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CAMBODIA'S RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: THE COLD WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

by

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The man who is unwilling to accept the axiom that he who chooses one path is denied the others must try to persuade himself, I suppose, that the logical thing to do is to remain at the crossroads.

But do not blame the man who takes a path--nor commend him, either.

Dag Hammarskjold, Markings

PREFACE

The study of Cambodian foreign policy is instructive in several ways. The history of Cambodia's relations with the United States and China illustrates the many problems confronted by both the Big Powers and the small neutrals in their inter-relations. Prince Norodom Sihanouk is for the Department of State an "enfant terrible," whose intentions, I believe, are misunderstood in Washington. Perhaps the failure of American policy in Cambodia, a genuine neutral, suggests misconceptions and misunderstandings underlying our relations with the neutrals, which today constitute the largest group of nation-states.

Cambodia is situated in Indo-China. The attention of the American people has been forcibly drawn to Asia at least four times in the last sixteen years to consider the once meaningless names of Korea, Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia. The American involvement in these areas can be seen as variations on the same theme--an attempt to confront the extension of the Cold War to Asia, by filling the gap created by the withdrawal of the other Western powers and by establishing and maintaining a power position. This attempt has brought the United States into close relationship with the countries there, whose support and approval were prerequisites for implementing American policy objectives. The Cambodian reaction to this development is the topic of this study.

Cambodia defies most foreign policy generalizations about Southeast Asia, and it is her foreign policy that distinguishes her most clearly. Cambodia, unilaterally, has severed all economic and diplomatic ties with the United States, despite her economy's struggle to reach the take-off stage and despite the fact that her citizenry has a life expectancy of thirty-two years. Cambodia has rejected SEATO's mantle, calling it dishonorable, while Hanoi and perhaps

even Saigon and Bangkok individually plot her destruction.

Cambodia, as have nearly all neutral nations, has become the object of Sino-American competition. The Big Powers have invested considerable amounts of economic aid and diplomatic prestige in attempts to woo Cambodia into their respective camps, but neither has succeeded. Cambodia, therefore, serves as an excellent model for the study of the comparative impact of the competing countries' instruments of policy and decision-making processes. Cambodian foreign policy has also influenced and has been influenced by international bodies, such as the United Nations, International Control Commission, and various assemblies at Geneva.

The Cold War, of which this competition is a part, is not an abstraction for Cambodia. Surrounded by Laos, South Vietnam, and Thailand, Cambodia has had to bear the burden of this competition. Prince Sihanouk holds the United States responsible for Cambodia's problems and the tension in the whole of Southeast Asia. This is of particular importance to Cambodia for whom, as a neutral, the maintenance of a power equilibrium in Southeast Asia is essential. Too often, the small powers who must bear the impact of the policies formulated by the Big Powers, have little or nothing to say about the factors defining the competition and yet may serve as the "grass on which the elephants fight."

Cambodia has not sat idly by, but has attempted to mitigate the impact of the Cold War, with a view towards creating a realistic order in Southeast Asia. Much of Cambodia's influence in Southeast Asia stems from the fact that under the leadership of Prince Sihanouk the country has attained a degree of political stability uncommon in Southeast Asia and has remained free from extensive Communist subversion. Nonetheless Sihanouk has been in the eyes of the Western press a "bête noire." I note here, however, the sympathetic comment of one British journalist, Michael Field, who has spent considerable time in Phnom Penh. He notes:

> I make no claim, however, to be unbiased about Cambodia; but my only bias is sympathy for the leaders and people of a country that can be understood only on its own terms, and according to it own conception of itself.

Scholars have increasingly focused their attention on Cambodia. Since my research on this topic began, Cambodia's Foreign Policy by Roger M. Smith, "Cambodia and China: Neutralism, 'Neutrality,' and National Security" by Michael Leifer in Policies Toward China: A View From Six Continents, and New Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia by Bernard K. Gordon have been published. The assistance of these volumes has been noted throughout.

I am indebted to the Department of State, Agency for International Development who invited me to participate in the AID Special Vietnam Project during the summer of 1965. This allowed me to travel in Vietnam, Thailand, and Cambodia.

I am especially indebted to my professors and thesis committee at the University of Washington, namely George E. Taylor, John M. Maki, Henry G. Schwarz, and Frank Williston. I must add a special note of thanks to Dr. Roger M. Smith, whose love of Cambodia I share, and whose interest and inspiration have sustained my graduate studies to a degree only I can appreciate.

I

INTRODUCTION

On November 8, 1953, Cambodia gained her independence from France. The grant of independence was indicative of a further weakening of the old order which was under attack from the Communist Viet-Minh, aided by the Communist Chinese. Cambodia then joined the ever-increasing number of states emerging from the break-up of the colonial empires. This large number of states, many of which would adopt a foreign policy of nonalignment, within time came to alter considerably the conduct of international relations through their rejection of the Cold War as the only possible order. They arrogated to themselves the right to define their own national interest, which was often at variance with the goals of both blocs. Likewise, they chose to address themselves to the many imperfections in the international order spanning the spectrum of human rights to nuclear disarmament. Thus their voice was added to the dialogue of the Big Powers, and perhaps for the first time these vital issues were discussed by all. The neutral countries sought to "inject the voice of reason" into "la grande diplomatie" and the monopoly of the Big Powers gave way to a collective responsibility for the world order.

The spirit of this development is revealed in the speeches of Sukarno at Bandung and Haile Selassie at Belgrade. Sukarno said:

> The burden of the delegates to this conference is not a light one, for I know that these questions--which are questions of the life or death of humanity itself--must be on your minds, as they are on mine. And the nations of Asia and Africa cannot, even if they wish to, avoid their part in finding solutions to these problems.[1]

Selassie reasoned:

> We, the Asian-African countries, have a unique role to play. We find ourselves between two opposing worlds. Indeed, it is we, more than most, who, since the remote times of history, have had to live intimately with groups of languages, races, and religions of the most divergent characters and who have had to cherish the sentiment of tolerance as a condition of national life.[2]

The Afro-Asian neutrals common heritage as former colonial subjects and "non-white have-nots" gave them an initial unity of positions which accounted for their influence, especially in the United Nations, and their attractiveness as a Cold War prize. Labelled the "Third World" or the "transitional peoples," their steadfast adherence to neutrality has, in fact, established their position and influence as a factor on the international scene still dominated by the Big Powers.

With little more than the support of world opinion as an instrument of policy, the neutral nations began to use foreign policy as a means to inject their voice into the world community. Edward Shils notes:

> Foreign policy is primarily a policy of 'public relations' designed not, as in the advanced countries, to sustain the security of the state or enhance its power among other states, but to improve the reputation of the nation, to make others heed its voice, to make them pay attention to it and respect it.[3]

The Big Powers greeted this attempt by the neutrals to exploit the inherent vulnerability of the bi-polar configuration with certain misgivings. Gunnar Myrdal points out that

> . . . it should not cause surprise when we find poor countries occasionally using that element of real political power which consists in their being capable of making themselves a nuisance of some sort or another, or threatening to do so. . . . On this principle the dissatisfied members of the world community have available blackmailing powers which they will increasingly learn to use at their own advantage, as they raise to national unity out of the long ages of apathy, social chasms, and local isolation.[4]

Because of the search for support, as part of the competition of the Cold War, by the Big Powers, the neutrals were accepted, and their criticism was tolerated. While this large number of states has added an element of disorder to a formerly closely knit international setting, the Big Powers appear to appreciate the changed rules and have worked to reconcile, in part, their foreign policies to the aspirations of the "Third World."

External factors also account for this "co-existence" of neutrals and Big Powers, which created a situation whereby the Western democracies and the Communist bloc sought to outdo each other in their professed support of the neutrals' choice to remain unaligned. Communist China had some inherent advantages at the outset and made all the more imperative a similar response from the United States. The advent of Communist China, the product of a violent anti-foreign Communist revolution, was not greeted in the "Third World" with the same consternation as in the Western capitals. Instead in China's accomplishments many Afro-Asians saw the fulfillment of many of the same goals of their own society. Likewise China's foreign policy addressed itself to many of the same objectives, giving China and the neutrals an identification of interests. This idea is reflected by U Nu who said:

> The unity of the Chinese people under Chairman Mao Tse-tung has earned the respect of many foreigners, and as Asians we take pride in this new phenomenon. . . . As Asians we are delighted at the great strides made there.[5]

The advent of Communist China also forced the United States to reconsider its policy towards Southeast Asia. The Times of Burma stated that Asian recipients of United States aid "should be grateful to Mao Tse-tung" since "only when China completely turned Communist" did Southeast Asia warrant consideration in American foreign policy.[6] Thus China's ability to compete with the United States for the support of the neutrals stemmed in a large part from the above advantages. China, within time, was able to compete in the material sense as well.

Appreciating these developments, the newly independent nations rejected the American invitation to join with them in a global struggle for the containment of Communism. This lack of support dealt a blow to American attempts to build a strong defense structure in Southeast Asia. Initial American policy miscalculated anti-colonial and anti-Western sentiment. The

American reaction to this was to brand those who hoped to remain unaligned as "immoral," and this line of reasoning was not laid to rest until the Kennedy administration, six long years later.

The Communists, who despite earlier misgivings about the neutrals, soon recognized the potential of the above development. The Communists also underestimated nationalist sentiment and attempted to apply Marxist pronouncements to the Asian societies.[7]

The foreign policy objectives of the neutrals remained constant. Instead of concern over the morality of either bloc's policies, the neutrals denounced attempts by both blocs to draw them into alliances. The neutrals directed their attention to their own development, peaceful co-existence, disarmament, and the eradication of colonialism in all forms and in all places.

Thus the context of the Cold War was changed somewhat in that the issues were expanded to include those same issues of concern to the neutrals. The Cold War lost some of its original ideological orthodoxy. Since increment of territory was ruled out through a nuclear stalemate, all that remained to vie for was the support of the neutrals. Influence and prestige, instead of territory, became the goals sought after. The increasing importance of the General Assembly as a forum for debate made the vote of each individual country important. The annual vote in the General Assembly on the question of Red China has become a device for measuring the comparative influence of the United States and the Communist bloc among the neutrals.

The competition that developed was waged on all fronts--military, economic, political, and cultural, overtly and covertly. With this competitive pattern somewhat established after Geneva (1954), the United States attached considerable importance to salvaging what was left of the Western position and to

gaining new adherents. As a result, it began to commit what eventually became billions of dollars in foreign economic aid. By December, 1966, the United States probably will have committed upwards of 450,000 troops to the Far East, indicating the importance Asia has played in American foreign policy and defense strategy. This presence is designed to indicate the degree to which the United States is committed in its competition policy with Red China.

Chinese policy toward the neutrals during this period has fluctuated between "hard" and "soft" line policies. In February, 1965, there was rumored a possible alliance between Communist China, North Vietnam, North Korea, Indonesia, and Cambodia, which might also serve as a basis for an "opposition" United Nations. From that time of high prestige, the Chinese have suffered considerable foreign policy reversals. Since Asian neutralism has proven its resiliency even against Chinese subversion, perhaps Communist China has learned the limits to which it can extend its foreign policy. China has shown in the past a remarkable ability in the conduct of its foreign policy-making to reconsider under pressure and attune its objectives with prevailing sentiment.

Whether or not neutral foreign policies exist at the pleasure of the great powers is a moot question. What is more certain and promising is the apparent acceptance by the Big Powers of the limitations, set by the smaller countries, on their foreign policy projections. This has been enforced by the competition that has developed since the neutrals have alternatives. This requires the competing powers to outbid each other in respecting the limitations or requirements established by the recipient country. As a result of Sino-American competition, there has developed strong nationalism in the neutral countries which sets limits to foreign policy projection, also. It is this phenomenon, ironically created in part by the competition, that has provided the strongest barrier to the spread of Communism or the extension of Western

military pacts and bases. In a sense, then, the United States and China are confronted with what must appear to be a "creature" of their own making.

The future of neutralism in Southeast Asia will be determined largely by China, the United States, and the Soviet Union, who must assure the neutrals that the maintenance of neutrality is also a goal of the Big Powers. Asian leaders are concerned over the degree of American commitment, on the one hand, and the future designs of Communist China, on the other. Any apparent loss of position, such as would result from an American withdrawal from Vietnam, would see neutralist tendencies appear on the part of our Asian allies, as they attempted to come into line with the de facto configuration in Southeast Asia. Likewise, a continued aggressive policy on the part of the Chinese, but only if coupled with American assurances, would see a shift to the right. A third possibility exists in the form of a neutralization of certain states recognized and guaranteed by the Big Powers. If the United States either is unable or unwilling to maintain its position, the likelihood of this development seems more certain. Increased Soviet interest in Southeast Asia, a function of the Sino-Soviet split, may add a stabilizing factor, through Russia's apparent willingness to conform to the pattern established by the neutrals. A fourth possibility exists if the neutrals can maintain their freedom of action and make their own decisions, irrespective of the interests of the Big Powers. Other encouraging signs are seen in the progress of regional development schemes financed through multi-lateral foreign aid programs.

It is within the above context that Cambodia gained her independence, adopted neutrality, attempted to conduct it, and today finds herself on the battleground of the Cold War. The impact of Sino-American competition on Cambodian foreign policy has played an important role in the evolution and

practice of this policy. In many respects Cambodia's foreign policy serves as a model of a neutral foreign policy, since Cambodia has confronted similar foreign policy problems as have many of the other neutrals. Before and after the independence struggle, Cambodia was subjected to Communist attempts to destroy her political unity through insurrection and infiltration. On the American side Cambodia has been subjected to more subtle attempts to undermine her neutrality and her political unity.

Cambodia has used foreign policy as one instrument in tackling the overwhelming economic problems through multi-lateral foreign aid assistance. Her acceptance of this aid has also served as a means of illustrating and making credible Cambodian neutrality.

As an active member of the family of nations Cambodia has attempted numerous times to serve as mediator in regional disputes as well as address herself in the United Nations to problems affecting the international order.

Cambodian foreign policy, in other ways, defies the generalizations made about the neutrals, stemming from a unique geographical location and the political ideology of the Chief of State, Prince Norodom Sihanouk. A study of Cambodian foreign policy, per se, is both necessary and revealing. From Cambodia's rapprochement with Communist China and deterioration of relations with the United States one can gain insight into the workings and assessments of a neutral foreign policy. That Prince Sihanouk has been the most outspoken critic of the Big Power chauvinsim should serve as a guide for the attempts by the Big Powers to meet the goals and aspirations of the neutrals, who today constitute the largest group of nation-states.

The study focuses on Cambodia's unique circumstances onto which Communist China and the United States have attempted to project their competing foreign policies. I will attempt first to analyze the evolution of Cambodian foreign

policy to the point of adopting neutrality, which is represented as a calculation made by Sihanouk. I suggest certain Cambodian historical, geographical, and colonial experiences as factors influencing Sihanouk's perception of the international scene at independence time. I will discuss the role of the United States in Southeast Asia from the post-war period to the end of the Geneva Conference. I will then compare the American performance with the actions of the Viet-Minh and Communist China (after 1949) during the same period. Whereas this leads Sihanouk to adopt a pro-Western stance at that time, the changed international order after Geneva results in new assessments, made on the basis of Cambodian foreign policy goals that have remained constant. The basis for the comparison by Sihanouk was the degree to which each bloc's goals coincided with his own. His rejection of both blocs in 1954 can thus be seen as a calculation that neither bloc came abreast of Cambodia's own goals, or that the liabilities of accepting aid from only one were greater than the benefits to be derived. This exercise will serve the instructive function of pointing our how the East and West were seen by another power and something about the priorities and objectives of foreign policy as assigned by that power. This evaluation by Sihanouk of the blocs' performances through the Geneva Conference (1954) contrasts significantly with those opinions regarding present-day relations. By this analysis I will point out those factors that are responsible for the turn about--in means, not goals. The section dealing with events from 1955 to the present deals with the conduct of a neutral foreign policy in conjunction with American and Communist Chinese Asian policies. I consider the difficulties this has presented for Cambodia in terms of impact and attempt to explain the reasons for Cambodia's gradual lean toward China. In conclusion, an attempt is made to assess and evaluate the performance of Cambodian foreign policy in response to specific issues and

crises. The Cambodian experience in absorbing and channeling the impact of the competition toward defined policy objectives should prove relevant to both the neutrals and the Big Powers.

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[1]George McTurnan Kahin, "Appendix: Speech by President Soekarno at the Opening of the Asian-African Conference, April 18, 1955," The Asian-African Conference; Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1956), p.41.

[2]Documents and Acts of the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries, Belgrade, September 1-6, 1961 (Beograde: Publicističko-Izdavački Zavod, 1961), p.85.

[3]Edward Shils, "The Intellectuals in the Political Development of the New States," Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries; Nationalism and Communism, ed. John H. Kautsky (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962), pp.195-234.

[4]Gunnar Myrdal, Rich Lands and Poor (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), p.75.

[5]U Nu, "Collected Speeches," For World Progress (Rangoon, Ministry of Information, 1954), n.p.

[6]"New Times of Burma, September 13, 1951," in The Politics of Foreign Aid; American Experience in Southeast Asia, by John Dickey Montgomery (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p.32.

[7]Sisir K. Gupta, "Communist China and the Neutrals," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol.362 (Philadelphia, 1965), pp.50-51.

II

THE EVOLUTION OF CAMBODIAN FOREIGN POLICY

An element of pride which stems from over 2,000 years of organized political society has been discernible in Cambodian foreign policy. As the heir to the Angkor civilization (802-1432) Cambodia claims a place among the "civilized" countries of the world. From her long experience at the crossroad of Southeast Asia, Cambodia has gained insights into the nature and context of international relations, an aid in her present foreign policy calculations. Unlike many newly independent countries, Cambodia is not a novice at the game of power politics.

Modern-day Cambodia is only a remnant of the once vast Khmer Empire that encompassed the greater part of Indo-China in the thirteenth century. Angkor eclipsed all of Southeast Asia in power and cultural development from the ninth to the fifteenth centuries, as evidenced by the construction of Angkor Wat, whose temples attest to the vitality of the Angkor civilization attained by the thirteenth century.[8]

However, the glories of Angkor were shortlived due to encroachments from neighboring Thailand and Annam, which reduced Cambodia to a mere vassal of these two states. Today's strained relations between Cambodia on the one hand, and Thailand and Vietnam (most recently South Vietnam) on the other, have their roots in this early conflict. Suffering from repeated border attacks by Thailand and Annam, Cambodia's political fortunes continued to dwindle. Reduced to a status of "Siamese overlordship with Annamite consent" by 1846, Cambodia was saved from possible extinction as a nation by French intervention sought by King Ang Duong in 1859. Cambodia's crisis coincided with French attempts to establish a presence in Indo-China at this time.

A French protectorate was established in 1863, which provided Cambodia

with a minimum of security by eventually regularizing her relations with her neighbors. The French were able to release Cambodia from Thai vassalage, but only after the cession to Thailand of the present day Cambodian provinces of Battambang and Siem Reap. The subsequent French defeat of Annam restrained Annamite designs on Cambodia during the period of French control. King Ang Duong's search for security from his neighbors has a parallel today in Prince Sihanouk's request for international guarantees of his borders. The issues at stake today are the same, but the international politics of the area have made the implications of the dispute of great significance for the peace of all Southeast Asia.

The French colonization of Cambodia was a mixed blessing. The excellent archeological work undertaken by the French has restored much of the Angkor ruins and revived an awareness of Khmer greatness among the Cambodian people and the world community. As a result, the feats of Jayavarman VII (1181-ca.1215), to whom is attributed the construction of Angkor Thom, have become legend. These legends have resulted in the exaltation of the position of the monarchy in Cambodian society, and the throne in more recent times has given Cambodia a degree of political stability uncommon in Southeast Asia. Parallels are drawn between Jayavarman and Prince Sihanouk, whose present tasks of nation-building seem no less Herculean than those confronting the Angkor king.[9]

French rule also served to exacerbate rivalries among the Indo-Chinese states. Having acquired a strategic position by the 1860's in what is present-day Vietnam, the French hoped to secure their control against possible Siamese or British pressures on Vietnam. Cambodia's location provided this buffer, and French efforts were directed toward maintaining Cambodia as a stable entity whose natural resources were of only secondary interest to the

French.

Indo-China was administered by the French from Hanoi, restricting governmental services, although not exclusively, to the larger Vietnamese cities on the coast. Whereas this arrangement was an administrative expediency, it affected Cambodia adversely. Revenue from Cambodia was siphoned off to support an administrative hierarchy from which Cambodia derived little benefit. Due to the transportation network that was established, Cambodia became dependent on the port of Saigon for the trans-shipping of goods. This dependency has been exploited by the Vietnamese government which has closed the port to Cambodian commerce during periods of hostility between the two governments.

A training program for Cambodian administrators was not started until 1919, and prior to this the French brought Vietnamese with them to Cambodia as civil servants. The French considered the Cambodians unable to perform this type of administrative work. Large numbers of Vietnamese were also brought in to work the plantations. This accounts, at least partially, for the large Vietnamese population in Cambodia today, which has at various times presented problems for the Cambodian government.[10]

In the political sphere, by manipulating family rivalries the French were able to eliminate the throne as a possible threat to French control by insuring only the accession of amenable monarchs. In 1941, King Monivong died, and his son, Prince Monireth, the apparent heir, was passed over. The Governor-General, Admiral Decoux believed him to be too independence-minded at a time when the French faced defeat at home and increasing Japanese pressure in Southeast Asia. The French choice was Norodom Sihanouk, a grandson of King Norodom, because the French believed he was better suited to uphold their view of rule. Donald Lancaster recounts:

> French influence was therefore brought to bear to secure the election of his (Monireth) nephew, Norodom Sihanouk, since the prince, who was then a boarder at the Lycée Chasseloup-Laubat in Saigon, possessed a capacity for short-lived enthusiasm and an artless candour which appeared to qualify him for the position of a protected monarch.[11]

By 1941 the young king's throne resembled only in name the mandate through which Jayavarman VII ruled Angkor. While the French were politically astute enough to appreciate the role the throne played as a symbol of Cambodian unity, the throne and the "representative" institutions which were created were only the facade behind which the French maintained complete control. Thus they were able to subordinate Cambodian interests to those of the French in Annam and Cochin-China with little opposition.

The French successfully maintained stability in Cambodia because there was little agitation from the masses for a change in the existing pattern. The French benefited from the over-all economic well-being of the country and their discreet colonial policies. The French also saw to it that only a few Cambodians received a higher education, apparently enough to satisfy the ruling families. Thus little impetus was given to national consciousness, a fact which accounted for the lack of independence or nationalist movements prior to World War II.

In 1937 the first Cambodian language newspaper Nagaravatta was founded by Son Ngoc Thanh, one of the few active nationalists. His efforts to awaken the semi-educated class to demand concessions from the French went unheeded. France had apparently found a working formula for maintaining her position in the absence of external threats. However the Japanese success in Indo-China shook the entire political and social structure on which French rule was based. The mock independence granted by the Japanese set in motion forces that later spelled the end of French rule in all of Indo-China. The

notion that Cambodia's future was now in her own hands sparked nationalist sentiment, and opinion crystallized among the elite on Cambodia's relationship with France.

With the decline of the French position in Cambodia, the throne reasserted itself as the foremost political institution of the country. The group surrounding the throne, aware of Cambodia's inability to govern itself, favored the return of the French and a slow evolutionary independence under French tutelage. The second group, the nationalists, led by Son Ngoc Thanh, favored seizing the initiative and declaring immediate independence. The opinion of the throne group prevailed, and the French returned to Cambodia in late 1945 with little opposition.

A return to the "ancien regime" clearly was not possible in light of the nationalist sentiment and the political developments that had taken place during the Japanese occupation.[12] A general plan leading to independence was worked out between the French and the ruling elite, but its moderate provisions drove the nationalists to the point of civil war. From 1945 to 1953 Sihanouk attempted to steer a course between the French and the nationalists, some factions of which were susceptible to Viet-Minh propaganda. When France appeared reluctant to meet Sihanouk's ever-increasing demands forced upon him by increased domestic pressures, the Prince began to seek independence in earnest. He did not seek it through the force of arms, but rather through mustering support for Cambodia's position from the world community. Up to then, Cambodia's foreign relations had been dictated by France, and it was with Sihanouk's "Croisade Royale pour l'Independance" that Cambodia became an international personality of her own.

Although France had committed herself on paper to Cambodian independence, the eventual form that this independence would take was determined largely

by the future of Indo-China as a whole. The disposition of Indo-China was the subject of much debate among the Allies. One author's sentiments are worth quoting at length for his dire predictions for Indo-China which have come true. In 1947 François Gourou, supporting a French federation stated:

> If the Indo-Chinese federation . . . were to disappear, the lands lying between the Annamite areas and Siam--that is Cambodia, Laos, and the Moi regions would become the pawn of more powerful neighbors which would become embroiled eventually in imperialistically rivalry and armed conflicts. There can be no doubt about it: the French Indo-Chinese Federation is a factor for peace. . . . Otherwise the stronger powers will be sure to oppress the weaker ones, who in turn will seek protectors, and an era of international complications will result.[13]

Abreast of the trend of political events in neighboring Vietnam, where an armed Communist insurgency against French rule by 1953 had reached the crisis stage, Sihanouk felt the granting of independence with adequate protection to Cambodia was imperative. Sihanouk feared that the Viet-Minh was attempting to forge a peninsula-wide independence movement. Thus, if Cambodia were granted independence very quickly, Viet-Minh assistance to Cambodia would be unnecessary. Sihanouk felt the granting of his demand would have far reaching implications for preventing the possible spreading of Communism not only in Cambodia, but also beyond her borders to Thailand, Malaya, and Burma. An independent Cambodia, the King reasoned, would be the best bulwark against the spread of Communism in Southeast Asia, and thus maintaining the Western position there. Sihanouk attempted to convey this urgency by writing:

> The King believes that the authorities of France and the United States, as well as the other nations of the free world, should be alerted to the necessity of resolving the crisis in Cambodia, which constitutes, with South Vietnam, the last bulwark of resistance against Communism, which is going to submerge the north and center of Vietnam and Laos.[14]

However, at home the King was not free to determine alone even the amount of

pressure to be applied against France. Since 1946, many of Son Ngoc Thanh's followers had fled to the northern part of the country, and organized themselves into armed bands, believing Cambodian independence would have to be won on the battlefield.

As the French continued to balk at the prospect of granting Cambodia a sufficient share of independence to satisfy the ardent nationalists, the King took matters into his own hands and departed in January, 1953, on his "croisade" which took him first to France and then to Canada, the United States and Japan. This was the King's first visit to the United States, and he was received at the White House by President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles, since the attention of both men had increasingly been drawn to the events in Indo-China. King Sihanouk, a patriot with obvious pro-Western sentiments, who had staked his political standing on this trip, received little more than sympathy from the Americans. The American position at this time was to support the waning French position that Communism had to be defeated before independence could be granted. Otherwise the weak defense capabilities of Cambodia would only cause it to fall prey to the aggressive designs of the Viet-Minh, now aided by the Chinese. During his visits, the King hoped to draw attention to the crisis which was of France's own making, whereby the longer the French delayed independence the closer the nationalists, in desperation, turned to the Communists. In his discussions with Dulles, Sihanouk presented the Cambodian position as follows:

> If a political solution is not found, the military effort, even though considerably augmented by American aid, will fail. . . . No success is possible if the interested people do not participate in the fight with conviction that the fight is for their benefit. . . . To give real independence to the Indo-Chinese state will oblige them to become fully conscious of their responsibilities in this fight, the issue of which is in the interest of the entire democratic world.[15]

Instead of support, the King received John Foster Dulles' advice to go home and fight the Communists. Dulles advised Sihanouk in the following manner:

> Rest assured (he told Sihanouk) that we fully understand and appreciate your legitimate aspirations. I can promise you that once the menace of Communism is dispelled in your country, we will do everything in our power to induce France to recognize your complete and total independence and sovereignty. But, as long as our common enemies, the Viet-Minh, are not defeated--and you know how they are capable of sweeping away the Khmer monarchy and your beautiful traditions, your ancient civilization and your young democracy--as long as this grave danger, which may be mortal for you, is not rolled back, we cannot discourage the French, who have suffered such heavy sacrifices in Indo-China in order to defend our common liberties.
>
> We are now at the most crucial moment of the war. It is necessary to win it. This is why, more than ever, we must unite, unite our forces, our means, and not dispute and divide ourselves. Your difference with France will only serve the enemy.[16]

Sihanouk returned to Phnom Penh where he lamented:

> Thus, compatriots, the great democracies to whom we have turned as one turns toward the sun, as a symbol of promise--these countries which pretend to fight for the liberty of the peoples oppressed or menaced by Communism, only put in front of us, in order to judge us, our military weakness, but forget that we have never had the ridiculous pretension to think that we could survive without French forces, American or even British aid.[17]

Sihanouk then dramatically left for exile in Bangkok, vowing not to return until Cambodia was granted independence. Sihanouk succeeded in embarrassing the French into taking action. The French relinquished complete control and Sihanouk returned to Phnom Penh on November 8, 1953, to a hero's welcome.[18]

The lightning pace of events in Indo-China soon cast Cambodia into the international spotlight again. Cambodia's independence, gained largely through Sihanouk's efforts, allowed Cambodia to go to Geneva, in 1954, as an independent nation. At Geneva she had to defend her sovereignty against

the Chinese and Viet-Minh attempts to enforce limitations on Cambodian sovereignty. Sihanouk's actions against the French gave him status in Southeast Asia and notoriety in the West. At Geneva Cambodia attempted to realize certain foreign policy goals and looked to the powers assembled there for support. However, it was Cambodian diplomatic finesse and intransigence, more than any support from the West, that enabled Cambodia to leave Geneva with her sovereignty intact. The decisions reached at the Geneva Conference had far-reaching implications for the development of Cambodian foreign policy.

THE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OF CAMBODIAN FOREIGN POLICY--PREMIERÈMENT LE CAMBODGE

Cambodia with a long history vacillating between periods of independence and vassalage was determined not to see this cycle reappear. Sihanouk knew that winning independence was only half of the struggle. The task of arranging a modus vivendi between his neighbors and respected by them, would be the sine qua non of Cambodian independence. Cambodia's first goal was security, which she realized would not be attainable solely through her own efforts. Thus initial foreign policy calculations were made in a crisis atmosphere, which afforded little opportunity for moralistic considerations or intellectual debate. Foreign policy, for the Cambodians, has always been seen as an instrument for eliciting international support for her security requirements.

In 1953, subjugation by the Vietnamese (Viet-Minh) was the biggest threat which confronted Sihanouk who tried to isolate Cambodia from the tide of events in neighboring Vietnam. Some Viet-Minh--French fighting had spilled over into Cambodia, and attempts were made by the Viet-Minh to enlist Cambodian

support in their anti-French, pro-Communist drive which was sweeping Indo-China at this time.

In April and May, 1954, the Viet-Minh invaded Stung Threng Province in northeast Cambodia, following increased Viet-Minh activity in the southern part of Cambodia. Sihanouk was able to rally his small,disciplined army against the Viet-Minh, who claimed to be fighting for Cambodian "independence." It was the position of the king, as a stabilizing factor, which maintained Cambodian unity, without which Cambodia may have succumbed to Viet-Minh subversion. The history of hostility in Cambodian-Vietnamese relations aided Sihanouk, because his soldiers fought not for the defense of the homeland against Communist agents, but more so against another wave of Annamite invaders. Martin Herz remarked:

> The propaganda themes to the effect that war in Indo-China was the result of Communist aggression had little plausibility in Cambodia, which felt it was fighting for its freedom both against the Viet-Minh and the French with Communism as a mere side issue. While Cambodia emerged from the war with ample reason to fear Communist North Vietnam the traditional hatred and suspicion of the Annamites extended as much to anti-Communist South Vietnam as it did to the North.[19]

The final disposition of the invasion force and its claim to represent Cambodian people, was made at the Geneva Conference.

Cambodia's subsequent actions and intransigent position on issues involving her sovereignty indicated that Cambodian officials were well aware of the import that this conference could have on their country's future. Not only did a danger exist from the Viet-Minh, but also the possibility of a Big Power settlement that would compromise the interests and be made at the expense of the smaller powers involved. Likewise, the subsequent withdrawal of French influence would make imperative the need to find the means to protect Cambodia's position through alliance and foreign aid

from some Western power.[20] At this time, a neutral foreign policy was not considered expedient by the Cambodians in light of the stronger Vietnamese position, and the Cambodians, in fact, argued successfully, in the remaining hours of the conference, against their being neutralized.

The final Geneva agreements only partially fulfilled Cambodia's security needs, and her ensuing disappointment with the Western position taken at Geneva was a major cause of Cambodia's seeking to work out her foreign policy independently.

Representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, USSR, Communist China, the Viet-Minh, the State of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia assembled at Geneva on May 8, 1954. This meeting gave the Cambodian representatives their first opportunity to talk with the Chinese Communists and gave Cambodia insights into the conduct of the international relations by the Communist powers. Sihanouk's admitted earlier disillusionment with the Big Powers during the "croisade pour l'independance" may have suggested some misunderstanding by the Cambodians of the manner in which Big Powers conducted international relations.

The first important issue for the Royal Cambodian delegation at Geneva was the claim made by the Khmer Resistance Government, established in 1951, to represent Cambodia. The following is a presentation of the claims of both Cambodian parties:

The Khmer Resistance Government claimed:

> During the past seven years the war of resistance...has been growing steadily...In April, 1950, the Khmer Peoples Congress attended by 200 delegates from the free zones as well as from the enemy occupied areas elected the Khmer Resistance Government. Since then, the KRG has been leading the people of Khmer in their struggle for independence, democracy, and peace.[21]

The Royal Cambodian Government vigorously argued against the above position and in response to the claims of the Cambodian Communists that large

areas of the country were under their control, General Nhiek Tioulong, representing the Royal Khmer Armed Forces said:

> Indeed, you are to be found all over our country, just like rabbits and other animals. If there are one or two of you in the woods, in the villages, in the towns, in the capital, Phnom Penh, you say that you are 'occupying' these places. We do not deny that you are there, but this does not mean that you are anywhere in control or that people follow you.[22]

The second issue at Geneva that bore directly on Cambodia was the insistence by North Vietnam, (DRV) with Chinese backing that Cambodia be demilitarized. The Communists charged that foreign military bases might be established in Cambodia or that the Cambodian Army might be used for aggression against the Viet-Minh. Chou En-lai's concern with the stand of Cambodia's foreign policy stemmed from the Five Power Talks being held in Washington, D.C. for the formation of a collective defense system to fill the void created by the French withdrawal. Cambodia denied these charges and sought to maintain her sovereignty on foreign policy matters, consistent with the United Nations Charter. Likewise, she demanded the right to seek foreign military assistance if her security were threatened, most likely by the Viet-Minh. Chou En-lai, as in the first issue, conceded Cambodia's demands, and a compromise whereby all foreign troops would be withdrawn from Indo-China, resolved this problem. This agreement implied the removal of Viet-Minh troops from Cambodia. Also, Cambodia's right to call upon American assistance for defense purposes was acknowledged. This "unwritten provision" would be a sword held over the heads of the Viet-Minh. Premier Chou, however, feared that Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia might be drawn into a Western military alliance and asked for guarantees from Britain, as chairman of the conference, that Indo-China would be neutralized and legally bound not to join the pact. Anthony Eden gave Chou these assurances, in exchange for Chinese recognition of Cambodia and Laos, without military bases, but Cambodia refused to be

obligated by these private agreements, since these agreements appeared to infringe on her sovereignty.

Devillers and Lacouture give the following account of the closing hours of the Geneva Conference:

> Le petit homme (Sam Sary) au teint fauve, aux mèches rebelles, riposte, coup pour coup, d'une voix râpeuse et stridente, à M. Molotov, à M. Eden, à M. Mendès-Franee: 'Non, je ne signerai pas un texte attentatoire à la souveraineté de mon pays. Un texte qui restreint la liberté du Cambodge de s'allier avec qui'il lui plaît, de céder à qui'il l'entend des bases militaires sur mon territoire.... Non, c'est impossible....'
>
> 'Mais voyons, pourquoi ne pas avoir fait ces objections plus tôt: Et d'ailleurs, les textes prévoient que vous pouvez faire appel aux forces de l'Union française, que ne vous sont interdites que les alliances non conformes à la Charte des Nations Unies. Votre défense sera assurée, vous le savez....'
>
> 'Nous voulons être libres de faire ce qui nous plaît! Nous voulons pouvoir installer des bases américaines au Cambodge. Nous voulons pouvier lutter contre le communisme par tous les moyens....'
>
> 'Mais ne voyez-vous pas que vous remettez en question l'équilibre dans le Sud-Est asiatique? La paix en Asie? La paix dans le monde?'
>
> 'Mais je ne suis pas comme tous les autres. Je n'ai pas peur du communisme, moi, ni des grandes puissances.[23]

Surprisingly, the Russians accepted the Cambodian demands and the Geneva Conference was over.

Cambodia had essentially accomplished her objectives at Geneva. As a result of Premier Chou's agreement to withdraw foreign troops, the Viet-Minh invaders of April-May, 1954, were left without a regroupment area, and Cambodia had let China and North Vietnam know that any aggression against Cambodia would probably lead to the establishment of American military bases in Cambodia. Cambodia did accept the following provision:

> The Royal Government of Cambodia will not join in any agreement with other states, if this agreement carries for Cambodia the obligation to enter into military alliances not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, or, as long as its security is not threatened, or the obligations to establish bases on Cambodian territory for the military forces of foreign powers.[24]

Cambodia's success at Geneva may be explained by the following: the legality of Cambodia's demands in light of the United Nations Charter, the shrewd diplomacy and persistency of the Cambodian delegates, and the Russian desires to conclude the conference. Before Geneva, Cambodia feared that a Big Power arrangement would be made at her expense, and the Eden-Chou agreements attempted exactly this. The fact that this almost occurred at Geneva, I think, would make the Cambodians apprehensive about any future Big Power conferences, especially since the stakes involved and the interests of the Big Powers have increased, and the provisions of the conference have been violated by both sides. Cambodian actions immediately after Geneva gave every indication that Cambodia believed the Geneva agreements were a breathing spell at most. Yet, perhaps it is Cambodian confidence, inspired at Geneva, 1954, that explains Sihanouk's "return to Geneva" theme, first to seek a solution to the Laotion crisis in 1961 and later to guarantee Cambodia's own borders and neutrality.

Thus, the most pressing problems were solved, but the longer range considerations were left unresolved. Cambodia knew that without more international support than it had received at Geneva, it could not realize the gains it had made there on paper. Cambodia realized that a Big Power equilibrium had to be found among the signatories to the Geneva agreements, since the withdrawal of the French mantle would leave Cambodia without adequate protection or voice. In addition to the Viet-Minh threat, Cambodia feared a possible resurgence of Vietnamese or Thai irredentism. Cambodia realized that she would have to stand the test of the viability of the Geneva Agreements. Prince Sihanouk, doubting the Viet-Minh's promises, sought a direct United States military commitment. The United States, however, for reasons explained later, turned down the Cambodian request.

The domestic political scene in Cambodia in 1954 was still a patchwork of political opinions and factions. Issues of priorities and means for the direction of Cambodian society and foreign policy were debated. Sihanouk personally felt that the threat of subversion, both internal and external, was still strong. Thus, the nation, in somewhat of a crisis, would have to close ranks behind a leader in order to build a strong, united Cambodia. This would enable her to fulfill responsibilities in Southeast Asia and the international community, and also meet the rising demands of the people, who felt certain that independence would bring a higher standard of living. Also, Cambodian history recalls how internal dissension has invited Thai and Vietnamese aggression. Michael Field notes:

> Sihanouk ensured that Cambodia emerged from the Indo-Chinese wars as a stable entity in which Khmer nationalism, untainted by the Vietnamese communism, was the driving force.[25]

This Sihanouk was able to do through his own dedication and untiring efforts to meet the needs of the people, identifying himself with their interests, and building a political base, which together have resulted in giving Cambodia stability uncommon in Southeast Asia.

Prince Sihanouk knew that large amounts of foreign aid would be necessary to finance his ambitious projects. Cambodia had signed an economic and military aid agreement with the United States in late 1954.[26] Cambodia's need for financial assistance coincided with expressed Soviet and Chinese willingness to compete in foreign aid with the United States in Southeast Asia. This development was not lost on the Cambodians. Despite Cambodia's concern with the Viet-Minh, the disinterested offer of aid from the Russians and the Chinese, now following a "soft-line" foreign policy, appeared as a possible source of sorely needed economic aid. This possibility became increasingly desirable as Cambodia's relations with the United States, South

Vietnam, and Thailand deteriorated in late 1955 and early 1956. As a result aid agreements were signed with Communist China in 1955 and with the Soviet Union in 1956.

However, foreign aid could only play a relative part in Cambodia's efforts at modernization. Phillipe Preschez in his Essaie sur le Democratie au Cambodge describes the unique blend of politics and economics that has been the essential ingredient for the spirit and motivation underlying Cambodia's impressive economic gains:

> Khmer socialism requires a political framework. It is a 'national socialism' derived from opposition to Communism that sacrifices the idea of nationalism for the benefit of internationalism. The formula is the following: Our administrators, soldiers, students, and politicians will be socialists for the welfare of the people and royalists for the prestige and cohesion of the nation.[27]

While the First Five Year Plan was not drawn up until 1960, it illustrates the goals of the Cambodian economy since independence. Prince Sihanouk hoped that the people would find in their progress, attributable to him, a source of pride that would enhance his own position domestically. Hopefully, this support would carry over to support for his foreign policy. With a minimum of prestige projects, he has succeeded in making Phnom Penh and the country, which is a sine qua non for his foreign policy. Cambodia's economic progress then fits into his political scheme. The following is cited in the introduction to the First Five Year Plan:

> Cambodia, who received her complete political independence in 1953, has faithfully dedicated herself since then to improving, without delay, the material sector and to acquiring the prosperity which her resources permit her to expect. Also, our first Five Year Plan marks a stage of utmost importance in our wish to rapidly acquire economic independence which is still incomplete today. We are convinced that, by the courage of our people and divine assistance, we will be able to reach the objectives, modest but essential, of this plan toward which we strive.[28]

Prince Sihanouk was thus confronted in both the international and domestic spheres with ambitious goals and only limited means of attaining them. At this time, (1954-5), Sihanouk was more predisposed to rely on the West than

the East to assist him in these goals. However, it should also be evident that the Prince had drawn up a Cambodia-first policy, and the aid that was offered would have to serve this goal.

The Prince continued to reassess American policy and the trend of events in Southeast Asia in terms of the corresponding Cambodian interests. The extension of the Cold War into Southeast Asia presented opportunities for Cambodia to exploit. The possibility of assistance from both blocs enabled Cambodia to broaden her alternatives, and to extract for Cambodia the maximum benefit from the Cold War. I will turn next to a discussion of these alternatives as seen by the Cambodians, bearing in mind the prerequisites that the Prince would, at all times, keep Cambodia's interests above those of the Big Powers extending the assistance.

FOOTNOTES

8. Lawrence Palmer Briggs, The Ancient Khmer Empire (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1951), passim.
9. Michael Field, The Prevailing Wind (London: Methuen, 1965), pp. 167-168.
10. For details of the French colonial administration in Cambodia see Rene Morizon, Monographie du Cambodge (Hanoi: Imprimerie d'Extreme--Orient, 1931), pp. 51-55, and
Achelle Silvestre, Le Cambodge administratif (Phnom Penh: Imprimerie Nouvelle Albert Portail, 1924), pp. 42-54.
11. Donald Lancaster, The Emancipation of French Indo-China (London, Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 97.
12. See Roger M. Smith, Cambodia's Foreign Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965), pp. 26-27.
13. Pierre Gourou, "For a French Indo-China Federation," Pacific Affairs Vol. XX, No. 1, (March, 1947), p. 22.
14. Gouvernement Royal du Cambodge, Livre Jaune sur les revendications de l'indépendance du Cambodge,I (Paris: Imprimerie Centrale Commercials, 1953), p. 70.
15. Norodom Sihanouk, La monarchie cambodgienne, et la croisade royale pour l'independance (Phnom Penh: Imprimerie Ramsey, 1961), p. 70.
16. Ibid., p. 71.
17. Livre Jaune,I p. 126.
18. Smith, op. cit., p. 50.
19. Martin F. Herz, A Short History of Cambodia (New York: Praeger,1958), p. 118.
20. Zolton M. Szaz, "Cambodia's Foreign Policy," Far Eastern Survey, Vol. XXIV, No. 10, October, 1955, pp. 151-158.

21. Dai Shen-yu, "Peking and Indo-China's Destiny," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. Xi, No. 30, September, 1954, pp. 346-368, p. 361.
22. Cited by Field, op. cit., p. 163.
23. Jean Lacouture and Philippe Devillers, La fin d'une guerre: Indochine 1954(Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1960), p. 270.
24. Great Britain, Further Documents Relating to the Discussion of Indo-China at the Geneva Conference, June 16-July 21, 1954. Cmd. 9239, Misc. No. 20 (London: H. M. Stationary Office, 1954), pp. 13-14.
25. Cited by Field, op. cit., p. 163. For a discussion of King Sihanouk's abdication and the formation of the Sangkum see Roger M. Smith, "Cambodia," in Governments and Politics in Southeast Asia, George McT. Kahin, ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1964), pp. 621-624. Sihanouk is referred to as "king" in all events prior to March, 1955 and "prince" after March, 1955.
26. See Table 1 Foreign Aid to Cambodia in Smith, op. cit., pp. 123-4.
27. Philippe Preschez, Essai sur la democratie du Cambodge (Paris: Foundation Nationale des Science Politiques, Centre d'Etudes des Relations Internationales, 1961), p. 116.
28. Royaume du Cambodge, Ministere du Plan, Le Plan Quinquennal, p. 1.

III

INSTRUMENTS OF POLICY: THE CHOICE - CAMBODIA AT THE CROSSROADS

THE WESTERN RECORD IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

A neglected area of concentration in the study of foreign policy is the decision-making process within the country considered. In the following section will be discussed the considerations and calculations made by King Sihanouk, as the head of state of a small, under-developed country. The decision by Cambodia to adopt a neutral foreign policy is presented as a calculation made by King Sihanouk, whose thinking and evaluations led him to conclude, that in light of the uncertain future of Indo-China in 1954 such a policy was most expedient.

Political and economic goals in the underdeveloped countries can not be separated due to the prerequisite of external financing and interest. Whereas, a country might turn to domestic considerations before meeting international obligations, this was often impossible because the amount of foreign aid made available to the country was only too often determined by the political stance taken at the international level. Thus, there seems to be some logic in the United Nations missions and embassies that the new nations have established, but can ill-afford, since they provided the means to define their position vis a vis the Cold War as the first order of business. Alignment could serve to guarantee aid from at least one source, or if a neutral stance were taken, from several sources.

Drawing on the context and configuration of international relations as sketched in the introduction, King Sihanouk was able to choose from among certain alternatives for the direction of Cambodian foreign policy. Both power blocs were willing to court Cambodia's favor, with economic and military aid, for their own reasons. This development was not lost on the King. One further consideration before a decision for alignment was made was an evalua-

tion by the aligning power of the past performances of the possible allies. King Sihanouk's initial preference for Western assistance after independence can be explained in terms of his own personal background as well as his reading of events from 1945 to 1954.

First, Sihanouk's pro-Western sentiments were probably due to his French education through which he was imbued with French culture. In addition, his family's preferred treatment, his own sheltered existence, and the lack of any vocal or widespread nationalist or anti-French feeling in the country, served to reinforce these sentiments. Secondly, after assuming the throne, Sihanouk realized that a withdrawal by France would only serve Vietnamese or Thai designs on Cambodian territory. He must have reasoned that there simply was no alternative to seeking Free World assistance in bringing pressure to bear on France to grant independence. Any pressure he might have applied via the Communists probably would have resulted in greater French determination to resist. Available evidence suggests that he never considered using Communist pressure against the French.

An interesting point concerns Sihanouk's knowledge of the American record in the Far East, which undoubtedly figured into his calculations. In the preface of his "Croisade Royale" King Sihanouk stated:

> To the American people, this book confirms that the eyes of the countries aspiring to independence turn hopefully to your glorious and mighty country, knowing that many peoples owe to it their freedom and even their very existence. The United States has increased the international personality of Cambodia. [29]

The United States' relations with Southeast Asia are a history of initial neglect, which gradually gave way to a recognition of the importance of this region to American national security. The United States, historically, had little to say about the colonial policies of the European states, treating them as domestic problems of the country involved. The failure of Ho Chi Minh

to get President Wilson's ear at Versailles is well-known. From Versailles onward, her own Philipine policy an exception, the United States has not played the role that she, in conscience, had hoped she could. Instead, effective propaganda was made by the Communists of our tacit support of the colonial policies of our allies. American Southeast Asian policy, colored by the events of World War II in Asia, has roots in Franklin D. Roosevelt's wish to see independence granted to Indo-China by France within a reasonable time period.

Roosevelt's plan is sketched in the following memorandum addressed to Cordell Hull on January 24, 1944:

> I saw Halifax (British ambassador to Washington) last week and told him quite frankly that it was perfectly true that I had, for over a year, expressed the opinion that Indo-China should not go back to the French but that it should be administered by an international trusteeship. France has had the country--thirty million inhabitants--for nearly one hundred years, and the people are worse off than at the beginning. . . . The only reason they (British) seem to oppose it is that they fear the effect it would have on their own possessions and those of the Dutch. They have never liked the idea of trusteeship because it is in some instances, aimed at future independence. This is true in the case of Indo-China.
>
> Each case must, of course, stand on its own feet, but the case of Indo-China is perfectly clear. France has milked it for one hundred years. The people of Indo-China are entitled to something better than that.[30]

However, Roosevelt's plan was subordinated to a Europe-first policy, and the economic recovery that was considered essential in Europe required the raw materials of the colonial areas at minimal cost. Also political instability, as in France, for example, was so acute that demands for independence might have delivered the "coup de grace" to the existing governmental structure. Although the United States appreciated the need for a commitment on the future independence of Southeast Asia, this requirement was not as pressing as was the prevention of the spread of Communism in Europe. Instead, the United States put her faith in British-French-Dutch proposals which called for either eventual indepen-

dence or loose confederation, within which preparations for independence would be made. In doing so, the principle of self-determination, to which the Americans claimed to be committed was sacrificed, and the hopes of many revolutionaries, borne in the days of the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia, were left to seek alternative means of support.[31]

The significance of this development was not lost on the Soviets. After the successful checkmating of the Soviet designs on Europe by the United States and her allies, the battleground of the Cold War was transferred by Soviet initiative to Asia, where communist strategy attempted to subvert the already independent governments and capture the leadership of the nationalist groups fighting the colonial powers.[32]

American Far Eastern foreign policy received another jolt. Chiang Kai-shek's regime crumbled before Communist Chinese advances, and with it crumbled the basis of the American new order in the Far East--a Pax Sinica.[33] This conservative policy points out, I believe, the lack of understanding on our part of the great change that had taken place in the new Southeast Asia which evolved from World War II. Instead of stability, borne of orderly progress towards independence, the phenomenon of change, sometimes revolutionary, became the order of the day.

In the post-war period, the Communists were sufficiently strong to raise their banners in Burma, Indonesia, and Malaya, and the Philippines. In response the United States had to devise a completely new strategy to replace the one shattered by Chiang's defeat. The American response to the Communist threat took the form of the United States, for the most part alone, leading a holy crusade against Communism in Southeast Asia. Since Communism presented more than a political challenge, the nature of the American response had to be many faceted, embracing the broad areas from the cultural and ideological to the

diplomatic. The Cold War served as a major impetus for a reconsideration of the over-all American policy towards the underdeveloped world.

The following lines of development should be noted. Firstly, the United States was responding, rather than initiating, because events occurred faster than American policy could adjust. The Soviets, then were at an advantage, for as in Indo-China, the Communists were the pace-setters. Second, America's allies in Asia and the independent governments due to their own difficulties and assessments, perceived the Communist threat in varying degrees of priority. The leadership in the anti-Communist struggle fell to the United States by default, who then had the difficult task of attempting to form a regional policy of interest to all.

The professed goals of the United States remained "the promotion of stability to permit internal development and the promotion of security to prevent a takeover by international Communism."[34] The adherence to this policy by the United States was deemed insufficient by some Asian leaders, and excessive and rigid by others. It is this dilemma of divided opinion that still confronts our policymakers today.

The events surrounding the Korean War, the first major East-West confrontation in Asia, served to solidify opinion on the Cold War struggle in Asia. The war tended to draw states into one camp or the other, since Communist aggression was met by the United Nations.

The cease-fire in Korea saw a related increase in Viet-Minh activities in Indo-China. The French continued to resist nationalist demands long after the British and Dutch had bowed out as colonial powers.

United States aid to the Associated States of Indo-China had been channeled through France, in a relationship much too close for the United States to maintain with any credibility its support of or even neutrality toward the indepen-

dence movements. By late 1953 the United States was bearing by far the greater financial burden of the French struggle in return for a stepped-up French military effort. A corollary of this policy was, however, the belief and insistence by the United States that once the revolution ended, France would grant independence.

During this period Cambodia was not a simple bystander, because King Sihanouk realized the implications that a French defeat would have for Cambodia. Because of the obvious designs on Cambodia harbored by the Viet-Minh, Cambodia could support the American efforts in Indo-China and probably shared many of the same hopes with the United States for the future pattern of Indo-China. Perhaps the United States did not appreciate to what degree Cambodian-American interests coincided, or Sihanouk would have received a more attentive hearing from Eisenhower and Dulles when he visited in 1953.

Sihanouk hoped to isolate Cambodia from events in Vietnam, but independence would be necessary in order to counter the Viet-Minh's effective propaganda theme that he was a French puppet compromising Cambodian interests. The United States, however, was supporting the French contention that independence could only be granted after the Communist insurrection was put down. Consequently, Sihanouk's position was made more difficult by his failure to enlist American support. The Americans believed that Cambodian independence could only weaken the French position, as no one was certain that Cambodia would then join France in her struggle, in light of previously expressed sentiments. Cambodian independence was thus won in 1953, in spite of the United States. Siahnouk noted the impact of this on Cambodian-American relations when he said:

> Our policy with regard to the Western bloc is explainable, in part at least, by the almost complete lack of support which came only several months after the transfer of military power. The united States and Britain were overwhelmed with the fear of Communism and tried to hold up the transfer of power and responsibility to the Khmers.[35]

The following year, in the spring of 1954, saw a Viet-Minh invasion of Cambodia. In reaction Cambodia sought direct military assistance from the United States. The American response was clouded by forthcoming major policy decisions on possible United States intervention in Indo-China as a whole. The United States didn't intervene, and the Viet-Minh invasion force was withdrawn according to the provisions of the Geneva Conference.

At Geneva, Cambodia openly sought a United States commitment to protect Cambodia from the Viet-Minh, which by this time had clearly demonstrated the extent and capabilities of its power. At this time Communist China was still in her "hard-line" phase of foreign policy. At home, Sihanouk was facing domestic opposition from the anti-royalist nationalists as a result of his pro-Western stance. The Cambodian request, clearly daring and venturesome in the light of the above, served to illustrate the degree to which Sihanouk was committed to a pro-Western position. With the unforseen disastrous military defeat of the French and the likelihood of a French withdrawal as a result of Geneva, Cambodia was losing its traditional protector at a time when the Viet-Minh threat was greater than ever. Cambodia hoped that by establishing ties with the United States, the Americans would fill this vacuum by guaranteeing her territory and independence. Cambodia believed her request would fall into line with overall United States strategy at this time. Instead of intervening directly in the pre-Geneva period, the United States had decided to build a wall against Communist expansion through a regional collective defense system in Southeast Asia. Cambodia feared covert Viet-Minh subversion, more than a direct attack, in which case she would probably receive SEATO assistance. In light of the basic differences of policy among the allies, a SEATO response to Vie-Minh subversion was less likely.

Due to the strong Viet-Minh position and comparatively weak Western position,

a Western guarantee was all the more imperative. The most Cambodia could hope for from Geneva would be a brief respite before the Viet-Minh reasserted its pressure and subversion. As was expected, the Geneva agreements themselves did not give Cambodia the kind of security of the type she wanted. While the United States hoped that the Geneva agreements would ensure self-determination on foreign policy matters for Cambodia and Laos, it was left to these countries to stand the test of viability of the Geneva Agreements by their own means. Cambodia's position was rendered even more difficult in light of her failure to get what she deemed was an adequate military guarantee, either bilaterally or later from SEATO.[36] While the United States hoped that a strong pro-Western Cambodia would be an element of stability in an uncertain political structure in Indo-China, this hope could not be realized without a commitment of American soldiers to Cambodia.

The failure of SEATO to provide American troops can be explained partially by the complications arising from American domestic pressures against direct involvement, by interpretations of written and unwritten Geneva Accords, by French attitudes, and a preoccupation with Vietnam.

First, memories of the conditions under which United States troops had fought in Korea and the humiliating defeat of French troops in Indo-China were too fresh to counsel the signing of any treaty that would automatically call for the unilateral commitment of United States troops. This hesitancy by the United States perhaps indicates that the above strategic considerations opposing a direct American commitment were a stimulus to the development of the theory of massive retaliation and collective security as the best means to confront the threat of international Communism, whether in Moscow or on the Vietnamese-Cambodian border. John Foster Dulles stated:

> The responsibilities of the United States are so vast and far flung that we believe we would serve best not by earmarking forces for

> particular areas of the Far East but by developing the deterrent of mobile striking power plus strategically placed reserves.[37]

Cambodia clearly saw her threats emanating from Hanoi, not from Peking, (and possibly from Saigon and Bangkok as well), and so the firepower of the Strategic Air Command was of little comfort. Thus, the prestige of SEATO dropped considerably in Phnon-Penh, which was one factor in Cambodia's decision not to join SEATO.

Second, excepting the Cambodian proviso, Cambodia was legally bound not to permit the establishment of foreign military bases.[38] The dispatch of American troops without a prior demonstrated threat from the Viet-Minh would have violated the spirit of the Geneva agreements which the United States had sworn not to do. Apparently the Cambodians were willing to overlook this technicality in their request for American bases or might have used this proviso to rationalize their actions.

Third, there was a hesitancy on the part of the French to be supplanted by the United States in Cambodia, the one area where France believed some influence could be retained. If the United States had brushed aside French considerations, it might have further strained Franco-American relations, already tense from the failure of the Brussels Conference and the forthcoming European Defense Community plans. On Franco-American relations in Southwest Asia, Professor Cady notes:

> It may prove to be one of the tragedies of the decline of Western influence in Asia that France could not admit the possibility of cultural or political equality with herself, much less the outright surrender of colonial possessions, without seeming to repudiate not only her position as a world power, but also the very rational of her own role in world affairs.[38a]

Fourth, the United States was increasingly pre-occupied with Vietnam, more than with Cambodia or Laos, and assigned priorities to stabilizing Vietnam. Only after the American position in Vietnam was consolidated was attention turned to drawing up a meaningful program for Cambodia. Cambodia's only protec-

tion was the "umbrella clause" of SEATO which extended to the Indo-Chinese states the same multi-lateral guarantees of the signatories. While Cambodia would not solicit "umbrella clause" protection, Cambodian inner circles were certain that the United States would extend direct aid if a massive Communist invasion were launched.

In addition to this military commitment as spelled out in the SEATO treaty, the United States realized that the Communist threat was manifold. Under SEATO's nuclear mantle, the United States committed billions of dollars to the "nation-building" process, realizing that strong, unified countries with effective armies were their own best protection against internal subversion.

Theoretically, American aid would set in motion economic and political forces which would help to meet the rising demands of the people. Hopefully this progress would be seen, in part, by the recipients as resulting from their country's close association with the United States.

In the post-Geneva period, 60% of American aid went to Asia, but 75% of this was for military aid representing a distorted view of the best way to counteract Communism in Asia.[39]

By 1955, Cambodia had signed economic and military agreements with the United States providing for the maintenance and training, along with support from France, of the 20,000 man Cambodian army. Economic aid provided the necessary currency for importing essential capital goods which Cambodia had been unable to produce or purchase.[40]

With the above commitments, the United States believed she had met Cambodia's security problem as well as possible in light of her other commitments and assesments of Cambodia's needs.

The tone of Cambodian-American relations was set in the 1953-1955 period, when American Southeast Asian policy was extensively reconsidered. Cambodia, compared to Thailand, South Vietnam, or the Philippines, fared worse, in terms

of military and economic commitment. Perhaps the outstanding feature of this relationship during the preceding two years considered was Cambodia's search for a Western commitment, which may be seen as a Cambodian endorsement of our policy up until the Geneva Conference of 1954. The failure of Cambodia to receive this commitment forced King Sihanouk to reconsider his position and seek a defense commitment through alternate means.

THE COMMUNIST RECORD IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Cambodia's pro-Western stance, as pointed out above, serves as a severe indictment against Communist policies during this same period extending equally to the Russians, Chinese and Vietnamese.

Russian foreign policy in the immediate post-war years, like the American, was also European oriented, which precluded any meaningful assistance to the independence movements in Southeast Asia. Thus, the American position vis à vis the independence struggle was made easier in light of the lack of competition in support at this time. This competition came only after the Cold War was shifted to Asia in the 1947-1948 period. However, in existence at this time were several Asian Communist parties, such as the Indo-Chinese party, formed in 1933, which was the basis for the eventual Viet-Minh victory about twenty years later. These parties supported the nationalists fighting the return of the Western powers after the defeat of Japan.[41]

Following the Calcutta Conference in 1947, Communist instigated civil war broke out in Burma, Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines.[42] These parties, now openly supported by the Communists, attempted in vain to destroy the political unity of these countries, making them vulnerable to a Communist takeover.

However, the only real success for the international Communist movement at this time took place in China. The fairly rapid success of the Chinese Communists on the mainland produced results neither the Soviet Union nor the

United States appreciated at this time. Communist Chinese foreign policy regarding the third world, as it evolved, was the support of only orthodox revolutionary movements. There was little sympathy at this time for neutral sentiment, reflecting a strictly bi-polar world order. Chinese policy during the period under discussion (1949-1955) has been characterized by the slogan "Join the Revolutionaries." China looked forward to more revolutions in Asia similar to its own. The Communist Chinese position mellowed as it gained confidence in foreign policy alternatives, illustrated by the slogan "Unite with All."[43]

It was a coincidence in China's favor that international relations in the Far East at this time provided many opportunities for her to exploit. French imperialism, United-States-Japanese relations, the colonial heritage with its resultant social conditions in several Asian states, undefined borders, and various intra-regional disputes and rivalries presented themselves as Cold War issues.[44] In short, China found a target area much to her liking and ripe for exploitation.

In addition to support of orthodox revolutionary movements, Communist China beamed propaganda through "People's diplomacy" to Asian labor organizations, the intelligentsia, and left-wing political groups dissatisfied with the government in power. Undoubtedly the above actions represented attempts by the Chinese to interfere in the domestic politics of others, but the Chinese had little alternative in their dealings with those states with whom she had no diplomatic relations.

The roles played by China as a world power in the Korean conflict and at the Geneva Conference opened to her new avenues for contact with national leaders. Consequently China was no longer forced to deal only with the political opposition, but could confront the governing elite.[45] China's new role

prompted rethinking by several countries on their relationship with China. Premier Chou exploited this apparent willingness of many countries to broaden their relationship with China. The development of Sino-Cambodian relations follows in part this same evolution.

Cambodia is one country where China can point, with some historical accuracy, to a traditionally amicable relationship. The Khmer states of Fun-Nan and Chen-La appear to have had friendly relations with China. The expanding empires of the Chinese and the Khmers never came into conflict; and tribute was sent by the Khmers, apparently at their initiative, to Peking.[46]

As a result, the Cambodians do not harbor anti-Chinese feelings for any historical reasons. Khmer nationalism did not grow in response to a more aggressive Chinese culture, which appeared to threaten the existing order. The Cambodian people differ in origin from the others inhabiting the Indo-Chinese peninsula, who settled there after migrating from southern China, where a more aggresive culture threatened to engulf them. During the modern period, also, what little Cambodian-Chinese relations existed were characterized by an absence of any conflict. In Phnom Penh today, relations between the Cambodians and Chinese are ideal, although perhaps more a tribute to the Khmer than the Chinese. Therefore, historically, the Khmers have had little anxiety over the Chinese, either in Asia or at home. Cambodia's first extensive contact with the Communist Chinese came at Geneva. The cordial relations that existed between the Cambodians and the Chinese, in general, probably facilitated Sikanouk's rapprochement with the Chinese.

Cambodia's relations with the Viet-Minh have from the outset been characterized by deep suspicion and hostility. Apparently, the Cambodians did not link the Communist Chinese to Hanoi's schemes. The Chinese, with good reason, kept in the background of the anti-French struggle.

In the post-war period, propaganda beamed at Sihanouk was harsh, a fact Viet-Minh and Communists would like to overlook today. It was fear of losing direction of the independence movement to the Issaraks-Viet-Minh that prompted Sihanouk to increase his pressure on the French, in order to invalidate Communist propaganda to the effect that he was a mere French puppet.

Son Ngoc Minh, the President of the Khmer Resistance Government, gave this account of Sihanouk's relationship with the French:

> After occupying the eastern part of South Vietnam in 1863, the French colonizers invaded Phnom Penh and set up in 1884 their colonial rule throughout Khmer (Cambodia). Since then the cruel colonial exploitations of the French colonizers has provoked the people to rise up and ceaselessly fight against them.
>
> . . . . On October 3, 1945, the French colonizers . . . invaded Khmer for the second time. The puppet (King) Sihanouk's clique which had collaborated with the French colonizers and with the Japanese fascists surrendered again to the French aggressors. But the Khmer people mobilized and organized the popular masses and launched a patriotic war. . . .
>
> In August, 1946, the Khmer Peoples Liberation Army liberated the town of Siem Reap. Thus began the nation-wide and long term struggle of the Khmer people.[47]

Ho Chi Minh's agents began infiltrating Cambodia in 1947 through supporting some elements of the Khmer Issaraks. The Viet-Minh hoped to extend their revolutionary influence into Cambodia and Laos via the local nationalist movements by exploiting anti-French sentiment. Pressure on the Issaraks by the Viet-Minh, however, led to a split in the movement, one faction retaining ties with the Viet-Minh and the other remaining entirely Cambodian. The numbers of Viet-Minh supporting the Issaraks were bolstered by using Vietnamese residing in Cambodia. Cambodians of Cochin-Chinese origin were also used. Special armed Vietnamese units were organized to help the Cambodians, to the extent that the Viet-Minh organization in South Vietnam was transferred to Cambodia. By 1950, the Viet-Minh had established three regional units with local committees in each.

These committees were staffed mainly by Vietnamese, who claimed that the lack of competent Cambodians made Vietnamese hegemony a necessity. To remedy this situation, a political school, for one hundred forty agents and an army of about one hundred pupils, was established. Other schools for training in propaganda, police duty, education and economics were also set up.[48]

On the political side, the Viet-M'nh established the Committee for the Revolutionary Cambodain Peoples Party in 1949, and the party itself was established in 1951. By 1954, a Khmer Peoples Liberation Army had been found.[49]

The widespread Viet-Minh activities were obvious by their invasion of Laos in April, 1953. Propaganda was beamed from Hanoi to the effect that the "Workers Party (Laotian) and the Viet-Minh people have the mission of creating a revolution in Cambodia and Laos and a union of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos." [50]

On April 2, 1954, the Viet-Minh-Peoples Liberation Army launched another attack on Cambodia from positions in Cochin-China and Laos.

Herz observed:

> These weren't guerillas, but regular forces coming from North Vietnam, and their eruption did what neither the French nor the King had succeeded in doing. It made it plain for everyone in Cambodia that the Viet-Minh were in fact Vietnamese invaders whose fight had nothing to do with the fight for Cambodian independence. [51]

After the Geneva agreements of 1954, the activities of the Cambodian Communists subsided. The Viet-Minh's lack of success in Cambodia may have prompted them to reverse their strategy in their plans to dominate Cambodia. A possible rapprochement between China and Cambodia, in light of Cambodia's neutral stance, may have been thought to promise better results than internal subversion, which could only drive Sihanouk towards the West.[52]Since the Geneva agreements ruled out any Viet-Minh regroupment area in Cambodia, it is logical to assume that many Cambodian Communists went to Hanoi to plan for another day.

During the time period under consideration, prior to Geneva, the Viet-Minh had attempted to subvert King Sihanouk's leadership. They failed due to King

Sihanouk's ability to rally the people behind his independence crusade. Contributing factors were traditional Khmer-Vietnamese enmity and lack of appeal of Communism to the Khmers.[53] With the establishment of the United Front for Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, Hanoi's plans for hegemony in Indo-China were exposed, giving King Sihanouk ample justification for his belief that an immediate French withdrawal would lead to subjugation at the hands of the Viet-Minh. Cambodia's position at Geneva was developed as a response to this demonstrated threat from the Viet-Minh leading Cambodia to seek an American commitment following the French withdrawal.

Sihanouk said:

> In 1954, at Geneva, the Communist delegates were bent on achieving a de facto partition of our country, a feat they had accomplished successfully to the prejudice of Laos--for the benefit of their satellites, the local 'reds' that is to say, the Cambodian Pathet Lao.[54]

Sihanouk, to my knowledge, never linked the Chinese to any of the Viet-Minh designs on Cambodia. In fact, the negotiations by the Communists at Geneva indicated a deep split between the Chinese and Russians on one hand and the Viet-Minh on the other. However, very early in the conference the Viet-Minh demands were supported by Russia and China. As these demands proved untenable, the Chinese and Russians were able to mitigate the Vietnamese position. This may indicate the degree to which the Viet-Minh were subject to Chinese and Russian pressure. It may also suggest a better Chinese-Russian understanding of the Western position. Lastly, Chinese-Russian actions may be seen as subjecting Viet-Minh interests to Russian-Chinese national interest.

The Communists made important concessions to the Cambodians. The claims of the Cambodian Resistance Government were dismissed. Another important concession came from Chou En-Lai on June 16, 1954. At Geneva, when in discussion with Anthony Eden, he agreed to treat the issues involving Cambodia and Laos differently from any general settlement on Vietnam. He agreed to the withdrawal

of French and Viet-Minh troops from both countries and offered diplomatic recognition to both Cambodia and Laos. Pham Van Dong and Molotov concurred.[55] Harold Hinton notes that "this major concession so improved the outlook for a settlement that the leaders of most of the delegations turned over the negotiations to subordinates and left temporarily for home.[56] The Chinese, therefore, must have appeared to the Cambodians as reasonable and conciliatory, who actually forced North Vietnam to accept concessions in Cambodia's behalf. The role played by the Chinese and Russians in restraining the Vietnamese was not lost on the Cambodians.

However, at Geneva, China's conciliatory position was made possible only at North Vietnam's expense. North Vietnam's positions in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia were undermined, by Big Power negotiation, in exchange for the promise that elections be held in South Vietnam in 1956. The Geneva Conference gave Cambodia a breathing space, during which time she shored up her defenses and sought outside assistance against a possible recurrence of Viet-Minh imperialism. Sihanouk's actions suggested little faith in international guarantees at this time. On the other hand, he saw how the North Vietnamese positions were compromised by the Big Powers for agreement among themselves on broader international issue, which clearly overlooked the facts as they existed. Yet, in light of Sihanouk's subsequent search for an American guarantee, we can assume that he did not believe that the Big Powers would actually uphold their own agreements.[57]

As of 1954, Cambodia had made no move toward the Communist bloc. Any accomodation between Cambodia and North Vietnam was clearly impossible, and Chinese-Russian actions, although conciliatory, did not suffice to convince Cambodia of their disinterested intentions either. Cambodia did not accept the diplomatic recognition offered by China, and a rapprochement with the Communist bloc was not seriously considered.

Although Cambodia did not get the American support she sought, she sensed that the United States would not stand idly by if the Viet-Minh invaded Indo-China, since this would threaten the American position. However, due to the uncertainty of American policy toward Indo-China at the time, Cambodia made alternate formulations not wishing to make her future dependent on American policy. Perhaps Cambodia concluded in light of the position taken by the United States at Geneva, and the American unwillingness to make a commitment to Cambodia, that future events in Indo-China would be directed increasingly by the Chinese and North Vietnamese. Also, the United States had no real foothold in Indo-China, due to a probable resurgence of civil war in Laos and the probably Viet-Minh victory in South Vietnam in 1956. A probable combination of disappointment with the United States, and a lack of faith in the Viet-Minh's respect for the Geneva agreements forced Sihanouk to consider a third alternative. Rather than fall victim to the probable Communist hegemony in Indo-China, Sihanouk hoped to acccmodate his country to it. He had, as an example, the success of India in steering a middle course in the Cold War. The configuration of international relations in Indo-China after Geneva differed radically from the period prior to the Viet-Minh victory. Neither the West nor the East, in terms of Sihanouk's evaluations, offered a prospect for ensuring Cambodian security. Therefore, neutrality appeared as the last alternative for achieving Cambodian foreign policy goals.

NEUTRALISM--PREMIERE\MENT, LE CAMBODGE

A neutral foreign policy appeared logical for several reasons. Cambodia assumed that a neutral foreign policy would be the least likely to upset the delicate power balance existing after Geneva. Alignment might serve as a pretext for a resurgence of Viet-Minh aggression. Cambodia felt membership in

an alliance would compromise her sovereignty, while neutrality would enhance it. As a member of a Western alliance, her role would be that of a third rate power, certainly inferior to her old enemy, Thailand. Cambodia also feared that she would lose a voice, not only in relation to Asian affairs, but in relation to the many other issues being considered by the neutrals, since her voice in the councils of SEATO would be, if heard at all, only a whisper.

Cambodia, confident in the gains her diplomacy had brought her at Geneva, believed that if she remained neutral, she could steer a meaningful course between the Big Powers, and maintain a power balance. These, perhaps, appear as grandiose pretensions for a small neutral nation with an uncertain future.

Second, in 1954, King Sihanouk was under domestic pressure from the Democrats to pursue either a neutral foreign policy, or at least one not outwardly pro-Western. With an approaching election in Cambodia, as spelled out in the Geneva Accords, the King feared a Democrat victory which might compromise his heretofore complete freedom in foreign policy matters.[53] In response, Sihanouk hoped to unite all parties with a common platform,and neutral foreign policy, apparently acceptable to all, would eliminate foreign policy issues as a possible source of contention. Also, if a neutral foreign policy were followed, Sihanouk would be immune from attack by the Democrats on foreign policy issues.

Third, I believe that King Sihanouk evaluated the international scene at this time and concluded that the Big Powers would support Cambodia's neutrality. Opinion is divided on Sihanouk's evaluation as related to Indo-China.

Michael Leifer suggests:

> Consequently (as a result of Geneva agreements relating to Cambodia) with no insurgent strongholds on its soil, and with no bordering snactuary from which insurgents would be likely to operate, Cambodia was not faced with an immediate

and pressing security problem.[59]

Therefore, with little prospect of a confrontation, it seemed likely that Cambodia's neutrality would not be threatened.

In my opinion, this observation seems inconsistent with Cambodian actions, all of which indicated that the country faced a Viet-Minh attack or subversion. The Cambodians were doubtful of Viet-Minh respect for the Geneva agreements. Anxiety increased as hopes for a United States commitment dwindled. In addition, the Cambodians were apprehensive about the forthcoming Vietnam election that would probably result in a Viet-Minh victory. This victory would give Cambodia a common border with the Viet-Minh.

Roger M. Smith notes:

> It is clear that at this time the Cambodian government still regarded North Vietnam as the most serious threat to its independence. Nor did it have any illusions about China, which had backed the Viet-Minh's demand at Geneva for recognition of the Khmer Resistance government.[60]

Cambodia, therefore, had to devise a means to prevent or forestall a Viet-Minh attack. Whereas American military aid provided some security, it was considered by the Cambodians to be, at most, token evidence to the Viet-Minh of American support. Also, American military aid had to be limited for fear of alarming the Chinese or Vietnamese. China apparently took no offense at Cambodian acceptance of arms aid and seemed to understand the Cambodian concern with the Viet-Minh. Thus, it appeared that China would accept a genuinely neutral Cambodia.

Cambodia hoped to duplicate the success of Burma and India, whose neutrality had been endorsed by both blocs. In light of apparent Communist and certain Western support for neutrality, the advocates of neutrality in Cambodia could present a somewhat convincing argument for Cambodia's adopting a neutral foreign policy.

The first indication that Sihanouk was considering a neutral foreign policy

came in late November, 1954. When Sihanouk returned from a state visit to neutral Burma, where he held discussions with U-Nu, Sihanouk reasoned that:

> In order to safeguard themselves the large and small nations of Southeast Asia should deploy all of their good will in order to create a center of pacific resistance to all pacts or alliances susceptible to provoking world conflicts, that is to say, a large group of nations should observe neutrality strictly.[61]

Prime Minister Nehru visited Phnom Penh on November 24th and 25th, and favorable references to neutrality were made. The Cambodian decision was probably made sometime between July 20, 1954, when, before signing the final Geneva agreements, Cambodia tried to determine the degree to which the United States would commit herself in Cambodian defense from Communist aggression or subversion, and December 23, 1954, when Cambodian policy was declared to be neutral. On September 8, 1954, the Protocol to the Southeast Asian Collective Defense Treaty with the "umbrella clause" was signed in Manila, ending all Cambodian hopes for a specific troop commitment.

On December 23, 1954, Premier Penn Nouth announced, over Radio Phnom Penh, that Cambodia would assume a neutral position in the Cold War and accept only foreign aid that did not compromise Cambodian sovereignty in foreign policy matters.[62]

In March, 1955, Prince Sihanouk returned Nehru's visit. Sihanouk hoped to line up support for the anti-Viet-Minh Chinese stand he would take at Bandung. The most important support he sought was India's who appeared as the only possible counterweight to the positions commanded by the Chinese and North Vietnamese, who. he hoped to convince of Cambodia's neutrality.

On March 18, 1955, Sihanouk expressed his appreciation of India's general approach to world problems and her desire for the maintenance of peace.[63]

Michael Leifer states that "the meetings with Nehru were a significant stage in the Prince's intellectual and political development."[64] Sihanouk and

Nehru agreed that the path to world peace lay through the fostering of peaceful co-existence.

Sihanouk received final assurances for his inclination toward neutralism and of the viability of his policy at Bandung. Here twenty-nine Afro-Asian nations met, with a great show of "moral force", to condemn the bipolarization fostered by both blocs. One of the most important developments in Cambodian foreign policy took place after Sihanouk became convinced that China and North Vietnam would respect Cambodia's neutrality, even if China had to restrain a more reluctant North Vietnam.

Cambodia joined the chorus of nations who expressed concern over the fate of the "Third World" neutrality among the Big Powers. Prince Sihanouk, one of the outspoken at Bandung, said that Cambodia:

> now finds herself on the separating line of two great civilizations, of two races, of two political worlds. . . and as such, has the dangerous privilege of standing the test and the application of the principles of Pancha Shil. My country adopted these principles and wishes to apply them to the fullest extent. In so doing, she only requests that her independence, her integrity, her security, her tradition and political ideology be not threatened.
>
> It will be the test of the task of the more powerful nations to set the example, to give proof and guarantees to smaller nations.[65]

Thus Sihanouk placed the onus of peaceful coexistence at the feet of the Communists, whose intentions were his primary concern.

According to Szaz's account, Cambodia's announcement that she would join the family of neutral nations was made as a concession to the political opposition at home and in order to ensure the support of the Colombo powers at Bandung. The importance of this support to Sihanouk was revealed when he said:

> To attract the sympathy of peaceful countries we even accept, today, the risk of death, if ever we should be attacked, while richer and more populated and more advanced and more powerful countries do not accept the challenge of the Communist world,

> unarmed like us. Cambodia is today doubly disarmed; disarmed she is by her smallness, her poverty, and her small population. Disarmed also by her determination to limit her armed forces to a derisory figure. She is proud of her courage and of the sympathy of neutral nations, but she apprehends the future.[66]

Cambodia apparently believed that she had this support, which accounts for her position at Bandung. Premier Chou was skillfully attuned to the sentiment expressed at Bandung and reacted accordingly. Either because Chou saw a potential ally in Sihanouk, or because he felt that the sentiment expressed by Sihanouk was widespread, he invited Sihanouk to lunch, where he assured him that China was willing to conduct her relations with Cambodia on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Discussions with Pham Van Dong were also held, and Sihanouk received a pledge of respect for Cambodia's independence and territorial integrity. Premier Chou querried Sihanouk on his request for military aid and commitment from the United States and was apparently convinced by Sihanouk of Cambodia's sincere desire to practice neutrality. Chou's private, and later public,assurances apparently satisfied Sihanouk, and the Bandung meeting clearly marked a turning point in Cambodian-Chinese relations. Sihanouk was struck by Chou and Pham's reasonableness, and he believed a rapprochement with his neighbors was possible. Sihanouk then returned to Cambodia certain that here-in lay the key to the solution of Cambodia's Cold War problems.

V. D. Dutt maintains that Cambodia's rapprochement with China came only as a third alternative. First, Cambodia failed to get an American security guarantee. Second, Sihanouk realized that an "alliance" of the neutrals could not exert a meaningful influence on international affairs. As a last resort, Sihanouk sought to make amends with China.

Dutt states:

> At first Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia looked towards India for devising some framework of security either through direct action or through some kind of a Bandung-type arrangement. Sihanouk himself traced the origin of his foreign policy to India's example and stressed the spiritual links between India and Cambodia. But as India appeared both unwilling and unable to undertake any such responsibility and become involved in the problems of Southeast Asian countries, Sihanouk began to look elsewhere and gradually veered toward Peking.[67]

This analysis seems inconsistent with the following statement made by Sihanouk in April, 1956.

> Since he (Nehru) expounded a few principles in international relations which were bearing fruit in lessening international tension I have been following them.[68]

Perhaps Sihanouk believed that India's success lay in a "pro-Peking" neutrality.

In either case, the increasing importance of Communist China as a party determining action in Indo-China, coupled with Communist China's professed adherence to the Five Principles, led Sihanouk to acknowledge the reality and necessity of including China in the scope of Cambodian foreign policy. With China's apparent willingness to restrain North Vietnam, Sihanouk had succeeded in meeting his primary concern. By Sihanouk's appraisal, acceptance of the SEATO "umbrella clause" was unnecessary and could only serve to disrupt the present balance. The possible benefit derived from SEATO protection simply was not worth the risk of testing China's reaction.

By 1956, the configuration of international relations in Indo-China had changed considerably from 1953-4, when initial Cambodian foreign policy calculations were made. At that time, Cambodia, (as well as) Thailand, and others, believed the United States could and would effectively fill the gap left by the French withdrawal. Yet the yardstick of American commitment for these countries was the number of American troops committed, and the degree of commitment was seen by those countries as directly proportional to the number

of troops involved. Subsequent American policy left Sihanouk with little alternative. This viewpoint did not seem apparent to Washington, which failed to appreciate that due to the limited American commitment to Cambodia and Cambodia's vulnerability, neutrality may have been the best solution for Cambodia. Instead, the half-measures of SEATO were credible to no one, and the American position was compromised, for it lent credence to the charge that it was United States policy that was responsible for exacerbating tension in Southeast Asia. In contrast, the political observer of the Asian scene saw China, during the same period, conduct her most successful foreign policy to date.

Thus, by 1955, Cambodian foreign policy had evolved into neutralism, which by this time was still a passive neutralism, defined by the Cambodians only as nonalignment with the West. Cambodia was not, as yet, the subject of Sino-American competition, and no influence from either side needed any balancing. As of May, 1954, acceptance of American aid appeared as the sole alternative. By 1955, the promise of peaceful co-existence that emerged from Bandung seemed to produce a viable international order that would restrain Viet-Minh designs and support Cambodian neutrality. Sihanouk could then turn his attention to the tasks of nation-building and in so doing construct an effective Khmer nationalism that would strengthen the Cambodian position both domestically and internationally.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER III

29. Quoted by Herz, op. cit., p. 121.
30. Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol. II, (New York: Macmillan, 1948), p. 1597.
31. George McT. Kahin, "Postwar Problems in the Southeast Asia Policy of the United States," in Philip W. Thayer, ed., Southeast Asia in the Coming World (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1953), pp. 33-35.
32. See Karl A. Wittfogel, "How to Checkmate Stalin in Asia," Commentary, Vol. 10, No. 4, October 1950, pp. 334-342.
33. See Russell H. Fifield, Southeast Asia in United States Policy, (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 17.
34. Fifield, op. cit., p. 4.
35. Quoted by John P. Armstrong, Sihanouk Speaks, (New York: Walker, 1964), p. 73.
36. See Smith, op. cit., p. 68.
37. See U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXI, No. 800, November 29, 1954, p. 802.
38. See Anthony Eden, The Memoirs of Anthony Eden: Full Circle, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), p. 53.
38a. John F. Cady, The Roots of French Imperialism in Eastern Asia, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1954), p. 295.
39. See "Message of the President (to the Congress) on the Mutual Security Program for 1956, April 20, 1955, (House Document 144, 84th Congress, 1st Session), in Paul E. Zimmer, ed., Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1955, (New York: Harper & Bros., for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1956), pp. 33 ff.
40. See Agency for International Development, Mission to Cambodia, Termination Report, American Economic Aid Program in Cambodia, (Phnom Penh: U. S. AID, 1964).
41. See David Galula, "Subversion and Insurgency in Asia," in Alastair Buchan, ed., China and the Peace of Asia (New York: Praeger, 1965) p. 179.
42. See Thomas Hovet, Jr., Bloc Politics in the United Nations, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 85.
See also Ruth T. McVey, The Calcutta Conference and the Southeast Asian Uprisings., Conference, (1953).
43. See H. Arthur Steiner, "The International Position of Communist China," American I.P.R. Paper No. 2, (New York: American Institute of Pacific Relations, 1953), pp. 8-15.
44. See Fifield, op. cit., p. 6.
45. See A. M. Halpern, "Communist China's Demands on the World," in Morton A. Kaplan, ed., The Revolution in World Politics, (Wiley: New York, 1962), p. 241.
46. See Paul Pelliot, trans. and ed., Memoires sur les coutumes du Cambodge de Tcheou Ta-kouan, (Paris: Librairie d'Amerique et d'Orient, 1951), passim.
47. Quoted by Dai Shen-yu, op. cit., p. 361.
48. See Joseph S. Roucek, "Sihanouk's Complaint," Eastern World, Vol. XXVIII, No. 1, January, 1964, pp. 12-13, p. 12.

49. Ibid.
50. Quoted by Lancaster, op. cit., p. 229.
See also New York Times, April 14, 1953.
51. Herz, op. cit., p. 93.
See Le Monde, October 1, 2, 3 and November 1, 1953; see Lacouture and Devillers, op. cit., pp. 257,268.
52. See Michael Leifer, "Cambodia and Her Neighbors," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXIV, No. 4, (Winter, 1961-1962), p. 364.
53. See Herz, op. cit., p. 93.
54. Norodom Sihanouk, "Mon Anti-Americanisme," in Ministere de l'Information, ed., Recueil d'editoriaux du Prince Norodom Sihanouk, (Phnom Penh: Service de Presse, 1965), pp. 1-22, p. 8.
55. See Eden, op. cit., p. 145.
See New York Times, June 17, 1954.
56. Harold Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin), 1965, p. 251.
57. See Ellen J. Hammer, The Struggle For Indo-China Continues--Geneva to Bandung. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955), p. 1.
58. See Smith, op. cit., pp. 74-77.
59. Michael Leifer, "Cambodia and China," in A. M. Halpern, ed., Policies Toward China,(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 330.
60. See Smith, op. cit., p. 74.
61. La Liberte, November 24, 1954, cited by Smith, op. cit., p. 73.
62. Radio Phnom Penh, December 24, 1954.
63. "Nehru-Sihanouk Joint Communique of March 18, 1955," Foreign Affairs Reports, (New Delhi), I, No. 3 (March, 1955), cited by Smith, op. cit., p. 78.
64. Leifer, op. cit., p. 331.
65. See George McT. Kahin, The Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April, 1955, (Ithaca, N.Y.; Cornell University Press, 1956), p. 13.
66. Quoted by Szaz, op. cit., pp. 157-8.
67. V. D. Dutt, China's Foreign Policy, (1958-1962), (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1964), p. 186.
68. See Hindustan Times (N.D.), April 3, 1956, cited by Leifer, op. cit., p. 331.

IV

THE PRACTICE OF CAMBODIAN NEUTRALITY

Cambodia's relations vis à vis the United States and China may be seen as part of an evolving competition wherein both powers hoped to woo Cambodia into their respective camps as part of their overall international strategy. The international relations of Southeast Asia during that decade have been largely the product of this competition.

It was imperative that Cambodia maintain a flexibility in her actions that would permit her to withstand pressures from either side attempting to force her from her neutrality. Since both powers sought her support, Cambodia hoped to exert some pressure on them, attempting to keep the competition peaceful.

The United States apparently felt that a continued interest in Cambodia was justified by Cambodia's predicament vis à vis the Viet-Minh. Although homage was paid to Cambodia's neutrality, the United States felt certain in her ability to woo Cambodia through a larger amount of aid than offered by the Communist bloc. The United States also believed it was only a matter of time before Cambodia realized which country had her true interests at stake and offered the better means for accomplishing her goals.

Sihanouk's espousal of neutralism drew a response from Peking and Moscow, both of whom likewise felt that Cambodia offered the potential for a foothold, or that a commitment of resources would be needed in order to neutralize the American influence. The Communists seemed more willing to come to grips with neutrality as the central issue in their relations with Cambodia. Since a Cambodian realignment towards the Communists was completely unlikely, the Communists hoped for an opportunity to grant economic aid as the sole means of maintaining an influence in Cambodia.

Consequently, Cambodia was willing to test the Communists' intentions.

As American pressure on Cambodia to join SEATO became apparent, Sihanouk switched from a "passive" to an "active" neutralism in order to counter the American pressure. Sino-American competition, supported by both sides, became the sine qua non of support for Cambodian neutrality. Both China and the United States were willing to play the game, with Cambodia writing the rules and serving as umpire. Within time, the stakes and commitment became too high for either side to counsel withdrawal despite an effective neutrality practiced by Cambodia that countered the zeal of both. Sihanouk had only to raise the stakes to produce a response.

Both sides hoped to use Cambodia as a showpiece to illustrate their support of peaceful co-existence. Since Cambodia remained truly neutral, both sides were forced to conform to Cambodian wishes, leaving no pretext for pressure from the other side. This was necessary if their endorsements of neutrality were to be credible to other states counseling similar foreign policy positions.

Whereas this situation appeared ideal in Cambodian eyes, Cambodia's neighbors interpreted Cambodian neutrality differently. Thailand and South Vietnam watched the development of Cambodian neutrality with great apprehension, interpreting it as Communist sympathies on the part of Sihanouk. They viewed with misgivings any increase of Communist influence near their borders. Thai-South Vietnamese relations with Cambodia worsened as Chinese influence increased. The deterioration of relations between countries became an essential factor in the direction of Cambodian foreign policy. The Thais and the South Vietnamese came to supplant the Viet-Minh as Cambodia's greatest threat. The possible connection between the United States and Thailand-South Vietnam appeared likely to Sihanouk due to the large-scale American commitment to these countries. The Chinese were able to exploit this situation to the fullest, whereby today the Chinese have given the Cambodians a "guarantee" against the South Vietnamese and Thais.

Through this peaceful competition a superficial stability evolved in the pattern of international relations. SEATO, designed to maintain a military presence, became the basis of the American position. China, on the other hand, showed her adeptness at reacting to different situations with different responses. Her Cambodian policy is an excellent example of this ability to gauge a situation.

CAMBODIA'S RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

At issue then is the conduct of American foreign policy with a neutral state. Undoubtedly, much of the American dilemma stemmed from Dulles' attitude on neutrality. By 1955, great status had been conferred on neutrality by the impartial foreign policy considerations made at Bandung, where colonialism, regardless of source, was denounced. Thus in October 1955, Dulles, perhaps annoyed by the poor response to SEATO, was clearly running against the tide of opinion when he stated:

> The United States does not believe in practicing neutrality. Barring exceptional cases, neutrality today is an obsolete conception. It is like asking each community to forego a police force and to leave it to each citizen to defend his own house with his own gun.
>
> Equally, we do not believe that nations and people who want to be independent should be forced into unwelcome dominance by others merely to produce monolithic power. We do not believe that such artificial unity will last or produce genuine security.[69]

Whereas Dulles did make exception to his "immoral dictum", Cambodia's set of circumstances did not, to Dulles, qualify her as one of those so blessed. The pattern of American-Cambodian relations reflected the disdain and discomfort which Sihanouk's policy brought to the State Department. American relations with Cambodia fit into the pattern of relations with states similarly disfavored, such as Egypt, While the United States overtly expressed sympathy for Cambodian neutrality, there is reason to believe that the United States sought to undermine Sihanouk's position and force Cambodia into SEATO.

Neutrality appeared to Dulles as a foreign policy aberration. With the passage of time, issues would crystallize that would inevitably force the country into one camp or the other. Issues in international relations were believed to center around two possible solutions, and thus bi-polarization was the order of the day to which all states were expected to adjust their foreign policies. In Cambodia's case, it would only be a matter of time before Hanoi's subversion would force Cambodia to ask SEATO's protection.

John Foster Dulles sketched the following underlying principles of American foreign policy:

> A). That the peoples of the world universally desire the elimination of war and the establishment of a just peace;
> B). That the designs of aggressive Communist imperialism pose a continuous threat to every nation of the free world, including our own.
> C). That the security of the nation can be maintained only by the spiritual, economic, and military strength of the free world, with this nation a powerful partner committed to this purpose.
> D). That change is the law of life, for nations as well as for men, and that no political, economic, or social system survives unless it proves its continuing worth in the face of ever-changing circumstances.
> E). That the effectiveness of our collective security measures depends upon the economic advancement of the less developed parts of the free world, which strengthens their purpose and ability to sustain their independence.
> F). That in all international associations and combinations within the free world, of which the United States is a member, it considers all nations, including itself, as equals. The sovereignty of no nations will ever be limited or diminished by any act of the United States.[70]

American foreign policy remained based on the assumption that the United States' best contribution to the Southeast Asian countries would be to protect them from Communist aggression or subversion. The most important instrument for this was SEATO, through which the United States attempted to maintain a military presence. Yet one may conclude that the American commitment to SEATO, without any troops, was credible to no one and was seen by them as providing no

real security. As a result, few Asian nations were willing to accept their being identified as "aligned." Whereas the threat that Communism presented to the Asians was acknowledged, it did not receive top priority in foreign policy goals. Increasingly, after Geneva and Bandung, China's line on peaceful coexistence seemed credible to Asians, and the American position, as too rigid.

Therefore there was no need to sign defense pacts that could only serve to heighten tension by labelling friend and foe in relations with China. This labelling would give the political opposition issues as well. The best deterrent to Communist subversion was thought to be a neutral foreign policy that gave China little cause for concern or desire to upset the status quo.[71] American attempts to induce neutrals into military alliances gave credence to Communist Chinese propaganda themes that blamed the United States for dragging Southeast Asia into the Cold War and held the United States responsible for the tension there. Some neutrals were reluctant to join SEATO, fearing alignment with the West would lead to Communist subversion or even attack, against which they would be helpless. There would be some logic in China's attempting to prove the American commitment and defense capability a "paper tiger." In 1955 upon return from his annual visitation to Southeast Asia, Senator Mansfield attempted to draw presidential attention to this problem in Cambodia. His report read:

> It should be stressed that no amount of foreign aid can develop the army to the point where it might offer anything more than initial resistance to a massive Communist invasion from the north. This observation in no way reflects on the quality of the Cambodian forces, but merely expresses the realities, which confront not only Cambodia, but each of the other small Southeast Asian states.[72]

Ironically this viewpoint is also a clear presentation of a dilemma we have never been able to resolve for Cambodia, South Vietnam, or Thailand.

In fact, subsequent military assistance to either South Vietnam or Thailand or Cambodia was viewed with concern by these countries, who for historic reasons suspected the motives and actions of each other. While military support was given to Cambodia for her protection against the Viet-Minh, South Vietnam and Thailand saw it as American endorsement of her neutrality. Likewise Cambodia later saw the build-up in Vietnam and Thailand in terms of a possible threat to her borders and greater American preference for her neighbors. [73]

While the importance of nationalsim and a strong "social fabric" were recognized as a means of combatting Communist subversion, American financial assistance was overwhelmingly military for all countries (except Cambodia.)[74] It was felt that only after a country was secure militarily, could economic programs have impact. However, events in Southeast Asia took place at an alarming rate, and a deterioration rather than an improvement in the security picture took place. As a result, the prerequisites for "economic impact" never came about. In 1961 Prince Sihanouk gave the following indictment of the American defense structure:

> The SEATO bastion exists no longer, except in the imagination of the armchair strategists of the Western press. Certainly not in North or South Laos, nor in the 17th parallel, nor in the High Plateaux of South Vietnam, nor at Camau Point. SEATO has been remarkable for the organization of conferences which have made Platonic decision or for combined military exercises which have never impressed anyone. Its performance in South Vietnam and Laos has been much less remarkable. It has proved that all it is able to do, by pushing local governments into deeper and deeper commitment, thereby bringing down thunder on their heads, was to hasten the disintegration of the countries it wished to defend. The defeat of the Laotian tendency which had expected to become the "bastion of the Free World" in Southeast Asia has signed SEATO's death warrant.[75]

The impact of American economic aid presents a brighter picture than military aid. Below are presented some varying views of the importance of American aid

to Cambodia. I believe a distinction can be drawn between aid given prior to 1956 and that given after. I suggest that only after it had become apparent in 1956 that Cambodia could not be pressured into SEATO did American economic aid finally serve a non-political, disinterested function.

In 1958, Prince Sihanouk made this frank analysis of American aid:

> By far the most important aid is that from the United States, since its purpose is to provide us with the framework of a modern state. . . . Our elite understands this. The poor, however, are less sympathetic to it because what they think about above all is the quick and easy satisfaction of their most pressing needs. This is the reason other aid programs, more tangible because they are in response to present demands, perhaps bring higher returns to their authors.[76]

In 1961 Prince Sihanouk gave this evaluation of American economic aid:

> In the past, American aid consisted of the allocation of currency for the importation of luxury goods. It benefitted only citizens of the upper social level. But what mattered was to raise the living standard of the masses which have a greater need of means of production, infirmaries, schools than they do of refrigerators, cars or air conditioners.

Sihanouk continued and distinguished between the former aid and aid given now, which he praised. This latter aid consisted of road-building equipment, funds for the construction of schools, sending of American technicians and teachers, and scholarships for Cambodian students to study in the United States.[77]

Michael Field, a British journalist, long resident in Phnom Penh made the following comment:

> The aid was effectively spread over wide sections of the economy and wove itself so much into the fabric of contemporary Cambodian life that its origins in the heated discussions on Capitol Hill tended to be forgotten by those who benefitted most from it. There is hardly an aspect of its physiognomy which does not owe something to American aid.[78]

In addition to these direct benefits to Cambodia, she benefitted from cooperative regional development schemes such as the Mekong development project, sponsored and required by certain American aid programs. These projects led

to an increase in cooperation among the capitals of Southeast Asia. To create a more favorable image of SEATO, the United States administered some programs through the SEATO Council.[79]

The most controversial aid project was the Phnom-Penh Sihanoukville Highway (Cambodian-United States Friendship Highway), constructed in part to release Cambodia from dependence on Saigon port facilities. The following evaluation is given of United States motives for the project, which, according to the author, were a deliberate attempt to draw Cambodia into SEATO and prevent her from recognizing Peking. Roseman commented:

> The history of a major project in Cambodia exemplifies the distortion of an economic aid program to secure political and strategic benefits. The United States unrealistically assumed that economic and military assistance could resolve the basic difference of political viewpoint between itself and the Cambodian government. . . . Not only were the efforts of American diplomats to impress him with hurriedly formulated impact projects in vain, but they diverted attention from the longer range development of Cambodia's human resources, where the aid program could make a more significant contribution to the country's progress.[79a]

Thus one finds strikingly different evaluations of the impact of American aid on Cambodia. It is probably likely that if the United States had not consented to the construction of the highway that Cambodia would have charged that the United States was using Cambodian dependence on Saigon as a pressure tactic. Saigon has during times of dispute closed her harbor to Cambodian commerce.

Prince Sihanouk has also attributed some less noble motives to American aid. Apparently the Central Intelligence Agency also had funds at its disposal.

In 1960, Prince Sihanouk said:

> For what many of you [General Assembly delegates] are perhaps unaware of, but what many small aided nations are perhaps not unaware of, is that too often a friendly aid, provided for inofficial agreements, is accompanied by a secret and far less friendly kind of aid, which

> is never mentioned, and which arouses indignation if one mentions it, can take several forms: either direct subversion, the totally artificial support or the creation of opposition groups, of the purchase of the consciences of men considered strong enough to achieve secession of certain provinces, and torpedo neutrality and the national regime.[80]

Prince Sihanouk has charged that the United States, through Thailand and South Vietnam, has been supporting the Khmer Serei, an anti-Sihanouk movement, in an attempt to overthrow him.[81] Sihanouk threatened, in November, 1963, to renounce all Western aid if Khmer Serei propaganda broadcasts, from alleged CIA transmitters in South Vietnam and Thailand, did not cease. After securing, what Sihanouk considered sufficient evidence of American collusion with the Khmer Serei, he requested the termination of American aid in November.

Sihanouk has gone to great length to point out Cambodia's meagre share of total American aid spent in Southeast Asia by drawing comparisons with amounts received by Laos and South Vietnam.[81] From this Sihanouk concluded that the United States does not treat the neutrals with equality. He delights in attributing Cambodia's progress to her own efforts. In direct references to Thailand and South Vietnam Sikanouk said:

> Unlike some other countries, we do not want to think of foreign aid as the oxygen we need for existence. We consider foreign aid as a recompense, a support granted to us by generous friends in recognition of our own efforts.[82]

On the political side Cambodia-American relations reflected the American disapproval of the Cambodian foreign policy. In 1960 Prince Sihanouk said, "I have had difficulties with every ambassador which the United States has sent to Cambodia."[83] He made the following remark on American policy in Cambodia:

> Our American friends are remarkable organizers, brilliant technicians, and excellent soldiers, but their incontestable realism stop short of the realm of politics, where the attitude of an ostrich seems to them to conform best with their interests.[84]

Cambodian-American relations have always lacked an accomodation of interests. With the Cambodian refusal to join SEATO, which would have violated the Geneva agreements, came American pressure to force Cambodia into SEATO. Cambodia, in the eyes of American strategists, was to form a link in the American defense chain. Cambodia, however, was not disposed to play this role.[85] The United States felt that a vulnerable Cambodia might become a "cancer" through which the Viet-Minh could threaten South Vietnam, Thailand, or Laos. This view, however, overlooked the Cambodian position that, if attacked, Cambodia would "be the first to advocate reconsidering our position and invoking aid from our aggressors." Cambodia maintained that she was not a "breach" in the Western defense system because she was not a "rampart." Sihanouk feared that a pro-Western policy was certain to incur the wrath of Hanoi and Peking, if not an invasion, which might possibly turn Southeast Asia into a battlefield. Cambodia reasoned that in such an event "the Free World would have other things to do besides undertaking our liberation, or rather the liberation of what little remained of us."[86] Apparently, Cambodia's concern did not seem credible to Washington. In fact, American military assistance was conditional upon Cambodian recognition that "application of the principle of collective security will better assure its independence."[87] In reaction to attempts to pressure Sihanouk through the Philippines Sihanouk said:

> Bitter experience has taught its (Cambodia's) leaders that alignment with other nations is likely to bring foreign intruders on their soil.[88]

The stand taken by Sihanouk in the Philippines, his subsequent trip to Peking where he was given a hero's welcome and an offer of unconditional economic aid, and overt hostility from Thailand and South Vietnam on the borders combined to produce a foreign policy crisis in Phnom Penh in 1956. In an attempt to explain Cambodian charges of American subversion, Sihanouk said:

> In clear language, it is good always to remain in the middle, . . . to observe strict neutrality, dangerously bending toward the left, toward the right. Thus I first of all accept an invitation of the Philippines, an anti-Communist nation, then that of People's China. Certain press organs, especially that of the Democrat Party, have accused me of 'false neutrality'. I am not a liar, otherwise my people would not have voted for me during the last general elections. I went to the Philippines, and I was invited by that country to participate in a reciprocal pact, but I did not want it. I went to Communist China with the aim of applying Pancha Shil. This does not mean that Cambodia has become Communist . . . that is impossible for a Buddhist country like Cambodia.[89]

The next day he contrasted American conditional aid, (implying political) with Chinese unconditional aid. He then gave what I believe is his first public anti-American speech which illustrates the crisis in American-Cambodian relations as early as 1956. The concerned Prince railed:

> The Americans are dissatisfied because I have refused the proposals of the Philippines to adhere to SEATO and because I have declared that American aid is used for enriching those who are already rich.. . . If the Americans want to cut off their aid to Cambodia we on our part are resolved to remain faithful to our neutrality policy. We will accept neither Soviet nor Chinese aid.[90]

Sihanouk went on to sketch Cambodian strategy that called for maintaining a balance of influence. He assumed that others would offer aid even if the United States, China, or the Soviet Union did not. Sihanouk did not threaten the United States with a turn to the left. Sihanouk has attempted religiously to maintain this balance of influence, but today is having the greatest difficulty. He blames the United States for making it impossible for him to maintain this balance.

As mentioned above he did not threaten the United States with a move to the left, but he said in April, 1956, that the "Cambodian people" might demand a shift in light of the "injustices" from the United States.

> In any case, the Americans who have so often promised to defend the liberties of small countries, have just shown their real face in Cambodia. It is not exemplary. Let my compatriots be assured, however. We will not permit anyone to trample on our neutrality or our sovereignty. We will not retreat a single step. We have victoriously rebuffed threats of this sort before.[91]

By April the United States felt the need to discuss the matter with the Cambodians and consultations were held between the American ambassador and King Suramarit. Also, Secretary Dulles wrote to Foreign Minister Nong Kimny charging as false the allegations of United States collusion in pressuring Cambodia into SEATO or that in any way the United States was responsible for South Vietnamese or Thai provocations.[92]

The National Congress, which was meeting at this time, voted unanimously in support of a neutral foreign policy and decided to accept aid offered from Communist China and Russia, as long as it was unconditional.

Cambodian-American relations after this period appear to be a direct function of Cambodia's relations with South Vietnam and Thailand. Sihanouk reasoned that since both Thailand and South Vietnam were so dependent on the United States their border provocations would require approval by Washington. When the United States, either through unwillingness or inability, was unable to influence Thailand and South Vietnam, Sihanouk, in response, established diplomatic relations with Communist China on July 13, 1958. This move by the Cambodians was received with considerable misgivings in Washington. Apparently Ambassador Strom was successful in defending Cambodia's neutral policy in Washington against pressure to withold aid from Sihanouk. Support of the Sihanouk regime was maintained, aid was continued, and the Vietnamese were encouraged to consult with the Cambodians. Cordial American-Cambodian relations followed

Alleged American collusion with Thai-South Vietnamese support of the anti-Sihanouk Khmer Serei (Free Khmer) movement has been another point of heated con-

tention in American-Cambodian relations. Minor skirmishes have taken place between the Khmer Serei and Cambodian army, usually in border regions. Sihanouk concludes that they are supported by the Americans, since the Khmer Serei arsenal is so large that more than Thai or South Vietnamese support would be necessary.[93]

Sihanouk has also denounced the Western, and particularly the American, press for a false representation of the Cambodian position. Time and Newsweek Magazines and The New York Times have received particular criticism.[94]

Despite the fluctuations in American-Cambodian relations, as early as 1955, Sihanouk had realized the "balancing" function that the American presence played, which he felt was the mainstay of Cambodian neutrality. (Later, as American under-handedness was revealed in certain events, he felt a similar need to balance the American pressure.)

In February, 1959, Sihanouk commented:

> We cherish American friendship, not only because it is, itself, precious, but also because it is indispensable to us to counter-balance the inevitable influence of Eastern countries.
>
> We know perfectly well that our neutrality and, therefore, our independence would be in danger if the leaders of the West would break off with us. We would have no alternative but to depend on ourselves or to slip, little as we are, toward those who, in the East, open their arms to us.[95]

This need to balance the "influence of Eastern countries" became obvious with the activities of the Communist Chinese Embassy and economic missions, especially among the Chinese community in Phnom Penh.

Sihanouk pointed out how economic aid could serve as an instrument to neutralize both pressure from East and West:

> By keeping ourselves in the golden mean, by accepting economical and technical aid from Communist countries, we succeed in neutralizing the American prevalence. . . . The contrary is also true. The influence of the Communist countries must similarly be neutralized; on that account we ought to preserve American friendship.[96]

Sihanouk has always attached great importance to his managing the Sino-American competition that he has courted. He has made varying predictions on the course he would recommend for Cambodia if either influence came to dominate Cambodia thereby compromising her neutrality. While Prince Sihanouk said this competition is vital for Cambodian independence, he has had misgivings on the impact. Since he has similar misgivings about Thai-South Vietnamese or Communist Chinese intentions, he must prevent the possibility of being forced into either camp. Thus he has attempted to prevent this eventuality by avoiding a major cold war confrontation in Southeast Asia which would eliminate one bloc. Sihanouk said:

> I should first declare that now we can not dispense with American aid without falling into the orbit of the Communist powers--an event that would signal the end of our independence.[97]

The importance that Sihanouk attached to this requirement of an American presence to prevent satellization seems ironic in light of his present break in relations with the United States. (This can, however, be explained in terms of developments in Indo-China, moreso than within Cambodia.) Sino-American competition must be seen as both a domestic and internation instrument of policy for Sihanouk, having impact on Cambodia. He had hoped to duplicate his successful domestic balancing of the competition in the international sphere of regional Indo-Chinese relations. Sihanouk blames the United States for the present break-down of what might have been a viable order through the American failure to support first Laotian neutrality and later Cambodian neutrality.

Sihanouk maintains that the Americans have never really appreciated the realities of international politics in Southeast Asia, nor do they consider the impact of the "wind-grass" relationship which is a reality for the small Southeast Asian country. Likewise the United States never came to appreciate the Cambodian view that Cambodia had less to fear from China than her neighbors.

Cambodia's predicament here is illustrated by Sihanouk when he said:

> Communist countries regard SEATO as an aggressive organization, while the West looks on it as defensive. It is not for us to say who is right and who is wrong. But facts are facts and we insist above all on being realists, for this is the only way we can survive in a world which belongs to great powers and not to the small. . . and we think that it is only our relation with one of our powerful friends in the area which actually prevents our neighbors from succumbing to the temptation to wipe us out.[98]

In short, the United States did not feel that neutrality was a "dictate of necessity" for Cambodia or that the Cambodian qualified as an "exceptional case" where neutralism was not immoral. Sihanouk made the following analysis in lite of the impace on Cambodia that Western alignment would bring:

> If through weakness or blindness, Cambodia had consented to ally itself with or become an instrument of policy of one of the Big Powers, if she had adopted a policy directed against one camp or the other, it would suffer today the same fate as South Vietnam or Laos, that is to say, internal subversion, civil war, insurrections and foreign intervention. Only a policy of strict nonalignment and a policy of equally friendly relations with all powers can safeguard unity. . . . In any case, we do not think that the methods practiced by the dictators of Saigon and Bangkok are the best to oppose Communist penetration in Southeast Asia.[99]

Sihanouk was also reacting to big power chauvinism when upon return from his trip to the United Nations in 1960 he reported:

> For the first time, I had the opportunity to see a country in its role as official diplomatic host. Clearly there was a hierarchy of the great, middle, and small powers. As the head of a delegation from one of the least important countries, I was constantly delayed in order to permit the heads of other delegations to pass, all of whom possessed an escort.[100]

Sihanouk interpreted his treatment as evidence of the disfavor in which he, as a neutral, was held.

As a result, little attention was paid to Sihanouk's claim that American foreign policy in Southeast Asia was on a collision course in Vietnam. This clash would probably result in a major confrontation, which was very likely to

over into Cambodia, in which case she would then be the "grass on which the elephants fought." In short, Sihanouk feels that this policy, which will end in an American defeat, is forcing Cambodia and other neutral states in Southeast Asia to "lean to the left" in an attempt to adjust to what will be a foregone conclusion. Cambodia, which wants the United States to maintain a presence in Southeast Asia, believes that American policy, designed to maintain this foothold, will have the opposite result. Sihanouk noted:

> They (Americans) have failed to understand that if Communism is to be contained, they should assist in forming a cordon of states, strong in their nationalist convictions, irreproachably independent and genuinely free, states which have at their head stubborn intractable leaders, such as De Gaulle in France and (I will add without false modesty) Sihanouk in Cambodia.[101]

Evident here is Sihanouk's logic that the United States position is not strengthened by pushing neutral states into military alliances. Sihanouk believes that a truly neutral Indo-China, where Sino-American competition is tendered by nationalism, must be the modus vivendi. If the United States continues in its present policies, she will drive Southeast Asia through fear into accomodation with Communist China. The United States simply has never embraced the notion that neutralism and nationalism are a nation's own best defenses against Communist influence.

He attributesthe deterioration of the Western position and the strengthened position of the Communists to the following:

> The principal reason for the Communist advance in all of the "Third World" is the culmination of the errors accumulated by the free world, particularly the United States, since the end of the Second World War.[102]

By 1961, the situation in Laos had reached a crisis stage for Sihanouk. He feared the resumption of the Laotian civil war, stemming in part from the United States attempt to overthrow Prince Souvanna Phouma, could lead to a major confrontation which would result in the defeat or retreat of one bloc,

thereby upsetting Sihanouk's equilibrium. Sihanouk was successful in having a Geneva Conference on Laos convened in May 1961 to guarantee Laotian neutrality. However, Sihanouk was disappointed by the outcome, for which he blamed the egoism of both blocs. The failure of the Laotian conference to arrive at any meaningful solution to the Laotian civil war, coupled with the American retreat in Laos heightened the crisis for Sihanouk. He feared a Pathet Lao victory which, working almost like the domino theory, would set up a chain reaction of increased Viet-Minh pressure on Cambodia and Thai withdrawal from SEATO. Cambodia would then be pressured from the Communist bloc in the same fashion as the Western bloc. A neutral or leftist Thai government and the Pathet Lao might also partition Cambodia. It would only be a matter of time before the South Vietnamese would fall into Viet-Minh hands. China, Cambodia's protector, could do little more than applaud this development.

Fearing this eventuality, Sihanouk attempted in August 1962 to secure Cambodia's position through an international guarantee of her neutrality and independence, a policy designed to ensure either protection or accomodation. In either case, this seemed the safest path to take, although it had not succeeded in Laos. While the Communist bloc, France, and Laos enthusiastically endorsed the proposal, the United States, South Vietnam, and Thailand rebuffed Cambodia's approach. Thus without this vital support, the conference could accomplish nothing. The United States position was governed by the more important consideration of what impact American support for the Cambodian proposal would have on its allies--Thailand and South Vietnam. In addition, the United States opposed the draft treaty's provision for supervision by the Internation Control Commission, whose Communist personnel she mistrusts. The United States also expressed discomfiture over the possibility that this conference might be used by the Communists as a forum to denounce the American posi-

tion in Vietnam or attempt to force a similar solution on South Vietnam.

Cambodia, with her alternatives exhausted, her borders violated almost daily, felt compelled to turn to China, whose "600 million people readily supported Cambodia's just struggle", or to make her peace with Hanoi,

In July 1963, Sihanouk stated:

> The other powers, including certain ones who pretend to be neutralists, have made us understand indirectly that they would rather sacrifice us than alienate their friendship or their complicity with the imperialist dictatorships of Saigon and Bangkok. Our future, therefore, is settled. The accords guaranteeing our neutrality and our present boundaries have no chance of being signed by all the powers solicited. It will be necessary for us to defend this neutrality and these boundaries by our own means and with the aid of the big friendly powers (among the first of which is China), who have accorded us without bargaining their total support in case of aggression.
>
> Our propositions, however, have had great merit: That of unmasking hypocrisies and revealing to us the true sentiments held by countries whose ideals of justice and democracy have shown themselves to be empty of meaning.[103]

Sihanouk was fully cognizant of the implications that this policy might have for Cambodia. As a nationalist who was determined to maintain the identity of the Khmer people, there was little choice. Sihanouk explained his reasoning as follows:

> We are aware of and concerned with the threat which the Communist powers present. However, it has been our observation that in the case of a Communist takeover, be it in Eastern Europe, or in Asia, the national entity of the country thus taken over is preserved. The Poles are Poles and the Czechs are Czechs and are ostensibly governed by people of their own kind. If we were to be swallowed up by the Thais and the Vietnamese tomorrow, we would purely and simply disappear as a people, not to speak of Cambodia as a national unit, and would become anonymous provinces of our neighbors. Set against it the possibility of genocide, Communist control is not an unbearable thought.[104]

Sihanouk's moving oratory has never struck a sympathetic response in Washington.

Cambodian-American relations continued to deteriorate with repeated border violations by the Thais and Vietnamese and an increase in Khmer Serei activity,

especially broadcasts, until Sihanouk demanded a termination of American aid in November 1963.

As for the continuation of diplomatic relations, Sihanouk said,

> We will be happy to sever diplomatic relations with the United States, for such a break diminishes the chances of a conflict between the two countries. Let the United States make war, if they are not afrid of being killed by ridicule.[105]

From November 1963 to the break in diplomatic relations in May 1965, there were increased border violations, Khmer Serei activity, and charges by the West that Cambodia was harboring Viet Cong and North Vietnamese regulars, and serving as a major infiltration route.[106] American field commanders have been authorized to pursue fleeing Viet Cong across the Cambodian border and fire in self-defense across the border.[107]

In light of these developments, Sihanouk's comments of December 1963 seem ironic. At that time he said:

> Consider the advantages for America of a neutralization of Cambodia. She is assured that Communist troops will not pass through or rest here; she can reassure our good neighbors that no infiltration or invasion will be launched from our territory; this will permit these same neighbors to withdraw part of their forces from our frontiers. Cambodia will cease to be the 'Number One' headache of the United States; the gap in the defense system of SEATO is closed.[103]

If American Cambodian policy were designed to force her into SEATO, it has obviously failed. Cambodia, likewise has failed to prevent a "Cold War confrontation on her soil." Perhaps more significant is Cambodia's inability, a consequence of American policy, to maintain the balance her neutrality and independence require. There have been misreadings of intentions on both sides, but I suggest here a complete lack of understanding on the American side of legitimate Cambodian foreign policy goals, which were sacrificed to American national interest. The real similarity of goals of the two countries apparently was never recognized in Washington.

CAMBODIA'S RELATIONS WITH THE COMMUNIST BLOC

A corollary development during this 1955-1966 period was the increasingly cordial relations between Cambodia and the Soviet Union and Communist China. Apparently Washington believed that Sihanouk's rapprochement with the Communist bloc represented enchantment with the Communists. This seems incredible indeed in light of Sihanouk's constant statements on the inapplicability of Communism to the Khmers. Perhaps it was never realized that, rather than any ideological conviction, Sihanouk's "slight lean to the left" was caused by the impact of policy in Cambodia. Ironically while on a visit to the Philippines, designed by the Filipinos to convince Sihanouk of the merits of SEATO, Sihanouk announced his acceptance of an invitation to visit Communist China in an attempt to prove to all observers that Cambodia was going to be neutral. To the Philippine Congress in 1956 Sihanouk said that Cambodia "has learned in the course of the last four years to mistrust the quarrels of the great and rely mainly upon itself. But the fact that we are neutral does not mean that we are simple-minded to the extent of being lured by the amiabilities of Communist governments. ... The neutral policy we practice deprives the Communists of any subject of complaint against us, or any pretext at intervention."[109] He also asked, "How could a neutral nation rebuff the friendship of the leader of 600 million people?"[110] Sihanouk's enthusiastic reception in Peking and the professed Chinese support of his neutrality reinforced his convictions. The Chinese said:

> The traditional friendship and cooperation should be restored between China and Cambodia, and developed. Both peoples have not only suffered by misery brought by colonial rule and aggression and war, but we sustained by the same hope of building up independent economies in a peaceful international environment.[111]

Cambodian-Chinese relations have steadily improved from their low-point in 1954 to the point where today Sihanouk proudly states that China is Cambodia's number-one friend.

By 1955, Chinese foreign policy was exhibiting new confidence resulting from its enhanced prestige after the Western retreat at Geneva and China's skillful diplomacy at Bandung. As a result there were new opportunities which the Chinese recognized and exploited with an appropriate policy. Halpern said:

> The strategic goal of the period shifted from undermining western strength by the revolutionary take-over of peoples and territory to preventing the extension of western strength into the peripheries of China and decreasing its potential where it could not be denied access--in short, the strategy of denial, of the area of 'collective peace'.
>
> By this time the Chinese also recognized the important asset that prestige might be. As a result, the Chinese then set out to win status in Southeast Asia and Africa through endorsing neutralism and attempted to direct Chinese foreign policy propaganda themes to coincide with the expressed objectives of the Asian neutrals.[112]

China's "enthusiastic endorsement" of neutralism marks a major switch in her foreign policy and instruments of policy. Morton Halperin concludes:

> In the border areas the major Chinese emphasis is not on revolutionary war, but on the use of military pressure, on the use of threat of military force, combined with political techniques, leading towards a Chinese attempt to dominate the countries on their border, to establish hegemony over them by a combination of military pressure and political gestures, promises and threats. One finds a pattern of policy in Burma, Nepal, in Cambodia, in which the Chinese go through the stage of concluding a treaty, defining the boundary, a treaty of friendship aiming at gradual establishment of hegemony in the foreign policy field over these countries. There has been no attempt even to exploit local situations which might make possible the communization in the short run. They are prepared to work with the group in power, to accept curbs on the Communist parties and on the overseas Chinese in these countries.[113]

The misapplication of parts of this thesis to Cambodia is governed by factors in the Cambodian situation apparently not considered by Professor Halperin. I believe the element of pressure was secondary. It was precisely the lack of Chinese pressure that accounted for success during this period. Also, it was China's exploitation of a local situation that opened the door for her in Cambodia.

China exploited the sentiment for peace, encouraged and supported the growth of neutralism, and denounced the American military position in South-

east Asia that had reduced the aligned nations to puppets. China sought to present herself as sympathetic to the social injustices and hoped to present a model for redressing these grievances. This required China to conduct diplomacy on many fronts. To this "struggle" China committed foreign and technical assistance, granted favorable trade concessions, hoping to present herself as an alternative to the United States, whose purpose Chou En-lai said is to "destroy the Geneva Conference Agreements (July, 1954), organize a military alliance to split Asia, show its hostility to the People's Republic of China, interfere in the internal affairs of the Asian countries and creat new tensions."[114]

China's relations with Cambodia followed for the most an idealized version of foreign policy techniques, as mentioned above by Halperin. Much of the subversion and pressure tactics were absent, and China could point to Cambodia as an example of peaceful coexistence with China, which pays dividends. Cambodia was the first non-Communist country to receive economic assistance from Communist China. On April 24, 1956, a trade agreement was signed and on June 21, 1956, an aid agreement was signed whereby Cambodia received about $25 million of aid for economic development over a two-year period. This aid was to be spent on training technicians, equipment, construction materials, and merchandise for the construction of factories, irrigation projects, rural power stations, universities, hospitals, roads, bridges, and for youth activities.

This grant of aid was interpreted by Cambodia as assurance of China's good intentions toward her. It also provided Cambodia with a means of balancing the American influence. Cambodian neutrality had shifted from passive neutrality to active neutrality, since the need for the balancing function had become apparent. Sihanouk said, "I hope, therefore, that Khmer neutrality will

be maintained . . . by the balance of powers, west and east."[115] Thus by this time the impact of Sino-American competition had been felt by the Cambodians through various threats of her neighbors, difficulties in relations with the Americans, and the grant of aid by China.

The impact of Chinese economic aid has been greater on the Cambodians than Cambodia. As pointed out in the above section American foreign aid was devoted to a minimum of impact projects. Chinese aid, on the other hand, appears to have been planned to elicit maximum impact. In this sense, Chinese aid has been more successful.

The manner in which Chinese aid has been given was also a factor adding to its impact. Funds and materiel were made available, and Cambodians made the final disposition, with a minimum of guidelines and strings. Chinese aid to Cambodia has increased, despite Sihanouk's steadfast neutralism that has criticized Chinese policies at times. For example, powerful radio transmitters, a personal gift from Chou En-lai, broadcast Radio Phnom Penh--The Voice of Neutral Cambodia.

In Chinese aid to Cambodian industry, stress had been placed on switching from raw materials production to the establishment of industries. The Communists have long claimed that the purpose of Western economic aid for raw materials production was to prevent the recipient country from developing her own industries and thus maintain her dependence on Western capital goods. China has helped to establish textile mills in Cambodia, while textiles are China's largest export item to Cambodia. Cambodia's Chinese-financed industrialization began in 1956, when four factories (textiles, plywood, cement and paper) were established. Cambodian technicians have received training in China, also. I will cite below some evaluations of Chinese economic aid and comparisons with American aid.

As Michael Field observed: "Chinese factories are primarily propaganda showpieces--but to the Cambodians are an earnest of the regard in which the Chinese hold them"[116]

Bernard Fall noted:

> American aid to Cambodia, placed in a competitive position with Soviet and Chinese aid . . . is perhaps one of the better administered programs in the world. Far from going into 'prestige' developments or 'showpieces,' it has gone into such things as basic education, rural hygiene and, above all, into the magnificent four lane highway from the capital to the sea, which saves Cambodia from the Vietnamese stranglehold on the Mekong.[117]

Martin Herz observed:

> Gradually it is being brought home to Cambodian leaders that there is a difference in kind between aid from America, a faraway country which can obtain no possible commensurate advantages in Cambodia, and aid from Communist China which has the capability of mobilizing a minority of 250,000 of its nationals inside Cambodia and which can act at any time to call out the guerrillas that once fought under orders from North Vietnam, which in turn can mobilize 300,000 of its compatriots in the country.[118]

Unfortunately American intentions in Cambodia have belied Herz's optimism.

The following evaluations were made by a Burmese journalist:

> In effect, the Chinese aid projects in Cambodia appear to be designed to promote the impression of progress but actually have turned out to be inefficient, costly and a drain on the nations' resources. Prince Sihanouk . . . has himself pointed out, on more than one occasion . . . that the creation of any more state enterprises modelled after the Communist Chinese aid factories would not be in the interest of the Cambodian economy.[119]

In May, 1966, Prince Norodom Kantol made the following comment to a high Chinese delegation visiting Cambodia:

> The contribution of China to our industrialization is an example of solidarity, disinterestedness, and efficiency. In contrast to the Chinese aid, the aid of the capitalist powers is designed to restrict and then to destroy their political and economic independence.[120]

The interplay of foreign economic aid in Cambodia is illustrated by Denis Warner. He stated:

> . . . Cambodians can now be born in a Russian hospital, grow strong on eggs that Americans have doubled in size, build houses from materials manufactured by the Chinese, export goods through a port built by the French and travel in railway coaches provided by Australia.[121]

The Cambodian and Chinese economies have continued to grow closer together. In 1964, Cambodian imports from China totalled 364.5 million Riels, equal to 12.5% of Cambodia's total imports, whereas in 1963 Cambodian imports, consisting mostly of iron, steel, and textiles, were valued at 244.7 million Riels.[122]

The political considerations in Cambodian-Chinese relations are tied, for the most part, to political developments in Indo-China. Chinese support of the Cambodian conference proposals raised the prospect that Cambodia could build a new "defense" system, this time one guaranteed by Peking and Hanoi. Since this prospect would cause concern in the West, Sihanouk hoped the United States might be forced to reconsider its position for prestige reasons. Cambodia's rapprochement with China during the 1955-1960 period can be explained in terms of China's identification with Cambodian foreign policy goals, namely security. On the other hand, it may be seen as a lack of alternatives for the Cambodians, considering Sihanouk's logic that China is destined to be the foremost influence in Southeast Asia. While this attitude has been denounced as opportunism by the Thais, it expressed for Cambodia the realities of the political situation. Also, China's exemplary relations with Cambodia have not made this prospect as unpalatable for Cambodia as it has for the West. Sihanouk has also made it clear to the Chinese that continued friendly relations are dependent on Chinese attitudes towards Cambodia.

The necessity of a Cambodia-Chinese rapprochement grew out of Cambodia's disappointment with lack of American response to her defense requests. Harold Hinton stated that Thailand's participation in SEATO "automatically alienated"

Sihanouk from SEATO eliminating this alternative.[123] I suggest that if Cambodia had been allotted a certain number of American troops, as was Thailand, this may have lessened the likelihood of Thai-Cambodian hostility. Therefore, it was not the mere association of Thailand with SEATO. Thai border hostilities in early 1956, plus the pressure applied in the Philippines served to undercut what pro-Western sympathy there was in Cambodia. Another factor that undoubtedly concerned Sihanouk was the likelihood of the Vietnamese elections, scheduled for July, 1956, which would certainly see a Viet-Minh victory, resulting in unification and a common border with Cambodia. By early 1956, the preparatory talks on the elections in Vietnam had not been held, and Sihanouk feared increased Viet-Minh activity that might spread to Cambodia. In this event the United States might react with a show of force, due to her commitment to President Diem. If this occurred, Cambodia hoped to avoid the military operations that might spill over onto her territory. Perhaps Sihanouk reasoned that Communist China might be able to prevent Viet-Minh activity from spreading to Cambodia. He also may have believed that possible Chinese involvement might discourage the Americans from open intervention.

Harold Hinton illustrated the atmosphere of tension that surrounded Sihanouk's decision to try the Chinese alternative:

> As the two year deadline approached (1954 1956) and passed, there was a feeling of tension in Indo-China, in expectation of some drastic move by the North Vietnamese. Both Cambodia and Laos looked to Peking for support and, whether for that reason or not, there was no crisis.[124]

Thus, by this time, the importance of China as a balance factor was manifest and her control or discouragement of the Viet-Minh could serve as a factor for peace in Indo-China. This, of course, assumed China's ability to control Viet-Minh activity. China's reasoning on this score is another factor.

Morton. Halperin made the following analysis:

> The Chinese are in effect pursuing an historical pattern of Chinese policy towards these areas (borders). They feel correctly that they can get the degree of control that they wanted over these countries, the elimination of American bases, elimination of American influence, and the establishment of Chinese influence without the regimes becoming Communist. Even if they were successful in establishing Communist regimes this would increase very substantially their economic obligations towards these countries, their political obligations, without bringing them much in return. They recognize that the attempt to establish Communist regimes all over their periphery would probably lead to a much greater willingness on the part of at least some countries to accept American bases and American support and might ultimately lead to American intervention and attack on China.[125]

As related to Cambodia, her vulnerability to the Viet-Minh due to her failure to receive an American commitment presented them with an opportunity to exploit.Cambodian-Chinese relations are an example of the above position, while this position does beg the question of immediate Viet-Minh goals.

Guy Wint related: "In their (Chinese) eyes non-Communist Asia was so much territory lying vacant to be possessed by Americans for installing bases from which they could bring about the fall of Communist China."[126]

Neither the Halperin nor Wint statements imply any outwardly aggressive intentions, of the type SEATO was drawn-up to confront. Therefore, I believe the American "hard-line" approach at this time was an inadequate and poorly-timed response to Chinese intentions, and to certain Asian eyes seemed likely to bring about the major confrontation even China was seeking to avoid. This does not overlook Chinese supported subversion aimed at, if not producing a Communist regime, overthrowing a pro-Western government or the installation of a regime more amenable to China.

Cambodia's rapprochement with Communist China appears completely logical. Prince Sihanouk went to Peking in February, 1956, essentially to prove his neutrality to an uncertain Chou En-lai.[127] Premier Chou had questioned Cambodia's neutrality because she only was receiving Western aid at this time. As a result of this trip, according to Michael Leifer, Cambodia agreed to

reject SEATO protection for a pledge that China would restrain the Viet-Minh.[128] According to Harold Hinton, anti-Cambodian propaganda emanating from North Vietnam did slacken.[129]

In April, a Sino-Cambodian trade agreement was promulgated and, in June, Cambodia received $22.4 million of unconditional aid from China. Cambodia became the first non-Communist country to receive aid from Communist China.[130] Sihanouk said: "Henceforward we shall receive assistance equally from Communist and Western countries."[131] In the absence of formal diplomatic relations, the establishment of a Chinese economic mission served to increase contact with the large Chinese community in Phom Penh. (Chou En-lai returned Sihanouk's visit in late November, 1956.) The Chinese community's enthusiastic reception of Chou was cause for alarm to the Cambodian government. Chou very adroitly encouraged the Chinese to make efforts at integrating with Cambodian life. However, by early 1958, the Cambodian government took measures to curtail Communist Chinese activities among the Phnom Penh community.[132]

Cambodia's concern with the Chinese community was soon diverted to intensified border clashes with South Vietnam. Sihanouk, by means of a threat to recognize Communist China, attempted to pressure the United States into restraining Vietnam. Pathet Lao activities were also increasing in neighboring Laos and perhaps Sihanouk assumed it was time to establish relations.

The United States failed to respond to the Cambodian threat and diplomatic relations were established on July 17, 1958, to the great displeasure of Thailand and South Vietnam. In August, 1958, Sihanouk made his second trip to Peking, where he received an impressive welcome. Chou En-lai's support for Cambodian neutrality reinforced Sihanouk's conviction that her security lay in continued friendly relations with China.[133] Sihanouk's visit occurred during China's Great Leap Forward, and he had these words of praise for China's accomplishments:

> In making your country achieve what some people considered impossible, you have set an example for the Asian and African peoples. Our visit to China has given us new hope in becoming masters of our fate.[134]

Premier Chou returned this visit in May of 1960. It was during this visit that Chou promised Cambodia Chinese support against Thailand and South Vietnam. Chou said: "In the event that an invasion of Cambodian territory takes place, this action must be condemned and the 650 million people will support Cambodia.[135] Ch'en Yi clarified the nature of this Chinese aid when he said: 'As to the kind of support, undoubtedly moral and political support, as there has always been. As to support in other aspects, we will take into consideration the needs of the Cambodian Government, the possibilities at our disposal and the conditions prevailing at the time.[136]

These statements served to raise China's prestige considerably in Phnom Penh.[137] Sino-Cambodians relations continued to improve. In one of a seemingly endless number of exchange visits, Sihanouk returned to Peking in December, 1960. On this occasion he said:

> China is one of the few powers which have shown disinterested solicitude for us and have taken into full account our particular situation, our needs, our pleas, and our hopes.

He added that he was grateful to Peking ". . . for not showing towards us any of that chauvinism and contempt which so many big and medium-sized nations find it difficult to avoid in dealing with weak nations.[138] In return Chou En-lai praised Cambodian neutrality,

> The policy of peace and neutrality practiced by Cambodia is just. The edification of Cambodia has illustrated its success. Throughout the nation there is unity and your people are diligent, hard-working and valiant.[139]

A Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression was signed, Chinese technical assistance increased, and China's peaceful intentions were reaffirmed.[140]

In response to the deteriorating security situation in Laos in 1960, Prince Sihanouk spoke at the United Nations recommending a neutral zone com-

posed of Cambodia and Laos to be maintained by guarantees from the Big Powers. According to Michael Field, Sihanouk had learned from his conversations with Khrushchev and Chinese leaders that the Communists were determined to hold their advantages in Laos, even risking war. In an attempt to avert this confrontation, which would probably engulf Cambodia, Prince Sihanouk proposed Big Power consultations. Harold Hinton attaches significance to the Chinese refusal to endorse Sihanouk's proposal while Sihanouk was in Peking. Hinton maintains, "Probably the CPR believes that it can manage Cambodia more easily if it is kept as isolated as possible from outside influences other than its own."[141] He cites as proof Chinese willingness to support a conference solely on Laos, as proposed by Sihanouk on January 1, 1961.

However, Chinese policy changed and enthusiastic support was given to the August, 1962, proposal.[142] Due to the incessant border attackes by Thailand and South Vietnam, which had led to a break in diplomatic relations, and the defeat of the Cambodian neutrality conference, Sihanouk threatened to request Chinese troops to protect his borders.[143] In January, 1963, Sihanouk spoke in terms of a possible alliance with the Chinese on the Viet-Minh, which should be seen only as the threat of a desperate man:

> In order to avoid subjugation by Thailand and Vietnam, the Khmers are ready to ally themselves with anyone. Only the socialist camp seems disposed to protect us from dismemberment. Only it has proposed to help us and says it is ready to offer us its guarantees. If our national existence is at stake, how can we neglect this sheet anchor?[144]

Sihanouk made another trip to Peking in February, 1963. On this occasion, he praised China in these terms:

> . . . I also feel obligated to accept promptly the invitation from a great country which has continually given our Fatherland full support since 1955. It is precisely due to this kind of support that we are able to overcome obstacles and defeat the plots and threats which imperialists, neocolialists, and certain countries, nearby and afar, have continued to create against our peaceful endeavor of safeguarding independence and nonalignment; we have also been able to defeat other hostile

> activities carried out by them. Since Cambodia and China renewed relations in the happy year of 1955, our two countries have covered a long journey together. Such a journey is strewn with flowers, because our friendship, our solidarity, and our cooperation are growing and are becoming ever more consolidated with each passing day.[145]

Cambodia, perhaps to attract world attention and interest, has supported Chinese policy at the international level. Cambodia has supported the seating of China in the United Nations and denounced the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which China refused to sign, as "only a 'bargain of dupes' and a demagogic act of little scope for the future of international detent, of world peace and of the fate of our poor mankind."[146] Cambodian pronouncement on the Vietnam crisis appear to be little different from the Peking line.[147] At the Colombo Conference on the Sino-Indian border dispute, Cambodia assumed a very cautious position in deference to China.[148]

After the termination of the American aid program Sihanouk did not call on the Chinese to fill the gap, but rather invited France.[149]

As border incidents continued Sihanouk threatened to form an alliance with Peking.[150] In February of 1964, Sihanouk also threatened to begin negotiations with the Chinese for the building of air fields in Cambodia.[151] The following months a military delegation led by General Lon Nol, Commander in Chief of the Royal Khmer Army, visited the Soviet Union and Communist China to negotiate the purchase of arms.[152] The first arms shipments from Peking arrived the same month.[153] Chou En-lai continued to assure Cambodia of China's support in her difficulties with the Vietnamese and Thais. Chou said:

> It is certain that in the event of an invasion and if soverign Cambodia expressly makes a request from China, China will give not only arms, but also soldiers. This is a promise which will be kept by China, who always maintains her word.[154]

The Chinese very skillfully pointed out that the issue of troops would have to be a request most cherished in Cambodia, rather than an offer from China. On

the Chinese guarantee of Cambodian security Michael Field notes:

> . . . The most spectacular fruit of Sino-Cambodian friendship is that which is most cherished in Cambodia and disturbing to the West--the unwritten agreement by which Communist China has promised to come to Cambodia's assistance if attacked by Thailand or South Vietnam.[155]

Prince Sihanouk made his sixth trip to Peking in October, 1965. On this occasion, the Chinese repeated their pledge:

> I (Liu Shao-Ch'i) would like to take this opportunity to reiterate that, should United States imperialism dare to spread the flames of its war of aggression to the peace-loving Kingdom of Cambodia, we will give our fraternal Cambodian people all-out support and assistance. Both the friends and the enemies of the Chinese people know that our words always count.[156]

After the break in diplomatic relations with the United States, the Chinese commented:

> The severance of diplomatic relations with the United States of America decided upon by the Royal Government of Cambodia at the suggestion of Prince Norodom Sihanouk with the unanimous approval of the Cambodian people, is an act of courage worthy of praise, which gives to this struggle its full significance and also constitutes both a lashing counter-blow to the aggressiveness of the United States imperialists and their valets and a great encouragement to all the countries and peoples fighting against United States imperialist aggression.[157]

The following statement by Sihanouk should point out the reasons for China's considerable impact on Cambodia. The Prince said:

> We dearly love China, because she has never tried to make us adopt her ideology. We love China, because she is one of the very few big powers ever to apply without qualification the principle of equality among all races and all countries regardless of their size.[158]

Hopefully the State Department in Washington performed a vital sifting function on all Cambodian pronouncements to determine which were meant for whose consumption. Unfortunately, I do not believe there was sufficient sympathy for the Cambodian position to warrant this, however.

Michael Field suggests that the dispatch of Chinese troops at Sihanouk's request is a remote possibility. He states:

> Difficult as this may appear, such an adventure would provide China with an unparalleled opportunity for sabotaging western military and political interests in the area. It is the sort of hectic risk which the Chinese leaders, least squeamish of Communist strategists, would probably relish. It would enable them to give a severe jolt, perhaps the final one, to the shaky structure of anti-Communist defense in Southeast Asia.[159]

In February 1966, Prince Sihanouk said that Cambodia would "fight with sticks" to repel the aggressors and never once suggested the likelihood of Chinese intervention. In fact he belittled the Philippines and Malaysia for their inability to defend themselves without using foreign troops.[160]

Harold Hinton concludes his section on Sino-Cambodian relations with the following prediction:

> Presumably the CPR does not expect to see for some years the materialization of what must be assumed to be its ultimate objective in Cambodia; a Peking oriented Communist regime.[161]

This, I suggest, indicates a misunderstanding of both Chinese and Cambodian objectives. The prestige value to China from its exemplary relations with a neutral nation far outweighs any benefit that would be derived from a regime merely parroting the Peking line. The suggestion that the establishment of a Communist regime in Cambodia even within a decade indicates only partial perusal of Cambodian source material. Throughout this rapprochement Sihanouk had made explicit to China the inapplicability of Communism to Khmer society. Thus China's interests must be analyzed in terms other than those suggested by Professor Hinton. Sihanouk has left little doubt as to his full understanding of Chinese objectives. China has attempted to relieve Sihanouk of these anxieties, to the point where the Khmer Serei may overshadow the Viet-Minh as the greatest threat to Prince Sihanouk.

In March 1964 Sihanouk said:

> The East does not push to change our position;for our socialist friends, Cambodia is the ideal show-piece of peaceful coexistence, a friend with a regime that is different socially and politically, which is useful to cite as an example to those who are uncertain

as to which attitude to take.
Cambodia, no longer neutral, but allied with their camp, interests them apparently very little, for then it would be impossible to use Cambodia as an example in their propaganda.[162]

In fact Harold Hinton suggests Sihanouk's disappointment with China's persistent denial to sign an alliance or offer more than vocal support. China has, on the other hand, offered fighter aircraft, which Sihanouk has refused. Michael Field states "The Chinese had quickly learned that Sihanouk always knows when and where to draw the line."[163]

Prince Sihanouk has also been outspoken in his criticism of Communism as an economic system, which he believes is applicable to Cambodia. Perhaps he hopes to convince the North Vietnamese that their efforts at subversion in Cambodia are in vain. Sihanouk reported this initial impression of Chinese society to the Cambodians, some of whom he feared were responsive to Communist propaganda extolling the virtues of the "people's democracy". I am assuming it was also meant for the Viet-Minh.

> In a Communist country, the people work without respite day and night in the factories and on the construction sites; women and old people can not remain inactive. Over there, human life is of little importance. Cambodia is faithful to the worship of Buddhism; it is thus impossible for it to accept such a regime.[164]

In 1964 Sihanouk repeated the same sentiment, when asked in an interview by Jean Lacouture for his feelings about the Chinese. He said:

> Oh! the Chinese, we admire them. But they are very sedate, you know, very strict, which is not in accord with our temperament, often jovial and gay. My countrymen love the gallic pleasantries. . . . One can think what he wants about their political system. The vast majority of my people do not wish to fall under the yoke of a disciple of Uncle Ho. . . . However, the aid which the Chinese offer us is really exemplary. . . . I need China. Whether I love these great people or not isn't important, but I maintain that without Chinese support against my neighbors, I would stand the risk of falling victim to them.[165]

China could draw little comfort from the following comments of Sihanouk:

> Does it imply that you are a satellite or a defeatist to say that China is the most important country of Asia, without whom no lasting

> or meaningful agreements can be made? You know that when Callas (Maria) comes on stage, all the others appear as figurines. Well, we realize that China is the Callas of Asia. But we are not like those, who after Callas, exit, take off her shoes and prepare her dinner. I eat my dinner at home with my wife and children.[166]

Sihanouk has shown even less proclivity toward theViet-Minh. Those pronouncements of support for the Viet-Minh and NLF have come only in the wake of a deteriorating Western position, first in Laos and second, in Vietnam. During the interlude when Sihanouk believed the Americans held the upper hand, he was outspoken against the Viet-Minh and when the occasion called for it, the Chinese. In 1958, in reaction to Chinese subversion attempts he said:

> Our neutrality is neither complaisance nor surrender to anyone. When a great power tries to submerge us beneath a flood of propaganda or tempt our youth away from its duty to its king and country, we take a firm stand. I have twice had occasion to put my compatriots on their guard against such attempts regardless of the consequences.[167]

Sihanouk has also been concerned with the impact of the appeal of Communism on Cambodian students and has taken measures to undercut the attraction.

In 1961 Sihanouk said:

> It (the appeal) is especially visible among our Communist students in France. . . . I set about showing these students that our present strength lies in our unity in a common ideal, a single political faith, and told them that I shall not hesitate, when the time comes for me to yield to Communism, to prepare our people and myself to become Communists to prevent the disruption of our unity and the shedding of our blood.[168]

Sihanouk makes certain to visit the Maison Cambodge during his visits to Paris. Sihanouk feels the best way to undercut Communist influence among the students is to educate them at home.

Sihanouk has used the Cambodian Communist Party, the Pracheachon, as a whipping boy, without a murmur of disapproval from Peking. Perhaps China concludes that since the Pracheachon has such a narrow base of support, it never could serve as an effective instrument of policy.

In 1961, he said:

> Having sold themselves to foreign interests, our local Communists can not help thinking that the same thing is true of all other Khmers. . . . The Prachechon wants me to be on perpetual bad terms with the western rivals of its own masters (the Communist powers). It has never tried to understand--nor can it ever understand since its ideas are all borrowed from other people--that by aligning ourselves definitely on one side we should run the risk of having difficulties with the other. Nor have the Khmer Communists understood that our survival depends on that of the two blocs. The moment one of them is defeated, we shall have the other one on top of us straight away and they would waste no time wooing us. . . . The stupid attitude of the Pracheachon Communists can be explained only by their absolute dedication to the cause of their masters and their utter lack of regard for that of their own country."[169]

Sihanouk has succeeded in undercutting much of the Pracheachon's appeal by portraying the party as a dupe of North Vietnam "working indefatigably for the Communist world and especially to bring Cambodia under the heel of North Vietnam."[170]

Sihanouk has been emphatic in pointing out that Communism has little chance of taking root in Cambodia. In February, 1966, the Prince said: "Cambodia is a monarchy which has no propensity toward Communism."[171]

Sihanouk sees a relationship between the Viet-Minh, Pathet Lao and the Pracheachon, and knows the fortunes of the Pracheachon are closely related to the strength of the Pathet Lao-Viet-Minh in Laos. He said: "our communists will undoubtedly rear their heads more in days to come. There is only one explanation for the recrudescence of their activity: the victories won by Communism in Laos."[172]

Since the Western powers, as well as South Vietnam and Thailand refused to convene to discuss Cambodian neutrality, and as the Western position of strength deteriorated, Sihanouk was forced to look to Peking, Hanoi, and the NFLSVN for a regularization of Cambodian borders and a political modus vivendi with the Communists who appeared increasingly to be the future masters of Indo-China.

In October, 1962, the NLFSVN called for the formation of a "neutral zone together with Cambodia and Laos, in which their respective sovereignty is fully retained."[173] This coincided with the requests Cambodia had made from all concerned powers. Sihanouk assumed that rather than permit a single Communist guarantee, the West would be forced to endorse the Cambodian proposal. Sihanouk hoped to convene the conference before China's influence had grown too strong in Cambodia, and while the United States still had a strong bargaining position in the area. He hoped to prompt American support by threatening to align with Communism. If the United States did not accept, Sihanouk would lose bargaining strength to the Communists. Sihanouk's threat to recognize Hanoi and the NLFSVN have not materialized and he hopes to keep this one last alternative open as a channel through which he can apply pressure on the West. An alliance with the Communists would bring with it many liabilities. Thai and South Vietnamese border attacks would undoubtedly increase. Likewise, the Viet-Minh would move to consolidate its position, and the Vietnam theatre would be expanded to Cambodia. Sihanouk expressed his concern when he said:

"The DRV and the Pathet Lao still fight for predominance and justify their reconnaissance of Cambodia's territorial integrity. After the victory of Communism in South Vietnam and its progress in the zones of Laos controlled by the right, the Cambodian request will have no chance of being accepted. Either we negotiate now or never."[174]

Cambodia has also had reasons to watch the events in Vietnam with misgivings, despite the promise of a Viet Cong border agreement. In March, 1964, Sihanouk said:

> The worst day for us will be the day that Ho Chi Minh comes to Saigon. That is why I have strived, with less and less hope, to gain acceptance of General DeGaulle's ideas for a political solution in Vietnam before the country is completely communized by the war. . . .All see through the eyes of Uncle Ho. It is he who must be convinced.[175]

Seymour Topping stated in October, 1965, that Sihanouk has "toyed" with the idea of rendering active assistance to the Viet Cong. Yet Sihanouk vigorously denied any support of the Viet Cong or their use of Cambodia as a refuge or supply route. He invited reporters, the ICC, and members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to send inspection teams. Seymour Topping was unable to find the presence of any Viet Cong on the border areas in October, 1965.[176] By April, 1966, however, Sihanouk admitted giving medical assistance to the Viet Cong and supplies to the North Vietnamese. He also feared that Viet Cong in recuperation areas within the Cambodian border might attempt to establish colonies. In late April he turned over 200 tons of dried fish to the NFLSVN "For the people of South Vietnam" in the name of the Khmer people. The status of commercial representative of DRV was raised to governmental representative.[177] American troops have finally fired across the Cambodian border at the entrenched Viet Cong positions. Cambodia's role in these developments may be explained in two ways. She is apparently convinced of a Viet Cong victory in Vietnam which would seal her fate. The American Commitment to Vietnam was not viewed as lasting. Moreover, Cambodia was unable to prevent the use of her territory as a refuge for PAVN or Viet Cong. As a neutral, guaranteed by the major powers, she could have called on her guarantors for assistance. Alone, Cambodia stood little chance of discouraging either North Vietnam or the Viet Cong. China's policy toward this development is, at present, unknown.

In May, 1966, all Cambodian foreign policy goals stand unachieved. Cambodia's apprehension of the future, without a balance of power in the areas, is apparent. Sihanouk has lost any American sympathy he had. The use of his rapprochement with China as a pressure device against the United States has failed for the present. Sihanouk has said:

> . . . We are able to survive thanks to People's China. I do not know whether People's China loves us. I know that for its own interests at present, People's China must protect us. As for the

> future, I do not know. There may be a change. However, I must thank the Americans for disputing with People's China. If they are on good terms with People's China, we would be dead. I want to thank the Americans. The Americans are really stupid because they do not want to recognize People's China because they only know how to mistreat the Chinese. I thank you very much, Messieurs the Americans. If you, the Americans, continue to insult the Chinese, the latter will be sure to come and protect the Khmer. I find this a very good situation for us.[178]

Cambodian foreign policy must be extensively reconsidered to adjust to the new political configuration that is slowly re-emerging.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IV

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70. _____. "Review of Foreign Policy," Testimony presented to Congress, June 3, 4 and 6, 1958, pp. 783-4.
71. See The Manila Bulletin, February 4, 1956.
72. United States Congress, Senate. Report to the President, Report on a Study Mission to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, by (Senator) Mike Mansfield. 84th Congress 1st Session, Washington, D.C.:Government Printing Office, 1955, p. 13.
73. United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearing, Report on United States Military Operations and Mutual Security Overseas, by (Senator) Dennis Chavez, 86th Congress, 2d Session, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1960.
74 See John D. Montgomery, The Politics of Foreign Aid,(New York: Praeger, 1962).
Amos A. Jordan, Foreign Aid and the Defense of Southeast Asia, (New York: Praeger, 1962); Charles Wolf, Jr., Foreign Aid: Theory and Practice in Southern Asia,(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960).
75. Cambodian Commentary, January, 1960, p. 4.
76. Norodom Sihanouk, "Cambodia: Dictate of Necessity, "Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXXVI, No. 4, (July, 1958), p. 583.
77. Speech to the Asia Society, reprinted in Cambodian Commentary, No. 12, December, 1961. The number of Cambodian students studying in the United States has remained constant during periods of hostility between the United States and Cambodia. In December, 1965, there were about 40 students studying in the United States. This information was received from discussions with AID officials in Washington, D.C.
78. Field, op. cit., p. 180.
79. See Montgomery, op. cit., 53-55.
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79a. Alvin Roseman, "Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia: A Decade of Aid," Current History, Vol. 49, No. 291, November 1965, pp. 271-278, p. 275.
80. See Sihanouk's address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 26, 1960, in Principaux discours et allocutions de S.A.R. le Prince Norodom Sihanouk en 1960 (Phnom Penh: Imprimerie du Ministere de l' Information, n. d. (1961?), 189-209, p. 207.
81. Royal Cambodian Government, Self-Aide for Cambodia, (Phnom Penh: Ministry of Information, 1962), p. 4.
82. Cambodian Commentary, loc. cit.
83. Quoted by Michael Field, op. cit., p. 224.
84. Roucek, op. cit., p. 12.
85. See U. S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXI, No. 805, (November 29, 1954), p. 823.
86. Norodom Sihanouk, "Cambodia Neutral: Dictate of Necessity", p. 585.
87. Senate Document No. 669.
88. Quoted by Smith, "Cambodia" in Kahin, op. cit., p. 662.
For accounts of the Philippine press during Sihanouk's visit, see Smith, Cambodia's Foreign Policy, 92-94.

89. Agence Khmère de Presse, March 1, 1956, cited by Smith, op. cit., p. 98.
90. _____, March 1, 1956, cited by Smith, op. cit., p. 98.
91. For text of press conference see La Liberte, April 2, and Réalités Cambodgiennes, April 14, 17 and 21, 1956, cited by Smith, op. cit., p. 101.
92. See letter of Secretary of State Dulles to Foreign Minister Nong Kimny in U. S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXIV,(April 30, 1956), No. 879, p. 727.
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97. See Smith, op. cit.,p. 173.
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128. Leifer, Cambodia and Neutrality, (Canberra: Australian National University, 1962), p. 93.
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V

CONCLUSION

NEUTRALISM AS A VIABLE POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The present foreign policy crisis in Cambodia is very real indeed. Cambodia's neutrality, in a little more than a decade, has accomplished certain foreign policy objectives, but the present impasse indicates that Cambodia still had not found the essential security which her independence requires. The impact of Sino-American competition has created as many problems for Cambodian foreign policy as it has resolved.

On the credit side, Cambodian independence has been maintained and Viet-Minh subversion kept to a minimum. Cambodia has received significant amounts of foreign aid that have strengthened her economy. Sino-American rivalry has strengthened a very strong Khmer nationalism, which may serve as a vital resource in the future.

On the debit side, the competition has not produced a power equilibrium in Indo-China. At present, Cambodia's neutrality is facing its first real test, with an uncertain outcome. Cambodia's rapprochement with China has embittered the Thais and South Vietnamese and the Americans, and Cambodia's territorial integrity is violated daily. Cambodia's borders have not received international guarantees nor has Cambodia found a disinterested protector. Cambodia has not succeeded in preventing an extension of the Vietnam war to her territory. Cambodia has also lost a certain latitude in foreign policy, as evidenced by her failure to take a position at the Colombo Conference on the Sino-Indian border dispute. Yet, in light of the developments in Indo-China, one must evaluate Cambodia's course in terms of the alternatives available at that time.

During the time period of Cambodia's relations with the United States and Communist China, major shifts occurred in the foreign policies of the Big Powers. Both increasingly directed their foreign policies toward Southeast Asia in

attempts to formulate a regional order coincidental with their interests. Cambodia's goals during this period have remained the same, but she has adjusted the means of accomplishing these to coincide with the "prevailing wind", which strikes me as a perfectly normal reaction. After the 1954 Geneva Conference, Communist China's influence in Indo-China appeared to be surpassing American influence. As early as 1946 in China, Communism was making tremendous gains in Asia, and this trend has continued. The weak American response to this threat, illustrated by failure to act in Laos, served to reinforce the accomodation tendency seen on the part of some of the Southeast Asian countries. Yet, the relative gains made by either side in forcing a re-alignment appear quite negligible, and in place of re-alignment, a highly nationalistic neutralism developed which set limits on the foreign policy extension of both blocs. The neutrals have been put to severe tests, as evidenced by Cambodia's foreign policy crisis.

At present, Cambodian foreign policy is at an impasse, which should prompt re-assessments of goals and possibilities by all countries concerned with the direction of Cambodian foreign policy. I will discuss possible initiatives of Cambodia, the United States, and Communist China in that order, and mention the possible roles of the neutrals, France and the Soviet Union.

Continued positive Cambodian neutrality requires that Sihanouk find a way out of the present predicament. However, Cambodia has exhausted certain means of pressure, since the United States has failed to respond. Even the threat of alliance with the NFLSVN has not prompted a genuine American overture.

Mere survival remains the raison d'etre of Cambodian foreign policy. According to Bernard Gordon, the operating principle of Cambodian foreign policy is "to establish that survival (of Cambodia's independence) is a value for these other states which have potential control over Cambodia's destiny."[179]

The method for implementing this principle is through attracting and focusing world attention on Cambodia.

Professor Gordon fails to indicate for which countries Cambodia's continued existence is a necessity. Unfortunately, for Cambodia, there are none. In fact, Thailand, South Vietnam, and North Vietnam all feel that Cambodia's rightful place is within their respective countries or spheres. Sihanouk has succeeded in attracting the attention of the Western press, but ironically, the press is, for the most part, anti-Sihanouk. This is illustrated by Denis Warner, who commented:

> As an unwitting agent of Kruschchev and Mao Tse-tung, he (Sihanouk) has few peers.[180]

Sihanouk has attacked the partiality of the Western press, and the Cambodian government itself has begun publishing a monthly, Kambuja, to present the Cambodian view of her policy and to publicize the Sangkum's achievements.[181]

Cambodia's future is closely tied to the outcome of the Vietnam conflict. If the presence of a "Sihanouk Trail", plus large encampments of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese troops (PAVN) exist in Cambodia, these may very likely lead to an extension of the war onto Cambodian soil. Cambodia, while acknowledging having given food and medical supplies to the Viet Cong, still denies vigorously the use of Cambodia as a supply route or haven for Viet Cong and PAVN troops. Cambodia has invited American senators to visit Cambodia to make an on-the-spot inspection and has offered every assistance to the ICC to facilitate an inspection. Sihanouk has said that the Cambodian Army would oppose American troops if they entered Cambodia. In February, 1966 he said:

> And if in spite of this good will(Cambodia's assistance to the ICC) the Americans bomb and escalate their war to our country, we will defend ourselves as do our Vietnamese brothers and will fight against the Americans until final victory, which the Indo-Chinese people will not fail to achieve, for one cannot conquer a people defending the independence of their country.[181]

In the same speech he reasoned that the United States would not attack Cambodia, since the Americans, who will be defeated in Vietnam, want to have an excuse for their defeat. This excuse will be that Cambodia served as a sanctuary for the Viet Cong. Such sentiments were bound to draw little sympathetic response in Washington.

I believe that Sihanouk was helpless in light of Viet Cong and PAVN infiltration. Could the Americans, with their weak position in Vietnam and still counseling a possible withdrawal in 1963-64, really expect the Cambodian Army of 33,000 to attack the Communists? Sihanouk had asked for guarantees of neutrality and borders by the Big Powers, to whom he could turn for assistance if the Communists infiltrated. Since the conference was not held, Cambodia has no choice but to bend with the wind. Whether or not Sihanouk has appealed to Peking to force the DRV and Viet Cong to respect Cambodia's borders is unknown. In any case, Sihanouk's actions seem logical in light of the American position in Vietnam in 1964.

Sihanouk may be attempting to prove to the United States how vulnerable Cambodia really is to Communist subversion, which should prompt more American support. Moreover, I believe that Prince Sihanouk is playing a waiting game with the United States. If the Cambodian security situation continues to deteriorate, a conference on Cambodian neutrality may be the only method left for the Americans to limit Communist influence, and therefore they would support it. Sihanouk hopes the United States will maintain her interest and within time make her peace with Cambodia, which would serve to vindicate Sihanouk in Western eyes. Sihanouk's logic requires a Western presence, so that even if Cambodian-American relations remain at an impasse, Sihanouk must, in some way, make a "slight lean to the right".

Perhaps the United States will recognize Cambodia's plight, and ease the

the rapprochement that must come if Cambodian neutrality is to be restored. Yet, due to the legacy of hostility between the two countries, it is not certain that the Americans will do this. Relations between the two countries have always lacked a mutual accomodation of interests. During the Eisenhower Administration, there was an attempt to draw Cambodia into SEATO. This attempt failed as did other attempts, during this period, to convert neutralist states into allies. The Kennedy Administration, appreciating the lessons of the 1950's, turned to accepting neutralism. President Kennedy said:

> In Asia, however, there may be some movement away from a wholly uncommitted neutralism as a result of the growing awareness of the Chinese threat. The desire to be independent and free carries with it the desire not to become engaged as a satellite of the Soviet Union or too closely allied to the United States. We have to live with that. And if neutrality is a result of a concentration on internal problems, raising the standard of living of the people and so, particularly in the underdeveloped countries, I would accept that.[182]

The above is a good description of the motives and direction of Cambodian neutrality.

President Kennedy also said:

> Some (states) may choose forms and ways that we would not choose for ourselves, but it is not for us that they are choosing. We can welcome diversity--the Communists can not. For we offer a world of choice--they offer a world of coercion.[183]

Despite this apparent acceptance of neutrality, the subversion of the Cambodian neutrality continued through American support of the Khmer Serei. Prince Sihanouk has been attempting to alert the United States since 1961, through the Laotian Conference, to the danger of Communism in Indo-China and the folly of American policy in subverting Laotian neutrality. After the failure of the Americans to make a stand in Laos, Sihanouk's confidence in a continued Western presence was visibly shaken. The American efforts in Vietnam today can be seen, in part, as an attempt to roll back the Communist gains of the last five years. Cambodia, as a small nation, could not wait that long, and, as a result, attempted to

accomodate herself with what she believed would be the future configuration of international relations in Southeast Asia. Cambodia, today, blames her predicament on United States foreign policy.

Cambodia clearly would like a return of the American presence to Cambodia. Cambodia has made know its willingness to open discussion on the resumption of relations with the United States, if certain minimum conditions are met. Prince Norodom Kantol conveyed these to Seymour Topping in October, 1965. The Prince said these are:

> . . . recognition of the framework of our existence, that is to say, the recognition of our territorial integrity; a commitment to end bombardments of our territory and intrusions in our frontier regions adjacent to Vietnam; indemnity for the loss of life of our citizens for the destruction of their goods as a result of American and South Vietnamese aggression against our territory.[184]

The acceptance of these conditions by the United States would present a minimum of difficulties, except for the second one, if Viet Cong continue to fire across Cambodia's borders at American troops. The United States could then resume relations at will. There may be logic, however, in witholding a rapprochement for other motives. The United States could try to beat Cambodia at the waiting game. Perhaps the United States assumes that if Cambodia is forced into complete reliance on China, China, with a free hand, would overstay her welcome and alienate herself from the Cambodians.[185] The United States might force a showdown in Cambodia, by occupying Cambodian territory itself or through the Thais and South Vietnamese. In this event, three possibilities might occur. In the first case, Cambodia would request Chinese troops. China would more than likely renege. China, then, would be the "paper tiger." Second, Cambodia may not ask for Chinese help, but merely accept the occupation of her territory. There would then appear to be little logic in a continued Chinese interest in Cambodia since China's offer of protection had been rejected.

Third, China might attempt to force Sihanouk's hand, which would certainly result in Cambodia's denouncing China. All these eventualities would undermine China's position, to the satisfaction of the United States, Last, Cambodia's agriculture at present is in a crisis due to natural calamities.[186] It has been also rumored that Sihanouk has had trouble meeting the payroll, formerly paid by the Americans, of the pro-American Cambodian Army. A grant of American aid or commodities could ameliorate these crises although Sihanouk has said that he would never ask for "alms" as Indonesia had done.[187] The United States probably could force some foreign policy concessions from Sihanouk in return. The above assumes, that the United States would be interested in bailing Sihanouk out. Unrest within the army and among the peasantry might weaken Sihanouk's position and make the Cambodians susceptible to Khmer Serei propaganda. An increase or decrease in Khmer Serei activity will probably be the best indication of the course of American policy in Cambodia. I believe that Sihanouk, a patriot, would abdicate if the likelihood of widespread civil war developed. American policy, at present, shows little propensity towards a greater respect for Cambodian neutrality.

China's future policy towards Cambodia will be determined largely by the outcome in Vietnam. The apparent ability and willingness of Peking to restrain Hanoi in 1955 was the basis of Cambodia's initial approaches to Peking. Later China promises protection against Vietnam and Thailand. Sihanouk has made no mention of China in relation to his present troubles with the Viet Cong and PAVN troops. If China has been unwilling or unable to restrain the Communists, China's policy towards Cambodia has lost its raison d'être. If continued interest is to be maintained, a new basis for cooperation will have to be found. Sihanouk, on the other hand, would be hard-pressed to justify his close relationship with China to pro-American groups, such as the army, in Cambodia, without

China's serving a protector function. Sihanouk is willing to accept Chinese influence in Indo-China, since he realizes that any guarantees that might be given Cambodia would require Chinese support if they were to be meaningful. Thus there is little likelihood of a complete break with China. If this occurred, China would be forced to support the Viet-Minh position in the area in order to maintain a foothold.

Sihanouk's rapprochement with the Vietnamese came as a last resort, when guarantees from Hanoi and the NFLSVN appeared as the only hope of freezing Cambodia's borders.[188] An alliance with the Chinese and Vietnamese is the last threat Sihanouk can hurl at the West. In April 1966, Sihanouk said:

> During the time of the present test, which will end one day, the future is being prepared under the sign of a solidarity more and more concrete among the peoples of Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos. Cambodia with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and with the NFLSVN on the other will soon sign solemn agreements at the summit. These agreements will set forth definite basis for fruitful and peaceful existence between our two countries, coexistence that will be placed under the sign of fraternity and mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Particularly Khmer-Vietnam solidarity is entering an irreversible phase in which a happy and prosperous future for the Indo-Chinese peoples can be foreseen. This solidarity will surely be strenthened thanks to the inexplicable crimes and the monumental errors of the policy of the American imperialists. This policy has pushed the Cambodians, Vietnamese, and Laotians into forgetting the injustices among them in the past and sincerely signing agreements to cope with the enterprise of aggression and domination of a common aggressor. This union, which is expressed in bits of solidarity such as those yesterday, can never be challenged by any attempt of the imperialists or other foreign powers to divide our people.[189]

Sihanouk still is uncertain of the outcome of the present struggle in Indo-China. China's actions to date have lead Sihanouk to believe that there will be room for Cambodia, with or without Sihanouk, Communist or non-Communist, in Chaina's "vast zone of peace." Although Sihanouk claims that the Communists are out to "cut his throat", he would certainly be more valuable alive as the leader of a pro-Peking Cambodia. China still has to prove to Burma, Laos, and

Thailand that there is room for them also in China's sphere, which will require a show of good faith on the part of China. Sihanouk said:

> The Communist Powers know full well that my presence at the helm of the country constitutes a major obstacle to the rapid communization of Cambodia. . . . But they are far too clever to oppose me, or the regime I represent at this juncture. For some time to come, they will need me and the uncompromising brand of nationalism I stand for in order to insure that Cambodia will be able to resist pressure and provocations on the part of the American camp. . . . I believe the Socialist camp will deal gently with us at least until the time comes for the United States to evacuate Indo-China--an event which will incite Thailand to proclaim itself more "neutralist" than Cambodia.[190] . . . The Americans overlook the fact that the "uprooting" of our Monarchy, coupled with the overthrow of "Sihanouk and the Sangkum" will remove all obstacles to the communization of our country. For the arrival of a San Ngoc Thanh and--more decisive still--of a Sam Sary, would throw our youth, our rural population, our working class and even our clergy, into the arms of Peking, and, if need be, of Hanoi. . . . If they (the Communists) were to enter the lists against me at this juncture, the Communist powers would certainly not precipitate me into the arms of the "Free World"--and still less into American arms. But they would alienate the bulk of the Khmer people, including our clergy, army and police, who are called "dyed-in-the-wool" Nationalists.[191]

On the day following Sihanouk's threat to go to the summit with Hanoi and the NLFSVN, he made the following statement:

> We will remain faithful to our policy of neutrality by refusing to sign any military pact with any country, to allow foreigners to set up their bases on our territory, and to participate in any external conflict.[192]

This may have been directed at the Americans to reassure them or to the Chinese to warn them. I suggest an additional factor to Professor Gordon's methodology of Cambodian foreign policy, namely an element of "contrived confusion," which may forestall a major move by either side pending clarification. The maintenance of Cambodian neutrality still appears as a tenet of Communist Chinese foreign policy towards Cambodia. Therefore it behooves the Chinese to avoid any actions which might prompt a turn towards the Americans, since China's present

relations seem to be ideal.

According to Michael Field, Sihanouk does not expect any real support from the neutrals in his dispute with Thailand, South Vietnam or North Vietnam As a result, Cambodia will continue to look to the Big Powers for any meaningful guarantees. Sihanouk said:

> Do you really think that if I were to advise Cambodia's adherence to a group, I should choose the one with the least power, the neutrals? They should look at the map. If I am to submit to any foreign power, I should prefer to become a satellite of Chou En-lai.[193]

Sihanouk has accepted the fact that Cambodia can never attract the attention that the United Arab Republic, India, or Indonesia have maintained.[194]

Recognizing the need for a Western presence in Cambodia, Prince Sihanouk has attempted to interest France in filling the gap created by the departure of the Americans. Sihanouk believes that France would be a truly disinterested ally The French seem inclined to play this role in an attempt to maintain French influence in Indo-China. Seymour Topping notes that "French officials look upon Cambodia as the first of their former Indo-Chinese colonies to conform to the Gaullist concept of the future evolution of the region--neutrality for the Indo-Chinese states, acceptance of Communist Chinese paramountcy of Southeast Asia and mutually profitable ties with France".[195]

In November 1963 after the termination of American aid, Prince Sihanouk said:

> For our country--liberated from the United States and for which the Communist powers do not wish to assume responsibility--this could be France's hour. The Americans have been removed from this country, The Communist powers are removing themselves because they do not want us as associates. There remains the France of Beneral De Gaulle which nobody henceforward can accuse of practicing here imperialism or neocolonialism.[196]

Unfortunately, General De Gaulle's views receive less than universal support It is doubtful if France has the prestige to convince the other Western powers

on the desirability of this course. Perhaps a successful French policy in Cambodia might convince others. The strongest Western support for Cambodian neutrality to date has come from the French. An encouraging sign for France is China's willingness to accept a French role in Cambodia. Chou En-lai told Sihanouk: "We do not mind the French. They are powerless to threaten China. But, if you bring the Americans, we shall be obliged to attack you."[197]

The Soviet Union has also shown a re-activated interest in Southeast Asia.[198] Cambodia's relations with the Soviet Union have been ideal and may suggest another method to balance foreign influence, from whichever source. The Russian cancellation of Sihanouk's proposed visit in November, 1965, came as a shock to Sihanouk, since his relations with Russia had been ideal. It has been suggested that Russia's purpose in cancelling the visit in an undiplomatic fashion was to indicate their displeasure with Sihanouk's pro-Peking stand.[199]

On the Russian rebuff Sihanouk said:

> We are the expiatory victim of the discomfiture in which the Soviet Union has found itself in its relations with our best friend, the People's Republic of China. Considering us to be pro-Chinese, they decided to treat us as anti-Russian.
>
> This is simply a manifestation of racism. The Russians are drawing closer to the Americans because, like them, they are white. To them, the 'yellow peril' refers above all to China and those who are friends of the Chinese are their enemies. . . . The United States has disappointed us, and now the Soviet Union has done the same. This shows us how dangerous it is to rely on the so-called generous Big Powers for disinterested aid to the undeveloped countries. It also substantially proves that the counsel of our Chinese brothers is correct and pertinent.[200]

If, as suggested above, the Russian purpose was to prompt a more neutral stance in Sihanouk's speeches, it obviously failed. The Russians hoped to impress on Sihanouk their misgivings with his pro-Peking sympathies, which could cost Cambodia Russian support. The Russians also appeared interested in supporting only a genuinely neutral Cambodia.

Cambodia's foreign policy crisis is one forced on her by the West on one hand, and the Viet-Minh on the other, rather than a crisis of her own making. Cambodia has asked only to survive as a nation and that her borders and neutrality be respected. Since the addition of Cambodia to either bloc would be a negligible increment, Cambodia is deserving of magnanimity from both blocs. Support from the Big Powers must be reinforced with regional support from the Indo-Chinese states. To warrant this Cambodia must prove that positive neutrality serves their interests, also.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER V

179. Gordon, op. cit., p. 61.
180. Denis Warner, op. cit., p. 40.
181. See Norodom Sihanouk, "La lourde resposabilité de la presse occidentale dans la deterioration des relations entre le monde 'Libre' et le Cambodge," in Ministère de l'Information, op. cit., pp. 25-44.
182. Quoted by Hans Morgenthau, "Critical Look at the New Neutralism," New York Times Magazine, (August 27, 1961, p. 25.
183. Quoted by G. Mennon Williams, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 87th Congress, 2d Session, (Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 614.
184. New York Times, October 13, 1965.
185. Christian Science Monitor, May 3, 1966.
186. Radio Phnom Penh, May 16, 1966.
187. Radio Phnom Penh, April 4, 1966.
188. New York Times, October 15, 1965.
189. Radii Phnom Penh, April 27, 1966.
190. See Norodom Sihanouk, Le Cambodge et ses relations avec ses voisins, (Phnom Penh: Imprimerie du Ministère de l'Information, 1962), p. 34.
191. Norodom Sihanouk, "The Failure Experienced by the United States In Their Dealings with the 'Third World' Viewed in the Light of Cambodia's Own Experience," Kambuja, No. 5, (August 15, 1965), p. 21.
192. Radio Phnom Penh, April 29, 1966.
193. Field, op. cit., p. 249.
194. Field, op. cit., p. 219.
195. New York Times, October 13, 1965.
196. AFP, Nov. 21, 1963.
197. Quoted by Field, op. cit., p. 201.
198. Kennedy, op. cit., p. 131.
199. FEER, December 2, 1965, p. 406.
200. Peking Review, No. 43, (October 22, 1965), p. 21.

APPENDIX

UNG HONG SATH, CHAIRMAN OF THE CAMBODIAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

It is in this spirit that I beg you, Mr. President, kindly to transmit to the honorable members of the United States Congress this private invitation to three representatives of the various factions elected by the American people to visit Cambodia as guests of the National Assembly of the Kingdom. It will be possible for them to converse freely and without witnesses with anyone they desire. . . functionaries, militarymen, religious persons, students, peasants or workers. . . and, thus, to appreciate the popular support given to our regime and our Chief of State. They will be given every facility to circulate throughout Khmer territory and every means to conduct a thorough investigation concerning the actual presence of the Khmer Serei rebels, and, if they desire, of the Viet Cong or North Vietnamese troops. We hope and wish only that our guests will show good will in making known the truch concerning their stay in Cambodia, a stay which can be extended if they judge it necessary. (Radio Phnom Penh, January 31, 1966.)

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U. S. CALLS FOR FRONTIER PATROL TO HELP PREVENT BORDER INCIDENTS BETWEEN CAMBODIA AND VIET-NAM

Statement by Adlai E. Stevenson (Excerpt)

U. S. Representative in the Security Council

(Made in the Security Council on May 21 (press release 249).

The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. L, No. 1302, June 8, 1964

pp. 907-913, (911-13).

THE CAMBODIA-VIET-NAM FRONTIER

Now, Mr. President, if we can return to the more limited issue before this Council today: the security of the frontier between Cambodia and the Republic of Viet-Nam. My Government is in complete sympathy with the concern of the Government of Cambodia for the sanctity of its borders and the security of its people. Indeed, we have been guided for nearly a decade, in this respect, by the words of the final declaration of the Geneva conference of July 21, 1954:

> In their relations with Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, each member of the Geneva Conference undertakes to respect the sovereignty, the independence, the unity and the territorial integrity of the above-mentioned states, and to refrain from any interference in their internal affairs.

With respect to the allegations now made against my country,[7] I shall do no more than reiterate what Ambassador (Charles W.) Yost, the United State delegate, said to this Council on Tuesday morning:[8] The United States has expressed regret officially for the tragic results of the border incidents in which an American adviser was present; our careful investigations so far have failed to produce evidence that any Americans were present in the inadvertent crossing of the Cambodian frontier on May 7 and May 8; and there is, of course, no question whatever of either aggression or aggressive intent against Cambodia on the part of my country.

Let me emphasize, Mr. President, that my Government has the greatest regard for Cambodia and its people and its Chief of State, Prince Sihanouk, whom I have the privilege of knowing. We believe he has done a great deal for his people and for the independence of his country. We have demonstrated our regard for his effort on behalf of his people in very practical ways over the past decade. We have no doubt that he wants to assure conditions in which his people

7 For text of the Cambodian complaint, see U.N. doc. S/5697 dated May 13.

8 For text, see U.S./U.N. press release 4391 dated May 19

in very practical ways over the past decade. We have no doubt that he wants to assure conditions in which his people can live in peace and security. My Government associates itself explicitly with this aim. If the people of Cambodia wish to live in peace and security and independence--and free from external alinement if they so choose--then we want for them precisely what they want for themselves. We have no quarrel whatsoever with the desire of Cambodia to go its own way.

The difficulty, Mr. President, has been that Cambodia has not been in a position to carry out, with its own unaided strength, its own desire to live in peace and tranquillity. Others in the area have not been prepared to leave the people of Cambodia free to pursue their own ends independently and peacefully. The recent difficulties along the frontier which we have been discussing here in the Council are only superficially and accidentally related to the Republic of Viet-Nam. They are deeply and directly related to the fact that the leaders and armed forces of North Viet-Nam, supported by Communist China, have abused the right of Cambodia to live in peace by using Cambodian territory as a passageway, a source of supply, and a sanctuary from counterattack by the forces of South Viet-Nam, which is trying to maintain its right to live in peace and go its own way, too. Obviously Cambodia cannot be secure, her territorial integrity cannot be assured, her independence cannot be certain, as long as outsiders direct massive violence within the frontiers of her neighboring states. This is the real reason for troubles on the Cambodian border; this is the real reason we are here today.

Now it is suggested that the way to restore security on the Cambodian-Vietnamese border is to reconvene the Geneva conference which 10 years ago reached the solemn agreement which I just read to you.

Mr. President, we can surely do better than that. There is no need for

another such conference. A Geneva conference on Cambodia could not be expected to produce an agreement any more effective than the agreements we already have. This Council is seized with a specific issue. The Cambodians have brought a specific complaint to this table. Let us deal with it. There is no need to look elsewhere.

We can make, here and now, a constructive decision to help meet the problem that has been laid before us by the Government of Cambodia--to help keep order on her frontier with Viet-Nam and thus to help eliminate at least one of the sources of tension and violence which afflict the area as a whole.

Let me say, Mr. President, that my Government endorses the statement made by the distinguished representative of Cambodia (Voeun-sai Sonn) to the Council on Tuesday when he pointed out that states which are not members of the United Nations are not thereby relieved of responsibility for conducting their affairs in line with the principles of the charter of this organization. We could not agree more fully. Yet the regimes of Peiping and Hanoi, which are not members of this organization, are employing or supporting the use of force against their neighbors. This is why the borders of Cambodia have seen violence. And this is why we are here today. And that is why the United Nations has a duty to do what it can do to maintain order along the frontier between Cambodia and Viet-Nam--to help uphold the principles of the charter in Southeast Asia.

As for the exact action which this Council might take, Mr. President, my Government is prepared to consider several possibilities. We are prepared to discuss any practical and constructive steps to meet the problem before us.

One cannot blame the Vietnamese for concluding that the International Control Commission cannot do an effective job of maintaining frontier security. The "troika" principle of the International Control Commission, which is to say the requirement under article 42 of the Geneva agreement on Viet-Nam that

decisions dealing with questions concerning violations which might lead to resumption of hostilities can be taken only by unanimous agreement, has contributed to the frustration of the ICC.

The fact that the situation in South Viet-Nam has reached the crisis stage is itself dramatic testimony of the frustration to which the International Control Commission has been reduced. With the exception of the special report on June 2, 1962, to which I referred, condemning Communist violations of the Geneva accords, the Communist campaign of aggression and guerrilla warfare against South Viet-Nam.

The representative of Cambodia has suggested that a commission of inquiry investigate whether the Viet Cong has used Cambodian territory. We have no fundamental objection to a committee of inquiry. But we do not believe it addresses itself to the basic problem that exists along the Viet-Nam-Cambodian border. More is needed in order to assure that problems do not continue to arise.

Several practical steps for restoring stability to the frontier have been suggested, and I shall make brief and preliminary general remarks about them. I should like to reiterate what Ambassador Yost said, that we have never rejected any proposal for inspection of Cambodian territory.

One suggestion is that the Council request the two parties directly concerned to establish a substantial military force on a bilateral basis to observe and patrol the frontier and to report to the Secretary-General.

Another suggestion is that such a bilaterial force be augmented by the addition of United Nations observers and possibly be placed under United Nations command to provide an impartial third-party element representing the world community. We also could see much merit in this idea.

A third suggestion is to make it an all-United Nations force. This might also be effective. It would involve somewhat larger U.N. expenditures than

the other alternatives. But if this method should prove desirable to the members of the Council, the United States will be prepared to contribute.

We would suggest, Mr. President, that whether one of these or some other practical solution is agreed, it would be useful to ask the Secretary-General of the United Nations to offer assistance to Cambodia and the Republic of Viet-Nam in clearly marking the frontiers between the two countries. One of the difficulties is there are places where one does not know whether he stands on one side of the frontier or the other. Certainly it would help reduce the possibility of further incidents if this uncertainty were to be removed.

In conclusion, Mr. President, let me repeat that I am prepared to discuss the policy and the performance of my Government throughout Souteast Asia. But the issue before us is the security of the Cambodia-Viet-Nam border. I have expressed my Government's views on that subject. I hope other members of the Council also will express their views on that subject and that the Council, which is the primary world agency for peace and security, can quickly take effective steps to remedy a situation which could threaten peace and security.

(Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson, The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. L, No. 1302, pp. 907-913, (911-13), June 8, 1964.)

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