

p.446, 23:1a) In the Hsiao-ssu-tu(小司徒) section of the Chou-li (it says)

you gather together (and organize) all the people into chor'o(卒伍) and use them (for work in such an organization). 5 men constitute an o(伍), 5 o make up a liang(兩), 4 liang make up a chol(率), 5 chol (tsu) make up a yö(旅), 5 yö make up a sa(師), 5 sa make up a kun, 軍 and you mobilize the army (kigunyö 起軍旅) in order to go hunting (chakchön 作田役) or perform labor service (yök 役). Also this organization is used to drive off enemy invaders and catch criminals (pi ch'usö 比追胥) and to collect taxes and labor service.

(note: Cheng Hsüan(鄭玄) comments: The word yung(用) means to use people for work. The terms, o, yang, chol, yö, sa, and kun are all names of groups. All of these are based on the (practice of) former kings ~~xxxx~~ determining a military command structure (kullyöng 軍令) on the basis of agricultural work. The desire (of this) was that ~~xxxx~~ benefits were relief such that people gave mutual aid to one another (ün chok sanghyöl 恩兄相恤), and righteousness was such that they gave mutual aid to one another, their clothing (pogyong pangbyöl 服裝) was mutually distinguished from one another, and their voices were mutually intelligible to one another. The word chön(田) means hunting (畋獵). The word yök(役) means labor service (kongnyök chi sa 功力之事). The word ch'u(追) means to chase bandits off. The word sö(胥) means to catch thieves and bandits.

I note that this was equivalent to the organization of 5 families into pi(比), 5 pi into lü(閭), 4 lü into tzu(族), 5 tzu into tang(黨), 5 tang into chou(州), 5 chou into hsiang(鄉). (end note)

The Ta-ssu-ma(太司馬) organized the army into (a unit) of 12,500 men. The king had 6 armies; a large state had 3 armies, the next sized state had 2 armies, and a small state had 1 army. Each general (chün-chiang 軍將) was appointed to the post of ching (ming-ching 命卿).

p.446, 23:1a-b) 2,500 men constituted a sa (師). All the sas (師帥: commanders) were (appointed) to the post of chung-ta-fu (中大夫). 500 men constituted a yō (旅) and the yōsu (commander) were all (appointed) hsia-ta-fu (下大夫). 100 men made up a chol (卒) and the cholchang (卒長) commanders were all (appointed to the post of) shih (士). 25 men made up a liang (兩) and the liang-ssu-ma (兩司馬) commanders were all appointed chung-shih (中士). 5 men made up an o (伍) and the wu (伍) all had a chief (chang 長). One army had 2 fu (府), 6 shih-hsi (士), 10 ku hsü (胥), and 100 tu (徒). (note: The wu (伍) consisted of 1 pi (比); the liang (兩) consisted of 1 lü (閫), the tsu (卒) consisted of 1 tzu (族). The yü (旅) consisted of 1 tang; the shih (sa) consisted of 1 chou; the army (chün) consisted) of 1 hsiang. Each family furnished one man

(for military service). The chiang-su (將帥), chang (馬) and ssu-ma (司馬) officers were the lower officials of the army, and they were equivalent to the hsiang ta-fu (鄉大夫), the chou-chang (州長), the tang-cheng (堂正), the tsu-shih (族師), the lü-hsi (閫胥), and the pi-chang (比長).

In the Chou dynasty, they relied on peasants (farmers) for their soldiers (ubyöng ö nong 寓兵於農). When there was no war, the men engaged in agriculture (as farmers), and an area of 12,500 families constituted 1 hsiang. For the post of hsiang-ta-fu, 1 ching (卿) (was appointed). And when there was war, the men were treated as soldiers, and an area of 12,500 men constituted one army, and all their generals ( Chiang rank) were appointed to the post of ching (卿), which is to say the ching who were the hsiang-ta-fu.) (end note)

Indented section: Chiu Chün (丘濬) commented: The military organization of the Chou dynasty was the responsibility of the Ta-ssu-tu. When they went out to fight, then they were assigned to the Ta-ssu-ma (大司馬). When there was some matter, they were mobilized to perform labor (military) service, and all of the men were farmers in the time (previous to the fighting). It was not necessary to move soldiers from (other places); in all cases the

p.446, 23:1b) Also there was no need to appoint other commanders; they were all our officials. When they were living at home, then their homes were connected to (right next) other families and all were organized into ~~xxxxxi~~ wu, liang, tsu and yū (伍兩卒旅). And when they moved out (of ~~ku~~ the village on military maneuvers), the men were connected up to form wu, liang, tsu, and yū military units. The officials of the 6 hsiang were all men (capable of) cutting up the enemy and defending against foreign <sup>future invaders</sup> invaders (ch'ōlch'ung ōhae 折衝禦侮). All the people of the 6 hsiang were capable of standing up to difficult circumstances (敵愾仗節之士). When there was a matter (of warfare) they were ~~xformed into ranks~~ and moved out, and when the fighting was over, then they returned home to their fields and villages. If a father died, then a son took his place, and there was no problems involved in (excessive) recruiting of men (mu ch'osū chi pōn ~~無招收之禁~~), and there were never any men missing from the quotas. They cultivated their own lands and fed themselves and there were no costs involved in providing them with salaries (food). They provided their own food, and there was no difficult labor involved in keeping the men stationed in permanent camps, and there was no fear that the commanders would exercise (exclusive) control over the troops (mu akbyōng chi hwan ~~無操兵之患~~). This is why in the time of former kings their defenses were strong and when they fought, they won factories.

China

At home the system was sufficient to defend/(against invaders), and when they went out, it was sufficient to overawe the four barbarians. How was this not the best way to organize armies (military forces)?

24:2a)

--. In the treatise of Pan Ku (Pan Ku chih <sup>班固志</sup>: Han-shu) it states and collected taxes that they organized the military forces/on the basis of the well-fields.

In the provinces (outlying areas) 1 li (里) made up a ching (井), 10 ching made up a t'ung (通), 10 t'ung made a ch'eng (成), and a ch'eng consisted of an area 10 li square. 10 ch'eng made up a chung (中), 10 chung made a t'ung (同), and 1 t'ung consisted of an area 100 li square. 10 t'ung made a feng (封), 10 feng made a chi (封).

*Handwritten notes:*  
 Han-shu  
 Hsiang = 10 #  
 ch'eng = 100 #  
 t'ung = 1,000 #  
 chung = 10,000 #  
 100x100

*Handwritten notes:*  
 feng = 100,000 sq. li  
 chi = 1 mill ching  
 SE

p.446, 23:2a) A chi was 1,000 li square. 4 ching in area made up an i (邑), and 4 i made a chiu (丘), and in 1 chiu there were 16 ching ~~(wells)~~ (wells), which contained 1 war horse, 3 oxen. 4 chiu (丘) made a

23:2b) tien (甸) and one tien contained 64 ching (wells), with 4 war horses, 1 war chariot, and 12 oxen, and 3 armored soldiers (kapsa), and 72 infantrymen with all shields and armored equipment stored in it. This was called the chariot and horse system (sūngma chi pōp 乘馬之法)

(note: 1 ching (well) had 8 families; 1 tien had 64 ching, or in terms of land, 576 ching (kyōng 井) and 512 families which provided 75 soldiers for service. A little bit less than every 7 families provided 1 ~~manxfox~~ soldier. Also 1 military chariot (cart). Also (they furnished) 16 oxen and horses combined. Every 32 families ~~xxxx~~ also had to furnish either 1 horse or 1 ox.)(end note)

One t'ung was a 100 li, which enclosed (by dikes?) 10,000 ching (wells), but if deduct 3,600 ching (wells) for mountains, rivers, dikes, walls, moats, town residences, animal preserves, and roads, then (the remainder) had to furnish taxes (military taxes) on 6,400 ching (wells), 400 war horses, and 100 war chariots (vehicles). This was the larges of the ching-ta-fu's ~~xx~~ fiefs (ts'ai-ti 采地) and was referred to as the house (family) of 100 chariots.

One feng (封) consisted of 316 li which enclosed 10,000 ching (wells), 6,400? and had to furnish taxes on 64,000 ching (wells), 4,000 war horses, and 1,000 chariots. This was the largest of the chu-hou, and this area was called a state (kuo) of 1,000 chariots.

The chi (畿) of the Son of Heaven was 1,000 li square, enclsoing 1 million ching (wells), furnishing 640,000 ching of taxes, 40,000 war horses, and 10,000

p.447, 23:3a) chariots. War horses, carts, and armor were all provided for. In the spring (in order to teach military tactics) they would send out the army (chinyō 振旅) for hunting (蒐), and in the summer in order to teach tactics in the woods, they would go out hunting (夏麥舍以苗). In

春振旅以蒐

夏麥舍以苗

p.447, 23:3a) the ~~winter~~ fall they would ~~take~~ take the troops out hunting (according to signals:PY, 4, 208) in order to train in controlling soldiers (ch'ibyōng 治兵), and in the winter they would take them out hunting in order to have a grand inspection. In all cases they ~~are~~ trained them during the agricultural slack season.

5 state (kuo 國 :fiefdoms?) constituted a shu (屬), and a shu had a chief (chang). 10 kuo (states) made a lien (連), and a lien had a shuai (帥) commander. 30 kuo made a tsu (卒) and a tsu had a cheng (正) as commander. 210 kuo made a chou (州) and a chou had a mu (牧) as commander. The mu had lien-shuai (連帥) (under them) and every year they would inspect the chariots. The tsu would inspect the troops every 3 years. And ~~the~~ all the mu would have a grand inspection of all chariots (vehicles) and personnel every 5 years. This was in ~~great~~ grand outline the way former kings established military affairs and kept the army (supplied) on behalf of the country (state).

Indented: Chu Hsi said: According to the system of former kings, within (the country) they had the ~~6~~ soldiers (armies) of the 6 hsiang, 6 su (道) and the tu-pi (都), and outside (in the provinces) they had the troops of the pang-pai (方伯) and lien-shuai (連帥). The (soldiers) of the capital and provinces supported one another and controlled one another (regulated?) during peace and war.

*check*

(~~in~~ double indented note: Mr. Chang (章氏) commented: Under the Chou system an army (chün) consisted of 12,500 men. The 6 armies consisted of 75,000 men. The king's territory (wang-chi 王畿) was 1,000 li, the near suburbs were 50 li, the far suburbs 100 li. The suburbs were organized into hsiang. /6 hsiang/ had 10 t'ung (同) and they all alike were 100 li square, ~~xxxxxx~~ <sup>通 controlled</sup> And they enclosed an area of 100,00 ching (wells) with 900,000 farmers (mu fu 夫). Excluding the land used up with mountains, streams, walls and towns, there was 36,000 ching (wells) of land. Excluding public land (kung-t'ien 公田 :the lord's fields), which

p.447, 23:3a) took up 1/9 of the total area, that left 512,000 households. ~~xxx~~ Every 512 families ~~xxxxxx~~ was required to furnish in taxes (fu 賦) 1 chariot, thus providing (a total of) 1,000 chariots. Every 7 households had to furnish 1 soldier (率七家賦一兵), giving (a total of) 23:3b) 75,000 men. This was the system of the liu-chün (six armies). The 6 su (道) and the three grades of hou-kuo (侯國 :marquisates?) were all organized like the hsiang. 10 were organized into a system of 6 armies, and this figure 10 was the same as the number of (chou (pref.)? Pyongyang, 4, p.209) throughout the chi (畿). The Ta-ssu-tu rotated in command of one army in mobilizing them (for duty) and every 10 years he had to servie one year on duty. If there were two men per family who could serve on duty, thenthroughout a person's lifetime, he would only have to serve no more than once or twice.

Handwritten notes on the left side of the page:

- pi = 5 p
- liu = 25
- tsu = 100
- tang = 500
- chou = 2500
- hsiang = 12500
- lin = 5 p
- li = 25
- pi = 5 p
- liu = 25
- tsu = 100
- tang = 500
- chou = 2500
- hsiang = 12500
- wu = 5 men
- liang = 25
- tsu = 100
- yü = 500
- shih = 2500
- chün = 12500

Chu Hsi commented: 5 families made up 1 pi (比); 5 pi made a lü (閭), 4 lü made a tsu (族) and 5 tzu made a tang, 5 tang made a chou, and 5 chou made a hsiang. 5 families made a lin (隣), 5 lin made a li (里), 4 li made a (鄰) and 5 (鄰) made a pi (部), 5 pi made a hsien, and 5 hsien made a su (道). This was the hsiang-su system, and the system for allocating land. ~~xxxxxx~~ 5 men made a wu (伍), 5 wu made a liang (兩), 4 liang made a tsu (卒), 5 tsu made a yü (旅), 5 yü made a shih (師), 5 shih made a chün (軍). This was the system by which the hsiang and su furnished troops! This is why it is said that when troops were raised for duty, no more than 1 man was furnished by a family, and since 1 family furnished 1 man, then the number of troops was numerous, but these men were only used for defending the royal palace, equivalent to the künwi (禁衛) guards of today. It would appear that these men were not taken (out of the country) on expeditions. According to the tu-pi system (都鄙), 9 farmers constituted a well (ching), and 4 ching made an i (邑), and 4 i made a chiu (丘), and 4 chiu made a tien (甸), and only then (did 1 tien) furnish 1 changgokkō (長轂車) cart.

and of Chu Hsi quote  
check  
Chu Hsi

p.447, 23:3b) and also 3 armored soldiers (kapsa) and 72 infantrymen. 512 families combined furnished 75 men, so that you could say that (the burden on them) was extremely small. Nevertheless, when the army was sent out on an expedition, they mobilized all the trouble of the tu-pi; they did not use all the men who were mobilized, and the ones who were used did not consist of all the men mobilized. In this way the two systems (the system of the hsiang-su and the system of the tu-pi) were not the same, but the tax systems of the kung and chu (貢助) were also different. Generally speaking, the system of the hsiang-su (鄉遂) used 10 as the unit (of calculation) and (the men) were distributed among the chang and lien (長連). The ching-t'ien (well fields) used the number 9 as the unit of calculation, and this was a system that was adapted to local circumstances. On the basis of this, things were not the same, but in recent times the Confucian scholars feel it necessary to combine them,

Chu Hsi but how can they be made to fit together as a unified system?"  
quote ends here?

23:4a) triple indented note: At the present time I note that even though the Han-shu treatise states that 1 chariot had 75 men on it, nevertheless this only refers to fighting men. In ancient times under the chariot system, for every 1 war chariot, they had to have 1 light chariot (cart) that was allocated to it. 75 men rode on the war chariot, while the light chariot had 25 men who cooked food, looked after the equipment and carried wood and drew water. In fact (the total) comes to 100 men. (end note)  
--. In the Kuo-yü (國語), Kuan-tzu (管子) said to Duke Huan of Ch'i (Ch'i Huan-kung 齊桓公): "If you want to rectify the ranks of the troops and put the weapons (armor and weapons) in order, then a large state should also be able to do this. If you should want to launch an attack of chastisement, then the small states (of small lords) should be prepared to defend themselves. If you should quickly obtain your way (will) with the feudal lords of the world (country), then you have to act secretly (sa yu so yin 事有所隱) and you

p.447, 23:4a) have to take of other matters related to (military affairs) (cheng yu so yü 政有所寓). (note: Because (the duke?) did not understand how to train troops, that is why he said that "there are affairs that have to be done secretly, and because military administration is related to hunting, that's why he said that "there are matters related to (military) administration)(end note) Thus he reformed internal administration and did things in relationship to military affairs. (note: internal administration refers to state administration)(end note)

He divided the state of Ch'i into three parts and formed 3 armies placed under the command of the Kao-tsu(高子 之里), the kuo-tsu(國子 之里) and one under the direct command of the duke (kung chih li 公之里). (note: In the Chou system, a large state (ta-kuo) had 3 armies. The Kao-tsu (eldest prince) and the kuo-tsu (國子 :other prince?) all were high ministers (shang-ching 上卿) in the state of Ch'i and each commanded forces under them as the left and right armies.)(end note) You select outstanding men and make them the lords of towns (li-chün 里君).

(note: Each li used outstanding men as their chün)(end note) In the hsiang you have tropp units and commanders so that your orders will be carried out. And when you go on the hunt, you give out rewards and punishment (note: rewards and punishment are to be based on merit or errors in the conduct of the hunt)(end note), and all the people will become knowledgeable about military affairs.

23:x4b)

At this time they organized 5 households into a chih(執) with a chief for each. 10 chih made a li(里) with a ssu(司) commander. 4 li made a lien(連) with a chief in command. 10 lien made hsiang with a liang-jen(良人) in command and in charge of military orders. Since 5 families were organized into chih, 5 men made up a wu(伍), and the chih-chang(執長:chief) was in command of them. 10 chih made a li, so that 50 men were in a small force (soyung 小戎, and a li had a ssu(司) who commanded it. 4 li made a lien with 200 men with a ssu making up a tsu( ) and commanded by a lien-chang(連長). 10 lien made a hsiang with 2,000 men

p.447, 23:4b)

making up a yü ( 遊 ), and the hsiang liang-jen ( 鄉良人 ) was in command of it. 5 hsiang made 1 shuai ( 帥 ), and 10,000 men made up 1 army (chün), and a shuai ( 帥 ) commander) of 5 hsiang was in command of this force. ~~xxx~~ Among these three armies, ~~h~~ you have the "drum" of the middle army (note: the middle army refers to the one under the direct command of the kung (duke, lord)(end note); the drum of the Kao-tsu (elder son), and the drum of the kuo-tsu (state son). In the springtime they took them out for hunting and training (note: because this was related to military affairs, they also formed the hunting units into army units)(end note), and in the fall during hunting time they trained the troops (...), and for this reason the ranks of troops were determined (set) in the li ( 里 :village), and military administration was determined in the kuo ( 郊内 :suburbs of the capital). And when training was carried out there was no need to move troops around.

p.448, 23:5a)

Therefore, the men of the squads protected one another, and each household loved one another. When they were young children, they lived in the same place, and when they grew up, they went around together. When they performed the chesa ancestral rites, they shared ~~mourning~~ the happiness with one another; and when there was a death or funeral, they commiserated with one another. They had the same concern ~~for~~ over calamity and happiness; When they were living at home, they shared the same joys, and when they were ~~going~~ going around they knew of one another's activities. For this reason during night battles, they would hear the sounds of their voices, and it was enough so that they would not become confused, and during daytime battles, they could see one another, and it was enough so that they could recognize each other. Their joy was such that it was enough for them to die for one another. For this reason, they were strong on defense and victorious in the attack. Trained like this, a force of 30,000 men in crossing through the land were used to punish those who did not obey

(i chu wu-tao ( 以誅無道 ), and to protect the Chou house, and eventually they became the hegemony of the world.

Pyongyang, 4.8.211.

p.448, 23:5a) In the Spring and Autumn annals, in the 1st year of Ch'eng-kung (成公), (of the state of Lu), he formed the chiu-chia (作丘甲) :Pyongyang, 4, p.2211, on 16 ching (wells) of territory he had 1 war horse and 3 oxen; 4 of these units made 1 tien, which furnished 1 changgokkō vehicle, 4 war horses, and 12 oxen, 8 armored soldiers (kapsa), and 72 ~~xxxxx~~ infantry)

-. The Hu-shih chuan (胡氏傳) :Pyongyang, 4, p.401. Hu An-kuo of

the Sung dynasty's 30 chuan commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals) says: The creation of the chiu-chia system was an expansion of the army.

In ancient times, 9 men made up a ching (well), and 4 wells made an i (邑), 4 i made a chiu (丘), and 4 chiu made a tien (甸). A tien was an area that was 8 li square. By adding 1 li to it it made a ch'eng (城).

The people were required to furnish 1 changgok (長穀) vehicle. This was the 1 ch'eng of taxes that were furnished under the ssu-ma fa (司馬法).

This system was created (by Duke Ch'eng of Lu) because of his war with the Ch'i. He expanded the army to defend against the enemy, but this placed a heavy burden on the peasants, and was not the right way of governing a state. The term used in the original text, "he created"

(chak 作) should not be used (is not correct). T'ai-tsung of the T'ang askee Li Ching (李靖), what about the (erh-) kuang (匡) of the state of Ch'u (楚) and (its relationship to?) the Chou system?

Li Ching replied: In the Chou system, one chariot (contained) 72 infantrymen and 3 armored soldiers (chia-shih, kapsa 甲士). 25 men made up 1 chia (甲).

And 3 chia consisted of 75 men. Since 1 chiu (丘) was required to furnish 18 men, 4 chiu together furnished one chariot's (worth of men). At the present time, those who use the chiu-chia (丘甲) system (require)

that the chiu furnish 1 chia (甲), and this means a troop unit of 100 men taken from 1 tien (甸). Therefore I cannot tell whether what this phrase, "to make" (to organize) refers to an additional 1 chariot for 3 tien, or an additional 1 chia (甲) for each chariot.

Handwritten notes:  
Han: 4, p. 233.  
丘甲: land tax  
System of Lu in the  
SFA period.  
16井 = 1丘  
128家, 12牛, 3甲士, 及步兵

p.448, 33:5b)

In the state of Lu, down to the time of the Duke of Chao (昭公), it was said that when they went hunting in Hung (紅), they (used) 1,000 chariots, so that if you calculate this in terms of tien (甸), it is not clear if they increased (the number of) chariots or not.

Under the 2 kuang system (erh-kuang chi fa 二廣之法) of the state of Ch'u, 1 chariot used (carried) as many as 150 men, so it is not clear whether the state of Lu added an additional chia (甲) for every chariot or not. Even though the system of military service (fu 賦)

33:6a)

was not the same, in fact all of them expanded the number of troops and increased the number by 1/3, and that is all.

*Han period*

--. The Han-chih (漢志: Han-shu) says: When the Han dynasty rose, it followed (the ways of) Ch'in and appointed a Tsai-kuan (材官) in the chün (commanderies), and in the capital they stationed the Southern and Northern Armies (nan-pei chün).

Indented section: I Fu (易祓): Pyongyang, 4, p.213, Sung dynasty figure; Han, 4, p.234, attained the post of Li-pu shang-shu--minister of rites) wrote: In the Han dynasty military system, nothing was more detailed in its

organization than the Southern and Northern Armies of the capital. At that time soldiers and farmers were not yet divided in two, and the Southern and Northern Armies in fact was made up of the common people (as a whole), well-field much like the/system of ancient times. The regulations

governing the on duty service of the Northern Army was the same as that for the Southern Army. The Southern Army's soldiers (guards soldiers) were recruited from (both the) chün (commanderies) and the feudalities (kuo 國). The soldiers of the Northern Army were recruited from the Left, Right, and Capital Fu (tso-u-ching fu 左右京輔: Pyongyang, 4, p.212-3. note The Left Fu refers to ~~Ku~~ Fu-p'ung 扶風, the Right fu was Feng-i 馮翊, and the capital fu was Ching-chao 京兆 --referred to as a whole as the san-fu (三輔))(end note) It is also said that the Southern Army defended the palace walls, and the Wei-wei (衛尉) was in command of them.

p.448, 23:6a) The Northern Army defended the walls of the capital, and the Chung-wei

(中尉) was in command of it. (note: In the reign of Wu-ti, the name of the Chung-wei was changed to Chih-chin-wu (執金吾) (end note)

He (I Fu) also said that when the Han dynasty established the post of Tsai-kuan (材官) in the commanderies and feudalities (chün-kuo), the commandery magistrate (chün t'ai-shou 郡太守) assumed concurrent command of military affairs. (note: and he was called the chün-chiang 郡將) (end note) The commanderies had the posts of tu-wei (都尉), tso-shou (佐守), t'ien-shou (典守) and they took charge of military posts and soldiers.

23:6b)

In the feudalities (the feudal lords) were similar to the chün-shou (郡守) and the chung-wei (中尉) was similar to the tu-wei (都尉). The soldiers of both in the commanderies and feudalities had to have tiger tallies (hu-fu 虎符) (check other volumes of the Pyongyang translation) before they could be mobilized. The soldiers of the san-fu (三輔) were not attached to the chün-shou (郡守 : commandery magistrate), but were in particular assigned to the Northern Army.

Lin Chiung (林馬同) : Pyongyang translation of Han, 4, p.234, a man of the Sung dynasty, held the post of Po-hsüeh and was knowledgeable about the systems of the time) wrote that: According to the Han dynasty system, the Southern Army defended the palace and the Northern Army guarded the capital. And the Southern Army was divided into the lang-wei (郎衛) and the ping-wei (兵衛). The various lang ( chu-lang 諸郎) of the San-shu (三署 : check other volumes of the Pyongyang transl), and the Yu-lin (羽林) and Chi-men (期門) were all lang-wei (郎衛). Such things as the wei-shih (衛士), ling-ch'eng (令丞), and the wei-hu (衛侯) of the various tun (屯) were all (part of the) ping-wei (兵衛). The Northern Army was divided up into the t'iao-ping (調兵) and the mu-ping (募兵). The soldiers of the san-fu (三輔) were t'iao-ping, and the pa-chiao (八校) and the hu-chi (胡騎) were both mu-ping.

skilled soldier  
H.B. - to Pyongyang  
Han military system  
ordinary military system  
an duty in home  
Haochi's department  
official files in

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p.448, 23:6b) --. Under the t'iao-ping (調兵之制) system of the Han dynasty (for recruiting soldiers for military service), when a man reached the age of 23 he was drafted as cheng (正 : regular soldier?); after 1 year he became a guard (wei-shih 衛士), and after 2 years he became a <sup>military</sup>magistrate's cavalryman (tsai-kuan chi-shih 材官騎士) and trained in shooting the bow and arrow, riding horses, and mounted tactics. At the age of 65 he was exempted from service.

During the Han dynasty they had three categories of shifts (keng 更) of duty. These were the chŏlkyŏng (辛更), the ch'ŏn'gyŏng (踐更) and the kwagyŏng (過更). In ancient times regular soldiers

p.449, 23:7a) (chŏngjŏl 正卒) were not permanent (soldiers). Everyone shifted (on and off) duty once a month. These were the kyŏngjŏl (更卒).

*Hired Substitutes*

In the case of poor people who wanted to receive cash payments for being hired to serve on tours of duty (kogyŏngch'ŏn 雇更錢), the people who (hired them?) and would serve the next time (ch'ajikcha 次直者) paid cash to hire them (at the price of) 2,000 (mun, wen 文) of cash per month. This was the ch'ŏngyŏng (踐更).

徭戍

Those people in the country who all served directly on military duty on the frontier for three days, this was also called kyŏngnyul (ching-llŭ 更律), and this was the so-called kyŏngmu (sujari 徭戍). (With regard to this sujari), even the sons of ts'eng-hsiang (丞相) were also required to perform this (t'iao 調). The people were not allowed to perform this 3 days of military service at will (at random). And those people who did go to perform this service (for wages?, Han, 4, p.235) had to serve on duty for 3 days; they could not either return as soon as they got there, or go as soon as they returned. One had to serve one turn per year. Those who did not go (to do this service), had to pay 300 (mun) of cash to the magistrate who would pay it to the person serving the duty. This was what was called the kwagyŏng (kua-ching 過更).

文獻通考

Indented section: Ma Tuan-lin (馬端臨) said:

p.449, 23:7a)

The tsu-keng(卒更) was a system where a regular person (the man himself) had to perform regular service (cheng-i 正役). The ch'ien-keng (戍更) was a system where another person was hired by the payment of cash to perform the service. The man who went on duty (for hire) would serve for one month in "internal territory" (within the country?), while the man who did not go (the one who hired the substitute) would pay cash to hire the substitute to go for him.

The kua-keng(洵更) system also involved the payment of cash for hiring a substitute to go on duty, and ~~xxxx~~ (in this case) the substitute went on duty to the frontier region for a period of three days, while the man who hired him sent cash (~~for his payment to support~~) to the district magistrate (of the hsien). The magistrate would then use the cash to pay a substitute who would go in his place. As for the phrase that "every year the (men ~~xx~~ required to serve) would shift, this probably ~~xxxxxx~~ includes the time spent in going back and forth (as well as the time served on duty). Since this involved going off a far way for military frontier duty and required 2 months to make the round trip, then the amount of time they were required to serve was 10 months a year. Under ~~xxxx~~ ch'ien -keng(戍更) system, one man ~~w~~ could perform the ~~x~~ military service for 9 other men, while under the kua-keng(洵更) system (done in this way), 1 man could perform the service for 99 other men. Since frontier military duty was a serious matter but out of 100 men, barely 1 man actually went to serve, then the actual number of men that served on military duty as soldiers was very few.

23:7b)

I believe that the system by which men on duty shifted tours once a year refers to the system that began in Ch'in times of requiring/military service of criminals (i ts'e tai ti-mu che? 以此待罰成者本非正法), and it was not ~~xxxxxxx~~ a correct system (the right thing to do). But later when they came to use excessive numbers of soldiers for warfare (kungbyöng tok-mu 窮兵黷武), whether a person was innocent of crime

p.449, 23:7b) ar supposed to be exempted from military service, ~~xxx~~ (or not), all of them were recruited and mobilized for service, and were treated the same as if they had been exiled to the frontier for military duty.

At the beginning of the Han dynasty, they also followed this method, but later on they issued orders to the effect that criminals had to ~~xxxx~~ perform military duty on the frontier for a year, while common people were obliged to serve not more than 3 days. If there happened to be someone who did not want to go, then he was allowed to make a cash payment to the hsien-kuan (district magistrate) in order to pay a replacement. This was the kua-keng system. (過更).

23:8a)

--. The fu-ping (府兵) system of the T'ang dynasty began (originated) in the Western Wei (西魏) and Later Chou and reached its completion in the T'ang. In the beginning of the Wu-te (武德) era, of Kao-tsu, 618-27) they first established the chün-fu (軍府), and they put the two generals of the p'iao-chi (驃騎將: the p'iao-chi-chiang) and the ch'e-chi-chiang (車騎將) in command of the chün-fu. The divided up Kuan-chung (關中: see other volume of Pyongyang transl) into 12 circuits (tao), with a fu (府) in each circuit. In the 3rd year (of mu-te, 620), they then treated the circuit as an army (chün). (note: For all of them they used the names of stars in the heavens for them, and they were called "the twelve armies")(end note) For each army there was a commander (chiang) and vice-commander (fu 副), one man each who supervised ~~the~~ both cultivation and fighting. In the 6th year (623) they changed the p'iao-chi and called it t'ung-chün (統軍), and they changed the ch'e-chi (車騎) and called it pieh-chiang (別將). During the reign of T'ai-tsung in the 10th year of the cheng-kuan era (636) they changed the name of the t'ung-chün (統軍) to che-ch'ung\* tu-wei (折衝都尉) and the pieh-chiang (別將) became the ko-i tu-wei (果毅都尉), and in general (the title for all of them) was Che-ch'ung-fu (折衝府). In the 10 circuits (tao) of the empire they establish 634 fu (府).

p.449. 23:8a) All of them had names, and within the passes (kuan-nei, inside the country) there were 261 of them. (note: According to another source (i pen 一本); there were 564 fu established in the 10 circuits. The Kuan-chung-tao (關中道) had 173 fu; the Ho-nei-tao(河內道) had 62 fu, the Ho-tung-tao(河東道) had 139 fu; the ho-pei-tao(河北道) had 10 fu, the Lung/-u-tao(隴右道) had 29, the Huai-nan-tao(淮南道) had 6, the Chiang-nan-tao(江南道) had 2, and the tao?-nan-tao(劔南道) had 10, and the Ling-nan-tao(嶺南道) had 30 fu.)(end note) All (of the fu) were attached to the various wei(衛). There were 3 grades of fu. 1,200 soldiers were assigned to an upper fu (shang-fu 上府), 1,000 men to a middle-fu (chung-fu), and 800 men to a lower fu (hsia-fu).

23:8b)

Each fu had a che-chung tu-wei(折衝都尉), one man, and a left and right ke-i tu-wei(果毅都尉), 1 man each. (note: The Che-chung tu-wei of an upper fu was rank 4a, and 1 rank lower for a middle fu, and another rank lower for a lower fu. The ke-i tu-wei of an upper fu was rank 5b, and one rank lower for a middle fu, and another rank lower for a lower fu.)(end note) (Each fu) also had a chang-shih(長史), ping-ts'ao(兵曹), and pieh-chiang(別將), 1 man each, and 6 chiao-wei(校尉). Each 300 men were formed into a tuan(團) with a chiao-wei(校尉 :as commander?). 50 men constituted a tui(隧), and each tui had a cheng(正 :as commander?). 10 men constituted a hua(火), and each hua had a chang(長 :as commander). They were equipped with weapons, armor and food, and each had an armory (storing several cartloads for each), and this material was granted (to the troops) when they went out on expeditions. (note: Each hua(火) was ~~xxx~~ equipped with 6 horses for carrying and each hua was furnished with (various types of equipment: 烏布

300 man 團  
50 man 隧  
10 man 火

equipment

omit

( ), one each, 2 armored beds? ( ), and 2 spears? ( ). Each tui( ) was equipped with 1 ( ) and 1 ( ) and 3 ( ). Each man had 2 tu( <sup>1 bow and</sup> :pecks) of arrows that ~~they carried with them~~, and 30 arrowheads

p.449, 23:8b) (list of equipment, food provisions etc. continues here for several lines...)

In general, when a (one of the people, min 民) reached the age of 20, he became a soldier, and at the age of 60 he was exempted from military service. Those people who could ride a horse and shoot (arrows) became ~~sh~~ yieh-chi (越骑) (means superior in courage and strength to the normal cavalryman)(endnote) All the rest were infantrymen. At the end of every year in the winter, the che-ch'ung tu-wei took command of the men to train them in fighting (note: for the methods of instruction,

p.450, 23:9a) see below). The rest were assigned to (attached) to the wei (guards).

Both the Left and Right Wei (Guards) all commanded 60 fu. The (rest of) the wei commanded 50 down to 40 fu. The rest of them were attached to the 6 shuai (率) of the Eastern Palace (tung-kung 東宮).

In general, when the fu-ping (府兵) soldiers were called up for duty, they issued tallies to them (pugye, fu-chi 符契; pyongyang 4, p.396, military tally sent in feudal times by govt to a commander; half was given to the person, and half kept by the govt). Then the tz'u-shih (刺史) of the chou (州) and the che-ch'ung (折衝) (commander) would examine the tallies (勘契) before sending them out (to duty, war).

If all the tallies were issued, then the che-ch'ung tu-wei and lower officials ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ all went (out to fight, to duty). If not all (tallies) were issued, then the ke-i (果毅) would go. If only a few were issued, then the pieh-chiang (別將). If a person was supposed to receive a horse, the magistrate would pay him the value (yō ki chi 與其直) and have him buy it in the market. (note: They gave 25,000 cash per horse. The tzu-shih, che-ch'ung, and ke-i would make a yearly inspection. Those ~~xxxxxx~~ not qualified to fight would be sold off and the money would be used to buy another in their place. If there were not enough horses, then the fu would pool its resources to supply it (them). (end note).

Those people obliged to stand guard (sugwija 宿衛者: on the palace or govt buildings?, pyongyang, 4, p.397) would go up for tours of duty (pōnsang) 卷上

Guards.  
卷上

tours

p.450, 23:9a) The Board of War (Ping-pu) would assign them to/duty on the basis of how far away the place of duty was (from their homes). Duty to distant places was less frequent, and duty to nearby places was more frequent.

(no. shift)

In all cases, the shift was changed after 1 month. (note: A distance of 500 li was 5 shifts (pōn 番), 1,000 li was 7 shifts, 1,500 li was 8 shifts, 2,000 li was 10 shifts, and more than that (the troops were divided up into) 20 shifts. Those men selected to stay and reside at a place for guard duty were handled as follows: 7 shifts for a distance of 500 li, 8 shifts for 1,000 li, 10 shifts for 2,000 li, and 12 shifts for a greater distance than that.) (end note)

Commentary  
Chang Chun-ch'ing

Indented section: Mr. Chang (章氏) commented: With regard to the fact that when the T'ang established fu, most of them were located within the passes (kuan-wei), commentators on this said that it was ~~fundamentally~~ designed to strengthen the capital (i wei ku pen 以為固本), and that the intention of the Han dynasty in establishing the tu-wei was also like this.

23:9b)

The Left and Right Guards (Wei) both were in command of 60 fu, and the other Guards (wei, chu-wei) were in command of from ~~40~~ 50 to 40 fu. All (Crown Prince) the rest were attached to the 6 shuai of the Eastern Palace (tung-kung), and the che-ch'ung (折衝) were also attached to it. The practice of having the Crown Prince (T'ai-tzu 太子) command armies was not an ancient system. However, it was only in the T'ang dynasty that the ~~che-ch'ung~~ che-ch'ung (折衝) trained the troops himself. In the Han dynasty, on the day that the troops were tested, the ch'in and hsien magistrates would assemble all of them.

Even though the T'ang fu-ping (soldiers attached to the fu) were scattered throughout the circuits (tao), nevertheless the che-ch'ung<sup>(帥?)</sup> tu-wei (折衝都尉) were all under the command of the various Guards (chu-wei 諸衛), from afar. They were regarded as "internally appointed officials" (nei-jen-kuan 內任官) and for that reason the official registers listed them after the Guards (chu-wei 諸衛). In the Han dynasty the tu-wei (都尉) were

Capital official

p.450, 23:9b) not attached to the ~~Guards~~ wei-wei (衛尉: guard commanders?).  
 provincial officials  
 They were regarded as "outside appointed officials" (wai-jen-kuan 外任官)  
 and for that reason the official rosters listed them after the district  
 magistrates (chün-shou 郡守). This was different from the T'ang dynasty  
 (system). Nevertheless, in terms of the command of troops, the T'ai-shou  
 (太守) and the tu-wei (都尉) were the same, and the tz'u-shih (刺史)  
 and che-ch'ung (折衝) were the same.

Shifts

one mo  
vs  
1 yr  
of Han

In the T'ang dynasty, the soldiers were divided into shifts (punbön 分番)  
 in accordance with how near or far their duty was (from their homes?0,  
 and in all cases, they had to serve one month. I am afraid that this  
 was a most confused (system). In the Han dynasty they felt that the  
 and substitute other soldiers  
 best system was to shift soldiers off duty/after one year's service.

Also in the T'ang dynasty they did not exempt from duty men who lived  
 over 2,000 li away (from the site of their military service), and this  
 end of Chang's was the reason why their system was destroyed (bad).  
 commentary

--. With regard to the Southern and Northern ya (nan-pei ya 南北衙)  
 soldiers of the T'ang dynasty, the men of the Nan-ya (南衙) were  
 the soldiers of the various Guards (chu-wei ping 諸衛系. (note: Among  
 the T'ang guards (chu-wei), they had the Left and Right Guards (左右衛),  
 the left and right yao? (驍), the left and right mu (武),  
 the left and right wei (左右衛), the left and right ling-chün (領軍),  
 the left and right chin-wu (金吾), the left and right chien-men (監門)  
 the left and right ch'ien-u (千牛) --altogether 16 guard units. From  
 the Left and Right Guards down to the Ling-chün, all were in charge of  
 guarding the palace. The chin-wu (金吾) were in charge of guarding  
 the interior of the palace and patrolling the capital. The chien-men (監門)  
 were in charge of guarding the walls. The ch'ien-u (千牛) were in  
 charge of being attendant guards. The fu-ping troops who were divided  
 into shifts and served on rotation (pönsang, pen-shang 番上) were all  
 attached to the various Guard units.)(end note)

23:10a)

p.450, 23:10a)

The Pei-ya (北衙) were the soldiers of the chin-chün (禁軍). In the beginning of Kao-tsu's reign, they were first created the yüan-tsung chin-chün (元從禁軍). During T'ai-tsung's reign they established the pai-chi (百騎). During the reign of Empress Wu, they changed them to the ch'ien-chi (千騎). During Jui-tsung (睿宗)'s reign, they increased them and established the wan-chi (萬騎). (note: In Su-tsung (肅宗)'s reign there was the kung-feng she-sheng-kuan (供奉射生官). At this time the fu-ping system had broken down and soldiers had to serve on permanent duty (chang-tsung 長從), and the (number of) guard soldiers (chin-chün 禁軍) had expanded. In the reign of Te-tsung (代宗: 763-80) and after they established the Left and Right Shen-ts'e-chün (神策軍), and in general all of them were (imperial) guard soldiers (chin-chün 禁軍) (end note)

Shift from rotating tours to permanent troop

Indented section: Lin Chiung (林弓) of Sung) commented: The capital guard soldiers (chi-ping 畿兵) of the Han dynasty began as soldiers who rotated on and off duty (fan-shang 番上). Later on, however, the fan-shang soldiers were changed to soldiers who were stationed as guards on duty permanently (chang-tun 長屯), and the chang-tun were changed to soldiers who were sent to distant places on expeditions (yüan-cheng 遠征) and the system of the capital guards (chi-ping 畿兵) broke down (was lost).

3 stages of change.

In the T'ang dynasty, the capital guards (chi-ping 畿兵) began as fu-wei (府衛: only guards of the capital). Later on the fu-wei were changed to permanent duty soldiers (chang-tsung 長從), and the chang-tsung were changed to Imperial Guards (Chin-chün 禁軍), and the system of capital soldiers (chi-ping 畿兵) broke down (was lost). This was the way in which the internal soldiers (capital soldiers, nei-ping) of the Han and T'ang dynasties went through three (stages of) change.

p.450, 23:10a)

Tu Mu (杜牧) of the T'ang commented: In governing a state (wéi kuo che 為國者), you cannot be without soldiers. If you station them outside (the capital, in the provinces), then what you get are rebellions like those of Han Hsin (韓信) and Ching P'u (程普) (Pyongyang, 4, pp. 217-8. generals of the early Han dynasty) or the revolt of the 7 feudatories (ch'i-kuo 七國 of the Han) or the rebellion of An Lu-shan (安祿山) of the T'ang, the Chieh-tu-shih).

If you station them in the capital, then what you get are usurpations (篡) like those of Wang Mang (王莽), Tung Cho (董卓) or Ts'ao Ts'ao (曹操) (Pyoangyang, 4, 218, Han dynasty figures who usurped military power), or Ssu-ma Yen (司馬炎) : Pyongyang, 4, 218, says Ssu-ma Yen; Han, 4, p.241 says Ssu-ma I (司馬懿).

If you want to prevent both provincial rebellions and capital usurpations, only if you prevent the troops from leaving their ranks (units), will there be no fear of their taking destructive action on their own. And only if the generals can preserve their own lives (pao-ching 保頸) can you ensure that there won't be any boiling of wild dogs (p'eng-chu 烹狗) : Pyongyang, 4, 218, assassinations). If you investigate the history of past and present systems, wasn't the best one the fu-ping? (for preventing this things)

people who obtained  
Ou-yang Hsiu (歐陽修) commented: Among the/states of the world in ancient times, their rise and fall, or whether they were well-governed founding a state or in confusion, there was not a case where (XXXXXXXX) did not begin with virtue (the virtue of the rulers). But since the Warring States Period, the Ch'in and Han dynasties on down, it rarely happened (that a man was able to take over the state) without the use of troops (military force).

How could it be that military affairs are not serious matters? Nevertheless systems are changed to accord with the circumstances of the times in order to chase after what (seems) to be profitable or convenient, so that things get to the point where it seems that there is ~~no~~ nothing (rulers) won't do.

Han, 4, p. 244  
Famous Tang  
poet. 字  
牧之  
叛  
Compared with  
Tu Fu + was  
called 小杜.  
23:10b)

Ou-yang Hsiu

to change things

p.440, 23:10b) And if you study (the various) systems (adopted), even though (some most of them of them) might be of utility at a given time, ~~they~~ were not sufficient (good enough) to be put into practice in later ages (adopted as a constant principle or system for all dynasties of later periods). (Of them all), only the fu-ping system established in the T'ang merits praise (contains elements which merit praise).

Generally speaking, in ancient times, military systems (ping-fa <sup>兵法</sup>) began with the well-fields (ching-t'ien), but ~~from~~ from the fall of the Chou dynasty the wang-chih (王制 <sup>王制</sup>: the king's institutions) were destroyed and were never restored. With the institution of the fu-ping for the first time everything (pertaining to military service?) depended on the peasants (il u chi ö nong 一畝之於農 <sup>(in advance)</sup> funde). With regard to where they lived, their training, accumulation of goods, preparation for emergencies, mobilization and resting of troops, in every case there were fixed regulations

p.441, 23:11a) (chölmok <sup>節目</sup>) for these (activities). And even though it was not possible for them to conform in every way with ancient methods, in general they captured the great purport (of the ancient ways), and this was the reason why the reigns of Kao-tsu and T'ai-tsung flourished.

(end of Ou-yang ~~hsi~~siu)

--.From the reigns of Kao-tsung and Empress Wu, for a long time ~~the fu-ping~~ soldiers (the ~~the fu-ping~~ army ~~system~~ was not used and the fu-ping system became dormant and destroyed (out of use). Shifts of troops on and off duty was frequently done without thought to the proper season (time) of the year, and the guard soldiers gradually began to abscond and hide until by the reign of Hsüan-tsung (玄宗 <sup>玄宗</sup>: 713-756) the army became even more reduced and scattered. (note: The fu-ping of the various Guards (chu-wei fu-ping) were not exempted from miscellaneous labor service. The people were sunken into abject poverty and absconded and almost completely disappeared.

The common people suffered greatly from this.))(end note) The prime minister, (tsai-hsiang <sup>宰相</sup>), Chang Yüeh (張詠 <sup>張詠</sup>) then requested that

p.451, 23:11a) all troops be recruited for service as guards (sugwi). Thus in the 11th year of Hsüan-tsung's reign (723) they recruited the fu-ping of Ching-chao (京兆), P'u (蒲), T'ung (同), Chi (歧) and Hua (華) and also the men who did not have jobs (service functions?--pai-ting :my transl. follows Pyongyang, 4, p.219) and they also increased the number of permanent-service troops (chang-tsung-ping 長從兵) in Lo-chou (洛州). The number of soldiers altogether came to 120,000 men and they were called "the permanent service guards" (chang-tsung su-wei 長從宿衛). (note: They were divided up and assigned to the various Guards and served in two shifts per year. At the time another edict was issued which said that the quota of horses for the chou (pref. 州) and fu was short and (required) the officials and private persons together to make up the shortage. Nevertheless, from this time there were even more shortages in the quotas of troops in the fu. And also because the che-ch'ung-chiang (折衝將) were not able to get transferred (promoted) for several years time, the people were ashamed to hold this position.)(end note)

*fu-ping*

*120,000 permanent service guards*

In the next year (724) the name was changed to kuang-chi (騎騎) (note: and they were divided up and assigned to the various guards to serve in 6 shifts)(end note). Thus the division between soldiers and farmers began at this time. (pyöngnong chi pun cha ch'a si 兵農之分 自此始).

Indented section: Ou-yang Hsiu commented: The general purpose for establishing troops (armies) is to prevent rebellion, but when the (military system itself) become ridden with evils, then it becomes sufficient to cause confusion (rebellion), and when this process becomes extremely bad, then it puts the country into difficulty, and it finally gets to the point where ~~it~~ it produces rebellion and leads to the decline and fall (of the dynasty). Generally speaking because the descendants of the T'ang (founders) became haughty and weak, they were not

23:11b)

p.451, 23:11b) to be diligent in the defense ~~of the dynasty~~ (preservation) of the laws of Kao-tsu and T'ai-tsung. Several times they changed their systems with the result that the ~~dynasty~~ Son of Heaven (dynasty) became weak while the power of the regional garrison commander became strong and the T'ang dynasty subsequently fell and was destroyed. This came about because the measures they took (with regard to the military system) caused it to happen.

Li Pi

--. Emperor Te-tsung (德宗 :780-805) discussed with Li Pi (李泌 : Han, 4, p.244, man of T'ang, official under Hsüan-tsung, served under 4 emperors and attained the post of Chung-chu shih-chung t'ung-p'ing-chang-shih) the restoration of the fu-ping system. Li Pi used the opportunity

to explain to the emperor the history of the founding of the fu-ping, and the reasons for its rise and fall. Furthermore he said that under the fu-ping system, during peacetime the people were all at ease (in the and were able to) cultivate

their fields; that every fu had its che-ch'ung who commanded it and the che-ch'ung would use the time afforded during the agricultural slack season to train the troops in fighting tactics. When the state was

faced with war and had to call up the troops, it used tallies (fu-chi 符契) which is issued to the chou (pref.) and fu (whose magistrates) would check the tallies before mobilizing the troops. And when they arrived

at designated places, the commanders would conduct a review and investigation (of the troops), and if they found that the troops were poorly trained, they would punish the che-ch'ung. In the worst instances, the punishment extended

to the tz'u-shih (刺史). Also when the troops returned from fighting, they granted them awards (medals) and rewards and then immediately dismissed the troops from duty (pyöndo p'aji 便道罷之). As for the

men who had to go (to fight), those who lived nearby did not have to exceed the (time) limits, while those who lived far off did not have to serve more than a year.

disbanding armies after fighting!

Kao-tsung appointed Liu Jen-chih (劉仁軌) to be the Chao-ho Chin-shou-shih (洮河鎮守). Because he planned to conquer Turfan (吐蕃)

p.451, 23:12a) this marked the beginning of long-term military service. During the reign of Empress Wu there was a peace for a long period of time and the fu-ping system gradually fell out of use and (service as soldiers) was regarded with contempt by the people; the common people (pai-hsing) were ashamed to serve. In addition, U sōn-gaek? (牛仙客) was a person who was able to buy the office of prime minister because he had accumulated much wealth, and the frontier commanders emulated his deception (and sought to buy office), so they got the troops to deposit silk in the fu treasury. During the daytime they kept (the troops) busy doing laborious work and in the evening they tied them up inside corrals (pens), making profit out of their deaths because they confiscated their goods (which had been deposited in the treasury). When the troops returned (from fighting), no more than 10 or 20% of them came back. This was how bad their suffering was. Nevertheless, there were no cases of provincial rebellions or usurpations at the capital (coups d'etat), cases where men killed their commanders and assumed command for themselves, and the reason for it was that the people loved their lands and gardens (didn't want to lose them) and were fearful of getting their families and clans into difficulty.

Beginning with Chang Yüeh (張詠) men were recruited for long-term military service, and this was called kuang-chi (廣騎). Li Lim-p'u (李林甫) became prime minister and also memorialized for the recruitment of men to be soldiers. These soldiers were not settled on the land and also had no relatives and families (to be concerned about). They lacked a sense of security (self-importance) and abandoned themselves to the pursuit of profit, and as a result calamity and rebellion were produced, and this evil has persisted to the present day. If the fu-ping system had been preserved and not abolished, how could things have become like this? And what fear would there be that those above would be brought down and those below would crumble (上陵下替之患)?

Li Pu

p.451, 23:12a) If your majesty should consider to restore the fu-ping, then it would be a day of happiness for the state, and a day of great peace."

23:12b) The emperor said: "After we pacify the central (Yellow?) River area (Pyongyang, 4, p.221--the state of 兗 Ch'u), I ~~wixx~~ ought to do as ~~you~~ you suggest." However, in the end, he was not able to restore (the fu-ping system).

--. In the Sung dynasty, in general there were three military systems: the chin-chün (禁軍), the hsiang-chün (廂軍), and the hsiang-chün (鄉軍). The chin-chün (禁軍) was one where in the beginning of the dynasty they selected all the brave men and sent them all to kuan-hsia (關下) to be palace guards and defend the capital and prepare to go out on military campaigns. The rest were kept in their home walled towns.

The hsiang-chün (廂軍) were the garrison troops of the various prefectures (chou). Each were attached to the home district walled town of the chou. All of them performed military service, and in the capital all were under the command of the Shih-wei-ssu (侍衛司).

The hsiang-chün (鄉軍) were selected from the household registers (hojōk 戶籍) and the men were formed into ~~xxxxxxx~~ units at the place where they were recruited for service and were trained as defensive troops.

Indented section: Su Shih (蘇軾) responded to an imperial edict and wrote a strategic plan (ts'e pieh 策別). ~~The first thing to do is to determine the army (military) system.~~ (in which he said): "The first thing to do is to determine the army (military) system. In the past during the Han dynasty they had the troops (tsu 卒) of the ch'ien-keng (戍更), but they did not have soldiers who cultivated their fields (ying-t'ien chih ping 營田之兵). Even though all the troops were taken from the farmers (peasants)(nongbu) and were made into soldiers, they didnot know anything about the work of farmers (peasants). It was for this reason that there were no troops permanently stationed in the

p.451, 23:12b) chūn and hsien, and in the ~~xxx~~ capital, they also had no more than the Southern and Northern Armies, the Chi-men(期門) and Yu-lin(羽林) (units) and that was all. When there was fighting on the frontier (borders),

p.452, 23:13a) or when there was trouble with the feudal lords (chu-hou), in all cases they used tiger tallies (hu-fu 虎符) as a means of calling up ~~xxx~~ the soldiers in the districts (chūn) and feudatories (kuo) for military service. And when the fighting was over and the troops rested, then they disbanded (漢然) and each of them returned to his home village.

~~This was~~ The reason that even though the soldiers did not know anything about agriculture, the empire did not fall was because they never gathered (the soldiers together in one place).

When the T'ang conquered the empire they established the ~~xxxxxxxi~~ fu-ping of the 16 wei (guards). There were more than 800 fu throughout the empire, of which 500 of them were stationed in the kuan-chung area (in the middle of the passes--interior of the country?). When there was no fighting then all of them worked in the fields and accumulated grain.

Not only did they have enough (food) to support themselves, but also they produced enough to expand the stored of the hsien officials (magistrates). The reason why the empire also did not fall even though the soldiers were gathered together into the capital armies was because the men were never allowed to eat without working.

At the present time the soldiers do not cultivate the fields, and are gathered together in the chi-fu(畿輔) at a number one would reckon at ~~xxxxxxxi~~ several

hundred thousand men. All of them look to the hsien magistrates for their sustenance. What we have (under this system) is all the worries of the Han and T'ang (systems) without any of the benefits of the Han and the T'ang. We have selected what is partial (leans to one side, what is incomplete) and have combined the use of all such (incomplete methods). For that reason we have reaped all the evils and are still not able to distinguish (what the problems are). The wealth of the empire

23:13a)

p.452, ~~23:13a~~ close by comes from Huai-tien(淮甸), and far away comes from

23:13b) the areas of Wu and Ch'u(吳楚). It takes all the boats and

✓ carts we have and all the human labor we have to bring (food) to the capital armies. Even though the country is at peace and there is no war, the tax levies are so onerous that we cannot add on any more, and still the amounts spent by the San-ssu(三司 :Finance Commission) pay out I fear are not enough to (cover the costs). This evils situation isx all

*standing  
armies  
of Sung*

due to the fact that soldiers who do not cultivate the fields are gathered together in the capital and consume the tribute taxes of the four areas of the empire. And it is not only because of this that things are the way they are. In addition, (the troops) are sent back and forth and yet the troops who are stationed in the chün and hsien (districts) are all ~~xxxxxxxx~~ sent out from the soldiers of the capital guards. In the greatest cases they are despatched from the fan-fu(蕃府 :border area), and in the smallest cases they are sent to the hsien and garrisons (chin), and all those who make these travels are soldiers of the capital armies. If you look at the situation on the basis of this, then (you can see) that even if the territory of the empire were only a foot or an inch, all of it is land that the Son of Heaven must defend himself (on his own).

*Su Shih*

Furthermore, there is no greater expense than that required for the maintenance of soldiers. And among the expenses involved in maintaining soldiers, none is greater than that required for sending troops on expeditions. At the present time we despatch palace guard troops to perform military service in the local chün and hsien districts as far away as several thousand li. In addition to the monthly salaires and yearly payments to these men, we also have daily provisions of daily fodder and rations. Every three years (the men) are shifted. When they go out there is great confusion, and those who come in follow after one another (in great numbers). Even though there were no more than groups of several hundred men, because they are required to ~~xxx~~ return, there is no difference

23:14a

p.452, 23:14a) between this and sending a force of several hundred thousand men out on an expedition once every three years. How ~~rukd~~ could it be that the strength of the farmers would not be exhausted, and how could it be that the men required to transport military provisions would not become tired out?

Moreover, at the present time the empire has not had the experience of fighting. The brave and dauntless ~~soldiers~~ officers and men do not have any fighting experience. ~~xxxxthattheyxxxxxxxxxx(theenemy)~~ They can follow the orders of their superiors (可以遵其上之人?), but none of them have any spare time to rest. The reason why these are idle and useless troops is in my opinion because they are sent out on military duty on behalf of the Son of Heaven (emperor). No matter how well clothed and adequately fed these men are, when you open up the fu granaries and load carts of ~~gxxx~~ gold and silk (to give them), if ~~what~~ they feel ~~x~~ crossed (discontent) with even one part of what they get, they want to get up and shout (their resentment). How is this the way to do things? (end of Su Shih)

--. In the time of Chen-tsung (真宗 :998-1023), the Chin-jung-chün (鎮戍軍), Ts'ao Wei (曹瑋) said that people living along the frontier ought to be recruited as bowmen and he ~~rx~~ requested that they be granted idle land and that their misc. service be ~~increased~~ exempted, and that they also be given emergency mobilization certificates (kyŏngch'ŏm 警符) and made into regular soldiers. Then the magistrates would have no costs of providing food and weapons."

23:14b) Chen-tsung then decreed that each man would be given 1 ching of land and would be required to furnish 1 armored soldier. Those receiving 3 ching of land would be ~~xxx~~ required to furnish 1 war horse.

--In the reign of Jen-tsung (仁宗 :1023-64), the Ho-pei Shuai-ch'en (河北帥臣), Li Chao-liang (李昭亮) presented his views, which said:

1/3  
 p.452, 23:14b) In the past in the T'ang dynasty, the Tse-lu yu-hou (澤路留侯?),  
 Li P'ao-chen? (李抱真) set the household registers in order, and  
 he selected one out of every three able-bodied males; during the agricultural  
 slack season he divided them into ts'ao (曹) and had them practice  
 shooting the bow and arrow. At the end of the year he tested all of them  
 and gave out rewards and punishment. In three years' time all of them  
 were good at shooting and he was able to obtain within his district 20,000  
 strong good soldiers (ching-tsu 勁卒). Since there were no salaries or  
 food provisions to give out, the fu granaries got even fuller. And he  
 prepared (shan 繕) armor and weapons for fighting equipment, and  
 subsequently (his men) became the strongest force in Shan-tung  
 (Üngsi Shantung 雄視山東; look strongly on?). At the time the Chao-i  
 infantry (chao-i-po-ping 昭義步兵) were praised as the best  
 troops in the army. Even though this is the best example (of troop  
 training) in recent times, still some people say that citizen-soldiers  
 (min-ping 民兵) are only good for defending walls, and that they  
 are difficult to prepare for fighting tactics (chōnjin 或者謂民兵難  
 可城守, 難備戰陣). This is really not an astute opinion. Thus <sup>only</sup>  
 for the time being, we ought to recruit people where they are (live)  
 and train them for 2-3 years. ~~in the military arts until they become~~  
~~somewhat skilled and practiced~~ They will gradually become refined in  
 the military arts and gradually trained in tactics of maneuver. And  
 if there should happen to be a war, we will be able to obtain men like  
 Li P'ao-chen to take command of them and organize them into battle units  
 and give rewards and punishments to the troops. What enemy would we not  
 be able to defeat (win a victory over)?

Indented section: I note that since the time of Hsüan-tsung  
 of the T'ang dynasty (713-56), soldiers and farmers (peasants) were divided  
 in two. From the confusion of the 5 dynasties period to the Sung dynasty,

p.453, 23:15a) this situation continued without change, and even to the present Great Ming dyansty, they also have not been able to reform and rectify (this problem).

Ming dynasty.

Chiu Chün( 丘濬 ) :Pyongyang, 4, p.393. Official of the Ming who served under Hsiao-tsung 1488-1506 and reached the post of Mun'yōn'gak t'aehaksa, deeply versed in books) said: In this dynasty the govt established/12 wei (guards) such as the Chin-i-wei and other (units) ~~above~~ in the capital to guard the palace, and we established ~~the~~ 48 wei such as the Liu-shou-wei( 留守衛 ) and others to defend the capital. ~~are~~ The upper 12 wei ~~were~~ imperial troops (ch'in-chün chih-hui shih-ssu 親軍指揮使司 ) who served on shifts of rotation (fan-shang 番上 ) on guard duty, and they are not attached to any (superior unit). But the wei of the capital are divided up and attached to the 5 armies Supreme Command (wu-chün tu-tu-fu 五軍都督府 ), and if there should happen to be an expedition to be sent out, these men are called up for duty. The various wei throughoug the empire are divided up and under the command of the tu-chih-hui-shih-ssu( 都指揮使司 ), which there are 5 are located in 16 places. Also/places (units) called the Hsing-tu-ssu( 行都司 ). Altogether the number of wei in both the capital and provinces come to over 500. With regard to the organization of the soldiers of these units, in general 5,600 men make up 1 wei; 1,120 men make up 1 ch'ien-hu-so( 千戶所 ), and 112 men make up 1 pai-hu-so( 百戶所 ). For every 100 households there are two ts'ung-chi ( 總旗 ) and 10 ~~xx~~ hsiao-chi( 小旗 ) who take charge of weapons and the organization of the men into units and squads. This is the system of military organization of this dynasty.

23:15b)

He also said: In previous periods the soldiers of the chou and chün (local districts) might be composed of local people (t'u-min 土民) who took responsibility for their own defense, or they might be composed of capital guard troops (chin-ping 禁兵 ) who would be despatched to an

p.453, 23:15b) area and stationed there. In both cases there were no regular quotas.

It is only in our dynasty since the beginning of the dynasty that we established the wei-so (衛所) to protect the chou and hsien (provincial

districts). A wei has 5 so, and a so must have 1,000 soldiers, and

thus each wei consists of about 5,600 men as a standard (quota). At

the present time the number of soldiers in a wei barely comes to half

this figure, and in the worst instances, no more than 20-30% (of the full

quota of troops). According to old regulations, if there should be

a vacancy in the ranks, the wei and so would commission a chi-chün (旗軍) )

to go to the place where the vacancy was and recruit men to fill it. The

evil has become so bad that the number of men who are recruited for

duty are now on the contrary less than the number of men sent out to do

the recruiting, and the number of men so obtained is not great enough

to compensate for the ~~many~~ number lost. As a result the legal agencies

(fa-ssu 法司) banish (che 竊) criminals to military service on the

frontier. Also, those who have opinions on this problem have calculated

that even though every year we despatch censors (yü-shih 御史) to

different ~~units~~ to clean up the recruiting system, nevertheless, this

exists in name only and had been of no benefit to the problem. Recently

there have been those who have presented the opinion that we ought to

investigate the number of men recruited by the yü-shih in order to

(check on their performance) and either promote or demote them. But

in this case, also, it is of benefit to the common people, but of no

benefit to military administration. In general, at the beginning of the

23:16a) dynasty we organized soldiers into military units, and ~~xxxx~~ in internal

areas of the country we recruited able-bodied men and organized them

into units for service, and along the frontiers for the most part we

banished criminals there for military duty. As time passed the evils

in this system grew worse by the day. People either changed their names,

or falsified the (military) registers, or illicitly divided up their families,

troop shortages.

p.453, 23:16a) ot these ~~men~~ split off from their families to live elsewhere. They cooperate with one another to conceal (themselves), and those above and below are in the dark (about the others' situation) (the authorities don't know what goes on among the people). Subsequently it got to the point where the record book were difficult to purify (set straight), and when investigations were conducted, there wasn't a trace left (of people who had escaped from military service registration). During this time there were also cases where able bodied males and whole households disappeared. Even though ~~regular households~~ there were those who were able to preserve regular households ~~(registers)~~, there were also implicated, involved (lei 累) cases of those who shifted their burdens to other people on the side.

--. The Koryŏ dynasty military system in general was modelled after the fu-ping system of the T'ang dynasty. ~~xxxxxx~~ T'aejo established the 6 wi (guards) (note: the 6 wi were the left and right wei, the shinhowi (神虎衛), the hŭngwiwi (興威衛), the Kŭmowi (金吾衛), the Ch'ŏn'owi (千牛衛), and the Kammunwi (監門衛) (end note) Each wi had 38 ryŏng (令領), and there were 1,000 men in each ryŏng. Men became soldiers at the age of 20 and were given ~~60~~ land. At the age of 60 they were exempted from military service ~~and~~ and had to return the land, which was then shifted either to their sons or grandsons or relatives who served in the military in their place.

indented section: Chŏng In-ji (鄭麟趾 :must be the Koryŏsa) said: (pyongyang, 4, p.399. Chŏng Rin-ji passed the saengwŏn exam at the age of 16 se in T'aejong 11 (1411) and the munkwa in 1414. He was apted posth to the post of CSC in Sŏngjong 9, 1478, (he died that year). He wrote or part. in the compilation of the Chach'i t'onggam hunŭi (訓義 :commentary on the Tzu-shih t'ung-chien), the Ch'ip'yŏng yoram (治平要覽), the ~~xxxx~~ Yŏktae pyŏngyo (歷代要) and the Koryŏsa)

p.453, 23:16a) (Chŏng In-ji said): The military system of Koryŏ was in general modelled after the fu-wei (府衛) system of the T'ang. At the beginning they established the 6 wi (guards), and ~~by~~ in the reign of Sukchong (1095-1110)

23:16b)

when they attacked the Eastern Nü-chen, they then established the Pyŏlmuban (別武班). Everyone from officials without posts (san'gwan 散官), and clerks to merchants, slaves and Buddhist monks (ch'iryu 繼流, same as ch'ido 繼徒, synonym for süngnyŏ 僧侶) --there was no one who was not assigned (to these military ranks). Even though (this system) was only used for a brief period of time during which results were obtained, it was not (as good as) the old system.

From the reigns of ũijong (毅宗) (1147-70) and Myŏngjong (1171-97) on down powerful officials seized control of the government and control over the army was shifted down (away from the king to his officials) (pyŏngbyŏng hai 兵柄下移). Strong and dauntless soldiers all ended up attached to private houses. Even though the country was faced with invasions, the government did not have control over even 1 regiment of troops. Only when the ~~is~~ situation had become desperate did they then begin to recruit troops from many areas. Or they might recruit (dragon) men from the capital without regard to whether they were noble or base in status; or they might inspect the civil and military officials without posts (sanjik 散職), the paekchŏng (百丁), or the clerks (chapsaek 雜色) and select them for service, or they might take the house servants (kadong 家僮) of officials of rank 4 and up, or recruit people on the basis of the size of their houses. Thus the condition of the state was destitute until the time when the dynasty finally fell.

-. King Kongmin (1352-74) once said: The state will (grant) 17 kyŏl of land (note: I note that the chŏn'gyŏl of Koryŏ was somewhat different from the kyŏl of today)(end note) (and in return for this) 1 able-bodied male (chokchŏng 足丁) (will perform military service). This <sup>is</sup> was a method handed down from ancient times whereby military service was exacted in return

for land. 古者田賦之遺法

based on the land

*inherit*  
*hereditary*

p.453, 23:16b) Military households are basically to ~~be set up~~ (on the land they receive) from one generation to the next (kunho sŭ so yŏn-rip *軍戶素所* *建立*), and if it is taken away by force by anyone else, they will be permitted to report it to the authorities who will give it back to them." (end Kongminwang quote)

p.454, 23:17a) Later on he also said: "In recent times the land system has become confused and the pubyŏng (*府兵*) are not able to receive land (grants). In particular this constitutes a mistake (loss of) the (original) purpose in selecting soldiers. Restore the old system!" However, in the end, this ~~work~~ was not carried out.

(Sahŏnpu)

In the reign of Kongyang-wang (1390-92), the Hŏnsa (*宣宗*) submitted a memorial which said: The 42 tobu (*都府*) of this dynasty is in general the fu-wei-ping (*府衛兵*) of the T'ang dynasty. The Khit'an looked over the world like tigers (dominated the world) but T'aejo severed relations with them, and they did not dare to invade us (lit. stand by the side and watch us). This was because he had the right kind of military system. In recent times the military system has been greatly destroyed (in disorder). We have unskilled commanders who lead the fighting so that the untrained men watch the wind and scatter in all directions (take flight when they hear the enemy is coming). Their bones are scattered over a thousand li. Even the dwarf slaves (waeno--Japanese) have become the plague of our country. This is a situation that really pains the heart (mind).

He also said: The pubyŏng (*府兵*) are commanded by the 8 wi (*衛*) (guards) (note: In Mokchong's reign, 998-1009, in addition to the 6 wi they ~~also~~ also established the Ungyanggun (*鷹揚軍*) and the Ryonghogun (*龍虎軍*) --the 2 armies. Later on these were combined (with the other 6 wi) and were referred to collectively as the 8 wi) (end note) The 8 wi are

commanded by the armies (kun). The registers record that there are 120,000 troops in the 42 tobu (*都府*). The tae (*隊*) have chŏng (*正*)

p.454, 23:17a) (as their commanders), and the o(伍) have wi(尉)(as their commanders), all the way up to the sangjang (上將 :upper generals). Each have their chain of command (those that command them and those to which they are attached). This is the reason why we have strong defense of the palace and can block foreign invasions. Since the time we entered into tributary relations with the Yüan dynasty (cha sawŏn irae 自事元以來), the civil officials have become peace-loving (peaceful, bland, t'ien 恬) and the military officials have indulged themselves in amusements (嬉).

23:17b) There is no one to defend the palace yet we have continued to increase the number of ~~guards~~ soldiers around the throne. The ~~wai wi~~ guards all have Hogun(護軍) and their subordinate officials (who command them) and who receive salaries. Thus, the system of our forefathers has been completely destroyed (become an empty thing) and the resources of the country are wasted (on the military's) salaries. As for the men who consume the salaries of the 5 officials (in command of) the 42 tobu, and the Pyŏngjang(平將) and wijŏng(尉正) ~~of the~~ (of the 42 tobu), if they are not young and weak children, then they are artisans, merchants, slaves, or underlings. How could this be the intention of our forefathers?

Pyongyang, 4, --. In the reign of King Kongmin (1352-74) the censor (kan'gwan), U Hyŏn-bo p.398, served (魚高玄寶) submitted a memorial which said: "People who have discussed into the Yi the matter think that the Japanese are good at maneuvering ships and dynasty one cannot do battle with them at sea. And if we were to construct warships this would cause difficulty to our people. This is not so. It is quite clear that sea pirates cannot attack on land. Furthermore, the purpose behind expelling bandits and repressing people who cause trouble ~~for~~ (violence) is to benefit the people. Should we give birth to great problems just out of our concern for small evils? At the present time we have stationed defensive troops along the East and West Rivers, but when the pirates come across the seas to attack us, our troops just stand on the ~~cliffs~~ ~~shore~~ shore with their hands folded (watching them), and that is all.

p.454, 23:17b) Even if we had a million men, if it involves fighting at sea (on the water), what use are they? Therefore we have to build warships, strictly prepare weapons and equipment, and defend strategic places against the bandits, so that no matter how skilled at sea warfare an enemy was, how would he be able to fly across the seas (to attack us)?

also  
23:18a) We must/observe the situation so that we could wipe out any surprise attack.

-. In the reign of King Kongyang (1390-92), the Todang(都堂) submitted a memorial which said: Recruit the people who live along the seashore. Every 3 able-bodied males will make up 1 household and they ~~were~~ will be naval soldiers (sugun). No land taxes will be collected from lands along the seacoast so that they may be used for supporting the naval soldiers. Their wives and sons will go along with them.

Indented section: I note that in our country in olden times we did not have naval soldiers or fleets of ships that were established (by the government). In general (both of these things) began at this time. (Silla?)(note: The above section, down to this point, discusses the organization of troops)(end note)

(Military Training) (kangmu 講武: title in Han, 4, p.252)

-. According to the Chou-li, the Ta-ssu-ma(大司馬) in mid-spring (chung-ch'un, Pyongyang, 4, p.227, says 2nd month) instructed (the troops of his area?) in fighting tactics (chin-yu 振旅), and the Ssu-ma used banners as a means of forming the ~~men~~ people into ~~lines~~ ranks just as if ~~like~~ they were in line of battle (yo chŏn chi chin 如戰之陣).  
note  
(Cheng Hsüan (鄭玄) commented: "To use banners" means that they raised banners in the hope that the people would (assemble) beneath them. Since soldiers (armies) are prepared for the defense of the state, Confucius said: "If you do not teach the people how to fight, this is tantamount to abandoning (neglecting) the ~~army~~ people. You cannot leave soldiers idle on the grounds that what they have to do is bad (distasteful?). You should