Bolstering the National Project: Competitive Nation Building and Immigration Policies in Catalonia, Israel and Quebec

Yoav H. Duman

Dissertation to be submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements of the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

University of Washington

2015

Reading Committee:

Joel Migdal, Co-Chair

Michael McCann, Co-Chair

Kathie Freedman

Stephen Hanson

Program Authorized to Offer Degree:

Department of Political Science

Abstract

Bolstering the National Project: Competitive Nation Building and Immigration Policies in Catalonia, Israel and Quebec

Yoav H. Duman

Co-Chairs of Supervisory Committee:

Professor Joel Migdal

Jackson School of International Studies

Professor Michael McCann

Department of Political Science

This study examines elite preference formation with regard to immigration and incorporation policies in contentious spaces. The latter category encompasses states, federal units, and regions in which competing nationally-defined autochthonous groups or central states promote national projects that espouse divergent visions of the polity's overall identity and institutional structure. I posit that the existing theories of immigration are insufficient to account for the policy preferences that emerge in these polities. In order to bridge this gap, the study traces and analyzes evidence from the cases of Israel, Quebec, and Catalonia for the purpose of examining the determinants of temporal change in elite preferences vis-à-vis immigration. I argue that despite the significant differences among these three polities with regard to their level of autonomy, the nature of inter-group competition, and the particular forms of immigration they have experienced, all three cases demonstrate a strong reciprocal relationship between the nation-building strategies that are employed by dominant groups on the one hand and the immigration

policies they implement on the other. Examining evidence from the three cases, this study advances four principal arguments. First, in all three cases, the dynamics of competitive nation building constitute a primary lens through which domestic elites perceive immigration and formulate immigration policies. Second, dominant elites in contentious spaces view immigration and incorporation policies primarily in instrumental terms as a means of bolstering their nation-building projects, increasing their autonomy, or promoting conflict management. Third, the temporal variation in immigration policies that occurs in these contentious spaces is also substantially shaped by intra-group competition among political parties within the dominant group itself that promote divergent visions of the national project. Finally, migrant settlement policies that are initially devised in order to bolster or preserve the dominant group's national project can profoundly transform both the very nature of that national project and the contours of the host society's social boundaries.

Table of Contents

Table of Figures

Dedication

To my wife Hadar and and daughter Alma with endless love

Acknowledgements

The completion of this study would not have been possible without the support, encouragement, and dedication of many people. In particular, I would like to thank my amazing wife, Hadar, who shared this incredible journey with me. Despite the many challenges, she agreed to travel across the world for both my fieldwork and my graduate studies, and was willing to endure all my stress, fears, and innumerable hours of work. Her suggestions and critiques were crucial to my work, as was her endless emotional support.

I also owe a great debt of gratitude to my advisor and mentor, Joel Migdal. From the day I arrived in Seattle, Joel was always there to support me, listen to my ideas, give me advice, and urge me to think and work harder. In fact, he is much more than a mentor: he is a true friend. In addition, my co-chair, Michael McCann, offered me significant intellectual support, advice, and inspiration throughout my graduate studies and the dissertation writing process. My committee members, Gad Barzilai, Stephen Hanson, and Kathie Freidman, have also been generous with their time and energy. They read and commented on drafts, offered important critiques, and made valuable suggestions as to how to improve this study. I would also like to thank Jamie Mayerfeld, who, while not serving as a formal member of my committee, has always given me enthusiastic support and important advice. Furthermore, my mother, Marion Duman Eilam, has not only provided motherly support, but has voluntarily served as my editor and been immensely helpful in enhancing both the writing and the coherence of this manuscript.

I would also like to express my deep gratitude to my graduate school friends and colleagues. In particular, I want to thank Ceren Belge, Daniel Berliner, Javier Crespan Hidalgo, Josh Eastin, Adam Forman, Stephan Hamburg, Milli Lake, Mary Anne Medeira, Jennifer Noveck, and Steve Zech for their ongoing support, encouragement, and enduring friendship.

Finally, this study would not have been possible without the generous financial support of the Department of Political Science at the University of Washington, the Jackson School for International Studies, the Stroum Jewish studies program, the Schusterman Foundation, the America-Israel Cooperative Enterprise, and the Government of Canada. Beyond research funding, the Department of Political Science has provided me with a host of teaching assistant and instructor positions, financial support, and a supportive intellectual home throughout my graduate education.

Chapter 1: Immigration in Spaces of Contention

The ingress of migrants into ethnically, religiously, or linguistically heterogeneous polities, in which disparate ethnic groups compete over institutional power and seek to instill their ideational vision of the polity, can engender divergent and even contradictory policies concerning immigrant recruitment and their inclusion in or exclusion from the host society. In some cases these long-lasting dynamics of intergroup competition can engender the rejection and marginalization of immigrants. In others, they can actually foster active immigrant integration into the fabric of the host society. In fact, at times nationalist groups will seek to mobilize immigrants to become active participants in promoting the national cause. These divergent approaches toward immigration are evident across polities. Also, intriguingly, they can be seen within them, across time and vis-à-vis migrants from particular origins. In those cases, the disparate approaches generate what are seemingly conflicting and inconsistent policies and outcomes.

The 1948 war between Israel and its neighbors produced large-scale flows of Palestinian refugees out of the newborn Jewish state and into the surrounding Arab states.[1] One such state was Lebanon, a newly created polity that was itself fraught with inter-ethnic tensions and inter-confessional instability. Following the ingress of over 100,000 Palestinian refugees, Lebanon faced a new form of demographic complexity since Palestinians now constituted approximately ten percent of its population. In contrast to Jordan, which opted to give Palestinian refugees Jordanian citizenship, Lebanon elected to exclude them from membership in the polity (Shiblak 1996). Notwithstanding these legal prohibitions, in practice, exclusion was not implemented

[1] There is controversy surrounding the causes underlying the formation of the Palestinian refugee problem, also known as the *Nakba* (catastrophe). While the official Israeli narrative argues that Palestinians leaders encouraged the

uniformly across the Palestinian population in Lebanon. Naturalization restrictions were strongly upheld vis-à-vis the largest Palestinian group, namely, the Sunni Muslims, who were denied basic civil and political rights including access to the public healthcare and education systems, land ownership, and freedom of employment and movement.[2] Conversely, many Christians were granted Lebanese citizenship, allowing them to fully integrate into Lebanese society and access rights that their Muslim co-ethnics were denied (Bel-Air 2012; Picard 2002; Siklawi 2010).[3]

A second example is nationally divided Belgium, which, like most Western European states since the end of World War II, has recruited large numbers of labor migrants and has since been the recipient of secondary immigration flows, such as those emanating from family reunification policies. Beginning in the early 1960s, the Belgian state recruited labor migrants from diverse source countries including Congo, Turkey, and Morocco (Castles 1986; Reniers 1999). While migrants have been distributed relatively equally throughout the country, significant differences in attitudes and policies toward immigrant integration and incorporation are evident between and within the two primary ethnic groups (Walloon and Flemish) and the country's three federal regions (Wallonia, Brussels, and Flanders).

In Flanders, the predominantly Dutch speaking Flemish community has historically maintained an irresolute attitude toward the prospect of immigrant settlement and their integration into mainstream Flemish society (Barker 2012; Kymlika 2002). This is evidenced on the one hand by the lack of political and social programs or interest in immigrant integration prior to the implementation of the first extensive linguistic, cultural, and labor *Inburgering*

---

[2] For an in-depth analysis of the human rights and legal conditions of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, see: ANERA 2013.

[3] According to Shiblak (1996), approximately 50,000 Christian Palestinians were granted Lebanese citizenship during the 1950s and 1960s. Furthermore, Bookman (1997) points out that besides Palestinians, other Christian populations such as Egyptian Copts and Armenians were also offered Lebanese citizenship and even encouraged to accept it, while long-time resident Muslim Bedouins, Palestinians, and Kurds were denied it.

integration policy in 2003, and on the other by the relatively high levels of electoral support accorded to the far-right Flemish nationalist and anti-immigrant party, *Vlaams Belang*, since the 1980s (Erk 2005).[4]

In contrast, the Flemish community in the bi-national region of Brussels has adopted a significantly different approach, namely, the active–pursuit of policies that seek to attract immigrants, incorporate, and integrate them into their community, language, and culture. The goal of immigrant inclusion was evident in the community's early adoption and implementation of *Cohabitation Initiatives* that sought to enhance migrant integration, as well as in public campaigns encouraging immigrants to send their children to the Dutch-language school system that is perceived to be the community's core institution of socialization and cultural reproduction.

These examples illustrate puzzling patterns of acceptance and rejection of migrants in these societies. In fact, these divergent preferences and policies are not only evident in these polities as a whole, but also in specific regions within them, and toward either immigrants generally or particular immigrant groups. In this dissertation, I seek to explain these seemingly contradictory responses toward immigrants in polities that are already deeply divided on the basis of ethnicity, religion, or language.

Lebanon and Belgium reflect broader patterns of the demographic, political, and social complexities and contingencies that arise when immigrants settle in polities that already contain deeply entrenched and enduring patterns of intergroup competition or conflict. In such cases, local cultural, ethnic, or linguistic groups, which espouse divergent preferences and visions

[4] Until its 2004 dissolution by the Belgian Court of Cassation due to racial incitement, the party went under the name of *Vlaams Blok* (Flemish Block). The court's decision followed allegations of xenophobia and the promotion of minority discrimination. Despite the ruling, the party resumed its activities almost immediately as *Vlaams Belang* (Flemish Interest).

concerning the juridical, institutional, ethnic, and ideational configurations of the country or region, strive to determine what the basic character of the particular society should be.

In this study, I will define these conflicting conceptions of the desirable identity and status of the polity as *national projects* (see: Keating 2001) and the interactions between the groups promoting them as *competitive national projects.*[5] These national projects dynamics exist, however, at two distinct levels: intergroup and intragroup. The first intergroup level concerns the aggregate overarching national project that encompasses the ethnic group as a whole. For instance, these would include the Flemish, Zionist-Israeli, Catalan, Flemish or Québécois National projects that represent the overall hegemonic desire that encompasses the majority of members of these particular groups to preserve and promote their relative position their polity.

The second level of abstraction reflects the multiplicity of visions toward the national project(s) that exists **within** each of these overarching projects. These divergent visions are in most cases represented by competing political parties or factions and are shaped by three central factors: (1) the faction's particular understanding or interpretation of the nature and the dynamics of inter-group relations, competition, or conflict;[6] (2) the particular goals the group has or outcomes it seeks to achieve (territorial expansion or compromise, political dominance, increased autonomy, secession); and (3) the particular means through which it seeks to achieve these goals (accommodation, marginalization, compromise, or violence). Thus, for example, in the Zionist-Israeli case, while all Zionist parties share an overarching national project that seeks to maintain and bolster the Jewish state, they widely diverge in the ways they perceive the nature

[5] By employing this conceptualization, I depart from prior studies that perceive such polities as divided, vertically segmented, or plural societies (see the discussion in: Ball and Gilligan 2011). Later I will contend that this conceptual shift offers a more precise and useful analytical category for the analysis of such polities.
[6] These include group's historical and strategic preferences with regard to its ethnic and social boundaries and the concrete historical experiences of intergroup relations as well as modalities of intergroup interactions that have emerged over time within the context of ethnic competition.

of the conflict with the Palestinians (as either zero-sum or reconcilable), the goals of the national project (expanding Jewish control over the occupied territories, or promoting a two state solution), and the means to promote these goals (ethnic cleansing, forced annexation, peaceful separation, or recognition and reconciliation).

The ongoing presence of intergroup competition over the fundamental definition of these societies constitutes them as what will be referred to as *spaces of contention*. The latter represent diverse forms of territorial entities that include sovereign states, federal subdivisions, and recognized or unrecognized regions, within which nationally defined mobilized groups compete to instill their own national vision or project within a specific territorial unit. In other words, a "space of contention" may incorporate a whole country or, in other cases, a particular part of the country or region. In this dissertation I will explore the dynamics of demography, immigration, and incorporation policies that emerge within these spaces of contention and analyze the means and conditions through which they interact with, and are shaped by, these enduring competitive national projects.

As the cases of Lebanon and Belgium delineate, the effects of competitive national projects in these contentious spaces are not confined to the well-documented and studied interactions, tensions, and interrelations among adversarial domestic ethnic groups, or between these groups and the central state's institutions (Gourevich 1979; Keating 2002; Lustick 1993; Seiler 1989; Smooha 2002). Instead, these competitive dynamics produce significant spillover effects that impact a host of issue areas. In particular, they give rise to profound implications for international migrants who choose to settle within them.

In the subsequent chapters, I will argue that these ongoing dynamics of competitive national projects, at both the inter-group and intra-group levels, play a crucial role in shaping the preferences, attitudes, and policies that autochthonous, in the sense of indigenous or non-immigrant, ethnic and other social groups adopt vis-à-vis immigration and incorporation. In these contexts, preferences and policies toward demography and immigration are deeply embedded in and predicated upon the persistent patterns and dynamics of domestic intergroup competition, rendering attempts to analyze such policies separately from those competitive patterns and dynamics necessarily partial and unsatisfactory.

Despite the profound interconnections between these two processes, scholars have devoted only scant attention to the analysis of their interrelations. Instead, autochthonous intergroup competition and international migration in these polities have largely been examined as discrete phenomena. By observing the interaction of competitive national projects in contentious spaces and preferences towards the recruitment, acceptance, and exclusion of immigrants, this study seeks to overcome these theoretical shortcomings by incorporating both intergroup competition and immigration into a joint analysis. It is my hope that a joint examination of these dynamics and processes will result in a unified theoretical and analytical framework that will shed light both on the relations between these two phenomena as well as on each of them individually.

In the chapters that follow, I will argue that regardless of the particular historical contexts and configuration, policies employed toward immigration and incorporation can largely be understood as instrumental attempts by the group with the upper hand within the contentious space, to prevail. More specifically, immigration policies are perceived as means of managing inter-group competition, bolstering the dominant group's strategic position while weakening its opponents. Furthermore, they are designed in ways that seeks to promote a particular vision of the national project of the political group that is in power at the point in time that they are constructed.[7]

Under these circumstances, preferences and outcomes regarding immigration broadly and patterns of migrant inclusion or exclusion are shaped by interests concerning and compromises among five factors that emerge from intergroup competition: (1) the historical legacies of intergroup competition and changes in the nature of these competitive dynamics; (2) The overarching and the particular vision of the national project that is espoused by the political faction that holds political power at a given point in time; (3) The potential demographic effects exerted by immigration on relative group size and power (in relation to all groups within the polity); (4) the cultural and social transformations that can potentially transpire due to the ingress of migrants and the subsequent alteration of group composition; (5) the possible political ramification vis-à-vis the nation project that the long term presence and perhaps the political membership of immigrants can exert on the promotion of both the overall and the particular vision of the national project.

These five factors are not static but are instead contingent upon ensuing material, ideational, and policy changes within the context of intergroup competition. Curiously, the interplay among these phenomena is particularly significant in contested spaces with democratic institutions since changes relating to a group's size and composition within a democratic context

[7] These dynamics are contingent upon the group's relative institutional power. While dominant groups within these spaces of contention generally have the upper hand in promoting policies that are expected to be beneficial to their national project, minority groups can also hold some sway over policy making. In cases like Quebec and Catalonia, where the competing minority's co-ethnics control the larger state, they can attempt to counter these dynamics by influencing policies from above. However, in cases like Israel, where one ethnic group exercises exclusive control over the polity while minority groups and their co-ethnics have no means of influencing policy, minorities are relegated to a passive and defensive position vis-à-vis immigration.

carry significant implications for its relative power (Bookman 1997).[8] However, the evidence suggests that as with any project of purposive demographic or social engineering, these strategies do not always achieve their intended objectives, occasioning instead unexpected, perverse, and even self-defeating outcomes (Scott 1998; Teitelboim and Weiner 2001).

For instance, beyond the impact of intergroup competition on immigration and incorporation policies, this study also contends that the presence of immigrants themselves, and the policies adopted toward them, can reshape and transform these enduring patterns of institutional, ideational, and political competition within contentious spaces. In fact, the evidence presented below suggests that immigrants oftentimes play an active role in altering the identity, self-definition, and social boundaries of local groups.

Returning to our initial examples, it is evident that in Lebanon, perceptions and policies regarding the entrance of Palestinian refugees were mediated by a lens predicated on existing intergroup rivalry and the delicate demographic balance within the state (Weiner and Teitelbaum 2001). The politically dominant but demographically declining Christian population perceived the influx of Palestinian Muslims as exacerbating its deteriorating demographic standing, facilitating its decline, and posing a threat to its political preeminence, thus necessitating the exclusion of Muslim refugees. At the same time, granting Christian Palestinians and other non-Lebanese Christian minorities access to national citizenship and political rights was perceived as a means of averting or delaying the specter of demographic decline (Shiblak 1996).

In Flanders, due to the ethnically-based division of space and the uncontested Flemish demographic and economic dominance both within Flanders and Belgium as a whole, Flemings

[8] Lebanon constitutes an interesting exception to this rule. Due to the delicate ethnic balance in the country, the declining demographic position of the historically-dominant Christian community, and the country's political system that is based on confessional quotas, no official census has been conducted since 1932. This fact has significantly reduced the direct effects produced by concrete demographic transformations on the political distribution of power (Kertzer and Arel 2002; Teitelboim and Weiner 2002).

have generally not perceived immigrants as an asset to their national project, though their has been significant variation and divergence between political group *within* Flemish society. Instead, many Flemish factions, particularly nationalists, have identified immigrants as a population that is potentially capable of undermining or diluting Flemish culture, demography, and national project; this has resulted mainly in engendering indifference or even hostility toward the immigrants (Barker 2012; Swyngedouw 1995).[9]

In Brussels, on the other hand, where Flemings have experienced decades of demographic and economic decline, the integration of immigrants was actively pursued as an instrument for bolstering the community size and relative position in the face of French speaking Walloon expansion into previously Flemish-dominated areas (Jacobs 2000). In both cases, competitive intergroup dynamics have played a crucial role in shaping the preferences and policies adopted vis-à-vis international migrants, and in constructing the role they are understood to assume in hindering or facilitating these respective national projects.[10]

To decipher and explain these complex dynamics this study will examine three diverse cases that offer distinct manifestations of these processes. The first is the case of Israel, a country that has experienced substantial patterns of intergroup competition and conflict that began well before its official formation as a state. While Israel has promoted almost exclusive ethnically Jewish immigration since it inception, over the past 20 years it has recruited large cohorts of labor migrants, to replace Palestinian commuter migrants. While these migrants are primarily

[9] Billiet *et al.* (2003) have identified a strong relationship between support of the Flemish national project and negative attitudes toward migrants on the one hand, and Flemings who support a unified Belgian State on the other.

[10] It should be noted that in most cases, the initial need for and ingress of migrants is exogenous to these competitive dynamics and stems primarily from increasing global migratory movements, economic development, and the domestic need for cheap and flexible labor (see: Hollifield 2008; Massey *et al.* 1993; Piore 1979). I do, however, argue that the presence of competitive national projects does shape preferences regarding the specific policies, identity, numbers, and spatial distribution of these migrants, as well as their inclusion in or exclusion within the polity.

temporary, their overall presence has remained permanent, and some labor migrants have even remained in the country for extended periods of time.

The second case is Quebec, the French-speaking Canadian province that was able to survive as such despite long-term attempts of Anglification that were exerted by Britain and later by the central Anglo-Canadian government. Since the 1960s the province has sought to redefine its position within the Canadian federation that has engendered competition and tension with the federal government. In particular, the province has attempted to assert itself in the field of immigration, which it perceived as crucial for the survival of a distinct Quebec society. For this purpose it has actively demanded and received autonomous powers to select and integrate immigrants. In fact, some factions have actively sought to assimilate immigrants and transform them into agents of Quebec nationalism.

Finally, I will examine the case of Catalonia. This Spanish autonomous community, that was an independent state until the 15th century has experienced several rounds of conflict and competition with the Spanish state over its independence, autonomy, or position within the Spanish state. Throughout the centuries Catalonia has experienced several waves of mass immigration that have threatened to undermine the ethno-demographic balance within it. In contrast to Israel and Quebec, Catalonia has virtually no power to regulate migratory flows. However, in response to massive waves of immigration to the region since the 1990s, it has attempted to promote its national project by controlling integration policies in ways that foster immigrant Catalanization and the preservation of the community's distinct identity.

Thus, beyond the shared history of intergroup competition, these three polities share contemporary experiences with large-scale third party immigration. By exploring the causes for the preferences and policies that they have adopted toward these migratory flows, I hope to offer a comprehensive and nuanced approach for explaining the dynamics of international immigration in contentious spaces (see discussion bellow of this study's case selection).

Spaces of Contention

Spaces of contention that emanate from ongoing competitive national projects are evident in an increasing number of self-proclaimed and de-facto plurinational or multinational polities[11]. These spaces represent a diverse set of regions and states that include Belgium, Israel, Cyprus, Scotland, Northern Ireland, Quebec, Estonia, Catalonia, Brittany, Basque country, Lebanon, and the former Yugoslavian republics during the 1990s, to mention just a few. However, although competitive national projects are present in a wide range of polities, they do not all carry equal weight with regard to their political salience and potential consequences and externalities. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, I will delimit the scope of the discussion of contentious spaces to include territorial units in which the dynamics of competitive national projects constitute the primary, though not the only, political fault line within the polity as reflected by both electoral preferences and behavior, and the political and social coalitions that emerge within the polity.

Following this definition, polities such as Catalonia and Quebec, where competitive national project dynamics play a constitutive role in shaping the very structure of political relations and interactions, are easily classified as contentious spaces. At the same time, the larger states in which Catalonia and Quebec are embedded, namely, Spain and Canada are not categorized as such. The exclusion of Spain and Canada from this category derives from the fact

[11] I contrast plurinational polities with ethnically heterogeneous ones. While the vast majority of polities, including so-called nation-states, are ethnically, religiously, or culturally heterogeneous (Hobsbawm 1996), such divisions are not inevitably politicized and groups are not necessarily mobilized. In these cases, heterogeneity does not pose a substantial threat to the polity's integrity and survival, due to shared norms and crosscutting group relations and social networks that transcend these divisions (Ball and Gilligan 2011).

that while both states contain significant competitive national projects that generate acute political concerns, these forms of competition do not constitute the core or primary fault line around which political relations are structured. This does not signify that competitive national projects in Spain and Canada are politically insignificant or inconsequential, as they carry many important political, social and economic implications for these polities. However, the distinction made in this study emphasizes the overall long-term role played by these competitive dynamics within a polity as well as the degree of influence that they exert on shaping political and social boundaries and policy preferences regarding diverse issues such as immigration, cultural, and economic policies.

While the nature of intergroup rivalry and both inter- and intra-group competitive national projects in spaces of contention vary considerably with regard to their historical legacies and trajectories, intensity of competition or conflict (peaceful or violent), and existing institutional configurations (form of authority, policies concerning intercommunity relations and power-sharing mechanisms, and regime type), they tend to share four central attributes. First, these spaces are generally controlled by groups or coalitions that McAndrew (2013) has identified as *fragile majorities.*[12] I define the latter as politically dominant national groups (which can be construed in ethnic, religious, or linguistic terms) whose majority status within the immediate polity or broader national or regional context, from a demographic, political, or cultural perspective, is contested and cannot be taken for granted, or as in the case of Lebanon, it might even be a relic of the past[13]. Furthermore, the ability of fragile majorities to define the

[12] Although a fragile majority is the central category of analysis in McAndrew's (2013) book, she only provides an implicit definition of it. Therefore, I provide my own definition of the concept. See also Abulof's (2009) discussion of small nations and the various threats, challenges, and opportunities that they face.

[13] As previously mentioned, the Lebanese political system is founded on confessional affiliation. Relative group power within this system was based on their relative size – as captured by the 1932 census in which Christians constituted a slight majority – and was made permanent by the 1943 national pact (Maktabi 1999). Be that as it may, since 1932, relative group size has changed significantly due to Christian emigration and high Muslim (both Shiite

rules of the game and promote their national aspirations is often challenged by overlapping national projects that are promoted by contending ethnic groups, central governments, or neighboring states.

Fragile majority groups are also characterized by fears of becoming a minority and losing their long-term institutional position and cultural vitality (Abulof 2009; Gans 2004). These are understood to be under constant threat due to deeply internalized historical memories and experiences, concrete or perceived trends of demographic or cultural decline, and other concerns engendered by enduring dynamics of intergroup competition.

Second, political and social dynamics in these polities tend to be fueled by ongoing concerns over the national, cultural, or linguistic viability of both majority and minority groups (Bookman 1997; Weiner and Teitelbaum 2001), which Gans (2004) has defined as *cultural nationalism*.[14] These fears are the product of long-lasting intergroup rivalries and tensions, which concurrently reinforce and reproduce them, generate diverse and at times contradictory outcomes that range from violent conflict and repression to accommodation and consociationalism (Gilligan and Ball 2011; McGarry and O'Leary 1993).

Third, group identity and social boundaries in these contentious spaces are not constituted primarily through differentiation vis-à-vis *others* who reside across national boundaries. Instead, they are defined in relation to competing ethnic or other social groups that are located within the polity itself (Wimmer 2003).

---

and Sunni) birth rates. The exact current demographic balance, however, is unknown since no census data or significant demographic data have been released during the last 80 years.

[14] Gans (2004) defines cultural nationalism as the project of promoting a group's future cultural, linguistic, or religious survival. In this context, the survival of the national culture is perceived as the primary end for which a sovereign state or autonomy serve as the means. He contrasts this to statist nationalism, in which the nation is perceived as a means of promoting stability within the state.

Finally, I contend that many central social and political processes that take place within these polities, including those that are seemingly unrelated to these competitive dynamics, are directly or indirectly defined, shaped, and constituted by them (Horowitz 1985). Specifically, intergroup competition functions as a lens through which preferences regarding diverse policy areas are interpreted and shaped. This emanates from several factors, including the long-term evolution of strategic and competitive intergroup interaction, spillover effects, and the intersubjective internalization of collective understandings and narratives that are engendered by these competitive dynamics. These factors fundamentally define and shape individual and group preferences, social scripts, and actions relating to social, cultural, and political phenomena (Harzig *et al.* 2006). As the evidence presented in the following chapters suggests, immigration and incorporation policies that emerge in these polities are not an exception to this pattern. I will posit that these issue areas are in many ways in fact manifestations of these complex and interconnected competitive dynamics.

While the foregoing discussion of intergroup competition seems to imply the possibility of producing an elegant and parsimonious analysis of strategic majority and minority group interaction within these contentious spaces, such an outcome is unfortunately elusive. Instead, in the wake of scholars such as Brubaker (1996; 2004), Eriksen (2002), Juteau (2003), and Wimmer (2002; 2013), this study adopts a disaggregated constructivist approach to the analysis of social and political groups and categories that maintains that the persistence of intergroup competition does not imply that these groups constitute or can be studied as unitary or static entities. Instead they are internally fragmented units that contain a multiplicity of viewpoint, ideas and preferences toward the group's national project. Therefore, I reject "the tendency to reify such groups…as if they were internally homogenous, externally bounded groups, even unitary collective actors with common purposes" (Brubaker 2004, 8).

While unitary approaches might be appealing owing to their analytical elegance from the standpoint of abstract social scientific analysis, they overlook the inherent complexities and internal divisions (based on class, political ideology, economic position, etc.) that all such broad ethnic or other large social groups contain. Unitary approaches also provide little consideration or explanation of agency and change that takes place within national groups or movements. Instead, I posit that rival groups should be perceived as complex, and often fragmented, social and political categories that include actors and sub-groups that subscribe to divergent, dynamic, and even contradictory preferences, goals, and means of achieving those goals as is exemplified through their vision of the national project. In addition, unitary conceptualizations of groups tend to be overly static and are unable to incorporate or explain changes in perceptions and preferences over time. As a result they run the risk of misrepresenting or oversimplifying the highly complex, contingent, and ongoing processes of identity formation and intergroup differentiation (Gilligan and Ball 2011).

While group disaggregation constitutes an important analytical factor that must not be overlooked, we must concurrently avoid the pitfall of overemphasizing these differences. This is particularly important since fragmented social and political groups can also converge around focal points and shared goals and interests, particularly in times of crisis or perceived collective threat (Oakes and Warren 2007).[15]

[15] An example of this is the convergence of preferences between the Quebec liberals (PLQ) and the Parti Quebecois after the failure of the Meech Lake accords in 1990. During this period, the two rival parties promoted a unified agenda calling for a sovereignty referendum despite the PLQ's traditional pro-federalist and anti-sovereigntist stance.

Due to these challenges, the processes that are explored in this study require that the analysis be sensitive to the delicate balance between group homogeneity and heterogeneity. This will be done through the concurrent exploration of both the overarching abstract national projects that unite divergent factions within a group and the particular visions of the national project that emphasizes the existing intra-group differences and competition. I will posit that both levels play a crucial role in shaping the preferences and outcomes that are explored in this study.

Furthermore, in the following chapters, identities, preferences, and social boundaries are not assumed to be stable or external to inter- and intra-group dynamics and competition. Instead, they are understood as being in ongoing flux. They are continuously shaped by factors that are endogenous to these dynamics such as: intergroup interactions, experiences, and discourses that reconstitute interests and identities, and redefine social boundaries generating significant and often unpredictable outcomes (Wimmer 2013).

Thus, as the cases discussed at the beginning of this chapter suggest, strategic, material, and ideational factors can impact and alter fundamental conceptions of groups' identities and preferences, as well as the character of the intergroup boundaries they assume and produce. However, it is also important to realize that these processes of transformative boundary construction do not take place in a vacuum, in a manner detached from past realities. Instead, they are profoundly influenced and shaped by historical and cultural legacies, trajectories, and path dependencies that concurrently form the basis upon which the evolution and transformation of social and political groups and categories occurs. Since these elements constitute the foundation for processes that define, alter, and reproduce the structure of both local intergroup relations and social boundaries, they play an important role in shaping preferences concerning contemporary polices and ideas regarding immigration and incorporation.

More specifically, in the context of immigration, I posit that we can also observe an additional, more complex, bi-directional process. While intergroup dynamics and corresponding visions of the national project shape preferences regarding immigration, the presence of immigrants, in turn, also carries significant implications for the contours of local intergroup competition and identity and the vary nature of and visions toward the national project. These bi-directional interactions between competitive national projects and immigration can in fact alter the foundations of these national projects, as well as the self-definition and social boundaries of these autochthonous groups. This is evidenced by the transformation in the ways these national projects and membership within them have been defined over time.

An example of such a transformation is evident in the shift in the nature of Quebecois nationalism and group boundaries since the quiet revolution of the 1960s (Behiels 1985; Breton 1988). Historically, French Canadians have adhered to a highly ethnic, inward-looking conception of the nation that promoted the exclusion of immigrants from membership and participation in the collective and resulted in their assimilation into the Anglophone community (Balthazar 1989; Bouchard 2008; Levine 2010).[16] However, due to the increasing institutional and demographic competition between Francophone and Anglophone Quebeckers and the Canadian state as a whole, the changing ethnic composition of immigration, dramatically decreasing birthrates, the replacement of the Catholic Church with new neo-nationalist elites, and the transformation of Quebec's provincial political institutions, Francophone nationalist intellectuals and politicians began to perceive immigrants as a means of both augmenting the

[16] As I discuss in detail below, prior to 1970, approximately 90 percent of the Allophone population (immigrants of non-English or French origin) integrated into the Anglophone minority, as represented by schooling preferences, participation in linguistic-based community organizations, and language transfers (Behiels 1991; Molinaro 2011). However, it is important to note that since the 1960s, immigrants have increasingly refused to accept Anglophone or Francophone identities as mutually exclusive and are increasingly becoming active participants in both ethno-linguistic groups while preserving their own cultural groups.

Francophone community while limiting the expansion of the Anglophone community, and promoting the francophone national project(s).

This shift, which initially emerged as a strategy to reverse the Francophones' declining demographic position in the context of intergroup competition, has over time contributed to the transformation of the Quebecois national project. The latter has shifted from a primarily ethnic into a largely, though not exclusively, civic project that seeks to integrate diverse groups of immigrants into its social fabric, although, divergent Francophone political groups maintain different preferences concerning the particular contours and modalities of immigrant integration (Bretton 1988; Juteau 2004; Keating 2001).

It is interesting however, that due to the fact that those who promoted this shift toward civic nationalism perceived immigrants primarily in abstract and instrumental terms, namely, as demographic agents, they devoted little attention to the deeper, long-term, transformative effects that immigrant incorporation would exert within context of the Francophone community and its national project. As a result, as time unfolded, the presence of immigrants and the introduction of diversity into Francophone society have engendered an increasing number of political debates over social boundaries and partial resurgence of ethnic nationalism.

The Israeli case offers a glimpse into an additional dynamic that is related to the reconfiguration of social boundaries. While, Israel maintains a strong from of ethnic nationalism that exclusively privileges Jews and explicitly excludes Arabs citizens of the state (Shafir and Peled 2002; Smooha 2002; Yiftachel 2006), it has selectively removed or partially blurred these boundaries in relation to other non-or partially Jewish groups (Bartram 2011; Lustick 1999). For instance, non-or partially Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union (FSU) have been legally and statistically incorporated into the very heart of Israeli society, even in cases where these immigrants are practicing Christians, as they are perceived as able to undergo a process of *sociological conversion* and to augment the relative size of the Jewish population (Cohen 2006).

Similarly, while international labor migrants are generally excluded from membership in the Israeli polity (Kemp and Raijman 2008; Rosenhek 2003; Sabar 2008), and many Israelis hold negative attitude toward the presence of non-Jewish labor migrants (Semyonov and Lerental 2005), when compared to other ethnic groups both the state and social actors have been willing at least to accept them. For instance, they are perceived as more able to be integrated and less of a threat than African asylum seekers.[17] Similarly, labor migrants are strongly preferred over Palestinian Arabs (Schnell 1999). For instance, Israel created two special regularization programs that enabled a small number of labor migrant families to gain permanent residence while they concurrently excluded Palestinians who conformed to the same conditions of eligibility. Similarly, at moments in which labor migrants were negatively affected by violence that is related to the conflict, Israeli leaders utilized discourses that located them within the national collective and provided them with the same benefits that are granted to Israeli citizens, while Palestinians have been excluded from both mechanisms (see chapter 3). Thus, these dynamics, which are also evident in Catalonia and Quebec, can be defined as *the hierarchization of otherness,* and suggest that even within the contours of a group's social boundaries, variation can exist in relation how the latter are perceived and implemented in practice.

In conclusion, immigrant inflows into contested spaces can entail significant long-term and transformative consequences. Depending on the balance among various factors, which include the intergroup demographic balance, spatial distribution of the population, and the specific ethnic, religious, or linguistic attributes of immigrants, the latter's presence can be

---

[17] This is assertion is based on a series of interview the author conducted with NGO's, community leaders, and anti-asylum seeker mobilization activists in Israel between 2011-2013.

considered a means of either bolstering or undermining these competing national projects. As a result, dominant groups within these spaces have actively pursued policies that seek to utilize immigration instrumentally as a means of bolstering their position within the context of intergroup competition or conflict. However, despite this unified goal, particular policies and strategies can diverge significantly. Depending on the specific contours of the competition, the nature of the group, and particular demographic realities these aims can be achieved through diverse polices that span from immigrant inclusion to immigrant exclusion and marginalization.

Competitive National Projects and International Migration

In his analysis of intra-state ethnic relations, Brubaker (2004) discusses two primary forms of ethnic heterogeneity that challenge modern polities, namely, *territorial nationality* and *immigrant ethnicity.* The first corresponds with our conception of *competing national projects* and emerges as a consequence of the national reification of ethnic, cultural, linguistic, or religious difference between competing ethnic groups. These groups perceive prevailing ethno-political power constellations within the polity or the larger state, to varying degrees, as a threat to their long-term collective survival and cultural reproduction due to competing national projects and policies.

At the two extremes, these include inclusionary policies that promote local groups' assimilation or exclusionary ones that promote their marginalization or repression (Bookman 1997; Duquette 2001; Gans 2004). These processes can engender demands for a reconfiguration of political space and authority through secession, consociationalism, or a comprehensive reconfiguration of the autonomy and institutional relations between groups through power devolution or federalization (Keating 2001; McGarry and O'Leary 1993). Such demands are often exacerbated by the presence of conflicting national projects that are pursued by competing ethnic groups within the contentious space, or by central states, resulting in the bolstering of the former's particularistic demands (Tilly 2004).[18]

The second challenge of heterogeneity emanates from *immigrant ethnicity*. Immigrants are generally perceived as a means of promoting economic ends, as the author Max Frisch (1986) famously reminds us: "We asked for workers. We got people instead" (374). In reality, immigrants are not merely workers, but are in fact individual and collective carriers of culture and difference (Vasille 1997), whose presence transforms the host polities in which they settle, regardless of the latter's initial intentions, and who often demand recognition of their cultural difference.

In contrast to the forms of local intergroup competition examined in this study, immigrants do not desire collective national rights or the reconfiguration of their institutional autonomy vis-à-vis the state. Instead, they demand equal membership and recognition of their distinctness through the espousal of multiculturalism or other policies that recognize and promote diversity (Benhabib 2002; Koopmans 2005; Kymlicka 1995).

Despite their more benign goals, these demands nevertheless pose significant challenges for political elites and evoke strong concerns among native populations regarding the possible disintegration of a reified *national order of things* and the decline of an imagined national

[18] For instance, as I elaborate in chapter 3, in the case of Canada and Quebec, attempts to instill pan-Canadian identity have produced a boomerang effect. Instead of strengthening Canadian identity, they have in fact enhanced the nationalist movement in Quebec, as exemplified by the rise of the Parti Quebecois (PQ) and the sovereignty association movements during Trudeau's reign as Prime Minister (Belthazar 1999; Dion 1992; LeForest 1995). These dynamics persisted as the PQ's policies generated nationalist responses among Anglophones who exhibited strong support for Trudeau's pan-Canadian national project. In response to the emergence of the Quebec sovereignty movement, Quebec Anglophones created social organizations such as Alliance Quebec and political parties such as the Equality Party that sought to counter Quebecois nationalism. Similar dynamics are evident today in Catalonia since recent calls for independence that have been led by the two major Catalan parties have generated a dramatic rise in support for the Ciutadanos party (Citizens), that espouses Spanish nationalism and national unity.

cohesiveness (Waldinger 2003; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). While some host groups have been willing to support the accommodation of immigrant particularism and pluralism, opponents have perpetrated an increasing backlash against accommodation and multiculturalism (Joppke and Morawska 2003; Vertovec and Werssendorf 2010). In fact, militant opponents of these policies have triggered the almost universal expansion of far-right anti-immigrant movements across host states (Messina 2007; Norris 2005; van de Brug *et al.* 2005).

In response to the two challenges mentioned above, in recent decades practitioners have witnessed the significant increase in scholarly interest regarding both these issues. There has been a burgeoning of literature concerning immigration and incorporation policies on the one hand, and peripheral nationalism, domestic intergroup competition, and divided societies on the other. However, despite the increasing empirical confluence of both challenges across a growing number of cases, Kymlica (2001) points out that the two "have generally been discussed in isolation from each other; the interaction between them has received much less attention" (62). These two challenges have traditionally been perceived as distinct and discrete objects of inquiry, and little attention has been devoted to their confluence or interaction (Gilligan and Ball 2011; Zapata Barrero 2009b). Those who have attempted to address the intersection between these issues (see for example: Banting and Soroka 2012; Kymlica 2001; McAndrews 2013; Zapata Barrero 2009a) have focused primarily on minority nations but have overlooked the broader context that includes other complex cases of intergroup competition and conflict within multinational and multiethnic states such as Lebanon, Belgium, Cyprus, and Israel.[19]

Due to the prevalence of methodological nationalism in immigration studies that assumes internal cohesion within polities, scholars tend to perceive immigrants as the primary source of intergroup conflict in receiving countries or as an aberration or challenge to the presumed

[19] One notable exception is Gilligan and Ball's (2013) edited volume.

overlapping categories of subjects, nation, and state (Waldinger 2003; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). Thus, they have yet to produce a systematic and comparative analysis of the role of enduring national contention over the institutional and political space in shaping preferences regarding migratory flows. At the same time, with the exception of Shafir (1995), literature dealing with divided and plural societies has also tended to underestimate the role played by immigration in transforming and challenging these dynamics. This has begun to change in recent years with the publication of several comparative studies and volumes on the topic (McAndrews 2013; Zapata Barrero 2009a).

In contrast to the majority of polities whose ethnic, linguistic, or cultural pluralism and heterogeneity assumes a secondary role that is transcended by "some shared overreaching norms and institutions that hold it together from top to bottom" (Gilligan and Ball 156), the territorially-defined spaces of contention located at the core of this study constitute a particular subset of cases in which heterogeneity engenders fundamental contestation pertaining to the very definition and institutional configuration of the polity (Gourevich 1979; Keating 2001). As a result, these cases reflect quantitatively and qualitatively more complex environments of pluralism and difference than other types of polities, prompting a need for special consideration and analysis, particularly with regard to the determinants of immigration and incorporation preferences and policies.

The present study attempts to bridge this theoretical and empirical gap by exploring the intersection between these two phenomena. The following chapters will explore and reveal a host of important and complex processes, relations, and issues that will be of interest to practitioners of immigration, ethnic relations, political demography, and nationalism. The analysis below will integrate these processes in order to propose a unified theoretical and analytical framework.

As the evidence in the following chapters demonstrates, when these challenges coalesce, neither phenomenon can be comprehensively analyzed and understood in isolation from the other. In fact, not only does their coincidence produce important interaction effects, but they are also mutually constitutive since they continuously affect and shape each other both directly and indirectly. On the one hand, domestic intergroup competition and interaction dynamically shapes and reconfigures the contours of social and ethnic boundaries and belonging, interests, and the social and the political playing field in which actors and groups interact. On the other, the political, social, and demographic realities that emerge as a result of immigrant settlement and the redefinition, alteration, or reaffirmation of social boundaries they produce, concurrently alter the relative power balance between rival ethnic groups (Bookman 1997).

This complex relationship is particularly evident in the preferences of nationalist groups vis-à-vis immigrants. It is hardly surprising that ethno-nationalist political actors generally fear immigration and the diversity it produces (Carter 2005; Muller 2008; Rydgren 2012), especially when immigrants are perceived as being significantly different from the core group and consequentially unassimilable (Balibar 1991). However, the persistence of competing national projects can fundamentally alter these preferences and circumscriptions.

For instance, nationalists in both Quebec and Catalonia have employed a broad array of tactics to recruit and incorporate immigrants from regions such as the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa, whom they perceive as more likely to integrate or assimilate into their national-cultural-linguistic groups than North Americans or Latin Americans (respectively), who are conventionally viewed as being ethnically closer to these polities' autochthonous populations (Calavita 2005; Juteau 2004).

At times, some nationalist groups within these societies have not solely sought to integrate these migrants nut have maintained tacit expectations that newcomers will ultimately become allies in the promotion of the national project (Juteau 2004). In these cases, however, while intergroup competition plays a central role in defining preferences concerning immigration and incorporation, once migrants settle, they concurrently alter or reinforce the pre-existing social and political intergroup dynamics within the polity.

A similar dynamic can be identified in Israel, where labor migration has been used in contradictory ways to manage the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Initially, in the late 1980s, radical ethno-nationalist groups led a campaign to recruit non-Jewish labor migrants abroad as a means of deterring Palestinian from engaging in violent resistance toward Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and undermining Palestinian nationalist mobilization. Later, labor migrants were actively recruited by the government not as a means of deterring resistance or weakening the Palestinian national movement, but of fostering separation that sought to either engender a new means of managing the conflict or a two state solution (Bartram 1998; Kemp and Raijman 2008; Rosenhek 2003; Sabar 2008).

However, with the 1996 rise to power of the Likud party that sought to halt and reverse the peace process, the Israeli government actively deported labor migrants, as it preferred to reintegrate Palestinians into the Israeli labor market as part of the process of erasing the boundaries between the two communities and undermining the peace process. Despite these initial interests, in practice the replacement of Palestinian labor with migrant labor engendered new circumstances that increased alienation and hostility between the Israeli and Palestinian societies and reduced support for reconciliation.

These examples elucidate how patterns of inter- and intra-group competition can shape interests regarding a host of issues that are not directly related to these competitive dynamics. Particularly, in the field of immigration they serve as a cognitive frame or mindset that can influence elite preferences and calculations concerning the possible role migrant *others* can play in the context of competition. Often, though not intentionally, these processes also foster the reconfiguration of social boundaries in the process.[20] Although these outcomes appear to emerge as rational-strategic or calculated responses to acute inter-group challenges, they are concurrently largely shaped by the ideas that policy makers and other social actors posses and espouse regarding the goals of the national project(s) and the means of its promotion. However, these preferences and policies can carry multiple and unexpected implications. The social and political consequences that they engender are potentially capable of fundamentally altering groups' identities, social boundaries, and at times the very nature of intergroup conflict and the national project. Furthermore, such processes of demographic and social engineering oftentimes backfire, thereby engendering adverse consequences in relation to these groups' relative demographic and political positions (Scott 1998).

Hence, in the context of intensified international migratory flows, these contentious spaces that are already deeply fragmented prior to the initiation of third-party migratory flows face particular opportunities, challenges, and dilemmas concerning the impact of immigrant presence on pre-existing and ongoing intergroup dynamics, competitive nation-building processes, and other social and political schisms.

First, besides potentially altering their delicate intergroup demographic balance, the introduction of diversity and difference increases intra-group heterogeneity and mitigates the

[20] These strategies of nation building are particularly interesting since Catalans, Quebecois, and Jews, have historically been the losers in nation-building projects that constituted them as the *others* against which the collective *we* was defined in Spain, Canada, and across Europe, respectively.

identity and perceived cohesion of local groups. As a result, immigration can undermine the very logic and legitimacy on which these distinct national projects and claims are predicated (Banting and Soroka 2012; Fiesler 2008). For this reason, fragile majorities actively seek to expand their autonomy and control over immigration and incorporation policies in the hopes of facilitating policies that produce positive and not detrimental outcomes – from the perspective of the national project (ibid).

Second, since the initiation of migratory flows generally emanates from economic objectives (Hollifield 2008; Kemp and Raijman 2008), in most polities, economic rationale constitutes the primary, albeit not the only, interest through which policy preferences vis-à-vis immigration are defined. This is due particularly to the increasing normative constraints on ethnic selection (Joppke 2005).[21] However, in polities that can be classified as spaces of contention, the success of the national project requires that economic interests at times be set aside and subordinated to collective political goals since the pre-eminence of economic efficiency and rationale does not necessarily correspond with the goals of the national project (Shafir 1996).

The predominance of economic interests in shaping immigration and incorporation policies runs the risk of undermining the national project when the promotion of the latter does not correspond with considerations of economic efficiency and profitability. However, the predominance of cultural or political interests can also generate acute challenges and unintended consequences. For instance, In the case of Quebec (which is examined in Chapters 4 and 5), the implementation of an immigrant recruitment criterion that privileged the interests of the

[21] Despite the increasing power of radical right and xenophobic parties across immigrant-receiving countries in general and Europe in particular (Messina 2007), evidence suggests that their impact on immigration and cultural policies is limited. Dunn and Singh (2011) find that in practice, radical right parties have little independent effect on policies relating to immigration and culture, while Minkinberg (2001) identifies limited and highly contingent effects.

Québécois national project by emphasizing linguistic skills and the potential for cultural integration can trigger the opposite challenge, namely, the ingress of migrants who might conform to the dominant group's cultural and political needs, but not to its economic ones (DeVoretz and Pivenko 2008). Similarly, while Palestinian labor was cheaper and generally easier to control and regulate, at least from the perspective of the state, when the Labor government deemed that the promotion of its national project necessitated separation between Israelis and Palestinians, labor migrants replaced the latter.

Third, while it is assumed that migrants will ultimately integrate or assimilate (within two to three generations) into their host societies through processes of linguistic and cultural transfer (Woolard 1989), this assumption may be problematic in the context of the multiple domestic ethnic or linguistic groups and nation-building projects in relation to which integration processes could potentially take place.

Consequentially, as the discussion above illustrates, the interaction between competitive national projects in spaces of contention and immigration raises a host of questions that are relevant to scholars and practitioners of immigration, ethnic relations, political demography, and nationalism. How do existing patterns of intergroup competition over the institutional and ideational structure of the polity affect and shape policies toward immigration in polities controlled by fragile majorities? In what ways and under what conditions do these competitive dynamics shape the preferences of autochthonous ethnic groups, and political factions within them, regarding immigration and incorporation policies? What explains temporal shifts in immigration and incorporation policies in these polities? Why do some national projects elect to actively incorporate immigrants so as to bolster their goals while others choose to exclude them?

How does the entrance of transnational migrants, who are exogenous to these ongoing domestic intergroup dynamics, impact competitive nation-building strategies and outcomes?

This study sets out to provide answers to these important questions and offers a foundation for analyzing and explaining immigration and incorporation policies and practices in contentious spaces that contain both inter- and intra-group competitive national projects. In the following chapters, I shall attempt to decipher the interaction between these phenomena and analytically and systematically, identify the central causal mechanisms and processes, and trace the outcomes they produce within divergent contexts. The analysis presented in following chapters will create a foundation for the development of a more comprehensive framework for the analysis of the many complex factors that shape local ethnic groups' interests toward third-party migrants who, at least initially, have little stake in these competitive dynamics.

By means of an examination of the cases of Israel, Quebec, and Catalonia, this study will explore the triadic relationship among fragile majorities in the context of intergroup competition over the institutional configuration of the polity, strategies, policies, attitudes, and preferences regarding both international migration and the migrants themselves. I will argue that both historical trajectories and ongoing dynamics and patterns of intergroup interaction and competition play a crucial role in shaping policies, preferences, and outcomes relating to immigration and incorporation. The detailed and comprehensive empirical data from these three cases will constitute a foundation for analyzing these complex dynamics and to enhance our understanding of them.

Explaining Immigration Policies

As I discussed above, despite the burgeoning of literature in social-scientific immigration studies over the last several decades, the field still lacks a strong theoretical foundation regarding the factors and mechanisms that shape immigration and incorporation policies across divergent national and regional context. When I discuss immigration policies I am primarily referring to the rules and procedures governing the scope, selection and admission procedures of foreign citizens, and the modes of their inclusion into or exclusion from the host society (Hollifield 2014; Freeman and Kessler 2008; Massey et al. 1998; Meyers 2000; Portes 1997).

In particular, theories of immigration have been divided by several crucial questions. First, are immigration policies primarily shaped by economic (Borjas 1990; Money 1999; Piore 1979), Cultural (Brubacker 1992; Letiner 1995; Zolberg 1999), or state-security interests (Weiner 1995; Rudolph 2006)? Second, are immigration policies created as part of a bottom up process in which the state is epiphenomenal (Borjas 1990; Freeman 1995) or one in which state actors and agencies play an active role (Messina 2008; Rudolph 2003; 2006; Tichenor 2000; Zolberg 1999)? Finally, what are the factors that shape preferences toward the inclusion or exclusion of immigrants? And in particular, what are the mechanisms that engender continuity and change in these preferences and policies over time?

In this section I will survey the existing theoretical literature on these issues, how they pertain to contentious spaces and the cases at hand, and discuss their various strengths and shortcomings. I will posit that while these approaches provide important tools for explaining the development of immigration and incorporation across most national contexts, particularly in advanced capitalist societies, they are insufficient to explain the outcomes in the cases that this study explores. Specifically, I argue that while existing approaches offer only partial explanations for the outcomes observed in Israel, Quebec, and Catalonia. Instead, a comprehensive explanation requires that we incorporate the political and ideological preferences and policies that emanate from inter-group and intra-group competition and the goals of the national project(s) into account.

Historically, immigration scholars have primarily privileged economic approaches for explaining the formation and development of immigration policies (Massey et al. 1998). Early economic approaches, that are derived from neo-classical economics, primarily examine the impact of wage differentials, uneven economic development, divergent factor endowments, and asymmetrical demand for labor across states and regions, as the primary factors that have generated migratory push factors in sending states and pull factors in receiving ones (Borjas 1990; 2001; Harris and Torado 1970). These approaches largely focus on the economic preferences of immigrants themselves and the labor demands of employers in the receiving countries, while the state is largely viewed as a passive actor.

Other predominantly economic approaches focus less on individual incentives and more on the broad characteristics of the receiving countries' economies; primarily their labor market structures that engender the need for large inflows of cheap and disposable migrant labor. For example, Castles and Kosack's (1973) Marxist approach suggests that immigration policies are shaped by the needs of employers in advanced capitalist societies to discipline native workers as a means of reducing structural wage inflation. For this purpose employers seek to recruit and maintain an *industrial reserve army* of workers who are willing to work for relatively low wages and assume temporary and low skilled positions that natives are not willing to fill. Furthermore, employers benefit from this disposable and unprotected labor force that can easily be disbanded during economic downturns. As with the previously discussed pull/push approaches, within this approach the state is largely epiphenomenal in the process of immigrant recruitment, as it is primarily perceived as a vehicle for promoting the interests of economic actors.

Similarly, other scholars focus on the segmented nature of the labor market structures in advanced capitalist societies. These, they posit, engender strong pull factors for migrants as employers demand access to a steady stream of cheap and flexible labor (Piore 1979; Massey et al. 1998; Torado et al. 1980). According to this approach, the formal economies in advanced capitalist societies have become increasingly inflexible due to the growing role and power of unions and various legal protections that shield indigenous laborers from the insecurities that are engendered by labor market fluctuations. As a consequence, labor markets have become divided into two segments. The primary or formal one in which workers enjoy various protections, stable wages, and relatively regular employment, and the secondary market in which jobs are primarily labor intensive, require low skills, provide workers with little job stability, low wages, and do not offer opportunities for mobility. Since native workers are mostly unwilling to assume employment in the secondary labor market, and often elect to remain unemployed instead, employers elect to exert pressure on the government to recruit immigrants that will be willing to work under these conditions.

Thus, both Marxist and segmented labor market approaches suggest that permissive and restrictive immigration policies are strongly related to economic booms and busts that shape the need for low skilled, flexible, and unprotected labor. As a result, during periods of economic growth we will expect to observe expansive immigration policies while economic contraction will lead to an increase in restrictions, as migrant workers are not needed.

While these approaches are able to explain a broad array of immigration policies, particularly the guest worker policies that were adopted in postwar Europe, and temporary labor programs like the Bracero program in the United States (Calavita 1992; Castles and Miller 2009; Messina 2008), scholars have criticized these approaches for three main reasons. First, they do not sufficiently analyze the role and impact of autonomous or semi-autonomous state interests and agency in the process of defining immigration policy (see: Freeman and Kessler 2008). Second, scholars such as Zolberg (1999) and Thichenor (2002) have argued that at least in the American case, the imposition of restrictions on immigration has oftentimes not been correlated with economic cycles, as these approaches would predict. Third, Money (1999) and Meyers (2000) argue that despite the fact that many receiving countries have experienced similar macro-economic conditions, during the same periods of time, they have nevertheless adopted divergent policies vis-à-vis immigration.

In an attempt to integrate the economic foundations of immigration together with political factors into a unified theoretical account, Freeman (1995) developed a pluralist approach for explaining immigration policies. Freeman uses the apparent liberal bias in immigration policy that engenders policies that are more liberal than those supported by public opinion, as his starting point. To solve this puzzle he posits that immigration policies are shaped by collective action problems and the uneven distribution of the cost and benefits that are related to immigration across society. According to this approach, this distribution and its impact on pattern of collective action play a crucial role in producing policy outcomes.

Since in most immigrant-receiving contexts the benefits engendered by immigration are concentrated in the hands of the few (employers, economic lobbies, ethnic groups), while their costs are diffuse across society, the former are more likely to be able to effectively organize than the latter and make political demands in favor of expansive immigration. As a result, under these circumstances client politics in which the state provides employers with increased access to migrant labor is likely to emerge, and supersede unorganized popular interests that favor immigration restrictions.[22] In this scenario-organized business lobbies and advocacy groups that seek permissive immigration policies are able to captivate the state and influence policy outcomes. Thus, these actors are able to facilitate the adoption of expansive immigration policies through this process that he defines as client politics.[23]

Freeman's client politics approach, however, has several weaknesses. First, it underestimates the role that divergent institutional arrangements can play in shaping the level of access and influence that these groups have within the policy making process (Boswell 2007; Kemp and Raijman 2008). Second, Freeman does not sufficiently take the role of organized anti-immigrant political interests into account. Despite the fact that policy makers tend to maintain a more liberal approach to immigration policy than the broader population (Lahav 2004), anti-immigrant parties and groups have gained significant power and have demanded, and at times affected, restrictive immigration policies (Carter 2005; Givens and Luedtke 2004). Furthermore, Freeman's approach does not fully identify the conditions under which either client politics or anti-immigration politics will be more dominant in the policy making process.

More generally, while these approaches offer important insights into the economic factors and interests that shape immigration policies, they tend to overlook state agency and the autonomous or at least partially autonomous role that state actors and agencies play in shaping these policies (Calavita 1992; Rudolph 2003; 2006; Zolberg 1999). If the interests of capitalists, employers, or economic interest groups primarily determine immigration policies, the state is relegated to a position in which it solely functions as an arbitrator between competing societal

[22] It is important to note that while client politics are usually discussed in the context of unskilled labor migration, it is often employers of high-skilled migrants that exert organized pressure in favor of permissive policies (Gimpel and Edwards 1999).

[23] See also Joppke 1999 and Kessler 2000

interests. For instance if immigration policies can be reduced to economic preferences, we are unable to explain why states have elected to limit immigration during periods of acute labor shortages, such as Britain's decision to halt commonwealth immigration during the 1960's.

In addition, the emphasis on economic interests limits our ability to explain the particular timing and character of migratory flows. For instance, in the Israel case, despite the existence of a robust secondary labor market and strong organized employer campaigns in favor of recruiting labor migrants that emerged in the mid 1980's, their recruitment materialized only when these economic interests became aligned with the state's geo-political interests vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict (Batram 1998; Kemp and Raijman 2008). Similarly, as I demonstrate in chapters 4 and 5, economic actors and other organized interest groups played a minor role in the shift in Quebec's immigration policies that took place in the 1960s and 1970s. Instead, the interests of political actors who sought to bolster Quebec's position within Canada and enhance Francophone demography primarily determined this shift. In fact, I posit that Quebec's primarily culturally focused immigration policies have undermined its economic interests.

In response to the limitations of economic and interest group based explanations, scholars have increasingly lamented the scant attention that has been given to the role of the state in shaping immigration policy (Hollifield 2014; Zolberg 1999)[24]. Zolberg (1999) has powerfully argued that historically, autonomous state interests and preferences have played a crucial role, though not an exclusive one, in both facilitating and limiting immigration flows. Thus, he argues that any analysis that overlooks the autonomous role that state actors and agencies play in shaping immigration policies necessarily offers a partial account.

---

[24] This however has begun to change over the last decade with the increased involvement of political scientists in the field of immigration studies outside the traditional focus on anti-immigrant political movements (Hopkins 2010; Norris 2005). Recent contributions to the field have examined the role of regime type (Mirilovic 2010), foreign policy (Greenhill 2012), and immigration control policies (Ellerman 2009). For an overview of current political science approaches to immigration see: Hollifield 2014)

While Zolberg's state centered approach offers students of immigration important historical insights concerning the central role that the state has historically played in regulating immigration, it does not provide us with a sufficient explanation with regard to the specific mechanisms and factors that have shaped and altered state preferences and policies over time. This gap has been partially filled by international relations scholars such as Rudolph (2003; 2006) and Weiner (1995) who offer a broader foundation for understanding the process through which state preferences and policies toward immigration are determined.

These scholars primarily emphasize the role that security, broadly defined, plays in shaping these outcomes. Specifically, they posit that state preferences toward immigration are shaped by the interaction between three central interests: economic growth, the protection of the state's territory, and maintaining social cohesion. While each single factor plays a partial role in determining policies the analysis of the interplay between these factors offers a more robust framework for explaining immigration policies. For instance, if permissive immigration policies promote economic growth but concurrently undermine social cohesion or domestic security, states are likely to limit migratory flows. Thus, Weiner (1995) argues that despite the economic benefits that immigration can engender, it is often necessary to limit migratory flows during economic booms due to the social conflict and ramifications it engenders.

From this perspective, Rudolph (2003; 2006) suggests that since interstate conflicts promote social cohesion and reduce the salience of domestic conflicts and cleavages, while they concurrently require the mobilization of vast economic resources, wars and inter-sate conflicts can engender more permissive immigration policies. Building on this relation between immigration and state power, Greenhill (2012), posits that developing states create refugee crises strategically as a means of extracting concessions from more powerful states and enhancing their bargaining positions. From this perspective, Skerntny (2002) argues that the 1965 removal of ethnic restrictions over immigration in the United States emanated from diplomatic and security interest. Specifically, he argues that the United States sought to increase its influence and appeal vis-à-vis African and Asian countries and therefore elected to remove restrictions that discriminated against African and Asian immigrants. Similarly, Bubacker and Kim (2011) posit that both Korean and German immigration policies toward co-ethnic were largely shaped in response to Cold War related security preferences.

While state centered approaches provide a more comprehensive explanation of the factors that shape immigration policy by integrating economic, social, and security factors, I posit that they do not pay sufficient attention to the ideological preferences and political processes that shape these outcomes. Specifically, they tend to blackbox and obscure the specific mechanisms, such as ideological preferences and political competition, which shape state interests beyond the calculation of the impact of these various factors. In contrast, I argue that a comprehensive explanation of the cases at hand requires that we disaggregate the state and identify the interests of divergent ideological and interests group on the one hand, and state agencies on the other.

Thus, in the context of this study, none of the cases discussed bellow can be fully explained without exploring particular ideological and instrumental preferences toward demography and intergroup competition. While the case of Quebec partially conforms to the security-based approach as patterns of intergroup competition with Canada have engendered more expansive immigration policies in Quebec, this approach cannot explain why Quebec expanded immigration and recruitment during a period of significant societal backlash against non-Francophone immigrants, or particular shifts in the provinces policies over time. In the Israeli case, while the recruitment of labor migrants was strongly related to security concerns, the decision to initiate recruitment was not a direct response to these concerns. Instead, as I demonstrate in chapter 3, the Labor Party's ideological prism played a crucial mediating role that produced this outcome. In fact, the same security concerns engendered diametrically opposite preferences among right wing political elites.

Beyond explaining the factors and conditions that shape the immigrant recruitment and admission, we must also examine explanations concerning immigrant incorporation (inclusion or exclusion). As Hammer (1985; 1990) and Money (1999) point out, while immigration and integration policies are often conflated in theoretical debates and empirical analysis they constitute distinct policy issues that require separate analysis.

The most common approach for explaining policies that seek to either include or even assimilate immigrants, on one end of the spectrum, or to exclude and marginalize them, on the other, emanates from Kohn's (1944) highly influential distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism which was later developed by Greenfeld (1992). Scholars have since attempted to analyze and classify national groups, movements, and states along these lines (Breton 1988; Brubaker 1992; Kaufman 2000; Muller 2008).

According to this approach, membership in some societies is primarily *ethnic*, meaning that membership in the community is predicated upon some primordial connection with co-ethnics. This approach is largely associated with *Jus Sanguinis* (right of blood) policies and has been historically prevalent in countries such as Germany, Austria, Ireland, Slovakia, and Israel. At the other end of the spectrum are *civic* societies in which membership is primarily defined by living in a society and participating in its political and social life. In civic societies membership is primarily defined by the Jus Soli (right of soil) or *Jus Domicile* (right of residence) principles that fosters the inclusion anyone who is born or resides within the territory of the polity. Civic polities primarily include France, Great Britain, and the settler states such as the United States, Canada, and Australia. According to this approach civic states are more likely to be willing integrate or assimilate immigrants, particularly the second generation, into the fabric of society, while ethnic states tend to be exclusivist and to promote immigrant exclusion and marginalization.

While this distinction is both intuitive and appealing, in recent years it has fallen into disrepute (Brubaker 2004; Gans 2004; Kuzio 2002; Yack 1999). Critics posit that that ethnic and civic national conceptions do not constitute binary, static, mutually-exclusive categories, as was formerly assumed, but instead represent a continuum, since most collectives exhibit varying levels and manifestations of both civic and ethnic components (Sekulic 2004; Triandafyllidou 1998).[25] Furthermore, following Kuzio (2002) and Kaufman (2000), I argue that the balance between these two components is not stable. Instead, they are subject to evolutionary processes that alter the equilibrium between them over time and in relation to particular groups.

However, critics of this approach have been largely unable to furnish satisfactory explanations regarding the causes and mechanisms that generate these temporal shifts in groups' positions along this continuum and their contradictory implementation in various contexts and toward divergent population groups. Are the sources of such shifts exogenous or endogenous to the group itself? Are these changes the result of linear progression or do they assume other patterns of development? What explains variation in the nature of these social boundaries vis-à-vis particular ethnic group?

[25] For instance, despite the United State's classification as a civic state, it has at times maintained ethnically based exclusionary policies toward ethnic and racial minority groups (Smith 1997). Similarly the *White Australia* policy used race as a criterion for excluding certain immigrant groups (Castles and Miller 2009).

A second approach that was developed by Stephen Castles and Mark Miller (2009) suggests a trichotomous model for classifying and explaining immigrant incorporation policies. According to this approach, states preferences and policies toward immigrant incorporation can be aggregated into three ideal-typical models. The first, *the differentialist exclusionary model* largely mirrors the ethnic approach. This model leaves little room for immigrant integration or labor market mobility. Instead, immigrants remain trapped within the secondary segment of the labor market and on the fringes of society. Immigrants in these polities, unless they are co-ethnics, are largely segregated, subject to discrimination, and receive inferior services from the state. Furthermore, both immigrants and their children are excluded from formal membership in the polity as they are denied access to citizenship. Examples of such countries include Israel, Switzerland, Austria, and Germany prior to 2000.

The second approach is *the assimilationist model.* Polities that embody this approach seek to incorporate immigrants under the condition that the latter fully assimilate into the host society's national culture and language. In fact, assimilation is perceived as the key determinant for social integration and mobility. Furthermore, while the state often funds language and integration classes that are meant to assist the assimilation process, it seeks to erase, ignore, or relegate to the private sphere various forms of difference (ethnic, racial or religious differences) as these are considered to be divisive. Furthermore, in contrast to the exclusionary model, either immigrants or their children are eligible to become citizens of the host state, thus completing their integration process. The classic example of this model is France, although in the context of this study Quebec, particularly under the Parti Québécois, represents it as well

The third approach is the *multicultural model* (see: Carens 2000; Kymlicka 1995). This model fosters immigrant integration while concurrently accepting and even supporting the preservation of immigrant cultural communities and ethnic difference. In fact, proponents of this approach believe that enabling immigrants to preserve their cultural traditions promotes, rather than inhibits, their ultimate integration into the host society. Thus, this model enables immigrants to both preserve their heritage and fully integrate and participate in the social and political life of their adopted country. As a result, immigrants are integrated unconditionally, granted full access to citizenship, while they are permitted to maintain the citizenship of their country of origin as well. The paradigmatic examples of this model are Canada and Australia (since the mid-1960s).

While this model is more expansive than the dichotomous ethnic/civic approach and can incorporate shifts overtime between these models, it still maintains some weaknesses. First as with the previous model it does not provide a theory of change. Since these models are primarily based on historical legacies of citizenship, colonial experiences, and legacies of state and nation building, it is unable to explain why and under what conditions change is likely to take place. Thus, it cannot explain the shifts in the ways that social boundaries have been defined in Quebec and Catalonia over time. Second, this model suggests that states espouse a single approach; however, this is not necessarily the case. For instance, as I discussed above, in the Israeli case divergent groups can synchronously experience different approaches. Furthermore, the same group can experience different approaches across time. Such discrepancies are also prevalent in Catalonia and Quebec as is exemplified by their preferences regarding immigrant selection that engender, a process that I have defined as *the stratification of otherness*.

Thus, while both the civic/ethnic and multicultural approaches provide us with important tools for categorizing and analyzing divergent incorporation policies, they are unable to provide us with a theory that explains change in incorporation preferences and policies over time and synchronic variation in policies vis-à-vis different groups. Below I will propose my own approach to these questions in the context of contentious spaces, which I will further develop in the following empirical chapters.

The Argument – A Political and Ideological Approach to Immigration

Due to the theoretical shortcoming that I discussed above, I propose a new approach for explaining immigration and incorporation policies in contentious spaces, one that emphasizes the role that politics and ideology play in this process. In broad terms, I argue that disruptive events threatening the balance of power among conflicting groups induce elites of the fragile majority to reimagine the role that immigration can play in giving their group an edge. Such a reconsideration of how immigration could help or hinder the group involves reconceptulalizing the parameters of the national project itself.

More specifically, I will argue that in contentious spaces, immigration and incorporation policies are intricately connected to and shaped by the dynamics of competitive national projects (both inter- and intra-group). Thus, I suggest that the observable temporal changes and shifts in immigration and incorporation policies in these polities have been largely, though not exclusively, shaped by divergent political and ideological responses to profound changes that have taken place in the nature or the context of intergroup competition. Specifically, exogenous or endogenous events, such as substantial demographic shifts or the eruption or pacification of violence, challenge and alter the ways in which political elites within the dominant ethnic group think about, perceive, and understand intergroup competition and the role that immigration plays within this context. As a result, this process can engender change in or refinement of these actors' preferences regarding immigration and incorporation policies.

As I discussed above, I posit that dominant elites in contentious spaces primarily perceive immigration policies in abstract instrumental terms, as a means of promoting both their group's overarching and their particular vision of the national project, while weakening the demographic, institutional, or material position of competing groups. In fact, as I shall demonstrate in the following chapters, all political groups in these societies, regardless of their political or ideological disposition have attempted to utilize or have viewed immigration in these instrumental terms at various points in time. Thus, given access to institutional power, these elites will seek to devise and promote immigration and incorporation policies that they deem most appropriate for fostering these goals, within the particular context they are embedded. These can include, shifts toward more inclusive or exclusive social boundaries (civic, ethnic, multicultural), selection preferences toward groups of immigrants that carry particular attributes, the active recruitment or deportation of immigrants, or their overall assimilation into or marginalization from the dominant ethnic group.

Specifically, when profound changes take place that alter the context or parameters of intergroup competition, these elites are likely to reassess their ideas regarding the national project and the role immigration should play under these new conditions. Such changes to the nature of intergroup competition include for example, the shift from Anglophone immigration to Allophone immigration in Quebec, the shifts in the demographic balance that took place in all three societies, the emergence of mass international immigration into Catalonia in the 1990s, or the eruption of the Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories. In response to these constitutive events, political elites have generated new ideas and preferences regarding the goals of the national project, the means of achieving them, and the ways on which immigration policies can serve to promote these goals, which they are able to implement once they have sufficient access to political power. In fact, as I demonstrate in the empirical chapters bellow, the vision of the national project constitutes a primary lens through which elite preferences vis-à-vis immigration are shaped and redefined.

However, despite the profound emphasis this approach gives to the role of political and ideological visions and preferences in shaping these outcomes, it is important to note that these processes do not take place in a vacuum. Instead, other factors that are included in other theoretical approaches, such as economic and security interests or historically defined cultural legacies, can also play an important role in shaping these outcomes. Despite the role these factors do play, I argue that the immigration policies that have emerged in the polities explored in this study cannot be fully explained without taking political and ideological preferences regarding patterns of inter and intra-group competition into consideration.

For instance, in the Israeli case, labor migrants would not have been recruited in the absence of the strong pressures that was exerted by various economic actors (employers, human resource firms). At the same time, these pressures alone were insufficient to engender recruitment, as is evidenced by the fact that the government elected not to recruit labor migrants despite almost a decade of relentless demands by employers that they do so. Instead, only when economic interests became aligned with the government's interests' vis-à-vis the national project, in the context of engendering separation between Israel and the territories, did the recruitment of labor migrants transpire. Similarly, while in Catalonia, the large scale entrance of immigrants, who were primarily irregular and undocumented, was the result of strong economic pull factors, the integration policies and strategies that Catalonia adopted, and preferences concerning immigrant origin have been closely related to particular ideological interests of various political parties vis-à-vis the Catalan national project(s) and thus cannot be explained by economic or security factors alone. The Quebec case in fact, offers the clearest example of the predominance of political and ideological factors in shaping immigration policies. Not only has immigration to the province not been shaped by economic interests, in fact, as DeVoretz (2008) illustrates the province's recruitment policies have been primarily shaped by political-cultural interests concerning the national project while they have significantly undermined its economic needs.

Thus, this approach does not seek to refute existing explanatory frameworks but instead proposes an additional complementary element, the political-ideological one, which I suggest, plays a particularly important role in the context of contentious spaces. Furthermore, I posit that economic approaches appear to overemphasize the inputs that are generated by economic actors and other interest groups at the expense of state agency and institutional structures while statist approaches tend to overemphasize policy outputs, and do not give sufficient attention to the various political inputs and processes that shape these outputs.

In contrast, my approach seeks to incorporate both inputs and outputs by exploring the inputs generated by competing ethnic and ideological groups, together with those generated by economic and security interests, while offering a more comprehensive analysis of the political and institutional processes through which immigration policies and outcomes are produced in contentious spaces. I am able to achieve the latter by examining the relation between a particular group's access to political and institutional power at a given time and its ability to alter immigration policies in ways that conform with its interests vis-à-vis the national project. These dynamics have been particularly prevalent in Quebec and Israel, as successive shifts in power in the two polities have been strongly correlated with the adoption of divergent policies vis-à-vis immigration and integration. However, as the evidence suggests, as with any project of purposive demographic or social engineering, these policies do not always fully achieve their intended objectives. Instead, they can occasion unexpected, perverse, and even self-defeating outcomes, even if they are able to partially fulfill their intended goals.

Thus, to conclude, in the following chapters I will argue that in order to better understand immigration and incorporation policies in contentious spaces, we need to incorporate political-ideological factors that are related to the dynamics of competitive national projects (both inter- and intra-group) into our analysis to complement security and economic factors. By examining the cases of Israel, Quebec, and Catalonia I will in fact demonstrate that these interests vis-à-vis the national project have played a crucial role in shaping these outcomes. These outcomes are therefore a result of (1) fundamental shifts in the nature or structure of intergroup competition that lead to (2) a reassessment of the particular national projects promoted by various political groups; (3) the emergence of strategies regarding how immigration can promote the particular vision of the national project; (4) however, policy change can only be implemented once the political group attains sufficient access to institutional power in order to effect its preferred change in immigration and incorporation policies.

Case selection

As mentioned above, the primary unit of analysis in this study constitutes what I have identified as *spaces of contention.* I have delimited and defined the scope conditions of this category to include polities that contain enduring patterns of competitive nation building between at least two nationally defined domestic groups that seek divergent ends with regards to the political and cultural status quo within the territorial unit. As a consequence of this definition, this study departs from prevailing practices in comparative political analysis that primarily select and compare identical or similar types of territorial units (states, regions). This analytical choice emanates from the fact that the concept, "spaces of contention," represents a heterogeneous unit of analysis comprising diverse forms of territorial units that include sovereign states, federal subdivisions, and recognized or unrecognized sub-state regions. Therefore, a comprehensive examination of these spaces as well as their impact on and interaction with immigration and incorporation policies dictate that we explore their manifestation within these diverse units[26]. Furthermore, the departure from the orthodoxy of comparative political analysis can also afford us new insights and understandings that might not have been evident or accessible from the comparison of seemingly equivalent units.

As mentioned previously, in order to explore these processes, I have elected to focus on three polities that exhibit the diversity represented by the concept of spaces of contention. Israel, Quebec, and Catalonia, each of which constitutes a different political and institutional configuration of contentious space. The first is an independent sovereign state; the second is one of the world's most autonomous federal units (Hechter 2000); and the third is an autonomous community within a nominally unitary state that has gradually devolved significant powers to its autonomous communities (Calavita 2005; Keating 2001; McRobers 2001). The choice of studying these dynamics in Israel, Quebec, and Catalonia might surprise some readers. While the latter two have been subject to many comparative analyses (see for example: Criekemans 2010; Guibernau 2006; Keating 2001; McAndrew 2013) as manifestations of peripheral or minority nationalism, Israel is considered either to represent a fundamentally different form of ethnic competition than Catalonia and Quebec or to be an exceptional case that should be excluded from comparative analysis due to its unique characteristics and history.[27]

[26] For a more comprehensive discussion of the implications of comparing dissimilar units, see: Appendix A: Comparing states and regions.
[27] For a discussion of the challenges of employing Israel as a case for comparative analysis, see: Barnett (1996).

This case selection consciously seeks to challenge these latter assumptions, arguing instead that the inclusion of Israel in fact enhances and bolsters the theoretical and analytical scope of its arguments and propositions and their applicability to a wider range of cases. Like Quebec and Catalonia, Israel can easily be classified as a space of contention due to the prevalent dynamics competing national projects between Israeli Jews and Palestinians (both in Israel and the occupied territories). The inclusion of the Israeli case will facilitate the development of a theoretical foundation that can be further tested and refined in future research, while it will also enhance the universe of cases to which the study's conclusions apply.

Furthermore, this case selection will allow us to control for the effects of a variable that some might suggest would be of crucial importance in producing the observed outcomes, namely, relative autonomy. By selecting cases that represent different values of this variable, I will demonstrate that despite the obvious opportunities and constraints that emanate from a polity's relative high level of autonomy and political power, particularly in relation to immigration, the general patterns and causal processes that I identify in this dissertation persist. From this perspective, Catalonia constitutes the most difficult case for my theory due to its low level of autonomy from Spain and its limited power vis-à-vis immigration.

For methodological purposes, however, it is also necessary to construct analytical criteria that identify and delimit potential units that adhere to the scope conditions concerning the category that we have labeled as spaces of contention. To this end, I suggest six main criteria. As mentioned above, the *first* and most crucial concerns the role played by intergroup competition in constituting the primary, albeit not the only, political fault line around which political debates are structured and coalitions converge within the polity[28]. As mentioned previously, this excludes

[28] For instance, despite significant differences with regard to economic and social policy, the current ruling coalition in Catalonia has united left and right parties around the issue of Catalan nationalism. Similarly in Israel, political

polities in which these dynamics constitute one fault line among many others, but not the primary one.

The *second* criterion concerns the control of the polity – at least for significant periods of time – by political parties that primarily represent the fragile majority group and its national project (or a central manifestation of it). In our study, actors who claim to represent their groups' respective national projects control all three polities. While the governing federalist Parti liberal du Quebec (PLQ) is often considered less nationalist than its pro-sovereignty counterpart, the Parti Quebecois (PQ), both its platform and the majority of its delegates perceive themselves as authentic representatives of Quebec nationalism who seek to increase the province's relative autonomy and enhance Quebec's role within the Canadian framework (Bouchard 1995; Barker 2010; Oaks and Warren 2007).

Since Spain's democratization and the first regional elections, the Catalan Generalitat has been controlled by the nationalist Convergecia i Unio (CIU), except for the short period between 2003 and 2010 during which the Socialist Catalan Party (PSC), whose stance regarding the national question has been primarily vague, governed a collation consisting of the PSC and two Catalanist parties (ERC and ICV). Similarly, while observers tend to associate the Israeli right primarily with Zionism and nationalism, all Jewish political parties in Israel (both right and left) subscribe to some form of the nationalist Zionist ideology and promote national projects that espouse Israel's survival as a Jewish state.

The *third* criterion concerns the presence of a competing minority group(s). In our three cases, while the fragile majorities control the polity, they face significant minority forces that

---

coalitions are primarily based on preferences regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, uniting political factions that vary significantly on other crucial issues such as economic policy, or religion and state.

contest the national and institutional character of that control and support a competing national project.

The *fourth* criterion relates to the support granted to these competing minorities by external actors with whom they share ethnic, cultural, and linguistic ties (Palestinians in the occupied territories and Arab states, Anglo-Canadians and the federal state, and Castilian Spaniards and the Spanish state). These dynamics are often the result of shared ethnicity and preferences regarding the institutional outcome of intergroup competition, between the minority group that resides within the contentious space and their external allies.

The *fifth* criterion concerns the existence of observable linguistic or cultural differentiation between the fragile majority and the competing minority group. In Quebec, intergroup competition exists between Anglophones and Francophones, in Catalonia, it is between Spanish- and Catalan-speakers, and in Israel, it exists between Hebrew-speaking Jews and Arabic-speaking Palestinians. This criterion emanates from the need of these polities to be able to differentiate between competing groups in order for immigrants to be able to alter their national project. For instance, in the case of Scotland, the lack of this form of differentiation undermines competing groups' ability to instrumentally use migrants as a means of augmenting or enhancing relative group size due to the lack of a clear and visible way of differentiating among local ethnic groups and the integration of immigrants into them.

The *final* criterion relates both to these groups' historical experiences and narratives of marginalization and minoritization and to ongoing concerns relating to their cultural survival. These collective concerns regarding cultural reproduction and sustainability have been defined as cultural nationalism, which in contrast to statist nationalism perceives the national project as primarily promoting cultural continuity and reproduction and not merely the integrity and cohesion of the state itself (Gans 2004). As mentioned above, all three groups have endured cultural and political oppression. While Jews have withstood centuries of persecution and violence, Catalans and Quebecois (or French Canadians) have experienced varying levels cultural and linguistic suppression by Spain and Britain respectively.

The selection of cases that I have elected to include in this study is based on a Most Different System (MDS) approach (George and Bennett 2005; Przeworski and Teune 1970). This approach facilitates the inclusion of cases that differ significantly in a range of important structural and institutional variables as a means of demonstrating that they are in fact manifestations of the same abstract phenomena and that they exhibit a similar relationship between explanatory factors and outcomes. This type of approach is particularly beneficial in the context of specialized research of phenomena in which the number of potential cases is limited (Wirth and Kolb 2004).

In practice, MDS promotes the study of polities that manifest many significant differences with regard to factors such as political institutional structures, level of autonomy, historical experiences, and cultural legacies, but share one fundamental dynamic that is the focus of explanation. In our case, this shared factor concerns the relationship between the two key processes explored in this dissertation, namely, nationalist contention and the ingress of third-party migrants. More specifically, I focus on contested spaces that are controlled by fragile majorities that face competition from a rival national project supported by groups both within and outside of the polity, and have experienced significant waves of third-party migration. The inherent differences among these cases afford us a firmer foundation on which to build our empirical analysis and theoretical conclusions. By demonstrating that the equivalent abstract causal mechanisms and processes are in action across the three cases despite the significant variations among them, the robustness and causal power of my arguments will be enhanced.

However, as with all case selection methods, this approach suffers from several shortcomings. The most crucial weakness of MDS is attributable to the possible effects of omitted or overlooked causal variables, which could in fact be responsible for the observed relationship between cause and outcome (George and Bennett 2004). In order to address this challenge, I will analyze the evidence from the three cases will be analyzed using process tracing and sequencing methods[29]. These methods will facilitate the analysis of complex social and political processes by testing for the presence of the hypothesized relationship between competitive nation building and immigration on the one hand and incorporation preferences and outcomes on the other, and then tracing its development[30]. Process tracing and sequencing will facilitate the testing of these abstract causal processes and relationships, help examine how they materialize and shape outcomes in practice, and whether and how they interact.

More specifically, they will help us test the hypothesized interplay between inter- and intra- group competition on the one hand and immigration and incorporation policies on the other, and determine how they correspond with each other. In addition, these methods will facilitate the exploration of alternative explanations and the identification of possible intervening and omitted variables. This empirical approach will enable me to test whether the primary relations between competitive nation-building and immigration and incorporation policies are maintained across contexts, institutional arrangements, levels of autonomy, and particular political, social, historical, and cultural legacies and dynamics.

[29] For in-depth analysis and specification of these methods, see: George and Bennett (2005) and Pierson (2004).
[30] For a detailed explanation of my approach, see the Methodology section below.

Empirical Approach and Methodology

As mentioned above, the primary aim of this study is to identify and decipher the complex interconnected relations between competitive national projects and immigration and incorporation policies as a means of devising a theoretical framework that accounts for these dynamics and explains particular outcomes. Given these goals, I have chosen to employ a qualitative research design. This approach allows me to explore both underlying structures and the ways in which the actors themselves view and articulate their preferences and actions and interpret events. For this purpose, I analyze documents, histories, interviews, and other public and private statements.

In order to pursue the study's research goals, I conducted eighteen months of field work in Quebec, Israel, and Catalonia. In the course of my field research, I collected diverse forms of data that provide the empirical foundations for the analysis presented in Chapters 3-5. During my time in the field, I employed several research and data collection strategies. First, I conducted 104 semi-structured in-depth interviews with a wide array of actors who have been involved in the many processes this study examines.[31] These interviews were conducted with local and national politicians and policy makers, bureaucrats, members of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), representatives of immigrant groups and associations, intellectuals, and journalists who represented a broad range of approaches toward these issues. While gaining access to these actors was oftentimes challenging in itself, and interviewees do not necessarily constitute a representative sample of actors in these polities, they have nevertheless provided me with an important window into the dynamics that form the focal point of this study. The interviews,

[31] Interview and recruitment protocols were approved by the Human Subjects Division at the University of Washington (approval number 39781 ec)

which were systematically analyzed, fulfilled the role of identifying subjective, phenomenological, and collective understandings concerning immigration and intergroup competition, as well as the relations between these phenomena.

Second, I collected an extensive number of official and unofficial reports and policy papers, statistical data, court documents, minutes from meetings, official transcriptions of parliamentary and municipal debates, and other contemporary and archival documents. These documents furnished me with a substantial amount of information concerning the preferences, interests, and concrete policies promoted by various groups and actors with regard to immigration and incorporation in these polities. While interviews afford a contemporary snapshot view of events coupled with a dose of hindsight, documents reflect the ideas and understandings that were in place at the time they were written, and are devoid of the noise generated by retrospective analysis.

Third, I performed multiple observations of political, social, and cultural events and gatherings. These were used both as data and also served to enhance my understanding of local intricacies and dynamics that are usually invisible or inaccessible to outsiders.

Finally, I systematically compiled a database of newspaper articles that afforded me additional concrete empirical information and facilitated the process tracing and sequencing of events. Similar to the other documents I collected, newspaper articles reveal the policies, interests, and justifications of various actors across time, while neutralizing the effects of changing perceptions and retrospective analysis.

The collection of these diverse forms of data and their critical analysis have afforded me the ability to construct reliable accounts of the events that transpired in each of the three cases.

The reliability of these accounts has been further reinforced through the triangulation of these diverse data sources.

From a more conceptual and epistemological perspective, the case analysis presented in the following chapters is informed by a two-tiered instrumentalist and constructivist approach. Together these to approaches facilitate a better and more comprehensive analysis and interpretation of outcomes that might be perceived as contradictory or inconsistent when employing a single-pronged approach (Checkel 1997, Fearon and Wendt 2002). From a rational-strategic perspective, the analysis seeks to identify the conditions under which actors in these polities perceive immigration and incorporation as a way of instrumentally promoting their political and demographic position within the context of intergroup competition or as a threat to this position.

The central finding yielded by this perspective suggests that in all cases, regardless of whether immigrants are included or excluded, integrated or marginalized, and the particular context of competition, immigration and incorporation policies have purposively been employed instrumentally as social and demographic engineering strategies. Such strategies are designed to bolster the fragile majorities' position within the competitive framework, while concurrently weakening competing groups' positions. In this context, immigrants are perceived utilized instrumentally to promote group interests and manage competitive intergroup dynamics.

Thus, immigrants are often viewed abstractly as pawns that can facilitate or obstruct the local groups' goals in a host of ways. While immigration is understood in highly divergent terms across these societies, this approach will enable me to decipher the role of various structural variables such as ethnic demographic balance, level of autonomy, origin of immigrants, spatial relations, intergroup dynamics, and national ideals that play potential roles in shaping and determining observed strategies and preferences concerning immigration.

At the same time, employing a constructivist approach adds another layer of complexity and depth to the analysis. This approach contributes to the empirical analysis of the evidence presented in chapters 2-7 in two central ways. First, it emphasizes that the aforementioned strategic choices and preferences do not emerge in a vacuum but are products of ongoing social negotiations and of the redefinition of inter- and intra-group boundaries, perceived interests, and the very meaning and goals of the national project. In contrast to studies that are based primarily on rationalist approaches, which tend to take group preferences and self-understandings as given and exogenous or as inevitable consequences of structural factors (Marsh and Smith 2001), constructivism problematizes preference formation and examines the development and evolution of social boundaries and the understanding of self and other. This approach provides analytical tools to better trace the processes through which these preferences are generated, defined, reproduced, and altered (Ball and Gilligan 2011; Brubaker 2004; Wimmer 2013) and to ultimately produce an analysis that is more sophisticated and contextually sensitive.

Second, constructivist analysis affords a more intricate and contingent means of studying political and social processes and outcomes. Rationalist frameworks tend to overlook ideational transformations that take place as a consequence of material changes and pay little attention to the interplay between material and ideational factors. Constructivists, however, posit that material processes can play an important role in altering, redefining, and reconstituting the very contours of the ideational space within which future preferences and policies are articulated, negotiated, and defined. As a result, this dual approach will enable me to examine and probe the ideational and material consequences of intergroup interactions, preferences, and policies.

The analysis below suggests that even at moments when preferences and actions emanate primarily from strategic reasoning, their adoption and implementation can significantly alter and transform social realities, understandings, and beliefs. These transformations are later collectively internalized by actors and can ultimately alter future interpretive and intersubjective frames through which the social world is understood and navigated, and within which agents act. Therefore, the instrumentalist-strategic and constructivist logics give rise to a complementary, dialectic, and interdependent analytical approach that will facilitate a more thorough and nuanced understanding of the processes this dissertation explores.

The Structure of the Study

The following chapters offer a systematic theoretical and empirical analysis of this study's three cases by exploring and tracing the core dynamics that relate to intergroup competition and international immigration within spaces of contention. While Chapter 1 has outlined and explained the study's theoretical and conceptual foundations, Chapters 2-7 constitute the empirical heart of this project. The examination of each of the cases will be divided into separate sections that include two chapters that together produce a detailed analysis of each case.

In the first chapter on each case, I explore the historical legacies and trajectories of intergroup relations and competition, the evolution and character of social boundaries, and the historical preferences toward immigration and demography. The second chapter of each section will trace and explain the development of specific immigration and incorporation policies on the one hand and competitive national project dynamics (inter- and intra-group) on the other. Through rigorous process tracing I explore the interaction between these processes and examine their mutual effects. In particular, I will explore the manner in which historical shifts and permutations of inter- and intra-group dynamics and other political processes have shaped and altered interests and strategies regarding immigration and incorporation over time. Furthermore, I will explore how immigration processes themselves have recast and altered these national projects.

Chapters 2 and 3 examine the case of Israel. As mentioned previously, Israel constitutes an intriguing case. In Chapter 2, I investigate the intergroup relations that have emerged since the first encounters between Zionist settlers and the Palestinian-Arabs in the late 19th century, and the historical development of attitudes and preferences among Zionist and Israeli leaders towards questions of demography and immigration. The discussion will focus on three particularly crucial periods that have profoundly shaped the trajectories of intergroup competition and demographic realities. First is the period of initial formation of the Zionist Jewish community in Palestine (the Yishuv) and its relations with the local Palestinians residents. Second, the post-1948 period, when Israel became a sovereign state and sought engender a demographic transformation within its territory. Third, the post-1967 period, when Israel became the de facto sovereign over the entire territory of mandatory Palestine,[32] thereby controlling a large Palestinian population that was both hostile toward the state's national objectives and was in the process of developing and defining its own competing national project. This period also

[32] There is much contention concerning Israel's legal position regarding the occupied territories (particularly the West Bank and Gaza, that unlike Jerusalem and the Golan Heights have not been annexed). While some view pre-1967 Israel and the occupied territories as a single unit (Benvenisti 1995; Shafir and Peled 2002; Yiftachel 2006), others separate the two (Smooha 2002). Legally these territories are considered as being under belligerent occupation (Kretzmer 2002), and with the exception of Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, have not been legally annexed to Israel. However, the long term occupation, lack of Israeli recognition of a Palestinian right to sovereign self determination, and the continual expansion of civilian settlements in these territories have led some scholars to argue that these territories are under de-facto Israeli sovereignty (Bevenisti 2010; Hajjar 2005). Beyond international law these questions concerning the status of these territories carry significant consequences for Israel's definition as a democracy, and the legitimacy of the differential legal rights practiced by Palestinians and Israeli settlers in the occupied territories.

constitutes a turning point in the structure of the states ideological spectrum that paved the way for the development of distinct left and right wing national projects in the late 1980s.

Chapter 3 explores the factors underlying the recruitment of hundreds of thousands of foreign labor migrants who are neither Jewish nor Arab. In particular, I will examine and trace how competing Jewish Israeli interests vis-à-vis the national project shaped their recruitment. I will explore the factors that led to their initial recruitment and explain why Israel chose them in order to replace Palestinians workers who since 1967 had constituted the primary source for cheap and flexible low-skilled labor (Bartram 1998; Kemp and Raijman 2008; Rozenhek 2003; Sabar 2008).

I will argue that the dynamics of the entrenched conflict with the Palestinians, and preferences toward it, played a crucial role in shaping Israeli interests and policies vis-à-vis these two groups. These include both the decision to recruit labor migrants to replace Palestinians and consequent polices that sought to reverse these polices. However, I also suggest that these policies have generated challenges to Israeli society as well as its social boundaries as they have given rise to a series of unexpected legal, political and cultural challenges.

Chapters 4 and 5, explore the case of Quebec. In Chapter 4 examines the historical trajectories of competition that have developed over the last three centuries in this primarily francophone polity. I explore the competitive intergroup dynamics that have emerged between Francophones and Anglophones as a result of these historical dynamics and analyze their evolution, development, and transformation across time. In particular, the analysis will trace the processes of group boundary and identity formation that emerged and developed within the context of the long-term interaction between French-Canadians and the British Empire and later Canada. The analysis also examines the processes and the various political and social agents that have historically played an active role in shaping and altering Quebec's perceptions and preferences towards questions of immigration and demography.

Chapter 5 delves into the role played by these competitive dynamics and historical understandings in shaping contemporary preferences, policies, and attitudes regarding immigrants, who are – at least initially – exogenous to these enduring competitive dynamics. This chapter examines the causes and consequences of the shift from full Canadian control over immigration and incorporation policies to one that is largely governed autonomously by Quebec. Furthermore, I analyze the processes underlying the development of specific immigration and incorporation policies and trace the determinants of continuity and change. I analyze how transformations that have taken place within the competitive dynamics have altered preferences and strategies concerning immigration. Moreover, trace the manner in which various factions within Quebec national movement have come to perceive immigrants as a means of strengthening their community and, more importantly, weakening the Anglophone community by circumscribing immigrant assimilation into it. In the analysis I pay particular attention to points of convergence and divergence among various Francophone-Québécois political groups in relation to immigration and incorporation and the role that divergent visions vis-à-vis that national project, have played in engendering both these commonalities differences. Finally, the chapter will explore how contemporary diverse immigration has itself altered intergroup dynamics as well as the fundamental goals and identity of the Quebec national project(s).

Chapters 6 and 7 explore the case of Catalonia. Chapter 6 offers a brief overview of Catalonia's long history and its difficult and complex relations with Spain. The discussion primarily focuses on the period that began with the advent of Catalan nationalism in the late 19th century, and analyzes the evolving and turbulent relations between Catalonia and the Spain until the death of Franco. In particular, I explore the development of the respective national conceptions and movements that emerged within these societies, and the interactions among them and their understandings and preferences vis-à-vis immigration and demography. Chiefly, I examine both the various attempts by the Spanish state to suppress Catalan culture, language, and identity, and the Catalan responses to these policies. I also examine the impact of mass immigration into Catalonia from other regions of Spain during the mid-20th century and the long-term effects these migratory flows have exerted on Catalonia both from a demographic and in relation to the nature of the Catalan national project.

Chapter 7 analyzes the dynamics of international immigration into Catalonia that commenced in the 1980s. The analysis explores the impact of this second wave of immigration, which, in contrast to the earlier internal migrations took place after Catalonia regained its autonomy and partial capabilities to incorporate immigrants. The analysis explores the co-development of Catalan preferences and policies regarding immigrants and its relations with the Spanish state. Since Catalonia has the lowest level of autonomy of our three cases, and its ability to engineer immigration in ways that benefit its national project is limited, it constitutes the most difficult case for my hypothesis. Thus, I investigate the means by which successive Catalan governments have sought to achieve these goals despite the aforementioned constraints, ultimately rendering Catalonia a pioneer of integration policies within Spain (Calavita 2005).

The final Chapter offers a review and comparative discussion of the findings presented in the previous chapters and integrates the arguments, propositions, and evidence advanced throughout study. It also offers some general conclusions and proposes future avenues for advancing the research on immigration and incorporation preferences and policies in spaces of contention.

Section 1: Israel – From Ethnic Exclusion to Non-Jewish Immigration

Following the theoretical and conceptual framework that I laid out in Chapter 1, the analysis presented in this section will trace how competing Israeli elites and groups, with divergent visions of the Zionist/Israeli national project, have dealt with issues of immigration, and demography in the twentieth century. The central questions that I will explore in this section are what factors explain the development and transformation of elite preferences and policies toward immigration across time? What accounts for the apparent contradictions inconsistencies that exist within these policies? In particular, I will explore the causes for the mass recruitment of Palestinian commuter migrants after 1967 and labor migrants in the early-mid 1990s. I will also examine the causes for the changing, and at times diametrically opposed, government policies toward these two groups. Finally, I will trace how in the long-term these policies have shaped or altered the parameters that define Israel's social.

My answer to these questions is that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has played a key role in shaping elite preferences and the policies they have promoted regarding demography and immigration and the recruitment, inclusion, or exclusion of Jewish, partially Jewish,[33] and non-Jewish (both Arab and non-Arab) immigrants. In fact, I will posit that these policies and preferences regarding immigration cannot be explained in full without including conflict-related factors in our analytical framework. Specifically, I posit that while security, cultural and economic explanations all play important roles both encompassing inter-group and specific intra-group preferences concerning the national project have been of primary importance in determining and shaping these outcomes.

[33] According to Jewish law, a person cannot be partially Jewish as Judaism is determined by maternal lineage. However, the existing discrepancy between Jewish law and the Israeli Law of Return has engendered liminal categories for those who have some Jewish lineage but whose mothers are not Jewish. Cohen (2006) describes this population category, which accounts for five percent of Israel's population, as *non-Jewish Jews*.

In Chapter 2, I will explore how the conflict helped promote and shape large-scale Jewish immigration into Palestine and later, Israel. The chapter will explore Arab-Jewish relations and the immigration dynamics that occurred between the late 19th century, when Zionist immigration to Palestine first commenced, and the late 1980s. I will trace how, over time, the ongoing conflict has shaped and reshaped elite ideas, preferences, and policies regarding immigration, demography, and the nature of membership in the polity. I will examine the overall nature of the Zionist national project (that encompasses most political groups), as well as the contours of and differences between competing particular divergent visions of the project that have been promoted by various Zionist political groups. Finally, I will examine how in turn these preferences, policies, and visions of the national project have concurrently altered and sustained the very nature and dynamics of the conflict itself.

In Chapter 3, I will then show how, since the 1990s, this very logic has engendered the recruitment of hundreds of thousands of non-Jews as well—in particular, international labor migrants as well as non-Jewish immigrants from the Former Soviet Union successor states (Bartram 2011; Lustick 1999; Kemp and Raijman 2008). Throughout this period, Israel has recruited hundreds of thousands of labor migrants hailing from 72 countries and constituting 10-12 percent of the private sector's labor force (Kemp and Raijman 2008; Rosenhek 2003; Sinai 2001), making it one of the advanced capitalist societies that is most heavily dependent on a migrant labor force. While the recruitment of labor migrants is not surprising *per se*, since most developed countries have recruited temporary or permanent migrants in order to supplement their labor forces (Castles and Miller 2009), it constitutes an intriguing anomaly within the context of Israel's exclusive ethnic immigration regime that promotes and permits solely the immigration of Jews into the country.

Thus, the chapter will examine the causes that led to the recruitment of and interplay between labor migrants and the Palestinian commuter migrants whom they replaced. In relation to both groups, I will trace and explain the patterns of their inclusion in and exclusion from the Israeli labor market and society over time (Bartram 1998;_Kemp and Raijman 2008; Rosenhek 2003).

Thus, in this section, I shall offer a detailed analysis regarding the relation between Israel's immigration preferences and policies, on the one hand, and intergroup competition in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, on the other. How has the ongoing conflict shaped Israeli interests toward both Jewish and non-Jewish immigration? What can explain shifts in preferences and policies over time? Why have political groups within Israel that espouse competing visions of the Zionist or Israeli national project manifested divergent attitudes in relation to the recruitment of various migrant groups? And finally, how has the long-term presence of large numbers of non-Jewish labor migrants impacted these national projects and the contours of membership of Israeli society more generally?

Chapter 2: Jewish immigration to Palestine and Israel: Intergroup Conflict and the Construction of a Jewish Majority

The Ideological and Material Foundations of Zionist Immigration and Demography

The fundamental goal of the Zionist national project from its inception and specifically since the 1897 Zionist Congress[34] has been the establishment of a Jewish home, eventually understood to be a state, in Palestine, which Zionism viewed as the historic Land of Israel (Eretz Israel). In order to facilitate this goal, the Zionist movement sought to engender an ethno-demographic transformation as a means of bolstering the relative size of the Jewish population residing in this territory through large-scale Jewish immigration (Cohen 2002; Joppke 2005).[35] Thus, the role Jewish demography has served a primary role in Israeli political thought and discourse and its maintenance has become a primary state goal. As former Knesset member Azmi B'shara explained: "Israel is one of the few places where demography first and foremost has an ideological meaning" (Knesset Plenary July 22, 1998).

Since Palestine at the time was primarily inhabited by an indigenous Arab population, demographic transfiguration was considered a crucial step in the process of facilitating Jewish sovereignty in Palestine and its population's ability to govern its affairs autonomously without being subjected to external authority, discrimination, and persecution (Fargues 2000; Friedlander and Goldscheider 1979; Goren 2002; Halpern 1969; Teitelbom and Weiner 2001; Yiftachel

[34] The significance of the Zionist Organization's first congress that convened in Basel, Switzerland, in August 1897 was its official declaration that the movement sought to create a *Jewish home* in Palestine.
[35] Friedlander and Goldscheider (1979) point out that immigration and settlement have been a central ideology in the Zionist movement.

2006).[36] Thus, fostering Jewish immigration was understood to play a crucial role in the realization of the movement's goals.[37]

The Zionist movement, however, faced severe challenges resulting from the fact that the territory of Palestine, under both Ottoman[38] and later British mandatory rule, was inhabited by a Palestinian Arab majority that was hostile to the political, territorial, and demographic goals of the Zionist movement (Khalidi 1997; Kimmerling and Migdal 2002; Shafir 1989; 1995).[39] In fact, Palestinian resistance to Zionism first emerged soon after the initiation of Zionist immigration in the late 19th century and has since developed into a long-lasting, entrenched conflict between the two national movements, or national projects—a conflict that persists to this day.

In response to these entrenched dynamics of intergroup competition, preferences and policies regarding immigration and demography became key issues within the Zionist national project. In fact, scholars have suggested that geopolitical considerations emanating from the conflict have strongly, though not exclusively, shaped the contours of Zionist and Israeli social boundaries, conceptions of membership in the polity, and preferences concerning immigration (Al-Haj 2004; Smooha 1978; 2002). In a 1922 speech, the leader of the Zionist movement and later Israel's first prime minister, David Ben Gurion, explained the movement's demographic perspective: "It is not out of a search or desire to organize our lives on the harmonious foundation of a complex socio-economic creation that we determine our path. The big concern,

[36] While this study focuses primarily on questions of demography and immigration, demographic concerns have significantly affected other policy areas such as fertility rates. Already in the 1930s, demographer Roberto Bachi, who was an advisor to Zionist leaders, stressed the demographic threat facing Zionism and the need to increase Jewish birthrates as a means of effecting demographic change (Portuguese 1998).

[37] The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) also understood Zionism primarily as a movement of demographic transformation: "The importance of the [demographic] question stems from the fact that the Zionist program can be basically summed up as the exchange of one groups of inhabitants for another: the expulsion of Arab inhabitants and the settlement of Jews in their place" (cited in Sternberg 1999, 28).

[38] The Ottoman Empire was opposed to the idea of Jewish settlement in Palestine. Instead, it officially permitted Jews to settle in any part of the empire but Palestine (Mandel 1974).

[39] For comprehensive demographic data on the historic development of the population of Palestine, see: Bachi 1973; Friedlander and Goldscheider 1979.

the one that controls our thought and work, is the conquest of the land and its construction through wide-scale immigration" (Achdut Ha'avoda Party Convention, December 1922).

Specifically, the Zionist movement sought to facilitate the immigration of Jews from the Diaspora to the territory of Palestine and later Israel—a migratory movement they defined as the *ingathering of the exiles*.[40] The latter was perceived as a crucial step in the process of altering the demographic balance between Jews and Arabs in Palestine (Ben Eliezer 1998; Morland 2014) and facilitating the establishment of Jewish sovereignty (Morag 2001). Thus, in the eyes of Zionist leaders, immigration, demographic transformation, and intergroup conflict were intricately connected; "The struggle between Jews and Arabs for Palestine would be resolved at a future date after the arrival of mass Jewish immigration that would transform Arabs into a small and negligible minority" (Shapira 1999, 66).

In the context of immigration to Palestine, however, the Zionist movement faced two related tasks that were somewhat unique in comparison to other national movements of the time—tasks that emanated from the movement's dual identity as both a national liberation and a colonial movement (Shafir and Peled 2002; Shamir 2000; Yiftachel 2006). First, the Zionists sought to create a national homeland for Jews in a territory that contained a relatively small Jewish population numbering fewer than 25,000 people in 1880 (Bachi 1974) and a larger indigenous Palestinian-Arab population that was hostile to the idea of European colonial settlement. Furthermore, the proposed homeland was located at a significant distance from the population centers where the majority of world Jews resided.[41] Second, the movement sought to create a homogeneous national society from a population that was highly diverse and

[40] Despite the fact that Jewish communities existed across diverse regions including various parts of Europe, North Africa, and Asia, initially the Zionist movement almost exclusively recruited Jews from Europe, who constituted the primary charter group of this new society (see: Shafir and Peled 2002; Yiftachel 2006).
[41] The consequent need to relocate the nation's population to the homeland rendered it more like a settler movement than a typical nationalist movement.

heterogeneous in terms of language, geography, culture, and social structure, although they did share common religious practices, elements of identity, and a historical connection to the land of Israel (Divine 2000; Friedlander and Goldscheider 1979).

During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, initiating push factors for Jews in the Diaspora did not constitute a challenge for the Zionist movement. Persistent anti-Semitism, the rise of nationalism in Western Europe that oftentimes placed Jews outside the boundaries of the nation, large-scale pogroms, and persistent ethnic restrictions and discrimination in Eastern Europe triggered mass Jewish emigration primarily from the latter region (Joseph 1910; Klier and Lambroza 2004). However, despite the fact that over 2.5 million Jews emigrated from Eastern Europe between 1880 and 1924,[42] only 2–3 percent opted for Palestine as their destination (Friedlander and Goldscheider 1979; Gittelman 2001; Shafir and Peled 2002; Troen 1991).[43]

Naturally, Zionists leaders largely rejected the idea of immigration to the United States, Canada, and other new immigration states as a suitable survival strategy or a solution for the *Jewish problem*. Instead, the movement privileged the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine as the only viable means for the long-term survival of the Jewish people. In fact, Zionism was predicated on the notion of creating a radical break within Jewish history and the negation of the Diaspora since it sought to engender a fundamental change in long-term Jewish mentalities and behavioral patterns (Divine 2000; Don-Yehiya 1995; Sheffer 2005). For Zionists, as long as Jews continued to form minority populations within non-Jewish societies, they would inevitably continue to suffer from various forms of political, social, and economic discrimination. Thus, the

[42] Owing to large-scale immigration from Eastern Europe and high fertility rates, Jews in America and Oceania increased from 100,000 in 1850 to 5.5 million in 1939 (Friedlander and Goldscheider 1979).
[43] In fact, out of those who did choose to immigrate to Palestine, it is estimated that some 90 percent returned to Europe or immigrated elsewhere (Shafir and Peled 2002).

only solution to the *Jewish problem* was the creation of a new society or state in which Jews were sovereign and able to define and shape their own destiny autonomously.

Thus, due to the prevailing immigration preferences among European Jews, Zionists primarily faced the challenge of generating pull factors that would entice Jewish emigrants to settle in Palestine and not elsewhere. This goal constituted a particularly difficult challenge since the vast majority of European Jewish emigrants did not identify with Zionist ideology and were attracted instead to the relatively high standards of living and economic opportunities that existed in other destination countries such as the United States, Canada, Argentina, and South Africa. In fact, with the exception of highly ideologically-motivated Zionists, Jews only elected to immigrate to Palestine when access to more attractive immigration destinations was not available (Dellapergola 1992; 2012; Shuval and Leshem 1998).[44]

From an ideational perspective, however, demographic preferences within the Zionist movement were not monolithic. Despite the fact that most factions agreed that in the long run, Palestine would serve as a homeland for all Jews, various Zionist groups that espoused different visions of the national project diverged with regard to the scope, nature, and timing of migratory flows due to several reasons (Friedlander and Goldscheider 1979).

First, there was significant disagreement between the Political Zionists led by Theodor Herzl and the Practical Zionist groups such as the Russian-based *Hovevei Zion* movement regarding the timing of immigration. This disagreement arose from their views concerning the nature of Zionism and the means of achieving its goals, or, in the terms of this study, from their conception of the national project. While the Political Zionists sought to obtain a colonial charter

[44] For instance, waves of immigration to Palestine from Eastern Europe significantly increased in response to the Johnson–Reed immigration act of 1924, which severely restricted immigration from Eastern Europe to the United States, thereby leaving immigrants with fewer immigration options (Pikar 1999).

from one of the dominant international powers as a precursor to the initiation of immigration, the Practical Zionists called for the immediate settlement of Jews in Palestine.

Second, various Zionist groups diverged with regard to issues concerning the movement's long-term immigration goals. In contrast to both the Practical and the Political Zionists, who believed in the eventual mass immigration of world Jewry to the Jewish state, the Cultural Zionists led by Ahad Ha'am believed that Jews needed to create only a small cultural-spiritual community in Palestine that would facilitate the regeneration and bolstering of Jewish culture and society in the Diaspora (Lockman 1996; Pikar 1999).

Third, Zionist leaders and groups diverged in their views concerning the number and quality of the immigrants that the movement required in its initial stages. With respect to the number, the more militant right-wing Revisionist movement and early Zionist leaders such as Nordau and Smilansky advocated open mass immigration as a means of swiftly altering the demographic balance, enhancing the military capacity of the Jewish community in Palestine, and assisting imperiled Diaspora Jews (Shapira 1999). In contrast, Political and Labor Zionists promoted selective and controlled immigration policies (Hacohen 2009; Halamish 2006; Pikar 2000). These differences stemmed from several factors.

Political Zionists feared the possible conflict that the promotion of mass immigration would spark vis-à-vis the British administration and adopted the British stance that linked immigration quotas to absorptive capacity on the ground (Halamish 1993; Mossek 1976; Segev 2000).[45] Second, Labor Zionists, who maintained political dominance within Palestine's Jewish

[45] Zionist leaders initially implicitly accepted British policy that linked immigration quotas to Palestine's absorptive capacity even prior to the policy's official publication in 1922 (Mossek 1976; Pikar 2000). It appears, however, that Britain and the Zionists interpreted the role of these criteria in different ways. The Zionists perceived them to be determining factors for immigration, meaning that as the economy expanded, immigration would increase. Conversely, Britain considered them a means of determining the maximum number of immigrants that would be allowed into the country (see: Palestine Royal Commission 1937, 298). Furthermore, when Britain sought to halt immigration in the early 1930s by claiming that these capacities had been exhausted, the Zionists and the British

community (the Yishuv) throughout this period, privileged institutional development, nation building, and the bolstering of proto-state capacities over mass immigration as the movement's initial goal, since they believed that the latter could only take place after the aforementioned goals had been achieved. Specifically, while they sought to foster demographic transformation, they concurrently feared that open immigration would undermine their ability to create a strong and cohesive institutional and material social and political structure and would overwhelm the Yishuv with economically dependent immigrants who would drain communal resources, offer a limited contribution to the movement's nation and state building efforts, expose the movement's weakness, and position the Zionists at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the Palestinian Arabs. Thus, for Labor Zionist leader, the overall interests of movement construction and state building as envisioned by their national project took precedence over swift demographic transformation.[46]

Instead, the Labor Zionists ideally sought to initially privilege the immigration of those who had reached an adequate level of ideological development and had what was defined as a *pioneering spirit,* meaning young, ideologically inclined, and healthy European immigrants that would participate in the grueling challenges of agriculture, construction, security, and state building, and would not constitute a burden to the enterprise or introduce exilic attitudes and

---

government issued a series of reports and counter-reports, each employing divergent methodologies and evidence to support their respective positions (Katz and Paz 1997). For a detailed analysis of the development of Zionist demographic studies during the pre-state period, see: Metzer 2003; Troen 1991.

[46] Zionist leaders appear to have been highly ambivalent toward unrestricted immigration. While they supported it ideologically, they concurrently feared its repercussions. This view was espoused by Zionist sociologist and demographer Arthur Ruppin, who explained his position with respect to Eastern Jews: "The Jews of the east…their level of spiritual and cultural development is so low that their mass immigration would significantly reduce the economic situation of the cultured Jews in the land" (in: Pikar 1999, 338-9). Opposition to open immigration emanated from three issues. First, as Ruppin's position indicated, Zionists feared that unrestricted immigration would engender an economic crisis in the Jewish community. As an internal Zionist memo explained, "If we grant workers entry permits in excess of demand, we would not be enriching the country but leading it into an economic crisis…That way we might put immigrants in danger of starvation and place an intolerable burden on the Zionist Organization" (in: Segev 2000, 226). Second, in addition to fears regarding the Jewish community's ability to support large numbers of economically dependent workers, Zionist leaders were concerned about the immigration of large numbers of Jews with capital. This concern stemmed from the fear that the prevalent harsh conditions in Palestine would lead to their departure and possible disengagement from the movement. Third, movement leaders were anxious that mass immigration would undermine social cohesion and institution building.

behaviors (Alroey 2010; Morland 2014; Mossek 1978; Pikar 2000). Ben-Gurion expressed the latter view: “Eretz Israel does not need immigrants but pioneers and the difference between them is simple: the immigrants come to take from the land while the pioneer comes to give to the land…. For that reason we demand preference for the immigration of pioneers” (in: Hacohen 2009, 212).[47]

In contrast, immigration maximalists such as Revisionist leader Vladimir Jabotinsky and early Zionist leader Moshe Smilansky perceived immediate demographic transformation to be the movement’s primary concern. They believed that the community could not advance if its relative size remained significantly inferior to that of the Arabs. Thus, they espoused open immigration as a means of increasing the Jewish presence vis-à-vis the Palestinians and enhancing the community’s demographic and material power. In order to support this goal, Smilansky proposed the immediate recruitment of 500,000 Jewish immigrants to bolster the Yishuv’s population (Shapira 1999).

Intriguingly, despite these disagreements, ambivalence existed among advocates of selective immigration as well, because their immediate preferences of state building stood in constant tension with the broader goal of facilitating demographic transformation through mass immigration to Palestine (Hacohen 2009).[48] In practice, support for selective immigration waned significantly in the mid-1930s in response to the plight of European Jews, the challenges engendered by the Great Arab Revolt (1936-39), and the harsh immigration restrictions imposed by Britain (Halamish 2006).

---

[47] Pikar (1999) suggests that this discourse served the instrumental goal of facilitating the immigration of Labor Zionist supporters.

[48] In fact, Halamish (2006) argues that selective immigration was solely a public discourse and even a myth that was designed to cover the fact that Britain had almost exclusive control over immigration quotas and selection. On this issue, see also: Gelber 1998.

Besides ideational preferences regarding the number of immigrants, immigration was initially constrained by community structure and labor practices. This was a result of the fact that the first wave of Zionist settlers primarily created what Shafir (1989; 1995) has defined as *ethnic plantation colonies*. During this period, Zionist immigrants created agricultural settlements that were funded mainly by private capital and external resources that were provided by the Baron de Rothschild, and relied largely on the local cheap Arab labor force (Aharoni 1991; Ben Porat 1997; Shafir 1989; 1996). While the confluence of external financial support and cheap labor afforded settlers an economic advantage, it concurrently inflicted a severe constraint on future immigration flows. The reliance on Arab labor limited employment opportunities for new Jewish immigrants—particularly those who did not have economic resources to purchase land—and created a large, unemployed immigrant class (Shafir 1989; 1996).[49]

Thus, the initial colonialization model that the Zionists employed posed significant challenges for the demographic transformation of Palestine. In response to these challenges, the more ideologically-inclined immigrants who settled in Palestine during the second and third waves of immigration (1904-1923) promoted a new colonialization approach that Shafir (1989;1996) defines as *pure ethnic colonialism* (see also: Yiftachel 1999; 2006). This approach was both more conducive to the expansion of Jewish demography and generated significant implications with regard to intergroup relations and competition. Within this process, the Yishuv leaders promoted an ideology of exclusive Jewish labor that sought to normatively undermine the material benefits that resulted from hiring cheap Arab labor. In addition, they created the *Histadrut* labor union that actively excluded Palestinian Arabs from the labor market as a means

[49] In many cases, the ratio between Jewish settlers to Palestinian workers was 1:5 with the latter establishing new towns around the Jewish colonies in which they worked (Shafir 1996). For instance, Aharoni (1991) points out that in the colony of Zichron Ya'akov, 200 settlers employed 1,200 Palestinian workers, while in the colony of Rishon Le-Zion, 40 Jewish families employed 300 Palestinian families.

of protecting the employment of current and future Zionist immigrants (Ben Eliezer 1998; The Constitution of the Jewish Agency 1929; Greenberg 1993; Ryan 1974; Shafir 1989; 1995).[50]

While many employers continued to rely on cheap Arab labor, the shift in the Zionist colonialization approach enhanced the employment opportunities that were available to Jews. In addition, this shift led to increased separation between the Jewish and Palestinian Arab communities as the Zionists sought to create a homogeneously Jewish society in Palestine. From a demographic-territorial perspective, the new approach fostered the adoption of territorial minimalism, which dictated that Zionist settlement should only expand to the extent that demographic homogeneity or superiority could be maintained (Shafir 1995). Furthermore, this approach largely shaped the strong form of ethnic nationalism that still defines membership in Israeli society (Joppke 2005; Shafir and Peled 2002; Smooha 2002).

However, despite the adoption of a pure settlement strategy, Shafir and others emphasize that the Zionist and Palestinian national projects did not develop in isolation as discrete national and social entities, as many mainstream Israeli scholars have historically maintained (see: Eisenstadt 1967, Lissak and Horowitz 1989; Metzer and Kaplan 1985). Instead, critical scholars such as Shafir argue that despite the formal separation between the Jewish and Palestinian societies, both developed in the context of an ongoing interactive, strategic, and mutually constitutive process (see also: Shafir and Peled 2002; Shamir 2000; Yiftachel 2006).

Zionist Immigration to Palestine 1881-1948

From a concrete demographic perspective, as a result of persistent waves of immigration, the Jewish population of Palestine increased significantly between 1881 and 1948, fundamentally

[50] The Constitution of the Jewish Agency (1929) explicitly promoted exclusive Jewish labor: "The Agency shall promote agricultural colonization based on Jewish labor and in all work and undertakings carried out or furthered by the Agency, Jewish labor shall be employed."

altering Palestine's ethno-demographic landscape. While prior to Zionism fewer than 24,000 Jews resided in Palestine, by 1948 there were over 650,000 Jews in the territory. Following initial Zionist immigration in the 1880s, the Jewish population increased to 42,900 in 1890, and to 94,000 by 1914 (Bachi 1974).[51] During World War I, however, this trend reversed and the Jewish population in Palestine decreased by 40 percent to 56,000 in 1918 due to high levels of return immigration, heightened mortality rates, and deportations (Friedlander and Goldscheider 1979; Shafir and Peled 2002).

As early as the late 19th century, Palestinian leaders began to identify the threat that Zionist immigration and territorial expansion posed to their society (Khalidi 1997). Initially, Zionist immigration and land purchases were interpreted primarily as economic and not political threats. However, by the last decade of the 19th century and early 20th century, Palestinian elites increasingly understood these processes in national terms as competition or conflict between two national movements over the same territory. This process not only fostered opposition to and mobilization against Zionism, but also contributed to the emergence and consolidation of a differentiated, particular Palestinian national identity that was discrete from the prevailing Syrian, Arab, and Ottoman identities.[52]

Palestinian leaders responded to Zionism through active attempts to halt the Jewish immigration and land purchases that they perceived as threats to their communal survival. Palestinian Arab resistance to Zionist immigration and territorial expansion increased significantly in the aftermath of the 1917 Balfour declaration, which promised Jews a *national home* in Palestine, and the subsequent introduction of British rule (Khalidi 2007). Like the

---

[51] In contrast, Muslim and Christian Palestinian Arabs are estimated to have together constituted a population of 489,000 in 1890 (just under 92 percent of the overall population) and 595,150 in 1914 (just over 86 percent) (Bachi 1974).

[52] Pan Arabism constitutes an additional political response to Zionism and other processes that occurred during this period.

Zionists, the Palestinians identified the crucial role of demography. The Palestinian elites increasingly understood that their claim to Palestine was largely predicated on their demographic majority within the territory and that the persistence of Jewish immigration could potentially alter this reality and consequentially their claim to the land.

Despite the consequent Palestinian objections, Jewish immigration resumed in response to the Balfour Declaration of 1917, the end of the War, and Britain's occupation of Palestine.[53] From a demographic perspective, during Britain's tenure, the overall population of Palestine increased significantly from 676,000 in 1919 to 1,970,000 in 1948, representing a threefold increase. Initially, Zionists demanded unlimited immigration to Palestine in accordance with the Balfour Declaration as a means of effecting the necessary demographic transformation so as to facilitate the creation of a Jewish Home.[54] The first official Zionist proposal to the Foreign Office demanded that the new government "recognize the desirability of large scale immigration and resettlement of Jews in Palestine" (in: Friedlander and Goldscheider 1979, 59). However, Herbert Samuel, Britain's first Commissioner for Palestine, opposed this stance since it bore the potential of enabling concurrent large-scale flows of Arab immigration into Palestine (Segev 2000).[55] Instead, Britain introduced an immigration quota system that limited the number of Jews who could enter the country and largely prohibited Arab immigration.[56]

In particular, the British mandate was a period of ongoing conflict around the timing and scope of Jewish immigration. While the Arab leadership repeatedly demanded that Britain halt

[53] For an in-depth discussion of the causes and effects of the Balfour Declaration, see: Scheener 2010.
[54] It is important to note that while the Balfour Declaration sought to secure Jewish immigration to Palestine in order to facilitate the creation of the Jewish Home, Britain had no clear policy concerning Arab immigration, which remained largely clandestine during this period (Friedlander and Goldscheider 1979).
[55] Samuel believed that Britain's ability to increase settlement in Palestine was a function of economic development. Thus, he encouraged British and Jewish capital investments in order to facilitate the expansion of immigration (Reichman *et al.* 1997).
[56] Segev (2000) points out that this quota system was seen as part of Britain's commitment in the Balfour Declaration to create a Jewish Homeland in Palestine.

Zionist immigration, the Zionists demanded that it be expanded. Thus, both groups perceived the issue of immigration as crucial to the future development of their respective national projects (Friedlander and Goldscheider 1979). Despite these repeated Arab objections, throughout the mandate, the Jewish population increased at an annual rate of nine percent,[57] three-quarters of which resulted from immigration, and the rest from natural growth (Friedlander and Goldscheider 1979). As a result, during the 30 years of British rule, the Jewish and Muslim populations experienced a similar absolute population increase of approximately 600,000. In relative terms, this growth represented an elevenfold increase in the Jewish population, which grew from 56,000 to 650,000, in comparison to an approximate 120 percent increase among both Muslim and Christian Palestinians (Bachi 1974).[58]

While the first decade of British rule represented a period of significant expansion of the Jewish population in Palestine, British policies began to shift in the aftermath of the 1929 Arab riots that erupted in response to Zionist territorial and demographic expansion. By the late 1920s, as a result of immigration, Jews constituted over 18 percent of Palestine's population with over 170,000 Jewish residents, significantly upsetting the intergroup balance in the country and exacerbating Palestinian Arab concerns. In response to the riots, the British government appointed three commissions that were charged with investigating various aspects of Palestine's land and immigration questions (Reichman *et al.* 1997). All three commissions concluded that Palestine could not absorb additional Jewish immigration without causing a significant

---

[57] While this calculation is based on the assumption that the Jewish population increased at a constant annual rate throughout this period, in reality, the Jewish population increased in several waves due to migratory flows. Specifically, the vast majority of Jewish immigrants entered Palestine between 1919 and 1921, 1924 and 1926, and 1932 and 1936. "While the population growth in the Arab sector was relatively high and predictable in the short and medium run, Jewish population growth was extraordinarily high but erratic, unstable, and unpredictable even in the short run" (Friedlander and Goldscheider 1979, 17).

[58] Bachi (1974) suggests that in contrast to the Jewish population, which increased mainly as a result of immigration, the Christian and Muslim Palestinian Arab populations increased primarily as a result of declining infant mortality (particularly among Christians) and increases in Muslim fertility rates.

disruption of intergroup relations, thereby leading to a temporary suspension of immigration. In particular, Britain feared that continued Jewish immigration at existing rates would engender a demographic shift between Jews and Arabs in Palestine and increase intergroup friction and hostility (Friedlander and Goldscheider 1979).

Zionists leaders responded by claiming that the community had attained a sufficient level of economic development and absorptive capacity to sustain additional immigration. However, immigration was largely halted and only resumed following the decision of Palestine Commissioner's Arthur Wauchope in 1931 in favor of its resumption (Sheffer 1971). As a consequence, over 165,000 Jews—mostly from Germany—entered Palestine between 1931 and 1935 (Palestine Royal Commission 1937),[59] thus increasing the overall proportion of the Jewish population to 30 percent by the late 1930s and further exacerbating intercommunal tensions (Bachi 1974).[60]

With regard to the Zionist leadership's position on immigration, the mid- to late 1930s appear to have been a turning point away from selective immigration and toward support for open large-scale immigration. The confluence of the Arab Revolt (1936-39) and the increasing plight of German and Polish Jews increased Zionist demands for additional immigration permits. To this end, Ben-Gurion commissioned a report that outlined a plan to facilitate the entrance of 100,000 immigrants annually over five years (Katz and Paz 1997). The report employed the logic

[59] The year 1935 witnessed the largest inflow of Jewish immigrants since the inception of the Zionist movement with more than 61,864 immigrants entering Palestine that year (Palestine Royal Commission 1937).
[60] This largely reinforces Halamish's (2006) and Hacohen's (2009) arguments that Zionist rhetoric and ideology concerning selective immigration were largely insignificant since the opening and closure of migratory flows were predicated primarily upon British policy.

of absorptive capacity[61] to support the claim that the Yishuv could in fact deal with the incorporation of this number of immigrants.[62]

However, following the revolt, increasing British concerns over the Arab unrest that was largely seen as a product of Zionist immigration, settlement, land purchases, and exclusionary labor market policies prompted the implementation of a more restrictive immigration policy. Furthermore, in 1936, members of Britain's Peel Commission toured Palestine in order to investigate the situation in the country and identify possible solutions (Goren 2002). In addition to the policy memos favoring an expansive immigration policy that were presented to the Commission, Zionist leaders employed various tactics that sought to enhance Jewish majorities in areas that they hoped would be included in the future Jewish state. In 1936, for instance, Ben-Gurion called on both new and veteran immigrants to settle in the city of Haifa in order to facilitate the creation of a Jewish majority in this largely Arab city (Goren 2002).

In its subsequent report, the 1936 Peel Commission stressed that if existing demographic trends persisted, equalization between Jews and Arabs would occur by 1947 (Palestine Royal Commission 1937). In response to the conflicting Zionist and Palestinian Arab demands and concrete demographic developments, the Commission called for the imposition of "a definite limit to the annual volume of Jewish immigration…at 12,000 per annum" (ibid, 306). The report went on to state that while immigration was a central part of the *problem of Palestine*, the fundamental challenge was "that the existence of the National Home, whatever its size, bars the way to the attainment by the Arabs of Palestine of the same national status as that attained…by

[61] Intriguingly, during this period, immigrants did not undermine the Yishuv's economic situation by relying on its resources. Instead, immigrants in the late 1920s and early 1930s imported large amounts of capital that in fact served to strengthen the community's absorptive capacity (Shamir 2000).
[62] A similar report was submitted to the Royal Commission (Peel) in 1936. However, in contrast to previous commissions and investigations dealing with the subject, Peel shifted away from the economic perspective in favor of a national community-based one that led the Commission to recommend partition.

all other Arabs of Asia" (ibid, 307). The Commission's report represented a significant shift in British preferences toward immigration.[63] Immigration quotas were no longer to be predicated upon the economic criterion of absorptive capacity and were replaced instead by a more political one. The new policy, however, condemned Jews to a permanent minority position.[64]

In response to these immigration restrictions and the dramatically deteriorating situation of European Jewry, the Zionists increasingly engaged in undocumented immigration (Friedlander and Goldscheider 1979; Ofer 1991). Facing these limited annual quotas, the Zionist movement promoted the clandestine immigration of imperiled European Jews, primarily from Germany and Poland. For this purpose, the Yishuv initiated the Aliya Beit program that attempted to smuggle as many as 100,000 immigrants into Palestine illegally (Hadari 1991; Ofer 1990; Strauss 1981).

Besides the restrictions imposed by the Peel Commission, the outbreak of the second round of the Great Revolt (1937-39), together with newly emerging British interests vis-à-vis the Middle East that resulted from the war in Europe, led Britain to publish the 1939 White Paper that represented a new formulation of British policy toward immigration.[65] The White Paper limited Jewish immigration to 75,000 over the following five years based on estimations of Arab natural growth during this period. Furthermore, it made any additional Jewish immigration after that period contingent upon Arab agreement, which was highly unlikely to be forthcoming.

---

[63] Beyond the issue of immigration, the report also represented a shift in British policy toward the overall question of Palestine. Specifically, in its report, the commission recommended that Palestine be partitioned between Jews and Arabs, and that population transfers take place between the two states. From the perspective of this study, the Zionist decision to accept the partition plan, despite the fact that it gave the Jewish state a smaller territory than Zionists had sought, offers an important illustration of Labor Zionist preferences regarding territory and demography. For labor Zionists in the balance between the two, the former was less important than the latter. Or in other words, the establishment of a Jewish homogeneity or at least a majority within a given territory was more important than the size of the territory itself (Morland 2014; Shafir 1996).

[64] Besides immigration, the Commission also concluded that due to the intractable nature of the conflict, Palestine should be partitioned between the two communities (ibid.).

[65] Khalidi (2007) contradicts this argument by suggesting that the 1939 White Paper constituted only a reformulation of Britain's commitments to the Jews that were embodied in the Balfour Declaration.

Finally, it proposed the creation of a single state in which Palestinian Arabs would constitute a majority (Segev 2001).

Despite Zionist objections to the immigration restrictions imposed by the White Paper, the concurrent war in Europe constrained the movement's reaction (Segev 2001). In fact, due to the war, Zionists were unable to fill even the annual immigration quota, which led Britain to extend the original timeframe (Friedlander and Goldscheider 1979). However, as the war began to wind down and the devastating concequences of the Holocaust became evident, in 1944, Ben-Gurion announced his plan, which became the official Zionist demographic program, to facilitate the immigration of one million Jews to Palestine (Eyal 2006; Frilling 2005; Meir-Glitzenstein 2004; Waitz 1994; 1998). While this plan became official in 1944, as early as 1941 Ben-Gurion began calling for mass immigration from Europe. In a 1942 Jewish Agency meeting, he stated that the Yishuv must "transfer two million Jews, and settle them in Palestine in one go" (Jewish Agency meeting, October 6, 1942). By 1944, however, once the extent of the physical annihilation of European Jewry became evident, he downsized the program's goals to one million. When he officially announced the plan, he stressed "the essence of Zionism is solely an essence of populating…. We must populate the land of Israel with multitudes of Jews" (in: Waitz 1994, 81).

Besides the plan's demographic goals and implications, it also represents two significant shifts in Labor Zionism's demographic preferences: first, its unequivocal support for unrestricted Jewish immigration to Palestine, and second, its emphasis on the recruitment of Jews from Arab countries who had largely been excluded from the Zionist project (Shafir and Peled 2002).[66] In

[66] Until this period, the Zionist project was dominated by European Jews, while Middle Eastern Arab-Jews (Mizrahim) were largely excluded. Despite the fact that Zionists sought to facilitate large-scale Jewish immigration to Palestine, they did not conceive of Middle Eastern Jews as part of this new society (Smooha 2008). While

addition, as the war ended, Zionists groups resumed their attempts to facilitate the illegal migration of European Jews into Palestine (Hadari 1991; Halamish 1988; Ofer 1990). As a result, over 75,000 immigrants entered Palestine between 1945 and 1948—most of them illegally, while over 50,000 undocumented immigrants were detained in British camps in Europe and Cyprus.

The Demographic Transformation of 1948

Following the creation of the State of Israel in May 1948, all external constraints on migratory flows were eliminated and "the long-standing Jewish insistence during the Mandate period on large-scale immigration became the basis for the new policy of Israel" (Friedlander and Goldscheider 1979, 83).[67] Despite the ongoing war, Ben-Gurion declared that the state would facilitate unlimited, large-scale, exclusively Jewish immigration regardless of the many financial, infrastructural, and security challenges facing the new state (Gelber 1998; Hacohen 1998a). In fact, open immigration constituted the new government's first decision (Hacohen 1998b). From that point on, immigration was a primary instrument for engendering demographic transformation as the state promoted mass immigration of Jews into the country (Shafir and Peled 2002; Smooha 2002).

Bolstering Jewish demography through immigration was perceived as a particularly urgent task since state leaders posited that creating a solid demographic majority was crucial

---

Mizrahim constituted almost 12 percent of the Yishuv's population, 50 percent of which resided in Palestine prior to Zionism while the remainder immigrated during the period of the Yishuv, they played a secondary and marginalized role (Bachi 1974; Khazoom 2003; Shafir and Peled 2002). The Zionist leadership's preferences with regard to Mizrahi immigration changed largely in response to the physical annihilation of the majority of the Jewish population in Europe and to the restriction on emigration from the Eastern Bloc that compelled the movement to seek immigrants elsewhere (Smooha 2008).

[67] In fact, Israeli immigration policies vis-à-vis Jews are considered to be the most proactive state policies ever recorded since the state actively recruits immigrants and provides them with assistance throughout all stages of the immigration and settlement process (see: Friedlander and Goldscheider 1979; Lissak 1998).

both for its long-term survival and in order for the new state to be both Jewish and democratic.[68] As Israel's future president, Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, explained, "An absolute Jewish majority…is the foundation of the institutions of the State of Israel and its continued existence…. If it [immigration] were to stop we would be risking the state's entire future and existence" (*Davar* 1948a).

In addition, the ongoing war required that Israel actively recruit and mobilize military personnel in order to expand its military capacity (Cohen 2000). Thus, the state continued to implement the 1944 policy that sought to facilitate the swift immigration of one million Jews from Europe and the Middle East (Halamish 2008; Shenhav 1999; Shuval and Leshem 1998). As a result, during its first three years, the state's Jewish population doubled as 689,739 immigrants entered the country (Bachi 1974).[69] Treasury Minister David Horowitz explained the significance of this transformation: "The immigration is causing us to grow at a great speed, even if the Arabs should develop at an incredibly feverish pace they will be unable to catch up with us" (in: Segev 1998, 39).

Besides positive immigration policies, during the 1948 war, the Yishuv and later the state implemented a policy, albeit ambiguous and not clearly defined, of expelling Palestinian populations from the Jewish state. This policy sought to precipitate the emigration of the majority of the Palestinian-Arab population out of the territory of the newly created state (Morris 1987; 2007; Pappe 2006).[70] Already in late 1947, Ben-Gurion told party members that dramatic

---

[68] The latter stemmed from the fact that if Israel were to remain a democracy but did not maintain a Jewish majority, an Arab majority could legally eliminate the Jewish character of the state. Thus, in order for the state to be both Jewish and democratic, a Jewish majority needs to be actively preserved (Smooha 2002).
[69] Between May 1948 and August 1951, immigration ranged between 15,000 and 20,000 per month (Numan 1999)
[70] Morris (2004) argues that the idea of expulsion had been actively debated by the Zionist movement throughout the 1930s and 1940s. However, this was not the basis for a master plan for expulsion. Instead, he explains that "transfer was inevitable and inbuilt into Zionism – because it sought to transform a land which was 'Arab' into a 'Jewish' state and a Jewish state could not have arisen without a major displacement of Arab population; and because this

demographic changes would have to take place, referring to expected Palestinian-Arab emigration (Segev 1998).

To this end, beginning in April of 1948, the Labor Zionist paramilitary organization, the Haganah, with the support of right-wing Revisionist terrorist organizations, implemented Plan Dalet (Plan D), which sought to occupy the territory of the future state while significantly reducing the size of the Palestinian-Arab population that resided within it (Khalidi 1988; Morris 2007).[71] As a result, approximately 760,000 Palestinians were either expelled or escaped from the territory of the new state, and over 400 villages were left empty or destroyed, leaving the country with a Palestinian population of approximately 150,000 (Morris 1997). Thus, as a consequence of both immigration and emigration policies, the proportion of Jews residing in the territory of the new state increased from 45 percent in 1947 to 89 percent by 1951 (Bachi 1974; Cohen 2002).

Israel's de-Arabization policies, however, were met with international demands that Israel permit expelled Palestinian refugees to return to their homes (Golan 1997). In response, Israel promoted two policies that were designed to block refugee return and maintain the state's Jewish majority.[72] First, it swiftly settled new immigrants in houses that were owned by Palestinian refugees and distributed their lands to Jewish farmers (Morris 2004; Smooha 2008). As a result, by 1949, 124,000 Jews were settled in such houses (Lissak 1999). At the same time,

---

aim automatically produced resistance among the Arabs which, in turn, persuaded the Yishuv's leaders that a hostile Arab majority or large minority could not remain in place if a Jewish state was to arise or safely endure. By 1948, transfer was in the air. The transfer thinking that preceded the war contributed to the dénouement by conditioning the Jewish population…for what transpired. Thinking about the possibilities of transfer in the 1930s and 1940s had prepared and conditioned hearts and minds for its implementation in the course of 1948 so that…it was accepted as inevitable and natural by the bulk of the Jewish population" (60).

[71] It is important to note that Zionist policies were not the only cause for the Palestinian exodus between 1947 and 1948, which Palestinians call the *Nakba* (the catastrophe). Other factors include the flight of the middle class, psychological pressure, and civilian fears of remaining in a war zone.

[72] See Golan 1997 for a detailed discussion of Israeli policies vis-à-vis confiscated Palestinian property and the demographic implications engendered by these policies.

between 1948 and 1949, Israel destroyed Palestinian dwellings that were deemed unlivable and created 144 new Jewish settlements on the land of former Palestinian towns and villages (Cohen 2002; Morris 2004; Naor and Giladi 1990).[73]

Besides clearing land for new Jewish-Israeli settlements, the destruction of Palestinian property, primarily in the border regions, sought to deliberately prevent the possibility of Palestinian return (Golan 1997; Morris 2004). In 1949, the state also implemented a policy of settling immigrants, primarily from Middle Eastern countries, in towns along the state boundaries so as to secure its borders (ibid.). Overall, the state's settlement and absorption policies aimed to facilitate its demographic transformation into a Jewish majority society by instrumentally settling immigrants across its territory and indigenizing the new-immigrant population in an attempt to erase and marginalize the territory's Palestinian-Arab past through the reconfiguration of space and ethnic categories (Benvenisti 1997; Yiftachel 1999; 2006).[74]

Second, Israel employed military force to actively block Palestinian refugees' return to the Jewish state. In fact, in 1954, the state promulgated *The Law for the Prevention of Infiltration* that enabled the military to employ harsh military force against refugees who attempted to cross the border (Morris 1997). The law was justified by a security rationale, despite the fact that the vast majority of *infiltrators* either sought to return to their homes, retrieve property left behind, steal goods and equipment from border towns, or harvest their lands, and were not involved in security-related activity (ibid.).

---

[73] Peretz (1956) suggests that of the 370 new settlements Israel created between 1948 and 1953, 350 were located on former Palestinian property. By 1954, a third of Jewish immigrants (250,000) lived in former Palestinian houses. In fact, a quarter of the buildings in the country and over 10,000 stores and businesses were former Palestinian property. Similarly, the profits from the export of fruit from formerly Arab-owned farms constituted over 10 percent of Israel's GDP in 1949. Thus, the expulsion and confiscation of property was crucial in facilitating the settlement and economic absorption of new immigrants (see: Peretz 1953, 143-46).

[74] Thus, in contrast to the adverse economic impact of the early exclusion of Palestinians from the Yishuv's economy, the expulsions of 1948 served both Israel's demographic and economic interests.

The Legal Construction of Immigration

Before we explore the development of concrete immigration policies and outcomes since 1948, it is also important that we examine the legal and institutional arrangements that have facilitated and shaped these processes. Despite the centrality of immigration as a nation- and state-building tool within both Zionism and the Israeli state, and the exceptionally high rates of immigration that Israel has experienced since 1948, it has curiously never defined itself as a state of immigration (Joppke 2005, Kemp and Reijman 2008) but rather as a state of *aliyah* (ascent or Jewish immigration).[75] The distinction between immigration and *aliyah* is predicated on the notion that Jews are motivated to immigrate to Israel for ideological and not material reasons (Keynan 1991; Lissak 1996),[76] and that immigrants are not newcomers but exiles who are repatriating (Shapira 1999).

From a legal perspective, the right of every Jew to make *aliyah* to Israel was enshrined in the Declaration of Independence and codified by the Knesset in the Law of Return (1950). The latter is an ethno-nationally-based law that enunciates the *exclusive right* of all Jews to make *aliyah*, regardless of their country of origin, skills, economic means, or any discriminating factor. From this perspective, the Law of Return was not perceived as an immigration law. Instead, it "was conceived as a natural right preceding the very existence of the state, as the latter figures only as its *trustee"* (Joppke 2005, 62; See also: Shachar 1999). In fact, besides this Law of Return, the state has never adopted a legal code regulating the immigration of non-Jews, thus

---

[75] Shapira (1999) explains the distinction between *aliyah* and immigration. "The term aliyah is laden with deep emotions and bestows upon the act of immigration to Eretz Israel a supernatural meaning, far beyond the limits of the prosaic equivalent, immigration" (32).

[76] Shuval and Leshem (1998) are critical of this view pointing out that Jewish immigration to both pre-state Palestine and Israel has primarily been motivated by push factors in the immigrants' countries of origin rather than ideological pull factors (see also: Dellapergola 2012).

rendering ethnic factors the sole conditions for immigration and membership in the polity (Avineri, Orgad, and Rubinstein 2009).

From a practical, instrumental perspective, the Law of Return constituted a crucial legal instrument for facilitating exclusive Jewish immigration and demographic transformation, while concurrently restricting or even eliminating the prospects for future Palestinian-Arab immigration into the country. Thus, according to Yiftachel (2006), the law permits "prolonging indefinitely the duration of the Judaization project" (60). In practice, the law grants immediate citizenship to any Jewish immigrant upon arrival, together with all the civil and political rights that are accorded to Jews and exceed those that are accorded to Palestinian-Arab citizens of the state (Shafir and Peled 2002; Weiss 2001).

Despite the fact that Judaism constituted the sole condition for eligibility, the Law of Return was curiously agnostic in relation to the question of who is a Jew.[77] Thus, the law initially enabled a large numbers of non-Jewish immigrants, most of whom were related to Jews by blood or marriage, to enter the country as *olim* and register as Jews based on their own declaration. Interestingly, while political leaders were concerned about Jews assimilating abroad and shedding their identity, they had a positive attitude toward non-Jews assimilating into Jewish society, even without official conversion (Levi 2006). This situation changed significantly in 1970 due to the persistent political objections that were voiced by the religious parties (Shafir and Peled 2002; Weiss 2001). That year, the Knesset promulgated an amended version of the

[77] In fact, during its deliberations, the government voted 10:2 in favor of not defining who is a Jew. Over time, however, this issue became increasingly salient as multiple legal controversies emerged with regard to who should be included in this category. Initially, the state adopted a liberal approach that enabled gentile spouses and other non-Jewish immigrants to simply declare that they were Jews and receive the related immigration rights and, more importantly, the ability to register voluntarily with the state as Jews (Hacohen 1998b; Shafir and Peled 2002; Weiss 2001). This approach increased the universe of potential immigrants, particularly Europeans, and facilitated the civic, religious, and social inclusion as well as the assimilation of spouses and relatives of Jews. As Ben-Gurion explained, "If a family goes to the Land of Israel, they will be surrounded by Jews and the children will become Jewish children" (in: Hacohen 1998b, 70).

Law of Return. On the one hand, the new version significantly expanded the universe of those who were eligible to immigrate to the country to anyone who had one Jewish grandparent.[78] On the other, it limited registration as Jews only to those who could prove that they were Jewish according to religious law. This revision constituted a compromise between secular interests in promoting expansive immigration and religious interests in restricting registration as Jews so as to prevent miscegenation (Shafir and Peled 2002; Zucker 1973).[79]

Despite the amendment, until the 1990s, the vast majority of immigrants who entered the country under the aegis of the Law of Return were Jewish according to religious definition, with only a few exceptions (see: Cohen 2002; Weiss 2001). However, since the late 1980s and particularly during the 1990s, a dramatic shift occurred in the composition of migrants entering the country under this law (Al Haj 2004; Cohen 2007; Lustick 1999). Following the initial decline and subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, approximately one million immigrants from the FSU settled in the country, over 30 percent of whom were not Jewish according to religious criteria. Out of 350,000 non-Jewish immigrants it is estimated approximately 50,000 are practicing Christians (Personal interview with FSU immigration specialist, March 12, 2012), in fact, in 2001 there were several hundred IDF soldiers who requested to make their oath of allegiance using the new instead of the old testament (Sheleg 2001). The remaining 300,000 were either atheist or non-Jews who self identified as Jews (Bartram 2011; Cohen and Susser

---

[78] Interestingly, Palestinian-Israeli have supported limiting the application of the law of return only to those who are Jews according to religious law, as a means of limiting the potential scope of Jewish or quasi-Jewish immigration.

[79] In the literature, there is a disagreement between Lustick (1999), who argues that the law was expanded to allow for future immigration of non-Jews or partial-Jews, and Weiss (2001), who suggests that the revised law was a result of political compromise rather than of demographic engineering. I posit that it is intriguing that the increase in the number of people who were eligible took place after Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 that increased the state's demographic woos. The Demographic concerns that arose during this period among some political elites, were epitomized by the creation of a demographic council that sought to find ways to increase the size of the Jewish population in the country (*Davar* 1967).

2009; Lustick 1999). In fact, in 2001 there were several hundred IDF soldiers who requested to make their oath of allegiance using the new instead of the old testament (Sheleg 2001)

This wave of immigration represents a fascinating case of the instrumental use of immigration as a means of bolstering an ethnic group within the context of intergroup competition. This constitutes the central dynamic this study explores. Specifically, during this period, right wing leaders sought to facilitate large-scale immigration, including that of non-Jews, or were willing to expand the very definition of Judaism, in order to bolster the Jewish majority in the entire territory of former mandatory Palestine, during a period of increasing parity between Jews and Palestinians. Furthermore, not only were these immigrants perceived as a means of reversing the demographic balance, but right wing leaders used them as a justification for Israel's continued occupation of the West bank and Gaza, as they claimed that the settlement of immigrants required that the state have a larger territory (Jones 2013; Moore 1992).[80]

Immigration to an Independent Israel: 1948-1989

As previously discussed, following the government's decision to remove all restrictions on immigration in 1948, massive migratory movement into the country ensued, leading to the Jewish population doubling within its first three years (Bachi 1974; Segev 1998). These migratory flows, together with the expulsion of the majority of the Palestinian population, engendered a demographic transformation within the new state, as majority Arab Palestine became majority Jewish Israel. The lack of external constraints enabled the state to actively boost its population and facilitate its Judaization (Yiftachel 1999; 2006).

[80] In fact, the right wing government did not only seek to recruit FSU immigrants regardless of their religion in order to increase the "Jewish" demographic balance. They also fostered the settlement of large numbers of these immigrants in illegal Israeli Settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem (Jones 2013; Moore 1992).

However, mass immigration did not occur naturally. Instead, immigrants were actively recruited, transported, and funded by the state and a host of Jewish and Zionist organizations (Friedlander and Goldscheider 1979). In fact, between 1948 and 1951, the state initiated the organized evacuation of entire Jewish communities who were under political or humanitarian threat in Bulgaria, Libya, Iraq, and Yemen (Lissak 1998). Similarly, during this period, Israel transferred large sums of money to the governments of Romania, Hungary, and Poland in exchange for these states granting emigration permits to their Jewish residents who wanted to immigrate to Israel (Segev 1998).

From an ethnic perspective, the immigrants who settled in Israel between 1948 and 1951 were divided evenly between European and Arab Jews (Cohen 2002).[81] With regard to the former, many of the new immigrants were holocaust survivors from Europe and clandestine immigrants who had been detained in Cyprus for several years. With regard to the latter, growing hostilities in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict undermined and destabilized the social and legal position of the Jewish population in Arab countries and generated large influxes of immigrants, particularly from Libya, Egypt, Morroco, and Iraq (Shenhav 1999; Smooha 2008). As a result, an intra-Jewish ethnic shift that altered the proportions between Europeans and Mizrahis in 1951, the proportion of Mizrahis increased from 12 to 33 percent (Smooha 2008). As a result of continued immigration, their proportion increased to 51 percent by the late 1960s (Cohen 2002).

The initial wave of mass immigration ended in 1951, having realized its goal of engendering demographic transformation or Judaization as a means of securing the state's Jewish majority. However, Israeli leaders sought additional immigrants. The head of the Jewish Agency

[81] Between 1948 and 2012, 59 percent of Jews from Europe and 80 percent of Jews from Africa and Asia immigrated to Israel (Dellapergola 2012).

claimed that the state needed to recruit an additional 600,000 immigrants in the following three years. Similarly, Ben-Gurion supported continued immigration and strongly opposed the imposition of any restrictions on Jewish immigration (Pikar 1999).

In practice, however, once a substantial Jewish majority of the state had solidified in 1951, the government and the Jewish Agency adopted a policy that attempted to partially curb migratory flows.[82] This policy preference that appears to constitute a significant departure from previous Israeli and Zionist expansionist demographic policies emanated from two reasons. First, it was a response to the increasing burden immigrants posed on the state's material and human resources and the services it provided. The growing strain on limited state resources engendered fears of possible state collapse (Cohen 2007). Second, It has been suggested that political elites adopted these policies in order to limit the number of olim from North Africa as a means of reducing the cultural shift from a majority European society to a majority middle eastern one (*Htzofe* 1952; Pikar 1999). Scholars however have questioned whether the formal policy was the cause or the effect of a real decline in the stocks of potential immigrants (Friedlander and Goldscheider 1979; Hacohen 2009).[83]

In practice, the selective immigration policy did not explicitly seek to reduce the number of immigrants, but rather to alter their composition (Pikar 1999). Specifically, it sought to exclude those who were considered a burden on the state: the chronically ill, the financially

---

[82] Pikar (1999) argues that this selective immigration policy was implemented as early as 1949 vis-à-vis immigrants from Morocco.

[83] Due to the fact that the majority of immigrants that entered the country between 1948 and 1951 were not financially independent, immigrants constituted a significant burden on the new state's economy. As a result, the government imposed strict austerity measures (Bachi 1974; Segev 1998) and settled many of the new immigrants in transition camps (*ma'abarot*). In fact, the population of these camps reached 250,000 by mid-1952, representing 17 percent of the state's population (Friedlander and Goldscheider 1979). Furthermore, while this wave of immigration included equal proportions of impoverished immigrants from Europe and the Middle East, over 81 percent of those settled in these camps hailed from the latter (Swirski 1981). While inequality between Europeans and Mizrahis still persists, this issue transcends the scope of this study. For additional analysis, see: Chetrit 2009; Shenhav 2006; Swirski 1981.

dependent, or those who lacked productive skills (Friedlander and Goldscheider 1979; Pikar 1999). While it is unclear whether these policies directly influenced immigration rates, the decline in the number of immigrants, greater than what was deemed necessary, led to this policy's revision and ultimate cancellation.[84]

It appears that at the time, policy makers in fact believed that the policy was causing a reduction in immigration flows. For instance, Yitzhak Refael, the head of the Jewish Agency's immigration unit, claimed that the policy was constraining immigration and that its cancellation would render the tripling of immigration rates (*Hatzofe* 1953b). Similarly, an editorial in *Hatzofe* (1953a) warned that these regulations threatened the survival of the Zionist project since they led to a reduction in immigration. The editorial suggested that the policy primarily sought to limit the North African immigration in order to maintain the state's European character and that it was inconsistent with state interests. "Aliyah has been restricted for two years now, and the loss this causes does not need explanation…The state was created for the ingathering of the exiles and will not survive without continued immigration both for security and economic reasons."

Thus, throughout the state's first decade, questions of demography and settlement continued to play a crucial role in policy making. Concerns that emanated from the conflict engendered broad support, across Zionist political parties, in favor of facilitating Jewish immigration into the state. Despite the hiatus in immigration during the selective immigration period (1952-53), the overarching state goal remained the facilitation of large-scale immigration and the maintenance of a strong demographic Jewish population that would yield sufficient manpower for mobilization in times of war. Furhtremore, state leaders sought a population that was sufficiently spatially dispersed throughout the its territory as a means of securing its borders.

[84] In 1953, the state experienced a negative immigration balance (Dellapergola 2012; Cohen 2002; Neuman 1999).

This view was exemplified in Ben-Gurion's statement in 1955 that "security is not possible without immigration…. security means settlement" (Ben Eliezer 1998, 207).

Overall, large-scale immigration, particularly from North Africa and Romania, persisted until the mid-1960s. Between 1952 and 1965, almost 600,000 additional immigrants settled in the country, enhancing the size of its Jewish population. Many of these immigrants—particularly those from North Africa—were settled in peripheral development towns in the north and the south and in agricultural settlements along the border, where they had access to relatively few economic opportunities (Cohen et al. 2013; Neuman 1999; Shenhav 2006). Immigration decreased significantly between 1965 and 1967 due to a deep, serious economic recession as well as the fact that the number of potential immigrants from developing countries with large Jewish populations had been depleted, and few Jews from developed countries chose to emigrate (Bachi 1974; Neuman 1999). Interestingly, despite the large-scale growth of the Jewish population as a result of immigration, Israelis —particularly those on the right—were highly concerned about Palestinian-Arab demography in the country. For instance, the right-wing newspaper *Heruth* expressed concerns regarding high Arab birthrates and their potential implications for the demographic balance (*Heruth* 1962). Furthermore, due to these growing demographic concerns political elites elected to create a demographic council that was mandated to identify ways of increasing the size of the Jewish population in the country (*Davar* 1967).

In the aftermath of the 1967 war, however, questions of immigration and demography became cardinal once again. While the events of the 1948 war and the mass immigration that took place during the first years of statehood resulted in the creation of a large Jewish majority within the state, the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the subsequent control over more than one million additional Palestinians, whose birthrates were substantially higher than those of Israeli Jews, put the future of the Jewish majority in jeopardy. However, in contrast to the pre-1967 period, during which demographic issues were a major concern for all Zionist political parties and groups, since 1967, demography have primarily been the purview of those on the left as the right has prioritized territorial expansion over demographic homogeneity.[85]

Specifically, following the 1967 war, dovish leaders such as Finance Minister Sapir were quick to identify the possible negative demographic implications of the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza together with their Palestinian residents. In fact, questions of Jewish demography had become an increasing concern for the ruling Labor Party prior to the war and gained additional significance in its aftermath (*Davar* 1967; Segev 2007). For the right and other groups who sought to maintain Israeli control over the territories, build settlements, and annex the territories, demographic concerns were to become less crucial since they believed that Israel could permanently deny Palestinians access to political rights within the Jewish state. This stance, which was entrenched in a supremacist and messianic approach, holds that the state should focus on territorial expansion and not view demography as a constraint. In fact, Israeli newspaper served as a platform for these debates concerning demography and territory throughout the 60s and the 70s, debates that flowed clear partisan lines. For examples of this debate, see: Bareli 1973; Beilin 1975; Ben-Gurion 1971; Katz 1968; Katz 1970; Ma'ariv 1968; Nissan 1968; Rand

[85] Following the 1967 war, finance minister Sapir was quick to identify the possible demographic implications of the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza together with their Palestinian residents. In fact, questions of Jewish demography had become an increasing concern for the ruling Labor Party prior to the war and gained additional significance in its aftermath (*Davar* 1967; Segev 2007). For the right and other groups who sought to maintain Israeli control over the territories, build settlements, and annex the territories, demographic concerns were less crucial since they believed that Israel could permanently deny Palestinians access to political rights within the Jewish state. This stance, which was entrenched in a supremacist and messianic approach, holds that the state should focus on territorial expansion and not view demography as a constraint. For debates regarding this issue, see: Bareli 1973; Beilin 1975; Ben-Gurion 1971; Katz 1968; Katz 1970; Ma'ariv 1968; Nissan 1968; Rand 1971; Rubinstein 1976; Ryan 1974; Sasson 1970; Shamir 1972; Shmariyahu 1968; Yaffe 1970; Zemmer and Agress 1968. Also see Chapter 3.

1971; Rubinstein 1976; Ryan 1974; Sasson 1970; Shamir 1972; Shmariyahu 1968; Yaffe 1970; Zemmer and Agress 1968. Also see Chapter 3.

In fact 1967 represents a turning point in attitudes that are related to the national project and demography. Although many within the Labor Party supported retaining the newly occupied territories, others feared that it would engender significant demographic ramifications that could undermine the Zionist project. Thus, Labor Party hawks and the right's post-1967 national project increasingly rejected maintaining a Jewish majority as the primary goal of the state in favor of territorial expansion or at least ignored the demographic implications of this expansion. Labor party doves and left wing parties however, continued to espouse the classical labor Zionist territorial minimalist national project that privileged demography over territory (Shafir 1996). This split generated a profound ideological cleavage within Israeli politics regarding the particular vision of national project the state should peruse. In fact, this rupture constitutes an important explanatory factor that underlay the recruitment of labor migrants, a process that I examine in-depth in chapter 3.

The demographic quandary Israel faced after 1967 was succinctly summarized in a 1971 report published by the Rand Foundation.

> The differences in culture and basic social structure between the Arab and Jewish communities were reflected in their relative rates of natural increase. The Israeli Arab minority had doubled from 150,000 in 1948 to 300,000 in 1967, an implicit average annual rate of increase of 3.8 percent, whereas the natural rate for Jews had decreased from 2.6 percent in 1951 to 1.5 percent in 1967. On the seemingly reasonable expectation that a similar gap would characterize the relative natural rates of increase of Jews and West Bank-Gaza Arabs, it seems clear that the Jewish majority, which was already slim (60 percent) would be turned into a minority in the foreseeable future. The only question appeared to be the exact date of the crossover point. What would then happen to the Jewish character of the state? (Becker 1971, 53)

However, despite these concerns, the threat to Jewish demography was partially alleviated owing to the reversal of the immigration trend. Intriguingly, during this period, both a quantitative and qualitative shift took place. In response to Israel's enhanced economic development and wide-scale military success in the 1967 war, increasing numbers of immigrants from developing countries elected to immigrate to Israel (Cohen 2002; 2007; Friedlander and Goldscheider 1979). These migratory flows differed considerably from their predecessors for two reasons. First, they were not initiated or subsidized by the state. Instead, immigration was primarily influenced by *pull* (endogenous) and not *push* (exogenous) factors, as had historically been the case (Shuval and Leshem 1998). Pull factors included new economic opportunities, Zionist ideology, and political and religious factors that stemmed from Israel's occupation and *de facto* annexation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.[86] Second, most of these immigrants were highly skilled and economically self-sufficient; many imported investment capital into the country. Thus, approximately 200,000 immigrants from the United States, Britain, France, Canada, Australia, and South Africa settled in Israel in the years following the war,

In addition, in the early 1970s, 160,000 Jews from the Soviet Union immigrated to Israel. Like those from Western countries, most of these immigrants were ideologically motivated. This is evidenced by the fact that although they were eligible to immigrate to the United States as refugees, they elected to settle in Israel instead (Dominitz 1997). Similarly, during this period, even immigrants who hailed from the traditional source countries in North Africa and Eastern Europe tended to be of a higher socio-economic status than their earlier compatriots (Achiram 1973; Cohen 2007; Neuman 1999).[87] As a result of these trends, approximately 400,000 Jewish immigrants settled in the country between 1967 and 1979 (CBS 2012).

---

[86] In fact, a substantial number of these immigrants, particularly those from the United States, chose to settle in the occupied territories (Cohen 2002).

[87] During the 1950s and early 1960s, highly educated North African Jews tended to immigrate primarily to France and Quebec rather than to Israel (Bensimon and DellaPrgolla 1984).

Demography in Decline?

By the late 1970s, however, these migratory flows from the Soviet Union and Western source countries had been exhausted and immigration waned significantly. As a result, the total number of immigrants to Israel between 1980 and 1989 fell below 154,000 (CBS 2012). Throughout the 1980s, there were only sporadic migratory flows from various Jewish communities around the world, prompting demographers to assert that "immigration could no longer be counted on to keep up Jewish growth rates" (Friedlander and Goldscheider 1984, 11). In fact, the sole large-scale migratory flow during this period was an organized airlift of approximately 17,000 Ethiopian Jews from refugee camps in Sudan (Neuman 1999; Shafir and Peled 2002).

Despite Israel's desire for immigration, the state was not interested in the immigration of Ethiopian Jews. In fact, the airlift was primarily a result of pressure from the Jewish community in the United States, which sought to ameliorate tensions with its own African-American population, and religious groups in Israel that sought to enhance the size of their own community and to settle these immigrants in the West Bank (personal interview with former Interior Minister, February 23, 2012; See also Shafir and Peled 2002).

Besides declining immigration, Jewish demography faced two additional challenges. First, throughout the decade, the state experienced significantly high levels of emigration (Friedlander and Goldscheider 1984; Ma'ariv 1986; New York Times 1985). As a result, the 1980s experienced four years (1981, 1985, 1986, and 1988) in which the immigration balance, namely, the difference between immigration and emigration, was negative. These constituted the only cases of a negative immigration balance since 1948, with the exception of 1953 (Dellapergola 2012).

Second, despite a relative decline, fertility rates among Arabs in both Israel and in the occupied territories were double those of Israeli Jews, significantly increasing the relative proportion of these two Arab groups within the overall population (Friedlander and Goldscheider 1984; New York Times 1985; Soffer 1989; Weiss 1983).[88] Due to these demographic trends, increasing concerns emerged within the center-left with regard to a future parity between the Jewish and Palestinian Arab populations residing within the territory of mandatory Palestine. This led to calls for Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories (see: *Davar* 1981; Gotthalf 1983, Landau 1987; Soffer 1983).[89] Specifically, while the Palestinian population within Israel accounted for only 17 percent of the population, together with the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, they constituted 38 percent of the population in the entire territory under Israeli control. In fact, demographic estimates suggested a 55:45 ratio by 2000 (Soffer 1989). These trends were particularly exacerbated by the exceptionally high birthrates among Palestinians and the limited prospects for additional large-scale Jewish immigration that could offset this emerging demographic trend (Neuman 1999; Portuguese 1998).[90]

Demographic concerns were significantly augmented during this period by the publication of a number of high-profile studies by leading demographers such as Roberto Bachi, Sergio Dellapergola, and Arnon Soffer (Kessler and Man 1986; Landau 1987; Moore 1992; Soffer 1989). These studies foregrounded Israel's declining demographic position, particularly if the state were to maintain its control over the occupied territories, and recommended that Israel

---

[88] This was the result of large differentials in fertility rates between the groups. For instance, in 1989, Israeli Jews had 19.7 births per 100 women, Palestinian Israelis had 34, West Bank Palestinians had 40.6, and Gazan Palestinians had 53.8 (Moore 1992).

[89] For instance, if we compare the demographic balance between Jews and Arabs in 1987 to the one in 1977, it is evident that the Jewish population decreased by 3.5 percent within Israel proper (Soffer 1989).

[90] In 1986, Israeli demographer Roberto Bachi warned the government about the implications of Palestinian fertility. He suggested that together with Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, Arabs contribute more to absolute population growth than Jews. In response, ministers called for a campaign to increase Jewish birthrates and limit abortions (Kessler and Man 1986; Shehori 1986).

either relinquish control over the densely populated Palestinian centers of the West Bank and Gaza or find ways to increase Jewish immigration and bolster fertility rates.

These demographic findings engendered growing concerns within the Israeli public and political spheres—particularly among the center-left, which, in response, became increasingly amenable to the prospect of territorial compromise as means of maintaining Israel's Jewish majority (Landau 1987). In fact, these demographic concerns, together with the eruption of the 1987 Palestinian uprising, constituted the catalysts for the consolidation of the divergent visions of the national project espoused by the left and the right. While differences had existed before this period, prior to the mid-1980s both camps promoted strategies that sought to preserve Israel's control over the occupied territories.

These demographic trends were further exacerbated by the vision of national project that was promoted the right wing government, which sought to actively expand Israeli control and settlement in the occupied territories. Due to its expansionist ideology, the right continued to overlook the emerging demographic realities.[91] Instead, it adopted policies that aggravated the situation by increasing the territorial integration between Israel and the occupied territories and promoting the erasure and obfuscation of the Green Line. During this period, the right-wing Likud government was engaged in a massive Judaization campaign in the West Bank and Gaza that increased the settler population from under 4,000 in 1977 to over 70,000 in 1987. As a result

[91] There were, however, several right-wing actors who did identify the demographic challenge facing Israel. Ariel Sharon, for instance, sought to significantly enhance immigration and settle these immigrants in West Bank settlements, reproducing patterns of pre-state Zionist demographic and territorial expansion. Similarly, former Labor Party member Rehavam Ze'evi created the Moledet (Homeland) party that championed the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians from the entire territory of mandatory Palestine. In fact, the so-called "transfer policy" gained significant popularity among the Israeli electorate.

of these policies, Benvenisti argued, it became untenable to examine pre-1967 Israel and the occupied territories as separate demographic entities (Benvenisti 2010).[92]

In May 1986, as a partial response to these growing demographic concerns, the government adopted a plan that sought to reverse the trend that could potentially lead to Jews becoming a minority. "The government has thereby decided to adopt comprehensive, coordinated, long-term policies that aim at securing an adequate level of growth of its Jewish population." (Government of Israel, May 11, 1986). This policy sought to incentivize increased fertility rates among Jews, limit access to abortions, and enhance immigration from the Diaspora.

It is important to note, however, that these demographic issues were not one-sided. In fact, questions of demography played a central role in the Palestinians' thinking as well, particularly as they became aware of Israeli concerns and the relative advantage demography offered them. While until the late 1970s, demography was primarily thought of in terms of the threat posed by Jewish immigration to Israel, in the early 1980s, the PLO increasingly evoked the specter of Palestinian demographic growth as a tool in the conflict. In particular, the PLO embraced the aforementioned Israeli demographic studies. In fact, together with the eruption of the Palestinian uprising in 1987, these studies engendered exponential growth in Palestinian writing on the demographic opportunities available to the Palestinians (Steinberg 1989).

Palestinian writers stressed that the demographic challenges facing Israel would require the latter to create a Palestinian state if Israelis wished to maintain the state's unique Jewish character (Steinberg 1989). Furthermore, during this period, Palestinians increasingly referred to demography as a weapon that could help them accomplish their goals. In July 1987, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat stated, "The Israelis fear us even if the fighting stops. They fear our children and women that give birth to another Palestinian every ten months…. The biological

[92] See the discussion on Israeli policies toward Palestinians both in Israel and the occupied territories below.

bomb threatens to blow up Israel from within, as after the year 2000 the number of Palestinians will be far greater than the number of Jews in Israel" (in: Steinberg 1989, 37. See also: Teitelboim and Weiner 2001).

Thus, by the mid-late 1980s, for the first time since independence, Israel was in the throes of a demographic crisis. Furthermore, the political system had become increasingly divided between the two distinct national projects espoused by left- and right-wing political actors. The former sought to promote territorial separation and compromise though an agreement either with Jordan or directly with the Palestinians in order to preserve the Jewish majority within Israel proper (Landau 1987). The latter sought to expand Jewish presence in the occupied territories at the cost of exacerbating demographic realities. As I will demonstrate in Chapter 3, this ideological schism, which began to emerge in 1967 and consolidated and became increasingly central in the 1980s, was further aggravated by the eruption of the Palestinian uprising in 1987, since it highlighted the fundamental differences between these approaches by placing questions of demography and territory at the forefront of the debate over the future of the Zionist national project.

To conclude, this chapter has examined the various dynamics and factors that have shaped Zionist and later Israeli elite preferences toward questions concerning demography and immigration. Using process tracing and by examining a host of evidence that spanned from the beginning of Zionist settlement in the late 19th century and until the late 1980s and, I have argued that elite perceptions and strategies toward the Arab- Israeli conflict have played a key role in shaping their preferences regarding immigration and demography.

Beyond the effects of intergroup competition, I have also demonstrated how, particularly in the aftermath of the 1967 war, the split between the left and the right concerning both the goals of their respective national projects and the means of achieving them have also substantially shaped their preferences toward immigration. Specifically, I posit that these intra-group dynamics can play as important a role as inter-group dynamics have in shaping immigration policies and outcomes. In the next chapter I will examine how and the extent to which these two levels of competition and divergent preferences concerning the national project can account for the contours and outcomes of Israel's contemporary immigration policies. In particular, the analysis will focus on the policies that have been adopted regarding international labor migrants and Palestinian commuter migrants and the factors that have engendered the interplay between them.

Chapter 3: Between Separation and Integration: The Recruitment of Labor Migrants in Israel

Since the early 1990s, Israel has recruited hundreds of thousands of non-Jewish and non-Arab temporary labor migrants from over 72 different countries—a policy that constitutes a substantial aberration from the state's traditional exclusive ethnic immigration policies of targeting Jews, even those who did not fit the traditional definition of who is a Jew. In fact, labor migrants were initially recruited in order to replace the Palestinian labor force from the Occupied Territiories that had provided the country's labor market with cheap, unprotected, and unskilled labor since 1967 (Bartram 1998; Kemp and Raijman 2008; Rosenhek 2003). Despite the fact that labor migrants are by definition temporary residents of the state, in practice, they have become a permanent feature within Israeli society over the last 20 years, constituting what Kemp (2004) has defined as a *permanent-temporary immigrant population*.

This chapter will decipher, explore, and untangle the multiple political and economic factors that led to the recruitment of these migrants. In particular, I will explore the role played by both inter-group dynamics in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict and intra-group division within the Zionist-Israeli national project in shaping elite preferences regarding the recruitment of non-Jewish labor migrants into the country during the 1990s.

Specifically, although both right- and left-wing actors have promoted the recruitment of international labor migrants during different periods of time, they have been motivated to do so by substantially different rationales that are related to their particular preferences regarding the occupied territories and the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the analysis below, I will trace these divergent preferences and attempt to discern a general pattern. On the one hand, I will suggest that groups that oppose territorial compromise have generally advocated the removal of foreign workers and their replacement by Palestinians as a means of enhancing integration between Israel and the occupied territories, even though these actors have also supported labor migrant recruitment as stopgap means of deterring Palestinian workers from resisting the occupation. On the other, those who have promoted territorial compromise have generally, though not enthusiastically, supported the recruitment of labor migrants (in the absence of low-skilled Israeli workers) as a means of creating separation between the two national groups and territories. I will argue that while economic interests, interest group politics, and security interests have all partially influenced the observed outcomes, the analysis below suggests that political determinants related to the conflict played a key role in generating these outcomes (see also: Bartram 1998; Kemp and Raijman 2008).

Since the recruitment of labor migrants has been inextricably linked to the incorporation of Palestinian workers into the Israeli labor market, it would be impossible to offer a comprehensive account of the causes that engendered the recruitment of the former without examining the history of the latter first. Thus, the following discussion will consist of three sections. The first will explore the role that Palestinian workers, both citizens and non-citizens, have played in the Israeli labor market since 1948. It will examine the determinants of their incorporation into the Israeli labor market and the consequential development of the state's ethnically segmented labor market with its structural dependence on cheap and flexible labor. The second section will examine both the political and economic determinants that sparked the mass recruitment of labor migrants during the 1990s. The final section will examine the manner in which the presence of non-Jewish and non-Arab labor migrants has impacted Israeli society and its competing national projects.

The Proto Labor Migrants: Palestinian Citizens and Non-Citizens in the Israeli Labor Market[93]

In the aftermath of the 1948 war, Israel imposed military rule upon its approximately 150,000 Palestinian citizens. Officially, the military regime was justified as a security provision that was designed to protect the state and its Jewish citizens from a hostile minority that had just waged war against it (Lustick 1980). However, scholars have argued that in practice, this regime constituted a mechanism of political and social control that was designed to promote several state goals.

First, it enabled the state to limit and regulate Palestinian citizens' access to the labor market in order to minimize potential competition between cheap Palestinian laborers and Jewish immigrants[94] and confine the former to the secondary unskilled sector. Second, military rule constrained autonomous Palestinian economic development that could potentially compete with the Jewish-dominated Israeli economy. Third, it aimed to reduce the possibility of ethnic mobilization among Arab citizens who resided in different parts of the state. Finally, it sought to foster Palestinian electoral support for the dominant Labor movement (Greenberg 1993; Lustick 1980; Rosenhek 2003; Shafir and Peled 2002).

The state practices that were embodied in the military regime emerged as a reformulation or extension of the pre-state Zionist exclusionary labor market strategies that sought to limit and even prohibit the access of cheap Palestinian labor into the emerging Zionist labor market. This

[93] It is important to note that in the Israeli context, Palestinian workers have not been considered labor migrants, but rather simply workers (see discussion in: Kemp and Raijman 2008; Rosenhek 2003) Semyonov and Lerental 1995). However, these workers do correspond with the concept of *daily commuter migrants* that has emerged primarily in the context of immigration across the US–Mexico border (see: Rodriguez and Hagan 2004).

[94] The military regime enabled the state to limit and expand Palestinian citizens' access to the labor market based on the latter's needs. At times of employment scarcity, the military governors sought to limit Arab access to the labor market. In contrast, during periods of labor scarcity, these restrictions were lifted (Greenberg 1993).

was done in order to facilitate the expansion and survival of the Zionist project (Shafir 1989). The creation of the State of Israel, however, rendered this form of overarching Palestinian labor market exclusion both difficult to maintain from a legal perspective and politically undesirable since the mass unemployment among Palestinian citizens of Israel could potentially foment substantial social and political unrest.

However, in the early years of the state, partial Palestinian exclusion from the labor market through the erection of legal and material barriers remained an imperative means of securing employment for the large numbers of Jewish immigrants who settled in the country after 1948. This military rule, which persisted for 18 years until its dissolution in 1966,[95] did not solely limit Palestinian citizens' access to the labor market. It also engendered an ethnically segmented labor market in which Palestinian workers were confined to the low-skilled secondary sector, with Jewish employers becoming increasingly reliant on the supply of a cheap, flexible, and subordinate labor force (Greenberg 1993; Rosenhek 2003; Shafir and Peled 2002; Yiftachel 2006).

In an interesting turn of events, this dynamic was concurrently fundamentally transformed and reinforced in 1967 in the aftermath of Israel's occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the one million Palestinian inhabitants who resided within those territories. Following the war, a highly publicized debate ensued within the dominant Labor Party concerning the future of the territories and the possibility of their economic integration into Israel cum their civic segregation (Gazit 1985; Greenberg 1993; Sagir 1988a; 1988b).[96] While this debate largely focused on the issues of whether Israel should integrate the occupied territories

[95] However, restrictions were partially removed during the period of full employment, 1959-1965 (Greenberg 1993).
[96] Following the war, unemployment rates in the West Bank and Gaza were approximately 40–50 percent. Initially, unemployment was alleviated through public works. However, increasing numbers of Palestinians began working illegally within Israel (Gazit 1985).

and their population into the state and, if so, the scope of the integration, from a more fundamental perspective it represented a schism within the party concerning the nature and future of the Israeli state and its national project.

On the one hand, hawkish defense minister Moshe Dayan believed that Israel's control over the West Bank and Gaza was likely to persist for the foreseeable future and sought to promote a future conception of the state that included these territories. To this end, he headed the camp that promoted the full economic integration of the territories into Israel. Dayan, whose position was supported by the military,[97] posited that the economic integration of the territories into the Israeli economy was necessary in order to bolster Israel's future negotiation position. He further contended that it would reduce the prospects of organized Palestinian resistance against Israeli rule as a result of the economic prosperity it would offer the Palestinians and their dependence on work in Israel (*Davar* 1968a; *Davar* 1968b; *Haaretz* 1968; *Maariv* 1968a; *Maariv* 1968b; *New York Times* 1968; Nissan 1968; Roy 1985; Shmariyahu 1968). This approach constituted part of the process that Gazit (1985) has defined as the "Carrot and Stick" policy vis-à-vis the Palestinians in the occupied territories. As long as Palestinians acquiesced to Israeli control, they would receive a carrot, while if they were to attempt to stage an uprising, Israel would be able to penalize them.

In an interview to the *New York Times* Dayan's explained his perspective, "the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and Israel could not function independently in economic matters. All oranges, he said, should be exported in a coordinated manner, under Israeli supervision". He also stated that the economic prosperity that would result from the integration of the territories would serve to

[97] This position emerged already in the late 1950s following Israel's temporary occupation of Gaza. A report authored by General Peled stated that in a case of a future occupation, Israel would need to integrate the Palestinian population into the Israeli labor market as a means of fostering dependence of the former on the latter (Gazit 1985). Thus, since 1967 the military has traditionally supported Palestinian access to the labor market as a means of assuaging Palestinian hostility and frustration.

reduce violent Palestinian resistance to the occupation making it easier for Israel to administer them (New York Times 1969).

On the other side of the debate, Finance Minister Sapir and David Ben-Gurion, who was now retired, strongly opposed economic integration and the recruitment of Palestinian workers. Sapir's objection stemmed from his fear that integration would constitute *de facto* annexation that would ultimately lead to domestic or international pressures. Annexation could potentially engender Palestinian political integration that would jeopardize Israel's survival as a Jewish state, hinder the prospects of future territorial compromise, and threaten the livelihood of unskilled Israeli workers (*Ma'ariv* 1968; Nissan 1968). For Sapir, demographic imperatives required that the state maintain a strict separation between Israel proper, which had a substantial Jewish majority, and the occupied territories, which had a large hostile Palestinian population. As Sapir explained in an interview on Israel's national radio in 1968, the integration of the territories would make Israel a Jewish state in name only (Ryan 1974). He believed that integration would be "a powder keg under our own society" and therefore Israel "must keep Israel Israeli and…the administered territories Arab" (in: Roy 1985, 147).

It is important to note that for demographic reasons, Dayan, like Sapir, opposed the political integration of the Palestinian population that would be the result of annexation. At the same time, however, he sought to create a political balance as if there were peace already (*The Jerusalem Post* 1968). "The aim may not have been to make the annexation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank easier, but it was meant to make their separation from Israel harder." (Roy 1985, 148).

Sapir's position, which opposed both economic or political integration, was also espoused by the chairman of the Histadrut Labor Union Yitzhak Ben-Aharon, who claimed that integration would lead to the collapse of the Zionist project both from a demographic and a moral perspective (Ben-Gurion 1971).[98] While it is likely that the latter's position was also motivated by his interest in protecting Israeli Jewish workers, he employed socialist discourse to argue against Israel ruling over and exploiting other national groups (Roy 1985; Ryan 1974). This unlikely coalition between Sapir the pragmatist and Ben-Aharon the ideological socialist suggests that the dispute over Palestinian economic integration had little to do with the labor market needs and Jewish or Israeli labor but was primarily a dispute between supporters of future annexation and those who sought to maintain the Green Line. Despite these heated debates and the strong opposition that was manifested by worker associations in several Israeli cities, the government informally adopted Dayan's approach in July 1968, opening the door to the mass participation of Palestinians in the Israeli labor market and the process of blurring the boundaries between Israel and the territories.[99]

Gazit (1985) points out that the integration and recruitment of Palestinian workers were not part of a comprehensive long-term plan but rather a result of a series of *ad hoc* decisions that were promoted by Dayan and authorized by both the government and the military.[100] Palestinian employment was primarily perceived as a safety valve, which would reduce economic pressures

---

[98] It is evident that these actors were not primarily motivated by solicitude for the Palestinian population but rather by the interests of preserving the Zionist national project as it had been shaped and defined by Labor Zionism, namely, as an exclusive Jewish project. Thus, their support for territorial compromise emanated from their Zionist approach, which precluded the possibility of Jewish control over a large Palestinian population.

[99] As Roy (1985) points out, although Sapir and Dayan were united in their opposition to the civil integration of the Palestinians in the territories into Israel, their rationales differed. Sapir's position stemmed from his stand positing that the occupation constituted a temporary situation that would be resolved through Israeli withdrawal in return for peace, and therefore precluded the possibility of any economic or civil integration that could prolong it. Dayan, on the other hand, opposed civil integration for the same reasons that he supported economic integration. First, Palestinian employment within Israel would allow the indefinite perpetuation of the occupation at little political or security cost. Second, Palestinian labor was beneficial to the Israeli economy precisely because Palestinians lacked the civil or political rights that political integration would have conferred. Finally, like Sapir, he opposed a bi-national state but believed that economic integration and political segregation constituted a feasible medium-term policy.

[100] On this issue, see also: Roy 1985.

that could fuel anti-Israeli mobilization. Concurrently, it constrained Palestinian economic development, which could potentially compete with the Israeli economy (Arnon 1997; Gordon 2007; Rosenhek 2003).[101] An IDF report explained the economic logic underlying the integration policy: "These areas provide supplemental markets for Israeli goods, on the one hand, and a source of factors of production, especially unskilled labor for the Israeli economy, on the other" (Ministry of Defense 1970). Thus, the integration policy served several goals, namely, promoting Palestinian acquiescence, limiting economic competition, providing the economy with a cheap labor force, and creating a captive market for Israeli products (Ryan 1974).

The government had an interest in fostering Palestinian employment because of its perceived political benefits and ability to fill labor shortages that were on the rise in the post-1967 economic environment. Still political leaders were concerned that employers' easy access to a large pool of cheap, unprotected Palestinian workers would lead to exploitation and the exclusion of low-skilled Israeli workers. Thus, in order to partially reduce the economic incentive to hire Palestinian workers, the state imposed social security taxes equivalent to those paid by Israeli workers (Rosenhek 2003).

While Palestinian wages were still significantly lower than Israeli wages, the policy still reduced the incentive to replace Israeli workers with Palestinian workers. In essence, these taxes were imposed in order to make Palestinian labor more expensive, while the workers themselves were denied access to the social security benefits that these payments would have funded. In reality, the social security payments, together with other income taxes paid by the Palestinians, remained in the coffers of the state and were used to cover approximately 82 percent of the cost

[101] Gordon (2008) points out that the economic integration also served to reduce Palestinian agricultural production, which competed with Israeli agriculture. As a result, Palestinian agricultural production and employment fell by approximately 50 percent between 1967 and 1987 (Roy 1995). Furthermore, the decline in Palestinian agriculture also facilitated Israel's land expropriation policies in the occupied territories.

of administering the territories. They even generated a surplus that was used to bolster Israel's own budget (Sagir 1988c). Thus, Palestinian employment played a secondary political economic role. Interestingly, during this period, various economic actors demanded access to these surplus revenues. For instance, in February 1988, the Construction Workers Union initiated a strike, demanding that the Palestinian social security contributions be transferred to it so as to offset the deficit in its pension fund (Winkler 1988b).

Furthermore, the incorporation of Palestinians into the Israeli labor market, coupled by the reduction in the limitations imposed on the movement of Palestinians between Israel and the territories, led to a gradual erasure of the Green Line and the elimination of the spatial distinction between Israel and the territories (see: Benvenisti 2010). This process of erasure or obfuscation of territorial boundaries served to normalize the Israeli occupation and promote the political interests of those who wanted to maintain Israeli control over the territories in the long run.

Thus, although integration policies were partially adopted in response to the economic realities of illegal Palestinian labor within Israel (Gazit 1985), they were primarily determined by political interests that emanated from the interests of dominant elites to prolong Israel's control of the occupied territories (Arnon 1997; Sagir 1988c). However, it appears that this policy was in fact successful in pacifying the violent conflict with the Palestinians in the occupied territories. As Nabil Khuri, a Palestinian residing in Lebanon, explained, "During these years of military occupation, Israel has succeeded in granting these people economic prosperity in lieu of the dejection they should have been feeling, almost to the extent of putting the conquered lands out of mind" (in Gazit 1985, 194). The success of these policies is also evidenced by the lack of substantial or persistent Palestinian violent resistance to Israel within the occupied territories, beyond several sporadic and short-lived episodes until the outbreak of the 1987 Intifada.

Figure 3.1: Palestinian participation in the Israeli labor market 1967-1992*



* My own calculations, based on Bank of Israel Annual Reports 1968-1993 and include both authorized and unauthorized workers.

Following the 1967 war, accelerated economic growth within Israel generated increased demand for low-skilled labor, especially in construction and agriculture. Palestinian workers, who constituted a cheap, flexible, subordinate, and largely unprotected labor force, satisfied this demand.[102] As Figure 3.1 illustrates—a few fluctuations notwithstanding—the number of Palestinian workers increased steadily until the end of 1992. It is estimated that as many as 50 percent of these workers were not authorized and were hired through so called *Ra'ises*, or middlemen (often Palestinian citizens of Israel), who received a share of the workers' wages (Danon 1988; Rosenhek 2003; Sagir 1988c). Due to this continuous expansion, some 40–50

[102] The incorporation of Palestinian labor had a substantial effect on the labor market's stratification structure as other groups were pushed up in the process, particularly Mizrahis and Palestinian-Israelis (Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein 1987).

percent of the labor force in Gaza and 30–40 percent of the labor force in the West Bank was employed in Israel (Arnon 1997; Roy 1995).

During this period, Palestinian labor market participation was primarily concentrated in the booming construction and agricultural sectors and to a lesser extent in manufacturing (Sagir 1988d). Because of the reliance of Palestinians on employment in Israel and their sectoral concentration, a strong mutual dependence developed between Palestinian workers and their Israeli employers (Arnon 1997; Sayigh 1988; Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein 1987). Specifically, following four decades of reliance initially on cheap Mizrahi and Palestinian-Israeli labor and subsequently on Palestinian commuter-migrants from the occupied territories, the secondary labor market remained technologically underdeveloped and highly dependent on an endless stream of cheap, disposable, and largely unprotected workers.

The Intifada and the Recruitment of Labor Migrants

During the mid- to late 1980s, two concurrent processes took place, leading to the transformation of labor market dynamics and opening the door for the recruitment of labor migrants. First, Israeli employers grew increasingly frustrated by the rising cost of Palestinian labor[103] and what they perceived as the latter's growing demands. In response, human resource agencies[104] and employers began lobbying the government to allow the recruitment of labor migrants, primarily

[103] This is despite the fact that by 1992, Palestinian wages constituted less than 40 percent of those of Israelis (Shafir and Peled 2002).
[104] Kemp and Raijman (2008) have demonstrated that well before the Intifada, human resource agencies, which were due to profit significantly from this shift, demanded that labor migrants be recruited in order to replace Palestinian workers as a result of the latter's increasing demands. Gabi Savag, the CEO of ORS, one of Israel's largest human resource agencies, led the campaign in favor of recruiting labor migrants, stating that employing the latter "has reduced the snobbery among workers from the territories. They have understood that they are replaceable" (ibid, 52). Two weeks before the Intifada broke out, Savag claimed that Israel needed an additional 13,000 labor migrants (Ginosar 1988).

from Turkey, Portugal, and Romania (Kemp and Raijman 2008; Rosenhek 2003; Semyonov and Lerental 2005).[105]

For instance, in September 1987, the Polgat clothing manufacturer commissioned a report alleging that Palestinians workers were actively sabotaging production and making unreasonable demands. These included the creation of a prayer room and the partial halting of production on Fridays. In order to remedy the situation, the report recommended that the company be granted 800 permits for labor migrants who would replace Palestinians (Rabin 1987). Similarly, construction companies also demanded the recruitment of 3,000 foreign workers (Lavie 1988b) and threatened to halt all building projects if the Labor Minister did not approve the recruitment of workers from abroad (Lavie 1988c).[106] Despite the exertion of intense pressures, the government refused to meet these demands (Kemp and Raijman 2007; Mena 1989).

A second and more crucial process was the outbreak of the Palestinian uprising, the Intifada, in December 1987. The Intifada carried significant ramifications for Palestinian employment in Israel. First, the leaders of the uprising demanded that Palestinian workers strike and not report for work in Israel.[107] Second, the Israeli military imposed harsh restriction on Palestinians' freedom of movement through general closures in both Gaza and the West Bank, severely limiting workers' ability to commute to their jobs in Israel (Bartram 1998; Kemp and Raijman 2008; Ministry of Defense 1990; Roy 1995).[108] Third, due to the increasing violence,

---

[105] In fact, the recruitment of highly skilled metal workers and other specialized construction workers had already begun on a small scale in the early 1980s (Kemp and Raijman 2008). In addition, a small community of undocumented domestic workers, primarily from the Philippines and African countries, emerged during this period (Erlich 1990; Golan 1990; Sabar 2008).

[106] For additional examples of employers' pressure to recruit foreign workers, see: Lavie 1988a; Tal 1987; Zarhiya 1988.

[107] While these demands were meant to punish Israel, they also represented a shift toward a new self-sufficiency paradigm within Palestinian society (Roy 1995).

[108] For a detailed report on Israeli policies toward Palestinian labor, see: Ministry of Defense (1990).

Israelis grew fearful of Palestinian presence within their cities.[109] In fact, the notion that Palestinian participation in the Israeli labor market exerted a normalizing effect increasingly lost currency among the Israeli public.

The tense situation vis-à-vis Palestinian workers was exploited by human resource agencies and by employers when they demanded the recruitment of labor migrants to replace them. While the agencies wanted to profit off their recruitment, the employers sought a cheaper and more subservient labor force. Thus, less than a month after the uprising erupted, human resource agencies insisted on the institutionalization of foreign worker recruitment and the immediate hiring of 3,000 foreign workers (Winkler 1988a). In July 1988, Aharon Geffen, chair of the Human Resource Agencies' Union, wrote an opinion piece in *Ha'aretz* in which he called for the creation of official procedures for recruiting workers and declared that the labor market was in dire need of thousands of labor migrants (Geffen 1988). Similarly, less than two weeks after the outbreak of the Intifada, the chair of the industrial production lobby demanded that the government recruit thousands of workers from abroad, claiming that the latter would reduce the economy's dependence on Arab labor (Ganor 1987). As the CEO of the ORS agency, Gabi Savag, explained in *Ha'aretz* 18 months after the outbreak of the Intifada, "The intifada constitutes an accelerator in the right direction and maybe a sweet result will come out of a bad situation" (Savag 1989). The *sweet result* he referred to was the recruitment of labor migrants.

In fact, on several occasions, Ora Namir, chairperson of the Knesset's Labor and Welfare Committee claimed that human resources were creating a media spin in order to increase their profits through labor migrant recruitment. Specifically, she posited that human resource agencies created an artificial discourse around the need to recruit labor migrants as a means of generating

[109] Besides feeling fear radical Israelis also began staging violent attacks against Palestinian workers within Israel (Morgenstern 1988; Yanub 1989).

profit (For example see Namir's comments during Knesset Labor and Welfare Committee meetings: January 26, 1988 and March 7, 1988).

Similar demands and pressures were also exerted by smaller employers who, in contrast to large employers and human resource agencies, were not set to profit significantly by the replacement of Palestinian workers by this new labor force, but were simply in need of workers. For instance, small agricultural enterprises located in the south and owners of factories in the Erez Industrial Zone near Gaza were unable to function without the supply of Palestinian workers that was halted due to repeated Israeli curfews and Palestinian labor strikes. In response to the rising cost of the absent workers, these employers demanded government compensation of 80 million shekels (40 million USD) and the recruitment of labor migrants to replace the absent Palestinian workers if the latter were not allowed to return to work (Sela 1988).

It appears that the demands of these employers and human resource agencies to recruit labor migrants persisted throughout the Intifada. In fact, every round of violence that involved Israeli casualties or closures of the territories engendered additional pressures. For instance, following the murder of a Jewish construction worker in September 1989, the head of the Builders Association claimed that the Intifada had led to the loss of more than one hundred million USD in revenue and called for the immediate recruitment of labor migrants. He explained, "I believe that if the government were to allow us to bring professional workers [from abroad]…we could achieve several goals at once. First, we can show the workers from the territories that we have an alternative…. Second, by bringing foreign workers we can hire more Jews and reduce unemployment" (Alon 1989). While the first argument is consistent with Israel's "Carrot and Stick" policy, which constituted the basic logic of the integration policy (Gazit 1986), the second was primarily cheap talk that seems to contradict the long-term attempts of construction companies to limit the access of Israeli Jews to the industry and rely on cheap and unorganized labor instead (Kemp and Raijman 2008; Rosenhek 2003).

Besides the demands expressed by economic actors and interest groups, the Intifada also engendered a large-scale political debate concerning Palestinian workers and the recruitment of labor migrants. As was the case with the debates over the integration of Palestinians in 1967, these debates were shaped by the competing visions espoused by divergent elite groups vis-à-vis the Israeli national project. Specifically, nationalist politicians from the Likud party and radical right-wing factions, who opposed any form of territorial compromise in the occupied territories, actively advocated in favor of labor migrant recruitment as a means of punishing Palestinians for participating in the uprising, thereby compelling the latter to re-normalize the occupation, or return to the pre-intifada status quo, by suspending violent resistance to it (Kemp and Raijman 2008). Furthermore, they emphasized that since international labor migrants were non-Arabs, they had no political or national claim in relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict and would therefore not constitute a threat.

During this period, popular newspaper such as *Yediot Aharonot* and *Maariv* published a host of articles that emphasized the security threat posed by Palestinians workers and the means whereby they sabotaged construction sites and agricultural production. For examples of these types of articles, see: Bar Yosef 1988; Bender 1988; Danon 1988; Elken 1988.

Similarly, Minister of Labor Moshe Katzav initially espoused this view by stating that recruiting labor migrants would be “an appropriate Zionist response to the Intifada” (Slutsky 1988) and that “granting permits to foreign worker recruitment will be the whip that threatens West Bank and Gazan workers” (Ganor 1988). Similarly, in January 1988, one month after the outbreak of the Intifada, Knesset Member Gershon Sheffet from the ultra-nationalist Hat’hiya party called on the government to ease restrictions on the recruitment of labor migrants. He argued that this would "contribute to the pacification in sectors that rely on workers from Judea and Samaria, workers that are now causing problems and pose a danger" (Knesset Plenary, January 25, 1988).

During the same Knesset debate, Avner Hai-Shaki from the radical right-wing Nationalist Religious Party demanded that labor migrants be recruited to replace Palestinian workers, claiming that the latter posed a threat to Israeli security. "There is no other option than searching for solutions in Portugal and Turkey…so that the whip and the threat that are directed at us by workers from Judea, Samaria, and Gaza will not intimidate us anymore…. I hope that we can prove to those Arab workers who use their work in Israel as a weapon…that we don't need them".(Ibid) Likewise, Likud hardliner Uzi Landau stated, "The labor market is a place where we can turn the current defeat into victory…. The defense minister should use this tool…. Those like me who call to remove these terrorists from the labor market need to offer an alternative…. My position is that we need to grant permits to several thousand foreign workers…; they will serve as live deterrence." (Knesset Plenary, December 12, 1989) Similar arguments were voiced by other right-wing hardliners such as Ariel Sharon and Rehavam Ze'evi For additional examples, see: Knesset Plenary meetings: January 18, 1988, May 24, 1989, December 10, 1989.

Rehavam Ze'evi, however, differed from the rest of this group in that he opposed Palestinians' participation in the labor market to begin with, since in contrast to other right-wing actors, his Moledet political faction advocated ethnic cleansing of Palestinians both in Israel and the occupied territories rather than integration, and believed that economic integration hindered their emigration (Ze'evi 1993).

An analysis of these statements, however, suggests that they did not sincerely seek to dismantle the integration regime that had been in place since 1967 in an effort to maintain Israeli control over the occupied territories by creating Palestinian dependency on the Israeli labor market. To the contrary: the recruitment of labor migrants was perceived instrumentally as a stop-gap measure that would enable the perpetuation of the integration paradigm in the long run and facilitate the ultimate return of Palestinians workers to the Israeli labor market, as had been the case prior to the Intifada.[110]

Thus, this position maintained the "Carrot and Stick" policy that had been adopted in 1967 toward the Palestinians, according to which access to the Israeli labor market was a benefit that was contingent upon their acquiescence in Israeli control (Gazit 1986). This stands in contrast with the developing position held by Labor Party elites who believed that the assumptions of the integration paradigm had been invalidated, and sought to implement new means of managing the conflict through separation, territorial compromise, or both (Bartram 1998; Kemp and Raijman 2008; Shafir and Peled 2002).

In response to the right-wing demands to recruit labor migrants as a means of deterrence and return to the pre-Intifada *status quo*, three political groups emerged. The first, included left-wing Knesset members from the Labor Party, Ratz, Mapam, and Hadash, who opposed labor migrant recruitment for two divergent reasons.

On the one hand, senior members of the Labor Party such as Ora Namir, Edna Solodor, and Israel Keisar argued that the exclusion of Palestinians from the labor market offered a golden opportunity to facilitate the return of Israeli workers to the agricultural and construction sectors that they had abandoned since 1967. These actors were opposed primarily to the use of cheap

[110] This interpretation is consistent with the right's initial understanding of the Intifada as a *temporary* aberration from the *status quo* that had been in place since June 1967.

Arab labor as a means of expanding profit margins and sought to privilege the organized labor of Israeli citizens, both Jewish and Palestinian (see Knesset Labor and Welfare Committee meetings: January 26, 1988 and March 7, 1988). Thus, instead of hiring workers from abroad to replace Palestinians or in anticipation of their return, they argued that the government should demand that employers increase wages and offer material incentives and training programs so that Israelis could permanently replace Palestinian workers in those sectors (Eldar 1989; Knesset Labor and Welfare Committee meetings: January 26, 1988, March 7, 1988. Knesset Plenary, July 12, 1989).

On the other hand, members of the more radical left-wing parties, such as Ran Cohen and Yair Tzaban, argued that as long as the occupation persisted, Israel had a moral obligation to provide employment for the Palestinians, while it had no such obligation toward labor migrants Knesset Plenary, January 25, 1988, March 8, 1988, February 19, 1991). Left-wing support for maintaining Palestinian employment constituted an interesting turn of events since Palestinian labor integration had initially been promoted by those who opposed territorial compromise. However, these actors approached the issue from the perspective of the humanitarian obligation that an occupier has toward the occupied population.

The second camp of opponents to labor migrant recruitment consisted of members of the ultra-Orthodox parties led by Knesset Member Menahem Porush. While some of those parties initially supported the limited recruitment of labor migrants, this group mainly stressed the potential danger that the presence of foreigners would pose to the Jewish character of the state (Knesset Plenary, December 31, 1990). For the ultra-Orthodox, the prospect of the state recruiting non-Jews who, in contrast to Palestinians, would not return to their homes, but would live among the Jewish population, represented a threat to the Jewishness of the state that could lead to proselytism and intermarriage.

Intriguingly, Porush initially supported the temporary recruitment of labor migrants since he perceived Palestinians (both Israeli citizens and from the occupied territories) as a security threat to the Jews. In a committee meeting, he stated: "My heart is not tranquil regarding the places I am responsible for – social and business institutions – when I see that 40 percent of their employees are Arabs [citizens and non-citizens]…It doesn't give me peace of mind when I think of what could happen…and recently there have been Israeli Arabs who have participated in the uprising…in direct conversations I see that Arabs are full of hatred toward Jews and this increases the security risk…therefore as a tactic we need to recruit foreign workers…this could deter the Arabs if they know that they are replaceable" (minutes of the Labor and Welfare Committee meeting March 7, 1988, 3). However, he was quick to change his mind during this very same committee meeting following the presentation of an Interior Ministry report that emphasized the logistic difficulty of deporting even temporary labor migrants.

The third group that opposed labor migrant recruitment was composed of mainstream center-right members of the Likud Party. This group, whose position was represented by Labor Minister Moshe Katzav,[111] Prime Minister Shamir, and David Mena, who served as the head of the Government Employment Services, believed that the Intifada was a temporary aberration that would soon end, leading to the ultimate return of Palestinian workers to the labor market and the *status quo* without necessitating the recruitment of labor migrants as a deterring factor. These Likud members also believed that there was little chance of replacing Palestinian workers with Israelis since the latter would not be willing to assume these low-skilled and low-paid positions

---

[111] This despite the fact that at other times he presented contradictory arguments that mirrored those of right-wing politicians who supported labor migrant recruitment as a means of deterrence.

(Knesset Labor and Welfare Committee meeting, January 28, 1988, 4-5). As Katzav explained, "I have the impression that the Arabs in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza want to come to work. There is not a situation of some intention of rebellion or uprising, of an intentional suspension of showing up to work. Inciters force this situation upon them…. The majority of Arabs want to come to work regularly" (Knesset Labor and Welfare Committee meeting, January 28, 1988, 4). To facilitate the goal of returning to the *status quo ante*, Katzav proposed a three-month closure of the occupied territories and the banning of media access so as to enable the security forces to crack down on the instigators of the uprising (Eldar 1988).

Ultimately, despite the demands of the hard right to import labor migrants as a means of deterring the Palestinians coupled with concurrent pressures exerted by human resource agencies and employers, the government ultimately elected not to approve large-scale labor migrant recruitment (Bartram 1998; Kemp and Raijman 2008; Zarhiya and Winkler 1989). Instead, it only authorized the recruitment of several hundred workers from Portugal, Turkey, and Southern Lebanon as a stopgap measure that would provide temporary relief to struggling sectors (Eis 1988). Despite the ultimate small-scale recruitment of labor migrants, I contend that this debate implanted the idea of recruiting labor migrants as an alternative labor force that could replace the Palestinians in the minds of policy makers. Thus, to a great extent, it facilitated or was a precursor to the mass recruitment that actually took place in the 1990s (Semyonov and Lerental 2005).

An additional failed attempt of right-wing policy makers to initiate the recruitment of foreign workers took place in January 1991. Following the imposition of a seven-week closure in the territories during the Gulf War, Construction Minister Ariel Sharon again attempted to replace Palestinians with foreign workers both to provide construction companies with workers during a period of mass *aliyah* and as a means of deterrence. Sharon argued that the construction sector required approximately 9,500 foreign workers due to the absence of Palestinian workers—a request that was swiftly approved by the cabinet (Kiper 1991).

Despite the cabinet's approval, ultra-Orthodox Deputy Labor Minister Porush was able to quash the implementation of the decision by threatening to dismantle the coalition if this recruitment took place (Zuriel 1991). Ultimately, he was largely successful in blocking labor migrant recruitment since only 1,500 out of the 9,500 approved workers were granted permits (Goldbrasht 1991). The failure to initiate the recruitment of labor migrants during the Gulf War delayed their large-scale entrance yet again. Despite the strong interest group pressures exerted by construction and agricultural firms and large human resource agencies, the lack of sufficient political support rendered recruitment unfeasible.

Thus, the attempts by right-wing elites to recruit labor migrants as a means of deterrence and punishment vis-à-vis the Palestinians largely failed. Instead, the Israeli government led by Shamir sought to maintain Palestinian economic integration once the violence subsided. In fact, the government employed several means toward this end. First, as early as February 1988, it granted special permits allowing Palestinian workers to remain in Israel overnight in order to facilitate their attendance regardless of strikes and curfews (Zarhiya 1988a). In addition, a new system of control was instituted through the use of magnetic card permits that facilitated both the increased monitoring of workers who entered Israel in order to reduce the associated security risks and the continued flow of Palestinians workers into the country (Kemp and Raijman 2008; Roy 1995). While the new system was implemented to preserve the *status quo*, it concurrently partially supplanted the open border policies that had been in place since the early 1970s with the purpose of obfuscating the Green Line.

While the new permit regime imposed limitations on who could access Israeli territory and participate in its labor market, Figure 3.1 above demonstrates that large-scale Palestinian participation in the Israeli labor force persisted and even increased throughout the early 1990s. To an extent, the Likud-led government was successful in maintaining economic integration between Israel and the occupied territories despite the Intifada—a policy goal that was largely determined by the government's particular expansionist vision of the national project. However, the debate over Palestinian labor and integration reemerged in 1993. This time, in contrast to the past, it emanated from the interests of a different political camp that espoused a divergent rationale—that of Labor party, which sought to promote separation and territorial compromise (Kemp and Raijman 2008; Rosenhek 2003).

The debate over labor migrant recruitment reemerged in March of 1993. Following the Labor Party's electoral victory in June 1992 and the consequent resumption of peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, Palestinian groups who opposed the peace process resumed their attacks.[112] In particular, the month of March witnessed a resurgence of Hamas-initiated stabbing attacks that left 15 Israelis dead (IDF Spokesman 1993). Following this series of attacks, the Rabin government imposed several *ad hoc* closures in the occupied territories, and on March 30, 1993, the eve of the Jewish Passover holiday, it decided to impose an indefinite closure on the territories and halt the flow of Palestinians workers into Israel (see: Arnon 1997; Bartram 1998; Gilat 1993; Schiffer 1993; Schiffer and Duek 1993).[113]

The government's decision to impose a large-scale closure was the result of two parallel causes or interests. First, the growing number of attacks staged by Hamas militants was

---

[112] While the official peace negotiations only resumed in April 1993, during this period the government sponsored the secret peace talks that led to the Oslo Accords. In addition, it set the scene for negotiation by nullifying the prohibition on meetings and negotiations with the PLO in January 1993.

[113] Interestingly, the military opposed the imposition of a long-term closure and sought to renew Palestinian participation in the labor market as a means of pacifying the ongoing hostilities (Schiffer and Duek 1993).

engendering increasing panic among the Jewish Israeli population concerning personal security. Although Ehud Shprintzak and other schoalrs stressed at the time that the level of violence was hyped by politicians, the media, Hamas, and the settlers, and did not represent a real qualitative or quantitative increase as compared to other rounds of violence (Tal-Shir 1993). However, the vast majority of the population felt that their personal security was threatened.

Already in late March, some Israeli employers voluntarily elected to stop hiring Palestinian workers (Kemp and Raijman 2008). Furthermore, throughout this period, employers exerted increased pressure on the government to enable the replacement of Palestinian workers with labor migrants (Knesset Plenary, March 11, 1993). Following the killing of a settler by a worker in the Gaza, farmers from the Gush Katif settlement bloc announced that they would stop employing Palestinian workers (Alush 1993). The next day, a similar decision was implemented in the West Bank Karnei Shomron settlement (Regev and Zinger 1993; Shragai 1993). The mayors of the cities of Petah Tiqwa and Ashdod also created bans on the hiring of Palestinians within these cities' limits (Shaked 1993).

In fact, Ora Namir, who by this point served as Labor Minister, was quick to provide settlers with unemployed Jewish workers to replace Palestinians by granting the workers a special daily bonus (Alush 1993; Regev and Zinger 1993). However, despite the so-called "Operation Ora", settlers were largely uninterested in Jewish workers, who were harder to exploit, and were quick to demand the recruitment of workers from Thailand. As Namir explained, "The closure decision is very good; in Gush Katif, when I was dealing with the issue of [Palestinian] workers, I promised the farmers that we would subsidize Jewish workers to work there, but they want Thai workers. They live on a disputed piece of land, in the heart of the Palestinian population…but they are adamant" (Azulai-Katz 1993).

A second and more crucial process that facilitated this outcome was embedded in a fundamental ideational change in the Labor Party's position vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict, or in terms of this study, in its vision of the national project. This transition took place as a result of both the aforementioned perceived demographic crisis of the 1980s, which suggested that the Jewish and Palestinian-Arab populations in the entire territory of Israel/Palestine were fast approaching parity (see Chapter 2), and the increasing rates of Palestinian resistance toward the occupation, which culminated in the outbreak of the Intifada in December 1987.[114] Specifically, three factors, namely, increasing Palestinian popular resistance, the belief that the conflict could not be ameliorated through the intensification of the use of military force,[115] and the changing demographic realities, demonstrated to center-left elites the impossibility and undesirability of continued direct Israeli control over the occupied territories and their residents (Hofnung 1996; Landau 1987).

In response to these concerns, the Labor Party gradually abandoned its traditional support for controlling the territories and Palestinian economic integration in favor of a new paradigm of conflict management: separation (Bartram 1998; Gordon 2007; Kemp and Raijman 2008; Landau 1987; Shiftan 1999). In fact, as Shafir and Peled point out, beginning in the mid–late 1980s, an informal coalition emerged between the Labor Party and business elites in favor of a dual policy of economic liberalization and conflict resolution, or privatization and peace.

For instance, the Labor Party's official peace plan that was published in 1987 stated, "In 15 years time, the Arab and Jewish populations in Israel will be equal. The Likud leadership is

[114] While the Intifada is often considered the watershed moment of popular Palestinian resistance, in fact, Palestinian violence against Israel's occupation forces intensified in the years prior to the Intifada. For instance, compared to 1986, 1987 represented a 100 percent increase in public disturbances. However, prior to the Intifada, a wide-scale uprising like the one that erupted in December of that year was not considered to be a realistic possibility (Hofnung 1996).
[115] For an example of this attitude, see *Haaretz* interview with former General Chief of Staff and Police Minister Haim Bar-Lev (Roy 1989).

making a terrible, historical mistake in its desire to annex the territories to the State of Israel. Israel will no longer be a state of the Jews. It will be a bi-national state. What kind of Israel are they preparing for our children?" (The Alignment 1987). As a former Labor Party Member of Knesset explained, "at the end of the 80s it became clear that something needed to change. Especially during the intifada we understood that demography was becoming a danger for Israel's survival as a Jewish state. We realized that time was against us and that we need to do something with the territories, and with Gaza especially…. We could either adopt the Schultz plan or do something ourselves. But something had to be done" (personal interview, February 16, 2012).

Thus, Labor Party leaders such as Rabin and Peres sought to engender increased separation between Israelis and Palestinians and between Israel and the occupied territories. To this end, they needed to reconstitute the intergroup and territorial boundaries that had largely been gradually and purposefully erased since June 1967 due to settlement expansion, economic integration, freedom of movement, and land expropriation (Eldar and Zertal 2009; Gordon 2007). For this purpose, Rabin increasingly differentiated between the sovereign state of Israel and the occupied West Bank and lamented the historical blurring of the boundaries between them (Knesset Plenary, March 23, 1993). Thus, for the Labor Party leadership, separation was perceived not only as a means of managing the conflict, but as a fundamental condition for any future peace agreement that would give rise to two discreet political entities, even though they did not explicitly endorse a Palestinian state.

While more dovish members of the Labor Party such as Shimon Peres increasingly promoted separation already in the mid–late 1980s (see: Clines 1988; Landau 1987; Telhami 1996), by the early 1990s this approach had become a consensual party policy that was also embraced by hawks such as Rabin (Barnett 1999). For instance, during the 1992 electoral campaign, Labor's returning hawkish leader Rabin repeatedly emphasized the goal of separating Israel from the territories and reaching a peace agreement within a year (Telhami 1996). In fact, the party's platform during the campaign revolved around a shift in government priorities away from settlements and expansion and in favor of creating separation between Israelis and Palestinians (Barnett 1999; Rynhold 2007). For instance, at the height of the campaign, following several stabbing attacks against civilians within Israel proper, Rabin promised that he would take "Gaza out of Tel Aviv" (Schindler 2008, 326) and the Labor Party endorsed the campaign slogan, "The Likud is bringing Gaza into your home" (Rubinstein 1992).

Thus, on the eve of the 1993 closure, Labor cabinet ministers stressed the intricate connection among separation, security, and the promotion of negotiations with the Palestinians (Azulai-Katz 1993).[116] These constituted the fundamental tenets of the Labor Party's revised vision of the national project. As a senior political analyst explained, "No one has a doubt – this closure is another desperate expression of Israel's desire to get out [of the territories]. The question is under which agreements, if any, this exit will take place" (Gilat 1993).

During this period, Labor Party members issued multiple statements linking the closure to the need for separation between Israel and the occupied territories (both territorial and with regard to workers) as a means of promoting reconciliation and reducing demographic and security threats [see: Rabin's statements, Knesset Plenary, March 22, 1993, April 8, 1993, May 10, 1993. Shimon Peres's statement, Knesset Plenary, April 28, 1993, and additional statements in Knesset Plenary meetings by: Avigdor Kahalani (December 21, 1992), Haim Ramon (December 23, 1992; April 21, 1993), Eli Dayan (April 8, 1993), Yael Dayan (April 21, 1993),

[116] In fact, Minister Yossi Sarid from the pro-peace left-wing party Meretz suggested that Israel close the borders permanently as a means of facilitating the peace process (Azulai-Katz 1993).

and Emanuel Zisman (March 3, 1993)]. In all these statements, a clear line was drawn between the need to enhance separation in the interests and fostering both peace and security.

As a consequence, it appears that the resumption of Palestinian violence in early 1993 afforded the Rabin government a golden opportunity to realize its goal of fostering separation between Israelis and Palestinians. As Lustick (1996) explains, "Despite the misery it inflicted on their [the territories'] Arab inhabitants, the move was also interpreted positively, as a kind of prelude to the political separation of Israel from the occupied territories" (159). However, separation and the recasting of the Green Line did not solely entail limiting settlement expansion and control over the daily lives of the Palestinians.

This process also meant halting the ingress of over 110,000 Palestinians into Israel every day. In fact, on the very day that the closure was announced, Rabin stated that the government sought to curtail, or at least significantly reduce, Palestinian employment in Israel (Roy 1995; Schiffer 1993). Already one week before the closure decision was made, Rabin announced in the Knesset that he sought to significantly reduce Palestinian participation in the Israeli labor market by stimulating economic development within the territories themselves (Knesset Plenary, March 22, 1993).[117]

This goal became a central tenet of the Rabin administration that was espoused repeatedly by a host of government ministers and coalition members (see: *Ha'aretz* 1993b; Shapira 1993; Tal 1993). As a means of ameliorating the tensions that were anticipated to emerge as a result of the mass exclusion of Palestinians from the Israeli labor market, the Rabin government concurrently attempted to augment employment opportunities within the territories

[117] Furthermore, despite the partial lifting of the closure, only a limited number of Palestinians were allowed to return to their jobs in Israel. For the purpose of facilitating separation, the government decided to actively stimulate economic growth within the West Bank and Gaza and to employ Palestinian in infrastructure projects within the occupied territories themselves (B'tselem 1993; Roy 1995).

themselves. To this end, Israel pursued two tracks: (1) It sought to stimulate economic development by providing government subsidies and facilitating international capital investment. (2) The government initiated a series of public work projects, particularly within the Gaza strip, as a means of diverting workers out of the Israeli labor market (B'tselem 1993; Roy 1995).[118]

Besides the issues concerning Palestinian employment and Israel's security, Rabin also emphasized that the closure would be accompanied by the resumption of negotiations with the Palestinians that would be based primarily on the idea of separating the two peoples (Schiffer 1993). He famously announced that fighting terrorism and promoting the peace process would proceed in tandem since the former could not be resolved through military repression, but rather through negotiations. A week after it was imposed Labor Member of Knesset Haggai Merom explained the rationale underlying the closure policy: "You will see how the separation theory will slowly become a reality, and we will have our state of Israel, without two million Palestinians, without knives, without weapons…. With the loyal Arabs of Israel, all the Jews of the State of Israel who represent a solid majority, and a democratic way of life….And the territories…,the centers of the population will remain there and we will stay here." (Knesset Plenary, April 8, 1993).

In contrast, the political right, which supported the continuation of Israel's control over the occupied territories through the integration of those territories, strongly opposed Rabin and the Labor government's separation and closure policies (Barnett 1999). Right-wing elites were highly concerned that a long-term or even permanent closure would facilitate separation between Israel and the occupied territories, undermine the erasure of the Green Line, and reverse the *status quo* of integration and *de facto* annexation. Thus, despite their support for *punishing* the

[118] For an in-depth analysis of the effects the closures and restrictions on Palestinians' employment had on Palestinian workers and the economy of the occupied territories, see: Miaari and Sauer 2006; Roy 1995.

Palestinians for the violence, they concurrently sought to maintain the *status quo* concerning the free flow of people between the territories and Israel. For examples of this position, see right-wing statements in the Knesset Plenary For instance, see statements by Benjamin Netanyahu (April 28, 1993), Moshe Katzav, who demanded both an end to the closure and the return of Palestinian labor (May 5, 1993), Yehoshua Matza (May 10, 1993), NRP's Yitzhak Levi (March 3, 1993), David Magen (May 10, 1993), Shaul Yahalom (May 5, 1993).

Instead, right-wing groups led by Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu proposed that Israel employ harsh military repression to *crack down* on those who provoked and encouraged Palestinian resistance. In addition, they advocated the imposition of a *selective closure* (in contrast to total closure), which would limit the access of specific Palestinian population categories into Israel, and increasing enforcement against and punishment of unauthorized Palestinian workers. However, they strongly opposed government policies that sought to halt the flow of Palestinian labor into Israel—a policy they believed would undermine territorial integration and prompt the reemergence of the Green Line (Benjamin Netanyahu's speech in the Knesset Plenary, April 8, 1993).

Ariel Sharon, one of the architects of Israeli expansion into the occupied territories, an advocate of the use of military force to preserve Israeli control over the territories, and a staunch opponent of Palestinian statehood, published a full-page article in Israel's most popular newspaper, strongly criticizing the government's separation and closure policies. Instead, he called for the use of indiscriminate state violence coupled with the return of Palestinian workers into Israel and the abandonment of the long-term closure policy (Sharon 1993). Similarly, multiple right-wing Members of Knesset also propounded this position during Knesset debates regarding labor migrants and Palestinian workers (Knesset Plenary, May 5, 1993). These right-wing politicians, including Moshe Katzav, Alex Goldfarb, and Shaul Yahalom, espoused the partial or complete removal of the closure and the return of Palestinian workers. Yahalom articulated this position: "I think the solution [to the scarcity of unskilled labor] is to end the closure. I am surprised by some of my friends on the right who support the closure and by so doing are renewing the so-called Green Line." (ibid).

Despite being embedded in Labor's ideational shift, the closure policy was also adopted as an *ad hoc* response to the dramatic rise in Palestinian resistance in early 1993. However, what started off as an instrumental policy in the context of intensified violence soon became the fundamental principle upon which the nascent peace process was to be based (Ben Yehuda 2000). In fact, the peace process promoted by the Labor Party was predicated primarily on the separation between Israelis and Palestinians, which was facilitated by the closure (Bartram 1998; Kemp and Raijman 2008; Rosenhek 2003). The former head of the Israeli Security Agency explained the rationale: "No genius plan will solve the problem of a terrorist who is willing to commit suicide. What is needed is to quickly promote the peace talks, to separate [ourselves] from the Arabs, to give them their state and go back into our shell. Time is working against us" (Talshir 1993).

Outside of the political realm, representatives of the construction and agricultural sectors, together with human resource agencies, responded to the closure by exerting heightened pressure on the government in favor of recruiting labor migrants (Duek et al. 1993a; Kemp and Raijman 2008).[119] However, initially both Rabin and Labor Minister Namir strongly opposed this solution, promoting instead the return of both Jewish and Arab Israeli workers to these sectors, as they had

[119] Initially, the government sought to require unemployed Israelis under the age of 35 to replace Palestinian workers as a precondition for receiving unemployment benefits (Gilat 1993; Schiffer and Duek 1993).

done during the Intifada. Due to this position, the day after the closure was announced, Namir declared that existing permits for Thai labor migrants would not be renewed (*Ha'aretz* 1993).

Similarly, in a political gathering, Rabin explained his attitude toward the Palestinians, foreign labor, Israeli workers, and the closure: "We are in a period in which we can create separation between us and the Palestinians, so that they don't loiter in our country…. Israel today has an historic opportunity to bring change to the field of labor for the sake of the state's security and its citizens…. It is time for the builders to be Israeli…, a nation who does not engaged in soil and cement is a nation that is not fulfilling its role" (Schiffer 1993).

In order to promote this goal, the government implemented a series of programs that set out to encourage recently discharged soldiers, new immigrants, and unemployed Israelis to replace Palestinian workers primarily in construction and agriculture. To this end, Namir implemented a series of programs that would offer Israelis who worked in these sectors special benefits and subsidies that included supplemental wages of almost 50 percent, special buses to transport them to their work sites, and tax benefits at a monthly cost of 200,000 USD (Alush 1993; Bior 1993; Regev and Zinger 1993; Zarhiya 1993a; Zarhiya 1993b). Overall, Namir's program sought to replace over 20,000 Palestinians with Israelis by the end of 1993 (Zarhiya 1993e). In addition, as a temporary measure, the military provided farmers with soldiers who were sent to farms to assist with harvesting crops. However, these programs were largely insufficient to facilitate large-scale and long-lasting structural change in employment patterns in construction and agriculture. Their inadequacy was exacerbated by the absence of employer support for the shift toward Israeli workers and the overhaul of the secondary labor market that would have been necessary for the purpose of altering both employers' and prospective employees' preferences and practices.

A deputy minister in the Rabin administration explained this outcome "We really wanted to bring Israelis into construction and agriculture to replace Palestinians but three were two main difficulties…Young people and the unemployed preferred not to work than take jobs that they perceived as *Arab Jobs*…employers too didn't really want to hire Israelis. They said they did but they didn't raise wages and continued to ask for foreign workers" (Personal interview, March 7, 2012).

While employers initially appeared to play along with the government's plan to replace Palestinians with Israelis (Anush and Ofri 1993; Regev 1993),[120] these attempts appear to have largely been a farce since besides the fact that few Israelis were interested in these low-wage, low-status positions, employers actively undermined their recruitment (Kemp and Raijman 2007). In fact, following requests for 10,000 new construction workers, an advisory firm to the construction industry claimed that it would be impossible to recruit this number of workers from within Israel (Zarhiya 1993a). The report suggested that the program to replace Palestinians with Israelis was not grounded in reality and could not materialize. Instead, the firm proposed a compromise, namely, the recruitment of labor migrants for a period of one year during which these workers would train their Israeli replacements (Lavie 1993).[121]

Thus, despite the employers' apparent support for recruiting Israelis, they employed numerous means that were designed to undermine this process, including initiatives that they themselves proposed. Kemp and Raijman (2008) explain this dynamic: "In the first half of 1993, the gap between the government's plan to reorganize the secondary labor market with Israeli

---

[120] For example, on April 1, 1993, the construction companies published a full-page advertisement in the daily newspapers, announcing an emergency conscription of Israeli workers to the construction industry. The advertisement promised a fair salary and benefits for those who were willing to join the sector.

[121] Ultimately, the government did in fact adopt this plan, according to which labor migrants would train Israeli workers who would eventually replace them. In reality, however, while labor migrants were recruited, no Israelis were ever trained to replace them (Rosenhek 2003).

workers and employers' opposition to stopping their reliance on the *golden* flow of cheap labor widened. Following the government's limitation on Palestinian workers and its opposition to the recruitment of labor migrants, employers increased their threats. They wanted to replace the Palestinians—however, not with Israelis, but with foreigners" (85).[122]

Although the government did permit the employment of limited numbers of Palestinian workers in response to employers' demands (Duek 1993; Duek et al. 1993b; Zarhiya 1993c), employers' pressure to recruit labor migrants persisted and intensified. The absence of workers, particularly in the construction industry, exacerbated wage demands among current workers. Furthermore, the ongoing housing shortage caused by mass FSU immigration augmented their leverage vis-à-vis the government. In order to promote their goals, the Builders Association threatened that it would halt all building projects if the government did not authorize the recruitment of 10,000 labor migrants (Lauper 1993). For these employers, the closure afforded an opportunity to replace the Palestinian labor force, whose rights had become increasingly costly and regulated, with weaker, less protected labor migrants. For human resource companies, the interest in labor migrants stemmed from the fact that in contrast to such workers, there was little profit in recruiting Palestinian workers.

Following these ongoing pressures, which occurred during a period of acute housing shortage, Rabin elected to alter the government's policy toward labor migrant recruitment despite his initial opposition. He realized that employer demands required him to choose between the wholesale return of Palestinian laborers through the reversal of the government's separation policy and recruiting labor migrants. While Rabin was willing to temporarily increase the number of Palestinian workers, he was strongly opposed to returning to the historical highs that

[122] For example an example of this dynamic see: Duek et al. 1993a.

had been recorded in 1992. Once he realized that this goal would be impossible to accomplish, he reluctantly opted to recruit labor migrants (Bartram 1998; Kemp and Raijman 2008). As a deputy minister during this period explained "At this stage we [the government] believed that brining all the Arab workers back to Israel would be a bad idea, a mistake…. But we couldn't get Israelis to replace them even though we tried. So we chose to do what seemed to be the lesser evil and bring foreign workers…. At the time no one was thinking about the long-term consequences this would have…. There was a housing shortage, constructors and farmers were under pressure, in panic and we needed to do something to solve this" (Personal interview, March 7, 2012). Similarly, a former minister during the Rabin administration explained, "we were in a position where we had no choice. We couldn't bring the Palestinians workers back and employers demanded workers…We needed a solution from today to tomorrow and this seemed to be a practical solution…the problem is that no one thought seriously about the consequences of employing foreigners in Israel (Personal interview, January 26, 2012).

Thus, following seven years of intense political pressures exerted by employers and human resource agencies in favor of recruiting labor migrants, they finally succeeded in achieving their goal. The lengthy delay, however, suggests that this outcome was not solely a result of these pressures. Instead, the recruitment of labor migrants was triggered by the intersection of the interests emanating from the Labor government's vision of the national project, on the one hand, and the employers and human resource agencies interests in cheap non-Palestinian labor, on the other. While economic interests alone played an essential in process that ultimately led to the recruitment of labor migrants, they were insufficient to produce this outcome in the absence of political support. Thus, it was only when employers' and human resource agencies' demands to recruit labor migrants became aligned with government preferences regarding the conflict and the national project that recruitment materialized.

While the government initially only granted permits to several thousand-labor migrants, Rabin's decision opened the door to massive labor migrant recruitment. Once the legal and institutional taboo was abolished, it became significantly harder to halt the expansion of recruitment. In fact, while the interests of political enabled the initiation of recruitment, it appears that political actors had little ability to alter or reverse its course once it had begun. Between 1993 and 1996, employers and human resource agencies continuously petitioned the government for additional permits for labor immigrants, and the government repeatedly conceded.

As a result, within two years, Israel hosted almost 150,000 documented labor migrants and approximately 100,000 undocumented ones—an aggregate figure that significantly surpassed the number of Palestinian who had worked in Israel during the height of Palestinian employment in the early 1990s (Shapira 1996). Employers and human resource agencies increasingly took advantage of the government's willingness to supply them with cheap foreign labor and continued to demand additional permits, frequently exceeding their concrete needs (Miaari and Sauer 2006). In particular, they identified and exploited the relationship between the Arab-Israeli conflict and government willingness to facilitate labor immigration. Thus, "[a]fter every terrorist attack or curfew, employers exerted additional pressure on the government and would receive 20,000 additional permits" (Semyonov and Lerental 2005, 221).

As a consequence, while some Palestinians continued to work in Israel, in general, international non-Jewish and non-Arab labor migrants increasingly replaced them (Kemp and Raijman 2008; Rosenhek 2003). In fact, Palestinian labor never returned to the rates that had existed in 1992. Figure 3 illustrates the inverse correlation between labor migrant recruitment and Palestinian participation in the Israeli labor market (see also: Miaari and Sauer 2006). Official data also illustrate this process. For instance, while labor migrants constituted less than 0.5 percent of the labor force in 1991, by 1996 they increased, accounting for 7.9–10 percent of the Israeli labor force (Bank of Israel 2002).[123] Concurrently, during the equivalent period, Palestinian participation in the Israeli labor force decreased from 8.7 percent to 3.4 percent (ibid.).[124]

Figure 3.2: Palestinians and Labor Migrants in the Israeli Labor Market 1990-2004



Source: Migration Information Source (2005)

Thus, the Rabin government's interest in promoting separation due to security constraints as a new paradigm of conflict management, its territorial-minimalist and demographic-centered vision of the national project, and its support for the peace process that was epitomized in the Oslo Accords jointly resulted in the compromise that generated the mass recruitment of labor

[123] It is important to note, however, as Figure 3 suggests, that despite the large-scale replacement of Palestinian workers by labor migrants, a relatively smaller number of Palestinian workers continued to work in Israel. For instance, in January 1994, it is estimated that approximately 30,000 Palestinians worked in Israel (Shapira 1994).
[124] The process of replacing Palestinian workers with labor migrants persisted despite the Paris agreement (1994) in which Israel agreed to maintain Palestinian labor flows into Israel (Arnon et al. 1997; Rosenhek 2003).

migrants. From this perspective, labor migrants nearly replaced the Palestinian labor force as a result of a shift in Israeli leaders' ideational and geo-political approach, which sought to reverse the economic and spatial integration policies that had been in place since 1967 and threatened to undermine Israel's position as a Jewish and democratic state (Reinhold 2007). As Kemp and Raijman (2008) explain, "With the institutionalization of the closure policy and the entrenchment of *separation* as the paradigm for conflict management, labor migrants became…a means of managing the conflict throughout the 1990s. From this perspective, labor migrants in Israel served as a virtual *separation barrier* between Israelis and Palestinians approximately ten years before the construction of the physical barrier had begun" (15). For these reasons, international labor migrants, who were neither Jewish nor Arab, constituted a perfect constituency since they did not disrupt the demographic balance between the two groups, constituting instead a politically and statistically neutral or invisible category (Kemp and Raijman 2008; Lustick 1999).

The process of recruiting regulated labor migrants engendered additional, unintended consequences. In particular, the increasing presence of labor migrants in the country facilitated a substantial secondary flow of undocumented labor migrants—a process that is similar to the one that has taken place in many other migrant-receiving countries (Kemp and Raijman 2008; Massey et al. 1998; Semyonov and Lerental 2005).[125] While undocumented immigration was not a completely new phenomenon in Israel, it has assumed new proportions since the 1990s. While

[125] It is important to note that there are two distinct processes that render labor migrants illegal or undocumented (see: Bar Zuri 1999; Dahan 2001; Ida 2004; Kemp and Raijman 2008). The first is entering the country on a tourist or pilgrim visa and obtaining employment despite visa restrictions. The second concerns labor migrants who were recruited as such but elected to leave their employer without authorization. This process is the result of the legal arrangement that ties labor migrants in most cases to their employers, which is similar to prevailing practices in Cyprus, Singapore, and South Africa. Thus, even in cases where labor migrants are abused, exploited, threatened, or do not receive monetary compensation for their work, by leaving their assigned employer they become undocumented and lose their work visa. In fact, Bar Zuri (1999) found that undocumented workers benefit from higher wages than legal labor migrants due to the absence of constraints on their labor market mobility. This category can also include those who entered the country legally as authorized labor migrants and did not leave the country once their visas expired.

Jews cannot be undocumented because of the Law of Return, already in the late 1980s and early 1990s there was an undocumented migrant population in the country. This population included approximately 10,000 workers, mostly from African countries, the Philippines, Thailand, and Eastern Europe, who entered the country with former diplomats and international businessmen or with pilgrim or tourist visas and did not leave (Golan 1990; Kemp and Raijman 2008; Oren 1987; Sabar 2008).[126]

However, by the mid-1990s, official estimates suggested that some 80,000–100,000 undocumented workers were present in the country.[127] In fact, an official government report published in March 1996 suggested that there were over 100,000 undocumented immigrants in the country (Golan 1996). Similarly, in its 1996 report, the Bank of Israel reported that between 1993 and 1996, almost 400,000 tourists had entered the country and not left. This figure, the report suggested, equaled the total number of tourists who had overstayed their visas during the period between 1948 and 1993 (Bank of Israel 1997).[128] In 2001, the Central Bureau of Statistics estimated that more than 120,000 undocumented labor migrants were present in the country (CBS 2001). While these estimations are highly divergent since they are based on different methodologies and often inaccurate and conflicting data sources and indicators, existing data and evidence suggest that since 1993, Israel has maintained an undocumented population whose size has ranged between 80,000 and 200,000 people.

While the mass recruitment of labor migrants persisted throughout the Rabin and later the Peres administrations, this process reached a turning-point in mid-1996, following the election of

---

[126] In fact, during this early period, communal organizations began to emerge among co-ethnics for Africa and Thailand / African and Thai co-ethnics (Oren 1987).
[127] These figures include both tourist visa overstayers and former documented labor migrants who left their employers and as a result became undocumented. In fact, in 1999, 53 percent of the undocumented immigrant population had entered the country as certified labor migrants (Bar Zuri 2000). For an in-depth discussion of the causes of this phenomenon, see Kemp and Raijman 2008, 98-104.
[128] See: Abramovich (1995) and Meiri (1995) for early reports on the dramatic increase in undocumented immigration.

Benjamin Netanyahu and the Likud Party. In contrast to its predecessor, the new coalition consisted solely of right-wing parties that promoted an expansionist vision of the national project. The goal of this vision was to undo and reverse the separation process that the Labor Party had endorsed. For this purpose, Likud and other right-wing elites sought to undermine and nullify the Accords and eliminate the separation between the occupied territories and Israel through reintegration and the renewed erasure of the Green Line. As part of this process, the new government strove to facilitate the return of Palestinian workers to the Israeli labor market.

In fact, one of the first measures adopted by the new coalition was to promote the mass deportation of labor migrants and to recruit Palestinian workers to replace them (Kemp and Raijman 2008; Morgenstern 1997; Rosenhek 2003; Saar 1996a; 1996b).[129] Although the Labor government had already begun examining possibilities of deporting undocumented immigrants and had created a special inter-ministerial committee on the matter, there was little political motivation to act on the issue. The rise of the Likud, however, altered the situation. The new government's approach was exemplified in an interview with Prime Minister Netanyahu, who explicitly stated that he actively sought to replace foreigners with Palestinians, as he preferred the latter to the former since they posed a smaller demographic threat (Cohen 1996; see also: Maor 1996). Other Likud members espoused similar approaches. For instance, MK Gideon Ezra demanded that the government increase the number of Palestinians from the occupied territories who are permitted to work in Israel (Knesset Plenary, February 5, 1997)

[129] Paradoxically, while Netanyahu sought to undermine the Oslo Accords, in practice, he did more than the Rabin government had done to fulfill Israel's obligations in the Paris agreement to allow the free flow of Palestinian labor into Israel. In fact, the Likud's finance minister, Dan Meridor, justified the program to deport labor migrants by claiming that Israel was required to hire Palestinians in accordance with the Oslo Accords (Eshet and Petersberg 1996). This explanation seems questionable since throughout its tenure, the Netanyahu coalition continuously sought to undermine the Oslo Accords. In fact, Netanyahu has admitted to being responsible for the collapse of the process (Eldar 2011). Similarly, other Likud ministers emphasized the need to employ Palestinians so as to offer the latter humanitarian support. However, in hindsight, these justifications seem untenable.

Similarly, Labor Minister Eli Yishai stated, "I want to make it clear, my policy to employ Palestinians and not labor migrants is very clear. Obviously it is subordinated to security limitations…. When there is a terrorist attack there are closures…, but a permanent closure is not a solution. Those who think we need to block Palestinian access into Israel and that this will contribute to security are wrong…. I repeat, the dangers that emanate from foreign workers, including security dangers, are big and grave, perhaps bigger and graver [than those posed by the Palestinians] (Knesset Plenary, February 5, 1997).

For this purpose, Netanyahu, together with Labor Minister Yishai and Interior Minister Suissa,[130] both from the ultra-Orthodox Shas party, actively promoted the deportation of labor migrants. While Netanyahu was motivated by his vision of the national project, the Shas ministers were motivated primarily by their opposition to the permanent or semi-permanent presence of non-Jews due to concerns about the Jewish character of the state and miscegenation (Eshet and Petersburg 1996).[131] As a result they adopted a highly exclusionary discourse that depicted labor migrants as an infection and a cancer (Sinai 1996). In fact, Less than three weeks after assuming office, Suissa announced that he sought to awiftly reduce the number of labor migrants and stated that he had already held six meetings to promote this issue (Knesset Plenary, July 10, 1996).

Thus, the government sought to facilitate the return of Palestinian workers and promised employers that it would secure the attendance of Palestinian workers even if increased violence were to erupt in the occupied territories, leading to closures (Morgenstern 1996b; 1997; Shmol

130

131 In fact, during Suisaa's tenure in the ministry, he sought to nullify marriages between labor migrants and Israeli women, which were assumed to be fraudulent *a priori* (Trabelsi-Hadad 1996). See also discussion in Knesset Plenary, July 10, 1996.

1997).[132] For this purpose in July 1997 the government approved a plan that would reduce labor migrant permits to 17,500, which would be limited to domestic health workers, and to increase the number of Palestinian workers to 70,000 (Saar 1997).

To this end, less than a month after assuming office, Yishai declared that he would initiate a mass deportation campaign of 100,000 undocumented workers once the closure of the occupied territories was lifted in order to facilitate the replacement of labor migrants by Palestinians (Eshet and Petersburg 1996). This program was also coordinated with the government's policy to end the closure in the occupied territories (ibid.) and its overall goal of reintegrating the occupied territories into Israel. Unsurprisingly, the government's plan was enthusiastically endorsed by the military as it was perceived as a means of and other security agencies that had always sought to maintain Palestinian participation in the Israeli labor market (Kemp and Raijman 2008).

However, despite these government preferences and policies as well as the powerful political interests that favored the replacement of labor migrants with Palestinians, the mass deportation plan enjoyed very limited success. The government's plan proposed the deportation of 500–2000 labor migrants per month and a 25 percent reduction in the number of permits (Klein 1996; Saar 1996c). While the government managed to deport approximately 4,000 labor migrants annually, this was a significantly lower figure than the one proposed.

Kemp and Raijman (2008) suggest that the failure to facilitate mass deportation emanated from unprecedented pressures exerted by the representatives of the building and agriculture sector lobbies and human resource companies. The two lobbies preferred labor migrants not only

[132] Throughout this period, Likud Ministers and Members of Knesset increasingly called for the removal of the closure and the wholesale return of Palestinains workers into Israel who would replace labor migrants (see: Sokol 1996; Shapira 1996b).

due to security concerns and mobility but also due to the fact that labor migrants were considered more subservient and professional and less demanding than Palestinian workers. In contrast, the human resource agencies opposed the return of Palestinian labor since they earned approximately 1.5 billion USD annually from labor migrant recruitment and placement fees whereas they were unable to profit from Palestinian labor.

Thus, due to these constraints, which stemmed from strong economic interest group pressure, and despite the government's political–instrumental interest in reintegrating Palestinians into the Israeli labor market, the government's deportation and worker replacement program largely failed to materialize. In order to explain this failure, we must return to the initial recruitment of labor migrants, when economic pressure alone proved insufficient in the absence of political preferences that emanated from interests concerning the national project (Bartram 1998; Kemp and Raijman 2008; Rosenhek 2003). Only when these two interests were aligned did recruitment materialize. However, once the use of labor migrants had become common and was institutionalized, the successful elimination or transformation of this system required the realignment of political and economic interests. This suggests that in relation to Israel's labor migration policies, neither economic nor political interests alone sufficed to bring about policy change.

Therefore, in the absence of the support of economic stakeholders for the replacement of labor migrants with Palestinians, political interests that stemmed from the Likud's expansionist vision of the national project were defeated by economic interests, making it impossible to turn the clock back. However, despite the partial failure of the deportation campaign, between 1996 and 1999 the government was able to achieve two of its goals. First, it was able to increase Palestinian participation in the labor market. In fact, during this period, the number of

Palestinians who worked in Israel doubled, although there were still significantly fewer Palestinian workers in Israel than had been the case prior to 1993 (Bank of Israel 2002; Morgenstern 1997). Second, the government was able to reduce the number of new work permits issued for labor migrants by approximately 20 percent, even though their overall number did not decline.

In this section, I have posited that the interplay between labor migrants and Palestinian workers in the Israeli labor market has primarily been the result of divergent interests concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict. While the conflict and competing political visions vis-à-vis the national project did not constitute the sole causes for these processes— economic and security interests also having influenced these outcomes—they nonetheless played a facilitating and even decisive role in determining outcomes. In fact, while the scope of this chapter does not enable me to explore further processes in depth, these partisan preferences vis-à-vis the two groups appear to have persisted well into the second millennium.

For example, in 1999, following Netanyahu's defeat in the general elections, the Labor Party returned to power under the leadership of Ehud Barak. During its tenure, the Barak administration sought to rescind the reintegration policies promoted by Netanyahu and revive the Olso Accords and the separation paradigm. As a consequence of these preferences, Barak's government attempted to reverse Netanyahu's policies that replaced labor migrants with Palestinians. As Figure 3.2 illustrates, between mid-1999 and late 2000, Barak was able to reduce the Palestinian labor force in the country by 14.3 percent while he concurrently increased the proportion of labor migrants by 15.5 percent (Bank of Israel 2002).

The premature collapse of the Barak administration and the rise of the Likud-led Sharon government altered this process yet again. This time, however, there was a substantial contextual change due to the outbreak of the second Intifada. The latter, that was significantly more violent than its predecessor, rendered the Likud's historic policy of integration impossible. Furthermore, under Sharon, the Likud began to reorient its vision of the national project. Instead of promoting Israeli expansion throughout the territory of mandatory Palestine while maintaining the Palestinians' status as non-citizen subjects, Sharon sought to combine Labor's separation policy with the Likud's policy of territorial expansion.[133]

In fact Sharon explicitly elaborated his political agenda that he would implement as Prime Minister, on Israel's national television program *Moked* almost five years before becoming Prime Minister (*Moked,* March 12, 1996). This new policy agenda sought to concentrate the Palestinian population within small enclaves that constituted 40 percent of the occupied territories while promoting the *de facto* annexation of the majority of the occupied territories that would remain under Israeli control as it contained a relatively small number of Palestinian residents. Sharon's new annexation-separation policy agenda was epitomized by the construction of the separation barrier and Israel's disengagement from the Gaza Strip (see: Shavit 2004).

Due to these policy preferences, Sharon did not seek to fully reintegrate the Palestinians into the Israeli labor market as Likud leaders before him had but rather to institute partial separation between the two groups as a means of maintaining Israeli control over the majority of the West Bank. In accordance with this rationale, Sharon increasingly invoked the *demographic threat*, which up to that point had primarily been employed by the Left in order to support its agenda favoring territorial compromise with the Palestinians (Galili 2002; Gordon 2008; Kemp

[133] For detailed analyses of Sharon's more contemporary positions vis-à-vis the Palestianins see: Gordon 2008; Shavit 2004; Weizman 2007.

and Raijman 2008).[134] Instead, Sharon employed this discourse in order to promote his own revised version of the separation regime and the national project that sought to isolate the Palestinians within 18 semi-autonomous spatially separated canton or Bantustans (Gordon 2008).

In the context of the labor market, Sharon sought to initiate two interrelated processes. First, he became increasingly concerned with the large-scale, *de facto*, permanent presence of non-Jewish labor migrants and the emergence of highly organized communities—particularly among Africans, Latin Americans, and immigrants from the Philippines (Kemp and Raijman 2008; Sabar 2008; Schnell 1999; Wurgfat 2008). Second, due to his opposition to the presence of labor migrants and his new position vis-à-vis the integration of Palestinian labor, he initiated a plan that set out to reform the secondary labor market and end its dependence on cheap non-Jewish workers.[135] In order to promote this goal, between 2002 and 2004, Sharon initiated a mass deportation campaign of undocumented workers that particularly targeted organized communities. As a result, over 50,000 labor migrants left the country during this period (Sabar 2008; Wurgfat 2008).[136]

The way Israel executed this program engendered a particularly intriguing dynamic or reversal. Specifically, while the initial recruitment of labor migrants was largely shaped by geo-political interests that emanated from the Arab Israeli conflict, by the early 2000 the conflict *itself* became the frame of reference through which labor migrants were perceived and their presence was interpreted.[137]

---

[134] In fact, during this period the government renewed the functioning of the demographic council that had been created in 1967 (Sarig 2002)

[135] For an in-depth analysis of Sharon's policies in relation to the secondary labor market, see: Kemp and Raijman 2008.

[136] Since the government's statistics conflated the numbers of those who left on their own accord and those who were forcefully deported it is impossible to identify the number of people who were in fact deported (Sinai 2003b).

[137] This is consistent with the coercive state practices that Israel has more recently employed vis-à-vis asylum seekers (Duman, forthcoming).

For instance, the immigration police's practices toward labor migrants that emerged during the campaign. Specifically, the immigration police employed a host of tactics that were appropriated from and shaped by Israel's military practices that the Israeli and military have employed to control and oppress the Palestinians in the occupied territories. This dynamic was brought to my attention by a former left wing Knesset Member who was involved in promoting legislation that sought to protect labor migrants' rights (personal interview, December 21, 2011).

In fact, Sharon appointed Yaacov Ganot, the former Chief Israel's Border Police, a unit that has been responsible for a significant share of Israeli brutality against Palestinians in the occupied territories, to head the deportation campaign.[138] Furthermore, the Chief of Police stated that the deportation campaign would be organized "Like a military operation" (Kra 2002). A former chairman of the Knesset's Labor Migrant's Special Committee explained, "They looked at it as they were going to conquer a village or fight terrorists…. They gave Ganot the job and he specializes in fighting Palestinians, not dealing with civilians who might be here illegally but are not criminal or terrorists…. I was not surprised when I heard stories about houses being raided in the middle of the night and about violence. They didn't understand that this is a different type of operation…. but their mindset was as if this was a war" (Personal interview, January 8, 2012).

During the deportation campaign immigration police employed high levels of violence and brutality toward labor migrants that included breaking down of doors, destroying property, creating networks of informants, police beatings and stabbings, violence against children, the assault of undocumented immigrants in schools and churches, and the denial of basic legal rights and freedoms (See: Levi-Barzilai 2004; Rozen 2009; Sinai 2003b; Wergfut 2008). These

[138] A former chairman of the Knesset Committee on Foreign Workers pointed out this connection to me. He suggested that by placing Ganot as the chief of the operation Sharon sought to replicate the coercive practices Israel has employed to control Palestinians, in the context of labor migrants (Personal interview, January 5, 2012). For details on the violent practices that were employed by the immigration police see: Rozen 2009; Wergfut 2008.

practices were documented in detail in a report that was written by two NGOs: Kav La'oved and the Foreign Workers Assistance Hotline (2003). However, the report received little public attention or any formal response from the immigration police (Sinai 2003b).

Similarly, state officials and politicians employed terminology and interpretive frameworks that stemmed from the conflict (Kav Laoved and Workers Hotline 2003). For instance, Interior Minister Poraz justified the deportation by suggesting, "We are not creating a community of foreign workers with local leaders. We do not want a state within a state or a Mandarin speaking Chinese canton. We don't want them to create an organized Chinese community because otherwise what will we tell the Palestinians when they demand the right of return (Leibovitch-Dar 2003). During this period the immigration police repeatedly warned about possible cooperation between labor migrants and Palestinian terrorists. For instance, the chief intelligence officer of the immigration police stated, "With the absence of a national connection [to Israel], their presence can provide a platform for cooperation with terrorist activity (Soberg 2003).

However, despite these efforts, due to strong economic pressures, the campaign largely failed to attain its goal of reducing the overall number of labor migrants in the country. Instead, labor migrants remained dominant in the fields of domestic care and agriculture even though the permits for construction companies were reduced (Kemp and Raijman 2008).

Interestingly, the 2009 return to power of the Likud, under the leadership of Benjamin Netanyahu, whose vision of the national project resembled that of Shamir in the 1980s, was marked by the dramatic resumption of the recruitment of Palestinian workers. Specifically, Netanyahu promoted a plan that he defined as Economic Peace, which sought to revive the pre-1967 economic integration policy and postpone the peace process (Koren 2008). As a result, Palestinian participation in the Israeli economy increased by almost 50 percent between 2009 and 2012 (Harel 2013). In fact, recent data suggests that the number of Palestinian workers in Israel has increased almost threefold, from 21,000 in 2007 to 59,000 in 2014 (Bank of Israel 2015).

To conclude, the evidence presented above suggests that despite constant employer demands for cheap labor, shifts in the supply of Palestinians workers and labor migrants have largely been determined by factors that are exogenous to the labor market itself. Specifically, successive governments, both from the left and right, have utilized these two groups instrumentally in order to promote their particular geo-political preferences—their vision of the national project—regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. Thus, any attempt to examine the dynamics of labor migration in Israel without incorporating the conflict and competing vision of the national project as explanatory variables will necessarily produce only a partial account.

Ambivalent Inclusion? The Unexpected Consequences of Labor Migration in Israel

Above I have examined the causes that engendered the large-scale recruitment of labor migrants since the early 1990s and the interplay between them and Palestinian workers. This section will explore some of the consequences that the large-scale ingress of labor migrants has had on Israeli society and the contours of its social boundaries. I will argue that as with the process of recruitment itself, preferences toward both their exclusion and inclusion have largely been shaped by the dynamics of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Specifically, I posit that despite exclusionary policies toward labor migrants, their non-Arab status has enabled them to partially penetrate Israeli society's largely impermeable ethnic boundaries and even take part in its civic virtue of defense. I define this dynamic of overall exclusion that is coupled by small inclusionary moments and opportunities as *ambivalent exclusion*.

This section will trace and decipher the processes that engender this pattern of *ambivalent inclusion.* Specifically, I will explore two instances in which labor migrants have been able to partially transcend their overall legal, institutional, and ethnic exclusion and to be partially perceived as part of the Jewish-Israeli collective. First, I will examine cases in which labor migrants themselves have been direct victims of Palestinian violence in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Second, I will explore the two rounds of regularization that Israel has implemented, during which over a thousand labor migrant families with young children were granted permission to remain in the country permanently and were given a path to Israeli citizenship.

It is important to stress however, that by examining instances cases of labor migrant inclusion, or ambivalent inclusion, I do not purport that they reflect a fundamental overarching shift in the ethno-national policies regarding membership in the Israeli polity or the transformation of its social boundaries. Instead, I posit that while these cases are exceptional, they offer us a unique opportunity to better understand the contours of membership and identity in Israel society, and how they interact with and are shaped by the dynamics of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Labor migrants as Victims of the Arab-Israeli Conflict

During the second Intifada, which coincided with the government's large-scale deportation campaign against labor migrants, two large-scale suicide bombings took place in the Neve

Sha'anan neighborhood in Tel Aviv. This neighborhood constituted the heart of labor migrant presence in the country, where the majority of the state's undocumented labor migrants and a large number of documented labor migrants resided.

In Israel, Arab-Israeli conflict related violence constitutes a particularly salient issue or a focal point around which the majority of the population unites and shares narratives of solidarity and victimhood. In fact, following conflict related violence and incidents such as suicide bombings, Jewish Israelis have tended to set political and social differences and divisions aside and espouse a unified ethno-nationally centered approach instead. Due to these complex social dynamics, the involvement of labor migrants as victims of Palestinian suicide bombings offers a particularly intriguing opportunity to explore their positioning within Israeli society during times of perceived crisis and threat to the national collective.

From this perspective, exploring Israeli political and social responses to labor migrants who have been victims of conflict related violence offers a unique lens through which we can examine the intricacies of their inclusion in and exclusion from the Israeli collective. Specifically, I posit that despite their overall legal exclusion, during these fleeting moments labor migrants have been temporarily included and accepted or perhaps co-opted into the heart of the Israeli collective form both an ideational and institutional perspective.

While over 30 labor migrants have been injured or killed due to several suicide bombings and other attacks that occurred during the Second Intifada, the double suicide bombing that occurred on January 5, 2003, was the most significant case of such an attack. On that day, Tel Aviv experienced one of the most lethal suicide bombings in its history. Two suicide bombers activated large explosive devices in the city's old central bus station, where a large proportion of the labor migrant population resided, killing 23 people and injuring over 100. In fact, almost half of those killed or injured in the attack were not Israeli citizens but labor migrants. Due to the ongoing deportation campaign many of the labor migrants who were injured refused medical assistance and escaped the scene due to their fear that accepting medical care would lead to their identification by law enforcement as undocumented and their subsequent deportation (Berdenstein 2003).

Such fears and assumptions concerning the possible risk of deportation were not unreasonable considering the mass repatriation campaign that the government was engaged in at the time (Regev and Yehoshua 2003; Wergfut 2007). However, their position as victims within the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict significantly altered their situation, at least temporarily. In response to the attack, several government agencies immediately announced that those who were injured would be temporarily immune from deportation. Television stations urged the injured to go to hospitals without fear of police action against them. In addition, the Interior Minister Eli Yishai, who in normal times has been one of Israel's strongest proponents of Xenophobic discourse (See: Duman, forthcoming), declared that labor migrants who were injured by the bombing would receive a special legal status that would allow them to remain in the country and receive government subsidized medical treatments, regardless of their status. Similarly, Foreign Minister Netanyahu, who as Prime Minister sought to replace labor migrants with Palestinians, announced that his ministry would subsidize the expenses related to transporting victims' relatives to Israel and would wave any existing visa restrictions to enable family members to visit their wounded relatives (ibid). Similarly, other ministers announced special programs to assist both legal and illegal labor migrants who were affected by the bombing.

Beyond these statements and ad-hoc policies, the day after the attack the government convened to discuss the bombing. During this meeting elected to enact a series of measures that were designed to assist labor migrants who had been injured or killed in the attack.[139] First, the government declared that it would temporary halt the deportation campaign completely in order to enable labor migrants to seek medical treatment and mourn the loss of their friends and relatives. Second, it instituted a policy that granted labor migrants who were involved in conflict related violence and their families a special one-year work and residency permit that could be renewed for an additional year, regardless of their legal status at the time of the attack OMinistry of Interior policy number 5.2.0037). Third, the government reaffirmed a policy that grant labor migrants who were killed or injured in conflict related violence the same rights and material compensation that Israeli citizens would receive under these circumstances (Regev and Eichner 2003).[140]

The institution of these policies in relation to labor migrants is particularly interesting if we juxtapose the state's policies toward Palestinian workers who were victims of similar conflict related violence while working in Israel. For instance, the official Ministry of Interior policy number (5.2.0037) regarding compensation for non-citizens individuals who are victims of such violence explicitly precludes Palestinians from receiving compensation. Similarly, a petition submitted to the High Court of Justice by the Palestinian-Israeli human rights organization Adala (2011) posits that all such government policies regarding non-citizen victims of conflict related violence have systematically excluded Palestinians. The latter have been denied material compensation, medical treatment or any other form of government assistance if they are injured or killed under such circumstances. In fact, even in cases where both labor migrants and

---

[139] Interestingly, beyond authorizing these provisions that sought to assist labor migrants, the government also authorized a programs that sought to utilize the death of labor migrants to promote Israel's position as a victim of Palestinian aggression in the international arena (Ben 2003)

[140] Such provisions include a monthly pension of $2,000-3,000, subsidized healthcare, and free university education.

Palestinians have been injured or killed at the same time, the former have been granted compensation by the state while the latter have not.

At the societal level, for a short period following the bombing, labor migrants were embraced by society and accepted as members of the Israel collective. This too differs significantly from the general indifference that has been exhibited toward Palestinian workers who have been affected by conflict related violence. For instance, on the day following the attack, the headline of *Maariv*, one of Israel's most widely distributed daily newspapers, was "Shared Destiny."[141] This headline symbolized the fact that on that day labor migrants and Israelis were widely perceived to share a bond, as both groups had become victims of unprovoked Palestinian violence. That day, Foreign Minister Netanyahu visited injured labor migrants at several hospitals and declared that labor migrants in fact constituted "a flesh from our [the Jewish people's] flesh" (Ashkenazi and Yablonka 2003) suggesting that the Jewish people and labor migrants shared a destiny, experiences, and they too had experienced the overall suffering that the conflict has inflicted upon native Jewish-Israelis.

Other policy makers and the media also promoted this shared destiny narrative as they emphasized "the monstrousness of the bombers who do not differentiate between Israelis and improvised hard-working foreigners" (Ushpiz 2003). In fact, in the days and weeks following the attack various Israeli media outlets detailed the personal stories of the labor migrants who had been injured or killed in the attack and the grim realities and fate they shared with their Israeli hosts (Alper 2003; Green 2003). Furthermore, the Tel Aviv municipality organized an official memorial service that was attended by both state and municipal representatives, in order to commemorate the labor migrants who had been killed in the attack (Sinai 2003a).

[141] At the time it was believed that the majority of those killed were labor migrants and therefore the coverage in Israel's three largest newspapers was particularly focused on the impact of the attack on this community.

While the effects of such cases have been short lived and have not engendered large-scale policy changes, I posit that they can contribute to our understanding of the contours of Israel's social boundaries. While labor migrants are largely excluded, both legally and socially from Israeli society, at moments in which they have become victims of the conflict, Israeli society and policy makers have tended to perceive them as part of the Jewish-Israeli collective. This point was brought to my attention by a leading Israeli conservative journalist who explained "while people know that the Palestinians are my enemy, and I cannot know who the Sudanese [asylum seekers] support, they perceive that the Filipinos who takes care of their elderly mother as being on their side…I think that most Israelis perceive foreign workers as people who live in their society them and that could become assimilated Israelis if the law allowed it." (Personal interview, March 1, 2012).

Thus, in these cases, labor migrants' suffering has been co-opted and incorporated into the narrative of collective Jewish-Israeli victimhood within the context of the conflict. Although such effects are not long lasting, they do suggest that at moments of crisis Israel's ethno-nationally defined social boundaries can at least temporarily be expanded or become permeable to those who are concurrently non-Jews and non-Arabs. This dynamic becomes particularly clear if we juxtapose labor migrant victims with Palestinian workers who have also been victims of conflict related violence while working in Israel but have been denied both access to material-legal provisions and support and the temporary and partial social inclusion that labor migrants have experienced.

Labor Migrant Regularizations

In 2005-6 and in 2010 the Israeli government authorized two limited regularization processes for over 1000 families of undocumented labor migrants. The programs were primarily designed to assist the children of these migrants who had either been born in Israel or had moved there with their parents at a young age. These regularization processes are particularly intriguing for three reasons. First, despite their small scale, they constituted the first instance in which individuals were granted access to Israeli citizenship based on the principles of Jus Soli or Jus Domicile instead of the principle of Jus Sanguinis on which both the Citizenship Law and the Law of Return on based. Second, the granting of permanent residence and access to citizenship to non-Jewish labor migrants constitutes a substantial shift in Israeli policies toward these groups. Third, it represents an apparent departure from Israel's strict ethno-national immigration and membership policies.

Avraham Poraz, from the anti-religious Shinui party, initiated the first regularization process in 2003 while he served as Minister of Interior. Poraz's initiative emerged in response to a Knesset report that explored the situation and status of the estimated 1,987 children of undocumented labor migrants, primarily from Africa, Latin America, and the Philippines, who despite living in the country and attending Israeli public schools did not *exist* legally (Kemp and Raijman 2008; Saar 2004). Poraz's regularization program sought to normalize the legal position of these children who were either born in the country or who had immigrated to Israel at a very young age.[142] These children had little or no cultural ties to their country of origin and Poraz and other proponents of this policy believed that their repatriation would be considered a form of *cultural exile* (Hareuveni 2004; Alon and Saar 2005).

[142] Poraz's plan was part of his broader program of granting access to citizenship to individuals who were not eligible for citizenship according to the law of return including relatives of non-Jewish FSU immigrants (Saar 2004). Interestingly, this program coincided temporally with his push for banning the right of Palestinians who had married Israeli citizens, to live in Israel or receive Israeli citizenship following to demographic concerns (Marciano 2003)

According to Poraz's view, "This [regularization] is an opportunity for the state that has invested tens of thousands in providing an education for each of these children of foreign workers…to allow them to live in Israel, serve in the IDF, and return the investment the state has made in them…. Today these kids do not officially exist even though Israel is the only country they know" (Saar 2004). Despite his eagerness to promote the plan, it was initially thwarted by religious political actors, who claimed that granting permanent residence to non-Jews was comparable accepting a Trojan horse (Bengal and Rahat 2005), and the right wing Attorney General who argued that Poraz did not have authority to promote the program as it would fundamentally alter Israel's ethnically based immigration and citizenship regime (Shragai and Kra 2003). However, in June 2005, following the creation of several committees and repeated rounds of political and public debate and well after Poraz had been replaced as Interior Minister, the government elected to approve the program by a large margin (Alon and Saar 2005; Government decision 3807). While the initial decision limited eligibility to children who had been born in Israel, in June 2006, the government decided to expand eligibility to also include children who were born abroad but who had lived in Israel for at least six years (Government decision 156).

Beyond the fact that this process granted permanent residency and the possibility of citizenship to non-Jews this decision was revealing for several reasons. First, the policy was constructed in such a manner as to exclude Palestinian children who otherwise would have been eligible to benefit from this policy (Kemp 2007; Kemp and Raijman 2008). Specifically, the policy stipulated that the parents had to have initially entered the country legally. While the vast majority of labor migrants' children who were eligible to participate in the program were undocumented, in contrast to undocumented Palestinians who cross the green line illegally, most labor migrants enter the country legally as workers or tourists and only later lose their status. Thus, the inclusion of this provision enabled to implicitly differentiate between labor migrants and Palestinians and deny the latter the possibility of participating in the regularization program (Alon and Saar 2005; Kemp and Raijman 2008; Saar and Sinai 2004).

While Poraz sought to facilitate the legal integration of labor migrant families, he concurrently acted to reduce Palestinian access to Israeli citizenship as is exemplified by his promotion of a amendment to the citizenship law that denied Palestinian the right for family reunification. While the law was justified by security concerns, in practice it was based solely on demographic considerations (personal interview with former Minister of interior, February 23, 2012). These conflicting policies of labor migrant inclusion and Palestinians exclusion suggest that policy makers perceived the demographic implications of these non-Jewish populations in significantly different ways. This conclusion was clearly evident in interviews I conducted with several right wing intellectuals, authors, and policy makers (personal interviews: January 26, 2012; February 2, 2012; February 17, 2012; March 3, 2012; March 15, 2012)

Second, and perhaps most intriguingly the policy tied the children's and their families' access to residency permits and citizenship to military service. This is particularly important since service in the IDF constitutes the country's primary socializing mechanism and one of the foundations of Israel's civic virtue from which Palestinian citizens of the state are excluded (Shafir and Peled 2002). Specifically, in order to receive citizenship these children were required to enlist in military service at the age of 18, as the law requires all non-Arab Israelis to do. Following their release, their parents would be eligible to receive permanent residency status. Similarly, siblings who were too young to regularize their status would be eligible for permanent residency and ultimately citizenship once they themselves served in the military. Thus, the policy drew a strong connection between granting long-term residence and citizenship to non-Jews and their participation in the primary Israeli institution, the IDF.

While the regularization was considered a one-time process, a second round of regularization for the children of labor migrants and their families was approved in 2010 (Vialer-Pollak 2010).[143] During 2009 a large-scale public debate ensued regarding the possibility of a second regularization process for children who were not eligible to participate in the first program but still remained in the country.

The debate over regularization was primarily led by a newly formed NGO called *Israeli Children* whose main goal was to attain residency permits for these children who had not been included in the previous process. Surprisingly, *Israeli Children* was highly successful in mobilizing large-scale public support in favor of the plan and was able to recruit a host of policy makers from a wide range of political parties, which included members of the left as well as members of the right wing Likud party and the radical right wing National Religious Party. In response to this public pressure, the government formed an inter-ministerial committee that recommended that 800 children be granted residency according to the 2005 procedures while 400 that did not fulfill the criteria would be deported pending individual appeal. Despite the strong opposition of the xenophobic Shas party, the government elected to approve the policy in August 2010.

While these two regularization processes do not reflect a fundamental shift in Israel's immigration and citizenship policies vis-à-vis non Jews they do teach us something regarding the long-term effects of labor migrant presence. Specifically, these regularizations can be interpreted to reflect a process of partial incorporation of these labor migrant families. Through their

[143] Specifically, the government's decision concerned 1,2000 children of labor migrants, the decision enabled 800 to receive residency permits while the rest would be deported (Vialer Pollak 2010).

participation in the Israeli education system these children were socialized into Israeli society and over time not only internalized and adopted an exclusive Jewish-Israeli identity but also were at least partially perceived as such by a broad range of social and political actors. In fact, support for their cause transcended political boundaries as members from almost all political factions except the ultra-orthodox parties favored regularization.

The perception of their Israeliness is not only evident from the broad public support for their regularization but from by the name of the campaign itself, *Israeli Children*, that emphasized their belonging within Israeli society. This position was also expressed by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. On the day that the first regularization was approved in 2005, Sharon explained that his support for regularization emanated from the fact that he had been moved by a documentary about a scout troop that was composed of labor migrants children and by their desire to serve in the military. "I admit that their cry impressed me. I reached a conclusion that we must find a way to enable these young, fluent Hebrew speakers to remain in the country" (Alon and Saar 2005). Furthermore, the concurrent exclusion of Palestinian children and the connection the policy engendered between regularization and military service suggest that despite their non-Jewishness, their simultaneous non-Arabness made their inclusion into the heart of Israeli society possible.

Ambivalent Exclusion?

In the last section I demonstrated the state's exclusionary policies toward labor migrants. These included temporary and limited residency permits, restricted access to civil and social rights, their legal binding to employers, and a host of other highly repressive measures and rules (see:

Dahan 2004; Rosenhek 2000; Kemp and Raijman 2008).[144] Despite all these, there have been moments of increasing inclusion, particularly if we juxtapose them with the Palestinians they replaced.

Additional factors have contributed to these outcomes. For instance, in contrast to Palestinians who were primarily daily commuters, labor migrants actually live within Israel proper, making their presence more visible and normal in the eyes of the broader Israeli population. Furthermore, since many labor migrants, primarily those from the Philippines, function as care workers for the elderly and disabled, they mostly live in the houses of their Israeli employers and develop close relations with them and their families,[145] a process that has fostered greater intimacy between migrants and their Israelis employers.[146]

The complex relations between Israelis and labor migrants are also evident in the context of the recent xenophobic violence against African asylum seekers. While the latter are perceived as an acute demographic and security threat, labor migrants are largely viewed as a neutral and even positive element by the same forces that have led the campaign against asylum seekers. As one of the leaders of this campaign explained, “These [labor migrant] are mostly good people. They are clean, polite and don’t create hassles for local residents. They are much more like us

[144] Despite the high level of labor migrant exclusion and the state level, Kemp and Raijman (2004) have identified inclusive trends at the municipal level, particularly in Tel Aviv. Their analysis suggests a disjuncture between municipal practices that promote territorial or urban membership and official state policies that preserve Israel’s hegemonic ethno-national membership regime. While inclusionary processes that emanate from the practices of municipal and various non-state actors and their incongruence with state policies have fostered fascinating and at times substantial outcomes, the analysis presented in this study will focus on the national level. This focus stems from the study’s primary interests in the relationship between immigration and incorporation policies and intergroup conflict that are primarily reflected in national and not municipal politics.

[145] Such a dynamic would be unthinkable vis-à-vis Palestinian workers due to the security risk they are perceived to pose. In fact, in contrast to agriculture and construction in which labor migrants replaced Palestinians, domestic care became a field of foreign employment only after labor migrants arrived in Israel. Interestingly, over time domestic care has become the largest employment sector for labor migrants, the only one that is not regulated by quotas (Kemp and Raijman 2008)

[146] This point is based on and interview with a former chair of the Knesset Committee on Foreign workers (Personal interview, January 5, 2012).

than the infiltrators who attack our children and are trying to take over our neighborhoods and schools" (Personal interview February 11, 2012).[147]

The outcomes discussed in this section appear to be consistent with the findings of Ian Lustick (1999) who argues that Israel is increasingly becoming a non-Arab state in contrast to a Jewish one. According to this approach, demographic pressures and the realities of global immigration have compelled Israel to partially alter its social boundaries and membership policies. As a result, the latter have been defined in ways that can potentially facilitate the inclusion of non-Jews who are also non-Arabs into Israeli society (See also: Bartram 2011; Cohen 2006). As a popular right-wing columnist explained, "I think we made a mistake with the foreign workers…I have no doubt that they would make good Israelis. They are speak Hebrew and are motivated to go to the army and fight. Just like the Russians [non-Jews] we should have made it easier for those who are really committed to the country to stay here…I am not the only one who says these things. Yaron London has been saying this for years." (Personal interview, March 15, 2012).

Based on the dynamics explored in this section, I posit that the presence of labor migration has engendered a process of ambivalent exclusion. While overall policies seek to maintain the exclusion of labor migrants from membership in the polity, their long-term presence within Israeli society together with their non-Arab status can engender opportunities for their inclusion. However, the conclusions engendered by my analysis somewhat differ from Lustick's. While I concur that both in the case of labor migrants and non-Jewish FSU immigrants, their non-Arab identity has played a central role in shaping their position vis-à-vis Israeli society and

[147] The differentiation made in this quote came up repeatedly in a series of interviews I conducted with the leaders of the anti-asylum seekers campaign in February and March 2012. The contrast is particularly interesting as labor migrants, both documented and undocumented, were significantly more numerous than asylum seekers, resided in the same neighborhoods, used the same public services, and attended the same schools (see: Duman, forthcoming)

their opportunities for inclusion, I posit that this does not warrant the conclusion that Israel is becoming a non-Arab state. Instead, these dynamics can be conceptualized in the context of the partial expansion of the Jewish collective through what Cohen (2006) has described as sociological conversion, which is akin to religious, ethnic, and cultural assimilation. It is important to note that the difference between these two processes is not solely semantic as it engenders significant consequences regarding the nature of Israel's social boundaries.

Although these inclusionary moments do not represent a fundamental shift in Israeli social boundaries and membership policies, they do suggest that under certain circumstances these boundaries are more permeable than often perceived, enabling non-Jews not only to penetrate but also to participate in the Israeli ethno-nationally defined national project. These processes reflect the complex dynamics, contradictions, and tensions that are present within Israel's overall ethnic and citizenship regime and their relation to the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict.

Conclusions

This section has explored and traced both the historical and contemporary preferences and policies that have been adopted and promoted by Zionist and Israeli elites toward demography and immigration in general and both labor migrant and Palestinian worker recruitment and incorporation in particular. The findings presented in Chapters 2 and 3 appear to largely support the theoretical proposition I expounded in chapter 1. Specifically, while the Arab-Israel conflict has not constituted the sole explanatory factor for these policies, I have demonstrated that political interests and preferences regarding these policy areas have been profoundly shaped by both collective and particular intra-group perceptions toward the conflict and the national project(s).

The historical analysis of the development of demographic and immigration preferences and policies among Zionist and early Israeli political elites reveals that questions regarding the demographic balance between Jews and Palestinian Arabs and the spatial distribution of these group played a key role both during the pre-state period and in the first decades that followed the creation of the state. In fact, demographic factors as they related to the inter-group conflict were perceived to be crucial components of the Zionist movement's state-building strategies.

Furthermore, in contrast to later periods, particularly after the 1967 war, when demographic preferences were largely shaped by divergent intra-group ideological differences concerning the goals of the national project and means of achieving them, throughout this period there was a virtual consensus among Zionist elites regarding questions of demography and immigration, despite minor differences concerning the pace and scope of these processes.[148] Specifically, elites across Zionist factions supported, at least publically, the goal of expanding the Jewish demographic balance as a means of creating a sufficient population basis for the future state. This goal became particularly critical following Israel's independence in 1948 and the eruption of the 1948 War. Thus, there was a broad political consensus in favor of the need to facilitate mass Jewish immigration into the country, particularly of young people who could be mobilized for war and self-sufficient capital importing individuals. Concurrently, these demographic woes also engendered broad support in favor of the ethnic cleansing of the territory from Palestinians and the Judaization of the new state's territory.

In fact, only two periods constitute aberrations from this overall strategy. First, was the restrictive recruitment of settlers between the mid-1920s and late 1930s. The second case was the

[148] It is important to not that while all groups supported the recruitment of Jewish immigrants there were still some fundamental differences between them with regard to other policy areas. For instance, the revisionists, who were significantly inspired by fascism, supported the use of more violent tactics against both Palestinian Arabs and the British administration than labor Zionist's did.

selective immigration policies that were implemented in late 1951 and were quickly abandoned due to their adverse demographic consequences. However, as I explained above, these policies that were largely promoted by the Labor Party did not constitute a fundamental shift from the pattern in which demographic and immigration preferences were shaped by the conflict. Instead, during both these periods, Zionist and Israeli leaders were largely concerned with processes of social and national consolidation and state building that they deemed to be particularly essential in the context of intergroup conflict.

Thus, during the late 1920s Zionists sought to increase the number of *pioneering* immigrants who were perceived as most beneficial for the immediate needs of the Zionist project. Similarly, following the demographic transformation that was completed by 1951 and the almost collapse of the state due to the strains of absorbing the mass immigration of impoverished individuals, the state sought to temporarily limit immigration. This, however, was not a response to the changing role of the conflict but to state leaders fear that continued mass immigration would engender state collapse and an inability to survive under adverse conflictual circumstances.[149]

The 1967 war, however, constituted a fundamental turning point vis-à-vis the dynamics explored in this study. Specifically, following Israel's large-scale territorial gains, an ideational shift ensued within Israeli politics. This shift was manifested by a split that initially took place *within* the hegemonic Labor Party between those who sought to maintain Israeli control over the newly occupied territories, on the one hand, and those who supported an eventual retreat once the sufficient conditions emerged, on the other. While the former viewed the occupation as a

[149] However, its also seems apparent that the outcomes of these selective immigration policies, or more accurately the actual selection of immigrants in practice was at least partially shaped by concerns regarding the cultural nature of the state. Specifically, political elites feared the possible Arabization of Israeli society that followed the mass immigration of Jews from Arab lands, and North Africans in particular (Shenhav 2006; Smooha 2008).

means of Israeli aggrandizement, the latter believed that the integration of these territories, their possible annexation, and control over a large hostile Palestinian population would inevitably lead to a bi-national state and the effective end of the Zionist project. These two camps did not only maintain different visions toward the territories but due to these processes began espousing profoundly different visions of the means and goals of the national project.

While these divisions initially emerged within the Labor Party by the mid 1980s these two conflicting national projects constituted the primary fault line around which political competition between the political left and right was organized. As a result, there was also a shift in the way the two groups perceived the relationship between the national project and the conflict. While the left maintained Zionist traditional preoccupations with the demographic balance, the right moved away from demographic concerns vis-à-vis the conflict in favor of a political program that was largely based on territorial expansion and blatantly overlooked demographic challenges.

As I have argued in Chapter 3, these political processes and divisions played a crucial role in the recruitment of both Palestinian commuter migrants between 1967 and the early 1990s and the consequent recruitment of labor migrants that began at a small scale in the late 80's and became a large scale process in the early 1990s. I have argued that these intra-group political divisions have constituted a primary mechanism that has shaped political elites' preferences toward these two groups. Specifically, after 1967, those who supported territorial expansion promoted Palestinian economic integration as a means of ameliorating resistance to the occupation by granting Palestinians economic incentives not to revolt and reducing the separation between Israel and the territories. In contrast, those who supported territorial compromise sought to maintain the separation between Israel proper and the territories, as they perceived the occupation to be temporary and supported a national project that promoted a territorially smaller but demographically more homogenous Israeli state.

The Intifada constituted a second moment that fostered change in Israeli policies toward immigration, which ultimately opened the door to the recruitment of labor migrants. Following the uprising, the divisions between left and right became more consolidated. The left increasingly espoused separation between Israel and the Palestinians, a process that required putting a stop to the daily ingress of Palestinian workers into the country, and their replacement with Israeli workers. The right, however, sought to continue the entrance of Palestinians into Israel as a means of erasing the green line and fostering territorial integration between Israel and the occupied territories. Concurrently, employers and human resource agencies also utilized the Intifada for their own agendas. Specifically, they exerted strong pressure on the government to replace Palestinian workers with labor migrants, which employers perceived as more subservient, and human recourse agencies perceived as more lucrative.

Thus, following the Intifada and the strong pressures that were exerted by economic actors, the two political camps adopted largely divergent positions regarding Palestinian, Israeli, and foreign labor. Intriguingly, when the intifada appeared to challenge the status quo of Palestinian labor, the right supported the temporary recruitment of labor migrants as a stopgap measure that would compel the Palestinians to end the uprising. The left, on the other hand, perceived the Intifada as a golden opportunity to recruit Israeli workers to replace Palestinians. While these preferences only led to minor labor migrant recruitment, the return of the Labor Party under Rabin in 1992 and his political agenda of promoting peace through separation led to a reluctant reversal of these positions.

Specifically, Rabin promoted increased separation and compromise between Israelis and Palestinians as a new paradigm of conflict management, a position that represented his demographic-centered vision of the national project. In fact, the goal of engendering separation received an additional boost following a dramatic increase in Hamas attacks against Israeli civilians in early 1993. Throughout this period, Rabin maintained his opposition to the recruitment of labor migrants, favoring Jewish Israeli labor instead. However, following the long-term closure of the territories that blocked the entrance of Palestinian workers, the inability to recruit Israeli workers, and ongoing pressures that were exerted by employers and human resource agencies, Rabin elected to alter the government's policy and authorized the recruitment of labor migrants. Thus, labor migrant recruitment was largely a result of the confluence of political interests vis-à-vis the conflict and the strong pressures exerted by economic actors who were set to profit from this policy. To conclude, while economic interests undoubtedly played an essential role in the process that ultimately led to the recruitment of labor migrants, alone they were insufficient to produce this outcome in the absence of political support. Only when government preferences regarding the conflict and the national project became aligned with employers' and human resource agencies' demands to recruit labor migrants did recruitment materialize.

The political underpinnings that underlie the process of labor migrant recruitment become particularly evident if we continue to trace the relation between political dynamics vis-à-vis the conflict and preferences toward labor migration. Following the return to power of the right in 1996, the new coalition under the leadership of Netanyahu sought to reverse these processes by deporting labor migrants and replacing them with Palestinian workers despite the security threat the latter were believed to pose. While the analysis in Chapter 3 primarily focuses on the 1990s, these intra-group dynamics that tie preferences vis-à-vis the conflict to the interplay between Palestinians workers and labor migrants have in fact persisted well into the 21st century. Thus, this study demonstrates that while security consideration per-se were not insignificant, their role in shaping policy has been largely mediated by the ideological preferences vis-à-vis the conflict and the national project that is espoused by the particular group that holds political power. This assertion stands in stark to mainstream accounts that commonly attribute these outcomes to security factors. In addition, the empirical evidence and process tracing that I presented in the previous chapters substantially clarifies the connections that others (See: Bartram 1998; Kemp and Raijman 2008; Rosenheck 2003) have postulated between preferences toward the Arab-Israeli conflict and Israel's policies toward immigration.

Finally, I have argued that despite the fact that labor migrants have generally been legally and socially excluded from Israeli society and denied access to various rights and citizenship, there have concurrently been particular moments that have fostered their inclusion. I define this dynamic as ambivalent inclusion, a position that largely emanates from labor migrants' external position vis-à-vis the conflict as non-Arabs. Specifically, I argue that at particular moments and under specific circumstances, labor migrants can be perceived not as full members, but as peripheral members of Israeli society that can partially participate in the state's civic republican form of citizenship.

While this dynamic is largely an exception to the rule, at moments in which labor migrants have been negatively affected by Palestinian violence, both Israeli leaders' statements and the institutional procedures that have been implemented to assist them suggest their partial conceptual incorporation into Jewish-Israeli society through a narrative of shared destiny between them and Jewish-Israelis. Similarly, the regularization of families that was explicitly designed to exclude Palestinians was legally tied to service in the military that constitutes the heart of Israel civic virtue and a crucial key for membership in Israeli society. Thus, I have posited that both labor migrants' exclusion, which is based on the state's ethno-national citizenship structure, and their partial or ambivalent inclusion are intricately tied to, as was their initial recruitment process was, to the dynamics of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Section 2: Quebec – From Ethnic Exclusion to Ambivalent Inclusion

Following the theoretical and conceptual foundations that I outlined in Chapter 1, the chapters included in this section will trace and explain the evolution, development, and outcomes of the various historical and contemporary attitudes, preferences, and policies toward questions of demography, immigration and integration in Quebec. In particular, the analysis will examine the complex relationships and interactions between preferences and policies pertaining to immigration and incorporation, on the one hand, and the political and social processes that emanate from the dynamics of competitive national projects—both between Quebec and Canada and within Quebec itself, on the other.

In order to comprehensively examine this relationship I will explore both historical and contemporary developments of these inter- and intra-group dynamics. Furthermore, I will decipher both the direct and indirect effects that they have exerted on perceptions, preferences, and policies regarding immigration and integration in Quebec.

To this end, Chapter 4 will offer a detailed historical analysis in which I will trace the development of Canada's Francophone society and its ongoing relationship with its Anglo-Canadian counterpart in Quebec and Canada as a whole. Specifically, I will explore these groups' mutual development, ongoing competition, and long-term interactions. Based on this analysis, I argue that Canadian immigration and state-building policies have played an important part in shaping Francophone society's orientation to issues revolving around demography, immigration, and diversity.

In addition, this chapter will also trace and explain the factors that engendered the province's move from strong ethnically-based exclusion of immigrants to active recruitment and incorporation in the post World War II period. I will posit that this was largely an instrumental move that aimed to increase Quebec's political and demographic power by bolstering provincial powers over their recruitment and integration and fostering the transformation of immigrants into Francophone Québécois.

Chapter 5 will explore the specific policy and attitude changes that came out of the post-War shift in the approach toward immigration. I will argue that these changed have not only been shaped by inter-group competition between Canada and Quebec with regard to immigration policies and competencies. But in addition, competing visions concerning the nature and goals of the national project between political groups *within* Quebec have also substantially influenced the province's preferences policies regarding immigration and incorporation. Thus, I posit that a comprehensive analysis of the policies that have emerged in Quebec since the 1960s requires that we take into account these crucial multilevel dynamics that are engendered by both inter- and intra- group competition. For this purpose, I explore two main policy areas in order to decipher these multilevel dynamics: recruitment policies and the evolution of Quebec's policies toward immigrant immigration and incorporation.

The final part of the chapter will explore the short and long-term outcomes of these policies. Specifically, I will examine the ways in which recruitment and incorporation policies have shaped immigrants' experiences in Quebec and how the new diversity has itself challenged Francophone Québécois society and its various national projects that shaped immigration and integration policies in the first place.

Chapter 4: From Canadiens to Québécois - Religion, Language, Immigration, and the Evolution of Intergroup Competition

Francophone society in North America emerged in 1534, when French explorers led by Jacques Cartier first set foot in what was to become the colony of New France or Canada. The French settlers who immigrated to the colony sought to create a distinct society that replicated the French model while incorporating elements from the North American context in which it was embedded (Bouchard 2008; Province du Québec 1978; Juteau 1994).[150] Between 1534 and 1759, approximately 10,000 French immigrants (*Canadiens*) settled in the colony (Beaujot 1979).

[150] The affinity for France was based on the settlers' and Church's support for the Ancien Régime. This alignment persisted well into the 19th century despite the many political and legal transformations that occurred following the French revolution.

Following a century and a half of expansion and exploration across the North American continent, with a population of 69,810 inhabitants in 1765 (Quebec Yearbook 1970), New France controlled a territory that encompassed today's Quebec, Ontario, much of the American Midwest, and extended to the Gulf of Mexico.

Britain's victory over France in the battle of the Plains of Abraham near the city of Quebec in 1759 and the subsequent French surrender in the Paris Treaty of 1763, however, arrested the development of this new society. The treaty granted Britain control over New France's colonies, including Canada and its Francophone Catholic inhabitants, who were legally transformed into British subjects. While these events might appear far removed from the realities and challenges of contemporary Quebec, throughout the centuries Britain's conquest of Canada has become a constitutive and defining event in the development of French Canadian identity and politics (Bouchard 2008; Leger 1954b; Maclure 2003). As Cook (2005) points out, "Every French Canadian, viewing the place of his community in Canada, almost invariably begins with an interpretation of the meaning of the British conquest. No question has so consistently occupied the attention of French Canadian historians, intellectuals, politicians, and social scientists…than the meaning of 1759…each generation appears to fight, intellectually, the Battle of the Plains of Abraham again" (82).

Beyond intellectual and political circles, the significance of the conquest has been interpreted, reproduced, and disseminated through French-Canadian culture[151], the church, and the French education system. For instance, a teacher in the French education system pointed out to me that the conquest remains until this day a central point of reference in the Francophone school system (personal interview November 14, 2011). Thus, the legacy of conquest has played

[151] For instance, see the edited volume by Buckner and Reid (2012) that explores the long-term impact of the conquest of Francophone culture and collective memory.

a central role in shaping Canada's Francophone community's social boundaries and its differentiation from Anglo-Canada, rendering the French–English and the Catholic–Protestant cleavages the constitutive elements of the identities of these groups (Balthazar 1989; Bouchard 2008).

Due to the near-absence of Francophone immigration since the late 18th century, most contemporary Francophone Québécois can trace their genealogy to this period, thereby enhancing their real or imagined personal connection to these events (Balthazar 1989).[152] Thus, the British conquest left a lasting imprint on Francophone narratives and identity, and is still perceived by many as an event that had significantly negative implications for the development of their national collective. Intriguingly, despite the fact that the interviews I conducted focused primarily on Quebec since the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s, 7 out of my the 31 interviewees emphasized the centrality of this event for understanding the dynamics of contemporary Québécois politics and society.

It marks their subjugation to a foreign empire and consequent abandonment by the French motherland (Knowles 2007).[153] These processes of conquest, subjugation, and abandonment fostered the development of Franco-Canadians a distinct society, *les Canadiens*, which differ from Anglo-Canadians on the one hand and French on the other (Juteau 1993; Maclure 2003; Ransom 2009). The persistent presence of the British conquest in the Francophone national consciousness locates it at the epicenter of the struggle over the identity of

[152] Immigration from France to Canada effectively ceased as a result of the British conquest. Small-scale immigration from France only resumed in the early 20th century. The decedents of the original French immigrants have historically identified as Pure Laine Québécois in order to differentiate themselves from later immigrants. Today, however, this concept is considered to be racially charged and has largely been replaced by the more neutral Québécois of French-Canadian origin (Hyndman 1998; Juteau 2004).

[153] Beyond the direct consequences of the British conquest for the relations between the settlers and the French motherland, this rift was further exacerbated by the Church's strong opposition to the values promoted by post-revolutionary France (Knowles 2007). In fact, French Canadian society continued to adhere to the values and identity of pre-revolutionary France well into the 20th century (Lowery 2003).

French Canada and the country as a whole (Cook 2005).[154] In addition, the conquest marks the transformation of intergroup competition from territorial control to competition over institutional control within the colony (Breton 2005).

The long-term significance of these narratives and collective memories are particularly intriguing since they differ from those held by Franco-Canadians at the time. Historical accounts suggest that the latter experienced few concrete changes following the conquest and did not perceive it as a radical break with the past. In fact, the recasting of the conquest as a tragic and fundamental episode in Franco-Canadian history only took place in the early 19th century with the emergence of anti-British *Canadien* nationalism (Cook 2005). While the meaning of the conquest has vacillated over time, it has sparked long-term ideational and material consequences. "For the Canadian nationalists of the early 19th century as well as for contemporary *Québécois*, the conquest has appeared as a terrible humiliation, the submission of one people to another. In such a situation the French Canadians could never really belong to themselves" (Balthazar 1989, 3).

From a concrete political-historical perspective, the conquest engendered mixed consequences. The majority of Francophones who led a predominantly rural existence, detached from the realities of political power, remained under the control of the Church leaders and experienced little if any direct impact.[155] Concurrently, however, Britain implemented a series of contradictory policies that were based on a combination of its long-term interest to promote anglification and its need to accommodate Francophones in response to short-term challenges.

[154] Members of the Montreal school of history, for instance, have described the conquest as a cataclysmic event or a seismic shock "that conditioned the subsequent fate of Canada's Francophones…New France was a preparing to step over the threshold of political, economic and cultural normality, but annexation to the British empire set in motion a long process of disorganization and restructuring of French Canada" (Maclure 2003, 24).

[155] The Church was quick to identify and fill the power vacuum that emerged following the departure of the French colonial bureaucracy, a stance it maintained for almost 200 years during which it dominated Franco-Canadian society (Bouchard 2008).

As a result, colonial policies "oscillated between assimilation and accommodation" (Keating 2001, 77) well into the 20th century.

In the immediate aftermath of the conquest, Britain sought to replicate the demographic and assimilatory patterns that had transpired in New England and "transform Quebec into a society with British institutions and an Anglo-Saxon majority" (Breton 1988b, 82). To this end, new policies were implemented in order to aggressively assimilate French Canadians into the English language, religion, and law (Breton 1984; Levine 2010). The 1763 proclamation set out to accomplish this goal by requiring that Franco-Canadians pledge their allegiance to the British crown, excluding them from public service, and outlawing Catholic practice, while concurrently promoting Anglo-Protestant immigration to alter the colony's demographic balance (Humphreys 1934; Levine 1990; Phelps Kellogg 1932; Trudeau 1958).

Despite these attempts, assimilationist policies failed due to concrete realities (Breton 1988b). The lack of effective enforcement, Franco-Canadian resistance to assimilation, the power of the Catholic Church over Francophone society,[156] and negligible Anglophone immigration rates beyond a small number of merchants who arrived as military contractors (Bernier and Salee 1992; Careless 1970) hindered these attempts. Furthermore, Britain's need to accommodate the *Canadiens* in order to secure their support and prevent the spread of the American Revolution into the colony limited the implementation of these policies (Kaplan 1994; Lanctot and Cameron 1967).

Thus, in 1774, assimilationist policies were supplanted by the Quebec Act, which has been described as the Franco-Canadian Magna Carta (Lowry 2003), and represented a significant departure from previous assimilatory strategies. Instead, it promoted institutional duality and

[156] McInnis (1969) suggests that Britain also perceived the feudal nature of the Church's social order as a way of enhancing its authority and control over the population by granting the Church special privileges.

Franco-Canadian accommodation by granting the Catholic Francophone elites privileged access to political power and overwhelming control over Francophone society. In addition, the Act sanctioned the official use of French and the civil law system (Breton 1988b; Kelly and Trebilcock 2010).[157] Despite the changes it engendered, the Act did not represent a shift in Britain's Anglicization preferences but rather was a pragmatic response to the American Revolution and Franco-Canadian demographic superiority (Kaplan 1994). In practice, the act failed to produce intergroup rapprochement and gave rise to a segmented institutional structure that fortified inter-ethnic boundaries. Furthermore, it contributed to the constitution of *Canadiens* as a distinct civilization or *race* within North America with its own language, religion, and legal tradition (Careless 1970).[158]

Despite Britain's initial failure to effect substantial emigration from the British Isles, its defeat in the revolutionary war in the United States led to the ingress of over 40,000 loyalists who had escaped the United States and settled in today's Ontario (Lowry 2003). In fact, these loyalist settlers are regarded as the original founders of Anglo-Canada (Careless 1970). The new Anglophone settlers expressed strong opposition toward the position of Francophones and the Catholic Church in the colony. In response, Britain implemented the Constitutional Act (1791) that partitioned the colony of Québec into two, namely, French lower Canada (today's Quebec) and English upper Canada (Ontario), with the two regions diverging in terms of language, religion, culture, and law (Breton 1988b; Kelly and Trebilcock 2010). While the Act significantly reduced the territory of the Franco-Canadian homeland, it concurrently increased the group's autonomous political power (Levi 1997). It further reinforced inter-group boundaries

[157] As Close (2008) points out, the Quebec Act was highly contentious in the British parliament since it was perceived as affirming the normative adequacy of French civil law and the Catholic Church—and perhaps even their superiority over English common law and the Protestant faith. Acting from this standpoint, Lord Camden unsuccessfully attempted to repeal the Quebec Act in 1775.

[158] For a discussion of Canadian duality and its consequences see: Faribault 1967 and LeForest 1995.

and bolstered institutional segmentation through “the establishment of separate, analogous, and parallel institutional spheres” (Juteau 2004, 85). Fenwick (1981) characterizes this as a process of *self-segregation*, to which he attributes both the survival of Canada and the persistence of the ethno-linguistic divisions within it. This legal, spatial, and institutional trifurcation, which reified the linguistic and cultural dualism, cemented the institutional and ideational duality that still constitutes the foundation of contemporary struggles over Canada-Quebec relations (Breton 2005; LeForest 1995).[159]

To conclude, the conquest and the three acts that followed it represent a cumulative series of constitutive moments that played a decisive role in shaping Franco-Canadian society, institutions, and identity as well as French Canada’s long-term relations with English Canada. The observable policy shifts did not represent a reversal of British preferences, but were rather perceived as means of weakening Franco-Canadian opposition and facilitating long-term assimilation (Breton 1988b).

By the 1830s, however, the status quo engendered by the Constitutional Act began to erode. The emergence of the Franco-Canadian nationalist Patriote movement led by Papineau, which sought to transform the colony’s institutional structure, exacerbated tensions between Francophones and the British administration, culminating in the rebellions of 1837-8, which were crushed by Britain.[160] In addition, Britain’s ongoing promotion of Anglophone immigration to and settlement in both Lower and Upper Canada led to the creation of an affluent Anglophone minority in the former region that sought to curtail the institutional power of the Francophones and the Church (Trudeau 1959).

[159] In fact, Anglophones opposed the partition, claiming that England was undermining the political and economic unity of the colony and ultimately weakening its development (Ouelett 1969).
[160] Rioux (1978) points out that the Church supported Britain over the rebels since British control facilitated the perpetuation of the Church’s position of power within Francophone society.

In response to these events and the mounting tensions, the British Parliament commissioned Lord Durham to conduct an inquiry concerning the future of the Union (Juteau 1994; Levine 1990). Durham's report, which was published in 1839, famously asserted that the situation in the colony represented "[t]wo nations warring in the bosom of a single state: I found struggle not of principles, but of races" (in Craig et al. 2007, 13). Durham's report clearly reflected his predilection for Anglophone culture and repeatedly emphasized the cultural and economic backwardness and inferiority of Francophones, who were described as "a people with no history, and without literature" (ibid., 38). Durham's report made three recommendations that are crucial to our discussion. First, he prescribed the unification of Upper and Lower Canada, a measure by means of which he sought to eliminate institutional duality, facilitate Francophone minoritization within the union, and promote British institutional dominance via the creation of an Anglophone majority throughout the colony (Bouchard 2008; Breton 2005). Second, he called for Francophone anglicization by declaring English the sole official language in the colony and banning the use of French in the courts and legislature (Rioux 1978).[161] Third, he advocated the active recruitment of Anglophone migrants from the British Isles and the United States for settlement in Lower Canada as a means of diluting the dominance of the French population—a policy preference that was maintained until 1948 (Knowles 2007; Trudeau 1958).[162] Employing these measures, Durham sought to erase the dual institutional character of the colony, suggesting that "the provinces must be merged into a single community, which would be irrevocably English in character. The barriers of language and of divergent laws and institutions must be

[161] As Fenwick (1981) points out, linguistic assimilation constituted a particular fear for the Catholic Church since language and religion were perceived as being intricately connected.
[162] In fact, Durham sought to increase immigration flows that had already begun. In the decade between 1831 and 1842, approximately 455,000 British immigrants settled in Canada. However, following Durham's report, British immigration doubled, reaching 952,000 between 1841 and 1852 (Careless 1970; McInnis 1969).

wiped out to pave the way for the absorption of the French into a homogeneous state" (McInnis 1969, 228).

While Durham's recommendations did not bring about Francophone assimilation and institutional marginalization (Levine 2010), provisions promoting British immigration and the unification of the two Canadas led to substantial demographic transformation. Mass immigration doubled the Anglophone population within the entire colony during the 1840s, leading to an Anglophone majority in 1852 (Beaujot and McQuillan 1982; Kralt 1976). Concurrently, the proportion of Anglophones within Lower Canada accounted for approximately 20 percent of the population (Knowles 2007; Silver 1997).[163] Sturgis and Davis (1998/9) argue that this mass wave of British immigration "ensured that, outside Lower Canada, its cultural identity would be British" (11).

Durham's recommendations were officially incorporated into the 1840 Act of the Union (AOU) that united Upper and Lower Canada, a process that facilitated Anglophones' political power in the colony as a whole (Breton 2005).[164] Initially, both the report and the AOU sparked large-scale Francophone resentment and alienation (Gagnon 1985).[165] However, despite British attempts, the AOU did not produce its intended consequences since it failed to eliminate institutional and ideational duality for three interconnected reasons. First, Francophone elites, who realized that an additional rebellion would likely fail, assumed a pragmatic stance vis-à-vis the united parliament and adopted conciliatory strategies in order to retain power (Levine 2010). Second, due to large political divisions among Anglophone political elites and the relative

[163] As a result of the persistence of Anglophone immigration during this period, by 1871 Francophones constituted a mere 31.1 percent of Canada's population (Kralt 1976).
[164] Furthermore, the unification of Canada co-opted Canadianism, depriving *Canadiens* of their separate identity and transforming them into French-Canadians (Brunet 1954).
[165] Martin (1939) argues that the report served as a strong catalyst for the development of a distinct French-Canadian identity and culture.

political cohesion among Francophones, the latter emerged as a tie-breaker and forged alliances with Anglophone parties (Martin 1972; Stewart 1986). Third, due to linguistic and spatial barriers and modalities, in practice, institutional duality was only formally eliminated ~~as~~ since informal duality persisted (Breton 1988b). As a result of these factors, new forms of political cooperation emerged, producing a de-facto quasi consociational structure within the colony—a situation that granted each linguistic group veto power within the union and facilitated the de-facto abrogation of linguistic and other restrictions (Bothwell 1995; Levine 1990). "Durham's forecast for the French race in Canada was a devastating miscalculation. The avowed purpose of the union of the two Canadas was defeated by the union itself" (Martin 1939, 179).

Despite the inter-group rapprochement, the Anglo Montrealers, who perceived French culture, religion, and law as impediments to economic development and their position in Lower Canada, reacted with increased militancy. In response to the emerging patterns of political cooperation, they staged violent riots that resulted in the incineration of the parliament building in Montreal and called for the annexation of Montreal to the United States (Levine 2010).

Despite the failure of Durham's assimilatory policies, they left two lasting marks on the Francophone collective memory.[166] First, they further increased Francophone suspicion of Britain's intentions for the future of the colony and the role of Francophone society within it, strengthening the French/English divide.[167] Second, active government encouragement and recruitment of Anglophone immigration and settlement bolstered Francophone fears concerning a possible demographic transformation and entrenched perceptions of immigration as a *threat* to

[166] For instance, Durham's centrality in Quebec collective memory is evident in the title of the influential and pessimistic 1978 report on Francophone demography issued by the nationalist Fédération de Francophones hors Québec entitled "The Heirs of Lord Durham: Manifesto of a Vanishing People".
[167] Thus, it appears that both accommodation and assimilation policies led to the bolstering of intergroup boundaries.

Francophone survival (Barker 2010; Carens 1995; McInnis 1969).[168] These concerns increased opposition and hostility toward immigration among both Francophone elites and the broader population (Juteau 2004; Rioux 1978). Opposition to immigration played a crucial role in crystallizing and fortifying Francophone ethnic and social boundaries and the development of a strong form of exclusionary ethnic nationalism that persisted well into the second half of the 20th century and fostered the rejection of those who did not descend from the original French settlers (Breton 1988a; Dumont 1997).

The role of the Church and 'La Survivance'

Despite the scale of these political and demographic transformations, they had little direct effect on the lives of most Franco-Canadians due to limited state penetration, the absolute social dominance of the Catholic Church, and the population's relatively insulated and rural existence.[169] Until the mid-20th century, most Franco-Canadians were confined to the localities in which they lived and subjected to the omnipresent authority of the Catholic Church that had become "[t]he unit of ethnic organization in French Canada" (Fenwick 1981, 201).

In the 1830s, however, the church faced a series of challenges that threatened to undermine its position of power. First, despite the fact that French Canadians constituted a majority of the population in Quebec, the lion's share of economic power was concentrated in the hands of the Anglophone industrialists and merchants who were centered in Montreal. In fact, until the early 20th century, the latter constituted a majority of the city's residents and maintained

[168] As McInnis (1969) points out, opposition to British immigration emerged as early as the 1830s. For instance, the cholera outbreak in 1832 that was caused by immigrants was perceived as a deliberate attempt to decrease the French population through the spread of infection.
[169] The rural-religious structure of French Canadian society can partly be attributed to the flight of civil servants, lawyers, and merchants following the conquest, leaving mainly the Catholic clergy and rural peasants behind (Cook 2005).

their economic advantage well into the second half of the century (Breton 1988b; Levine 2010). Anglophone economic dominance bolstered their relative power and led them to demand that Francophone influence in Quebec be limited by integrating Lower Canada into the dominion's Anglo-Saxon mainstream instead.[170]

Second, this period witnessed the emergence of new Francophone elites who, due to the church's absolute social power, were confined primarily to the political sphere (Breton 1988a). This new educated class, which included Papineau and his Parti Patriote, sought to emancipate Francophone society from the church's authoritarianism by encouraging modernization and industrialization. The threat posed by these new elites, however, was partially neutralized by Britain, which, in return for maintaining the status quo of British overall dominance in Canada, enabled the church to maintain its privileged position among Francophones (Parkin 1892; Rioux 1978). Interestingly, the Anglophone merchants and industrialists of Lower Canada also perceived these elites as a threat. The former feared that the latter's ascendance to power would subordinate them to a modernized Francophone political authority, undermine their influence, and curtail the stock of cheap unskilled Francophone labor at their disposal (Breton 1988b).

Third and most important, the Church was increasingly concerned about Francophone emigration. Between 1840 and 1930, over one million Francophones—a quarter of the population—emigrated from Quebec[171] primarily to the United States and Ontario in search of land, economic opportunities, and emancipation from the authoritarian power of the Church

[170] In fact, in order to preserve its power, the church set up a system of elite accommodation with the Anglophone business class and facilitated the latter's economic dominance in the province in return for maintaining autonomous control over the Francophone population (Chiswick 1981; Levine 2010). For an in-depth analysis of the Church's role in Francophone society, see: Gauvreau 2005.
[171] These waves of emigration were primarily a reaction to the difficulties of obtaining land due to land tenure rules that concentrated ownership in the hands of the Church and absentee landlords. For an in-depth discussion of the causes of emigration, see: Gates 1934 pp. 27-29.

(Belanger 2000; Falardeau 1953; Henripin 1957; Knowles 2007).[172] Despite the Church's attempts to create institutional frameworks for the emigrants in a bid to prevent their assimilation, the latter ultimately shed their Francophone identity. Emigration and assimilation increasingly exemplified the concrete danger faced by Francophones in a predominantly Anglophone North America (Lachaine 2011; Linteau et al. 1983).[173]

The clergy was particularly concerned about the relative demographic weakening that occurred as a result of emigration. As an editorial of the conservative journal *l'Opinion Publique* put it, "United together we can accomplish great things; dispersed to the four corners of the continent our efforts are half paralyzed" (in Silver 1997, 113).[174] In addition, emigration constituted an acute threat due to its confluence with mass Anglophone immigration and the later ingress of Eastern European immigrants at the end of the 19th century who largely assimilated into Anglophone society (Knowles 2007; Richmond 1967).[175] Due to these demographic dynamics, within less than half a century, the Francophones diminished demographically from a clear majority to just over a third of the Canadian population and approximately 75 percent of the population in Lower Canada (Kelly and Trebilock 2010; Silver 1997). As the leader of the pro-British imperial movement explained, "The whole inflow of immigration increases the weight of the English-speaking in the province; the outflow to New England lessens that of Quebec. The

[172] During this period, immigration was considered temporary. Immigration was perceived as a means by which French Canadians could save money to purchase land in Quebec (Beaujot 1979).
[173] Interestingly, many emigrants in New England had fervent national identities and continued to adhere to *La Survivance* by creating small, inward-looking French Catholic communities in their host communities. These institutions, coupled ~~by~~ with popular resistance to assimilation among Francophones, delayed their assimilation and acculturation processes in comparison to other immigrant groups (Petrin 1990).
[174] French Canadian nationalists have argued that during this period, Ottawa supported Francophone emigration to the US and intentionally made it costly and difficult to emigrate from French Canada to the Western provinces where farming lands were abundantly available. As a result, it was both easier and cheaper to emigrate from Eastern Europe to Western Canada than it was from Quebec. (See: Angers 1954, 458).
[175] Immigrant assimilation into Anglophone society emanated from three factors. First, immigrants sought to integrate into the primary power group. Second, the Francophones' strong social boundaries precluded the incorporation of non-ethnics (Behiels 1991). Third, most non-Anglophone immigrants settled in the prairies and Western provinces that were primarily Anglophone (Sturgis and Davis 1998/9).

relative numbers and influence of French Canada will never be greater than they are at present, but rather less…partly owing to the hesitation…to throw themselves more entirely than they have hitherto done into the tide of the Anglo-Saxon movement" (Parkin 1892, 154-5).

In response, the Church sought to maintain its dominance within Francophone society by promoting the culture of *La Survivance.* Beginning in the 1830s, the Church fostered this ideology, which primarily sought to ensure the protection and preservation of a distinct French Canadian society under the authority of the Church through the creation of a closed society with impermeable social boundaries (Dumont 1993; 1997). This culture was rooted in a strong conception of ethnic nationalism that privileged those of French Canadian descent and perceived immigrants as a threat to Francophone survival (Breton 1988; Juteau 2004). *La Survivance* was not a transformative approach but a defensive one that was rooted in Catholicism and social conservatism. It was an inward-looking stance that sought to shield and isolate Franco-Canadians from the influences of alien cultures, modernization, and secularization (Breton 1988; Keating 2001). "The darkness of the present was forgotten as traditional nationalism rewrote the past in glorious terms…A direct link was posited between the past and the future: the present was obliterated and along with it the political dimension of the national question was reduced to a mere cultural matter" (Lamoureux 1992, 124). *La Survivance* constituted, as an official Quebec report later asserted, a messianic approach that highlighted a glorious past and a future national resurrection while discounting the difficulties and challenges faced by many Francophones in the present (Province du Québec 1978).

As a means of maintaining the Church's social and political power, *la Survivance* explicitly promoted the maintenance of the three constitutive pillars of French Canadian society and identity: language, culture, and religion (Rioux 1978; Savage and Stewart 2011). It emphasized the fragility and contingency of the community's survival and promoted social solidarity and cohesion, which were seen as necessary to contain the threat posed by North American heterogeneity, depredation by Anglophone hegemony, demographic decline, and modernization.[176] Collective survival required isolation and rejection of external influences emanating from the Canadian state, the marginalization of modernizing elites who were not appointed by the Church, the rejection of industrialization and urbanization in favor of a rural way of life, and the exclusion of *others* (Kwavnick, 1965).

While rejecting immigration, the church sought to offset demographic decline by strongly enforcing religious prohibitions on birth control and family planning, which, in the absence of Francophone immigration, constituted the sole means of demographic expansion (Breton 1988b; Henripin 1957).[177] The Church's reproductive policies were strictly observed by the clergy across French Canada, producing exceptionally high birth rates that averaged 4.5 children per woman in 1926 (Linteau et al. 1986). As a prominent Québécois public intellectual explained, "the priests would demand that women would have more and more children. Even if you already had 12 children and the doctor said you would die if you had another one, the priests would insist…this is why so many people of my generation are still opposed and fearful of the Church" (personal interview November 28, 2011).

High birthrates persisted until the 1940s and large families became a fixture of French Canadian identity and culture, which was termed *the revenge of the cradle* (d'Anglejan 1984; Lachapelle 1988). "High birth rates…were not simply a question of obedience to the Catholic Church. They were also a defensive reaction against the threat of disappearing as an ethnic group" (Beaujot 1979, 17). Reproduction engendered exponential growth of the French Canadian

[176] For an in-depth discussion of the parameters of *La Survivance*, see: Bouchard 2008 pp. 77-86.
[177] According to Linteau et al. (1993), from the beginning of the 19th century until the end of World War II, Quebec's population doubled every 25 years due to natural growth.

population. Despite mass emigration, the population increased from 200,000 in 1800 to over four million in 1950 (Bouchard 2008; Henripin 1957).[178] However, with the secularization of Quebec following World War II, birthrates declined rapidly, falling well below those of other Canadian provinces by 1968 (Beaujot 1979; Maroney 1992).[179]

It is intriguing that while the exclusion of non-Francophone *others* emerged as a defensive stance against external influences that could undermine Francophone society, in the realm of immigration it proved to be a largely self-defeating strategy (Breton 1988b). Due to the wholesale rejection of migrants, immigration became the exclusive domain of Anglo-Canada, which continued to promote it instrumentally as a means of facilitating demographic expansion and Anglo-Saxon nation building (Breton 1988b; Knowles 2007; Richmond 1967).

La Survivance was successful in maintaining Church domination as it continued to define and control French-Canadian society, identity, and culture. In addition, it also succeeded in hindering modernization, the emergence of competing elites, and Francophone social and economic development since ongoing opposition to development and industrialization and the underdeveloped education system impeded opportunities for upward mobility (Bouchard 2008). Prospects for mobility were also circumscribed due to Anglophone economic dominance. Interestingly, this dominance was supported and sustained by the Church, since Church leaders believed that it would inhibit Francophone modernization (Rioux 1978). Consequently, most French-Canadians maintained a rural existence well into the 20th century, although increasing numbers began migrating to the urban centers of Quebec and Montreal to assume subordinate

[178] Data suggest that while the world population increased fourfold between 1760 and 1960 and the European population increased fivefold, in Quebec birthrates account for a 9000 percent population growth. Additionally, while high birthrates bolstered population growth and countered Anglophone expansion, they also inhibited economic development and negatively affected education (Henripin 1962; Henripin and Peron 1972).
[179] The average birthrate was already declining during the post-war period; in 1961, it was still 2.99, in 1966, it was 2.7, while in 1971, it declined to 1.9, which is below replacement rate (Linteau et al. 1983; Meroney 1992).

positions in Anglophone enterprises (Levine 1990).

The dominance of *La Survivance* persisted until after World War II and the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s. In fact, despite the subsequent modernization of Quebec and the popular rejection of the Church, several elements of this culture have survived, particularly those related to the threats faced by Francophones in a predominantly Anglophone North America. As the analysis below reveals, the interpretive and phenomenological frameworks it produced continue to play an important role in shaping group identity, ethnic and social boundaries, and preferences and policies regarding immigrants.

The British North America Act and Inter-Group Competition over Power

In the institutional-political realm, 1867 ushered in a new era in Canadian history. In the wake of fears that emanated from American expansion, the ongoing political impasse in the Dominion, struggles between supporters of centralization and proponents of regional autonomy, and ongoing institutional conflicts between the two linguistic groups, a new constitutional act was devised (Breton 1988b; Stanly 1971). The British North America (BNA) established the Canadian Federation dividing Canada into four provinces (Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia).

Initially, both religious and secular Francophone elites were divided in regard to the BNA (Balthazar 1989; Silver 1997). When the act was put to the vote in the Canadian Assembly, Quebec representatives were split with 27 for and 22 against (Government of Quebec 1979). Proponents emphasized that the act rejected assimilation and anglification and created a separate province of Quebec where Franco-Canadians constituted a clear majority (Behiels 1991).

Opponents feared that it would undermine existing modalities of intergroup power sharing, entrenching British dominance throughout Canada instead. For Francophone nationalists, however, the BNA was largely positive since it enshrined the duality of the two founding nations of Canada and granted them a territorially defined homeland (Government of Quebec 1977; 1979; Silver 1997).

In practice, the act was a compromise between the centralizing goals of English Canada and French-Canadian aspirations for regional autonomy (Breton 1988b). The BNA divided competencies between the federal government and the provinces based on their relative importance and the level of agreement. It maintained exclusive federal jurisdiction over economic development, international relations, transportation, and criminal law, but granted the provinces full autonomy over education and social services, and instituted shared jurisdiction regarding immigration and agriculture. While the new federation was not flawless, "from 1867 until about 1960 federalism (variously defined) was taken for granted…sovereignty for Quebec…was not considered a realistic or serious option" (Stevenson 2011, 51).

Despite the apparent political stability that was brought about by the BNA act, the decades following 1867 were accompanied by intense demographic competition and increasing hostility between the two linguistic groups (Breton 1988b).[180] These tensions were evident in their conflicting positions regarding the 1885 Louis Riel rebellion in Manitoba, which emerged

[180] Breton (1988b) points out that despite the increased accommodation of Francophones within the BNA framework, the act ultimately privileged Anglo-Canada, enabling the group to become dominant throughout the dominion. This occurred due to several factors. First, the Anglophones gained primary control over government. Second, the BNA was accompanied by the rise of the Imperialist Movement that sought to shape Canada's identity as part of Britain (Berger 2013; Cole 1971). Third, the Protestant Church of Canada gained substantial institutional power within the federal government and acted to maintain the Dominion's Anglo-Saxon character (Knowles 2007; Sturgis and Davis 1998). Fourth, Anglo-Candians exclusively uses immigration in order to increase their demographic power (Richmond 1967). Fifth, the incremental increase in the number of provinces that were dominated by Anglophones minoritized Quebec. Finally, despite the BNA's balance between federal and provincial competencies, in practice, Anglophone politicians implemented a highly centralized approach (Breton 1988b).

largely in response to increasing Anglophone immigration to the province and resulted in Riel's execution. Five years later, linguistic conflict re-emerged over Manitoba's legislative assembly's prohibition of the instruction of French (Hebert 2004).[181] Similar conflicts emerged as other provinces and localities banned or limited bilingual education and the instruction of French. In fact, restrictions of French across Canada served to mobilize Francophones against an alleged *anti-French conspiracy* that had swept Canada, enhancing the community's siege mentality (Breton 1988b).

These measures however gained strong support from Anglophone goups both in Canada and Britian. For Instance, *The Times* of London defended these restrictions by comparing Francophone linguistic demands to those of the pre-civil war South in favor of slavery and racist protectionism (*The Times*, Februry 17, 1913). Silver (1982) argues that these events served as a catalyst for the emergence of a pan-Canadian Francophone identity, a bilingual theory of the confederation that imagined a community whose boundaries transcended the province of Quebec, generating a need to protect Francophone minorities across the federation.

Beyond linguistic conflict and demographic competition, intergroup relations were exacerbated by the increasing popular support for Canadian nation building that was defined primarily as an Anglo-Saxon Prottant society with close ties to Britain (Buckner 1997; Detre 2004; Sturgis and Davis 1998). This trend was evident in the rising popularity of the pro-British Imperial Federation (Breton 1998b). The Federation sought to shape Canada's identity around Britain (for a detailed manifesto, see: Perkins 1872). According to this view, "The only true members of the British Empire were Anglo-Saxon. All others seemed to be considered second-class citizens, tolerated for historical and economic reasons" (Girard 2001, 250).

[181] Similar bans and limitation were instituted in Alberta, New Brunswick, and Saskatchewan in 1905, and in Ontario in 1913 (Breton 1988a). In Ontario, these policies were part of a larger provincial policy that sought to assimilate and anglicize Francophones (Girard 2001).

Francophones perceived these developments as attempts to expand Anglophone hegemony across Canada and as a direct threat to their survival. Cole (1971) argues that the desire to enhance the British role within the Federation emanated mainly from a lack of an ethnically differentiated conception of Anglo-Canadian identity beyond its relationship with Britain. He suggests that Anglo-Canadian nation building was not motivated primarily by an aspiration to weaken the French fact in Canada but by the goal of consolidating English Canada, with the former constituting only a secondary and implicit interest. However, these processes served to mobilize French-Canadians and enhanced the defensiveness and social closure that emanated from *La Survivance* (Breton 1988b).

On the demographic front, intergroup competition intensified as elites from both linguistic groups sought to augment their relative size within the Federation. To this end, beginning in the 1870s and with greater force during the 1890s, English Canada facilitated immigration by recruiting English-speaking immigrants from Britain, the United States, and northern Europe (Richmond 1967; Wade 1953).[182] "The federal government was responsible for a policy which exclusively favored the interests of a nation dominated by an Anglo-Saxon majority. Even though European immigration was sought for economic reasons, there was no political desire to foster the entry of Francophones" (Girard 2001, 251-2). While policies were primarily based on positive rather than negative discrimination (Sturgis and Davis 1988/9), in the eyes of Francophone elites, between 1892 and 1950, "British-Canadian leaders were deliberately trying to swamp Canada with a policy of massive immigration of Anglophones and Allophones

[182] Sturgis and Davis (1988/9) point out that in Eastern Canada, there was a strong preference for British immigrants, while in Western Canada, white Anglo-Saxon Americans were the preferred category of immigrants.

(non-English and non-French speakers)" (Behiels 1991, 6).[183] As Dumont (1977) explains, Francophones increasingly believed that "from now on it was going to be a minority forever, and, with the help of a dynamic federal immigration policy, an increasingly diminishing one" (117).

As a result of federal recruitment policies, almost three million immigrants entered Canada between 1894 and 1914, 700,000 of whom settled in Quebec (Behiels 1991; McInnis 1969). During this period, immigrants' ethnic origin was a concern for Canadian policy makers, who wanted to enhance the Federation's Anglo-Saxon character. This is blatantly evident for example in the Dominion's official information handbook that solely referred to immigration from Britain and emphasized the Anglo Saxon Character of Canada (Dominion of Canada 1894). Furthermore, to further facilitate the goal of anglification, the Canadian government established a network of immigration agents in Britain, Germany, and the United States to encourage *desirable* (Anglo-Saxon and Protestant) individuals to immigrate (Careless 1970; Knowles 2007).[184]

Migrant recruitment strategies were significantly expanded under Clifford Sifton, who served as Minister of State between 1896 and 1905. During his tenure, over 650,000 immigrants entered Canada (Kelly and Trevilcock 2010). Despite the goal of recruiting *desirable immigrants*, Sifton primarily sought to expand Canada's population in the west and prairies by recruiting migrants with agricultural experience and paid less attention to issues concerning Canada's Anglo-Saxon identity per se.[185] However, it was assumed that due to the limited French influence in these regions, Allophones would assimilate into Anglophone society (Detre 2004; Sturgis and

---

[183] In fact, as Girard (2001) explains, Francophones were not perceived as being an organic part of Canadian society since they "considered Anglo-Saxons the only 'true' Canadians, whether they were born in Canada or in Great Britain: French-Canadians were identified with the foreign elements in the country" (105).

[184] Immigrant desirability was contingent on factors such as country of origin, economic resources, professional skills, and adaptability. For a detailed discussion on this issue, see: Knowles 2007, 69-71.

[185] Although as Wade (1953) points out, Sifton's active role in the movement for abolishing French in Manitoba and his disinterest in recruiting Francophone migrants from France and Belgium "led the French Canadians to suspect a plot to swamp them in an English-speaking Canada in which Quebec would have little voice or importance" (120).

Davis 1998/9).[186] Although Sifton promoted a diversity of immigration from Central and Eastern Europe, Britain and the United States remained primary areas for his immigrant recruitment efforts. While immigrants from the United States were sought after because of the convenience of their recruitment and agricultural experience, British immigrants were “deemed politically necessary since English Canadians took it for granted that the government would do everything possible to retain the British Character of the country” (Knowles 2007, 94).[187]

In 1905, Frank Oliver replaced Sifton as Minister of State. For Oliver, the bolstering of Anglophone Canada constituted a primary concern. Thus, he explicitly attempted to facilitate Canadian nation building by enhancing Anglophone and Protestant immigration to the country (Kelly and Trebilcock 2010; Knowles 2007). Immigration “was a political means that would swing the balance decisively against the French” (Innis 1969, 269). He relegated immigrants’ economic suitability to a secondary position, privileging their ethnic origin instead. Furthermore, in contrast to Sifton’s focus on the west, Oliver settled immigrants in the urban centers of Quebec and Ontario. He sought to exclude both Francophones and Eastern and Central Europeans, whom he defined as “a millstone around Canada’s neck”, and whose presence, he believed, would hinder the development of social solidarity and a cohesive Anglo-Saxon Canadian national identity (Hall 1981; Knowles 2007).

Concurrently, he expanded the network of immigrant recruitment offices throughout Britain and granted large bonuses to immigration officers who successfully recruited British migrants (Avery 1979). In addition, Oliver employed a host of additional tactics to increase the number of Anglo Saxon immigrant. A 1906 debate in the Canadian House of Commons offers a

[186] While Sifton did not explicitly promote Anglo-Saxon immigration, he strongly believed in the importance of assimilating non-English-speaking immigrants into Anglophone society and sought to limit Francophones’ linguistic rights, which he perceived as impediments to Anglicization (Bothwell 1995).
[187] Girard (2001) points out that beyond maintaining and enhancing Canada’s Anglo-Saxon identity, these policies also represented a preference for maintaining strong trade relations with Britain.

revealing account of the various methods the Canadian government employed in order to attract immigrants of British stock (see: The Standing Committee on Agriculture and Colonization, Debate on Immigration to Canada 1905-6, April 4, 1906, pp. 451-542).

Furthermore, recruitment pamphlets that were distributed during this period in Britain systematically over-emphasized Canada's *Britishness* while downplaying or ignoring the presence of Francophone and native populations. For instance, a promotional pamphlet entitled "Canada: the Land of Opportunity", published by the Ministry of the Interior (1910), makes no mention of the French nature of Quebec or the use of the French language in Canada. Unsurprisingly, these policies engendered strong negative reactions from Francophone nationalist lawmakers such as Henri Bourassa and Armand Lavergne who perceived them as deliberate attempts to undermine and Weaken Francophone Canada (See: "Talked Immigrants", *The Montreal Gazette* April 10, 1907).

To the dismay of Francophones, these policies sparked a dramatic increase in immigration from the British Isles (Balthazar 1986; Girard 2001; Knowles 2007). British immigrants increased from fewer than 1,200 annually in 1900 to over 86,000 in 1906 and just under 143,000 in 1914 (Knowles 2007). While there appears to have also been large-scale immigration from the United States, It is difficult to accurately assess the number of these immigrants, since they did not enter through controlled seaports (see initial assessment in: "Immigration to Canada", *The Duluth Herald* August 21, 1906). However, it is estimated that United States Citizens consistently ranked the first or second largest immigrant group (after the British) (Knowles 2007).

Following World War I and the decline in immigration, the government promulgated the 1919 immigration law in order to reinvigorate European and British immigration. In 1922, British immigration was again enhanced by the annulment of all occupational limitations for British subjects and the legislation of the Empire Settlement Act. The act created special monetary incentives for agriculturalists, laborers, women, and children under 17 by providing government assistance and distributing $600,000 in subsidized loans (*The Montreal Gazette* June 22, 1922; *Quebec Daily Telegraph* June 13, 1923). In an report on immigration to Canada, *The Times* of London explained, "Unquestionably British people are preferred, with Americans second, but there is also an increasing readiness to admit people from Switzerland, Holland, Norway and other approved countries" (*The Times*, October 14, 1922). As an Anglophone Conservative MP put it, "We need immigrants of the right class, and I would say that immigrants should be preferably of British stock…these are the chief desiderata in an immigrant" (House of Commons, Plenary debate, 6 October, 1924; *The Montreal Gazette* July 19, 1923).[188]

Although there was a relative decline in immigration between the 1920s and the mid-1940s, the federal and provincial governments' interests in facilitating British immigration persisted. In 1923, a group of British journalists was invited for a month-long tour of Canada in return for promotional articles on immigration. Members of the expedition affirmed the need to increase British immigration and preserve Canada's Anglo-Saxon purity (*The Montreal Gazette*, September 10, 1927). In 1928, Prime Minister Mackenzie King asserted, "I wish it to be understood…Canada wants immigrants and above all, she wants them from the British Isles – from England, Scotland and Ireland – and is prepared to receive…the natural flow of immigrants from the British Isles who are prepared to come" (*The Glasgow Herald*, March 28, 1928).[189]

---

[188] For a discussion of the growth of and prospects for British immigration see: "immigration from Britain has Doubled", *The Montreal Gazette* July 19, 1923.

[189] There are multiple examples of public and state support for the expansion of British immigration. For instance, in September 1921, Montreal author John MacCormac (1921) lamented that bureaucratic procedures and complexities had kept out British immigrants who are "the most desirable class of new citizens" and facilitated the immigration of Slavs instead. For additional examples, see: Knowles 2007.

Similarly, in 1929, the Bishop of British Columbia and the Yukon called Anglo-Canadians to unite against the disruptive influence of Quebec and the Francophone population. "The only solution…is that all English speaking people in the dominion should bind themselves together…and demand that the country be kept British and made more British still…the French people have gained control of our country…. We could yet save the situation but the time is short" (*The Montreal Gazette,* August 22, 1929).

Throughout this period, French Canadians had no influence on Federal immigration policy (Girard 2001). By the early 20th century, Francophone political elites had become increasingly concerned about immigration and the threat it posed to communal survival. First, since immigrants were almost exclusively joining the Anglophone community, the demographic position of Francophones vis-à-vis Anglophones both in Quebec and the Federation as a whole was in decline, although this trend was mitigated by the high Francophone birthrates (Bouchard 2008). Second, Francophones outside Quebec (particularly in the Western provinces) faced discrimination since both Anglophones and new Allophone (immigrants who are neither French nor English speakers) immigrant groups such as Ukrainians and Austro-Hungarians outnumbered them.[190] Third, expansion of the new Western provinces reduced Quebec's weight within the Federation, decreasing its influence in Ottawa (Breton 1988b; Parkin 1882).

Interestingly, French Canadians contributed to the anglification of immigrants as a result of the entrenched protectionist French-Canadian ethnic nationalism that rejected immigrant inclusion (Breton 1988a; Keating 2001). Furthermore, the superior economic and political position of Anglophones both in Quebec and Canada incentivized immigrants to assimilate into

[190] During this period, large nativist movements that called for the deportation of all non-Anglophone immigrants, both Francophones and Allophones, emerged (Girard 2001). These groups lumped Francophones together with newly landed immigrants as being inimical to the interest of maintaining a British identity.

Anglo-Canadian society. Thus, inward-looking social closure and the rejection of immigration in response to the threat of anglification became a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Quebec elites reacted to these developments in two contradictory ways, both of which supported social closure and an ethnic conception of membership. First, some actors such as nationalist MPs Henri Bourassa and Armand Lavergne, who later formed the *Ligue Nationaliste Canadienne*[191] political party, demanded that the government facilitate increased Francophone immigration from France and Belgium (*The Montreal Gazette* April 10, 1907). Lavergne claimed that there was a "conspiracy against French immigration which is carried on in the interior department." (House of Commons debate April 9, 1907, 6151)[192] Lavergne also reacted against "the Anglicization and Americanization of Canada" (ibid) and called for increasing the number of "French immigrants who would be assimilated by the French Canadian people." (ibid, 6154). Second, the Church maintained its historical objection to immigration. Instead, Church leaders exerted efforts to halt all immigration to Canada (Behiels 1991; Breton 1988b) and to protect the linguistic and cultural rights of Francophones outside of Quebec (Stevenson 2011).

Ultimately, the Church's position prevailed, though it is unclear whether this was due to its inability to recruit Francophone immigrants or its relative power among French-Canadians. Beyond immigration, the political-institutional competition with Canada persisted between 1910 and 1945. A particularly acute crisis occurred during World War I due to Quebec's opposition to providing conscripts to support the war efforts, which was perceived as an 'English interest' (Armstrong 1974). Opposition to conscription led to large-scale protests that were harshly repressed by the federal government (Van Loon and Wittington 1971). The conscription crisis

[191] Later, as a member of the Quebec legislative assembly, Lavergne was responsible for the legislation of the province's first language law.
[192] Official Report of Debates, House of Commons, Volume 4; April 9, 1907, p. 6151.

recurred in the wake of World War II when the Canadian parliament again authorized conscription.[193] Fenwick (1981) points out that both conscription crises represented the deeply-entrenched identity conflict between English Canada and Britain and the willingness of the former to rely on its demographic advantage within Canada and employ violence toward minority groups in order to facilitate the its interests.

World War II and its Aftermath: The Shift from Anglophone to Allophone Immigration

The period preceding and following World War II constituted a time of transformation in Quebec for Francophone society and the nature of intergroup competition owing to several factors. First, from the early 1900s and more forcefully in the mid-20th century, Allophone immigration to the province increased dramatically, almost completely replacing Anglophone immigrants. During this period, hundreds of thousands of immigrants, primarily Jews, Italians, Greeks, and Portuguese, fled Europe and settled in the province. While Allophones constituted approximately two percent of the population in the 1930s, by 1971 they accounted for 10 percent of the province's population and integrated at a 90 percent rate into Anglophone society (Behiels 1991; Girard 2001). As a result of their Anglification, the ingress of Allophones threatened to substantially alter the province's ethnic and linguistic balance in favor of Anglophones (Behiels 1991; Dupré 2012; Kelley and Trebilcock 2010). Thus, the increase in Allophone immigration

[193] While the Church and the UN led the anti-conscription campaign, the latter ultimately served as a catalyst for neo-nationalism (Breuilly 1982).

constituted a profound change for the province since it challenged traditional ethnic divisions, thereby engendering substantial challenges and opportunities for Francophone society.

Second, modernization and secularization dramatically decreased Francophone fertility rates. Within 20 years, Quebec shifted from one of the most fertile societies in the developed world to one of the least fertile ones.[194] This trend generated a threat to Francophones' relative demographic position (Horin 1966). In response, Francophone political and religious elites adopted a particularly vocal stand against the open-door immigration policy (Behiels 1991). French newspapers echoed this opposition by promoting xenophobic ideologies and discourse (ibid.). Third, increasing Francophone modernization, urbanization, and secularization eroded the Church's position—a process that created a substantial power vacuum in the province, generating political space for new elites to emerge (Balthazar 1989; Bouchard 2008).[195]

Beyond the traditional hostility toward immigrants, increasing Allophone immigration triggered two concerns among Francophones. First, while they feared that the anglification of Allophones would undermine Francophone demography both within the province and in Canada, they were concurrently concerned that Allophone assimilation into Francophone society would facilitate the disintegration of their society and identity (Detre 2004; Rioux 1978). Second, Allophones threatened to undermine the delicate bi-cultural and linguistic balance in Canada and Quebec. In particular, the plurality of cultures was perceived as a phenomena that could

---

[194] During this period, demography became an increasing concern in Quebec. Following several estimations by leading demographers concerning the relative decline of Francophones in Quebec and particularly in Montreal due to immigrants assimilating into English and declining birthrates, policy makers increasingly viewed immigration as a problem that needed to be rectified by increasing provincial powers over immigration and the integration of migrants into Francophone society.

[195] For instance, between 1939 and 1950, the number of French-Canadians who worked as manual laborers doubled, a proportion equal to that of the entire 100-year period leading up to 1939. Over the same period, manufacturing in the province increased by 92 percent. Furthermore, during and after World War II, the number of farmers decreased by over 30 percent (Rioux and Martin 1964).

transform Francophones into one minority among many within a predominantly Anglophone state (Behiels 1993; Blad and Couton 2008).

Due to the Francophones' rejection of migrants, Anglophones' economic power, and the robust civil society-based Anglophone welfare system (Bloemraad 2001), the majority of Allophones assimilated into Anglophone society, bolstering the latter's demographic position. In fact, the majority of today's Anglophone community in Quebec, are the descendants of Allophone immigrants from the first half of the twentieth century (personal interview with prominent Québécois historian, November 28, 2011).

For instance, in 1943, only 12 percent of Allophone immigrants, mostly Italians, attended French schools (Fugère 1945).[196] Beyond Anglophone pull factors, this outcome was largely a result of the Catholic-French school board's active encouragement of Allophones to attend English schools as a means of maintaining the ethnic and cultural homogeneity of French schools (McAndrew 2010). As a Jewish community leader who immigrated as a child from Hungary explained, "When we arrived in Montreal, my parents wanted me to attend a French school…. However, they were told that as Jews, I must attend an English Protestant school because for educational reasons, Jews are Protestants and Anglophones" (Personal interview, October 10, 2011).

The rejection of migrants was guided by both the Catholic Church and Quebec's premier, Maurice Duplessis, promoting an organic view of French-Canadian and perceiving immigrants as an inherently disruptive, destabilizing, and even dangerous force (Pâquet 1997). Francophone hostility toward immigration persisted at the federal level as well. For instance, a 1947 Senate recommendation to increase immigration was decried as a racist attempt to weaken and

[196] Most immigrant groups sought to be members of the Anglophone community due to the latter's economic power within the province and the general position of English in North America.

assimilate French Canada (Debates of the Senate of the Dominion of Canada, February 12, 1947; The Standing Committee on Immigration and Labor Report, July 10,1947; *The Ottawa Citizen,* August 22, 1951).[197]

Thus, traditional Francophone political and religious elites sought to halt immigration, which they perceived as a federal conspiracy (Beaudin 1948).[198] While Pâquet (1997) is skeptical of such a premeditated conspiracy, Trudeau (1958) argues that the Federal government practiced positive discrimination in favor of Anglophones until 1948. Regardless of the realities of this issue, it provided an important interpretive frame through which French-Canadians narratives were constructed.[199]

A New Quebec: Neo-Nationalism, the Quiet Revolution, and Immigration

While Quebec's political leaders continued to fear and oppose immigration throughout the 1950s (Baker 2010), the declining influence of the Church created political space for a new group of elites to emerge. These new elites were secular, educated, and modernized and sought to alter the social and political structure of the province through the weakening of conservative and religious forces and the dissemination of a new positive and forward-looking neo-nationalist ideology (Maclure 2003; Rioux 1978).

Neo-nationalism differed from traditional nationalism in its emphasis on the political and transformative aspects of nationalism, secular character, focus on change and progress, and

[197] While federal policies did not explicitly emphasize the role of British immigration, it appears evident that the government continued to incentivize it (*The Ottawa Citizen,* August 22, 1951).
[198] For instance, between 1921 and 1949, the Quebec Catholic labor federation issued 21 resolutions calling for Ottawa to suspend all but Francophone immigration (Pâquet 1997).
[199] This view is evident in the unanimous approval of a motion proposed in February 1948 by MLA René Chaloult that condemned the Federal Government's policies toward immigration (*The Montreal Gazette* 1948).

nation-building within the territory of Quebec rather than the pan-Francophone community across Canada. In contrast to the protectionist, religious, and rural nationalism espoused by the church and political elites, neo-nationalists sought to create a modern, forward-looking, and dynamic Francophone nation that controlled its own destiny. They aimed to actively create a self-confident Francophone society in Quebec, governed by an autonomous government that promoted autonomy, progress, and a state-directed nationalism (Blad and Couton 2007).

With regard to immigration, neo-nationalists were acutely aware of the profound demographic and linguistic transformations engendered by the dramatic increase in Allophone immigration and the latter's subsequent Anglification, coupled by plummeting Francophone birthrates. They argued that these challenges necessitated provincial intervention and perceived "[t]he inaction of the Quebec government as nothing but gross negligence" (Pâquet 1997, 8). They espoused new ideas concerning the intricate connections among the future of the French-Canadian national project, the role of the provincial government, and immigration as a positive force that could enhance rather than hinder Quebec's national aspirations. In particular, they sought to appropriate Anglophone long-term policies that viewed immigration as an instrument of cultural and demographic expansion. To achieve this goal, they demanded that the provincial government assume an active role in defining immigration policy and that it facilitate Allophone integration in order to ensure that immigrants would enhance and not undermine Quebec's emerging national project. "Quebec could and should set norms to deal with what they saw as the potentially highly destabilizing effects of immigration" (Pâquet 1997, 4).

This is particularly evident from a survey I conducted of 64 articles, opinion pieces and essays that were published in various nationalist media outlets (*Action Nationale; Le devoir*) and pamphlets between 1952 and 1958 on the topic of immigration. The survey revealed that during this period this group of neo-nationalist entrepreneurs, who included Pierre Laporte, Jean Marc Leger, Gerard Fillion, Guy Fregault, and members of the so-called Montreal School, actively disseminated new ideas and promoted substantial change in provincial policies and broader public opinion toward immigration.[200]

For instance, in May 1954, the neo-nationalist journal *Action Nationale* devoted an entire issue to the topic of immigration, and continued to publish numerous articles on the topic throughout the decade. The authors recognized that in the Canadian context, immigration was inevitable: “To oppose immigration and deny its need in the reality of our county can only do us harm…. The chances for successful opposition are low just like workers who tried to stop the progress of machinery by destroying machines” (Angers 1954, 426-7). Similarly, Marc Leger (1957) stated, “Our hostility to immigrants, our absence from the field of immigration is equivalent to submitting to the Anglo-Saxon element….Elementary national realities require to make every effort to ensure that most of our immigrant brothers rally for our cause” (42). In addition, they called on the French-Canadian public to alter its exclusionary posture toward immigrants. Despite these attempts, the public and political elites were reluctant to embrace immigration. When the provincially commissioned Tremblay Committee’s report (1956), which examined the challenges faced by Francophones and the province within Canada, recommended an active provincial action to strengthen the position of French both generally and the francization of immigrants in particular, the report was tabled (Kwavnik 1974; Meren 2012).[201]

Thus, in contrast to prevailing attitudes, neo-nationalist elites called on the provincial government to take decisive action on immigration and demanded political intervention to ensure

[200] For examples of this literature see: Jean Marc Leger (1954a; 1954b; 1957), Séguin (1953), Pierre Laporte’s (1954) and Gérard Filion’s (1956) editorial in *Le Devoir*.
[201] The Tremblay Committee was created to assuage neo-nationalists’ criticism of the Church and the province’s conservative political elites. However, the report was highly critical of the defensive and authoritarian practices of these elites (Rioux 1978).

that Allophone immigration would neither undermine Canadian duality nor upset the intergroup demographic balance. In particular, they sought to harness immigration through the use of provincial regulation in order to bolster Francophone demography within the province. To this end, they demanded that the provincial government use its authority to promote the selection of French-speaking immigrants, and make Quebec, and not Canada, the primary host society for immigrants. In particular, they emphasized the importance of integrating Allophones into Francophone society (Lévesque 1968; Pâquet 1997) and halting both Allophone anglification and the creation of ghettoized immigrant communities that were believed to undermine social cohesion. Thus, in this view "immigration and integration became inextricably tied to the fate of the Quebec nation" (Gagnon and Iacovino 2005, 29).

During this period these authors promoted a range of policy preferences that combined various ethnic and civic elements. While some authors supported a almost fully civic conception of membership, others initially maintained an ethnic perspective on immigration that emphasized the need to recruit European Francophone and Catholic migrants, primarily from France, Belgium, and Switzerland, who would bolster the *French fact* in Canada. For instance, In a March 1954 article in *Action Nationale,* Pierre Laporte suggested that these immigrants "would be immigrants of the highest value for French Canada" (404). However, due to the realities of Allophone immigration, this partially ethnic position was quickly abandoned by this group and replaced by a focus on the francization of Allophones and the recruitment of immigrants with a working knowledge of French, regardless of their ethnic or religious origin.

While these new neo-nationalist elites had little institutional power to affect provincial policy change, throughout the 1950s they disseminated these ideas via public writing and the creation of a host of civil society organizations that sought to facilitate Allophone integration into Francophone society (Levine 2010). Despite their minor initial impact, these approaches ultimately generated the ideational foundation for Quebec's contemporary immigration policies.

A crucial shift that enabled these new elites to exert a direct influence on immigration policy occurred in the early 1960s with the advent of the Quiet Revolution (QR), which constituted "the transformation in the governance of a modernized, urbanized, and rapidly secularizing Quebec" (Behiels and Hayday 2011, 157). This shift followed the death of Quebec's long-time conservative premier, Union Nationale (UN) leader Maurice Duplessis in 1959.[202] Officially, the Quiet Revolution, which put an end to over 120 years of conservative, defensive, French-Canadian *La Survivance* culture, emerged following the 1960 electoral victory of the Liberal Party (PLQ) led by Jean Lesage, under the slogan *Il faut que ça change* (things must change).[203] The Quiet Revolution constituted a radical break in French Canadian history, as provincial policies shifted from survival strategies to a focus on active state intervention and management of the economic and social spheres and the promotion of Québécois nation building (Balthazar 1989; McRoberts 1993).

The QR encompassed several simultaneous fundamental transformations that transpired during the 1960s. It both facilitated and was facilitated by the secularization of society and the consequent weakening of the church's power, which since the conquest had constituted the almost exclusive source of social and political authority in the province (Balthazar 1989; Warren 2003). In addition, the QR transformed Francophone society's orientation from negative autonomy (survival) toward positive autonomy, which is defined by institutional development, economic modernization, cultural revitalization, and the development of autonomous provincial power (Behiels 1985). This spirit of change engendered by the Quiet Revolution was epitomized

[202] For and in-depth analysis of Duplessis as premier, see: Jones 1983; Rouillard 2011.
[203] For a comprehensive analysis of the causes for this political transformation, see: Behiels 1985.

by the PLQ's 1962 electoral slogan 'maîtres chez nous' (masters in our own home) (Parti Liberal du Québec 1962).

Under Lesage, the provincial government was quick to fill the authority vacuum left by the Catholic Church and to assert its power over provincial affairs that had historically been the exclusive domain of the Church. As a result, the provincial government was transformed into the Quebec State that increasingly assumed a leading role in governing and shaping Quebec's political, social, economic, and cultural affairs. The new leadership perceived the provincial government as a primary tool for promoting collective and national goals (Breton 1988; Juteau 1994). Policy areas such as education, health, welfare, culture, and immigration, which had been controlled primarily by the Church, were co-opted by the government and became central domains of the state (Fortin 2011).

The implementation of political control over social affairs served to assert Francophone dominance in the province—dominance that had been eroded by decades of Anglophone economic influence and the Church's authoritarian control (Behiels 1985; Keating 2001). As Lesage explained, "It must be understood that the Quebec state is the collective lever of the French-Canadian community…. the necessary instrument of its cultural, economic and social progress…. The Quebec state is not a danger for us. On the contrary, it is ours" (in Balthazar 1989, 9).

Additionally, the QR weakened pan-French-Canadian nationalism and identity, replacing it with a bounded territorialized notion of a French Canada within Quebec (Barker 2010; Oaks and Warren 2007). As a result, Quebec became a nationally defined province in which cultural and linguistic boundaries were to be congruent with territorial ones (Elmer 1997; Keating 2001; Pâquet 1997). Territorialization transformed Quebec Francophones from French-Canadians, a minority group in Canada, into Québécois, a majority nation within the territorially defined homeland of Quebec (Breton 1988a).[204] These processes partially contributed to the allaying of popular anxieties regarding the perceived threat posed by immigration (Kelly and Trebilcock 2010).

The shift in Québécois society's orientation from a minority group within Canada to majority group within the bounded province of Quebec also facilitated a gradual shift from ethnic to civic nationalism as collective insecurities subsided (Breton 1988a; Kuzio 2002; Oaks and Warren 2007).[205] As a result of these transformative processes and de-ethnicization, a space was created for the inclusion of immigrant *others* within the Francophone community. Concurrently, territorialization also excluded Francophones who resided outside Quebec from full membership in the nation. Thus, these processes significantly transformed the contours of the French-Canadian nation and its collective identity and consciousness, reorienting the trajectory of its nation building processes (Juteau 1994; Oaks and Warren 2007).

However, as a prominent Québécois public intellectual explained, this shift engenderd new complexities, "This dual position of being at once a majority and a minority has created several complexities among Francophones.…On the one hand they can now control the province and their destiny. On the other, they are still a minority within Canada and the threat to their survival is still there…. This is the tension that the sovereignty movement has tried to solve" (personal interview November 28, 2011).

[204] Territorialization was further bolstered by the development of modern media, particularly the French unit within the federal broadcasting service (CBC) that played a crucial role in consolidating this renewed identity and its anchoring in the Quebec territory (Balthazar 1995).
[205] Territorialization was a process whereby the Francophone collective understanding shifted from that of a minority throughout Canada to a majority within Quebec (Barker 2010; Balthazar 1989). During the 1970s and 1980s, the federal government under the leadership of Pierre Trudeau attempted to reverse this process by granting all individuals equal linguistic rights across Canada (Blad and Couton 2007).

Finally, the Lesage administration sought to exploit its newfound powers to alter the economic balance that had been dominated by Anglophones for almost two centuries (Breton 1988b). The economic frustration and inferiority felt by French-Canadians was epitomized in Pierre Vallière's (1968) book, *White Niggers of America*. While this might seem like an unwarranted comparison, it echoed the profoundly prevailing sentiments among Québécois, who felt dominated and marginalized within the provincial economy, and reflected the substantial income and status disparities between Francophones and Anglophones (Breuilly 1982; Fenwick 1982; Schmid et al. 2004).[206] Lesage's goal was partially facilitated by the development of a large Francophone-dominated provincial bureaucracy that offered Francophones opportunities for social, economic, and professional mobility.

The profound changes ushered in by the Quiet Revolution generated institutional opportunities for these neo-nationalist elites who promoted active state intervention in policy fields such as education, welfare, culture, and immigration. The nation- and state-building processes did not focus solely on the domestic Québec affairs but also sought to utilize the broader Canadian and international arenas to bolster the province's position and autonomy. These goals were promoted through increased exertion of provincial power at the federal level as well as the development of a provincial international presence—processes within which immigration played a key role (Barker 2010; Kostov 2008; Symodns 2002).

In relation to immigration, the QR fostered a gradual transformation of Québécois social boundaries and willingness to accept immigrants. While as discussed above, prior to the 1960s, Allophone immigrants were largely excluded and perceived together with Anglophones as a

[206] For example, Francophones on average earned 52 percent less than their Anglophone counterparts, while the parallel figure for African Americans in the United States was 54 percent (Fortin 2011).

threat to the French fact in Canada,[207] Quebec's territorialization generated a space for the emergence of the neo-nationalist approach. The latter depicted immigrants as potential members of Francophone Quebec and as a means of bolstering Francophone demography rather than as an impediment to the national project. Thus, from the mid-1960s, the provincial government actively sought to reverse Allophone anglification and to enhance provincial involvement in immigrant selection and integration policies in ways that would benefit Quebec's collective interests (Behiels 1991; Blad and Couton 2009; Dickinson and Young 2003).

For this purpose, Lesage created a Ministry of Culture that promoted Québécois cultural interests, and the *Office de la Langue Française* (OLF), which was responsible for bolstering the use of French within the province. Furthermore, he appointed Pierre Laprote and Marc Leger, both of whom played central roles in developing the new approach toward immigration, to head these new offices (respectively). In the Cultural Ministry's first White Paper, Laporte warned: "Studies show that the relative importance of the Francophone population is declining…. The principal reason is that immigration is a marginal fact within the Francophone collective, while for Anglophones it is an important demographic support" (in Handler 1988, 175). Additionally, in response to mounting pressures from neo-nationalist groups to take stronger action on immigration (Debates de L'Assemblée Législative du Québec January 16, 1965; January 28, 1965), in late 1965, the government created a dedicated immigration agency that was commissioned to counter the demographic and linguistic challenges engendered by Allophone anglification, generate plans for altering Ottawa's de-facto monopoly over immigration, and facilitate Allophone francization (Debates de L'Assemblée Législative du Québec, February 10, 1965; February 17, 1965). In her inaugural speech, the agency's director announced that it would

[207] Irish Catholic immigrants were considered an exception to this rule and in fact many members of this community integrated into Catholic Francophone society (Balthazar 1993).

act to assimilate immigrants as a means of bolstering Francophone demography vis-à-vis English Canada (Goodyer 1965). The increasingly important role of immigration became evident in the PLQ's 1966 electoral platform declaring immigration as one of its central tenets (Parti Libéral du Québec 1966).

The PLQ's defeat in 1966 sparked a revival of nationalist and separatist movements in Quebec. Pâquet (1997) argues that rise in popular support for the resurgence of neo-nationalist movements was intricately linked to the issue of immigration and Allophone integration since many sought the implementation of more coercive integration policies that would require that immigrants integrate solely into the Francophone majority. In fact, immigration and the PLQ's alleged failure to deal with the issue constituted a central issue in the victorious Union Nationale's electoral platform. Beyond demands to increase Quebec's power over immigrant selection and integration, the platform made three proposals: (1) creation of a provincial immigration ministry; (2) providing enhanced resources to study immigration issue in Quebec; (3) creation of a center for national demography that will develop appropriate immigration policies (Union Nationale 1966).

Similarly, in a militant pamphlet on immigration, Claude Morin (1966), who would later become a Parti Québécois leader, also called for the development of active policies that would facilitate recruitment of French-speaking migrants, the creation of a dedicated Immigration Ministry, enhancing Québec's international presence in Francophone countries, repatriating Québécois emigrants from Canada and the United States, and increasing openness toward immigrants. Despite the PLQ's initial opposition, in 1968 the new Union Nationale government with the support of Québécois nationalists transformed the Quebec's immigration agency into a fully-fledged ministry (Symond 2002).

In the National Assembly debate around the creation of the ministry, the bill's sponsor explained the rationale behind it, "It is to avoid our group, as a nation in Quebec and Canada, from diminishing that we seek to fully occupy the field of immigration and demand that the federal government an increase our powers regarding immigration". Interestingly neo-nationalist leader René Lévesque was critical of the final version of the bill since it did not do enough to promote Francophone demographic and social interests. Lévesque lamented that the bill did not explicitly mention that "Quebec seeks immigration to reinforce the number and quality of our French society…English speakers will be in a majority position in 10 or 15 years…French society in North America will go to the devil" (Debates de L'Assemblée Nationale du Québec, October 31, 1968).

Beyond these institutional policies and changes, public hostility toward immigration also began to wane. Prior to the Quiet Revolution, the first public opinion study on immigration that was published in 1952 found significant differences between Anglophones' and Francophones' opinions regarding immigration. While only 37 percent of the former opposed immigration, a staggering 67 percent of the latter were highly opposed to it (Malone 1952). However, in the 1960s and early 1970s, Québécois society became increasingly more favorable toward immigration (Levine 2010). Two processes facilitated this shift in popular perceptions. First, an increasing number of demographic studies emphasized the weakening position of French in Quebec (Behiels 1991; Laporte 1984; d'Anglejan 1984). These studies were the product of both the Federal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism and the increased use of demographic research as a tool for social planning by the Quebec government (Maroney 1992). Québécois demographers such as Dumereau, Horin, and Henripin stressed that immigration would pose a demographic threat to Francophones in Canada if the decline in birthrates persisted and Allophones continued assimilating into Anglophone society.[208] Second, the new ideas that were espoused by neo-Québécois nationalists such as Liberal minister René Levesque and other political elites increasingly resonated among Francophones (Levine 2010). This was not, however, unqualified openness, but one that primarily perceived immigration instrumentally as a means of bolstering Francophone Québécois society through selective immigration and active provincial development of integration policies (Traisnel 2008).

In response to these transformations, a multitude of new actors became actively involved in the field of immigration. For instance, the Francophone Catholic School Board initiated reforms that made their schools, which were pivotal tools of socialization into Francophone society, more inclusive. At the same time, the unions attempted to bolster the use of French in the workplace both as a means of enhancing Francophones' economic standing and facilitating immigrants' integration into French. These efforts engendered strong opposition from the Anglophones, who feared that their community in general and their educational and social institutions in particular would be jeopardized since these changes would reduce their capacity to grow demographically as a result of the incorporation of Allophones (Behiels 1991).[209]

The 1968 creation of the pro-sovereignty Parti Québécois (PQ) by liberal neo-nationalists Lévesque, Morin, and Leger, who believed that the liberal party had not done enough to promote Francophone autonomous interests, provided an additional boost for the immigration issue (Breuilly 1982). In fact, Pâquet (1997) argues that the rise of separatist nationalism was intricately connected to the immigration issue and the demand for more coercive integration policies Personal interview with a former separatist leader November 14, 2011).

[208] For examples of this demographic literature, see: Dumareau (1952); Falardeau (1953); Henripin (1957); Henripin (1959); Horin (1966).
[209] Since the early 20th century, Allophone immigration constituted the primary means of demographic expansion among Anglophones (Bouchard 2008).

Similarly, in his separatist manifesto, PQ leader René Levesque (1968) explained the role that his movement accorded to immigration. He blamed the federal and provincial governments for neglecting Francophone immigration and lamented immigrant assimilation into English: "We know the results of this policy…. Canada has become a unilingual country where French minorities are irreparably submerged…. For Quebec this policy combined with declining birthrates is leading to demographic catastrophe…. This is enough to see clearly where we stand and what we must do, in a few years it will be too late" (93-94).

In his writings and statements, Lévesque drew a direct line connecting the assertion of Francophone dominance within the province, increased powers over immigrant selection and integration, and the survival of the Québécois nation. Similarly, National Independence (RIN) leader Bourgault stated that it did not matter whether immigrants "[a]re English, German, Italian or French, as long as circumstances force them to integrate into the French-speaking majority" (in Pâquet 1997, 16). Nationalist journal, *Action Nationale* (1966) similarly demanded a concerted political effort to increase provincial powers over selection and integration. These manifestos emphasized the strong relationship among sovereignty, nation and state building, and immigration. For these authors, despite the fact that the BNA designated immigration as a shared federal and provincial domain, Quebec's ability to develop selection and integration policies that would facilitate the maintenance of a Francophone majority was hindered by federalism, requiring Quebec to become a sovereign state (Fraser 2001).

Preliminary Conclusions

This chapter asked why have Francophones in Canada adopted particular preferences and policies toward immigration? And why have these changed so significantly across time? To answer these questions I have argued that these preferences and policies have largely, though not exclusively, been shaped by the ongoing and changing dynamics of intergroup competition between Anglophone Canada and Quebec over the nature of the polity, which I have defined as national projects.

I have posited that between the conquest and the 1960s, the Québécois elites' preferences toward these issues largely emanated from a reactive approach. Specifically, due to Anglophone Canada's repeated attempts to anglicize the entire country through the promotion of Francophone assimilation or Anglophone immigration, Francophones elected to oppose immigration, which they identified as a destabilizing and threatening force.

However, as my analysis above demonstrates, as the nature of intergroup competition changed following the ingress of Allophone immigrants, neo-nationalist Québécois elites argued that traditional opposition to immigration was self-defeating. Instead, they developed new integrative or assimilatory approaches that emphasized the active role the province needs to assume in transforming immigrants into Francophone Quebecois. These new approaches perceived immigration not as a threat to the Francophone national project, but instrumentally as a means of promoting it.

In practice however, their influence was only made possible following the Quiet Revolution, which erupted due to reasons that were mostly exogenous to the immigration Question. As I have argued, the QR created a new paradigm of thought concerning the role of the Quebec State and its modes of intervention in various social and cultural fields. In particular, it granted these new elites access to influential political position through which they could shape and transform the provinces immigration policies.

While this chapter largely focused on the historical and ideational underpinnings of Quebec's immigration policies, in Chapter 5, I will examine the concrete means of implementation and implications of this new approach. In particular, I will argue that while inter-group competition continues to shape policies regarding immigrant recruitment, contemporary shifts in preferences and polices toward integration have largely been shaped by intra-group competition over the specific nature of the Francophone national project. My analysis will trace these divergent visions of the national project, examine how they have influenced integration policies, and explore their overall impact on the national project.

Chapter 5: The Evolution of Quebec's Instromental Immigration Policies: Between Recruitment, Devolution, Integration, and Assimilation

This chapter examines how the ideational and institutional transformations vis-à-vis immigration that occurred between 1950 and 1970 shaped Quebec's approach toward immigrant recruitment and incorporation. I argue that nation building played a prominent role in shaping preferences and policies toward immigration and have relegated economic interests to a secondary role (Blad and Couton 2009; Venne *et al.* 2001). I posit that Quebec's approach to immigration stems from the evolution of the national project and both inter- and intra-group competition. In fact, "immigration and ethnocultural management have become some of Québec's main tools for nation and province building" (Dupré 2012, 228).

Recruiting the "Right" Immigrants

The shifting approach toward immigration in Quebec and the understanding that "immigration and integration became inextricably tied to the fate of the Quebec nation" (Gagnon and Iacovino 2005, 29), not only fostered the creation of new approaches toward immigration, but also engendered social conflicts centering on the linguistic medium of schooling and Allophone integration[210] and competency struggles between Quebec and the Federal government.

Specifically, Quebec's leaders believed that the province's powers over immigration were insufficient to promote its nation- and state-building interests. In contrast to the past, they realized that continued immigration flows were necessary for Quebec's economic development

[210] The best known of these conflicts were the St. Leonard riots that took place between 1967 and 1968 (see: Levine 2010).

and as a means of preserving the Francophones' demographic position within Canada, which carried significant implications for the province's political influence in the country and the share of federal funding it received (Barker 2010; Carens 1995).[211] In particular, provincial leaders asserted that Quebec's needs differed from those of other provinces because of its unique position as a distinct society within Canada. This difference, they believed, necessitated granting the province a special status within the federation and enhanced powers over immigration policies. Thus, immigration was increasingly perceived not solely a means of economic growth but as a tool that could either enhance or undermine the development of the national project (Blad and Couton 2009; Venne 2001). To further these interests, leaders sought to increase provincial powers over immigrant selection and integration in ways that were guided by national self-interests. They hoped that new policies would attract immigrants who were better suited to the province's demographic and nation-building needs and would increase Allophone francization and identification with Quebec's national project (Carnes 1995). In addition, expanded powers of immigration would serve to enhance the province's relative autonomy and national project more broadly by accruing state-like powers and increasing its international presence (Barker 2010; Kostov 2008).

Until the early 1970s, the provincial government lacked any substantial power over immigrant selection and integration. While immigration was codified as an area of shared federal-provincial jurisdiction (British North America Act 1867, article 95), in practice, the federal government monopolized it (Balthazar 1989). Following the transformations of the 1960s and increasing provincial interest in immigration, Quebec demanded that its competencies over

[211] Barker (2010) points out that that while Quebec accounted for 30 percent of Canada's population between 1947 and 1977, it received only 19 percent of its immigrants, reducing Quebec's demographic position within Canada. This process occurred in tandem with the anglification of the vast majority of immigrants who did settle in the province.

immigration be expanded. At the provincial level, the creation of an immigration ministry was an important turning point since more resources were diverted to promote immigrant integration (Barker 2010; Pâquet 1997).[212] To facilitate these goals, the ministry's budget increased progressively between 1968 and 1979 from $2.8 million to over $20 million annually (Gagnon and Iacovino 2005). In addition, beginning in the late 1960s, the ministry opened offices abroad and was allowed to participate as an observer in Canada's immigrant screening processes.

However, the province's lack of influence over immigrant selection led Quebec leaders to seek to substantially expand its participation in these processes. As a result, between 1971 and 1991, Quebec and the federal government signed four immigration agreements, each of which expanded the federal government's competencies in this area. Following the return to power of the PLQ in 1970, the aftermath of the St. Leonard language riots (see below), and the unexpected electoral success of the newly formed secessionist Parti Québécois that gained 24 percent of the vote, the province demanded new competencies over immigrant selection. Premier Lesage argued that the existing federal selection procedures were inadequate since the proportion of French-speaking migrants in Quebec was only 8-13 percent (Demarino, *Montreal Gazette,* 1974). Immigration Minister Cloutier stated that Canada's policies "go against the interests of French Quebeckers…. 90 percent of immigrants to Quebec opt to integrate into the province's English speaking population…. This could be solved by a better information system…that would tell immigrants what they are getting into…. This issue will either lead to confrontation or surrender (of the Quebec people)" (Hill, *Montreal Gazette,* 1970).

[212] The Quebec ministry was the first such ministry in Canada and preceded the creation of its federal counterpart. In fact, until today, Quebec is the only Canadian province with its own immigration ministry.

Despite Prime Minister Trudeau's strong opposition to Quebec's demands (Kostov 2008)[213] the first immigration agreement was signed in May 1971 (Cloutier-Lang agreement 1971). However, this agreement had a limited impact on the province's powers over immigration as it only granted Quebec the right to station orientation officers in three Canadian consulates (Pâquet and Duchense 1996).[214] These officers could furnish information about the province to immigrants who had already been approved by federal immigration officers. Quebec's representatives could also assess candidates' suitability, but their recommendations had no binding status. Despite its shortcomings, the agreement did enable Quebec to initiate a provincial marketing policy using publicity campaigns and informational fairs both to help recruit desirable immigrants and to increase the province's presence abroad. However, due to its limited scope, the agreement produced little concrete change in the composition of the immigrants settling in the province.[215]

Quebec initiated a second round of negotiations in response to three factors: (1) Cloutier-Lang's limited ability to increase the recruitment of Francophone immigrants; (2) strong provincial opposition to the federal government's new multicultural policy that was perceived as a means of bolstering an Anglophone pan-Canadian identity while minoritizing Francophones (Balthazar 1995; Blad and Couton 2009);[216] and (3) increasing pressure from the

[213] Trudeau opposed Quebec's demands for two interrelated reasons. First, he was a strong opponent of Quebec nationalism, promoting a bilingual pan-Canadian nationalism instead. Second, he opposed the asymmetrical federalism that would be the result of granting Quebec a privileged position over immigration (Gagnon 2009).

[214] Quebec's right to place orientation officers was limited to consulates in countries where Romance languages are spoken.

[215] Although the number of French-speaking migrants did increase between 1971 and 1974, the increase accounted for less than 1.5 percent of the annual immigrant population (Demarino, *Montreal Gazette,* 1974).

[216] The official Canadian multiculturalism that was introduced by Trudeau in 1971 was largely understood as a means of weakening Francophone nationalism by strengthening the largely English Canadian identity and transforming Francophones into one minority among many others (Balthazar 1996). Thus, multiculturalism was perceived as "deceitful, timid, dangerous, folkloric, racist and much else" (Juteau 2004, 122) since it privileged particularistic identities while erasing the difference between minority groups and founding nations. In addition, supporters of Quebec's approach argue that incorporating immigrants into the heart of the national community is

PQ, which won 30 percent of the vote in the 1973 elections. Demands for renegotiation were also bolstered by the provincial Commission of Inquiry on the Situation of the French Language and Linguistic Rights in Quebec, also known as the Gendron Commission (Gouverment du Quebec 1972), which concluded that it was crucial for the province to extend its power over immigrant selection and integration. In response, the National Assembly passed Bill 46 in July 1974, asserting the province's right to select and determine the composition of its immigrants (Debates de L'Assemblée Nationale du Québec, June 30, 1974).

During this period, provincial leaders primarily wanted "to seek out more immigrants who are French speaking or whose cultural background made them more Francisisable" (Block, *Montreal Gazette,* 1975). Immigration Minister Bienvenue reorganized the ministry to promote these goals and demanded that the province be granted veto power over immigrant selection (Laughlin, *Montreal Gazette,* 1974). After several rounds of negotiation with the federal government, the final agreement accorded Quebec the right to station immigration officers who could assess immigration candidates in all Canadian embassies and consulates. The agreement (Andras-Bienvenue Agreement 1975) granted these Quebec officers the authority to conduct interviews with prospective immigrants. Quebec representatives were also granted a larger advisory role so as to allow them to promote immigrants who were deemed more likely to integrate easily and rapidly into Quebec's Francophone society (Houle 2014).

However, the province's influence over the selection process remained limited since final determinations remained at the exclusive discretion of the federal government. Thus, like its predecessor, the Andreas-Bienvenue was largely symbolic and did not grant Quebec substantial powers to determine and shape immigration flows into the province (Pâquet and Duchense 1996).

---

more inclusive than the Canadian model that perpetuates ethnic difference and divisions (Bissoondath 1994; Keating 2001).

In particular, this was due to the fact that immigrants were formally applying to immigrate to Canada without necessarily specifying the province in which they intended to settle, making it impossible to determine who would settle in Quebec or in the rest of Canada (Barker 2010).

Despite the shortcomings of the agreement, the broad stationing of provincial officers abroad was perceived as particularly important since Quebec policy makers believed that only officers who primarily identified as Francophone Québécois would actively promote the cultural and demographic needs of the province when selecting immigrants (Juteau 1994). Quebec leaders understood the influence of interpretation and subjectivity in making decisions concerning immigration applicants and sought to station officers who were motivated by and committed to Quebec's nation-building interests (Carens 1995).

Demands to expand provincial control over immigration substantially increased in the aftermath of the PQ's 1976 electoral victory (Seale 1977). Immigration constituted a primary concern for the PQ due to the implications that processes of migrant recruitment and Allophone integration had for Francophone demography and nation building, as well as the province's bid for sovereignty (Gouvernement du Québec 1979; Houle 2014). As a consequence, the issue played a prominent role in the PQ's electoral platform (Parti Québécois 1976). For the PQ, control over immigration was perceived as a crucial feature of sovereignty and the creation of a sustainable political community (Barker 2010; Carens 1995). In fact, one of Lévesque's first pronouncements as premier concerned Quebec's demand for increased control over immigration (Chénier-Cullen 2009), and it was the first issue the PQ raised in its negotiations with Ottawa (Knowles 2007).

As a first step, Immigration Minister Jacques Couture relocated the province's overseas immigration officers to separate Quebec offices from their federal counterparts in order to signal to potential immigrants that Quebec was a political entity that was differentiated from Canada (Radmanovich 1976). Furthermore, in 1977, Couture initiated a new round of negotiations in which he demanded the significant expansion of Quebec's powers over immigrant selection (Kostov 2008).[217] Premier Lévesque explained his perception of the issue: "There is no self-respecting society that knows its best interests and has a self-identity that allows its immigration to be in the hands of others" (in: Kostov 2008, 98).

Negotiations with Canada were initially adversarial. Claiming that Quebec was demanding "too much power that the federal government cannot afford to give" (Seale 1977), the federal government conceded after several rounds of negotiations and despite Prime Minister's Trudeau opposition. The 1978 agreement granted Quebec joint selection powers over economic migrants (together with the federal government) and stipulated that future immigration must contribute to Quebec's cultural and social development. Specifically, the province gained both positive and negative veto powers, allowing it to accept immigrants that did not pass the Canadian criteria and deny those who did (Collister 1977; Cullen-Couture Agreement 1978).

Beyond selection powers, the agreement created separate institutional mechanisms for immigration to Quebec and the rest of Canada, enabling provincial authorities to determine both the quantity and quality of the immigrants who could settle in the province during any given year. In addition, it mandated the creation of a federal-provincial standing committee to supervise the working of the agreement and to foster collaboration between the province and the federal government in matters concerning immigration and population. Finally, and perhaps most

[217] Interestingly, in order to limit Quebec's privileged position, Trudeau encouraged other provinces to reach similar agreements with the Federal government concerning immigration. In 1976, he initiated a reform in Federal immigration law allowing all provinces to negotiate immigration agreements with the Federal government (Seale 1977). However, special legislation that was initiated to limit Quebec's asymmetrical power and prevent a de-facto special status for the province was not utilized by other provinces but instead created the unintended consequence of bolstering Quebec's negotiating position (Houle 2014; Knowles~~s~~ 2007). Carens (1995) explains that other provinces have not followed suit on this issue since they do not face the same cultural, linguistic, and demographic challenges.

crucially, the creation of a semi-separate Quebec immigration process served to signal to potential migrants that Quebec constituted a distinct entity that differed from the rest of Canada. In fact, the agreement had an almost immediate effect on immigrant selection. While in 1978, only 18 percent of immigrants were partially selected by the province, in 1979, over 90 percent of economic immigrants were selected directly by the province according to its own selection criteria (Ministère de l'Immigration du Québec 1981). Thus, it "was a significant step in Quebec's development as a state: it began a process of gaining official autonomy in its demographic development" (Blad 2011, 110).

Despite these significant gains, successive Quebec administrations, led by both the PQ and the PLQ, continued to demand the further expansion of provincial powers. These demands included increasing the categories over which the province had selection powers and managing integration processes that remained a Federal prerogative. For instance, the failed Meech Lake constitutional accord, which sought to effect reconciliation with Quebec over the Canadian constitution, included the expansion of the province's immigration powers as one of its four key elements. The failure of the accord in 1990 and Prime Minister Malruney's subsequent attempt to attenuate Quebec's growing hostility to the federation, which was reflected in the PLQ's support for a second sovereignty referendum in the absence of an agreement regarding the constitution, compelled the federal government to accept a more expansive agreement.

The Quebec-Canada Accord (Gagnon Tremblay-McDougall Accord 1991) granted Quebec exclusive powers over immigrant selection, enabled the province to devise and implement its own immigrant selection point system, and granted it full control over reception and integration policies and services. The accord guaranteed Quebec CA$332 over four years to develop integration mechanisms and regular transfers of almost 33 percent of the federal budget for integration (Gagnon Tremblay-McDougall Accord 1991; Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration 2005). This is particularly crucial since Quebec receives approximately 15 percent of Canada's immigrants, meaning that proportionally, immigrants in Quebec receive significantly higher financial support than those who settle in the rest of Canada. Carens (1995), however, argues that Quebec's increased level of funding is attributable to issues of scale, since integrating immigrants into French is a more costly endeavor than integrating them into English.

Furthermore, Quebec was granted the exclusive right to determine the total volume of immigrants who settled in its territory and to control flows of temporary immigrants such as students and seasonal workers. Under the new agreement, the Federal government retained veto power solely for the purpose of denying immigrant visas if it had substantial security concerns, full determination powers over immigrants in the family reunification category, and joint determination powers regarding refugees.[218] In addition, the agreement significantly strengthened the independence and standing of Quebec's immigration officers stationed abroad (Gagnon Tremblay-McDougall Accord 1991).[219] Since the signing of the accord, the Quebec National Assembly has held official public consultations every three years in order to reassess and determine the province's immigration preferences, quotas, and priorities based on the recommendations of various political groups, immigrant associations, and demographers.

Thus, as my analysis of these accords demonstrates, between 1972 and 1991, both major political parties in Quebec were able to effect a substantial devolution of power from the federal government, thereby increasing the province's control over immigrant selection and

[218] According to the agreement, the federal government is responsible for making final determinations concerning refugee status while Quebec is able to select the refugees it wants to host out of that pool.
[219] Iacovino (2014) points out that the augmented role of Quebec's immigration officers served to reduce immigrant confusion over the province's role in the immigration process and to limit determinations that were contrary to provincial interests.

integration.[220] This expansion of power has not only bolstered the province's ability to utilize immigration for demographic and economic growth, but has also enabled it to be employed as a tool of national construction (Blad and Couton 2009; Carens 1995). From this perspective, these agreements have fostered Quebec's state building processes and the development of the province's proto-sovereign attributes (Barker 2010; Kostov 2008).

Figure 5.1: Percentage of French-Speaking Immigrants to Quebec by Year: 1977-2013*

* This graph is based on my own calculations. The data was provided by Statistics Canada (1984;1992;2000) and the Quebec Ministry of Immigration and Cultural Comminutes (1989;1993;1999; 2006; 2014).

[220] For a normative discussion of the merits and faults of Quebec's cultural-linguistic immigrant selection policy see: Abu Laban 1998; Carens 1995

While Quebec's increased immigration competencies provided it with tools that enabled it to bolster its national project, it is important to explore the concrete effects of these agreements on the composition of immigrants entering the province. As Figure 1 demonstrates, it is evident that the expansion of provincial competencies has fostered a substantial growth in the proportion of immigrants who can speak French.[221] While in 1977 under 15 percent of immigrants to Quebec had a working knowledge of French, by the mid-1980s, their proportion was above 40 percent—a figure that exceeded 65 percent in 2010.[222] This suggests that the dramatic expansion of Quebec's powers over immigrant selection that followed the Cullen-Couture Agreement enabled the province to select immigrants who are deemed more suitable for its needs by substantially increasing the number of immigrants who are able to speak French upon settling in the province.

It is important to note however, that the data in Figure 5.1 reflect the proportion of immigrants who have a working knowledge of French, including those who speak French as a first, second, or third language. Unfortunately, I was unable to obtain information concerning the exact criteria employed to categorize immigrants. According to a provincial immigration officer, there are no formal criteria, and French-speaking abilities are measured subjectively by provincial representatives and not through a standardized exam (personal interview Novemver 18, 2011). Furthermore, the extent to which the increasing proportion of French-speaking

[221] The data in Figure 1 reflect the proportion of immigrants who have a working knowledge of French, including those who speak French as a first, second, or third language. Unfortunately, I was unable to obtain information concerning the exact criteria employed to categorize immigrants. According to a provincial immigration officer, there are no formal criteria, and French-speaking abilities are measured subjectively by provincial representatives (personal interview November 18, 2011). Furthermore, the extent to which the increasing proportion of French-speaking immigrants is the result of the province's proactive immigration policies or of immigrant self-selection is unclear.

[222] These data refer to the entire population of immigrants who settled in Quebec in a given year, including refugees and family migrants regarding whom the province has limited selection power. Thus, among the 2010 economic immigrants who were all selected by the province, 78 percent could speak French (Ministère de l'Immigration et des Communautés Culturelles 2011).

immigrants is the result of the province's proactive immigration policies or of immigrant self-selection is unclear.

Figure 5.2: The Six Largest Immigrant Source Countries to Quebec and the Rest of Canada 2001-2010*

Quebec	The Rest of Canada
Algeria	China
Morocco	India
France	The Philippines
China	Pakistan
Columbia	The United States
Lebanon	South Korea

* Data compiled from the 2006 and 2011 censuses (provided by Statistics Canada), and the Quebec Ministry of Immigration and Cultural Communities data (2011).

As Figure 5.2 illustrates, it appears that Quebec's autonomous immigration policies have initiated the recruitment of immigrants that hail from a substantially different set of source countries than the rest of Canada (see also: Reitz 2014)—a divergence that did not exist prior to the 1978 and 1991 agreements (Blad and Couton 2009). In fact, with the exception of China, none of the six largest source countries of immigrants to Quebec appear in the equivalent list for the rest of Canada. Not surprisingly, the top four source countries to Quebec are either predominantly Francophone or have large French-speaking populations. In addition, other top source countries, which include Argentina, Egypt, Moldova, and Romania, are countries whose residents are considered more likely to integrate into French and not into English owing to linguistic proximity or cultural proclivity (Gagnon 2009; Gagnon 2013). However, due to lack of data, it remains unclear to whether these differences are primarily the result of the success of Quebec's selection procedures or perhaps migrant self-selection as a result of the province's nation-building program and coercive linguistic policies.

While these data appears to suggest that Quebec autonomous selection powers have substantially altered immigration flows into the province, a more comprehensive understanding of the province's immigration regime requires that we examine the concrete means Quebec has employed to enhance the proportion of *integratable* immigrants settling in the province. Since 1978, Quebec has implemented several strategies to facilitate this outcome.

First, as discussed above, the province has developed its own separate immigration point system that prioritizes French and potential immigrants' prospects of integrating into Francophone society. In the Quebec system, immigration candidates are granted 22 points for language competency, in contrast to 16 points in the federal system (See also: Carens 1995, 43; Chénier-Cullen 2009). Furthermore, in Quebec, only six of these points can be earned for knowledge of English, with the remainder being allocated solely to French. This stands in contrast to the federal system, which grants all 16 points to immigrants with a working knowledge of either official language.

In addition, while both Canada and Quebec grant points for adaptability, in contrast to the federal system, Quebec's allocation criterion is not clearly defined, and appears to be left largely to the discretion of the immigration officer. In addition, Quebec offers six additional points to applicants with children under the age of 12 since the latter are expected to attend Francophone schools that are considered a primary integration mechanism, and are more likely than older children to adopt French as their primary language of communication (Conseil Supérieur de la Langue Française 2000). As Francophone teacher explained, “If children go to French schools, this provides a way for parents to integrate as well. They will need to learn enough French to help the kids with their schoolwork and to communicate with their teachers” (personal interview September 16, 2011).[223] Finally, Quebec requires applicants to earn fewer points overall than the federal system does (63 and 67 points respectively).

Second, the province has increasingly expanded the number of provincial immigration officers stationed abroad, both as part of Canadian consulates and in separate Quebec units. Quebec initiated its first international offices in 1966 in Paris, Brussels, and Beirut, further expanding them during the 1970s as a result of its agreements with the federal government. Currently, Quebec maintains permanent or temporary immigration officers in 82 countries. In particular, these campaigns have targeted countries with large French-speaking populations as well as countries whose residents are considered Francotropes, meaning that their populations are more inclined to gravitate toward French (Oaks and Warren 2007). Officially defined, Francotropes include “newcomers who speak a language of Latin origin or have had contact with Francophone culture, which makes them more sensitive to the fact Quebec French” (Gouvernement du Québec 1996, 223).

Third, over the last two decades, Quebec has initiated large-scale television, radio, and internet advertising campaigns to attract prospective immigrants. In addition, it has organized

[223] In a study commissioned by the Conseil Supérieur de la Langue Française (2000), parents’ concerns over participating in children’s schooling was cited as a central reason informing parents’ decision to learn French and integrate into Francophone society. In addition, Carens (2000) posits that acquiring knowledge of French at an early age contributes to identification with Quebec (See also: Helly and Schnedel 2001; Oaks and Warren 2007).

both information and job fairs in target countries as a means of recruitment. Such promotional campaigns provide prospective immigrants with information about Quebec and the opportunities they can pursue in the province. These efforts, however, have been particularly concentrated in source countries whose populations are deemed more able to be integrated. For instance, in recent years, the province has exerted a particularly great effort to recruit immigrants from Mexico, Columbia, Brazil, France, Belgium, Romania, Moldova, Ukraine, and Russia. These target countries were selected for two reasons. First, their residents are considered more likely to integrate into French than those from other source countries. Second, in contrast to immigrants from Arab countries who, while being more likely to speak French, are also characterized by religious and cultural differences that are deemed a potential cause for social instability (data are based on a personal interview with Quebec immigration officer, November 17, 2011).

Fourth, Quebec has initiated 121 formal agreements with French language schools across the world, allowing it to furnish French language students with information about life in Quebec. In addition, the Ministry of Immigration also provides these schools with Quebec-oriented textbooks and other French language-learning materials that offer information about the province's culture, geography, and history. These schools also provide initial linguistic and integration services for prospective immigrants and those who have already received their provincial immigrant selection certificates. To this end, the province reimburses immigrants with up to $1,500 for French classes taken prior to immigration.

Finally, Quebec has signed a series of agreements with Francophone countries, granting their citizens special privileges vis-à-vis access to Quebec's higher education programs, special work visas, and accelerated programs for professional accreditation (Keating 2001).[224] For instance, in both 1989 and 2004, Quebec signed agreements with the French government to

[224] For example, in 2008, Quebec signed a mutual qualification recognition agreement with France.

facilitate immigrant recruitment events across France. Other similar, though more limited, agreements have been signed with the governments of Haiti and Senegal. In addition, Quebec has taken advantage of humanitarian crises in Francophone countries to recruit French-speaking refugees. For instance, following the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, the province created a special refugee reception program that led to the permanent immigration of over 4,000 Haitians. The creation of these programs serves the dual purpose of recruiting Francophone immigrants and increasing Quebec's visibility in the international arena (personal interview with immigration officer November 17, 2011).

In the realm of reception and integration, the province has sought to facilitate and promote immigrant integration through the provision of provincial integration services (Carens 1995). These services are primarily subsidized by the Federal government, which diverts 33 percent of its integration budget to Quebec. For this purpose, Quebec has developed a host of state-run services for newcomers. These include 600 hours of French language and integration classes that are offered to immigrants free of charge. In fact, the completion of these classes is mandatory for immigrants who have limited knowledge of French at the time they apply for permanent residency or citizenship. As a consequence, there has been a continuous rise in Allophone immigrant participation in these classes since 1990. While between 1991 and 1994, approximately 4.8 percent participated in these classes, by 1999, 11.7 percent participated, reaching 21 percent in 2005 (Ministère de l'Immigration et des Communautés Culturelles 2011).

Due to both the provincial interests in controlling integration processes and Quebec's relatively high level of state intervention—in contrast to other large migrant-receiving provinces—the provincial government maintains tight control over integration funding and services. For instance, while in Ontario almost 80 percent of integration funding is distributed through civil society organizations, in Quebec less than 15 percent of reception and integration funds are funneled through such organizations (Personal interview with chairperson of the Quebec's Immigrant Association Union, October 25, 2011). While this centralization of integration processes is particularly evident under PQ administration, it is slightly weaker under the PLQ because of the former's strong state-led approach to politics, as opposed to the latter's more neo-liberal approach (ibid).

In addition, Quebec sought to increase preferred immigration of either French speakers or people who are deemed more likely to learn French by creating special incentives for migrants to settle in the province. For instance, in the early 1980s, the PQ proposed that immigrants to Quebec receive increased access to social rights as compared to those who settled in other parts of Canada. The proposals further called for granting citizenship upon arrival for immigrants who complied with the province's cultural needs (r and Fournier 1987). Concurrently, the province sought to limit immigrant rights to move to other Canadian provinces in order to limit the use of its immigration policies as a back door into Canada.

Ironically, as I discuss at length in the last section of this chapter, these policies are fraught with several weaknesses that have at least partially undermined provincial interests and goals. For instance, exploring the outcomes of these policies, DeVoretz and Pivneneko (2008) argue that although the Quebec system has successfully promoted the province's nation-building interests, it has failed to recruit the high-skilled migrants that its economy requires. While the Quebec economy primarily requires high-skilled immigrants with engineering, medical, and advanced degrees and skills, a large proportion of the Francophone immigrants it has recruited are low-skilled and unable to provide the economy with the requisite manpower. Following these outcome, a former PQ spokesmen on immigration suggested that Quebec has failed on two fronts.

First, it has not assimilated immigrants sufficiently or fostered their identification with the province. Second, the recruitment of French-speaking immigrants from sources such as Haiti, Morocco, and Algeria yielded immigrants who did not adapt culturally or economically (personal interview August 29, 2012).

Thus, there appears to be a disjuncture between the province's recruitment policies that are based primarily on cultural interests and its need for immigrants who have specific labor market skills (Carens 1995). While Quebec's recruitment policies have been a success from a cultural perspective, the primacy of cultural and nation-building interests has been an impediment to the province's economic development.

From Foreigners to French Québécois? The Politics of Integration

While the struggle to increase the province's competencies over immigrant selection has largely been a consensual bi-partisan interest in Quebec (although it has not always been supported by the Anglophone minority), the manner in which immigrants are integrated into Francophone society has been significantly more contentious.[225] Over the last three and a half decades, both the PQ and the PLQ have promoted divergent preferences and philosophies concerning the practices and goals of immigrant integration and the role of the Quebec state in this process. While the PQ has generally promoted a civic-republican French-style assimilationist approach that seeks to transform migrants into agents of Quebec nationalism through the active intervention of the state (Juteau 2004), the federalist PLQ has fostered its own version of Canadian multiculturalism. I argue that both these conceptions are intricately linked to and

[225] This mirrors the pattern that Money (1999) identified in the United Kingdom, according to which, while all British political parties converge in relation to immigration policies, they diverge substantially in relation to immigrant integration and incorporation policies.

shaped by the parties' respective positions toward the national project and Quebec's future in relation to Canada. Furthermore, I posit that over time, the observable shifts in these policies have largely occurred in response to either changing political strategies concerning the national project or shifts in power between the two parties.

From the mid-1950s, the debate over immigration in Quebec largely revolved around the integration of Allophone immigrants. Following the decline of Anglophone immigration in the early 20th century, increasing numbers of Allophone immigrants from Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Poland settled in Quebec, constituting 10 percent of the population by 1971. Due to the size of this population, Allophones have substantially influenced the demographic, political, and linguistic balance in the province (Knowles 2007).

As I discussed above, these trends triggered significant concerns amongst neo-nationalist elites who feared that these processes would have negative long-term consequences for the province's demographic balance and consequentially for the Quebec national project. For instance, the nationalist sociologist, Marcel Rioux (1978), explains, "The English Canadians use the schools so graciously provided by the provincial government to anglicize immigrants…. Ninety percent of the children of these immigrants go to English schools. Considering the rate at which they are being assimilated to the English speaking minority…social critics are led to the conclusion that they will soon be a minority in their own province…. Montreal is sure to become English in 10 years; Quebec itself has a reprieve of two years…. Are French Canadians going to disappear?" (115)

Following the political, demographic, and ideational transitions that took place during the 1950s and 1960s, coupled with the rise of neo-nationalism, the question of Allophone integration became increasingly salient in public discourse (Behiels 1991). In particular, immigrant integration was primarily debated in the context of the language of schooling, since it serves as the primary socializing institution that influences long-term integration patterns and linguistic transfers (McAndrew 2013; Woolard 1989). The issue of Allophone integration was exacerbated as Allophone settlement upset the spatial segregation between Anglophones and Francophones in the city of Montreal, since Allophones increasingly settled in working-class Francophone neighborhoods and towns. This process altered the demographic balance in these localities, triggered the creation of businesses and institutions that catered to Allophones, and led to the establishment of a large number of English and bi-lingual schools that often replaced French schools whose enrollment had declined.

This was the case in areas such as the city of St. Leonard, where language riots broke out between 1967 and 1969 (d'Anglejan 1984; Levine 2010; Veltman 1996). By the 1960s, St. Leonard, a traditionally homogeneous Francophone city, had an Italian population that accounted for almost 40 percent of its total population. Immigrant settlement in the city resulted in the increased use of English both in business and education. In response, Quebec nationalists, led by the short-lived nationalist political party, Rassemblement Pour l'Indépendence Nationale (RIN) initiated a campaign to promote French as the sole language of instruction in the city. During the campaign, Marcel Chaput, one of the RIN leaders, explained that "the system of public schools in English not only keeps the Anglo-Saxons on the fringes of Quebec society but attracts all the other ethnic minorities…because the economic ascendency of this Anglo-Saxon minority…is supported by the vast majority outside the province." (*Le Journal de Montréal*, September 5, 1968).

The militants were concerned both about the anglification of the city and about the overall increasing proportion of Anglophones in the province as a result of Allophone assimilation. In consequence, a two-year conflict over access to English and bi-lingual schools ensued between English speakers and immigrans on the one hand, and Francophone nationalists, on the other (Levine 2010).[226]

Beyond its direct implications, the conflict served as a constitutive moment for the issue of Allophone integration and led to three important consequences. First, it popularized the cause of Allophone integration into Francophone society and sparked additional linguistic conflicts across Montreal.[227] Second, the language of instruction, primarily with regard to Allophones, became a highly salient issue in the province. The concerns that emerged from these conflicts provoked a series of state interventions in the field of language that sought to regulate culture and immigrant integration politically (Behiels and Hayday 2011; Keating 2001; Meadwell 1993). Third, these conflicts popularized the sovereignty movement and contributed to the PQ's ultimate victory in the 1976 elections since many Francophones realized that other political parties were reluctant or unable to limit immigrant access to Allophone schools (Behiels 1991; Handler 1988; Quinn 1979; Saywell 1977). As Marc Léger (1968) explained, "We must have in Québec 20 or 50 St. Leonards. We need to coordinate efforts in a vast movement to safeguard our nation. Force the government to protect French schools and adopt an educational policy that will effectively lead to the integration of immigrants into our community" (23)

The first language laws in Quebec were created at the height of the St. Leonard conflict. Bills 85 and 63 required all students to possess a working knowledge of French in order to graduate while concurrently institutionalizing parents' right to choose their children's primary language of education. These bills were met with staunch opposition across all linguistic groups. Despite their attempt to preserve linguistic freedom in the province, both Anglophones and

---

[226] These linguistic conflicts bolstered the alliance between Allophones and Anglophones (Cappon 1974).
[227] For instance, during the Battle for McGill in 1969, Francophone militants demanded that the university be transformed into a Francophone institution (Levine 2010).

Allophones feared that they would undermine their ability to educate their children in English and that they would be responsible for the legislation of more restrictive laws. Most Francophones, however, were highly opposed to granting Allophones linguistic freedom in relation to schooling. Thus, the limited scope of these laws garnered substantial Francophone support in favor of the use of state intervention to restrict Allophone access to English schools (d'Anglejan 1984; Levine 2010; Quinn 1979).

The PLQ's return to power in 1970 did not lead to an immediate change in the status quo due to the party's increasing reliance on Anglophone electoral support. However, growing nationalist pressure and the publication of the Gendron report,[228] which called for strengthening the position of the French language in the province in general and among immigrants in particular, compelled the government to act on the matter.[229] In response, the government passed Bill 22 in 1972, declaring French to be the sole official language in Quebec, limiting Allophone access to English-medium schools, and restricting the use of English in the workplace as well as in provincial and municipal affairs.[230] d'Anglejan (1984) argues that the law represented an important shift in provincial policy toward a more coercive approach concerning the language issue. Like its predecessors, Bill 22 encountered opposition from all language communities. Anglophones and Allophones argued that it infringed their basic right to freely exercise their language rights, while Francophones believed that it did not suffice to protect the position of

[228] The Gendron Commission (1972), also known as the Commission of Inquiry on the Situation of the French Language, was created in 1968 in response to the St. Leonard conflict and was instructed to study the situation of the French language in the province. The commission identified a series of challenges to the French language in Quebec including the prominence of English in business and Allophone integration into English.

[229] Breuilly (1982) points out that despite the Liberal Party's interest in strengthening French in the province, its association with the Federal Liberals, coupled with its widespread Anglophone support, has constrained its ability to actively pursue these goals.

[230] In practice, the province created English tests that students would have to pass in order to attend English schools. As a result, underground preschools that prepared Allophone children for these tests sprang up throughout Montreal (Behiels 1991).

French in the province. This further increased support for sovereignty, which was presented as a palliative for these linguistic and demographic woes (Conway 2004).

The PQ's 1976 electoral victory, which was largely motivated by the language issue, engendered a new approach (Bourhis 1984; Saywell 1977). The incoming PQ government ascribed supreme importance to immigration, language, and culture, and sought to increase state intervention in these fields. As Cultural Affairs Minister Camille Laurin explained, "The Quebec that we want to build will be essentially French. The fact that the majority of its population is French will finally be visible…. There will no longer be any question of a bilingual Quebec (Comite Ministeriel Permanent du Developement Culturel, 36-7). To this end, the PQ published a white paper calling for stringent measures to be taken in order to protect French and foster Allophone integration into Francophone society. The paper proposed the imposition of severe restrictions on the use of English in the public sphere, workplace, public administration, and schools in order to protect the right of Francophones to use French in the province.[231] In addition, it proposed blocking Allophone access to public schools since "the common good…requires the integration of all diverse groups into the essentially French speaking Quebec totality" (Ibid, 63).

These proposals and plans were legislated and implemented as part of The Charter of the French Language (Bill 101), Quebec's most comprehensive, controversial, and enduring language law. On a practical level, Bill 101 restricted the access of all non-Anglophone Quebeckers, including Anglophone foreigners and Anglophone Canadians from other provinces, to English schools. In addition, it introduced a host of measures that were intended to bolster the position of French in the economic, political, and social realms. With regard to schools, the law

[231] In Quebec, language rights are constructed around the right to use French in every aspect of life. Thus, not only do people have the right to use French at work and in the public sphere they concurrently have the right not to use any language but French.

made the French school system the hub for immigrant integration, turning the schools into de-facto multicultural and pluralist sites (McAndrew 2010).

As one Québécois intellectual explained, “many people claim that Law 101 was somehow discriminatory or exclusionary. I think that the opposite is true; it is a very good law. By demanding that children of immigrants go to French schools, I am saying that I want them to play and be friends with my own children. We are not pushing them away but pulling them into our society. I want my children to be exposed to foreign cultures and for children of newcomers to feel part of Québécois society. Now how is that discriminatory?” (Personal interview, August 31, 2011).

The law also increasingly enhanced the use of French in the workplace by requiring small businesses to obtain francization certificates, that attest to their ability to conduct business in French, and by developing mechanisms to enforce its provisions. Beyond linguistic rights, the enforcement of the use of French in the workplace was designed to bolster Francophones’ position in the labor market—in particular in senior positions. Thus, the law was perceived as a means of altering the distribution of material benefits across society (Breton 1988b). On a symbolic level, it affirmed that Quebec maintained a unique identity as a Francophone nation within Canada that defined the province’s nature and public culture (Gagnon and Iacovino 2007). However, the promotion of Allophone integration into Francophone society in order to strengthen its demographic position and bolster the national project constituted the centerpiece of this legislation (Behiels 1991; Oaks and Warren 2007). From this perspective, Bill 101 “was not merely a language law but a nation building mechanism” (Keating 2001, 103).

Due to its broad scope and severity, the bill engendered large-scale concerns among non-Francophones, who felt that their status in the province was threatened. It also prompted the mass emigration of approximately 20 percent of the province’s Anglophone community (Grenier 1987; Pettinicchio 2012). While the PQ’s policies constituted a decisive political move in favor of strengthening French, their reliance on coercion was insufficient to promote substantial Allophone integration into and identification with Francophone Quebec, as opposed to language acquisition alone. As MacLeod and Poutanen (2004) put it, “In this case the definition of success was breaking…the demographic monopoly of English speakers. In effect, immigrants were being used as political tools and their interests were not being taken into consideration” (354). Similarly, McAndrew (1996) points out that lawmakers believed that the law would lead to the mere reproduction of Québécois Francophone culture and had little understanding of the profound social and cultural changes its implementation would generate—primarily the introduction of large-scale pluralism and diversity into the Francophone school system.

However, in contrast, others have argued that linguistic laws have facilitated the creation of a more inclusive community by alleviating Francophone linguistic anxieties. For instance, Kymlicka (2001) argues that, while Bill 101 was illiberal, it contributed to the decline of the ethnic component of Quebec nationalism. Similarly, Breton (1988b) suggests that law contributed to the process of disassociation between language and ethnicity.

In practice, however, these policies did little to foster the substantial inclusion of immigrants in the collective *we*. In fact, this issue came up repeatedly in interviews with representatives of civil society organizations and immigrants who suggested that the almost exclusive focus on the acquisition of French language skills did not provide sufficient means for meaningful integration into Québécois society. These interviewees suggested social membership to be mediated by cultural knowledge, social networks, social prejudice, and overly abstract policies that undermine real integration.[232] Thus, despite the PQ's and Lévesque's belief in the importance of Allophone integration and their participation in the national project and the sovereignty movement, the government's primary reliance on coercive linguistic policies did little to promote these goals.

The initial failure of these policies to bring about meaningful integration into Québécois society and the PQ's vision of the national project was particularly evident in the 1980 sovereignty referendum in which Allophones voted overwhelmingly against sovereignty (Juteau 2002; Pammet and Leduc 2001). The PQ understood that if it wanted to achieve sovereignty, it would have to gain Allophone support. "Independence could be more easily attained with the support of non-French Canadians. Achieving sovereignty would require the formation of a community that coincided with territorial boundaries, and the development…of a common identity. From this point on, ethnic minorities would be actively wooed" (Juteau 2002, 444). Thus, integration was increasingly understood as crucial, not only for demographic-linguistic purposes, but also for securing the future success of the sovereignty movement.

In response to these needs, the PQ government elected to develop a more substantive integration policy to supplement the more coercive measures that were embodied in Bill 101, in an attempt to rectify immigrant alienation from the Québécois national project. The resulting program, *Autant de façon d'être Québécois* (1981),[233] which was based on a 1978 white paper,[234] offered Quebec's first official comprehensive approach to diversity management and afforded a reference on how the province perceived its role as a host society (Dupré 2012; Iacovino and

[232] See in-depth discussion in the last section of this chapter.
[233] *Quebeckers, Each and Every One*.
[234] Like other later PQ documents, the 1978 white paper primarily promoted immigrants' assimilation into what is perceived as a constant a-historical Quebec culture. "The general common good and that of minority groups require the integration of these diverse groups into the essentially French speaking Quebec totality" (Gouverment du Quebec 1978, 63).

Sevigney 2011; Juteau 2002). This approach was elaborated in the document and defined as a *culture of convergence*, which the authors sought to differentiate from both Canadian multiculturalism and the American melting-pot approach.[235]

The plan affirmed the province's commitment to immigration and diversity and its support for the development of cultural communities. The overarching goal of the plan was to promote the convergence of immigrants' cultural communities and the core Francophone society. Thus, the program largely corresponded with French civic republicanism that primarily promotes assimilation of immigrants into the core French society (Dupré 2012; Juteau 2004; Karmis 1997).

However, the PQ's convergence model concurrently maintained an antithetical communitarian aspect, which is evident in the development and use of the concept *cultural communities*, which contradicts the unity that is espoused by the civic republican model (Dupré 2012). For instance, while the PQ promoted restrictive French-only policies and immigrant assimilation, it simultaneously developed provincially funded programs that were designed to teach heritage languages and culture, other than French or English, to second and third generation immigrants (Gagnon and Iacovino 2007).

Fontaine (2010) suggests that this contradictory policy emanated from the deep ambivalence within the PQ toward immigration and partial opposition to or fear of real immigrant integration. This proposition can, to some extent, explain the concurrent high level of funding that was granted to heritage language programs and the limitations on immigrant access to the English education system. Similarly, Symond (2001) asserts the tensions that are evident in the document are the consequence of two contradictory preferences. the PQ sought to attract and recruit immigrants to become active participants in the national project; at the same time, it

[235] Gagnon and Iacovino (2005) suggest that this approach posed a direct challenge to the concept of Canadian citizenship.

imagined cultural boundaries as impermeable and feared the potential cultural and linguistic transformation that immigrant integration might engender. As a result, the approach wavered between the elimination of diversity through assimilation and the perceiving Allophones as permanent *others* who are unable to truly become members of the nation, as epitomized in the concept of cultural communities (see also: Fontaine and Juteau 1996).

In contrast to this approach, Handler (1988) argues that the ambivalence that is inherent in the document emanated from the tension between the PQ elite's fundamental support for assimilation and their desire to appease allophones and reduce their opposition to the PQ's national project following the large-scale resistance to the provisions of Bill 101. Furthermore, he suggests that the programs duality was purposefully designed to ameliorate both popular and intellectual accusations that the party was xenophobic. Thus, these conflicting preferences that sought to concurrently foster immigrant assimilation and support for the PQ generated a seemingly contradictory policy that downplayed the PQ's desire for complete assimilation by promoting programs that maintained minority cultures.[236] This interpretation is also consistent with Baker (2010) who posits that the PQ has been highly constrained in its policy making vis-à-vis immigration and integration due to the prevalent perception that it holds a hostile approach towards immigrants and diversity.

In practice, the PQ's program defined immigrant integration primarily as a moral contract, a process through which minorities would proceed to ultimately adopt the cultural markers of the Francophone majority. While the document did not explicitly invoke the term *assimilation*, and as discussed above provided some room for cultural pluralism, the policy chiefly promoted an

[236] In addition, Handler (1988) suggests that the emphasis on minority cultures might have been designed primarily in relation to the Anglophone community. According to this explanation, by emphasizing the plethora of ethnic communities that are present in Quebec, the PQ sought to transform Anglophones into one cultural community among many. This position is evident in the Cultural Minister Camille Laurin's approach that "English speakers need to learn to see themselves as a minority" (ibid, 178).

essentialist-assimilatory approach to Quebec culture in contrast to a multicultural or pluralist one (Sevigney and Iacovino 2011).

The program invoked a clear hierarchy of cultures that identified French Québécois culture as the focal point around which the integration process takes place and toward which all cultural groups are ultimately expected to shift. For this purpose, the document called for increased public openness toward immigrants; however, the government did little to promote public desensitization regarding immigration and in practice placed the onus of integration on the immigrants' shoulders (Gagnon and Iacovino 2007).

Due to its inherent weaknesses and contradiction, the lack of concrete measures, limited implementation and immigrants' overall opposition to and fear of the PQ and its national project, the convergence policy had a limited concrete impact on immigrant integration as Allophones continued to gravitate toward Anglophone culture, failing to identify with Francophone society, the Quebec national project, or the PQ's national project despite the fact that their children were increasingly attending French schools (Fontaine and Juteau 1996).

Although immigrants were encouraged to converge with Quebec society, they were not imagined as part of the national community or as Québécois (ibid). This is particularly evident in the manner that the document reifies cultural communities and the permanence of the cultural difference they represent. Symbolic exclusion was further exacerbated by persistent economic inequality, low levels of representation in public service, and pervasive social and racial discrimination (Levine 2010).[237] Thus, while the PQ sought to promote Allophone integration and muster support for its sovereignty project through linguistic coercion and assimilation

[237] While the plan specifically sought to counter these forms of inequality and discrimination, it did little in practice to effect such outcomes.

policies, it generally failed to do so, as reflected in the persistent high levels of Allophone electoral support for the PLQ in the provincial elections in November 1985 (Juteau 2002).

Following the above-mentioned provincial elections, the PLQ regained power over the provincial government. In contrast to the PQ, the PLQ's national project did not seek the creation of a sovereign Quebec state but instead to strengthen Quebec's position within Canada.[238] To this end, the PLQ government primarily utilized immigration in order to bolster the province's demographic, symbolic, and institutional position within the federal system (Barker 2010). Thus, from this perspective, integration was not meant to transform immigrants into ardent Québécois nationalists who would support the separatist national project but rather to facilitate migrant integration into French culture as a means of bolstering Francophone demography both in Quebec and Canada. Despite the PLQ's return to power in late 1985, the ongoing constitutional crisis largely relegated the issue of immigration to the back burner. This changed in 1990 when the government announced a new approach to integration, namely, interculturalism.

In 1990, the PLQ published its official statement on integration entitled *Let's Build Quebec Together*, which promoted a more inclusive intercultural perspective on immigrant integration than the one proposed by the PQ a decade earlier. This approach largely abandoned assimilation in favor of an interactive, bi-directional process of integration. In contrast to the PQ's policies that essentialized both Francophone Québécois and immigrants' cultures, the PLQ's position viewed culture as being in constant flux through a process of ongoing negotiation

[238] A common misperception emanates from the understanding that in contrast to the PQ, the PLQ does not advocate Quebec nationalism. While this might be true for some members of the party and for most of its Anglophone supporters, the PLQ does in fact actively promote a Quebec nationalist agenda that seeks to increase the province's power, autonomy, and authority within the Canadian federation. (See: Barker 2010; Beland and Lecourse 2006; Keating 2002). For instance on October 30, 2003, the national assembly voted unanimously in favor of a bill that recognized that Quebec constituted a separate nation. This vote signified and reaffirmed the commitment of all political parties to the national project (Lluch 2014)

and intercultural dialogue, with language and history constituting the only constants (Ministère des Communautés Culturelles et de l'Immigration 1990).

Although the statement retained some elements of the convergence approach since it promoted the idea of a shared French public culture as a moral contract between Quebec and its immigrants, it strongly emphasized the centrality of democratic values and cultural pluralism (Carens 1995). From this perspective, the development of a common French public culture had two goals: first, it fostered French as means of communication and social integration; and second, it was understood to provide a space in which diverse members of society could interact, share their experiences, negotiate identities, and promote cultural understanding (Gagnon and Iacovino 2005).

Through the intercultural process, both the Francophone majority and the minorities were expected to engage in an ongoing process of mutual interaction and learning in which the onus of integration is shared by society as a whole. For this purpose, the PLQ's approach reduced the emphasis placed on essentialized nations of cultural communities, emphasizing instead intergroup negotiation and dialogue. As early as 1987, three years prior to the publication of the policy statement, the Liberal government increasingly diverted resources from the cultural community and heritage language programs, replacing them with more intercultural ones (Ministère des Communautés Culturelles et de l'Immigration 1989; 1990). In addition, the PQL's approach expanded Québécois membership. In contrast to the PQ's approach that held that only after complete assimilation can one *perhaps* become a true Québécois, the new approach referred to immigrants as Québécois from the day they settled in the province, and created a space for hyphenated identities to emerge as a means of generating more inclusive hybrid identity categories that would allow immigrants to belong in Quebec and retain elements of their identities concurrently.

The document therefore envisions all Québécois as participants in the collective task of building a diverse and pluralist Quebec that was grounded in the French language. The sole demand made of immigrants was that they take part in this French public culture as a means of integrating into and participating in society. Thus, although the PLQ did not seek to transform immigrants into old-stock Québécois, their integration into Francophone society remained a vital goal.

As a PLQ member of the National Assembly explained, "Quebec is and always will be am immigrant society. Our goal is to make everyone feel welcome and to maintain some social cohesion…But we don't want a US style melting pot or a sovereigntist society like the PQ ….It is of course important to us that newcomers have access to French classes so that they can enjoy the economic opportunities Quebec offers and be part of this society…But we also want them to share their own knowledge and experience….Look at the workers in my office, they are all from different origins and together we are promoting and enhancing Quebec…. We are nationalists but we see things differently than the PQ." (personal interview November 8, 2011).

While both the PQ's and the PLQ's approaches toward integration were guided by their nation-building interests (Blad and Couton 2009), the differences between these parties' visions of this project—sovereignty or Francophone empowerment within Canada—engendered significantly diverse approaches toward integration. In contrast to the convergence approach, which many Allophones perceived as a mere extension of the PQ's coercive linguistic policies, immigrants largely embraced interculturalism (Oaks and Warren 2007). However, despite the inclusive nature of interculturalism, the PLQ government created few concrete mechanisms to facilitate immigrant integration. In practice, interculturalism remained primarily an integration philosophy and did little to actively foster concrete immigrant identification with Quebec (personal interviews with immigrant association managers and activists of both immigrant and Francophone descent, October 12, 2011; October 26, 2011; November 17, 2011; August 23, 2012).

Following the PQ's return to power in 1994 and the subsequent failure of the second sovereignty referendum in 1995 by less than a one percent margin, the provincial government decided to reassess its inability to foster immigrant support for sovereignty once again (Iacovino and Sevigney 2011). The fact that 95 percent of non-Francophone Quebeckers voted against sovereignty (McRoberts 1997) illustrated the extent of the party's failure to mobilize Allophone support. This was epitomized in Jack Parizeau's famous statement that the defeat was the result of "big money and the ethnic vote." The spirit behind is words prompted the PQ to create a new integration policy, which moved away from both convergence and intercultural pluralism, but returned to the civic republican model by focusing on the idea of a shared Quebec citizenship (Juteau 2002; 2004).

The new policy emphasized its departure from culture since its authors believed that it was culture that foregrounded the differences between Francophones and Allophones, and undermined the construction of a more unified Québécois national collective. Instead, the policy promoted a political concept of integration that stressed formal equality, secularism, and a shared political community that would promote a sovereign Quebec (Gagnon and Iacovino 2005).

The concept of Quebec citizenship negated both cultural pluralism and hybrid identities (as epitomized by both the PLQ's interculturalism and Canadian multiculturalism), on the one hand, and cultural essentialism, which considered immigrant difference to be permanent, on the other. Both were perceived as barriers to the creation of a unified political Québécois community. As a result, the PQ government terminated the use of the term *cultural communities* and renamed the Immigration Ministry "The Ministry of Citizen Relations and Immigration." In addition, it canceled all ethnic heritage and language classes and other provincially-funded diversity programs. The government also designed, although it did not implement, a formal process for acquiring Quebec citizenship that required immigrants to reach specific integration thresholds in order to gain full membership in society. In addition, it created a series of events including Citizenship Week and the Citizenship Awards as a means of fostering immigrant inclusion (Hepburn 2010). Quebec citizenship was presented as a means of increasing equity across society and generating participatory opportunities for immigrants and natives alike.

To advance this approach, a provincial council was charged with developing and formalizing the concept of Quebec Citizenship. In the document it published—*Le Forum National sur la Citoyenneté et l'Intégration*, also known as the Larose Commission (Gouvernement du Québec 2000 ; 2001)—it negated the importance of culture, claiming that people should not be defined by their cultural heritage but rather by their common status as citizens of the Quebec State whose most fundamental right was self-determination. The committee in fact promoted the idea that "citizenship is defined in its transcendental function, as an institution that is meant to overcome, rather than accommodate, particular identities" (Iacovino and Sevigny 2011, 257). The report emphasized the role of citizenship in creating a common social space. From this perspective, the use of French served as an equalizing force and a means of exercising one's citizenship, demonstrating one's membership of society, and promoting social justice: "Citizenship can be perceived as an explicit recognition of belonging to the nation…. The Quebec nation is abandoning its defensive stance to minority peoples, rejecting the divisive, ethnic nature of multiculturalism and relying increasingly on the potential to rally society around…the collective benefits of sharing the same citizenship" (Gouvernement du Québec 2000, 12).

A former PQ member of the National Assembly and member of the assembly's immigration committee explained "The idea of citizenship is about creating a shared base for both Quebeckers and immigrants in addition to language and culture…. While other groups here in Quebec don't even care if immigrants speak French we think that it is important that immigrants become part of our society that has many unique features…. We in the PQ believe that Quebec Citizenship was and still is a way of achieving this. For immigrants to truly integrate and become part of our society we need to create paths for them to be able to fully participate." (personal interview, August 22, 2012).

In practice however, it appears evident that Quebec Citizenship constituted primarily a revised version of the PQ's civic republican assimilatory approach (See: Castles and Miller 2009; Jennings 2000; and chapter 1). Whereas the convergence policy highlighted ethnic difference as a starting point from which immigrants were expected to shift toward the majority, Quebec Citizenship required all members of society to converge around French and the PQ's national project to form a coherent national community. As Juteau (2002) suggests, "What was put forward as citizenship was in fact sovereignty" (450). This sentiment is evident in the statement of the editor of the nationalist newspaper *Le Devoir*: "If the minister wants a discussion about [sovereignty], let him do so openly, not under the cover of an alleged debate about citizenship" (in Oaks and Warren 2007, 33).

Beyond developing the Quebec Citizenship model, the PQ significantly enhanced immigrant integration and French language acquisition programs. Furthermore, the government actively promoted these classes among immigrant communities, resulting in an almost 100 percent increase in enrollment by 1997 (Ministère de l'Immigration et des Communautés Culturelles 2011). In addition, the government initiated programs to increase the number of immigrant workers in government and the civil service. However, despite the PQ's attempts to foster Allophone assimilation, Barker (2010) argues that due to liberal constraints, the PQ was unable to facilitate the large-scale reforms it sought to implement. These constraints emanated from the PQ's negative international and domestic reputation concerning immigration and tolerance of diversity and its need for legitimacy. Thus, these dynamics substantially curtailed its ability to implement reforms due to fear that the latter would be perceived as illiberal or anti-immigrant. Paradoxically, the liberal party was more effective than the PQ in implementing nationalist immigration policies owing to the absence of these constraints.

Following the return of the PLQ to power in 2003, the concept of Quebec Citizenship was abandoned and replaced by the former liberal intercultural approach. As it did in the early 1990s, the PLQ continued to promote intercultural dialogue, diversity, and the creation of a shared Francophone public culture (Gouvernement du Québec 2004a; 2004b). To this end, the ministry's previous name was reinstated and the various policies and event that had been developed by the PQ and revolved around the idea of Quebec Citizenship were cancelled. For instance, Intercultural Week replaced Citizenship Week as the primary annual celebration of immigration and diversity in the province. Interestingly, the PLQ also brought back the concept of cultural communities that it had abandoned in favor of interculturalism and that the PQ had abandoned in favor of citizenship. It is unclear, however, why this shift took place, since the PLQ itself acted to limit the concept of cultural communities because of its essentialist connotations. One possible hypothesis suggests that the PLQ was seeking to regain the political support of immigrant groups that were increasingly supporting the PQ (*Globe and Mail* 2003). The return to cultural communities permitted the large-scale transfer of funds to a host of immigrant organizations and offered the PLQ an opportunity to co-opt them as a means of regaining their political support.

Immigration and Integration Policies and the National Project(s)

As I have demonstrated in the analysis above, while many of the preferences regarding immigration are shared across Quebec's political groups, on certain issues, the latter's particular visions of the national project can engender divergent policy preferences vis-à-vis immigration. From this perspective, I diverge from scholars who suggest that the differences between these political groups are marginal (see: Baker 2010). To support my argument, I have explored the development of two policy areas. First, I trace the development of Quebec's policies toward immigrant recruitment and the debate between Canada and Quebec over immigration competencies. Second, I examined the development of Quebec's integration philosophies and policies that have ranged from incentivized voluntary intercultural integration to coercive assimilation.

In particular, I analyzed the determinants of these approaches and their relation to competing visions of the national project. I therefore posited that while both central political parties (PLQ and PQ) converge in their promotion of immigration and the expansion of provincial competencies over immigration (Fraser 2001), they diverge in relation to the particular integration polices they have promoted. I have contended that while shared preferences toward recruitment emanate from a mutual interest of bolstering Quebec's demographic and institutional position, divergent preferences vis-à-vis integration stem from these parties' different approaches toward the national project (renewed federalism or sovereignty), including the role that immigrants are expected to play within each of them.

My analysis of these processes therefore partially contrasts with that of Barker (2010), who argues that the differences between the PQ and the PLQ with regard to immigration are marginal. On the one hand, I concur with Barker's assertion that in contrast to prevailing interpretations that perceive the sovereignty movement as xenophobic and anti- immigration (see for instance: Linz and Stepan 1996; Teitelboim and Weiner 2001)[239], both the sovereigntist PQ and its PLQ counterpart do in fact support the adoption of expansive immigration policies. On the other, I disagree with Barker's assessment concerning the lack of difference between the two parties' preferences and strategies. While her analysis focuses primarily on refuting the position that the PQ manifests a negative stance toward immigration, she overlooks the intricacies and differences between how these two groups perceive the role of immigrants in Quebec society. My analysis suggests that while the two parties do actually converge with regard to immigrant recruitment preferences, they diverge significantly with respect to their specific policy preferences or philosophies toward immigrant integration. I suggest that their preferences regarding the latter are intricately connected to and shaped by the particular vision of the national project that they espouse.

The Outcomes of Immigrant Integration and the National Project

The previous section examined the various political approaches toward immigrant recruitment and integration. It examined how these approaches spawned competing visions of Quebec-

[239] Keating (2001) points out that this perception is partially the result of Canadian attempts to delegitimize Quebec's immigration model.

Canada relations and the nature of Quebec itself. I now turn to the outcomes of the immigration policies.

Specifically, two questions require particular investigation. First, in what ways have these policies facilitated or hindered immigrant integration into Francophone society and immigrant identification with Quebec and its national project(s)? Second, how has the incorporation of diverse immigrant populations over the last 50 years altered or affected the foundations Quebec society? And how has their ongoing presence promoted or challenged the nature of these national project(s) more broadly?

Integration and Language

Today, in the aftermath of 50 years of transformation in Quebec's attitudes and policies toward immigration, it is evident that immigrants are increasingly, though not exclusively, integrating into Francophone Québécois society. Beyond the aforementioned immigrant selection practices, Bill 101 has constituted a largely effective policy tool for promoting this goal. Since its implementation in 1977, it dramatically reversed the schooling situation as Allophone immigrants shifted from the English to the French school system in the province. For instance, only about 10 percent of Allophones who resided on the Island of Montreal during the early 1970s attended unilingual French schools (Gouvernement du Québec 1996). However, during the 1978-79 school year—one year after the implementation of Bill 101—this proportion increased to 20.5 percent.

As Figure 5.3 illustrates, attendance rates have increased steadily, reaching 61 percent in 1982, 65 percent by 1985 (Paillé 1989), and ultimately plateauing in the early 1990s with approximately 80 percent Allophone attendance.[240] In fact, by 2013, Allophones hailing from 188 different countries constituted 41.8 percent of students in French schools and are fast approaching parity with native-born Francophone students if one takes into account the fact that approximately five percent of students in this system are Anglophones (Conseil Supérieur de l'Education 2014; Meilleur 2005; Ministère de l'Éducation, du Loisir et du Sport 2014). Furthermore, due to the concentration of immigrants in the Montreal metropolitan area, Allophone students constitute a majority in 121 schools (36 percent) in that area (McAndrew 2002).

Figure 5.3: The Proportion of Allophone Children Who Attend French Schools 1970-2013*



* Figure is based on my calculation of data provided by the Ministère de l'Éducation, du Loisir et du Sport (2013).

---

[240] The reason for the partial lag in Allophone transfer to French schools emanates from the provision in Bill 101 that exempts Allophone children whose parents attended English schools in Quebec from attending French schools (La charte de la langue française 1977).

Thus, despite initial large-scale Allophone opposition to coercive linguistic policies and resistance toward Bill 101, it appears that the province's coercive linguistic policies with regard to the medium of education have been successful in enhancing immigrant integration into Francophone society through school attendance. Beyond the formal aspects of this process, school attendance has fostered intensified interaction between Francophones and Allophones since these schools have de-facto become multicultural sites in which children from diverse cultural backgrounds meet and interact (McAndrew 2010). At the same time, this process has also decreased Allophone interactions with Anglophones, thereby diminishing Allophone students' opportunities to engage socially in English (CLF 2000).

Furthermore, beyond being educated in French and socialized into Francophone Québécois culture and values (McAndrew 2013), school attendance has promoted the integration of students' families into the broader Québécois culture as well since it is necessary for parents to speak French in order to communicate with teachers and assist their children with schoolwork. In an interview, an immigrant integration worker pointed out that this constituted a crucial and purposive component of Quebec's schooling policies. While these policies formally focus on students they indirectly foster broader family assimilation through schoolwork, extra curricular activities and programs, informal gatherings, and social events (personal interview, November 10, 2011). Thus, as a result, both Allophone students and parents have become increasingly embedded in Francophone culture and social networks (McAndrew 2010).

However, owing to the fact that Allophones are legally required to attend French schools, data on increasing attendance do not reveal immigrants' true linguistic preferences or their relative level of integration into Quebec's Francophone society. "Quantitative data reveals the effectiveness of Bill 101 in transforming enrollment trends, but provides no information on the qualitative impact of this on the cultural and linguistic fabric of a school system which, until very recently, was largely monoethnic" (McAndrew 1996, 35). While evidence concerning this issue is mixed (see: Oaks and Warren 2007), as I demonstrate below, it appears that there is in fact a trend of francization among Allophones. However, this process appears to be proceeding at a slower pace than political actors had hoped (Keating 2001). Furthermore, while political elites have designed policies that emanate from a binary mutually exclusive English/French model, in reality, young Allophones have increasingly become proficient in both cultures and languages, as well as their mother tongue, and have largely rejected the single language model (either English or French) that has historically prevailed in Quebec (Konidaris 2007; Oaks and Warren 2007).

Since French constitutes the primary identity marker in Quebec (Bloemraad 2001) and there is a strong relationship between regular use of French and identification with Quebec (Conseil de la Langue Française 2000). In fact, in response to a question concerning the components of Quebec identity, a Francophone Québécois public intellectual pointed out that there was very little distinct in this identity beyond shared language and history. In fact he pointed out "The struggle over Quebec identity and culture is partially due to the lack of a coherent understanding of what this really means beyond us all speaking French...This also makes it difficult to create clear and efficient cultural integration policies because policy makers themselves are not always sure what this culture really is beyond language (personal interview, November 28, 2011).

Thus, a comprehensive examination of the degree to which immigrants are in fact integrating into Francophone society requires that we explore the extent to which Allophone immigrants use French not only in the formal school setting, but also in their daily lives both at home and in public.[241] A study conducted by Renaud et al. (2003) that explored Allophone students' language practices found that by 1997, 20 years after Bill 101 was implemented, 61 percent of Allophone children used French as their primary language of public communication, while only 20 percent used English. This signifies a dramatic shift from data collected prior to the 1970s according to which the vast majority of Allophone immigrants exclusively used English for public communication, with only approximately 10 percent having even a working knowledge of French (Gouvernement du Québec 1972; Levine 2010).

Similarly, a study conducted by Beaulieu (2004) that explored language practices and identity among *the children of Bill 101*, referring to Allophones who entered the province's education system after 1977, also reveals data pointing to increased Allophone francization (see also: Gouvernement du Québec 1996a). With regard to language, the study found that 54 percent of respondents spoke French exclusively in social interactions and public settings (both vis-à-vis provincial institutions and the business sector), 19 percent spoke both English and French, and only 17 percent of the respondents used only English. In addition, the study revealed that 59 percent of the respondents read newspapers and books in French only, and 84 percent supported the maintenance or the adoption of additional policies designed to protect the position of French in the province. A study that examined Allophones of all ages found that 41 percent used French as their primary public language in contrast to 34 percent who used English (Conseil de la Langue Française 1993; 1998).

Similar trends were identified in an additional study that was conducted by the Office Québécois de la Langue Française, the official provincial body for the promotion of the French Language and the enforcement of linguistic policies (Office Québécois de la Langue Française

[241] While Quebec nationalists claim that Quebec's distinct identity is rooted in a wide array of factors, the vast majority of Francophone Québécois interviewees were unable to identify components other than language and a sense of shared history.

2008). In 1996, according to this study, 31.3 percent of immigrant families spoke primarily French at home. After excluding immigrants from countries like France, Belgium, Morocco, and Algeria for whom French was a first or second language prior to immigration, the study revealed that 17.7 of Allophone immigrants spoke French at home as compared to 17.2 percent of *both* Allophone and Anglophone[242] immigrants (combined) who spoke primarily English at home. These data enable us to partially overcome the interpretive challenge that arises from the fact that policies designed to enhance the use of French were created at the same time that the province gained increased selection powers enabling it to increase the proportion of French-speaking immigrants.

Beyond general language use, linguistic transfers can also serve as important indicators for measuring the level of immigrants' linguistic and social integration into host societies (Molinaro 2011; Woollard 1989). A language transfer takes place when an immigrant adopts the host's society's language not solely for public use (in education or employment) but as the primary language of interaction both at home and with peers since it replaces the language used in the country of origin (Woolward 1989). Thus, from both the PQ's and the PLQ's perspectives, language transfers constitute a crucial indicator for measuring the level of Allophones' substantial adaptation into Francophone society.

Despite an explicit provincial focus on and encouragement of transfers, it appears that the majority of immigrants have not undergone linguistic transfer in the traditional sense. In fact, recent research suggests that the majority of immigrants are actively trilingual, functioning concurrently in French, English, and their mother tongue, depending on the particular social context in which they find themselves, thereby challenging the province's traditional socio-

[242] This category primarily consists of British and American immigrant and excludes internal Anglophone immigrants from other Canadian provinces.

linguistic categories and boundaries (Konidaris 2007; Oaks and Warren 2007; Personal interview November 28, 2011).[243]

However, concurrently, despite the shift towards bilingualism and trilingualism, recent data suggest an increasing trend in favor of language transfers into French rather than English. With regard to these transfers, the data illustrate that the overall proportion of immigrants who have undertaken this process has not changed dramatically since the early 1980s when the province began collecting data on this issue. For instance, with regard to immigrants in the Montreal Metropolitan area, where approximately 80 percent of Allophones reside, 29.5 percent and 28.1 percent of immigrants underwent linguistic transfer in 1983 and 1986 respectively, while 35.7 percent and 36.3 percent underwent this process in 2011 and 2012 respectively (Ministère de l'Éducation, du Loisir et du Sport 2014). However, despite the fact that the number of Allophones undergoing linguistic transfers has stabilized at approximately one-third of the population, there has been a significant shift in favor of transfers into French. While only 15.6 percent and 18.6 percent of immigrants who transferred chose French in 1983 and 1986 respectively, 65 percent and 67 percent transferred into French in 2011 and 2012 respectively (ibid.).

A study conducted by Statistics Canada (2007) found that among Allophones who immigrated between 2001 and 2006 and underwent a language transfer, 75 percent chose French. Furthermore, Renaud *et al.*'s study (2003) identified that more than 37 percent of Allophones spoke French at home either exclusively or in conjunction with a heritage language. Similarly, a

[243] In fact, Molinaro (2011) points out that Quebec has a particularly high retention rate of heritage languages compared to other Canadian provinces. These differences can, however, be partially explained by the relatively recent emergence of diverse immigration into Quebec and by the strong attraction power of English in other provinces. (These hypotheses are based on suggestions made by a leading Québécois public intellectual. Personal interview November 28, 2011.) Furthermore, linguistic transfer trends are particularly complex in the context of autochthonous linguistic competition (Molinaro 2011).

provincial study found that transfers to French were substantially higher among immigrants who settled in Quebec after the implementation Bill 101 and particularly among young immigrants who attended French schools (Gouvernement du Québec 1996).

Another important indicator for examining the intensity of Allophone integration into French concerns their language choices in the field of higher education. In contrast to both primary and secondary education that are governed by Bill 101, Francophones, Anglophones, and Allophones are free to choose the language of education in Quebec's pre-university college system and university system (CEGEP) alike. Thus, in contrast to the language of schooling, language preferences in the real of higher education offer us a better understanding of Allophones' linguistic choices. Studies provide mixed results on this front. A study that was undertaken by the Conseil Supérieur de la Langue Française (Conseil Supérieur de la Langue Française 2011) found a significant increase in Allophone attendance in Francophone CEGEPs. While only 16 percent of Allophones attended French CEGEPs in 1981, the proportion increased to 37 percent in 1998 and 69 percent in 2009. However, the study also found that approximately 47.3 percent of Allophones who attended French schools enrolled in English-speaking universities such as McGill.

In recent years, in response to these mixed outcomes, the PQ has unsuccessfully promoted several legal measures that would expand the mandate and the restrictions of Bill 101 to include CEGEPs and Universities (Dougherty 2012). However, a Conseil Supérieur de la Langue Française report (2011) suggests that Allophone enrollment in Anglophone universities is not necessarily an indicator of lack of integration into Francophone society. Instead, the report cites several factors suggesting that students' decisions are more strategic than ideational. These include (1) the national and international prestige of Anglophone universities, McGill in particular, in contrast to Francophone universities, (2) Allophone students' interests in enhancing their English language skills, and (3) the goal of increasing their job prospects in Quebec, Canada, and the United States (see also: Conseil de la Langue Française 2000).

The data presented above suggest~~s~~ that beyond recruiting immigrants who are able to speak some French upon arrival, immigrants are increasingly integrating linguistically into Francophone society. However, the shift from anglification to francization poses two central challenges. First, in interviews I conducted with immigrant associations and integration workers, the respondents stressed that the province's integration policies were overly focused on language and lacked other aspects of the cultural and social integration process. As a senior member of one of Quebec's largest integration organizations explained, "language is not enough. We [the province] spend a lot of time and money on teaching immigrants how to speak French but we don't give them other skills and information that are important in the labor market and society…integration is not just a technical process, it is also about being part of society. They never talk about that aspect….this is a big problem especially for those who already speak French because they have very few resources because everything is so focused on teaching French" (personal interview November 17, 2011).

Another civil society integration worker explained, "….more than 70 percent of companies in Quebec have less than 15 employees. Most of them hire workers through connections and social networks….for this reason French classes don't really help them find good jobs in French companies" (personal interview October 29, 2011). In addition, several interviewees stated that skin color (black) and religion (Islam) diminish the human capital effects of speaking French, as exemplified by the experiences of Haitian and North African Immigrants (see: Labelle and Salee 2001; Mahrouse 2010; Racine 2009).[244] For instance, while PQ members argue that the majority of immigrants who leave the province do so because they do not speak French an integration worker argued that that was not the case. In fact, she pointed out that her anecdotal experience suggest that those most likely to leave are high-skilled Haitians and North Africans who speak French as a first or second language but are unable to find adequate employment in the province due to their visible racial and/or religious difference (personal interview November 17, 2011).

Second, the focus on the acquisition of French overlooks the social reality that many immigrants are required to master English as well as French in order to participate in the labor market, particularly in Montreal. According to Langlois (2009), while on average 37.1 percent of jobs in Quebec necessitate some use of English and 6.9 percent require English only, these proportions for immigrants are 51 percent and 16 percent respectively. An integration worker explained that these data result from the fact that the majority of immigrants work either in the low-skilled service sector that requires the ability to interact with both French- and English-speaking clients, or in the high-skilled international sector (personal interview November 17, 2011). Despite the importance of English for labor market integration, the provincial government does not provide these services, putting immigrants who only speak French at a disadvantage. Furthermore, since the recruitment systems strongly emphasize Quebec's position as a French-speaking province, most immigrants do not know that they will be required to speak English as well. When I questioned a senior official at the Ministry of Immigration on this issue, she clarified that the need to speak English is explained in the material immigrants receive upon

[244] One interviewee pointed out anecdotally that many of the immigrants who leave the province are in fact native Francophones from countries like Morocco or Haiti (November 12, 2011). This argument, however, appears to contradict official provincial data suggesting that immigrants who speak French upon arrival are almost 15 percent more likely to remain in the province after five years (Ministère de l'Immigration, de la Diversité et de l'Inclusion 2014).

being selected (personal interview December 1, 2011). However, a review of these materials, which were provided by this official, revealed that no such information is provided (Ministère de l'Immigration et des Communautés Culturelles 2011).

Integration and Quebec Identity

While language constitutes a means of measuring integration and identity, particularly in the Quebec context where language serves as the primary identity marker, Carens (1995) points out that the connection between the two must not be overstated. Similarly, other scholars have suggested that immigrant integration and identification with Quebec is only partially determined by linguistic practices, since other factors such as overall economic and social integration (Bélanger and Perrella 2008; Juteau and McAndrew 1992; Piché 2004). For this reason and due to the centrality of the goal that is espoused to various degrees by all political parties of fostering some level of Quebec identity among immigrants, it is essential that we examine the dynamics of immigrant identity with and attachment to the province and its national project(s).

In recent empirical studies, scholars have identified contradictory and ambivalent trends concerning immigrant adoption of a Québécois identity and support of Quebec nationalism (Bélanger and Perrella 2008; Helly and Schendel 2001; Gagné and Langlois, 2002; Oaks and Warren 2007). For instance, Labelle and Salee (2001) found that immigrants of both the first and second generations are divided with regard to Quebec nationalism: while some fear and strongly oppose it, others are highly enthusiastic about it. At the same time the study found that immigrants are more likely to view Canada and not Quebec as the primary host society. An integration worker I interviewed explained these seemingly contradictory findings. "I think that it has to do with if the immigrants come from a minority or a majority. For instance, Arab

Moroccans are usually against Quebec nationalism but Berbers support it" (personal interview October 20, 2011).

In addition, and perhaps more importantly they found that immigrants tend to challenge existing social boundaries by not assimilating into existing linguistic categories but instead adopting hyphenated and multifaceted identities that simultaneously preserve their identification with their country of origin. However, they found that at the same time, these immigrants are more likely to hyphenate their identities with Quebec than with Canada.

Beaulieu's (2004) study of the children of Bill 101 also identifies mixed but somewhat positive results concerning identification with the province. On the one hand, when asked about their primary site of identification within the host society, the largest group identified themselves as Canadian (34 percent), while the other respondents were divided almost equally between Montrealer (29 percent) and Québécois (28 percent). On the other hand, when asked more specific questions about their Quebec identity, 16 percent identified themselves as sovereigntists, 40 percent stated that they would vote in favor of Quebec sovereignty in a referendum—a figure that increased to 48 percent among the 18-26 age group, which is equivalent to rates among autochthonous Québécois. The study also found that a majority of respondents (54 percent) perceived Quebec as a fundamentally different entity from the rest of Canada,[245] and 67 percent of the respondents emphasized that Quebec constituted a separate nation—a status that requires that it receive additional competencies and implement different policies.

Similarly other empirical studies have found increasing levels of Allophone identification with the province and support for Quebec sovereignty (Gagné and Langlois 2002; Lavoie and Serré 2002; Serré 2002). Based on survey research, these scholars argue that Allophone public

[245] The generational gap in preferences for sovereignty identified by Beaulieu (2004) might explain the discrepancy between the findings of this study and the fact that Allophones overwhelmingly voted against sovereignty in 1995.

opinion, particularly among post Bill 101 youth, is increasingly converging with that of Francophones. According to these studies, although allophones support sovereignty or increased Quebec autonomy at lower rates than Francophones, over time there has been a significant shift in favor of Quebec nationalism. These studies primarily attribute this shift to the effects Bill 101 had on immigrant integration into Francophone society and on their linguistic practices (Helly and Schendel 2001).

Bélanger and Perrella's study (2008), however, qualifies these findings. Although the study identifies an increase in support for sovereignty among young Allophones, as 29 percent of the latter declare support the sovereignty option (in contrast to 9 percent among Anglophones and 59 percent among Francophones), they argue that there is a difference causal process underlying these outcomes. In contrast to Francophones, Allophone support for sovereignty is less ideological and primarily emanates from socio-economic factors. Thus, they posit that increased identification with the province does not indicate convergence and that the impact of Bill 101 and linguistic practices has been overstated by previous studies that focused on preferences alone and assumed the factors that shaped these preferences.

The findings presented in the aforementioned studies stand in partial contrast to those of the Conseil de la Langue Française's (2000) qualitative study, which identified a relatively weak level of identification with both French and English, particularly among those who speak the two languages well, since these languages were perceived primarily in instrumental and not ideational terms. This corresponds in part with studies suggesting that trilingual Allophones increasingly problematize traditional linguistic identity categories (Meintel and Fortin 2001; Oaks and Warren 2007). However, despite this finding, the CLF study also found that the majority of interviewees possessed a strong normative commitment to sending their children to

French-speaking schools as well as an ingrained respect for the importance of the position of the French language within Quebec. These commitments are particularly pronounced when Allophones are exposed chiefly to other Allophones and Francophones rather than to Anglophones (CLF 2000).

Finally, several studies have found that the variation in the level of attachment to Quebec is related to the respondents' ages and whether they are first-, second-, or third-generation migrants (Banting and Soroka 2011; Oaks and Warren 2007). Banting and Soroka's (2011) study found that non-racialized immigrants (Europeans, Arabs, and Latin Americans) tend to identify primarily with Quebec rather than with Canada—an identification that increases among younger generations and approximates that of the general population in the province. For instance, a 30-year-old Allophone who emigrated from Hungary at the age of 11 explained, "I wouldn't say all the children of Bill 101 are sovereigntists. But we are a lot more sovereigntist than our parents" (Globe and Mail 2005). However, Banting and Soroka (2011) also found that among racialized minorities, identity with Quebec is high among first-generation immigrants but decreases substantially among younger generations who are alienated from Quebec and Canada equally. The authors hypothesize that these findings among racial minorities can be explained by the dynamics of the competitive nation-building between Quebec and Canada that fosters alienation toward both groups.

The Consequences of Immigration: Transformations, Challenges and Responses

While the previous section explored the impact that Quebec's immigration, integration, and linguistic policies have had on immigrants' linguistic and identity preferences, it is also important to briefly examine and assess the impact that immigration has exerted on the province, its competition with Canada, and the various national projects within it. Specifically, I posit that despite the overall instrumental desire to recruit and integrate immigrants, their long term presence in the province and their position as carriers of ethnic, religious and cultural difference, has ultimately challenged the province's social boundaries, identity, and national project(s).

The perceived challenges posed by immigration have primarily stemmed from the increased level of pluralism and social transformation that immigrant long-term settlement has engendered. This process has problematized both the nature of the competitive dynamics that lie at the center of this study and Quebec's overall distinctiveness in relation to the rest of Canada. Specifically, the emergence of cultural, religious, and linguistic pluralism in Quebec has partially altered the nature of intergroup competition from one that had historically been organized along linguistic and cultural lines to what can be defined as competition between two de-facto pluralist or multicultural polities (Canada and Quebec).[246]

In response to the challenges of pluralism, immigration has reemerged as a central concern among the dominant nationalist groups in the province and has generated a response that can be termed *ambivalent inclusion,* which differentiates between abstract immigration that is perceived as demographically desirable and the concrete manifestations of immigrant presence that are partially viewed as a threat to communal survival. Thus, there is an ongoing tension that had arisen as a consequence of the dissonance between the province's vision of immigrants as demographic *pawns* that would not disrupt the cultural realities in the province, and the realities that are engendered by immigrant settlement and agency.

[246] For instance, this transformation is evident in the aforementioned shift from bi-linguialism to tri- or pluri-lingualism that problematizes the linguistic divide that has constituted the fundamental fault line on which intergroup competition between Quebec and Canada has been based.

This inherent tension between the nationalist desire for cultural homogeneity or fixity and the pluralist realities of immigrant settlement, particularly in the context of contentious spaces, where the host society is itself in a struggle for cultural and political recognition, evokes a crucially important question. Specifically, how can the mass incorporation of diverse immigrants be reconciled with Quebec's ethnic distinctiveness that constitutes the very foundation upon which its political claims (for increased autonomy or sovereignty) are founded? While immigration and incorporation policies in Quebec necessarily engender pluralism, this pluralism concurrently generates a particular challenge for those who make political demands that are predicated upon the existence of a distinct *Quebec nation* or identity that is fundamentally different from Canada, a difference that according to Quebec nationalists requires that they be granted increased political autonomy or the right self-determination.

As the analysis above indicates, the presence of immigrants has historically engendered a host of fears and concerns among Francophone Québécois regarding their national survival. These have been manifested by the enduring anxieties over Francophone assimilation and Anglophone immigration that emerged in the aftermath of the conquest and persisted well into 20th century. Furthermore, since World War II fears have primarily concerned the threat of Francophone demographic decline due to Allophone assimilation into Anglophone society (Behiels 1991; Levine 2010).

In recent decades, following the transformation of Quebec immigration and integration policies, the challenges of pluralism have replaced historical fears and engendered a host of new concerns and anxieties across Quebec society. In particular, issues concerning religion and societal values (including: gender equality and personal freedoms) have constituted a focal point around which such tensions and concerns have been most forcefully expressed.

As discussed above, following the large-scale social transformations that took place in the years preceding and following the Quiet revolution, Quebec shifted from an intensely religious and church dominated society to a highly secularized one (Balthazar 1989; Zubrzyci 2013). For instance, in 2001 Quebec and British Colombia had the lowest religious attendance rates in Canada as a whole (25 percent), in contrast to 36 percent in Ontario and Manitoba. Furthermore, Quebec's two largest metropolitan areas (Montreal and Quebec City) experienced the lowest rate (21 percent) of religious attendance in comparison to all other metropolitan areas in Canada (Clack 2003).[247]

In fact, beyond religious attendance the secular nature of the province has come to constitute one of the five core *common values of Quebec* along with democracy, the rule of law, gender equality, and the protection of human freedoms (Gouvernement du Québec 2012). These values have not only been enshrined in provincial policies and documents but constitute, together with the primacy of the French language, the fundamental conditions that are included in the *Declaration on the Common Values of Québec Society* that immigrants have been required to sign since 2008 in order to be eligible to settle in the province.

Maintaining these patterns of secularism has thus constituted a primary concern and cause for anxiety within Québécois society in the context of increasing flows of international immigration. As a Francophone public intellectual explained, "Over the past 10 years, religion and the level of religiousness of immigrants has become the central issue in the immigration debate…. many of these fears are not real or have been hyped by the media…. But you can say that today immigrants' religion has become more central than even the language issue" (Personal interview November 28, 2011). Thus, both Quebec's public and political spheres have been

[247] According to this data Quebec cities were significantly more secular than cities in the rest of Canada. For example, in 2001 Toronto had 36 percent rate of religious attendance and Winnipeg had 32 percent.

engaged in debates over the preservation of secularism and the role that immigrants, Muslim and Sikhs in particular, can potentially play in disrupting the existing status quo over religion.

However, despite the focus on immigration, it appears that religion has assumed a largely symbolic role in these debates that in fact reflect broader societal reactions, concerns, and insecurities regarding the changes that immigrant presence and agency have and potentially can introduced in the absence of wholesale assimilation (Iacoviano 2015). In fact, this position was expressed in five separate interviews I conducted with two Québécois intellectuals and three integration workers. Thus, in contrast to the past when immigrants were perceived as posing a linguistic and demographic threat due to their lack of integration into Francophone-Québécois society, over the last decade they have increasingly come to represent a threat to the province's core secular values and overall identity because of their integration and the consequent diversity that they introduce into Francophone society.

Furthermore, it is highly revealing that while the scant existing data on immigrant religiosity suggests that the vast majority of immigrants are in-fact not religious (Clark 2003). For instance, the chair of the Quebec's Immigrant Association Union, suggested in an interview that according to her organization's data, less than 20 percent of Immigrants from Muslim countries practice the religion on a regular basis (personal interview, October 25, 2011). Religion has nevertheless become the focal point around which the pluralism debate has emerged.[248] While the debate over religion has mirrored similar debates and concerns that are prevalent in other immigrant receiving countries (Benhabib 2002; Kastroyano 2002; Reitz 2002) this comparison only tells us part of the story. In practice, this debate has also been a response to the

[248] This outcome is likely related in part to increasing concerns worldwide regarding immigrant religion, primarily vis-à-vis Muslims since the September 11th attacks and in response to the increasing international impact and salience of radical Islamic movements.

inherent tension between Quebec's national project(s) that are predicated upon the provinces' particular cultural attributes and the de-nationalizing pressures that emanate from transformation of the province into a diverse and perhaps multicultural social space.

The Debate over immigration and religion in the province was largely sparked by a series of events that generated a perception that immigrants seek to alter the province's cultural and religious status quo. Specifically, the catalyst for this debate emerged in 2006 in response to the Canadian Supreme Court's *Miltani* decision that permitted a Sikh schoolboy to carry his ceremonial Kirpan knife within the school's premises (Kousens 2009; Stoker 2007). Both Quebec elites and the Francophone public perceived these demands and the subsequent court decision as an affront to Quebec's secular values and as an imposition of Canada's multicultural policies on the province (Zubrzyci 2013). The outraged public response to the decision therefore had a dual impact. First, it exacerbated popular fears that seemingly integrated immigrants sought to transform Quebec society's fundamental values. Second, the ruling partially revived the historical tensions between Quebec and Canada over the former's autonomy regarding identity issues and increased anxieties concerning the resurgence of historical patterns of intergroup competition.

Following the Miltani decision, the issue of immigrant religion and pluralism became increasingly salient across the province. In particular, francophone tabloids became preoccupied with the issue. For instance, *Le journal de Montréal* published a host of reports concerning both real and fabricated cases in which immigrants and other minorities had allegedly demanded to receive special religious and cultural accommodation (Bouchard and Taylor 2008; Potvin 2010; Zuberzyci 2013). Similarly, communities across Quebec sough to devise rules that would prevent such demands. For instance in 2007 the rural town of Herouxville, created a code of conduct for immigrants, despite the fact that no immigrants resided in the town. The code prohibited culture practices that included: praying and schools, covering ones face, and burying women alive (Bruemmer and Dougherty 2007; Hepburn 2011).

In response to these concerns and social unrest a large-scale debate regarding what constitutes *reasonable accommodation* ensued in the province. Participants in this debate primarily questioned the rules and limits that should be imposed regarding the level of accommodation for immigrants' religious and cultural demands. Furthermore, they debated the impact that these accommodations could exert on Quebec's culture and core values.

While this debate formally revolved around the issue of religious accommodation, following Iacovino (2015) I posit that in practice it was largely engendered by and reflected deeper societal concerns regarding the profound social, cultural, and political effects that immigrant settlement generated in a polity that is itself engaged in a struggle for cultural and political recognition. In response to these increasing social anxieties, the provincial government commissioned a report by two of the province leading intellectuals, Charles Taylor and Gerard Bouchard. Following a year of public hearings, the Bouchard-Taylor Commission concluded that the debate over religious accommodation was primarily the result of media sensationalism and hype and was not grounded in the concrete realities of the province. In fact, the commission found that in practice immigrants had made few requests for religious or cultural accommodation (Bouchard and Taylor 2008; Iacovino 2015).

However, Iacovino (2015) posits, that due to the committee's almost exclusive focus on the reasonable accommodation issue, the report did not sufficiently recognize that this debate was largely a proxy for broader societal concerns. These concerns were not solely about religious practices but involved the broader social and cultural changes that immigrant settlement and integration into Francophone society, over the last several decades, has engendered in the province. For a significant proportion of Francophone Québécois, accommodation constituted a particular manifestation of a process through which the national project that sought to preserve Quebec society by expanding immigration was being undermined by immigration itself.

For instance the head of a popular Quebec nationalist NGO explained "the problem with what I call unreasonable accommodation is that it starts with small changes here and there and then these changes become permanent and they ask for more accommodations…We are a society whose survival as a French speaking society is under threat so we don't want to be multicultural like Canada…What we want is for immigrants to assimilate. When did assimilation become a bad word, something that you can't talk about?" (personal interview, September 28, 2011).

This position is evident not only from the societal responses but also by examining political responses to the crisis. For instance, following the accommodation debate the PQ proposed Bill 195, The Quebec Identity Act, which sought to safeguard the province's collective values of gender equality, secularism, and the predominance of French language and culture. For this purpose, the law proposed a three-year probationary period during which immigrants would be denied political rights during which the province would ensure that they in fact conform to these values (Assemblee Nationale du Québec 2007). Similarly, the PLQ led government concurrently responded to the debate by introducing a *Declaration on the Common Values of Québec Society* which new immigrants were required to sign in order to receive an immigration visa. Furthermore, the PLQ introduced Bill 94, which sought to bar women from receiving public services while wearing a Muslim Niqab (Assemblee Nationale du Québec 2010). At the same time however, the provincial government implemented a program for schools on ethics and world religions that was designed to desensitize the population toward immigration and diversity (Hepburn 2010).

It is interesting that despite Quebec's high level of focus on immigration and integration policies, the province has done little to prepare the Francophone public for the diversity and cultural difference immigration engenders. In fact, the lack of programs for native Francophones was a central point that came up in several interviews that I conducted with both integration workers and policy makers (personal interviews, September 14, 2011; October 6, 2011; October 20, 2011; November 15, 2011). These respondents suggested that the recent conflicts and debates around immigration and accommodation were largely a result of this lack of public desensitization. One possible explanation for the lack of such programs might be related to the social engineering role immigration plays in the province. Since immigrants are perceived in abstract term as pawns or numbers that can bolster Francophone demography, little attention has been given to their individual and collective agency as actors within Quebec society.

While the scope of this study does not enable me to delve into the wide array of scholarship and documents produced during and in the aftermath of this debate (see: Leroux 2014; Mahrouse 2010; Seidle 2009; Sharfy-Funk 2010; Zuberzyci 2013), it is seems apparent that it was largely, though not exclusively, triggered by Quebec's incomplete national construction that are at the center of this study. Thus, while Quebec policy makers in the 1960s and 1970s imagined that the province's revised immigration policies would largely mimic historic patterns of Allophone anglification and assimilation, in practice, while immigrants have in fact francisized they have concurrently not fully assimilated but maintained various elements of their culture of origin that have partially transformed their host society.

From this perspective, immigrants are not mere pawns that serve the demographic interests of Francophone elites, but active agents who actively participate in the process of shaping and altering the society in which they live. The consequent transformation of Québécois culture and identity has, however, constituted a particular challenge in the context of the long-term patterns of intergroup competition between Quebec and Canada. This is due to the fact that immigrants are increasingly understood to have an attenuating force vis-à-vis some of the distinct elements around which the various visions of the Quebec national project have been constituted and mobilized.

Therefore, in the context of competitive national projects, where immigration is seen primarily as an instrumental means for bolstering the national project, immigrant presence and agency can potentially undermine the very national project it was initially designed to bolster. While social and political concerns over and reactions to the forms of pluralism and difference that are introduced by immigrant settlement have become ubiquitous across receiving countries (Benhabib 2002; Lahav 2005; Messina 2008), the context of contentious spaces and competitive national projects introduces an additional level of complexity to these dynamics. Specifically, this diversity can pose significant challenges vis-à-vis the currency and broader legitimacy of political claims in favor of increased provincial autonomy or national sovereignty. From this perspective, Quebec's quest for altering the status quo vis-à-vis Canada is paradoxically understood to require the maintenance of the status quo within Quebec itself.

These growing concerns over immigration appear to initially contradict survey research that has found the population of Quebec is relatively favorable toward immigration (Bilodeau et al. 2012; Bilodeau and Turgeon 2014). However, a close reading of this data exposes a revealing dynamic. Specifically, these studies have identified a growing discrepancy between abstract support for immigration, on the one hand, and concerns over the impact immigrants exert, on the other. Or particularly between perceptions toward immigration and perceptions toward immigrants.

I posit that in the context of Quebec, this finding might suggest that members of Francophone-Québécois society differentiate between the abstract demographic need for immigrants and the concrete broad and substantial influence that immigrant presence and agency can exert on their society over time. This suggests the emergence of what I define as *ambivalent inclusion,* a position that concurrently engenders formal and enthusiastic supports for and even requires immigrant recruitment and integration, while it maintains a fearful stance toward the possible implications and social transformation that settlement and integration can produce. This outcome, I believe, is largely, though not exclusively, a manifestation of the complexities that are produced by the confluence of intergroup competition and national insecurity, on the one hand, and large-scale immigration, on the other.

Conclusions

This section has explored and traced the historical development of the Quebec national project, its competition with Canada, the development of the province's contemporary immigration and integration policies, and the consequences they have engendered. Specifically, I have argued that both historical and contemporary policies vis-à-vis immigration and immigrant incorporation have been largely shaped by and embedded in the dynamics of both inter-group competition between Francophone-Quebec and Anglophone-Canada and intra-group competition between various francophone-Quebecois groups that have embraced and promoted divergent visions of the Quebec national project.

The case of Quebec constitutes a prime example of the theoretical propositions that I outlined in Chapter 1. Both Francophone initial rejection and later acceptance of immigrants has been largely shaped by the changing dynamics of intergroup competition. During the first century and a half after the conquest, Britain and later Canada implemented demographic policies that sought to either assimilate Francophones into Anglophone society or to turn the into a minority by facilitating Anglo-Saxon immigration. In response, the Francophone population, under the authority and leadership of the Catholic Church, adopted a defensive stance, La Survivance, which engendered the erection of impermeable social boundaries and the development of strong ethnic nationalism. As a result of these processes Francophone society became staunchly opposed toward and fearful of non-ethnic immigration and actively excluded immigrants from their community.

However, in the aftermath of the concurrent and interrelated weakening of the Church and the institutional transformation of Quebec, together with increasing levels of Allophone immigration that altered the nature of the threat that immigration posed, substantial change took place in Francophone elites' preferences toward immigration. During this period a group of emerging neo-nationalist elites began conceptualizing new ideas and perceptions that identified immigration not necessarily as a threat, but as an opportunity for enhancing and bolstering Francopone-Quebecois demography both within Quebec and in Canada as a whole.

Specifically, they proposed and espoused new policies that would transform immigrants into an asset and not a threat for Quebec's newly defined national project. These new policies were primarily designed to promote increased levels of immigration and integration into Francophone Québécois society. However, these elites primarily perceived immigrants abstractly, as demographic pawns that lacked substantial agency, and assumed that they would replicate patterns of Allophone anglification and fully assimilate into Quebec society and shed and markers of cultural difference.

What initially began as ideas regarding the instrumental use of immigration was transformed during the 60s and 70s into a clear Québécois policy agenda regarding immigration and integration. This approach was manifested by both the bi-partisan support for expanding the province's immigration competencies and the development of voluntary and later coercive linguistic integration policies. While until the 1970s the national project was located primarily within the PLQ that espoused a unified neo-nationalist approach, the split in the party that led to the creation of the PQ fostered the emergence of two distinct Québécois national projects. The differences between these projects were not only evident in their approaches regarding the goals of the national project and the means of achieving them but also in these parties' divergent approaches regarding how immigrants were to be integrated into society. Thus, while the overarching national project dictated bi-partisan support for provincial immigration competencies, these competing visions intra-group of the national project engendered divergent preferences and policies regarding how immigrants should be incorporated and in defining their role in promoting the national project.

Thus, while shifts is the nature of intergroup competition have engendered substantial changes in Québécois preferences and polices toward immigration and incorporation, these have largely been shaped by both unified nationalist goals and particular visions concerning the goals and means of the national project(s). The role that these particular visions of the national projects have played in shaping policies these becomes particularly evident when we observe the positions espoused by the elites of these groups and by the fact that power shifts between them have fostered to substantial changes in Quebec's integration policies.

Finally, I have argued that while these policies have been largely successful in fostering the Francization of immigrants and reversing trends of allophone Anglicization that were prominent until the 1970s, immigrant presence has also generated several challenges for Quebec society. First, while immigrants have increasingly integrated into French, the historical pattern of either/or linguistic assimilation has been largely replaced by the rise of trilingualism. The latter has not only undermined the *Frenchness* of Quebec but has also problematized the historical English/French ethno-linguistic cleavage.

Second, the large-scale presence of integrated but unassimilated immigrants within Francophone-Québécois society has generated a heightened level of pluralism within Quebec. This has both challenged Francophone-Québécois overall identity and social boundaries and the distinctiveness on which the province's demands for increased autonomy or self-determination have been predicated. As a consequence, over the last decade, the province has experienced a revival of debates and conflicts around the issue of immigration. In contrast to the past, however, when such debates were primarily focused on language issues, contemporary debates have primarily, though not exclusively, revolved around religious accommodation, secularism, and gender equality. I have argued that despite the formal focus on these issues, they have largely served as proxies for the more fundamental insecurities within Québécois society that emanate from the introduction of diversity and the consequent implications for the national project.

Following these dynamics, a new approach appears to have emerged in the province. This approach, which I define as ambivalent inclusion, differentiates between the province's demographic need for immigrants and the long-term effects that are engendered by immigrant settlement. Thus, while Francophone-Québécois continue to support the abstract recruitment of migrants, they concurrently and seemingly contradictorily are fearful of the profound consequences immigrant settlement engenders in practice.

Section 3: Catalonia – Integration in the Context of Limited Autonomy

The chapters included in this section will examine the case of Catalonia. Specifically, they will examine and decipher the relationship between immigrant settlement in Catalonia and the regions long-lasting competition with the Spanish State. These political entities have been at odds over the level of Catalonia's autonomy and integration into Spain engendering significant competitive nation building dynamics that have significantly intensified since the emergence of Catalan nationalism in the 19th century. While since the 17th century this competition has not taken a violent form, it has been shaped by a series of cultural and linguistic prohibitions, attempts for political domination, and adversarial relations both within Catalonia and the broader Spanish context. As a consequence, these competitive processes have profoundly shaped immigrant settlement and integration.

The Chapters will analyze how the Catalan national movement has worked, and succeeded, to preserve Catalan national culture and language in the face of massive twenty- and twenty-first century immigration, first Spanish immigrants during the Franco period (Ch. 6) and subsequently, Latin American and North African immigration (Ch. 7).

In particular, they will explore the dynamics of competitive national projects—both between Catalonia and Spain and among the various competing nationalist groups (Catalan and Spanish) within Catalonia, on the other.

In contrast to the former two cases; this section will focus almost exclusively on integration policies. This focus emanates from the fact that immigration policies per-se largely remain the exclusive prerogative of the Spanish state. From this perspective, Catalonia differs significantly from the other two cases examined in this study, where the local authority—the Israeli state and the Quebec government—maintain sufficient political power to shape and control the flows of migrants that settle within their boundaries.

The analysis presented in this section will be divided into two chapters. Chapter 6 primarily constitutes an historical analysis of the development and evolution of Catalan society since the 10th century until the 1970s. The discussion will trace the development of the distinct Catalan language, culture, identity, and political and social structure. In addition, I will examine the historical relations and competition between Catalonia and Spain and the interactions between Catalan nationalism and the various attempts that have been made to promote centralization within Spain.

Beyond the development of Catalan society and identity, I will also explore the impact that immigration has historically had on the province and how it has shaped and been shaped by Catalonia's distinct identity and later by its national movement. Specifically, I will examine how Catalonia has managed migratory flows throughout its history while largely being successful in maintaining its distinct cultural and linguistic character.

In the analysis I will pay particular attention to the processes of immigrant settlement and integration that have taken place throughout the 20th century, both during periods of relative autonomy and periods in which any expression of Catalan culture or identity, not to mention political authority, were legally prohibited. In particular, the analysis will trace the various reactions and strategies that Catalan elites' employed vis-à-vis the mass influx of Spanish immigrants during the mid-20th century. I will examine and evaluate the various ideational approaches that these elites developed and promoted in an attempt to cope with these flows and preserve the Catalan language and identity during the Franco period in which Catalonia lacked any autonomous ability to define its policies or shape immigrant integration in a meaningful way.

Chapter 7 will offer a comprehensive analysis of contemporary immigration to Catalonia. Since the mid-1990s Catalonia has again faced massive inflows of immigrants, primarily from North Africa and Latin America. However, in contrast to the Spanish migration during the 60s and 70s, contemporary Catalonia maintains relative political autonomy that enables it to both protect its language and culture and promote particular regional policies toward immigrant integration.

In particular, the analysis presented in this chapter will focus on two processes. First, I will examine the effects of the ongoing dynamics of inter-group competition between Catalonia and Spain over the former's relative autonomy and political competencies and how these processes have shaped and been shaped by the settlement and integration of over 1.6 million immigrants. I will argue that, as in the case of Quebec, the promotion and maintenance of the Catalan national project has come from Catalan nationalist elites' using immigration instrumentally to increase Catalonia's overall autonomy from Spain.

Second, as in the cases of Israel and Quebec I will also examine the impact of intra-group competition that emanates from the promotion of particular and divergent visions of the national project. I will posit, that these divergent visions of the national project visions have had a profound impact on shaping the specific integration policies that competing political groups have promoted and sought to implement.

Chapter 6: From a Principality to a Nation – The Foundations of the Catalan National Project

Similar to the cases of Israel and Quebec, Catalonia has a long and complex relationship with immigration, demography, and inter-group competition (Conversi 1997; McRoberts 2001; Shafir 1995). However, in contrast to the other two cases, Catalan society itself was not a product of settlement and immigration. Instead, it emerged and developed through an incremental process of cultural, political, and linguistic differentiation of the native population from neighboring societies.

Catalans believe that they can trace their culture and political heritage back to the 10th and 11th centuries. Specifically, it is understood that a distinct Catalan society emerged as a result of two processes. First, following the severing of ties with the Carolingian monarchy under the leadership of Count Borrell of Barcelona in 988, Catalonia obtained clearly defined territorial and social boundaries that separated and demarcated Catalans from other neighboring groups such as the Castilians and the French (Castells 2009; Keating 2001; Llobera 2005; Wright 1999). In fact, several nationalists draw a direct link between the secession from France and the emergence of contemporary Catalonia (Puigjaner 2002).

Second, despite the fact that a nascent Catalan dialect had already begun to crystallize during Roman times (Woolard 1989), it was during the 10th and 11th centuries that the Catalan language developed its distinct character, becoming a clearly differentiated Latin vernacular and a written language.[249] While early written Catalan had limited use, by the 12th century it was popularized among regional elites and employed in religious, philosophical, and juridical texts. During the 13th century, its use increased owing to the fact that it had become the primary language of public administration, trade, and literature across Catalonia (McRoberts 2002; Strubell 2011). Besides language serving as a means of communication, these broad processes also facilitated the formation of a distinct collective identity among the population of Catalonia (Kleiner-Liebau 2011).

By the early 12th century, corresponding to these processes, Catalonia was gradually recognized by external state actors as constituting a distinct society (Castells 2009). Specifically, this process took place following a military campaign led by the Count of Barcelona against the Muslim rulers of Majorca. In the aftermath of the battle, there was increasing domestic and regional recognition of Catalans as a separate group, and the count was widely portrayed as a *catalanicus heros* (Catalan hero). Furthermore, by 1178, the name "Catalonia" was referenced in both domestic and foreign official documents, and the indigenous population increasingly referred to themselves as "Catalans" (Balcells 1996; Woolard 1989).

This early period of collective group formation also witnessed the emergence of a unique Catalan feudal structure and political representative institutions that further contributed to the consolidation of a distinct Catalan collective identity (Keating 2001; Kleiner-Liebau 2011; Vidal 1975).[250] These institutions, the Corts (the Parliament) and the Generalitat (the executive), were

---

[249] This differentiation took place primarily in relation to the two languages employed by proximate cultural groups: Occitan and Castilian. In contrast to common perceptions, Catalan did not derive from Spanish but rather directly from Latin; it shares grammatical structures with French and Italian as well as Castilian (Hughes 1993).

[250] Catalan historiography and popular culture emphasizes the representative and demographic character of these institutions (Eliot 1963; Illas 2012). This interpretation was also espoused by several of the Catalan nationalists I interviewed. They cited this far-reaching democratic tradition as a unique feature of Catalonia's distinct history and as a justification for reconfiguring the relations between Catalonia and Spain (based on personal interviews from March 27, 2012; April 23, 2012). However, some scholars have argued that such claims are overstated since the so-called democratic pacts, which supposedly functioned as social contracts between the monarchy and the broader

based on a series of pacts (pactisme) between aristocrats, agrarian landowners, urban and maritime merchants, and religious elites that played a crucial role in limiting the unilateral imposition of monarchical authority (Giner 1984; Vicens i Vives 1970).

From an economic perspective, throughout this period, Catalonia flourished as it gained a prominent role in the trade routes for spices and other goods between the Italian Mediterranean, Flanders, North Africa, and the Iberian Peninsula. In consequence, between the tenth and thirteenth centuries, Catalonia continued to develop as a distinct principality or territorial unit under the leadership of successive counts of Barcelona.

From a demographic perspective, owing to Catalonia's geographic location between France and Spain, it became a focal point for both immigrants and travelers. In fact, immigration is popularly believed to have been a constant in Catalonia for over two millennia, and documented mass migratory movement dates from the 15th century (Conversi 1997).[251] As a result of these migratory flows, Catalonia has been defined as *la terra de pas* (the land of passage), a melting-pot of influences that were introduced by travelers, temporary residents, and long-term immigrants who introduced and incorporated Spanish, Italian, and French influences into Catalan society and culture (Eaude 2011; Woolard 1989). In fact, during particular historical periods, immigration has constituted a primary mechanism for population growth in the principality (McRoberts 2001). Although migrant populations did import some cultural peculiarities and differences, many of them concurrently shared social and cultures attributes

---

population, were primarily between various classes of elites; the majority of workers had no real representation in government (Elliot 1963; Vicens i Vives 1970). While Hargreaves (2000) accepts the latter interpretation, he posits that this legacy, albeit partially fabricated, has profoundly shaped Catalan identity and collective understandings of political process. Similarly, Woolard (1989) argues that despite their democratic shortcomings, Catalan political institutions during the 12th and 13th century were highly novel and innovative. In fact, they constituted the first representative institutions in Europe with the Catalan Cortes serving as the first parliament on the continent.

[251] Although, as I illustrate below, the popular perception of Catalonia as a site of mass immigration appears to have been exaggerated and reinterpreted in the light of the mass immigration it has experienced during the 20th century.

with their Catalan hosts. In fact, until the mid-20th century, most immigrants were native speakers of languages that were closely related to Catalan, such as Valencian and Occitan. Thus, migrants were relatively easily assimilated into Catalan society and became largely indistinguishable from the native Catalan population (Conversi 1997; Elliot 1963).

While there are no studies that explore the historical contours of Catalonia's ethnic and social boundaries, today it is widely accepted that immigrants were embraced by and welcomed into Catalan society. Regardless of their accuracy, these inclusionary narratives corroborate the fact that contemporary Catalan identity and nationalism do not assume the cultural purity that many other nationalist movements emphasize, but are perceived at least partially as products of hybridization (Guibernau 2004; Keating 2001). Thus, while Catalan nationalists still largely emphasize the common historical, cultural, and linguistic heritage of *the nation*, they concurrently take pride in the numerous cultural influences that have historically been amalgamated into what is today perceived as Catalanism. As I will demonstrate below, this dual perception of hybridization, on the one hand, and historical permanence, on the other, still pervades Catalan society and has engendered preferences and discourse that observers may consider contradictory.

Political Mergers and the Decline of Catalonia

Catalonia's confederation with Aragon in 1137, which occurred in response to the growing threat of Castile and the combined strength of the two principalities, unleashed a process of political and economic expansion. Although externally, the confederation united the two principalities into a single political unit, internally, both Catalonia and Aragon maintained their separate political institutions and cultural distinctiveness. Following their unification, however, Catalonia and Aragon were able to secure substantial regional power and influence across the Mediterranean region. This was achieved by means of the expansion of trade routes and the conquest of territories that included, among others, Athens, Sardinia,[252] Sicily, Valencia, and the Balearic Islands (Castells 2009; Vives and Llorens 1958).

However, by the early 15th century, the confederation's economic vitality had experienced a significant decline (Conversi 1997). Consequentially, by the late 15th century, Catalonia's overseas trade had diminished by as much as 80 percent (Maicas 1985). This decline sparked a severe crisis in the two principalities, resulting in a dynastic confederation between Aragon and Castile in 1469 and the ultimate merging of the two crowns, together with Catalonia, into a single political unit in 1516.

Following the merger, Catalonia lost its autonomous sovereign status and became an integral part of the Kingdom of Castile instead (Salrach 1996). Initially, however, incorporation into Spain was not detrimental to Catalonia. First, it was largely able to maintain its autonomous regional political institutions, legal system, and distinct cultural, religious, and linguistic character within Spain. This was made possible by a series of special autonomy agreements (*Fueros*) that governed the relationship between Catalonia and the kingdom (Ruff 2001). Second, owing to its integration into Spain, Catalonia gained privileged access to Spanish markets in addition to the position it already held vis-à-vis Mediterranean markets. Third, during this period, the Catalan economy underwent a process of large-scale development as a domestic industry of consumer goods emerged, and economic actors promoted the large-scale accumulation of capital (Castells 2009). Fourth, despite the fact that it constituted a part of the kingdom, Catalonia's semi-autonomous position exempted it from the obligation to transfer tax revenues to the

[252] In fact, Catalan became Sardinia's official language in 1323 and maintained this status until 1711 (McRoberts 2001).

Spanish kingdom or to contribute to Spain's military efforts unless it was directly under attack (Keating 2002).

In addition, during the first half of the 16th century, Catalonia's economy and population were bolstered following a massive wave of immigration, primarily from Occitan and Valencia. As a result of these migratory flows, approximately 20 percent of the male population in Catalonia were first- or second-generation immigrants by the end of that century (Elliot 1963; McRoberts 2001). These immigrants, like those before them, did not maintain distinct identities, assimilating instead into Catalan society, language, and culture.

However, despite the initial benefits derived from Catalonia's integration into Spain, from a longer-term perspective, this process carried negative implications for the principality's economic and demographic prosperity. Specifically, in the decades following the confederation, Catalonia underwent a process of incremental economic, demographic, and political decline (Balcells 2010). This was largely a consequence of the fact that from the outset, the union was designed in a manner that would enhance the economic and political power of Castile at the expense of Aragon and Catalonia, which became peripheral regions within the kingdom (Maicas 1985).

Catalonia's situation was further exacerbated by the fact that beginning in the late 16th century, it went through an acute process of demographic decline due to recurrent plagues and a paucity of immigration (Nadal and Giralt 1960; Vives 2013). In the early decades of the 17th century, immigration emanating from outside of Catalonia, in contrast to internal immigration, was significantly lower than in the past since immigrants opted for other parts of the Iberian Peninsula instead (Nadal and Giralt 1960; Vives 2013). Although immigrants from Spain, France, Italy, and other Mediterranean societies continued to settle in Catalonia and assimilate into the

Catalan language and culture throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, these migratory processes occurred at a much slower pace than they had during the peak of migration in the 16th century.

Thus, most of the migratory waves that occurred during the 17th and 18th centuries were internal to the province. Specifically, in response to the relative economic development of Barcelona and other urban centers, large numbers of individuals from Catalonia's agricultural hinterland converged on the industrial cities on the coast, thereby increasingly depopulating Catalonia's agricultural regions (Conversi 1997; Termes 1984).

The overall demographic decline produced by these migratory patterns not only resulted in economic weakness but also substantially eroded Catalonia's political position within the unified kingdom. As a consequence, Catalonia became marginalized from political processes within the kingdom, which in turn intensified its elites' desire for autonomy (Vicens i Vives 1970). Furthermore, like other peripheral regions within the Spanish kingdom, Catalonia was excluded from participating in the profitable commerce with the American colonies that became the exclusive domain of Castile (Castells 2009).

Besides economic, demographic, and political decline, the early 17th century witnessed Catalonia facing an additional challenge that served as a constitutive moment in shaping the long-lasting competitive relationship between Catalonia and Spain with regard to Catalan identity. Specifically, beginning in 1625, King Philip IV, under the guidance of his chief advisor, Duke Olivares, promoted policies that favored the centralization and unification of the regionally-fragmented Spanish kingdom. The fulfillment of this goal required that Catalonia be denied its traditional privileges of institutional autonomy and exemption from taxation and conscription that had been enacted in the Fueros agreements in year (Castells 2009; Elliot 1989; Konnert 2008; Ruff 2001). In a letter to the king, Olivares explained the objectives of his plan:

"It is for Your Majesty to make yourself King of Spain. By this I mean, sir, that Your Majesty should not be content with being King of Portugal, of Aragon, of Valencia, and Count of Barcelona, but should secretly plan and work to reduce these kingdoms of which Spain is composed, to the style and laws of Castile, with no difference whatsoever; and if Your Majesty achieves this, you will be the most powerful prince in the world" (Eliot 1999, 197).

Catalan elites and peasants alike reacted forcefully to the consequent repeated attempts by King Philip and Olivares to weaken Catalan autonomy and annul its privileges. In response, in 1640, Catalans staged a large-scale popular rebellion that became known as "the revolt of the reapers", bearing the slogan "Long live the land of Catalonia and down with bad government" (Maicas 1985; Ruff 2001).[253] During the rebellion, Catalans initially declared independence but later elected to forge an alliance with Spain's rival, France (McRoberts 2001). In consequence, Catalonia briefly became an autonomous region under French control, only to return to Spain in 1659, with the exception of northern Catalonia, which remained part of France.[254] Following its reincorporation into Spain, Catalonia was granted the right to maintain the special privileges and autonomous institutions that it had acquired prior to the implementation of centralization policies (Vicens i Vives 1970).[255]

Despite the restoration of partial autonomy, Catalan relations with the Spanish kingdom remained tense. Specifically, hostility erupted again during the War of Spanish Succession that

[253] Catalonia was not alone in its resistance to Spain's centralizing project. These policies also sparked a mass rebellion in Portugal, which, with the support of Britain, was able to gain its independence from Spain (Newitt 2009; Tengwall 2010).

[254] Despite the return of Catalonia to the Spanish kingdom, France continued to control the northern regions of the principality, Rousillon and Cerdagne, which have remained under French control until this very day. In fact, the platform of Catalonia's largest secessionist political faction, Esquera Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), calls for an independent Catalan state that includes French Catalonia as well.

[255] The rebellion served as a constitutive moment both for Catalan–Spanish relations and Catalan nationalism. Nationalists often invoke it as a symbol; Catalonia's national anthem is based upon it. As Woolard explains, "The Revolt of the Reapers was the first time *the land* and the historical charter were invoked as the ideological justification of the defense not only of the liberties but of the nation of Catalonia" (Woolard 1989, 19).

followed the death of Charles II and the assumption of the Spanish throne by Philip V. Despite the fact that Philip had pledged to preserve Catalan autonomy, the Catalans sided with Philip's rival, Charles of Austria, who was supported by England, and staged a revolt against the king in 1705. Following approximately 10 years of struggle, the Catalans were ultimately abandoned by their English and Austrian allies, and the revolt was quashed on September 11th, 1714, which has since become Catalonia's national day (La Diada).

Hargreaves (2010) suggests that while celebrating the Catalans' national holiday on the anniversary of the Catalan defeat might seem bizarre to some observers, "Nevertheless, it is an effective way of preserving the popular memory of Catalonia's subjugation and of rekindling the desire to recover her lost autonomy" (19). Thus, despite this day's negative historical legacy, or perhaps because of it, it remains a salient point of reference for Catalan nationalists and Catalan society as a whole, It is therefore not surprising that the recent large-scale wave of Catalan nationalist mobilization was sparked during the Diada events of 2012.

Following Catalonia's surrender, King Philip sought to unite Spain and eliminate its substantial regional differentiation and fragmentation. In order to promote his goal of unification, he promulgated the *Nueva Planta* decree in 1716. The decree abolished all of Catalonia's autonomous political institutions that had preceded its incorporation into Spain. These institutions included the Corts, the Generalitat, and regional councils (Harris 2014; Sobrer 1992).

From a cultural perspective, the Nueva Planta dealt Catalonia a particularly heavy blow. Specifically, the decree prohibited the public use of Catalan in administrative and legal proceedings and instated Castilian as the sole official language of administration and law (Hargreaves 2010). In fact, the Nueva Planta represents the first instance in a series of attempts by the Spanish state,[256] over the following 250 years, to prohibit the use of the Catalan language as a means of eliminating Catalan difference and fostering Spanish or Castilian dominance (Conversi 1997; Hall 2001; Sobrer 1992).[257] From an economic perspective, the decree imposed a particularly high level of taxation on Catalonia and other regions outside Castile that enabled the Spanish monarchy to eliminate its deficit within a decade (Balcells 1996).

These restrictions notwithstanding, the Catalan language had already been in decline – both with regard to its use and overall prestige – since the 15th century (Melchor and Branchadel 2002). The Catalan aristocracy, seeking the favor of the Spanish rulers, increasingly abandoned the use of Catalan in favor of Castilian, transforming the former primarily into a language of informal interaction and the medium of the peasants, who were unilingual Catalan speakers (Fishman 1967; Nadal 1987; Smith 2014). In fact, it was mainly the peasant population that preserved the language during this period (Guibernau 2004).[258] Due to these processes, Catalan lost its status as a language of high culture and of literary production, becoming primarily a personal rather than a public language (Hall 2001; Pi-Sunyer 1971; Vallverdù 1970). Thus, while "Catalan tradition points to the Nueva Planta as the death knell of the Catalan language" (Woolard 1989, 20), in practice, it only added legal sanction to a broader process that had already been in motion for over two centuries.

The Spanish monarchy's attempts to suppress the use of Catalan persisted throughout the 17th century. For instance, in 1768, Carlos III banned the use of Catalan in all institutions of

[256] Prior to this, however, there were attempts to enforce the use of Castilian, which was largely perceived as a foreign language in Catalonia (Woolard 1989). For instance, in the mid-16th century, Castilian became the obligatory language in Inquisition trials (Nadal 1987).

[257] Ironically, such attempts have not only failed to achieve their purpose of eliminating Catalan difference, but rather they appear to have backfired since they have served to motivate Catalans to maintain their linguistic and cultural difference (McRoberts 2001; Shafir 1995).

[258] In contrast to mainstream scholars who argue that Catalan elites became Catalanized following the incorporation of Catalonia into Spain in the 15th century, Smith (2014) argues that substantive elite incorporation took place in the late 18th century as Catalan goods increasingly penetrated Spanish and colonial markets.

primary and secondary education. In 1772, he banned the use of Catalan in the realms of bookkeeping, business, and taxation. Furthermore, in 1801, the Catalan language was prohibited in cultural performances (Hall 2001). These processes appear to have failed to eliminate Catalan difference beyond bringing about the assimilation of economic elites since most Catalans maintained linguistic and cultural difference (McRoberts 2001; Shafir 1995).

However, despite these hostile linguistic, political, and cultural policies, the overall relations between Catalonia and Spain remained largely peaceful between the Nueva Planta and Catalonia's industrialization in the late 18th and early 19th centuries (Shafir 1995). This outcome appears to have been largely the result of overall elite acquiescence to and cooperation with Spain (Vicens i Vives 1970).

Catalonia's Industrial Revolution and Cultural Renaixença

While Catalonia remained stagnant during most of the 18th century, by the end of that century and during the early 19th century two important, interrelated, and mutually constitutive shifts that would play a pivotal role in shaping modern Catalonia and its relationship with Spain occurred. First, Catalonia underwent a process of rapid industrialization as a result of which, by the 19th century, it far surpassed Spain in its development. Second, Catalonia experienced the emergence of a large-scale linguistic and cultural revival movement. Together, these two processes significantly altered and disrupted the *status quo* between Catalonia and Spain and set the stage for the advent of modern Catalan nationalism (Conversi 1997; Shafir 1995).

Beginning in the mid- to late 18th century, Catalonia experienced exponential growth. Because of its modernized social structure, large-scale capital accumulation, significant population growth that led to the creation of a robust domestic market, and the lifting of the ban on trade with Spain's colonies, Catalonia experienced an industrial revolution that positioned it as the most economically and technologically developed region within the Spanish empire (Balcells 2010; Keating 2001; Marphany 2012; Pi-Sunyer 1970; Shafir 1995).[259]

Industrialization was significantly facilitated by the 1714 dissolution of Catalonian political institutions – a result of the Catalan aristocracy being largely absorbed into Spain's nobility. This occasioned a decline in traditional patterns of land tenure and facilitated the emergence of independent farmers, artisans, small businessmen, and new modernizing elites. All these actors contributed to the rapid development of industrial capitalism in the province during the following century (McRoberts 2001; Maicas 1985; Shafir 1995). Conversely, in the rest of Spain, due the perpetuation of traditional feudal patterns of land tenure in Castile, the preponderance of traditional authority, and the increasing burden of maintaining the empire, the Spanish economy remained largely stagnant and did not industrialize until the 20th century.

Thus, during this period, Catalonia became an island of economic development in the broader context of Spanish economic backwardness (Maicas 1985; Shafir 1995).[260] As the Spanish journalist, Francisco Nipho, explained in 1779, "If Catalonia was all of Spain, Spain would overshadow England" (in Vicente 2010, 151). Not only did industrialization push Catalonia, and later the Basque Country, forward but it significantly increased economic and social disparities between these regions and the rest of Spain, whose economy was based largely on traditional, small-scale agriculture (Guëll 2006).

[259] In fact, Balcells (2010) points out that Catalonia was the first territory in the entire Mediterranean region to industrialize.
[260] For an in-depth analysis of Spain's failure to industrialize during this period, see: Roses 2003.

Catalonia's economic development was primarily spurred by large-scale expansion of the local textile industry and cotton production (Conversi 1997; Dowling 2013).[261] While Barcelona had only eight textile production companies in 1750, this number had increased to 150 by the end of the century (Thompson 2003). Furthermore, the inauguration of the first steam-powered mechanical loom in 1832 facilitated Catalan development (Mas and Pau 2011). Catalonia's industry continued to expand at a rapid pace throughout the 19th century until it was the largest textile producer in Spain and the fourth-largest producer worldwide (Diez-Medrano 1995; McRoberts 2001). While industrial development focused largely on cotton and textile, it led to the creation of a host of support industries such as railways, banks, and local merchants, thus further bolstering regional development.

In addition to economic development, Catalonia also experienced a large-scale cultural and linguistic revival, namely, the Renaixença (renaissance) (Guell 2006; Guibernau 1996; Woolard 1989). Traditional Catalan historiography identifies the emergence of this movement with the 1835 publication of Carles Aribau's poem, *Oda a la Patria* (Ode to the Fatherland), which represented the first time since the 16th century that Catalan had been used for literary purposes (Strubell 2011). However, there is evidence that an earlier process of linguistic and cultural revival had been taking place among newly-emerging cultural and religious elites. For instance, in 1814, Catalan priest Josep Pau Ballot i Torres published a book titled *Grammar and a Defense of the Catalan Language* that sought to revive Catalan as a written language (Harris 2014).[262]

[261] For instance, in 1790, Catalan cotton production was second only to England (Dowling 2013)

[262] Ironically, Ballot i Torres's book was initially published in Castilian and not in Catalan (See: Ballot i Torres 1814).

The Catalan Renaixença, which was inspired by European romanticism, sought to resurrect Catalan's former position as a high literary language and not solely as the spoken language of the peasants and the working class (Mas and Pau 2011; Woolard 1989). Specifically, movement leaders wanted to restore Catalan to its perceived past glory. This process was greatly supported by the emerging economic elites, urban workers, and the broader rural peasant population. As part of this process, local elites (both new and old) underwent a process of re-Catalanization (Dowling 2013; Hall 2001).

Thus, during the mid-19th century, an increasing number of both new and old literary, religious, and philosophical works were published in Catalan (Salvador 2010; Woolard 1989). In 1841, the first Catalan periodical was published, and in 1859, a group of Catalan writers and historians organized for the purpose of reviving several historical Catalan cultural traditions that had disappeared since the 14th century (Conversi 1997; Wollard 1989).

This cultural and linguistic movement, together with increasing industrialization, engendered a revival or re-creation of collective Catalan identity of which the Catalan language constituted the primary marker (Seguin 1984). The confluence of economic superiority and independent cultural development generated a new phase in the history of Catalonia and in Catalan self-perception (Shafir 1995). Furthermore, these two processes were mutually reinforcing since Catalonia's economic development lent additional credence to its language and culture, granting them a more prestigious status than that of Castilian. The growing prestige of the Catalan language and culture also brought about a situation in which immigrants from other parts of Spain, whose numbers were gradually increasing owing to industrialization, found incentives to assimilate into the Catalan language (Conversi 1997; Wollard 1989).[263]

---

[263] Despite Catalonia's large-scale economic development during the 19th century and the growing economic disparities between Catalonia and the rest of Spain, immigration levels remained rather low. As Termes (1984)

From Catalanism to Catalan Nationalism: The Emergence of the Catalan National Project

In the context of this study, Catalonia's industrialization and cultural renaissance are of cardinal importance owing to their ultimate politicization initially under the slogan of Catalanism and later under that of Catalan nationalism (Hargreaves 2000; Harris 2014). While the former primarily advocated the revival or construction of a distinct identity and language, the latter sought to increase Catalonia's autonomy and influence within a federal Spain.

The emergence of Catalanism occurred in the late 19th century; it was entrenched in the dual approach of cultural distinctness and economic supremacy and was largely bourgeois in character. Specifically, the movement's informal leader, Valenti Almirall, sought to "reconcile the traditionalist and progressive strands within Catalanism, adding to them the ingredient of the defense of Catalan economic interests" (Conversi 1997, 17). While the Catalan bourgeoisie had largely been Castilianized, its interest in promoting economic protection for Catalan goods, together with its frustration with Spain's backward centralist bureaucracy, led its members to increasingly support the regionalist cause during the late 19th century. This shift was particularly strengthened after the loss of Spain's colonies in 1898. However, despite the fact that Catalanism emerged largely as a bourgeois phenomenon, it also garnered significant support among rural

points out, in 1887, only 1.25 percent of the populations were first-generation immigrants, even though this figure increased to over 4 percent by 1900. Furthermore, while Spanish immigrants were attracted to the Catalan language as a result of its increasing prestige, until the 1930s, the majority of immigrants during this period came from Catalan-speaking regions such as Valencia and Mallorca (Conversi 1997).

populations that during this period developed their own traditional folkloric version of Catalanism (Woolard 1989).

Political Catalanism, however, was not a secessionist movement. Instead, it promoted a two-pronged agenda. First, the Catalanists sought to bolster Catalonia's autonomous power and restore its language and legal tradition within the context of a federal Spain. Second, they sought to *Catalanize Spain* by modernizing Spain's backward economic and political structures, which were impeding Catalonia's and Spain's future growth (Guibernau 2004; Llobert 2005).

In 1879, Almirall founded *Diari Catalá*, the first daily newspaper published exclusively in Catalan. The newspaper both espoused the ideas and interests of Catalanism and promoted Catalan business interests and national production (Conversi 1997; Smith 2014). The following year, he organized the first Catalanist Congress (where a document defending the Catalan legal tradition was drafted) and founded the Catalanist movement's political organization, *Centre Catalá* (Harris 2014). In 1885, following the threat of a commercial agreement between Spain and England that would compromise Catalonia's economic interests, Almirall and his allies published a list of grievances (*Memorial de Grueges*) in which they demanded that Spain increase tariffs on imports as a means of protecting Catalan economic interests. In addition, it espoused the two goals of the movement: autonomy and increased influence within Spain (Conversi 1997; Figueres 2003; Mas and Pau 2013).

The following year, Almirall published a book titled *La Catalanisme* in which he propounded his autonomist philosophy and transitioned the Catalanist movement from a regionalist to a federalist one. By so doing, he positioned the Catalan language, which he perceived as an expression of the region's collective personality, at the center of the movement and Catalan identity (Almirall 2015 [1886]; Conversi 1997; Molinero 2002).[264]

By 1890, however, the Catalanist movement had both expanded and fragmented across ideological lines with new nationalist forces taking center stage.[265] Specifically, the movement split among left-wing republican federalists, right-wing bourgeois nationalists, and groups that focused primarily on Catalan cultural revitalization and autonomy. From this perspective, "In the eyes of republicans, Almirall was too Catalanist, while in the eyes of the Catalanists, he was too republican" (Masgru 1984, 43). Concurrently, a new actor, Prat de la Riba, replaced Almirall as the prominent Catalanist leader and was at least temporarily successful in uniting the various Catalanist factions within the newly created *Unio Catalá* (Catalan Union) organization that later became the *Lliga Regionalista* (the Regionalist League).

Under Prat de la Riba's leadership, the movement primarily espoused a right- wing, conservative, and bourgeois vision. As its leader, he promoted two goals. First, he continued the development and revival of Catalan language and culture. New and old symbols commemorating Catalan history and the rebellions of 1640 and 1714 were created and disseminated across society. Furthermore, he facilitated the creation of a host of institutions whose objective was to enhance the development of Catalan language and culture (Conversi 1997). For instance, in his capacity as Mayor of Barcelona, Prat de la Riba created an institute for Catalan studies and culture (McRoberts 2001). In addition, he recruited the linguist, Pompeu Fabra, to codify and develop the grammatical rules of the Catalan language (Carreras 2009). Finally, under the

---

[264] In his Catalanist manifesto, Almirall (1886) argues that Spain did not constitute a nation in the traditional sense and that instead various peoples had inhabited the peninsula. Thus, in his view, Spain should have been considered a collection of nations since the fundamental character of these nations was different (also see discussion in Llobra 2005).

[265] See in-depth discussion and analysis of the evolution, development, and transformation of the Catalan nationalist movement in: Guell (2006); Conversi (1997); McRoberts (2001).

auspices of the autonomous regional Catalan government that was created in 1914 (*Mancomunitat*), large subsidies were granted to publishers of Catalan books and periodicals as well as to other cultural projects.

Second, from a political perspective, Prat de la Riba promoted a shift from Catalanism, which was primarily a cultural movement, to Catalan nationalism, or the Catalan national project, which sought to fundamentally alter the political balance between Catalonia and Spain (Masgrau 1984). While his predecessors had focused mainly on Catalan identity, de la Riba fostered the political implications of the Catalans' national distinctness (Jardi 1983; Nespereira 2007; Solé i Tura 1967). This shift is particularly evident in Prat de la Riba's 1906 book, *La Nacionalidad Catalana* (1987), in which he espoused Catalan autonomism and the idea of Catalans constituting a distinct national group plays a central role.

The central position of right-wing bourgeois Catalan nationalism persisted well into the 1920s. However, the rise of the new dictatorship under Primo de Rivera in September 1923 dramatically altered this situation. Specifically, the dictatorship triggered the transformation of the Catalan national movement in general and the balance of forces within it in particular (Balcells 1995; Balfour 2007; McRoberts 2001). Despite their initial resistance to Primo de Rivera's coup, the Catalan nationalist bourgeoisie elected to support Primo de Rivera in the hopes that he would promote their economic and political goals (Encarnacion 2008). Instead, however, he elected to quash Catalan nationalism and identity, thereby engendering a corresponding decline in popular support for bourgeois nationalism in favor of left-wing republican nationalism (Conversi 1997).

During his tenure in office, Primo de Rivera promoted strong centralist policies that echoed those of the 1716 Nueva Planta. Specifically, he implemented a series of measures that sought to eradicate the use of Catalan and instate Castilian as the sole legal language of Catalonia. For instance, he banned the use of Catalan in public, required that all street and commercial signs appear solely in Castilian, and mandated the use of Castilian in all formal education settings.[266] From a political perspective, he outlawed nationalist and Catalanist cultural and political organizations, prohibited the display of the Catalan flag, and, in 1925, dismantled Catalonia's newly-revived autonomous political institutions (Carreras and Fabra 2009; Dowling 2013; Herr 1971).

Due to the regime's harsh coercive measures, a new alliance emerged between Catalan republican nationalists and other republican groups across Spain, on the one hand, and Spanish socialists groups, on the other (Balfour and Quiroga 2007; Guibernau 2004; McRoberts 2001). The rise of this socialist-republican-nationalist coalition facilitated both the emergence of the Second Republic in 1931 following the resignation of Primo de Rivera a year earlier, and the creation of a Catalan autonomy within it. Furthermore, this coalition, along with the initial complicity of Catalan conservatives with the dictatorship, also expanded political support for a new nationalist-republican movement in Catalonia. In consequence, the newly formed left-wing federalist-nationalist *Esquera Republicana de Catalunya* (ERC – the Republican Left of Catalonia) became the dominant political party in Catalonia throughout the Second Republic (Coversi 1997; Dowling 2012).

The Second Republic (1931-39) was largely a period of increasing Catalan autonomy and intensified identity formation. Political and cultural autonomy were largely restored through the Catalan Statute of Autonomy (1932). This statute granted Catalonia significant autonomous

[266] Balcells (1995) and McRoberts (2001) point out that as in previous cases in which restrictions were imposed on Catalan culture and language, these policies engendered an increasing popular resurgence of Catalan language and culture. In fact, speaking and reading in Catalan were perceived as a means of popular resistance against the dictatorship.

powers and enabled the regional government to pursue a policy of Catalanization so as to reverse the restrictive measures that had been imposed by Primo de Rivera. For instance, Catalan was declared the sole official language despite the fact that the Spanish parliament decreed Castilian to be a co-official language (McRoberts 2001).[267] Thus, Catalan again became the primary language of government, education, the media, and business (Guell 2006; Woolard 1989).

Despite this renewed autonomy, Catalonia's autonomy and position vis-à-vis Spain wavered significantly throughout the Second Republic. Specifically, during the eight years of the republic, due to repeated power shifts, Madrid adopted a host of contradictory policies toward Catalonia, ranging from support for almost full autonomy to limited autonomy, and in some cases even reverting back to Spanish centralization (Balcells 1995; Giner and Sevilla 1984). Despite these shifts throughout this period, the ERC and its left-wing brand of republican nationalism maintained strong predominance across Catalonia since the party promoted a policy of Catalan self-determination and significant autonomy within a federal Spanish republic. This situation, however, was bound to change following the Spanish Civil War and Francisco Franco's rise to power.

Demography and Immigration in the Context of Catalan Nationalism

While the previous section examined the development and evolution of Catalanism and the Catalan national project during the 19th and early 20th centuries, it is also imperative that we explore two additional issues that lie at the center of this study. First, it is important to examine the concrete demographic realities of Catalonia during this period, particularly with regard to the

[267] During this period, the public and commercial use of Catalan flourished. For instance, in the mid-1930s, over 400 periodicals were published regularly in Catalan (Pi-Sunyer 1971).

immigration of non-native Catalans. Second, we must examine the perceptions and preferences regarding immigration that were espoused by the Catalan nationalist movement in aggregate and in various factions within it.

As discussed above, Catalonia's modernization initially did not engender large-scale immigration from either other parts of Spain or abroad (Conversi 1997; McRoberts 2001). Only during the last decade of the 19th century and the early 20th century did immigration emerge as a more significant phenomenon. For instance, in the 20-year period between 1890 and 1910, the proportion of immigrants in the Catalan population increased from just over 1 percent to 5.4 percent (Malquer i Sostres 1963; Termes 1984). However, during this period, the bulk of migratory movement was out of Catalonia, particularly toward Latin America and the Caribbean (Roy 1997; Vicent 2013). For instance, according to the Barcelona municipal data that I examined, between 1890 and 1901, approximately 12,000 Catalans emigrated annually; that constituted approximately 0.6-1 percent of the population (Ciudad de Barcelona 1901; 1903; 1904; 1905; 1906).

Furthermore, despite increasing rates of Castilian immigration and the consolidation of the national project, it appears that the issues of immigration and cultural difference were largely absent from Catalanist and nationalist discourse during this period. In fact, in a survey I conducted of 28 nationalist pamphlets and texts that were published during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, there is very little discussion of this issue, and the possible interaction between immigration and the emerging national project appears to have been largely overlooked. The only direct reference to immigration that I identified appeared in the 1892 *Bases de Manresa,* a draft for a future statute for Catalan self-government that was written by a diverse group of mainstream Catalan nationalists and bourgeoisie. In the context of ethnic and cultural origin, the document demanded that the majority of government positions be reserved for Catalans. However, it defined Catalan social boundaries in a relatively inclusive-civic manner that permitted the inclusion of Castilian-speaking immigrants – even first-generation ones – on the assumption that they would become assimilated into Catalan culture.

In practice, as had been the case with historical immigration to Catalonia, the majority of immigrants who settled in the region during the late 19th and early 20th centuries originated from neighboring regions such as Valencia, Aragon, and Mallorca; most were either Catalan-speakers or were highly familiar with the language (Conversi 1997).[268] Thus, these migrants brought about minimal cultural change and were easily assimilated into Catalan language and culture. Assimilation processes were facilitated by the fact that a significant proportion of these immigrants settled in primarily Catalan-speaking rural Catalonia, replacing native Catalans who had migrated to Barcelona and other industrial cities (Badia 1964; Conversi 1997).

However, during the early 20th century, Catalonia also experienced an increasing number of Castilian-speaking migrants from southern and central Spain, many of whom did not integrate into the Catalan language and culture. For instance, by the beginning of the century, non-Catalan-speaking immigrants constituted between 16 and 25 percent of the population in several of Barcelona's working-class neighborhoods (Smith 2007).[269]

The presence of this non-Catalan population appears to be largely underexplored in the scholarly literature on Catalonia.[270] This might be the result of a tendency that is prevalent within Catalonia (that I discuss in detail below) to overlook manifestations of lack of integration and to

[268] As Conversi (1997) points out, only in 1930 did the proportion of Castilian-speaking immigrants exceed that of Catalan-speaking immigrants.
[269] Smith (2007) also points out that there was a large non-Catalan population in wealthy neighborhoods – a population that was composed primarily of domestic workers.
[270] In general, I have observed that most scholarly literature on Catalan history, politics, and society has been conducted by native Catalan scholars who do not necessarily challenge prevailing national narratives or examine cases that challenge the validity of these narratives.

foreground the patterns of immigrant Catalanization instead (Conversi 1997; Pi-Sunyer 1971). Be that as it may, it appears that already in the early 20th century, there was a substantial Castilian population within Catalonia – particularly in Barcelona – that maintained their cultural and linguistic traits and did not assimilate. As the Catalan geographer, Fransec Carerras, pointed out in 1909 with regard to these neighborhoods, "Based on the language of the inhabitants it does not seem that one is on Catalan soil" (in Smith 2007, 47).[271]

From a Catalan perspective, we can observe a dual dynamic. On the one hand, due to the fact that Catalan-speakers still constituted the majority of immigrants and Castilian immigrants assumed inferior labor market positions and were concentrated in particular neighborhoods, there appears to have been little public concern regarding the latter's acculturation or integration. In fact, this indifference as well as the assumption that these immigrants would either leave or voluntarily assimilate into Catalan society seems to have been pervasive.[272] Concurrently, however, new discourses concerning Catalans' ethnic and racial superiority over the immigrants emerged on the fringes (McRoberts 2001; Vicent 2013).

The early 20th century, for instance, witnessed the emergence of a host of stereotypes that juxtaposed lazy Castilian-speaking immigrants with industrious Catalans (Smith 2007; Woolard 1989). This attitude was probably the result of Catalonia's exponential economic growth in contrast to Spain's concurrent decline, which was exacerbated in the aftermath of the loss of its last colonial holdings in 1898. In addition, there were several Catalan nationalist entrepreneurs who developed and espoused explicit exclusionary approaches toward Castilian migrants. For example, in the early 20th century, Pompeu Gener, a republican-nationalist journalist, formulated

[271] Also cited in Smith 2007.
[272] This seems to conform at least partially with material realities since the majority of the second generation of these migrants did not share their parents' hostility toward Catalan language and culture and largely became assimilated. This outcome is likely the result of the economic lure of Catalan since speaking the language was a prerequisite for upward mobility.

a doctrine that identified Castilians as being racially inferior due to their historical miscegenation with Moors and Berbers (Conversi 1997; Hall 1983; McRoberts 2001).[273] While stances of this type attracted some sectors of the population, they had little impact on the overall ideology of the Catalan nationalists, who continued either to ignore the immigrant diversity or to presume their assimilation.

However, both the number and cultural composition of immigrants to Catalonia changed significantly in the 1920s when various government-sponsored public works projects and the 1929 Barcelona Exposition required the large-scale recruitment of non-Catalan labor (Strubell 2011). While during the first decade of the 20th century, just slightly fewer than 34,000 immigrants entered Catalonia, this number increased to over 320,000 between 1920 and 1930 (Del Campo and Lopez 1987). Over and above the quantitative shift in the number of immigrants, this period also represents a qualitative shift since the vast majority of these immigrants were Castilian-speakers.

Mass Castilian immigration during the 1920s, however, did not provoke large-scale social tensions or disruptions (Dowling 2013; Llobert 2005). This outcome emanated from two primary factors. First, as discussed above, during Primo de Rivera's dictatorship, Castilian-speaking immigrants – most of whom were socialist-republicans – and Catalan nationalists formed an alliance as a result of their united struggle against the regime. This cooperation largely relegated cultural and linguistic differences between natives and immigrants to a secondary position. Furthermore, it fostered the willingness of immigrants to integrate and their Catalan hosts to accept cultural diversity (Balfour and Quiroga 2007; Conversi 1997; Smith 2007). Second, during the Second Republic, the autonomous Catalan government (the Generalitat),

[273] Conversi (1997) points out that Gener represented the scientific racism movement that was popular during this period. Furthermore, she suggests that his focus on race emanated from the absence of any real difference between Catalans and other residents of Spain beyond that of language.

which was governed by the nationalist ERC, promoted policies that enforced the use of Catalan in schools and business. As a result of these regulations, coupled with the high status of the Catalan language vis-à-vis Castilian, immigrants and their descendants were integrated into Catalan society relatively easily (Conversi 1997; Laitin 1992).

Despite these generally positive Catalan–immigrant relations during this period, several challenges remained. In contrast to the straightforward process of assimilation that is often depicted in Catalan literature (Pujol 1976), it appears that that many immigrants retained elements of their ethnic identities. Since immigrants were largely clustered at the bottom of the scale of labor migrants, they resided mainly in working-class neighborhoods. For instance, in the early 1920s, the La Rambla area of Barcelona near the port was commonly referred to as *Chinatown* "and comprised the most Spanish streets in the Catalan city" (Smith 2007, 45).

In addition, during this period, exclusionary approaches toward Castilian immigrants within Catalan nationalism emerged. For instance, nationalist demographer Josep Vandèllos (1935a; 1935b) promoted an approach that lamented Catalonia's demographic decline due to low birthrates. He emphasized the undesirability of expanding the Catalan nation through immigration, claiming that this could disrupt and attenuate the integrity of the Catalan nation and national project, which was based on Catalonia's unique identity. In his book, he explained that the combination of low fertility and immigration would create "a Catalonia without the Catalans" (Vandellos 1935a, 72).

Similarly, nationalist author Manuel Rossell (1917; 1930) suggested that immigrants would weaken Catalan nationalism by creating a concentration of Castilian population that would undermine Catalan demography and spatial dominance. While authors such as Conversi (1997; 2002), Keating (2002), and McRoberts (2001) argue that these approaches have assumed a minor, non-influential role within the Catalan national project, I will demonstrate below that despite the Catalan nationalist overall civic-inclusive approach, these ideas continue to permeate the popular conceptions of immigration espoused by most contemporary Catalan nationalist factions.

The Post War Period: The Franco Regime and Mass Migration from Spain

The aftermath of the Spanish Civil War and the rise of Francisco Franco to power in Madrid represented a particularly challenging period for the Catalan national project. During Franco's reign, which lasted until 1975, Spain adopted unprecedented policies of centralization and repression against minority languages, culture, and their respective nationalist movements (Conversi 1997; Shafir 1995; Woolard 1989). These policies have even been described as a form of cultural genocide (McRoberts 2001)

In the aftermath of the civil war, Catalan society was on the verge of collapse. Most of the political and cultural elites had either been executed or had gone into exile, leaving Catalonia without an indigenous political elite to guide the population through this difficult period. Specifically, Franco introduced a host of anti-Catalan policies that criminalized the public use of Catalan and prohibited its use in government, literary or news publications, education, and commercial signs (Benet 1973; Conversi 1997; Guibernau 2004). Initially, the informal use of Catalan in public settings was prohibited as well (Woolard 1989). Besides language, all manifestations of Catalan culture, identity, and nationalist mobilization were strictly banned, and the government repeatedly attacked and ridiculed the idea of Catalan distinctness. While most of these prohibitions persisted until Franco's death in 1975, some were eased or partially lifted during his last decade in power (Guibernau 2004; Keating 2001; McRoberts 2001).

From a demographic perspective, the Franco period engendered profound challenges for the Catalan national project. Beginning in the 1950s and in particular during the 1960s, Catalonia experienced an unprecedented influx of Castilian-speaking rural immigrants from southern Spain, primarily from Murcia and Andalucía. In fact, between 1950 and 1970, an average of 60–70,000 immigrants settled in Catalonia every year (Conversi 1997). In aggregate, during this period, almost 1.2 million Spanish immigrants settled in Catalonia, significantly contributing to the expansion of the population from 3.24 million in 1950 to 5.12 million in 1970 (Greer 2007). Indeed, by 1970, first-generation immigrants constituted almost 38 percent of Catalonia's population (Friend 2011; Saez 1980; Termes 1984) reaching almost half (49 percent) of Barcelona's population in 1979 (Giner 1984). Furthermore, if we consider the relatively young age of most immigrants, many of whom were of child-rearing age, in conjunction with the higher birthrates among immigrants than among Catalans, it was only a matter of time until the migrant population exceeded the native Catalan one (Termes 1984).

The causes of this mass migratory movement remain unclear. There is a broad consensus that the primary forces underlying immigration during this period were the large-scale and persistent economic disparities between highly industrialized Catalonia and economically underdeveloped southern Spain (Balfour 1989; Castells and Parellada 1993; Greer 2007).[274] In addition, some scholars suggest that beyond the economic push-pull factors that emanated from these economic differentials, immigration was also driven by the active encouragement of the Franco regime, which sought to reduce the proportion of Catalans by promoting the settlement of

[274] In fact, Linz (1966) described Catalonia during this period as "bourgeois Spain" due to its large middle class and its highly-skilled workforce.

Castilian immigrants (Davidson 2011; Guibernau 2004).[275] As Wright (1999) explains, "The Franco government hoped that large-scale immigration would dilute the Catalan population and achieve a melting pot situation which would eradicate Catalan difference" (45-6). In fact, two Catalan nationalist leaders that I interviewed also emphasized Madrid's alleged role in facilitating these flows (personal interview, April 24, 2012, May 17, 2012; see also Pujol 2006).

While there is little evidence to substantiate the claim regarding the direct involvement of the Franco regime in generating these flows, it is important to bear two points in mind. First, while Franco might not have directly facilitated immigration as a means of undermining Catalan nationalism, his regime did encourage internal migration as a means of alleviating societal tensions that emanated from unemployment and economic stagnation (Conversi 2001). Second, regardless of the facts, the regime's role in fostering immigration has become a prevalent narrative within the Catalan national project. This narrative has profoundly shaped and influences Catalan perceptions and understanding of Catalonia–Spain relations and the history of immigration to the principality (personal interviews with nationalist politicians, April 24, 2012, May 17, 2012).

These unprecedented waves of immigration created a series of challenges for those who sought to promote Catalonia's national project (Benet 1978; Colomer 1986). Specifically, mass immigration from Spain problematized the maintenance of Catalonia's distinct cultural and linguistic identity and posed a risk of sparking conflict between Catalans and immigrants (Guibernau 2004; Llorba 2004). While such challenges are common in immigrant-receiving polities, in Catalonia they were coupled with constraints that emanated from the severe

[275] Besides economic immigrants, the regime settled a large number of Spanish bureaucrats across Catalonia. In contrast to the economic migrants who were largely indifferent to the Catalan national project, language, and culture, these Spanish officials were opposed to any manifestation of Catalanism and largely refused to use the language (Conversi 1997; McRoberts 1997).

restrictions on Catalan nationalist activity that were imposed by Franco. Specifically, the regime prohibited the public use of the Catalan language and its cultural expression and relinquished any form of autonomous government that could foster the integration of immigrants into Catalan society. From this perspective, Catalonia faced an additional challenge, namely, newly arrived immigrants who were not simply foreigners but also served as carriers of the central state's language and culture. In fact, they spoke the very language that Madrid sought to instill in Catalonia as part of its quest for cultural centralization.

Furthermore, in contrast to past waves of immigration, this one's scope was significantly larger and included a vast majority of immigrants who had little or no knowledge of or acquaintance with the Catalan language or culture (McRoberts 2001; Pi-Sunyer 1971). This situation was further exacerbated due to the realities of immigrant settlement in Catalonia. As a result of the vast number of immigrants, who settled almost exclusively in greater Barcelona, there was an acute housing shortage. In order to solve this problem, the Spanish government initiated the construction of a large number of low-budget buildings and makeshift housing in Barcelona's suburbs, where immigrants quickly came to constitute the majority of the population (Conversi 1997; McRoberts 2001; Tatjer and Killinger 2010). These living conditions gave rise to substantial spatial segregation and limited the possibilities for interaction between immigrants and the native population in schools and other social spaces.

In addition, the vast majority of immigrants were employed in low-skilled positions together with other non-Catalan-speaking immigrants, thereby creating a gap between the Catalan-speaking administrative class and a Castilian-speaking worker class (Shafir 1995). Thus, informal spatial, educational, and professional segregation broadened the gap and hindered any possibilities of integration between immigrants and native Catalans (Maluquer Sostres 1963).

Due to these dynamics, by the time Spain's democratic transition took place in 1975, monolingual Castilian-speakers constituted approximately 40 percent of Catalonia's population (Laitin 1992).

In consequence, during this period, there was a growing perception in Catalonia that two parallel societies that had few interconnections – namely, immigrant Castilians and native Catalans – were emerging in the province. In his 1964 book, *The Other Catalans*, which documented the experiences and challenges faced by immigrants in Catalonia, Francesc Candel, himself a Catalan-speaking immigrant from Valencia, described this perception by citing the text on a sign located in one of Barcelona's suburbs: "Catalonia stops here. Murcia begins here" (Candel 1965, 15). For Candel, writing from an immigrant's perspective, the emergence of deeply-entrenched social divisions between immigrants and natives entailed negative consequences for both groups. Instead, he believed that both immigrants and Catalan natives had much to gain from increased interaction, integration, and appreciation of one another's cultures. In particular, he called on fellow migrants to appreciate and adapt to the Catalan language and culture (ibid).

Due to these growing divisions and cleavages, coupled with the lack of any form of regional autonomy or authority, Catalan elites became increasingly preoccupied with the impact that mass Spanish immigration could have on the survival of Catalonia as a distinct society (Pi-Sunyer 1971; Porecel 1970). In fact, already in the early 1950s, some Catalan elites began espousing exclusionary discourses that emphasized the risk of *crossbreeding* and cultural intermixing. These elites depicted the situation vis-à-vis immigrants primarily in hostile, racial terms that were reminiscent of those that appeared in Vandèllos's aforementioned books from the 1930s. For instance, the popular Catalan author, Antoni Peyri, warned that cultural and ethnic miscegenation would undermine the survival of Catalonia's distinct culture (Hall 1978). Similarly, others stressed that the sheer number of immigrants who were largely uninterested or unwilling to learn Catalan constituted a concrete threat to Catalan survival. While these approaches exerted some degree of influence on the nationalist movement (which I will discuss in detail below), they were largely unsuccessful in facilitating a strong anti-immigrant movement or sentiment across society.

Mainstream Catalan nationalist elites increasingly realized that this new demographic and social reality required the formulation of a Catalan solution. Specifically, they sought to create a formula that would enable them to continue to promote the national project despite the fact that Catalonia was becoming a society that was deeply divided along linguistic, cultural, and economic lines, and in which native Catalans were losing their majority position.

Their solution to this challenge stood in stark in contrast to Quebec's initial hostile reaction to Anglophone immigration (see Chapter 4) or to the large-scale Basque opposition to similar waves of Spanish immigration (Conversi 1997; Friend 2011; Shafir 1995). Understanding the potential consequences and implications of this issue for Catalonia in general and for the national project in particular, Catalan elites primarily sought to create an accommodative and inclusive approach that would foster the natural integration or assimilation of immigrants into Catalan language and society. In particular, they sought "to constitute a new form of Catalan nationalism that was based on a realistic assessment that to be viable any national project would have to win the support of the immigrants" (McRoberts 2001, 131).

In order to promote this goal, Catalan nationalist elites, under the leadership of Jordi Pujol, the most central (conservative) nationalist actor of the time who would later become president of Catalonia, began devising a new integrative and nationalist approach toward immigration. During this period, Pujol disseminated the new *Catalan approach* toward Spanish immigrants. Specifically, he formulated his approach in two articles that he published secretly in 1958: *Immigració i Integració* (Immigration and integration) and *Per una Doctrina de la Integració* (Toward a doctrine of integration) (Pujol 1958a; 1958b), which were later reprinted after Franco's death in his book *The Immigration Problem and Catalonia's Hope* (Pujol 1976).[276]

In general, the new Catalan approach to immigration focused primarily on what Pujol described as integration; in practice, however, it was closer to cultural assimilation (Pujol 1976). Specifically, he sought to eliminate immigrants' cultural distinctiveness, incorporate them into the Catalan language and culture, and mobilize them to participate in the national project. To this end, he famously redefined the contours of being Catalan: "A Catalan is any man who lives and works in Catalonia, and helps build Catalonia…. Who makes Catalonia his home, and in one way or another is incorporated, integrated and not hostile to it…. Besides those with an anti-Catalan prejudice all immigrants are in principle Catalan" (Pujol 1958b). Thus, in developing his approach to immigration, Pujol largely promoted a modern civic-inclusionary definition of membership in the Catalan nation. At least discursively, being Catalan was not defined in ethnic terms and therefore enabled anyone who chose to identify as Catalan and spoke the language to be considered a member of the nation.

By promoting these new ideas, Pujol sought to foster the immigrants' incorporation into the heart of Catalan society and nationality (Conversi 1997; McRoberts 2001; Woolard 1989). Interestingly, a close reading of his writings on the matter suggests that he appeared to have paid little attention to immigrant agency or preferences regarding their integration or lack thereof. In

[276] The title of this book symbolizes Pujol's attitude toward immigration. Despite his overall inclusionary discourse, he approached immigration primarily as a problem for the Catalan movement that needed to be solved.

fact, it seems that he did not see the challenge of integration in terms of the immigrants themselves or their desire but rather in terms of the absence of autonomous political control to facilitate this process.

Despite Pujol's non-ethnic and inclusive approach, he was not a wholehearted supporter of the immigrant cause. In fact, as he admitted in his autobiography, he was deeply influenced by the writings of anti-immigrant author Vandèllos, on the one hand, and the liberal Candel, on the other (Domingo 2014; Pujol 2009). Specifically, it was Vandèllos's work that alerted him to the potential dangers and threats that large-scale immigration posed to the Catalan national project. In addition, he appears to have had accepted Vandèllos's negative perception of immigrants as rootless people who lacked communal structure and a clear sense of identity or purpose. At the same time, Candel, who in 1958 published the first article version of his book, *The Other Catalans*, also influenced Pujol's approach. In particular, Candel's book with its telling title promoted the notion that immigrants were in practice becoming part of Catalan society and that, more importantly, there were alternative routes to "Catalan-ness" besides being of Catalan descent.

Pujol's thoughts concerning immigration represented a combination of these two diametrically opposed views. Following Vandèllos, he posited that mass immigration posed a potential threat to Catalan survival and therefore it was necessary to develop a political program in order to face these challenges. Specifically, Pujol – who, like Vandèllos, believed that immigrants lacked real roots or any form of real communal structure – perceived them as constituting a *tabula rasa* for national construction. Thus, their integration into Catalonia's structured and cohesive community was not only possible but would be to their benefit, since it would foster their development. Furthermore, immigrants' individual and social position would also be substantially enhanced as a result of their integration into Catalan society.

From Pujol's Catalan nationalist point of view, this process would also serve to hinder the potential Catalan denationalization of which Vandèllos had warned. This possible denationalization posed a particularly significant threat due to the combination of two factors: (1) the absence of any form of Catalan political autonomy that could coerce or facilitate integration; and (2) the unprecedented number of immigrants who settled in Catalonia and whose presence and demographic expansion threatened to render Catalans a minority in their own land (Gubernau 2004; Llobra 2004).

In this manner, Pujol promoted a complex, novel, but somewhat contradictory program of social integration that emanated from an amalgam of inclusionary and exclusionary approaches toward migrant others. From this perspective, my interpretation, which is based on a close reading of these primary texts as well as the authors' biographies, diverges significantly from the mainstream interpretation, both academic and popular, which emphasizes primarily the inclusive dimensions of Pujol's approach (see: Conversi 1997; McRoberts 2001; Shafir 1995). In fact, as I will demonstrate in Chapter 7, the inherent tension within this approach between its partially ethnic-exclusionary foundation, on the one hand, and inclusionary prescription, on the other, continues to beset the relations between Catalan nationalist and contemporary international migrants to this day.

From a practical perspective, Pujol and his supporters developed two tactics as a means of facilitating their inclusionary approach and fostering immigrant integration. The first was to ignore or overlook the ethnic divisions that had emerged as a result of immigrant settlement (see a critique of this approach in: Cruells 1965; Pi-sunyar 1971). From this perspective, Catalanist leaders acted as if there were no cultural or social cleavages in Catalonia, nor was there a large segregated population of non-Catalan-speakers. Thus, they sought to normalize the situation by deemphasizing or even denying the existence of these cleavages. This largely emanated from a belief that any discourse that juxtaposed the Catalan *we* with the Castilian *them* would generate irreparable social divisions and hinder integration (personal interview with a former nationalist politician, March 28, 2012). Instead, they perceived Catalonia as a harmonious society and described the process of Catalanization as a natural one that would take place inevitably and as a matter of course. From this perspective, Catalan nationalist and linguist Antoni Badia argued: "The possibility that the immigrants will escape assimilation is simply nil" (cited in: McRoberts 2001, 133).

A second tactic that was employed by Pujol and his followers was to generate narratives that redefined the entire history of Catalonia as one that had always been rooted in immigration – and specifically, in Pujol's vision of immigrant integration. Thus, they sought to transform Catalan national identity into one that was intricately and inextricably linked to immigration. For this purpose, the history of Catalonia and its demographic development were recast through this new lens. While Catalonia did in fact have a long history of immigration, the vast majority of these immigrants came from cultures that were closely related to Catalonia and easily became part of Catalan society. In other cases, culturally distinct immigrants did actually assimilate into Catalan culture; however, this was a result of an individual acculturation process rather than a consequence of a deliberate effort on the part of Catalan society. In fact, as I have argued above, until the second half of the 20th century, Catalonia and its national project did not have a definite philosophy regarding immigration and integration.

Thus, while Catalan history was not completely fabricated, it was reframed in a way that corresponded with the contemporary immigration- and integration-related preferences and interests of nationalist elites and of Pujol in particular. Interestingly, these narratives, which suggest that Catalonia has maintained its integrative immigration approach for hundreds of years, were raised and elaborated on in a number of interviews I conducted with nationalist actors (March 23, 2012; April 12, 2012; June 7, 2012).

This approach quickly became, and largely remains, the hegemonic approach within the Catalan national project toward the issue of immigration (Conversi 1997; Guibernau 2004; Shafir 1995). It seems plausible that its overall predominance stems from the fact that besides Pujol there were few dominant nationalist leaders who were active in Catalonia at the time and could develop and promote competing visions. Alternatively, due to the failure of strong ethnic conceptions of the nation to gain broad salience in Catalonia, together with Pujol's right wing political positioning, little political space remained for competing conceptions to emerge.

However, during this period, there were several scholars and authors who remained skeptical with regard to this approach. For instance, in 1965, Catalan separatist author Manuel Cruells wrote a book titled *The Non-Catalans and Ourselves* (1965) in response to Candel's *The New Catalans.* In contrast to Candel, who believed that immigrants wanted to integrate and could benefit from integration, Cruells argued that immigrants were not interested in becoming Catalan or learning the language. In addition, he posited that the social and cultural divisions between the two groups would increase over time and engender substantial social malaise.

Similarly, the US-based Catalan anthropologist, Oriel Pi-Sunyer, argued against the assumption that immigrants would easily and willingly assimilate (Pi-Sunyer 1971). Specifically, he drew attention to the *de facto* segregation between natives and immigrants and to the emergence of Castilian enclaves around Barcelona as evidence for his thesis. "The argument that a minority within a minority, given the right conditions, can be assimilated without significant problems smacks of wishful thinking and is not borne out by similar historical cases" (Pi-Sunyar 1971, 11). As Llobra (2004) explained, "In their [Catalan nationalists] idealist conception it was assumed that immigrants would miraculously become assimilated" (22).

Despite the facts that Pujol and his followers had no access to institutional power and that the Catalan national project they were promoting was effectively illegal in Franco's Spain, they were partially successful in facilitating immigrant integration and ameliorating social divisions because of two factors over which they had no direct control. First, due to the overall economic differentials between the regions from which immigrants hailed and Catalonia, together with the ethnic division of labor within Catalonia, many migrants were induced to integrate and learn Catalan as a means of enhancing social and occupational mobility (Guibernau 2004). This trend was further underpinned as a result of the relative prestige of the Catalan language relative to Castilian – a prestige that itself emanated from Catalonia's higher level of development (Shafir 1996; Woolard 1989). In fact, studies conducted during the early 1970s in neighborhoods that were dominated by Castilian-speaking immigrants indicated that the vast majority of these immigrants sought to learn Catalan and wanted their children to learn the language as well (Shafir 1995; Torres 1980).[277] However, as Guibernau (2004) pointed out, immigrants' voluntary integration should not be overstated. Despite these broad trends, there was a sizable population that opposed Catalanization – a process that they perceived as a threat to their cultural heritage, language, and identity. These immigrants, many of whom supported Franco, had no interest in

[277] In addition, throughout this period, due to the overall cultural and religious proximity between the two groups, the number of mixed marriages was increasing – a fact that facilitated the process of language acquisition and overall social integration (Shafir 1995).

speaking any language besides Castilian or in adopting Catalan culture (De Miguel *et al.* 1980; Guibernau 2004).

A second factor that favored integration emanated from the anti-Franco coalition that emerged during this period (Balfour and Quiroga 2007). The Franco regime, like the Primo de Ribera dictatorship of the 1920s, targeted peripheral nationalists as well as left-wing socialist groups and labor unions. In response, nationalist groups (both left- and right-wing), socialist parties (including both socialists and communists), and labor unions, all of which operated illegally, formed an anti-regime alliance. For the purpose of collaboration, they suspended their ideological differences on issues concerning nationalism and economic structure in favor of promoting their common cause of regime change and democratization (Guibernau 2004). The ongoing collaboration and interaction between these diverse political groups within common institutions, which were mostly Catalan-controlled, enabled them to serve as arenas of inter-group interaction and Catalan socialization and integration (Maluquer i Sostres 1965; McRoberts 2001). Thus, paradoxically, Franco's coercive policies facilitated the creation of alliances between immigrants and natives that promoted the former's integration into Catalan society.

The Post-Franco Period

Beyond these facilitating factors, Franco's death and the transition to democracy were crucial in enhancing immigrant integration in Catalonia. While Catalonia did not play a direct role in effecting this transition, the collapse of the Franco regime and the restoration of democracy enabled it to reassert at least partially its culture, language, and autonomy. In 1978, a new Spanish constitution was drafted, recognizing that while Spain was indivisible, it constituted an amalgam of nationalities with distinct languages and cultures that had a right to limited self-determination within a unified state structure.[278] The following year, Catalonia and Spain approved the Catalan Statute of Autonomy (1979), which restored Catalonia's political institutions (the Generalitat) and granted it autonomous control over issues concerning language, education, social and economic planning, and culture. As a result, the Catalan political parties were able to reemerge and publically promote their vision of the national project(s).

Thus, owing to these developments, Catalonia gained a better ability, though by no means exclusive power, to influence the process of immigrant integration (McRoberts 2001; Shafir 1995). A key political slogan that became popular during this period echoed the Catalan integration approach that had developed during the dictatorship: "Now more than ever, one single people" (in Woolard 1989). From a practical perceptive, the newly-empowered Catalan government now had the means and the authority to promote linguistic policies that would facilitate the integration of Spanish immigrants. Since language has always constituted the primary, and perhaps the only, pillar of Catalan identity (Conversi 1997; Woolard 1989), Catalan nationalists perceived the promotion of these policies as being crucial in fostering social cohesion.

In fact, one of the Generalitat's first tasks was to create effective legislation concerning the status of the Catalan language. This constituted a particularly urgent goal since approximately 40 percent of the population was unable to speak Catalan (Hall 1990; Laitin 1992). Even among native-born Catalans, Catalan usage was limited since fewer than 20 percent had the ability to write in Catalan due to the absence of Catalan-language schools. The members of the governing right-wing nationalist party, Convergencia Democratica de Catalunya (CDC), sought

[278] Even in this document there remains an ongoing tension between Spanish and regional nationalities. In order to resolve this tension to some extent, the constitution differentiates between the Spanish *nation* and regional *nationalities*.

to promote Catalan as the sole official language in Catalonia. However, due to constraints that emanated from the Spanish state, both Castilian and Catalan were ultimately recognized as official languages in Catalonia (Balcells 1995; Generalitat de Catalunya 1992).[279]

The primary arenas of the re-Catalanization process were the cultural and educational spheres. In 1983, after several years of deliberation, in order to promote this policy, which sought to promote the Catalanization of both space and population and reconstitute Catalan as the primarily language of business and administration, the Catalan parliament approved the language normalization law (*Llei de normalització lingüística*). Overall, the law sought to promote several goals: (1) to encourage and promote the use of Catalan among all residents; (2) to expand the official use of Catalan in government and business; (3) to make Catalan the normal language of interpersonal communications; and (4) to enhance the language more broadly in the realms of culture and society (Generalitat de Catalunya 1983). As in the case of Quebec, the most crucial elements of this law relating to immigrant integration were those concerning education. Specifically, the law prescribed unified bilingual education with a particular emphasis on the Catalan language. The position of Catalan was further enhanced by the 1998 *llei de política lingüística* (Generalitat de Catalunya 1997), which enhanced Catalan's preferred status in education, entertainment, and other realms.

Thus, in contrast to Quebec schools, which are divided along linguistic lines, in Catalonia, bilingualism meant that all teachers and students were required to speak and study both languages (McRoberts 2001). McAndrew (1997) argues that this preference emanated from two causes. First, the size of the native Catalan population and that of the Spanish immigrant population (including descendants) were practically equal. This fact engendered fear among the

[279] However, despite both languages being official, the 1978 statute of autonomy recognized Catalan as Catalonia's *own language* (Generalitat de Catalunya 1992; McRoberts 2001).

Catalan nationalists that, if separated, their institutions would be smaller than the Castilian ones, thereby signaling their demographic inferiority. Second, unified schools corresponded with Catalonia's integration philosophy that deliberately deemphasized group differences and ethnic cleavages in favor of social cohesion as a means of reducing or obfuscating inter-group divisions. Interestingly, during my fieldwork, I encountered strong support for this unified approach to education from both Catalan and Spanish nationalists, whereas the representatives of the two groups diverged with regard to the identity of the primary language of education within these institutions (personal interviews: March 23, 2012; April 26, 2012; May 7, 2012).

In practice, while schools were initially required to teach in both languages and teachers were able to teach in the language of their choice, over time the role of Catalan was incrementally enhanced (McAndrew 2014). In 1992, a government decree pertaining to the language education system shifted almost entirely to Catalan (decree 75/92). Following this shift, educators have been required to use only Catalan as the normal language of instruction in general classes such as science, history, and culture (interview with a senior official in the Linguistic Normalization Office: July 9, 2012).[280]

As a result of this legislation, schools that taught primarily in Castilian were forced to close down or change their linguistic orientation. In consequence, the number of students who attended these schools decreased from 24.5 percent in 1986 to less than half a percent in 1995 (Generalitat de Catalunya 1998). Furthermore, the government developed and funded special Quebec-inspired Catalan immersion programs in schools whose Castilian-speaking student populations exceeded 70 percent in order to facilitate their linguistic acquisition and integration (Artigal 1993; Keating 2001). In contrast to Quebec, however, Catalan nationalists sought to

[280] For a detailed account and discussion of these policies, see: McAndrew 2013; McRoberts 2001; Woolard 1989.

avoid policies that were or appeared to be overly coercive due to the fear that they would trigger hostility toward integration (personal interview with a senior official in the Linguistic Normalization Office July 9, 2012). While this anti-coercive position has become pervasive in Catalonia, it is unclear whether it initially emanated from Catalan preferences or from Catalonia's relatively weak autonomous position.

Overall, the results of these policies are encouraging for those who support Catalanization. While only 60 percent of Catalonia's residents could speak Catalan in 1975, this figure increased to 64 percent in 1986, 68.3 percent in 1991, and 75.3 percent by 1996 (Conversi 1997; Ferrer 2000; McRoberts 2001) as a result of the 1983 law. Concurrently, the proportion of those who could understand Catalan increased from 81 percent in 1980 to 90.6 percent in 1986 and 94.9 percent in 1996. Similarly, the proportion of those able to write in Catalan increased from less than 20 percent of the population in 1975 to over 45.8 percent in 1996 (ibid).

Despite the increase in Catalan language acquisition, the consequent integration of Spanish immigrants and their descendants, and the fact that linguistic policies have engendered significantly less conflict than in Quebec (Keating 2001), the process of linguistic integration of Spanish immigrants is still far from complete.[281] First, many neighborhoods and towns with large Castilian-speaking populations have remained predominantly Castilian and Spanish. For instance, in the city of Badalona and the Barcelona neighborhood of Sant Adrià de Besòs, the Castilian language and Spanish cultural traditions are still predominant. This was highly evident in several observations I conducted in these and other Spanish-dominant areas of Catalonia (personal

[281] It is important to note that there is a substantial difference in the scope of linguistic integration between rural and urban areas, primarily Barcelona. Specifically, in rural areas that tend to be predominantly Catalan, Spanish immigrants and their descendants have overwhelmingly integrated into Catalan. However, in cities such as Barcelona that contain large Castilian-speaking populations who often reside in segregated neighborhoods, linguistic adaption and the regular use of Catalan have been lower (interview with a senior official in the Linguistic Normalization Office July 9, 2012; see also Hall 1990).

observations March 29, 2012; April 18, 2012; April 29, 2012; June 17, 2012). One striking example of the inter-group cleavage was the prevalence of Spanish flags on the porches of apartments and houses – a phenomenon that is almost non-existent in other parts of Catalonia in which the only flag visible is the Catalan one.

Second, despite the increased knowledge of and competency in the Catalan language, the persistence of relatively segregated Castilian-speaking regions perpetuates the Castilian dominance among many of its speakers (Woolard 1989). Thus, while the vast majority of immigrants and their descendants can now both understand and read Catalan, most of them rarely use it in their daily lives. In fact, there have been several rounds of political mobilization by native Castilian-speakers in Catalonia and political groups in Madrid that perceive Catalan language and educational policies as overly coercive and even as Francoist policies in reverse (Guibernau 2004; Keating 2001). As early as 1981, 2,300 teachers and civil servants signed a manifesto calling for the maintenance of equal rights for the two languages (McRoberts 2001). In addition, Spanish nationalists and Castilian groups such as *Coordinadora de la Defensa del Castellano* and *Padres Contra la immersión* have repeatedly petitioned both the Spanish and Catalan court systems against Catalonia's linguistic policies in education. In 1994, after 10 years of debates in Spain's supreme and constitutional courts over a petition regarding the imposition of Catalan in education, the Spanish constitutional court declared Catalonia's linguistic policy to be legitimate (Tribunal Constitutional 337/1994).[282]

Finally, there is also a residual political cleavage between the two groups that is particularly evident in their political behavior. Specifically, while the majority of Catalans of non-immigrant origin vote for Catalan nationalist parties, most Castilian-speakers vote for the

[282] For an in-depth analysis of these legal contestations, see: Costa 2003; Keating 2001; Pogesschi 2004.

Catalan affiliates of the main Spanish political parties, Partido popular de Catalunya (PPC) and Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC). Recently, in fact, many Castilian-speakers have supported the newly formed center-right *Ciutadans* party that primarily promotes Spanish nationalism and unity in Catalonia. These differential voting patterns have become particularly visible following the recent nationalist mobilization in Catalonia that began in 2012 and resulted in a shift of approximately 50 percent of Castilian PSC voters to Ciutadans. In addition, inter-group differences in political behavior are evident if we compare voter turnout for the Catalan and Spanish national elections: while native Catalan-speakers demonstrate high turnout rates in both elections, Castilian-speakers tend to vote only in national elections and not in regional ones (Llobera 2004; Shafir 1995).

Preliminary Conclusions

This chapter has traced and explored the historical development of Catalonia, its relationship with Spain, the emergence of the Catalan national project, and the development of the Catalan elite's preferences and ideas concerning demography and immigration. I have sought to demonstrate that, as in the cases of Israel and Quebec, these processes have been closely interconnected.

Specifically, I have posited that the emergence of the Catalan national project was the result of Catalonia's tense relations with Spain and the latter's attempts to suppress the Catalan language and culture, on the one hand, and Catalonia's high levels of economic growth and development that exceeded those of Spain, on the other. As a result of these processes, Catalanism and Catalan nationalism emerged and promoted the revitalization of the Catalan language and culture and increased regional autonomy and/or influence in Madrid.

While questions of immigration did not initially play a central role in the Catalan national movement, during the 20th century and particular during the 1960s, this situation began to change as a result of large influxes of Spanish immigrants whose presence threatened to transform Catalans into a minority in their own land. Despite limited resources and the absence of autonomous political power, Catalan nationalists under the leadership of Jordi Pujol developed a new civic-territorial approach to immigration that favored maintaining a coherent society by means of deemphasizing social, linguistic, and ethnic divisions, the adoption of a civic definition of Catalan nationhood, and the promotion of the Catalan language as the primary marker of identity and belonging. Following the death of Franco and the restoration of democracy in Spain, Catalonia was able to regain partial political autonomy and transform these abstract principles into ones that guide its official policies.

The next chapter will explore the impact of and nationalist responses to the large-scale flows of international migrants who began settling in Catalonia during the 1980s and 1990s and became a sizable portion (16 percent) of the Catalan population during the 2000s. As in the cases of Israel and Quebec, I will posit that policies toward these immigrant groups have largely been determined by two forms of competition: inter-group competition between Catalonia and Spain over competencies regarding immigration and intra-group competition between divergent Catalan nationalist groups.

Chapter 7: The Catalan National project and International Migration – Threat or Opportunity?

Since it was primarily a country of emigration rather than of immigration, Spain experienced little public or political debate over this issue, and the state did not devise provisions or policies in its regard until the mid-1980s (Calavita 2005; Zapata-Barrero 2009). For instance, in the Spanish constitution (1978), immigration is only mentioned in passing in article 159 (1) 2, which grants the Spanish government exclusive control over determining and executing an immigration policy. However, the constitution does not specify particular rules, competencies, or guidelines with regard to immigration policies (Kossler 2015).[283]

While immigration continued to constitute a minor occurrence over the following decade (Izquierdo 1992), as a condition of Spain's accession to the European Community in 1986, it was required to adopt immigration policies that were consistent with those of other community members. To this end, it passed it first legislation on immigration, *The Law Concerning the Rights and Liberties of Foreigners in Spain* (Ley Orgánica 7/1985) in 1985. This law represented an amalgamation of inclusionary and exclusionary approaches. On the one hand, the new law regularized Spain's small undocumented resident migrant community. On the other, it concurrently imposed severe restrictions on future immigration flows, established strict deportation procedures, and created a complex dual system of residence and work permits that was extremely difficult to implement and subsequently hindered immigrants' ability both to gain legal status and to maintain it (Arango 2000; Calavita 1998; Calavita 2005; Duman 2014).

Due to the dismally small number of immigrants that settled in Spain during this period, neither the Catalan government – which, during this period, focused primarily on language normalization and nation building in the aftermath of the Franco regime (Conversi 1997; McRoberts 2001) – nor the governments of other autonomous communities actively sought to alter the *status quo* regarding this issue.

However, this situation began to change in the early 1990s as immigration flows into Spain, while still modest, began to increase (Huntoon 1998; Perez 2003). Specifically, Spain's 1991 decision to initiate a second regularization process sparked a broad debate both across

[283] Specifically, the article states, "The State holds exclusive competence over the following matters:…. [n]ationality, immigration, emigration, aliens, and asylum" (Constitución Española 1978).

Spain and within Catalonia with respect to the increasing presence of international immigrants (Apap et al. 2000; Levinson 1995).[284]

In 1992, in response to these growing concerns, when international migrants accounted for only 1.2 percent (72,200) of the Catalan population (Departament de Benestar Social 2001), a group of civil society organizations in the Catalan city of Girona authored a pioneering document entitled *L'Informe Girona: 50 Propostes sobre Immigraciò*. This document represents the first attempt within Spain to devise a comprehensive approach toward the issue of immigration.[285] Divided into three parts, namely, legality, integration, and attitudes toward immigrants, it espoused a highly progressive and inclusive approach toward immigrant integration rights. Specifically, with regard to the Catalan national project, the document stressed the crucial importance of integrating immigrants into the Catalan language and society since this was perceived as a primary means of fostering their mobility and maintaining social cohesion (Commission d'associations et d'ong des Comarques de Girone - CAONGCG, 1992). Furthermore, due to the immigrants' tendency to cluster in particular areas – a process the authors believed could hinder integration and foster the creation of segregated ethnic enclaves – it also stressed the need to ensure immigrants' spatial dispersal and integration. In addition, the document offered an initial administrative blueprint for promoting and facilitating immigrant integration into Catalan society (ibid; Gomá 2001).

Concurrently, besides such attempts that emanated from civil society, as a result of Catalonia's historical experiences with mass immigration, the issue of immigration increasingly preoccupied the members of Catalonia's political body, the Generalitat. In particular, they feared that large-scale migratory flows, coupled with Catalonia's limited capacity for autonomy could

[284] At the time of regularization, the foreign-born population in Spain was still relatively small. In total, 360,700 immigrants, 160,000 of whom were legal, resided in the country (Ministerio de Trabajo i Asuntos Sociales 2002).
[285] The Girona Report: 50 Proposals regarding Immigration.

undermine the Catalan national project (Libeau-Kleiner 2009). In response, in November 1992, the ruling right-wing conservative nationalist party, Convergencia i Unio (CIU),[286] under the leadership of Jordi Pujol, created a special commission to explore the issue of international immigration. The commission consisted of members from eight different government departments who were instructed to devise policies and programs that would foster immigrant integration in Catalonia. The following year, the committee published its report, the *Pla Interdeparatmental d'Immigració,* which was approved by the Catalan government in September of that year (Departament de Benestar Social 1993).

The *Pla Interdepartamental d'Immigració* constitutes the first substantial attempt of any governmental body in Spain to develop a comprehensive plan regarding the issue of international immigration (Apap 1999; Calavita 2005; Turrión and Pinyol Jiménez 2009). In addition, together with the Girona document, it was the first attempt to initiate a public discourse and create a philosophy regarding the place of international immigrants in Catalan society (Zapata-Barrero 2005).[287]

However, despite the seminal role of the report, the implementation of these integration policies was largely put on hold due to the limited increase in migratory flows during the mid-1990s together with the absence of designated resources. In fact, only in 1997 did the Generalitat actively begin to promote these new policies in regions with high concentrations of immigrants (Vicent 2013).

[286] Convergencia i Unio (CIU) was a Catalan political party that emerged following Spain's democratization in 1978. The party is in fact an alliance between the right-wing liberal-nationalist CDC (*Convergencia Democratica de Catalunya)* and the Christian-Democratic UDC (*Unio Democratica de Catalunya).* The united CIU was the governing party of Catalonia between 1980 and 2003 and again between 2010 and 2015. On July 15th, 2015, the party was dissolved due to differences between the CDC and the UDC over the sovereignty issue. For a detailed analysis of the party and its two factions, see: Guibernau 2004.

[287] In fact, the plan served as a blueprint for future integration plans that were developed by both the central and various regional governments (Turrión and Pinyol Jiménez 2009).

Immigration to Catalonia in the new millennium

While immigration persisted at a slow pace throughout the 1990s with immigrants hailing primarily from Latin America and Morocco, as Figure 7.1 demonstrates these flows intensified significantly as of the year 2000. Following both Spain's and Catalonia's dramatic economic growth during this period as well as the increasing upward occupational mobility among the native population, there was a rising demand for immigrant labor to fill low-skilled positions, primarily in agriculture and construction (Calavita 2005; Medrano 2005).

Figure 7.1: International Immigrants in Catalonia 1991-2011*



*Source: This Data presented in this graph was compiled form: Departament de Benestar Social (1993); (2001); IDESCAT – Catalan Institute for Statistics (2012)

However, despite the increasing demand for labor migrants, the Spanish state, which maintained sole responsibility for controlling immigration flows, did not devise or implement new immigration policies that met the concrete needs of the labor market (Callejo et al. 2008; Perez 2003). Instead, the majority of immigrants who entered Spain during the early 2000s did so illegally and were later regularized in a series of special programs implemented by the central government (Calavita; 2004; 2005; Duman 2014). In fact, between 2000 and 2006, Spain regularized over one million immigrants, many of whom resided in Catalonia (Finotelli and Arango 2011).

Although immigration altered the demographic composition of Spain as a whole, immigrants settled disproportionally in Catalonia as a result of regional economic disparities. While in 2008 the Catalan population constituted 15 percent of the Spanish population, it hosted approximately 22 percent of the country's immigrants (IDESCAT 2009). During the brief period between 1998 and 2010, the proportion of international migrants within the Catalan population increased from under 2 percent to approximately 16 percent (Departament de Benestar Social 2012).[288] In fact, owing to these large-scale migratory flows, international immigration accounted for almost 90 percent of its population growth between 2000 and 2005 (Departament de Benestar Social 2005).

However, as was the case in Quebec, mass immigration bore particular significance for Catalonia because of its unique position – together with the Basque Country and to a lesser extent Galicia – as a minority nation that aspires to maintain and promote its own distinct identity, language, and national project. In contrast to the early to mid-1990s, when moderate levels of immigration enabled Catalonia to foster immigrant integration relatively effectively, the sheer size of the migratory waves during the 2000s severely challenged its capacity to integrate immigrants into the Catalan language and society (personal interview with the former head of Catalonia's Immigration Department, June 26, 2012). Thus, mass immigration was increasingly perceived by Catalan elites, and in particular by members of the CIU, as a process that, if not managed correctly, could potentially undermine the Catalan language, identity, demography, and national project(s) (Libeau-Kleiner 2009; Saura 2001).

Interestingly, this perceived threat prompted a dual response. On the one hand, mass immigration led nationalist political elites, who had learned from the experiences of the 1950s and 1960s, to call for the adoption of an accommodating and inclusionary approach toward immigrants. Concurrently, these elites demanded an increase in autonomous Catalan control over immigration and integration policies that would facilitate Catalonia's ability to effect a seamless

[288] This represents a particularly high proportion of the population if we compare Catalonia to other large migrant-receiving countries in Europe. For instance in Italy, immigrants represent 9.4 percent of the population, Belgium 10.4 percent, and France 11.6 percent (International Organization of Immigration 2014). However, it is lower than that of other countries such as Switzerland, where immigrants constitute 22.9 percent of the population (ibid).

integration of these immigrants. On the other hand, the potential threat posed by mass immigration to the Catalan language, culture, and national project induced some of these same elites to assume a defensive stance and employ exclusionary and xenophobic discourses (Guibernau 2004; Libeau-Kleiner 2009). For instance, Jordi Pujol's wife, Marta Ferrusola, publicly stated her views vis-à-vis immigrants (particularly those from North Africa): "If the Catalans are not concerned about Catalonia, the others [immigrants] will destroy us…[w]ant to impose their way on us, all they know to say in Catalan is 'Give me something to eat'…. Benefits for people who don't even know what Catalonia is" (Puigverd 2001).

When challenged with regard to his wife's statements, Pujol explained that these were solely her views but that they were shared by a majority of the population (Tremlett 2001). Similarly, the former leader of the left-wing Separatist ERC party stated that he identified with late Austrian politician Jörg Haider's concerns regarding the substantial threat posed by immigrants to host societies' identities and cultures, claiming that "if more immigrants arrive, Catalonia will disappear" (Company 2001; Valls 2001).

Besides issues that emanated from the unprecedented number of immigrants, the latter's spatial distribution also triggered concerns regarding the prospects of their integration. Specifically, in contrast to the Spanish immigrants who settled primarily in the greater Barcelona region, international immigrants settled across Catalonia, including rural areas whose populations had little experience with immigration and cultural diversity. Thus, as early as 1999, increasing immigrant presence in Catalonia's rural regions began to generate strong opposition among local populations, who staged xenophobic demonstrations in Terrasa and Banyoles (*El País* 1999a; 1999b).

At the same time, immigrants who settled in urban areas resided mainly in non-Catalan low-income neighborhoods whose population consisted overwhelmingly of Castilian-speaking immigrants from the 1960s, many of whom had been poorly integrated into Catalonia. Thus, the immigrants' spatial concentration limited their opportunities to interact with native Catalans, which was perceived as crucial for their integration into Catalan society. Furthermore, the overrepresentation of immigrants in these already-disadvantaged neighborhoods occasioned increasing levels of hostility between the immigrants and the Castilian-speaking populations since the former perceived the latter as a threat to both their social and economic positions (personal interview with a councilman from Badalona, June 1, 2012).

In an attempt to respond to these increasingly frequent social conflicts pertaining to immigration, the Catalan parliament passed a resolution emphasizing the development of policies toward immigration via consensus among political groups and the promotion of immigrant integration while eschewing the development of xenophobic discourses (Parliament of Catalonia, plenary session, October 5, 2000). Furthermore, parties from across the political spectrum, with the exception of the right-wing anti-Catalan Partido Popular (PP) reached an informal agreement prohibiting the use of anti-immigration discourse for electoral purposes (Libeau-Kleiner 2009).

Besides these challenges, the incorporation of immigrants into Catalan society was further complicated by the fact that in contrast to the other two cases examined in this study, Catalonia wields no legal control over immigrant selection or other aspects of immigration policy (quotas, regulation, integration); these remain the exclusive domains of the Spanish state.[289] As a result of these limitations on Catalonia's actions vis-à-vis immigration coupled with its desire to increase its overall relative autonomy, as in the case of Quebec, competition over

[289] As I discuss below, there was a partial change in this between 2005 and 2006 following the revised Catalan Statute of Autonomy that granted Catalonia increased control over the determination and implementation of immigrant integration policies.

immigration competencies ensued between Catalonia and Spain. The following section will examine these inter-group competitive dynamics.

Who Makes the Rules? Immigration Competencies and Inter-group Competition between Catalonia and Spain

As in the case of Quebec and Canada, immigration has constituted a key bone of contention between Catalonia and Spain over the last several decades. In fact, immigration competencies have constituted a fundamental issue around which supporters of both Catalan nationalism and Spanish centralization have rallied. Specifically, for Catalan nationalists whose political interests are represented primarily by the right-wing autonomist CIU and the left-wing secessionist ERC, attaining autonomous control over immigration and integration policies is deemed crucial for Catalonia's survival and for the development of its respective national projects in the context of large-scale migratory flows (personal interviews with former and current ERC and CIU officials: April 6, 2012; May 17, 2012; May 25, 2012; June 14, 2012).[290] These groups are deeply concerned about the denationalization that immigration could potentially induce. In fact, in a 2006 speech, Pujol stated that Spain sought to *flood* Catalonia with immigrants as a means of undermining its distinct identity (Pujol 2006).

[290] It is important to note that despite the broad agreement between the CIU and the ERC concerning the need to expand Catalonia's immigration competencies as a means of bolstering its position in relation to Spain, these preferences, however, also emanate from partially different interests. As I discuss in greater detail in the following section, for the CIU, the demand for immigration capacities is related to the party's interest in promoting more assimilatory policies and selecting immigrants who are deemed more culturally suitable for Catalonia. For the ERC, on the other hand, powers over immigration are necessary for two reasons. First, the ERC attributes the utmost importance to the preservation and promotion of the Catalan language, which it perceives as the sole constant marker of Catalan identity. Second, it seeks to incorporate immigrants into its secessionist national project – a goal that requires Catalonia to maintain full control over their integration (personal interviews with former and current ERC and CIU officials: April 6, 2012; June 14, 2012).

However, as I demonstrated in the case of Quebec, it is evident that the struggle over immigration competencies does not emanate solely from Catalan interests with regard to this particular policy area. Instead, the struggle over immigration represents only one dimension within a larger political program that seeks to expand Catalonia's political power and autonomy vis-à-vis Spain. This is particularly evident with respect to the ERC, which regularly employs the immigration issue as a means of attacking Spanish policies. Thus, I posit that the immigration debate affords an opportunity or a means that Catalan nationalist groups have instrumentally sought to utilize in order to increase Catalonia's overall state-like functions and capacities and its autonomy from Spain.

As discussed above, the mass influx of immigrants significantly increased anxieties among Catalan nationalist elites, particularly CIU members, who frame immigrants as *threats* more frequently than other groups (van Dijk 2005). These groups primarily fear that Catalonia will be unable to integrate immigrants in a manner that will permit the preservation of its distinct identity and the promotion of its national project(s). Furthermore, they are particularly concerned that immigrants will identify Spain rather than Catalonia as the host society and in consequence will elect not to integrate into the Catalan language and, in the case of the CIU, into its culture.

Thus, during the early 1990s, in order to promote integration, Catalonia focused primarily on developing integration policies that would facilitate immigrant incorporation and integration into the heart of Catalan society (Zapata-Barrero 2004; Libeau-Kleiner 2009). However, by the end of the decade, due to the rapidly-rising levels of immigrant settlement, both nationalist parties, and to a lesser degree the Catalanist Socialist Party (PSC), made increasing demands to expand Catalonia's provincial powers over immigration (Apap 1999; Zapata-Barrero 2009). As a former CIU legislator who worked on this issue explained, "We were in a very difficult position.

Immigration was a given because the economy needed more workers, but we had no power to decide who comes in and how many…. This was especially a problem for our identity. Immigrants are important for the economy, but we also know that the price could be high for Catalonia's interests if we don't integrate them properly…. But Catalonia did not have sufficient powers" (personal interview, April 27, 2012).

Thus, as in Quebec of the 1960s, the goal of increasing competencies over immigration constituted an issue around which broad political consensus emerged.[291] The only exception was the anti-Catalanist right-wing Partido Poplar de Catalunya (PPC), which supported the maintenance of the *status quo* and largely perceived pro-Catalan integration policies as being overly coercive.

In fact, as early as the late 1990s, Catalonia's nationalist political elites demanded increased control over immigration and integration policies (Apap 1999). Specifically, they sought to increase regional control over the number of immigrants who were permitted to settle in Catalonia and to select the immigrants they wanted since it was perceived that non-Castilian immigrants, meaning non-Latin Americans, were more likely to integrate into Catalan society (Calavita 2005).[292] For instance, during the 1999 Catalan electoral campaign, both the CIU and the ERC included the expansion of Catalonia's power over immigrant selection, regulation, and

[291] It is important to note that despite this overall consensus, there is a difference between the Catalanist PSC and the nationalist ERC and CIU in the scope of their demands. First, while the ERC and CIU demand broad competencies over policy determination and implementation, immigrant selection, and integration, the PSC focuses primarily on the issue of quotas since catalanization plays a more minor role in its agenda (Ribera Garijo 2012). Second, in contrast to ERC and CIU's adversarial discourse vis-à-vis Spain, the PSC has sought to expand these powers by means of consensus and amicable negotiations with Spain.

[292] The assumption that Latin American immigrants would be less likely to integrate into the Catalan language and culture appears to have been prevalent in Catalonia in the late 1990s and early 2000s. However, in an interview I conducted with the former head of Catalonia's immigration department, he explained that this was ultimately discovered to be a false presumption and that there are data indicating that Latin Americans are no less likely than other groups to integrate into Catalan culture and to identify as being Catalan (personal interview, June 26, 2012).

integration as a central component of their respective platforms (Convergencia i Unio 1999; Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya 1999).

During this campaign, ERC chairman Lluis Carod Rovira publically demanded that Spain transfer significant powers to Catalonia with regard to immigration. Carod cited the extreme challenges that Catalonia had faced following the mass immigration from Spain during the 1960s and 1970s. These challenges led to the creation of segregated immigrant neighborhoods that impeded the immigrants' integration into Catalan society and overall societal cohesion. Carod claimed that in the absence of regional powers over immigration and integration policies, current international migratory flows posed a similar challenge, since many immigrants believed that they were settling in Spain and exhibited little interest in learning Catalan (El País 1999c). The demands to increase Catalan authority and control over immigration and integration policies were also included as one of the ten points of a political pact that the ERC and the PSC created together with the Socialist Greens (IC-V) in October 2000 (Company and Rusiñol 2000).

Facing these political demands for autonomy, the governing right-wing Partido Popular (PP), which had gained power in Madrid in 1996, was strongly opposed to increasing Catalonia's powers over immigration. The PP's stand has generally favored the centralization of powers within Spain while limiting the competencies of regional governments. However, between 1996 and 2000, the PP was unable to pursue this agenda since its minority government was dependent on CIU support. However, once it gained an absolute majority in 2000, it renewed its centralization campaign, which actively sought to weaken the powers of both Catalonia and the Basque country in fields such as language, culture, and immigration (Alland 2006). As a consequence of this approach, the PP-led government actively sought to prevent any expansion of Catalonia's independent powers over immigration. Nevertheless, as Keating and Wilson

(2009) point out, this approach largely backfired because it served to stimulate regional demands for increased autonomy instead of dampening them (ibid).

Catalan demands in favor of increased control over immigration ~~however~~ were not limited to the political realm. In 2001, Catalan employers and unions, most of whom also supported the Catalan national project, launched a campaign demanding that the CIU-led government expand its jurisdiction over the immigration issue. Specifically, they stipulated that Catalonia be granted powers regarding immigrant selection as well as the right to recruit in the countries of origin and that it play a participatory role in devising Spanish immigration policies. As the Catalan labor minister explained, "We are the ones that best know and understand the needs of Catalonia and its labor market" (*El País* 2001b).

This goal was also promoted in the second immigration plan that the CIU government developed and promoted in 2001 (*Pla Interdepartamental d'Immigració* 2001-2004). Specifically, the plan posited that Spain's exclusive control over immigration was both detrimental to Catalonia's distinct identity and detached from the region's concrete cultural and economic realities. Thus, it suggested several operational reforms: (1) to create a committee that would include government representatives from Spain and Catalonia, together with Catalan municipal representatives who would facilitate a more coordinated and effective immigration policy-making process; (2) to increase Catalonia's role in determining immigration quotas and in the granting of work and residency permits; (3) to redefine and clarify the roles and competencies of various immigration-related national and regional agencies as a means of increasing their autonomous control over these processes; (4) to enhance Catalonia's overall role in the formulation of Spain's immigration policies; (5) to grant Catalonia complete control over immigrant reception and integration (Departament de Benestar Social 2001).

In addition, the plan called for the creation of a fund within the Spanish state that would transfer resources to autonomous communities, based on the size of their immigrant populations, in order to finance their integration and reception services (ibid.). However, as discussed above, the PP-led Spanish government, which strongly opposed Catalan autonomy, rejected these proposals outright by claiming that the immigration issue fell under Spain's sole jurisdiction (El País 2002a).

In addition to these demands, in early 2002, the CIU embarked on a unilateral policy of establishing independent immigrant recruitment offices abroad, based on the Quebec model. These offices were designed to select immigrants informally and provide prospective migrants with information about Catalonia (Blanchar 2003; *El País* 2003; Garriga 2002). At the time, however, a CIU government representative explained that these offices also aimed "[t]o ensure that the Catalan Executive was able to determine the pace and priorities regarding the immigration issue [vis-à-vis Spain]" (Anguera 2002).

While Catalonia initially requested the Spanish government's support for these offices, the PP-led government rejected these demands. When the Catalan government ultimately elected to open offices in Warsaw and Casablanca despite the Spanish government's objections, the PP government refused to cooperate with it and stated that "The opening of the office was a unilateral initiative of the Generalitat that does not conform with the agreements between the central government and the regions" (Garriga 2002).

The 2003 Catalan elections witnessed a substantial increase in the role of ~~that~~ the immigration issue and Catalonia's powers over it as compared to previous campaigns. This was largely a response to the dramatic rise in the number of immigrants settling in Catalonia, which engendered increasing political concerns regarding Catalonia's ability to effectively integrate them without sparking social conflict. In fact, the proportion of international immigrants within the overall Catalan population increased during this period from just over 2 percent in 1999 to 8.1 percent in just four years (IDESCAT 2012; Departament de Benestar Social 2005). These growing concerns over immigration are particularly evident if we examine the role assumed by this issue in the platforms of the two central nationalist parties – the CIU and the ERC. Throughout the campaign, these parties strongly promoted increased autonomy from Spain in general and with regard to immigration competencies in particular (Convergencia i Unio 2003; Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya 2003).

These nationalist demands for the expansion of Catalan competencies over immigration were not particularly novel; in fact, they had been a constant since the late 1990s. However, during the electoral campaign, the Catalanist PSC, which sought to capture a larger share of the Catalan vote, also pledged its support for these demands concerning immigration and for a new statute of autonomy that would recognize Catalonia as a distinct nation. Specifically, the party claimed that owing to the fundamental effect immigration had on Catalonia, it was imperative that it play a more active role in formulating policies and quotas (interview with PSC official, May 29 2012; Keating and Wilson 2009; *La Vaguardia* 2003; Partit Socialista de Catalunya 2003).

Throughout the campaign, Artur Más, who succeeded Pujol as head of the CIU, made stringent demands concerning the immigration issue, which he perceived not only as a political goal in its own right but also as a lever that would increase Catalonia's overall autonomy. He argued that Spain's exclusive control over immigration and integration policies rendered it difficult for Catalonia to fulfill its economic and social needs or to promote effective immigrant integration. In his campaign speeches and interviews, he linked this issue to the broader demand for a new statute of autonomy that would constitute an overall reconfiguration of Catalonia's autonomy and authority vis-à-vis Spain. "Catalonia has been cut off with regard to immigration competencies. One of the main reasons why we ask for a new statute is that the current statute forbids us to intervene effectively in immigration…. We want to lead the way in this regard" (Más 2003).[293] For this purpose, Más and other member of the CIU demanded that Catalonia also be granted control over immigrant selection and policing, claiming that at the very least, Catalonia merited the right to select immigrants as Quebec does (Garriga 2003; Más 2003). In a speech, Pujol summarized the CIU position regarding the importance of gaining such powers: "We should pray that the statute includes competencies over immigration because while authority over immigration is a serious issue for many societies, in Catalonia it is a question of being or not being" (*El Mundo* 2004).

As discussed above, under the PP's administration, Spain refused to concede to Catalan or Basque demands for increased autonomy.[294] However, its opposition declined following the 2004 electoral victory of the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE). In the aftermath of the socialist victory, the Spanish government's position on autonomy became more favorable toward regional autonomy than it had been under the PP (Alland 2006; Guibernau 2004). This position was further enhanced by the fact that the PCS, which is the Catalan partner of the PSOE, concurrently held power in Catalonia (Juberias 2013). Thus, Spain's new prime minster, José Luis Zapatero,

---

[293] This statement reflects two points. First, as discussed in Chapter 6, Catalanists have historically sought to influence Spanish policies from within. Second, the statement reflects Catalonia's position as a pioneer within Spain regarding immigration policies. Interestingly, these demands arose at the same time as the Basque Country's attempt to expand its own autonomous position (Libeau-Kleiner 2009; see footnote 12).

[294] While this section focuses on the Catalan case, Catalan demands for increased autonomy took place in tandem with similar demands in the Basque Country. Beginning in 2001, the Basque *lehendakari* (head of state), Juan Ibarretxe, sought to radically transform the Basque Statute of Autonomy into a *free association* that would place the Basque Country and Spain on an equal footing. While the plan stopped short of independence, it would have entailed a significant devolution of powers from the central state. However, it encountered strong opposition from both the PP and the PSOE. The PP contended mainly that the proposal was anti-Spanish, while the PSOE argued that its provisions were excessive. However, despite the PSOE's opposition to the plan, this debate led it to support the renegotiation of the autonomy statutes in a manner that would recognize Spain's pluri-national character (Junerias 2013; Keating and Bray 2006).

announced that he would be willing to consider reforming regional statutes of autonomy, particularly in the Basque Country and Catalonia, which had both initiated large-scale public campaigns with regard to this issue (*El País* 2004; Hernandez Garcia 2004).

Catalonia wasted no time responding to these proposals. In fact, several days after the election, the Generalitat announced that as a crucial part of these new autonomy negotiations, it would demand increased powers over immigration (Marin 2004). The Catalonian demands can be divided into three main issues: (1) the recognition of Catalonia as a nation within Spain; (2) an increase in Catalonia's overall autonomy from Spain, including the realm of immigration;[295] and (3) a decrease in Catalonia's relative tax burden within Spain. Following a process of intense debate within both Spain and Catalonia, the Catalan parliament approved a draft for a new statute of autonomy in September 2005. Finally, in early 2006, the statute was approved both by the Spanish Cortes General and by the Catalan population in a special referendum.

With regard to immigration, while the final version of the statute did not grant Catalonia all the competencies it had initially demanded, it did significantly increase the region's autonomy over this issue. Article 138 of the statute expanded Catalonia's immigration powers in four ways. First, it granted Catalonia exclusive powers with regard to immigrants' initial reception and their linguistic and socio-economic integration. In other words, it enabled Catalonia to develop its own reception and integration model that corresponded with the region's cultural, economic, and linguistic needs. Second, it granted the Generalitat a participatory position in the determination of Spain's future immigration policies. Third, it granted Catalonia the right to grant and revoke

[295] However, the final version of the statute granted Catalonia fewer competencies over immigration than it had initially demanded (Requejo 2010).

work and residency permits (Ley Organica 6/2006).[296] Finally, it granted Catalonia significant economic resources from the Madrid government in order to fund immigrant integration programs.[297]

Despite the increase in Catalonia's power over integration, tension with Spain over these issues still persists. In an interview with a former CIU-affiliated head of the Catalan immigration office, he explained these dynamics: "It is really about an identity clash. Catalonia has its own culture and identity and we will not give it up. I think that the Spain–Catalonia relationship on immigration as well as other issues doesn't work and doesn't seem to be getting better. Particularly under the PP, there is an inability to create a productive dialogue." (personal interview, June 24, 2012).

Thus, following a decade of struggle between Catalan nationalist groups and Spain over immigration competencies, Catalonia succeeded in gaining significant powers over immigration. While these powers fell significantly short of those that had been obtained by Quebec, they represent a substantial advance as compared to its position prior to 2006. As in the Quebec case, Catalan demands to extend the region's power over immigration gained broad support across Catalan society, with the exception of anti-Catalanist factions such as the PPC. However, as I will demonstrate in the following section, despite the broad consensus regarding the competency issue, the particular visions of the national project that have been espoused by various nationalist groups have given rise to divergent preferences regarding immigrant integration and their place within Catalan society.

---

[296] Due to its overall opposition to the statute, particularly its opposition to the provisions concerning immigration, language, and Catalan nationality, the PP petitioned the constitutional court against the statute (*El Pais* 2006). In 2010, however, the court declared article 138 to be constitutional as long as Catalonia's powers over immigration did not interfere with the state's exclusive powers regarding the granting of citizenship and the maintenance of border control (Constitutional Court Judgment 31/2010).

[297] However, due to the ongoing economic crisis that hit Spain in 2009, these funds have been significantly reduced over time (personal interview with the former head of Catalonia's immigration department, June 26, 2012).

Immigrant Integration: The National Project and 'The Catalan Way'

As was evident in the case of Quebec, in contrast to the broad political consensus within Catalonia concerning the need to increase its powers in the field of immigration, there has been a concurrent disagreement among Catalan political groups regarding the nature and process of immigrant integration. In fact, due to Catalonia's limited competencies over immigration policy, integration constitutes the primary axis around which the debate over immigration takes place (Libeau-Kleiner 2009). This section explores the various perspectives and approaches toward immigrant integration, reflecting different visions of the national project, which have emerged in Catalonia over the last 20 years.

In contrast to the debate over immigration competencies that was largely consensual across the Catalan political system, preferences regarding particular integration policies have been shaped primarily by Catalan intra-group competition vis-à-vis the national project. Specifically, divergent Catalan parties have promoted different conceptions and programs concerning immigrant integration that are largely based on their particular visions of the national project.

These principal divergent visions of the national project have been espoused by the two central nationalist parties, the CIU and the ERC, and the Catalanist PSC. The analysis below explores the various positions and policies that have been endorsed by each of these groups. This section is divided into two parts. The first examines the variation in the preferences and goals of the three political parties concerning the national project and immigrant integration.[298] The

[298] While I largely examine each of these approaches as distinct for analytical purposes, the boundaries between them are sometimes blurred since various actors vacillate at times – at least temporarily –between approaches. Furthermore, as a result of the formation of coalition alliances among these parties, as was the case with the PSC and ERC coalition between 2003 and 2010, hybrid or seemingly contradictory integration programs have emerged as well.

second traces the specific policies and strategies, both in the formal political realm and within civil society, employed by these political groups in order to promote immigrant integration and their vision of the national project.

Varieties of Integration 1: The CIU's Assimilationist Approach

The right-wing nationalist CIU that ruled Catalonia continuously between 1979 and 2003 and again from 2010 to the present day primarily endorses the creation of an autonomous Catalonia within Spain. With regard to immigrant integration, the party defines its approach as pluralist, civic–territorial, and inclusive (Pujol 2001; Convergencia i Unio 1999; 2003; 2006; 2010). Despite its official position, in practice, the CIU's approach to integration appears to be largely an assimilatory one that strongly opposes and fears multiculturalism and cultural hybridity, one that primarily seeks to transform immigrants into Catalans (see: Departament de Benestar Social 1993; 2001; *El País* 2001b personal interviews with former and current CIU members: April 24, 2012; May 17, 2012; Pujol 1976).

From this perspective, while the CIU leaves some room for cultural transformation and change, it considers the Catalan national project to be based primarily on cultural, linguistic, and historical continuity and differentiation from Spain. To this end, immigrants are expected to conform to the historical conception of Catalan society. This approach toward the integration of international migrants is largely an extension of the one developed by the party's historical leader, Jordi Pujol, vis-à-vis the Spanish immigrants of the 1950s and 1960s (see: Pujol 1976).

However, as we will see below, this approach does not take into account the profound cultural, linguistic, and normative differences that international immigrants carry with them and the fundamental changes they can effect with regard to the host society in contrast to the culturally proximate Spanish immigrants of the mid-20th century.[299] In fact, Catalan human rights NGOs suggested that the use of contradictory discourses (inclusive and exclusionary) by CIU members with regard to immigrants can be explained by the dissonance between this approach, which was developed with regard to a proximate migrant group, and the realities engendered by the settlement of diverse international migrants (personal interviews April 24, 2012; May 16, 2012)

The CIU perceives the Catalan national project primarily as a defensive one that seeks to promote cultural preservation. This requires immigrants to assimilate in order for Catalonia to survive. As the current CIU leader, Artur Más, explained, "Our goal as a country is not only to defend our way of collective being, our identity, but also to strengthen and project it" (Más 2003). Applying this perspective to immigration, Pujol suggested, "Immigrants should assume that the host society is going to remain as it is…. They cannot impose anything on their hosts…. So it is important that immigrants come with a desire to be Catalan" (*El País* 2002b). Thus, for the CIU, as in the case of the PQ in Quebec, integration is largely perceived as a unidirectional process in which immigrants are expected to gradually assimilate into and identify with the majority group.[300]

From the CIU's perspective, the primary goal of the national project is to promote increased Catalan autonomy within Spain as a means of preserving and protecting the Catalan language and culture, which constitute the fundamental pillars of Catalan identity. This defensive nationalist approach is largely the product of the context in which it developed. In particular, it

[299] This argument is based on interviews with Catalan human rights NGOs (April 22, 2012; May 13, 2012)
[300] Interestingly, when I asked CIU members about the possibility of more bi-directional interactions, the interviewees focused primarily on programs that enabled Catalans to assist in immigrant acculturation and language acquisition and did not refer to the possibility of natives learning from immigrants (nal interviews with CIU members of the Catalan parliament: April 6, 2012; May 17, 2012).

emerged in reaction to Franco's repressive policies regarding the Catalan language and identity and the concurrent mass settlement of Spanish migrants in Catalonia.

The CIU's approach stands in contrast to other cases of defensive nationalism that tend to exclude immigrants, as was the case in Quebec until the second half of the 20th century (Bretton 1988). Specifically, the CIU's brand of defensive Catalan nationalism has not sought to exclude immigrants from the Catalan collective but rather to incorporate and assimilate them as a means of both maintaining and expanding the nation (Conversi 2002). Two processes brought about the adoption of this relatively inclusive civic approach.

The first process was the product of the numerical–demographic weakness of ethnic Catalans within Catalonia. Since a majority of the population comprised individuals of immigrant descent, ethnic Catalans could not erect exclusionary social boundaries for the simple reason that this would have accentuated their demographic weakness. Thus, they opted to adopt an inclusionary approach that downplayed and overlooked differences as a means of maintaining their cultural dominance despite their demographic inferiority. Second, the region's lack of autonomy during the Franco period severely limited its capacities to actively shape and control immigrant integration processes and facilitate immigrant incorporation into Catalan society, thereby necessitating the adoption of an accommodating approach.

Due to these divergent interests and realities, the CIU project concurrently manifests both strong inclusionary and assimilatory tendencies that at times produce ambivalent and even contradictory outcomes. In a speech at the opening of an exhibition on historical immigration to Catalonia, Pujol described this dual approach. On the one hand, he emphasized the role played by immigrants in Catalonia's development as well as their contribution to it. On the other, however, he stressed the importance of cultural continuity and reproduction. "One of our greatest achievements as a country is that we have received and welcomed such a huge number of foreign people [including Spanish] who have also contributed and enriched us…. [This was achieved] Without losing our cohesion or undermining coexistence and [our] own identity while offering them great chances for promotion…. On more than one occasion, politicians, thinkers, and historians have talked about *the end of Catalonia.* But we have [continued] and will continue here as long as we don't accept a fundamental change in our path of identity" (Pujol 2001).

At another event, Pujol similarly addressed the balance between diversity and the maintenance of the essence of Catalan culture. Specifically, he claimed that a balance must be struck between cultural transformation and cultural continuity and that high levels of the former, which he dubbed "cultural miscegenation," would constitute the end of Catalonia. To illustrate his point, Pujol equated diversity to dissolving salt in water: while a moderate amount of salt can be dissolved in the water, there is a limit to the amount that can be dissolved without making the water bad and undrinkable (*El País* 2004). Using similar logic, Pujol suggested that "Catalonia is like a tree that has constantly been grafted by people and ideas for centuries. But we must make sure that the original trunk remains strong and solid" (*El Mundo* 2004).

This delicate balance between cultural preservation and diversity was also evident in interviews I conducted with several senior CIU members. While all the interviewees stressed the importance of pluralism and diversity within Catalan society, the tension between pluralism and cultural preservation was evident. For instance, as a former CIU member of parliament explained, "It is important that we accept and appreciate immigrants' cultural contributions to Catalonia…. But these alone are not enough. Immigrants also have to learn about *our* language and culture and become part of Catalan society and not remain outside of it…. We need to keep our society cohesive" (personal interview, April 27, 2012).[301]

During an interview with a member of the left-wing non-nationalist Catalanist party, *Iniciativa per Catalunya* (IC-V), he eloquently analyzed the CIU's approach toward integration: "Right-wing nationalists don't always say this out loud, but they believe in a conception of a real Catalan culture which immigrants, if they do not assimilate, threaten. So to save their symbolic world, the CIU wants immigrants to assimilate and does not really accept pluralism…. They don't want immigrants to disturb the strengthening of the fixed Catalan identity they believe in…. Even if they do agree to accept immigrant diversity, this is usually within a cultural hierarchy in which Catalan culture is placed at the top" (personal interview, June 26, 2012).

Varieties of Integration 2: The ERC's Inclusive National Project

The left-wing ERC's national project primarily promotes the secession of Catalonia from Spain and its transformation into an independent sovereign state. In contrast to the CIU's culturally defensive and assimilationist approach, the ERC does not support the preservation of a relatively fixed Catalan cultural identity. Instead, its members perceive the national project as a means of creating a new kind of society based on social, economic, and gender equality as well as respect for human rights. At the same time, its goal is releasing Catalonia from the long-term control of Spain (personal interviews with former and current ERC members: April 6, 2012; May 28, 2012). From this perspective, the ERC perceives immigrants as making an important contribution to the shaping of this new Catalan society. In fact, the only element of Catalan culture that the party's

[301] This interview, like other CIU texts, illustrates the strong *us versus them* discourse regarding immigrants that is pervasive among CIU members and supporters.

approach requires or demands that immigrants adopt is proficiency in the Catalan language,[302] which it perceives as *the* crucial element around which the integration process is structured.

Thus, the ERC strongly opposes the idea of cultural assimilation and the transformation of immigrants into old-stock Catalans. Instead, they primarily promote notions of inter-culturalism and multiculturalism. (For an elaboration of the ERC's approach to these concepts, see: The Parliament of Catalonia, Welfare Committee meeting, April 10, 2007.) From this perspective, the party's conception of integration is rooted in the right of both immigrants and native-born Catalans to preserve elements of their identity while concurrently developing an inter-cultural dialogue that allows people that hail from various ethnicities and cultures to share their experiences, traditions, and ideas. Furthermore, the party's national project emphasizes the construction of shared citizenship and develops a common public culture that employs the Catalan language. For the ERC, these processes engender the creation of a new type of Catalan nation through a collective and collaborative process of state building and community formation (personal interviews with former and current ERC members: April 6, 2012; May 28, 2012).

As the former head of the ERC's immigration department explained, "Our goal is not to maintain some kind of ideal Catalan culture…. I believe that the worst enemy of a strong Catalonia is a pure Catalonia…. To become Catalan, you don't need to become something other than what you already are. Instead, we all need to learn from each other and create a society with respect for difference and diversity…. We do emphasize the importance of the Catalan language and everybody learning and speaking Catalan, but language does not provide enough of a common denominator for a national project.... Instead, we need to create a new kind of bond

[302] From my interaction with ERC members, it appears that the Catalan language realizes three goals. First, it is the only element of Catalan identity that the ERC maintains. Second, it serves to differentiate Catalans from Spaniards. Third, knowledge of Catalan is deemed important for fostering mobility, increasing social interactions, and limiting exclusion (personal interviews with former and current ERC members: April 6, 2012; May 28, 2012).

among all Catalan citizens regardless of their origin. To achieve this, we need to stop talking about Catalans and immigrants. From our perspective, there are no immigrants, only Catalans…. Our goal is to convince new Catalans to join us in our project to create a stronger independent Catalonia" (personal interview, May 28, 2012).

Beyond the themes I have already discussed, the approach espoused in this statement suggests an additional difference between the approaches of the ERC and the CIU. While the latter differentiates between immigrants and Catalans, both with regard to international migrants and the old Spanish migrants, the ERC rejects such distinctions. Instead, it employs terms such as "New Catalans," "Catalans who were born outside the country," or simply "Catalan citizens" to refer to these populations. (See the discussion in Liebau-Kleiner 2009, 199).[303]

A similar approach to integration was adopted by an ERC member of parliament who stressed the need to create an inclusionary and equitable Catalan society: "We are not nationalists in the traditional sense. We want to promote sovereignty because we believe that Catalonia is limited by being part of Spain…. The amount of taxes Catalonia pays is larger than other communities and our autonomy to determine our own policies is limited".[304] As regards integration, he explained, "Esquerra follows a republican ideology but not a Jacobin one…. There are no Catalans or immigrants but citizens living in a society and we want to establish a low common denominator of being Catalan that will enable everyone to feel part of society" (personal interview April 6, 2012).[305]

---

[303] This approach began to change in 2008 following the creation of the Nous Catalans (new Catalans) organization under the auspices of CIU. This organization has primarily sought to foster immigrant acculturation and support for CIU.

[304] The issue of the transfer of tax money to Spain constitutes a cardinal bone of contention for the ERC (see: Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya 2003; 2006; 2010)

[305] While these statements appear compelling, the ERC interviewees discussed their vision of the national project in largely general terms, focusing primarily on values rather than on the concrete content around which this new identity would be built. Specifically, besides language, what is the glue that will bind this new Catalan society together? A review of the ERC's electoral platforms also offers little information in this respect. While these

Writing as the head of the Generalitat's immigration office, ERC member Adela Ros similarly emphasized the futility of attempting to reproduce old Catalan society through immigration. Instead, she emphasized the importance of boosting respect for ethnic, racial, and cultural diversity, reducing segregation, increasing mobility among marginalized groups, and building a unified national project that is not simply an extension of old approaches but rather a Catalan identity that is predicated on diversity and equality. "We need to consider the fact that Catalan society, language, and identity exist within a global world and now face the challenge of being attractive to a large number of diverse people…. Immigrants are neither the problem nor its perpetrators; instead, they are the solution" (Ros 2004).[306]

Varieties of Integration 3: The PSC – Between Ambivalence and Catalinization

In contrast to the other two groups discussed above, the PSC is not a nationalist party that seeks to alter the *status quo* between Catalonia and Spain. Instead, it is officially a Catalanist party, meaning that it emphasizes the strengthening or at least the preservation of the centrality of the Catalan language and culture in Catalonia – but within a federal Spanish framework. For instance, the party's 1999 electoral platform emphasized the crucial importance of Catalonia's national character and its expression through language, and politics. Furthermore, it stressed Catalonia's distinctiveness and its corresponding unique position within Spain (Partit Socialista de Catalunya 1999, 3; for a detailed analysis of its position, see Guibernau 2004).

platforms elaborate on a host of concrete policies that are intended to promote various aspects of the integration process such as labor market mobility, language acquisition, and equality, the contours of the national project they propose remain vague. (See: Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya 2003; 2006; 2010.)

[306] The last part of this statement corresponds with the ideas of the ERC members I interviewed. Three out of the four party functionaries I met with emphasized the party's goal of recruiting immigrants to support the ERC's national project. From their perspective, this could not be a matter of coercion as in Quebec, but they perceived the onus of convincing immigrants to support its national project to be on the party.

However, despite this official Catalanist stance, over the years – especially since the 1990s – it has adopted an ambivalent approach toward the national project. The PSC's stance regarding the nationalist issue can primarily be explained by two factors. First, the party's membership is highly diverse and includes Catalan nationalists, Spanish nationalists, and others who do not support the advancement of either national project. Second, as a result of historical circumstances, while the party's leadership is comprised primarily of ethnic Catalans, the majority of the party's voters have traditionally been Castilian-speakers who do not necessarily identify with Catalan nationalism. Thus, despite its official discourse, the party has traditionally taken a weak stance on the nationalist issue.

Instead, its national project has focused mainly on promoting a unified society, gender and social equality, the development of the Catalan language and culture, and the advancement of the working class (Partit Socialista de Catalunya 1999; 2003; 2006; 2010). At the same time, and in contrast to the ERC and the CIU, the PSC's approach rejects political approaches that are based on dichotomies between Catalonia and Spain, and downplays or marginalizes issues that lend themselves to these dynamics of inter-group competition (Guibernau 2004).

In consequence, with regard to immigration, the PSC has focused primarily on supporting immigrants as workers and encouraging social cohesion among all groups within Catalan society. With regard to culture and language, despite its formal Catalanist approach, it tends to downplay these issues and is not particularly concerned with the languages spoken by immigrants (Ribera Garijo 2012). In an interview with a former PSC member of parliament, she explained, "Our main goal is to help immigrants integrate into society…. Learning Catalan is important, but for most immigrants, finding a job and not being exploited is more important…. So this is our main concern" (personal interview, August 8, 2012). This statement is in line with PSC strategies regarding the mid-20th century migrants that focused on integration through labor unions and related to these individuals as workers rather than as immigrants.

As regards integration, the PSC's approach largely mirrors that of the ERC, with two important differences. First, despite its official Catalanist discourse, in practice the party does not strongly champion or emphasize the immigrants' linguistic integration into the Catalan language (Ribera Garijo 2012). Second, while the PSC encourages the perception of immigrants as citizens and workers, it does not seek to recruit immigrants to help transform Catalonia into an independent state. Instead, it focuses on pacifying such conflictual or adversarial elements within Catalan society in order to promote a cohesive society that "[a]llows immigrants to bring in their own values and ideas while still preserving certain elements of Catalan and Spanish identity" (personal interview with a former PSC member of parliament, August 8, 2012).

As a senior PSC administrator in the regional Barcelona government explained, "The socialist approach is inter-cultural…. We want to integrate immigrants into civil society by creating a dialogue among all parts of society…. However, while this idea is good on paper, it is difficult in reality because there is often not enough interaction…. It is important that immigrants understand both languages, but speaking one is enough…. We don't need to force them to speak one or the other…. We are also different from the CIU because they think that immigrants need to adapt to the *status quo* while we emphasize mutual dialogue" (personal interview, June 26, 2012).

Devising and Implementing Integration on the Ground

Following the discussion and analysis of these divergent approaches toward immigrants and their integration into Catalan society, it is also important for the purposes of this study to examine how and to what extent these approaches have been translated into concrete policies. In contrast to the cases of Quebec and Israel, where shifts in power have resulted in strongly divergent policies, the translation of patterns of intra-group competition into policies in Catalonia has been subtler for several reasons.

First, despite the profound differences among these groups' political positions regarding both the national project and the nature of immigrant integration, the boundaries between these political groups are more fluid than in Quebec or Israel. This is particularly evident from both the mobility of political actors among political groups and the relatively high level of heterogeneity of ideological positions within these groups. Second, due to the nature of the Catalan political landscape, no party has been able to form a majority government since 1999. Instead, they have formed coalitions along two non-overlapping political fault lines: (1) the left/right continuum with regard to socio-economic policies and the role of the state in society; (2) the nationalist/non-nationalist/anti-nationalist continuum with regard to Catalonia's position vis-à-vis Spain.

Thus, between 2003 and 2010, the PSC led a left-wing-based coalition together with the nationalist ERC and the non-nationalist IC-V. Similarly, between 2010 and 2012, the anti-Catalanist PPC supported the CIU government based on their shared socio-economic right-wing ideology. In contrast, despite their differences regarding economic issues and the role of the state, the right-wing CIU has maintained a coalition with the left-wing ERC based on their mutual support for Catalan independence since 2012. Thus, the emergence of these complex and contradictory political alliances has partially undermined the ability of the governing parties to develop and promote coherent integration programs that are directly shaped by the vision of the national project.

These caveats notwithstanding, I posit that the preferences discussed in the previous section still play an important role in shaping the particular policies and approaches that these parties have espoused. In order to explore these dynamics, I explore the broad policy programs that have been promoted by the various political groups with regard to immigrant integration. Second, I consider the nature and structure of the various civil society-based immigrant organizations that these parties have created. I argue that the manner in which these organizations are structured affords us a unique lens that enables us to better understand these groups' positions regarding immigrant integration and incorporation into Catalan society.

Immigration policies 1993-2009

As I mentioned above, due to Catalonia's mid-century experience with mass immigration in the context of limited regional autonomy and control as well as its precarious position as a minority nation within Spain, the CIU government was quick to identify the challenge of international immigration and design policies to deal with this perceived threat. Thus, in 1992, when immigration was still a marginal phenomenon, the CIU-led government created the first interdepartmental commission on immigration, which included members from eight government departments including: labor, education, culture, social services. The commission's mandate was to evaluate the challenges posed by international migration and propose solutions and policies that would promote immigrant integration. In 1993, following a year of deliberations, the commission published Catalonia's first comprehensive document on immigration, the *Pla*

Interdepartamental d'Immigració, which included 40 comprehensive action proposals designed to facilitate immigrant integration into Catalan society (Departament de Benestar Social 1993). In fact, not only was this report novel in the Catalan context, but it constituted the first attempt anywhere in Spain to develop a comprehensive political program dealing with the immigration issue in general and immigrant integration in particular (Calavita 2005).

While the CIU-sponsored program focused mainly on the concept of integration, in practice the report primarily promoted a process of acculturation or assimilation. According to this approach, immigrants are viewed as subjects that are expected to gradually adapt to and adopt the cultural and social practices of the majority culture, at the same time shedding or attenuating the cultural traits of their society of origin (Departament de Benestar Social 1993).

Thus, the plan emphasized and developed a host of procedures and strategies for promoting immigrant integration or assimilation into Catalan society, language, and the national project. In particular, it foregrounded the central role that learning Catalan and adopting Catalan culture played in the integration process. While it paid some attention and attributed some value to the cultural diversity generated by immigrants, it mainly espoused an assimilatory approach according to which immigrants are expected to ultimately shed their distinctiveness and Catalanize.

With regard to our primary interest in this study, namely, the Catalan national project, the document stated that the ultimate goal of the integration process was to "facilitate the necessary mechanisms for the integration of foreign immigrants into our society…. The objective of integration is for foreign immigrants to contribute to the process of national construction, to our national identity, and to the collective project of the national construction of Catalonia" (Departament de Benestar Social 1993, 67).

A close reading of the plan suggests that its general approach toward integration, or more accurately, assimilation, was significantly influenced and shaped, as was the CIU's approach more generally, by the integration philosophy developed by Pujol vis-à-vis Spanish immigrants several decades earlier (see: Pujol 1976). Specifically, it promoted a civic–territorial definition of belonging to the Catalan nation that required only that immigrants integrate into the Catalan language. In practice, however, this approach depicted immigrants' native cultural preferences and practices in a negative light and as something that had to be discarded and the adoption of Catalan culture as an opportunity for cultural enhancement and growth. From this perspective, the plan paid scant attention to immigrant agency or to the preferences of the immigrants themselves. Instead, the latter were largely perceived as malleable subjects who would inevitably assimilate into Catalan society (see the discussion of the Catalan approach to integration in Chapter 6).

In addition, the report positioned this new form of immigration in the context of the revised historical narratives that Pujol and his followers had devised during the 1960s and the 1970s. These narratives internalized immigration into the core of the Catalan national narrative and historical memory. As discussed in Chapter 6, this revised national narrative claimed that diverse immigration has been a constant in the history of Catalan society, which, in response, has maintained an inclusive and welcoming integrative-territorial approach toward immigrants for close to a millennium (Liebau-Kleiner 2009).

From a discursive perspective, three issues are evident. First, despite the claim that Catalonia has always been a land of immigration and that Catalan culture developed as a result of the contribution of diverse populations, this culture is largely described through a lens that depicts it in permanent and essential terms. Second, while the report describes how natural immigration is to Catalonia, it nonetheless portrays it as posing a threat to Catalan culture – a threat that needs to be dealt with. Finally, the report clearly distinguishes between *us* and *them,* or specifically between autochthonous populations and immigrants. Interestingly, this distinction is also employed in the report to refer to the former immigrants who settled in Catalonia during the 1950s and 1960s and who by this point had been residents of Catalonia for over 30 or 40 years.

The overall approach espoused in the report was summarized by Pujol himself who explained in a 1999 newspaper interview that "Catalonia has a great capacity for reception and integration, which has made people coming from the outside *fully identify* with our country and enabled them to rise both economically and socially. We have done this many times and we can also do it now" (Andreu, *El País*, 1999). Similarly, as a member of the CIU similarly explained in 1997, "We expect the immigrants to be sensitive to Catalan culture…, that they progressively integrate themselves…, into our customs, our language, the way things are done here" (cited in Ribas 2000, 147).

From an organizational perspective, the document proposed the creation of an interdepartmental commission that would coordinate the various policy measures to be promoted by the various departments and ministries in the Generalitat. Developing this coordination mechanism was deemed particularly important since the immigration issue was not centralized in one administrative unit but rather was dispersed across the competency areas of a host of units, frequently generating inefficiencies and confusion (Vicente 2013).

Despite its intentions of promoting integration, however, the plan had several crucial weaknesses that impeded this outcome. First, it did not link its provisions to the budgetary resources that were necessary for promoting its objectives. This emanated from an inherent contradiction within the CIU's political program, as described below: Despite its nationalist agenda, the party's right-wing fiscal approach resulted in a limited provision of resources to promote these policies. In fact, the shortfall in resources has habitually plagued the CIU's immigration programs and undermined its ability to ensure effective integration. Second, the report did not alter the administrative distribution of competencies regarding immigration, resulting in a complex and somewhat dysfunctional system. Third, its authors lacked the requisite political power to push for the implementation~~s~~ of its measures (Turrión and Pinyol Jiménez 2009).

In any case, due to the lack of a significant increase in migratory flows during the mid-1990s and the absence of designated resources, the implementation of these integration policies was delayed for several years. In fact, it was only in 1997 that the Generalitat actively begin to promote these new policies in regions with high concentrations of immigrants (Vicent 2013).

The situation described above changed dramatically in 2000. As a result of the substantial increase in immigration flows, the CIU government decided to develop a new immigration policy. Following a year of deliberations, a special interdepartmental committee on immigration published the *Pla Interdepartamental d'Immigració 2001-2004*. While the new plan was largely an extension of the 1993 plan, it sought to expand the previous one and develop what it defined as *the Catalan way of integration.*

As in the case of the 1993 plan, this document contains a dual discourse that frames immigration as a threat that needs to be dealt with, while depicting it as a phenomenon that is natural to Catalonia. In addition, the plan is largely ambivalent toward the balance between diversity and integration. While it strongly emphasizes the role that diversity has historically played in Catalonia by highlighting the contributions of various immigrant groups to Catalan society and culture, it concurrently stresses the fact that despite these migratory processes, the region has been able to maintain its own distinct identity (Departament de Benestar Social 2001). In addition, the plan generally appears to overemphasize the extent of integration that has taken place, particularly in the 20th century, as it largely overlooked the large residual pockets of non-integrated Castilian-speakers residing primarily in the working-class suburbs of Barcelona (see Chapter 6).

Sanjay (2014) offers two explanations for the emphasis that given to diversity in the plan, despite CIU's overall assimilatory preferences. First, he suggests that by emphasizing diversity CIU sought to differentiate itself from the Spanish PP whose leadership it had supported in Madrid between 1996-2000. By promoting a philosophy of integration that emphasized diversity and increased social rights, CIU sought to create, at least publically, the idea that Catalonia's vision of immigrant integration was distinct form Spain's in general and from that of the homogenizing PP in particular. Second, CIU created its own approach to integration instrumentally as a means of promoting its agenda of increasing Catalonia's autonomy within Spain.

While the plan officially proclaims Catalonia's opposition to the concept of assimilation, focusing instead on integration, it offers scant guidance as to how the latter – which fails to eradicate immigrants' prior identities but nevertheless enables Catalonia to maintain its core essence or its cultural *trunk* – is to be achieved. In an interview that took place two months after the plan was published, Pujol further championed this ambivalent approach. "The multicultural approach, some argue, would be devastating for Catalonia. We have always advocated commingling, but without losing our country's cohesion and the Catalan way of being and thinking" (*El País* 2001B).

Overall, the plan largely remained at an abstract, philosophical level, and there was insufficient discussion of the requisite concrete means for integrating diverse international immigrants into Catalan society. On the whole, as Barrero (2007) suggests, it constituted an ideational starting point from which specific policies were to be developed.

In contrast to the 1993 document, which paid little attention to the role of Catalan society in the integration process, the new plan emphasized the need to sensitize the indigenous population to the settlement of diverse immigrants. However, as with other parts of the program, these notions were not accompanied by specific instructions for inducing such sensitization. The plan was also vague with regard to the national project. In contrast to the first plan, which stressed the role migrants were expected to play in the construction of an autonomous Catalonia, the new plan hardly mentioned Catalan nationalism and failed to define the role immigrants were expected to play within it.

Besides its cultural approach, the plan perpetuated two of its predecessor's primary flaws. First, it did not offer any provisions for funding immigrant integration. Second, it maintained the dispersion of competencies concerning immigration across a host of ministries and departments, making it difficult to promote and implement effective policies. In response to these two weaknesses and the lack of a clear policy, the first Commissioner of Immigration in the Generalitat resigned only six months after the publication of the plan (*El País* 2002a).

In 2003, a large-scale shift took place in Catalonia's political landscape following the victory of the PSC over CIU that had controlled the Generalitat for 23 years. In the aftermath of the election, the PSC created a tripartite left-wing coalition together with ERC and IC-V. While the new coalition partially continued to promote and execute the CIU's immigration plan, it concurrently promoted several changes within Catalonia's approach to integration. These changes became particularly evident in the immigration plan, *Pla de Ciutadania i Immigració 2005–2008,* that the new government published in 2005 (Departament de Benestar Social 2005).

The new plan espoused several new elements that illustrate both the divergent and convergent elements that are present within the ERC's and PSC's visions of the national project. First, the plan promoted a significantly less assimilatory discourse than previous CIU plans had. Specifically, it reduced the minimal *requirements* for being considered Catalan. For this purpose, the emphasis on acculturation was largely replaced with a focus on Catalan citizenship that is decoupled from the adoption of Catalan culture. Instead, the sole requirement that immigrant had to fulfill in order to be considered Catalan was that they settle permanently and register with their municipality (regardless of their legal status).

This focus on citizenship and inclusion within Catalan society, while requiring minimal conditions membership, illustrates ERC's and PSC's overall approach toward immigration and integration. Specifically, the two parties sought to replace assimilation with a more inclusionary-political approach that would be the foundation of a new, more diverse, and inclusive Catalan society. However, despite this convergence, the two parties still diverged with regard to the role of Catalan language acquisition[307] and the ultimate goal of citizenship, independence for ERC, or remaining part of a federal Spain in the case of the PSC (personal interviews with senior official in the Barcelona Regional government June 29, 2012 and with former head of the ERC's Immigration office, June 14, 2012).[308]

Second, due to the two parties' left wing social-democratic approach, the plan gives particular emphasis to immigrants' status as workers whose rights require vigilant protection. In

---

[307] Interestingly the plan grants free classes in both Catalan and Spanish. This bi-lingual approach is closer to the PSC's preference than that of the ERC that strongly espouses the sole use of Catalan.

[308] This shift in emphasis is also evident in the name of the Plan that changed from the Interdepartmental Plan for Immigration, to The Plan for Citizenship and Immigration.

particular, the plan offers both programs that promote the protection of immigrant workers from exploitation and the enhancement of their integration into the Catalan labor market through various classes and training programs. Additionally, the plan created programs that sought to facilitate increased diversity and migrant mobility within Catalan firms and the public sector.

In this case too, while the two parties converged with regard to the overall promotion of immigrant workers' rights their objective slightly diverged. Specifically, while ERC perceived the support for immigrants in the labor market as a way of recruiting immigrants into their national project, the PSC emphasized immigrants as workers to relegate issues concerning inter-group competition between Catalonia and Spain to a more minor role.

Third, in contrast to the CIU's plans that made little budgetary provisions to fund the various integration and acculturation programs that they proposed, the new plan included a detailed provision of budgetary allocations. Finally, the new plan largely approached integration as a bi-directional inter-cultural process and not as a unidirectional assimilatory one as had largely been the case in the two CIU plans. To this end, the plan promoted the creation multiple programs that sought to desensitize the Catalan population to cultural diversity and difference and to foster interaction between Catalan natives and immigrants (see also: Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya 2006; 2010).

Interestingly, CIU's move to the opposition and the publication of the new plan on citizenship and immigration led it to promote its assimilatory preferences more explicitly (Sanjay 2014). For instance, during the 2006 electoral campaign the party promoted a proposed requirement that immigrants be required to sign integration contracts (ibid). Similarly, the party called for the creation of a point system that would link between immigrants' access to various rights and their specific level of integration in order to incentivize them to integrate (Cedo and

Zanon 2006; *El Mundo* 2006). In addition, CIU leaders increasingly employed discourse that emphasized the requirement that immigrants integrate into Catalan society, claiming with respect to those who didn't that "Catalonia is not suitable for everyone" (*El Pais* 2007).[309]

This shift to a more explicit assimilatory discourse appears to have emanated from two factors. First, being in opposition the CIU was better positioned to directly promote its assimilatory preferences particularly in the context of the highly inclusionary and anti-assimilatory approaches that were being promoted by the parties in the ruling coalition. Second, in order to regain control over the Generalitat, CIU sought to attain the support of immigration skeptics who opposed the new integration policies that were being promoted by the tripartite government.

To conclude, while the policies that have been promoted by these various administrations do not reflect the strong swings that have been observable in Quebec and Israel, it is evident that these policies do reflect and have been shaped by these parties' particular visions of the national project. The policies promoted by the CIU, have largely, though not exclusively, reflected its cultural-essentialist approach toward integration. Specifically it has promoted policies that seek to maintain many features of a supposedly constant Catalan culture, in relation to which immigrants are permitted to introduce some level of diversity but are primarily expected to assimilate.

The ERC and PSC, on the other hand, have focused on immigrants as citizens of Catalonia and as workers. Following their more post-national perception of membership, the policies they have promoted have sought to decouple the adoption of Catalan culture from membership in society. While the two parties developed a unified policy as coalition partners,

[309] Similarly a CIU spokesperson stated "There must be limits on the entrance of immigrants into Catalonia because if not Catalonia will dissolve as a society." (*El Pais* 2007)

they still differed on several issues. First, although they both rejected an essentialist approach regarding Catalan culture and sought a more pluralist bi-cultural or multicultural one instead, the ERC still maintained a strong emphasis on the Catalan language and identity that would serve as the cornerstone of Catalonia's new public culture.

While preserving that Catalan language was officially a PSC goal as well, in practice the party largely promotes a laissez faire approach that sought to enable immigrants to adopt the language of their choice (Ribera Garijo 2012). This is both due to their ambiguous position toward the Spanish-Catalan issue and fear of alienating non-integrated Castilian speakers. Second, while both parties have promoted the creation of new more diverse Catalan culture and approach to citizenship, they have done so out of different motivations. While the PSC believes that it will lead to a shift away from old modalities of Catalan-Spanish inter-group dynamics, ERC believes that this approach will constitute the baseline for its sovereigntist approach that views immigrants as important actors in achieving a shaping the character of a future independent Catalonia (personal interviews with senior official in the Barcelona Regional government June 29, 2012 and with former head of the ERC's Immigration office, June 14, 2012).

Party-Sponsored Immigrant Associations and Integration

As discussed in Chapter 6, due to the lack of autonomous political power during the period of mass migration in the 1950s and 1960s, civil society organizations such as unions played a cardinal role in the process of integrating immigrants into Catalan society and forging ties between immigrants and natives. In line with this tradition of immigrant associations, the three political parties examined in this chapter have developed substantial civil society networks that seek both to integrate immigrants and, in some cases, to recruit them to support the parties' national projects. This section briefly explores these networks and examines the degree to which the integration approaches discussed above are reflected in the workings of these associations. Specifically, I posit that the structure and goals of these association networks strongly reflect the respective parties' positions toward immigrant integration.

Since the 1990s, both the PSC and the CIU have developed and funded a complex system of immigrant organizations and networks. While the majority of these organizations are based on country of origin (Senegal, Pakistan, Latin American countries), others are based on other common denominators such as region of settlement or profession.

In general, the CIU sponsored organizations, in line with the party's stance regarding integration, tend to focus primarily on cultural and linguistic issues. For instance, when I attempted to set up an interview with one of these associations, I was surprised that despite the fact that I had initially communicated with its representative in Castilian, he insisted on responding in broken Catalan. When I asked him why he was adamant that our email and phone interaction take place in Catalan, he explained that he was required to conduct all official communication in Catalan despite being more proficient in Castilian (personal interview with the head of an immigrant association, May 29, 2012).

Interestingly, while the association at hand primarily assists highly disadvantaged workers from one of the poorest countries in the world, who primarily require assistance and support in the labor market, its central mission focuses on the promotion of their cultural integration (personal interview with the head of an immigrant association, May 29, 2012). He explained that due to the organization's primary cultural focus, it has sparked little interest among the community members, who are reluctant to join the association or participate in its activities. I received a similar response from a second CIU affiliated association I visited. In this case, the organization representative explained, “We are required to provide Catalan cultural services because of our funding, but most people do not want to participate…. They are mainly concerned about economic survival…. The issue of Catalan or Spanish is not important to them” (personal interview with an immigrant association organizer, July 2, 2012).

Over and above the main focus on issues of culture and language, the interviewees suggested that these organizations did not provide sufficient means for immigrants to integrate into Catalan society. Specifically, as opposed to the associations that fostered immigrant integration during the 1960s and 1970s, these organizations do not promote interactions between immigrants and native Catalans. “Despite the fact that we feel that Catalan people generally have a positive attitude toward us, our organization is not meant to create interactions between them and our community” (personal interview with an immigrant association organizer, July 2, 2012).

The above observations seem to indicate that the CIU affiliated immigrant associations seek primarily to foster immigrant acculturation and expand immigrants’ knowledge regarding Catalonia; however, they do so in manner that partially secludes immigrants from native society. This dynamic seems to correspond with the CIU’s overall ambivalent or uni-directional assimilatory approach toward immigrant integration that seeks to preserve Catalan culture and society by failing to foster a meaningful intercultural dialogue between immigrants and natives.

As in the case of the CIU, the PSC has also maintians a network of organizations that receive funding from the party. These associations, like the CIU-suppoerted counterparts, also appear to largely reflect the PSC’s integration preferences and national project. For instance, in contrast to the CIU organizations, those belonging to the PSC pay scant attention to the Catalan language and culture. In fact, out of the three interviews I conducted with association leaders, only one spoke Catalan fluently.

During my visits to PSC associations, I discovered that their primary emphasis concerns immigrant as workers and their respective rights rather than on Catalan culture or language. Specifically, as one association leader explained "We are mainly an association that helps our community members with issues of discrimination, fair pay, and assistance in finding jobs…. We are not very interested in language issues…. All our members obviously speak Spanish; some speak Catalan as well, but this is not something we are concerned about" (personal interview with association leader in Barcelona, May 16, 2012).

While the CIU and PSC's immigrant associations differ significantly in their focus and agenda, they appear to share one common feature: neither network of associations promotes substantial interaction between natives and immigrants. Instead, each association network appears to primarily emphasize the interests of the party that funds it. In the case of the CIU, these are culture and assimilation, while in the case of the PSC, the focus shifts from questions concerning the use of Catalan or Spanish toward issues regarding workers' rights. From this perspective, it appears that these organizations are largely set up as spaces for socialization and the promotion of the agendas of the respective political groups that fund them rather than as spaces that encourage substantial integration and intercultural dialogue.

While following the discussion above it is not surprising that the CIU sponsored associations offer few opportunities for interactions with native populations, I was puzzled by this outcome in the case of the PSC associations. In an interview I conducted with a senior PSC representative in the Barcelona regional government she explained, "We know this is a problem. But we prefer to organize immigrants according to their ethnic origin than not organize them at all. We see this as a first step. As a second step we plan to create more interaction with the broader society and between these organizations themselves…. But we understand that real integration requires more interactions and dialogue between old and new Catlans." (personal interview, June 29, 2012).

While exploring immigrant associations, I was initially surprised by the absence of immigrant associations that are sponsored by or affiliated with the ERC. However, during an interview with the former head of the ERC's immigration office I discovered that ERC opposes the very idea of separate immigrant associations. "We believe that creating targeted immigrant associations is the wrong approach…. We don't see them as immigrants but as citizens of Catalonia. For this reason we focus on integrating immigrants into our existing associations and organizations and not on separating them…. This also allows us to convince them to support our political project for the future of Catalonia" (personal interview, June 14, 2012).

Thus, in contrast to CIU and PSC's immigrant associations that create separated and even secluded enclaves for immigrants, ERC promotes a more integrative approach in which immigrants are incorporated into pre-existing civil society organizations. While I was unable to measure the level of immigrant participation in these associations, it appears that the goals of this approach are twofold. First, it seeks to eliminate the differentiation between immigrants and natives and to promote interaction and dialogue between these groups on the basis of mutual Catalan citizenship. Second, it seeks to promote the socialization of immigrant into the ERC's national project since the majority of the associations that are affiliated with the party promote issues that are related to its national project such as Catalan independence and the Catalan language.

To conclude, this brief examination of the structure of politically sponsored immigrant associations offers additional support for the analysis presented above. First, in the case of CIU, associational activities have primarily promoted cultural assimilation while their seclusion exemplifies the party's ambivalent approach toward substantial immigrant incorporation and intercultural dialogue. Second, the PSC's associations emphasize immigrants as workers, which emulates the party's policies toward the Spanish immigrants of the past. By doing so the PSC seeks to at least partially mute or weaken the salience of issues that are related to language or intergroup competition as it has little to contribute on this front. Finally, the ERC seeks to directly integrate immigrants into existing associations as a means of promoting both a unified form of membership in Catalan society and to recruit immigrant support for the movement and its particular vision of the national project.

Ambivalent Inclusion or Xenophobia?

Despite Catalonia's overall integrative approach toward immigration, or perhaps due to it, the region has experienced higher levels of anti-immigrant mobilization than any other region in Spain, many of which have promoted less inclusive policies toward immigration than Catalonia has. In fact, Catalonia has been home to the only (partially) successful anti immigrant movement in Spain, Plataforma per Catalunya (PxC), which espouses anti-immigrant and particularly anti-Muslim discourses and policies.

This section will briefly explore the backlash around immigration in Catalonia and its relation to the dynamics of the nation project(s). Specifically, I posit that as in the case of Quebec immigrant inclusion has engendered instances of social conflict. These have been partially due to the tensions between the nationalist goals and diversity and the gap between the abstract perception of immigration and the concrete realities that are engendered by immigrant settlement.

However, in this respect, Catalonia diverges from Quebec in two ways. First, while in Quebec processes of immigrant integration have concurrently engendered what I have defined as ambivalent inclusion, in Catalonia ambivalent inclusion has at times take the shape of outright xenophobia. A second difference between the cases of Catalonia and Quebec emanates from the fact that in the former, fear from and hostility toward immigrants have not solely been contained within the majority group that fears that immigrants could potentially undermine the distinct national project or engender what Gagnon and Iacovino (2007) have defined as *existential suicide*.[310] Instead, the Catalan case, these dynamics have emerged both among native Catalan speakers and even more so among non-integrated Spanish speakers; at times creating a partial unity at the fringes of these two otherwise diametrically opposed groups.

As discussed above, despite the overall inclusionary approach, various Catalan political actors, from both the left and the right, have made exclusionary statements with regard to immigrant presence. In particular, these nationalist actors have feared that despite Catalonia's proactive and accommodating approach toward immigrants and the diversity they introduce, the latter would ultimately transform Catalan speakers into a minority within Catalonia and mark the end of the Catalan national project (Guibernau 2004; Libeau-Kleiner 2009; Puigverd 2011; Pujol 2006). Although these kinds of statements have been more common and less of a taboo in Catalonia than in Quebec, they have largely been sporadic and have not become a central feature within Catalan nationalist political discourse or policy. In fact in 2000 the parliament passed a

[310] In Quebec, the Anglophone minority has traditionally been pro-immigrant and actively sought to encourage immigrants to join Quebec's English speaking community.

resolution in which parties pledged not to employ xenophobic discourse as a means garnering electoral support (Parliament of Catalonia, plenary session, October 5, 2000).

Beyond discourse, however, various Catalonian municipalities have implemented exclusionary policies toward immigrants. For instance, in 2010 the town of Lleida, under the leadership of the PSC, imposed a ban on wearing a Muslim Burka in public spaces, claiming that the ban was intended to promote gender equality (Visa 2010). That same year, the CIU affiliated Catalan nationalist mayor of the city of Vic declared that he would prohibit the municipal census registration (padron) of undocumented immigrants despite the fact that the law required the city to do so. The measure, which the mayor claimed to have implemented in order to "save the city," received a muted response from PSC and ERC representatives who opposed the policy but elected to remain part of the city's governing coalition (Clota and Blanchar 2010; Zapata-Barrero and Carbonero 2014).[311]

The most prominent and long-lasting manifestation of xenophobia in Catalonia has been the emergence and relative success of the anti-immigrant radical right PxC party. This party that first emerged in the 2003 municipal Catalan elections was successful in obtaining five seats in five Catalan towns and cities (one in each). Despite its failure to gain any seats in the 2006 and 2010 Catalan parliamentary elections, PxC was able to significantly expand its power in both the 2007 and 2011 municipal elections in which it obtained 17 and 67 municipal council seats respectively.

PxC was formed by the former pro-Francoist politician Josep Anglada and is a single issue party that espouses a strong anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim agenda. Its slogan, *the first in our home,* reflects its anti-immigrant broader approach. The party has been involved in

[311] For and in-depth analysis of recent Xenophobic discourses and policies in Catalonia see: Zapata-Barrero and Carbonero 2014

campaigns against the construction of mosques and various other anti-immigrant activities. While the party's formal political platform solely espouses the deportation of undocumented immigrants and immigrants who have committed crimes, in public statements Anglada has espoused the deportation of all North African immigrants, whom he has described as constituting a separate species and an overall threat to both public order and health (Storbart 2013). In it 2012 electoral platform, PxC warned of the many dangers immigration Muslim poses, "Massive Islamic immigration to Catalonia jeopardizes our identity…,[our] personal and collective freedom…,the Christian religion, our language, and popular traditions" (Plataforma per Catalunya 2012; also see: Zapata-Barrero and Carbonero 2014)

Despite the fact that the party has assumed a marginal role within the domestic politics of Catalonia since mainstream parties have largely excluded it from governing coalitions, it constitutes an intriguing phenomena. This is due to three factors. First, PXC is unique within the Spanish political sphere since the latter has not experienced the electoral or popular success for any other radical right or anti-immigrant parties. Second, PxC's success in Catalonia is particularly intriguing due to the fundamental and historical inclusionary tendencies that exist within the Catalan national movement and the failure of xenophobia in the past to take hold (Conversi 1997; McRobers 2001; Shafir 1995). Third, despite its marginalization, PxC has exerted a broader political influence as its tactics have inspired similar campaigns by PP candidates both in Catalonia and other parts of Spain and have influenced discourse around immigration within Catalonia (Noguer 2011; Zapata-Barrero and Carbonero 2014).

Thus, indentifying the causes for the PxC's relative success can offer us a better understanding of both the dynamics of xenophobia in Catalonia and the relationship between immigration and the national project(s) more broadly. Specifically, I posit the PxC's success is related to three factors. (1) The party's general ambivalence or fuzzy position vis-à-vis the Catalonia-Spain cleavage; (2) The perceived economic and social threat immigrants engender among marginalized Castilian speakers. (3) The perceived cultural threat immigrants engender among native Catalan speakers.

The primary key to the party's success is that it has been able to maintain a fuzzy position vis-à-vis the Catalonia-Spain political divide. In fact, my interviewees suggested highly conflicting interpretations of the party's position with some claiming it is primarily a Catalanist party while others suggesting that it is a Spanish nationalist one. In fact some scholars suggest that the PxC primarily seeks to replace the Catalonia-Spain cleavage with an autochthonous-immigrant one instead (Hernandez-Carr 2011; Stobart 2013).

The party has primarily been successful in maintaining its ambivalent position toward the national question by concurrently promoting agendas on both sides of this debate. On the one hand, the party uses a Catalan name, the Catalan flag, and mobilized in support of the 2006 statute of autonomy. However, on the other, many of its leaders are Spanish nationalists, and some have participated in demonstrations and movements that are opposed Catalan nationalism. In fact, Anglada himself was a member of the now defunct Franco-inspired Spanish centralist Fuerza Nueva party. As a former PxC member explained "He [Anglada] is in favor of the Statute in Vic, while he is a Spanish centralist nationalist in Madrid" (Myriam Muñoz in Rius-Sant 2011, 225). This ambiguous approach, which is also shared by the PSC, has been key in enabling the PxC to concurrently recruit both Catalan nationalist and Castilian speakers to support to party (interview with Catalan public intellectual, August 2, 2015).

A second factor that has promoted the PxC's relative success has been the support it has gained among certain groups within the Castilian speaking population, who have not integrated into Catalan society. In fact, a study that examined electoral support for the PxC found that a significant proportion of the PxC's voters are Castilian speakers who formerly supported the PSC (Prados-Pardo and Molins 2009). This finding is consistent with interviews I conducted with PSC politicians. For instance a former PSC member of parliament explained, "Recent studies have shown that we have lost votes to PxC. I believe that this is the result of the economic crisis and increasing feelings of marginalization within these groups…. We have not figured out how to confront this problem but we know that it is real… This is a complicated issue because it is related to emotional and not rational factors" (personal interview, May 29, 2012). As a former CIU councilman in a town with PxC councilors explained, "The Spanish immigrants see themselves as threatened both by Catalan nationalism and the immigrants who are becoming more numerous and visible in their neighborhoods…. Most of them don't support PxC but some are attracted to these ideologies as a solution to their problems" (personal interview, June 1, 2012).

A third, but more minor factor, has been the support of Catalan nationalists (Prados-Prado and Molins 2009). Specifically a small proportion of Catalan nationalists have been inspired by ideologies that perceive immigrants as an existential threat to the survival of the Catalan national project and in response have shifted their support to PxC. While as discussed above discourses concerning the *immigrant threat* have been employed by mainstream Catalan nationalists, these actors have rarely pursued explicit exclusionary policies toward immigrant; to the contrary, as discussed above, despite such statements they have often promoted inclusionary or assimilatory policies toward immigrants. Thus, as a result of such anxieties, a relatively small number of Catalan nationalists have supported the PxC (interview with Catalan public intellectual, August 2, 2015).

To conclude, while this section only offered a brief analysis of immigration backlash in Catalonia, several conclusions can be drawn. First, despite its relatively minor role it has assumed in Catalonia, in contrast to the wide scale debate on reasonable accommodation and immigrant integration in Quebec, Catalonia has experienced significantly more explicitly xenophobic political discourse and activity than Quebec has. This is a particularly interesting outcome since historically Catalan nationalism has maintained a more favorable approach to immigration than Quebec nationalism has.

While Catalonia has experienced exclusionary discourses and mobilization that have emanated from the gap between immigrants' abstract role in the national project and the concrete realities that their settlement engenders, it appears evident that in Catalonia there are additional complexities that shape these outcomes. Former Spanish immigrants who concurrently feel marginalized within Catalonia due to these national projects and the increasing immigrant presence in their neighborhoods have also supported the xenophobic agendas that have been promoted by the PxC. Interestingly due to PxC's fuzzy stance on the Catalonia-Spain issue, the party has been able to engender an odd bedfellows coalition between these two extremes within Catalonia that would have not been likely to converge under most circumstances.

Conclusions

This section has explored the relationship between the ongoing dynamics of competitive national project(s), both vis-à-vis Spain and between competing Catalanist groups, and the settlement of immigrants in Catalonia. Specifically, I have argued that, as in the previous two cases that are examined in this study, the case of Catalonia exemplifies the profound and complex relationship between these two processes. As I discussed at length in Chapter 1, Catalonia represents the hardest case for my theory due to the fact that it lacks the significant autonomous powers over immigration that are held by both Israel and Quebec.

My findings demonstrate that, in contrast to the Catalan national narrative that asserts that Catalonia's tradition of and approach to migrant integration dates back over 1000 years, Catalonia's contemporary inclusive approach has largely been shaped over the last century. Specifically, the evidence suggests that in contrast to historical forms immigration that took place sporadically and included many migrants who either spoke or understood Catalan, contemporary immigration has constituted a substantially more complex phenomenon.

Following the development and crystallization of the Catalan national movement in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Catalan elites became increasingly aware of the impact immigration could have on their community. These processes became particularly evident during the 1920s when under the rule of Primo de Rivera Catalonia was denied any form of autonomous control that would have enabled it to effectively integrate the large number if Castilian speaking migrants who settled in the region.

Although during 1920s and 1930s a nascent Catalan approach to immigration emerged, the more developed approach took shape during the 1950s and the 1960s when Catalonia, who again under Franco was denied any form of autonomy, faced unprecedented waves of immigration from Southern Spain. During this period, Catalan elites under the informal leadership of Jordi Pujol increasingly realized that if immigration is not managed adequately it could potentially contribute to the transformation of native Catalan speakers into a minority within their own territory. While Pujol lacked any political authority to effectively promote immigrant integration policies, he and other elites actively developed and disseminated ideas that would constitute the foundation of a Catalan philosophy on immigrant integration. This approach primarily promoted a civic-territorial and linguistic definition of being Catalan that enabled any person who lived in Catalonia and spoke the language to be considered Catalan (Conversi 1997; Pujol 1976).

Despite this inclusionary civic approach, as I discussed above, Pujol's integration philosophy was based on a combination of both inclusive and negative perceptions of these Castilian immigrants. Specifically, Pujol believed that immigrants want to and can become part of the Catalan nation; however, this assumption was largely based on feelings of ethnic superiority that perceived Catalanization as strongly benefiting immigrants or as a step up from their previous and largely empty, uprooted existence. In addition, Pujol's inclusionary approach was also informed by his realization that the exclusion of immigrants could augment the Spanish-Catalan divide within Catalonia, which could potentially put Catalan speakers in a precarious demographic position due to the fact that, together with their descendents, Spanish speaking immigrants constituted almost half of the population. For this reason, he sought to integrate these immigrants without engendering linguistic based separation between immigrants and locals, as had occurred in Quebec. In fact, his approach denied or overlooked the existence of significant pockets of non-integrated Castilian speakers within Catalonia, some of which still persist today.

The restoration of Spanish democracy in the late 1970s, however, enabled Catalonia to reassert its autonomous political control and created space for its national project(s) to reemerge. Since during the late 70s and early 80s there was very little immigration into Catalonia, the regional elites primarily focused on the re-Catalanization, or linguistic normalization, of both Castilian immigrants and native Catalan speakers. These policies were largely intended to promote the use of Catalan across society and reverse the impact that almost four decades of anti-Catalan policies had produced.

In recent years, Catalonia has again faced massive waves of international immigration that began in the 1990s and dramatically increased during the early 2000s as over 1.6 million immigrants settled in the region. However, in contrast to the previous migratory waves in the middle of the last century, now Catalonia had some autonomous control. Catalonia used this political autonomy and took advantage of the absence of clearly defined Spanish policies on immigration in order to promote a proactive approach toward immigrant integration. In fact, Catalonia was quick to realize the profound implications that this mass wave of immigration could have on Catalan society and its distinct identity. As a consequence, the Generalitat, was the first political body in Spain to develop a comprehensive plan concerning immigrant integration.

Furthermore, beginning in the late 1990s, all Catalan parties, with the exception of the pro-Spanish PP, engaged in a struggle to expand the region's autonomous power over immigration and integration policies. While Spain was unwilling to devolve broader powers over immigration policy per-se, by 2006 Catalonia was able to significantly increase and codify its powers over immigrant integration and reception.

As in Quebec, groups espoused divergent immigration policies that were based on their particular visions of the national project. Using evidence from interviews, party programs, policy documents, newspapers, and by exploring the nature, structure, and goals of party based immigrant associations I have argued that the CIU, ERC, and PSC have each promoted a distinct approach to immigrant integration that is intricately connected to their vision of the national project.

Pujol's CIU largely promoted a national project that was based on the idea of cultural preservation. As a result, despite the fact that the program officially promoted integration, in practice it was more closely related to assimilation with limited role for cultural pluralism. In contrast, the ERC's national project sought to de-ethnicize the Catalan national project and transform it into a pluralist and cultural project that promotes independence from Spain. This approach's only requirement for membership is the use of the Catalan language. As a result, ERC has largely promoted a pluralist and integrative approach that seeks to facilitate linguistic integration, intercultural dialogue, and social justice.

Finally, the PSC's national project is primarily based on enhancing Catalonia's autonomy within Spain as a means of reducing or eliminating dynamics of inter-group competition as the party has little to contribute on this front. Thus, the PSC's position toward integration is similar to that of the ERC with three main differences. First, it does not promote the idea of Catalan independence. Second, it has taken a less decisive stand on the language issue as a means of downplaying the Catalan/Spanish divide and not alienating potential voters, since the majority of its supporters are native Castilian speakers. Third, as it did during the 20th century, the party approach to integration primarily emphasizes the role of immigrants as workers.

Conclusions: Conceptualizing Immigration in Spaces of Contention

In the preceding chapters have I explored the relationship between intergroup competition and elite preferences toward immigration and incorporation in polities that I have defined as *spaces of contention*. These contentious spaces constitute complex social and political environments of intergroup competition, in which divergent autochthonous groups compete over defining the ideational and institutional nature of the polity. These competing agendas, which I define as *national projects*, influence policy areas that are commonly perceived to be directly related to these competitive dynamics, such as language, resource allocation, national symbols, and education. I argue that additionally, these competitive visions of the national project spill over into a host of other key issue areas. The policies examined here are those related to immigration and societal incorporation of immigrants. My aim has been to explain how competition over the national project has shaped these policies.

Chapter 1 demonstrated that the existing literature on the politics of immigration has largely overlooked this relationship. Most scholarly works examine intergroup competition and immigration as discrete phenomena (Kymlicka 2001). Scholars have analyzed the causes and dynamics of immigration and incorporation policies as if they take place within the context of cohesive national polities (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). Therefore, they have paid little attention to the interplay between these two processes.

In fact, many of these studies carry an embedded assumption that immigrant-receiving societies have maintained significant levels of national integration prior to immigration. Thus, they primarily perceive immigrants as the causes of social disruption and conflict in host societies (Dancygier 2012; Carter 2005). However, as is evident from cases such as Israel, Cyprus, Scotland, Belgium, Lebanon, Catalonia, and the Basque country, this is oftentimes not the case.

Due to the assumption of social cohesion, these approaches have looked to economic, cultural, societal, and security factors to explain particular preferences and outcomes vis-à-vis immigration. While these variables offer important analytical and conceptual tools for understanding the formation of immigration policies, I posit that the type societies that I have classified as constituting spaces of contention require additional theoretical, analytical, and empirical consideration. Specifically, the analysis of Israel, Quebec, and Catalonia demonstrates the important role that both intergroup and intragroup competition over the national project play in shaping immigration policy outcomes in these polities.

The role of Inter-group Competition

Inter-group competition has been important in two mutually constitutive ways. First, elites have primarily interpreted immigration through the lens of intergroup competition. In fact, these competitive dynamics or conflicts have served as important frameworks through which a host of issue areas are interpreted and negotiated. This has been particularly evident in the role that demographic questions and rationale concerning the relative size of various autochthonous groups have played in all three cases.

Specifically, in contrast to other types of polities, dominant elites in contentious spaces do not primarily interpret these demographic issues in terms of native populations versus immigrants. Instead, they primarily interpret them in terms of the impact that the ingress of immigrants can potentially have on the numerical balance among the various autochthonous groups. For this reason there is a strong emphasis not only on *whether* immigrants will integrate but into *which* groups they will integrate.

Second, the elites of dominant autochthonous groups in contentious spaces often devise and promote immigration and incorporation policies instrumentally, as a means of bolstering their position within the broader context of intergroup conflict. From this perspective the entrance of international migrants is not solely perceived as engendering an additional level social of political complexity or demographic threat Instead, elites may see immigration as offering an opportunity for enhancing their group's position in the competition over the national project.

As the cases of Quebec, Catalonia, and Israel demonstrate, such instrumental use of immigration does not pre-determine the specific nature of these policies. For instance, in the cases of Quebec and Catalonia, nationalist elites have instrumentally sought to integrate immigrants into the heart of their respective national collectives. In contrast, in Israel, while intergroup competition contributed to the large-scale recruitment of international labor immigrants, inter-group competition also engendered the social and political exclusion of these immigrants.

An additional instance of instrumental use of immigration is evident in Quebec's and Catalonia's use of large immigration flows to bolster their demands in for greater autonomy from Canada and Spain. They have also used immigration to enhance their state-like capacities. To this end, Catalonia and Quebec have utilized the immigration issue to enhance their international visibility by creating offices abroad (see Chapters 4,5, and 7). Thus, both polities have seen the international immigration as constituting a golden opportunity for demanding and promoting the expansion of their autonomy both in relation to immigration and more broadly.

Similarly, immigrant recruitment and integration (or marginalization) have oftentimes been instrumentally shaped by demographic strategies. For instance, in Israel, the desire to strengthen the Zionist nationalist project has led the state, at different points in time, to both recruit and exclude Palestinian commuter migrants from the Israeli labor market. Similarly, the mass recruitment of international labor migrants during the 1990s was at least initially designed to weaken the Palestinian population in the occupied territories and to promote the Israeli government's goal of increasing separation between the two groups without engendering significant labor market disruptions.

In Quebec, following the Quiet Revolution the provincial government increasingly sought to gain control over immigration as a means of transforming it from a phenomenon that threatened to undermine Francophone society to one that bolstered it instead. Prior to the 1960s Francophone society largely rejected immigrants, even those who wanted to integrate, due to fears that their incorporation would alter the foundation of that society. However, due to the dramatic increase in the rates of post-war Allophone immigration, this position became increasingly untenable. Specifically, the rise of new nationalist elites engendered space for new ideas to emerge that reconciled between the acceptance of migrants and the promotion of the national project. In fact, these new ideas conceptualized immigrants as a force that could help reverse Francophones' declining demographic position both within Quebec and in Canada.

These new elites sought to gain control over immigrant selection so that they could recruit immigrants who could either speak French or other Romance languages, or, at least, were not native English speakers. These immigrants were deemed more likely to integrate in Francophone and not Anglophone society. One outcome of these policies was the recruitment of large numbers of French speakers from developing countries, many of whom did not have skills that the province's labor market required (DeVoretz and Pivneneko 2008).

The privileging of immigrant's ethnic identity is evident in the cases of Catalonia and Israel as well. In Catalonia, at least initially, elites sought to promote the recruitment of non-Castilian speaking immigrants, or specifically non-Latin Americans, since they believed that native Spanish speakers would be less likely to learn Catalan and integrate into Catalan society (Calavita 2005). Similarly, as Lustick (1999) and others have pointed out (see: Bartram 2011; Cohen 2006), while Israel has primarily sought to promote the immigration of Jews, at certain moments it has also been willing to allow the permanent or temporary settlement of people who are not Jewish by most definitions but have some Jewish connection, who can serve to expand the Jewish population, or at a minimum of immigrants who are first and foremost not Arabs.

Beyond recruitment, Quebec has also sought to facilitate immigrant integration into Francophone society and not the Anglophone community or the broader Canadian society. For this purpose, political elites devised and implemented a host of policies that promoted this cause. For instance, bill 101, which prohibited immigrants' access to Anglophone schools, was designed to promote adoption of French as their primary language.

A similar pattern is evident in Catalonia where nationalist elites were highly concerned that immigrants would opt to integrate into the Castilian language. While Catalonian elites had little power over these processes during the Franco period, after the collapse of this regime, they sought to reconstitute the region's powers over issues of education and language by promoting policies that were designed to promote the overall Catalinization of society. However, due to the fact that native Catalans almost constituted a minority within Catalonia, in contrast to Quebec, political elites decided against the creation of separate language based schools and in fact outlawed any possibility of linguistically segregated educational institutions. Instead, over time all schools were required to shift to use Catalan, a process that has fostered the integration of both Spanish and international immigrants into Catalan language and culture.

Israel differs in this respect. Elites sought a cheap and disposable labor force that was not Palestinian, which meant that international labor migrants need not be integrated. However, due to the spatial location of these migrants within Israeli society and in order to prevent the remote possibility of labor migrants identifying with the Palestinian *other*, labor migrants were de-facto, though not de-jure partially integrated into Israeli society and their children have attended regular Israeli schools that have further facilitated their unintentional socialization and integration (see last section of Chapter 3). Also, Israeli elites sought to strengthen the demographic dominance of Jews by promoting immigration, especially from the Soviet Union, of people who had tenuous ties to Judaism but could assimilate into the Israeli non-Arab population.

Interestingly, as I discussed above, while these policies were primarily designed in order to facilitate the maintenance of the dominant group culture and identity, they have ironically functioned as catalysts that have altered the very cultures they were meant to preserve. In fact, the presence of immigrants can engender a fundamental redefinition of the meaning and contours of membership in a given society. In Quebec, while Bill 101 appears to have been successful in facilitating the Francization of immigrants, it has concurrently transformed Francophone schools into sites of multiculturalism. Thus, Quebec's strategy of cultural survival has in practice engendered the partial transformation of the very cultural attributes it sought to preserve.

Similarly, in Catalonia, the decision not to create two separate school systems, based on the language divide, has contributed to the Catalanization of both former immigrants from Spain and their descendants, as well as international migrants. At the same time, however, this policy has transformed these educational institutions from ones that are almost purely Catalan, to ones in which the use of Spanish and other languages for social interactions is frequent.

In Israel, ironically, despite explicit attempt not to integrate international labor immigrants, their location within Israeli society and their conceptual and practical differentiation from Palestinians has led among some of them to de-facto Israelization. While due to the state's harsh exclusionary legal framework this phenomenon has remained limited, it constitutes a challenge for the very nature of the state and its social boundaries. Similarly immigrants from the former with tenuous ties to Judaism have also engendered changes in the character of the core Jewish population as their assimilation into Jewish Israeli society has led to increasing demands that religious authorities either adopt a more expansive definition of who is a Jew or that the state should secularize its provisions concerning family law.

The role of Intra-group Competition

While the discussion up until this point has primarily focused on the role of inter-group competition, the analysis of these three cases suggests a second form of competition that also influences particular policies and outcomes regarding immigration and integration, namely, intra-group competition within each national project. While inter-group competition often provides the primary rationale that guides the development of instrumental immigration policies, these dynamics only offer us a partial explanation of the observed outcomes. Specifically, in contrast to these overall abstract national projects such as Zionism or Catalan nationalism, that tend to unite the majority of political forces in the polity, divergent political groups also tend to develop particular visions of the national projects.

These visions tend to diverge in two ways. First, in the definition of the overall goals of the national project, in the case of Catalonia or Quebec this has revolved around questions of whether the focus should be on autonomy or independence, while in the Israeli case divergent visions have differed with regard to the necessity and desirability of territorial compromise with the Palestinians. Second, groups diverge with regard to the particular means they promote in order to achieve these goals. For instance, should Catalonia and Quebec coerce the integration of minorities or should they be solely incentivized to do so? In the Israeli case these difference emerge in relation to the use and implementation of various policies that facilitate or hinder separation between Israelis and Palestinians at particular points in time.

As I have argued in Chapters 2-7, these intra-group dynamics, which are primarily manifested in party politics, can play as important a role as inter-group ones do in shaping and determining outcomes concerning immigration and integration policies. In Israel, differences between the national projects that have been promoted by the left and the right have fostered substantial shifts in state preferences and policies both in favor and against the recruitment of international labor migrants or Palestinian commuter migrants. In Quebec and to a lesser extent in Catalonia, while there has been consensus in favor of increasing regional power over immigration, this has not been the case with regard to integration.

Specifically, in both cases, the particular preferences toward integration that have been espoused and promoted by various political actors have been strongly shaped by their particular visions of the national project. For instance, since the PLQ's national project solely requires that immigrants speak French and become part of the broader Francophone community, the party has primarily promoted linguistic and political integration, while it has been less concerned with their overall assimilation and transformation into Francophone Québécois. In contrast, the PQ's sovereigntist approach does not solely promote linguistic integration but seeks to transform immigrants into agents of Quebec nationalism that can promote the sovereigntist cause. For this purpose, the party's policies have not focused on mere linguistic integration but have instead sought to promote cultural and political assimilation.

Finally, in the case of Catalonia, while the changes engendered by shifts in political power have been less pronounced than in the other cases (see chapter 7 for discussion on this issue), particular visions of the national project have also played a key role. Specifically, each of the visions that have been promoted by the three parties that are analyzed in this study has engendered a different approach toward integration. For the CIU, which views the national projects as one that is focused on cultural preservation, immigrant integration is primarily perceived as a process that requires their assimilation or at least the reduction in the level of diversity and difference that they introduce and practice.

For the ERC, which seeks to promote a newly defined and independent Catalan society in which language is the sole marker of Catalanism, linguistic integration together with the promotion of cultural diversity are perceived as vital elements in the process of shaping this new form of Catalanism. For the PSC, however, the national project concerns the bolstering of Catalonia's autonomy as a means of reducing or eliminating the Catalonia-Spain divide since the party does not have a strong position on this matter. In fact, as recent events demonstrate, it has tended to lose support when the national issue gains salience. Thus, in contrast to the party's official Catalanist position, in practice it has focused on reducing these distinctions and promoting a laissez-faire approach that strives to enable immigrants and natives to freely select the language of their choice and the manner in which they integrate into society.

Where do we go from here?

As I discussed at length in Chapter 1, this study constitutes a first step toward better understanding the relationship between the presence of entrenched inter-group competition or conflict, on the one hand, and the settlement of immigrants, on the other. While each of these topics has been studied separately, the interaction between the two has not received much scholarly attention.

There are, however, two exceptions to this rule. First, there is a new and expanding literature on minority nations (see: Sanjay 2014; Zapata-Berrero 2009). Second, there is a host of single case studies that examine immigration dynamics and policies in minority nations, multiethnic states, and deeply divided societies (see for example: Bartram 1998; Gagnon and Iacovino 2005; Kemp and Raijman 2008; Richmond 1997; Zapata-Barrero 2007). However, each of these literatures carries a crucial weakness.

The nascent literature on immigration in minority nations provides a host of important insights regarding the dynamics examined in these studies; however, the closed focus on minority nations limits its analytical scope and obscures how other forms of contention play out, in other contexts such as sovereign states. The case study literature also provides important empirical and theoretical insights regarding these issues; however, it is by definition limited in scope as it offers little comparative evidence or broader theoretical contributions concerning patterns that transcend the individual cases they examine.

This study has attempted to overcome these weaknesses in two ways. First, by adopting a comparative perspective it examines a diverse set of cases that have enabled me to differentiate between systematic and more idiosyncratic effects. Second, by focusing on what I have defined as spaces of contention, a category that includes a host of different types of polities that represent various levels of autonomy (autonomous regions, federal subdivisions, and sovereign states), I have constructed a boarder category of analysis that allows us to transcend particular configurations of power within which intergroup competition and immigration take place. In fact, relative autonomy constituted the variable upon which I selected my cases. As I suggested in Chapter 1, the goal of this particular case selection method was to test whether the various dynamics I observed held across cases that significantly diverged in their level of autonomy. It is not surprising that an independent sovereign state like Israel, which holds substantial state capacities, would use immigration instrumentally. What is more surprising is that these patterns held in Federal Quebec and the semi-autonomous Catalonia, the latter constituting the hardest case for my theory.

As the empirical analysis in Chapters 2-7 demonstrates, the theoretical propositions that I developed in Chapter 1 have broadly held across all three cases. Despite the high level of heterogeneity across my cases the effects of inter- and intra- group competition vis-à-vis the national project together with existing explanatory factors provide a comprehensive framework for accounting for the observed outcomes that are evident in these cases. While these two forms of competitive dynamics do not constitute sufficient explanatory variables to explain these outcomes, in their absence existing explanations of immigration policies that primarily focus on cultural, economic, societal, and security factors are oftentimes insufficient.

Beyond the obvious necessity of examining whether and to what extent other contentious spaces conform to the propositions developed in this study; there are two additional trajectories along which it would be fruitful to further develop this research agenda.

First, there is a need for more rigorous analysis that explores additional explanatory factors that shape immigration policy preferences and outcomes in continuous spaces. For instance, the role that the autochthonous inter-group demographic balance or the spatial distribution of various autochthonous as well as that of immigrant groups might play in shaping and producing these outcomes. Furthermore, variation in the relative level of political, economic, and institutional power that is held by divergent autochthonous groups within society might also influence policy preference concerning immigration. The examination and inclusion of additional cases and explanatory factors will not only enable me to enhance my understanding of the processes examined in this study more broadly, but will also facilitate the development of a more comprehensive and systematic theoretical approach to this issue.

Second, while this study has primarily focused on temporal variation, it would also be important to explore the dynamics of spatial variation. For instance, what explains differences in both elite and popular preferences regarding immigration and incorporation in various areas **within** these contentious space? The evidence presented in this study suggests that there is significant urban-rural variation in this regard. However, it is likely that there are other forms of spatial variation that can facilitate our understanding of particular relationships between inter- and intra- group competition and preferences toward immigration. From this perspective, the case of the three federal regions of Belgium that is discussed in the introduction to Chapter 1, offers an intriguing opportunity to conduct an experiment that examines spatial variation. Namely, why have these regions implemented and promoted such divergent policies toward immigrant integration? By examining these cases and questions I hope to continue expanding and developing the research agenda that I have embarked on in this study.

References

Abramovitz Shlomo (1995), The Land of Opportunities, *Yediot Aharonot*, March 3, 1995.

Abu-Laban, Y. (1998). Welcome/STAY OUT: The contradiction of Canadian integration and immigration policies at the millennium. *Canadian ethnic studies*, 30(3), 190.

Abulof, U. (2009). "Small Peoples": The Existential Uncertainty of Ethnonational Communities. *International Studies Quarterly*, 53(1), 227-248.

Achiram, E. (1969). Economic Aspects of Absorption of Immigrants, *The Economic Quarterly* 62:151-156 (Hebrew).

Aharoni, Y. (1991). *The Israeli economy: Dreams and realities*. London ; New York: Routledge.

Al Haj, M. (2004). *Immigration and ethnic formation in a deeply divided society : The case of the 1990s immigrants from the Former Soviet Union in Israel* (International studies in sociology and social anthropology ; v. 91). Leiden ; Boston: Brill.

Alland, A. (2006). *Catalunya, one nation, two states: an ethnographic study of nonviolent resistance to assimilation*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Almirall, V. (2015). *Lo catalanisme*. Editorial Minimal.

Alon Gideon (1989), The Intifada has Caused Losses of more than 100 million Dollars to the Construction Industry, *Haaretz*, Spetember 9, 1989.

Alon Gideon (1993), Employers Want Cheap Workers, *Haaretz*, March 9, 1993

Alroey, Gur (2010). This national project cannot be based on pity: The Zionist Movement and the Yishuv's reactions to the Ukrainian progroms 1918-1920. 411-450.

Alush Tzvi (1993), Exercise for New Pickers, *Yediot Aharonot*, March 22, 1993

Andreu, C. (1999). Pujol, convencido de que Cataluña integrará a la inmigración africana "como ha hecho otras veces. *El Pais.* July 23, 1999.

Andrew Dowling. (2013*). Catalonia since the Spanish Civil War: reconstructing the nation*. Apollo Books.

Angers, F.(1954) Le Canada francais et l'immigration. *L'Action nationale*, May 1954

Anguera, E. (2002). Pujol abre en Varsovia una oficina para seleccionar a trabajadores inmigrantes, *ABC*, Octiber 29, 2002.

Anush, H. and Dan O. (1993) Construction workers demand a 50% addition to entry level wages, *Yediot Aharonot*, April 14, 1993.

Apap, J. (1999). Citizenship rights and migration policies: the case of Maghrebi migrants in Italy and Spain. *Southern Europe and the New Immigrations*, 138-57.

Apap, J., De Bruycker, P., & Schmitter, C. (2000). Regularisation of Illegal Aliens in the European Union-Summary Report of a Comparative Study. *European Journal of Migration & Law* 2, 263.

Arnon, Arie. 1997. *The Palestinian economy: between imposed integration and voluntary separation*. Leiden: Brill.

Artigal, J. M. (1993). Catalan and Basque immersion programs. *Multilingual Matters*, 30-39.

Aseguinolaza, F., Abuín González, Anxo, & Domínguez, César. (2010). *A comparative history of literatures in the Iberian Peninsula* (Comparative history of literatures in European languages ; v. 24). Amsterdam ; Philadelphia: John Benjamins Pub. Col.

Assemblee Nationale. (2007). *Bill 195: Québec Identity Act*. Québec: Assemblee Nationale

Assemblee Nationale (2010). *Bill 94: An Act to Establish Guidelines Governing Accommodation Requests within the Administration and Certain Institutions*. Québec: Assemblee Nationale

Avery, D. (1979). *" Dangerous Foreigners": European Immigrant Workers and Labour Radicalism in Canada, 1896-1932*. McClelland & Stewart.

Azulai-Katz Orly (1993), Against the death Penalty, In favor of gradual detachment from the territories*, Yediot Aharonot*, April 1, 1993

Bachi, R. (1974). *The population of Israel.* Paris: CICRED.

Badia, A. M. (1964). *Llengua i cultura als Països Catalans* (Vol. 19). Edicions 62.

Balcells, A. (1996). *Catalan nationalism: Past and present*. St. Martin's Press.

Balcells, R. (2010). *Catalonia : An emerging economy : The most cost-effective ports in the Mediterranean Sea*. Brighton ; Portland, Or.: Sussex Academic Press.

Balfour, S. (1989). *Dictatorship, workers, and the city: labour in greater Barcelona since 1939* (Vol. 13). Oxford University Press.

Balfour, S., & Quiroga, A. (2007). The reinvention of Spain: nation and identity since democracy. Oxford University Press.

Balibar, E. (1991). Racism and nationalism. *Nations and nationalism: A reader*, 163-72.

Ballot i Torres, J. P. (1814). *Gramática y apología de la llengua cathalana*. Estampa de Joan Francisco Piferrer, impresor del Rey.

Balthazar, Louis. 1989. *French-Canadian civilization*. Washington, D.C.: Association for Canadian Studies in the United States.

Balthazar, L. (1995a) 'Quebec and the ideal of federalism', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 38(5): 40-53

Balthazar, L. (1995b). The dynamics of multi-ethnicity in French-speaking Quebec: Towards a new citizenship. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 1(3), 82-95.

Bank of Israel (1968), *Annual Report*. Jerusalem.

Bank of Israel (1969), *Annual Report*. Jerusalem.

Bank of Israel (1970), *Annual Report*. Jerusalem.

Bank of Israel (1971), *Annual Report*. Jerusalem.

Bank of Israel (1972), *Annual Report*. Jerusalem.

Bank of Israel (1973), *Annual Report*. Jerusalem.

Bank of Israel (1974), *Annual Report*. Jerusalem.

Bank of Israel (1975), *Annual Report*. Jerusalem.

Bank of Israel (1976), *Annual Report*. Jerusalem.

Bank of Israel (1977), *Annual Report*. Jerusalem.

Bank of Israel (1978), *Annual Report.* Jerusalem.

Bank of Israel (1979), *Annual Report.* Jerusalem.

Bank of Israel (1980), *Annual Report*. Jerusalem.

Bank of Israel (1981), *Annual Report*. Jerusalem.

Bank of Israel (1982), *Annual Report*. Jerusalem.

Bank of Israel (1983), *Annual Report*. Jerusalem.

Bank of Israel (1984), *Annual Report.* Jerusalem.

Bank of Israel (1985), *Annual Report*. Jerusalem.

Bank of Israel (1986), *Annual Report*. Jerusalem.

Bank of Israel (1987), *Annual Report*. Jerusalem.

Bank of Israel (1988), *Annual Report*. Jerusalem.

Bank of Israel (1989), *Annual Report*. Jerusalem.

Bank of Israel (1990), *Annual Report*. Jerusalem.

Bank of Israel (1991), *Annual Report*. Jerusalem.

Bank of Israel (1992), *Annual Report*. Jerusalem.

Bank of Israel (1993), *Annual Report*. Jerusalem.

Bank of Israel (1994), *Annual Report*. Jerusalem.

Bank of Israel (1995), *Annual Report*. Jerusalem.

Bank of Israel (1996), *Annual Report*. Jerusalem.

Bank of Israel (1997), *Annual Report*. Jerusalem.

Bank of Israel (1998), *Annual Report*. Jerusalem.

Bank of Israel (1999), *Annual Report*. Jerusalem.

Bank of Israel (2000), *Annual Report*. Jerusalem.

Bank of Israel (2001), *Annual Report*. Jerusalem.

Bank of Israel (2002), *Annual Report*. Jerusalem.

Bank of Israel (2003), *Annual Report*. Jerusalem.

Bank of Israel (2004), *Annual Report*. Jerusalem.

Banting, K., & Soroka, S. (2012). Minority nationalism and immigrant integration in Canada. *Nations and Nationalism*, 18(1), 156-176.

Bareli Meir (1973) Fear and Concern, *Davar*, January 29, 1973.

Barker, F. (2010). Learning to be a majority: Negotiating immigration, integration and national membership in Quebec. *Political Science*, 62(1), 11-36.

Barnett, M. (1999). Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change:: Israel's Road to Oslo. *European Journal of International Relations*, 5(1), 5-36.

Barrero, R. Z. (2005). Construyendo una filosofía pública de la inmigración en Catalunya: los términos del debate. *Revista de derecho migratorio y extranjería*, (10), 9-38.

Bartram, D. (1998). Foreign workers in Israel: history and theory. *International Migration Review,* 303-325.
Bartram, D. (2011). Migration, Ethnonationalist Destinations and Social Divisions: Non-Jewish Immigrants in Israel. *Ethnopolitics*, 10(2), 235-252.

Beaujot, R. P. (1979). A demographic view on Canadian language policy. *Canadian Public Policy/Analyse de Politiques*, 5(1), 16-29.

Beaujot, R. P., & McQuillan, K. (1982). *Growth and dualism*. Toronto: Gage.

Beaulieu, I. (2004). Le premier portrait des enfants de la loi 101. Sondage auprès des jeunes Québécois issus de l'immigration récente. In M. Venne (ed.) *L'annuaire du Québec*. 260–73

Becker, A. S. (1971). *Isreal and the Palestinian Occupied Territories: Military-Political Issues in the Debate* (Vol. 882, No. ISA). Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.

Behiels, M. D. (1985). *Prelude to Quebec's Quiet Revolution: Liberalism vs Neo-Nationalism, 1945-60*. McGill-Queen's Press-MQUP.

Behiels, M. D. (1991). *Quebec and the question of immigration: from ethnocentrism to ethnic pluralism, 1900-1985* (Vol. 18). Canadian Historical Association.

Beilin Yosi (1975), Greater Eretz Israel, *Davar*, August 15, 1975.

Béland, D., & Lecours, A. (2006). Sub-state nationalism and the welfare state: Québec and Canadian federalism. *Nations and Nationalism*, 12(1), 77-96.

Bélanger, C. (2000). French Canadian Emigration to the United States, 1840-1930. *Quebec History*, 3.

Bélanger, É., & Perrella, A. M. (2008). Facteurs d'appui à la souveraineté du Québec chez les jeunes: une comparaison entre francophones, anglophones et allophones. *Politique et sociétés*, 27(3), 13-40.

Ben-Eliezer, U. (1998). *The making of Israeli militarism*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Ben-Porat, A. (1987). The emergence of a Jewish working class in Palestine. *Theory and Society,* 16, 741-769.

Ben-Yehuda, H. (2000), Policy Transformation in the Middle East: Arms Control Regimes and National Security Reconciled. In: Eisenberg Laura and Neil Caplan (eds.) *Review Essays in Israel Studies: Volume 5.* SUNY Press, NY: Albeny.

Bender A. (1988), Construction Workers from the Territories are Sabotaging houses, *Maariv*, January 18, 1988.

Bender, A (1991), The Cabinet approved to import 9,500 foreign workers, *Haaretz* , January 7, 1991.

Benet, J. (1973). *Catalunya sota el règim franquista*. Paris: Edicions Catalanes de Paris.

Benhabib, S. (2002). *The claims of culture: Equality and diversity in the global era*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Bensimon, D., & Della Pergola, S. (1984). La population juive de France. *Sociodemographie et identite, Jerusalem et Paris, Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, et CNRS*.

Benvenisti, M. (1987). The West Bank Data Base Project 1986 report: demographic economic legal social and political developments in the West Bank.

Benvenisti, M. (1995). *Intimate enemies: Jews and Arabs in a shared land*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Benvenisti, M. (2010). The inevitable bi-national regime. Z. Amit and D. Levitt (Trans.). *Haaretz*, January, 27.

Billiet, J., Maddens, B., & Beerten, R. (2003). National identity and attitude toward foreigners in a multinational state: A replication. *Political Psychology*, 24(2), 241-257.

Bilodeau, A., Turgeon, L., & Karakoc, E. (2012). Small worlds of diversity: views toward immigration and racial minorities in Canadian provinces. *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 45(3), 579-605.

Bissoondath, N. (1994). *Selling illusions : The cult of multiculturalism in Canada*. Toronto: Penguin Books.

Blad, C. (2011). *Neoliberalism and National Culture: State-building and Legitimacy in Canada and Quebec* (Vol. 38). Brill.

Blad, C., Couton, P. (2009). The rise of an intercultural nation: immigration, diversity and nationhood in Quebec. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 35(4), 645-667.

Blanchar, C. (2003). La Generalitat abrirá una oficina de inmigración en Marruecos. *El Pais.* January 15, 2003.

Bookman, M. (1997). *The demographic struggle for power : The political economy of demographic engineering in the modern world*. London ; Portland, OR: Frank Cass.

Bookman, M. Z. (2013). *The demographic struggle for power: the political economy of demographic engineering in the modern world*. Routledge.

Borjas, G J. (1990) *Friends or strangers: the impact of immigrants on the U.S. economy*. New York: Basic Books.

Borjas, G. J. (2001) *Heaven's door: Immigration policy and the American economy.* Princeton University Press, 2001.

Boswell, C. (2007). Theorizing Migration Policy: Is There a Third Way? *International migration review*, 41(1), 75-100.

Bothwell, R.(1995). *Canada and Quebec: One country, two histories*. UBC Press.

Bouchard, G. (2008). *The making of the nations and cultures of the New World: an essay in comparative history* (No. 211). McGill-Queen's Press-MQUP.

Bouchard, G., & Taylor, C. (2008). *Building the future. A time for reconciliation.*

Bourhis, R. Y. (1984). *Conflict and language planning in Quebec (Vol. 5)*. Multilingual Matters.

Breton, R. (1988). From ethnic to civic nationalism: English Canada and Quebec. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 11(1), 85-102.

Breton, R. (2005). *Ethnic relations in Canada: Institutional dynamics* (Vol. 44). McGill-Queen's Press-MQUP.

Breuilly, J. (1982). *Nationalism and the State*. Manchester University Press.

Brubaker, R. (1996). *Nationalism reframed : Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe.* Cambridge [England] ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Brubaker, R. (2004). *Ethnicity without groups*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Bruemmer, R., & Dougherty, K. (2007). Herouxville: Cause Celebre. *The Montreal Gazette*. February 2, 2007.

Brunet, M. (1954). *Canadians et canadiens*.

Buckner, P. (1997) 'Making British North America British, 1815-1860' in C.C. Eldridge (ed.) *Canada, Britain and the United States from the Revolution to the Cold War* (Cardiff, 1997) pp. 17-18.

Buckner, P. A., & Reid, J. G. (2011). *Revisiting 1759: the conquest of Canada in historical perspective*. University of Toronto Press.

Calavita, K. (1992). *Inside the state: The bracero program, immigration, and the I.N.S. (After the law).* New York: Routledge.

Calavita, K. (1998). Immigration, law, and marginalization in a global economy: Notes from Spain. *Law and Society Review*, 529-566.

Calavita, K. (2005). *Immigrants at the margins : Law, race, and exclusion in Southern Europe* (Cambridge studies in law and society). Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Caldwell, G., & Fournier, D. (1987). The Quebec question: A matter of population. *Canadian Journal of Sociology/Cahiers canadiens de sociologie*, 16-41.

Candel, F. (1965). *Els altres catalans*. Barcelona: Edicions 62.

Cappon, P. (1974). *Conflict entre les Néo-Canadiens et les francophones de Montréal (Vol. 8)*. Publié pour le Centre international de recherche sur le bilinguisme [par] les Presses de l'Université Laval.

Carens, J.H. (1995) *Is Quebec nationalism just?: perspectives from Anglophone Canada.* McGill-Queen's Press-MQUP

Carens, J. H. (2000). *Culture, citizenship, and community: A contextual exploration of justice as evenhandedness.* Oxford University Press.

Careless, J. M. S. (1970). *Canada: A story of challenge*. Cambridge University Press.

Carreras J.C. and Fabra P.P. (2009). *The Architect of Modern Catalan: Selected Writings*. John Benjamins Publishing.

Casals, M. and Solsona, M. (2008), *La immigració, un motor econòmic: Reflexionsentorn de l'impacte de la població estrangera en l'economia catalane.* Barcelona: Fundació Jaume Bofill, p. 14.

Castles, S. (1985). The guest-worker in Western Europe--an obituary. *The International migration review*, 20(4), 761-778.

Castles, S., & Kosack, G. (1973). *Immigrant workers and class structure in Western Europe*. London: Oxford University Press.

Castles, S., Miller, M. J. (2009). *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*. New York: The Guilford Press

Castells, M. (2009). *The Power of Identity The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture Volume II (2nd ed., Information Age Series)*. Hoboken: Wiley.

Castells, A., & Parellada, M. (1993). Los desequilibrios territoriales en España. In *I Simposio sobre igualdad y distribución de la renta y la riqueza* (Vol. 9, p. 17).

Checkel, J. T. (1997). International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the Rationalist—Constructivist Divide. *European journal of international relations*, 3(4), 473-495.

Chetrit, S. (2010). *Intra-Jewish conflict in Israel : White Jews, black Jews*. London ; New York: Routledge.

Cipolla, C. M. (Ed.). (2013). *The economic decline of empires*. Routledge.

Ciudad de Barcelona (1901). *Anuaro Estadistico de la Ciudad de Barcelona*. Barcelona.

Ciudad de Barcelona (1903). *Anuaro Estadistico de la Ciudad de Barcelona*. Barcelona.

Ciudad de Barcelona (1904). *Anuaro Estadistico de la Ciudad de Barcelona*. Barcelona.

Ciudad de Barcelona (1905). *Anuaro Estadistico de la Ciudad de Barcelona*. Barcelona.

Ciudad de Barcelona (1906). *Anuaro Estadistico de la Ciudad de Barcelona*. Barcelona.

Clines, F. (1988) Peres says Israel should Yield Gaza, *The New York Times*, February 19, 1988

Clota, E. Balnchar, C. (2010). El alcalde de Vic veta el padrón a los 'sin papeles' para "salvar la ciudad", *El Pais. January 14, 2010.*

Close, R. E. (2008). The Attempted Repeal of the Quebec Act: The State of Parliamentary Opposition in 1775. *Past Imperfect*, *1*.

Cohen Amiram (1996), Netanyahu: I prefer Palestinians of the foreigners, *Haaretz*, November 29, 1996.

Cohen, A. (2006). *Non-Jewish Jews in Israel*. Jerusalem: Shalom Hertman Institute, Bar-Ilan University, and Keter Publishing House.

Cohen, A., & Susser, B. (2009). Jews and Others: Non-Jewish Jews in Israel. *Israel Affairs*, 15(1), 52-65.

Cohen, M. (1973). Appeasement in the Middle East: The British White Paper on Palestine. *The Historical Journal*, 16(3), 571-596.

Cohen, Y. (2002). From haven to heaven: Changing patterns of immigration to Israel. In: *Challenging ethnic citizenship: German and Israeli perspectives on immigration*. 36-56.

Cohen, Y. (2007). The demographic success of Zionism. *Israeli Sociology*, 8(2), 355-362.

Colino, C. (2009). Constitutional change without constitutional reform: Spanish federalism and the revision of Catalonia's statute of autonomy. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*.

Collister, R. (1997) “Quebec’s Immigration Ultimatums Rejected,” *Toronto Sun*, 19 May 1977

Colomer, J. M. (1984*). Espanyolisme i catalanisme: la idea de nació en el pensament pollític català (1939-1979)*.

Comissió d’Associacions i Organitzacions No Governamentals de les Comarques de Girona (1992) *L’Informe de Girona: Cinquanta Propostes sobre Immigració.* Generlitat de Catalunya

Comite Ministeriel Permanent du Developpement Culturel (1978). *La politique québécoise du développement culturel.* Editeur Officiel du Quebec, 1978.

Commission scolaire de Montréal (2006). *Année scolaire 2004–2005*. Montréal: Commission scolaire de Montréal.

Company, E. (2001), Los inmigrantes increpan a Barrera por "racista". *El Pais*. March 1, 2001.
Company. E, Rusinol P. (2000), La izquierda catalana pacta una plataforma alternativa a CiU y PP, *El Pais,* October 6, 2000.

Conseil de la Langue Française. (2000), *Résultats de recherche qualitative*. Conseil de la Langue Française.

Conseil Supérieur de l’Education (2014). *L’amélioration de l’enseignement de l’anglais, langue seconde, au primaire : un équilibre à trouver*. Quebec: Gouvernement du Québec

Convergència i Unió (1999). *Programa Electoral.* 1999.

Convergència i Unió (2003). *Programa Electoral*. 2003

Convergència i Unió (2006). *Programa Electoral*. 2006

Convergència i Unió (2010). *Programa Electoral.* 2010

Convergència i Unió (2012). *Programa Electoral.* 2012

Conversi, D. (1997). *The Basques, the Catalans and Spain. Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilisation*. London: Hurst.

Conversi, D. (2002). *Immigration and Statelessness: Political Participation of Immigrants and their Descendants in Catalan and Basque Mobilizations (1959-1978)*. ECPR Joint Session, Turin (Italy), 22-27.

Conway, J. F. (2004). *Debts to pay: English Canada and Quebec from the Conquest to the Referendum*. James Lorimer & Company.

Cook, R. (2005). *Watching Quebec: selected essays*. McGill-Queen's Press-MQUP.

Craig, G. M., Ajzenstat, J., & Laforest, G. (2006). *Lord Durham's Report*. McGill-Queen's Press-MQUP.

Criekemans, D. (2010). Regional sub-state diplomacy from a comparative perspective: Quebec, Scotland, Bavaria, Catalonia, Wallonia and Flanders. *The Hague journal of diplomacy*, 5(1-2), 37-64.

Cruells, M. (1965). *Els no catalans i nosaltres*. Barcelona: Mediterrània.

Cué, C. Rusiñol, P. (2003). Reivindicación de los "otros catalanes". *El Pais*. November 13, 2003.

d'Anglejan, A. (1984). Language planning in Quebec: An historical overview and future trends. *Conflict and language planning in Quebec*.

Dancygier, R. M. (2010). *Immigration and conflict in Europe*. Cambridge University Press.

Danon Eli (1989), The Construction Sector has been Taken Over by Arab Ra'ises and the Jewish Workers Suffer, *Maariv*, January 26, 1988.

Danon, R. (1988), They came, cursed, and left, *Yediot Aharonot*, October 19, 1988.

Davar (1949), The majority problems in the state of Israel, *Davar,* November 18, 1949.

Davar (1967), Zina Herman and Professor Bachi will solve demographic problems, *Davar,* September 13, 1967

Davar (1971) The 22nd statistical yearbook, *Davar*, October 26, 1971

Davar (1981), Dayan: Change in Labor Paltform, *Davar*, January 4, 1981

De Bel-Air, F. (2012). *A Political Demography of the Refugee Question*. Palestinians in Jordan and Lebanon: Between protection, forced return and resettlement.

De La Riba, E. P. (1906). *La nacionalitat catalana.* L'Anuari de la Exportació.

De Miguel, A., Ubeda, A., & Martín-Moreno, J. (1980). *Los intelectuales bonitos*. Editorial Planeta.

del Campo, S., & Lopez, M. (1987). *Nuevo análisis de la población española*. Ariel.

DellaPergola, S. (1992). Israel and world Jewish population: A core-periphery perspective. *Population and Social Change in Israel*, ed. C. Goldscheider (Boulder, 1992), 39-63.

DellaPergola, S. (2012). When Scholarship Disturbs Narrative: Ian Lustick on Israel's Migration Balance. *Israel Studies Review*, 26(2), 1-27.

Demarino, G. (1974) Francophone immigration, Ottawa motives questioned, *Montreal Gazette*, November 12, 1974.

Departament de Benestar Social (1993). *Pla interdepartamental d'immigració*. Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya.

Departament de Benestar Social (2001), *Pla interdepartamental d'immigració (2001-2004)*. Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya.

Departament de Benestar Social (2005). *Pla de Ciutadania i Immigració 2005–2008*. Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya.

Detre, L. A. (2004). Canada's Campaign for Immigrants and the Images in" Canada West" Magazine. *Great Plains Quarterly*, 24(2), 113-129.

DeVoretz, D. J., & Pivnenko, S. (2008). The Immigration Triangle: Quebec, Canada, and the Rest of the World. *Journal of International Migration and Integration/Revue de l'integration et de la migration internationale*, 9(4), 363-381

Dion, S. (1992). Explaining Quebec Nationalism. *The Collapse of Canada*, 77-121. Brooking Institute.

Divine, D. (2000). Zionism and the Transformation of Jewish Society. *Modern Judaism*, 20(3), 257-276.

Dominitz, Y. (1997). Israel's immigration policy and the dropout phenomenon. *Russian Jews on Three Continents: Migration and Resettlement*, 113-27.

Domingo, A. (2013). " Català és..." El discurs sobre immigració i identitat nacional durant el franquisme: Francesc Candel i Jordi Pujol. *Treballs de la Societat Catalana de Geografia*, (75), 9-32.

Domingo, V. A. (2014). *Catalunya al mirall de la immigració: Demografia i identitat nacional*. Barcelona: L'Avenç.

Don-Yehiya, E. (1995). Political Religion in a New State: Ben—Gurion's Mamlachtiyut. *Israel: The First Decade of Independence*, 171-194.

Dougherty, K. (2012). Anglophone newspapers support CAQ because it "scares them less," Pauline Marois says. *Montreal Gazette.* August 31, 2012.

Duek N, Dan Ofri, and Zvi Singer (1993b), 33 thousand workers form the territories will be permitted to work in Israel, *Yediot Aharonot*, May 3, 1993.

Duek N. (1993a), The government decided – the closure will continue, *Yediot Aharonot*, April 19, 1993

Duek Nehama, Dan Ofri, and Zvi Singer (1993), The construction companies are threatening to strike if The government does not authorize workers, *Yediot Aharonot*, April 13, 1993.

Duman, Y. H. (2014). Reducing the Fog? Immigrant Regularization and the State. *Politics & Policy*, 42(2), 187-220.

Duman, Y. H. (forthcoming). Infiltrators Go Home! Explaining Xenophobic Mobilization Against Asylum Seekers in Israel. *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, 1-24.

Dumanreau, P. (1952). "L'aspect et l'avenir démographiques du Canada français", *L'Actualité économique*, 28, 1, avril-juin 1952, 5-26.

Dunn, K. P., & Singh, S. P. (2011). The surprising non-impact of radical right-wing populist party representation on public tolerance of minorities. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties*, 21(3), 313-331.

Dupré, J.-F. (2012), Intercultural Citizenship, Civic Nationalism, and Nation Building in Québec: From Common Public Language to Laïcité. *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, 12: 227–248.

Duquette, G. (2001). Double Minoritisation: Intragroup Domination and Cultural Hegemony. *Language Culture and Curriculum*, 14(2), 98-111.

Eaude, M. (2011). *Catalonia A Cultural History*. Luton: Andrews UK.

Eis Edna (1988), How many consruction workers are we really missing? *Yediot Aharonot*, July 19, 1988.

Eisenstadt, S. N. (1967). *Israeli society*. New York: Basic Books.

El Mundo (2004) Pujol dice que el mestizaje sería 'el final de Cataluña'. *El Mundo.* August 23, 2004.

El Pais (1999a), Unas 3.000 personas se concentran en Terrassa contra el racismo y la xenophobia, *El Pais*, July 28, 1999.

El Pais (1999b), Las asociaciones de inmigrantes piden una entrevista con Pujol para que les dé su apoyo, *El Pais*, July 24, 1999.

El Pais (1999c). Esquerra Republicana reclama el traspaso de las competencias de inmigración. *El Pais*, October 9, 1999

El Pais (2001a). Los sindicatos y la patronal Pimec piden que la Generalitat decida sobre inmigración. *El Pais*. May 22, 2001.

El Pais (2001b). Pujol: "La multiculturalidad como algunos la entienden sería demoledora para Cataluña". *El Pais*. September 2, 2001.

El Pais (2002a). El secretario de Inmigración de la Generalitat dimite para dedicarse a la empresa privada. *El Pais.* January 17, 2002.

El Pais (2002b). Pujol dice que la inmigración no debe destruir la identidad catalane. *El Pais*. May 18, 2002.

El Pais (2003). Colom dirigirá una oficina para inmigrantes en Casablanca, *El Pais*. January 14, 2003.

El Pais. (2004). Fraga alerta a Zapatero contra las reformas estatutarias de Cataluña y País Vasco. *El Pais*, June 14, 2004.

El Pais. (2006). El PP presenta su recurso de inconstitucionalidad contra la reforma del Estatuto catalán. *El Pais*. July 31, 2006.

El Pais (2007), Duran sobre la inmigración: "Aquí no cabe todo el mundo", *El Pais,* October 21, 2007.

Eldar Akiva (1989), Benefits Offered to Jews who Replace Arab Workers from the Teritories, *Haaretz*, May 22, 1989

Elken Mordechai (1988), David Stern, President of Construction Center: We have no Solutions, *Maariv*, January 18, 1988

Ellermann, A. (2009). States against migrants: deportation in Germany and the United States. Cambridge University Press.

Elliott, J.H (1963). *The revolt of the Catalans, a study in the decline of Spain, 1598-1640*. Cambridge [Eng.: University Press.

Elliott, J. H. (1989). *The Count-Duke of Olivares: The statesman in an age of decline.* Yale University Press.

Elliot, J.H (2013). The Decline of Spain. In: Cipolla, C. M. (Ed.). (2013*). The economic decline of empires*. Routledge. 168-195.

Elmer, G. (1997). Excavating Ethnicity in Québécois. *Québec Studies*, (23), 13-28.

Encarnación, O. G. (2008). *Spanish politics: democracy after dictatorship*. Polity.

Eriksen, T. (2002). Ethnicity and nationalism (2nd ed., Anthropology, culture, and society). London ; Sterling, Va.: Pluto Press.

Erk, J. (2005). From Vlaams Blok to Vlaams Belang: the Belgian far-right renames itself. *West European Politics*, 28(3), 493-502.

Erlich Sari (1990), An African quarter in Tel Aviv, *Maariv*, November 14, 1990.

Eshet Gideon and Ofer Petersburg (1996), Labor Minister: I Will soon Deport 100 Thousand Foreign Workers, *Yediot Aharonot*, July 16, 1996.

Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya(1999). *Programa Electoral* 1999.

Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (2003). *Programa Electoral* 2003

Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (2006). *Programa Electoral* 2006

Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (2010). *Programa Electoral* 2010

Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (2012). *Programa Electoral* 2012

Eyal, G. (2006). *The disenchantment of the Orient: Expertise in Arab affairs and the Israeli state*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.

Faribault, M. (1967). *Unfinished Business: Some Thoughts on the Mounting Crisis in Quebec*. McClelland and Stewart.

Falardeau, J. C. (1953). *Essais sur le Québec contemporain*. Presses universitaires Laval.

Fargues, P. (2000). Protracted National Conflict and Fertility Change: Palestinians and Israelis in the Twentieth Century. *Population and Development Review*, 26(3), 441-482.

Fearon J.D., Wendt, A. (2002). Rationalism and Constructivism in International Relations Theory. In: Carlsnaes W., Risse T., Simmons B. (Eds.), *Handbook of International Relations Theory*. London: Sage Publications, pp.52-72.

Fenwick, R. (1981). Social change and ethnic nationalism: an historical analysis of the separatist movement in Quebec. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, *23*(02), 196-216.

Feron, James (1969), Dayan Gives plan for Arab Areas, *The New York Times*, June 3, 1969

Ferrer, F. (2000). Languages, Minorities and Education in Spain: The case of Catalonia. *Comparative Education*, 36(2), 187-197.

Ferrero-Turrión, R., & Pinyol-Jiménez, G. (2009). Immigration and the Construction of Public Philosophy (ies) of Integration in Spain. Illiberal Liberal States. *Immigration, Citizenship and Integration in the EU*. Surrey: Ashgate, 337-56.

Flesler, D. (2008). *The return of the Moor: Spanish responses to contemporary Moroccan immigration* (Vol. 43). Purdue University Press.

Figueres, J.M. (2003). *Història contemporània de Catalunya*. Editorial UOC.

Finotelli, C., & Arango, J. (2011). Regularisation of unauthorised immigrants in Italy and Spain: determinants and effects. *Documents d'anàlisi geogràfica*, 57(3), 495-515.

Fishman, J. A. (1967). Bilingualism with and without diglossia; diglossia with and without bilingualism. *Journal of social issues*, 23(2), 29-38.

Fontaine, L. (1995). Immigration and cultural policies: a bone of contention between the province of Quebec and the Canadian federal government. *International Migration Review*, 1041-1048.

Fontaine, L., & Juteau, D. (1996). Appartenance à la nation et droits de la citoyenneté. *Les Frontières de l'identité*, 191-205.

Forbes, H. D. (1993). Canada: From bilingualism to multiculturalism. *Journal of Democracy*, 4(4), 69-84.

Fraser, G. (2001). *Rene Levesque and the Parti Quebecois in power*. McGill-Queen's Press-MQUP.

Freeman, G. P. (1995). Modes of immigration politics in liberal democratic states. *International migration review*, 881-902.

Freeman, G. P., & Kessler, A. K. (2008). Political economy and migration policy. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 34(4), 655-678.

Friedlander, D., & Goldscheider, Calvin. (1979). *The population of Israel*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Friedlander, D., & Goldscheider, C. (1984). Israel's population: The challenge of pluralism. *Population Bulletin*, 39(2), 3-39.

Friend, J. (2012). *Stateless Nations: Western European regional nationalisms and the old nations*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Friling, T. (2005). *Arrows in the dark : David Ben-Gurion, the Yishuv leadership, and rescue attempts during the Holocaust*. Madison, Wisc.: University of Wisconsin Press.

Fugère, J. (1945). Le fait néo-canadien dans la vie montréalaise et dans la vie canadienne, *L'Action nationale*, 25 (4): 354-368.

Gagné, G., & Langlois, S. (2002). *Les raisons fortes: nature et signification de l'appui à la souveraineté du Québec*. PUM.

Gagnon, A. and R. Iacovino, (2005) *'Interculturalism: Expanding the Boundaries of Citizenship'*,

Gagnon, A. & Iacovino, R. (2006). *Federalism, Citizenship and Québec*. University of Toronto Press.

Gagnon, A. G., & Iacovino, R. (2007). *De la nation à la multination. Les rapports Québec-Canada*. Montréal: Boréal.

Gagnon, L. (2013), How Quebec chooses immigrants, *The Globe and Mail*. November 20, 2013

Gagnon, S. (1985). *Quebec and Its Historians: The Twentieth Century* (Vol. 2). University of Ottawa Press.

Ganor A. (1987), The president of the commerce lobby: it is possible without workers from the territories; we need to import workers from cultured countries, *Haaretz*, December 23, 1987.

Gans, C. (2003). *The Limits of Nationalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Garriga, J. La Generalitat abre en Varsovia una oficina para inmigrantes. *El Pais.* November 7, 2002.

Gates, P. W. (1934). Official Encouragement to Immigration by the Province of Canada. *Canadian Historical Review*, *15*(1), 24-38.

Gauvreau, M. (2005). *Catholic Origins of Quebec's Quiet Revolution, 1931-1970* (Vol. 2). McGill-Queen's Press-MQUP.

Gazit, S. (1995). *The carrot and the stick: Israel's policy in Judaea and Samaria*. Bnai Brith Books.

Geffen A. (1988), We need to institutionalize the recruitment of foreign Workers, *Haaretz*. July 14, 1988.

Gelber, Y. (1998), From don't immigrate to the Law of Return, in Hacohen, D. *The Ingatherong of the exiles and immigration to Israel: Myths and Reality*, Jerusalem: 249-284

George, A. L., & Bennett, A. (2005). *Case studies and theory development in the social sciences*. Mit Press.

Gilat Moti (1993), Passover Closure, *Yediot Aharonot*, April 9, 1993

Gilligan, C., & Ball, S. (2011). Introduction: Migration and Divided Societies. *Ethnopolitics*, 10(2), 153-170.

Giner, S. (1984). Ethnic nationalism, centre and periphery in Spain. In: Abel and Torrents, *Conditional Democracy*. London: Croom Helm

Giner, S., & Sevilla, E. (1984). Spain: from corporatism to corporatism. *Southern Europe Transformed. Harper & Row, London*, 113.

Ginosar U. (1988), Bring me a Portuguese, *Maariv*, November 15, 1988.

Girard, C. (2001). *Canada, a Country Divided: The Times of London and Canada, 1908-1922*. Chicoutimi, Québec: Groupe de recherche et d'intervention régionales.

Gitelman, Z. Y. (2001). *A century of ambivalence: the Jews of Russia and the Soviet Union, 1881 to the present*. Indiana University Press.

Glasgow Herald (1928), Canada wants Britons, *Glasgow Herald*. October 11, 1928.

Golan A. (1990), Are you being served? *Davar*, October 10, 1990.

Golan Yehuda (1996) In Foreign Hands, *Maariv*, March 13, 1996.

Golan, A. (1997). "The transformation of abandoned Arab rural areas." *Israel Studies.* 2.1: 94-110.

Goldbrasht E. (1991), Porush convinces builders that they only need 1,500 foreign workers, *Maariv*. January 8, 1991.

Gomà, R. (2001). *Govern i polítiques públiques a Catalunya (1980-2000): Autonomia i benestar* (Vol. 1). Univ. Autònoma de Barcelona.

Goodyer, B. (1965) Quebec Seeks to lure immigrants, *Montreal Gazette*, March 8, 1965.

Goren, T. (2002). The vision of a greater Hebrew Haifa, *Iyunim Betkumat Israel* 11, 230-260.

Gossage, P., & Gauvreau, D. (1999). Demography and discourse in transition: Quebec fertility at the turn of the twentieth century. *The History of the Family*, 4(4), 375-395.

Gotthalf Yehuda (1983), Gambling on Israel's Future, *Davar*, March 19, 1983

Gourevitch, P. A. (1979). The reemergence of "peripheral nationalisms": some comparative speculations on the spatial distribution of political leadership and economic growth. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 21(03), 303-322.

Gouvernement du Québec (1972). *La situation de la langue française au Québec. Rapport de la commission d'enquête sur la situation de la langue française et sur les droits linguistiques au Québec*. Livre I. La langue de travail. La situation du français dans les activités de travail et de consommation des Québécois.

Gouvernment du Québec, (1973), *Commission of Inquiry on the Position of the French Language and on Language Rights in Quebec: Language of Work* (Gendron Commission). L'Editeur Officiel du Quebec, Quebec.

Gouvernement du Quebec, (1981) *Autant de facons d'etre Qebecois: plan d'action du gouvernement du Quebec* (Qu´ebec: Ministere des Communaut´es culturelles et de l'Immigration, 1981).

Gouvernement du Québec (2004a). *L'immigration au Québec*. Québec: Ministère des Relations avec les citoyens et Immigration.

Gouvernement du Québec (2004b). *Des valeurs partagées, des intérêts communs. Pour assurer la pleine participation des Québécois des communautés culturelles au développement du Québec*. Québec: Ministère des Relations avec les citoyens et de l'Immigration.

Gouvernement du Québec. (1996a). *Le français langue commune*. (Rapport du comite´ interministériel sur la situation de la langue française). Québec: Gouvernement du Québec.

Gouvernement du Québec. (1996b). *Le français langue commune.* Proposition de politique linguistique. Québec: Ministère de la Culture et des Communications.

Gouvernement du Québec. (2000). *La Citoyenneté´ québécoise*. Document de consultation pour le forum national sur la citoyenneté´ et l'intégration. Québec: Ministère des Relations avec les Citoyens et de l'Immigration.

Gouvernement du Québec. (2001). *Le Français, une langue pour tout le monde* (Rapport de la Commission des Etats généraux sur la situation de l'avenir de la langue française au Québec). Québec: Gouvernement du Québec.

Greenfeld, L. (1992). *Nationalism : Five roads to modernity*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Greenhill, K. (2010). *Weapons of mass migration : Forced displacement, coercion, and foreign policy* (Cornell studies in security affairs). Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Greer, S. (2007). *Nationalism and self-government : The politics of autonomy in Scotland and Catalonia* (SUNY series in national identities). Albany: State University of New York Press.

Grenier, G. (1987). Earnings by language group in Quebec in 1980 and emigration from Quebec between 1976 and 1981. *Canadian Journal of Economics*, 774-791.

Güell, C. (2006*). The failure of Catalanist opposition to Franco (1939-1950)* (Biblioteca de historia ; 65). Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas.

Guibernau, M. (1996). *Los nacionalismos*. Ariel.

Guibernau, M. (2004). *Catalan nationalism: Francoism, transition and democracy*. Routledge.

Guibernau, M. (2006). National identity, devolution and secession in Canada, Britain and Spain*. *Nations and Nationalism*, 12(1), 51-76.

Haaretz (1993), Minister Namir Announced that no more Visas will be issued to Thai Workers, *Haaretz*, March 31, 1993

Haaretz (1993b), Minister Tzur will not Authorize the replacement of Workers from the Territories with Thai Workers, *Haaretz*, April 23, 1993.

Hacohen, D. (1998a). Aliya policies during the first decade: attempts to limit aliya. In: Hacohen, D. *Aliya to Israel: myth and reality.* Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Center. 285-316.

Hacohen, D. (1998b). Who supported large Aliya in the 1950s and who demanded its limitations – comments on Avi Pikar's article. *Iyunim bekumat Israel* 11. 578-581.

Hacohen, D. (2009), Obstacle Race, *Israel* 15, 211-218

Hadari, Z. (1991). *Second Exodus : The full story of Jewish illegal immigration to Palestine, 1945-1948.* London, England ; Portland, Or.: Vallentine Mitchell.

Haim Bior (1993) Due to the Closure: Pressure on the Government to Maintain incentives For Israeli Agricultural Workers, *Haaretz*, March 31, 1993

Hajjar, L. (2005). *Courting Conflict The Israeli Military Court System in the West Bank and Gaza.* Berkeley: University of California Press

Halamish, A. (1988). Illegal immigration: Values, myth and reality. *Studies in Zionism, 9(1), 47-62.*

Halamish, A. (2006). *A Dual Race Against Time: Zionist Immigration Policy in the 1930s.* Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Zvi.

Halamish, A. (2008). Zionist immigration policy put to the test: Historical analysis of Israel's immigration policy, 1948–1951. *Journal of Modern Jewish Studies*, 7(2), 119-134.

Hall, D. (1981). *Clifford Sifton*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.

Hall, J. (1979). Immigration et nationalisme en Catalogne. *Perspectiva social*, 14, 93-136.

Hall, J. (2001). *Convivència in Catalonia*. Institut d'Estudis Catalans.

Halpern, B (1969). *The idea of the Jewish state*. (2d ed., Harvard Middle Eastern studies ; 3). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Handler, R. (1988). *Nationalism and the Politics of Culture in Quebec*. Univ of Wisconsin Press.

Harel Amos (2013), The number of work permits for Palestinians, the highest since the second Intifada, *Haaretz*, September 17, 2013.

Hargreaves, J. (2000). *Freedom for Catalonia? : Catalan nationalism, Spanish identity, and the Barcelona Olympic Games*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Harris, John R., and Michael P. Todaro. "Migration, unemployment and development: a two-sector analysis." *The American economic review* (1970): 126-142.

Harris, S. (2014). *Catalonia Is Not Spain - A Historical Perspective*. Barcelona: 4Cats Books.

Harzig, C., Juteau, D., & Schmitt, I. (2006). *The social construction of diversity: recasting the master narrative of industrial nations*. New York: Berghahn Books.

Hatzofe (1953a). The Aliya Crisis. *Davar,* July 1, 1953.

Hatzofe (1953b). Refael Soker and the problem of Aliya, *Hatzofe,* December 28, 1953.

Hawkins, Freda (1988). *Canada and immigration: Public policy and public concern*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press.

Helly, D., & Van Schendel, N. (2001). *Appartenir au Québec: citoyenneté, nation et société civile: enquête à Montréal, 1995*. Éditions de l'IQRC.

Henripin, J. (1957). From acceptance of nature to control: The demography of the French Canadians since the seventeenth century. *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, 10-19.

Henripin, J., & Péron, Y. (1972). *The demographic transition of the province of Quebec*.

Hepburn, E. (2010). Small worlds in Canada and Europe: A comparison of regional party systems in Quebec, Bavaria and Scotland. *Regional and Federal Studies*, 20(4-5), 527-544.

Hernández Carr, A. (2011). ¿ La hora del populismo?: elementos para comprender el" éxito" electoral de Plataforma per Catalunya. *Revista de Estudios Políticos*, (153), 47-74.

Hernandez Garcia, E. (2004), Zapatero busca un pacto de Estado que acote las reformas estatutarias, *Diario Córdoba*, April 10, 2004

Herr, R. (1971). *An Historical Essay on Modern Spain* (Vol. 118). Univ of California Press.

Heruth (1962), Go Sabras, *Heruth*, June 1, 1962

Herzog, Lawrence, A. (1990) Border commuter workers and transfrontier metropolitan structure along the United States‐Mexico Border." *Journal of Borderlands Studies* 5.2 (1990): 1-20.

Hobsbawm, E. J. (1996). The future of the state. *Development and Change*, 27(2), 267-278.

Hollifield, J. F. (2014). The politics of international migration. *Migration theory: Talking across disciplines,* 137-85.

Hopkins, D. J. (2010). Politicized places: Explaining where and when immigrants provoke local opposition. *American Political Science Review*, 104(01), 40-60.

Horin, R. (1966), L'immigration au Canada, Montreal: *Action Nationale*

Horowitz, D. L. (1985). *Ethnic groups in conflict*. Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press.

Horowitz, D., & Lissak, Moshe. (1989). *Trouble in Utopia : The overburdened polity of Israel* (SUNY series in Israeli studies). Albany: State University of New York Press.

Hughes, R. (1993). *Barcelona* (1st Vintage Books ed.). New York: Vintage Books.

Houle, F. (2014). Implementing Québec Intercultural Policy Through the Selection of Immigrants. In: *Immigration Regulation in Federal States* (pp. 117-138). Springer Netherlands.

Huntoon, L. (1998). Immigration to Spain: implications for a unified European Union immigration policy. *International Migration Review,* 423-450.

Hyndman, J. (1998) "Managing difference: Gender and culture in humanitarian emergencies." *Gender, Place and Culture: A Journal of Feminist Geography* 5.3: 241-260.

Iacovino, R. (2014). Canadian Federalism and the Governance of Immigration. *The Politics of Immigration in Multi-Level States: Governance and Political Parties*, 86.

Iacovino, R. (2015). Contextualizing the Quebec Charter of Values: Belonging without Citizenship in Quebec. *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, 47(1), 41-60.

Iacovino, R., & Sévigny, C. A. (2011). Between unity and diversity: examining the Quebec model of integration. *Quebec Questions: Quebec Studies for the Twenty-First Century*, eds. Stéphan Gervais, Christopher Kirkey and Jarrett Rudy, 249-266.

IDF Spokesman (1993), *IDF Response to B'tselem Report on the Closure*, April 29, 1993 (unpublished).

Illas, E. (2012). *Thinking Barcelona*. Liverpool University Press.

Irit Keynan (2003), "She'erit Hapletah: immigrants or Olim," in *Iyunim Bitkumat Israel: Studies in Zionism and the State of Israel*, (ed.) Pinhas Genosar, Vol. 1 (1991), pp. 343-358.

Izquierdo, A. (1992). *La inmigración en España 1980-1990*. Ministerio de Trabajo y de Seguridad Social. Madrid.

Jardí, E. (1983*). El pensament de Prat de la Riba*. Editorial Alpha.

Jones, C. A. (2013). *Soviet Jewish Aliyah, 1989-92: Impact and Implications for Israel and the Middle East*. Routledge.

Jones, R. (1983). *Duplessis and the Union Nationale administration*. Canadian Historical Association.

Joppke, C. (2005). *Selecting by origin: ethnic migration in the liberal state*. Harvard University Press.

Joppke, C., & Morawska, Ewa T. (2003). *Toward assimilation and citizenship : Immigrants in liberal nation-states* (Migration, minorities, and citizenship). Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Joseph, S. (1914). *Jewish immigration to the United States, from 1881 to 1910* (Studies in history, economics, and public law ; no. 145). New York: Columbia University.

Juberias, C. F. (2013). Catalonia's Search for a Place Within Pluralist Spain. In: Ghai, Yash, and Sophia Woodman. *Practising Self-Government*. Cambridge University Press. 228-257

Juteau, D. (1996). Theorising ethnicity and ethnic communalisations at the margins: from Quebec to the world system. *Nations and Nationalism*, 2(1), 45-66.

Juteau, D. (1997). Multicultural citizenship: The challenge of pluralism in Canada. *Citizenship and exclusion*, 96-112.

Juteau, D. (2002). The citizen makes an entrée: Redefining the national community in Quebec. *Citizenship Studies*, 6(4), 441-458.

Juteau D. (2003). *Social differentiation patterns and processes* (Policy research (Toronto, Ont.)). Toronto ; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press.

Juteau, D. (2004) '"Pure Laines" Quebecois: The Concealed Ethnicity of Dominant Majorities', in E.F. Kaufmann (ed.) *Rethinking Ethnicity: Majority Groups and Dominant Minorities*, pp. 84–101. London: Routledge.

Juteau, D., & McAndrew, M. (1992). Essai—Projet national, immigration et intégration dans un Québec souverain. *Sociologie et sociétés*, 24(2), 161-180.

Kaplan, D. H. (1994). Two nations in search of a state: Canada's ambivalent spatial identities. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, *84*(4), 585-606.

Karmis, D. (1997). *Identities in Québec: Between" la Souche" and" atomization". Programme d'études sur le Québec*, Université McGill.

Kastoryano, R. (2002). *Negotiating identities: States and immigrants in France and Germany.* Princeton University Press.

Katz Israel (1968), Birthrates, Children and Parents in Israel, *Davar*, July

Kaufmann, E. (2000). Ethnic or civic nation? Theorizing the American case. Canadian *Review of Studies in Nationalism*, 27(1/2), 133-155.

Keating, M. (2001). *Nations against the state: The new politics of nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia, and Scotland*.

Keating, M., & Bray, Z. (2006). Renegotiating sovereignty: Basque nationalism and the rise and fall of the Ibarretxe Plan. *Ethnopolitics*, *5*(4), 347-364.

Keating, M., & Wilson, A. (2009). Renegotiating the state of autonomies: Statute reform and multi-level politics in Spain. *West European Politics*, 32(3), 536-558.

Keynan, I. (1991), "She'erit Hapletah: immigrants or Olim," in *Iyunim Bitkumat Israel: Studies in Zionism and the State of Israel*, (ed.) Pinhas Genosar, Vol. 1 , pp. 343-358.

Kelley, Ninette, and Michael J. Trebilcock. (2010). *The making of the mosaic: a history of Canadian immigration policy*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Kemp, A., & Raijman, R. (2008). *Workers" and" Foreigners": The political economy of labor migration in Israel*. Van-Leer Institute and Hakibbutz Hameuchad, Jerusalem (in Hebrew).

Keown, D. (2011). *A companion to Catalan culture* (Colección Támesis. Serie A, Monografías ; 293). Woodbridge, Suffolk, UK ; Rochester, NY: Tamesis.

Kertzer, D., & Arel, Dominique. (2002). *Census and identity : The politics of race, ethnicity, and language in national census* (New perspectives on anthropological and social demography). Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Kessler and Man (1986) An increase expected in percentage of non-jews in Israel, *Ma'ariv*, May 12, 1986

Khalidi, R. (1997). *Palestinian identity : The construction of modern national consciousness*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Khalidi, R. (2007). *The iron cage: The story of the Palestinian struggle for statehood*. Beacon Press.

Khalidi, W. (1988). Plan Dalet: Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 18(1), 4-33.

Khazzoom, A. (2003). The great chain of Orientalism: Jewish identity, stigma management, and ethnic exclusion in Israel. *American Sociological Review*, 481-510.

Kimmerling, B., & Migdal, Joel S. (2003). *The Palestinian people : A history*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Kiper, D. (1991), The Cabinet has authorized the importation of 9,500 cunstruction workers from abroad, *Yediot Aharonot*, January 7, 1991.

Kliner-Liebau, D. (2009). *Migration and the construction of national identity in Spain (Vol. 15).* Iberoamericana Editorial.

Klier, J., & Lambroza, Shlomo. (2004). *Pogroms : Anti-Jewish violence in modern Russian history.* Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Knowles, V. (2007). *Strangers at Our Gates: Canadian Immigration and Immigration Policy, 1504-1990*. Dundurn.

Kohn, H. (1944). *The idea of nationalism : A study in its origins and background*. New York: Macmillan.

Konnert, M. (2006*). Early modern Europe : The age of religious war, 1559-1715.* Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press.

Koopmans, R. (2005*). Contested citizenship : Immigration and cultural diversity in Europe* (Social movements, protest, and contention ; v. 25). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Kössler, K. (2015). *Immigration and Integration in Multilevel Systems: A Challenge between Autonomy and Intergovernmental Cooperation. Migration and Autonomous Territories: The Case of South Tyrol and Catalonia*, 27.

Kostov, C. (2008). Canada-Quebec immigration agreements (1971–1991) and their impact on federalism. *American Review of Canadian Studies*, 38(1), 91-103.

Kralt, J. (1976). *Language in Canada*. Ottawa: Statistics Canada

Kuzio, T. (2002). The myth of the civic state: a critical survey of Hans Kohn's framework for understanding nationalism. *Ethnic and Racial studies*, 25(1), 20-39.

Kwavnick, D. (1965). The Roots of French-Canadian Discontent. *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science/Revue canadienne de economiques et science politique*, *31*(04), 509-523.

Kymlicka, W. (1995). *Multicultural citizenship : A liberal theory of minority rights (Oxford political theory)*. Oxford : New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press.

Kymlicka, W. (2001). Immigrant integration and minority nationalism. In: *Minority nationalism and the changing international order*, 1, 61-84.

Labelle, Micheline, and Daniel Salée. "Immigrant and minority representations of citizenship in Quebec." *Citizenhip Today. Global Perspectives and Practices*, Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2001): 278-315.

Lachapelle, R. (1988). Changes in fertility among Canadas linguistic groups. *Canadian Social Trends,* (10), 2-8.

Lachaine, A, The Evolution of French Canada. In *Quebec Questions: Quebec Studies for the Twenty-First Century,* eds. Stephan Gervais, Christopher Kirkey and Jarrett Rudy (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 66-79.

Laforest, G. (1995). *Trudeau and the End of a Canadian Dream*. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Lahav, G. (2004). *Immigration and politics in the new Europe: Reinventing borders*. Cambridge University Press.

Laitin, D. D. (1992). Language normalization in Estonia and Catalonia. *Journal of Baltic Studies*, 23(2), 149-166.

Lamoureux, D. (1992). Nationalism and Misogyny. In Dodge, W. *Boundaries of identity: a Quebec reader*. Lester Publishing.

Landau, D. (1987). Professor's bombshell on Arab growth rates rocks Israeli Politics, *The Toronto Star*, July 11, 1987.

Laporte, P (1954), Panorama l'immigration, *L'Action nationale*, May 1954

Lauper Dan (1993) Construction companies threaten to Strike if government refuses to recruit forigners, *Haaretz*, April 20, 1993.

Lavie A. (1988a) There is a government decision not to allow the employment of workers in the construction industry, *Haaretz*, February 26, 1988.

Lavie A. (1988b), Construction companies: we plan on petition the HCJ regarding Labor Minister Katzav's refusal to recruit foreign workers, *Haaretz*, May 26, 1988.

Lavie A. (1988c), Construction companies: if we are not granted approval for recruiting workers abroad we will go on leave. *Haaretz*, June 1, 1988.

Lavie A. (1993), The Constructers Received over 10,000 requests for Workers, *Haaretz*, April 2, 1993.

Lavoie, N., & Serré, P. (2002). Du vote bloc au vote social: le cas des citoyens issus de l'immigration de Montréal, 1995-1996. *Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique*, 35(01), 49-74.

Leger, J.M. (1954a) Le devoir du Quebec envers l'immigrant, *L'Action nationale*, May 1954

Leger, M.J (1954b). Culture et destin national, *La Presse*, 23 June 1954.

Leger, J.M. (1957), "Immigration: probleme sociale, drame nationale, " *Le Devoir*, 12 December, 1957

Leibovitch-Dar Sarah (2003), The Chinese Worker has done his Job, *Haaretz*, May 7, 2003.

Leitner, H. (1995). International migration and the politics of admission and exclusion in postwar Europe. *Political Geography*, 14(3), 259-278.

Leroux, D. (2014). Entrenching Euro-Settlerism: Multiculturalism and the Politics of Nationalism in Québec. *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, 46(2), 133-139.

Lévesque, R. (1968). *Option Québec*. R. Laffont.

Levi, M. (1997). *Consent, dissent, and patriotism*. Cambridge University Press.

Levine, M. (2010). *The reconquest of Montreal: Language policy and social change in a bilingual city*. Temple University Press.

Levinson, A. (2005). *Regularisation programmes in Spain. The Regularisation of Unauthorised Migrants: Literature Survey and Country Case Studies*. University of Oxford: Centre on Migration, Policy and Society.

Linteau, P. A., Durocher, R., Robert, J. C., & Ricard, F. (1983). *Québec: A History*, 1867–1929, trans. Robert Chodos (Toronto 1983), 306.

Linz, J. J (1966). *Within-nation differences and comparisons: the eight Spains*. Yale University Press.

Linz, J. J., & Stepan, A. (1996). *Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe*. JHU Press.

Llobera, J. R. (2005) *Foundations of national identity: From Catalonia to Europe*. Vol. 19. Berghahn books.

Lluch, J. (2014*). Constitutionalism and the Politics of Accommodation in Multinational Democracies.* Palgrave Macmillan.

Lockman, Z. (1996). *Comrades and Enemies: Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine, 1906-1948*. Univ of California Press.

Lowry, D. (2003). The crown, empire loyalism and the assimilation of non-British white subjects in the British world: An argument against 'ethnic determinism'. *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, *31*(2), 96-120.

Lustick, I. (1980*). Arabs in the Jewish State : Israel's control of a national minority* (Modern Middle East series (Austin, Tex.) ; no. 6). Austin: University of Texas Press.

Lustick, I. (1993). *Unsettled States, Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank-Gaza*. Cornell University Press.

Lustick, Ian (1996) "The Fetish of Jerusalem: A Hegemonic Analysis." *Israel in Comparative Perspective: Challenging the Conventional Wisdom* (1996): 143-172.

Lustick, I. S. (1999). Israel as a non-Arab state: the political implications of mass immigration of non-Jews. *The Middle East Journal*, 417-433.

Maariv (1986) Aproximatly half a million residents have emigrated since the creation of the state, *Maariv*, May 11, 1986

Maicas, M. P. (1985). *Aproximación a Cataluña*. Univ. Autònoma de Barcelona.

MacCormack, J. (1921) Canada's policy on Immigration works out badly. *Montreal Gazette. September 12, 1922.*

MacLeod, R., & Poutanen, M. A. (2004). *Meeting of the People: School Boards and Protestant Communities in Quebec*. McGill-Queen's Press-MQUP.

Maclure, J. (2003) *Quebec Identity: The Challenge of Pluralism*. Montreal and Kingston: McGill

Mahrouse, G. (2010). 'Reasonable accommodation'in Québec: the limits of participation and dialogue. *Race & Class*, 52(1), 85-96.

Maktabi, R. (1999). The Lebanese census of 1932 revisited. Who are the Lebanese?. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 26(2), 219-241.

Malone, A. G. (1952). *The Group Opinions and Attitudes of the Quebec Population Concerning Immigration: a Statistic Analysis*. Université de Montréal.

Malquer i Sostres, J. (1963). *L'estructura econòmica de les terres catalanes* (Vol. 202). Editorial Barcino.

Maor Ziv (1996), Contractors are Facing Difficulties and are Delaying Project Completions, *Haaretz*, December 1, 1996.

Marcet, J., Argelaguet J. (2003*). Nationalist Parties in Catalonia*. In:De Winter, L., &

Tursan, H. (Eds.). (2003). *Regionalist parties in western Europe*. Routledge. 70-86.

Marfany, J. (2012). *Land, proto-industry and population in Catalonia, c. 1680-1829: an alternative transition to capitalism?*. Ashgate Publishing.

Mandel, N. J. (1974). Ottoman policy and restrictions on Jewish settlement in Palestine: 1881–1908—part I. *Middle Eastern Studies*, *10*(3), 312-332.

Marín, A. (2004). La Generalitat reclamará a Zapatero las competencias sobre inmigración. *ABC*. March 17, 2004.

Martin, G. (1972). *The Durham Report and British policy: A critical essay.* (Cambridge Commonwealth series). Cambridge University Press.

Mas, A. (2003). “Defenderemos un nuevo estatuto dentro de la legalidad. *El Pais*. October 29, 2003.

Mas, A. Pau, E. (2011). *From industrialization to the present day. In: Keown, D. (2011). A Companion to Catalan Culture* (Vol. 293). Tamesis Books. 71-97

Masgrau, R. (1984). *Els orígens del catalanisme polític:(1870-1931*). Editorial Barcanova, SA.

Masnau, R. M. (2002). *Notes on nationalism*. Gracewing Publishing.

Massey, D. S., Arango, J., Hugo, G., Kouaouci, A., Pellegrino, A., & Taylor, J. E. (1993). Theories of international migration: a review and appraisal. *Population and development review*, 431-466.

Massey, D. S., Arango, J., Hugo, G., Kouaouci, A., & Pellegrino, A. (1998*). Worlds in Motion: Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millennium: Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millennium*. Oxford University Press.

McAndrew, M. (2003). Should national minorities/majorities share common institutions or control their own schools? A comparison of policies and debates in Quebec, Northern Ireland and Catalonia. *The social construction of diversity: recasting the master narrative of industrial nations*, 369-424.

McAndrew, M. (2010). Immigration and Diversity in Quebec’s Schools: An Assessment. *Quebec Questions: Quebec Studies for the Twenty-First Century*, 287-304.

McAndrew, M. (2013). *Fragile Majorities and Education: Belgium, Catalonia, Northern Ireland, and Quebec*. McGill-Queen's Press-MQUP.

McAndrew, M., & Lamarre, P. (1996). The integration of ethnic minority students fifteen years after Bill 101: Linguistic and cultural issues confronting Quebec's french language schools. *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, 28(2), 40.

McGarry, J. and B. O’Leary, “Introduction: The Macro-Political Regulation of Ethnic Conflict”, in McGarry, J. and O’Leary, B. (eds.), *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation*, (London: Routledge, 1993).

McInnis, M. (1969). Provincial migration and differential economic opportunity. In *Migration in Canada*. DBS Ottawa.

McRoberts, G. (1993). English-Canadian Perceptions of Québec. In *Québec State and Society* (pp. 116-129). NelsonCanada Scarborough, ON.

McRoberts, K. (Ed.). (1997). *Misconceiving Canada: The struggle for national unity.* Oxford University Press, USA.

McRoberts, K. (2001). *Catalonia: Nation building without a state.* Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press Canada.

Meadwell, H. (1993). The politics of nationalism in Quebec. *World Politics*, 45(02), 203-241.

Medrano, J. D. (1995). *Divided nations: class, politics, and nationalism in the Basque Country and Catalonia*. Cornell University Press.

Meilleur, N. (2005). *Profil sociolinguistique des élèves du secteur des jeunes de la*

Meintel, D., & Fortin, S. (2001). Identité et langue. Commission des États généraux sur la situation et l'avenir de la langue française au Québec.

Meir-Glitzenstein, E. (2004). *Zionism in an Arab country : Jews in Iraq in the 1940s*. London ; New York: Routledge.

Meiri Baruch (1995), Swimming, By Camel, and Counterfeit Passports, *Maariv*, September 21, 1995.

Mena D. (1989), Your own city's poor come first, *Haaretz*, June 14, 1989.

Meren, D. (2012). *With friends like these : Entangled nationalisms and the Canada-Quebec-France triangle*, 1944-1970.

Messina, A. M. (2007). *The logics and politics of post-WWII migration to Western Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Metzer, J. (2003). Eretz Israel's Economy during the mandate - a view on the development if research. *Itunim Betkumat Israel* 11. 7-58

Metzer, J., & Kaplan, O. (1985). Jointly but severally: Arab-Jewish dualism and economic growth in mandatory Palestine. *The Journal of Economic History*, *45*(02), 327-345.

Ministère de l'Éducation, du Loisir et du Sport (2014), *Indicateurs linguistique*. Quebec: Gouvernement du Québec

Ministère des Communautés Culturelles et de l'Immigration (1981). *Autant de façons d'être Québecois: plan d'action du Gouvernement de Québec à l'intention des communautés culturelles*. Québec City: Ministère des Communautés Culturelles et de l'Immigration du Québec.

Ministère des Communautés Culturelles et de l'Immigration. (1990). *Let's Build Québec Together: Vision: A Policy Statement on Immigration and Integration*. Québec City:

Ministère de l'Immigration et des Communautés Culturelles (2011), *Plan d'Immigration 2012-2015.*

Ministère de l'Immigration, de la Diversité et de l'Inclusion (2014). *Présence en 2014 des immigrants admis au Québec de 2003 à 2012. Québec: Ministère de l'Immigration, de la Diversité et de l'Inclusion.*

Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales (2002): "*Tablas de trabajadores extranjeros con permisos de trabajo en vigor por ocupación.* Madrid: Subdirección General de Estadística

Ministry of Defense (1970), *Development and economic situation in judea, samaria, the gaza strip and north sinai; 1967-1969* Ministry of Defense: Tel Aviv

Ministry of Defense (1990), The economy of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip two years after the disturbances. Ministry of Defense: Tel Aviv

Ministry of the Interior Government of Canada (1910), *Canada – the Land of Opportunity*. Ottawa.

Minkenberg, Michael. "The radical right in public office: Agenda‐setting and policy effects." *West European Politics* 24.4 (2001): 1-21.

Mirilovic, N. (2010). The Politics of Immigration: Dictatorship, Development, and Defense. *Comparative Politics*, 273-292.

Molinaro, I. (2011). Context and integration: the allophone communities in Québec. In: *Contemporary Quebec: Selected Readings and Commentaries*, 455-472.

Molinero, C. (2000). *The politics of language in the Spanish-speaking world: From colonisation to globalisation*. Psychology Press.

Money, J. (1999). *Fences and neighbors: The political geography of immigration control. Cornell University Press.*

Moore, J. W. (1992). Immigration and the demographic balance in Israel and the occupied territories. *Middle East Policy*, *1*(3), 88-105.

Morag, N. (2001). Water, Geopolitics and State Building: The Case of Israel. *Middle Eastern Studies, 37*(3), 179-198.

Morgenstern R. (1997), 70,000 Palestinians will be employed in Israel, the majority in the construction sector, *Haaretz*, November 16, 1997.

Morgenstern R. (1988), We are Scared, *Al Hamishmar*, August 16, 1988

Morland, P. (2014). *Demographic Engineering Population Strategies in Ethnic Conflict* (International Population Studies). Farnham: Ashgate Publishing.

Morris, B. (1987). *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949*, Cambridge Middle East Library. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire].

Morris, B. (2004). *The birth of the Palestinian refugee problem revisited* (Vol. 18). Cambridge University Press.

Mossek, M. (1978). *Palestine immigration policy under Sir Herbert Samuel : British, Zionist, and Arab attitudes.* London : Totowa, N.J.: F. Cass ; Distributed by Biblio Distribution Centre.

Muller, J. (2008). Us and Them: The Enduring Power of Ethnic Nationalism. *Foreign Affairs,* 87(2), 18-35.

Nadal, J. M. (1987). El català en els segles XVI i XVII. *L'Avenç*, *100*, 24-30.

Nadal O.J., & Giralt R.E. (1960). *La population catalane de 1553 à 1717. L'inmigrai ion française et les autres facteurs de son développement.*

Naor, M., & Giladi, D. (1990*). Eretz lsrael in the 20th Century: From Yishuv to Statehood, l948-1950*. *Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense.[Hebrew]*.

Nespereira, M. P. (2007). *Prat de la Riba: nacionalisme i formació d'un estat català* (Vol. 28). Editorial Base.

New York Times (1968) Israelis' dispute on Arab Land Widens, *The New York Times*, November 21, 1968,

New York Times (1985), Emigration worries israel as economy sags,
The New York Times, October 14, 1985

New York Times (1986), Israel Reports least immigration since '48 amid worry for future. *The New York Times*, January 7, 1986

Neuman, S. (1999). Aliyah to Israel: Immigration under conditions of adversity.

Newitt, M. (2009). *Portugal in European and world history*. Reaktion books.

Noguer, M. (2011). El partido xenófobo de Anglada quintuplica su resultado en Cataluña. *El Pais.* May 24, 2011.

Norris, P. (2005). *Radical right: voters and parties in the electoral market*. Cambridge University Press.

Oakes, L., & Warren, J. (2007). *Language, citizenship and identity in Quebec (Language and globalization)*. Houndmills, Basingstoke Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Ofer, D. (1991). *Escaping the Holocaust Illegal Immigration to the Land of Israel, 1939-1944* (Studies in Jewish history). New York: Oxford University Press.

Office Québécois de la Langue Française (2008). *Rapport sur l'évolution de la situation linguistique au Québec*. Québec: Ministre de la Culture, des Communications

Olzak, S. (1982). Ethnic mobilization in Quebec*. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 5(3), 253-275.

Oren David (1987) Black Labor, *Davar*, June 14, 1987

Ouellet, F. (1969). The historical background of separatism in Quebec. *French-Canadian Nationalism: An Anthology, ed. Ramsay Cook. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada*, 49-63.

Oyón, J. L., Griful, E., & Moreno, J. M. (2001*). Barcelona 1930: un atlas social*. Edicions UPC.

Paillé, M. (1989). *Aménagement linguistique et population au Québec*. Journal of Canadian Studies, 23, 54-69.

Palestine Royal Commission. (1937). *Palestine royal commission report* ([Parliament. Papers by command] ; Cmd. 5479). London: H.M. Stationery Office.

Pammett, J. H., & LeDuc, L. (2001). Sovereignty, leadership and voting in the Quebec referendums. *Electoral studies*, 20(2), 265-280.

Pappe, I. (2007). *The ethnic cleansing of Palestine*. Oneworld Publications.

Pâquet, M. (1997). *Toward a Quebec Ministry of Immigration, 1945 to 1968* (No. 23). Canadian Historical Association.

Pâquet, M., & Duchesne, É. (1996). Étude de la complexité d'un événement: les responsables politiques québécois et les immigrants illégaux haïtiens, 1972-1974. *Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française*, *50*(2), 173-200.

Pardos-Prado, S., & Molins, J. M. (2009). The emergence of right-wing radicalism at the local level in Spain: the Catalan case. *International Journal of Iberian Studies*, *22*(3), 201-218.

Parés i Maicas, M. *Approach to Catalonia*. Univ. Autònoma de Barcelona, 1985.

Parkin, G. R. (1892). *Imperial Federation, the Problem of National Unity* (No. 143). London; New York: Macmillan.

Parti québécois (1976), Programme électoral du Parti québécois

Parti québécois (1981), Programme électoral du Parti québécois

Parti québécois (1985), Programme électoral du Parti québécois

Parti québécois (1989), Programme électoral du Parti québécois

Parti québécois (1994), Programme électoral du Parti québécois

Parti québécois (1999), Programme électoral du Parti québécois

Parti québécois (2003), Programme électoral du Parti québécois

Parti québécois (2007), Programme électoral du Parti québécois

Parti Liberal du Quebec (1960), Programme 1960

Parti Liberal du Quebec (1962), Programme 1962

Parti Liberal du Quebec (1966), Programme 1966

Parti Liberal du Quebec (1970), Programme 1970

Parti Liberal du Quebec (1973), Programme 1973

Parti Liberal du Quebec (1976), Programme 1976

Parti Liberal du Quebec (1981), Programme 1981

Parti Liberal du Quebec (1985), Programme 1985

Parti Liberal du Quebec (1989), Programme 1989

Parti Liberal du Quebec (1994), Programme 1994

Parti Liberal du Quebec (1999), Programme 1999

Parti Liberal du Quebec (2003), Programme 2003

Partit Socialista de Catalunya (1999). *Programa Electoral* 1999.

Partit Socialista de Catalunya (2003*). Programa Electoral* 2003.

Partit Socialista de Catalunya (2006). *Programa Electoral* 2006.

Partit Socialista de Catalunya (2010). *Programa Electoral* 2010.

Partit Socialista de Catalunya (2012). *Programa Electoral* 2012.

Pau Ballot, J. (1814). *Gramática y apología de la llengua catalana*. Barcelona: Juan Francisco

Peretz, D. (1955*). Israel and the Palestine Arabs*. Washington: Middle East Institute.

Pérez-Moreda, Vicente (1987) "Spain's demographic modernization, 1880-1930," in N. Sánchez-Albornoz (ed.) *The Economic Modernization of Spain, 1830-1930*. New York: New York University Press: 13-41.

Pérez, N. O. (2003). *Spain: Forging an immigration policy.* Migration Information Source.

Petrin, R. A. (1990). *French Canadians in Massachusetts politics, 1885-1915: ethnicity and political pragmatism*. Balch Institute Press.

Pettinicchio, D. (2012). Migration and ethnic nationalism: Anglophone exit and the 'decolonisation'of Québec. *Nations and Nationalism*, 18(4), 719-743.

Phelps Kellogg, L. (1932). A Footnote to the Quebec Act. *Canadian Historical Review*, 13(2), 147-156.

Pi-Sunyer (1971), *The maintenance of ethnic identity in Catalonia*, Amherst: The University of Massachusetts

Picard, E. (2002). *Lebanon, a Shattered Country: Myths and Realities of the wars in Lebanon.* Holmes & Meier Pub.

Piché, V. (2004). Immigration et intégration linguistique: vers un indicateur de réceptivité sociale. *Les Cahiers du Gres*, 4(1), 7-22.

Pierson, P. (2004). *Politics in time: History, institutions, and social analysis*. Princeton University Press.

Pikar, A. (1999). The emergence of selective immigration in the 1950s. Iyunim Betkumat Israel 9. 338-394

Piore, Michael J. 1979. *Birds of passage: migrant labor and industrial societies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Plataforma per Catalunya (2010). Programa Electoral 2010.

Plataforma per Catalunya (2012). Programa Electoral 2012.

Portes, A. (1997). Immigration theory for a new century: Some problems and opportunities. *International migration review*, 799-825

Portugese, J. (1998). *Fertility policy in Israel : The politics of religion, gender, and nation*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger.

Prat de la Riba, E. (1987*). La nacionalidad catalana*. Madrid : Barcelona: Alianza Editorial ; Enciclopèdia Catalana.

Przeworski, A., & Teune, Henry. (1970*). The logic of comparative social inquiry* (Comparative studies in behavioral science). New York: Wiley-Interscience.

Puigjaner, J.M. (2002), Getting to Know Catalonia. Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya

Puigverd, A. (2001). Ferrusola expresa su preocupación por el 'alud de la inmigración', *El Pais*, February 21, 2001.

Pujol, J. (1958a). *Immigració i integració.*

Pujol, J. (1958b). *Per una doctrina de la integració*

Pujol, J. (1976). *La Inmigració: problema i esperança de Cataluña (Vol. 10*). Nova Terra.

Pujol, J. (2001). Cataluña, tierra de acogida. *El Pais*. May 14, 2001.

Pujol, J. (2012). On Immigration, Centre D'estudis Jordi Pujol.

Quinn, H. F. (1979). *The Union Nationale: Quebec Nationalism from Duplessis to Lévesque.* University of Toronto Press.

Rabin Y. (1987), The polgat document: Nationalism and sabotage on the part of workers from the territories, *Haaretz*, December 29, 1987.

Racine, L. (2009). Haitian Canadians experiences of racism in Quebec: a postcolonial feminist perspective. *Racialized migrant women in Canada. Essays on health, violence, and equity*, 265-274.

Radmanovich, A. (1976) "New Minister Says PQ Wants Key Role in Immigrant Policy," *The Montreal Gazette,* June 22, 1976.

Ransom, A. J. (2009). *Science Fiction from Québec: A Postcolonial Study* (Vol. 15). McFarland.

Regev David (1993), Wanted: Thousands of Workers, *Yediot Aharonot,* April 1, 1993.

Regev David and Itamar Eichner (2003), Minister of Interior: Injured Illegals will receive Special Status, *Yediot Aharonot*, January 6, 2003.

Regev David and Yosi Yehoshua (2003), The Fear of Deportation is Stronger than the fear of Terrorism. *Yediot Aharonot*, January 6, 2003.

Reichman, S., Katz, Y., & Paz, Y. (1997). The absorptive capacity of Palestine, 1882–1948. *Middle Eastern Studies*, *33*(2), 338-361.

Reitz, J. G. (2002). Host societies and the reception of immigrants: research themes, emerging theories and methodological issues. *International migration review, 36(4), 1005-1019.*

Reitz J. G. (2004)"Canada: Immigration and Nation-Building in the Transition to a Knowledge Economy." in *Controlling Immigration: a Global Perspective*, 2nd Edition, edited by Wayne A. Cornelius, Philip L. Martin, James F. Hollifield, and Takeyuki Tsuda, Stanford CA: Stanford University Press. 97-133

Reitz, J. G. (2014). New Initiatives and Approaches to Immigration and Nation Building. *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective*, 88.

Renaud, J., Gingras, L., Vachon, S., Blaser, C., Godin, J. F. and Gagné, B. (2003). *What a Difference Ten Years Can Make! The Settlement Experience of Immigrants Admitted to Québec in 1989.* Sainte-Foy: Les Publications du Québec.

Rendon, Silvio. "The Catalan premium: language and employment in Catalonia." *Journal of Population Economics* 20.3 (2007): 669-686.

Reniers, G. (1999). On the history and selectivity of Turkish and Moroccan migration to Belgium. *International Migration*, *37*(4), 679-713

Requejo, F. (2010). Revealing the dark side of traditional democracies in plurinational societies: the case of Catalonia and the Spanish 'Estado de las Autonomías'. *Nations and nationalism,* 16(1), 148-168.

Ribera I Garijo, E. (2012). Catalonia: Immigration and Integration at a Regional level. In: Novotný, V. *Opening the door: immigration and integration in the European Union*. 56-80.

Riera Sagrera, P. (2009). *L'Evolució del vot dual a Catalunya*. Barcelona: ICPS.

Rioux, M. (1978). *Quebec in question*. Lorimer.

Rioux, M., & Martin, Y. (Eds.). (1964). *French Canadian Society (Vol. 1).* McGill-Queen's Press-MQUP.

Rius Sant, X. (2007). *El libro de la inmigración en España. Historia, legislación, política y debate social desde el franquismo hasta nuestros días*. Spain: Almuzar.

Rodriguez, N. and Hagan, J. (2004) "Fractured families and communities: effects of immigration reform in Texas, Mexico, and El Salvador." *Latino Studies* 2.3 (2004): 328-351.

Roi Natan (1989), Interview with Haim Bar-Lev: Tensions and Extremism will Increase, *Davar*, July 21, 1989.

Ros, A. (2004). Un Falso Debate. *El Pais*. September 4, 2004.

Rosenhek, Z. (2003). The Political Dynamics of a Segmented Labour Market Palestinian Citizens, Palestinians from the Occupied Territories and Migrant Workers in Israel. *Acta sociologica*, 46(3), 231-249.

Rosenhek, Z. (2011). Dynamics of inclusion and exclusion in the Israeli welfare state: State building and political economy. *The contradictions of Israeli citizenship: land, religion and state.* London: Routledge, 63-86.

Rosés, J. R. (2003). Why isn't the whole of Spain industrialized? New economic geography and early industrialization, 1797–1910. *The Journal of Economic History*, *63*(04), 995-1022.

Rossell, P. M. (1917*). Diferències entre catalans i castellans : les mentalitats específiques* . Barcelona: Tipografia l'Avenç

Rossell, P. M. (1930) *La Raça*. Barcelona : Catalonia.

Roy, J. (1997). The Nature of Spain's Relations with Latin America. In: Roy, J., & Galinsoga, A. (Eds.). (1997). *The Ibero-American Space: Dimensions and perceptions of the special relationship between Spain and Latin America*. Universitat de Lleida.

Rubinstein Dani (1976) Bi-national state More Dangerous than the Third State, *Davar*, August 13, 1976.

Rubinstein Dani (1982), The struggle for Judizing the West Bank, *Davar*, January 1, 1982.

Rubinstein Danny (1992), Not Much Flavor, *Haaretz*, June 9, 1992.

Rudolph, C. (2003). Security and the political economy of international migration. *American Political Science Review*, 97(04), 603-620.

Rudolph, C. (2006). *National security and immigration: Policy development in the United States and Western Europe since 1945*. Stanford University Press.

Ruff, J. R. (2001). *Violence in early modern Europe, 1500-1800*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rusiñol, P. (2003). Los 'otros catalanes' sólo han tenido el 5,2% del poder autonómico en la era Pujol. *El Pais*. May 18 2003.

Rouillard, J. (2011). Duplessis: Quebec Turns Right. *Contemporary Quebec: Selected Readings & Commentaries*, 17-30.

Ryan, S. (1974). Israeli Economic Policy in the Occupied Areas: Foundations of a New Imperialism. *MERIP Reports*, (24), 3-28.

Rydgren, J. (2008). Immigration sceptics, xenophobes or racists? Radical right‐wing voting in six West European countries. *European Journal of Political Research*, *47*(6), 737-765.

Saar Rali (1996a) The employment service has begun a campaign to encourage construction companies to hire Palestinian workers, *Haaretz*, July 10 ,1996.

Saar Rali (1996b) The Ministers' Committee on Foreign Workers Decided: Freeze the Permits for Overseas Wrkers; 500 foreigners will be Deported Every Month, *Haaretz*, October 28, 1996.

Saar Rali (1996c), The Employment Agency Initiated a Campaign Encouraging Israeli Builders to Hire Palestinians, *Haaretz*, July 10, 1996

Saar Rali (1997), The number of Labor Migrants will be Reduced to 17,500 within 5 years, Palestinian Workers to increase to 70,000, *Haaretz*, April 16, 1997

Sabar, G. (2008). *We're not here to stay": African Migrant Workers in Israel and Back in Africa*. Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Press [Hebrew].

Sàez, A. (1980). Catalunya, gresol o explotadora? Notes sobre immigració i creixement. *en: Catalunya: Immigració i reconstrucció nacional (Ponència sòcio-econòmica). Jornades d'estudi en Barcelona*, 15-18.

Sagir Dan (1988d), 108,300 Workers form the Teritories Work in Israel, *Haaretz*, February 23,1988

Salrach, J. M. (1996). 'Catalunya, Castella i Espanya vistes per si mateixes a l'edad mitjana,''. *L'Avenc*, *200*, 30-7.

Salvador, V. (2010) Literary Language and Diatopic Variarion. In: Aseguinolaza, Fernando Cabo, Anxo Abuín González, and César Domínguez, eds. *A Comparative history of Literatures in the Iberian Peninsul*a. John Benjamins Publishing, 2010. 4

Sasson Eliyahu (1970), The Arab in the Teritories is not Just a Human Being, *Davar*, March 26,1970

Savag Gabi (1989), A foreigner knocking at the door, *Haaretz* , June 14, 1989.

Saywell, J. T. (1977). *The rise of the Parti québécois 1967-76*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Schiffer Shimon (1993), Fuad: "We have tried everything – We Must Punish them, *Yediot Aharonot*, March 31, 1993.

Schiffer Shimon (1993), To Sperate; I don’t want the Palestinians loitering in our contry, *Yediot Aharonot*, April 8, 1996.

Schiffer Shimon and Nehama Duek (1993), Rabin: Closure until Further Notice, *Yediot Aharonot*, April 13, 1993

Schmid, C., Zepa, B., & Snipe, A. (2004). Language policy and ethnic tensions in Quebec and Latvia. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 45(3-4), 231-252.

Schneer, J. (2010). *The Balfour Declaration : The origins of the Arab-Israeli conflict* (1st ed.). New York: Random House.

Schnell, I. (1999). *Guidelines for Policy Making Towards Foreign Workers in Israel*. Jerusalem: The Israeli Centre for Political and Social Research (Hebrew).

Scott, J. (1998). *Seeing like a state how certain schemes to improve the human condition have faile*d (Yale agrarian studies). New Haven: Yale University Press.

Seale, L. (1965). Quebec enters Immigration, *Montreal Gazette*, February 11, 1965.

Segev, T (1998). *1949: The First Israelis*. Macmillan.

Segev, T. (2000). *One Palestine, complete* : Jews and Arabs under the Mandate (1st American ed.). New York: Metropolitan Books.

Segev, T. (2007). *1967: Israel, the war, and the year that transformed the Middle East*. Macmillan.

Seguin R.L (1953) Le habitant*, L'Action nationale*, June 1953

Seiler, D. L. (1989). Peripheral nationalism between pluralism and monism. *International Political Science Review*, 10(3), 191-207.

Sekulic, D. (2004). Civic and ethnic identity: The case of Croatia. *Ethnic and racial studies,* 27(3), 455-483.

Sela, Michal. (1988), Noticeably Absent, *Koteret Rashit*, January 20, 1988

Serré, P. (2002). *Deux poids, deux mesures: l'impact du vote des non-francophones au Québec* (Vol. 60). Montréal: VLB.

Shachar, A. (1999). "Whose republic?: citizenship and membership in the Israeli polity". *Georgetown Immigration Law Journal*. 13 (2): 233-272.

Shafir, G. (1989). *Land, labor, and the origins of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 1882-1914* (Cambridge Middle East library ; 20). Cambridge [England] ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Shafir, G. (1995*). Immigrants and nationalists: Ethnic conflict and accommodation in Catalonia, the Basque Country, Latvia, and Estonia*. Albany: State University of New York.

Shafir, G. (1996). Zionism and colonialism: a comparative approach. *Israel in Comparative Perspective: Challenging the Conventional Wisdom*, 227-242.

Shafir, G., & Peled, Y. (2002). *Being Israeli: The dynamics of multiple citizenship* (Vol. 16). Cambridge University Press.

Shaked Roni (1993), The Loss for Workers – 150 Million Shekels, *Yediot Aharonot*, April 1, 1994.

Shamir Aharon (1972) We will liberate ourselves from demographic fears, *Davar*, November 12, 1972

Shamir, R. (2000). *The colonies of law : Colonialism, Zionism, and law in early mandate Palestine (Cambridge studies in law and society).* Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Shapira, A. (1999). *Land and power: The Zionist resort to force, 1881-1948*. Stanford University Press.

Shapira R. (1993), Shachal: When the Closure is removed the Regulation concerning the Entrance of people and Vehicles from the Territories will Change, *Haaretz*, April 21, 1993.

Shapira R. (1994), 30,000 Palestinians hold permits to work within the green line, *Haaretz*, January 22, 1994.

Shapira R. (1996a), The Number of Labor Mingrant has Increased from 10,000 in 1990 to over a 250,000, *Haaretz*, July 1, 1996.

Shapira Reuven (1996b), Kahalani, Labor Migrants have Created a City within a City in Tel Aviv, *Haaretz*, July 18, 1996.

Sharify-Funk, M. (2010). Muslims and the politics of "reasonable accommodation": Analyzing the Bouchard-Taylor report and its impact on the Canadian province of Quebec. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 30(4), 535-553.

Sheffer, G. (2005). Is the Jewish Diaspora Unique? Reflections on the Diaspora's Current Situation. *Israel Studies*, 10(1), 1-35.

Sheleg Yair (2002), The State's Jewish Majority is Shrinking, *Haaretz*, June 12, 2002.

Shenhav, Y. (1999). The Jews of Iraq, Zionist ideology, and the property of the Palestinian refugees of 1948: an anomaly of national accounting. *International Journal of Middle East Studie*s, 31(04), 605-630.

Shenhav, Y. A. (2006). *The Arab Jews: A postcolonial reading of nationalism, religion, and ethnicity*. Stanford University Press.

Shiblak, A. (1996). Residency status and civil rights of Palestinian refugees in Arab countries. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 36-45.

Shindler, C. (2008). *A history of modern Israel (Reprinted with corrections. ed.). Cambridge* ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Shmol Avi (1997) Three Million Square Meters are Looking for Builders, *Haaretz* August 17, 1997.

Shragai Nadav (1993) After Gush Karif, Karnei Shomron also Decided to Stop Hiring Arabs, *Haaretz*, March 17, 1993

Shuval, J. T. Leshem, E. (1998). The sociology of migration in Israel: A critical view. Immigration to Israel: *Sociological Perspectives*, 8, 3.

Siklawi, R. (2010). The dynamics of Palestinian political endurance in Lebanon. *The Middle East Journal*, 64(4), 597-611.

Silver, A. I. (1997). *The French-Canadian Idea of Confederation, 1864-1900*. University of Toronto Press.

Sinai Ruti (1996), Foreign Work, *Haaretz*, August 19, 1996.

Sinai Ruti (2001), Labor Migrants are 13 percent of the Labor Force, *Haaretz*, April 2, 2001.

Skrentny, J. D. (2002). *The minority rights revolution*. Harvard University Press.

Smith, A. (2007). *Anarchism, revolution, and reaction: Catalan labour and the crisis of the Spanish state, 1898-1923* (Vol. 8). Berghahn books.

Smith, A. (2014). *The Origins of Catalan Nationalism, 1770-1898*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Smooha, S. (2002). The model of ethnic democracy: Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. *Nations and Nationalism*, 8(4), 475-503.

Smooha, S. (2008). The mass immigrations to Israel: A comparison of the failure of the Mizrahi immigrants of the 1950s with the success of the Russian immigrants of the 1990s. *Journal of Israeli History*, 27(1), 1-27.

Soffer, A. (1983). The changing situation of majority and minority and its spatial expression: the case of the Arab minority in Israel. *Pluralism and Political Geography,* 80-99.

Soffer, A. (1989). Demography and the shaping of Israel's borders. *Contemporary Jewry*, 10(2), 91-105.

Sokol Sami (1996) MK Gideon Ezra Calls to end the Closure: "We need to Learn to live with the Palestinians", *Haaretz*, July 2, 1996

Solé I Tura, J. (1967). *Catalanisme i revolució burgesa: la síntesi de Prat de la Riba* (No. 47). Edicions 62.

Sobrer, J. M. (1992). *Catalonia, a Self-portrait* (Vol. 883). Indiana University Press.

Steinberg, M. (1989). The demographic dimension of the struggle with Israel--as seen by the PLO. *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, *11*(4), 27-51.

Stevenson, G. (2011). Canadian Federalism and the Search for Accomodation of Quebec Nationalism. In: Stéphan Gervais et al, *Quebec Questions*. Toronto: Oxford University Press.

Stewart, G. (1986). *The origins of Canadian politics : A comparative approach*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.

Stoker, V. (2007). Zero tolerance? Sikh swords, school safety, and secularism in Quebec. *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, 75(4), 814-839.

Strauss, H. A. (1980). Jewish Emigration from Germany: Nazi Policies and Jewish Responses (I*).* *The Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook*, 25(1), 313-361.

Strubell , M. E. Boix-Fuster (2011). *Democratic policies for language revitalization: The case of Catalan.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan

Strubell, M. (1999). *Language, democracy and devolution in Catalonia. Language, democracy and devolution in Catalonia*. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters, 4-38.

Sturgis, j., & Davis, j. (1998/9). Who was the ideal immigrant? settlement in western Canada, 1880-1914.London Journal of Canadian Studies, 14, 9-22

Swirsky, S. (1981). The Ethnic Division of Labor in Israel. *Machbarot Lemechkar Ulebikoret, Haifa*.

Swyngedouw, M. (1995). The 'threatening immigrant'in Flanders 1930–1980: Redrawing the social space. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 21(3), 325-340.

Symonds, G. L. (2002). The State and Ethnic Diversity: Structural and Discursive Change in Quebec's Ministere d'Immigration. *Canadian Ethnic Studies Journal,* 34(3), 28.

Tal-Shir Anat (1993), The Terrorism and You, *Yediot Aharonot*, March 30, 1993.

Tal Yerah, (1987a), In the Year 2000: Israel will not be Jewish, *Yediot Aharonot*, June 7, 1987

Tal Yerach (1987b), Employers submit approximately 90 requests for foreign workers every month, *Haaretz*, December 16, 1987.

Tal Yerach (1993), Rabin denies Shohat and Ben Eliezer’s requests to Allow Construction Workers from the Teritories into Israel, *Haaretz*, April 19, 1993

Tatjer, M., & Killinger, C. L. (Eds.). (2010). *Barraques: la Barcelona informal del segle XX*. MUHBA, Museu d'Història de Barcelona.

Telhami, S. (1996). Israeli Foreign Policy: A Realist Ideal-Type or a Breed of Its Own. *Israel in Comparative Perspective*, 29-51.

Tengwall, D. L. (2010). The Portuguese Revolution (1640-1668): *A European war of freedom and independence.* Lewiston, N.Y: Edwin Mellen Press.

Termes, J. (1984*), La immigració a Catalunya i altres estudis d’història del nacionalisme*

Thomson, J. K. (2003*). A distinctive industrialization: cotton in Barcelona 1728-1832.* Cambridge University Press.

Tichenor, D. J. (2009). *Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America: The Politics of Immigration Control in America*. Princeton University Press.

Tilly, C. (2004). Observations of social processes and their formal representations. *Sociological Theory*, 22(4), 595-602.

Trabelsi-Hadad Tamar (1996), Foreign Workers are Fictitiously Marrying Israeli Women, *Yediot Aharonot,* June 30, 1996.

Trasnel, C. (2008). Combining local distinctiveness and cultural diversity: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in the Identity Discourse of Nationalisms of Protest in Quebec, Acadia and Wallonia. *Canadian Issues*, 34.

Tremlett, G. (2001). Immigrants provoke ire in Catalonia. *The Guardian*. February 28, 2001.

Triandafyllidou, A. (1998). National identity and the'other'. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 21(4), 593-612.

Troen, I. S. (2001), "Creation of Zionist Social Sciences: Calculating 'Economic Absorption Capacity' of Israel". *Iyunim Betkumat Israel* 1. 481-496.

Trofimenkoff, S. M. (1982). *The Dream of Nation: A Social International History of Quebec.* McGill-Queen's Press-MQUP.

Trudeau, P. E. (1958). Some obstacles to democracy in Quebec. *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science,* 297-311.

Turgeon, L., & Bilodeau, A. (2014). Minority nations and attitudes towards immigration: the case of Quebec. *Nations and Nationalism*, 20(2), 317-336.

Ṿaits, Y. (1994). *Muda'ut ṿe-ḥoser onim: Mapai le-nokhaḥ ha-Sho'ah*, 1943-1945. Yerushalayim: Yad Yitsḥaḳ Ben-Tsevi.

Vallières, Pierre. *Nègres blancs d'Amérique*. Vol. 149. Parti pris, 1969.

Valls, F. (2001). Un nacionalista de la línea dura*, El Pais*. March 2, 2001.

Vallverdú, F. (1970) *Dues llengües: dues funcions? Per una històrica lingüstica de la Catalunya contemporània*. Barcelona: Edicions 62.

Van der Brug, W., Fennema, M., & Tillie, J. (2005). Why some anti-immigrant parties fail and others succeed A two-step model of aggregate electoral support*. Comparative Political Studies,* 38(5), 537-573.

Van Dijk, T. (2005). Discourse and racism in Spain. *Associació de Professors d'Anglés de Catalunya*, 25(1), 68-75.

Van Loon, R. J., & Whittington, M. S. (1971). The Canadian Political System: Environment. *Structure and Process. McGrawlHill.'. Book Co*.

Vandellós, J. A. (1935a). *Catalunya, poble decadent*. Institut d'Estudis Catalans.

Vandellós, J. A. (1935b). *La immigració a Catalunya: obra premiada en el XV Concurs, corresponent a l'any 1934.* Institut d'Estudis Catalans.

Vasile, E. (1997). Re–turning Home: Transnational Movements and the Transformation of Landscape and Culture in the Marginal Communities of Tunis. *Antipode*, 29(2), 177-196.

Veltman, C. (1996). The English language in Quebec 1940-1990. *Contributions to the Sociology of Languag*e, 72, 205-240.

Venne, M., Chodos, R., & Blair, L. (2001). *Vive Quebec!*. James Lorimer & Company.

Vertovec, S., & Wessendorf, S. (Eds.). (2010). *Multiculturalism backlash: European discourses, policies and practices*. Routledge.

Vicens I Vives, J. (1970). *Approaches to the History of Spain* (Vol. 22). Univ of California Press.

Vicens I Vives, J. (2013). The decline of Spain in the Seventeenth Century. In: Cipolla, C. M. (Ed.). (2013). *The economic decline of empires*. Routledge. 121-167.

Vicens I Vives, J., Llorens, M. (1958). *Industrials i Polítics*. Barcelona: Teide

Vicente, M. (2010). Crafting the Industrial Revolution: Artisan Families and the Calico Industry in Eighteenth-Century Spain." In Horn J. and Rosenband L (eds.) Reconceptualizing the Industrial Revolution. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 151-168.

Vidal, J. (1976) *Liber Maiorichinus. Text, traducció, notes i introducció*. Barcelona: Universidad de Barcelona

Visa, L. (2010). Lleida es la primera ciudad que prohíbe el velo integral, *El Pais,* May 29, 2010.

Wade, M (1953). "Political Trends." Jean-Charles Falardeau, éd., *Essais-Essays*. Pp. 145-64.

Waitz, Y. (1994). *Awareness and Helplesness*: *Mapai in Face of the Holocaust, 1943-1945*. Jerusalem: Ben Zvi.

Waitz, Y. (1998). News on European exermination and the question of the scope of aliya. In: Hacohen, D. *Aliya to Israel: myth and reality.* Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Center. 223-248.

Waldinger, R. (2003). Foreigners transformed: International migration and the remaking of a divided people. *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies*, 12(2), 247-272.

Warren, J. P. (2003). The history of Quebec in the perspective of the French language. *Linguistic Conflicts and Language Laws*, 57-86.

Weiner, M (1995). *The global migration crisis: challenge to states and to human rights. New York: HarperCollins College Publishers.*

Weiner, M and Teitelbaum, M. S. (2001). *Political demography, demographic engineering*. Berghahn Books.

Weiss Shimon (1983), Demographic Forcast for 1992: One Arab for Every four Jews, *Davar*, May 2, 1983

Weiss, Y. (2001). "The Monster and its Creator, or How the Law of Return Made Israel a Multi-Ethnic State." *Theory and Criticism* 19:45-69 (Hebrew)

Wimmer, A. (2002). *Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict Shadows of Modernity.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wimmer, A. (2013). *Ethnic boundary making : Institutions, power, networks* (Oxford studies in culture & politics). New York: Oxford University Press.

Wimmer, A., & Glick Schiller, N. (2002). Methodological nationalism and beyond: nation–state building, migration and the social sciences. *Global networks*, 2(4), 301-334.

Winkler Y. (1988a), The national organization of human resources services proposed the institutionalization of worker importation, *Haaretz*, January 17, 1988.

Winkler Y. (1988b), Construction workers union is striking construction sites in Kohav Yair, *Haaretz,* February 25, 1988.

Winter, H. (1969), "Bourassa Strides into Liberal race." *Montreal Gazette*, 5 September 1969
Wirth, W., & Kolb, S. (2004). Designs and methods of comparative political communication research. *Comparing political communication: Theories, cases, and challenges*, 87-111.

Woolard, K. A. (1989). *Double talk: Bilingualism and the politics of ethnicity in Catalonia.* Stanford University Press.

Wright, S. (1999). Catalonia: The Geographical and Historical Context of the Language Question. *Language, Democracy, and Devolution in Catalonia*, 5(3), 39.

Yack, B. (1999). The myth of the civic nation. In R. Beiner (Ed.), *Theorizing nationalism* (pp. 108– 118). Albany: State University of New York Press.

Yaffe Aviad (1970), Withdrawal – Under Peaceful Circumstances, *Davar*, May 5, 1970.

Yanub Ezra (1989), Israelis Lit Tires and the Workers Returned to the Territories, *Maariv*, May 22, 1989

Yiftachel, O. (1999). 'Ethnocracy': The Politics of Judaizing Israel/Palestine. *Constellations,* 6(3), 364-390.

Yiftachel, O. (2006). Ethnocracy : Land and identity politics in Israel/Palestine. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.Yonah, Y. (2004). Israel's immigration policies: The twofold face of the 'demographic threat'. *Social Identities*, 10(2), 195-218.

Zapata-Barrero, R. (2004). *Inmigración, innovación política y cultura de acomodación en España*. Barcelona: Fundació CIDOB.

Zapata-Barrero, R. (2009b). Policies and public opinion towards immigrants: the Spanish case. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 32(7), 1101-1120.

Zapata-Barrero, R. (Ed.). (2009a). *Immigration and self-government of minority nations* (No. 3). Peter Lang.

Zarhiya Z. (1988), Opossition in the Knesset's welfare committee to the importation of foreign workers, *Haaretz*, March 8, 1988.

Zarhiya Z. and Winkler Y. (1989) The Employmet Service does not plan to change its policy against the hiring of foreign workers, *Haaretz*, May, 19, 1989.

Zarhiya Zvi (1993a) The Government will subsidize the replacement of 1,000 Workers From the Teritories, *Haaretz*, March 10, 1993.

Zarhiya Zvi (1993b) The Labor Ministry Will Subsidize an Additional 3,000 Israeli Workers in Agriculture, *Haaretz*, April 1, 1993.

Zarhiya Zvi (1993c), Employers exerted Pressure and Rabin Agreen to Increase the number of Palestinains Employed in Israel to 2,500, *Haaretz*, April 7, 1993.

Zarhiya Zvi (1993e) Namir: If in 1993 we replace 20,000 Palestinian Workers with Israelis it will be a Success, *Haaretz*, April 13, 1993.

Zeevi Rehavam (1993), This is not how you encourage Emigration, *Yediot Aharonot,* April 27, 1994

Zemer Hannah and Agress Eliyahu (1969), Interview with Golda Meir, *Davar*, April 2, 1969.

Zolberg, A. (1999). "Matters of State: Theorizing Immigration Policy," in: Charles Hirschman, Philip Kasinitz, Josh DeWind, eds. *The Handbook oof International Migration: The American Experience.* New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Zubrzycki, G. (2013). Aesthetic revolt and the remaking of national identity in Québec, 1960–1969. *Theory and society*, 42(5), 423-475.

Zucker, N. L. (1973). *The Coming Crisis in Israel: Private Faith and Public Policy.* Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Zuriel Y. (1991), Porush threatens to dismantle the coalition, *Maariv*, January 7, 1991.