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Media Constructions of Scottish National Identity Though the Prism of the New Scottish Parliament

Douglas Bicket

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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Abstract

Media Constructions of Scottish National Identity Though the Prism of the New Scottish Parliament

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This dissertation examines the media's influence in developments surrounding the implementation of the new Scottish parliament and executive in 1999. Focusing on the central role of the Scottish press, it analyzes the changing conceptions of Scottish identity as articulated through the mediated prism of the new Scottish parliament, as well as that parliament's relationship with the United Kingdom and the European Union. It addresses the question of whether the new political institutions of Scottish government could and did have an immediate and discernible effect on media articulations and constructions in two vital areas: first, Scotland's changing political relationships with other European political institutions – particularly the UK parliament at Westminster and the EU Commission in Brussels; and second, Scottish identity politics as it has developed within the contexts set by these changing constitutional arrangements. The dissertation combines quantitative and qualitative research methods to provide a clearer picture of how Scotland's changing relations with the EU and the UK are being framed and presented in the media – specifically the press – as the Scottish nation and its new polity began to redefine itself within these larger entities. A content analysis and source analysis precede a qualitative frame analysis that focuses on the identification of media packages that comprehensively frame media coverage of the subject matter. The study covers approximately the first six months of 1999, up to and including the official opening of the new legislature on July 1 of that year. It explains what UK-level and European-level issues are being raised, and how and why they are being raised, within the context of a sub-nation-state polity being given a partially independent voice for the first time in the modern era. Identity politics play a significant role in this process. Therefore, this study also examines changing conceptions of regional, national, nation-state, and European identity, all of which could be seen as competing for preeminence in Scotland, and across the EU, at the time.

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Chapter 1. Scotland's shifting relationship with Westminster and Brussels

"There's ane end o ane auld sang."

The Earl of Seafield, at the last meeting of the Scottish Parliament, called to vote itself out of existence, January 1707

Introduction

A truly seismic shift in British constitutional affairs has taken place since 1999, as the Westminster government has legislated large swaths of political power away from the core of that long-centralized unitary state. In perhaps the most important single example of this shift, Scotland's first parliament in 292 years opened for business in July 1999 – creating at a stroke a major center of power lying outside of Westminster's direct control. As a result of major constitutional reform instigated by the ruling Labour administration in London, a devolved Scottish government now exercises control over education, health, local government, housing, justice, and economic development – as well as limited control over taxation. Devolved power has set Scotland on a course into uncharted political, constitutional, and social territory. The consequences of this development in that country are obviously huge, though the nature of these consequences are not yet readily apparent. The consequences for the United Kingdom as a whole, the UK's membership of the European Union, and even the EU itself, could also be significant; once again, though, we are unsure about what these consequences might be.

Although this new parliament and executive is a clear expression of the Scottish electorate's will, having been endorsed by 75 percent of the country's voters, the devolution campaign itself was marked by a complete absence of the sort of ethnic violence and

intimidation so often associated with drives for national autonomy or independence. The *Economist*, a publication not given to expressions of hyperbole, characterizes this extraordinary achievement in these terms:

> This has been perhaps the first revolution (how else do you describe the re-establishment of a nation's government?) that has been conducted by pen-pushing committees of lawyers, clergymen and accountants rather than cells of bearded radicals. And, unless someone cut themselves on a paperclip, it has been achieved without a drop of blood being spilled. ("A Nation Once Again," 1999, p. 53)

Ever present in this is the European angle: although the new Parliament – the first new regional legislature to be created in the EU for some years – is still subordinate to the United Kingdom, it is also being perceived by many elements of the Scottish media in very European terms, at least in certain respects. Both dimensions of the Scottish devolution process – the European as much as the British – are fundamental factors in that country's political gestation, including its mediated development of identity politics, that require more study. And the European dimension should not be underestimated. Its salience is suggested by an analysis of the Lexis-Nexis database which reveals that, between January 1998 and January 1999, 39 articles directly concerning the Scottish Parliament's future role in the European Union appeared in just two Scottish quality newspapers, the *Herald* and the *Scotsman*.[1] (This does not take into account the prominence of this issue in the Scottish tabloid or regional press, or on the Scottish broadcast media, although anecdotal evidence suggests that the issue is being given equally prominent attention there. Nor does the figure include the many articles in the UK press dealing with the same issue.) To take just one example of the sort of rhetoric now appearing regularly in the Scottish press:

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[1] Search conducted by the author on the Lexis-Nexis database, February 1 and 8, 1999.

> Europe has always loomed large in the Scottish consciousness and in the operation of our economy, and in the years when devolution appeared an impossibility, the links - both real and desired - were enhanced in importance. Now that devolution is almost upon us and as we enter the run-up to the election of the Scottish Parliament, it is abundantly clear that European affairs will be a key element in the new Scotland. (Ritchie, 1998, p. 16)

This dissertation examines the nature of these exceptional developments and the influence of the Scottish media in their implementation. Focusing on the central role of the Scottish press, it analyzes the changing conceptions of Scottish identity as articulated through the mediated prism of the new Scottish parliament, as well as that parliament's relationship with the United Kingdom and the European Union. The question at the most fundamental level concerns the extent to which the birth of a new political institution such as the Scottish parliament could and did have an immediate and discernible effect on media articulations not just of these aforementioned political relationships, but also of Scottish identity politics as it has developed within the contexts set by changing constitutional arrangements. The case study covers approximately the first six months of 1999, up to and including the official opening of the new legislature on July 1 of that year. In combining quantitative and qualitative research methods, it provides a clearer picture of how Scotland's changing relations with the EU and the UK are being framed and presented in the media – specifically the press – as the Scottish nation and its new polity begins to redefine itself within these larger entities. The study will explain what UK-level and European-level issues are being raised, and how and why they are being raised, within the context of a sub-nation-state polity being given a partially independent voice for the first time in the modern era. Identity politics play a significant role in this process. Therefore, this study will also examine changing conceptions of regional, national, nation-state, and European identity, all of which can be seen as competing for preeminence in Scotland, and across the EU, at the present time.

In addition to communications and media studies, this work should be of considerable interest to scholars in the related fields of political science, sociology, and international studies, including peace studies and conflict resolution studies. The focus on the media and its role in international/ transnational culture, inter-state politics, and political affairs is one of the central concerns of Political Science, while the study of ethnicity and national identity has long been of interest to Sociologists and is now increasingly relevant to scholars of Cultural Studies and Postcolonial Studies.

Media, identity, and the public sphere

At the broadest level, this dissertation fits within the theoretical orientation of communication and media studies that deals with media effects and media discourses in the political and cultural realms. Research in the social constructionist tradition is particularly relevant, emphasizing as it does the power and persuasive influence of media texts within the realm of a strong and interlocking media-economic-political establishment (Curran, Gurevitch, & Woollacott, 1977; Bagdikian, 1983; Bennett, 1988; Entman, 1989; Schiller, 1989). Various mechanisms of media manipulation have been studied within this tradition, including salience cueing, priming effects, mainstreaming, and ideological cultivation (Neuman, Just, & Crigler, 1992). However, the recent research on frame analysis (including, where appropriate, the associated examination of agenda-setting processes) provides the methodological backbone for the present work (see below).

"Media effects" can be, and has been, conceptualized in many different ways. At its narrowest, the concept can be defined simply in terms of narrow quantitative analysis, with the intent of finding some causal link between an independent and dependent variable. Indeed, this description generally describes the first two of what McQuail (1994) calls the four phases

of media effects. These phases span the 20th century; with the exception of cultural and critical media studies, they constitute the bulk of what is commonly thought of as mass communication research. The first phase, which lasted from the beginning of the 20th century until the late 1930s, took the "hypodermic needle" model of media effects as a core principle. The "the all-powerful media" phase, most closely associated with behaviorism, Lasswell's World War I propaganda studies, and deep-seated fear of media effects, gradually gave way to a second, "minimal effects" phase. This phase, which lasted until about the late 1960s, took its cues from Klapper's (1960) findings that media do not necessarily influence people, but rather function only to reinforce preexisting values, and then only "through a nexus of mediating factors" (p. 8). The third phase, which lasted only through the 1970s and never truly established itself, tried to reintroduce a conceptualization of strong media effects, albeit from the perspective of a psychological, or cognitive model. It quickly gave way to the fourth and most current phase, of social constructionism. This description of media effects combines elements of minimal and strong effects, and is described by McQuail (1994) as follows:

> first, ... media 'construct social formations and history itself by framing images of reality (in fiction as well as news) in a predictable and patterned way; and secondly, that people in audiences construct for themselves their own view of social reality and their place in it, in interaction with the symbolic constructions offered by the media. (p. 331)

Viewed through this prism of social constructionism, media actively select and construct the frames of reference (arguably, set the *agenda* of framing) that are made available for the audience to interpret and construct on their own terms (Scheufele, 1999). Audience members therefore select what Neuman et al. (1992) refer to as a "version of reality built from personal experience, interaction with peers, and interpreted selections from the mass media (p. 120). The application of framing to the present study is taken up in more detail in chapter 3.

Within the broad methodological context outlined above, this study is informed by the general debate on the media's effects as they relate to two broad areas of study: first, the impact on national and cultural identity at various levels within the United Kingdom and European Union, from the local and regional, through the "national" and nation-state, to the supranational level; and second, the relationship with the changing nature of the mediated public sphere as it relates to each of these levels as well as the concepts of economic and cultural globalization. Of course, both these areas are closely interrelated; however, for the purposes of this work it is useful to consider each separately.

Group identity, especially when articulated as ethnic or national identity, is a powerful factor requiring explication. The recent literature on nations and nationalism is extensive. While it is unnecessary to review the entire field here, it is worth noting that the study of ethnicity and nationalism has, of necessity, blossomed in the social sciences since the early 1980s, following a period when it was largely rejected in favor of more universalist studies on such issues as the role of development and modernization in international affairs. Theories of ethnicity center on the idea that every cohesive group – knit together by bonds of race, religion, nationalism, or some mix of all three – has constructed for itself a strong sense of identity, built up partly on its observations and stereotypes of both its own people and of other nations. Nationalism itself is somewhat harder to define (see below), but its centrality in the history of Europe is unarguable, right up to the present.

Nationalism and national identity are abstract concepts, yet their articulation in the political realm – the politics of identity – has had huge repercussions in the course of human events. When researchers in the social sciences and humanities have tried essentializing the terms "nation" and "nationalism" in recent years, they have tended to fall into two general, yet distinct camps: the primordialists and the modernists (Smith, 1991, p. 12). Modernists,

represented by sociologists such as Benedict Anderson, have pronounced the nation an essentially modern creation, with few roots in pre-modern times. Smith himself is probably the leading and most prolific primordialist – a believer in the historical longevity of nationalism and ethnicity. Even though modern nationalism itself (which also incorporate the notion of popular self rule) is only about two centuries old, he argues that ethnic identity has existed for thousands of years, and nationalism can only be understood as its modern articulation. Primordialists tend to see nations as being essential, basic units of social cohesion, a universal attribute of humanity.

It could be argued that the term itself is too multifaceted, meaning too many things to too many people, and our attempts to define it therefore inadequate. In any case, the struggle to delimit and articulate a unitary nationalist *thesis* is perhaps beyond us for the moment. If that is the case, it might be better to recognize that, while there might be a variety of different articulations inherent in the concept, all such articulations retain certain features in common. This leads us to a reconceptualization of nationalism as a discourse rather than a thesis. And, as Tomlinson (1991) points out in relation to cultural imperialism: "To speak of a discourse rather than a thesis is to recognise the multiplicity of voices in this area and the inherently 'unruly' nature of these articulations" (p. 9). Of course, this does not mean the term is anarchic – but its use is fairly strictly regulated and contained by the societies and cultures which apply it, as Foucault (1981) recognized. This is an area that has been investigated in depth not only by European thinker and scholars, but also by post-colonialist scholars from Edward Said (1978) to Partha Chatterjee (1986), who have introduced the concept of resistance to colonial cultural oppression (see chapter 2). For these reasons, it is best to recognize that nationalism *per se* does not exist anywhere in an original platonic form, but exists only as a number of *versions*, each of which, while related to the others, has little if

anything of an identifiable central antecedent. This conceptualization is a large part of the underlying reason why the present study recognizes nationalism and identity in multiple forms, encompassing at a minimum regional, Scottish, British, and European aspects. It also explain why the analysis of data is predominantly exploratory, allowing extensive open-coding and interpretive analysis to identify emergent frames and discourses in media content (see chapter 4).

However the term is conceived, there seems to be no disagreement with the basic premise that nationalism remains an extremely powerful political force in the world today. And it has the potential to be an exceptionally pernicious force. As Philip Schlesinger (1993, p. 9) reminds us,

> the grand narrative of the nation is far from dead today; on the contrary, it is undergoing a heady revival. If the right to belong to the national collectivity is narrowly conceived – whether it be in terms of blood, long-term residence, or a dominant religion – this then raises some profound problems for civic, pluralistic, and flexibly inclusive conceptions of democracy. National exclusivity necessarily creates "minorities" and "outsiders."

Given the recent events in Yugoslavia, Northern Ireland, Spain, the former Soviet republics, and elsewhere in Europe – places where articulations of identity politics have realized many of Schlesinger's fears in the worst possible way – it seems clear that a fuller understanding of these powerful concepts is essential. And, crucially, a better grasp of the *media*'s central role in articulating and altering conceptions of national identity is required. In addition to the groundbreaking work in this area by Schlesinger (1991, 1992), a number of important case studies linking media and national identity have been carried out in many countries with contentious or bifurcating cultural issues, including Ireland (Barbrook, 1992; Boyle, 1992), Canada (Ferguson, 1993), Norway (Syvertsen, 1992); Turkey (Sahin & Aksoy, 1993), and Scotland itself (Meech & Kilborn, 1992). Furthermore, recalling the tragic

consequences of the crucial role of Bosnia's media – especially radio and television – in exacerbating ethnic tensions in that region ("Bosnia's Polluted Airwaves," 1997), the relationship between media and national identity is an aspect that cannot be ignored.

At the EU level, many of the interlocking issues of media, identity, and political and cultural sovereignty have been tackled by focusing on the debates surrounding the EU's *Television Without Frontiers* directive and its impact in the late 1980s and 1990s. A major point of discussion has been over the tension created by, on the one hand, the EU's desire to create a common European identity through the EU's media institutions, and on the other, competing demands from political entities at the nation-state *and* regional/national levels to maintain or expand control over their political and cultural representations in the mass media realm (Burgelman & Pauwels, 1992; Drijvers, 1992; Meech & Kilborn, 1992; Schlesinger, 1997). This is an issue that will only become more salient as these competing interests increasingly come into conflict, with nation-states being pressured to cede control of their media by political entities at the regional and European levels, and commercial transnational entities on the global stage.

Scotland and the United Kingdom

While significant political developments have been taking place at the European Union level over the past two years, particularly with the preparations for monetary union, major constitutional change has also been taking place within the United Kingdom for the first time in more than a century. This dissertation focuses on constitutional change in Scotland, but such change has not been limited to Scotland. Two other new UK political units emerged in 1999: A separate Welsh Assembly, with more limited powers, and a Northern Ireland Assembly (which, due to problems in that region's peace process, has had serious trouble

forming and maintaining a working executive). Of the three, however, Scotland – the largest in terms of population, area, and GDP, with a greater measure of political power and a stronger historical and institutional claim to national self-determination – promises to be the most fascinating from a UK and a European perspective.

As far as Scotland is concerned, the story is one of a perennial European nation rediscovering its political identity and voice within an emerging European context, following centuries of relative dormancy. What's more, this is unfolding after a long period when many elements in Scottish civil society continue to perceive what has become known as the "Englishing" of Scotland – the idea that Scotland, a country with, for the most part, a shared language and close geographical links with England, is finding it increasingly hard to resist cultural assimilation with the English. Not surprisingly, the steady development of improved communications in Britain and the concentration of power by London-based and English-dominated mass media do little to dispel such concerns.

As for the impact of recent events on Scottish national identity and identity politics, the present developments are undoubtedly positive, given their primary articulation in a civic, rather than an ethnic, milieu. In other words, as this dissertation shows, the reinvention of Scottish identity in the political realm is being channeled primarily in terms of inculcating a progressive, social democratic civil society along Nordic/North European lines (see below), rather than attempting to foster a regressive image of an ethnically "pure" Scottish state. Even the Scottish National Party has held closely to this line, frowning on ethnic expressions of anti-English sentiment and expelling any member who engages in it ("A Nation Once Again," 1999, p. 53). This is a healthy development, especially when one considers the potential hazards of the *status quo ante*. Previously, Scotland and the Scottish sense of identity had been in quite an unstable and potentially dangerous condition, relying as it did on "a

distinctive national identity from the past but without a real political dimension to anchor and articulate that identity in the present" (Bicket, 1999, p. 16). Thankfully, Scotland now has, at last, just such a political anchor in its identity politics. Still, to fully appreciate present developments, it is necessary to examine how the Scottish nation and the British state got to where they are today. This requires some historical context.

The modern British state has been, until the very recent past, a fascinating yet anachronistic entity. Tom Nairn (1981) writes about the appropriation of state power in Britain by an English "self-regulating elite group" which, from feudal times, established a firm hold over England and, later, Britain and its empire. This group holds power over the – supposedly – decaying yet still-intact British state to this day, Nairn argues (p. 28). Based originally on loyalty to the British "Crown" and the promotion of the British Empire and an imperial identity, the late 20th century British state has seen its unitary and centralized nature slowly adapting itself to the retreat from Empire by integrating itself uncertainly into the European Union (Coleman, 1999).

Oddly, perhaps, given its early adoption of liberal and democratic principles, the United Kingdom had over the course of almost three centuries developed for itself a near-unique – and inflexible – set of constitutional arrangements with regard to its constituent nations. Within this powerful and heavily centralized unitary state, Scotland and Wales (and, under its own very different social circumstances, Northern Ireland) had to struggle for continued recognition as *de facto* separate entities, especially in the 20th-century era of vastly expanded central government power.

Prior to the recent developments, there had been no significant constitutional change since the appointment of a Secretary of State for Scotland in the 19th century. In fact, 20th century constitutional developments have been remarkably few and far between, in spite of the

constantly expressed desire for some form of constitutional reform for Scotland. This desire expressed itself in a number of forms during the 20th century: in 1949, for example, the Scottish Covenant movement succeeded in gathering a million and a quarter signatures in a massive petition drive calling for a devolved government; thirty years later, a majority of Scots voters opted for a devolved assembly in a referendum, but the Yes vote fell below a hurdle erected by the Westminster government requiring 40 percent *of the total electorate* to vote for devolution; then, in 1989, continued dissatisfaction with London's rule led to the inauguration of the Scottish Constitutional Convention, a grouping of Scottish politicians and other civic and religious leaders, which laid the groundwork for the sort of devolved Scottish government that had been explicitly rejected by the Thatcher government (McCreadie, 1991, p. 50). In the meantime, powerful political, economic, social, and cultural forces emanating from England threatened to undermine further Scotland's independent political and civic culture.

As the preceding section makes clear, "Scotland" never disappeared as a distinctive nation, culture, or civil society. Although this continuing sense of a distinctive national identity was not primarily manifested in the legislative and executive functions of state power, these elements were preserved to a very limited extent within the context of a unified parliament at Westminster. Scotland retained a marginal degree of autonomy in the legislative domain, through the role of the Scottish Grand Committee, an assembly of Scottish MPs that met at regular intervals to debate Scottish legislation at Westminster. Because of Scotland's separate legal system and status under the 1707 Treaty of Union, most Westminster bills dealing with domestic issues were subject to further consideration and minor amendment before taking effect north of the border. (Such functions are now, of course, undertaken by the new Scottish parliament and executive.) Still, this process took place strictly within the walls

of Westminster; for the most part, legislative and executive functions had long been effectively merged within the British state.

Despite only a very limited expression of legislative autonomy, Scottish exceptionalism was preserved elsewhere in the complex interplay of institutions that made up the United Kingdom. It resided partly in the preservation of a number of key national institutions, and partly in the maintenance of a civil society, or public sphere, that was organically distinctive from that of England or "Great Britain." Institutionally, Scotland had always retained its separate legal and constitutional identity, even in the absence of a separate government. As Kellas (1984, p. 2) notes:

> The Act of Union . . . laid down that Scotland would retain for all time certain key institutions such as the Scottish legal system, the Presbyterian Church . . . the Scottish educational system, and the 'Royal Burghs' [local authorities]. These became the transmitters of Scottish national identity from one generation to the next.

It was primarily these institutions and arrangements that preserved a strong and continuing "Scottish consciousness" in the realm of civil society and the public sphere. A powerful contributing element to this ongoing cultural autonomy was the maintenance of separate and distinctive Scottish media, at least in the newspaper industry. This aspect of Scottish exceptionalism will be examined at length in a later chapter.

Overall, then, and in spite of the unitary construction of the British state, Scotland's social and institutional development has contributed to the maintenance of a strong measure of cultural distinctiveness from London. This exceptionalism is reflected in the Scottish people themselves, who generally see themselves as being Scottish first, as well as – and often instead of – British, and who continue to cherish their separate Scottish identity and institutions. Peter Meech and Richard Kilborn, for example, quote an independent survey carried out for Scottish

Television in 1988, in which 39 percent of Scots described themselves as "Scottish, not British," and an additional 30 percent regarded themselves as "more Scottish than British." It is important to note the difference between "English" and "British" in this regard. As the authors note, if there remains an equivocation about their British identity, "[n]o such equivocation exists among Scots as regards Scottish and *English* national identity (a distinction frequently lost on foreigners)" (1992, p. 246).

In politics, most of the Scottish electorate has tended to choose British political parties, and particularly the Labour Party, over the Scottish National Party – currently the only major political entity advocating outright independence for Scotland. This is beginning to change, however, and a swing to the SNP was especially strong in the May 6, 1999, elections for the Scottish Parliament, where almost 30 percent of the national vote went to the SNP (http://www.alba.org.uk/scot99results.html).[2] In any case, the political scene in Scotland has remained significantly different from the rest of the UK in other ways, despite the absence (until now) of a devolved Scottish Parliament. As James Cornford (1991, p. 161) notes, in recent years fewer than one in five Scottish voters consistently expressed support for the Conservative Party. This is quite exceptional, given that the Tories have typically retained the support of around 45 percent of all British voters at general elections from 1979 to 1997 – enough to retain an absolute majority in the House of Commons under the first-past-the-post voting system. In sharp contrast to England, then, the Conservative Party's popular support in Scotland has been marginalized not only by the Labour Party, but also by the rising popularity of the SNP and even the Liberal Democrats (which now competes with the Tories for third place in popular support).

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[2] For more data and information see "The 1999 Scottish General Election: Holyrood Election Results" web site, available at: http://www.alba.org.uk/scot99results.html

One more longstanding element of Scottish institutional distinctiveness should be pointed out: the Scottish Office. Although Scotland only achieved legislative and executive devolution in 1999, it has enjoyed some measure of administrative autonomy for more than a century. This statement must be carefully qualified, however. The British civil service as a whole has remained highly centralized, even if some of its minor functions have been dispersed from London in recent years. It was within the context of this centralized bureaucracy that the Scottish Office was created in the 1880s. Still, the move was significant in that it created a distinctive entity within the civil service that catered solely to Scottish interests. The Scottish Office was headed by a secretary of state, a position which enjoyed full cabinet status from the 1920s (one of the few 20th-centutry developments in the evolution of Scotland's constitutional role in the UK). As constituted, it was structured along the lines of a standard British department. The secretary of state, the ministerial representative of the government, was responsible to parliament for the activities of the department. Based in Edinburgh, he was served by a principal private secretary plus, by the 1980s, more than 10,000 civil servants (Kellas, 1984, p. 63). One significant way in which the Scottish Office differed from its English counterparts was that its responsibility extended to a large array of areas that in England were dealt with by a wide array of separate departments: agriculture and fisheries, home and health, and education, to name a few.

The main weakness of the Scottish Office, in terms of its perceived legitimacy in the eyes of the Scottish populace, was always its tight links with the party in power in Westminster. The entity was in no way independent of the dominant UK government. The secretary of state, as a government cabinet minister and member of the ruling party, had to follow, and publicly support, the policies of his party, no matter how unpopular these policies may have been in Scotland. This became a serious problem when the party in control of Westminster had a

drastically small base of political support in Scotland, as was the case under right-wing Conservative governments from 1979 to 1997. That government in particular promoted, through the Scottish Office, policies that were deeply unpopular in Scotland. One of the main functions of the new Scottish Parliament and Executive is to take control of most of the functions of the Scottish Office, both financially and legislatively, and provide a much greater measure of democratic accountability for government actions to the people of Scotland.

The current constitutional state of play

The current round of constitutional change dates back to the May 1997 election of Britain's first Labour government in 18 years, under Prime Minister Tony Blair. The new governing party at Westminster brought devolution to the head of a (seemingly) radical new constitutional agenda, fulfilling an old Labour manifesto pledge that had been given new life under previous party leader John Smith. Blair quickly initiated legislation to enable referendums for devolution in Scotland and Wales (and, the following year, in Northern Ireland). In Scotland, the September 1997 referendum resulted in an overwhelming majority of Scots voting for the creation of a Parliament with responsibility for most Scottish domestic affairs and with significant tax-varying powers. With the parliament and executive now officially functioning, the question is whether, and to what extent, these institutions – through the conduit of the mass media, which remains the central element in all this – will be able to reflect, and perhaps alter, the country's internal political-cultural articulation of *itself* and in relation to its role within the larger political units of the United Kingdom and the European Union.

Interest in these issues is not confined to the borders of Scotland, however. Shifting economic and social ties, and changing conceptions of regional, national, and European

identity have been major concerns in the move toward Scottish devolution, just as they also resonate across most of the regions of the European Union. Such issues will be at the heart of this study. One of the major questions currently surrounding the development of the European Union is the changing role of the regions at the sub-nation-state level. European regions, long subordinated to the power of nation-states, have become increasingly relevant and important in the EU in recent years, as they push for more prominence and power. As Charlie Jeffrey points out in relation to Germany, for example, the *Länder* (or states) have been very successful at leading the way in promoting subsidiarity and inter-regional cooperation in Europe – thereby creating a new sub-national, or "third-level," EU presence that has been aped by many other regions across the European Union. He argues that, in the process, the federal government in Germany

> has fallen victim to a wider trend in the federal and decentralized states in the EU: the apparent unsustainability of the central state's claim to a monopoly over external relations in a Union whose competencies have, by the 1990s, achieved a pervasive scope. . . . Throughout these federalized and decentralized member states (alongside Germany, Austria, Belgium, Spain, Italy, and France) some kind of conception of 'European domestic policy is emerging. (Jeffrey, 1996, p. 264)

It is precisely this sort of move toward regionalist political ascendancy that Scotland has now joined. Since 1985 the number of EU regions with official representation in Brussels has increased from just six to 160 ("Voices from the Margin," 1999, p. 2). There has been a great deal of talk in the press of the new links that a Scottish Parliament must create for itself, not only with Brussels, but also with other European "third-level" regions (Dinwoodie, 1998, p. 5). This is a particularly important trend to study and understand because of its potential for disruption of the transnational status quo – based on treaty-bound relations among recognized member states – underlying the EU's development since the earliest days of the European

Coal and Steel Community. Regionalism could be a positive trend, enriching the cultural and political development of the European Union, or it could be very negative, as the experiences of the former (and current) Yugoslav republics have so brutally shown.

The ways in which the EU as a whole, and its member states, deal with this issue could well define the future of the confederation. There is a distinct possibility that regional ascendancy will, perhaps in concert with growing ethnic nationalism, ultimately undermine the traditional European nation-state. Indeed, this has already begun to happen to a limited extent – as is explicitly recognized by, for example, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer's comment, in 1999, in the *New York Times* that "the nation-state in Europe is now a thing of the past, no more than a virtual reality" (Cohen, 1999, p. A3). While Fischer's comment might have seemed to many to be ahead of its time, it is broadly in line with German policy toward the EU, as propounded most recently (May 2001) by Chancellor Gerhard Schroder. In any case, his statement retains a great deal of resonance in a Europe which is becoming increasingly integrated as a supranational – if not yet federal – entity. In this context, many in Scotland and England now see the UK polity in terminal decline in the face of a stronger Europe. Scottish devolution is regarded as a "stepping stone" to full independence from Britain and the inevitable breakup of the UK; indeed, one of the major Scottish political parties (the SNP) is formally committed to complete independence *within* the European Union (Macartney, 1997, p. 10). (Precisely what form Scotland's "sovereignty" would take in the EU, if it were to seek separate membership of that body, is beyond the scope of this study; but it is a fascinating question nevertheless.)

Under the circumstances outlined above, the process of Britain's and the EU's accommodation of Scotland's aspirations and the changing circumstances of that nation's

emerging role in Europe could have profound implications for other traditional nation-states struggling with their own resurgent regional entities.

There are other compelling reasons for focusing on the Scottish experience within the EU context. While most regions in Europe – even those with significantly fewer aspirations to self-determination than in Scotland – gained some measure of devolution years ago, the inflexible, reactionary nature of the British state prevented Scotland from following suit until now. However, the tardiness of reform in the United Kingdom now provides an unprecedented opportunity to study the gestation of a brand-new, major political unit within the European Union at a critical point in that Union's development, some 42 years after its birth.[3] And the EU dimension, as indicated earlier, appears to be fundamental to how Scots are redefining themselves, even prior to the election for the new Parliament. Now, even as Scots see themselves as less and less British, they seem increasingly to be open to European ideas and ideals: for example, recent surveys indicate that Scots are more strongly in favor of monetary union, and in European integration, than their neighbors in the rest of the United Kingdom (Ritchie, 1999, p. 1).

In spite of these indications, it is still far too early to pronounce the imminent breakup and demise of the United Kingdom – just as the concept of the post-Westphalia nation-state is itself far from being consigned to the dustbin of history. The *Economist*, for example, focused on tentative moves by some Scottish Nationalists to tone down the anti-British elements of their position, arguing that "the relentless assault on Britishness is hindering rather than helping the cause." Referring to a speech by the SNP's finance spokesman, a rising star in the party, the article characterized his remarks as a plea to emphasize "that it is only the political

[3] The Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957. If, however, the origin of the EU is dated from the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1950, then the organization is almost half a century old.

union that the SNP wants to dissolve. Many aspects of Britishness, such as the Monarchy (provided people want it) or the British market in goods, labour, and services, would remain in place after independence" ("Second Thoughts," 1999, p. 67). It is precisely such mediated expressions of competing identity that this study seeks to analyze.

Finally, a related object of study is the Scottish mass media structure itself. The data gathered here should provide a fascinating, informative, and essential picture of how a new polity's media framework adapts to the sort of rapidly changing political, economic, and social circumstances outlined above. Newspapers will be the primary focus of examination, although the discussion will of course also be informed by the developing role of terrestrial broadcast media as well as cable, satellite, and internet. This aspect brings in notions of the media's relationship with political institutions at four different levels across which both operate – Scottish, British, European, and global. It also inevitably leads to a discussion of the debate on the role of a media-led public sphere in the cultural life of the nation-state, in opposition to the supposedly pernicious forces of media globalization and their perceived assault on the nation-state. The impact of globalizing capitalism and global media articulation on the supposedly sovereign nation-state is a powerful element that will be incorporated into the case study of Scotland in the UK and the EU.

It seems clear, then, that there is much yet to be resolved. It is important to comprehensively study the processes outlined above, to see what broader lessons can be learned and adapted at the European regional, nation-state, and EU levels. For all these reasons, the emerging Scottish political experience will provide a fascinating case study with profound implications far beyond Scotland's borders.

Research design

To study the issues set out in this introduction, the dissertation relies on a two-stage analysis of the news. The first stage is a broad overview of all the news being reported in the *Herald* and the *Scotsman* concerning any political institutions within the member states of the European Union, during four selected periods of time between January and early July 1999 (see below). These institutions range from regional assemblies through national member country parliaments to the organs of EU government located in Brussels and Strasbourg. The analysis includes all straight news and interpretive news concerning any of these aforementioned institutions. From this broad sample, a narrower subset of articles was selected for second-stage analysis. The second-stage analysis focuses specifically on news pieces that dealt with bilateral or multilateral relations between or among Scottish governmental institutions and other political institutions in the rest of the UK and EU. Political news that involved only one national or regional entity (including Scotland) was not selected for second-stage analysis. Nor was news involving bilateral or multilateral relations involving non-Scottish institutions. Thus, for example, a story concerning links between the Scottish parliament and the EU Commission would be selected for second-stage analysis, but a story involving the Westminster parliament and the EU Commission would not.

These methods are rounded out with a historical and intellectual study of the situation, involving a close observation of Scottish government and media operations by the author. Each method's approach supports the other, and the results will dovetail to form a fuller, systematic picture of how the Scottish media are covering these exceptional developments.

The press is the primary focus for study. A major reason for this is the relative power and influence retained by the print media in the Scottish public sphere. While the broadcast media have traditionally been centered in London, allowing Scotland only a marginal "regional"

perspective, the Scottish-produced and -edited press retain a dominant position – so much so that approximately two-thirds of all newspapers bought in Scotland are printed there (Hutchison, 1987, p.241). Furthermore, the Scottish press remains clearly differentiated from its English counterpart in terms of content and political viewpoint. The major "national" titles – including the *Herald* and the *Scotsman* (as well as the tabloid *Daily Record*) – cover Scotland quite extensively, offering quality content, background and analysis of Scottish affairs which are often all but ignored by the English national press. They also cover British, European and international affairs from an alternative perspective, with, for example, a relative absence of the right-wing bias so often found in English titles (Hutchison, 1987). In short, the press in Scotland has retained the position of prime agenda-setter in terms of political affairs. As long as broadcast media output in Scotland remains predominantly in the hands of non-Scottish media, this state of affairs is likely to continue.

With these factors in mind, a number of broad research questions are addressed, outlined below:

Research Question 1. What is the extent to which the print media emphasized the Scottish parliament's political links with the following political institutions in the first half of 1999: the UK Parliament at Westminster; other UK assemblies; the EU's central institutions; other EU sub-national regions; and/or EU member states? How are these links characterized in the print media?

Research Question 2. Which groups of sources and actors dominated in the coverage of the issue of Scottish political links with external relations?

Research Question 3. How did the print media *frame* Scottish political links with these aforementioned political institutions? What kinds of media frames influenced perceptions of

Scottish national and political identity as viewed through the prism of the new Scottish parliament and executive?

Research Question 4. Did the dominant frame originate within the nascent Scottish political system or was it imposed by an external body, such as the British government at Westminster London or EU institutions in Brussels?

Research Question 5. To what extent did media coverage of Scotland's political links with the UK and the EU emphasize an ethnic versus an institutional articulation of Scottish national identity?

These research questions are necessarily broad, given the primarily qualitative nature of the research. Thus they draw on a frame analysis of the *Herald* and the *Scotsman* undertaken for the study. They consider the various dynamics that might be at play under the alternative influences of a) the Westminster versus the Edinburgh institutions, and b) other institutions of the public sphere (including the media). There may well be framing dynamics created by other, non-governmental institutions in the public sphere, such as the church, trade union organizations, farmers' groups, and so on. The media themselves, and the print media in particular, certainly must be considered as a prime agenda-setter and framer of events, especially if there is perceived to be a political vacuum in running Scottish affairs. Such developments could have a profound effect on the changing relationship among the Scottish parliament/executive, Westminster, and Brussels. Given the circumstances of the present study, it is very appropriate to be searching for new media frames as they emerge in Scotland in the first half of 1999. In fact, the circumstances analyzed in this study are precisely the sort of issues for which frames have yet to be established.

Dissertation structure

The task of synthesizing and articulating this diversity of approaches for the present topic requires a reasonably comprehensive review of the literature on international and intercultural studies, and their relevance to the present topic. *Chapter 2* covers this requirement, as well as investigating more comprehensively the current debate on theories of nationalism, national identity, identity politics, and press-state relations. *Chapter 3* examines the various methodological issues at play, building on the bibliographic review in chapter 2. It explains the relevance of certain appropriate methodological approaches for investigating the role of the Scottish press in its relationship with the Scottish parliament, outlines the main formal and content-related characteristics of that medium, and indicates which methods provide the best fit for analyzing these institutions. *Chapter 4* turns to an analysis of media and political structures in the EU, the UK, and Scotland, the extent to which each is influencing and changing the others. It discusses the nature and roles of the Scottish government and the Scottish media – focusing the two main quality newspapers of record in Scotland, the *Herald* and the *Scotsman*. It goes on to deal with the changing nature of the relationship between these institutions and the broader relationships among the political institutions at the UK and EU levels.

Chapter 5 is the first of three findings chapters. It introduces the two-stage analysis, focusing on the interplay of quantitative and qualitative analyses, and goes on to outline the results of the quantitative analysis of sources and actors in the press. This sets up the qualitative analysis of sources and actors that is the subject of *chapter 6*. The focus in this chapter is on the salience and contextual relevance of sources and actors in the news coverage – factors that provide a thick description of their use, and which set the stage for studying the creation and maintenance of media packages, the subject of *chapter 7*. This third and last

findings chapter completes the analysis by identifying a series of media packages used by the press to describe the "issue culture" of the new Scottish parliament's dealings with the UK and the EU. These packages constitute the elements that determined how most news stories concerning this issue were framed during the period of study. This leads to the conclusion in *chapter 8.*

Chapter 2. The Literature of International Communication Research

This study into the relationships among the media, political institutions, and national identity in Scotland plugs into an enormous literature developed over the years by researchers across a broad swathe of the social sciences. This subject is of considerable interest to scholars not only in communication, but also in the related fields of political science, international studies, sociology, and anthropology. The focus on the media and its role in international/transnational culture, inter-state politics, and political and social affairs is increasingly a central concern of political science, while the study of regional and national identity have long been of interest to sociologists and anthropologists, and is now increasingly relevant to scholars in the field of cultural studies. While an exhaustive account of all the relevant literature produced in these fields would be too vast for a work of this size, it is useful to review the more pertinent work in this area.

It can be said without too much fear of controversy that the field of international communication is often as confusing as it is broad. As such, it can be likened to a cake that can be cut any number of ways. By definition or extension, the field covers research that involves any type or mix of comparative, intercultural, cross-cultural, or cross-national factors, and can be extended to single-country case studies, including intercultural research within one polity. For the purposes of this dissertation the term "international communication" will be used in a broad sense to refer to all of these factors. Nevertheless, the complexity of the subject requires consideration of some type of overview and clarification at the outset.

Defining the field

One problem with trying to characterize a single, all-encompassing view of international communications is highlighted by Robert L. Stevenson's (1992) article, "Defining International

Communication as a Field." Although it is a useful, empirically based overview of part of the field, it suffers from the author's strong anti-critical studies bent. (It is perhaps ironic that he decries what he calls cultural studies' tendency to "polemicize," yet he engages in a withering polemic of his own against that method.) Stevenson, espousing the traditional, functionalist viewpoint, is simply not willing to accept any method that rejects universalizing theory and the need for an objective viewpoint. Slightly less biased is Thomas R. Lindlof (1987), who nevertheless takes almost an apologetic tone in promoting the "soft" scientific method of qualitative inquiry. This is still in many ways a more traditional American functionalist view of qualitative research methods. Still, its brief coverage of cultural/critical studies and its more substantial coverage of ethnographic methods make it a more useful bridge between these different methods of qualitative research.

One approach that is useful to consider in the context of the present study focuses on the means by which research is conducted. Thus research can be distinguished according to whether it is subjectively or objectively based. A number of research teams, including Johnson & Tuttle (1989), and Gudykunst & Nishida (1989) have written overviews of the field that point out this important distinction. Johnson & Tuttle (1989), for example, make the essential distinction as follows: objective research is positivist, relies on observation and inductive reasoning, usually conducted along social scientific lines, nomothetic (universalizing), and generally etic, recognizing a universal truth against which the factors under consideration are measured; subjective research, on the other hand, tends to be antipositivist, ideographic (i.e., relying on firsthand knowledge), deductive, generally emic, and is, to some extent, relativistic. Brent D. Slife and Richard N. Williams (1995) put the distinction another way: objective research is about the *discovery* of knowledge, whereas subjective research is about the *production* of knowledge. This dichotomy is one of the most fundamental in international research – as it is across most of

the humanities and social sciences – since it involves a fundamental epistemological disconnect that often seems hard to reconcile. In describing the "embedded ideas" underlying some of the most commonly accepted behavioral theories, Slife and Williams question the very factuality of science and the scientific method in the sciences. Data mean nothing without interpretation, and it's the interpretation that must always be focused on.

In terms of the present study, perhaps the most useful model which provides a comprehensive framework of the field is Burrell & Morgan's (1988) typology of international communications research. Martin and Nakayama (1999), reexamining the current state of intercultural communication research, resurrected the typology by elaborating on four distinct paradigms of culture and communication identified by Burrell & Morgan: functionalist, interpretive, critical humanist, and critical structuralist. From these paradigms they propose a dialectic approach that facilitates research across these paradigms. These four paradigms are defined as follows: the *functional* paradigm is the home of more traditional, quantitative, social science-based research, conforming broadly to the traits described in the "objective" classification described above (see, e.g., Hui and Triandis, 1985; Gudykunst and Nishida, 1989); the *interpretive* paradigm relies on qualitative rather than quantitative research, and involves interpretation of observed information by a researcher, usually in an intercultural setting (see, e.g., Geertz, 1973; Stewart, 1972; Stewart & Bennett, 1992); the *critical structuralist* paradigm (the one most closely aligned to this dissertation) recognizes the existence of a universal framework (often Marxist-inspired, based especially on Gramscian and Althusserian theory) for research, within which comparative critical studies are made. Finally, the *critical humanist* paradigm is consciously relativistic, post-structuralist, and relies heavily on "theory building" rather than observation. It should be noted that the functionalist paradigm is most often associated with sociological or psychological factors; the interpretive paradigm is generally tied with anthropology and psychology; critical

structuralism relies heavily on more subjective analysis of media texts and is associated most closely with critical and cultural studies (including the Critical Legal Studies approach to legal research); critical humanism is also text-oriented and is associated with post-structuralism and post-colonial studies. These categories are of course not mutually exclusive; there is often a fair amount of interplay between and among them, depending on the nature of the research study. However, the two most appropriate paradigms for the present study are the critical humanist and the critical structuralist.

The Burrell and Morgan model sets the stage for most of the major debates in the field – including the most fundamental debate that encompasses the whole discipline: the nature of knowledge itself. Slife and Williams (1995) call attention to the interpretive and subjective factors that play a major role in the supposedly nomothetic (i.e., universalizing) social scientific method. They argue that in fact science, and especially social science, is all about selection and selective interpretation. Social scientists must, therefore, question the very assumptions they make when they embark on a project in which variables are supposedly being measured "objectively." Many other researchers, from Thomas R. Lindlof (1987) to Stan Deetz (1992), have recognized the inherent problems with the scientific method as it is now commonly practised. While Deetz points out the inadequacy of quantitative methods due to their reliance on views of the world that ignore emergent and reflexive human phenomena. Lindlof notes that quantitative inquiry has for too long "focused on what messages refer to, or the effects they have, without examining what messages are or *how* their articulation creates social realities for speakers and audiences" [emphasis added] (1987, p. 22).

One important articulation of this desire to find some balance between the particular and the universal is made by Clifford Geertz (1973). Geertz prefers to study individual cultures without generalizing and making universal claims about culture from his "thick descriptions." He has

stated famously that culture is not about science in search of law but about interpretation in search of meaning. However, he recognizes that the formation of "culture" is, in the broadest sense, a common element that unites all humanity; he refers to it in semiotic terms as the creation in each group of a specific myth-symbol complex, within which each of us lives our lives and learns to understand the world around us. This is where he brings in the metaphor of the "octopus" to describe the way that cultures are all intimately linked, but only by a distant, unintelligent, and non-controlling "brain" at the center. It is important to note that many researchers in the critical humanist tradition still regard Geertz as a type of functionalist because his work is regarded as an implict attempt to impose a Western-universalist viewpoint on the lives of the subject group under observation. Nevertheless, Geertz's approach is an important factor underpinning the assumptions made in the present study, considering the role of myth-symbol complexes in various communities – whether defined nationally of by some other factor.

The case study

An important facet of the debate over the usefulness of the particular versus the whole, and one that impinges directly on this work, is the appropriateness of the case study method. Qualitative case studies, whether single or comparative, have in fact become increasingly popular over the years, as part of the more general turn by researchers toward less functional research methods. Casley and Lury (1987) describe the case study as involving "the detailed examination of a relatively few persons or items" whose main methodological feature and greatest strength is its ability to provide researchers with "in-depth, detailed analysis" of a given topic (p. 64). They go on:

> The method is indicated when it is necessary to probe deeply into the systems governing behavior and the interrelationships between people and institutions. . . . Case studies are particularly appropriate when a high analytical content is required, such as the study of causal relationships. (1987, p. 64)

Generally speaking, institutions and organizations are more tangible, and therefore more able to be comprehended across nations, than are individuals or cultures on their own. Case studies can involve the use of a variety of methods. Casley and Lury include personal and participant observation, straight interviews, and the use of informants for historical or current data among their examples (1987, p. 65). They point to a number of general advantages of case studies over other methods: they help to illuminate contrasts between and among different cultures; they are particularly useful for comparing particular institutions; they provide the sort of in-depth analysis of cultures that is often overlooked in more superficial empirical studies; they have the potential to overcome, or at least attenuate, academic parochialism by expanding our knowledge of alternative systems, methods, and cultures; and perhaps, most importantly, they challenge the "naïve universalism" that so often accompanies empirical studies that are based on the researchers' own particular cultural assumptions. By extension of the above, the case study is also an excellent method for undertaking comparative studies. This holds whether the comparison is explicitly between two or more institutions, or implicit in the study's focus on one institution within the context of a research tradition involving previous studies of comparable institutions. The present study fits well within this orientation, being a single-case study of the Scottish Parliament's developing relations with two broader polities: the Uniited Kingdom and the European Union. It is grounded in an emerging body of research involving European regionalism and regional-national identity, and case studies of prominent sub-nation state units in Europe (e.g., Catalonia, Wallonia, German *Länder*) and North America (Quebec). While this study is not explicitly comparative, it does recognize an implicit comparison between the Scottish institutions of government – in particular, the parliament and executive – and the corresponding institutions, at the UK and EU levels, with which they are being compared.

If there is one word that can sum up the case study, it is flexibility. As Casley & Lury point out, case studies are often used in pilot surveys as part of the broader framework of a general survey. In addition, "a case study can explore a field or situation, refining or ruling out preliminary hypotheses and suggesting new ones" (Casley & Lury, 1987, p. 66). Of course, this flexibility comes at a price. It is widely accepted that the central limitation of the method is the restricted ability for researchers to generalize their findings from the units of analysis to a wider community or system (1987, p. 67). Of course, this limitation is closely linked to the nature of the method: its lack of randomness and (apparent) lack of representativeness. This problem should be less severe in cross-national research, where studies of more than one national unit will be undertaken and a closer examination of broader, universalizing variables will be necessitated, but it should be recognized and acknowledged nevertheless.

In looking at possible cases for comparative work, Gurevitch & Blumler consider the case study approach to be one solution to the problem of finding a sufficient number of units (in this case, countries, media systems, or broadcast organizations) to analyze since, to put it in functional terms, there are often too few units of this size and complexity available for a representative, random quantitative analysis. However, case studies rely to a great degree on the ability and experience of the researcher or researchers conducting the study. This need not be a hindrance, but it does mean that, in practical terms, it is more important than ever for comparative studies of this type to be conducted by competent researchers representing each culture or country under review (Gurevitch & Blumler, 1989, p. 318).

Another method often closely related to the case study, and used as the main method in this work, is the frame analysis. In recent years, frame analysis has increasingly been applied to communications research in order to provide a useful – and much-needed – compromise between hermeneutic or subjective studies of particular cultures and more empirical studies that

traditionally attempt to isolate and measure quantitative factors (usually referred to as independent and dependent variables) and from these make universal statements about some condition or conditions in the broader universe. Frame analyses therefore try to measure certain qualitative factors (such as symbolic images or discourse types) with a degree of accuracy absent from work in the pure hermeneutic or humanist traditions. The use and conceptualization of the frame analysis for the present study is dealt with in more detail in chapter 4.

Nationalism and national identity

In considering the issue of nationalism, two essential questions have to be addressed: how to distinguish the "nation" from the state, and whether nationalism is a recent phenomenon or one that goes back much further in time? The first question leads immediately to a level of obfuscation that clouds a clear distinction between the two terms. Some attempts have been made to clarify the definition of the state – for example, Max Weber's definition of the state as "a human community that [successfully] claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (1948, p. 78). More recently, Philip Schlesinger (1991) has attempted to carve out a communications-related defintion of the state based on Norbert Elias's (1982) reference to the "pacified social spaces" that the state confers upon a given territory. Based on this perspective he extrapolates that "in the modern world such social spaces are also communicative spaces." Within this context we can focus on "the permitted range of communicative practices within the territory of a state, and the extent to which official linguistic and cultural norms may be exclusively imposed and resisted" (1991, p. 299). As this passage suggests, however, much of the debate revolves around the idea of the legitimacy of the state, and questions of power, hegemony, and competing cultures inevitably intrude. As a result of this and other factors, the two terms become conflated in many scholarly works (a trap that the present

work studiously attempts to avoid). The remainder of this debate is therefore best outlined within the framework sketched out below.

The question of nationalism's historical pedigree has elicited a good deal of academic debate in recent years, with scholars falling into a small number of fairly well-defined camps. First off, there are the "classic" histories of the subject, such as Eric Hobsbawm's *Nations and nationalism since 1780* (1990) and Hans Kohn's *The idea of nationalism* (1967). Hobsbawm mixes elements of structuralism and Marxism, looking at nationalism as a by-product of capitalism at a particular (modern) stage of its development. For Marxists such as Hobsbawm, the power of nationalism is something they have had great trouble reconciling with their core beliefs of the primacy of class conflict in and economic exploitation in society. Hobsbawm therefore seeks to explain away nationalism as a deliberate ploy by the capitalist class to sow "false consciousness" in order to divert the proletariat from the class struggle.

More recently, Liah Greenfield's *Nationalism* (1992) has provided a dense intellectual history of the development and migration of the idea, from England to a selection of other countries. Greenfield regards the basic framework of modern politics – the world divided into sovereign nations – as simply the realization of the nationalist project, expressed in different ways in different nations, but all springing from similar sociological circumstances. Greenfield deliberately conflates liberal democracy and modern nationalism, both of which spring spring from 16th-century England. However, by casting all nationalist discourse into sociological categories such as resentment and status envy, she largely overlooks the role of economics, diplomacy (and also ethnic/cultural identity) in fostering nationalism.

Beyond historical accounts, researchers in sociology and cultural studies, in defining the terms "nation" and "nationalism" in recent years, have tended to fall into two general, yet distinct camps: the primordialists and the modernists. Modernists, represented by sociologists such as

Benedict Anderson (1991), have pronounced the nation an essentially modern creation, with few roots in pre-modern times. Primordialists, on the other hand, tend to see nations as being essential, basic units of social cohesion – in other words, a universal attribute of humanity.

More firmly set in the primordialist camp is Walker Connor (1994), who challenges the modernist/structuralist tendency to see ethnicity only as a by-product of modernization. Instead, he argues, myths of kinship and common origin are crucial to the genesis of nationalism. In fact, Connor's work also suggests a strong aesthetic bent, revolving around the concepts of land, youth, blood, and sacrifice.

Primordialists also argue that every so-called "nation" has constructed for itself a sense of national identity, built up partly on its observations and stereotypes of both its own people and of other nations. Though subject to alteration and development, it is these stereotypes that form the web of collective myths and memories that are the stuff of national identity, built up over centuries and as old as human society itself. Modernists might agree with much of that, but place the concept and process of "nationhood" in the specific context of modern society (particularly in Europe). Human beings might have sustained distinctive ethnic and cultural patterns in earlier eras, but that was not nationalism as we understand it today.

Another way to deal with the concept of nationalism is to chart a course between the primordialists and the modernists. This so-called perennialist position, taken by Smith and others, still emphasizes "the antiquity of collective cultural ties and sentiments," but "falls well short of any presumption that such ties are universal" (Smith 1996, p. 12). Ethnic identity has existed for thousands of years, and nationalism can best be understood as its modern articulation.

Bibliographic essayists and reviewers have been known to further divide modernists into sub-groups of structuralists and deconstructionists, reflecting the wider split in cultural studies between structuralism and poststructuralism. (Another sub-group sometimes identified by

commentators are the "instrumentalists," who posit that nationalism is often used by elites as a tool – or instrument– to pursue narrow economic or political goals: John Breuilly's (1982) *Nationalism and the states,* for example, holds that elites used nationalism as a tool to build coalitions to undermine the multinational empires of central Europe.) Structuralists, while approaching the problem from various angles, all tend to see nationalism as an epiphenomenon of deeper social mechanisms – such as modern communications (Karl Wolfgang Deutsch's *Nationalism and social communication*), modern industry (Gellner's *Nations and nationalism*), and capitalism at a particular stage of its development (Hobsbawm's *Nations and nationalism Since 1780*).

Gellner's (1983) work, *Nations and nationalism*, is one of the standard sociological introductions to the field. It argues that the need for modern industrial economies to build and maintain a mobile and interchangeable workforce requires complex new skills and social formations beyond the resources of family and kinship ties. Such skills "can only be provided by a public education system that requires vast resources and standardization" integrated by (preferably) a single language and within a centralized political, economic, and educational system.

One of the most influential texts in studies of nationalism in recent years is Benedict Anderson's *Imagined communities* (1991). In many ways, Anderson's work can be seen as a useful bridge between traditional Marxists and structuralists such as Gellner and Eric Hobsbawm, as well as post-colonial deconstructionists such as Homi Bhabha (1990) and Partha Chaterjee (1993). His central thesis is also very relevant to communication and media studies. To Anderson, who has alternatively been described as a modernist and a deconstructionist, ethnicity and nationalism are essentially artificial constructs, i.e., erratic, ephemeral imagined communities that float out of new forms of media that append the spread of economic modernization. The

example of print capitalism and its role in engendering a modern sense of nationalism is the clearest iteration of this process provided by Anderson (see below). Anderson places the birth of the modern nation-state in the Americas, not Europe, and charts three stages of nationalism that affected, in turn, the Americas, Europe, and the newly emerging nations of the old European empires.

Anderson's description of a nation as an "imagined political community" has been widely quoted. It is imagined, he posits, "because the members of even the smallest nations will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives an image of their community." It is a community, he goes on, because it is "conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship" (Anderson 1991, p. 6). This is a useful definition in relation to current articulations of European nationalism, both at the nation-state level (e.g., the United Kingdom, Spain) and the "stateless nation" level (e.g., Scotland, Catalonia). However, its modernist presumptions make it a little problematic, since it fails to allow for any significant articulation of the nation in the pre-modern era.

For the most part, in fact, Anderson *ignores* history (and historical materialism), at least prior to the American and French Revolutions. It is only at that period, the late 18th century, that he places the birth of national consciousness – quite late by most theorists' standards. He does go as far as to say that the creation of nationalism was caused by "the spontaneous distillation of a complex 'crossing' of discrete historical forces;" but once these forces were set in place (how they do this he doesn't say) they became "modular, capable of being transplanted ... to a great variety of social terrains, to merge and be merged with a correspondingly wide variety of political and ideological constellation" (1991, p. 4). It is this attempt to "modularize" the concept within a synchronic, structuralist/deconstructionist paradigm that sets off Anderson's work. He sees this as a by-product of the propagandist use of printing and the general development of print capitalism.

In the context of the present study, which focuses closely on the political and cultural influence of the press in Scotland, it is useful to consider Anderson's conception of the role of print and its modern articulation in an overwhelmingly commercial milieu. He explains the force of print capitalism, and its expression in books and daily newspapers, as allowing the maintenance of a mass community linked by the common synchronous imaginings of the nation. This is what, borrowing from Walter Benjamin, he calls "homogeneous, empty time," marked "by prefiguring and fulfillment, but by temporal coincidence, and measured by clock and calendar" (p. 24). Books and newspapers as cultural products are the essential linking products in this process – Anderson envisages the process of media consumption by the masses as a habit or even as a religious ritual (pp. 33-36).

In (sequential) addition to print capitalism in the rise of nationalism, Anderson notes the role of provincial elites in the Americas and the bureaucratic "weld" of nations onto empires in Britain and Russia. One more fundamental concomitant of nationalism is national education (he quite clearly agrees with Hobsbawm on this point). For Anderson, nationalism is not so much an ideology as it is an anthropological phenomenon. In this, and in his semiotic analysis of nation and culture, his ideas bear some relation to those of Clifford Geertz.

Beyond the sociological/critical structuralist typologies of nationalism promoted by Gellner and Anderson, it behooves us to briefly consider an approach that fits more clearly within the critical humanist paradigm as outlined by Burrell and Morgan. John A. Armstrong (1982) promotes just such an approach to theory in explicating his perennial view of nationalism – as "part of a cycle of ethnic consciousness" that in the modern era has become a predominant force for constituting political structures. Not unlike Benedict Anderson, he emphasizes the boundary approach to constructing and identifying nationalism – an approach that "clearly implies that ethnicity is a bundle of shifting interactions," based on cultural identification through exclusion of

Others, rather than a nuclear component of some social organization. This notion abandons the principle of territorial exclusivity, and instead recognizes that ethnicity is "part of a continuum of social collectivities" that include shifting class and religious identification. Three core concepts for Armstrong are Symbol, Myth, and Communication. He draws on myth-symbol theory (and the creation of an ethnic *Mythomateur*) to note that, in nationalist ideology, the mythic past lies "outside history", and the decisive aspects of the common fate are symbolic rather than material or historic. Armstrong's work also provides support for approaches that emphasize cultural-symbolic differences among groups, such as Samuel Huntingdon's (1996) thesis about the role of differential civilizations in the world today.

Perhaps the simplest (or most oversimplistic) working appraisal of this concept comes from Hobsbawm, who, for the purposes of his work, "assumes no a priori definition of what constitutes a nation. As an initial working assumption any sufficiently large body of people whose members regard themselves as members of a 'nation', will be treated as such" (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 6). Marxists such as Hobsbawm have had great trouble reconciling the power of nationalism with their core beliefs of the primacy of class conflict in and economic exploitation in society. Tom Nairn (1981) is one person who attempts to answer that question from a Scottish/British perspective. Nairn candidly states that the success of nationalism represents Marxism's greatest failure. His work can be seen as an attempt to reconcile these two powerful -isms. He posits that having imperial possessions keeps states from having to build true national identities, or to pursue thoroughgoing centralization, since the boundary between imperial "core" and "periphery" is blurred by the inclusion of colonies as a factor in the maintenance of a (somewhat looser) imperial identity. Thus, so long as these empires remain viable, and so long as these empires do not impose financial and political penalties on the peripheral nations of the core state, such peripheral nations "tend to accept subordination to the core. But when empires begin to unravel,

the peripheries rebel against the new financial, political, juridical, and military demands of the core" (1981).

Finally, an approach toward national identity grounded in psychology has gained academic currency in recent years. This approach, which is also relevant to the present study, is known broadly as social identity theory. The focus in this theory is on the centrality of *social* identity as a factor in individuals' sense of self-identity. In this context, social identity is essentially a categorization framework made up of sets of comparisons and contrasts used to emphasize distinctions among groups. It suggests an active process whereby collectives proactively form "in-groups" by setting themselves apart from others; in so doing, the group cements relationships among members of the in-group while providing individuals with a sense of belonging within the collective (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Hogg & Abrams, 1988). A crucial aspect of this theory is the fluctuating nature of identity. While people tend to identify with many social groups, based on various factors such as race, ethnicity, class, gender, national origin, and so on, these factors become salient at different times and in different ways. According to social identity theory, if and when a particular group identity becomes salient at a particular time – for whatever reason – the sentiments, emotions, and behaviors of any given member of the salient group will tend to be affected and guided by the norms and aspirations of the group as a whole.

Social identity theory obviously has important applications to the area of national identity, given nationalism's role as a primary articulator of group identity whose salience can be particularly powerful. Rivenburgh (1997), for example, suggests that national news coverage of international issues tends, depending on the circumstances, to either protect or enhance national (group) identity whenever that identity becomes salient in relation to a topic in the news. This is simpler to analyze when national identity is fixed, as it has been in most studies of national identity and its role in international relations.

Globalization, the public sphere, and mediated Identity Politics in EU

The deep impact of globalization is another theme that informs most of the works referred to here. Not all commentators agree on the extent and nature of that impact (Ferguson, 1992); but most would probably agree, in general terms, with Herman and McChesney's (1997) assessment that the impact on local and national cultures and societies of the seemingly unstoppable force of globalization has been at best mixed and at worst pernicious. The central effects of this trend have included "larger cross-border flows of media outputs, the growth of media TNCs [transnational corporations] and the tendency toward centralization of media control, and the spread and intensification of commercialization" (Herman & McChesney, 1997, p.8). These effects are not altogether negative – Herman and McChesney note among globalization's more positive aspects the rapid dissemination of popular culture and humanitarian values, and pressure on "stodgy" and unrepresentative state broadcasting systems to improve their service; however, in their opinion, these benefits are more than offset by the pernicious aspects of media globalization and commercialism. According to this (admittedly Eurocentric) scenario, such forces are shown to be at their worst when contrasted with the ideal of public-service broadcasting and the maintenance of the Habermasian "public sphere." The former is thus viewed as a direct threat to the latter; the "internal logic" of the commercial model is such that it "tends to erode the public sphere and to create a 'culture of entertainment' that is incompatible with a democratic order. Media outputs are commodified and are designed to serve market ends, not citizenship needs" (Herman & McChesney, 1997, p.9). However these effects are viewed, there is nevertheless little doubt that the relationship between the state, or government, and the media is undergoing a radical transformation worldwide. Increasingly, formal control of the media by the government is being replaced by more informal regulation by other forces. In nearly all cases, these forces are the forces of capitalism, as market forces substitute – and are allowed to substitute – traditional

regulatory pressures (Grossberg, Wartella, & Whitney, 1998).

While the external effects of globalization and commercialism has been one source of pressure on the European nation-state, the internal demands of regional and sub-national entities within the nation-state's borders has been another. In this context, the media – and in particular its role in articulating and altering the politics of national identity – have been examined closely at the regional, national, nation-state and European levels. Philip Schlesinger has been a leading force in examining this area. In "Media, the Political Order and National Identity", for example, he points to the existence of substantial separatist movements as a rationale for separating the Scottish, Catalan, Basque, and similar cases from other non-national collectivities and regions (Schlesinger, 1991, p. 298). He lists some characteristics of these "nations without states" which sustain the existence of a national cultural identity by such elements as

> continuity of territorial settlement entailing a deeply meaningful sense of place, a distinctive language, an identifiable pantheon of heroes, battles and traditions constructed as a 'national history' or collective memory, and specific political, economic, and cultural traditions. (p. 300)

Both nations and "stateless nations" constitute viable and real "communicative spaces," according to Schlesinger. He also notes, however, that "there are global and other supranational *communicative* spaces which impact variously upon those of given states," and which are in turn impacted by various national and transnational entities, including global media corporations (p. 299) [Emphasis in original]. Schlesinger therefore concludes that the media and similar cultural spheres are "to be conceived of as *battle*fields, as spaces in which contests for various forms of dominance take place. They are by their very nature part of the public domain and therefore objects of public policy-making and legal action" (p. 299) [Emphasis in original].

What goes for stateless nations also goes for small nation-states, so it seems. A number of other scholars have focused on the ability – or inability – of the small sovereign nation-state to

protect its culture, whether it be from the general forces of globalization or the more localized forces of cultural hegemony emanating from a large neighboring country or regional grouping. Syvertsen (1992), for example, while drawing attention to Norway's traditionally strong support for public service broadcasting that stresses "equality rather than diversity, information rather than entertainment, and protection against anything that could be harmful" (p. 231), also notes that this model has increasingly come under the dual pressures of competition and globalization (p. 234). Barbrook (1992), referring to Ireland, notes that an orientation to cultural protectionism in the early years of the Republic has been gradually broken down, under the banner of respecting the rights of the people over the rights of the Irish state (p. 225). Luger's (1992) focus on Austria also draws attention to the pressures on national culture of a small European nation-state sharing a common language with a much larger neighbor.

In terms of the threat of cultural homogenization, small nation-states are, thanks to globalization, increasingly finding themselves in a similar situation to stateless nations that wish to preserve their own separate cultures – apparently too small to adequately protect their domestic cultural realm from external forces that are perceived as threats. The Netherlands has been cited a number of times as an example of small European nation-state that is no more capable, in the present economic climate, of protecting "its" culture than is an established sub-national entity such as Catalonia or the Basque country (De Swaan, 1989; Schlesinger, 1991). (In the context of North America, the Canadian situation vis-à-vis its U.S. neighbor also comes to mind.) At the same time, the role of sub-national entities is increasingly coming into focus in the European debate over the future of the EU's "audiovisual space". This is because, in the context of current EU policy, culture still is primarily defined along nation-state terms, with "French" culture articulated alongside "British" culture, "Spanish" culture, and so on. Not surprisingly, this policy emphasis comes in for sharp and widespread criticism. Schlesinger (1997) notes the inability of

this policy to adequately incorporate the needs and desires of stateless nations, such as Catalonia and Scotland, that "may also properly be said to have national cultures and to have institutionalized these in ways akin to states, adding both political complexity and another sense to the term 'national'" (p. 372).

Scotland has had some success in preserving a separate national media identity, although not in the same way as, say, Catalonia. Meech and Kilborn (1992) note the prime role of the Scottish press in articulating a strong and continuing sense of Scottish identity (pp. 257-258). Although they place part of the reasoning for this in the English press's neglect of Scottish affairs, Meech and Kilborn note that the entrenched position of Scottish newspapers also owes much to "the local loyalties and national consciousness of their readers" (p. 255). This is in contrast to many other small stateless nations – including Catalonia – where that role has fallen primarily to broadcasting. While the Scottish press remains healthy, however, official support for an autonomous Scottish broadcast policy has been much less pronounced – an aspect that will be raised in greater detail in chapter 4.

Finally, it is necessary to consider the debate over the public sphere in Europe, as well as the relationship between this concept, the media, and globalization. This is an issue that will only become more salient as these competing interests increasingly come into conflict, with nation-states being pressured to cede control of their media by political entities at the regional and European levels, and commercial transnational entities on the global stage. Although the nation-state is far from dead, the argument that statehood equals increased cultural protection is problematic, as Schlesinger (1991) makes clear.

The concept of the public sphere itself has traditionally been used to describe the social and civil society institutions where information is exchanged – providing the bedrock for democratic debate and resolution of societal issues. These institutions traditionally have included the church,

the educational system, and public forums. In the modern era, however, the media as an institution has increasingly come to be seen as *the* prime vehicle of the public sphere. In relation to Europe, the debate over the preservation of this "public sphere" has for some years been a constant in media and communication studies. Much recent research, taking its cue from the work of Jürgen Habermas (1974, 1989), has focused on the perceived clash between principles of the national, democratic public sphere – enshrined, first and foremost, in the institution of public service broadcasting – and the supposedly insidious, antidemocratic influences of transnational commercial media corporations and their role in undermining the democratic process . Meanwhile, at the EU level, the issues of European cultural policy – with regard to media, identity, and political and cultural sovereignty – have focused primarily on the debates surrounding the EU's Television Without Frontiers directive and its impact in the late 1980s and 1990s. To date, much of the commentary on the EU's role has been less than complimentary (Burgelman & Pauwels, 1992; Drijvers, 1992; Shore, 1993; Wallace & Smith, 1995; Schlesinger, 1997). For the present study, consideration of EU media policy is not a central component of the analysis. Instead, it is the UK context that takes center stage, for reasons that will be made clear in chapter 4.

Chapter 3. Methodological framework

This chapter's role is to round out the broad bibliographic review in chapter 2 by focusing on a narrower methodological spectrum that provides the bedrock of the present study. It explains the relevance of certain appropriate methodological approaches for investigating the role of the Scottish press in its relationship with the Scottish parliament, outlines the main formal and content-related characteristics of that medium, and indicates which methods provide the best fit for analyzing these institutions. A supporting goal is to suggest the means by which a study might instrumentalize the perceived shift in identity among Scots in relation to Britain and Europe – from identifying, in large part, with the British polity against the Europeans, to identifying primarily with Scotland and "othering" England as well as the rest of Europe.

A central question underlying all this is whether Scottish national identity is becoming more salient in relation to British political affairs, and whether Scottish group identity is beginning to eclipse British group identity, even in relation to the European continent – traditionally a common "out-group" for both Scots and English united under the state banner of "Britishness." This chapter provides some background to this question, while the later chapters propose some answers. For the moment, it can fairly safely be assumed that, by calling attention to "Scottish" issues in the political sphere, the Scottish parliament and executive, along with the media, have the ability and the opportunity to call upon national identity as a relevant categorization for responding to news of UK and European issues. The questions, then, are whether this *is* actually happening, the *extent* to which it is happening, and *how* it is happening. The central concern here is whether increased news about the Scottish parliament could, by nature, encourage the salience

of membership in the national group by presenting images of non-Scottish nations – including England – in political "competition" with other polities in the UK as well as the European Union.

Background to the analysis: Identity and the role of news in society

Once again, the central role of news in society must be emphasized. In relation to this study, the institutional focus on news and newsmaking falls primarily on the press within the Scottish and UK levels of polity. In this context, it makes sense to start with the UK level, and then focus in on this situation in Scotland. While the Scottish press remains institutionally distinct its relationship with the London-based institution is close enough that the UK level must also be taken into consideration. In doing so, this section also takes the opportunity to raise methodological issues, relating to frame analysis, that aid a broader understanding of the task at hand.

At the broadest level, this study relies on an approach to media effects bounded by "social constructionism." A form of structuralism, social constructionism is an approach to analyzing how the world works based on how people make meaning of the world, rather than trying to empirically observe what is actually "out there" in reality. It holds that humans can have no access to reality, beyond the systems of representation that they build up to describe and make sense of that reality. This doesn't mean that there is no reality out there, however – just that individuals can't make sense of it, except in terms of the systems of representation (i.e., the conceptual maps of meaning) that people create culturally to gain meaning from the world around them.

Most social constructionists, betraying their theoretical origins in Marxism, link these systems of representation with economic power struggles in society, i.e., the notion that some groups in society, more powerful in economic terms than others, are able to successfully – if only

temporarily – impose a dominant system or systems of representation on the "masses." In this way these groups are able to maintain ideological control over the population. However, this control is never complete, and cannot be sustained indefinitely; opportunities exist for opposition to these dominant systems. It is the ability of social constructionism to engage the world of ideological structures, via the discourses that betray such structures in mass media output, that makes the method worthwhile in the present context.

Within the broad context of social constructionism, a particular debt is owed to a number of concepts and approaches outlined below. What's more, while many of the scholars outlined here are American, their contributions to the study of press-state relations are clearly applicable in a Scottish-British-European context. For example, Daniel Hallin's (1986) articulation of the existence in media discourse of spheres of legitimate controversy, consensus, and deviation applies as well in the present context as they did in relation to U.S. media coverage of the Vietnam War. Thus the present analysis strongly indicates that, in the period under examination, certain subjects were defined as legitimately controversial and worthy of enhanced coverage while certain subjects – most notably that of full independence – were effectively relegated to the outer bounds of the sphere of legitimate controversy, at least in regular news reports.

From the perspective of the sociology of news production, the work of Herbert Gans (1979) stands out as especially prominent in relation to the present study. Gans outlines the nature and extent of media-government relationships in *Deciding what's news* (1979). While he concentrates on the situation in the United States, much of his study is applicable to the Scottish-UK-European environment (see below), while studies following a similar sociological approach have been applied to the UK situation – in works such as Jeremy Tunstall's *Journalists at work* (1971), and Philip Schlesinger's (1987) study of BBC employees, *Putting 'reality' together.*

Mention must also be made of Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky's (1988) "propaganda model" and its relevance to this study. Herman and Chomsky propose five filters that condition news media output: the size, wealth, and profit orientation of the major media firms; the use of advertising as the media's prime income source; the media's heavy dependence on information from government and business; orchestrated attacks by conservative organizations on media outlets critical to the status quo, known as "flak;" and anticommunism as an ideological and political control mechanism (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). The first four of these filters can readily be applied to the Scottish situation, while, for the fifth, the replacement of anticommunism with "British patriotism" (a concept of nationalism based on ultimate loyalty to the British Crown and state) would serve essentially the same purpose in relation to political-ideological control of the media. In any case, this more critical approach to the study of media and society has recently been buttressed by an expanding array of qualitative scholarship in the realms of political economy and critical theory (e.g., Altschull, 1995; Bagdikian, 2000; McChesney, 1999). This study takes much of its strength from the work done by these as well as other authors whose work is recounted here.

From agenda-setting to frame analysis

It is helpful now to turn to specific mechanisms – proposed by various scholars within the tradition outlined above – that defined this complex press-state relationship. In particular, a question that needs to be addressed is, what is it about the media that gives them such influence, even as they come under the influence of other powerful groups and institutions. As Grossberg, Wartella, & Whitney (1998) point out, the most important single resource the media have is publicity – the ability to focus public attention on a topic, issue, or person. While it is problematic to try to determine accurately the extent to which a "national" press molds – or

reflects – public opinion in a given state or country, it can be posited that the press attempts to address its audiences directly (in some ways more directly than the other mass media). Through its frames and discourses the press acts to reflect and reinforce the various beliefs, opinions and prejudices of its various audiences (which include not only the general reading public but also, crucially, various groups representing government, business, and in particular, advertising and PR). However, in doing this, many individual papers ignore or neglect large areas of news which are presumed not to fit in with those beliefs or opinions, or which do not fit in with that paper's own particular editorial or ideological viewpoint. In so judging the newsworthiness of individual items on this basis, newspapers engage in agenda-setting.

Agenda-setting in turn sets the stage for the academic method that is the prime investigative tool in the present study: frame analysis. These two concepts are widely held to be complementary. In some studies, such as Iyengar & Simon's (1993) review of media coverage of the Gulf war, the two methods are considered so closely intertwined as to be almost indistinguishable. The relationship is so close, according to McCombs, Shaw, and Weaver (1997), that framing is in effect an extension of agenda-setting – what they call "second-level agenda-setting" – which also describes the salience of media coverage on audience's interpretation of the news.

Put at its most simple, frame analysis is an approach that, in the words of Herbert Gans (1979), "can observe recurring patterns in the news and can find a structure in its content" (p. 6). Gans, commenting on the activities of journalists in the production of news, goes on:

> That structure is not solely a figment of the analyst's work, for journalists, being unable to report everything that happened ..., must select some actors and activities from many millions they could choose. The result is a recurring pattern of news about a fairly small number of actors and activities. (p. 6)

In the context of the present analysis, this begs the question of what *kinds* of patterns have gained precedence in news of Scottish politics, the parliament, and Scottish identity. An analysis of the discourses in the press can provide many clues to the underlying ideological positions apparent in the press; but its role in the present study is as an adjunct to the frame analysis, which can most completely identify the patterns of coverage and address the fundamentally structuralist questions raised here. Frame analysis follows the premise that the news in general – and in particular the news being analyzed here – is not simply made up of random coverage of external events, but is rather a specific process of selection and construction. This process is social in origin, in the sense that news is socially constructed at a number of levels. Hanson (1995) describes the process most succinctly:

> Any organization that transmits the news frames the world for its audience. It selects a small number of events from thousands of items provided by international, regional, and national news and by its own correspondent. It highlights some of the available information about the event and downplays others. It helps the reader, listener, or viewer to process the information by using familiar categories, key words, and images. (p. 371)

A number of successful media and communications studies using this method have been carried out in recent years. Of particular interest in the context of the present work are studies in the international arena that focus on media coverage of a single nation-state or region, such as those completed by Friedland and Mengbai (1996), Larson and Rivenburgh (1991), and Elizabeth C. Hanson (1995). These studies are reviewed in more detail later below. However, it is useful at this point to return to an outline of the method itself and review it in more detail.

The method is determined not only by the interplay of organized news routines at the institutional level (the news organizations); it also determines news norms that are preserved and reproduced by the news workers themselves, who follow a number of set processes in the selection, gathering, and production of news stories (Gans, 1979; Tuchman, 1978). Previous

research (Entman, 1991, 1993; Gitlin, 1980; Pan & Kosicki, 1993) suggests that news frames exist both institutionally, presenting news consumers with encoded "maps" of the world of news and current affairs, within which they "decode" the news they receive (such as the "cold war" frame for post-WWII international affairs and the "horse race" frame for election campaigns); and at the level of the news story itself. Such frames reveal themselves through use and *repetition* of certain keywords, concepts, metaphors, symbols, and visual images. Hanson (1995) focuses on the vital role repetition plays in the process. "For a newspaper, or any medium that transmits the news, the repetition of certain topics, ideas, and images in association with each other becomes a self-reinforcing process that in turn shapes future decisions about the selection of news. This is what is meant by the framing of the news" (p. 389).

Frame analysis has been conceptualized and articulated in many different ways in different studies over the years. Perhaps the majority of scholars in the area, from Tuchman and Gitlin on, have seen the method's application in decidedly hermeneutic terms; others, including Pan and Kosicki (1993) and Friedland and Mengbai (1996), have tried to create a more objective paradigm for frame analysis, albeit while still emphasizing its application to qualitative analysis. However, what all the studies generally have had in common is the ability to provide some means of aggregating and measuring – albeit, usually, in a more subjective rather than objective way – the symbols and discourses in media news coverage that would evade a more traditional content analysis. In short, instead of answering the question of what kind of news is being covered, it gives functional clues as to how and even why that particular news is being covered in the way that it is.

The sociologist Erving Goffman (1986) is regarded as one of the first researchers to define frame analysis as a way of attaching meaning to various social factors in society. He posits that news frames, which are usually based on pre-existing values (and prejudices) in society, are thus

able to quietly insert themselves into individuals' frames of reference. These personal frames are the primary means by which people organize events and experiences so that they can take meaning from them and make sense of the world around them.

Gaye Tuchman (1978) extends the concept of framing to news and news reporting. Accepting that news is "first and foremost a social institution" and stories are "the product of cultural resources and active negotiations," Tuchman examines the social and institutional aspects of framing. Todd Gitlin (1980) continues the process, adding a more critical societal and media aspect to frame analysis with his survey of the framing of SDS (Students for a Democratic Society) activities in America during the Vietnam war. Gitlin's main contribution is to link the concept of framing to the issues of power and hegemony – by relating news and news values to the dominant ideology of those in power. He notes the power of media frames to organize the news; such frames quietly and efficiently "organize the world both for journalists who report [the news] and, in some important degree, for us who rely on their reports" (1980, p. 7).

Beyond these aforementioned pioneers, an array of scholars, from Herbert Gans in sociology to Stuart Hall in cultural studies, have enhanced our understanding of how frames work. However, given the wide variety of subjects to which the method has been applied, and the apparent flexibility of the method itself, frame analysis has appeared to lack focus. In an attempt to pull the area into shape, Robert M. Entman, in "Framing: Toward a clarification of a fractured paradigm" (1993) strives to bring a seemingly disparate topic together, and give a comprehensive account of how frames work (or should work). One of the most prominent figures to emerge in this area in recent years, Entman returns to the basic power of framing – its ability to describe the true "power of a communicating text" and its use in highlighting the media's *selection* and *salience* of a perceived reality. From this perspective, he attempts to offer framing as a mature and legitimate communications-inspired research paradigm.

Entman opines that "nowhere is there a general statement of framing theory that shows exactly how frames become embedded within and make themselves manifest in a text, or how framing influences thinking" (1993, p. 51). He goes on to offer his synthesis of framing theory as a legitimate Communications-inspired research paradigm. Frame analysis, he contends, "illuminates the precise way in which influence over a human consciousness is exerted by the transfer (or communication) of information from one location – such as speech, utterance, news report, or novel–to that consciousness" (1993, p. 56). This is the context in which framing's power to examine *selection* and *salience* becomes apparent. His classic example is the Cold War frame, which identified certain foreign events – e.g., civil wars – as problems *(define the problem*); identified their source as communist rebels (*diagnose causes*); *offered moral judgments* about the problem (terrorism, brutish thugs, anti-democratic, etc); and *recommended particular solutions* (US support for the other side, as long as they're not communist). Entman went on to draw attention to framing in the Gulf War, when the dominant news frame in the U.S. "included only two remedies, war now or sanctions now with war (likely) later, while problem definitions, causal analyses, and moral evaluations were homogenous" (1993, p. 55). (This is worth comparing with Carrier's (1997) analysis of the Gulf War across different countries, which showed that each country framed the war in significantly different ways.) Entman's (1991) classic study of two Cold War incidents in the 1980s highlights this process very well. This study identifies fundamental differences in the framing of, on the one hand, the Soviet shooting-down of a KAL airliner, and on the other, the downing of an Iranian Airbus by the destroyer USS *Vincennes* four years later. He shows how each was framed by the U.S. media in such a way as to show the Soviet action in the worst possible light while emphasizing the U.S. action as a tragic error. The overall frame provided by the Cold War in the 1980s, Entman argues, guided the very

different discursive strategies and event frames constructed for what, on the face of it, appeared to be two very similar incidents.

The Cold War example also suggests that frames have at least four locations in the communication process: the *communicator*, the *text*, the *receiver*, and the *culture*. In fact, Entman places some importance on *culture*, which he describes as "the stock of commonly invoked frames." By this he means "the empirically demonstrable set of common frames exhibited in the discourse and thinking of most people in a social grouping" (1993, p. 53). However, he concentrates on *salience* as a central factor, since textual references can make certain bits of information more salient "by placement or repetition, or by associating them with culturally familiar symbols" (p. 53). To be salient, however, the reference has to comport with the existing schemata in a receiver's belief system. (He characterizes *schemata* – as well as closely related concepts such as categories, scripts or stereotypes – as connoting "mentally stored clusters of ideas" that guide people's thinking.)

Moving from the review of frame theory to the application of the method in contemporary studies, some salient points emerge. Perhaps the most active area in comparative frame analysis has been the study of cross-national and international news flows. A number of important studies have been completed that attempt to show whether or not Western instrumental control of the international news media has resulted in a form of globalized cultural imperialism in the international flow of news. The background to this work is the long-running debate over the impact and legacy of the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO). Within this debate, globalization theorists such as Cees Hamelink (1983) and Hamid Mowlana (1986) argue that such Western control – which includes control of news content through the Western news agencies and control of the transmission networks through telecoms and satellites – translates to ideological and cultural control over "Third World" countries' news; this has

supposedly led to the erosion of many non-Western cultures. However, an opposing camp of researchers rejects, or at least downplays, the importance of the "globalization thesis." Frame analysis has had an important role to play in this perspective. Comparative case studies of news coverage of major world events, such as the Gulf War (Carrier, 1997), the Beijing Spring uprising (Friedland & Mengbai, 1996), and the Olympic Games (Larson & Rivenburgh, 1991), suggest that instrumental control of news media does not automatically lead to ideological and cultural control. In each of these studies, media output from countries with widely varying national and/or cultural ideologies were compared with regard to the common media events, each of which was considered to be of global significance. In each case, when the countries' media interpretation of the common events were analyzed – by means of a frame analysis, sometimes in conjunction with a supporting content analysis – it was shown that each country interpreted the event more or less according to its own geopolitical or cultural viewpoint, and *not* according to some hegemonic viewpoint of the major news media powers (such as the United States and Britain). This was so even when the country in question relied almost wholly on Western news sources for its news content on the event in question.

The conceptualizations and operationalizations of the above studies provide some useful pointers for the present work. Entman's work on framing U.S. media responses to U.S. and Soviet military incidents has already been referred to. Larson and Rivenburgh (1991) apply framing as a context for interpreting differences among broadcasters from the United States, Britain, and Australia in the televised coverage of the Seoul Olympics. Iyengar and Simon's (1993) study of the Gulf War finds that U.S. television news coverage framed such news in a very episodic, rather than thematic, manner, thereby biasing public response toward a military rather than a diplomatic solution to the crisis. A particularly appropriate study is Hanson's (1995) study, a longitudinal analysis of the frames employed by the *Times of India* in its articulation of

world events. It is an instructive example of how to combine quantitative and qualitative data, in order to get at the amount and kinds of news covered, as well as the tone of the news set by the paper. Hanson conducts a longitudinal case study of the *Times of India*'s attempts to find out how international news is being framed in that following after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the contemporaneous end of the dominant Cold War narrative. Her case study combines a basic quantitative content analysis of a medium – applied to get at *what* kinds of news is covered – with a qualitative frame analysis of that same medium, to get at *how* and *why* that news is being covered. As the author puts it, the study "addresses the dynamics of framing by investigating how the dramatic transformation in the international political environment that occurred in 1990 and 1991 affected the selection of international news by the *Times of India*" (1995, p. 371). The results indicate that, while there was relatively little change in the quantitative coverage of the two "superpowers" after 1991, the framing of the United States as a pernicious hegemon gradually gave way to a more benign depiction of that country.

Another characterization of framing worth comment is Hanson's description of the method as a self-reinforcing process that shapes subsequent decisions about the direction of news, since she acknowledges the power of the process even while recognizing its limits. Particularly illuminating here is her analogy of a changing frame with a Kuhnian paradigm shift: "Like a scientific paradigm, frames persist until an overwhelming amount of discrepant information forces them to change. Even then, the old frame persists as an alternative picture of reality, and the debate continues" (1995, p. 390). The present study investigates whether just such a "paradigm shift" is taking place in the Scottish press and its framing of the UK and the EU.

It is also worth pointing out the close links between discourse and frame analysis. The two *are* closely related. The common element is culture – defined by Entman (1993) as "the empirically demonstrable set of common frames exhibited in the discourse and thinking of most

people in a social grouping" (p. 53). A major distinction in discourse analysis is in how closely the method focuses on the text itself, instead of on the social and political circumstances surrounding the production of the news text, the realm of frame analysis. In most cases, including the present one, there is a good deal of overlap, and it is important to appreciate when and where the two approaches are complementary. Indeed, a number of scholars have recognized the influence of mediated discourse within the broader context of the frame. Entman (1991) reminds us that the components of a frame are often linked within the context of what he calls "an established *discursive domain*" [emphasis in original] (p. 11). This concept he describes as "a series of associated idea clusters that form a way of reasoning about a matter that is familiar to audiences from other cultural experiences." Key words and images are invoked regularly and repeatedly – made *salient*, in fact – in order to "evoke ideas typically associated with a particular kind of public discourse" (p. 11).

Finding, measuring and building frames

Following the social constructionist approach, it is necessary to consider in more detail the process by which the media *build* frames, by constructing meanings and offering such constructs "in a systematic way to audiences, where they are incorporated (or not), on the basis of some form of negotiation, into personal meaning structures, often shaped by prior collective identifications" (McQuail, 1994, p. 331). In this context, media frames that are so built should be viewed as independent variables that have "an impact on attitudes, opinions, or individual frames" (Scheufele, 1999, p. 110). So frame building and identification of media packages are closely concerned with the social construction of meaning. However, a proviso must be made with respect to causality. This study follows Gamson and Modigliani's (1989) admonition that changes in media discourse do not necessarily cause changes in public opinion. Rather:

> Each system interacts with the other: media discourse is part of the process by which individuals construct meaning, and public opinion is part of the process by which journalists and other cultural entrepreneurs develop and crystallize meaning in public discourse. (p. 2)

This leads to the concept of media (framing) packages (Gamson & Lasch, 1983; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). Previous research suggests that this approach has worked better in a domestic rather than foreign affairs news setting and Gamson and Modigliani (1989) provide an illustrative model. The approach elaborates on the media's development of an "issue culture" through which media outlets, acting as a conduit for mostly government sources, create a "presentation framework" that fits with the audiences perceived core values. This framework defines as "a set of interpretive packages that give meaning to an issue" (Gamson & Modigliani, p. 3). These media packages are conceived of as cohesive sets, each containing a frame, or "central organizing idea," that allows both media producers and media consumers to make sense of relevant events. Since this is closely related to the model chosen for the present frame analysis, it is useful to look in more detail at the concept in general.

Gamson and Modigliani set out the circumstances under which media packages can be usefully applied to media analysis. In order to be viable, they argue, these framing packages have to be able to construct, and maintain, dominant meanings *over time* (p. 4). Frames should not be confused with positions for or against any given policy, they caution. The frame, or package, allows quite a bit of room for disagreement within its bounds. The authors refer, as an example, to what they call the "progress" package, the power of which relies on the "cultural resonance" of our continuing associations with concepts such as innovation, economic expansion, practicality, invention, and, in particular, efficiency (1989, p. 5).

A package can incorporate a range of "different condensing symbols that suggest the core frame and positions in shorthand, making it possible to display the package as a whole with a deft

metaphor, catchphrase, or other symbolic device" (p. 3). The authors note a distinction between framing devices and the reasoning devices. The framing devices they chose to emphasize are metaphors, exemplars, catchphrases, depictions, and visual images. Reasoning devices, on the other hand, are roots (i.e., causal analysis), consequences (i.e., a particular kind of effect), and appeals to principle (i.e., a set of moral claims). These eight devices, or "signature elements," form the core of the package, within which a range of positions can be outlined in the form of a "signature matrix" (see below).

Gamson and Modigliani, in applying their framing approach to analysis of public opinion of nuclear power, provide an example of this process by articulating a package about the use of nuclear power for generating electricity in the United States. This package, labeled "progress" by the authors, "frames the nuclear power issue in terms of the society's commitment to technological development and economic growth" (1989, p. 4). The progress package is reproduced below for illustrative purposes:

> If the electric chair had been invented before the electric light, would we still be using kerosene lamps? There has always been resistance to technological progress by nervous Nellies who see only the problems and ignore the benefits. Resistance to nuclear energy development is the latest version of this irrational fear of progress and change, the expression of modern pastoralists and nuclear Luddites. Certainly nuclear energy development is not free of problems, but problems can be solved, as the history of technological progress shows. The failure to develop nuclear power will retard our economic and make us renege on our obligation to the poor and to future generations. If coercive utopians prevent us from moving ahead now with nuclear energy, the next generation is likely to be sitting around in the dark blaming the utilities for not doing something this generation's officials would not let them do. (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989, p. 4)

The media packages model encompasses three types of determinants, each of which will be applied to the situation under study here: cultural resonances, sponsor activities, and media practices. The issue of media practices has already been dealt with in this chapter (see above) but cultural resonances and sponsor activities deserve more explanation.

Cultural resonances: This concept is based on the principle that some symbol systems are considerably more potent – "resonant" – than others with a given population. Thus some packages "resonate" with larger cultural or social themes. This resonance – what Snow and Benford (1988) call the "narrative fidelity" of a frame – is directly relevant to one of the most powerful themes to emerge in Scotland in recent years: the reemergence of Scottish political identity (articulated in various ways, from devolution to outright Scottish independence).

Cultural resonance embodies what Snow and Benford (1988) call the "stories, myths, and folktales that are part and parcel" of a culture, and are for this reason of obvious applicability to the study of a stateless nation such as Scotland. In this case, the resonance of Scottish cultural heroes, from William Wallace to Sean Connery, is indeed a factor in the developing discourses surrounding the "new Scotland." The same could be said of Scotland's abiding cultural myths, whether it be of the plucky little country, of Tartanry, the Kailyard, or Clydesideism. Interestingly, most of these myths set Scotland sqarely apart from its "auld enemy," England. This study follows the sense of both "cultural resonance" and "narrative fidelity" as a means of linking disparate parts of the cultural system – in other words, "to connect symbols on a specific issue with more enduring cultural themes" (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989, p. 5).

Gamson and Modigliani also talk of themes as working dialectically: for every theme, there is a countertheme. In their example of technological progress, there exists a countertheme that is hostile to the very notion of technology (and they see this countertheme articulated in works of popular culture, such as Chaplin's *Modern Times*, Huxley's *Brave New World*, and countless other films about "technology gone mad and out of control" (1989, p. 6). In the context of the present study, the theme/countertheme dialectic can be expressed fairly simply in terms of national identity. If a main theme is Scottish nationalism, for example, a countervailing theme

which retains a good deal of resonance in Scotland is British identity. These broad themes will inform the identification of the set of media packages later in this chapter and the next.

Sponsor activities: Media packages do not exist in a causal vacuum, but rather are sponsored by groups in society. Gamson and Modigliani (1989) refer to the sponsor of a media package as "typically an agent who is promoting some collective rather than personal agenda" (p. 6). This agent usually takes the form of an organization, part of whose role is to frame events and conditions in such a way as to mobilize public opinion (Snow & Benford, 1988). Their role is really one of signification, in that the organization attempts to control Gamson and Modigliani's mediated "condensing symbols" in ways that are amenable to that organization's view of the world. While Gamson and Modigliani refer to sponsors primarily as non-governmental "social movement organizations", the comparable organizations in terms of the present study are, for the most part, the various political parties (at the EU and UK as well as the Scottish levels) that are all trying to frame the terms of the debate to their own ends. Of course, other organizations in the public sphere are also engaged in attempting to frame the debate – for example, the churches, NGOs, and the press itself. One of the purposes of the present study is to identify both media packages emerging from the frames and the most salient sponsor groups, and match the two categories together.

What all the above approaches and studies show is that a well-defined frame analysis of a media outlet can provide a very effective and instructive qualitative insight into how that medium presents the world to its audience. Chapter 7 focuses more closely on the specific application of the frame analysis method applied to the present study.

It is fair to conclude from the above that the press in Britain today provides a fascinating index to the various ideologies simultaneously running through that state. In its structure, its form and its content, the press provides vital clues to the way the society operates. Although

relatively declining in importance as a mass medium, it remains one of the most visible manifestation of a country's overall national identity, complete with its dominant and subordinate cultures, its class consciousness and its social contradictions. This is especially so in the case of Scotland, as has been suggested in previous chapters and will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters. The stage is therefore set to proceed to a review of the press-state nexus in Scotland, and the subsequent chapters' analysis of the frames appearing in the Scottish press in relation to national identity and conceptions of "Scotland", "Britain", and "Europe".

Chapter 4. The Media-Government Nexus in Scotland: UK and EU influences

This chapter focuses on media structures in the EU, the UK, and Scotland. It goes on to discuss the nature and roles of the Scottish media and the Scottish government, the changing nature of the relationship between these two institutions, and the broader relationships among the political institutions at the UK and EU levels. The main questions being asked here concern the extent to which each is influencing and changing the others. While the chapter covers the differing roles played by the press, the broadcast media, and cinema at all these levels, particular attention is paid to the enormous influence still wielded by the press in Scotland.

Media structures in the UK as a whole, in the EU, and in Scotland in particular have undergone massive changes in the 1980s and 1990s. The main thrust of these changes, as will be outlined below, has been to significantly strengthen the hand of commercial, for-profit media at the expense of traditional national public service broadcasters. In the political sphere, the EU itself has become an increasingly important player in terms of media regulation across Europe, at the same time as UK sub-national regions (primarily Scotland and Wales) have pressed for greater media autonomy. Concurrent with these far-reaching political groundswells have been fundamental shifts in patterns of ownership and control of Scottish, British, and European media. In spite of these changes, however, overall control of broadcast regulation remains in the hands of the Westminster government. Although signs of agitation against this status quo have come from, for example, BBC Scotland over the Scottish Six controversy (see below), changes in the national and regional organization of broadcast media have been less prominent. Consequently, it is the press that has remained the most important battleground over which competing frames for the new Scottish polity have been fought.

This aspect brings in notions of the media's relationship with political institutions at four different levels across which both operate – Scottish, British, European, and global. It also inevitably leads to a discussion of the debate on the role of a media-led public sphere in the cultural life of the nation-state, in opposition to the supposedly pernicious forces of media globalization and their perceived assault on the notion of the sovereign nation-state. This is a powerful element that must be incorporated into any communications-related study of Scotland in the UK and the EU.

A major factor that underlies this study is the nature of the link between the media and the government, and in particular the extent to which the press acts as a conduit for the dominant ideologies of the state – in this case, the British state. The analysis that follows in the later chapters indicates that, in spite of the essentially Scottish nature of the new developments, the Scottish press follows an ideological orientation that is unmistakably British – in terms of its setting within the dominant framework of the British state in general, and the national (London-based) Labour government in power.

The British state, the EU, and the "new" Scotland

The British state has long maintained a tradition of keeping its distance from Europe, displaying a form of socio-political insularity from the mainland. This insularity, buttressed by geographical, religious and political separation, kept Britain on the social, economic, and political fringes of Europe for centuries. Combined with the development of its maritime economy, its empire and worldwide economic interests, this frame of reference helped to provide the basis for Britain's foreign policy (Joll, 1950). It is a frame of reference that was largely shared by Scotland and its civil society for most of the period of the British empire. Although it had been politically independent from England for centuries, and had maintained a foreign policy that often put it at odds with that of its southern neighbor, Scotland

found itself locked into the dominant geopolitical circumstances of the British state following the Act of Union in 1707. Although, as has already been discussed, a strong sense of national identity remained in Scotland, that identity became increasingly defined in British and imperial terms – particularly in relation to the European Continent.

In spite of its preferred sense of isolation, the British state has always out of necessity kept a close eye on European affairs. Royal marriages, alliances, and in particular trade all helped to keep the country engaged in Europe – albeit at a distance – and British interests led its merchants, its politicians and its armies into Europe again and again. However, the 19th Century, and in particular the latter part of the Victorian era, saw a further shift in Britain's priorities, away from Europe and toward its growing empire. The traditional sense of British "apartness" was consolidated and compounded by a culture of imperial grandeur, policy that favored support for the expanding British empire and "Splendid Isolation" from Europe (Hobsbawm, 1968).

Britain's primary goal in Europe during this time was to maintain a balance of power in the region: in other words, to prevent any one nation from dominating the continent, thereby maintaining peace and stability in Europe so that profitable trade could continue unhindered (Joll, 1950). It was this "divide and rule" principle – an underlying commitment to prevent European domination by a single power – that dragged Britain into one European war after another, and which still has some influence on British thinking today.

It was during the latter years of the 19th century, a period marked by industrial and economic maturity, rapid economic growth and expansion of empire, that the foundations of modern Britain's sociological character were laid. This era, with its emphasis on global imperialism and relative isolationism from European affairs, was instrumental in setting the agenda for Britain's future relations with Europe: indeed, the impact of this period on Britain's present-day perspective on the continent was perhaps only exceeded by that of World War II. So when the

European Economic Community was set up in 1957, Britain remained lukewarm to the whole concept of economic union, and initially declined to become part of the new Community. Moreover, when Britain finally decided to apply for membership of the EEC in the 1960s the role of France – traditionally Britain's *bête noir* in international affairs – in preventing entry until 1973 was hardly a positive signal to the British establishment.

In the years following World War II, Britain had come to see closer links with Europe essentially in pragmatic terms, as a means of increasing trade and commerce, rather than as part of a greater dream of European unity. Further, with the continuing contraction of its empire in the 1960s, Britain saw the emerging Community – which it had initially spurned – as an opportunity to increase its trade within a European free trade area. Trade was the motivating factor for closer European cooperation, not any grand design to bind the nations of Europe together in a federal union. This is important for understanding the somewhat schizophrenic attitude of Britain to the recent moves toward closer European union.

In the years following Britain's entry to the EEC, devolution in Scotland and Wales once again became, for a short time, a political issue. The Devolution Bill that passed through the Westminster parliament in 1978 required a referendum on the issue of a Scottish assembly, including a provision that at least 40 percent of the Scottish electorate vote for such an assembly. While a majority of Scots voters opted for this option, the Yes vote fell below the 40 percent hurdle (McCreadie, 1991). The effect of this setback was to take the wind out of the devolution/independence debate for another decade, until the inauguration of the Scottish Constitutional Convention in 1989 brought the issue back into the national debate (McCreadie, 1991). However, from a media perspective, one positive effect of the devolution debate in the late 1970s was that it precipitated the creation of BBC Radio Scotland, a separate "national" radio

station that reported on political, national, and world affairs from a uniquely Scottish perspective (Schlesinger, 1998b, p. 67).

The defeat of the 1978-79 devolution process was quickly followed by the election of the Conservatives. From that point, UK constitutional affairs in general – and Scottish affairs in particular – became effectively sidelined as the Thatcher government embarked on a raft of far-reaching liberal-market reforms designed to attenuate the role of the state in the economy. These reforms brought a great deal of internal stress within the UK throughout the 1980s – particularly in Scotland, where the "Thatcher revolution" has often been cited as a major factor undermining the long-term cohesion of the UK (Patterson, Brown & McCrone, 1992; Holliday, 1992; Lindsay, 1992; Moffat, 1999). The move to a market-capitalist economy was also a factor in the British government's constantly strained relations with the EC during this period. Ironically, perhaps, given the nature of these tensions, the EU has since that time moved decisively toward a broadly similar liberal-market ideology (Collins, 1999; Venturelli, 1997).

In Scotland during the 1990s, meanwhile, the debate turned once again to devolution, and the election of the Labour government in 1997 accelerated that debate, as is recounted in chapter 1. The referendum for the Scottish Parliament was itself a significant step in redefining the terms of the political debate, as the abstract notion of Scottish nationalism became reified in the form of the preparations for a physical and institutional articulation of that nationalism: the Scottish Parliament. All too suddenly, it seemed, the memories and dreams of past Scotland, as well as the hopes and aspirations of future Scotland, migrated to the new institutions taking shape in Edinburgh.

As the idea of a new Parliament settled among the opinion leaders in the Scottish public sphere, so did the idea that this new parliament should be significantly "different" from – and therefore better than – the Westminster model. Prior to the institution of the new Parliament,

much was made of the "new politics" in Scotland – a politics that would be defined by cooperation, not confrontation, and civility rather than obloquy (see Schlesinger, 1998b, pp. 68-70).

An inevitable concomitant of these new developments was an emerging tendency among important elements of Scottish civil society to question London suzerainty in areas where it had not previously been seriously questioned. One clear example of this development – and one that is directly relevant to the media – is the so-called "Scottish Six" controversy. This issue, which blew up in late 1998, concerned BBC Scotland's attempt to create a "national" six o'clock news to take the place of the London-run national news. This was a significant development. While BBC Scotland has long been regarded as a "national region" – along with Wales and Northern Ireland – in news terms it is treated in much the same way as the English regions: It produces a half-hour "regional" news program to follow the UK news at 6 o'clock in the evening, plus a five-minutes news segment following the BBC's other flagship news broadcast, the Nine O' Clock News. The argument, made forcefully at the time by BBC Scotland chief John McCormick, was that Scotland needed to take over such "national" news operations in order to be able to meaningfully integrate UK and international news within the context of developments in the Scottish Parliament and Executive, which was about to replace Westminster as the most important newsmaker in Scotland. Nevertheless, the BBC Board of Directors held firm, refusing to cede such an important task to a "national region." (Schlesinger) In spite of this, the issue has never completely gone away, and remains something of a *cause celebre* that unites Scottish Nationalists and many others in Scotland who see this as a natural development. Perhaps the most important point in all this is that the argument for a "Scottish Six" was made at all. Even 10 years previously, the idea of replacing the "national" news with a "regional" (and therefore, according to the sentiment, inferior) version would have been laughable.

The mediated cultural power of "Scotland", "Britain", and "Europe"

One of the tasks of this work is to examine the powerful role of culture and "cultural resonances" in the maintenance and development of dominant frames and what Gamson and Modigliani (1989) call "media packages." Such devices are built on the sustaining myths that drive depiction of what it means, in this case, to be "Scottish" (see chapter 7 for a fuller exposition of this method and its application to the present study). The "imagined community" of Scotland necessarily incorporates a number of myths, not all of which are "Scottish". Myths of Britain and even Europe also play a role in the construction of contemporary Scottish identity. This necessitates a brief discussion of the nature and extent of the various myths running through Scotland in the present day. This discussion forms the backdrop for the discourse, frame and media package analyses in the subsequent chapters.

Given that, in the minds of many Scots, notions of "Scottishness" resides (however uneasily) alongside those of "Britishness," it is also necessary to consider the myths and discourses that make up notions of "Britishness."

British nationalism is, in many ways an institutional nationalism – and a recently formed nationalism, at that. As Hobsbawm & Ranger (1983) point out, to be "British" has been to owe loyalty to the British state and its political establishment – a primarily English construction nurtured and promulgated by English political and social institutions, and the main conduit for British socio-political discourses. (It is this British establishment which, incidentally, has for a long time regarded the country as being separate, and somehow different, from the continent of Europe.) However, this construction's main ideological force comes not from the fact of the Union of England and Scotland; rather it draws its main strength from the reconstitution of British institutions and identity that took place in the later 19th Century, during the apotheosis of the British empire. Britain's present-day social and class structures were essentially reformed

formed during this period and its institutions, while maintaining a superficial link with the past and a veneer of "traditionalism," were in fact radically restructured to meet the demands of a modern capitalist state. When allied with the role of the British monarchy, the result was the constitution of a new British institutional identity, centered on the power of the state state rather than any sense of combined or united ethnicity among its constituent nationalities (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983).

The two periods of history which had a particularly strong effect on the present-day British nationalism were the high point of British imperialism (referred to above), and the Second World War. Both, in their own ways, played a fundamental part in shaping British views on Europe, and in particular Germany.

World War II had the perfect ingredients to fit in with Britain's already-existing conceptions of Europe as the "other": Germany as the brutal aggressor; France as the cowardly weakling who failed us in our hour of need; Italy as the hot-head of Europe which was useless in a crisis; and so on. This conception – already developing in Britain before and during the First World War – was greatly assisted by a very effective British propaganda machine, which transferred those prejudices into the media, from where they were transmitted into popular culture. This is important in understanding the dominant British view of Europe after the war: that Britain had proudly stood apart from the Continent, and had been instrumental in liberating that Continent from the evils of Nazism and Fascism; and that, specifically, Britain had stood firm in "their finest hour," alone against the tyranny of Nazi Germany, while others – notably the French – had caved in all too easily to the enemy.

Nation-building is one area where the British media have an important role to play, in their articulation of preconceived notions of Britishness such as toughness, stoicism, and a commitment to fairness (Blain *et al.*, 1993, pp. 65-68). In absorbing and mediating these supposed notions of Britain's national culture and identity, the media have a powerful influence

in transmitting such notions of national identity and Britain's place in the world, and in turn reflect some of the dominant ideologies of the country's centers of influence. In the context of nationalism, various periods of history have had an effect on present-day British nationalism, but none has had a stronger impact in shaping Britain's present-day views on Europe, and in particular Germany, than the experience of the World War II. For example, in the realm of sports, Blain et al. conclude, from press coverage of non-English European national soccer teams in the 1990 World Cup, that "the discourse of Britishness derives essentially from definitions of Britishness that arose in connection with the Second World War, and . . . it is matched by discourses of Germanness which also derive from the same period" (Blain *et al.*, 1993, p. 65). However, the impact of these discourses extend far beyond the world of sports journalism.

It is worth noting, however, that these myths have significantly reduced resonance in Scotland. North of the border, a separate, albeit related, myth-symbol structure has been allowed to develop – resulting in, among other things, a less one-dimensional image of Europe, and the other countries and peoples of Europe. In looking for evidence of this, one needs to look not at the political sphere, but at the cultural sphere, and particularly that most resonant of cultural activities in Scotland: football.

Beyond the realm of sports, Scottish identity differentiates itself from British identity in other ways – leading Alan Bold, for one, to point out that "although Scotland is not officially an independent state, Scottishness is a recognized state of mind: sometimes an independent state of mind, occasionally a theocratic state of mind, frequently a confused state of mind" (1983, p. 1). Of course, while many Scots retain a strong sense of Britishness and British values – albeit in addition to, rather than instead of, their sense of sense of Scottishness, antagonism against the English is a factor in the cultural makeup of Scotland.

When talking about Scottish myths, the problem of accurately addressing the issue of representation – the way Scots and Scotland are portrayed and the discourses used for their portrayal in both fictional and "factual" media content – appears difficult. These portrayals are part of what Meech and Kilborn (1992) call the central and abiding myths of Scottishness, such as

> those of the Kailyard (a nostalgic and overly sentimental parochialism) and of Tartanry (heavily romanticized depictions of heroic deeds of yesteryear against spectacular Highland backdrops). The other stereotype that has come to the fore in the last two decades has been that of the 'dark and dangerous city' (frequently Glasgow) where urban squalor, religious strife and social breakdown provide fast-moving thrillers or social realism pieces (e.g. *The Big Man*, 1990). (Meech and Kilborn 1992, p. 254)

These are the basis of such well-known stereotypes as the kilted buffoon, the drunken, hard-bitten Scotsman, and the canny, tight-fisted Scotsman on the make. The Glasgow-centered "dark and dangerous city" stereotype mentioned above corresponds to the discourse of "Clydesideism" referred to here (although the recent literary efforts of Irvine Welsh, James Kelman, and others to transplant this discourse's elements to Edinburgh show that it retains resonance beyond the Clydeside area). All these myths retain strong cultural resonances to the present day.

There is another factor, transcending the myths mentioned above, that needs explication because of its enormous impact on Scottish culture: the country's relationship with England. This is important because, in order to talk about distinctiveness, it has to be made clear from whom or what Scots and Scottishness are distinctive. In this case, it seems that the benchmark in this test can only be England. The importance of England as a rallying point for Scottish identity, however defined, cannot be underestimated. According to Meech and Kilborn, "Scottish collective identity defines itself, to a significant degree, by differences in attitudes,

values and behavior between the Scots and the English" (1992, p. 246). Put more viscerally, "to be Scottish is, to some degree, to dislike or resent the English" (Dickson 1989, p. 61).

UK regional developments since 1997

The 1997 referendum on Scottish devolution was a decisive moment in redefining the changed terms of the relationship between Westminster and Scotland. The referendum revolved around two questions asking voters to decide whether there should be a Scottish parliament and also asking them whether this body should have the power to vary taxation rates within Scotland. This dual-question referendum brought forward the "Yes-Yes" campaign – an exceptionally broad coalition of the two main pro-devolution parties, Labour and the Liberal Democrats, plus the pro-independence Scottish National Party (SNP). Only the Scottish Conservatives backed the rejection of the new body in favor of the status quo; but with the backing of less than one-fifth of the electorate, and the loss of the last of their Westminster seats in the May 1997 General Election, the Scottish Tories were a spent force. The referendum itself was therefore passed by a wide margin. While the turnout, at 60.4 percent, was slightly disappointing to some, the margins of victory were clear: 74.3 per cent supported the creation of the Scottish parliament, while 63.5 per cent approved of the tax-varying powers (Schlesinger, 1998b, p. 60).

The most salient point to consider is that the new Scottish parliament, together with the Welsh assembly, introduced serious centrifugal stresses on the UK polity – stresses that are not likely to go away anytime soon, and which may get far worse. Schlesinger (1998b) notes that within the now-recognized British multi-national state, the new parliament is "a key test bed" for the ability of the traditionally centralized British state to incorporate other major centers of political power outside the "sovereign" parliament of Westminster (p. 60). The issue of "asymmetrical government" – whereby the Scottish and Welsh nations are given legislative

power while the English are denied a parliament of their own – is another potential problem for the future.

From a social-cultural standpoint, one more thing was especially notable about the subsequent elections: its implicit definition of Scotland in civic rather than ethnic terms. These elections were open only to Scottish residents – regardless of ethnic background or place of birth. "Ethnic Scots outside the country had no voting rights. This is an important benchmark, though still little appreciated, for future political discourse about the 'nation' of Scotland" (Schlesinger, 1998b, p. 59). Part of the task of the present work is to judge the extent to which this civic evocation of "Scotland" has been maintained into the period of elections for the new Scottish parliament.

The Scotland Act

The very nature of the defining piece of legislation that created the Scottish Parliament.and Executive, the Scotland Act, neatly encapsulates the position of the institutions created under its provisions. As an Act of the Westminster Parliament the legislation gives to that body final say over all the structures and powers of the Scottish bodies. Under British constitutional law, the London Parliament remains the supreme law-making body in the United Kingdom. As such, any and all legislation passed by the Scottish Parliament can become law only with at least the tacit approval of Westminster. It's important to remember that the Scottish Parliament has no constitutional protection of the sort afforded, say, U.S. states. Just as Westminster legislated the parliament into existence, it could also, in theory, legislate it back out of existence (as it temporarily suspended the Northern Ireland Assembly for a few months in 1999 and 2000).

Within the bounds of this basic fact of constitutional existence, the Scottish parliamentary and executive bodies have been given a fair measure of legislative and operational autonomy. At

root, the basis of the Scottish Executive's relationship with Westminster is governed by a series of *concordats*. These concordats, which were written up by civil servants in London and Scotland, are supposed to lay down procedures for dealing with disputes between Holyrood and Westminster. Disputes are most likely to arise in areas at the boundary between devolved powers and reserved powers (e.g., social policy in relation to Kosovo refugees arriving in Scotland). In relation to the EU, the concordats call for a joint approach, between London and Edinburgh, in all matters concerning relations with Brussels. The Scottish executive is *not* permitted to dictate unilateral policy between Scotland and the EU. European issues are a reserved power. As the signatory state to the supranational body, the United Kingdom is regarded as the final voice representing all parts of that state. Westminster therefore has an ultimate veto any Scottish policy that involves the EU.

The political parties in Scotland

As noted in the opening chapter, Scotland's political party system, while closely linked with that of Britain as a whole, nevertheless remains strongly distinctive for a number of reasons. For one thing, there now effectively exists in Scotland a four-party system, with Labour, the SNP, the Liberal Democrats, and the Conservatives all consistently managing to secure more than 15 percent support among the electorate (System 3 poll). With the exception of the SNP, these parties all operate at the British level, with their Scottish arms remaining subordinate to the national organizing structure. (The SNP is, of course, the only major political entity advocating outright independence for Scotland). The British-level parties have, together, long secured at least three-quarters of the Scottish vote at major elections, Under the changed environment of a new Scottish political sphere, however, this is showing signs of change, as evidenced by the 1999 Scottish election, when the SNP secured almost 30 percent of the national vote. At various times

before and after that election, opinion polls have shown SNP support to be reaching over 35 percent and even, at times, nearing 40 percent ("The 1999 Scottish General Election: Holyrood Election Results").

While support for the SNP, the Conservatives, and the Liberal-Democrats has risen and fallen over the years, support for the Scottish Labour Party has remained fairly steady over time, at between 40 and 50 percent. The other three parties have generally been left to fight for the remainder, and typically any change in support for any one of the non-Labour parties has come at the expense of one or more of the others. In terms of comparing Scottish and UK-level politics, however, perhaps the most striking disparity has been in support for the Conservatives North and South of the border. While the Tories typically retained the support of up to 45 percent of all British voters at general elections from 1979 to 1997, they have during this time attracted, on average, less than 20 percent of the Scottish vote (Cornford, 1991). In the 1992 general election, the Conservatives won a majority in the House of Commons, while losing all but 10 of their Scottish MPs. When, five years later, they were soundly beaten across the UK, they nevertheless retained a significant representation in Westminster while losing every single constituency in Scotland.

What follows is a brief outline of the major political parties that were involved in the Scottish political system during the run-up to the Scottish parliamentary elections in May 1999.

1. *Labour/New Labour/Scottish Labour*. The Labour Party is one of the two main political parties that has dominated British politics and government since the early part of the 20th century. Between 1945 and 1979 it had been in power for a total of 17 years, but was then consigned to the opposition benches for 18 years until Tony Blair's election victory in 1997. The Scottish Labour Party has traditionally been more left-wing in tone than its London parent; nevertheless, institutionally, it has remained integrally linked to the UK-level party, with its MPs treated

exactly the same as the other British members of the Parliamentary Labour Party. This state of affairs has continued under Prime Minister Blair. Scottish Labour MPs are expected and required to remain loyal to the Labour government in charge at Westminster, and the omniscient power of the party whips applies to them just as much as to their English and Welsh counterparts. Scottish Labour's leader in 1999, Secretary of State Donald Dewar, was widely regarded as a tireless campaigner for devolution and a man of integrity, although his credentials as an effective leader had yet to be verified. In terms of popular support, opinion polls placed Labour as the first or second most popular party in Scotland; from July 1998 to May 1999, support for Labour ranged between 36 and 46 percent (System 3).

2. *Scottish National Party (SNP)*. The SNP is the only major party in Scotland advocating full independence for that country. Formed in 1928 as the National Party of Scotland, it remained mostly sidelined by the UK-oriented parties until 1974. In that year's two general elections (in February and October), the party secured first seven and then 11 parliamentary seats in the Westminster parliament, in elections where the party fought on a platform of preserving North Sea oil profits for the Scottish people, rather than the Westminster government. The party saw a slump in the 1980s, followed by a resurgence in the 1990s, as the issue of devolution moved to center stage. With the collapse of support for the Conservatives (see below), the SNP established itself as one of the strongest parties in Scotland, well ahead of the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives and even challenging Labour in popular support. The SNP's leader in 1999 was Alex Salmond, the Westminster MP for Banff and Buchan.

3. *Conservatives/Scottish Conservatives*. The Scottish arm of the Conservative Party (officially known as the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party) has always remained closely wedded to the UK party – as befits an entity that has long been powerfully committed to preserving the Union status quo. The Conservatives last gained a majority of Scottish seats in

1951, and since then they have seen their share of both the popular vote and their Westminster representation drop steadily. The Thatcher years in particular saw the Tories become increasingly unpopular in Scotland, as even traditionally safe (typically suburban and rural) Tory seats came under pressure not only from Labour, but also the Liberal-Democrats as well as the resurgent SNP. The low point came in the general election of 1997, when the Conservatives lost every last one of their Westminster seats in Scotland (as well as Wales). As the debate over devolution accelerated in the 1990s, the Conservatives were left as the only major party which rejected the need for any sort of devolved parliament – in a country where polls consistently indicated that approximately three-quarters of the Scottish population favored such a parliament. Thus it was from a historically weak position that the Conservatives entered the campaign for representation in a parliament whose utility and legitimacy they had long opposed in principle. However, the Scottish party leader, David McLetchie, an Edinburgh lawyer, was widely liked – in spite of his party affiliation – for his sense of humor and easy-going style.

4. *Liberal Democrats/Scottish Liberal-Democrats*. The Liberal Democrats are descendants of a 1980s union between the Liberal Party and the Social Democrats. The Liberal party itself, descended from the Whigs, was one of the great British parties of the 19th and early 20th centuries – the party of Gladstone and Lloyd-George – but following the First World War the Liberals went into a permanent decline that saw them perennially marginalized as the third party. Apart from the Second World war and a brief period of coalition with Labour in the 1970s – the much-maligned "Lib-Lab pact" – the party has remained out of power at Westminster since 1922. However, with the new proportional representation voting system in place for the Scottish parliamentary system, Scottish leader Jim Wallace saw a real chance at gaining power, albeit most likely as a coalition partner with Labour.

In addition to the four main parties referred to above, two fringe parties, the *Scottish Socialist Party* and the *Scottish Greens,* also contested the election. The SSP was a radical Socialist party whose biggest attraction was its fiery, charismatic leader, Tommy Sheridan – who garnered a fair share of media attention. The Greens, without such a public face to attract the media, remained firmly below the media's radar screen for the most part. Support for both parties remained low, though in the case of the SSP it seemed as if the party might gain just enough votes in West-central Scotland to give Sheridan a regional seat under the PR system.

Political power and media policy in Scotland, the UK, and the EU

The media's relationship with the state, as opposed to other elements of civil society, is also worth noting. In this context, all the British media – even the independent press – remain vulnerable to more direct pressure from the government and elsewhere, through the mechanisms of the Official Secrets Act, the libel laws, and the ever-present threat of a privacy bill being foisted on the media (Goodwin, 1999). This sets up a potentially antagonistic relationship with the state. By contrast, the press's relationship with major elements of civil society seems to be more complementary in nature.

As the sovereign entity with the longest continuous record of involvement with the mass media, the British state still provides the best starting point from which to consider the more recent developments and changing circumstances emanating from the rise of competing polities at the sub-national (Scottish) and supranational (EU) levels. It need hardly be said that the state intervenes, in some way, in the operation of all mass media. But in the past century, most governments have tended to intervene far more directly in the activities of broadcast media than in print. This state of affairs has been just as true of Britain as elsewhere. As Goodwin (1999) reminds us:

> State monopoly and state ownership have been a feature of virtually every European country and of many other countries in other continents. Even in free-market America, state regulation of radio and television has always been more stringent than state regulation over any other media. (p. 131)

There are many reasons for this, not least of which are the historical antecedents of each medium. The print media in Britain evolved over a long historical period that included constant libertarian pressure in that country for freedom from government control (beginning with John Milton's *Areopagitica* in the 17th century). This certainly has not been the case for most of the history of British broadcasting. While it is undoubtedly true that the British state has shaped all media industries to some extent, it is also true that no media industry has been as comprehensively shaped by the state as has television and radio broadcasting. The ostensible reason given for increased government regulation in the 1920s, spectrum scarcity, undoubtedly has some validity (Crisell, 1999, p. 61). However, it is also worth pointing out that the British solution to this problem relied as much on the prevailing ideological attitude of that period: that of the interventionist state, with its presumption that a broadcast monopoly under a public corporation was a "natural" way to organize things (Goodwin, 1999, p. 130).

Another important point to consider is that in Britain there is, in effect, no coordinated national media policy. Instead, the government, through the Home Office, has set the general regulatory framework over the years, but otherwise maintains a hands-off approach (apart from some notable instances involving government interference with broadcasters over national security matters, an area that is outside the scope of this study). Having said that, the broad control of broadcasting is not a power that Westminster is willing to give up. Thus the Scottish executive was granted responsibility for the arts, museums, and cultural heritage in Scotland – but refused control over broadcast regulation. Instead, the British government has retained ultimate control of all UK broadcasting as a "reserved power."

The Department of National Heritage (DNH) is the UK government department with overall responsibility for policy on broadcasting and press regulation, as well as (in England) the following affairs: the arts, sport and recreation, the National Lottery, libraries, museums and galleries, export licensing of cultural goods, the built heritage, the royal estates and tourism. In addition, the department represents the UK's interests in various international forums. The British Home Office has also traditionally played a role in UK broadcasting policy formulation. However, particularly since the early 1980s, it has been the Department of Trade and Industry that has played an increasingly important role in formulating broadcast policy. This is significant in itself, since the DTI has been "given an overall brief for broadcasting as an industry" (O'Malley 1994, p. 124), thus ensuring that broadcasting would be treated as an economic, rather than a cultural, entity. The setup of broadcasting regulation therefore reflects the still-centralized nature of the medium in the context of the British state. The UK (including Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland) is, in broadcast terms, still essentially one unit; and although the "national regions" are becoming more assertive in media matters, ultimate authority over broadcast matters remains firmly in the hands of Westminster.

Scottish media overview in the 1990s

Scottish media – whether print or broadcast – have come under many pressures in recent years, not all of them social or cultural in nature. The undermining of the BBC-ITV duopoly, which took hold in the 1980s, was undertaken for primarily commercial reasons, though technological change and the ideological predisposition of the Thatcher government also played a vital part. But the introduction of greater competition across the broadcast industry opened up new challenges to "British" broadcasting that were cultural, rather than purely commercial, in nature. Broadcasting deregulation (while much less extreme than concurrent moves in the United

States) nevertheless opened the door to new paradigms that emphasized multiple identities in the UK – based on characteristics such as race, sexual identity, and especially national (sub-British) identity. The new orientation to broadcast policy was perhaps best illustrated by two developments in the 1980s: the creation of S4C, a primarily Welsh-language version of a new national commercial channel (Channel 4); and the institution of a direct government grant to support Gaelic-language broadcasting in Scotland ("Soft-soaping the Gaels", 1992). What's more, perhaps ironically, this trend has been supported, albeit indirectly, by the EU Commission's increasing emphasis on regionalism (Jeffrey, 1996). However, we should be careful not to overemphasize the impact of these moves. While programming targeted directly to Welsh and Scottish interests has increased somewhat since the early 1980s, it remains true that broadcasting in the UK remains constituted overwhelmingly within a UK paradigm. What's more, unlike Wales, there is no structural challenge to that paradigm in Scotland. While the legislation that set up S4C gives that channel complete local control over scheduling, no such provision exists for any Scottish broadcaster (Smith, 1997). And, as already mentioned, the Westminster government has made sure to retain broadcasting as a "reserved power," under the continued control of London. In the commercial sector, things are not substantially different. While majority ownership of the main Scottish commercial broadcasters, Scottish Television and Grampian, remains in Scottish hands (through the Scottish Media Group), these broadcasters work under the auspices of the Independent Television Commission, a UK body charged with monitoring and controlling the ITV commercial network through the country (Schlesinger, 1998b, p. 64). Again, opportunities for independent action at the Scottish level are limited.

As for the BBC itself, the existence and organizational structure of the corporation in Scotland had often been cited, at least prior to devolution, as paralleling Scotland's unfavorable constitutional position *vis-a-vis* the rest of the UK (Meech & Kilborn 1992, p. 245). The result of

this development has been the imposition of cultural codes by London on Scotland, and the relegation of many aspects of genuine Scottish culture to the background (Lemire, 1987). However, it is worth noting that, in recent years, the Scottish arms of UK-wide media and cultural organizations such as the BBC have become increasingly outspoken in favor or Scottish over British interests. This is highlighted for example, by the recent controversy over the desire for a Scottish "national" Six O'Clock News broadcast, recounted above (Seenan, 1998; Buxton & Groom, 1998).

Table 4.1 Major Scottish-originated media outlets with Scotland-wide or multi-regional coverage

Media outlet/type of medium	Owner	Reach
The *Herald* (daily newspaper)	Scottish Media Group (Scottish-based)	Scotland-wide
Sunday Herald (Sunday newspaper)	Scottish Media Group (Scottish-based)	Scotland-wide
The *Scotsman* (daily newspaper)	Barclay (English-based)	Scotland-wide
Scotland on Sunday (Sunday newspaper)	Barclay (English-based)	Scotland-wide
Daily Record (daily newspaper)	Mirror Group News (English-based)	Scotland-wide
Sunday Mail (Sunday newspaper)	Mirror Group News (English-based)	Scotland-wide
Sunday Post (Sunday newspaper)	D.C. Thomson (Scottish-based)	Scotland-wide
Daily Express (daily newspaper)	Hollinger (English-based)	Scotland-wide
Sunday Express (Sunday newspaper)	Hollinger (English-based)	Scotland-wide
BBC Scotland (TV)	British Broadcasting Corporation	Scotland-wide
Scottish Television	Scottish Media Group (Scottish-based)	Central Scotland
Grampian Television	Scottish Media Group (Scottish-based)	Scottish Highlands
BBC Radio Scotland	British Broadcasting Corporation	Scotland-wide

Table 4.1 outlines current patterns of ownership and control of the main Scottish media outlets. (Note: Independent, i.e., commercial TV and radio stations are regionally based, and do not have national coverage; they are, however, expected to cover "Scottish" as well as specifically regional news events and issues. The two main newspapers that are at the heart of the present study – the *Herald* and the *Scotsman* – are reviewed in more detail below.)

Development of the press's role in Scotland

Beyond the more macro-level aspects of the media-government nexus described above, the remainder of this chapter seeks to examine and understand specifically the role of the press in Scotland. This involves a discussion of the various facets of this role, and the significant ways in which its manifestation pertains first and foremost to Scotland, rather than the UK or the EU. In particular, the concepts of news agendas and news values will be discussed, as will the professional, cultural, institutional, and commercial forces being brought to bear on the industry as a whole, its constituent titles, and its class of news producers.

Given the extent to which the form and content of broadcast media remains concentrated in London's hands, it is more appropriate in this context to focus on the press, which enjoys a significantly greater degree of local autonomy than is the case with the "Scottish" audiovisual media. Within this context, the print sector retains a level of significance largely absent from other mass media operating in Scotland, as will be outlined below. This brings up the centrality of the press in any analysis of Scottish media – a state of affairs that does not necessarily hold for other political entities in the EU. So, while this discussion is intended to follow on naturally from the previous chapter's broader analysis of media policy at the Scottish, UK, and EU levels, it should be noted that the analysis of the press necessarily and inevitably focuses on the Scottish (and, where appropriate, UK) contexts; in this institutional context, the EU aspect recedes in

importance, given the relative lack of EU involvement in member states' print media. This is not to downgrade the place of the EU in the broader study; rather, it is to recognize its lack of importance in this particular context.

The first step is to consider more carefully the institutional and commercial forces that have attended the historical development of the modern Scottish press, and which manifest themselves in the medium today. Given the nature of these developments, which are outlined below, these forces must be regarded in light of the experience of the British press as a whole. Only from this vantage point can the peculiarities of the Scottish institution, as it developed in the 19th and 20th centuries, be appreciated.

At both the Scottish and UK levels, it almost goes without saying that the press as an institution has seen significant changes in the years since the Second World War.[4] Change has been particularly pronounced in the past two decades, under the pressure of technological change and forces of rampant commercialism and competition – forces which have, of course, been felt with equal intensity in the other mass media. At the same time, the press's relationship with the British state has in many ways remained remarkably stable. Based on a liberal tradition of a free press buttressed by a long period of struggle for press freedom in the 1800s (Curran & Seaton, 1997), the press-state relationship settled down into a more-or-less stable compact for much of the 20th century. This compact has long allowed the press a significant degree of freedom to report on the issues of the day, albeit within the fairly tight limits set by civil law and government restrictions over national security.

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[4] One point which should be made here is that, when specific reference is made to the "British" press, this study refers to the London-based institution (with its centralized production and nationwide distribution). Beyond these broad introductory remarks, the Scottish press, based in Scotland and with a separate institutional history, is considered separately from the British entity.

The overwhelmingly commercial nature of the UK press is an important consideration in its own right. As Fowler (1991) points out, the profit motive will inevitably color the press's content, and provide functional and institutional restrictions on news agendas. Apart from financial restrictions on what can and cannot be reported, newspapers will generally select and present news in a form which is in tune with the capitalist-oriented ideologies of the institution. Sparks (1999), is more critical, questioning whether the structure and organization of the commercial press – which is not obliged, as broadcasters are, to be impartial in coverage of political affairs – even "permits the expression of the plurality of views necessary to the democratic political debate" (p. 41). Nevertheless, this is the context within which the present-day press industry in the UK must be considered.

It is also worth noting that, within this commercial context, links between the press and the broadcast media have increased dramatically in recent years – in both form and content, and at both operational and institutional level (Curran & Seaton, 1997). As disseminators of news, information and especially entertainment, the press and the broadcast media more and more serve basically similar functions in society, and increasingly they feed off each other in terms of form and content. Meanwhile, the press has also been caught up in the general trend towards conglomerization in industry, with organizations such as Rupert Murdoch's News International owning vast worldwide media empires, as well as a stable of British newspapers.

It is also important to consider the press's developing relationship with its audience. Hutchison (1987) and Fowler (1991) list a number of points which are important in determining just how readers relate to their newspapers – such as how publications construct a particular view of reality for their audience, based on their perceptions of the nature and prejudices of their readership. These points will be examined more carefully in relation to individual titles in subsequent chapters.

In some ways, the character of British newspapers has changed significantly over the post-war period. While an increasing proportion of the press has become independent of close party political affiliations (Curran, 1982, p. 214), the industry's institutionalization within the emerging global market system has itself come to serve as a controlling force over modern journalism. As a large business enterprise or part of a conglomerate, the modern newspaper is generally vulnerable to various external pressures, from the political establishment as well as other powerful lobbies and pressure groups.

What appears to have happened in recent years is that sections of the press have moved closer ideologically to the market capitalist-oriented conservative establishment, in order to further the interests of its multinational owners: Murdoch again springs to mind, as does Canadian media mogul Conrad Black, with his extensive media and wider business holdings in the UK and beyond. Baistow (1985) draws a clear distinction between today's proprietors and the press barons of previous years – such as Beaverbrook, Northcliffe and Rothermere – whose "modifying diversity ... made for a more heterogeneous press, in terms of both editorial standards and political viewpoints" (p. 2). By contrast, today's concentration of ownership has resulted in a near-oligopoly situation in the press, where a mere handful of corporate concerns control most of the British daily and Sunday newspaper market.

The current Scottish press scene: ownership, control, and political outlook

From the preceding discussion it might seem difficult to accept a position that posits one part of Britain's seemingly unitary press system as being exceptional, in that it has developed in substantially different ways – and within a substantially different context – from the rest. Yet that is exactly the argument that can be made in relation to the Scottish press, and the there are clear historical, cultural, and geographic reasons for this being the case. For, in the context of the press

structure in Britain, Scotland *is* clearly exceptional. As a semi-autonomous entity, its print media market is not dominated by the cohort of London-based English titles that dominates the market in all other parts of the UK. Instead, there exists north of the border a press structure which operates independently and (to a degree) unilaterally, reporting on Scottish and British affairs from a Scottish perspective. This state of affairs is long-standing and apparently durable; and, in UK mass media terms, this structure is not replicated either in any other medium or in any other region or nation within the UK. While it is clear that the Scottish press operates within an institutional framework that is recognizably British (and continues to do so), there are a number of historical, social and political circumstances which set it apart from the rest of the UK. In this regard, the Scottish press still closely mirrors Scotland itself – to a greater degree, almost certainly, than is the case with audiovisual media. While the broadcast media are still centered in London, allowing Scotland only a marginal "regional" perspective, the Scottish-produced and -edited press retains a dominant position *in relation to the Scottish public sphere.* As Smith (1997) notes, the Scottish press retains a "dominant editorial and operational presence" to such an extent that, whereas only six percent of television programs appearing on Scottish screens originate in Scotland, approximately 80 percent of Scottish daily newspapers are edited and produced there (p. 35). In recent years, similar conclusions as to the continuing power and influence of the Scottish press have been reached by Hutchison (1987), Meech & Kilborn (1992), and Schlesinger (1998b), who emphasizes "the strong hold that Scottish-produced and headquartered newspapers exercise in the country, when compared with most of those published south of the border" (p. 62). Compared to most other regions of the EU, the press's role in relation to Scotland's political affairs is therefore of especial importance. This is the main reason why the present dissertation focuses primarily on the output and content of the press. It is clearly the most appropriate vehicle for study in the present context.

Beyond its general salience in Scottish political life, the press remains quite clearly differentiated from its English counterpart in terms of content and political viewpoint. The major "national" titles – including the *Herald* and the *Scotsman*, both "quality" titles, and the popular *Daily Record* – cover Scotland quite extensively, offering quality content, background and analysis of Scottish affairs that are often all but ignored by the English national press. They also cover British affairs from a genuinely alternative perspective, with, for example, a relative absence (D.C. Thomson titles notwithstanding) of the right-wing bias so often found in English titles (Hutchison, 1987). In short, the press in Scotland has retained the position of prime agenda-setter in terms of political affairs; the two quality papers in particular "have a disproportionately significant role in setting the agenda of Scottish political affairs" (Schlesinger, 1998b, p. 63). Having said that, there have been recent developments in the Scottish press that have, to some extent, muddied the waters with regard to what makes a Scottish newspaper title clearly "Scottish."

When the focus is turned to individual titles, it becomes clear that the Scottish press scene has become somewhat more complicated in recent years. For some time, and up till the late 1980s, there were only three nationally circulating daily titles in Scotland, all of which could clearly be labeled "Scottish" within the terms outlined earlier in the chapter: the *Herald*, the *Scotsman*, and the *Daily Record*. (In addition, there were two Sunday titles available at that time: the *Sunday Mail* and the *Sunday Post*, both of which were available across Scotland and beyond). In 1988, however, a fourth daily contender entered the Scottish arena with the instigation of a Scottish edition of the *Sun* – an English newspaper printed in Glasgow but whose editorial content is largely dictated in London. Then, in the early 1990s, Scottish production of the *Daily Express*, another English title, restarted after a break of almost two decades. Most recently, Mirror Group Newspapers, the owner of the *Daily Record*, has begun marketing a Scottish version of the

Mirror – previously regarded as the *Record*'s English-only sister paper, yet now placed ambiguously alongside the Record in news vendors' display shelves across Scotland. (The *Record* is owned by the English-based Mirror Group Newspapers, is officially the *Daily Mirror*'s "sister" paper in Scotland, and its circulation is combined with the *Mirror*'s for the purpose of compiling the National Readership Survey figures, for example. Yet despite recent attempts by MGN to turn it effectively into a Scottish edition of the *Mirror*, the *Record* retains a substantial level of independence, as well as a separate identity, from its English sister.)

These developments complicate the matter of what actually constitutes a "Scottish" newspaper, although the strongest claimants to that title, both in character and in terms of superior nationwide circulation, remain the *Herald*, the *Record*, and the *Scotsman*. The *Herald* – formerly the *Glasgow Herald* – remains, with the *Scotsman*, one of two serious broadsheet titles with an aspiration to national status and a claim to the title of prime agenda-setter in Scottish affairs (something that will be examined in greater detail later in the chapter). In terms of Sunday papers, the Scottish press has actually gained a stronger foothold in the quality sector over the past decade, first with the creation of *Scotland on Sunday* (a stable-mate to the *Scotsman*) in the early 1990s, and then the inauguration of a Sunday version of the *Herald* later in the decade. These two qualities join a pair of tabloid mid-market Sundays, both of which are Scottish-produced and -edited, and both of which have a phenomenal presence in terms of sales and readership: the D.C. Thomson-owned *Sunday Post*, and the *Sunday Mail*, the *Record*'s stable-mate (Schlesinger, 1998b, p. 63).

In terms of ownership and control, the Scottish press has been subject to many of the same powerful commercial fluctuations as have affected print media in England and elsewhere. The *Herald* has been particularly strongly impacted by such changes. After years of being under the control of the Lonrho group, the *Herald* became a wholly Scottish-owned newspaper in 1992,

thanks to a management buy-out. Five years later, the paper was sold to what became the Scottish Media Group (SMG) – a mini-conglomerate whose holdings include Scottish Television in central Scotland and Grampian Television in the North-east of the country. Incidentally, this development raised strong fears about concentration of media ownership, since the group now controls one of Scotland's two main quality newspapers as well as 90 percent of the Scottish television audience (Schlesinger, 1998b, p. 64). The *Scotsman* had a somewhat smoother ride in the 1990s, at least in terms of ownership. The paper ended up in the hands of Press Holdings, a London-based media company owned by the Barclay brothers, David and Frederick. One development that did cause a stir, however, was the appointment of Andrew Neil as editor-in-chief of Scotsman Publications, the parent company which controls the *Scotsman* and its Sunday stable-mate, *Scotland on Sunday*.

In formal terms, both the *Herald* and the *Scotsman* generally follow similar patterns to those of the English qualities. Thus, like their English counterparts, they are privately owned institutions with a dual commitment to making money and preserving the practices and traditions of what might be called "Anglo-Saxon" or Anglo-American journalism, which includes a strong support for freedom of expression. In this, they can be considered as counterparts and equals of many other mainstream quality titles in the English-speaking world – those that presume to represent the public sphere of their state- or nation-based polity. It would therefore be a mistake to regard the *Herald* and the *Scotsman* as "regional" newspapers in the UK sense. Their role as agenda-setters in the national (Scottish) context places them alongside such organs as the *New York Times*, the (Toronto) *Globe & Mail*, and the *Times of India*. In their content, then, both Scottish titles inevitably concentrate on Scottish domestic as well as external political affairs, the extensive coverage of which they have long regarded as a natural – and central – part of their function as newspapers. This function in relation to Scottish political affairs, and their

relationships to affairs beyond Scotland's borders, can only be strengthened by the institution of the new parliament and executive in the Scottish public sphere.

Both the *Herald* and the *Scotsman* claim a high proportion of ABC1 (middle-upper income and professional) readers – although at around 70 per cent the figure is slightly lower than most English qualities (National Readership Survey, 1999). Nevertheless, like their English counterparts, the Scottish papers assume their readers to be predominantly middle-class; their news-agenda concentration on political-economic and current-affairs subjects and their use of the "educated" mode of address – calculated to appeal to middle-upper income audiences, much as the English *Guardian* and the *Independent* do – also reflects this, albeit in a Scottish context.

News values in the Scottish press

When considering the tricky topic of news values, we must first place it in the context of the media's relationship with the nation of which it a part. In this regard, the "nation" can be considered as a unit made up of what Gans (1979, pp. 20 - 21) refers to as "symbolic complexes," such as government, religion, the law, medicine, education. the arts, and so on. As has already been indicated, in Scotland, many – perhaps most – of these symbolic complexes are primarily Scottish, rather than British, in nature. It is within the context of the nation that the issues that are made salient through an articulation of news values, and especially those divisive issues determined by class, race, age, gender, and ideology, are primarily dealt. Increasingly, as this study shows, such societal divisions in Scotland are being dealt with in a specifically Scottish, rather than a British, context. And, of course, one of the most potentially divisive societal issues is that of national identity, which by definition emphasizes the divisions between the competing cultural and political entities of Scotland and Britain – not to mention "England." These factors

support the notion that, in the present context, the prime articulation of "the nation" in the media is shifting toward the Scottish entity and not that of the United Kingdom.

Within this context, there are a number of adjunct factors that should be considered in any overview of news values in the Scottish media. For example, news journalists still often contend that they are "objective" – that is, they are neutral reporters of facts. Is this true? Or do reporters inevitably shape the news every time they report on it, as is argued in this course? The analogy of a picture frame has been used to explain what reporters do. Just as photographers decide what to place within a photo's boundaries – thereby "framing" the photograph – so do reporters decide what to place within a story – what facts, what quotes, what verbs, adjectives, and so on. What is included is as important as what is excluded. In this way, reporters "frame" the news.

Gans (1979) highlights many of the normative roles (or functions) that, at the broadest level, journalists tend to fulfill in a democratic society. While Gans writes in an American context, many of these roles and values can be considered as applicable to the Scottish situation. Turning first to the normative roles, there are four such roles undertaken by the media: first, that they should by their actions support democracy (given that the media are an important source of information and access to competing ideas, and, given that a democratic citizenry must have access to such information and ideas in order to be able to participate fully, it follows that the media should *facilitate* and *organize* information flow, as well as perform a "watchdog" role, thereby acting as a check on power of government; second, there is an important surveillance role, whereby citizens rely on the media to tell them what's going on in society; third, there is an interpretation role for the media, by which they are expected to interpret the news, and provide necessary context so that citizens might make sense of the issues that affect them; fourth, there is the safety valve role, which refers to the role media play by simply giving people the chance to

make their voices heard and "let off some steam" (e.g., over crime, taxes, tuition fees, airport congestion) – in the hope that their representatives are listening.

At the broadest level, these roles guide journalists in determining whether something is "newsworthy." They feed directly into the enduring values of news journalism. These values are widely known, and include timeliness, proximity, impact, prominence, conflict, currency, and the bizarre (Grossberg, Wartella, & Whitney, 1998). Such values, which tend to apply to journalists across many cultures and countries, must necessarily be inferred, since "journalists do not, in most instances, deliberately insert values into the news" (Gans, 1979, p. 40). While it would be reckless to automatically assume that the press holds to a common set of values, it is useful to keep the existence of such values in mind – as a guide – when studying press operations in any given political-cultural context.

Source-journalist relations

In the context of the present study, the extent of the symbiosis in source-journalist relations is highlighted not only through interpersonal and social links, but also through a number of other factors. These include institutional links among the political parties' rapidly expanding public relations operations, government public information offices, business promotional and P.R. activities, and the press outlets that are themselves part of larger business conglomerates (see chapter 4). The rise of public relations in Britain and Scotland, and in particular to the huge expansion in party political news management and public information in recent years, is quite exceptional, and has resulted in a paradigm shift in UK politics (Petley, 1997; Harrison, 1999). This brings to the fore the concept of "information subsidy" associated with Oscar Gandy (1982). Gandy starts with the notion that information is a commodity, which has certain value to media producers – including certain opportunity costs associated with the time and effort required by

reporters to gather the news. What has occurred in relation to the media, Gandy argues, is the shift in news reporting linked to the proliferation of public relations outlets. He characterizes the burgeoning public relations industry as a central component of a tacit attempt by powerful government and business interests to set the agenda by offering certain types of information at little or no cost. These outlets effectively subsidize the cost of production of news, since it is easier, quicker, and cheaper for journalists and their news organizations to utilize the content provided for free by the PR industry than it is to go out and uncover news on their own. Journalists, under deadline and productivity pressures, are often all too happy to accept these subsidies, which typically take the form of press releases, press packets, video news releases, and so on. But in accepting these handouts (even if they subsequently edit or alter them in some way), journalists allow themselves to be directed by an agenda that is set largely by the interests they are purportedly covering on an impartial basis. Indeed, Gandy's definition of information subsidy eschews any notion of journalistic news values by focusing strictly on the economic cost of news – "the price of information that may be reduced selectively by interested parties in order to increase the consumption of preferred information" (1982, p. 30). From this perspective, the Scottish press has allowed itself to be subsidized to an unprecedented degree in recent years (Brown, 2000).

The exact nature of this process in relation to the Scottish parliament is still vague, but some general statements can be safely made. Political party use of communications operatives (also known as "spin doctors") to interact with the mass media has certainly increased markedly in recent years. In relation to the Scottish elections, all of the parties had media managers on hand for this purpose, including the Scottish Socialists and the Scottish Greens. However, by far the biggest and most efficient media management operation was not a Scottish operation at all, but one run by the London Labour party. The media center, based at London party headquarters in

Millbank Tower, directed much of the Labour campaign in Scotland. This formidable operation is credited for having won Labour the UK election in 1997 (Jones, 1997; Oborne, 1999). Under its powerful director of communications, Alastair Campbell, the center turned its attention to the Scottish situation early in 1999. It's media machine, complete with a media campaign that emphasized the fearful possibilities of a potential Scottish split from the UK, was noted by many in the media as a significant influence on the campaign. While there has been relatively little scholarly work published to date on the full extent of the London media centre's role in the campaign, many journalistic sources have credited its role as significant. There is also a strong perception in the media that Labour's media machine clearly outclassed its political opposition – particularly the SNP (Cook, 1999; "Spinners and Losers, " 1999). While the present work is not focused on an in-depth analysis of the media management systems of the parties, it is nevertheless a factor that needs to be considered in relation to the dominant media messages appearing in the press – especially considering the extent of media management operations emanating from outside Scotland. These issues are dealt with in more detail in chapters 6 and 7.

On a different, linguistic level, the ideologies and beliefs of the powerful are further promulgated through the very discourses transmitted to us by the press and other media. When reporters get information from accessed voices, either first-hand or second-hand through press releases or whatever, they are often in the habit of replicating the language and jargon of that source. In this way, the press effectively "reproduces the attitudes of the powerful" (Fowler, 1991, p. 23). This may not be a conscious decision on their part, but it clearly happens, nevertheless. It is particularly relevant where the paper's editors or owners are already predisposed to that source's views (whatever they may be). This recalls Chomsky's (1989) characterization of the capitalist media as representing nothing more than the opinion of elite groups in society, who limit the range of acceptable opinion in the news by promulgating

"necessary illusions" by which such groups manage and control public opinion. While Chomsky focuses on a broader structural overview of the political economy of the media, Fowler examines the role of dominant media discourses as representative of media-promulgated ideological constructs, involving capitalist, racist, and patriarchal notions of society.

This is a point that requires illumination. Few scholars – even those who describe themselves as Marxist – still hold to the notion of a single dominating economic base that controls to social and cultural superstructure. Things are much more complex than that. It certainly isn't the case that the leading members of any of these polities are in general agreement among themselves, let alone members of the other groups. There are all kinds of conflicting and contradictory ideologies and beliefs running through the political and business establishments in Edinburgh, London, and Brussels, many or most of which are betrayed (to anyone who is consciously looking) by the discourses reproduced in the media. On the broad issue of Scotland's role in both the United Kingdom and the EU, the conflicts and differences in opinion are quite apparent. For example, there are significant differences between and among elites over whether Scottish devolution be seen as an end result in itself, or as just the first step on the road to full independence in the EU (though, as is indicated in the study, the preponderance of media opinion represents the former position, for specific reasons). Significant questions also remain over how the Scottish parliament and executive should articulate its emerging new political and national identity in relation to England, the EU, EU nation-states, and regions in both the UK and the EU. Doubt remains over the extent to which Scottish representatives in Brussels will remain firmly under the wing of Westminster, as opposed to striking out on their own (Mair & McAteer, 1997; Bond, 2000; McConnell, 2000; Purvis, 2000; Taylor, 2000).

Only time will provide clear answers to such questions. However, the Scottish press reviewed in this study provides many fascinating clues to at least beginning to answer these

questions, via the discourses running through the headlines and columns. Such discourses are provided both by the journalists who write these articles and the sources they choose to highlight. Following the descriptive content analysis in chapter 5, this is the focus for the analysis in chapters 6 and 7.

In the period leading up to the study, the issue of Scottish devolution was hotly debated in the *Herald* and the *Scotsman*. The debate only intensified in the early part of 1999, spurred on by the imminent elections for the Parliament and its official opening. The next chapter will explore in more detail how this dissertation analyzes the ways in which individual titles set the agenda and framed the political debate during the first few months of 1999, as devolution moved from the realm of speculation to that of reality.

Chapter 5. Analysis of the political news environment

Having reviewed the background to and scope of the present study, we now turn to the analysis itself, and the ways in which the relevant methods are being applied. As the first of three findings chapters, this chapter introduces a two-stage analysis – a quantitative content analysis followed by a frame analysis – that encompasses the study of the Scottish parliament's role in determining Scottish political and cultural links with the UK and the EU, as seen through the editorial eyes of the *Herald* and the *Scotsman*. It thus sets the framework for the remainder of the study, by indicating the range of coverage presented in Scotland's two main national daily newspapers.

Design and rationale

The present study places quantitative and qualitative analysis within the structure of a two-stage analysis. The descriptive content analysis is intended to provide a broader overview of the types of political news being reported in the press during the period of study. To facilitate this goal, the descriptive content analysis surveys a total of 1,057 articles dealing with political news in the Scottish quality press. The information thus gleaned is descriptive: it "sets the scene" for the frame analysis, which is outlined below.

The study at the broadest level is therefore a content analysis, in that it consists of a detailed analysis of selected content of two major Scottish newspapers. For reasons that are outlined below, it can therefore be best characterized as an interpretive frame analysis that also includes some descriptive quantitative elements for contextual purposes. Still, there is an emphasis on descriptive statistics at the outset, since it is recognized that some sort of categorical framework

for this material is helpful, if not essential. This necessitates a brief review of the quantitative aspects of content analysis. What follows is a detailed rationale for the preferred approaches in the present study – outlining the strengths and weaknesses of various methods and approaches within these methods – followed by the first-stage analysis itself.

Examined in its traditional social scientific terms, content analysis has, of course, been defined in fairly narrow terms as a quantitative method, the purpose of which is to "identify and count the occurrence of specified characteristics or dimensions of texts" (Hansen, Cottle, Negrine, & Newbold, 1998, p. 95). At its most basic level, the content analysis is useful for indicating what is (and, by inference, what is not) being reported on a specific subject or subjects. The standard procedure is to code, say, newspaper articles and/or broadcast news stories according to a number of variables so that a picture can be built up of what kinds of issues are being covered. Modern content analysis of this sort has been with us for about half a century, and has been accepted as a prime tool of media analysis at least since the publication of Bernard Berelson's 1952 study, *Content analysis in communication research* (Wimmer & Dominick, 1994). Surveys of mass media research from the 1960s through the 1990s have shown the method's sustained popularity (Tannenbaum & Greenberg, 1968; Comstock, 1975; Moffett & Dominick, 1987; Wimmer & Dominick, 1994).

Despite its continuing popularity, there are a number of strong epistemological and practical reasons why the method on its own might be regarded as inadequate (and why the present study focuses on a frame analysis rather than a simple content analysis). This study recognizes the admonition of Siegfried Kracauer (1953) who, writing in response to Berelson, was extremely critical of Berelson's preference for quantitative methods. Kracauer, regarded as the author of the first "manifesto of qualitative content analysis" (Larsen, 1991), focuses on the pernicious atomizing effect of quantification on media content, as follows:

> when trying to establish the meaning of texts by breaking them down into quantifiable units (words, expressions, statements, etc.), analysts in fact destroy the very object they are supposed to be studying, since the atomistic character of the resulting data precludes a relevant examination of the relations within each text as a meaningful whole. (p. 122)

More recently, Brent D. Slife and Richard N. Williams, authors of *What's Behind the Research* (1995), have provided an updated critique of the implicit assumptions and implications in most behavioral research. All theories must come from somewhere, they remind us, and invariably these theories emerge from the fertile imaginations of researchers, whose embedded ideas usually take the form of such assumptions and implications – the "from whence" and "whence to" of theories (p. 2). Such researchers proceed to set the terms of the debate, either explicitly or implicitly, by means of the way they structure their research questions – a point often overlooked by many scholars. Slife and Williams, describing the nature of these "embedded ideas" underlying many of the most commonly accepted quantitative/behavioral theories, question the very factuality of science and the scientific method in the social sciences. Data means nothing without *interpretation*, they argue, and it is the interpretation that must always be focused on, first and foremost.

Beyond the more fundamental epistemological issues related to quantitative content analysis, there is, it is generally accepted, some more prosaic limitations to the content analysis as an analytical tool for studying media texts. A fundamental problem, Hansen et al. (1998) note,

> is how far quantification is taken in content analysis and to what degree the quantitative indicators that this technique offers are read or interpreted in relation to questions about the intensity of meanings in texts, the social impact of texts, or the relationship between media texts and the realities which they reflect. (p. 95)

Obviously, the relationship between frequency of occurrence and wider social impact is very complex, and cannot be adequately deduced from a content analysis alone. Instead, the content analysis's prime purpose should be regarded as a means to set the stage for a deeper interpretive

analysis – taking the form, in this case, of a frame analysis – which is in general better suited to getting at these deeper questions of meaning and significance. Therefore, while a quantitative content analysis is used in the present study to yield some useful descriptive data about what is being reported, the emphasis is on the frame analysis to discern the underlying reasons for the news being presented in the manner that it is – and to suggest why certain news is being given more prominence than others. To put it another way: if the content analysis can tell us *what* kinds of news topics are being covered, and what sources are being used, then the frame analysis can help us understand *how* and *why* these issues are being covered, and why these sources are relevant. It should also be able to get us beyond the problem of conflating *salience* (the number of times a word or message appears in the text) and *significance*. As Entman (1993) reminds us:

> Often, coders simply tote up all messages ... and draw conclusions about the dominant meanings. They neglect to measure the salience of elements in the text, and fail to gauge the relationships of the most salient clusters of messages – the frames – to the audience schemata. (p. 57)

The best way to avoid this error, he goes on, is to place any quantitative content data firmly within a framing paradigm. A considered content analysis informed by a theory of framing should therefore enable researchers to overcome many of the most egregious problems of determining salience and significance.

For all the reasons mentioned above, this study veers away from the narrower quantitative definitions of what a content analysis is and should be, and instead focuses on a frame analysis – an approach that incorporates principles of "frame building" and the identification of "media packages" and discursive matrixes in the media content. This aspect will be explored further in the succeeding chapters.

Sample, data collection and limits of analysis

Regardless of the type of analysis undertaken, it is necessary to identify and analyze a set of data that is comprehensive yet limited by practical considerations of time and appropriateness. For the present study, the first step was to trawl primary and secondary sources relating to the Scottish media in a broad sweep, looking for information, ideas, and broad principles; from there, the next step was to choose a representative (in the broader sense of the term) sample of media output and collect a set of data. A number of Scottish media sources were reviewed and tracked for the purpose of providing contextual background – these included the *Daily Record*, *Daily Express*, *Scotland on Sunday*, *Sunday Herald*, BBC Scotland radio and television, and Scottish Television (the commercial network channel for central Scotland). From there, the study narrowed to a content analysis of Scotland's two premier quality newspapers, the *Herald* and the *Scotsman*. (The data-gathering was conducted in Scotland over a period of approximately 10 weeks during the summer of 1999.) As explained in chapter 3, the data collection focused on these media outlets because they were determined to be by far the most significant agenda-setters and interpreters of Scottish political affairs, as well as having a broad national (i.e., Scottish) reach.

At this stage, the survey was strictly limited to cover a particular set of political news, that is, news stories, editorials, and feature stories appearing in these media that dealt with all political news at the Scottish, other UK regional, UK national, and EU levels during the four periods under review. The data collection yielded a final tally of 1,057 political news articles from the *Herald* and the *Scotsman*; this represents all the coverage of UK and European political news that appeared in both newspapers during the periods of analysis. The sample also encompasses the 383 articles selected for the second-stage analysis (see below).

The sample is purposive in nature: it selects all the articles dealing with political news from the four half-month periods across the first half of 1999. Given the nature of the study, the clear definition of the temporal parameters, and the concentration of media coverage on the issues being analyzed, this approach was able to yield more useful results than would have been the case for, say, a constructed week. The four purposive samples from January to July 1999 cover a total of approximately nine weeks of media coverage during this period, or about one third of the total period under review. These samples were timed to include coverage of major initiatives and developments in the emergence of a new Scottish political identity through the first half of that year, leading up to the formal inauguration of the parliament. An informal survey of all six months' coverage in these papers revealed that no significant developments in the gestation of the Scottish parliament was reported outside these periods. The sample therefore is representative of the main thrusts of the media debate throughout the first six months or so of 1999.

Most content analyses – of whatever type or nature – select periods of study based on two main factors: whether the subject of analysis relates to a specific event (e.g., a war, presidential election, or major disaster) or to the media's mapping of some general issue, such as portrayals of race, violence, nuclear power, or whatever (Hansen et. al., 1998). The present study is something of a hybrid: It attempts to do a little of both, since its intention is both to focus on coverage of specific events relating to the political gestation of the Scottish parliament and executive (such as the elections, the official opening, etc.) and to garner a broader sense of the portrayal of Scottish identity politics over the period under review.

Periods of study

The following section briefly recounts the main pertinent events that occurred in the first half of 1999, and is intended to explain why the four periods under review were chosen. (The frequencies for all UK- and EU-related articles appearing in the *Herald* and the *Scotsman* during these periods is summarized in Table 5.4.)

Period 1 (January 16 – 30, 1999)

This first period covers the second half of January 1999, when, after a short rest following the new year, the press resumed its crystal-ball gazing at the possibilities inherent in the coming parliament. The catalyst for the renewed coverage was the release by a parliamentary working group of a detailed blueprint for the Scottish parliament, on January 15. This blueprint, and its coverage in the press, emphasized the ways in which the new parliament would differ from the Westminster model – a theme repeatedly visited in news articles across this period and beyond, and an important element in one of the main media packages identified in chapter 7. The first period of review more or less ended at the close of the month, after a brief flurry of coverage following the announcement of a major rhetorical shift in the Scottish Tories' policy, insofar as they announced a move to emphasize the Scottishness of the party, in place of their traditional focus on British Unionism. While this issue was of some significance, if only for novelty reasons, the minor status of the Scottish Conservatives (the party had secured no seats whatsoever in the previous Westminster general election, in 1997) kept its salience to a minimum. Following this development, coverage of issues relating to the Scottish parliament took a dip for the next six weeks or so.

A total of 219 politics-related stories appeared in the *Herald* and *Scotsman* during this period, of which 68 (or slightly under a third) were selected for close reading in the frame analysis (see below for more details).

Period 2 (March 1 – 15, 1999)

The second period of analysis saw an upsurge in reporting on the upcoming Scottish parliament because it covered a number of pre-election party political conferences in Scotland, as well as other key developments that took place as the election loomed closer on the horizon. The period opened with two major events: New Labour's selection of its team to fight the campaign (and fill ministerial positions should Labour win); and the opening salvoes of the SNP's announcement that it would reverse Labour's recently announced UK-wide tax cut if elected to power. This latter policy, which the SNP dubbed "A penny for Scotland," was to form the basis for one of the campaign's defining features – its focus on economic issues. The announcement prompted a great deal of coverage of the SNP's economic policies – and speculation over its economic competence to govern. In many ways, this period, approximately two months prior to the election, was the rhetorical cauldron from which many of the election's defining themes, symbols, and frames emerged. The coverage of politics in general, and Scottish politics in particular, intensified. A total of 236 politics-related stories was coded during this period, 97 of which were selected for second-stage analysis.

Period 3 (May 1 – 15, 1999)

This period provided a natural bulge in media coverage of the Scottish parliament, as it encompassed the May 6 elections for the Scottish parliament, as well as the early decisions regarding the makeup of the executive branch. The press kept up a barrage of stories concerning the election and Scotland's changing relations with Westminster (and, to a lesser extent,

Brussels). At 353, the number of politics-related stories appearing in the *Herald* and *Scotsman* was higher than for any other period, while the number of articles selected for second-stage analysis was 146 – the highest concentration of such stories in any of the four periods under review.

Period 4 (June 20 - July 5, 1999)

Late June and early July was the period surrounding the official opening of the parliament by Queen Elizabeth II. The official opening marked the formal transfer of devolved power from Westminster to Holyrood, even though the parliament, executive, and its committee structure had effectively been in operation since May. The opening, on July 1, was followed by only one day of parliamentary activity before the institution closed for its summer recess. Period 4 covers the events leading up to and immediately following this defining event, during which 249 politics-related stories were coded at this time, 72 of which were selected for stage 2 analysis.

Descriptive analysis

The descriptive content analysis here covers all 1,057 articles dealing with news that appeared in the Scottish quality press concerning any political institution within the UK and the EU. Of these articles, 577 appeared in the *Herald*, and 480 appeared in the *Scotsman*. The main unit of analysis is the news article (in the newspaper). Only news and editorial opinion relating to political matters were analyzed. For each article, data were collected that highlighted the general character of the article. Excluded was news from the sports, business, and other specialist sections. In addition, the recording units that were coded for the first-stage descriptive analysis included the following: name of newspaper; date of newspaper; page number; page number; main focus of article; news format (straight news, news analysis, opinion & commentary, newspaper editorial); play in the newspaper (above or below the fold); and total length of article (in column

inches). Another main category, main focus of article, identifies the interplay of the main political units involved in the study (the Scottish government, the UK/Westminster government, the European Union itself, other EU member governments, and so on). The analysis of sources – identified first by their role (such as Scottish First Minister, MSP, party spokesperson) and then by their party affiliation (SNP, Conservative, Scottish Labour, UK Labour, and so on) – is recounted later in the chapter.

News format is an important main category in examining how the papers were covering political news in the first half of 1999. In particular, the distinction between "straight news" and "interpretive news" is one that is worth making. As with most Western newspapers, the *Herald* and the *Scotsman* divide their news coverage into four fairly distinct types, or formats. These formats are, by and large, identical to those commonly found in U.S. newspapers, and are as follows:

1. *Straight news*: A news report that purports to be balanced and unbiased. Whether or not it is unbiased is a matter for debate, and this is an aspect that has already been covered in some depth in previous chapters. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile, at least at this stage of the game, to accept this classification at face value.

2. *News analysis*: More in-depth, background piece, usually distinguished by a "News Analysis" or similar logo. Such pieces are typically written in a more informal manner, employing various literary devices that recognize – whether tacitly or implicitly – the "voice" of the author.

3. *Editorial*: The editorial opinion of the newspaper, usually distinguished by setting the type in wider columns than is normal; in the absence of exceptional news circumstances, editorials usually appear in a clearly distinguished section of the newspaper (usually toward the back of the first section).

4. *Opinion column*: An individual writer's opinion – this material is usually identified by a mug shot of the contributor, her/his name in larger type, and sometimes the word "Commentary" in special type. Opinion columns appear not only in the "Op-Ed" pages but also throughout both papers.

For the purposes of the present study, the last three types are grouped into a single category: interpretive news. This classification explains the essential distinction that each of these types share in relation to straight news – that their stated intention is to eschew a strict notion of impartiality in order to interpret the news (which, of course, you can't do without expressing some sort of opinion).

The period with the heaviest concentration of articles was period 3 (May 1 - 15), where 353 articles appeared in the two newspapers. This was the period covering the actual elections to the Scottish parliament. In terms of articles selected for second-stage selection, period 3 more-or-less tied period 2 for the highest concentration – the 146 articles dealing with Scottish political relations with other entities represented more than 41 percent of all political news covered in that period. Period 3 also contained the longest articles of the four periods under review, with an average length of 17.66". During that period, more than 41 percent of all the political articles that ran were more than 18 inches in length. In comparison, only 28.3 percent of period 1's articles were in this length range. May 1 - 15 was the period surrounding the inaugural elections to the Scottish parliament, so it is perhaps not surprising that newspaper articles would be longer, as the editorial staff tried to explain the issues in greater detail, both in straight news and interpretive stories.

Perhaps surprisingly, there were no significant differences among the categories in terms of page 1 stories (which made up approximately 10 percent of all the articles coded). Similarly, the

proportions of stories that appeared above versus below the fold remained broadly similar for both papers and across different periods and different categories of news.

For the first-stage analysis, the content of the *Herald* and the *Scotsman* was coded to find out which formats were more or less prominent across both the different time periods and the two newspapers. The proportion of total coverage made up of straight news was, with one exception, fairly consistent across the periods of study, at approximately 72 percent, except for the period covering March 1-15, which recorded a slightly lower proportion, at just over two-thirds of the total. The remaining coverage was split fairly evenly among different types of "interpretive" news – opinion pieces, editorials, and news analysis. However, the proportions of coverage allotted to news analysis, editorials, and opinion pieces did show some slight variations. In particular, the number and proportion of news analysis and opinion pieces were highest during the period 3, May 1-15, although the highest proportion of editorials was not reached until period 4, when the official opening of the parliament took place (see Table 5.1).

Table 5.1. News formats across all four periods of coverage, first stage (n = 1057)

		period 1 Jan. 16-30	period 2 Mar. 1-15	period 3 May 1-15	period 4 Jun 20-Jul. 5	Total
straight news	**count**	158	169	234	179	740
	%	72.1	71.6	66.3	71.9	70.0
news analysis	**count**	16	21	41	12	90
	%	7.3	8.9	11.6	4.8	8.5
editorial	**count**	21	22	22	30	95
	%	9.6	9.3	6.2	12.0	9.0
opinion	**count**	24	24	56	28	132
	%	11.0	10.2	15.9	11.2	12.5
TOTALS	**count**	**219**	**236**	**353**	**249**	**1057**
	%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

In terms of coverage broken down by newspaper, there was little substantive difference between the *Herald* and the *Scotsman*, except that the *Scotsman* ran a slightly larger proportion of opinion columns during the periods under review.

Frequencies calculated according to the types of political institutions involved in the coverage, under the *main focus of article* category, recognized the most prominent relationships between political institutions. The category of main focus of article specifies the predominant focus of each article. Only one main focus was chosen for each article. The initial coding scheme for activities in the news recognized 15 categories. This was set up with the intention of recognizing as broad a range of cross-institutional links as possible. However, many of these categories recorded so few stories that it became problematic to use them for any meaningful statistical analysis. They were therefore collapsed into five broader categories, as outlined below:

Scot-EU: Articles that relate Scottish political matters dealing directly with the European Union, including its central institutions, individual EU member states, or EU regions.

Scot-UK: Articles that relate Scottish political matters political matters that are contrasted in significant ways to affairs concerning the UK parliament or to devolution (or which deal directly or predominantly with the Welsh assembly, where the Scottish dimension is given priority).

UK-UK: Articles concerning UK political matters that relate directly or predominantly to the UK parliament (or to the Welsh assembly).

UK-EU: UK-level political matters relating to EU institutions, states, or regions, with little or no explicit Scottish or UK dimension, plus news of EU internal matters.

Scot-Scot: Purely internal Scottish matters (no comparisons made with UK or EU bodies).

So, for example, the four articles on the Welsh assembly's relations with Westminster were collapsed into the category of UK-UK stories, while the two articles dealing with

relations between Scotland and Wales, where the Scottish dimension was given priority, were collapsed into the Scot-UK category. The results of the breakdown according to these collapsed categories is shown in Table 5.2.

Table 5.2. Frequency of categories of political news, and length of articles, in the *Herald* and the *Scotsman* (n=1057)

	freq. of articles	*%*	*total length (")*	*%*	*av. length per article (")*
Scot-EU*	21	2.0	375	2.1	17.05
Scot-UK*	362	37.6	7411	42.3	18.71
UK-UK	273	25.8	4630	26.4	17.02
UK-EU	75	7.1	1084	6.2	14.45
Scot-Scot	291	27.5	4005	22.9	13.31
		100.0		100.0	

*selected for second-stage analysis

The number of articles dealing solely with UK issues in the Scottish papers was roughly similar to the number of articles that dwelt on Scottish-only issues – 273 against 291 articles, respectively. The largest single category of stories concerned Scottish-UK issues. More than 37 percent of the articles that appeared in the *Scotsman* and the *Herald* during the four periods under review dealt with issues relating primarily to the new Scottish government's emerging relationship with Westminster. This is not surprising, since this whole period was dominated by the debate over exactly how much power would be devolved to Scotland. But it does also suggest the dominance of the Scottish-Westminster relationship at the gestation of the new Scottish parliament.

The proportion of articles that dealt solely with Scottish-EU matters was, perhaps, surprisingly small, comprising only 2 percent of the total. It was significantly smaller than articles that dealt with relations between the UK and the EU, which garnered 75 articles, or 7.1 percent of the total (see Table 5.3). It was perhaps surprising to see so little coverage of the EU during these periods. Possible explanations for this disparity are explored in subsequent chapters. As alluded to earlier, this lack of quantitative coverage masks some substantial and significant framing of Scotland's place within the EU, as will become clear from the following chapters.

The proportions of UK-EU articles were roughly similar for both newspapers. However, the *Scotsman* did run a slightly higher proportion of UK-only articles (28.1 percent versus 23.9 percent) as well as Scottish-UK articles (42.3 percent versus 33.6 percent). On the other hand, the *Herald* ran more Scottish-only articles – amounting to almost one third of the total – than did the *Scotsman*. Although both papers' coverage of EU issues was light, the *Herald*'s share was slightly larger, with 10.4 percent of its politics news covering EU-only, UK-EU, or Scottish-EU issues, compared to just 7.5 percent for the *Scotsman*. Overall, it appeared that the *Herald*'s political coverage was spread slightly more evenly among the main categories of news outlined above.

The relative proportions of types of stories remained fairly consistent across both newspapers in terms both of total numbers of articles run and, with minor exceptions (see below), in space devoted to such articles. A total of 17,505 column inches was devoted to political news during the period of analysis – of which 7,661 column inches concerned affairs relevant to the second-stage analysis. The most common length for all news articles was between 13 and 18 inches. (In general, the *Herald*'s articles were somewhat shorter than the *Scotsman*'s, with the average length being 14.07 inches for the *Herald* and 19.55 inches for the *Scotsman*.)

Table 5.3. Comparing main focus of stories against news format (straight news vs interpretive news)

	format		
	straight news	interpretive news	Total
main focus			
Scot-EU count	**11**	**10**	**21**
% of total	52.4	47.6	100.0
% within format	1.5	3.2	2.0
Scot-UK count	**206**	**156**	**362**
% of total	56.9	43.1	100.0
% within format	27.8	49.2	34.2
UK-UK count	**210**	**81**	**291**
% of total	72.2	27.8	100.0
% within format	28.4	25.6	27.5
UK-EU count	**59**	**16**	**75**
% of total	78.7	21.3	100.0
% within format	8.0	5.0	7.1
Scot-Scot count	**254**	**54**	**308**
% of total	82.5	17.5	100.0
% within format	34.3	17.0	29.1
TOTAL count	**740**	**317**	**1057**
% of total	70.0	30.0	100.0
% within format	100.0	100.0	100.0

$x^2 = 66.06$, df = 4, $p < 0.05$, n = 1,057

When political coverage of the above categories was cross-tabulated against news format ("straight news" stories versus "interpretive" news, which aggregated opinion, editorial, and news analysis articles), one or two interesting points emerged (see Table 5.4). Coverage of Scottish-only, UK-only (i.e., UK-UK), and UK-EU news was overwhelmingly by means of straight news reports, which amounted to between 72.2 and 82.5 percent of the total within each category. However, for the categories of Scottish-EU and Scottish-UK news, the proportions allocated to straight news was much lower, at slightly over half of the total, while the percentage of interpretive pieces was set at 47.6 and 43.1 percent, respectively. Even though the total amount of coverage of Scottish-EU matters in both papers was only a small proportion of the total coverage of political news, almost half of the coverage within that small category was of an

interpretive/opinionated nature. (The same is true of Scottish-UK news, which also took up a much greater proportion of the total coverage of political news.) This indicates that the papers were covering Scottish-UK and Scottish-EU news from a much more interpretive standpoint, focusing a proportionately greater amount of their energies on interpreting such news for their audience, rather than simply reporting it.

While this breakdown of institutional categories was useful for gaining a broad picture of which British and European institutions were being covered in the Scottish press, the prime purpose of this coding was to identify the subset of articles to be selected for the second-stage frame analysis. This subset, numbering 383 out of the total of 1,057 articles, comprises the articles dealing with Scottish political matters as they related to either UK or EU institutions. (Table 5.4 gives a breakdown of these figures.) Specifically, this second-stage analysis was designed to focus on the media's coverage of the new Scottish government's activities in relation to a number of other units, as below:

- The UK Parliament at Westminster
- The European Union executive and legislative apparatus
- Bilateral or multilateral links between Scotland and EU nation-states
- Bilateral or multilateral links between Scotland and other EU regions/sub-nation-state entities (e.g., Bavaria, Catalonia, Lombardy)
- Bilateral or multilateral links between Scotland and Wales (or Northern Ireland).

As previously stated, a surprisingly small proportion of these articles directly concerned the EU relationship. However, since the emphasis in the frame analysis is on interpretation and impact of discourses and frames that are present, rather than relative frequency of occurrence, this should not present too much of a problem.

Table 5.4. Frequencies of straight news and interpretive pieces chosen for second-stage analysis (n=383)

	straight news		*interpretive*		***OVERALL TOTALS***	
	total	# selected/ % selected*	total	# selected/ % selected*	total	# selected/ % selected*
Period 1	158	44/ (27.8)	61	24/ (39.3)	**219**	**68/ (31.1)**
Period 2	169	65/ (38.5)	67	30/ (44.8)	**236**	**95/ (40.2)**
Period 3	234	80/ (34.2)	119	68/ (57.1)	**353**	**148/ (41.9)**
Period 4	179	47/ (26.3)	70	25/ (35.7)	**249**	**72/ (28.9)**
Totals	**740**	**236/ (31.9)**	**317**	**147/ (46.4)**	**1057**	**383/ (36.2)**

* for second-stage analysis

Frame analysis of straight news and interpretive pieces

For both newspapers, the 383 articles that were selected for second-stage analysis were slightly longer than the overall average. Overall, the *Herald* ran the most second-stage straight news stories (at 126), while the *Scotsman* slightly outnumbered the *Herald* in second-stage interpretive articles (80 versus 67). In terms of column inches selected for second-stage analysis, the amount of *Scotsman* space given over to editorials slightly exceeded that for the *Herald*, but otherwise there was little difference between the papers.

In terms of relative frequencies, straight news stories and interpretive pieces were selected in roughly equal proportions across both papers. The period with the densest coverage of political news was period 3 (the period that straddles the election). Editorials and opinion columns were especially dominant in second-stage subjects during period 3, when over 57 percent of the

original first-stage interpretive pieces were chosen for second-stage analysis. Again, far more interpretive pieces selected for second-stage analysis focused primarily on Scotland's relationship with the UK government at Westminster rather than the EU institutions in Brussels – 50 out of 53 editorials and 82 out of 88 opinion columns (although these raw figures mask some important aspects of editorial and opinion-related thinking on the importance of the EU in Scotland's future – an aspect that will be discussed more fully later in later chapters).

So the broad picture for the second-stage analysis is that the story of the new Scottish parliament's external relations was certainly a major news story, but it was also, in relative terms, an even bigger topic for discussion in opinion columns, news analysis pieces, and newspaper editorials. In all cases, comparisons with the UK parliament vastly outnumbered stories that articulated external relations with other external institutions. The next chapter focuses on second-stage straight news stories in an examination of the sources and actors used in these stories, and their role in defining dominant discourses and a sphere of legitimate controversy in the debate. The subsequent chapters look at both second-stage straight and interpretive news reported in the *Herald* and the *Scotsman*, first to examine how sources and actor selection affected the sphere of legitimate controversy for the issue, and then to see what frames and media packages emerged that defined the nature and extent of the issue culture.

Chapter 6. Analysis of sources and actors

The notion that news, and newspapers' mediation of the news, intervenes heavily in the social construction of reality, is central to the present study. But this still leaves open the question of where the "news" comes from. In answer to this question, perhaps one of the most important links between the media and the power structure in any country is the link between and among reporters, the news organizations they represent, and the sources they access to report (in effect, to "create") the news. In considering mechanisms for the reproduction of various discourses and frames of reference (related to the aforementioned ideological filters), careful consideration must be given to this relationship. A related factor is the preponderance of source power over audience power, given that, as Gans notes, the media "appear to supply a good deal of news which is not preferred by the audience" (1979, p. 283). In this way, news audiences can be conceived of – and, increasingly, are treated as – consumers, who rarely have as much power to affect the products they consume as suppliers do. Fowler (1991), analyzing the topic from a British point of view, notes the media's heavy use of official and quasi-official sources – also referred to as "accessed voices" or "primary definers." These terms refer to a select group of people whose views are invariably sought after during any news story. They are the sources who are either quoted in the press and other media – whether directly or indirectly – or who provide much of the background information to a story. Such people are usually prominent in the public domain, and typically include national politicians, government leaders, civil servants, lobby group leaders, television and film stars, and "experts" of various kinds. In relation to the EU they can also include various pro- or anti-European lobby groups, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), and some prominent European politicians or public figures, such as a British

Commissioner or EU Commission president Romano Prodi. (It should be noted that most of the EU-related sources who appear in the British press are themselves British nationals; relatively few non-UK members of the EU's institutions are quoted.) These sources are in a powerful and highly privileged position. Their importance, established by official authority, social status or commercial success, is confirmed and accentuated by their role as accessed voices (Fowler, 1991, p. 22).

Certainly, none of this is news to researchers in the field. The media have long relied heavily on official sources in their news operations. The studies mentioned here are just a sample of a range of scholarship that, since the early 1970s, has reinforced the notion of a strong, almost incestuous, relationship maintained between the media and government (Sigal, 1973; Gans, 1979; Manoff & Schudson, 1987; Shoemaker & Reese, 1991; O'Sullivan, 1988). British studies into this topic have come to similar conclusions. Incidentally, the media-government relationship is even stronger with regard to the reporting of international news and external issues (Graber, 1993).

Beyond the government, the other group to which the media have turned in recent years is a small but enormously influential group of "experts". Van Ginneken (1998) notes that, both in Europe and the U.S., almost every issue in the news is covered by "an extremely limited number of experts, who appear and reappear time and again" (p. 100). Also, increasingly, the traditional source of "expert" opinion, the universities, have been supplanted by a plethora of "think tanks" which promote narrow sectional interests – often those of big business, which funds these groups to a much greater extent – over consideration of what is good for the public sphere.

There are good functional reasons for the media's reliance on such people: under constant and intense pressure of time and money, journalists must often restrict themselves to a small pool of people upon whom they can rely for information or comment. Van Ginneken (1998) refers to

three main criteria by which sources are selected: authority, credibility, and availability – criteria that provide a huge advantage to official over non-official sources. Gans (1979) makes a similar point in relation to what he refers to as "knowns" – government, economic, cultural, and social elites – versus "unknowns," that is, ordinary, non-elite people. Gans finds that reporters consistently rely on the same "authoritative" sources – again, mostly government and political party officials, but also economic, cultural, and social elites – over and over again, and that these "knowns" are four times more likely to appear in stories than "unknowns" (1979, p. 12). In accessing its narrow selection of sources, the press and other media ignore the vast majority of the general public; they listen to the views of the official, the powerful, the rich and the famous over the views of the rest of the population. This aspect is analyzed in depth in this chapter.

Gans (1979) also puts the work of the journalist clearly within a national social-political framework. He talks of journalists as "constructors of nation and society" and "managers of the symbolic arena." They do this by helping to impose unity on what is otherwise a formless aggregation of "individuals and groups acting inside a set of geographic and political boundaries" (p. 297). In other words, the journalistic reporting of the actions and statements of those in power in itself is what constantly reinforces the reality and resonance of the constructs of that power, he argues. On the symbolic side of things, journalists have a central role in managing the "symbolic arena" which encompasses what is more broadly known as the public sphere. This arena he describes as a battleground, with power being contested by government, the media themselves, and other groups in society. As the news organizations and journalists struggle for supremacy in this battle, he holds, "they also regulate individuals and groups with messages; and in so doing, they maintain order in the symbolic arena" (p. 299).

Source and actor analysis: findings

The press's selection and use of sources and actors, and the integration of these sources and actors into the discourses that dominated press coverage, are key components of the present work. The types of sources and actors, and their relative salience in news coverage, help provide a context for studying the creation and maintenance of media frames (the subject of the next chapter). From the standpoint of social constructionism, their role is central. As Hansen et. al. (1998) point out, social constructionists are interested in analyzing sources and actors "to see *who* successfully makes claims about social problems and thus help 'construct' and elevate new or low profile issues to centre public stage" (p. 110) [Emphasis added]. Such an inquiry reveals the power of sources and the nature of power in the mediated public sphere. Thus an analysis of both sources and actors is a useful way of determining the range of voices deemed appropriate by the media. The incorporation of sources also assists in the frame analysis by suggesting areas that are being both emphasized and, by extension, deemphasized in the media. As chapter 3 makes clear, the press's heavy reliance on official (i.e., government and political party) sources amounts to a significant information subsidy, while chapter 4 elaborates on how the press operated this subsidy – with its debates, discourses, sources, and main actors – in the construction of the devolution campaign. The remainder of this chapter rounds out this analysis through recourse to source and actor data from the newspapers at the heart of this study, the *Herald* and the *Scotsman*.

For the purposes of the study, *sources* were coded along the following lines: sources were limited to persons who were *directly* quoted in the story. Sources whose statements were only paraphrased were not coded. A direct quote had to consist of a word or words that were placed in quotation marks. In order to be counted, direct quotes had to be attributable to a single source, though the source need not be identified by name. Sources who appeared in the article were

counted only once, regardless of the number of times they were quoted in the article. Letters, statements, or other communications where the paper directly quoted a source were also counted.

Sources were analyzed along two dimensions: their role and party affiliation. They were first analyzed by *role*, i.e., the broad role the source plays as part of a governmental or non-governmental institution. Examples of this type of source include the Scottish First Minister (Donald Dewar, who is also counted in his role as Scottish Secretary prior to the May election) or other minister or shadow minister. They were then categorized by *party affiliation* (Labour, the Scottish National Party, Conservative, Liberal Democrat, Scottish Socialist, and Scottish Green).

In addition to sources, *actors* are also identified in the survey. An important distinction needs to be made between sources and actors. Individuals were coded as *sources* when their main function was to make a statement used by the reporter to support a particular story or angle. However, individuals, institutions, political parties, and government agencies were coded as *actors* when their main function in the coverage was to perform an *action* reported as an event or part of an event by the journalist. The distinction is worth making, since a review of actors allows for a more accurate portrayal of who – or what institution – is making the news, rather than simply recording sources who are depicted as responding to news created by others.

The sources, actors, and their prominence

Of the 383 articles selected for second-level analysis, 236 were straight news stories (i.e., not commentary, editorial, or opinion pieces) that provided attributable sources. Out of this sample, 126 stories came from the *Herald* and 110 from the *Scotsman*. Forty-three of these articles (or just below 18 percent) were page one stories. In keeping with the broader coverage, the vast majority of articles – 225, or 95 percent of the total – concerned Scottish-UK news. Only 11 straight news articles were *primarily* concerned with Scottish-EU news.

The vast majority of the straight news stories contained direct quotes of sources from senior party leaders, their spokespeople, and representatives of various groups that make up civil society. Far and away the most common sources for direct quotes – six out of seven in the sample – were political leaders and their spokespeople. The largest identifiable group for sources was the Scottish political establishment – including the Scottish Secretary and later First Minister, Donald Dewar; other ministers and shadow (opposition) ministers; Members of the Scottish Parliament; and various Scottish parliamentary, executive, and party spokespersons (see Table 6.1).

Table 6.1: Top 10 sources by type in the *Herald* and the *Scotsman*.

Rank	#	Source types
=1	**189**	Scottish first minister or other minister
=1	**189**	Other Scot government source, party spokesperson
3	**73**	Holyrood MSP
4	**70**	UK prime minister, other minister, or shadow minister
5	**33**	Business person
6	**22**	Other UK government source, party spokesperson
7	**21**	Westminster Scottish MP
8	**14**	Public interest group spokesperson
9	**13**	Professor or other academic spokesperson
10	**12**	Trade Union representative
	53	All others
	689	*Total recorded sources*

Of the major political figures in this group, the most common sources for direct quotes were Donald Dewar, Scottish secretary and later First Minister, and SNP leader Alex Salmond. UK-level government and parliamentary sources – from the prime minister down – were recorded 121 times in the sample. Of this number, 70 came from executive and shadow executive positions at Westminster (only 22 quotes originated from "spokespersons" in this group). The most

commonly quoted people in this group were Prime Minister Tony Blair, Chancellor Gordon Brown, and Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott. The most commonly identified non-government sources came from the business community, with 33 sources (accounting for one third of all non-government sources). By comparison, references to public interest groups, trade union representatives, and academic sources were much rarer (each running at approximately one-eighth of non-government sources or less than three percent of all sources).

In terms of party affiliation, Labour was the most commonly accessed political party in the pages of the *Herald* and the *Scotsman*, with the SNP coming second. Of the 245 sources recorded for Labour, 164 were identified as Scottish Labour (e.g., Scottish First Minister, Scottish parliamentary ministers and their spokespeople, MSPs) versus 81 identified as UK Labour (e.g., Prime minister, other UK government ministers, MPs). There were no Labour Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) identified as sources in the sample. Liberal Democrat and Conservative sources were both recorded an equal number of times (65 each). The minor parties (the Scottish Socialists and the Greens) were between them sourced only 20 times. Little variation was seen between the relative proportions of party political sources in the *Herald* and the *Scotsman*.

The main *actors* involved in the sample coverage again came primarily from political groupings – parties, party organizations, government ministers, officials, and spokespersons. These actors, whether persons or institutions, were depicted as performing an action that directly affected a political event in the news. Sometimes the actor was an institution, such as the UK Labour party, and sometimes it was an individual, such as Tony Blair or Donald Dewar.

In terms of numbers and proportions, some significant differences were noted in comparing sources and actors. For example, the most oft-cited *institutional* actor was the UK Labour government (including all the mechanisms of the UK party and executive), followed by the SNP

and Scottish Labour. This contrasts with the results for sources, where the rank order of these three groups were reversed. Among individual actors, Donald Dewar was cited most often, followed by Tony Blair and Alex Salmond. The Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties, and their Scottish and UK leaders, were also cited as actors multiple times. However, elements of civil society – such as citizens' action groups and trades unions – were rarely cited as actors; these groups (including CND and Friends of the Earth) were represented as actors only four times each.

The actors in turn formed "clusters," or communities of common interests that could reasonably be regarded as acting more or less in concert with the creation of discourses in the press. For example, by combining all references to UK Labour actors (i.e., all major UK party leaders and institutions), a distinctive UK Labour cluster emerged that narrowly surpassed a parallel cluster of Scottish Labour actors in terms of the number of actor appearances in the *Herald* and the *Scotsman* (see Table 6.2). As will become apparent from the analysis later in the chapter, it is instructive to distinguish between UK Labour and Scottish Labour. And it is notable that the relative prominence of UK Labour actors is higher in comparison to their prominence as sources, since in terms of sources UK Labour runs well behind Scottish Labour.

The minor parties' views received very limited coverage. The most salient coverage given to the Scottish Socialist Party and the Scottish Greens involved a dispute with the UK Registrar of Political Parties over the use of the word "Socialist" in the party name, since the title was already in use by the Socialist Party of Great Britain, a completely separate party (Dinwoodie, 1999j, 1999k). With cross-party support, the Scottish Socialist Party succeeded in retaining their name, as did the Greens in a later decision (Dinwoodie, 1999l). However, little more was heard from either party – at least with regard to Scottish parliamentary links with the other institutions under examination.

Table 6.2. Main "clusters" of actors – combined individual and institutional – by reference in the *Herald* and the *Scotsman*

#	Cluster
135	All UK Labour individuals, institutions
120	All Scottish Labour individuals, institutions
94	All SNP individuals, institutions
45	All Liberal Democrat individuals, institutions (UK & Scottish)
29	All Conservative individuals, institutions (UK & Scottish)
45	All civil society individuals, institutions*
10	EU individuals, institutions
8	Monarchy
27	All others
513	*Total recorded actors*

* Includes all non-government actors recorded in the sample.

Occasionally both the *Herald* and the *Scotsman* featured the comments and opinions of ostensibly non-partisan academics and economists. Both papers would from time to time quote academics such as Professor James Mitchell, of Sheffield University, who suggested that the SNP's "penny for Scotland" policy would be an electoral advantage to that party (O'Shea, 1999); or Professor Andrew Hughes Hallett of Strathclyde University, the subject of a *Herald* article, quoted at length as an academic expert who saw no reason why an independent Scotland could not be a viable candidate for the euro (Ritchie, 1999m). In addition, it should be noted, both papers would also publish pieces by academics such as Strathclyde University's John Curtice; however, such articles were dwarfed in number by those produced by the papers' own staff writers, who provided the vast majority of interpretive material.

"The Scottish people" were also infrequently mentioned as independent actors, and almost never as sources. The only time this amorphous group became salient in the press was in reports of occasional opinion polls, trumpeting majority and minority opinion about the euro or Scottish

identity. One of the rare polls that was supposed to highlight the desires of the Scottish people – outside the confines of the party political debate – concerned the parliament itself. The poll, which was reported in the *Herald*, indicated that "an exceptionally high number of those questioned – 96% – wanted members of the [Scottish] parliament to work together more in the interests of the people and less along party lines" (Horsburgh, 1999i, p. 6). More often, the papers left it to themselves occasionally to pontificate in the name of the "Scottish people," articulating their needs and aspirations.

Outside the business community, reviewed later in the chapter, relatively few areas of civil society were depicted as actors. Religious leaders were rarely consulted for their points of view about devolution or independence, unless – as in the case of Canon Kenyon Wright – they were standing for office as an independent candidate. Non-partisan opinion from legal sources was even rarer; a March profile of Scotland's chief legal officer, Solicitor General Colin Boyd, QC, included his expressed desire for a forward-looking and modern Scottish parliament that was "no clone of Westminster" (MacLeod, 1999e, p. 13). This was the only time the *Herald* gave voice to a non-partisan legal officer over Scotland's future parliament.

One major institution of the UK government that was notable by its relative absence in the Scottish press was the monarchy. Although the *Scotsman* did note in early March that senior members of the royal family wished to hold a summit meeting on the monarchy's "changing role in Scotland after devolution" (Tait, 1999f, p. 3), little more was heard about the monarchy in either paper, until the queen's visit to Edinburgh to officially open the new parliament on July 1. Overall, the monarchy was not seen as a point of contention among the main actors, since all the parties – even the SNP – recognized a continued role for the queen as head of state in Scotland (Meek, 1999b). Nor was the monarchy presented as anything more than a marginal actor in any of the developments surrounding the elections and the inauguration of the new parliament.

Articulations of identity: Scottishness, Britishness, and Europeanness

As outlined in chapter 3, articulations of identity in the context of changing constitutional relationships provide important clues to understanding the role of the Scottish parliament and the other institutions as mediated in the pages of the press. It is therefore important to review the print media's selection of sources and quotes that relate to identity.

One point that should be emphasized is that all the main groups quoted in the press characterized their positions on Scottish national identity in civic rather than ethnic terms. Even the SNP had eschewed ethnic nationalism in favor of an inclusive, civic identity than encompassed everyone from Scots of Asian origin to English people living in Scotland ("A Nation Once Again," 1999).

Once again, most expressions and articulations of identity identified as originating from external, non-journalistic sources came from representatives of the main political parties. Such expressions from non-party sources were rare. An occasional exception to this state of affairs manifested itself with religious leaders; such expressions usually took the form of a plea for unity and progressive values in the name of the Scottish people. In the case of Canon Kenyon Wright, for example, the one *Herald* article that focused on him emphasized his desire for a "less confrontational, less party-dominated, more consensual" parliament (Horsburgh, 1999k, p. 8). His position on the issue of Scottish independence was not stated. However, the new moderator of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland was quoted in The *Scotsman* as calling for a closer, "constructive, generous, and developing" friendship with England. The article, which characterized the position of Scotland's primary church as anti-independence, also noted that Chancellor Gordon Brown – a very prominent Labour opponent of Scottish independence, as will be seen later in the chapter – would also be a speaker at the assembly. In addition, it quoted the outgoing moderator thus:

> We cannot just think of Scotland without realizing that we are still very much part of the United Kingdom, with a role to play on the bigger stage. Parochialism was never an endearing trait and we still have to relate to Westminster on British and international issues. (Jamieson, 1999, p. 7)

A more pro-independence viewpoint was expressed in the *Scotsman* by Roman Catholic Cardinal Thomas Winning, who was quoted as "setting out his hopes for a 'new Scotland'" whose parliament would not be "simply a localized version of the Westminster bear pit" (Hardie, 1999h, p. 12). Such opinions from men of the cloth were rarely expressed in the pages of the *Herald* and the *Scotsman*. Indeed, with the partial exception of the Scottish business community viewpoints from any non-partisan political sources were rare. Most notions of identity that were expressed in the Scottish press originated in the context of pronouncements by the major political parties.

The Nationalists, as constructed in the media, expressed a position on Scottish identity that was furthest removed from the status quo. A good example of this position was provided in the press coverage following SNP leader Alex Salmond's keynote speech at the party's pre-election conference (Dinwoodie, 1999n). In touting the SNP as "the party of principle" Salmond not only underscored SNP positions on defense, the environment, social services, and independence, but also promoted a notion of Scottish identity that borrowed heavily from the Scandinavian social welfare model. His keynote conference speech encapsulated these aspirational positions – what might be called a form of Scottish exceptionalism. On social services, Salmond noted how independence "would give us the right to choose not to accept unemployment as a price worth paying. The right to choose not to stigmatise single parents or the disabled in search of spending cuts" (Dinwoodie, 1999n, p. 7). On defense and international affairs, he cited the following rights he thought should accrue to an independent Scottish nation:

> The right to choose not to take part in Anglo-American adventures in the bombing of Iraq. The right to choose to take part in international peace keeping and agreed

> United Nations initiatives. The right to choose to be part of Europe and the world, not stuck on the sidelines. The right to choose a society which does not measure itself by the destructive power of its weaponry. (Dinwoodie, 1999n, p. 7)

The Labour party – and especially the UK Labour party – promoted its own, very different ideas about what it meant to be Scottish, and this provided part of the context for the main rhetorical battle portrayed in the press – between Labour and the SNP. On issues of identity, the prime Labour player was Prime Minister Blair. Blair's key Scottish Labour conference speech in March (see below) was mostly devoted to lambasting SNP economic policies, but during his visit to Scotland the prime minister was also quoted for his opinions on identity – or rather his apparent rejection of the concept. Prior to his keynote Scottish Labour conference speech, the *Scotsman* noted Blair's vexation with the content of the debate so far: "What I find frustrating about the Scottish election campaign is not about policy – it is about 'Are you more Scottish than me'" (Tait, 1999g, p. 2). Instead, the article goes on, Blair implored the Scottish people to focus on what their newly elected representatives would actually do to improve their lives. At his conference address, Blair expanded on this theme, calling for a future Scotland "to be based on the politics of ideals, not identity, of principles, not passports" (Ritchie, 1999i, p. 1). He was also quoted as saying, "Ours is the true and real patriotism," though it is not made clear from the article whether he is referring to British patriotism or Scottish patriotism. The *Scotsman* quoted from the same speech at greater length, noting Blair's appeal to party and national "solidarity" and a national future "built by national ideals not national identities" (MacMahon & Hardie, 1999a, p. 1).

By the day prior to the election, Blair's quotes, like those of his government ministers, had turned in part to emphasizing the potentially disastrous consequences of "a messy and expensive divorce." But even then he tempered this discourse with a call for a Scottish parliament that

would support, rather than undermine, British identity – an identity built from a modern, tolerant country with progressive values. Thus he called, somewhat paradoxically, for:

> One nation in which all the nations of Britain and all the peoples of Britain have the opportunity to succeed. One nation united at home and abroad against bigots and racists and those who seek to undermine decent values. (Settle, 1999b, p. 8)

The Liberal Democrats joined Labour in rejecting ethnic nationalism, though it went further in promoting its own version of Scottish exceptionalism. At the party's national conference in Edinburgh, the outgoing leader, Paddy Ashdown, tried to distinguish between the Liberal Democrat approach to identity politics, and those of its opponents: "Narrow nationalism is not our way: the little England of the Tories, or the little Scotland of the SNP. But nor is it the stultifying centralism that runs through the veins of Labour, Old and New." Instead he returned to the notion of a Scottish parliament as as a vital part of his vision of a renewed Britain (Scott, 1999i, p. 4). Interestingly, in their coverage of this key event, neither the *Herald* nor the *Scotsman* articles turned to Scottish leader Jim Wallace for his view of Scottish identity.

For the Scottish Conservatives, the problem was not one of being seen as too Scottish, but rather one of not appearing Scottish enough. In fact, the Tories were caught between a traditional instinct to maintain loyalty to the status quo ante – in other words, the unitary British state – and a perceived need to reconnect with a Scottish electorate that had consistently rejected them at the polls. This tricky balancing act was most apparent at what became known as the Hampden Declaration (named after the national football stadium where it was made). Here Scottish Conservative leader David McLetchie – in a speech approved by UK party leader William Hague – announced what he called a "new Unionism." In this speech he tried to identify his party more closely with what it meant to be Scottish – at the expense, inevitably, of traditional notions of what it meant to be British. Focusing first on young Scots adults, a group held to be especially alienated from the British state, he described this group as a "lost generation." He went on:

> This lost generation sees itself as Scottish and British, and not British and Scottish, and we must see it that way, too. From now on in, Scotland's first and oldest political party will be putting Scotland first. That will be at the heart of the new Unionism. Labour tries to label the SNP as Tartan Tories as a badge of shame. But we must claim it as a badge of pride. We are the Tartan Tories: Scotland's other national party. (Ritchie, 1999d, p. 1)

This sort of rhetoric caused an SNP spokesman to quip: "The Tories are going through an identity crisis, leaving a huge credibility gap between their rhetoric and reality" (Dinwoodie, 1999c, p. 6). Labour and Lib-Dem spokespersons happily agreed with this characterization. Such a characterization was perhaps understandable, under the circumstances. Days before that declaration, the *Scotsman* had quoted Liam Fox, the Tory constitutional affairs spokesman, as depicting devolution itself in apocalyptic terms: "Our country is in grave danger," he is quoted as saying. "We believe devolution poses a threat to the United Kingdom. We believe there are serious risks inherent in it" (Hardie, 1999c, p. 4). This apparent contradiction was apparently not fully resolved in subsequent days and weeks, though the *Scotsman* did note days later that McLetchie was trying to "distance himself" from Fox's remarks. McLetchie's initial response was to distinguish between an "upsurge in nationalism" – which, he accepted, "poses a grave danger" – and "devolution per se," which he said is not dangerous "provided there is strong representation for those parties who want to make it work" (Tait, 1999d, p. 10). Eventually, the Scottish Tories developed an argument that stressed the need for the party to work within the new constitutional arrangement in order to preserve the Union. Donald Findlay, a prominent Queen's Counsel (lawyer) and party activist, urged his fellow Conservatives – many of whom were opposed in principle to the Scottish parliament – to remain loyal to the party thus:

> Scots Tories are committed to making the parliament work within the United Kingdom. We do not want to see the SNP using it as a tool with which to cut Scotland adrift, and that is surely a danger if we don't vote. (Dinwoodie, 1999o, p. 7)

When Labour's sources were compelled to tackle the notion of Scottish identity, they typically turned – much like the Tories – to "safe" or non-political expressions, with sports being the most common choice. A good example of this is found in the Labour response to a System Three poll in March, which indicated that 72 percent of people in Scotland thought of themselves either as wholly Scottish or "more Scottish than British" (Harrington, 1999). Responding to this seemingly strong expression of Scottish identity, a Scottish Labour spokeswoman resorted to defining such identity very narrowly, noting: "We don't see any inconsistency in feeling Scottish when watching the football, British when you are in London, and European when you are abroad" (Harrington, 1999, p. 6). The Labour spokeswoman's quote goes on to express a very functionalist interpretation of the role of the new institution. "We are delivering a Scottish parliament because we think Scotland needs a parliament that can develop Scottish solutions to Scottish problems," she states. "You don't have to choose between being Scottish and British – it is not a choice, you are Scottish, British, and European" (Harrington, 1999, p. 6). This statement begs the question of what these terms – Scottish, British, and European – actually mean in relation to each other, in a political environment that is responding to the sort of shift in cultural and identity aspirations supposedly identified by the poll. In fact, the spokeswoman seems to go out of her way to avoid this question; consequently, the statement is bereft of any nationalist assumptions whatsoever, preferring instead to equate, and treat as equal, three concepts that are very different, both in terms of identity and political expression of that identity.

In contrast, the SNP spokesman reflecting on the same poll seemed more comfortable expressing his party's articulation of notions of identity. SNP chief executive Mike Russell was quoted as pointing out the "overwhelming primacy of Scottish identity in modern Scotland rather than Britishness" – although the quote goes on to stress again the negation of any ethnic dimension to this identity, making the point that "people are extremely confident and comfortable

about their Scottishness nowadays and the SNP welcomes the civic and inclusive nature of our modern national identity" (Harrington, 1999, p. 6). Interestingly, the quote from the Scottish Conservative spokesman lay closer to the SNP's position than to Labour's, though it is more circumspect. Speaking in the wake of David McLetchie's "Hampden declaration" (see above), the spokesman noted: "It is not a surprise poll result and we are totally comfortable with it" (Harrington, 1999, p. 6).

All the parties to some extent accepted the notion of the Scottish parliament as a "people's parliament," reflecting the will of the Scottish people. Such a characterization implicitly reflected the perception of Scots as being a more communitarian people than the English. SNP and the Liberal Democrat sources expressed this notion more blatantly than their counterparts in the other parties. For example, at one rally near Edinburgh, the *Herald* noted that UK Lib Dem leader Paddy Ashdown, standing alongside Scottish party leader Jim Wallace, "mocked" both Labour and – ironically – the SNP for engineering a Scottish parliament that would be a "toytown replica of that miserable longest-running farce in Westminster" (Scott, 1999g, p. 2). Ashdown stated that the Liberal Democrats instead supported the creation of a parliament that would be very different from Westminster – "a parliament for Scotland to be proud of, and which puts the Scottish people first" (Horsburgh, 1999f, p. 6).

Expressions of European identity were considerably rarer in the sources used by the *Herald* and the *Scotsman*. What's more, when such expressions were made, it was usually in the context of placing Europe within preexisting notions of Scottish and/or British identity.

The SNP was the most prominent source for articulations that rejected the British component of Scottish identity in favor of a European component. However, in the absence of a specific news event to provide a clear contrast between British and EU identity, such expressions remained mostly marginal to the broader debate. For example, in his keynote party conference

speech, Salmond called for Scotland to "be part of Europe and the world, not stuck on the sidelines" (Dinwoodie, 1999n, p. 7); but such SNP aspirations were ill-defined in relation to the EU itself.

However, lack of a clear SNP articulation of its European aspirations did not stop Labour spokespersons from undermining the implicit assumptions behind the SNP's Europe policy, when the occasion arose. The *Herald*, for example, noted one Dewar campaign speech that contrasted what the Scottish Labour leader called the SNP's "narrowly national interests" with Labour's own devolution plan, which "would make Scotland stronger in the UK and Europe" (MacLeod, 1999b, p.6). Labour's position stressed Scotland's role in Europe exclusively as part of the UK, rather than as a separate entity; the European dimension was only expressed through the prism of the UK, and not as a vehicle to replace the UK (Harrington, 1999).

On Europe, the Scottish business community was again depicted as an actor whose views coincided with that of Labour. The following quote, repeated in the *Herald* and the *Scotsman* (in both cases, on page 1), perhaps best summarizes the dominant discourse supposedly held by those in the Scottish business community, one that neatly places Scotland in its proper place vis-à-vis both Britain and the EU: "We are a small country and are much stronger when united with the rest of the UK. When Europe is grouping together for strength, it would be ludicrous for a small country like Scotland to be separating" (Campbell, 1999a, p.1; Clelland, 1999, p. 1). This statement was reported in the context of a poll conducted by MORI for the Scottish Industry Forum (SIF), which, according to the *Scotsman*, "revealed that three quarters of Scotland's leading companies believe that independence would be a disaster for business" (Clelland, 1999, p. 1).

Ultimately, the debate over the European Union revolved less around aspirations of identity than over narrower debates over more prosaic economic matters such as adoption of the euro –

the sort of battleground where, as will be seen below, Labour consistently held the upper hand (MacMahon, 1999a).

Bounding the sphere of legitimate controversy: Labour vs. SNP

Dan Hallin's (1986) concept of media discourses bounded by spheres of legitimate controversy, consensus, and deviation applies in the present context. The range of points of view accorded space in the pages of the press, and the repetition and relative salience of these points of view, to a large degree determined what was and was not portrayed as legitimate topics for debate in the media. Here as elsewhere, the relative prominence of sources and actors in the media clearly demarcates the boundaries of the sphere of legitimate controversy. Such prominence is indicated not only by the frequency of appearances by different sources, but also by what these sources are reported as saying and when and how they are reported as saying it. In other words, the latent meaning behind communication messages, and the contexts within which such messages are presented, are important factors to be considered as well. In attempting to judge the bounds of legitimate discourse, the first step is to read more closely into the earlier analysis of just who was and was not being quoted in the papers, and – equally important – how they were being quoted.

Notwithstanding the limited amount of non-partisan and expert opinion, the vast majority of sources and actors in the straight news pieces came from representatives of the political parties, and it was largely left to the political parties to attempt to set the press agenda in the months leading up to the election. And in terms of attempting to change the status quo in Scotland, the party that was depicted in the most radical terms was, almost inevitably, the SNP.

The SNP had long been seen by Labour as the foremost threat to a Labour parliamentary majority in Scotland. Opinion polls had regularly shown the Nationalists running close to Labour

in terms of popular support, so the messages being communicated in the press by SNP sources assumed greater significance. Thus, the press coverage of the SNP's annual conference in March took on added importance. While the SNP was, of course, the party of independence, its apparent intention was to avoid dwelling on independence for its own sake – after all, the election was not de facto a referendum on separation from the UK. Salmond was perceived as repositioning his party on the left-wing ideological ground vacated by Labour, which had moved to the right under Blair (Duncan, 1999b, p. 9; MacMahon, 1999, p. 8). This was the preferred "story" for the Nationalists, as election day approached; the party's focus was on its policies of the "penny for Scotland" tax hike, increased provision of public services, and the scrapping of tuition fees. On economic issues – where the party was perceived to be on weaker ground with regard to independence – the emphasis was on how an elected SNP government in Holyrood would use the limited powers the parliament had been granted to boost living standards and reduce income inequality; and the party's "campaign managers regarded the viability of independence as a debate for another day" (Duncan, 1999b, p. 9). Thus, at the outset, the Nationalists were depicted as promoting a series of left-of-center social welfare policies in an attempt to drive a wedge between Labour and a Scottish electorate widely regarded as being more left-leaning than its English counterpart. Perhaps the most prominent aspect of this approach was a pledge by the Nationalists to implement the "penny for Scotland," aka the "tartan tax" – in other words, to reverse the Chancellor's promised 1p reduction in the basic income tax rate, and thereby raise revenue for public services in Scotland. The devolution settlement gave the Scottish parliament the power to alter the income tax rate from that of the UK, within a range of three pennies in the pound either way. In fact, the Liberal Democrats had already committed themselves to implement a 1p tax hike, but the SNP decision to follow suit in March opened the way for Labour's vitriolic attack on the Nationalist party.

As the terms of the media debate shifted away from national and civic aspirations toward the prosaic subject of economics, the SNP's viewpoint on the latter was initially given some illumination. In one *Herald* article dealing with the merits and costs of independence, the following section is excerpted from the party's economic assessment paper, *An Economic Strategy for Independence*:

> Scotland is a rich country. In terms of wealth created per head, we are the seventh richest country in the world. The Scottish parliament offers us the chance to begin the process of governing Scotland well and delivering the best policies for long-term sustainable growth. (Ritchie, 1999q, p. 1)

This, it was argued, was a reasonable economic basis for asking the Scottish electorate to sacrifice the extra tax in the name of providing better public services for all, while at the same time bringing more economic power and control back to Scotland and preparing for independence in the longer term. But the publication of the above paper was the cue for Labour to increase its already steady stream of anti-SNP rhetoric, a stream that focused on the inevitability of Scotland falling into economic ruin if it left the Union with England.

Labour's very different agenda stressed the links with the rest of the UK and the primacy of the Westminster parliament. This approach was also reflected in the relationship between the UK Labour party and its Scottish offspring. As far as Labour politicians, candidates, and spokespeople were concerned, the sphere of legitimate controversy was decidedly narrow, and apparently under the strict control of the UK party's London headquarters at Millbank. While Labour's sources repeatedly claimed to be the "party of Scotland," Labour was, if anything, the UK party represented as being the most closely tied to its London parent – even more so than the Tories. And the ultimate authority in the London party was the prime minister, Tony Blair.

As previously stated, Blair focused on Scotland not as a cultural entity but as an economic component – and one that was intricately bound up with the United Kingdom. His statements

typically would combine expressions of this belief with virulent attacks on the SNP. A prime example of this approach was a keynote speech at Labour's Scottish conference in March. Here Blair attacked the SNP on all fronts, in what the *Herald* called "a rallying call to Scottish Labour – Old, New, Left and Right – to unite in a sustained assault on separatism in saving the Union with England" (Ritchie, 1999h, p. 1). Blair, turning his attention to party positions on education, branded the SNP as "Luddites." He was also quoted as declaring, "The SNP want Scotland to leave Britain. Scottish New Labour wants Scotland to lead Britain" (Brogan, 1999e, p. 7). In another *Herald* article, Scottish Labour's education spokesperson Keith Geddes repeated the "Luddite" claim, adding that the SNP was "more interested in embassies than education" (Ritchie, 1999l, p. 6). The parroting of London Labour pronouncements by Scottish Labour spokespersons was a pattern that was oft-repeated during the campaign, as is shown below.

The depictions of extensive London Labour control came through the many times that UK government officials were quoted in both papers in ways that strongly suggested that it was they, rather than the Scottish Labour leaders, who were setting the party agenda. For example, as early as January, Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott was depicted as being forced to fly up to Scotland to "kickstart" a lackluster campaign. The *Scotsman* quoted Prescott as saying that Labour – the party in general, but the Scottish party in particular – was "resting on its laurels" and had to wake up and campaign hard for the Scottish election (Copley & Tait, 1999, p. 22). During his two-day visit, Prescott mixed praise – calling Scotland a "role model" for the UK – with what was to become a recurrent theme: a steady drumbeat of criticism by London Labour ministers criticizing the SNP. And it was these London ministers whose views were given prominence over their Scottish colleagues in the pages of the press.

The SNP attempted to capitalize on this apparent state of affairs. Party spokespersons retaliated against Labour's jibes by attempting whenever possible to draw attention to the

powerful control being exerted by Millbank over Scottish Labour. The strategy seemed less successful before the election; but the SNP charges seemed to gain more traction when they touched upon the issue of "London control" after the election, when it was linked with coalition talks between Scottish Labour and the Scottish Liberal Democrats. Nationalist accusations of London Labour controlling Dewar and Scottish Labour by "pulling the strings" were given more prominence in the press. SNP spokespersons characterized Dewar as "Blair's puppet" (Hardie & Percival, 1999, p. 1), while Salmond was quoted as dubbing Blair the "puppetmaster" over his role in coalition talks (Settle & Robertson, 1999, p. 7). In all such instances, the SNP's position – tacitly or explicitly stated – was to promote itself as the proponents of a separatist Scottish civic identity that only they could represent, especially in a devolved parliament. London Labour, it was argued, would never permit such an identity to be manifested as long as its Scottish component remained in power at Holyrood. However, this discourse, while more prominent after the election, was displaced by a different dominant discourse in the crucial weeks and months leading up to the election: a discourse centering on the fear of the unknown that would supposedly follow the election of a party committed to separation.

Throughout the early part of 1999, Labour – and especially London Labour – eagerly fed the fear appeal of a disaster awaiting Scotland should the electorate dare to elect a majority SNP government in the first Scottish parliament. Many of the Labour Party's quoted statements focused on how the SNP would instantly "rip Scotland apart" – despite repeated assurances from the Nationalists that they would put independence to a referendum first. The major UK Labour figures – Prime Minister Tony Blair, Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown, and Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott – were repeatedly quoted in the papers as warning of the "risk and damage" of voting SNP, and decrying the SNP's perniciousness, "recklessness" and supposed propensity to "tax and spend." The most prominent Labour purveyor of the fear appeal was

Gordon Brown, who, according to the *Scotsman*, "personally took charge of Labour's fight against the SNP" (Hardie, 1999g, p. 1).

This approach bore fruit in the pages of the *Herald* and the *Scotsman*, with the SNP being forced to fight the campaign battle on ground chosen by Labour – what *Scotsman* economics editor Gary Duncan called the "terra incognita of independence economics" (1999b, p. 9). In early May, for example, following the publication of a detailed economic plan for an independent Scotland, the SNP was again being characterized as being "put on the defensive" over the veracity of its economic claims. While the SNP Treasury spokesman, Andrew Wilson, had the minutiae of his plan being repeated in the *Scotsman*, Brown's visceral riposte – that there was a huge "black hole in the SNP plans" – was more prominently displayed in the same article. Furthermore, according to Brown, "Once again their policies do not add up. Today has shown they are unfit to govern" (MacMahon, 1999a, p. 11). This type of rhetoric – focusing on such key words as "risk," "disaster," and "divorce" – was repeated regularly by the Chancellor and his spokespersons in the press. Even Brown's rare expression of positive economic benefits under continued Labour administration was invariably tempered by recourse to the fear appeal. Days before the election the Chancellor was depicted by the *Herald* as promising voters "a bumper collection of Christmas presents if they back Labour, after claiming that the Nationalists posed 'too big a risk' to Scotland's economy" (Carrell & Duncan, 1999, p. 7). Once again, the Scottish Labour source was placed in a supporting role, repeating the same rhetoric: This time, the comments of Wendy Alexander, the Scottish party's industry spokeswoman, appeared in the same article under those of Brown. Alexander also slammed the SNP by repeating the claim that "even voting for the party that wants a divorce by Christmas is too big a risk" (Carrell & Duncan, 1999, p. 7).

Again and again, this was the pattern in the media debate, with UK Labour figures – and especially the powerful chancellor, Gordon Brown – given prominence in the papers with calculated, emotive quotes, Scottish Labour figures placed in a supporting role, and SNP spokespeople quoted responding to the Labour charges, and Conservative and Liberal Democrat opinions (which, in any case, tended to support the Labour position) relegated to the end of the article. The result was that the SNP increasingly was depicted in reactive rather than proactive terms in the developing economic debate. Labour's rhetoric did not solely revolve around fear, as Brown's comments, and the prime minister's occasional calls for a united country based on progressive values, indicate. Brown's quotes, however, did display a predominant, perhaps even overwhelming, recourse to the fear appeal, interspersed only occasionally with the promise of incentives to the Scottish people if they voted in a Labour government.

Another issue where SNP policy departed significantly from the other parties was defense. The Nationalists supported policies that were regarded by the other major parties as extreme: complete withdrawal from the NATO military alliance; the creation of a nuclear-free Scotland; and no involvement in the allied air campaign against Yugoslavia during the Kosovo conflict, which was underway in the spring of 1999. With Scottish Labour significantly ambivalent on the issue of nuclear weapons (see below), it was the UK Labour party that was again depicted as leading the charge against the "dangerous" and "isolationist" Nationalists. For example, in a *Scotsman* article focusing on the developing "bitter row" between Labour and the SNP over defense policy, primacy was given to a (presumably open) letter written by Defense Secretary George Robertson to SNP leader Alex Salmond. Robertson's letter is quoted portraying the SNP as "miserably isolationist" and suffering from "blind anti-NATO prejudice." The SNP's riposte was given second billing and focused on policy details rather than emotional rhetoric (Scott, 1999h, p. 4).

From Labour's point of view, perhaps the most bitterly contested SNP stance on defense was over basing nuclear weapons in Scotland. The Nationalists' solidly anti-nuclear stance focused on the Royal Navy's Trident ballistic missile submarine base in Faslane, Western Scotland, as an example of how Scotland was being exploited as a massive military base by London (Ritchie, 1999g, p. 7). In keeping with its overall strategy, Labour focused again on the fear appeal in its rejection of SNP defense policy. On this issue, UK Labour's "big guns" lambasted the SNP over its policies by focusing on the potentially dire security consequences of independence. During a speech at Aberdeen University – for the opening of the Scottish Center for International Security – Defense Secretary George Robertson claimed that an independent Scotland would have to pay the UK billions of pounds Sterling in compensation for the closure of the submarine base. He also speculated on the loss of jobs through the closure, and the broader costs of a separate Scottish defense structure. Both the *Herald* and the *Scotsman* noted Robertson's comments that the separation of Scotland from the UK would be "messy and expensive" (Ritchie, 1999h, p. 8; Urquhart, 1999a, p. 7). The *Herald* further quoted Robertson as follows:

> What would be the timetable for withdrawal? Have they [the SNP] bothered to look at the fraught and uncompleted negotiations which took place between Russia and Ukraine on the base for the Black Sea fleet? Would a separate Scottish state compensate the rest of the UK for any costs that arose? More generally, what would be the true costs of setting up a separate Scottish Army, Navy and Air Force? (Ritchie, 1999h, p. 8)

The clear implication was not only that the SNP had given no such consideration to these potential problems – and should therefore be roundly criticized by all right-thinking observers – but also that a UK government certainly had given the matter deep consideration, and would, in the event of an independent Scotland going its own way, seek redress. The ultimate losers, of course, would be the Scottish people.

The issue of defense and nuclear weapons also provided a useful insight into the divisions within the Scottish Labour party over policy, and a clue to the extent of control by the London party. On defense, as on other issues, factions in Scottish Labour were occasionally depicted as identifying with SNP issues. But for the most part these depictions were fuzzy and amorphous, and, in the absence of any official Labour backing, were soon expunged from the day-to-day reporting of that party in the press. This powerful official voice of Millbank appeared to cow any deviation from the dominant discourse – at least in the pages of the press.

A good example of London Labour's apparent influence on media coverage of contentious devolution issues occurred in March, when the SNP highlighted a survey by CND (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) that asked candidates for the Scottish parliament to state their position on the presence of nuclear weapons in Scotland, and particularly the presence of the Trident nuclear submarine base. The survey asked two questions: should there be nuclear weapons in Scotland? and should Trident be decommissioned? The *Herald* reported that Labour candidates showed by far the lowest response rates among all the major parties. While every one of the 67 SNP respondents said Yes-Yes to the questions (thereby signaling a strong anti-nuclear stance), most of the Tory respondents said No-No, and the Liberal Democrats were split evenly between Yes-Yes and No-No respondents (with others stating mixed Yes-No and No-Yes responses). Among the mere 13 Labour responses, as reported by the *Herald*, six responded Yes-Yes to the questions. This prompted the following statement from SNP defense spokesperson Colin Campbell: "The CND survey shows that Labour are split from top to bottom on the Government's pro-nuclear defence policy ... London Labour are badly out of step with UK and Scottish opinion – and even with the views of their own candidates" (Ritchie, 1999i, p. 7). However, a Labour spokesperson's quote seemed to ignore the results of the survey and focused instead on the party

position as expounded by the defense secretary: "George Robertson has made Labour's position clear. Scotland will have strong defences as part of the United Kingdom" (Ritchie, 1999i, p. 7).

Interestingly, the above example also indicates the lack of coverage of non-part actors in the press. Neither the *Herald* nor the *Scotsman* bothered to elicit comments from anyone from the CND, whose survey it had been. Still, perhaps the deeper point was that only 13 Labour candidates had bothered (or dared?) to complete the survey, compared to 67 for the SNP. In any case, little was heard from these detractors in later reports of debates over defense policy. This was true even of Labour MP John McAllion, depicted prominently as a party renegade because of his views on potential independence. He was named but not quoted in the *Herald,* though the *Scotsman* did emphasize his support. By March, McAllion's viewpoints effectively seemed to have been neutered, and were nowhere to be seen in the press coverage. This left the debate over defense to settle on Labour's fear campaign against SNP policies.

During the run-up to the election, dominated as it was by Brown's and Blair's pronouncements on the economic agenda, Dewar was only occasionally depicted as a truly independent actor in the drama, as when a letter he wrote to Salmond over the contentious issue of Scottish citizenship received some coverage in both papers (McGregor, 1999a, p. 8). Most often, Dewar's role in the papers' articulation of the Labour discourse was to act in concert with the UK-level ministers, and even to parrot the rhetoric employed by UK Labour ministers. For example, Dewar criticized the SNP's economic strategy as "back of the envelope nonsense" (Horsburgh, 1999j, p. 7), a phrase previously used by Brown to describe Nationalist policy (Duncan, 1999b). A call by Blair to "not let [the SNP] in by the back door" was repeated by Dewar within a day (Settle, 1999b, p. 8; McGregor, 1999c, p. 7). When Dewar's comments did depart from those of UK Labour ministers, they usually focused on the need for unity and progressive values – while the fear appeal rhetoric was provided by someone else. In the final

news conference before the May election, in which the *Herald* noted that Dewar was "flanked" by Gordon Brown, the soon-to-be first minister's quoted comments focused on the need for Scots to vote Labour not only to prevent a "divorce" between Scotland and the UK, but also to "make our parliament a success" under Scottish Labour. In contrast, Brown's comments from the same news conference again placed much greater emphasis on the fear appeal:

> We know now that if the SNP came to power there would be instant divorce – but with higher taxes to pay for separation, businesses chased away and Scotland isolated in Europe. ... We say to the people of Scotland – don't gamble Scotland's future. (McGregor, 1999c, p. 7)

Only after the election was Dewar depicted as genuinely having a mind of his own on a broad array of party policies – even as, paradoxically, the opposing parties increased their levels of rhetoric over the extent to which he was under the control of London Labour. One major post-election issue – the talks between Scottish Labour and the Liberal Democrats over a coalition government – gave the papers some space to debate the extent to which Dewar was or was not in fact "Blair's puppet." The battle took center stage in the days immediately following the election, when page one articles in the *Scotsman* and the *Herald* indicated that Blair was "pulling the strings" in talks over a possible coalition (Hardie & Percival, 1999, p. 1). However, subsequent days' coverage suggested that Dewar was becoming "defiant" toward London as he pushed ahead with coalition talks with the Lib Dems – apparently against the wishes of Blair and Brown in London (MacMahon et al. 1999; Tait, 1999l; Percival, 1999b). The *Scotsman* quoted "friends of Mr Dewar" as stating he was going to be "his own man" from then on. The front page article quoted "one of Mr Dewar's allies" as follows: "They have got to realise in London that it was Donald who won this election on his own. It's his party and his country. There is nothing they can do. They just have to trust him" (MacMahon et al. 1999, p. 1). However, a final quote from a

Dewar "friend" notes: "This is not Gordon Brown's show any more" – suggesting that it *had been* Brown's "show" right up to the election.

Another important Labour ally in the war of rhetoric was that of Scottish business. This group's role in defining the sphere of legitimate controversy was particularly apparent in the earlier part of the year, when the limits of the sphere were being set. Scottish business leaders typically were characterized as portraying devolution as the thin end of the wedge, potentially or inevitably leading to the disaster of full independence. In January, the *Scotsman* highlighted a letter written by a group of ten leading Scottish businessmen to its sister Sunday paper, *Scotland on Sunday*. The paper stated that the group's members wanted the parliament to work, but are "deeply concerned by the possibility of independence." It went on to quote the following passage from the letter: "Separation would mean swapping the simplicity of a single market in the UK for what would be in all probability a range of complex financial and business regulatory issues ..." (Hardie & Scott, 1999a, p. 4). Within days of this, the *Herald* was quoting the director of the Scottish CBI (Confederation of British Industry) who proffered the notion that independence "would dislocate the present seamless and efficient market which operates in the UK (Campbell, 1999b, p. 6).

The *Herald* and the *Scotsman* consistently represented the Scottish business community as forming a more-or-less united front, in support of traditional Unionism generally, and of Labour policies in particular. This group – perhaps the most significant non-political party actor in terms of press representation – was typically associated with the fear appeal tactic of portraying the SNP as a dangerous force in Scotland's future, not just on the big issue of independence, but also on more tactical issues such as the SNP's "penny for Scotland"/"tartan tax" campaign promise. The Labour-business "alliance" at times seemed tacit, but often appeared to be quite explicit. In mid-March, Gordon Brown released a list of names of prominent figures in the Scottish business

community, all of whom were depicted in the *Herald* and *Scotsman* as being gravely concerned at the possibility of higher tax rates in Scotland (Brogan & Ritchie, 1999; Hardie, 1999g). To drive home Labour's message, Brown called the SNP's tax pledge a "separatist policy" that would not be accepted by the Scottish business community. In support of this point of view, the *Herald* quoted Arnold Clark, a major Scottish car dealer, as supporting Brown on this issue, as the following quote indicates: "It [the tax hike] will be damaging to the Scottish economy generally and to Scottish business in particular for Scotland to have higher taxes than the rest of the UK" (Brogan & Ritchie, 1999, p. 1).

Little distinction was made between independence and devolution in this view of the world. As far as business leaders were concerned when portrayed in the print media, the SNP was inherently pernicious because it was fighting for independence, and independence was bad; in fact, anything that changed the constitutional status quo was deeply suspect. As the *Herald* noted in an editorial, "Scottish business was ... extremely cautious about devolution and had to be hauled, kicking and protesting" to accept the project. Now, it seemed, "the overwhelmingly sceptical and negative tone which businessmen in general adopted over devolution looks likely to be transferred seamlessly to the possibility of an independent Scotland" ("Still on the inside," 1999, p. 16).

Labour, always eager to feed the fear appeal of the consequences of a majority SNP government, was represented as the natural ally to business (a role traditionally held by the Conservatives). For example, the *Scotsman*, reporting on John Prescott's visit to Scotland within days of a MORI poll indicating Scottish business disapproval of independence, depicted the deputy prime minister as explicitly allying himself with this group and its opinions. Prescott was quoted at a Glasgow speech as characterizing an SNP victory thus: "It's SNP in – jobs out – and taxes up. Businesses understandably believe that Scotland's industry is stronger together with the

rest of the UK" (Tait, 1999b, p. 6). On the education front, when Labour and SNP policies were contrasted in the press, it was Labour whose policy was depicted as business-friendly – not only by Labour spokespeople, but also by business and industry sources. Thus the *Herald* quoted Gordon McKenzie, the Scottish manager for Microsoft, as throwing "the full weight of the company" behind Labour's – and specifically Blair's – plans for computers in the classroom. Furthermore, he stated:

> Microsoft is fully behind the Prime Minister's pledges to Scotland, and we look forward to working closely with the new Scottish Parliament to help realise his vision, ensuring that the Scottish schoolchildren of today are prepared for the global workplace of tomorrow. (Brogan, 1999e, p. 7)

The role of the Scottish parliament appears to be little more than a conduit for the prime minister's vision, according to this view.

Following the announcement of the SNP's "penny for Scotland"/"tartan tax" policy, Labour again explicitly associated itself with a business community that was apparently opposed to any policy that would lead to Scotland taking even a mildly divergent economic path from the rest of the UK. Chancellor Gordon Brown provided the statement that there was "an avalanche of criticism about the SNP's tax proposal;" he continued: "Business sees the risk in making us here in Scotland the higher taxed part of the United Kingdom. They are appalled to think Scotland could become known as a "high tax enclave" (Hardie, 1999g, p. 1). The same article –once again on page one – duly provided supporting quotes from business community leaders, including representatives from the Scottish CBI and the Forum of Private Business.

The last major expression of Scottish business's clear anti-SNP discourse in the press came the day before the election. On the front page of the *Scotsman*, in the main article, which led with a poll showing Labour well ahead of the SNP, the comments of a major Scottish business leader were again given prominence. The article characterized the SNP as having "suffered a setback"

when Mike Ross, the chief executive of a financial services firm, Scottish Widows "openly attacked independence" in comments made after the company's annual general meeting in Edinburgh. In this case, however, the quoted comments revolved around Ross's perception that people such as he were being prevented from speaking out about their anti-independence views by "being shouted down, or threatened or abused or intimidated" (MacMahon, 1999c, p. 1). While Ross was quoted right at the end of the article as wanting "devolution to work," the dominant discourse suggested by the placing of quotes suggests an embattled anti-independence community struggling to make its voices heard. As much of this analysis here makes clear, this simply was not the case.

The subordinate role of the Liberal Democrat and Conservative parties

Of the four major parties, the Liberal Democrats had the most difficult task defining their role and status in the developing new order. However, the Scottish party was at least characterized as being relatively free from London dominance. UK leader Paddy Ashdown's role in the election was depicted as passive, notwithstanding his prominent role during a March visit to Scotland for the national party conference. Mostly, he was depicted as maintaining a hands-off approach to Scottish party policy, and supporting, rather than controlling, his Scottish party leader, Jim Wallace. This was expressed in terms of Ashdown's desire for the whole Scottish polity to be able to find *its own* place as a unique and special institution within the UK.

The issue that Liberal Democrats in general, and Wallace in particular, tried hardest to "own" was education – what Wallace was quoted as calling "the key to Scotland's future prosperity" (Little & Hardie, 1999b, p. 4). On the issue of university tuition fees, which the Lib Dems were committed to abolishing in Scotland, Wallace insisted that he wanted "tuition fees to be dead. The people of Scotland have made it non-negotiable." Still, it was left to his UK party leader, Paddy

Ashdown, to be quoted in more aspirational terms about the party's commitment to education: "Scotland is uniquely placed to show the rest of the UK what a world-class education system is about. Education traditionally has a higher place in Scotland than the rest of the UK," he is quoted as saying (Dinwoodie, 1999q, p. 9).

The Scottish Liberal Democrats were also depicted as treading a fine line between support for a Scottish parliament within a robust federal UK polity – the official UK party line – and a desire to remain open to working with the independence-minded SNP. This was significant because the Lib Dems were more frequently depicted as seeking potential partnerships with other parties for a coalition government. (The Lib Dems' most likely potential partner mentioned in the press was Scottish Labour.)

However, there were other options relayed in the press. David Scott, writing in the *Scotsman*, noted that the Lib Dems had not "ruled out co-operation with the SNP, although that would require the Nationalists to ditch their insistence on a referendum on independence" (Scott, 1999b, p. 3). The *Herald* quoted senior Scottish Lib Dem MP Donald Gorrie as telling his party's national conference that the SNP was by no means "beyond the pale" in terms of possible parliamentary cooperation, and they could even prove to be respectable allies. Gorrie used his speech to remind Liberal Democrats that the party and its predecessors, the Liberals and the Whigs, had had a long history of supporting "good nationalists" – going back to their support of the rebelling American colonists during the War of Independence; thus the party should keep this in mind when thinking about possible coalition with the Scottish Nationalists (Horsburgh, 1999e, p. 6). However, while this point of view was occasionally aired in the press, the dominant Liberal Democrat line stressed a possible coalition with Scottish Labour – which is in fact what ended up happening.

The Conservatives fought the war of media representation from perhaps the weakest position of the four main parties, in terms of media perceptions. Following the extinction of Tory parliamentary representation in Scotland two years previously, press commentators were still finding the Conservatives a tempting target for vilification. It was hard for the Scottish Tories to get a mention in the press without being linked with William Hague and the UK Tories (Ritchie, 1999d, 1999f; Hardie, 1999d). The *Scotsman* did report that William Hague would allow his party in Scotland to "go it alone" for the election – though it indicated that the aim was to "contrast the freedom for the Tories in Scotland with the Labour Party's so-called 'control freak' tendency" (Copley, 1999b, p. 6). But more often, the coverage emphasized the strong and direct links between the Scottish party and its UK parent. Even on the occasion of the "Hampden Declaration," designed to relaunch the Scottish Conservatives as a "Scottish first" party, the *Herald* noted that McLetchie's keynote speech had been "approved by party leader William Hague" (Ritchie, 1999d, p.1).

The *Scotsman* also noted Donald Findlay's characterization of Scottish Labour – which, perhaps surprisingly, displayed some similarity to the SNP view of that party. Thus he was quoted as saying that Labour has "failed to adapt to devolution. Time and again they've been exposed as Tony Blair's puppets. Time and again Mr Blair has made it plain that he will not let go of the strings" (Scott, 1999m, p. 4).

Following the election, the Scottish Conservative Party tried to solidify its previously amorphous position in the new Scottish political environment. Although the Conservative party had in fact reduced its share of the vote from the disastrous 1997 general election showing, it had managed to win 18 seats under the proportional representation system and narrowly beat the Liberal Democrats into fourth place. The Tories thus pronounced themselves the "Unionist opposition" – in spite of the fact that they had secured just over half the number of seats as the

SNP, the recognized Official Opposition. McLetchie presented his party as the true defenders of the United Kingdom, endeavoring to ignore the SNP as some sort of anomaly that was beyond the pale of Scottish constitutional politics. His MSPs would now be "determined to get on with the job of ensuring that the new parliament will work in the interests of all the people of Scotland, within a strong United Kingdom" (Trueland, 1999, p. 7).

On narrower issues, the Conservatives, when quoted, were more likely to be depicted as reflecting Labour's pro-Union, anti-SNP discourse. For example, in promoting his own version of the fear appeal, McLetchie is quoted denigrating both Alex Salmond and his party's tartan tax proposal – likening Alex Salmond to a man pulling off a butterfly's wings and "trying to hurt the poorest people in Scotland" and then adding: "It doesn't half take the shine off his Braveheart image" (Ritchie, 1999p, p. 7). In this case, however, as in most cases involving policy debates, the Tory pronouncement received less prominence, and was placed at the end of the article behind the statements of Labour and the SNP. The same situation more or less held with the Liberal Democrats, and the relative lack of prominence accorded these parties and spokespersons ensured that their sentiments remained in the margins of the press debate.

Limits of the sphere of legitimate controversy

This focus on the sources and actors featured in the straight news articles in the *Herald* and the *Scotsman* indicates how these papers dealt with the main issues relating to the new Scottish parliament's relations with other political institutions at the UK and EU levels. The findings suggest that coverage of the Scottish parliament relied in large part on the main institutions of government and party, and the representatives of those institutions. This amounts to a significant information subsidy (see chapter 3), with the parties heavily supporting the production and dissemination of news on this subject.

By far the majority of the sources and actors either were direct representatives of political parties or were speaking in a supporting role for one of the main parties (most often for Labour). Though there was the appearance of a wide-ranging debate on the issues, the sphere of legitimate controversy was in fact narrowly bounded by the competing discourses of the main political parties – which meant, primarily, those associated with Labour and the SNP, as represented in the press. While both newspapers occasionally utilized external, supposedly non-partisan views, via academics, religious leaders, and representatives of civic organizations, recourse to such sources was rare. Much more common was the use of political party actors and sources to frame straight news articles. (As for interpretive pieces, the majority were written by newspaper columnists and editorial staff, most of whom were writing within the same sphere of legitimate controversy bounded by the use of sources and actors in the straight news articles.) This sphere thus emerged not from any attempt, say, to set a higher tone of "what's best for Scotland's future," but from the competing discourses emerging from the concentrated and at times bitter partisan dispute between and among the political parties. This is in spite of the fact that, early on, many accessed voices had called for a new, consensual style of politics – a shift from the so-called "yaa boo" style (a term connoting unrestrained verbal conduct and a lack of respect for opponents) commonly associated with the Westminster parliament. Still, while the partisan nature of the debate was clearly depicted in the press, this conclusion does not adequately explain the unequal relationship among the various political parties.

The analysis presented here indicates a strong preference for Labour sources and actors in the news. In particular, given the contexts in which they appeared, it was the major *UK* Labour actors who were depicted as being the most important and influential in defining and constructing the news – providing the dominant frames and discourses that were replicated not only by Scottish Labour, but also, indirectly, by the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives. The sphere

of legitimate controversy was thereby bounded in terms primarily set by Prime Minister Blair and the other leaders of the UK Labour party. This state of affairs was also applicable to the portrayed role of the new parliament itself. The terms of the news coverage implicitly accepted the UK Labour position of discussing a devolved Scottish parliament constructed in strictly limited terms – as a subordinate legislative body, set within the United Kingdom, which eschewed any progress or commitment to outright independence or increased autonomy. This also helps to explain why straight news articles presented in the *Herald* and the *Scotsman* did not seriously or consistently address the issue of changing Scottish identity. Labour sources had attempted to set the range of legitimate controversy by characterizing Scottish identity as narrowly as possible, in terms that would leave it safely out of reach of any political expression – and to an extent they were successful in this effort.

Liberal Democrats and Tories were not invisible as actors and sources, but nor were these parties prominent in setting the limits of legitimate controversy – except to act, effectively, in a supporting role for the status quo paradigm adopted by UK Labour. This might have been expected of the Liberal Democrats, a party exhibiting only minor ideological differences with Labour (on independence or anything else). But for the Scottish Conservatives, it is ironic to consider the extent to which they were depicted as being on the same side of the debate as Labour. The more the core of the debate turned to narrow economic issues, the more these two parties seemed to speak as one on the excessive "cost of independence" – with Labour taking the lead and the Tories faithfully following as both rejected the Nationalists' vision. Thus it was quite in order for a *Herald* page one article titled "The cost of independence," appearing days before the election, to depict Salmond as being "locked ... in combat over statistics with Prime Minister Tony Blair, Chancellor Gordon Brown, and Tory leader William Hague as [Salmond] held out his vision of an independent Scotland with a big fiscal surplus and a robust and modern

economy" (Ritchie, 1999q, p. 1). Whatever the differences at the UK level, Labour and the Tories were primarily portrayed in the press – usually implicitly, sometimes explicitly – as maintaining a common front against the threat of an SNP victory.

While the SNP was portrayed as the main political competitor to Labour, it was not treated in a like manner in the regular news pages. Since UK Labour actors were most often depicted as proactively setting the bounds of legitimate controversy, Nationalist actors were depicted increasingly as acting in a reactive fashion, as the debate developed on Labour's terms. Those issues defined as legitimately controversial and worthy of enhanced coverage were primarily Labour issues; issues associated more closely with the SNP were effectively relegated to the outer bounds of the sphere of legitimate controversy, at least in regular news reports.

Thus the focus on economic policy – and in particular over taxation – was defined largely in terms set by UK Labour ministers who, together with their apparent allies in the Scottish business community, rejected any move toward a differential tax rate for Scotland by promoting fear of the consequences of such an action. The SNP, which promoted a tax increase on social welfare grounds, was mostly portrayed as defensive and reactive on the issue, in part because its policy was presented as a move toward a substantial break between Scottish and UK policy. But at least the differential tax rate was a policy that was allowed for under the terms set for the devolved parliament. The same could not be said of the SNP's positions on defense and foreign policy, and EU membership: these were pushed to the very edge of the sphere of legitimate controversy. These policies, calling for a much more substantial break with UK practice, were therefore portrayed as even more extreme (besides which, they placed the Nationalist party most at odds with all the other major parties). For the same reason, independence and independent membership of the EU were pushed to the margins of legitimate debate – because, again, they represented a paradigm that called for a much more substantial break with the status quo than the

proposed parliament called for or allowed. Scotland's future as a potential independent entity in the EU was given even less salience – perhaps because the SNP itself failed to define this issue, or its position on the issue, with any degree of clarity.

All of this suggests, in toto, a continuing tendency by the press to tacitly reproduce the elite source/actor structure of the UK parliament and UK politics – to show deference to Westminster and the status quo – even in the context of a new system of devolved parliamentary power that ostensibly was being presented as a "fresh start," and a necessary break with the (Westminster) past and Westminster ways of doing things. This is a matter that will be reviewed in more detail in the concluding chapter. The above analysis of sources and actors presents only part of the picture. First, a deeper contextual analysis is needed to fully understand the nature of the media environment within which this news was constructed, and this brings us to the frame analysis that is the subject of the following chapter.

Chapter 7. Nature of the issue culture: Frame construction and media packages

This third and final findings chapter outlines and qualitatively examines the main factors influencing the press in framing the Scottish parliament's external relations. It does this by focusing closely on the print media's presentation of the various issues surrounding the creation of the Scottish parliament and its articulation of Scottish identity within the UK and EU. Hence the ultimate goal is to understand the use of media frames that incorporate notions of Scottish identity as refracted through the prism of the parliament based upon "Scottish" interests, when such notions come in contact with competing notions emanating from UK and EU political institutions. This analysis raises several questions: What packages and frames are used? How do they fit into broader themes? And what are the implications of their use?

A basic introduction to the area of framing, frame analysis, and adjacent methods is presented in chapter 3. That chapter also describes the wide variety of framing-related methods available to the researcher. This variety is itself a testament to the flexibility of the approach. In fact, it's fair to say that how one pursues frame analysis depends very much on the project and the researcher. One of the main difficulties encountered in the present study has been identifying and determining the best approach – among the variety available – for studying the material at hand. For example, an initial attempt to impose Entman's (1991) approach to the study proved less than appropriate. The essentially comparative nature of Entman's approach to framing identifies frames by comparing narratives of events that, while different, have enough common elements that they could be reported similarly. Such an approach can reveal what sorts of textual and discourse-related choices were made to provide differing frames for the events. For example, Entman in this way framed the competing narratives in a study of U.S. media coverage of the

shooting-down of the KAL and Iran Air airliners by the Soviet Union and the United States, respectively. In these cases, the incidents were both covered heavily by U.S. media outlets, and therefore provided plenty of material that could meaningfully be compared and contrasted. The present study proved to be slightly different. It was originally designed to compare Scottish press coverage of the new Scottish parliament's relations with, on the one hand, the UK, and on the other, the EU. However, press coverage turned out to be so heavily skewed toward Scottish-UK coverage (see chapter 5) that comparisons in terms similar to those of Entman's study would be problematic. Moreover, Entman's use of terms such as problem definition, moral evaluation, and treatment recommendation were found to be unsuitable for this study. In particular, the focus on a moral evaluation seemed more appropriate for foreign affairs issues, especially those involving conflict, war, or suffering. Therefore, a different approach was chosen, one that utilizes a different type of frame analysis, known as frame-*building*, that examines and identifies the construction of media frames and packages that define the boundary of a particular issue culture. While this approach owes something to Entman's work, it draws most heavily from the work of scholars such as William Gamson, Kathryn Lasch, and Andre Modigliani, all of whom have been prominent in applying this type of approach to media studies.

Gamson and Modigliani's (1989) conceptualization of a media frame as "a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events" provides a particularly useful introduction to this approach. The media frame, they suggest, defines "the essence of the issue" (p. 143). However, this characterization, taken alone, disguises the complexity of the device. A more intricate way of approaching this issue is to think in terms of *media packages*, which in turn form a signature matrix of condensing symbols that highlight various salient aspects of the media frame. These terms, and their application to the present study, are examined below.

The issue culture of the Scottish parliament and the UK and EU: Discussion

As Gamson & Modigliani point out, every public policy issue has a culture, which involves a set of media discourses that evolves over time. The media provide the main forum for discussion of any given issue – the "site on which various social groups, institutions, and ideologies struggle over the definition and construction of social reality" (Gurevitch & Levy, 1985, p. 19, qtd. in Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). These media discourses can be conceived of as a set of *media packages*, i.e., interpretive packages that imbue a given issue with meaning. At the heart of these media packages are core frames. Scottish devolution politics in the first half of 1999 was no exception to this rule. It too had an issue culture, complete with its various and competing discourses, frames, and media packages.

This issue culture, like all issue cultures, is rooted in a particular time and place: the cultural and political environments of Scotland and the United Kingdom (and, to an extent, the EU) in the late 1990s. It is informed by more than a century of efforts to establish some form of home rule in Scotland. It is in particular informed by the previous debate over devolution – which culminated in the failed referendum to establish a Scottish Assembly in 1979 – and by the aftermath of that debate. However, the nature of the 1999 devolution debate was very different from that of its immediate predecessor. The intervening two decades had seen 18 years of Conservative rule – and in particular, the 11-year rule of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who was particularly disliked in Scotland. In addition, the 20 years leading up to the parliamentary elections were informed both by the cultural flowering that had taken place in Scotland, and the Scottish Constitutional Convention that, from 1989, had provided the latest political and constitutional impetus for devolution. These issues have all been discussed in previous chapters; they are repeated here merely to emphasize their importance in constructing the foundations for the issue culture analyzed in the present chapter.

The analysis of the issue culture surrounding the media's coverage of the birth of the Scottish parliament is based on the same qualitative analysis of the *Herald* and the *Scotsman*, from which a number of dominant media packages and frames are deduced. The analysis follows Gamson & Lasch's (1983) model of interpretive analysis of frames, positions, and signature elements in constructing *media packages*. Each media package is, in essence, the articulation of a dominant discourse in the coverage, complete with its core frame, core position, and sets of reasoning and framing devices that explain and justify the package (see below). The package or packages taken together describe the overall ideology of a given issue. Thus the present issue culture incorporates four such media packages: Modernized Scotland and Britain, Aspirational Scotland, Realist Scotland, and Fear Appeal. Each of these packages includes a number of signature elements in addition to a *core frame* (or frames) and core positions for each media package. The concept of the core frame has already been described at length. In the present context, *core positions* are articulations of the core frame in relation to two political entities: the UK and the EU; thus each of the four packages contain two core positions: one for each of the two larger entities. Following the format used by Gamson and Lasch (1983) to describe the issue culture of welfare policy in the United States, this study applies *signature matrixes* (Tables 7.1 and 7.2) that describe the packages and their roles in constructing the overall issue culture for the Scottish parliament's relations with the UK and the EU.

In addition to the core frame and core positions, the signature matrix for an issue also articulates two more groups of signature elements: *framing devices* and *reasoning devices*. Following Gamson & Lamsch (1983), this analysis distinguishes those signature elements that articulate *framing* devices – metaphors, exemplars, catchphrases, depictions – from those that emphasize *reasoning* devices – roots, consequences, and appeals to principle. The former group of devices suggests a framework within which the issue can be understood; the latter group of

Table 7.1 Signature matrix: Framing devices

	Framing devices			
Package	***dominant metaphor(s)***	***dominant depictions(s)***	***representative catchphrases***	***dominant exemplars***
Modernized Scotland and Britain	A longstanding and happy marriage between two different but complementary people	The Scottish parliament, with strictly limited powers, as the final answer to calls for increased devolution Labour as benevolent harbinger of more democracy to the Scottish people	The "Battle for Britain"	The UK itself as a historically successful union and nation-state. (Lesson: Don't change something that's worked so well in the past.)
Aspirational Scotland	A formerly sick patient now regaining strength A child growing up and able to take care of him/herself A new dawn	Scotland as a more autonomous (if not quite independent) nation, freed from many of the constrictions of Westminster Scottish parliament leading the way for the rest of the UK Scottish people as a proud, independent people Westminster as an outmoded, anachronistic institution A new Scottish spirit and confidence replacing outmoded sense of Britishness	"The new politics" Scottish parliament a "people's parliament" "A penny for Scotland"	Last Scottish parliament in 1707 (Lesson: It's time for the parliament to return.)
Realist Scotland	Scotland at the crossroads A delicate balancing act A bumbling oaf neither ready nor able to take on major responsibilities.	Scottish parliament as barely competent Scottish parliament as little more than a scaled-up version of a local or county government Scottish nation not even close to being ready for full independence MSP's as inferior to their Westminster counterparts UK Labour as a necessary force to maintain reason and order in Scotland	"West Lothian question"	Scottish parliament a glorified version of Strathclyde Regional Council (Lesson: Scottish parliament has all the idiosyncrasies and problems of the smaller government unit with few of the benefits of Westminster)
Fear Appeal	A potentially messy and expensive divorce between two partners who have been through a lot together.	Labour as a defender of the Scottish people against the destructive forces of separatism. SNP as a tax-and-spend party.	"The English backlash" "It's SNP in, jobs out, taxes up." "The tartan tax"	Darien scheme "disaster" (Lesson: If Scotland tries to go it alone, disaster awaits)

Table 7.2 Signature matrix: Reasoning devices, core frames & core positions

	Reasoning devices				
Package	***root cause***	***consequences***	***appeals to principle***	***Core frame(s)***	***core position***
Modernized Scotland and Britain	A parliament with limited powers is necessary to head off rising Scottish pressure for more extensive autonomy or outright independence	The potential breakup and demise of the United Kingdom	The UK constitution needs to be updated so that it may retain its integrity and relevance, bit nevertheless it is fundamentally solid and beneficial to all.	To use Westminster power to address the changing democratic needs of Scotland (and Wales) within a robust United Kingdom	*(Re. the UK)* A basic level of democratic power and accountability should be moved from Westminster to Scotland; but such power is strictly limited, and ultimate sovereignty remains with the Westminster parliament *(Re. the EU)* EU relations remain firmly within the remit of the Westminster Parliament's sovereignty.
Aspirational Scotland	Extensive devolved government is necessary to overcome a long history of Westminster neglect of Scotland's needs and aspirations.	The new parliament has unleashed a new wave of optimism among Scots, as Scottish identity is once again able to be channeled through progressive governmental as well as cultural means.	As a historically distinct nation, Scotland deserves a powerful devolved parliament and a much greater measure of self-determination, if not outright independence.	A. To make the Scottish parliament a progressive institution, in order to build a better future for Scotland (whether in the UK or separately) B. To emphasize the progressive tendencies of the Scottish parliament by comparing it favorably with the anachronistic Westminster parliament	*(Re. the UK)* Scots parliament, representing a reenergized Scottish nation and a spirit that is displacing outmoded sense of Britishness, is moving aspirationally toward a new and brighter future (whether in the UK or separately) *(Re. the EU)* The new parliament can create many powerful and effective links to the EU, its institutions, and its member states and regions; the EU will eventually supplant Westminster as Holyrood's most important partner.
Realist Scotland	The Scottish parliament has raised expectations well beyond what can be or should be delivered by the institution itself.	The inevitable let-down and disappointment, when expectations are unfulfilled, could be a serious blow to the Scottish people.	The Westminster parliament still is the most competent and appropriate vehicle for dealing with Scotland's most important needs; the Scottish parliament should only be used for subordinate issues, for which it is competent.	To recognize the limits of Holyrood's competence and effectiveness, and tackle the difficult task of making the Scottish and Westminster parliaments work together within the changed constitutional environment.	*(Re. the UK)* A devolved Scottish parliament might well with the rest of the UK, but there are many serious problems still to be resolved. *(Re. the EU)* The parliament should keep its links with the EU to a minimum, and leave EU relations primarily to the Westminster parliament.
Fear Appeal	There is too much dangerous talk of the Scottish parliament being taken in directions for which it was never designed.	The election risks giving the SNP a majority to control the Scottish parliament, instigating a process that could lead to independence.	The United Kingdom is sacrosanct and must be preserved.	To keep Scotland firmly within the UK, by scaring the electorate away from doing something stupid and catastrophic like electing a Nationalist government.	*(Re. the UK)* Scotland can't stand on its own, outside UK, and independence would be economic folly. *(Re. the EU)* EU relations must remain firmly under UK control, since Scotland would be unable to function effectively as an independent entity in the EU.

devices provides reasons or justifications for a given position. Each of these devices is described in more detail below.

Roots. This is the first of three reasoning devices. A dominant frame (or package) for a given event or development also suggests a dominant or preferred reading of the causes or roots of that frame's development (i.e., the cause that provides the context within which the present event or development is understood). The root device is similar to what Iyengar & Simon (1993) describe as *causal responsibility*, "the origin of the issue or problem" (p. 369). The device is implicitly and sometimes explicitly ideological, since assigning blame or credit for an event gives a strong indication of the value system of the party or parties supporting that point of view. For example, during the Cold War, a popular revolution or uprising in a Third World country was often characterized in the United States as having roots in Soviet-Communist subversion; such an assignment of blame fit neatly within a U.S. Cold War mentality that perceived the world as consisting only of friends of the U.S. and friends of the Soviet Communists (and by extension enemies of freedom). In the context of the present study, it is worth noting that commentators in Scotland have often placed the roots of that country's present-day problems with two sources: mismanagement from London and the lack of vitality of the Scottish people themselves.

Consequences. If a given event or development is framed as having certain roots, it follows that the package will also allow for the event to have certain consequences. Again, the ways in which these consequences are framed are necessarily ideological. Much of the debate over the new Scottish parliament revolves around the potential consequences of allowing the Scottish parliament to exist in the first place – that its creation might lead to a breakup of the United Kingdom, for example.

Appeals to principle. Media frames and packages "rely on characteristic moral appeals and uphold certain general principles" (Gamson & Lasch, 1983, p. 400). These principles define the dominant ideological framework within which the media frames operate. For example, a Scottish Tory politician might appeal to the principle of the sovereignty of the Westminster parliament – which must remain the source of ultimate authority in the United Kingdom; an SNP politician, on the other hand, might be expected to appeal to the principle of independence and freedom from the dominating control of an external power.

The four framing devices are defined as follows:

Metaphors. The term's meaning in the present study is basically the standard dictionary definition – though it should be noted that metaphors in this context always have two constituent parts: the main subject that the metaphor is supposed to highlight and the associated subject evoked by the use of the metaphor to enhance the preferred reading of the message. Gamson & Lasch allude to what Lakoff & Johnson (1979) call "entailments" – "characteristics of the associated subject that, by implication, attach to the principal subject" – and go on to distinguish between two types of entailments leading to two types of metaphors: single-valued metaphors, and dynamic, or multiple-valued metaphors. The present study eschews this false dichotomy, preferring a cultural studies approach that recognizes all metaphors (and metonyms) as fundamentally polysemic and open to dominant, negotiated, and oppositional decoding (Hall, 1980). In the present context, metaphors are thus identified as the apparent preferred reading intended by the media producer. This general statement applies not only to metaphors but also to exemplars, catchphrases, and all the other condensing symbols recounted here. In other respects, however, this part of the analysis holds fairly closely to Gamson & Lasch's approach.

Depictions. These are figures of speech that attempt to apply a particular characterization to a given person or event. More general examples of this device in action include depictions of

welfare recipients as "freeloaders," of welfare itself as degrading, and Scots as mean or stingy. Again, those promulgating these depictions intend the preferred meaning to "stick" in the minds of the media consumer. In the present context, most of the depictions occur in relation to political parties, their policies, and (often) the personalities of high party officials and leaders.

Representative catchphrases. In the relationship between media source and reporter, one or either of the parties will often try to capture the essence of the events dominant meaning "in a single theme statement, tagline, title, or slogan that is intended to suggest a general frame" (Gamson & Lasch, 1983, p. 399). Catchphrases are attempts by parties or groups to condense the preferred meaning attached to particular objects, events, or developments into a simple phrase or summary. Classic examples include "No taxation without representation" (before the American War of Independence); "I like Ike" (referring to the "likeable" President Dwight D. Eisenhower); and Coke's "The real thing." A 1974 catchphrase that was successful for the SNP was "It's Scotland's Oil," referring to the belief that the newly discovered North Sea oil fields should belong to Scotland rather than the UK.

Exemplars. These are defined either as "historical events from which lessons are drawn" (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989, p. 3), or as "real events of the past or present ... frequently used to frame the principal subject" (Gamson & Lasch, 1983, p. 399). In other words, these are words or phrases that conjure up past or present events that are compared with the current subject in order to frame that subject. In the Scottish context there are of course many historical events that could be chosen to frame current events, such as great battles or the dissolution of the 1707 parliament.

The packages

This study identifies four major media packages used by the Scottish press to cover developing relations between the Scottish parliament and the UK and EU polities. Taken

together, these packages – Modernized Scotland and Britain, Aspirational Scotland, Realist Scotland, and Fear Appeal – cover the broad ideological landscape within which most events in this issue were framed during the period of analysis. They are not necessarily the only packages that could have emerged, but they are the most salient. These packages are presented in the signature matrixes in Tables 7.1 and 7.2.

Although the limits of the issue culture remained fairly constant during the period under review, there were some minor shifts in the coverage during the four periods covered, and it is worth briefly reviewing these in the context of the four media packages identified below. Early coverage was somewhat more "visionary" in terms of the new parliament's future. Much media coverage followed the "Aspirational Scotland" package, focusing on the ways in which the Scottish parliamentary system would be different from, and better than, the Westminster model. The EU dimension was also given slightly more prominence in the first two periods – especially in the editorial, commentary, and Op-Ed sections. The third and fourth periods, when the parliament actually began operating, saw a greater emphasis on – and disillusionment in – the effectiveness of the new institution that first began to be felt in the media; coverage of the body also began to express more regular criticism for a lack of competence and concentration on prosaic and self-serving matters such as pay, expenses, and holidays. With the Labour-led coalition firmly in power, the news media emphasized Scotland's continuing role within the UK and its links with Westminster and the other UK regional assemblies. EU relations were framed primarily as an issue to be dealt with at the UK nation-state level, with the Scottish Parliament articulating its EU-related concerns mainly through Westminster, rather than directly to Brussels of other EU entities. These small differences are interesting, but ultimately less significant than the fact that all four packages remained salient throughout all four periods.

Package #1: Modernized Scotland and Britain

The Modernized Scotland and Britain package emphasized the robust, contented, and mutually beneficial nature of the continued union between Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom, while recognizing the need for the underlying structures of this union to be brought up to date. It thus closely approximates Prime Minister Tony Blair's and New Labour's vision of what the new constitutional arrangements should mean. As such, it serves as a sort of framing benchmark against which the other packages can be compared.

The *core frame* in this package is the use of existing Westminster institutions to address the changing democratic needs of Scotland (as well as Wales) within the UK. Within this core frame, two *core positions* are identified, one in relation to the United Kingdom and the other in relation to the European Union. The former position emphasizes a basic level of democratic power and accountability that should be moved from Westminster to Scotland; but such power is strictly limited, and ultimate sovereignty clearly remains with the Westminster parliament. The latter position emphasizes the extent to which EU relations should remain firmly within the remit of the Westminster parliament's sovereignty. Holyrood-EU relations should be minimal and should in any case always be channeled through British government institutions first.

The *reasoning devices* within which this package is framed – roots, consequences, and appeals to principle – emphasize the need for Westminster to enact limited evolutionary change in the UK constitution in order to mitigate the risk of more radical or revolutionary changes down the road. Thus the *roots* of the package relate to the need to head off rising Scottish pressure for more extensive autonomy or outright independence. The potential *consequences* of any failure to make these aforementioned changes is the weakening and demise of the United Kingdom itself. The underlying *appeal to principle* is that the UK constitution needs to be updated so that it may retain its integrity and relevance, but nevertheless it is fundamentally solid and beneficial to all.

In providing the building blocks for this frame, the four *framing devices* for this package clearly expressed the arguments characterized in the reasoning devices above. Turning first to *depictions*, these devices expressed the progressive novelty of the situation. One such depiction, expressed in a *Herald* editorial, talked of *"a different Scotland, but not a separate Scotland,"* with a parliament that *"was born of, and seeks to reconcile, the tensions"* in the UK ("Cause for celebration," 1999, p. 16). It was also expressed in the words of one academic, who called devolution a *"watershed in British politics,"* a *"new politics at the ballot box," a "decentralization" of the British state,"* and *"a way forward that can serve the Scottish and British people best in the future"* (Dickson, 1999c, p. 8). Most of the depictions in this package, however, were associated with the Labour Party or the Conservatives. Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott depicted Scotland as being *"in the vanguard of constitutional change"* and a *"role model for England"* (MacMahon & Carrell, 1999, p. 6). On education policy, for example, Labour intended to *"woo"* Scots with a *"courtship"* ending in *"happy and successful union before the Home Rule Altar"* ("Labour's education targets," 1999, p. 18). Indeed, the successful marriage or close partnership was the dominant *metaphor* for this package. Labour spokespersons, and particularly the prime minister, used this device regularly. The UK government under Labour *"delivered on the bread and butter issues"* (Copley & Tait, 1999, p. 6). Blair wanted an *"enhanced and strengthened United Kingdom,"* in which things that are *"distinctly Scottish"* could be dealt with in Scotland and *"those things where it is right that we cooperate and work in partnership we do so within the United Kingdom"* (Settle, 1999a, p. 7). The *Herald* noted that in one key speech Blair returned repeatedly to his theme of *"Scotland being stronger in Union with England than isolated and impoverished"* by separation (Ritchie, 1999j, p. 1). In this and other speeches he would give an *"impassioned defence"* of the Union and touted the *"benefits of the UK"* (Brogan, 1999c, p.6); he pledged to *"defend the UK"* and to

"champion Britishness" (Ritchie, 1999j, p. 1). Blair would also take the press *"to task"* over its supposedly excessive interest in Scottish *"nationality"* and *"image"* (Ritchie, 1999j, p. 1). Instead, he wanted to focus on a *"modern, tolerant"* Britain (Settle, 1999b, p. 8). Thus the election victory for Labour was a *"defeat for separatism"* and a *"victory for a stronger UK"* (Settle, 1999d, p. 4).

It is hard to discern a dominant *catchphrase* that appeared regularly within this package. The closest representative example emerged not from Labour, but rather the Conservative party, which styled its own election campaign *"the Battle for Britain"* – a play on the famous WW II air battle between Britain and Germany that helped stave off a German invasion. The obvious implication was that the Tories were the only people who could *"save the Union"* from the forces of evil and destruction. However, the lack of salience of Conservative viewpoints in the newspapers meant that the catchphrase was less prominent than might have been the case if it had been associated with Labour or the SNP.

The prime *exemplar* in this package is the United Kingdom itself. The UK is presented as a great example of a united and coherent nation-state that has worked well for centuries and which continues to work in the present. Although there were few specific examples of the historical effectiveness of the UK – e.g., the creation of the British empire, the fight to defeat fascism in the Second World War – the use of this exemplar typically expressed such effectiveness as a matter of fact, without any need of further explication.

Package #2: Aspirational Scotland

This package stressed the ability of the new Scottish parliament to aid the expression of national identity in positive, progressive, or aspirational ways. Such aspirations suggested a role for Scotland either as a progressive new sub-national political unit firmly within the UK, or as an

entity that was fully independent of the UK (with the tacit or stated assumption that such an entity would be a full member of the European Union). This package thus includes full independence *and* devolution – because there was not a clear enough distinction between both these political states. Instead, the overlap between these two states was so great that it made more sense to deal with them as part of a single package.

Numerous examples of this package appeared in both newspapers under review. To complicate matters, however, two core frames were discerned within this package. One focuses on the need to make the Scottish parliament a progressive institution, in order to build a better future for Scotland, either in the UK or separately. This frame stresses the ability of the new Scottish parliament to aid the expression of national identity in positive, progressive, or aspirational ways. This includes progressive expressions of "the Scottish people," where the parliament is regarded as the prime means of this expression. The other *core frame* emphasized the progressive tendencies of the Scottish parliament by comparing it favorably with the anachronistic Westminster parliament. This frame serves a similar function to the one above, but stresses negative aspects of the Westminster parliament, thereby implying in the context of the article that the Scottish parliament would be an improvement on the Westminster example.

The *core position* regarding the Scottish parliament's relations with the UK is that the parliament, representing a reenergized Scottish nation and a spirit that was displacing outmoded sense of Britishness, was moving toward a new and brighter future (again, either in the UK or separately). The EU-related core position contained short-term and a longer-term elements: first, that the new parliament would create many powerful and effective links to the EU, its institutions, and its member states and regions; and second, that the EU would eventually supplant Westminster as Holyrood's most important partner.

The *reasoning devices* all emphasized the shift from political and cultural dormancy to a type of political renaissance, reified in the form of the parliament. The *root* cause of this package revolved around the sense that Scotland had endured a long history of Westminster neglect of its political and cultural needs and aspirations. The *consequences* of this package focused on the new parliament's perceived ability to unleash a new wave of optimism and progressivism among Scots. These traits would be channeled through progressive governmental as well as cultural means and lead to a heightened sense of Scottish exceptionalism, which would in all probabaility lead to calls either for greater autonomy or outright independence. The basic *appeal to principle* underlying all this is that the Scottish people deserved a much greater measure of self-determination.

Overall, the *framing devices* all contributed to the sense of radical change. The dominant *metaphors* in this package were those of a child growing up and finding its independence, and a long-sick or struggling person emerging from a period of dormancy. Thus, with the new parliament, Scotland was *"emerging from a long illness ... struggling, sometimes painfully, to find its voice"* (Brewer, 1999, p. 13); its new parliament would learn to come to terms with *"the new, growing-up Scotland"* (Ritchie & Dinwoodie, 1999a, p. 7). The Scottish nation no longer needed *"the crutch of regressive nostalgia,"* and now had the *"self-confidence to do exactly as it wants"* (Brewer, 1999, p. 13).

Other aspirational metaphors were often linked to SNP attempts to take the initiative in the election campaign, especially with its "penny for Scotland" policy (see below). In this case the dominant metaphor was of an earthquake or other violent act of nature. The SNP was depicted as having *"seized the campaign ... and shaken it hard"* ("Consensus v confrontation," 1999, p. 12); the party had *"thrown down the gauntlet"* and opened up a much-needed debate (Reid, 1999b, p. 13); as a result, it was *"shaking the British constitution to its foundations"* (Ritchie, 1999l, p. 8),

and had *"blown away"* New Labour's attempts to control the debate. Elsewhere, a *Herald* article, reporting on the detailed blueprint of the new parliament, noted that the new institution was *"breaking new ground"* in more ways than one (Horsburgh, 1999a, p. 6). A *Herald* editorial used the first person plural (a common practice in this context) in stating that Scotland was at the *"threshold of a new beginning, for the resurrection of our Parliament will mean that political life in Scotland will take off in new directions which can be tailored particularly for Scotland and the needs of her people"* ("Descent into puerile politics" 1999, p. 12); it could replace the *"hatred of a rank-ridden past with faith in an egalitarian future"* ("Cause for celebration," 1999, p. 16); Scotland therefore could be *"a beacon for progressive, grown-up politics"* (Taylor, 1999, p. 2).

Rarer were depictions that portrayed a future Scotland as a better country for being fully independent. Notably, such allusions were usually qualified somehow – as when one *Scotsman* commentator noted, *"The parliament is a bridge to independence. But independence is not going to be achieved by stealth ... it will come when the Scottish people want it"* (Milne, 1999a, p. 6). Otherwise, aspirational *depictions* tended to focus on the notion that Scotland could lead the all of the UK to a better future. Thus, the *Herald* noted that *"Scottish New Labour wants Scotland to lead Britain"* (Brogan, 1999e, p. 7). On education, Scotland could not only be *"in the front rank of advanced nations in the world,"* but also *"show a lead to the rest of the UK"* (Dinwoodie, 1999q, p. 9). On certain important policy issues, Scotland could be an effective *"testbed for the rest of the UK"* (Cairns, 1999a, p. 1). Even the SNP at times accepted the premise that Holyrood could lead Westminster – as when an SNP spokesperson noted, *"We have taught Westminster something before the Scottish parliament has even started"* (Horsburgh, 1999h, p. 6). One commentator, criticizing New Labour for being just the same as the Tories, insisted that the *"decent"* Scottish people people wanted *"decency over [Westminster] greed"* – emphasizing that Scotland's role was to *"set an example to our cousins south of the border"* (Reid, 1999b, p. 13).

At one point the Conservatives seemed to catch the aspirational bug: the *Herald* noted that the Tories were metaphorically *"wrapping themselves in the saltire"* (i.e., the Scottish flag, the St. Andrew's saltire cross) as they tried to repackage themselves as *"the new tartan army,"* more Scottish than British (Hardie, 1999d, p. 4; "The new tartan army of Tories," 1999, p. 1).

This aspirational commentary, focusing on progressive impulses for Scotland to improve itself through the vehicle of the new parliament, typically took a pragmatic turn. Scots were *"not tribal and emotional"* but *"pragmatic;"* they combined (perhaps paradoxically) *"a new idealism and an old pragmatism."* True, devolution was *"a political device intended to repair the institutions of the United Kingdom in a manner satisfactory to us Scots;"* but it also emerged from *"a deeper yearning: to make something which is specifically and distinctively ours"* (Massie, 1999, p. 3). The parliament itself would help to clarify and harness the country's *"new energy"* ("Scotland at the crossroads," 1999, p. 17), for it was *"not a council writ large, nor Westminster writ small;"* rather, it was *"unique"* (Wishart, 1999b, p. 19). This was going to be a *"different kind of parliament"* (Horsburgh, 1999k, p. 8), a *"new departure"* (Gray, 1999, p. 7), a powerful *"idea whose time had come"* (McMillan, 1999b, p. 23). In time, it would even *"break down"* the old Scottish Labour *"one-party state"* and overcome a *"tradition of degenerate local politics"* which had long been the hallmark of Labour machine politics in Scotland (MacWhirter, 1999a, p. 6). Even that staunch Unionist and Scotsman editor, Andrew Neil, noted that Scots *"are in the driving seat of constitutional change that is now affecting the whole of the United Kingdom"* (Neil, 1999c, p. 23). This optimism extended to reports of the EU's views of the new parliament. The papers recorded that EU leaders *"warmly welcomed"* the new parliament, which was bringing democracy *"closer to the people;"* Scotland would be a *"good partner"* with Europe, though EU leaders still cautioned *"pragmatism"* on all sides as the parliament found its feet (Watson, 1999b, p. 4).

Depictions of this aspirational package could also be found, albeit with less salience, in the uncertain period between the election and the inauguration of the parliament. Even the messy process of forging a Lib-Lab coalition was occasionally depicted in aspirational terms, since coalition government itself, and the proportional representation system that had encouraged it, were novel concepts in the Scottish and British contexts; they were a *"radical departure"* (Dickson, 1999d, p. 3), *"changing the climate from that of Westminster to the new politics of Scotland"* (Dinwoodie & Ritchie, 1999b, p. 1). The success of the coalition might decide *"whether Westminster too, could see cooperative or coalition government"* (Carrell, 1999b, p. 2). The swearing-in of new MSPs also marked a significant *"break with [Westminster] tradition"* (Breen, 1999a, p. 4). This break would also allow the parliament to *"make a difference"* and be *"better, fairer, more open"* ("Beginning of a new song," 1999, p. 18). The difference emerged from the perceived inclusiveness of the new body: *"In the Commons, legislation comes down from on high – here it's intended to emerge from below"* (MacWhirter, 1999c, p. 6). On the issue of social welfare, the *Herald* insisted that *"if the UK government will not grasp the nettle, the Scottish parliament (which has tax-varying powers) should"* ("Meeting the cost of care," 1999, p. 20). Even the Scottish Labour decision to take center-stage in the horseshoe-shaped Scottish parliament – derided as *"control freakery"* by the SNP – was also depicted as emphasizing the *"new politics and consensus,"* and underscored the belief that the *"old Westminster style of cross-flow antagonisms would not be replicated"* (Ritchie, 1999s, p. 8).

Interestingly, aspirational depictions frequently appeared in relation to either "the Scottish people" or the European Union. Throughout the period of study, a European dimension impressed itself on these types of aspirational depiction, albeit fitfully. Whether in terms of increased Scottish autonomy or outright independence, Scotland's relationship with the EU was about to be fundamentally altered, so it seemed – one of the parliament's nine permanent

committees would deal specifically with European affairs (Scott, 1999a, p. 6) – and a sub-class of aspirational depictions focused on this aspect. Sooner or later, it seemed, Scottish politics *"will be centred in Brussels"* (Meek, 1999b, p. 17). Such depictions, though rare, were always aspirational. The Scottish parliament would eventually offer a *"one-stop shop"* for presenting a unified *"clear identity"* for Scotland in Europe (Watson, 1999e, p. 10). This was a *"pivotal moment"* in Scotland's relationship with the EU (Watson, 1999c, p. 6). Murray Ritchie commented: *"In voting terms, an independent Scotland in Europe would not be short of friends.... For this truly is the age of the small country in Europe"* (Ritchie, 1999e, p. 7). Over the contentious issue of the euro, there was a *"dramatic shift"* in Scottish public opinion, toward being more amenable to adoption of the single currency (Ritchie, 1999a, p. 6). In this, the Scots were more *"phlegmatic"* about the pound sterling and were *"bucking the [UK] trend"* over the EU ("Still on the outside" 1999, p. 16).

Depictions of "the Scottish people" were typically reverential, with the clear implication that the parliament would have to work hard to match the high expectations of "the people" – a phrase that, in relation to the Scottish parliament, *"has meaning."* As for the parliament, the people *"want it. It goes forward at their insistence"* (Pearce, 1999a, p. 17). Many aspirational depictions focused more closely on how the Scottish parliament would or should be a *"parliament for the whole of Scotland,"* and a parliament that *"must belong to all the people"* (Horsburgh, 1999a, p. 6); it would be committed to *"sharing power with the people"* (Scott, 1999a, p. 6); it was a parliament that should *"listen more, talk less"* – and work more for the people and less along party lines (Horsburgh, 1999h, p. 6).

A number of aspirational catchphrases were used that also alluded to the importance of "the people." There were repeated calls for the new parliament to be *"family-friendly"* (Horsburgh, 1999a, p. 6; "Holyrood achievement," 1999, p. 14; (Scott, 1999a, p. 6). It was going to be a

"people's parliament" and a *"parliament of diversity"* ("Vote with clarity and pride," 1999, p. 18; Wishart, 1999b, p. 19; Reid, 1999d, p. 13; MacWhirter, 1999a, p. 6); it was time for a *"new song"* (Ritchie, 1999u, p. 1) – a reference to the famous quote of Earl of Seafield, made on the occasion of the extinction of the last Scottish parliament, in 1707. One catchphrase that was intimately associated with a particular political party was the SNP's "Penny for Scotland." This referred to the party's plan to raise the basic Scottish tax rate by a penny in the pound, to pay for expanded social services in a devolved Scotland. Underlying this catchphrase was an implicit assumption (on the part of the SNP) that, compared with the English, Scots are generally more inclined toward social welfare and communitarian values, and therefore would be willing to pay a higher tax rate for the good of the broader community. The defining representative catchphrase for this package, however, was that of *"the new politics."* In addition to the use of this term on the front page of one post-election special, the catchphrase also repeatedly appeared in both papers, in editorials and commentaries, and in quotes attributed to numerous spokespersons of multiple parties. The term was even used ironically on occasion, to emphasize the extent to which the new parliament was not living up to its original hype, or the supposed tendency for the "new politics" to be just as bad as the old, even as the parliament struck out into new territory.

The *Aspirational Scotland* package also tended to denigrate the Westminster system. Such derogatory depictions stressed the supposedly negative aspects of the Westminster parliament, implying in the context of the article that the Scottish parliament would be an improvement on the Westminster example. For example, the *Herald* editorial that touted the *"threshold of a new beginning"* also noted the *"descent into puerile politics"* at the UK level, and *"the squabbling and back-biting which passes for political conduct"* at Westminster ("Descent into puerile politics," 1999, p. 12). Another editorial, focusing on the plan for a *"refreshingly different"* and *"eminently sensible ... new politics"* in Scotland, noted that there would be no *"doffing of caps"*

to a Westminster parliament *"whose outdated, outmoded protocols are alien to the way its MPs and their constituents live today"* ("Holyrood achievement," 1999, p. 14). The new parliament would be designed to *"abandon Westminster traditions"* (Scott, 1999a, p. 6). In a sense, Scotland had already gained its independence from the *"governing psychoses"* of Westminster; while there was a realistic expectation that the Scottish parliament would actually deal with *"down-to-earth issues,"* no such thing could be expected from Westminster (Cumming, 1999, p. 13). The *Herald* emphasized that *"we don't want things to be like Westminster"* ("The new politics," 1999, p. 1); its MPs practiced *"ya-boo" politics* (Taylor, 1999, p. 2; Ritchie, 1999y, p. 7); its corridors were full of *"squabbling," "backbiting,"* and *"sleaze"* ("Descent into puerile politics," 1999, p. 12). In later periods, similar devices made an appearance in relation to the angry debate over the extent to which Scottish Labour was being controlled by the UK party. In this case, for example, *"London Labour"* was again depicted as an oppressive force, while Tony Blair was the *"puppetmaster"* controlling its Scottish underling (McLynn, 1999, p. 6); the Scottish parliament should not be an *"elective dictator,"* as the Westminster parliament had long been (MacWhirter, 1999b, p. 6).

The most salient *exemplar* to appear more than once in this package was that of the last Scottish parliament, which was closed in 1707. This *"pre-1707 parliament"* had once been the embodiment of the Scottish nation, but it was also Burns' famous *"parcel of rogues"* who allowed themselves to be *"bought and sold for English gold"* (Reid, 1999d, p. 13). The new institution would have to be very different from the *"old Parliament"* that *"committed suicide"* in 1707 (Horsburgh, 1999m, p. 1). In this context, the lesson was clear: it was time for the parliament to return, but the new version had to reflect the concerns of modern, progressive Scotland, not some jaundiced memory of the past.

Other exemplars that appeared more than once included the historical exemplar of the unsuccessful 1979 referendum; and the geo-political exemplar of Catalonia. This Spanish autonomous region served as a model for a Scotland which would eschew independence for *"a kind of Catalonian settlement"* where Scots *"remain nominally British but have our culture, different legal and educational systems accepted as part of our membership of the European Union"* (Meek, 1999b, p. 17).

Package #3: Realist Scotland

This package focuses on a group of much more prosaic expressions of the nature of Scottish devolution vis-à-vis Westminster and (more by omission than commission) the EU. Its elements usually focused on a sober assessment of the nature and extent of Scottish parliamentary endeavors, and their effects on the Scottish people. Two associated aspects of this package are the recognition of heavy London involvement in Scottish parliamentary affairs, and an occasional tendency to denigrate the emerging Scottish political system itself – with the implication that Scots were neither ready nor able to govern themselves without a great deal of assistance from London.

The *core frame* for this package concerned the need to recognize and accept the limits of Holyrood's influence and effectiveness, and tackle the difficult task of making the Scottish and Westminster parliaments work well together within the changed constitutional environment. The underlying assumption was that Scottish demands for greater autonomy had already outstripped the limited provisions set out in the devolution settlement, and it was time to readjust expectations. The *core positions* in relation to the Scottish parliament's relation with the UK and the EU clearly emphasized the primacy of the former over the latter. The UK-related core position was that a devolved Scottish parliament might work reasonably well with the rest of the

UK, but there were many potential problems to address and overcome, and the parliament had to realize the limits of its power and work strictly within the rules and constraints established by Westminster. In relation to the EU and its member states, the core position was that the parliament should keep its links with the EU to a minimum, and leave EU relations primarily to the sovereign Westminster parliament. The *reasoning devices* for the realist package underscored this position, as well as Westminster's primacy. The *root cause* of the package was that the Scottish parliament has raised people's expectations well beyond what could and should be delivered by the institution itself. The *consequences* focus on the letdown and disappointment that will inevitably result when expectations are unfulfilled; such disappointment could be a serious blow for the Scottish people. The basic *appeal to principle* underlying the Realist Scotland package is that the Westminster parliament still is the most competent vehicle for dealing with Scotland's most important needs; the Scottish parliament should only be used for less important issues.

The *framing devices* buttressed the package's core frame and positions by applying various forms of criticism that highlighted the limited effectiveness of the parliament. The dominant *metaphor* for the Realist Scotland package was that of the "crossroads" – that it was time for the nation to take a hard look at itself and what it was doing. The implication was that Scotland had to take great care in deciding which path to take. This was a metaphor for cautious consideration or even trepidation, not aspirational leaps into the unknown. The dominant *depiction* in this package was of the new parliament as potentially or actually *"boring"* or a *"let-down"* (MacWhirter, 1999b, p. 6; "Respect for our readership," 1999, p. 16). What if the parliament turned out to be *"too boring"* or *"too left-wing"*? What if it all went wrong? Would it just be *"an enlarged version of the Strathclyde Regional Council"*? (Webster, 1999, p. 23)

In the first period (the latter half of January), depcitions of the Realist Scotland package were fairly rare – although the *Scotsman* was already fearing potential *"slanging matches"* between the two parliaments, which could lead to the *"danger that too much political distance ... be put between Edinburgh and London"* ("The Westminster connection," 1999, p. 14). At the same time, *Herald* columnist Robbie Dinwoodie predicted that the much-ballyhooed *"new politics"* of consensus and cooperation would *"go out the window"* shortly after the May 6 election – and a good thing too, he insisted. In the run-up to the election, realist assessments sometimes related to policy decisions and political maneuvering – such as over the *"thorniest issue"* of MSP pay (Brogan, 1999e, p. 7). Another example concerned the SNP's decision to retain the pound even in the event of independence (presumably prior to joining the euro at some later point). The *Scotsman* noted that the SNP would be *"forced"* to *"cling"* to the British currency (MacMahon, 1999c, p. 11), while the *Herald* characterized it as an admission and a reminder that *"Scotland needs the rest of the UK"* ("Independent Scotland," 1999, p. 18). At other times, realism indicated a deeper uneasiness about the Holyrood-Westminster relationship. There would need to be a *"trade off"* in terms of Scotland's representation in Westminster, as the price of devolution; rapidly emerging in early 1999 were *"prickly tensions exposed by Home Rule"* that would cause friction between the parliaments ("Home rule haggling," 1999, p. 16; Ritchie & Dinwoodie, 1999a, p. 7).

As the press took stock of the campaign, realist and sober depictions mounted. This was most clearly expressed in relation to independence – as when the *Herald*, in a front page editorial the morning after the election results were known, insisted, *"The country does not want, and is not yet ready for, independence"* ("The new politics," 1999, p. 1). However, the Realist Scotland package was more salient in relation to the future of devolution politics. In the period straddling the election, editorials alluded to the many unresolved problems in the new constitutional

settlement. The new parliament would have to negotiate *"a delicate balancing act"* between Scottish and UK interests; Scotland's *"new politics"* could and would be *"just as difficult and thrawn as the old politics"* (Dinwoodie & Brogan, 1999, p. 1). Commentator Gordon Brewer, noting the inherent problems created by the new system, quoted an unidentified Glaswegian thus: *"The genie's out of the bottle. If the parliament works, people will want more power; if it doesn't, then people will blame Westminster"* (Brewer, 1999, p. 13). The new parliament would have *"to learn new skills of compromise, cooperation, and cross-party policy development, to add to their old ones of confrontation, insult, and cowed obedience to the leadership"* (McMillan, 1999b, p, 23). Meanwhile, the *"ruling government in the UK"* would always act to *"contain the extent of the divergence"* of Scotland, which was still unmistakably part of the UK (McBain, 1999, p. 12). This sense of disillusionment with the reality of the new parliament was a powerful component in the Realist Scotland package. It was expressed widely after the election campaign, which was described as *"dour"* and *"boring."* While the *Herald* was still *"seeking a new politics as well as a new polity"* after the election, they still concluded that *"it's been a dreary campaign"* ("Respect for our readership," 1999, p. 16). There was a feeling that the issue of Scotland's relationship with the rest of the UK had not been properly resolved. There had been a *"rather sterile"* debate about economic cost of independence ("Independent Scotland," 1999, p. 18); this debate had masked some of the *"deeper issues"* that should have been addressed (Dickson, 1999d, p. 3).

Increasingly, there were doubts expressed over the true efficacy of the Scottish parliament, which was *"supposed to leave the old Westminster model behind,"* and this doubt took the form of a dose of realism, as expressed in the pages of the *Herald* and the *Scotsman*. Expectations were reined in for Holyrood; after all, it was only a *"kid-on parliament"* (Wishart, 1999b, p. 19), *"a subordinate parliament"* (MacWhirter, 1999b, p. 6), a mere *"halfway house to independence"*

(Webster, 1999, p. 23), and, of course, little more than an enlarged version of a regional council (Webster, 1999). In any case, the country was simply *"not yet ready for independence"* ("The new politics," 1999, p. 1). Also, there could be *"potentially explosive dealings with London"* ("Reid right for tough job," 1999, p. 20). The parliament had to be different, after all, because the Scots came *"from a different political culture;"* otherwise, it would simply be *"a dud"* (Reid, 1999d, p. 13).

A constant feature of the Realist Scotland package was an acknowledgement of the dominance of Westminster and the UK Labour government. These depictions emphasized the tendency of UK political and party institutions – to wit, the Westminster parliament and that parliament's ruling Labour party – to dominate the emerging Scottish political process, thereby restricting its development. Such depictions, it should be noted, were most often associated with the UK Labour party. For example, when, in January (period 1), the press reported on a supposedly lackadaisical Scottish Labour campaign, UK Labour was consequently depicted as *"flexing its muscles"* over Scotland, while Blair said that the campaign needed to *"move it up a gear"* (Dinwoodie & Ritchie, 1999a, p.1; Thompson & MacMahon, 1999, p. 6). Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott's *"tub-thumping"* visit was a *"wakey-wakey call to Scottish Labour"* ("The Westminster connection," 1999, p. 18). While Prescott was sent north to sort things out by *"kickstarting the Holyrood campaign"* (Copley & Tait, 1999, p. 6), Gordon Brown's enforcer role started to be developed at this time – he was referred to as the *"Iron Chancellor"* (Dinwoodie & Ritchie, 1999a, p.1).

There were consistent depictions of Holyrood's inferior status vis-à-vis Westminster. At times, the fear was expressed that Holyrood would *"have its strings pulled"* from London (Simpson, 1999, p. 1), and *"London Labour"* would end up controlling the parliament *"by remote control"* (Hardie & Percival, 1999, p. 1). Other times, the Scottish parliament was

depicted simply as a *"junior partner,"* an *"appendage,"* or a *"poodle of a poodle"* (McLynn, 1999, p. 6); Blair was occasionally styled the imperious *"President Blair"* (Kerevan, 1999a, p. 15); he was a *"puppetmaster, pulling Donald Dewar's strings"* (Settle & Robertson, 1999, p. 7); Dewar, in turn, was *"a poodle of Millbank"* (Dinwoodie, 1999s, p. 7). The new first minister was also blamed for *"lacklustre performance"* of the Scottish Executive, which, by the end of June, was already being depicted as not living up to expectations (Brogan, 1999h, p. 1). The parliament and executive had an *"absence of vision"* and until they got it right, *"the SNP's professional opportunists and a bored media will ... fill the vacuum"* (Brogan, 1999i, p. 6). The Scottish version of Question Time – portrayed as the centerpiece of Dewar's *"new politics"* – was depicted as *"embarassingly wooden,"* and was to be quickly replaced by a Westminster-style version, complete with *"ya boo"* exchanges between MSPs and the first minister (Ritchie, 1999y, p. 7).

In broader policy issues also, some telling dominant Westminster depictions were apparent in the coverage. Thus, for example, a new education policy being considered for adoption in Scotland was characterized as following a *"very English agenda"* and as *"an English green paper with a kilt"* (Buie, 1999a, p. 9). In the field of health care, a flawed system of patient care quality control was being *"imposed"* on Scotland by Westminster (MacLeod, 1999d, p. 6). Early in March the *Herald* editorialized about the need for Scottish Labour to be *"free from Millbank control"* ("Dewar campaign team," 1999, p. 12). Two weeks later the same paper noted that UK Labour, shocked at the rise in support of the SNP, was resorting to *"an act of desperation"* in bringing in famous expatriate Scots to endorse its view of what the future should be for Scotland ("A polished performance," 1999, p. 14). Yet Blair's focus on Scotland, and his emphasis on *"Nat-bashing,"* only served to show how *"out of touch"* he was ("The essential debate," 1999, p. 14). Jimmy Reid insisted that, were Scottish Labour to get a majority, then the parliament would

be *"under the heel of New Labour control freaks in London,"* and would therefore be *"a sham"* (Reid, 1999a, p.13). The depiction of Blair and his New Labour party as *"control freaks"* was common in both papers.

During and after the election, similar devices were again evident, this time in relation to UK Labour's *"interference"* in Scottish Labour's plans to form a coalition with the Liberal Democrats; Scottish Labour was unable to act on its own, and *"still looks to London"* ("Vote with clarity and pride," 1999, p. 18). On the contentious issue of university tuition fees in Scotland, *"London Labour"* was again trying to *"control talks"* (Ritchie & Dinwoodie, 1999b, p. 1), it was *" meddling"* in Scottish affairs, and *"running the show;"* the SNP noted, *"this isn't devolution; it's a Millbank fix"* (Dinwoodie, 1999s, p. 7); Prime Minster Blair and his cabinet colleagues were still *"those who must be obeyed"* (Meek, 1999c, p. 19); Dewar himself, the *"father figure of the nation"* (Ritchie, 1999bb, p. 7), was depicted as being under pressure to *"remember the union"* (Dinwoodie & Brogan, 1999, p. 1); he was also under the control of the *"ultimate control freak ... St. Tony of Islington"* (Meek, 1999c, p. 19); the first minister had clearly been *"flanked at his party's final campaign news conference by ... Gordon Brown"* (McGregor, 1999b, p. 6).

In early May and late June (periods 3 and 4), attempts by Dewar to chart a separate course for his parliament and executive were typically placed in terms of the realist package. Thus there was a *"growing tension"* and *"potential strains"* becoming apparent between London and Holyrood over Dewar's policies on coalition government and tuition fees (Brogan, 1999h, p. 1; Ritchie, 1999x, p. 6); Dewar's attempt to develop a *"less confrontational"* politics was *"looked down upon"* in London (Brogan, 1999h, p. 1); he was *"under seige"* by Westminster ("Attack on PR," 1999, p. 18), and the target of a London-instigated *"whispering campaign"* (Ritchie, 1999bb, p. 7) over his supposed inability to lead effectively.

Not surprisingly, there were few *catchphrases* associated with such a prosaic package. One that did make an occasional appearance concerned the "West Lothian Question," a constitutional problem that had not been resolved. It concerned the supposed conundrum raised by the new constitutional set-up, one that would allow Scottish MPs in the Westminster parliament to continue to vote on English domestic affairs, while English MPs had no reciprocal voting rights in the Scottish parliament. This matter was fudged by the Blair government, which never tackled it head-on. Its existence in the first half of 1999 was less a matter of open controversy than it was a potentially constant irritant in Westminster-Holyrood relations, and a possible catalyst for future conflict. The main exemplar for the Scottish parliament was that of a local or regional council. The lesson to be learned from this exemplar was, once again, a reminder that the Scottish parliament had all the idiosyncrasies and problems of the smaller government unit with few of the benefits of Westminster. Holyrood therefore should not adopt pretensions to become an institution of equal standing with the UK parliament. It had neither the competence nor the wherewithal to tackle a role that it was safer to leave to Westminster, and it was time for everyone to realize it.

Package #4: Fear Appeal

The *Fear Appeal* package was, in many ways, the flip side of the Modernized Scotland and Britain package. The focus in this package was not on the actual benefits of the new constitutional settlement and continued membership of the UK, but the potential consequences if the settlement became regarded as only the first step toward inevitable independence. The package denigrated *any* attempt to separate Scotland from the rest of the UK, or even increase the level of autonomy granted by the London government. Such attempts were viewed *prima facie* as potentially catastrophic.

The *core frame* focused on the need to keep Scotland firmly within the UK, by scaring the electorate away from doing something stupid and catastrophic like electing a Nationalist government. The *core positions* for both the UK and the EU underscored the fear appeal and the inability of the Scottish parliament to address the potential consequences that could make that fear a reality. In relation to the Scottish parliament's relations with the UK, the core position was that Scotland was simply unable to exist independently, outside the UK, and independence would be economic folly. Nor would independent membership in the EU be a viable remedy or alternative. Scotland would be unable to function effectively as an independent entity in the EU, either because it was too small or too poor. EU relations must therefore remain firmly under UK control, since any attempt by Scotland to form direct EU links independently would weaken both Scotland and the UK and a whole.

The *reasoning devices* explained the nature and bounds of the fear appeal package. The *root cause* of this package is that there was too much talk about the Scottish parliament being taken in directions for which it was never designed (such as independence or greater autonomy within the EU), and these notions had to be quashed rapidly, because of their insidiousness. The *consequences* of a failure to quash these notions were that the SNP could win a majority in the Scottish elections, control the new parliament, and lead Scotland down a disastrous path to full independence. The *appeal to principle* in this package was that the United Kingdom was sacrosanct and had to be preserved; anything that threatened to undermine the UK was to be feared and loathed.

The four *framing devices* for this package clearly expressed the fear-inducing aspects outlined in the reasoning devices above. The dominant fear appeal *metaphor* was that of a potentially messy and expensive divorce between two partners who have been through a lot together. Thus Labour, the Tories, and the Scottish business community constantly emphasized

the threatened dangers of Scotland's *"divorce," "instant divorce,"* or *"a messy and expensive divorce"* (McGregor, 1999c, p. 7; Settle,1999b, p. 8), of *"divorcing Scotland from the rest of the UK"* (Brogan, 1999d, p. 6). Another common metaphor involved the SNP using the parliament as a *"tool"* to *"rip apart ... the most successful union"* (Horsburgh, 1999l, p. 7) or *"as a tool to cut Scotland adrift"* from the UK (Scott, 1999m, p. 5). These metaphors all hinted at a level of violence and dissension associated with the potential events they symbolized. No party would come away unscathed.

Most of the *depictions* in this package were largely a function of political mud-slinging between parties. Such expressions were most often directed squarely against the SNP, and were in fact a barely disguised warning against an SNP-led Scottish parliament that deviated too far from London's guidance. As the debate over economic policy heated up, the *Herald* noted that all the main political parties were *"closing ranks"* against the SNP (Ritchie, 1999p, p. 7), and Labour in particular was engaged in *"unrestrained Nat-bashing"* (Ritchie, 1999j, p.1). While one editorial noted that the SNP *"clearly had Labour rattled"* at this time, it also stated that the party had a credibility gap to bridge ("A polished performance," 1999, p. 14). The *Scotsman* noted the substantial *"uncertainties of independence economics"* and concluded that any attempt to break with the UK *"could only be a leap of faith"* ("Separation and Scottish solvency," 1999, p. 18). *Herald* columnist Brian Meek was critical of the lack of pragmatism amongst what he called the SNP's *"traditional broth and braveheart boys;"* Scotland simply wasn't yet ready to *"take the plunge"* into independence, and a shift from Labour rule from London to SNP rule from Edinburgh, he concluded, would be *"akin to leaving the blazing plane to clamber aboard the sinking ship"* (Meek, 1999b, p.17). The fear was also expressed of Scottish Labour's potential for running the country the same way as it ran local councils: as a *"one-party state."*

As indicated in the previous chapter, the Scottish CBI and other business groups were also depicted as deeply suspicious of any move to alter the status quo. According to the *Herald*, a *"crushingly large majority"* of Scots businesspeople were anti-independence, displaying *"deep hostility"* to the idea and *"genuine worries"* that were *"far from being calmed"* by the Nationalists ("Still on the inside," 1999, p. 16). Even the possibility of independence would result in *"ripping Scotland apart"* from the *"seamless and efficient"* UK market, and therefore inevitably a *"catastrophe"* would result; Scotland was *"too small"* to be a viable independent entity in the EU (Campbell, 1999a, p. 1; Campbell, 1999b, p. 6). Such statements were the cue for Labour and the Tories to emphasize the great *"risk and danger"* of voting SNP (Brogan & McGregor, 1999, p. 7); an SNP-led government would be a *"recipe for conflict"* causing *"dangerous tensions and anomalies"* in the UK as a whole. Independence would "destroy the level playing field" that the UK provided (Thompson & MacMahon, 1999, p. 6). Scotland would be *"plunged into economic ruin"* if it ever decided to leave the UK (Ritchie, 1999q, p. 1) and *"isolated and impoverished "* by separation (Ritchie, 1999j, p. 1).

One fear appeal *catchphrase* that was consistently repeated – mostly by Labour – was that the SNP was a *"tax and spend"* party (MacLeod, 1999b, p. 6; Dinwoodie & Ritchie, 1999a, p. 1); another characterized a possible Nationalist victory in the following terms: *"It's SNP In, Jobs Out, Taxes Up"* (MacLeod, 1999b, p. 6; Tait, 1999b, p. 6). Another oft-repeated catchphrase was that of the *"English backlash."* It implied a threat to Scotland's future finances emanating from Westminster MPs increasingly angered at what they saw as preferential treatment for Scotland. Even on polling day, the papers were expecting an *"English backlash"* from some quarters in Westminster – especially from the Tories (Simpson, 1999, p. 1; Settle, 1999c, p. 9; Settle, 1999e, p. 6). This backlash could constitute a *"recipe for conflict"* at Westminster (Ritchie &

Dinwoodie, 1999c, p. 1). Westminster, meanwhile, would quickly *"take revenge"* if the Scottish parliament didn't accede to its wishes (Dinwoodie & Brogan, 1999, p. 1).

Few *exemplars* appeared in relation to the fear appeal package. One used more than once was the *"Darien disaster,"* referring to the disastrous Scottish attempt, in the late 16th century, to set up a colony in central America – a failure so profound that, according to many historians, it led a weakened Scotland to accept the Treaty of Union with England in 1707. This was characterized as a Scottish *"capital scheme that went badly wrong"* (Bell, 1999, p. 9). The lesson was clear: any attempt by the Scottish parliament to go it alone in an economic sense would be speculative and inevitably lead to disaster.

Sponsor activities, themes, and resonances in the issue culture

Most packages have sponsoring agencies – groups or organizations that act as agents who promote a cohesive collective agenda. Sponsor activities include all forms of public relations – advertising, speech making, interviews with journalists, and the creation of media packets and news releases – all of which are used to promote that group's "preferred package" (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). Note that in addition to any group or social movement identified as a sponsor of a media package, the media themselves also carry partial responsibility for the promotion of that package. In relation to the debates and discourses surrounding Scottish devolution in the first half of 1999, each of the four main packages identified above are associated with sponsor activities. In each case, a political party was the prime sponsor of the package, and political parties were predominant sponsors across all the packages. Furthermore, notwithstanding the aforementioned role of the media, all four packages were associated with more than one sponsor; however, three of the four packages are associated most strongly with a single sponsor: the UK Labour party.

In relation to the Modernized Scotland and Britain package, the prime sponsor was undoubtedly UK Labour. Again, the primary role of the Scottish Labour party was to act as a booster for its UK parent. Although this was the case in the three packages in which Labour took the prime sponsor role, it was especially so in relation to the Modernized Scotland and Britain package. A subordinate sponsor of this package was the Scottish Conservative Party, which, from early 1999, supported the essential elements of this package. Party leader David McLetchie's "tartan Tories" campaign recognized the need to follow Labour's lead in promoting a partially autonomous Scotland within a strengthened UK. However, the reduced media salience of the Conservatives, as well as conflicting signals from the Tory camp – with some elements in the London party still criticizing the very notion of devolution – further diluted the Conservative position. This left UK Labour clearly as the prime sponsor of this package.

The UK Labour party was also the prime sponsor of both the Realist Scotland and Fear Appeal packages. While the Modernized Scotland and Britain package reflected the basic rationale for Labour's original decision to enact devolution, the rise of the SNP and its pro-independence agenda necessitated a shift in emphasis, and the packages based on realism and fear suited the interests of that party. Again, in both cases, Labour's position was aided in part by the Conservatives. In the case of the Fear Appeal package, Labour was also assisted by the Scottish business community in promoting a package that emphasized the fear inherent in changing the relationship between Scotland and the UK.

The Aspirational Scotland package was the only package not dominated by UK Labour. The prime sponsor of this package was the SNP, although a number of other political parties and organizations also promoted it, in varying degrees. To the extent that the Liberal Democrats could be identified as promoting any single package, it was this one. This was also the package that was promoted by the church and religious groups that were occasionally portrayed in the

papers. It was also more culturally resonant than any of the others – it emphasized Scotland's cultural and political primacy, as part of the vision of a proud and forward-looking Scottish people creating a new, autonomous or independent Scotland. Nevertheless, this resonance, while powerful, was insufficient to offset the other packages that emphasized caution, fear, or trepidation.

The result of this process was, at the broadest level, the dominance of two broad themes: those of Scottish dependency and UK unity. The former theme places Scotland as strictly dependent on the UK – the continuation of a long-term state of affairs. The assumption is that Scotland is in a vastly inferior position to England, and any separation would be deeply destructive to Scotland, while leaving the rest of the UK more-or-less unharmed. The UK unity theme is similar, but more progressive, since it incorporates more positive aspects of the union with England and the rest of the UK, and places Scotland as a more equal partner – or at least a less unequal partner – to England in the UK. The assumption here is that it is not fear that binds Scotland to the UK, but rather a sense of mutual trust and friendship between equal partners. The flip-side of this assumption is that England and the rest of the UK would have as much to lose as would Scotland, so it is in everyone's interests to remain united.

Following Gamson & Modigliani (1989), both these themes work dialectically, and therefore also contain counterthemes that reject the dominant ideology of their partnered themes. In the case of the dependency theme, a Scottish independence countertheme also existed – a theme based on the notion that Scotland could be, and should be, independent from London, and not have to rely on the United Kingdom and its institutions. Equally, the Unity with the UK theme also contains a Unity with the EU countertheme, which not only presents the inevitability of Scotland's eventual separation from the UK (as does the independence countertheme) but also incorporates the notion of Scotland shifting its membership: from the UK to the EU. The point is

with the theme/countertheme pairs is not that they exist in the coverage, but that in each case the dominant theme recognizes the primacy of the UK.

Overall, then, UK Labour emerged as the dominant influence in the issue culture of Scottish devolution in the first half of 1999. It was therefore UK Labour that played by far the greatest role in setting the boundaries for the whole debate. This is perhaps the most important single point to keep in mind as this analysis moves to a conclusion in the next and final chapter.

Chapter 8. Conclusion

This study has attempted to discern the nature and limits of the media debate surrounding Scottish devolution in the first half of 1999. In doing so, it has examined in detail the constitutional developments at this time, and the changing conceptions of mediated Scottish identity as articulated through the prism of press coverage of the new Scottish parliament's relationship with the United Kingdom and the European Union. A number of salient discourses, frames, and packages have been discerned, allowing a significant insight into the state of the issue culture surrounding Scottish devolution at this time. These elements are described in more detail below.

At the broadest level, this study has set out to examine the extent to which the birth of a new political institution such as the Scottish parliament could have an immediate and discernible effect on media articulations not just of Scotland's political relationships within the United Kingdom and the European Union, but also Scottish identity politics as it has developed under the auspices of all of these institutions. The analysis conducted here has certainly suggested that the parliament has had such effects, the nature and extent of which are suggested below by reference to the five core research questions outlined in chapter 1.

Research question 1, which examined the extent to which the print media emphasized Scottish political links with various external institutions in the UK and the EU, has already been answered quite clearly. In news and interpretive articles where the Scottish parliament was explicitly compared or contrasted with other such institutions, the institutions most often found in these comparisons – by an overwhelming margin – were the UK parliament and executive at Westminster. The other UK assemblies, in Wales and Northern Ireland, were

very rarely mentioned, and the same was true of other EU regional, sub-national, and national assemblies. Such comparisons might have been expected to be quite common, given the nature of the political developments underway, and their relative absence is puzzling. Comparisons with the EU's central institutions – the commission, the Council of Ministers, and the EU parliament – were slightly less rare, and were more likely to have been made in editorials and opinion pieces. But even these pieces were few in number compared to contemporary comparisons with Westminster. The preliminary conclusion to be drawn from this finding is that the press still regarded the UK parliament as vastly more important to Scotland than any other institution. Yet when commentators in opinion columns and interpretive pieces did bring up the issue of Scotland's relationship with the EU, they typically expressed the belief that such relationships were inevitably going to become much more important in the future. The disconnect between the current lack of coverage of EU institutions, and the more frequently expressed editorial belief that such institutions will eventually equal or even eclipse Westminster in importance, is significant.

Many of the same findings emerged from the study of actors and sources in the news coverage. *Research Question 2* asked which groups of sources and actors dominated in the coverage of the issue of Scottish political links with external institutions. Again, EU-originated sources and actors were rare – almost non-existent, in fact – as were sources from Wales and Northern Ireland. The vast majority of non-Scottish actors and sources were associated with Westminster and the UK government. The dominant group in this regard was the Labour party, and especially UK Labour. UK Labour actors – particularly senior party members such as Prime Minister Tony Blair and Chancellor Gordon Brown – were most often depicted as proactively setting the bounds of legitimate controversy, and thereby setting the agenda. Those issues defined as legitimately controversial and worthy of enhanced coverage

were primarily Labour issues. Issues associated more closely with the SNP, portrayed as the main political competitor to Labour, were effectively relegated to the outer bounds of the sphere of legitimate controversy. Other political parties were portrayed much less prominently than either Labour or the SNP, while non-political and civic society groupings were effectively relegated to the periphery of discussion of the issue of devolution.

The use and prominence of various sources and actors set the stage for examining the issue culture of the Scottish parliament's external relations with UK and EU institutions. Chapter 7, which analyzed the nature and extent of the issue culture that emerged, provided answers to *Research Question 3*, which asked how the print media framed Scottish political links with these aforementioned political institutions. The said issue culture was dominated by the four media packages identified in chapter 7. These packages provide further contexts and frameworks for understanding the quantitative and qualitative article, source, and actor information outlined in chapters 5 and 6 – including the continuing tendency by the press to tacitly reproduce the ideological structures of the UK parliament and UK politics, albeit within the context of a new system of devolved administration.

The packages themselves – which, with the partial exception of the Modernized Scotland and Britain package, were of roughly equal salience in the coverage – dealt with the issue of devolution politics along fairly established lines, for the most part. Of the four packages identified in the coverage, only one – the Aspirational Scotland package – was in any way novel in the context of Scottish-UK relations. It was the only package that placed the Scottish parliament in an unambiguously superior position to the Westminster parliament. The other three packages – Modernized Scotland and Britain, Realist Scotland, and Fear Appeal – all emphasized, in one way or another, the supremacy of the UK institutions. While the Modernized Scotland package was perhaps the least prominent of the four that were identified, it remains

especially important because it most closely approximates to New Labour's vision of what the new constitutional arrangements should mean. It served as a sort of framing benchmark for the other packages. It also contained the seeds of Labour's emphasis on the Realist and Fear Appeal packages. These last two packages were particularly prominent in the last three of the four periods under review ... A small but significant shift occurred in March 1999: before that time, Labour and the SNP repeatedly swapped leads in the monthly tracking poll conducted by the System 3 polling agency for the *Herald*; after March, Labour gained a dominant poll lead, and maintained that lead through the election and beyond (System 3 poll, http://www.alba.org.uk/polls/pollholyrood99.html). Chapters 6 and 7 will suggest some explanations for this shift.

As for the EU, all four packages emphasized or tacitly recognized Westminster's prominence over European institutions in its relations with the Scottish parliament, certainly in the context of present-day developments. Even the Aspirational Scotland package, when it dealt with the EU (which was rarely), recognized EU primacy as occurring only at some unspecified point in the future. Taken together, these packages placed the role of the Scottish parliament in an ambiguous position; all recognize (if at times grudgingly) the necessity for some sort of devolved assembly in Scotland, but most are wary of what the need for such an institution might imply. The result is a sense of uncertainty in the press. While the Scottish parliament seems to be a widely accepted improvement over the status quo ante, the media packages provide little evidence for the notion that the parliament was, at its outset, changing the fundamental power relations between the Scottish polity and its relationship with the UK and the EU.

The wider issue culture thus reflected this sense of uncertainty and London dominance in the crucial early days of the parliament. What was clearly missing in the issue culture was a clear, dominant message emerging exclusively from Scottish sources that was uniquely Scottish, i.e.,

created in the absence of Westminster or other UK political interference. Aspirational metaphors and depictions put the new parliament in the best of lights, but many of these devices emerged from non-Scottish institutional sources. For example, there was no catchphrase that had the resonance and sustainability of "It's Scotland's Oil" to galvanize political and public opinion. The SNP's "Penny for Scotland" was widely regarded as a political failure. References to the "people's parliament" or the "new dawn" were rare (unless used ironically) after the first sitting of the parliament following the election. In the pages of the press, disillusionment and fear of the unknown (represented by the Realist and Fear Appeal media packages) set in very quickly, and there was little or no apparent "honeymoon period" provided by the media while the institution found its feet. Instead the issue culture became dominated by disillusionment and loss of faith. The prime culprit for this state of affairs was the UK Labour party, which not only promoted realism and fear as electoral campaign devices, but also gained the greatest proportion of media coverage of its point of view. The result of this was, at the broadest level, the emergence of two themes that dominated the coverage: those of Scottish dependency and UK unity. As indicated in chapter 7, these themes eclipsed their respective counterthemes , of Scottish independence and EU unity – counterthemes that encompassed discourses and symbol systems that were ultimately more culturally resonant.

Research Question 3 also asked how the media packages that emerged influenced perceptions of Scottish national and political identity as viewed through the prism of the new Scottish parliament and executive. Nationalism and national identity were issues that were given a good deal of attention within the pages of the press. But such coverage was more often limited to cultural or narrowly political expressions of identity, i.e., expressions that would not seriously undermine the constitutional status quo underwritten by devolution. In cultural terms, it appears, the press had in place a consensus that Scotland is exceptional and substantially different from

England. But in political and economic terms, there was much less agreement over how this exceptionalism should be articulated – in particular, over how much actual power should be ceded to Scotland's devolved political institutions. While media coverage expressed a consistent desire for Scottish exceptionalism in the abstract, it often returned to more limited articulations of identity when covering the potential or actual political consequences of that exceptionalism.

As for whether Scottish national identity was becoming more salient in relation to British political affairs, this analysis suggests that this was the case. News about the Scottish parliament's relations with Westminster emphasized the salience of membership in the Scottish national group, by presenting images of non-Scottish parts of the UK – especially England – in political "competition" with Scotland. The coverage also suggests an enhanced confidence in Scottish cultural identity, with recognition of the role of the Scottish parliament in promoting and enhancing Scottish culture and cultural institutions (with the notable exception of broadcasting). However, the extent to which these processes extended to interactions with the EU was less clear, given the relative lack of coverage of this element. It is too early to state with confidence whether any sustained shift in identity among Scots specifically in relation to Europe – from identifying, in large part, with the British polity against the Europeans, to identifying primarily with Scotland and "othering" England as well as the rest of Europe – is taking place.

An important point that emerged from the analysis is that most of the debate over whether Scotland should strive for future independence in the EU or remain firmly within the UK was framed in narrow economic terms – certainly this was so in most of the straight news articles, if not always in the Op-Ed pieces. The media debate was dominated by whether Scotland would be richer or poorer following independence. Much of the debate followed party political lines, with the so-called "Unionist" parties – mainly Labour and the Conservatives, though also, to a lesser extent, the Liberal Democrats – emphasizing how Scotland would be much poorer and weaker as

a result of independence, and opposing any economic deviation from England. This held even for any proposed devolved change, such as the possible use of the variable tax rate in Scotland. This attention to narrow economic aspects deemphasized deeper issues of political identity.

Of course, it could be argued that the election was not about independence, but about electing a devolved parliament with limited autonomy from London. But that didn't stop the Scottish Conservatives and New Labour in particular for labeling the SNP as a dangerous separatist party that would "divorce" Scotland from the UK instantly. But the dominant framing of any issues relating to independence or greater devolution remained determinedly economic and "cost-based," and placed Scotland in a decidedly inferior position to the UK – the rhetorical basis of the Realist Scotland and Fear Appeal packages. There was, for example, little serious discussion of the sort of vision Alex Salmond had laid out in his speech to the SNP conference – a vision of a small, progressive independent nation within Europe, acting in concert with its peers in the EU and the United Nations, advancing the values of peace, democracy, and social welfare. And the Aspirational Scotland frame that encompassed this vision was, in the end, overwhelmed by three other media packages that emphasized, in one way or another, the continued primacy of the UK government and the Westminster parliament. There was, indeed, relatively little coverage of whether, and to what extent, Scotland would be socially or culturally comfortable as part of a UK that spent less on health care than any other industrialized country, that preserved a powerful nuclear deterrent, and which allowed one of the highest income differentials between rich and poor of any nation-state in Europe. Also, whenever the issue of Scotland's independent standing in the world came up, it tended to be in terms framed either by the sources of the Labour Party or the business community, e.g., how much would embassies cost? how much would a Scottish navy cost? would Scotland have to pay compensation for closing Faslane? The clear conclusion to be drawn from this (one that addresses *Research Question 4*) is that the media packages that

sustained the dominant discourses concerning the Scottish parliament's external relations were set early on by the British government at Westminster.

The end result of these developments was an election campaign that lacked much energy. As the *Herald* pointed out, it was in many ways a "dreary" election campaign, with "too much negativity" and too little vision. The little political "excitement" that had been injected into the campaign, it was recognized, had been courtesy of the SNP. It was, after all, the Nationalists who had promoted the "Penny for Scotland" tax increase (to raise up to £700 million, or $1.1 billion, over three years for public services). And Alex Salmond's attack on the British government's conduct in the Kosovo war was certainly enervating. But, again, such positions were overwhelmed by the dominant theme in coverage that stressed Scottish dependency on Westminster; they therefore failed to give the Nationalists the electoral boost they needed to overhaul Labour in the opinion polls and gain a majority in the new parliament. Only the SNP ever attempted to bring foreign policy into play during the campaign, and the little press coverage it received for doing so was mostly negative. Foreign policy was, after all, a matter for the British government, not the Scottish parliament; thus, it seems, it was not matter to be dealt with in news relating to the new Scottish parliament.

Some clear answers emerged in relation to the issue of identity politics in the press, raised in *Research Question 5*. Media coverage of Scotland's political links with the UK and the EU overwhelmingly emphasized an institutional rather than an ethnic articulation of Scottish national identity. Indeed, there were many aspects of Scottish culture and identity politics that might have been expected to have been more prominent, but weren't. For example, there was little in the coverage about nationalistic icons and symbols, such as national flags or the Crown. In most cases, these potent symbols were not the stuff of controversy or even of comment in relation to the new parliament. They only became prominent in news of the official opening itself.

Otherwise, in most cases the issue of British versus Scottish symbols of statehood did not impinge on coverage of events. Where issues involving symbolism did arise – such as in the row over a lack of William Wallace exhibits in the new National Museum of Scotland – they did not become central or defining issues impinging on the parliament, and instead remained on the periphery. Other artifacts that were presented as icons of British sovereignty or suzerainty – such as the Trident ICBM submarines based on the Clyde – did have a little more resonance, especially in the hands of the SNP. But ultimately this potentially potent symbol of external domination failed to resonate consistently. The same thing held true of the vain SNP attempts to promote the Skye Bridge as a vivid symbol of Scottish nationalism (in part, by promising to abolish user fees on the new bridge that connected the Isle of Skye to the mainland). Even the issue of North Sea Oil failed to resonate, in sharp contrast to the campaigns of the 1970s when the "It's Scotland's Oil" campaign gave the SNP a catchphrase that contributed to its unprecedented success in general elections. Finally, the monarchy played almost no serious role in the coverage. Although all parties, including (somewhat half-heartedly) the SNP, were committed to retaining the monarchy, that institution had almost no active or clearly defined role in any of the discourses emerging in relation to the new parliament. Once again, the monarchy became salient only at the time of the official opening of the parliament by the queen; it quickly fell back into the shadows following that event.

Perhaps most surprisingly, history itself was only a minor factor in the media coverage. With the fleeting exception of the official opening of parliament, historical events – whether Scottish or British – were rarely mentioned in the coverage of the parliament. This is revealed in part by the relatively sparse use of historical exemplars noted in chapter 7, both among the Scots and the British arguing for the maintenance of the Union. Even Tony Blair's many speeches praising "this most successful union" rarely made reference to the great events of history that had thrown

the countries together – the common enterprises of empire-building, the two world wars, etc. Even the creation of the post-war welfare state got little mention – ironically, given the fact that the London government is nominally left-of center, as are the parties representing more than 80 percent of the Scottish electorate. In all the talk of consensus in the "new politics," no-one brought up the post-war political consensus as a historical exemplar.

The paucity of stories directly relating to Scottish-EU relations made it more difficult to ascertain how that very important issue was being dealt with by the dominant media packages in the coverage. What references there were about the EU in the press were generally restricted to opinion pieces (see chapter 5). This small sample was mostly positive, approving of increased ties between Holyrood and Brussels. There was a clear sense in much of the more independence-oriented writing that Scotland had to look beyond its cloying relationship with the UK and instead engage with Europe and the world as a fully fledged independent entity – even if, for the moment, the country was not yet able to break free of these constraints. This emphasis on Scotland's strong and aspiring relationship with the EU placed most such articles firmly within the Aspirational Scotland media package. Interestingly, most of the coverage within the other three packages barely mentioned the EU at all, either in positive or negative terms. It simply wasn't salient in relation to Modernized Scotland and Britain, Realist Scotland, and Fear Appeal. However, it also needs to be noted that, for the most part, the EU coverage wasn't salient even in relation to the Aspiration Scotland package. Even though that package's characterization of Holyrood as a wonderful, forward-looking institution, i.e., as "not-Westminster" (Schlesinger, 1998b, p. 71) was clear and constant, its rejection of Westminster and its form had not yet translated to an explicit embrace of EU content coverage.

There remains the question of the Scottish press's parochialism in relation to the EU. The concentration on local, Scottish and British affairs, at the expense of wider European and world

matters, leads to the Scottish press being seen as inward-looking and provincial (Macdonald, 1978; Hutchison, 1987). Although there is now some more direct coverage of Brussels by Scottish reporters, such reporting still tends to reflect the British position *vis-à-vis* the EU. This was the case at least up to the mid-1990s, when the Scottish press covered EU-British relations almost identically to their counterparts in London (Bicket, 1997). The current analysis does not yet suggest a fundamental shift in Scottish press thinking.

Future Research Directions

Ultimately, it is hoped that this study will become part of a broader long-term analysis of the emerging role of European regions in the development of the EU. Future longitudinal studies of Scotland's relationship with the EU could also be carried out, based on a similar research design as at present. Research of this scale and nature could lead to significant contributions to the field, through publication of either a regular stream of scholarly articles or a book.

One interesting theme that cropped up regularly – mostly in opinion and editorial pieces – was the idea that it will perhaps take an entire parliament (four years) for the fundamental changes enacted to sink in, both to the voters and the elected MSPs. Until then, the parliament might well tend to act tentatively, unsure of its power and authority. It might well not be until 2003 that the true "perceived importance" of the new institution will be realized, as the institution builds itself into a true tool of democracy. [5]

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[5] From a purely selfish academic point of view, my original hope had been that the SNP or an SNP-led coalition would gain power in the elections for the Scottish parliament. In that case, the news media might well have emphasized more prominently the Parliament's developing role in the European Union, and EU issues and Scotland's EU links might have been emphasized more prominently. Scotland's links with the Westminster Parliament would likely have been de-emphasized, except for contentious issues where the relationship would be framed as primarily confrontational. In such a climate the various issues of identity politics and divergent news frames would have risen to the surface much more quickly. As things stand, the tensions between Edinburgh and Westminster are still an important part of the new constitutional dynamic; they are just taking a little longer to manifest themselves.

It might be expected that the mass media will play a major and growing, albeit informal, role in setting the Scottish government's agenda in relation to Europe. Furthermore, given the constitutional constraints in Scotland's ability to challenge Westminster, successful use – or manipulation – of the media could be a powerful weapon in the hands of a skillful Scottish executive trying to alter the agenda to suit Scotland's perceived needs where they diverge from those of England. Of course, speculating further, such a media strategy might resort to national and ethnic, as well as economic, symbolic manipulation, and the possibility exists that the media could use such a strategy independently, for their own purposes – a course that could be highly destabilizing.

For the moment, however, the constitutional set-up still strongly favors the traditional nation-state and the supranational levels over Europe's regions and sub-national elements. In the United Kingdom, for example, the British government retains formal control of European matters and is the member-state signatory to all EU treaties (Sloat, 1999, p. 8). While the Scottish executive is expected to assist in the formulation of a common British negotiating position *vis-à-vis* Europe, it is also expected to toe the British line once a position has been arrived at (by whatever means) in London. The potential for future conflict over Scottish and British interests in the EU is obvious. It is not a matter of whether such conflicts will take place; it's a matter of when. All we can say with any degree of certainty is that the media will be there to report on such conflicts as they develop, and report these conflicts back to the Scottish public. *How* they cover such conflicts is the big question. At what point will the Scottish media break out of its "British" straitjacket and report on EU affairs from a "Scottish" perspective? Will a Scottish-EU media agenda develop independently of government sources, or must it await the election of a Scottish administration politically at odds with London? These are fascinating questions, and they will need to be answered, and soon.

It seems clear, then, that there is much that is yet to be researched and much that is yet to be resolved. It is important to comprehensively study the processes outlined above, to see what broader lessons can be learned and adapted at the European regional, nation-state, and EU levels. For all these reasons, the emerging Scottish political experience can and will provide a fascinating area of study with profound implications far beyond Scotland's borders.

Some signs are encouraging. While much of the Scottish press still has a good deal of inertia to overcome when dealing with institutions and events outside the British Isles, there are *some* signs of an emerging Scottish media perspective on Europe, at least in the opinion pages of the *Herald* and the *Scotsman*, and in "Good Morning Scotland's analysis of European and world affairs on BBC Radio Scotland (a rare, if underfunded, example of a media voice for Scottish articulation of non-UK affairs). However, this needs to be investigated more fully. In organizational terms, Scotland's emerging national identity, buttressed by strengthening links with Brussels as well as London, looks to be following a positive path thus far – even if the Scottish press has not fully picked up on this yet. Importantly, the Scottish parliament has numerous policy areas devolved to it that overlap with EU competencies, including agriculture and fisheries, the environment, health, education, and transport. The links to Brussels are set to be a major agenda-setting factor in the Scottish polity, with up to 50 percent of the Scottish executive's legislative agenda expected to originate in Brussels (Sloat, 1999, p. 8). At the EU level, meanwhile, the Treaty of Amsterdam, which took effect in 1998, has given the democratically elected European Parliament stronger powers of co-decision with the more autocratic European Commission and Council. The co-decision power, which gives the parliament veto power over legislation, applies to many areas of policy devolved to Scotland. This factor, plus the establishment of the Scottish executive's Brussels Bureau as well as Scotland Europa (set up to deal with Scottish-EU trade and economic matters) can only increase Scotland's

profile on the EU stage. Although "Europe" is officially an area where power is reserved to Westminster, the Scottish Parliament will be able to scrutinize EU legislation and implement directives within a framework defined primarily by Scottish needs (Sloat, 1999, p. 8). The important question, however, remains: how far will the Westminster government allow the Scottish Parliament to set its own agenda in Europe?

Looking at the broader constitutional landscape, there seems little doubt that the traditional nation-state maintains strong levels of support among the peoples of Europe – even in regions with strong, institutionally derived devolution movements in place, such as Scotland and Catalonia. This is reflected in election results in these regions; for example, the SNP has consistently failed to break through the "glass ceiling" of around 30 percent of the vote for a sustained period, while the Catalan separatist movement has settled down to a level of support of only 10 percent or so. Furthermore, in Catalonia, the bulk of support has been retained by groupings that emphasize a strong, vibrant, and autonomous Catalonia in partnership with the rest of Spain and the EU (Keating, 1996, p. 23). As the new constitutional arrangements settle down, this may well be the scenario that develops in Scotland *vis-à-vis* the UK and the EU. Or it might not; it's simply too early to say. Much depends on what type of legislative and constitutional dynamics emerge in the relationship between Edinburgh, London, and Brussels. For the moment, the constitutional set-up still strongly favors the traditional nation-state and the supranational levels over Europe's regions and sub-national elements.

It seems clear, then, that there is much that is yet to be researched and much that is yet to be resolved. It is important to comprehensively study the processes outlined above, to see what broader lessons can be learned and adapted at the European regional, nation-state, and EU levels. For all these reasons, the emerging Scottish political experience can and will provide a fascinating area of study with profound implications far beyond Scotland's borders.

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Appendix A. Newspaper articles selected for second-stage analysis

I. Straight news articles

Bell, D. (1999, May 5). Private can be a public good. *The Herald*, p. 9.

Booth, J. (1999a, Mar. 5). McLeish to announce Scotland's response to Lawrence inquiry. *The Scotsman*, p. 8.

Booth, J. (1999b, Jun. 30). Fight begins to end scourge of child poverty. *The Scotsman*, p. 6.

Breen, S. (1999a, May 7). Swearing-in ceremony underlines break with tradition. *The Scotsman*, p. 3.

Breen, S. (1999b, May 8). Awkward squad set to test party leaders' patience. *The Scotsman*, p. 6.

Breen, S. & Terkelson, S. (1999, Jul. 2). Security scare by protesters fails to mar occasion. *The Scotsman*, p. 5.

Brogan, B. (1999b, Jan. 29). Rendition of Scots wi' Hague. *The Herald*, p. 7.

Brogan, B. (1999c, Mar. 3). Scots keep their say on the affairs of England. *The Herald*, p. 6.

Brogan, B. (1999d, Mar. 4). Blair targets ordinary Scots. *The Herald*, p. 6.

Brogan, B. (1999e, Mar. 5). GBP14,000 pay deal for Scots MPs. *The Herald*, p. 7.

Brogan, B. (1999f, Mar. 6). It's personal on computers. *The Herald*, p. 7.

Brogan, B. (1999g, May 4). Labour turns on Lib Dems. *The Herald*, p. 9.

Brogan, B. (1999h, Jun. 28). He has got to get a grip, says minister. *The Herald*, p. 1.

Brogan, B. & McGregor, S. (1999, May 3). Penny dreadful for low paid. *The Herald*, p. 7.

Brogan, B. & Ritchie, M. (1999, Mar. 15). Business broadside escalates tax war. *The Herald*, p. 1.

Buie, E. (1999a, Jan. 28). Westminster's education dowry to a parliament short on experience. *The Herald*, p. 9.

Buie, E. (1999b, Mar. 9). Wallace in GBP50m pledge to teachers. *The Herald*, p. 6.

Buie, E. (1999c, May 11). Grants, not fees, is key issue. *The Herald*, p. 7.

Cairns, C. (1999a, Jan. 23). Road tolls to start in Scotland this year. *The Scotsman*, p. 1.

Cairns, C. (1999b, May 1). Holyrood 'could ban fox hunting.' *The Scotsman*, p. 12.

Campbell, D. (1999a, Jan. 19). Break-up rated bad for Scots business. *The Herald*, p. 1.

Campbell, D. (1999b, Jan. 20). CBI chief questions economics of going it alone. *The Herald*, p. 6.

Carrell, S. (1999a, May 3). Reid rekindles talk of succeeding Dewar. *The Scotsman*, p. 7.

Carrell, S. (1999b, May 4). SNP would be unable to halt PFI. *The Scotsman*, p. 3.

Carrell, S. (1999c, May 5). SNP accuses Labour of Tory policies. *The Scotsman*, p. 1.

Carrell, S. & Duncan, G. (1999, May 3). Brown plays Santa with promis of festive gifts. *The Scotsman*, p. 7.

Carrell, S. & Percival, J. (1999a, Mar. 11). Treasury's investment role defended. *The Scotsman*, p. 7.

Carrell, S. & Percival, J. (1999b, Jun. 30). Scottish secretary battles to stay in mainstream. *The Scotsman*, p. 6.

Carrell, S., MacMahon, P. & Scott, D. (1999, Mar. 6). Threat to Scots Lib Dems' autonomy. *The Scotsman*, p. 6.

Carrell, S., Tait, R. & Smith, I. (1999, May 1). Labour's woes grow over private cash scheme. *The Scotsman*, p. 1.

Chisholm, W. (1999, Mar. 12). Borders aid dismissed as 'just a sticking plaster.' *The Scotsman*, p. 10.

Clelland, S. (1999, Jan. 19). Independence would be disaster for business, say Scots firms. *The Scotsman*, p. 1.

Copley, J. (1999a, Jan. 18). London MPs face Holyrood gag. *The Scotsman*, p. 1.

Copley, J. (1999b, Jan. 19). Hague to give Scottish Tories a free rein on policy. *The Scotsman*, p. 6.

Copley, J. (1999c, May 8). Poll gains take sting out of Hague's woes. *The Scotsman*, p. 7.

Copley, J. & Tait, R. (1999, Jan. 22). Prescott's hard sell for Holyrood. *The Scotsman*, p. 6.

Dickson, M. (1999a, Mar. 5). Coalition on the cards as Labour fails to shake off SNP. *The Herald*, p. 6.

Dickson, M. (1999b, Mar. 6). SNP set to cause Labour more than a little local difficulty. *The Herald*, p. 6.

Dinwoodie, R. (1999a, Jan. 25). Leak and wrangle spell taxing times for Dewar. *The Herald*, p. 5.

Dinwoodie, R. (1999b, Jan. 30). SNP army ready for fight. *The Herald*, p. 6.

Dinwoodie, R. (1999c, Jan. 30). Positive, hard fight for the Union. *The Herald*, p. 6.

Dinwoodie, R. (1999d, Mar. 2). McAllion signs SNP motion. *The Herald*, p. 8.

Dinwoodie, R. (1999e, Mar. 3). Socialists hit by name ban. *The Herald*, p. 7.

Dinwoodie, R. (1999f, Mar. 4). Salmond joins row on party names. *The Herald*, p. 6.

Dinwoodie, R. (1999g, Mar. 4). SNP to put tax-raising issue to conference. *The Herald*, p. 6.

Dinwoodie, R. (1999h, Mar. 5). Court action looms over the use of party names. *The Herald*, p. 6.

Dinwoodie, R. (1999i, Mar. 5). Pledge to scrap tuition fees. *The Herald*, p. 7.

Dinwoodie, R. (1999j, Mar. 8). Socialists battle registrar's ban on names. *The Herald*, p. 6.

Dinwoodie, R. (1999k, Mar. 9). Main parties back Socialist name. *The Herald*, p. 6.

Dinwoodie, R. (1999l, Mar. 10). Threats work for Socialists as Greens fear the worst. *The Herald*, p. 3.

Dinwoodie, R. (1999m, Mar. 11). SNP takes a chance on Holyrood tax gain. *The Herald*, p. 1.

Dinwoodie, R. (1999n, Mar. 13). Scotland's party principles. *The Herald*, p. 7.

Dinwoodie, R. (1999o, May 4). Unionists urged to make their mark. *The Herald*, p. 7.

Dinwoodie, R. (1999p, May 5). Writer's food for though on Greens. *The Herald*, p. 6.

Dinwoodie, R. (1999q, May 5). Lib Dems are more bullish on good deal. *The Herald*, p. 9.

Dinwoodie, R. (1999r, May 6). Good turnout could clinch it for SNP, says Salmond. *The Herald*, p. 7.

Dinwoodie, R. (1999s, May 12). Salmond on attack over Millbank meddling. *The Herald*, p. 7.

Dinwoodie, R. (1999t, May 13). Old tactics amid the new politics. *The Herald*, p. 9.

Dinwoodie, R. (1999u, Jun. 29). No 10 rules on Commission jobs. *The Herald*, p. 6.

Dinwoodie, R. (1999v, Jun. 30). Battle starts over committee chairs. *The Herald*, p. 7.

Dinwoodie, R. & Brogan, B. (1999, May 10). Coalition talks test Dewar's resolve. *The Herald*, p. 1.

Dinwoodie, R. & Ritchie, M. (1999a, Jan. 23). Brown keeps iron grip on councils. *The Herald*, p. 1.

Dinwoodie, R. & Ritchie, M. (1999b, May 14). A deal is done. *The Herald*, p. 1.

Dinwoodie, R. & Ritchie, M. (1999c, May 15). Partners face a falling out over who has whip hand. *The Herald*, p. 1.

Donnelly, B. (1999, Jun. 25). Fishermen step up campaign over boundary. *The Herald*, p. 6.

Duncan, G. (1999a, Mar. 6). Opposition to euro growing. *The Scotsman*, p. 6.

Duncan, G. (1999b, May 3). Parties in fight to get ahead with the figures. *The Scotsman*, p. 9.

Gray, A. (1999, May 8). Blair's Babes no role models for rising woman stars. *The Scotsman*, p. 7.

Hardie, A. (1999a, Jan. 19). Minister defends handling of NHS. *The Scotsman*, p. 6.

Hardie, A. (1999b, Jan. 20). SNP faction at Holyrood make Salmond's life difficult. *The Scotsman*, p. 4.

Hardie, A. (1999c, Jan. 27). Tories go on tour with warning on devolution. *The Scotsman*, p. 4.

Hardie, A. (1999d, Jan. 30). Scots Tories draped in tartan for new vision of Unionism. *The Scotsman*, p. 4 .

Hardie, A. (1999e, Mar. 6). Labour rebel McAllion tries hard to toe the line. *The Scotsman*, p. 6.

Hardie, A. (1999f, Mar. 13). E-mail pledge for all Scots pupils. *The Scotsman*, p. 6.

Hardie, A. (1999g, Mar. 15). Brown in charge of blitz on SNP tax. *The Scotsman*, p. 1.

Hardie, A. (1999h, May 1). Cardinal Winning condemns election 'venom.' *The Scotsman*, p. 12.

Hardie, A. (1999i, May 5). Wallace teeters on balance of power high wire. *The Scotsman*, p. 9.

Hardie, A. (1999j, May 10). Green MSP denies deal with Canavan. *The Scotsman*, p. 9.

Hardie, A. (1999k, May 12). Capital witnessing a difficult birth for the nation's new government. *The Scotsman*, p. 5.

Hardie, A. (1999l, Jun. 24). MSPs decide to take a St Andrew's Day break. *The Scotsman*, p. 8.

Hardie, A. (1999m, Jun. 25). Holyrood costs to be offset by GBP20m windfall. *The Scotsman*, p. 11.

Hardie, A. (1999n, Jun. 25). Labour reveals radical changes for future PFIs. *The Scotsman*, p. 10.

Hardie, A. & Percival, J. (1999, May 11). Blair pulls strings in talks on coalition. *The Scotsman*, p. 1.

Hardie, A. & Scott, D. (1999a, Jan. 18). SNP plans England initiative. *The Scotsman*, p. 4.

Hardie, A. & Scott, D. (1999b, Jan. 20). SNP faction at Holyrood makes Salmond's life dull. *The Scotsman*, p. 4.

Hardie, A. & Scott, D. (1999c, Mar. 3). Blair defends left-wing MP's stance on independence. *The Scotsman*, p. 6.

Harrington, A. (1999, Mar. 8). Survey confirms no Scots identity crisis. *The Herald*, p. 6.

Holme, C. (1999a, Jan. 20). Holyrood's chance to lead on care for the elderly. *The Herald*, p. 4.

Holme, C. (1999b, Mar. 6). Nationalists up stakes on fees. *The Herald*, p. 6.

Holme, C. (1999c, Mar. 8). Greens see PS as a real chance. *The Herald*, p. 8.

Horsburgh, F. (1999a, Jan. 16). Laying out the rules to govern. *The Herald*, p. 6.

Horsburgh, F. (1999b, Jan. 23). Prescott poses taxing question of direction of SNP transport policy. *The Herald*, p. 3.

Horsburgh, F. (1999c, Jan. 27). 100 days until the deliverance of home rule. *The Herald*, p. 6.

Horsburgh, F. (1999d, Mar. 1). Dewar unveils his top twenty for Scottish election campaign. *The Herald*, p. 6.

Horsburgh, F. (1999e, Mar. 5). SNP not beyond the pale, Gorrie to tell Lib-Dems. *The Herald*, p. 6.

Horsburgh, F. (1999f, Mar. 6). Ashdown attacks rival on toytown Holyrood. *The Herald*, p. 6.

Horsburgh, F. (1999g, Mar. 12). Time to grow up says McAllion. *The Herald*, p. 6.

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The ambivalent Labour show. (1999, Jun. 18). *The Scotsman*, p. 14.

The essential debate (1999, Mar. 6). *The Herald*, p. 14.

The mature, radical choice. (1999, May 5). *The Scotsman*, p. 13.

The new tartan army of Tories. (1999, Jan. 28). *The Herald*, p. 6.

The party report cards. (1999, May 6). *The Herald*, p. 6.

The new politics. (1999, May 8). *The Herald*, p. 1.

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Treasury plan a recipe for conflict. (1999, Mar. 4). *The Scotsman*, p. 16.

University fees: Horse trading not the answer. (1999, May 11). *The Herald*, p. 18.

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Vote with clarity and pride. (1999, May 5). *The Herald*, p. 18.

Wakey-wakey call to Scottish Labour. (1999, Jan. 22). *The Scotsman*, p. 18.

Webster, J. (1999, May 13). We must pray that our dreams will be pleasant. *The Herald*, p. 23.

Wha's like us? Identity is a subject worth debating. (1999, Mar. 8). *The Herald*, p. 12.

Williams, T. (1999a, May 8). You have cruelly betrayed your own people, Tony. *The Scotsman*, p. 14.

Williams, T. (1999b, May 13). Collapse of central party control. *The Scotsman*, p. 13.

Williams, T. (1999c, May 15). Old politics? New politics? No, just plain bad politics. *The Scotsman*, p. 15.

Wishart, R. (1999a, Jan. 28). Open up the key liberator. *The Herald*, p. 19.

Wishart, R. (1999b, May 6). Do not send in the clones. *The Herald*, p. 19.

Wishart, R. (1999c, May 12). Why John Smith's unfinished business is top of the agenda. *The Herald*, p. 6.

Wishart, R. (1999d, Jul. 2). Day of destiny. *The Herald*, p. 19.

Young, A. (1999, May 14). Let's ask the real questions. *The Herald*, p. 19.

CURRICULUM VITA

Douglas Bicket

Education

University of Washington, Communication, Ph.D. (October 2001)
Dissertation: "Media constructions of Scottish national identity through the prism of the new Scottish parliament"

University of Washington, Communication, M.A., 1995-1997
Thesis: "Diverging Conceptions of Free Expression in the Anglo-American Judicial Tradition"

Glasgow Caledonian University, Glasgow, Scotland
Communications and Mass Media, 1989-1993, B.A. (2.1 Honours)

Academic Employment Experience

Positions held

Assistant Professor, Department of Communication, State University of New York, College at Geneseo, October 2001-present

Instructor (tenure-track), Department of Communication, State University of New York, College at Geneseo, from August 2000-October 2001

Instructor, School of Communications, University of Washington, 1998-2000

Teaching Assistant, School of Communications, University of Washington, 1995-1998

Courses taught

SUNY Geneseo (2000-2002):

- INTD 101, Literature of Journalism
- Comn. 160, Introduction to Mass Communication
- Comn. 251, Mass Communication and Society
- Comn. 301, Topics in Journalism
- Comn. 362, International Mass Communication
- Comn. 364, Seminar: Issues and Problems in Broadcasting
- Comn. 355, Contemporary Issues in Freedom of Speech

University of Washington (1998-2000):

- CMU 418, Textual and Visual Literacy in Communications – funded through a Huckabay Teaching Fellowship (see Grants, Honors, and Awards below)
- CMU 320/POL S 329, Global Communication
- CMU 300, Basic Concepts of New Media

- CMU 403 Visual Culture, Winter 1998 quarter (TA/Instructor)
- CMU 300 Basic Concepts of New Media (TA /Instructor)
- CMU 200 Introduction to Mass Communications (TA /Instructor)
- CMU 440/POL S 461, Mass Media Law (TA /Instructor)
- CMU 328 News (Writing) Laboratory (TA /Assistant Editor)

Other Academic Positions

Research Mentor Center Coordinator, Spring 1999 quarter

Research Assistant for Prof. Diane Gromala, School of Communications, University of Washington, January to June 1999

Scholarly Activity

Publications

D. Winterstein and D. Bicket, Regional Powers and Global Politics: New York Times Framing of Nuclear Testing in India and Pakistan. *Inter/Sections* (Summer 2001), 1(1), 35-48.

D. Bicket, Fictional Scotland: A 'Realm of the Imagination' in Literature and Film Drama. *Journal of Communication Inquiry* (January 1999), 23(1), 3-19.

D. Bicket, Drifting Apart Together: Diverging Conceptions of Free Expression in the North American Judicial Tradition. *Communications and the Law* (December 1998), 20(4), 1-38.

D. Bicket, Friends or Enemies? The British Press and the European Union. *Ecquid Novi* (Autumn 1997), 18(1), 90-114.

Academic Reports

C. A. Giffard and D. Bicket, "IPS Coverage of the Fourth World Conference on Women," Inter Press Service (1996).

Academic Conference Papers

D. Bicket, "The Media, Scotland, Britain, and the EU: A Case for Further Investigation and Study," presented at the National Communication Association Annual Convention, Seattle, Washington, November 2000

D. Bicket, "Political and Cultural Devolution: Scotland's Struggle and the Lessons of Quebec and Catalonia," presented at the International Communication Division,

International Association for Mass Communication Research (IAMCR), Leipzig, Germany, July 1999

D. Winterstein and D. Bicket, "A Frame Analysis of *New York Times* Coverage of Indian-Pakistani Nuclear Weapons Testing," presented at the International Communication Division, IAMCR, Leipzig, Germany, July 1999

D. Bicket, "Still Surprisingly Different: Why Canadian and U.S. Free Expression Law Has Not Converged in the 1990s," presented at the International Communication Association conference, Communication Law and Policy division, San Francisco, California, May 1999

D. Gromala and D. Bicket, "Not Quite Through the Looking Glass: Reconciling the Virtual-Physical Dichotomy in the New Media Classroom," presented at the International Communication Association conference, Instructional and Developmental Communication Division, San Francisco, California, May 1999

D. Bicket, "Fictional Scotland: A 'Realm of the Imagination' in Literature and Film Drama," presented at the International Communication Association, Philosophy of Communication Division, Jerusalem, Israel, July 1998

D. Bicket, "Philosophies, Polities, and Constitutions: Foundations of Canadian and U.S. Free Expression Law," presented at the Western Journalism Historians Conference, University of California Berkeley, February 1998

D. Bicket, "Polity and Identity: Scotland's Struggle for Cultural Independence and the Lesson of Quebec" (poster session), Qualitative Studies Division, Association of Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, Chicago, Illinois, August 1997

D. Bicket, "Friends or Enemies? The British Press and the European Union," presented at the International Communication Association, Mass Communications Division, Montréal, Canada, May 1997

D. Bicket, "Fictional Scotland: A Realm of the Imagination," presented at the Western States Graduate Student Communication Conference, Annenberg School of Communication, University of Southern California, April 1997

C.A. Giffard and D. Bicket, "International News Agency Coverage of the Fourth World Women's Conference (Beijing)," presented at the Council on Information and Communication for International Development Conference on Third World Media, Copenhagen, Denmark, September 1996

Grants, Awards and Honors received

Recipient, SUNY Geneseo Research Travel Grant for travel to NCA annual convention, Seattle, November 2000

Recipient, UW Huckabay Teaching Fellowship (1999-2000) to construct and teach an undergraduate course focusing on visual and textual literacy (see Teaching Experience above)

Recipient, EU Center/UW Center for West European Studies research grant (1999) to study the new Scottish Parliament's relationship with the European Union

Nominated by the EU Center as one of three graduate students from the UW to participate in a working visit to Brussels, Belgium, June 13-19, 1999, sponsored by the European Union Commission. (Award is directed toward U.S. graduate students involved in research on European integration.)

Recipient, Foreign Language and Area Studies award for intensive German language study, University of Washington, Summer 1997

Talks and Presentations

"If it's no' Scottish Identity Politics, it's Crap." CMU Talk Series, School of Communications, University of Washington, October 20, 1999

"Scotland and Quebec: Comparative History and Culture." Arts and Sciences Colloquium, Lock Haven University, March 1, 1995

Service

Service to the Department and College

Department of Communication Curriculum Committee and Departmental Affairs Committee, Fall 2000 - present

College Social Science Core Committee, from Fall 2001

Other service

GPSS Graduate Student Senator representing the School of Communications, 1999-2000

Graduate student representative, School of Communications new faculty hire search committee, Fall 1999

Co-organizer, CMU Talk Series, University of Washington School of Communications, 1999-2000

Webmaster, University of Washington School of Communications Web site, Spring 1999 quarter

Volunteer writing tutor, School of Communications Research Mentor Center from its inception, 1996-2000

Volunteer lab assistant, new technology instructor, and web designer, New Media Research Lab, School of Communications, 1996-1999

Vice President, Student Cooperative Council (student government), Lock Haven University, Pennsylvania, 1994-1995

Memberships and affiliations

- International Communication Association (ICA)
- National Communication Association (NCA)
- Association of Education in Journalism and Mass Communication (AEJMC)
- Eastern Communication Association (ECA)