politically potent segment of the populace⁸² by what amounted to a wholesale purge of high office holders. The appointment list reveals a tripartite division of offices in the upper and middle echelons of the central government of Chu. Within the context of structural data before and after 558, there is no reason to accept the order of subordination suggested by Takezoe.

the right deputy chief minister, was leader of the Right Army. Takezoe has misinterpreted the significance of the 558 appointments on which he relies to support his view (ZZHJ 16:22).

⁸⁰ ZZS 41:30b (710, Zhao 1).

⁸¹ ZZS 41:29b (710, Zhao 1).

⁸² ZZS 32:24a-25a (565-66, Xiang 15--see *guoren* 國人).

Rather, definite hierarchical relationships existed between the division chiefs and within particular divisions only.

Changing Preferences for "Left" and "Right" Offices

Use of the terms "right" and "left" to differentiate subordinates of the chief minister and the marshal (hereafter referred to as "grand marshal" in contradistinction to its subordinates) has some interesting structural implications. The right subordinate is named before the left subordinate in the appointments of 558, an indication of the preference of right over left in the ranking of subordinates within officialdom at the time. However, this is a marked deviation from the strong traditional preference for left over right that was evident in earlier years.

When confronted by a Chu force in 704, a Sui military strategist made the following remarks: "Since the men of Chu esteem the left, the ruler will be sure to be left. . . . Since the right has not the finest in it, it will be sure to be defeated."⁸³ 楚人上左，君必左。右無良焉，必敗。 In this instance either a single Chu force was divided into left and right units in battle array or the left and right armies were both deployed. When the full complement of Chu armies took to the battlefield, there were three armies, the armies of the left, center, and right, and the center army was supreme.⁸⁴

⁸³ ZZS 7:3b-4a (119, Huan 8).

⁸⁴ ZZS 16:22b (272, Xi 28) at Chengpu in 622, 23:10b (392, Xuan 12) at Bi in 597, and 28:3a-b (473, Cheng 16) at Yanling in 575. On the latter occasion, a Chu informant advised the ruler of Jin that the finest troops of Chu, comprised of the royal garrison, were concentrated in the center army.

The organization of the royal garrison is revealed in details of the battle at Bi 郟 in 597 where Chu defeated Jin. The royal garrison was divided into two components known respectively as the right *guang* (*youguang* 右廣), which saw duty from dawn to noon, and the left *guang* (*zuoguang* 左廣), which took over from noon to dusk.⁸⁵ In the first reference to battle activity on this occasion, the king accompanied the left *guang* with good results.⁸⁶ Later when he wanted to switch to the right *guang*, an officer stopped him, saying, "Since you began with [the left], you also must end with it" 君以此始，亦必以終. At this point the compiler of the historical record interjects the observation that "From that [time forward] when Chu called up the *guang*, it gave preference to the left."⁸⁷ 自是楚之乘廣，先左。 Tang commentator Kong Yingda rightly separates the issues of preference and precedence in his gloss on this passage. Noting the traditional esteem for the left, as indicated in the 704 passage, and he might have added references when all three Chu armies went into battle, he contends that the statement only refers to reversing the order in which the two *guang* were called to duty.⁸⁸ That is to say that the left designation had always been an indicator of superior status.

Since "left" and "right" were also used to distinguish chief minister and grand marshal subordinates, the assumption may be made that the left bias evident in military organization was originally operative in officialdom when such terminology was

⁸⁵ ZZZS 23:12a-b (393, Xuan 12) and 16a (395, Xuan 12); also see Wen 1967:60-63.

⁸⁶ ZZZS 23:16b (395, Xuan 12).

⁸⁷ ZZZS 23:17a-18a (396, Xuan 12).

⁸⁸ ZZZS 23:18a (396, Xuan 12).

employed. Thus, initially left subordinates would have been ranked higher than right subordinates; however, by 558 this was no longer the case among the subordinates of the chief minister and grand marshal.

The shift in primacy from left to right among the chief minister and marshal subordinates was the consequence of a personal rivalry between Chief Minister Zizhong and Marshal Zifan 子反 (d. 575). Prior to becoming chief minister, Zizhong served as left deputy chief minister, a post which he held as early as 598 when he led an incursion into Song.⁸⁹ Zifan was probably appointed to the position of marshal in 605 following the murder of Marshal Wei Jia.⁹⁰ In the battle at Bi in 597, when all three armies saw action, Zizhong commanded the left army and Zifan led the right army.⁹¹

The position of Zizhong in charge of a higher ranking army was but a portent of his subsequent selection to fill the highest office of chief minister, a promotion which took place possibly as early as 595, when he was thwarted in his bid to parcel out the

⁸⁹ ZZS 22:15b (383, Xuan 11).

⁹⁰ ZZS 21:21b (370, Xuan 4). This date is suggested by the fact that no other person is identified as marshal between 605 and 575 when Marshal Zifan led the center army in battle (*ibid.*, 28:2b-14b [473-78, Cheng 16]) and by the nature of the activities of Zifan in the intervening years as outlined below. As in the case of the appointment of Zizhong as chief minister, Zifan was surely made marshal before 590 and the ascension of King Gong, for when the latter was heir apparent, his tutor and guardian regularly presented the boy to Zizhong and Zifan, a sign that they held the highest posts in the government (*ibid.*, 26:26a [448, Cheng 9]). That he was probably already in that key position prior to the battle at Bi in 597, when he commanded the right army, is suggested by the story about his quest for the hand of beautiful Xia Ji 夏姬, who was also sought by King Zhuang (*ibid.*, 25:19a-20b [428, Cheng 2]). This incident can be dated prior to the battle at Bi since Archery Master Xianglao, who was ultimately given Xia Ji by the king, was killed during that battle (*ibid.*, 23:19a [397, Xuan 12]). In view of the marshal vacancy which was created in 605 by the murder of Marshal Wei Jia, the post was probably filled by Zifan at that time.

⁹¹ ZZS 23:10b (392, Xuan 12).

fields of Shen and Lü as military rewards after a siege of Song.⁹² It certainly occurred before the ascension of King Gong in 590, the year suggested by Gu Donggao,⁹³ for while King Gong was still heir apparent, his tutor and guardian allegedly presented him to Zizhong in the morning and to Zifan in the evening,⁹⁴ an unlikely situation if they did not occupy the top two positions in the state. The presentation of the heir apparent to both the chief minister and the marshal separately is suggestive of competition between the holders of these offices. Whatever tension may have existed beforehand, it was surely aggravated by the elevation of Left Deputy Chief Minister Zizhong to the post of chief minister, for Zifan had reason to expect his own selection in view of the fact that Marshal Ziyue, who was replaced by ill-fated Wei Jia, had been chosen earlier to serve as chief minister.⁹⁵

From 595 until 575 Chief Minister Zizhong and Marshal Zifan competed on more or less even terms. Because of their influence, they were both utilized by foreign emissaries seeking peace covenants with Chu.⁹⁶ At times they worked together, first taking revenge against the lineage and friends of a mutual antagonist,⁹⁷ then scrambling to meet the threats to the borders of Chu which he stirred up in exile.⁹⁸ At other times

⁹² ZZS 26:16a (443, Cheng 7--text and commentary).

⁹³ CQDSB 23:6b (1453).

⁹⁴ ZZS 26:26a (448, Cheng 9).

⁹⁵ ZZS 21:21b (370, Xuan 4).

⁹⁶ ZZS 24:9a-b (408, Xuan 15), where Zifan is approached by Hua Yuan 華元 of Song, and 27:4a (457, Cheng 11), where the latter utilizes his good relations with Zizhong.

⁹⁷ ZZS 26:16b-17a (443-44, Cheng 7). Zifan had borne a grudge against Shen Administrator Wuchen since before 597 when the latter foiled his attempt to claim Xia Ji as wife (*ibid.*, 25:19a-20b [428, Cheng 2]) and then made off with her in 549 (*ibid.*, 25:20b-21a [428-29, Cheng 2]). Zizhong had nursed hard feelings since Wuchen thwarted his bid to parcel out fields of Shen and Lü 呂 as rewards to valiant soldiers (*ibid.*, 26:16a [443, Cheng 7]).

⁹⁸ ZZS 26:17b (444, Cheng 7).

they acted separately to perform significant civil,⁹⁹ diplomatic,¹⁰⁰ and military functions.¹⁰¹ From 585 to 582 Zifan spent as much time as possible in the capital, evidently consolidating his influence *vis-à-vis* that of his rival. By 576 Marshal Zifan was recognized as the chief architect of the military policy of Chu.¹⁰²

The ascendancy of Marshal Zifan was formally recognized in command assignments during the battle at Yanling in 575, when he was given command of the center army. Having been deprived of his rightful leadership, Chief Minister Zizhong was assigned to lead the left army; Right Deputy Chief Minister Zixin 子辛 (d. 568) took charge of the right army.¹⁰³ Zizhong was down in, but not out of, the race for influence. On the eve of the battle he sent a Jin refugee to interpret the preparations of the Jin army for King Gong,¹⁰⁴ and his own presence was acknowledged by a Jin officer.¹⁰⁵ Concerned by the inability of Zifan to achieve victory by nightfall of the first day, the king had him summoned. However, Zifan was not fit to respond, for, perhaps not incoincidentally, he had been lured into a state of intoxication by a servant. Taking

⁹⁹ZZZS 25:22a (429, Cheng 2--see Zizhong).

¹⁰⁰ For Zizhong, see ZZZS 25:22b-23a (429-30, Cheng 2). For Zifan, refer to *ibid.*, 26:7a-8a (439, Cheng 4) and 27:5b-8b (458-59, Cheng 12).

¹⁰¹ For Zizhong, see CQZS 26:11a (441, Cheng 6); ZZZS 26:16a (443, Cheng 7), 25b (448, Cheng 9), and 26b (448, Cheng 9).

¹⁰²ZZZS 27:22b (466, Cheng 15).

¹⁰³ZZZS 28:3b (473, Cheng 16). The ascendancy of Marshal Zifan is seen in his role enroute to battle (*ibid.*, 28:4a-5a [473-74, Cheng 16]). Rivalry between the two Chu leaders was also cited as one of six weaknesses of Chu which could be exploited to the advantage of Jin on this occasion (*ibid.*, 28:7a-b [475, Cheng 16]).

¹⁰⁴ZZZS 28, 7b (475, Cheng 16).

¹⁰⁵ZZZS 28:12b-13a (477-78, Cheng 16).

this as a sign that his men had been forsaken by Heaven, King Gong ordered the Chu armies to withdraw during the night, leaving their supplies behind to Jin.¹⁰⁶

In retreat, King Gong sent word to Zifan taking personal responsibility for the fiasco and exonerating him. However, the king's messenger was followed by one from Zizhong suggesting strongly that Zifan follow the example of an earlier commander-in-chief by committing suicide to atone for the defeat of the Chu force. He took the hint and perished before the king's men could arrive to prevent him from doing so.¹⁰⁷ Thus, ultimate victory went to Zizhong, who regained his place as the most powerful official in Chu.

Chief Minister Subordinates

The personal humiliation that Chief Minister Zizhong suffered when he was forced to assume a command assignment that he had held as left deputy chief minister had an immediate and a long term impact on the hierarchical relationship among subordinates of the chief minister. The immediate impact can be seen in the fact that command of the right army in 575 was given to the right deputy chief minister instead of the left deputy chief minister, who was, in theory, the superior subordinate of the chief minister.

The suggestion has been made that on this occasion the office of Zizhong in fact reverted to that of left deputy chief minister, presumably because he was commanding the left army.¹⁰⁸ This line of thinking need not be seriously entertained since in the first

¹⁰⁶ ZZS 28:13a-b (478, Cheng 16).

¹⁰⁷ ZZS 28:14a-b, (478, Cheng 16).

¹⁰⁸ Cheng Tingzuo 2:12b.

recorded instance of the deployment of three Chu armies in 632, the commander of the left army was the marshal, while the center army was led by the chief minister.¹⁰⁹ There was no necessary correlation between left and right in official titles and assignments to command posts in the left and right armies.

This fact also negates the argument that the left deputy chief minister could not lead the right army because of his title. The command of the center and the left armies in 575 was the reverse of that in 632; but, more importantly, the chief minister had been forced to take a command that he had held earlier as left deputy chief minister. Because of this fact, the left deputy chief minister was denied a command assignment in 575, and the office lost its hierarchical standing to the right deputy chief minister.

The rise of the right deputy chief minister and the decline of the left deputy chief minister is evident in the subsequent history of these two offices. The record of command assignments in 575 marked the entry of right deputy chief minister into the historical record; however, its existence from earlier times can be assumed in the previous use of "left deputy chief minister" in 598, for the designation of an office on the left implies a counterpart on the right. As discussed above, the fate of a former left deputy chief minister provided an opportunity for the office of right deputy chief minister to surface historically, a development, which in this case, is an indication of its increasing importance.

The revelation in 571 that Chief Minister Zizhong and Right Deputy Chief Minister Zixin had been subjected to repeated pressure on behalf of the interests of

¹⁰⁹ ZZS 23:10b (499, Xuan 12).

neighboring petty states is another indicator of the increased stature of the office of right deputy chief minister.¹¹⁰ By now this office was clearly the principal channel for access to the chief minister, if not the second most influential position in the central government, notwithstanding the higher hierarchical placement of the offices of marshal and *mo'ao*. After Zizhong died in 570, Right Deputy Chief Minister Zixin was chosen to replace him as chief minister.¹¹¹

The eclipse of left deputy chief minister is evident in the fact after 570 this office does not reappear in the historical record until 524,¹¹² whereas four holders of the office of right deputy chief minister are identified during the same period.¹¹³ Whether the absence of the left deputy chief minister in the appointments of 558 is an indication that there was no change in personnel or that the office was left vacant cannot be determined. In any case, the immediate and long-term effect of the development in 575 was the shift of primacy from left to right among subordinates of the chief minister.

Cheng Qisheng has noticed what he perceives to be evidence of change in the status of the offices of left deputy chief minister and right deputy chief minister. Because both Zizhong and Zixin had received major command assignments as left deputy chief minister and right deputy chief minister, respectively, then moved on to serve as chief minister, he concludes that during their tenure those offices were highly

¹¹⁰ ZZS 29:8b (499, Xiang 2) for Chief Minister Zizhong and Right Deputy Chief Minister Zixin.

¹¹¹ ZZS 29:11a, 13a (501-02, Xiang 3).

¹¹² ZZS 48:20a (843, Zhao 18).

¹¹³ ZZS 32:24a (565, Xiang 15, Pirong 罷戎), 34:7b (587, Xiang 19,), 38:17a (650, Xiang 27, Shen Xianyu), and 41:29b (710, Zhao 1, Zigan).

regarded. However, as refugees from other states came to hold both offices in subsequent years, Cheng argues, their importance declined.¹¹⁴ Specifically, he had in mind references to Zige 子革, who fled Zheng in 554 to Chu, where he eventually became right deputy chief minister,¹¹⁵ and Shen Xianyu 申鮮虞, a man from Qi who was summoned to Chu from exile in Lu in 546 to be made right deputy chief minister.¹¹⁶ Cheng assumes that Zige began service as right deputy chief minister in 554 and served continuously until at least 531, when he is explicitly identified (for the first time) in this office.¹¹⁷ Because of this assumption, Cheng is puzzled by the reference to Right Deputy Chief Minister Zigan, who fled to Jin in 541.¹¹⁸ This causes him to speculate that either two men could serve concurrently in the office of right deputy chief minister, or Zige temporarily yielded the post to Zigan and resumed it after the latter fled.¹¹⁹

Surprisingly, Cheng does not deal with the tenure of Shen Xianyu which also fell between 554 and 531 and complicates either of the alternatives that he offers. Whereas the *Zuo zhuan* states clearly that Shen Xianyu was recruited to be made right deputy chief minister, even giving the year and the season (Winter, 546), it merely makes reference in passing to the fact that Zige, who fled to Chu in 554, became right deputy chief minister there.¹²⁰ There is no reason to assume that he obtained that

¹¹⁴ Quoted in CQDSB 10:44a (1259).

¹¹⁵ ZZS 34:7b (587, Xiang 19).

¹¹⁶ ZZS 38:17a (650, Xiang 27).

¹¹⁷ See quote in CQDSB 10:44a-b (1259).

¹¹⁸ CQDSB 10:44a-b (1259).

¹¹⁹ CQDSB 10:44a-b (1259).

¹²⁰ ZZS 34:7b (587, Xiang 19), 38:17a (650, Xiang 27).

position in 554. On the contrary, there is good cause to believe that he did not serve as right deputy chief minister until after 541; for the first reference to the official activities of Zige occurs in 538, whereafter, he appears prominently in the Chu record for more than a decade.¹²¹ Thus, Shen Xianyu was the first of the two refugees to serve as right deputy chief minister.

That no other left deputy chief minister or right deputy chief minister other than Zizhong and Zixin are known to have become chief minister is true; but subsequent holders of these positions were assigned to military command duties¹²² and were men of influence, among whom the most respected left deputy chief minister, Xi Wan, may also have been a foreigner.¹²³

¹²¹ Zige is not referred to as right deputy chief minister until 530 on the eve of the overthrow of King Ling, when he sought through counsel to check the king's ambition (ZZZS 45:35b-38b [794-95, Zhao 12]). Prior to that time, he is shown in action with mainly the king's men in 538 and 533 (*ibid.*, 42:31a [733, Zhao 4] and 45:2a-3a [777-78, Zhao 9]) in contexts which raise the possibility that he was also one of the king's men at the time rather than a central government official. In 531 Zige is cited as an example of the folly of King Ling in assigning next-of-kin to an outside position (younger brother Gongzi Qiji was to be appointed administrator of Cai), while according a refugee an inside position (*ibid.*, 45:22a-23b [787-88, Zhao 11]). Whether "inside" refers to a place on the personal staff of the king or to the office of right deputy chief minister is not clear. Regardless, Zige would had to have been close to the king to have performed any notable service during this particular reign, for King Ling habitually circumvented the established central government apparatus by relying on his personal retainers and royal household staff to conduct the affairs of state. As noted above, Zige sought to deter King Ling from his self-destructive course in 530. Later in the same year, when Gongzi Qiji and other took advantage of the king's absence from the capital to stage a coup d'etat, Right Deputy Chief Minister Zige remained loyal to King Ling in counsel until the futility of sticking with him became crystal clear (*ibid.*, 46:6a-b [806, Zhao 13]). Ever the political realist, Zige returned alone to the capital of Chu, where he was retained as right deputy chief minister by new King Ping, formerly Gongzi Qiji (*ibid.*, 47:3a [820, Zhao 14]).

¹²² ZZZS 47:3a (820, Zhao 14, Right Deputy Chief Minister), 52:16a (907, Zhao 27, Left Deputy Chief Minister Xi Wan).

¹²³ ZZZS 48:20a-21a (843-44, Zhao 18, Left Deputy Chief Minister Wangzi Sheng 王子勝), 52:18a (908, Zhao 27, Left Deputy Chief Minister Xi Wan). The Xi Lineage was powerful in Jin until its demise in 574 (*ibid.*, 28:23b-26b [483-484, Cheng 17]). Perhaps Xi Wan was a descendant of a member of this Xi Lineage who was able to find employment outside of Jin.

Far from being a sign of a decline of the importance of these offices, the appointment of refugees is an indication that Chu was finally aware of the potential value of employing refugees in key positions, a point which was effectively impressed on the minds of the chief minister and king of Chu in 547, just one year prior to the recruitment of Shen Xianyu, in a speech which delineated the many times that Jin had used refugees from Chu to harm Chu.¹²⁴ Whereas the rankings of the left deputy chief minister and the right deputy chief minister changed, they retained their collective place as subordinates to the chief minister in the official hierarchy.

Grand Marshal Subordinates

The first reference to left marshal and right marshal occurs in a problematic *Zuozhuan* passage under the year 617. When King Mu (r. 625--614) of Chu was joined by rulers of Chen 陳 and Zheng 鄭 in an intended attack on Song, the latter state wisely decided to submit to Chu without resistance. Subsequently, all of the states joined in a hunting party under the leadership of King Mu, with the ruler of Song leading the right unit (*youyu* 右孟) and the ruler of Zheng leading the left unit (*zuoyu* 左孟). As to the lesser officials on the hunt, the *Zuozhuan* records that "the administrator of Qisi, Fusui, acted as right marshal, Zizhu and Wenzhi Wuwei acted as left marshals." 期思公復遂爲右司馬，子朱及文之無畏爲左司馬。 During the hunt the ruler of Song violated orders; whereupon, Wuwei publicly punished the ruler's servant. When criticized for doing so on the grounds that the rulers of states were immune to such treatment in public, Wuwei retorted that he was merely

¹²⁴ZZZS 37:11b-17b (635-37, Xiang 26).

carrying out the duties of his office without special consideration and that he would rather risk death than do otherwise.¹²⁵ The problems in this passage are manifold and will be entertained briefly here because of their potential bearing on the foregoing discussion about the ranking of left and right subordinates in the central government.

If Chu traditionally honored the left over the right, why do the leader of the left unit and the left marshal appear in the record after their counterparts on the right? If Wuwei was really so faithful to his office as alleged, why was he meting out punishment in the right unit while acting as left marshal?

As for the reference to the ruler of Song first as leader of the right unit, several explanations which have nothing to do with actual preference are possible. First, the most relevant portion of the passage reads as follows: "Then [Song] met the Viscount of Chu; feted [him]; and, moreover, accepted [his] orders. Subsequently, [Song] led [him] to hunt at Mengzhu. The Duke of Song acted as [leader of] the right unit, . . ."¹²⁶

乃逆楚子，勞且聽命。遂道以田孟諸。宋公爲右孟。

Whether the Song agent who met King Mu of Chu was the duke or an official is not clear, but he definitely was a Song man. Thus, the continuation of the narrative in a series of coordinate clauses, giving positions that were held by Fu Sui and the others during the hunt, begins with a Song man (probably the duke) as subject of the first clause. Second, Song and its ruler are central to the story contained in the passage; therefore, the position of the Song ruler, being foremost in the mind of the recorder of

¹²⁵ ZZS 19a:24b-25b (322-23, Wen 10).

¹²⁶ ZZS 19a:25a (323, Wen 10).

the incident, was written down first without regard to actual rank. As host of the event, albeit under duress, first mention of the ruler of Song was logical.

Reference to the left marshal and the right marshal in this story have given rise to commentaries, some of which are helpful in arriving at answers to the questions posed above. Du Yu deals with the phenomenon of two left marshals by suggesting that two were necessary to staff the left and right units, while the right marshal served in the center unit (which was presumably led by the king of Chu).¹²⁷ Kong Yingda refines the argument of Du by asserting that since Wuwei was acting within his office in punishing the servant of the duke of Song, who was leader of the right unit, he was attached to it; Zizhu, the other left marshal, served in the left unit.¹²⁸ Kong has moved a step closer to the truth without tampering with the *Zuozhuan* text; but his solution is not wholly satisfactory because, in this case, the *Zuozhuan* text has organic problems, or in the words of Qing classicist Yu Yue: "This passage must have errors." 此傳必有誤。 He suggests that the text originally read as "Qisi Administrator, Fu-sui, acted as marshal, Zizhu and Wenzhi Wuwei acted as left and right marshals" 期思公復遂爲司馬，子朱及文之無畏爲左右司馬； but because of the immediately preceding reference to right unit and left unit, the original text became confused in transmission by copyists. According to the restored original version, the line-up of marshals is clear: Fusui acted as marshal in the center unit, Zizhu acted as left marshal in the left unit, and Wuwei acted as right marshal in the right unit. So Wuwei was

¹²⁷ ZZS 19a:25a (323, Wen 10-Du commentary).

¹²⁸ ZZS 19a:25a (323, Wen 10-Kong commentary).

indeed acting in accordance with his proper duties as left marshal when disciplining members of the left unit.¹²⁹ If the correction by Yu Yue can be accepted, then the actual ranking of units on the hunt--namely, center, left, right--was preserved in the marshal references and agrees with what is known about the left-right preference in this early period.

As mentioned above, these problems have been examined because of their possible impact on the discussion of the ranking of left and right subordinate offices in the central government; but, in fact, the marshal offices cited in this passage are not central government offices. The disciplinary role played by Wenzhi Wuwei is identical to that of the marshal of the center army (*zhongjun sima* 中軍司馬) in Jin.¹³⁰ In the Spring and Autumn Era, the hunt was sometimes merely a pretext for military training exercises;¹³¹ thus, its organization along military lines can be known. That such was the case here should be obvious in the fact that Song was able to transform an invading force into a hunting party. Instead of being known as armies, the principal units were designated as *yu* 孟, and in each unit a marshal functioned at a sub-command level to maintain discipline in the ranks. Although the left and right unit commanders were heads of state, their marshals were Chu men,¹³² a clear demonstration of Chu control and a sign that the actual organizational structure originated with Chu. In the regular

¹²⁹ Cited and quoted in Takezoe's commentary in ZZHJ, 10:65.

¹³⁰ ZZS 9:13a-15a (502-03, Xiang 3--Wei Jiang was acting as marshal of the center army at this time).

¹³¹ Lewis 1990:18. Perhaps the best known example is the "hunt" led by Duke Wen of Jin at Pilu 被廬 in 633 (ZZS 16:11a-13a [267-68, Xi 27]). Also see *ibid.*, 32:2b (554, Xiang 11) and Creel 1970:285-86.

¹³² Takezoe argues that all of these men were administrators of *xian* in Chu (ZZHJ 10:65).

Chu military structure, as in other states, there were marshals, purely military positions situated below the command level, which must be distinguished from the various central government marshal offices that functioned on a higher plane in both civil and military roles. Unfortunately, these two types of marshal offices in Chu cannot be distinguished on the basis of title, for their titles are identical, a fact which was missed by Gu Donggao in his cataloging of Chu offices.¹³³

The first reference to a subordinate of the central government marshal occurs in 571. In that year Right Marshal Gongzi Shen was executed for having put pressure on the chief minister and the right deputy chief minister through repeated bribery on behalf of petty states ever since his assumption of the office.¹³⁴ Gongzi Shen probably became right marshal around 574 when he led a Chu force to rescue Zheng from attack by other states.¹³⁵ In two earlier references he appears to have been acting as administrator of *Shenxian*. First, in 585 he was co-leader of a troops from Shen and another locality that went to rescue Cai from occupation by a force retreating from an invasion of Zheng,¹³⁶ and second, in 576 he relocated the population of Xu 許, a small state not far from Shen, to She 葉, a site located between them and just outside of the Fangcheng 方城 defense wall of Chu, because the ruler of Xu feared oppression by Zheng.¹³⁷ Perhaps due to his prior associations with petty states (Shen, Cai, and Xu were or had been in

¹³³ CQDSB 10:10:5b-8a, 45a-46b (1240-41, 1260).

¹³⁴ ZZS 29:8b (499, Xiang 2).

¹³⁵ ZZS 28:22b (482, Cheng 17).

¹³⁶ ZZS 26:14a-b (442, Cheng 6).

¹³⁷ ZZS 27:29a (468, Cheng 15). For a quick reference to the locations of Shen, Xu, and She, refer to Cheng Faren 1967:map 3.

this category),¹³⁸ the sympathy of Gongzi Shen was with them. Because of his scandalous behavior in their behalf, the central government office of right marshal is mentioned in the historical record earlier than its counter part, the left marshal.

The office of left marshal in the central government is not mentioned until 558 when it is listed behind the right marshal as the second ranking subordinate of the grand marshal, contrary to the traditional status accorded to the left position.¹³⁹ As discussed above, the reversal of left and right preference was the legacy of earlier competition between the holders of the chief minister and (grand) marshal positions. However, the effect of the change on the subordinates of the marshal does not appear to have been as long lasting as the shift of primacy among subordinates of the chief minister, for in 511 Left Marshal Xu (*Shenyin* Xu 沈尹戍) is shown as superior to the right marshal as they led troops to battle.¹⁴⁰ The return of the office of left marshal to its former place in the hierarchy was probably due to the inordinate influence of Left Marshal Xu at that time (see Appendix 6).

***Mo'ao* Subordinates**

Commenting on the difficulty of understanding the nature of the *mo'ao* subordinates which are identified in the appointments of 558, Kong Yingda makes the following observations: "Official titles were something provisionally made. The subordinates of the *mo'ao* also could not be explained; therefore, Du [Yu] did not

¹³⁸ Shen, Cai and Xu were still viable states at this time. For synopses of the histories of these three places, see Chen Pan 2:143a-145a (Xu), 147b-151a (Cai), and 151b-155a (Shen).

¹³⁹ ZZZS 32:24a-b (565, Xiang 15).

¹⁴⁰ ZZZS 53:19a-b (930, Zhao 31).

explain any one of them."¹⁴¹ 官名臨時所做。莫敖之徒並不可解，故杜皆不解之。As for his first assertion, there was nothing temporary about any of the titles of *mo'ao* associates; for the remonstrance master appears in references ranging from 605 to 479,¹⁴² the archery master, from 597 to 522,¹⁴³ and the palace stable master, from before 558 to 515.¹⁴⁴ These dates neither represent the beginning nor the end of the three offices since no such details are available. Regarding the issue of inexplicability, as noted in earlier mention of the *mo'ao* subordinates, explanations have been ventured above for the remonstrance master and the archery master on the basis of the meaning of their Chinese characters, and this can be readily done for the palace stable master. This method can provide no more than a clue to what the original roles of these offices might have been; subsequent functions can be discerned from references to their actual activities, which are typical of upper level, central government officials (see Chapter 6). Du Yu generally reserved comment for terms and passages which were difficult to understand or required elaboration. Perhaps in this case he felt that the titles were sufficiently suggestive to obviate explanation or that there was no need to elaborate.

¹⁴¹ ZZZS 32:24b (565, Xiang 15).

¹⁴² ZZZS 21:22b (370, Xuan 4), 60:6b (1043, Ai 16).

¹⁴³ ZZZS 23:19a (397, Xuan 12), 52:20b (909, Zhao 27). Note that the latter reference in the *Zuozhuan* under the year 515 recalls the murder of Archery Master Wushe in 522; see *ibid.*, 49:2b-4a (852-53, Zhao 20).

¹⁴⁴ ZZZS 32:24b (565, Xiang 15), 52:20b (909, Zhao 27). Note that the latter reference refers to this office as *zhong juyin* 中廩尹. *Zhong* and *gong* 宮 are interchangeable, therefore Takezoe correctly regards this to be the office of palace stable master (ZZHJ 2:7 [Zhao 27]).

Earlier the suggestion was made that *mo'ao* and subordinate offices originated in the household staff of the king. This idea is supported in the common thread of closeness to the king that runs through the activities of individuals who served as remonstrance master, archery master, and palace stable master prior to and during their tenure in these positions.

At an unspecified date prior to 597 when the king and the marshal were talked out of taking a much sought after lady as wife, the king gave her to Archery Master Xianglao 襄老 (d. 597),¹⁴⁵ a sign that he was one of the king's trusted men. In the battle at Bi in 597, Qu Dang 屈蕩 (fl. 597) and Yang Youji, who were appointed archery master and palace stable master respectively in 558, served in the king's garrison, Qu as spearman on the right in the left *guang* and Yang in the same slot in the right *guang*.¹⁴⁶ They were clearly the king's men. During the battle at Yanling 鄢陵 in 575, Yang and the king's spearman on the right showed off their archery skills, then boasted to the king that there was nothing to fear with the likes of them around, only to be sharply reprimanded by him for their shameful behavior. Nevertheless, later in the battle the king gave Yang a chance to acquit himself through errorless marksmanship.¹⁴⁷

Palace Stable Master Zixi was isolated in 541 with other member's of the king's faction when the king was overthrown. Zixi and the grand intendant (*dazai* 大宰) were sent out of the capital to build fortifications and to get them out of the way of the *coup*. When it was consummated, Zixi fled to Zheng, and the grand intendant was

¹⁴⁵ ZZZS 25:19a-20b (428, Cheng 2).

¹⁴⁶ ZZZS 23:16a (395, Xuan 12), 32:24b (565, Xiang 15).

¹⁴⁷ ZZZS 28:9b-10b (476, Cheng 16).

killed.¹⁴⁸ Five years earlier at the signing of the Song armistice, Zixi had been conspicuous in formulating its language, while the king orchestrated the actions of the chief minister, who was the principal representative of Chu on this occasion.¹⁴⁹ In 538 the remonstrance master was sent out to build fortifications along with other officers who were close to the king.¹⁵⁰ When Palace Stable Master Qiji 棄疾 (Dou Qiji) was killed in battle in 536, the chief minister who commanded the Chu force was quick to blame and execute another hapless official for the death.¹⁵¹ By such actions, the chief minister appears to have sought to avoid the wrath of King Ling (r. 540–529), a usurper of the kingship who was not known for self control.¹⁵² Not only was the palace stable master a position which was close to him, King Ling had undoubtedly selected Qiji to replace his opponent Zixi at the time of the *coup d'etat* and the flight of the latter.

Among the notable crimes of sycophant Fei Wuji was causing the execution of Archery Master Wu She 伍奢, who had been appointed tutor of the heir apparent with Wuji as his assistant in 528,¹⁵³ and Palace Stable Master Yang Lingzhong 陽令終 (d. 515).¹⁵⁴ Six years of slander and scheming were consumed before Wuji finally

¹⁴⁸ ZZZS 41:29a-b (710, Zhao 1); see below for more on the office of grand intendant.

¹⁴⁹ ZZZS 38:6a-8a (644-45, Xiang 27). Here Zixi acts as advance man.

¹⁵⁰ ZZZS 42:31a (733, Zhao 4). Two of the other four principals in action at this time are identified by offices which were part of the royal household staff; namely, *shenyin* 沈尹 and grand intendant. The remaining two actors also seem to have been closely tied to the king. For Ran Dan 然丹 (Zige) see note 126 above. Peng Sheng 彭生 came from a lineage whose members are always shown in personal service to kings of Chu (see Chapter 4 above).

¹⁵¹ ZZZS 43:22b-23a (752-53, Zhao 4).

¹⁵² ZZZS 46:3a-b (805, Zhao 13); note the litany of abuses attributed to King Ling as background to the revolt against him in 529.

¹⁵³ ZZZS 48:21b (844, Zhao 19), 52:20b (909, Zhao 27).

¹⁵⁴ The office of Yang Lingzhong is shown as *zhongjiuyin* 中廩尹 ("central stable master") in ZZZS 52:20a (909, Zhao 27). Takezoe correctly interprets this to be the office of *gongjiuyin* (see ZZHJ 26:9), for *zhong* and *gong* are in the same rhyme group in archaic Chinese

succeeded in fatally poisoning the relationship between Wu She and the king.¹⁵⁵

Finally, Remonstrance Master Wei Gu 蘧固 (fl. 506-477) fled the capital in the same boat as the king when Wu attacked Chu in 506, and at some point, which is unclear, he was sent by the king to direct a charge of fire-bearing elephants to rout enemy troops.¹⁵⁶

Takezoe takes the role of the remonstrance master on this occasion to be evidence that all of the major officials of Chu had already gone to the battlefield, leaving the lesser ones behind.¹⁵⁷ It may just as well be a sign that remonstrance master was one of the offices that was close to the king regardless of the whereabouts of higher ranking officials.

The kind of intimacy which is evident in the relationship of the *mo'ao* subordinates to the kings of Chu strengthens the argument for their household staff origins. The data further suggest that holders of these offices were frequently recruited from among the personal retinue of the king. In view of the fact that Qu Dang finished his career as *mo'ao*,¹⁵⁸ the possibility exists that other *mo'ao* appointees from the Qu

(to use Karlgren's terms) and, thus, are interchangeable loan words (see Karlgren 1940:392-93, numbers 1006 and 1007).

¹⁵⁵ ZZS 49:2b-4a (852-53, Zhao 20).

¹⁵⁶ ZZS 54:24a-b (951, Ding 4). Allusion is made in 477 when the loyal service of Wei Gu to King Zhao is recalled in *ibid.*, 60:13a (1047, Ai 18).

¹⁵⁷ ZZHJ 27:35.

¹⁵⁸ Du Yu argues that the Qu Dang who succeeded Qu Jian as *mo'ao* in 548 is not the same Qu Dang who served in the royal garrison during the battle at Bi in 597 because the *Shiben* states that Qu Dang was the grandfather of Qu Jian (ZZS 36:11a [622, Xiang 25]). However, Du makes no comment on the identity of Qu Dang in 558 when he was made archery master at the same time that Qu Jian was appointed *mo'ao* (*ibid.*, 32:24a-25a [565-66, Xiang 15]). Since Yang Youji, who had served with Qu Dang in the royal garrison in 597, was made palace stable master on this occasion, there is good reason to believe that his fellow appointee as remonstrance master was the same Qu Dang as before. If that were so, then the appointment of Qu Jian to the office of *mo'ao*, which was the line position immediately superior to his "grandfather" (Qu Dang) would have been odd indeed. That Qu Jian and Qu Dang served

lineage for whom pre-*mo'ao* information is missing came from a similar background of personal service to the king in keeping with the household roots of the office.

Lower Level Offices

With the exception of *qingyin* 清尹,¹⁵⁹ all of the offices that are shown above in Table 7 as lower level appear in contexts which suggest that they were part of the central government and independent from the royal household staff.¹⁶⁰ Dou Zixi, a former grand marshal, surrendered voluntarily to the director of punishment (*sibai* 司敗) in 617, supposedly seeking execution in order to put to rest rumors that he was planning to flee into exile.¹⁶¹ Following decimation of his rebellious lineage in 605, Remonstrance Master Dou Kehuang turned himself into the director of punishment even though he had been away on state assignment and was not involved in the

concurrently in the posts of *mo'ao* and remonstrance master serves as indirect evidence that the latter could not have been the grandfather of the former. But they could have been brothers or cousins; and in either of these cases, the appointment of Qu Jian as *mo'ao* presents no problem, for although the *mo'ao* post was always held by a member of the Qu lineage, it was not usually passed on from father to son. By 548 both men were evidently quite elderly; whereas the recorded career of Qu Dang spanned fifty years from 597 to 548, Qu Jian died of apparently natural causes in 545 only three years after advancing from *mo'ao* to chief minister (ZZZS 38:32a [657, Xiang 28]). In this instance, Du Yu was led astray by the *Shiben* pedigree.

¹⁵⁹In the opinion of Zhang Taiyan, this was an office of the royal court rather than a local government position (cited in Song Gongwen 1988:350). *Qingyin* 清尹 occurs only as the title of *Qingyin Feiji* 清尹弗忌. He was among the agnates of Shengong Qu Wuchen who were murdered in 589 (ZZZS 26:16b [443, Cheng 7]). This information appears in a flashback under the year 584. The actual event occurred in 589 when Wuchen fled into exile (*ibid.*, 25:20b-21a [428-29, Cheng 2]).

¹⁶⁰Song Gongwen 1988:341-56 includes the subordinates of the *mo'ao* in his list of *daifu* rank central government officials. He might be correct about the rank of those offices, but I have shown them in the division to which they belonged, a structural point that he has missed. He also lists fifteen offices in this category that I have classified below as royal household staff evidently because they were neither high offices nor local government positions and did not fit his rather narrow definition of offices that were close to the king and heir apparent. More shall be said of this in the discussion of royal household staff offices below.

¹⁶¹ZZZS 19a:23b-24b (322, Wen 10).

disorder.¹⁶² In 598 Chief Minister Wei Ailie ordered the fortifications engineer (*fengren* 封人) to plan a fortification project that was executed by the director of the masses (*situ* 司徒) on schedule, a noteworthy achievement.¹⁶³ In 507 Chief Minister Zichang used a functionary (*yousi* 有司) as court messenger.¹⁶⁴ The activities of all of these positions were confined to, or at least in harmony with, the functions implied in their respective titles. They were inferior to the upper level positions and posed no threat to the jurisdiction, influence, and power of the latter.

Song Gongwen shows three *daifu* rank offices that appear in late Warring States and Qin-Han sources. One of them, namely the office of *xinzaoyin* 新造尹, deserves special consideration.¹⁶⁵ Citing a *Zhanguoce* anecdote about Fenmao Bosu 樊冒勃蘇 who identifies his office as *xinzaoli* 新造盪, Song says this was the office of *xinzaoyin*.¹⁶⁶ This anecdote is a redaction of the *Zuozhuan*'s account of the role played by Shen Baoxu 申包胥 (fl. ca. 522-505) in persuading the ruler of Qin to send an army to rescue Chu from Wu in 506;¹⁶⁷ so Fenmao Bosu is generally regarded to be Shen Baoxu, whose office is not identified in the *Zuozhuan*.

¹⁶² ZZS 21:22b-23a (370-71, Xuan 4).

¹⁶³ ZZS 22:15b-16b (383, Xuan 11).

¹⁶⁴ ZZS 54:10a (1944, Ding 3).

¹⁶⁵ The other offices are *wudai* 五大夫 and *houren* 侯人 (Song Gongwen 1988:55-56). *Wudai*, which was a rank in the *Lushi chunqiu*, was the name of a rank in Qin which was supposedly given to an officer of Chu by King Wen. *Houren* has already been rejected as the name of an office of Chu in the *Zuozhuan* reference cited by Song (see note 3 above).

¹⁶⁶ ZGC 14:11b-12a (282-83, "Chu 1").

¹⁶⁷ ZZS 54:27a-b (953, Ding 4).

The *Zhanguo* passage that contains the character string *xin zao li* presents problems for punctuation and interpretation. Fenmao Baosu caught the attention of the ruler of Qin after making a nuisance of himself in his court. When the ruler asked him to identify himself, he said: "*Chen fei yi Chu shi xin zao li Fenmao Bosu Wu yu Churen zhan yu Boju san zhan ru Ying. . .*" 臣非異楚使新造盪棼冒勃蘇吳與楚人戰於柏舉 三戰入郢。 The editors of the modern punctuated edition of the text note two conflicting commentaries: Bao Biao 鮑彪 of the Northern Song dynasty says that *xinzaoli* was the name of an office that Bosu made up on the spot, concocting a name that was similar to the Qin offices of *shangzao* 上造 and *daliangzao* 大良造. And Wu Shidao 吳師道 of the Yuan dynasty says Bao's interpretation was wrong and argues that *xin zao li* was a phrase that means "have begun to make trouble" 始構難 and should appear after the character *wu*. Evidently following Ban Biao, the editors preserve the original word order and punctuate as follows: "*Chen fei yi, xinzaoli Chu shi Fenmao Bosu. Wu yu Churen zhan yu Boju, san zhan ru Ying, . . .*"¹⁶⁸ 臣非異，楚使新造盪棼冒勃蘇。吳與楚人戰於柏舉，三戰入郢。 Thus, the text reads: "I am none other than emissary of Chu *Xinzaoli* Fenmao Bosu. Wu has joined the men of Chu to battle at Boju [and] in three engagements entered [our capital] Ying." Zhu Zugeng, who follows Wu Shidao, rearranges the text and punctuates it as follows: "*Chen fei yi, xinzaoli Chu shi Fenmao Bosu. Wu yu Churen zhan yu Boju, san zhan ru Ying, . . .*"¹⁶⁹ 臣非異，楚使棼冒勃蘇。吳製造

¹⁶⁸ *Zhanguo* 2:517-18.

¹⁶⁹ Zhu Zugeng 1985.14:769 and 775 (note 27).

盞，與楚人戰於柏舉，三戰入郢。 The text reads: "I am none other than emissary of Chu Fenmao Bosu. Wu, recently making trouble, has joined the men of Chu to battle at Boju [and] in three engagements entered [our capital] Ying." J. I. Crump, Jr., gives yet another interpretation in his translation: "None other than Fen-mei Po-su, emissary of Ch'u, who of late has offended your majesty. Wu has entered our capital after three battles by Lake Chü."¹⁷⁰

Song Gongwen, for his part, appears to have found a good reason for interpreting *xinzaoli* as the name of an office. He takes *xinzaoli* to be a mistake for *xinzaoyin*, which appears in the bamboo slips found in the grave of Marquis Yi of Zeng.¹⁷¹ Since office names in Zeng were evidently influenced by Chu, it is possible that *xinzaoyin* was also the name of an office of Chu.¹⁷²

Local Government Offices

Three local government offices appear in the *Zuozhuan*, namely the *xian* administrator (*xianyin* 縣尹 or *xiangong* 縣公), sheriff (*sima* 司馬), and headman (*yin* 尹).¹⁷³ As shall be seen in Chapter 6 below, the importance of the *xian* administrator office is manifest in the social status of its occupants, who were mainly royal agnates. The other two offices figure only incidentally in the history of Chu.

Chu was perhaps the first Spring and Autumn state to establish the *xian* 縣 as a local administrative unit of the central government. The earliest *xian* is thought to have

¹⁷⁰ Crump 1970:234.

¹⁷¹ Song Gongwen 1988:350.

¹⁷² See Hubeisheng bowuguan 1989:467-68.

¹⁷³ Song Gongwen identifies four other local offices from later sources that are not treated here; *Jiangnanling* 江南令, *shiling* 市令, *shizhang* 市長, and *guanli* 關吏 (1988:371-72).

been created during the reign of King Wu (r. 740-690) after he had vanquished the state of Quan 權.¹⁷⁴ *Xian* were created from territory and population of conquered states and the former capitals and secondary capitals or towns of states that bordered Chu.

Twenty-five or more *xian* have been identified in classical historical sources and recently excavated Chu documents. The *xian* administrator was appointed by the king and responsible for registering the local population, gathering taxes, organizing corvee labor, and mustering, training, and leading local conscripts into battle on behalf of the state. Consequently, *xian* administrators played prominent roles in domestic and military affairs, particularly the latter as defenders of the heartland of Chu.¹⁷⁵

Taking his cue from Yang Bojun, who says that the *shen* 沈 in *shenyin* 沈尹 is the name of a *xian* that was created from a piece of territory taken from the state of Shen 沈, Gu Jiuxin explains the two titles for *xian* administrator (*xiangong* and *xianyin*) as follows: "Looking at it in the *Zuozhuan*, [as to] all *xian* that were established away from the former state, their *xian* officer was called *yin* . . . [as to] all *xian* that were established in the old territory of the former state, their *xian* officer was called *gong*."¹⁷⁶ The traditional view is that either title could be used and that Chu usurped the title of *gong* for its *xian* administrator just like it usurped the title of king (*wang*).¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁴ ZZZZ 9:16a (159, Zhuang 19). The year of this event is not known.

¹⁷⁵ For recent studies of the *xian* in Chu, see Yang and Zhu 1981, Gu Tiefu 1984, Li Yujie 1987:74--94, and Xu Shaohua 1990 and 1994:275-98.

¹⁷⁶ Gu Jiuxin 1984:130. For Yang's comment see CQZZ 4:728-29. The notion of Shen as the name of a *xian* is rejected below in Appendix 6.

¹⁷⁷ Li Yujie 1988:87.

Gu garbles the case of *Quanxian* which he offers as an example of the office of *xianyin*. He says that ". . . after *Quanxian* was moved to Nachu, [King Wu] 'ordered Dou Min to administer (*yin*) it.'" ¹⁷⁸ However, the *Zuozhuan* actually says: "Earlier, King Wu vanquished Quan and ordered Dou Min to administer it. [When Min used it] to rebel, [King Wu] laid siege and killed him. [Then he] moved [the populace of] Quan to Nachu, [and] ordered Yan Ao to administer it." ¹⁷⁹ 初武王克權，使鬥緡尹之。以叛，圍而殺之。遷權於那處，使閻敖尹之。 Thus, in what is understood to be the first reference to the creation of a *xian* in Chu, the term *yin* is used as "to administer" both before and after *Quanxian* was moved from its old territory to a new location. So this example, does not make Gu's case for *xianyin*.

Gu gives Shengong 申公 as his example for *xiangong*. The *Zuozhuan* says that the vanquished states of Shen 申 and Xi 息 were made into *xian* during the reign of King Wen (r. 689-675). ¹⁸⁰ All nine administrators of Shen who are identified in the *Zuozhuan* and in the *Guoyu* or Spring and Autumn era bronze inscriptions bear the title of Shengong, and the three administrators of Xi are called Xigong. Altogether the administrators of *xian* created from seven states that were conquered by Chu during this era are identified by *gong*. However, so are the administrators of six *xian* that were evidently not created from vanquished states. ¹⁸¹ Once again the picture is not clear.

¹⁷⁸ Gu Jiuxin 1984:130.

¹⁷⁹ ZZS 9:16a (159, Zhuang 19).

¹⁸⁰ ZZS 60:9a-10a (1045, Ai 17).

¹⁸¹ Compare Song Gongwen's list of *xiangong* (1988:361-71) to names of states that were extinguished by Chu during the Spring and Autumn era in He Hao 1988:10-12. In addition to Shen and Xi, *xian* that were formerly states are Ruo 郟, Yun 鄆, Deng 鄧, Chen 陳, and Cai 蔡. Note that the *xiangong* of Ruo and Deng appear in bronze inscriptions from the period

In terms of the place of the *xian* administrator in the official hierarchy, Li Yujie argues that "[t]he position of the *xiangong* and *xianyin* of the state of Chu was only second to the chief minister and the marshal." The basis for his argument is the comment of Du Yu on a statement attributed to Chief Minister Zixi in 479 which says (in the original unpunctuated text): *Chuguo di wo si lingyin sima fei Sheng er shei* 楚國第我死令尹司馬非勝而誰. The word *di* 第 is commonly used in the sense of "sequence" 次第. Du Yu says "*Chuguo di*" means "the sequence in which officers are employed" 用士之次第;¹⁸² thus, he understands the passage to read as follows: "In the sequence of Chu State [for employing officers], [should] I die, if chief minister [or] marshal were not Sheng, who [would it be]?" *Chuguo di, wo si, lingyin sima fei Sheng er shei* 楚國第，我死，令尹司馬非勝而誰. As proofs, Li cites examples of *Shengong* Dou Ziyi, *Shengong* Gongzi Shen and *Xigong* Gongzi Cheng 公子成 (fl. 585-574), who ultimately held the offices of grand marshal, right marshal, and left marshal respectively, and *She* Administrator Zhuliang, who became chief minister (and grand marshal). He seeks to buttress his argument by offering a statement by King Zhuang that puts the *xiangong* on equal standing with the rulers of other states and noting the presumed usurpation of the title of *gong* by Chu as evidence

rather than in the *Zuozhuan* and the *Guoyu*. The *xian* that do not appear to have been created from former states are Shang 商, Qisi 期思, Bai 白, and She 葉.

See CQZZZ 4:1700-01 for Bai as the name of a place in Chu. The "Yi Yong" 義勇 chapter of the *Xinxu* (quoted in CCBD 15:408) says "Zixi summoned Sheng, ordered him to govern Bai, [and] called him 'Baigong'." 子西召勝，使治白，號曰白公。

¹⁸² ZZS 60:4a-b (1042, Ai 16).

that "when a *xian* of Chu was first established, it still possessed the nature of the 'capital of the state' of a ruler."¹⁸³

Modern commentator Yang Bojun says that Du is wrong about the meaning of *di*, which is a "hypothetical conjunction" in this context. He punctuates and understands the text to mean: "In the state of Chu, supposing that I die, as to the chief minister [or] marshal, if [the appointee] were not Sheng, then who [would it be]?" *Chuguo, di wo si, lingyin, sima, fei Shen er shei.*¹⁸⁴ 楚國，第我死，令尹，司馬，非勝而誰。

Regardless of which reading is correct, the idea that the passage implies that the *xian* administrator was next in line for promotion to either of these positions is not correct from the viewpoint of government structure. Wangzi Sheng 王子勝 (d. 479) was the son of deposed Heir Apparent Jian and grandson of King Ping (r. 528-516). As the grandson of a king, he was eligible for appointment to any office. Gongzi Shen and Gongzi Cheng were members of the royal house and Dou Ziyi belonged to the royal Dou lineage. All were eligible for appointment to marshal positions because they were royal agnates. The Administrator Zhuliang (Shen Zhuliang) seized the positions of chief minister and grand marshal after the occupants were killed by Wangzi Sheng in 479. There is no evidence of systematic appointments or promotions that can be used to place the *xian* administrator just below chief minister and marshal in the hierarchy of

¹⁸³ Li Yujie 1988:87.

¹⁸⁴ CQZZZ 4:1701.

officialdom in Chu (see Chapter 6). *Xian* administrators were very important for strategic security reason and not because they held a high government office.

Regarding the local sheriff, my identification of this office is based on an anecdote that appears in the *Zuozhuan* under the year 522. King Ping had sent Heir Apparent Jian to dwell in Chengfu in the previous year ostensibly to defend the northern frontier. However, when Jian was falsely accused of planning to use the place to stage a rebellion and secede from Chu, the king ordered Chengfu *sima* Fenyang 城父司馬奮揚 to kill him. When Fenyang reported the rationale for failing to carry out this order, the king forgave him and sent him back to resume his post in the local administration.¹⁸⁵

Yin occurs as the name of a local office in a *Zuozhuan* under the year 515. The relevant passage says:

When the Chief Minister (Zichang) sent someone to check out Xi Wan's place, the armor was there. Instead of going [there], [he] summoned Yan Jiangshi and told him [about it]. Jiangshi withdrew and subsequently gave an order to attack Xi's place and moreover burn it [down]. When Ziwu (Xi Wan) heard about it, he killed himself. When the statesmen did not burn it, [Jiangshi] ordered, "Whomever does not burn Xi's place [will] have the same crime [as Xi Wan]. Some took one mat there, and some took a straw there; the statesmen threw them [on it], [but] subsequently did not burn it. [Jiangshi] ordered the headman to torch it, annihilated the agnates and partisans of Mr. Xi, killed Yang Lingzhong and his younger brothers Wan and Tuo, and Jin Chen and his children and younger brothers."¹⁸⁶

令尹使視郤氏，則有甲焉。不往，召鄢將師而告之。將師退，遂令攻郤氏，且蕪之。子惡聞之，遂自殺也。國人弗蕪，令曰：不蕪郤氏，與之同罪。或取一編菅菴A，或取一秉秆焉，國人投之，遂弗蕪也。令尹

¹⁸⁵ ZZS 48:22b (844, Zhao 19), 49:2b-3a (852-53, Zhao 20).

¹⁸⁶ ZZS 52:18b-19a (908-09, Zhao 27)

炮之，盡滅郤氏之族黨，殺陽令終與其弟完及佗與晉陳及其子弟。

In the sentence that begins *ling yin pao zhi* 令尹炮之, many scholars take the characters 令尹 as "chief minister" and the subject of the three clauses that follow. However, Takezoe argues cogently and correctly that Yan Jiangshi was the active agent and the one giving all of the orders on this occasion. The proof is in Left Marshal *Shenyin* Xu's criticism of Chief Minister Zichang: "... That Yan Jiangshi forged your charge in order to annihilate three lineages which were the state's finest, and yet he has not lost his position. 夫鄢將師矯子之命，以滅三族，國之良也，而不愆位。 On the receiving end of his order in the first clause of this sentence was the neighborhood head man (*liyin* 里尹).¹⁸⁷

Royal Household Staff

On the eve of the famous battle of Bi between Chu and Jin in 597, the commander-in-chief of the Jin forces is alleged to have praised the preparations of Chu, commenting on the make-up of the king's own chariot units, their deployment during the daylight hours, and the orderliness of the night watch that was set by his "inner officers" (*neiguan* 内官).¹⁸⁸ Du Yu says: "*Neiguan* are offices close [to the king]." 内官，近官。Kong Yingda elaborates: "His *neiguan*, the ones closest to the king., took turns to cover the night [hours]." 其内官，親近王者，為次序以當其夜。¹⁸⁹ In other occurrences of the term *neiguan* in the *Zuozhuan*,¹⁹⁰ as well as in

¹⁸⁷ ZZZS 26:6-7. Song Gongwen also accepts this interpretation (1988:372).

¹⁸⁸ ZZZS 23:11a-13a (393-94, Xuan 12).

¹⁸⁹ ZZZS 23:12b-13a (393-94, Xuan 12--Du and Kong commentaries).

¹⁹⁰ See ZZZS 41:24a (707, Zhao 1) and 42:8a (721, Zhao 3).

the *Guoyu*,¹⁹¹ it clearly means "harem" or "female consorts"; just as clearly, it cannot have that meaning within the context of this speech. Those officers who served closest to the king were on the royal household staff.

Royal household staff offices are divided into various categories on the bases of the interpretation of titles and contextual evidence in Table 8 below.¹⁹² As one will gather from reviewing the recorded activities of each office that are presented here or in Appendix 5 below, titles are not of much value as guides to actual duties of office; but they can serve as indicators of the original functions and groupings of these positions on the royal household staff. The evidence is not sufficient to go further in the delineation of the specific structure of the staff; consequently, no hierarchy is implied in the arrangement of the staff list shown here.

Song Gongwen's list of "Offices Close to the King of Chu and the Heir Apparent" includes: all of the offices shown here as heir apparent's staff; the servants except for the attendant (*yuren*); the palace staff except for the functionary (*yousi*); a single specialist, the musician (*shi*--he shows this office as *yueshi* 樂師 and *yuezhang* 樂長); only the chief of the palace guard among the gendarmes; and all of the royal garrison positions except the left spearman (*zuo*). He also identifies seven offices here that appear only in late Warring States and Qin-Han era sources.¹⁹³ Excluded from

¹⁹¹ See GY 2:4a (43, "Zhouyu" *zhong*).

¹⁹² Several offices listed in this table do not appear in Chart 10 of CQDSB; namely, valet (ZZZS 45:34b [793, Zhao 12] and GY 17:7b-9a (392-95, "Chuyu" *shang* [where it is referred to as *pufu* 僕夫]), historian (GY 17:10a [397, "Chuyu" *shang*]), and groom (ZZZS 60:6a [1043, Ai 16]).

¹⁹³ The positions are *liangyin* 良尹, *xiaoyin* 校尹, *zhongsheshi* 中射士, *zhongshuzi* 中庶子, *juanren* 鍤人, *paozai* 庖宰, and *jianshi* 監食(Song Gongwen 1988:335, 338, and

Song's list are the grand tutor and the senior and junior intendants, the senior palace doorman of the palace staff, the remaining specialists, husbandmen, the craftsmen, the remaining gendarmeries, and the royal domain officials. From the foregoing breakdown, one can see that Song has defined his list primarily on presumed physical proximity to the king.

In terms of contextual evidence, my classification of royal household staff offices is based on one or more of the following factors: (1) explicit identification as a member of the staff of the king or other members of the royal house; (2) appearance in a royal household context; (3) activity in close physical proximity to the king; (4) personal service for the king; (5) participation in the royal garrison during battle; (6) activity under circumstances or during a period in which the king appears to have been circumventing central government officials to conduct state business; and (7) activity with other royal household staff officers, usually under conditions that are suggestive of in-house operations. The validity of the results of this approach to classification is borne out in the findings about the social basis of recruitment that I provide in Chapter 6 which show that eighty-three percent of royal household staff appointments went to non-royals.

340-41). I have excluded these offices because they do not appear in earlier sources that are more reliable for the Spring and Autumn era. Song also argues that the *wangma* of *wangma zhi shu* 王馬之屬 ("tenders of the royal steeds") is the office of *jiaoren* 校人 in the *Zhouli* (*ibid.*, 338). See note 3 above for comments on *wangma zhi shu*.

Table 8. Royal Household Staff

Heir Apparent's Staff
Tutor (<i>shi</i> 師)
Junior Tutor (<i>shaoshi</i> 少師)
Preceptor (<i>fu</i> 傅)
Protector (<i>bao</i> 保)
Head Valet (<i>zhengpuren</i> 正僕人)
East Palace Guard (東宮)
King's Staff
Personal Staff
Grand Tutor (<i>taishi</i> 太師)
Grand Intendant (<i>dazai</i> 大宰)
Junior Intendant (<i>shaozai</i> 少宰)
Servants
Valet (<i>pu</i> 僕)
Charioteer (<i>yushi</i> 御士)
Attendant (<i>yuren</i> 御人)
Palace Staff
Chamberlain (<i>shenyin</i> 沈尹 or <i>qinyin</i> 寢尹)
Chief Eunuch (<i>sigong</i> 司宮)
Senior Palace Doorman (<i>dahun</i> 大閹)
Doorman (<i>hun</i> 閹)
Functionary (<i>yousi</i> 有司)
Specialists
Historian (<i>shi</i> 史)
Left Historian (<i>zuoshi</i> 左史)
Physician (<i>yi</i> 醫)
Divination Master (<i>buyin</i> 卜尹)
Music Master (<i>vueyin</i> 樂尹)
Musician (<i>shi</i> 師)

Table 8 continued

Husbandmen

- Chief Swineherd (*tunyin* 豚尹)
- Chief Horse Inspector (*jianmayin* 監馬尹)
- Groom (*yu* 圉)
- Taro Master (*yuyin* 芋尹)
- Indigo Master (*lanyin* 藍尹)
- Youyin* 莠尹

Craftsmen

- Artisan Master (*gongyin* 工尹 or *gongzheng* 工正)
- Jade Master (*yuyin* 玉尹)

Gendarmery

- Chief of the Palace Guard (*huanliezhiyin* 環列之尹)
- Chief of Noise Control (*aoyin* 囂尹)
- Right Captain (*youling* 右領)

Royal Garrison:

- Charioteer (*yu* 御)
- Left Spearman (*zuo* 左)
- Right Spearman (*you* 右)
- Left *Guang*
 - Charioteer (*yu* 御)
 - Right Spearman (*you* 右)
- Right *Guang*
 - Charioteer (*yu* 御)
 - Right Spearman (*you* 右)

Royal Domain Officials

- Suburb Administrator (*jiaoyin* 郊尹)
- Graves Master (*lingyin* 陵尹)

Other

- Qingyin* 清尹

Sources: *Zuozhuan* and *Guoyu*

In the remainder of this section, I shall present my arguments for the more problematic offices in this classification of royal household staff positions. The other offices are covered in Appendix 5 below.

Grand Tutor

The grand tutor (*dashi* 大師) on the king's personal staff is also simply called "tutor" (*shi* 師) like the grand marshal (*dasima* 大司馬) in the central government is often known as "marshal" (*sima* 司馬). This naming convention has been overlooked by scholars who have failed to identify two of the four persons who are shown serving in this key position on the king's personal staff (see Appendix 5). The grand tutor was an office of the royal household staff; it was not a central government position. This can be demonstrated from what is known about the first two occupants of this office to appear in the historical record of Chu.

The first grand tutor of record is Pan Chong who had previously served as tutor to Heir Apparent Shangchen. When the latter, upon Chong's advice, forced his own father's suicide, thereupon succeeding him to the throne in 625, the *Zuozhuan* says "[he] gave his heir apparent's household wealth to Pan Chong and made him Grand Tutor and Chief of the Royal Guard."¹⁹⁴ 以其爲太子之室與潘崇，使爲大師，且掌環列之尹。 Both of these positions were on the royal household staff. As the closest confidante and chief minder of King Mu, the usurper, Chong joined the chief minister in 616 to lead attacks on the Man Yi state of Jun 麋.¹⁹⁵ Still serving in 613

¹⁹⁴ ZZS 18:5b-6b (299, Wen 1).

¹⁹⁵ ZZS : 19b:1a (328, Wen 11).

after the succession of King Zhuang, who came to the throne as a minor, Pan Chong and the chief minister again led troops in battle, this time against Shu 舒 states.¹⁹⁶

Pan Chong was succeeded by his son, Pan Wang 潘 尅 (fl. 611-597), who also served close to the king. When the Rong, Man, and Pu people took advantage of a severe famine in Chu in 611 to stage a major rebellion against it, Wang, who is called Tutor Shu 師 叔 in the anecdote,¹⁹⁷ drew upon historical precedents to devise and justify a strategy that ultimately resulted in quelling the rebellion and a covenant between King Zhuang and the Mans 蠻 氏.¹⁹⁸ In 597 King Zhuang led a siege of the capital of Zheng, then negotiated peace with its ruler and withdrew a short distance. Pan Wang went into the capital to execute the peace covenant and brought out Ziliang 子 良 as hostage.¹⁹⁹ Later in the year on the eve of the famous battle of Bi between Chu and Jin, which had come to the rescue of Zheng, after commenting on the preparedness of the king's chariot units and his "inner officers", the commander-in-chief of the Jin forces said, "Ziliang is Zheng's finest, [and] Tutor Shu is Chu's noblest. [Since] Tutor Shu entered to make the covenant, [and] Ziliang is in Chu, Chu and Zheng are intimate

¹⁹⁶ ZZS 19b:16b (335, Wen 14)

¹⁹⁷ "Shi Shu" is considered by Qing scholar Liang Lusheng to be the style name of Pan Wang (see Yang Bojun's commentary in CCZZZ 3:1093). Following the naming custom described by He Hao (1993), Shishu could not be the style name of Pan Wang for there is no correspondence between the meaning of *wang* 尅 ("sickly, crippled, emaciated") and *shishu* ("tutor, teach" + "younger brother"). Here "shi" is taken as the name of Pan Wang's office because he is identified as Tutor Shu after his father disappeared from the historical record, perhaps having died and vacated the office of grand tutor. Moreover, Pan Wang's role on this occasion had tutorial overtones, and he was clearly in a position close to the king for the remainder of his official career.

¹⁹⁸ ZZS 20:2b-4b (346-47, Wen 16).

¹⁹⁹ ZZS 23:2a-3b (388-89, Xuan 12).

indeed!"²⁰⁰ 子良，楚之良也。師叔，楚之崇也。師叔入盟，子良在楚。楚，鄭親矣。 The royal household staff of Chu dominated the leadership roles in this epic battle (see the discussion in Chapter 6 and Appendix 6) that resulted in Chu defeating Jin and establishing its hegemony over the various Spring and Autumn states. Pan Wang was one of them.

Grand Intendant

The first reference to a grand intendant in Chu is in 582 when young King Gong sent Grand Intendant Zishang 子商 on a diplomatic mission to Jin.²⁰¹ This event, which occurred when the king was eighteen years old, is the sole recorded involvement of King Gong in state affairs before reaching his majority.²⁰² While Song Gongwen places the grand intendant in the central government, a few incidents in the career of Grand Intendant Bo Zhouli, a refugee from Jin, suggest that this, too, was a royal household office.²⁰³

Grand Intendant Bo Zhouli appears in 547 during the reign of King Kang to mediate a dispute between the king's brother, Wangzi Wei, and a local administrator over the capture of a prisoner from Zheng.²⁰⁴ In this role the grand intendant appears to have been functioning as the royal household officer who was responsible for hearing

²⁰⁰ ZZS 23:11a-13a (393-94, Xuan 12).

²⁰¹ ZZS 26:27b, 28b (449, Cheng 9).

²⁰² For the age of King Gong at the time of succession, see ZZS 32:4b (555, Xiang 13). This event occurred in the 9th year of his reign. The second act of King Gong that is recorded in extant sources is in the 12th year of his reign when he had reached the age of 21 (*ibid.*, 27:5b [458, Cheng 12]).

²⁰³ In bronze inscriptions of the Zhou court, the *zai* officer appears as the director of the royal household staff; see Li Feng 1:2001-2002:32, 40.

²⁰⁴ ZZS 37:7a-b (632, Xiang 26).

cases involving household members and the public. Due to the traditionally dominant position of the royal house in the state of Chu, the alternative interpretation that the grand intendant may have been acting as a functionary of the central government seems unlikely.

During the negotiation and conclusion of the Song armistice covenant in 546, King Kang's brother Zixi (Gongzi Heigong 公子黑肱) acted as advance man and Grand Intendant Bo Zhouli attended Chief Minister Zimu, while the king himself directed Chu's participation from a distance.²⁰⁵ Thus, the armistice negotiations seem to have been controlled and monitored by the king and his men.

Chief Minister Ziwei sent Gongzi Heigong, who was now serving in the central government as palace stable master, and Bo Zhouli out of the capital ostensibly to build fortifications at three towns near Zheng, but in reality it was to clear the way for his imminent attack on the palace and usurpation of the throne in 541.²⁰⁶ In the winter Chief Minister Ziwei set out on a mission to Zheng, but before he had cleared the border, he received word that the king had become ill. Returning to the capital, he called upon the King Jia'ao (r. 544-41) under the pretense of inquiring about the latter's illness and strangled him, then murdered the king's two small sons. Ziwei forced his own brothers, Zigan and Zixi, to flee into exile. He then caught up with Grand Intendant Bo Zhouli at the town of Jia 夾, where the latter had been sent earlier, and killed him. With the potential claimants and chief defenders of the throne either

²⁰⁵ ZZS 38:7b-8b (645, Xiang 27).

²⁰⁶ ZZS 41:29a (710, Zhao 1).

murdered or dispersed, the coup was completed by burying the deposed king at Jia, the place from which the deceased's posthumous title Jia'ao 郟敖 was taken.²⁰⁷

Senior Palace Doorman

Doormen in Chu are mentioned on two occasions in the *Zuozhuan*. The first reference is in a retrospective passage about how Yu Quan was made senior palace doorman. This appointment by the officers of Chu occurred when Quan cut off his own feet after threatening King Wen with a dagger in order to force the king to follow his remonstrations. The officers also "caused his descendants to hold it." 使其後掌之。 When King Wen returned with his troops in 675 after failing to withstand an invasion by Ba to the west or southwest of the capital, Senior Palace Doorman "Yu Quan would not let him in" 鬻拳弗納. So the king went north, where he attacked and defeated the state of Huang. After the King Wen died of sickness enroute back to the capital, Yu Quan buried him, and then committed suicide and was buried at the entrance of the king's tomb.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁷ ZZS 41:29b (710, Zhao 1).

²⁰⁸ ZZS 9:17a-b (160, Zhuang 19). Yang Bojun says that Shi Qi 石乞 (d. 479) held the office of senior palace doorman (CQZZ 1:211), but this is not the case. Shi Qi was the righthand man of Wangsun Sheng, the administrator of Bai, who staged a nearly successful coup d'état in 479; he was not in the service of the king in any capacity. He was consulted by Sheng, accompanied him to recruit supporters, and advised him on strategy. When Sheng captured King Hui and locked him up in Gao Treasury 高府, the *Zuozhuan* says, "Shi Qi controlled the door (*yin men*). Groom Gongyang dug a hole through the palace [wall], and carrying the king on his back, went to the palace of [his mother] the wife of [King] Zhao" 石乞尹門。圍公陽穴宮，負王以如昭夫人之宮。 After Sheng fled to the mountains and strangled himself, Qi was captured. Subsequently, he stoically suffered death by boiling rather than reveal the burial place of his boss (*zhangzhe* 長者) (ZZS 60:4a-6b [1042-43, Ai 16]). Commenting on the Gao Treasury incident Du Yu says that Shi Qi "acted as the doorman" (*wei menyin* 爲門尹) (*ibid*, 60:6a [1043, Ai 16]), and Yang observes that he "guarded the door of Gao Treasury" (CQZZ 4:1701). This passage clearly states what Shi Qi was doing on this occasion, namely guarding the door of the treasury with a prisoner inside, but

The second reference to a doorman occurs in the *Zuozhuan's* account of Han Xuanzi and Shuxiang of Jin escorting a bride to Chu in 537, which says:

When [they] reached Chu, [King Ling] called his officers to court and said, "Jin is my enemy. If we obtain [our] will with it, [we will] have no worries about anything else. Now the ones that have come from it are a high official and a great officer. If we make Han Qi doorman and Yangshe Xie chief eunuch, [that] will be suffice to insult Jin, and we will also obtain our will, I predict! Can [it] be done?"

及楚，楚子朝其大夫，曰晉，吾仇敵也。苟得志焉，無恤其他。今其來，上卿上大夫也。若吾一韓起爲闔，以羊舌肸爲司宮，足以辱晉，吾亦得志矣。可乎。

According to Du Yu's commentary, King Ling would have cut off the feet of Han Xuanzi and castrated Shuxiang. Of course, he received counsel against it and wisely abandoned the idea.²⁰⁹

The nature of the office of senior palace doorman has been a matter of controversy from antiquity to the present. There are two possible interpretations for the title *dahun*, namely keeper of the city gate or chief doorman within the palace. The early commentary by Du Yu says, "[It] was like [our] present city gate officer." 若今城門校尉。Kong Yingda agrees with Du, who was evidently influenced by Zheng Xuan's commentary on the *Zhouli*. Zheng had observed that according to the "Tian Guan" 天官 and "Qiu Guan" 秋官 chapters, rather than criminals with severed feet, tattooed criminals were used as doormen within the palace and gatekeepers for animal pens. Of the keepers of the entrance gate to the capital, Zheng had opined, "[They],

it has no implications for office holding.

²⁰⁹ ZZS 43:8b-13a (745-48, Zhao 5).

like [our] present city gate officer, controlled the twelve gates of the royal city." 若今城門校尉主王城十二門。 Kong claims that Yu Quan was appointed as *dahun* because he was an important official and the appointment had nothing to do with the severance of his feet.²¹⁰ Takezoe says that because Yu Quan was already an important official, there is no necessary connection between *dahun* and the capital gatekeepers of Zhou.²¹¹

Liu Wenqi declares that Du Yu's commentary was wrong. He argues that "Chu's [practice of] making those with severed feet doormen differed from the Zhou institution" and cites the contention by Shen Qinhan and other Qing scholars that since the pronunciation of *hun* 闈 and *xun* 熏 could be the same, the Han dynasty office of *guangluxun* 光錄勳 and *dahun* were identical; they were controllers of the palace doors.²¹²

In our time, Yang Bojun argues that Du probably reached his conclusion based on the fact that Yu Quan had refused to admit the returning troops. For this reason, he rejects Shen Qinhan's argument as illogical. Nevertheless, he argues that in the Spring and Autumn era those whose feet had been severed were indeed used as doormen.²¹³

Each of the arguments has its own appeal, but the symbolism inherent in Yu Quan's burial in front King Ling's grave²¹⁴ and the apparent fact that Ying, the capital of

²¹⁰ ZZS 9:17b-18a (160, Zhuang 19).

²¹¹ ZZHZ 3:53.

²¹² CQZZJZSZ 177.

²¹³ CQZZZ 1:211.

²¹⁴ Yang Bojun argues cogently that the location of Yu Quan's grave was representative of the ante-chamber to the private quarters of the king, which he maintained even when on road trips away from the palace; see CQZZZ 1:211. Thus, the physical proximity between the place

Chu, was not walled until well after the time of King Wen²¹⁵ suggest that the correct interpretation should be senior palace doorman.

Historians

The offices of historian and left historian of Chu appear in the historical record towards the end of the reign of King Ling (r. 541-529). Useful insights can be gained into the nature of these two offices from references to the activities of the first mentioned occupants.

Historian Lao 史老,²¹⁶ who was very old and apparently attempting to retire from service, refused to receive Left Historian Yixiang 左史倚相 in the court of the palace. When he was informed of critical remarks made by Yixiang, the following exchange is said to have occurred:

Ziwei got mad and came out saying, "You have no grounds for calling me an old man, then dismissing me, [and] then, in addition, criticizing me." Left Historian

where the *dahun* performed his duties and where the king took his rest was certainly closer than between a city gate and the palace.

²¹⁵ See Liu Binzheng 1982 and Guo Dewei 1997:41-43.

²¹⁶ "*Shi Lao*" ("Historian Lao") appears in another anecdote, where Wei Zhao identifies him as Ziwei; see GY 17:10a (397, "Chuyu" *shang*). Whether there was an office of historian in Chu depends, in part, on how "*Shi Lao*" is interpreted. Huang Yongtang considers it to be "Shilao," or another name for the Shengong, whose personal name was Ziwei, rather than a compound of office name + personal name (625). Wu Guoyi, et.al. evidently understand *lao* 老 to be a term of respect for the elderly, for they comment that Ziwei "was an elder of Chu" (521). However, both interpretations are wrong.

He Hao shows conclusively that *Lao* is a personal name (*ming* 名) because Ziwei refers to himself as "Lao" at the end of this anecdote. He shows that according to the naming custom of Chu, Ziwei is a style name. And he establishes the fact that the office name + personal name compound was a common way of identifying Chu officials (1988:75). Contextual evidence supports his interpretation.

He makes a plausible argument that *shi* was actually Grand Historian (*taishi* 太史), for as noted above the grand marshal was simply called "marshal," and the grand tutor was called "tutor." However, since there is no reference to "Grand Historian" in Chu, it is not as convincing.

Yixiang said, "It is just because you, sir, are old that I desire to meet in order to warn you. Supposing that you, sir, were still robust and able to take care of all matters, I, Yixiang, would be running to and fro taking [your] orders, and yet [I] would not [be able to] give [all that was required], so how would I have the leisure to be able to meet?"²¹⁷

子憂怒而出，曰女無亦謂我老耄，而舍我，而又謗我。
 ○左史倚相曰唯子老耄，故欲見以交儆子。若子方壯，能經營白事，倚相將奔走承序，於是不給，何暇得見。

In his opening remarks, Yixiang clearly delineated the subordinate relationship of the office of left historian to the office of historian.²¹⁸

Continuing his comment, Left Historian Yixiang used the example of ninety-five year old Duke Wu of Wei, who encouraged criticism of himself so that he could learn from it. Enumerating those who provided feedback to the duke, he said,

[While] in his chariot, he had the rules of his bodyguards; on or around the throne, he had the regulations of the top officials; at his reading table, he had the remonstrations [of the officers in charge] of reciting admonitions; residing in his private quarters, he had the barbs of his close servants; taking care of the affairs [of state; namely war and sacrifices], he had the guidance of the musician and the historian; [and] taking leisure, he had the recitations of the musicians. The historian did not neglect to write and the musician did not neglect to recite, in order to present [their] admonitions to him . . .²¹⁹

²¹⁷GY 17:9a (395, "Chuyu" *shang*). Wei Zhao comments *mao* 耄 saying, "Eighty is called *mao*" 八十曰耄, but here it is combined with *lao* ("old") in the compound *laomao* 老耄) which means "old man." The proof is in the continuation of this anecdote, when 95 year old Duke Wu of Wei orders his government officers to not refer to himself as "the old man (*laomao*)" (*ibid.*).

²¹⁸Noting that there was preference of left over right in Chu, He Hao says that "left" in the name of the office of left historian does not imply that there was right historian and that it did not have anything to do with left preference. He argues that the "left" and "right" in the names of Chu offices simply means that the offices were subordinate to their namesakes, the chief minister, marshal, and historian (1988:76). That these terms were indicators of subordination is true, but there was a preference for one over the other in Chu officialdom; see Chapter 6 below for a detailed discussion.

²¹⁹GY 17:9a-b (395-96, "Chuyu" *shang*). Commenting on *gu shi* 瞽史, Wei Zhao says, "*Gu* is the grand musician . . . [and] *shi* is the grand historian" 瞽，樂太師。史

在輿有旅賁之規，位宁有官師之典，倚几有誦訓之諫，居寢有褻御之箴，臨事有瞽史之導，宴居有師工之誦。史不失書，矇不失誦，以訓御之。

Yixiang's message was double edged; Historian Lao should not only listen to what he had to say, he must also perform his own duty to guide and admonish King Ling.

Left Historian Yixiang appears in two more anecdotes that suggest he was a member of the royal household staff and provide more insights into the functions of this office. As King Ling was talking with Right Deputy Chief Minister in his private quarters on the battlefield in 530, Yixiang hustled by, thus prompting him to remark: "That is a fine historian. Sir, take a good look at him. That one is able to read the *Sanfen*, *Wudian*, *Baso*, and *Jiuqiu*."²²⁰ 是良史也。子善視寘。是能讀三墳，五典，八索，九丘。 In an alleged speech that would have been made no later than 490, Yixiang is described as one of the treasures of Chu and is praised as one who "is able to preach and expound the standard works in order to explain all things; utilizing morning and evening, he proffers the good and the bad to our ruler, causing him not to forget the affairs of our former kings. . . ." ²²¹ 能道訓典，以敘百物，以朝夕獻善敗于寡君，使寡君無忘先君之業。

，太史也 (*ibid.*). The base meaning of *gu* is "blind." According to Zheng Xuan, blind men were employed as musicians (ZLZS 17:8b [262]). Describing how the king of Zhou pacified the rulers of the various state, the "Qiuguan" chapter of the *Zhouli* says, "In the ninth year, [he] gathered the musicians and historians (*gu shi*), who declared the writing on the documents and distinguished sounds" 九歲，屬瞽史，諭書名，聽聲音 (*ibid.*, 37:20b [565, text and Zheng commentary]). There is, however, no sign that the holders of musician offices in Chu were blind; see discussion of musicians below.

²²⁰ ZZS 45:36b-37a (794-95, Zhao 12).

²²¹ GY 18:8a-b (415-16, "Chuyu" *xia*).

Thus, the abilities of the left historian, as exemplified by Yixiang, were known by the king because it was a pedagogical staff position close to him.

Artisan Master

In the historical record, the artisan master is referred to by the title of *gongyin* 工尹 on all occasions but one.²²² In the sole exception under the year 605, the *Zuo zhuan* uses the term *gongzheng* 工正.²²³ Gu Donggao takes *gongyin* and *gongzheng* to be the same office, listing this office along with the *gongzheng* offices which existed in a number of other Spring and Autumn Era states.²²⁴ Because *gongyin* is first used in 617,²²⁵ Takezoe also considers *gongzheng* to be the same office as *gongyin*.²²⁶ Since *yin* 尹 and *zheng* 正 both mean "to supervise," the two words are clearly interchangeable;²²⁷ so the assumption that *gongyin* and *gongzheng* refer to the same office is on safe philological ground. Because *yin* was commonly used in official titles in Chu, there is reason to believe that the proper name of this office was *gongyin* and that the use of *gongzheng* in 605 is an interpolation by the *Zuo zhuan* compiler(s) or later copyists, perhaps under the influence of the use of *gongzheng* by other states. Therefore, here *gongyin* and *gongzheng* are accepted as interchangeable and names for a single office.²²⁸

²²² ZZS 19a:24a (322, Wen 10), 23:17a (396, Xuan 12), 28:10a (476, Cheng 16), 45:36b (794, Zhao 12), 48:21b (844, Zhao 19), 52:16a (907, Zhao 27), 60:13a (1047, Ai 18).

²²³ ZZS 21:21a (370, Xuan 4).

²²⁴ CQDSB 10:25a-26a (1250).

²²⁵ ZZS 19a:24a (322, Wen 10).

²²⁶ ZZHJ 10:27).

²²⁷ EYZS 3:14b (43, text and commentary).

²²⁸ For a discussion of the evolution role of the artisan master of Chu during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States eras, see Cook 1995:264-69.

When Dou Ziyang was made chief minister in ca. 611, Dou Ziyue was appointed marshal, and Wei Jia was made artisan master. Then, in the same year after the execution of Ziyang as the result of alleged slander by Wei Jia, Ziyue advanced to chief minister, and Wei Jia became grand marshal.²²⁹ From these changes, the conclusion could be made that the artisan master was a subordinate of the grand marshal and in line for advancement to that position.²³⁰

This conclusion would, however, be erroneous for a number of reasons. First, since the positions previously held by Ziyang and Ziyue are not known, there is no basis for assuming that the appointment of Ziyang as chief minister created the grand marshal opening for Ziyue and that the latter assignment opened the position of artisan master for Wei Jia. The appointment of Ziyang and Ziyue was probably more heavily influenced by the fact that their fathers had formerly served respectively as chief minister and grand marshal²³¹ than by the structural proximity of their previous positions to their new assignments. Second, the advancement of Wei Jia to grand marshal is the only clear-cut example of this type, it can only be viewed as coincidental at best, rather than as evidence of a regular structural relationship between the two offices. Third, the revelation of appointments and changes which occurred in ca. 611 is given as background for the murder of Wei Jia and the rebellion by Ziyue against the

²²⁹ ZZS 21:21a-b (370, Xuan 4).

²³⁰ Liu Xianmei interprets this sequence of appointments to mean that the rank of the offices of marshal and artisan master were equal in a forced argument to identify artisan master with the director of public works (*sikong* 司空) and show that the structure of Chu officialdom was originated in the Six Offices (*liuguan* 六官) of the Zhou court (1982:59).

²³¹ CQSZP 47a (Dou pedigree).

king in 605; therefore, one cannot confidently assume that it is a straightforward account of appointments in 611. Other appointments or changes may have taken place but been omitted from the *Zuozhuan* account because the individuals concerned were not principals in the chaotic situation in 605. Thus, the appointments that were made prior to the demise of Ziyang in 611 cannot be used in conjunction with those that followed in order to establish the existence of a structural relationship and promotion pattern that connects the offices of artisan master and grand marshal in the central government.

A former marshal, Dou Zixi, was appointed artisan master in 617 under circumstances which clearly suggest that this office was part of the royal household staff.²³² Following the humiliation of Chu by Jin in 632 during the battle at Chengpu, Marshal Zixi was demoted to the post of Shang administrator (*Shanggong*), a local position away from the capital. When he returned to the capital sixteen years later to voluntarily seek execution in order to put to rest rumors that he was going to flee into exile, King Mu, as if to demonstrate his confidence in the good faith of Zixi, made him artisan master.²³³ Zixi had been completely removed from central government office and was now brought into the king's employ.

²³² Keightley 1969 provides detailed treatment of the office of artisan during the Shang and Western Zhou periods. He finds that artisans were attached to the king and, in some cases, the royal temple. He suggests the possibility that artisans were members of occupational clans. The office of artisan master in Spring and Autumn Chu was not hereditary, although there may well have been hereditary artisans in skill positions such as jade master (see Appendix 5). Cook 1995 argues from bronze inscriptions that the artisan master took over the ritual functions of the scribe (historian) in Chu during the Warring States era.

²³³ ZZS 19a:23b-24b (322, Wen 10).

Further evidence for artisan master as a royal household staff position is found in accounts of the activities of artisan masters in the battlefield. For example, during the battle at Bi, which was executed mainly by the king's men in 597, the king sent the artisan master with troops in hot pursuit of the Lower Army of Jin.²³⁴ In the battle at Yanling in 575, during which the king and his personal troops constituted a discrete component of the Chu force, the artisan master was sent by the king to inquire about the strange behavior of a Jin officer who would step down from his chariot and run away every time he saw the king during battle.²³⁵

Artisan masters also appear in the historical record during periods of domestic political turmoil. With the central government in disarray in 523, the artisan master is shown on assignment to relocate certain population.²³⁶ And in 478, the year after the chief minister and the marshal were murdered by Wangzi Sheng, the administrator of Bai, in an abortive rebellion, the king assigned Artisan Master Wei Gu and Chamberlain Wu Youyu 吳由于 (fl. 506-477), two distinguished and loyal servants of former kings, to serve as assistants to the new chief minister on a military campaign.²³⁷ Wei Gu had previously served as remonstrance master, a lower ranking central government office with roots in and close ties to the royal household staff.

²³⁴ ZZS 23:17a (396, Xuan 12).

²³⁵ ZZS 28:10a-11b (476-77, Cheng 16).

²³⁶ ZZS 48:21b (844, Zhao 19).

²³⁷ ZZS 60:13a (1047, Ai 18).

Conclusion

The institutional framework that the king of Chu had at his disposal for governing the state included central and local government offices and the royal household staff. The highest offices in the central government were the chief minister, the grand marshal, and the *mo'ao*. They each headed a division that is made clear in official appointments that occurred in 558. Their subordinates in these divisions held middlelevel offices. There were also a number of low level offices in the central government. The leading local government office was that of *xian* (or county) administrator. An extensive royal household staff existed to instruct, protect, and serve the king and his heir apparent and to provide services to the palace and the royal house. As shall be demonstrated in the next chapter, it also provided the king with an alternative source of manpower to central and local government officers for conducting the affairs of state. Studies of Chu government must take the existence of the royal household staff and its roles into account in order to arrive at a more complete understanding of the way the king governed.

The origins of each of the highest offices have been explored. Although the office of *mo'ao* appears first in the historical record, there is good, but circumstantial, evidence that the offices of chief minister and grand marshal were older offices. The origin of office of *mo'ao* is murky at best. Judging from the titles of its subordinate offices, it appears to have originated in the royal household staff. Contrary to what some have suggested, the rise to prominence of the office of *mo'ao* at the turn of the seventh century signaled political innovation by King Wu not the creation of the office

of chief minister. There is reason to believe that the *mo'ao* became prominent in the political arena because it provided an alternative to the long established offices of chief minister and grand marshal. for the king to rely upon in governing the state.

The structural dynamics of Chu government are clearly manifest in changes in the hierarchical relationships between the high offices and among the subordinates of the chief minister and the grand marshal. Prior to 690 the hierarchical relationship between the chief minister and the *mo'ao* was ambiguous, but after that year there is no doubt that the chief minister sat at the top of the central government and was followed in descending order by the grand marshal and the *mo'ao*. The subordinates of the chief minister and the grand marshal were distinguished as left and right offices. During the 7th and first part of the 6th centuries, the left office was superior to the right one. However, by the time of the appointments in 558 the right office was superior to the left one. This shift occurred as the outcome of fierce personal competition between the chief minister and the grand marshal that intensified in 595 when the latter was passed over in the appointment of the former. It culminated in 575 during the Battle of Yanling when the grand marshal was assigned to lead the center army and chief minister the left army, a command assignment that he had previously performed as left deputy chief minister. Thereafter, the right deputy chief minister was superior to the left deputy chief minister. The same shift in superiority seems to have occurred among the subordinates of the grand marshal although it may not have been permanent.

Chapter 6

Government Operation

The historical record of military, diplomatic, and domestic events that transpired during the Spring and Autumn era provides valuable insights into the operation of Chu government. In this chapter I focus on providing answers to the following questions: How active were the kings in day to day government operations? What were the social bases for recruitment of officials for central and local government positions and the royal household staff? How and by whom were appointments and promotions made? What evidence is there for systematic appointments and promotions? To what extent and at what levels are there signs of specialization in the duties of offices? Who were decision makers and how were decisions made? How were officials accountable for the performance of their assignments? How well-developed was officialdom? What evidence exists for competition within its ranks? Why and how was the royal household staff employed in the affairs of state?

The picture that emerges is one of government as a royal enterprise. The kings were generally in charge of all of the domestic, military, and foreign affairs of state. They ruled through a government structure that was staffed by officers who were selected primarily from among their own agnatic kinsmen or, in exceptional cases, through the royal household staff who were mostly of non-royal background. During

periods when a minor was enthroned, the role of the king in government was diminished, but mature kings who had the ability and will to rule were the ultimate governors of the state. Nevertheless, with only a few exceptions, kings did not exercise their authority arbitrarily as they appointed officers and directed government.

By virtue of descent from a former ruler, royal agnates were eligible for appointment, but, with one exception, lineages, either royal or non-royal, were not able to secure the right of appointment to high government offices. From the beginning to end of the Spring and Autumn era, the royal house maintained its grip on the throne, the king governed the state, the royal agnates assisted him, and, overall, the political role of lineages was not as significant as it was in other states.

Court Politics

Barry B. Blakeley's 1992 study of Chu court politics, which was summarized at the beginning of this dissertation, argues against the kinds of findings that I have just enumerated. Therefore, before I proceed to present my case, I need to comment on his approach. In my opinion his long-running work on the social composition of power in court politics has conceptual and methodological problems that adversely affect his analysis and conclusions.

While he offers an untraditional definition of "clan," his definition of "lineage" assumes the traditional definitions of *xing* ("clan") and *shi* ("lineage"), which are themselves wrong as I argue in Appendix 3. In trying to separate himself from the prevailing view of Chu politics, he includes the "hereditary lord" in his definition of

"main lineage," defining it in the same terms that I have defined "royal house" (*wangshi*) above, yet he speaks of the main lineage in opposition to the ruler. This has the effect of exaggerating tension within the ruling house.

In the chronological overview of Chu politics, Blakeley's operative assumptions are: (1) the political interests of the king and the lineages of the royal clan were inherently at odds; (2) all appointees from the main lineage or collateral lineages and independent clans served as representatives of their respective lineages and clans; and (3) the number of lineage members appointed plus the levels of their offices can be equated with lineage dominance of the court. In my opinion these assumptions are not valid.

The roles of the members of the royal house and royal lineages in managing the succession of kings (see Chapter 2 above) and governing in regency and post-regency periods (see below) reveal deeply shared common interests in preserving the right of the royal house to rule and the attendant benefits that accrued to the royal agnates. The historical evidence for appointments shows that lineages in Chu, even the mighty Dou lineage, were unable to establish the right of appointment to offices (see below). Men of lineage served at the will of the king in their capacity as individuals not as representatives of their lineages.

Blakeley's statistical technique for assessing the significance of the "lineage composition" of the roster of court offices, which is weighted for different levels of offices, is problematic.¹ As "high officials," he counts marshal (*sima*, whether this

¹ Blakeley 1970:97 (note 6).

includes all types is unclear), director of masses (*situ*), artisan master (*gongyin* and *gongzheng*), chief minister (*lingyin*), *mo'ao*, right deputy chief minister (*youyin*), and left deputy chief minister (*zuoyin*), left historian (*zuoshi*), and divination master (*buyin*). "Crucial officials" include all of these offices except the last two. All offices not mentioned are evidently lumped together.² Thus, his calculations are based on a confusion of offices at different levels and in different institutions.

In his 1992 study, he has mistakenly considered the left and right subordinates of the chief minister and the grand marshal to be "upper level offices" and *mo'ao* to be "an office of secondary rank." Regarding the "lesser offices" of the Chu court, he comments: "From the titles, some offices seem concerned with state administration; others, with running the royal household. In practice, however, there was no strict distinction between the two spheres in the Ch'u political system at this stage of its development."³ As shall be illustrated below, by minimizing the distinction between offices in the state administration and on the royal household staff and not taking it into account, he has missed two important dynamics of Chu politics, namely the differences in the social bases of recruitment for government offices and royal household staff and the King's use of royal household staff officers as alternatives to government officials in administering the affairs of state.

Blakeley's focus on the lineage composition of the roster of court officials and those who caused its configurations (of which there is much room for discussion) is too

²Blakeley 1977a:216-19. The results attained by this statistical technique are used in this and his earlier and later works on court politics during the Spring and Autumn era.

³Blakeley 1992:5-6 (note 27).

narrow to arrive at a complete understanding of Chu politics and the power relationships that are manifest in it. By not considering all contextual data for the participation of the king and his officers in day to day government operations, the decision making process, and dispensing of rewards and punishments, as well as the various power struggles among strong willed officers for influence with the king, he has overlooked crucial information for understanding the full extent of the king's governance.

I will now provide an analysis of these data in order to clarify the relationship between kinship and government in Chu and to establish the roles that the king and his officers played in governing the state. In the course of this discussion the nature and dynamics of court politics will become clear.

Royal Activity

The ability of the king of Chu to participate in government operations was affected by his age at succession. At least six of the twelve kings whose enthronement is noted in the *Spring and Autumn Annals* and/or in the *Zuozhuan* were enthroned as minors. As shown in Table 9 below, most of the kings who had reached their majority prior to enthronement actively governed the state from the early years of their reigns, while young kings did not become active until they had reached their majority.

In the day to day conduct of the affairs of state, mature kings were either conspicuously in the forefront of activity or loomed prominently in the background. As shall become evident in the remainder of this chapter, the kings were fully engaged in

domestic government, appointing, promoting, rewarding, and disciplining officials, making decisions in all of the major areas of government activity, parceling out diplomatic, military, and domestic assignments to officers as they say fit. Because of the omnipotence of most mature kings, one cannot safely assume that officials ever acted entirely on their own in the performance of official duties.

Table 9. Kings of Chu: First Year of Government Activity

King	First active	Years elapsed	Age at succession
King Wen (r. 689-675)	689	0	
Du'ao (r. 674-672)	No recorded activity	NA	8
King Cheng (r. 671-626)	656	15	9
King Mu (r. 625-614)	618	7	
King Zhuang (r. 613-591)	611	2	under 20
King Gong (r. 590-560)	579	11	10
King Kang (r. 559-545)	559	0	
Jia'ao (r. 544-541)	543	1	
King Ling (r. 540-529)	540	0	
King Ping (r. 528-516)	528	0	
King Zhao (r. 515-489)	506/5	9/10	6 or 7
King Hui (r. 488-432)	479	9	ca. 13

Source: *Zuozhuan*

When the king participated in military campaigns, he usually directed the action at a safe distance. Some examples: When the Rong and Man took advantage of a major famine in Chu in 611 to rebel against it, King Zhuang went to the battlefield and directed the deployment of the Chu force as it extinguished the rogue state of Yong.⁴ In 598 King Zhuang waited at Yan while Right Deputy Chief Minister Zizhong led an

⁴ZZZS 20:2b-4b (346-47, Wen 16).

incursion into Song.⁵ When King Ling led the various rulers and the Eastern Yi on a military campaign in 537 to repay Wu for invading Chu, he stayed behind at the bend of the Luo River while his troops crossed over to engage the enemy without success. Afterwards, he gathered the troops for inspection at Shiji Mountain and led most of them back to Chu.⁶ While "hunting" at Zhoulai in 530, King Ling camped at Yingwei from whence he ordered the siege of the capital of Xu. During the siege, he camped at Qianxi to provide assistance to the troops.⁷

The kings of Chu also directed interstate covenant making from behind the scenes. A detailed example is found in the account of the conduct of the armistice of 546. The armistice was brokered by Xiang Xu of Song, who was friends with Chief Minister Qu Jian of Chu and Zhao Meng, the commander-in-chief of Jin. During preliminary negotiations on difficult protocol issues, the chief minister sent a courier to King Kang asking his direction on how to proceed.⁸ Following the covenant, which was made between the ruler of Song and the officers of the various states, the chief minister returned and reported to King Kang, and the two reviewed and evaluated the proceedings.⁹ Thus, from the beginning to the end of the covenant process, King Kang directed the affair from behind the scenes. If this was the case during a reign of a weak king,¹⁰ it was surely the pattern during the reigns of stronger kings.

⁵ ZZS 22:15b (383, Xuan 11).

⁶ ZZS 43:13b-15a (748-49, Zhao 5).

⁷ ZZS 45:34a-b (793, Zhao 12).

⁸ ZZS 38:7b-8a (645, Xiang 27).

⁹ ZZS 38:17a (650, Xiang 27).

¹⁰ ZZS 34:14b-15a (590-91, Xiang 21).

Social bases of recruitment

Central and local government and royal household staff officials who were at the beck and call of the king were recruited from various social backgrounds. An officer of Jin is said to have made the following observation about Chu: "As to its ruler's selections, within [his] clan surname (*xing*) [he] selects among [those who are] close relatives, and outside [his] clan surname [he] selects among [those who descend from] former [loyal officials]" 其君之舉也，內姓選於親，外姓選於舊。¹¹ Thus, the manpower pool from which the king drew may be divided into two basic groups, namely royal agnates and persons who were unrelated to the royal line. "Royal agnates" is used here to refer to members of the royal house (uncles, brothers, and sons of the reigning king and grandsons of his immediate predecessor) and of the royal lineages that were descended from former kings. Individuals who are not descended from rulers of Chu are referred to as "non-royals."

Central government appointments in Chu during the Spring and Autumn Era are summarized below in Table 10, where data are subdivided chronologically according to obvious shifts in the sources of recruitment. The most striking characteristics of appointments during the period are the dominant status of royal agnates (fifty-nine of eighty-one, or 83.1 percent, of recorded appointments) and the alternation of favor between members of the royal house and the royal lineages. A closer look at each sub-period will provide better understanding of the recruitment dynamics that are evident in these figures.

¹¹ ZZS 23:6b (390, Xuan 12).

Table 10. Central Government Appointments by Social Status, 706 - 479

Period	Royal		
	Royal House	Lineages	Other
706-605	4	14	1
604-551	15	4	2
550-479 ^a	6	16	9
Totals	25	34	12
Percent	35.2	47.9	16.9

Source: *Zuozhuan*.

^aDoes not include appointments of Gongzi Xi as chief minister and Gongzi Qiji as marshal after King Ling was forced to flee the capital during the *coup d'etat* of 529. The appointments were not legitimate and were only held briefly.

From the appearance of the first reference to Chu government in 706 until the ill-fated *coup d'etat* attempt by the higher order Ruo'ao lineage in the 7th month of 605, recruitment data for central government positions are available only for the offices of chief minister, grand marshal, and *mo'ao*. The relationships of appointees to these officers during this period are summarized below in Table 11. With the exception of Chief Minister Peng Zhongshuang, a prisoner of war from the state of Shen 申, all holders of these key offices were related to the kings of Chu. During the waning years of the reign of aged King Wu (r. 740-690), two of his uncles, Dou Bobi and Dou Lian, served as chief minister and grand marshal respectively, and a son, Qu Xia was appointed as *mo'ao*. For the remainder of the period after King Wu died, all appointees but one were cousins of the king under whom they served. Members of the higher order Ruo'ao lineage, which was comprised of the Dou and Cheng lineages, monopolized the chief minister and grand marshal positions, providing nine of twelve chief ministers and

four of the five grand marshals who are known to have served during this period.

Within the higher order Ruo'ao lineage, the senior Dou lineage supplied six of nine chief ministers and all of the grand marshals.¹² With the succession of kings, the degree of blood relationship between the reigning kings and the officials whom they selected from among their royal lineages grew more and more distant.

Table 11. Chief Minister, Grand Marshal, and *Mo'ao* Appointees by Relationship to Reigning King, 706-605

Office	Relationship to Reigning King					Totals
	Uncle	Brother	Cousin	Uncertain	None	
Chief Minister	2		8	1	1	12
Grand Marshal	1		4			5
<i>Mo'ao</i>		1		1		2
Totals	3	1	12	2	1	19

Source: *Zuozhuan*.

Note: See Appendix 7, Tables A3-A5 for details.

A marked shift in the social basis of recruitment of chief ministers and grand marshals occurred after the ill-fated *coup d'etat* by the higher order Ruo'ao lineage in 605.¹³ As evident in Table 12 below, the grip of royal house on the reigns of power was reinforced between 604-552 through the selection of the uncles and brothers of the reigning kings for the top two positions in the central government. The office of *mo'ao*, which had become less important, was passed down among the descendants of Qu Xia in the royal Qu lineage.

¹² See Appendix 7, Tables 1 and 2 for details.

¹³ ZZS 21:21a-22a (370, Xuan 4).

Table 12. Chief Minister, Grand Marshal, and *Mo'ao* Appointees by Relationship to Reigning King, 604-552

Office	Relationship to Reigning King				Totals
	Uncle	Brother	Cousin	Uncertain	
Chief Minister	4	1	1		6
Grand Marshal		1	1	2	4
<i>Mo'ao</i>			2		2
Totals	4	2	4	2	12

Source: *Zuozhuan*

Note: See Appendix 7, Tables A6-A8 for details.

Table 13 below shows that the social basis for recruitment switched back to dominance by appointees selected from among the royal lineages during the reign of King Kang (r. 559-543). His father, King Gong, died after designating the youngest of his five favorite secondary sons as heir apparent. King Kang, the eldest of these sons, was installed as king by the officers of Chu, but, as events would show over the next three decades, his ambitious brothers had their eyes on assuming the kingship. In 552, the 8th year of his reign, King Kang sought to get away from having an uncle or brother as chief minister by appointing his distant cousin Grand Marshal Wei Zifeng. Zifeng, however, feigned illness and declined the position on the advice of Shen Shuyu who is said to have remarked, "The state has many favorites, and the king is weak; the state cannot be governed" 國多寵而王弱，國不可爲也. Uncle Zinan was appointed in his stead.¹⁴ Concerned by the obvious corruption of Zinan's favorite, Guan

¹⁴ZZZS 34:14b-15a (590-91, Xiang 21). Chinese and English translations of the sentence translated here render *ruo* 弱 as *nianqing* 年輕, or "young" (see ZZYW 307; ZZQY 901; Legge 5:490; and Hu Zhihui and Chen Kejong 1996.2:814-15). However, Du Yu glosses *ruo* as follows: "*Ruo* [means the king's] administrative injunctions were weak and the important officials were strong." 弱，政教微而貴臣強 (ZZZS 34:14b [590, Xiang 21]).

Qi, and the chief minister's incompetence, King Kang had them both killed in the following year. He then again ordered Wei Zifeng to serve as chief minister. This time Zifeng accepted and, following further counsel by Shen Shuyu, quickly dismissed eight of his own favorite retainers who, like Guan Qi, had accumulated wealth beyond their means. As a result, "King [Kang] was at ease with him" 王安之.¹⁵

Table 13. Chief Minister, Grand Marshal, and *Mo'ao* Appointees by Relationship to Reigning King, 551-479

Office	Relationship to Reigning King						Totals
	Uncle	Brother	Nephew	Cousin	Uncertain	Unrelated	
Chief Minister	1	1	1	6		1	10
Grand Marshal		2	1	2	2	2	9
<i>Mo'ao</i>				2			2
Totals	1	3	2	10	2	3	21

Source: *Zuozhuan*

Note: See Appendix 7, Tables A9-A11 for details.

After the appointment of six cousins as chief minister and only one uncle to the office of chief minister, this period ends with the appointment of a brother of the king, a non-royal, and a grandson of as chief minister. The final appointments for grand

This interpretation brings to mind the compound *weiruo* 微弱 which means "weak, feeble." Indeed, in the seven years of his reign preceding these events, King Kang appears to have been a weak ruler. The chief ministers dominated the government. The appointments to central government officers in 558 were calculated to please the influential people in the capital, the *guoren* 國人. Notably King Kang is not credited with these appointments in the assessment of the *Zuozhuan* compiler(s) (ZZS 32:24a-25a [565-66, Xiang 15]). Two years later, King Kang is shown sending a member of the royal household staff to challenge a decision by Chief Minister Zigeng to deny a request from Zheng for military assistance, complaining that he, the king, had come under criticism from the *guoren* for not sending the armies of Chu into battle in the five years since his enthronement, and to ask Zigeng to rethink his decision, thus squarely placing responsibility for this state of affairs upon the shoulders of Zigeng. (ZZS 33:14a-b [578, Xiang 18]).

¹⁵ ZZS 35:5b-6a (600, Xiang 22).

marshal follow the same pattern (see Appendix 7, Tables A7 and A8). In the midst of the occupation of the Chu capital by an invading force from Wu in 506, Zixi (Gongzi Shen) and Ziqi (Gongzi Jie) became chief minister and grand marshal respectively. Their appointments followed the scandalous tenure and flight of Chief Minister Zizhang of the Nang lineage who had been responsible for killing a number of able officers of Chu and allegedly weakening the ruling house.¹⁶ After Zi Xi and Ziqi were killed by Wangsun Sheng, who rebelled and took King Hui hostage in 479, Ziguo (Gonsun Ning) and Kuan (Gongsun Kuan) were appointed as chief minister and grand marshal to the positions formerly held by their deceased fathers. In the interim, Shen Zhuliang, administrator of She, who led a local force to quell the rebellion had temporarily assumed these two positions himself.¹⁷ All of these appointments occurred in the wake of major events that destabilized the state and ruling house and represent a reassertion of the dominance of the latter in a time of crisis.

Under normal circumstances membership in the royal house or a royal lineage were obviously prerequisites for the selection of appointees to the highest positions in the central government of Chu throughout the Spring and Autumn Era. Exceptional circumstances gave rise to the rare appointments of non-relatives of the king to the posts of chief minister and grand marshal. The selection of prisoner of war Peng Zhongshuang as chief minister late in the reign of King Wen (r. 689-675) was evidently motivated by Chu's drive to expand its sphere of influence northward from Ying near

¹⁶ ZZS 52:20b-21b (909-10, Zhao 27); GY 18:5a-6b (409-12, "Chuyü" xia).

¹⁷ ZZS 60:4a-7a (1042-44, Ai 16); 60:10a (1045, Ai 17).

the confluence of the Yangzi and Han rivers to the upper Han River and upper Huai River drainage basins, for he is credited with reducing the states of Shen (his native place) and Xi to *xian* status, winning the submission of the states of Chen and Cai, and establishing the borders of Chu along the Ru River, a major tributary to the Huai.¹⁸ As just noted, She Administrator Zhuliang held the positions of chief minister and grand marshal simultaneously in 479. As soon as peace returned to the capital and the state was stabilized, Zhuliang assisted the king in selecting his nephews to serve in their late fathers' positions and relinquished both positions to them, thus supporting the prerogative of royal agnates to serve in the highest posts of the central government (see below).

¹⁸ ZZS 60:9b (1045, Ai 17).

Table 14. Middle and Low Level Central Government, Local Government, and Royal Household Staff Appointments by Social Status, 675-479

Period	Offices	Appoint-ments	Royal Agnates		Non-royals	
			House	Lineage	Chu ^a	Foreign
675-479	Central Government	30	11	3	12 (8)	4
	Local Government	17	5	5	7	
	Royal Household Staff	52	2	7	42	1
	Total	99	18	15	61 (8)	5
675-605	Central Government	3			3 (3)	
	Local Government	5	1	3	1	
	Royal Household Staff	8	1	3	4	
	Total	16	2	6	8 (3)	
604-552	Central Government	10	7	1	2	
	Local Government	2	0	1	1	
	Royal Household Staff	14	1	1	11	1
	Total	26	8	3	14	1
551-479	Central Government	17	4	2	7 (5)	4
	Local Government	10	4	1	5	
	Royal Household Staff	30		3	27	
	Total	57	8	6	39 (5)	4

Source: *Zuozhuan, Guoyu, Shibei*.

^aParenthetical numbers indicate temporary, *ad hoc* military positions that are included in the count.

The statistics for recorded occupants of lower level government offices and of royal household staff positions that are summarized in Table 14 and detailed in Appendix 7 reveal a broader social base for recruitment than for the highest offices. Considering first the totals for the entire period, 675-479, thirty-three percent of appointees were royal agnates and sixty-seven percent were unrelated to the royal house, either being denizens of Chu or, in a few instances, foreigners. Whereas, seventy-three percent of the royal agnates served in central or local government offices, the latter representing the central government as *xian* 縣 ("county") administrators and gendarmes, sixty-five percent of the non-royals served in royal household staff positions. This contrast provides a striking illustration of the fact the government in Chu was very much a royal enterprise over which the kings and royal agnates maintained firm operational control. Fifty-nine percent occupancy of local government offices by royal agnates clearly reflects the strategic importance attached to a loyal, reliable local administration by the king and the central government. The fact that eighty-three percent of the appointments to positions on the royal household staff went to non-royals demonstrates the relative unimportance of those positions to royal agnates and/or the desire of the kings to keep their agnates physically at a distance. It also validates the distinction made in this study between central government and royal household organizations.

Looking at these statistics by period in the same blocks of time that were used for analyzing shifts in the social basis of recruitment in the top central government

offices, while the numbers are admittedly small, they do mirror to a certain extent the shifts that occurred at the highest level. Between 675-605 no appointees to permanent middle or low level positions in the central government are recorded. However, from 604-552 members of the royal house outnumbered their cousins from royal lineages seven to one in positions at these levels; this corresponds to the dominance of royal house appointees at the highest level during the same period in the aftermath of the failed *coup d'etat* by the Ruo'aos in 605. During the final period, 551-479, four members of the royal house and two members of a royal lineages are recorded in middle or low level central government positions.

The selection of non-royals for permanent lower level offices in the central government increased from zero to two to six over all three periods.

Taken together these developments suggest movement towards a power equilibrium in the central government between the two sectors of royal agnates. Non-royals provided a relatively neutral staffing source; consequently, they were brought into the central government in growing numbers over time. The rise in the number of references to members of the royal household staff over the entire Spring and Autumn era is largely a reflection of various kings turning to them as alternatives to central government officials in the conduct of the affairs of state (see discussion below).

Table 15. Middle and Low Level Central Government Appointments by Department, Office, and Social Status, 675-479

Dept	Office	Total Occupants	Royal Agnates		Non-royals	
			House	Lineage	Chu	Foreign
Chief Minister						
	Left Deputy Chief Minister	3	2			1
	Right Deputy Chief Minister	5	3			2
Grand Marshal						
	Left Marshal	4	2		2	
	Right Marshal	2	2			
<i>Mo'ao</i>						
	Remonstrance Master	2	1			1
	Archery Master	2		1	1	
	Palace Stable Master	4	1	2	1	
Military (<i>ad hoc</i> assignments)						
	Center Marshal	1			1	
	Right Marshal	1			1	
	Left Marshal	1			1	
	Right Army unit leader	5			5	
	Grand Total	30	11	3	12	4

Source: *Zuozhuan*, *Guoyu*, and *Shiben*.

Further insights into the social basis of recruitment can be gained by considering the social status of the holders of particular offices in central government as presented above in Table 15. The data clearly show that among the royal agnates, appointments in the chief minister and grand marshal departments were given to members of the royal house (brothers and uncles of reigning kings) rather than to their cousins from royal lineages. By contrast, the latter received appointments only to offices in the less important *mo'ao* department. As noted above, all middle and low level appointments

that are recorded follow the ill-fated, attempted *coup d'etat* by the Ruo'aos in 605; they represent an attempt by the royal house to retain control of the central government even after its grip on the top posts of chief minister and grand marshal was broken in 551.

With a few exceptions, non-royals were excluded from service in the chief minister and grand marshal departments. Only foreigners who had taken refuge or were summoned to Chu were given posts in the chief minister's department. The practice of giving asylum, rank, offices, and emoluments to officials and nobility from other states was a common phenomenon during the Spring and Autumn Era. Doing so was not merely an extension of diplomatic courtesy; it often had a strategic, ulterior motive. As noted by Shengzi of Cai when appealing to Chief Minister Qu Jian for the return of his friend, Wu Ju, from exile in 549, Chu had contributed significantly to its own woes by forcing numerous officers to seek asylum in Jin, where they were used as military strategists to administer major military defeats to Chu.¹⁹ The offices given to foreigners in Chu, however, were significantly higher than those given elsewhere to its own exiles; therefore, their utility as an alternative to members of royal lineages may have been a consideration in their selection for those positions.

Appointments and Promotions

Historical sources disclose changes of personnel in one of three ways: (1) a person is identified as an active officeholder, (2) the record simply notes that a

¹⁹ See ZZS 37:13a-17b (637, Xiang 26). Wu Ju was permitted to return and became a significant player in the regime of King Ling (see discussion below). Ironically, Ju's grandson Wu Yuan (Zixu 子胥) fled to Wu on the eve of the execution of his father and elder brother in 522 where he became the architect of Wu's successive military campaigns that resulted in the capture and occupation of the capital of Chu in 506.

appointment or promotion occurred without stating who effected it, and (3) the person making the change is identified along with the name(s) of the new officeholder(s). In the latter instances, with two exceptions, the text says that appointments were effected by the king.

As to the exceptions, both are cases of an official yielding his position to another. In the first instance, the *Zuozhuan* states that in 637 Chief Minister Dou Ziwen stepped aside and made his cousin Cheng Ziyu chief minister. When Wei Luchen's criticized the move saying, "What do you make of the state?" 子若國何, he clearly put responsibility for the change on Ziwen.²⁰ However, if the second documented case of yielding can be taken as a guide, it was not done without involvement of the king.

The *Zuozhuan* says that when Administrator of Bai Wangsun Sheng killed Chief Minister Zixi and Grand Marshal Ziqi 子期 in 479, "[Administrator of She] Zhuliang held the 'two matters.' When the capital was peaceful, he caused Ning to become chief minister and caused Kuan to become [grand] marshal."²¹ 諸梁兼二事。國寧，乃使寧爲令尹，使寬爲司馬。A fuller account of this event relates:

When King [Hui] and Administrator of She cast lots for Ziliang to become chief minister, *Shenyin* Zhu said, "'Auspicious.' [It] transcends his intentions." The Administrator of She said, "When the king's son, such a one, assists the state, after that what will he do?" On another day, [they] changed to divine for Ziguo and made him chief minister.²²

²⁰ ZZS 15:7a (250, Xi 23).

²¹ ZZS 60:6b-7a (1043-44, Ai 16).

²² ZZS 60:10a (1045, Ai 17).

王與葉公杖卜子良以爲令尹，沈尹朱曰吉。過於其志。葉公曰王子而相國，過將何爲。他日改卜子國而使爲令尹。

Another allusion to this event states,

Earlier at the time of the divination of Left Marshal Ziguo, Guan Zhan said, "It is] just like his intention." Therefore, [the King] appointed him. Coming to the time that the Ba troops arrived, [Guan Zhan?] was going to divine a commander. King [Hui] said, "Ning's [divination] was 'just like his intention,' why divine about it? [Then he] ordered [Ning] to lead the troops and move out."²³

初右司馬之卜也，觀瞻曰如志。故命之。及巴師至，將卜帥。王曰寧如志，何卜焉。使帥師而行。

Thus, the appointments of Gongsun Ning (Ziguo) and Gongsun Kuan were made actually by the king in consultation with his officers and after confirmation through divination.

²³ ZZS 60:13a (1047, Ai 18). Du Yu, who is followed by Yang Bojun, says that this divination took place when Ziguo was made left marshal (*ibid.*; CQZZ 4:1713). Takezoe, however, argues that the passage refers to the left marshal's selection as chief minister (ZZHJ 30:41). The historical context in which this anecdote is related is the selection of a commander and assistant commanders for a force that was to be sent to resist an invasion by troops from Ba. This event happened in 477, two years after Ziguo's became chief minister. Therefore, Takezoe's interpretation makes the most sense in context:

The auspicious divination for Ziguo's appointment matched his political ambition; therefore, he was appointed chief minister; so King Hui saw no need to divine again about assigning him to perform the duty of chief minister in leading a force to withstand the invaders. For this decision, he earned the praise of the Superior Man of the *Zuozhuan* compiler(s), who said:

King Hui knew intentions/wishes. The *Xiashu* says, "The office in charge of divination, only when able to discern intentions, afterwards [puts] the charge to the great tortoise." Is that perhaps what it means? A text says, "An omniscient man (i.e., a sage) does not trouble [the diviner] to divine." King Hui perhaps had this [quality] in himself (ZZS 60:13b [1047, Ai 18]).

惠王知志。夏書曰官占，唯能蔽志，昆命于元龜。其是之謂乎。志曰聖人不煩卜筮。惠王其有焉。

The same process was followed by King Hui, and we can presume previous kings, in making ad hoc military command assignments. In 478, after peace was restored in Chu, he listened to Grand Tutor Zigu 子穀 and She Administrator Zhuliang argue about whom to appoint to lead a retaliatory attack on Chen, which had invaded Chu during the rebellion in the previous year. King Hui divined about it and appointed Zhuliang's candidate, the administrator of Wucheng, Gongsun Chao 公孫朝 (fl. 478). Chao was the son of the late Chief Minister Zixi (子西, d. 479), who was the leader of earlier campaigns against Chen.²⁴

Table 16. Top Central Government Officers, 701-479

First Year of Recorded Service		Office		
BC	Reign Year	Chief Minister ^a	Grand Marshal ^b	<i>Mo'ao</i>
706	Wu 35	Dou Bobi ^c		
703	Wu 38		Dou Lian ^c	
701	Wu 40			Qu Xia
690	Wu 51	Dou Qi		
676	Wen 14	Peng Zhongshuang		
666	Cheng 6	Gongzi Yuan (Ziyuan)		
664	Cheng 8	Dou Ziwen		
637	Cheng 35	Ziyu (Cheng Dechen)		
634	Cheng 38		Zixi (Dou Yishen)	
632	Cheng 40	Wei Luchen ^c		
627	Cheng 45	Zishang (Dou Bo)		
626	Cheng 46	Cheng Daxin		
615	Mu 11	Zikong (Cheng Jia)		
611	Zhuang 3	Ziyang (Dou Ban)	Dou Ziliang	
611	Zhuang 3	Dou Ziyue	Dou Ziyue	
604	Zhuang 10	Wei Ailie		

²⁴ZZZS 60:9a-10a (1045, Ai 17).

Table 16 continued

BC	Reign Year	Chief Minister ^a	Grand Marshal ^b	<i>Mo'ao</i>
597	Zhuang 17		Zifan (Gongzi Ce)	
590	Gong 1	Zizhong (Gongzi Yingqi)		
570	Gong 21	Zixin (Gongzi Renfu)	Gongzi Heji	
568	Gong 23	Zinang (Gongzi Zhen)		
561	Gong 30		Zigeng (Gongzi Wu)	
558	Kang 2	Zigeng (Gongzi Wu)	Wei Zifeng	Qu Dao
552	Kang 8	Zinan (Gongzi Zhuishu)		
551	Kang 9	Wei Zifeng	Gongzi Yi	Qu Jian (Zimu)
548	Kang 12	Qu Jian (Zimu)	Wei Yan	Qu Dang
544	Jia'ao 1	Wangzi Wei (Ziwei)		
541	Jia'ao 4	Wei Pi (Zidang)		
538	Ling 3			Qu Shen
537	Ling 4			Qu Sheng
529	Ling 12	DouChengran (Ziqi)		
528	Ping 1	Zixia (Yang Gai)		
525	Ping 4		Ziyu (Gongzi Fang)	
519	Ping 10	Zichang (Nang Wa)	Wei Yue	
506	Zhao 10	Zixi (Gongzi Shen)		
506	Zhao 10		Ziqi (Gongzi Jie)	
479	Hui 10	Shen Zhuliang	Shen Zhuliang	
479	Hui 11	Ziguo (Gongsun Ning)	Gongsun Kuan	

Source: *Zuozhuan*

^a See Appendix 8 for a reconstruction of chief minister appointments.

^b Song Gongwen argues that Cheng Dechen (Ziyu) and Dou Ke (Ziyi) served as grand marshals (1988:261-63). However, the cases that he presents are weak.

^c See Chapter 5 for the argument for these appointments.

The exercise of the power of appointment by kings who ascended the throne through normal succession was not arbitrary, being restricted to occasions when legitimate vacancies occurred. This is evident from several perspectives. First, the

tenure of sitting officials transcended changes of kings. As shown in Table 16 above, Marshal Zifan served under Kings Zhuang and Gong, Chief Minister Zinang 子囊 (fl. 576-599) and Marshal Zigeng (d. 552) under Gong and Kang, Chief Minister Zichang under Kings' Ping and Zhao, and Chief Minister Ziguo under Kings Zhao and Hui. Second, during periods of normalcy, when a chief minister was appointed during the first regnal year of the new king, it was because the former chief minister had passed away. Such were the appointments of Wangzi Wei in 544 following Chief Minister Jian's death of natural causes in the previous year²⁵ and Zixia (Yang Gai) in 528 after the execution of Chief Minister Ziqi (Dou Chengran).²⁶

Usurpers of the throne acted under no restrictions and often rewarded fellow conspirators appointment as chief minister upon successful completion of the *coup d'etat*. The appointments of at least three chief ministers appear to have occurred after this fashion.

First, Cheng Daxin succeeded Chief Minister Dou Zishang after the latter was executed by King Cheng in 626. Zishang had been accused by Heir Apparent Shangchen of quitting the battlefield after taking a bribe from Jin. In reality, he had been persuaded by Daxin to refrain from joining battle. Shangchen, whose appointment as heir apparent had been opposed by Zishang, forced his father, King Cheng, to commit suicide in the following year, and succeeded him to the throne. The date of

²⁵ ZZS 38:30b-32a (656-57, Xiang 28), 39:4a (665, Xiang 29).

²⁶ ZZS 47:4a (820, Zhao 14). Yang Gai (Zixia) is not shown acting in office until three years later (*ibid.*, 48:12a-b ((839, Zhao 17), but his appointment probably occurred immediately after Ziqi's execution.

Daxin's appointment to the position of chief minister is not recorded in extant sources (it could have occurred in 627 or 626), but taken together with the forced suicide of King Cheng, there is an appearance of collaboration between Cheng Daxin and Shangchen to clear the way for the latter's enthronement.

A more obvious instance is the appointment of Wei Pi 蓬罷 (fl. 546-436) as chief minister after his predecessor Chief Minister Ziwei killed Jia'ao and usurped the throne in 541. Pi was an able official whose display of diplomatic skills during a state banquet 546 moved Shuxiang of Jin to predict that he would become chief minister someday. The *Zuozhuan* records:

When [Wei Pi] was going to leave, he recited [the ode] "Drunk." Shuxiang said, "Mr. Wei's having descendants in Chu state will be fitting indeed! Accepting his ruler's orders, he has not forgotten to be sharp. Zidang [Wei Pi] will know power, I predict! Cleverly serving his ruler, [he] must be able to nourish the citizenry, where else will authority go?"²⁷

將出賦既醉。叔向曰蓬氏之有後於楚國也，宜哉。承君命不忘敏。子蕩將知政矣。敏以事君，必能養民，政其焉往。

Later Jia'ao sent Pi to the state of Lu in 543 to announce his succession to the throne, when the following incident is said to have occurred:

When Mu Shu asked about how [Chief Minister Wangzi Wei] was exercising political authority, [Wei Pi] replied, "I am a insignificant person, who just eats and obeys, yet [I] am afraid that [I] will not be given a charge and not avoid recrimination. How would [I] know about [exercising] political authority?" When Mu Shu persisted asking him, [he] did not tell. Mu shu told an officer, "The chief minister is going to stage a *coup d'etat*. Zidang (Wei Pi) is going to join it and help him; [he] is hiding his feelings."²⁸

²⁷ ZZS 38:17a (650, Xiang 27)

²⁸ ZZS 40:2a-b (679, Xiang 30).

穆叔問王子之爲政何如。對曰吾儕小人，食而聽事，猶懼不給命而不免淚。焉與知政。固問焉，不告。穆叔告大夫曰楚令尹將有大事。子蕩將與焉助之，匿其情矣。

Thus, Wei Pi telegraphed his future involvement in the *coup d'etat* for which he would be rewarded with appointment to the position of chief minister.

Another case wherein the participation of the future chief minister in the *coup d'etat* that brought him to power is detailed is that of Dou Chengran, who was appointed chief minister by King Ping in 529. His father, Dou Weigui, had attached him to the future king, then known as Gongzi Qiji, at the time of the latter's selection as heir apparent to King Gong.²⁹ Qiji was denied succession several times as his elder brothers and one of their sons ascended the throne before him. King Ling, his elder brother, confiscated the benefices of Weigui and Chengran and appointed the latter to the lowly office of suburb administrator on the royal household staff. Consequently, Chengran shifted his allegiance to Qiji, who was serving as administrator of Cai *xian*.³⁰ As his repressive rule wore on, King Ling's enemies multiplied. In 529, Chengran joined Qiji, Zigan, Zixi, and Chao Wu, an officer in Cai, to stage the *coup d'etat* that overthrew King Ling. After the rebel force entered the capital, Zigan, Zixi, and Qiji usurped the positions of king, chief minister, and grand marshal respectively. Qiji got

²⁹ ZZS 46:9a-b (808, Zhao 13). After recounting that Qiji, who was still a babe-in-arms, bowed twice with his hands on the jade talisman, the next sentence in the anecdote says: "Dou Weigui *shu* Chengran *yan*" 鬥韋龜屬成然焉." It reads straightforwardly as "Dou Weigui attached Chengran to him." However, Blakeley translates as follows: "Dou Weigui entrusted the boy to [his son] Dou Chengran." His translation is incorrect for "*yan*" 焉 refers back to King Ping, who was the subject of the preceding sentence.

³⁰ ZZS 46:3b (805, Zhao 13).

rid of his two brothers through a ruse in which Chengran played a key role. Qiji sent him to them claiming that King Ling had returned to the capital, he, Qiji, had been killed by the statesmen, and the masses were coming after them. They committed suicide after Qiji sent another messenger to them saying that the masses had arrived. Thereupon, Qiji ascended the throne and appointed Chengran (Ziqi) as his chief minister.³¹

Appointments were made on occasion to accommodate influential members of the royal lineages and of the royal house throughout the Spring and Autumn era. For example, when Cheng Ziyu (Dechen) returned from successive victories on the battlefield in 637, the *Zuozhuan* records:

(Chief Minister) Ziwen, considering his achievement, made him chief minister. Shubo (Wei Luchen) said, "What do you make of the state?" Ziwen said, "I did it to pacify the state. When a fellow with great achievements has no respected office, is there one who is able to be at peace? [They] are [very] few."³²

子文，以爲之功，使爲令尹。叔伯曰子若國何。對曰吾以靖國人也。夫有大功而無貴仕，其人能靖者與。有幾。

In 558 three members of the royal house and three members of royal lineages assumed key positions in the central government, appointments which reportedly pleased the influential men of the capital. Commenting on this affair, the compiler(s) of the *Zuozhuan* observed "Chu upon that occasion was able to office men" 楚於是乎能官人,³³ that is, the king was able to place the right men in office. The appointees may

³¹ ZZS 46:4a-8a (805-807, Zhao 13).

³² ZZS 15:7a (250, Xi 23).

³³ ZZS 32:24a-25a (565-66, Xiang 15).

have been right in the sense that they were suited for those positions, but the appointments were apparently made to keep those whose opinions mattered happy and pacified.

Appointments were also made on the basis of the recognized ability of the individual as in the cases of Guan Dingfu and Peng Zhongshuang. Guan, a prisoner of war from Ruo, who was selected as a military leader by King Wu, and Peng, a prisoner of war from Shen, who was appointed chief minister by King Wen, were remembered later as having been chosen for their "outstanding virtues" (*ling de* 令德) despite their lowly status.³⁴

During rebellions against the throne with the king not yet deposed, "appointments" were made without the king's involvement. As noted earlier, during the successful *coup d'etat* in 529, Zigan claimed the throne, Zixi became chief minister, and Gongzi Qiji became marshal, while King Ling was still alive.³⁵ Later in 479, when Wangsun Sheng, the administrator of Bai, rebelled and killed the chief minister and grand marshal, Shen Zhuliang, the administrator of She, came to the rescue and, for a brief time, held both posts before relinquishing them to sons of the deceased officers.³⁶ Given the circumstances, sequence, and speed of these events, it is likely that Zhuliang simply claimed the authority of the two offices that had been vacated by the killing of the incumbents.

³⁴ ZZS 60:9a-10a (1045, Ai 17).

³⁵ ZZS 45:5b-6a (806, Zhao 13).

³⁶ ZZS 60:7a (1044, Ai 16).

Turning now to promotions, the data for Chu are not plentiful. The previous office of only one grand marshal and one *mo'ao* is known; so the data are insufficient for studying promotion to those offices. The previous offices of only eight of twenty-five chief ministers are known and shown in Table 17 below where there is no sign of systematic promotions to this office. Rather any sitting officer in one of the three major divisions of the central government could be selected for the office of chief minister without regard to hierarchical position. There was neither systematic promotion from within the chief minister division nor between divisions.

Table 17. Previous Offices Held By Chief Ministers

Chief Minister	Previous Office
Dou Ziyue	marshal
Zizhong	left deputy chief minister
Zixin	right deputy chief minister
Zigeng	marshal
Zinan	remonstrance master
Wei Zifeng	marshal
Qu Jian	<i>mo'ao</i>
Ziguo (Gongsun Ning)	left marshal

Source: *Zuozhuan*

Although the central government of Chu consisted of a fairly well-developed official hierarchy, systematic appointments and promotions failed to develop and become established as it did in other states. Unlike in the state of Jin, for example, there is no evidence that royal or other lineages were able, in the long run, to wrest control of appointments the top offices away from the ruler and establish the hereditary

right to hold central government offices. This fact is evident above in Table 16 which shows the names of holders of the offices of chief minister, grand marshal, and *mo'ao*. The latter was the only one of these offices to passed down hereditarily throughout the Spring and Autumn Era.

Domination of the offices of chief minister and grand marshal by members of the higher order Ruo'ao lineage, particularly its senior component, the Dou lineage, from 706-605, cannot be interpreted to mean that at this time the lineage per se had secured the right to representation in the central government.³⁷ Peng Zhongshuang and Gongzi Yuan served as chief ministers between Dou Qi and Dou Ziwen. Although Dou Ziwen was later remembered for his selfless, meritorious service to the state,³⁸ his appointment in 664 came on the heels of his cousin's assassination of Chief Minister Ziyuan in retaliation for killing one of their lineage mates for criticizing his philandering.³⁹ When Ziwen yielded the chief minister position to ambitious cousin Cheng Ziyu in 637, it was case of satisfying personal ambition not because the Cheng lineage had the right of appointment to high office.

Ziyu's pride and headstrong, aggressive nature caused Chu to suffer a major military defeat at the hands of Jin at Chengpu in 632. When King Cheng pressed him about how he was going to account for his failure to the elders of Shen and Xi, Ziyu

³⁷ Blakeley says that the between the 637, when Dou Ziwen yielded the office of chief minister to Cheng Ziyu and the demise of the Ruo'aos in 605, a pattern of alternating appointments between the Dou and Cheng lineages to this office was followed. He argues that this was the result of power sharing arrangement worked out between them (1992:8-11). There is no evidence for such an arrangement as shall be shown here.

³⁸ ZZS 21:22b (370).

³⁹ ZZS 10:18b-19a (179).

committed suicide and was probably replaced briefly by Wei Luchen.⁴⁰ When Chief Minister Dou Zishang was executed by King Cheng in 627, Gongzi Xie 公子變 (d. 613) evidently sought to fill the vacancy but failed to get appointed.⁴¹ Instead, as noted earlier, Cheng Daxin, the son of Ziyu, was made chief minister apparently as payoff by King Mu who hated Zishang for opposing his selection as heir apparent.

Dou Ziyue, who was the member of a junior segment of the Dou lineage, replaced Chief Minister Dou Ziyang of the senior Dou segment, when he was slandered and killed by Wei Jia in ca. 611.⁴² When Chief Minister Ziyue, whose fatal ambition was evident in his youth, led the fighters from his higher order Ruo'ao lineage in the failed *coup d'etat* attempt in 605, the remarkable influence of the Ruo'ao lineage and its segments, the Dou and Cheng lineages, that had been sustained for a century came to an end.⁴³

Eligible for high office by virtue of being agnates of the king, members of the royal lineages Dou, Cheng, and Wei lineages were appointed to the office of chief minister and grand marshal in this early period based on personal talents and abilities or ambitions and connections rather than as the heads of their respective lineages. That such was the case is clear in the history of appointments to these two offices during the remainder of the Spring and Autumn era. As can be discerned from the names of officeholders, brothers and uncles of rulers and one or a few members each of the royal

⁴⁰ ZZS 16:19a-23a, 25a-27a (271-75, Xi 28).

⁴¹ ZZS 19b:16b-17a (335-36, Wen 14)

⁴² ZZS 21:21b (370, Xuan 4). See the argument for 611 as the date of this event in Appendix 8.

⁴³ ZZS 21:21a-22b (370, Xuan 4).

Wei, Qu, Dou, Yang, and Nang lineages, served in these key offices. With the possible exception of the Qu lineage, the sole provider of *mo'ao*, no royal lineage established the hereditary right, as a lineage, for its head to hold high office in the central government of Chu. Royal descent was more important than an individual's status within his lineage, which is to say that the lineage itself did not have the right of appointment.

At least three offices on the royal household staff were hereditarily held. The office of senior palace doorman was made hereditary in honor of the extraordinary fealty of an early occupant, Yu Quan, who was appointed to office when he cut off his own feet after threatening King Wen with a dagger in order to force the king to follow his remonstrations. In an extreme display of loyalty, coupled with remorse, Quan committed suicide and was buried at the entrance of King Wen's tomb in 675 when the latter died of illness enroute back to the capital after having been turned away earlier by him. Consequently, the officers of Chu "caused his descendants to hold [his office]" 使其後掌之。⁴⁴

Musician and diviner were hereditary, skill positions that required specialized knowledge that was passed on from father to son. In 584 Zhong Yi, the administrator of Yun, was captured by Zheng and presented to Jin. When the ruler of Jin, who had him released two years later, "asked him about his occupation, [Zhong Yi] replied, "I am a musician." [The ruler] said, "Can you play music?" [Zhong Yi] replied, "It was the duty of my forefathers. How dare I have a second task?" 問其族，對曰冷人也。公曰能樂乎。對曰先父之職也，敢有二事。 When

⁴⁴ ZZS 9:17a-b (160, Zhuang 19).

presented with a lute by the ruler, he demonstrated his proficiency by playing a southern tune on it.⁴⁵ The hereditary nature of this occupation must have been a consideration in the appointment of Zhong Jian as music master eight decades later.⁴⁶ It was clearly a factor in the appointment of Guan Cong to the position of divination master in 529, when King Ping reportedly said, "Your progenitor(s) assisted making divinations" 臣之先佐開卜。⁴⁷

Decision Making

The dominant role of the kings of Chu is especially evident in the decision making process in the three major areas of government activity, namely diplomatic, military, and domestic. Diplomatic decisions involved such matters as interstate strategy, sensitive requests from rulers of other states, dispute settlement, diplomatic protocol, return of prisoners of war, and treatment of exiles and foreign emissaries. Military decisions included the military strategy, whether to attack, deployment of troops, command assignments, and tactics on the battlefield. Domestic decisions dealt with rewards for meritorious service, punishment of officials for offenses or failures, marriage of the heir apparent, preventing officers from seeking asylum in another state, allowing exiled officers to return, homeland security, peace and order, managing the king's health, selection of posthumous names for a deceased king, and royal succession.

⁴⁵ ZZZS 26:16a (443, Cheng 7); 26:25b-26a (448, Cheng 9).

⁴⁶ ZZZS 54:25b (952, Ding 4), 55:4a (959, Ding 5).

⁴⁷ ZZZS 46:8a-b (807, Zhao 13). No Guan is shown performing or in charge of divination in Chu prior to Cong. However, Guan Zhan was involved later when King Hui divined the appointment of Left Marshal Ziguo; see ZZZS 60:13a (1047, Ai 18). The absence of references to ancestors of Cong in divining roles is not fatal, for we do not have a complete daily record of official activities in Chu.

Table 18. Decision Makers by Reign and Type of Decision, 706-477

Reign	Type of Decision			Ratio (King:Officers)
	Interstate	Military	Domestic	
King Wu (740-690)	K1	K2, MA1		3:1
King Wen (r. 689-675)	K1			1:0
Du'ao (r. 674-672)		No recorded events		
King Cheng (r. 671-626)		K1, CM1	K1	2:1
King Mu (r. 625-614)		K1		1:0
King Zhuang (r. 613-591)	K3 GM1	K1, Of2	K2	6:3
King Gong (r. 590-560)				
590-587	"K1," Of1		"K1"	0:3
576-564		K3		3:0
560	CM1	GM1	CM1	0:3
King Kang (r. 559-545)	K1, CM1	K1, CM2	K1, GI1	3:4
King Jia'ao (r. 544-541)	Of1			0:1
King Ling (r. 545-529)	K4		K1	5:0
King Ping (r. 528-516)	K3	K2	K5	10:0
King Zhao (r. 515-489)				
516-506		"K1," CM1	CM1	0:3
505-489		K1	K4	5:0
489 (King dead)			KB1	0:1
King Hui (r. 488-432)				
480		CM1	CM2	0:2
479-477		K2	K1	2:0
Ratio (King:Officers)	13:6	13:10	15:7	39:12

Source: *Zuozhuan*

Legend: K=king, KB=king's brothers, CM=chief minister, GM=grand marshal, MA=*mo'ao*, GI=grand intendant, Of=officers

Anecdotal data where the decision maker is explicitly identified or can be safely inferred in each major area of government activity are summarized above in Table 18.

Before proceeding, the observation must be made that in the table decisions attributed to boy kings at a tender age are noted by quotations marks and counted as decisions made by officials, who were either their tenders or central government leaders.

The decisions in question are as follows: In 590/89 King Gong, who was a ten or eleven year old, is reported to have turned down Grand Marshal Zifan's request to pay a heavy bribe to Shengong Wuchen to prevent him from fleeing the state with the beautiful Xia Ji, whom Zifan also wanted to take to wife.⁴⁸ When King Gong was only thirteen years old, Zifan is said to have deferred resolution of a suit brought before him by the rulers of Zheng and Xu to the king and his officials (*ersanchen* 二三臣) saying "If you will plead your case before my ruler, my ruler and [his] officers will hear together what you two rulers desire to achieve, [then] a decision can be taken. If not, then I am not up to knowing the solution for your states."⁴⁹ 君若辱在寡君，寡君與其二三臣共聽兩君之所欲成，其可知也。不然，側不足以知二國之成。The officers were the key. Finally, eleven year old King Zhao is alleged to have ignored the advice by Left Deputy Chief Minister Zixi, who was his elder brother, against using two exiled sons of the ruler of Wu to attack it in 512.⁵⁰ The actual decision makers in all of these instances would have been officials rather than the king.

At the highest level of generalization, the recorded decisions by the kings of Chu outnumber those made by officials by a ratio of nearly 2:1 during the entire Spring and

⁴⁸ ZZS 25:19a-20a (428, Cheng 2).

⁴⁹ ZZS 26:7a-8a (439, Cheng 4).

⁵⁰ ZZS 56:15b-16b (928, Zhao 30).

Autumn Era. However, the breakdown of decision making data for the reigns of young kings Gong, Zhao, and Hui reveal that officers, overwhelmingly the chief minister, were the principal decision makers during their minority years by a ratio of 0:8 (king to official). Such was also the case in the interregnum between the death of a king and the enthronement of his successor as decisions about succession issues and state business had to be made by officers and close agnates of the king. Subtracting the forgoing decisions by officers (twelve), the ratio of recorded decisions by mature kings (forty-two) rises to over 4:1.⁵¹ When viewed from the perspective of the major areas of

⁵¹ He Hao and Zhang Jun 1984:12 enumerate the young kings of Chu. However, they do not include King Cheng. He was the second son born of King Wen and Xi Wei after she was forcefully taken as his wife in the fall of 680. Thus, the earliest possible year of his birth would have been 682, which would have made him age nine at the time of his enthronement in 671. No dated decisions are recorded during his reign until 632 when he was about fifty years old (see ZZS 16:19a-23a (271-73, Xi 28).

He and Zhang list King Zhuang as a young king, quoting a gloss by Du Yu, "[The *Zuozhuan*] says King Zhuang was still young" when he was apparently taken hostage by Shengong Ziyifu and Gongzi Xie during their rebellion in the capital a month following his enthronement (ZZS 19b:16b [335, Wen 14]). Du Yu's gloss actually states, "The *Guoyu* says, 'When King Zhuang was still young, Ziyifu acted as tutor and Wangzi Xie acted as guardian.'" 國語曰楚莊王幼弱，子儀父為師，王子變為傅。(*ibid.*)

The account of this event in the *Guoyu* says:

Formerly, when King Zhuang was still young, Shengong Ziyifu was his tutor and Wangzi Xie was his guardian; (King Zhuang/they?) ordered [Grand] Tutor Chong and [Chief Minister] Zikong to lead troops to attack the Shu. Xie and Yifu spread [blame] on the two commanders and divided their household goods. When the commanders returned and arrived [at the capital], they took the King and went to Jili of Lu. Jili of Lu killed the two gentlemen and restored the King [to His place]. (GY 17:3a-b [385-86, "Chuyu" *shang*]-text and Wei Zhao commentary)

昔莊王方弱，申公子儀父為師，王子變為傅。使師崇，子孔帥師以伐舒。變及儀父施二師而分其室。師還至則以王如廬戡黎。廬戡黎殺二子而復王。

Commenting on this passage, Wei Zhao says, "'Still young' [means] 'not yet 20'" 方弱，未二十(*ibid.*) (Some points need clarification: Ziyifu and Xie were serving as tutor and guardian to King Zhuang while he was heir apparent, while the grand tutor and chief minister

government activity, namely diplomatic, military, and domestic affairs, the kings of Chu clearly dominated decision making in every area throughout the entire Spring and Autumn era. Among the officers of Chu who are shown making decisions, the chief minister was the most prominent decision maker in each area of activity.

In the decision making process, the kings of Chu drew upon the advice of many individuals. Advisors shown below in Table 19 who advised the king directly include central government officials, royal household staff officers, personal aides, and a spouse. The apparent parity between central and non-central government (royal house and other) advisors needs to be tempered, for more than half of the references to the latter (nine of sixteen) are generated by the activities of two men, Wu Ju, who was an influential aide of King Ling, and Junior Tutor Fei Wuji, the notorious slanderer who served during the reign of King Ping. The references to central government officials and other non-central government advisors are scattered across the Spring and Autumn era.

were carryovers from his father's administration). Although this account differs significantly from the *Zuozhuan* version, which clearly shows Grand Tutor Pan Chong and Chief Minister Zikong in charge, both in taking the initiative to attack the Shu and in ordering Ziyifu and Xie to stay behind and guard the capital, it does help to explain the dominant roles of the grand tutor and chief minister and why King Zhuang was left with, and became a pawn in the hands of, his former tutor and guardian.

Table 19. Frequency of Recorded Advice by Office or Status and Major Area of Government Activity

Office/Status	Major Areas of Activity		
	Diplomatic	Military	Domestic
Central government advisors			
Chief minister	3	5	6
Grand marshal		2	1
<i>Mo'ao</i>		1	
Left deputy chief minister	1		
County administrator		1	2
Non-central government advisors			
Grand intendant		1	
Grand tutor		1	2
Junior tutor	1		4
Charioteer ¹	2		
King's favorite	4		
King's aide	4		
King's wife		1	
Office unknown		1	

Source: *Zuozhuan*

¹Shen Shushi is shown giving advice while driving the king's chariot in 594 (see ZZS 24:9a-b (408, Xuan 15). The name of his office is not explicitly stated.

As evident in Table 19, the chief minister was the most frequent advisor to the king in all major areas of government activity. However, the king, who had access to whomever he wished to listen, was not obligated to follow his chief minister's advice. On the eve of the battle of Bi in 597, King Zhuang, who desired to turn back, heard opposing arguments from his personal favorite, Wu Can, and Chief Minister Wei Ailie (Wei Ao). While Ailie urged the king to call off the campaign, Can argued for engaging the allied force led by Jin in battle. When Ao, who had apparently prevailed,

turned the troops around and headed south, Can spoke up again and convinced King Zhuang to order the chief minister to turn them around and resume their northward march.⁵² In 594 when Chief Minister Zizhong requested permission to use the fields of Shen and Lü as rewards to meritorious soldiers who had fought against the state of Song, King Zhuang agreed. However, he reversed his decision after Shen Administrator Wuchen convinced him that proceeding with the land grants would destroy the ability of the two counties to raise a military levy and thus weaken the northern defensive perimeter of Chu.⁵³ Finally, when Chief Minister Ziqi (Dou Chengran) requested permission to launch a counter attack in 528 against Wu for attacking the Chu town of Zhoulai, King Ping who had just come to power through a coup d'etat, turned him down to focus on stabilizing the domestic situation.⁵⁴ Thus, the chief minister, who appears most frequently in advisory roles, was just one among many advisors to the king, in whom the ultimate decision making authority resided.

Rewards, Punishments, and Suicides

Rewards and punishments were used by the kings of Chu to manage officials at all levels in the government and on the royal household staff throughout the Spring and Autumn era. As to rewards that are noted in the historical record, King Zhuang approved Chief Minister Zizhong's request in 594 to reward meritorious officers with fields from the counties of Shen and Lü.⁵⁵ In 548, when King Kang rewarded Chief

⁵² ZZZS 23:10b (392, Xuan 12).

⁵³ ZZZS 26:16a-b (443, Cheng 7).

⁵⁴ ZZZS 46:21b-22a (814, Zhao 13).

⁵⁵ ZZZS 26:16a (443, Cheng 7).

Minister Zimu for extinguishing the state of Shujiu, Zimu declined in favor of Wei Yan, giving credit for the achievement to Yan's late father Grand Marshal Wei Zifeng who had articulated the winning strategy.⁵⁶ During the first year of his reign, King Ping (r. 529-516), who had usurped the throne, sought to solidify his rule by dispensing emoluments to meritorious officials.⁵⁷ After the invaders from Wu were driven out of the capital of Chu in 505, King Zhao rewarded a number of officials for their contributions.

Dou Xin and Dou Huai 鬥懷 (506-505) were among those rewarded by King Zhao on the latter occasion. Their father Chief Minister Ziqi had been executed by his father, King Ping, in 528. When Wu invaded and occupied the capital, King Zhao had fled to Yun, where Xin was the local administrator. Xin had dissuaded younger brother Huai from avenging their father's death by killing him. The *Zuozhuan* says that when King Zhao wanted to reward both brothers, Chief Minister Zixi objected saying, "I request to set aside Huai" 請舍懷也. But King Zhao rejected him saying, "When great virtue extinguishes small grievances, it is the [Moral] Way" 大德滅小怨，道也.⁵⁸ This incident is elaborated in the *Guoyu* as follows:

King [Zhao] returned and dispensed rewards. When [he] came to Huaizi of Yun, Zixi remonstrated, "You have two officers [of whom] one can be rewarded, [and] one can be punished. If you treat them equally (literally, equate them), all officials will become afraid, I predict." King [Zhao] said, "Those gentlemen are the two sons of Ziqi. I know them, indeed. One was acting

⁵⁶ ZZS 36:16b-17a (624-25, Xiang 25).

⁵⁷ ZZS 47:2b-4a (819-820, Zhao 14).

⁵⁸ ZZS 55:4a (959, Ding 5).

properly towards his ruler, one was acting properly towards his father. Can treating them equally not also be done?"⁵⁹

王歸而賞。及鄆懷子，子西曰君有二臣，或可賞也，或可戮。君王均之，群臣懼矣。王曰夫子期之二子耶。吾知之矣。或禮於君，或禮於父。均之不亦可乎。

This and the earlier examples reveal that rewards were intended to encourage both faithful service and acceptable conduct.

Punishment, on the other hand, was used to maintain discipline within the ranks of officialdom. The rationale for its use in Chu can be gleaned from several anecdotes in the *Zuozhuan*. Fearing that *Mo'ao* Qu Xia, who had been emboldened by a recent military victory, was leading troops to sure defeat, Dou Bobi advised King Wu to provide aid for the troops. When his counsel was refused, Bobi informed the king's wife Deng Man. She remonstrated with her husband explaining that, among other things, Bobi meant that he should "overawe the *mo'ao* by means [of the threat] of corporeal punishment" 威莫敖以刑 and was encouraging him to "have an audience with the *mo'ao* and warn him that Heaven (God) will not forgive deviations."⁶⁰ 見莫敖而告諸天之不假易也。The threat of corporeal punishment and divine retribution were viewed as twin levers for instilling self-discipline in an official.

The concept of divinely sanctioned punishment is articulated in two later anecdotes. When Remonstrance Master (Dou) Kehuang was passing through Song on his way back from a diplomatic mission to Qi in 605, he learned that a *coup d'etat*

⁵⁹ GY 18:7b (414, "Chuyu" xia). The *Guoyu* text interpolates 子期 for 子旗; the latter is the correct name for the father of Xin and Huai.

⁶⁰ ZZS 7:14b-15a (124-25, Huan 13).

staged by his higher order Ruo'ao lineage had failed. Responding to advice that he could not safely enter the capital, he is alleged to have said, "If I abandon my charge, who will receive me? The ruler is Heaven. Can one run away from Heaven?"⁶¹ 棄君之命，獨誰受之。君，天也。天可逃乎。 Dou Xin's rebuke of younger brother Huai in 506 clearly states the king's divine right to punish his officials: "When a ruler punishes his servant, who would dare to hate it? The ruler's orders are Heaven's. Suppose [it] is to die, Heaven orders [it]. Who will resent it?"⁶² 君討臣，誰敢讎之。君命，天也。若死天命，將誰讎。 Since the king acted for deity; his action had to be accepted. Thus, according to the *Zuozhuan*, punishment to maintain discipline and the king's right to use it were sanctioned by deity.

Evidence for disciplinary actions taken in Chu during the Spring and Autumn era is summarized below in Table 20. The king of Chu stands out as the principal disciplinarian and execution as the chief mode of punishment. One can argue that executions were more likely to be recorded by government scribes and reported to other states, as was the common practice and surely the case. Nevertheless, the king of Chu and, to a much lesser extent, his chief minister and officers, as a body, had the power to execute errant officials. Demotion is the only other form of punishment that is mentioned in the historical record and that but once. Central government officials, local administrators, and their retainers, and royal household staff officers were all

⁶¹ ZZS 21:22b-23a (370-71, Xuan 4).

⁶² ZZS 54:25b-26a (952, Ding 4). For the execution of their father, Chief Minister Zi Qi by King Ping, who was the father of King Zhao, see *ibid.*, 47:4a (820, Zhao 14).

liable to be executed for failures or reversals in the diplomatic arena and conduct that threatened the king or disrupted domestic tranquillity.

Table 20. Forms and Reasons for Punishment of Officials by Position

Year	By	To	Position	Form	Reason
???	King Wu	Dou Min	local administrator	executed	rebellion
689?	King Wen	Yan Ao	local administrator	executed	rebellion
632	King Cheng	Zixi	grand marshal	demoted	military defeat
627	King Cheng	Zishang	chief minister	executed	accused of taking bribe
617	King Mu	Zixi	artisan master	executed	plotting regicide
		Zijia	?	executed	plotting regicide
571	officers of Chu	Gongzi Shen	right marshal	executed	taking bribes
568	officers of Chu	Zixin	chief minister	executed	provoking Chen to rebel
551	King Kang	Guan Qi	retainer of Zinan	executed	corruption
		Zinan	chief minister	executed	incompetence
537	King Ling	Qu Shen	<i>mo'ao</i>	executed	duplicity with Wu
530	King Ling	Cheng Hu	?	executed	remnant of Ruo'ao lineage
528	King Ping	Ziqi	chief minister	executed	insatiable demands
522	King Ping	Wu She	tutor	executed	slandered by Fei Wuji
		Wu Shang	local administrator	executed	son of Wu She
515	CM Zichang	Xi Wan	left deputy chief minister	executed	slandered by Fei Wuji
	CM Zichang	Fei Wuji	junior tutor	executed	causing popular unrest
		Yan Jiangshi	right captain	executed	causing popular unrest
479	Shegong Zhuliang	Shi Qi	retainer	executed	refusal to disclose location of corpse of rebel chief

Source: *Zuozhuan*

Under special conditions, especially those involving himself, the king had the power to show clemency to officials through extending pardons. After *Mo'ao* Qu Xia and his troops were defeated by Luo and the Lu Rong in 690, Xia committed suicide. His commanding officers were taken into custody and held for punishment at Yefu. However, King Wu pardoned them all saying, "It was my mistake," for he had failed to heed the call of Dou Bobi and Deng Man to send supplementary troops in time to prevent defeat⁶³ When Remonstrance Master (Dou) Kehuang entered the capital and submitted himself to the director of punishment in 605, King Zhuang restored him to his position and gave him the new name of Sheng 生 ("alive, lives") in memory of the loyal service of his late father, Chief Minister Ziwen, and to encourage men of ability to serve.⁶⁴ When Zhiru Zigong 枝如子躬 reported that he had failed to perform the king's charge to return some territory to Zheng in 528, King Ping is said to have forgiven him saying, "Sir, do not be exercised. Go back for now. When I have something [for you to do], perhaps I will let you know."⁶⁵ This show of magnanimity by King Ping may have been calculated to drum up support for his usurpation of the throne in the previous year.

Later in his reign, King Ping forgave Sheriff Fenyang of Chengfu, when the latter allowed Heir Apparent Jian to flee into exile in 522 instead of killing him as ordered. The *Zuozhuan* records:

⁶³ ZZZS 7:14b-16a (124-25, Huan 13).

⁶⁴ ZZZS 21:22b (370, Xuan 4).

⁶⁵ ZZZS 46:8a-b (807, Zhao 13).

When King Ping summoned Fen Yang, Fen Yang ordered the officers of Chengfu to grab himself and present him [to the King]. King Ping said, "The words went out from my mouth and entered into your ears; who told Jian?" [Fen Yang] replied, "I told him. You, my ruler king, commissioned me saying, 'Serve Jian like serving myself.' I am not bright; [so] I am not able to be careless and duplicitous. Having clutched the first [order] and returned [with him to Chengfu], [I] could not bear the later order; therefore, [I] chased him away. When it was done, [I] repented of it, but it was too late(?). King Ping said, "How do you dare to come?" [He] replied, "Having been ordered, I neglected my assignment. [If] when being summoned, [I] did not come that would be two transgressions. Were [I] to run away, there is no place that I could enter." King Ping said, "Go back [to Chengfu] and serve in the administration as in the other days."⁶⁶

王召奮揚，奮揚使成父人執己以至。王曰言出於余口，入於爾耳，誰告建也。對曰臣告之。君王命臣曰事建如事余。臣不佞，不能苟貳。奉初以還，不忍後命，故追之。既而悔之，亦無及已。王曰而敢來何也。對曰使而失命，召而不來，是再奸也。逃無所入。王曰歸，從政如他日。

Touched by the loyalty and forthrightness of Fenyang, King Ping forgave his dereliction of duty.

The power of a royal pardon was an effective means of inculcating ties of loyalty in the recipient and their descendants is evident in a speech attributed to Taro Master Shen Hai 申亥 when he decided to give safe harbor to beleaguered King Ling during the *coup d'etat* of 528; he said, "My father twice went against the King's orders [and] the King did not punish him. What mercy is greater than that? A [true] ruler cannot be scorned, mercy cannot be abandoned, I shall follow the King."⁶⁷ 吾父再奸王命，王弗誅。惠孰大焉。君不可忍，惠不可棄，吾其從王。

⁶⁶ZZS 49:2b-3a (852-53, Zhao 20).

⁶⁷ZZS 46:6b (806, Zhao 13).

Another measure of mercy available to the king was the power to demote officials. In the only instance on record, the king had a vested interest in its use. After Chu suffered a major defeat at the hands of Jin in the Battle of Chengpu in 632, the *Zuozhuan* provides the following context for the demotion of Grand Marshal Zixi:

Earlier, Yisi, shaman of Fan, addressed King Cheng, Ziyu, and Zixi saying, "You three will all die violently." At the Battle of Chengpu the King thought about it; so he stopped Ziyu saying, "Do not die!" He did not get to Zixi in time, but when Zixi hung himself, the rope (?) broke. The King sent someone to stop him, then made him administrator of Shang (*Shanggong*).⁶⁸

初 范 巫 裔 似 謂 成 王 與 子 玉 ， 子 西 曰 三 君 皆 將 強 死 。 城 濮 之 役 ， 王 思 之 ， 故 使 止 子 玉 曰 毋 死 。 不 及 止 子 西 。 子 西 縊 而 縣 絕 。 王 使 適 至 ， 遂 止 之 ， 使 爲 商 公 。

Thus, to prevent himself from suffering the predicted fate, King Cheng demoted Zixi from the second highest post in the central government to the local office of *xian* administrator.

In addition to deity and the king, officials were accountable to their fellow men for the performance of their duties. For instance, after Jin defeated Chu in the battle of Bi in 632, King Cheng sent a messenger to ask Chief Minister Ziyu, who had troops from Shen and Xi under his command, "Great officer, should [you] enter [our state], what will you do about the elders of Shen and Xi?" 大夫若入，其若申，息之老何。 Rather than face the elders, Ziyu accepted responsibility for his failure by committing suicide.⁶⁹

⁶⁸ ZZZS 19a:23b-24b (322, Wen 10).

⁶⁹ ZZZS 16:26a (274-75, Xi 28--text and Du commentary).

The disapprobation of fellow officers was a powerful motivation for accepting responsibility. When Grand Marshal Wei Yue 蕞越 (d. 519) was unable to prevent Wu from taking away a wife of King Ping in 519, his retinue tried to persuade him to attack Wu again. But he replied, "[If] I cause the troops to be defeated again, even if I commit suicide, still there will be blame. Having lost the primary wife [of our ruler], I cannot not die for that." 再敗軍師，死且有罪。亡君夫人，不可以莫之死也。 Thereupon, he hung himself.⁷⁰

In the following year when Chief Minister Zichang succumbed to the slander and chicanery of Fei Wuji and Yan Jiangshi and killed popular Left Deputy Chief Minister Xi Wan and his partisans, the capital filled with virulent criticism of him. Left Marshal Xu confronted Zichang about all of the many misdeeds that he had committed or permitted under the influence of Wuji and Jiangshi saying, in part, "Supposing that Chu State had a major incident, you would perhaps be endangered!!! A wise one would clear out slander in order to make peace for himself. Now you are fond of slander, thereby [you] endanger yourself. Extreme indeed is [your] confusion." 楚國若有大事，子其危哉。知者除讒以子安也。今子愛讒以自危也，甚矣其惑也。 With his conscience thus pricked, Zichang replied, "This is my fault. I dare not but think carefully [about it]." 是瓦之罪。敢不良圖。 Then he had Wuji and Jiangshi killed, and the criticism ceased.⁷¹

⁷⁰ ZZS: 50:25b (879, Zhao 23).

⁷¹ ZZS 52:20b-21b (909-10, Zhao 27).

Accepting responsibility for serious failures by committing suicide was a high virtue. Following a major defeat at the hands of Jin at the battle of Yanling in 575, the *Zuozhuan* elaborates on the suicide of Marshal Zifan:

The Chu troops went back. Upon reaching Xia, King Gong sent [someone] to address Zifan saying, "As to the case of our former officer toppling the troops, our ruler was not present. You have done nothing wrong; it is my mistake." Zifan twice bowing and striking his head on the ground said, "If [my] ruler were to give [his] subject death, death would perhaps not be bad. [Your] subject's troops actually fled; it is my mistake."

楚師還。及瑕，王使謂子反曰先大夫之覆師徒者，君不在。子無以爲過，不穀之罪也。子反再拜稽首曰君賜臣死，死且不朽。臣之卒實奔，臣之罪也。

(Chief Minister) Zizhong again spoke to Zifan saying, "As to the earlier incident of losing troops, you also have heard of it, I dare say! You had better think about it." [Zifan] replied, "Although no previous officers have [experienced] it, you, great officer, have commanded me, Ce, [so] I, Ce, dare not but do [my] duty. [Can] I, Ce, having lost the ruler's troops, dare forget about his [i.e., my] dying?"⁷²

子重復謂子反曰初隕師徒者，而亦聞之矣。盍圖之。對曰雖微先大夫有之，大夫命側，側敢不義。側亡君師，敢忘其死。

Suicide was evidently regarded as an honorable way of atoning for military defeat. After losing three battles against the invading force from Wu in 506, Chief Minister Zichang desired to flee into exile. Historian Huang 史皇 remonstrated with him saying, "When there is peace, [you] seek its [the state's] affairs; when there is difficulty, [you] run from it. Where will you enter? You must die for it; your earlier "sins" will surely be expurgated." 安求其事，難而逃之。將何所入。

⁷² ZZS 28:14a-b (478, Cheng 16).

子必死之，初罪必盡脫。 Zichang, however, took a less honorable path by fleeing into exile in the state of Zheng.⁷³

Successful performance of official duties was an important issue in the operation of government in Chu throughout the Spring and Autumn era. The emphasis on performance and responsibility in Chu is well expressed in the title of the office director of punishment, *sibai* 司敗, literally, "manager of failures," which was known as *sikou* 司寇, "manager of bandits," in Zhou and other states.

The king and his officials shared a sense of responsibility and accountability for the performance of official duties. This shared understanding underpinned the king's ability to discipline errant or under performing officials and also empowered officials to administer punishment on occasion. Failure in the performance of official duties resulted in executions and suicides. While having the ability to discipline his officers, the king also had the power to pardon and to temper discipline as he saw fit.

Authority of Office Versus Personal Influence

Throughout the Spring and Autumn Era the central government was afflicted by competition for influence between the holders of high central government offices, a reflection of the personal style of royal leadership. In the discussion of central government structure in Chapter 5, note has already been made of the earliest cases involving Chief Minister Dou Bobi, Marshal Dou Lian, and *Mo'ao* Qu Xia which saw the influence of the chief minister and marshal surpassed by the occupant of the newly

⁷³ ZZS 54:22a-23a (950-51, Ding 4).

upgraded office of *mo'ao* between 703 and 699. The following examples illustrate the persistence of this state of affairs until the end of the era.

The next instance of competition that stands out occurred after Chief Minister Dou Ziwen yielded his office to cousin Cheng Ziyu in 637. As noted earlier, when Wei Luchen criticized this move saying, "What do you make of the state?," Ziwen replied that he did it in order to keep the peace. However, his reply may have been a bit disingenuous, for four years later he appears competing with Ziyu. Preparing to lay siege to the capital of Song in the autumn of 633, King Cheng ordered Ziwen and Ziyu to muster troops at different locales. Ziwen completed his assignment within a morning and "had not punished a single person" 不戮一人, but Ziyu took the entire day and had to "beat seven men and pierce the ears of three men" in the process. As a result, the "state elders all congratulated Ziwen, and Ziwen offered them drinks of wine."⁷⁴ 國老皆賀子文，子文飲之酒。 King Cheng, who, as events would unfold, probably did not care much for Ziyu, had provided an opportunity for Ziwen to show up his successor, which he did with great relish to the delight of his old cronies.

A command anomaly occurred during the battle of Yanling that reveals serious competition between Chief Minister Zizhong and Grand Marshal Zifan. On this occasion Zifan commanded the Center Army, while Zizhong led the Left Army and Right Deputy Chief Minister led the Left Army. With the grand marshal in a higher command position than the chief minister, their normal roles in the military command

⁷⁴ZZS 16:10b-11a (266-67, Xi 27). Wei Jia, who was younger, refused to congratulate Ziwen for his feat arguing instead that he had weakened Chu externally by giving way to Ziyu in the first place.

structure and government operations were reversed. This time Zifan was clearly in charge and recognized to be so. As the armies passed through the county of Shen, he had an audience with Shen Shushi who commented on the conditions needed for military success and the shortcomings of Chu, and concluded saying, "I won't be seeing you again!"⁷⁵ 吾不復見子矣。 The rivalry between Zizhong and Zifan was evidently widely known, for when the officers of Jin discussed their military strategy, Xi Zhi, who had been frightened by Zifan's antics at a banquet hosted by the king of Chu during the Song armistice process in 589,⁷⁶ is said to have observed, "Chu has six openings that cannot be neglected: [First] its two high officials hate each other . . . We can surely conquer it."⁷⁷ 楚有六間不可失也。其二卿相惡。 . . . 我必克之。 While Zifan is not mentioned in the detailed account of the battle, Zizhong appears several times in contexts which suggest that he was not content to take a back seat to his rival. Although he was not commanding the Center Army, he ordered Grand Intendant Bo Zhouli to wait behind King Gong's chariot to respond to questions as the latter surveyed the troops of Jin.⁷⁸ And when Luan Zhong of Jin saw the banner of Zizhong in the midst of the battle, he sent a man with a cup of wine to Zizhong and reminded him of an earlier conversation that they had shared concerning the fighting men of Jin. Zizhong responded by ordering the war drums to resume beating.⁷⁹

⁷⁵ ZZS 28:5a (474, Cheng 16).

⁷⁶ ZZS 27:5b-8b (458-59, Cheng 12).

⁷⁷ ZZS 28:7a-b (475, Cheng 16).

⁷⁸ ZZS 28:7b-8a (475, Cheng 16).

⁷⁹ ZZS 28:12b-13a (477-78, Cheng 16).

The next day, following a full day of battling, Zifan ordered the lesser military officers to take stock and prepare to continue fighting on the morrow. When King Gong heard that Jin had employed the tactic of releasing Chu prisoners, he summoned Zifan to plan how to respond, but Zifan, who was in a drunken state, failed to appear. Consequently, King Gong concluded that Chu had been defeated by Heaven and ordered his troops to abandon their camp and go back to Chu. In the end, even though the king tried to take the blame, Zizhong forced Zifan to take responsibility for this major military defeat by committing suicide.⁸⁰

Chief Minister Zichang (Nang Wa) faced stiff competition from Left Marshal *Shenyin Xu* who is remembered as an outspoken critic of the management of Chu affairs and a military leader. In 522 he criticized the fortification of Zhoulai against Wu by the officers of Chu when the deplorable state of domestic affairs needed rectification.⁸¹ Two years later, Wu attacked Zhouli and withstood a counterattack by Chu. Chief Minister Zixia (Yang Gai) died and the troops lost their morale. Zichang became chief minister and built a defensive wall around Ying, the capital of Chu. Xu criticized the move in a lengthy speech, predicting that the capital would be lost and arguing that virtuous government was the only thing that could protect it.⁸² When King Ping led a flotilla against the border region of Wu in 518, Xu predicted that it would

⁸⁰ ZZZS 28:13a-b (478, Cheng 16).

⁸¹ ZZZS 48:25a-b (846, Zhao 19).

⁸² ZZZS 50:25b-27a (879-80, Zhao 23).

result in the loss of territory for Chu and reiterated his charge that the domestic situation in the state needed attention.⁸³

King Ping died in 516, and the following year Wu launched an invasion of Chu to take advantage of his passing. Now identified in the office of left marshal, Chamberlain Xu led a supplementary force composed of elite from the capital (*dujunzi* 都君子) and low ranking officers of the royal calvary to resist Wu at Qian, while Zichang led a naval attack. Later in the year, Zichang succumbed to the slander and chicanery by Junior Tutor Fei Wuji and Right Captain Yan Jiangshi, and killed the close agnates and partisans of popular Left Chief Minister Xi Wan, whose suicide they had forced. With the criticism of Zichang at a fever pitch in the capital, Xu confronted him directly about this incident and for condoning a string of similar misdeeds that had been perpetrated by Wuji over the years. Persuaded by Xu and that he had put himself at considerable risk, Zichang executed Wuji and Jiangshi and annihilated their lineages, thus stilling his critics.⁸⁴

Left Marshal Xu was very active in defensive preparations and military actions connected with Wu aggression in 512 and 511, walling Yang, rescuing the state Xu, walling Yi, and rescuing Qian and Xuan.⁸⁵ Wu launched a successful drive that culminated in the occupation of the Chu capital Ying in the winter of 506. As Wu and its allies faced off with Chu on opposite sides of the Han River, Xu laid out a battle plan, telling Zichang to employ some delaying tactics, then he set off to execute his part.

⁸³ ZZS 51:4a-b (886, Zhao 24).

⁸⁴ ZZS 52:20b-21b (909-10, Zhao 27).

⁸⁵ ZZS 53:15b-17a (929, Zhao 30), 19a-b (930, Zhao 31).

However, two low ranking officials advised Zichang to attack quickly; one of them said:

The men of Chu hate you and are fond of the [left] marshal. Suppose that the [left] marshal destroys the Wu boats at the bend of the Huai and blocks the entrance to the fortification, then enters, that would amount to him single-handedly overcoming Wu. You must quickly do battle, otherwise you will not avoid [trouble]."

楚人惡子而好司馬。若司馬毀吳舟于淮，塞城口而入，是獨克吳也。子必速戰，不然不免。

Persuaded by the appeal to his rival's popularity, Zichang led his troops across the Han River and engaged the Wu troops unsuccessfully three times. In the end, his troops were routed, he fled to exile in Zheng, and Wu entered and occupied the capital of Chu.⁸⁶

Open rivalry between Chief Minister Zixi and Marshal Ziqi, both brothers of King Zhao, who was the reigning king, began as early as 505 when Ziqi boldly went against the will of Zixi to burn a Wu town, which still contained the remains of Chu soldiers killed in a previous engagement, thus driving out the Wu force that had taken refuge there. In the ensuing battles, no doubt to the credit of Ziqi, Chu repeatedly defeated Wu and forced its king and troops to abandon their nearly successful drive to vanquish the state of Chu.⁸⁷ When a Chu naval force was defeated by Wu in 504, Marshal Ziqi led an unsuccessful infantry attack against Wu. This failure on the battlefield tarnished his image in the capital, thus, giving Chief Minister Zixi, who

⁸⁶ ZZS 54:22a-24a (950-51, Ding 4).

⁸⁷ ZZS 55:2b-3a (958-59, Ding 5).

"being pleased, said, 'Now [it] can be done!'" 喜曰今可爲矣, the opportunity to relocate the capital to a less vulnerable site and make badly needed political reforms, changes which had apparently been blocked by Ziqi.⁸⁸ Thereafter, Marshal Ziqi was not put out of action; but Chief Minister Zixi was clearly in control until their untimely deaths in 479 at the hands of the administrator of Bai.⁸⁹

Competition within the ranks of the upper level of the central government structure is indicative of the early stage of structural and hierarchical development reached in Chu during the Spring and Autumn Era. After a period of uncertainty stemming from the meteoric rise of the newly elevated post of *mo'ao* at the end of the 8th Century, the chief minister became firmly established as the highest administrative office in the central government early in the 7th Century, followed in order by the grand marshal and *mo'ao*. Intense competition between the chief minister and the marshal in the first quarter of the 6th Century was ultimately resolved in favor of the chief minister; thus, it did not result in a change in the hierarchical relationship between the offices of chief minister and marshal. However, as discussed above in Chapter 5, it did cause a reversal of the traditional left/right pattern of subordination among their respective subordinates for some time, since in 575 the chief minister was assigned command of the Left Army, an assignment which he had formerly filled as left deputy chief minister, while the marshal occupied the highest post as leader of the Center Army. This and numerous other incidents of competition within the central government

⁸⁸ ZZS 55:7b-8a (961, Ding 6).

⁸⁹ ZZS 60:5a (1043, Ai 16).

reveal that, despite the existence of definite patterns of relationship between officials in the upper level, either the concept of rights and duties pertaining to particular offices was not firmly established in the minds of officeholders, or rights and duties were in fact ill-defined to the point that officials did not feel constrained by the office held, either as a matter of individual conscience or group pressure, to refrain from competing with and/or meddling in the affairs of other offices in the pursuit of influence and power.

Central Government Versus Royal Household Staff

In the history of the operation of Chu government during the Spring and Autumn era, there are at least three periods during which high central government officials took a back seat to favorites of the ruler and officers of the royal household staff. These episodes were usually, but not always, precipitated by a cataclysmic event that destabilized the royal house and/or the state.

The first period, extending from 626 to 613, encompasses the reign of King Mu and carries into the early years of his successor King Zhuang. It followed the coup d'etat of 626 that was staged by Heir Apparent Shangchen (King Mu) and his tutor, Pan Chong, and perhaps with the complicity of Cheng Daxin. As noted earlier, Daxin's flawed advice to Chief Minister Dou Zishang in 627 provided the occasion for Shangchen to accuse the chief minister, who had opposed his selection as heir apparent, of taking a bribe from the officers of Jin, for which Zishang was executed by King

Cheng. With the chief minister out of the way, Shangchen was free to make his move for the throne. The *Zuozhuan* gives the following precise of the coup in 626:

In the end, when [King Cheng] again desired to install Wangzi Zhi and remove Heir Apparent Shangchen, Shangchen heard about it and, not yet having investigated [it], informed his tutor, Pan Chong, saying, "How should [we] investigate it?" Pang Chong said, "Have [your sister] Jiang Mi to dinner and do not show [her] respect." [Shangchen] followed him [i.e., his advice]. Jiang Mi became angry and said, "Oh, you working stiff, it is fitting that [our] king desires to kill you and install Wangzi Zhi." [Shangchen] informed Pan Chong saying, "It is true, indeed!" Pan Chong said, "Are you able to serve him?" [He] said, "No." "Are you able to go away?" [He] said, "No." "Are you able to stage a coup?" [He] said, "Yes."

既又欲立王子職而黜大子商臣，商臣聞之而未察，告其師潘崇曰若之何而察之。潘崇曰享江羊而勿敬也。從之。江羊怒曰呼役夫，宜君王之欲殺女而立職也。告潘崇曰信矣。潘崇曰能事諸乎。曰不能。能行乎。曰不能。能行大事乎。曰能。

In winter, the 10th month, [Shangchen] used the palace soldiers to surround King Cheng. The King requested to eat bear's paw and die. When King [Mu, i.e., Shangchen] was installed, [he] gave his heir apparent's household wealth to Pan Chong and made him Grand Tutor and chief of the Palace Guard.⁹⁰

冬，十月，以宮甲圍成王。王請食熊蹯而死。弗聽。丁未，王縊。王立，以其爲大子之室與潘崇，使爲大師且掌環列之尹。

In addition to rewarding Pan Chong handsomely, King Mu appointed Cheng Daxin to be chief minister, thus filling the vacancy created by the execution of Zishang.⁹¹ For the duration of the reign of King Mu, Grand Tutor Pan Chong was the dominant force in

⁹⁰ ZZS 18:5b-6b (299, Wen 1).

⁹¹ Blakeley's analysis of this incident and related events overlooks the royal household staff dynamic represented by Pan Chong upon whom the then heir apparent and now king relied in taking over the throne and governing thereafter. He speaks of Pan Chong as "an independent clan upstart" (1992:12), when in reality Chong was serving on the royal household staff in an individual capacity rather than as the representative of his lineage.

government operations, sharing the stage with Chief Minister Daxin⁹² and the latter's successor Cheng Jia.⁹³

The second period was from 598-591 during the reign of King Zhuang. After defeating the *coup d'etat* that was attempted by the higher order Ruo'ao lineage in 605, King Zhuang reasserted his right to rule by evidently taking complete charge of all diplomatic, military, and domestic affairs from 605-599, for he is the only person named in action between these years.⁹⁴ In 598 central government officials reappear with Left Deputy Chief Minister Zizhong leading an invasion into Song, while King Zhuang stayed behind and waits at Yan. And Chief Minister Wei Ailie organized and supervised the walling of Yi.⁹⁵

However, from 598-594 King Zhuang is shown taking the advice of a lower level official, a personal favorite, and officers on his royal household staff. In 598 Shengong Wuchen dissuaded him from either taking beautiful Xia Ji of Chen to wife or giving her to Marshal Zifan⁹⁶ and royal charioteer Shen Shushi 申叔時 (fl. 598-575) convinced him to restore Chen to statehood status.⁹⁷ When the king's personal retinue (*zuoyou* 左右) persuaded him not to accept a request from the ruler of Zheng for

⁹² ZZZS 19b:1a (328, Wen 11).

⁹³ ZZZS 19b:16b-17a (335-36, Wen 14).

⁹⁴ ZZZS 21:22b-23a (370-71, Xuan 4); 22:3a (377, Xuan 5), 7b (379, Xuan 8), 11a (381, Xuan 9), 13b (382, Xuan 10); and GY 17:1a-2b (379-382, "Chuyu" *shang*).

⁹⁵ ZZZS 22:15b-16b 383, Xuan 11).

⁹⁶ ZZZS 25:19a-20a (428, Cheng 2).

⁹⁷ ZZZS 22:16b-17b (383-84, Xuan 11).

reduction of his state to *xian* status in 597, he sent (Grand) Tutor Pan Wang into the capital to make a peace covenant with Zheng.⁹⁸

As discussed in detail in Appendix 6, in the battle of Bi in 597, while King Zhuang paused at Yan, the royal chamberlain (*shenyin*) led the Center Army, Right Deputy Chief Minister Zizhong, led the Right Army, and Marshal Zifan led the Left Army. When Chu was about to engage the force led by Jin, King Zhuang, who initially wanted to retreat, was talked into pursuing the battle by his favorite Wu Can over the objection of Chief Minister Wei Ao as noted earlier. The junior tutor went to the Jin troops to dissuade it from battle. In the account of the battle, the only central government official noted is Chief Minister Wei Ao, who appears at a critical juncture to turn the tide in favor of Chu. Others mentioned include Pan Dang 潘黨 (fl. 597-575, the son of Grand Tutor Pan Wang), who is not identified by office, the officers of the royal garrison, and Artisan Master Qi of the royal household staff.

King Zhuang sent lesser officials Shen Zhou 申舟 (WenzhiWuwei) and Gongzi Feng on diplomatic missions to Qi and Jin respectively in 595. When Shen Zhou was killed while passing through Song, he led a force to lay siege to the capital of Song in the 9th month.⁹⁹ When King Zhuang was about to abandon the siege in the 5th month of the following year the son of Shen Zhou appealed for him to persist, and royal charioteer Shen Shushi offered him the winning strategy. Marshal Zifan reported an offer of submission that he received from Hua Yuan of Song to King Zhuang, who

⁹⁸ZZZS 23:2a-3b, 12a (388-89, 394, Xuan 12).

⁹⁹ZZZS 24:3a-b (405, Xuan 14).

accepted it and made a peace covenant with Song. After the king and his troops returned to Chu, Shengong Wuchen persuaded King Zhuang to disapprove Zizhong's request to use the fields of Shen and Lü as rewards for meritorious service in the siege of Song.¹⁰⁰

While the chief minister and grand marshal were definitely around and involved in the affairs of state during this period, lower level officers and members of the royal household staff are more visible in the historical record, thus suggesting that King Zhuang relied more heavily on them than on his highest central government officials.¹⁰¹ Following the passing of King Zhuang in 591 and the enthronement of young King Gong, the situation changed.

The third period of royal household staff ascendancy is during the time of King Ling (r. 540-529). Central government officials appear sparingly in the historical record. In his first year, Wei Pi became chief minister.¹⁰² As noted earlier, this appointment was evidently a reward for supporting the King Ling's takeover of the throne of Chu; however, Pi is shown in action only twice, first in 537 when he was sent to Jin by King Ling to fetch a bride for himself¹⁰³ and again as the leader of a military

¹⁰⁰ ZZS 26:16a-b (443, Cheng 7). This event occurred following the return of King Zhuang and his troops from Song after the 5th month of 594 (see *ibid.*, 24:9a-b [408, Xuan 15]).

¹⁰¹ Blakeley's analysis of the post-605 years of court politics during the remainder of King Zhuang's reign notes that "[t]here . . . also were more court figures than ever before from independent clan backgrounds, most notably the P'an and Wu (伍) lineages, albeit in rather inferior positions.." (1992:14-16). Here again he has overlooked the royal household staff dynamic that was most conspicuous during this period of stabilization and reassertion of the king's prerogative to rule. Many non-royals are shown in the historical record at this time because they served in low level government offices and more particularly on the royal household staff not because there was sudden rise of "independent clan" power during the reign of a "docile" king.

¹⁰² ZZS 41:30b (710, Zhao 1).

¹⁰³ ZZS 43:6b (744, Zhao 5).

force that was defeated by Wu in 536.¹⁰⁴ The grand marshal does not appear at all in the historical record during the reign of King Ling. The *mo'ao* division experienced something of a revival at this time with the occupants of three of its offices shown in active roles. *Mo'ao* Qu Shen 屈申 (d. 537) was sent on a military mission in 538 to lay siege to a Wu town,¹⁰⁵ only to be suspected of duplicity with Wu and killed by King Ling in the following year.¹⁰⁶ *Mo'ao* Qu Sheng 屈生 (fl. 537), who was appointed by the king as replacement for Qu Shen, was sent with Wei Pi to fetch the Jin bride for King Ling.¹⁰⁷ Remonstrance Master Yijiu 宜咎, a foreigner, walled Zhongli in 538.¹⁰⁸ And Palace Stable Master Qiji was captured when Wei Pi's troops were defeated in 536.¹⁰⁹

Perhaps not coincidentally, the central government official who appears most frequently in the historical record at this time is Right Deputy Chief Minister Zige, a foreigner who had taken refuge in Chu in 554.¹¹⁰ His first appearance in an official capacity does not occur until 538 when he walled the town of Zhoulai;¹¹¹ so he may well have been appointed to this office by King Ling. Also active in leadership roles on this occasion were Chamberlain She 沈尹射, Remonstrance Master Yijiu, and Peng Sheng, whose office is not named. In 533, Gongzi Qiji, Wu Ju, and Zige relocated

¹⁰⁴ ZZS 43:22b-23a (752-53, Zhao 6).

¹⁰⁵ ZZS 42:28b (731, Zhao 4).

¹⁰⁶ ZZS 43:6b (744, Zhao 5).

¹⁰⁷ ZZS 43:6b (744, Zhao 5).

¹⁰⁸ ZZS 42:31a (733, Zhao 4).

¹⁰⁹ ZZS 43:22b-23a (752-53, Zhao 6).

¹¹⁰ ZZS 34:7b (587, Xiang 19).

¹¹¹ ZZS 42:31a (733, Zhao 4).

various populations or reassigned control of territory on the northern and eastern frontiers of Chu.¹¹² When King Ling camped at Qianxi in 530 to provide assistance to a military force (led by rulers of petty states and officers of the royal household staff) that he had sent against Xu, Zige, who is the only central government official mentioned, advised him on the prospect of success in interstate affairs and gave a negative assessment of the analytical skills of Left Scribe Yixiang.¹¹³ Finally, during the tumultuous events of 529 which culminated in the overthrow of King Ling, Zige was at the king's side helping him sort out alternative courses of action.¹¹⁴

In terms of references in the historical record, King Ling relied more on personal aides, royal household staff officers, and others whose offices are not recorded than on high officials in the central government.¹¹⁵ The closest and most frequent advisor of King Ling during the early years of his reign was Wu Ju who is shown counseling him on at least seven occasions between 540 and 538.¹¹⁶ Ju, whose office is not identified, had served as King Ling's key personal assistant on diplomatic visits during his tenure as chief minister.¹¹⁷ Ju appears to have been intimately involved in the usurpation of the throne by King Ling for when the then Chief Minister Ziwei

¹¹² ZZZS 45:2a-3a (777-78, Zhao 9).

¹¹³ ZZZS 45:34b-38a (793-95, Zhao 12).

¹¹⁴ ZZZS 46:6a-b (806, Zhao 13).

¹¹⁵ Blakeley's analysis of court politics during the reign of King Ling is inadequate because he has failed to distinguish between central government and royal household staff positions (1992:19--21). The usurper king relied heavily on a few foreigners in middle level government offices and many royal household staff officers who usually were "independent clansmen" serving in their capacity as individuals rather than as representatives of their lineages.

¹¹⁶ GY 17:6a-7b (389-92, "Chuyu" *shang*); ZZZS 42:18a-21b, 26a-29b (730-32, Zhao 4). He was still active in 533 filling an assignment to increase the territorial boundaries of the state Xu (see *ibid.*, 45:2a-3a [777-78, Zhao 9]).

¹¹⁷ ZZZS 41:3a-4a, 29a(697, 710, Zhao 1).

aborted a diplomatic mission to Zheng to return back to the capital and kill the reigning king (his nephew), he continued on to Zheng. When a messenger arrived from Chu to report the king's death, Ju asked him what he would say if queried about the successor. The messenger said his reply would be, "My officer Wei" 寡大夫圍; so Ju had him say, "King Gong's son Wei was the eldest."¹¹⁸ 共王之子圍爲長。

Grand Intendant Wei Qiqiang 蘧啓疆 (fl. 549-535) also appears prominently in the service of King Ling between 538 and 535 in diplomatic, domestic, and military roles during government operations.¹¹⁹ He was appointed to the top position on the royal household staff during the first year of the king's reign. The previous occupant, Bo Zhouli, had been killed by King Ling during the coup d'etat in the previous year.¹²⁰ Other members of the royal household staff who are shown in military and advisory roles include Chamberlain She,¹²¹ Taro Master Shen Wuyu¹²² 申無宇 (fl. ca. 541-531), Noise Control Wu 囂尹午 and Grave Master Xi 陵尹喜.¹²³ Valet Xifu 僕析

¹¹⁸ ZZS 41:29a-30b, (710, Zhao 1).

¹¹⁹ ZZS 43:6b (744, Zhao 5); 43:8b-15a (745-49, Zhao 5); 44:5a, 9a-b (760, 762, Zhao 7).

¹²⁰ ZZS 41:29a-b, 30b (710, Zhao 1).

¹²¹ Chamberlain She participated in military actions against Wu in 538 and 537 (ZZS 42:31a [744, Zhao 4]; 43:15a [749, Zhao 5]). In the latter instance, the *Zuozhuan* text records refers to Chamberlain She 射 and Chamberlain Chi 赤, thus giving the appearance that there were two people in the office of chamberlain. Takezoe, however, argues correctly that there was actually only one chamberlain and that this is a case of using different characters for the same name (ZZHJ 21:41).

¹²² Taro Master Shen Wuyu was a constant figure in the court from 541-531. He is shown negotiating with King Ling to avoid discipline for an infraction that he had committed within the palace, criticizing the domestic impact of various actions ordered by the king, commenting on the inauspiciousness of offering of the heir apparent of Cai as a human sacrifice, and advising King Ling that he had made a serious mistake by appointing his youngest brother Gongzi Qiji as administrator of Cai (ZZS 42:29a-b [732, Zhao 4]; 44:3a-5a [759-60, Zhao 7]; 45:21b-23b [787-88, Zhao 11]).

¹²³ These two officers received *ad hoc* military command assignments from King Ling in

父, Jade Master Lu, 玉尹路 and Left Scribe Yixiang accompanied King Ling on military maneuvers.¹²⁴

King Ling also employed other individuals whose loci in officialdom are not clear.¹²⁵ Chief among them was Gongzi Qiji, the heir-designate of King Gong and youngest brother of King Ling. Between 538 and 531, he is shown walling a town, filling a diplomatic mission, leading troops, relocating a frontier population in the field, realigning boundaries, and commanding the siege that toppled the state of Cai. Appointed as administrator of Cai in 531,¹²⁶ Qiji joined with two other brothers to drive King Ling from the throne two years later and replaced him as King Ping.

As evident in the foregoing examples, throughout the Spring and Autumn era officialdom was at the mercy of individuals, whether kings or ambitious officials, in terms of its effectiveness in parceling our *de facto* authority and assignments in the governing process. Kings were free to rely on personal retainers and royal household staff in the conduct of state government and, under extraordinary circumstances, to virtually ignore high officials in the central government.

530 (ZZZS 45:34a-b [793, Zhao 12]).

¹²⁴ZZZS 45:34a-38a (793-95, Zhao 12).

¹²⁵*Sima* Du 督, who was among five men who were given *ad hoc* military commands in 530, was either a low level marshal in the army or a local sheriff. His fellow commanders included two officers of the royal household staff (ZZZS 45:34a-b [793, Zhao 12]). No clue is given to the offices of Dou Weigui, who eventually fell out of favor with King Ling (*ibid.*, 42:29a-b [732, Zhao 4]; 46:3b [805, Zhao 13]), Peng Sheng (*ibid.*, 42:31a [733, Zhao 4]), and Wei She (*ibid.*, 43:13b-15a (748-49, Zhao 5)).

¹²⁶ZZZS 42:29a-b (732, Zhao 4); 43:21a-22a (752, Zhao 6); 44:25a (770, Zhao 8); 45:2a-3A (777-78, Zhao 9); 45:17a, 21b-22a (785, 787, Zhao 11).

Functional Differentiation

A modern scholar, Cai Jingquan, assumes that government offices had well-defined duties and responsibilities and argues that the office of *mo'ao* differed from other government offices because its occupants, who performed military, diplomatic, and other roles, did not appear to have a "clear-cut sphere of official duties."¹²⁷ However, as shown in Table 21 below, functions performed by the chief minister, grand marshal, and *mo'ao* during the Spring and Autumn era are distributed among all of the major areas of government activity, namely diplomatic, military, and domestic affairs., indicating that they were all generalists rather than specialists.

**Table 21. Frequency Distribution of Government Activity, 701-478:
Chief Minister, Grand Marshal, and *Mo'ao***

Activity		Offices		
		Chief Minister	Grand Marshal	<i>Mo'ao</i>
Diplomatic	Covenant	3		2
	Meeting			
	Emissary	5	2	
	Advisor	4	3	
	Sub-totals	12	5	2
Military	Combat	44	28	5
	Advisor	15	5	3
	Sub-totals	70	33	8
Domestic	Administration	24	2	
	Advisor	14		
	Royal Affairs	4	2	
	Sub-totals	42	4	0
Totals		124	42	10

Source: *Zuozhuan*

¹²⁷ Cai Jingquan 1991:70.

However, distinctions can be made between the activities of the chief minister, on the one hand, and the grand marshal and *mo'ao*, on the other. Whereas during the first half of the Spring and Autumn era, the chief minister acted almost exclusively in military affairs, from the end of the seventh century onward his activities became more diversified, including more frequent action in the diplomatic and domestic fields. By contrast, the grand marshal and the *mo'ao* are recorded as being active primarily in military affairs. The grand marshal's activities in domestic affairs were generally associated with military matters. For example, when Wei Yan became grand marshal in 548, Chief Minister Qu Jian ordered him to conduct a military levy and to inventory armor and weapons.¹²⁸ Although the grand marshal did not have exclusive jurisdiction in all activities related to military affairs, in 528 one holder of this office is reported to have appealed to tradition in order to establish his right to give the order to divine about impending battles:

Wu (State) attacked Chu. Yang Gai (Zixia) became chief minister [and] divined about doing battle, [but the result] was not auspicious. Marshal Ziyu said, "We have attained the upper reaches of the river, why is it not auspicious? Moreover, by Chu's custom, the marshal orders the tortoise (divination). I request to divine again." [He] gave the charge saying, "If Fang (Ziyu) leads his subordinates to die for it, and the Chu force follows after them, [we] still will greatly conquer it." [The divination] was auspicious.¹²⁹

吳伐楚。陽匄爲令尹，卜戰，不吉。司馬子魚曰握得上流，何故不吉。且楚故司馬令龜。我請改卜。令曰魴也以其屬死之，楚師繼之，尚大克之。吉。

¹²⁸ ZZS 36:14a-16b (623-24, Xiang 25).

¹²⁹ ZZS 48:12a-b (839, Zhao 17).

While there may have been some historical basis for Marshal Ziyu's 子魚 appeal to tradition, throughout the Spring and Autumn Era central and local government officials and royal household staff officers are seldom shown performing duties that one might expect to see based on the titles of their offices. The few exceptions occur in anecdotes about low level government officials and royal household staff officers. For instance, when King Wen returned with his troops in 675 after failing to withstand an invasion by Ba to the west or southwest of the capital, Senior Palace Doorman "Yu Quan would not let him in" 鬻拳弗納. So King Wen went north, where he attacked and defeated the state of Huang. After the king died of sickness enroute back to the capital, Yu Quan buried him. He then committed suicide and was buried at the entrance of King Wen's tomb.¹³⁰ During a hunt in Song in 617 involving rulers and troops from Chu, Song, and Zheng, Wenzhi Wuwei, a local administrator from Chu, served in an ad hoc assignment as right marshal in the right rank which was commanded by the Duke of Song. When Wuwei was criticized for beating the duke's valet because the duke had violated an order from King Mu, he defended his action saying, "I was acting in my office . . . Dare [I], because of preferring to die, trash my office?"¹³¹ 當官而行。 . . . 敢愛死以亂官乎。 Grand Intendant Bo Zhouli is depicted managing the affairs of the ruling house in 547 when he heard and settled a dispute between a county administrator and Wangzi Wei over the capture of a

¹³⁰ ZZS 9:17a-b (160, Zhuang 19).

¹³¹ ZZS 19a:24b-25b (322-23, Wen 10). The identification of the office held by Wenzhi Wuwei is discussed above in Chapter 5.

prisoner from Zheng.¹³² Valet Xifu was at the side of King Ling to take his hat and whip as the king camped at Qianxi in 530.¹³³ On the same occasion, Jade Master Lu interrupted King Ling saying, "You , my ruler and king, have ordered me to flay a jade baton in order (to inlay the handle of a sword); dare I ask for [further] orders?"¹³⁴ 君王命剝圭，以爲鍼秘，敢請命。 Finally, in 522 King Ping ordered Fenyang, sheriff of Chengfu, to kill Heir Apparent Jian who had been posted there and was now accused of planning a rebellion.¹³⁵

With a few exceptions such as those just cited, central government officials and royal household staff officers are generally shown in roles that have no apparent connection to the titles of their offices. Liu Xianmei has recently described this situation as "one office with many functions." He argues that in contrast to traditional "feudal society" with its bureaucracy and strictly defined and observed official duties Spring and Autumn Chu "employed an assignment system, that is no matter what (the official's) office was, what he did was determined by the assignment that he received."¹³⁶

Liu's observation brings to mind Wei Pi's disclaimer in 543, "I am an insignificant person, who just eats and obeys, yet [I] am afraid that [I] will not be given a charge and not avoid recrimination. How would [I] know about [exercising] political

¹³² ZZZS 37:7a-b (632, Xiang 26).

¹³³ ZZZS 45:34b (793, Zhao 12).

¹³⁴ ZZZS 45:36b (794, Zhao 12). For the interpretation of *gongyin* 工尹 as *yuyin* 玉尹 ("jade master"), see Appendix 5.

¹³⁵ ZZZS 49:2b-3a (852-53, Zhao 20).

¹³⁶ Liu Xianmei 1982:60-61.

authority?"¹³⁷ Central and local government and royal household staff officers alike performed whatever military, diplomatic, or domestic assignments that they were given by the king and senior officers.

Conclusion

The institution of kingship and the right of the king to rule remained strong in the state of Chu throughout the Spring and Autumn Era. Mature kings dominated government operations, whether in the forefront at home or from behind the scenes in the battlefield or on the diplomatic front. The kings had the option of ruling through a central and local government apparatus, his household staff and personal retinue, or both.

Officials recruited to serve in the government or on the royal household staff were either royal agnates or unrelated to the royal house. Royal agnates, who were members of the royal house (uncles, brothers, sons, and grandsons of a king) or members of royal lineages, dominated top and middle level central government offices and local government positions. Over the course of Spring and Autumn era preference for individuals from royal lineages shifted to the royal house and back as the kings consolidated their hold on the reins of government in the wake of the ill-fated *coup d'etat* by the higher order Ruo'ao lineage in 605. The dominance of royal agnates is clear evidence that the business of government was a royal enterprise and that these offices were important to the kings and their agnates for maintaining control of the state. The preference for non-royals to serve on the household staff was inversely

¹³⁷ ZZS 40:2a-b (679, Xiang 30).

proportional to the preference of royal agnates for government positions. This is a manifestation of the unimportance of royal household staff positions to royal agnates and the desire of the kings to keep their agnates physically at a distance. With the exception of a few foreigners, non-royals were not appointed to central government positions.

The kings of Chu controlled appointments and promotions throughout the Spring and Autumn era. The exercise of the power of appointment by kings who came to the throne through normal succession was limited to filling legitimate vacancies as royal agnates were also stake holders in the governing process. By contrast, kings who usurped the throne were able to reward their fellow conspirators with key appointments such as the offices of chief minister in the central government and grand tutor and grand intendant on the royal household staff. Appointments were sometimes made to accommodate the ambitions of or to appease royal agnates. Personal abilities were also taken into consideration by the king when selecting officers. There is no evidence for systematic promotions to fill offices in the central government. The king was evidently free to promote whomever he wanted without regard to the candidates hierarchical position in the central government or within its divisions. Unlike in other states, such as Jin, lineages were not able to establish the hereditary right of appointment to official positions. Members of royal lineages were eligible for appointment by virtue of being royal agnates; the king was not obligated to appoint an individual because he was the head of a lineage.

Mature kings dominated decision making in the diplomatic, military, and domestic arenas by a ratio of 4:1 over government officials, while the latter monopolized decision making during the interregnum between the death and succession of a king and until a young successor reached majority age. As the highest officer in the central government, the chief minister was the primary decision maker among officials. During the decision making process, the kings took advice from many individuals at every level of government, on the royal household staff, and, in one case, even a wife. The chief minister was the most frequent advisor of kings who ascended the throne via normal succession. He was, however, but one among many advisors, and the king, who was the ultimate decision maker, was free to disregard his advice and/or follow the counsel of other lesser officials in the government, royal household staff officers, or personal aides and favorites.

Kings utilized rewards and punishments to manage government officials and royal household staff officers. Rewards were employed to recognize and encourage faithful service and acceptable conduct. Punishment was used to maintain discipline and penalize bad performance. As Heaven's representative, the king's right to punish was divinely sanctioned as well as recognized and accepted by his officials. Execution is the most common form of punishment recorded. The king, and to a lesser extent the chief minister and other officials, as a body, had the power to execute officials who had suffered serious failures or made major mistakes. No officials at any level of government from the chief minister downward or on the royal household staff were

exempt from execution. The king also had the power to demote officials and to show clemency through issuing pardons. Pardons were used effectively to win support among the ruling elite and to inculcate loyalty among the descendants of faithful officers. The king and his officials shared a sense of responsibility which served as the basis for some royal pardons and numerous suicides by officials who failed in the performance of their assignments, especially in the battlefield. Suicide, which was regarded as the proper way of atoning for major failures and mistakes, was often carried out by officials in the face of serious peer pressure even when the king tried to prevent it.

The frequent incidences of competition between officers of differing levels in the government throughout the Spring and Autumn era suggest that only a rudimentary stage of development in the official hierarchy was achieved. Kings were generally strong, patrimonial rulers who had direct access to officials at all levels and vice versa. The kings' accessibility permitted an environment in which the personal influence of an official could significantly exceed the authority of his office.

The ability of the kings of Chu to bypass the central government structure and rely upon their favorites and royal household staff officers at various times is indicative of structural weakness which persisted throughout the Spring and Autumn Era. The right of the ruling house to the kingship was challenged, albeit unsuccessfully, only once. The fact that most of the chief ministers and grand marshals and all *mo'aos* were royal agnates gave them a vested interest in preserving the traditional authority

structure, thus inhibiting development of a strong corporate identity among offices in the central government to offset or supplant royal power.

There is little evidence of specialization in the duties of particular offices in the central and local government or on the royal household staff. The chief minister, grand marshal, and *mo'ao* were active in all of the major areas of government activity, namely diplomatic, military, and domestic affairs, although the latter participated primarily in military affairs. The only examples of officials performing specialized tasks implied by the titles of their offices are found in the military, local government, and on the royal household staff. While offices probably had core functions, the kings, in particular, and senior officers made *ad hoc* assignments to officeholders as they saw fit in any of the major areas of government activity.

Conclusion

When I started this dissertation my chief concerns were about the kinship and government institutions of Chu and their interaction in the political process. I did not think that secondary Western sources portrayed the socio-political history and institutions of Chu accurately; so I thought there was need for a closer look. Due to the nature and limitations of historical sources and inscriptional materials, my examination of this topic has been limited to the ruling elite.

Part of the confusion in secondary sources was caused by the imprecise and inconsistent application of anthropological terminology and a lack of clarity about the meaning of kinship and related terms in the classical historical sources that we use to study ancient China. Therefore, I made a point of trying to understand the terms used by anthropologists in the study of kinship and to understand the meaning of Chinese terms in my sources, particularly in the *Zuozhuan* and in the *Guoyu*. I determined that the concepts of clan and lineage could be used to explain ancient Chinese kinship as understood in its own terms. I have sought to use anthropological terms and concepts accurately and consistently when discussing and analyzing relevant data concerning kinship in Chu.

The conclusions presented in secondary sources did not agree completely with what I thought I was learning from primary sources. This was due in part to analytical

errors and choice of methodology which I thought could be corrected through a careful evidentiary approach to the topic. Consequently, I elected to pursue the primary sources and build my understanding of Chu kinship and political institutions and their interaction from the raw data.

On the basis of kinship data for the ruling elite of Chu, the structure of kinship seemed to me to be much like that in the northern states of the Central Plains. Because Creel's influential idea that it was different was based on the assumption that the southern state of Chu was a "non-Chinese" state, I had to delve into the ethnic origins of the royal house.

Spurred by the CCP's policy of promoting a "unified multi-national state" in which the distinctiveness and contributions of all minority nationalities are recognized and valued, and stimulated by many archaeological finds showing local cultural complexes from the Neolithic period and a distinctive regional culture in the Eastern Zhou period., the origins of the Chu people has been one of the liveliest topics in Chu studies in recent decades. Depending upon the focus that one takes, the arguments for an east, west, south (indigenous), or north origin all have their own logic and some supporting evidence. The answer is that there is no single ethnic origin for the people of Chu taken as a whole. Therefore, my focus has been on the origin of the ruling house.

By its own genealogical tradition, which was also recognized by others at the time, the ruling house of Chu was descended from Zhu Rong, whose progenitor was the

Emperor Zhuan Xu, the purported ancestor of the Xia, Shang, and Zhou dynasties of the Central Plains north of Chu. One can argue that this was a fabrication for political purposes to gain acceptance and/or bring Chu into the fold of Hua Xia states. However, the Hua Xia connection and a Central Plains origin is confirmed by a) the soft evidence of historical geography in place names associated with its genealogical claim, early migration path, and the location of the state when it was founded, and of the history of Chu's relations with its Man Yi subjects and neighbors and b) the hard evidence of archaeological finds in Chu territory that reveal the intrusion of Central Plains material culture and show that the scribal and ritual traditions and calendrical practices of the Hua Xia people were shared by the ruling elite of Chu.

Royal succession in Chu is another relevant topic that has attracted scholarly interest. Some have argued that the practice of fraternal succession and a supposed rule of ultimogeniture made the succession regime in Chu unique; therefore, it was of different ethnic stock than the Hua Xia people of the Central Plains. However, consideration of all data for succession by other scholars and myself has shown that the succession regime in Chu was fundamentally the same as that in the northern states. Father to son succession was the dominant mode and fraternal succession was a minor mode that occurred everywhere in times of domestic disorder. So rather than providing negative evidence, royal succession is another sign of a systemic connection between the ruling houses of Chu and the northern states.

By focusing on the structural terms *zong* and *zu*, my investigation and analysis of kinship data have demonstrated that the structure, development, and behavior of kin groups of Chu were fundamentally the same as in the northern states of the Central Plains. Kin groups, based on descent from a common ancestor, were structured in at least a three-tiered, nested hierarchy: the higher order lineage was composed of several basic lineages that contained sublineages. As in the north, higher order lineage ties came into play occasionally, and lineage fission occurred in the third, or grandson, generation, counting down from the founding ancestor of the segment that succeeded in breaking off from its natal lineage. The lineage naming customs of Chu and the north were the same. The higher order lineage had a name (*shi*) by which its component lineages were collectively known. A newly formed basic lineages took a unique name (*shi*), derived from the cognomen of its founder or, perhaps, a place associated with it, to mark its independent status. Corporate groups were active at all levels in the kinship structure of Chu from the early part of the Spring and Autumn era. Common activities were primarily ritual and political in nature. The formation of new lineages and the appearance of inter-lineage alliances for the first time after the mid-sixth century (later than in the north) were not signs of acculturation to the Chinese way but rather a revival of corporate lineage activity about five decades after the decimation of the higher order Ruo'ao lineage and its component lineages by King Zhuang in 605.

Royal and non-royal lineages were present in Chu. While little is known about the origins of the latter, four of the royal lineages came into existence either prior to the

Spring and Autumn era or by the first part of the seventh century, and only two originated after the mid-sixth century. Whereas anecdotes about the extinction of some lineages provide the only evidence for their existence, the demise of lineages in Chu usually resulted from personal vendettas or machinations rather than inter-lineage conflict. This contrasts sharply with the situation in the northern states of the Central Plains. The difference is explainable in terms of the underdevelopment of lineages in Chu and their generally insignificant roles in state politics.

Unlike their counterparts in the north, prior to the mid-sixth century lineages in Chu do not appear to have had territorial bases that provided them with a source of income independent from the throne. Territory in Chu was centrally administered; there were no quasi-private *xian* that could be counted as lineage property like in Jin. In fact, until late in the sixth century, there is no evidence of the existence of private real estate. Rather, the wealth of the lineage was the sum of the economic rewards and spoils obtained from service rendered by its individual members who were fortunate enough to be appointed to an office by the king. The private wealth needed to attract followers, maintain private armies, and develop political clout could be accumulated only if many individual members received royal appointments over an extended period of time. This happened only in the cases of the Dou and Cheng lineages of the higher order Ruo'ao lineage that was wiped out when it attempted to overthrow the king in 605. The Wei and Qu lineages showed more staying power but never became strong enough to challenge the authority of the king. Given enforcement of a two-generation

limit on enjoyment of land related compensation and the king's monopoly of the power of appointment, the fortune and long-term development of lineages was essentially in his hands. Consequently, politically motivated inter-lineage conflict in Chu was negligible, and lineages that did manage to form were not, on the whole, nearly as powerful as lineages in the Central Plains states.

The political institutions and structure of government in Chu have not been not been adequately described and analyzed in secondary sources. In order to detect and understand the dynamics of court politics the high, middle, and low level offices in the central government, offices in the local administration, and positions on the royal household staff must each be tracked. Conflating institutions or offices at different levels smoothens the playing field so much that some important subtleties of politics and governance drop out of sight. The validity of the classifications and distribution of offices between the various categories that I have made are borne out in recruitment data which show that royal agnates monopolized central and local government offices, while mainly non-royals were employed in royal household staff positions. Concerning the government service of royal agnates, the data also reveal that while members of the royal house and of the royal lineages both were appointed to the high offices of chief minister, grand marshal, and *mo'ao*, the former were clearly preferred as subordinates of the chief minister and grand marshal and the latter only served as *mo'ao* subordinates. The consistent discrimination between the two categories of royal

agnates in appointments to middle level offices in the central government is observable only through the correct classification and distribution offices.

I have given particular attention to evidence for structural dynamics in the central government. The evolution of the hierarchical relationship that ultimately prevailed between the high offices of chief minister, grand marshal, and *mo'ao* is well-known, but previous studies have failed to recognize the development of three central government divisions that were headed respectively by these high offices and staffed by their middle level subordinates. This development, which is manifest in the appointments of 558, was missed because offices are usually listed in descending hierarchical order when two or more appear in the same record or anecdote. However, one only needs to think about it for a minute to see that this is not so in this case. How could the grand marshal, who was the right hand man of the chief minister, have been a subordinate of a deputy chief minister, or the third ranking official in this slate of appointments? The record of participation in government activities by office says otherwise. The reversal of the hierarchical standing of the left and right subordinates to the chief minister and the grand marshal as the consequence of a long-running personal rivalry between one pair of their bosses during the first quarter of the sixth century reveals the official hierarchy of Chu was still in an early stage of development during the Spring and Autumn era.

Now we come to the question of how the state of Chu was actually governed: How did kinship interact with government? Did the king of Chu reign *and* rule? Or did the king only reign while the lineages ruled?

In addition to clarity about the nature of political institutions and the structure of government, a solid understanding of kin groups and their capacity for involvement in the political process are indispensable prerequisites for operational analysis. While the royal agnates were all descended from former kings, the royal house did not function as a lineage, at least not of the same type as the royal lineages. To belong to it, one must be either the king, the son of a king, or the grandson of a king; more distant agnates were excluded. Historical evidence shows that it was conceived and recognized as the royal house and behaved that way in the political arena. The king presided over the ruling house as he did the state; he should not be considered apart from it; likewise, other members should not be regarded as a separate group and equated with other royal or non-royal lineages competing with the king for control of government. The discussion of the role of royal agnates in government should be framed in terms of their two components, the royal house and royal lineages. This approach need not obscure the internal political dynamics of the royal house which was intent on keeping power regardless of which one of its members sat on the throne.

Data for the social basis for recruitment clearly show that government was a royal enterprise that was the provenance of the royal agnates, namely the king, other members of the royal house, and members of royal lineages. Non-royals, whether from

lineages or not, played only cameo roles in comparison to the royal agnates. The history of royal succession shows that when a king died without a designated heir, or after having selected a successor who was deemed incapable of serving the interests of the royal house well, the surviving members of the royal house chose and installed a suitable successor as king. The best interest of the royal house was the prime consideration regardless of whether royal succession was managed by members of the royal house or of royal lineages. When an underage king ascended the throne, the affairs of state were handled by royal agnates in high offices in his name, but as the record of the king's participation in government, making appointments, and decision making indicate, power and control usually reverted to the king when he came of age. Thus, the idea that the king's right to rule was supported by his royal agnates is a valid conclusion. Governing, with its rewards and spoils, was their collective enterprise.

In the case of Chu, assuming that a person was appointed to office as the representative of his lineage is incorrect. Appointment and promotion data reveal that lineages were not able to win the hereditary right for appointment to office. While royal descent made one eligible for appointment to office, the king selected his officers on criteria pegged to the individual or the exigencies of current circumstances. There is no evidence that officers were appointed because they were the heads of their respective lineages, royal or not.

The dynamic at work in appointments is found in the milieu surrounding the king's selection of officers from the royal house or from the membership of royal

lineages or from non-royal sources. Regardless of which one he preferred, the mature king was in charge not the lineages. As noted above, the latter were in a position of almost total economic dependence on the largesse of the king in the form of emoluments paid for the services of their members. With the notable exception of the lineages of the higher order Ruo'ao lineage, no lineages ever became strong enough to challenge the king's right to rule. When a member of the royal house or of a royal lineage appeared to dominate the king, it was by dint of personality, not because he was acting as an agent for a powerful lineage.

Keeping in mind the idea of government as royal enterprise, the institution of kingship and the right of the king to rule remained strong in the state of Chu throughout the Spring and Autumn era. While royal agnates necessarily managed royal succession and state business during a king's minority years, the mature king directed diplomatic, military, and domestic affairs either in person or from behind the scenes.

The king controlled appointments and promotions, however; his exercise of the power of appointment was affected by the circumstances of his succession. A king who ascended the throne as the result of normal succession appointed new government officials only when vacancies occurred, a restraint that arose from the fact that his royal agnates were also stakeholders in government. Not surprisingly, a scion of the royal house who usurped the throne was able to exercise the power of appointment arbitrarily as he consolidated his rule. Because of the inability of lineages to establish the hereditary right of appointment to office, a process of systematic promotions failed to

develop as it did in the northern states of Qi and Jin. The king of Chu was free to appoint and promote officials as he saw fit; lineage rights were not a consideration.

The reality of the rule by kings in Chu is also manifest in the other aspects of the operation of Chu government that have been treated in this dissertation.

The mature king controlled and dominated the decision making process in all areas of government activity. The chief minister was the primary-decision maker among government officials. The chief minister was only one among many advisors of the king who included government officers at all levels, royal house staffers, and personal favorites whose positions are not known. Although the chief minister was his most frequent advisor, the king was not bound to follow his advice.

The king managed government officials and royal household staff officers through rewards and pardons, and demotions and punishments. As to the latter, the king's right to punish his officers was thought to be divinely sanctioned. From the chief minister down, none were exempt from punishment for disciplinary reasons or poor performance. The most frequently recorded punishment was execution, and the officer most often on the receiving end of it was the chief minister. So there should be little doubt as to who ruled in Chu. A shared sense of responsibility between the king and his royal agnates for governing underlay the management of government itself. It is also manifest by resort to suicide as the honorable way for officers to atone for mistakes and failures in the eyes of one's peers and, presumably, of the royal ancestors.

The personal style of the king's rule and his accessibility fostered an environment that permitted competition for influence and power among officials within and between levels in the government throughout the Spring and Autumn era. The ability of the king to bypass the central government structure and rely upon royal household staff and personal favorites and to dispense *ad hoc* assignments without regard of the office held by the recipient are further evidence of the extent of the king's personal rule.

In sum, kinship and government were inextricably intertwined in the southern state of Chu during the Spring and Autumn era. The kinship structure of its ruling elite was the same as that found among the Hua Xia people in the northern states of the Central Plains, where the roots of the ruling house are found. However, centralized administration of the state's territory until late in the era generally prevented lineages from developing sufficient strength to secure hereditary rights to participate in government through the appointment of their heads to high offices. Consequently, unlike in a number of the northern states, the lineages of Chu were unable to wrest control of the government away from the royal house.

Government was the enterprise of the royal agnates (including the king) who were members of the ruling house and the royal lineages. The kings of Chu were indeed stronger than their counterparts in the northern states. As head of the royal house, the king reigned *and* ruled a state whose central and local government offices were staffed mainly by his agnates. Dependent upon the fruits and spoils of

government service for wealth, the royal agnates ensured the survival and supremacy of the royal house and rule by the king through managing royal succession, running the government until underage kings reached maturity, and serving mature kings who dominated and controlled all aspects of government activity. The chief minister, who was almost always a royal agnate, was the top official and subservient to the king. The signs of structural change and weakness in Chu government that appeared during the Spring and Autumn era resulted from the interplay of strong personalities with the personal rule by the king.

This dissertation has confirmed the place of Chu on the ruling house-lineage power continuum of social and political institutions during the Spring and Autumn era that I presented in my earlier studies. Thus, it presents a serious challenge to Mark Edward Lewis' depiction of the Spring and Autumn state as an incarnation of the *zongfa* and *fengjian* models of the Zhou court that I noted in the Introduction.¹ The connection between kinship and government in the political process varied from state to state during this era.

My findings also have important implications for interpreting and understanding the state and society of Chu during the Warring States era that followed. Some argue that the kings of Chu were relatively weak at this time.² The record of appointments shows that royal agnates lost their monopoly of the office of chief minister.³ Significant

¹ See Lewis 1990, Chapter 2. Li Feng also questions the applicability of Lewis' formulation even for the Western Zhou period (2001-2002:30-31).

² Lewis 1999:597, 601-02.

³ Hsu 1965:45-47.

changes clearly occurred during the Warring States era. The degree of centralization that is evident in recently discovered legal documents from fourth century Chu⁴ has its antecedents in the structure and operation of Chu government in the Spring and Autumn era. Studies of developments and issues like these must include investigating the relationship between kinship and government in Chu.

⁴Chen Wei 1994 and Weld 1999 point out that central control of the local level was not absolute. However, this need not diminish the fact that justice was centrally administered as is evident in the two-way reporting process that is revealed in these documents. See also Lewis 1999a:18, 21-22 and 1999b:646.

A Glossary of Chu Personalities

Note: This glossary gives access to the other names by which persons mentioned in the narrative portions of the main text and appendices are known in historical sources.

Royal House**Rulers**

King	Reign	Other names
Ruo'ao 若敖	790-764	Xiong Yi 熊儀
Xiao'ao 霄敖	763-758	Xiong Kan 熊坎
Fenmao 蚡冒	757-741	Xiong Shun 熊胸
King Wu 武王	740-690	Xiong Tong 熊通
King Wen 文王	689-675	Xiong Zi 熊贄
Du'ao 堵敖	674-672	Zhuang Ao 莊敖, Xiong Xi 熊屹
King Cheng 成王	671-626	Xiong Yun 熊惲
King Mu 穆王	625-614	Heir Apparent Shangchen 太子商臣, Shangchen 商臣
King Zhuang 莊王	613-591	Lü 旅, Lü 侶, Xiong Yun 熊惲
King Gong 共王	590-560	King Gong 恭王, Shen 審, Xiong
King Kang 康王	559-545	Zhao 昭, Zhao 招
Jia'ao 郟敖	544-541	Jun 麋, Juan 卷, Yuan 員
King Ling 靈王	540-529	Wangzi Wei 王子圍, Gongzi Wei 公子圍, Wei 圍, Qian 虔
King Ping 平王	528-516	Gongzi Qiji 公子棄疾, Qiji 棄疾, Cai Administrator 蔡公, Ju 居, Xiong Ju 熊居
King Zhao 昭王	515-489	Heir Apparent Renfu 太子壬夫, Zhen 軫, Zhen 珍
King Hui 惠王	488-432	Zhang 章

Kings' Sons and Grandsons

Name	Era	Other names
Gongsun Chao 公孫朝	fl. 478	
Gongsun Kuan 公孫寬	fl. 478-476	Kuan 寬
Gongzi Bi 公子比	d. 529	Zigan 子干, Zi'ao 訾敖
Gongzi Bing 公子丙	fl. 597	
Gongzi Cheng 公子成	fl. 585-574	
Gongzi Fa 公子筏	fl. 621-574	

Name	Era	Other names
Gongzi Fan 公子繁	fl. 508	
Gongzi Feng 公子馮	fl. 595	
Gongzi Ge 公子格	fl. 557-555	
Gongzi Guchen 公子穀臣	fl. 597-588	
Gongzi Heigong 公子黑肱	d. 529	Zixi 子皙
Gongzi Heji 公子何忌	fl. 570	
Gongzi Pi 公子罷	fl. 579	
Gongzi Pidi 公子罷敵	d. 529	
Gongzi Ping 公子平	fl. 600	
Gongzi Pirong 公子罷戎	fl. 564-558	
Gongzi Qing 公子慶	fl. 476	
Gongzi Shen 公子申	d. 571	
Gongzi Tuoshi 公子橐師	fl. 574-558	
Gongzi Xie 公子燮	d. 613	Zixie 子燮, Wangzi Xie 王子燮
Gongzi Yi 公子懿	fl. 551	
Gongzi Yigu 公子宜穀	fl. 559	
Gongzi Yin 公子寅	fl. 574	
Gongzi Yuan 公子元	d. 664	Ziyuan 子元, Chief Minister Ziyuan 令尹子元
Luyang Wenzhi 魯陽文子		see Gongsun Kuan 公孫寬
Mu 幕	d. 541	
Pingxia 平夏	d. 541	
Taizi Jian 太子建	d. 480	
Taizi Lu 太子祿	d. 529	
Wangsun Qi 王孫啓	fl. 597	
Wangsun Sheng 王孫勝	d. 479	Bai Administrator 白公
Wangsun Yan 王孫燕	fl. 479	
Wangzi Nang 王子囊	fl. 576-559	
Wangzi Yang 王子揚	n.d.	
Wangzi Zhi 王子職	fl. 626	
Zifan 子反	d. 575	Gongzi Ce 公子側, Ce 側, Marshal Zifan 司馬子反

Name	Era	Other names
Zigeng 子庚	d. 552	Gongzi Wu 公子午, Marshal Zigeng 司馬子庚, Wu 午
Ziguo 子國	fl. 478-477	Gongsun Ning 公孫寧
Ziliang 子良	fl. 478	
Zilu 子闔	d. 479	Gongzi Qi 公子啓, Qi 啓
Zinan 子南	d. 551	Gongzi Zhuishu 公子追舒, Chief Minister Zinan 令尹子南
Zinang 子囊	fl. 576-559	Gongzi Zhen 公子貞
Ziqi 子期	d. 479	Gongzi Jie 公子結
Zixi 子西	d. 479	Gongzi Shen 公子申
Zixin 子辛	d.568	Gongongzi Renfu 公子壬夫, Chief Minister Zixin 令尹子辛, Right Deputh Chief Minister Zixin 右尹子辛
Zizhong 子重	d.571	Gongzi Yingqi 公子嬰齊, Er 二, Chief Minister Zizhong 令尹子重, Yingqi 嬰齊, Right Deputy Chief Minister Zizhong 左尹子重
Zizhu 子朱	fl. 624-617	Gongzi Zhu 公子朱, Administrator of Xi Zizhu 息公子朱
Ziyu 子魚	fl, 548	Gongzi Fang 公子魴

Royal Lineages

Name	Era	Other names
Dou Lineage		
Dou Ban 鬥班	fl. 666-664	
Dou Bobi 鬥伯比	fl. 704-699	Bobi 伯比
Dou Chao 鬥巢	fl. 505	Chao 巢
Dou Chengran 鬥成然	d. 528	Ziqi 子旗, Chengran 成然, Man Chengran 蔓成然
Dou Dan 鬥丹	fl. 704	
Dou Huai 鬥懷	fl. 506-505	Huai 懷, Yun Huaizi 鄖懷子
(Dou) Kehuang 克黃	fl. 605	Sheng 生

Name	Era	Other names
Dou Lian 門廉	fl. 703-664	Dou Sheshi 門射師
Dou Min 門緡	King Wu	
Dou Qi 門祁	fl. 690	
Dou Qieting 門且	ca. 515	
(Dou) Qiji 棄疾	fl. 536	
Dou Weigui 門韋龜	fl. 538-529	
Dou Wu 門梧	fl. 666	
Dou Xin 門辛	fl. 528-505	Xin 辛, Yun Administrator Xin 鄭公辛
Dou Yujiang 門御疆	fl. 666	
Dou Zhang 門章	fl. 658-628	
(Dou) Ziliang 子良	n.d.	
Dou Zishang 門子上	d. 627	Dou Bo 門勃, Zishang 子上, Chief Minister Zishang 令尹子上
Dou Ziwen 門子文	fl. 664-633	Ziwen 子文, Chief Minister Ziwen 令尹子文, Dou Ruowutu 門穀於菟
Dou Zixi 子西	d. 617	Dou Yishen 門宜申, Yishen 宜申, Marshal Zixi 司馬子西
Dou Ziyang 子揚	fl. ca. 611	Dou Ban 門般, Ziyang 子揚
Dou Ziyi 門子儀	d. 614	Dou Ke 門克, Zziyi 子儀 Shen Administrator Ziyi 申公子儀, Ziyifu 子儀父
Dou Ziyue 門子越	d. 605	Dou Jiao 門椒, Jiao 椒, Ziyue 子越, Ziyuejiao 子越椒, Bofen 伯芻
Miao Fenhuang 苗芻皇	fl. 605	
Cheng Lineage		
Cheng Daxin 成大心	d. 616	Daxin 大心, Dasun Bo, 大孫伯 Sun Bo 孫伯
Cheng Hu 成狐	d. 530	Cheng Ran 成然
Cheng Jia 成嘉	d. 613	Zikong 子孔
Ziyu 子玉	d. 632	Chief Minister Ziyu 令尹子玉, Cheng Dechen 成得臣 Dechen 得臣

Name	Era	Other names
Nang Lineage		
Zichang 子常	fl. 519-506	Nang Wa 囊瓦, Wa 瓦, Chief Minister Zichang 令尹子常
Qu Lineage		
Feiji 弗忌	d. ca. 590	
Qu Pi 屈罷	fl. 528	
Qu Dang 屈蕩	fl. 597	
Qu Dang 屈蕩	fl. 558-548	
Qu Zhong 屈重	fl. 690	
Qu Yukou 屈禦寇	fl. 635	Xi Administrator Zibian 息公子邊
Qu Wu 屈巫	fl. 597-582	Ziling 子靈, Shen Administrator Wuchen 申公巫臣, Wuchen 巫臣
Qu Shen 屈申	d. 537	Qu Shen 屈伸
Qu Xia 屈瑕	d. 699	
Qu Huyong 屈狐庸	fl. 542	
Qu Sheng 屈生	fl. 537	
Qu Wan 屈完	fl. 656	
Qu Dao 屈到	fl. 558	
Qu Jian 屈建	fl. 551	Jian 建, Zimu 子木, Chief Minister Zimu 令尹子木
Zidang 子蕩	d. ca. 590	
Ziyan 子閻	d. ca. 590	
Wei Lineage		
Wei Yue 蕩越	d. 519	
Wei Qiqiang 蕩啓彊	fl. 549-535	
Wei Jia 蕩賈	d. 605	Boying 伯嬴
Wei Ailie 蕩艾獵	fl. 598-597	Wei Ao 蕩敖, Shuao 叔敖, Sun Shu'ao 孫叔敖
Wei She 蕩射	fl. 532-505	
Wei Zifeng 蕩子馮	d. 548	Wei Zifeng 蕩子馮, Weizi 蕩子, Weizi 蕩子
Wei Gu 蕩固	fl. 506-477	
Wei Luchen 蕩呂臣	fl. 637-632	Shubo 叔伯

Name	Era	Other names
Wei Ju 蘧居	fl. ca. 541	
Wei Zhang 蘧章	fl. 706-703	
Wei Xie 蘧洩	d. 536	
Wei Pi 蘧罷	fl. 546-536	Wei Po 蘧頗, Zidang 子蕩
Wei Yan 蘧掩	d.543	Wei Yan 蘧掩
Yang Lineage		
Tuo 佗	d. 515	
Wan 完	d. 515	
Yang Gai 陽匄	d. 519	Zixia 子瑕, Chief Minister Zixia 令尹子瑕
Yang Lingdong 陽令冬	d. 515	
Yin 尹	n.d.	

Non-Royals

Name	Era	Other names
Bo lineage		
Bo Pi 伯駘	fl. 506	
Bo Zhouli 伯州犁	d. 541	
Guan lineage		
Guan Cong 觀從	fl. 551-529	
Guan Dingfu 觀丁父	fl. 8th century	
Guan Qi 觀起	d. 551	
Guan Yifu 觀射父	fl. 516-506	
Guan Zhan 觀瞻	fl. ca. 479	
Pan lineage		
Pan Chong 潘崇	fl. 626-613	
Pan Wang 潘尙	fl. 611-597	Tutor Shu 師叔
Pan Dang 潘黨	fl. 597-575	Shudang 叔黨
Peng lineage		
Peng Sheng 彭生	fl. 538	

Name	Era	Other names
Peng Ming 彭明	fl. 597	
Peng Zhongshuang 彭仲爽	fl. 689-680	
Shen lineage		
Shen Baoxu 申包胥	fl. ca. 522-505	
Shen Hai 申亥	fl. 528	
Shen Shu 申叔	fl. 635-632	Shen Administrator Shuhou 申公叔侯
Shen Xi 申犀	fl. 594	
Shen Xianyu 申鮮虞	fl. 546-531	
Wenzhi Wuwei 文之無爲	fl. 617-595	Shen Zhou 申舟
Shenshu lineage		
Shen Shushi 申叔時	fl. 598-575	
Shen Wuyu 申無宇	fl. ca. 541-531	Taro Master Shen Wuyu 芋尹申無宇
Wu lineage		
Wu Can 伍參	fl. 597	
(Wu) Jiao Ming 椒鳴	fl. 547	
Wu Ju 伍舉	fl. 547-533	Jiao Ju 椒舉
Wu She 伍奢	d. 528	
Wu Yuan 伍員	fl. 523-494	Yuan 員, Zixu 子胥
Zhong lineage		
Zhong Jian 鍾建	fl. 506-505	
Zhong Yi 鍾儀	fl. 584-582	Yun Administrator Zhong Yi 鄭公鍾儀
Others		
Cai Wei 蔡洧	fl. 531-529	
Chaiche 差車	fl. 478	Right Captain Chaiche 右領差車
Chao Wu 朝吳	fl. 529	
Du 督	fl. 530	Marshal Du 司馬督
Fei Wuji 費無極	d. 515	
Fenyang 奮揚	fl. 522	Chengfu Marshal Fenyang 城父司馬奮揚

Name	Era	Other names
Fusui 復隨	fl. 617	Administrator of Qisi Fusui 期思公復隨
Gongyang 公陽	fl. 478	Groom Gongyang 圉公陽
<i>Gongyin Jun</i> 工尹麋	fl. 515	
<i>Gongyin Shou</i> 壽	fl. 515	
Huang 皇	fl. 506	Historian Huang 史皇
Jin Chen 晉陳	d. 515	
Jin 繒	fl. 638	Musician Jin 師繒
Lao 老	r. King Ling	Historian Lao 史老, Administrator of Shen Ziwei 申公子 臬
Lao 老	fl. 478	Left Historian Lao 左史老
Meng Gu 蒙穀	fl. 506-505	
Pi 狎	fl. 529	Historian Pi 史狎
Qi Li 祁犁	fl. 549	Tutor Qi Li 師祁犁
Ran 然	fl. 512	<i>Youyin</i> Ran 莠尹然
Shen Zhuliang 沈諸梁	fl. 499-477	<i>Shengong</i> Zhuliang 葉公諸梁, Zigao 子高
<i>Shenyin Xu</i> 沈尹戌	d. 506	
Shi Qi 石乞	d. 479	
Shou 壽	fl. 549	<i>Shenyin</i> Shou 沈尹壽
Wei 臬	fl. 506	Indigo Master Wei 藍尹臬
Wu Youyu 吳由于	fl. 506-477	<i>Shenyin</i> Wu Youyu 沈尹吳由于
Xi Wan 郤宛	d. 515	
Xiong Shuai Qiebi 熊率且比	fl. 706	
Xu Wumou 須務牟	fl. 529	
Xu Wei 許圍	fl. 529	
Yan Jiangshi 鄢將師	d. 515	
Yan Ao 閻敖	d. 676	
Yang Youji 養由基	fl. 597-558	
Yijiu 宜咎	fl. 538	Remonstrance Master Yijiu 箴尹宜咎

Name	Era	Other names
Yixiang 倚相	fl. 530	Left Historian Yixiang 左史倚相
Yu Quan 鬻拳	fl. 675	
Zhiru Zigong 枝如子躬	fl. 528	
Zige 子革	fl. 554-531	Ran Dan 然丹, Dan 丹, Right Deputy Chief Minister Zige 右尹子革
Zigu 子穀	fl. 478	Grand Tutor Zigu 大師子穀
Zigu 子穀	fl. 478	Tutor Zigu 師子穀
Zishang 子商	fl. 582	Grand Intendant Zishang 子商

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Appendix 1

The Scribal Tradition and Historical Writing in Ancient China: From Bronze Inscriptions to the *Zuozhuan*

Bronze inscriptions of the Zhou period (ca. 1078-221 B.C.) provide the earliest examples of historical writing in China. However, commentators on the nature of Zhou historiography customarily ignore inscriptions.¹ Discussions of Zhou historiography typically focus on such classical texts as *Shujing* 書經, *Chunqiu*, *Zhushu jinian* 竹書紀年, *Zuozhuan*, *Guoyu*, and *Zhanguoce* 戰國策. Analyses of these texts reveal that the three most important elements of historical writing in the Zhou period are dates, events, and speeches.² As will be discussed below, classical historical texts can be divided into two general types on the basis of the presence or absence of speeches. Texts that contain speeches may be subdivided according to the degree of emphasis on speech. Texts that record only events or which emphasize events provide dates with varying degrees of specificity; whereas texts which emphasize speech seldom mention dates of related events. The neglect of bronze inscriptions has deprived analysts of valuable insights into the nature of the scribal traditions of the royal Zhou house and the various states, traditions that produced the sources which ultimately served as the basis for classical Zhou historical writing and significantly influenced its format.

¹ For examples, see van der Loon 1961:24-30; Jin Jing'an 1972:21-35; and Qian Mu 1973:1-56.

² van der Loon 1961:25-26; Jin Jing'an 1972:33-34; Qian Mu 1972:50-55.

Bronze inscriptions may be profitably viewed as concrete evidence of the rise of historical consciousness in ancient China because of the clearly commemorative intent of the makers of bronzes so frequently manifest in the closing phrase, "May my sons and grandsons forever treasure and use [this vessel]" 其子子孫孫永寶用,³ not to mention the rather permanent medium in which the inscriptions were cast. The historical nature of most bronze inscriptions can be easily established through content analysis. For example, as shall be shown below, inscriptions commemorating ceremonial events in the royal Zhou court or special assignments from the king commonly reflect two viewpoints: first, that of the royal court as the date and details of the event are noted, apparently on the basis of an actual record of the event obtained from the royal scribe; and second, that of the celebrant who identifies himself as the maker of the bronze and states the purpose for which the bronze was cast. Bronze inscriptions that serve as the basis of this study are examples of historical writing made by actual participants in the events, often on the basis of the original scribal records of the events.

The basic assumption underlying the discussion which follows is that Zhou historiography reflects the nature and style of the source materials available to the historian; therefore, bronze inscriptions from the Zhou period may be used to establish the nature of the scribal tradition on which Zhou historians drew for inspiration and information. The purpose of this study is twofold: (1) to demonstrate that the three principle elements (dates, events, speech) of classical Zhou historical writing, in

³For examples of this phrase and its variants, see Guo Moruo 1935:*passim*.

particular as found in the *Zuozhuan*, the most widely accepted and respected Zhou historical text, dating from the fourth century B.C.,⁴ were present in the scribal tradition, source material, and historical writing from the beginning of and continuously throughout the Zhou period; and (2) to show that the classical historical texts, especially the *Zuozhuan*, utilized primary written sources similar in content and style to the sources that served as the basis for inscriptions on bronze.

Nature of Historical Writing in Bronze Inscriptions

Inscriptions on bronze from the Zhou period may be roughly divided into two categories on the basis of content: first, inscriptions made primarily for the purpose of preserving and transmitting detailed information; and second, inscriptions that merely state the use or function or maker of the vessel which is being cast. Inscriptions of the first type often provide the date, nature of the noteworthy event and related discourses, if any were recorded and considered of sufficient significance to be transmitted to later generations, or they simply record a personal statement. These inscriptions treat a wide range of human activity, including military campaigns,⁵ appointments and awards at the royal court with related ceremony,⁶ dispute settlement,⁷ definition of land boundaries,⁸ and reports to ancestral spirits.⁹ Inscriptions of the second type often simply state the

⁴ On the date of *Zuozhuan* authorship I follow Karlgren 1926 and Maspero 1931-32.

⁵ Guo Moruo 1935:2b-121a *passim*.

⁶ Guo Moruo 1935:56b-156a, *passim*.

⁷ Guo Moruo 1935:96b-99b *Tao ding* 鬲鼎 and 126b-127a *Ge Youcong ding* 鬲攸從鼎 .

⁸ Guo Moruo 1935:129a-132a 炙人盤 .

⁹ Guo Moruo 1935:46a-49a *Shenzi gui* 沈子簋; 80a-81b *Shiwang ding* 師望鼎; *Dake ding* 大克鼎; 127a-b *Guo Shulu zhong* 虢叔旅鐘; 132a-b *Shuxiang fu gui* 叔向父簋.

function of the vessel, for example, a cooking vessel to be used in sacrifices and entertaining guests,¹⁰ a sacrificial vessel to be used in sacrifices to August heaven and deceased ancestors,¹¹ a harmonious bell to be used for pleasure and entertainment,¹² and a wedding vessel.¹³ However, occasionally these inscriptions provide additional information such as family relationships,¹⁴ names of bride or spouse,¹⁵ and in the case of musical bells, minute details concerning the musical qualities of the bells and the paraphernalia that accompanied them.¹⁶ Although inscriptions of both types are useful within the context of the present discussion, the first type of inscription is of primary importance because of their emphasis on dates, events and/or speech.

With respect to dates, events, and speech, as is the case with classical historical texts, inscriptions of the first type mentioned above may be divided according to the presence or absence of speech. and, event oriented inscriptions usually provide dates; whereas inscriptions focusing on speech often do not. Since the preoccupation of early historical man in China with dates and events is generally acknowledged, there is no need to dwell on these two elements, except to point out the following: (1) In bronze inscriptions dates are not uniformly recorded; the method of recording dates ranges from the fullest form of year, month, moon phase, and cyclical date of the event to

¹⁰ Guo Moruo 1935:159a *Xuwan Liang ding* 郟王糧鼎 .

¹¹ Guo Moruo 1935:162a-b *Xuwan Yichu zhi* 郟王義楚 .

¹² Guo Moruo 1935:159b-160b *Shen Er zhong* 沈兒鐘 .

¹³ Guo Moruo 1935:195b-196a *Lu Dasitu yi* 魯大司徒匜 .

¹⁴ For example, five generations are traced in Guo Moruo 1935:163a-b *X Er zhong* 僖兒鐘 .

¹⁵ Guo Moruo 1935:196b *Lu Bo Hou fu pan* 魯白后父盤 and *Zhongji Yu gui* 仲姬俞簋; *Mengji Jiang gui* 孟姬姜簋 .

¹⁶ Guo Moruo 1935:232a-234a *Lu zhong* 郟鐘 .

simply dating the event according to a well-known event that occurred in the same year.¹⁷ And (2) inscriptions dealing with events for which no speeches are recorded, such as military campaigns, are generally terse factual records.¹⁸ The element of speech requires a more detailed examination, for it is the most vexing element in Zhou historiography, rejected outright by one Western commentator as "fictitious conversations."¹⁹

Speeches and/or conversations in bronze inscriptions are marked by the terms 'yue' 曰 (vb., "to say, said") and 'ruo yue' 若曰 ("in this wise said"), or, in the absence of these markers, can be determined through the use of terms of direct personal address.²⁰ The spoken word is recorded in a variety of contexts: court ceremony in which a superior confers a commission or reward on an inferior,²¹ rewards to family or personal retainers,²² dispute settlements,²³ contract negotiations,²⁴ official

¹⁷ For one of many fully dated inscriptions refer to Guo Moruo 1935:83b *Shi Ju gui* 師遽簋. Dating by event may be seen in *ibid.*, 3b-5b *Ling gui* 令簋 and 29b-30b *Hou X ding* 厚斲鼎, among others.

¹⁸ Brief reference is often made to military ventures as the occasion for casting a vessel (Guo Moruo 1935:120a *Guo Zhong xu* 虢仲盃), the reason for a small reward (*ibid.*, 2b-3a *Xiaochen Dan zhi* 小臣單觶), or the source of booty which made the casting of the bronze possible (*ibid.*, *X ding* 斲鼎, 25a-b *Luxing hu* 呂行壺, 28a *Yuan you* 員卣). Inscriptions of this type are generally undated and seem to be intended primarily to note the reason the bronze was cast.

There are, however, a number of relatively long inscriptions which give more detailed information concerning the military situation and rewards for military merit (*ibid.*, 3b-5b *Ling gui* 令簋, 23a-24b *Xiaochen X gui* 小臣諶簋, 27a *Lu ding* 旅鼎, 66a *X zhi* 鬲觶, 109a-110a *Yu gui* 敔簋). Military campaigns are often used in these inscriptions to establish the year of the event and specific dates are given for particular episodes and the day of the reward.

¹⁹ van der Loon 1961:29.

²⁰ Guo Moruo 1935:84b-85b *Kang ding* 康鼎, 86b-87a *Tong gui* 同簋.

²¹ Guo Moruo 1935:106a-107b *Bu X gui* 不嬰簋.

²² Guo Moruo 1935:67a-68a *Xianfei gui* 縣妃簋, 85b-86b *Mao gui* 卯簋, 114a-115a *Shi X gui* 師戩簋.

²³ Guo Moruo 1935:96b-99b *Tao ding* 盱鼎 and 126b--127a *Ge Youcong ding* 鬲攸從鼎.

investigations,²⁵ oath making,²⁶ and reports of personal achievements to ancestors.²⁷

Examples of recorded speech in bronze inscriptions are numerous and readily discernible for the most part.

Chen Mengjia notes two types of Western Zhou inscriptions that record the bestowal and commissions and rewards by the kings of Zhou during ceremonies that were held in palaces or ancestral temples. In the first type the king makes the bestowal without assistance of any intermediary. This type of inscription gives the location of the event. Some inscriptions merely note what was bestowed. Others record the words of the king as direct speech marked by the phrases such as "The King commissioned (person's name) saying . . ." (*wang ming . . . yue* 王令 . . . 曰) or "The King said . . ." (*wang yue* 王曰).²⁸

Chen Mengjia divides the second type of inscription in which the king uses an official as his intermediary into seven categories of which five contain the words of the

²⁴ Guo Moruo 1935:142a-143b *Shaobo Hu gui* 召伯虎簋.

²⁵ Guo Moruo 1935:26a-b *Shilu ding* 師旅鼎, 126b-127a *Ge Youcong ding* 鬲攸從鼎.

²⁶ Guo Moruo 1935:126b-127a *Ge Youcong ding* 鬲攸從鼎, 129a-132a *Jiuren pan* 灸人盤.

²⁷ For examples of the Western Zhou period, see Guo Moruo 1935:46a-49a *Shenzi gui* 沈子簋; 80a-81b *Shiwang ding* 師望鼎; *Dake ding* 大克鼎; 127a-b *Guo Shulu zhong* 虢叔旅鐘; 132a-b *Shuxiang fu gui* 叔向父簋. A number of Eastern Zhou inscriptions continue to employ a speech format in addressing ancestors; however, only one reports the deeds of the maker of the bronze to the ancestral spirits (*ibid.*, 247a-249b *Qingong gui* 秦公簋). The others are of the nature of eulogies to illustrious ancestors (*ibid.*, 214a-215a *Chen Fang gui* 陳助簋, *Chen Ni fu* 陳逆簋, *Yinzi X* 因資罈); these vessels are prefaced by a date, unlike *Qingong gui* and the Western Zhou inscriptions above.

²⁸ Chen Mengjia 1956:100-101. Yu Xingwu 1966:149 makes the same point and gives three examples, which are among those cited by Chen; for the full texts of each, see Guo Moruo 1935:20b-24b *Ban gui* 班簋 and Luo Zhenyu 8:47b *Jun Fu gui* 君夫簋 and 13:42b *Nong you* 農卣.

king's charge.²⁹ In the fullest accounts, the bestowal ceremony typically proceeded as follows: At dawn the king went to the main hall and took his place facing south. Then a royal official escorted the recipient into the hall,³⁰ where they stood in the center of the court and faced northward. The king then ordered the maker of records (*zuoce* 作册),³¹ usually a scribe (*shi* 史),³² to announce the charge to the recipient; whereupon

²⁹ Chen Mengia 1956:101-103.

³⁰ Karlgren punctuates the *Wu yi* 吳彝 inscription as follows: *Zai Fei you; zuoce; Wu ru men* 宰肫右; 作册; 吳入門 and translates, "the intendant Fei assisted; one made a brevet; Wu entered the gate" (Bernhard Karlgren 1949:93). Because of his interpretation of *zuo ce*, Karlgren incorrectly punctuates this and other similar passages. The full text (Guo Moruo 1935:74b-76b) should be punctuated as follows: *Zai Fei you zuoce Wu, ju men, li zhong ting, bei xiang* 宰肫右作册吳; 入門, 立中廷, 北鄉 "Intendant Fei assisted *zuoce* Wu; [they] entered the gate, stood in the center of the court, and faced northward." The following constructions from variant textual accounts of this type of ceremony are proofs of the latter punctuation: *Mishu you Hai; ji wei* 盪叔右蕪; 即位 "Mishu assisted Hai; [they] took their place" (*ibid.*, 56b-58a *Hai ding* 蕪鼎); *Gongzu X ru you Mu; li zhong ting* 公族魯入右牧立中廷, "Gongzu X entered and assisted Mu; [they] stood in the center of the court" (*ibid.*, 75b-76b *Mu gui* 牧簋); *jingshu you Mian. Wang . . . ming shi Mou xi Mian* 井叔右免. 王 . . . 命史懋錫免 . . . , "Jingshu assisted Mian. The King . . . ordered scribe Mou to grant Mian . . . [things] . . ." (*ibid.*, 91a-b *Mian zhi* 免罍).

³¹ Karlgren argues that *zuoce* should be understood as finite verb + object; thus, the *Shujing*, "Lo Gao 洛誥" passage " *Wang ming zuo ce Yi zhu ce* 王命作册逸祝册 should be punctuated after *zuoce* and read, "The king ordered to make a brevet, and Yi recited the brevet" (Karlgren 1949:92). In an earlier sharply worded attack on Wang Guowei 王國維, Karlgren rejects the noun reading of *zuo ce* as the title of an office, "maker of brevets" (Karlgren's translation). His objection is based on the insertion of a variety of official titles, such as *neishi* 內史, *neishiyin* 內史尹, etc., between *zuoce* and the personal name that follows (Bernhard Karlgren 1948:246). Karlgren has become a slave of his own interpretation, forcing it in contexts where *zuoce* clearly stands for an official title, as in *Da ding* 大鼎: *wang shang zuo ce Da bai ma* 王賞作册大白 "The prince made a present and made a brevet for [D]a of a white horse" (*ibid.*, 92). *Shang* and *zuoce* are not coordinate clauses in this context; the sentence should read: "The King presented *zuoce* Da a white horse."

In a passage such as *wang hu zuoce neishi A ce ming B* 王乎作册內史 A 册命 B *neishi* A stands in apposition to *zuoce*; the passage should read as "The King ordered the *zuoce*, Interior Scribe A, to announce the charge to B." *Zuoce* is an example of title formation from an earlier verb + object combination, a common occurrence in ancient Chinese language. For example, the title *jiangjun* 將軍 ("general, commander"), which appears for the first time in 514 B.C., was derived from the earlier verb + object combination *X jiang zhong jun, Y zuo shi* X 將中軍, Y 佐之 ("X led the Center Army, and Y assisted him") (ZZZS 52:31b [915, Zhao 28] and 19a:5b [313, Wen 6]). Guo Moruo's interpretation of *zuoce* as a generic term and titles such as *neishi* as specific terms is correct (Guo 1956:58b-61a).

the king's charge was read. Finally the recipient acknowledged the grace of the king by kowtowing before him.³³

Scholars generally agree that the charge was written down ahead of time and read by the maker of the record or a scribe upon the king's order.³⁴ The charge follows the phrase "The King in this wise said . . ." (*wang ruo yue* . . . 王若曰). In longer inscriptions of this type, the charge is signified by "The King in this wise said . . . The King said" . . . (and or) "said" (*yue* 曰). At least one inscription records both direct speech by the king and the reading of his charge: "The King called to Interior Scribe Wu saying, 'Announce the charge to Hu.' The King in this wise said, ' . . .'"³⁵ 王乎內史吳曰册命虎。王若曰。 The keys to identifying this kind of inscription are the preamble, which states that the king called on an officer to read the charge, or when this marker is missing, the expression "The King in this wise said."³⁶ Some inscriptions note the transmission of a charge document (*mingshu* 命書) from one participant to another before the order is given by the king to announce it to the recipient,³⁷ thus confirming that the charge was written beforehand. In at least one instance, the recipient was given a copy of the charge after it was pronounced.³⁸

³² Other officials identified announcing the charge include the *mingyin* 命尹 (Guo Moruo 1935:125b *Yin gui* 伊簋) and *zuoceyin* 作册尹 *ibid.*, 152a-153a *Xiu pan* 休盤).

³³ See Guo Moruo 1935:56b-58a *Hai ding* 燕鼎, 65a-b *Shan ding* 善鼎 and 68a-134a, *passim* for examples of ceremonial bronzes. For detailed discussions of this system, see Qi Sihe 1947, Chen Mengjia 1956, Shizuka Shirakawa 1964, and Wong Yin-wai 1978.

³⁴ See Qi Sihe 1947:54, Chen Mengjia 1956:106-108, Wong Yin-wai 1978:89-91.

³⁵ Guo Moruo 1935:73b-74a *Shu Hu gui* 師虎簋.

³⁶ For more discussion on the latter point, see Yu Xingwu 1966.

³⁷ Guo Moruo 1935:72a-73b *Song ding* 頌鼎, 89b-90a *Mian gui* 免簋.

³⁸ Guo Moruo 1935:72a-73b *Song ding* 頌鼎.

If the king's charge is not set apart by any of the means described above, it can be detected by the use of pronouns of direct address such as *ru* 女 ("you") in the text of the charge, whether spoken directly by the king or read by his intermediary.³⁹ Whether the king's charge was spoken directly or read, the speech format was employed to record it in the record of the event.

The chronological distribution of Western Zhou bronze inscriptions that record events and/or speeches in the first five volumes of Shirakawa's *magnum opus* is shown in Table A1 below. Speeches are first recorded in inscriptions extant from the reign of King Cheng (r. 1084-1060).⁴⁰ Thereafter there is a general upward trend of recording more speeches until the percentage of inscriptions with speeches finally surpasses those that record events only in the reign of King Yi (r. 950-937). During the remainder of the Western Zhou period, inscriptions that record speeches dominate. Details of the royal Zhou appointment and reward ceremony outlined above begin to appear in inscriptions made during the reign of King Kang 康王 (r. 1051-1025 B.C.).⁴¹ This type of inscription occurs with greatest frequency between the reigns of King Gong (r. 967-951) and King Yi (r. 917-879).⁴²

³⁹ For examples of charges identifiable by pronoun usage only, refer to Guo Moruo 1935:80a *Wang gui* 望簋 for a charge that was read and 84b-85a *Kang ding* 康鼎 and 86b-87a *Tong gui* 同簋 for charges that appear to have been spoken directly by the king.

⁴⁰ Shizuka Shirakawa 1962-.1a:217-222 *X ding* 寧鼎 and 276-308 *Ling yi* 令彝.

⁴¹ Guo Moruo 1935:35a-38b *Xiao Yu ding* 小孟鼎. For the date and reading of this inscription, Shizuka Shirakawa 1962:1b:682-718.

⁴² Among the Western Zhou bronze inscriptions in Shizuka Shirakawa's compendium of bronze inscriptions, twenty-one of twenty-five ceremonial bronzes that include speech and thirty-three of thirty-seven total ceremonial bronzes appear during this period (vol. 1-3b *passim*).

Table A1. Western Zhou Bronze Inscriptions with Events and Speeches

Reign/Era	Inscription Type			Total	Percentage	
	Event	Speech	Both		Event	Speech
Cheng (1084-1060)	26		2	28	93	7
Cheng/Kang	5	1	1	7	71	29
Kang (1051-1025)	11	1	2	14	79	21
Kang/Zhao	4	1	1	6	67	33
Zhao (1024-999)	7		1	8	88	12
Zhao/Mu	8	2	1	11	73	27
Mu (998-968)	9		5	14	64	36
Gong (967-951)	8		5	13	62	38
Yi 懿王 (950-937)	5		6	11	45	55
Yi/Xiao		1	4	5		100
Xiao (936-918)	4		7	11	36	64
Yi 夷王(917-879)	10	1	10	21	48	52
Li (878-828)	1	1	4	6	17	83
Gonghe (841-828)	2		2	4	50	50
Xuan (827-782)	1		2	3	30	70
Totals	102	8	53	163	63	37

Source: Shizuka Shirakawa 1962-, vols. 1-3b, *passim*, 5:406-428.

In general, inscriptions from the Western Zhou period (1067-771 B.C.) were generated by the royal Zhou house and officers of the royal court, whereas Eastern Zhou inscriptions were produced primarily by the rulers and other individuals in the various states that had fragmented the political authority of the Zhou house.⁴³ Although inscriptions describing the function of bronze vessels proliferated during the Eastern Zhou period,⁴⁴ inscriptions that were made for more clearly historical purposes continue

⁴³ Guo Moruo 1935:4a (preface).

⁴⁴ Guo Moruo 1935:153a-252b; Shizuka Shirakawa 1962-, vol. 4.

to record personal statements such as eulogies to the ancestral spirits⁴⁵ and such state matters as appointments and rewards.⁴⁶ Eastern Zhou inscriptions of the latter type in particular continue to record dates, events and/or speeches.

Historical writing as manifest in bronze inscriptions is based on scribal documents, personal knowledge, or a combination of these two sources.⁴⁷ As for scribal documents, the description of the royal Zhou appointment and rewards ceremony above highlights the role of documents as an integral part of court ritual. When this kind of inscription is taken in its entirety, the viewpoints of the court and of the maker of the bronze can be detected, thus suggesting that the inscription is based on a court document obtained from the royal archives. Whereas the account of the ceremony is given from the point of view of the Zhou court, there is an obvious shift of viewpoint to that of the recipient when at the conclusion of the ceremony account, he introduces himself as the maker of the inscription and entreats his posterity to forever treasure and use the vessel. This shift in viewpoint indicates the presence of a scribe, in addition to the scribe directly involved in the ceremony, who made a record of the entire proceeding from the date through the acknowledgment of the king's grace by the recipient. Evidence for the accessibility of scribal documents is found in inscriptions

⁴⁵ Guo Moruo 1935:214a-215a *Chen Fang gui* 陳助簋, *Chen Ni fu* 陳逆簋, *Yinzi X* 因資罇, and 247a-249b *Qingong gui* 秦公簋.

⁴⁶ Guo Moruo 1935:202b-208b *Shuiyi zhong* 叔夷鐘, 208b-209b *X hu* 庫壺.

⁴⁷ Guo Moruo 1935:142a-143b *Shaobo Hu gui* 召伯狐簋 may be an example of the latter type, for another document is quoted in the inscription along with the conversations and other details of the event.

that quote court documents⁴⁸ or which are nothing more than a verbatim inscription of the source document complete with the signature of the scribe who was its author.⁴⁹

Historical writing based on personal knowledge is most evident in Western Zhou reports to ancestral spirits.⁵⁰ Inscriptions of this type are undated and appear to be based on a verbatim record of a speech made by the principal whose words are simply introduced at the outset by the phrase "[so and so] says." The speaker addresses his ancestors directly, then recites his own meritorious deeds. Although the physical setting of the report is not identified in the inscription, the report was probably delivered in an ancestral temple. A *Zuo zhuan* entry under the year 710 B.C. states that when a ruler returned from a foray outside of the state, he made a report in the ancestral temple where his successful labor was recorded (*ce* 策).⁵¹ One commentator on this passage maintains that reports to ancestors were made following a variety of external and domestic activities, and that while a written record was made of successes, failures were reported verbally but not recorded.⁵² Reports to ancestral spirits that are preserved in bronze inscriptions support this observation for they are uniformly positive in recording only meritorious achievements. The source documents for these inscriptions

⁴⁸ An excellent example is provided in Guo Moruo 1935:121a-122b 大克鼎. The first part of this inscription from the reign of King Yi (r. 950-937) records Ko's report to his ancestor, then it quotes the record of his own award ceremony. See Shizuka Shirakawa 1962-3b:490-511 for interpretation and the date of this inscription.




⁴⁹ See Guo Moruo 1935:129a-131a *Jiuren pan* 灸人盤.

⁵⁰ Guo Moruo 1935:46a-49a *Shenzi gui* 沈子簋; 80a-81b *Shiwang ding* 師望鼎; *Dake ding* 大克鼎; 127a-b *Guo Shulu zhong* 虢叔旅鐘; 132a-b *Shuxiang fu gui* 叔向父簋.

⁵¹ ZZS 5:17a-b (96, Huan 2). *Ce* 策 and *ce* 冊 are interchangeable characters.

⁵² ZZS 5:17a-b (96, Huan 2).

may have been temple records that were written on bamboo slips at the time of the report.

Although the functional role of scribes appearing in bronze inscriptions is frequently ambiguous, there is sufficient evidence to establish that the scribe was the official most intimately involved with written records. The bronze inscription character for scribe (*shi* 史) is , depicting a hand  holding a tablet .⁵³ This may be taken as a representation of someone holding a tablet either in a reading or in a writing position; thus, the character is also ambiguous with respect to the function of the scribe. References to scribes in classical texts show that they were noted for both their reading and writing abilities.⁵⁴

Eastern Zhou and Former Han texts also indicate that among the most important functions of Zhou period scribes were maintenance of the royal or state calendar and record keeping.⁵⁵ The latter function was conceived as a division of labor between the scribe on the right (*youshi* 右史), who recorded events or actions, and the scribe on the left (*zuoshi* 左史), who recorded the spoken word.⁵⁶ A modern Chinese scholar suggests that while the recording of events or actions and speech were two major elements of Zhou historiography, such a division of labor is unlikely.⁵⁷ Insofar as historical writing in the bronze inscriptions reflects the Zhou scribal tradition, notices of

⁵³ For detailed discussions of *shi* consult Wang Guowei 1973:6:1a-6b (263-74), Xi Hanjing 1958:5-22, and Dai Junren 1963:53-65.

⁵⁴ ZZZS 45:36b-37a (794-95, Zhao 12); SZHZKZ 39:3-4 (620-21), 4:62 (79); and Wang Guowei 1973:6:3a-4b.

⁵⁵ Wang Guowei 1921:3a-4b, Dai Junren 1963:63-64, Jin Jing'an 1972:3-4.

⁵⁶ LZZS 29:5a-6a (545).

⁵⁷ Qian Mu 1973:51.

military campaigns reveal that on occasion events were recorded without speech; reports made to ancestral spirits and possibly the pronouncement of royal charges show that a scribe was present who recorded only the spoken word; and the full account of ceremonies in the royal Zhou court and other proceedings indicate that scribes were also called upon to make a complete record of date, actions, and words related to a single event. Thus, in bronze inscriptions from throughout the Zhou period, the calendar and record keeping functions are on display in the recording of dates, events, and speech.

Nature of Classical Historical Texts

Classical historical texts of the Zhou period may be divided into two general categories on the basis of the presence or absence of speech. Texts of the latter type are chronicles of important events, particularly political affairs and natural phenomena. The date of the event is noted, then the event is described in a terse statement. The best known chronicle of this type is the *Chunqiu*, or *Spring and Autumn Annals*, of the state of Lu 魯, which is distinguished by its notation of the four seasons in addition to the year, month, and day.⁵⁸ The *Zhushu jinian*, or *Bamboo Annals*, is said to represent another kind of chronicle that dates events by year only.⁵⁹ However, close examination of the version of the *Zhushu jinian* reconstructed from authentic fragments of the original quoted in later writings will reveal that some entries include month and/or cyclical day.⁶⁰ The probability exists that precise dates were often lost in the

⁵⁸ van der Loon 1961:25.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ For example, GBZSJN 11b records Duke Chu, 6th year, 4th month and 14b has King

transmission of these passages, for omission of such information is out of character for this kind of historical writing in the Zhou period. The provision of more complete dates in the forged version of the *Zhushu jinian* is noteworthy as part of the author's attempt to establish credibility for his spurious work.⁶¹

Historical texts of the Zhou period that contain speech may be subdivided according to degree of emphasis on speech in relation to events. The authentic chapters of the *Shujing*, or *Book of Documents*, which are accepted as historical writing are the earliest examples of historical texts that place more emphasis on speech than on events.⁶² These chapters are believed to be documents from the Zhou archives and to originate primarily from the reign of King Cheng (r. 1115-1079 B.C.).⁶³ Authentic Western Zhou passages in the *Shujing* are very close to the documentary portions of Western Zhou bronze inscriptions in language and style, especially recorded speeches and pronouncements.⁶⁴ Two additional well-known works that emphasize speech are the *Guoyu*, or *State Discourses*, and the *Zhanguo ce*, or *Strategies of the Warring States*. The *Guoyu* is arranged according to state and deals mainly with the Spring And Autumn

Huicheng of Liang, 6th year, 4th month, *jiayin* 甲寅.

⁶¹ JBZSJN *passim*. Refer to the following works for additional discussions of the editions of the *Bamboo Annals*: H.G. Creel 1937:xvi-xxii; Alesky Debnicki 1956:41-53; Zhang Xincheng 1960:490-500, and Edward L. Shaughnessy 1997.

⁶² Qu Wanli 1972:3, Qian Mu 1973:54-55.

⁶³ Qu Wanli 1972:3.

⁶⁴ Qu Wanli 1972:70-134. Note the use of *wang yue* and *wang ruo yue* in the *Shujing* and in the inscriptions. The *Shujing* chapters "Dagao" 大誥, "Jiugao" 酒誥, "Zicai" 梓材, "Wuyi" 無逸, "Junshi" 君奭, and "Lizheng" 立政 consist entirely of undated speeches (*ibid.*, 70-76, 83-90, 106-116, 120-126); thus, they appear to have been based on the scribal record of speeches (refer above, pp. 5-14). Chapters "Kanggao" 康誥, "Shaogao" 召誥, "Luogao" 洛誥, "Duoshi" 多士, "Duofang" 多方, and "Guming" 顧命 place speeches in a temporal and spatial context (*ibid.*, 76-83, 91-106, 116-120, 126-134) which suggest that they have been based on the more detailed and complete scribal record of events.

Era (770-453 B.C.) of the Eastern Zhou period.⁶⁵ The *Zhanguo* is also arranged by state; but it concerns mainly the later portion of the Eastern Zhou period, the Warring States Era (453-221 B.C.).⁶⁶ Because of the emphasis on speech rather than events, dates are seldom mentioned in any of these three historical works. Nevertheless, the events that gave rise to speeches are generally arranged in chronological order.

With regard to the treatment of dates, events, and speech, the most balanced historical text from the Zhou period is the *Zuozhuan*. It has been described as the "first extremely detailed chronological history," but recorded dates vary in completeness as they do in bronze inscriptions.⁶⁷ Although a significant portion of the text is speeches, the emphasis of the *Zuozhuan* is on the factual details of social, political, and military events in the Spring And Autumn Era.⁶⁸ For this reason, it is generally regarded as the most reliable classical historical text of the Zhou period. Some scholars believe that originally the text may have been arranged according to state, and that during the Former Han the original arrangement was lost when the text was reconstituted into a strictly chronological format and appended to the *Chunqiu* as a commentary.⁶⁹ Since its composition, the *Zuozhuan* has been recognized for its historical value.

⁶⁵ Qian Mu 1973:48-55.

⁶⁶ A recent study by Zheng Liangshu suggests that in general terms the chapters of this text can be divided according to their emphasis on events or speech; the latter type comprises the majority of the text (1975:140-175). See also Qian Mu 1973.

⁶⁷ In its present arrangement, the first entry in a given year in the *Zuozhuan* is indicated by the number of the year; subsequent entries for that year which are dated are identified by the season and/or month and/or day. However, occasionally an event is dated according to a well-known event that occurred in the same year; for an example see, ZZS 44:12a (763, Zhao 7).

⁶⁸ Qian Mu 1973:41-45, 50-51.

⁶⁹ Maspero 1931-32.

Classical historical texts of the Zhou period are based on a variety of sources which include products of the scribal tradition. As noted above, scribes attached to the Western Zhou royal court and to the courts of the various states of the Eastern Zhou period maintained written records of events that were kept in the royal and state archives.⁷⁰ Some documents that were simply logs of important events involving the government or notices of events occurring elsewhere became the basis for annalistic works such as the *Chunqiu* and the *Zhushu jinian*; there is ample evidence to show that the Eastern Zhou states produced these kinds of documents and works.⁷¹ Governmental edicts and public pronouncements were carefully documented.⁷² Penal codes were written⁷³ and criminal records were kept in state archives.⁷⁴ Numerous documents were created as the result of interstate contacts, particularly covenant making. Meticulous records were made by the delegations of each state represented at a covenant meeting.⁷⁵ The documents included detailed records of the conduct of the meeting, negotiations over the terms of the covenant, and the wording of the covenant in its final form.⁷⁶

⁷⁰ See also GYCK 2:18a-19b.

⁷¹ GYCK 2:9b-11a provides full documentation of this point.

⁷² See Qu Wanli 1972:70--143 and the foregoing discussion.

⁷³ Tripods with inscribed penal codes were cast based on penal code documents (*xingshu* 刑書) in the states of Zheng 鄭 in 536 B.C. (ZZZS 43:16a-20a [749-51, Zhao 6] and Jin 晉 in 513 B.C. (*ibid.*, 53:11a-12b [920, Zhao 29]).

⁷⁴ The names of criminals were recorded on *ce* 策 that were kept by the rulers of the various states (ZZZS 19b:19a-20b [337, Wen 15]; 34:11a [589, Xiang 20]).

⁷⁵ ZZZS 13:4b (215, Xi 7) where Guan Zhong 管仲, the famous chief minister of Qi 齊, is reported to have said that "at interstate meetings . . . there is no state that does not make a record" 諸侯之會。無國不記。

⁷⁶ ZZZS 38:6a-12a (646-647, Xiang 27); 51:7a-15a (888-892, Zhao 25). for a discussion of Eastern Zhou covenants recorded in historical texts and several covenant texts recently recovered in archaeological excavations, see Chen Mengjia 1966:271-281. For examples of covenant texts from the Spring and Autumn state of Jin unearthed in Houma, Shanxi, see HMMS.

Covenant documents were of such importance that they were kept in a special covenant archive (*mengfu* 盟府).⁷⁷ Scribal officials were responsible for making and preserving a written record of all phases of government activity.

Private sources of documentation were also available. Scribes were retained by powerful lineages for whom they maintained records similar in nature to those kept in state archives.⁷⁸ Zhou period historians evidently drew upon these records for detailed accounts of internal family and lineage matters.⁷⁹ Another important product of the scribal tradition that served as source material for historians was privately cast bronze inscriptions.⁸⁰

Oral history and traditions were also important sources for early historians and philosophers. According to the *Guoyu*, the Western Zhou kings received feedback from the people through oral sources which included odes presented by his high and mid level officers, folk songs sung at court by blind musicians, as well as the rhapsodies and recitations of other blind men and verbal reports passed on from artisans and people at the grassroots, while scribes (historians) provided their input by offering, probably reading, documentation of past events.⁸¹ The scribe and the blind musician were closely associated as providers of instruction and admonishment to rulers during the

⁷⁷ ZZS 12:22b-23a (207-208, Xi 5); 16:7a (265, Xi 26); 31:22b-23a (547-548, Xiang 10).

⁷⁸ See Xi Hanjing 1958:89-90 for examples and discussion.

⁷⁹ See, for examples, the perspective of the Xi lineage on punishing wife swapping by one of its members and the inside view of objections by Shuxiang's mother to his desire to marry the daughter of an ill-starred beauty in ZZS 52:23a-26b (911-912, Zhao 28).

⁸⁰ For bronze inscriptions quoted in the *Zuozhuan*, see ZZS 16:2a (262, Xi 25); 42:11b-12a (723, Zhao 3); 44:16b-17a (765-766, Zhao 7).

⁸¹ GY 1:4b-5a ("Chou yu" *shang*, 11-12).

Western Zhou and Spring and Autumn periods.⁸² In time their teachings were combined into a written form, known as the record of the blind musicians and scribes (*gu shi zhi ji* 瞽史之紀 or *gu shi ji* 瞽史記), which is quoted in accounts of events that occurred during the latter period.⁸³ Many songs of the blind musicians and recitations of others were undoubtedly captured by historians who wrote what they heard on bamboo slips when going outside to investigate events.⁸⁴ This practice helps account for anecdotes in classical histories about events that did not occur in a setting where a scribe or historian would have been present at the time of occurrence.

Access to royal and state archives was important to both officials and scholars. The Western Zhou tradition of accessible archives evident in the nature of bronze inscriptions was continued in the Eastern Zhou period. During the latter period archives were apparently open to residents and non-residents alike. In 540 B.C. an official from the state of Jin was permitted to examine the chronicles of the state of Lu and the statutes of Zhou during a visit to Lu.⁸⁵ The philosophers Mo Di 墨翟 (fl. 479-438 B.C.) and Mengzi 孟子 (371-328 B.C.) were familiar with the records of many of the Eastern Zhou states.⁸⁶ Access to original documents and historical records of the various states of the Spring And Autumn Era made possible the composition and compilation of the *Zuozhuan*.⁸⁷

⁸² GY 1:5a ("Zhouyu" *shang*, 13), 17:9b ("Chuyu" *shang*, 396).

⁸³ GY 4:3a, 11b ("Jinyu" 4, 249, 266).

⁸⁴ For an example, see ZZS 36:6b (619, Xiang 25).

⁸⁵ ZZS 42:1a-b (718, Zhao 2).

⁸⁶ MZJG 141-145; MZS 8a:12a (146).

⁸⁷ GYCK 2:9b-11a; RZL 4:1a, 2b-4a.

Although the *Zuozhuan* in its present form may appear to be a "disjointed collection of tales and anecdotes,"⁸⁸ there is ample evidence to demonstrate that it is largely based on primary written sources from the various states. For example, failure to harmonize dates from records of the different states has left traces of at least three calendar systems that were used concurrently in the Spring And Autumn Era.⁸⁹ Another sign of reliance on original documents is the use and misuse of official titles and general terms of reference to official rank. For example, passages focused on the state of Chu, or written from its viewpoint, refer to the highest official in the government as *lingyin* 令尹, but in a passage written from the perspective of another state this office is identified inaccurately as *zai* 宰.⁹⁰ Careful reading of Jin passages will show that the official hierarchy of that state was divided between *qing* 卿, who were officials of high rank, and *daifu* 大夫, or officials of lower rank; nevertheless, from the point of view of another state a Jin official with the rank of *qing* could be referred to as *daifu*.⁹¹ Whereas terminology derived from the records of a particular state is used consistently and with specificity, references to that state from other sources may use inaccurate terms. Access to original documents is also evident in the occasional verbatim reproduction of such a document in the *Zuozhuan* text. The best known example is a

⁸⁸ Hulsewe 1961:33.

⁸⁹ Consult RZL 4:4a-6a and Qian Mu 1973:42 for full documentation and discussion.

⁹⁰ See commentary on ZZZS 23:5a (390, Xuan 12).

⁹¹ Although Zhao Dun 趙盾 was commander of the Center Army, the highest military and political office in Jin, he is referred to as *daifu* in the *Chunqiu* record of Lu (compare CQZS 19a:12a [316, Wen 7] to ZZZS 19a:15a [318, Wen 7]). Jin passages in the *Zuozhuan* always use *daifu* in the specific sense of low rank official such as a great officer of the army (*jun daifu* 軍大夫 and great officer of the ducal lineage (*gongzu daifu* 公族大夫) (ZZZS 28:30a [486, Cheng 18]; 23:4b [389, Xuan 12]).

letter originating in the state of Zheng that reflects local grammar in its reversal of the normal *Zuozhuan* usage of the prepositions *yu* 於 and *yu* 于.⁹²

There is also evidence that the *Zuozhuan* is based on original documents that were recorded over an extended period of time. A study of the *Yijing* 易經 quotations in the *Zuozhuan* and the *Guoyu* has shown that both texts incorporated material "which is roughly contemporary to the dates in which it is recorded."⁹³ The evolution of the present version of the *Yijing* is traceable through the quotation of the older layers of the text in the *Zuozhuan* and the *Guoyu* passages from the first two thirds of the Spring And Autumn Era; *Yijing* oracles from the final period are identical to the present *Yijing* text.⁹⁴ Diachronic studies of officialdom in the Spring and Autumn era, which show the gradual evolution and disparate development of official hierarchies and appointment and promotion procedures in several states, provide additional evidence that the *Zuozhuan* is based on a corpus of reliable documents that originated from the various states and were contemporaneous with the recorded events.⁹⁵ Regardless of the disjointed appearance of the present *Zuozhuan* text, most of the sources on which it is based were authentic documents that provided coherent historical data.

⁹² According to Bernhard Karlgren 1931-32:41-48, in the *Zuozhuan* the preposition *yu* 於 is normally used with persons or things with human qualities and *yu* 于 is used with place names. However, the usage of these prepositions is reversed in the Zheng letter of 610 B.C.; see ZZS 20:7b-9b (349-350, Wen 17).

⁹³ Helmut Wilhelm 1959:275.

⁹⁴ Helmut Wilhelm 1959:275-280.

⁹⁵ See Barry B. Blakeley 1977, 1979a, 1979b and Melvin P. Thatcher 1973, 1977-1978, 1985.

Summary

Historical writing of the Zhou period reflects the concern of the scribal tradition with dates, events, and speech. Scribes produced three kinds of documents that recorded the bare facts of events, speeches, and facts and speeches related to events, respectively. The influence of the scribal tradition is evident in the nature of bronze inscriptions and the various historical texts that relied on archival documents. Continuities in style and content between inscriptions and classical historical texts may be attributed, at least partly, to their mutual reliance on scribal sources. Among the historical texts, the scribal concern with bare facts is transmitted in the *Chunqiu* and the *Zhushu jinian*, and the scribal focus on speech is reflected in the *Shujing*, the *Guoyu*, and the *Zhanguoce*. All elements of the scribal tradition are evident in the *Zuozhuan* which was compiled and composed on the basis of documents from state archives and works that drew upon them, as well as on other literary sources and oral traditions.

Appendix 2
Pedigree of the Kings of Chu




Figure A1. Early Generations (1)

Sources: The pedigree in this appendix is based on the "Di Xi" 帝繫 chapter and the Chu portion of the "Hereditary House" 世家 section of the *Shiben* (SBJB:11-14, 45 and on the "Hereditary House of Chu" 楚世家 chapter of the *Shiji*.

Notes

Cheng, the Son of Zhuan Xu

The "Di Xi" chapter of the *Shiben* omits Cheng and shows Lao Tong as the son of Zhuan Xu. However, as noted by Qin Jiamou, Kong Yingda's commentary on a Zhao 29 entry in the *Zuozhuan*, Kong Yingda states that both the *Shiben* and the "Chu Hereditary House" chapter of the *Shiji* state that Zhuanxu begat Cheng who begat Lao Tong (ZZZS 53:9a [925, Zhao 29]). Evidently the *Shiben* that was in circulation during the time of Sima Qian, who drew upon it for his "Chu Hereditary House" chapter, and of Kong Yingda included the generation of Cheng. One must note, however, that other early texts such as the "Di Xi" chapter of the *Da Dai Liji* 大戴禮記 and the *Shanhaijing* 山海經 omit Cheng; so this remains a problem. Telescoping of generations in oral pedigrees is a well-known phenomenon in Africa; this may be the cause of this discrepancy.

Lao Tong

The "Chu Hereditary House" chapter of the *Shiji* lists Juan Zhang 卷章 in the place of Lao Tong. Although the "Di Xi" chapter of *Shiben* gives Lao Tong as the name, Kong Yingda's commentary on Zhao 29 of the *Zuozhuan* says that the *Shiben* and "Chu Hereditary House" chapter of the *Shiji* are in agreement on Juan Zhang (ZZZS 53:9a [925, Zhao 29]). The *Jijie* commentary on the *Shiji* cites a source that says "Lao Tong was Juan Zhang." And the *Suoyin* commentary says "Juan Zhang was named Lao Tong." (see SJHZKZ 40:2 [644]). Assuming that the compiler(s) of the *Shiben* wrote down information that was originally transmitted orally, the identification of the same person by another name in different renditions of an oral pedigree is not unusual. I show Lao Tong here because a variant of this name is mentioned in a genealogical reference in a Chu silk manuscript from the Warring States era that was uncovered near Changsha, Hunan (He Guangyue 1988:2).




Figure A2: Early Generations (2)




Figure A3. Western Zhou Generations (1)




Figure A4. Western Zhou Generations (2)




Figure A5. Spring and Autumn Generations (1)




Figure A6. Spring and Autumn Generations (2)




Figure A7. Spring and Autumn Generations (3)

Appendix 3

Lineage in Spring and Autumn China

The Lineage Question

In a brief discussion of descent group organization in the Spring and Autumn state of Chu written in 1962, the historian H. G. Creel describes the *xing* 姓 as "a rather large and loose 'common descent group,' showing an attitude of solidarity which in a specific situation might or might not produce united action." He says that the *shi* 氏 was smaller and "a corporate group in the fullest sense of Max Weber's terminology,"¹ meaning that it was characterized by exclusive membership and an internal organization with a chief and, possibly, an administrative staff.² Anthropologist Maurice Freedman, writing in 1966, notes that the distinction Creel made between *xing* and *shi* is precisely the distinction between "clan" and "lineage," the terms which anthropologists normally use to translate *zu* 族, *zong* 宗, and *zongzu* 宗族.³ Later Western anthropologists and social historians, however, laboring under some version of Freedman's own conception of the Chinese lineage, which emphasizes the possession of a corporate estate, especially ancestral halls,⁴ assert that there were no lineages in China before the Song dynasty (AD 960-1279).⁵

¹ I would like to thank Professors Patricia B. Ebrey and David N. Keightley for their helpful comments during the revision of this chapter. Creel 1964:168.

² Weber 1947:145-46.

³ Freedman 1966:25-26.

⁴ Freedman 1958 and 1966; also see discussion below.

⁵ For examples, see Johnson 1977:94-97; Sangren 1984:410-11, note 21; Rubie S.

Through a contextual analysis of the meanings of key terms in classical historical texts, I shall show that lineages, as defined by Western scholars, did in fact exist during the Spring And Autumn Era (720-453 B.C.; hereafter all dates are B.C. unless noted otherwise) of Chinese history. My intention is to clarify the structure of agnatic (or patrilineal) descent groups, which is not well understood even by researchers who specialize in early China. For example, as will be shown below, Creel's interpretation of *xing* and *shi* is not correct.⁶

This study begins with an overview of terms and concepts used by social anthropologists working outside of China. My purpose here is to lay out the chief characteristics which have been used to identify and differentiate between various ways of organizing kinsmen. Next I provide a brief review of the most influential definitions employed in the study of descent group organization in Chinese society. This will give a view of the lineage which is said to be missing prior to the Song dynasty. I then turn to consideration of the meanings of relevant key terms in oracle bone inscriptions, in bronze inscriptions, and in the *Zuozhuan* and in the *Guoyu*, with particular emphasis on these two works because they are the primary historical sources for the Spring and Autumn Era. I have deliberately chosen to exclude from consideration references in the *Liji* and *Zhouli* in order to minimize the influence of these systematizing texts on my

Watson 1985:15-18; and Ebrey 1986:50, note 20.

⁶ Blakeley offers the following definitions of clan and lineage: "I use 'clan' to refer to the larger proprietary kinship group *within a regional state* (not, as is customary, the supra-state *xing* 姓), and 'lineage' refers to a segmented unit (*shi* 氏) of a 'clan.'" (1992:3 [note 7].) Although his definition of "clan" is untraditional, Blakeley clearly accepts Creel's understanding of *xing* and *shi* and uses it in his analysis of early Chinese kinship and Chu in particular (1999:53-55).

interpretation of historical sources.⁷ I close by comparing the meaning of the key Chinese terms to the social anthropological concepts of clan and lineage.

Denis Twitchett, recognizing the complexity of the problem, asserts that the study of the historical meaning of terms, particularly kinship terminology, is not likely to be very productive. He says: "One of the problems of concentrating on terminology is that the meaning of words is so dependent upon immensely complex factors of context."⁸ I agree. This is precisely why a contextual analysis of the key terminology used in historical texts is so necessary for understanding ancient society. If one is able to correctly analyze the meaning of words in context, then the shape and texture of societal forms and social behavior can be teased out of the limited number of extant texts.

Another important reason for concentrating on terms is that the polysemic nature of generic terms can help to establish the organization and structure of society. Harold W. Scheffler, a leading critic of the concepts of social anthropology that will be presented below, says:

[I]n many societies with corporate descent-ordered groups the generic terms for those groups are polysemic. The terms designate (a) *classes* or socially significant *categories* of agnatic or uterine or cognatic descendants of a specific "founder" and also (b) the operant groups (sometimes "localized") which form around some of those category members. Moreover, the same terms may designate categories and groups at several levels of segmentation, resolution of referential ambiguity being left to linguistic and social contexts of usage.⁹

⁷On early systematizing texts, see Karlgren 1946:201.

⁸Twitchett 1982:623.

⁹Scheffler 1966:550.

In an article written from the perspective of cultural anthropology, David M. Schneider also comments on the analytical importance of the polysemy of kinship terms. He claims that "the articulation of symbols into clusters and sub-systems is partly accomplished by such a multiplicity of meanings."¹⁰

In the continuation of his argument, Schneider gives another good reason for examining symbols, or terminology:

[I]f there is reason to believe that a descent category is culturally differentiated in any particular culture, the essential test of this hypothesis is the simple one of showing that more than one symbol for it exists. A descent category which is merely marked in one way is more likely to be an artifact of some analytic maneuver than it is a part of the culture being studied.¹¹

This aspect of the way agnatic descent groups in Spring and Autumn society are described in the historical sources will constitute a major proof in the argument which follows.

Because of the focus on key Chinese terms and the contexts in which they are used, this cannot be a comprehensive study of agnatic descent groups in the Spring And Autumn Era. Much more can be, and has been, said through tracing the external and internal activities of particular agnatic descent groups and their members regardless of whether key terms are used in the sources.¹² Here I only seek to highlight what can be learned by concentrating on key terms.

¹⁰ Schneider 1967:69, text and note 4.

¹¹ Schneider 1967:70.

¹² For examples, see Blakeley 1970 and Thatcher 1973. These studies deal with society and politics in the Spring And Autumn Era. They also share the problem of the "confusion of terminology" that is pointed out by James L. Watson in his comments on the works of contemporary social historians who employ anthropological models (perhaps 'approaches' might

Lineage and Related Concepts in Social Anthropology

In this section I shall focus on the definitions of key terms and concepts which have been formulated and debated by social anthropologists working outside of China. The debate has been conveniently summarized by Holy and Kuper;¹³ so I will not rehash it here. While I do not subscribe to the descent and lineage theories that have been propounded,¹⁴ I still find some of the terms and concepts of social anthropology useful for describing and analyzing descent group organization in Spring and Autumn China. Those key terms and concepts are group, aggregate and category, kinship and descent, descent group and corporate group, and clan and lineage.

Group, Aggregate, and Category

Keessing begins his discussion of kinship and descent by asserting that "[p]erhaps more theorists of kinship over the years have come to grief or caused confusion by losing track of the differences between social groups and cultural categories than by any

be a better word) in their study of Chinese society (1982:590).

¹³Holy 1976, Kuper 1982.

¹⁴For understanding the nature of the Shang and Zhou lineage system, K. C. Chang (1976:74) finds great heuristic value in the lineage theory which was developed by Evans-Pritchard (1940) and Fortes (1953) and employed by Middleton and Tait (1958), among others. Chang says "There is little question that there was a segmentary lineage system in Shang and Zhou China . . ." (1976:79). However, this is not the case. While Spring and Autumn society had segmented lineages, it cannot be said to have a segmentary lineage system for four of the five of the reasons cited by Sahlins (1961) for restricting the use of this concept to Tiv and Nuer societies: (1) the entire polity was not organized on a unitary lineage model; (2) genealogical segmentation did not correspond to political or administrative jurisdictions; (3) complementary opposition of equivalent units did not create the structure of the lineage or the political system, segmentation was not symmetrical; and (4) there was no structural relativity, the groups were "permanent, *absolute* social entities . . . [not] *relative* ones." Another important difference was that complementary filiation was not "the principal mechanism" (Fortes 1953:33) of lineage segmentation. In short, the conditions required by lineage theory simply did not exist.

other conceptual flaw."¹⁵ While I do not pretend to be a theorist, this distinction is crucial to the discussion of lineage in Spring and Autumn China.

The main attributes of "group" are: (1) interaction among members of the group is observable, recurrent, extensive, personal, and institutionalized, that is, definable in terms of rights and duties; (2) relationships and roles among members are institutionalized and interconnected, in other words, the group is organized and has a leader; (3) behavior towards outsiders is predictable and expected, and members act as a group in relation to non-members; (4) a shared perception or consciousness of unity exists among members and is manifest in the existence of a technical term for "group" and often in a group name; and (5) members share common, ongoing objectives.¹⁶ The group must be distinguished from an aggregate of persons whose interaction is sporadic and limited in duration and extent.¹⁷

The defining trait of "category" is simply having some characteristic in common.¹⁸ Keesing makes a distinction between a "cultural category," which is "a set of entities in this world that are classed as similar for some purposes because they have in common one or more culturally relevant attributes"¹⁹ and "social category," or "a category of human beings grouped conceptually because of some socially relevant features they share in common."²⁰ Thus, a category is merely an observer's

¹⁵ Keesing 1975:9.

¹⁶ This list of attributes has been compiled from the following sources: Freeman 1961:202; Goody 1961:8; Fried 1970:15 note 10; and Keesing 1975:10.

¹⁷ Fried 1970:15 note 10; Keesing 1975:10.

¹⁸ Freeman 1961:202.

¹⁹ Keesing 1975:9.

²⁰ Keesing 1975:10.

conceptualization of how people can be classified together by referring to something they have in common. The people who fit into a category need not have a sense of belonging or any of the other attributes associated with groups. Schneider, who has migrated from social to cultural anthropology, discusses kinship and descent only in terms of cultural categories.²¹

Kinship and Descent

Social anthropological literature, during the past four decades at least, has been careful to distinguish between the concepts of kinship and descent.²² Keesing notes that anthropologists use "kinship" in two ways. In a narrow sense it "refers to connections between parents and children . . . and to the networks of relationship built out of these parent-child links" and must be distinguished from ties of affinity and from descent. In a broad sense it "refers to the whole conceptual and social field relating to kinship, marriage, and descent."²³ The key element in this concept is the recognition of relationships bilaterally through both mothers and fathers.²⁴

²¹ Schneider 1967:66.

²² For examples, see Fortes 1959b, Leach 1962:161, Goody 1983:225, and Harris, 1990:42.

²³ Keesing 1975:22. Critics of kinship theory, principally cultural anthropologists, argue that "kinship" has no theoretical or comparative value because the concept is based on premises, such as the existence of a fundamental connection between the reproductive process and socially acknowledged kinship relations and the notion that "blood is thicker than water," which are not universally shared across cultures, the concept of kinship itself being rooted in the European and American cultures of the anthropologists (Schneider 1984), and because in common English usage the term has too many meanings and connotations to be analytically useful (Needham 1974:16). Most social anthropologists, however, have not been persuaded by such arguments and continue to use the term (see, for example, Harris 1990:39-46 for a critique of Schneider).

²⁴ Fortes 1953:33; Goody 1983:225-26.

"Descent" also has several meanings that commonly appear in anthropological literature. It is used in the restricted sense of sole criterion for eligibility to membership in a unilineal descent group.²⁵ Meyer Fortes defines "descent" in 1953 as a "fundamentally jural concept" linking the descent group to the outside political and legal spheres in contrast to kinship, which is "the source of title to membership of the group or special jural status."²⁶ In a 1959 article he defines it broadly as "a genealogical connection recognized between a person and any of his ancestors or ancestresses,"²⁷ or, in contrast to the relation of filiation between a child and his parents (i.e. kinship), "a relation mediated by a parent between himself and an ancestor, defined as any genealogical predecessor of the grandparental or earlier generation."²⁸ Other authors prefer this broader definition and attack more restricted uses, arguing that descent is not a mode of recruitment at all but, rather, a dogma or ideology.²⁹

In the Spring And Autumn Era "descent" combines all of the elements outlined here. While the ideology of descent is manifest in all kinds of settings, for example, interstate relations, mate selection, funeral rites, etc., descent from a common ancestor was indeed the critical mode of recruitment for the types of groups which will be described below.

²⁵ Rivers 1924:86; Goody 1961:5, 7; and Leach 1962:31.

²⁶ Fortes 1953:30.

²⁷ Fortes 1959b:206.

²⁸ Fortes 1959b:207.

²⁹ Barnes 1962:6, Sahlins 1965:104, Scheffler 1966:542, and Holy 1976:119.

Descent Group and Corporate Group

The concept of "descent group" is heavily disputed. Rivers argues that it should be restricted to discrete, non-overlapping, unilineal descent groups.³⁰ Fortes, building on this definition, stresses the importance of corporate organization, "even if the corporate possession is as immaterial as an exclusive name or an exclusive cult."³¹ Goody says, "A descent group . . . is an institutionalized social group, recognized by the presence of a technical term or a distinctive name, which is organized in the basis of unilineal consanguinity, actual or supposed."³²

Scheffler, however, rejects these views as theory which fails to account for structural and behavioral phenomenon observed by ethnographers in the field. He coins the term "descent constructs" to be used in lieu of "descent group" for "the [cultural or ideological] formulations of genealogical connections between persons and their ancestors." He argues that there "is no intrinsic connection between unilineal descent and descent 'groups'" In other words, common descent creates a category, not a group. He maintains that on functional or operational grounds, these groups should be regarded simply as local "political, economic, and religious groups."³³

On the basis of Spring and Autumn era data, my opinion is that both views should be taken into account. In this period, as shall be shown below from the analysis of key Chinese terms, there were real descent groups. These groups are definable in part by the critical roles that they played in the operation of state and society.

³⁰ Cited in Leach 1962:130-31.

³¹ Fortes 1953:25 and 1959b:208.

³² Goody 1961:8.

³³ Scheffler 1966:541, 543, 544.

Recognition of common descent and mutual rights and duties were starting points for the articulation of group structure and joint activities of any kind.

A corporate group is a self-perpetuating entity that persists over time even though its individual members change or are replaced.³⁴ It is viewed by outsiders as a single legal personality which has rights, duties, and liabilities attached to it.³⁵ The group has an authority structure with a head or chief who serves as trustee of the corporate property and represents the group in its external affairs.³⁶ Corporate property is held by and passed down, or inherited, within the group.³⁷ And the group itself assumes functional roles in various spheres of activity.³⁸

Clan and Lineage

Social anthropologists who accept the concept of descent group agree on the use of "clan" for a unilineal descent group whose members claim descent from a common ancestor but are unable to trace exact genealogical relationships.³⁹ Clan members tend to be geographically dispersed.⁴⁰ Structurally the clan may be composed of a number of segments or lineages.⁴¹ Some stress that the clan is exogamous, forbidding marriage between its own members.⁴² Interaction between members of a clan may not be

³⁴ See view of Maine in Fried 1957:18; this attribute is also identified in Fortes 1953:27, Middleton and Tait 1958:4, Leach 1962:131, Fortes 1959:259 and 308, and Fried 1970:15-16.

³⁵ See view of Maine in Fried 1957:18; also refer to Fortes 1953:25, Middleton and Tait 1958:4, and Fortes 1969:308.

³⁶ Weber 1947:145-46, Fortes 1953:32, Middleton and Tait 1958:4.

³⁷ Maine and Fried in Fried 1957:18, Goody 1961:5, Leach 1962:131.

³⁸ Befu and Plotnicov 1962:325.

³⁹ Fortes 1953:25, Middleton and Tait 1958:4, Fried 1970:27, Goody 1983:24.

⁴⁰ Fortes 1953:25, Middleton and Tait 1958:4.

⁴¹ Middleton and Tait 1958:4.

⁴² Middleton and Tait 1958:4.

frequent and extensive enough to satisfy the functional definition of a group. In such a case, the clan may be regarded as a descent category (or an aggregate) rather than as a descent group.⁴³

"Lineage" is defined as a unilineal descent group whose members are able to demonstrate their descent from a common ancestor. Thus, its membership is more restricted, or exclusive, than that of a clan.⁴⁴ The lineage is a corporate group.⁴⁵ It is self-perpetuating.⁴⁶ It is usually identified by a name.⁴⁷ It is recognized as a single legal person by outsiders and has an authority structure with a head who serves as trustee of its property, controls its resources, and represents it in external affairs.⁴⁸ A lineage may be segmented,⁴⁹ with each segment having its own head whose authority in respect to the segment is comparable to that of the lineage head.⁵⁰

Lineage and Related Concepts in Chinese Studies

Maurice Freedman built upon the foundation laid by his British colleagues, but not as uncritically as some maintain.⁵¹ His main contributions to the study of Chinese lineage are found in the emphasis that he placed on the possession of common estates

⁴³ Fried 1957:23, Middleton and Tait 1958:4.

⁴⁴ Fried 1970:27, Goody 1983:224.

⁴⁵ Fortes 1953:26, Firth 1957:4, Middleton and Tait 1958:4.

⁴⁶ Fortes 1953:27, Middleton and Tait 1958:4.

⁴⁷ Middleton and Tait 1958:4.

⁴⁸ Fortes 1953:25-26, Middleton and Tait 1958:4.

⁴⁹ Middleton and Tait 1958:4.

⁵⁰ Fortes 1953:33.

⁵¹ See the assessment in Kuper 1982:89. Freedman, however, disagreed with and diverged from the lineage theory of the Africanists in significant ways. For example, he rejected the "principle of equilibrium," which was central to the notion of complementary opposition, as "naive in its conception" (1958:38). And in his 1966 work, he critically considers the views of Evans-Pritchard and Paul Bohanan on lineage segmentation (37-39).

for defining lineage and determining lineage segmentation, in his concept of asymmetrical segmentation, and in the typology of lineages that he developed. Clanship exists "where lineages of a like surname may be tied together by genealogy but are not members of an enduring group with common interests and activities." The crucial distinction between clan and lineage is the possession of a common estate rather than demonstrated descent, because the former gives rise to corporate activity.⁵² Lineage segmentation is keyed to the establishment of a common estate, especially ancestral halls, and is asymmetrical because of the uneven distribution of wealth across lineages.⁵³ "Local lineages" are defined as "corporate groups of agnates (minus their married sisters and plus their wives) living in one settlement or a tight cluster of settlements." "Dispersed lineages" exist when lineage members are spread across different communities. "Higher Order lineages" are comprised of local lineages grouped "on the basis that the ancestors of those lineages are all descended agnatically from a common ancestor, the whole unit in turn being focused on an ancestral hall or other piece of property."⁵⁴

Freedman's pioneering work on the nature and formation of Chinese lineages has given rise to many studies by supporters and critics of his views. Two relatively recent works by James L. Watson, an anthropologist, and Patricia B. Ebrey, a social historian, are particularly important here because they pay special attention to

⁵² Freedman 1966:21-22. Freedman was at odds with Morton H. Fried and most other anthropologists on his contention that demonstrated descent was not the crucial demarcation between clan and lineage; see *ibid.*, note 1 and Fried 1957 and 1970.

⁵³ Freedman 1958:47-49, 1966:33-35, 37.

⁵⁴ Freedman 1966:20-21.

anthropological concepts and Chinese terminology. They concur on the definition of "clan" as "organizations composed of lineages or descent groups . . . linked by 'stipulated' rather than 'demonstrated' descent."⁵⁵

Watson proposes a "working definition of the Chinese lineage" as follows: "A lineage is a *corporate group* which celebrates its *ritual unity* and is based on *demonstrated descent* from a common ancestor." To qualify as a lineage, all three elements must be present at the same time.⁵⁶ He criticizes historians of China for often failing to distinguish between descent lines (father to son chains), which show no signs of corporate behavior, and corporate lineages based on descent.⁵⁷

Ebrey formulates a more restricted definition in order to distinguish lineages from other types of descent groups. She limits "descent group" to groups of agnates who recognize descent from a common ancestor but "whose corporate behavior must be limited to activities such as ancestral rites or compilation of genealogies." "Lineage" is reserved for "descent groups that have strong corporate bases in shared assets, usually, but not exclusively, land." Thus, by this definition, if there is no evidence of a corporate estate, the descent group cannot be regarded as a lineage.⁵⁸

Myron L. Cohen, an anthropologist, challenges Freedman's lineage paradigm based on fieldwork in North China. His aim is to remove or reduce the emphasis on corporate resources or holdings, while retaining common descent and shared ancestral

⁵⁵ Ebrey 1986:7; also see J. Watson 1982:611.

⁵⁶ J. Watson 1982:95.

⁵⁷ J. Watson 1982:95-96.

⁵⁸ Ebrey 1986:5.

rites as the core elements of lineage organization. He proposes the concept of lineage solidarity based on "the fixed genealogical mode of agnatic kinship" wherein ". . . patrilineal ties are figured on the basis of the relative seniority of descent lines so that the unity of the lineage as a whole is based upon a ritual focus on the senior line of descent traced back to the founding ancestor, his eldest son, and the succession of eldest sons." He contrasts this to the "associational mode of patrilineal kinship" in which ". . . all lines of descent are equal and this equality provides the foundation for the subdivision of the lineage into hierarchies of genealogically based branches or segments. . . [and] . . . access to corporate resources" In the fixed genealogical mode, "lineages are . . . subdivided into sections based on genealogical branching rather than asymmetrical segmentation" and "affiliation is . . . a matter of levels of genealogical reckoning and . . . does not involve any exclusivity based on corporate holdings." By contrast, in the associational mode "agnates define themselves in a group within a larger lineage by highlighting an ancestor that they shared in common; . . . [who] might be the focus of a new ancestral temple and a separate set of rituals."

Cohen says that the fixed genealogical mode and the associational mode can co-exist within the lineage framework. Common kinship based on genealogical branching in "lineages where agnates [are] separated into subgroups based on pronounced asymmetrical segmentation" is "associational kinship in its genealogical aspect." In the fixed genealogical mode "lineages can also be subdivided into branches based upon the nonequivalency of lines of descent. A branch tracing its origin from the

eldest son of the founding ancestor is seen to be in a relationship of ritual superiority to those branches deriving from younger brothers." However, as to the latter, he says that the senior-junior relationship "in principle cannot be modified by asymmetrical segmentation or other factors external to kinship."⁵⁹

The review and analysis of ancient Chinese kinship terms that follows will permit an assessment of the applicability of these concepts to kinship in the Spring and Autumn era.

Key Chinese Terms

In focusing on terminology, I shall follow Ebrey's suggestion to avoid equating anthropological concepts with Chinese terms, while using those concepts to describe and analyze what the terms reveal.⁶⁰ The key terms which I shall examine are *xing*, *shi*, *zong*, and *zu*. In this section I shall not use the terms "lineage" and "clan" in the anthropological sense presented above. "Clan" will be used, however, to translate *shizu* 氏族, a term which is used by Chinese scholars writing under the influence of Lewis Henry Morgan's *Ancient Society*⁶¹ or Marxist ideology.

Xing 姓

Xing means "surname" in modern Chinese. It commonly appears in this sense in the compound noun *xingshi* 姓氏; however, originally *xing* and *shi* were not

⁵⁹ Cohen 1990:509-13.

⁶⁰ Ebrey 1986:8.

⁶¹ See Yang Dongchun, et. al., 1987.1:61 for a discussion of this term in the Chinese translation of Morgan's work.

synonyms. The *Shuowen* 說文, the earliest Chinese dictionary, compiled by Xu Shen (d. A.D. 146), defines *xing* as follows:

"*Xing* is whereof a man is born. The mother of the divine sage of antiquity moved by Heaven, bore a son; therefore [he] was called 'Son of Heaven.' [The meaning] follows *nu* ["female"] and *sheng* ["to give birth, to be born"]; *sheng* is also the phonetic. The *Chunqiu* says, 'The Son of Heaven bestowed *xing* in accordance with birth.'⁶²

姓人所生也。古之神聖母感天而生子，故稱天子。从女从生，生亦聲。春秋傳曰天子因生以賜姓。

The *Shuowen* definition of *xing* has been translated recently as "[*Xing*] is that which is born by man (as a genus)" and interpreted to mean "son" or "descendants."⁶³ While this translation is semantically correct and *xing* does have those meanings, among others, this translation and the interpretation do not agree with the quotation that clarifies Xu Shen's own understanding of this term.

Xu's closing citation is to a passage in the *Zuozhuan* that describes the ancient tradition of bestowing *xing* and *shi* at the time of the enfeoffment of vassal lords.⁶⁴ All references to this rite in the *Zuozhuan*⁶⁵ and in the *Guoyu*⁶⁶ occur in passages harking back to legendary times or early Zhou. By Spring and Autumn times the bestowal rite had fallen into disuse; *xing*, however, continued on as the technical term for "surname" of groups comprised of descendants of those early recipients.

⁶² SWJZGL 5518a-b.

⁶³ Chun 1990:26. Chun also mistranslates the final sentence thus, "As a consequence of birth, *zi* (son) was taken to be *xing*." He inexplicably omits the reference to *Chunqiu* and "Son of Heaven," the subject of the quoted sentence.

⁶⁴ For the full text of the *Zuozhuan* account, see ZZS 4:11a-13b (75-76, Yin 8).

⁶⁵ ZZS 44:27a (769-71, Zhao 8).

⁶⁶ GY 3:5a-7a (76-79, "Zhouyu" *xia*).

Xing occurs in oracle bone inscriptions of the Shang dynasty (ca. 1523-1028) but does not mean "surname." According to Li Xiaoding, in the sole inscription that gives a clue to its usage, *xing* is used to identify a female who was about to give birth.⁶⁷ Discussing the significance of *xing* in oracle bone inscriptions, David N. Keightley finds no supporting evidence for the argument of scholars who claim the *xing* was originally the term for matriclan or matrilineage. He maintains that its significant *sheng* 生 has the primary meaning of "progeny" in the inscriptions when used alone as the object of prayer in the phrase *dao sheng* 禱生 ("pray for progeny") or in the compound *duosheng* 多生 ("the many progeny").⁶⁸

Writing earlier than Li Xiaoding, Fu Sinian argues that *sheng* was the original character for *xing* and that the addition of the female radical (*nu* 女) to distinguish *xing* from other variants of *sheng* probably did not occur until well into the Spring And Autumn Era. He notes that *sheng* appears frequently in Zhou 周 dynasty (ca. 1027-256) bronze inscriptions, where it has six uses. Three are derived from the basic meaning of "birth"; two occur in the compounds *zisheng* 子生 and *baisheng* 百生 which are written respectively as *zixing* 子姓 and *baixing* 百姓 in classical texts; and one has the meaning of "life" (*shengming* 生命). Fu glosses *zisheng* as "a general term for grandchildren, both male and female" and *baisheng* as "the so-called one hundred surnames."⁶⁹

⁶⁷ JGWZJS 12:3589.

⁶⁸ Keightley 1999:46-53.

⁶⁹ JWGL 6675-6676f.

Xing has a variety of meanings and nuances in the *Zuozhuan* and in the *Guoyu*. It is occasionally used alone in the sense of "child (born of a woman)" and "descendants."⁷⁰ The compound *zixing*⁷¹ and *zuxing* 族姓⁷² refers to members of the same agnatic descent group. The most common use of *xing*, however, is for "surname" as in such expressions as *bu shu xing* 不書姓 ("... did not record [his/her] surname),⁷³ *ci xing* 賜姓 ("bestowed [the] surname"),⁷⁴ *ming xing* 命姓 ("designated

⁷⁰ For the sense of "son," see ZZS 42:37a (733, Zhao 4) and 45:21a-b (787, Zhao 11); for "descendants," ZZS 53:35a-36b (933, Zhao 32).

⁷¹ GY 18:4a (407, "Chuyu" *xia*, text and Wei commentary).

⁷² The *Zuozhuan* records Zixi advising the king of Chu about how to deal with a succession struggle in the archenemy state of Wu saying, "... Why don't we in the meantime pacify our deities and pacify our *zuxing* while awaiting its outcome. ..." 我盍姑億吾鬼神，而寧吾族姓，以待其歸 (ZZS 53:16a [928, Zhao 30]). Early commentators are silent on the meaning of *zuxing*. Although Yang Bojun ventures no interpretation in his commentary on this passage (CQZZ 4:1508), he says that it means *zuren* 族人 ("zu members") in his dictionary of *Zuozhuan* terms (1985:622). I think that he is correct.

Zuxing should probably be understood as "zu members (or 'mates')" in its first, and only other, occurrence in the *Zuozhuan* as well, where the passage reads, "Gongsun Hui has the capacity to understand the [executive] acts [of rulers] of the various states and to discern the *zuxing*, ranks, social status, and capabilities of [their] officers ..." 公孫揮能知四國之爲，而辨於其大夫之族姓班位貴賤能否 (ZZS 40:20a [688, Xiang 31]). Here Yang defines *zuxing* as *xingshi* ("surname") (CQZZ 3:1191), an anachronistic definition because at this time the term for *zu* surname was *shi* (see below), not *xing*. Gongsun Hui was good at discerning the extent of the membership of the *zu* of the officers of other states, an important bit of political intelligence.

The "Shiqin" 釋親 chapter of the *Erya* notes that collateral agnates in the sixth generation of descent from a common grandfather, the sons of *zu* fathers (*zufu* 族父), refer to each other simply as "close agnates" (*qintongxing* 親同姓), meaning that starting in this generation there was no further differentiation of collateral relationships (EYZS 4:15a [62, text and commentary]; also refer to Feng [n.d.]:20-22 for a diagram of the lineal and collateral kinship terms listed in the *Erya*). With *xing* understood in this way, *zuxing* has the meaning of agnates within five degrees of relationship and beyond.

⁷³ On two occasions the *Zuozhuan* notes that *xing* of wives of rulers of Lu were deliberately not written in the historical record when their deaths were reported. In the first case, the reason given is deference to the ruler's principal wife (ZZS 3:4a-b [50, Yin 3]). In the second instance, it was to conceal a marriage which violated the taboo against marrying someone with the same surname as one's own (*ibid.*, 59:1b-2a [1025, Ai 12]).

⁷⁴ GY 3:6a (77, "Zhouyu" *xia*); ZZS 4:11a-13b (75-76, Yin 8) and 44:24a-27a (769-71, Zhao 8).

[the] surname"),⁷⁵ *geng xing* 更姓 ("change [your] surname"),⁷⁶ and *du xing* 嬖姓 ("defile [one's] surname").⁷⁷

Tongxing 同姓 ("same surname"),⁷⁸ *yixing* 異姓 ("different surname"),⁷⁹ and *shuxing* 庶姓 ("multitudinous surnames")⁸⁰ are used to distinguish between ruling houses of states and between individuals with shared surnames and those with different surnames from one's own. *Neixing* 內姓 ("within [his] surname") and *waixing* 外姓 ("outside [his] surname") are synonyms of *tongxing* and *yixing* respectively.⁸¹ Such distinctions affected protocol in interstate rites,⁸² participation in kin group ritual,⁸³ and appointment of officials.⁸⁴

Distinguishing surnames was an especially important aspect of managing heterosexual relations.⁸⁵ The taboo against marriage between people with the same surname is stated as "male and female distinguish [their] *xing*" (*nan nu bian xing* 男女

⁷⁵ *Ming xing* occurs in the Guoyu in phrase *ming xing shou si* 命姓受祀 (GY 3:6b [78, "Zhouyu" *xia*]). Wei Zhao's commentary suggests that *si* ("sacrifices") may be an interpolation for *shi* (*ibid.*).

⁷⁶ GY 2:4b (44, "Zhouyu" *zhong*).

⁷⁷ GY 2:10b ("Zhouyu" *zhong*, text and Wei commentary).

⁷⁸ ZZS 15:11a (252, Xi 23), 16:2a (262, Xi 25), 16:31b (277, Xi 28), 17:15b (290, Xi 33), 26:23a (447, Cheng 8), 31:24a-b (548, Xiang 12), 41:24a (707, Zhao 1). GY 5:11b (152, "Luyu" *xia*), 10:5b (254, "Jinyu" 4), 10:7b (258, "Jinyu" 4), 10:8b (260, "Jinyu" 4).

⁷⁹ ZZS 4:19b (70, Yin 11), 16:31b (277, Xi 28), 26:23a (447, Cheng 8), 28:10a (476, Cheng 16), 31:24a-b (548, Xiang 12), 53:16a (928, Zhao 30). GY 5:11b (152, "Luyu" *xia*), 10:8a (259, "Jinyu" 4), 10:14a (271, "Jinyu" 4), 16:4b (372, "Zhengyu").

⁸⁰ ZZS 4:19b (79, Yin 11).

⁸¹ ZZS 22:6b (390, Xuan 12, text and Kong Yingda commentary).

⁸² ZZS 4:19a-20b (79, Yin 11); also refer below to the discussion of interstate covenant protocol.

⁸³ See ZZS 31:24a-b (548, Xiang 12) and the discussion of ancestral temples rites below.

⁸⁴ ZZS 22:6b (390, Xuan 12)

⁸⁵ For example, see GY 10:8a-b (259-60, "Jinyu" 4).

辨姓) in accounts of its breach.⁸⁶ The harems of the ruling elite were "provide[d] [courtesans with different] surnames" (*gai xing* 咳姓) from the master.⁸⁷ Special care was taken to divine the purchase of a concubine if her *xing* was unknown.⁸⁸ Thus, to prevent violation of marriage and reproduction taboos, females were customarily identified by their *xing*, that is, the surname of the agnatic descent group of their earliest ancestors.

Xing is used in various compounds to refer to ruling houses or to classify states. For example, the Guoyu records Shuxiang of Jin saying, ". . . I have heard it, namely 'A *xing* does not rise a second time [*yi xing bu zai xing* 一姓不再興].' How could it be that Zhou is rising [again]? . . ."⁸⁹ The ruling royal house of Zhou was the senior segment of the agnatic descent group known by *Ji xing*. In a covenant oath the ancestors of the participating states are invoked as "the ancestors of the twelve states of the seven *xing*"⁹⁰ (*qixing shi'er guo zhi zu* 七姓十二國之祖). *Erxing* 二姓 ("the two *xing*") was another way of referring to two states by alluding to the fact that their ruling houses had different surnames.⁹¹

⁸⁶ ZZS 36:2b (617, Xiang 25), 38:25a-b (654, Xiang 28), 41:24b (707, Zhao 1). For further discussion, see Thatcher 1991:37-38.

⁸⁷ GY 19:2a (425, "Wuyu," text and Wei commentary).

⁸⁸ ZZS 41:24b (707, Zhao 1).

⁸⁹ GY 3:9a (83, "Zhouyu" *xia*). Modern translators render "*yi xing*" variously as "a (single) dynasty" (*yige chaodai* 一個朝代) (Huang 1990:124), "a (single) clan" (*yige zuxing* 一個族姓) (Dong 1993:119), and "a clan" (*yixing* 一姓) (Wu, et. al. 1994 (87).

⁹⁰ ZZS 51:4a-b (886, Zhao 24--text and commentaries). An earlier *Zuozhuan* anecdote also mentions *qixing* but the referent is different. There Du Yu comments, "When King Ping [of Zhou] moved [east], the senior officials who followed [him] had seven surnames" (*ibid.*, 31:12a-13b [542-43, Xiang 10]).

⁹¹ ZZS 51:4a-b (886, Zhao 24--text and commentary).

Finally, *xing* is used alone and in various compounds as a euphemism for certain categories of officials. For example, seven senior officials who followed King Ping of Zhou when he moved the capital eastward in 771 were referred to by a descendant of one of them as "our seven surname[d officials]" (*wu qixing* 吾七姓).⁹² The logic of this practice can perhaps be seen in the following *Zuozhuan* passage arguing for the necessity of officers who had charge of the five elements (wood, fire, metal, water, and earth):

Therefore, there were the officers of the Five Elements, who were called "the Five Officers" [*wuguan*] and actually all were given *shi* [names] and *xing* [names], invested with the rank of *shanggong*, and sacrificed to as honored deities.⁹³

故有五行之官，是謂五官，實列受氏姓，封爲上神，祀爲貴神。

Baixing ("the hundred *xing*") is used in two ways. First, it appears in the *Guoyu* as a collective reference to a certain category of offices and their hereditary occupants who served the kings of Zhou. This meaning is crystal clear in the following excerpt:

The King [Zhao of Chu] said. "What is that which is referred to by 'one hundred *xing*, one thousand grades, ten thousand officials, one hundred thousand classes,' and the people regularly submit taxes from the outer regions?"

⁹² ZZS 31:12b (542, Xiang 10, text and Du commentary).

⁹³ ZZS 53:5a (923, Zhao 29). This argument occurs in the middle of a lengthy response to a request for an explanation of unusual surnames (*shi*) which were given to dragon keepers in the time of Emperor Shun and during the Xia dynasty. In the former case, the text says, "Emperor Shundi gave him the *xing* called 'Dong,' [gave him] the *shi* called 'Huanlong' ('Dragon Raiser'), and enfeoffed him at Zong River" 舜帝賜之姓曰董，氏曰豢龍，封諸鬲川 in the latter cases, it says, "The Ruler of Xia commended him [and] bestowed the *shi* called 'Yulong' ['Dragon Trainer'] . . ." 夏后嘉之，賜氏曰御龍 (*ibid.*, 53:4a-b [922, Zhao 29]).

[Guan Yifu] replied, "[In Zhou] the people could attain [literally, "reach"] offices amounting to one hundred. The sons of the King and the [three] dukes who had the wherewithal to be able to speak and listen were the ones who attained offices, and the King gave them surnames based on results, whereby [they and their successors hereditarily] oversaw their offices; those were the *baixing* ["the one hundred surnamed officials"]. The surname[d officials] [*xing*] had [subordinates] who attained grades amounting to ten times the King's [subordinates] [i.e., 10 x 100], call them the 'one thousand grades.' Subordinates of the officials in charge of the Five Affairs [heaven., earth, gods, people, and other matters] being ten thousand, constituted the ten thousand officials. [Each of these] official[s], having ten classifications, constituted the one hundred thousand classes [of officials]. The Son of Heaven's fields were divided into nine outer regions in order to feed the one million people [*zhaomin*]. The King took regular taxes from them in order to feed the ten thousand officials."⁹⁴

王曰所謂百姓，千品，萬官，億醜，兆民經入咳數者何何也。對曰民之徹官百。王公之子弟質能言能聽徹其官者，而物賜之姓，以監其官，是爲百姓。姓有徹品十於王謂之千品。五物之官陪屬萬，爲萬官。官有十醜，爲億醜。天子之田九畝，以食兆民。王取經入焉，以食萬官。

Gong 公 should be understood as *gongqing* 公卿, referring to the three dukes and nine officials (*sangong jiuqing* 三公九卿) who served as the highest officers in the royal Zhou court. While the numbers in this anecdote cannot be taken literally, it is clear that *baixing* designated a category of officials.

In the phrase *baixing zhaomin* 百姓兆民 (literally, "one hundred surname[d officials] and the one million people"), officials as an elite class are juxtaposed to commoners. This phrase occurs for the first time in the *Guoyu* in an answer to a question from King Xiang of Zhou 周襄王 (r. 651-619) about how to benefit those within the kingdom: ". . . [As to] the *baixing zhaomin*, when everyone receives profit,

⁹⁴ GY 18:5a (409, "Chuyu" *xia*).

then shares it with their superior, that is internalizing profit."⁹⁵ 百姓兆民，夫人奉利而歸諸上，是利之內也。

Baixing zhaomin has the same meaning as *baili shumin* 百吏庶民 ("the one hundred officials and the multitudinous people") in an earlier anecdote about the performance of ritual Spring plowing by the king of Zhou. There the other participants are listed as *gongqing baili shumin* 公卿百吏庶民 (rendered freely, "upper officials, lower officials, and commoners").⁹⁶ Thus, the relative position of the *baili* vis-a-vis the top officials is the same as the *baixing*. In this anecdote *baili* and *baiguan* 百官 (literally, "one hundred officials") are used interchangeably. Both terms are interchangeable with *baixing*.

The second usage of *baixing* is for "commoners." The first occurrence of *baixing* in the *Zuozhuan* is in a *junzi yue* 君子曰 gloss on the behavior of officers in the state of Jin when their appointments were changed in 560:

When a single man sets a good example, the *baixing* are blessed with harmony; can [that] not be diligently sought? The *Shu[jing]* says, "When the Solitary Man has goodness, the one million people [*zhaomin*] rely on him. Its [the kingdom's/their (?)] peace is but forever." Is that what it refers to?⁹⁷

一人刑善，百姓休和，不可務乎。書曰一人有慶，兆民賴之。其寧惟永。是之謂乎。

Yang Bojun states flatly that *baixing* stands for "the 'clans' of the one hundred officials (*baiguan_zhi zuxing* 百官之族姓)", which is different from the way *baixing* is used

⁹⁵ GY 2:2b (40, "Zhouyu" *zhong*). One modern translation renders it incorrectly as "commoners" (*pingmin baixing* 平民百姓) (Wu, et.al. 1994:41).

⁹⁶ GY 1:7a-b (17-18, "Zhouyu" *shang*).

⁹⁷ ZZS 32:3b (555, Xiang 13). I follow ZZHZ 2:37 in reading *qing* 慶 as "goodness."

today,"⁹⁸ that is, *baixing* does not mean "commoners." I think that his interpretation is incorrect. The meaning of *baixing* in the mind of the author of this passage is manifest in the quote from the *Shujing*, of which the sentence in the *Zuozhuan* where *baixing* occurs is but a paraphrase. In this context *baixing* and *zhaomin* are interchangeable; they both refer to the common people. Whereas *baixing* can mean either "the hundred surnamed officials" or "commoners" in the *Guoyu*,⁹⁹ it only means "commoners" in the *Zuozhuan*.¹⁰⁰ How the same term came to be used for a category of officials and for commoners is a matter for speculation.¹⁰¹

Shi 氏

As noted above, *shi* means "surname" in modern Chinese and is synonymous with *xing*. However, these two words are technical terms for surnames for different kinds of agnatic descent groups in the *Zuozhuan* and in the *Guoyu*. *Shi*-bearing groups were segments of older *xing*-bearing groups or of higher order *shi*-bearing groups.¹⁰²

⁹⁸ CQZZZ 3:1000.

⁹⁹ In addition to the occurrences of *baixing* in the sense of "surname[d] officials" already cited in Notes 92 and 93, see GY 2:4a and 5a (43 and 45, "Zhouyu" *zhong*), 18:3a-4b (405-408, "Chuyu" *xia*). It may also have this meaning in all occurrences in the "Qiyu" sections. For "commoners," see *ibid.*, 3:18b, 19b, and 20b (102, 104, and 106, "Zhouyu" *xia*), and 16:2b (368, "Zhengyu"). It also appears to have this meaning in the "Jinyu" sections.

¹⁰⁰ ZZS 32:18a-b (562, Xiang 14), 53:24b (932, Zhao 32), 57:10b (994, Ai 2).

¹⁰¹ *Baixing*, standing alone, could be interpreted as "one hundred surnames" or "one hundred progeny" (using Keightley's terminology). As to the former, since "one hundred surnames" shorthand for hereditary offices passed down from meritorious officers who were bestowed surnames by the king of Zhou, one can imagine the meaning of *baixing* changing to "commoners" as hereditary rights of the heads of agnatic descent groups to those offices were lost over time with a consequent reduction in social status. Concerning the latter, the extension of "one hundred progeny" to encompass the ruled classes, or commoners, in the paternalistic political ideology of the Zhou era is not a far stretch.

¹⁰² See Kryukov 1966 for a solid study of this topic.

Scholars offer two interpretations of the character *shi* in oracle bone inscriptions. First, Ding Shan argues that *shi* and *shi*₂ 示 ("to proclaim, to exhibit, to manifest") were originally represented by the same character 示. He relates the origin of *shi*₂ to the practice of totemism, claiming that clans (*shizu*) placed totem poles outside their residential areas for protection. Thus, the original meaning of this word was "to erect a pole and sacrifice to Heaven." Drawing on the *Zuozhuan* account of the rite for bestowing *xing* and *shi* (see translation below) that links granting land with the bestowal of a *shi*, Ding argues that the first meaning of *shi* is "big landlord" or "same totem or ruler of a benefice" and that later it came to mean "tribal symbol."¹⁰³ Second, Guo Moruo says that *shi* was the original form of *chi* 匙 (also pronounced *shi*; "spoon, ladle"), and it was interchangeable with *shi*₃ 是 ("to be; right, correct"). Li Xiaoding agrees with Guo and adds that *shi* does not appear in the sense of "surname" in oracle bone inscriptions.¹⁰⁴

Commenting on the meaning of *shi* in bronze inscriptions, Lin Yiguang argues that its original meaning was "root" (*gendi* 根柢). He maintains that the earliest form of the character 𠂔 resembles a root and that its use for surname "was an extension of the meaning of root."¹⁰⁵ *Shi* occurs frequently in bronze inscriptions following the

¹⁰³ Ding 1956:3-4, 33-34.

¹⁰⁴ See comments of Guo Moruo and Li Xiaoding in JGWZJS 3723-28. Zhao Cheng argues that the bone inscription form of *shi* is 𠂔. He notes this form "resembles the shape of a man carrying something; so it should be the original character for *ti* 提 ("to lift, to pick up"). He says that in oracle bone inscriptions this character functions as a verb in the sense of 1) "to carry" and 2) "to lead" and claims the use of this character in the sense of "surname" was a later development (JGWJMC 317-18). However, Ding Shan has argued that 𠂔 is the original form of *bao* 抱 not *shi* (1956:14-16).

¹⁰⁵ JWGL 6904-05. Zhou Fagao accepts Lin's interpretation (*ibid.*, 6909).

names of persons, both male and female, in the sense of "Mr." or "Miss."¹⁰⁶ As will be shown below, these are cases of referring to a person by his or her surname, which is the name that precedes *shi* in the inscriptions.

Shi is used in a number of interrelated ways in the *Zuozhuan* and in the *Guoyu*. In the sense of "surname," it is frequently used to mark the surnames of various levels of agnatic descent groups below the level of *xing*-bearing groups.¹⁰⁷ As in bronze inscriptions, when a man is referred to by his surname + *shi*, it means Mr.¹⁰⁸ In some contexts when *shi* follows a second person pronoun or the name of a person, it must be understood as "your house" or "so and so's house."¹⁰⁹ Sometimes *shi* refers to a state.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁶ See numerous examples in JWGL 6899-6902.

¹⁰⁷ For an excellent example of *shi* as the term for the surname of a basic agnatic descent group, see ZZS 35:22a-23b (608-09, Xiang 24) where Fan Xuanzi 范宣子 lists the five *shi* by which his group was known throughout past dynasties until the Spring And Autumn Era. For an example of surname + *shi* for higher order agnatic descent groups, see references to Huanshi 桓氏 in ZZS 27:22a-24a (466-67, Cheng 15) and 59:17a-19a (1033-34, Ai 14). Other examples of this usage will appear throughout the present study.

¹⁰⁸ For example, when Cui Zhu 崔杼 was forced to flee from Qi to Wei in 598, the *Chunqiu* identified him as Cuishi 崔氏 (CQZS 22:11a [381, Xuan 10]). Commenting on this matter, the *Zuozhuan* begins, "The Record says 'Cuishi' [because] it was not his fault. Moreover, [it] reports using [the name of his] *zu* and not using [his] personal name [*ming*]." 書曰崔氏，非其罪也。且告以族，不以名。(ZZS 22:12a-13a [381-82, Xuan 10])

¹⁰⁹ For example, in 575 the *Zuozhuan* states: "The chief minister [of Chu] desires to drink wine at your *shi* [*zi shi*]" 令尹欲飲酒於子氏 (ZZS 52:18a [908, Zhao 27]). Yang Bojun glosses *shi* as *jia* 家 (in the sense of "house") in this sentence and offers a quote of the same sentence in the "Shenxinglun" 慎行論 chapter of the *Lushi chunqiu* as proof. There it reads: "The chief minister [of Chu] desires to drink wine at your house (*zi zhi jia*)" 令尹欲飲酒於子之家 (CQZZZ 1:454).

Examples of personal name + *shi* in this sense can be found in ZZS 16:18a (270, Xi 28--Xi Fuji *shi* 僖負羈氏) and 33:7a-b (575, Xiang 17--Hua Chen *shi* 華臣氏).

¹¹⁰ This usage appears in the closing lines of a covenant between rulers of states calling their ancestors and various deities to cause the one who violates it to lose his people, mandate, *shi*, and state (ZZS 31:18a-19b [545-46, Xiang 11]). Yang Bojun interprets *shi* to mean *shizu* ("clan"); so "lose *shi*" is like saying 'destroy *zu*.'" Evidently not fully satisfied with this interpretation, he closes by citing another view put forward by Zheng Jiao. Zheng argues that *shi* was used as a means of discriminating between the noble and the lowly and concludes that "lose *shi*" then is the same as losing one's rank and state" (CQZZZ 3:990) I, too, think that *shi*

Shi is also used, though rarely, to refer to females.¹¹¹ The occurrences of *shi* as a technical term for surname for agnatic descent groups are too numerous to discuss in detail; so I will focus on selected examples to illustrate this meaning.

The *Zuozhuan* describes the ancient rite of bestowing *xing* and *shi* as follows:

When Wuhai [the grandson of Gongzi Zhan 公子展] died, Yufu requested a posthumous title and a [name for his] *zu*. Duke [Yin 隱公] asked Zhong Zhong about [naming] *zu*.

Zhong Zhong replied, "When the Son of Heaven established the virtuous [as a vassal lord], he bestowed a *xing* in accordance with [the vassal lord's] birth, gave him territory, and decreed him a *shi*. A vassal lord took his style name as posthumous name, [and his descendants] used it as [the name of their] *zu*. If an office were hereditarily held, then there was the occasion of the office [name being used as the name of the] *zu*. [The names of] benefices were also like that."

Duke [Yin] authorized using the style name [of Wuhai's grandfather] as *Zhanshi*.¹¹²

無駭卒，羽父請諡與族。公問族於衆仲。衆仲對曰天子建德，因生以賜姓，胙之土而命之氏。諸侯以字爲諡，因以爲族。官有世功，則有官族。邑亦如之。公命以字爲展氏。

In this rite, which is difficult to fully understand,¹¹³ the bestowal of *shi* was a political act connected with the granting of territory at the time of the vassal lord's enfeoffment.

refers to "state" because the *shi* which was bestowed on a vassal lord at the time of his enfeoffment was the name of his state (see GY 3:5a-7a [75-79, "Zhouyu" *xia*]). Therefore, losing one's *shi* would be the same as losing one's state, or the authority to rule. The last line refers to *guojia* 國家, which is also "state" but perhaps from a different angle, namely the material side of territory and administrative staff.

¹¹¹ The mother of Duke Yin of Lu is referred to as *junshi* 君氏 in the *Chunqiu* notice of her death (CQZS 3:2b [49, Yin 3]). And Abandoned, the beautiful wife of Duke Ping of Song 宋平公, was referred to as *junfurenshi* 君夫人氏. She had been promoted from concubine to primary wife (*furen* 夫人) when her son was made heir apparent (*ibid.*, 37:10b-12a [633-34, Xiang 26]).

¹¹² ZZS 3:11a-13b (75-76, Yin 8--text and Du commentary).

¹¹³ After citing a variety of opinions, Yang Bojun comments:

And the style name (*zi* 字), office name (*guan* 官), and benefice name (*yi* 邑) of a progenitor (typically, the grandfather, as in this case) were regarded as potential surnames for an agnatic descent group (*zu*) formed by his descendants.

Commenting on the above passage, Yang Bojun says, "Zu and the *shi* of surname [*xingshi*] have the same meaning."¹¹⁴ Clearly they refer to the same thing, but I think that they refer to different aspects of it. The relationship between *shi* and *zu* is clear in the following examples. A Zuo zhuan entry in 563 states:

Earlier when Zisi constructed irrigation ditches, Sishi, Dushi, Houshi, and Zishishi all lost fields because of it; therefore, the five *zu* [includes another *zu* named Wei 尉], gathering a gang of rowdies, took advantage of the followers of the ducal son to make disorder.¹¹⁵

初子駟爲田洫，司氏堵氏侯氏子師氏皆喪田焉，故五族聚群不逞之人，因公子之徒以作亂。

Another entry in 506 recounting the disposition of the remnant Yin 殷 population after the dynasty was overthrown by Zhou says the ruler of Lu 魯 was given "Yin people amounting to six *zu*, [namely] Tiaoshi, Xushi, Xiaoshi, Suoshi, Changshuoshi, and Weishuoshi" 殷民六族，條氏徐氏蕭氏索氏長勺氏尾勺氏 and the ruler of Wei 衛 received "Yin citizens amounting to seven *zu*, [namely] Taoshi, Shishi,

The specific circumstances of the origins of *xing* and *shi* in high antiquity are very difficult to determine; not only do all of the various explanations belong in the realm of speculation, even Zhong Zhong's theory about the Son of Heaven bestowing *xing* is also articulated on the basis of legends and rites of his time and, I fear, do not necessarily conform with the circumstances of antiquity (CQZZZ 1:60-61).

The language of the passage itself is very difficult to understand and requires interpretation, as is evident in my translation.

¹¹⁴ CQZZZ 1:60.

¹¹⁵ ZZS 31:9a-b (541, Xiang 10).

Fanshi, Qishi, Fanshi, Jishi, and Zhongkuishi."¹¹⁶ 殷民七族，陶氏施氏繁氏
錡氏樊氏饑氏終葵氏。

Thus, *zu* stands for a category or group of people who have something in common (in this case, descent; see below), and *shi* is a technical term for "surname" by which the category or group was known or identified. In the words of Du Yu, "[When] naming them separately, state their surname [*shi*]. [When] speaking of them collectively, refer to their [descent] group [*zu*]."¹¹⁷ 別而稱之，謂之氏。合而言之，謂之族。

Zong 宗

Zong is the most crucial structural term that will be treated in this study, for the descent based nature of the agnatic descent group in Ancient China is clearly revealed in its various meanings. In oracle bone inscriptions, the character *zong* 宗 is composed of a spirit tablet inside a structure or building; so its basic meaning is "the place where [spirit] tablets are stored," or temple.¹¹⁸ *Zong* is often modified by the name of a particular ancestor, as in "Zu Yi *zong*" 祖乙宗, evidently referring to a temple devoted exclusively to that ancestor. This usage agrees with the *Shuowen* definition of *zong* as "a temple where one pays respect to ancestors" (*zun zu miao* 尊祖廟), or ancestral temple.¹¹⁹ The combinations *dazong* 大宗 ("big, major, or senior *zong*") and

¹¹⁶ ZZS 54:15b, 17b (947-48, Ding 4).

¹¹⁷ CQSL 2:2b.

¹¹⁸ Guo Moruo argues that the component *shi* is the "image of the god of reproduction;" so *zong* is the temple dedicated to the god of reproduction. This view is rejected by Li Xiaoding who says that *shi* simply represents a spirit tablet (*shenzhu* 神主) (JGWZJS 2479). Zhao Cheng follows the latter interpretation (JGWJMCD 211).

¹¹⁹ SWJZGL 3263a.

xiaozong 小宗 ("small, minor, or junior *zong*") also occur in oracle bone inscriptions as designations of temples dedicated to series of ancestors rather than to a single ancestor.¹²⁰ But there were also *zong* dedicated to other deities, for example the river god;¹²¹ so the specific meaning of *zong* in oracle bone inscriptions is determined by the contexts in which it appears.

According to the compilers of JWCYZD, *zong* has three basic meanings in bronze inscriptions: (1) ancestral temple (*zumiao* 祖廟), (2) having the same ancestor (*tongzu* 同祖), and (3) master or chief (*zhu* 主).¹²² When used in the sense of "ancestral temple," *zong* may be used alone, or be modified by the name of an ancestor, or appear as part of a compound noun standing for ancestral temple (*zongshi* 宗室 or *zongmiao* 宗廟), or for temple vessel (*zongyi* 宗彝), or for the original capital of Zhou (Zong Zhou 宗周), where the royal ancestral temple was located. When referring to having the same ancestor, it may appear alone or in the following

¹²⁰ Chen Mengjia says that ancestral rites performed in the *dazong* began with ancestor Shang Jia and in the *xiaozong* with ancestor Da Yi 大乙. He argues that since there were eleven generations between Da Yi and Wu Ding 武丁, in this context *xiaozong* cannot be understood as the *xiaozong* of the "Sangfu xiaoji" 喪服小記 chapter of the *Liji* which spanned five generations, counting downward from the great-great grandfather (*gaozu* 高祖) (1988:473; LJZS 590). Zhao Cheng also disagrees with those who associate *dazong* and *xiaozong* with the *zongfa* 宗法 system and argue that *dazong* refers to the direct line of descent of Shang kings, while *xiaozong* refers to collateral royal lines. He effectively rejects this view on the basis of two considerations: (1) The relevant inscriptions explicitly state that sacrifices to ancestors beginning with Shang Jia were performed "in the *dazong*" (*zai dazong* 在大宗 and from Da Yi "in the *xiaozong*" (*zai xiaozong* 在小宗), meaning in the actual places, or temples, where the ancestral tablets were kept. And (2) the scholarly consensus is that Shang Jia and Da Yi were kings in the direct line of descent (JGWJMZD 212).

¹²¹ JGWJMZD 9.

¹²² Most of the examples glossed in JWCYZD 747-750 appeared earlier in JWGL 4724-4726. As indicated in relevant notes, I have modified interpretations of some of the examples.

combinations: *dazong* ("senior *zong*");¹²³ *zongzi* 宗子 ("son of the *zong*," that is, the heir and successor to the head of the *zong*, ideally the eldest son by the first wife of the head;¹²⁴ *zongjun* 宗君 ("ruler, or head, of the *zong*"); *zongjia* 宗家 ("family, or member, of the *zong*); *zongfu* 宗婦 ("lady of the *zong*");¹²⁵ and *zongxiaozi* 宗小子 ("younger son[s] of the *zong*," that is, sons other than the *zongzi*).¹²⁶ In the sense of "master" or "chief," *zong* occurs unmodified.¹²⁷ As in the case of oracle bone inscriptions, the specific meaning of *zong* in bronze inscriptions is determined by

¹²³ The example of *dazong* found in the "Chen Ni fu" 陳逆簋 inscription is as follows: ". . . use it to sacrifice and to make offerings to the august ancestor(s) and the august ancestress(es) of the *dazong*" 以享以孝于大宗皇祖皇妣 (JWCYZD 748). One could, perhaps, argue that *dazong* refers to a particular temple, as in oracle bone inscriptions, rather than to a group of people having the same ancestor. The ritual context and the fact that *dazong* precedes and, thus, qualifies ancestor(s) and ancestress(es) suggest that it refers to a group of people, probably the male ancestors and their wives in the senior *zong*, which in this case means "descent line."

¹²⁴ JWCYZD 748-49 defines *zongzi* as "the eldest son of the legal wife" (*dizhangzi* 嫡長子). In practice, all sons of a man were eligible to be selected as his heir and successor if the eldest son by his first "legal wife" was not suitable for these roles (Thatcher 1991:34-35). *Zongzi* also refers to the head of the *zong* in the *Zuozhuan* (see below).

¹²⁵ JWCYZD 750 defines *zongfu* as "the eldest daughter by the legal wife (*dizhangnu* 嫡長女)." While *zongfu* refers to one lady in bronze inscriptions, in the *Zuozhuan* it is used to refer to all of the ladies of the *zong*, namely the wives of *zong* members (see below). Thus, I doubt that this definition is correct.

¹²⁶ JWCYZD 750 defines *zong xiaozi* as "younger son(s) in the royal *zu*" (*wangzu de xiaozi* 王族的小子) and gives two examples which are found in inscriptions of the royal Zhou house. I have given a more generic definition, because there is no reason to believe that the term was used exclusively by the royal Zhou house.

¹²⁷ JWCYZD 748 cites two examples. First, the "Maqiang zhong" 虘羌鐘 inscription says that the vessel was cast for the maker's leader, who was head, or master, of the Han (Han *zong*). Han is the surname (*shi*) of the agnatic descent group, and *zong* refers to "head or master" rather than agnatic descent group because of syntax (also see Shirakawa 1964 4:182). In the second example, *chenzong yi wei* 臣宗易位, in the "Zhongshanwang Xi hu" 中山王響壺 inscription, *chenzong* is a compound subject meaning "subject and master." *Zong* appears in the sense of "master" further on this inscription in *chen qi zong* 臣其宗 (see YZJWJL 373-79 for full text and transcription and Wang 1993:92-97 for interpretation). Additional examples in inscriptions from Zhongshan include, *zhang wei ren zong* 長爲人宗 and *chenzong zhi yi* 臣宗之宜 in "Zhongshanwang Xi ding" 中山王響鼎 (YZJWJL 380-87; Wang 1993:98-103) and *chen qi zong* in "Zhongshan dizi Yuan hu" 中山嫡子圓壺 (YZJWJL 388-391; Wang 1993:104-07).

inscriptions, the specific meaning of *zong* in bronze inscriptions is determined by context.

Coming now to the principal historical texts used in this study, namely the *Zuozhuan*¹²⁸ and the *Guoyu*, *zong* also has a variety of meanings. When referring to an

¹²⁸ Yang Bojun gives seven meanings for *zong* in the *Zuozhuan*: (1) To respect (*zun* 尊), (2) *zongzu*, (3) same *xing* (*tongxing*), (4) state of the same *xing* (*tongxing guo* 同姓國), (5) ancestral temple (*zongmiao*), (6) *zong* village/seat (*zongyi*), and (7) office name (*zongren*) (1985:384).

In my opinion, the first of these meanings can be discarded because it is based on a misreading of the following *Zuozhuan* text found under the year Huan 11:

Earlier the *fengren* of Ji, Zhongzu, had favor with Duke Zhuang [of Zheng] [*Ji fengren Zhongzu you chong yu Zhuanggong*], [and] Duke Zhuang made him a high level official [*qing*]. [He] took Deng Man as a bride for the duke, and [she] bore Duke Zhao; therefore, Ji Zhong installed him [as successor to Duke Zhuang who had died].

Mr. Yong [Yongshi] of Song wed a daughter to Duke Zhuang of Zhen [who was] called Yong Ji and [who] bore Duke Li. Mr. Yong, being respected [Yang's reading], had favor with Duke Zhuang of Song [*Yongshi zong you chong yu Song Zhuanggong*]; therefore, [the officers of Song] enticed Ji Zhong [to come to Song] and detained him, saying "[If you] do not install Tu [Duke Li], you are going to die." [They] also detained [Duke] Li and sought a bribe [or concession] from him.

Ji Zhong and the officers of Song made a covenant. [whereupon] he took Duke Li back [to Zheng] and installed him [as Duke of Zheng] (ZZS 7:10b-11a [122-23, Huan 11]).

初祭封人仲足有寵於莊公，莊公使爲卿。爲公取鄧曼，生昭公，故祭仲立之。宋雍氏女於莊公曰雍姑，生厲公。雍氏宗有寵於宋莊公，故誘祭仲而執之，曰不立突，將死。執厲公而求賂焉。祭仲與宋人盟，以厲公歸而立之。

The misread line, *Yongshi zong you chong yu Song Zhuanggong*, should be interpreted as "The *zong* of Mr. Yong had favor with Duke Zhuang of Song; . . ." *Yongshi zong* is an ellipsis for the possessive construction *Yongshi zhi zong* 雍氏之宗. Here *zong* is used in the sense of the *zong* of *zongzu*, Yang's second definition. James Legge translates *Yongshi zong* as "The Yong clan . . ." (Legge 5:57 [Huan 12]) and ZZQY renders it as "*Yongshi zongren* 雍氏宗人 ("The *zong* mates of Mr. Yong')." (95 [Huan 11]; note 13 on page 94 says "*Yongshi zong* refers to the *Yongshi zu de ren* 雍氏族的人 ("the members of Mr. Yong's *zu*"). The syntax of the sentence in which *Yongshizong* occurs is the same as *Ji fengren Zhongzu you chong yu Zhuanggong* ("the *fengren* of Ji, Zhongzu, had favor with Duke Zhuang [of Zheng]; . . .)" in the preceding paragraph.

ancestral temple or a part of it, *zong* may be used alone¹²⁹ or in the following combinations: *zongfang* 宗, ¹³⁰ *zongmiao*, ¹³¹ *zongshi*, ¹³² *zongshi* 宗祐, ¹³³ and *zongtiao* 宗桃. ¹³⁴ *Zong* is used as the name of a type of ancestral sacrifice¹³⁵ and in the compound noun *zongqi* 宗器 for temple, or sacrificial, vessel. ¹³⁶ *Zong* is used alone¹³⁷ and in the following compounds to refer to officials or to name offices concerned with performing sacrificial rites: *zongbo* 宗伯, ¹³⁸ *zongguan* 宗官, ¹³⁹ *zong zhu* 宗祝, ¹⁴⁰

¹²⁹ See ZZS 45:15b-16a (784, Zhao 10); CQZZ 4:1320 (see Gu Yanwu quote in commentary); ZZS 50:11a-12b (872, Zhao 22--text and commentary).

¹³⁰ ZZS 35:24b (609, Xiang 24) (see gloss on this occurrence in CQZZ 3:1080); GY 2:5a (45-46, "Zhouyu" *zhong*). As noted in the commentary by Wei Zhao in *ibid.*, *fang* is actually a door to the ancestral temple, but the compound *zongfang* is used for the ancestral temple itself. The *Zuozhuan* occurrence cited here, *yi shou zongfang* 以守宗 ("thereby protect [ancestral sacrifices in] the *zongfang*"), has the same basic meaning as *zongmiao* ("ancestral temple") in *shi shou zongmiao* 失守宗廟 ("failed to protect [the ancestral sacrifices in] the *zongmiao*") (ZZS 22:13a [382, Xuan 10) and *zongtiao* ("distant ancestors' temple") in *shi shou zongtiao* 失守宗桃 ("failed to protect [the ancestral sacrifices in] the *zongtiao*") (ZZS 35:18b [606, Xiang 23]).

¹³¹ ZZS 5:17a (96, Huan 2), 10:15a (178, Zhuang 28), 22:12a-13b (381-82, Xuan 10), 30:12a-b (519, Xiang 7), 31:24a (548, Xiang 12); GY 1:14b (32, "Zhouyu" *shang*), 4:9a (123, "Luyu" *shang*), 6:2a (159, "Qiyu"), 8:11a (225, "Jinyu" 2), 18:1b (402, "Chuyu" *xia*), 18:4b (408, "Chuyu" *xia*), 19:14a (449, "Wuyu") 20:1b (452, "Yueyu").

¹³² ZZS 38:31a (657, Xiang 28).

¹³³ ZZS 9:8a-9b (155-56, Zhuang 14).

¹³⁴ ZZS 35:18b (606, Xiang 23--Du commentary says "The temple of distant ancestors [was known] as *tiao*."), 37:9a-b (633, Xiang 26), 42:27b (731, Zhao 4), 44:5a-7a (760-61, Zhao 7), 53:18b (929, Zhao 31), 60:18a-b (1049, Ai 23).

¹³⁵ GY 4:5b-7b (116-20, "Luyu" *shang*).

¹³⁶ ZZS 30:6b-7b (516-17, Xiang 6), 35:2b-3a (598-99, Xiang 22), 36:8a-b (620, Xiang 25), 36:9a-10a (621, Xiang 25); GY 14:12a (345, "Jinyu" 8).

¹³⁷ For examples of *zong* used alone in this sense, see GY 4:8b-9b (122-24, "Jinyu" 4--Xiafu Fuji 夏父弗忌 -- Wei Zhao identifies his specific office as *zongbo*, GY 9b-10a (148-49, "Luyu" *xia*--here it appears to be used as a generic reference to this type of official), and GY 18:1a-b (401-02, "Chuyu" *xia*--Wei Zhao comments that it refers to the office of *zongbo*) in this context). Also see the reference to *Zong* Qu of the state of Guo in ZZS 10:22a (181, Zhuang 32) where Qu is identified by his office; Du Yu claims that his office was *zongren* (*ibid.*).

¹³⁸ The office of *zongbo* is recorded for Zhou and Lu, see GY 1:8a (19, "Zhouyu" *shang*) and 4:8b-9b (122-24, "Luyu" *shang*--reference to Xiafu Fuji); ZZS 18:12b-14b (302-03, Wen 2--another reference to Xiafu Fuji).

¹³⁹ GY 3:14b (94, "Zhouyu" *xia*). According to Wei Zhao's commentary *zongguan* refers

zongyousi 宗有司,¹⁴¹ *zongren* 宗人,¹⁴² and *zongsi* 宗司.¹⁴³ *Zong* is used alone¹⁴⁴ or in the compound *zongyi* 宗邑¹⁴⁵ to refer to a settlement where an ancestral temple was located; it also appears as part of the proper names of some of those settlements, for example, Zong Zhou (this term was also used to refer to the royal house of Zhou)¹⁴⁶ and Zongqiu 宗丘.¹⁴⁷

The most common use of *zong* by itself in these sources is to refer to agnatic descent groups. In this sense, it also occurs in the compounds *dazong*, *erzong* 二宗, *zongzhu* 宗主, *zongzi*, *zonglao* 宗老, *zongchen* 宗臣, *zongren*, *zongfu*, *zongmeng*

to the office of *zongbo*.

¹⁴⁰ *Zong zhu* refers to two types of offices concerned with different aspects of sacrificial rites, the temple officiator (*zong* 宗) and the invocator (*zhu* 祝); see GY 2:10a (55, "Zhouyu" *zhong*) and GY 4:9a (123, "Luyu" *shang*). Wei Zhao comments that the offices in both occurrences of this combination are *zongbo* and *taizhu* 太祝 ("grand invocator").

¹⁴¹ A *zongyousi* ("temple officiator") appears as the subordinate of the *zongbo* in GY 4:9a (122-23, "Luyu" *shang*).

¹⁴² ZZS 35:4a-b (599, Xiang 22), 60:19a-b (1050, Ai 24); GY 4:2b (110, "Luyu" *shang*). *Zongren* also appears to be a term used for agnatic descent group officers and members (see below).

¹⁴³ *Zongsi* ("temple officiator") is a generic term used to refer to the role of the office of *zongren* in ZZS 60:19a-b (1050, Ai 24). The term may be a short form of *zongyousi* (see note 141 above).

¹⁴⁴ GY 7:7a-8a (193-95, "Jinyu" 1).

¹⁴⁵ ZZS 10:13a-b (177, Zhuang 28), 38:15b-16a (649, Xiang 27), 59:17a (1033, Ai 14).

¹⁴⁶ ZZS 41:10b-11a (700-701, Zhao 1), 45:3a-6a (778-79, Zhao 9), 47:15a (820, Zhao 16), 51:3a (886, Zhao 24). See Yang Bojun's gloss in CQZZ 4:1309-10 for the double meaning of Zong Zhou. In virtually all occurrences in the *Zuozhuan*, Zong Zhou can be understood as referring to the royal house, which was based in Zong Zhou, rather than to the place itself.

¹⁴⁷ According to commentaries on the *Zuozhuan*, two places are referred to as Zongqiu. One was located in the state of Chu (ZZS, 47:3a [820, Zhao 14--Du commentary]). The other place was Hanyuan 韓原, a town of the state of Jin. This was the site of a military victory by Qin over Jin in 645 (*ibid.*, 14:5a-7b [231-32, Xi 15]). The victory was regarded as fulfillment of an earlier prediction that Qin would defeat Jin at Zongqiu (*ibid.*, 14:8b-10b [232-233, Xi 15]). Du Yu argues that "*qiu* 丘 is like *yi* 邑;" therefore, *zongqiu* is *zongyi* (*ibid.*, 14:10a [233, Xi 15]). Kong Yingda agrees with Du's interpretation of *qiu* and notes that "Han[yuan] had an ancestral temple of a former ruler; therefore, it was called 'Zongqiu'" (*ibid.*, 10:14a-b [233, Xi 15]). Yang Bojun supports the identification of Zongqiu with Hanyuan (CQZZ 1:364).

宗盟, *zongzu*, *zongshi* 宗氏, and *tongzong*. Careful reading of the contexts in which it occurs alone and in compounds will reveal the existence of different structural and functional levels of agnatic descent groups in the Spring and Autumn Era.

At the highest level, *zong* is used to refer to a *xing*-bearing group of agnates descended from a common ancestor. Two examples of this usage are found in the *Zuozhuan*. In the first example, the ruler of Yu 虞 discounts the risk of letting the army of Jin 晉 pass through his territory in 655 to attack the state of Guo 虢 saying, "Jin is my *zong*. How could it possibly harm us?" 晉吾宗也。豈害我哉。 In response, the ruler's counselor addressed his faulty reasoning by pointing out that the ruling house of Guo also had a distant agnate relationship with the ruling house of Jin. Moreover, he maintained, Jin had shown no mercy to closer kin who were members of its own ruling house, the descendants of Huan 晉桓公 and Zhuang 晉莊公, respectively the great grandfather and grandfather of the current ruler of Jin, Duke Xian 晉獻公 (r. 677-652). Their descendants were the ducal sons of Jin who were killed by Duke Xian between 671 and 669.¹⁴⁸ The claim of being in the same *zong*, was based on descent from a common ancestor, namely Taiwang Danfu 大王亶父 (fl. fourteenth century B.C.), the father of the founder of the ruling house of Yu and the great-grandfather of the founder of the ruling house of Jin.¹⁴⁹ Since this example deals with ruling houses, *zong* clearly refers to the *xing*-bearing group. A ruling house was known by the name of its state and by the *xing* that it had in common with related ruling houses.

¹⁴⁸ ZZS 12:22a-26a (207-09, Xi 5); CQZZ 1:309--commentary; SB 43; Li and Chang 1988:21-22.

¹⁴⁹ CQZZ 1:308-09--text and commentary; SJ 13:2b, 6a ("*Shibiao*" 世表).

The second example concerns violation of the taboo against marriage between persons who bear the same *xing*. When Lupu Gui 盧蒲癸 accepted Qing She's 慶舍 offer of a daughter in marriage in 545, a retainer of the prospective father-in-law queried Gui saying, "Male and female distinguish *xing*, [but] you do not avoid [your] *zong*, why is it?" 男女辨姓，子不辟宗，何也。He replied, "[Since my] *zong* does not avoid me, how can I alone avoid it? [Just as] one selects a verse when quoting an ode, I am taking what I want in [this marriage]. Why should I take cognizance of [my] *zong*?" 宗不余辟，余獨焉辟之。賦詩斷章，余取所求焉。惡識宗。 Although the prospective bride and groom had different *shi* surnames (Qing and Lupu), they evidently shared the *xing* name of Jiang 姜 and were members of the same *zong*,¹⁵⁰ that is, they descended from a common ancestor.

Zong is used in the sense of an agnatic descent group which constitutes a subset of a *xing*-bearing group, has its own surname (*shi*), and has segments that have their own unique surnames (*shi*). In 539 the *Zuozhuan* records Shuxiang 叔向 (Yangshe Xi 羊舌肸) speaking of the demise of the branches of the ducal house of Jin saying, "Of the eleven *zu* of [my] *zong*, only the Yangsheshi 羊舌氏 [literally, "Yangshes"] remain."¹⁵¹ 肸之宗十一族，唯羊舍氏在而已。 Yangshe was the surname (*shi*) of one of eleven segments (*zu*) of a higher order agnatic descent group. The common ancestor may be Duke Wu of Jin 晉武公 (r. 678-687), who is thought to be the great-grandfather of Shuxiang.¹⁵² Unlike the two examples cited above, in this

¹⁵⁰ ZZZS 38:25a-b (654, Xiang 28--text and commentary); QQZZZ 3:1145--commentary.

¹⁵¹ ZZZS 42:12a (723, Zhao 3).

¹⁵² CQSZP 21a-b.

case *zong* does not refer to a *xing*-bearing group. Instead it refers to an agnatic descent group comprised of descendants of the sons a former ruler. Unfortunately the name of this particular group is not given, but surnames of other groups of the same type, such as Ruoao*shi* 若敖氏 of Chu and the ducal *zu* of Song (see below), have been preserved.

Zong is also used to refer to the senior segment of a group of the type just discussed. For example, the descendants of Ruoao 若敖, ruler of Chu, comprised an agnatic descent group surnamed Ruoao (Ruoao*shi*). It was composed of named segments, the senior segment Dou 鬥 and the junior segment Cheng 成.¹⁵³ When Dou Ziyue of Chu went on an official visit to the state of Lu in 618, his arrogant behavior prompted the prediction that he "would be sure to extinguish the *zong* of the Ruoaos [Ruoao*shi zhi zong*]."¹⁵⁴ 是必滅若敖氏之宗。 Earlier Uncle Dou Ziwen 鬥子文, acting in a dual capacity as head of the Dous and of the Ruoaos, had counseled Yuejiao's father to kill him when he was born lest he grow up to ruin the Ruoaos.¹⁵⁵ When upon his deathbed sometime between 613 and 611, Ziwen called together the members of his segment (*zu*) of the Dous and advised them to clear out quickly in order to avoid trouble if Yuejiao should become chief minister. He then went on to tearfully express his concern for the fate of the ancestral spirits of the Ruoaos.¹⁵⁶ Within the overall context of these references, which reveal the existence of agnatic descent groups

¹⁵³ See pedigrees in CQSZP 46a, 48a-b.

¹⁵⁴ ZZS 19a:22b (321, Xi 9).

¹⁵⁵ ZZS 21:22b (370, Xuan 4).

¹⁵⁶ ZZS 21:21a-b (370, Xuan 4); see pedigree in CQSZP 48a.

at three levels, *zong* should be understood to refer to all of the Dous, or the senior segment of the higher order agnatic descent group surnamed Ruobao.

Named segments of higher order agnatic descent groups were themselves independent agnatic descent groups which stood on their own in politics and society. *Zong* is used to refer to a group of this type (which had a generational depth of three or more generations) separately from any larger group of which it may have been a part. I will give three representative examples of this usage here.

The first example is found in the *Zuozhuan* in 541. When the officers of Zheng 鄭 decided to banish You Chu 游楚 (a.k.a. Gongsun Chu 公孫楚) for causing mayhem, Zichan 子產 consulted You Ji 游吉 (a.k.a. Dashu 大叔) about it. The latter replied,

Since I, Ji, am not able to protect my own person; how am I able to protect my *zong*? That one is a matter for state government, not a private problem. You, sir, think about the State of Zheng; if it will be beneficial, then do it. How can [you] have further doubts about it? . . . If I, Ji, were to be found guilty, you would do it. What does it have to do with all the Yous [*zhu You*]?¹⁵⁷

吉不能亢身，焉能亢宗。彼國政也，非私難也。子圖鄭國，利則行之。又何疑焉。吉若，獲戾，子將行之。何有與諸游。

You Chu was the son of Gongzi Yan 公子偃, who was also known as Ziyou 子游, You being his style name. You Ji was the grandson of Ziyou and second son of the elder brother of Chu. The descendants of Ziyu had taken his style name (*zi*) as the

¹⁵⁷ ZZS 41:14b-16a (702-03, Zhao 1).

surname (*shi*) of their *zong*, which, at this time, was four generations deep, counting from Ziyou.¹⁵⁸

Yang Bojun says that You Ji was the *zong* head (*zongzhu*); therefore, he was consulted in this matter.¹⁵⁹ Ji probably assumed this role when he was appointed as a high state official (*guoqing*) in lieu of his brother's son in 551.¹⁶⁰ Here he protected his *zong*, all the Yous, by drawing upon the distinction between public (state) and private (*zong*) matters, making sure that the uncle, and not the *zong*, paid for violating public order.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁸ See CQSZP 30a for reconstruction of the pedigree.

¹⁵⁹ CQZZZ 4:1213.

¹⁶⁰ CQZZZ 35:6a-b (600, Xiang 22).

¹⁶¹ For other examples of this type, see ZZS 7:10b-11a (122-23, Huan 11 [see my comment on this reference in note 125 above]), 34:8b (587, Xiang 19), and 54:25b-26a (952, Ding 4). Also see GY 5:6a (141, "Luyu" *xia*) and 13:1b-2a (312-13, "Jinyu" 7).

I believe that another example can be added from the account of the release of Zhi Ying 智磬 of Jin from captivity by the king of Chu in 588. During a parting interview with the king, he comments on his possible fate upon returning home, noting that should the ruler of Jin decide not to execute him, his father, Shou 首, might request permission to slay him "in/among (*yu* 於) the *zong*," but that if approval for his execution was not forthcoming, he may be allowed "to succeed to [his] *zongzhi* 宗職" (ZZS 26:2b-3b [436-37, Cheng 3]). While not commenting on *zong*, Du Yu says that *zongzhi* means "the position [or office] of [his] ancestors" (*ibid.*, 26:3b [437, Cheng 3]). Hung Liangji argues that it should be understood as "father's position (*fuzhi* 父職) because Ying's grandfather had not held the same position as his father Shou. Shen Qinhan says that it refers to "the business of the head of the *zong* (*zongzi zhi shi* 宗子之事)." Liu Wenqi (CQZZZZSZ 811) and Yang Bojun reject Hung, because Shou was still in his position, and accept Shen's interpretation. Yang glosses *zong* as "ancestral temple" (*zongmiao*), and notes that Shou, as head of a minor *zong* (*xiaozong*), had life or death authority over his son (CQZZZ 2:813).

In my opinion, *zong* refers to the agnatic descent group itself in this case rather than to a place (temple). The use of the preposition *yu* ("in, among") with *zong* supports this view because it is normally used in connection with people rather than places in the *Zuozhuan* (see Karlgren 1968:41-48). Shou (a.k.a. Xun Shou 荀首, Xun Xiu 荀秀, and Zhi Zhuangzi 智莊子) was, in fact, the founder of an agnatic descent group which split off from the Xun and became known as Zhi, a surname derived from the place where he was enfeoffed (see Thatcher 1973:71). By virtue of his authority as head of an agnatic descent group, which in this case probably was three generations in depth, Shou could seek permission to execute Ying privately within the group. The likely execution site may well have been an ancestral temple, that of the

The second example occurs in the *Guoyu* account of the elimination of the Three Xi 三郤 (Xi Qi 郤錡, Xi Chou 郤犇 and Xi Zhi 郤至) of Jin in 574. Political opponents of the Three Xi successfully saddled them with the blame for Jin's defeat by Chu in the battle of Yanling 鄢陵 in 575 and convinced the duke of Jin that they were planning to depose him. When they learned that the duke had sent assassins to kill them, Xi Qi said to Xi Zhi, "[Since our] ruler is not fair with us, I desire to use our *zong* and our partisans to flank and attack him. Even though [we will] die [and] surely be defeated, [our] ruler [will] certainly be endangered. Can it be done?" 君不道與我，我欲以吾宗與吾黨夾而攻之。雖死必敗，君必危。其可乎。 Zhi talked him out of attacking the duke and, according to this account, they all took the honorable way out by committing suicide.¹⁶² The Three Xi

higher order Xun since Shou was still alive, but *zong* refers to the agnatic descent group which Shou headed. If Ying were fortunate enough to escape execution, then he would be in a position to succeed his father as one of the commander-officials. *Zongzhi* refers to the hereditary right to commander-official status which was won by powerful agnatic descent groups in Jin between 621 and 618; the actual appointment was reserved for the head of the agnatic descent group (see Thatcher 1977-1978:153-59).

¹⁶²GY 12:6a-b (307-08, "Jinyu" 6). While the *Zuozhuan* version of this affair contains many of the same elements as the *Guoyu* account, it does not include the reference to *zong* quoted here. Nor does it say that the Three Xi committed suicide, rather it details their murders by the assassins (ZZZS 28:23b-25b [483-84, Cheng 17]). The next episode in the *Guoyu* also alludes to their murders (GY 12:6b-7a [308-09, "Jinyu" 8).

In the passage quoted, I have translated *wu zong* 吾宗 as "our *zong*." Here *wu* functions as a first person possessive pronoun; the overall context suggests that it should be read as "our" rather than "my." *Wu zong* also means "our *zong*" in the following *Zuozhuan* entry. When Shusun Muzi 叔孫穆子 of Lu fled to Qi for refuge in 538, he said to his elder brother Shusun Qiaoru 叔孫僑如, who had taken up residence in Qi earlier, "Lu is going to preserve our *zong* [*wu zong*] because of our forefathers. It will be sure to summon you. When it summons you, what will you do?" 魯以先子之故，將存吾宗。必召女。召女，何如 (ZZZS 42:31a-32a [733, Zhao 4]). Shusun was the surname (*shi*) of their *zong*.

represented three branches of their *zong*, which was descended from a former duke of Jin. The surname (*shi*) Xi was taken from the name of the founder's benefice.¹⁶³

The third example is found in the following excerpt from the *Guoyu*:

When Zhi Xuanzi was going to make Yao his successor, Zhi Guo said, "Xiao would be better." . . . "If [you] really install Yao, the Zhizong will surely be extinguished." [Xuanzi] did not heed him.

Zhi Guo distinguished [his] segment [*zu*] to the grand historian as *Fushi*. Coming to the time of the destruction of the Zhis [*Zhishi*], only Fu Guo remained.¹⁶⁴

智宣子將以對爲後，智果曰不如宵也。。。。。若果立瑤也，智宗必滅。弗聽。智果別族于太史爲輔氏。及智氏之亡，唯輔果在。

Here Zhi is clearly the surname of the *zong* from which Guo's segment split off to form the agnatic descent group surnamed Fu.¹⁶⁵ Taking a new surname was a political declaration of independence by the junior segment headed by Zhi Guo.

Shi-bearing *zong* of the type just described were composed of unnamed segments of which one was the senior segment, or *dazong*. The *Zuozhuan* reports that in 514 the *dazong* of the plaintiff in a suit tried unsuccessfully to obtain a favorable decision by offering female musicians as a bribe.¹⁶⁶ This is the sole occurrence of *dazong* in the *Zuozhuan*; it does not occur in the *Guoyu*. As K. C. Chang has correctly observed, this *dazong* must not be confused with the *dazong* that is juxtaposed to

¹⁶³ CQSZP 18b-19a. While the Three Xi died in the capital, their *zong* was extinguished at Jiang 絳 (GY 14:12a-b [345-46, "Jinyu" 8]). Jiang was the former capital of Jin and probably the ancestral place of the Xis.

¹⁶⁴ GY 15:7a-b (359-60, "Jinyu" 9).

¹⁶⁵ For other examples of surname (*shi*) + *zong*, see Hanzong 韓宗 in GY 13:5a-b (319-20, "Jinyu" 7) and Zhaozong 趙宗 in *ibid.*, 15:4a-5a ("Jinyu" 9).

¹⁶⁶ ZZZS 52:31a-b (Zhao 28, 915).

xiaozong in the *zongfa* system which is described in the "Dachuan" chapter of the *Liji*.¹⁶⁷ *Dazong* and *xiaozong* in the latter source refer to generational depth, the *dazong* remaining intact for one hundred generations and the *xiaozong* for five generations. The real world for agnatic descent groups, however, was not so systematic. In historical sources, the actual longevity of agnatic descent groups and their segments was decided chiefly by socio-economic and political factors.

The modifier *da* ("big, major, senior") in *dazong* does, of course, imply the existence of *xiao* ("small, minor, junior") *zong*. Takezoe argues that the term *erzong* ("auxiliary *zong*"), which occurs in a *Zuozhuan* passage in 710, should be understood as *xiaozong*.¹⁶⁸ The contextual evidence for the hierarchical arrangement of segments at this level of descent group organization is plentiful in the historical record.¹⁶⁹ The status of senior segment was determined by the selection of the successor to the head of the larger agnatic descent group rather than by the chronological order of segmentation. While there was a preference for the eldest son in the oldest segment, he could be set aside in favor of another son¹⁷⁰ or of the head of a junior segment of the agnatic descent

¹⁶⁷ LJZS 34:10a-11b (620-21); Chang 1976:78.

¹⁶⁸ ZZHJ 2:24-26 (Huan 2). The original text says, "The great officer has *erzong*" 大夫有貳宗. Du Yu comments, "The legal heir became *xiaozong*, [his] other brothers acted as *erzong* in order to be mutually supportive." Kong Yingda and Shen Qinhan, who is cited by Kong, and Yang Bojun take *erzong* to be the name of an office (ZZZS 5:20a-b [97, Huan 2]; CQZZZ 1:94).

¹⁶⁹ See Thatcher 1973:67-74 for a discussion of the internal dynamics of agnatic descent groups and their segments in the state of Jin.

¹⁷⁰ See the comment on the preferred order for selecting an heir in ZZZS 10:14b-15a (685-86. Xiang 31) and the discussion in Thatcher 1991:34-35.

group. In the latter case, the junior segment was elevated to the status of senior segment.¹⁷¹

Finally, *zong* is also used to refer to two generations of agnatic kin. For example, in the year 522 the *Zuozhuan* details the machinations of sycophant Fei Wuji 費無極 in securing the execution of Wu She 伍奢 and his son Shang 尚. Prior to complying with a royal summons to the capital ostensibly to secure the release of his father but to certain death, Shang sent younger brother Yun 員 to the State of Wu 吳 to prepare to take revenge against Chu. When Yun requested Wu to attack Chu, a dissenter said, "Since that one's *zong* was slaughtered, [he] desires to return his enmity; [his request] cannot be granted."¹⁷² 是宗爲戮，而欲反其讎，不可從也。 In this allusion to the deaths of the father and the brother of Wu Yun, *zong* refers to two generations of agnatic kin.

Now, before proceeding to other aspects of *zong* that can be discerned through the other compounds in which this term appears, I would like to deal with one more example which illustrates the problem of interpretation of *zong* when it is used alone. Above I have argued that *zong* refers to a higher order agnatic descent group in the *Zuozhuan* in 539 when Shuxiang said, "Of the eleven *zu* of my *zong*, only the Yangsheshi [literally, "Yangshes"] remain." The *Guoyu* records the prediction by the

¹⁷¹ See Takezoe's comment on the term *erzong* for a number of examples (ZZHJ 2:25 [Huan 2]). This change happened in the Zhongsun 仲孫 and Jisun 季孫 lineages of Lu with the selections of Meng Xiaobo 孟孝伯 and Ji Daozi 季悼子 respectively (CCDSB 12a:8a-b [1284], 12a-b [1286]) and in the Han 韓 and Zhao 趙 lineages of Jin with the selections of Han Xuanzi 韓宣子 and Zhao Chengzi 趙成子 (*ibid.*, 12a:18b [1289], 20a [1290]).

¹⁷² ZZS 49:2a-4a (852-53, Zhao 20).

mother of Shuxiang that his infant son Yang Shiwo 楊食我 (Boshi 伯石), whom she had heard crying but refused to see, would cause the demise of the Yangshes in these words, "His voice is the voice of a wolf. The one who will finally extinguish the *zong* of the Yangshes [*Yangsheshi zhi zong*] is sure to be that child."¹⁷³ 其聲豺狼之聲。終滅羊舍氏之宗者，必是子也。 The *Zuozhuan* relates this incident in 514 as a flashback when the involvement of Shiwo in political intrigue resulted in his execution and the extinction of the Yangshes' agnatic descent group. There the mother of Shuxiang says, ". . . If it is not that one, there is none who can ruin the Yangshes [*Yangsheshi*], I predict!"¹⁷⁴ 非是，莫喪羊舍氏矣。 Thus, the *zong* in this *Guoyu* passage has the surname Yangshe in the *Zuozhuan* and is referred to in both sources as an independent agnatic descent group rather than as one of eleven segments of the higher order agnatic descent group (also *zong*) to which it belonged. When interpreting this and other terms, care has to be taken to determine the point of reference in each context.

Zong Leadership and Staff

The head of an agnatic descent group may be referred to as *zong* and *zongzhu*, and possibly *zongshi*₄ and *zongzi*, in the *Zuozhuan*. For example, when Chu laid siege to the settlement of the Man minority in 491, its ruler fled to Jin, and his people scattered. They were lured back and captured by Chu when it "gave [them] a town [*yi*] and installed [their] *zong* in it . . ." 致邑立宗焉¹⁷⁵ The meaning of *zong* in this

¹⁷³ GY 14:13a (327, "Jinyu" 8).

¹⁷⁴ ZZZS 52:24a-26b (911-12, Zhao 28).

¹⁷⁵ ZZZS 57:20b-21b (999-1000, Ai 4). For another example, see *ibid.*, 44:18b-20a

context becomes clear when compared to a declaration in 546 that, "Cui 崔 is a *zong* seat [*zongyi*]; [it] must be located with the head of the *zong* [*zongzhu*]" 崔，宗邑也，必在宗主，namely, Cui Ming 崔明。¹⁷⁶

When *Zuoshi* Xiang Xu 左師向戌 of Song criticized Hua Hai 華亥 for obtaining the office of *youshi* 右師 in 536 by collaborating with the eunuch who had driven his brother *Youshi* Hua Hebi 右師華合比 into exile, he said,

A fellow such as you is sure to flee [into exile]. Since you have destroyed your *zongshi*₄, what will you have occasion to do to others? What will others perhaps have occasion to do to you? An ode says, "The *zongzi* is a fortress wall / Do not allow the fortress wall to be damaged / Do not fear this by yourself." You should be afraid of it!¹⁷⁷

女夫也，必亡。女喪而宗室，於人何有。人亦於女何有。詩曰宗子維城，毋俾城壞，毋獨斯畏。女其畏哉。

In the opinion of Yang Bojun, *zongshi*₄ means *zongzhu* in this context. He argues that the ode was cited as an allusion to Hua Hebi who was "the *zongzi* of the Huas,"¹⁷⁸ that is, he was the head of their *zong*. I think he is right.

(766-67, Zhao 7--text and commentary).

¹⁷⁶ ZZS 38:15b-16a (649, Xiang 27). For another example of *zongzhu*, see *ibid.*, 48:22b-25a (845-46, Zhao 19).

¹⁷⁷ ZZS 43:21a-b (752, Zhao 6). The first sentence in this quotation has an error in the original text. 女夫也人亡 should be 女夫也必亡 (compare CQZZ 4:1278 and other editions). The excerpt is from ode "Ban" 板 in the Da Ya 大雅 section of the *Shijing* (see the original text in MSZS 17.4:20a [635]).

¹⁷⁸ CQZZ 4:1277-78. James Legge translates *zongshi*₄ as "members of your own House" (5:610). Modern Chinese translators, who rely heavily on Yang Bojun's work, reject Yang's reading of *zongshi*₄ and render it as *zongzu*; see ZZYW 410 and ZZQY 1166.

Legge translates *zongzi* as "The circle of relatives" (5:610). Elsewhere, when it is used in a different context, Yang also understands the *zongzi* in this ode to refer to members of the *zong* rather than to its head (CQZZ 1:303-04). Liu Wenqi, however, accepts its interpretation as "the entire *zong* (*qunzong* 群宗)" in both contexts (CQZSZZSZ 269). Karlgren renders it as "the men of the (royal) clan" in his translation of the ode (1974:214).

I think that the context in which this line of the ode is quoted here supports Yang's

The terms *zonglao*, *zongchen*, and *zongren* appear in the *Guoyu* in agnatic descent group contexts, and, according to Wei Zhao's commentary, all three terms stand for descent group staff. These terms occur together in an anecdote about selecting a bride for Gongfu Wenbo 公父文伯 of Lu. Wenbo was the son of Gongfu Muzi 公父穆子 and grandson of Ji Daozi 季悼子.¹⁷⁹ At this time, Ji Kangzi 季康子, another grandson of Daozi, was the head of the powerful Ji agnatic descent group. In Spring and Autumn kinship terminology Wenbo's mother, who had frequent interaction with Kangzi,¹⁸⁰ is described as his "grandfather's younger brother's wife (*congzushumu* 從祖叔母)."¹⁸¹ Thus, Gongfu was the surname (*shi*) of a junior segment of the higher order agnatic descent group surnamed Ji.¹⁸²

Wei Zhao understands these terms and interprets this *Guoyu* passage as follows:

When the mother of Gongfu Wenbo desired to wife [*shi*₄] Wenbo, [she] feted his/her *zonglao* and recited the third stanza of the "Luyi" [ode] for [them]. The *lao* requested the keeper of the tortoise to divine the wife's *zu* [that is, the surname, or *xing*, of her agnatic descent group].

Musician Hai, hearing about it, said, "Excellent! [In the] boy-girl feast, [she] did not join the *zongchen* [*bu ji zongchen*]. [In the] deliberations about [selecting] a *zong* wife [*zongshi*₄], [she] did not go beyond the *zongren*. . . ."¹⁸³

公父文伯之母欲室文伯，饗其宗老而爲賦綠衣之三章。老請守龜卜室之族。師亥聞之曰善哉。男女之饗不及宗臣。宗室之謀，不過宗人。

interpretation. Regardless of what *zongzi* may have meant originally, it has to be interpreted consistently with the context of its use on this occasion.

¹⁷⁹ GY 5:7a (143, "Luyu" *xia*--commentary).

¹⁸⁰ GY 5:7a-8a, 9b (144-45, 148, "Luyu" *xia*).

¹⁸¹ GY 5:9b (148, "Luyu" *xia*).

¹⁸² For the Ji (Jisun) pedigree, see CQSZP 9b-10a.

¹⁸³ GY 5:10a (149, "Luyu" *xia*--text and commentary).

Commenting on *zonglao*, Wei says: "Family retainers [*jiachen* 家臣] were called *lao*. *Zong* was *zongren*, the one who was in charge of rites and music." He then supports his argument by referring to the occurrence of *zonglao* in another *Guoyu* anecdote, which I shall present momentarily. While Wei makes no comment in the meaning of *zongchen*, he says that the *zongren* was their chief (*zhengzongchen* 正宗臣) and that this office was filled by a kinsman with the same surname.¹⁸⁴

As to the anecdote that Wei mentions, the text says:

Qu Dao was addicted to water chestnuts. When [he] became ill, [he] summoned his *zonglao* and enjoined them saying, "When sacrificing to me, be sure to use water chestnuts and the *xiang* sacrifice."

When the *zonglao* were about to offer the water chestnuts, Qu Jian [his son] ordered them to get rid of it. The *lao* said, "That gentleman enjoined it."

屈到嗜芰。有疾，召其宗老而屬之曰祭我，必以芰及祥。
宗老將薦芰，屈建命去之。老曰夫子屬之。

Here Wei's gloss reads: "Family retainers were called *lao*. *Zonglao* were referred to as *zongren*."¹⁸⁵ Thus, in his view *zongren*, or *zonglao*, performed the same role in the *zong* as family retainers in the family. If this is the case, *zongchen* can be understood as "zong retainer." *Zongren* then becomes the chief *zong* retainer.

Wei refers back to the anecdote that immediately precedes the first *Guoyu* passage above to interpret *bu ji zongchen* in the last paragraph. In that anecdote, the mother of Wenbo is lauded for observing the rules of proper conduct for females by not

¹⁸⁴ GY 5:10a (149, "Luyu" *xia*--commentary).

¹⁸⁵ GY 17:3a (383, "Chuyu" *shang*--text and commentary).

eating with Ji Kangzi.¹⁸⁶ Thus, following Wei Zhao's commentary, the first passage, when fully translated, should read:

When the mother of Gongfu Wenbo desired to wife [*shi*₄] Wenbo, [she] feted his/her *zong* retainers and recited the third stanza of the 'Luyi' [ode] for [them]. The retainers requested the keeper of the tortoise to divine the wife's *zu* [that is, the surname, or *xing*, of her agnatic descent group].

Musician Hai, hearing about it, said, "Excellent! [In the] boy-girl feast, [she] did not join the *zong* retainers. [In the] deliberations about [selecting] a *zong* wife [*zongshi*₄], [she] did not go beyond the chief *zong* retainer. . . ."

Read in this way, the text is nonsensical and inconsistent.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁶ GY 5:9b-10a (148-49, "Luyu" *xia*).

¹⁸⁷ Modern Chinese renditions of this passage also have serious problems. Dong Lizhang takes *zonglao* and *zongchen* in the original text to mean *zongren*. He follows Wei Zhao's definition of *zongren* as "the one in charge of rites and music" in the latter's initial gloss on *zonglao*. He also accepts Wei's use of the preceding anecdote to explain the meaning of *bu ji zongchen* (GY 10:5a [149, Luyu *xia*]). However, he gives a different interpretation of *zongshi*₄ as follows: "Prior to the Tang dynasty, as far back as the Spring And Autumn Era, the collateral descendants of officials could be referred to as *zongshi*₄. Here it refers to important family matters." Thus, Dong translates:

When Jing Jiang wanted to marry a wife for her son, Wenbo, [she] feted the *zongren*, who was in charge of rites and music in the family, [and] recited the third stanza of "Luyi" in the "Beifeng" section of the *Shijing* to the *zongren*. The *zongren* requested to take the tortoise shell which had been kept for generations in the family [and] use it to divine the surname [*zuxing*] of the wife.

When Shi Hai, the musician of the court of Lu State, came to know [about it], [he] said, "Good! [At] the boy-girl feast after a sacrifice, [one] definitely wants to have the *zongren* attend; [in] deliberating major family matters, [one] also must invite the *zongren* to participate. (1993:247-48)

He has completely misread Musician Hai's appraisal.

Another translation by Wu Guoyi, et. al, interprets *zonglao* as "family retainer [or servant] in charge of rites and music," *zongchen* as "an official who had the same surname as the ruler of the state," and *zongren* as "the name of an ancient office in charge of sacrificial rites." The translators note, "Rulers and [high] officials both had *zongren* [officials]" (1994:171). Acceptance of Wei Zhao's interpretation of *bu ji zongchen* is clearly evident in their translation:

The mother of Gongfu Wenbo planned to wed a wife for Wenbo; for this [purpose she] feted the family retainer in charge of music and rites, and [she] recited poetic lines from the third stanza of the "Luyi." The family retainer, thereupon, requested the diviner to divine about the family circumstances of the girl's side.

The cross reference that Wei Zhao used to explain *bu ji zongchen* is not necessary, and this entire passage translates more smoothly, if *zonglao* is understood as "zong elders" and *zongren* is interpreted as "zong members." It would, thus, be rendered as follows:

When the mother of Gongfu Wenbo desired to wife [*shi*₄] Wenbo, [she] feted his/her *zong* elders and recited the third stanza of the 'Luyi' [ode] for [them]. The elders requested the keeper of the tortoise to divine the wife's *zu* [that is, the surname, or *xing*, of her agnatic descent group].

Musician Hai, hearing about it, said, "Excellent! The boy-girl feast did not include the *zong* retainers. The deliberations about [selecting] a *zong* wife (*zongshi*₄) did not go beyond the *zong* members. . . ."

Zonglao appears in a bronze inscription passage which reads: "Xingzhong Ji, August Mother, makes [this] *zunding* [a bronze vessel]. May [her] sons and grandsons use [it] to make [sacrificial] offerings to [their] *zonglao*."¹⁸⁸ 辛中姬皇母作尊鼎，其子子孫孫用享孝于宗老。 In bronze inscriptions, *lao* can refer to those who are elderly or to major officials; however, in the context of making sacrificial offerings, it is thought to refer to the former as in the following phrase: ". . . use [it] to make [sacrificial] offerings to brothers, in-laws, and all the elders [*zhulao*]."¹⁸⁹ 用享

When Musician Hai heard about it, he said, "[She] did well! When holding a banquet concerning the marriage of a boy and a girl, [one] does not need to request a high official who has the same surname as the ruler to be present; when discussing the marrying of a daughter-in-law in [one's] own family, [one] only needs to invite the family retainer in charge of rites and music, that's all." (*Ibid.*)

The interpretation of *zongren* does not fit the context of this passage.

¹⁸⁸ "Xingzhong Ji *ding*" inscription in Yu Xingwu 1934.3:19a. The intended recipients of sacrifices mentioned in other inscriptions recorded in this source are clearly ancestors or consanguineal kin. The syntax of those inscriptions is the same as in this one.

¹⁸⁹ See definitions and "Shuji Liangfu *hu*" 夔季良父壺 inscription cited in ZWCYZD 811.

孝于兄弟婚媾諸老。 If this interpretation is correct, then *zonglao* in the former inscription is an example of "zong elders."

Zongren is found in the Houma covenant texts (see discussion below) where it clearly means male members of the *zong* in the expression *zongren xiongdi* 宗人兄弟. The covenantee makes an oath that he will not confiscate the movable property (*shi*₄) of others and that he will detain any "zong members, elder and younger brothers," that he hears about engaging in such activities.¹⁹⁰ In this context, *zongren xiongdi* can be taken as a compound term meaning simply "zong members."

The term *lao* used alone and in various combinations can refer to state and private officials.¹⁹¹ *Zongren*, as noted earlier, is a term for a type of office or official. There were evidently state and private *zongren* officials during the era.¹⁹² However, in the context of the *Guoyu* passage under consideration, reading these terms as *zong* officials or retainers does not work.

If *zonglao* and *zongren* are interpreted here as "zong elders" and "zong members," the passage reads smoothly, is internally consistent, and makes sense. The selection of the wife for a *zong* male, particularly the head of the *zong* or his designated successor, becomes a highly private matter to be decided exclusively by male agnates of the principal. The fact that the mother of Wenbo did not violate this protocol is what

¹⁹⁰ HMMS 40--text and commentary.

¹⁹¹ See GY 3:9a (83, "Zhouyu" *xia*) for the first occurrence of *lao* in the sense of "family retainer" in the *Guoyu*.

¹⁹² For example, the *Rites of Zhou* notes that there was a *zongren* who served in the capital (i.e., the government) and a *zongren* who served in the *jia* 家, that is, the households of high officials; see ZLZS 17:16b-17a [266-67]).

earned her handling of the selection of a wife for him the accolade of "Excellent!" from Musician Hai.

ZongFu 宗婦

The term for women of the *zong* is *zongfu* or "zong ladies." In 706 the *zong* ladies helped Duke Huan 魯桓公 of Lu and his wife Wen Jiang 文姜 name their infant son.¹⁹³ Duke Zhuang 魯莊公 of Lu is judged to have committed an act of impropriety in 670 when he sought to impress Ai Jiang 哀姜, his new bride, by ordering his *zong* ladies to give her gifts which were normally to be presented by men only.¹⁹⁴ And in 571 Duke Ling of Qi 齊靈公 also caused an impropriety when he

¹⁹³ ZZS 6:21b-22a (112, Huan 6).

¹⁹⁴ ZZS 10:4b-5b (172-73, Zhuang 24).

The *Chunqiu* and *Guoyu* versions of this incident say that the gifts were presented by the *daifu zongfu* 大夫宗婦 (CQZS 10:3a-b [172, Zhuang 24]; GY 4:2b [110, "Luyu" shang]). The meaning of this expression has been disputed from the time of the earliest commentaries on the *Chunqiu*. The *Gong Yang Commentary* 公羊傳 views *daifu* as a modifier of *zongfu* and interprets *zongfu* as "the wives of officials" (*daifu zhi qi* 大夫之妻). The *Gu Liang Commentary* 穀梁傳 however, takes the two terms as coordinate nouns, meaning "officials [and] zong ladies," and claims that the conjunction *ji* 及 ("and") was omitted in the text as a sign of disapproval of the improprieties that were committed, namely females giving inappropriate gifts and officials (males) giving gifts to a lady (Fu 1:306-08). Du Yu has it both ways, interpreting the text as "officials and wives of officials with the same surname (*tongxing daifu zhi fu* 同姓大夫之婦)," but he sees nothing improper about men giving gifts to women; the impropriety was in the kinds of gifts presented by the women (see his comments in CQZS 10:3b [172, Zhuang 24] and ZZS 10:4b [172, Zhuang 24]). Liu Wenqi (CQZZZZSZ 193) and Yang Bojun (CQZZZ 1:228) follow Shen Qinhan, who utterly rejected Du's reading of *daifu zongfu*; they say that only the wives of *zong* members who were officials presented gifts, albeit the wrong ones, and the officials were not around. Fu Lipu introduces the comments of others arguing that males and females did, in fact, participate together in rites to refute one of the improprieties noted in the *Gu Liang Commentary* (1:307).

In my opinion, the *Gu Liang Commentary* is correct in taking *daifu* and *zongfu* as coordinate nouns; otherwise the meaning would be "the *zong* ladies (or wives) of officials." If this reading were correct, there would be no reason to believe that the ladies were wives of members of the *zong* of the ruler; they would have been wives of officials from all *zong*, related and unrelated to the ruler. Such a scenario does not fit the domestic contexts in which *zongfu* occurs.

sent his *zong* ladies and "all of the Jiang" (*zhu Jiang* 諸姜), i.e., married women with the same *xing* as himself who were daughters of his own *zong*, to Lu to attend the burial of Qi Jiang 齊姜, the widow of Duke Cheng 魯成公 (r. 590-573).¹⁹⁵

As is evident in the last example, *zongfu* refers to the women who married into the *zong* rather than those who were born into it. This conclusion can be supported indirectly by remarks attributed to Confucius' in the *Guoyu* when he praised the mother of Wenbo saying, "The Ji lady [*Jishi zhi fu*] is not licentious, indeed!" 季氏之婦不淫矣,¹⁹⁶ "The Gongfu lady [*Gongfushi zhi fu*] is knowledgeable," 公父氏之婦智也,¹⁹⁷ and "The Ji lady can be said to know the rules of propriety, indeed!" 季氏之婦可謂知禮矣。¹⁹⁸

When a women married in, she acquired the right to material support and funerary rites as long as she resided with her husband and his agnates. These rights were forfeited through divorce.¹⁹⁹

Zong Meng 宗盟

Zong affiliation was acknowledged in the conduct of interstate relations. For example, Duke Wen of Jin 晉文公 convened an interstate meeting Jiantu in 632 in order to make a covenant with the rulers of states that accepted his hegemony. As shown in Table A2 below, the list of participants recorded in the *Chunqiu* reflects the prevailing hierarchy of power, ordering the states from most to least powerful; however,

¹⁹⁵ ZZS 29:5b, 6a (498-99, Xiang 2).

¹⁹⁶ GY 5:9b (148, "Luyu" *xia*).

¹⁹⁷ GY 5:10b (150, "Luyu" *xia*).

¹⁹⁸ GY 5:10b (150, "Luyu" *xia*).

¹⁹⁹ ZZS 8:3b (137, Zhuang 1).

in the actual covenant text, which is quoted in the *Zuozhuan*, the rulers and/or their representatives are grouped according to their *xing*, or *zong* surnames, with those sharing the same *xing* as the covenant chief (*mengzhu* 盟主), Duke Wen, listed ahead of those with *xing* different from his own.

**Table A2. *Chunqiu* and *Jiantu*
Covenant Participants Lists**

<i>Chunqiu</i> List		Covenant List		
State	<i>Xing</i>	State	<i>Xing</i>	
Lu	Ji	Jin	Ji	姬
Jin	Ji	Lu	Ji	姬
Qi	Jiang	Wei	Ji	姬
Song	Zi	Cai	Ji	姬
Cai	Ji	Zheng	Ji	姬
Zheng	Ji	Qi	Jiang	姜
Wei	Ji	Song	Zi	子
Ju	Ji	Ju	Ji	己

Sources: CQZS 16:14b (268, Xi 28); ZZZS 54:21a (950, Ding 4)

Note: The ruler of the State of Lu is listed first in the *Chunqiu* because it is the history of his state. Duke Wen of Jin was the covenant chief.

The *Zuozhuan* records the following incident in Lu in 712:

Spring. When the Marquis of Teng and the Marquis of Xue came to pay a court visit, [they] contended for precedence [i.e., the right to go first].

The Marquis of Xue said, "I was enfeoffed first."

The Marquis of Teng said, "I am the chief diviner of Zhou. Xue is of a different surname [than we are] [*shuxing*]. I cannot follow it."

Duke [Yin] sent Yufu to intercede with the Marquis of Xue saying, "You and the ruler of Teng deign to inquire after me. A Zhou proverb has it, 'When a mountain has timber, the lumberjack works it. When a guest has occasion for ceremony, the host selects it.' When Zhou conducts a covenant, [those with] a different surname are made [to go] last [*Zhou zhi zong meng, yixing wei hou*]. Supposing that I were to pay a court visit to Xue, [I] would not dare to be placed

together with all the Ren [i.e., those bearing the *xing* of the Xue ruling house]. Supposing that you deign to give grace to me, [I] wish to make intercession for the ruler of Teng."

The Marquis of Xue agreed to it, then precedence was given to the Marquis of Teng²⁰⁰

春。滕侯薛侯來朝，爭長。薛侯曰我先封。滕侯曰我周之卜正也。薛庶姓也。我不可以後之。公使羽父請於薛侯曰君與滕君辱在寡人。周諺有之曰山有木，工則度之。賓有禮，主則擇之。周之宗盟，異姓爲後。寡人若朝于薛，不敢與諸任齒。君若辱貺寡人，則願以滕君爲請。薛侯許之，乃長滕侯。

Commentators and translators have divided opinions about how to read *Zhou zhi zong meng* in this anecdote. Some regard *zong* and *meng* as verb + object and others view them as a compound noun. As a verb, *zong* has been interpreted as *zun* 尊 ("to respect, to honor")²⁰¹ and *zhu* 主 ("to conduct, to host").²⁰² As a compound noun, *zongmeng* has been understood to mean *tongzong zhi meng* 同宗之盟 ("a covenant [by members] of the same *zong*")²⁰³ or the term for the covenant record kept by the office of *zongbo*.²⁰⁴

Yang Bojun asserts that all of these definitions miss the mark. He says that *zongmeng* is a parallel construction. Noting that in the *Rites of Zhou*, *zong* is a term for a certain seasonal meeting with foreign guests and that it appears in the parallel

²⁰⁰ ZZS 4: 19a-20b (79, Yin 11). I follow Yang Bojun's reading of *du* 度 ("to work wood") and *kuang* 貺 ("to give grace") (CQZZ 1:72).

²⁰¹ This definition is attributed to Jia Kui in ZZS 4:19b (79, Yin 11--see sub-commentary by Kong Yingda).

²⁰² See ZZHJ 1:92.

²⁰³ This definition is attributed to Fu Qian in ZZS 4:19b (79, Yin 11--see sub-commentary by Kong Yingda).

²⁰⁴ This definition is attributed to Sun Yu in ZZS 4:19b-20a (79, Yin 11--see sub-commentary by Kong Yingda).

construction *chaozong* 朝宗, where two words with the same meaning are used as one term (actually a compound verb in his example meaning "to meet"), he concludes that "zong is also a name [or noun] for a get together" (*huitong zhi ming* 會同之名).²⁰⁵ Following Yang's reading, Shen Yucheng takes *zongmeng* as a compound noun and translates *Zhou zhi zongmeng* as *Chengzhou de huimeng* 成周的會盟 ("[At] Chengzhou covenant meeting[s], . . .").²⁰⁶ In my opinion, this is not an improvement over the earlier commentaries. In a *Chunqiu* entry in 641, which states that "The Viscount of Ceng met and covenanted [*hui meng*] [with the other rulers] at Zhu" 鄫子會盟于邾,²⁰⁷ *hui* and *meng* are independent coordinate verbs; the two words do not appear together anywhere in the *Zuozhuan* as a compound noun.

Reading *zongmeng* as "a covenant [by members] of the same *zong*," or simply "zong covenant," would fit nicely into this study, but it will not work in the context in which these two words occur above. In my opinion the *zhi* in *Zhou zhi zong meng* marks the subject in a subordinate clause which requires a verb. In this instance, the transitive verb *zong*, understood as *zhu* ("to conduct, to host") followed by the direct object *meng* ("covenant"), makes the most sense. The verb + object combination *zhu meng* occurs elsewhere in the *Zuozhuan* meaning "conduct a covenant."²⁰⁸ The anecdote here is about deciding who will go first in court ceremony. To decide the matter, the ruler of Lu (the repository of the statutes of Zhou²⁰⁹) drew on the rule of

²⁰⁵ CQZZZ 1:70.

²⁰⁶ ZZYW 16.

²⁰⁷ ZZS 14:20b (238, Xi 19).

²⁰⁸ ZZS 19a:16b (318, Wen 7), 46:13a-14b (810, Zhao 13).

²⁰⁹ ZZS 54:16a (947, Ding 4), 58:28a (1019, Ai 11).

precedence employed by the Zhou court when it conducted the making of interstate covenants.

Zong Covenants

A major cache of covenant texts, which was discovered at the site of the late Spring and Autumn capital of Jin (located in modern day Houma, Shanxi 山西侯馬) in 1965,²¹⁰ reveals that just as covenants were made between states, they were also concluded between the head of a *zong* and his agnates and retainers and between the head and *zong* supporters (or followers).²¹¹ While these covenants do not constitute a *zong* charter, their contents reveal the structure, or organization, of the *zong* and its concerns. They show how the relationships between the *zong* head and supporters were formalized in a time of crisis. Above all, they stand as testaments of the pain of *zong* fission and of the intensity of the political struggle of a *zong* for survival. Fortunately, people and events mentioned or implied in this set of records can be tied to those recorded in traditional historical sources for the Spring And Autumn Era.

The covenants were made by members and retainers of the Zhao *zong* 趙宗, one of the most powerful agnatic descent groups in Jin after 633.²¹² In 497 intra-*zong*

²¹⁰ HMMS 13.

²¹¹ The compilers of the Houma report cite a *Zuozhuan* entry in 481 about a covenant between Kan Zhi 闞止 and "all of the Chens at the Chen ancestral temple" 諸陳於陳宗 as an example of a *zong* covenant (HMMS 68; see the anecdote in ZZS 59:14a-17a [1031-33, Ai 14]). However, that covenant was between the members of the Chen*zong* and a non-agnate rather than between members of the same *zong*.

Kong Yingda says Chen*zong* in this passage stands for the head of the Chens (*Chenshi zongzhu* 陳氏宗主) and that the covenant was made at his house (*ibid.*, 15a [1032, Ai 14]). If this were correct, the passage would read awkwardly as, "Ziwo 子我 covenanted all of the Chens with the Chen *zong* [head]." I think *zong* makes more sense here as "ancestral temple," the place where the covenant was made.

²¹² For a detailed study of agnatic descent groups (specifically, lineages) and their political

competition erupted into violence when Zhao Yang 趙鞅 (a.k.a. Zhao Meng 趙盟, fl. 517-478), head of the zong and of the senior segment based in Jinyang, ordered the execution of Zhao Wu 趙午 (a.k.a. Handan Wu 邯鄲午), head of a junior segment based in Handan 邯鄲. The heads of the rival Fan 范 and Zhonghang 中行 agnatic descent groups seized the opportunity and sided with the Handan Zhao in an unsuccessful attempt to attack and eliminate the Jinyang Zhao.²¹³ The covenants preserved in the texts were concluded in the aftermath of these hostilities and following the return of Zhao Yang to the capital. Zhao Yang has been reliably identified as the Zhao Meng who conducted the covenants.²¹⁴

The contents of the texts bear out the observation of a representative of the king of Zhou in 529, who said, "Covenants are used to bring forth trust" 盟以底信.²¹⁵ For example, the vow of an agnate, or *zong* mate, of Zhao Yang, or a retainer typically begins, "[So and so] dares not but declare his innermost intentions [literally, 'lays open his stomach and heart'] in order to serve his head [or master] [*yi shi qi zong*]²¹⁶ and

activities in Jin, see Thatcher 1973.

²¹³ For details of this affair, see Thatcher 1973:64-66, 97-98, 169, and 255-62; Li and Chang 1988:131-33.

²¹⁴ HMMS 65-68.

²¹⁵ ZZS 46:13b (810, Zhao 13).

²¹⁶ The authors of the major Chinese report on these texts maintain that *yi shi qi zong* "refers to doing ancestral temple sacrifices" (*ibid.*, 36). They use this notion together with the status of the covenant chief that is manifest in avoidance of his personal name and the obligation to protect his ancestral temples, also stated in the vow, to classify this type of document as a *zongmeng* ("zong covenant"), that is, a covenant between members of the same *zong* (*ibid.*, 68-69).

I agree with this classification, but I think that in the vow *zong* should be understood as *zongzhu* ("zong head") when the vow maker is an agnate, or *zong* mate, of Zhao Meng or *zhu* ("master, lord") when he is a retainer. This reading is suggested by the rephrasing of *yi shi qi zong* as *yi shi qi jia* 以事其嘉 ("in order to serve [Your] Excellency") in several vows taken by servants whose surnames were not Zhao. The authors of the report draw attention to this

dares not but completely adhere to his excellency's covenant [and] the charge [given him] at Ding Temple and Pingzhi 平峙 ."[...] 敢不其腹心，以事其宗，而不敢不盡從嘉之明定宮平峙之命 . . . It goes on to call for annihilation by the spirits for changing loyalty, not protecting the ancestral temples, and allowing the Handan Zhaos and their allies (who are named) and their grandsons to return to the capital of Jin.²¹⁷ The individual who switched allegiance from the enemy to become a supporter of Zhao Yang's *zong* pledged himself (i.e., his own person) to his new chief (*jun* 君) in order to establish complete trust, vowed to cut off relations with the persons on the other side (who are named) and their grandsons, called for annihilation by the spirits if he allowed the enemy to return to the capital of Jin, and sought the approbation of his chief should he fail to kill on sight any grandsons of a certain deceased member of the opposition.²¹⁸

Viewing the relationships around Zhao Yang manifest in these texts as concentric circles, the innermost circle was comprised of agnates, or *zong* mates, next came old retainers, and last new supporters (see Figure A8 below). Bonds of trust were formed or reaffirmed and strengthened by the covenants that were made between Zhao Yang and his *zong* mates, retainers, and supporters during the *zong*'s struggle for survival.

anomaly but do not try to interpret it (*ibid.*, 13). However, since *jia*, a term of praise used to address one's superior (*ibid.*, 65), can be substituted for *zong*, I think *zong* clearly refers to a person, namely lord and master Zhao Meng, the convener of the covenant. (See note 121 above for more examples of the use of *zong* as *zhu* in bronze inscriptions.)

²¹⁷ HMMS 36-37 for original text, transliteration, and notes, 68-71 for discussion.

²¹⁸ HMMS 37-39 for original text, transliteration, and notes, 73 for discussion.




Figure A8. Relationships around the *Zong* Head

Zu 族

Definitions of the term *zu* are legion. Starting with the earliest, the *Shuowen* defines it as: "*Zu* is the tip of an arrow. A *zu* of fifty arrows [*shu*] is a *zu*. It [takes its meaning] from banner [*yan*] and arrow [*shi*]." 族，矢鋒也。束之族，族也。从 旃从 矢。 Duan Yucai's commentary adds the following line to the definition, "A banner is what is used to signal the masses and where arrows of the

masses are gathered." 所以標衆，衆矢之所集。 ²¹⁹ Some of the explanations of *zu* offered by commentators on the *Shuowen's* definition are: "to gather together things of the same type and firmly bundle [them]," "to gather" (*ju* 聚) and by extension "category, kind" (*zulei* 族類)," "to collect, to amass" (*cou* 湊), "a multitude" (*zhong* 衆), "to belong to" (*shu* 屬), and "subordinates" (*bushu* 部屬). ²²⁰ Bone inscription scholars define *zu* variously as "where arrows are collected under a military banner," ²²¹ "a cross-legged man" or prisoner of war, ²²² and "a military unit." ²²³ As to the meaning of *zu* in bronze inscriptions, one commentator accepts the definition "tip of an arrow" (*zu*) but says that it was used as a loan word for "to belong to" (*shu*) in bronzes. ²²⁴ Another scholar agrees that *zu* originally meant military unit but maintains that it means family group (*jiazu* 家族) in bronze inscriptions, unless it appears in or as a personal name. ²²⁵ With the possible exception of the "cross-legged man," all of these definitions share the notion of presumably like things gathered together, which I think can be taken as the basic meaning of *zu*. ²²⁶

²¹⁹ SWJZGL 2980b. I have followed Mao Xiang's definition of *shu* in Duan Yucai's commentary (*ibid.*).

²²⁰ SWJZGL 2980b-82a.

²²¹ Luo Zhenyu in JGWZJS 2231.

²²² Ye Yusen in JGWZJS 2232.

²²³ Ding Shan, followed by Li Xiaoding, in JGWZJS 2232-33.

²²⁴ Takada Tadachika in JWGL 4267.

²²⁵ Lin Jieming in JWGL 4268.

²²⁶ Ding Shan says the basic meaning of *zu* is "military unit." Li Xiaoding accepts this and argues that the term came to be used for kin groups because they provided military units for the army. He rejects Duan Yucai's argument that *zu* originally meant "to gather" and then "category, kind" by extension (see note 219 above). Chen Mengjia notes that *zu* almost always occurs in military contexts in bone inscriptions (1988:497); so Ding's definition is acceptable. However, I think that "category, kind" should be regarded as the basic meaning. The other definitions are derived from this one and determined by the contexts in which they appear.

Zu is used in the *Zuozhuan* and the *Guoyu* in the senses of category or kind,²²⁷ military unit,²²⁸ subordinates,²²⁹ mourning group (bilateral kinsmen and affines of the deceased),²³⁰ and agnatic descent group (at various levels). Occurrences of the latter usage are too numerous to discuss completely,²³¹ so I shall only give several representative examples as illustrations.

The State of Song provides excellent examples of the various levels of agnatic descent groups described as *zu*. Following the regicide of Duke Min 宋閔公 in 682, all the ducal sons (*qun gongzi* 群公子) fled to other states. In the eleventh month the *zu* of former dukes Dai 宋戴公, Wu 宋武公, Xuan 宋宣公, Mu 宋穆公, and Zhuang 宋莊公 joined with foreign allies to attack and kill the perpetrators and installed Duke Huan 宋桓公.²³² The five dukes represent four generations of progenitors of Min and Huan, who were brothers.²³³ In 620 Le Yu 樂豫 advised Duke Zhao 宋昭公 against getting rid of all the ducal sons saying, "[It] cannot [be

²²⁷ ZZS 13:15b-16b (221, Xi 10), 26:7a (439, Cheng 4), 26:25a-26b (448, Cheng 9). GY 1:4b (12, "Zhouyu" *shang*--Wei Zhao comments that here "zu is father and son." However, it follows mention of three sets of three of a kind; so the meaning should be "category."), 4:6a (117, "Luyu" *shang*), 7:1a (181, "Jinyu" 1), 14:11b (344, "Jinyu" 8), 17:b (280, "Chuyu" *shang*).

²²⁸ ZZS 28:8b-9a (475-76, Cheng 16--*wangzu* 王族 ["the royal garrison"]). GY 17:4b (386, "Chuyu" *shang*).

²²⁹ GY 6:4b (164, "Qiyu"--text and commentary).

²³⁰ ZZS 6:17a-20b (110-11, Huan 6--text and commentary on *jiuzu* 九族); also see *ibid.*, 22:13b-14a (382, Xuan 10) for another possible instance of *zu* for mourning group.

²³¹ For some more examples, see ZZS 16:18a (270, Xi 28), 20:4b-5b (347-48, Wen 16), 26:16a-17b (443-44, Cheng 7), 28:23b-26b (483-84, Cheng 17), 39:20a-b (673, Xiang 29), 40:11a (684, Xiang 30), 40: 22b-24b (689-90, Xiang 31), 42:28b (731, Zhao 4); GY 2:11b (58, "Zhouyu" *zhong*).

²³² ZZS 9:5a-b (154, Zhuang 12).

²³³ CQSZP 39a-b. The dukes are listed in generational order with Dai as generation one and Xuan and Mu as brothers in generation 3.

done]. The ducal *zu* [*gongzu*] are the branches and leaves of the ducal house [*gongshi*].²³⁴ If you get rid of them, then the root will not have wherewith to protect and shade [itself], I predict!" 不可。公族，公室之枝葉。若去之，則本根無所以庇陰矣。When the duke persisted, the *zu* of Mu and Xiang 穆襄之族 led an attack against him.²³⁵ In 619 the wife of Duke Xiang 宋襄公 sought revenge for an affront by Duke Zhao, her husband's grandson, by using the *zu* of the Daishi ("the Dais") 戴氏之族 to kill his partisans. Du Yu identifies the *zu* of the Daishi as the Hua 華, Le 樂, and Huang 皇.²³⁶ In 609 the *zu* of the Wushi ("the Wus") 武氏之族 led an unsuccessful rebellion against Duke Wen 宋文公, who then "ordered the *zu* of Dai, Zhuang, and Huan to attack the Wushi ["the Wus"] . . . ; subsequently [he] expelled the *zu* of Wu and Mu" 使戴莊桓之族攻武氏 . . . 遂出武穆之族. Here Du Yu identifies the *zu* of Dai as Hua and Le, of Zhuang as Gongsun Shi 公孫師, of Huan as the Xiang 向, Yu 魚, Lin 鱗, and Dang 蕩.²³⁷ Finally, in 576 the *Zuozhuan* says, "The two Huas are Daizu 戴族. The *sicheng* 司城 [i.e., Gongsun Shi, here identified by the office which he held rather than by his surname Zhong 仲氏]²³⁸ is Zhuangzu 莊族. Of the occupants of the Six Offices, all

²³⁴ Compare the words of Shuxiang in 539: "The *gongzu* of Jin have been depleted, I dare say! I, Xie, have heard it; namely, when the ducal house is about to be brought down, the *zongzu*, the branches and leaves, first fall, then the duke follows them" (ZZZS 42:12a [723, Zhao 3]); see p. 470 below for this passage in Chinese characters.

²³⁵ ZZZS 19a:12a-13a (316-17, Wen 7).

²³⁶ ZZZS 19a:18b-19a (319-20, Wen 8).

²³⁷ ZZZS 20:20b-21a (355-56, Wen 18--text and Du commentary).

²³⁸ See *Zhongshi* pedigree in SB 164 and CQSZP 43b.

are Huanzu 桓族 " Later in the same anecdote, mention is made of the ancestral sacrifices of the Huanshi 桓氏 .²³⁹

In the first reference cited above, Du Yu glosses the *zu* of Dai, Wu, Xuan, Mu, and Zhuang as "the grandsons [or descendants] of the five dukes."²⁴⁰ If this reading were correct, then *zu* could be interpreted simply as a category of agnates rather than a group. However, from this and the other examples, we can conclude that these *zu* were, in fact, agnatic descent groups, with surnames, that undertook collective action and performed their own ancestral sacrifices, presumably in their own ancestral temples.²⁴¹

Three levels of agnatic descent groups are discernible in the evidence cited here (see Figure A9 below): (1) the ducal house, which included ducal *zu*; (2) the ducal *zu*²⁴² that were descended from different dukes and identified by surname as *zu* (e.g., Daizu) or simply by their surnames (e.g. Daishi, Wushi, and Huanshi); and (3) *zu* of the ducal *zu* which had their own unique surnames (e.g., Hua, Le, Huang, etc.). Thus, in a hierarchy of agnatic descent groups looking from the top down, higher level *zu* are composed of a number of smaller *zu*. And looking from the bottom up, *zu* are components of ever higher and larger agnatic descent groups.

²³⁹ ZZZS 27:22a-24a (466-67, Cheng 15).

²⁴⁰ ZZZS 9:5b (154, Zhuang 12).

²⁴¹ GY 10:4a (251, "Jinyu" 4) mentions Wu *zu* 武族 ("the *zu* of [King] Wu), noting that only Jin survives; thus, *zu* refers to the ruling house of Jin. Wei Zhao comments "*zu* means heirs (*si* 嗣)." While this passage is about the good legacy of King Wu, *zu* is used here in the same sense as in Daizu, etc. in the Song example. Jin was the name of the state and the surname of its ruling house, the founder of which was a descendant of King Wu of Zhou.

²⁴² After Duke Xian of Jin banished all the ducal sons in 655, he forbid the development of *gongzu* within the state (GY 8:4a [211, "Jinyu" 2]). Later in 607 *gongzu* was restored as the name of an office (ZZZS 21:12b-14b [365-66, Xuan 2]).




Figure A9. Agnatic Descent Groups Descended from Duke Dai of Song

Sources: *Zuozhuan* and CQSZP 39a, 41a-43a.

To round out this discussion, the lowest level *zu* are the unnamed components of *zu* which have surnames. Two examples of this type were mentioned earlier in the discussion of *zong*. first, there was the case of Zhi Guo, who "distinguished [his] *zu*," or junior segment, from the *Zhizong* by taking a new surname, *Fushi* (see above). The second instance occurred in the discussion of the Dous, the senior segment of the Ruo'aos (see above). The context showed that when Dou Ziwen, who was the head of the senior segment of the Dous, gathered his *zu* to discuss the prospect of annihilation

of the Dou agnatic descent group, he was talking only to members of his particular segment rather than to all of the Dous.

Zongzu 宗族, Zongshi 宗氏, and the Hierarchy of Agnatic Descent Groups

The compound *zongzu* appears in the *Zuozhuan* two times where it refers collectively to the *zong* and its *zu* segments or branches. The first occurrence is in a passage in 636 hearkening back to the time of King Li of Zhou 周厲王 (r. 878-842) when Duke Mu of Shao 召穆公 "assembled [his] *zongzu* at Chengzhou" 糾合宗族于成周. He spoke to his agnates on the theme of harmony and unity by quoting parts of an ode about the kind of relationship that should prevail among brothers.²⁴³ The second occurrence, which makes clear the structural relationship between *zong* and *zu*, is found in a 539 report of a conversation between Yanzi 晏子 and Shuxiang about the future fate of the ducal house of Jin. When asked what he was going to do since he thought the ducal house was on its last legs, Shuxiang said, "The *gongzu* of Jin are finished, I dare say! I, Xi, have heard it; namely, when the ducal house is about to be brought down, the *zongzu*, the branches and leaves, first fall, then the duke follows them. Of the eleven *zu* of my *zong*, only the Yangsheshi [literally, "Yangshes"] remain."²⁴⁴ 晉之公族盡矣。肸聞之，公室將卑，其宗族枝葉先落，則公從之。肸之宗十一族，唯羊舍氏在而已。 The Yangshe agnatic descent group was a named segment of a *zong* which was composed of eleven segments and focused on a former duke of Jin. Thus, *zongzu* clearly refers to the

²⁴³ ZZS 16:19b-20a (256, Xi 24).

²⁴⁴ ZZS 42:12a (723, Zhao 3).

structure of a complex agnatic descent group, the nature and level of which would have to be determined from context.

Zongshi occurs one time in the *Zuozhuan* in a sentence following the description of the allocation of six named *zu* of Yin to the Duke of Lu at the time of his enfeoffment. On that occasion, the six *zu* of Yin, were then "ordered to lead their *zongshi*, collect their *fenzu*, and bring their *leichou*" 使帥其宗氏，輯其分族，將其類醜 into the service of the Duke of Zhou 周公 and the royal house of Zhou.²⁴⁵

Ding Shan uses this passage in his discussion of clan organization during the Yin dynasty. He equates *zongshi* with the meaning of *zong* in "the nine *zong* of Huaixing" (*Huaixing jiu zong* 懷姓九宗, which were given to the founder of Jin,²⁴⁶ and explains them as early terms for referring to a *shizu* ("clan"). He understands *fenzu* ("separate *zu*") as components of the *zong*, and interprets *leichou* as individual members (*lei*) of the *fenzu* and its captives (*chou*), or slaves.²⁴⁷

In a comment on structure in the Yin kin system, Chen Mengjia also cites this passage and glosses *zongshi* as *zongzu* and *fenzu* as *jiazu* ("family"), thus, preserving the hierarchical relationship between them. He ignores *leichou*, evidently considering this term irrelevant.²⁴⁸

²⁴⁵ ZZS 4:15a-b (947, Ding 4).

²⁴⁶ ZZS 4:19a (949, Ding 4).

²⁴⁷ Ding 1956:34-36.

²⁴⁸ Chen 1988:446.

My view is that the *shi* in *zongshi* may be regarded as a substitute for *zu*. As noted earlier, both words refer to the same thing, albeit with different nuances. Perhaps *shi* was used by the compiler of the *Zuozhuan* because of the enumeration of the six *zu* by their surnames (*shi*) in the preceding line. *Fenzu* clearly refers to lower level units.²⁴⁹ I see no reason for interpreting *leichou* as referring to different things; this is simply a compound noun meaning "type or kind."²⁵⁰ It refers to the agnates who were members of the descent groups.

The existence of a hierarchy of agnatic descent groups in Spring and Autumn society is evident in the following *Zuozhuan* entry in 561 which links specific groups to temples of ancestors of varying degrees of remoteness:

Whenever there is a funeral for a ruler [*zhuhou*], [rulers] with a different surname [*yixing*] [from the deceased] come to [a place] outside [the city wall]. Those with the same surname [*tongxing*] [come] to the temple of the king from whom they descend [*zongmiao*]. Those who belong to the same *zong* [*tongzong*] [come] to the temple of the first enfeoffed ruler [in their ruling house] [*zumiao*]. Those who belong to the same *zu* [*tongzu*] [come] to the temple of their fathers [*nimiao*]. Therefore, for all [rulers with the *xing*] Ji, [the ruler of] Lu comes to the ancestral temple of Zhou [*Zhou miao*]. For [the rulers of] Xing, Fan, Jiang, Mao, Zuo, and Ji, [the ruler of Lu] comes to the temple of the Duke of Zhou [*Zhougong zhi miao*].²⁵¹

凡諸侯之喪，異姓臨於外，同姓於宗廟，同宗於祖廟，同祖於禰廟。故魯爲諸姬臨於周廟。爲邢凡蔣茅胙祭臨於周公之廟。

²⁴⁹ This term also occurs in GY 2:10a (55, "Zhouyu" *zhong*), where Duke Xiang of Dan mentions his *fenzu* relationship with the royal house of Zhou.

²⁵⁰ See Wei Zhao's comment on *chou* in GY 1:4b (12, "Zhouyu" *shang*).

²⁵¹ ZZS 31:24a-b (548, Xiang 12). The glosses on temple terms by Du Yu have been incorporated into this translation.

Thus, members of the same *xing*-bearing agnatic descent group paid their respects in the temple (*zongmiao*) of the remotest common ancestor. Members of an agnatic descent group focused on a later ancestor gathered in that ancestor's temple (*zumiao*) (see Figure A10 below). And members of an agnatic descent group focused on a more recent ancestor mourned in temple of that ancestor (*nimiao*). The ruling house of Lu bore the Ji *xing* and descended from a king of Zhou; therefore, its ruler or representative was permitted to enter the ancestral temple of Zhou. Since the ruling houses of Lu, Xing, Fan, Jiang, Mao, Zuo, and Ji were all founded by sons of the Duke of Zhou,²⁵² his temple was the venue for their mutual mourning rites.

²⁵² ZZS 31:24a-b (548, Xiang 12--Du commentary).




Figure A10. Hierarchy of Ancestral Temples and Agnatic Descent Groups

Source: ZZS 31:24a-b (548, Xiang 12).

Conclusion

In order to address the question of the existence of lineage in the Spring And Autumn Era, I have focused on the meanings of four key Chinese terms: *xing*, *shi*, *zong*, and *zu*. In the *Zuozhuan* and in the *Guoyu*, the primary historical sources for the period, *xing* and *shi* are often used as technical terms for "surname." *Xing* marks the surname of the highest level agnatic descent group, perhaps category or aggregate in some cases. *Shi* marks the surnames of agnatic descent groups at all lower levels. *Zong* and *zu* are frequently used as structural terms in these sources to designate agnatic descent groups which were based on descent from a common ancestor. While *zong* does have the meaning of "descent line," it is used most often in the sense of "agnatic descent group" when appearing in a context involving descent. A *zong* was comprised of *zu*.

The application of *zong* and *zu* to different levels of agnatic descent groups in the *Zuozhuan* and in the *Guoyu* has been clearly demonstrated. *Zong* is used for at least six levels: (1) the *xing*-bearing agnatic descent group, which was comprised of *shi*-bearing segments; (2) the higher order *shi*-bearing agnatic descent group, which was a segment of a *xing*-bearing group and comprised of *shi*-bearing segments; (3) the senior *shi*-bearing segment of a higher order agnatic descent group; (4) the *shi*-bearing agnatic descent group, which is shown acting independently of, or in contexts without reference to, any higher level kin group; (5) the unnamed segment of a *shi*-bearing agnatic descent group; and (6) the two-generation descent line of father and son. *Zu* is used to refer to three levels of agnatic descent groups: (1) the higher order *shi*-bearing

group, (2) the *shi*-bearing group which is shown as a part of higher order group or alone, and (3) the unnamed segment of a *shi*-bearing group.

The organization and structure of agnatic descent groups in the Spring And Autumn Era is confirmed in the polysemic nature of the key generic kin terms used in the *Zuozhuan* and in the *Guoyu*. As to the key structural terms, *zu* is used to refer to classes or categories of any type, and *zong* and *zu* are used for both operant groups and groups at different levels. The analysis of the term *zongzu* showed that *zong* were composed of *zu*. Depending upon context, *zongzu* could refer to the *xing*-bearing *zong* and its component *shi*-bearing *zu*, which were usually higher order agnatic descent groups, or to the higher order agnatic descent group and its component *shi*-bearing agnatic descent groups, or to the *shi*-bearing agnatic descent group and its unnamed segments.

The use of more than one term for agnatic descent groups demonstrates their existence in reality rather than as analytical constructs in the mind of the observer. In the *Zuozhuan* and in the *Guoyu*, the highest level agnatic descent group is referred to as *zong* and identified by its *xing*, or surname. A lower level agnatic descent group of any type is referred to as *zong* or *zu* in different contexts and identified by its *shi*, or surname. An unnamed segment of the lowest level agnatic descent group is referred to as either *zong* or *zu*.

In the foregoing discussion of key Chinese terms, I deliberately eschewed the use of the anthropological concepts of "clan" and "lineage" in order to avoid masking

the meaning of the Chinese terms. From that examination, however, we can conclude that the Spring And Autumn Era did have agnatic descent groups that meet the criteria for clan and lineage which have been formulated by social anthropologists, who study Chinese and non-Chinese populations, and by social historians of China.

The *xing*-bearing *zong* can be regarded as a clan. It is the highest level agnatic descent group that is articulated in historical sources for the Spring And Autumn Era. It was comprised of agnatic descent groups which qualify as lineages. Members claimed but may or may not have been able to demonstrate descent from a common male ancestor. In the case of the royal Ji clan, which was headed by the king of Zhou, the descent of member lineages which ruled states was probably demonstrable, for it can be traced in historical sources. As to most cases of ruling lineages which bore a common *xing*, or clan surname, the historical sources reveal little about their common descent and relationships to each other. In terms of residential patterns, clan membership could be scattered across many states; thus the opportunity of frequent and extensive interaction within the clan was greatly reduced. Clan ideology persisted into the Spring And Autumn Era and manifested itself in notions about how clan members should treat each other, rules of precedence at interstate meetings, and the clan endogamy taboo. However, the inefficacy of clan ties is also clearly evident in the frequently recorded breaches of these conventions.

Shi-bearing *zong* and *zu* have the virtually all of the attributes of lineage. They were corporate groups. Once established, they were self-perpetuating unless they were

extinguished by the state or by other hostile lineages. The authority structure of the group consisted of a head and other staff who looked after its external interests and directed its internal affairs. A single legal personality for the group was established by taking or receiving a *shi*, or lineage surname, and recognized through the appointment of its head to a government position. Members generally lived relatively close proximity so that interaction within the group was frequent and extensive. Common estates were established through the acquisition of benefices and the construction of ancestral temples. The performance of ancestral rites and participation in them were essential to the unity and continued existence of the group. Descent from a common male ancestor could be demonstrated.

How do Cohen's fixed genealogical and associational modes of lineage organization apply to lineage during the Spring and Autumn era? We do not have the good fortune of being able to do fieldwork among our subjects; so we cannot say for sure, but the associational mode is more obvious. The lineage, based on descent from a common ancestor, was composed of senior and junior segments, but these relationships were not fixed since they could be changed as the result of heir selection. However, when a segment became an independent lineage by splitting from its natal lineage, its junior relationship to the latter was not changeable within the higher order lineage that resulted. As noted above, solidarity was fostered through participation in shared rites that were performed in the lineage's ancestral temple, a form of corporate property. Although the lineage was not created by a charter of association, in some cases

covenants were made between individual members and its head to confirm their loyalty to him. Non-kin factors such as appointment to office or land grants for meritorious service produced founding ancestors of segments that became independent lineages. There is no doubt that a sense of common kinship based on descent from the founding ancestor existed, but it was not the case that every son stood at the head of a segment of the lineage. Asymmetrical segmentation was facilitated by the accumulation of economic resources in the forms of movable wealth and/or land accrued by the founding ancestor and his descendants.

Appendix 4
Pedigrees of Royal Lineages




Figure A11. Dou Pedigree

Individuals with untraceable descent

Dou Dan 鬥丹 (fl. 704)	Dou Wu 鬥梧 (fl. ca. 666)
Do Qi 鬥祁 (fl. 690)	Dou Zhang 鬥章 (fl. 658-628)
Dou Min 鬥緡 (reign of King Wu)	Dou Zixi 鬥子西 (d. 617)
Dou Yuqiang 鬥禦疆 (fl. 666)	Dou Zishang 鬥子上 (d. 627)

Sources: CQSZP 48a-b, CQDSB 12a:25a-26b (1315)

Dou Pedigree

The First Generation

Cheng Gongshuo shows ancestor Ruo'ao (r. 790--764) with five sons with the surname Dou in the following order: Lian, Hun, Qi, Bobi, and Ziliang.¹ However, there is evidence for only two of these relationships; the *Zuozhuan* states that Bobi was the offspring of Ruo'ao and a woman from the state of Yun;² and Du Yu, the leading commentator on the *Zuozhuan*, says that Dou Sheshi was Dou Lian, who is shown as the son of Ruo'ao in a fragment from Du's genealogical study.³

How Many Dou Founders Were There?

In the pedigree above, having two brothers, Bobi and Lian, who appear as founders of lineages named Dou is a bit troubling. In his rendition of the *Shiben*, Qin Jiamo takes note of this phenomenon and dismisses it with the statement, "[Since] Chu was a Man Yi state, its reasons for designating [names of] lineages cannot be determined!"⁴ 楚蠻夷之國，其命族之故，不可考矣。

¹ CQFJ 14:6a.

² ZZS 21:22b (Xuan 4, 370).

³ ZZS 10:18b (179, Zhuang 30) and CQSL 9:10a.

⁴ SBJB 171.

Zhang Jun, although not addressing this problem directly, has recently questioned the link between Ruo'ao and Dou Bobi on mathematical grounds. He argues that there is at least a forty year gap between the death of Ruo'ao in 764 (based on the "Chu Hereditary House" 楚世家 chapter of the *Shiji*) and the birth of Bobi, which he estimates from *Zuozhuan* references to the activities of Bobi and his son Ziwen (a.k.a. Dou Guyutu). Drawing on Tang Jiasong's claim that "*ruo'ao* 若敖, (*mo'ao* 莫敖, *ao* 敖)" was a generic term for "head of household (father)" 家長 (父), Zhang sees the chronological gap as indicating a missing generation and declares that Bobi actually descended from a "son of Ruo'ao, the ruler of Chu, who was separately installed at Dou town and became the ancestor of the Dous, and who within in his lineage was respectfully referred to as 'ruo'ao'; so the one who the *Zuozhuan* says 'married Yun and beget Dou Bobi' was him and not any Chu ruler Ruo'ao."⁵

If Zhang's argument were to be validated, it would also provide a satisfactory solution to the problem of the founding of the Dou lineage since the actual founder of the Dou lineage would be the individual whom Zhang proposes as the missing link, namely the father of Bobi and Lian. The two brothers would then be the founders of their respective segments of the Dou lineage, as they indeed appear to have been, rather than the founders of separate lineages named Dou. There are, however, major problems with the two pieces of evidence that Zhang introduces in support of Tang's argument concerning the meaning of "*ruo'ao*, (*mo'ao*, *ao*)."

⁵Zhang Jun 1986:175-79.

His first evidence is taken from Wei Zhao's commentary on an allusion to an anecdote about Qu Jian refusing to follow his father Qu Dao's order to use water caltrop for ancestral sacrifices to himself, of which the *Guoyu* says, "Zimu [Jian] was able to violate the desire of *ruo'ao*" 子木能違若敖之欲, and Wei comments, " *Ruo'ao* is Zixi [Dao]" 若敖, 子夕.⁶ While "*ruo'ao*" does, indeed, refer back to Qu Dao, it should be understood as an interpolation for "*mo'ao*," which is the name of the office that had been held by Dao.⁷

Zhang's second evidence is from *Zhanguoce* where Shen Baoxu 申包胥 is referred to as Fenmao Bosu 芡冒勃蘇.⁸ A number of commentators interpret Fenmao 芡冒 to be Fenmao 蚡冒, which is one name of a former ruler of Chu. Some speculate that Baoxu may have descended from Fenmao (r. 757--741) and that "Fenmao" is used here as a surname in the same way that the name of the ruler Ruo'ao was used as the surname of the higher order lineage that descended from him. Other commentators argue that "Fenmao Bosu" merely is another way (the long way) of saying "Baoxu," perhaps in the "barbarian" (i.e., Chu) dialect.⁹ Zhang, gives the reading 蚡冒 but says that since there is no evidence of the use of "Fenmao" as a surname, it must be understood as "elder" (following Tang's interpretation of *ao*). He argues further that with the exception of the use of *ao* in the name of the office of *mo'ao*, since Spring

⁶GY 17:11b (400, "Chuyu shang" - text and commentary).

⁷Dong Lizhang 1993:652, note 7.

⁸ZGC 14:11b-12a (282-83).

⁹Zhu Zugeng 1985:2:773.

and Autumn times it was used to identify the eldest sons of rulers of Chu who did not attain the rulership or for rulers who died by regicide.¹⁰

While Kings Du'ao 堵敖 (r. 674-672) and Jia'ao 郟敖 (r. 544-541) died as a result of regicide,¹¹ so did King Ling (r. 540-529) but he is not known by "ao." Moreover, there is no record of the rulers Ruo'ao, Xiao'ao, and Fenmao, all of whose successive reigns led into the Spring and Autumn era, dying by regicide.¹² Thus, Zhang's argument about the meaning of *fenmao* cannot be accepted.

The Sons of Dou Xin

Cheng Gongshuo incorrectly lists Huai and Chao as the sons of Xin,¹³ for the *Zuozhuan* states that Huai and Chao were the younger brothers of Xin.¹⁴

¹⁰ Zhang Jun 1986:178-79)

¹¹ SJHZKZ 40:13 (647, for Du'ao but by the name of Zhuang'ao 莊敖 in this edition); ZZS 41:29a-b (710, Zhao 1 for Jia'ao).

¹² SJHZKZ 40:9-13, 25, 29 (646-47, 650-51).

¹³ CQFJ 14:6a .

¹⁴ ZZS 54:25b-26a (Ding 4, 952).



Figure A12. Cheng Pedigree

Source: CQDSB 11:10a (1267)

Cheng Pedigree

Cheng Dechen and Ruo'ao

According to Wei Zhao, Dechen (Ziyu) was Ruo'ao's great grandson.¹⁵ Du Yu's comment that the grandfather of Cheng Dechen buried Ruo'ao¹⁶ agrees with Wei. Zhang Jun, however, points out the fact that Dechen does not appear in the *Zuozhuan* until 127 years after the death of Ruo'ao. He says that even if one considers Dechen to be the great grandson of Ruo'ao, still another generation must be missing, because while his father would have been a contemporary of King Wu (r. 740-690), who reigned for 51 years, Dechen does not appear in the *Zuozhuan* until the 35th year of the reign of

¹⁵GY 10:7a (257, "Jinyu" 4).

¹⁶ZZS 16:20a (271, Xi 28).

King Cheng (r. 671--626). Consequently, Zhang argues that the Ruo'ao who was the grandfather of Dechen was not Ruo'ao, the father of King Wu.¹⁷

Cheng Daxin

Du Yu says that Cheng Daxin was the son of Dechen.¹⁸

Descent of Cheng Jia and Cheng Hu

The descent and generational standing of Cheng Jia are not clear. Du Yu simply says that Jia was the great grandson of Ruo'ao,¹⁹ while Cheng Gongshuo shows him as the younger brother of Daxin,²⁰ and Chen Houyao notes that some say he was the younger brother of Dechen.²¹

The descent of Cheng Hu is also unclear. When King Ling murdered Hu in 512, he is alleged to have declared, "Cheng Hu is a remnant of Ruo'ao" 成虎，若敖之餘也。 Du Yu comments only that Hu was the grandson of Dechen.²² Cheng Gongshuo identifies him as the son of Daxin.²³ Chen Houyao simply says others say that Hu was either the son of Daxin or of Jia.²⁴

¹⁷ Zhang Jun 1986:179-80.

¹⁸ ZZS 16:26b (274, Xi 28).

¹⁹ ZZS 19b:5b (790, Zhao 12).

²⁰ CQFJ 14:6b.

²¹ CQSZP 48b.

²² ZZS 45:28a (790, Zhao 12 text and Du commentary).

²³ CQFJ 14:6b.

²⁴ CQSZP 48b.




Figure A13. Wei Pedigree

Individuals without traceable descent

Wei Qiqiang 遠啓疆 (fl. 549-535)

Wei Pi 遠罷 (fl. 546-536)

Wei Ju 遠居 (fl. ca. 541)

Wei Xie 遠洩 (d. 536)

Wei She 遠射 (fl. 532-505)

Wei Yue 遠越 (d. 519)

Wei Gu 遠固 (fl. 506-477)

Sources: CQSZP 49b, CQDSB 12b:27b-28a (1316)

Wei Pedigree

On Wei 蔦 and Wei 蕝

Zhang Jun argues that 蔦 and 蕝 are different surnames for two segments of the Wei lineage.²⁵ However, Du Yu has noted that "蔦 was originally also written 蕝."²⁶ 蔦本又作蕝。Qin Jiamo says the pronunciations of these words were interchangeable but erroneously cites *Zuozhuan* references to Wei Luchen as 蕝呂臣 in 637 and 蔦呂臣 in 632 as proof.²⁷ In the first instance, 蕝呂臣 appears in Du's commentary rather than in the *Zuozhuan* text.²⁸ The two characters are, however used interchangeably in the *Zuozhuan* in the names of Wei Zifeng, namely 蔦子馮²⁹ and 蕝子馮,³⁰ and Wei Yan, or 蔦掩³¹ and 蕝掩.³² Gao You's commentary on the *Lushi chunqiu* also refers to Wei Jia 蔦賈 of the *Zuozhuan* as 蕝賈.³³ The reconstructions of the Wei pedigree cited above and all others consulted treat the two characters as interchangeable rather than as different surnames. Zhang Jun argues that the senior segment of the Weis was surnamed 蕝, while the junior segment was 蔦. He includes Wei Zifeng and Wei Yan in the junior segment without comment on the fact that the *Zuozhuan* also shows them with the surname of the senior segment!

²⁵ Zhang Jun 1986:18-19.

²⁶ ZZZS 33:15a (579, Xiang 25).

²⁷ SBJB 172.

²⁸ ZZZS 15:7a (Xi 23, 250).

²⁹ ZZZS 32:24a (565, Xiang 15).

³⁰ ZZZS 34:14b (590, Xiang 21).

³¹ ZZZS 36:14a (623, Xiang 25).

³² ZZZS 46:3a (805, Zhao 13).

³³ Cited in Liu Wenqi's quote of Lu Wenchao in CQZSJZSZ 671 (Xuan 11).

Was Wei Zhang the Son of Fenmao?

Wang Fu (ca. 76-ca. 157), who wrote his "Zhi shixing (Recording Surnames)" 志氏姓 chapter on the basis of his reading of genealogical records (*shiji* 世記) and classical texts ³⁴ says, "As to the case of Fenmao begetting Wei Zhang, [the latter] was Wangzi Wugou" 蚡冒生蔦章者，王子無鉤也。 ³⁵ "Wangzi" (literally, "king's son") was a designation borne by the sons of kings. All reconstructions of the Wei pedigree before the modern era agree that Wei Zhang was the son of Chu ruler Fenmao and founder of the Wei lineage.³⁶

Zhang Jun, however, maintains the Wei Zhang could not have been the son of Chu ruler Fenmao because of a reference in the *Guoyu* to an officer of Chu named Mr. Wei 蘧氏, who was active 100 years earlier than Wei Zhang and more than sixty years before the commencement of the reign of Fenmao in 758. Commenting on the struggle among the sons of Xiong Yan for succession to the rulership of Chu, the *Guoyu* says, "Shu Xiong escaped the difficulty in Pu and became Man, [and] Ji Xun was installed [as ruler]. Mr. Wei was going to raise [Shu Xiong] up, but [he] encountered a calamity and was again unsuccessful." 叔熊逃難於濮而蠻, 季 紂是立. 蘧氏將起之, 禍又不克. ³⁷ Zhang argues that the role reportedly played by Mr. Wei in the succession struggle suggests that the Weis were already an established and influential ducal lineage 公族, that is, the lineage was descended from an earlier ruler

³⁴ QFLJ 35:192.

³⁵ QFLJ 35:175.

³⁶ In addition to the sources cited above, for examples see Xin Tangshu 新唐書 "Zaixiang shixi biao 宰相世系表" and CQFJ 14:4b-5a.

³⁷ GY 16:2a (367, "Zhengyu").

of Chu. Because Mr. Wei had supported the losing side, the senior segment (遠) suffered discrimination from that time until it reappeared on the political scene in the latter part of the Spring And Autumn Era. His final point is that if Wei Zhang were truly a son of Fenmao, he would have been killed in 740 when, according to the "Chu Hereditary House" chapter of the *Shiji*,³⁸ Xiong Tong, the younger brother of Fenmao, murdered the latter's heir apparent and installed himself as King Wu.³⁹

Except for the last point, Zhang Jun's argument is based purely on speculation. There is no necessary connection between Mr. Wei of the late ninth century and the later Wei lineage. Early in the Spring and Autumn era, an individual such as Chief Minister Peng Zhongshuang, who was not a member of a royal lineage, could assume an influential role; so membership in a lineage descended from a former ruler need not be the explanation for Mr. Wei's part in the succession struggle in an earlier period. The notion that Wei Zhang would have been killed when Xiong Tong usurped the throne has some merit, for there are examples of killing off all sons of the ruler in the history of royal succession in Chu (see Chapter 2).

Defending his position that Peng, the grandson of Shu of Chu 楚叔之孫棚, who is referred to this way in a bronze inscription uncovered at Xiasi, Henan, is Chief Minister Wei Zifeng, Li Ling keys off the same *Guoyu* reference to Mr. Wei to argue that the Wei lineage descends from Shu Xiong (Shu Kan in the *Shiji* and the *Shiben*), who would be, if true, the great-great-great grandfather of Fenmao. On this point he

³⁸ SJHZKZ 40:9 (646).

³⁹ Zhang Jun 1986:180-82.

maintains that the phrase "Mr. Wei was going to raise [Shu Xiong] up" was a later gloss by someone who must have been a member of Shu Xiong's lineage. Li acknowledges the fact that the lineage would not have been named during the lifetime of Shu Xiong, hence his claim that "Mr. Wei" is a late gloss. Citing the ancient practice of taking the style name of the grandfather (or founding ancestor) as the name of the lineage, he claims that formation and naming of the lineage would have occurred in the third generation. Just as in the case of referring to three lineages descended from Duke Huan of Lu as "the Three Huan," "[Shu Xiang's] grandsons' generation should be called 'the grandsons of Shu of Chu'."

Li Ling's argument is tortuous. The idea that the offspring and descendants of Shu Xiong would have been able to stage his comeback is a far stretch for they would have lacked critical mass during his lifetime. For its members to have played this role, the lineage would have already been established and not been descended from Shu Xiong. The *Guoyu* says that Shu Xiong became a Man; that is, he and his descendants adopted the ways of the Man people among whom they settled and lived. In this case, it is not likely that his supposed Wei descendants would have enjoyed an illustrious history in Chu. Finally, while related Spring and Autumn lineages are sometimes referred to collectively by the name of their common ancestor (see Appendix 3 above), there are no other examples like "the grandsons of Shu of Chu."

The question of Wei Zhang's father cannot be answered definitively. But there should be no doubt from the record of the government offices held by its members that the Wei lineage descended from a king of Chu (see Chapter 6 and Appendix 8).

Were Wei Ailie, Wei Ao and Sun Shu'ao the Same Person?

The sources cited for the Wei pedigree above say that Wei Ailie was also known as Wei Ao 蔦敖 and Sun Shu'ao 孫叔敖. Over the millennia scholarly opinion about these identifications has been sharply divided.

Mao Qiling (A.D. 1623-1716) offers the most radical negative argument, claiming the Sun Shu'ao was neither a man of Chu nor a member of one its ducal lineages; rather he was a man of the former state of Liao, which had been vanquished by Chu a few years prior to his appearance in the *Zuozhuan* as chief minister of Chu. Mao alludes to anecdotes about Sun Shu'ao, a "country man" 鄙人, recommended for appointment as chief minister of Chu in the *Xunzi*, *Lushi chunqiu*, *Shiji*, *Shuoyuan*, *Xinxu*, and *Lienuzhuan* to buttress his argument that there is some substance to Zhao Qi's comment on the *Mengzi* passage, "Sun Shu'ao was selected by the sea" 孫叔敖舉於海, which says, "Sun Shu'ao dwelt in hiding and plowed by the seashore. King Zhuang (r. 613--591) of Chu selected him to be chief minister."⁴⁰ 孫叔敖隱處，耕於海濱。莊王舉之，以爲令尹。

Takezoe rejects the idea that Chief Minister Sun Shu'ao was not a member of a ducal (or royal) lineage, because chief ministers were either sons, brothers, or agnates

⁴⁰MZZS 12b:12b, 223, "Gaozi" 高子 *xia*; Mao Qiling 169:7b-9b (1692-93).

of the kings of Chu.⁴¹ The only known exception is Peng Zhongshuang,⁴² but Takezoe's assertion is correct for the remainder of the Spring and Autumn era (see the discussion below in Chapter 5). Citing the commentaries of Gao You on the *Lushi chunqiu* and of Fu Qian on the *Zuozhuan* which say that Sun Shu'ao was the son Wei Jia, Takezoe argues that the *Zuozhuan* reference to Wei Ao in 597 proves that Sun Shu'ao's surname was Wei. He also finds supporting evidence in the Sun 孫氏 entry in the ("Pedigrees of Ministers Chart" 宰相世系表) in *Xin Tangshu* which states that Sun Shu'ao was the great-grandson of Wei Zhang and the grandson of Wei Luchen.⁴³

Du Yu says, "Wei Ao is Sun Shu'ao" 蔣敖，孫叔敖。⁴⁴ Mao observes that Du Yu was misled into thinking that Wei Ao and Sun Shu'ao were the same person because of the shared given name Ao. He argues, however, that this could not be the case because Wei Ao is said to have held the lowly office of steward (*zai* 宰) in peace time, while Sun Shu'ao occupied the exalted office of chief minister during the battle at Bi in 597.⁴⁵

Sun Xingyan and Takezoe, writing later than Mao, regard Wei Ao and Sun Shu'ao as the same person. Sun, however, argues that Sunshu was the style name of Wei Ao and cites the references to Wei Ao, Sunshu Ao, and Sunshu in the *Zuozhuan* account of the Battle of Bi⁴⁶ as proof.⁴⁷ Takezoe refers to the same account and argues

⁴¹ ZZHZ 10:50 (Xuan 11).

⁴² ZZS 60:9b (1045, Ai 17).

⁴³ ZZHZ 10:50-51 (Xuan 11).

⁴⁴ ZZS 23:5b (390, Xuan 12).

⁴⁵ ZZS 23:5b-6b, 10b-11a (390, 392-93, Xuan 12); Mao Qiling 3.169:7b-9b (1692-93).

⁴⁶ ZZS 23:5b-6b, 10b-11a 390, 392-93, Xuan 12).

⁴⁷ Sun Xingyan 774:8a-9a (8736-37).

that Wei Ao and Sun Shu'ao are the same person because: (1) the textual context of the occurrence of these names demands this conclusion; and (2) there is no record of two chief ministers serving in Chu during 597.⁴⁸

One should also note that the reference to Wei Ao as "steward," which is cited by Zhang, occurs in a speech that is attributed to an officer of the state of Jin; so the term is not used as the actual name of the office that he held, but rather as a generic reference to or as an analagous term, from the viewpoint of Jin, for his functional role in Chu government--the chief minister was in-charge. This type of reference by an officer of one state to an office in another state is not unheard of elsewhere in the *Zuozhuan*; for example, the *Chunqiu* of the state of Lu refers to Zhao Dun 趙盾, the top official of Jin who held the rank of *shang qing* 上卿, as *daifu* 大夫, which was a generic term for "officer" and the name of a lower official rank.⁴⁹

The final question to be addressed is whether Wei Ailie and Sun Shu'ao were the same person. Commenting on a *Zuozhuan* reference to Chief Minister Wei Ailie under the year 598, Fu Qian says, "Ailie is the son of Wei Jia, Sun Shu'ao"⁵⁰ 艾獵，蔦賈之子，孫叔敖也。 Du Yu also comments, "Ailie is Sun Shu'ao"⁵¹ 艾獵，孫叔敖也 and reiterates this conclusion in his analytical study.⁵² Commenting on Du, Kong Yingda refers to the *Shiben* as saying, "Ailie is the elder brother of Sun Shu'ao"⁵³ 艾

⁴⁸ ZZHZ 10:50-51 (Xuan 11).

⁴⁹ Compare CQZS 19a:12a (316, Wen 7) to ZZZS 19a:15a (318, Wen 7).

⁵⁰ ZZZS 22:15b (383, Xuan 11 - quoted in Kong's commentary).

⁵¹ ZZZS 22:15b (383, Xuan 11 - Du commentary).

⁵² CQSL 9:10a.

⁵³ ZZZS 22:15b (383, Xuan 11).

獵，孫叔敖之兄。Concerning the identity of Wei Zifeng in a *Zuozhuan* passage under the year 558, Du Yu says, "Zifeng is the nephew (*congzi* 從子) of Shu'ao" 子馮，叔敖從子。Again Kong Yingda comments on Du and cites the *Shiben* saying, "Wei Ailie is the elder brother of Sun Shu'ao" 焉艾獵是孫叔敖之兄 "... Zifeng is the son of Ailie."⁵⁴ 馮是艾獵之子。These commentaries are the primary sources of the debate that has ensued.

Qing scholars Mao Qiling, Hui Dong, Hong Liangji, Shen Qinhan, and Sun Xingyan are among those who argue that Wei Ailie and Sun Shu'ao were different persons. Mao, Hui, Hong and Sun all cite the *Shiben* passages quoted by Kong Yingda. Mao, the earliest of the proponents of this view, argues that the assumption that they must be the same just because they appear in the *Zuozhuan* in successive years is fallacious because officers in other states could change from year to year.⁵⁵ Sun offers a different approach to these references by arguing, "... as to Sunshu Ao's acting as chief minister, the *Shiji* has the view that he thrice quit as minister and thrice acted as minister. How can one see the [chief ministers in those] two years as necessarily being a single person?"⁵⁶ 孫叔敖之爲令尹，史記有三去相而三爲相之說。何見二年必是一人。

Hui uses a tombstone inscription of Han dynasty provenance about Sun Shu'ao which says, "[He] was named Rao, [his] style name was Shu'ao" 名饒，字叔敖

⁵⁴ ZZZS 32:24a-b (565, Xiang 15).

⁵⁵ Mao Qiling 169:8b (1692).

⁵⁶ Sun Xingyan 774:8b (8736). Also see Sima Qian's brief biographical sketch of Sun Shu'ao in SZHZKZ 149:2-4 (1277-78).

to claim that Ailie was not the given name of Shu'ao.⁵⁷ Sun accepts the identification of "Rao" with "Ao" in this inscription on the basis of similar pronunciations, but he rejects the interpretation of "Shu'ao" as a style name. As proof of the latter he offers the two references to "Sunshu" in the *Zuozhuan* in 597 which, as noted above, he takes to be the style name of Wei Ao. Since "Ao" was the given name and "Sunshu" was the style name, Sun argues that "Ailie" could not also be the given name of Wei Ao.⁵⁸

Mao and Sun agree that the two sons of Wei Jia were Wei Ailie and Wei Ao. As noted above, however, while Mao maintains Wei Ao was not the same person as Sun Shu'ao,⁵⁹ Sun says that "Sunshu" was the style name of Wei Ao and comments further that the character "shu" ("younger brother") in his style name is also fitting in view of the *Shiben* saying that Wei Ailie was his elder brother.⁶⁰

Zuozhuan commentators Kong Yingda, Liu Wenqi, and Takezoe Koko all agree with Fu Qian and Du Yu that Wei Ailie and Sun Shu'ao are the same person. Kong, who set the stage for the controversy through his quotes of the *Shiben*, rejects the latter as being full of errors.⁶¹ All three make, or go along with, the argument that the appearance of Chief Minister Wei Ailie in 598 and Chief Minister Sun Shu'ao (Wei Ao) in 597 is proof because there is no mention of a change of occupant of the office of chief minister at this time.⁶² Sun's denial of the identification of Sun Shu'ao with Wei

⁵⁷ Cited by Liu Wenqi in CQZSZJZSZ (671, Xuan 11).

⁵⁸ Sun Xingyan 774:8b-9a (8736-37).

⁵⁹ Mao Qiling 169:8b-9a (1692-93).

⁶⁰ Sun Xingyan 774:8b (8736).

⁶¹ ZZS 22:15b (383, Xuan 11).

⁶² ZZS 22:15b (383, Xuan 11); CQZSZJZSZ (671, Xuan 11); and ZZHZ 15:64 (Xiang 15).

Ailie because Sima Qian claimed in the *Shiji* that Sun Shu'ao served and quit three times as chief minister is ill-founded. Takigawa Kametaro has correctly rejected Sima Qian's remarks, noting that he has confused Sun Shu'ao's career with that of Chief Minister Ziwen.⁶³

Was Wei Jia the Father of Sun Shu'ao?

Early sources and commentators all say that Wei Jia was the father of Sun Shu'ao. The *Shiben* states that "[Wei] Jia beget Wei Ailie and Sun Shu'ao" 賈生薦艾獵及孫叔敖.⁶⁴ As noted above, Fu Qian says that Wei Jia sired Sun Shu'ao. And Du Yu comments, "Wei Jia, styled Boying, the father of Sun Shu'ao . . ." ⁶⁵ 薦賈字伯贏, 孫叔敖之父。 Later commentators also accept this relationship.

However, modern scholar Gu Tiefu argues that Sun Shu'ao could not have been the son of Wei Jia for three reasons: (1) They were too close in age. When he appeared in the historical record for the first time in 633, the *Zuozhuan* says "Wei Jia was still young" 薦賈尚幼. Gu interprets this to mean that Jia was between fifteen and

⁶³ See Takigawa's commentary in SZHZKZ 83:27-28 (1006-07). The tradition about Sun Shu'ao was carried down through the Warring States era to Sima Qian in the writings of philosophers, but as Qing scholars cited by Takigawa show, it is not historically accurate (see for example, the argument by Yan Ruoqu (22:28a-b [232]). Dou Ziwen was actually the chief minister who yielded his office to others. In the "Gongye Chang" 公冶長 chapter of the *Lunyu*, Zizhang asks Confucius, "When Chief Minister Ziwen was thrice employed as chief minister, he did not have a happy appearance. [When he] thrice quit it, he did not have an unhappy appearance. As to [the record of] of the previous chief minister's government, [he] was sure to tell it to the new chief minister. What do you make [of him]?" 令尹子文，三仕爲令尹，無喜色，三已之，無~色。舊令尹之政，必以告新令尹。何如。(LYZS 5:8b [44]). The *Guoyu* also clearly states that Chief Minister Dou Ziwen stepped down from his position three times (GY 18:5b ("chuyu" *xia*, 410).

⁶⁴ SBBZ 171 (Qin Jiamo edition).

⁶⁵ ZZS 16:10b (Xi 27, 266).

twenty years of age. So when he was murdered in 605, he could not have been older than forty-eight. Since the *Xunzi* says that he was already bald at the time of his recruitment to the post of chief minister (which Gu posits at ca. 605), he must have been over 40 years old despite the fact that he was called by the diminutive "*shu* (younger brother)." Moreover, the immediate effectiveness of his performance indicates that he was a seasoned politician. Hence, his age could not have differed much from that of Wei Jia. (2) Since Wei Jia had held the offices of artisan master and marshal, if Sun Shu'ao were his son, he, too, should have been an office holder prior to his recruitment as chief minister. And (3) none would have dared to recommend Sun Shu'ao for the chief ministership if he were the son of Wei Jia because Jia and Chief Minister Ziyue had been co-conspirators in court intrigue that benefited them both through advancements in office and set the stage for the ill-fated coup that Ziyu led after killing Jia in 605.⁶⁶

Gu's first point on the relative ages of Wei Jia gives one pause for thought. The term *you* 幼 is normally defined as "young" (*shao* 少), which is interpreted to mean anywhere between ten to twenty years of age.⁶⁷ However, as Takezoe points out in this passage, *you* is used in contrast to *guo lao* 國老, "state elders" or "senior statesmen," that is, retired officials.⁶⁸ The relevant lines read: "[When] the state elders all congratulated Ziwen, [he] gave them liquor to drink. Wei Jia, still young, arrived late

⁶⁶ GuTiefu 1988:288.

⁶⁷ See JJZG 2:1813.

⁶⁸ ZZHJ 7:3.

[and] did not offer congratulations."⁶⁹ 國老皆賀子文。子文飲之酒。蔦賈尚幼，後至，不賀。 In this context "young" should be interpreted to mean that Wei Jia was junior in government service, i.e., not yet retired.

The notion that the governing circle was so open that a brash teenager could walk in and have a say is incredulous. Wei Jia was a much older man. For the sake of argument, let us assume that his father, Wei Luchen, was born in 703, the last year of grandfather Wei Zhang's recorded service, Luchen would have been seventy-one years old in 633, and Jia could have been about fifty years young by that time. Sun Shu'ao, then, might have been fifty-five when he first appears a chief minister in 598--old enough to have gone bald!

Gu's last two points are based on acceptance of the basic story line about how Sun Shu'ao, who was said to be an unemployed, country bumpkin hiding out in Qisi, was recruited for the office of chief minister. As I show in Appendix 6, this recruitment story has no historical basis; so the two points can be rejected.

Who Was the Father of Wei Zifeng?

Mao Qilin, Hong Liangji, and Qin Jiamo all criticize Du Yu for saying that Wei Zifeng was the nephew (*congzi* 從子) of Sun Shu'ao. Mao, who says that Wei Zifeng was the son of Wei Ailie, evidently following the *Shiben* fragment quoted by Kong Yingda, ridicules Du Yu for saying that Zifeng was the nephew of Sun Shu'ao after having claimed that Wei Ailie and Sun Shu'ao were the same person.⁷⁰ Hong uses Du's

⁶⁹ ZZS 16:10b (Xi 27, 266).

⁷⁰ Mao Qiling 169:8b-9a (1692-93).

comment as proof that Sun Shu'ao could not have been the same person as Ailie.⁷¹ And Qin suggests that Du got his examples confused when he made this comment.⁷²

The confusion, however, does not originate with Du, for as Takezoe has noted, it stems from the interpolation of *cong* into Du's commentary.⁷³ Kong Yingda was clearly looking at a version of Du's commentary which read, "Zifeng was the son of Shu'ao" 子馮，叔敖子， when he commented, "the *Jijie* and *Shili* of Du both regard Wei Ailie as the same person. Feng was the son of Shu'ao. The *Shiben* mixes things up and has many errors. Du should have researched and attained the truth."⁷⁴ 杜集解及釋例皆以蔦艾獵，叔敖爲一人。馮是叔敖之子。世本轉寫多誤。杜當考得其真。 Thus, according to Kong, Du Yu's position was consistent whenever he wrote about this subject; Wei Ailie (Sun Shu'ao) was the father of Wei Zifeng.

⁷¹ Cited by Liu Wenqi in CQZSZJZSZ [671, Xuan 11).

⁷² SBJB 172.

⁷³ ZZHZ 15:64 (Xiang 15).

⁷⁴ ZZS 32:24a-b (565, Xiang 15).




Figure A14. Qu Pedigree

Individuals without traceable descent

Qu Zhong 屈重 (fl. 690) Zidang 子蕩 (d. ca. 590)
 Qu Wan 屈萬 (fl. 656) Feiji 弗忌 (d. ca. 590)
 Qu Yukou 屈禦寇 (fl. 635) Qu Pi 屈罷 (fl. 528)
 Ziyan 子閻 (d. ca. 590)

Source: CQDSB 12b:28a-29b (1316)

Qu Pedigree

Questioning the Relationship between Qu Xia and King Wu

Based on the commentary by Wang Yi (fl. A.D. 89-158) on the *Chuci*,⁷⁵ Qu Xia is generally regarded as the son of King Wu, who was given a benefice at Qu, from whence the Qu lineage surname was derived.⁷⁶ Zhang Jun, however, questions this relationship on three grounds: (1) Xia's appearance in the *Zuozhuan* as the top military leader would be the only example in Chu history of a son serving in this kind of role during the reign of his father. (2) According to the customary way of attaining surnames in Chu, if Xia was founder of the Qu lineage, he should not have been known by the Qu surname, for the surname would have been adopted by the generation of his own sons. Furthermore, there are virtually no examples of sons of kings taking surnames from benefices while their fathers were still alive. Sons of kings had given names and style names but not their own unique surnames. And (3) the call by Queen Deng Man in 699 for King Wu to mete out severe corporeal punishment to Xia⁷⁷ does not sound like the words of a mother or a stepmother. Zhang concludes, "Analyzing from the perspective of the customs of the state of Chu, . . . Qu Xia should be the younger brother of King Wu." This, he maintains, would explain the high status and position that Xia enjoyed. As to the attribution of the surname Qu to Xia, Zhang suggests that this was an error perpetrated by a later historian.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ CCBZ 1:3a (13).

⁷⁶ For examples see, SBBZ (Mao edition --commentary) 42, (Qin edition--text and commentary) 172; CQFJ 14:6b; CQDSB 11:10b (1267); and CQSZP 49a.

⁷⁷ See ZZZS 14b-15b (124-25, Huan 13).

⁷⁸ Zhang Jun 1986:183-85.

Filling the Gap from Qu Xia to Qu Dang

The descent between Qu Xia and Qu Dang is not noted in primary sources or in early commentaries. However, Cheng Gongshuo and Zhang Jun offer reconstructions to fill this gap. Cheng gives the following line of descent: Xia to Bian (a.k.a. Yukou 禦寇) to Zhu to Dang.⁷⁹ Zhang says the descent was from Xia to Zhong to Wan to Dang.⁸⁰

Descent from Qu Dang

Cheng Gongshuo's view of the descent from Qu Dang also differs from the pedigree presented above. Claiming that the presence of two people by the name of Qu Dang in the historical record is a mistake, he shows only one Dang in the pedigree as the father of Dao and Shen. He also gives Dao as the father of Jian and Shen as the father of Sheng.⁸¹ This reconstruction can be rejected on the grounds that Qu Jian was succeeded in the office of *mo'ao* by the second Qu Dang in 548.⁸² Furthermore Du Yu says that Shen was the son of Dang.⁸³

Agnates

Ziyan, Zidang, and Feiji; are regarded as members of the Qu lineage because the *Zuozhuan* identifies them as "Wuchen's agnates" 巫臣之族.⁸⁴

⁷⁹ CQFJ 14:6b.

⁸⁰ Zhang Jun 1986:184.

⁸¹ CQFJ 14:6b.

⁸² ZZS 36:11a (622, Xiang 25).

⁸³ ZZS 42:28b (731, Zhao 4) and Sheng was the son of Jian *ibid.*, 43:6b (744, Zhao 5).

⁸⁴ ZZS 26:16b (443, Cheng 7, cited incorrectly as Cheng 2 in CQDSB 12b:29a-b [1317]).




Figure A15. Yang Pedigree

Sources: CQFJ 14:5a; CQSZP 50a.

Yang Pedigree

The reconstruction of this pedigree is based on the commentary of Kong Yingda which says, "According to the *Shiben*, King Mu (r. 625-614) beget Wangzi Yang, Wangzi Yang beget Yin, Yin beget Chief Minister Gai"⁸⁵ 依世本，穆王生王子揚，王子揚生尹，尹生令尹匄 and on the *Zuozhuan* account of the murder of Yang Lingdong and his two younger brothers in 515, on which Du Yu comments that Lingdong was the son of Yang Gai.⁸⁶ Elsewhere Du shows Tuo and

⁸⁵ ZZZS 48:12a (839, Zhao 17).

⁸⁶ ZZZS 52:19a (909, Zhao 27--text and Du commentary).

Wan as the sons of Lingdong,⁸⁷ but this interpretation has been universally rejected on the basis of the preceding *Zuozhuan* reference. Gu Donggao cites Kong's commentary but does not show Yin in the second generation.⁸⁸

The Name of Wangzi Yang

Wang Jipei says that the character 揚 in the name of Wangzi Yang should be 陽 since the lineage surname was taken from his style name.⁸⁹

⁸⁷ CQSL 9:45b-46a.

⁸⁸ CQDSB 12b:29b-30a (HQJJXB 2:1317).

⁸⁹ QFLJ 35:175--Wang commentary.




Figure A16. Nang Pedigree

Source: CQFJ 14:5a, CQDSB 11:11a (1268)

Nang Pedigree

This reconstruction is based on the commentary of Du Yu.⁹⁰ Cheng Gongshuo, however, shows *Xiyin Guangtang* 郗尹光唐 in the second generation as the son of Zinang and father of Nang Wa.⁹¹ His rendition of the pedigree is based on the commentary of Gao You in the "Shenxing" 慎行 chapter of the *Lushi chunqiu*. The line of descent provided by Gao appears in a comment on an anecdote about how Chief Minister Zichang 令尹子常 was tricked into murdering Left Administrator Xi Wan 左尹郗宛. Gao says, "Zichang, named Nang Wa, was the grandson of Chief Minister Zinang and the son of *Xiyin Guangtang*, whose style name was Wan."⁹² 子常

⁹⁰ ZZS 50:25b (879, Zhao 23).

⁹¹ CQSZP 47b.

⁹² LSCQXJZ 22:285--text and Gao commentary. Gao is thought to have drawn upon the *Shiben* (*ibid.*, Bi Yuan 畢沅 commentary). However, only Qin Jiamo includes it in his version

，名囊瓦，令尹子囊之孫，郟尹光唐之子，字宛也。 If this pedigree were correct, then Zichang would have murdered his own father, who was serving as his lieutenant and had been accused of seeking to usurp his position. This a highly unlikely scenario. Since Xi Wan allegedly refers to himself in the anecdote as "a man of low status" *jianren* 賤人, he could not have been of royal lineage. Consequently, Gao's reconstruction of the Nang pedigree can be rejected.

of the *Shiben* (see SBJB 173).

This anecdote first appeared in the *Zuozhuan* where the characters for Xi Wan 郟宛 (ZZZS 52:18a-19b [908-09, Zhao 27]). In this gloss, 字宛也 can only refer to *Xiyin* Guangtang, who Gao evidently identified with Xi Wan.

On Shenshi 沈氏 and Shenyinshi 沈尹氏

Shenyins in the Shen pedigree

Chen Houyao includes all of the *shenyin* of Chu in his reconstruction of the Shen pedigree. He claims that *Shenyin* Shou 沈尹壽 beget *Shenyin* Xu 沈尹戌, who beget Shen Zhuliang 沈諸梁, and Hou Zang 后臧, and that Zhuliang beget *Shenyin* She 沈尹射, who beget *Shenyin* Chi 沈尹赤 and *Shenyin* Zhu 沈尹朱.⁹³ Of these relationships, only those between Xu and Zhuliang and Zhuliang and Houzang are documentable in early sources. Du Yu says *Shenyin* Xu was the father of She Administrator Zhuliang,⁹⁴ and the *Zuozhuan* states that Houzang was the younger brother of Zhuliang.⁹⁵ No classical historical or philosophical texts or early commentators, down to and including Du Yu, claim that any of the *shenyin* were agnates; so Chen's inclusion of the *shenyin* in this pedigree can be rejected.

Whence the Shens?

One view of the origins of the "Shens" of Chu is that *Shenyin* Xu was descended from King Zhuang. Wang Fu and Du Yu say that *Shenyin* Xu was the great grandson of Duke Zhuang,⁹⁶ while Gao You states that Xu was his grandson.⁹⁷ Qing scholars Chen Houyao (CQSZP 52b) and Gu Donggao (CQDSB 11:11a-14b [1268-69]) are also proponents of this line of descent. Li Xueqin, however, argues that it baseless and has been debunked by other Qing scholars (Li Xueqin 1980, 58).

⁹³ CQSZP 52b.

⁹⁴ ZZS 48:25a (846, Zhao 19).

⁹⁵ ZZS 55:31 (959, Ding 5).

⁹⁶ QFLJ 35:176, ZZS 48:25a (846, Zhao 19).

⁹⁷ LSCQXJZ 22.2:286.

Another view which has been refuted by Gu Donggao is that the "Shens" of Chu descended from the ruler of the state of Shen. Chen Houyao quotes a source entitled *Fengjiankao* 封建考 which says,

In the 8th year of Duke Cheng [of Lu], when Jin extinguished Shen, Cheng, the Viscount of Shen, fled to Chu, [where his descendants] constituted the Shens. [He] beget Jia, Jia beget two sons called "Bing" and "Xu," Xu beget Zhuliang and Houzang, Zhuliang's two sons were called "She" and "Wen."⁹⁸

成八年，晉滅沈，沈子逞奔楚，爲沈氏。生嘉，嘉生二子曰丙曰戌，戌生諸梁及后臧，諸梁二子曰射曰文。

Gu Donggao extends this quote to include, "She beget Chi and Zhu" 射生赤及朱 . . .

He then argues that Viscount Cheng could not have fled to Chu because he was killed by the state of Wu in 519. Jia could not have been the father of Shenyin Xu because the latter already held a high position in the government when Cai extinguished Shen and brought Jia back to Chu in 506.⁹⁹

Circumstantial evidence suggests that *Shenyin* Xu was more likely a man of Wu than a descendant of King Zhuang. He appears to have hailed from Wu, for he served a scion of the ruling house there prior to his employment in Chu.¹⁰⁰ He first appears in the *Zuozhuan* advising the Chu king against fortifying a town that had been taken from the state of Wu.¹⁰¹ In the Spring and Autumn era, refugees were often involved in

⁹⁸ CQSZP 52b.

⁹⁹ CQDSB 11:11a-14b (1268-69).

¹⁰⁰ ZZS 54:24b-25a (951-52, Ding 4)

¹⁰¹ ZZS 48:25a-b (846, Zhao 19). Thereafter, Xu was frequently engaged in action related

government matters pertaining to their states of origin.¹⁰² If Xu was the father of Zhuliang, then he was married to a woman of Wu who was the mother of Zhuliang and his younger brother Houjian.¹⁰³ Xu ended his life after being wounded resisting Wu's invasion of the capital of Chu rather than be taken captive by his former master, who was now the king of Wu.¹⁰⁴

Was "Shen" a Surname in Chu?

Wang Fu shows Shen as a Chu surname.¹⁰⁵ Zheng Qiao claims that the surname Shen was derived from Shenlu 沈鹿, the place where Gongzi Zhen, the son of King Zhuang, was allegedly enfeoffed.¹⁰⁶ While Shenlu was located in Chu,¹⁰⁷ Gongzi Zhen is not associated with it in the *Zuozhuan* or in the *Guoyu*. Moreover, there is no evidence that he founded a lineage surnamed Shen.

Referring to the *Zuozhuan*, which mentions Shen Zhuliang 沈諸梁 of Chu,¹⁰⁸ Ying Shao says, "[His] surname was Shen, and [his] name was Zhuliang."¹⁰⁹ 姓沈，名諸梁。 However, Chen Houyao, says that Shen could not have been Zhuliang's surname because his son and grandsons went by "Shenyin." Rather Chen suggests that

to Wu, see *ibid.*, 51a-b (886, Zhao 24), 52:14b-18a (906-08, Zhao 27), 53:15b (928, Zhao 30), 53:16b (928, Zhao 30), 53:19a-b (930, Zhao 31)54:24b (951, Ding 4).

¹⁰² For example, see the long speech by Shengzi 聲子 in 547 which details how the state of Jin had repeatedly used refugees from Chu to the disadvantage of the latter in ZZZS 37:12b-17b (634-37, Xiang 26).

¹⁰³ ZZZS 55:3a (959, Ding 5)

¹⁰⁴ ZZZS 54:24b-25a (951-52, Ding 4).

¹⁰⁵ QFLJ 35:177.

¹⁰⁶ Cited in commentary on QFLJ 35:77.

¹⁰⁷ ZZZS 7:3b (119, Huan 8--text and Du commentary).

¹⁰⁸ ZZZS 60:14a (1047, Ai 18).

¹⁰⁹ FSTY 2:5a-6b.

suggests that Shen was the name of Zhuliang's benefice which was taken up as a surname later by his descendants.¹¹⁰ If he is correct, then "Shen Zhuliang" should be interpreted to mean "Zhuliang of Shen." In any case, there is no evidence of a Shen lineage in Chu to which Zhuliang belonged during the Spring and Autumn era.¹¹¹

Was "*Shenyin*" a Surname?

Chen Houyao apparently interpreted *shenyin* to be a surname. This position has also been taken by Li Xueqin, who has recently said, "The Shenyins sometimes abbreviated as Shens were important aristocrats of the state of Chu." He arrives at this conclusion while discussing bronze vessels from a locality called 番 or belonging to 番君 that have been excavated in the southern part of Henan Province. Li supports the identification of 番 with 潘 in the Sun Shu'ao inscription. He says 潘 "should be read as *shen* 潘, which is also Shen 沈." He quotes Liu Wenqi's gloss on the first

¹¹⁰ CQSZP 52b. When the state of Shen, which was located on the northern border of Chu, was destroyed by Cai in the summer of 506, Chu responded by attacking Cai in the autumn (ZZZS 54:22a [950, Ding 4]). According to Chen Pan, Shen subsequently belonged to Chu and was known as Pingyu 平輿邑 (Chen Pan 1969:4:357-58; see SJHZKZ 6:18 [115] for Pingyu in Chu at the end of the Warring States era). Other than this possibility, there is no other evidence for a locality called "Shen" in Chu during the Spring and Autumn era that could have been the benefice of Zhuliang (see Appendix 6 for further discussion).

¹¹¹ The notion that Shen was a surname in Chu has produced awkward results in some later renditions of the supposed Shen pedigree. Consider, for example, the following from the "Ministerial Pedigrees Table" in the *Xintangshu* which says that "Jia . . . [beget] two sons called "Yinbing" and "Yinxu." . . . [Zhuliang beget] two sons called "Yinshe" and "Yinwen." . . . [Yinshe beget] two sons called "Yinzhu" and "Yinchi." 嘉 . . . 生二子曰尹丙曰尹戌 . . . [諸梁生]二子曰尹射曰尹文 . . . [尹射生]二子曰尹朱曰尹赤 (Xintangshu 新唐書, "Zaixiang shixibiao" 宰相世系表 14a:39a (30:16955)). "Yin" was part of the name of the office of *shenyin*; it was not a given name or a style name of any of these individuals. For example, *Shenyin* Xu, who at ended his career in the office of left marshal (*zuosima* 左司馬), is identified in the *Zuozhuan* as Left Marshal Xu 左司馬戌, not Left Marshal Yinxu (see ZZZS 54:226 [950, Ding 4]).

occurrence of *shenyin* in the *Zuozhuan*, which quotes Du Yu's comment that "沈 is also written as 寢, Qin was a *xian*" 沈或作寢, 寢縣也。Liu also cites Hong Liangji, who locates Qin in the southern part of Henan at Gushi 固始, and Hui Dong, who says that Du Yu thought Sun Shu'ao was referred to as *qinyin* 寢尹 because he was enfeoffed at Qinqiu 寢丘. Equating *qin* 寢 with *shen* 沈 and the latter with *shen* 藩, and noting that the ancient pronunciations of 藩 and 藩 were interchangeable, Li concludes, "... the 番尹 or 番君 which are frequently seen in bronze vessels then are the Shenyins of Chu in the [classical] literature."¹¹²

While Li Xueqin's argument is plausible, it cannot be accepted. As noted earlier, there is no evidence of a lineage surnamed Shenyin in classical texts or in their commentaries. Nor is there any evidence of the same in the inscriptions cited by Li. The repeated occurrence of *shenyin* in the classical literature or 番君 in bronze inscriptions in connection with the names of different individuals is not proof of agnatic relationships. Neither in the *Zuozhuan* nor in the *Guoyu* nor in any other early classical texts or commentaries is "*shenyin*" used or understood as a surname. Rather as argued in Appendix 5, *shenyin* is the name of an office on the royal household staff which was in charge of the inner sanctum of the king's palace. There is no evidence that descendants of an occupant of this office took its name as the surname of their lineage during the Spring and Autumn era.

¹¹²Li Xueqin 1980:57-58.

Pan 番 and the Pans 潘氏

In the course of his argument, Li notes that there is no evidence in antiquity of a state of Pan 潘國 located at Gushi. He then dismisses the possibility that the Pan 潘 bronzes might be connected with the Chu lineage which was known as Pan 潘氏, noting simply that it was not called 潘君,¹¹³ the implication being that if there had been a state or locality of Pan, the latter term or its variant 潘尹 would have been associated with the Pans, or perhaps as the name of a *xian* office, in classical literature. This line of reasoning can be rejected because the classical literature does not provide a complete record of the administrative structure or history of any state. Many details are missing.

According to the *Shuowen*, 番 is the phonetic of *pan* 潘;¹¹⁴ so the two characters are interchangeable. If there were a state of Pan along the upper reaches of the Huai River, it may well have been among the many small states that were extinguished by Chu as it expanded its territorial control and sphere of influence into the area beginning with the destruction of Xi 息 in 684 and ending with the annihilation of Jiang 江 in 623. By the time the first official with the surname Pan appeared in the service of the royal house of Chu in 626, most of the small states had been eliminated.¹¹⁵ There is still a locality in the general vicinity of the 番 bronze finds

¹¹³ Li Xueqin 1980:58.

¹¹⁴ SWJZGL 8:5027.

¹¹⁵ See He Hao 1989:10-13 for a table of states that were extinguished by Chu.

known as Pandian 潘店.¹¹⁶ Perhaps "Pan" has been carried down from antiquity in this locality name.

¹¹⁶GJDMDCD 1174.

Appendix 5

Royal Household Staff

The royal household staff filled roles that are not self-evident in the names of their offices. Many officials in the various functional groups appear on military and other state assignments, usually in concert with the king and/or other members of the royal household staff and often in contexts that reflect its role as an alternative for the king to central government officialdom in the management of affairs of state (see Chapter 6). There is not enough evidence for these offices as a group to reconstruct the structure of the royal household staff. Therefore, the purpose of this appendix is simply to present evidence for their place on the royal household staff according to the criteria outlined in Chapter 5. The offices presented here are discussed in the order of their appearance in Table 8 in the latter chapter. The discussion that follows does not include offices that are covered there..

Heir Apparent's Staff

Offices on the heir apparent's staff included the tutor, junior tutor, protector, preceptor, and head valet.¹ In addition, the East Palace Guard was at his disposal.²

¹ When King Ling was toppled by his disgruntled brothers in 529, the rebels gained access to his heir apparent and another son through the head valet (*zhengpuren* 正僕人), who evidently attended them. Du Yu says, "The head valet was an officer close to the heir apparent" 正僕人，太子之近官；see ZZS 46:5b (806, Zhao 13--text and Du commentary).

² The East Palace Guard was part of the small contingent of palace troops that King Cheng allowed Chief Minister Ziyu to use against Jin during the battle at Chengpu in 632.

The tutor, protector, and preceptor, were charged with preparing the heir apparent for succession to the royal throne. For example, when Zhong Yi, a prisoner of war from Chu, was asked by the ruler of Jin to describe King Gong (r. 590-560) in 582, he replied, "When he was heir apparent, his tutor and protector presented him to [Chief Minister Zizhong] in the morning and to [Grand Marshal Zifan] in the evening. I do not know anything else."³ 其爲大子也，師保奉之，以朝于嬰齊而夕于側也。不知其他。Recalling his ascension to the kingship while still a prepubescent boy, King Gong said, "When I was ten, I lost my former ruler. While not yet familiar with the instructions of my tutor and protector, I received many blessings."⁴ 不穀不德，少主社稷。生十年，而喪先君。未及習師保之教訓，而應受多福。

The training received by the heir apparent is detailed in the following account of the appointment of a preceptor for the future King Gong. The *Guoyu* relates:

When King Zhuang ordered Shi Wei to teach (*fu* 傅) Heir Apparent Jian, he declined saying, "Your servant is not talented. [He] has nothing with which [he] is able to enhance him." The King said, "Rely on your excellence to make him excellent." [He] replied, "That excellence is located in (i.e., up to) the Heir Apparent. [If] the heir apparent desires excellence, excellent men will come. Supposing that [he] does not desire excellence, excellent [men] then will be of no use. . . . [When] the King finally ordered [Shi Wei] to teach him, [he] asked Shen Shushi about [it]. Shushi said, "Teach him the annals . . . Teach him the generations . . . Teach him the odes . . . Teach him the rites . . . Teach him music . . . Teach him the edicts . . . Teach him the discourses . . .

Heir Apparent Shangchen used palace soldiers to surround and force the suicide of King Cheng in 626. According to Du Yu, these soldiers were probably drawn from the East Palace Guard, which he says was attached to the heir apparent (ZZZS 16:19a-23a (271-273, Xi 28) and 18:5b-6b (299, Wen 1).

³ZZZS 26:26a (448, Cheng 9).

⁴ZZZS 32:4b (555, Xiang 13).

Teach him the old records . . . Teach him the instructional classics . . . (and so on).⁵

莊王使士亶傅太子箴，辭曰臣不才，無能益焉。王曰
 賴子之善，善之也。對曰夫善在太子。太子欲善，善
 人將至。若不欲善，善則不用。 . . . 王卒使傅之。
 問於申叔時，叔時曰教之春秋。 . . . 教之世。 . . .
 教之詩。 . . . 教之禮。 . . . 教之樂。 . . . 教之令。
 . . . 教之語。 . . . 教之古志。 . . . 教之訓典。 . . .

Thus, the training of a future king included a rigorous education and exposure to the high officials of the central government by his tutor, protector, and preceptor.

Members of the heir apparent's staff indulged in dubious extracurricular activities that involved them in a number of political intrigues during the Spring And Autumn Era. Tutor Pan Chong, provides the first example of this sort of activity.

When King Cheng (r. 671-626) was considering setting aside Heir Apparent Shangchen in 626, Chong incited his charge to usurp the throne by staging a coup which forced the suicide of his father.⁶ Subsequently, Shangchen ascended the throne and became king of Chu.

The disorder caused by Dou Ziyi 子儀 and Gongzi Xie 公子變 in 613, the first year of the reign of King Zhuang (r. 613-591), is another example. The *Guoyu* states, "Formerly when King Zhuang (the son and successor of King Mu) was still weak (i.e., young), Shengong Ziyifu (i.e., Ziyi) acted as [his] tutor [and] Wangzi Xie

⁵GY 17:1a-2b (379-82, "Chuyu" shang). Commenting on Shi Wei 士亶, Wei Zhao merely states that he was "an officer of Chu" 楚大夫 (*ibid.*). Dong Lizhang 1993:613, however, says he was also known as Shilao 史老. Shi Wei should be the same person as Shengong Ziwei 申公子亶 in GY 17:9a--b (395-96, "Chuyu" shang). The *shi* 士 in Shi Wei is probably a miswriting of *zi* 子 in Ziwei.

⁶ZZZS 18:5b-6b (299, Wen 1).

(i.e., Kongzi Xie) acted as [his] preceptor."⁷ 昔莊王方弱，申公子儀父爲師，王子變爲傅。 These appointments would have been made after King Cheng committed suicide in 626. Since Dou Ziyi and Gongzi Xie rebelled during the first year of the reign of King Zhuang, this is clearly a reference to positions that they held while on his personal staff when he was heir apparent.

The *Zuozhuan* suggests the reasons for this incident. During the reign of King Cheng, Ziyi had been captured by the army of Qin in 636 while serving as administrator of Shen (Shengong 申公).⁸ After suffering defeat by Jin at the battle of Xiao in 627, Qin sent him back to Chu to make peace with it. Ziyi's unhappiness is attributed to his not being rewarded for securing the peace as the reason for his involvement in the 613 incident. Xie's alleged motivation is denial of the position of chief minister, probably in 615 when Chief Minister Cheng Daxin 成大心 died and was succeeded by Cheng Jia 成嘉.⁹

The final example, Junior Tutor Fei Wuji (d. 515), the "slanderer of Chu" 楚之讒人, was perhaps the most famous trouble maker. The *Zuozhuan* reports: "When [King Ping, r. 528-516] ascended the throne [in 529], [he] ordered Wu She 伍奢 to be [Heir Apparent Jian's] tutor 師, [and] Fei Wuji became junior tutor (*shaoshi* 少師)."¹⁰ 及即位，使吳奢爲之師，費無極爲小師。 Thereafter,

⁷GY 17:4a (385, "Chuyu" *shang*).

⁸ZZS 16:3b-4b (263, Xi 25). Ziyi's father Dou Ban 鬥班 had also served as administrator of Shen; see *ibid.*, 10:19a (180, Zhuang 30)

⁹ZZS 19b:16b-17a (335-36, Wen 14); also *ibid.*, 19b:5b (330, Wen 12).

¹⁰ZZS 48:21b (844, Zhao 19).

accounts of his activities are of continuous involvement in political intrigues that belie his key position on the royal household staff.

In 527 Wuji, being jealous of a trusted ally of King Ping by the name of Chao Wu,¹¹ used his power of deceit to get him driven out of the state of Cai by his own subordinates. When King Ping protested, Wuji cleverly responded, "Could it be that I do not desire [to approve of] Wu? Nevertheless, beforehand [I] knew that the way he constitutes a man is different. If Wu remained in Cai, Cai would surely quickly take flight. [I] got rid of Wu as a means of clipping its wings."¹² 臣豈不欲吳。然而，前知其爲人異也。吳在蔡，蔡必速飛。去吳，所以翦其翼也。

Next Wuji turned on Tutor Wu She 伍奢(d. 522) and Heir Apparent Jian. In 523 the *Zuozhuan* records that when Wuji became junior tutor,

"[he] did not find favor [with Heir Apparent Jian]. Desiring to slander him to the King, [Wuji] said, 'Jian can be wed, indeed!' [When] the King betrothed [a

¹¹ According to Du Yu, Chao Wu is the son of Shengzi of Cai 蔡聲子 (ZZZS 46:4b [805, Zhao 13]). He was on the staff of Gongzi Qiji when the latter served as administrator of Cai. Wu and his subordinate Guan Cong were instrumental in staging Qiji's rebellion against King Ling and persuading the officers of Cai to support it. He was one of the five leaders of the rebel force that entered the capital of Chu and drove King Ling out (*ibid.*, 46:4b-5b [805-06, Zhao 13]).

¹² King Ping said, "It is only because I trusted Wu that I placed him in Cai; moreover, were it not for Wu, I would not have arrived at this position" 余唯信吳，故實諸蔡，且微吳，女何故去之 (ZZZS 47:8a-9a [822-23, Zhao 15]). Nevertheless, there may have been something to Fei Wuji's assessment of Chao Wu's motives for Guan Cong, who had been in Cai since his father was executed by King Kang of Chu in 551 (see *ibid.*, 35:5a-b [600, Xiang 22]), had persuaded his boss to stage the revolt with these words: "If you don't [re]build [the state altar of] Cai now, Cai will not be [re]built, I dare say! I request permission to give it a try" 今不封蔡，蔡不封矣。我請試之 (*ibid.*, 46:4b [805, Zhao 13]).

bride] for him from Qin, Wuji participated in fetching [her] and advised the King to take her [as his own wife]."¹³

無寵焉。欲譖諸王，曰建可室矣。王爲之聘於秦，無極與逆，勸王取之。

After the arrival of the king's new wife from Qin,¹⁴ Wuji persuaded King Ping, who was engaged in a military campaign against the Pu people in the south, to fortify Chengfu, a key town north of the Fangcheng range in the southern part of modern Henan, and to relocate Heir Apparent Jian there to establish a communications bridge to states in the north.¹⁵ In the following year, Wuji accused Jian and Tutor Wu She, who had evidently gone with him, of considering Fangcheng to be on par with the northern states and planning to break away from Chu. Convinced, King Ping interrogated Wu She, who responded, "Your lone error is much indeed! How can [you] believe slander?" 君一過多矣。何信於讒。The king had him arrested and ordered the local marshal to kill Heir Apparent Jian. When the marshal tipped him off about what was going to happen, Jian fled into exile in Song. Wuji then persuaded King Ping to summon two sons of Wu She to the capital under the pretext of forgiving and releasing their father. Wu Shang came after sending his

¹³ ZZS 48:21b (844, Zhao 19).

¹⁴ The *Zuozhuan* says: "In the First Month, Miss Ying, the primary wife of [the King of] Chu arrived from Qin" 正月，楚夫人嬴氏至自秦 (*ibid.*, 21b-22a [844, Zhao 19]). Reference here to Miss Ying as "the primary wife" is anachronistic, for she was not elevated to that status until Ren, her son by King Ping (ZZS 52:6a [902, Zhao 26]), was selected as heir apparent after the flight of Heir Apparent Jian into exile in 522. At the latest, this change occurred prior to 519 when Jian's mother is shown in her place of origin at Ju 郟 in the state of Cai, having returned there to her natal family following the removal of her son as heir apparent (ZZS 50:25a-b [879, Zhao 23]; for more on changing the status of women in the households of ruling elite, see Thatcher 1991:33-35).

¹⁵ ZZS 48:22b (844, Zhao 19).

younger brother Wu Yun to refuge in the state of Wu. Wu She and his eldest son were subsequently executed by the officers of Chu.¹⁶

Fei Wuji followed these machinations by undoing some of the good that King Ping had done when he restored Cai to statehood in 529. Two years earlier King Ling (r. 540-529) had invited Marquis Ling of Cai to meet him at Shen, where he killed him and seventy of his officers. Then he ordered younger brother Gongzi Qiji to lead an attack on Cai. When the state of Cai was extinguished in the eleventh month, King Ling violated the rules of propriety by using its Heir Apparent Yinzi as a human sacrifice at Mount Gang. Subsequently, the king walled the capital and appointed Qiji administrator of Cai.¹⁷ As a concession to win the support of the people of Cai for his coup attempt in 529, Qiji offered to restore Cai to statehood.¹⁸ After ascending the throne later in the year, King Ping made good on his word by reconstituting the state altar of Cai, allowing its original populace to return, installing Lu (aka, Duke Ping), the eldest son of deceased Heir Apparent Yinzi, as ruler, and providing Marquis Ling with a proper burial. All of these actions, according to the *Zuozhuan*, followed the rules of propriety.¹⁹

When Duke Ping died at the end of 521, he was succeeded by Heir Apparent Zhu who failed to assume the place appropriate to his station at his father's burial

¹⁶ ZZZS 49:2b-4a (852-53, Zhao 20)

¹⁷ ZZZS 45:17a-18b, 21b-22a (785 and 787, Zhao 11).

¹⁸ ZZZS 46:5a (806, Zhao 13).

¹⁹ ZZZS 46:8a, 21a-b (807 and 814, Zhao 13). The vanquished state of Chen was also restored to statehood at this time for supporting the rebellion.

service.²⁰ About eight months later, when Marquis Zhu fled to Chu, Wuji, having accepted a bribe from Dongguo, the uncle of Zhu, first convinced the officers of Cai that King Ping was going to install Dongguo as their ruler because Zhu was not going along with the king's orders, then he persuaded King Ping that Zhu was duplicitous and could be replaced by his uncle who shared the king's views.²¹

The terminal activity of Junior Tutor Fei Wuji occurred in 515 when he teamed up with friend Right Captain Yan Jiangshi to cause the murders of Left Deputy Chief Minister Xi Wan 郤宛 and his partisans. Known for being straightforward and peace loving, Wan was despised by them. The *Zuo zhuan* says, "Chief Minister Zichang took bribes and believed slander. Wuji slandered Xi Wan to him. Addressing Zichang, [he] said, '[Xi Wan] desires to offer you spirits.' Also addressing [Xi Wan], [he said], 'The Chief Minister desires to drink spirits at your place.'" 令尹子常賄而信讒。無極譖郤宛焉，謂子常曰子惡欲飲自酒。又謂子惡令尹欲飲酒於自氏。 Thereupon, Wuji proceeded to persuade Xi Wan to place armor and weapons, helping him select five types of each, outside the gate to his compound because Zichang was fond of them and would respond positively. Then he convinced Zichang that Xi Wan was laying a trap for him and was in league the state of Wu, Chu's mortal enemy. Zichang sent someone to confirm that armor was indeed displayed outside of Xi Wan's gate, then summoned and informed Yan Jiangshi about it. Jiangshi ordered the residents of the capital to attack and burn down Xi's place.

²⁰ CQZS 49:1b-2a (852, Zhao 20) and ZZS 50:2b-3a (867-68, Zhao 21).

²¹ ZZS 50:9a-b (871, Zhao 13).

When they steadfastly refused, he ordered the neighborhood headman to light the fire, completely slaughtered the members of Xi Wan's lineage, and murdered Xi partisans Yang Lingzhong and Jin Chen and their sons or brothers. In the wake of this turn of events,

"Jin Chen's agnates cried out in the capital , 'Mr. Yan and Mr. Fei act like kings; [they] have monopolized and brought calamity to Chu State and weakened my royal house; [they] have blinded the king and the chief minister for their own advantage. The chief minister totally believes them. What will come of the state?'^{m22}

晉陳之族呼於國，曰鄴氏，費氏自以爲王，專禍楚國，弱寡王室，蒙王與令尹，以自利也。令尹盡信之矣。國將如何。

The curtain finally came down on Fei Wuji and his friend after *Shenyin Xu* confronted Zichang about the incident saying,:

As to that Left Deputy Chief Minister and Central Stable Master 中廢尹 (i.e., Yang Lingzhong), there are none who are aware of their guilt, and yet you killed them, thereby giving rise to criticism and clamor the has not ceased until now. I also have my suspicions about it. If a benevolent one [could] kill a man in order to cover up criticism, he still would not do it. Now you have killed others thereby giving rise to criticism, and yet you do not give it a thought; isn't that strange?

夫左尹與中廢尹，莫知其罪，而子殺之，以興謗讟，至于今不已。戎也惑之。仁者殺人以掩謗，猶弗爲也。今吾子殺人以興謗，而弗圖，不亦異乎。

That Wuji is the slanderous man of Chu; of the citizens, there are none who are not aware. He got rid of Chao Wu , ousted Zhu, the Marquis of Cai, destroyed Heir Apparent Jian, killed Archery Master She (i.e., Wu She), and covered the ears and eyes of the King, causing him to not hear and see. King Ping's grace and moderation exceed that of Kings Cheng and Zhuang; there is nothing that is not reached by him, the reason that he has not obtained the

²² ZZS 52:18a-19b (908-09, Zhao 27).

various rulers is because he is close to Wuji.²³ Now in addition [Wuji] has killed three innocents (i.e., the Xis, Yangs, and Jinchens)²⁴ thereby giving rise to great criticism about you. If you don't give some thought, how will you be able to use it?

夫無極，楚之讒人也，民莫不知。去朝吳，出蔡侯宋，喪太子建，殺連尹奢，屏王之耳目，使不聰明。不然，平王之溫惠共儉，有過成莊，無不及焉。所以不獲諸侯，邇無極也。今又殺三不辜，以興大謗，幾及子矣。自而不圖，將焉用之。

That Yan Jiangshi forged your charge in order to annihilate three lineages which were the state's finest, and yet he has not lost his position.²⁵ Wu has recently had a new ruler; the border region is getting tenser by the day. Supposing that Chu State had a major incident, you would perhaps be endangered!!! A wise one would clear out slander in order to make peace for himself. Now you are fond of calumny, thereby [you] endanger yourself. Extreme, indeed, is [your] confusion."

夫鄢將師矯子之命，以滅三族，國之良也，而不愆位。吳有新君，疆場日駭，楚國若有大事，自其危哉。知者除讒，以自安也。今子愛讒，譯自危也。甚矣其惑也。

²³ In Ran Yuan's edition of the *Zuozhuan*, the final clause in this sentence reads: 邇無及也. The texts in Hong (CQZZG 2:785), Takezoe (26:10), and Yang (CQZZZ 4:1488), render 無及, which makes no sense in this context, correctly as 無極, the name of the junior tutor who is the subject of this paragraph.

²⁴ Here Ran Yuan corrects what surely is a copyist's error in Du Yu's comment on the identity of the "three innocents"; the commentary says, "The three innocents were Messers. Xi, Chen, and Jin Chen" 三不辜，郤氏，陳氏，晉陳氏. Jan says the six editions that write "Mr. Yang" 陽氏 for "Mr. Chen" 陳氏 are correct (1815:52:6b [918]).

²⁵ Du Yu understands *qian* 愆 as "to transgress." Commenting on *bu qian wei* 不愆位, he says it meant "[While] in his position, [he] did not commit a mistake" 在位不愆過; see ZZS 52:21a (910, Zhao 27). My translation follows Takezoe who argues that *qian* means *shi* 失, or "to lose." His convincing proof is in a *Zuozhuan* entry from the previous year, which says "Coming to King You, Heaven did not take pity on Zhou, the King was confused and out of synch, and thereby lost his position (*qian qi wei*)" 至于幽王，天不弔周，王昏不若，用不厥位。 In his comment on this passage, Du Yu says, "*Qian* means *shi* ('to lose')" 愆，失也。 See ZZHJ 26:10 and ZZS 52:8a (903, Zhao 26--text and Du commentary).

Vexed and perplexed, Chief Minister Zichang put an end to public criticism by executing Fei Wuji and Yan Jiangshi and exterminating their respective lineages.²⁶

The office of junior tutor on the heir apparent's personal staff had enabled Wuji to get close to the king and wreak havoc in the affairs of state.

The King's Staff

Like the heir apparent, the king had a personal staff that included the grand tutor, grand intendant, and junior intendant²⁷

Grand Tutor

Pan Chong and Pan Wang, the first recorded occupants of this position are discussed in Chapter 5. The remaining tutors are presented here.

When the Shujiu 舒鳩 people answered a call from the state of Wu to rebel against Chu in 549, King Kang (r. 559-545) led troops to the vicinity and ordered two members of the royal household staff, Chamberlain Shou 壽 and Tutor Qi Li 祁犁, to upbraid its officers. The latter denied that there was anything to it and requested to make a covenant as proof. After receiving their report, the king still desired to attack Shujiu, but he was talked out of it by Chief Minister Wei Zifeng.²⁸

²⁶ ZZZS 52:20b-21b (909-10, Zhao 27--text and Du's commentary).

²⁷ A unnamed junior intendant (*shaozai* 少宰) appears once in the *Zuozhuan* account of the Battle of Bi in 597 when he was sent to the Jin force to talk it out of going to battle against Chu; see ZZZS 13:13b (394, Xuan 12).

²⁸ ZZZS 35:28a (611, Xiang 24). Several interpretations of "Shi Qi Li" have been offered. According to Yang Bojun, Qing scholar Liang Lusheng suggested "[since] Pan Wang had the style name Shishu, his descendants took his style name (i.e., Shi) as their surname, and Qili is a given name. However, based on Han and later sources, Yang Bojun interprets "Shi Qi Li" as a compound surname + given name, namely Shiqi Li (CCZZZ 3:1093). I have rendered it as office + surname + given name, or "Tutor Qi Li," because parallelism with "Shenyin Shou, or Chamberlain Shou, requires *shi* to be the name of an office. Qi was a surname in the Spring And Autumn Era in the state of Jin. Officers of one state commonly sought refuge and

The final reference to a grand tutor occurs in 428 following an abortive coup d'etat by the administrator of Bai, the son of demoted and exiled Heir Apparent Jian, which was put down by Shen Zhuliang, administrator of She. When King Hui (r. 488--432) consulted Grand Tutor Zigu 子穀 and Zhuliang about who should lead a retaliatory raid on the state of Chen to confiscate its grain stores, Zigu recommended sending fellow royal household staff members Right Captain Chaiche 差車 and Left Historian Lao 老 because they had accompanied the late chief minister and grand marshal in prior attacks on Chen. Zhuliang, however, objected to their appointment because they were of low status. In the end Zhuliang prevailed, and Gongsun Chao, a son of the late Chief Minister Zixi, was sent to extinguish the state of Chen.²⁹

Grand Intendant

Information about Grand Intendants Zishang and Bo Zhouli has been presented in Chapter 5; however, more is known about the latter. The first fifteen years of the reign of King Gong (r. 590--560) are characterized by the domination of state affairs by Chief Minister Zizhong and Marshal Zifan and by the intense rivalry between these two officials that reached its finale in 575 in the battle at Yanling (see Chapter 6). During that engagement with Jin, Chief Minister Zizhong, who had been assigned a command post that was inferior to that of his arch rival, ordered Grand Intendant Bo

received employment in another state. Some examples in Chu are Right Deputy Chief Minister Zige (ZZZS 34:7b [587, Xiang 19]), who was a refugee from Zheng and Remonstrance Master Yijiu, who was a refugee from Chen (*ibid.*, 35:28a-b [611, Xiang 24]). Many Chu officers fled to the state of Jin and served there (see *ibid.*, 37:13a-17b [635-37, Xiang 26]); Qi Li may be an example of a refugee from Jin in Chu. Left Deputy Chief Minister Xi Wan was probably a Jin man also.

²⁹ ZZZS 60:9a-10a (1045, Ai 17).

Zhouli, a refugee from Jin and an apparent pawn in the power struggle, to stand behind King Gong and advise him on the composition and movement of troops in the Jin camp.³⁰

After King Kang and Chief Minister Qu Jian both died in 545, the sixteen year old heir apparent ascended the throne, and his uncle, Wangzi Wei, became chief minister.³¹ Chief Minister Ziwei completely monopolized the exercise of state power. He ultimately overthrew the young king in a ruthless coup in 541 and became King Ling.³²

In the spring, prior to the coup, Grand Intendant Bo Zhouli accompanied Chief Minister Ziwei and his aide, Wu Ju , on a mission to the state of Zheng. When the officers of Zheng refused to allow the party to lodge inside the capital, Chief Minister Ziwei ordered Bo Zhouli to upbraid them. The visitors were finally allowed to enter after Wu Ju offered an acceptable compromise.³³

Subsequently, in a meeting with the various states to follow up the Song armistice, Chief Minister Ziwei showed up for the signing ceremony in regal attire and with two of the king's guards posted in front of him. This ostentatious display prompted a number of witness to make speculative comments that were unflattering to the status of the reigning king in view of the apparent ambition of the chief minister. Perhaps more in defense of the king and the honor of the throne than to whitewash the

³⁰ ZZZS 28:7b (475, Cheng 16).

³¹ ZZZS 38:31b-32a (657, Xiang 28).

³² ZZZS 41:29a-b (710, Zhao 1).

³³ ZZZS 41:3a-4a (697, Zhao 1).

behavior of the chief minister, Grand Intendant Bo Zhouli offered the rather lame excuse that the gear and the guard had been borrowed from the king. When pressed on this proposition by one of the critics, he told the latter to worry about the power struggle in his own state.³⁴

The first acts performed by King Ling were to appoint Wei Pi to replace himself as chief minister and Wei Qiqiang to the vacant post of grand intendant. The Wei lineage had a history of service close to previous kings,³⁵ and these two Wei were not exceptions. Wei Pi, whose previous office is not known, may have been a member of the household staff, for in the only recorded action taken by martyred ruler Jia'ao, he was sent in 543 to notify the state of Lu about the ruler's recent ascension. On that occasion, however, when he avoided giving a straight answer to questions about the governing methods of Chief Minister Ziwei, he tipped his hand as at least a passive accomplice in the forthcoming coup and provoked prediction that he would himself become chief minister as a result of it.³⁶ Wei Qiqiang first appears in action at the behest of King Kang in 549 shortly after the latter attained firm control over the affairs of state.³⁷ Since his office at that time is not revealed, he may have been acting as a personal retainer of the king. In view of the circumstances surrounding his appointment as grand intendant in 541, there can be no doubt that he

³⁴ ZZS 41:5b-8a (698-99, Zhao 1).

³⁵ The service history of the Weis is treated in Chapter 5 in the discussion of the office of artisan master.

³⁶ ZZS 40:2a-b (679, Xiang 30).

³⁷ ZZS 35:26a-b, 28a (610-11, Xiang 24).

was King Ling's man. Thus, King Ling began his reign with his own men in the key positions of chief minister and grand intendant.

The most outstanding characteristic of the reign of King Ling is his almost complete circumvention of central government officials in conducting state business (see Chapter 6). His own central government appointees appear only rarely. The chief minister appears twice, once in 537 together with the *mo'ao* whose predecessor was executed by King Ling for alleged duplicity with Wu,³⁸ and then in the following year killing a scapegoat to atone for defeat by Wu and the capture of King Ling's replacement for Palace Stable Master Zixi.³⁹ In 530, Right Deputy Chief Minister Zige 子革, a refugee from Zheng who may have been selected from among the king's men to fill the position, is shown in council with King Ling.⁴⁰ The two parted ways in the following year when the king was deposed during a coup led by the latter's disenchanted brothers.⁴¹

³⁸ ZZS 43:6b (744, Zhao 5).

³⁹ ZZS 43:22b-23a (752-53, Zhao 6).

⁴⁰ ZZS 45:35a-38b (794-95, Zhao 12). Zige had fled from Zheng to Chu in 554, where he became right deputy chief minister (*ibid.*, 34:7b [587, Xiang 19]); however, he could not have assumed that position before 541 when right Deputy Chief Minister Zigan fled from Chu to Jin (*ibid.*, 41:29a-b [710, Zhao 1]). He first appears as one of five leaders of defensive efforts in the face of an invasion by Wu in 538. The offices of only three of the five are identified, two were royal household staff officers, namely the chamberlain and grand intendant, and the other, the remonstrance master, was a central government office with close connections to the royal household staff (*ibid.*, 42:31a [733, Zhao 4]). Since Zige's office was not mentioned on this occasion, he probably was not yet right deputy chief minister. But he must have been in this position by 531 when he was singled out as a notable refugee "located inside," that is in the capital near the seat of power (*ibid.*, 45:22a-23b [787-88, Zhao 11]) where he became right deputy chief minister; see *ibid.*,

⁴¹ ZZS 46:3a-8a (805-08, Zhao 13).

Totally monopolizing state power until the fateful year of 529, King Ling relied primarily on his personal retainers, in particular Wu Ju, in the early years;⁴² Grand Intendant Wei Qiqiang, who was the most active Chu official and the chief confidant of the king from late 538 to 535;⁴³ various other officials;⁴⁴ and, unfortunately for the king himself, Gongzi Qiji, who was the original heir designate of King Gong and the only brother of King Ling who was allowed to remain in Chu after the 541 coup.⁴⁵

Since King Ling had made the central government the launching pad for his successful coup, his motivation in stacking its positions with his own men and ultimately circumventing the central government in order to undercut its authority is understandable. Within the total context of King Ling's rise to power and his extremely personal style of governing, the grand intendant and other royal household offices appear to have been part of an institutional alternative to the central

⁴² Wu Ju was the closest advisor to King Ling from 539-538; see ZZS 42:18a-21b (726-28, Zhao 4), and 26a-29b (730-32, Zhao 4). He appears again in an advisory role in 535 in GY 17:6a-7b (389-92) and in concert with Gongzi Qiji and Ran Dan on a field assignment in 533 in ZZS 45:2a-3a (777-78, Zhao 9).

⁴³ ZZS 42:31a (733, Zhao 4); 43:8b-14a (745-48, Zhao 5), 15a (749, Zhao 5); and 44:5a (760, Zhao 7), 9a-b (762, Zhao 7).

⁴⁴ ZZS 42:29b (732, Zhao 4--Dou Weigui), 31a (733, Zhao 4-- Chamberlain She, Ran Dan, Peng Sheng); 43:13b (748, Zhao 5--Wei She), 15a (749, Zhao 5--Chamberlain Chi/She, Wei She), 22b-23a (752-53, Zhao 6--Wei Yan); 44:3a-5a (758-60, Zhao 7--functionary [*yusi*]); 45:2a-3a (777-78, Zhao 9--Ran Dan), 22a-23b (787-88, Zhao 11--Taro Master Shen Wu-yu), 34a-b (793, Zhao 12--*Sima* Du [here *sima* is either a low level marshal in the army or a local sheriff], chief of noise control, graves master, and valet), 36b ((794, Zhao 12--artisan master, left historian); 46:3a-b (805, Zhao 13--Cai Wei, suburb administrator). Also GY 17:10a (397, historian).

⁴⁵ For the activities of Gongzi Qiji in state affairs during the reign of King Ling, see ZZS 42:29b (732, Zhao 4); 43:21a-22a (752, Zhao 6); 44:25a-b (770, Zhao 7); 45:2a-3a (777-78, Zhao 9), 17a-18b (785, Zhao 11). His sibling relationship with King Ling is recorded in *ibid.*, 46:9a-b (808, Zhao 13).

government offices that was readily available to a strong willed king with a mind to use it.

Servants

Personal servants waited upon the queen⁴⁶ and king.⁴⁷ For example, Valet Xifu was by the side of King Ling during a "winter hunt" (*shou* 狩, often used as euphemism for "military exercise") to Zhoulai in 530. When the king camped at Qianxi after sending off the hunting party, which included several other members of the his personal staff, to lay siege to the capital of Xu 徐, the weather turned inclement. The *Zuozhuan* reports: "The king went out wearing a leather hat, a fur robe from Qin, a cape of kingfisher feathers, leopard skin shoes, and clutching a whip; Valet Xifu followed." 王皮冠，秦復陶，萃被，豹舄，執鞭以出。僕析父從。

In the evening, when he was visited by Right Deputy Chief Minister Zige, King Ling removed his hat and put down his whip, presumably handing them to his valet, while they conversed. When their conversation was interrupted and the king had to leave for a moment to review some work that he had commissioned done by his jade master, Valet Xifu criticized Zige saying, "You, my gentleman, are the hope of Chu. [But] now [when you] speak to the King, it is like an echo. What will perhaps become of the state?" 吾子，楚國之望也。今與王言如響，國其若

⁴⁶ When the widow of King Wen privately criticized Chief Minister Ziyuan in 666 for showing prurient interest in herself while neglecting foreign enemies, her comments were reported to him by her attendant (*yuren* 御人); see ZZS 10:14b (177, Zhuang 28).

⁴⁷ In addition to a valet, the king had his own charioteer (*yushi* 御士), who frequently drove him about the capital; see ZZS 35:5a-b (600, Xiang 22).

之何。 Speaking allegorically, Zige replied, "I am sharpening my blade while biding time. When the King comes out, my blade is going to cut him in half."⁴⁸ 摩厲以須。王出，吾刃將斬矣。 Evidently the valet had been present the whole time.

Although this is a rare instance of a royal household staff officer functioning in a role that was consistent with the name of the office, King Ling had used Valet Xifu in the previous year to obtain advice from Taro Master Shen Wuyu on administrative matters.⁴⁹ Thus, as is the case with almost every office, the valet performed a wider range of duties than is implied in the name of his office.

Palace Staff

The king's palace staff included the chamberlain, doormen, eunuchs, and functionaries.⁵⁰

Chamberlain

The first reference to chamberlain (*shenyin* 沈尹) occurs in 597 on the eve of the battle at Bi where the chamberlain, who is unnamed, is shown as the commander of the Center Army. The left deputy chief minister led the Left Army, and the marshal led the Right Army.⁵¹ In terms of structural implications, the command assignments on this campaign are problematic, for the chief minister, who was also present, should

⁴⁸ ZZS 45:34b (793, Zhao 12).

⁴⁹ GY 17:7b-8b (392-94). In this anecdote, *Pu Xifu* is identified as *Pufu Zixi* 僕夫子皙.

⁵⁰ The doormen positions are discussed in Chapter 5. For an example of a palace functionary in action, see ZZS 44:3a-5a (759-60, Zhao 7). For a central government functionary, see *ibid.*, 54:9b-10a (944, Ding 3).

⁵¹ ZZS 23:10b (392, Xuan 12).

have commanded the Center Army. This anomalous situation has given rise to much speculation about the meaning of the Chinese term for chamberlain, the nature of the office, and the relationship between the chamberlain and Chief Minister Wei Ailie.

The resolution of these and related questions is fully detailed below in Appendix 6. However, the findings that are of structural relevance may be summarized as follows: *Shenyin* is neither the contraction of "Shen *lingyin*" 沈令尹 nor the title of the administrator of *Shenxian*. It is the same office as *qinyin* 寝尹, which was in charge of the inner chambers of the royal compound--the chamberlain. This conclusion is supported by a review of the activities of chamberlain officeholders and their associates which shows that they were household type officials closely associated with the king. They constituted a group which could and sometimes did act as a counterweight or alternative to the high central government officials in the king's conduct of state government.

When put into proper historical and political perspective, the appointment of the chamberlain to command the Center Army in 597 becomes a rather pointed manifestation of competition between the royal household staff and the central government officers that had been going on for about four decades. In the account of the battle at Bi in 597, the chamberlain is not shown in an active role, whereas Chief Minister Wei Ailie is the only central government official actually depicted as taking part in decision making and leading troops in battle. As such, the chief minister is constantly shown in conflict with the king's men and favorites, while the actual battle

is managed by the king and his personal staff.⁵² The chamberlain was neither superior to the chief minister nor part of the central government structure. Chamberlain was a position on the royal household staff which was assigned command on this occasion as a symbol of royal authority.

Specialists

Specialized offices on the king's staff included physician (*yi* 醫),⁵³ historian (*shi* 史), left historian (*zuoshi* 左史), divination master (*buyin* 卜尹), musician (*lingren* 伶人),⁵⁴ and music master (*yueyin* 樂尹).

Historians

Historian Lao and Left Historian Yixiang are discussed in Chapter 5. Possibly two more holders of the office of historian are known.

As the final action of the coup d'etat that overthrew King Ling in 529, "Gongzi Qiji ordered Xu Wumou and *Shi Pi* 史獒 to enter first; taking advantage of the chief valet, [they] killed Heir Apparent Lu and Gongzi Pidi."⁵⁵ 公子棄疾使須務車及史獒先入，因正僕人殺大子祿及公子罷敵。 They were able to gain access to the sons of King Ling through the heir apparent's personal valet because

⁵² ZZZS 23:3a-20a (389-97, Xuan 12).

⁵³ ZZZS 34:14b-15a (590-91, Xiang 21). When Chief Minister Zigeng died in 552, King Kang sought to replace him with Marshal Wei Zifeng. But the latter feigned illness; so the king sent a physician to investigate his alleged illness.

⁵⁴ When King Cheng was entertained by two wives of the ruler of Cheng in 638, he ordered *Shi Jin* 緡 to show them the severed ears of war captives that had been taken recently in battle. Du Yu comments, "*Shi Jin* was a musician of Chu" 師緡，楚樂師也。 Kong Yingda attributes this interpretation of *shi* to the fact that it is the title of musicians who served in the state of Jin (ZZZS 15:5a [249, Xi 22 -- text and commentaries]). However, there is no corroborating evidence from or about Chu that supports this interpretation. *Shi* might just as well have been "tutor."

⁵⁵ ZZZS 46:5b-6a (806, Zhao 13)

Shi Pi was a member of the royal household staff. He Hao argues that although the *Guoyu* shows that Historian Lao was still active at this time, he had already relinquished the post of historian to serve as administrator of Shen; so it is possible that *Shi Pi* was his replacement.⁵⁶

The last person who may have been a holder of the office of historian is *Shi Huang* who, along with the men whom he led, died in 506 trying to head off an invasion of the capital of Chu by military force from Wu after Chief Minister Zichang had fled.⁵⁷ He Hao speculates that he was in the battlefield fulfilling the historian's role of making record of military events; whether this is so cannot be determined. What is clear is that he was leading a contingent of troops in battle.

The reckoning of *Shi Pi* and *Shi Huang* as holders of the office of historian hinges on interpreting *shi* as the name of their office. As He Hao notes, *shi* could be the type of surname that originated as the name of the office held by founding ancestor of a lineage; but there is no evidence for the existence of a Shi lineage in Chu. Drawing on examples of historians from other states, he concludes that these two officeholders are identified the name of their office plus their given names.⁵⁸

Divination Master

The only person explicitly identified in the position of divination master is Guan Cong, who instigated the coup d'etat that brought King Ping to power in 529. From the time of his father's execution by King Kang of Chu in 551, Cong had resided

⁵⁶ He Hao 1988:75.

⁵⁷ ZZZS 54:22a-24a (950-51, Ding 4).

⁵⁸ He Hao 1988:75.

in the state of Cai where he served government officer Chao Wu.⁵⁹ As noted above, after Chu extinguished Cai in 531, Gongzi Qiji was appointed to be administrator of Cai. Seizing upon widespread discontent with King Ling, Cong persuaded Chao Wu to stage the revolt.⁶⁰ After the initial success of the coup, Qiji was made grand marshal, while his elder brothers and cohorts, Zigan and Zixi, were made king and chief minister respectively. Even though Qiji had entrusted Cong with an important mission,⁶¹ the latter fled the capital after failing to persuade Zigan to kill Qiji before he could take the throne away.⁶² Ironically, perhaps unaware of this incident, King Ping ultimately summoned and appointed Guan Cong to the position of divination master, an office that had been hereditarily held by his ancestors.⁶³

Musicians

Valuable insight into the hereditary nature of the office of musician is afforded in the following anecdote from 582 about Zhong Yi, the administrator of Yun *xian*, two years after he was captured by the state of Zheng and presented to Jin.⁶⁴

The Marquis of Jin, looking over the military depot 軍府, saw Zhong Yi and asked about him saying, "Who is the one wearing the southern-style hat and tied up?" The functionary said, "He is a Chu captive who was presented by Zheng." [The Marquis] gave the order to release him. [The Marquis]

⁵⁹ZZZS 35:5a-b [600, Xiang 22].

⁶⁰ZZZS 46:4b (805, Zhao 13).

⁶¹ZZZS 46:6a (806, Zhao 13).

⁶²ZZZS 46:7a-b (807, Zhao 13).

⁶³ZZZS 46:8a-b (807, Zhao 13). No Guan is shown performing or in charge of divination in Chu prior to Cong. However, Guan Zhan was involved later when King Hui divined the appointment of Left Marshal Ziguo; see ZZZS 60:13a (1047, Ai 18). The absence of references to ancestors of Cong in divining roles is not fatal, for we do not have a complete daily record of official activities in Chu.

⁶⁴ZZZS 26:16a (443, Cheng 7).

summoned and commiserated with him. [He] bowed twice and struck his head [on the floor]. When [the Marquis] asked him about his occupation (*zu* 族), [Zhong Yi] replied, "I am a musician" 冷人. [The Marquis] said, "Can you play music?" [Zhong Yi] replied, "It was the duty of my forefathers. How dare I have a second task?" [The Marquis] had a lute given to him, and [Zhong Yi] played a southern tune 南音. [The duke] said, "What is your king like?" [He replied], "When he was heir apparent, his tutor and protector presented him to Yingqi (i.e., Zizhong) in the morning and to Ze (i.e., Zifan) in the evening. [I] do not know anything else."

晉侯觀于軍府，見鍾儀，問之，曰南冠而縶者，誰也。有司對，曰鄭人所獻，楚囚也。使稅之。召而弔之，再拜稽首。問其族，對曰冷人也。公曰能樂乎。對曰先父之職也，敢有二事。使與之琴，操南音。公曰君王何如。對曰非小人之所知也。固問之，對曰其爲大子也，師保奉之，以朝于嬰齊而夕于側也。不知其他。

[When] the Duke told Fan Wenzhi, Wenzhi said, "The Chu prisoner is a Superior Man. Speaking about the duties of his forefathers, [he] did not turn his back on [his] roots. Playing a local tune, [he] did not forget his old (place/duties). Mentioning the heir apparent, [he] did not get personal. Naming his highest officers, [he] was respectful to his ruler. . . . [My] ruler, why not return him [to Chu] [and] order him to bring peace between Jin and Chu." The Duke, following his counsel, treated [Zhong Li] with the utmost courtesy and sent [him] back to seek peace.⁶⁵

公語范文子，文子曰楚囚，君子也。言稱先職，不背本也。樂操土風，不忘舊也。稱大子，抑無私也。名其二卿，尊君也。君何不歸之，使合晉楚之成。公從之，重爲之禮，使歸求成。

Early and modern commentators agree that *lingren* is the name of an office.⁶⁶ Yang Bojun says that in this passage *zu* 族 has the "meaning of hereditary office."⁶⁷ While this interpretation can be debated, it is clear from Zhong Yi's response that his

⁶⁵ ZZS 26:25b-26b (448, Cheng 9).

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, (see the commentaries of Du and Kong). Based on examples in the *Guoyu*, Yang Bojun says that 冷人 can also be written as 伶人 or simply 伶 (CQZZZ 2:844).

⁶⁷ CQZZZ 2:844.

ancestors hereditarily served as musicians. This fact may also have been an unstated consideration in the appointment of Zhong Jian 鍾建 as music master eight decades later.

When Wu invaded the capital of Chu in 506, Jian had carried Ji Mi 季羊, the sister of King Zhao (r. 515-489), on his back as they fled to Yun. After Wu was repelled and peace restored, King Zhao desired to marry her off. Ji Mi protested saying, "That which makes a [real] girl is keeping [her] distance from real men."⁶⁸ Zhong Jian carried me on his back, indeed!" 所以爲女子，遠丈夫也。鍾建負我矣。 So the king married her to Zhong Jian and appointed him music master.⁶⁹

Husbandmen

Husbandmen on the royal staff included the keepers of animals, namely the chief swineherd and the equerries--the chief horse inspector⁷⁰ and grooms.⁷¹ Other husbandmen who appear in the historical record include the taro master and the indigo master. However, no occupants of these offices are shown in roles that are suggested by their titles.

⁶⁸ Yang Bojun says "'Zhangfu' is like today saying 'a manly man' (*nanzihan* 男子漢);" CQZZZ 4:1554.

⁶⁹ ZZS 54:25b (952, Ding 4), 55:4a (959, Ding 5).

⁷⁰ In 512, ten year old King Zhao is said to have decided to receive two refugees from Wu. He sent the chief horse inspector to meet them (and presumably escort them to their new domicile), and ordered the *youyin* and Left Marshal Xu 戌 to fortify the place for them. See ZZS 52:15a (907, Zhao 27).

⁷¹ Finally, during the rebellion that was staged by Wangzi Sheng in 479, when King Hui was taken hostage, his escape from the Gao Treasury, where had been incarcerated, was effected by Groom Gongyang 圍公陽; see ZZS 60:5b-6a (1043, Ai 16).

Chief Swineherd.

The office of chief swineherd (*yangtunyin* 揚豚尹) is problematic. The *Zuozhuan* says that in 555, King Kang sent the chief swineherd to express concern to Chief Minister Zigeng about his pacifist policies.⁷² Scholars do not agree about how to interpret *yangtunyin*. Neither Du Yu nor Kong Yingda gloss this term. Yang Bojun notes the following divergent views: Song commentator Lin Yaosou 林要叟 says it is a town name. Qing scholar Gu Yanwu claims it is the name of an office.⁷³ Another Qing scholar Liang Lusheng 梁履繩 disagrees with Lin and Gu. He quotes the *Shuoyuan*, which says, "King Zhuang, desiring to attack Jin, sent the *tunyin* to observe it" 楚莊王欲伐晉，使豚尹觀焉 and says, "[I] suspect that *tunyin* was like the swineherd and shepherd types of the 'Zhou guan.' Yang is his surname and Yi is his given name." To support his claim, he argues that 揚 is interchangeable with 陽 which was the surname of Chief Minister Zichang (Yang Gai 陽匄), the grandson of Wangzi Yang 王子楊.⁷⁴ Finally, Zhang Binglin cites a *Zuozhuan* passage in 504 that speaks of the presentation of 60 willow shields (*yangtun* 楊楯) to Zhao Jianzi of Jin and suggests that 楊豚尹 should be 楊楯尹 ("willow shield master"); that is, the one who was in charge of making willow shields. Yang rejects Lin and Gu as unreliable and considers Zhang's argument as a "forced interpretation." He agrees with Liang that *tunyin* 豚尹 was an office and that Yang 楊 was his

⁷² ZZS 33:14a-b (578, Xiang 18).

⁷³ Gu lists *tunyin* as an office without comment (see RZLJS 1.4.40a) as does Gu Donggao in CQDSB 10:45b (1260).

⁷⁴ For the original source, see Liang Lusheng 梁履繩, *Zuotong bushi* 左通補釋 in HQJJB 5.286:12a (3419).

surname and Yi his given name. He disagrees, however, with the idea that it was like a swineherd or shepherd. because the *tunyin* appears as a messenger in this passage.⁷⁵

In my opinion, *yangtunyin* has to be the name of an office. Yang 楊 and Yang 陽 are indeed Chinese surnames; however, Ran Yuan corrects his Northern Song edition of the *Zuozhuan* to read 揚 based on numerous other editions (Lin, Gu, and Liang all read 揚).⁷⁶ Moreover, the construct surname + office + given name was not used in Chu, where the name of the office always preceded the name of its occupant. But what was the meaning of *yangtunyin*? *Yang* 楊 ("willow") and *yang* 揚 ("to pick up; to praise") are interchangeable characters as are *tun* 豚 ("suckling pigs") and *dun* 楯 ("shield"). "Willow shield" may be forced but it at least makes sense, whereas to pick up or raise suckling pigs does not. If *yang* 揚 is an interpolation in the text and can, thus, be deleted, *tunyin* makes sense as a type of chief swineherd. The fact that the occupant of this office is shown as a messenger instead of making willow shields or herding swine is irrelevant because the activities of officials frequently do not correspond to the duties that are implied by their titles.

Taro master

Taro Master Shen Wuyu was a courageous figure on the king's staff. Sometime between 544 and 541, Chief Minister Wei , who made no secret of his ambition to become king, misappropriated the banner of Jia'ao for a hunting party. Defending the honor of the Jia'ao, Wuyu broke the banner in half and declared, "One

⁷⁵ CQZZZ 3:1041.

⁷⁶ Ruan Yuan 1815.33:6b (582).

country two rulers, who could perhaps stand it?"⁷⁷ 一國兩君，其誰堪之。

After usurping the throne in 541, King Ling built Zhanghua palace. When he staffed it with petty offenders in 535, Wuyu spotted his wayward doorman among them and seized him. Thereupon, the taro master, himself, was seized by a functionary on the palace staff and hauled before the king for committing the offense of taking someone into custody within the royal palace. However, he managed to convince the king that he had done the right thing and was permitted to collect his doorman and go home.⁷⁸ Wuyu evidently won the respect of King Ling who turned to him for advice four years later.⁷⁹

Shen Hai, the son of Shen Wuyu, appears to have succeeded his father, for he is repeatedly identified as taro master in historical sources. When King Ling was deposed by Gongzi Qiji and his rebel force in 529, Shen Hai sided with the king saying, "My father twice went against the King's orders, [and] the King did not punish him. What mercy is greater than that? Our ruler cannot endure; mercy cannot be abandoned; I shall follow the King." 吾父再奸王命，王非誅，惠孰大焉。君不可忍，惠不可棄，吾其從王。 Then he tracked down King

⁷⁷ In 531 King Ling walled the capitals of Chen, Cai, and Bugao, three states that he had extinguished and reduced to *xian* status. When he asked Shen Wuyu's opinion about having Gongzi Qiji in Cai as its administrator, Wuyu cautioned him to be careful about installing next of kin in walled cities away from his capital. When the king inquired further about the long term consequences having major walled cities, Wuyu reminded him of four well-known negative examples in other states; see ZZS Z: 44:3a (759, Zhao 7).

⁷⁸ ZZS 44:3a-5a (759-60, Zhao 7).

⁷⁹ ZZS 45:22a-23b (787-88, Zhao 11). The *Guoyu* version of this anecdote does not include King Ling's question about Gongzi Qiji. Shen Wuyu's response to the second question is longer and gives three additional negative examples; see GY 17:7b-9a (392-95, "Chuyu" *shang*).

Ling and took him into his home. Later when the king committed suicide there, he buried two of his own daughters alive with the corpse of King Ling at his place.⁸⁰ In the following year, Taro Master Shen Hai reported the grave site, and King Ping had the casket moved to another place.⁸¹

Indigo master

Indigo Master Wei 韋 was with King Zhao as he fled when Wu invaded the capital of Chu in 506. He helped transport the king's immediate family members across the river at Chengjiu 成臼. But when King Zhao asked for help too, Wei scolded him for losing the capital to an enemy for the first time in the history of Chu and left him standing there. After the king's return to the capital, Wei asked for an audience with him. King Zhao wanted to arrest him, but he was talked out of it by Chief Minister Zixi, the king's brother, who suggested that Wei may have good reasons for his actions. After Wei explained to a representative of the king that he was merely trying to warn him that he needed to change course in order to maintain his rule over the state, Zixi suggested that Wei be restored to the office of indigo master, and King Zhao agreed to meet him.⁸²

⁸⁰ ZZS 46:6b-7a (806-07, Zhao 13). For another account of these incidents, see [GY 19:3b--4a (428--29, "Wuyu").

⁸¹ 46:8b (807, Zhao 13).

⁸² GY 18:6b (412, "Chuyu" *xia*). Shortly after this event, Zixi was the beneficiary of Wei's sage counsel about how to deal with a change of rulers in Wu; see *ibid.*, 18:7b (414, "Chuyu" *xia*).

Hu Shaohua interprets Du Yu's gloss the Lanyin Wei was a great officer of Chu to mean that he was a *xian* administrator (1990:71). Shi Quan argues that *lanyin* is the name of the office of administrator of Lan 藍, which he identifies as a Chu town nearby Chengjiu. He says when King Zhao reached the river, he ran across the Lan Administrator Wei helping his family ford it (Shi Quan 1988:392-95; Song Gongwen 1988:360 follows him). However, there is no hint in the *Zuozhuan* account of this incident that the king was travelling apart from

Youyin

There may have been a third horticulturist on the king's staff, namely the *youyin* 莠尹. The occupant of this position appears several times in the historical record. In the early years of the reign of King Zhao (r. 515-489), who came to the throne at the age of seven, competition between Left Marshal Xu, who was formerly a member of the royal household staff, and Chief Minister Zichang was intense (see Chapter 6 below). Within this context, the *youyin*, jade master, artisan master, and tenders of the royal steeds are seen in action together with central government officials in the battlefield in 515.⁸³ In 512, King Zhao, who was now ten years old, is said to have decided to receive two refugees from Wu. He sent the chief horse inspector to meet them (and presumably escort them to their new domicile), and ordered *Youyin* Ran 然 and Left Marshal Xu to fortify the place for them for the purpose of antagonizing the state of Wu.⁸⁴

The meaning of *youyin* is difficult to discern. Du Yu notes that it is the name of an office but does not comment on its function. Kong Yingda says it cannot be explained⁸⁵ Takezoe, however, offers the following explanation: "*Youyin* was probably the officer in charge of managing the fields. [Since] farmers emphasize selecting seeds and toil at weeding, its meaning is taken from getting rid of weeds

his family and the *lanyin*. Moreover, as just noted, *Lanyin* Wei was a court figure. It is unlikely that he was a local administrator. He held the office of indigo master on the royal household staff, hence he was nearby the king and around the court.

⁸³ ZZS 52:15a (907, Zhao 27).

⁸⁴ ZZS 53:15b-16b (928, Zhao 30), 19a-b (930, Zhao 31).

⁸⁵ ZZS 22:15b (907, Zhao 27--Du and Kong commentaries).

(*you* 莠); therefore, it was named *youyin* ('chief weeder').⁸⁶ Regardless of whether Takezoe is correct, since *you* 莠 does share the grass, or weed, radical *cao* 艸 with taro 芋 and indigo 藍, this office probably did originally have something to do with horticulture; so it can be grouped with taro master and indigo master.

Craftsmen

Two craftsman positions appear in the historical record for Chu during the Spring And Autumn Era, namely the artisan master and the jade master *yuyin* (玉尹). The office of artisan master and its occupants are discussed in Chapter 5.

Jade Master

The *Zuozhuan* says that the state of Wu sought to take advantage of the recent death of King Ping, by attacking the Chu town of Qian in 515. *Gongyin* Jun 麋 was one of two royal household staffers who led a force to rescue it. A little later during the same military action, *Gongyin* Shou 壽 was one of the leaders of another force the was sent to box the Wu force in at Qian.⁸⁷

As noted earlier, *gongyin* 工尹 was the Chu term for "artisan master." Because two *gongyin* were active in this incident, some commentators, believing that there could only be one artisan master serving at a time, argue that one of the two "*gongyin*" mentioned on this occasion must actually be the name of a different office. Kong Yingda reads *gong* as *wang* 王 but says that its "meaning cannot be known" 義不可知也. Nevertheless, he quotes the Han commentary by Fu Qian which says,

⁸⁶ ZZHJ 26:2.

⁸⁷ ZZS 52:14a-16a (906-07, Zhao 27).

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⁸⁶ ZZHJ 26:2.

⁸⁷ ZZS 52:14a-16a (906-07, Zhao 27).

"The *wangyin* managed the palace administration" 王尹主宮內之政 . Kong then concedes that *gong* may not be *wang* after all because *gongyin* is used in this anecdote in another edition of the *Zuozhuan*.⁸⁸ Qing scholar Hong Liangji argues that *wang* in Fu's commentary is a Han era mistake. He cites Liang Chusu (aka Lusheng), who argued, "*Wangyin* is probably a mistake for *yuyin* 玉尹 ("jade master"). Anciently the 'yu' 玉 characters all were written 'wang' 王." ⁸⁹ Takezoe says, "Fu's explanation . . . is wrong. How could the name of an office be enhanced by the title *wang*?" Noting Liang's argument, he offers an excellent proof ; namely where the *Xinxu* writes "The King of Jing (i.e., Chu) ordered the *yuyin* to assist him" 荆王使玉尹相之, the *Lunheng* 論衡 quote of this passage has *wangyin*.⁹⁰ Confirmation of this reading is also found in the *Zuozhuan* under the year 530 when *Gongyin* Lu 工尹路 interrupted King Ling's conversation with Right Deputy chief Minister Zige saying, "You , my ruler and king, have ordered me to flay a jade baton in order (to inlay the handle of a sword); dare I ask for [further] orders?"⁹¹ 君王命剝圭 , 以爲鍼秘 , 敢請命 。 In this instance, *gongyin* should also be read as "jade master" (*youyin*).

⁸⁸ ZZS 52:15b (907, Zhao 27).

⁸⁹ CQZG 2:781.

⁹⁰ ZZHJ 26:2.

⁹¹ ZZS 45:36b (794, Zhao 12).

Gendarmery

Three offices on the royal household staff were probably palace peace officers, namely the chief of the palace guard,⁹² the chief of noise control,⁹³ and the right captain. This classification of the latter office is somewhat problematic.

Right Captain

As noted above, Right Captain Yan Jiangshi was the accomplice of Junior Tutor Fei Wuji in the murder of Left Deputy Chief Minister Xi Wan in 515. Chief Minister Zichang may have reported his perception of trouble to Yan because of his peace officer role. The right captain appears again in 479, when Grand Tutor Zigu recommended Right Captain Chaiche and Left Historian Lao to serve as assistants to a newly appointed chief minister on a military campaign against Chen. He said that they had assisted the previous chief minister and grand marshal in earlier attacks on Chen.⁹⁴

Classification of right captain in the gendarmery of the royal household staff is based on the close association of Right Captain Yan Jiangshi with Junior Tutor Fei Wuji and the fact that the grand tutor, who was a member of the king's personal staff, recommended Right Captain Chaiche and the left historian, who was on the royal household staff, to assist the chief minister. On the latter occasion She Administrator

⁹² The office of chief of the palace guard is mentioned only in 626 when Pan Zhong received it as one of this two appointments. See ZZS 18:5b-6b (299, Wen 1).

⁹³ The chief of noise control also appears just once when Chief of Noise Control Wu is listed among five men sent by King Ling to lay siege to the capital of Xu 徐 in 530. The other leaders were the graves master from the royal household staff, two rulers of petty states, and a local marshal. See ZZS 45:34a-b (793, Zhao 12).

⁹⁴ ZZS 60:9a-10a (1045, Ai 16).

Zhuliang objected to the grand tutor's recommendation saying, "When a leader is lowly (*jian* 賤), the people despise him. [I] fear [they] will not apply orders from them." 率賤，民慢之，懼不用命焉。 Zigu countered, citing two prisoners of war, Guan Dingfu 觀丁父 and Peng Zhongshuang 彭仲爽, who had served anciently as leaders in Chu and achieved significant military victories. He then asked, "[It] is only that they were responsible; what does lowliness have to do with it?" 唯其任也，何賤之有。 Zhuliang advocated sending a son of the late chief minister and said, "I fear that the right captain and the left historian have the lowliness of the two captives but do not have their outstanding virtues."⁹⁵ 臣懼右領與左史有二俘之賤，而無其令德。

Du Yu says that the term *jian* in the above anecdote means that the "right captain and left historian both were lowly offices (*jian guan* 賤官) of Chu." 右領，左史皆楚賤官。⁹⁶ However, modern commentator Yang Bojun disagrees and accepts Yang Shuda's contention that from the context of Zigu's retort "the two men probably were both prisoners of war; [this term] seems not to refer to lowly offices." Citing several appearances of these offices in the *Zuozhuan* as proof, Yang argues they were not lowly offices for otherwise they would not have received notice in the historical record.⁹⁷

It is true that Zigu's examples were people of low status, albeit in high offices, who were effective leaders. It is not true that holders of lowly positions are not

⁹⁵ ZZS 60:9a-10a (1045, Ai 17).

⁹⁶ ZZS 60:9b (1045, Ai 17).

⁹⁷ CCZZ 4:1708.

mentioned in the historical record, for there are many examples of members of the royal household staff leading military forces and doing or saying other noteworthy things throughout the Spring And Autumn Era. By comparison to offices in the central government administration, these were indeed lowly offices. However, the best proofs that *jian* refers to the low social status of the right captain and left historian are, perhaps, first, Zhuliang's argument for selecting a son of the late chief minister who would have had high social status both as the son of a chief minister and, in the case of Gongsun Chao, the grandson of a king and member of the royal household, not its staff; and second, the fact that the appointee held the local office of administrator of Wucheng rather than an office in the capital.⁹⁸ However, there is no corroborating evidence that Chaiche and Lao were ever prisoners of war.

Royal Garrison Officers

The royal garrison is shown in action during three battles. When Chu engaged Jin during the Battle of Bi in 597, the king's guard was divided into two *guang*. Xu Yen 許偃 was charioteer, and Yang Youji acted as right spearman in the Right *Guang*. Peng Ming 彭明 served as charioteer, and Qu Dang was right spearman in the Left *Guang*.⁹⁹ The king's garrison joined a military campaign to rescue Qi that

⁹⁸ ZZZS 60:10a (1045, Ai 17). This is not to say that his office was not an important position in the overall civil and military administration of Chu. Wucheng, a key outpost of Chu situated on its northern frontier in modern day Nanyang *xian* in southern Henan, was relatively close to Chen and a logical choice for fielding troops for an attack on it.

⁹⁹ ZZZS 23:12a-16a (393-95, Xuan 12). Another example of a charioteer in battle is found in 594 during an attack on the state of Song. On this occasion Shen Shushi, who was driving for King Zhuang, gave him advice about how to win the submission of Song. See ZZZS 24:9a-b (408, Xuan 15). The king's garrison is not mentioned in this account.

culminated in the battle at Yangqiao 陽橋 in 589. On that occasion the king's charioteer was Peng Ming, his left spearman was Duke Jing of Cai, and his right spearman was Duke Ling of Xu.¹⁰⁰ When Chu and Jin faced off in 575 in the Battle of Yanling 鄢陵之役, the king's garrison was again called into action, with Peng Ming driving King Gong's chariot, and Pan Dang acting as right spearman.¹⁰¹

Royal Domain Officers

Royal household officers involved with administering territory near the capital include the suburb administrator and graves master. Prior to the coup that toppled him in 529, King Ling earned the enmity of Dou Chengran by taking away his benefice at Man making him suburb master (*jiaoyin* 郊尹) at the capital.¹⁰² Based on the discovery of extensive cemeteries near Chu towns, and particularly its core developmental territory between Danyang and Jiangling, Hubei, the graves master must have been a key position on the king's staff. However, the sole reference to the graves master (*lingyin* 陵尹) is on the battlefield as a military leader sent into action by King Ling in 530.¹⁰³

Summary

In the foregoing discussion, the royal household staff have been grouped according to the original functions implied in their names. The heir apparent's staff

¹⁰⁰ ZZS 25:21b-22a (429, Cheng 2).

¹⁰¹ ZZS 28:8a-10b (475-76, Cheng 16).

¹⁰² ZZS 46:3b (805, Zhao 13). Song Gongwen considers this to be a local office (1988:360).

¹⁰³ ZZS 45:34a-b (793, Zhao 12). Li Yujie regards *lingyin* as the name of the office of a *xian* administrator (1988:85).

was comprised mainly of officers charged with instructing and preparing him for succession to the rulership. The king also had his own personal staff which provided him instruction and helped manage the affairs of the royal household. Servants cared for the personal needs of the king and his consorts. Specialists provided a variety of services including record keeping, medical, divination, and music. Husbandmen tended the king's livestock and crops. Craftsmen were on call. The gendarmery was responsible for maintaining peace and order. The royal garrison accompanied the king into battle. And other officers managed the royal domain.

Appendix 6

An Investigation and Explanation of the Office of *Shenyin*

Shenyin 沈尹 is one of the most enigmatic offices of the state of Chu in the Spring and Autumn era. The source of confusion is found in the first reference to this office on the eve of the battle at Bi in 597 which states that the *shenyin* led the Center Army, the left deputy chief minister (*zuoyin* 左尹) led the Left Army, and the grand marshal (*sima* 司馬) led the Right Army.¹ In this type of command configuration the leadership of the Center Army should have been assigned to the chief minister (*lingyin* 令尹), who was, in fact, on the campaign and intimately involved in decision-making and in leading troops during the actual battle.² By contrast, the *shenyin* is not shown taking an active role either in council or in battle; thus, the impression is given that he was the nominal commander of the Center Army, while the chief minister was the actual leader. This anomalous command situation has been a key factor in the rise of various explanations of the meaning of *shenyin* and the relationship between the holders of the offices of *shenyin* and chief minister on this occasion.

The discussion that follows clarifies the meaning of *shenyin*, the nature of the office, and the relationship between the *shenyin* and Chief Minister Wei Ailie in ways that are consistent with the structure of Chu officialdom and the dynamics of its politics.

¹ZZZS 23:10b (392, Xuan 12).

²ZZZS 23:12b-19b (393-7, Xuan 12).

First, the various interpretations of *shenyin* are identified and analyzed. The meaning of *shenyin* and the nature of this office is then established based on an analysis of the term *qin* 寢, which is interchangeable with *shen* 沈, and a review of the activities and associates of officeholders. Next, the anomalous command situation during the battle at Bi in 597 is interpreted within its historical and political contexts. Finally, the Warring States tradition that developed around the *shenyin* and Chief Minister Wei Ailie is examined because of its widespread transmission in Han works and its relevance to the issues that are explored here.

Interpretations of *Shenyin*

The first possibility to be considered is that *shenyin* is an ellipsis for Shen *lingyin* 沈令尹 as it is rendered in a Han source, *Hanshi waizhuan* 韓詩外傳.³ Takezoe has interpreted this reference to mean that someone identified as Shen held the office of chief minister.⁴ This view is untenable, for the names of offices held by individuals in Chu always precede the name of the man. The *Hanshi waizhuan* rendition should be read as "chief minister of Shen," not "chief minister from Shen" or "Chief Minister Shen." Its author simply made a mistake in emending *shenyin* to read Shen *lingyin*.

Some have suggested that in the battle of Bi the *shenyin* and the chief minister were in fact the same man, namely Wei Ailie.⁵ This provides a neat solution to the

³ CQBD 5:105.

⁴ ZZHJ 11:10.

⁵ ZZHJ 11:9; CQZSZJZSZ 692. Wei Ailie is also known as Wei Ailie 蔦敖 or Sun Shu'ao 孫叔敖 in the anecdotes that will be cited hereafter. The question of whether Wei Ailie and Wei Ailie are the same person is treated in detail in the discussion of the Wei lineage in Appendix 4.

command anomaly referred to above; however, it cannot be successfully supported. The bases for this suggestion are found in the traditional tie between Wei Ailie and/or his posterity and a place called Qinqiu 寢丘 and the fact that *shen* and *qin* are phonetically interchangeable so that one character can be used as a loan word for the other.⁶ Thus, the implication is that Wei Ailie was also known as administrator of Shen (*Shenyin*).

All of the sources, but one, which mention the acquisition of Qinqiu by Wei Ailie or his son state that while Wei Ailie was on his deathbed, he cautioned his son to request undesirable land when the king should insist on making a bequest of territory following his death.⁷ The *Han Feizi* 韓非子, the sole exception, says that the request for such a place was made by Wei Ailie himself after Chu had defeated Jin at Bi.⁸ In either case, the bequest occurred after the battle of Bi; so Wei Ailie could not have been known as administrator of Shen before or during that confrontation. Therefore, the *shenyin* and Chief Minister Wei Ailie were not the same man.

In his discussion of the numerous Shen 番 bronzes which have been unearthed in southern Henan, Li Xueqin has introduced another possible interpretation of *shenyin* by his assertion that the state of Chu had a powerful aristocratic lineage that was known as *Shenyinshi* or *Shenshi*. The references to *shenyin* and Shen Zhuliang in the *Zuozhuan* and the *Lushi chunqiu* are cited as evidence of the importance of this lineage over generations of time.⁹ Given the fact that politically effective lineages in Chu were

⁶ ZZHJ 11:9-10; CQZSZJZSZ 692; Karlgren 1971:294, 296.

⁷ LZZ 8:96; LSCQXJZ 10.4:101; HNZ 19:306.

⁸ HFZJJ 7:2a (259).

⁹ Li Xueqin 1980a:57-58.

usually formed through segmentation and fission of the royal lineage,¹⁰ the rise of a powerful Shenyin lineage capable of sustaining its influence over many generations would have been virtually impossible in this period unless it, too, descended from a former king. However, the suggestions of Han commentators that *Shenyin* Xu 沈尹戌, who appears late in the list of *shenyin*, was either the great grandson or the grandson of King Zhuang (r. 613--591) is rejected by Li.¹¹ In his reconstruction of Chu pedigrees, Qing scholar Chen Houyao included a pedigree for *Shenshi*, which shows all of the *shenyin* who are mentioned in the *Zuozhuan*;¹² but Gu Donggao later thoroughly refuted his evidence by pointing out the logical inconsistencies and factual contradictions in it.¹³ There is no evidence that individuals who are identified as *shenyin* were members of a lineage that was known by that name.

The reading of *shenyin* as administrator of Shen is most common, but incorrect. In a comment on the "Zun Shi" 尊師 section of the *Lushi chunqiu*, Eastern Han scholar Gao You states that he was "the grandee of Shenxian" (*Shenxian daifu* 沈縣大夫);¹⁴ that is, he was administrator of Shen, for *xian* administrators in Chu could be known either by the title *yin* 尹 or *gong* 公 following a place name. Commenting later on the *Zuozhuan* reference to *shenyin* during the battle at Bi in 597, Du Yu says, "Shen, some write Qin 寢; Qin was a *xian*."¹⁵ 沈或作寢，寢縣也。 Thus, the implication is

¹⁰ Zhang Jun 1986.

¹¹ Li Xueqin 1980:58.

¹² CQSZP 51b.

¹³ CQDSB 11:11a-14b (1268-9).

¹⁴ LSCQXJZ 4.3:38.

¹⁵ ZZZS 23:10b, (392, Xuan 12).

that *shenyin* means "administrator of Shen." In a gloss on Du Yu' comment, Kong Yingda suggests that the source of this interpretation by Du is the *Zuozhuan* reference to *Qinyin* Wu Youyu 寢尹吳由于 in 477 that led him to explain Qin as the name of a *xian* and to equivocate as to which was right, Qin or Shen.¹⁶ Takezoe accepts the readings by Gao and Du and states further, commenting on the *shenyin* reference in 597, that Shen, a petty state located outside of the defense wall (Fangcheng) of Chu in the southeast corner of modern day Henan,¹⁷ was an important possession of Chu, who had annexed it as is evident in numerous *Zuozhuan* references to various *shenyin* after this time.¹⁸ Takezoe refers the reader to his gloss on Shen in 624 where he says that Shen was the state that was extinguished by Cai in 506.¹⁹ Thus, the reading of *shenyin* as administrator of Shen turns around the existence of a Shen, or Qin, *xian* in Chu as early as 597 (the year of the first reference to *shenyin*) in the Spring And Autumn Era.

As for the existence of a *xian* which was known as Shen at this early date, two Shen states mentioned in the *Zuozhuan* may be considered. The history of the Shen state suggested by Takezoe rules it out as one possibility, for from the first reference to it in 624 until its demise in 506, this Shen never lost its identity as a state (*guo* 國).²⁰ The

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Chen Pan 1969:4:357a-358b.

¹⁸ ZZHJ 11:9-10.

¹⁹ ZZHJ 5:23.

²⁰ Shen was a pawn in the competition between Jin and Chu in alliance building. In 624 it was attacked by Jin and allies for submitting to Chu (ZZZS 18:16a-b [304, Wen 3]). Following incursions into Cai and Chu, Jin invaded Shen in 585 and captured its ruler (ZZZS 26:21a [446, Cheng 8--text and Du commentary], 27:15a [636, Xiang 26]). The viscount of Shen was among the rulers of petty states who appeared in the court of Jin in 545 under the terms of the Sung Armistice, which had recently been concluded between the two superpowers (ZZZS 28:20b [651, Xiang 28]). In 538 and 537 Shen and the petty states allied to Chu joined the latter in a summit meeting and in attacking Wu (CCCS 42:17a-b [726, Zhao 4], 43:1a [742, Zhao 5]). Two of these

other Shen state, which is mentioned in 541, was located far away from Chu in the territory of Jin, by whom it was eliminated at an early but unspecified date.²¹ Thus, neither of the Shen states were ever reduced to the status of *xian* by Chu in the Spring And Autumn Era.

Qing scholar Gu Donggao has reconciled the co-existence of the state of Shen and the Chu office of *shenyin* by arguing that Chu established an important town called Shen in territory that it won from the state of Shen; the former was located at Gushi 故始, and the latter was north of it at Pingyu 平輿.²² Yang Bojun, while not referring specifically to Gu, has picked up this argument and suggests that Chu may have acquired the territory at Gushi when it attacked the state of Shen in 624.²³ More recently Gu Jiuxin has developed this view even further. As additional evidence that the state of Shen and the Chu town of Shen were located at different places, he claims that whenever Chu established a *xian* town at a location apart from the site of the capital of a former state, the *xian* administrator office was known as *yin*, whereas the office was known as

petty states, Chen in 534 (ZZZS 44:25a-b [770, Zhao 8] and Cai in 531 (ZZZS 45:21b-22a [787, Zhao 11]), were extinguished by Chu and turned into *xian*. On the latter occasion the populations of Shen and several other current and former petty states were relocated among the Chu populace by order of King Ling. When he was overthrown in 529, Chen and Cai were restored to the status of states and the relocated populations were allowed to return to their former places (ZZZS 46:21a-b [814, Zhao 13]). In 519 the petty states again followed Chu into battle against Wu (ZZZS 50:23a-24a [878, Zhao 23]). When Shen, its status as state still intact, failed to join the Jin alliance's invasion of Chu in 506, Jin ordered Cai, which it had wooed away from the Chu camp, to take military reprisal with the result that Shen was then destroyed (ZZZS 54:22a [950, Ding 4]). Although Chu responded by laying siege to Cai, it was not able to subdue Cai until during the Warring States period (Chen Pan 1969:1:26a-27a). Thus, this state of Shen was never reduced to the status of *xian* by Chu during the Spring And Autumn Era.

²¹ ZZZS 41:22a (706, Zhao 1); Chen Pan 1969:5:475b.

²² CQDSB 7.4:6b-7b (1168-1169).

²³ CQZZZ 2:728-729.

gong when the *xian* town was established at a former capital city. He also cites the military role of various *shenyin* in the eastern part (modern Anhui Province) of Chu, suppressing a major rebellion in 546 and resisting repeated incursions by the state of Wu beginning from 538, in support of the existence of *Shenxian* at Gushi, which was south of the Shen capital at Pingyu and closer to the scene of action. In his view, the strategic location of *Shenxian* at Gushi and the rise of the military threat from Wu account for the frequent appearances of *shenyin* in the historical record of sixth century Chu.²⁴

This argument for the existence of a *xian* called Shen in Chu cannot be accepted for several reasons. First, there is no evidence that Chu ever took territory away from the state of Shen. To have done so and then renamed it Shen would have been a serious affront to a state whose allegiance Chu sought and to whom it, at times, extended protection (see Note 20 above). Second, Gu's argument based on the significance of the *yin* office is defeated by the example that he cites in support of it. Dou Min 鬥縉 was appointed to administer (*yin* 尹), the former territory of Quan 權 state after Chu and conquered it before, *not* after, its population was relocated to Nachu 那處. When he staged a rebellion at Quan prior to 676, its people were relocated to Nachu and another man was appointed to administer that place.²⁵ And, finally, after Wu became a threat to Chu, the military activity of Chu was concentrated in its eastern sphere of influence; so any officer of Chu sent into the battlefield would probably have gone there regardless of where he was based.

²⁴ Gu Jiuxin 1984:129-132.

²⁵ ZZS 9:16a (159, Zhuang 18).

Gu highlights the role of *Shenyin* Xu in anti-Wu military campaigns and suggests that he might have hailed from Wu since he was formerly the retainer of a Wu officer.²⁶ If *Shenyin* Xu, who by now was serving in the office of left marshal (*zuosima* 左司馬), were a man from Wu, this would have been an important consideration in his appointment to lead these campaigns because of his superior knowledge of the military tactics and strategies of Wu. Since he already held the office of left marshal, he clearly would not have been based in *Shenxian*, if one had existed at this time.

As is the case with *Shenxian*, a *Qin xian* cannot be shown to have existed in the Spring And Autumn Era. *Qin* does not occur alone as the name of a locality in either the *Zuozhuan* or the *Guoyu*, the chief historical sources for this period. The same is true of *Qinqiu* (or its possible variant *Shenqiu* 沈丘), the locality which was allegedly given to Wei Ailie or his son after the battle at Bi in 597, though the existence of such a place seems credible in view of the traditional association of the descendants of Wei Ailie with it. *Qin* appears as a Chu place name during the Warring States period, but some evidence suggests that *Qinqiu* is the actual place in question.²⁷

The first clear reference to a *Qin xian* occurs in the "Geographical Treatise" 地理志 section of the *Han Shu* 漢書, where the *xian* of the Former Han Dynasty (B.C. 206-7 A.D.) are detailed.²⁸ Ying Shao of the Later Han Dynasty (A.D. 25-220) claims that this is the *Qinqiu* which was given to the son of Wei Ailie and that the name of *Qin xian* was

²⁶ Gu Jiuxin 1984:131-132, 134.

²⁷ SJHZKZ 73:14-15 (940, text and commentaries).

²⁸ HSBZ 28a:6a (709).

changed to Gushi *xian* by Guangwu Di (r. A.D. 25-57).²⁹ Gushi and Qin were contiguous *xian* during the Former Han; however, in the 2nd year of Guangwu Di (A.D. 26), following the restoration of the imperial Han house to power, Gushi was given as a marquissate to one of the Han loyalists,³⁰ and Qin then became known as Gushi *xian*.³¹ During the Jin Dynasty (A. D. 265-316), when Du Yu wrote his *Zuozhuan* commentary, Gushi *xian* belonged to Ruyin *jun* 汝陰郡.³² When he equated *shen* with Qin *xian* in his 597 gloss on *shenyin*, the source of his inspiration was not the later reference to *qinyin* (where he, in fact, makes no comment) as suggested by Kong Yingda; it was the Qin *xian* of the Former Han, for Du concludes his gloss by noting that "[Qin *xian*] is present-day Gushi *xian* of Ruyin."³³ 今汝陰故始縣。 Assertions by others that Qin *xian* existed during the Spring And Autumn Era are also without historical basis.³⁴ The earliest period in which Qin *xian* can be clearly shown to have existed is the Former Han dynasty.

Meaning and Nature of *Shenyin*

The observation by Du Yu that the *shen* and *qin* characters could be used interchangeably is philologically sound.³⁵ In it is found a clue to the solution of the problem of the nature of the office of *shenyin* and its place in Chu officialdom, even though the conclusion that Du reached is not valid. In his classification of Chu offices,

²⁹ HSBZ 28b:31a-b (844).

³⁰ HHS 15:575.

³¹ HSBZ 28b:31a-b (844).

³² DSFYJY 50:42b (1060).

³³ ZZS 23:10b (392, Xuan 12).

³⁴ DSFYJY 50:42b [1060]

³⁵ Karlgren 1971:294, 296.

Gu Donggao considered *shenyin* and *qinyin* to be the same office, although he misinterpreted the nature of that office.³⁶ The "Shi Gong" 釋宮 section of the *Erya* 爾雅 describing various rooms and their particular features, defines *qin* as a large room without small adjoining rooms on the east and west sides.³⁷ Commentators add that it was located behind the main hall (*miao* 廟) where the ancestral spirits were greeted, and it was the room where artifacts left behind by the deceased were stored.³⁸ A *Guoyu* anecdote set in the state of Lu reveals that the area inside the *qin* entrance was considered to be private quarters regardless of the rank of the household head, for although state and family business could be handled in the outer and inner courts, "as to the area inside the *qin* entrance, the wife took care of her duties in it."³⁹ 寢門之內，婦人治其業焉。

The *Shuowen* defines *qin* as "to rest" (*wo* 臥);⁴⁰ by extension, as a noun it refers to the act of resting or to the place of rest. Takezoe does not identify *qinyin* with *shenyin*, but he provides an instructive gloss in his explanation of an allusion to the former valorous service of *Qinyin* Wu Youyu in behalf of King Zhao (r. 515–489). Although Wu Youyu is not identified as *qinyin* in the *Zuozhuan* until 477,⁴¹ Takezoe considers him to have been acting in that office in 506 when he took a halberd in the back while defending the king, who had retired to rest (*qin*), from attack by would-be assassins.⁴² Takezoe

³⁶ CQDSB 10:45a, 46a (1260).

³⁷ EYZS 5:7b (75).

³⁸ EYZS 5:8a (75).

³⁹ GY 5:7b-8a (144-5).

⁴⁰ SWJZGL 7b:3246b.

⁴¹ ZZS 60:16a-b (1047, Ai 18).

⁴² ZZS 54:25b (952, Ding 4).

argues that the *qinyin* probably controlled the king's rest area.⁴³ Thus, the insight which can be gained by focusing on the term *qin* is that the *qinyin* was the officer in charge of the inner sanctum of the royal compound; namely, the chamberlain. Therefore, Rao Zongyi includes this office in his enumeration of palace officials (*gongting zhi guan* 宮庭之官) in Chu.⁴⁴ The credibility of this conclusion can be strengthened through a review of the activities and associates of *shenyin*, or *qinyin*, office holders to show that this was one of the royal household staff offices close to the king.

Setting aside for the moment the first reference to *shenyin* in 597, *shenyin* appear frequently in contexts that are suggestive of an intimate connection with the kings of Chu. In 589 eleven year old King Gong (r. 590-560) allegedly defended Shengong Wuchen from the retribution sought by Grand Marshal Zifan by refusing to authorize the latter to secure his return from self-exile in Jin on the grounds that Wuchen had given loyal service to the former king.⁴⁵ However, one or two years later Chief Minister Zizhong and Grand Marshal Zifan, both nursing grudges against Wuchen, obtained vengeance by killing his partisans in Chu, then dividing the household wealth of the deceased with the *shenyin* and Wangzi Pi 王子罷 (fl. 590). Responding to this development by letter, Wuchen charged the chief minister and grand marshal with serving the king, in part, through "flattery and covetousness" (*chanyutanlan* 讒慝貪憚).⁴⁶ In view of the fact that King Gong had previously been a staunch defender of

⁴³ ZZHJ 30:41.

⁴⁴ Rao Zongyi 1969:283.

⁴⁵ ZZS 25:19a-21a (428-429, Ch'eng 2).

⁴⁶ ZZS 26:16b-17a (443-444, Cheng 7).

Wuchen , the latter's accusation against Zizhong and Zifan appears to have had some substance. Their sharing of the spoils with the *shenyin*, who is not identified by name, and Wangzi Pi, who was possibly a brother or uncle of King Gong (the title *wangzi* may be rendered literally as "son of the king", but Pi could not have been the son of King Gong), betrays the complicity of these two individuals in moderating the stance of King Gong to tolerate the action that was taken. In effect the chief minister and the grand marshal bought the acquiescence of the royal house by appealing to the baser instincts of the *shenyin* and Wangzi Pi by offering material incentives.

The next reference to *shenyin* occurs within the context of competition between royal favorites and central government officials. In the fifth year (555) of his reign, King Kang (r. 559-545), who succeeded his father King Gong at a relatively tender age (the latter died at age 40), complained to Chief Minister Zigeng that he was under pressure from the *guoren* because Chu troops had not gone to battle since his succession. This amounted to criticism of the government of Zigeng, who was operating on the assumption that the populace of Chu preferred peace and prosperity.⁴⁷ It was even more difficult to understand in view of the fact that his appointment was one of many that were made in 558 in order "to pacify the *guoren* (靖國人)." ⁴⁸ When Zigeng died in 552, King Kang wanted to appoint Wei Zifeng to succeed him as chief minister, but Zifeng feigned illness after being advised that the state could not be managed due to the

⁴⁷ ZZZS 33:14b (578, Xiang 18).

⁴⁸ ZZZS 32:24a-b (565, Xiang 15). Mark Edward Lewis takes this incident as a sign that the chief minister had full control of the military and that the king had no say at all (1990:35 [note 83]).

presence of too many favorites and a weak king.⁴⁹ In his stead Chief Minister Zinan was appointed to the post, only to be executed by King Kang in the following year under pressure from the officers of Chu. The king then ordered Zifeng to assume the position of chief minister, and this time he accepted.⁵⁰

In 549 King Kang embarked on military adventurism against the state of Wu and directed contact with the state of Qi. Apparently bypassing the holders of high central government positions, he relied upon individuals closer to the royal house to carry out assignments. One such person was Wei Qiqiang, who was the king's agent in conducting relations with Qi.⁵¹ Qiqiang later served in the royal household staff position of grand intendant), but never in a central government position.⁵² When Wu responded to the provocation by Chu by enlisting the aid of a group of states formerly allied to Chu, King Kang took up a defensive position and sent *Shenyin* Shou 壽 and Tutor Qi Li to upbraid the leader of a wayward ally. (The king's tutor was a key member of the royal household staff.) When the *shenyin* and the tutor returned with their report, the king wanted to attack his old ally, but Chief Minister Wei Zifeng was able to persuade him to postpone such action for a more opportune time.⁵³ With this turn of events Zifeng was able to seize policy-making initiative for the central government officials. In 548 Wei Zifeng died and was replaced by Chief Minister Qu Jian, who put down a rebellion in that year. When King Kang desired to reward him, Zimu declined in favor of the son of Zifeng, for

⁴⁹ ZZS 34:14b-15a (590-591, Xiang 21).

⁵⁰ ZZS 35:5a-6a (600, Xiang 22).

⁵¹ ZZS 35:26a-b, 28a (610-611, Xiang 24).

⁵² ZZS 41:30b (710, Zhao 1).

⁵³ ZZS 41:30b (710, Zhao 1).

in his opinion Wei Zifeng was responsible for this success.⁵⁴ The implication of this action by Chief Minister Zimu was that success came through following proper channels.

The next reference to *shenyin* appears during the reign of a usurper king who routinely circumvented central government channels in conducting state business. When King Ling (r. 540-529) usurped the throne, he made one of his accomplices chief minister. During the reign of King Ling the chief minister appears in the historical record only twice in active roles, and those were rather inconsequential in terms of wielding power and influence.⁵⁵ The grand marshal is not shown in an active role at all. This may be a result of the fact that in preparation for usurping the throne, while serving as chief minister, King Ling had executed the previous grand marshal.⁵⁶ The latter action may also have precipitated increased visibility of holders of the central government office of *mo'ao*, who were more active during the reign of King Ling than in the previous 150 years in spite of the fact that the first *mo'ao* to serve him was soon executed for alleged duplicity with the state of Wu.⁵⁷ After 536, the fifth year of the reign of King Ling, neither of these high central government officials appears again in the historical record as active participants in his regime. Instead King Ling chose to rule chiefly through officials with close ties to himself and the royal house or who were of lower rank in the central government.

⁵⁴ ZZS 36:11a-b, 16b-17a (622, 624-625, Xiang 25).

⁵⁵ ZZS 40:2a-b (679, Xiang 30); 41:20b (710, Zhao 1); 43:6b (744, Zhao 5), 22b-23a (752-753, Zhao 6).

⁵⁶ ZZS 40:10a (683, Xiang 30).

⁵⁷ ZZS 43:6b (744, Zhao 5).

While the offices of chief minister and *mo'ao* were receding into the background, others came forward including the grand intendant and taro master on the royal household staff, remonstrance master, which was an office subordinate to *mo'ao* in the central government, both having their roots in the royal household staff, and *shenyin*. Wu Ju, the principal advisor to King Ling during the early years of his reign,⁵⁸ is not identified by title, but he comes from a lineage whose members often held positions close to the royal house.⁵⁹ During the remainder of the reign of King Ling the grand intendant⁶⁰ and the taro master⁶¹ are shown in advisory roles to the king, and the top central government officials make no appearance in the historical record. The holders of both of these offices and the remonstrance master were among the officials entrusted with defensive maneuvers in the face of a retaliatory attack by the state of Wu in 538.⁶² The Chu response seems to have been very much a royal operation; certainly it was closely managed by the king. When Chu counter attacked in the following year, King Ling relied heavily upon the *shenyin* and grand intendant in commanding troops.⁶³ Thus, the office of *shenyin* appears in the historical account of the reign of a usurper king who chose to bypass established central government channels in seeking advice and in executing his plans, relying instead upon persons and offices linked more directly to himself and with past or present roots in the royal household staff.

⁵⁸ ZZS 42:26a-29b (730-732, Zhao 4).

⁵⁹ See role of Wu Can 吳參 in ZZS 23:10b-11a (392-393, Xuan 12).

⁶⁰ ZZS 43:7b-13a (745-748, Zhao 5); 44:5a-6a, 9a-b (760 and 762, Zhao 7).

⁶¹ ZZS 45:22a-23b (787-788, Zhao 11).

⁶² ZZS 42:31a (733, Zhao 4).

⁶³ ZZS 43:13a-15a (748-749, Zhao 5).

From the foregoing examples the *shenyin* appears to be an office close to the king and one of a group which could and did act as a counterweight and alternative to the high central government offices. This picture holds for most of the remaining references to *shenyin*, or *qinyin*, as well. The best known of the historical *shenyin* is *Shenyin Xu* (d. 511), who, as noted above, ultimately served in the office of left marshal in the central government. Unfortunately, since he is still referred to by the title of *shenyin* after becoming left marshal, there can be no certainty as to whether references to him as *shenyin* prior to his identification as left marshal in 515 are valid or are also anachronistic.⁶⁴ In any case in the early years from 523 to 515, during which *Shenyin Xu* was a rather free-wheeling critic of both the king and central government officers (in particular, the chief minister),⁶⁵ the state was beset by the political chaos that was generated by the machinations of sycophant Fei Wuji, who had extraordinary influence with the king.⁶⁶ If Xu was not yet left marshal at this time, then this is another example of the appearance of *shenyin* during a period of imbalance between the royal house and the central government. The 506 reference to *Qinyin Wu Youyu* defending the king, who was in his resting place, from attack by would-be assassins has already been discussed above and requires no further elaboration here. *Shenyin Zhu* 沈尹朱 was among the royal loyalists consulted by the king in the selection of a new chief minister in 478⁶⁷ in a move to end a politically and structurally irregular situation which had been caused by

⁶⁴ See ZZZS 52:15b (907, Zhao 27).

⁶⁵ ZZZS 48:25a-b (846, Zhao 19); 50:25b-27b (879-880, Zhao 23); 51:4a-b (886, Zhao 24).

⁶⁶ ZZZS 48:31b-32b (844, Zhao 19); 49:2b-4a (852-853, Zhao 20); 52:18a-19b 908-909, Zhao 27).

⁶⁷ ZZZS 60:9a-10a (1045, Ai 17).

the assassination of both the chief minister and grand marshal by a disgruntled scion of the royal house in the previous year.⁶⁸ The final reference to a *shenyin*, or a *qinyin*, occurs in 477 when Wu Youyu is assigned by the king to be an assistant to the chief minister on a military expedition.⁶⁹ Whether Youyu still held the position or this is another anachronistic reference to a man by his former title is difficult to determine. Of primary importance here is the fact that these examples basically conform to the pattern evident in the earlier *shenyin* examples.

The 597 Command Anomaly in Context

When the *shenyin* reference in 597 is put into its proper historical and political contexts, the anomalous command situation that existed in the battle at Bi, namely the identification of the *shenyin* as commander of the Center Army instead of the chief minister, can be explained in a way which is consistent with the nature of the *shenyin* office as revealed in the foregoing examples.

The battle at Bi took place after more than three decades of strife and competition both within and between the royal house and its staff and the central government leadership. The power of chief minister's office had been weakened as a result of competition between a retired chief minister and an incumbent chief minister in the 630's.⁷⁰ When the latter insisted on employing troops of Chu in battle in 632 against the wishes of the king, the main body of the Chu force was defeated, while the chief minister

⁶⁸ ZZS 60:3b-7a (1042-1044, Ai 16).

⁶⁹ ZZS 60:16a-b (1047, Ai 18).

⁷⁰ ZZS 15:7a-b (250, Xi 23); 16:10a-11a (266-267, Xi 27).

quickly withdrew his contingent and escaped.⁷¹ He was subsequently forced to commit suicide under threat of punishment by the king.⁷²

Six years later the king ended his own life when the heir apparent, whom another chief minister had earlier advised setting aside, staged a coup and seized the throne.⁷³ In the previous year the heir apparent had already secured the execution of that chief minister by accusing him of taking a bribe from the enemy during battle.⁷⁴ Following his installation King Mu (r. 625-614) promoted his tutor to the positions of grand tutor and chief of the palace guard on the royal household staff.⁷⁵ Thereafter, the grand tutor shared prominence with several chief ministers,⁷⁶ an indication of the increased strength of the king and his royal household staff *vis-à-vis* the central government officials.

When the usurper king died and was succeeded in 613 by his heir apparent King Zhuang, who was still a minor, the tutor and guardian of the youthful king took advantage of the absence of the grand tutor and the chief minister, who were away together on military assignment, to stage a coup by fortifying the capital and sending a man to assassinate the chief minister. Both rebels bore grudges that had been incurred during previous reigns, the guardian having been denied appointment as chief minister, probably in 615 when the current chief minister assumed office.⁷⁷ Their rebellion was directed at the chief minister and the grand tutor, who were the twin pillars of authority,

⁷¹ ZZS 16:19a-23b (271-273, Xi 28).

⁷² ZZS 16:25b-27a (274-275, Xi 28).

⁷³ ZZS 18:5b-6b (299, Wen 1).

⁷⁴ ZZS 17:18a-19a (291-292, Xi 32).

⁷⁵ ZZS 18:6b (299, Wen 1).

⁷⁶ ZZS 19b:1a (328, Wen 11), 16b (335, Wen 14).

⁷⁷ ZZS 19b:5b (330, Wen 12).

and not at the young king whom they had in their charge; the latter was merely a pawn in their power play. Despite the machinations of the king's tutor and guardian, the rebellion floundered when the assassination attempt was botched and the rebels were routed and executed.⁷⁸

Around 611, presumably following the death of the chief minister due to natural causes, a new chief minister was appointed and then executed after he was allegedly slandered by Artisan Master Wei Jia.⁷⁹ In 605 his successor murdered Jia, who had been appointed grand marshal, and rebelled against King Zhuang before being subdued and executed by troops who were loyal to the king.⁸⁰ As discussed below, the Wei lineage had a long tradition of faithful service to the kings of Chu; so the choice of Wei Ailie, the son of Jia, as a "safe" chief minister to head the central government in 605 was not surprising. Nevertheless, his appointment was made in a political climate of nearly constant turmoil and tension that had resulted in strengthening the royal house while weakening the central government. An analysis of the situation in Chu in 597 asserts that nary a day had passed without King Zhuang disciplining and exhorting the *guoren*,⁸¹ an apparent allusion to events of the type cited here--the execution of two chief ministers.

During his tenure as chief minister prior to the battle at Bi in 597, Wei Ailie earned high marks for his considerable skills as an administrator.⁸² Because of that and

⁷⁸ ZZS 19b:16b-17a (335-36, Wen 14).

⁷⁹ By the time they played key roles in dealing with a local rebellion in 611 (ZZS 20:2b-4b [346-347]), Dou Ziyue and Wei Jia may have already assumed the positions of chief minister and grand marshal, respectively.

⁸⁰ ZZS 21:21a-22b (370, Xuan 4).

⁸¹ ZZS 23:11b (393, Xuan 12).

⁸² ZZS 22:15b-16b (383, Xuan 11).

the conditions under which he served, he was perhaps unavoidably caught in the competition between the royal house and the central government in spite of the traditional good relationship that his progenitors had enjoyed with the kings of Chu. The designation of *shenyin* as commander of the Center Army in the battle at Bi in place of Chief Minister Wei Ailie is a clear manifestation of this competitive situation.

As far as revealed in the historical record, the execution of the battle at Bi was dominated by the king and his personal staff or retainers.⁸³ Although the left deputy chief minister and the grand marshal are identified in command positions along with the *shenyin*, who was one of the king's men, they do not appear again in the battle and events related to it. The only high central government official who is shown in a substantive role is Chief Minister Wei Ailie. After command assignments were made, word was received that the opposition force from Jin was advancing toward the Chu camp. King Zhuang desired to beat a hasty retreat but was opposed by one of his favorites, Wu Can. Wei Ailie, who was also in favor of retreating, exchanged sharp words with Can, then ordered the Chu chariots and banners to make an about face southward. Whereupon Can convinced King Zhuang to change his mind and order Ao to turn the chariot teams northward again to face the enemy.⁸⁴ Later in the campaign, when the king was away on maneuvers with part of his garrison, Chief Minister Wei Ailie seized the opportunity to order the drive that ultimately resulted in victory for Chu. However, when King Zhuang joined with the main force again, he immediately took charge and gave his own men

⁸³ ZZS 23:10b-21b (392-398, Xuan 12).

⁸⁴ ZZS 23:10b-11a (392-393, Xuan 12).

crucial roles in the ensuing fight.⁸⁵ Thus, from the beginning to the end of the battle at Bi the king and his men maintained superiority over the central government officials as represented by their leader Chief Minister Wei Ailie.

The appointment of the *shenyin* to command the Center Army instead of the chief minister was but the tip of the iceberg that is revealed in the interplay between the royal house and central government officials during the battle. The *shenyin* was neither a former chief minister nor a *xian* administrator. He was one of the king's men, who occupied a royal staff position close to the king and who was appointed as the symbol of the king's authority to lead the Center Army on this occasion.

An Examination of Later Traditions

As a result of victory in the battle at Bi, King Zhuang of Chu was able to establish hegemony over the various states.⁸⁶ Because of their participation in this crucial encounter, the relationship between Chief Minister Wei Ailie and the *shenyin* and their supposed contribution to the success of Chu in winning the hegemony became part of the philosophic and folkloric traditions of subsequent eras. Due to their influence on the writing of Chu history until the present time, these traditions merit close scrutiny and critical evaluation.

The "Suo Liang" 所梁 chapter of *Mozi* credits Wei Ailie (Sun Shu'ao) and the *shenyin* with making King Zhuang hegemon. This assessment is included as one of twenty-nine examples of the way political kingpins were influenced for better or worse

⁸⁵ ZZS 23:16a-22b (395-398, Xuan 12).

⁸⁶ Tong 1969:203-206.

by their lieutenants.⁸⁷ Since the examples range from legendary Emperor Shun to King Kang of Song (r. 328-286), who lived after Mo Ti, this chapter is considered to be of late Warring States authorship by a disciple of Mo Di as an embellishment on a comment by the master on the nature of influence.⁸⁸ Each of the examples consists of the main man and two aides, an apparent response to the conceptual and, perhaps, literary demands for parallelism. The fact that the examples serve a pedagogical purpose without regard to their historicity and that parallelism required each set of relationships gives ample reason for questioning historical reliability in every instance. All relationships and roles are suspect until they can be shown to have some basis in fact, particularly those involving figures in historical periods. Consequently, the "So Liang" assertion regarding Wei Ailie and the *shenyin* must be viewed critically.

The "Dang Liang" 當梁 section of the *Lushi chungiu* repeats most of the "So Liang" chapter of *Mozi* with a few amplifications and additional illustrations. Here the *shenyin* is identified by the personal name of Zheng 蒸.⁸⁹ Elsewhere in the *Lushi chungiu*, the earliest work to supply a name, he is identified variously as Wu 巫, Shi 筮, and Ching 莖. The "Zun Shi" section states, "King Zhuang of Chu took as instructors Sun Shu'ao [i.e., Wei Ailie] and *Shenyin* Wu."⁹⁰ 楚莊王師孫叔敖沈尹巫。 The "Chachuan" 察傳 chapter says "Zhuang of Chu heard about Sun Shu'ao from *Shenyin* Shi."⁹¹ 楚莊聞孫叔敖於沈尹筮。 Finally, the "Zan Neng" 贊能

⁸⁷ MZJG 1:6-11.

⁸⁸ MZJG 1:6 (Sun commentary).

⁸⁹ LSCQXJZ 2.4:18-21.

⁹⁰ LSCQXJZ 4.3:38.

⁹¹ LSCQXJZ 22.6:294.

chapter tells how *Shenyin* Jing persuaded his close friend Sun Shu'ao, who had tried unsuccessfully for three years to find employment in the Chu capital, to go back to plowing fields at Qisi 期思, while he (Jing) sought to attract the attention of King Zhuang in order to secure an appointment for him. After loitering about the capital for five more years, Jing succeeded in getting an offer for appointment to the office of chief minister which he declined in favor of the "country-man from Qisi" (*Qisi zhi biren* 期思之鄙人), who was far superior to himself. "The King of [Chu], thereupon, sent a man with a royal carriage to fetch Shu'ao and made him chief minister. In twelve years time King Zhuang became hegemon."⁹² 莊王於是使人以王輿迎叔敖，以爲令尹。Zheng, Wu, Shi, and Jing are regarded as interchangeable on the basis of similarity of form;⁹³ therefore, they stand for the name of the same man.

The foregoing *Lushi chunqiu* embellishments must be closely scrutinized because they were widely transmitted in Han works and have affected the interpretations of the nature of the office of *shenyin*, the relationship between Chief Minister Wei Ailie and the *shenyin*, and their relationship to King Zhuang. All of the embellishments are rife with problems.

First, the recruitment story is neither consistent with the usual nature of appointments to high office in Chu nor with the circumstances under which Wei Ailie obtained the office of chief minister. A speech made on the eve of the battle at Bi details the internal conditions that prevailed in Chu during the tenure of Chief Minister Wei

⁹² LSCQXJZ 24.2:310.

⁹³ ZZHJ 11:9-10; Liu 1973:692; Yang 2:728.

Ailie. There the observation is made that, "As to the way that its ruler makes appointments, within his clan name he selects among close relatives, and without his clan he chooses among the old faithful [i.e., the descendants of loyal former officials]."⁹⁴ 其君之舉也，內姓選於親，外姓選於舊。 As a rule, appointments to the high offices, particularly that of chief minister, went to the sons, brothers, and other close relatives of the king,⁹⁵ and the final determination of who should serve was made through divination.⁹⁶ The situation was not such that an outsider could come to the capital and successfully campaign for appointment to high office, especially at this stage in the history of Chu.

Wei Ailie, or Sun Shu'ao, is traditionally believed to be descended from Fenmao (r. 757-741), who was the third great-grandfather of King Zhuang.⁹⁷ For three generations, his ancestors had loyally served the kings of Chu. His great-grandfather, Wei Zhang was one of the trusted lieutenants of King Wu (r. 740-691).⁹⁸ His grandfather, Wei Luchen,⁹⁹ is believed to have served as chief minister in ca. 632.¹⁰⁰ His father, Wei Jia,¹⁰¹ who moved from the office of artisan master to grand marshal during the early years of the reign of King Zhuang,¹⁰² is noted for being outspoken and having influence

⁹⁴ ZZS 23:6b (390, Xuan 12).

⁹⁵ Thatcher 1985:39-40.

⁹⁶ ZZS 60:10a (1045, Ai 17), 13a-b (1047, Ai 18).

⁹⁷ CQSZP 46a-b.

⁹⁸ ZZS 6:16b (109, Huan 6), 7:3b-4a (119, Huan 8), 5a (120, Huan 9).

⁹⁹ CQSZP 49b.

¹⁰⁰ ZZS 16:27a (275, Xi 28).

¹⁰¹ CQSZP 49b.

¹⁰² ZZS 16:10b-11a (Xi 28, 266-67), 21:21b (370, Xuan 4).

with the king.¹⁰³ Upon becoming chief minister, Dou Ziyang was executed allegedly because he had been slandered before King Zhuang by Wei Jia. His successor, Chief Minister Dou Ziyue, supposedly out of hatred but probably also due to fear, had Wei Jia surrounded and slain. Ziyue then turned his ire toward King Zhuang and made a futile attempt at a *coup d'etat*. When it failed, he was executed by troops loyal to the king.¹⁰⁴ With this turn of events the mighty royal Dou lineage lost its position of dominance in officialdom, and Wei Ailie became chief minister.

The Wei lineage had been loyal to the ruling house for generations, and Wei Jia had enjoyed a close and influential relationship with King Zhuang. Therefore, when he was killed by opponents of the king, who were in turn eliminated by royal loyalists, the appointment of his son to the post of chief minister, although not a foregone conclusion, could not have been totally unexpected. During the turmoil Wei Ailie might have run away to Qisi, but neither he, for three years, nor his friend, for five years, would have had to expend much time to bring him to the attention of King Zhuang. In short, this recruitment story has no basis in reality.

When the *Lushi chunqiu* recruitment anecdote is viewed in context in the "Zan Neng" chapter, the principal source of its inspiration becomes obvious, namely the model that immediately precedes it and begins illustrations of the philosophical point made in the chapter. That model is the recruitment of Guan Zhong by Duke Huan of Qi, the most famous of the so-called Five Hegemons, on recommendation from Bao Shuya, who is

¹⁰³ ZZZS 16:10b11a (Xi 28), 21:21b (370, Xuan 4).

¹⁰⁴ ZZZS 21:21b-22a (370, Xuan 4).

said to have declined appointment as minister because he was not equal to Guan Zhong.¹⁰⁵ Although some of the details leading up to the appointment of Guan Zhong may be of dubious historicity, there is historical basis for the claim that he was recommended by Bao Shuya.¹⁰⁶ This cannot be said for the recommendation of Wei Ailie by the *shenyin*.

The second major problem in the *Lushi chunqiu* references cited above is in the identification of the *shenyin* by name. The failure of contributors to the *Lushi chunqiu* to use the same character for his name from reference to reference is suggestive of uncertainty as to what actually was the name of the *shenyin*.

When looking to more reliable sources for someone who might fit the *shenyin* role portrayed in the *Lushi chunqiu*, the name of Shengong Wuchen 申公巫臣 (fl. 597-584) stands out. In the *Zuozhuan*, he is shown advising King Zhuang in both domestic and military matters and as having influence to the point of being able to thwart the designs of such highly placed officials as grand marshal and chief minister (in the latter case, the successor of Wei Ailie).¹⁰⁷

When Shengong Wuchen sought greener pastures in Jin in 589, two years following the death of King Zhuang, Grand Marshal Zifan requested permission to secure his return through bribery, but King Gong allegedly refused saying, "Although when he makes plans for himself, he goes too far, when he made plans for my [father], he was

¹⁰⁵ LSCQXJZ 24.2:309-10.

¹⁰⁶ ZZS 8:19b-20a (145, Zhuang 9); Thatcher 1977-8:149-50.

¹⁰⁷ ZZS 23:23b-24a (399, Xuan 12), 25:19a-20b (428, Cheng 2), 26:16a-b (443, Cheng 7).

loyal. Loyalty . . . is what covers many [mistakes], indeed!"¹⁰⁸ 其爲吾先君謀也，則忠。忠。所蓋多矣。 Thus, Shen *gong* Wuchen was regarded as a strategist loyal to King Zhuang. He may have been considered an "instructor" by the king--or those familiar with his activities could arrive at that conclusion, and he may have helped to formulate plans which culminated in the attainment of hegemony by Chu.

During the reign of King Zhuang the offices of *Shengong* and *shenyin* both existed. *Shengong* was the title of the administrator of Shen 申. As discussed above, *shenyin* has also been understood to be the title of the administrator of Shen 沈. The existence of two places known by these names is beyond doubt. Whereas nothing is recorded in historical sources about the occupant of the *shenyin* office at this time other than his possibly nominal role as commander of the Center Army in 597, more details have been transmitted about the activities of *Shengong* Wuchen. In view of the fact that the name of the latter was Wu, which is one of the names of attached to the *shenyin* and an element in another of the *Lushi chunqiu* names, and of the similar interpretations which can be given to these titles, contributors to the *Lushi chunqiu* appear to have fused the careers of the occupants of each office to arrive at their evaluation of the role played by someone whom they dubbed *Shenyin* Wu (and variants).

¹⁰⁸ ZZS 25:21a (429, Cheng 2).

Appendix 7
Recruitment Tables

Table A3: Chief Ministers by First Year of Recorded Service, Relationship to Reigning King, and Descent or Social Status: 706 - 605

First Year of Recorded Service		Name	Relationship to Reigning King	Descent or Social Status
BC	Reign Year			
706	Wu 35	Dou Bobi	uncle	son of Ruo'ao
690	Wu 51	Dou Qi	unknown	unknown
676	Wen 14	Peng Zhongshuang	none	prisoner of war
666	Cheng 6	Gongzi Yuan (Ziyuan)	uncle	son of King Wu
664	Cheng 8	Dou Ziwen	cousin	son of Dou Bobi
637	Cheng 35	Cheng Ziyu (Dechen)	cousin	grandson of Ruo'ao
632 ^a	Cheng 40	Wei Luchen	cousin	grandson of Fenmao
627	Cheng 45	Dou Zishang	cousin	unknown
626	Cheng 46	Cheng Daxin	cousin	son of Cheng Ziyu
615	Mu 11	Cheng Jia	cousin	cousin/uncle of Cheng Daxin
611	Zhuang 3	Dou Ziyang	cousin	son of Dou Ziwen
611	Zhuang 3	Dou Ziyue	cousin	son of Dou Ziliang

Source: *Zuozhuan, Shibei*.

^a Probable year.

Table A4: Grand Marshals by First Year of Recorded Service, Relationship to Reigning King, and Descent or Social Origin: 706 - 605

First Year of Recorded Service		Name	Relationship to Reigning King	Descent or Social Status
BC	Reign Year			
705	Wu 36	Dou Lian	uncle	son of Ruo'ao
664 ^a	Cheng 8	Dou Ziliang	cousin	son of Dou Bobi
634	Cheng 38	Dou Zixi	cousin	unknown
611	Zhuang 3	Dou Ziyue	cousin	son of Dou Ziliang
611	Zhuang 3	Wei Jia	cousin	son of Wei Luchen

Source: *Zuozhuan, Shibei*.

^aYear uncertain; Dou Ziliang is not shown functioning in office.

Table A5: *Mo'ao* by First Year of Recorded Service, Relationship to Reigning King, and Descent or Social Origin: 706 - 605

First Year of Recorded Service		Name	Relationship to Reigning King	Descent or Social Status
BC	Reign Year			
701	Wu 40	Qu Xia	son	
690	Wu 51	Qu Zhong	son? grandson?	

Source: *Zuozhuan, Shibei*

Table A6: Chief Ministers by First Year of Recorded Service, Relationship to Reigning King, and Descent or Social Status: 604 - 552

First Year of Recorded Service		Name	Relationship to Reigning King	Descent or Social Status
BC	Reign Year			
604	Zhuang 10	Wei Ailie	cousin	son of Wei Jia
590	Gong 1	Zizhong (Gongzi Yingqi)	uncle	son of King Mu
570	Gong 21	Zixin (Gongzi Renfu)	uncle	son of King Mu
568	Gong 23	Zinang (Gongzi Zhen)	brother	son of King Zhuang
558	Kang 2	Zigeng (Gongzi Wu)	uncle	son of King Zhuang
552	Kang 8	Zinan (Gongzi Zhuishu)	uncle	son of King Zhuang

Source: *Zuozhuan, Shibei*

Table A7: Grand Marshals by First Year of Recorded Service, Relationship to Reigning King, and Descent or Social Origin: 604-552

First Year of Recorded Service		Name	Relationship to Reigning King	Descent or Social Status
BC	Reign Year			
597	Zhuang 17	Zifan (Gongzi Ce)	brother?	unknown
570	Gong 21	Gongzi Heji	brother? uncle?	unknown
561	Gong 30	Zigeng (Gongzi Wu)	brother	son of King Zhuang
558	Kang 2	Wei Zifeng	cousin	son of Wei Ailie

Source: *Zuozhuan, Shibei*.

Table A8: *Mo'ao* by First Year of Recorded Service, Relationship to Reigning King, and Descent or Social Origin: 604-552

First Year of Recorded Service		Name	Relationship to Reigning King	Descent or Social Status
BC	Reign Year			
558	Kang 2	Qu Dao	cousin	son of Qu Dang
551	Kang 9	Qu Jian	cousin	son of Qu Dao

Source: *Zuozhuan, Shibei*

Table A9: Chief Ministers by First Year of Recorded Service, Relationship to Reigning King, and Descent or Social Status: 551-479

First Year of Recorded Service		Name	Relationship to Reigning King	Descent or Social Status
BC	Reign Year			
551	Kang 9	Wei Zifeng	cousin	son of Wei Ao
548	Kang 12	Qu Jian	cousin	son of Qu Dao
544	Jia'ao 1	Wangzi Wei	uncle	son of King Gong
541	Jia'ao 4	Wei Pi	cousin	unknown
529	Ling 12	Dou Chengran	cousin	son of Dou Weigui
528	Ping 1	Zixia (Yang Gai)	cousin	gg grandson of King Mu
519	Ping 10	Zichang (Nang Wa)	cousin	grandson son of Zinang
506	Zhao 10	Zixi (Gongzi Shen)	brother	son of King Ping
479	Hui 10	Shen Zhuliang	unrelated	
478	Hui 11	Ziguo (Gongsun Ning)	nephew	son of Zixi

Sources: *Zuozhuan, Shibei*

Table A10: Grand Marshals by First Year of Recorded Service, Relationship to Reigning King, and Descent or Social Origin: 551-479

First Year of Recorded Service		Name	Relationship to Reigning King	Descent or Social Status
BC	Reign Year			
551	Kang 9	Gongzi Yi	uncle? brother?	unknown
548	Kang 12	Wei Yan	cousin	son of Wei Zifeng
524	Ping 5	Ziyu (Gongzi Fang)	unrelated?	unknown
519	Ping 10	Wei Yue	cousin	unknown
496	Zhao 20	Ziqi (Gongzi Jie)	brother	son of King Ping
479	Hui 10	Shen Zhuliang	unrelated	
478	Hui 11	Gongsun Kuan	nephew	son of Ziqi (Gongzi Jie)

Source: *Zuozhuan, Shibei*

Table A11: *Mo'ao* by First Year of Recorded Service, Relationship to Reigning King, and Descent or Social Origin: 551-479

First Year of Recorded Service		Name	Relationship to Reigning King	Descent or Social Status
BC	Reign Year			
538	Ling 3	Qu Shen	cousin	son of Qu Dang
537	Ling 4	Qu Sheng	cousin	son of Qu Jian

Source: *Zuozhuan, Shibei*

Appendix 8

Chief Minister Appointments

The best documented position in the central government is the office of chief minister. Table A12 below offers a reconstruction of chief minister appointments from 706, the year of first substantive reference to the internal affairs of Chu in the Spring and Autumn Era, to 478, the date of the last recorded appointment to this position. Similar tables of chief minister appointments have been prepared previously by Gu Donggao,¹ Zeng Zisheng,² and Song Gongwen.³ However, although there is agreement on the identity and order of most appointees, none of the tables are identical and each differs from the reconstruction which is presented here. Therefore, a review of relevant appointment data is in order.

None of the three scholars named above include Dou Bobi (fl. 706-699) on their lists of chief ministers. Indeed, the *Zuozhuan* does not reveal the name of the office which he held. Nevertheless, Gu Donggao makes the observation that "Dou Bobi governed the state and controlled planning;"⁴ thus, he acknowledges the importance of the role which Dou played during the waning years of the reign of King Wu (r.740-690). There are a number of reasons for assuming that he held the position of

¹ CQDSB 23:1a-15b (1451-1458).

² Zeng Zisheng 1943:121.

³ Song Gongwen 1983.8:70-75.

⁴ CQDSB 23:1a (1450, "Preface").

chief minister. First, although Dou Qi (fl. 690) is the first person identified as chief minister,⁵ the Dou lineage, which provided five of the twelve occupants of this office between 690 and 590, traced its origins to Dou Bobi, thus suggesting that he may have been the first lineage member to serve as chief minister.⁶ Second, as indicated in the assessment of his performance by Gu Donggao, the role which Dou Bobi played in the administration of King Wu is consistent with that of subsequent chief ministers. Over the reservations of another advisor, in 706 Dou Bobi persuaded King Wu to accept the overtures of a peace emissary from Sui and lift the siege of that state.⁷ When conditions were right two years later, he first persuaded Chu to attack Sui, then when it sued for peace, he talked King Wu into accepting the initiative in spite of the king's own inclination to annihilate Sui.⁸ Third, as will become evident below, since the kings of Chu customarily picked uncles, brothers, and members of royal lineages to fill the top central government positions, the fact that Dou Bobi was the uncle of King Wu⁹ means that he was eligible for appointment to the office of chief minister. Finally, as noted elsewhere, his chief rival for influence was Mo'ao Qu Xia, a secondary son of King Wu.¹⁰ Since Dou Bobi was senior to Qu Xia both in generation and age, his position in officialdom should have been higher than the latter. In view of the above considerations, the probability that he held the office of chief minister is very high.

⁵ ZZZS 8:9a-b (140, Zhuang 4).

⁶ GY 18:7a (413, "Chuyu" *xia*).

⁷ ZZZS 6:16b-17a (109-110, Huan 6).

⁸ ZZZS 7:3b-4a (119, Huan 6).

⁹ SBJB 46 shows King Wu as the grandson of Ruo'ao, who was the father of Dou Bobi; also see ZZZS 21:22b (370, Xuan 4).

¹⁰ Appendix 4, Qu pedigree.

Table A12. Chief Minister Appointments, 706-479

Chief Minister	BC	Reign Year	Chief Minister	BC	Reign Year
Dou Bobi	706	Wu 35	Zixin (Gongzi Renfu)	570	Gong 21
Dou Qi	690	Wu 51	Zinang (Gongzi Zhen)	568	Gong 22
Peng Zhongshuang	688	Wen 2	Zigeng (Gongzi Wu)	558	Kang 2
Ziyuan (Gongzi Yuan)	666	Cheng 6	Zinan (Gongzi Zhuishu)	552	Kang 8
Ziwen (Dou Ruowutu)	664	Cheng 8	Wei Zifeng	551	Kang 9
Ziyu (Cheng Dechen)	637	Cheng 35	Zimu (Qu Jian)	548	Kang 12
Wei Luchen	632	Cheng 40	Ziwei (Wangzi Wei)	544	Jia'ao 1
Zishang (Dou Bo)	627	Cheng 45	Wei Pi (Zidang)	541	Jia'ao 4
Cheng Daxin	626	Cheng 46	Ziqi (Dou Chengran)	529	Ling 12
Cheng Jia (Cheng Jia)	615	Mu 11	Zixia (Yang Gai)	528	Ping 1
Ziyang (Dou Ziyang)	612	Zhuang 2	Zichang (Nang Wa)	519	Ping 10
Ziyue (Dou Jiao)	611	Zhuang 3	Zixi (Gongzi Shen)	505	Zhao 11
Wei Ailie	605	Zhuang 9	Shen Zhuliang	479	Hui 10
Zizhong (Gongzi Yingqi)	590	Gong 1	Ziguo (Gongsun Ning)	479	Hui 10

Source: *Zuozhuan*

As noted above, the first reference to the office of chief minister is found in 690 when Dou Qi is shown in that position. Although his line of descent is not known, he is assumed to have been a member of the Dou lineage.¹¹ The actual date and circumstances of his appointment are also not revealed in extant historical texts. He served under King Wu, who died on the campaign against Sui in 690.¹²

The next person who is said to have served in this position is Peng Zhongshuang, a prisoner of war from the state of Shen who was appointed chief minister by King Wen (r. 689-675). During his tenure he is credited with reducing the states of Shen (his native place) and Xi to *xian* status, winning the submission of the

¹¹ Appendix 4, Dou pedigree.

¹² ZZS 8:9a-b (140, Zhuang 4).

states of Chen and Cai, and establishing border of Chu at the Ru River, a major tributary of the Huai River which flows in a southeasterly direction through the middle of modern Henan Province.¹³

Since the actual dates of his service are not recorded, the foregoing events provide some useful clues. Early in the reign of King Wen there are two references to military action against the state of Shen. When King Wen assumed the kingship, Chu allied itself with the state of Ba in attacking Shen.¹⁴ Unfortunately, this event is not dated, but it could have occurred no earlier than 689. The *Zuozhuan* records that King Wen led an attack on Shen in 688.¹⁵ Whether this is the same event just mentioned or an action taken after Peng Zhongshuang had been captured and made chief minister cannot be determined. In 684 an emissary from Xi persuaded King Wen to launch a successful military campaign against Cai in 684.¹⁶ In the same or following year, the ruler of Cai got his revenge by convincing King Wen to attack and extinguish the state of Xi. The final chapter of this episode was written in 680 when King Wen invaded Cai for having caused him to extinguish Xi.¹⁷ Since Peng Zhongshuang is given credit for

¹³ ZZS 60:9b (1045, Ai 17).

¹⁴ ZZS 9:16a (159, Zhuang 18).

¹⁵ ZZS 8:12b-13a (241-242, Xi 21).

¹⁶ ZZS 8:24a (147, Zhuang 10).

¹⁷ ZZS 9:9b (156, Zhuang 14). The extinction of Xi State occurred either in 684 or 683, for prior to the invasion of Cai in 680, King Wen had sired two sons by Lady Wei, the wife of the former ruler of Xi. Her brother-in-law, the ruler of Cai, had used her as bait in persuading King Wen to attack Xi. Her refusal to speak even a single word to King Wen, in spite of having borne him two sons, provoked his invasion of Cai in 680. This entire chain of events began in 684 when the ruler of Cai slighted her as she passed through his state enroute to her home state of Chen.

these successes, his tenure as chief minister should at least span the period from 684-680. He may have been appointed as early as 689 or 688.

There is no consensus as to whether Peng Zhongshuang actually served as chief minister. Gu Donggao takes an ambivalent view, indicating in his table of chief ministers that Peng served from 689-675,¹⁸ then explicitly deleting him from his final tally of occupants of this position.¹⁹ Zeng Zisheng simply omits Peng from his list of chief ministers without any comment,²⁰ while Song Gongwen argues that he served from about 687-682.²¹ The fact that Peng Zhongshuang was formerly a prisoner of war and, thus, not of royal Chu blood seems to underlay the positions of Gu and Zeng, for neither one allows for this kind of exception in the selection of chief ministers.²² However, a precedent for the employment of a foreigner in such a key position can perhaps be found in King Wu's use of Guan Dingfu, also a prisoner of war but from the state of Ruo, as a military commander.²³ Like Peng Zhongshuang, he was instrumental in military and diplomatic successes in the region where his home state was located, namely the lower Han River drainage basin northeast of the capitol of Chu. Note must

¹⁸ CQDSB 23:1a-b (1451).

¹⁹ CQDSB 23:15a (1458).

²⁰ Zeng 1943:121.

²¹ Song 1983:70.

²² In his prefatory remarks to Table 23, Gu makes the categorical statement that "This office was mostly filled by ducal sons or descendants of rulers. As to others, there were none who were able to attain it." (CQDSB 23:1a ["Preface," 1450]). Gu's personal bias in favor of keeping top government positions in the hands of blood relatives of the ruler is clearly evident in his assertion that by so doing Chu was able to "correct the shortcomings of [the states of] Qi and Jin" (*ibid.*, 16a ["A Discussion of the Chief Minister of Chu in the Spring And Autumn Era," 1458]). Zeng 1943:120, simply states that chief ministers were sons, full brothers, or half brothers of rulers.

²³ ZZS 60:9b (1045, Ai 17).

be made of the fact that Guan and Peng are not shown in action in the *Zuozhuan* account of the period in which they are said to have served; they are only mentioned retrospectively in a passage from the year 479. This need not be construed to mean that they were not actually employed as portrayed. The omission of their names from the historical record of their time may simply be a reflection of the biases of contemporary recorders.

Song Gongwen ends the tenure of Peng Zhongshuang in 682 in order to make room for Bao Shen 鮑申, whom he believes also held the position of chief minister during the reign of King Wen.²⁴ Admitting that no references to Bao Shen can be found in extant pre-Qin sources, he turns to Qin and Han works to make his argument. In a gloss on a reference to Bao Shen contributing to the success of King Wen's rule in the "Shuo Shan" 說山 chapter of *Huainanzi*, Gao You of the Later Han (A.D. 25-220) states that "Bao Shen was a minister of Chu."²⁵ 鮑申，楚相。 Song asserts that the comment by Gao should be accepted in the absence of any contrary evidence because he was undoubtedly widely read in pre-Qin sources, and where his observations can be documented, he is right more often than wrong.

Song brings an anecdote about Bao Shen 保申 and King Wen in the "Zheng Jian" 正諫 chapter of the *Shuo Yuan* forward as confirmation of the accuracy of Gao You's gloss. Here Bao Shen states his office saying, "When our former king divined about making me guardian, it was auspicious." 先王卜以臣爲保，吉。 He

²⁴ Song 1983:72.

²⁵ *Huainanzi* commentary by Gao You, in XBZZJC, vol. 7, 16:286.

then remonstrates with King Wen and flogs him for pursuing personal pleasure while neglecting affairs of state. Having been thus reprimanded and humbled, King Wen changes his ways, takes the advice of Shen, and goes on to apply himself in governing Chu and expanding its territorial influence.²⁶

This anecdote is a recension of a passage in the "Zhi Lian" 直諫 chapter of the *Lushi Chunqiu* where Bao Shen is written 葆申, and Gao You explains the name as follows: "Bao is the office of Grand Guardian. Shen is the given name."²⁷ 葆，太葆官也。申，名也。 Even though this anecdote explicitly states that Shen held the office of guardian (*bao* 保) and shows him acting only in that capacity, Song insists that it implies that he was promoted to the position of chief minister. While Shen may be correctly said to have assisted King Wen, Gao You is wrong if, by identifying him as "a minister of Chu," he meant that Shen served as chief minister. Song's argument is too forced to be convincing.

The next person who is known to have occupied the position of chief minister is Ziyuan (Gongzi Yuan), who was a younger brother of King Wen.²⁸ He is identified as chief minister upon his first appearance in the *Zuozhuan* in 666,²⁹ but the date of his

²⁶ SY 9:7a-b.

²⁷ LSCQXJZ 23:299 (text and Gao commentary). Quoted in Song Gongwen 1983:72 (Note 1). No one is shown in the office of grand guardian in the *Zuozhuan* or in the *Guoyu*; therefore, this office is not included in the royal household staff list in Chapter 5 or discussed in Appendix 5.

²⁸ Appendix 2, Spring and Autumn generations.

²⁹ ZZS 10:14b (177, Zhuang 28).

actual appointment is not known. He served in this position until 664 when he was assassinated by Dou Ban (fl. 666-664) and replaced by Dou Ziwen.³⁰

On the surface the end of the tenure of Ziyuan and the appointment of Ziwen appears to have been the result of a conspiracy by the Dou lineage to regain the chief minister position. While this may have indeed been the case, Ziyuan provided ample justification for their action. In 666 he sought to woo his sister-in-law, who was Lady Wei of Xi and mother of King Cheng (r. 671-626), into an adulterous relationship by staging the performance of a dance beside her bedchamber. When she rebuffed him by accusing him of neglecting his martial duties in contrast to her former husband King Wen, who had used that particular dance when preparing for war, Ziyuan admitted his error and launched a campaign against the state of Zheng. Dou Ban, who evidently held the position of administrator of Shen *xian*, was among his officers on the campaign.³¹ When he took up residence in the king's palace after returning from attacking Zheng (the year is unclear), Dou Lian was arrested and handcuffed for remonstrating with him for his impertinence. In the Autumn of 664 Dou Ban, who is regarded as the son of Lian,³² killed Ziyuan.³³ Whether Dou Ban was acting to avenge the honor of his father only or to clear the way for the appointment of Ziwen, the son of Dou Bobi and head of the Dou lineage,³⁴ is difficult to determine.

³⁰ ZZS 10:18b-19a (179-80, Zhuang 30).

³¹ ZZS 10:14b (177, Zhuang 28); CQZZ 1:241-42. In the continuation of this episode in 664, Dou Ziyang is identified as administrator of Shen; see ZZS, 10:18b-19a (179, Zhuang 30). For the parentage of King Wen refer to *ibid.*, 9:9b (156, Zhuang 14).

³² Appendix 4, Dou pedigree.

³³ ZZS 10:18b-19a (179, Zhuang 30).

³⁴ ZZS 21:22b (370, Xuan 4).

Ziwen is remembered as an able official who exhausted the wealth of his immediate family and shunned personal gain for the sake of the well-being of the state and its citizenry.³⁵ He is said to have voluntarily stepped down as chief minister on three occasions;³⁶ however, he is actually shown doing so only once. In 637 Ziwen yielded the position of chief minister to his first cousin Cheng Ziyu (Dechen), a grandson of ruler Ruo'ao (r. 790-764),³⁷ when the latter returned from an extremely successful military campaign. When the wisdom of this action was questioned by Wei Luchen, he responded, "I did it in order to pacify the state. When a fellow has major achievements, yet has no important office, how few are such people who are able to keep still."³⁸ 吾以靖國也。夫有大功而無貴仕，其人能靖者與有幾。 Ziyu was evidently not one of the few, for he was ambitious and headstrong. Despite the serious reservations of King Cheng, in 632 Dechen persisted in leading the troops of Chu against Jin and to severe defeat in the battle of Chengpu. When faced with local accountability for the lives of soldiers lost during this debacle, he ended his career by committing suicide while enroute back to Chu.³⁹

³⁵ See ZZS 10:18b-19a (179, Zhuang 30) and 21:22b (370, Xuan 4), and GY 18:5b (410, "Chuyu" *xia*). According to the latter source, Ziwen was not motivated by a sense of altruism. It relates the following: "Someone criticized Ziwen saying, 'Since men live to pursue wealth, why do you avoid it?' [Ziwen] responded, 'The reason one participates in government is to shelter the people. If the people were for the most part neglected, while I sought wealth from it, that would amount to serving the people in order to enrich myself. Death would be quick indeed! I avoid death, I do not avoid wealth.'" 人謂子文曰人生求富，而子逃之，何也。對曰夫從政者，以庇民也。民多曠也，而我取富焉，是勤民以自封，死無日矣。我逃死，非逃富也。 Ziwen was a survivor!

³⁶ GY 18:5b (410, "Chuyu" *xia*).

³⁷ Appendix 4, Cheng pedigree.

³⁸ ZZS 15:7a-b (250, Xi 23).

³⁹ ZZS 16:19a-27a (271-275, Xi 28).

When Duke Wen of Jin was advised of the death of Ziyu, he is alleged to have said, "There are simply none to harm me. When Wei Luchen actually becomes chief minister, he [will] serve only himself; [his ambition] will not be with the people."⁴⁰ 莫余害也已。薦呂臣實爲令尹，實奉己而已，不在民矣。On the basis of this allusion, Wei Luchen, who was the son of Wei Zhang and grandson of Fenmao (r. 757-741),⁴¹ is believed to have replaced Ziyu in 632.⁴² Whereas Du Yu maintains that Luchen had opposed the appointment of Ziyu in 637 because he felt the latter would not be able to adequately fill the position,⁴³ Takezoe suggests that he was opposed because at that time he was himself next in line to become chief minister.⁴⁴ However, to this point in Chu history there is no evidence of systematic promotions within the central government. On the basis of promotions which are recorded later, Grand Marshal Zixi (Dou Yishen) would have been the most likely replacement for Ziyu, but he was demoted to become administrator of *Shangxian* following the defeat at Chengpu.⁴⁵ The death of Ziyu may have cleared the way for the appointment of Luchen as chief minister. The move was predictable not because he was next in line, but rather because he had long sought the position.

However, since Wei Luchen is never shown in action as chief minister, his actual appointment is open to question. Possibly for this reason, Zeng Zisheng does not

⁴⁰ ZZS 16:27a (275, Xi 28).

⁴¹ Appendix 4, Wei pedigree.

⁴² See CQDSB 23:3b (1452) and Song 1983:70.

⁴³ ZZS 15:7a (250, Xi 23, Du commentary).

⁴⁴ ZZHJ 7:29.

⁴⁵ ZZS 19a:23b-24b (322, Wen 10).

include him in his list of chief ministers.⁴⁶ If he did actually hold this office, he was evidently not involved in any noteworthy activity and served only for a short period.

A *Zuozhuan* entry under the year 626 shows Chief Minister Zishang (Dou Bo) advising King Cheng against appointing Shangchen to be heir apparent.⁴⁷ Since Zishang had been executed in the preceding year,⁴⁸ this is clearly a retrospective reference to an earlier event. He first appears in the *Zuozhuan* in 632 during the battle at Chengpu taking orders from Chief Minister Ziyu and leading the Right Army.⁴⁹ Whether he was acting as an officer of the central government or merely as one of the troops of the higher order Ruo'ao lineage is not clear.⁵⁰ If the former, he may have been serving as right deputy chief minister, for in the battle at Yanling in 575, the right deputy chief minister commanded the Right Army.⁵¹ If this was his office, then the suicide of Ziyu and demotion of Grand Marshal Zixi in 632 would have made him a prime candidate for promotion to chief minister at that time. While regarding Wei Luchen as having been made chief minister after Ziyu, Gu Donggao maintains that Zishang was appointed in 631 because he advised against the selection of Shangchen as heir apparent when King Cheng was still relatively young.⁵² At that time King Cheng

⁴⁶ Zeng 1943:121.

⁴⁷ ZZS 12:5b-6b (299, Wen 1).

⁴⁸ ZZS 17:18b-19a (291-292, Xi 33).

⁴⁹ ZZS 16:20a-23a (271-273, Xi 28).

⁵⁰ ZZS 16:19a-b (271, Xi 28). The primary components of the Chu force in the battle at Bi were the "six divisions of the Ruo'ao [lineage]" 若敖之六卒. As discussed in Chapter 3 above, this higher order lineage was comprised of the Dou and Cheng lineages which were descended from ruler Ruo'ao. The army commanders at Bi were all members of the higher order Ruo'ao lineage, namely Ziyu (Cheng Dechen), Zixi (Dou Yishen), and Zishang (Dou Bo).

⁵¹ ZZS 28:3a-b (473, Cheng 16). Right Deputy Chief Minister Zixin led the Right Army in battle at Yanling.

⁵² CQDSB 23:3b (1452).

would have been about forty-nine years old. However, the first certain year in which Zishang is identified as chief minister is 627.⁵³

The tenure of Zishang as chief minister ended in 627 when he was executed by King Cheng after Heir Apparent Shangchen had falsely accused him of avoiding battle with Jin because of bribery. In actual fact the troops of Jin had withdrawn from the battlefield after he had taken the advice of Cheng Daxin not to cross the Zhi River to join Jin in battle.⁵⁴ Du Yu maintains that Shangchen slandered Zishang because the latter had opposed his appointment as heir apparent.⁵⁵ However, since Cheng Daxin, who was the son of Ziyu,⁵⁶ apparently became the next chief minister, there is also an element of collusion and intra-lineage rivalry involved in the demise of Zishang.

Cheng Daxin is not explicitly identified as chief minister until his death in 615.⁵⁷ Opinions differ concerning the year of his appointment. Gu Donggao considers the appointment to have taken place by 626, or shortly after the execution of Zishang.⁵⁸ Song Gongwen says that it occurred in 625, the first year of the reign of King Mu (r. 625-614), arguing that the appointment of a new chief minister during the first year of a king's reign was common practice in Chu.⁵⁹ He cites four later appointments to

⁵³ ZZS 17:18b-19a (291-292, Xi 33).

⁵⁴ ZZS 17:18b-19a (291-292, Xi 33).

⁵⁵ ZZS 17:18b-19a (291-292, Xi 33, Du commentary); see *ibid.*, 17:5b-6b (299, Wen 1) for relevant details.

⁵⁶ ZZS 16:26a-27a (274-275, Xi 28, Du commentary).

⁵⁷ ZZS 19b:5b (330, Wen 12).

⁵⁸ CQDSB 23:4a-b (1452).

⁵⁹ Song 1983:72. Here the author considers and rejects the possibility raised by references in the *Shiji* of Sima Qian that Pan Chong (fl. 626-613) may also have served as chief minister during the reign of King Mu. "The Chronology of the Twelve Lords" states that in the first year of the reign of King Mu he was employed as minister (SJHZKZ, 14:18 [256]). "The Hereditary House of Chu, however, says that King Mu "ordered [him] to become Grand Tutor and control

buttress his argument.⁶⁰ However, because at least two of those appointments followed the natural deaths and another the execution of incumbent chief ministers,⁶¹ they cannot be used as evidence of common practice. Since Zishang was executed in the 12th month of 627,⁶² the appointment of Cheng Daxin could not have occurred before that time. Gu is correct in placing him in this office by 626.

When Cheng Daxin died in 615, Cheng Jia was appointed chief minister.⁶³ His precise relationship to Daxin is not known for certain. While Du Yu simply states that Jia was a great-grandson of Ruo'ao,⁶⁴ others claim that he was either the younger brother or son of Daxin.⁶⁵ If the latter relationship were true, this would be the only recorded case of father-son succession to the office of chief minister. Therefore, it

state affairs" (*Ibid.*, 40:11-17 [648]). Sima Qian makes no mention of the roles or contributions of any other officers during the reign of King Mu. Perhaps this is the reason why Song entertains the possibility that he served as chief minister in spite of the fact that his office was identified as grand tutor. According to the *Zuozhuan* Pan Chong was promoted from tutor of the heir apparent to grand tutor and chief of the palace guard after coaxing Shangchen to usurp the throne in 626 (ZZZS 12:5b-6b [299, Wen 1]). Although he exercised extraordinary influence in state affairs from these positions, in the *Zuozhuan* he is always shown to have been of inferior rank to the incumbent chief minister (*ibid.*, 19b:1a [328, Wen 11] and 16b-17a [335-36, Wen 14]). Song is correct in pointing out the fact that there is no evidence which should lead one to believe that Pan Chong ever served as chief minister.

⁶⁰ Song 1983:72, note 3. Song cites the appointments of Zizhong in 590 (Kung 1), Zigeng in 558 (Kang 2), Wangzi Wei in 544 (Jia'ao 1), and Zixia in 528 (Ping 1).

⁶¹ Zigeng became chief minister in 558 after the death of Zinang in 559 (see, ZZZS 32:22b [564, Xiang 14] and 32:24a-25a [565-566, Xiang 15]). Wangzi Wei was appointed chief minister in 544 after Zimu passed away in 545 (see *ibid.*, 38:22a [657, Xiang 28] and 39:4a [665, Xiang 29]). (Since his appointment occurred in the 2nd year of the reign of King Kang, it does not fit Song's pattern.) Zixia was appointed to fill the vacancy created in 528 when King P'ing executed Ziqi (see *ibid.*, 47:4b [820, Zhao 14]).

⁶² According to CQZS, 17:12b-13b (288-89, Xi 33), the events which surround the execution of Zishang occurred in the 12th month of 627.

⁶³ ZZZS 19b:5b (330, Wen 12).

⁶⁴ ZZZS 16: 26a-27a (274-275, Xi 28, Du Commentary).

⁶⁵ See Appendix 4, Cheng pedigree; ZZHJ 9:6; and Barry B. Blakeley, "An Annotated Genealogy of the Royal Clan of Chu in the Ch'un Ch'iu Period," *Early China*, 1 (1975), 34 and 37.

could not be safely interpreted as an example of appointment by hereditary right. While the selection of Cheng Jia may have resulted from the close relationship which Daxin enjoyed with King Mu, who was still serving at the time, it was more surely a manifestation of the strength of the Cheng lineage and/or the higher order Ruo'ao lineage to which the Cheng belonged.

The next person to hold the position of chief minister appears to have been Dou Ziyang (Dou Ban, who was the son of Ziwen).⁶⁶ The *Zuozhuan* states that when Ziwen died, Ziyang became chief minister.⁶⁷ However, it neither records the date of the death of Ziwen nor the activities of Ziyang in this office. Perhaps because of lack of the latter data, Gu Donggao and Zeng Jinsheng omit him from their lists of chief ministers.⁶⁸ However, Song Gongwen accepts the *Zuozhuan* evidence and correctly concludes that Ziyang must have served briefly between Cheng Jia and Dou Ziyue, probably between 612 and 611.⁶⁹ Since the office of chief minister was filled continuously from 637 to the final reference to Cheng Jia in 613⁷⁰ and Ziwen was still active in 632,⁷¹ Ziyang could not have served in that position before 613. The *Zuozhuan* states that Ziyue was made chief minister to fill the vacancy created by the execution of Ziyang at an unspecified date prior to 605.⁷² Since the first probable reference to Ziyue acting in this position occurs in 611 when the king gave him command of a military unit during

⁶⁶ ZZS 21:21b (370, Xuan 4, Du Commentary).

⁶⁷ ZZS 21:21b (370, Xuan 4).

⁶⁸ CQDSB 23:5a (1453); Zeng 1943:121.

⁶⁹ Song 1983:73.

⁷⁰ ZZS 19b:16b-17a (335-36, Wen 14).

⁷¹ ZZS 16:26a-27a (274-75, Xi 28).

⁷² ZZS 21:21b (370, Xuan 4).

battle,⁷³ Ziyang would had to have served as chief minister between 613 and 611, or in 612. With this appointment, the Dou lineage regained ascendancy over its Cheng cousins and was once again represented in the top position in the central government.

Ziyang was executed and replaced as chief minister by his cousin, Dou Ziyue, under rather dubious circumstances. The *Zuozhuan* states that when "Dou Ban [Ziyang] became chief minister, [and] Ziyue became [grand] marshal. Wei Jia became artisan master, slandered Ziyang and [caused] him to be killed; Ziyue became chief minister, [and he] himself became [grand] marshal."⁷⁴ 鬥般爲令尹，子越爲司馬。 蔣賈爲工正，譖子揚而殺之，子越爲令尹，己爲司馬。

Ziyue and Wei Jia both benefited from the elimination of Ziyang the former advancing from grand marshal to chief minister and the latter moving from artisan master on the royal household staff to grand marshal in the central government. The view of Du Yu that "Jia slandered Ziyang for Jiao (i.e., Ziyue) and himself obtained Jiao's place"⁷⁵ 賈爲椒譖子揚而已得椒處 has been either accepted without comment or buttressed by later writers.⁷⁶ Collusion between Ziyue and Wei Jia is certainly a

⁷³ ZZS 20:4a (347, Wen 16).

⁷⁴ ZZS 21:21b (370, Xuan 4). On the translation: The case of Wei Jia slandering Ziyang and causing his death is analagous to Shangchen slandering Zishang and causing King Cheng to kill him in 627 (*ibid.*, 17:18b-19a [291-92, Xi 33]). Therefore, the phrase *zen Ziyang er sha zhi* (literally, "slandered Ziyang and killed him") has been translated as "slandered Ziyang and [caused] him to be killed." Wei Jia may have in fact done the killing; however, his purpose in slandering Ziyang was to obtain the death of the latter by order of the king.

⁷⁵ ZZS 21:21b (370, Xuan 4, Du Commentary).

⁷⁶ Among the latter, the argument by Liu Wenqi that Wei Jia collaborated with Ziyue because he was his subordinate can be rejected (see CQZZJZSZ 644.) Liu argues that, as in the state of Song, the office of artisan master (*gongzheng*) in Chu was a subordinate of the grand marshal. However, there is no evidence from Chu which can be used to support his case; refer above, Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of the office of artisan master and its place on the royal household staff.

possibility; however, when these appointments are placed in historical context, a different picture emerges.

Wei Jia can be regarded as acting on his own initiative in securing the death of Ziyang. From the time of his grandfather Wei Zhang (fl. 706-704), the progenitors of Wei Jia had been forced to take a back seat in state government Dou and Cheng members of the higher order Ruo'ao lineage.⁷⁷ When Wei Luchen, his father,⁷⁸ questioned Ziwen for voluntarily yielding the position of chief minister to Ziyu in 637,⁷⁹ he may have been motivated by personal designs on that position as much as genuine concern for the welfare of the state. While still a relatively young man in 633, Wei Jia had refused to go along with his elder statesmen in congratulating Ziwen for undermining Ziyu. On that occasion he reminded Ziwen of the rationale which he had given to Wei Luchen for yielding to Ziyu and charged that he was responsible for the latter's failures.⁸⁰ As noted above, Luchen finally became chief minister in 632 but only served until about 628. Although the reasons for the brevity of his tenure are not known, the succession of Dou and Cheng appointees which followed meant that the Wei lineage was once again sidelined. At the time he caused the execution of Ziyang, Wei Jia was serving on the royal household staff rather than in the central government. With the promotion of Ziyue from grand marshal to chief minister, Jia was finally able

⁷⁷ ZZZS 6:16b-17a (109-110, Huan 6), 7:3b-4a (119, Huan 8), and 7:5a (120, Huan 9). Wei Zhang is shown acting only in the role of emissary, while Dou Bobi and Dou Lian were active in decision-making and other leadership duties.

⁷⁸ Appendix 4, Wei pedigree.

⁷⁹ ZZZS 15:7a (250, Xi 23).

⁸⁰ ZZZS 16:10b-11a (266-67, Xi 27).

to enter the central government as grand marshal. Holding a key position on the royal household staff and having access to the king, he was strategically located to promote the political interests of himself and his lineage. Within the context of the appointment history of Chu, these personnel changes were made by King Zhuang (r. 613-591), not Ziyue.

When Ziyue succeeded Zishang as chief minister in 612, the fact that the last two Dou to serve in that position had been executed after being slandered must have weighed heavily on his mind. In the meantime Grand Marshal Wei Jia, who had been critical of two generations of Dou leaders and was responsible for the demise of Zishang, continued to grow in influence and stature. For example, when local ethnic groups took advantage of a major famine in Chu in 611 to attack its capital, Wei Jia persuaded the officers of Chu, presumably including Ziyue, to abandon their plan to relocate the capital to a less vulnerable site. Instead he proposed the extremely successful strategy of sending troops into battle to show the attackers that Chu was not incapacitated by the famine and, thus, scare them away.⁸¹ In 608 Jia enjoyed another notable military success in going to the rescue of Zheng and forcing Jin and its allies to withdraw their forces.⁸² By 605 he was apparently perceived as an intolerable political threat by Ziyue, for the latter "employed [the soldiers of] the lineages of the higher order Ruo'ao lineage to incarcerate [Jia] at Liaoyang and killed him."⁸³ 以若敖氏

⁸¹ ZZZS 20:3a-4b (347, Wen 16).

⁸² ZZZS 21:5a (362, Xuan 1).

⁸³ ZZZS 21:21b (370, Xuan 4).

之族圍伯嬴於轅陽而殺之。 Ziyue, however, was not content to stop there, for he next turned the Ruo'ao soldiers on King Zhuang.

Since the tenure of Ziyu as chief minister, tension between the royal house and the higher order Ruo'ao lineage had been growing. It first became evident in 632 when Ziyu, by one account,⁸⁴ went against the will of King Cheng in an attempting to silence his detractors, such as Wei Luchen and Wei Jia, by insisting on doing battle with Jin. In the severe defeat which ensued at Chengpu, six units of troops or chariot outfits of the higher order Ruo'ao lineage formed the core of his military force, and his principal commanders were cousins Grand Marshal Zixi and Zishang.⁸⁵ This military debacle

⁸⁴ GY 17:4a (385, "Chuyu" *shang*).

⁸⁵ ZZS 16:19a-23a (271-73, Xi 28, text and Du Commentary); also see GY 10:15b-16b (274-76, "Jinyu" 4). Takezoe accepts the gloss by Du Yu that the six Ruo'ao units were composed of 100 men each (ZZHJ 7:17); whereas, Yang Bojun argues that they were chariot outfits (CQZZZ, 1:457). Liu Wenqi making no judgment, merely notes that Ma Zonglian also takes issue with Du for other reasons and that Du is following the interpretation of Wei Zhao (CQZSZJZSZ, 415). For Wei Zhao on *zu*, refer to GY 14:11a (343, "Jinyu" 8, Wei commentary).

Du Yu and all later commentators on the *Zuozhuan* account of the battle of Chengpu say that King Cheng grudgingly sent the six Ruo'ao units together with the West Guang chariot division and the East Palace guard of the royal garrison to join Ziyu and the force which was already under his command during the siege of the capital of Song. However, the text is not that clear. It relates that when King Cheng ordered Ziyu to quit the siege of Song and not pursue Jin, the latter sent Ziyue to request permission to do battle anyway. Then it says, "The King, becoming angry, sparingly gave him troops. Only the West Guang [chariot division], East Palace [guard], and six units of the Ruo'ao [lineage] actually followed him." 王怒，少與之師。唯西廣，東宮，與若敖之六卒實從之。 Next Ziyu is shown sending a messenger to Jin offering to lift the siege of Song in return for a concession from Jin. The breakdown of units which followed Ziyu appears to be an observation by the author of this account that besides reinforcements from his own immediate kinsmen Ziyu had only two units from the royal garrison at his disposal. Later on the *Zuozhuan* states that when battle was joined, "Ziyu relied on the six units of Ruo'ao to lead the Center Army . . ." 子玉以若敖之六卒將中軍。 A speech by an officer of Chu recorded in GY 17:4a (385, "Chuyu" *shang*) quotes a Chu refugee advising a Jin commander at Chengpu saying, "As to that force, only Ziyu desires [to do battle], [he is] going against the desire of the King; therefore, only those East Palace [guard] and West Guang [chariot division] have come." 寔師也，唯子玉欲之，與王心違，故唯東宮與西廣寔來。 These two military units are

was, in essence, an affair of the higher order Ruo'ao lineage which stood behind its highest ranking politician despite the wishes of the king.

Following the suicide of Ziyu and demotion of Grand Marshal Zixi, who was sent far away from the capital to become administrator of *Shangxian*,⁸⁶ King Cheng went outside the Dou and Cheng lineages to appoint Wei Luchen as chief minister in 632. Although the Dou regained this position by 628 with the appointment of Zishang, the recommendation by the latter that Shangchen be replaced as heir apparent ultimately damaged relations between the Dou lineage and the royal house. When King Cheng heeded false accusations by Shangchen and executed Zishang in 627, he unwittingly cleared the way for the coup d'etat which brought Shangchen (who became known as King Mu) to the throne in 626.⁸⁷

Nine years later Zixi returned to the capital from *Shangxian* and submitted himself to the Director of Punishments, allegedly seeking execution in order to end rumors that he was about to flee into exile. However, King Mu, in an apparently reconciliatory move, intervened and appointed him to the position of Artisan Master on the royal household staff. But Zixi and another disgruntled official subsequently conspired to kill King Mu, only to be discovered and executed themselves.⁸⁸ This development may have had a bearing on the decisions by King Mu in 616 and King Zhuang in 613 to give Grand Tutor Pan Chong of the royal household staff important

probably all that were actually sent by King Zhuang, while the Ruo'ao contingent responded on its own initiative.

⁸⁶ ZZS 19a:23b-24b (322, Wen 10).

⁸⁷ ZZS 17:5b-6b (299, Wen 1).

⁸⁸ ZZS 19a:23b-24b (322, Wen 10).

military command roles alongside Chief Ministers Cheng Daxin and Cheng Jia, respectively.⁸⁹

In 613 Dou Ziyi, who felt that his contribution in bringing peace between Chu and Qin twelve years earlier had not been properly recognized, staged a rebellion in the capital together with an unhappy member of the royal house who had been refused appointment as chief minister. When their plot to assassinate Chief Minister Cheng Jia failed, they abducted King Zhuang and headed for safe haven in Shangmi. However, they were again foiled when they were deceived and killed by a local official along the way.⁹⁰

With this history as background, Wei Jia probably had little trouble in gaining credibility for his fatal charges against Chief Minister Ziyang in 612. When he was appointed grand marshal to fill the vacancy created by the promotion of Ziyue to chief minister, Jia became the first grand marshal of record who was not a member of the Dou lineage (see below). For nearly three decades the Dou and Cheng lineages, which made up the higher order Ruo'ao lineage, had been on a collision course with the royal house of Chu.

Of the Ruo'ao rebellion which Ziyue led in 605, Sima Qian writes, "Someone perhaps slandered him [to] King [Zhuang]; [so] fearing punishment, [he] rebelled and attacked the king."⁹¹ 人或譖之王，恐誅反攻王。 Considering what happened to Zishang and Ziyang, one can well imagine such a scenario with Wei Jia as

⁸⁹ZZZS 19b:1a (328, Wen 11) and 16b (335, Wen 14).

⁹⁰ZZZS 19b:16b-17a (335-36, Wen 14).

⁹¹SJHZKZ, 40:20 (649).

the slanderer. Ziyue may have taken this drastic step in anticipation of punishment by royal decree for having killed Jia. However, the support which he received from the higher order Ruo'ao lineage suggests that this was a case of corporate action motivated by the fact, as illustrated above, that the privileged position of its Dou and Cheng components was becoming increasingly tenuous with each passing decade. With the vulnerability of lineage members in high office to slander and execution and the growing inclination of reigning kings to rely on members of other lineages and the royal household staff, the prospect of continued access to the power and wealth of the state was diminishing. Unfortunately this gamble by the higher order Ruo'ao lineage did not pay off, for it was virtually extinguished by King Zhuang and his loyal supporters when it forced them to fight at Gaoxu.⁹² Only the descent from Ziwen was preserved through his grandson in order to "encourage the able" 勸善.⁹³

Wei Ailie, who was the son of Wei Jia,⁹⁴ is generally regarded as the next person to serve as chief minister after Ziyue.⁹⁵ By the time of his first appearance in the historical record in 598,⁹⁶ he already held this office. Gu Donggao argues that Ailie should have been employed as chief minister immediately after the 605 execution of Ziyue, who had detained and killed his father.⁹⁷ However, Song Gongwen says, "This kind of theory lacks the necessary historical basis."⁹⁸ Whereas, Gu maintains that the

⁹² ZZS 21:22a (370, Xuan 4).

⁹³ ZZS 21:22b (370, Xuan 4).

⁹⁴ Appendix 4, Wei pedigree.

⁹⁵ CQDSB 23:5b (1453); Zeng 1943:121.

⁹⁶ ZZS 22:15b (383, Xuan 11).

⁹⁷ CQDSB 23:5b-6a (1453).

⁹⁸ Song 1983:73-74.

services of a person who proved to be as meritorious as Wei Ailie would not have been put off for seven years until 598,⁹⁹ Song states that there are no references to him during this period because he was leading the life of a recluse outside of officialdom. Song goes on to argue that a person who is identified as *shenyin* 沈尹 served as chief minister for 5 to 7 years after Ziyue, with the transfer of this office to Wei Ailie taking place as early as 600.¹⁰⁰

The role of the person who is identified as *shenyin* during this period and his supposed relationship to Wei Ailie are the subject of many anecdotes in late Warring States and Former Han sources (most of which are cited by Song Gongwen) and have given rise to much comment. Although these are dealt with above in Appendix 6, some points must be mentioned here. An anecdote in *Hanshi waizhuan* expands *shenyin* to *shen lingyin* 沈令尹.¹⁰¹ *Shen lingyin* can be either understood as "chief minister of Shen" or "Chief Minister Shen." Within the context of the anecdote, only the latter rendition is acceptable because Shen is shown stepping down from office and advising King Zhuang to appoint Wei Ailie as chief minister of Chu. While regarding Shen as the name of a place rather than a person, Takezoe Kametaro, nevertheless, takes this to be a reference to the office of chief minister of Chu, not Shen. He claims that *shen lingyin* is contracted to *shenyin* in the *Zuozhuan* in deference to Wei Ailie, to whom the office of chief minister had already been yielded.¹⁰² While *shen lingyin* as "Chief

⁹⁹ CQDSB 23:5b (1453).

¹⁰⁰ Song 1983:74.

¹⁰¹ Quoted in CQBD 105.

¹⁰² ZZHJ 11:10.

Minister Shen" makes sense within the context of the *Hanshi waizhuan* anecdote, in more reliable historical sources the names of offices held in Chu always precede the names of the officeholders as in *Lingyin X*. Therefore, the author of the *Hanshi waizhuan* is wrong in inserting *ling* between *shen* and *yin*. Since there is no case of an officer of the central government of Chu being identified only by a compound consisting of the name of a place and the office held in the central government, the interpretation by Takezoe is also incorrect. *Shenyin* is a variant form of *qinyin* (寢尹 "chamberlain"), an office of the royal household staff (see Appendix 6). The person who commanded the Center Army in 597 was not and had never served as chief minister. The stories about his role in recruiting Wei Ailie are spurious and of late origin.

In selecting Wei Ailie to replace Ziyue as chief minister, King Zhuang once again drew from the Wei lineage. It had retained his trust by remaining loyal during the attempted coup d'etat. In view of the apparently influential relationship which Wei Jia had enjoyed with King Zhuang, the choice of his son to fill the position which might well have gone to himself, had he not been murdered by Ziyue, is not surprising. Despite the expression of confidence which is manifest in this appointment, the rebellion of 605 weakened the position of the royal lineages *vis-a-vis* the royal house and its staff.

Gu Donggao and Song Gongwen disagree of the length of Wei Ailie's tenure as chief minister and who succeeded him in this office. Gu shows Wei Ailie serving

through the end of the reign of King Zhuang in 591, when he was succeeded by Zizhong (Gongzi Yingqi).¹⁰³ Song states that he served until 596 or 595 when he presumably died. Perhaps because Zizhong is not identified by the title of chief minister in the *Zuozhuan* until 589, the second year of King Gong (r. 590-560), Song raises the question of who served in that office until the end of King Zhuang's reign. He offers Chief Minister Zipei 子佩, who shown inviting King Zhuang over for a drink in the "Daoyingxun" 道應訓 chapter of the *Huainanzi*.¹⁰⁴ Arguing that the all occupants of office of chief minister from the beginning of King Zhuang's reign to Wei Ailie are known, Song claims that Zipei could only have served following Ailie.¹⁰⁵

Song's argument can be rejected. By positing the death of Wei Ailie in 596 or 595, he made room for Zipei, but there is no historical evidence that Ailie died at this time. Moreover, the reliability of his key source, the *Huainanzi*, a late source which was composed in the Former Han dynasty, for historical detail is open to question. For example, the "Daoyingxun" chapter of the *Huainanzi*, also says that Sun Shu'ao (i.e., Wei Ailie) was appointed and resigned three times as chief minister.¹⁰⁶ There is no evidence for this in earlier sources.

Gu Donggao assumes that Left Deputy Chief Minister Zizhong, who was the younger brother of King Zhuang,¹⁰⁷ was appointed chief minister in 590, the first year of

¹⁰³ CQDSB 23:5b-6a (1453).

¹⁰⁴ See HNZ 12:197.

¹⁰⁵ Song Gongwen 1983:74-75.

¹⁰⁶ HNZ 12:207.

¹⁰⁷ Appendix 2, Spring and Autumn generations.

the reign of King Gong.¹⁰⁸ Zeng Zisheng and Song Gongwen have him starting in the position in 589¹⁰⁹ when he is first identified by the title of that office in the following *Zuozhuan* passage:

When Duke [Cheng] ascended the throne, he made a covenant with Jin [and] met Jin to attack Qi. The officers of Wey did not send an emissary to Chu, instead they also covenanted with Jin and followed it to attack Qi. Therefore, Chief Minister Zizhong of Chu made the Battle of Yangqiao in order to rescue Qi.¹¹⁰

公即位，受盟于晉，會晉伐齊。衛人不行使于楚，而亦受盟于晉，從於伐齊。故令尹子重爲陽橋之役以救齊。

The first reference to the battle of Yangqiao says, "When King Gong ascended the throne [in 590] and was about to make the Battle of Yangqiao, he sent Qu Wu 屈巫 (Shengong Wuchen) on a friendly visit to Qi and advise it of the time for the military action."¹¹¹ 及共王即位，將爲陽橋之役，使屈巫聘于齊，且告師。 Thus, Gu is correct; Zizhong, who was the commander of troops on this occasion, held the office chief minister as early as the first year of King Gong's reign, or 590.

After Zizhong allegedly died of a heart attack in 570 after being criticized by King Gong and blamed by his fellow officers for a military defeat by the state of Wu and the capture of Deng Liao, Right Deputy Chief Minister Zixin (Gongzi Renfu), who was the younger brother of Zizhong and uncle of King Gong, became chief minister.¹¹²

¹⁰⁸ CQDSB 12:6b (1453).

¹⁰⁹ Zeng Zizheng 1943:123 and Song Gongwen 1983:71.

¹¹⁰ ZZZS 25:21b-22a (429, Cheng 2).

¹¹¹ ZZZS 25:20b-21a (428-29, Cheng 2).

¹¹² ZZZS 29:10b-11a, 13a (500-02, Xiang 3); Appendix 2, Spring and Autumn generations.

When Zixin was killed 568 by the officers of Chu for driving the state of Chen away and into the camp of Jin and its northern allies, Zinang (Gongzi Zhen), who was the youngest brother of King Gong, was made chief minister.¹¹³ In 559 Zinang's carelessness in the battlefield created an opening for Wu to make a surprise attack and defeat his troops. Upon returning to Chu, he passed away.¹¹⁴

Grand Marshal Zigeng (Gongzi Wu), the elder brother of Zinang and uncle of King Kang (r. 559-545), was made chief minister in 558 in a series of appointments that were designed to appease the ruling elite in the capital.¹¹⁵ Gu Donggao says that Zigeng began his tenure as chief minister in 559. He apparently interpreted a deathbed assignment by Zinang to Zigeng to wall the capital Ying and the accolade given him by the *Zuozhuan* compiler(s) for protecting the altars of state as he was dying as evidence that his appointment occurred in this year.¹¹⁶ The *Zuozhuan*, however, states clearly that he was appointed chief minister in 558.

When Zigeng died in 552, King Kang ordered Grand Marshal Wei Zifeng to become chief minister, but he avoided serving by feigning deathly illness. Consequently, the king appointed Remonstrance Master Zinan (Gongzi Zhuishu), his uncle, chief minister.¹¹⁷ In 551, King Kang executed Zinan for incompetence and again

¹¹³ See ZZS 29:13a (502, Xiang 3) and 30:3a-b (515, Xiang 5). Zeng Zisheng overlooked Zinang when compiling his list of chief ministers (1943:123).

¹¹⁴ ZZS 32:20b-21a, 22b (563-64, Xiang 14).

¹¹⁵ Appendix 2, Spring and Autumn generations; ZZS 32:24a-25a (565-66, Xiang 15).

¹¹⁶ CQDSB 12:8b (1454).

¹¹⁷ Appendix 2, Spring and Autumn generations; ZZS 34:14b-15a (590-91, Xiang 21).

ordered Zifeng, who was his distant cousin, to serve as chief minister; this time he accepted.¹¹⁸

Wei Zifeng was the son of Chief Minister Wei Ailie and a descendant of Fenmao, ruler of Chu.¹¹⁹ As argued above, the royal Wei lineage had a long history of loyal service to the kings of Chu. The significance of the appointment of Wei Ailie in the wake of the *coup d'etat* of 605 and son Wei Zifeng after a string of uncles and brothers of the reigning king has served as chief ministers ought not be overlooked. Both were safe appointments from the point of view of the king. In the first instance, King Zhuang was seeking to shore up his rulership by appointing a member of a historically faithful royal lineage, and in the second instance, King Kang was putting some distance between himself and members of the royal house.

When Wei Zifeng died in 548, *Mo'ao* Qu Jian (Zimu), who was a distant cousin of King Kang, became chief minister.¹²⁰ The king and Chief Minister Zimu died in the 12th month of 545,¹²¹ and Wangzi Wei, who was King Kang's younger brother, became chief minister in 544 after his nephew, Jia'ao (r. 544-541), was enthroned.¹²² As discussed in Chapter 6, after Wangzi Wei murdered Jia'ao and sons, drove his own brothers Right Deputy Chief Minister Zigan (Gongzi Bi) and Palace Stable Master Zixi (Gongzi Heigong) into exile, and killed Grand Intendant Bo Zhouli in 541, he usurped

¹¹⁸ ZZS 35:5a-6a (600, Xiang 22). Zeng Zisheng mistakenly entered 552 as the year of the appointment of Wei Zifeng (1943:123).

¹¹⁹ Appendix 4, Wei pedigree.

¹²⁰ Appendix 4, Qu pedigree; ZZS 36:11a-b (622, Xiang 25).

¹²¹ ZZS 38:30b-32a (656-57, Xiang 28).

¹²² ZZS 9:4a (665, Xiang 29).

the throne and Wei Pi, his collaborator, and cousin, became chief minister.¹²³ Gu Donggao says that Wei Pi served as chief minister until 529.¹²⁴ Song Gongwen, although stating that his tenure ended with his last appearance in the *Zuozhuan* when he led an unsuccessful attack on Wu in 536, notes the "distinct possibility" that Wei Pi actually served until 529 because no other chief minister is mentioned in the interim.¹²⁵

Gongzi Qiji, the only brother who King Ling (r. 540-529) allowed to remain in the state, staged a *coup d'etat* in 529. Serving as administrator of Cai, he summoned his elder brothers Zigan and Zixi back from exile and enlisted them in the rebellion. He was also joined by Dou Chengran (Ziqi), who had been made his charge as a child, and others. When the rebels sent an advance party into the capital of Chu, King Ling fled. While camped nearby, Zigan was declared king, and Zixi became chief minister. In the role of grand marshal, Qiji took charge of the capital. Shortly thereafter, King Ling committed suicide at Yun. Qiji tricked Zigan and Zixi into committing suicide by sending Chengran and another messenger to them claiming that the king had returned, he (Qiji) had been killed, and the masses were coming to get them. After Qiji ascended the throne, becoming known in history as King Ping (r. 528-516), he appointed Chengran, who was his distant cousin, as chief minister.¹²⁶

¹²³ Appendix 4, Wei pedigree; ZZS 41:29a-b, 30b (710, Zhao 1).

¹²⁴ CQDSB 12:10b (1455).

¹²⁵ Song Gongwen 1983:71.

¹²⁶ Appendix 4, Dou pedigree; ZZS 46:3a-8a (805-807, Zhao 13). Also see discussion in Chapter 6.

Gu Donggao shows Qiji among the marshals of Chu, but he does not recognize Zixi as a legitimate holder of the office of chief minister.¹²⁷ Zeng Zisheng and Song Gongwen, however, include him in their lists of chief ministers.¹²⁸ I follow Gu because Zixi's appointment was not made by legitimate authority, and he never functioned in the office.

In 8th month of the first year of his reign, 528, King Ping executed Chief Minister Ziqi (Dou Chengran) despite their intimate relationship because of his "insatiable demands."¹²⁹ His successor, Zixia (Yang Gai), who was King Ping's cousin, does not appear acting as chief minister until 525 when he divined about responding to a military attack by Wu.¹³⁰ Gu Donggao, however, has him in office in 527. Zeng Zisheng and Song Gongwen have 525, but the latter opines that he may actually have started by the 9th month of 528.¹³¹ This most important office must have been filled shortly after it was vacated.

When Chief Minister Zixia passed away in 519, he was replaced by Zichang (Nang Wa), a descendant of King Zhuang and cousin of King Ping.¹³² Better known as Zichang, he served as chief minister until he fled into exile after his troops were severely defeated at Boju by the army of Wu as it advanced on the capital of Chu in the 11th month of 506.¹³³

¹²⁷ CQDSB 10:7a (1241), 12:10a (1455).

¹²⁸ Zeng Zisheng 1943:123 and Song Gongwen 1983:71.

¹²⁹ ZZS 47:4a (820, Zhao 14).

¹³⁰ Appendix 4, Yang pedigree; ZZS 48:12a-b (839, Zhao 17).

¹³¹ CQDSB 12:10b (1455), Zeng Zisheng 1943:123, and Song Gongwen 1983:71.

¹³² Appendix 4, Nang pedigree; ZZS 50:23a, 25b (878-79, Zhao 23).

¹³³ ZZS 54:23b-24a (951, Ding 4).

Zichang was replaced by Zixi (Gongzi Shen), who was the elder brother of King Zhao (r. 515-489). Zixi, however, is not named in the office of chief minister until 504.¹³⁴ Whereas Zeng Zisheng inexplicably omits him from his list of chief ministers, Gu Donggao says his service began in 505, and Song Gongwen shows 504 but notes that Zixi was probably appointed in 505 because he was already directing the affairs of Chu in that year.¹³⁵ He evidently came to rescue of th royal house following the flight of Zichang.

When Wu invaded and occupied Ying, the capital of Chu, in the 11th month of 506, King Zhao fled and ended up taking refuge in the state of Sui. He remained there until he returned to the capital in the 10th month of 505.¹³⁶ While King Zhao was fleeing to Sui, Zixi, disguised as the king and riding in the royal chariot, set up a temporary capital at Pixie.¹³⁷ Gu cites this event as having occurred in 505, the year under which it is recorded in the *Zuozhuan*, and as evidence of that Zixi was chief minister at this time. When Zixi learned the whereabouts of King Zhao, he joined him in Sui where was frequently at the side of the king, giving him advice on dispensing rewards and taking an assignment from him.¹³⁸ In a *Guoyu* anecdote about an exchange between Zixi and Indigo Master Wei which occurred after King Zhao returned to Ying,

¹³⁴ Appendix 2, Spring and Autumn generations; ZZZS 55:7b-8a (961, Ding 6).

¹³⁵ Zeng Zisheng 1943:123, CQDSB 12:12b (1456), Song Gongwen 1983:71.

¹³⁶ ZZZS 54:24a-b, 26a (951-52, Ding 4), 55:3b (959, Ding 5).

¹³⁷ ZZZS 55:4a-b (959, Ding 5).

¹³⁸ ZZZS 55:3b-4a (959, Ding 5); GY 18:6b, 7b (412, 414, "Chuyu" *xia*).

Wei criticized Zixi asking how he, being in charge of government, could afford to sigh in court.¹³⁹ Clearly, he was chief minister in 505.

When Wangsun Sheng, the administrator of Bai, rebelled in 479, he killed uncles Chief Minister Zixi and Grand Marshal Ziqi (Gongzi Jie) in the courtyard, presumably, of the palace of King Hui (r. 488-432).¹⁴⁰ She Administrator Zhuliang led troops from the Fangcheng region south to the capital and quelled the rebellion, forcing Sheng to flee into the mountains where he strangled himself.¹⁴¹ When peace was restored the capital, the *Zuozhuan* records that Zhuliang, who "held the two matters . . . ordered Ning to become chief minister and caused Kuan to become Marshal, then retired to She."¹⁴² 兼二事。 。 。 使寧爲令尹，使寬爲司馬，而老於葉。 A slightly later reference, however, says that Ning was commissioned by the king after his selection was confirmed through divination.¹⁴³ Thus, Zhuliang, who was not related to King Hui, briefly occupied the offices of chief minister and grand marshal under very extraordinary circumstances before relinquishing them to the king's cousins, Gongsun Ning (Ziguo), who was the son of the late chief minister and Gongsun Kuan, who was the son of the late grand marshal.¹⁴⁴ Ning and Kuan are the last occupants of these offices that are recorded in the historical sources for the Spring and Autumn era.

¹³⁹ GY 18:7b (414, "Chuyü" xia).

¹⁴⁰ ZZS 60:5a (1043, Ai 16).

¹⁴¹ ZZS 60:5b-6b (1043, Ai 16).

¹⁴² ZZS 60:6b-7a (1043-44, Ai 16).

¹⁴³ ZZS 60:13a (1047, Ai 18).

¹⁴⁴ Appendix 2, Spring and Autumn generations.

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