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Document:DIRR -0000 452212 Subject: CUBAN EXPECTATION THAT THE SALVADORAN REVOLUTIONARIES
WILL ACHIEVE POWER IN 1985 AND DISAPPOINTMENT THAT
THEY WERE UNABLE TO TAKE BETTER ADVANTAGE OF THE
RECENT PROBLEMS WITHIN THE SALVADORAN MILITARYC 48856DIRR 452212 ISR83-0373380
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SUBJ: CUBAN EXPECTATION THAT THE SALVADORAN REVOLUTIONARIES
WILL ACHIEVE POWER IN 1985 AND DISAPPOINTMENT THAT
THEY WERE UNABLE TO TAKE BETTER ADVANTAGE OF THE
RECENT PROBLEMS WITHIN THE SALVADORAN MILITARY

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AN INFORMATION REPORT WITH THE ABOVE HEADING AND NUMBERED
[Redacted] WAS ISSUED ON 24 JANUARY 1983. THE FOLLOWING
SHOULD BE ADDED AS PARAGRAPH 3:

"3. [Redacted] IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT
THE INSURGENTS INTENDED TO EMBARK ON THEIR JANUARY MILITARY CAMPAIGN
TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE OCHOA PROBLEM AS OCHOA'S REACTION TO
GENERAL GARCIA'S ORDER OCCURRED ON 6 JANUARY AND CAME AS A SURPRISE
TO MOST SALVADORANS. ON THE OTHER HAND, IN JANUARY THE INSURGENTS
INITIATED MILITARY OPERATIONS IN MORAZAN, CHALATENANGO AND
SAN SALVADOR DEPARTMENTS, WHICH ARE STILL IN PROGRESS.)"

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