

Part IV:
The State Stratum-of-Being

Chapter 10: The State as Stratum-of-Being

For life is inseparable from the will to live, and the only form of life is the present.¹

Hegel's view of the oriental State summarized European preconceptions:

The oriental nations are characterized, according to these (Hegel's) fragments, by their complete subordination to external necessity, coupled with a total disregard for immediate reality in their cultural life. Further, oriental society is static, stagnant and unchanging. The subservience to external necessity makes despotism and tyranny into the main ingredients of the oriental political system: "Lordship and slavery: both conditions are equally justified here, since both are ruled by the same law of force. He is considered a happy man in the Orient who has the courage to subjugate him who is weaker."

S. Avineri, Hegel's Theory of the Modern State, 8.

Characterizing Asian States as static has been rejected in the twentieth century. But "subordination to external necessity" does capture an elemental source of motivation central in Anthrocentric Security Theory (AST).^{*} The complementarity and tension between individual Will-to-Life and harsh necessity of eking a living persuaded Mongols to unite behind Genghis Khan and mitigate their subordination to severe nature and to surrounding States and tribes. Only by forging a stronger State out of plural tribes could they accomplish self-lifting out of want's mire. The State requires a sovereign, and Genghis Khan emerged as the heroic despot to lead

^{*} "According to an old Oriental concept, man contains on a small scale everything that can be found in the cosmos. He is himself a microcosmos. Therefore the Oriental does not, like the European, approach nature as a person different from it. Unlike the European-who therefore historically pounced on him like a beast of prey-the Oriental does not feel called to dominate nature spiritually and technically. Thus all culture ultimately depends on the concept of man. In Far Eastern paintings man seems, to our admiration, to feel like a plant growing in the landscape, like an integrating tone within the great melody of the universe." Landmann, 112.

them out of precipitous marginality. He had only war, warriors and clans for this enterprise, and brilliantly assembled them into a Mongol army-State.

Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* declares that "the state reaches its fullest actualization as an ethical community, not simply as an instrument of power."² The savagery and unbridled deployment of force seems to belie this proposition for the Mongols, but in fact describes the re-orientation of random violence within life-community, into an outward direction. While hardly recognizable as an "ethical" improvement, it nonetheless marked a vital step out of savagery when Genghis Khan decreed that Mongol should not kill Mongol. While not a full-blown ethical system, it was a start insofar as the State intervened in issuing a life security imperative – although one having no benefit for non-Mongols.

Redirecting individual allegiance from family, clan and tribe to the State has been a major task of State-builders and engineers of the human soul – those who perceive human affection and loyalty as a limited resource which must be appropriated for collective purposes. Families possess a high degree of genetic uniformity while State-structures vary from democratic to despotic*. Aspirations for improving and extending State-reach have occupied philosophical minds, while families carry out functions of reproduction, nurturing and aggrandizement. Feudalism resulted when family solidarity transformed into political domination by dynasties and hereditary aristocracies in mostly agricultural settings.

* Albeit with less regard for bloodline except in aristocracy and monarchy.

Clans have been the basis of State formation in much of Asia. A few outstanding men in every era of social change have seized opportunity to reconstitute a new organization consisting of men and women alienated or rejected by their originating clan society, to form the core of a new State – one that could compromise or dissolve clan solidarity for the benefit of the new trans-tribal nation. This brought men with clan-nurtured virtues of honor, intelligence and courage into a new political and military setting. Clan values of loyalty and collective coordination were not negated but re-oriented to the new State. Hayek's distinction between spontaneous and organized action suggests that in status societies, rules of hierarchy and obligation are intrinsic and cannot be changed by contractual agreement alone. A burden of past precedent, reinforced by religious sanctions, influence actions and obligations. In contrast, more organized societies based on contract and constitution refer individual actions to explicit and human-amendable laws, enforced by civil authority. All societies evolved and maintained kinship/status structures and their durability permeates modern States in the non-West.

Human evolution through life-community to the State

Habits and customs emerged out of continuous patterned behavior – efficient actions to facilitate survival and stability. But as humans became more numerous, disputes occurred and without common and enforced rules for conflict resolution, force of arms determined outcomes, with those more skilled in fighting and more numerous having a decided advantage. Domestication of animals and planting crops provided a steady source of food, skins and fibers, but organized predation and defenses required diversion of productive resources. Human labor worked to extract life's

necessities and warred to retain them or take from others, with every individual's fate to lose all claims at the end of life. Nothing changed end of life's inevitability, but human progress has consisted of steps to make Being more sustainable for more persons and to postpone the inexorable.

A higher ethical stage of human evolution occurred when humans consciously pooled some of their material and affective resources, either voluntarily or coercively, into organized and hierarchical structures for more efficient production and war. This evolution saw greater complexity, increased numbers, efficient production and improved warmaking technique (actions) and technology (tools, weapons, devices). Kinship built life-community which became a necessary platform for State construction.* As a form of human organization, the State is broader in its reach over territory, people and resources than any single clan or tribe, and it is a higher level of complexity –introducing a unified appeal to divine or supernatural authority[†] and a rational division of labor, with bureaucracy and warrior categories to regulate affairs and protect (as well as expand) the reach of State agents. One glaring weakness is that it requires belief in the credibility of those who claim to wield its force – credibility that originates in damaging or eliminating those who oppose its hegemony.[‡]

* "Thus for the first time man's power to create culture is revealed and man is recognized and celebrated as the creative center. He is the one who can establish a norm (*nomos*)." Landmann, 48.

[†] Possibly a prerequisite to human morality.

[‡] Roman persecution of early Christians testified to the desire for absolute hegemony in law and belief.

Evolution of State from life-community

With an established State, obedience to laws becomes habitual, or enforced by coercion. Its benefits may be considered greater than costs, as cities become possible where dense populations are able to live side-by-side in trust and commerce. Laws to reinforce order are obeyed out of acceptance to sustain public order and fear of punishment. Mature States mete out justice and replace jurisdiction of families, clans and tribes by specialized jurists who have one eye on the Will of the sovereign and another on laws that maintain social order.

The functions of government are to maintain its powers, to stabilize society by reducing conflict, to protect territory and Subjects against domestic and foreign enemies, and to encourage economic activity which enhances prosperity of the State's constituents. When a steady-condition of the State has been achieved, we apply the name "civil society" to the resultant association supposedly replacing earlier life-communities. The modern State, whose evolution was largely the product of developments in post-medieval Europe, has been identified with institutions producing order through coercion and law. In this, it conforms to the natural family pattern. The dynastic or family-centered State has been the dominant pattern through most of history. The Hegelian tendency to conceptualize the State as a unitary actor reduces and obscures understanding it as a network of persons who become rulers and Subjects.³

Confucian clannism

In the East Asian State, Confucianism supported clan values that could be extracted and employed as guiding principles for

civilized society. In addition those same principles informed an ethical system based on social hierarchy, not legal equality. The status ladder of Confucian ideal society was an aristocracy of achievement, not birth or ascription. A reinforcing hierarchy existed within the family. Modes of behavior were ascribed according to sex and status – father, mother and children had their prescribed norms for behavior and deference, with family as the school for larger community and society – a system we can describe as “ethical familism.”* From a Western liberal standpoint, clans and clannism are obstacles to democracy, equality and social progress. They submerge individual identity into lineage which may be mythical and impose “gender roles” incompatible with values of sexual equality. Clannism dictates an authoritarian paternalism unsuited to the fluidity and self-interest demanded by modern meritocracy and social mobility. A clannist pattern of society (SB₂) inhibits formation of justice institutions based on equality before the law and condemns its members to mental servitude that limits intellectual horizons. Despite merit-based reforms and recruitment of non-Mongols into administration, Mongol society and State remained divided into two classes: the nobility or “White Bone” and commoners or “Black Bone.”⁴ On the other hand, a State based on clannism (but not tribalism), allowed reversal to a functioning life-community when government dissolved in anarchy or war or conquest. Subsequently, and usually upon resolution of Chinese

* "Chinese clannism developed over centuries in the absence of an effective legal system and it was reinforced by neo-Confucian principles under which a well-ordered patriarchal family was viewed as the foundation of a well-ordered State. While modernization under communism reduced the functional significance of family lineage, the core ideals of the clan and its principles of Status are still influential." Weiner 81.

dynastic wars, a new clannist emperor came to the throne and inaugurated attempts to restore former glory of past dynasties.

Custom, habit, necessity and effectiveness govern behavior of persons in life-community. Clan and tribe, via family, ritual and material interdependence, impose patterns of cooperation intended to engender loyalty and trust and most importantly to prolong members' lives. For natural communities to surrender implicit sovereignty to an entity which overtly erodes their autonomy, their leaders had to be offered a stake in the new order of State sovereignty, or suffer humbling subordination. For the Mongols, State order incorporated life-community strengths and yet had to nullify the characteristic parochialism creating walls of suspicion and hostility between tribes. Elsewhere, inter-tribal marriage, war, trade, religion and linguistic merging existed prior to the State and facilitated integration but did not precipitate States until permanent urban settlements formed. Agriculture gave sedentary humanity predictable sources of food and a surplus which could be stored, exchanged, and confiscated as tax.

Nomad life on the Mongol plateau remained fluid and migratory, and possessed qualities of a weak life-community. Low population density and non-sedentary production nullified movement to urbanism. Property and trade existed in livestock. Inter-tribal warfare was common, and arranged marriages reinforced human relations. Religious piety was shaped by shamanism which had no particular doctrine or theology. Food largely came from game or herd – a movable yet highly rationed feast. How this unlikely people coalesced into a powerful State and how that State's violent emergence was fashioned on an imperative

to prolong Mongol life and welfare is the subject of these remaining chapters.

Three categories of State Subject/citizens derived from Will

The working assumption of Anthrocentric Security Theory is that the State, in whose service millions have died in defense, emerged as humanity's most effective institution for enlarging life security. For individuals, it became a third Stratum-of-Being (SB₃), with mankind's majority experiencing only marginal participation and benefit., Humans carry on their affairs energized largely by individual Will-to-Live and Will-to-Freedom. A few, those with the elusive Will-to-Power, not only participate, but seek to maximize control over a State by any means. A middle group, characterized by self-conscious Will-to-Freedom, are Subjects who recognize the utility of the State, but lack background, skills and motivation to enter the inner circle of State governance. This middle group forms a link between the State and life-community and is vital to the State's success, while providing a barrier between the State's inner circle and their ambition to extend control.*

A State is not a tangible entity and yet orients human behavior in the modern era with secular intensity nearly equal to traditional religion.† It has no material substance and exists only as a pattern of

* Those persons characterized by strong Will-to-Freedom and weak Will-to-Power have been adults in the Subject category of the State. True republics consist of a citizenry who are given formalistic and periodic access to power. Modern democracies demonstrate that the Will-to-Power is more widespread than earlier believed. As barriers to political participation diminish, the costs and requirements for entry into the third Stratum-of-Being are lowered – a phenomenon creating the fourth Stratum-of-Being – civil society.

† "After he has unmasked God as a mere projection, Feuerbach strives to transfer back to man the qualities that had been lent to God. Since all statements about God from the first were statements about man, one needs only to discover the true meaning of these statements by reversing them and interchanging subject and predicate. If

power distribution in the minds of men and the institutions which Will-to-Power factions have constructed. Ernst Cassirer interpreted Machiavelli's State idea as a myth.⁵ The effects of State pattern cannot be denied, even as senses and science cannot validate its existence. As a category of AST, constructed States define Stratum-of-Being with norms and instruments distinct from life-community. States induce wars, make laws, issue currency and draw boundaries to separate territory and populations.

Mongol human life security prior to the State

The State can never be more than enforced illusion. Its central feature is an association of empowered individuals performing State-assigned roles within a government entity. It began historically under a single sovereign and later extended to include the legal fiction of a "sovereign people." It "exists" in history, constitution and laws, but remains alien to the five senses, persisting only in the minds of Subjects who have experienced or anticipate actions by legitimate agents empowered by the State idea. The State as a supreme source of norms (conforming to or in conflict with organized religion) bestows a degree of order on action and mobilizes human and material resources for the sake of prolonged survival, sometimes initiating destructive wars, genocides and auto-genocides* in the name of State preservation or transformation.

Christianity says, 'God suffers for others,' then the true transposition is: 'Suffering for others is divine.' In this manner, step by step, God is deprived of existence and his entire richness is heaped upon man. Theology, which always was only anthropology in disguise, dissolves into a manifest anthropology." Landmann, 88-89.

* Genocide is the term used to indicate a State or society policy of killing an identifiable race, religion or ethnicity. Auto-genocide differs in that extermination occurs across all groups by the State in its governed society, as was the case of the Communist killings in Cambodia (1975-1979).

The State has proven to be an enforced illusion in that men will ignore “it” at their risk, after its presence has been implanted in the minds of Subjects. Law and constitution may have written form, but their power lay in a consensus that violation of their tenets will have adverse consequences. Written law gave rise to the modern lawyer syndrome – knowing the letter of the law enables Subjects or citizens to adjust behavior to increase liberty within legal wording, or more simply, finding loopholes in the law. Chinese Legalists circumvented this evasion of State power by prohibiting publication or discussion of laws. Since familiarity with laws of the Qin empire was restricted to a select few, the masses lived in fear that random action might entail severe punishment and so complied with State commands. When laws cannot be discussed, despotism will arise. When laws can be debated openly, compromise is necessary and effectiveness may be diluted after promulgation.

The State shapes consciousness

Subjects habituate to civil society and take on attributes of citizens; old habits and loyalties are erased. Aldous Huxley ‘s vision in the *Brave New World* extrapolated trends he saw in the Soviet Union and other advanced industrial societies. George Orwell ‘s *1984* dictum, “He who controls the past controls the future. He who controls the present controls the past,” was an observation on the modern State’s determination to re-contour its myths of origins and sources of power. State domination of education, law and media shapes perceptions and obscures collective memory, leading to creation of a New Man who, shaped by priorities of progress and reason, will conform to modes of behavior sanctioned and encouraged by a socio-political order that goes beyond the voluntarism of civil society. The Soviet State manifested these

qualities in a relatively short time, while democratic states appear to follow the same direction of State hegemony in smaller steps – a phenomenon which can be tentatively described as post-civil society.

Krader described how local and kinship groups form associations and societies, and these furnish the foundation for States.

Societies are formed on the basis of principles of kinship and territorial neighborhood. Members associate within societies for specific purposes: to preserve the civil order; to express common interests or achieve common goals; to establish or maintain religious cults and orders. Membership in associations is based neither on kinship nor on common residence—members may live here and there in the society, or even internationally. Maciver defined associations as organizations in a society composed of members joined for a common end and the State as the most permanent and comprehensive of associations. The State, according to Maciver, is an authoritative association, exclusive in membership in the sense that one can be an active citizen of no more than one State; it is a central institution of government whose purpose is to maintain and develop the rights and obligations of a community.⁶

He indicated how Genghis Khan bridged life-community and State despite their apparent contradictions.

The Tatar (i. e. Mongol) polity was an amalgam of local community practices and institutions characteristic of particularistic societies and practices of statecraft characteristic of universalistic rule. Chingis Khan governed in part by universal decrees and edicts which affected everyone equally within his empire; in part by making exceptions,* allowing for the personal status of this man or that. It is true that modern states also exhibit this amalgam; they attempt to cover the role of personal bonds and loyalties by subterfuges of various kinds. When these are laid bare, then scandal and shame ensue. Chingis Khan, on the other hand, felt no contradiction between the two systems of rule and was at home in both the particular law of the clan and kin community and the universal law of the State; yet the contradiction was there, even though it was not yet perceived. The practices and institutions of kin community first inhibited the growth of the Tatar State and then survived it. The modern State, in theory, seeks to overcome the personal bond. However, such a bond was deeply implanted in the Tatar State.⁷

AST avers that the mutually reinforcing purpose of State and life-community to strengthen life security neutralizes a destructive

* Genghis Khan distributed rewards, including the exclusion of a man from punishments for nine future crimes – a blanket immunity with welcomed loopholes from Mongol law.

contradiction. Genghis Khan did not seek to destroy clans and tribes in a manner akin to Stalin's or Mao Zedong's liquidation of bourgeoisie and wealthy peasants. Rather, he modified clan and tribe by mixing unit assignments and shifting loyalty orientation to new army units and sovereign Khan. In the transformation of Mongol life-community into State, a level of existence was added to their human condition. This cannot be considered a "process" in the way water becomes steam – that is, merely a change of form. Mortal-souled men are not transformed from persons into Subjects by introduction of the State. Most retain individuality (SB₁) and personhood (SB₂) and accept the additional layer of existence (SB₃) required by the State.* The transition from "headless" (acephalous) to "monocephalous" life-community requires reorientation of fundamental loyalty and is the gateway to State-formation. The acceptance of one person's Will-to-Power as framing that level of existence requires voluntary actions for the sake of enhancing life security. Acceptance of a sovereign who will make life and death decisions for subordinates demands confidence and trust that the ruler will at least consult life-preservation interests of those who have surrendered some of their natural liberty in exchange for more freedom (from raw necessity). Life-community rests upon habit and the natural liberty from explicit law (as commands). Formation of a State proceeds from existing life-community, creates new Security Action Platforms (SAP), and imposes a human layer of control consisting of aggregated individual Wills-to-Power whose possessors impose laws and coordinate actions more complex than

* In its power-concentrating form, the State ignites the normally dormant Will-to-Power in a restricted circle of men, who choose to serve or oppose the new Leviathan.

possible in life-community. The payoff for Subjects is greater life security.

Headless or not - Surrendering freedom for security

The most dangerous struggles for Genghis Khan were inter-tribal before 1206. The danger was that his defeat would entail end of life (EOL) by violence – it was a time of “win or die.”* Other chieftains wanted to retain their power and resisted unification under a single strong leader. They were opposed by Temüjin and his warriors who envisioned better and longer lives under a victorious general. Chieftains had enjoyed a limited version of tribal sovereignty in life-community. Kingship represents a State’s higher stage. Why would men surrender some of their liberty for more security? The God of Israel’s argument against monarchy is in the *Book of Samuel*:

The elders of Israel gathered together and came to Samuel. But when they said, “Give us a king to lead us,” the Lord to the people said, “This is what the king who will reign over you will claim as his rights: He will take your sons and make them serve with his chariots and horses and they will run in front of his chariots.

12 Some he will assign to be commanders of thousands and commanders of fifties and others to plow his ground and reap his harvest and still others to make weapons of war and equipment for his chariots.

13 He will take your daughters to be perfumers and cooks and bakers.

14 He will take the best of your fields and vineyards and olive groves and give them to his attendants.

15 He will take a tenth of your grain and of your vintage and give it to his officials and attendants.

16 Your male and female servants and the best of your cattle and donkeys he will take for his own use.

17 He will take a tenth of your flocks and you yourselves will become his slaves.

* In the initial campaign against the Merkit, if Genghis Khan had not responded by forming the Triple Alliance, his vulnerability to itinerant raids would have ended him. Complete defeat by Jamuqa in later battles would have entailed his execution. His attack against the Tatars (jointly with Toghrul) can be regarded as a full offensive campaign that was characteristic of his later State.

18 When that day comes, you will cry out for relief from the king you have chosen, but the Lord will not answer you in that day."⁸

If kingship brought calamity to a collection of tribes, the absence of strong leadership was no unmitigated blessing. Tacitus described ancient Germanic life as vital and free, but having a critical constitutional flaw in radical decentralization. While chiefs and other important men nominally led the tribes, major decisions were made in common by all male members gathered together under a new or full moon. At these warrior assemblies, when a tribal chief spoke he did so "more because he has influence to persuade than because he has power to command." If his counsel displeased the group, the men "reject [it] with murmurs," and if they approved, they "brandish their spears." Even the tribes' military generals, wrote Tacitus, led "more by example than by authority."⁹ Their watered-down form of leadership and discipline contributed to defeat at the swords and shields of the Roman juggernaut. Liberty and military power are not always complementary.*

Foundations of the Mongol State -On the Will-to-Power and the State

Genghis Khan did not initially seek unitary sovereignty. His first and earliest priority was preserving his mortal life, second was to secure and enhance his family's safety, and third was to extend the fruits of war and peace to his personal and tribal supporters. Wealth and power were byproducts of his ambition to survive in the toxic web of steppe politics and war. His life security priority was

* Soviet "Order No. 1 authorized 'committees of representatives elected from the lower ranks' to adjudicate relations between soldiers and their officers, effectively terminating formal discipline in the army." Kotkin, S. (2014). *Stalin*. New York: Penguin Books, 181.

augmented by the second and third priorities. Individual autonomy was established in his early trials of capture and escape, fed by his Will-to-Life and fear of death. He decisively established practical sovereignty over his family by killing Bekter, while acknowledging formal maternal authority of Ho'elün. Her empty authority was demonstrated when Temüjin and Qasar took the sable coat, given to her by the mother of Börte, to be a vassalage-cementing gift to Toghrul.

Only when reminded of mortality did Genghis Khan consider the need to arrange for his succession. Constructed sovereignty, as personal attribute and political concept, was new (but not unknown) to the Mongols. Normally, passing the throne to the eldest son was practiced, but this produced a fierce dispute among his other sons. Second son Ca'adai called eldest Jochi a bastard, owing to his birth soon after Börte's liberation from the Merkit. Despite objections from both parents that Jochi was the legitimate son of Genghis, a compromise was reached and the third son, Ögedei, was named heir – the prospect of protracted conflict overruled custom. The sovereignty created by Genghis Khan was considered family property, but without further conquests, third and fourth generations of sons would find their realms ever diminishing, like the divided and subdivided duchies of Kievan Russia. For the sons and grandsons of Genghis Khan, Eurasia was their limitless acreage, awaiting seizure and apportioning, regardless of present owners and occupiers. With sparse populations, the early Mongols did not need more *lebensraum*, while thirteenth century successes bred unlimited ambition.

Practice of sovereignty began as self-protection

The practice of concentrated sovereignty began as self-protection for Genghis Khan. Appointment of bodyguards, quiver carriers and stewards created a cadre of protectors, as well as a network of men to be observed and groomed for higher office. Since appointment to headquarters staff was drawn from sons of military commanders, they were also hostages to the loyal behavior of their fathers. For the Mongol dynasty created by Genghis, sovereignty was a careful construction, and not the inevitable convergence of law and State power into a philosophical unity. Expansion of Mongol power into adjacent regions created new requirements and solutions for law and order.

The biography of Genghis Khan demonstrates how the trinity of Wills existed in a single person and how their strict sequence of appearance ($SB_1 \rightarrow SB_2 \rightarrow SB_3$) suggested a similar hierarchy of frequency in humans. There was originality in how Genghis adapted patterns of Mongol social existence and modified them to serve the Mongol State. He was builder and liberator as well as destroyer, and it could be said that he destroyed in order to build anew and free his people from harsh necessity. His army pillaged tribes and cities to ameliorate their own poverty, as well as destroying means of livelihood to terrorize and postpone their potential for revenge. They exterminated threatening tribes to avenge past injuries and prevent future recurrence. He liberated men and women from constant insecurity by bringing them under a banner of common defense by repeated military offensive and sharing loot from the campaigns. At the same time he built a militarized State with himself at its head, created a meritocratic and specialized government and established a dynasty which conquered

and ruled much of Eurasia through the thirteenth century. Genghis Khan was neither altruist nor bloodthirsty tyrant, but a consistent leader of men who fought to survive. He attracted a coterie of loyal warriors and created a mobile State based on mutual interest. While the Mongol State was a child of unique time and place, the value of examining it is the search for universal characteristics of the human condition which are summarized in AST and demonstrated in the life-narrative of Genghis Khan.

On the Will-to-Power

Nietzsche* supercharged Schopenhauer's idea of Will-to-Life† and remade it into the Will-to-Power as foundation of "Being" and "Becoming":

All Being is for Nietzsche a Becoming. Such Becoming, however, has the character of action and the activity of willing. But in its essence will is will to power. That expression names what Nietzsche thinks when he asks the guiding question of philosophy.¹⁰

But in this way he minimized what his philosophical predecessor had apotheosized and what his contemporary, Karl Marx had failed to notice – the Will-to-Freedom from want underlies human labor and striving, and disguises itself as appetite.‡ By

* "As man is a super-ape, so he in turn is 'something that must be overcome' by the superman, who constitutes the extension of the road already covered into the future and to yet higher things. Man's species is not constant; he is 'something fluid and malleable-one can make whatever one wants out of him.' Just as every being till now brought forth a higher being, man should do the same. 'Like an embryo of the man of the future,' he is 'not a goal, but only a way, an incident, a bridge, a great promise.' However, what becomes of him is, in only his case, no longer a matter of nature: he must be his own breeder." Landmann, 166-167.

† "For Schopenhauer, the will produces the intellect as something substantially heterogeneous, but as its servant." Landmann, 136.

‡ "As soon as man is made the true object of the national economy, which has never yet happened, the revolutionary demand for the abolition of private ownership of the means of production, along with the resulting alienation of labor and man's domination over man, follows logically. Only then is class society changed into

driving political evolution from ancient Greeks to Bismarckian Germany, the Will-to-Power motivated a number of ambitious men, who would rule over *Untermenschen*. This Will is more frugally distributed than the universal Will-to-Life. Similar to species' evolution, it insures that the strongest will survive and reproduce. Human evolution has emphasized cooperation and mutual dependence, therefore an entire (hypothetical) species of man characterized by universal Will-to-Power would result in mutually assured destruction over the clash of ambitions. As it is unevenly distributed among mankind and variable in intensity, it exists in shades and nuances. Democracy, since ancient Athens, gives greater play to the Will-to-Power than in oligarchy, monarchy or aristocracy, wherein order and stability reign supreme over men who must comply or face severe penalties.

The Will-to-Power is motivation to dominate one's human environment. It is neither merely spontaneous whim nor a rarefied occurrence within mortal souls. Its roots are found in the Will-to-Life as natural man molds the material around him to make tools and weapons and shelter to protect himself and family. He subordinated kin in ways to enhance his continuous existence, domesticated animals to serve his needs, and searched voiceless nature for nutrients and minerals. Women, generally weaker when handicapped by pregnancy, were forced to submit to male domination, and exchanged autonomy for protection. Children were born with no natural independence and gradually acquired the skills to exist without parents, but accepted subservience in

human society. Man emerges from prehistory and his real history begins; indeed, as Engels agreed, he leaves the animal kingdom once and for all by overcoming the natural 'struggle for individual existence.'" Landmann, 67.

recognition that even a meagre accumulation of useful things and habitation was preferable to starting life with nothing. Slavery existed in pre-historic bands, as prisoners or abandoned orphans were useful as herders, servants, or other manual laborers. More expendable than kin in primitive circumstances, they were subject to their masters' purposes.*

The distinction between superior and inferior was based on cumulative experience of efficacious exploitation of human labor and subordination of those victimized by birth, war or abandonment. The distinction's utility was too great not to import into more complex life-community, and it nourished a universal acceptance of inequality as organizing principle. It has been further buttressed by the growing occurrence of Will-to-Power – a Will, dependent upon the Will-to-Freedom, itself a product of the Will-to-Life.†

The serf or slave farmed and submitted much or all of the harvest to the master, or guarded a flock from predators. Subordination of man by man habituated, then institutionalized, as feudalism and slavery, germinating the Will-to-Power, whose seeds are contained in the husk of the Will-to-Freedom. Slaves who experienced manumission became slave owners or even slave

* The theme of division between predator and prey was raised early in the *Secret History*. The prodigal Bodoncar recognized the need for leadership and saw a raiding opportunity offered when a group lacked it. For Bodoncar, human or natural equality was, if not an absurd conception, then a condition of vulnerability. Unity was better for mutual security than separateness, but humans need an alpha leader who will plan, inspire and guide the band or nation to security and success.

† "Schopenhauer has already proclaimed that the dominant force in us is not intellect but will. But Schopenhauer seems not yet to have had the courage of his own conviction. He decides to let us be not only capable of but even called to knowledge; indeed, supported by knowledge, we ought to kill the will." Landmann, 132.

traders themselves, illustrating acceptance of bifurcated humanity as normal. It has always the potential to expand exponentially under propitious conditions. As Napoleon proclaimed, “In every soldier’s knapsack is a marshal’s baton” – every soldier or citizen has a seedling Will-to-Power which can be transformed into leadership within the sheltering parameters of an army or State.

In sum, the Will-to-Power stood on the shoulders of the Will-to-Freedom, whose feet rested on Will-to-Life. Genghis Khan’s state-building achievement was to destroy those whose Will-to-Power conflicted with his own, and to channel the remainder into serving his Will. He subordinated the Mongol nation to his sovereignty and built an army by discovering among his warriors who could best wield the “marshal’s baton” in his service. A central purpose of establishing his extensive personal bodyguard, in addition to protecting his “golden life”, was to observe and judge potential generals and officers.

The Secret History as chronicle of State-building

The *Secret History of the Mongols* was a handbook of conquest for State and empire rulers after Genghis Khan. During formation of Mongol hegemony dependent on life continuity of the Khan, his early termination might have aborted emergence of a unified nation. Historical speculation cannot prove that another leader could have replaced him. One subtext of the *Secret History* is that Mongol and Genghis Khan fates were inextricably fused. The challenge for his successors was to institutionalize a permanent khanship that (1) incorporated the bonds of family and clan, (2) transformed the weak rule of tribal khanship into monarchical sovereignty, and (3) maintained the military momentum that had been generated.

Genghis Khan, his generals, his warriors and their women had engendered a juggernaut's momentum whose hesitation would refund their enemies losses and guarantee vengeance. Insofar as the *Secret History* identified the Mongol route to power, Ögedei and his successors tended to follow the script written on the high plateau, and adapted to circumstances as necessary and prudent.

When a new dynasty came to power in China, official historians collaborated to write a history of the previous ruling house. The purpose was not only to chronicle events and personalities of the past, but to identify deeds and character which had given the previous dynasty its Mandate of Heaven (*tianming* 天命) at the start and whose violation removed it at the end. An implicit didactic purpose motivated Chinese historiography. Since the *Secret History* was written after the beginning of the Mongol empire and before its full flourishing in conquest of China, Persia and Russia, it does not fall into the category of dynastic history – except for its didactic subtext. The moral lessons of State creation were retrospective in the sense its rise was attributable to identifiable virtues and actions. Its narrative traces the sources of the Mongol people, the biography of Genghis Khan and the events precipitating the Mongol State out of tribal society. As chronicle, it has gaps and myth, although much has been verified from other sources.

Written for the ruling family and not for the Mongol people, the *Secret History* has elements of historical epic – conspiracies, battles, captures and escapes, vendettas, failures and successes. The twelve chapters conclude at a turning point in Mongol history, when the sons of Genghis had to decide whether to stop expanding and consolidate their conquests, or to continue expansion and

follow the path opened by the father. To halt the course of conquest would have eventually ended in civil war among sons or grandsons and vengeance wars by defeated peoples who would ally with the undefeated enemies. Furthermore, conquest brought power, prestige and enormous pillage. With ambitious sons and grandsons eager for patrimony and wishing to emulate Genghis, respite from war was unlikely. These ambitions permeated the commanders and lower ranks of the army as well, where appetites had been whetted, ambitions stimulated and new needs discovered. The wars of unification were followed by wars of imperial ambition. Genghis Khan had assembled an army and a code to carry them to nearly all corners of inhabited Eurasia.

Less obvious in the *Secret History* was how it outlined the structure of the Mongol State, its genesis, principles and staffing. That State, destined to grow into empire, had a few antecedents* and was constructed by men tempered in war who were mostly products of life-communities which barely provided necessities for extended survival and where the luxuries of distant cities were vague rumors. The components of the Mongol State, as described in the *History*, were recognizable from customs and practices of clans and tribes. These State components can be divided into two categories – the familiar and the innovative.

1. Familiar aspects were derived from practices of life-community and included
 - Centrality of family,

* The Uighur State for example.

- Alliances through marriage,
- Obliteration of opponents,
- Hierarchy based on birth,
- Retention of slavery,
- Suspicion of cities and agriculture, and
- Warfare and martial skills as the final arbiter of dispute and ownership.

2. Innovative characteristics of the new Mongol State were

- Rigid centralization of pillaged goods and persons,
- Major increase in personal security of the sovereign Khan,
- Transformation of conquered territory into appanages to be assigned to family, generals and retainers,
- Assimilation of foreign experts into administration and army, and
- Promulgation of laws (*Yasa*)

Reading the *Secret History* as State constitutional document reveals key points of its structure. From the opening words to the birth of Temüjin comprises a preamble – defining Mongol origins, the proliferation and identity of the constituent clans and their initial territory. Other constitutional principles were implied:

- Family was projected as the inner unit of life-community and the basis of dynasty. Trust and competence were

proven by evidence, and then assumed unless disproved by experience.

- Women were core of the family's interior life. Their realm of action was the ger and its environment, with the chief wife serving as caretaker of the children, secondary wives, servants, hearth and larder. A wife might be a wise counsellor and companion, or a burden, but was hoped to be indispensable as a trusted source of positive Security Action Monads (SAM).
- Hierarchy determined the basic structure of life-community and was imported into the State. This was modified by recognition of merit allowing promotion and reward for the purpose of motivating individuals to exceed normal performance. Equality was identified as a source of weakness and at best, a brittle foundation of order.
- Horses and herds were key sources of growth and wealth, with war as an activity suited to their acquisition.
- Mobility, not settlement in cities, was the wellspring of Mongol existence and power. Cities produced wealth and people, and were static hunting grounds for warriors of the steppe.
- Trust and loyalty were core virtues of the Mongol State and were validated by SAM behavior. Disloyalty disqualified a man from reliance or service. A new ethos, expressed by the *Yasa*, was that Mongols must not kill

their own kind, but war allowed inflicting EOL on enemy without penalty.

What is a constitution?

Modern constitutions since the late eighteenth century have had an underlying philosophy based on liberal-democratic ideas to delineate powers of the State. Democratic and democratic-façade constitutions included specification of rights and duties of citizens, as well as prescription and design of government. As the stipulated “basic law”, it usually contains methods of amendment. In rudimentary terms, the *Secret History* directs a glance at these characteristics, though implicit and lacking ideological underpinnings. In place of legally stipulated rights and duties, it contains stories telling of actions and their outcomes. While not claiming to define cause and effect, events identified actions which affected life security of one or several actors. The narratives tell how order was achieved among the Mongol people, but rarely prescribe how that order was to be maintained after the passing of Genghis Khan.

Modern constitutions benefit from the past experience of States and they project lessons into an anticipated future by prescribing a matrix within which government power is concentrated or divided. As a medieval constitutional document, the *Secret History* can be characterized as mild didacticism lurking in historical description, describing rather than explicitly prescribing institutions of government. By refraining from prescription, narrative history left open formulation of whatever novel institutions might be necessary as the State-empire expanded across two contiguous continents. Thus Khubilai Khan could rule China as founder of a new Yuan

dynasty, the Golden Horde ruled Russia as foreign occupation force and the Ilkhan converted to Persian Islam and ruled as semi-caliph. The wisdom of Genghis's children in adapting to local State practice, however, eventually led to their assimilation and absorption of their descendants.

The simple, nomadic life of the Mongol clans and tribes had not been brought into the fold of Islam, as had several of their western neighbors. Nestorian Christianity had converted Toghrul, but in general, major religions were weak in affecting supernatural or moral outlook. Ethics tended to be organic – neither explicit nor centralized. If a constitution is basic law which establishes government and a framework for a legal system, it leaves morals* to religion and philosophy. Where religion is embodied in a constitution, as in the modern Islamic Republic of Iran, sacred and secular sanctions are fused.† When the late Ottoman empire created a constitution, Islamic theocracy decried secularization of the State which they thought should remain subject to religion.¹¹ Ancient

* "Man does not have an intrinsic being that remains immutably the same, while history unrolls only in the outer regions. Even for spontaneous actions apparently independent of history, such as loving and praying, we have no guidelines valid once and for all as to how we should perform them: down to our deepest interior we are committed to a fate of historical mutability." Landmann, 225.

† "The 'Islamic Constitutions Index' ranking reveals the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran to be the 'most Islamic' followed by Saudi Arabia and the Maldives. Pakistan's Constitution of 1973 comes in fourth place followed by Somalia, Yemen, Bahrain and Iraq. Beyond the ranking, the interpretation of the results reveals that not all countries with Muslim majority populations have Islamic constitutions. Notable among these are the Central Asian Republics of Azerbaijan and Kyrgyz Republic as well as Mali, all of whom have majority Muslim populations but secular constitutions. There is a geographic basis to this, for countries in the Middle East and North Africa with active movements for the imposition of Sharia have consequently Islamic constitutions while most Central Asian Republics without such movements have secular constitutions." <http://www.constitutionnet.org/news/islam-and-constitution>.

Israel and medieval European kingdoms also relied on a single religion to bind Subjects under their monarchies.

The Mongol State required more than suppression of tribal violence to persist beyond the lives of founding father and sons. The major channel of the sacred was shamanism, but had little utility as a basis of the State. There was no ready-made ethical code to be imported from outside to pacify the Tayici'ut and other tribes. Unlike the pagan tribes of Russia or France or Germany who converted to Christianity, gave up rituals and customs of their forefathers, submitted to priests and popes and accepted the philosophical heritage of Greece and material legacy of Rome (or Byzantium in the case of Russia) into their identity, the Mongols lacked their propinquity and saw no advantage to joining Christendom, when offered by Carpini and other envoys from Rome. Neither Islam nor Buddhism made inroads into the Mongol State until post-Genghis times.

Secret History stories as moral parables

Prior to 1206, Mongol warriors and chieftains had allegiance no higher than clan and tribe. Even this was tentative and as the career of Temüjin demonstrated, the Mongol equivalent of the Japanese *ronin* (roving samurai) might attach himself to a strong leader of another birth-group. The compiler (or compilers) of the *Secret History* extracted moral lessons via story and elaborated speeches extolling ethical principles in the mouths of various actors. Bodoncar's comment to his elder brother that his drinking group had no leader and thus was vulnerable to a raid, implied that equality of men made them weak. Ho'elün's diatribe to Temüjin after he killed Bekter warned men not to act as animals. Temüjin's

reward and appreciation of loyal service and punishment of men who were disloyal, elevated fidelity to the highest virtue of Subject behavior.

The *Secret History* conveys the central imperative to preserve one's life – kill or be killed. Temüjin was judged wrong to kill his half-brother Bekter. That he was not a natural-born killer was evident when he refrained from total destruction of the Merkit after reuniting with Börte. Jamuqa was unfit to rule because he took excessive pleasure in killing and could not restrain his anger. In terms of AST, EOL SAMs are not initiated except to protect (and extend) life security of self and other trusted individuals. Jamuqa's cruelty was unbridled anger, in contrast to Temüjin, who usually matched punishment to purpose. By expanding this principle to his Subjects, war was blessed as a legitimate and paramount activity.

If self-preservation and conditions for killing were the not-so-hidden precept of the *Secret History*, the second mandate was to protect the Khan. Nothing or nobody must be spared to prolong the life of the sovereign ruler – the core life in the Mongol State. The Mongols were a marginal people made strong by arduous fighting, unblessed by fruited plain and led by a determined Khan, who managed his family with discipline and parsimony, chose commanders based on merit and suffered no humiliation without vengeance. Life security of Mongols was increased with conquest of richer enemies through confiscation of horses, women and wealth and elimination of cities and kingdoms which were threats or had insulted them. Revenge in repayment for humiliation was justification for attack and conquest among Genghis's successors, as the founder had used it to be a powerful motivation for war.

Justice and Law in the Mongol State

Appeals to justice as rationale of the State have been framed since the time of Plato and establishment of law is a response to that appeal. States take rule-making and rule-enforcement away from clans and tribes, and incorporate those functions into its validation of concentrated coercion, accomplishing the triple effects of weakening life-communities, disguising personal dictatorship and tightening grip on Subjects. Nursed grievances smouldered and erupted to disturb order. Their elimination was possible by retribution and could be affected by a heavy thumb on Lady Justice's scale. Among the Mongols, wrestling matches were a form of trial, similar to trial by ordeal in other societies, with the winner "justified."

Justice for Subjects can be the central and primary purpose of a State, and is sought by establishing a legal system, with means of adjudication and enforcement. The State builds its sovereignty by prohibiting vendettas and vigilantism and other private or collective remedies to injury. China had early developed laws suited to agrarian society, and the Mongols later created laws adapted to nomadic pastoralism. Administration of law remained simple under Genghis Khan, and sons and grandsons further refined the rule of law.

Among the Mongols, the state power had its origin in the power of the clan chief, and the Great Mongol Empire was organized on clan principles. But the state unification of the Mongols, built on clan principles, was not stable and clan relations served continuously as an obstacle to the creation of a strong state.¹²

The dilemma of the Mongol State was that its strength was based on clan solidarity and their efficacy in generating SAMs for members' survival. At best the State could re-orient those actions in

a common direction but could not arrogate all SAM responsibility to a sovereign entity. The result was a self-limiting sovereignty balanced against clannist structure.

But in general the State tends to move in the direction of universalistic rule, tending to make every law theoretically applicable to one and all. The Tatar polity, its principles of organization founded on genealogy and personal identity based on genealogy, could not achieve impersonality and impartiality. But it did move in the direction of increasing rights for all, increasing women's rights and obligations correspondingly and increasing the rights of strangers under the law of hospitality.¹³

Nonetheless, the motley collection of tribes, clans and clan federations was transformed into a semi-cellular State with the Khan having sovereign power over life and death. The clan leaders declared "their unity under the Khan and ritually acknowledged the mandate which the Khan now possessed to govern over them."¹⁴ Consciously or not, European philosophers of the Enlightenment may have described creation of man's first social contract as an event roughly similar to the 1206 Quriltai at the source of the Onan River.

Moses and Halkovic¹⁵ see rivalry of four or five major Turkic groups toward statehood that produced wars during Temüjin's youth. On the periphery of the conflicts, he learned what was useful and how wars could be won or lost. According to Krader, the Khan became supreme in the State by centralizing coercive force as the State developed. This perspective recognizes that Mongol State formation was a process dependent upon concentration of military power under a single sovereign and completed when other contenders were defeated or absorbed. Genghis's rise to power is generally seen as a personal journey and not a usurpation since the Mongol State had not existed until he had obtained the assent of the tribal assembly. While clan and shamanism continued to guide post-Genghis imperial government, inclusion of foreign experts, advisors,

ministers and soldiers weakened life-community as a new State-logic permeated institutions. Power evolved first as superior force and then out of consensus:

Chingis Khan proceeded through two stages in the establishment of his power. In the first he gathered his personal following, though his authority was not yet firm. In the second he sent messages to all the nomads and assembled them to witness, participate in and support his election as Mongol Khan. By their assembly they expressed their consent.¹⁶

The Asian State –How different from European State?

Before examining how the State created an arena in which new SAPs could further enlarge life security, it is useful to consider how, in the broadest terms, the Asian State differed from the Euro-American version – a version which produced a novel form of civil society currently projected as the ideal towards which all States must evolve.* From an Euro-American perspective, the modern nation-State has become omnipresent and a powerful re-arranger of lives:

From the hour of birth to the hour of death our life is beset with innumerable forces which obstruct or protect its course and often determine its fate. Some of these forces are wholly outside our control-certain natural forces, for example. Others, on the contrary, are the result of circumstances created by ourselves or by others, sometimes intentionally, sometimes not. The most numerous of these circumstances-circumstances which at any time may require our doing certain things or prevent us from doing others -the most stringent, the most frequently experienced, are those which are commonly associated with the notion of a mysterious but omnipresent entity, of an indefinite but at the same time imperious and irresistible power: the notion of the State.¹⁷

* "...it is the claim that the Western State form is an inescapable universal: it was either imposed from outside through colonization or appropriated intact in recognition of its inherent superiority. Every latecomer polity recognizes this, fashions itself according to the now universal principles of territoriality, unified sovereignty, institutional hierarchy and centralization, monopoly and control of violence, presents itself in this form to the international community and does its best to make domestic circumstances match the claims of the nation-State format." Boyd, *State Making in Asia*, 2.

The twentieth century saw the State's refinement, amplification and global spread as a human construct accompanying material and longevity benefits eventually spreading to all corners – unequally but effectively. As the earth was mapped with natural and artificial boundaries, lands, waters, and space have been allocated to particular States or international bodies created by States. But States are neither equal nor similar nor humanity's endgame.

it is no longer accepted that the modern State, as configured and understood in the West, is the ultimate and final destination of modern political development; with respect to the second, it is equally doubted that a reading of the Western State can provide a proximate and adequate description of the states of the rest of the world.¹⁸

The European State template is now global, but the contents of each modern State varies with time and place. Japan was the first Asian society to adapt to that template and imitate the industrializing, colonizing and conquering capacities of nineteenth century Western Europe, but outsized ambitions were defeated in war. Modern Asian polities face each other as rivals, allies or dependencies, seeking to reconcile long traditions of State-building with contemporary responsibilities to their populations and the global political environment.

State making has been commonplace in many parts of Asia quite independently of, or, in the case of China and Japan, even prior to the processes of State formation in Europe. The historical circumstances of many Asian nations were far removed from those in Europe at their State-making apogee. We can add to this that the emergence of Asian states has been attended by long traditions of indigenous writing and theorizing. Some of these traditions, as in China, were untouched and untroubled by Western conceptions and practices; others, notably in Japan, filtered, interpreted, accommodated, confronted and even improved upon Western conceptions.¹⁹

Finally, State organization cannot be unilaterally imposed on society. Attitudes must be changed. Plutarch described how the lawgiver of Sparta, Lycurgus, persuaded lyric poet Thales to first go there and civilize his future Subjects. Every society that became a

State required attitude transformation. Old clan and tribal habits and orientations needed modification. The Spartan lawgiver realized he would not accomplish State creation without those changes.*

The very songs which he (Thales) composed were exhortations to obedience and concord and the very measure and cadence of the verse, conveying impressions of order and tranquillity, had so great an influence on the minds of the listeners, that they were insensibly softened and civilised, insomuch that they renounced their private feuds and animosities and were reunited in a common admiration of virtue. So that it may truly be said that Thales prepared the way for the discipline introduced by Lycurgus.²⁰

Conclusion

The State is not merely a formal organization consisting of offices, laws and institutions. It must conform to needs and expectations of a population, and the governors must convince them of their competence. Subjects of the State may become aware that they are increasing their freedom from want at the expense of liberty from coercion. Creating and supporting a new sovereign who will hobble part of their Free Will also exchanges tribal warfare for a form more disciplined and effective. The State advances life security by diffusing benefits among Subjects, although most benefits accrue to the rulers and their supporters. More direct support is demanded from Subjects than persons in life-community, in return for additional State-created SAPs. As Genghis Khan spearheaded this transformation and was accepted as sovereign monarch, he oversaw the shifting of the Mongols into a new Stratum-of-Being. Heretofore non-existing SAPs will be elaborated in following chapters - Political Obligation [O_S], Political Economy [E_S], Political Knowledge

* Rousseau was an iconoclast who attacked the outcomes of old habits and prepared the minds of men to accept a new fount of trust and action – the mass democratic State.

[K_S], Coercive Institutions[M_S], Political Concord Variable [C_S], and External Relations [E_S]. Without implementation of these, Mongol life security would have floundered in clan and tribal parochialism.

Chapter 11: Political Obligation and State Economy

Culture would not exist without man to fulfill it. But he would also be nothing without culture. Each has an inseparable function for the other. Any attempt to separate these two intermeshing parts from this unity must necessarily be artificial.
Landmann, 218-9.

Tenth Security Action Platform: Political Obligation [O_s] and Emergence of the State

Three Wills in each mortal soul vary with character, circumstance and urgency. State formation occurs when a few men having a robust Will-to-Power appear in the life-community theater of action, responding to opportunity and challenge. They achieve a degree of consensus and compliance through example, myth and force to give shape and content to a new Leviathan. It emerges as a set of behavior-inducing structures constructed to impose control by one group over parts of pre-existing life-communities. State rulers impose laws, extract resources to protect Subjects, territory and possessions. Consciousness of nationhood is durable when based on the array of purposeful behaviors embedded in a culture. Orientation of clan and tribe loyalty to State symbols is critical, requiring reduction of one for the benefit of the other. The French revolution sought to end feudal and church allegiances to favor deference to the State. Prussian absorption of multiple city-states led to creation of modern Germany, and Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) defeat of regional warlords was necessary before Chinese unification was accomplished. "*E pluribus unum*" inserted "United" in the USA. One goal of the people's commune system in Mao Zedong's Great Leap Forward was to weaken traditional family solidarity which had been the core of dynasties and society. Every

ambitious State is constantly in a low-level war against features of life-community which inhibit sovereignty.* Laws and regulations are justified as supplementing life security inputs already in place and as improvement over parochial scope of individuals in primary groups. Political obligation to the State and its commands reduce inter-personal and inter-group violence by providing neutral adjudication of disputes and outlawing use of force by non-State actors. A Mongol State could not appear without supplanting or diminishing the very life-communities which had enabled survival of Mongol persons.

Locating political obligation in the State

Social obligation was a duty from birth, owed to kin, friends and specified persons. Confirmed by custom, names, interaction, crisis and ritual, it entailed loyalty even to ultimate self-sacrifice. In the monarchical State, disloyalty became treason. Political obligation has resemblance to social obligation, but is dispersed among a much wider constituency and claims priority over loyalty to tribe, kin, friends and self. Political obligation is impersonal and addressed to symbols as well as rulers, who are the chief beneficiaries. Obligation specifies duty, and is the basis of legal contract, enforced by life-community and States. In theory, it is impersonal but in practice depends upon a range of personal factors of both parties. Social obligation is highly personal and subjectively implemented by affection, debt, threats, habit, custom, and norms. Political obligation tends to be codified, impersonal, and enforced by the

* More usually it erodes its rivals by establishing a layer of obligations enforceable by law. These include tax payment, military service, licensing of business, oversight of families and universal education.

State through law, punishment and judiciary. Both forms operate more effectively when all parties have common orientation, reinforced by common religion, economy, territory and blood. They also have greater efficacy when voluntary more than coerced. The more intense expression of this common orientation is loyalty. Social loyalty is strongly embedded in considerations of consanguine or fictive kinship proximity, while political loyalty inheres in and derives from external symbols and internalized aspirations and ambitions while justified as deference to an abstract common good.

Enumerating Political Obligation SAMs

The origin and core of personal loyalty was predicated on the filial piety of child to parents. When Bo'orcu joined Temüjin to recover his eight geldings, he left too hastily to tell his parents – a clear violation of parental respect. Upon return, his father blessed the act and implored Temüjin to accept his son's services. Other parents also offered their sons to serve Temüjin. In the Mongol view, a filial son made a loyal soldier. Loyalty was not merely verbal oath but had to be proven in action. Kinship was given some priority, but was not the *sine qua non* of reliability. The example of releasing a son from primary parental loyalty into a semi-filial, semi-fraternal relationship with a leader illustrated the portability and adaptability of loyalty – a virtue nurtured in natural man's nuclear family and applicable to relations in life-community and State after appropriate adjustments. Sigi Qutuqu,²² born a Tatar and Genghis Khan's sixth adopted son, resented that he was passed over in the distribution of rewards.* After nominating ninety-five commanders over units of a

* He was appointed chief judge and in charge of written records, and was probably author/compiler of the *Secret History*. See Rachewiltz xxxvii.

thousand, Genghis went on to reward those he considered most deserving. Genghis recognized his merit, and gave him great civil powers to enforce laws.*

The quintessence of loyal service was to protect the life of Genghis Khan in his journey of close scrapes. Toghrul adopted Genghis who could be a successor to tribal leadership. After the defeat of Jamuqa, this relationship could have evolved into a duumvirate of Toghrul and Genghis. This aroused great envy in natural son Senggüm, who turned father against the rival, and hatched a plan to assassinate the presumptive Khan. It was a critical turning point in transformation of tribal society to Mongol State, since successful dispatch of Genghis might have driven the clans and tribes back into anarchy. Mönglik 's advice not only saved Genghis's life but prevented virtual decapitation of the nascent State. In this passage, the ever-loyal Mönglik recounts previous Kereyit hostility and advises life-saving caution to Temüjin.

Father Mönglik said, "When we requested Ca'ur Beki, those same *people* despised us and would not provide her. How is it that now, on the contrary, they invite you to dine at the betrothal feast? Why do people who think themselves *so* important invite you, and contradicting themselves, *now* say, "We shall provide her"? Are they right? Are they correct? Son, you must proceed with caution. Let us send a *message* giving as an excuse that it is spring, our herds are lean, and we must fatten our horses *first*.²³

Genghis learned early that knowing whom to trust or suspect was vital to self-preservation. Personal experience was part of that learning, and so accepted wise counsel. Senggüm plotted to seize Genghis and his party at the feast where he promised to give his sister to Genghis's son. He planned to catch his guests off guard at

* But he preferred allotment of land and people over office as providing wealth and power to him and his lineage.

the betrothal celebration where good cheer prevailed. Such events often required passage to or through hostile territory.* Taking a contingent of guards to the banquet would insult the hosts and proclaim distrust at an event ostensibly meant to build up harmony. Food, drink and conviviality were reliable eroders of suspicion and guarantors of vulnerability. Genghis was understandably dubious about Senggüm's invitation, considering he had recently gone back on an earlier promise. While spending the night at Mönglik's tent, he discussed the scenario and decided the risk was too high, even with his party of ten men, who were no match for Senggüm's forces. Genghis rescinded his acceptance of the invitation and promised to return in the spring. This told Senggüm that his plot had been discovered, and so he decided to attack Temüjin, putting aside his wedding subterfuge.

The incident illustrates several points. First, Genghis was anxious to preserve his alliance with Toghrul and sought to cement it with marriage between kin. Second, he knew of Senggüm's jealousy. Toghrul had adopted Temüjin as a son, and Senggüm saw this as loss or at least serious diminishment of his tribal birthright. Third, Genghis surmised the character of the son from the dishonesty of the parent. Toghrul had vacillated in his support, had a history of family treachery, and had demonstrated unseemly greed for material accoutrements (golden tent, black sable coat, monopolizing pillage). The "acorn does not fall far from the tree" is universal wisdom, even where acorns do not grow.

* Temüjin's great-grandfather Qabul was captured and killed by the Jin while taking his daughter to a betrothal. Ciledü lost Ho'elün while taking her to the Merkit camp, and Yisügei lost his life on returning from betrothing his son to Börte.

Temüjin decided to move before Senggüm could assemble an army to attack him, marched three days, then fought for three days and nights. Surprised while feasting, Toghrul escaped with his son under the protection of Qadaq Ba'atur, and the remaining Kereyit surrendered. Qadaq Ba'atur continued to be loyal to Toghrul and fought to protect him until he capitulated. He was spared by Genghis, but was ordered to serve the orphan children of dead warrior Quyildar. The arrangement was extolled as the wise justice of Genghis. He recognized the constancy of Qadaq Ba'atur and spared him but condemned him to lifetime servitude.

Genghis expressed his appreciation to Father Mönqlik, father of Teb-Tengri, recounting how he saved him from the wedding feast ambush. He bestowed on him the honor of occupying a seat in his tent as reward.

Cinggis Qa'an then addressed Father Mönqlik and said "You fortunate and blessed man, Who at birth were born together with me, When growing, grew up together with me, how many times have you helped and protected me. Among those was the occasion when Father Toghrul and sworn friend Senggüm deceitfully invited me to the betrothal feast and on the way I spent the night in Father Mönqlik's tent. Had you, Father Mönqlik, not dissuaded me then, I would have gone right Into whirling waters, Into a blazing fire.²⁴

1. Stratum-of-Being	(Nascent) State (prior to its formation)= SB ₃
2. Security Action Platform	Political obligation (as loyalty) [O _s]
3. Initiator (subject) + predicate + target (object)	Mönglik (advice)+ saved + Genghis Khan from ambush.
4. Intended consequence	Avoid assassination plot.
5. Unintended consequence	Downfall of Toghrul – proof of his enmity and falseness.
6. Resources used	Escape plan formulated.
7. Actual effect on life-length of object	Avoided Genghis entrapment and probable death.
8. Positive or <i>negative</i> for subject	Loyalty rewarded.
9. Positive or <i>negative</i> for Object	Mongol State project completed by eliminating last major domestic obstacle.

Table 19: Mönglik saved Genghis Khan from assassination.

The nuclear family was idealized as a template for relationships based on loyalty, but as Temüjin and Bekter demonstrated, kinship did not always bestow necessary dedication and commitment. Social obligation [O_L] was an active inter-personal bond in life-community expressed as loyalty. In its fundamental form, this loyalty required purposive actions to protect life of specified others. It became a required criterion of trust and membership in a group and was expressed as the highest virtue. The value of loyalty was that it added a voluntary increment of commitment by one person to preserve the life of another, with expectation of reciprocity. Genghis's goal of State-building was to preserve social loyalty as the primary bond among Mongols and to

re-direct that bond towards a State entity. He needed to create political loyalty and constant political obligation as dependable as counterparts in life-community. He accomplished this by building on those foundations. The solution was threefold:

- Extract, divert and direct part of every Mongol's Will-to-Live to protecting the Khan – as if his were their own life.
- Stimulate the Will-to-Freedom of every Mongol by promising human (slaves, wives, concubines), animal (horses, herds) and inanimate provisions deemed necessary for adequate life in return for loyalty.
- Consonant with Will-to-Power logic, Genghis's life security was not complete as long as others' Will-to-Power conflicted with his. As he pursued aggrandizement, he organized bodyguard to protect his life and an army to eliminate opposing tribes and States. He personalized the State, fusing protection of his life and that of the Mongol State.

Tension between life-community and State

Clan and tribal loyalty was nurtured from birth and generated organic solidarity in consanguine groups. A State-idea could emerge only by exceeding and reorienting social loyalties to a transcendent though imagined entity. Men had to be convinced that a State could offer protection greater than units of life-community could. Mimicking clans and tribes, the State conferred new identity with attendant obligations which could not be withdrawn or dissolved without accusations of treason. A State superseded life-community by directing consanguine loyalties to itself – a rerouting that

involved construction of a political layer of sovereignty, allegiance, obligation, administration and deployment (acquisition and distribution) of material goods. This political layer depended upon drawing on the strengths of life-community, and controlling clan and tribe components so they posed less threat to the State. State-building rested on a razor's edge between a totalitarian State dissolving key social units and life-community resisting any alteration of kinship potency.

Founders of States establish a mixture of voluntarism and coercion to produce dependable conformity. Stability of compliance is heightened when Subjects believe their personal interests are better served when acting in obedience to State commands than in adhering to the exclusive loyalties demanded by life-community. The challenge for the Mongol State was to channel the virtue of loyalty, as it had been cultivated and nourished within clans and tribes, into constructive and uniform obligation favoring State (*YJC* in Mongolian) over life-community. As fragmented Mongol society transformed to trans-tribal State, building a sovereign government with laws and army did not automatically establish loyalty to that State. It could only be created by translating social obligation intensity into political obligation [O_s]. In the Mongol case, this was accomplished by fusing personal loyalties and the State incarnated in the person of Genghis Khan. A cult of personality emerged where Subjects invested loyalty in, and emotionally identified with, a charismatic ruler who manifested Tengri's blessing. Transforming tribal loyalty into State obligation required that voluntary Security Action Monads (SAM) be turned into mandatory SAMs.

Overlap of religion and law

To bring order to tribal anarchy, Genghis Khan fought wars and made alliances. To rule with minimum dissent, his people needed a code of laws, so the *Yasa* was formulated as the distilled wisdom of the Khan – the “divinely inspired Son of Heaven.”²⁵ Law affects human behavior in many forms. A traditional distinction is between natural and positive law.* The first proceeds from Divine Will or nature and is beyond human creation or control. The second is human-created and prescribes or proscribes actions. Positive law was introduced in the Mongol State as *Yasa*, based on customary practices and taboos. Its life security relevance can be summarized in a single dictum: “Mongols will not kill other Mongols.” There were other stipulations, but its key impact was to remove the freedom with which tribal Mongols had treated fellow nationals as enemies. For the incipient Mongol State to survive and flourish it was not enough for subjects to comply passively to law and commands. Using Rousseau’s metaphor, Individual Will had to be directed and incorporated into a General Will, propelled by fear, self-interest and passion for whatever purposes the sovereign decided. The *Yasa* was an accretion of regulations and commands from Genghis Khan and his son Ögedei, dealing with civil, military and criminal matters and was more an afterthought to deal with emerging problems than it was formal legislation to define the State.

* A relationship analogous to that of morality (conforming to nature) and ethics (behaving according to socially constructed imperatives).

Ca'adai, second son of Genghis Khan, was appointed guardian of the *Yasa*.^{*} Descendants had to gather annually with the higher officers and confirm that no prince had violated it in the previous twelve months. Punishment for princes was deposition. Rules could be added by later Khans, but could not contradict the basic principles of the *Yasa* and could only apply locally. These were called *yarlyk*. One such was the exemption of the Russian orthodox church from taxation under the Golden Horde.²⁶ A section on religion set the Mongol policy of tolerance. Vernadsky wrote that a Supreme Court and the foundations of the highly useful messenger and post-horse service (*yam*) were created. "Taken together, all these reforms and enactments constituted the basis of the new Mongol imperial law, the Great Yasa of Chingis Khan."²⁷ "The basic laws of the Mongol Empire promulgated in 1206 were systematized and approved in written code, the Great Yasa."[†]

Religion and political loyalty

The symbols and practices of shamanism were incorporated into the Mongol State, but it remained unorganized. Tribal chieftains were occasionally shamans, and Mongol leaders appealed to Tengri to bless their battles and campaigns. Mongol tolerance facilitated assimilation of Muslims, Christians and Buddhists into the imperial army. Mongol pragmatism and small numbers restrained efforts to convert conquered peoples, and shamanism was not a proselytizing

^{*} No complete copy of the Great Yasa is known to have been preserved, although several Oriental writers of the 13th to 15th centuries testify that such copies existed. Vernadsky, 100.

[†] Vernadsky 37. A critical survey of *Yasa* existence is provided by David Morgan, "The 'Great Yasa of Genghis Khan' Revisited," in *Mongols, Turks, and Others : Eurasian Nomads and the Sedentary World*, ed. Reuven Amitai and Michal Biran (Leiden: Brill, 2005) 291-308.

belief system but more a set of superstitions relying on fear and self-interest to navigate life's vicissitudes by appealing to a nether world of spirits. Mongol religion was an unorganized affair, with a paucity of pan-tribal symbols. In contrast to Christianity and Islam which blessed States and empires reinforced by religious legitimacy and hierarchy, Mongol religion was pantheistic in identification of Divine Will and nature. As such it offered no basis for philosophy or government principles or morality. Worship of Tengri and sacred places projected a homeland placed in the cosmos, with Mount Burqan Qaldun as pivot. During his lifetime, Tengri and shamanism predominated, with worship of the latter and a quasi-priesthood to minister spiritual needs in the old way. One shaman and his family became so powerful as to be a threat to the Khan.

Disloyalty and treason

Political obligation had positive and negative definitions.

A nation can survive its fools, and even the ambitious. But it cannot survive treason from within. An enemy at the gates is less formidable, for he is known and carries his banner openly. But the traitor moves amongst those within the gate freely, his sly whispers rustling through all the alleys, heard in the very halls of government itself. For the traitor appears not a traitor; he speaks in accents familiar to his victims, and he wears their face and their arguments, he appeals to the baseness that lies deep in the hearts of all men. He rots the soul of a nation, he works secretly and unknown in the night to undermine the pillars of the city, he infects the body politic so that it can no longer resist. A murderer is less to fear. — Marcus Tullius Cicero²⁸

Treason doth never prosper: what's the reason?
Why if it prosper, none dare call it treason.
John Harrington

The boundary between life-community and State is located by the difference between treachery and treason. Treachery and betrayal usually refer to breaking a personal oath or violating the expectation of continued personal loyalty, with the intention or effect of harming a once-trusting person or persons. Only when the State comes into being can we speak of treason – an allegation which

acknowledges existence of sovereignty. While “betrayal” represents breaking a personal trust, “treason” is a crime against an entire people in the State. Treason’s seriousness originates in the State’s fragility. Mature States enjoying benefits of civil society are less sensitive.

The Greeks recognized the State’s demand for complete loyalty, even above that demanded by religion and close kinship. King Creon sentenced Antigone to live burial in Sophocles’ drama, for she had disobeyed his command and performed prescribed burial rites for her brother, whom Creon branded a traitor and ordered to be abandoned and rot in the open. She petitioned for clemency, but Creon responded, “Disloyalty is fatal to the State.” Loyalty and its opposite occur both in life-community and the State, while treason is a severe violation of obligation to the State. Enlarging on Creon’s words, neither State nor society can exist without compliance, obedience, mutual trust and loyalty.

Warrior loyalty was a behavioral value that diminished individual freedom and was the highest virtue in the Mongol State.²⁹ With Genghis as axis of the State, sustained proximity to him required harmonization with his behavior and goals. The ideal of loyalty between equals intensified after suppression of the Merkits, as Temüjin early strengthened his *anda* relationship with Jamuqa. Loyalty between superior and inferior was dramatized in Temüjin’s vows to Toghrul, who reciprocated as lord and patron. In both cases, harmony was expressed in their joint military campaign against the tribe who had stolen Börte.

The final appearance of Jamuqa in the *History* was in complete defeat. He retained arrogance but had been deflated by rout.

Acknowledging Temüjin's mandate and advantages, he earlier realized he could not win. Temüjin invited him to share power, but Jamuqa declined – there could only be one leader. Temüjin did not accuse him of betrayal, despite childhood oaths of *anda* and death before perfidy. Personal disloyalty was eclipsed by the high stakes of khanship. By his defection from Jamuqa's camp after their victory over the Merkit, Temüjin was equally guilty of disloyalty, fed by ambition. Their quarrels, involving many deaths and destructive battles, were a function of two powerful Wills-to-Power, in which only one could survive. Mutual and open betrayal is not treasonous in life-community.*

Jamuqa declined to reconcile with Temüjin, proclaiming that there could never be permanent *anda* cooperation where State power was concerned – divided sovereignty and conflicting ambitions had brought about civil war and was settled by war. In the final battle and after a change-of-heart, Jamuqa told his allied Naiman tall tales about the fighting strength of Temüjin's generals and frightened them into disastrous retreat, acknowledging Temüjin's superiority and recognizing the correctness of surrender to him. During the fluidity of State formation, defections were common and betrayals violated life-community values, but did not rise to the level of treason. When Genghis had the assassins of Toghrul executed, it was for violation of loyalty, even though he was at war with his liege-lord and one-time ally.

* In their final dialogue neither accused the other of of disloyalty or treason. Both acknowledged the other's virtue and the tragedy of rivalry which could end only with one's victory and the other's utter defeat.

Before establishment of the State, Temüjin had little choice but to tolerate misbehavior and weak loyalty of allies. A man is known by his actions, not his oaths. Temüjin's relationship with Toghrul was more distant than with Jamuqa. While fraternal feeling between the two *anda* was broken by conflicting ambitions, Toghrul was secure as chief of the Kereyit after his installment by Yisügei. Although a formal vassal of Toghrul, Temüjin proved himself to be a more able leader and a potential threat to his nominal lord, despite protestations of deference. A final straw in the relationship occurred when Toghrul surreptitiously deserted the battlefield against the Naiman and left Temüjin to face them. Estimating that the foe was a spent force he also departed the field and set up camp in the Sa'ari Steppe. It became clear to Temüjin that Toghrul and his tribe were unreliable allies and might even join the enemy. Toghrul did not regard Temüjin as a rival, but rather as an ambitious vassal and useful ally. Considering his own son to be unequal to inheriting chieftainship of the Kereyit, he adopted Temüjin as son and planned to give his daughter to the son of Temüjin. As noted, the marriage was used as bait by Senggüm to ambush Temüjin.

Treason at the foundation of State formation

Treason was born as a heinous crime when the nation-State laid claim to all allegiance, above self, faith, kin and tribe. Benedict Arnold remains engraved on the American consciousness for switching sides and revealing the location of chains across the Hudson River (at West Point) to the British. For the Soviet Union, Trotsky, Bukharin and thousands of other old Bolsheviks were condemned to traitors' deaths in the Stalin purges. Wang Jingwei was the wartime quisling for the Japanese and Liu Shaoqi was Mao Zedong's treasonous antagonist according to show trials. Vidkus

Quisling was Norway's eponymous traitor in collaborating with Nazi Germany. By raising the State to moral entity, governments erase any middle ground – in matters of national survival every Subject is either patriot or traitor. An accusation of treason extends State power into new realms. In Nazi Germany, non-Aryan blood was de facto proof of less-than-loyal allegiance. The bloodletting of the French revolution's Reign of Terror was loosed on up to 40,000 suspected collaborators with forces of reaction.³⁰

State economy [E_s] as eleventh Security Action Platform

By uniting the Mongol tribes into a State-like organization, Genghis Khan performed a transformation similar to turning a “limited partnership” into a “corporation” – a hierarchical organization with specified offices and delegated authority to carry out functions for the purpose of defending and enriching the group and its dependents. The Mongol horizon had long consisted of actual and potential enemies, and Genghis Khan had little difficulty in finding *casus belli*. Several Central Asian tribes and States had injured or insulted the Mongols, and their wealth offered ample loot for the taking when defeated. Warriors had to be rewarded so a cycle of insult, attack, and pillage marked the course of war and expansion. Tribute and taxes allowed conquered peoples to return to normal trade and occupations, coerced into enriching their new lords. Advised by Chinese, Persian and other State-wise counselors, Mongol rulers oversaw and benefited from orderly trans-continental commerce via the Silk Road and its tributaries. This complemented but could not replace the maritime trade which prospered on the southern littoral of Asia. After *Pax Mongolica* collapsed, that littoral expanded into battleground and empire for Portugal,³¹ followed by Iberian exploration and penetration into the Western hemisphere.

With establishment of the Mongol empire, vast new market opportunities opened for all Eurasia. Paper currency supplemented coinage. Other elements of multinational mercantile activity were introduced and sponsored. War and pillage were replaced by an semi-administrative State to shear the productive populations as herders once harvested the wool from their sheep and goats. Before the Mongol State arrived, harsh environment and paucity of resources contributed to material scarcity in steppe life. Minimal trade and agriculture left the Mongols bereft of many possessions enjoyed by sedentary populations. Wars against other tribes brought some relief, but often at a cost of casualties. Agrarian settlements were more vulnerable, while large towns and cities less so, with armies, walls and moats for defense. Poverty could be alleviated by raid and pillage, but was irregular and dangerous. Armies and warriors had to be compensated. Their motivation was satisfaction of material need and elimination of bachelorhood's attendant deprivations. The material growth of the Mongol State was owed in large part to a successful predatory economy, but could not be maintained without regular and less violent material inputs.

Standardization under State economy

Pre-historic humans lacked thick protective body hair, and endured cold weather by hunting, killing and skinning animals, and assembling fur garments. As language developed, tools and trade possibilities expanded. Weights and measures evolved within communities and locales, but varied from one district to another. State-building fostered standardization of weights and measures to facilitate trade and tax collection. The first Emperor of Qin standardized the length of cart axles so that a common set of ruts would prevail on roads, to form a uniform track in wet weather. The

virtue of standardization is that it widens the scope of individual activities, and offers the possibility of interacting with more persons who share a common understanding of rules, material values and institutions. It also breaks down local barriers and creates extended markets and communities. Creating a common money has also attended the incorporation of political realms. Coinage of uniform weight and value, marked with appropriate symbols, has been a universal attribute of States. The Mongols adopted paper money as legal tender, in response to the continental trade of their empire. Under Ögedei, paper money was issued as a credit instrument and quickly advanced growth in trade. It had been used earlier in China, and quantity was carefully restricted.*

State, Political Economy and life security

Acquisition of needful things is accomplished in several ways. Natural man took what he needed from his physical surroundings. By hunting and gathering, or stealing, or when he had tools, he produced life-extending things. His actions were direct and without recompense. The person in life-community was less liable to confiscate belongings from other persons, and was aware that to acquire another's possession peacefully he had to offer compensation – either a good or a service or a promise of future payment. Where no clan or tribal connection occurred, barter or theft was used.

* The Mongols provided capital to back caravans as needed. Like the First Emperor of Qin, the son of Genghis Khan standardized weights and measures.

Expectation of reward drew men and women into the service of Genghis, and his reputation for generosity and dispensation of justice attracted many to his side. His victories were not guaranteed, and many of his warriors perished before efforts paid off. A herdsman who became warrior calculated that the risks in warfare were worth the reward and that steppe life was barely sustainable. War was a rational response to normal deficiency plus possession of war skills. The system of rewards and punishments gave predictability to the army-State and honed the steppe-riders into a formidable army. But if the Mongol army was possible only as long as wars were successful, it might be shattered at the first major defeat. Two preventive avenues were pursued. First, constant warfare fed the warrior horde with glory, booty and higher life security for them and their families. Second, military discipline tutored warriors in the ways of loyalty as prelude to political obligation. Obedience, endurance, skill, courage, improvisation, accountability and above all loyalty, were encouraged and rewarded. Under Genghis's leadership, action was purposive, rarely spontaneous and always sensitive that chaos and death were never far away.

Political order facilitates an economy of material production, trade, and prosperity by protection of property, risk-reduction, improving transportation/communication infrastructures, and minting and printing a common currency. A flourishing economy benefits the State by providing more resources for government and its agencies, improving the livelihoods of Subjects, deflecting ambitious individuals from dissent or sedition into trade and comfort, and binding social units into a common and interdependent matrix subordinate to claimed sovereignty of State.

The State's positive security contributions to an economy tend to be facilitation of positive tendencies and interruption of negative ones. Excessive State intervention through disproportionate regulation and taxation, corruption of institutions for private purpose, currency manipulation or failure to maintain infrastructure contributes adverse security inputs for Subjects and citizens. Using law and its enforcers to reduce autonomy of life-community is a perennial temptation for State rulers. Feudalism is the enemy of State amalgamation.

Mongol political economy dictated by army needs

Once Genghis commanded the unified Mongol tribes, he faced the pressing problem of maintaining a large army. Provisioning had been accomplished by plunder and confiscation during the tribal wars, with victories not only overcoming enemies but feeding his warriors with livestock and providing them with slaves and material booty. Demobilization was not a solution as it would dissolve the only source of State power and render the new super-tribe vulnerable to secession, revenge and incursion by surrounding tribes. He faced a choice of continued war or exposed peace (with predictable backsliding), and had no choice but to build on past successes. This meant maintaining, strengthening and deploying the army. The Mongol State had to grow or die.

A primary concern was to feed his people, and he ordered that distribution be equitable.

When you, the two stewards Onggür and Boro'ul, distribute food to the right and left sides, Do not let it fall short For those who stand or sit On the right side; Do not let it fall short For those who are placed in a row Or who are not - On the left side. If you two distribute the food in this way, my throat will not choke and my mind will be at rest. Now, Onggür and Boro'ul, ride off and distribute food to the multitude.³²

Supplying the army required dependable service. Genghis rewarded the steward Onggür by reuniting him with his brothers. He assigned him the responsibility of distributing food and assuring adequate portions. With his staff of a thousand,* Onggür acquired, prepared and distributed fare to the warrior army. Mongols were more carnivorous than vegetarian, and a constant supply of fresh meat was vital. Having lost his father to a poisoned meal, Genghis needed a trustworthy cook. Onggür was delegated to insure good and adequate food, and insure against spoilage and poisoning. For this purpose, he organized an effective network of hunters, herders, flocks, cooks, and purchasing agents to provide constant nourishment supply for the army. The system was a rudimentary political economy, adapted to the diet of nomadic Mongols and their army frequently on the move. Requisitions supported by and for the army replaced warriors' former hit-or-miss meals by hunting or raiding, and thus augmented food security. The sovereign's attention to nutrition assured quality and quantity greater than what was attainable alone or in life-community.

The army was the core template for the State, forming a command economy *par excellence*. The specified duties of the night guards included management of the females, food and utensils of the Khan's camp. On his direct order, these household matters were a vital concern since injury and death could come from innocuous sources. Pleasure and comfort were less an objective than maintaining mobility ("carts and camels"), communications

* The *History* uses "thousand(s)" as synonym for "many."

("standards and drums"), weapons (spears), and eating utensils ("bowls and vessels").*

By a series of measures, Genghis Khan guided formation of a State economy which adapted to its organic origins. Its first principle was mobility – a State "on the hoof", so to speak, could not be tied to farming or urban depots. Second, skills of fighting, herding and hunting influenced management of goods and people. The traditional hunt was both necessity and sport, demanding coordination, bowmanship and equestrian skills – an appropriate set incorporated in the State at war. Warriors motivated by material or chattel rewards and judged by courage were nurtured by the centralized control of pillage. Conquered peoples were culled into categories according to their usefulness or opposition to Mongol requirements. But managing the numerous tribes and later, non-Mongols, in the State enterprise required talents not cultivated in nomad life, nor could it subsist on pillage alone if it was to prosper.

The principle of reward for service was embedded as a privilege to be allocated by the sovereign. Horse herders Badai and Kisiliq informed Temüjin of Senggüm's plot against his life, enabling him to evade the conspiracy and destroy the Kereyit. He rewarded these humble men with Toghrul's golden tent and other privileges. Giving them manumission was an additional favor demonstrating his generosity and his right to dispose of property – both material and human. His exclusive right to give and take

* "The nightguards shall be in charge of the female attendants of the Palace, the sons of the household, the camel-keepers and the cowherds, and they shall take care of the tent-carts of the Palace. The nightguards shall take care of the standards and drums, and the spears arranged beneath them. The nightguards shall also take care of the bowls and vessels. The nightguards shall supervise Our drink and food." Rachewiltz 10:232.

people for State purposes was further illustrated when he decreed that his uncle Qorci could take thirty Tumat girls as prizes. When he went to collect his reward, the Tumat rebelled again, seizing Qorci.³³ The Khan dispatched a force and they submitted, allowing Mongol hostages to be freed.

Rewards for loyal service were substantial, and punishment for perfidy most severe. The thriving Tang'ut had promised to supply goods rather than fighters for the Mongols. When that support did not materialize, Genghis ordered their plunder, capture of their leader Asa Gambu, killing all warriors, and enslavement of remaining commoners. The Tang'ut had earlier protested their military weakness, so were not a difficult prey. Their ample material wealth and population provided motivation and payment to the Mongol warriors. Plunder justified by vengeance, earned by loyal service, and sanctioned by the sovereign was not considered to be theft in the eyes of the Mongols. Confiscation of goods and people seemed part of a divine plan, according to Genghis when he began the attack: "Eternal Heaven, you be the judge." Destruction of the Tang'uts removed an unreliable ally and gave the Mongols a harvest of plunder.

He captured Asa Gambu and plundered his people Who had tents of thin woollen cloth, Who had camels laden with goods, until they were blown to the winds like hearth-ashes. He then gave the following order: "Kill the valiant, the bold, the manly and the fine Tang'uts, and let the soldiers take for themselves as many of the common Tang'uts as they can lay hands on and capture."³⁴

Political economy characteristics and functions

In a rudimentary social economy, transactions consist of two parties, while political economy adds the State as a third. Multiple roles of the State open numerous opportunities for intervention:

- Protection of market neutrality in that buyers and sellers are on equal plane, with neither having unfair advantage or use coercion to conclude transactions; which is contradicted by
- Reduction of market neutrality by tipping transactions in favor of one party or itself as State agents intrude and impose external interests;
- Protection and restriction of markets through licensing, tariffs, and inspections of imports and exports;
- Provision and improvement of communications, including construction of roads and opening maritime or riverine trade routes,
- Pursuit, punishment and elimination of bandits and pirates who prey on traders;
- Issuing standard currency and establishing values of coinage and other instruments of exchange;
- Collection of taxes to pay for services, protection and government operations;
- Contract enforcement;
- Natural disaster prevention and relief;
- Arbiter of disputes;
- Quality oversight of goods;

- Sponsoring, encouraging and subsidizing innovation*;
- Owner and manager of surpluses to be distributed in times of scarcity; and
- Gaining economic intelligence about foreign States.

Activities of government can make a social economy more efficient in creating a political economy. Often, they generate momentum to intervene in further activities, or to impress economic actors into State service. A social economy augments life security of participating persons through more effective acquisition of survival necessities. The political (State) economy builds a layer of control over the social economy insofar as it augments already existing markets. The State may suffocate or stimulate those markets through policies and corruption. Through its coercive potential, the State might reduce irrationalities in markets and also subject them to policy purposes. In this undertaking, the State creates a new class of political actors to boost material surplus. This consists of administrators, counselors, strategists, tax collectors and workers who were nominally personal servants of the sovereign, formed the State core and were deployed to labor on behalf of a political economy dependent on, but ontologically separate from, the under-layer of social economy. Individuals comprising this new layer of State workers were required to be more loyal to the sovereign than to kin and acquaintances. Corruption is associated with failure to act on one's economic allegiance to the State and to seek private gain as an emolument of office power. The stratum of State workers does

*

not depend directly on the social economy for life security inputs, and enjoys a surplus confiscated from life-community for benefits to life-length.

Functions of a political economy

A State's primary justification is a claim to protection and enhancement of Subjects' life security, with equity a second goal. As the State pursues these objectives it exists symbiotically with life-community. When a State wavers or fails in its claimed efficacy in protecting population, its credibility and integrity are challenged. Inertia from accumulated success may carry it to reform or drag it into decline. In either case, cohesion of life-community and its attendant family, clan, and tribal bonds will be called upon to regenerate the life security resources required for continued survival of persons. Even a State-weakened life-community can carry out life security functions if it has not suffered major damage from the State or its failures. Once a State is established, its existence, decline and fall leave indelible memory and modified behavior among Subjects. A State creates a template for imposing organization on life-community, and once experienced, will not be easily erased, especially when that State had ruled large territories and extensive populations in the past. A positive, State-generated political economy:

- can improve life security above what is attainable in life-community;
- is a vital instrument reinforcing survival and flourishing of a State's coercive apparatus;
- requires credibility of the State's security inputs;

- can refine and improve the social economy;
- performs various functions ordinarily not possible in the social economy;
- depends upon the health of the social economy for sustenance of the State;
- is subject to regulation, enforcement, and improvement by the State;
- can fail or dissipate its successes through excessive ambition, greed, bad policy, inertia or sheer misfortune; and
- is affected by the social and political economies of other States.

Weatherford writes: “Living so far to the north, the Mongols were essentially out of range of the trade routes that later became known as the Silk Route...Yet enough trade goods filtered north to make the Mongols aware of the treasures that lay in the south.”³⁵ Once the Mongol State was consolidated, they turned attention to trade – with war a possibility if trade overtures were rebuffed. When a governor of a Khwarazm province executed several Muslim traders he suspected as spies in the service of the Mongols, the Mongols took this as *casus belli* and declared war.³⁶

The plunder economy of Mongol society made steppe survival more likely and nurtured martial skills which helped to insure successful military campaigns. Agrarian States often paid tribute to tribes to minimize raids and raised walls and armies for defense.

When Genghis Khan conquered adjoining States, he razed the walls, liquidated their armies, and drafted their craftsmen to exploit what might be useful under his new order. When successors defeated the knights of Germany and Eastern Europe, the spoils were disappointing, although prisoners with skills were spared the sword and conscripted into service. The victors made a deal with Italian merchants allowing them to sell prisoners as slaves in exchange for material goods. Thus expanded the profitable slave trade whereby Italian trading posts on the Black Sea received Slavs and sold them in the markets around the Mediterranean. Rather than rely on repeated raids to replenish the Mongol army-State, an extractive economy replaced the plunder economy. The tribute system was exchanged for extinguishment of old rulers and acceptance of the Khan as sovereign.

Those who obeyed the Khan's rule on spoils were rewarded, as such action acknowledged loyalty to him and his laws. When the campaign against Jungdu (modern Beijing) ended with victory, some of the booty was offered by the temporary governor to stewards, Onggür, Arqai and Sigi Qutuqu. The last refused the offer and reminded his colleagues that the city and all its wealth now belonged to Genghis Khan. When they met with him, Sigi Qutuqu reported that Onggür and Arqai had accepted the proffered gold, and he had not. Hearing this,

Cinggis Qa'an then mightily rebuked Onggür and Arqai. *As for Sigi Qutuqu, he greatly favoured him, saying, "You, Sigi Qutuqu, have been mindful of the great norm concerning one's obligations to the qan."* And he said, "You shall be
Eyes for me to see with,
Ears for me to hear with!"³⁷

Genghis used rewards as payment to his warriors and favored subordinates. He assigned whole tribes and peoples, along with

their possessions, to commanders as compensation. In turn, they would pay their soldiers with confiscated goods and prisoners fated to slavery.³⁸ After Ögedei completed the conquest of Altan Qan, he despoiled his possessions and established garrisons and resident commissioners throughout the land of former Jin. A victory in war on the eastern front allowed him to return home where he set up camp at Qara-qorum. From there he began reforms which regularized Mongol government, administration and the economy. Appointment of officials was based on merit, and because of extensive territory and a dearth of qualified officials, a pattern of employing non-Mongol administrators was followed.

The sovereign Genghis Khan allotted privilege and property as he deemed fit. Men who had helped him in the past were given privileges including the right to carry a quiver, drink ceremonial wine, keep whatever booty they took in battle, and retain what they killed in the mass hunt. Only the Khan could dispense these favors, and exemptions reinforced his personal majesty as the source of benefits.

After Ögedei became Khan, he proposed reforms for the distribution of food, drink and wealth. The military unit became the social and economic unit. Distribution of goods and food resembled primitive communism, and a rudimentary tax was imposed on sheep herders. He also proposed other elements of a centrally organized political economy. Mare-milkers, campmasters, storemen and grainkeepers were given their orders, and the Khan ordered wells to be dug, and walls built against wild animals. Ögedei inserted a simple tax system into the State to modify and regularize a largely predatory economy. He decreed that from "every flock would be given a two-year-old sheep's levy for Our soup. They shall

also provide one sheep out of every hundred sheep and give it to the poor and needy within the same unit.”³⁹ Campmasters, storemen and grainkeepers, well-diggers and messengers became a skeleton of administration, while warriors and generals were the muscle and sinews of the State. Less a command and more an act of aristocratic legislation, the measure was approved by the princes. At the State Stratum-of-Being (SB₃), his reforms consisted of a series of ancillary SAM.

1. Stratum-of-Being (SB)	State (SB ₃)
2. Security Action Platform	Political Economy [Es]
3. Initiator (subject) + predicate + target (object)	Ögedei + reforms + distribution of goods to poor and needy.
4. Intended consequence	Welfare of warriors and their families.
5. Unintended consequence	Consolidation of State control over livestock, communications (possibly an intended result, since political compassion is often a disguise for incompassionate preferences).
6. Resources used	Literate officials; compliant subjects.
7. Actual effect on life-length of object	More secure lives, less indigence.
8. Positive or <i>negative</i> for subject	Legal claims over taxation; relief from predation as major means of enrichment.
9. Positive or <i>negative</i> for Object	+Life security; <i>-Diminished private control over herds, reduction of private property.</i>

Table 20: Ögedei establishes forerunner of tax system.

The Khans imposed a system of regular taxation which became onerous with repeated imposts and tax farming in later years. With expansion of the tax burden on conquered peoples, the cash economy replaced grain and animals as payments. Later, paper currency supplemented or replaced metal coins, having greater convenience of transport and government ease of manipulation. Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai was Ögedei's chief minister who introduced fiscal reforms culminating in the 1236 tax system.⁴⁰

Predatory political economy of the Mongols

A great khan was not bathed in the mystery of majesty so crucial for the preservation of the "civilized" world. He was awarded respect, authority and even adulation because he delivered wealth and prosperity to his followers. He was admired for his generosity and for his martial skills. He was expected to lead his army, which in effect was his people and tribes, into battle and win for them riches. These were very real expectations and concrete rewards. The object of his martial adventures could of course be other tribes, but ideally and increasingly as the supratribes became larger, that object was the sedentary communities of the town and their rich urban centers, cities and caravans.⁴¹

There was little technological innovation, but rather prudent political-military management of existing human, animal and material resources, tempered by self-control and the requirement that subordinates combine their energy and goals into a single direction. Pillage was a means to alleviate poverty by aggression at direct victim expense. It was accompanied by destruction and injury of life and the means that sustained life – dwellings and cultivated fields. Killing or capturing humans also ruptured social fabric of a target people – loss of an adult male was major damage to the labor pool, and if head of household, to the survivability of the nuclear family. Survival also required diversion of resources from production to defense, perhaps in the hiring of mercenaries, or paying tribute.

Organizing the extractive economy SAM

Cities are synonymous with civilization - a word denoting creation of civil society. Civilization emerged with occupational specialization, high density habitation, tighter government control, more frequent face-to-face contacts, markets, and defensive fortifications. To maintain concentrations of people, reliable sources of food, water, and revenues are necessary. The Mongols declined to establish cities. Cities were associated with sedentary, i.e. unfreedom in the nomad, life. Rather than rely on an economy providing life resources dependent on others, they preferred an autarchic existence of herding and hunting. Mobility was a winning characteristic of the Mongol armies. As the empire expanded, there was need for a permanent settlement or city to serve as the capital of *Pax Mongolica*. Qara-qorum was built in central Mongolia and required great expenditure merely to keep it fed. The growing season was short, and it was at great distance from other urban centers. "At its peak, the city required five hundred cartloads of provisions daily for its survival, mostly of food, but also of textiles and tools. In its proper context, this was a massive undertaking."⁴² It remained an artificial city despite substantial efforts to make it more self-sustaining. Large rewards were bestowed on a man who grew a few radishes and another whose almond trees survived a winter. By the end of the thirteenth century, the Khan no longer resided in Qara-qorum* as the empire fragmented under descendants of Genghis Khan.

* I visited Karakorum while in Mongolia, saw a couple of artifacts, and the Erdene Zuu monastery constructed of materials salvaged from the medieval city. It was a scene that vividly brought Shelley's *Ozymandias* to mind:

"Look on my works, ye Mighty and despair!"

Nothing beside remains."

Communication as lubricant of the political economy

A State creates and depends upon the political economy through policy-driven actions to achieve desired outcomes. In comparison to life-community, the State provides a much broader network of communication, over a vaster area, involving many more people, and in a shorter time. The State relies on timely and accurate information to carry out its primary task of defending lives and livelihood of Subjects. Starting from Genghis Khan, the Mongols developed a courier service to relay messages and orders across Central Asia. The mounted courier service (*Yam*) was protected by military units, benefiting military and government communications. The routes sometimes became incubators of commerce and enterprise, energizing a new Silk Road and after the conquest of the Southern Song, linked Europe and China in trade and diffusion of ideas, technology, and knowledge.

Conclusion

Humanity's quest for sufficiency and then abundance has met with considerable success, but wealth is not shared equally. The majority of people in the world remain poor while progress and economic development promise amelioration of deprivation. This economic quest for more things and benefits, however, disguises a root cause for this search – there is huge life security advantage to wealth, in its adequacy to meet life's needs. Having material abundance provides some assurance that end of life (EOL) will not occur from paucity or absence of necessities.*

* A mansion, as signifier of wealth, presumably serves a more mundane life security purpose. Roof and walls protect from natural elements, its space allows for habitation of larger family, and its conveniences relieve

To Rousseau and Hegel, poverty was an inevitable consequence of property. Wittfogel's citation of weak property as a characteristic of oriental despotism made the case that private wealth was a weak barrier to State aggrandizement, and ownership was too insecure to support a Lockean growth of liberty against the State. In the case of Mongol history, a stronger State enabled it to take an increasing share of wealth in the form of plunder or taxes. Unlike Western Europe where there existed a stronger notion of private property reinforced by law, the combination of plunder economy, strong State, and Genghis's early centralization of spoils collection and distribution obstructed emergence of private property as defense of individual autonomy or liberty.

The wealth sought by consumers may be refined, expensive and decorative, but it is also the top layer of several material strata laid down over centuries by unsung ancestors to improve life security, hurled by habitual inertia favoring acquisition over disbursement. Aristocratic characters in nineteenth century Russian novels who lost fortunes in wild gambles knew or cared little for the suffering and labor others had expended in accumulating undeserved and profligate surplus for the gentry. While thirteenth century Mongols did not represent the starting point in humanity's quest for material protection against premature EOL, their survival condition prior to unification was primitively fragile – vulnerable to natural and human vicissitudes. Refinement of a rudimentary social economy into political economy in a single generation was largely due to the precedent established by Genghis Khan in establishing

inhabitants from back-breaking and brain-numbing labor. Compared to the Mongolian ger, a modern mansion represents civilization-protecting effectiveness at its best.

sovereign control over people, animals and things. Starting with determined claims over battle spoils, he and his successors extended the State economy to include persons, families, livestock, grazing rights, and much of the wealth confiscated in war. It was a political economy based not so much on production and property (except animal husbandry), but on what the army might capture and divert to itself and their families.

With a centralized political economy, the Mongols restructured the conquered economies. Men of commerce were useful because they enjoyed Mongol-approved mobility, and were sources of information about cities and kingdoms along their trading routes. The Mongols were eager to learn about the world over the horizon and over the next mountain range. Traders were valuable in gathering intelligence about potential conquests. Most important was that commerce produced wealth. As the Mongol empire grew after Genghis died, trade became a major source of income by selling goods from one region to another. Silk was long a vital commodity, and the conquest of China by Khubilai Khan was motivated by the ambition to control its production and sale. Re-establishing the Silk Road within the confines of the empire was a major factor in creating the fabled wealth described by Marco Polo.⁴³

Chapter 12: Political Knowledge; Army, War and Institutions of Protection and Coercion

Twelfth Security Action Platform: Political knowledge

Political knowledge appears in human consciousness as adjunct to the Will-to-Power – a Will which fuels acquisition of information to feed and protect itself.* It asks, who are loyal friends and deadly enemies? How to insure resources I need to survive? Who profits if I succeed or fail, live or die? Mistakes may be as likely as accurate estimations, and loyal men who depend upon that Will must take risk of life and fortune when proceeding in their chosen arena. In a perfectly ordered State, the Will-to-Powerist may act in ways bordering on or trespassing into ethical and moral violation, but rationalizing when necessary that his acts are for a higher good, or “ends justify the means.” Supporters join the enterprise out of power ambitions, idealism, or vicarious indulgence. Since it is impossible for a leader to merge his mortal soul with those of his supporters, there is always the possibility that one or several will seek to usurp his paramountcy.†

* “..by creating the general patterns of culture, he decides at every point of history about the pattern of his own existence. Each individual too must on a lesser scale again and again, and not only in the narrow ethical sense, decide originally about himself.” Landmann, 144.

† The Qin Legalists argued that the sovereign must not disclose his aims, and should allow his ministers act as if they understood what was necessary. Those who failed could be demoted, and successful ministers rewarded. Giving overt and specific direction made the leader vulnerable to error and subject to criticism which eroded legitimacy and mystique.

All living things act to preserve unit existence, but only men have created additional levels of Being to prolong life. Humanity's third Stratum-of-Being (SB₃), the State, consists of complex and intertwined institutions fashioned for protection of a territory and defined population of rulers and Subjects. The cumulative actions which create and maintain the State are guided by memory of past deeds and their consequences as well as by calculation of future outcomes. The concentrated expression of coercive action, an armed force, is refined to maximize operational effectiveness. Sunzi, author of the *Art of War*, wrote that foreknowledge* of military strength, economy, religion, social structure, and topography were critical to State survival. "Knowledge of the enemy's dispositions can only be obtained from other men." The ruler of a State must depend on others to provide political knowledge of other States in order to plan and act in defense of his realm. In much of the ancient world up to the modern period, every State was constantly preparing for war, or defense against attackers. Walls, armies and weaponry required constant vigilance. At this point political knowledge parted from social knowledge, where national security became separate from personal security. Social knowledge is acquired by a person for enhancing his security; political knowledge addresses organizations, leadership and resources. This knowledge requires a higher level of abstraction and conceptualization, with a sophisticated mix of numbers, concepts and facts facilitating State rulers' plans, acquisitions and deployments of material and human resources. SB₃ requires a level of knowledge abstracted from experience and

* "Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is FOREKNOWLEDGE." <http://suntzusaid.com/artofwar> 13:4.

history.* Political knowledge necessarily relies on symbolic representations – maps, words, or even viewed vistas during battle or a monarch’s tour of the provinces.

A governing elite extracts precedents, lessons and priorities from political history to plan and implement policies. A long-term strategy to create, consolidate, maintain and expand the State is the foundation of political knowledge, and is restricted to a few leaders and counselors. The Mongol empire, transformed from tribal anarchy into a State, maintained hegemony through experience and memories of destructive military supremacy. Genghis’s descendants maintained order through practical application of political knowledge and judicious use of military force gained from the campaigns described in the *Secret History*. From 1206 to 1209, Genghis consolidated power by setting up laws, establishing a written language, creating central administration, and reorganizing the army.

Sources of political knowledge

In a society consisting of multiple life-communities where a State has not yet emerged, a body of experience, distilled as memory, forms a symbolic class of facts which can be applied to current

* Political knowledge addresses techniques and ideas needed to assemble elements of the State. It includes familiarity with the social economy, and how its elements can be integrated with the State in order to achieve a more efficient acquisition and distribution of human and material resources. It includes adaptation of best practices of other past or present States faced with similar problems. Political knowledge operates in an environment requiring risk and prudent judgment, evaluation of opportunities and limitations imposed by pre-existent life-community, and objective verdicts on the character, loyalty, strength and interests of key individuals who support or oppose the State and its rulers. Finally, political knowledge requires an appreciation and extensive acquaintance with military affairs, including the disposition of one’s own, allied, and opposing forces. In short, political knowledge is all knowledge relevant to State-building and State-maintenance. The more complex the State, the more that labor must be subdivided, with the sovereign responsible for having a sense of the whole.

problems. Every life-community has such a body of pre-political knowledge embedded in its culture as myth or history, and available as orientation to action. In this context, political action may be defined as any Security Action Monad (SAM)* which affects formation or viability of a State. Once the State is established, political action consists of SAMs initiated to preserve (positive) or dissolve (negative) that State. Since the primary purpose of a State is to enhance life security of the Subject population and reduce their vulnerability to premature end of life (EOL), the prospect of negative SAMs (external attack or internal dissolution) will mobilize those who acknowledge life dependency on that State. Expanding and deepening that perception is necessary for long-term survival, and so political knowledge becomes the basis of education, ritual, and law. Family, clan and tribe loyalties are intentionally diminished, and loyalty to the State fills their place. As the State concept may be too abstract for most, other formulations serve as operable substitutes. In the instance of the Mongols, they had common language and lifestyle, and were defined as those living in felt tents. This characterization assumed non-sedentary and non-agricultural subsistence, and the inferiority of agrarian and urban populations.

Political knowledge represents a higher level of generalization than social knowledge upon which it is modelled. Stakes are higher,

* At the State Stratum-of-Being, a SAM has changed character and no longer affects individuals directly. The State changes the human environment to one where ideas enter and may dominate motivation. Consciousness of incentive and effect, vital in SB₁ and SB₂, is replaced in SB₃ by conceptual or numerical expression. An example of SB₃ (negative) SAM was the command to execute all adult male Tatars, although taking place in the tribal (SB₂) context. To be considered a SB₂ SAM, the order would have named specific persons for particular crimes or reasons. The leap from specific to abstract objects of SAMs marks the distinction between life-community's Strata-of-Being and that of the State.

much larger populations are affected, and deployment of multiple resources are involved as inputs to collective human strategies for improving life chances. This chain of existence connecting individual human embrace of life to social being and enrollment as Subject into the nation-State parallels the ancient and medieval “chain of being.”*

Political knowledge is distilled from social knowledge, and refines that knowledge by analogy, calculating survival and accumulation of power based on enemies, loyal allies, malleable independents and opponents to be defeated and removed. Knowledge of deployment and distribution of material, moral and military resources is intrinsic to political calculus. At any Stratum-of-Being, knowledge failure or error could be fatal if erroneous SAMs are implemented, or appropriate SAMs are not deployed. Political knowledge is time-bound. Without a steady stream of timely and accurate information, political actors could lose all. Lenin’s pamphlet question, “What is to be done?”† (*Что делать?*) encapsulates the State actor’s perennial quest for direction. He is not guided by morals or law or religion. Survival and aggrandizement of leverage over others compel him to action. Natural man in isolation had few opportunities for introspection, and had lower awareness of self. When enmeshed in social relationships a person becomes conscious of self through human connections and interactions. Help and dangers from others become factors in maintaining existence, as one weighs trust, enmity, loyalty and

* The hierarchy of species, culminating in man, then God.

† Published in 1902. Its title is inspired by the novel of the same name by the 19th century Russian revolutionary Nikolai Chernyshevsky.

desires of kin, friends, superiors, inferiors and other acquaintances. As the political actor enters and occupies State SB₃, he tempers emotive and habitual judgments of others with greater and more frequent calculation of how they may help or hinder flourishing. This survival calculus occurs at prior Strata-of-Being, but in the State, the prizes are grander and the Power-Willed individuals enjoy more guarantees to longevity. A government official or satrap has access to far more life protections than an ordinary Subject, and the sovereign most of all.

The Delphic maxim “know thyself” is crucial to the political actor. He must understand his weaknesses and strengths, and this is accomplished by testing against adversity. The results of tests and trials are incorporated into character, and are often replayed in later actions and crises. Whether Ivan IV’s (“the Terrible”) battle against Russian boyar intrigues, or Temüjin’s fights against bandits and hostile tribes, calibration of violence and risk was constant. A Will-to-Power never follows a straight line, and may be blocked at every juncture. The Will-to-Power feeds on its antecedents and nourishes them as well. Temüjin was the last man standing after ferocious tribal wars, and was stronger than ever when raised to Great Khan.

Ögedei, the next Khan, understood the necessity of self-examination and self-knowledge, even if *pro forma*, and listed his mistakes and successes. He reflected upon his life, and gave an accounting of his good points and faults, in comparing himself to his father.⁴⁴ While self-serving, such admission was necessary in claiming responsibility for actions, and for learning from mistakes. Projecting a formalistic image of humility was less hypocrisy than a tacit admission of weakness requiring counsel of others. It was an exercise familiar to Chinese rulers, and was embedded in lower

levels of State and society. While an emperor was sovereign and exercised near-absolute power over the State, he was also mortal and fallible. The bronze mirror in China was a symbol of self-examination, with historiography as an honored vehicle for every dynasty to be “reflected in”, so that its origin and fate could be “reflected upon”. In Japan the Three Imperial Regalia includes the *Yata no Kagami* (sacred mirror) representing “wisdom” or “honesty,” because it reflected what was known and seen without obfuscation.

Political knowledge differs from social knowledge

Political knowledge does not occur in natural man and begins in social experience, where State Stratum-of-Being germinates. Whereas survival knowledge [K_N] applies to reduction of ignorance over direct actions which are life-relevant, and life-community knowledge [K_L] encompasses virtues, propriety, morals, and treating friends differently than enemies, political knowledge [K_S] consists of ascertaining how persons and groups will respond to actions and symbols. It builds on self-knowledge and social knowledge to enhance State order and stability, and can be divided into “esoteric” and “exoteric” knowledge.⁴⁵ Political knowledge is facilitated by language refinement into written form. Building on common spoken language of life-community, a State standardizes a written language in order to widen the scope of law and commands. Writing also retains memory of past problems and solutions, thus facilitating rule over large territory. Writing facilitates commerce with contracts and other representations of conveyance.* In pre-modern States, education in literacy was restricted to rulers, priests

* Confucius advocated conformity of words to reality – the “rectification of names.”

and clerks – a hallmark of privilege, authority and dominance, as well as gateway to greater life-protections.

Exercising sovereignty:

Military and political knowledge overlapped in wide swaths, and were mutually dependent. Without a firm grasp of generalship, Genghis Khan could not have united the Mongol tribes. War and economics provided the entrance through which his army was able to turn confiscated wealth into instruments of sovereignty. Successful war and growing wealth had propelled ancient Athens, Rome and Qin States into powerful empires, bringing neighbors under heel. The Mongols began as poor hunters and herdsman, and by astute leadership in war, acquired wealth and territory. Sovereignty became vested in the Khan, but benefits of empire were distributed to kin and those who fought under his banners.

Whereas earlier Khans had ruled personally and directly, Chingis Khan ruled through his *nöküt*, his personal retinue and company. The earlier khans were close to their people; Chingis Khan governed over them indirectly and reached out to them directly only at the ceremony of his enthronement in 1206. He ruled by delegating his authority, and maintained only formal relations with his people—the exception to this being in his relations to his *nöküt*, whom he forgave even when they committed grievous offenses.⁴⁶

Sacred sources of sovereignty

The State is inseparable from the notion of sovereignty – the claim of supremacy over a defined realm. It asserts that only one Will-to-Power is legitimate and supreme, and all others must be subordinate. The religious impulse often buttressed a flow of power to a single head of State. Doctrines of emperor-worship, god-kings, Divine Right, and Mandate of Heaven strengthened State cults which reinforced claims of sovereignty. Genghis Khan appealed to Tengri as supporting his supremacy. Emergence of the nation-State was accompanied by elaboration of political vocabulary and growth

of a new conceptual arsenal. Old words were adapted to new phenomena associated with the State, and original meanings were lost or discarded.

The root notion of sovereign has sacred meaning. "God is above all things and before all things. He is the alpha and the omega, the beginning and the end. He is immortal, and He is present everywhere so that everyone can know Him." (*Revelation 21:6*) "God created all things and holds all things together, both in heaven and on earth, both visible and invisible." (*Colossians 1:16*)⁴⁷ Secular sovereignty claims a more limited reach – only a portion of mankind and a boundaried extent of earthly territory. States, sovereignty, security and much of the political glossary have existed largely as claims on persons, material, and territory, enforced by emotion and rational compliance. A divine source of sovereignty is also evident in Islam:⁴⁸

Knowest thou not that it is Allah unto Whom belongeth the sovereignty of the heavens and earth; and ye have not, beside Allah, any friend or helper?—2: AL-Baqarah: 107

Say: O Allah! Owner of Sovereignty! Thou givest sovereignty unto whom Thou wilt, and Thou withdrawest sovereignty from whom Thou wilt. Thou exaltest whom Thou wilt and Thou abasest whom Thou wilt. In Thy hand is the good. Lo! Thou art to do all things. —3: Al-Imran: 26

Knowest thou not that unto Allah belongeth the Sovereignty of the heavens and the earth? He punisheth whom He will, and forgiveth whom He will: Allah is Able to do all things. —5: AL-Ma'idah: 40

A State's law is a claim in the form of demand that Subjects behave in ways conforming to the sovereign State, or suffer enforcement penalties if they violate prescribed legislation or commands. One obeys a law partly out of emotion (fear of punishment) and partly from reason (the law is "just" and by conforming, one is preserving the "justice" claimed by the State). The State and its overt claims are intangible, and yet exert powerful

control over all who enjoy “its” benefits and others who oppose “its” claims – even though there exists no “it.” Similar to Adam Smith’s “unseen hand” providing a metaphor for markets, the State is an “invisible fist” exercising potency because men have accepted some or most of “its” claims, and have felt or have anticipated enforcement of those claims.

Mongol creation of sovereignty

Unified leadership was vital for transformation of Mongol life-community into a State. The campaign against the Merkit created a Triple Alliance that proved impermanent, with subsurface ambitions initiating breakup. The shattering of that alliance held an inescapable moral – any triumvirate intimating or proclaiming equality of participants is fundamentally unstable. Only one king, one chief, one Khan, or one emperor is feasible – sovereignty is indivisible.* Until the question of who would be sovereign was settled, unification of the Mongol tribes had to be postponed. When the wars of unification began, the question became “who shall rule?” Specifically, which claimant would be Khan of all the Mongols – Temüjin or Jamuqa? Unlike the evolution of State sovereignty in Western Europe,† where Christianity and feudalism had integrated the post-Roman world into pan-tribal communities, entrenched Mongol tribes resisted amalgamation and rejected fixed territoriality. A propensity to move pasture-dependent camps resisted permanent settlements which would have political emphasis to greater fixed

* Sovereignty may be a principle derived from nature, where the solitary sun has been worshipped as the source of life and inflated by religion into a ruling divinity, personified in many beliefs as reigning above all creation.

† Particularly in Merovingian France and Alfred the Great’s England.

territoriality. War, rather than economics, was the “iron fist” of Genghis Khan in creating a sovereign State. With no church or transcendent religion or legal tradition* to invoke for suitable framework, he used familiar resources from life-community to create the Mongol State.

The Mongol version of sovereignty was vested in the person of the Khan. Formation and maintenance of the State hinged directly on the physical presence of Genghis Khan. His preoccupation with postponing EOL was not selfish, but a fusion of his existence with that of the State idea, so much so that he overlooked settlement of succession until reminded by consort Yisüi Qatun. Here, as in most of his biography, the burden of physical life was an oppression that pushed civilian thinking from consciousness. When he attained sovereignty, it was with a sense of relief that he could assign protection and distribute responsibility for his life security to a corps of bodyguard. After his EOL their failure to fulfill that primary mission (to keep him alive) partly accounted for the cruel secrecy of his burial cortege. In shame and in maintaining concealment they killed any who saw the funeral caravan. When he died, there was Mongol apprehension that their hard-won State might succumb with him, and hiding that fact may have prevented mutinies.

* "The past is something unique that never returns. Tradition, however knows no distance; rather, the past extends relevantly into the present. It is forever repeated anew by it. Therefore we generally do not know where traditions come from. The earlier the stage a people is at, the more the past lives for it only in the form of tradition. What is to be kept is built into the tradition; when it finds no place in real life, then tradition finds one, for instance by the establishment of a yearly recurring feast day, on which the event is reenacted." Landmann, 227.

Acquisition and communication of political knowledge

Knowledge is not a synonym for truth, as perception may be distorted by faulty interpretation. Verbal and written reports can be purposely biased, incomplete or perverted. Genghis Khan highly valued what they saw and reported. "Further, Cinggis Khan said to Old Üsün, Üsün, Qunan, Kökö Cos and Degei, these four, without hiding or concealing, have always reported to me what they saw and heard; they have always informed me of what they thought and comprehended."⁴⁹ While truth-telling can be liberating and life-saving, giving information to the wrong person can have adverse consequences. After the Mongols had defeated traditional enemy Tatars, their disposition was discussed by Temüjin and a "great council with his kinsmen." They reached a decision:

From olden days the Tatar people
 Have destroyed our fathers and forefathers;
 To avenge our fathers and forefathers,
 And requite the wrong, for them
 We shall measure *the Tatars* against the linchpin of a cart,
 And kill them to the last one,⁵⁰

Unaware of their doom and numbed by defeat, the Tatars remained passive prisoners until half-brother Belgütei divulged their fate.

The council being concluded, as they emerged from the tent, the Tatar Yeke Ceren asked Belgütei what decision they had made. Belgütei said, "We have decided to measure you all against the linchpin of a cart and slay you." At these words of Belgütei, Yeke Ceren issued a proclamation to his Tatars, and they raised a barricade. As our soldiers tried to surround and attack the Tatars that had barricaded themselves in, they suffered great losses. After much trouble, when they forced the barricaded Tatars into submission and were about to slay them to the last man by measuring them against the linchpin of a cart, the Tatars said among themselves, "Let everyone put a knife in his sleeve and let us die *each taking an enemy with us* as a death-companion! " And again we suffered great losses.⁵¹

In this incident, political knowledge consisted of the council's decision, which was vital to keep secret. Belgütei's disclosure of their execution fate mobilized resistance and caused deaths and

injury among the Mongols. Knowledge of planned action is only effective when shared exclusively by those who will benefit. Forewarning the targeted adversary or victim cancels advantage from an intended action. Belgütei failed to consider the consequences of his remark to Yeke Ceren. Temüjin punished his half-brother by banishing him from all future council deliberations. Belgütei's loose tongue revealed a political secret and illustrated the absolute necessity of prudence. The consequences of gossip and unguarded remarks led to unnecessary deaths from the mutiny. Although kin, he was demoted and proved a reputation of weak character.*

* In the family encampment, he had been an accomplice of Bekter, and surrendered to Temüjin after the elder's execution.

1. Stratum-of-Being	State SB ₃ (in this incident, occurring in SB ₂)
2. Security Action Platform	Political knowledge [Ks]
3. Initiator (subject) + predicate + target (object)	Belgütei + discloses (impending massacre to) + Tatars.
4. Intended consequence	Belgütei, half-brother of Genghis, was unaware of the consequences of his offhand remark.
5. Unintended consequence	Tatar mutiny and Mongol deaths.
6. Resources required v. used	Easy words, no regard for effect on the Tatars.
7. Actual effect on life-length of object	Stiffened resistance of warrior prisoners to their execution.
8. Positive or <i>negative</i> for subject	Complete elimination of old enemies. <i>Alerted Tatars to impending massacre, so furiously resisted, killing several Mongols.</i>
9. Positive or <i>negative</i> for Object	+Enabled them to die fighting, rather than as slaughtered prisoners. <i>-EOL either way</i>

Table 21: Belgütei discloses execution decision to Tatars.

Reliance on shamans and superstition guided some of Temüjin's actions and were a substitute for political knowledge anchored in cognition, precedent or laws. Qorci told of his dream that Temüjin would gain ascendancy over Jamuqa to become lord of the earth. Recognizing the value of the omen, he requested a reward for this vaporous political knowledge. A favorable portent was a message to be inserted in gossip and gave confidence, showing Heaven on his side. The dream was useful to Temüjin as validation of his ambition from a pseudo-supernatural source. Spreading the dream story to his army and to his enemies had value as a propaganda tool. The incident is also a demonstration of myth-making importance. In the

Secret History, Temüjin is portrayed as intermittently pious, acknowledging the role of Heaven in saving him from untimely EOL. Dreams and other signs helped create Khan sovereignty as a form of shared and propagated political knowledge. Analogous to the Chinese Mandate of Heaven, invocation of Tengri as sponsor of Genghis domination gathered support and resources, and encouraged warriors to believe they had chosen to fight for the right leader. Religion and superstition can be considered in the Mongol context as expressions of quasi-knowledge in that such messages verified rightness of action. Their suppositions could not be objectively proved, but their interpretation led to confidence in actions based on faith more than rational calculation. Unverifiable belief functions as a substitute for knowledge in generating SAMs at all Strata-of-Being, and especially when State presence has been accepted as an article of actionable faith.

Deception and the creation of false knowledge

Deception, the creation of false knowledge, is a tool in war and State-building. Projecting a false image of condition or intention was a valuable weapon in Genghis Khan's arsenal. It gave the adversary false confidence to think he had superior knowledge, and gave Mongols a screen behind which they could take effective actions. In preparation for launching his first campaign against the Naiman, Genghis lit campfires and then moved upstream to deceive the enemy. In a later battle, he ordered each man to set five fires to trick them about the size of his army. Seeing these fires, Naiman patrols reported that the Mongol soldiers were "more numerous than the stars," demonstrating Sunzi's aphorism that "all warfare is based on deception."⁵² Genghis had used this device in several other campaigns, surmising that the enemy were usually too risk-averse

to sneak into his camp to verify actual numbers. In several battles, he sent a troop of cavalry to skirmish and then fall back in retreat as if beaten, leading the enemy into disastrous ambush by waiting archers and cavalry in the wings.

Sometimes an enemy was led into self-deception. The Naiman captured a soldier on patrol on a thin white gelding with a poor saddle, and they concluded that this represented the general condition of Mongol horses⁵³ – a weakness they could exploit in the attack. The lessons for political knowledge were clear – never assume that a single instance represents a general condition or that “the plural of anecdote is data.” For the Mongols it illustrated the importance of psychological warfare in the military and political spheres. Deception and cunning were at the core of Mongol tactics, helped by enemy ignorance and Mongol unity of purpose. Another form of distorting perceptions of an enemy was planting exaggerated estimates of opposing forces. Rival Jamuqa had allied himself with Tayang Qan, then realized the weakness of his new coalition, and belatedly aided Temüjin with exaggerated descriptions of Genghis warriors. His words embellished the reputations of Mongol generals as veritable demons from Hell.

Jamuqa said, “Mother Ho’elün has raised one of her sons on human flesh: His body is three fathoms high, And he dines on three-year old cattle; Wearing a three-layered armour, He is pulled along in his cart by three bulls. When he swallows a man complete with quiver, It does not get stuck in his throat. When he gulps down a whole man, It does not fill his stomach. When he is angry and draws his bow, And releases a forked-tip arrow, He shoots and pierces ten or twenty men Who are beyond a mountain; When he draws his bow and releases A long-range thin arrow, He shoots and pierces through his enemies, The ones he fights Who are beyond the steppe. When he shoots, drawing his bow to the full, He covers nine hundred fathoms; When he shoots, drawing it only a little, He covers five hundred fathoms. Different from all other men, He was born a coiling dragon-snake. His name is Jochi Qasar. That is he!” Tayang Qan then said, “If this is so, let us strive for the mountain heights and go further up!” They climbed further up the mountain and took position. Again Tayang Qan asked Jamuqa, “Who is approaching after him?” Jamuqa said, “He is the youngest son of Mother Ho’elün. He is called Otcigin, the Easy-going. He is an early sleeper and a late riser, yet He does not lag behind, when the army is in full array; He does not lag behind, when the army is in position.” Tayang Qan said, “If this is so, let us go up to the top of the mountain!”⁵⁴

Education is primarily the transmission of knowledge between generations. Genghis exercised caution in educating and reprimanding his sons. Not only their decisions but their temperament would affect political outcomes. If they feared error or criticism, they might avoid risk and fail to win battles. At the head of a patrimonial State, Genghis Khan passed on his knowledge and experience, and even elements of temperament, to his sons. After Jochi, Ca'adai and Ögedei once conquered a city and failed to share the booty with him, he refused to see them for three days as a reprimand. His quiver bearers implored him to relent, since they were young and still learning: "Like grey falcons that have just begun training, the sons are barely learning *how* to wage a military campaign, and, at such a time, you rebuke them in this way, piling abuse on them. Why? We fear lest the sons, being afraid, will lose heart."⁵⁵ His anger abated and he promoted the three quiver bearers. The Khan demanded strict obedience from all, but recognized that contrary advice should be considered, and that courageous expression be encouraged.

Although he often resorted to deception in war, Genghis expected veracity from all who served him. His trust was allotted in proportion to evidence of loyalty and the reality of actions matching words. When he completely subdued the Merkit, Dayir Usun, chief of a branch tribe, took his daughter Qulan Qatun with him and went to offer her to Genghis Khan as a token of his loyalty. Along the way, he met warrior Naya'a Noyan, who detained the pair, to provide protection from roving bands of soldiers. After three days, they went together and Genghis showed anger at the delay, suspecting that the girl had been molested in the interim. She protested, and requested that her intact body be examined. Naya'a's version of events was corroborated and he declaimed:

If I come across maidens and ladies Of foreign people with beautiful cheeks, And geldings with fine croups, I always say, "They are the Khan's!" If ever I think differently from this, let me die!" Cinggis Khan approved of Qulan Qatun's testimony. then, that very day, he examined her accordingly and turned out to be just as Qulan Qatun had Stated. Cinggis Khan showed favour to Qulan Qatun and loved her. As Naya" a's words had been confirmed, he approved of him. He showed favour to him too, saying, "He is a truthful man, I shall entrust him with an important task!"⁵⁶

The most critical form of political knowledge was identifying, neutralizing and removing potential life threats. Sitting between the two Tatar sisters, Yisüi Qatun and Yisügen Qatun, Genghis ordered the Tatar prisoners to assemble and stand in kin groups. One who stood alone was a warrior who had been betrothed to consort Yisüi. Genghis Khan still harbored jealousy against a man for whom Yisüi might have residual feelings. The warrior had no kin who could vouch or restrain him or be punished collectively if he committed a crime, and this made him a dangerous person in the eyes of the Khan.

As the people were standing thus in groups of related families, a handsome and alert young man stood apart from all the groups. When they said, "To which clan do you belong?", that man said, "I am the bridegroom to whom was given the daughter of the Tatar Yeke Ceren called Yisüi. When we were plundered by the enemy, I took fright and fled. I came hither because things seemed to have settled down now and I kept telling myself, "How can I be recognized among so many people?" When these words were reported to Cinggis Khan, he ordered: "all the same, he has been living as an outcast, with hostile intentions; what has he come to spy upon now? Those like him we have measured against the linchpin of a cart and exterminated. Why hesitate? Cast him out of my sight!" He was cut down immediately.⁵⁷

A man with no kin obligations might do anything, so his life was pre-emptively forfeit. The incident suggested that suspicion of hostile intent, even when a remote possibility and coupled with absence of advantage for the Khan, were sufficient grounds for elimination of a person or a tribe or a city.

Political knowledge for life security was obtained by demanding truth from subordinates. A single source of information could be unreliable. Political knowledge was a major resource of the

sovereign, enabling him to act in ways beneficial to himself and the State, and harmful to his enemies. Thoroughness was required in military and political enterprises, not as mere completion but to prevent future vendetta or conflict. His treatment of the Tatars was the pattern for exercising cruel fastidiousness in war – ruthless elimination of anyone of a tribe or city who had opposed his army or his people, and employment of persons useful to him. Killing the Tatar Yeke Ceren and taking his two daughters as consorts revealed this pattern. Alive, the father might always conspire and oppose Genghis Khan so could not be spared. The daughters were attractive, intelligent, proved to be wise advisors and were trusted not to avenge their father's death – if they wanted to stay alive. Regretting that he had not exterminated the Merkit when he had the chance years before, he instructed General Sübe'etei to pursue and destroy them:

If they grow wings and fly up into the sky, you, Sübe'etei, will you not fly up like a gerfalcon and catch them? If they tum into marmots and burrow into the ground with their claws, will you not become an iron rod and, digging and searching for them, catch up with them? If they tum into fishes and plunge into the Tenggis Sea, you, Sübe'etei, will you not become a casting-net and a dragnet, and get them by scooping them out?⁵⁸

A forest tribe, the Qori Tumat, rebelled when Qorci went to collect his promised thirty young women. They took him hostage, then ambushed and killed a commander who had been sent to rescue. Angered Genghis Khan was prepared to lead a force against the tribe and their woman chieftain, who ruled after her husband died. He appointed Dorbei Doqsin to lead an expedition, who sent decoys along the usual trails through the forest. Another force was provided with axes, saws and weapons, and they cut a road through the trees and attacked the camp while the Tumat were feasting.

Winning wars was only a first step in establishing political order under a single sovereign. Governing a conquered or surrendered people required a structure of administration which was both familiar with existing customs and economy of the population as well as responsive to the commands and requirements of the Khan. After the Sarta'ul were subdued, he appointed a resident commissioner in their cities. He was visited by a father and son of the Qurumsi clan who told him of their laws and customs. Recognizing the importance of keeping peace and conforming to local tradition,* he appointed them to share power with the Mongol commissioner over a number of cities and the Kitat people. Both were also placed in charge "Because, from among the Sartaul people, Yalawaci and Masqut were adept in the laws and customs of cities."⁵⁹

Military knowledge is an actionable form of political knowledge. When the Triple Alliance attacked the Merkit camp, the chief was informed of the coming army and escaped. Several fishermen and hunters had observed the armies, and travelled all night to inform the Merkit, removing the element of surprise. This information was not the result of Merkit organized effort to have early warning outposts, and the informers probably had kinship or a trading relationship with the tribe, and wished to be rewarded or at least maintain past relations. The alarms from roving individuals saved Toqto'a Beki and a few others – an example of positive SAMs

* "Each individual and generation may subjectively believe that they are merely passing down their age-old traditions faithfully to their offspring. But in fact they change them. When two generations do the same thing, it is no longer the same, and in the course of long periods of time something new in principle arises through an accumulation of slight modifications. But the change becomes visible only where earlier documents have been preserved." Landmann, 230.

for them. Providing timely knowledge of imminent attack enabled evasion of the oncoming army of the Triple Alliance.

Espionage as political knowledge

Temüjin's personal experience and observations were an encyclopedia which he meticulously consulted. It contained mental maps of persons, terrain and strategy, constantly subject to correction and expansion. The same principle was applied to the Mongol State when it expanded beyond old tribal pastures. A new body of knowledge had to be collected, further places mapped, and intelligence gathered about key persons, armies and political conditions. Prisoners and deserters provided one source of information. Merchants and spies were more reliable, and trade with the enemy supplied valuable estimations of their military strength. Raiding parties and reconnaissance missions tested an enemy's preparations and competence, permitting the Mongols to frame their plan of attack. Conquests were primarily military matters, and holding those winnings required governance. Government was necessary for the continuous extraction of resources from a population, for the maintenance of Mongol hegemony, and for the delivery of security to keep the peace.

Toghrul asked Jamuqa about the fighting strength of Temüjin's forces.

There are his people called the Uru'ut and Mangqut; those people of his do indeed know how to fight: Every time they turn about, Their battle array holds; Every time they wheel round, too, Their ranks hold. Those people are accustomed to swords and spears from childhood. They have black and multicoloured standards - they are the people of whom we must be wary!⁶⁰

The Mongols were expert practitioners of a warfare that placed highest value on timely intelligence gathering. Prior to a battle they sent spies and scouts to gain information on morale, water, food,

and topographical advantages or obstacles. Only then would the army move into an area. The political knowledge needed before a campaign was sifted and checked, weaknesses of the enemy noted, and propaganda prepared to soften morale among the opposition. What had been haphazard in tribal warfare became highly organized by the Mongol State.*

Channels of knowledge acquisition

Acquisition of knowledge was acquired first by visual observation and objectivity. Single-eyed Du'a Soqor could see a great distance and used this gift in seeking a wife for his younger brother. Personal experience was the second valued source, and what it lost in objectivity, its lessons gained in immediacy. A victim of a negative SAM, if he lived, retained an acute memory of the experience. A third source of knowledge consisted of words spoken by other individuals. Words and names inhabited the fabric of Mongol pre-literate life-community, and were shadows of a reality better perceived by observation or experience. But verbalization expanded possible knowledge despite slippage in reality-grounding.

* "Before entering into battle the Mongols employed their vast intelligence network of spies and scouts. The physical landscape was scoured for information advantageous to an advancing army. Grazing ground, water supplies, food sources, secure camping ground, possible battle sites, and lookout points all had to be assessed and considered before the army moved. In addition human intelligence was gathered in order to maximize any advantages to be gained from an enemy's weaknesses. To gathering intelligence, the spies and scouts would also sow disinformation and cast doubt in order to weaken enemy morale. Nobody ever surprised the Mongols. The Mongols valued intelligence highly and early appreciated the advantages to be gained from a thorough knowledge of the enemy terrain, brain, and any rivalries and splits within the enemy ranks, especially those that they could exploit. Psychological warfare was a key component of their expanding repertoire." Lane, 104.

The genius of Genghis was to grasp and integrate facts and take one step further. His device of setting multiple fires to deceive the enemy, manipulated the truthfulness of observation into enemy illusion for his benefit. Using hungry geldings in patrols lulled the enemy into over-confidence. Similarly, words had power, and entering the mind through the ears, hearing them was a type of experience, though inferior and symbolic and requiring verification. When Ho'elün likened young Temüjin to "a dragon-snake swallowing its prey alive" the humiliation he experienced was more than if she had beaten him with a rod. Verbal punishment was not the only use of words. Jamuqa was more eloquent than Temüjin. He spoke with bravado before the Triple Alliance attack on the Merkit, undoubtedly inspiring confidence in their enterprise and increasing morale within their forces. He slandered Temüjin to Toghrul and planted doubts in their partnership. When he realized that Temüjin had the best chance to unite the Mongols, he inflated the abilities of Mongol generals to a demonic level and frightened the Naiman into near-paralysis.

Seducing the Mongols to surrender their tribally-acquired freedom for higher level State security was a prominent task for Temüjin, but elegant speeches and logical arguments were absent and in any event, would carry little weight. Among the Greeks, rhetoric was the art of creating beliefs about things. Plato considered it to be a form of flattery and deceit, but others, including Roger Bacon, thought of it as the application of reason to the imagination for the purpose of moving or strengthening the Will.* As far as we

* Modern charismatic leaders including Lenin or Mussolini or Hitler or Fidel Castro came to power in part through skilful use of rhetoric, and laid foundations for the revolutionary State by projecting an image of an *übermensch* who would transform the nation.

know, Genghis Khan had little or no rhetorical skill, and times were not conducive to cultivation of verbal cleverness. Yet he was able to convince thousands of men and women to pledge their lives and possessions to his project of conquest. Herdsmen and hunters became warriors, surrendering tribal liberty by submitting to harsh discipline in exchange for possible personal and family enrichment.* Stories of Temüjin's rise supplied a narrative of fortune's direction around the campfires, and one can imagine an inchoate rumor mill gradually emerging that identified two alternatives – join Temüjin to win, or ignore him and suffer the consequences. Joining had the advantage of participation in an army which was acquiring a reputation for invincibility and whose conquests would lead to material rewards. To ignore him might be taken as a sign of hostility, and tribesmen had heard or seen how he dealt with enemies. Thus reputation of and accomplishment by Temüjin and his companions – not rhetoric or charisma – expressed in rumor, legend, gossip, and eyewitness report was one basis of active subordination to his Will.

Justice

Claims to restoring justice gave the Mongol State a moral high ground in making war during the first decades of empire.† Men engage in wars for protection and gain, but fight harder when they are convinced of the justice of their cause. Before Temüjin's army achieved hegemony over the Mongol tribes, he invoked rough

* Voluntary membership was not an individual decision but one of clan leaders. Pre-1206 wars among the tribes and various confederations had swelled the ranks of Temüjin, and with the vanquishing of Toghrul and Jamuqa, and the extermination of the Tatars and Merkit, lesser tribes had little choice.

† This was illustrated in Khubilai Khan's two abortive naval campaigns against Japan, where the Shogun had insulted his ambassadors.

justification of wars. Achieving a State based on justice was another matter. Thrasymachus argued that justice is only the interest of the stronger. Hobbes and Spinoza wrote that men living in a natural condition, without benefit of civil society or State, are outside the realm of justice. Aristotle considered justice the bond of men in States, and it implies notions of duty and obligation. Others considered justice to be part of natural law, and is inalienable to the human condition. Equity is also considered to be part of justice when linked to distribution or fairness. Finally, for justice to be a basis for a community or a State, it must be present as an actionable value which sets the standard for interpersonal and government-Subject behaviour. A just community or State habituates men to duty. Justice is an idea which societies and nations have sought to define and embed in law and legal institutions. Prior to the State, its implementation was often sought in violence and vendetta. States became habituated when men and tribes surrendered much of their particular determinations and jurisdiction over decisions on what was fair and how to implement that fairness. Every State embodied its own notion of justice, incorporating it into *raison d'état*.

Justice is one of the highest benefits men expect from the State and entails a restoration of imagined or experienced social harmony.* Absent sovereign authority to restore that concord or even determine of what justice might consist, actors in non-State settings are left to their own devices to settle disputes. Peaceful

* On the role of nostalgia in politics, see Yuval Levin, *The Fractured Republic: Renewing America's Social Contract in the Age of Individualism*. (New York: Basic Books, 2016).

arbitration, negotiation and compromise avoid violence.* Justice as “higher good” has little traction in life-community, where vengeance and its vendetta offspring evened the scales when injuries were inflicted. Honor was the standard by which injustice was measured, and was restored only with personal retribution. Claims of injury and dishonor were used by the Mongols in declaring war on neighbors near and far. Sometimes, mistreatment of emissaries or historical wrongs provided an excuse for war. Promoting tribal vendetta to claims of violated justice gave the Mongol State a higher moral status (in their own eyes) than mere lust for booty. Such claims also enhanced a collective identity transcending loyalty to life-community.

A central component of Mongol justice was retribution. Those who had wronged the Khan were made to pay – usually with lives, goods, family, and territory. This idea of retributive justice extended beyond his person. The Xixia had tortured and killed Qabul Qan, and so were attacked and destroyed by his descendant Genghis Khan. A band of Tatars had poisoned his father, Yisügei, and so the entire tribe was killed or enslaved. When a group of envoys was killed by a governor in Kwarazm, Mongol vengeance destroyed its

* Mark Weiner relates how this worked in a Pashtun Afghan tribal setting. A man killed another and tribal elders sought to avoid violent retribution. The relatives of the victim refused monetary compensation for absolution. The solution was to give the youngest daughter of the perpetrator’s family in marriage to the brother of the victim: “By giving away their youngest daughter, the perpetrator’s family would pay a restitution that was more valuable than money, and the families would now be bound together. Naturally, the young woman had no choice in the matter. Her brother’s actions had condemned her to a kind of exile. Like many married women in traditional societies, she would be cut off from her own family. But she would also be held at arm’s length by her new family as an everlasting reminder of the murder of one of their cherished members.” Weiner 40.

This case demonstrated how the actions of one family member affect siblings and parents – especially the innocent girl given as wife. While the killer seems to have escaped physical punishment, his relationship with his family was forever subject to condemnation – no small penalty in tribal society. Had the case not been disposed, blood vendetta by the victim’s kin was likely.

monarchy and annexed the territory. If a city resisted demands to surrender, it was destroyed and its inhabitants killed or enslaved. Mongol wars began in retribution, extended into vengeance, and culminated in terrible punishment for resistance. Justice and punishment were inextricably intertwined. The evolution of Mongol justice began in survival, was nourished by memory and vengeance, and ended as a belief that it was a divinely (Tengri) inspired instrument of world order – establishing law under hegemony and ending internecine feuds and wars. His successors inherited and expanded the empire he had initiated, adapted his template of institutions to their Khanates, and modified according to local practice. The irony of the Golden Horde over Russia was the quarter millennium of Mongol rule, which brought a centralized administration and provided conditions for the emergence of Moscow as the future center and nemesis of the Mongol rulers.

Another component of Mongol justice was distribution. The Tayici'ut exclusion of Yisügei's family from the clan, insofar as the widows and children were anticipated to be consumer dependents rather than contributors to the common weal, indicated that the norm of fulfilling needs went only so far, and collided against limitations imposed by harsh environment. Survival required self-love and selfishness.

Before good and evil

Schopenhauer linked Will and vengeance:

Asserting this will, he yet desires that in the drama which represents its nature no such fearful wrong shall ever appear again, and wishes to frighten every future wrong-doer by the example of a vengeance against which there is no means of defence, since the avenger is not deterred by the fear of death.⁶¹

He expressed in philosophy what Genghis Khan conveyed in deed centuries before. Terrible retribution was visited on those who resisted his Will-to-Power, once his military strength was sufficient. Historians might adjudge him as bad or evil or depraved, but a case can be made that he developed, and was motivated by, dormant Wills present in most of mankind. Again, the philosopher of Will offers a criterion of good v. bad:

If a man is always disposed to do wrong whenever the opportunity presents itself, and there is no external power to restrain him, we call him bad. According to our doctrine of wrong, this means that such a man does not merely assert the will to live as it appears in his own body, but in this assertion goes so far that he denies the will which appears in other individuals. This is shown by the fact that he desires their powers for the service of his own will, and seeks to destroy their existence when they stand in the way of its efforts. The ultimate source of this is a high degree of egoism, the nature of which has been already explained.⁶²

Asking whether Genghis Khan was “bad” because he chose to harm others is accusation posing as question. There is near-universal agreement that killing is wrong, yet killing has been ubiquitous in human history. Temüjin grew and survived in an environment of violence, was forced to kill or be killed in tribal wars, acquired the means to remain alive through alliances and war, and was joined by men with similar purpose. From a modern perspective, where good and evil have been clarified and ratified by Judeo-Christian ethics and twentieth century experiences of genocide, Genghis was depraved and disposed to do wrong.* However, had he halted his satisfaction of Will-to-Power in 1206, when he united the Mongols under his sovereignty, was it possible to become a “good” enlightened monarch? His *Yasa* decreed that

* "The theory of progress opposes the Christian doctrine of sin by its faith in the original goodness of man, but it also is against the Christian doctrine of grace. For in Christianity, fallen man, powerless of himself, can be saved only by the gift of divine grace. The theory of progress, however, holds that man, whom it regards as not fallen very deep, can lift himself up by his own power and 'work his way up the paths to Olympus.' Both know a 'self-redemption.'" Landmann, 97.

Mongols should no longer kill Mongols, and he reorganized his armed forces to dilute clan and tribe affiliation. An alternative was to demobilize and disarm – which would leave him, his family and his followers vulnerable to other tribes thirsting for revenge.* Moreover, maintaining an army for defense and the corps of bodyguards against assassins, surrounding enemies and allies who might defect at any sign of weakness was a huge expense for Mongol headquarters. Past wars had “harvested” goods, animals and slaves to reimburse and motivate warriors, and the predatory economy was too effective to be abolished.

Political knowledge is central to the creation and maintenance of a State. Each category of knowledge is a potential trigger for SAM, with these differences:

- Individual knowledge @ SB₁: Knowledge generating direct interaction with natural environment, producing a sensed effect on life security, mostly benefiting self.
- Social knowledge @ SB₂: Knowledge triggering a direct SAM by an individual for or against interaction with other persons who are affected. Social knowledge, when translated into action, increases or diminishes life security of the individual and affected persons. Requires consideration of interests of others in same life-community.

* In Brian Moore’s novel, *Black Robe*, a savage Indian tribe was converted to Christianity and later massacred in their meekness by another tribe. The Mongols lost their warlike disposition and were subjugated by Chinese dynasties after conversion to Buddhist other-worldliness.

- Political knowledge @ SB₃: Knowledge facilitating the process of subordinating groups (families, clans and tribes) and merging them into a State. Interaction is based on relations between government and those groups, and between one State and others, expressed in commands, decrees or laws. SAMs at SB₃ are lawful and expressed as impersonal commands, best framed as reinforcing justice.

Each Stratum-of-Being requires and generates a form of knowledge needed to maintain life. As population becomes denser, possibility of higher Stratum-of-Being takes form on the foundation of the previous SB, providing opportunities, resources and traps* (usually as unanticipated consequences) that affect life-length. A minority of persons, acting with greater Will-to-Power, take advantage of acquired knowledge and apply it to resources and institutions for aggrandizement. Political knowledge enables greater use of resources to attract supporters who in turn provide protection for ambitious leaders.

Thirteenth Security Action Platform: Protective/Coercive Institutions and the Army-State

The king, the minister, the country, the fort, the treasury, the army and the friend are the elements of sovereignty.
Kautilya, *Arthashastra*, 63.

The genesis of the thirteenth century Mongol State began when the band of Merkit attacked Temüjin's camp and abducted Börte. Temüjin learned practical statecraft lessons from the short war:

* An example would be continued success in exploitation of the environment, with population pressure consuming available resources. Exhaustion of Easter Island resources is a case study examined in Jared Diamond, *Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed* (New York: Penguin Books, 2011).

- A strong enemy can be overcome with a larger and disciplined army; size is less critical than leadership.
- Surprise, audacity and unified leadership are critical to success in battle. Taking the Merkit by surprise was compromised by the late arrival of Jamuqa's allies, allowing leaders to escape.
- Availability of loot and booty help to motivate soldiers and commanders, but has a negative effect on discipline and outcome if not controlled.
- Having common purpose and justice help to raise motivation above greed for booty. Wife-retrieval in that case was adequate justification, demonstrated when Temüjin ceased fighting once Börte was found.
- An effective alliance requires trust, which was nourished by Temüjin's fictive kinship with Jamuqa and Toghrul.
- Alliances are rarely permanent when the prize is sovereignty. The boyhood friendship between Temüjin and Jamuqa was shattered by realization that Jamuqa was assuming leadership of their partnership after the battle.
- The stronger alliance is one where there is acceptance of a senior leader. (Bodoncar's observation)
- War was the quickest means to higher status, power and wealth. Winning in war was an effective yet risk-laden project to improve survivability – elimination of enemies increased individual security.
- A winner attracts envy and suspicion, raising the possibility that allies will become rivals.

The opening drama of the Merkit battle found closure in the later ceremony of Genghis Khan's enthronement and the appointment of his generals:

He sent messages to all the peoples in the felt tents and they gathered together in the Year of the Tiger [1206] at the source of the Onon River and raised the white flag with nine tails. They gave Chingis Khan the title Khan there. He appointed Mukhali as Go-ong, Royal prince; he commanded Jebe to lead the campaign against King Guchuluk of the Naiman. He appointed leaders of troops of thousands; of the Mongol people, ninety-five leaders of thousands; in addition, he named a leader of the three thousand Onggirat allied to him, of the two thousand Ikires allies, and of the five thousand Onggut and forest people, all of whom he appointed to their posts at that time. The people gathered at the Khan's call, and joined in the ceremonial of his election, the ritual of primary delegation of power to the highest political authority. The ceremony developed further the expression of unity implicit in his call to all the people in the felt tents. The ritual of enthronement, the banner, the appeal to the symbol of the felt tent, all expressed the unity of the people under the Khan.⁶⁴

He now presided over the Mongol nation, whose cohesion rested on military victory over Jamuqa, Toghrul, Tatars, Naiman, Tayici'ut and Merkit among others. The centralizing Mongol State could only survive by enhancing collective security – a project requiring neutralization or conquest of neighbors. To rest on recent victories and improve defenses alone could, at most, provide a decade of peace and prosperity. However, there were disgruntled losers who allied with neighbors to attack the alleged usurper of Mongol power. Tribes were constantly jockeying for power and protection, so the Mongol State would inevitably be attacked. Moreover, the social economy was weak – herding and hunting, as main sources of sustenance for nomads, barely provided a living and would not support a necessary standing army of defense. Pre-emptive attack on wealthier, agrarian neighbors for pillage was attractive, but would reduce Genghis Khan to bandit chieftain. Pillage and booty had long been a supplementary source of sustenance for tribes of the steppe, and a few had established State-entities. Religious zeal had served Arab conquest well, but was not

available to the Mongols. To rouse his army and Subjects of the new Mongol State to further conquest, a higher principle than wealth-through-pillage had to be devised or discovered.

In 1211 Genghis launched a campaign against north China, demonstrating his well-trained and highly mobile army. He sent Jebe as vanguard to lure out the defenders of Cabciyal Pass, and enticed them to pursue. His imaginative general then turned around and rushed against the enemy, routing them and slaying large numbers.* Genghis attacked the main body of troops “slaying them until they were like heaps of rotten logs.” He then launched an attack on Jungdu, and various towns and cities in north China. Jebe was ordered to attack Duncang city but was unable to take it. He turned back, feigned retreat for six days, then reversed, night marched and took the city unawares.

While the sources of Mongol statecraft remain dim, and no full text of the *Yasa* has been found, the *Secret History* offers an example of one precise command, which could have been the model for others. Genghis gave detailed instructions on the duties and disposition of dayguards, stewards, quiver bearers at night and during the day. Punishment was specified for civilians who broke through bodyguard lines. The organization and duties were designed to provide maximum security for Genghis and to prevent

* A similar tactic was used by the Mongol Esen at the Battle of Tumu (1449). A force of 20,000 Mongols slaughtered the Chinese army of half a million north of the Great Wall.

assassination. The detailed flavor of extensive specification* is conveyed in the following:

Further, Cinggis Qa’an issued the *following* order and proclaimed it to the commanders of the various companies: “When the quiver bearers, the dayguards *and the stewards* take their turn of duty, they shall carry out their day duties, each at his respective post. As the sun sets, they shall retire *so as to be replaced* by the nightguards and, going outside, they shall spend the night *there*. At night, the nightguards shall spend the night beside Us. The quiver bearers shall leave, turning over their quivers - and the stewards their bowls and vessels to the nightguards.⁶⁵

The length and detail of bodyguard prescriptive regulations may have been unique or perhaps typical of other laws. But the fact that it was prominent and presumably verbatim in the *History* underlines the thesis of Anthrocentric Security Theory (AST) – that the State, sovereignty, and coercive institutions were erected for the purpose of life security. The Khan’s bodyguard regulations may have been unique to the Mongols, but were rational as the best means for his protection. He was the “crown” of the Mongol *ger*, holding the roof in place – the strategic component needed for integrity and completion of the structure. The two pillars (*bagana*) holding up the roof of the *ger* could be likened to the bodyguards and the clans.

Transformation of tribal warriors into a unified instrument of the Mongol State was formally accomplished after the Grand Quriltai. Tightening his grip on the army insured central control of military resources, and the *Secret History* describes it as formation of a bodyguard corps dedicated to protecting the Khan. In the context of AST, his command to organize the bodyguard was a set of

* Considering that many of the key incidents were described almost telegraphically in their terseness, expending nearly 3000 words (Rachewiltz 9: 224-234) on detailing the duties of the bodyguards came as close to a legalistic specification as anything found in the *Secret History*.

ancillary SAMs for self-protection at his State Stratum-of-Being. Duties of the guards were detailed, and their primary and supreme responsibility was protection of the Khan. This new elite force consisted of appointed officers who were available for other tasks if needed. A mobile army with movable headquarters could not have stone walls and moats, and so warriors of unquestioning loyalty were appointed to his camp strictly for his protection.

1. Stratum-of-Being	State (SB ₃)
2. Security Action Platform (SAP)	SAP13: Protective/Coercive institutions[Ms].
3. Initiator (subject) + predicate + target (object)	Genghis Khan + organized + bodyguard.
4. Intended consequence	Protect the sovereign from harm.
5. Unintended consequence	Created a new aristocracy based on merit and clan affiliation.
6. Resources required v. used	Men of proven loyalty, merit, competence. <i>Sons of generals, officers, clan leaders.</i>
7. Actual effect on life-length of object	Fighting and guarding division of labor – mutual protection.
8. Positive or negative for subject	Positive for Genghis Khan – protection from assassination or other threats.
9. Positive or <i>negative</i> for Object	+Raised status and responsibility of personal guards. <i>- made these men hostages to their kin loyalty</i>

Table 22: Genghis Khan organized bodyguard corps.

Prior to formal State formation, Genghis employed an informal band of brothers to protect him from assassination and on the battlefield. As Khan, he issued detailed regulations on duties, hours,

and deployment of a bodyguard corps. He was concerned over his own safety from possibility of poisoning or sneak attack. It implied that Genghis Khan was not merely an organ of the State (as Tatsukichi Minobe framed the Japanese Emperor in the mid-1930s), he was the State personified, and untimely death would dissipate a painfully constructed unity. As Great Khan, Genghis initiated major reorganization of his army, taking the bodyguard as central molecule of the State and himself as nucleus. Life, as expressed in purposive actions to preserve longevity, was vulnerable to violent ending if not protected. He had secured this “golden life” by vanquishing and exterminating enemies, acquiring allies and warrior disciples, and fathering many children with multiple wives and liaisons. His creation of the formal bodyguard within his headquarters was a unique SAM possible only within the State Stratum-of-Being.

This corps also served as a military school for young commanders, using fictive family bond and mutual responsibility to enhance army solidarity. It became a new aristocracy and core of the Mongol State. Bodyguard division of labor provided a prelude to government organization regarding the assignments among guards and chamberlains. The early Mongol State had little in common with bureaucratic States described by Eisenstadt.* Some guards were assigned judicial duties with Sigi Qutuqu. Others cared for weapons

* “in the Carolingian and Mongol States (or empires), while there did develop rulers with such new types of leadership, there did not exist an appropriate level of differentiation; thus the imperial system could not become institutionalized, and these polities remained at the level of loosely integrated ‘conquest’ empires, in which the different regions or groups (conquerors and conquered) were not integrated into a polity bound by common symbols of identity, and which basically retained, despite the efforts of their would-be imperial rulers, most of the characteristics of patrimonial systems.” S.N.Eisenstadt, *The Political System of Empires: The Rise and Fall of Historical Bureaucratic Societies* (New York: Free Press, 1969) ix.

and armor, distributing them, reporting on establishing an encampment. The initial Mongol State had more characteristics of an army than a sovereign government.

Organized military action as template of State action

Violence often intruded on Genghis Khan, both as recipient and wielder, varying with Stratum-of-Being. As natural man, hand-to-hand combat dominated, as when he struck his Tayici'ut guard to escape, or when he was ambushed by a band of brigands. As warrior general and warlord, group violence was more the rule as he and his troops smote enemies with sword and arrows. As Khan, he commanded armies of warriors and was protected by a wall of bodyguards. Organized military action concentrates a force of men and arms to maneuver and attack or defend against an enemy army in ways to maximize injury and death to enemies for the purpose controlling territory, communications, resources and population. Assembling and coordinating a mixed force is a more complex endeavor than a simple command to move a unified one, and requires a high order of strategic thinking, planning and execution, preceded by disciplined training and adequate logistical support.

The State subdues life-community by imposing sovereign rule to reduce internal violence and expand life security. Breaches of that order pose a security threat to all who have accepted the paramountcy of ruler and laws. Majesty without arms and men to wield them invites chaos, so armies are organized to enforce sovereignty and laws.* Establishment of the Mongol State was not

* Police and the courts are the modern expression of a perennial need for protection and coercion, and can add a veneer of equal justice.

based on an amicably concluded social contract but achieved through multiple negative SAMs exterminating enemies and positive SAMs of mutual protection and alliance.

Genghis Khan attracted and depended on men who became his generals and advisors. His clear view on the qualities of his commanders came from trials of hardship and battles. In appointing army commanders, he commissioned men who had demonstrated loyalty and competence, evidenced by past battle victories or deeds of outstanding merit. The Mongol army became the Mongol State by absorbing components of life-community into its domain. Eurasia* had seen mass migrations for millennia, often in response to population pressures or climate change or the rise of militant empires such as the Scythians or Huns.† The Mongol hordes were no migrating rabble nor merely a stronger tribal band seeking enrichment at the expense of aboriginal settlers. Genghis had fused his comrades and followers into a formidable force, with hundreds of thousands of warriors and millions of animals.‡ Armed with

* Geographical Eurasia was modified and transformed into political Asiatica by Mongol conquest.

†“ on the other hand, when one pastoral people, seeking to permanently occupy key pasture areas, attacked another, the latter could not resist by strategically retreating. If successful, the aggressor groups could occupy vital winter campsites and thereby take control of the whole area. Given a choice between submitting or fleeing, many defeated tribes maintained their autonomy by emigrating. Indeed, the history of central Eurasia was replete with examples of whole peoples periodically relocating hundreds, even thousands, of kilometers away and establishing new migratory ranges there. Such mass movements necessarily displaced other tribes in their turn, eventually leading to invasions of sedentary areas by those nomads occupying the margin of the steppe. These large-scale emigrations were the results of political decisions by tribes to find a new home range rather than fight for their old one.” Barfield 117.

‡ “Most of the Mongol army was mounted, with up to five horses assigned to each soldier. Add to this other provisions, which might “...include a slave or two, a weapons wagon, and a small herd of sheep and goats, it was not only a logistical nightmare in the making for the army commanders but a major calamity waiting to strike the towns, villages, and lands through which this martial storm intended to pass. Some contemporary historians have calculated the Mongol army as many as 800,000 in 1220, in which case a storm of 4 million horses and 24 million sheep and goats in addition to the highly armed troops would have swept across central Asia and Khorasan after

superior weapons and skills to use them, unity under outstanding leadership and explicit goals turned much of Central Asia into their oyster.

Primary division of army

The army was reorganized into two parts having essentially separate roles – attack and defense. The attackers consisted of the soldiers commanded by his generals – particularly his “hounds and steeds.” They would go into battle, advance against the enemy and destroy them. The defenders were his bodyguard corps. He expressed dependence on their loyalty and sacrifice:

Cinggis Khan said, “My elder nightguards who, in the cloudy night, Lying down around my vented tent Ensured that I slept in quiet and peace, You have made me gain this throne. My blessed nightguards who, in the starry night, Lying down all around my Palace tent, Ensured that I was without fear in my bed, You have made me gain the high throne. My true-hearted nightguards who in the swirling snowstorm, In shivering cold, in pouring rain, taking no rest, Stood all around my latticed tent Bringing peace to my heart, You have made me gain this throne of joy.”⁶⁶

Building castles or forts or palaces to be defensible bases was not an option. Mobility was key to his victories, and establishment of his bodyguard corps as human fortification to guard his life preserved and refined that key. An incident demonstrated the need for professional bodyguards. The threat of harm in battle was always present and predictable. Away from war and inside the *ger*, a higher level of protection was assumed by residents. After destroying the Tatars, one Qargil Sira escaped but became desperate from hunger and came to Ho’elün’s tent as a beggar. She received him and when Genghis’s fourth son, five-year old Tolui, entered, the

the sacking of Bokhara. Such an invasion would have been devastating even without the military aspect.” Lane, 116.

Tatar grabbed him and exited while pulling a knife. Boroqul's* wife, Altani, followed the pair and seized the abductor's hand holding the knife. Jetei and Jelme heard the commotion, ran with axe and knife and slew the Tatar. The incident illustrated vulnerability of the mobile base and a need for tighter security. Tolui was spared only because of quick action by Altani and the chance proximity of Jetei and Jelme, who happened to be nearby killing an ox. The incident demonstrated the vital need for intimate bodyguards and that their absence revealed an opportunity for assassination of royal family.

* Boroqul was a Tatar orphan who had been adopted and raised by Ho'elün. He saved Ögedei's life by sucking poison blood from an arrow wound.

1. Stratum-of-Being	SB ₃ (Although the incident occurred prior to formal establishment of the State, it illustrated the need for sovereign action.)
2. Security Action Platform	(Absence of) adequate protection institution[Ms].
3. Initiator (subject) + predicate + target (object)	Altani + intercepts + Qargil Sira.
4. Intended consequence	Save life of Tolui.
5. Unintended consequence	Illustrated need for personal bodyguards, Preserved life of Tolui, who became a great general.
6. Resources used	Altani quick action; nearby presence of Jetei and Jelme with killing tools.
7. Actual effect on life-length of object	Termination
8. Positive or negative for subject	Her actions reflected well on her husband, and she was considered "a second shaft for a cart for Boroqul." Major outcome - <u>Demonstrated the absolute need for reliable and omnipresent bodyguards.</u>
9. Positive or <i>negative</i> for Object	-EOL for the Tatar Qargil Sira.

Table 23: Justifying bodyguard corps - Foiling assassination of Tolui.

On the establishment of political order

People desire justice but most will settle for order. Even a political order with large measures of perceived injustice can be tolerable if the expectation from disorder is anarchy or violent revolution.* In medieval Mongolia, frequent tribal conflicts and raids

* Hitler's attraction in Weimar Germany, for example, could be attributed partly to disorder expressed in riots, inflation and vulnerability to the victorious allies. Fear of a Bolshevik-type revolution was inspired by movements such as the Marxist Spartacus League and its offshoot, the Communist Party of Germany.

raids expressed a broad picture of anarchy among clan-based units and this was ameliorated by solidarity, custom, and ritual which subjected most individuals to one or another of those units. As population grew, and young male warriors were squeezed out of their inheritance by stagnant social economy, their prospects within the group were dimmed and many chose the path of unattached warrior until they could find a leader to serve. In peaceful Tokugawa Japan, many *ronin* entered business and retired from samurai life, but in Mongolia, fighting and riding skills were valued by emergent leaders, and exacerbated internecine struggles until only one chieftain was left standing.

An army as State template requires formal hierarchy and means of enforcing commands and behavior. The 1219 campaign against the Sarta'ul bypassed cities by order of Genghis Khan to Jebe and other commanders. However, son-in-law Toqucar, coming behind Jebe attacked the border towns of Khan Melik and pillaged his peasants. Melik rose in rebellion over this and joined Jalaldin Soltan. Genghis, aided by Jebe, destroyed his enemies. He was furious over Toqucar's disobedience:

"Making *this a matter of law*, we shall execute him!" However, in the end he did not execute him, but having severely reprimanded him, he punished him by demoting him from his command of the army.⁶⁷

After establishment of his bodyguard corps for personal protection, Genghis appointed 95 commanders of thousand-man units in recognition of their loyalty and service. He also sent Jebe to capture the chieftain of the Naiman. The army became the skeleton of the State. Armies have had varying relationships to their

governments.* The Mongol army was distinctive in that it was an almost pure template for State formation, having neither religion nor ideology as justification – only protection and coercion.

Summary

Protection and coercion are the core functions of organized military force. With the military essence of the Mongol State, organized protection was hoisted to first principle, strengthened by general acceptance that a living sovereign would wield it to benefit those who served and submitted to it. To protect, a military force must have means to coerce. Tyranny, despotism, force, and discipline are among words used to describe the use of coercion by man against man, and describe relations which cause an individual to compromise or suppress his Will in deference to another person or group. The test of coercion is that, in its absence, the individual would have more choices to act differently. Coercion is both physical and psychological, and a Subject of State may submit voluntarily or after resistance. A credible threat of punishment, injury, or death usually accompanies coercion, and persuasion to submit may be verbal or physical. It always carries a loss of natural liberty. Force is present in every life-community, and is accepted as justifiable for maintaining group security and solidarity. It is ubiquitous in traditional families as a tool for raising children.

* Cromwell 's New Model Army was formed (1645) by Parliamentarians to be non-political and professional, and it overthrew Parliament and Crown authority from 1649 to 1660. Petrograd's Order Number One weakened the Russian army and facilitated Bolshevik takeover under a weakened aristocratic officer corps. The Communist Chinese army (People's Liberation Army) was the leading force in defeating the Nationalists and establishing a party dictatorship, although under Lin Biao, it came close to dominating the State. Immediately after the Bolshevik revolution, the Soviet military experimented with democratic organization. The unsurprising result was decline in discipline, so battle effectiveness required restoration of hierarchical command structure. A vestige of democratic virtue took the form of political commissar, who represented the Party, the claimed vanguard of the proletariat.

Stronger men intimidate weaker men and women. Higher status awards an added increment of durability and force to commands. Lower status individuals comply with coercive demands, sensing that diminished liberty is the price to reduce pain or postpone death or reduce material loss.

The State is the most efficient body of organized protection and coercion. Behavior of warriors was generally exempt from normal civilian rules, and dedicated weaponry was fashioned, maintained, and familiarized, distinguishing the soldiery from the general population. Tactics, intelligence, espionage, armor, flags and banners, quartermaster, and supply trains were organized and refined, requiring extraction of taxes from the population for maintenance and expansion. The Mongol State was unique in its fusion of army and life-community to a Spartan degree.

Civilization has been a process for controlling unrestricted use of coercion. For the targets of raw coercion, whether low-status workers, or slaves, or foot soldiers, resistance is dangerous, while passivity usually brings protection paybacks to compliers. With laws and regulations backed by warriors, the Mongol State expanded and confiscated wealth, destroyed resistance, and incorporated territory into a growing empire. Winning victories and destroying enemies was the clearest and most effective method for consolidating Genghis's and his Subjects' life security. An unprotected life was a short one. For his followers, war was a direct way of acquiring goods and persons to supplement peaceful means of getting needful things. "Harvesting" the necessities and surplus from others, while risking life, was not so different from hunting or killing livestock in an era and region where civil society was invisible or beyond a dozen horizons.

Four stages of Mongol expansion

Mongol expansion after 1206 went through four stages culminating in conquest. First, through military scouting parties and intelligence derived through merchants and spies, a target people and territory were identified, their weak and strong points noted, and what advantages might be acquired through conquest. Next, contacts were made, usually in the form of demands, ultimata, or offers of alliance. Third, depending on the response, the Mongol armies could advance and attack. Finally, after victory a general was placed in command of the city or kingdom, and its inhabitants assimilated into the empire through slavery, tribute, and military recruitment.

Group hunting and herding were a template of empire. In the hunt, game and their environment were explored, then various tasks were assigned to the hunters with appropriate weapons and snares, then the attack, and finally capture and kill, with care not to damage future hunts by total extermination. The Mongol style of government had resemblance to herding animals. Each species required different care, and each individual beast had use, unless there was evidence that it was dangerously untameable and therefore was culled and eliminated. As long as a conquered people acquiesced and paid taxes, their religious and social practices were not obstacles to tolerance, unless there was conflict with the *Yasa*.

The army was a composite organization created as a SAP for producing SAMs – positive protection for Mongols, negative coercion for enemies. The Mongol State described in the *Secret History* was a fusion of individual, life-community and military force. The State was created when the Khan's army defeated rivals for power. A united people, organized as an army part aristocratic

and part meritocratic, accepted discipline and sacrifice of personal liberty for the sake of greater freedom from privation. Without effective and organized coercion from a State, Mongols were left with the meager self-protections of the semi-cellular life-communities. How harmonious relations were established, maintained or damaged within the Mongol State and with other empires and kingdoms will be examined in the next Chapter.

Chapter 13: Political Concord and External Relations

...whoever is strong in mind and spirit will have power over them. Anyone who is greatly daring is right in their eyes. He who despises most things will be a lawgiver among them and he who dares most of all will be most in the right! So it has been till now and so it will always be.
Dostoevsky, *Crime and Punishment*⁶⁸

Fourteenth Security Action Platform: Social Concord

Peace without Order after the Merkit battle

The *History* describes idyllic harmony following the joint destruction of the Merkit camp. With his *anda* and retrieved wife, Temüjin moved his flocks to green pastures. Together they hunted and resumed boyhood friendship, now intensified after victorious battle. They “had captured the splendid women of the Merkit”⁶⁹ and the fruits of war sweetened life. But victory also sharpened ambitions to full leadership lurking in tribal fragility. Toghrul returned to oversee his Kereyit tribe and withdrew in the direction of the Black Forest by the Tu’ula River. The two blood brothers set up their camp in the Qorqonaq Valley. They recalled their childhood games, oaths and gift exchanges.⁷⁰

Temüjin girdled his sworn friend Jamuqa with the golden belt taken as loot from Toqto’a of the Merkit. He also gave sworn friend Jamuqa for a mount Toqto’a’s yellowish white mare with a black tail and mane, a mare that had not foaled for several years. Jamuqa girdled his sworn friend Temüjin with the golden belt taken as loot from Dayir Usun of the U’as Merkit, and he gave Temüjin for a mount the kid-white horse with a horn, also of Dayir Usun. At the Leafy Tree on the southern side of the Quldaqar Cliff in the Qorqonaq Valley they declared themselves sworn friends and loved each other; they enjoyed themselves revelling and feasting, and at night they slept together, the two of them alone under their blanket.⁷¹

After a year and a half of fraternal reflection between them, a flicker of dissent appeared when Jamuqa suggested a new camp

near the mountain. Phrased in imperative mode* rather than as a suggestion, it raised suspicion by Temüjin over possible hidden meaning for the move. Börte, who may have harbored resentment over the *andas'* intimacy, was quick to read into the quasi-command Jamuqa's claim to precedence, but she expressed it as ennui in order to personalize it to Temüjin. "Sworn friend Jamuqa, so they say, grows easily tired of his friends. Now the time has come when he has grown tired of us."⁷² Heeding her suggestion, he and his people silently broke camp that night and passed the Tayici'ut, who anticipated a conflict and joined Jamuqa. Sensing that rivalry for hegemony was brewing, men and clans chose sides. From this episode onward the rift between them grew, and many lives were lost before the Mongols had a single Khan. The mutual loyalty of the Merkit-defeating trio was based on blood brotherhood, a fiction inherently unequal by birth order. The three had very different personalities: Toghrul was cautious and suspicious, anxious of his domination over the Kereyit. Jamuqa was headstrong and ruthless, while Temüjin was more cunning and sought advice and help from others. He had first asked his mother the meaning of Jamuqa's decision of campsite change, when Börte answered first she offered an interpretation which settled the matter. Years later, as prisoner of Temüjin, Jamuqa admired the consultative support his *anda*-antagonist had received from wife and family.

The tribal wars had fundamental personal dimensions, and only elimination of rivals could bring peace. There was no religious covenant or single confession to bring harmony to the people of the

* Jamuqa said "Let us camp near the mountain" and Temüjin repeated the same words to mother Ho'elün, claiming not to understand them.

felt tents – no Islam to convert warriors into a single army, and no Christian church to assimilate pagans into higher loyalty. Later, some Mongol rulers converted to Islam, while the homeland Mongols embraced Buddhism, a non-violent faith imported from Tibet and one that suffocated the warrior ethos which had fueled the earlier empire.

On the political concord variable

The political equivalent of the social concord variable [C_L] is the degree of hostility or harmony between the State and its foundational life-communities. When State leaders have sought repression or destruction of an aristocracy or rival ruling class, subtle or overt violence occurs, as Ivan IV and his struggle with the boyars, or Qin Shi Huangdi's dissolution of old kingdoms or the Tokugawa Shogun against the western han. More peaceful and effective was Louis XIV's bankrupting the nobility by forcing them to attend court at Versailles, after they had been defeated in the Fronde war, or Tokugawa establishment of the *sankin kotai* – an annual residence in Edo requiring *daimyo* pomp at home and in the capital, as well as leaving hostages with the Shogun.* Genghis Khan accomplished similar results, first with war, and then by reorganizing the army.

War and conflict are ubiquitous in human history, and with occasional periods of long peace. Tranquility and war are variables directly affecting participant and victim longevity. Individual conflicts in the absence of firm social institutions or lacking legal

* The house of Tokugawa's hegemony was established after victory at the Battle of Sekigahara (1600).

intervention by a State are most intense and reflect the primary Stratum-of-Being (SB₁). Violence can result when passion is dominant and perceived external consequences few. Where kinship and community prevail, destructive passions are bridled by custom and rules since group enforcement significantly raises the cost of acting out individual emotion. Clans and tribes maintain internal peace by appeal to actual and fictive lineage as well as applying sanctions against disruptive behavior. The State, man's tertiary Stratum-of-Being (SB₃), keeps the peace by encouraging compliance from individuals to abide by life-community's rules, and reinforcing that compliance with laws. When most individuals habituate law-abiding behavior, reinforced by reason and punishment, a resemblance to civil society emerges, and extreme penalties can be diminished or eliminated.

The State offers peace and concord by outlawing inter-tribal violence, and deliberately reduces the freedom of individuals to carry out retributive injury against others. To accomplish this, the State must have credible means to exact punishment of individuals who injure others, and wisdom to distinguish who is wronged and which party unjustly inflicted injury. A person who takes the law into his own hands (vigilantism), even when adjudged in the right, threatens State integrity and its agents' claims to act on behalf of the State. Men are made peaceable by accepting the injunction to obey laws, and by joining the community of trust and subordination premised on enforced illusion of an omnipresent State. The terms of human existence are altered by the State. The surrender of direct independence - to protect oneself or initiate actions in response to dominant passions - is considered an acceptable bargain and without recourse in the presence of a muscular State.

The Eurasian paradox was that the Mongol conquests revealed two contrary themes. Theme One was that the land mass was a geographical unity which could be traversed and conquered by a single determined army – or united by mutual interest.* Later armies of Napoleon and Hitler understood and sought to achieve tri-continental unity.† Roads, railways, and pipelines create a modern Silk Road to carry goods and people if economic and political obstacles are reduced. Technology and the end of the Cold War have stimulated this continental subset of globalization to emerge.‡

Theme Two is national identity, jealous of autonomy and based on cultural adaptation to physical and social environments. Long before the emergence of modern nationalism, disparate communities evolved with unique customs, religion, language and economies. Trade and cultural intercourse flourished in most periods with little assimilation. For Russians and Chinese, the Mongol lesson was the necessity to strengthen defenses and tighten control of the State over society and territory. A Russian State emerged out of Muscovy during Mongol domination and reached imperial breadth under the Romanovs. The post-Mongol Ming dynasty rebuilt the Great Wall, tightened its northern defenses and refined the bureaucracy to have closer control over society.

* The Macedonian Alexander had reacted against the Persian wars against Greece, and penetrated well into Central Asia and India. Other steppe peoples, including the Scythians and Huns, invaded parts of Europe, so connections between east and west were well-traversed from early times.

† There has also been a more peaceful and partial pan-Asianism, reflected in positive periods of Sino-Russian relations, Malaysian “Look East” policies, less peaceful Japan’s pre-war Greater Co-Prosperity Sphere, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

‡ The Mongol empire demoted "Eurasia" to geographical landform, and defined the spatial realm "Asiatica."

Establishing a Mongol political contract: Reduction of warfare

Genghis Khan harmonized the interests of the tribes through war, coercion and a record of victories. A higher PCV (Political Concord Variable) facilitated Mongol confidence to attack adjacent tribes and kingdoms. The not-yet-hostile separation of Temüjin and Jamuqa at the Qorqonaq Valley festered into friction and rivalry, with war the final arbiter. Practically every tribe of note had a complement of warriors available for defense. As the two aspiring khans gathered support from clans, tribes and itinerant fighters, two nuclei of quasi-States formed to vie for dominance. After the Qorqonaq separation, Altan, Qucar and Saca Beki came to Temüjin to make him Khan, swearing to serve and obey him. He accepted and assigned guard and quartermaster duties to his entourage. It was here that he assumed formal Khanship over some, but not all, the Mongol tribes. He could not assume actual sovereignty so long as Jamuqa opposed him with his coalition. He informed Toghrul of his “coronation” and was congratulated for uniting the Mongols.⁷³ Jamuqa was livid and blamed Altan and Qucar for “poking in the flanks, pricking the ribs of the sworn friend.”⁷⁴

Overt conflict was inevitable over who would rule supreme, and only a minor event was needed to transform a crime and retribution into *casus belli*. Taicar, a kinsman of Jamuqa, stole a herd of horses from Jochi Darmala, who pursued alone, killed him with an arrow and retrieved his horses. Jamuqa vowed revenge and led an attack on Temüjin. The new khan rallied an equal number of men and they fought a battle at Dalan Baljut (“Seventy Marshes”). Beaten back, Temüjin and his forces retreated into a gorge by the Onan River. The personal fused with the political, and jealousy catapulted into a war waiting to start. It was one of the several

turning points where low political concord was a platform turning social vendetta into growing face-off competing for supremacy. Jochi Darmala's killing (negative Security Action Monad) of Taicar sparked and ignited the conflagration that would not end until either Jamuqa or Temüjin was defeated. Low political concord was a SAP in which two opposing forces collided and launched the multiple negative SAMs of battle.

Earlier, Jamuqa's leadership over the clans was tacitly acknowledged when he coordinated forces to attack the Merkit. Not until Temüjin became Khan of all the Mongols could he claim to be sovereign in name and as well as in fact. His power came not from laws, but by defeating two one-time allies who disputed his ascension. As "last man standing," he left no other candidate to be Great Khan. Resistance was futile among the clans and tribes, and he amply rewarded his followers with posts, privileges, wealth and captives.

Taicar's killing initiated the battle for supremacy at a time when political concord was low and war seemed inevitable between two ambitious leaders. Had the herd theft and fatal retrieval occurred in a tribal setting, social concord could have been restored by negotiations, arbitration, blood money or wrestling match. However, both leaders recognized the volatile balance of power and sought to eliminate the other as contender. The killing laid bare the fissure between two ambitious leaders and initiated the wars to decide who would be sovereign Khan.

1.	Stratum-of-Being	(Nascent) State (SB ₃)
2.	Security Action Platform	Political concord [C ₅]- Low political concord variable was conducive to conflict outbreak.
3.	Initiator (subject) + predicate + target (object)	Jochi Darmala (JD) + kills + Taicar (over horse theft).
4.	Intended consequence	JD retrieved his herd; avenged theft by eliminating Taicar.
5.	Unintended consequence	Triggered Temüjin-Jamuqa war.
6.	Resources used	Assuming JD confronted the horse thief alone: If a band of JD comrades had gone with him, they might have intimidated Taicar and retrieved the horses without further incident. Alone, JD may have had no choice but shooting Taicar.
7.	Actual effect on life-length of object	Violent end of life (EOL) for Taicar; numerous casualties in the ensuing war.
8.	Positive or <i>negative</i> for subject	+Retrieved JD property; exacted rough justice - <i>Negative=triggered Jamuqa vendetta</i>
9.	Positive or <i>negative</i> for Object	- <i>EOL for Taicar.</i>

Table 24: Jochi Darmala kills Taicar.

The ultimate purpose of war is peace, achieved by neutralizing or destroying opposing forces. The conundrum “killing for peace” reveals purpose and target where law does not prevail. Temüjin’s battles and alliances were affairs where winning was not only domination, but acquisition of booty and slaves to be distributed as payment to followers. Victory carried its own momentum and as the steppes had few natural borders, the opportunity for further conquests seemed endless.

Notion of political concord variable

The PCV is analogous to social concord's measure (SCV), which ranges between zero and one, with political concord towards the upper limit of 1.00 and discord intensifying towards 0.00. Political conflict exists within a State (whether it is potential, nascent, embryonic or actual) where social conflict may be rooted in individual actions and attitudes, leveraged by kinship or other affective groups. Individuals engage in political conflict primarily as Subjects or as members of government-created bodies including the royal court, aristocracy, military, bureaucracy, dependent churches and State education system. The political is State-defined, and PCV has dimensions only where the State is present as a frame of reference. A PCV is largely determined by degrees of acceptance or rejection of sovereignty. Jamuqa and Temüjin each sought exclusive sovereignty and fought over who would have full control in an emerging State. Sovereignty consisted of full power over disposing and allocating security resources for self, family, officials and Subjects. A low PCV accompanied credible claims to challenge sovereignty and could only be increased by reducing or eliminating those challenges.

Genghis Khan nurtured trust as the correlative of loyalty.* Replacing organic suspicion of non-kin with military discipline and mutual reliance was part of the foundation of Mongol political order

* "As we attempt to overcome suspicions over the motives and desires of those closest to us, we can build relationships of trust. Trust and suspicion are, therefore, not opposed but are bound up in one another. The fear of betrayal is at the productive core of social and political interaction. Through the attempt to overcome suspicion, or at least put it to one side, the possibility for a more benign form of sociality is created." Thiranagama, 17.

– a prerequisite of political concord. Men cooperate, and modify their wants in order to reduce conflict and to better acquire needed things. Trust is imperative and is the result of words exchanged in sincerity and of deeds performed out of habit. Compromise and reciprocity reduce human friction and enhance trustful relationships. Betrayal is a violation of social trust, while treason is a high crime against the State. Trust is an individual's expectation that another person will not behave in a way contrary to his vital interests. The highest form of this expectation is to depend on another person with one's life. In this one-to-one relationship, the life security of both is reinforced and their mortality risks are reduced. Trust is a condition of mind expressed in voluntary words and acts which reinforce the mutual commitments of two persons to honor and strive for benefits to be shared or distributed.

Expansion of partnerships; *Three Musketeers*

Adding third and fourth person to a partnership is both risk and benefit. Alexandre Dumas' novel, *The Three Musketeers*, proclaims "*tous pour un, un pour tous*," and their brotherhood, expanded to include D'Artagnan, is sealed and renewed in combat and conspiracy. Throughout the history of war, small unit combat has been the organizational spearhead of successful battles, indicating that fraternal feelings can be expanded above simple pairings, but are most effective within the numerical limit of a large family or modern army platoon. A higher though less intimate level of loyalty is possible but not many more than 150 persons.*

* "Most people can neither intimately know, nor gossip effectively about, more than 150 human beings." Harari, 17.

Summary


The vulnerability of individual human life has been reduced over centuries. Institutional arrangements, from the nuclear family through life-community to the modern State, have been largely based on superior-inferior relationships under which have developed habits of trust and cooperation. Various world religions have reinforced and ritualized those habits. The modern State is based less on contract in the Hobbesian sense, and more on an emotional replacement of filial and feudal bonds with an exclusive affection for a society without gradation – an organic nation to replace the life-community which, in the mind of Rousseau, was corrupted with unjust inequality.

Peace, or political concord, is a condition envisioned by philosophers and sought by most people most of the time. Its durability in those eras when achieved is more than the absence of war, and required institutions and attitudes conducive to continuation. Hobbes wrote that formation of a commonwealth and a government with adequate force to maintain law would secure peace. The roots of war may be found in clan and tribal distinctions between “us and them,” which tend to diminish the value of others’ lives. Formation of a State, even despotic, tends to reduce internal violence. Peace among Mongols was purchased at the price of bloodshed and destruction. Those who survived and dominated were enrolled as Subjects in Genghis Khan’s army-State. For many, the option was surrender or immediate death. As he and his successors pursued the project of larger Asian conquest, the same choices were offered to non-Mongols. The words of Tacitus, (“They make a desert and call it peace”) were more accurate for the Mongols than the Romans, who built roads, aqueducts, and left a

legacy of law for Europe. Roman infrastructure, grandeur and governance was easier to accomplish with the Mediterranean Greek legacy, existing maritime markets, and compact geography. The Mongol assimilation of conquered tribes preceded wholesale destruction of Asian cities and peoples, finally resulting in a period of peace and prosperity, but practically no monuments or material infrastructure. Internal dissension among new generations of khans broke down cohesion of the empire, while trade and religion eroded warrior elan when the limits of conquest were reached. The Mongol empire exhibited a potential to become a world State through massive wars to wipe out or subjugate all opposition.

The Jochi Darmala/Taicar incident demonstrated that tribal or national wars could be sparked by relatively minor incidents if one party decided it could profit by launching a response in force. After his headquarters and army had consolidated, Genghis Khan turned to the empires on his periphery with intentions of increasing wealth to pay his army, and provide sons and generals with territory to exploit. Ambition, Will-to-Power, and military success propelled Genghis Khan to iconic oriental despotism, and political order prevailed over his territory as never before. The temptation to translate political concord into greater military reach and conquest was too great to resist.

Fifteenth Security Action Platform: External relations [E₃]



Map 1: Eurasia at the beginning of the thirteenth century . Note the Mongol location in Northeast Asia, and the extent of empires and kingdoms which they would conquer in the next century. Source: <http://www.karakalpak.com/mongols.html>



Map 2: Approximate location of the major tribal groups in North-East Asia during the 12th century.⁷⁵

State unification -

The narrative of every State in history is inscribed on US coinage - *E Pluribus Unum*. “Out of many” (*E Pluribus*) begs the question of “many what”? What are the units being unified? Individuals? Tribes? Provinces? City-States? Whatever the answer, a State primarily consists of persons who have been united for the ostensible purpose of protection. The State has no material substance – it is an arrangement of mortal soul/bodies who adapt their behavior to the belief in a powerful entity, under which rulers, through the apparatus of government, make and enforce laws, take

tribute and taxes, wage war, control territory and people, and act in accord under a single sovereignty. The Mongol State was a credible entity in that sovereignty, laws, personnel and protective/coercive apparatus were present and effective. Unlike many historical States, the Mongol version was less fixated on territory and marked frontiers, than by extension of military conquests over people and their wealth. The military campaigns were driven by need to provide pastures for herds, Subjects for the growing royal clan and generals, booty to pay warriors, and vengeance for past injuries. As Mongol armies advanced in several directions, a pattern of action emerged where insults or broken promises justified attack.*

Mongol State unification

Centuries later, Otto von Bismarck assembled princely States under Prussian leadership to form the German State, and it shattered French dominance in Western Europe. An analogous medieval development occurred when Genghis Khan united the tribes and destroyed a large part of multi-State Eurasia in wars of conquest. On the one hand, the lands and wealth of Khwarazm, Tanguts and Jin beckoned to his armies needing pasturage for horses and booty for warriors. Limited Mongol consolidation and prosperity would not be secure when surrounded by stronger and wealthier empires and kingdoms who despised them. The Mongols used statecraft and war to neutralize and suppress actual and potential threats.

* Mongol State policy was initially vendetta writ large.

The State and human life security

While individual and life-community have direct effect on the lifespan of persons, States indirectly affect larger numbers through war, laws and the economic arrangements which structure and alter rewards or punishments. Foundations for nationhood are laid when human organizations transcend kinship and embrace all who claim a common allegiance for mutual purpose. State conditions prevail when a contiguous territory is occupied by a people governed by a single sovereign, where laws are established, a unified army is created, and a finance system imposed.

Western thoughts on war

Like "State", "war" is an abstraction describing phenomena having a common purpose and comprised of multiple actions. States and war are inseparable. Thucydides argued that three primary reasons for waging war are reasonable fear, honour, and interest. The Romans imposed peace by preparing for war - *Si vis pacem, para bellum*. Rousseau considered war a matter between States, not man v. man. Hegel thought wars would never be eliminated as long as the world divided into States. The linkage between States and the phenomenon of war has been fairly constant in Western thought, so tribal wars have largely been considered to be feuds and the mark of uncivilized barbarians. Nonetheless, there is much in common between tribe v. tribe and State v. State conflicts. The Mongol tribal wars which ultimately eliminated opposition to Temüjin were a rehearsal for later foreign wars. Fighting for his life was a perennial activity for Temüjin and had intruded into his childhood as a result of Tatar vengeance. Killing was a constant companion on the steppes - whether animals or persons. Tribal wars were bloody affairs with winners who took all and the defeated side losing life

and possessions. Killing animals for sustenance and battling enemies were necessities imposed by hard life and relative anarchy of the steppe. But successful survival also required accommodation and compromise with individuals who could alleviate some of the negative inputs to survival.

Mongol State-to-State relations consisted of diplomacy, war, alliance, espionage, and trade. Once Genghis Khan had consolidated dominion over Mongol and peripheral tribes, he turned attention towards two States which had given major offense in the past. The capture, torture and execution of Temüjin's great grandfather gave him rationale to attack the adjacent Jin empire. Jin-backed Tatars who poisoned Yisügei fused personal and tribal revenge. The steppe and forest arena of tribal affairs was a school where Temüjin learned to deal with inter-State affairs. War, alliance and trade comprised the chief elements of Genghis Khan's diplomatic quiver.

Genghis Khan's new State found precedents in his life-protecting experiences as well as observations, and he drew on advice from knowledgeable non-Mongol advisors. Fragments of imperial China in Jin provided part of a durable template – one which did not require religious sovereignty as did medieval Islamic or Christian States. Conquest of territory and their peoples was a direct method of acquiring resources for the new State, even at the expenditure of Mongol lives and arrows. Winning victories created its own momentum, and vicious massacres and destruction cowed surviving populations into submission. Major campaigns were preceded by diplomacy measuring the intention of the targeted State, or brief raids and incursions to test military preparedness and fighting ability, and by espionage to provide military, political, economic and social intelligence to discover strong and weak points.

On the grasslands, thin populations and land/climate hostile to agriculture precluded urbs and their benefits. Life security was a fragile blossom. A harsh natural environment and tribal anarchy made for strenuous survival, and only the strong could prevail. The most effective antidote to early and violent death was to be a hammer rather than a nail – to be a ferocious wolf instead of a timid rabbit. As wolves are more aggressive in packs* than alone, collective action as tribes offered humans the most protection. The political landscape was checkered with occasional tribal warfare, with some rising to the top of the food chain, and then becoming prey to upstarts. Five tribes comprised the immediate political landscape faced by Temüjin – Merkit, Tatars, Kereyit, Tayici'ut and Naiman.

As long as internecine warfare had dominated the Mongol steppe, the Chinese and their allies could exercise hegemony and prevent concentration of power under a single upstart leader. To the truism that most individuals prefer peace to war, there is the possible exception of warriors, armies and their commanders, whose arms profession is predicated on the preparation for, engagement in, and conclusion of, war. Extended peace leads to prolonged garrison duty, corruption, and civilian amnesia on the importance of strong defenses. On a primeval level, peace is boring and war exciting. An emergent military leader will renew the vigor of disparate warriors by giving them purpose and opportunity for deployment of skills and strengths. War heralds EOL for many combatants and

* Tracking wolf packs in the Yellowstone Ecosystem demonstrated how they aggressively eliminated coyotes or attacked other packs who trespassed in their territory. Pat Shipman, *The Invaders: How Humans and Their Dogs Drove Neanderthals to Extinction* (Harvard University Press, 2015), 94.

bystanders, and creates new relationships among individuals and peoples. Wars ensue within circumstances of rivalry or desperation or ambition. They also occur as the result of deliberate provocation and ambition.* Genghis Khan was an impresario in initiating wars of conquest. The destruction of the Merkit was the first instance in which the sequence of events and his actions have a strong scent of manipulation for the purpose of igniting a winnable war.

Khwarazm - Significance of the campaign

Prior to the Khwarazm campaign, Mongol wars had been waged on tribes who had a history of hostile interaction. A *casus belli* was generally based on avenging past injury and current opposition or non-cooperation. The Khwarazm empire was *terra incognita* to the Mongols. Ruler and Subjects were Muslim, and there had been little interaction except in the far west of the nascent Mongol empire. Judging that Khwarazm was a sovereign power equal to or greater than his own, Genghis made peaceful overtures for trade and diplomacy, and it was unlikely that war or conquest was uppermost, since the Jin and Tangut wars were still unresolved.

The sequence of events was as follows:
Güçülük, son of the Naiman Khan, had escaped Genghis's vengeance, and found refuge among the Kara-Khitai. He married a daughter of their Gurkhan (khan), renounced his Christian faith and became a devout Buddhist. He then gathered his scattered tribesmen and secured support from the Sultan of Khwarazm, who

* As an example of a provocation to start a war, an explosion in Mukden on September 18, 1931 was engineered by Japanese military officers to initiate a takeover the whole of Manchuria. The Chinese government had done its best to avoid a fight with the Japanese, and was unprepared for the onslaught. The gains for the Japanese empire were huge, and the incident may be considered the flash point of World War II.

bridled at paying tribute to the Gurkhan. Together they attacked, and the Sultan's forces defeated the Kara-Khitai. Gücülük suffered defeat but taking advantage Khwarazm's victory, took over his former guardian's realm and imposed a strict Buddhist regime. Imams were forced to convert, and he prohibited public religious services. His growing strength on the Mongol frontier was a threat to Genghis Khan's security, and so Jebe commanded a 20,000 man force and was sent to attack Gücülük at Kashgar (1218), where he proclaimed the Mongol principle of religious toleration and liberation from heavy taxes. The population revolted and the usurper was killed.⁷⁶

Jebe's expedition brought Mongol forces into contact with Khwarazm. Genghis Khan offered all booty to the Sultan, and ordered no hostile actions against his troops. He invited envoys to his camp and declared that he regarded the Sultan as ruler of the West, and that he was ruler in the East. The "Western Ruler" increasingly viewed Genghis as a rival, and was incensed to be considered equal to him.* Nevertheless, the Sultan declared war, claiming to follow "Allah's Will" to destroy all idolators. Genghis attempted to mollify the Sultan by sending gifts and offering trade relations with anticipated Mongol-controlled north China, where he had support of caravan merchants. He proposed a treaty of peace and friendship for mutual benefit.† "We should undertake to assist and support each other in times of need and to ensure the security of

* The East-West offer and Khwarazm rejection has distant echo with Mao Zedong's emergence in 1949 and his thorny relationship with Stalin.

† The faint foreshadowing of the Sino-Soviet alliance (1950-1969) is tantalizing in demonstrating Mongolian location at a strategic pivot in East-West relations.

the caravan routes from disastrous incidents in order that merchants, on whose flourishing trade the welfare of the world depends, may move freely hither and thither.”⁷⁷ The Sultan interpreted these words to be a deceptive cover for ambitious plans of conquest, although not likely since Mongols were still fighting a war with the Jurchid in China. Jebe and Sübe’etei had launched a raid into southern Russia against the Khwarazm-supported Kipchak, and larger clashes were forthcoming.

In 1218, a Mongol trading caravan arrived in Otrar, and the governor, Inal-khan (a cousin of the Sultan’s mother), hearing that the traders were spies and were spreading dissent among the population, had the merchants massacred and seized their goods. Genghis could not ignore the provocation and declared war after one futile attempt to have Inal-khan handed over for retribution. The Sultan’s response was to kill the Mongol envoys rather than risk alienating his maternal kin, upon whom he depended for Turkic tribal support. The Khwarazm outrages provoked the Mongol Khan and he prepared an armed response. Although one of the most extensive empires in Central Asia, Khwarazm was a fragile confederacy of tribes, with numerous internal conflicts. Genghis exploited dissent and offered clemency to those who surrendered. The Mongols and their allies circulated forged letters purporting allegiance of Khwarazm nobles to Genghis Khan. Suspecting his own allies and fearful of a coup by a successful commander, the Sultan kept his forces under divided commands – a strategy which allowed Mongol piecemeal victories. One by one the cities fell – those who resisted were put to sword and surviving populations enslaved. Cities which capitulated without resistance were spared. Samarkand was the crown jewel of the Khwarazm empire and wealthy terminus on the Silk Road. After major defections and a ten-

day siege, the city yielded to the Mongol army (1220). The Sultan then became a fugitive and died a natural death (pneumonia) on an island in the Caspian Sea (January 1221). The fight continued against the Sultan's successor, Jalal ad-Din, who resisted ferociously, then fled across the Indus, where his army was destroyed and he barely escaped with horse and life.

The conquest of Khwarazm brought Mongol might into Islamic Asia, and then into Russia. Jochi's Golden Horde destroyed Kiev (December 1240), occupied much of the Russian heartland, and won victories in Hungarian fields, poised to enter Western Europe. Relatively impoverished medieval Europe and a deficit of equine pasturage made further inroads unattractive, and death (December 11, 1241) of Ögedei Khan brought khanship-contending generals back to Mongolia, sparing Rome, Florence, Paris and other centers from the fates of Kiev, Samarkand and Bokhara. Christian Europe survived to generate Renaissance, Reformation, Enlightenment and global exploration.

Had the Khwarazm Sultan and Genghis Khan concluded a stable condominium of northern Asia we might speculate that Mongol globalization would not have occurred. The closest parallel would be the Sino-Soviet relationship during the 1950s and early 1960s – Russian dominance over the Soviet empire extending from Eastern Europe to Kamchatka, and Chinese Communist control of its homeland with ambitions to extend influence over Southeast Asia and other frontier areas, including North Korea, Nepal, Pakistan, Mongolia, and Taiwan. Khwarazm was an Islamic State built on tribal alliances, while the Mongol State was foremost a military State subordinating tribal loyalties into a unitary entity. A shrewd Genghis Khan recognized the Sultan's weaknesses and

exploited them to advantage. Stalin, had he lived beyond 1953, might have brought Mao Zedong to heel, but his successors lacked his ruthless personality and strategic shrewdness. Khrushchev may have weakened totalitarian advantage with his “Secret Speech” in 1956, allowing Mao to consolidate his power and aspire to leadership of the world Communist movement.

External relations as Security Action Platform

How is the world of diplomacy and war a Security Action Platform? First, metamorphosis of warrior bands into an organized army is a key marker for emergence of the higher Stratum-of-Being identified as State (SB₃), and as depicted, occurred when Temüjin defeated his main rivals, assumed Mongol khanship, and organized a unified Mongol army. The sequence of events culminating in Mongol defeat of Khwarazm traced to the extended campaign against the Naiman, whose aristocracy were of Turkic origin. The chain of events leading to Khwarazm defeat began after the Naiman Khan succumbed to Mongol might, frightened into retreat by Jamuqa’s exaggerations of Genghis’s generals. His successor Gücülük Qan, as noted above, fled to protection under Kara-Khitai. A fierce enemy, he could endanger the Mongol’s western flank and so Jebe was sent to neutralize or destroy him. His clash with Khwarazm forces was the first in what became the downfall of their Islamic empire. Security of the Mongol State intersected with military necessity – Gücülük was successor to leadership of a tribe which had been backbone of opposition, and with his takeover of Kara-Khitai and support of Khwarazm, he could once again inflict great damage on the Mongols. The campaign against him can be summarized as an aggregate SAP. In this incident, Genghis Khan was thinking strategically and in terms of the Mongol State’s

interests. It was no longer a tribe-against-tribe conflict, but had become (Mongol) State v. (Kara-Khitai) State growing out of a remaining tribal threat.

01. Stratum-of-Being	State (SB ₃)
02. Security Action Platform	15. External relations [E ₃] – Gücülük had seized sovereign control over Kara-Khitai.
03. Initiator (subject) + predicate + target (object)	Jebe + attacks + Gücülük.
04. Intended consequence	Destroy Gücülük and Naimans; secure Mongol Western flank.
05. Unintended consequence	Mongol force fought against Khwarazm army defending Gücülük.
06. Resources required v. used	Jebe army <i>Army plus policy of religious toleration to halt persecution of Muslims.</i>
07. Actual effect on life-length of object	EOL
08. Positive or <i>negative</i> for subject	+Defeat of Naiman, replaced with Mongol hegemony. <i>Provoked Khwarazm suspicions of Mongol strategic agenda, and increased likelihood of a new war.</i>

Table 25: Jebe campaigns against the Naiman Gücülük.

In considering this Security Action Platform, human life security is enlarged under State political order, which can be maintained only by accommodating or opposing interference from other States. It requires, as James C. Scott suggests, “Seeing Like a State.”⁷⁸ State resilience demands a record of achievement. Unity under law, judicious deployment of security actions, and balanced partnership with life-community elements facilitate a State which can overcome external and domestic threats to population longevity. A major incentive to widen support for State formation is to

neutralize actions and threats from other States or tribes. A State must deal with those either as equals or superiors or inferiors, and as allies or enemies or neutrals. Depending on social and political concord, management of external relations necessitates diplomacy, war, negotiations, tribute, and espionage.

There were no natural boundaries to demarcate territory and no cities to symbolize a center – only a Khan, his lineage, and his invocation of Mongol unity personified and insured enforcement of the tentative State. Government did not become the complex of officials, commissions, agencies and laws which the modern State requires. Rather, the axis of Mongol sovereignty was vested in the Khan, who resided in a movable ger, pulled by a dozen or more oxen. Employment of foreign experts carried out the functions of government, and war-making, pacification and peace-keeping remained the primary mission of the Mongol State. Demobilization would have blunted the outward thrust of the Mongols, had they adequate civilian occupations roughly equal in generating income to that gained in war pursuits. Any hope of beating swords into plowshares was negated by recognition there was little land worth plowing. More important was that the political environment of hostile empires and suspicious tribes offered little possibility of post-unification tranquility. Like the Warring States era in ancient China, peace might be secured by consensus among roughly equal kingdoms, or by a single conqueror achieving hegemony. Genghis Khan tried diplomacy but knew that war was more decisive. Conquest of land and people, using terror when necessary, and having the strongest army in the field proved to be the key to State and life security.

Summary

The concept of sovereign nation-State had not yet appeared in the medieval lexicon and would not become part of European vocabulary for several hundred years. Nonetheless, institutions and practices we moderns associate with States became part of the Mongol Khanate from 1206. Other kingdoms and empires scarcely took notice of that grand *quraltai*, or else they viewed it as a feeble confederation of tribes destined to fall apart after a few years with the death of its leader. By stressing a common nomadic lifestyle, contiguous territory, worship of Tengri, and sharing the Mongol language, he created the foundation of the Mongol nation. Men had been sorting themselves into ethnic, tribal and religion groupings since time immemorial, and Genghis Khan was creating a common Mongol political identity for pragmatic reasons. Initially the territory of the Mongol State extended as far as the traditional pasturage of member tribes, and contained few permanent settlements. All persons were automatically Subjects, and the Khan had the right to mobilize all, along with their property, to carry out purposes of the State. Ordering the adaptation of Uighur orthography to Mongolian, he facilitated record keeping. With advisors consisting of family members, commanders, and foreign experts, he formed a government that managed the new Mongol State.

The Mongols assembled essential components of a State – sovereign ruler, formidable army, a population accepting the new order, and exclusive control over contiguous territory. The hardscabble existence of the past would be no more, and encampments, not walled cities, were the bases of the Mongol State. The Mongol empire emerged out of tribal society and Genghis Khan

would not abolish those kin-based units which had given identity and security to his base. The State was the entity giving cohesion to a reconstituted people, making them less vulnerable to mutual violence and raiding tribes. It restructured the security actions which reinforced lives and mitigated harm from enemy.

Chapter 14: Conclusion

Yet all things must die.
The stream will cease to flow;
The wind will cease to blow;
The clouds will cease to fleet;
The heart will cease to beat.
“All Things Will Die”, Alfred, Lord Tennyson.

Great transformation – liberation from necessity

The Mongol State, once set in outward motion, shattered the heterogeneous kingdoms, tribes and empires scattered over the Eurasian landmass. While unique in historical significance, it was hardly an outlier in State-making. Anthrocentric Security Theory has framed that as progress through three Strata-of-Being, focusing on mortal individuals as creators of their own protections. Philosophical anthropology provides a set of ideas to locate human longevity as the central purpose of security actions.

Order is conducive to longevity and annulled by violence.* Until the nineteenth century, the universe and rationality in human affairs seemed to exhibit a natural order that most believed to have originated in divine creation. Man was liberated from religion and its alleged oppressions, but could he live a moral life without religion? Science, invention and industry accelerated progress and prosperity, and man seemed in control of his own destiny. Democracy replaced despotisms and aristocratic feudalism. However, two world wars, global economic depression and the rise

* Modern man has forgotten how violent were earlier eras, even where a semblance of civil society prevailed. See Johan Norberg, *Progress: Ten Reasons to Look Forward to the Future*, especially Chapter 5, “Violence.”

of dictators, totalitarianism and efficient genocide demonstrated man's incapacity to transform knowledge and prosperity into full freedom or concord. For a relative minority, industrialization brought freedom from daily necessity of seeking sustenance, with more leisure to pursue pleasure, science and cultural enrichment.

Genghis Khan's single-generation transition from SB₁ through SB₂ to SB₃ demonstrated that life on the steppe was a matriculation into the institutions of life-community and State already present in adjoining and distant regions. The Mongols amalgamated their rudimentary skills and needs into borrowed features of adjacent civilizations to construct their *über*-tribe. But for all the ingenuity and adaptation, a mature and thriving civil society failed to materialize. Fragmentation of the empire into khanates and hordes occurred to dissolve its initial unity, local cultures exerted centrifugal influence, and failure of Mongol warriors to adapt to urban existence all contributed to non-emergence of a Mongol civil society. Acceptance of a Buddhist overlay on homeland institutions subsequently raised Mongol consciousness, but prospered in a post-imperial era after Ming restoration of a unified Chinese empire. The Golden Horde continued to rule Russia until Ivan IV's counter-attack, and remnant Tatars either settled in enclaves, assimilated, or retreated eastward. Perhaps adherence to warrior ethos, nomadism, and animal husbandry was sufficient barrier to SB₄ and dictated by the hard reality of steppe life. As the modern sovereign nation-state has refined and become ever more effective in strengthening life security as prolonging life, postponing death, it may also have accelerated its distinctiveness from existing States and societies which have not established mature civil societies. As claims of rationality, secularism and equality are pursued and expanded by modern States, Asiatica's sovereign entities hesitate. They continue

to find strength from life-communities and religious faith, so are less enthusiastic over the advanced forms of civil society characteristic of thoroughly modern States – especially in matters of global homogenization. Moreover, Russia and China experienced extreme State domination of society under communism, and their Subjects suffered terribly as consequence. Communism claimed to be an even more advanced form of the State, bringing rationality, equality and liberation – promises which soured into famine and poverty. Western liberal democracy also promises much, but has lost attractiveness since the end of the Cold War.

Democracy, science and reason promised mankind's liberation from despotism, poverty and superstition. Much progress has been accompanied by refinement and massive expansion of State power. In contrast, life-community seems retrograde. For millenia it induced cooperation and trust, reduced local violence, and accommodated diverse talents and personalities. Kinship has the advantage of creating dependability and collective consciousness in life-community and within the State. However, clans and tribes remain limited in size* and influence unless custom allows for exogenous infusion of new blood and new genes. Arranged marriage has traditionally been practiced to maximize economic and political advantage, often with bride price or bride dowry as inducements. The practice also brings groups closer together and helps to form alliances. A side effect is to increase the value of women born higher in the social order, but also to restrict their freedom by imposing greater restrictions based on honor and

* Yuval Noah Harari cites studies claiming that 150 persons is the maximum for group membership to be effective. *Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind* (New York: Harper, 2015).

feminine virtue. Another practice to expand relations beyond the chains of kinship was blood brotherhood – a voluntary oath sealed in blood of artificial fraternity, often held as sacred as birth brotherhood.

Effective despotism as crucial in assembling power

Men in life-community have sought security in a political order which was less the result of contract and agreement, and more an imposition of despotism – especially during times of anarchy and violence. Even constitutional democracies resort to extraordinary emergency powers during war, which may approach dictatorial powers.* Tyranny and despotism are traditionally terms used to describe government or entities which seek to rule with absolute power. While despotism is considered corrupt and inferior to constitutional democracy, J. S. Mill wrote that despotic government could serve to civilize people ("barbarians") who were not prepared for self-government – a rationale that served the European colonial powers through the nineteenth century.⁷⁹ Montesquieu deplored the conditions which made despotism necessary for a large portion of humanity. Some tyrants were acceptable if they demonstrated a degree of “enlightenment” and concentrated power for the sake of improving and civilizing their subjects. Liberty could be withheld and obedience to despotism enforced if the purpose was spreading enlightenment and benefits of civilization. A monarchy could be simultaneously despotic and enlightened, if government was directed to good ends, and not practiced solely for the enrichment of the ruler. Paternalism – a ruler treating his Subjects as virtual

* John Wilkes Booth on killing Abraham Lincoln, shouted ‘*Sic semper tyrannis*’ (‘Thus always to tyrants’).

children – had merit if he expected those "children" to grow into mature adults, and prepared them – through protection, education and guidance – for that end. Treating them as permanent children was a form of tyranny. American constitution writers were aware of this danger, and designed a government with limited powers to immunize against despotism.

The Mongol conquest demonstrated that Central Asia was a cockpit from which the great empires of Persia and China could be conquered, and from there, the Middle East, and Russia attacked and subjugated.* Post-Mongol State evolution in Asia responded to the need for stronger defenses against conquerors from the steppes, but were unprepared for later European gunboats attacking and trading in their coastal waters. Eastern Europe fell and Western Europe was saved only by the event of a Khan's death. When the Mongol empire reached its apogee, its nexus was Silk Road trade to nourish its economy, a system of couriers for communication, and backed up by threat of re-conquest in case of rebellion. Eurasia is a geographical unity trod by Mongol armies, and their maximum extent is a political continuum we can call Asiatica – those lands conquered by them as an episode of political unity. Its modern resurrection roughly occurred during the Soviet period, and most pointedly during the decade following the Chinese Communist revolution when the Sino-Soviet alliance was in place and a degree of ideological agreement concurred. The modern configuration of Russia, China, Iran, and the other States of Asia owes much to precipitation out of Mongol conquest.

* Japan was attacked but not conquered.

Is there an “Asiatic State”?

If the Mongol State had been the last gasp of nomadic incursions from the Eurasian heartland into the periphery, we could dismiss it as a one-off historical phenomenon made irrelevant by subsequent events. In preceding chapters I have delineated the progressive improvement of a people, led by a man driven by a robust Will-to-Power. Conscious of their subordination to nature and to their neighbors, a band of warrior brothers defeated opposition, absorbed, eliminated or enslaved the remainder and went on to expand over much of two continents. As with numerous empires, when it stopped expanding, its Subjects enjoyed a period of peace and prosperity followed by inevitable decline. The Mongol legacy was prominent in breaking down old boundaries and inspiring claimants to expand further. The Moghul empire over India was founded by Babur, an Afghan descendant of Genghis Khan. Timur the Lame, or Tamerlane, claimed kinship with Genghis Khan, and reclaimed some of his lands from his Samarkand capital. The Seljuk Turks also emerged from the Asiatic heartland to conquer a swath including Turkey, Iran, Syria and Turkestan. The impact of the Mongol conquests were two-fold:

1. Integrative: the Mongol juggernaut grew with success, recruiting multi-ethnic troops into the army, neutralizing old tribal loyalties and redirecting them to their respective hordes.
2. Stimulated counter-forces: As a foreign overlay on former loose empires and States, Mongol rule was resented, then overtly resisted and overthrown when its original momentum had been exhausted. There was little restoration of old regimes, and in their place, more tightly organized

governments with greater attention to economic, administrative and military organization. The growing population and wealth of northern Russian princes and concentration of power in Muscovy saw the creation of the Russian State and its subsequent envelopment of northern Asiatica to the Pacific Ocean. Chinese consolidation of historical fragments into a unitary State occurred under the Yuan, and held through the Ming and Qing dynasties.

With growing emphasis on sea power and maritime trade, inner Asia lost its importance as Western European explorers, traders, missionaries and gunboats seized territories on a global scale. However, the Mongol phenomenon left its mark, and may have re-emerged in the twentieth century in those countries where Communist revolution and conquest prevailed to produce a new type of Asiatic State having these characteristics:

1. Unification of social and political fragments by victorious war.
2. Establishment of dictatorship under a dedicated group of military leaders.
3. Ruthless elimination of opposition upon taking power, or assimilation into inferior status after neutralization.
4. Perception of foreign powers as potentially or actually hostile.
5. Alliances and accomodation where possible with similar regimes able to provide assistance.

6. Initial period of economic compromise followed by extreme control, then retrenchment.
7. Periodic crises of succession.

Evaluating the Mongols

The Mongols coalesced in an environment of tribes, States and empires far wealthier and more powerful than they. The Mongol empire began with survival of Temüjin in a life of repeated peril. Each near-death experience was not a mere event, but a profound lesson in the fragility of life and the necessity of preserving it. Faced with the prospect of imminent EOL, a powerful Will-to-Life marshalled his every physical and mental resource. Overcoming threats and dangers, his circle of loyal kin, friends and allies expanded, with deepening mutual dependence. His passage from natural SB₁ to life-community SB₂ increased his life security reserves as well as generated new rivals and enemies. His generosity, loyalty to comrades and astute strategies, plus decisive execution of foes, strengthened the bonds of collective action, so that war became a higher form of the tribal hunt - coordinated by a center with each man knowing his role.

Genghis Khan's ascent from natural man through person in life-community to sovereign ruler in his lifetime laid the foundation for a potential Mongol civil society with promulgation of the Yasa code and encouragement of trade. Cities were not their natural habitat and were either destroyed or became vassals of the Khan. He weakened and diluted, yet preserved, clans and tribes by mixing army units. He ruthlessly suppressed secession or rebellion or betrayal. Alliances by marriage were concluded and a Mongol nation appeared in history. But as long as its essence remained

nomadic, pastoral, and warrior-led, transformation into full civil society could not be accomplished. Khubilai Khan's conquest of China stimulated important modifications of its ancient civil society, but these were not evenly applied to the remainder of the Mongol empire.

Much death and destruction had accomplished his victory but an identifiable Chinese civil society survived – formed from a sequence of powerful dynastic States, efficient agriculture, relatively meritocratic bureaucracy, common culture and language, weakened aristocracy, coordinated communication between capital and regional cities, and an imperial Son of Heaven as absolute sovereign. Instead of installing himself purely as a Mongol Khan over a conquered people, Khubilai established a new Chinese dynasty – the Yuan. As emperor of China he adapted to his realm's culture and forms, although dispensing with the official examinations. Other policies made Chinese society more open to social mobility while financial reforms restored trade – and massive corruption. His heir learned Chinese and was educated according to Chinese Confucian principles, with the victorious Mongol State assimilating into its conquest. Khubilai Khan continued his father's and grandfather's policy of conquest by launching attacks on Korea whose rulers eventually succumbed. From there and China he launched two naval attacks on Japan but these were repulsed by storms and samurai defenses. He carried war into Burma, Vietnam and Java, and met with partial success but not permanent dominance. Three generations later, the Yuan dynasty was overthrown and the Ming dynasty established.

The Anthrocentric Security Theory perspective

Specific historical circumstances influenced, but did not determine, formation of the Mongol State. AST shifts focus to the men who created the empire, using the ascent of Genghis Khan to illustrate human progress in protecting life. The elements and motivations in AST describe humanity's successful quest for greater longevity, from state of nature to modern civil society. Through individual reason, exploitation and domination of nature, accumulation of knowledge and invention, man generated new levels of existence (SAP) which he discovered and further refined. These enabled humanity to initiate a wider range of SAMs to prolong life and postpone death on a planet once hostile to any living thing.

AST postulates that men have mortal souls fused with individual bodies.* From beginnings as deviation from animal life, he has constructed a sequence of levels of existence for the sake of sustaining the mortal soul/body. These innovations proved more vital than material inventions, and constructed or discovered SAPs which initiate security actions to PLPD. As Strata-of-Being inhere to mankind's evolutionary record, so does a belief in Free Will appear to have emerged as individual existence became more secure and temporarily detached from nature's tyranny. The invention of institutions has bestowed greater choices of action but has also required more restraint and limitation on pure and immediate instinct or emotion. Security actions are motivated by reason, habit,

* "...the body is a foundation of the conscious mind." Antonio Damasio, *Self Comes to Mind*, quoted in Anil Ananthaswamy, *The Man Who Wasn't There: Tales from the Edge of the Self* (New York: Dutton, 2015), 137.

memories, capabilities, and calculus of benefits v. costs. Civilization has imposed structural and normative restraints on the free exercise of various Wills, but civil society has simultaneously offered a relatively satisfactory fulfillment of mortal Wills – namely improved longevity.

Can AST be used as a framework to understand modern civil society? Every human life is an experiment – a fact disguised by statistical and conceptual homogenized categories. It is an experiment which always fails. The biological life of Genghis Khan was a failed experiment, but curiosity inquires into how it was prolonged. Identification of SBs, SAPs and SAMs reveals the security inputs and outputs which sustained his existence despite numerous opportunities for early failure. Modern life in advanced societies is considerably less vulnerable but of limited duration nevertheless. Our present societies rest upon successful States and differ ontologically from life-communities where direct connections with state of nature were tangible and visible.

AST is reveals how human life is protected. Even more important is that it discloses how each layer of existence depends on the preceding one. AST demonstrates that the State, while responsible for massive wars and oppressions, is intimately connected to the primary human concern to live a long life. This is not to advocate a State-form which suffocates individual responsibility in the name of security, or which erases personhood from life-community. Rather there must be a refinement of a limited State which acknowledges and preserves constructions of the mortal soul.

Appendix One: On Security

Living things are by their very nature dynamic systems for sustaining themselves against the odds. Whether dogs, worms or amoebas, they continually struggle with what seems to be a single purpose: to just keep going. This striving to perpetuate is the essence of life.⁸⁰

Mortality must be seen as the physical fact which stimulates and inspires security actions. It constricts the intellect as compensation for the human deficit of instincts, inborn in animals, which produce near-automatic responses to threats and challenges. Augustine and Thomas Mann considered man's flaws as the "yeast of culture" - a sickness which thought and action seek to overcome. Landmann, 179.

National security and life security

In the US, national security and national defense have been used interchangeably. Security refers to a condition assuring that vulnerabilities have been reduced and minimized. Defense is a more active concept, consisting of measures to achieve protection. Since the Cold War, the notion of security has been broadened to include a wider range of activity beyond State military capabilities. The shift from emphasizing security of the State to security of human individuals can be found in the concept of human security.⁸¹ It addresses the "safety of individuals" and depends on civil society for generation and consumption of SAMs. But like narrower notions of national security or national defense, it remains State-centric. It focuses on improving lives for citizens of benighted societies, working through the international State system and State-sponsored NGOs. As an analytical tool, human security remains inadequate. It identifies and addresses areas where improvements are needed and possible, but State-centrism transforms it into a form of limited welfarism aiming at producing advanced democratic countries out of unpromising societies, and through the agency of international elites. Human security and the programs and policies

it produced were responses to challenges of an apparent new world order. Since World War Two, visions of global peace hatched the UN, numerous international agencies and programs, and cautious optimism that cooperation had its own momentum. By 1949 it became clear that the international Cold War and local hot wars had neutralized or negated envisioned harmony. The post-Cold War period generated optimism that military confrontation belonged to the past and that advanced nations should get on with spreading the benefits of democracy, freer trade, science and technology. This sunny expectation has been clouded by democratic slippage, failing States, Islamist terrorism and episodic economic stagnation. In this setting the promises of human security have not been forthcoming. NGO-advocated programs of human security have been a form of benevolent globalization which does not always correspond to general public expectations.

The public, overall, is concerned with physical security but also with societal security, which involves the sustainability—within acceptable conditions for evolution—of existing patterns of language, culture, association, religion and national identity. For many elites, these concerns are secondary to participating in the global economy, supporting international trade and migration, strengthening international institutions, promoting American values abroad, and encouraging minority identities and cultures at home. The central distinction between the public and elites is not isolationism versus internationalism, but nationalism versus cosmopolitanism.⁸²

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and evaporation of the Cold War, there emerged the prospect of a new international order which would shift emphasis from military machines of sovereign nation-States to communities and individuals. The UNDP formulated a concept of human security which addressed the needs of individuals and enumerated seven categories of security where action was needed: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political security. UNDP human security provided a roadmap for development, but

also sought to redirect the State to more benevolent tasks and to encourage an international welfare apparatus to improve the condition of those living in the Third World. In formulating human security, the UNDP assigned a key role to “civil society”, expressed as NGOs whose links to the State were indirect. There would be no dismantling of the sovereign State, but a redirection of its energy and resources. This last task has been central in the human security enterprise, introduced as part reformulation of the security concept and part moral mandate to States and international organizations to shift policy efforts from military to personal security. The defect of this approach has been that it largely relies on existent States, their agencies, and semi-governmental actors to engage in peaceful development of human welfare. Civil society* has the responsibility to undertake human security improvement, and although conceptually distinct from the State, it remains a creation under auspices of States and their governments, dependent on laws, protections and resources.

Distinctions between human security and human *life* security

In contrast to human security, life security designates fundamental and objective conditions of life and death for human organisms, and has applicability to society and State insofar as they contribute to human longevity. The universal quest for life security can be analyzed by identification of factors affecting life-length and specification of existential actions. The UNDP approach to human security is State-centric in that actions, policies and sentiments rely

* "Civil society", as defined in the human security approach, refers to the advanced nation-States or the sectors and governing elites of the less advanced which have adapted the values of democratic industrial States. Anthrocentric Security Theory reference to civil society is existential – as Stratum-of-Being (SB₄).

upon governments and their respective civil society superstructures for planning and implementation. The advocates and goals of human security seek to bestow benefits of modernity on societies left behind or suffering from war and poverty. Modern State security and UNDP's human security perceive people in their aggregate identity and socio-economic category, and differ in that one promotes security as a military quality and the other attempts to minimize coercive components in favor of positive developmental processes. The concept of human security encompasses "safety of individuals" and generally promotes what States and their agencies can do for groups, resembling a form of international welfarism with transfers of wealth and democratic values to poorer nations.

Life security, in contrast, begins with the living individual, exploring how humans have survived and constructed social and political institutions to reinforce survival.* Human security is mega-policy aiming at improvement of the human condition. Life security, the subject of AST, begins with acknowledgement of individual mortality, is validated by historical experience, motivates the calculated interests of the living, and is confirmed by the subjective reflection common to all men. Human security requires State and civil society as platforms for action; life security proceeds from the factuality of existence and each individual's innate desire to preserve it from termination. Human security addresses improvement of aggregate conditions which can improve life-chances, and shifts emphasis from military security to a value to be pursued among and on behalf of developing nations.

* "Institutions consist of value-motivating actions. The Sophists claimed that cultural institutions are not natural but are the product of human convention." Landmann, 48.

The anthrocentric perspective on life and its security differs from the human security approach in that it asserts an active and decisive role for individuals and more importance for pre-State society, with proportionally less for the State and therefore a lesser role for civil society. This is particularly valid in those societies where State infrastructure has not developed the complexity and efficacy to OECD levels. Where that gap exists, individuals, aided by social groups, struggle harder to survive, and average longevity remains lower. Foreshortened lifetimes reduce fulfillment of life choices, life promises, and individual potential. As well, they suffer attendant poverty, ill-health and knowledge deficits which not only reduce life expectancy, but narrow the range of possibilities within any life. As international migrations accelerate under globalization, these external deficits are becoming domestic challenges for the developed world.

Why Anthrocentric Security Theory?

AST is a deeper and alternative exploration of individual security from the standpoint of knowledge, environment, transactional economics, motivation and the efficacy of actions. It proceeds by identifying the pre-State array of security inputs which enabled survival of humans, and tracing how those became the basis of civil society after establishment of the sovereign State. In this way, AST might supplement human security programs and concepts by rediscovering resources which are available when the State is weak or not present – a useful antidote in an age when the State is proffered as foremost solution to human fallibility and vulnerability. Identification of SAPs and SAMs is facilitated by analyzing how a single historical figure, Genghis Khan, was able to survive and flourish in his hostile environment. His life-story summarized

humanity's long pilgrimage from natural condition to sovereign State, but in the case of the Mongols, stopping short of establishing a stable civil society.

On State appropriation of "security"

State is a term referring to US and some Latin American sub-national administrative divisions, making discussion of "the State" as concept somewhat confusing. The designation of what other countries may term "provinces", has not been employed as subdivision usage as in Europe or Canada. Woodrow Wilson referred to State and government interchangeably, and he reflected that "Law is the will of the State concerning the civic conduct of those under its authority."⁸³ In attributing Will to the State, he was importing Hegelian doctrine as well as anthropomorphizing an abstract concept, in a way not so distant from treatment of corporations as persons under the US constitution's Fourteenth Amendment (1868). Modern political trends have championed enlargement of government's role in human affairs, created and expanded departments, agencies, commissions, boards, ministries, bureaus, police forces, militias and armies to defend it as if it were the wilful living thing implied by Wilson. The term "security" had been historically applied to living persons, but was appropriated by governments as they claimed corporate personhood. When governments demanded the same degree of security as actual persons, a line was crossed and the modern State was born.

Verbal gymnastics

Since World War One, "government" became a replacement for "State" in US parlance. Elsewhere, "State security" has become a valued goal to justify government penetration into society and

individual life. Other substitutions for “State” have been devised. Deferring to possible American suspicion of using the authoritarian-like term “State security”, the “Department of Homeland Security” was established to prevent persons who might damage normal tranquility. In the social sciences, “political system” was substituted for “State,” although progressive Woodrow Wilson had placed the term at the center of his seminal work. The meaning of security has been applied beyond its original connotation of a personal sense of safety, i.e. calmness where present fears of EOL, injury, hunger or other major pains and discomforts were exiled beyond everyday consciousness. In the twentieth century, the word was stretched to apply to organizations and ultimately has been adapted as a goal of the State. “Home security” and “national security” are among common expressions where the notion has transcended the personally subjective and has migrated to abstraction. The subjectivity of its traditional meaning could be summed up as “I feel secure, therefore I am probably secure.”* Since the State is not a tangible entity, the modern illusion of its omnipresence is enhanced by agents claiming to have powers invented and deployed by a designated sovereign power. In this perspective, security, like wealth, trickles down to individuals from an unseen hand (State or market) to be passively accepted.

The modern meanings of security have changed according to perceptions of threats. “National security” has been described as a “marvelously elastic term that has been stretched at times to cover a multitude of different issues and activities.”⁸⁴ The same authors

* As the term conveyed cognition of organic integrity, it reinforced a notion of selfhood requiring protections for singular existence.

point out “that the term does not just mean protection from physical harm, but also implies protection, through a variety of means, of vital economic and political interests, the loss of which could threaten the fundamental values and vitality of the State.” Its elasticity allows stretching to the extent that its original and personal meaning becomes nearly invisible. National security policies adapt to new challenges and crises, and therefore our concepts of security, defense and protection have changed accordingly. But if “security” is so malleable that it is defined by current common circumstance, then its definition must be written in light pencil, not ink, to be periodically erasable. In detaching “security” from its original meaning and its connection with individual existence, governments minimize its essential link to perceptions of mortality. Most of humankind has daily sought security as both feeling and reality, though living in near-permanent insecurity. Life security is humanity’s fundamental value, for nothing else human is possible when absent. As in many other polities, the Mongol State was constructed in the quest for realizing this indivisible and ultimately ephemeral value.

Nations, empires* and States appear and disappear in the past three millennia, but long before that, the world has been habitation of humans as living and dying organisms. Nations and governments were formed and supported to protect lives and property of sovereigns, Subjects and citizens. Defining security in terms of protecting human lives (the essence of AST) rather than defense of transitory organizations has greater possibility of broad historical

* The first empire. the Akkadian Empire of Sargon, appeared about 4250 years ago.

application. The post-Cold War concept of “human security” is a good start, but is burdened with Statist and welfarist assumptions. My term “human life security” or “anthrocentric security” more precisely coincides with man’s persistent objective to protect his physical existence in all historical circumstances,* not just the contemporary array of States and societies.

Defining human life security as PLPD; postponing EOL;

The notion of national security is continuously in flux and is applicable to a tenuous entity, so its utility as analytical tool is limited despite its policy ubiquity. If we apply and restrict “security” to individual life, exclusive State relevance is diminished where aggregates of human and material resources, perceived threats to institutions and well-being of Subjects/citizens are primary. By turning from a Statist and time-bound, contingent notion of security back to its original and fundamentally human connotation, discussion can apply to an existential realm – not answering “the meaning of life” question but rather addressing “how is life possible?” and “how can it be extended?” Pragmatically limiting association of security to life preservation reveals its elemental character – security consists of actions whose purpose and effects are to protect and singly preserve individual lives. Security in its core empirical meaning refers to measures which postpone EOL – the defining life event which occurs uniquely, naturally, mostly unwelcomed or unwilled, and often inflicted by another or others -

* Hegel and Marx saw man as a product of history, and prophesied his future. Schopenhauer and Nietzsche were alien to historical thinking. Soviet heirs to the former school placed Genghis Khan in their historical framework, and so labelled him as a feudalist. AST considers his life to be representative of common human limitations and desires, and as an example of a unique security action vortex where numerous life risks paid imperial dividends in which feudal factors were incidental.

but always inevitable. A feeling of security is the belief that all or most safeguards to one's life are in order. Objective security is less complacent and considers unseen and unfelt threats, and may suggest actions to protect against endangerment. Specifically, life security consists of all actions whose purpose is to prolong individual existence – a fundamentally physical phenomenon attended by three primary Wills. Security is both a condition and a goal. The formulation of life security as PLPD summarizes its core element, returns the concept to its essential focus on individuals, and establishes that security and individual life are inseparable.

AST is based on recognition that self-love is embedded in human nature. This love of self is neither narcissism nor solipsism, but a posture of embracing one's existence as highest good.* Individuals plan and execute actions based on desire to prolong life, improve it where possible, resist any attempt to terminate it, and cooperate with other individuals for the purpose of preserving existence. Love of self motivates actions which prolong human life, and are described by AST as security inputs or outputs, depending on whether the (self-loved) individual is recipient or a source or both. Self-love is a passive emotion, fused with Schopenhauer's "will-to-live" to be made active. This love turned inward demands constant reassurance of undying attention, which may cause persistent *angst* over possible loss. Such anxiety triggers the senses and reason to devise strategies and discover sources of life-sustaining inputs from human association and material environment.

* "...all men have a tendency to revere only themselves and their own kind and conversely to look down upon strangers. At the heart of human nature is narcissistic self-love." Landmann, 30.

The expansion of “security” from mental property of living persons to the *raison d’etre* of organizations has stretched and distorted its original meaning from protection of individual life to coercive actions to defend a State. States were first conjured as expressions of laws and their enforcement, as shorthand for supremacy of a sovereign government, and as collective entities to defend inhabitants of prescribed territory. After implying protection of life and property through laws, offering some freedom from unrelenting and permanent necessity, a few men transformed the multiple acceptance of those promises into a form of power veiled in State myth. Security has been appropriated by States whose reality consists of rulers who control and deploy ideological, legislative and coercive instruments for their own protection with trickle-down benefits for their Subjects. At best, it consists of enlarging life-length and postponing EOL. The “pursuit of happiness,” in this perspective, is an expression of personal security in that existential *angst* is disguised or papered over by the quest for an ephemeral condition of pleasure.

Ontology of security

The three strata of existence prior to civil society are sequential and ontologically distinct, with the natural human individual most real and accessible to sensory and mental detection by the mortal soul/body.* Life-community (SB₂) lacks the same factual reality and

* A human body is the natural environment of mind and Will, a combination I have termed herein as mortal soul/body. The mind perceives through the eye and other senses, then considers the relevance to physical survival of what is perceived. Instinct, experiential memory, critical evaluation, belief and expectation play their part in responding to environmental opportunities and crises. A SAM is a transaction involving the capabilities of Will, body, and available material and human or animal resources. The primary criterion of any security action is its contribution to protection of the mortal body and more distantly, happiness of the mortal soul.

is known more by SAM output and less by sensible perception. Of the three Strata-of-Being, the least “real” is the State (SB₃) which only has existence as an idea inculcated in the mind and values of post-primitive man. It is humanity’s most ambitious construction of the imagination, claiming precedence over individuals and life-community as the foremost mechanism to create and dispense life security resources. Where successful, it derived efficacy from conforming to the life security arrangements prevalent in the life-community where it was constructed. Those States with declining life security tended to be where rulers sought to bend life-community to a transcendent plan of justice or power or progress. These would include the Qin empire of ancient China, the USSR, the People’s Republic of China under Mao Zedong, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea). These States sought to diminish or extinguish elements of life-community which competed with absolute sovereignty. For the Qin, the old aristocracy and ruling families were broken up and dispersed. Under twentieth century Communism, industrialists, dissenters and rich/middle peasants were foremost targets – not merely because of status or economic class, but chiefly as persons who had been vital to the functioning of an old order which had delivered economic security to associated and subordinate persons in society.

Human life security and negative freedom

Life security is a process consisting of actions manifested in the totality of habits, knowledge, technology and institutions which protect and preserve the biological existence of human life. It protects and perfects collective peace and prosperity to enhance human freedom. Ideal security is freedom from risk or danger. Safety is a form of preventive security, and its practice is related to

the freedom which allows humanity to rise above barest necessity. Compared to primitive man, we who enjoy the luxury of civil society are far freer from scarcity, dangers of nature, disease, predatory animals, and insects.* Only with this negative freedom can we have positive freedom – to pursue self-satisfying ambitions, preferences and goals.†

Subjective and objective human life security

Trying to salvage an old word by shedding its acquired penumbral meanings can be quixotic, yet brings some clarity. Genuine security can only be applied to real things. Ontologically, life-communities, States and civil societies are imagined and organizational ideas. Strictly speaking, this leaves us with only existent humans and those things accessible to human senses as worth investing limited resources. Is a border drawn by representatives of two countries real? It is an imaginary line acknowledged by two or more States' representatives agreeing on behalf of their respective governments as the limitation of their respective spheres of action and jurisdiction of laws. It is generally made "real" by fences, markers, custom houses and border guards. Individuals who violate the imaginary line are subject to punishment and deportation, so we can say that while the line is

* This freedom enables us to rise above Subject-status to become empowered citizens as we distance our existence from the oppressive physical concerns of survival, and attend to what has become a a Stratum-of-Being oriented to symbol manipulation.

† "One may recall Aristotle who taught that originally, as long as man still had to fight hard with nature, because the most elementary cultural institutions such as agriculture, house construction, etc., still had not been invented, the mind had stood completely at the service of practical matters. Only when life became easier as a result of those inventions and men found leisure could the mind turn also to unnecessary occupations such as philosophy and science." Landmann, 130.

symbolic and made-up, it is sufficiently manifested in real things and actions to trigger SAMs protecting Subjects/citizens and penalizing trespassers.

“Security” comes from Latin *securitas*, from *securus* “free from care” and in mid-15th century meant “condition of being secure,” specified it as the condition of living.* Not until 1941 was the word applied collectively as “safety of a state, person, etc.” in England, though a few years earlier in the US. This etymological application of a word describing the condition or state of mind of an individual about self or a tangible possession, to an abstract idea is not uncommon in linguistic evolution. “Security” has been expanded and still retains its original meaning. Four statements use the term in the same sense, but with different meanings:

- (1) “I feel secure;”
- (2) “he is secure;”
- (3) “the nation is secure”.
- (4) “the nation feels secure.

The first is a subjective statement, and “I” could be wrong about objective conditions of “my” safety. The second is an objective judgment, even though he may not feel secure. The third is an objective judgment applied to an abstract notion (“nation”).

* On the usage and etymological evolution of security: meaning "something which secures" is from 1580s; "safety of a state, person, etc." is from 1941. Legal sense of "property in bonds" is from mid-15c.; that of "document held by a creditor" is from 1680s. http://etymonline.com/index.php?allowed_in_frame=0&search=security

Statement number four is meaningless except as metaphor, since an abstract entity has no capacity for feeling.

Which usage is valid – or most valid as a predictor of life-length outcomes? Perhaps it is the usage of objective (2) “secure”, which can be empirically verified by seeing the individual alive, mobile and conscious, for he has enough faculty to “secure” his own safety in ordinary circumstances. Statement (1) may be true as reflection of feeling, but does not necessarily conform to objective reality. Moreover, a subjective sense of security will never have long-term constancy, since humans are always reminded of vulnerability to harm and EOL when crisis appears.* So the first expression may be true some, but not all, of the time. Expression (3) is less true and cannot be verified. “Nation” is an idea that a majority of a given population have enough in common to comprise a unity. To improve the validity of adjudging a nation secure would require a method of evaluating the objective life security of each member of that “nation” and aggregating that data into a momentary, not permanent, evaluation. An impossible task so approximations are devised based on various statistical measures, such as per capita income, incidence of violent crime, etc. Statement (4) could possibly have passing substance if a valid national opinion poll demonstrated that more people felt secure than not.

Subjectivity is a major component of security. To feel secure, a post-primitive individual must believe his circumstances are conducive to PLPD. This feeling of security may also be a

* Buddha, raised in comfort and ease, one day confronted illness and death and was shocked by the realization that man suffers and is not immortal.

manifestation of false consciousness, a belief that life protections are more efficacious than they really are. While an objective observer's estimation of another's life security will be more accurate than the subject's, the feeling of security should not be dismissed. A person who believes he is secure may be more generous in launching ancillary SAMs than one who feels highly vulnerable to negative SAMs, suggesting that security is self-reinforcing. Members in a group having high positive judgments of personal security are more likely to generate positive SAMs than a group characterized by lower subjective security. Winning consolidates secure feelings, losing, the opposite.

Is a feeling of security valid as a measure of an individual's security? Feelings and perceptions can be notoriously distant from action and reality, but nevertheless vital in forming motivation. Certain objective conditions of the individual must be determined – what are the potent protections contributing to an individual's safety? Secondly, what are the actual and potential threats to security, and are the existing protections adequate to prolong one's existence? Third, even ideal conditions inevitably change, and a security-dependent pursuit of happiness demands unflagging attention. Lastly, continued nourishment of security feelings needs active refueling, for it is not an embedded quality like color or physical mass. The feeling of life security affects happiness. Without physical security and an individual's recognition of this condition, he cannot experience happiness in the sense of sensual pleasure and intellectual harmony. Much incremental pleasure produces false happiness and fertilizes a delusion of well-being. Neither true happiness nor counterfeit euphoria is possible without felt and actual life security.

The political economy of a State is another beneficiary of adequate security. States and empires, not tribes of families, issue currency and rely on order and trust to make money an acceptable medium of exchange within their borders. Capitalism, perhaps the greatest creator of wealth in history, could not have emerged without the State umbrella of security. Barter markets have flourished long before emergence of higher forms of organization, but remained local until States extended jurisdiction and coinage to disparate regions of their realms. It has long been in the State's interest to encourage wealth generation in order to provide the taxes and resources for its aggrandizement and defense.

Conclusion

Without objective life security, extended life becomes more precarious. It is restricted to living human beings, because it is a condition whose absence precludes much possibility of happiness, health, mobility and agency. Understanding the human condition begins with consideration of autonomous individuals* seeking life security and consolidating his protection by cooperation with like-minded individuals. Each living person enjoys life security, and when that is exhausted or removed, the person and his life are no more –vanishing into nothingness or hopefully into blissful afterlife.† A corollary is that total security failure is simultaneous with EOL. Recognition and cultivation of life security inputs can expand longevity of individuals. The important course of human

* "The human trait of being completed by a culture neutralizes that of autonomous self-completion and lets it shine through only dimly." Landmann, 229.

† "Man must learn to cease hoping futilely for his wishes to be fulfilled in the beyond, and must realize them by his own actions in this world." Landmann, 89.

evolution was not passive biological adaptation but wilful security-seeking.

Concept clarification is the first step to understanding human existence. One can devote a lifetime to grappling with actual Being and its philosophical nuances, as Martin Heidegger did. But without considering man's bedrock anxiety over his termination and the resultant actions to postpone individual doom, some hard realities may be overlooked. "Security" has been adapted to be an organizational quality at the expense of human individuals who need it most. By reviving its traditional meaning and considering how mankind has sought its improvement throws a different light on morals and institutions. I hope that Anthrocentric Security Theory can provide this perspective

Appendix Two: Quantifying Anthrocentric Security Theory

The inborn drive to maintain existence of the mortal soul/body affects development of self. A proclivity to cooperate in the struggle for self-protection gave birth to life-community (SB₂) – the intermediate stage when man acquired ability to reason with symbols and act from ideas, while creating the State. Each Stratum-of-Being brought about a cluster of security platforms to initiate outputs and inputs (SAMs). Because mortality and random misfortune are intrinsic to the human condition, no life will ever be completely securitized. However, mortality risk has been reduced through addition and refinement of security inputs, with the greatest and most widespread life-length achieved in modern civil society.

Quantification of AST Formulas

An omniscient scientist/engineer of human life could assign numerical values to security actions affecting every humlear. In the following table, a hypothetical scientist/engineer postulates equal impact of security actions during a random humlear. Our individual/person/Subject is named Mr. X and his subscript ($N, L, \text{ or } s$) indicates the Stratum-of-Being he occupies. We start with Mr. X_N who exists in a state of nature, and so his life security (excluding random events) is:

$$\mathbf{LS}_N = W_N + F_N + K_N + E_N^*$$

A perfect operation of available Security Action Monads at the state of nature Stratum-of-Being would have equal values as follows:

Security Action Platform (SAP)	% Value of SAP	Numerical value
01. Will to Live [W_N]	25%	0.25
02. Family [F_N]	25%	0.25
03. Practical Knowledge [K_N]	25%	0.25
04. Natural Environment [E_N]	25%	0.25
Totals	100%	1.00

Table A: Ideal humlear of state of nature individual Mr. X_N

Demonstrating life security for a humlear

This matrix (Table A) stipulates average life security for Mr. X_N for one year, when all four SAP are providing maximum efficacy.[†] Table B represents a more realistic profile of a year in the life of Mr. X_N under state of nature conditions. For the sake of illustration, only Mr. X_N 's Will-to-Life underwent radical change during the year, and raised his mortality risk for that humlear. Perhaps hunting prey were fewer, he was injured, family deaths occurred, and companions deserted, resulting in diminished life security. In any given humlear, the greatest threat to mortal soul/body is that

* See Chapter 2.

[†] In the real world, this is never the case, with SAPs providing SAMs unequally and negative SAMs reducing maximums.

moment when the sum of SAP values is lowest. That moment is when mortality risk is highest.

SAP -Security Action Platform	Minimum life Security during sample humlear	Maximum life security during sample humlear
01. Will to Live[Wi]	0.3	0.4
02. Family [Fi]	0.1	0.2
03. Practical Knowledge [Ki]	0.1	0.1
04. Natural Environment [Ei]	0.1	0.2
Totals	0.6	0.9

Table B: Hypothetical sample of one humlear for Mr. X_s

In Table B, Mr. X_N as natural individual experienced a humlear during which his life protection diminished by 0.3, making him more vulnerable to EOL due to his subjective reduction of Will-to-Life which responded to abridged life supports. By constructing life-community and a State, a multitude of Mr., Mrs. and Miss X 's increase the variety of SAPs supporting their individual lives, and make possible the number of humlears which measure their mortal soul/bodies residence on earth. Life-community and State formation also reduce sole dependence on individual efforts. Table C represents an equal distribution of security contributions by natural individual, life-community, and State to life security. An expanded number of SAP, from four/ five to fifteen when the State is present, significantly increases life chances for Subjects, and diminishes the importance the first four SAP from 0.25 to 0.07. This dilution of $[W_N]$, $[F_N]$, $[K_N]$, and $[E_N]$ as longevity determinants also devalues their contributions to life-community and State institutions. Physical courage, for example, is highly important for survival in unpopulated wilderness, but less so among human populations. It

will be celebrated by groups and States because it becomes more uncommon and less necessary where others take up slack.

Security Action Platform	% Value of SAP	Numerical value
01. Will to Live [W _N]	6.67%	0.07
02. Family [F _N]	6.67%	0.07
03. Knowledge [K _N]	6.67%	0.07
04. Natural Environment [E _N]	6.67%	0.07
05. Freedom [F _L]	6.67%	0.07
06. Cultural & social knowledge [K _L]	6.67%	0.07
07. Social obligation/loyalty [O _L]	6.67%	0.07
08. Social economy [E _L]	6.67%	0.07
09. Social concord variable [C _L]	6.67%	0.07
10. Political Obligation [O _S]	6.67%	0.07
11. Political Economy [E _S]	6.67%	0.07
12. Political knowledge [K _S]	6.67%	0.07
13. Coercive institutions [M _S]	6.67%	0.07
14. Political concord coefficient [C _S]	6.67%	0.07
15. External relations [E _S]	6.67%	0.07
TOTAL	100.00% (rounded)	1.00 (rounded)

Table C: Contribution of all SAP to perfect life security, one humlear, benefiting Mr. X_s, postulating equal potency.

Perfect equality of the 15 SAPs represents a humlear of immortality. In our world, and at any moment or hour during a humlear, one or several SAPs will take precedence as critical in life protection. A drowning Mr. X_N's Will-to-Life [W_N] and Practical Knowledge [K_N] of swimming will be of greater utility than anything society or state can offer.* As an arithmetic experiment, Table D offers a ranking of SAPs, and a diminishing percentage value proportionate to a SAP's hierarchical position in the inventory.

* However, a State-provided life preserver or lifeguard, would be welcomed.

A total of fifteen SAP are listed, and the sum of the integers (1+2+3...15) equals 120. The integer in column 2 is divided by 120 to give % value of SAP and its derived numerical value. These four Tables demonstrate that life security does not consist of constants and has dynamic requirements varying over time and circumstance. Severe failure of one or several SAPs risks EOL during that humlear. The dynamic mix of SAPs (Column 3) will vary over time, and Numerical Values (Column 4) will be increased or diminished according to circumstances.

SAP	Rank, in relative importance	% Value of SAP	Numerical value = Life Security contribution at perfect maximum	Hypothetical Subject (Randomly assigned values), less-than-perfect life security.
01. Will to Live[Wi]	1	13%	0.1250	0.1038
02. Family [Fi]	2	12%	0.1167	0.0968
03. Knowledge [Ki]	3	11%	0.1083	0.0899
04. Natural Environment [Ei]	4	10%	0.1000	0.0830
05. Freedom [Fo]	5	9%	0.0917	0.0761
06. Cultural & social knowledge [Ko]	6	8%	0.0833	0.0692
07. Social obligation/loyalty [Oo]	7	8%	0.0750	0.0623
08. Social economy [Eo]	8	7%	0.0667	0.0553
09. Social concord variable [Co]	9	6%	0.0583	0.0484
10. Political Obligation [Os]	10	5%	0.0500	0.0415
11. Political Economy [Es]	11	4%	0.0417	0.0346
12. Political knowledge [Ks]	12	3%	0.0333	0.0277
13. Coercive institutions[Ms]	13	3%	0.0250	0.0208
14. Political concord coefficient[Cs]	14	2%	0.0167	0.0138
15. External relations [Es]	15	1%	0.0083	0.0069
TOTAL	120	100%	1.0000	0.8300

Table D: Hierarchical ranking of SAP, for one hypothetical humlear of Mr. X_s as State Subject .

Measuring human life security and mortality risk

A life becomes more precarious as the sum of positive and negative security actions approaches zero, and terminates when mortality risk equals 100%. Mortality risk is defined as the reciprocal of life security score. For example, the mortality risk of hypothetical State Subject Mr. X_s, at the 39th year, 55th day, 21st hour

of his lifespan, having a life security score at time of .83 out of a possible 0.99, equals 16.2*% ($0.99-0.83=0.16/0.99=16.1616\%$). Human efforts at all levels have aimed at increasing individual life security score, which translates into lowered mortality risk. The highest mortality risk in a humlear, represents the nearest a natural individual comes to EOL – and he will more likely pass away at that point than when mortality risk is lower. A consistently high life security score equals low mortality risk and indicates probable increased life expectancy. The life security score at any moment is an instantaneous profile, equaling to zero at EOL.

Life-length is measured in humlears. The more positive SAMs occur and benefit a natural individual (Mr. X_N), the greater the likelihood of longer life-length. When a mortal soul/body encounters EOL, roles of person and Subject also expire. Security equilibrium consists of each human “consuming” a humlear’s worth of security inputs, and producing one humlear of security outputs, where “humlear” represents a surplus of life-reinforcing positive SAMs over life-negating negative SAMs. One humlear, as existence duration of one mortal soul/body, testifies to the success of life security for that person. This stability of existence is disturbed by two usual developments. An excess of consumption over production of SAMs will affect collective decline of lifespan, and a surplus of positive security outputs over security inputs should produce more humlears – giving more people longer lifespans.

To recapitulate, life security score is inversely proportional to mortality risk, and is derived by estimating the sum of SAM

* Rounded, from 16.1616161616....%

contributions to a humlear. Life security score can be averaged over individual lifespan enabling estimation of factors which made a mortal soul/body's life secure or dangerous. Unlike the mathematics of calculus, where material movement and accelerations have measurable vectors, the sequential life security score fluctuations of instantaneous or humlear duration follow a minimally predictable path in the primary level of existence, and have increasing stability in organic society and state, reaching a maximum (below immortality) in civil society. As human culture has produced social and political institutions to complement Security Action Platforms, extreme fluctuations in life security have been modulated. Therefore, from the desire to maintain existence, the natural individual Mr. X_N gravitates and commits to membership and the benefits of higher levels to become Mr. X_L , then Mr. X_S . We can postulate the following hypotheses:

- Life-length is a major component of human evolution, and has been determined by individual human life security.
- The longer the lifespan of an individual, the greater the probability of average higher life security score over that lifetime.
- Humans have historically refined their competence to construct, deploy and improve life security unequally, with some individuals more adept and successful than others.
- An individual surviving more humlears has more opportunity to consume and produce SAMs.

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