Increasingly Radical: Examining Predictors of Support for Reactionary Right-Wing Candidates for the United States House of Representatives

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Abstract

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Why are voters in Western democracies turning towards more reactionary right-wing politicians? Using the United States as a prominent example of this phenomenon I examine the validity of various explanations for increasing popularity and electoral success of right-wing candidates. By combining newly available measures of candidate ideology with individual level survey responses and county-level contextual information, I use multi-level logistic models to identify predictors of White Republicans supporting reactionary right politicians in United States Hose of Representatives elections from 2010 to 2020. I find that residents of counties with higher social capital are more likely to support far-right candidates and that this relationship is strengthened in settings where county-level unemployment is low. Additionally, I find that those residing in counties that have seen an increase in the Hispanic population and those who reside in more economically unequal counties are more likely to support far-right candidates. In combination, these results lend support to the notion that it is not those who have been left behind economically that are moving towards right-wing candidate, but rather it is

those in areas that have experienced demographic change and who experience a sense of status threat from their new neighbors who support such candidates.

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Introduction

Reactionary right-wing politicians have seen an upswing in popularity and electoral success across Europe and in the United States over the past two decades. These successes have occurred to varying degrees since the beginning of the twenty-first century with some notable elections of leaders such as Viktor Orban in Hungary or sizeable vote shares to candidates such as Marine Le Pen in France or perhaps the most discussed result of the election of Donald Trump in the United States. These electoral outcomes raise the question: why are voters in Western democracies turning towards more reactionary right-wing politicians? Popular press and scholarly works have explored a variety of theories for this common trend across countries ranging from focusing on individual level characteristics such as race, economic standing, and religiosity to changes in the contexts people live in such as increased immigration or declining regional economies. Using the United States as a case study and with newly available data, I seek to test the leading theories for this shift in voters' attitudes towards right-wing candidates and investigate the underlying factors driving this phenomenon.

The surprise of Trump's election sparked a large body of research seeking to understand what factors played a role in his success. From special issues grappling with this surprise, such as Perspectives on Politics' "Trump: Causes and Consequences" issue to individual works seeking to understand whether economic factors (Green and McElwee 2019), immigration (Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2017), social capital (Rodríguez-Pose, Lee, and Lipp 2021), status threat (Mutz 2018), or exposure to trade shocks (Autor et al. 2020; Hinojosa Ojeda and Telles 2021) offer the best explanations for the what drew voters to Trump. However, with notable exceptions such as Autor et al. (2020) and Parker (2021) most recent work focused on the United States and political extremism has taken the narrow view of examining the election of Trump in isolation rather than as a notable breakthrough of a growing movement that we can trace back to the Tea Party (Parker 2018) that emerged during Obama's presidency and even further back to a rightward shift that began in the Republican

party in the 1970s (Moskowitz, Rogowski, and Snyder 2019). Treating Trump's election as a unique event rather than the continuation of a trend limits our ability to study the factors that contribute to success of increasingly reactionary right-wing politicians in the US. Limiting research to this one outcome may help explain some of the conflicting evidence for which factors matter most in predicting whether someone supports such politicians (Morgan and Lee 2018; Mutz 2018). In addition to this focus on a singular electoral outcome, previous research has generally examined the above explanatory factors in isolation with incomplete testing of the theoretically implied interactions between these factors. Here I broaden the scope of the discussion by examining a key period of rightward shift in favor of for more reactionary right-wing candidates in US House of Representatives races from 2010 to 2020 and include a more complete set of relevant controls and interactions of the factors explored in previous researchers' works.

While the United States does not have explicitly defined far-right parties as is the case in many European countries, there are growing similarities between the Republican party, particularly certain subsets of its membership, and reactionary right parties in Europe (Lührmann et al. 2020). By their design European parliaments and their multi-party systems allow for easier tracking the rise of far-right parties, while in the US the two party system makes capturing and measuring the success of politicians espousing more extreme views a bit more complicated. This explicit recognition and demarcation of political groups with more extreme views may play a role in the overall success of these ideas in the political marketplace, in the sense that such politicians can more easily be excluded from governing coalitions in some circumstances. However, that question is not examined in this work. Of particular interest here is the shift in the Republican party that began largely with the Tea Party that gained prominence during the Obama administration and that largely lives on in the more recent and still influential Freedom Caucus. Both groups defined the rightward bounds of the Republican party during their popularity (Clarke 2020; Desilver 2015). The rhetorical and in many cases policy positions of politicians in these groups have increasingly emphasized anti-immigrant, anti-globalization, and at times populist economic policies that mirror those of European parties (Lührmann et al. 2020; Rydgren 2007).

Coinciding with this polarization we have has seen increasing economic inequality in the United States as well as immigration spreading from traditional cities of reception to new immigrant destinations and areas that have experienced rapid growth in Hispanic populations in recent decades (Massey 2008; Suro and Singer 2002). These trends of unequal economic conditions and the changing immigrant destinations alongside anti-immigrant messaging of the contemporary right movements raise the question of if and how these changes are related. Understanding the relationship between these demographic, economic and political trends is the primary focus of this article.

In addition to shifting the focus from a singular electoral outcome to a larger trend in political preferences and attitudes of the US public, I further advance our understanding of these processes by linking individual survey responses of preferred political candidates and extensive demographic data with county level economic, population, and social characteristics to move beyond studies that examine aggregate level voting data such as vote totals or margins and link this data to county or similarly local geographies to test the relationships between local contextual factors and votes for Trump (see Rodríguez-Pose, Terrero-Dávila, and Lee (2023) for example). This aggregate predictor to aggregate outcome approach is susceptible to ecological fallacies that has the potential to misconstrue the true underlying relationships for voting or political opinions which by definition are individual level outcomes. To this literature, I add a wider set of contextual and individual predictors to simultaneously measure the evidence for the leading theories of what drives individuals towards right-wing candidates that has not previously been analyzed.

Below I review the evidence for the leading explanations for voters supporting reactionary right politicians. Following that I describe the linkages I make across individual and contextual level data that I use in hierarchical logistic models to examine the degree of evidence for these prior explanations of support for reactionary right politicians. I then describe my results, discus limitations and point towards directions for future research.

Background and Literature Review

Defining the Reactionary Right

The turn to the right in the Republican party began in the last quarter of the 20th century and has resulted in the right-most wing of the party being notably further to the right than even their counterparts from 1980. For instance, using DW-Nominate measures of elected official ideologies based on roll call votes, we see that in 1981 the average ideological score for Republicans in the House was approximately 0.3 on a scale from -1 to 1 for most liberal to most conservative (Lewis 2023) . By 2023, the mean ideology of House Republicans was 0.5, demonstrating a marked increase in the popularity of more conservative politicians (Lewis 2023)[1] . While DW-Nominate data are limited to those who are elected, other data on candidates who ran for the House of Representatives displays similar trends with Republican candidates. Using data from the Database on Ideology, Money and Elections (DW-DIME) which capture candidate's ideologies based on donor information, we see a similar trend towards a level of right-wing ideology that we have not seen previously in the modern era of politics. The average ideology of Republican candidates for House seats increased from 0.83 in 1980 to

[1]Author's replication of their analysis using the replication code provided by Lewis 2023 to update to the most recent data.

1.24 in 2020[2].

For the purposes of this paper, I define the reactionary right as any candidate who had a DW-DIME score greater than or equal to 1.4. As shown in the chart below, the 80th percentile of candidate ideologies crossed this value in 2010, aligning roughly with the emergence and popularity of the Tea Party Caucus. While exact membership data is difficult to obtain, in 2012, the official membership of the Tea Party Caucus stood at 59 members out of 242, representing 24 percent of the party (Anon 2012) . My motivation for using the the 80th percentile rather than the 75th percentile is that the Freedom Caucus, representing the current right most wing of the party, is slightly smaller and as of 2023 had 49 members or 22% of Republicans in the House (DeSilver 2023). In summary, a DW-DIME CFscore of 1.4 offers a reasonable approximation of the self-identified right-most elected officials and by using such a measure, rather than politicians' stated ideologies or another metric, I can categorize both those politicians who won elections and had the opportunity to identify with these explicit right groups as well as those who lost elections.



Figure 1: Republican House Candidate Ideology 1980-2020

With this working definition of the reactionary right in contemporary US politics, I turn now to review previous theories and explanations for the increasing viability and popularity of more extreme candidates. In their review of the sociology of the radical right, Rydgren (2007) outlined a number of demand-side

[2]Note that DW-DIME scores are on a different scale than DW-Nominate scores and therefore are not directly comparable.

explanations, or those "factors that have changed the interests, emotions, attitudes, and preferences" of voters. Here I follow the general categories of explanations they outlined based on earlier evidence from Western Europe's politics, but modify them to reflect more recent evidence from research focusing on the United States.

Anomie and social capital

One popular narrative around why individuals are drawn towards right-wing candidates is a breakdown of social relations and a feeling of disconnectedness associated with modern society and the resulting anomie felt by individuals (Rydgren 2007). The logic being that right-wing candidates who offer a framing of the world rooted in a return to traditional values and a sense of creating an "other" group through their focus on immigration might appeal to those who feel disconnected from others in society (Rydgren 2007). Namely, these theories rest on the assumption that the disconnected will gain a sense of belonging by joining in support of a candidate that paints their supporters as the true or rightful members of a society and paints newcomers as a threatening other. As noted by Rydgren (2007) in their review, to date there is little evidence in support of this mechanism from quantitative studies. That is, "voters of the new radical right-wing parties are not the isolated, asocial individuals that would be predicted from this theory."

Recent work by Rodríguez-Pose et al. (2021) focused on the election of Trump confirms these earlier empirical findings from Rydgren (2007). In their examination of support for Trump in the 2016 and 2020 elections, they find that rather than Trump having large margins of victory in areas with low social capital, defined here along the lines of Robert Putnam's Putnam (2000) notion of community groups and engagement with others through civic and non-work organizations, it was in fact communities with high levels of social capital that were more likely to vote for Trump over Clinton. This finding supports an alternative logic for social capital within a community as a feature that represents dense webs of social relations that can provide a sense of group membership for residents. In this case, rather than seeking a sense of belonging by joining in support of a candidate promising to prevent "others" from entering the country, those in communities with high social capital already feel a strong sense of connectedness that could be threatened by newcomers seeking to gain access to these networks. Additionally, this web of connections within a community could act as transmission networks for spreading a sense of threat from newcomers into a community (Rodríguez-Pose et al. 2021).

Finally, social disconnection's role in increasing the appeal of reactionary right-wing politicians could operate through a third mechanism where those with strong social connection and who are relatively well off economically and who live in communities that are relatively economically secure may in fact be the places

most receptive to the idea of immigration and the reality of newcomers moving to their communities. Put differently, those who are doing relatively well may feel comfortable enough in their social and economic standing to go out of their way to welcome new residents. This alternative logic of the role of social connection and economic security has not been tested in previous works, likely due to data limitations in linking individual level economic standing and community level social connection. However, this alternative role of social connection as a force that operates differently for people in varying economic settings and personal situations offers a plausible third variation on the relationship between social connection, economic contexts, and the favorability of politicians who focus on demonizing immigration.

Relative deprivation, the left-behind, and fearing the fall

Closely related to the notion of disconnectedness is a sense of falling behind others economically and the feelings of injustice and anxieties that this can produce in people. There are a number of variations on this theme in the literature with some emphasizing the role of individuals' economic situations while others highlight the role of living in places that have been "left-behind" (Rodríguez-Pose et al. 2023) . Finally, there are those who may not have been left behind by society, but who fear falling down the economic ladder in more unequal settings and support reactionary right candidates as a way to protect their own economic standing (Jetten, Mols, and Steffens 2021).

Turning first to those who are themselves worse off than those around them, particularly those who may have previously had better economic standing. The assumption tested in prior research is that those who are struggling with a changing economy that prioritizes new sets of skills and knowledge and who therefore are more likely to "become anxious, bewildered, insecure and resentful, sentiments that may be channeled into support for policy proposals that stress the need to return to the traditional values of the status quo ante" as they see limited future prospects for economic advancement (Rydgren 2007). In this case we would expect to see those who are unemployed or have lower incomes relative to those around them more likely to support further right candidates. Notably, as summarized by Parker (2021) , "the proposition that Trump's victory was driven by working-class Whites is a myth: many of his followers are well-to-do, with two-thirds making more than the national median income."

Others, such as Rodríguez-Pose (2018) have explored the concept of left-behind places, examining the notion that residing in a community that has seen economic decline might lead to similar feelings of resentment or anxiety as described above in the case of individual unemployment. Here they find some support for communities with declines in employment and population having greater support for Trump. However, this analysis is at the aggregate level, so it remains unclear if it is actually those in the area who

were worse off voted for Trump at a higher rate or if there is something about this context of decline that made everyone in a setting more likely to support Trump.

Finally, along the lines of the quote from Parker regarding the relatively strong economic standing of Trump supporters in the US, this raises the potential that even though voters for reactionary-right politicians may not be worse off themselves, they may have a sense of economic status threat. If true, we would expect that those in the middle to upper income quantiles of a community that has high inequality to be most receptive to candidates promising to protect their standing in society. Findings from more recent work lend some support for this mechanism, that it is those who are fearful of falling down the economic and status ladder that show increased opposition to immigration's potential threats to their status (Jetten et al. 2021).

Cultural status threat

Intertwined with the theories of economic predictors of support for reactionary politicians, but capturing a more general sense of anxiety around one's standing in a rapidly changing society is the concept of status threat. For the US context this view is perhaps best summarized by Parker's analysis of the Tea Party movement stating that "what seems to drive people to sympathize with such movements, and in some instances, join is the perception that their way of life is under threat, something that transcends material threat" (Parker 2021). Given the lack of data explicitly asking individuals if they feel their status is threatened, most research turns to examine the impact of immigration, which is assumed to trigger status threat under certain conditions, as a way to gain traction on this mechanism. That is, if we saw that residents of communities that experienced a large influx of immigrants move towards the right or begin expressing more restrictionist immigration attitudes, then this would be an indicator that this mechanism of status threat is present.

In recent reviews of the international context, immigration and associated status or group threat seems to be a common and critical component of the right's appeal to voters. Notably, Ivarsflaten (2008) analyzed the electoral successes of seven far right political parties in Western Europe and found that while some parties succeeded in attracting voters through activating economic grievances, no party was able to achieve electoral success without activating grievances around immigration or immigrant integration. In the US, Parker and Barreto find that there are marked differences between Tea Party supporters and other Republicans on immigration related issues, but not necessarily in other realms, with Tea Partiers favoring more restrictive policies (Parker and Barreto 2014). Relatedly, immigration has been identified as the key issue in explaining the behavior of those who switched from Democratic voters to Trump in the 2016 election (Mutz 2018; Reny, Collingwood, and Valenzuela 2019; Sides et al. 2017).

Recent experimental evidence supports the argument that activating a sense of threat to group status

among Whites by reminding them of population projections that of a "majority-minority" America led to increased support for Trump (Major, Blodorn, and Major Blascovich 2018). Others have dealt with the concern of the causal ordering of party alignment and immigration finding that the changes in immigration attitudes precede changes in party alignment, with immigration "driving individual defections from the Democratic to Republican Party" (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015). Finally, Abrajano and Hajnal find that after controlling for state economic conditions, Whites living in states with "larger Latino populations are identifying as more Republican than their conservative ideology, age, gender, and class status would imply" (2015). However, not all research has found positive relationships between support for more conservative politicians and immigration. In research that has examined county level immigration has found that support for Trump in 2016 was not linked to objective levels of immigration (Hinojosa Ojeda and Telles 2021). In this work I advance our understanding of the role that immigration and group threat play in moving individuals towards more reactionary political views by incorporating measures of immigration into individuals' communities and testing various interactions with economic and social conditions to get a sense of under which conditions this threat might be activated and lend further support for politicians that highlight this fear of status lost to a changing racial and ethnic composition.

Theoretical framing and approach

As outlined above, there are a number of competing potential individual and contextual level factors with plausible theoretical mechanisms for influencing the likelihood of individuals supporting reactionary right wing candidates who center their platform on anti-immigrant, "traditional values", anti-elite paranoia, and sometimes populist economic rhetoric. The typical approach to testing these has been to focus one mechanism and control for one or two others. However, this article presents the first work that attempts to test these mechanisms simultaneously as well as the various interactions between these forces. I examine the relationships between individual level characteristics and likelihood of voting for reactionary right politicians and then add to these individual level predictors a set of key theoretically relevant contextual variables capturing county level economic indicators such as unemployment rate, inequality as captured by the Gini coefficient, change in immigrant population and Hispanic population, and the level of social connectedness defined as community level social capital in each county.

Next, I turn to examining the interactions and moderating roles that the theories outlined above suggest between these predictors. Specifically, to test the various mechanisms of action for social connection outlined above, I run models that: (1) interact county level social capital with county level immigration to test whether the level of social connection in a county modifies the relationship between local immigration and support

for reactionary right candidates, (2) interact social capital and local inequality to test whether the level of inequality in a county modifies the role of social capital in predicting support, (3) interact social capital and county-level unemployment as well as social capital with individual level unemployment to examine whether the relationship between social capital and support for right-wing politicians varies for those in "left-behind" places or who themselves are "left-behind" and (4) to test whether those in more socially connected communities that are more unequal respond differently to immigration, I run a model that interacts social capital, immigration, and inequality.

Further, I compare the evidence for the theories discussed above that suggest those who are "left-behind" economically may be more likely to support right-wing candidates who offer a return to economic prosperity versus those who themselves are relatively well-off but live in unequal conditions fear falling downwards and are attracted to politicians who, at least rhetorically, offer a sense of security for their economic standing in society. To test these notions I run models (1) interacting individuals' relative family income, compared to their county's median family income, with county level inequality, and (2) that add a third level to this interaction by incorporating immigration to see if a sense of economic threat is present or operates differently based on one's relative standing in settings of varying inequality. Along the logic of this three-way interaction examining the degree to which group status threat might be activated in different economic conditions, I also examine models that test (1) the interaction between immigration into respondents' county of residence and the county-level unemployment rate, and (2) the interaction between immigration and individual level unemployment. In combination these allow me to further adjudicate between previous confusion in the literature around whether it is everyone in regions that are "left-behind" who move to the right or if it is specifically those who themselves are "left-behind" who move to the right.

By examining a more complete set of theoretically implied relationships that much of the prior literature has left implied but unexamined, I advance our understanding of the role that immigration and group threat play in moving individuals towards more reactionary political views. I do this by including measures of immigration into individuals' communities and testing various interactions with economic and social conditions to get a sense of under which conditions this threat might be activated.

Finally, I contribute to a growing movement to advance the conversation beyond an examination of Trump's election as a unique outcome and rather as part of a longer trend by examining elections for the US House of Representatives. Further, by making use of new data, discussed below, I examine not only support for those candidates who won their electoral races but for all major party candidates who ran for the House whether they won or lost. The House of Representatives is uniquely situated for studying the role of local context in predicting support for more extreme right-wing candidates. The size of districts allow

for candidates to offer more concern to local conditions compared to Senate races where candidates have to appeal to statewide constituencies. On the other hand while House races lack the political salience of Presidential elections, they remain more politically salient than local elections even in off-cycle elections (Anon n.d.; Hajnal, Kogan, and Markarian 2022) offering the possibility that voters and survey respondents are more aware of the policy positions and rhetoric of these House candidates than those in local elections and give their support accordingly rather than relying strictly on party identification.

Data

I combine several datasets to construct my final sample. Below I describe these sources, how I align them, and variables I create for use in my analysis.

The Cooperative Election Survey (CES) cumulative files prepared by Kuriwaki (2023) and Dagonel (2021) align demographic and policy preference questions, respectively, over years of the CES administrations from 2006 to 2021. The CES, formerly named the Cooperative Congressional Election Study, is an online survey administered each year by YouGov that in even numbered election years gathers 50,000+ respondents and in odd-numbered years collects smaller samples around 15,000 to 20,000 responses (Schaffner and Kuriwaki n.d.; Kuriwaki 2023). YouGov's matched random sampling methodology that employs proximity based matching and draws respondents primarily from their online panel results in a final sample that is representative of all US adults (Ansolabehere, Schaffner, and Luks 2021). In election years, the CES administers a pre-election and post-election wave where respondents answer policy preference, demographic, and candidate preferences in the pre-election wave which is administered from late September to late October shortly before general elections. My analysis relies on these pre-election data from 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016 and 2020. I limit my sample to only respondents who identified as Republicans and White non-Hispanic respondents given that the primary interest is the outer bounds of ideology within the Republican party and the supporters of such candidates are largely non-Hispanic Whites. Respondents provide their county of residence as well as the name of the candidate that they intend to vote for in the upcoming US House of Representatives elections which I use to link these survey responses to contextual information about their county of residence and chosen candidate ideologies as described below.

I use the nominally integrated time-series tables created by IPUMS National Historical GIS (NHGIS) for county level characteristics (Manson et al. n.d.). These data combine decennial census files with American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year estimates to provide county level characteristics from 2000 to 2021. One advantage of using counties as a measure of local context is that they are relatively static geographic boundaries compared to congressional districts and in many cases capture a reasonable approximation of

one's lived geography more accurately than smaller geographies such as census blocks or tracts do or larger geographies such as metropolitan statistical areas or states. I merge the CES individual level survey responses with these ACS estimates using county FIPS codes. With 5-year estimates, there is some overlap in the time periods covered by the ACS estimates and the survey responses in the CES as highlighted in Table 1 below.

Alongside the demographic and economic variables from the ACS data, I incorporate a county level measure of social capital developed by Rupasingha, Goetz, and Freshwater (2006) that uses information on (1) the number of various community groups such as religious organizations, professional associations, and recreational facilities, (2) voter turnout in presidential elections, (3) census response rates, (4) domestically focused non-profit organizations to provide a single measure of social capital for all US counties in 2009 and 2014.[3] I join this measure of social capital to the working dataset again using county FIPS codes.

Given the key role that the potential for contact or exposure to new residents of respondents' counties of residence, I also include a measure of whether a county is primarily urban, suburban, or rural based on a collapsed version proposed by Castillo (2019) that is based on the the 2013 National Center for Health Statistics urban-rural classification scheme for counties as developed by Deborah D. Ingram and Sheila J. Franco (2014). I merge these time invariant county classifications onto the working dataset by county FIPS codes.

I use the DW-DIME database as the source for my outcome of interest, namely the ideology of US House of Representatives candidates. These data contain ideological scores for House candidates from 1980 to 2020 on a common scale that allows for comparisons over time. The primary benefit of these data is that they capture a more complete picture of the "ideological marketplace" than measures that only capture elected officials and base their ideological measures on roll call votes (Bonica 2014). I use data for candidates running in House elections from 2010 to 2020. I use the traditional version of the ideology measure (CFscore) which is time invariant across elections for each candidate. The DW-DIME ideology data contain Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) identifiers for candidates who have held office at some point in their careers. The CES data contain these same ICPSR identifiers for candidates who have held office. These ICPSR codes provide the primary link between ideology scores from DW-DIME and the candidate that each respondent reported supporting from the CES data. For those candidates who have never held office, and therefore have no official identification code to join by, I conduct a series of joins by candidates' names between the CES and DW-DIME data.

Table 1 below summarizes the alignment of the years of data contained in these data sources.

[3] I exclude Edgefield County, SC as it stands as a clear outlier with a social capital index score of 1.5 times higher than any other county in 2009 and more than double the next highest county in 2014.

Table 1: Data Source Alignment

Source	2010	2012	2014	2016	2020
CES	2010	2012	2014	2016	2020
DW-DIME	2010	2012	2014	2016	2020
Social Capital	2009	2014	2014	2014	2014
ACS 5-Year	2005-10	2011-15	2011-15	2016-20	2016-20
NCHS	2013	2013	2013	2013	2013

Note: The baseline values for all ACS derived contextual variables is the 2000 Census. ACS and Census Data are sourced from the NHGIS Nominally Integrated Time Series Tables, with the exception of Gini estimates which are imported from the ACS using the tidycensus package for 2005-2010, 2011-2015, 2016-2020.

Derived Variables

To create a measure of immigration into a community, I first calculate the percent of foreign born population in each county in four periods (2000, 2005-10, 2011-15, 2016-20). I then calculate a percentage point change in foreign born population between each period and the period immediately preceding it. Given recent findings from Abrajano and Hajnal (2015) that White Americans conflate change in Hispanic population as change in immigrant population and largely conceive of immigration as Hispanic population change, I also create similar measures tracking the change and baseline levels of Hispanic population in counties.

Given the central focus on the US-Mexico border in immigration debates and political rhetoric I include a measure of the distance from each county to the US-Mexico border. To construct this I take the centroid of each county and measure the shortest possible straight line distance to the southern land border. The intent of this variable is to control for general proximity to the US-Mexico border given the expectation that issues of immigration and border control, which have been a primary feature of anti-immigrant rhetoric from reactionary right politicians, will be more salient for those closest to the border.

Additionally, I incorporate unemployment rate, poverty rate, and percent of the county population that identified as non-Hispanic African American/Black from the NHGIS data as additional variables capturing county level economic conditions and demographic context.

To operationalize a measure of relative economic standing within each respondent's community, I use the median family income estimates for each county and convert this continuous measure into the same ordinal categories that family incomes are reported in the CES data. Next, I take those whose family income fell in the same category as the county-level median income or the categories immediately above or below and assign these respondents a value of "At or near Median". Respondents whose family income fell two or more categories below the median county family income, are categorized as "Below median". Similarly,

those whose family income fell two or more categories above the median county family income category are categorized as "Above median". The CES data capture family income as an ordinal set of ranges and due to the unequal spacing of these categories a more precise or information dense measure of relative economic standing of respondents within their county of residence is unavailable using these data.

After omitting observations with missing data, my final dataset contains data on 34,717 individual respondents from 2,503 counties. A full set of descriptive statistics for the individual level variables and the county-level contextual variables are included in the Appendix.

Method

Given the hierarchical structure of these data with individuals grouped in counties, I use mixed effect models with random intercepts for counties to estimate the associations of county level covariates on individuals' preferences. As discussed above, I define reactionary right politicians as those who had an ideology score greater than or equal to 1.4. This value defined the 80th percentile of ideology scores for all candidates in 2010 and the 90th percentile for Republican candidates in 2010. The logistic regressions predicting likelihood of supporting a candidate of a reactionary right wing candidate are as follows:

$$\text{logitP}(y_i = 1) = \beta_0 + X_{ij}\beta + Z_j\gamma i + year + \alpha_{j[i]} \text{ for } i = 1, \ldots, n \text{ and } j = 1, \ldots, m$$

- y_i is the whether a candidate had a CFscore greater than or equal to 1.4
- X_{ic} = is a set of individual level characteristics
- Z_c = a set of county level characteristics
- $year$ = Factor with five levels (2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2020).
- $\alpha_{j[i]}$ = County level effect in county j where person i resides

Results

My primary goal is to examine the predictors of individuals supporting candidates at the outermost right-wing of the Republican party. For reference, a model with individual level predictors only, and a model with control variables for % African American/Black, distance from the border, region in the US, and counties' population density measured as rural, urban, or suburban are included in the Appendix. The results in Tables 2 and 3 begin with models that includes all key theoretical variables of interest, namely individuals' own employment statuses, their ratings of the economy, their family income compared to the county median, the level of social capital in their county of residence, as well as the Gini coefficient, unemployment rate, poverty rate for counties, and finally the percentage point change in foreign born and Hispanic populations as well as

the percent of county population that was foreign born and Hispanic in the previous five year period. I turn now to review these results in relation to the proposed mechanisms for these variables discussed earlier.

First, turning to examine the potential roles of social capital as outlined earlier. Namely, whether social connection at the community level acts as a force that prevents feelings of isolation and anomie and thereby reduces the likelihood of supporting far-right politicians, or if social connection acts as a potential coveted good that people want to protect their networks from intrusion by others and would therefore have a more heightened sense of group threat, or if the sense of security offered by close relations with those around them allows people to welcome newcomers into their community and therefore would be less inclined to vote for politicians who demonize immigrants. First, from Models 3 and 3.2, which differ only on the measure used for immigration, which I discuss further below, we see that those living in counties with higher social capital are more likely to support reactionary right candidates, with a one unit increase in social capital increasing the odds of voting for such candidates by a factor of 1.38 based on Model 3.2.

Examining the interactions between social capital and other variables, Model 4 tests an interaction between social capital and change in Hispanic population to test whether the relationships between social capital or immigration and support for right wing candidates are moderated by one another. I find no evidence for this interaction effect improving the fit of the model. Model 5 tests whether local inequality impacts the effect of social capital. Here we see that the it is those in more equal settings and with high social capital that are more likely to vote for far-right candidates than those in higher inequality settings. (See plot M5 below).

Model 6, which offers the best fit out of all models considered, shows that those in areas with low unemployment and high social capital are more likely to support right wing candidates. Plot M6 below displays the predicted probabilities at various representative levels of these two variables. In Model 7, the interaction between individual level employment status and social capital does not improve model fit based on BIC or AIC metrics and finds no differences in the effect of social capital for individuals of employment types other than the reference of full-time employed. These findings in combination lend support towards the proposal earlier that it is not those who are left-behind economically and isolated, but those who are in areas with strong social networks and areas that are doing relatively well economically that fear falling down.

The final social capital interaction I consider is in Model 10, which interacts inequality, immigration, and social capital to test whether those in more unequal settings are more reactive to immigration and demonstrate a heightened sense of group threat that leads to supporting candidates who amplify this fear. Adding social capital into this interaction tests whether there is evidence for either of the mechanisms alluded

to in prior research but left untested for whether higher social capital acts as a mechanism that makes those feel comfortable in their social standing and able to welcome newcomers into their community or if these dense social networks amplify a sense of in-group versus out-group and potentially provide avenues for a feeling of group threat to spread quickly within a community. From the table below, we see that based on model fit diagnostics, these interactions do not improve moel fit despite the statistical significance of the interaction terms.

Where do the above findings leave our understanding of the role of social connectedness at a community level and likelihood of supporting far-right candidates. Largely, these findings confirm previous research, namely that it is those in areas that are relatively well off economically and in areas with higher levels of community social capital that are most likely to vote for right-wing candidates. This result aligns with previous findings on the role of social capital from Rodríguez-Pose et al. (2021), however conflicts with their finding that it is areas with employment decline that are most likely to support, in their case Trump, but in this case right-wing candidates.

As detailed earlier, closely related to the notion of disconnectedness is a sense of falling behind others economically and the feelings of injustice and anxieties that this can produce in people that then heightens the appeal of politicians promising a return to better times. Unemployed individuals have odds of voting for a far-right politician that are 1.2 times higher than the full-time employed. This effect is consistent across models and while fails to meet a significance threshold of 0.5, is significant at a 0.1 threshold. Across models we see a lack of evidence for individuals with more positive retrospective ratings of the economy over the past year being more or less likely than those who though the economy got much worse over the period to support far-right candidates. Similarly, we see little difference in support for reactionary right candidates between those who have family incomes above or at the median county income relative to those below it. Unemployment plays some role in driving individuals towards the far-right, however there is little evidence supporting the notions that those who are relatively worse off or feel the economy has been worse are any more or less likely to support far-right candidates.

Regarding the contextual measures of economic well being and whether those in places that have been left-behind are more likely to support right-wing candidates, I find little evidence for this mechanism. Across models county-level unemployment and poverty rate are both negatively associated with likelihood of supporting right-wing candidates. Relatedly, there is little evidence in support of the notion that it is those who are relatively well off but who reside in unequal communities who are fearful of falling down who are more likely to support right-wing candidates.

Turning to testing theories for the role of immigration in heightening a sense of group threat for respondents under various conditions. From Model 3, when measured as change in foreign born percentage of county population within the last five years, immigration shows no effect on favorability of far-right candidates. However, there is evidence across models that those in areas with a higher baseline level of foreign-born residents are more likely to support far-right candidates. However, given recent findings from Abrajano and Hajnal (2015) that Whites conflate change in Hispanic population as change in immigrant population and largely conceive of immigration as Hispanic population change, I also examine immigration as measured by the change in Hispanic population between periods. These results are shown in Model 3.2. Comparing these models, while White respondents seem unaffected by the change in foreign born population, there is consistent evidence across models of evidence of White residents in counties that have seen an increase in Hispanic population over the last five years being more likely to support far-right candidates. Given this effect, I measure immigration as Hispanic population change in all further models.

As discussed above, the interaction between immigration and social capital in Model 4 was found to reduce model fit, challenging the idea that the impact of immigration on respondents' views of right-wing candidates is impacted by the social capital of the region they reside in. Similarly, the effect of immigration does not vary meaningfully for those at different levels of economic standing in their community based on the results from Model 9, nor do the interactions between immigration and individuals' unemployment status or county-level unemployment rates improve model fit (see Models 11 and 12). Finally, considering the three-way interaction between social capital, immigration, and inequality included in Model 10, including these interactions does not improve the model fit. In summary, these results concerning immigration and the various potential moderating effects of individual and contextual level variables supports the posited mechanism that Whites in areas that have experienced an increase in Hispanic population are more likely to support right-wing candidates due to a sense of group status threat, however there is no evidence that this effect is meaningfully moderated by individuals' economic standing, the economic conditions of the region, or the level of social capital in a community.

Table 2: Abbreviated Model Outputs 1-6 (Odds Ratios)

	3	3.2	4	5	6	7
Employment [Part-Time]	1.10 (0.09)	1.10 (0.09)	1.10 (0.09)	1.10 (0.09)	1.10 (0.09)	1.07 (0.10)
Employment [Unemployed/Laid Off]	1.22 (0.13)+	1.22 (0.13)+	1.22 (0.13)+	1.22 (0.13)+	1.22 (0.13)+	1.10 (0.15)
Employment [Retired/Disabled]	1.00 (0.07)	1.00 (0.07)	1.00 (0.07)	1.00 (0.07)	1.00 (0.07)	1.00 (0.07)
Employment [Other]	1.05 (0.09)	1.05 (0.09)	1.05 (0.09)	1.05 (0.09)	1.05 (0.09)	1.00 (0.10)
Rating of Economy [Worse/somewhat worse]	0.98 (0.06)	0.98 (0.06)	0.98 (0.06)	0.98 (0.06)	0.98 (0.06)	0.98 (0.06)
Rating of Economy [Not sure]	1.23 (0.29)	1.23 (0.29)	1.23 (0.29)	1.23 (0.29)	1.24 (0.29)	1.23 (0.29)
Rating of Economy [Unchanged]	1.00 (0.07)	1.00 (0.07)	1.00 (0.07)	1.00 (0.07)	1.00 (0.07)	1.00 (0.07)
Rating of Economy [Better/somewhat better]	0.96 (0.09)	0.97 (0.09)	0.97 (0.09)	0.96 (0.09)	0.97 (0.09)	0.97 (0.09)
Rating of Economy [Much better]	1.19 (0.13)	1.20 (0.14)	1.20 (0.14)	1.20 (0.14)	1.20 (0.14)	1.20 (0.14)
Family Income [Above median]	0.94 (0.06)	0.94 (0.06)	0.94 (0.06)	0.93 (0.06)	0.94 (0.06)	0.94 (0.06)
Family Income [Below median]	1.03 (0.06)	1.03 (0.06)	1.03 (0.06)	1.03 (0.06)	1.03 (0.06)	1.03 (0.06)
Family Income [Prefer not to say]	0.97 (0.07)	0.97 (0.07)	0.97 (0.07)	0.97 (0.07)	0.97 (0.07)	0.97 (0.07)
Social Capital	1.24 (0.11)*	1.38 (0.13)***	1.43 (0.15)***	15.70 (12.59)***	1.79 (0.25)***	1.42 (0.14)***
Gini	1.05 (0.03)*	1.05 (0.03)*	1.05 (0.03)*	1.06 (0.03)*	1.06 (0.03)*	1.05 (0.03)*
Unemployment Rate	0.96 (0.03)	0.95 (0.03)+	0.95 (0.03)+	0.96 (0.03)	0.94 (0.03)*	0.95 (0.03)+
Povery Rate	0.96 (0.02)*	0.95 (0.02)*	0.95 (0.02)*	0.94 (0.02)**	0.95 (0.02)**	0.95 (0.02)*
Ppt Change Foreign Born	1.05 (0.04)					
% Foreign Born (lag)	1.05 (0.02)**					
Ppt Change Hispanic		1.17 (0.04)***	1.15 (0.05)***	1.18 (0.04)***	1.15 (0.04)***	1.17 (0.04)***
% Hispanic (lag)		1.06 (0.01)***	1.06 (0.01)***	1.06 (0.01)***	1.06 (0.01)***	1.06 (0.01)***
Social Capital × Ppt Change Hispanic			0.98 (0.02)			
Social Capital × Gini				0.95 (0.02)**		
Social Capital × Unemployment Rate					0.96 (0.02)*	
Employment [Part-Time] × Social Capital						0.94 (0.10)
Employment [Unemployed/Laid Off] × Social Capital						0.85 (0.12)
Employment [Retired/Disabled] × Social Capital						1.00 (0.07)
Employment [Other] × Social Capital						0.91 (0.10)
Num.Obs.	34 775	34 775	34 775	34 775	34 775	34 775
R2 Marg.	0.101	0.112	0.112	0.114	0.113	0.112
R2 Cond.	0.788	0.793	0.792	0.795	0.794	0.793
AIC	16 259.4	16 170.4	16 171.2	16 161.4	16 159.6	16 175.3
BIC	16 673.7	16 584.8	16 594.0	16 584.2	16 582.5	16 623.5
ICC	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8
RMSE	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23

Table 3: Abbreviated Model Outputs 7-12 (Odds Ratios)

	8	9	10	11	12
Employment [Part-Time]	1.10 (0.09)	1.10 (0.09)	1.10 (0.09)	1.10 (0.09)	1.11 (0.13)
Employment [Unemployed/Laid Off]	1.22 (0.13)+	1.21 (0.13)+	1.21 (0.13)+	1.22 (0.13)+	1.10 (0.16)
Employment [Retired/Disabled]	1.00 (0.07)	1.00 (0.07)	1.00 (0.07)	1.00 (0.07)	1.07 (0.09)
Employment [Other]	1.05 (0.09)	1.05 (0.09)	1.05 (0.09)	1.05 (0.09)	1.04 (0.13)
Rating of Economy [Worse/somewhat worse]	0.98 (0.06)	0.98 (0.06)	0.98 (0.06)	0.98 (0.06)	0.98 (0.06)
Rating of Economy [Not sure]	1.24 (0.29)	1.23 (0.29)	1.25 (0.29)	1.24 (0.29)	1.23 (0.29)
Rating of Economy [Unchanged]	1.00 (0.07)	1.00 (0.07)	1.00 (0.07)	1.00 (0.07)	1.00 (0.07)
Rating of Economy [Better/somewhat better]	0.97 (0.09)	0.97 (0.09)	0.97 (0.09)	0.97 (0.09)	0.96 (0.09)
Rating of Economy [Much better]	1.20 (0.14)	1.20 (0.14)	1.21 (0.14)+	1.20 (0.14)	1.20 (0.14)
Family Income [Above median]	0.92 (0.76)	0.88 (0.08)	0.93 (0.06)	0.94 (0.06)	0.94 (0.06)
Family Income [Below median]	1.73 (1.30)	0.94 (0.08)	1.02 (0.06)	1.03 (0.06)	1.03 (0.06)
Family Income [Prefer not to say]	1.48 (1.50)	0.99 (0.11)	0.97 (0.07)	0.97 (0.07)	0.97 (0.07)
Social Capital	1.38 (0.13)***	1.38 (0.13)***	34.12 (31.37)***	1.40 (0.13)***	1.38 (0.13)***
Gini	1.06 (0.03)*	1.05 (0.03)*	1.02 (0.03)	1.06 (0.03)*	1.06 (0.03)*
Unemployment Rate	0.95 (0.03)+	0.95 (0.03)+	0.97 (0.03)	0.93 (0.03)*	0.95 (0.03)+
Povery Rate	0.95 (0.02)*	0.95 (0.02)*	0.94 (0.02)**	0.95 (0.02)*	0.95 (0.02)*
Ppt Change Hispanic	1.17 (0.04)***	1.14 (0.05)**	0.27 (0.10)***	1.06 (0.08)	1.18 (0.04)***
% Hispanic (lag)	1.06 (0.01)***	1.06 (0.01)***		1.06 (0.01)***	1.06 (0.01)***
Family Income [Above median] × Gini	1.00 (0.02)				
Family Income [Below median] × Gini	0.99 (0.02)				
Family Income [Prefer not to say] × Gini	0.99 (0.02)				
Family Income [Above median] × Ppt Change Hispanic		1.04 (0.04)			
Family Income [Below median] × Ppt Change Hispanic		1.07 (0.04)+			
Family Income [Prefer not to say] × Ppt Change Hispanic		0.99 (0.05)			
Social Capital × Ppt Change Hispanic			0.48 (0.13)**		
Social Capital × Gini			0.93 (0.02)***		
Ppt Change Hispanic × Gini			1.03 (0.01)***		
Social Capital × Ppt Change Hispanic × Gini			1.02 (0.01)**		
Unemployment Rate × Ppt Change Hispanic				1.01 (0.01)	
Employment [Part-Time] × Ppt Change Hispanic					1.00 (0.05)
Employment [Unemployed/Laid Off] × Ppt Change Hispanic					1.05 (0.06)
Employment [Retired/Disabled] × Ppt Change Hispanic					0.96 (0.03)
Employment [Other] × Ppt Change Hispanic					1.00 (0.05)
Num.Obs.	34 775	34 775	34 775	34 775	34 775
R2 Marg.	0.112	0.112	0.100	0.113	0.112
R2 Cond.	0.793	0.793	0.796	0.793	0.793
AIC	16 175.4	16 172.4	16 231.9	16 168.5	16 174.5
BIC	16 615.2	16 612.1	16 671.7	16 591.4	16 622.7
ICC	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8
RMSE	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23



Figure 2: Social Capital and Inequality Interaction



Figure 3: Unemployment Rate and Social Capital

Conclusion and Discussion

This work focuses on the factors that explain individuals' preferences for far-right wing politicians in the US. In examining the evidence for social, economic, and demographic factors in influencing individuals' likelihood to support these radical candidates I find that there is moderate evidence in support for those who are actively unemployed to be more likely to support far-right candidates. I confirm previous findings from other researchers that community level social capital is an important predictor of support for these candidates. However, due to data limitations, I am unable to determine if it is those in the communities with high levels of social capital who are themselves well connected to these networks or if we are seeing a response from those who are in the presence of strong networks but are themselves excluded from them and are therefore still feeling disconnected despite living in areas with higher levels of connectedness. Future work would benefit from identifying new data sources to capture this information. However, contrary to prior research such as Rodríguez-Pose et al. (2021), I find that this effect is strengthened in in areas with lower levels of unemployment.

Additionally, I find that residents of counties with higher social capital are more likely to support

far-right candidates and that this relationship is strengthened in settings where county-level unemployment is low. Additionally, I find that those residing in counties that have seen an increase in the Hispanic population and those who reside in more economically unequal counties are more likely to support far-right candidates. In combination, these results lend support to the notion that it is not those who have been left behind economically that are moving towards right-wing candidate, but rather it is those in areas that have experienced demographic change and who experience a sense of status threat from their new neighbors in settings where they can fall down the economic ladder that are most likely to support far-right candidates.

Future work would benefit from testing various time frames of changes in demographic and economic conditions, similar to the approaches used by Autor et al. (2020) and Rodríguez-Pose et al. (2023). It may be that people form their views based on earlier experiences or that it is changes in their communities over longer periods of time that shape their attitudes and preferences more so than the most immediate or recent change in the last five year as used here.

Additionally, future work would benefit from examining not just intra-county inequality but test the various geographic scales at which people may be comparing themselves economically. We know that social lives and the environments that people spend their time in throughout the day to not perfectly align with administrative boundaries such as counties, so as more detailed data becomes available for linking individuals, their preferences and attitudes to the social environments that they actually spend their time in we will be able to better understand the role of context on shaping attitudes. Closely related to this suggestion of working for collecting data that provides better measurement of lived environments, incorporating more detailed information on where individuals obtain their information about the world in terms of media consumption and news sources will be key for fully understanding the growing right-wing popularity in the US. There is evidence that media such as Fox News pushes people towards more conservative views and there is evidence around local context becoming more salient for shaping views when highlighted in the media (DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007; Hopkins 2010; Martin and Yurukoglu 2017). In my models above I control for self-reported levels of news interest from respondents but the national CES data do not contain details on the specific media sources that respondents use or consume.

Finally, conducting surveys that ask respondents not only their demographic information and their policy views, but also their perceptions of conditions in their local community and nationally would allow further testing of whether it is a change in objective conditions or a change in perceptions that is not supported by objective conditions people are surrounded by that is motivating these preferences. This will shed light on the social and psychological processes at play. Additionally, it will help answer a persistent question in this literature of whether perceptions rooted in objective conditions or based on external messaging such

as news media or social media point to different solutions for those interested in countering a rightward shift in politics. This need for improved data is not simply for academic curiosity. If research identifies that perceptions largely track objective conditions and those conditions push people further to radically reactionary views then for those who seek to counteract this movement improving those conditions is the prescription for slowing the rise of the radical right. However, if perceptions largely do not track objective conditions, then those who seek to undercut this rising tide of right-wing support by investing in improving objective conditions may be disappointed in the results.

Appendix

Table 4: Individual Variable Descriptives

Characteristic	**N = 34,775**
Sex	
Male	18,687 (54%)
Female	16,088 (46%)
Age	
Mean (SD)	59 (14)
(Range)	(18 to 95)
Education	
HS or Less	10,588 (30%)
Some College	8,543 (25%)
2-Year	3,523 (10%)
4-Year	8,265 (24%)
Post-Grad	3,856 (11%)
Religion Importance	
Very Important	19,882 (57%)
Somewhat Important	9,094 (26%)
Not Too Important	3,603 (10%)
Not at All Important	2,196 (6.3%)
Home Ownership	
Own	30,980 (89%)
Rent	2,969 (8.5%)
Other	826 (2.4%)
Parent of young child	6,288 (18%)
Military Service	
Neither Self/Family	11,082 (32%)
Self/Family	23,693 (68%)
Party ID	
Democrat	0 (0%)
Republican	34,775 (100%)
Independent	0 (0%)
Other or Not Sure	0 (0%)
Employment	
Full-Time	12,477 (36%)
Part-Time	3,282 (9.4%)
Unemployed/Laid Off	1,688 (4.9%)
Retired/Disabled	13,968 (40%)
Other	3,360 (9.7%)
No Health Insurance	2,166 (6.2%)
Union Membership	
Yes or formerly	9,268 (27%)
No, Never	25,507 (73%)
Rating of Economy	
Much worse	9,452 (27%)
Worse/somewhat worse	13,540 (39%)
Not sure	287 (0.8%)

Unchanged	7,301 (21%)
Better/somewhat better	2,735 (7.9%)
Much better	1,460 (4.2%)
News Interest	
Hardly at all	754 (2.2%)
Only now and then	2,202 (6.3%)
Some of the time	6,802 (20%)
Most of the time	25,017 (72%)
Family Income	
Near or at median	9,793 (28%)
Above median	8,621 (25%)
Below median	11,553 (33%)
Prefer not to say	4,808 (14%)
Granting Legal Status	
Support	8,262 (24%)
Oppose Granting Status	26,513 (76%)
Border Security	
Oppose	5,347 (15%)
Support Increase Security	29,428 (85%)
Pref. Candidate (CFscore)	
Mean (SD)	1.05 (0.47)
(Range)	(-1.73 to 2.79)
faminc_fct	
Less than 10k	494 (1.4%)
10k - 20k	1,499 (4.3%)
20k - 30k	2,512 (7.2%)
30k - 40k	3,063 (8.8%)
40k - 50k	3,034 (8.7%)
50k - 60k	3,232 (9.3%)
60k - 70k	2,544 (7.3%)
70k - 80k	2,840 (8.2%)
80k - 100k	3,489 (10%)
100k - 120k	2,589 (7.4%)
120k - 150k	2,229 (6.4%)
150k+	2,442 (7.0%)
Prefer not to say	4,808 (14%)

[1] n (%)

Table 5: County-Year Level Descriptives

Characteristic	**N = 7,990**
% African American/Black	9 (12)
Prop. Foreign Born	5.5 (6.0)
Ppt Change Foreign Born	0.39 (1.06)
% Hispanic	9 (12)
Ppt Change Hispanic	1.08 (1.27)
Social Capital	-0.25 (0.89)
Gini	0.44 (0.03)
Unemployment Rate	6.77 (2.73)
Povery Rate	14.7 (5.6)
Miles (100s) from Mexico Border	10.0 (4.1)
County Type	
Rural	3,634 (45%)
Suburban	4,040 (51%)
Urban	316 (4.0%)
Region	
Midwest	2,515 (31%)
Northeast	912 (11%)
South	3,512 (44%)
West	1,051 (13%)

[1] Mean (SD); n (%)

Table 6: Full Models 1-6

	1	2	3	3.2	4	5	6
(Intercept)	0.03 (0.01)***	0.10 (0.04)***	0.02 (0.03)***	0.01 (0.01)***	0.01 (0.01)***	0.01 (0.01)***	0.01 (0.01)***
Sex [Female]	0.90 (0.05)*	0.90 (0.05)*	0.90 (0.05)*	0.90 (0.05)*	0.90 (0.05)*	0.90 (0.05)*	0.90 (0.05)*
Age (Std)	1.01 (0.04)	1.01 (0.04)	1.01 (0.04)	1.01 (0.04)	1.01 (0.04)	1.00 (0.04)	1.00 (0.04)
Education [Some College]	0.98 (0.06)	0.97 (0.06)	0.97 (0.06)	0.97 (0.06)	0.97 (0.06)	0.96 (0.06)	0.97 (0.06)
Education [2-Year]	0.98 (0.08)	0.98 (0.08)	0.98 (0.08)	0.97 (0.08)	0.97 (0.08)	0.97 (0.08)	0.97 (0.08)
Education [4-Year]	0.92 (0.06)	0.92 (0.06)	0.91 (0.06)	0.91 (0.06)	0.91 (0.06)	0.91 (0.06)	0.91 (0.06)
Education [Post-Grad]	0.83 (0.07)*	0.83 (0.07)*	0.82 (0.07)*	0.82 (0.07)*	0.81 (0.07)*	0.82 (0.07)*	0.82 (0.07)*
Religion Importance [Somewhat Important]	0.93 (0.05)	0.94 (0.05)	0.94 (0.05)	0.94 (0.05)	0.94 (0.05)	0.94 (0.05)	0.94 (0.05)
Religion Importance [Not Too Important]	0.84 (0.07)*	0.84 (0.07)*	0.84 (0.07)*	0.84 (0.06)*	0.83 (0.06)*	0.84 (0.06)*	0.84 (0.06)*
Religion Importance [Not at All Important]	0.96 (0.09)	0.96 (0.09)	0.95 (0.09)	0.94 (0.09)	0.94 (0.09)	0.94 (0.09)	0.94 (0.09)
Home Ownership [Rent]	1.04 (0.09)	1.04 (0.09)	1.03 (0.08)	1.03 (0.08)	1.03 (0.08)	1.03 (0.08)	1.03 (0.08)
Home Ownership [Other]	1.08 (0.16)	1.07 (0.16)	1.07 (0.16)	1.08 (0.16)	1.08 (0.16)	1.08 (0.16)	1.08 (0.16)
Parent of young child [Yes]	1.05 (0.07)	1.06 (0.07)	1.06 (0.07)	1.06 (0.07)	1.06 (0.07)	1.06 (0.07)	1.06 (0.07)
Military Service [Self/Family]	1.01 (0.05)	1.00 (0.05)	1.01 (0.05)	1.00 (0.05)	1.00 (0.05)	1.00 (0.05)	1.00 (0.05)
Employment [Part-Time]	1.10 (0.09)	1.10 (0.09)	1.10 (0.09)	1.10 (0.09)	1.10 (0.09)	1.10 (0.09)	1.10 (0.09)
Employment [Unemployed/Laid Off]	1.20 (0.13)+	1.21 (0.13)+	1.22 (0.13)+	1.22 (0.13)+	1.22 (0.13)+	1.22 (0.13)+	1.22 (0.13)+
Employment [Retired/Disabled]	0.99 (0.06)	0.99 (0.06)	1.00 (0.07)	1.00 (0.07)	1.00 (0.07)	1.00 (0.07)	1.00 (0.07)
Employment [Other]	1.05 (0.09)	1.05 (0.09)	1.05 (0.09)	1.05 (0.09)	1.05 (0.09)	1.05 (0.09)	1.05 (0.09)
No Health Insurance [No]	0.84 (0.08)+	0.84 (0.08)+	0.84 (0.08)+	0.83 (0.08)+	0.83 (0.08)+	0.83 (0.08)+	0.84 (0.08)+
Union Membership [No, Never]	1.00 (0.05)	1.00 (0.05)	1.00 (0.05)	1.00 (0.05)	1.00 (0.05)	1.00 (0.05)	1.00 (0.05)
Rating of Economy [Worse/somewhat worse]	0.98 (0.06)	0.98 (0.06)	0.98 (0.06)	0.98 (0.06)	0.98 (0.06)	0.98 (0.06)	0.98 (0.06)
Rating of Economy [Not sure]	1.23 (0.29)	1.23 (0.29)	1.23 (0.29)	1.23 (0.29)	1.23 (0.29)	1.23 (0.29)	1.24 (0.29)
Rating of Economy [Unchanged]	1.00 (0.07)	1.00 (0.07)	1.00 (0.07)	1.00 (0.07)	1.00 (0.07)	1.00 (0.07)	1.00 (0.07)
Rating of Economy [Better/somewhat better]	0.97 (0.09)	0.97 (0.09)	0.96 (0.09)	0.97 (0.09)	0.97 (0.09)	0.96 (0.09)	0.97 (0.09)
Rating of Economy [Much better]	1.19 (0.13)	1.20 (0.13)	1.19 (0.13)	1.20 (0.14)	1.20 (0.14)	1.20 (0.14)	1.20 (0.14)
News Interest [Only now and then]	0.91 (0.17)	0.92 (0.17)	0.91 (0.17)	0.91 (0.17)	0.91 (0.17)	0.90 (0.17)	0.90 (0.17)
News Interest [Some of the time]	0.89 (0.15)	0.89 (0.15)	0.89 (0.15)	0.88 (0.15)	0.88 (0.15)	0.88 (0.15)	0.88 (0.15)
News Interest [Most of the time]	0.97 (0.16)	0.98 (0.16)	0.97 (0.16)	0.97 (0.16)	0.97 (0.16)	0.97 (0.16)	0.97 (0.16)
Family Income [Above median]	0.93 (0.06)	0.93 (0.06)	0.94 (0.06)	0.94 (0.06)	0.94 (0.06)	0.93 (0.06)	0.94 (0.06)
Family Income [Below median]	1.03 (0.06)	1.03 (0.06)	1.03 (0.06)	1.03 (0.06)	1.03 (0.06)	1.03 (0.06)	1.03 (0.06)
Family Income [Prefer not to say]	0.97 (0.07)	0.97 (0.07)	0.97 (0.07)	0.97 (0.07)	0.97 (0.07)	0.97 (0.07)	0.97 (0.07)
Year [2012]	0.94 (0.07)	0.93 (0.07)	0.92 (0.08)	1.05 (0.10)	1.04 (0.10)	1.07 (0.11)	1.02 (0.10)
Year [2014]	1.16 (0.09)+	1.14 (0.09)+	1.14 (0.11)	1.29 (0.13)*	1.28 (0.13)*	1.32 (0.14)**	1.26 (0.13)*
Year [2016]	1.60 (0.12)***	1.57 (0.12)***	1.21 (0.14)+	1.32 (0.17)*	1.30 (0.17)*	1.35 (0.17)*	1.29 (0.16)*
Year [2020]	7.34 (0.56)***	7.23 (0.56)***	5.57 (0.65)***	6.05 (0.77)***	5.99 (0.77)***	6.18 (0.79)***	5.97 (0.76)***
% African American/Black		1.04 (0.01)***	1.05 (0.01)***	1.06 (0.01)***	1.06 (0.01)***	1.06 (0.01)***	1.06 (0.01)***
Miles (100s) from Mexico Border		0.96 (0.03)	0.96 (0.03)	1.05 (0.03)	1.05 (0.03)	1.05 (0.03)	1.05 (0.03)
region [Northeast]		0.17 (0.07)***	0.16 (0.06)***	0.09 (0.04)***	0.09 (0.04)***	0.09 (0.04)***	0.09 (0.04)***
region [South]		0.15 (0.04)***	0.18 (0.05)***	0.16 (0.04)***	0.16 (0.04)***	0.17 (0.04)***	0.17 (0.04)***
region [West]		0.98 (0.29)	0.95 (0.28)	0.75 (0.22)	0.75 (0.22)	0.81 (0.24)	0.79 (0.24)
county_type [Suburban]		0.62 (0.12)*	0.55 (0.11)**	0.54 (0.11)**	0.55 (0.11)**	0.54 (0.11)**	0.55 (0.11)**
county_type [Urban]		1.23 (0.58)	0.55 (0.28)	0.53 (0.26)	0.53 (0.26)	0.50 (0.24)	0.52 (0.25)
Social Capital			1.24 (0.11)*	1.38 (0.13)***	1.43 (0.15)***	15.70 (12.59)***	1.79 (0.25)***
Gini			1.05 (0.03)*	1.05 (0.03)*	1.05 (0.03)*	1.06 (0.03)*	1.06 (0.03)*
Unemployment Rate			0.96 (0.03)	0.95 (0.03)+	0.95 (0.03)+	0.96 (0.03)	0.94 (0.03)*
Povery Rate			0.96 (0.02)*	0.95 (0.02)*	0.95 (0.02)*	0.94 (0.02)**	0.95 (0.02)**
Ppt Change Foreign Born			1.05 (0.04)				
% Foreign Born (lag)			1.05 (0.02)**				
Ppt Change Hispanic				1.17 (0.04)***	1.15 (0.05)***	1.18 (0.04)***	1.15 (0.04)***

Table 6: Full Models 1-6 *(continued)*

	1	2	3	3.2	4	5	6
% Hispanic (lag)				1.06 (0.01)***	1.06 (0.01)***	1.06 (0.01)***	1.06 (0.01)***
Social Capital × Ppt Change Hispanic					0.98 (0.02)		
Social Capital × Gini						0.95 (0.02)**	
Social Capital × Unemployment Rate							0.96 (0.02)*
SD (Intercept GEOID)	37.54	29.90	26.07	26.82	26.64	27.18	27.06
Num.Obs.	34 775	34 775	34 775	34 775	34 775	34 775	34 775
R2 Marg.	0.034	0.098	0.101	0.112	0.112	0.114	0.113
R2 Cond.	0.807	0.800	0.788	0.793	0.792	0.795	0.794
AIC	16 465.6	16 310.8	16 259.4	16 170.4	16 171.2	16 161.4	16 159.6
BIC	16 770.1	16 674.5	16 673.7	16 584.8	16 594.0	16 584.2	16 582.5
ICC	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8
RMSE	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23

Table 7: Full Models 7-12

	7	8	9	10	11	12
(Intercept)	0.01 (0.01)***	0.01 (0.01)***	0.01 (0.01)***	0.07 (0.08)*	0.01 (0.01)***	0.01 (0.01)***
Sex [Female]	0.90 (0.05)*	0.90 (0.05)*	0.90 (0.05)*	0.90 (0.05)*	0.90 (0.05)*	0.90 (0.05)*
Age (Std)	1.00 (0.04)	1.01 (0.04)	1.01 (0.04)	1.01 (0.04)	1.01 (0.04)	1.00 (0.04)
Education [Some College]	0.96 (0.06)	0.97 (0.06)	0.97 (0.06)	0.97 (0.06)	0.96 (0.06)	0.97 (0.06)
Education [2-Year]	0.97 (0.08)	0.97 (0.08)	0.97 (0.08)	0.98 (0.08)	0.97 (0.08)	0.97 (0.08)
Education [4-Year]	0.90 (0.06)	0.91 (0.06)	0.91 (0.06)	0.91 (0.06)	0.91 (0.06)	0.91 (0.06)
Education [Post-Grad]	0.82 (0.07)*	0.81 (0.07)*	0.82 (0.07)*	0.83 (0.07)*	0.81 (0.07)*	0.82 (0.07)*
Religion Importance [Somewhat Important]	0.94 (0.05)	0.94 (0.05)	0.94 (0.05)	0.94 (0.05)	0.94 (0.05)	0.94 (0.05)
Religion Importance [Not Too Important]	0.83 (0.06)*	0.84 (0.06)*	0.84 (0.06)*	0.84 (0.07)*	0.84 (0.06)*	0.84 (0.06)*
Religion Importance [Not at All Important]	0.94 (0.09)	0.94 (0.09)	0.95 (0.09)	0.95 (0.09)	0.94 (0.09)	0.94 (0.09)
Home Ownership [Rent]	1.03 (0.08)	1.03 (0.09)	1.03 (0.08)	1.04 (0.09)	1.03 (0.08)	1.03 (0.08)
Home Ownership [Other]	1.08 (0.16)	1.08 (0.16)	1.08 (0.16)	1.08 (0.16)	1.08 (0.16)	1.08 (0.16)
Parent of young child [Yes]	1.06 (0.07)	1.06 (0.07)	1.06 (0.07)	1.06 (0.07)	1.06 (0.07)	1.06 (0.07)
Military Service [Self/Family]	1.00 (0.05)	1.00 (0.05)	1.00 (0.05)	1.00 (0.05)	1.00 (0.05)	1.00 (0.05)
Employment [Part-Time]	1.07 (0.10)	1.10 (0.09)	1.10 (0.09)	1.10 (0.09)	1.10 (0.09)	1.11 (0.13)
Employment [Unemployed/Laid Off]	1.10 (0.15)	1.22 (0.13)+	1.21 (0.13)+	1.21 (0.13)+	1.22 (0.13)+	1.10 (0.16)
Employment [Retired/Disabled]	1.00 (0.07)	1.00 (0.07)	1.00 (0.07)	1.00 (0.07)	1.00 (0.07)	1.07 (0.09)
Employment [Other]	1.00 (0.10)	1.05 (0.09)	1.05 (0.09)	1.05 (0.09)	1.05 (0.09)	1.04 (0.13)
No Health Insurance [No]	0.84 (0.08)+	0.83 (0.08)+	0.83 (0.08)+	0.83 (0.08)+	0.83 (0.08)+	0.84 (0.08)+
Union Membership [No, Never]	1.00 (0.05)	1.00 (0.05)	1.00 (0.05)	1.00 (0.05)	1.00 (0.05)	1.00 (0.05)
Rating of Economy [Worse/somewhat worse]	0.98 (0.06)	0.98 (0.06)	0.98 (0.06)	0.98 (0.06)	0.98 (0.06)	0.98 (0.06)
Rating of Economy [Not sure]	1.23 (0.29)	1.24 (0.29)	1.23 (0.29)	1.25 (0.29)	1.24 (0.29)	1.23 (0.29)
Rating of Economy [Unchanged]	1.00 (0.07)	1.00 (0.07)	1.00 (0.07)	1.00 (0.07)	1.00 (0.07)	1.00 (0.07)
Rating of Economy [Better/somewhat better]	0.97 (0.09)	0.97 (0.09)	0.97 (0.09)	0.97 (0.09)	0.97 (0.09)	0.96 (0.09)
Rating of Economy [Much better]	1.20 (0.14)	1.20 (0.14)	1.20 (0.14)	1.21 (0.14)+	1.20 (0.14)	1.20 (0.14)
News Interest [Only now and then]	0.91 (0.17)	0.91 (0.17)	0.90 (0.16)	0.91 (0.17)	0.91 (0.17)	0.91 (0.17)
News Interest [Some of the time]	0.88 (0.15)	0.88 (0.15)	0.88 (0.15)	0.89 (0.15)	0.88 (0.15)	0.88 (0.15)
News Interest [Most of the time]	0.97 (0.16)	0.97 (0.16)	0.97 (0.16)	0.97 (0.16)	0.97 (0.16)	0.97 (0.16)
Family Income [Above median]	0.94 (0.06)	0.92 (0.76)	0.88 (0.08)	0.93 (0.06)	0.94 (0.06)	0.94 (0.06)
Family Income [Below median]	1.03 (0.06)	1.73 (1.30)	0.94 (0.08)	1.02 (0.06)	1.03 (0.06)	1.03 (0.06)
Family Income [Prefer not to say]	0.97 (0.07)	1.48 (1.50)	0.99 (0.11)	0.97 (0.07)	0.97 (0.07)	0.97 (0.07)
Year [2012]	1.05 (0.10)	1.05 (0.10)	1.05 (0.10)	1.17 (0.12)	1.03 (0.10)	1.04 (0.10)
Year [2014]	1.29 (0.13)*	1.29 (0.13)*	1.30 (0.13)*	1.44 (0.15)***	1.27 (0.13)*	1.28 (0.13)*
Year [2016]	1.32 (0.17)*	1.31 (0.17)*	1.32 (0.17)*	1.61 (0.20)***	1.25 (0.16)+	1.30 (0.17)*
Year [2020]	6.05 (0.77)***	6.03 (0.77)***	6.07 (0.78)***	7.38 (0.94)***	5.78 (0.76)***	5.99 (0.77)***
% African American/Black	1.06 (0.01)***	1.06 (0.01)***	1.06 (0.01)***	1.05 (0.01)***	1.06 (0.01)***	1.06 (0.01)***
Miles (100s) from Mexico Border	1.05 (0.03)	1.05 (0.03)	1.05 (0.03)	0.96 (0.03)	1.05 (0.03)	1.05 (0.03)
region [Northeast]	0.09 (0.04)***	0.09 (0.04)***	0.09 (0.04)***	0.17 (0.07)***	0.09 (0.04)***	0.09 (0.04)***
region [South]	0.16 (0.04)***	0.16 (0.04)***	0.16 (0.04)***	0.19 (0.05)***	0.16 (0.04)***	0.16 (0.04)***
region [West]	0.75 (0.22)	0.75 (0.22)	0.75 (0.22)	1.21 (0.36)	0.75 (0.22)	0.75 (0.22)
county_type [Suburban]	0.54 (0.11)**	0.54 (0.11)**	0.54 (0.11)**	0.61 (0.13)*	0.54 (0.11)**	0.54 (0.11)**
county_type [Urban]	0.53 (0.25)	0.53 (0.26)	0.53 (0.26)	0.88 (0.42)	0.52 (0.25)	0.53 (0.25)
Social Capital	1.42 (0.14)***	1.38 (0.13)***	1.38 (0.13)***	34.12 (31.37)***	1.40 (0.13)***	1.38 (0.13)***
Gini	1.05 (0.03)*	1.06 (0.03)*	1.05 (0.03)*	1.02 (0.03)	1.06 (0.03)*	1.06 (0.03)*
Unemployment Rate	0.95 (0.03)+	0.95 (0.03)+	0.95 (0.03)+	0.97 (0.03)	0.93 (0.03)*	0.95 (0.03)+
Povery Rate	0.95 (0.02)*	0.95 (0.02)*	0.95 (0.02)*	0.94 (0.02)**	0.95 (0.02)*	0.95 (0.02)*
Ppt Change Hispanic	1.17 (0.04)***	1.17 (0.04)***	1.14 (0.05)**	0.27 (0.10)***	1.06 (0.08)	1.18 (0.04)***
% Hispanic (lag)	1.06 (0.01)***	1.06 (0.01)***	1.06 (0.01)***		1.06 (0.01)***	1.06 (0.01)***
Employment [Part-Time] × Social Capital	0.94 (0.10)					

Table 7: Full Models 7-12 *(continued)*

	7	8	9	10	11	12
Employment [Unemployed/Laid Off] × Social Capital	0.85 (0.12)					
Employment [Retired/Disabled] × Social Capital	1.00 (0.07)					
Employment [Other] × Social Capital	0.91 (0.10)					
Family Income [Above median] × Gini		1.00 (0.02)				
Family Income [Below median] × Gini		0.99 (0.02)				
Family Income [Prefer not to say] × Gini		0.99 (0.02)				
Family Income [Above median] × Ppt Change Hispanic			1.04 (0.04)			
Family Income [Below median] × Ppt Change Hispanic			1.07 (0.04)+			
Family Income [Prefer not to say] × Ppt Change Hispanic			0.99 (0.05)			
Social Capital × Ppt Change Hispanic				0.48 (0.13)**		
Social Capital × Gini				0.93 (0.02)***		
Ppt Change Hispanic × Gini				1.03 (0.01)***		
Social Capital × Ppt Change Hispanic × Gini				1.02 (0.01)**		
Unemployment Rate × Ppt Change Hispanic					1.01 (0.01)	
Employment [Part-Time] × Ppt Change Hispanic						1.00 (0.05)
Employment [Unemployed/Laid Off] × Ppt Change Hispanic						1.05 (0.06)
Employment [Retired/Disabled] × Ppt Change Hispanic						0.96 (0.03)
Employment [Other] × Ppt Change Hispanic						1.00 (0.05)
SD (Intercept GEOID)	26.76	26.81	26.82	28.36	26.81	26.77
Num.Obs.	34 775	34 775	34 775	34 775	34 775	34 775
R2 Marg.	0.112	0.112	0.112	0.100	0.113	0.112
R2 Cond.	0.793	0.793	0.793	0.796	0.793	0.793
AIC	16 175.3	16 175.4	16 172.4	16 231.9	16 168.5	16 174.5
BIC	16 623.5	16 615.2	16 612.1	16 671.7	16 591.4	16 622.7
ICC	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8
RMSE	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23

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